Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04004/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04004-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT KISSLING,

Plaintiff,

v.

WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, 

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04004-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Docket No. 11

Plaintiff Albert Kissling filed the instant suit against Defendants Wyndham Vacation 

Resorts, Inc. and Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. The action is predicated on allegations that 

Defendants sold Plaintiff timeshare points through fraudulent sales conduct. Plaintiff has sued 

Defendant on eight Counts: (1) intentional fraud and deceit, (2) intentional misrepresentation, (3) 

violation of Business & Professional Code Section 17200, (4) violation of Welfare & Institutions 

Code Section 15610.30, (5) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), (6) violation 

of California Corporations Code Section 25401, (7) constructive fraud, and (8) negligent 

misrepresentation. Docket No. 1, Exh. B (First Amended Complaint) (FAC).

Defendants now move to dismiss Counts five through eight of Plaintiff‟s First Amended 

Complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). Docket No. 11 (Motion to Dismiss) (Mot.) at 1. 

Defendants argue that the CLRA claim fails because timeshare points do not meet the definition of 

“goods” or “services” under the Act, and that the constructive fraud claim fails because it does not 

plead the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. Mot. at 1-2. Defendants also 

contend that the California Corporations Code Section 25401 and negligent misrepresentation 

claims fail because they are time-barred. Id. The motion to dismiss came on for hearing before 

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the Court on November 9, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

Defendants‟ motion to dismiss with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about December 19, 2011, Plaintiff attended a sales presentation at the Wyndham 

Canterbury in San Francisco, CA. FAC ¶ 8. At that presentation, a Wyndham sales associate1

informed Plaintiff that he owed about $85,000 on his timeshare account even though Plaintiff 

argued that his balance was closer to $52,000. Id. Plaintiff asked the sales associate to contact Ed 

Gray, another sales associate in Alexandria, Virginia, from whom Plaintiff had most recently 

bought timeshare points. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff claims that the San Francisco sales associate never 

contacted Mr. Gray even though she told Plaintiff that she had spoken to Mr. Gray and verified 

that Plaintiff indeed owed $85,000 on his account. Id.

Due to this misinformation, Plaintiff agreed to enroll in a program called Club Wyndham 

Access, which he believed would lead to consolidated maintenance fees and a lower interest rate 

and monthly payments. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff later learned from another Wyndham representative, 

Elizabeth Brock, that his balance had only been $52,000 and that he incurred an additional 

$33,000 in liability after he purchased additional timeshare points on December 19, 2011, at the 

Wyndham Canterbury presentation. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that he was never informed that his 

enrollment in Club Wyndham Access meant the purchase of additional timeshare points or an 

increase in financial liability. Plaintiff also alleges that Wyndham sales associates target 

individuals over the age of seventy and misrepresent information to them in order to induce them 

into increasing their payments and investments with Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. 

On approximately June 6, 2012, Plaintiff met with Katherine Landry, a representative of 

Wyndham‟s Member Services Team, to discuss his experience at the Wyndham Canterbury and 

attempt to cancel his purchase and contract for additional timeshare points. Id. ¶ 14. Ms. Landry 

called her supervisor, Rebecca Hawkins, and Plaintiff was asked to meet with Ms. Hawkins at 

 

1

Plaintiff has not identified the sales associate by name in any of the papers submitted to the 

Court.

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another office. Id. When Plaintiff arrived at Ms. Hawkins office, Representatives Jorge Jorge and 

Jeff Cross informed Plaintiff that Ms. Landry had reported him for sexual harassment and that he 

could be arrested. Id. ¶ 15. After agreeing to set the matter aside, the two representatives 

allegedly tried to convince Plaintiff to purchase the next highest level of timeshare-point 

membership. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Once the representatives left the room to purportedly determine the 

amount Plaintiff would be required to pay to purchase the next level of timeshare-point 

membership, Plaintiff left the room and decided to leave the Wyndham resort he was staying at. 

