Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-00954/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-00954-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

BEN LITTLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF ANNISTON, GENE D.

ROBINSON, and HERBERT N.

PALMORE,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:15-CV-954-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This civil action was originally filed on May 5, 2015, in the Circuit Court of

Calhoun County by the Plaintiff, Ben Little, against the following Defendants: the

City of Anniston, Alabama (“the City”); Gene D. Robinson, in his official capacity

as the mayor of Anniston, Alabama; and Herbert N. Palmore, in his official capacity

as a member of the City Council of Anniston, Alabama.1 The Complaint sets out

claims for “racial discrimination” under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (Count One),

1

 How the individual defendants are sued (i.e. in their official or individual capacities) is

confusingly stated in the caption of the Complaint which names Robinson “individually as

former mayor [of the City Anniston],” and Palmore “individually as former member of the

Anniston City Council.” (Doc. 1-3 at 2). The caption also includes the line “and their successors

in office.” (Doc. 1-3 at 2). Paragraph 3 of the body of the Complaint seems to resolve all doubt

when it states that “Defendants are all sued in their official capacities.” (Doc. 1-3 at 3). Thus,

the Court treats the individual defendants as sued in their official capacities only.

FILED

 2016 Dec-22 AM 09:36

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 1 of 25
and “breach of implied contract” under Alabama law (Count Two). Both counts arise

out of two lawsuits filed against the Plaintiff while he was a member of the Anniston

City Council and the City’s failure to pay the Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees incurred in

defending those proceedings.

The case comes before the Court on the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (doc. 16), and motion to strike certain evidence proffered by the Plaintiff

in opposition to the motion (doc. 19). For the reasons stated herein, the motion to

strike will be GRANTED, and the motion for summary judgment will be

GRANTED. 

I. THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE (DOC. 19)

In the motion to strike the Defendants write:

In the Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, the Plaintiff relied upon six evidentiary submissions which

were not previously produced or identified, each of which should have

been responsive to Defendants’written discovery requests, as well asthe

disclosure requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26:

B. Cleo Thomas Email 12/14/11 (D.18-2)

F. Don Hoyt Email 12/16/11 (D.18-6)

J. Ken Smith Email 12/9/11 (D.18-9)

K. Don Hoyt Email (D.18-10)

N. Raymond Johnson Letter to Joel Laird 9/17/14

2

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 2 of 25
(D.18-13)

R. Ben Little Claim for Attorney’s Fees to Ken Smith

1/2/14 (D.18-17)

(Doc. 19 at 3-4). The Plaintiff does not dispute that these documents have always

been under his care, custody, or control. Accordingly, since these documents are

being used by the Plaintiff to support his claims, they fall under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the Plaintiff to produce:

a copy--or a description by category and location--of all documents,

electronically stored information, and tangible thingsthat the disclosing

party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support

its claims or defenses, unlessthe use would be solely for impeachment[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (underlining added). It is undisputed that the Plaintiff

failed to produce or even to identify the requested documents as required by Rule

26(a)2, and never filed a supplemental response identifying or producing those

documents. 

It is also undisputed that the above referenced documents were within the scope

of materials sought by the Defendants in their requests for production.

3 The Plaintiff

2

 In his disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) the Plaintiff wrote only the name and

address of his counsel and failed to describe any documents. (Doc. 19-1 at 4). 

3

 The Defendants state that:

During discovery in this matter, Defendants propounded discovery

requests on Plaintiff, requesting, among other things:

3

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 3 of 25
does not dispute that he did not respond to those requests by producing or identifying

the documents.

4

It is also undisputed that the documents were not produced or

identified as a result of any supplemental production by the Plaintiff. 

Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providesthat “[i]f a party

fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the

party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a

motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is

· Please produce a copy of every document upon which you may

rely or which you may offer into evidence at trial;

· Please produce a copy of each and every document or item in

your, or your attorney’s, possession or control which you believe

supports or evidences your claims or allegations;

· Please produce a copy of each and every document or item in

your, or your attorney’s possession, or control which disproves or

controverts any defenses of the Defendants;

· Please identify all correspondence, electronic mail, documents,

notes, and/or memorandums, whether in either written form or

electronic data, between you and the named Defendants regarding

the facts made the basis of your complaint. Please produce a copy

of each correspondence as part of your response to this

interrogatory.

