Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02051/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kenneth Ramon Kensey, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-2051-PHX-SPL (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Kenneth Ramon Kensey filed a Petition and Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus challenging his convictions, pursuant to a plea agreement, in Maricopa County 

Superior Court for seven felonies. His Amended Petition alleges that his indictment was 

insufficient, his sentence was illegal, and his request for an evidentiary hearing about his 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim should have been granted. Respondents 

contend that his petition is untimely. As explained below, the Court recommends that 

Kensey’s petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

In May 2009, Kensey was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court for seven 

felonies arising out of the shooting of Phoenix Police Officer Mario Gaxiola. (Doc. 13, 

Ex. A) Subsequently, the State alleged aggravating circumstances and that Kensey had 

prior felony convictions. (Doc. 13, Exs. B, C) After a settlement conference, the Court 

held a change-of-plea hearing where Kensey entered a plea of no contest to all seven 

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felonies. (Doc. 13, Exs. D, E, F) Kensey acknowledged the existence of prior felony 

convictions and admitted to an aggravating factor. (Doc. 13, Exs. E, F at 17) 

 On January 15, 2010, the Superior Court held a sentencing hearing for Kensey. 

(Doc. 13, Exs. H, I) At this hearing, Kensey indicated he wanted to withdraw from his 

plea agreement and obtain new counsel; after consulting with his counsel and family 

members, he agreed to proceeded with sentencing and to representation by his attorney. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. I at 3-6) The Court sentenced Kensey to exceptionally aggravated terms of 

30 years for one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, 

and one count of drive by shooting. (Doc. 13, Ex. I at 58) The Court also sentenced 

Kensey to presumptive terms of 10 years for three counts of aggravated driving or actual 

physical control while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs and one count 

of misconduct involving weapons. (Doc. 13, Ex. I at 52, 58) The Court ordered all seven 

sentences to run concurrently and ordered Kensey to pay $65,217.38 in restitution. (Doc. 

13, Exs. H, I at 52, 58) 

 Kensey filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and, on February 1, 2010, the 

Superior Court appointed him counsel. (Doc. 13, Ex. J) On January 19, 2011, Kensey’s 

counsel notified the Court that she was unable to find any claims for relief and would not 

file a Petition. (Doc. 13, Ex. M) On April 1, 2011, Kensey filed a pro per Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 13, Ex. N) After full briefing, the Court found that 

Kensey had failed to present any colorable claims and dismissed his post-conviction 

proceedings on September 12, 2011. (Doc. 13, Exs. O, P, Q) The record reflects that 

Kensey did not appeal this dismissal to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 13, Ex. EE) 

 On November 8, 2011, Kensey filed another Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in 

the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 13, Ex. S) On November 17, 2011, the 

Court found that the Petition failed to state a claim that can be addressed in an untimely 

or successive petition. (Doc. 13, Ex. T) On December 1, 2011, Kensey moved for 

rehearing and, after the state responded, the Court denied his motion. (Doc. 13, Exs. U, 

V. W) 

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 On October 24, 2012, Kensey filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in 

Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 13, Ex. X) On November 14, 2012, the Court 

found that none of Kensey’s claims fell within an exception for untimely filing under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a). (Doc. 13, Ex. Y) Kensey petitioned the 

Arizona Court of Appeals for review and, on April 18, 2014, the Court of Appeals 

granted review and denied relief. (Doc. 13, Exs. Z, AA, BB) 

 On September 15, 2014, Kensey filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court and, after it was dismissed without prejudice, he filed an Amended Petition on 

November 7, 2014. (Doc. 1, 6) Respondents were ordered to respond to the Amended 

Petition. (Doc. 7) His Amended Petition raises several, related claims that allege his due 

process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by an 

indictment that was insufficient and a sentence that was illegal both because his plea was 

coerced and because the facts of the crime did not meet the requirements of first degree 

attempted murder. (Doc. 6 at 6) The Amended Petition also argues that he should have 

had an evidentiary hearing after he had requested new counsel. (Doc. 6 at 7-8) Kensey 

does not raise any claims of actual innocence. Respondents contend that the Petition is 

untimely and that he is not entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. 13) The Court agrees and 

recommends that the Petition and Amended Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

Kensey’s Petition for Habeas Relief is Untimely. 

 A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is 

required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during 

the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). If a defendant is convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, then 

the first post-conviction proceeding is considered a form of direct review and the 

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conviction becomes “final” for purposes of Section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the Rule 32 ofright proceeding concludes. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a 

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for 

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”) (internal quotation omitted); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (conviction pursuant to plea agreement is final on expiration of 

the time for seeking Rule 32 relief). 

 On September 12, 2011, the Superior Court dismissed Kensey’s post-conviction 

proceedings. Kensey did not appeal this dismissal. Accordingly, his post-conviction 

proceedings became final on October 17, 2011, and his one year limitations period began 

the next day. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3, 32.4(a); State v. Savage, 573 P.2d 1388, 1389 (1978). 

Kensey then filed several petitions in Superior Court which were dismissed as 

untimely. The Superior Court’s rejection of these petitions means that they “must be 

treated as improperly filed, or as though [they] never existed,” such that “for purposes of 

section 2244(d), the pendency of th[e] petition[s] did not toll the limitations period.” 

Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Kensey was required to file his habeas petition in this court by October 18, 2012. 

He did not and the one year period expired and, once expired, could not be revived. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005) (no AEDPA tolling from untimely state postconviction petitions). Instead, he filed his first habeas petition in this Court nearly two 

years later, on September 15, 2014. Therefore, his petition is untimely. 

Kensey is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling. 

 Kensey’s habeas petition is untimely unless he can show that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling. To make such a showing, Kensey must demonstrate both that he 

pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him 

from filing his petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 

 Kensey’s argues that his untimely petition should be allowed because the “lawyer 

that drafted all my motions was moved from prison.” (Doc. 4-3 at 14) This argument is 

not persuasive. See, e.g., Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (habeas 

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petition alleges delay from circumstances that “are hardly extraordinary given the 

vicissitudes of prison life, and there is no indication in the record that they made it 

‘impossible’ for him to file on time.”); Norwood v. Lockyer, 390 Fed.Appx. 762, 763 (9th

Cir. 2010) (equitable tolling standard not met for circumstances that are ordinary for 

prison life); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (habeas petitioner not 

entitled to equitable tolling because of limited library and copier access); Rasberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling”). Thus, Kensey has not showed that he acted diligently or that he encountered 

some extraordinary circumstance. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Kenneth Ramon Kensey’s 

Amended Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the petition 

and amended petition are justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would 

not find the ruling debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

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order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Dated this 5th day of May, 2015. 

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