Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00182/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00182-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DENNIS CORDELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE W. W. WILLIAMS

COMPANY,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:14-CV-182-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING MOTION TO REMAND

On December 30, 2013, Dennis Cordell, filed this civil action in the Circuit

Court of Jefferson County, Alabama against the W. W. Williams Company, Inc.

(“Williams Company”), the entity which formerly employed him. (Doc. 1-1 at 5). The

only count of the complaint alleges that the defendant terminated Cordell, on account

of his age, in violation of the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“AADEA”), Ala. Code § 25-1-20, et seq. (Doc. 1-1 at 6-9). The complaint claims

1

no specific amount of damages.

On January 31, 2014, the defendant removed the case to this court. (Doc. 1).

The complaint refers to Ala. Code. § 25-1-20, et seq. as the “Alabama Age

1

Discrimination Enforcement Act.” (Doc. 1-1 at 5).

FILED

 2014 Apr-23 PM 03:16

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 1 of 16
The case is now before the court on the plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. 7). For the

reasons stated herein, the motion will be DENIED. 

I. STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

America,511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). For removal to be proper, the court must have

subject-matter jurisdiction in the case. “Only state-court actions that originally could

have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the Defendant.”

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). In addition, the removal

statute must be strictly construed against removal, and any doubtsshould be resolved

in favor of remand. See, City of Vestavia Hills v. Gen. Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310,

1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism

concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly. Indeed, all

doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”)

(citation omitted).

“In removal cases, the burden is on the party who sought removal to

demonstrate that federal jurisdiction exists.” Friedman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 410

F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted);Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269

F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 2 of 16
That burden goes not only to the issue of federal jurisdiction, but also to

questions of compliance with statutes governing the exercise ofthe right

of removal. Albonetti v. GAF Corporation-Chemical Group, 520 F.

Supp. 825, 827 (S.D. Texas 1981); Jennings Clothiers of Ft. Dodge, Inc.

v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 496 F. Supp. 1254, 1255 (D. Iowa

1980); Fort v. Ralston Purina Company, 452 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E.D.

Tenn.1978). 

Parker v. Brown, 570 F. Supp. 640, 642 (D.C. Ohio, 1983).

II. ANALYSIS

The defendant claims that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and

is between . . . citizens of different States.” The parties agree that this case is between

citizens of different states, but they disagree over whether the amount in controversy

2

has been satisfied.

A. Standard for Proving the Amount of Damages

If, as in this case, a plaintiff makes “an unspecified demand for damages in

state court, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

The defendant, which is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in 2

Ohio (doc. 1 at 2; doc. 1-1 at 5), is a citizen of both Ohio and Delaware. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)

(“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has

been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”).

The plaintiff is a citizen of Alabama. (Doc. 1-1 at 5; doc. 1 at 2).

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 3 of 16
the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the . . . jurisdictional

requirement.” Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir.

1996), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069

(11th Cir. 2000). The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

We reiterate that the burden of proving jurisdiction lies with the

removing defendant. A conclusory allegation in the notice of removal

that the jurisdictional amount is satisfied, without setting forth the

underlying facts supporting such an assertion, isinsufficient to meet the

defendant's burden. See Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873

(10th Cir.1995); Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335; Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564,

567 (9th Cir.1992); see also Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092,

1097 (11th Cir.1994) (concluding that removing defendant did not meet

burden of proving amount in controversywhere it offered “nothing more

than conclusory allegations”); Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S.

Co., 287 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir.1961) (stating that removing defendant

must make “affirmative showing ... of all the requisite factors of

diversity jurisdiction”).

Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001).

B. The Amount of Back Pay Alone Exceeds the Jurisdictional

Minimum of this Court

The plaintiff asksthe court to award back pay and other relief. (Doc. 1-1 at 8).