(Doc. 19 at 2-3; see also, doc. 19-2 at 5, ¶15; at 6, ¶¶2, 4; at 7 ¶5).

4

 To each request the Plaintiff responded only with “Plaintiff will respond to this request

based on the Court’s pre-trial order.” (Doc. 19-2 at 5, ¶15; at 6, ¶¶2, 4; at 7 ¶5).

4

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 4 of 25
harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (emphasis added).5

“The burden of establishing

that a failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless rests on the

nondisclosing party.” Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 318 F. App'x 821, 824 (11th Cir.

2009) (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).6

 

Although a number of courts have articulated a standard for determining

whether a failure to disclose was “substantially justified,” the Eleventh Circuit has

not. However, many district courts within this circuit have adopted the approach that

a failure to disclose is “substantially justified” when there is a “justification to a

degree that could satisfy a reasonable person that parties could differ as to whether

5

 As noted, the Plaintiff also failed to produce or identify the subject documents in

response to a request for inspection under Rule 34. Under Rule 37(d), a district court may

sanction a party who fails to serve a “written response” to a request for inspection submitted

under Rule 34. Even if a response is filed, that is not always enough to insulate the Plaintiff from

a Rule 37(d) sanction. See OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344,

1367 (11th Cir. 2008) (“under appropriate circumstances, evasive and incomplete answers to

interrogatories are tantamount to no answers at all”); In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d

627, 638 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.1981) (same). One appropriate sanction mentioned in Rule 37 is

“prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or

from introducing designated matters in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). However, in

this case the Defendants do not seek relief under Rule 37(d). Accordingly, the Court analyzes the

motion only under Rule 37(c)(1).

6

 Both parties cite Bearint ex rel. Bearint v. Dorell Juvenile Grp., Inc., 389 F.3d 1339,

1353 (11th Cir. 2004), as purportedly setting out the standard applicable when ruling on a motion

to strike. (See doc. 19 at 4; doc. 21 at 3). However, Bearint dealt with a district court’s

exclusion of a witness from testifying at trial when that witness was not listed on the pre-trial

order. See, Bearint, 389 F.3d at 1353 (“We review a district court's exclusion of a witness not

listed on the pretrial order for abuse of discretion, and consider: (1) the importance of the

testimony; (2) the reason for the appellant's failure to disclose the witness earlier; and (3) the

prejudice to the opposing party if the witness had been allowed to testify.”). 

5

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 5 of 25
the party was required to comply with the disclosure request.” See, e.g., Longhini v.

W. 97 Corp., No. 1:15-CV-22874-UU, 2016 WL 3671870, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 11,

2016) (Ungaro, J.); REX D. HILL, Plaintiff, v. ALLIANZ LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Defendant., No. 614CV950ORL41KRS, 2016

WL 7228748, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2016) (Mendoza, J.); Graf v. Morgan, No.

CIV.A. 11-0064-CG-N, 2012 WL 869004, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 13, 2012) (Granade,

J.); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, No. CV 408-194, 2011 WL 321782, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Jan.

28, 2011) (Hall, J.); Smith v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp., Inc., No. 4:06CV496-WS, 2008 WL

4194521, at *12 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2008) (Stafford, J.); Herndon v. Tippets, No.

CIV.A. 04-PWG-1026-E, 2005 WL 6736112, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 16, 2005)

(Greene, M.J.); Bosch v. Title Max, Inc., No. CIV A 03-AR-0463-S, 2004 WL

5238128, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 25, 2004) (Acker, J.); Chapple v. Alabama, 174

F.R.D. 698, 701 (M.D.Ala.1997) (Carroll, M.J.). The EleventhCircuit has articulated

thissame approach with regardsto sanctions under Rule 37(a) and (b). See, Devaney

v. Cont'l Am. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing and quoting

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490

(1988)) (“The Supreme Court has clarified that an individual's discovery conduct

should be found ‘substantially justified’ under Rule 37 if it is a response to a ‘genuine

dispute, or if reasonable people could differ asto the appropriateness of the contested

6

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 6 of 25
action.’”). In light of the Devaney opinion, and the district court decisions which have

already adopted this approach, the Court is persuaded to follow suit. 

