Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02130/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02130-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR G. TORRES, Civil No. 09-2130 IEG (WVG)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

DERYL G. ADAMS, Warden, 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Arthur G. Torres, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego County Superior Court conviction

in case number SCD 179259. Torres was convicted by jury of numerous gang-related felonies and

sentenced to 26 years to life. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”), vol. 1 at 67-87.) Torres

claims his federal constitutional rights were violated for the following reasons: (1) the prosecutor

improperly excused African-Americans from the jury, in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights; (2) constitutionally insufficient evidence supported his conviction on Count 4 of

the indictment (conspiracy to furnish a firearm to a felon); and (3) the trial court improperly

instructed the jury on accomplice testimony in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process. (Pet. at 6-8 and Attachment A, Torres’ Petition for Review to the California Supreme

Court, at 1-11.)

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The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support of the Answer, the Lodgments submitted by Respondent, and all the

supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented

in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition be

DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. 

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1)(West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to

statutory presumption of correctness). The introductory facts as found by the state appellate court

are as follows:

[¶] In 2003, the authorities placed a wiretap on Torres's phone to obtain evidence

about a methamphetamine distribution operation run by the Mexican Mafia. The

Mexican Mafia is a Hispanic gang operating in California's prisons. The gang's

methamphetamine distribution operation extends to the outside community. In the

outside community, the gang designates crew leaders who manage the

methamphetamine distribution operation. The crew leaders and crew members may

belong to different gangs, and are not necessarily persons who have been accepted

into the Mexican Mafia. The crew leaders are also charged with the responsibility of

collecting debts owed to drug dealers who are under the Mexican Mafia umbrella and

of “taxing” methamphetamine dealers who are allowed to operate in areas controlled

by the Mexican Mafia. The taxation requires the dealers to provide the crew leader

with money, which is then transmitted to Mexican Mafia members in prison and their

family members.

[¶] Torres and Contreras are members of the Old Town National City gang, and

Gongora is a member of the Del Sol gang. The prosecution presented evidence that

Torres was a crew leader for the Mexican Mafia, running a methamphetamine

distribution operation from June through December 2003. Torres worked under

Mexican Mafia members Jose Marquez and Robert Marin, who he referred to as “the

Señors .” Contreras and Gongora were identified as crew members working for

Torres.

[*3] [¶] Victims Sanchez and Bush were also methamphetamine dealers. The

extortion-related conduct committed by Torres and Contreras against Sanchez

occurred because Sanchez owed money to another methamphetamine dealer who

Torres was protecting. The robbery-related offenses committed by defendants against

victim Bush occurred as part of taxation activity directed at Bush. The conspiracy to

kidnap Jauregui committed by Torres and Gongora arose because Torres believed

Jauregui had arranged for Torres to be killed.

[¶] Much of the evidence against defendants was derived from the wiretaps on

Torres's phone, as well as from the testimony of several methamphetamine dealers

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1

The unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal pertaining to Torres’ case was

lodged by the Attorney General’s Office as Lodgment No. 12. Because the copy of Lodgment No. 12

submitted contains only the odd-numbered pages and omits the even-numbered pages of the opinion,

the Court cites to the Westlaw version of the opinion found at 2008 WL 2381772 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.) and

refers to the opinion in the body of this report and recommendation as “Opinion.”

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who agreed to testify on behalf of the prosecution. We will present more facts

concerning the offenses in our discussion of the various issues raised by the

defendants.

(Opinion1/

 at *2-3.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 21, 2005, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office charged Arthur

Torres in an Amended Consolidated Information/Indictment with conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine with ten (10) overt acts for the benefit of a criminal street gang, with a prior

conviction, in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) section 182(a)(1), California

Health and Safety Code (“H&S Code”) section 11379, and Penal Code sections 186.22(b)(1) and

11370.2(a) [Count 1]; kidnaping for robbery for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal Code §§

209(b)(1) & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 2]; assault upon a person by means likely to produce great bodily

injury for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal Code §§ 245(b)(1) & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 3];

extortion for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal Code §§ 520 & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 4];

robbery for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal Code §§ 211 & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 5];

conspiracy to commit extortion with 18 overt acts for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal

Code §§ 182(a)(1), 518, 520 & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 6]; attempted murder for the benefit of a

criminal street gang (Penal Code §§ 187(a), 664 & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 7]; conspiracy to commit

robbery, with ten (10) overt acts, for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1),

211, 213(a)(1)(A) & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 8]; first degree robbery in concert as a principal with at

least one principal personally using a firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal Code

§§ 211, 213(a)(1)(A), 12022.53(b), (e)(1) & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 9]; conspiracy to commit assault

by means likely to produce great bodily injury, with four (4) overt acts alleged, for the benefit of a

criminal street gang (Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1), 245(a)(1) & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 10]; assault by

means likely to produce great bodily injury for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal Code §§

245(a)(1), 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 11]; battery with serious bodily injury for the benefit of a criminal

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Torres was tried along with two co-defendants named in the Amended Consolidated information

/indictment, Francisco Gerardo Gongora and Julio Contreras. (See 1 CT 67-87.)

3

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court as to co-defendant Gongora and

affirmed the judgment as modified as to co-defendant Contreras. (Lodgment No. 12.)

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street gang (Penal Code §§ 243(d) & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 12]; conspiracy to commit assault by

means likely to produce great bodily injury, with four (4) overt acts alleged, for the benefit of a

criminal street gang (Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1), 245(a)(1) & 186.22(b)(1) [Count 13]; conspiracy to

furnish a firearm to a prohibited person, with three (3) overt acts alleged, for the benefit of a criminal

street gang (Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1), 12072 & 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 14]; conspiracy to kidnap, with

four (4) overt acts alleged, for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1), 207(a)

& 186.22(b)(1)) [Count 15]; and conspiracy to commit assault by means likely to produce great

bodily injury, with six (6) overt acts alleged (Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1) & 245(a)(1)) [Count 16]. (1

CT 67-87.)2/

Following a jury trial, Torres was found guilty on all counts except Count 7, which was

dismissed. (3 CT 547-83.) The trial court sentenced Torres to 26 years to life in prison. (6 CT

1148-1152.05, 7 CT 1450-1452.) Torres then pled guilty to conspiracy to commit an assault as a

lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit assault by means likely to produce great bodily

injury. He was given a one-year concurrent sentence. (6 CT 1155-1157.)

Torres and his co-defendants appealed their convictions to the California Court of Appeal for

the Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 2-4.) The state appellate court

affirmed the judgment against Torres in an unpublished opinion filed June 13, 2008. (Lodgment No.

12.)3/ Torres and his co-defendants then filed petitions for review in the California Supreme Court,

which that court denied “without prejudice to any relief to which defendants might be entitled after

the United States Supreme Court decides Oregon v. Ice, No. 07-901.” (Lodgment Nos. 13-16.) 

Torres filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on September 29, 2009

[doc. no. 1]. Respondent filed an Answer and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support

of the Answer to the Petition on February 26, 2010 [doc. no. 6]. Torres did not file a Traverse.

//

//

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//

IV. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 

“[The Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] establishes a ‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the

benefit of the doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Woodford

v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). To obtain federal habeas relief, Torres must satisfy either

§ 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme

Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a

federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Id. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

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//

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-

76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). A state court, however, need

not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S.

3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts

[Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

Torres alleges the following claims in his petition. First, he claims he was denied his Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights when the prosecutor improperly struck African-Americans from

his jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). (Pet. at 6, Attachment A at 3-9.)

Second, he alleges that constitutionally insufficient evidence supported his conviction on Count 14 -

conspiracy to furnish a firearm to a felon. (Pet. at 7 and Attachment A at 9-11.) Third, he claims

that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when the jury was inadequately

instructed regarding accomplice testimony. (Pet. at 8 and Attachment A at 11.) Respondent

contends the state court’s adjudication of these claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 5-

26.)

1. Batson Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

prevents a prosecutor from systematically eliminating potential jurors on the basis of racial identity. 

Batson, 476 U.S. 79. Torres argues that the prosecutor systematically used his peremptory

challenges to exclude three African-American female jurors, one African-American male juror, and

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 People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978) is the California version of Batson.

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one Hispanic male juror from his jury in violation of the federal Constitution and Batson. Torres

raised this claim in his petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court, and that court

denied the claim without reasoned decision. (Lodgment Nos. 13 and 16.) Accordingly, this Court

must “look through” to the California appellate court’s opinion denying this claim as the basis for its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

In its opinion, the state appellate court summarized the following facts, which are supported

by the record, with regard to the voir dire, the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes of the four jurors, and

the trial court’s rulings on the defense’s Batson objections:

[¶] During what turned out to be the initial round of peremptory challenges, the

prosecutor excused six jurors, including an African-American woman (juror number

16) and a Hispanic man (juror number 43). When the prosecutor excused the

Hispanic man, defense counsel [FN5] made a Batson-Wheeler4/ objection, contending

the prosecutor had excused the only African-American woman and the only Hispanic

man in the jury box. Defense counsel asserted the prosecutor was deliberately

attempting to eliminate minorities, and the excusal of Hispanics was of particular

concern because the defendants were Hispanic. In response, the trial court referred to

a lengthy questionnaire the Hispanic man (and all prospective jurors) had completed

and noted that he had stated on his questionnaire that his brother had been charged

with various crimes and he believed the prosecution had treated his brother

improperly. Based on this, the trial court denied the Batson-Wheeler motion.

[¶] The peremptory challenges continued, and the prosecutor excused one additional

juror. The parties were then satisfied with the jury and the jurors were sworn.

Thereafter, juror number 38 (the only African-American male then on the jury)

advised the court that he did not think he could stay focused on the case because of its

magnitude and he was generally not comfortable with the case. The trial court

excused juror number 38 and reopened the peremptory challenges.

[¶] The prosecutor excused 11 more jurors, including an African-American/Filipino

woman (juror number 80) and an African-American male (juror number 85). Defense

counsel made a second Batson-Wheeler objection. Defense counsel noted the

prosecutor had excused two more African-American jurors, and argued this

demonstrated a pattern of discrimination and an attempt to exclude minorities.

Defense counsel argued that although juror number 85's questionnaire stated that he

believed there was racial profiling, this was not a sufficient basis to excuse him.

[*4] [¶] The prosecutor argued there was no prima facie case of discrimination

against African-Americans, stating his notes indicated juror number 80 was Filipino,

and the prosecution had earlier allowed an African-American male to remain on the

jury (juror number 38, subsequently excused by the court at the juror's request).

Further, the prosecutor stated there was no showing of discrimination against

minorities in general, noting there were three Hispanic males currently on the jury.

[¶] The trial court denied the second Batson-Wheeler challenge, stating the prosecutor

had passed on African-American juror number 38, and in the court's recollection juror

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number 80 had not indicated she was African-American on her questionnaire, and

thus “this is really the first one.”

[¶] Peremptory challenges continued, and the prosecutor excused seven more jurors,

including an African-American woman (juror number 113). Defense counsel objected

on Batson-Wheeler grounds for a third time. Defense counsel asserted the prosecution

was excusing all African-Americans, there were very few minorities on the jury, and

there was no valid reason to excuse juror number 113. The prosecutor responded

there was no prima facie case of discrimination, noting there was an

African-American male on the jury, the prosecutor had earlier passed on

African-American juror number 38, and there were minorities on the jury. At this

time, six of the 12 jurors in the jury box were minorities, including one

African-American male, one Native American male, three Hispanic males, and one

Filipino/Irish male. The trial court denied the third Batson-Wheeler motion, stating

there were minority (including African-American) jurors on the panel.

[¶] Thereafter, there was one additional peremptory challenge exercised by the

defense (replacing a Caucasian juror with a Filipino juror), and the 12 jurors were

sworn. The final jury consisted of seven minority jurors (an African-American male,

a Native American male, three Hispanic males, a Filipino/Irish male, and a Filipino

male). The five remaining jurors were Caucasian, consisting of one male and four

females.

(Opinion at *3-4.)