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Specifically, the complaint asks the court to: 3

a. Issue a declaratory judgment that the employment policies, practices,

procedures, conditions and customs of the [d]efendant, its agents,

servants[,] and employees are violative of the rights of the [p]laintiff as

secured by the [AADEA].

b. Grant the [p]laintiff a permanent injunction, enjoining the [d]efendant, its

employees, servants, agents[,] and successors and those acting in concert

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 4 of 16
The plaintiff states that at the time of removal he had been unemployed for

approximately 26 weeks, and that, while employed by the defendant, his gross

average weekly wage was $1,262.49. (Doc. 7 at 5). He then admits that his “lost

wages at the time of removal was $32,824.74.” (Doc. 7 at 6) (emphasis added).

However, the defendant urges the court to continue the computation of lost

back wages up until the potential future trial date. (Doc. 1 at 2-3). At the earliest, the

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trial of this matter would be on or about January 13, 2015. From the date of removal 5

with it and at [its] request from continuing to violate the above cited laws.

c. Award the [p]laintiff an appropriate amount of lost back pay,

compensation, benefits, front pay, liquidated damages, compensatory and

punitive damages, costs, expenses of prosecuting this action and attorney’s

fees.

d. Return the [p]laintiff to employment with the [d]efendant in the same or

similar position as he occupied with the [d]efendant at the time of his

termination, with the same compensation and benefits, or to those he

would have been otherwise entitled but for his unlawful termination. In the

alternative, award the [p]laintiff an appropriate amount of front pay.

(Doc. 1-1 at 8).

 If the case did in fact go to trial, back pay through the date of trial would be the proper 4

measure of the plaintiff’s damages. Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th

Cir. 2000) (“[I]n an age discrimination suit, a successful plaintiff receives back pay from the date

of his or her termination to the date of trial.”); Kok v. Kadant Black Clawson, Inc., 274 F. App'x

856, 857 (11th Cir. 2008) (same standard under Alabama Act).

 On March 10, 2014, based upon the parties’ representations in their Rule 26 Report of 5

Parties Planning Meeting, this court entered a scheduling order which sets September 15, 2014,

as the dispositive motion deadline. (Doc. 9 at 5). That order also provides:

This case will be set for a final pretrial conference . . . if no motion for summary

judgment is filed, approximately 60 days after the dispositive motions deadline. . .

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 5 of 16
to the estimated trial date is about 50 weeks. Therefore, through the estimated trial

date, $63,124.50 of additional back wages would be added to the amount computed

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up to the time of removal ($32,824.74), for $95,949.24 in total back wages. That

figure easily satisfies the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

The plaintiff insists that the standard for removal requires the court to

determine back pay due only at the time of removal, and implies that to compute it

based upon a possible future trial date would amount to the type speculation

prohibited by the Eleventh Circuit in Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184

(11th Cir. 2007).

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. The case should be ready for trial approximately 60 days after the pretrial

conference date.

(Doc. 9 at 3). Using these time periods, if no motion for summary judgment is filed, the pretrial

conference would be set on or about November 14, 2014. Thereafter, the case would be tried on

or about January 13, 2015. Of course, if a motion for summary judgment is filed, the trial date

would be later.

This figure is computed by multiplying the plaintiff’s gross average weekly wage of 6

$1,262.49 by 50 weeks.

Actually the plaintiff, in a footnote, writes: 7

In addition to the opinion in Snellgrove, this court has rendered several

remand decisions based on Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, (11th Cir.

2007). See Wood v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 580 F.Supp.1248 (N.D. Ala. 2008);

Smith v. Parker, No. 4:08-CV-901-VEH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87220 (Docs. 10,

11) (N.D. Ala. July 11, 2008); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:08-CV-449-VEH,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87067 (Docs. 6, 7) (N.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2008); Stanfields v.

Fleet Global Services, No. 2:07-CV-2307-VEH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87227

(Docs. 10, 11) (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 2008).

