Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00119/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00119-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Also pending is Barba’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(b) (Doc. 49), to which Defendant police officers and firefighters have filed a

Joinder (Doc. 51). The Motion to Dismiss is not yet fully briefed.

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Sambrano, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Sgt. Opferback, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-0119-PHX-GMS (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Anthony Sambrano brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against various City of Phoenix police officers and Fire Department firefighters and

Rosemary Barba, a Maricopa County Hospital nurse (Doc. 1). Before the Court are

Defendant Barba’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 39) and Motion for

Summary Disposition (Doc. 48).1

The Court denies both motions.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims stem from his arrest on January 25, 2009 (Doc. 1). He alleged that

Defendant police officers surrounded him as he left a restaurant, used excessive force when

cuffing him, and refused his pleas for medical attention. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant

firefighters arrived and also refused to take him to a hospital. Plaintiff averred that the jail

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Citation refers to the page numbers in the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case

Filing system.

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refused to book him because of his injuries, at which point he was taken to the Maricopa

County Hospital. According to Plaintiff, Nurse Barba told Plaintiff to “shut-up” in response

to his claims of pain and difficultly breathing and, during the night at the hospital, she

taunted him for crying. Plaintiff claimed that he had broken ribs and a collapsed lung, and

after a shift change the next morning, a physician inserted a chest tube and Plaintiff was

finally able to breathe (id. at 3-92

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In his Complaint, Plaintiff set forth eight counts for relief alleging excessive force,

denial of constitutionally adequate medical care, and due process violations (id. at 10-17).

The Court screened the Complaint, dismissed the due process claims in Counts VI and VII,

and ordered 13 Defendants to answer Counts I-V and VIII (Doc. 10 at 12). The Court found

that Plaintiff stated the following constitutional claims:

Count I–alleged use of excessive force by Defendant police officers Douglas

Opferback, Michael Moyer, Daniel Quillman, Albert Casados, Lourdes Lopez, Mercedes

Fortune, James Smoke, and Ethan Coffey (Doc. 1 at 10). 

Count II–alleged cruel and unusual punishment by the same 8 Defendants named in

Count I (id. at 11).

Count III–alleged denial of constitutionally adequate medical care by Defendant

police officers and firefighters and Nurse Barba (id. at 12).

Count IV–alleged violations of contemporary standards of decency by (1) Defendant

police offices when they used excessive force and (2) Nurse Barba when she denied him

medical care despite his obvious injuries and pain (id. at 13).

Count V–alleged denial of constitutionally adequate medical care by Nurse Barba (id.

at 14).

Count VIII–alleged denial of constitutionally adequate medical care by Defendant

firefighters—specifically, Rob Simpson, Jason Knippel, Corrinee Dunnington, and Donna

Feller—when they failed to respond to Plaintiff’s medical emergency (id. at 17).

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Barba also argued that the equal protection claim in Count VII fails (Doc. 39 at 3).

But Count VII was dismissed at screening (Doc. 10).

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Upon screening, the Court dismissed all the named Maricopa County Hospital

Defendants except Nurse Barba (Doc. 10 at 6, 12).

Barba has moved for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 39). Barba argued that

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims in Counts III, IV, and V fail because at the relevant

time, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial

detainees (id. at 2). Barba further argued that the excessive force claims in Counts I, II, and

IV (in part) fail because Plaintiff did not allege any facts linking Barba to the alleged

excessive force (id. at 3).3

On January 26, 2012, the Court issued an Order notifying Plaintiff of his obligation

to respond to Barba’s motion (Doc. 41). Plaintiff did not file a response.

Thereafter, on March 13, 2012, Barba filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and

requested that the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be granted due to Plaintiff’s failure

to file a response (Doc. 48).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the

pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” The

standard governing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is “functionally

identical” to that governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Caffaso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics

C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054-55 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2011). When analyzing a Rule 12(c)

motion, the court must accept the nonmovant’s allegations as true, see Hal Roach Studios v.

