Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00232/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00232-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE JERCICH,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MERCED, JOHN

HERRELL, DEIRDRE KELSEY, JOHN

L. FAGUNDES, LEON MARTINEZ,

WILLIAM NICHOLSEN, LEO ROBERT

AYERS, AND RICHARD GRAVES;

DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

1:06-CV-00232-OWW-DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

1. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff George Jercich (“Jercich”), proceeding pro se,

brought this action against County of Merced and various County

employees (“County Defendants”), John L. Fagundes (“Fagundes”),

and Robert L. Ayers (“Ayers”). County Defendants and Ayers move

to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiff has not opposed the motions.

2. Procedural History

The complaint was filed on February 28, 2006. (Doc. 1-1,

Complaint for Violation of George Jercich’s Civil Rights

(“Complaint”).) County Defendants moved to dismiss on May 12,

2006. (Doc. 16, Mot. to Dismiss by Defs. County of Merced, John

Herrell, Deirdre Kelsey, Leon Martinez, William Nicholson, and

Richard Graves (“County Defs. Mot. to Dismiss”).) Ayers moved to

dismiss on May 24, 2006. (Doc. 18-3, Mem. of Points and

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Authorities in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss by Def. Robert L. Ayers

(“Ayers Mot. to Dismiss”).) Fagundes does not respond to

Jercich’s complaint. Jercich did not file an opposition to

either motion to dismiss.

3. Background

Jercich alleges that the County of Merced, several County

officers, including Fagundes, and Ayers, conspired to deprive

Jercich of equal protection under the law and to commit fraud in

the sale of the real property. (Doc. 1-1, Complaint ¶¶ 11-15.) 

Fagundes is the seller of real property to Jercich. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Ayers is the president of TransCounty Title Company, the escrow

company involved in the sale. (Doc. 18-2, Aff. of Robert L.

Ayers ¶¶ 2, 6.) Jercich filed suit on February 28, 2006 against

County Defendants, Fagundes, and Ayers. (Doc. 1-1, Complaint.)

County Defendants raised a statute of limitations defense. 

(Doc. 16, County Defs. Mot. to Dismiss at 7-8.) They also moved

for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), contending that

Jercich incorrectly invokes federal jurisdictional grounds, makes

only conclusory allegations, and fails to allege comprehensible

claims. (Id. at 8-9.) Ayers moves to dismiss for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). (Doc. 18-3,

Ayers Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Ayers alternatively moves to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), failure to join an

indispensible party under Rule 19, although he does not identify

the absent party. (Id.) County Defendants and Ayers both move

to dismiss the complaint for improper service of process, failure

to comply with Rule 8, and failure to state a claim for relief as

a § 1983 action. (Doc. 16, County Defs. Mot. to Dismiss at 2;

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Doc. 18-3, Ayers Mot. to Dismiss at 2.)

4. Factual History

Fagundes originally owned 260 acres of land. (Doc. 1-1,

Complaint ¶ 14.) In 1996, the County permitted Fagundes to

subdivide his land into three parcels, one of which, 46 acres,

was purchased by Jercich. (Id.) Prior to Fagundes’ ownership,

Jercich claims that Jercich’s property had been “illegally

backfilled under a permit issued by [Merced County] between 1969

and 1971.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims reasonable inspection of the

property did not reveal this backfilling until thirty-one to

thirty-four years later. (Id.) Fagundes described the property

as a “residential parcel.” (Id.) Jercich claims that much of

his property is “unbuildable . . . without significant additional

expenditures.” (Id.)

In “late 2002,” Jercich purchased from Fagundes the fortysix acre property located at 7800 Merced Falls Road. (Doc. 1-1,

Complaint ¶ 12.) Jercich and Fagundes met Ayers during the

escrow proceedings. (Id.) Ayers is the president of TransCounty

Title Co., a privately-owned escrow company. (See Doc. 18-2,

Aff. of Robert L. Ayers ¶¶ 2, 5, and 6.)

Some unspecified time afterwards, John Herrell (“Herrell”),

deputy environmental health officer of Merced County, and Richard

Graves (“Graves”), deputy building officer for Merced County

Building Department, cited Jercich for various code violations. 

(Doc. 1-1, Complaint ¶ 4, 10, 13.) The violations included piles

of “tires, wheels and other refuse” as well as Jercich’s lack of

a Certificate of Occupancy to live in his mobile home. (Id. ¶

13.) Jercich explained that he was “compelled” to live there

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 Examples of violations included illegal mobile home dwellings, illegal 1

wood-burning stove, and “much more egregious piles of junk and tires” on their

land. (Complaint ¶ 13.)

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because he was “robbed of significant personalty.” (Id.) 

Jercich alleges that Graves and Herrell, his neighbors, engaged

in numerous violations themselves, yet the County did not enforce

land use regulations against them. (Id.) In July of 2005, 1

while hurrying to meet a deadline to dispose of his refuse,

Jercich claims he was nearly “crushed to death” by a tractor. 

(Id.) As a result, he allegedly suffers from intense pain and is

heavily medicated just to function at 60% of his pre-accident

capability. (Id.)

At another unspecified time, Deirdre Kelsey (“Kelsey”), a

County Supervisor, met with Leon Martinez (“Martinez”), former

Chief Code Enforcement Officer of Merced County’s Planning

Department. (Doc. 1-1, Complaint ¶ 5, 7.) Jercich alleges they

prevented him from subdividing his property. (Id. ¶ 15.) Prior

to this, Kelsey’s husband had sought to purchase a quantity of

“saleable rock” from Jercich. (Id. ¶ 15.) Jercich refused

because the offer was much less than the rock’s supposed worth. 

