Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02220/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02220-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1365 Environmental Matters

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FOREST SERVICE EMPLOYEES FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND

INFORMATION CENTER, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-2220 SI 

No. C 05-2227 SI

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

AND VACATING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

On December 9, 2005, the Court heard argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss this case as moot

and to vacate the Court’s June 27, 2005, preliminary injunction. Having carefully considered the parties’

arguments, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART defendant’s motion to

dismiss, and VACATES the preliminary injunction.

BACKGROUND

During the late summer of 2004, the Sims Fire burned approximately 4,030 acres of the Six Rivers

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NationalForest innorthernCalifornia. In January 2005, defendant, the United States Forest Service, proposed

to log some of the trees killed by the fire. After receiving comments fromthe public, the Forest Service issued

a decision memorandum on May 17, 2005, authorizing the Sims Fire Salvage Project in selected areas ofthe

Six Rivers National Forest.

Plaintiffs, Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (“FSEEE”) and the Environmental

Protection and Information Center (“EPIC”), brought suit in early June 2005, seeking an injunctionagainst the

proposed timbersale. Plaintiffs claimed that the sale would result in the logging of 57.31 acres of critical habitat

forthe northern spotted owl, a threatened species, and that the Forest Service had failed to properly conduct

anenvironmentalassessment, asrequired by the NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct(“NEPA”). When plaintiffs

moved for a preliminary injunction, the Forest Service urged the Court to rule quickly, claiming that the salvage

effort could not go forward if it did not begin before June 30, 2005.

In a June 27, 2005, order, this Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and issued a preliminary injunction,

enjoining the Forest Service from awarding a contract for the Sims Fire Salvage Project and from harvesting

any trees pursuant to the May 17, 2005, decision memorandum. On July 15, 2005, the Forest Service

rejected all bids on the timber sale contract for the Sims Fire Salvage Project. Two weeks later, the Forest

Service withdrew its May 17, 2005, decision memorandum that had approved the sale.

The Forest Service now moves to vacate the preliminary injunction, claiming that the case has become

moot because the timbersale is no longer economically feasible. Plaintiffs oppose defendant’s motion, claiming

that defendant’s voluntary abandonment ofthe timbersale does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the

matter.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A case becomes moot whenever it ‘los[es] its character as a present, live controversy ofthe kind that

must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.’” Cantrell v. City of Long

Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S. Ct. 200 (1969)).

When mootness is based upon “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice,” however, federal

courts may continue to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l

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1The Forest Service’s actions are also consistent with its position. When the Forest Service rejected

all bids and withdrew its May 17, 2005, decision memorandum, it explicitly stated that the timber sale would

not be reoffered. July 29, 2005, Decl. of James A. Coda, Exh. 3.

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Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S. Ct. 693, 708 (2000). In such a case, the party asserting

mootness must meet a “heavy burden.” Id. “In accordance with this principle, the standard we have

announced for determining whether a case has been mooted by the defendant’s voluntary conduct is stringent:

‘A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongfulbehavior

could notreasonably be expected to recur.’” Id.(quoting United States v. Concentrated PhosphateExport

Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S. Ct. 361 (1968)).

DISCUSSION

With the exception of FSEEE’s challenge to the Forest Service regulations implemented under the

Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act, the Court finds that there is no longer enough of a

case or controversy to proceed with this litigation. The Court will therefore dismiss plaintiffs’ challenge to

defendant’s proposed timber sale as moot and vacate its preliminary injunction order.

1. Plaintiffs’ Challenge to the Timber Sale

Defendant argues that the case is moot because this Court can no longer grant effective reliefgiventhat

defendant has withdrawn the challenged timber sale and will not reoffer it. In support of this argument,

defendant claims that the timber sale is no longer economically feasible – given the steep terrain, the

deterioration ofthe trees, and the distance to the nearest mill, defendant asserts that the cost oflogging the trees

now exceeds the expected revenue from the timber. This argument is consistent with defendant’s position,

which it has held from the outset of this litigation, that the timber sale would not be possible if logging did not

begin before June 30, 2005.1 Plaintiffs contest defendant’s assertions, and claim that the timber sale still has

some potential economic viability.