The Eleventh Circuit has also not explained what “harmless” means in the

context of Rule 27(c)(1). Again, though, the recent trend among district courtsin this

circuit isto hold that failure to comply with the mandate of the rule is harmless “when

there is no prejudice to the party entitled to the disclosure.” Coleman v. Home Depot

U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-21555-UU, 2016 WL 4543120, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21,

2016) (Ungaro, J.); see also, Lee-Bolton v. Koppers Inc., No.

1:10-CV-253-MCR-GRJ, 2015WL 11110547, at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 28, 2015) (Jones,

J.); Witt v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. CV-11-S-1031-NW, 2013 WL 832152,

at *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2013) (Smith, J.); Ripps v. Powers, No. CIV.A.

07-0832-CG-B, 2010 WL 3339514, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2010) (Granade, J.);

Ellison v. Windt, No. 6:99-CV-1268-ORLKRS, 2001 WL 118617, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

Jan. 24, 2001) (Spaulding, M.J.); Chapple, 174 F.R.D. at 701. The Court is

persuaded that this approach is also proper. The Plaintiff fails to set out or argue any

of the above standards, and therefore failsto satisfy his burden. For that reason alone,

the motion to strike is due to be granted. Further, as shown below, the arguments

which are made fail to show how his failure was substantially justified or harmless.

First, the Plaintiff makes no argument whatsoever as to exhibits N and R. The

7

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 7 of 25
motion to strike will be granted as to those two exhibits. As to the remaining

exhibits, he argues: 

Plaintiff’s Exhibits B [sic] is an email sent from Cleo Thomas to

Ken Smith on December 14, 2011, which was copied to Plaintiff Ben

Little and to Defendants Robinson and Palmore. Plaintiff’s Exhibit F is

an email sent from Cleo Thomas to Don Hoyt on December 14, 2011

and was copied to the Plaintiff and to Defendants Palmore and

Robinson. Plaintiff’s Exhibit K is an email that was sent from Don Hoyt

to Plaintiff and Defendants Palmore and Robinson on December 16,

2011. These exhibits were readily available to the Defendant, and the

Plaintiff was substantially justified in producing them in response to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. 21 at 2) (italics and underlining in original). The Plaintiff cites no authority,

and this Court has found none, for the proposition that a party is justified in failing

to produce or identify a document in Rule 26(a) merely because that document was

already in the possession of an opposing party.

Nor does the above argument demonstrate lack of prejudice. In making this

argument, the Plaintiff confusesthe Defendants’ knowledge that the documents exist

with their knowledge that the documents may be used to support a claim of the

Plaintiff. The fact that the Defendants possessed the documents imputes knowledge

of the former, but not necessarily the latter. The purpose of requiring the Plaintiff to

at least identify these documents as part of his initial disclosures is to avoid surprise

and minimize prejudice. Cash v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 474,

8

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 8 of 25
477 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (citing Reed v. Iowa Marine & Repair Corp., 16 F.3d 82, 85

(5th Cir.1994); Smith v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 877 F.2d 1106, 1111

(1st Cir.1989)); King v. City of Waycross, Georgia, No. CV 5:14-CV-32, 2015 WL

5468646, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2015). The Plaintiff’s failure to identify and

produce these documents, even if they were in the possession of the Defendants, runs

afoul of this purpose. If they had been produced or identified, the Defendants would

have had the opportunity for further investigation, preparation, and discovery with

regards to the Plaintiff’s anticipated use of these documents. The Plaintiff has failed

to show how the failure to identify or produce these documents, even if they were in

the possession of the Defendants, did not prejudice them.

7 The motion to strike will

be granted as to exhibits B, F, and K.

The Plaintiff next argues:

With respect to Exhibit J the Defendant claims that Ken Smith was

never disclosed in Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendants’ Written

Discovery. However, Plaintiff’sresponse to Defendants’Exhibit 2. #16.

Plaintiff identifies Ken Smith as having knowledge of assurances that

Plaintiff’s legal fees would be paid. Defendants knew that Ken Smith

could have evidence that could be presented in this case. 

(Doc. 21 at 2-3). Actually, the Defendants argue that the Ken Smith email was not

produced or identified pursuant to Rule 26(a). Whether or not Smith had

7

 Again, the burden is on the Plaintiff to demonstrate a lack of prejudice.

9

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 9 of 25
“knowledge” pertinent to the issues in this case is irrelevant.

Finally, the Plaintiff argues:

The Defendants are not prejudiced by presenting these exhibits the

failure of the Plaintiff to disclose these documents emails. The

information contained in the emails was also discussed in the deposition.