(Id.) In retaliation, Jercich claims that Kelsey acted to “make

certain [Jercich] could not subdivide his property” by “working

behind the scenes” to influence the Board’s vote on his proposed

subdivision. (Id.) Kelsey recused herself from the Board vote,

an act that Jercich labeled “specious.” (Id.) Jercich had

allegedly worked on his land for two years and had spent $12,000

in anticipation of receiving approval of his proposed

subdivision. (Id.) Because his subdivision failed, Jercich

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 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights). For 2

a successful § 1983 action, the conduct must be under color of state law, and

the conduct must result in the denial of constitutional rights. Parratt v.

Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). 

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claims to have lost a pending business offer of $250,000 for 12

acres of his land. (Id.) He claims this lost opportunity caused

him to file bankruptcy. (Id.)

Jercich seeks $1,000,000 in damages and “further relief as

is just.” (Id. ¶ 17.) Jercich throughout his complaint makes

conclusory statements as to the existence of conspiracies to

deprive him of his civil rights and to defraud him. He does not

state facts concerning the emotional distress he suffered. 

Jercich alleges a civil rights violation for deprivation of

his “equal protection under the law.” (Doc. 1-1, Complaint ¶

13.) Defendants assume arguendo that Jercich’s claim is for

violation of his civil rights under § 1983. (See Doc. 16, 2

County Defs. Mot. to Dismiss at 7; Doc. 18-3, Ayers Mot. to

Dismiss at 3.)

Jercich served County Defendants by mail using a private

process server. (See Docs. 5-8 & 10-11, Summons on County Defs.

at 2.) The summons and complaint were sent by first Class U.S.

Mail to 2222 M St., Merced, CA. (Id.) Whose address this is, is

unknown. Jercich served Ayers by first class mail to Ayers’

workplace. (See Doc. 12, Summons on Ayers at 2) (sent by First

Class U.S. Mail to TransCounty, 633 W. 19th St., Merced, CA). 

Jercich did not seek waiver of service or provide acknowledgment

or receipt of the mailed summons and complaint. 

5. Analysis

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 “District courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 3

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 1331 (2005). Diversity jurisdiction is not invoked. 

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In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In general, “a pro se complaint will be liberally construed

and will be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief." Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471

(9th Cir. 1992). However, “a liberal interpretation of a [pro

se] complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Id.

6. Federal Claims

A. Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

A federal court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when

a “well-pleaded complaint” shows that federal law created the

claim or that the plaintiff's relief depends on “a substantial

question of federal law.” Empire Health Choice Assur., Inc. v. 3

McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2131 (2006). A well-pled complaint

means that the federal question must be apparent on the face of

the complaint. See Cal. ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375

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Jercich erroneously brings his complaint under California Government 4

Code Title 1, Division 3.6, entitled “Claims and Actions Against Public

Employees and Public Entities.” (Doc. 1-1, Complaint.) He cites 28 U.S.C. §

157(b)(2)(1), a nonexistent section, for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Id. Title 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) provides for what sort of cases and “core

proceedings” a bankruptcy judge may hear. Section 157(b)(2) provides the

definition of “core proceedings.” Neither of these sections gives

jurisdiction in this matter.

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F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.

Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1974).

Parties can raise challenges to federal subject-matter

jurisdiction as provided by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Even in the absence of a

party challenge, federal courts have an obligation to determine

whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See Ruhrgas AG v.

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). A federal question

claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction if it is “immaterial and solely for the purpose of

obtaining federal jurisdiction” or “wholly insubstantial and

frivolous.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 n.10

(2006) (citations omitted). 

1. Ayers’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of SubjectMatter Jurisdiction

Jercich’s allegations of an equal protection violation, as

well as his filing suit in federal court, suggest that he brings

suit under § 1983, which if applicable would satisfy federalquestion jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1334. Ayers

moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ayers

correctly argues that Jercich does not identify facts supporting

federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Ayers disputes federal 4

jurisdiction, as no conduct under color of state law is alleged. 

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Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535. He contends Jercich’s complaint does

not allege Ayers is a state actor. 

Ayers conflates federal subject-matter jurisdiction with a

plaintiff’s need to prove the defendant liable under federal law,

a “merit-based determination.” See Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1242

(citations omitted). Jercich’s complaint on its face claims an

equal protection deprivation by County Defendants and Ayers

acting in concert in their alleged selective prosecution of 

Jercich’s code violations and the denial of his subdivision plan

to deprive him 14th Amendment of his due process right to

enjoying free ownership and use of his real property by virtue of

his differential treatment from others similarly situated. This

is sufficient to invoke federal subject-matter jurisdiction to

hear this claim pursuant to § 1331. Whether these allegations

sufficiently state a claim is a separate issue. Ayers’ motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is DENIED.

B. Service of Process

Jercich does not state whether he sues County Defendants and

Ayers in their official and/or individual capacity. Both are

assumed.

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs

service of process. Plaintiff must cause a copy of the summons

and the complaint to be delivered to the defendants. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(c)(1). Rule 4(e) pertains to service on individuals

and states in relevant part:

Unless otherwise provided by federal law,

service upon an individual from whom a waiver

has not been obtained and filed . . . may be

effected in any judicial district of the

United States: 

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(1) pursuant to the law of the state in

which the district court is located, or

in which service is effected, for the

service of a summons upon the defendant

in an action brought in the courts of

general jurisdiction of the State; or

(2) by delivering a copy of the summons and

of the complaint to the individual

personally or by leaving copies thereof

at the individual’s dwelling house or

usual place of abode with some person of

suitable age and discretion then

residing therein or by delivering a copy

of the summons and of the complaint to

an agent authorized by appointment or by

law to receive service of process.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).

Rule 4(j)(2) pertains to service on municipal governments

and states in relevant part:

Service upon a state, municipal corporation,

or other governmental organization subject to

suit, shall be effected by delivering a copy

of the summons and of the complaint to its

chief executive officer or by serving the

summons and complaint in the manner

prescribed by the law of that state for the

service of summons or other like process upon

any such defendant.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). If service is not waived, proof of

service shall be made by affidavit by the person effecting

service if that person is not a U.S. marshal. Id. 4(l). Failure

to prove service does not affect the validity of service. Id.