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 6 of 16
1. Courtsin the EleventhCircuit Can UseReasonable Deductions,

Reasonable Inferences, or Other Reasonable Extrapolations To

Determine the Amount in Controversy

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d

744 (11th Cir. 2010), provides the appropriate framework for this case. However, its

discussion of Lowery is instructive. In Pretka, the court summarized the facts and

holding in Lowery as follows:

We concluded in Lowery that it would be “impermissible

speculation” for a court to hazard a guess on the jurisdictional amount

in controversy “without the benefit of any evidence [on] the value of

individual claims.” 483 F.3d at 1220; see also id. at 1214–15 (“If [the

defendant's] evidence isinsufficient to establish thatremoval was proper

or that jurisdiction was present, neither the defendants nor the court may

speculate in an attempt to make up for the notice's failings. The absence

of factual allegations pertinent to the existence of jurisdiction is

dispositive and, in such absence, the existence of jurisdiction should not

be divined by looking to the stars.” (footnote and citation omitted));

Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1332. Because the proper interpretation of

Lowery's “impermissible speculation” rule isimportant, we will explain

it in greater detail.

In Lowery the defendant, Alabama Power, had attached to its

notice of removal copies of the initial complaint and the third amended

complaint, but nothing else. 483 F.3d at 1189 & n. 8. Those pleadings

offered no specific facts on the amount in controversy. See id. at 1219

(“[The third amended] complaint contains neither an ad damnum clause

indicating the amount of damages sought, nor any other concrete

(Doc. 7 at 4, n. 1).The plaintiff discusses none of these cases, and none of them dealt with the issue

in the instant case. Then, he argues that “rather than determining the amount in controversy at the

time of removal, the [d]efendant calculated the amount in controversy based on a totally conjectured

trial date a year into the future.” (Doc. 7 at 4). 

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 7 of 16
information about the value of plaintiffs’ claims.” (emphasis added));

see also Lowery v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 460 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1291

(N.D.Ala. 2006) (“There is nothing in the original complaint to

distinguish between a plaintiff who may be claiming severe lung disease

from one who may be claiming grit in her grits.”).

The notice of removal in Lowery contained a conclusory

allegation that CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement had been

satisfied, but that was not enough. See Williams, 269 F.3d at 1320 (“A

conclusory allegation in the notice of removal that the jurisdictional

amount issatisfied, withoutsetting forth the underlying facts supporting

such an assertion, is insufficient to meet the defendant's burden.”).

Recognizing the shortcomings of Alabama Power's notice of

removal, the Lowery plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. In response,

Alabama Power filed a supplement to its notice of removal, pointing out

that to reach CAFA's $5 million jurisdictional threshold, each of the 400

plaintiffs' claims would need to put in controversy only $12,500. The

supplement argued it was evident more than $5 million was in

controversy because plaintiffs in recent mass tort cases in Alabama had

received jury verdicts or settlements exceeding that amount. Lowery,

483 F.3d at 1189. But the supplement failed to explain the facts of those

other tort cases or link them to the facts of the Lowery case. See id. at

1221 (“Looking only to this evidence and the complaint, the facts

regarding other casestell us nothing about the value of the claims in this

lawsuit. Even were we to look to evidence beyond that contained within

the notice of removal, in the present dispute—with a record bereft of

detail—we cannot possibly ascertain how similar the current action isto

those the defendants cite.”); Lowery, 460 F.Supp.2d at 1299

(“Defendants' hopeful conjecture based on Alabama jury verdicts in

cases that may have some similarity to this case, but are not closely

similar, do[es] not suffice ....”).

We concluded in Lowery that Alabama Power's supplement and

its additional “ ‘evidence’ ”—note the scare quotes—about other mass

tort cases told us “nothing about the value of the claims” because the

record was “bereft of detail” about whether the plaintiffs' complaint was

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 8 of 16
similar to those other cases. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1220–21; see also id.

