Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00653/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00653-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

RYAN LAMAR THOMAS, #250601, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-653-WHA

 ) (WO)

 )

WARDEN LOUIS BOYD, et al., )

 )

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Ryan Lamar Thomas (“Thomas”), a state inmate, 

challenges the constitutionality of actions taken against him during a prior term of 

incarceration at the Staton Correctional Facility (“Staton”). Thomas names Officer Stacey 

C. Singleton, Warden Louis Boyd, Sgt. Richard Parker, Officer Bruce LaFogg and the 

Alabama Department of Corrections as defendants. In the complaint, Thomas maintains 

that defendant Singleton used excessive force against him on the morning of June 26, 2013 

during check-out for trade school by choking and punching him absent provocation or need 

for the use of force. Attachment to Compl. - Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-2. In an amendment to the 

complaint, Thomas asserts that on September 17, 2013 defendant LaFogg subjected him to 

excessive force at the Staton/Draper health care unit when LaFogg sprayed him with a 

chemical agent “without cause of justification.” Amendment to Compl. - Doc. No. 11 at 1-

3. Finally, Thomas alleges that defendant Parker denied him access to medical treatment. 

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Amendment to Compl.- Doc. No. 5 at 1. Thomas seeks monetary damages for the alleged 

violations of his constitutional rights. Amendment to Compl. - Doc. No. 11 at 4. 

 The defendants filed a special report, supplemental special report and supporting 

evidentiary materials addressing Thomas’ claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered 

in this case, the court deems it appropriate to construe these reports as a motion for 

summary judgment. Order of February 28, 2014 - Doc. No. 21. Additionally, in his 

response in opposition, Thomas seeks dismissal of his claims against Louis Boyd and the 

Alabama Department of Corrections “as neither Defendant [had] any personal or direct 

involvement with the deprivation of his constitutional rights in which the Plaintiff now 

seeks redress[.]” Response in Opposition - Doc. No. 24 at 1-2. The court therefore 

construes this request as a motion to dismiss with respect to defendants Louis Boyd and 

the Alabama Department of Corrections. 

Insofar as Thomas seeks dismissal of his claims against Louis Boyd and the 

Alabama Department of Corrections, the court finds that the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss 

is due to be granted. Furthermore, upon consideration of the defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint 

and Thomas’ response in opposition, including his affidavit, the court concludes that the 

motion for summary judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no 

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

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as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (“The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).1	 The 

party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, 

including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 

1995) (moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material 

fact for trial). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there 

is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present 

appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate 

burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324. 

The defendants assert that they have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated 

the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by 

the plaintiff. The burden therefore shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate 

																																																												

					1Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and 

deciding summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, 

“[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), 

changing only one word -- genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus 

of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant 

summary judgment.” Id. Despite these stylistic changes, the substance of Rule 56 remains the same and, 

therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. 

Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to 

properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record 

including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant 

summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered 

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party 

must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under 

penalty of perjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” 

demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider 

“specific facts” pled in a plaintiff’s sworn complaint when considering his opposition to

summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 

2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces 

evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. 

Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 

1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). 

To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff is required to 

produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting 

his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 

(1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the 

nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . 

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summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ 

of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough 

of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 

911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective 

beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, 

do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 

1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . ., in the absence of 

[admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); 

Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment 

appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” 

challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 

1984) (“Mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose 

summary judgment. . . .”); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 

1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative 

value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forthspecific facts supported by requisite 

evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on 

which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be 

granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof 

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other 

facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th 

Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence 

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to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is 

appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(summary judgment appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists). At the 

summary judgment stage, this court must “consider all evidence in the record . . . 

[including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. -- and can only grant 

summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of 

material fact exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 

(11th Cir. 2012). 

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are 

relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74thAvenue, 

Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by 

the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary 

of the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(“Only factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will 

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will 

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting 

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 

(11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the 

party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] 

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. ZenithRadio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

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In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can 

be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the 

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment 

is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, 

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a 

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 

1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party 

must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his 

favor.). 

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant 

does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of 

material fact. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2576 (2006); Brown v. 

Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone 

does not mandate this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof 

in a civil case. 

The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence 

contained in the record. In this case, Thomas, through the submission of his sworn 

complaint and affidavit in response to the defendants’ reports has demonstrated a genuine 

dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment on his excessive 

force claims against defendants Singleton and LaFogg. Defendant Parker, however, is

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entitled to summary judgment on Thomas’ claim regarding deliberate indifference to his 

medical needs. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

In his response in opposition to the defendants’ initial report, Thomas seeks 

dismissal of his claims against Louis Boyd and the Alabama Department of Corrections. 

