Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01504/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01504-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT RUSSO,

Petitioner,

 v.

ROBERT AYERS JR., Warden,

Respondant. /

No. C 07-01504 WHA

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Vincent Russo filed this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2242. In his

petition, Russo argues that the Board of Prison Terms unconstitutionally denied him parole in

2005, twenty years after he was convicted of attempted murder and kidnaping to commit

robbery. For the below stated reasons, this order holds that “some evidence” existed for

denying Russo parole, that Russo received adequate individual consideration, and that Russo’s

continued commitment does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, Russo’s petition

is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Petitioner Vincent Russo is an inmate in the California state prison system, serving a

term of seven years to life with the possibility of parole. Russo was convicted in 1985 on

counts of attempted murder and kidnaping to commit robbery (Ans. Exh. B at 7). The

seven-year sentence for attempted murder was stayed, pending completion of the life sentence

for the kidnaping charge.

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The following facts are not in dispute. Russo committed the crimes leading to his

imprisonment while serving as a sergeant in the U.S. Marine Corps. After stealing guns from

Camp Pendleton Marine Base in southern California, Russo and his roommate proceeded to rob

several liquor stores in the area. On December 22, 1978, Russo robbed the Stage Stop Liquor

Store in Ramona, California. Russo ordered the clerk, Dale Scott Eaton, to the ground while he

took $515 from the cash register. Russo then forced Eaton into Russo’s car. Holding a gun

against Eaton’s head, Russo drove for 35 minutes to a rural area, where he forced Eaton to lie

down on the side of the road. Russo then shot Eaton five times: twice in the head, once in the

left bicep, once in the right forearm, and once in the left cheek (Ans. Exh. D at 9, Exh. G at 3). 

Leaving Eaton at the scene of the crime, Russo drove away. Eaton survived the shooting.

The circumstances of the shooting remain in dispute. According to Eaton and the Board

of Prison Terms, Russo threatened Eaton’s family and said “Merry Christmas” before shooting

Eaton. Russo argues, however, that he sensed Eaton moving and pulled the trigger as he hit

Eaton in the head with the gun; he then “panicked and pulled the trigger four more times” (First

Amd. Pet. 7; Ans. Exh. D at 11; Ans. Exh. G at 3). Russo denies that he ever said “Merry

Christmas” to Eaton or that he intentionally shot Eaton (Trav. at 2).

After the shooting, Russo left California with his girlfriend and her daughter. Russo and

his family members remained at large for seven years, living under false identities in Canada,

New York, Florida, Texas and Pennsylvania until his arrest on January 14, 1985. He kept a

clean criminal record after the alleged attempted murder, working as a restaurant manager for

part of the time before his arrest. Russo was arrested by the FBI in Pennsylvania in 1985, seven

years after the offense. In a plea bargain, Russo pled guilty to attempted murder and kidnaping

to commit robbery. He received a life sentence, with the possibility of parole beginning in

seven years. Russo has now been incarcerated for 22 years (Ans. Exh. G at 3; First Amd. Pet.

8; Ans. Exh. C at 6). 

Russo had no prior criminal history before 1978, and aside from one report for

participation in a work strike in 1987, he has had no disciplinary record in prison. A

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psychological evaluation of Russo found his violence potential to be “below average” for the

inmate population (Ans. Exh. D at 31).

Although Russo became eligible for parole in 1991, he has been denied parole eight

times, including the challenged parole hearing in 2005. In the 2005 parole hearing, the Board of

Prison Terms declared that Russo continued to pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if

released. The parole decision rested on the following factors: (1) the “especially cruel and

callous manner” of Russo’s offense; (2) the panel’s interpretation of Russo’s act as a

“calculated,” “dispassionate” effort to eliminate a potential witness — an “execution type

offense”; (3) the panel’s concern about “statements that were made such as Merry Christmas”;

(4) the fact that five shots were fired; (5) Russo’s contradictory statements to psychiatrists about

why he had shot Eaton, which alternately characterized the shooting as accidental or as selfdefense; and (6) the panel’s finding that Russo had not expressed remorse for his crime. After

evaluating these factors, the board denied Russo parole and refused to set a parole date until his

next parole hearing (Ans. Exh. E at 71–75).

