Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02526/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02526-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:206 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROL M. LEONARD,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv2526-AJB (MDD)

REPORT AND

v. RECOMMENDATION

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Carol Leonard (“Plaintiff”), proceeding by and through

counsel, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial

review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Defendant”) denying Plaintiff’s application for disability

insurance benefits. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment to

reverse the decision and order an award of benefits on October 17, 2012. 

Defendant filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment,

asking the Court to affirm the denial of benefits. After a thorough review

of the pleadings filed by the parties and the entire record submitted in

this matter, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court recommends

that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied and Defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment be granted. 

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Background

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born March 6, 1956, and was 48 yrs. old on her alleged

onset date of disability of September 27, 2004. Plaintiff’s medical reports

span the period of 2004 to 2009 and document Plaintiff’s conditions of

cervical and lumbar degenerative disease and spondylosis, mild to

moderate pain disorder, mild arthritis of the right hip, and mild carpal

tunnel syndrome. 

II. Procedural History

On June 7, 2006, Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning

September 27, 2004. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 163, 340). On

August 28, 2006, her claim was denied. (A.R. at 182). On February 9,

2007, after Plaintiff requested reconsideration, her claim again was

denied. (A.R. at 190). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (A.R. at 197). On February 26, 2008,

a hearing was held before ALJ James S. Carletti. (A.R. 60-127). Plaintiff

appeared and was represented by counsel. (A.R. at 60). At the hearing,

Plaintiff, Medical Expert Dr. George Weilepp, and Vocational Expert

Mark Remas testified. (Id.).

On October 8, 2008, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that

Plaintiff was not disabled. (A.R. at 167-178). Plaintiff appealed and the

Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ for further proceedings. 

(A.R. at 179). The Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to “[f]urther

evaluate the claimant’s neck impairment . . . along with the claimant’s

pain disorder.” The Council further instructed the ALJ to hear testimony

from a vocational expert regarding the expanded record before him.

On December 17, 2010, a second hearing was held before the ALJ. 

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(A.R. at 133-162). Plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel. 

(A.R. at 60). At the hearing, Plaintiff, Medical Expert Dr. George

Weilepp (mistakenly referred to as Dr. Wyliff in the transcript), and

Vocational Expert Gloria Lasoff testified. (Id.). On December 27, 2010,

the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

(A.R. at 37). On August 24, 2012, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review. (A.R. at 1-6).

On October 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court

seeking judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s decision. 

(ECF No. 1). On February 21, 2013, Defendant answered and lodged the

administrative record with the Court. (ECF No. 12). On April 1, 2013,

Plaintiff moved for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 18). On April 22,

2013, Defendant cross-moved for Summary Judgment, and responded in

opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion. (ECF Nos. 19, 20). On May 6, 2013,

Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion. (ECF No.

21).

Discussion

I. Legal Standard

a. Qualification for Disability Benefits

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an

applicant must show that: (1) he or she suffers from a medically

determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death or has

lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of twelve

months or more: and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable

of performing the work that the applicant previously performed and

incapable of performing any other substantially gainful employment that

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). An applicant

must meet both requirements to be disabled. Id.

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The Social Security Regulations employ a five-step process to

determine whether an applicant is physically disabled under the Act.

First, the claimant must not currently be working. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(b). Second, the claimant must have a “severe” impairment. 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the medical evidence of the claimant’s

impairment is compared to a list of impairments that are presumed

severe enough to preclude work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s

impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, benefits are

awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment does not

meet or equal a listed impairment, a finding of claimant’s residual

functional capacity is made based on all the relevant medical and other

evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The claimant’s residual

functional capacity is used in the fourth and fifth steps. Id. Fourth, if

the claimant can do his past work, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(f). Fifth, if the claimant cannot do his past work and,

considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, cannot do other work that exists in the national

economy, benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). The last two

steps of the analysis are required by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 

If an applicant is found to be disabled or not disabled at any step,

there is no need to proceed to the subsequent steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180

F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). Although

the ALJ must assist the applicant in developing the record, the applicant

bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps. Id. If the fifth step is

reached, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to rebut the finding of

disability. Id. 

The ALJ has a special duty in social security cases to fully and

fairly develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a

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claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924

F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Because disability hearings are not

adversarial in nature, the ALJ must “inform himself about the facts

relevant to his decision,” even if the claimant is represented by counsel. 

