Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02461/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02461-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARON L. PATTERSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

 

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No. 04-02461 SC

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION

Sharon L. Patterson ("Plaintiff" or "Claimant") moves for

summary judgment on her action seeking review of the Social

Security Commissioner's final decision denying Plaintiff's claim

for Social Security disability benefits. Defendant Jo Anne

Barnhart ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") has cross-motioned for

summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, this Court

hereby DENIES Plaintiff's motion and GRANTS Defendant's crossmotion. 

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II. BACKGROUND

Claimant Sharon Patterson worked as a psychiatric technician

for Mendocino County from October 1990 until December of 1993. 

Administrative Record ("AR") at 424-25. During the last six

months of her employment as a psychiatric technician, Claimant

suffered two separate on-the-job injuries to her back that

ultimately prevented her from continuing to work as a technician. 

Id. First, in June 1993, Claimant was assisting in moving a

patient down a hallway when Claimant was unexpectedly saddled with

the entirety of the patient's weight, causing unspecified injury

to Plaintiff's back. Id. After receiving treatment from a

physician and a chiropractor, Plaintiff returned to work. AR at

214. In September 1993, Claimant was attempting to restrain a

patient when she experienced a "pop" in her back and felt pain in

her right side and leg. Id. Despite enjoying some progress as a

result of her physical therapy, Claimant did not feel able to

return to her full work duties by December 1993 because of

continued back spasms and back pain. AR at 197; Plaintiff's

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 4 ("Pl.

Mem."). Claimant ultimately left her position as a psychiatric

technician in December 1993. AR at 225.

 Claimant continued to experience pain and spasms in her

back during the Spring of 1994, and an MRI performed in April of

that year revealed degeneration of the L4-5 and L5-S1

intervertebral discs. AR at 190. The April 1994 MRI also

demonstrated a "broadly based bulge of the disc annulus" at L4-5,

and "central spinal stenosis" at L4-5 and L5-S1, both described as
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"mild." Id. Claimant spent the remaining months in 1994 and the

beginning of 1995 participating in a variety of treatment and

therapy programs for her back pain and depression, evidently

without much success. Pl. Mem. at 5-6. During this period,

Plaintiff worked as a drug and alcohol counselor for several hours

a day, twice a week, but reports that she was ultimately unable to

continue in this line of work beyond February 1995 because

management requested that she increase her workload to six hours

per day, a duration Plaintiff claims she was not physically

capable of accommodating. AR at 424. 

In January 1996, Claimant was evaluated by Dr. Dee Filgas,

who reported that Claimant was suffering from disc degeneration,

leg pain, intermittent urinary incontinence, depression, and

insomnia. AR at 214-219. In February 1997, Dr. Filgas referred

Plaintiff to Dr. Gary McCarthy, who noted the spread of

Plaintiff's leg pain to her left side, and confirmed earlier

diagnoses of limited range of motion, considerable back pain, and

underlying depression. AR at 253. Upon reviewing the results of

a May 1997 MRI which showed "a very large L5-4 disc severely

compressing the thecal sac," Dr. McCarthy recommended removal of

the bulging disc in a procedure known as a lumbar laminectomy, a

procedure he successfully performed in June 1997. AR at 248. 

In September 1997, Dr. A. K. Bhattacharyya performed a

disability evaluation of the Plaintiff at the request of the State

Department of Social Service. AR at 231. After reviewing

Plaintiff's medical records, including the reports of Dr.

McCarthy, Dr. Bhattacharyya opined that while the Plaintiff
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1

 Plaintiff took exception to these conclusions and has

consistently maintained that Dr. Bhattacharyya only examined her

for a very short period of time, during which he did not perform

those tests necessary to arrive at his conclusion that Plaintiff

was able to return to work. In this respect, Plaintiff has

asserted that Dr. Bhattacharyya's report is fraudulent. 

4

experienced lower back pain as a result of the laminectomy, she

did not demonstrate evidence of neuromuscular dysfunction related

to the surgery, and was capable of returning to work based on her

job qualifications. AR at 232.1 

An unknown consultant who reviewed Claimant's medical records

but who did not examine the Claimant concluded in October 1997

that Plaintiff could return to light duty. AR at 239. These

findings stand in some contrast to the reports issued by Dr.

McCarthy over the same time period, in which he found that

Claimant's condition was worsening. AR at 244.