Thomas concedes that neither of these defendants is responsible for the constitutional 

violations made the basis of this case. Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that 

Thomas’ motion to dismiss is due to be granted and his claims against Louis Boyd and the 

Alabama Department of Corrections are due to be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. Absolute Immunity

To the extent Thomas lodges claims against the remaining defendants in their 

official capacities, these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from monetary 

damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a 

suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official 

may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 

S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see 

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 

(1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of 

Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not 

abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from 

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claims brought against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 

F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). 

The defendants are state actors entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 

Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. 

Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 

1998) (state officials sued in their official capacities are protected from suit for damages 

under the Eleventh Amendment); Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 

1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (damages are unavailable from state official sued in his official 

capacity). The court will henceforth address the claims presented against defendants 

Singleton, LaFogg and Parker in their individual capacities. 

C. Excessive Force

(i) Qualified Immunity. With respect to Thomas’ excessive force claims against 

defendants Singleton and LaFogg in their individual capacities, the defendants argue they 

are entitled to qualified immunity. “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, if the 

defendant establishes that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority 

when the alleged excessive force occurred, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that 

the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Skop [v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 

1136-1137 (11th Cir. 2007)]. To defeat qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show both 

that a constitutional violation occurred and that the constitutional right violated was clearly 

established. Fennell [v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)]. In 

Eighth Amendment excessive force cases, however, ‘the subjective element required to 

establish [the constitutional violation] is so extreme that every conceivable set of 

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circumstances in which this constitutional violation occurs is clearly established to be a 

violation of the Constitution.’ Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 

2002).” Bowden v. Stokely, 576 Fed. App’x 951, 954-955 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); 

“While . . . there is no per se rule barring qualified immunity in Eighth Amendment cases, 

where the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged or shown a material dispute of fact as to an 

excessive force claim, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not appropriate. 

See Skrtich [v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002)].” Bowden, 576 Fed. App’x 

at 956. Accordingly, this court will consider whether the plaintiff’s allegations that 

Singleton and LaFogg maliciously and sadistically used excessive force against him, which 

the court must take as true for purposes of summary judgment, sets forth violations of his 

Eighth Amendment rights.

(ii) Excessive Force. Claims of excessive force by prison officials against 

convicted inmates are governed by the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). The 

standard applied to an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim contains both a subjective 

and objective component. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). The subjective 

component requires that prison “officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (internal quotations omitted). With respect to the objective 

component, a plaintiff must show that “the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful 

enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. In addition, “the use of excessive 

physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when 

the inmate does not suffer serious injury.” Id. at 4. “Injury and force . . . are only 

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imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is 

gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim 

merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. 

Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010). The court, however, further directed that “the relatively 

modest nature of [an inmate’s] alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may 

recover.” Id. at 40. 

Under the Eighth Amendment, force is deemed legitimate in a custodial 

setting as long as it is applied “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline [and not] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Whitley v. 

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) 

(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir.1973)); see also 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). 

To determine if an application of force was applied maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm, a variety of factors are considered including: “the 

need for the application of force, the relationship between that need and the 

amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible 

officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-8, 112 S.Ct. 995; see also Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 

106 S.Ct. 1078; Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505 (11th Cir. 1996). From 

consideration of such factors, “inferences may be drawn as to whether the 

use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary, or instead evinced 

such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is 

tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 

106 S.Ct. 1078 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033). 

Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1300-1301. “‘When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use

force to cause harm,’ the Court recognized, ‘contemporary standards of decency always 

are violated . . . whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth 

Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, 

inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.’ Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 

995[.]” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38. Thus, in an excessive force case such as the one at hand, 

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“the ‘core judicial inquiry’ is ‘not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but 

rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’ Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 

S.Ct.1175, 1178, 175 L.Ed.2d 995 (2010) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted) 

(concluding that a gratuitous beating by prison guards, even without injuries requiring 

medical attention, violated a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights).” Bowden, 576 Fed. 

App’x at 953. 

Thomas asserts that on June 26, 2013 at approximately 7:30 a.m., while waiting 

with other inmates to check-out for trade school, he was watching a rat eat a cheese cracker 

and fell to the back of the line. Defendant Singleton asked Thomas what he was doing, 

cursed him and then began to choke him. Attachment to Complaint - Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-2. 

Thomas “put [his] hands up and tried to back away” advising Singleton there was no need 

to hit him. Id. at 2. Singleton then punched and hit Thomas in the chest and face. Id. 

Another officer arrived on the scene and sprayed Thomas with a chemical agent. The 

chemical agent also affected defendant Singleton. Within minutes of the altercation, 

Thomas was transported to the health care unit at Staton for decontamination and treatment. 

Defendants’ Exh. C - Doc. No. 20-3 at 13. The attending nurse observed that Thomas’ 

eyes were pink but that he had “no open areas, cuts, bruises, or scrapes[.]” Id. She also 

noted “no pain or discomfort [was] voiced” by Thomas. Id. After completion of her 

examination, the attending nurse released Thomas to the custody of correctional officials 

for return to the facility. Id. 

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Thomas next alleges that on September 17, 2013 defendant “LaFogg became 

physically abusive in front of the healthcare nurses, then chemically sprayed [him] with 

pepper spray without cause or justification.” Amendment to Compl. - Doc. No. 11 at 3. 

The defendants adamantly deny Thomas’ claims regarding the alleged acts of

excessive force. Defendant Singleton addresses the excessive force claim lodged against 

him as follows:

On June 26, 2013, I was assigned as the Draper/Staton Trade School 

Back Gate Officer. At approximately 7:30 am, I was counting inmates as 

they entered the back gate to go to Trade School. At that time, I observed 

inmate Ryan Thomas walking back and forth to the gate while staring at 

several of the female drug counselors. I gave him approximately ten loud, 

verbal commands to continue through the gate. He failed to comply with 

those orders, and instead continued to stare. Once or twice, I did state 

something to the effect of, “get your ass through the gate.” After telling him 

one last time, he finally continued through the gate. I asked him why he had 

not complied [with my orders], and he refused to answer and instead was 

staring me down. I responded by taking him by the elbow to escort him to 

the front of the line to report the incident to the Sergeant, who was standing 

at the front of the line. [Thomas] then snatched away from my hands and 

assaulted me by punching me twice in the face. I attempted to wrap my arms 

around his torso to keep him from hitting me, and he pushed me in the chest 

area. A slight tussle ensued afterward, and another officer hearing the 

commotion responded to the area and used his pepper spray. Inmate Thomas 

disengaged, and allowed himself to be handcuffed. The entire incident lasted 

maybe twenty to thirty seconds. At no time did I threaten inmate Thomas. 

During the incident, I was sprayed in the face, and reported to the health care 

unit for decontamination approximately fifteen minutes later.

Defendants’ Exh. E - Doc. No. 20-5 at 1-2. 

Defendant LaFogg maintains that:

On September 17, 2013, I was assigned as the Rover in the Health 

Care Unit at Staton Correctional Facility, which administers health care for 

four ADOC facilities in the area. That particular day, the Health Care Unit 

was very busy, and the inmates from both Elmore and Draper Correctional 

Facilities showed up at approximately the same time, which happened to be 

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around lunch time. The nurse at the time indicated to me that she had to go 

to lunch, and, therefore, I ordered the inmates to go into the HCU’s holding 

cell until they could be seen. All of the inmates complied, except one, Inmate 

Ryan Thomas. I gave Inmate Thomas another direct order to proceed to the 

holding cell, and he again refused stating, “[n]o, they called me over here, 

and I’m going to see the nurse!” Because Inmate Thomas refused to 

willingly [to the holding cell], I placed my hand on his arm in the escort 

position. It appeared at first that he was going to comply, but then he 

snatched away from my grasp and stepped towards me threatening, “Don’t 

put your hands on me, or I’ll knock you out.” In response, I protected myself 

by deploying a one-second burst of pepper spray. The first burst did not 

appear to be effective because Inmate Thomas continued coming towards 

me. I then deployed a second one-second burst of pepper spray, and he 

finally became compliant. Thereafter, he was helped up and escorted to be 

decontaminated. . . . 

Defendants’ Exh. G - Doc. No. 20-7 at 1-2.

Even though the defendants dispute the version of events presented by Thomas, this

court is required at this stage of the proceedings to view the facts in the light most favorable 

to Thomas and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in his favor. Bradley v. 

Franklin Correctional Service, Inc., 739 F.3d 606, 608 (11th Cir. 2014); Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255 (all justifiable inferences are to drawn in favor of the party 

opposing summary judgment). In that vein, Thomas provides that defendant Singleton 

chocked, punched and hit him without provocation and while he posed no threat to 

Singleton or the security of the facility. Thomas further asserts that defendant LaFogg used 

a chemical agent against him absent provocation and for no reason. Thomas maintains that 

the actions of the defendants caused him to endure pain and the adverse effects of a 

chemical agent. In sum, Thomas contends “that he was the victim of an unprovoked attack 

[on two separate occasions] in circumstances that did not present a risk of creating a 

disturbance or harming staff or other inmates. This version of the events could support an 

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excessive force claim despite the lack of serious injuries.” Bowden, 576 Fed. App’x at 954.

As previously explained, defendants Singleton and LaFogg deny Thomas’ 

allegations regarding the use of excessive force and maintain that at no time during the 

incidents at issue did either of them utilize more force than necessary to subdue and gain 

control of Thomas after he refused orders and took actions which both defendant Singleton 

and defendant LaFogg perceived as threatening. Nevertheless, viewing the facts in the 

light most favorable to Thomas, the court concludes that defendants Singleton and LaFogg 

are not entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive 

their motion for summary judgment regarding the excessive force claims lodged against 

them. Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301. Specifically, disputed issues of material fact exist 

regarding the need for the use of force by the defendants, the nature of the force used and 

whether the defendants acted “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm. Consequently, 

the motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims of excessive force presented 

against defendants Singleton and LaFogg in their individual capacities is due to be denied. 

D. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Thomas makes the conclusory allegation that defendant Parker, on various 

unidentified occasions, denied him access to medical treatment for issues related to his 

chronic asthma which resulted in his missing several appointments with health care 

personnel. Thomas also alleges that defendant Parker caused him to miss an x-ray 

scheduled for August 1, 2013. Parker adamantly denies these allegations and states that 

“[a]t no time did I refuse medical treatment to . . . Thomas[.]” Defendants’ Exh. B - Doc. 

No. 20-2 at 1. Parker further avers that anytime “an inmate has a valid complaint about a 

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medical emergency; I must immediately take the inmate to the Health Care Unit. If the 

complaint is not an emergency, the inmate must fill out a sick call form to schedule an 

appointment.” Id. The medical records filed by the defendants in support of their report 

establish that during the period of time relevant to the complaint Thomas submitted 

numerous sick call requests regarding chest pains, tightness in his chest and/or shortness 

of breath. Defendants’ Exh. C. - Doc. No. 20-3 at 2-40. These records further demonstrate 

that Thomas appeared at the health care unit for treatment regarding each such request with 

only one exception. Id. Specifically, an appointment scheduled for July 23, 2013 to 

address a July 18, 2013 sick call request submitted by Thomas referencing chest pain and 

shortness of breath was rescheduled by the attending nurse to July 24, 2013 as correctional 

officials were “short staffed” and unable to escort Thomas to the initially scheduled 

appointment. Id. at 18. It is therefore apparent that the nurse did not deem the request for 

treatment an emergency situation as she agreed to delay the appointment for one day rather 

than dispatch a medical professional to examine Thomas. With respect to the x-ray 

appointment set for August 1, 2013, the medical records indicate that health care personnel 

rescheduled this appointment for August 2, 2013, Id. at 38, and Thomas underwent the xray on this date. Id. at 25. The results of this chest x-ray showed “[c]ardiomediastinal 

structures unremarkable. Lungs are well expanded and free of acute infiltrate. Study is 

negative for effusion. Conclusion: Study is negative for acute cardiopulmonary process.” 

Id. A subsequent x-ray performed on August 7, 2013 showed “[t]he heart is normal in size 

and configuration. The mediastinum is normal without adenopathy. The lung fields are 

clear without mass, infiltrate, congestion or effusion. Bony structures are unremarkable 

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without acute fracture or destructive lesions. Conclusion: No acute cardiopulmonary 

disease seen.” Id. at 24. In addition, when Thomas reported to the health care unit on 

September 3, 2013 complaining of shortness of breath and chest pains, the Certified 

Registered Nurse Practitioner performed an EKG on Thomas which showed that his heart 

was functioning within normal range. Id. at 35. 

 A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with 

“‘deliberate indifference’” to an inmate’s health or safety when the official knows that the 

inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm” and disregards that risk by failing to take 

reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 

1974 (1994). A constitutional violation occurs only when a plaintiff establishes the 

existence of “a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, 

. . . and [that] the official does not respond[] reasonably to the risk’[.]” Marsh v. Butler 

County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001)(en banc), quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 

114 S.Ct. at 1982-1983. To obtain relief, the plaintiff must also present evidence that the 

constitutional violation caused him to suffer an injury. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1014. 

In Farmer, the Court identified both objective and subjective elements necessary to 

establish an Eighth Amendment violation. With respect to the requisite objective elements, 

an inmate must first show “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm . . . exist[ed]. 

Second, once it is established that the official is aware of this substantial risk, the official 

must react to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Marsh, 268 F.3d 1028-

1029. As to the subjective elements, “the official must both be aware of facts from which 

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

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draw the inference. . . . The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual 

‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’ . . . [A]n official’s failure to 

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for 

commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838 (emphasis added); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 

(11th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) (“Proof that the defendant should have 

perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient.”); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 

(11th Cir. 1996) (same). The conduct at issue “must involve more than ordinary lack of 

due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not 

inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel 

and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with 

establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official 

control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) 

(emphasis added). 

To be deliberately indifferent, a defendant must have been “subjectively aware of 

the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have had a ‘“sufficiently culpable state of 

mind.”’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38, 114 S.Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324-25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). . . . Even assuming the 

existence of a serious risk of harm and legal causation, the prison official must be aware of 

specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists - and the prison official must also “draw that inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. “The known risk of injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than 

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a mere possibility before [the responsible official’s] failure to act can constitute deliberate 

indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted). As the foregoing makes clear, “[m]erely negligent [conduct] 

. . . does not justify liability under section 1983.” Id. Pursuant to the aforementioned 

criteria, Thomas is “required to produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of 

serious harm; (2) the defendant[s’] deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation[]” 

in order to survive summary judgment on a claim arising from alleged deliberate 

indifference by the defendants. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 

1995); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838 (To circumvent entry of summary judgment on a 

properly supported motion, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence which 

demonstrates (1) an objectively substantial risk of serious harm; (2) a subjective awareness 

of this risk on the part of the defendant; (3) the defendants responded to such risk in an 

objectively unreasonable manner; and (4) the actions/omissions of the defendants caused 

his injuries); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028-1029 (same). When seeking relief based on 

deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an objectively serious need, an 

objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the 

need and an actual inference of required action from those facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; 

McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official must know of and then 

disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when 

a defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the 

[defendant] must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 

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U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendant must have 

actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore 

known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). 

Furthermore, “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be 

condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

The record before the court demonstrates that Thomas received medical treatment 

for his chest pains, shortness of breath and chronic asthma upon submission of sick call 

requests and at chronic care clinic appointments while confined a Staton. The medical 

records refute Thomas’ allegation that he missed several sick call appointments. 

Specifically, these records establish that Thomas merely had one such appointment 

rescheduled from July 23, 2013 to the following day due to a staffing shortage. With 

respect to the x-ray scheduled for August 1, 2013, the medical records demonstrate that 

health care personnel rescheduled this appointment for August 2, 2013 and Thomas 

underwent the x-ray on this date, the results of which showed unremarkable 

cardiomediastinal structures with well expanded lungs “free of acute infiltrate” and 

“negative for effusion.” Defendants' Exh. C - Doc. No. 20-3 at 25.

Thomas has failed to present any evidence which indicates defendant Parker knew 

Thomas suffered a serious medical need and with this knowledge prevented him access to 

medical treatment. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that the manner in which 

Thomas was provided access to medical treatment created a substantial risk to his health 

or that Parker had knowledge of a substantial risk to Thomas’ health and consciously 

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disregarded such risk. The record is therefore devoid of evidence, significantly probative 

or otherwise, showing that defendant Parker acted with deliberate indifference to Thomas’ 

medical needs. Consequently, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be 

granted in favor of defendant Parker on the deliberate indifference claim presented by 

Thomas. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350; Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564 n.6; Harris, 65 F.3d at 916.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The plaintiff’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

2. The plaintiff’s claims against Louis Boyd and the Alabama Department of 

Corrections be DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s 

claims against defendants Singleton, LaFogg and Parker be GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part as addressed herein. 

4. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s 

claims for monetary damages lodged against defendants Singleton, LaFogg and Parker in

their official capacities be GRANTED and these claims be DISMISSED with prejudice as 

the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from such relief. 

5. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claim of 

deliberate indifference against defendant Parker in his individual capacity be GRANTED 

and this claim be DISMISSED with prejudice.

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6. The motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of defendants Singleton and 

LaFogg with respect to the plaintiff’s claims of excessive force lodged against them in their 

individual capacities be DENIED.

7. This case be set for a jury trial on the plaintiff’s surviving claims of excessive 

force lodged against defendants Singleton and Parker. 

It is further

ORDERED that on or before August 24, 2016, the plaintiff may file objections to 

the Recommendation. The plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or 

general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and 

factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the plaintiff to 

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error 

or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th CIR. R. 3-

1. See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. 

City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 

Done this 10th day of August, 2016

/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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