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989), and construe factual

allegations in a complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Fleming v. Pickard,

581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). “Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is proper

when the moving party establishes on the face of the pleadings that there is no material issue

of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Jensen Family

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As stated, the Rule 12(c) standard is functionally identical to the 12(b)(6) standard,

and the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is identical to the screening standard under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b) (“fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”). 

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Farms, Inc. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 644 F.3d 934, 937 n. 1 (9th

Cir. 2011).

Pro se filings, particularly in civil rights cases, must be construed liberally, and courts

must afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

III. Analysis

The Court screened Plaintiff’s Complaint under a standard that is identical to the

standard applied to a Rule 12(c) motion (Doc. 10). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).4

 Thus, the

Court has already determined that the counts Barba challenges sufficiently state

constitutional claims. Nothing in Barba’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings causes the

Court to reconsider that determination. Nonetheless, Barba’s arguments will be addressed

so as to clarify the claims specific to Barba. 

A. Counts III, IV (in part), and V

In his Complaint, Plaintiff identified the constitutional right violated in Counts III, IV,

and V as the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 1 at 12-14). Barba is correct that the Eighth

Amendment applies to convicted prisoners and, at the time his claims arose, Plaintiff was a

pretrial detainee (Doc. 39 at 2-3). But a pro se litigant’s claims are not limited to the

constitutional or statutory source identified in the complaint. Rather, the Court looks at the

facts alleged; “[a] complaint need not identify the statutory or constitutional source of the

claim raised . . . .” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2008) (the defendants

had notice of a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(RLUIPA) even though the plaintiff did not cite to RLUIPA in the complaint because his

factual allegations supported a RLUIPA claim). 

As explained in Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003),

which was cited in the Screening Order (Doc. 10 at 8), as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff is

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protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Pierce v. County of

Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008). In addressing a pretrial detainee’s medicalcare claim Lolli, the Ninth Circuit referred to the “traditional Eighth Amendment standards

used in Fourteenth Amendment claims such as this one,” and proceeded to conduct a

deliberate-indifference analysis. 351 F.3d at 419-20 & n. 6. Indeed, at a minimum, the Due

Process Clause imposes the same duty to provide adequate medical care to those incarcerated

as imposed by the Eighth Amendment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187

(9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the Eighth Amendment standards governing medical care may

be applied. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Johnson, 781

F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (“the eighth amendment guarantees provide a minimum

standard of care for determining [the plaintiff's] rights as a pretrial detainee, including his

right to medical care”).

In short, Plaintiff’s allegations in Counts III, IV, and V set forth facts to support a

medical-care claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, to which the

Eighth Amendment standards may be applied. Barba’s request for judgment on these counts

will be denied.

B. Counts I, II, and IV (in part) 

To the extent that the Screening Order may not have been clear in articulating that

Barba was named only in those counts related to medical care, the Court clarifies here that

she need only respond to those claims in Counts III, IV, and V alleging that she denied

Plaintiff constitutionally adequate medical care. Because Barba was not named as a

Defendant in the excessive-force claims, there is no basis for her request for judgment on

these claims.

C. Motion for Summary Disposition

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i) provides that a pro se litigant’s failure to respond

to a motion “may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the Court

may dispose of the motion summarily.” The Court declines to grant Barba’s Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 7.2(i) because the motion is baseless and it would be

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improper to grant the motion where Barba is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925. Moreover, Plaintiff’s failure to respond is more appropriately

addressed in Barba’s pending Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(b) (Doc. 49).

For the above reasons, Barba’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for

Summary Disposition will be denied.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant Nurse

Rosemary Barba’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 39) and Motion for Summary

Disposition (Doc. 48). All other matters will remain with the Magistrate Judge.

(2) Defendant Nurse Rosemary Barba’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.

39) and Motion for Summary Disposition (Doc. 48) are denied.

DATED this 24th day of April, 2012.

Case 2:11-cv-00119-GMS Document 52 Filed 04/24/12 Page 6 of 6