Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01410/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01410-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIAN SWIG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JON R. ROLOFSON, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-01410 CRB

ORDER

Now before the Court is plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 

A court may authorize a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without prepayment

of fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable to pay

such fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Nonetheless, a court is under a continuing duty to

dismiss a case seeking to proceed without the prepayment of fees whenever it determines that

the action “(I) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Here, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s representation that he “cannot afford the court costs

for this action.” His application to proceed in forma pauperis is therefore GRANTED. The

Court further determines, however, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief

can be granted. 

Case 3:07-cv-01410-CRB Document 6 Filed 03/20/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The complaint contains a good deal of incoherent discussion about the nature of the

federal system and the federal government’s “policy of cultural genocide” to undermine local

control. Nonetheless, there is a discernible political theory at work in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

Namely, he contends that the State of California is not a bona fide member of the federal

union; that all officers of the State of California are “renegade” officers who have improperly

usurped power and perpetuated a fraud among the persons currently living within its putative

borders; and that the acts of all California officials are null and void, including the actions of

certain judicial officers who ruled against Plaintiff in previous litigation in “so-called” state

court. Plaintiff explains his theory as follows:

In 1870 or 1871 the California legislature commissioned private

lawyers or legal scholars to codify the then existing laws of the State. The

commissioners exceeded their commission and crafted a Code pertaining

exclusively to the Federal Zone enclaves then existent within California. 

The Code was presented to the legislature in 1872. It was however never

enacted into law in accordance with the procedures set forth in the

Constitution of 1849. In the eyes of the law this was an is a void and vain

act. On January 1st 1873 the legislators went renegade; they followed the

Code which was never made law, and in doing so they vacated their offices. 

They foisted a fraud upon the people, a fraud which continues to this day. 

All successors to the legislators of 1873 have and do ignore the offices for

the State of the union, California.

The present state of affairs in California is the product of historical

treachery. The public is deluded into thinking that the present State of

California is a continuation of the same State established in 1849 and 1850. 

To suggest that all State offices are vacant is to go against the grain of

common opinion; it is to invite cognitive dissidence. Because of this your

plaintiff pleads as-if the defendants and all present day officers would have

lawful authority if only they restricted their operations to the Federal Zone

enclaves of 1872. This attributed authority is plaintiff’s own legal fiction to

aid in imparting knowledge of the status quo. Actual authority is nonexistent in either venue for the reason that the Code was and is never

lawfully and never legally enacted, and is non-existent for the reason that

Congress had/has exclusive jurisdiction to legislate for its enclaves in

California. To this day no persons enjoy lawful public office in California.

Compl. at 1-2. The consequences that flow from Plaintiff’s theory are complex. First, he

claims that this Court is not a properly constituted judicial body under Article III of the

federal Constitution. Rather, because it is not situated in a properly constituted State, it is a

judicial entity created under Article IV, which gives Congress authority to manage foreign

territories. (Plaintiff distinguishes between other properly constituted courts, which he calls

Case 3:07-cv-01410-CRB Document 6 Filed 03/20/07 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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“United States District Courts,” and improperly constituted judicial bodies such as this one,

which he calls “District Courts of the United States.”) Because Plaintiff views this Court as

an improperly constituted judicial body, and one that exists only because of Congress’s

power to regulate foreign territories, he demands the immediate reassignment of this case to a

judge from the International Court of Trade.

Second, Plaintiff claims that all legal proceedings in the so-called California courts are

null and void. Specifically, he labels the Alameda County Superior Court a “foreign and

fictitious court,” Compl. at 3, and he criticizes the judges of that and other so-called “state

courts” for failing to set aside their judicial oath to the State of California of 1873 and 1879

(the one widely recognized as one of the United States of America) and refusing to recognize

their solemn judicial obligation to the State of California of 1849 (the one recognized by

Plaintiff). Plaintiff thus seeks a declaration from this Court regarding his status and his rights

as a “common law man . . . entitled to protection by the State of California of 1850.” See

Compl. at 3, 16.

Third, Plaintiff seeks various forms of relief against three individuals: Jon Rolofson,

Elizabeth Rogers, and Pat Sweeten. According to the complaint, Rolofson is a judge and

Rogers is a deputy public defender in the unlawful and fictitious entity widely known as

California. Plaintiff alleges that these two officials once gave him an opportunity to speak at

a public meeting on “cooperative federalism,” but claims that when he began to speak, these

individuals silenced him and refused to recognize the validity of his political theory. As a

result, Plaintiff claims he was forced to bring this lawsuit against them in order to expose

their status as “renegade public officers.” See Compl. at 5-8. Finally, according to the

complaint, Sweeten is a clerk at a Superior Court in Oakland, where Plaintiff has also filed a

lawsuit against Rolofson and Rogers in a case that the complaint identifies as “RG

05248349.” Plaintiff filed this lawsuit to compel Sweeten to enter a default judgment against

Rolofson and Rogers in that action, which involves claims for, among other things, false

arrest.

//

Case 3:07-cv-01410-CRB Document 6 Filed 03/20/07 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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G:\CRBALL\2007\1410\order dismissing case.wpd4

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Whatever

the historical basis for Plaintiff’s understanding of California’s existential status and his own

identity as a “common law man,” this Court must follow binding precedent that recognizes

the State of California as a sovereign entity within the federal union. See, e.g., Riggle v.

State of California, 577 F.2d 579, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1978) (recognizing California’s claim of

sovereign immunity, and thus implicitly, its good standing within the federal union). The

Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-01410-CRB Document 6 Filed 03/20/07 Page 4 of 4