Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-00941/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-00941-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 11-cv-00941-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING RELATORS’

MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF 

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

Docket No. 281

Currently pending before the Court is the Campies’ motion for approval of a voluntary 

dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). In their motion, the Campies 

essentially ask the Court to dismiss the instant case – which at present consists of a federal 

retaliation claim, several California retaliation claims, and a number of state/local FCA claims1

(including but not limited to one based on California law) – so that they may pursue a narrower 

case in California state court. That narrower case would consist of California retaliation claims 

and a California-only FCA claim. In other words, the Campies would no longer be pursuing (1) a 

federal retaliation claim and (2) state/local FCA claims other than one based on California law.

The Court held a hearing on the Campies’ motion on April 17, 2020. At the close of the 

hearing, the Court granted the motion subject to certain conditions. This order memorializes the 

Court’s ruling and provides additional analysis as necessary.

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, “[a] district court should grant a motion for voluntary 

1 Both federal and state/local laws have statutes that prohibit the submission of false claims to the 

government. For convenience, the Court refers to claims based on these statutes as “FCA claims” 

– i.e., False Claims Act claims – even though not all statutes may formally be titled “False Claims 

Act.

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dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal 

prejudice as a result.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001). “Legal prejudice is

prejudice to some legal interest, some legal claim, some legal argument.” Zanowick v. Baxter 

Healthcare Corp., 850 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[U]ncertainty because a dispute remains unresolved or because the threat of future litigation . . . 

causes uncertainty does not result in plain legal prejudice. Also, plain legal prejudice does not 

result merely because the defendant will be inconvenienced by having to defend, in another forum 

or where a plaintiff would gain a tactical advantage by that dismissal.” Smith, 263 F.3d at 975

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 F.2d 

143, 145 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that “[p]lain legal prejudice . . . does not result simply when 

defendant faces the prospect of a second lawsuit or when plaintiff merely gains some tactical 

advantage”). Furthermore, “the expense incurred in defending against a lawsuit does not amount 

to legal prejudice.” Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In the instant case, Gilead has failed to show legal prejudice. As an initial matter, the 

Court notes that, although the Campies initially asked in their papers for a dismissal without 

prejudice and without any conditions, they modified their position at the hearing, stating they 

would agree to a dismissal with prejudice of the following claims: the federal FCA claim,2the 

federal retaliation claims, and the state/local FCA claims, other than the one based on California 

law. The Campies also committed to not appealing the dismissal of the federal FCA claim and to 

filing their contemplated California state court case within two weeks of an order approving 

voluntary dismissal (provided state courts are accepting new filings).

At the hearing, Gilead claimed that they would suffer legal prejudice because, if the case 

were to remain with this Court, the Court would more than likely grant Gilead’s pending motion to 

dismiss the state/local FCA claims. But Gilead’s position is speculative. Moreover, if the merits 

of Gilead’s motion to dismiss are as strong as it asserts, then a California state court would 

2 The Court previously granted the United States’ motion to dismiss the federal FCA claim. 

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United States District Court

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likewise dismiss the California FCA claim.

3

 Given the similarity in legal standards applicable to a 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and a demurrer, there is no reason a priori to believe the outcome of 

Gilead’s motion/demurrer would be different depending on the court.

According to Gilead, there is less certainty that the state court would dismiss the claims 

because the instant case has been pending before this Court for many years and thus this Court is 

more knowledgeable about the merits of the Campies’ case. But this Court has not made any 

analysis of the state/local FCA claims at all; proceedings in the instant case have focused largely 

on the federal FCA claim. And although the Court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss 

the federal FCA claim, that was not based on the merits of that claim. To the extent Gilead argues 

that the United States has nevertheless indicated its belief that there is no merit to the Campies’ 

case (which would suggest the state/local FCA claims lack merit), Gilead can make that same 

argument to the state court, relying on the same record in support of their motion in this case. This 

Court is in no better position to evaluate the state/local FCA claims than the state court, and the 

state court is equally equipped to address the merits of the claims.

At the hearing, Gilead also claimed legal prejudice because, if this case were dismissed and 

the Campies could start a new lawsuit in state court, resolution of the parties’ dispute would be 

delayed, and the parties’ dispute has already been pending for close to ten years (i.e., since 2010). 

But delay in resolution of the instant case is not because of a lack of diligence on the part of the 

Campies. Although this case dates back 2010, the United States took several years to investigate 

to determine if it wished to intervene, and then the case was further later delayed for a significant 

period of time because of the Campies’ appeal of this Court’s original dismissal of the case, and 

then Gilead’s subsequent petition to the Supreme Court. 

To the extent Gilead argues delay because this Court could resolve Gilead’s pending 

motion to dismiss in short order and it would take longer for a California state court to get to the 

same point (after the Campies file a new lawsuit in state court), the Court is not persuaded. Gilead 

has not pointed to any convincing evidence indicating that there would be a significant delay

3 Gilead’s pending motion to dismiss is not useless work precisely because Gilead can re-employ

the arguments made in the motion to dismiss in a demurrer to the California state court.

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beyond a few months. For example, there is no indication that, once the Campies initiate suit in 

California, the state of California will take a lengthy period of time to investigate the Campies’ 

California FCA claim, especially since the state reviewed this matter and decided to take no action 

to intervene when this case with the California FCA claim was filed. It also appears that the state 

has been kept apprised of what has taken place in the instant action.4 Gilead can point to no 

practical prejudice were decision on a demurrer delayed by several months.

In the absence of any legal prejudice, the only question remaining is whether there should 

be any conditions imposed for a dismissal of the instant case. Based on what has transpired before 

the Court, and the representations the Campies made in moving for a voluntary dismissal, the 

Court, concludes that the only appropriate conditions are as follows:

• the federal FCA claim shall be dismissed with prejudice, and the Campies shall not 

appeal that dismissal;

• the federal retaliation claim shall be dismissed with prejudice; 

• the non-California state/local FCA claims shall be dismissed with prejudice; and

• the Campies shall file their California state action within two weeks of the date of 

this order.5

The California retaliation claims and the California FCA claim are dismissed, but without

prejudice. Although the Court does not condition a dismissal on the Campies’ filing the operative 

third amended complaint in this case “as is” in California state court – i.e., “deleting those 

allegations relevant only to non-California claims and with no new allegations,” Opp’n at 8, at the 

hearing, the Campies made a clear and express representation to the Court that their contemplated 

4 According to the Campies, they have informed the State of California of their intent to dismiss 

this action and to file a new suit in California state court. See Mot. at 1 (noting California law 

allows a dismissal only with the written consent of the California Attorney General). It also 

appears that the Campies have told the other states/localities about their intent to dismiss the nonCalifornia FCA claims, even though it does not appear that the Campies need their consent to a 

dismissal. The Campies stated at the argument that Gilead has already presented its views to the 

State of California.

5

If, because of the COVID-19 situation, the California state court does not accept the filing of a 

new complaint, then the Campies shall have two weeks from the date that the court does accept 

new complaints to file their state court action.

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state court action would not be based on any new material facts or documents not already 

disclosed in this litigation. In dismissing this case, the Court relies on these representations. The 

remaining conditions requested by Gilead are not reasonable or otherwise not warranted.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Campies’ motion for approval of a voluntary dismissal 

and imposes only those conditions identified above. 

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file in this case.

This order disposes of Docket No. 281.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 20, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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