Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05810/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05810-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICIA A. MCCOLM,

Plaintiff, No. C 02-5810 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS

SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING 

AUTHORITY, et al.

Defendants.

___________________________________/

On May 23, 2007, defendants’ motions for summary judgment and motions to

dismiss came on for hearing before the court. Defendants San Francisco Housing

Authority (“SFHA”), Joretha Abrahams, Ignacius Lenore, Roberto Lechuga, Naja Boyd, Jim

Williams, Michael Roetzer, and Greg Fortner, and specially appearing defendants Tony

Ucciferri and Beverly Marshall, appeared through their counsel, Colin H. Jewell, of

Walsworth, Franklin, Bevins & McCall, LLP. Defendants Paula Jones individually and d/b/a

A-1 Security ("A-1"), and Henry Johnson, appeared through their counsel, Guy W. Stilson,

of Low, Ball & Lynch. Pro se plaintiff, Patricia McColm, failed to file any opposition to the

motions, and also failed to appear at the hearing. Having read the papers filed in

conjunction with the motions and carefully considered the arguments and the relevant legal

authority, the court GRANTS defendants’ motions for summary judgment and motions to

dismiss for the reasons that follow.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

It has been nearly four and one-half years since McColm filed the complaint in this

case on December 12, 2002, and until the recent May 23, 2007 hearing, the court had

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heard no dispositive motions. Instead, what followed plaintiff's filing of this case, literally up

until the day before the hearing on the instant motions, has been numerous requests for

extensions of time, continuances, and stays by McColm. Rather than reiterate the lengthy

history of the requests and related rulings, which are set forth in this court’s recent May 8,

2007, and May 22, 2007 orders denying plaintiff’s last minute requests for stays, the court

will instead incorporate by reference those two orders. It bears mentioning, though, that

throughout the course of this case, the court has granted plaintiff no fewer than eighteen

accommodations, in addition to the numerous accommodations granted plaintiff by

defendants as well.

Although it will not set forth as comprehensive a history as that included in the

above-referenced orders, the court nevertheless sets forth such history as is necessary to

provide a context for the instant motions. It took nearly three and one-half years for

plaintiff to serve the defendants she has chosen to sue, and still, as of the date of this

order, several remain unserved. More than four years ago, on May 8, 2003, this court

issued an order to show cause why plaintiff’s claims should not be dismissed for failure to

serve the defendants. Plaintiff was ordered to file a responsive written declaration no later

than May 30, 2003. On June 2, 2003, the court granted plaintiff’s request for a sixty-day

extension of time to serve all defendants and discharged the prior OSC, based on plaintiff’s

medical condition. On August 13, 2003, the court again granted plaintiff a thirty-day

extension of time to serve all defendants, again based on plaintiff’s medical condition. The

court, however, advised plaintiff that was the final extension, and that any parties remaining

unserved would be dismissed in thirty days, which would have been September 12, 2003.

Meanwhile, on August 27, 2003, defendant SFHA filed a Rule 12(b) motion to

dismiss. Plaintiff then requested a six-month extension to respond to SFHA’s motion and

to take jurisdictional discovery, based on her limitations due to her disability and due to an

upcoming trial in state court. On September 17, 2003, the court denied plaintiff’s request

for discovery, but granted a two-month extension of the motion hearing date and related

deadlines, and set a December 10, 2003 hearing date on the SFHA’s motion to dismiss. In

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the meantime, on October 2, 2003, defendant A-1 and several individual defendants moved

to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b). 

Again, on November 7, 2003, plaintiff moved to continue the December 10, 2003

hearing date due to conflicts with other state court matters and with problems involving her

elderly father. The court denied McColm’s request to move the hearing date, but granted

her an extension of time to file her opposition brief. Subsequently, on November 19, 2003,

plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”), and on November 20, 2003, the court

denied all defendants’ motions to dismiss as moot, and ordered that they respond to

plaintiff’s FAC no later than December 22, 2003. Those defendants who had been served

at the time answered the FAC on December 12 and 19, 2003. 

However, as of December 2003, in part because service of all defendants had not

been accomplished (and still to this date has not), a case management conference was not

automatically scheduled as it normally would have been. While the court was waiting for

service on the remaining defendants, the case fell through the cracks and two years of

inactivity ensued.

When the inactivity came to the court’s attention, on January 5, 2006, the court

ordered the parties to file a joint statement regarding the status of the case. It took more

than three and one-half months, however, before the court was able to hold a case

management conference (“CMC”) due to plaintiff’s unavailability and numerous requests for

extensions based on her disabilities, her medical condition, and the health of family

members. At the April 21, 2006 CMC, the court set a number of deadlines and ordered the

opening of formal discovery. In light of plaintiff’s medical condition, the court afforded her

nearly three months - until July 20, 2006 - to respond to defendants’ discovery requests

which would normally be due under the federal rules within thirty days. Additionally, as it

appeared that some defendants had still not been served with either the original or

amended complaint, the court ordered that within 120 days, plaintiff must move for the

default of any defendants she believed were properly served but who had not appeared,

and further that any defendants remaining unserved would be dismissed, as well as any

non-responding defendants whose default had not been sought. Plaintiff requested the

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In the May 8, 2007 order, the court inadvertently overlooked the entry of a clerk’s

default against three tenants who had apparently been served but did not answer.

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default of several defendants, and her request was granted in part and declined in part by

the Clerk.1

 On September 6, 2006, several individual defendants, one whose default had

been declined and the other defendants whose default had not been sought, moved for

their dismissal. McColm filed no opposition and their motion was granted.

On April 6, 2007, in an order which set a consolidated briefing schedule and hearing

date on two separate summary judgment motions filed by defendants, the court sua sponte

continued a May 2, 2007 hearing date on defendants’ motions for summary judgment to

May 23, 2007 in order to afford plaintiff additional time to respond to both of the motions. 

Later that same day, the court received plaintiff’s April 5, 2007 letter requesting a stay of all

proceedings due to the fact that her father was hospitalized with a terminal medical

condition. In its April 9, 2007 order, the court granted in part and denied in part plaintiff’s

request. It noted that it was not unsympathetic to plaintiff’s situation, but that given the

numerous extensions, the imminent trial date of July 30, 2007, and the court’s need to

manage its docket, the accommodation could not be without limits. In light of plaintiff’s

request, it continued an April 25, 2007 hearing date on SFHA’s pending motion to dismiss

by nearly 30 days to May 23, 2007, to be heard at the same time as the motions for

summary judgment, and also continued the corresponding briefing schedule. The court,

however, warned both parties that no further continuances would or could be granted in

view of the court’s unavailability during most of the month of June 2007.

On May 2, 2007, plaintiff’s oppositions to defendants’ motions for summary

judgment and motion to dismiss the case were due pursuant to this court’s April 9, 2007

order. Plaintiff failed to oppose the motions, and instead at the last minute filed another

emergency request to stay the proceedings based on her father’s medical condition, family

crises, and her severe bronchitis, and also filed a motion to disqualify the magistrate judge

to whom discovery matters had been referred. Defendants opposed the motions, and on

May 8, 2007, this court denied plaintiff’s motions in the above-referenced nine-page order

that set forth the long history of extensions and continuances in this case. 

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In spite of the May 8, 2007 order, on May 21, 2007, plaintiff again filed another

motion to stay all proceedings, including the May 23, 2007 hearing on the instant motions,

which this court denied on May 22, 2007.

B. First Amended Complaint

1. Parties and Claims

McColm’s FAC names as defendants the SFHA and the San Francisco Housing

Commission (SFHC), along with eleven SFHA employees, including Joretha Abrahams,

Ignacius Lenore, Roberto Lechuga, Beverly Marshall, Naja Boyd, Jim Williams, Michael

Roetzer, Ronnie Davis, Greg Fortner, Valerie Stathem, and Tony Ucciferri (substituted in as

one of the Doe defendants). Of the eleven SFHA employees, seven have appeared in the

lawsuit and are represented by SFHA's attorneys in the pending motions: Joretha

Abrahams, Ignacius Lenore, Roberto Lechuga, Naja Boyd, Jim Williams, Michael Roetzer,

and Greg Fortner. SFHA moves to dismiss two of the other four additional defendants,

Beverly Marshall and Tony Ucciferri, under Rule 4(m). Another two of the named SFHA

individual defendants, Valerie Stathem and Ronnie Davis, appear to have never been

served, as there are no executed summonses in the court’s record. 

McColm also names as defendants Paula Jones individually and d/b/a A-1 Security,

and A-1 Security guards Henry Johnson, Patrick, and Reed. The court dismissed Patrick

and Reed under Rule 4(m) on November 30, 2006. 

McColm also names as defendants several SFHA tenants, including two Does

(Does 1-2), and tenants Gracie Smith, Mr. Smith, and David Gonzalez. The Clerk entered

default as to the latter three on August 25, 2006.

McColm also names Does 4-150.

In sum, the following defendants have appeared in the case: “SFHA defendants,”

which include SFHA, SFHC, Joretha Abrahams, Ignacius Lenore, Roberto Lechuga, Naja

Boyd, Jim Williams, Michael Roetzer, and Greg Fortner; and “A-1 defendants,” which

include Paula Jones individually and d/b/a A-1 Security, and former A-1 security guard,

Henry Johnson. In this order, the court refers collectively to both groups of defendants as

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“defendants.” “A-1" refers to all defendants in the A-1 group as set forth above, including

the individual defendants, and the same is the case for “SFHA,” unless otherwise specified.

McColm's FAC alleges ten clearly identified claims for relief, and in addition, another

ten state law tort claims that are lumped together under one heading entitled "actionable

torts under state law." The first ten claims include: (1) racial and disability discrimination,

interference, and harassment under the Fair Housing Act, as amended by the Fair Housing

Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 32 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, (2) discrimination based on

disability and retaliation for complaints of disability discrimination under the Americans with

Disabilities Act ("ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12203 et seq.; (3) violation of the Privacy Act of 1984

and California's Information Practices Act; (4) racial and disability discrimination and

retaliation for exercise of her First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) violation

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, section 504; (6) "violation of Code of Federal Regulation,

HUD" (no specific regulations cited); (7) breach of landlord's duty to warn under California

law; (8) violation of California's Unruh Act, §§ 51-52 et seq.; (9) "breach of contract and

covenant of good faith and fair dealing and occupancy policy"; and (10) negligent hiring,

training, and supervision of employees.

McColm’s “grab bag” of ten state law tort claims, include: (11) negligence and gross

negligence; (12) violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 for unfair and fraudulent

business practices; (13) fraud; (14) intentional and negligent emotional distress; (15)

invasion of privacy; (16) spoliation of evidence; (17) assault and battery; (18) property

damage; (19) violation of California Civil Code §§ 1950 et seq.; and (20) civil conspiracy. 

McColm seeks both damages and injunctive relief.

2. Description of FAC and Factual Allegations Therein

McColm has not alleged specific claims against specific defendants, but instead

attempts to sweep all defendants into all claims in the lawsuit. The first six pages of her

FAC describe the defendants. The following nineteen pages, which include paragraphs 29-

100, set forth the facts underlying the claims. The next five pages include the abovereferenced claims. For purposes of all of the claims, she incorporates by reference the

preceding paragraphs (100 paragraphs for the first claim, and up to 128 paragraphs by the

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time she gets to the “grab bag” of state law tort claims). However, McColm fails to specify

which facts are relevant to each of her twenty claims, and also fails to designate which

claims are being asserted against which defendants. This is in spite of the fact that not all

claims can be asserted against all defendants, e.g., tenants cannot be liable for some of

the claims asserted against the SFHA, nor can the private security service, A-1. 

Review of the FAC reveals that the case concerns alleged racial and disability

discrimination, harassment, and mistreatment McColm claims she suffered while living in

public housing through Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §

1437, at Sala Burton Manor ("Sala Burton") at 430 Turk Street in San Francisco, CA. 

McColm lived in this housing as an SFHA tenant from September 1999 to July 2002. 

During that time, McColm contends that the SFHA and its employees discriminated

against and harassed her based on her race and disabilities. She asserts that the majority

of Sala Burton’s residents and SFHA management and employees are African American,

and that because she’s white and disabled, she suffered verbal abuse, racial slurs, threats,

assaults, unlawful entry into her unit, theft, lack of ventilation, smoking and drug use, and

vandalism. She alleges that some of the mistreatment took place by SFHA employees,

and that as for the residents, SFHA failed to adequately address other tenants’

mistreatment even though she complained, and even encouraged residents to

“orchestrat[e] a campaign of defamatory representations and police reports.”

In terms of A-1, McColm alleges that the company and its employees entered into a

conspiracy with the SFHA and its employees to mistreat, harass, and discriminate against

her. The mistreatment allegedly consisted of “closing of windows,” banging on McColm’s

door, putting glue in her locks, unlawful entry, refusal to remove persons threatening her,

inflicting asthma, failing to maintain clean and sanitary premises, and failing to stop

nuisance and harassment of McColm by other tenants. She contends that SFHA

encouraged or solicited A-1 guards to falsify incident reports and police complaints about

her, including police reports. As for A-1 guard Johnson, McColm contends that he

harassed her with racially charged language “because she was white,” and then wrote a

false report accusing her of making racial slurs against him based on his African American

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race. McColm further contends that she asked Paula Jones personally and in writing to

control her employees’ conduct, but that Jones failed to do so, and instead allowed the

conduct to continue “with her blessing.”

As for the alleged racial discrimination and harassment, which seem to comprise the

majority of the FAC allegations, McColm alleges that the SFHA refused to provide her with

a wheelchair-accessible unit based on her race. She asserts in her FAC that she had

been waiting for a “disability unit” since the inception of her contract with SFHA, but that

SFHA gave African Americans preferential treatment in assigning such units. She also

alleges that SFHA employees instructed African American security guards not to take

complaints from her, but to instead “write her up” in an attempt to have her evicted. 

McColm alleges that whenever a report was written (but does not specify who was writing

the report, presumably A-1 or SFHA), it was slanted to misrepresent the “white victim’s”

view in favor of the African American perpetrator. She further contends that SFHA

employee, Beverly Marshall, constituted a “token white” employee, who carried out the

orders of her African American SFHA superiors to discriminate against white residents. 

McColm also contends that she complained about a number of problems at Sala

Burton, including poor ventilation, criminal activity, food odors, noise, and defective

elevators and entry doors, but that the SFHA failed to correct the conditions because she is

white, and even retaliated against her for complaining. 

McColm claims that as a result of the mistreatment, harassment, and discrimination

she suffered “extreme distress, fear, nightmares, cracked/sprained wrist, pain, asthma,

nausea, bites, lack of concentration and ability to function effectively, depression, physical

weakness, headaches, and general ill health and its related illnesses,” in addition to

property damage.

C. Status of Discovery

Because McColm has refused to comply with discovery obligations and because

she failed to oppose the instant motions, there is no evidence in support of her claims other

than the allegations contained in her FAC. In addition to the FAC, the only other very

limited information provided by plaintiff in the course of this lawsuit, which was submitted by

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McColm “advises herself” during the course of the deposition not to answer many of

the questions posed by defense counsel. 

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defendants in conjunction with the instant motions, were her responses to defendants’

interrogatories, and her deposition testimony. However, neither is illuminating since they

both consist almost entirely of objections by McColm to very basic questions.2

 For

example, several pages of McColm's deposition transcript consist of her objections to

defense counsel's question regarding her current address. Instead of simply answering the

question, which calls for basic background information, McColm objects to the question on

relevance grounds, and then attempts to advise defense counsel which questions he may

and may not ask regarding her address. See Deposition Transcripts at 40-45.

McColm has not complied with her discovery obligations with respect to either A-1 or

SFHA. Her initial responses to A-1 interrogatories, which provided absolutely no factual

information and consisted entirely of boilerplate objections, spawned a motion to compel,

which Magistrate Judge Spero granted, ordering McColm to give more full and complete

responses. McColm subsequently revised her responses, but those responses currently

included as an exhibit to A-1's motion papers, are only marginally better, and are still

replete with objections to requests for basic and relevant information. 

McColm’s responses to SFHA interrogatories are even worse than those with

respect to A-1, and contain nothing but boilerplate objections. See Jewell Decl., Exh. D.

Judge Spero previously granted SFHA’s motion to compel more full and complete answers,

which were originally due in April, and then in May pursuant to a subsequent extension

Judge Spero granted McColm, but, to date, McColm has not complied with the order

requiring further responses.

As a result, at the time of the hearing on the instant motions, defendants had seven

pending discovery-related motions, including motions to compel and for sanctions, before

Magistrate Judge Spero. In this court’s May 8, 2007 order denying McColm’s request for a

stay and to disqualify Judge Spero, the court stayed all pending discovery motions until

these dispositive motions could be resolved.

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DISCUSSION

A. Defendants’ Motions

SFHA and A-1 defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment, but A-1

joined in SFHA’s motion. Additionally, SFHA filed a separate motion to dismiss individual

SFHA defendants Marshall and Ucciferri; and A-1 incorporated a motion to dismiss

individual A-1 defendant Henry Johnson in its motion for summary judgment. 

1. Motions to Dismiss

A. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides in part:

If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within

120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own

initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice

as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time;

provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall

extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

The court’s discretion to provide extensions under Rule 4(m) is not without limits. 

See Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007). In cases where a plaintiff has

not shown good cause for an extension, in considering whether an extension or dismissal is

warranted, the court considers whether a permissive extension of time is warranted under

the equities of the case, in addition to other factors including “a statute of limitations bar,

prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of a lawsuit, and eventual service.” Id. at 1042

(concluding that district court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss

under Rule 4(m) where the length of delay in service was extraordinary).

B. SFHA Motion 

SFHA moves to dismiss defendants Tony Ucciferri and Beverly Marshall pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and this court’s April 20, 2006 CMC order, 

memorialized in an April 24, 2006 pretrial order, that any defendants not served within 120

days of the CMC, Friday, August 18, 2006, would be dismissed. 

In her November 19, 2003 FAC, McColm named Marshall, but did not name

Ucciferri. However, on August 17, 2006, McColm filed an “amendment to complaint” with

the court, substituting Tony Ucciferri for “Doe 3.” Subsequently, on August 21, 2006, three

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days after the deadline, McColm then filed “proofs of personal service,” which consisted of

only one proof, stating that on August 21, 2006, an unidentifiable person (signature

illegible) personally served what appears to be “Tatum Grande (?) and Elizabeth Clark,” at

the San Francisco Housing Authority (“SFHA”), at 440 Turk Street, “on behalf of Tony

Ucciferri.”

More than a month later, on October 6, 2006, McColm filed another proof of service

in which John Snavely, a registered process server attests that on September 22, 2006, he

attempted to serve Marshall at the Berkeley Public Library, but was told she was

unavailable. He contends that he then effected “substitute service” on another library

assistant, and then mailed the documents to Marshall on September 23, 2006, at the

Berkeley Public Library. Because McColm did not oppose the instant motions, there is no

further information regarding her attempts at service on Marshall and Ucciferri.

SFHA argues that this court should dismiss defendants Marshall and Ucciferri under

Rule 4(m), and based on McColm’s failure to comply with the April 2006 CMC order. They

argue that because she has already been afforded a generous extension of time to

complete service, no additional time is warranted. In support, defendants cite to a

declaration from SFHA assistant general counsel, Tim Larsen, who attests that sometime in

October 2006, McColm also attempted to serve Ucciferri and Marshall by dropping copies

of the pleadings on the ground at 1815 Egbert Street in San Francisco. Neither Larsen nor

the motion papers offer any detail regarding that address, except that McColm apparently

believed that it was a work address for Ucciferri and Marshall. Larsen also attests that

McColm never personally served either Ucciferri or Marshall to date.

The court GRANTS SFHA’s motion to dismiss Ucciferri and Marshall under Rule

4(m). The evidence reflects that any service on Ucciferri and Marshall occurred more than

three and one-half years after the filing of this case, and after August 18, 2006, the

deadline set by the court. Given the circumstances of this case, the court finds that the

“extraordinary delay” and potential for prejudice to defendants and absence of any good

cause articulated by McColm weigh in favor of dismissal under Rule 4(m). See Efaw, 473

F.3d at 1042.

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C. A-1 Motion

In its motion for summary judgment, A-1 also moved for dismissal of security guard,

Henry Johnson, the only remaining individual A-1 guard in the lawsuit, based on untimely

service. Johnson was served on August 18, 2006, the deadline set by the court at the April

2006 CMC. 

Even though Johnson was served by the August 18, 2006 deadline, he argues that

service was nevertheless untimely based on the fact that McColm never applied for an

extension of a prior service deadline, that was set by the court on August 13, 2003. He

argues that the passage of forty-four months from the time McColm filed the lawsuit until

the time he was served was extraordinary, and that McColm has never explained why she

was unable to serve Johnson in 2003. A-1 also notes that there is no evidence that

Johnson tried to evade service or contributed to the delay, and that there is also no

evidence that he was aware of the suit. In a supporting declaration from A-1 owner, Paula

Jones, she attests that A-1 no longer employs Johnson and that she is not aware of

Johnson’s contact information.

The court GRANTS A-1's motion to dismiss Johnson under Rule 4(m). As A-1

correctly notes, in setting the August 18, 2006 deadline, the court never guaranteed plaintiff

that it would not grant a defendant’s Rule 4(m) motion to dismiss, even if the defendant

was served by that date. Plaintiff made no showing of good cause as to the lack of service

on any defendant. In fact, it was impossible to determine at that time which defendants

had been served as plaintiff claimed to have completed service although the docket

reflected otherwise. The court simply advised plaintiff that it would dismiss any remaining

unserved defendants by that date without any further showing by her. Given the fact that

plaintiff has offered no explanation for her inability to comply with this court’s prior August

13, 2003 service order, and because the court finds that all of the factors present in the

Efaw case are present here- extraordinary delay, plaintiff’s lack of a reasonable excuse,

lack of evidence that Johnson evaded service, and lack of evidence that defendant had any

knowledge of the lawsuit – the court dismisses Johnson under Rule 4(m). See 473 F.3d at

1041.

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D. Sua Sponte Dismissal

Unlike Marshall and Ucciferri, SFHA did not specifically move for dismissal of

Stathem and Davis, who also remain unserved. The same reasoning applies as that

above, and accordingly the court sua sponte dismisses Stathem and Davis under Rule

4(m). 

In sum, the court dismisses pursuant to Rule 4(m): SFHA individual defendants

Marshall, Ucciferri, Stathem, and Davis, and A-1 individual defendant Henry Johnson.

Accordingly, the only defendants that remain in the case are “SFHA defendants,”

which include SFHA, SFHC, Joretha Abrahams, Ignacius Lenore, Roberto Lechuga, Naja

Boyd, Jim Williams, Michael Roetzer, and Greg Fortner; and “A-1 defendants,” which

includes only Paula Jones individually and d/b/a A-1 Security.

2. Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there

is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof

at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

than for the moving party. On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. If the moving

party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific facts showing

that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 

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“To show the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue, . . . [a plaintiff] must produce at least

some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Smolen v. Deloitte,

Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). The court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. City

of Tacoma, 332 F.3d 574, 578 (9th Cir. 2003). The court must not weigh the evidence or

determine the truth of the matter, but only determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). If the nonmoving party

fails to show that there is a genuine issue for trial, “the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Regardless of whether plaintiff or defendant

is the moving party, each party must “establish the existence of the elements essential to

[its] case, and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. 

 A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely because the

opposing party has failed to file an opposition. Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95

& n. 4 (9th Cir.1994). The court may, however, grant an unopposed motion for summary

judgment if the movant's papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not

on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact. See United States v. Real Property at

Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir.1995) (local rule cannot mandate automatic

entry of judgment for moving party without consideration of whether motion and supporting

papers satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 56).

 It is not the task of the district court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue

of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996). The nonmoving party

has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes

summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, the district court may

properly grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. See Carmen v. San

Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir.2001) (even if there is

evidence in the court file which creates a genuine issue of material fact, a district court may

grant summary judgment if the opposing papers do not include or conveniently refer to that

evidence). Although the district court has discretion to consider materials in the court file

not referenced in the opposing papers, it need not do so. Id. at 1029. "The district court

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need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact." Id. at

1031.

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The court has consolidated its analysis of defendants’ motions for summary

judgment claim-by-claim as follows. However, before addressing the specific claims, the

court notes that even if it were inclined to “scour the record” in light of plaintiff’s failure to

oppose the motions, there is essentially no record to scour. As discussed above, plaintiff

failed to comply with her discovery obligations and has failed to produce any evidence, in

discovery or in opposition to the motions, in support of her claims. 

1. Fair Housing Act

Plaintiff alleges racial and disability discrimination, interference, and harassment

under the Fair Housing Act, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988

("FHAA"), 32 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19.

The FHAA makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise

make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of – (A)

that buyer or renter." The statute further provides that "discrimination" includes "a refusal

to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such

accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and

enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d

1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2003).

In order to state a discrimination claim under the FHAA for failure to reasonably

accommodate, plaintiff must allege that (1) she suffers from a handicap as defined by the

FHAA, (2) that the defendant or defendants "knew or reasonably should have known of"

plaintiff’s handicap; (3) that "accommodation of the handicap 'may be necessary' to afford

[plaintiff] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy [her] dwelling;" and (4) that the defendant or

defendants "refused to make such accommodation." Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1147.

McColm presumably bases this claim on the SFHA’s alleged failure to provide her

with a wheelchair-accessible unit, the comments that she alleges SFHA and A-1

employees made, and the SFHA’s alleged failure to respond to her complaints.

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SFHA argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff has not

alleged and has not provided any evidence that SFHA refused to rent or to make its

property available to her based on her race and/or disability. It contends that McColm has

presented only conclusory, self-serving accusations in support of the claim. It notes that it

accommodated McColm’s asthma by providing her with a Section 8 voucher so that she

could locate private housing to meet her special needs. It also notes that to the extent that

McColm purports to sue on behalf of other disabled, white residents, she is no longer

“similarly situated” since she has not resided in SFHA public housing for four and one-half

years.

A-1 contends that it should be presumed that this claim applies only to SFHA. It

argues that nevertheless, because there is no evidence that McColm rented property from

A-1 or its employees, it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. In support of its

arguments on this claim and others, A-1 submitted a declaration from its owner, Paula

Jones, who explains the relationship between A-1 and SFHA. She attests that A-1 was an

independent contractor to SFHA, and that it was not an agent for SFHA. She asserts that

A-1 provided its own personnel, uniforms and equipment, and training for its guards.

Based on the absence of evidence of discrimination and a failure to accommodate

as required by the FHAA, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants. In

addition to that absence of evidence, summary judgment in favor of A-1 is also warranted

given the absence of evidence that McColm rented property from A-1.

2. ADA/Rehabilitation Act

McColm also claims discrimination based on disability and retaliation for complaints

of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§

12203 et seq., and a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, section 504, claims two and

five of the FAC, respectively. 

The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§

12101, et seq. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. §§

12111, et seq. Title II prohibits discrimination in the provision of services and programs by

a public entity, and the provision of transportation to the general public. 42 U.S.C. §§

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12131, et seq. Title III prohibits discrimination in public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§

12181, et seq.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states: “No otherwise qualified individual with a

disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded

from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. 794(a). 

Title II of the ADA, modeled after Section 504, states that “no qualified individual with

a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Because “[t]here is no significant

difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act,” courts consider Section 504 and ADA claims jointly. Zukle v. Regents

of University of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n. 11 (9th Cir.1999) (internal citations

omitted). 

Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II, a plaintiff must establish that she is,

among other things: (1) an individual with a disability, (2) otherwise qualified, and (3)

subjected to discrimination solely by reason of the disability. See Mustafa v. Clark County

Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.1998) (citing 29 U.S.C. 794(a)). 

SFHA notes that McColm has not specified which section of the ADA she is alleging

defendants violated, but it assumes that she is proceeding under Title II – which prohibits

discrimination in the provision of services and programs by a public entity, and the

provision of transportation to the general public. It argues that plaintiff has not provided

any evidence that SFHA denied her services or participation in programs based on her

disability, or that it failed to make Sala Burton accessible to her.

Although McColm has not explicitly stated it, SFHA assumes that she is taking issue

with the alleged unavailability of a wheelchair-accessible unit. It notes that at the time she

became a Sala Burton resident, McColm did not request such a unit. Apparently after she

became a resident, she requested such a unit. SFHA notes that McColm testified in her

deposition, though, that her particular unit was indeed wheelchair and scooter-accessible.

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As for the retaliation portion of McColm’s claim, SFHA notes that McColm apparently

argues that it issued a Section 8 voucher to her so that she could leave Sala Burton in

retaliation for her complaints and for filing the instant lawsuit. It contends that McColm has

presented no evidence that SFHA issued the voucher to interfere with her assertion of her

rights. It also notes that it is ironic that she is claiming retaliation since she is the one who

wanted to move out of Sala Burton, about which she had so many complaints, so that she

could use the vouchers for privately owned rental housing.

In terms of the Rehabilitation Act Claim, SFHA similarly argues that McColm has not

provided any evidence that she was denied benefits or excluded from participation in

federally funded programs because of her disability. It contends that she has again

provided no admissible evidence of harassment or discrimination, or that she was treated

differently from other public housing tenants based on a disability.

A-1 again argues with respect to both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims that it

was not involved in the provision of housing services, is not a government entity, and had

no role in SFHA housing decisions, so it cannot be liable under the ADA. It also argues

that to the extent that McColm claims it falsified alleged reports in conspiracy with the

SFHA to get her evicted, it cannot be liable for retaliation because there is no evidence that

McColm was ever evicted, that the SFHA used A-1 reports in reaching housing decisions

concerning McColm, that A-1 personnel understood McColm was exercising her ADA

rights, or that A-1 tried to interfere with her assertion of these rights.

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of the defendants. As noted,

McColm’s FAC does not specify the section of the ADA under which she asserts this claim. 

However, it cannot be Title I, which concerns employment. Nor does Title III apply,

because residential portions of housing developments do not fall within the bounds of the

ADA. See Indep. Housing Servs of San Francisco v. Fillmore Ctr. Assocs., 840 F.Supp.

1328, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (legislative history of ADA clarifies that residential facilities

such as apartments and condominiums do not constitute “public accommodations” within

the meaning of the Act). 

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Accordingly, it must be assumed that plaintiff intended to allege the claim under Title

II, and the motion must be granted because McColm has not produced any evidence that

defendants discriminated against her based on her disability. Additionally, because plaintiff

cannot allege a claim of discrimination under the ADA and/or the Rehabilitation Act, which

constitutes the predicate for any claim of retaliation and/or interference under those

statutes, she also cannot assert a claim of retaliation because she has “opposed any act or

practice made unlawful” by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); or a claim of interference,

coercion, or intimidation in the “exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of . . . having

exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected” by the ADA, id. § 12203(b).

Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants.

3. Privacy Act

McColm also alleges a violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and California's

Information Practices Act. She alleges that although she has requested information

regarding the reports generated about her (presumably by SFHA and A-1) and has also

requested grievance proceedings, that the SFHA has refused to provide her with the

information and/or to remove the defamatory material from her file.

Federal Act

An individual may bring a civil action under the Privacy Act based on an agency’s

disclosure of a challenged record, failure to amend a record on request, and/or failure to

comply with a request for access to records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. However, exhaustion

of administrative remedies before filing a Privacy Act lawsuit is mandatory, and a plaintiff

must include in her complaint allegations regarding exhaustion. See Diliberti v. U.S., 817

F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1987). Additionally, the civil remedy provisions of the Privacy Act do

not apply against private individuals, state agencies, private entities, or state and local

officials. Dittman v. State of California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999).

SFHA first notes that it is unclear whether the Privacy Act applies to it because it is

“a unique entity established by a combination of federal, state, and local actions.” 

However, assuming that the act does apply, it argues McColm has produced no evidence

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that she made a request under the act or that SFHA withheld any records. It also notes

that McColm has not alleged that she exhausted her administrative remedies.

A-1 argues that summary judgment should be granted against it because it is not a

federal agency. It also notes that McColm did not allege exhaustion.

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of SFHA and A-1 on the basis that

McColm has not presented any evidence that she exhausted this claim, and has not

produced any evidence that she made a request under the Act or that SFHA withheld

records. The court additionally GRANTS summary judgment in favor of A-1 because it is

not a federal agency. Given that SFHA has asserted that it is a consortium of federal,

state, and local actors, the court declines to grant summary judgment in favor of SFHA on

this basis.

State Act

California’s Information Practices Act of 1977, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798 et seq., 

prohibits state agencies from disclosing personal information, except in designated

situations. See § 1798.24. An individual harmed by an unauthorized disclosure may bring

a civil action against the agency. See § 1798.45(c). Additionally, a civil action may also be

brought against any person other than a governmental employee acting in the scope of his

or her employment, who intentionally discloses personal information obtained from

information maintained by a state agency or from records within a system of records

maintained by a federal agency. 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts § 667,

Information Practices Act (2005 & 2006 Suppl.).

As noted, McColm does not appear to be alleging an unauthorized disclosure, but

instead a failure to disclose information in conjunction with a request she allegedly made

and a failure to maintain accurate information. Section 1798.45 of the Act provides:

An individual may bring a civil action against an agency whenever such

agency does any of the following:

(a) Refuses to comply with an individual's lawful request to inspect

pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1798.34.

(b) Fails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such

accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to

assure fairness in any determination relating to the qualifications,

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character, rights, opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may

be made on the basis of such record, if, as a proximate result of such

failure, a determination is made which is adverse to the individual.

(c) Fails to comply with any other provision of this chapter, or any rule

promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect

on an individual.

SFHA argues that because the Act applies only to state, as opposed to local

agencies, and because it is not purely a state agency, it has no liability under the Act. 

Alternatively, assuming that the Act applies, it argues that McColm has failed to provide any

evidence that she made a request under the Act for access to or amendment of her

records, or that such request was denied. A-1 similarly argues that it is not a state agency

nor are its employees state actors. Like SFHA, it also argues that McColm has failed to

provide any evidence that she made a request under the Act for access to or amendment

of her records, or that such request was denied. 

Again, as with the federal Privacy Act, the court GRANTS summary judgment in

favor of SFHA and A-1 because McColm has not produced any evidence that she made a

request under the Act or that SFHA withheld records. The court additionally GRANTS

summary judgment in favor of A-1 because it is not a state agency. Again, given that

SFHA has provided that it is a consortium of federal, state, and local actors, the court

declines to grant summary judgment in favor of SFHA on this basis.

4. § 1983

McColm also alleges racial and disability discrimination, and retaliation based on the

exercise of her First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983

is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West

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v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

In addition, an alleged violation of federal law may not be vindicated under § 1983

where “(1) the statute does not create an enforceable right, privilege, or immunity, or (2)

Congress has foreclosed citizen enforcement in the enactment itself, either explicitly, or

implicitly by imbuing it with its own comprehensive remedial scheme.” Buckley v. City of

Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995). A comprehensive scheme for the enforcement

of a statutory right creates a presumption that Congress intended to foreclose resort to

more general remedial schemes to vindicate that right. Middlesex Co. Sewerage Auth. v.

Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). 

To the extent that McColm bases her § 1983 claim on alleged retaliation for exercise

of her First Amendment rights, her burden of proof is similar to that set out in cases where

an employer's adverse employment action is alleged to be due to a plaintiff's First

Amendment activities. See Sloman v. Tadlock 21 F.3d 1462, 1469 n.10 (9th Cir. 1994). In

order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she

engaged in protected speech; (2) the defendants took an adverse action against her; and

(3) the speech was a “substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. See Thomas

v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2004). In determining whether the

plaintiff's speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action, courts

examine three principal factors: (1) proximity in time between the protected speech and the

alleged retaliation; (2) the defendant’s expressed opposition to the speech; and (3) other

evidence that the reasons proffered by the defendant for the adverse action were false and

pretextual. Keyser v. Sacramento Unified School Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 751-52 (9th Cir.

2001).

As for the alleged racial and disability discrimination, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-

87 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “To state a claim under

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Id. Proof

of a discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show an equal protection violation. City

of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 193-94 (2003)

(claim could not survive summary judgment where there was no proof of discriminatory

intent by city which placed citizen-sponsored and allegedly racially-motivated referendum

on the ballot as required by the city's facially neutral charter and the referendum was not

enacted); see also Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff

must produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by a

preponderance of the evidence that the decision was motivated by the plaintiff's

membership in the protected class to avoid summary judgment). Where the challenged

governmental policy is “facially neutral,” proof of its disproportionate impact on an

identifiable group can satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends to show that some

invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy. Village of Arlington Heights v.

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1976). Because “the disabled do not

constitute a suspect class” for equal protection purposes, a governmental policy that

purposefully treats the disabled differently from the non-disabled need only be “rationally

related to legitimate legislative goals” to pass constitutional muster. Does 1-5 v. Chandler,

83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.1996).

Presumably, McColm’s disability and racial discrimination allegations that underlie

her section 1983 claim are the same as those described above in this order. Additionally,

the First Amendment retaliation allegations appear to be based on alleged retaliation,

including but not limited to an eviction notice and a failure to provide her with a wheelchairaccessible unit, in response to her complaints about property conditions, tenant conduct,

and SFHA and A-1 employee conduct. 

SFHA argues that McColm has not produced any evidence that it acted under color

of state law, and that she has not produced evidence of nor specified what speech

protected by the First amendment was curtailed. Additionally, it contends that she has not

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produced even a shred of evidence in support of the discrimination allegedly based on her

race and/or disability.

A-1 argues that there is no evidence that it was acting under color of state law, and

that McColm has not presented any evidence that there was an agreement or meeting of

minds between A-1 and a state actor. Radcliffe v. Rainbow Construction, 254 F.3d 772

(9th Cir. 2001); Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435. In support, owner Paula Jones has attested

in a declaration that there was never any such conspiracy or agreement between A-1 and

SFHA. Additionally, A-1 also argues that even if McColm had evidence that one of its

guards did in fact violate her rights, there is no vicarious liability on A-1's behalf.

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants because McColm has

not presented any evidence to demonstrate that she engaged in protected speech, or that

the defendants took adverse actions against her that were substantially motivated by the

speech. Additionally, McColm has also failed to produce any evidence of discriminatory

intent or purpose based on her race and/or disability. Finally, the court additionally

GRANTS summary judgment in favor of A-1 because there is no evidence that it was acting

under color of state law. 

5. "violation of Code of Federal Regulation, HUD"

McColm alleges a "violation of Code of Federal Regulation, HUD,” but failed

to specify either in her FAC or in discovery responses the particular regulation that was

allegedly violated. Accordingly, defendants argue that the claim fails because McColm has

not specified the basis for this claim nor has she produced any evidence in support of the

claim. The court agrees with both grounds, and GRANTS summary judgment in favor of

defendants. 

6. “breach of landlord's duty to warn under California law”

McColm alleges in her FAC that “[d]efendants’ policies and practices have been and

are now in violation of its duty under California law to warn current and prospective

residents of San Francisco public housing developments about known dangers and

reasonable forseeable harassment and crimes by third parties.” Par. 121. It appears to

the court that McColm is alleging public entity liability for maintaining a dangerous condition

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of public property under the California Tort Claims Act, based on the SFHA’s alleged failure

to respond to her complaints about SFHA property, including the lack of ventilation,

smoking and drug use by tenants, vandalism of the property, and other issues related to

the elevator and windows.

The liability of a public entity for property defects is governed by the Tort Claims Act,

at Cal. Govt Code §§ 830 to 835.4. The elements of a cause of action for a dangerous

condition on public property are (1) a dangerous condition, (2) either created by the public

entity or actually or constructively known to the entity, with sufficient time before the injury

for the entity to have taken remedial action, (3) a proximate causal connection between the

condition and the injury sustained, and (4) a reasonably foreseeable risk that the kind of

injury that occurred would result from the dangerous condition. People ex rel. Department

of Transp. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1485 (Cal. Ct. App.1992); Dominguez v.

Solano Irrigation District, 228 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

The public entity must be the owner or in control of the property at the time of the

injury. Carson v. Facilities Dev. Co., 36 Cal.3d 830, 840-41 (Cal. 1984). Before liability can

be imposed on a public entity, the entity must be in a position to protect against or warn of

the danger. Tolan v. State ex rel. Department of Transp., 100 Cal.App.3d 980, 984, (Cal.

Ct. App.1979). A "dangerous condition" is "a condition of property that creates a

substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such

property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably

foreseeable that it will be used." Government Code § 830(a); see Huffman v. City of

Poway, 84 Cal.App.4th 975, 992 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). The condition must be one that

creates a hazard to a person who foreseeably would use the property or adjacent property

with due care. Id. Proof of knowledge or negligence is part of the plaintiff's burden;

however, "constructive notice may be imputed if it can be shown that an obvious danger

existed for an adequate period of time before the accident to have permitted the [public

entity], in the exercise of due care, to discover and remedy the situation...." Carson, 36

Cal.3d at 842-44.

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The courts will not ascribe liability to a dangerous condition of public property solely

on the basis of the conduct of a third party. Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.4th

1112, 1134-41 (Cal. 2002). A plaintiff may be able to state a cause of action arising from

injuries caused by criminal assailants if the occurrence of the injuries can be linked to a

physical characteristic of the public property, such as insufficient lighting or construction

and maintenance in such a fashion as to encourage illegal activity. Slapin v. Los Angeles

Int'l Airport, 65 Cal.App.3d 484 (Cal. Ct. App 1976). In sum, a governmental entity may be

liable for injuries caused by a combination of a dangerous condition of public property and

the wrongful acts of third parties, and a public defendant may not successfully defend that

the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the wrongful criminal act of a third party, when the

basis of alleged negligence is that the defendant created a reasonably foreseeable risk of

the third party criminal conduct that occurred. Id.

SFHA argues that plaintiff has provided no evidence to support her allegations of

unsafe conditions; nor has she provided any evidence that she was harmed by the

allegedly unsafe conditions. It also argues that she has not shown that the SFHA breached

its duty of care. Moreover, SFHA contends that since McColm no longer lives in public

housing, she lacks standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief to correct its allegedly

unsafe practices.

A-1 again argues that because there is no evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship

between it and plaintiff, it cannot be liable on this claim.

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of both defendants based on

McColm’s failure to produce evidence of any of the following elements required for the

claim: (1) a dangerous condition, (2) either created by the public entity or actually or

constructively known to the entity, with sufficient time before the injury for the entity to have

taken remedial action, (3) a proximate causal connection between the condition and the

injury sustained, and (4) a reasonably foreseeable risk that the kind of injury that occurred

would result from the dangerous condition. Additionally, the court GRANTS summary

judgment in favor of A-1 based on the absence of evidence demonstrating a landlordtenant relationship between it and McColm.

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7. Unruh Act

McColm also alleges a violation of California's Unruh Act, §§ 51-52 et seq., but as

with many of her other claims, provides absolutely no detail or description regarding the

basis for the allegation.

 The Unruh Act provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free

and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,

disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,

advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind

whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). In 1992, the Unruh Act was amended to provide that

"[a] violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Public

Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section." Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). 

The California Supreme Court has held that the Unruh Act prohibits only intentional

discrimination. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1175 (Cal. 1991)

("[W]e hold that a plaintiff seeking to establish a case under the Unruh Act must plead and

prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the

Act."). However, Harris was decided prior to the 1992 amendment that added § 51(f).

Thus, the question arose as to whether, as a result of the 1992 amendment, a showing of

intentional discrimination was required in cases where the plaintiff predicated his Unruh Act

claim on a showing that the defendant violated the ADA. In 2004, the Ninth Circuit held

that "no showing of intentional discrimination is required where the Unruh Act violation is

premised on an ADA violation." Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837,

847 (9th Cir. 2004). 

McColm’s Unruh Act claim appears to be based on the same allegations of racial

and disability harassment and discrimination described above, including the SFHA’s

alleged failure to provide her with a wheelchair-accessible unit, and also its allegedly

passing her over for a particular wheelchair-accessible unit based on her race. SFHA

argues that McColm has not presented any evidence to support her claim. It also argues

that she has not shown a denial of full and equal accommodations within the meaning of

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the Act. A-1 again argues that because there is no evidence that it provided

accommodations to McColm, it cannot be liable under the Act.

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants since McColm has not

presented evidence that they intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of her

race, that she was discriminated against, intentionally or otherwise, on the basis of her

disability, and/or that SFHA denied her fair and equal accommodations. Additionally, the

court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of A-1 because it cannot be liable under the

Unruh Act since it did not provide McColm with accommodations. 

8. "breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair

dealing and occupancy policy"

In support of this claim, McColm alleges that “SFHA breached the terms of its rental

agreement with [her] and violated the notice requirements for change of the grievance

procedures under the SFHA’s occupancy policies.”

A claim for damages for breach of contract is comprised of the following elements:

(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's

breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley

Oil & Gas Co. 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1391, fn. 6. (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 

To prove a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiff

must establish: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the plaintiff did all, or substantially all of

the significant things the contract required; (3) the conditions required for the defendant's

performance had occurred; (4) the defendant unfairly interfered with the plaintiff's right to

receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's

conduct. See CACI No. 325. Breach of a specific contractual provision is not a prerequisite

to asserting this cause of action. Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-350 

(2000). However, “[i]t is universally recognized the scope of conduct prohibited by the

covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the purposes and express terms of the contract. 

[U]nder traditional contract principles, the implied covenant of good faith is read into

contracts ‘in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, not to

protect some general public policy interest not directly tied to the contract's purpose.” Id. In

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essence, the covenant is implied as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to

prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically

transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other party's rights to the benefits of

the contract. Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation, 11 Cal.App.4th

1026, 1031-1032 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). The covenant thus cannot “be endowed with an

existence independent of its contractual underpinnings.” Id. It cannot impose substantive

duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of

their agreement. Id.

SFHA argues that McColm has not provided evidence supporting a breach of

contract claim because she has not produced evidence that she fully performed the rental

contract or that she was excused from performing, that SFHA failed to fully perform, and

that she was harmed by the breach. As for the claim for breach of covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, which SFHA contends should be a separate claim, it again argues that

McColm has provided no evidence in support of the elements of such a claim. It further

asserts that it is not clear what McColm is alleging the SFHA did to interfere with her right

to receive the benefit of her rental agreement. 

A-1 argues that it cannot be held liable on this claim because there is no evidence of

a contract between it and McColm, and that for this reason, the breach of covenant claim

also fails.

The GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants on both the breach of

contract and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims because McColm has

not produced evidence that she performed or was excused from performing under the

contract with SFHA, or that SFHA breached any of its duties under the contract. 

Additionally, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of A-1 on both claims because

there is no evidence of a contract between it and McColm. 

9. Negligence

McColm alleges that defendants were negligent in their duty to maintain the

premises in a manner free of unlawful discrimination, and that they were negligent in their

hiring, training, supervision, and discipline of their employees. She asserts specifically that

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they were negligent in training their employees regarding federal and state fair housing

laws, and that they failed to hire employees familiar with such laws. She contends that as a

result of defendants’ negligence, she suffered a “loss of housing opportunities, violation of

her civil rights, bodily injury, humiliation and physical and emotional distress and property

damage.”

The California Tort Claims Act states, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute[,] ...

[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or

omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." Cal. Gov't Code §

815(a); see also Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, 31 Cal.4th 1175 (Cal.

2003). The intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not to

expand it. Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 1112 (Cal. 2002). 

In Eastburn, the California Supreme Court determined that direct tort liability of

public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least

creating some specific duty of care. Eastburn involved a tort action arising out of alleged

negligence on the part of three public agencies responsible for providing "emergency

dispatch services for 911 callers." Eastburn, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d at 552. The complaint alleged

that the public agencies were negligent in the manner in which dispatchers were trained

and responded to the calls, and how the guidelines for the handling of 911 calls were

promulgated. Id. It was further alleged that plaintiff's injuries were either caused or

exacerbated by this negligence. Id. The California Supreme Court held that plaintiffs failed

to identify an independent statutory basis for imposing liability on the public agencies as

required by Government Code § 815. Id. at 660. Thus, the public agencies were immune

for the acts or omissions of the 911 emergency dispatchers in their employ. Id. at 661. 

The Eastburn court reasoned that the common law and general tort principles embodied in

California Civil Code § 1714, which imposes a duty to act with reasonable care, are

insufficient to create direct liability and bypass the immunity of Government Code § 815. 

Id.; see also Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1112 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).

With respect to negligence by a public employee, such an employee is generally

"liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person." Cal.

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Gov't Code § 820(a). Furthermore, Government Code § 815.2 "expressly makes the

doctrine of respondeat superior applicable to public employers." Hoff, 19 Cal.4th at 932. A

"public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of

the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from

this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal

representative." Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2(a). Thus, § 815.2 "makes a public entity

vicariously liable for its employee's negligent acts or omissions within the scope of

employment." Eastburn, 31 Cal.4th at 1180; Hoff, 19 Cal.4th at 932. However, "liability of

the employer only attaches if and when it is adjudged that the employee was negligent,"

and, although "public entities always act through individuals, that does not convert a claim

for direct negligence into one based on vicarious liability." Munoz, 120 Cal.App.4th at 1113.

SFHA cites to controlling California law in support of the principle that a public entity

is not liable for injury unless provided by statute, and argues that McColm has failed to

establish a statutory duty in connection with her negligence claim. It also argues that she

has failed to allege how any breach proximately caused any harm to her. However,

assuming that she has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim, SFHA argues that she has

produced no competent evidence in support of the claim.

A-1 does not address this claim separately in its motion papers, but responds simply

that it can not be liable for acts not shown to be in the course and scope of its employees’

employment 

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants because McColm has

not produced any evidence in support of her negligence claim. Additionally, summary

judgment is appropriate because McColm has failed to establish a statutory duty in

connection with this claim. See Eastburn, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d at 560. 

10. State Law Tort Claims

As noted, in addition to the ten claims above, McColm also alleges what has been

referred to as a “grab bag” of state law tort claims, listed in paragraph 130 of the FAC, at aj. A-1 addressed some of these claims separately, while SFHA, for the most part, includes

a more general discussion of the claims as a whole. 

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negligence and gross negligence

McColm has offered no distinction between this “claim” and the negligence claim

listed above. Because the legal standards and conclusion set forth with respect to the

previously discussed negligence claim are equally applicable here, the court GRANTS

summary judgment in favor of defendants. 

violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 for

unfair and fraudulent business practices

 Under the Unfair Competition Act (UCA) found at Business and Professions Code

section 17200 et seq., any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice is deemed

to be unfair competition. Section 17200 defines unfair competition as including any

“unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or

misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section

17500) . . . of the Business and Professions Code."

 Government Code section 815 declares that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by

statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act

or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." The statute

amounts to a legislative declaration that governmental immunity from suit is the rule and

liability the exception. Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 50 Cal.App.4th 632, 647 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1996); Harshbarger v. City of Colton, 197 Cal.App.3d 1335, 1339 (Cal. Ct. App.

1988). Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be

liable only if a statute declares them to be liable. Id. California courts have held that

“[b]ecause there is no statute making public entities liable under the UCA, the general rule

of governmental immunity must prevail.” Trinkle v. California State Lottery, 71 Cal.App.4th

1198, 1202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Although "persons" who engage in unfair competition

may be sued for damages and injunctive relief (§§ 17203-17205), a "public entity"

(Gov.Code, § 811.2) is not a "person" within the meaning of the Unfair Practices Act. Id.

Although A-1 has not separately addressed this issue, as noted, it joins in SFHA’s

motion. SFHA correctly notes that McColm has failed to allege the essential elements of

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any of the claims; nor does she plead any specific facts in support of them; nor has she

produced any competent admissible evidence in support of her claims. 

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants because McColm has

produced no evidence in support of her UCA claim. Additionally, to the extent that SFHA

constitutes a public entity, the California courts have held that it may not be held liable

under the UCA. 

fraud

Plaintiff also asserts a claim of fraud. The elements plaintiff must prove include: "(a)

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of

falsity (or scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and

(e) resulting damage." Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996). 

Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiff in federal court

give a short, plain statement of the claim sufficient to put the defendant on notice. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). However, Rule 9 imposes a particularized pleading requirement on a

plaintiff alleging fraud or any claim premised on fraud. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (in actions

alleging fraud, "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with

particularity"). Under Rule 9(b), the complaint must allege specific facts regarding the

fraudulent activity, such as the time, date, place, and content of the alleged fraudulent

representation, how or why the representation was false or misleading, and in some cases,

the identity of the person engaged in the fraud. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d

983, 992-93 (9th Cir. 1999)

Again, it is unclear which allegations plaintiff asserts underlie her fraud claim and/or

which apply to which of the defendants. Assuming that plaintiff’s fraud claim is based upon

her allegations regarding defendants’ generation of false reports about her and/or alleged

misrepresentation regarding what type of unit she would receive at Sala Burton, she still

has presented absolutely no evidence in support of this claim. Moreover, her noncompliance with Rule 9's requirement for particularity makes it impossible to determine

even which defendant is accused of fraud. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants'

motions for summary judgment.

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intentional infliction of emotional distress

Plaintiff asserts a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements

of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous

conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the

defendant's outrageous conduct. Cervantes v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 593

(1979); see also Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 904-05 (1991). 

Severe emotional distress means "emotional distress of such substantial quantity or

enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to

endure it." Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux, 134 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1226 (2005). While the

outrageousness of a defendant's conduct normally presents an issue of fact to be

determined by the trier of fact, the court may determine, in the first instance, whether the

defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to

permit recovery. Trerice v. Blue Cross of California, 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883 (1989). 

Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a relation or position

which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is

susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with

the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. Kiseskey

v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California, 144 Cal.App.3d 222 (1983).

Again, as with the fraud claim, it is unclear which allegations plaintiff asserts underlie

her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and/or which of those facts apply to

which of the defendants. However, assuming that the claim is based on some of the acts

detailed above, including the harassment, glue in the locks, false incident reports, and

alleged unlawful entry, McColm has nevertheless failed to present any evidence that the

alleged incidents occurred. Nor has she alleged sufficient evidence of a nexus between the

alleged conduct and her injuries. Therefore, the court GRANTS summary judgment in

favor of defendants on this claim as well.

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negligent infliction of emotional distress

Plaintiff asserts a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. In California,

there is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Potter v.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 981 (1993). Negligent infliction of emotional

distress is merely a form of the tort of negligence. Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores

California, Inc., 6 Cal.4th 124, 129 (1993). 

The negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but the

tort of negligence. The traditional elements of duty, breach of duty,

causation, and damages apply. [¶] Whether a defendant owes a duty of care

is a question of law. Its existence depends upon the foreseeability of the risk

and a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability. 

Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.3d 583, 588 (1989) (citations

and quotations omitted). 

Thus, to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff

must set forth each of the elements of negligence, as described above: (1) duty; (2)

negligent breach of duty; (3) legal cause; and (4) damages caused by the negligent breach. 

Friedman v. Merck & Co., 107 Cal.App.4th 454, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). "Unless the

defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is

an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant's

breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that

breach of duty." Gu v. BMW of North America, LLC, 132 Cal.App.4th 195 (Cal. Ct. App.

2005).

Because defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for

negligence, the court likewise GRANTS summary judgment as to this claim.

invasion of privacy

Under California common law, the right to privacy is generally analyzed under four

categories of wrongs or types of invasion, including: intrusion into private affairs; public

disclosure of private facts; placing the plaintiff in a false light; and appropriation of the

plaintiff’s name or likeness. See 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts § 651,

Invasion of Privacy. Additionally, the California Constitution lists “privacy” among the

fundamental “inalienable rights” of all people, and confers a right of action beyond the

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scope of decisional law on the common law tort action. Id.; see also Porten v. University of

San Francisco, 64 Cal.App.3d 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).

Like the other state law tort claims, the factual basis for this claim is unclear. It

appears to be based on allegations that defendants misrepresented events and plaintiff’s

culpability in incident reports.

Again, though, McColm has produced absolutely no evidence that defendants

publicly disclosed private facts about her or placed her in a false light, and summary

judgment is therefore GRANTED in favor of defendants. 

spoliation of evidence

Defendants correctly note that there is no tort of intentional spoliation of evidence

under California law. Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 464 (Cal.

1999); Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court 18 Cal.4th 1, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248

(Cal. 1998). Accordingly, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants on

this claim.

assault and battery

Plaintiff asserts a claim of assault of assault and battery. Specifically, she claims

that three of the remaining individual SFHA defendants assaulted her, including Jorethra

Abrahams, Roberto Lechuga, and Ignacius Lenore. FAC, par. 35. As for A-1, all of the

individual security guards have been dismissed from the case. 

 “Assault” is generally defined as “a demonstration of an unlawful intent by one

person to inflict immediate injury on the person of another then present.” Lowry v.

Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 63 Cal.App.2d 1, 5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944). The California Civil

Code does not define “assault,” but rather incorporates the definition that appears in the

California Penal Code. Under that definition, “assault” is “an unlawful attempt, coupled with

a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Cal. Penal Code §

240. 

The elements of a civil battery are: (1) Defendant intentionally did an act which

resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person; (2) Plaintiff did not

consent to the contact; and (3) The harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage,

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loss or harm to the plaintiff. Piedra v. Dugan, 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495 (Cal. Ct. App.

2004).

Once again, plaintiff has presented no evidence in support of her assault and battery

claim(s), and for this reason, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants.

property damage

Again, it is not clear to the court what the factual, or even legal basis, is for this

claim. In her A-1 interrogatory responses, plaintiff alleged that she suffered personal

property damage to her locks, food, clothing, rug, and additional “personal property,” in the

amount of $500. Stilson Decl., Exh. 3, at p.32.

The court thus assumes that McColm she is alleging a claim for vandalism. Under

the California Penal Code, “vandalism” is defined as the malicious defacing, damaging, or

destruction of real or personal property belonging to another. Cal. Penal Code § 594; see

In re Leanna W., 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 

As with the above state law tort claims (and all of the claims in for that matter),

plaintiff has presented no evidence in support of her property damage claim, and for this

reason, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants. 

violation of Cal. Civil Code § 1950 et seq

California Civil Code section 1950 provides:

LETTING PARTS OF ROOMS FORBIDDEN. One who hires part of a room

for a dwelling is entitled to the whole of the room, notwithstanding any

agreement to the contrary; and if a landlord lets a room as a dwelling for more

than one family, the person to whom he first lets any part of it is entitled to the

possession of the whole room for the term agreed upon, and every tenant in

the building, under the same landlord, is relieved from all obligation to pay

rent to him while such double letting of any room continues.

The FAC is silent regarding the factual basis for this claim, but given the statute cited

by McColm, the court must assume that she is accusing of SFHA of letting one of its units

to more than one family.

A-1 argues that because it has no landlord-tenant relationship with McColm, it can

not be held liable under § 1950. SFHA argues that McColm has not plead any facts

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supporting such a violation, and that even if she could, there is no authority that the section

applies to public entities. 

Again, because plaintiff has presented no evidence in support of this claim, the court

GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants. 

conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges throughout the statement of facts in her FAC that defendants all

conspired to do the acts complained of. 

However, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants because

civil conspiracy is not a separate and distinct cause of action under California law. 

Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1228

(9th Cir. 1997). Additionally, defendants have introduced evidence, which McColm failed to

rebut, that no such conspiracy existed.

11. Other Claims

While not specifically alleging them as claims, McColm also vaguely references

violations of “state fair housing laws” throughout her FAC. However, because the

references are vague and conclusory, because it is unclear what state code provisions she

is referring to, and because she has introduced no evidence in support of any such claims,

the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants on those claims as well.

3. Pending Discovery Motions

The pending discovery and discovery sanctions motions, recently stayed by the

court, are DENIED without prejudice as moot. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court DISMISSES defendants Beverly Marshall,

Tony Ucciferri, Henry Johnson, Gloria Stathem, Ronnie Davis, and Does 1 and 2, and 4-

150 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

The court DISMISSES Gracie Smith, Mr. Smith, and David Gonzalez as plaintiff has

never sought to obtain a default judgment against them and given the record the court has

just reviewed, it is not likely she could have obtained such a judgment in any event.

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The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of all remaining defendants,

including the individual defendants and business and public entity defendants, as to all

claims set forth in plaintiff’s FAC.

In addition to the pending discovery motions, the docket numbers for which are too

numerous for this court to ascertain, this order fully adjudicates the motions listed at Nos.

161, 178, and 185 of the clerk’s docket for this case and terminates all other pending

motions. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 29, 2007

_________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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