Id. (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983)).

b. Standard of Review on Appeal 

An unsuccessful applicant may seek judicial review of the

Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)

(incorporating 405(g) for SSI judicial review). The scope of judicial

review is limited, however, and the Commissioner’s denial of benefits

“will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is

based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Green v. Heckler, 803

F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less

than a preponderance. Sandqathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir.

1997). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala,

53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from

the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health &

Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576, (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence

supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold

the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and

resolution of conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the

Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports

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the ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ

failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and

reaching his or her decision. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th

Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment affirming,

modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social Security

Administrator for further proceedings. Id. 

II The ALJ’s Decision

In this case, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as

defined under the Act, at any time from September 27, 2004, her alleged

onset date, through December 31, 2006, the date last insured. (A.R. at

51). The ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R.

404.1530(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff

had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as

defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) except she is able to stand, walk, and sit

for six hours each in an eight workday; stand and walk for forty minutes

at a time; lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently ; no overhead reaching; and no climbing ladders, ropes and

scaffolds; and must avoid hazards. 

The ALJ considered and found not credible Plaintiff’s statements

concerning intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms

and the extent to which those symptoms limited her ability to work. 

(A.R. at 47). 

The ALJ relied on the testimony of Medical Expert Dr. Weilepp. As

an initial matter, Dr. Weilepp stated that he had the “opportunity to

review the evidence of record.” (A.R. at 151). Dr. Weilepp then

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questioned Plaintiff regarding the timeline of her drug treatment, the

duration between her nerve ablation treatments and the return of severe

pain, and various other medical details of her case. Plaintiff answered

that she switched from Vicodin to Oxycontin in late 2006, and that pain

returned after the ablations in three to six months. Plaintiff also

described shoulder pain when raising her arms in front of her and a brief

attempt at physical therapy.

The ALJ asked Dr. Weilepp what the record showed Plaintiff’s

medical conditions to be and whether those conditions qualified Plaintiff

as disabled in accordance with the regulations. (A.R. at 154). Dr.

Weilepp testified that Plaintiff’s primary condition was a “pain disorder”

that had been “treated with surgical care with the nerve ablations,

medications, narcotics, [and] some physical therapy.” (Id.). Dr. Weilepp

identified the severity of the condition as “mild to moderate” indicating

that it could be variable by day and depending on whether Plaintiff took

medication. Dr. Weilepp testified that Plaintiff’s second condition was

“cervical and lumbar stenosis, spondylosis . . . aggravated by soft tissue

injuries,” also descibed as mild to moderate. Further, Dr. Weilepp

identified hip arthritis described as mild, and carpal tunnel symptoms

also described as mild. Dr. Weilepp compared these conditions with any

that would qualify Plaintiff as disabled as described in the regulations. 

(A.R. at 155). “[I] really feel that there’s a paucity of evidence of upper

extremity restriction, neurologically intact or otherwise, other than the

pain issue . . . . So if pain is improved enough to be functional for six

months after ablation or for use of Oxy versus Vicodin, she could

probably be allowed to be functional . . . as I suggested.” (A.R. at 157). 

The ALJ asked Dr. Weilepp to assess Plaintiff’s functional capacity. 

Dr. Weilepp indicated that Plaintiff was capable of highly restricted light

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work and could perform the following tasks with the following

restrictions: sit, stand, or walk for up to sixty minutes at a time, and up

to six hours in a workday; be restricted from heights and ladders;

restricted from irregular terrain; and have some restriction of any

overhead work. (A.R. at 156-157). 

The ALJ also relied on the testimony of Vocational Expert Lasoff. 

Ms. Lasoff indicated that she had an opportunity to review the evidence

of record. The ALJ inquired as to the exertional requirements of

Plaintiff’s past employed positions. According to Ms. Lasoff’s testimony

Plaintiff had previously worked as a retirement officer categorized as

“skilled light,” and as a policy holder info clerk categorized as “skilled

sedentary.” 

The ALJ cited the reports of Dr. Yee, M.D., Dr. Nelson, M.D., and

Dr. Phillip, M.D., and found that their findings made on examination did

not support Plaintiff’s claimed limitations. (A.R. at 47). The ALJ rejected

the assessment provided on a checklist-based form by Dr. Avian, M.D.,

because: (1) Dr. Avian’s opinion appears on a fill-in-the-blank form with

only marginal notes and he failed to cite any medical testing or objective

observations to support his conclusions; and, (2) the objective evidence in

the record does not support the level of severity Dr. Avian assigns. (A.R.

at 50). 