In May 1998, Claimant was admitted to the emergency

department of Redbud Community Hospital after experiencing

numbness in her feet. AR at 339. Dr. Simmons, the physician who

reviewed films taken of Plaintiff's lower back during her stay in

the emergency department, noted "minimal degenerative changes" in

Plaintiff's lumbosacral spine. AR at 340.

A hearing on Plaintiff's claim for Social Security disability

benefits was held on December 1, 1998, in Ukiah, California,

before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") James S. Carletti. AR at

29. On January 12, 1999, the ALJ ruled that Claimant was not

disabled, and that decision became final when the Appeals Council

declined to review the ALJ's decision. AR at 10, 5-6. Plaintiff

then filed an action in the Northern District of California,
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2 It is at least worth noting that Claimant did not voice any

objection or protest at her hearing when it was determined that Dr.

Bhattacharyya would not honor the subpoena.

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seeking review of the Commissioner's decision, see Patterson v.

Barnhart, No. C-00-04800 SC (N.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 2001), an action

that resulted in a remand following joint stipulation. In that

case, this Court remanded the matter to the ALJ for purposes of

"allowing the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to consider and

address Claimant's allegations regarding the consultative

examination by neurologist A. K. Bhattacharyya [and to] reassess

the credibility of Claimant's allegations of pain and

limitation...and re-evaluate Claimant's residual functional

capacity to determine whether Claimant can still perform other

work in the national economy." Id.

On remand, Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before ALJ Gilbert

Pavlovsky on April 16, 2002, in Ukiah, California. AR at 512. 

Prior to the hearing, Plaintiff moved for and obtained a subpoena

ordering Dr. Bhattacharyya to appear at the hearing so that

Plaintiff would have the opportunity to cross-examine him as to

the basis for his medical conclusions. AR at 450-51. Dr.

Bhattacharyya did not appear at the hearing, and the ALJ did not

enforce the subpoena.2

 AR at 535. On September 12, 2002, the ALJ

issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled, and

therefore not entitled to Social Security benefits. AR at 357-65. 

In his decision, the ALJ considered testimony presented by the

Plaintiff and her family members, and made findings with respect

to the credibility of that testimony based upon the extent to
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which those witnesses were in a position to observe Plaintiff's

limitations, as well as the degree to which their testimony was

consistent with reports detailing Plaintiff's daily activities. 

Id. That decision became final on April 13, 2004, when the

Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision. AR at 348. 

Plaintiff then brought this action and now moves for summary

judgment. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This court may set aside the decision of the ALJ if it is

based on an incorrect application of the law or is not supported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial

evidence" is the relevant evidence which a reasonable person might

accept as adequate to support the ALJ's conclusion. Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). In order to be

"substantial," the evidence must amount to "more than a mere

scintilla," but need not rise to the level of a preponderance. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Where the

evidence could reasonably support either affirming or reversing

the ALJ's decision, this Court may not substitute its judgment for

the ALJ's decision. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21. "The ALJ is

responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in

medical testimony and ambiguities." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503,

509 (9th Cir. 2001). 

IV. DISCUSSION

This case calls on the Court to decide two different issues:

(1) whether the ALJ complied with this Court's remand order of

July 3, 2001, and (2) whether the ALJ's decision was supported by
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substantial evidence. The Court will first address Plaintiff's

claims that the proceedings on remand did not comply with this

Court's order, and will then determine whether the ALJ's opinion

was supported by substantial evidence.

A. The Proceedings on Remand and the Challenged Report

The heart of Plaintiff's claim before this Court is that the

ALJ committed legal error by relying, to some extent, on Dr.

Bhattacharyya's report in which he opined that Plaintiff was able

to return to work. See Pl's. Mem. at 12. Specifically, Plaintiff

argues that she was denied due process when the ALJ failed to

enforce the subpoena requiring Dr. Bhattacharyya to appear at the

hearing, and that this failure to compel Dr. Bhattacharyya to

appear at the hearing contradicted the terms of this Court's

remand order. Id at 12-13.

The federal courts have reached different results with

respect to the question of the extent of a claimant's due process

right to cross-examine a witness in Social Security disability

cases. The Supreme Court has not squarely ruled on this issue,

but did provide some insight into this question when, in

Richardson v. Perales, it ruled that medical reports could be

received in evidence, despite their hearsay character and absence

of cross-examination, and could be relied on as substantial

evidence supporting a decision adverse to the claimant where the

claimant has not exercised his right to subpoena the physician and

thereby provide himself with the opportunity for crossexamination. 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). In Lidy v. Sullivan, the

Fifth Circuit took the implication of the Supreme Court's decision
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in Perales a step further when it held that a claimant has a right

to cross-examine an examining physician when the claimant has

properly requested a subpoena. 911 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir.