(D.16-1 Ex. 1Pg. 65-66).

(Doc. 21 at 3). Again, whether or not the emails were “discussed,” whatever that

means in this context, has no bearing on whether they were identified as documents

the Plaintiff would use to support his claim. Further, this underdeveloped and vague

argument does not meet the Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the Defendants

were not prejudiced as a result of the Plaintiff’s failure to produce or identify these

documents.

The Plaintiff having failed to carry his burden to show that his failure to

disclose the documentsin question wassubstantially justified or harmless, the motion

to strike will be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Exhibits B, F, J, K, N, and R, and all

references and argument pertaining thereto (see doc. 18 at 10, 13-14), will be

STRICKEN. 

II. FACTS

The following facts have been proffered by the Defendants and have been

admitted by the Plaintiff:

10

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 10 of 25
1. Ben Little (“Little”) was elected to the City of Anniston City

Council in August 2000 and served until approximately November 5,

2012. (Deposition of Ben Little. (D. 16-1/p. 10-11). 

2. On November 21, 2011, the Fraternal Order of Police and

multiple individualsfiled a state lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Calhoun

County (CV-2011-000341) against Councilman Little and former

Councilman John Spain (“Spain”), a Caucasian man, alleging abuse of

process, defamation,intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrage,

and negligence/recklessness and/or wantonness, and seeking a

declaratory judgment and other injunctive relief (hereinafter, the "F.O.P.

lawsuit")(D. 16-1/p. 67/Ex. 2).

3. The plaintiffsin the F.O.P. lawsuit allege[d]that Little and Spain:

...carried out a plan, scheme and intentional and continual

pattern and practice of harassment, intimidation, bullying,

defamation, negligence, recklessness, wantonness and

malice toward and against the Plaintiffs, sometimes in

violation of Alabama law and contrary to their oath of

office, creating a hostile work environment for Plaintiffs,

and placing Plaintiffs, and the community, in risk of

extraordinary and unnecessary harm and danger. 

Defendants have deliberately and falsely painted Plaintiffs

in a false light and made every attempt possible to turn the

individuals whomthe Plaintiffs have taken a vowto protect

and serve against the Plaintiffs. By falsely promoting

distrust of Plaintiffs, with absolutely no basis, and

attempting to turn the community against the Plaintiffs,

Defendants actions have made the Plaintiffs already

difficult and dangerous job even more difficult and

dangerous, exposing Plaintiffsto extreme and unnecessary

danger and causing undue burden and emotional distressto

Plaintiffs.

(Id.)

11

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 11 of 25
4. Little hired attorneys Raymond Johnson and Lawrence Cooper to

represent him in the defense of the FOP lawsuit. (D. 16-1/pp. 27-28).

5. At the December 13, 2011 City of Anniston Council meeting,

Little made a motion to add to the agenda a motion concerning paying

legal fees for him and John Spain in the FOP lawsuit. The motion

carried. (D.16-1/ Ex. 10).

6. When that agenda itemwasreached, Cleo Thomas, City Attorney,

stated that Little could neither make nor vote on this motion, and asked

if there was a motion forthcoming. (Id.)

7. No councilmember made a motion concerning the attorney’s fees

in the matter against Council Member Little and Council Member

Spain[].

8

8. On December 21, 2011, the City'sinsurer, the Alabama Municipal

Insurance Corporation (“AMIC”) filed a complaint for Declaratory

Judgment against Ben Little and John Spain in the Circuit Court of

Calhoun County, Alabama (CV-2011-900549)("Declaratory Action"),

seeking a determination that the alleged actions of the defendants were

not covered by the City's insurance policy. The City of Anniston was

not named as a party in the Declaratory Action.

9

 (D.16-1/Ex. 5).

9. At the December 27, 2011 City of Anniston Council meeting,

Little made a motion to approve for the City to defend against the

Declaratory Action. The motion wasseconded by Mayor Robinson, and

the vote failed with Council Member Little casting the only vote in

favor. (D.16-1/p.58/ Ex. 11).

10. Little failed to respond to the Declaratory Action, and, on July 3,

2012, the court entered a default judgment in favor of AMIC.

8

 The original version of fact number 7 included the language “and the motion failed.” 

