Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00252/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00252-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL E. FEAGIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-CV-252-MHT

) [WO] 

)

SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by Michael E.

Feagin [“Feagin”], an indigent inmate, challenging the adequacy of medical treatment provided

to him for diabetes and diabetes-related complications during his confinement at the Covington

County Jail from December 7, 2009 until March 17, 2010. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 5. Feagin

names Southern Health Partners, the contract medical care provider for the Covington County

Jail, Dr. Millard McWhorter, a physician at the jail, and Annette Cain and Dianne Williams,

nurses employed by the jail, as defendants in this cause of action.

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The defendants filed a special report and relevant supporting evidentiary materials,

including affidavits and medical records, addressing Feagin’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the

orders entered in this case, the court deems it appropriate to construe this report as a motion for

Feagin incorrectly identifies Dr. McWhorter as Willard McWhorter and identifies nurse Williams merely as

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nurse Diane W. For purposes of this Recommendation, the court will utilize the proper identities of the defendants. 

Case 2:10-cv-00252-MHT-CSC Document 22 Filed 08/13/12 Page 1 of 16
summary judgment. Order of April 1, 2010 - Doc. No. 13. Thus, this case is now pending on

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the

evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the plaintiff’s response to the motion, the court

concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir. 2007)

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(per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (“The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for summary

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judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials

and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -]

of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet

this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing

that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 2

summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision ©, changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. 

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent

stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the rule remain

equally applicable to the current rule. 

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on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any

genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists.

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party failsto properly support an assertion of fact or failsto properly

address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits,

relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion

and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed -- show that the movant

is entitled to it.”) A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces

evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg,

498 F.3d at 1263.

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of [jail medical personnel]. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on

the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for

summary judgment, Feagin isrequired to produce “sufficient[favorable] evidence” which would

be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “If the

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evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ... or is not significantly

probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a

showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573,

1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise

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insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a

motion forsummary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275,

1279 (11 Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s th th

“conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to

withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant of

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summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory

allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11

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Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose

summary judgment....”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by

requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on

which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted

in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other factsimmaterial.”);

Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any part

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of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the

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case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, Florida,

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363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law

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applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of

Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that

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are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary

judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment

unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick

v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To

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demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “must do

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its

face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicatesthere is no genuine dispute of material

fact and the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary

judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where

pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to

a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (to establish a genuine dispute of material

fact, nonmoving party must produce evidence such that reasonable trier of fact could return a

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verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant

does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material

fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir.

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1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard of

elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Feagin fails to

demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment.

Matsushita, supra.

III. DISCUSSION

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A. Suit Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities - Absolute Immunity

To the extent Feagin suesthe defendantsin their official capacities, they are immune from

monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, ... treated

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as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official

Although the defendants present a defense based on Feagin’s failure to exhaust the administrative remedy 3

provided at the Covington County Jail, Feagin asserts the medical care provider has not implemented a grievance

procedure and the inmate handbook does not provide for the filing of grievances with respect to medical treatment. 

Plaintiff’s Response - Doc. No. 19 at 2; Plaintiff’s Exhibit D (Inmate Handbook) - Doc. No. 19-4 at 4 (“If at anytime you

feel that an officer has mistreated you, or implemented an excessive punishment, you are encouraged to fill out a

grievance on that officer.”). Feagin filed a grievance addressed to a captain at the jail as required by the inmate

handbook referencing an incident of elevated blood pressure on March 25, 2010. Defendants’ Exhibit C to the Affidavit

of Dennis Meeks - Doc. No. 11-3 at 10. The captain referred the grievance to medical personnel for a response. Based

on the foregoing and as the plaintiff is entitled to no relief, this court will address the merits of the plaintiff’s claims for

relief. 

Under all facets of Alabama law, a county sheriff, his jailers and medical staff act as state officers “when 4

supervising inmates and otherwise operating the county jails.” Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 137 F.3d 1285,

1289 (11 Cir. 1998); see Ala. Const. Art. V, § 112 (designates sheriff and, by extension, hisstaff as members of State’s th

executive department); see also Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442 (Ala. 1987) (county sheriff is executive officer of

the State). 

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may not be sued in his [or her] official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100,

104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).

Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916

F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s th

immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought against them in

their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11 Cir. 1997).

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In light of the foregoing, it is clear the defendants are state actors entitled to sovereign

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in

their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Georgia Department of

Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11 Cir. 1994).

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B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

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Feagin allegesthe defendants acted with deliberate indifference to various medical needs

resulting from his diabetes. Specifically, Feagin complains the defendants failed to (i) properly

It appears the alleged denial of medical treatment which forms the basis of the instant complaint occurred 5

during Feagin’s confinement as a detainee on felony charges pending the revocation of his probation. Nevertheless,

regardless of Feagin’s status in the jail, the applicable standard of review remains the same. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997); Cottrell v. th

Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11 Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (“Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or th

pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners.... However,

the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies equally to cases involving

arrestees or pretrial detainees.”); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11 Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. th

1096, 106 S.Ct. 1492 (1986) (For analytical purposes, there is no meaningful difference between the analysis required

by the Fourteenth Amendment and that required by the Eighth Amendment.); Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission, 10

F.3d 1535, 1539 (11 Cir. 1994) (observing that “[w]hether the alleged violation is reviewed under the Eighth or th

Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial.”). 

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monitor his blood sugar, cholesterol and blood pressure, (ii) prescribe appropriate medication

for treatment of his conditions, and (iii) order an appropriate treatment plan. The defendants

adamantly deny they acted with deliberate indifference to Feagin’s medical conditions and,

instead, maintain they provided Feagin with appropriate treatment for his conditions.

The assertions made by Feagin fail to establish deliberate indifference as the medical

records indicate the defendants provided treatment to Feagin based on his medical history and

their evaluations of his conditions. These records establish that upon his entry into the

Covington County Jail on December 7, 2009 jail medical personnel immediately examined

Feagin and prescribed medications for treatment of his medical issues. The medical records

further demonstrate that medical personnel routinely examined Feagin regarding his complaints

of low blood sugar, high blood sugar, chest pains and high cholesterol, continuously adjusted his

medication, performed twice daily then weekly tests of his blood sugar levels and routinely

checked his vital signs.

To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of adequate medical treatment, an

inmate must, at a minimum, show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254

(11 Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11 Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871

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F.2d 1030, 1033 (11 Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11 Cir.1986).

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Specifically, medical personnel may not subject an inmate to “acts or omissions sufficiently

harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106,

97 S.Ct. at 292; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11 Cir. 1995) (citation and internal

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quotations omitted) (Under Estelle, plaintiff must establish “not merely the knowledge of a

condition, but the knowledge of necessary treatment coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in

[the acknowledged necessary] treatment.” Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 787 (11 Cir.1989).

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In order to properly establish “deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need ..., Plaintiff[]

must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need;

and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc.,

588 F.3d 1291, 1306-1307 (11 Cir. 2009). When seeking relief based on deliberate

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indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an objectively serious need, an objectively

insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual

inference of required action from those facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d

at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to

the prisoner). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164,

168 (4 Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just

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knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of

deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he

should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be

condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

In articulating the scope of inmates’ right to be free from deliberate

indifference, ... the Supreme Court has ... emphasized that not ‘every claim by a

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prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of

the Eighth Amendment.’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291; Mandel, 888

F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth amendment only when it is ‘so

grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be

intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted).

Mere incidents of negligence or malpractice do not rise to the level of

constitutional violations. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292 (‘Medical

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim

is a prisoner.’); Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical

malpractice ‘not sufficient’ to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871

F.2d at 1033 (mere medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate

indifference). Nor does a simple difference in medical opinion between the

prison’s medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of

treatment support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871

F.2d at 1033 (citing Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4 Cir.1977)).

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Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11 Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (citation and

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internal quotations omitted) (To show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that [the] defendants’ response to the need was more than “merely

accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice

actionable understate law.”). Moreover, “as Estelle teaches, whether government actors should

have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of

a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability

under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545; Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896,

898 (7 Cir. 2001) (“A difference of opinion as to how a condition should be treated does not

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give rise to a constitutional violation.”); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11 Cir.

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1985) (mere fact inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to

deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

(9 Cir. 1981) (prison medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because

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their opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient). Selfserving statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory,

contemporaneously created medical records. See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11 Cir.