Id. ¶ 16. When Plaintiff attempted to return his room key at the front desk, he was arrested for the 

sexual battery of Ms. Landry. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Wyndham sales associates target individuals over the age of seventy 

and misrepresent information to them in order to induce them into increasing their payments and 

investments with Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants‟ sales associates 

used promises to set aside the sexual-harassment claim against Plaintiff as a means to coerce him

into purchasing additional timeshare points. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff believes that he was arrested in 

retaliation for not purchasing additional timeshare points. Id.

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with five causes of action 

consisting of fraud, intentional misrepresentation, violation of Business & Professional Code 

Section 17200, violation of Welfare & Institutions Code Section 15610.30, and violation of the 

CLRA on December 17, 2014, in the San Francisco County Superior Court. Docket No. 1, Exh. A 

(Complaint). On July 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, adding claims of 

violation of California Corporations Code Section 25401, constructive fraud, and negligent 

misrepresentation. FAC ¶ 1. On September 1, 2015, Defendants removed the case to federal 

court. Docket No. 1 (Removal).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 

12(b)(6) allows for dismissal based on a failure to state a claim for relief. A motion to dismiss 

based on this rule essentially challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged. See Parks 

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School of Business v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). In considering a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion, a court must take all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, although “conclusory allegations of law and 

unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 

568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual 

allegations . . . it must plead „enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.‟” 

Weber v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556. However, “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a „probability requirement,‟ but it 

asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted 

unless it can be determined that no possible amendment would cure the deficiency.” Gyore v. 

Krausz Precision Mfg. Corp., 954 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Counts Six and Eight: California Corporations Code § 25401 and Negligent 

Misrepresentation Claims

In his opposition and at the hearing, Plaintiff conceded that these claims are indeed timebarred. Docket No. 20 (Plaintiff‟s Opposition) (Opp.) at 5 n.1. The Court therefore dismisses 

these claims with prejudice.

C. Count Five: CLRA Claim

The CLRA protects against unfair competition and deceptive practices intending to result 

in the sale or lease of “goods” or “services” to any consumer. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). 

Defendants argue that the Plaintiff does not have a claim under the CLRA because timeshare 

points do not fall under the Act‟s definition of “goods” or “services.” Mot. at 3. As defined by 

the CLRA:

(a) “Goods” means tangible chattels bought or leased for use 

primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, including 

certificates or coupons exchangeable for these goods, and including 

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goods that, at the time of the sale or subsequently, are to be so 

affixed to real property as to become a part of real property, whether 

or not they are severable from the real property.

(b) “Services” means work, labor, and services for other than a 

commercial or business use, including services furnished in 

connection with the sale or repair of goods.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(a), (b). 

The California Supreme Court has not addressed whether timeshare points fall within the 

CLRA's definition of goods or services. See Wixon v. Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp., No. C 07-

02361 (JSW), 2008 WL 1777590, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2008). However, the Northern 

District of California and California Court of Appeal have held that timeshare points do not fall 

within the CLRA‟s definition of “goods” or “services.”2 

In Wixon, the court described timeshare points as a vacation license, constituting a right to 

use and occupy a unit during the member‟s timeshare use, and a nonexclusive license to use, 

enjoy, and occupy the property and timeshare points, among other things. Id. at *4. Thus, 

timeshare points were not tangible chattel in that they could not be touched, seen, or smelled. Id. 

Consequently, the court concluded that as a matter of law, timeshare points did not qualify as a 

“good” under the CLRA. Id. 

Likewise, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal held that timeshare 

points were not goods under the CLRA. Boling v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., No. G034203, 2005 

WL 1186519, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 19, 2005) (unpublished).3 The court compared the sale 

of timeshare points to “membership interests” entitling the “members to the use of condominium 

units for one or two weeks each year” in Cal-Am Corp. v. Department of Real Estate, which the 

court found constituted interests in real property that are in the nature of a lease. Id. at *4 (quoting 

 

2 Because for the most part timeshare interests, vacation credits, and timeshare points are 

interchangeable terms, this Order uses the term “timeshare points” to provide consistency even if 

relevant cases sometimes use a different term.

