Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02169/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Carter was originally given lifetime probation. In 2009, the Adult Probation Office

submitted a Petition to Modify, recommending a five-year probationary term. The trial court

granted the motion on March 10, 2010 (Doc. 10, Exh O, V). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gordon B. Carter, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 10-2169-PHX-JWS (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Gordon B. Carter filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, challenging his convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court for one count each of

molestation of a child and attempted molestation of a child, and the imposition of a mitigated

15-year prison term followed by 5 years’ probation. 1

 The original 11-count indictment

alleged molestation of his step-daughter over a period of several years. In his petition, Carter

contends that the trial court unlawfully imposed an enhanced sentence. Respondents contend

that the petition is untimely filed, that Carter is not entitled to any statutory or equitable

tolling, and that his sole ground for habeas relief is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

The Court recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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 In State v. Davis, the supreme court held that sentencing a twenty-year-old defendant

to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifty-two years without the possibility of parole for

having voluntary sex with two post-pubescent teenage girls violated the eighth amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

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BACKGROUND

On August 13, 1999, Carter entered a guilty plea; on April 14, 2000, the trial court

imposed sentence (Doc. 10, Exh B, E). On July 10, 2000, following his guilty plea and

sentencing, Carter filed a timely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Id., Exh F). On January

10, 2001, appointed counsel requested withdrawal of the PCR notice and dismissal of the

post-conviction proceeding; (Id., Exh G). On January 23, 2001, the trial court granted

counsel’s request (Id., Exh H). On August 28, 2006, Carter filed a second Notice of Postconviction Relief (Id., Exh I). Carter alleged that the reason justifying his six-year delay in

filing his petition was that there had been a significant change in the law that would probably

overturn his conviction or sentence (Id. at 3). He also alleged a “lack of access to a legal

resource library” as the reason why he was not aware of the Arizona Supreme Court’s

decision in State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377 (2003). 2

 In his petition, he argued that his sentence

was so grossly disproportionate to the crime as to violate the eighth amendment prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment, requiring a remand to state court for resentencing. He

also argued that counsel provided ineffective assistance. On October 6, 2006, the trial court

dismissed the petition, concluding that Carter’s claim was precluded, and that State v. Davis

did not apply to his case (Id., Exh J). On November 7, 2006, Carter sought review of this

decision; on September 12, 2007, the court of appeals denied review (Id., Exh K, L). 

On September 28, 2009, Carter filed another Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. He

argued that counsel was ineffective, the sentence was illegal and unconstitutional, and

lifetime probation for attempted child molestation was an illegal sentence (Id., Exh M). On

November 3, 2009, the trial court dismissed the notices, concluding that Carter’s arguments

did not constitute newly discovered material facts which probably would have changed the

verdict or sentence (Id., Exh N). On December 14, 2009, Carter petitioned for review and

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on December 17, Carter filed a Notice of Appeal (Id. Exh P, Q). On December 29, 2009, the

court of appeals dismissed the appeal; on May 10, 2010, the supreme court denied review

(Id., Exh R, W). Carter’s petition for review is still pending in the court of appeals.

DISCUSSION

Carter was required to file his federal petition within one year of the “date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct.

681, 685 (2009). Because he pleaded guilty, he was entitled to a Rule 32 “of-right” postconviction relief proceeding, and the conclusion of that proceeding was the date on which

Carter’s conviction became final. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2007). Carter

filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief on July 10, 2000. On January 19, 2001, the trial

court granted Carter’s request to withdraw his notice, and dismissed the post-conviction

proceedings. Carter’s conviction became final on January 19, 2001. Absent statutory tolling,

he was required to file his petition on or before January 21, 2002. His present petition, filed

8 years, 8 months, and 17 days after this limitations period, is therefore untimely. 

Carter’s post-conviction petitions filed in 2006 and 2009 did not toll the limitations

period. “[A] properly and timely filed petition in state court only tolls the time remaining in

the federal limitation period.” See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.2001), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 949, 123 S.Ct. 1627, 155 L.Ed.2d 492 (2003). There can be no tolling

following the expiration of the limitations period because “there is no period remaining to

be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

991 (2000). Finally, Carter’s petition for post-conviction relief, filed six years after the

expiration of the limitations period, does not revive the expired limitations period. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

In addition, Carter is not entitled to equitable tolling. He has not demonstrated that

he had been pursuing his rights diligently and the existence of any extraordinary

circumstances which prevented him from timely filing his petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408, 418-19 (2005). In his Reply, Carter admits the petition is untimely, but

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provides no explanation for his many years of inaction. He filed nothing in state court for

almost six years. Instead he appears to be claiming “actual innocence” as an exception to the

limitations bar. His claim of actual innocence, however, does not relate to the charged

offense, but to the sentence imposed. The claim is without merit and does not justify

equitable tolling. First, Carter has repeatedly mischaracterized the sentence he received for

child molestation as an “enhanced sentence,” when in fact it was a mitigated prison term. 

In addition, he cites Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004), in support of his claim. However,

the issue in Dretke was whether the actual innocence exception to procedural default could

be extended to constitutional claims challenging noncapital sentencing error. The Supreme

Court declined to extend the exception. Dretke does not provide any support for Carter’s

claim that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Gordon Carter’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

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Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 24th day of May, 2011.

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