This is the only part of the fact which the Plaintiff disputes. (See doc. 18 at 6, ¶7 (“No motion

was made so it could not fail.”)). 

9

 Also sometimes referred to in this opinion as the AMIC lawsuit.

12

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 12 of 25
(D.16-1/Ex.7).

11. On November 24, 2014, the court in the FOP lawsuit dismissed

the claims against Defendant Little with prejudice, but held the case

open to address the issue of Little's contention that the City of Anniston

should be responsible for paying his legal expenses in that case, stating

as follows:

This case shall remain open for the issue of payment of

legal fees of the Defendants. For that reason, the city of

Anniston is joined in this case under Rule 19, Alabama

Rules of Civil Procedure. It will be the responsibility of

the Defendant, Benjamin Little, to insure service on the

city of Anniston as well as his claim regarding the city's

responsibility of paying his accrued legal expenses in this

case. Failure to timely accomplish this willresult in waiver

of that claim.

 (D. 16-2/p. 4).

12. Little filed a “Notice of Claim” with the City Clerk on December

3, 2014,but never filed a legal pleading asserting a claimagainst the City

in the FOP lawsuit for the payment of his attorney’sfeesrequested in his

Notice of Claim. (D.16-2; D.16-1/Ex. 3/¶ 4).10

13. On May 5, 2015, the court in the FOP lawsuit filed an Order, in

response to the City's Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Motion for

Default Judgment, stating that Defendants Little and Spain must file a

separate action solely against the City of Anniston rather than through

the FOP lawsuit. (D.16-1/Ex. 4).

16. On May 5, 2015, Little filed the present lawsuit against the City

10

 Although this fact is technically “disputed” by the Plaintiff, his “dispute” does not

seem to disagree with the fact as stated. (See, doc. 18 at 7, ¶12 (“In the hearing on November 24,

2014[,] the [C]ourt ordered the City of Anniston joined in the lawsuit and did not direct the

Plaintiff to file an additional pleading against the City.”)). 

13

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 13 of 25
of Anniston, Gene Robinson, former Anniston Mayor, and Herbert

Palmore, former member of Anniston City Council, in the Circuit Court

of Calhoun County, Alabama. (D. 16-1/Ex. 1).

17. On June 5, 2015, this case was removed to this Court, and

Plaintiff's Motion for Remand was denied on July 13, 2015. (D.1; D.6).

18. Mayor Robinson has notserved as Mayor for the City of Anniston

since November 2012. (D.16-3/p. 12).

19. Council Member Palmore has not served as a City Council

Member for the City since the end of 2012. (D. 16-4/pp. 17, 18).

(Doc. 17 at 2-6).11

III. ANALYSIS

11

 The Plaintiff proffered six facts, none of which included an evidentiary citation to the

record. (Doc. 18 at 8-9, ¶¶20-25). This Court’s Uniform Initial Order provides:

The third section [of the non-movant’s brief] may contain additional, allegedly

disputed facts set out in separately numbered paragraphs that the opposing party

contends require the denial of summary judgment. The third section of the

opposing party’s statement of facts, if any, shall be clearly designated as such.

Each statement of allegedly disputed facts must be followed by specific reference

to those portions of the evidentiary record which both support and contradict the

alleged fact. 

(Doc. 2 at 18) (italics in original). The Uniform Initial Order also provides: “The court reserves

the right sua sponte to STRIKE any statements of fact or responsive statements that fail to

comply with these requirements.” (Doc. 2 at 19) (emphasis in original). Because the Plaintiff

has failed to include a citation to the record in support of any of his proffered facts, these facts

are hereby STRICKEN and will not be considered by the Court.

Further, proffered fact number 21 references the December 16, 2011, Hoyt email which,

as noted above, will be stricken. For that reason as well, the fact will not be included.

14

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 14 of 25
A. Summary Judgment Is Appropriate as to the Claims Against

Robinson and Palmore

Because Robinson and Palmore are sued only in their official capacities, the

section 1983 claims against them are essentially suits against the City of Anniston. 

Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991); see also, Penley v.

Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 854 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Official-capacity suits ... generally

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent.”) (citation omitted); Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th

Cir. 2009) (“A claim asserted against an individual in his or her official capacity is,

in reality, a suit against the entity that employs the individual.”) (citation omitted);

Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessler v. Sheriff of Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115

(11th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be

treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for

the real party in interest is the entity.”) (citation omitted); Brown v. Neumann, 188

F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We start with the proposition that a suit against

a governmental official in his official capacity is deemed a suit against the entity that

he represents.”). For that reason, summary judgment will be granted asto the section

1983 claims (Count One) against Robinson and Palmore.