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Error

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by: (a) relying too heavily on the

testimony of the independent medical expert; and (b) failing to articulate

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s allegations of

disabling pain and limitations. (P. MSJ at 2 ). The Court addresses each

of Plaintiff’s allegations in turn. 

a. The ALJ’s reliance on medical expert Dr. Weilepp, M.D.

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Plaintiff contends that non-examining medical expert Dr. Weilepp 

did not have a correct understanding of Plaintiff’s functioning

capabilities1

. (P. MSJ at 2). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts: 

Dr. Weilepp’s opinions are predicated upon the false

impression that [Plaintiff] benefitted from her ablation and

narcotic pain regimen to the extent that it directly translated

to her ability to physically function. The medical evidence of

record stands for the opposite conclusion. Consequently, it would appear that a reasonable person would not accept Dr.

Weilepp’s testimony in light of this significant inaccuracy. In

other words, Dr. Weilepp’s testimony fails to rise to the level of substantial evidence. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision, i.e., the Commissioner’s final decision, should be reversed. 

(Id. at 5). Defendant contends the ALJ properly relied on the medical expert’s

opinion and on Plaintiff’s medical records to find that she was not

disabled and was not entitled to disability insurance benefits. 

The Ninth Circuit has held “the ALJ in a social security case has an

independent ‘duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure

that the claimant’s interests are considered.’” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among

the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant

(“treating physicians”); (2) those who examine but do not treat the

claimant (“examining physicians”); and (3) those who neither examine

nor treat the claimant (“non-examining physicians”). Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). As a general rule, more weight is given to

the opinion of a treating source than to that of a nontreating physician.

Id. (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Likewise, the opinion of an examining physician is typically entitled to

greater weight than that of a non-examining physician. Pitzer v.

1 In the instant case, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating or examining physicians. Thus the Court will not address this issue. See Rudebusch v.

Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 521 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Sullivan, 980 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, “[t]he opinions

of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also serve as

substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent

clinical findings or other evidence in the record.” Thomas v. Barnhart,

278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)

(stating that the opinions of non-examining physicians constitute medical

evidence.). The Ninth Circuit has also held the ALJ may give more

weight to doctors, non-examining or otherwise, who testify, because they

have been subject to cross-examination. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d

1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In this case, the ALJ concurred with the opinion of the nonexamining testifying medical expert Dr. Weilepp, finding Plaintiff’s pain

disorder was mild to moderate in nature. The ALJ also concurred with

Dr. Weilepp’s finding that Plaintiff’s cervical and lumber spondylosis was

mild to moderate in severity. (A.R. at 49). Additionally, the ALJ agreed

that Plaintiff’s mild arthritis of the right hip with hip disease was not

significantly severe and “[h]er restrictions were not found due to a lack of

neurological deficiency and other than her complaints of pain her

restrictions of activities were consistent with her cervical or lumbar

problem.” (Id.) In reaching these conclusions, the ALJ explained:

[Dr. Weilepp] tesitifed that he had reviewed the entire medical file [and] [h]e gave a detailed and longitudinal

summary of the claimant’s medical history finding that the

claimant had transferred from OxyContin in December, 2006

and as of August 22, 2006, her head was clearer. He testified

that ablation killed her pain, but it grew back in 3-6 months. 

Dr. Weilepp found that the claimant has pain disorder from

multiple vehicle accidents and had been treated with surgical

care, nerve ablation, physical therapy, and narcotics until

2006 that was mild to moderate in nature. He also found

cervical and lumber spondylosis that was mild to moderate in

severity, severe, and long standing with aggravation by

injuries and mild arthritis of the right hip with hip disease that was not significantly severe. She also had carpal tunnel

symptoms without surgery and was mild in nature. Her

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restrictions were not found due to a lack of neurological

deficiency and other than her complaints of pain her

restrictions of activities were consistent with her cervical or

lumbar problem. Based on these records, it was his expert

medical opinion that the claimant did not meet or equal the

criteria of 1.04 or 1.02A or B. The claimant was found to be

able to perform restricted light activities and could not

perform continuous reaching or climbing ladders and able to

perform frequent overhead reaching with her medications as

of the date of the hearing. The undersigned concurs with the Medical Expert’s opinion and so finds. 