(“Absent specific detail about the present action, the supplement in no

way clarifies the aggregate value of the claims here.”). The record in

Lowery contained only “naked pleadings”—no specific factual details,

no discovery, no affidavits or declarations, no testimony, no

interrogatories, and no exhibits other than the complaints. We took pains

to emphasize that fact. Over and over. See id. at 1189 n. 8 (“[A]labama

Power cited nothing from such discovery in support of its notice of

removal or in its subsequent argument to the district court ....”); id. at

1209 (“naked pleadings”); id. at 1210 (“bare pleadings”); id.(“a removal

case—like this one—where there is no evidence to review”); id.

(distinguishing Lowery from a case in which counsel admitted certain

jurisdictional facts during oral argument and another case in which the

defendant's employee testified during a pretrial hearing); id. (“naked

pleading context”); id. (“only the bare pleadings are available”); id. at

1210–11 (“We have no evidence before us by which to make any

informed assessment of the amount in controversy.”); id. at 1213 n. 63

(“bare pleadings”); id. at 1217 (“[A]labama Power ... has asserted no

factual basis to support federal jurisdiction ....”); id. at 1220

(emphasizing that we were “without the benefit of any evidence

[regarding] the value of individual claims”).

We stated in Lowery that “[t]he absence of factual allegations

pertinent to the existence of jurisdiction is dispositive and, in such

absence, the existence of jurisdiction should not be divined by looking

to the stars.” Id. at 1215 (emphasis added). On that basis we concluded

that the Lowery defendants had failed to establish federal jurisdiction by

a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 1220–21.

Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752-53. The court then stated:

Lowery did not say, much less purport to hold, that the use of deduction,

inference, or other extrapolation of the amount in controversy is

impermissible, as some district courts have thought. That was not the

question in Lowery. Instead, the question was how to apply the

preponderance of the evidence standard in the “fact-free context” ofthat

particular case. Id. at 1209. The answer we gave is that without facts or

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 9 of 16
specific allegations, the amount in controversy could be “divined [only]

by looking at the stars”—only through speculation—and*754 that is

impermissible. See id. at 1209, 1215.

A different question is presented, however, when a removing

defendant makes specific factual allegations establishing jurisdiction

and can support them (if challenged by the plaintiff or the court) with

evidence combined with reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences,

or other reasonable extrapolations. That kind of reasoning is not akin to

conjecture, speculation, or star gazing. See Northup Props., Inc. v.

Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 567 F.3d 767, 770–71 (6th Cir.2009)

(concluding that the defendant's affidavits were specific enough to

prevent the determination of the amount in controversy “frombecoming

a matter of judicial star-gazing”); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168

(2d Cir.2007) (“An inference is not a suspicion or a guess. It is a

reasoned, logical decision to conclude that a disputed fact exists on the

basis of another fact that is known to exist.” (quotation and other marks

omitted)); cf. Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 664 (11th Cir.2001)

(“Suffice it to say that while damages may not be determined by mere

speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence shows the extent

of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” (quotation

and other marks omitted)).

Pretka, 608 F.3d at 753-54. The defendant states that computing back pay damages

through the trial date is exactly the type of reasonable deduction, inferences, or other

extrapolation which is allowed after Pretka. The court agrees.

2. There Is Persuasive Authority from the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals Supporting the Method of Calculation Proposed by

the Defendant

The defendant cites Kok v. Kadant Black Clawson, Inc., 274 F. App'x 856 (11th

Cir. 2008), for the proposition that “[o]n the specific question of lost wages, the

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 10 of 16
Eleventh Circuit has approved a court’s reasonable calculation of back pay damages

through a future trial date.” (Doc. 10 at 4). Like this case, Kok was an AADEA case

where, in order to establish that the amount in controversy was satisfied, the

defendant “calculated [the plaintiff’s] recovery for back pay from the date of his

termination to trial to equal $94,963.” Kok, 274 Fed. Appx. at 857. The Eleventh

Circuit noted that the defendant supported this calculation with evidence which

established the dollar value of the plaintiff’s gross pay and benefits through the first

eleven months of the year. Id. The Eleventh Circuit then noted that “[t]he district

8

court correctly concluded that[the defendant] established that, at the time ofremoval,

[the plaintiff’s] complaint for damages exceeded the amount in controversy required

for diversity jurisdiction.” Id.