The following record excerpts set out the voir dire questioning of the excused prospective

jurors and the trial court’s comments and rulings on defense counsel’s Wheeler/Batson challenges.

a. Voir Dire of Prospective Juror No. 16 

During voir dire, Torres’ counsel, Mr. Leahy, questioned Juror No. 16 (listed on her juror

questionnaire as a 61-year-old female, no ethnicity/heritage specified) as follows:

[By Mr. Leahy] Q: You’ve had some education in the area of criminal justice; is that

correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And you’ve also indicated that it’s something that you’d like to pursue further in

the future; is that right?

A: Correct.

Q: What type of work would that be preparing you for?

A: Just to say I did accomplish something.

Q: Okay. Would I be correct that you don’t necessarily want to work in the area of

criminal justice?

A: No. I’m cool.

Q: Okay. So this is just something that interests you and you’d like to pursue it?

A: That was one of my fields when I was in high school. And I never did finish, I

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started, then I had to take care of my grandmother, so –

Q: How would you go about – well, maybe you haven’t even planned this far. [¶]

What do you think you’d do to further your education in the area of criminal justice?

A: Attend college.

Q: Okay. Do you have – have you looked into it enough to know where you might

want to go?

A: Not really. It’s a lot of credible colleges around. But I haven’t made up my mind

yet.

Q: You also indicate that you had an ex-husband who was a bounty hunter; is that

right?

A: Yes.

Q: Was that here in San Diego?

A: Yes. And he goes all around.

Q: He’s still working in that area?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Would he share with you his experiences as a bounty hunter?

A: No, except he’s having fun.

Q: I’m sorry.

A: Except he’s having fun.

Q: He wouldn’t go into the details of it?

A: No.

Q: Okay. You have also been a member of a neighborhood watch program?

A: Still are.

Q: Still are?

A: (Nods head).

Q: How long have you been working with them?

A: I believe this is my second year. Second year.

Q: Thank you. Would I be correct that you’ve indicated that you look upon being a 

juror as a learning experience, something where you can learn things?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. You also indicated that you have had some experience in your life regarding

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prejudice based on ethnicity or culture, religion or gender or culture; is that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Has that been here in San Diego, in the county?

A: Kind of like, but not really. From where I come from.

Q: Where was that?

A: Texas.

Q: Okay. But you still had some experiences even here in San Diego?

A: Sure.

Q: Now, there is a question here that you were asked whether or not you could judge the

guilt or innocence of a defendant irrespective of the color of his skin or his or her ancestral

heritage, and you answered “No.” Was that just a circle on the wrong answer?

A: I think so. I thought about it afterwards and I said –

Q: As you sit here now, do you think that you could judge these men based solely on the 

evidence that’s presented here in the courtroom, and that the fact that they may be of a

different heritage or ethnicity that that would not matter in your decision?

A: It doesn’t matter.

Q: Okay. Do you think you can judge them irrespective of their skin color or heritage?

A: Do I think –

Q: Do you think you could judge them just on the evidence?

A: On the evidence only.

Mr. Leahy: Thank you, Juror No. 16. Thanks you very much.

(Lodgment No. 20, Augmented Reporter’s Transcript, “Aug RT,” vol. 1, 119-22; see Lodgment No. 

19, Augmented Clerk’s Transcript, “Aug CT,” vol. 2, 414-28.)

b. Voir Dire of Prospective Juror No. 43

During voir dire, co-defendant Contreras’ counsel, Mr. Apgar, questioned Juror No. 43

(listed on his juror questionnaire as a 46-year-old Hispanic male), as follows:

By Mr. Apgar: Q: . . . This is question 79, which everybody answered equally “No”

and equally “Yes.” I think it was one of those. “Could you judge the guilt or

innocence of a defendant irrespective of the color of his or her skin or his or her

ancestral heritage?” And you answered “No.”

. . . By Mr. Apgar: Q: Okay. And Juror No. 43, I think – I think you said “No” on 79,

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too. [¶] But you would not convict my client simply because of his ethnic heritage,

would you?

A: No.

Mr. Apgar: Okay. That’s – everybody made the mistake on that one.

(1 Aug RT 239-241; see 3 Aug CT 683-97.) Later, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence

of the jury panel to address Juror No. 43's “confidential” responses on his juror questionnaire:

By the Court: Q: . . . On questions 43 and 44, you had “confidential,” had something

to do with your brother, an assault charge, domestic violence, but apparently was a

mistrial. [¶] I think you indicated I think he was not treated right by the prosecution

but everyone else treated him okay. Can you tell us about that?

A: Well, he was arrested in, I believe it was, 1999. And he had four counts. I can’t

remember the other ones. But I guess it’s their job to, you know, prove the guilt of

the person. But I think he was too much when – because I was present – he was tried

two times. And both of them last like a little over two weeks. And he was constantly

over – the victim testified and got caught lying three times, changing her story, and

that was the reason it was a mistrial. Most of it was in favor of not guilty. That’s the

only thing, but that’s all I have, you know.

Q: Okay. But you indicated you didn’t think he was treated right by the prosecution. 

You mean because they retried him?

A: Yeah. And because the way the victim was pressing the charges and in

everybody’s eyes it was clear that she was making stories up there.

Q: Did you attend the trial?

A: Yes, I was present.

Q: Both trials?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you testify?

A: No.

Q: Okay. Did he have a retained attorney or public defender?

A: A public defender.

Q: And how did you think his attorney treated him, fairly?

A: Oh, very good.

Q: The District Attorney was not Mr. Amador, I take it?

A: No, it was not him.

Q: Do you feel you have any feelings towards Mr. Amador abased on what somebody

in his office did?

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A: No. No, not at all.

Q: You’re not going to hold that case against Mr. Amador?

A: No.

The Court: Okay. Do you have any follow-questions in this limited area?

[Deputy District Attorney] Mr. Amador: Yes, your honor. . . . Was your brother in jail

throughout?

A: Yes, the first one. And the second one he was out on bail.

Q: Okay. And does that – the fact that he was incarcerated for probably some period

of time, I’m sure he didn’t like that?

A: Yeah, he didn’t.

Q: And you don’t like that, do you?

A: No.

Q: Okay. Did your family or did your brother ever sue the county or anybody?

A: No.

Q: Not at all?

A: No.

Q: Okay. And do you know who the D.A. was who tried the case, do you remember

a name?

A; It was a woman.

Q: How did you feel about that particular Deputy D.A., that woman who tried the 

case?

A: Well, she was tough, that’s all I can say, very tough. And, I mean, she did her job

probably the best that she could, you know, but with the proof that the victim was

 providing, like changing the story, embarrassing her I believe at points.

Q: Did you think she was fair even though she was tough?

A: Ok, no, she was fair.

Q: And do you hold it against that Deputy D.A. or my entire office, including myself,

that – let’s say you say the victim was – obviously was lying, that’s what you belief

is, right?

A: Yes.

Q: The fact that it was retried again by the District Attorney’s Office, does that affect 

towards the D.A.’s Office?

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A: No.

Q: Have you had any personal dealings besides this case with your brother with the

District Attorney’s Office here or anywhere else?

A: No.

Q: Do you remember what courtroom it was in?

A: No.

Q: Was it the same judge each time?

A: Yes.

Q: And do you remember what your brother’s attorney’s name was?

A: Kate Coyne.

Q: Okay. And was she the attorney on both trials?

A: Yes.

Q: Have you or your brother remained in touch with her?

A: No. I – no. I’ve seen her name in the newspaper a couple times, but –

Q: Did you like her?

A: Oh, yeah.

Q: Respect her?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, based on all of that, do you think you may have stronger feelings that might

favor the defense as opposed to the prosecution in this case?

A: No, sir. I’ll weigh the evidence and everything else.

Mr. Amador: All right. Thank you.

 (1 Aug RT 247-51.)

c. The Trial Court’s Batson Inquiry Regarding Peremptory Excusals of

Jurors No. 16 and 43 

During peremptory challenges, Deputy District Attorney (“D.A.”) Amador thanked and

excused Juror No. 16 and Juror No. 43. (4 Aug RT 774, 777.) Immediately after Juror No. 43 was

excused, Torres’ attorney Mr. Leahy made a Wheeler/Batson challenge. (4 Aug RT 777.) The

following proceedings were held in chambers:

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Mr. Leahy: Your Honor, Mr. Amador has excused the only Black woman that we had

on the panel [referring to Juror No. 16]. And now he’s excluding one of the only

Hispanic gentlemen that we’ve had on the panel [referring to Juror No. 43]. [¶] And I

think it’s the deliberate attempt to eliminate minorities. And I’m very concerned

about Hispanics in particular because we have three Hispanic defendants.

The Court: Well, I’m looking at his questionnaire. This is Juror No. 43. [¶] And on

question 43 and 44, apparently he had a brother who was charged with assault with a

deadly weapon, sodomy and many domestic violence, there was a mistrial. [¶] And

question 44 indicates “I think he was not treated right by the prosecution, but

everybody else treated him okay.” [¶] And I think he expanded upon that, he was a

little upset that they retried his brother. [¶] Is that your recollection, Mr. Amador?

Mr. Amador: Forty-three, right, your Honor?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Amador: Yes.

The Court: I mean, I have the questionnaire here, if you want to look at it.

Mr. Amador: Yes, I just wanted to make sure.

The Court: Okay. I’m going to deny the motion, but I’m watching out for it.

Mr. Leahy: Thank you, Your Honor.

(4 Aug RT 777-78.)

d. Voir Dire of Prospective Juror No. 80

During voir dire, co-defendant Contreras’ counsel, Mr. Apgar, questioned Juror No. 80

(listed on her juror questionnaire as a 25-year-old Black and Filipino female) as follows:

Mr. Apgar: . . . [¶] Now, Juror No. 80, you haven’t been picked on yet. I noticed in

your questionnaire that, it may have been inadvertence, you said you could not be

impartial. Is that what you meant?

Prospective Juror No. 80: I just have to remain open-minded.

The Court: Can you talk to me please and not to Mr. Apgar. Thank you. My court

reporter is here. Okay?

Prospective Juror No. 80: I’m sorry. [¶] I’ll just keep an open mind honestly. This is

my first time even being summoned, so it’s for me – I can be either way. I just hear

everything first and then make my decision. I’m not jumping into the courtroom

saying this person is guilty because from what I heard or what I read.

Mr. Apgar: Are you willing to sit on the jury?

Prospective Juror No. 80: Yes, I am.

(2 Aug RT 323-24; see 4 Aug CT 938-52.) Later, Juror No. 80 was questioned by Deputy D.A.

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Amador with regard to juror question No. 107 (“Do you know much about wiretaps? If yes, what do

you know?”) as follows:

Mr. Amador: Q: Let me ask Juror – prospective juror No. 80, I said that – in that

question you said “phone taps as well as undercover.” Do you remember that,

answering the question that way?

A: Vaguely. Vague, but –

Q: What does that mean “phone taps as well as undercover”?

A: Just my opinion. I think it’s – you have a phone tap, it’s basically trying to find

out what’s going on, such as undercover work.

Q: You were just describing what you thought it was –

A: Yeah.

Q: – the process was. [¶] Any problems with that?

A: No.

 (2 Aug RT 366-67; see 4 Aug CT 947.) 

e. Voir Dire of Prospective Juror No. 85

During voir dire, Deputy D.A. Amador questioned Juror No. 85 (listed on his juror

questionnaire as a 49-year-old Black male) as follows:

Q: No, Juror No. 85, let me ask you a couple of questions. We’ll go in reverse order.

[¶] I note that in your questionnaire you mentioned something about burglaries, and

then the police never found the robbers, is that true?

A: Uh-huh, correct.

Q: Okay. Now, I think we all understand that sometimes crimes aren’t solved. But

you actually have had a personal experience where it seems that the police were

called and the crime wasn’t solved and nobody was ever brought to justice; is that a

fair assessment?

A: That’s correct.

Q: Okay. Any lingering negative feelings towards the police or the system even with

regards to that situation?

A: No.

Q: Did the police do their job in your opinion?