Having considered the competingclaims ofthe parties, the Court findsthat defendant has met its burden

of establishing that the timbersale cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.’” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S.

at 189, 120 S. Ct. at 708. Most importantly, even if the timber sale were to retain some economic viability,

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the Forest Service has officially withdrawn its memorandum decision authorizing the sale. Thus, any subsequent

decision to proceed with the sale would need to pass through the administrative process once again. If this

were to occur, the basis forthe decision, and the basis for a challenge to that decision, could change. Indeed,

given changes to Forest Service regulations that have occurred after the Forest Service issued its decision

memorandum, a court reviewing a future sale of the trees covered by this Court’s preliminary injunctionwould

likely face a different lawsuit and administrative record thatwhat this Court has considered. See Earth Island

Institute v. Pengilly, 375 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (finding Forest Service regulations governing

administrative process promulgated under ARA to be invalid and severing regulations).

Putting aside the procedural and regulatory differences that a new Forest Service decision to institute

a new sale would create, the Court finds that it is unreasonable to presume that any such decision would be

reached in the first place. The economic arguments presented by defendant make a compelling case that the

Sims Fire sale is no longer economically feasible. Most convincing to the Court is the evidence defendant has

offered concerning interest in the sale from timber companies. Even before this litigation was commenced, the

timber industry was already encouraging the Forest Service to act quickly, estimating a dramatic declination

in value of the timber should the sale be delayed. This view is documented in a February 15, 2005, letter from

the AmericanForest Resource Council to the Lower Trinity DistrictRanger. Supp. Decl. of Roy E. Bergstrom

in Support of Def. Mot. (“Supp. Bergstrom Decl.”), Exh 3. This letter expressed the view that “there will be

a very short window this next field season to harvest non-stained fire killed timber on this project.” Id. The

letter also anticipated that “[c]ontinued delays . . . could result in a $600,000 to $800,000 reduction in

stumpage receipts.” Id. In addition, only two timber companies bid on the original sale. Before this Court’s

preliminary injunction issued, both of these timber companies shared defendant’s view that after the 2005

season the Sims Fire sale would no longer have enough value to attract bids. Id. at ¶ 14.

Defendant has also argued convincingly that the economic value of the trees will decline dramatically

between 2005 and 2006. Defendant anticipates, based on a 1992 study by E.C. Lowell, that the trees will

have suffered an average 24.5% deterioration in volume as of May 16, 2006, the start of the 2006 operating

season. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. Plaintiff contests this figure, arguing that a 10% deterioration rate is more appropriate

based on a 1996 study by the same author. But defendant consulted with that authorin reaching its conclusion

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that the 1992 study was more appropriate for the characteristics of the Sims Fire than the 1996 study. Id.

Defendant has also presented convincing evidence to the Court that the value of the lumber will decline much

more rapidly than the rate of deterioration suggests. According to defendant, the majority ofthe deterioration

of the trees will occur to the most valuable parts of the tree – the “sapwood” – causing the dead trees to lose

value at a much faster rate than their rate of deterioration. Decl. of Dave Schultz in Support of Def. Mot.

(“Schultz Decl.”), ¶ 11. Consistent with this position, the February 15, 2005, letter from the American Forest

Resource Council argues that delay could cause the quality of lumber to be downgraded from “shop grade”

to “structural grade.” Administrative Record (“AR”) 393-394. Finally, defendant argues that the unique

characteristics ofthe Sims Fire site, including itssteep slopes, limited road access, and distance fromsaw mills,

all reduce the potential value of the salvageable timber. Shultz Decl., ¶ 9.

FSEEE makes two non-economic arguments as to why the timber sale will still be feasible next year.

