Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02947/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02947-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT AND DEBORAH CAPSHAW,

NO. CIV. S-09-2947 LKK/CMK

Plaintiffs,

v.

O R D E R

WACHOVIA BANK, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

In this case, both plaintiffs and defendants have pending

motions. Plaintiffs have moved to remand the case to state court

and defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint. Both motions

are set to be heard on January 11, 2010. The court does not find

oral argument necessary in these matters, and has resolved the

motions on the papers. Accordingly, the hearings on the above

motions currently set for January 11, 2010 are vacated. 

Furthermore, for the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ motion

to remand to state court is granted. Plaintiffs’ request for fees

and costs is granted as to the amount of $2,250. Because the court

grants plaintiffs’ motion to remand, defendant’s motion to dismiss

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is denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 27, 2009, plaintiffs Robert and Deborah

Capshaw, proceeding pro per, filed a complaint against defendant

Wachovia Bank in state court. Plaintiff served the complaint on

defendant on March 2, 2009. This complaint stated that the court

had jurisdiction over the “Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claims

under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e)[,] . . . [the] Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act (RESPA) claims under 12 U.S.C. § 2607[,] . . .

[and] the Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA) [claims] under

15 U.S.C. § 1679g.” Complaint at ¶¶ 2-4. The complaint

subsequently enumerated six counts. The first two counts

concerned TILA, and cited U.S. Code and the Code of Federal

Regulations; the third count concerned RESPA, and similarly

cited U.S. Code; the fourth count concerned CROA, and likewise

cited U.S. Code. Defendant filed a demurrer and a motion to

strike portions of the original complaint.

On May 8, 2009, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint

in state court pro per. (“FAC”). Based on the record provided to

the court, it is unclear when defendant received this complaint.

In the jurisdictional section of this complaint, plaintiffs

stated that the court had jurisdiction over the “Truth in

Lending Act (TILA) claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). . . [and

over the] Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) claims

under 12 U.S.C. § 2607." FAC at ¶¶ 3-4. The first count in this

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complaint concerned violations of TILA and RESPA for failure to

provide disclosures; the second count concerned violations of

TILA’s rescission rights. Both counts cited to U.S. Code and the

Code of Federal Regulations. Defendant also filed a demurrer and

a motion to strike portions of the first amended complaint.

On October 7, 2009, plaintiffs, represented by counsel,

filed a second amended complaint. (“SAC”). Defendant received

this complaint on October 13, 2009. On October 21, 2009,

defendant removed the case to federal court. On October 27,

2009, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the second amended

complaint. On November 19, 2009, plaintiffs filed a motion to

remand the case to state court and a request for fees and costs.

Both motions are set to be heard on January 11, 2010.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Removal Was Proper

A civil action brought in state court is removable to

federal court where the district courts of the United States

have original jurisdiction, among other reasons. 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a). Defendants, however, must file a notice of removal

within thirty days after receipt of the initial pleading setting

forth “the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding

is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). “[T]he the first thirty-day

period for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) only applies if the

case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face.”

Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir.

2005). However, “[i]f the case stated by the initial pleading is

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not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty

days after receipt by the defendant, through service or

otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or

other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case

is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

Here, the face of plaintiffs’ original complaint was

clearly removable. This complaint clearly set forth claims for

relief based upon federal laws. Because “district courts . . .

have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under

the . . . laws . . . of the United States,” the district courts

had original jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ federal claims,

however inartfully pled. Subsequently, defendant’s notice of

removal must have been filed by April 1, 2009, thirty days after

service of the original complaint. Defendant, however, did not

file a notice of removal until October 21, 2009. Thus,

defendant’s notice of removal is procedurally improper, and

plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court is granted.

B. Whether Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Fees and Costs

When remanding a case to state court, district courts may

“require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,

including attorneys fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Supreme Court has held that, attorneys

fees should not be awarded automatically on remand, nor is there

a strong presumption that fees should be awarded. Martin v.

Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136-37 (2005). Rather, the

Court held that fees and costs should only be awarded where

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“such an award is just.” Id. at 138. Accordingly, the Court

concluded that “the standard for awarding fees should turn on

the reasonableness of the removal.” Id. at 141. Specifically,

“absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees

under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an

objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Id.

Here, defendant makes no argument concerning the

reasonableness of its decision to remove or of the amount of

fees sought by plaintiffs. Nonetheless, defendant does argue

that removal was timely because the issue of removability was

not evident on the face of plaintiffs’ original and first

amended complaints. This argument is not reasonable in that

plaintiffs specifically based the claims in their original and

first amended complaints on federal laws. Even if these claims

would not have survived a motion to dismiss, they still support

federal jurisdiction up until those claims are dismissed. Thus,

because defendant’s removal was unreasonable and because

defendant has not opposed plaintiffs’ calculation of fees,

plaintiffs are entitled to fees and costs.

In plaintiffs’ counsel, Daphne C. Lin’s, declaration

attached to their motion to remand, Lin declares that, “I spent

a total of five and a half (5 1⁄2) hours preparing this motions

[sic] and the supporting papers. I spent another twelve (12)

hours to oppose Wachovia’s Motion to Dismiss. I anticipate

spending four (4 1⁄2) hours replying to Wachovia’s opposition [to]

the motion to remand and attending the hearing on these

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motions.” Lin Declaration at ¶ 6. Lin continues to list her

current billing rate at $250, and indicates the total amount of

plaintiffs’ fees and costs as a result of the improper removal

to be $5,000. While defendant did not challenge the amount of or

calculation of fees, the court, upon consideration of the

totality of the circumstances, shall award plaintiffs $2,250.

The court deducts the twelve hours sought for time spent

opposing defendant’s motion to dismiss in that plaintiffs will

likely oppose a similar motion in state court; the court also

deducts one hour sought for the anticipated time spent attending

the hearings for both motions in that the court has vacated the

hearings. Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to nine hours of

attorneys’ fees at Lin’s billing rate of $250, which totals

$2,250.

C. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Because the court grants plaintiffs’ motion to remand,

defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby ORDERS that

plaintiffs’ motion to remand, Doc. No. 11, is GRANTED. Plaintiff

shall be awarded fees and costs from defendant in the amount of

$2,250.

The court further ORDERS that defendant’s motion to

dismiss, Doc. No. 6, is DENIED as moot.

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Accordingly, the hearings set for both motions on January

11, 2010 are VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 5, 2010.

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