Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01484/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01484-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 15:2(a) Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL MONPLAISIR, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INTEGRATED TECH GROUP, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. C 19-01484 WHA 

ORDER COMPELLING 

ARBITRATION

INTRODUCTION

In this wage-and-hour putative class action, defendant employers move to compel 

arbitration as to a subset of plaintiff employees. Because the arbitration agreement is valid, 

covers the claims in suit, and is not unconscionable, ARBITRATION IS ORDERED.

STATEMENT

The facts of this case are set out in prior orders. Briefly, defendants Integrated Tech 

Group, LLC and ITG Communications LLC install cable and communication equipment across 

the nation. The complaint alleges that defendants made plaintiffs work significant portions of 

their day off-the-clock, including trainings, pre-shift work, meal periods, driving time, and other 

added work. Additionally, defendants allegedly pressured plaintiffs to alter or not submit 

billing records. Plaintiffs filed this action in March 2019, alleging various state and federal law 

wage-and-hour claims. An August 6 order granted plaintiffs’ motion for conditional class 

certification and deferred ruling on defendants’ July 10 motion to compel arbitration until the 

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close of the opt-in period (Dkt. No. 76). The period closed on January 9 (Dkt. No. 164), so this 

order now addresses the motion to compel. 

Defendants invoke an arbitration agreement against many plaintiffs, including opt-in 

plaintiffs. Since around January 2017, defendants have included an arbitration agreement in 

new-hire packets (Dkt. No. 65 at 9). The agreement provides for arbitration to resolve “all 

disputes . . . arising out of or relating to Parties’ employment relationship or termination of that 

relationship” (Dkt. No. 65-8 at ¶ 1). The agreement also includes a class action waiver (id. at ¶ 

5) and specifies “[c]ommon law claims shall be decided in accordance with Florida substantive 

law” (id. at ¶ 10). Of the more than 2,600 potential plaintiffs, defendants contend 

approximately 1,400 signed the arbitration agreement. This order follows full briefing and oral 

argument. 

ANALYSIS

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court determines “whether a valid arbitration 

agreement exists, and if so, whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Lifescan, 

Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, plaintiffs do 

not dispute the arbitration agreement, which “govern[s] the resolution of all disputes . . . arising 

out of or relating to the Parties’ employment relationship or termination of that relationship,” 

covers the wage and hour claims in suit (Dkt. No. 65-8 ¶ 2). Thus, the only issue is whether the 

arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable.

Plaintiffs contend: (1) the arbitration agreement is unconscionable; (2) defendant ITG 

Communications may not enforce the arbitration agreement; and (3) procedural defects mean 

certain plaintiffs never agreed to arbitrate. 

1. UNCONSCIONABILITY

“Under California law, a contractual clause is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and 

substantively unconscionable.” Courts use a sliding scale: more substantive unconscionability 

requires less procedurally unconscionability to render the contract term unenforceable, and vice 

versa. But “both must be present” for a court to deem a contract unenforceable as 

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unconscionable. Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (overruled 

on other grounds) (emphasis added). 

Here, AT&T Mobility v. Concepion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), and Epic Systems v. Lewis, 584

U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), effectively foreclose any substantive unconscionability

challenge to the arbitration agreement plus class-action waiver. So plaintiffs challenge the 

agreement as “unfairly one sided” because several employee arbitration agreements leave blank: 

(1) the identity and address of the ITG officer “to whom the employee should send notice in 

order to initiate any arbitration proceeding,” and (2) the “location of the arbitration proceeding” 

(Dkt. No. 67 at 11–12). At the hearing the parties represented that fifty-five opt-in plaintiffs’ 

agreements left the notice provision blank, five other opt-in plaintiffs’ agreements left the 

location provision blank, and 121 further opt-in plaintiffs’ agreements left both blank. To 

plaintiffs, the blanks make it unfairly difficult for employees to invoke the dispute resolution 

process. 

