Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01952/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01952-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VANTRAE GREGORY,

CDCR #C-85909,

Civil No. 11-CV-1952 WQH (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE 

DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)

vs.

DOMINGO URIBE, Jr.; J.J. DENAULT;

L. VALENZUELA; J. SAIS;

A. HERNANDEZ; CALDERON; 

JACKSON; CASTILLO 

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On August 5, 2011, Plaintiff, VanTrae Gregory, a state prisoner currently incarcerated

at California State Prison located in Lancaster, California and proceeding pro se, filed a civil

rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleged that his due process rights

were violated when he was housed at Centinela State Prison in 2009 and 2010. Plaintiff has not

prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 4].

On October 12, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but sua sponte

dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b). On December 1, 2011, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

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II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the Court to review complaints

filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained

in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). 

Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any

portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

A. Constitutional Claims

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Application to Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him due process during two separate disciplinary

hearings and as a result, Plaintiff lost thirty (30) days of good time credits and was placed in

Administrative Segregation. (See FAC at 6-8.) As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s claims must be

dismissed because they are premature under the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Constitutional claims involving a prison’s disciplinary or

administrative decisions to revoke good-time credits are subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) since habeas corpus is the exclusive federal

remedy whenever the claim for damages depends on a determination that a disciplinary judgment

is invalid or the sentence currently being served is unconstitutionally long. Edwards v. Balisok,

520 U.S. 641, 643-44 (1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500

(1973). 

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In order to state a claim for damages under section 1983 based on these allegations under

Heck and Edwards, Plaintiff must allege facts in his First Amended Complaint sufficient to show

that Defendants’ decision to remove his credits has already been “reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a

determination, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. 

Plaintiff has failed to do this. Therefore he must sufficiently amend his First Amended

Complaint to provide such a showing before any cause of action for damages accrues under the

Civil Rights Act. Id.

Even if Plaintiff were able to overcome the Heck bar, he has failed to state a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim. “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and

property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison

regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly

limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and

significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations

omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of disciplinary conviction which show “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus

discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s

confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when

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compared to those shared by prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of

whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Administrative Segregation, and thus, has failed

to state a due process claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515

U.S. at 486 (holding that placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not

present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a

liberty interest.”).

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be dismissed

for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b); 1915A(b). 

III. Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45)

days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a Second Amended Complaint

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must

be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. 

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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2. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a Court approved civil

rights complaint form.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 3, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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