A: Yes. They came and took a report.

Q: Should they have done more?

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A: Well, okay, yes, but that was the extent. There was nothing more they could do. 

They even explained to me they’re not likely to find out who did it.

Q: And was this a residential burglary?

A: Correct.

Q: Were you or was anyone else at home at the time?

A: No.

Q: And did you have a lot of property stolen?

A: Not a lot. Sentimental things.

Q: Sentimental things. [¶] And how long ago did this happen?

A: 1989, 1990.

Q: Did they fingerprint the house?

A: No. Oh, yes, they did. They did try to take some prints.

Q: So they did take some steps to at least try to find some evidence to try to find out 

who did this to you; is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. But there was no violence involved in that case, per se, correct?

A: No.

Q: Okay. Do you have – I asked you if there were any lingering negative feelings

towards the police, and you said “No,” and I understand that. [¶] How about towards

the people who did that residential burglary, or others, you know, people who

burglarize houses, do you have any particular negative feelings towards those types

of people?

A: Yes. Yes. People that steal and invade others’ privacy, I don’t agree with that.

Q: If one of the charges in this case dealt with that type of situation, how would you

feel?

A: Well, I would listen to the evidence and I wouldn’t be biased because of that. I

would consider if it’s true or not true.

Q: Now, you live in a particular are of town. We don’t have to bring it up right now. 

How long have you lived there?

A: On and off all of my life. But the last stint was six years.

Q: Do you live there now?

A: Yes.

Q: And in your questionnaire you said you have no knowledge of gangs in that area

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or in your area; is that fair?

A: I can’t say they are gangs. There is some activity. Every once in a while I hear

gunshots and things of that nature, but I can’t say that those are gangs – those are

gang members.

Q: Are there persons in the neighborhood that you see that at least your first

impression is that’s a gang member?

A: Well, it’s possible.

Q: You don’t want to judge that person, do you?

A: No. I can’t

Q: And make assumptions?

A: I can’t.

Q: And I’m not asking you to make any legal determination right now. But, generally

speaking, in your neighborhood, do you see graffiti, gang graffiti?

A: Not in my immediate area. When I drive up around, I see some at times.

Q: To go to the store, to come off the freeway or something along those lines, do you

ever see gang graffiti?

A: Correct, yes.

Q: Okay. And you hear gunshots sometimes at night?

A: Yes.

Q: And you’re not assuming that’s gang related?

A: I assume it’s gang related, but I don’t know for a fact. I can’t tell somebody else

that was definitely gang related.

Q: Okay. Because on those questions, it was basically does it affect your life at all,

and you just basically put “not at all.” [¶] But now asking you a little more into it, it

seems like you see graffiti in your neighborhood, if you hear shots at night, that you

assume it may be gang related, that’s go to affect you a little bit.

A: Affect me in a way to where it is something I can’t sleep at night about, no.

Q: In your prior jury service – and you’re very lucky, four jury trials, and looks like 

every couple years.

A: Yes.

Q: So you’re due, right?

A: Right.

Q: One of the answers you put was regarding jury service, you said “if all of the

instructions are adhered to, it could be tough to reach a verdict.” [¶] Do you

remember writing that?

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A: Yes.

Q: What do you mean by that?

A: Well, you sit through the case during a trial and you hear the evidence, and you

sort of form your own opinion about you feel it’s the truth or where you’re going to

decide. [¶] But then there’s the instructions, and the instructions, you follow them,

it’s pretty tough to do. And if it’s pretty tough for all 12 to follow the instructions

step by step, because we pretty much go by our feelings and you’re not supposed to,

according to the instructions, use your feelings, you’re supposed to go by the

evidence, if this is this, then this is this, and if that is that, then that is that, and keep

all of that in mind for 12 jurors and then come to a decision. I guess that’s why the

deliberations sometimes take so long.

Q: But you were able to reach verdicts in the past?

A: Correct.

Q: Do you think the instructions are – say overly use too much legalese or technical

language where it’s hard to decipher exactly what’s meant? Have you had that

experience?

A: My first trial was now exposed to the legalese and instructions and this and that. 

And go easier after I was settled on the cases. And now I understand what’s going on

to speak of.

Q: In any of those times when you were deliberating, were there any times where you

just thought to yourself “this is a terrible process. There must be a better way”?

A: No.

(2 Aug RT 372-77; see 4 Aug CT 998-1012.) 

f. The Trial Court’s Batson Inquiry of Peremptory Excusals of Jurors

No. 80 and 85

During peremptory challenges, Deputy D.A. Amador thanked and excused Juror Nos. 80 and

85. (4 Aug RT 790.) Immediately, Torres’ attorney Mr. Leahy made a Wheeler/Batson challenge. 

(Id.) The following proceedings were held in chambers:

Mr. Leahy: Your Honor, I didn’t make a Batson/Wheeler challenge for the Black

woman who was just released. Now we’ve had two more Black jurors excused by the

District Attorney. [¶] The Juror No. 85, and I believe it was No. 80, the large Black

woman, was also excused by the District Attorney’s Office. [¶] I think this clearly

establishes a pattern of behavior of discrimination on the part of the District Attorney. 

I looked through the No. 85's questionnaire, and he had four criminal juries service

and on four different cases in ‘94, ‘96, ‘98 and 2001. [¶] I don’t see anything else in

his questionnaire that might suggest that he is, for some reason, a biased individual. 

He does make a comment that he believes that there’s profiling, but I don’t think that

that is a sufficient basis to excuse him. And I think that Mr. Amador is again

attempting to weed minorities out of the jury.

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This was an incorrect recollection by Mr. Apgar. (See 2 Aug RT 372-77.)

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Mr. Apgar: The only person that asked him any questions was me. And I just – the

only thing I said was, “have you served on four juries?” and he said, “Yes.” And that

was the extent of the voir dire of that juror.5/

The Court: Mr. Cox?

Mr. Cox: Joining.

The Court: Okay. Mr. Amador?

Mr. Amador: Well, Your Honor, first of all, with regards to whether there has been a

prima facie case made or not, I do not believe there has been a prima facie case made.

[¶] First of all, I’m not really clear what the challenge is because Mr. Leahy, in my

opinion, has not articulated exactly what he thinks that the People are doing. [¶]

We’ve got different races that he’s bringing up each time. He brought up Hispanic 

female and then a Black male before. And now he’s bringing up a Black male that

was just challenged. [¶] And from my notes, Juror No. 80 said she was Filipino, so –

and that’s just, of course, me checking over my notes after the challenge has been

made clearly. So in that sense on the first hurdle, I’d like to hear exactly what they

are articulating I’m supposed to be doing. [¶] They’re not obviously saying a

particular race, just whatever minority. What does that include to them? Does that

include Filipino, Black, Hispanic, Asian? I don’t know. [¶] I mean, are they saying

that every time I challenge somebody who’s not a white male or white female then

that’s a sufficient reason for a Batson/Wheeler challenge? I don’t believe so. [¶] And

at least on the point of African-Americans, I passed and we had a juror who was an

African-American male who was ready to be sworn, and then he came in here and

was removed for cause by the court. He was a good juror for me obviously, I had

passed on him. And I didn’t have anything to say with regards to the court excusing

him for cause. [¶] So, first of all, I don’t believe that they’ve made any prima facie

case.

The Court: Do you want to further amplify, Mr. Leahy, or not?

Mr. Leahy: No, your honor.

The Court: Okay. Well, as I indicated, I’m keeping track of particularly the

prosecution’s challenges. And I do note that he passed on the African-American

gentleman that was about to be sworn as a juror in this case. [¶] And, as I recall, Juror

No. 80, who has been referred to, although she may look African-American, I think

she’s indicated on the questionnaire that she’s other than that. So this is really the

first one. [¶] So I’m going to deny the challenge, the Batson challenge.

Mr. Amador: Your honor, one other thing I wanted to note for the record that,

obviously, the defendants are Hispanic and there are three Hispanic males, they’re all

males that are sitting on the jury right now.

The Court: Well, I don’t think that Batson/Wheeler is limited to Hispanics.

Mr. Amador: I agree.

The Court: It’s minorities.

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Mr. Amador: I agree. I know it’s not limited. It’s not as if the prospective juror that

is challenged has to be of the same race as the defendants. 

The Court: I understand.

Mr. Amador: To just note the overall argument that it’s overall minorities, that’s not

the case.

The Court: Okay.

(4 Aug RT 791-94.) 

g. Voir Dire of Prospective Juror No. 113

During voir dire, co-defendant Contreras’ attorney questioned Juror No. 113 (listed on her

juror questionnaire as a 28-year-old “Afro. American” female) as follows:

Q: Juror No. 113, now here again, you correct me if I’m wrong, okay. And on no. 54,

the question was “generally speaking, do you feel you can be an impartial juror?” 

And you said, “No.” And why is you have to hear all the facts of evidence until

proven guilty. So that was just the way you interpreted the question, impartial,

meaning that, you know, you can go either way. [¶] Can you go either way or am I

confusing you?

A: With the question did it say I can’t?

Q: No. The question said, “Can you be – do you feel you can be an impartial juror?” 

And you said, “No.” [¶] That was just misinterpreting the question?

A: It was. It was.

Q: Okay. And you’re not alone, okay.

(2 Aug RT 414-15.) Later, Deputy D.A. Amador questioned Juror No. 113 as follows:

Q: Prospective Juror No. 113, how are you, ma’am?

A: Fine.

Q: And are you currently a cosmetologist?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Yes?

A: Yes.

Q: All right. And how long have you been doing that?

A: For about five years.

Q: Are you full-time?

A: Yes, I am.

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Q: Do you work in a shop?

A: No. I work out of my home.

Q: Out of your home?

A: Out of my home.

Q: All right. And I’m not sure if you answered this question. Do you own or rent?

A: I rent.

Q: All right. And I noted that the person who lives with you is disabled?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And do you take care of that person?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is this going to be a hardship being here every day from 9:00 to 2:00 when this

person is going to be at home?

A: No.

Q: Had you --

A: No.

Q: – you made other arrangements?

A: Yes, I have.

Q: Okay. And I know that Mr. Apgar asked you a couple questions. Apparently

there was a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of a couple questions. And don’t

worry about that. You know, a lot of times lawyers don’t really write, you know –

just like the judge was talking about with jury instructions and things like that,

sometimes it’s overly technical, too much legalese. And we apologize for that. [¶]

But let me ask you one thing. You put in there, I notice you said that you’d been shot

at before?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Is that a yes or no?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And can you explain or describe that situation?

A: Well, it was several years ago. I was going out to the movies with an exboyfriend. We ran into an altercation with like some young kids. I guess they were

like some type of gang or something like that. [¶] They wanted to talk to a couple of

us, but they didn’t want to talk to them because they wanted to like get into some

trouble, go and take things. I mean, because we seen them taking things from other

kids around in the movie theater parking lot.

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Q: Was this in the parking lot?

A: Yes.

Q: Where was it?

A: This was back home in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Q: Okay. And this ex-boyfriend, was he a member of a gang or anything like that?

A: No, he wasn’t.

Q: This was just –

A: Basically in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Q: Uh-huh. [¶] How do you know that they were gang members who were

approaching you?

A: They were throwing up like little gang signs and saying like gang quotes.

Q: Okay. So then what happened at the end, they’re throwing gang quotes and gang

signs, what happened?

A: We tried to approach into the theater, they didn’t allow us. I wanted to call

security. Security didn’t come. And then that’s when they pulled out a gun.

Q: And what happened?

A: After that point, they wanted basically to take everything that we had, we didn’t –

we didn’t give up anything, and they didn’t shoot at us.

Q: They did not?

A: They did not. They just pointed the gun at us.

Q: It was an attempted robbery, is that it?

A: Yeah, it was.

Q: They pointed a gun at you?

A: Yes.

Q: Demanded your property?

A: Yes.

Q: And you and your boyfriend --

A: Yes, and a couple friends.

Q: Other people were there with you?

A: Yes.

Q: That must have been pretty scary?

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A: Yes.

Q: How long ago was this?

