Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00947/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00947-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BOBBY BEJARANO, 

Petitioner,

vs. 

KIM HOLLAND, Warden, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 14CV947-LAB(JMA) 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

REQUEST FOR AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

Petitioner Bobby Bejarano (“Petitioner”) has filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Respondent Kim Holland (“Respondent”) has filed an Answer to the Petition. 

(Doc. No. 10.) Petitioner thereafter filed a Traverse. (Doc. No. 19.) The Court, 

having reviewed the Petition, Answer, Traverse, and all the supporting 

documents and lodgments submitted by the parties, hereby recommends that the 

Petition and Request for Evidentiary Hearing be DENIED. 

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FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) at the California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) at 

Tehachapi, California. On June 21, 2012, at approximately 10 a.m., Correctional 

Officer L. Garza was monitoring the morning yard when he observed Petitioner 

and inmate H. Juarez punching inmate R. Romero in the head and upper torso 

area. (Lodgment 3 at 1.) Officer Garza then ordered the yard down and notified 

the yard gun officer and Central Control of a fight via radio. (Id.) As Officer Garza 

was responding with staff, he saw Petitioner and Juarez continue to strike 

Romero in the head and upper torso area. (Id.) Officer Garza gave the three 

inmates a verbal command to stop fighting. (Id.) The inmates complied and 

assumed the prone position. (Id.) Officer Garza placed Romero in restraints and 

proceeded to conduct a clothed body search for weapons and contraband. (Id.) 

When Officer Garza turned Romero onto his side, Officer Garza observed a 

deadly weapon in the dirt area where Romero was lying. (Id.) The weapon was a 

piece of metal inserted inside a pen approximately five inches in length. (Id.) 

Romero sustained two puncture wounds to his left abdomen, one puncture 

wound to his right shoulder and another to his right bicep. (Lodgment 4 at 2.) The 

staff later discovered Petitioner had been wearing a pair of altered state-issued 

shorts that had three pockets sewn on the inside of the shorts. (Lodgment 2 at 7 

of 8.) 

 Correctional Sergeant M. Barra completed a supplemental report, dated 

June 21, 2012, recounting his response to the incident (Id. at 5 of 8.) Sergeant 

Barra’s supplemental report corroborated Officer Garza’s report, stating that 

Officer Garza located the weapon underneath Romero. (Id.) 

 Correctional Officer R. Alvarez authored a crime incident report, dated June 

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21, 2012. (Lodgment 2 at 5 of 8.) Officer Alvarez stated he was informed by radio 

of the assault while performing his duties as Security and Investigations Officer. 

(Id.) Officer Alvarez reported to the Facility “A” Yard #1, where staff advised him 

of the battery on an inmate with a manufactured deadly weapon. (Id.) 

 On July 3, 2012, Petitioner was issued a preliminary copy of the Rules 

Violation Report (“RVR”) for battery on an inmate with a weapon. (Lodgment 3.) 

On July 17, 2012, Petitioner was informed he had been assigned Correctional 

Officer G. Badilla as the investigative employee for the RVR. (Lodgment 5 at 1 of 

2.) 

 The rules violation hearing was held on July 31, 2012. (Lodgment 2 at 2 of 

8.) Correctional Lieutenant J. Sigler was the Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”). (Id.) 

Petitioner stated he had additional questions to give to Officer Badilla. (Id.) The 

SHO obtained the additional questions from Petitioner and postponed the 

hearing. (Id.) On August 2, 2012, the hearing resumed, at which point the SHO 

read the charges to Petitioner. (Id. at 3 of 8.) Petitioner pled not guilty. (Id.) 

Petitioner submitted a handwritten statement by Correctional Officer Jones, in 

which Officer Jones declared no weapon was found underneath Romero. (Id.) 

Petitioner also submitted Romero’s declaration, in which Romero stated there 

was no weapon used during the altercation between Petitioner and Juarez. (Id.) 