3

“Although unpublished California cases have no precedential value, they may be considered „as 

a possible reflection of California law.‟” Valencia v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am. Inc, No. 15–cv–

00887–HSG, 2015 WL 4747533, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2015) (quoting Roberts v. McAfee, 

Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1167 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011)).

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Cal-Am Corp. v. Dep’t of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 456-57 (1980)). The Court of 

Appeal found several similarities between the sale of membership interests in condominium units 

and vacation-club memberships, such as being able to stay at a specific resort or hotel for a certain 

amount of time. In the end, the court concluded that, even assuming that timeshare points are

chattel, the timeshares were not a tangible chattel because the timeshares represented an 

incorporeal right in real property. See Boling, 2005 WL 1186519, at *4. The court reasoned that 

tangible property consists of things that can be touched, seen, or smelled, while intangible 

property is usually a “right” rather than a physical object. Id. As the CLRA applies only to 

“tangible chattels,” timeshare interests were not a “good” that could support a CLRA claim.

Like Wixon and Boling, the Court finds that timeshare points are not “goods” under the 

CLRA. The CLRA‟s definition of goods explicitly defines goods as “tangible chattels,” which is

distinct from an interest in real property. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(a). Moreover, the CLRA 

provides that:

The provisions of this title shall not apply to any transaction which 

provides for the construction, sale, or construction and sale of an 

entire residence or all or part of a structure designed for commercial 

or industrial occupancy, with or without a parcel of real property or 

an interest therein, or for the sale of a lot or parcel of real property, 

including any site preparation incidental to such sale.

Id. at § 1754. As conceded by Plaintiff at the hearing and in his papers, timeshare points are an 

interest in real property, which is not covered by the CLRA‟s definition of goods. It is undisputed 

that in this case, Plaintiff‟s purchase of timeshare points came with a deed of trust. Thus, 

Plaintiff‟s rights emanate from a purchase of real property, not tangible chattels. Opp. at 7. See 

also Boling, 2005 WL 1186519, at *4-5 (“The memberships sold by defendant constituted 

incorporeal rights in real property. [Citation] ¶ Consequently, the trial court properly dismissed 

the first cause of action on the ground it lacked merit.”) 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that timeshare points are a “good” covered under the CLRA 

because his purchase of timeshare points, although intangible, were memorialized on a written 

deed of trust and the contract was obtained at a brick-and-mortar sales office. Opp. at 7. Plaintiff 

argues that his purchase of timeshare points is analogous to Ladore v. Sony Computer 

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Entertainment America, LLC, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2014), where this Court rejected the 

defendant‟s argument that a video game disc was not a “good” under the CLRA. In Ladore, the 

defendant argued that the good at issue was the video game software, not the disc that it was sold 

on. Id. at 1074-75. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the video game was purchased 

on a physical disc at a brick-and-mortar store. Id. at 1073. Furthermore, unlike an insurance 

contract or credit card which was merely a “physical representation” of the parties‟ intangible 

agreement, “„[c]onsumers do not purchase software discs or books to memorialize or prove the 

existence of an agreement; they purchase the objects to possess and use them. As a physical 

object purchased for a consumer‟s use, a software disc is a tangible chattel.‟” Id. (quoting Haskins 

v. Symantec Corp., No. 13-cv-01834-JST, 2013 WL 6234610, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013).

Here, Plaintiff argues that not only did he buy timeshare points at a brick-and-mortar 

location like in Ladore, but that timeshare points are analogous to videogame software and the 

timeshare‟s deed of trust and written contract are analogous to a videogame disc. Opp. at 7. 