The same theory applies as to the state law claim in Count Two. As Judge

15

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 15 of 25
Steele, in the Southern District of Alabama has noted:

The Alabama Supreme Court has recognized that, just as claims against

county commissioners in their official capacities constitute claims

against the county, “claims that are brought against municipal

employees in their official capacity are also, as a matter of law, claims

against the municipality.” Morrow v. Caldwell, 153 So.3d 764, 771

(Ala. 2014); see also Alabama Mun. Ins. Corp. v. Allen, 164 So.3d 568,

576 (Ala. 2014) (same); Ex parte Labbe, 156 So.3d 368, 374 (Ala. 2014)

(“the claims asserted against Mayor Labbe in his official capacity are

simply claims asserted against the City”); Dickinson v. City of

Huntsville, 822 So.2d 411, 415 (Ala. 2001) (reasoning that a mayor is

“in her official capacity, within the line and scope of her office, the

agent of the City, through whom the City acts. Thus, to sue the mayor

in her official capacity is simply another way of suing the City.”)

(emphasis added).

Raby v. Reese, No. CV 15-0159-WS-C, 2016 WL 1642677, at *9 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 25,

2016) (Steele, J.). Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted asto the state law

breach of implied contract claim (Count Two) against Robinson and Palmore..12

B. Summary Judgment Is Appropriate as to the Claims Against the

City of Anniston

1. The Section 1983 Claim in Count One

Count One allegesthat Little’srequest that the City pay his attorney’sfees was

12

 Because the individual defendants are sued only in their official capacities, there is no

need to review their qualified immunity arguments. (Doc. 17 at 16). See, Fish v. Brown, 838

F.3d 1153, 1162 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects governmental

officials who are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages in their personal, or

individual, capacities[.]”).

16

Case 1:15-cv-00954-VEH Document 22 Filed 12/22/16 Page 16 of 25
denied, because he is an African American, in violation of the equal protection clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The claim is based

on two separate requests to pay fees associated with two separate suits–the FOP

lawsuit and the AMIC lawsuit. 

a. The Statute of Limitations as to These Claims Has Run

The Eleventh Circuit has noted that “[a]ll constitutional claims brought under

§ 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury

actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515

F.3d 1168, 1173 (11thCir. 2008) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275–76, 105

S.Ct. 1938, 1946–47, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). Because this claim was brought in

Alabama, the two-year statute limitationsfound in Ala. Code § 6-2-38 applies. Jones

v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989). However,

federal law determines the date on which the statute of limitations

begins to run, and for a § 1983 action the statute begins to run from the

date “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or

should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his

rights.” Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261

(11th Cir.2003). While a plaintiff must have “a complete and present

cause of action” to bring suit, the “cause of action accrues even though

the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable” once the

wrongful act occurs. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 391, 127 S.Ct.

1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007).

Allen v. Dekalb Cty. Jail's Med. Providers/Private Contractors, 632 F. App'x 593,

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594 (11th Cir. 2016).

Little makes no argument that the section 1983 claim, to the extent that it is

based upon Little’s request for payment of attorney’s fees in connection with the

AMIC lawsuit, is timely.

13 Regardless, that claim accrued, and the statute of

limitations began to run, on December 27, 2011, when Little made a motion before

the council for those fees to be paid, and the motion failed. At that point “the facts

which would support a cause of action [were] apparent,” or they should have been

apparent “to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Brown, 335

F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir.2003). Because this case was not filed until May 5, 2015,

well more than two years after the statute of limitations began to run on that claim,

it is untimely and due to be dismissed. 

The statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim for fees related to the FOP

litigation began to run on December 13, 2011. That was the date that Little asked for

the issue to be added to the council’s agenda, and it was, but ultimately no motion

13

 It appears that the Plaintiff may have recognized the futility of doing so. In his brief he

seems to limit his section 1983 claim to only the FOP lawsuit, writing:

The FOP Lawsuit was directed specifically at Little. The fact that Spain was

named was secondary to the FOP’s efforts to disgrace, humiliate and destroy

Little’s personal and political life. This §1983 claim is brought against the City for

discriminating against Little by not acting to pay his attorney’s fees in the lawsuit.