A: I think over ten years ago.

Q: Because I do notice that in your questionnaire you said basically “have you ever

been affected by gang violence,” and you put “not at all.”

A: No.

Q: Did this come to mind?

A: No.

Q: You wouldn’t consider this gang violence?

A: No, I wouldn’t .

Q: Okay. Would they have to have pulled the trigger for you to consider it gang

violence?

A: No. No. Maybe. Maybe. But I didn’t look at it that way as being gang violence. 

I mean, with them throwing up gang signs, maybe I should have looked at it that way,

but I didn’t.

Q: Okay. And you said that you are familiar with some gangs in San Diego, including

Bloods and Crips and some others; is that right?

A: Not familiar with them, but just hearing other people talk about them.

Q: Okay. The area that you live now, any gang problems there?

A: No, not that I know.

Q: It’s close to an area where there’s a lot of gang-related activity though, isn’t it?

A: Yes, it is.

Q: Maybe going to the store or coming off the freeway do you see graffiti or anything

like that around the neighborhood?

A: I do. I do.

Q: And are you able to determine what type of graffiti it is, like know what gang it is

or what it says?

A: Not from what gang it is, but to notice like what it says.

Q: Okay. Basically claiming a turf?

A: I wouldn’t say as claiming a turf. I mean, I just always seen it as being graffiti. 

Might say some type of word on it, but I wouldn’t know if it was describing some type

of turf or anything like that.

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Q: Did you ever see people that you think to yourself “Ok, oh, that might be a gang

member, and I need to stay away”?

A: No.

Q: Okay. Do you hear shots at night?

A: No.

(2 Aug RT 466-71; see 5 Aug CT 1223-37.) 

h. The Trial Court’s Batson Inquiry of Peremptory Excusal of Juror No.

113

During peremptory challenges, Deputy D.A. Amador thanked and excused Juror No. 113. (4

Aug RT 798.) Immediately after Juror No. 113 was excused, co-defendant Contreras’ attorney Mr.

Apgar made a Wheeler/Batson challenge. (Id.) The following proceedings were then held in

chambers:

Mr. Apgar: 113, I believe she’s Black, your honor. And I think outside of the one

juror, I think Mr. Amador has pretty much kicked off every Black juror. And I don’t

see by Black jurors left. There may be some out in the hall.

The Court: No. There is one in the audience, there’s one in the box now. We still

have two – actually another Black male.

Mr. Apgar: So I think it’s – he’s kicking off all the Blacks. And our clients are

Hispanic. But there are very few minorities on this jury panel and they’ve been

decimated. I don’t see any reason why she would otherwise be kicked.

The Court: Okay. Mr. Amador?

Mr. Amador: Your honor, again, with regards to the prima facie showing, I believe

almost everything Mr. Apgar said was inaccurate. [¶] First of all, there are numerous

minorities, if he wants to discuss the entire panel. There are numerous minorities that

are on the panel, which if you’re going to say the “minority,” that includes Asians,

Filipino, African-American, Hispanic, that’s the way they’re defining it. [¶] So I think

the record is clear, with the questionnaires, there are numerous individuals who are not

White. [¶] Secondly, there’s an African-American gentleman sitting in the jury box

right now. We already have the record with regards to the other African-American

that was ready to be sworn as a juror. [¶] There are other African-Americans out in the

audience. And I still don’t see any articulation of why we would be kicking AfricanAmerican jurors as opposed to any other minority to what the defense is saying.

The Court: Okay. Well, I’m going to deny it. As I’ve indicated, I’m keeping track of

it. And we do have African-Americans on there and other minority. So it’s denied.

(2 Aug RT 798-99.)

i. Analysis of the Batson Claim 

i. The Appellate Court’s Opinion

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[¶] Peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors need not be supported by cause;

the challenges may be based on even trivial reasons or hunches, including body

language and the manner of answering questions. (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31

Cal.4th 903, 917; People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 70; Snyder v. Louisiana

(2008) 552 U.S.472 [128 S.Ct. 1203, 1208] (Snyder) [juror's demeanor can support

peremptory challenge].) However, under both the federal and state Constitutions,

peremptory challenges may not be based on group bias. (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 88; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277; People v. Bell

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 596.)

[*5] [¶] The trial court's evaluation of a defendant's Batson-Wheeler motion occurs in

three stages. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the totality of

relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, if there is

a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer nondiscriminatory

justifications for the strikes. Third, if nondiscriminatory explanations are presented,

the trial court must then decide whether the defendant has proved purposeful

discrimination. (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 596.)

[¶] To make a prima facie showing, the defendant need only produce evidence

sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has

occurred. (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 67.) The defendant may cite

evidence showing the prosecutor has struck most or all of the members of the

identified group; the prosecutor has used a disproportionate number of peremptory

challenges against the group; the excused jurors share only their membership in the

group in common but are otherwise heterogeneous; the prosecutor engaged the

excused jurors in merely cursory, or no, voir dire; the defendant is a member of the

excluded group; and the victim is a member of the same group as the majority of the

remaining jurors. (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 597.) In deciding whether

the defendant has presented a prima facie case, the trial court should consider all

relevant circumstances. (Ibid.) On appeal, we review the trial court's ruling on this

issue for substantial evidence. (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 228, fn. 13.)

[¶] Here, although the trial court did not expressly rule that the defense had not made a

prima facie showing of discrimination, it is apparent from the record this was the basis

for the court's denial of the Batson-Wheeler motions. After the first objection, the trial

court did not ask the prosecutor to state his reasons for the excusals. Rather, the court

simply denied the motion based on its evaluation of the excused Hispanic juror's

questionnaire. After the second and third objections, the trial court asked the

prosecutor for a response and the prosecutor argued no prima facie case had been

made. Again, the trial court did not ask the prosecutor to state his reasons, but merely

denied the motions after the prosecutor argued there was no prima facie case. 

Accordingly, we consider whether the record supports the trial court's implied findings

that there was no prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. (See People v.

Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 345; People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1016, 1018.)

[¶] At the time of the first motion, the prosecutor had excused six jurors, including an

African-American female (juror no. 16) and a Hispanic male (juror no. 43). Defense

counsel asserted the prosecutor was eliminating minorities, and that the elimination of

Hispanics was of particular concern. Based on a review of the Hispanic juror's

questionnaire, the trial court ascertained that this juror had expressed a belief that the

prosecution had treated his brother unfairly. This was an obvious race-neutral

justification for the prosecutor's exclusion of this juror. The trial court reasonably

denied the first Batson-Wheeler motion because the Hispanic juror's bias against the

prosecution belied any inference of discriminatory motive.

[*6] [¶] Contrary to defendants' assertion on appeal, the trial court's reliance on juror

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number 43's questionnaire was not improper speculation into the prosecutor's reasons

for the excusal. Once a prima facie showing is made by the defendant, the trial court

should not speculate about the prosecutor's reasons but should require the prosecutor

to provide an explanation. (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 73-74.) 

However, the trial court must first make the threshold inquiry as to whether the record

can support an inference of discriminatory purpose. (Ibid.) If the information

available to the court shows any prosecutor would excuse the juror for

nondiscriminatory reasons, this defeats a prima facie showing. (See id. at pp. 69-70,

73-74.) Because juror number 43's clear statement of bias against the prosecution in

the questionnaire would cause any prosecutor to excuse him, the trial court properly

relied on this information to deny the motion without further inquiry as to the

prosecutor's actual reasons.

[¶] Defendants assert the trial court's ruling was erroneous because the court failed to

evaluate their Batson-Wheeler challenge as to juror number 16. When defendants

made the first Batson-Wheeler challenge, juror number 16 was the only

African-American that had been excused by the prosecutor. The premise of the

motion was that the prosecutor was discriminating against minorities (i.e., an

African-American and a Hispanic). In effect, the evidence of discriminatory purpose

as to juror number 16 was based on the combined effect of excusing both juror

numbers 16 and 43. Once the court ascertained an obvious nondiscriminatory purpose

for excusing juror number 43, there was no need for the court to further address the

challenge to juror number 16. Absent some other indication of discriminatory motive,

the removal of one member of an identified group from the jury is normally

insufficient to support an inference of discriminatory bias. (See People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 598 and fn. 3 [the exclusion of one or two jurors of a particular group

can rarely suggest discriminatory purpose].)

[¶] The second Batson-Wheeler challenge was made after the prosecutor excused an

African-American/Filipino woman (juror no. 80) and an African-American man (juror

no. 85). Defense counsel noted the excusal of two more African-Americans, and

argued the prosecutor was attempting to exclude minorities. By this time, there were

three Hispanic jurors on the jury. Further, the prosecutor had earlier passed on an

African-American juror, and that juror had been removed for cause at the juror's, not

the prosecutor's, request. The trial court reasonably concluded that there was no prima

facie showing of discriminatory purpose given that the prosecutor had accepted three

Hispanic jurors and had earlier accepted an African-American juror. Notably, the

second Batson-Wheeler objection was directed at the exclusion of two

African-Americans, whereas the defendants are Hispanic. Although a defendant need

not be a member of the excluded group to raise a discrimination claim, the absence of

this factor is relevant to the determination of whether the defendant has made a prima

facie case. (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 597, 599-600.)

[*7] [¶] We note, as emphasized by defendants on appeal, the trial court did err when

it stated its recollection that the African-American/Filipino woman (juror no. 80) was

not African-American. This juror's questionnaire identifies herself as

African-American/Filipino. However, this factual error does not require reversal. 

Exercising our independent review-and for the reasons just stated-we likewise

conclude the record does not show a prima facie case of discrimination arising from

the dismissal of juror numbers 80 and 85. (See People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p.

597 [appellate court may independently review whether record supports inference of

discrimination].)

[¶] The trial court's statement after the excusal of African-American juror numbers 80

and 85 that “this is really the first one” suggests that it may also have forgotten about

the earlier excusal of African-American juror number 16. Assuming this is so, and

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exercising our independent judgment, we find no inference of discriminatory motive at

this point arising simply from the excusal of three African-American jurors. As stated,

the prosecutor had accepted an African-American juror and three Hispanic jurors, and

the defendants are Hispanic, not African-American.

[¶] Defense counsel made the third Batson-Wheeler motion based on the exclusion of

another African-American woman (juror no. 113), arguing discrimination against

African-Americans and minorities. Defendants argue the excusal of a total of four

African-American jurors shows a discriminatory purpose against this racial group. At

the time the fourth African-American juror was excused, the jurors accepted by the

prosecution and seated in the jury box included an African-American male, three

Hispanic males, a Native American male, and a Filipino/Irish male. Thus, there were

three seated jurors who were the same ethnicity as the defendants; there was a seated

African-American juror; and the prosecutor had earlier accepted another

African-American juror. Given the minority jurors accepted by the prosecutor

(including African-Americans and jurors of the same ethnicity as the defendants), the

trial court could reasonably infer the prosecutor did not have a discriminatory purpose

to eliminate African-Americans or any other minority group.

[¶] To support their claim of discrimination, defendants note that the prosecutor

excused all three African-American females that were called to the jury box. When

making their Batson-Wheeler objections before the trial court, defendants asserted the

prosecutor was attempting to exclude minorities (in particular Hispanics and

African-Americans). Defendants did not contend the prosecutor was singling out

African-American females; thus this claim is forfeited on appeal. (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, fn. 4.) In any event, exercising our independent

review, the fact that there were no African-American females left on the jury does not

alone support an inference of discriminatory purpose in this case. An

African-American male and four Caucasian women were on the jury. The defendants

are not African-American females. There is nothing about the facts of the case which

would suggest that African-American females might favor the defense. Under these

circumstances, the record does not suggest a discriminatory purpose based merely on

the prosecutor's excusal of the three African-American woman. (See People v.

Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 344-345.)