First, FSEEE pointsto anecdotal evidence of three occasions on which the Forest Service conducted a timber

salvage sale years after a fire had occurred. All three of these occasions occurred after the Biscuit Fire in

southwest Oregon, with the sales taking place two or three years after the fire. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Given that

significant effect that locationcan have on tree deterioration and operating expenses, see Bergstrom Decl., ¶¶

12, 17, 21-22, Schultz Decl., ¶ 7, the Court does not find FSEEE’s anecdotalevidence convincing. Second,

FSEEE notes that the Sims contract did notrequire logging to be completed until March 31, 2007, undermining

defendant’s contention that the sale must be completed as quickly as possible. Id. at ¶ 12. The Court,

however, does not find thatMarch 31, 2007 contract terminationdate to be particularly significant. Defendant

has explained that the termination date did notindicate that logging was likely to occur during 2006; rather, the

date was intended to provide additional time to finish removing logs, should weather or some other obstacle

have prevented the logging from being completed in 2005. See Decl. ofRoger Moore in Support ofDef. Mot.

at ¶¶ 4-5. 

Finally, EPIC brings an additionalreason why the sale could still proceed: the Forest Service’s stated

desire to “set the stage forreforestation” by logging the trees. EPIC Oppo. Br. at 7. The Court finds that this

is not a sufficient reason, giventhat “[t]he proposed reforestation project . . . can, and is expected to, proceed

without the salvage project or the removal of any trees.” Supp. Decl. of Bergstrom in Support of Def. Mot.,

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2Munsingwear concerned a case that became moot after the district court had entered finaljudgment.

Plaintiffs have provided the Court with no reason why vacatur would be less appropriate where a case

becomes moot before a final judgment is entered.

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¶ 23.

Based on the above evidence, the Court findsthat defendant has met its burden of establishing thatthe

timbersale cannotreasonably be expected to recur. Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS plaintiffs’ challenge

to the timber sale as moot.

2. Vacatur of Preliminary Injunction

Given that plaintiffs’ challenge to the Sims Fire Salvage Sale is moot, defendant also moves to vacate

the Court’s June 27, 2005, preliminary injunction. Ordinarily, when a case becomes moot, the appropriate

action is to vacate the judgment and dismiss. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950).2 This

rule is by no means absolute; a Court should dispose of a moot case “in the manner most consonant to justice

in view of the nature and character of the conditions which have caused the case to become moot.” U.S.

Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994) (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted). The primary factorin this analysis is “whether the party seeking relief from the judgment

below caused the mootness by voluntary action.” Id. The public interest is also an important factor. Id. at 26-

27.

Plaintiffs use these principles to argue that the Court’s preliminary injunction should not be vacated

because the defendant’s voluntary action caused this case to become moot. According to plaintiffs, allowing

the defendant’s withdrawal of the decision memorandum to moot this case would permit defendant to

manipulate the Court’s jurisdictionand to avoid having an adverse ruling in existence. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64

F.3d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A dissatisfied litigant should not be allowed to destroy the collateral

consequences of an adverse judgment by destroying his own right to appeal.”).

Despite plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court agrees with defendant that the preliminary injunction should be

vacated. Most importantly, the Court finds that the primary reason that this case has become moot is

“happenstance.” See Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40; U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25 (where review of a ruling

is frustrated by “happenstance,” the adverse party “ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the

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3FSEEE’s amended complaint also challenges the Sims Fire Salvage Project because the Forest

Service relied on the ARA regulations to exempt the project from administrative review. For the reasons

discussed above, this “as applied” challenge to the Forest Service’s action is moot.

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judgment”). As discussed above, this case has become moot through the passage of time and the

corresponding effectonthe economic feasibility ofSims Fire sale. Although defendant may strategically benefit

from the vacatur of this Court’s preliminary injunction, the Court does not believe that defendant is driven

entirely by a desire to “dodge the bullet” of this Court’s prior order. See EPIC Oppo. Br., at 10.

In addition, while the public may have an interest in a court decision on the subject of the Forest

Service’s use of categorical exemptions in its timber sales, the Court does not find that interest particularly

strong in this case. As an initial matter, the Court’s prior order granted only a preliminary injunction. The Court

therefore did not consider the entirety ofplaintiffs’ case on the merits, but was motivated in part out of a desire

to preserve the status quo. Moreover, the preliminary injunction was brought before the Court on an extremely

expedited briefing schedule. Although plaintiffs’ complaints were filed on June 1, 2005, briefing was not

complete on the preliminary injunctionmotion untilJune 20, 2005, and the hearing was held on June 22, 2005.