Proper service of process is required for federal courts to

obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Action Embroidery

Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir.

2004); Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986). Unless

there is “substantial compliance with Rule 4,” actual notice

alone will not suffice to establish personal jurisdiction. 

Cranford v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 2d 981, 983-84 (E.D. Cal.

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2005) (citing Benny, 799 F.2d at 492). Rule 4 should be

liberally construed as long as there is “sufficient notice of the

complaint.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta

Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984); Cranford, 359 F. Supp.

2d at 983.

Under the sufficient notice exception, failure to personally

serve does not result in dismissal of the complaint if (a) the

party to be served personally received actual notice, (b) the

defendant suffers no prejudice from the service defect, and (c)

the plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if his complaint were

dismissed. Oyama v. Sheehan (In re Sheehan), 253 F.3d 507, 512

(9th Cir. 2001); accord Cranford, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 985. If a

plaintiff falls within the sufficient notice exception, he has

“substantially complied” with Rule 4. Borzeka v. Heckler, 739

F.2d 444, 447 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984). Service at a person’s place

of employment is generally insufficient if the claim is against a

defendant in his individual capacity alone. Daly-Murphy v.

Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987).

County Defendants and Ayers move to dismiss for improper

service pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) because Jercich did not

personally effect service on the Defendants pursuant to Rule 4.

1. Individual Service of Process

If a plaintiff does not seek a waiver of service, Rule 4(e)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint

be personally served on individual defendants. The rule lists

five ways in which service is effected:

(1) pursuant to the law of the state in

which the district court is located;

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(2) Or pursuant to the law of the state in

which service is effected;

(3) delivering a copy of the summons and of

the complaint to the individual

personally;

(4) leaving copies of the summons and

complaint with some person of suitable

age residing at the individual’s

dwelling house or usual place of abode;

or

(5) delivering a copy to an agent authorized

to receive service of process. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).

The facts do not show that Jercich personally delivered the

summons to the Defendants, nor left the summons with a

responsible person at their abodes. However, Rule 4(e) provides

other means to effect service, the most relevant of which is

pursuant to California law, the state in which the district court

is located and service is to be affected. 

a. Rule 4(e) and Pursuant to the Law of the State

Under California law, service on an individual may be

effected by delivering a copy to the individual or an authorized

agent. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.90 (Deering 2006). California

law provides for three means to effect service: 

(1) Personally delivering to the individual

or someone authorized to receive service

(the agent). Id. § 415.10.

(2) Leaving a copy of the summons and

complaint with a responsible person at

the individual’s (or agent’s) usual

home, office, place of abode, or mailing

address and afterward mailing a copy to

the individual (or agent) at such home,

office, place of abode, or mailing

address. Id. § 415.20(b).

(3) Mailing a copy to the individual (or

agent) with notice and acknowledgment

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 Service by mail requires that a copy of the summons and complaint be 5

sent by first-class mail to the person to be served, with two copies of the

notice and acknowledgment of receipt, and a pre-paid return envelope,

addressed to sender. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(a) (Deering 2006). 

Service is complete when acknowledgment of receipt of summons is executed and

returned to sender. Id. § 415.30(c). If the person who is served by this

means refuses to complete and return the acknowledgment form within 20 days

from the date of mailing, this person is liable for the extra costs of service

by another method. Id. § 415.30(d).

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form. Id. § 415.30. 5

Jercich used service by mail. The facts fail to show

whether the person who effected service for Jercich is legally

authorized to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (service

effected by anyone who is not a party and at least 18 years of

age). To serve the County Defendants, Jercich’s process server

mailed the summons and complaint to 2222 M Street, Merced, CA. 

It is unclear if this is the address of an authorized agent to

receive service of process for County Defendants. The facts also

fail to show whether an acknowledgement form was sent with the

copy of the summons and complaint as required by California Civil

Procedure Code Section 415.30. 

When serving Ayers, Jercich’s process server sent the

service by mail to TransCounty Title Company, a private company,

Ayers’ place of business. It is unclear if the process server

included an acknowledgment of service form as required by law. 

Jercich’s claim against Ayers is in reference to his individual

and official capacity as the president of TransCounty. It cannot

be determined on this record if Jercich complied with all the

requirements of Section 415.30. Jercich has failed to provide

evidence of proper service. Ayers’ motion to dismiss the

complaint for insufficient service of process is GRANTED WITH

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LEAVE TO AMEND. 

2. Service of Process on Merced County

Rule 4(j)(2) governs service on a public entity

municipality. Service is effected by (1) delivering a copy of

the summons and complaint to the public entity’s chief executive

officer or (2) service pursuant to the law of the state. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(j)(2).

Under California law, service is effected on a municipality

by delivery of summons and complaint to the “clerk, secretary,

president, presiding officer, or other head of its body.” Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 416.50 (Deering 2006). Service is proper when:

(1) The summons is personally served. Id. §

415.10;

(2) The summons is left “during usual office

hours in his or her office . . . with

the person who is apparently in charge .

. . thereafter mailing a copy of the

summons and complaint.” Id. §

415.20(a); or

(3) The summons is sent by first-class mail

to the designated individual, pursuant

to California Civil Procedure Code

Section 415.30.

The facts fail to show whether or not Jercich’s process

server mailed Jercich’s summons to the correct person or address. 

It is unknown if she sent an acknowledgment form in compliance

with Section 415.30. Defendant Merced County’s motion to dismiss

for insufficient service of process is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

C. Motion for More Definite Statement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(e)

A motion for more definite statement attacks an

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unintelligible complaint, not a complaint that lacks detail. 

Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1169 (E.D. Cal.

2005). Courts will deny the motion if the complaint is specific

enough to give notice to the defendants of the substance of the

claim asserted. See id.; Beery v. Hitachi Home Elecs. (Am.), 157

F.R.D. 477, 480 (C.D. Cal. 1993). A 12(e) motion is proper only

if the complaint is “so vague or ambiguous that the opposing

party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith or

without prejudice to himself.” Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging,

Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see Bautista v. L.A.