[*8] [¶] Defendants assert that an inference of discriminatory purpose against

African-Americans was shown because during voir dire questioning, the prosecutor

did not engage in meaningful voir dire of two of the excluded African-American

females, i.e., he did not ask juror number 16 any questions and he asked juror number

80 only one short question. First, the weight of this factor is of less significance in a

case where, as here, the jurors filled out questionnaires which gave the prosecutor

information about their background and attitudes. (See People v. Bell, supra, 40

Cal.4th at pp. 598-599, fn. 5.) Second, as recognized by defendants, the prosecutor

questioned the third excused African-American female juror (juror no. 113) at length,

and also engaged in lengthy questioning of the excused African-American male juror

(juror no. 85). The record does not show that the manner in which the prosecutor

handled voir dire questioning of African-American jurors supported an inference of

discriminatory purpose against African-Americans. [FN6]

[FN6. We note also that although the prosecutor did not ask juror number 16 any

questions, the defense did question her, thereby giving the prosecutor an opportunity

to observe her demeanor.]

[¶] Defendants also contend the trial court erred in its rulings because they were not

required to show a pattern of discrimination; rather, the dismissal of even one juror for

a discriminatory reason is unconstitutional. ( People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p.

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598, fn. 3.) However, there must still be some threshold evidence in the record

supporting an inference that the prosecutor had a discriminatory motive when

excusing one or more jurors. As set forth above, the trial court reasonably concluded

there was no such evidence here. In a similar vein, defendants argue that reversal is

required because the prosecutor failed to point to anything in the record showing a

legitimate reason for excusing the four African-American jurors. The contention is

unavailing because absent a prima facie showing of discriminatory motive, the

prosecutor had no obligation to explain why he exercised a peremptory challenge to

remove a particular juror.

[¶] Finally, defendants request, for the first time on appeal, that we engage in a

comparative analysis between the excluded jurors and the retained jurors. 

Comparative analysis is used to ascertain whether a prosecutor's proffered reason for

striking a juror is pretextual; for example, by showing that a proffered reason applies

equally to a retained juror who is not a member of the identified group. (See People v.

Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1017 (Lewis ); Snyder, supra, 128 S.Ct. at pp.

1211-1212.) As illustrated in Lewis, “ ‘If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking

a[B]lack panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar non[-B]lack who is

permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be

considered at Batson's third step.’ “ (Lewis, supra, at p. 1017; see also People v.

Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 71.)

[¶] However, although a comparative analysis for the first time on appeal may be

appropriate in some cases (see Lewis, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1017; Snyder, supra, 128

S.Ct. at p. 1211), it is not appropriate in a case involving only first-stage

Batson-Wheeler analysis where the prosecutor was not required to, and did not,

present reasons for the strikes. (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 601.) As

explained in Bell, “In the circumstances of this first-stage Wheeler-Batson case,

comparative juror analysis would make little sense. In determining whether defendant

has made a prima facie case, the trial court did not ask the prosecutor to give reasons

for his challenges, the prosecutor did not volunteer any, and the court did not

hypothesize any. Nor, obviously, did the trial court compare the challenged and

accepted jurors to determine the plausibility of any asserted or hypothesized reasons. 

Where, as here, no reasons for the prosecutor's challenges were accepted or posited by

either the trial court or this court, there is no fit subject for comparison. Comparative

juror analysis would be formless and unbounded.” ( People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th

at p. 601.)

[*9] [¶] Here, based on the trial court's rulings of no prima facie case, the prosecutor

was not required to, and did not, state his reasons for excusing the jurors. Accordingly,

a comparative analysis to determine whether the prosecutor's reasons were pretextual

is not warranted. [FN7]

[FN7. We note that the only instance where the trial court in effect identified a reason

for the prosecutor's striking of a juror was when it ascertained the clear statement of

bias against the prosecution in Hispanic juror number 43's questionnaire. Even

assuming comparative analysis might be appropriate as to this juror, defendants do not

contend, and our review of the record does not reveal, that the prosecutor retained

Caucasian jurors who evinced such a clear bias. Moreover, on appeal defendants

confine their challenge to the excusal of African-Americans, not Hispanics. We note

additionally that in People v. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 1020, the court held

that even when the prosecution offers reasons for its peremptory challenges, a

comparative analysis is not required when the trial court ultimately rules no prima

facie discrimination was shown. (See also People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p.

350.)]

//

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//

[¶] Defendants have not cited any evidence that defeats the trial court's rulings that

there was no showing of a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, the court

did not err in denying the Batson-Wheeler motions.

(Opinion at *4-9.)

ii. Clearly Established Supreme Court Law and the trial court’s factual

determinations

In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995), the United States Supreme Court outlined the steps a

court must follow in conducting a Batson analysis:

Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has

made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of

production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral

explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must

then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful

racial discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359, 111 S.Ct.

1859, 1865-66, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 375, 111 S.Ct. at

1874 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Batson, supra, at 96-98, 106 S.Ct., at

1722-1723.

Id. at 1170-71; see also Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004). The trial court

impliedly found in response to each Wheeler/Batson challenge that the totality of all relevant facts did

not give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. In the case of prospective Jurors No. 16 and

43, the trial court essentially stated a race-neutral reason for excusing Juror No. 43 and then denied

the challenge. (4 Aug RT 777-78.) In the case of prospective Jurors No. 80 and 85, the trial court

impliedly found that no prima facie case of racial discrimination in juror selection was made. (4 Aug

RT 791-94.) With regard to prospective Juror No. 113, the trial court again impliedly found that no

prima facie case of racial discrimination had been made. (4 Aug RT 798-99.) Although the trial

judge did not definitively state that he found no prima facie case made under Batson in each incident,

his rulings directly implied that finding. Because the trial court found no prima facie case of

discrimination, the second and third prongs of the Purkett analysis were, and are, unnecessary. Thus,

the question for this Court on collateral review is whether the state appellate court’s findings that the

record supported the trial court’s implied findings of no prima facie case of discrimination was an

objectively unreasonable determination of the facts in light of clearly established Supreme Court law. 

The undersigned magistrate judge finds and recommends that it was not. 

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//

A state court’s determination as to whether a prima facie case has been made is a factual

determination entitled to a presumption of correctness. Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir.

1999). With regard to prospective Juror No. 16, voir dire questioning revealed that she had some

criminal justice education and that her ex-husband had “fun” doing his work as a bounty hunter. (1

Aug. RT 119-22.) With regard to prospective Juror No. 43, voir dire questioning revealed that his

brother had been jailed and, in Juror No. 43's mind, had not been treated fairly during two trials for

violent crimes. (1 Aug. RT 247-51.) In light of these facts, the trial court’s finding that the

prosecution’s excusal of this African American woman and Hispanic man did not raise an inference

of discriminatory purpose is amply supported by the record.

With regard to prospective Juror No. 80, voir dire consisted of brief questioning by Contreras’

counsel and the prosecutor. However, a juror’s demeanor can support peremptory challenges, and the

cold record generally does not reveal issues of demeanor. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. at 479. 

Moreover, at the time defense counsel made this second Wheeler/Batson challenge, there were three

Hispanics already seated on the jury, and the prosecution had accepted an African-American male

who was later excused for cause, not at the prosecutor’s request. With regard to prospective Juror

No. 85, voir dire questioning revealed that he had been the victim of an unsolved burglary. (2 Aug.

RT 372-77.) In addition, his extensive familiarity with jury service (he had previously served on four

juries) may have raised a concern for the prosecution that prospective Juror No. 85 (a 49-year-old

male) would be granted excessive influence over deliberations by the other jurors. (Id.) Again, in

light of these facts, the trial court’s finding that the excusals of this African-American/Filipino

woman and this African-American man did not raise an inference of discriminatory intent is amply

supported by the record.

With regard to prospective Juror No. 113, voir dire questioning revealed that she and her exboyfriend were mugged at gunpoint in a parking lot by young men exhibiting gang behavior. (2 Aug.

RT 466-71.) Yet, on her juror questionnaire she responded that she had never been affected by gang

violence. (5 Aug. CT 1223-37.) Based on this contradiction, the record supports the trial court’s

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finding that the prosecution’s excusal of this African-American woman did not raise an inference of

discriminatory purpose, especially in light of the fact that a state court’s determination as to whether a

prima facie case has been made is a factual determination entitled to a presumption of correctness. 

Tolbert, 182 F.3d at 685.

The jury in Torres’ case ultimately consisted of one African-American male, one Filipino

male, one Irish/Filipino male, two Caucasian males, three Hispanic males, one Caucasian/Native

American female, and three Caucasian females. (1 Aug. CT 9-188.) In addition to the analysis of the

trial court’s individual finding of no discriminatory intent as to the five minority jurors, the ultimate

racial make-up of Torres’ jury belies any claim of racial discrimination in jury selection. Moreover, a

consideration of the record of voir dire as a whole reveals no discriminatory intent on the part of the

prosecutor.

iii. Conclusion

After careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authorities, the Court finds

that Torres has failed to satisfy his burden under AEDPA to establish that the state court’s denial of

this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in state court or involved an unreasonable application of Batson and its progeny. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1)-(2); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that

federal habeas relief be DENIED as to Claim One of Torres’ petition.

2. Insufficient Evidence Claim

Torres also contends that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when

the jury convicted him of conspiracy to furnish a firearm to a felon. (Pet. at 7; attachment A at 9-11.) 

Specifically, Torres complains that: 1) there was no evidence to support the conviction apart from his

own admissions; (2) there was no evidence of an overt act; and (3) there was no evidence that his

alleged co-conspirator knew he was an ex-felon. (Id.) Respondent counters that the state court’s

resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. (Resp’ts Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at 12-18.) 

Torres raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court,

and that court denied the claim without reasoned decision. (Lodgment No. 16.) Accordingly, this

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Court must “look through” to the California appellate court’s denial of this claim for its analysis. 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. That Court recounted the underlying facts surrounding this claim which are

supported by the record and to which this Court defers under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1):

[¶] In a recorded conversation on the morning of July 10, 2003, Torres told an

individual named Richard Alvarado that Torres’s family had been threatened.

Alvarado told Torres he could get him some guns, and Torres stated he needed some.

Alvarado stated he could get the guns in about one hour. Later during the day

Alvarado informed Torres that the delivery of the guns had been delayed. At 9:55

p.m., Alvarado told Torres he had a gun for Torres, and agreed to bring it to Torres.

Later, Alvarado told Torres he could not get a ride. Torres stated he would go to

where Alvarado was, and Alvarado gave Torres directions. Torres asked what kind of

gun it was, and Alvarado stated it was “a .20-gauge, sawed off.” At 11:44 p.m., Torres

told Alvarado that he was “on [his] way” and the two agreed to meet at a particular

taco shop.

(Opinion at *28.)

The state appellate court’s analysis of the claim was as follows:

[¶] Torre’s challenges to this conspiracy conviction based on the corpus delicti rule

and on the absence of an overt act are unavailing. The corpus delicti rule requires

proof that a crime actually occurred by evidence other than the defendant's own

out-of-court statements. ( People v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1200.) The

independent proof of the crime may be slight or minimal. ( Ibid.) Here, the

conspiracy offense was supported by both Torres’s and Alvarado’s statements during

the recorded conversations. Thus, the corpus delicti was shown independent of

Torres’s own statements. To the extent Torres suggests the corpus delicti was not

established because there was no evidence he actually acquired a gun from Alvarado,

the contention is unavailing. Conspiracy is an “ ‘inchoate crime [that] does not require

commission of the substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy.’” (People v.

Morante, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 416-417.)

[¶] The overt act necessary for conspiracy culpability can be any outward act done to

pursue the crime and manifesting an intent to accomplish the crime. ( People v. Von

Villas, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 243-244.) Alvarado's statement that he had

obtained a gun for Torres was sufficient to show an overt act had been committed.

[*29][¶] Finally, there is substantial evidence to support the knowledge element of the

substantive offense of supplying a firearm to an ex-felon. This offense is committed

when the defendant “knowingly” furnishes a firearm to an ex-felon (§ 12072, subd.

