Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00562/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00562-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Armand Andreozzi, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Kathryn Tracy, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-16-00562-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

On February 29, 2016, Petitioner Armand Andreozzi filed a pro se petition for writ 

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. The Court referred the petition 

to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade. Doc. 4 at 3. On July 8, 2016, Judge Bade issued a 

report and a recommendation that the Court deny the petition (“R&R”). Doc. 16. 

Petitioner filed pro se objections to the R&R (Doc. 19), and Respondent Kathryn Tracy 

filed a response (Doc. 22). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will accept Judge 

Bade’s recommendation that the Petition be denied, but on a different basis. 

I. Background. 

 Judge Bade provided the following summary of Petitioner’s convictions and 

habeas corpus petition: 

A. June 12, 1998 Court-Martial 

On June 12, 1998, a panel of officers and enlisted members sitting as a general court-martial at Fort Carson, Colorado convicted Petitioner of rape, forcible sodomy, assault, burglary, kidnapping, and solicitation of another to assist in escape from pretrial confinement, in violation of several 

provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Petitioner was 

sentenced to reduction in rank, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 

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confinement for twenty-seven years, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence except for the forfeiture of pay and allowances, which was waived pursuant to Article 58b of the UCMJ 

and paid to Petitioner’s spouse. 

Petitioner, through counsel, appealed his conviction to the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA). November 4, 2004, the ACCA 

affirmed the “findings of guilty and the sentence . . . .” Petitioner then filed a “petition for grant of review” of the ACCA’s decision in the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). On October 4, 2005, the 

CAAF denied Petitioner’s request for review. 

B. November 13, 1998 Court-Martial 

On November 13, 1998, Petitioner pleaded guilty to charges in a second court-martial and was found guilty of desertion, escaping confinement, larceny, wrongful appropriation of military property, assault, kidnapping, and unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon. On November 13, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to confinement for fifteen years and a 

dishonorable discharge. On April 14, 1999, the convening authority approved the sentence. Petitioner, through counsel, appealed to the ACCA. 

On October 19, 2001, the ACCA affirmed the November 13, 1998 findings of guilty and the sentence. Petitioner filed a “petition for grant of review” of the ACCA’s decision in the CAAF. On May 7, 2002, the CAAF denied Petitioner’s request for review. 

C. Dishonorable Discharge and Transfer to BOP 

Following Petitioner’s appeals, on December 6, 2005, he was dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Army. In accordance with a Memorandum of 

Agreement (MOA) between the U.S. Amy and the BOP, Petitioner was transferred to the BOP on January 17, 2006. 

D. Habeas Corpus Proceeding in the ACCA 

In January 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the ACCA challenging his detention within BOP. Petitioner asserted that, 

although he was “housed” by BOP, he was in the custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed pursuant to a court-martial. He argued that because he remained in the legal custody of the armed forces, he was entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was being confined in immediate 

association with foreign nationals in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 812. On 

February 2, 2016, the ACCA denied relief. Petitioner requested reconsideration en banc, which was denied on February 26, 2016. 

Doc. 16 at 2-4 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

II. The Petition and the R&R. 

Petitioner again argues that he has been confined with foreign nationals in 

violation of 10 U.S.C. § 812, which prohibits the confinement of members of the armed 

services in close association with enemy prisoners or other foreign nationals. Doc. 1 at 1. 

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As a remedy, he seeks five days’ credit to his sentence for every day his custody has 

violated § 812. Id. at 9. He also argues that the Army Court of Criminal Appeals 

(“ACCA”) arbitrarily denied his petition for habeas corpus relief. Id. at 5. 

 Judge Bade found that the “full and fair consideration” standard applies to the 

Court’s collateral review of the ACCA’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. Id. 

She concluded that federal courts should defer to military courts when reviewing the 

merits of court-martial proceedings and any ancillary matters that have been considered 

and decided by military courts. Id. at 6. She also determined that the ACCA’s denial of 

Petitioner’s habeas petition constituted full and fair consideration because Petitioner fully 

briefed and argued his claim before the ACCA. Judge Bade found that if an issue is fully 

briefed before a military court, even a summary denial by that court constitutes full and 

fair consideration. Id. at 5. 