These blanks are troubling omissions to contracts that defendants drafted. But at the 

hearing, defendants stipulated to filling the blanks with the most plaintiff-favorable terms. The 

location provision now permits plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims in any county of their 

choosing. And the closing of opt-in period moots the notice provision because ITG has notice 

of plaintiffs’ wish to sue (Dkt. No. 164). Moreover, the agreement specifies the American 

Arbitration Association as the arbitrator, and commits defendants to pay the arbitrator’s fees 

and costs (Dkt. Nos. 65 at 5; 65-6 at ¶¶ 2, 14). These terms ease this order’s conclusion that the 

agreement is substantively conscionable. 

In sum, unenforceability for unconscionability requires both procedural and substantive 

defects. Plaintiffs’ pleas of procedural unconscionability cannot, as a matter of law, overcome 

the lack of substantive unconscionability. See Davis, 485 F.3d at 1072. The arbitration 

agreement is, thus, not unconscionable.

2. ENFORCEMENT BY ITG COMMUNICATIONS, LLC.

Plaintiffs next contend one defendant, ITG Communications, may not invoke the 

arbitration clause. 

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ITG Communications is, strictly, not a signatory to the asserted agreement between the 

employees and Integrated Tech Group, LLC (Dkt. Nos. 65-8, 67 at 5–6). Ordinarily it would be 

a close call whether ITG Communications could invoke the arbitration agreement against 

plaintiffs. But here, we enjoy a unique circumstance. Defendants have stipulated, for the 

purposes of this litigation, that they are plaintiffs’ joint employers (Elizabeth Stone Tr., Dkt. 

No. 128-5 at 119–20). Thus, ITG Communications, as joint employer, may arbitrate plaintiffs’ 

wage and hour claims alongside Integrated Tech Group. 

3. CONTRACT VALIDITY.

Last, plaintiffs note a language barrier that might simply preclude contract formation. The 

argument has merit. The “mutual manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or 

by conduct, is the touchstone of contract.” Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 

1175 (9th Cir. 2014). The manifestation of assent is judged objectively. See Cal Fire Local 

2881 v. Cal. Pub. Empls. Ret. Sys., 435 P.3d 433, 455 (Cal. 2019) (Kruger, J., concurring); 

1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. L., CONTRACTS § 767 (11th ed. 2017). And, where a party’s 

conduct could not reasonably be taken as assent to contract, for example where the terms are 

hidden, no contract is formed. See Barnes & Noble, 763 F.3d at 1177 (citing Specht v. 

Netscape, 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002)). 

It could certainly be found that otherwise assenting conduct cannot so indicate where one 

party’s limited English reasonably precludes contract comprehension absent translation. 

Defendants’ response that “[a]ll technicians are required to read, comprehend, and write English 

in order to effectively communicate with customers, clients, and co-workers to fulfill their job 

duties” is unconvincing (Dkt. No. 71 at 11). English competence to install cable hardware is 

one thing — the “English” used in most contracts is quite another. 

But plaintiffs offer insufficient evidence of a language barrier, merely two identical

statements alleging “English is my second language and I did not understand all the complex 

legal documents” (Dkt. Nos. 67-4, 67-5 at ¶ 6). The bare allegation that “English is my second 

language” is not probative of English proficiency. Education and practice with the language is. 

Absent probative evidence of the language barrier, plaintiffs’ objection fails. 

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4. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

Under 9 U.S.C. § 3, the Court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial until 

such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” Our court of 

appeals has acknowledged that this language “seems to direct that the action ‘shall’ be stayed 

pending completion of arbitration.” Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 

1073 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 

2013). Following this dictum yields the pragmatic result. Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims are 

derivative of the substantive claims — half of which will proceed to arbitration and half of 

which remain before the Court. There is no use proceeding on the PAGA claims here with 

potentially half the class missing. All PAGA claims are STAYED pending resolution of the

arbitration proceedings.

CONCLUSION

The arbitration being valid, enforceable, and not unconscionable, defendants’ motion to 

compel arbitration against all plaintiffs who signed the agreement (Dkt. Nos. 65-5 164-1 

(indexes), 65-6, 164-2, 164-3 (agreements)) is GRANTED. The remainder of plaintiffs will 

proceed on their primary claims. All PAGA claims, for all plaintiffs, are STAYED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2020. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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