Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07075/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 730
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Report &amp; Disclosure
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 1994 Decided November 1, 1994

No. 93-7075

FREDERICK J. DIVEN, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION INTERNATIONAL

AND LOCAL 689, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(91cv1099)

Arthur L. Fox, II, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.

Douglas Taylor argued the cause and filed the brief for appellees. With him on the brief was Neal

Goldfarb. Earle W. Putman entered an appearance for appellee Amalgamated Transit Union

International. Martin P. Hogan entered an appearance for appellee Local 689, Amalgamated Transit

Union.

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Appellants challenge the district court's refusal to exercise

supplementaljurisdiction over appellants'non-federalclaims against appelleeLocalUnion 689. Local

689 is the exclusive bargaining representative of employees of the Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority ("WMATA"), a joint project among, and political subdivision of, the District of

Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. Appellants seeks to assert non-federal claims against Local 689

in an otherwise federal lawsuit against the local's national affiliate. Since appellants' non-federal

claims against the localunion predominate over the related federal cause of action against the national

union, we affirm the district court's decision.

I.

Appellants, members ofLocal689 ofthe Amalgamated Transit Union International("ATU"),

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were fined over the course of several local union meetings by the local president, Thomas, for

speaking in a manner deemed "disruptive" of those meetings. The fines were levied pursuant to local

union bylaw § 12(b), which authorizes the president summarily to discipline members for disrupting

meetings. In issuing fines, the president did not refer to the ATU's constitution or its policies

regarding member speech, but appellants brought (untimely) appeals to the international union,

seeking to have the fines declared invalid under substantive and procedural provisions of the national

union constitution. The ATU did not act, and the local union successfully extracted the fines from

appellants. Appellants then sued in the district court, alleging violations by both the local and

international unions of appellants'free speech rights, as protected in Title I ofthe Labor Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA" or "Landrum-Griffin Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 411, as well as

contractual violations by the local.

Appellants claimed that the local had violated the Landrum-Griffin Act outright, by curtailing

members' speech. The local was also said to have violated its members' contractual rights by

disregarding substantive protections of the Landrum-Griffin Act, which are guaranteed in the ATU

constitution and incorporated by reference in the local bylaws. Appellants further claimed that the

localhad violated contractualproceduralprotectionsformemberssetforthin the internationalunion's

constitution, as well as its own bylaws regarding the discipline of members.

For its part, the ATU was alleged not to have followed its own procedures for review of

member discipline, as well as to have violated the Landrum-Griffin Act less directly. The ATU's

constitution includes a § 22.6, which bansmembers'speech conducive to "dissension orsubver[sion]"

of the interest and harmony of the national union, but the constitution also contains a savings clause,

§ 22.7, to the effect that nothing in § 22.6 can be read to undermine Landrum- Griffin's Title I free

speech rights. Appellants claim that, notwithstanding the savings clause, § 22.6 is facially inconsistent

with Landrum-Griffin and has an illegal chilling effect by providing "aid and comfort to local officials'

efforts to stifle" members' speech. The offending clause, in other words, although not referred to by

the local officials, nevertheless had encouraged their allegedly illegal behavior. Accordingly,

appellantssought declaratoryand injunctive relief against the local, recoveryofthe fines, and an order

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excising § 22.6 from the ATU's constitution.

The local union moved to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that appellants'

only cognizable claim against it was based on D.C. laweven if the non-federal question implicated

Landrum-Griffin by virtue of successive contractual incorporationsand that therefore federal

question jurisdiction was lacking. Appellants responded that a federal question had at least been

raised against ATU if not also against the local, and the state contract claim against the local

defendants was so closely related to the federal claim that the district court was obliged to assert

"supplemental" jurisdiction over the contractual claim per the new supplemental jurisdiction statute.

28 U.S.C. § 1367. The district court declined to do so. It believed that appellants' federal claim

under both the Landrum-Griffin Act and the Taft-Hartley Act could not be brought against the local

because neither Act covers unions composed solely of employees ofstate or municipal governments.

While the federal claim against the international union remained, the district court ruled it would be

inappropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law contractual claims against the

local. The district judge thought that to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over appellants'

contractual claim, which also asserted that the local was bound to observe Landrum-Griffin, would

be to "admit at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the front door." (citing

Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977)).

The determination of the district judge was certified under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) for our review.

II.

Much of appellants' argument is directed against the district court's reasoning. Appellants

particularly object to the notion that Congress' determination not to cover unions composed only of

employees of state or local governments under Landrum-Griffin should bear on the supplemental

jurisdiction question. We quite agree with appellants that the two issues are analytically differentin

other words, the congressionaldecision not to cover employees of politicalsubdivisions under federal

labor law does not amount to a directive to keep allsuch employees' claims out of federal court under

any circumstances. See Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987). We think, however,

that the district court's decision can be read, and should be read, as a determination, under the

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supplemental jurisdiction statute, that the state claim substantially predominates over the federal

claim.

What used to be called pendent jurisdictionthe discretionary exercise offederal jurisdiction

over a related state claim,see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)wassuperseded

by the supplemental jurisdiction provisions in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.

101-650, 104 Stat. 5113. The statute seemingly speaks in directory language: jurisdiction "shall" be

extended to the state claim if the federal claim properly supports original jurisdiction, if the claims

arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact, and if no one of four exceptions obtains:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; (2) the claim substantially

predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original

jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons

for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

The extent to which the trial judge's traditional discretion has been cabined by this

legislationor in what manneris a matter of some debate. Compare Growth Horizons, Inc. v.

Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993) (§ 1367(c) incorporates Gibbs factors) with

LaSorella v. Penrose Saint Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F. Supp. 1413, 1415 (D.Colo. 1993) (§

1367 "greatly expands" supplemental jurisdiction); see also Executive Software v. U.S. Dist. Court,

24 F.3d 1545, 1556-58 (9th Cir. 1994). Appellant understandably argues that the district judge,

under the Act, was obliged to exercise supplemental jurisdiction; that he had no discretion to refuse

to hear the claims against the local. We disagree. The judgment of the district court comes into play

at several points in § 1367, including the threshold inquiry under § 1367(a) as to whether a party

raises a legitimateand legitimately relatedfederal claim. Certainly, a determination as to whether

the state claim "substantially predominates" over the federal is not one that admits to a mechanistic

application, nor is the question whether the claim raises a "novel or complex" issue of state law

(which could be said to apply to this case as well) or whether there are "other compelling reasons"

for refusing to extend federal jurisdiction. Despite Congress' use of "shall," the statute fairly exudes

deference to judicial discretionat least once the threshold determinations have been met and the

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court moves on to consider the exceptions. It follows that our review of the district court's judgment

must be quite deferential; the abuse of discretion standard applies. See Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc.

v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103, 1110

(2d Cir. 1992).

To be sure, appellants do make a rather strained argument that their LMRDA claim against

the local is itself federal. WMATA, they maintain, should be thought to be something other than a

state or local entity. While we have not decided WMATA's status as a governmental entity in

precisely this context, that status appears on reflection to be abundantly clear. WMATA is a political

subdivision of two states, and the presence of the District of Columbia in the compact does nothing

to alter the nature of WMATA as a political subdivision. See Washington Metropolitan Transit

AuthorityCompact, Pub. L. No. 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966), codified at D.C.CODEANN. § 1-2431

(1992) and MD.TRANSP.CODEANN. §§ 10-203, 10-204 (Michie 1977); VA.CODEANN. §§ 56-529,

56-530 (Michie 1986) (not set out); Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218,

222-28 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding governmentalstatus and sovereign immunity of WMATA); see

also Colbert v. United States, 601 A.2d 603, 605 (D.C. 1992). WMATA thus does not constitute

an "employer" nor do employees of WMATA belong to a "labor organization" within the meaning

of the LMRDA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3), (5) (defining "employer" not to include "any State or

politicalsubdivision thereof " and defining "labor organization" as "any organization ... which exists

for the purpose ... of dealing with employers"); see also Hawaii Gov't Employees Ass'n, Local 152

v. Martoche, 915 F.2d 718, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Smith v. Office&Professional EmployeesInt'l

Union, 821 F.2d 355, 356 (6th Cir. 1987).

Appellants further argue that the claim against the local could be thought to rest on § 301 of

the Taft-Hartley Actunder the theory that the members were third-party beneficiaries of a contract

between the local and the international. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("Suits for violation of contracts ...

between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States

having jurisdiction of the parties") (emphasis added); Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec.

Workers, Local 71, 112 S. Ct. 494, 498-501 (1991) (individual union member may sue on contract

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between national and local union). That argument founders, however, on the same rock that blocks

the Landrum-Griffin action against the local; both statutes use the same definition of "labor

organization," and the local qualifies under neither. Chaparro-Febus v. Local 1575, 983 F.2d 325,

329 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting exclusion of "political subdivisions" from "employer" coverage under

Labor Management Relations Act).

There remains the federal claim against ATUthat it, through its constitution or in some

other ill-defined way, provided moral or psychological support for the local's imposition of

punishment upon appellants. We cannot help but note, however, as we think did the district court,

that the claim against the ATU, in the absence of any allegation that its officials actually

communicated with the local with regard to the events at issue, israther frail, even though that claim

has survived a summary judgment motion. Section 22.6 of the ATU constitution would certainly, if

it stood by itself, be violative of the Landrum-Griffin Act, but we do not understand how it can be

given any weight in light of the savings clause, § 22.7.

Of course neither the district court nor we, at this stage and on this record, can definitively

pronounce on the validity of appellants' federal claim against the ATU, but the apparent weakness of

the claimeven before discoveryis, under these circumstances, a factor to be weighed in

determining whetherthe state claim"substantiallypredominates." SeeTurnerBroadcasting Sys.,Inc.

v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1992) (describing § 1367(a) as a threshold inquiry but applying

§ 1367(c)(2) despite doubts regarding the relatedness of state to federal claims).

The relative weakness of the federal claim and concomitant primacy of the state law issues

are evident when examining the factual and legal basesfor appellants' claims. The injury to appellants

was caused directly by the local, and all of the complex argumentsthat appellants marshal to contend

that the local's actions are illegal require resolution under D.C. law, even the claim that the local's

bylaws have implicitly incorporated concepts offederal law. Inclusion of a federal statute in a private

contract does not, of itself, create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809-10 (1986). The contractual claims are

subtlemuch more so than the labored federal claimand therefore it is impossible to quarrel with

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the district court's implicit determination that the state claim predominates. In general, "[t]he

question of whether state law predominates ... must be answered by looking to the nature of the

claims as set forth in the pleading and by determining whether the state law claims are more complex

or require more judicial resources to adjudicate or are more salient in the case as a whole than the

federal law claims." Moore v. DeBiase, 766 F. Supp. 1311, 1319 (D.N.J. 1991) (emphasis added)

(footnotes omitted). Combined, then, with the weakness of the federal claim against the international,

we have little difficulty in concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

jurisdiction. See Hudson County News Co. v. Metro Assoc. Inc., 141 F.R.D. 386, 392-93 (D. Mass.

1992) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where federal claim "is attenuated to the point

of being hypothetical"); see alsoCouncil of Unit Owners of WispCondominium, Inc. v. Recreational

Indus., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Md. 1992).

* * *

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the claims against the appellee local union. The order below dismissing appellants' claims against the

local union for want of jurisdiction is affirmed.

So ordered.

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