 Judge Bade also found that Petitioner has provided no factual support for the 

alleged violation of § 812. As a result, she found that Petitioner’s claim should be denied 

even if considered de novo. Id. at 9. Further, Judge Bade denied Petitioner’s motion to 

strike documents relating to his court-marital proceedings, finding that they provided 

important context for this case. Id. at 2. 

III. Petitioner’s Objections. 

Petitioner first objects to the denial of his Rule 12(f) motion to strike “all matters 

pertaining to Pet[itioners court martial proceedings], appeal, discharge, and 

confinement”. Doc. 14 at 2. According to Petitioner, those matters are “outside the 

scope of the issues raised in this action.” Doc. 19 at 1. Next, Petitioner argues that the 

full and fair consideration standard does not apply to collateral review of his claim 

because he does not challenge the merits of his court-martial proceedings or a matter 

ancillary to those proceedings. Id. at 2-5. He asserts, in the alternative, that even if the 

standard applies, it was not met in his case. Id. at 5-7. Finally, Petitioner objects to 

Judge Bade’s finding on the merits of his claim, again asserting that he is being confined 

with foreign nationals in violation of § 812. The Court will review Petitioner’s specific 

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objections de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

IV. Analysis. 

 A. Motion to Strike.

 Under Rule 12(f), the court may “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or 

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 

Motions to strike are generally disfavored and “should not be granted unless it is clear 

that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the 

litigation.” Johnson v. Cal. Medical Facility Health Servs., 2015 WL 4508734, at *6 

(E.D. Cal. July 24, 2015). 

 Petitioner argues that Respondent’s pleadings, which contain records of 

Petitioner’s charges, sentencing, appeal, discharge, and confinement, are “immaterial, 

impertinent, and are an insufficient defense to the issues raised in the petition and fall 

squarely within the parameters of Rule 12(f) to be stricken.” Doc. 19 at 1. Judge Bade 

found that the records provide context for Petitioner’s claim. Doc. 16 at 2. The Court 

agrees. Petitioner’s claims concern his status within the military, the adequacy of the 

consideration his claims received in military court, and the nature of his current claim 

under § 812. The records are relevant to Petitioner’s claims. 

 B. Habeas Claim. 

 Petitioner filed a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The 

government did not assert that this was an improper form of relief, and Judge Bade dealt 

with his claim as a habeas petition. The Court concludes, however, that Petitioner seeks 

relief that cannot be obtained through a habeas petition. 

 There are “well-recognized boundaries between habeas corpus and civil rights 

claims.” Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 385 (7th Cir. 2005). As the Supreme Court 

has made clear, habeas claims are proper only when an individual is challenging the 

validity or duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), 498-

99. The Ninth Circuit has echoed this distinction: 

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Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie 

within the heart of habeas corpus, whereas a § 1983 action is a proper 

remedy for a . . . prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the 

conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody. 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). In a 

recent en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that cases challenging conditions of 

confinement, rather than the fact or duration of confinement, cannot be brought as habeas 

claims. Nettles v. Grounds, --- F.3d ---, No. 12-16935, 2016 WL 4072465, at *9 (9th Cir. 

July 26, 2016) (“Because success on Nettles’s claims would not necessarily lead to his 

immediate or earlier release from confinement, Nettles’s claim does not fall within ‘the 

core of habeas corpus,’ and he must instead bring his claim under § 1983.”) (citation 

omitted). 

 In Glaus, a federal prisoner filed a habeas petition alleging a violation of his 

Eighth Amendment rights based on prison officials’ indifference to his need for medical 

treatment, and requested transfer to a prison medical facility or release from custody to 

obtain treatment. 408 F.3d at 384. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s 

dismissal of the petition, noting that it “was really a classic ‘conditions of confinement’ 

claim” which should be brought as a civil rights action. Id. at 386; see also Wiley v. Holt, 

42 F. App’x 399, 400 (10th Cir. 2002) (“A habeas corpus proceeding attacks the fact or 

duration of a prisoner’s confinement and seeks the remedy of immediate release or a 

shortened period of confinement. In contrast, a civil rights action attacks the conditions 

of the prisoner’s confinement.”) (internal citation omitted). 