1990). In so holding, the Fifth Circuit noted support of varying

degrees for that proposition among several other federal courts of

appeal. Id; compare Coffin v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1206, 1212 (8th

Cir. 1990) (stating that "[d]ue process requires that a claimant

be given the opportunity to cross-examine and subpoena the

individuals who submit reports.") with Townley v. Heckler, 748

F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that a claimant has a due

process right to cross-examine the author of an adverse report and

to present rebuttal evidence where the report is submitted posthearing).

On the other hand, in Flatford v. Chater, the Sixth Circuit

held that a Social Security claimant did not necessarily have the

right to subpoena and cross-examine a medical expert who authored

a report that was adverse to his claim and was submitted to the

ALJ after conclusion of the hearing. 93 F.3d 1296 (6th Cir.

1996). The court found that the ALJ's decision whether to issue a

subpoena in those situations was governed by the more general duty

imposed on all ALJs to ensure full and fair development of the

record. Id. at 1306-07.

Finally, although the Ninth Circuit has not specifically

addressed this precise question, the court's ruling in Solis v.

Schweiker provides ample guidance for this Court to resolve this

issue. 719 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1983). In Solis, the Ninth Circuit

held that "where [a] physician is a crucial witness whose findings
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substantially contradict the other medical testimony, and

when...interrogatories are an inadequate substitute for crossexamination, [a] claimant has been denied procedural due process

if his request to subpoena the physician is not granted." 719

F.2d at 301. Together, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Solis and

the Supreme Court's ruling in Perales provide support for

Claimant's position that the ALJ should either have enforced the

subpoena issued to Dr. Bhattacharyya or disregarded his medical

opinion. See id; Perales, 402 U.S. at 402 (suggesting that the

"right" to subpoena a physician includes the attendant

"opportunity" to cross-examine him). This Court therefore finds

that the ALJ erred in considering the medical opinion of Dr.

Bhattacharyya without having enforced the subpoena and provided

Claimant an opportunity to cross-examine him. 

However, as explained below, the ALJ did not need to rely on

Dr. Bhattacharyya's contested opinion in order to properly reach a

finding that Claimant was not disabled. The role of the

challenged report in the overall scheme of Plaintiff's disability

claim is therefore not dispositive, and the Court will now turn to

the question of whether the ALJ's decision was otherwise supported

by substantial evidence.

B. Was the ALJ's Decision Supported by Substantial Evidence?

In her moving papers, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's

decision was not supported by substantial evidence because he

improperly rejected her testimony and the testimony provided by

her family members. Pl. Mem. at 16. As to the testimony provided

by Claimant, the ALJ expressly considered her alleged functional
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limitations and symptoms. See AR at 361-63. After reviewing

Claimant's testimony along with her own reports of her daily

activities, the ALJ determined that "the alleged intensity,

persistence, and functionally limiting effects of claimant's

symptoms are not found to be entirely credible." AR at 363; see

also AR at 362 ("Claimant's daily activities also show that her

symptoms are not as severe as claimed."). This is precisely the

kind of credibility determination entrusted to ALJs in Social

Security disability cases and, consequently, is expressly outside

the province of District Courts sitting in review of the Social

Security Commissioner's final decision. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at

509.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the

testimony of Plaintiff's in-laws on the grounds that they see her

"rarely," since Plaintiff's father-in-law reported visiting her

"every 2-3 months...usually for several days at a time," and

Plaintiff's mother-in-law reported seeing her "2 or 3 times a

year." Pl. Mem. at 16; AR at 460, 462. Without determining what

extent of yearly visitation with one's in-laws would constitute

"rare" as opposed to "frequent," the Court is satisfied that the

ALJ acted within his discretion when he considered the testimony

of Plaintiff's in-laws but ultimately found their assertions with

respect to the extent of Plaintiff's alleged limitations not

"entirely credible." AR at 363; Cf. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d

915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the extent to which a lay

witness observes a claimant is a permissible factor in judging

what weight to accord that witness' testimony); Sprague v. Bowen,
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812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that "[d]escriptions

by friends and family members in a position to observe a

claimant's symptoms and daily activities have routinely been

treated as competent evidence.")(emphasis added). 

