Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01196/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01196-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Injunctive/Declaratory Relief

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael S. Neminsky, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Bank of America Corporation, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01196-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs 

Arlene C. Neminsky and Michael S. Neminsky. (Doc. 62.) Also pending before the 

Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants BAC Home Loans Servicing 

LP, Bank of America Corporation, and Bank of America NA (collectively “Bank of 

America”). (Doc. 66.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion and 

grants defendants’ motion. 

BACKGROUND 

In 2009, Plaintiffs Michael and Arlene Neminsky were struggling to make their 

loan payments, and requested a loan modification under the federal Home Affordable 

Modification Program (“HAMP”) from Bank of America. A representative of Bank of 

America instructed Plaintiffs to stop making their mortgage payments in order to obtain a 

modification. Based on this information, Plaintiffs became over ninety days delinquent 

in payments. In October 2009, Plaintiffs entered into a Loan Modification Agreement 

with Defendants. (Doc. 63 at PDF 26-28.) 

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 The Neminskys made their modified payments through April 2011. According to 

Mr. Neminsky’s testimony, the Bank of America employee who advised him about the 

2009 loan modification had suggested (in 2009) that he could apply for another 

modification later that would reduce the debt principal, and that he should do so using the 

same procedure as the first, which was to stop payment on the mortgage and apply to 

Bank of America. (Doc. 76-1 at PDF 34, p. 81.) In May 2011, the Neminskys did not 

submit their payment. In June 2011, Defendants sent the Neminskys a Notice of Intent to 

Accelerate, stating that the previous month’s missed payment constituted a default, that 

the Neminskys had the right to cure the default by paying the missed monthly payment 

and the late charge, and that if the default was not cured by July 16, 2011, the mortgage 

payments would be accelerated and foreclosure proceedings would be initiated. (Doc. 

67-1 at PDF 52.) 

 On August 13, 2011, Bank of America sent the Neminskys a letter stating that the 

Naminskys “may be eligible” for a loan modification through the Home Affordable 

Modification Program (“HAMP”) and encouraging them to send financial information so 

that Bank of America could determine whether they were eligible. (Doc. 67-1 at PDF 

54.) On August 28, 2011, the Neminskys filed an application for a loan modification. 

(Doc. 67-1 at PDF 68-70.) 

 On October 12, 2012, Bank of America informed the Neminskys that it had 

transferred its servicing rights on the Neminskys’ loan to Specialized Loan Servicing 

(“SLS”). On December 11, 2012, SLS sent the Neminskys a letter informing them that 

their loan modification application was denied because the financial information they 

provided disqualified them for a HAMP loan. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Legal Standard 

 The Court grants summary judgment when the movant “shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the Court views the 

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evidence “in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Warren v. City of 

Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995). Where the parties have filed cross-motions 

for summary judgment, the Court “evaluate[s] each motion independently, ‘giving the 

nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.’” Lenz v. 

Universal Music Corp., 2015 WL 5315388, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015) (quoting 

ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir.2003)). “[A] party seeking 

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court 

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

 The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or 

denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 

53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). Substantive law determines which facts are material, 

and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. 

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 248). Thus, the nonmoving party must show that the genuine factual issues “can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of 

either party.” Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 

F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). 

II. Analysis 

 Arizona has adopted the “Good Samaritan Doctrine,” which provides that when a 

person voluntarily undertakes to render services to another, even when there is no legal 

duty to do so, that person is liable for any lack of due care in performing it. Restatement 

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(Second) of Torts § 323; Lloyd v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 176 Ariz. 247, 250, 860 

P.2d 1300, 1303 (Ct. App. 1992). The Good Samaritan Doctrine applies to economic 

harm and lenders are not excepted from liability. Steinberger v. McVey ex rel. County of 

Maricopa, 234 Ariz. 125, 137, 318 P.3d. 419, 430–31 (App. 2014); accord Silving v. 

Am.’s Servicing Co., 552 F. App’x 684, 684–85 (9th Cir. 2014). Under Arizona law, to 

succeed on a claim for increased risk of economic harm under the Good Samaritan 

Doctrine, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) defendants undertook to render services to the 

plaintiff that they should have recognized were necessary for the protection of the 

plaintiff’s property, (2) the defendants’ failure to exercise reasonable care while doing so 

increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff was in fact harmed because 

of the defendants’ actions. Steinberger, 234 Ariz. at 137, 318 P.3d at 431. 

 Here, there is no evidence that Bank of America failed to exercise reasonable care, 

or that the Neminskys were harmed. In 2009, a Bank of America representative advised 

the Neminskys that they must default on their loan before applying for a loan 

modification. The Neminskys did default on their loan in 2009 and did receive a loan 

modification in 2009.1

 In 2011, the Neminskys defaulted on their modified loan in hopes 

of receiving another loan modification, relying again on the information given by a Bank 

of America representative in 2009.2

 They had the opportunity to apply for a loan 

modification, but their application was denied. The Neminskys have failed to provide 

evidence suggesting that their application was denied due to any negligence on the part of 

Bank of America. The loan application was processed by SLS, not Bank of America. 

Moreover, the Neminskys’ financial information did not qualify them for a loan. 

/ / / 

 

1

 The Neminskys have cited to nothing in the record to support their contention that the 

October 2009 loan modification agreement signed by the Neminskys (Doc. 63 at PDF 26- 28) “never resulted in a ‘permanent modification’ per FDIC guidelines.” (Doc. 71 at 2.) 

2

 In considering Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment, the Court assumes the 

truth of Mr. Neminsky’s testimony that a Bank of America representative told him in 

2009 that he could later default a second time to pursue a second, more desirable loan modification, and that he acted upon that advise two years later, in 2011. (Doc. 76-1 at PDF 34, p. 81.) 

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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact to support Plaintiff’s claim under the Good Samaritan doctrine. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment by 

Plaintiffs Arlene C. Neminsky and Michael S. Neminsky (Doc. 62) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment by 

Defendants BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, Bank of America Corporation, and Bank of 

America NA (Doc. 66) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED and the Clerk 

of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 5th day of February, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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