Russo challenged the denial of parole in August of 2005. Russo’s first petition for writ

of habeas corpus was heard by the San Diego County Superior Court, which denied relief on

October 17, 2005. The superior court relied on In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 656 (2002),

which held that there need only be “some evidence” for the board’s decision to deny parole. 

Based on Rosenkrantz and In re Powell, 45 Cal. 3d 894, 904 (1988), the superior court argued

that the board has wide discretion in parole decisions, which cannot be set aside unless the

board acted “without information, fraudulently, or on mere personal caprice.” In adjudging

Russo’s case, the superior court found that the board had met the Rosenkrantz standard of

“some evidence” for denying parole, based on the factors involved in Russo’s offense, and that

under Powell their decision should not be set aside (Ans. Exh. F at 1–3).

Russo appealed the superior court’s ruling, and the California Court of Appeal denied

Russo’s appeal on January 20, 2006. The court of appeal emphasized that parole applicants in

California generally have an expectation of parole, but that they can be found unsuitable for

parole in the light of circumstances specified by statute and regulation. Applying In re

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Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1084 (2005), the court of appeal held that statutory concern for

the public safety trumps any expectation by an indeterminate life offender of parole by a given

date. After reviewing the facts, the court of appeal denied Russo’s appeal, finding factual

support for the board’s judgment: “[T]he Board’s conclusion that the crime showed a callous

disregard for the suffering of the victim and Russo showed no remorse is supported by the facts

of the crime, his flight and efforts to avoid arrest for seven years” (Ans. Exh. G at 1–3). On

October 11, 2006, the California Supreme Court summarily denied Russo’s petition, without

writing an opinion (Ans. Exh. H at 1). Russo filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas

corpus on March 15, 2007 (First Amd. Pet. 1). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

2254.

ANALYSIS

Persons in custody pursuant to a state judgment may be freed by a district court if they

are held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. They must,

however, exhaust their remedies in state court, or demonstrate that such appeals either are

unavailable or ineffective. If a petitioner advances a claim that was decided in state court on the

merits, the petitioner must establish that either: (1) the state court decision was contrary to

clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court; (2) involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court; or (3) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), (b)(1), (d).

A state court’s decision can be overruled as “contrary to” federal law if it fails to apply

the correct Supreme Court authority or if it applies such authority incorrectly to a case

involving facts “materially indistinguishable” from those in the controlling decision. A state

court can also be overruled if it used federal law unreasonably. There are two ways it may so

err: (1) by applying the governing Supreme Court rule to a new set of facts in a way that is

objectively unreasonable, or (2) by extending or failing to extend a clearly established legal

principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Clearly established federal

law exists only in the holdings, but not in the dicta, of Supreme Court decisions. See Williams

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v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–12 (2000). The applicable law is also limited to those decisions

handed down before the state court issued its decision. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

71–72 (2003). Determinations of factual issues by a state court must be presumed correct. 

They can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1).

When evaluating the state court’s adjudication, federal courts examine the last reasoned

judgment of a state court, not later, unexplained decisions upholding that judgment. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). Here, the last reasoned state-court decision was the

court of appeal’s decision.

1. ALLEGED DUE PROCESS VIOLATION.

Russo contends that his due process rights were violated when he was denied parole. 

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” When evaluating a claim brought under the Due Process

Clause, there are two steps: first, is there any constitutionally protected interest at all and,

second, if there is a constitutionally protected interest, did the state provide the requisite

procedural protections.

A. Existence of a Protected Liberty Interest.

Respondent denies that Russo has a protected liberty interest in parole. Respondent

acknowledges, however, that this issue was recently decided by the Ninth Circuit in Sass v.

California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006). In Sass, the Ninth

Circuit plainly held that California prisoners do have “a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in a parole date.” Respondent merely wishes to preserve the argument for appeal (Br.

4). In light of respondent’s position, this order briefly explains why Russo has a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.

In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12

(1979), the United States Supreme Court held that a state’s statutory parole scheme may create

“a presumption that parole release will be granted” if it uses mandatory rather than permissive

language. The Greenholtz court held that where Nebraska’s parole statute provided that the

parole board “shall order” release of eligible inmates, that presumption of parole gave rise to a

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constitutionally-protected liberty interest that could not be denied without adequate due process

of law. Id. at 11–16. The Supreme Court revisited this issue in Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369, 376–78 (1987). In Allen, the Supreme Court held that where Montana’s statutory

parole scheme instructed that the parole board “shall” release a prisoner absent certain

conditions, the prisoner had a liberty interest in parole even though the parole board had great

discretion. Id. at 381.

Under California law, the Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense . . . is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code 3041(b). By

using such mandatory language, California’s parole scheme gives rise to the same liberty

interest recognized in Greenholtz and Allen. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “Section

3041 of the California Penal Code creates in every inmate a cognizable liberty interest in parole

which is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause.” Biggs v. Terhune,

334 F.3d 910, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2003). This principle was more recently reaffirmed in Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128. 

For these reasons, Russo has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.

Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this petition. This order now addresses whether

the state provided Russo with adequate due process.

B. Requisite Due Process Protections.

(1) Some Evidence Existed For Russo’s Conviction.

The Ninth Circuit has held that when an inmate has a protected liberty interest in parole,

due process is satisfied when “some evidence” supports the parole board’s decision not to

release the prisoner. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that

Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), which required some

evidence to support revocation of inmate’s good-time credits, applies to decisions to deny

parole reviewed in a Section 2254 habeas petition). In Biggs, for example, the Ninth Circuit

held that the “some evidence” standard was satisfied by the board’s consideration of the gravity

of the petitioners’ offense, which exhibited a callous disregard for life. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916. 

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The Ninth Circuit later held that the “some evidence” standard was satisfied by reference to

undisputed facts about the would-be parolee. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

This Court has recently considered and denied several similar habeas petitions. See,

e.g., Mejia v. Kane, 2007 WL 30595 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Machado v. Kane, 2006 WL

449146 (N.D. Cal. 2006). In both decisions, a prisoner had been denied parole while serving an

indeterminate life sentence. This Court held in both instances that the board appropriately

relied on the gravity of the commitment offense as an important factor in denying parole. Mejia

and Machado both distinguished Biggs, where the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that “[a]

continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and

conduct prior to imprisonment . . . could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at

916–17. Since this statement from Biggs was “Ninth Circuit dicta without apparent foundation

in any Supreme Court holding,” this Court held that it could not “rely upon such a thin reed to

overturn, in a habeas action, a state-court ruling.” Mejia, 2007 WL 30595 *6.

The California Court of Appeal denied Russo’s state court habeas petition, finding that

the facts of the crime and his efforts to avoid arrest after the crime were sufficient grounds for

denial of parole. The court of appeal took particular note of Russo’s efforts to cover [his] tracks

by executing the witness” and his “different self-serving statements to psychiatrists,

characterizing the shooting as accidental” (Ans. Exh. G). Based on these circumstances, the

court of appeal agreed with the board’s determination that “the crime showed a callous

disregard for the suffering of the victim and [that] Russo showed no remorse” (id. at 3). 

This circumstance of carrying out a crime in a “dispassionate and calculated manner,

such as an execution-style murder” tends to show unsuitability for release under California

parole regulations. Cal. Code Regs. Title 15 2402(a), (c)(1)(B). The facts of the crime, as

understood by the court of appeal, were not contested by Russo when first presented at his

parole hearing (Ans. Exh. E. at 18). Like in this Court’s rulings in Mejia and Machado, this

order holds that the board legitimately considered the heinous circumstances of Russo’s offense

as a decisive factor in refusing to grant parole. Therefore, the court of appeal, which found

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support for its ruling in the facts of Russo’s crime and its aftermath, had “some evidence” for

denying parole under McQuillion and Biggs. 

(2) Russo Received Individual Consideration and Due Process.

Russo also argues that the Board of Prison Terms denied him individual consideration

by refusing to grant him parole. Russo presents no evidence for this claim in his petition. In

Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held that due process requires only that a state parole system

provide an opportunity for the prisoner to be heard, and that when parole is denied, the inmate

be informed of the reasons for the denial. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. The transcript of Russo’s

parole hearing demonstrates that he received full individual consideration under the Greenholtz

standard. The board reviewed the circumstances of Russo’s crime, his lack of prior criminal

history and his “discipline free” post-conviction record before declaring him unfit for parole

(Ans. Exh. E). Russo had the opportunity to comment on the facts of the case, which he

declined, and he spoke to the board about his attempts at self-reform after incarceration (id. at

18–24). When the board announced its decision to deny Russo parole, the commissioners

explained their rationale: Russo’s crime was “especially cruel and callous,” his psychiatric

evaluations were contradictory, and he had not adequately expressed remorse (id. at 70–74). 

