Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01255/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01255-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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KM

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Matthew L. Harris, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-1255-PHX-DGC (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Matthew L. Harris, who is confined in the Maricopa County Lower Buckeye

Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. On July 22, 2008, the Court granted Plaintiff in forma

pauperis status and dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend. On July 30, 2008,

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. The Court will order Defendants Clark, Hayley,

Carlson, Biggs, and Silbert to answer Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint and will

dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

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All Defendants are employed by the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office.

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be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

III. Amended Complaint

Plaintiff names the following Defendants1

 in the Amended Compliant: (1) Maricopa

County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio; (2) Sgt. Silbert; (3) Officer Clark; (4) Officer Smith;

(5) Officer Carlson; (6) Officer Biggs; (7) Officer Clark (third shift, N yard); (8) Sgt. Hayley;

(9) Sgt. MacPherson; (10) Officer Basham; (11) Officer Touchet; (12) Officer Reid;

(13) Officer Gomez; (14) Officer Von Reeden; (15) Sgt. Gunn; (16) Sgt. Wells; (17) Sgt.

Lewis; (18) Lt. Unknown, badge #A4149; (19) Melissa Marino; (20) St. Sgt. Bureau;

(21) Officer Barrone; (22) Officer Chapman; (23) Officer McVaugh; (24) Officer Landry;

(25) Officer Cain; (26) Officer Purslow; (27) Officer Hale; and (28) Officer Webb.

Plaintiff raises nine grounds for relief in and seeks injunctive relief and money

damages.

IV. Failure to State a Claim

A. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

when he was wrongfully issued two disciplinary tickets, was found guilty before he could

present witnesses, and his appeal of his disciplinary convictions was denied. Plaintiff states

that he was “placed on restriction unjustly.”

Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against the

imposition of “punishment” prior to an adjudication of guilt, a detainee may be subjected to

“the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and

restrictions to not amount to punishment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979).

“[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a

legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Id.

at 539. “[M]aintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are

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essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights

of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Id. at 546.

Plaintiff does not describe the restrictions he received because of his disciplinary

proceedings and it is therefore impossible to determine whether those restrictions amount to

“punishment” under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Moreover, even assuming that Plaintiff’s due process rights were implicated during

his disciplinary proceedings, an inmate may be prevented from calling witnesses where

permitting the inmate to do so would threaten institutional security or correctional goals.

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In this case, Plaintiff makes no allegations

about whether he was prevented from calling witnesses without legitimate regard to

institutional security or correctional goals. 

Count III will therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

B. Count IV 

In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied adequate medical care because

he has not received treatment for bi-polar disorder. Plaintiff states that he requested

treatment on July 1, 2008, that he was given an assessment on July 21, 2008, and that he has

been scheduled for several appointments, but has not actually been seen or offered treatment.

To maintain a claim under the Eighth Amendment based on prison medical treatment,

a prisoner must show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both

know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994). The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference. Id.

This subjective approach focuses upon the mental attitude of the defendant. Id. at 839. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). In the medical context, deliberate indifference may be shown by (1) a

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and

(2) harm caused by the indifference. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)

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(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The harm need not be substantial. Id. (citing Estelle, 429

U.S. at 104). 

Medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a violation. Toguchi,

391 F.3d at 1060. Thus, mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a condition does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. Also, an inadvertent failure to

provide adequate medical care alone does not rise to the Eighth Amendment level. Jett, 429

F.3d at 1096.

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate deliberate medical indifference

because he has not identified the individual responsible for denying him medical care.

Moreover, the facts Plaintiff alleges show at most negligence in providing him with medical

treatment; Plaintiff does not allege that his appointments were deliberately canceled, nor does

he allege that results of his assessment showed an immediate, serious need for care which

was ignored. Accordingly, Count IV will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

C. Count V

In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the courts because he has

not received a Rule 32 Post Conviction Relief hearing, “ILS” denied him access to the courts,

and “as of 7-27-08 . . ., [he has] yet to file the paperwork with the Superior Court of

Arizona.”

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state officials from actively

interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The right of access to the courts is only a right to bring petitions or

complaints to federal court and not a right to discover such claims or even to litigate them

effectively once filed with a court. Id. at 354; see also Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 899

(9th Cir. 1995) (“The right of access is designed to ensure that a habeas petition or civil

rights complaint of a person in state custody will reach a court for consideration.”) The right

“guarantees no particular methodology but rather, the conferral of a capability – the

capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement

before the courts.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. 

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As a matter of standing, for an access to courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he

suffered an “actual injury” with respect to contemplated litigation; the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the conduct of the defendants prevented him from bringing to court a

nonfrivolous claim that he wished to present. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53. An “actual injury”

is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability

to meet a filing deadline or present a claim.” Id. at 348. 

The Court notes first that the denial or grant of a hearing on a Rule 32 petition is made

by the state court, and not Inmate Legal Services. Further, Plaintiff has stated that he has

not yet sent his required paperwork to the state court, but he has not alleged that Defendants

have prevented him from doing so. Plaintiff states that “ILS” denied him access to the

Courts, but Plaintiff does not specifically state what “ILS” did or failed to do to deny that

access. 