However, the Court finds that the deed of trust and written contract are not like a software disc, 

which a consumer purchases to use. It is instead like the insurance contract or credit card that is 

merely a “physical representation” of an agreement for something intangible – in this case 

Plaintiff‟s timeshare points, which are themselves an incorporeal right in real property. The fact 

that Plaintiff‟s timeshare points may be memorialized on paper does not turn the timeshare points 

into a tangible chattel covered by the CLRA.

In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that timeshare points are a “service” under the CLRA. 

However, when pressed for an explanation as to how timeshare points are a service, Plaintiff

responded that the right to use a facility for a specific amount of time was the “service” rendered 

by the timeshare points. This argument was considered and properly rejected by the Wixon court, 

which found that that the right to use and occupy a unit was not a service covered by the CLRA, 

even when applying a liberal construction of the CLRA. 2008 WL 1777590, at *4. 

Plaintiff‟s reliance on Hernandez v. Hilltop Financial Mortgage, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 842 

(N.D. Cal. 2007) likewise fails. There, the court held that the financial services rendered by the 

defendant were sufficient to constitute a “service” under the CLRA. Id. at 851. Although the 

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extension of a credit line usually did not fall under the CLRA‟s definition of a “service” (because 

the issuing of a credit line alone is not work or labor or related to the sale or repair of a tangible 

chattel) the court in Hernandez determined that the totality of the services provided were indeed a 

“service” under the CLRA because the defendant provided assistance in developing, securing, and 

managing an acceptable refinancing plan so that the plaintiffs could remain in possession of their 

home, along with the credit line. See id. In contrast, there is no allegation that Defendants 

provided Plaintiff with any “services” other than the sale of the timeshare points that goes beyond 

that sale and into a level of ancillary services attendant to the use of the vacation unit. The core 

value of the timeshare points is the interest in and use of real estate, not e.g., housekeeping 

services incidental thereto. Consequently, timeshare points do not fall under the CLRA‟s 

definition of “goods” or “services.” For this reason, the Court dismisses the CLRA claim with

prejudice.

D. Count Seven: Constructive Fraud Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff‟s constructive fraud claim fails as a matter of law because 

he has not alleged the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship that is a threshold for 

such a claim. Mot. at 5. Under California law, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, 

and concealments involving breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence that results in 

damage to another. Grenier v. Harley, 250 F.2d 539, 544 (9th Cir. 1957). In other words, 

“[c]onstructive fraud exists in cases in which conduct, although not actually fraudulent, ought to 

be so treated” and there exists a fiduciary or confidential relationship which was breached. See 

id.; Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of California, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 4th 949, 961 (2005). The 

existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship is a question of fact, which the party asserting 

the relationship has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. See Estate of 

Gelonese v. Balassi, 36 Cal. App. 3d 854, 862 (1974). 

Plaintiff claims that he does have a fiduciary relationship with Defendants because 

timeshare points are a form of real property that California requires be sold by licensed real-estate 

agents, who owe fiduciary duties to their clients in some circumstances. Opp. at 7-8. However, 

the district court in Martinez v. Welk Group, Inc., found that a fiduciary duty did not exist between 

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a purchaser of timeshare points and a corporation selling timeshare points where there was no 

“conduct or circumstances that could reasonably elevate the parties [sic] conduct above those 

present by virtue of the contractual relationship.” 907 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1132-33 (S.D. Cal. 