County, 216 F.3d 837, 843 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (Reinhardt, J.,

concurring) (party can move for more definite statement on those

rare occasions where a complaint is so vague or ambiguous that

party cannot reasonably frame a responsive pleading); see also

Sagan v. Apple Computer, 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal.

1994).

Rule 12(e) motions “should not be used to test an opponent’s

case by requiring him to allege certain facts or retreat from his

allegations.” Neveau, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (citing Palm

Springs Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Desert Hosp., 628 F. Supp. 454, 464-

65 (C.D. Cal. 1986)). If the facts sought by a motion for a more

definite statement are obtainable by discovery, the motion should

be denied. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.

1996) (granting 12(e) motion if complaint does not provide

defendants “a fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading”);

see also Neveau, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70 (12(e) motion should

be denied if discovery can obtain the desired facts); Sagan, 874

F. Supp. at 1077 (“Parties are expected to use discovery, not the

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pleadings, to learn the specifics of the claims being asserted”);

Beery, 157 F.R.D. at 180 (finding a 12(e) motion should be denied

if detail sought is obtainable through discovery).

A Rule 12(e) motion is considered in light of Rule 8's

liberal pleading standards. See, e.g., Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922

F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Sagan, 874 F. Supp.

at 1077). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

only requires “a short and plain statement of the claim”

sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and on what grounds it rests. Swierkiewicz

v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (U.S. 2002) (citing Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (U.S. 1957)). Because of the minimal

federal pleading requirements, 12(e) motions are viewed with

disfavor. Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at 1077. A motion for more

definite statement is more likely granted when there is ambiguity

as to the nature of the claim or the party claimed against. Id.

Unlike pleadings drafted by lawyers, pleadings by pro se

plaintiffs are liberally construed. See Hearns v. Terhune, 413

F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.

5, 9 (1980)); Analysis, infra.

County Defendants bring a 12(e) motion for more definite

statement as an alternative to their 12(b)(6) motion. They

contend that Jercich makes only conclusory allegations and that

his complaint is so poorly written they do not know what he is

claiming.

Jercich makes several claims. He raises general allegations

of a civil right deprivation, which implicate § 1983. He

contends his civil rights were violated by the County’s selective

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 Similarly, Defendants’ motion that Plaintiff violates Rule 8(e)(1), 6

which directs a claim be short, concise, and direct, is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND.

16

prosecution in its enforcement of land use violations. He makes

conclusory allegations that Defendants Fagundes, Herrell, Graves,

and others are responsible for these deprivations. Jercich also

contends that Kelsey and Martinez conspired to deny approval of

his subdivision, denying him Equal Protection under the law,

without providing any grounds for claim. Likewise, Jercich

alleges that Ayers, Fagundes, and other Defendants named in the

complaint sought to defraud him through their “speech, acts and

omissions.” Such conclusory statements, fail to give Defendants

fair notice of Jercich’s claims. Motion for more definite

statement is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

6

D. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join a Party

Rule 12(b)(7) is a motion to dismiss for failure to join a

party pursuant to Rule 19. Rule 19 governs compulsory joinder of

parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. In relevant part, Rule 19(a)

provides that

[a] person who is subject to service of

process and whose joinder will not deprive

the court of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the action shall be joined as a

party in the action if

(1) in the person’s absence complete relief

cannot be accorded among those already

parties, or 

(2) the person claims an interest relating

to the subject of the action and is so

situated that the disposition of the

action in the person’s absence may 

(i) as a practical matter impair or

impede the person’s ability to

protect that interest or 

(ii) leave any of the persons already

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parties subject to a substantial

risk of incurring double, multiple,

or otherwise inconsistent

obligations by reason of the

claimed interest . . . 

If the joined party objects to venue and

joinder of that party would render the venue

of the action improper, that party shall be

dismissed from the action.

There is a three-step process to determine whether Rule 19

applies:

(1) Is the nonparty necessary, as described

in Rule 19(a)? See EEOC v. Peabody W.

Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing United States v. Bowen,

172 F.3d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1999)).

(2) If the absent party is necessary, is

joinder feasible? See Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(a) (joinder unfeasible if improper

venue, nonparty not subject to personal

jurisdiction, or joinder would destroy

subject-matter jurisdiction); Peabody W.

Coal Co., 400 F.3d at 779.

(3) If joinder is not feasible, is the

absent party indispensable? See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 19(b); Bowen, 172 F.3d at 688

(“whether ‘in equity and good

conscience’ the action can continue

without the party”). 

Ayers moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7). However,

he fails to identify the absent necessary party who must be

joined under Rule 19. The purpose of Rule 19 is to “consummate .

. . relief as to those already parties, and with precluding

multiple lawsuits on the same cause of action.” Peabody W. Coal

Co., 400 F.3d at 780 (citations omitted). As Ayers is already a

party to this action, Rule 19 does not apply to him. The Motion

to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party pursuant to Rule

12(b)(7) is DENIED.

//

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E. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” The question is not whether the

plaintiff will ultimately prevail; rather, whether the plaintiff

could prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would

entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.

69, 73 (1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van

Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted).

1. 1983 Action

To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show

1) that he has been deprived of a right secured by the United

States Constitution or a federal law and 2) that the deprivation

was effected “under color of state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320

F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). Ayers contends that he did not

act under color of state law. County Defendants contend that

selective prosecution is not an actionable claim under 1983.

a. Deprivation of a Secured Right

Equal Protection is a right secured by the United States

Constitution. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562, 564 (2000) (Equal Protection clause intended to protect

every person within a state from intentional and arbitrary

discrimination). Jercich claims that his Equal Protection right

is being deprived by the County, implicating the first prong of a

§ 1983 action.