(A.R. at 49)

In addition to the ALJ’s concurrence with Dr. Weilepp, the ALJ also

relied on the objective medical conclusions of Dr. Yee, M.D., Dr. Nelson,

M.D., and Dr. Phillip, M.D. (A.R. at 47). The ALJ noted that none of

these three doctors gave an opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to

function in the workplace given her medically determinable impairments.

(A.R. at 48). All three doctors reported impairments mild to moderate in

nature and her pain controllable with medical intervention. (A.R. at 47). 

For example, Dr. Yee noted in a clinic progress report that Plaintiff’s

sciatic nerve ablation helped 80%. (A.R. at 512). Additionally Dr.

Nelson, reported that Plaintiff “certainly does have arthritis in her neck

and back. . . consistent with her history of waxing and waning neck and

low back pain.” (A.R. at 462). Dr. Nelson also recommended that

[Plaintiff] maximize non-surgical measures . . . until that point in which

she begins to develop radicular type symptoms.” (A.R. at 463). Lastly the

ALJ cites the numerous reports of Plaintiff’s treating physician for pain,

Dr. Phillip, who noted:

[M]ultiple radiofrequency ablations in May 2003, October 2003, 6/04 and again on 1/17/05 . . . have provided

[Plaintiff] 50% to 60% pain relief of her axial low back pain.

(A.R. at 474). [Plaintiff] underwent years of conservative

therapy and has experienced significant resolution of the neck

pain. . . . (A.R. at 474). Plaintiff’s cervical spine does not

reveal any tenderness over the cervical spinous processes . . . [or] over the cervical facets. Lumbar spinous processes are nontender to palpatation. There is very mild lumbar

paraspinous spasm. Range of motion is 60 degrees lumbar

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flexion, 10 degrees lumbar extension and rotation with less

discomfort upon facet loading maneuvers. There is some mild

tenderness to palpatation over the lumbrosacral junction and

the sacral area . . . . Shoulder range of motion [is] intact. No

atrophy of the upper extremities. Strength is five out of five. 

Stable and intact in the lower extremities. 

(A.R. 474-475). Consequently, the ALJ found that “no treating or

examining source determined that the claimant’s impairments were

totally debilitating or rendered the claimant unemployable.” (A.R. at 48). 

 Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Weilepp misunderstood her medical

impairments is not supported by the evidence presented. In support of

her claim, Plaintiff cites to facts in the record which she contends “stands

for the opposite conclusion” to the ALJ’s decision which erroneously relies

on Dr. Weilepp’s opinion. For example, Plaintiff cites to a progress report

dated February 9, 2005, where “she made it clear that her pain is made

worse with sitting, bending forward, transitioning from sitting to

standing, and transitioning from standing to sitting.” (P. MSJ at 4 (citing

to A.R. at 474)). Yet in the same report, physical examination of the

Plaintiff revealed no tenderness in the cervical spine or over the cervical

facets. (A.R. at 474). Additionally, her range of motion in her neck was

found to be full without restriction despite a finding of long-standing

axial low back pain, lumbar degenerative disk disease and lumbar facet

syndrome. (A.R. at 475). Plaintiff next argues that a progress report

dated November 3, 2008, “notes a pain level at 5-6 out of 10 but increased

to an 8 in the lumbar spine when getting up from a seated position, and

to a 9 in the cervical spine when engaging in movements of the cervical

spine.” (P. MSJ at 4 (citing to A.R. at 768)). But a review of information

contained in the same report shows “no contact or deformity of the

thoracic spinal cord...[and]...[t]he entire remainder of the central spinal

canal appears unremarkable without other levels of spondylosis.” (A.R.

at 771). Overall the cervical spine shows foraminal narrowing as mild to

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moderate. (A.R. at 772). In other medical records dated June 1, 2009,

erroneously referred to by Plaintiff as a progress report, Plaintiff cites to

her self-report that “she was unable to bend over and do housework; that

it was difficult to shop; and that it was difficult to get things out of the

refrigerator or cabinets.” (P. MSJ at 4 (citing to A.R. at 869)). A review of

the record shows that this functional impairment complaint was part of a

request for a pain prescription refill. Notably, Plaintiff also reported at

that time, her pain severity was currently 4.5/10, with an average daily

pain severity of 3-4/10 despite claims of neck pain resulting from having

“recently moved some heavy items.” (A.R. at 869). 