Russo’s claim that the board denied him individual consideration thus lacks merit.

2. ALLEGED EIGHTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION.

Russo raises the additional claim that he received disproportionate punishment by

remaining in prison 22 years after his conviction, when he was sentenced to an indeterminate

scheme of seven years to life. This lengthy incarceration, Russo argues, is so disproportionate

to the crime that it violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 

Although the California Penal Code does not require that an eligible inmate receive parole, or

even that a parole date be set, it does state that a parole date “normally” shall be set at the first

parole hearing; the board, however, can choose not to set a parole date in consideration of the

“the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or

past convicted offense or offenses.” Cal. Penal Code 3041(a)–(b). Since the board denied

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Russo’s request to set a parole date based on the “callous” nature of his offense, Russo’s

continuing incarceration did not violate California law. 

Neither the length of Russo’s sentence nor the continued denial of parole violate the

Eighth Amendment. Outside of the capital context, only sentences that are grossly

disproportionate to the crime violate the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,

289–90 (1983); United States v. Carr, 56 F.3d 38, 39 (9th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Amendment

will generally uphold sentences that do not exceed the statutory maximum. See Belgarde v.

Montana, 123 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997). Petitioner alleges that the “[Board of Parole

Hearings’] matrix for kidnaping for robbery” provides for a maximum term of 17 years, in a

case of prior planning and significant injury to the victim (First Amd. Pet. 23). Petitioner,

however, is incarcerated under the California Penal Code, which states that “any person who

kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery [shall] be punished by imprisonment

in the state prison for life with possibility of parole.” Cal. Penal Code 209(b)(1). Petitioner’s

indeterminate sentence of seven years to life in prison therefore falls within the statutory

maximum for kidnaping for robbery, and does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Under binding Supreme Court law, Russo does not have a presumptive right to parole

after serving his minimum term. Convicted inmates can claim “no constitutional or inherent

right [to] be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz, 442

U.S. at 7. Since Russo remains incarcerated under a valid sentencing scheme, pursuant to

California Penal Code 209(b)(1), he cannot claim a constitutional right to be released before the

expiration of his indeterminate life term. His Eighth Amendment claim, therefore, is rejected.

3. OTHER ARGUMENTS.

Russo raises the final claim that the board arbitrarily found that he lacked remorse for

the commitment offense. The success or failure of this claim is not material to the outcome of

this petition; nevertheless, it fails to persuade. The board relied on Russo’s inconsistent

explanations for his crime and his failure to contact the victim’s family with an offer of

restitution. These findings constitute “some evidence” sufficient to support the board’s holding

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that Russo had not shown adequate remorse; they therefore suffice to defeat Russo’s claim that

the board acted arbitrarily.

4. IRONS V. CAREY DOES NOT MANDATE RELEASE.

On a final note, in Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 665 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit

recently stated, in dicta, that “in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s

commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due

process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California statutes.” 

The Irons decision held that the denial of parole to a prisoner who had not yet served the

minimum number of years required by his sentence did not violate due process. Unlike the

petitioner in Irons, Russo has served three times the minimum number of years required by his

sentence. The board’s 2005 evaluation of Russo, however, suggested that his final release was

drawing nigh: the board requested an additional psychological examination before Russo’s next

hearing and asked Russo to make another attempt to contact the victim’s family with an offer of

restitution. These actions, the board argued, would “bode well for [Russo] in [his] next

hearing” (Ans. Exh. E at 75). Prolonging Russo’s commitment indefinitely might very well

violate due process under Irons. The board took careful account of the circumstances of

Russo’s crime in 2005, however, and made a reasonable decision, supported by “some

evidence,” to deny him parole.

CONCLUSION

Russo is not being held in violation of the Constitution. The court of appeal correctly

found that Russo’s denial of parole was supported by some evidence and did not otherwise

violate Russo’s right to due process of law. The court of appeal’s decision to deny habeas relief

was consistent with clearly-established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. For

the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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