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An Equal Protection claim is usually brought because of an

irrational law or by a member of a protected class. See Esmail

v. McCrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1995). Where state action

does not affect a fundamental right or protected classification,

plaintiffs can establish an Equal Protection claim as a “class of

one”. See Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. For a

successful Equal Protection action under § 1983, “class of one,”

a plaintiff must still show he was 1)intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and 2) there is no

rational basis for the different treatment. Id.; see also Squaw

Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2004)

(1983 action brought by “class of one” plaintiff for Equal

Protection violation).

In order to survive the rational basis test, government

actions must implicate legitimate goals and the means chosen must

bear a rational relationship to those goals. See, e.g., Lyng v.

Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 375 (1988). Under the rational basis

test, there is a strong presumption of validity; government

actions are valid so long as there is a legitimate government

interest. See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d 1173, 1185

(9th Cir. 2004); McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th

Cir. 1999). There is no rational basis for state conduct that is

clearly “malicious, irrational, or plainly arbitrary.” Squaw

Valley Dev. Co., 375 F.3d at 944 (citation omitted). Jercich

does not allege entitlement to protection as a protected class. 

//

//

//

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I. Selective Prosecution through Code

Enforcement

Jercich alleges a deprivation of his Equal Protection right

to use and enjoy his real property for development by the

County’s enforcement of code violations against him and not his

neighbors. County Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that

selective prosecution is not a cognizable claim under § 1983,

citing Esmail v. McCrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1995)

(stating that failure to prosecute all known lawbreakers is not

actionable under Equal Protection). See also Wayte v. United

States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (“Examining the basis of a

prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill

law enforcement . . . and may undermine prosecutorial

effectiveness.”).

County Defendants misinterpret the law. Selective

prosecution is limited by constitutional restraints. Wayte, 470

U.S. at 608. The law in the Ninth Circuit recognizes selective

prosecution as a viable basis for a 1983 action. See, e.g.,

Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 375 F.3d at 944; Freeman v. City of Santa

Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995). Selective prosecution

is judged according to ordinary standards of Equal Protection:

Plaintiff must show that 1) others similarly situated have not

been prosecuted and that 2) the prosecution has an impermissible

motive. Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187; see also Squaw Valley Dev.

Co., 375 F.3d at 944 (to satisfy the second prong, selective

prosecution claim by “class of one” plaintiff requires showing of

irrationality in the challenged conduct). “Selective enforcement

of valid laws, without more, does not make the defendants’

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actions irrational.” Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1188.

Jercich does satisfy the first prong: he claims his

neighbors have not been prosecuted for similar violations, but

alleges no facts to show they are similarly situated. He does

not satisfy the second prong because he does not plead an

irrational basis for this alleged differential treatment, other

than conclusory conspiracy statements. Though not explicitly

stated by the County Defendants, the County has a legitimate

interest in enforcement of code violations and land use laws

against Jercich. Jercich can dispute this by showing that such

rational basis is a pretext for an “impermissible motive.” Squaw

Valley Dev. Co., 375 F.3d at 944 (internal citations omitted). 

He alleges motive. 

In Squaw Valley, an executive officer of a water regulation

board enforced water code violations against a ski resort. The

plaintiff ski resort argued it was 1) subjected to more

regulations than neighboring resorts, 2) had a higher standard of

regulation than its neighbors, and 3) had every violation

enforced against it while substantial violations by its neighbors

were not enforced. Id. at 945. These reasons, however, had a

rational basis: the ski resort had resisted lesser regulatory

efforts and had a history of non-compliance. Id.

The Ninth Circuit found other allegations that indicated the

rational basis was pretextual. The officer had a long history of

disputes with the ski resort management, and was verbally

aggressive with them. Id. at 946. The neighboring resorts

commented on the obviousness of the selective treatment by the

officer. Id. Despite stating the resort’s history of nonCase 1:06-cv-00232-OWW -DLB Document 32 Filed 12/19/06 Page 21 of 39
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compliance as the reason for the disparate treatment, the officer

could not name a single instance of non-compliance. Id. The

court held that the ski resort successfully raised triable issues

of fact about the executive officer’s animus against the resort. 

Id. at 947.

Jercich’s complaint does not allege an irrational motive or

animus, other than conclusory conspiracy claims. Though Jercich

alleges selective enforcement, the County Defendants had a

rational basis for their actions: he was in violation of various

codes. Unlike Squaw Valley, the facts do not show a history of

conflict between Jercich and the County Defendants for these code

violations or the operation of his real property. The facts do

not show any evidence of personal animosity between the County

Defendants and Jercich. The, motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim for an equal protection § 1983 action is GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

II. Denial of Subdivision by Kelsey and

Martinez

Jercich claims that the denial of his subdivision

application resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional

rights. He alleges that Kelsey, a County Supervisor, and

Martinez, the Chief Code Enforcement Officer, conspired behind

the scenes to do so. However, Jercich does not allege a

constitutional deprivation by either Kelsey or Martinez or their

unlawful purpose.

To establish an Equal Protection violation, Jercich must

allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others

similarly situated and that there was no rational basis for this

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difference in treatment. Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 375 F.3d at 944. 

Jercich fails to allege or identify others similarly situated who

were treated differently than him, i.e., people with various code

violations whose similar subdivision applications were approved. 

Jercich acknowledges that Kelsey did not participate in the

vote that denied his subdivision. Martinez is not a Supervisor

so he did not vote. Even if Jercich was treated differently from

others similarly situated, there is a rational basis for Kelsey

not voting: her husband had prior dealings with Jercich. (Doc. 1-

1, Complaint ¶ 15). To mitigate any claims of impropriety,

Kelsey recused herself. The facts do not show how either Kelsey

or Martinez exercised their authority as County officials to deny

Jercich his subdivision in an unconstitutional manner. The

denial of his subdivision approval is not actionable under § 1983

on the facts alleged. Nor are any facts stated that would show a

basis for liability on the part of Kelsey or Martinez. 

b. Under Color of State Law

To act under color of state law requires that the defendant

in a § 1983 action has exercised power “possessed by virtue of

state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed

with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326

(1941)). Id. If defendant’s conduct satisfies the state action

requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, “that conduct [is] also

action under color of state law and will support a suit under §

1983.” Id. In such circumstances, defendant’s alleged

infringement of plaintiff’s federal rights is “fairly

attributable to the State.” Id. 