Thus, the Court had lessthan a week to read the briefing, consider the parties arguments, and review the more

than 3,000 pages of administrative record. Given that the Court’s ruling was not, and was not intended to be,

a comprehensive analysis ofthe arguments presented, the Court finds that the public interest in this case is not

particularly compelling.

The Court finds that no equitable considerations warrant denying defendant’s motion to vacate the

preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court VACATES its preliminary injunction.

3. FSEEE’s Challenge to ARA Regulations

Plaintiff FSEEE’s remainingargumentisthatthis case is notmoot because itstill has pending a challenge

to defendant’s regulationsimplementingthe Forest ServiceDecisionmakingand Appeals ReformAct(“ARA”),

Pub. L. No. 102-381, Title III § 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (1992). FSEEE raised this challenge in its first amended

complaint, which was filed on July 28, 2005, a month after the preliminary injunction issued in this case. The

Court agrees with FSEEE that its challenge to the regulationsis notmoot,3 but STAYS any proceedings related

to this issue pending the resolution of an appeal in a related case in the Ninth Circuit.

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The ARA provides that the Secretary ofAgriculture “shall establish a notice and comment process for

proposed actions of the Forest Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource

management plans.” ARA, Pub. L. No. 102-381, Title III § 322(a). The ARA also provides for a right of

appeal of a Forest Service decision, and for an automatic stay of Forest Service action during appeal. Id. at

§§ (c), (d), (e). Forest Service regulations, however, promulgated at 36 C.F.R. Part 215, exempt certain

projects from these provisions. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a) (notice and comment procedures do not

apply to “projects and activities which are categorically excluded from documentation in an environmental

impact statement (EIS) or environmentalassessment (EA)”), 215.10(a) (allowing Chief and Associate Chief

of Forest Service to delegate the determination that an emergency situation exists to the Regional Foresters),

215.12(f) (excluding fromappealprocedures “decisions and actionsthathave been categorically excluded from

documentation in an EA or EIS”), and 215.20(b) (“Decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture or Under

Secretary, NaturalResources and Environment are notsubject to the notice, comment, and appealprocedures

set forth in this part.”). FSEEE challenges these Forest Service regulations as ultra vires to the ARA.

To the extent that FSEEE challenges the Forest Service’s regulations, defendant agrees that challenge

presents a live controversy. Nonetheless, the Court will stay any proceedings related to that challenge because

of the district court’s decision in Earth Island Institute v. Pengilly, 375 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

In Earth Island, the Eastern District of California found a number of the Forest Service’s regulations were

invalid, and severed them from the remainder of the regulations. Id. at 1011. According to both parties, the

Forest Service has appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit. 

It is the Court’s understanding that the Earth Island decision directly addressed all the regulations that

FSEEE challenges here. Given that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling will be binding on this case, unless FSEEE brings

the Court’s attention to specific Forest Service regulations that it is challenging that were not addressed by the

Earth Island decision, the Court will STAY this action pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision. If FSEEE intends

to challenge regulations not covered by the Earth Island decision, it should notify the Court immediately.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion

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4Defendant’s motion to dismiss is Docket No. 40 in Case No. 05-2220 and Docket No. 41 in Case

No. 05-2227.

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to dismiss4 with respect to plaintiffs’ challenge to the Forest Service’s authorization of the Sims Fire sale, and

VACATES its June 27, 2005, preliminary injunction order (Docket No. 27). The clerk shall close the file in

No. 05-2227.

The Court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to FSEEE’s ultra vires challenge to

the Forest Service regulations at 36 C.F.R. Part 215. The Court further STAYS this action pending the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in the appealofEarth Island Institute v. Pengilly, 375 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

The parties are directedto inform the Court promptly when such a decision issues. In addition, the

parties are directed to file a Joint Status Report every 60 days from the date this order issues,

informing the Court of the current status of the appellate process. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2006

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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