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1990).

Upon his entry into the Covington County Jail in December of 2009, medical personnel

performed a medicalscreening of Feagin. After obtaining information regarding Feagin’srecent

treatment by free-world physicians, Dr. McWhorter prescribed medication he deemed

appropriate in treating the conditions presented by Feagin. Medical personnel also performed

checks of Feagin’s blood sugar levels two times per day until his blood sugars stabilized in late

January of 2010. At this time, medical personnel administered weekly blood sugar tests on

Feagin. The probative evidentiary materials before the court further demonstrate that the jail’s

medical staff routinely examined Feagin when he presented with complaints, thoroughly

evaluated his complaints and provided treatment as they deemed medically necessary. Thus,

Feagin received medical treatment for his diabetes and related conditions upon his initial intake

and throughout his confinement in the Covington County Jail in the form of physical

examinations, medical evaluations, prescription medication and performance of various tests.

The affidavit filed by defendant Cain addresses the claims before this court, in pertinent

part, as follows:

The plaintiff was booked into the Covington County Jail on December 7,

2009. Later that day, I completed a medical staff screening form, wherein the

plaintiff stated that he had been treated for diabetes, high cholesterol and ulcers

and was taking 70/30 insulin twice a day, Humulin R insulin on a sliding scale as

needed, Glucophage 850 mg twice a day and Glucotrol (Glipizide) 20 mg twice

a day. During his initial screening, the plaintiff indicated that he was under the

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care of Dr. Johnson and Dr. McWhorter and that he was filling his prescriptions

at City Drug, Darby’s and Wal Mart. The plaintiff’s vitalsigns were checked, and

his blood pressure was 110/74, which is normal.

After the plaintiff’s screening, I followed up with Dr. Johnson and Dr.

McWhorter to verify the treatment provided to the plaintiff. Dr. Johnson’s nurse

indicated that the plaintiff had been released as a patient on August 20, 2009, due

to non-compliance; specifically, Dr. Johnson had tested the plaintiff’s glucose

level and the plaintiff had not been taking his insulin. The plaintiff was given

prescriptions by Dr. Johnson for Zocor, Glucophage, Soma, Lortab and Humulin

R. On August 25, 2009, he had seen Dr. McWhorter outside the jail at Dr.

McWhorter’s private office, and Dr. McWhorter had prescribed Neurontin and

Ultram. After contacting the pharmacies at City Drug, Wal Mart and Darby’s, I

determined that the plaintiff filled his Lortab, Soma and Neurontin prescriptions

as well as filling a prescription for a 90 day supply of Glipizide, a blood sugar

medication similar to Glucophage. The plaintiff had not filled his prescriptions

for Glucophage, Zocor or Humulin R, and, as such, it did not appear that he had

taken these medications since August 2009.

On December 9, 2009, Dr. McWhorter entered an Order, prescribing

Glipizide 10 mg. twice a day and Humulin R insulin on a sliding scare twice a day

for the plaintiff’s diabetes. Pursuant to Dr. McWhorter’s protocol, Humulin R

was only to be administered if needed to control high blood sugar levels.

Thereafter, from December 9, 2010 through late January 2010, a blood sugar flow

sheet was completed twice daily on the plaintiff, documenting his blood sugar

levels twice a day and providing insulin as needed. The blood sugar flow sheet

is included in the medical records [contained in the exhibits before the court].

On December 19, 2009, Dianne Williams, LPN completed a history and

physical of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s blood pressure was 110/70, and he gave

a history of diabetes and hyperlipidemia. In his medical history, the plaintiff

stated “none” when asked if he was on any current medications.

On January 8, 2010, plaintiff completed a sick call slip, complaining

primarily of a red irritation on the bottom of his right big toe and athlete’s foot.

He also complained of chest pain in his upper left chest area, high cholesterol and

stated that he thought he needed Zocor for his lipids and Glucophage for his

diabetes. In response to this sick call, on January 9, 2010, the plaintiff was seen

by Dianne Williams, LPN, and Nurse Williams examined his feet and no fungus

was noted. After examining the plaintiff, Nurse Williams documented that no

treatment was indicated.