In determining whether there exists substantial evidence to

support the ALJ’s finding, the court must weigh both the evidence that

supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion as that

evidence exists in the record. Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980

(9th Cir. 1997). “Where the evidence can rationally be interpreted in

more than one way, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision.”

Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. Here, the ALJ properly concluded that Dr.

Weilepp’s medical opinion of Plaintiff’s claimed disabilities was based

upon the record as a whole and generally consistent with that record. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s concurrence with Dr. Weilepp’s

opinion is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error and

recommends Plaintiff’s claim on this issue be DENIED. 

b. The ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s allegations of

pain

Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ failed to articulate clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting [Plaintiff’s] testimony.” (P. MSJ at 5). 

According to Plaintiff, the pain and physical limitations she experiences

as a result of her physical impairments were sufficiently proven to be

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severe by the evidence presented. 

Defendant asserts “substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s

finding that Plaintiff’s testimony of subjectively disabling symptoms was

not fully credible.” (D’s MSJ at 6). 

In the instant case, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegation of disabling

limitations “out of proportion with the record.” (A.R. at 48). When

evaluating a plaintiff’s claim of subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ

must engage in a two step analysis:

Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying

impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit the

claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. 

Unless there is affirmative evidence of malingering, the

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony

must be “clear and convincing.” “General findings are insufficient; rather the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s

complaints.” 

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F3d. 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).

Defendant encourages the Court to forego the “clear and

convincing” standard because “this judicially created standard exceeds

the requirements set forth by Congress.” (D. MSJ at 7). Rather, relying

on Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) and 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), Defendant argues that ‘[a] reviewing court is limited to

determining whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence and made in accordance with the Commissioner’s regulations.” 

(Id.) A review of cases after Bunnell specifically hold that an ALJ “may

only find an applicant not credible by making specific findings as to

credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins v.

Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Lingenfelter

v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We must . . . determine

whether the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for [the] adverse

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credibility finding.”); Valentine v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 574

F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Under our case law, [w]ithout affirmative

evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s

reasons for rejecting claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.”)

(citations omitted). Consequently, the Court declines to follow

Defendant’s suggestion and will apply the clear and convincing standard

to determine whether the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility. 

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the impairments that in

combination are “severe,” including cervical and lumbar degenerative

disease and spondylosis, mild to moderate pain disorder, mild arthritis of

the right hip, and mild carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms. (A.R. at 42).

The ALJ did not find these impairments could not have reasonably 

caused some degree of Plaintiff’s symptoms, nor did the ALJ make a

finding of malingering. Therefore, the ALJ was required to give “clear

and convincing reasons” for rejecting Plaintiff’s allegations. See Reddick,

157 F.3d at 722. 

 “To determine whether the claimant’s testimony regarding the

severity of her symptoms is credible, the ALJ may consider, for example:

(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s

reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the

symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than

candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek

treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the

claimant’s daily activities.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

 First, the ALJ found the record before him lacked any objective

clinical findings from the treating or examining physicians establishing

Plaintiff’s inability to perform work. (A.R. at 47). Second, the ALJ drew

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the inference from Plaintiff’s lack of hospitalization and significant active

care beyond conservative routine maintenance insufficient to find that

her “cervical or lumbar complaints are disabling.” (A.R. at 48). 

Additionally, the ALJ stated he took into consideration “the type, dosage,

effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; other

treatment, other than medication for relief of pain” and found that her

pain allegations were out of proportion with the record. (Id.) Notably, in

response to questioning by Dr. Weilepp, Plaintiff testified that she did

not know when she last saw a physical therapist and then only a few

times. (A.R. at 154). See Fair v. Bown, 885 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1989)

(finding that an inadequate or unexplained reason for not pursuing a

particular course of treatment is a sufficient factor to consider when

discrediting a plaintiff’s allegation of disabling pain.) Third, the ALJ

found Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were out of proportion to her

impairments. The ALJ made the following findings based on the medical

evidence: 

[Plaintiff’s] cervical and lumbar spondylosis is mild to

moderate and does not cause . . . severe limitation in her

ability to ambulate effectively or reach, handle, finger or feel

or prevents effective fine or gross manipulation; her right hip arthritis is mild and fails to prevent her from performing

effective ambulation; there has been no significant increase or changes in prescribed medication reflective of an uncontrolled

condition, nor did the claimant describe side effects from her

medication that would prevent her from substantial gainful activity; and no treating or examining source determined that the claimant’s impairments were totally debilitating or

rendered the claimant completely unemployable. 