(Doc. 18 at 15).

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was made as to that agenda item. Little argues, without authority, that the fact that

“no vote was ever taken” (doc. 18 at 15) means that the statute did not begin to run

on that date. This argument is without merit. The fact that the matter was before the

council and it refused to approve his request should have been enough for “a person

with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Brown, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th

Cir.2003).14 Likewise, just because the state court “held the case open to address the

issue of Little’s contention that the City of Anniston should be responsible for paying

his legal expenses in that case” (doc. 18 at 15-16), does not mean that the city’s

earlier failure to approve fees should not have put him on notice that he had a claim. 

Little has offered no authority to the contrary, and the Court is aware of none. 

More than two years having passed since the council meeting on December 13,

2011, the section 1983 claim, to the extent it is based on the request for payment of

attorney’s fees in connection with the FOP litigation, is untimely, and summary

judgment is appropriate on that claim.

b. There Is No Evidence that the City Had a Policy or

Custom of Race Discrimination

The Supreme Court has explained:

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:

14

 There is no evidence that the issue was tabled for another meeting or otherwise

continued. Notably, Little never suggests when, if ever, the statute began, or will begin, to run.

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“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunitiessecured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress ....”

A municipality or other local government may be liable under this

section if the governmental body itself “subjects” a person to a

deprivation of rights or “causes” a person “to be subjected” to such

deprivation. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). But, under § 1983,

local governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts.”

Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d

452 (1986) (citing Monell, 436 U.S., at 665–683, 98 S.Ct. 2018). They

are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' actions. See

id., at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Canton, 489 U.S., at 392, 109 S.Ct. 1197;

Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct.

1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (collecting cases).

Plaintiffs who seek to impose liabilityon local governments under

§ 1983 must prove that “action pursuant to official municipal policy”

caused their injury. Monell, 436 U.S., at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see id., at

694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Official municipal policy includes the decisions of

a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and

practicesso persistent and widespread asto practically have the force of

law. See ibid.; Pembaur, supra, at 480–481, 106 S.Ct. 1292; Adickes v.

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–168, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d

142 (1970). These are “action[s] for which the municipality is actually

responsible.” Pembaur, supra, at 479–480, 106 S.Ct. 1292.

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60–61, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1358–59, 179 L. Ed. 2d

417 (2011).

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The Plaintiff does not set out, or explain, what “official municipal policy”

caused hisinjury in this case. While the Plaintiff’s brief does briefly discuss “policies

or procedures” with regard to “determining whether or not a city officialshould have

his attorney fees paid” (doc. 18 at 12),15

he does not do so in the context of showing

15

 The Plaintiff argues:

In his deposition statement Councilman Herbert Palmore was asked if

there were any policies or procedures that are followed in determining whether or

not a city official should have his attorney fees paid if sued in his official capacity.

Mr. Palmore stated that; “...you have to be in an official capacity, operating under

your position as the authorities you have. If you are operating officially and on an

honest capacity – you should be paid.” He agreed there would be an expectation of

those attorney fees being paid. (Exhibit E. Herbert Palmore Depo. pp 24-26)[.]

(Doc. 11-12). The Plaintiff continues:

However, when asked why the council would not consider paying

Councilor Little’s attorney fees, Mayor Gene Robinson stated; “ Because I didn’t

believe that Spain or Reverend Little needed the money to go forward. That I took

on all my lawsuits myself. I paid for all my lawsuits, and they shouldn’t go and

waste the city money like that. That’s just the way I felt.” (Exhibit F . Gene

Robinson Depo. pp 31-32)[.]

The law provided for the City to pay to defend a councilor sued in his

official capacity, but the mayor felt it was a waste of money. However, we believe

that it all depended on who the particular city council member was. When asked

wasn’t it the practice for the city to pay the legal fees for council members and

elected officials and employees sued for performing the functions of their job,

Mayor Robinson stated, “Not necessarily. It all depends on the individual

case.”(Exhibit G. Herbert Palmore Depo. pp 45-56)[.]

(Doc. 12 at 18) (emphasis in original). Nothing about these paragraphs establishes a custom or

practice of the City of discriminating against African American city councilmen in the failure to

pay legal fees. Notably, the City took the same position regarding the legal fees of Spain, who is

Caucasian.