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To constitute state action, the deprivation must be caused

by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State

or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and the party

charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be

said to be a state actor. Id.; see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). It is firmly established

that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law

when he abuses the position given to him by the State. Atkins,

487 U.S. at 49. Generally, a public employee acts under color of

state law while acting in his official capacity or while

exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law. Id.

I. Suit Against Ayers As Private Individual

The United States Supreme Court has held an individual’s

conduct is equivalent to government action if there is a nexus

between the State and the action such that “seemingly private

behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S.

288, 295 (2001) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has

identified four factors that influence a finding of state action

by a private individual:

(1) The government compelled the action

using its coercive power, or significant

overt or covert encouragement. Single

Moms, Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d

743, 747 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Blum v.

Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982));

(2) The government and the private actor

wilfully participated in joint activity. 

Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982));

(3) The government controlled a nominally

private actor. Id. (citing Pennsylvania

v. Bd. of Dir. of City Trusts, 353 U.S.

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230, 231 (1957)); or

(4) The government delegated a public

function to the private actor. Id.

(citing Atkins, 487 U.S. at 56).

See also Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir.

2003) (replacing the nominally private actor factor with the

Brentwood nexus factor: seemingly private behavior that may be

fairly considered state action).

Of these four factors, Jercich’s complaint refers to the

second, willful participation in a joint activity by the

government and the private actor. Jercich does not provide facts

to show where there was joint activity. Under the joint action

test, a plaintiff must show that the state “has so far insinuated

itself into a position of interdependence with the private

entity” that the act must be recognized as a joint activity. See

Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1093 (citation omitted). A plaintiff may

demonstrate interdependence by showing a conspiracy or wilful

participation by the private entity and the state. See Franklin

v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts generally

require a substantial degree of cooperation before imposing

liability on private actors. Id.

Jercich’s complaint does not state a § 1983 action against

Ayers. Jercich does not provide facts that show joint action

between County Defendants and Ayers to deprive him of

constitutional rights. He fails to allege a “substantial degree

of cooperation” between Ayers and County Defendants. There are

no facts to support a finding that the County acted

interdependently in Ayers’ activities. Ayers’ motion to dismiss

pursuant to 12(b)(6) with regards to a 1983 action is GRANTED

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WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

II. Suit Against Merced County As Local

Government

Local governments are persons subject to suit for

constitutional torts under a 1983 action. Haugen v. Brosseau,

339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Local governments can be

sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where such

suits arise from unconstitutional actions that execute a

governmental policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.

A municipality cannot be held liable solely on a respondeat

superior theory, i.e., merely because it employs a tortfeasor. 

Id. at 691; see Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2004). 

For a successful complaint against a local government, a

plaintiff must satisfy any of the following three theories:

1) The employee acted pursuant to an

expressed official policy;

2) The employee acted according to a longstanding practice or custom; or

3) The employee acted as a final policymaker (even in cases where only one

constitutional violation occurred).

See Lytle, 382 F.3d at 982; Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164

(9th Cir. 2003). The policy must come from a deliberate choice

by a policy-making official and can be inferred from widespread

practice or repeated constitutional violations for which the

offending officer received no punishment. See Brass v. County of

L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th Cir. 2003); Nadal v. Las Vegas

Metro Police Dep’t, 268 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2001).

In Lytle v. Carl, the plaintiff was a teacher who brought a

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1983 action against the superintendent of the school district in

which she worked. The court found that the superintendent had

fired the teacher in retaliation for the teacher’s criticism of

the district. Lytle, 382 F.3d at 981. The plaintiff did not

allege there was an official policy or custom by the school

district. Id. at 982. However, the plaintiff successfully

argued that the superintendent was a final policymaker, making

the district liable. Id. at 986. To determine final

policymaking authority, the court must find the individual has

authority in a particular area or issue. Id. at 983. In Lytle,

the court found that the superintendent was not constrained by

policies other than his own, and he was not subject to review by

anyone within the district, which made the superintendent a final

policymaker with respect to teacher employment. Id. at 985-86.

Like Lytle, Jercich does not allege that the County

officials violated a constitutional right in accordance with any

policy or custom of Merced County. The present complaint is

distinguishable from Lytle in that there are no facts to support

a finding that any of the County Defendants are final

policymakers. Herrell and Graves, the County officials who

allegedly conspired to deprive Jercich of his Equal Protection

right through their selective prosecution, are more accurately

described as subordinate enforcement officers, not policymakers. 

Jercich’s complaint is insufficient against the County under §

1983. 

III. Suits Against Government Officials

i. Official Capacity

“Claims against government officials in their official

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 County Defendants contend that as a legislator, Kelsey is immune from 7

suit in 1983 actions in her official duties as a legislator. Bogan v. ScottHarris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1999). An act is legislative by the nature of the

act, and not by motive or intent. Kaahumanu v. County of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215,

1219 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54). Courts determine whether

an act is legislative by four factors: (1) Does it involve ad hoc decision

making or policy formation?; (2) Does it apply to a few individuals, or the

public?; (3) Is it formally legislative in character?; (4) Does it bear the

hallmarks of legislation? Id. at 1220. The burden of proof lies with the

party raising it. Id.

Defendants have not established that Kelsey acts as a legislator when

she votes on a subdivision proposal. Jercich’s subdivision proposal is more

ad hoc than public policy-oriented, is applicable to him primarily or a single

property, and is not formally legislative in its character. The lack of

legislative nature does not factor here because Kelsey is not liable under §

1983.

28

capacities are really suits against the governmental employer

because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” Butler v.

Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations

omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held that official

capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading

an action against the entity which employs the agent. Wolfe v.

Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 364-65 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Hafer v.

Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)). An official capacity suit is

treated as a suit against the government entity “as long as the

[entity] receives notice and an opportunity to respond.” 

Ruvalcaba v. City of L.A., 167 F.3d, 514, 524 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)).

Because Jercich’s complaint does not allege a County policy

or custom deprived him of his constitutional rights, nor does he

allege the actions were that of a final policymaker, Jercich’s

suit against Merced County was dismissed. Since lawsuits against

County officials in their official capacity are actually suits

against the County, Jercich’s suit against the County Defendants

in their official capacity is likewise DISMISSED.7

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ii. Individual Capacity

Individual capacity suits impose personal liability upon a

governmental official for actions taken under color of state law. 

Dittman v. Cal., 191 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Graham, 473 U.S. at 165). Color of state law means “pretense of

law.” McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citation omitted). This includes acts by government officers in

performing their official duties, whether or not authorized by

the local government. Id. The challenged acts “must bear some

similarity to the nature of powers and duties assigned.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Officials sued in their personal capacity may assert

personal immunity defenses such as “objectively reasonable

reliance on existing law.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473

(9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67). 

Individuals are not immune under qualified immunity if they

violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” See Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Winning an individual

capacity suit is a victory against the individual, not the

employing entity. Cerrato v. S.F. Comty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d

968, 973 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67).

Jercich’s claim against County Defendants in their

individual capacity satisfies color of state law. He alleges

that they abused their positions as County officials to deprive

him of his Equal Protection right. To prosecute Jercich for his

various code violations, County Defendants use their power as

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County officials, which necessarily indicates that County

Defendants act under color of state law. County Defendants do

not raise qualified immunity as a defense. 

2. Conspiracy to Deprive Plaintiff of his Civil Rights

To prove a conspiracy, Plaintiff must show “an agreement or

‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights.” 

Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted). Each individual does not need to know the plan;

sharing the common purpose of the conspiracy is sufficient. Id.

A private individual may be liable if he conspired with a state

actor. Id. (internal citations omitted).

The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation and

operation of a conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of

the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from wrongful conduct.

Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th

503, 511 (Cal. 1994). A conspiracy does not stand as an

independent claim, rather it is a legal doctrine to establish

joint liability by the conspirators for the underlying tort. See

Entm’t Research Group v. Genesis Creative Group, 122 F.3d 1211,

1228 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Applied Equipment Corp., 7 Cal. 4th

at 511). Each member of the conspiracy must be able to commit

the underlying tort, intend the success of the purpose of the

conspiracy, and all the elements of that tort must be satisfied. 

7 Cal. 4th at 511. If a plaintiff fails to plead the underlying

claim, the corresponding conspiracy claim must also fail. See

id. (“It is the acts done and not the conspiracy to do them which

should be regarded as the essence of a civil action.”) (internal

citation omitted).

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In order to show a conspiracy, Plaintiff must first

successfully allege the underlying 1983 action. Jercich must

show the deprivation of a secured right under color of state law. 

Since Jercich has not successfully alleged a 1983 action against

any Defendants, the conspiracy claim likewise fails. Further,

Jercich does not show facts that support the existence of a

conspiracy among any Defendants, such as the formation and

wrongful acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Labeling conduct

a conspiracy is not enough. Jercich’s claim for conspiracy

pursuant to § 1983 fails.

Jercich’s conspiracy claim cannot implicate 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3), conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Elements of

a 1985(3) claim are: (1) existence of a conspiracy to deprive

Plaintiff of equal protection under the law; (2) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) a resulting injury. 

Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

An essential requirement for a 1985(3) claim is that there

must be some racial or otherwise class-based “invidious

discriminatory animus” for the conspiracy. Bray v. Alexandria

Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1993) (citing

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Section

1985(3) was not meant to apply to all tortious conspiracies to

deprive the rights of another. Id. Section 1985(3) does not

extend to classes beyond race unless that class can show that the

government has determined that class members “require and warrant

special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights.” 

Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Jercich cannot assert a § 1985(3) action because he does not

claim a racially-motivated animus, nor that he is a member of any

class requiring special federal protection. Section 1985(3) was

not meant to apply to tortious actions such as Jercich’s. 

Further, the complaint does not allege the elements of a 1985(3)

action, a race, or class based conspiracy. Section 1985(3) has

no application. County Defendants’ and Ayers’ motions to dismiss

for conspiracy is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

3. Statute of Limitations for 1983 Actions

The United States Supreme Court has held the limitation

period for 1983 actions to be the same as the personal injury

claim limitation period of the state in which such action is

brought. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (U.S. 1985). The

9th Circuit has adopted this approach. McDougal v. County of

Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1991) (statute of

limitations for 1983 actions same as that of personal injury

actions). If a state has more than one limitation period for

personal torts, the United States Supreme Court has determined

that the statute of limitations for general personal injury

claims governs for 1983 actions. Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608,

610 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50

(1989)).

The pertinent state statute is California Civil Procedure

Code Section 335.1, which gives a two-year limitation period. 

Though state law determines the statute of limitations, “federal

law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” Morales v.

City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Accrual occurs when “a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of

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the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. at 1154.

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(c). A defendant raising a statute of limitations

defense has the burden of proof. Cal. Sansome Co. v. United

States Gypsum, 55 F.3d 1402, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995). In a 1983

action, a defendant has the burden of showing that the alleged

wrongdoing and injury occurred outside the limitation period. 

See id.

County Defendants contend that Jercich’s § 1983 selective

prosecution claim is barred by the statute of limitations. While

Plaintiff does not allege many dates, Defendants as the moving

party must show how the statute of limitations applies. Id.

Jercich vaguely alleges that he sought county action in late

2002. Jercich is under an obligation to allege dates or tolling

facts that save his cause from the statute of limitations period. 

It is unclear when the alleged wrongful acts occurred. The

Motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds is GRANTED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

7. Non-Federal Claims

A. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides in pertinent part:

“In any civil action of which the district

courts have original jurisdiction, the

district court shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are

so related to the claims in the action within

such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy under

Article III of the United States

Constitution.” 

A court can choose to decline supplemental jurisdiction if “the

district court has dismissed all claims over which it had

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original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2000).

The United States Supreme Court has interpreted “same case

or controversy” as state and federal claims that derive from a

“common nucleus of operative facts” such that a plaintiff “would

ordinarily be expected to try them all in a single judicial

proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

725 (1966); see Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1173

(9th Cir. 2002).

Jercich brings claims of fraud and conspiracy to commit

fraud under California law. County Defendants and Ayers do not

specifically address the fraud claim. However, they do move to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Jercich’s allegations of

conspiracy extend from the fraud committed during the sale to the

selective prosecution and denial of his subdivision by the

County. He thus contends a wide-spread conspiracy to defraud him

and violate his equal protection rights. The fraud claim derives

from the same case or controversy as the 1983 action. However,

if a § 1983 claim does not exist there will be no federal subject

matter jurisdiction and no reason for the court to retain this

action. 

B. Fraud

To successfully plead fraud, Plaintiff must show a 1) false

representation, 2) knowledge of its falsity, 3) intent to

defraud, 4) justifiable reliance, and 5) damages. Moore v.

Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotations

omitted). Pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, “[i]n all averments of fraud . . . the circumstances

constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity.” 

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The fraud allegations must be specific enough to give defendant

notice of the particular misconduct so that the defendant can

defend against it. Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672

(9th Cir. 1993)). This includes time, place, and nature of the

actions, and why the actions are false. Decker v. Glenfed, Inc.

(In re Glenfed, Inc., Sec. Litig.), 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir.

1994).

Plaintiff accuses Ayers and the County Defendants of fraud. 

He fails to state any specifics regarding when or how the fraud

was perpetrated by Fagundes, the County, and Ayers or what

constitutes the fraud. Plaintiff’s only mention of Ayers and the

County is in paragraphs 9 and 12 of the Complaint, a conclusory

allegation of conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff. This does not

meet the more particular pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).

The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with

regard to the fraud claim is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

C. Conspiracy to Commit Fraud

Civil conspiracy elements are (1) the formation and

operation of a conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of

the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from wrongful conduct). 

See Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal.

4th 503, 511 (Cal. 1994). Conspiracy is a legal doctrine to

establish joint and vicarious liability by the conspirators for

the underlying tort. See Entm’t Research Group v. Genesis

Creative Group, 122 F.3d 1211, 1228 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing

Applied Equipment Corp., 7 Cal. 4th at 511). Each member of the

conspiracy must be able to commit the underlying tort, and all

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the elements of that tort must be satisfied. 7 Cal. 4th at 511. 

If Plaintiff fails to plead a claim for fraud, the corresponding

conspiracy claim must also fail. See id. (“It is the acts done

and not the conspiracy to do them which should be regarded as the

essence of a civil action.”) (citation omitted).

Jercich failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity

as required by Rule 9(b). Since Jercich failed to show the

underlying fraud action, there is no liability for conspiracy to

commit fraud. Motion to dismiss for conspiracy to commit fraud

is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

D. Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, under state law, a plaintiff must allege 1) extreme and

outrageous conduct by the defendant, with the intent or reckless

disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, 2)

plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress and 3) that

defendant was the cause of the emotional distress. Ess v.

Eskaton Properties, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 4th 120, 129 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2002). 

To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress under state law requires that a plaintiff show 1)

serious emotional distress, 2) actually and proximately caused by

3) wrongful conduct 4) by a defendant who should have foreseen

that the conduct would cause such distress. Austin v. Terhune,

367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004). It is well settled that

negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent

tort; rather it is the tort of negligence to which the duty

element applies. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med.

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Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588 (Cal. 1989); Friedman, 107 Cal.

App. 4th at 464. 

Where injury such as mental and emotional distress is caused

by the constitutional violation, that injury is compensable under

§ 1983. Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir.

1988); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-264 (1978). It is not

a stand alone federal claim. Awards for emotional distress

damages require proof that such injury actually occurred. See

Carey, 435 U.S. at 264.

Jercich alleges that he suffered emotional distress from the

Equal Protection violation and the fraud. The only facts he

alleges describe a tractor incident in July 2005. (Doc. 1-1,

Complaint ¶ 13). However, that incident does not implicate

County Defendants or Ayers, as Jercich was hurrying to meet the

County’s disposal deadline, the County did not cause the tractor

to allegedly nearly crush him. The facts do not show how County

Defendants or Ayers are responsible for the actions of the

tractor. Even if Defendants caused a constitutional deprivation,

that deprivation did not cause the alleged injury Jercich

suffered from the tractor. Nor do the facts rise to the level of

outrageous conduct required by state law. The complaint fails to

state a claim for emotional distress. Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Jercich’s emotional distress claims is GRANTED WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND. 

8. Conclusion

(1) Ayers’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is DENIED.

(2) County Defendants’ and Ayers’ motions to dismiss

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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process are

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

(3) County Defendants’ and Ayers’ motions to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 8 and for more definite statement pursuant to

Rule 12(e) are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(4) Defendants motion to dismiss on Rule 8(e)(1) grounds is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

(5) Ayers’ motion to dismiss for failure to join a party

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) is DENIED.

(6) County Defendants’ and Ayers’ motions to dismiss for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) regarding the

1983 action are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(7) County Defendants’ and Ayers’ motion to dismiss for

conspiracy pursuant to a 1983 action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND.

(8) County Defendants’ motion to dismiss on statute of

limitation grounds for a 1983 action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND.

(9) County Defendants’ and Ayers’ motions to dismiss

regarding the fraud claim are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(10) County Defendants’ and Ayers’ motion to dismiss for

conspiracy to commit fraud are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(11) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Jercich’s emotional

distress claims is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Any amended complaint shall be granted within twenty (20)

days of the date of service of this decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 18, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

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dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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