(A.R. at 48). 

Further, the ALJ gave little weight to Plaintiff’s allegations of

debilitation in her August 1, 2006, adult function report. (A.R. at 390-

397). According to the ALJ, Plaintiff reported that “she is able to take

care of pet cats, take care of her personal care, cook meals, dust, sweep,

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vacuum, water plants, clean the bathroom, deadhead flowers, perform

yard work, drive a car, go shopping in stores, pay bills, count change,

handle savings account, use a checkbook and money orders, use email,

and follow written and spoken instructions.” (Id.). The ALJ also cited a

report prepared by psychologist, Dr. Whitehead, on August 14, 2006, that

reported claimant stated she is able to cook or prepare simple foods and

required no assistance showering, bathing, toileting, or other personal

hygiene activities, but on her own schedule and timing. (A.R. at 528-529). 

The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s own testimony wherein she stated she was

able to cook, clean, and grocery shop. (A.R. at 139-141). Further,

Plaintiff testified she took care of her terminally ill sister until she died. 

(A.R. at 142). Plaintiff further testified that she used a glider machine

without any resistant weights to help try and alleviate “really bad pain.2

”

(A.R. at 148). The ALJ explained “the overall evidence suggests that the

claimant has the ability to care for herself and maintain her home.” (A.R.

at 48). “Furthermore, the performance of the claimants’ daily activities

as described is not inconsistent with the performance of many basic work

activities.” (A.R. at 48-49). 

In this case, the ALJ articulated clear and convincing reasons for

partially rejecting Plaintiff’s pain testimony. The ALJ properly

considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in his credibility analysis. 

“[I]f a claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that

could be transferred to the workplace, the ALJ may discredit the

claimant’s allegations upon making specific findings relating to those

activities.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Morgan v.

Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[C]laimant’s ability to fix meals,

2 A machine used for exercise.

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do laundry, work in the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child

was evidence of claimant’s ability to work.”)

The ALJ then considered Plaintiff’s boyfriend’s third party adult

functioning report of August 1, 2006. An ALJ may consider third party

statements as evidence regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s impairment.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913. “If the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of

the lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each

witness” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 9915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993); Bruce v.

Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the ALJ considered the

third party adult function report from David Pierce (Plaintiff’s boyfriend)

and noted his report was virtually identical to Plaintiff’s in the list of

activities that Plaintiff can perform. (A.R. at 48). “Where the ALJ has

first found a claimant not credible, the ALJ may subsequently reject lay

testimony because it essentially reproduces the claimant’s testimony.”

Valentine, 574 F3d at 694 (2009). Additionally, Mr. Pierce reported that

Plaintiff has “the ability to do laundry and water the front and back

yards.” (A.R. at 48). Mr. Pierce further stated in his report that he

“doesn’t know every detail” because he is away from home up to ten

hours a day. (A.R. at 398). These reasons are sufficiently germane for

the ALJ not to credit Mr. Pierce’s opinion evidence. 

The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the . . . residual

functional capacity assessment” was supported by clear and convincing

reasons. (A.R. at 47). The ALJ cited to specific evidence in the record

that contradicted Plaintiff’s assertions that her disability makes it

impossible for her to work. “Where as here, the ALJ has made specific

findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation of excess pain,

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and those findings are supported by . . . evidence in the record,” the ALJ

decision will not be disturbed. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir.

1989). “[Q]uestions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the

testimony are functions soley of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694

F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604

(9th Cir. 1989) citing Russell v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1988))

(Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ.) For these

reasons, it is recommended Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on

her claim that the ALJ committed error for failing to fully credit

Plaintiff’s allegations of pain be DENIED. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, and in consideration of the record

as a whole, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment be denied and that Defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment be granted and the ALJ’s decision be upheld. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S. C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than February 3, 2014. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than February

10, 2014. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 21, 2014

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 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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