Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04090/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charlton Glen Ward,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn,

1 Attorney General of the State 

of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 18-04090 PHX DWL (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA:

Petitioner Charlton Ward, proceeding pro se, filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 15, 2018, challenging his state court 

convictions on one count of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of attempted 

sexual exploitation of a minor. Respondents docketed a Limited Answer to Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus, (ECF No. 9), and Ward has replied to the answer. (ECF No. 11; 

ECF No. 12). Ward contends he is entitled to habeas relief because he was denied his right 

to due process of law. Respondents assert the Petition is not timely and relief on his sole 

claim for relief is procedurally barred.

 

1 Effective October 21, 2019, David Shinn replaced Charles Ryan as Director of the 

Arizona Department of Corrections. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Shinn is 

automatically substituted as the party of record.

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I. Background

A. State court proceedings

On January 18, 2005, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ward pled guilty to: (1)

one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, classified as a class 2 felony and a dangerous 

crime against children in the first degree with one predicate prior dangerous crime against 

children; and (2) one count of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. (ECF No. 10-1 

at 2; ECF No. 10-2 at 2-3). In the written plea agreement Ward acknowledged his guilt of 

and conviction on a predicate prior dangerous crime against children. (ECF No. 10-1 at 5). 

In return for Ward’s guilty pleas the State agreed to dismiss Counts 3 through 6 of the 

indictment and also agreed not to allege Ward’s parole status to enhance his sentence or to 

allege his predicate prior conviction to enhance his sentence on the charge of attempted 

sexual exploitation of a minor. (ECF No. 10-1 at 3). 

The written plea agreement specified the minimum, presumptive, and maximum 

terms of imprisonment Ward faced pursuant to his guilty pleas. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2).

Additionally, the parties stipulated that Ward would be sentenced to the presumptive term 

of 28 years’ imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on the charge of sexual exploitation 

of a minor, and a term of lifetime probation pursuant to his conviction on the charge of 

attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, and required to register as a sex offender. (ECF 

No. 10-1 at 3). In the written plea agreement Ward averred his guilty pleas were knowing 

and voluntary and that he understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading 

guilty, including his right to an appeal. (ECF No. 10-1 at 4-5). 

Specifically, the plea agreement provided: 

. . . the Defendant hereby waives and gives up any and all motions, defenses, 

objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or could assert hereafter, 

to the court’s entry of judgment against him and imposition of a sentence 

upon him consistent with this agreement. By entering this agreement, the 

Defendant further waives and gives up the right to appeal.

(ECF No. 10-1 at 4). Ward also “consent[ed] to judicial fact-finding by preponderance of 

the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of sentence . . .” (Id.). 

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On March 8, 2005, Ward was sentenced to a 28-year term of imprisonment pursuant 

to his conviction on the count of sexual exploitation of a minor and to a term of lifetime 

probation pursuant to his conviction for attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. (ECF 

No. 10-3 at 2-5).

On May 16, 2005, Ward filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and he was appointed counsel in his 

Rule 32 action. (ECF No. 10-4; ECF No. 10-5). Ward’s appointed counsel filed a notice 

that she had reviewed the record and could find no arguable issues to raise on Ward’s 

behalf. (ECF No. 10-7). The trial court granted Ward leave to file a pro per petition, and

dismissed the Rule 32 action on February 21, 2006, when Ward failed to file a pro per 

petition. (ECF No. 10-8; ECF No. 10-9). Ward did not seek review of the trial court’s denial 

of Rule 32 relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals 

More than 10 years later, on May 5, 2016, Ward filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus” in the state trial court. (ECF No. 10-10). Ward alleged that “his indictment failed

to state an offense and was jurisdictionally defective—rendering his entire criminal process 

void” and in violation of his right to due process of law. (ECF No. 10-10 at 2-3). Ward 

argued that the “subject indictment” did not “identify any ‘actual minor’ victim of the 

alleged ‘[Dangerous Crimes Against Children]’ offenses.” (ECF No. 10-10 at 5). Ward

filed a second, similar petition on September 6, 2016. (ECF No. 10-11 at 2-15). In an order 

entered September 22, 2016, the state trial court construed both “habeas corpus petitions 

as a single Rule 32 notice of post-conviction relief.” (ECF No. 10-12 at 2-4). The trial court 

concluded that Ward’s successive petitions were untimely and, “[t]o the extent that [he] is 

attempting to raise new Rule 32.1(a) claims that could have been asserted in the first 

Rule 32 proceeding, relief is also precluded.” (ECF No. 10-12 at 3, 4). The state trial court 

also found Ward’s jurisdictional claim regarding the insufficiency of the indictment waived 

by his failure to raise the issue in a pretrial motion and also waived by his guilty plea. (ECF 

No. 10-12 at 3). 

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Ward filed a “Notice of Intent to File a Special Action; Motion to Vacate Order of 

09-22-2016,” and later filed a motion seeking expedited disposition of the motion to vacate. 