Registered Nurse Ortiz, one of Petitioner’s questioned witnesses, stated the 

weapon was “found near [Romero], by the fence.” (Lodgment 5 at 2 of 3.) 

During the SHO’s questioning of Petitioner, he could not explain how 

Romero sustained four puncture wounds during the altercation. Instead, 

Petitioner stated Romero “may have already had them.” (Id. at 4 of 8.) During the 

questioning, Petitioner also admitted to the act of “Battery” on Romero. (Id.) 

The SHO found Petitioner guilty of violating California Code of Regulations, 

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Title 15, §3005(d)(1) for the specific act of battery on an inmate with a weapon. 

(Id.) In reaching this decision, the SHO relied on the following “preponderance of 

evidence submitted at the hearing[:]” (1) Officer Garza’s written report of the 

incident; (2) Sergeant Barra’s written report, stating he witnessed the altercation 

and the discovery of the weapon under Romero; (3) the Crime Incident Report 

authored by Correctional Officer R. Alvarez, stating he was advised via radio of 

the assault and discovery of the manufactured deadly weapon; (4) a medical 

report dated June 21, 2012, documenting the four puncture wounds Romero 

sustained in the altercation; and (5) Petitioner’s partial admission of guilt when he 

stated he was guilty of battery. (Id. at 5 of 8.) The SHO found no evidence 

indicating Juarez or Petitioner was in physical possession of the weapon 

recovered in the immediate area of the incident. (Id.) However, based on the 

evidence presented, the SHO stated it was reasonable to believe either 

Petitioner or Juarez was in possession of the weapon recovered from under 

Romero. (Id. at 6 of 8.) The SHO further stated his belief that Petitioner and 

Juarez acted in concert with each other in committing the battery on Romero. 

(Id.) The SHO found no merit in Petitioner’s testimony that Romero’s injuries 

were caused by foreign objects on the ground because the medical staff testified 

the injuries sustained were puncture wounds. (Id. at 7 of 8.) The SHO discredited 

Romero’s declaration denying the use of a weapon during the altercation 

because the weapon, according to documentation, was found under Romero, 

and its location was also identified to the medical staff. (Id.) The SHO noted the 

staff also discovered Petitioner wearing a pair of altered state-issued shorts that 

had three pockets sewn on the inside of the shorts, commonly used by inmates 

to conceal contraband. (Id.) 

Petitioner was assessed one hundred and eighty days forfeiture of good-time 

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credit; ninety days temporary placement in privilege group “C;” ten days loss of 

yard; and referral to the Institutional Classification Committee with the 

recommendation of a Solitary Housing Unit assessment. (Id.) 

Petitioner appealed the guilty finding through the prison’s grievance 

system. On November 30, 2012, Petitioner received notification of a delay in the 

appeal process at the second level by reason of “appeal office backlog.” 

(Lodgment 7.) The extended due date for the second level appeal decision was 

listed as January 14, 2013. (Id.) On January 18, 2013, Petitioner’s appeal was 

denied at the second level of review. (Lodgment 6.) On April 5, 2013, Petitioner’s 

appeal was denied at the third level of grievance review. (Lodgment 8.) Petitioner 

then filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the California courts. (Lodgments 

9, 11 &13.) These petitions were denied at every level of judicial review. 

(Lodgments 10, 12 & 14.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. (Doc. 

No. 1.) 

DISCUSSION 

A. Scope of Review 

The Court may entertain a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A writ of habeas corpus is the sole remedy when a prisoner 

challenges the fact or duration of confinement, and seeks immediate or speedier 

release from that confinement. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974); 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498 (1973). 

 As amended, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) reads: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

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granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphases added). 