On January 20, 2010, the plaintiff completed a sick call form, complaining

of chest pain and stating that he had high cholesterol. On the same day, he was

seen by Dr. McWhorter, who noted that the inmate was complaining of mid

sternal chest pain and observed that the plaintiff’s blood sugars had been

fluctuating. Dr. McWhorter assessed the plaintiff with non insulin dependent

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diabetes and ordered that the plaintiff receive Glucophage 1000 mg. twice a day

in addition to the Glipizide he was already receiving. With respect to the

plaintiff’s complaints of chest pain, Dr. McWhorter told the plaintiff that it was

Dr. McWhorter’s opinion that the chest complaint was muscular and not

cardiovascular, and that there was no treatment indicated. The plaintiff’s blood

pressure was 136/90, which is within normal limits.

Since January 20, 2010, the plaintiff has completed no further sick call

slips with respect to chest pain.

In late January 2010, after the plaintiff’s blood sugars began to stabilize,

Dr. McWhorter directed me to scale back the plaintiff’s blood sugar checks to

once a week. From late January through early March, the plaintiff’s blood sugars

were checked weekly and they remained stable, never rising to the level that

insulin was required.

On March 3, 2010, Dr. McWhorter entered a written Order that the

plaintiff’s blood sugar be checked every Friday. As of today [March 30, 2010],

the plaintiff’s last blood sugar check was this past Friday, March 26, 2010, and

his blood sugar level was 112, which is within normal limits. The plaintiff’s

blood sugars have remained stable enough that insulin has not been required since

January 26, 2010.

On March 25, 2010, the plaintiff completed a sick call slip, complaining

of high blood pressure. In response to this complaint, I saw the plaintiff and

checked his blood pressure, which read 122/86. 122/86 is within normal limits.

That morning, prior to seeing the plaintiff, a correction officer related to me that

the plaintiff had complained during the night that he thought he had high blood

pressure. The plaintiff’s blood [pressure] was taken on the automatic blood

pressure machine [that night], which gave a reading of 166/106, which is slightly

elevated. When I saw the plaintiff on March 25, 2010, I explained to him that the

blood pressure machine will sometimes reach an amount that is higher than what

would be reached if checked manually. I then manually checked the plaintiff’s

blood pressure and his reading was 122/86.

Since being incarcerated on December 7, 2009, the plaintiff has

consistently registered normal blood pressure readings.

Defendants’ Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Annette Cain, LPN) - Doc. No. 11-2 at 3-6; Defendants’

Exhibit 1 (Affidavit of Dr. Millard McWhorter) - Doc. No. 11-1 at 3-6 (same). The synopsis of 

treatment provided to Feagin as detailed by the defendants in their affidavits is supported by the

medical records filed in this case, Defendants’ Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Nurse Cain - Doc.

No. 11-2 at 9-39, and there is nothing before the court which undermines the validity of these

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records.

Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes the course of treatment

undertaken by the defendants in addressing Feagin’s diabetes, cholesterol, hypertension and

chest pain did not violate his constitutional rights. The medical care Feagin received was

certainly not “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to

be intolerable to the fundamental fairness.” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. The allegations presented

by Feagin simply fail to establish deliberate indifference. Garvin, 236 F.3d at 898 (difference

of opinion regarding manner in which condition should be treated fails to demonstrate a

constitutional violation); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545-1546 (Whether medical personnel “should

have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of

a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis” on which to ground

constitutional liability. In addition, inmate’s allegation prison physician did not diligently pursue

alternative means of treating condition “did not ‘rise beyond negligence’... to the level of

deliberate indifference.”); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505 (inmate’s desire for some other form of

medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution);

Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (simple divergence of opinions between medical personnel and

inmate-patient do not violate the Eighth Amendment).

It is undisputed Feagin received continuous medical care for his diabetes and other related

conditions and evident the defendants rendered treatment to Feagin in accordance with their

professional judgment. Based on wellsettled law cited herein, Feagin’s mere desire for different

modes of medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. In addition, Feagin has

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failed to present any evidence which indicates the defendants knew the manner in which they

provided treatment created a substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge

consciously disregarded such risk. The record is therefore devoid of evidence, significantly

probative or otherwise, showing the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Feagin’s

medical conditions. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the

defendants. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before August 27, 2012, the parties may file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking

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on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court

except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding

precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 13 day of August, 2012.

th

/s/Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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