 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the validity or duration of his confinement. He 

challenges a condition of his confinement – being housed with foreign nationals. 

Doc. 19. The fact that petitioner asks for a remedy that would shorten his sentence does 

not change the underlying nature of his claim. Doc. 1. The petitioner in Glaus also 

sought early release, but the court held that habeas corpus was not the proper avenue for 

his claim. 408 F.3d at 384. Glaus noted that release was not an available remedy for an 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Similarly, Petitioner has presented no 

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authority to suggest that a reduced sentence is an appropriate remedy for violation of 

§ 812. 

 A court may recharacterize an improperly labeled habeas petition as a civil rights 

claim, and deal with it as recharacterized. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 

(2004); Glaus, 408 F.3d at 388; Weaver v. Sanders, No. CV 13-3269-FMO JPR, 2013 

WL 2147806, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2013). But the court in Glaus recognized several 

factors that recommend caution before recharacterizing a habeas petition. 408 F.3d at 

388. These include discrepancies in the identification of the defendant, the nature of the 

relief sought, relevant exhaustion requirements for filing, and the amount of the filing fee. 

Id. Here, as in Glaus, the warden has been named as the respondent and may not be the 

correct or exclusive defendant in a civil rights action. It does not appear that the decision 

to house Petitioner in the Bureau of Prisons was the Warden’s. Petitioner may need to 

seek relief against the Department of the Army or the Bureau of Prisons. See Moore v. 

Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The right respondent in a § 2254 action 

is the warden of the prison; the right defendants in a § 1983 suit are the persons whose 

wrongful acts harmed the plaintiff (and the warden is rarely a proper defendant, because 

he is not vicariously liable for subordinates’ acts).”). 

 In addition, because Petitioner is complaining about where he has been housed by 

federal officials, his civil rights claim may need to be brought under Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), if it can 

be maintained under the Bivens doctrine. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Glaus, 

however, “federal prisoners suing under Bivens may sue relevant officials in their 

individual capacity only. In this instance, Glaus’s suit against the warden appears to be 

an action against the warden in his official capacity.” 408 F.3d at 389. The same is true 

of Petitioner’s claim. 

 Considering the nature of Petitioner’s allegations, the Court declines to 

recharacterize Petitioner’s complaint as a civil rights suit. The Court instead will deny 

the petition without prejudice so Petitioner can consider pursuing his claim as a civil 

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rights action. This comports with the recognition in Glaus that recharacterization should 

occur only “in a narrow set of circumstances.” Id. at 388; see also Nettles, 2016 WL 

4072465, at *9-10 (discussing Glaus favorably).1

 The Court expresses no view on whether Petitioner can plead or prevail on a civil 

rights claim. 

 IT IS ORDERED 

1. The Petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is denied without prejudice. 

 2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action. 

 3. A certificate of appealability is denied because the Court concludes that the 

Petition plainly cannot be pursued as a habeas action and the Court should 

not recharacterize it as a civil rights claim. The Court does not believe that 

reasonable jurists would disagree, particularly in light of the Ninth Circuit’s 

recent decision in Nettles, 2016 WL 4072465. 

 Dated this 3rd day of October, 2016. 

 

1

 Judge Bade concluded that Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits because he has 

not shown that he has been confined in “immediate association” with foreign nationals. Doc. 16 at 8-9. The Court agrees with this analysis under § 812, and would affirm on the 

merits were it not for the fact that Judge Bade’s decision is based on petitioner’s failure to produce evidence in this case. Because the Court has concluded that this case should not 

have proceeded under the habeas statute, and should be dismissed without prejudice to allow a possible civil rights action, the Court also concludes that it should not dismiss on 

the merits due to a failure to produce evidence in this proceeding. If Petitioner can make out a viable civil rights claim, he may be able in that case to produce the evidence lacking here. Nor will the Court attempt to resolve the government’s argument that § 812 does not apply to Petitioner because he has been dishonorably discharged from the military and thus is no longer a “member of the armed forces.” Doc. 22 at 4. The Court would 

address this issue if it recharacterized this action and retained jurisdiction, but concludes 

that it should not engage in further merits analysis given its lack of jurisdiction over this action as a habeas petition. 

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