(ECF No. 10-13; ECF No. 10-14). The state trial court denied the motion to vacate on 

January 11, 2017, and simultaneously declined to take any action on Ward’s notice of intent 

to file a special action. (ECF No. 10-15). Ward did not seek review of the trial court’s 

decisions by the Arizona Court of Appeals; however, Ward submitted a “Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus” to the Arizona Supreme Court on September 14, 2017. (ECF No. 10-

16). The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed the petition on February 5, 2018, noting the 

trial court had dismissed Ward’s 2016 habeas petitions as untimely and successive, and 

further noting Ward failed to seek timely review of the trial court’s decision in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 10-17). The Arizona Supreme Court also denied Ward’s

subsequent motion for reconsideration. (ECF No. 10-18; ECF No. 10-19).

Ward then filed a petition for special action in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (ECF 

No. 10-20). The Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction of the special action on March 9, 

2018. (ECF No. 10-21 at 2-3). Ward sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which

denied relief on August 24, 2018. (ECF No. 10-22; ECF No. 10-23).

B. Federal Habeas Claims

Ward filed the instant habeas petition on November 15, 2018. (ECF No. 1). Ward 

asserts a single claim for federal habeas relief: “Ward’s indictment was insufficient as a 

matter of law, and the trial court proceeded over Ward’s pleas, convictions, and sentencing 

without or in excess of proper jurisdiction/authority under the law,” because “the plain 

language of ARS 13-705(P)(1) requires the state to actually identify any ‘actual minor’

victim of ARS 13-3553 (when alleged as a dangerous crime against children) under 15 

years of age as an essential element” of the crime. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Ward argues the 

“indictment was insufficient as a matter of law because it failed to allege an ‘essential 

element’” of the “Dangerous Crime Against Children” statute under which he was charged, 

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i.e., the indictment did not allege the identity of an “actual minor” under the age of 15 who 

was the victim of his alleged crime. (ECF No. 11 at 4). (Id.).2

II. Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

Relief on the merits of Ward’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the 

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners 

seeking federal habeas relief from their state convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The oneyear statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which 

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). For an Arizona non-capital defendant who 

pleads guilty, the conviction becomes “final” at the conclusion of their first “of-right” postconviction proceeding under Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because

“Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The state trial court dismissed Ward’s first Rule 32 action on February 21, 2006. 

Ward had thirty days to seek review of the trial court’s decision, see Ariz. R. Crim P. 

32.9(c), but he failed to do so. Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations on Ward’s

federal habeas action began to run on or about March 23, 2006, and expired on March 23, 

2007. 

Ward did not file his federal habeas action until November 5, 2018, more than ten 

years after the AEDPA statute of limitations expired. Although the statute of limitations is 

tolled so long as a properly filed application for habeas corpus is pending in state court, see 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), Ward’s 2016 and 2017 state actions seeking post-conviction relief 

 

2 Ward also “contends that the state court denials of review in all available procedural 

vehicles has resulted in a fundamentally inadequate post-conviction forum in which to vindicate 

his federal constitutional guarantees in state criminal process . . .” (ECF No. 11 at 4). To the extent 

Ward asserts he was denied due process in his state post-conviction proceedings, this claim is not 

cognizable in a § 2254 action. Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 331-32 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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did not “revive” the limitations period with regard to his federal habeas petition. A statecourt post-conviction action that is filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations 

under the AEDPA does not revive the running of the limitations period. See Jiminez v. 

Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th 

Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001). Additionally, these 

untimely state actions did not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations because they were not 

“properly filed” actions for state post-conviction relief. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 413 (2005) (holding that a state petition that is not filed within the state’s required 

time limit is not “properly filed.”). “A state habeas petition is not ‘properly filed’ for 

purposes of statutory tolling under AEDPA if the state petition was determined by the state 

court to be untimely as a matter of state law.” Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 

2012), citing Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5-6 (2007).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition may be 

equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control prevented the 

prisoner from filing his petition on time. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010); 

Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2014). To be entitled to equitable tolling 

the petitioner must establish he was diligently “pursuing his rights,” and that “some 

extraordinary circumstance” beyond the petitioner’s control prevented the timely filing of 

his habeas petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839-40 (9th 

Cir. 2014); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling 

is also available if the petitioner establishes their factual innocence of the crimes of 

conviction. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 

929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2014). It is Ward’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is 

warranted in his case. See, e.g., Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); 

Waldon-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1111; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 

(9th Cir. 2004). 