It is significant that the ALJ's assessment of the statements

of Plaintiff's in-laws was also based on reasons articulated

elsewhere in the ALJ's decision. For example, Plaintiff's fatherin-law reported that, on his visits to Plaintiff's home, Plaintiff

had become "incapacitated by pain," and demonstrated an "inability

to do even the simplest of tasks." Ar at 460. Claimant's motherin-law reported that when Plaintiff had come to visit her in

Oregon, she "is always laid up and not able to do anything for

days." AR at 462. In his decision, however, the ALJ noted that

Plaintiff reported participation in such activities as "care for

her children, taking them to school and picking them up from

school." AR at 361. The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff had

reported cooking, cleaning, shopping, watching television,

reading, and visiting with her mother. AR at 362. Finally, the

ALJ noted that the death of Plaintiff's mother forced her to do

more for herself, and that she was employed from March 2000 to

July 2000 as a census bureau enumerator/crew leader. Id. These

apparent conflicts between the statements of Plaintiff's in-laws

and Plaintiff's own statements regarding her daily activities

provide an additional, legitimate basis on which the ALJ properly

discounted the weight accorded to the statements of Plaintiff's

family members. See, e.g., Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346

(9th Cir. 1991) 
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Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by offering "no

reasons for rejecting the testimony from Mr. Patterson, Claimant's

husband." Pl. Mem. at 16. Plaintiff asserts that in noting only

that "consideration" was given to Mr. Patterson's testimony, the

ALJ ran afoul of Social Security Ruling 96-7p, directing ALJs to

provide "specific reasons for the finding on credibility,

supported by evidence in the case record." Pl. Mem. at 16. 

Defendant counters by noting that Mr. Patterson never testified to

having witnessed Plaintiff's allegedly debilitating panic attacks,

and that, in any event, the ALJ provided proper reasons for

declining to fully credit Mr. Patterson's testimony when he noted

its inconsistency with Plaintiff's daily activities, as reported

by both Mr. Patterson and the Claimant. Def. Mem. at 8. This

Court finds that although the ALJ did not explicitly state that he

was according Mr. Patterson's testimony little or no credibility

because of its inconsistency with other testimony regarding

Plaintiff's activities, the ALJ did not thus contravene the

mandate of Social Security Ruling 96-7p. A fair reading of the

ALJ's decision demonstrates that he did not find Mr. Patterson's

testimony entirely credible because of its inconsistency with

other aspects of his testimony, and because of its inconsistency

with elements of Plaintiff's testimony. See AR at 361-63. This

is a permissible basis on which to reject layperson testimony, see

Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995), and where the

ALJ's credibility determinations are based on proper criteria,

this Court is not empowered to second-guess those determinations. 

See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509.
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Because the ALJ based his credibility determination with

respect to Claimant's testimony and the testimony of her family

members on permissible criteria, the final remaining inquiry for

this Court is whether the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff is not

disabled was supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). In determining that Plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ

credited the testimony of the vocational expert offered at the

initial hearing held on December 1, 1998. AR at 363. At that

hearing, the vocational expert testified in response to a

hypothetical question that certain jobs existed both nationally

and regionally that would be appropriate for persons exhibiting

physical restrictions similar to those the ALJ ultimately found to

apply to the Plaintiff. See AR at 438-39; 363. Accordingly,

because the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled was based

on both Plaintiff's own testimony with respect to her daily

activities and the report of the vocational expert offered at a

previous hearing, the ALJ's decision was based on "substantial

evidence" as that term has been construed by the Ninth Circuit. 

See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. Although this case does present a

close call because of the lack of definitive and unambiguous

medical evidence on either side, where the evidence could

reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ's

decision, this Court may not substitute its judgment for the ALJ's

decision. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21. 

V. CONCLUSION

Although the ALJ should not have considered the challenged

report of Dr. Bhattacharyya after he failed to honor a subpoena,
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the ALJ's decision was nonetheless supported by substantial

evidence because he used permissible criteria in assessing the

credibility of the testimony offered by Plaintiff's family

members, and because the ALJ based his decision on the testimony

of a vocational expert offered at a previous hearing, the

testimony of the Claimant herself, and the entirety of the medical

evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is

DENIED and Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: August 29, 2005 ____________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE