Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03150/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Emelio Osorio-Rosas,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn,

1 Attorney General of the State 

of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 19-03150 PHX MTL (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI:

Petitioner Emelio Osorio-Rosas, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents docketed a Limited

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 10), and Osorio-Rosas filed a 

reply. (ECF No. 11). 

I. Background

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ opinion in Osorio-Rosas’ appeal provides the 

following background regarding his state criminal proceedings:

At 5:17 p.m. on July 6, 2011, Osorio-Rosas was arrested after 

admitting he engaged in sexual conduct with a minor. . . .

A jury found Osorio–Rosas guilty of indecent exposure to a minor, a 

Class 6 felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 

13–1402(A) []; aggravated assault, a Class 6 felony, in violation of §§ 13-

1203 [] and 1204(A)(6) []; and three counts of sexual conduct with a minor, 

Class 2 felonies and dangerous crimes against children in violation of § 13-

1 Effective October 21, 2019, David Shinn replaced Charles Ryan as Director of the 

Arizona Department of Corrections. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Shinn is 

automatically substituted as the party of record.

Case 2:19-cv-03150-MTL Document 12 Filed 06/01/20 Page 1 of 7
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1405(A) []. Sentencing originally was set for May 8, 2012, but was continued 

to May 22, 2012. At the continued hearing, the court sentenced Osorio-Rosas 

to concurrent one-year terms of imprisonment for the Class 6 felonies with 

306 days’ presentence incarceration credit and three consecutive terms of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of release for 35 years for the Class 2 

felonies.

Osorio-Rosas timely appealed. . . 

State v. Osorio-Rosas, 2013 WL 1777346, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2013). In his 

appeal Osorio-Rosas asserted “the superior court granted him too few days of presentence 

incarceration credit.” Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on April 25, 2013. Id.

Osorio-Rosas did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court and the appellate court’s 

mandate issued June 14, 2013. (ECF No. 10-1 at 20). 

Osorio-Rosas initiated a state action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure on July 5, 2013. (ECF No. 10-1 at 27-31). His 

appointed post-conviction counsel notified the court that they could find no meritorious 

claim to raise on Osorio-Rosas’ behalf. (ECF No. 10-1 at 37-39). Osorio-Rosas filed a pro 

se Rule 32 petition, asserting the sentencing court failed to follow the Arizona rules and 

procedures governing imposition of sentence. (ECF No. 10-1 at 44-47). In a decision 

entered April 23, 2015, the state habeas trial court denied relief, finding Osorio-Rosas’ 

claim regarding his sentence was precluded by Rules 32.2(a)(1) and 32.2(a)(2) of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because the claim could have been, but was not,

raised in his appeal. (ECF No. 10-1 at 55). Osorio-Rosas did not seek review of this 

decision.

On May 19, 2015 and June 17, 2015, respectively, Osorio-Rosas filed a “Motion to 

Extend the Due Date for Reply by Thirty Days Due to Extraordinary Circumstances” and 

a “Motion Requesting Leave of Court to Submit an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief for Good Cause Shown.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 58-61, 63-77). The state trial court 

treated the motions collectively as a second petition for post-conviction relief, which it 

denied on November 2, 2015, finding the proposed “amended petition” presented claims 

Case 2:19-cv-03150-MTL Document 12 Filed 06/01/20 Page 2 of 7
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that were precluded under Arizona’s rules of criminal procedure. (ECF No. 10-1 at 79-80.) 

Osorio-Rosas did not appeal the denial of relief. (ECF No. 10-1 at 109).

More than two years later, on June 20, 2018, Osorio-Rosas filed a request for relief 

from “cruel and unusual punishment” in the Arizona trial court. (ECF No. 10-1 at 82-106).

Osorio-Rosas claimed, inter alia, that his sentence was unconstitutional and he was denied 

the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel allowed improper evidence at

sentencing. (Id.). The state trial court construed the pleading as a third petition for postconviction relief, and dismissed the action because Osorio-Rosas presented only claims for 

relief precluded by his failure to raise them in his appeal. (ECF No. 10-1 at 108-10). The 

court also found the claims regarding sentencing without merit. (ECF No. 10-1 at 109-10). 

Osorio-Rosas appealed the dismissal of this action, and the Arizona Court of Appeals 

granted review but denied relief. (ECF No. 10-1 at 112-14). The Arizona Supreme Court

summarily denied a petition for review on May 10, 2019. (ECF No. 10-1 at 125).

In his federal habeas petition Osorio-Rosas asserts he is entitled to relief because 

the imposed sentence violates his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment; he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel; the sentencing court considered “materially false 

information” when imposing sentence; and “deportation,” i.e., he is an “illegal alien” and 

“there are treaties of the United States existing with the country of his origin.” (ECF No. 

1 at 6-9). Respondents contend the habeas petition is not timely-filed and that OsariosRosas’ federal habeas claims were not properly exhausted in the state courts. (ECF No. 10 

at 2, 4-14).

II. Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

Osario-Rosas’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the statute of 

limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners seeking federal 

habeas relief from their state convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions begins to run on “the date on which the judgment became 

Case 2:19-cv-03150-MTL Document 12 Filed 06/01/20 Page 3 of 7
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

Id. at § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is statutorily tolled during the time a 

“properly filed” state action for post-conviction relief is pending in the state courts. Id. at 

§ 2244(d)(2).

Osario-Rosas’ conviction became final on June 14, 2013, when the Arizona Court 

of Appeals issued its mandate in his direct appeal.

2 The statute of limitations ran for 21 

days, until July 5, 2013, when Osario-Rosas initiated an action for state post-conviction 

relief. This Rule 32 action tolled the running of the statute of limitations until May 23, 

2015, when the time expired for Osario-Rosas to appeal the state trial court’s denial of Rule 

32 relief. Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas action 

expired May 2, 2016. 

Osario-Rosas second and third post-conviction actions, initiated May 19, 2015, and 

June 20, 2018, were deemed successive and untimely by the state court and, accordingly, 

they were not “properly filed state action for post-conviction relief” and they did not toll 

the running of the statute of limitations on Osario-Rosas’ federal habeas petition. See Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005) (holding that a state petition that is not filed 

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed.”). See also Allen v. Siebert, 552 

U.S. 3, 5-7 (2007) (holding that the Pace rule applies even where there are exceptions to 

the state-court filing deadlines, and reaffirming that a state court’s rejection of a petition as 

untimely is “the end of the matter”).

Additionally, Osario-Rosas had no state actions for post-conviction relief of any 

kind pending for more than two years, between November 2, 2015 (when the state habeas 

2 For purposes of the timeliness of a § 2254 petition, in cases wherein the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ decision is not appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, the date the mandate issues is 

the date the statute of limitations begins to run on the federal habeas action. However, if the 

intermediate appellate court’s decision denying Rule 32 relief is appealed to the Arizona Supreme 

Court, it is the date of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision, not the issuance of the Court of 

Appeals’ mandate, that concludes the post-conviction process and determines when the tolling 

period has terminated. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007). See also 

Martinez v. Ryan, 2018 WL 3110045, at *3 & n.3 (D. Ariz. 2018), distinguishing Celaya v. 

Stewart, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (D. Ariz. 2010).

Case 2:19-cv-03150-MTL Document 12 Filed 06/01/20 Page 4 of 7
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

trial court dismissed his second post-conviction action) and June 20, 2018, when he filed

his third Rule 32 petition. Accordingly, more than one year of untolled time passed between 

the date Osario-Rosas’ conviction became final and the filing of his federal habeas petition 

on May 15, 2019. The third Rule 32 petition, filed in June of 2018, unarguably could not 

and did not restart the limitations period on Osario-Rosas’ federal habeas petition. See 

Larson v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 

823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition may be 

equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control prevented 

them from filing their petition on time. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010); 

Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2014). To be entitled to equitable tolling, 

the petitioner must establish “due diligence,” i.e., that he diligently pursued his claims and 

that “some extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control prevented the timely filing of 

his habeas petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839-40 (9th 

Cir. 2014); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling 

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual, factual innocence of the crimes of 

conviction. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 

929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2014).3

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 

1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014); Waldon-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 

2009). It is the petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his 

case. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldon-Ramsey, 556 F.3d 

3 When an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner “presents evidence of innocence 

so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the 

court is also satisfied that the trial was free of non-harmless constitutional error,” 

the Court may consider the petition on the merits. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

[] (1995). The Supreme Court has recently cautioned, however, that “tenable actualinnocence gateway pleas are rare.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928. “[A] petitioner 

does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, 

in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2014).

Case 2:19-cv-03150-MTL Document 12 Filed 06/01/20 Page 5 of 7
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 1011; Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004). To be 

entitled to equitable tolling Soares must show “extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Porter, 620 F.3d at 959 (emphasis added and internal quotations 

omitted).

In reply to Respondents’ allegation that his habeas petition is not timely, OsarioRosas asserts he properly exhausted his claims in the state courts. (ECF No. 11 at 2-4). 

However, Osario-Rosas does not proffer any reason why he should be afforded equitable 

tolling of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Osario-Rosas has not met his burden of 

showing “extraordinary circumstances” were the cause of his failure to timely file his 

federal habeas petition, nor does he assert his factual innocence of the crimes of conviction. 

III. Conclusion

Osario-Rosas’ federal habeas petition is not timely, as more than one year of 

untolled time passed between the date his conviction because final and the filing of the 

§ 2254 petition. Osario-Rosasis not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, 

nor has he established his actual, factual innocence of the crimes of conviction sufficient 

to warrant an examination of the merits of his claims for relief.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Osario-Rosas’ petition seeking a 

federal writ of habeas corpus at ECF No. 1 be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of 

Case 2:19-cv-03150-MTL Document 12 Filed 06/01/20 Page 6 of 7
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections 

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Osario-Rosas seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.

Dated this 1st day of June, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-03150-MTL Document 12 Filed 06/01/20 Page 7 of 7