(a)(1)) or furnishes a firearm with “cause to believe” (§ 12072, subd. (a)(2)) the

recipient is an ex-felon. [FN17] A violation of the “knowingly” provision is a felony

punishable by a two-, three-, or four-year sentence (§ 12072, subd. (g)(2)(A)), whereas

a violation of the “cause to believe” provision is a “wobbler” punishable by a fine, jail

sentence, or prison sentence (§ 12072, subd. (g)(3)(A)). Here, the jury was instructed

solely under the “knowingly” prong of section 12072. Accordingly, we shall evaluate

the evidence under this prong.

[FN17. Section 12072 states in relevant part: “(a)(1) No person, corporation, or firm

shall knowingly supply, deliver, sell, or give possession or control of a firearm to any

person within any of the classes prohibited by Section 12021 or 12021.1 [ex-felons].

[¶] (2) No person, corporation, or dealer shall sell, supply, deliver, or give possession

or control of a firearm to any person whom he or she has cause to believe to be within

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any of the classes prohibited by Section 12021 or 12021.1 of this code....” (Italics

added.)]

[¶] Preliminarily, we note we are not persuaded by the Attorney General’s argument

that a violation of section 12072, subdivision (a)(1) occurs when a person knowingly

supplies a firearm, even without knowledge of the recipient’s ex-felon status. This

assertion is contrary to the plain language of section 12072, subdivisions (a)(1) and

(a)(2), which differentiates between “knowingly” supplying a firearm to an ex-felon

and supplying a firearm with “cause to believe” the person is an ex-felon. Further, the

assertion is contrary to the general rule that, absent compelling evidence of a contrary

legislative intent, “the prosecution [must] prove some form of guilty intent,

knowledge, or criminal negligence” to support a criminal conviction. (In re Jorge M.

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 872, 879; In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 267.) The

Attorney General's interpretation is also unsupported when the statute is viewed in its

entirety. As stated, a violation of section 12072, subdivision (a)(1) is a felony,

whereas a violation of section 12072, subdivision (a)(2) may be punished as a felony

or a misdemeanor. It makes no sense that the harsher felony provision has no

knowledge requirement at all regarding ex-felon status, whereas the more lenient

“wobbler” provision does impose a knowledge (i.e., imputed knowledge) requirement. 

[FN18]

[FN18. We note that in People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592-593, the court

held that a defendant's claim that she thought she was convicted of a misdemeanor, not

a felony, was not a defense to a charge of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. The

court reasoned that the defendant’s claim constituted a mistake of law, and the

defendant was charged with knowledge that the offense she was convicted of was a

felony. ( Id. at p. 593.) There is nothing in Snyder which supports interpreting section

12072, subdivision (a) to dispense with the plainly-stated requirement that the

defendant must have actual or imputed knowledge of the firearm recipient's ex-felon

status.]

[¶] A conspiracy conviction requires that both “the defendant and another person had

the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific

intent to commit the elements of that offense....” ( People v. Morante, supra, 20

Cal.4th at p. 416, italics added.) A person “‘may not conspire with himself.’” (People

v. Palmer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 864 .) Thus, to sustain a conviction under count 14,

the prosecution had to prove that both Torres and Alvarado knew Torres was an

ex-felon.

[¶] Knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence. ( In re Jorge M., supra, 23

Cal.4th at p. 884.) A prosecution witness testified that Alvarado was a National City

gang member who worked for Torres. [FN19] Because a primary activity of a

criminal street gang is to engage in felonious criminal activities, the jury could

reasonably infer that gang members who associate with each other are aware when one

of their associates is caught, prosecuted, and convicted of a felony. The jury could

reasonably conclude that the nature of the association between Torres and Alvarado

established that Alvarado was apprised that Torres had suffered a felony conviction.

[FN19. Although the record it not entirely clear, Alvarado may have been a member of

the National City Locos gang, whereas Torres was a member of the Old Town

National City gang.]

[*30] [¶] There is substantial evidence to support Torres's conviction of conspiracy to

supply a firearm to an ex-felon.

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(Opinion at * 28-30.)

//

a. Analysis

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated “if it is found that upon the

evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The evidence is to be considered

in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. If the factual record

supports conflicting inferences, federal courts are to presume “that the trier of fact resolved any such

conflicts in favor of the prosecution,” and must “defer to that resolution.” Id.; see also Payne v. Borg,

982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). In deciding whether a due process violation has occurred, this

Court must look to “the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, n. 16. 

Under California law, no agreement amounts to a conspiracy unless some act, beside the

agreement itself, is done to effect the object of the agreement. Cal. Penal Code section 184. A

conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and another person had the specific intent

to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that

offense, together with proof of the commission of an overt act “by one or more of the parties to such

agreement” in furtherance of the conspiracy. People v. Morante, 20 Cal.4th 403 (1999). Evidence is

sufficient to sustain a conviction of conspiracy if it supports an inference that the parties positively or

tacitly came to a mutual understanding to commit a crime. Therefore, conspiracy may be proved

through circumstantial evidence inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the

alleged conspirators before and during the alleged conspiracy. People v. Prevost, 60 Cal.App.4th

1382, 1399 (1998). The rule in California is that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime when

there is no proof a crime occurred other than the defendant’s own earlier utterance indicating a

predisposition or purpose to commit it. People v. Alvarez, 27 Cal. 4th 1161, 1164-65 (2002).

With regard to the overt act requirement, “[i]t is only necessary to prove one overt act.” 

People v. Olson, 232 Cal.App.2d 480, 489 (1965). An overt act need amount to no more than an act

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The transcriptions of the ten (10) recorded telephone conversations between Torres (“Nite

Owl”) and Alvarado (“Rick”) on July 10, 2003 are found at 14 CT 3052-78. Those recorded

conversations were played in court during questioning of the prosecution’s witness, but were not

transcribed as part of the Reporter’s Transcript. Thus, the two (the Clerk’s Transcript and the Reporter’s

Transcript) must be read together to fully recreate the testimony and evidence presented at Torres’ trial.

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showing that the conspiracy has gone beyond the state of a mere meeting of the minds upon the

attainment of an unlawful object and that action between conspirators as such has begun. People v.

Sullivan, 113 Cal.App.2d 510, 523-24 (1952). The overt act requirement fulfills two purposes.

First, it provides an opportunity to repent, so that any of the conspirators may reconsider and abandon

the agreement before taking steps to further it, and thereby avoid punishment for the conspiracy.” 

People v. Russo, 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1131 (2001). Second, it shows that “an indictable conspiracy

exits” because “evil thought alone cannot constitute a criminal offense.” Id. A conversation may

constitute an overt act made in support of a conspiracy once the parties reach a meeting of the minds

about their intention to commit a crime. People v. Olf, 195 Cal.App.2d 97, 108 (1961); People v.

Shaw, 115 Cal.App.2d 597, 601 (1953).

An independent review of the record of Torres’ trial reveals that the state court’s denial of his

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Jackson in light of California conspiracy

law. At trial, the prosecution presented the following evidence that Torres was guilty of conspiracy

to furnish a felon with a firearm.

On July 10, 2003, Torres and Richard Alvarado discussed Alvarado providing Torres with

guns and money.6/

 Torres said some people were after his family. (23 RT 3976-79; 14 CT 3053 (“. . .

I took my family somewhere else because some shit was coming down.”)) Later that day, Torres left

a message mentioning guns. (23 RT 3979-80; 14 CT 3057 (“. . . He’s got a couple of weapons for

us.”)) A few minutes later, Alvarado told Torres his “homeboy” was bringing him guns. (23 RT

3980-81; 14 CT 3059 (“ . . . My homeboy come bring me couple of straps right now so ...”.))

Approximately two hours later, Alvarado told Torres he was waiting for a ride to Torres’ residence. 

(23 RT 3981; 14 CT 3060 (. . . “I’m waiting for my homie dog. I just hung up with him right now. 

He’s gonna come . . . drop me off.”)) An hour after that, Alvarado called and said the guy was

“lagging,” but he would be over with guns and money. (23 RT 3982; 14 CT 3063 (. . . “Don’t trip. I

will go up there and I guarantee you’ll have some straps today, dog, for sure. He’s just lagging.”)) 

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There were three more recorded calls between Alvarado and Torres. Alvarado kept assuring Torres

he would provide the guns and money. However, he had met with some delays. (23 RT 3982-84; 14

CT 3065-71.) Alvarado finally called and said he had a “20 gauge sawed off” shotgun. (14 CT

3074.) Alvarado gave Torres directions, and Torres confirmed that he understood. (23 RT 3984-86;

14 CT 3074 (“. . . Uhm, you get off on 24th and you go all the way up, pass Highland and then we

make a turn until we get to 20th through the back roads, you see what I’m saying? And then we

make a left turn on ‘F.’ Okay? And then, where, where . . . ? You’re gonna be outside?”.)) 

Afterwards, Alvarado called Torres, and it sounded as if Torres was in a car. Alvarado suggested that

it might be easier to meet at a Taco Shop on 21st and Highland, and Torres stated “Okay. I’ll be

there.” (23 RT 3986-87; 14 CT 3077-78.) It was stipulated that Torres had previously been

convicted of a felony. (24 RT 4145.)

The evidence was sufficient to support Torres’ conviction. The evidence showed that Torres

had previously been convicted of a felony. Torres and Richard Alvarado engaged in a series of

telephone conversations to discuss Alvarado providing Torres with guns and money. In the fourth

call, Alvarado informed Torres that he had arranged to take delivery of guns from his “homeboy.” By

the conclusion of the forth call, a meeting of the minds existed between Torres and Alvarado that

Alvarado intended to obtain guns and supply at least one gun to Torres. At that point, the plan for

Torres to pick up a gun and money from Alvarado was in place. Each of the conversations thereafter

constituted an overt act in support of the already-formed conspiracy between Torres and Alvarado

because each of the conversations was designed to further the conspiracy. Sullivan, 113 Cal.App.2d

at 523.

It could reasonably be inferred from the final recorded conversation that Torres picked up the

gun from Alvarado shortly after the conversation’s end because Torres was in a car and getting final

meeting instructions from Alvarado. Alvarado’s statements during the ten (10) recorded

conversations leading up to the meeting and gun exchange were sufficient evidence of a crime under

California law because they constituted evidence beyond Torres’ own confessions or extrajudicial

statements, and they constituted evidence of both the formed conspiracy and overt acts in furtherance

of that conspiracy. Moreover, a rational trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that Alvarado

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knew Torres was a felon because of Alvarado and Torres’ status as members of the Mexican Mafia

(albeit with different gang affiliations) and the fact that Alvarado had previously worked for Torres,

who was a crew leader for the Mexican Mafia running a methamphetamine distribution operation. 

Under California law, this is all that is required to establish conspiracy to furnish a felon with a

firearm. 

 While the evidence supporting Torres’ conviction for conspiracy to furnish a felon with a

firearm was by no means overwhelming, the Court should find that it was sufficient under the

Constitution, especially in light of the deference afforded state court factual findings on collateral

review. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and resolving any

conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Torres committed the crime. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 324.

b. Conclusion

Torres has failed to establish that the appellate court erred when it denied his insufficient

evidence claim as to Count 14. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Early,

537 U.S. at 8 (stating that “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be contrary to clearly

established federal law). Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS that federal habeas relief be DENIED as

to Claim Two of Torres’ petition.

3. Improper Jury Instructions Claim

Torres claims that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when the trial

court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding accomplice testimony. (Pet. at 8; attachment A at

11.) Specifically, Torres contends that: (1) the trial court erred because its accomplice instructions

failed to identify Francisco Lopez and Sergio Pulido as accomplices in all of the offenses involving

victim Sanchez, and (2) the trial court erred because its cautionary accomplice instructions failed to

identify Gongora as an accomplice in the alleged conspiracy to kidnap Jauregui. (Id.) Respondent

contends the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Answer at. 19-25.) The

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 To the extent that Torres’ claims are based on errors in the interpretation or application of state

law, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

8

“Additionally, in counts 2 through 5, the information alleged that on June 4, 2003, Torres and

Contreras committed five offenses against Sanchez; i.e., kidnapping for robbery, robbery, assault by

means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, and extortion. After the presentation of the

prosecution’s case, the kidnapping for robbery and robbery offenses were dismissed as to Contreras

based on insufficient evidence. The jury convicted Contreras of conspiracy to commit extortion, but

acquitted him of the June 4 assault and extortion charges. Torres was convicted of all the charged

offenses related to Sanchez.” (Opinion at *18.)

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Court will discuss these two instructional claims in turn.7/

a. Torres’ claim that the trial court erred because its accomplice instructions

failed to identify Francisco Lopez and Sergio Pulido as accomplices in all of

the offenses involving victim Sanchez

Torres raised this claim in a petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court, and that

court denied it without a reasoned decision. (Lodgment Nos. 14 and 16.) Accordingly, this Court

must “look through” to the California appellate court’s denial of the claim as the basis for its analysis. 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In its opinion, the state appellate court summarized the following facts,

which are supported by the record, with regard to Count 6 of the information, conspiracy to commit

extortion by Torres and co-defendant Contreras against Sanchez from June 4 through June 27, 2003:8/

[¶] Sanchez and Pulido were methamphetamine drug dealers. As a result of their

transactions, Sanchez owed money to Pulido. Torres, who was providing protection to

Pulido, conspired with several individuals to collect money or drugs from Sanchez to

pay off the Pulido debt.

[¶] Pulido and Francisco [Lopez] testified at trial and provided evidence implicating

Torres in the offenses against Sanchez. The June 4 offenses of kidnapping for

robbery, assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, extortion, and

robbery commenced at Pulido's residence and continued on at a residence shared by

Jaime and Contreras. Pulido testified that Torres and Jaime arrived at Pulido's

residence at about 3:00 p.m. on June 4 asking for Sanchez. Pulido directed them to a

bedroom where Sanchez was visiting him. Francisco arrived at the residence shortly

after Torres and Jaime. Francisco observed Sanchez in the bedroom, dressed only in

his underwear, on his knees with his head against closet doors or a wall. As Francisco

was leaving the bedroom, Jaime hit Sanchez. Francisco stayed in the living room with

Pulido, and Pulido left the residence about five minutes later.

[¶] About 10 or 15 minutes later, Francisco saw Jaime and Torres walk with Sanchez

(now clothed) out of the residence. Sanchez, Jaime, and Jaime's girlfriend left in

Sanchez's car, and Torres left on foot. Jaime's girlfriend was driving Sanchez's car,

and Jaime and Sanchez were sitting in the backseat. Sanchez looked scared.

[¶] Thereafter, the police wiretap revealed that Sanchez was taken to Jaime's and

Contreras's residence, where the assault and threats continued into the night of June 4.

[FN14] During these recorded conversations, Torres revealed his intention not to

return Sanchez's car to him. In a recorded conversation between Torres and Jaime at

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6:06 p.m. on June 4, Jaime reported that he had Sanchez with him and that Sanchez

was trying to get drugs from “his people” to pay the debt. Torres instructed Jaime to

tell Sanchez that he better come up with some money, or he was not going anywhere

and was not going to live. During this same conversation, Torres told Jaime that he

had promised Sanchez's car to the Señor. During a 7:49 p.m. conversation, Jaime told

Torres that he had beaten Sanchez up, and told Sanchez that he had to pay

“[e]verything right now, tonight, or else....” At 8:28 p.m., Jaime reported that Sanchez

asked to be let go for a day so he could get what was needed to pay them, and that

Jaime told Sanchez the next time he saw him he would “see no more.” Torres told

Jaime to tell Sanchez that “he better not report that car either.” Torres instructed Jaime

to do what he thought was right, and that Jaime could consider if he thought Sanchez

was “going to come through.”

[FN14. In many of the recorded conversations discussing the events of June 4 and

thereafter, Sanchez was not identified by name. However, from a review of all the

phone calls and other information it is apparent that the person being discussed was

Sanchez.]

[*20] [¶] The wiretap revealed that Contreras was also at his residence while Sanchez

was being held captive there. At 9:02 p.m. on June 4, Contreras called Torres and told

him that he was “[r]ight here when the shit happened.” Torres asked what was

happening right then; Contreras responded “we're talking to him right now and shit ... I

think we're having a little chat.” Torres told Contreras to tell Jaime to call Torres in a

few minutes because if they needed to move Sanchez to another place, it was ready.

[¶] At 12:24 a.m. on June 5, Jaime called Torres and reported “it's done”; that Sanchez

was going to report in tomorrow; and that Jaime would call Torres the next day.

Subsequent recorded conversations revealed that Sanchez had been freed by Jaime and

that Torres was monitoring the situation to ensure that Sanchez adhered to his promise

to pay the debt. From June 5 through June 27, there were numerous phone calls

between Torres and other individuals discussing the ongoing attempts to get money or

drugs from Sanchez to pay off the debt, as well as Torres's anger at Sanchez and his

intent to assault him and/or take his property. Francisco and Pulido were frequent

participants in the recorded conversations.

[¶] Following Sanchez's release, Contreras was involved in three conversations with

Torres in which Sanchez was discussed. During a conversation on June 7, Contreras

asked Torres, “[w]hat's up with [Sanchez]?” Torres responded that he was waiting for

Jaime to reach Sanchez and then report to Torres. Contreras asked whether Sanchez

had “come through.” Torres stated no, and that he was getting upset and was “gonna

go over there and fucking kill that mother fucker [Sanchez].”

[¶] On June 8, after Torres had discovered that Sanchez had lied to him about his

assets, Torres told Contreras that he needed to talk to Jaime because there was a

problem with Sanchez that Torres needed to handle “personally.” Contreras stated

that he thought another individual (apparently referring to Jaime) was going to handle

it. Torres stated, “No.... He lied to me and you know how I feel about fucking liars. 

[¶] ... [¶] I fucking found out some shit, homie. And I confirmed it, and now he's

going to be mine.” In response to this disclosure, Contreras called Sanchez a

“motherfucker,” and stated, “What the heck is this guy's problem, man?” Torres told

Contreras he could not say what he was planning to do over the phone, and Contreras

responded “Yes” and “Uh-huh.” Torres continued, “But, this guy ... you think he got

fucking hurt last time,” and then laughed. Contreras stated, “Man ... seriously?”

Torres answered, “Seriously, homie.” Torres asked Contreras to find Jaime for him so

he could talk to him about this matter, and Contreras agreed he would do so.

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[¶] On June 9, Contreras called Torres and asked if anything had happened. Torres

responded that he knew where Sanchez was staying. Contreras inquired, “[I]f he's

hiding out, though[,][w]hat makes you think he gots anything?” Torres stated he had

confirmed that Sanchez had money and was “moving some shit right now.” Torres

assured Contreras that he was “gonna be in there, don't worry.”

(Opinion at *18-20.)

In its analysis of the claim, the state appellate court, citing California law, wrote:

[¶] The trial court gave the jurors the cautionary instructions applicable to

accomplices, informing them that accomplice testimony should be viewed with

caution, that it must be corroborated, and that one accomplice's testimony may not be

corroborated by another accomplice's testimony. The court instructed the jury that

Pulido was an accomplice as a matter of law for the count 6 offense of conspiracy to

commit extortion against Sanchez. Torres contends the trial court should have also

instructed the jury that Pulido was, or could be found by the jury to be, an accomplice

for the June 4 offenses against Sanchez alleged in counts 2 through 5 (kidnapping for

robbery, assault, extortion, and robbery).

[¶] The court instructed the jury that Francisco was an accomplice as a matter of law

for various counts unrelated to the Sanchez count. However, Francisco was not

identified as an accomplice for the counts related to victim Sanchez. Torres asserts

this was error.

[¶] We agree the trial court should have given accomplice instructions for Pulido and

Francisco for all the counts related to victim Sanchez. If the evidence is sufficient to

support a conclusion that a witness implicating the defendant was an accomplice, the

trial court must sua sponte instruct the jury to determine whether the witness was an

accomplice and give the cautionary accomplice instructions. ( People v. Zapien

(1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 982.) The jury could have found that Pulido and Francisco were

accomplices in the offenses committed against Sanchez on June 4, including the

assault at Pulido's residence, the kidnapping for robbery, the robbery of his vehicle,

and the extortion.

[¶] Both Pulido and Francisco were at Pulido's residence when Sanchez was first

assaulted by Jaime. Sanchez was being assaulted for a debt he owed Pulido. From

this fact the jury could infer that Pulido participated as an aider and abettor, for

example by arranging for the encounter at his residence to give Jaime an opportunity

to assault, kidnap, extort, and rob Sanchez. The jury could have also concluded that

Francisco was an aider and abettor based on the facts that Francisco was present at

Pulido's residence when the offenses occurred, and (as we will discuss shortly) during

the ensuing weeks there were repeated discussions between Torres and Francisco

about the efforts to get money or property from Sanchez. Because Francisco was

involved in the efforts to obtain money or property from Sanchez after June 4, the jury

could reasonably infer that he was likewise an aider and abettor while at Pulido's

residence on June 4.

[¶] The jury could also find that Francisco participated in the conspiracy to commit the

extortion. In a June 5 conversation, Francisco reported to Torres that Sanchez had

called him and stated he wanted to pay off the debt with drugs. Francisco agreed to

call Pulido for Torres to check whether Pulido would accept drugs instead of cash.

Francisco had additional conversations with Torres about collecting the debt from

Sanchez on June 5, 8, and 9. On June 10, Francisco met with Sanchez and acquired

methamphetamine from him; Francisco then delivered the drugs to Torres. Torres

tested the drugs and discovered they were not good quality. When Torres angrily

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informed Francisco of this, Francisco agreed that Sanchez “keeps messing around”

and “that's why he's got coming what he's got coming.” Subsequently, Francisco

assisted Torres in efforts to try to reach Sanchez. On June 27, Francisco reported to

Torres that Sanchez's telephone had been disconnected and promised that he would try

to find Sanchez. This evidence provided a sufficient basis for a jury finding that

Francisco was an accomplice in the extortion conspiracy.

[*23] [¶] However, the failure to identify Pulido and Francisco as accomplices for all

the Sanchez offenses does not require reversal. Because an accomplice may tend to

shift blame to the defendant, the accomplice instructions inform the jury that an

accomplice's testimony should be viewed with caution and must be corroborated by

evidence, independent of the accomplice's testimony, that tends to connect the

defendant with the commission of the crime. ( People v.. Howard, supra, 42 Cal.4th at

p. 1022; People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 982.) The failure to give accomplice

instructions is harmless if there is sufficient corroborating evidence in the record.

(People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 982.) Corroborating evidence may be slight,

may be entitled to little consideration when standing alone, and need not establish all

the elements of the crime. ( Ibid.)

[¶] Torres's connection to the charged offenses against Sanchez was amply

corroborated by the recorded phone conversations with Torres obtained from the

police wiretap. These conversations contained repeated admissions by Torres

reflecting his intention that Sanchez be beaten and threatened, his plans to keep

Sanchez's car, and his continued efforts to get money or property from Sanchez.

[¶] Other Instructions

[¶] To support his contention of reversible error, Torres asserts the trial court

compounded the error arising from the incomplete accomplice instructions by

instructing the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.11.5 and 2.27. CALJIC No. 2.11.5

admonished the jury not to speculate why other persons who may have been involved

in the crimes were not being prosecuted in this trial, and that the jury’s sole duty was

to decide whether the People had proven the guilt of each defendant on trial. Torres

asserts the instruction should not have been given because Francisco, Pulido, and a

third accomplice (Julio Navarette) testified for the prosecution in exchange for lenient

deals.

[¶] In People v Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312-313, the court held that a former

version of CALJIC No. 2.11.5 should not be given when a prosecution witness has

been afforded leniency, because the jury may be misled to believe that it was

precluded from considering whether the witness had a strong incentive to tesify

favorably to the prosecution. However, the Carrera court concluded the “potential for

such a misunderstanding of the instructions as a whole, and that it may consider the

existence of a bias, interest, or other motive when evaluating credibility. (See CALJIC

Nos. 1.01, 2.20; People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 313; see also People v.

Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 162-163; People v. Fonseca (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th

543, 547-550.)

[¶] Here, as in Carrera, the jury was instructed in the language of CALJIC Nos. 1.01

and 2.20. Based on these instructions, and as a matter of common sense, we are

confident the jury understood it could consider the lenient deals provided by the

prosecution when evaluating the accomplices’ credibility. Any error arising from

giving CALJIC No. 2.11.5 does not warrant reversal, even when considered in light of

the failure to fully specify all the counts for which Francisco and Pulido could have

been found to be accomplices.

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[¶] CALJIC No. 2.27 told the jury that it should give uncorroborated testimony of a

single witness whatever weight the jury though it deserved, and testimony concerning

any fact by one witness who did not require corroboration was sufficient to prove that

fact. As stated, the police wiretap contained repeated admission from Torres clearly

tying him to the Sanchez counts. Thus, the jury would certainly have found

corroboration for these counts if it had been instructed that such corroboration was

necessary in order to rely on Francisco’s and Pulido’s testimony. Once this

corroboration was found to exist, the jury could properly rely on a single accomplice’s

testimony to establish a fact. Under these circumstances we find no reversible error

arising from the incomplete accomplice instructions even when considered in light of

CALJIC No. 2.27. [FN15]

[[¶] FN15. As we will discuss below in section V(B), the trial court also erred in

failing to instruct the jury regarding codefendant Gongora’s status as an accomplice in

count 15 (conspiracy to kidnap Jauregui), but we find the error harmless based on

sufficient corroborating evidence. We likewise find no prejudice arising from the

giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.11.5 and 2.27 as it pertains to Gongora.]

(Opinion at *22-24.)

To warrant habeas relief in a jury instruction context, there must be a reasonable likelihood

that the jury applied the instruction(s) in a way that violated the Constitution. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). Under California law, if evidence corroborates an accomplice’s testimony,

error in failing to give adequate accomplice instructions is harmless. People v. Verlinde, 100

Cal.App.4th 1146, 1163 (2002). The court in Verlinde stated:

The corroborative evidence ‘must tend to implicate the defendant and therefore must

relate to some act or fact which is an element of the crime but it is not necessary that

the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the

offense charged.” [Citations omitted.]’” The evidence necessary to corroborate

accomplice testimony need only be slight, such that it would be entitled to little

consideration if standing alone. [Citation omitted.] It is enough that the corroborative

evidence tends to connect defendant with the crime in a way that may reasonably

satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. [Citation omitted.] Corroborative

evidence may be entirely circumstantial. [Citation omitted]. Id.

There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in a way that denied

Torres due process. The record reflects that evidence other than the testimony of Lopez and Pulido

tended to corroborate that Torres participated in kidnaping for robbery, robbery, assault by means of

force likely to cause great bodily injury, extortion, and conspiracy to commit extortion, all against

victim Sanchez. As the Court of Appeal concluded, Torres’ connection to the charged offenses was

amply corroborated by the recorded telephone conversations obtained from the wiretaps. (See 10 CT

2090 - 11 CT 2370.) Specifically, Torres (identified by his street name “Nite Owl” in the transcripts

of the recorded conversations), participated in more than fifty (50) conversations between June 4,

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2003 and June 28, 2003 pertaining to the crimes committed against victim Sanchez. (Id.) For

example, after some discussions with associates about obtaining payment from Sanchez, Torres stated

in a call “Well, then . . . tell [Sanchez] if [he] wants to . . . live, he better . . . come up with something

or I’m gonna go . . . put him away right now.” (10 CT 2094.) Later, Jaime Lopez stated “I had to do

some Chinese torture on the guy . . . and . . . he’s a little more serious now;” to which Torres replied

“Okay.” (10 CT 2095.) A few days later, while discussing a new arrangement for payment by

Sanchez, Torres stated “and give that son of a bitch a good beating.” (10 CT 2163.)

Additional evidence presented at trial further showed that Sanchez went to the hospital and

had wounds that required attention within a couple of hours of Torres’ co-defendant Contreras

“having a little chat” with Sanchez. (9 RT 1273-1306; 10 CT 2106.) The E.R. doctor testified that

Sanchez “looked very distressed, and, frankly, . . . petrified” when he arrived at the hospital. (9 RT

1279.) Sanchez had sustained blunt trauma to the right side of his face, including a laceration that

required stitches. (9 RT 1282-84.) Sanchez’s mother corroborated this evidence when she testified

that she saw Sanchez with blood on his face, a swollen eye, and bruises on his face, shoulders and

back. Sanchez asked his mother for $5,000. He told her he needed the money or something might

happen to him. (19 RT 3041-46.) 

Although such evidence was circumstantial, this was amply sufficient for corroboration

purposes under California law. Verlinde, 100 Cal.App.4th at 1163. Coupled with this corroborating

evidence is the fact that the jury was already instructed that Lopez was an accomplice as a matter of

law on Counts 1, 8, and 9, and Pulido was an accomplice as a matter of law on Counts 1 and 6. (1 CT

147.) Thus, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in a way that

denied Torres due process.

Torres has failed to cite any clearly established Supreme Court law requiring particular jury

instructions in cases where accomplice testimony is in evidence, and he has failed to establish that the

state appellate court erred when it denied his jury instruction claim as to Counts 2-6. Accordingly,

the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (stating that “so long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state

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court decision will not be contrary to clearly established federal law). Thus, the Court

RECOMMENDS that federal habeas relief be DENIED as to this part of Claim Three of Torres’

petition. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

b. Torres’ claim that the trial court erred because its cautionary accomplice

instructions failed to identify Gongora as an accomplice in the alleged

conspiracy to kidnap Jauregui

Torres raised this claim in a petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court, and the

California Supreme Court denied it without a reasoned decision. (Lodgment Nos. 14 and 16.) 

Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the California appellate court’s denial of the claim as

the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In its opinion, the state appellate court

summarized the following facts in its discussion of codefendant Gongora’s claim that insufficient

evidence was presented to convict him of Count 15, conspiring to kidnap Jauregui. These same facts

pertain to Torres’ jury instruction claim:

[¶] The police wiretap revealed that in August 2003 Torres believed Jauregui was

planning to have Torres killed. [FN16] On August 3, Torres repeatedly left messages

on Jauregui’s phone stating that Jauregui should come and meet him if he had the

“balls.” The wiretap revealed that Torres was arranging for several individuals to get

Jauregui and “put him somewhere where [Torres] want[ed] him.” On August 3,

Torres and his coconspirators formulated a plan to grab Jauregui when he arrived at a

location near a trolley station. Jauregui never showed up. On August 4, Torres and

his cohorts decided to get Jauregui when he got off work. On that same day, the

police notified Jauregui that he was in danger.

[FN16. As with other wiretap recordings, the conversations did not always identify

Jauregui by name, but his identity was apparent from the context of the conversations

and other information.]

[¶] The recorded conversations revealed that on August 3, Torres told Gongora about

the threat to his life. On that same day, Gongora assisted Torres in an assault on

another individual whom they believed was also involved in the plot to kill Torres. 

Thereafter, Gongora participated in two specific discussions regarding the plans to

kidnap Jauregui. In an August 4 conversation at 6:28 a.m., Torres told Gongora to

“[g]et your ass over here ‘cause these guys are gonna take care of [Jauregui] over that

at his work.” Gongora responded, “All right, I’ll be over there.” In a recorded

conversation about two hours later, Torres asked Gongora what time he wanted “this

to happen.” Gongora responded the best time to “get on him” was when he

(Juauregui) got off work.

[¶] The record supports that Gongora understood and agreed that the plan was to

kidnap Jauregui. The recorded conversations between Torres and other coconspirators

(apart from Gongora) regarding Jauregui contain statements that the men were going

to “take the . . . dude with them”; “put him somewhere where [Torres] want[s] him”;

“take him somewhere”; “pick up this bastard and . . . take him over there”; “take him

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away”; take his ass”; and “snatch him.” These statements support that the plan was to

seize and transport Jauregui to a location where Torres could confront him. Based on

the August 4 communication between Gongora and Torres in which Torres asked

Gongora what time he wanted the event to occur and Gongora responded the best time

to “get on” Jauregui was when he got off work, the jury could reasonably infer that

Gongora was aware of and in accord with these kidnapping plans.

(Opinion at *27.)

Later in its opinion, the Court of Appeal analyzed the trial court’s failure to instruct that

 Gongora was an accomplice in the Jauregui conspiracy count, as referenced in FN15:

[¶] When giving cautionary instructions pertaining to testimony from an accomplice,

the trial court did not identify Gongora as an accomplice in the count charging Torres

with Conspiracy to kidnap Jauregui. Torres contends this was error.

[¶] Gongora testified at trial. In his testimony, Gongora acknowledged that Torres was

afraid because someone was threatening his life and that Torres and he had a phone

conversation during which they discussed “get[ting] [Jauregui] after he gets off work.” 

On appeal, the Attorney General agrees the trial court should have instructed that

Gongora was an accomplice in the Jauregui count, but asserts the instructional error

was harmless.

[¶] [*28] As noted, the failure to give accomplice instruction is harmless if there is

sufficient corroborating evidence in the record, and the corroborating evidence may be

slight. (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 982.) The recorded phone

conversations contain repeated admissions to Torres showing his involvement in the

conspiracy to kidnap Jauregui. Because Gongora’s testimony regarding this count was

corroborated by Torres’s own admissions, the instructional error was harmless.

(Opinion at *27-28.)

The record reveals that the Court of Appeal was correct in finding that the instructional error

was harmless, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions so as to

violate Torres’ right to due process. As the Court of Appeal concluded, Torres’ connection to the

kidnaping of Jauregui was amply corroborated by the recorded telephone conversations obtained

from the wiretaps. After the beating of a person at the trolley station, intercepted telephone calls

showed Torres calling Monie and saying “We just got one of them. We got him right there in the

trolley station. The other one his name is Richard, Urie, Urigi, Uriege and he’s from Shelltown. 

He’s the one that’s supposed to be paying these people to come and do this.” (12 CT 2667.) Other

recorded phone calls referenced “the guy” and trying to find “the guy.” (17 RT 2792-93; 12 CT

2629-51.) Later, there were calls referencing beating “the shit out of him” at the trolley. Torres said

he and Gongora punched the guy.” (17 RT 2808-13; 12 CT 2652-64.) Torres told Monie the guy

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they were looking for was Richard Jauregui and was from ShellTown. Torres left messages on

Jauregui’s phone taunting him. (17 RT 2815, 2830; 18 RT 2850; 12 CT 2665-66, 2684-85, 2687-88.) 

Torres spoke to Jose Jaime “Speedy” Gutierrez about some hidden weapons. Speedy apologized to

Torres for not getting an admission out of the guy after beating him . (17 RT 2821-25; 12 CT 2672-

74.) Police confirmed that Torres had been calling Jauregui. (18 RT 2850-51.) 

Although such evidence was circumstantial, this was amply sufficient for corroboration

purposes under California law in light of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that Gongora’s

accomplice testimony should be viewed with caution. Coupled with this corroboration is the fact that

the jury was already instructed that Lopez was an accomplice as a matter of law on Counts 1, 8, and

9, Pulido was an accomplice as a matter of law on Counts 1 and 6, and Navarette was an accomplice

as a matter of law on Counts 1 and 7. (1 CT 147.) Given the corroboration of Gongora’s accomplice

testimony and the fact that the jury had been given cautionary instructions as to other accomplice

witnesses, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions so as to violate

Torres’ right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72.

Torres has failed to cite any clearly established Supreme Court law requiring particular jury

instructions in cases where accomplice testimony is in evidence, and he has failed to establish that the

appellate court erred when it denied his jury instruction claim as to Count 15. Accordingly, the state

court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (stating that “so long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state

court decision will not be contrary to clearly established federal law). Thus, the Court

RECOMMENDS that federal habeas relief be DENIED as to this part of Claim Three of Torres’

petition. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Irma E.

Gonzalez under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

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Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 16, 2010 , any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than August 30, 2010 . The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 15, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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