For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), clearly established federal law includes 

only “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the U.S. Supreme] Court’s 

decisions.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). A state court 

decision is contrary to clearly established federal law “if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question 

of law...[or] confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at [an opposite result].” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). “A state-court decision that 

correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to 

the facts of a particular prisoner's case certainly would qualify as a decision 

‘involving an unreasonable application of...clearly established Federal 

law.’” Id. at 407-08. A state court decision might also involve an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it 

“unreasonably extend[s] a legal principle from our precedent to a new 

context where it should not apply (or unreasonably refuse[s] to extend a 

legal principle to a new context where it should apply).” See id. at 409. 

A federal habeas court must use an objective approach in determining 

whether the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of federal 

law. See Id. “The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes 

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the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was 

unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 

465, 473 (2007). State court factual determinations are presumed to be correct. 

Id. at 473-74 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). However, the petitioner can rebut 

this presumption through “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1)). 

B. The State Court’s Decision 

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the 

Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision. YIst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). Here, because Petitioner’s claims 

were denied by the California Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal in 

unreasoned decisions, this Court will look through to the Imperial County 

Superior Court’s decision. (Lodgment 10.) The Superior Court found Petitioner 

was afforded due process of law because the SHO’s decision was supported by 

some evidence. In doing so, the court observed that a deadly weapon was 

discovered in the immediate area where Petitioner and Juarez were subdued for 

assaulting Romero, who was found with four puncture wounds. Id. Additionally, 

the court noted Petitioner’s shorts had been modified to include pockets where 

he could hide contraband. Id. 

C. Due Process Rights 

Petitioner asserts his due process rights were violated because CRCR’s 

second-level appeal decision was “untimely,” and thus Respondent “waived [its] 

right to respond.” (Doc. No. 19 at 9.) Respondent contends Petitioner was 

afforded all the process that was due, and any alleged violation of the California 

Code of Regulations regarding the timeliness of the processing of Petitioner’s 

second-level appeal does not state a federal question required for habeas review 

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by this Court. 

 Prison disciplinary proceedings may violate a petitioner’s procedural due 

process rights if the petitioner has a protected liberty interest at stake. See 

Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1994). A protected liberty 

interest may arise under the due process clause itself or under the laws of the 

states. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 

(1989). When a state creates a protected liberty interest, “the Due Process 

Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication--and federal courts will review 

the application of those constitutionally required procedures.” Swarthout v. 

Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). Liberty interests “are created and their 

dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 

independent source such as state law -- rules or understandings that secure 

certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Bd. of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566 (1972). 

The Due Process clause accords prisoners the following procedures: (1) 

written notice of the claimed violations; (2) a brief period of time to prepare for the 

hearing; (3) a written statement by the fact finder regarding the facts relied upon 

in reaching the decision and the reasons for disciplinary action; (4) an opportunity 

to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; and (5) an opportunity to 

seek the aid of a fellow inmate or prison staff for complex matters. Wolff, 418 

U.S. at 563-70. Courts grant prison officials “wide-ranging deference in the 

adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are 

needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional 

security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). 

Here, Petitioner argues his due process rights were violated when the 

second-level appeals decision was not rendered in a timely manner. On 

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November 30, 2012, Petitioner received notification of a delay in the appeal 

process, and the due date for the second-level appeal was extended to January 

14, 2013. (Lodgment 7.) On January 18, 2013, Petitioner received notification 

that his appeal was denied at the second level of review. (Lodgment 6.) 

Petitioner argues that because there was such a delay, Respondent has waived 

its right to respond under California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.8(c). 

The Court finds no merit in this argument. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 

that the relevant section of the California Code of Regulations grants him a liberty 

interest protecting him from untimely appeal decisions. To the contrary, a 

prisoner has “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure.” Mann 

v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that 

his due process rights were violated as a result of an untimely appeal decision 

should be denied. 

D. Sufficiency of Evidence

 Petitioner further argues that the state courts have unreasonably applied 

the “some evidence” standard in upholding the CDCR’s charge of battery on an 

inmate with a weapon. Respondent contends the SHO found Petitioner guilty 

based on substantial evidence, which easily meets the “some evidence” 

standard. 