The plaintiff argues 

While the Kok opinion did state that the defendant opposed “[the

plaintiff’s motion [to remand] and calculated [the plaintiff’s] recovery

for back pay from the date of his termination to trial”, [sic] this

statement is nothing more than a recitation of the defendant’s argument

in opposition to the motion to remand and isin no way binding authority

for such a proposition.

(Doc. 11 at 3). The court does not agree. In reaching its holding, the Eleventh Circuit

 This part of the Kok opinion is confusing since, on the one hand, it states that the 8

defendant calculated damages “to trial” and then, one sentence later, sets out the value of the

plaintiff’s damages “for the first 11 months of the year.” Kok, 274 Fed. Appx at 857.

11

Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 11 of 16
explained that the damages in Kok were computed through a future trial date and set

out the evidence which supported the computation. Further, it cited Munoz v.

Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000), a case which holds

that back pay should be computed through the date of trial. In order to accept the

plaintiff’s argument, this court would have to assume that the opinion included all of

that information for no reason, and the Eleventh Circuit determined, based on some

unstated evidence and reasoning, that the amount in controversy was satisfied. The

undersigned declines to make such an assumption. Accordingly, the court finds Kok

to be persuasive authority for the proposition that back pay, computed up to an 9

anticipated trial date, is an appropriate measure of the amount in controversy for

purposes of determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.

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3. Post-Pretka Authority Supports the Approach Advocated by the

Defendant

No Eleventh Circuit opinion has cited Kok. However, all district court cases

decided after Pretka that the undersigned is aware of have held that, in a removal

“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as

9

persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

The plaintiff argues that this court should look to the facts before Judge Hancock, the 10

district judge in Kok. He contends that doing so would show that “at the time the notice of

removal was filed, the actual amount in controversy had already exceeded the $75,000.00

threshold.” (Doc. 11 at 3-4). He contends that those facts explain why the Eleventh Circuit

reached the decision it did. The court will not look outside the opinion to try to read the mind of

the Eleventh Circuit panel which decided Kok. 

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 12 of 16
context, back pay should be computed up to an anticipated date of trial for purposes

of determining whether or not the amount in controversy requirement has been met.

The court is aware of two pre-Pretka district court decisions holding to the

contrary. However, those cases are not persuasive, asthey rely on Lowery asthat case

was understood prior to Pretka. In the first of these cases, Snead v. AAR Mfg., Inc.,

809-CV-1733-T-30EAJ, 2009 WL 3242013 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2009) (Moody, J.),

Judge Moody cited Lowery’s statement that “[t]he defendant and the court may not

speculate about the amount in controversy, nor should the district court's jurisdiction

be “divined by looking to the stars.” Snead, 2009 WL 3242013 at *2 (citing Lowery

at 1215). He then found that the amount in controversy “cannot be satisfied by

speculation as to the amount of damages through the date of trial,” writing “[t]he

cases [d]efendant relies upon to support its argument that the damages can be

calculated through the date of trial were decided prior to Lowery, which drastically

changed the analysis of removal.” Id. at *3. Then, in a footnote, Judge Moody found

Kok to be unpersuasive, noting that it did not cite to Lowery, “and the issue on review

[in Kok] was decided by the district court prior to Lowery.” Id. at *3 n. 2. Similarly,

in Brown v. Am. Exp. Co., Inc., 09-61758-CIV, 2010 WL 527756 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 10,

2010) (Seltzer, M.J.)., citing and discussing Snead, the court wrote “[t]he Kok

decision . . . is unpublished and, as such, is not binding on this Court.”Brown, 2010

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 13 of 16
WL 527756 at *4. 