Moreover, as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts for his

criminal prosecution is guaranteed by the State’s offer of a criminal defense attorney. The

Ninth Circuit and other courts have uniformly held that the right of access to the courts

cannot be violated when an inmate is offered the assistance of court-appointed counsel. See

United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The offer of courtappointed counsel to represent [Defendant] satisfied the Fifth Amendment obligation to

provide meaningful access to the courts.”); accord Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d 768, 769 (5th

Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“having rejected the assistance of court-appointed counsel, [the

defendant] had no constitutional right to access a law library in preparing the pro se defense

of his criminal trial”); United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1990) (“principles

of due process are not violated when a defendant waives his right to counsel, even though

by doing so he destroys any meaningful access to the court that he may have had”). The

Supreme Court of Arizona follows the same principles. See, e.g., State v. Henry, 863 P.2d

861, 876 (Ariz. 1993); Salstrom v. State, 714 P.2d 875, 878 (Ariz. 1986). 

Count V will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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D. Count VI

In Count VI, Plaintiff claims that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

when Defendants Gomez and Von Reeden purposefully destroyed Plaintiff’s personal

property and tampered with his legal paperwork.

In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), the Supreme Court held that due

process is not violated when a state employee negligently deprives an individual of property,

as long as the state makes available a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. The rationale

underlying Parratt was that predeprivation procedures are impractical when the deprivation

of property occurs through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, because

the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

533 (1984). This logic was extended to intentional deprivations of property. Id. The

availability of a common-law tort suit against the state employee constitutes an adequate

postdeprivation remedy. Id. at 534-35. Because Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation

remedy for the loss of his property, his property claims will be dismissed.

To the extent that Plaintiff claims his right to access to the courts was violated because

his legal work was tampered with, Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim. Plaintiff has not

alleged that he suffered an actual injury because of Defendants’ actions, as required to state

an access-to-the-courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53. Count VI will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim.

E. Count VII

In Count VII, Plaintiff claims that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated when he was subjected to a hostile work environment where some of the named

Defendants “repeatedly swore in [his] presence and directly at [him].” 

“‘Verbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987)

(quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979)). Count VII will therefore be

dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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F. Count VIII

In Count VIII, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hale refused to allow Plaintiff to

receive a law textbook, Plaintiff was refused a postcard, and on several occasions Plaintiff

did not timely receive a newspaper to which he had subscribed.

Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff,

52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,

407 (1989)). However, a prison may adopt regulations which impinge on an inmate’s

constitutional rights if those regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

Plaintiff has failed to allege that the denial of the book or postcard were not

reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. With respect to Plaintiff’s newspaper

subscription, in order to state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff must show that he suffered some

real injury: mere delay in receiving mail does not state a claim. See Morgan v. Montanya,

516 F.2d 1367, 1371 (2d Cir. 1975). Count VIII will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

G. Count IX

In Count IX, Plaintiff claims that he spoke with several Detention Officers about

obtaining a replacement water bottle and that Defendant Clark stated it was “a frivolous

issue.” Plaintiff states that suffered a lack of water for approximately eight and a half hours.

Plaintiff has failed to show a constitutional deprivation. “It cannot be said that all . .

.conditions . . . even if discomforting or undesirable, amount to deprivations of constitutional

dimensions . . . [A] federal court is not the proper forum for challenging or changing every

aspect of the harsh realities of confinement unless conditions cannot be tolerated under the

Constitution.” Thomas v. Smith, 559 F. Supp. 223, 224 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Griffin v.

Smith, 493 F. Supp. 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1980)). Count IX will be dismissed for failure to state

a claim.

. . .

. . .

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V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment rights were violated when

Defendant Clark issued a disciplinary ticket to Plaintiff for attending a church service that

was only offered on Sunday, rather than going to work. Plaintiff also alleges that his right

to free exercise of religion was violated the following Sunday when he was prevented from

attending the church service.

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Hayley, Carlson, Biggs, and Silbert

violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they retaliated against him for

filing grievances and the initial complaint in this action. Plaintiff claims that Defendants

prevented him from filing further grievances, informed him that he would be found guilty of

at least two disciplinary violations, and informed Plaintiff that he would face additional

security for filing grievances. The Court will construe this claim as brought pursuant to the

First Amendment. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-58 (9th Cir. 2005).

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations in Counts I and II adequately state a claim

and the Court will require Defendants Clark, Hayley, Carlson, Biggs, and Silbert to answer

Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint.

VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

. . . 

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C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Counts III through IX of the Amended Complaint and Defendants Arpaio,

Smith, MacPherson, Basham, Touchet, Reid, Gomez, Von Reeden, Gunn, Wells, Lewis,

Unknown, Marino, Bureau, Barrone, Chapman, McVaugh, Landry, Cain, Purslow, Hale, and

Webb are dismissed without prejudice.

(2) Defendants Clark, Hayley, Carlson, Biggs, and Silbert must answer Counts

I and II of the Amended Complaint (Doc. #10) . 

(3) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the Amended

Complaint (Doc. #10), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendants Clark, Hayley, Carlson, Biggs, and Silbert.

(4) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(5) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days

of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later,

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the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv

16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(6) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Amended

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(7) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Amended Complaint, and this

Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process

receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against

the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(8) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Amended

Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the

Plaintiff.

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(9) Defendant must answer the Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(10) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(11) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin pursuant to Rules 72.1

and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings.

DATED this 18th day of August, 2008.

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