 A prisoner has a protected liberty interest in good time credits when the 

state has created a statutory right to such credits. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. In 

addition to the Wolff requirements, due process requires a showing of “some 

evidence” supporting the decision of the SHO or reviewing official to revoke good 

time credits. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447 

(1985). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record 

that can support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. 

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 The record presents ample evidence supporting the SHO’s decision finding 

Petitioner guilty of battery on an inmate with a weapon. First, the SHO relied on 

Officer Garza’s and Sergeant Barra’s reports, both of which confirmed 

Petitioner’s and Juarez’s assault on Romero and the subsequent discovery of the 

deadly weapon in the immediate vicinity. (Lodgment 2 at 4-5.) Next, Romero’s 

medical report states that he sustained four puncture wounds, including one to 

his bicep area, one to his left upper back, and two to his lower abdomen. 

(Lodgment 2 at 5.) The SHO also considered the fact that Petitioner admitted to 

committing battery. (Lodgment 2 at 3 & 6.) Lastly, prison staff discovered that 

Petitioner had been “wearing a pair of altered state issued shorts that had three 

pockets sewn on the inside of the shorts commonly used by inmates to conceal 

contraband.” (Lodgment 2 at 7.) Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for 

the SHO to conclude that either Petitioner or Juarez was in possession of the 

weapon recovered under Romero. (Lodgment 2 at 6.) 

Petitioner contends there is insufficient evidence to meet the “some 

evidence” standard because there were conflicting reports as to the precise 

location of the weapon and whether the weapon was actually discovered at the 

scene. (Doc. No. 19 at 10.) As for the first contention, any dispute as to the exact 

location (up to five feet in distance) of the weapon is insufficient to undermine the 

SHO’s finding that a weapon was likely in either Petitioner’s or Juarez’s 

possession during the incident. Further, because Officer Garza reported finding 

the deadly weapon underneath Romero and the weapon’s location was identified 

to responding medical staff, it was reasonable for the SHO to discredit Romero’s 

testimony asserting there was no weapon used during the incident or found at 

the scene of the incident. (Lodgment 2 at 7.) Lastly, Officer Jones’s handwritten 

statement to the effect that Officer Garza’s search of Romero did not lead to the 

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discovery of the weapon was documented and considered by the SHO; the SHO 

relied on substantial evidence contrary to Officer Joness’ statement, finding 

Petitioner guilty of battery with a weapon. In sum, the “some evidence” standard 

in Hill was clearly satisfied in light of the evidence presented against Petitioner. 

E. Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner contends an evidentiary hearing should be held, claiming he has 

presented evidence contrary to the SHO’s and state court’s findings. Petitioner 

further alleges he has not been afforded a state court hearing to examine 

evidence that might reduce his charge to a simple battery. 

“A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if: (1) the 

allegations in his petition would, if proved, entitle him to relief; and (2) the state 

court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant 

facts.” Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis 

omitted). “[I]f the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise 

precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary 

hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). 

As discussed above, Petitioner’s allegations do not refute the SHO’s 

findings, which the state court found to be supported by some evidence. 

(Lodgment 10 at 2.) Officer Jones’s statement regarding the absence of a deadly 

weapon at the scene was considered by the SHO. (Lodgment 2 at 3.) Registered 

Nurse Ortiz’s statement regarding the location of the weapon (“near the victim, by 

the fence”) was also considered. (Lodgment 5 at 2 of 3.) Therefore, Petitioner is 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because his arguments were considered by 

the SHO and found to be outweighed by a preponderance of the evidence. 

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CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

RECOMMENDS the petition for writ of habeas corpus and request for an 

evidentiary hearing be DENIED with prejudice. 

This report and recommendation is submitted by the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, section 636(b)(1). 

 IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 31, 2015, any party to this action 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed 

with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 7, 2015. The parties 

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 15, 2015 

 

 _________________________ 

 Jan M. Adler 

 U.S. Magistrate Judge 

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