Interestingly, Judge Moody, the author of the Snead decision, which was

quoted by Brown, has, post-Pretka, computed back pay through an “estimated” trial

date, for the purpose of determining that the amount in controversy exceeds the

jurisdictional minimum. In Cashman v. Host Int'l, Inc., 8:10-CV-1197-T-30MAP,

2010 WL 4659399 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2010), Judge Moody addressed the plaintiff’s

argument that doing so “would be engaging in impermissible speculation prohibited

under Lowery.” Cashman, 2010 WL 4659399 at * 2. He wrote:

[I]n Pretka, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that Lowery was a “fact-free”

case, in which there was no “concrete information” regarding the value

of the claims. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752 (quoting Lowery, 483 F.3d at

1219). “But Lowery did not say, much less purport to hold, that the use

of deduction, inference, or other extrapolation of the amount in

controversy is impermissible.” Id. at 753.

Here, [the defendant] has provided uncontroverted concrete

information which supportsits calculation of the amount in controversy

at the time of removal. Consideration of the additional back pay amount

from the date of removal to the date of trial, based on a conservative

estimate of the trial date, is not impermissible speculation. It is, instead,

extrapolation of the submitted evidence, which is permitted under

Pretka.

Id.; see also, Sheehan v. Westcare Found., Inc., 8:12-CV-2544-T-33TBM, 2013 WL

247143 at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2013) (Hernandez Covington, J.) (“The Court agrees

with the reasoning in Cashman and, accordingly, rejects [the] argument that the

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 14 of 16
amount of back pay damages in this case are impermissibly speculative.”).

Similarly, in Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 12-60055-CIV, 2012 WL

2523692 * 2 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012), the court considered back pay up to the date

of trial, writing:

In opposing the use of this trial date, Plaintiffs point to cases that

rely upon Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th

Cir.2007). (Mot. at 5–6.) However, in Pretka, the Court stated that

“Lowery did not say, much less purport to hold, that the use of

deduction, inference, or other extrapolation ofthe amountin controversy

is impermissible” for purposes of establishing the amount in

controversy. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 753; see also Roe, 613 F.3d at 1062

(“courts may use their judicial experience and common sense in

determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal

jurisdictional requirements.”)

See, also, Chase v. Ace Hardware Corp., CIV.A. 13-0077-KD-M, 2013 WL 1788496

at *2 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2013) (Milling M.J.) report and recommendation adopted,

CIV.A. 13-00077-KD, 2013 WL 1788023 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2013) (rejecting Snead

and following recent cases in finding that “calculating back pay from the date a

claimant wasterminated until the date of trial to be a more accurate reflection of those

damages than calculating them, as Plaintiff had suggested, to the date of removal.”);

Leslie v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 11-81035-CIV-MARRA, 2012 WL 4049965 (S.D.

Fla. Sept. 13, 2012) (Marra, J.) (citing Cashman); Penalver v. N. Elec., Inc., 12-

80188-CIV, 2012 WL 1317621 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2012) (Cohn, J.) (“[B]ack

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pay should be calculated from the date of the adverse employment action until the

date of trial.”); Morris v. Plant Performance Servs., LLC, 5:11-CV-350/RS-EMT,

2011 WL 6203497 at *1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2011) (Smoak, J.) (same) (citing Fusca

v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 98194 (M.D. Fla. 2011)). 

In sum, all Eleventh Circuit district court decisions that the undersigned is

aware of and that have considered this issue post-Pretka have determined that back

pay should be computed through an estimated trial date in order to determine whether

the requisite amount in controversy has been shown for purposes of subject matter

jurisdiction. This court is persuaded by that fact, the rationale of the post-Pretka

district court opinions cited above, and the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Kok. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court determinesthat the amount in controversy

requirement has been met. The motion to remand is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of April, 2014.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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Case 2:14-cv-00182-VEH Document 19 Filed 04/23/14 Page 16 of 16