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that the City had a custom or practice of discrimination. He does not explain how

those procedures led to the alleged discrimination in this case. 

The Plaintiff also has not alleged conduct which establishes a practice of the

City. In his Complaint, he alleges that the City had paid the legal fees “for similarly

situated white councilors.” (Doc. 1-3 at 7). However, the Plaintiff hasidentified only

two lawsuits, one in 2006, and one in 2014, in which he alleges the City has paid the

fees of Caucasian members of the City counsel. Even if the Court were to consider

such allegations evidence, and it does not, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (requiring

parties to cite to evidence to support factual positions), two lawsuits over eight years

does not establish a “practice” or “custom.”

16

 

c. There Is No Evidence of Disparate Treatment

With regardsto claimsfor race discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit hasstated:

To state a § 1983 equal protection claim, [a] plaintiff . . . mustshow that

she is similarly situated to non-[African Americans] who received more

favorable treatment. See Sweet v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311,

1318–19 (11th Cir.2006) (“To establish an equal protection claim, a

[plaintiff] must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to [others]

who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in

invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national

origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis.”); Jones v. Ray,

279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir.2001) (stating that, to establish an equal

protection violation, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that “he

16

 In his deposition the Plaintiff merely stated that “a lot of lawsuits have been paid.” 

(Doc. 16-1 at 19(71)). 

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is similarly situated” to others who received more favorable treatment).

Douglas Energy Relief Ass'n v. City of Douglas, Ga., 556 F. App'x 820, 822 (11th

Cir. 2014). The Plaintiff fails to argue, or even cite, this standard. Further, even if

the Court were to consider the allegations in his Complaint to be evidence of

disparate treatment, and it does not, the Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the

Caucasian council-members whose fees were allegedly paid were similarly situated

to the Plaintiff in all relevant respects. See, Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d

1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). There is no discussion of evidence of the nature of

those other suits compared to the FOP lawsuit and the AMIC lawsuit.

2. The Implied Contract Claim in Count Two

In Count Two, the Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he Defendants have breached their

established policy, as well as their implied contract, by failing to reimburse Little

[for] the fees and expenses he incurred in defendant against the FOP lawsuit.” (Doc.

1-3 at 8). 

The Alabama Supreme Court has stated:

“The basic elements of a contract are an offer and an acceptance,

consideration, and mutual assent to the essential terms of the

agreement.” Hargrove v. Tree of Life Christian Day Care Ctr., 699

So.2d 1242, 1247 (Ala.1997). Proof of an implied contract requires the

same basic elements as an express contract. Steiger v. Huntsville City

Bd. of Educ., 653 So.2d 975, 978 (Ala.1995)(explaining that “[n]o

contract is formed without an offer, an acceptance, consideration, and

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mutual assent to terms essential to the contract” (citing Strength v.

Alabama Dep't of Fin., 622 So.2d 1283, 1289 (Ala.1993))).

Stacey v. Peed, 142 So. 3d 529, 531 (Ala. 2013). The Defendants argue that there is

no evidence of any implied contract. In response, the Plaintiff fails to cite or argue

these elements. Instead he writes:

There was no valid reason given to support why the City has not

voted to pay attorney’s fees for Little in the FOP lawsuit. However, the

City hasin the past paid legal expensesfor other city officials defending

lawsuits against them in their official capacity. The City of Anniston

paid attorney fees for Councilor Herbert Palmore when he was sued in

a lawsuit with the Joint Power Authority (“JPA”). And, according to

Councilor Palmore, legal fees were also paid by AMIC for Anniston

City Council member Jeff Fink in 2006 sued in his official capacity.

(Exhibit O. Palmore Depo. pp 18-22) I am certain their [sic] are others,

however we have not been privy to those records. But as Mayor

Robinson said, it depends on the individual situation. Councilor Palmore

agreed in his deposition, “if a councilor is sued in his official capacity,

operating under his authority, there would be an expectation those

attorney’s fees would be paid. (Exhibit D. Herbert Palmore Deposition

pp. 24-26)[.]

(Doc. 18 at 16-17). The Plaintiff fails to provide any evidentiary support for any of

the elements of a breach of implied contract claim. Summary judgment is therefore

appropriate on that claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Defendants’ motion to strike and motion for

summary judgment will be GRANTED, and this case will be DISMISSED.

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DONE this 22nd day of December, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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