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In reply to Respondents’ allegation that his petition is not timely, Ward does not 

allege a basis for tolling of the statute of limitations, but asserts he did not discover “his 

instant subject-matter jurisdiction/Due Process claim” until after expiration of the date for 

bringing a federal habeas action. (ECF No. 12 at 3). Ward contends his petition is timely 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), which provides the one-year statute of limitations 

may begin to run on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” However, 

Ward asserts he did not discover the legal argument underpinning his claim until 2016, 

rather than alleging he did not discover the factual basis for his claim, i.e., that the 

indictment was insufficient as written, until 2016. Accordingly, Ward is not entitled to 

invoke the provisions of § 2244(d)(1)(D). See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th 

Cir. 2003); Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[F]actual predicate” means 

“evidentiary facts or events, and not court rulings or legal consequences of the facts.” 

(internal punctuation and citation omitted)); Silva v. Roden, 951 F. Supp. 2d 222, 227 (D.

Mass. 2013); Summers v. Patrick, 535 F. Supp. 2d 995, 998 (C.D. Cal. 2008).

Because the habeas action was not filed within the statute of limitations and Ward

is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, Ward’s federal 

habeas petition is time-barred.

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Absent specific circumstances, the Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the 

merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan 

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 

(1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim the petitioner must afford the state 

courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim 

to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 

489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). The 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, 

the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner 

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presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either in a direct appeal or in a petition 

for state post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999); Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 2008); Crowell v. Knowles, 

483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007).

Ward did not raise his federal habeas claim in the Arizona Court of Appeals in a 

procedurally correct manner. Procedural default occurs when, as in this matter, the

petitioner did present the claim to the state’s “highest court,” but the court did not address 

the merits of the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule when 

presenting the claim. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-28; Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 802 (1991). Federal habeas review is barred on claims dismissed by a state court 

pursuant to an “adequate and independent” state procedural rule. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 

386, 392 (2004); Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2011). A state rule is

“adequate and independent” if it is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the 

time of a petitioner’s purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 (9th 

Cir. 2011). The Arizona appellate court found Ward’s claim regarding the insufficiency of 

the indictment barred by Arizona’s rules regarding untimely and successive Rule 32 actions

and the waiver of claims, which have been found to be “adequate and independent” state 

procedural rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Simmons v. Schriro, 187 F. 

App’x 753, 754 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Arizona’s procedural rules, including its 

timeliness rules, are “clear” and “well-established”); Pollard v. Schriro, 2006 WL 

3512037, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2006) (finding a claim procedurally barred when the state postconviction court dismissed a Rule 32 proceeding based on the petitioner’s failure to file a 

timely petition).

Accordingly, the claim stated in Ward’s federal habeas petition was procedurally 

defaulted in the state courts. If a prisoner has defaulted a claim in the state courts he is not 

entitled to a review of the merits of the claim in a federal habeas action absent a showing 

of cause and prejudice. E.g., Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000). “Cause” 

is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim and “prejudice” is 

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actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. It 

is the petitioner’s burden to establish cause and prejudice with regard to their procedural 

default of a federal habeas claim in the state courts. Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 

1415 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court may also consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted 

claim if the failure to consider the merits of the claim will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 1033, 1059 

(9th Cir. 2017); Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. A petitioner meets the “fundamental miscarriage 

of justice” exception by “establish[ing] that under the probative evidence he has a colorable 

claim of factual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333. 339 (1992) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

In reply to the argument that he procedurally defaulted his claim in the state courts,

Ward contends the state court erred by construing his claim of a jurisdictional defect as a 

Rule 32 action and that this claim was properly presented in his special action. (ECF No. 

11 at 2). Even if Ward could show cause adequate to excuse his procedural default of his 

federal habeas claim, he is unable to show prejudice with regard to his claim for relief.

Ward’s substantive claim, one asserting the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction 

over him by virtue of the indictment, was waived by his entry of his guilty plea. See, e.g.,

Ross v. Arizona, 2015 WL 1549284, at *20 (D. Ariz. 2015) (“To the extent that Petitioner 

argues that alleged defects in the indictment somehow divested the Maricopa County 

Superior Court of subject matter to try him on the charged felonies, that claim does not 

warrant habeas relief because such an outcome would contradict overwhelming federal and 

state precedent holding that defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to 

adjudicate a case.” (internal quotations omitted)); Reel v. Ryan, 2013 WL 2284988, at *6 

(D. Ariz. 2013) (rejecting the petitioner’s habeas claim that the state court lacked 

jurisdiction over his case due to a defect in the indictment, because the petitioner pled

guilty). See also United States v. DeVaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1153 (10th Cir. 2012) (“A 

guilty plea waives all defenses except those that go to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 

and the narrow class of constitutional claims involving the right not to be haled into court”).

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IV. Conclusion

Ward’s federal habeas petition was not filed within the applicable one-year statute 

of limitations. Ward has not established he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling of the 

statute of limitations. Furthermore, Ward’s federal habeas claim was procedurally 

defaulted in the state courts. Ward has not established cause for or prejudice arising from 

his procedural default of his claim, nor has he established a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice will occur absent consideration of the merits of his claim.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ward’s petition seeking a federal 

writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections 

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Ward seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Dated this 6th day of November, 2019.

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