2012). There, the plaintiff sought to buy timeshare points from the defendant and asked if the 

resort was safe for his son who previously had cancer and needed a clean environment. Id. at 

1127. The sales agent assured the plaintiff that the resort he was buying timeshare points for was 

clean, safe, and well maintained. Id. The plaintiff later became suspicious that mold was growing 

at the resort and filed suit for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. Nevertheless, the court found that 

despite the sales agent‟s assurance that the resort was clean, safe, and well maintained, the plaintiff 

failed to prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship, “above and beyond the contractual 

relationship between the parties.” Id. at 1133. The Martinez court explained that the 

“„relationship of seller to buyer is not one ordinarily vested with fiduciary obligation, even though 

sellers routinely make representations concerning their product, often on the basis of a claimed 

expert knowledge about its utility and value.” Id. (quoting Comm’n on Children’s Television, Inc. 

v. Gen. Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 221 (1983) (superseded by statute on other grounds). “Thus, 

unless a seller has taken on „duties beyond those of mere fairness and honesty in marketing its 

product,‟ the law of fiduciary relationships is ill-suited to deal with such claims.” Id. (citation 

omitted); see also Commission on Children's Television, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d at 222 (“the various 

statutory and common law doctrines fashioned to protect the consumer from overreaching and 

deception are strong and flexible enough to accomplish that purpose, and that it is unnecessary to 

call upon the law of fiduciary relationships to perform a function for which it was not designed 

and is largely unsuited.”).

Here, similar to Martinez, Plaintiff relies upon his contract with Defendants and alleged

misrepresentations by the Defendants‟ sales agent to allege the existence of a fiduciary or 

confidential relationship. As was the case in Martinez, there is no such fiduciary or confidential 

relationship between Defendants‟ sales agent and Plaintiff. There is nothing to elevate the parties‟

conduct above that of an ordinary contractual relationship and into one of a fiduciary or 

confidential relationship. 

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At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that he has a fiduciary relationship with Defendants 

because the sales agent who sold Plaintiff timeshare points at the Wyndham Canterbury 

presentation acted as a dual agent who represented both Plaintiff and Defendants in the sale of 

timeshare points – a type of real estate transaction. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the sales 

agent owed Plaintiff written notice regarding this dual representation, which he did not receive.

In some circumstances, a real-estate agent can form a fiduciary relationship with a buyer 

by being a dual agent for the seller and buyer. See Assilzadeh v. California Fed. Bank, 82 Cal. 

App. 4th 399, 414 (2000). Although a seller‟s real-estate agent generally acts as the agent for the 

seller, a real-estate agent can be the agent for both seller and buyer in a transaction if there is 

knowledge and consent from both the seller and buyer. Cal. Civ. Code § 2079.16. In such a case, 

the law requires that the agent disclose as soon as practicable whether the agent is acting as a dual 

agent, and the relationship must be confirmed in the contract. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2079.17.

The Court finds that contrary to Plaintiff‟s argument, the failure to provide written notice 

of a dual agency does not create the dual agency. Cal. Civ. Code § 2079.17. Furthermore, 

Plaintiff has provided no factual basis for a reasonable inference that Plaintiff‟s contractual 

relationship with the sales agent reached the level of a fiduciary, confidential, or dual agency 

relationship. There are no facts showing or implying that the sales agent served as a dual agent 

between Plaintiff and Defendants. Instead, the alleged dual agent was clearly Defendants‟ 

employee – the sales agent worked at Defendants‟ sales office and sold Defendants‟ timeshare 

points at Defendants‟ sales presentation. Plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that the 

sales agent represented him as well as Defendants. Thus, the sales agent does not owe Plaintiff a 

dual agency disclosure because Plaintiff and Defendants never knew about or consented to a dualagency arrangement. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2079.16-.17; Assilzadeh, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 414 

(2000). Consequently, no factual basis with which to support a constructive fraud claim exists.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend his Complaint so that he may specifically allege a 

fiduciary relationship with the sales agent who sold him the timeshare points at issue. Opp. at 8. 

However, there is no evidence to suggest that the transaction between Plaintiff and the sales agent 

at the Wyndham Canterbury was anything more than a contractual relationship. Thus, amendment 

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would be futile, and thus, Plaintiff‟s constructive fraud claim is dismissed with prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants‟ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs‟ claims five through eight with prejudice.

This order disposes of Docket No. 11.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 18, 2015

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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