Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02557/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02557-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ZAPATA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CLARK DUCART, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-02557-EMC 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND REFERRING CASE 

TO MEDIATION PROGRAM

Docket Nos. 26, 32

I. INTRODUCTION

In this pro se prisoner’s civil rights action, Jose Zapata complains about the denial of his 

request for a religious diet at Pelican Bay State Prison. Defendants have filed a motion for 

summary judgment, which Mr. Zapata has opposed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment will be denied. The Court will refer this case to the Pro Se

Prisoner Mediation Program. 

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

A. The Parties and Relevant Time Period

The relevant time period in this action is from August 2016 through June 2017, when Mr. 

Zapata was a prisoner housed at Pelican Bay State Prison. In June 2017, he was transferred from 

Pelican Bay to the California State Prison – Los Angeles County, where he remains in custody. 

Mr. Zapata is a “Messianic Jew.” Docket No. 1 at 5. 

Four Defendants remain in this action. Robert Losacco was a community resource 

manager at Pelican Bay and was responsible for the religious diet program at Pelican Bay. Docket 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 1 of 22
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

No. 26-8 at 1. Mr. Losacco also was a member of the Religious Review Committee at that prison. 

Id. Clark Ducart was the warden at Pelican Bay who denied Mr. Zapata’s inmate appeal at the 

second level. M. Hodges, an appeals examiner, and M. Voong, the chief of the office of inmate 

appeals, denied Mr. Zapata’s inmate appeal at the third level. Docket No. 27 at 37.

A fifth Defendant upon whom the Court had ordered service of process, Rabbi Kreindler,

was later voluntarily dismissed by Mr. Zapata. See Docket Nos. 20, 21. Rabbi Kreindler 

allegedly initially denied Mr. Zapata’s kosher diet request, using the former regulations. Docket 

No. 1 at 6. 

B. Kosher Diets In The CDCR

A religious diet program exists in the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR). At least three religious diets are available for prisoners: vegetarian, 

kosher, and “religious meat alternate.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3054(e) (effective June 29, 

2016).

For several years before June 29, 2016, a regulation provided that a “Jewish Kosher Diet” 

was available to Jewish inmates who had been authorized to participate by a Jewish chaplain. See

former Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3054.2(a) (as amended through Feb. 2, 2010) (“Jewish kosher 

meals shall be available at designated institutions. Jewish inmates may participate in the program, 

as determined by a Jewish chaplain.”); see also id. at former § 3054.2(g)(1) (as amended through 

Feb. 2, 2010) (“A Jewish Chaplain shall . . . [d]etermine inmate entry into the Jewish kosher diet 

program, oversee the program, and determine Jewish inmate compliance violations.”).1

Effective June 29, 2016, the regulation regarding the kosher diet was amended. As a result 

of the amendment, (1) the name of the diet has changed from “Jewish kosher diet” to “kosher 

diet,” (2) the kosher diet is no longer limited to Jewish inmates, (3) the kosher diet can be 

approved by any chaplain or by the Religious Review Committee (RRC), and (4) the kosher diet 

 

1 Mr. Zapata did not request participation in the kosher diet until a couple of months after the 

June 29, 2016, amendment to this regulation. The former version of the regulation is mentioned 

because Mr. Zapata devoted a substantial part of his inmate appeal and his opposition brief in this 

Court to argue that prison officials erroneously applied the outdated regulation to his request for a 

kosher diet.

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 2 of 22
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

can be denied only by the RRC (and not by a chaplain). See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3054.2 (as 

amended effective June 29, 2016).2

To request any religious diet, a prisoner must fill out a CDCR-3030 form and submit it to 

any chaplain. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3054.4(a). The “Chaplain or designated 

representative of the RRC” will interview the prisoner and determine his eligibility for the 

requested diet. Id. at § 3054.4(b).

The CDCR-3030 form lets the prisoner state the diet he requests and lets the inmate attach 

documentation in support of his request. The CDCR-3030 form also requires the prisoner to sign 

an agreement to the conditions for the diet that states, in part, that he will not buy or consume food 

 

2 The regulation now provides, in relevant part:

(a) Kosher meals shall be available at designated institutions for 

inmates with a religious dietary need that cannot be met by another 

religious diet option or by the mainline diet. Inmates may seek 

participation in the Kosher Diet Program by submitting to any 

Chaplain a CDCR Form 3030, Religious Diet Program Request. 

The Chaplain may approve the Form 3030 request or refer it to the 

Religious Review Committee (RRC) for determination.

. . . .

(c) Inmates shall not give away, trade, or sell any portion of a kosher 

meal. Doing so may result in a compliance violation of the Religious 

Diet Program Agreement.

. . . .

(g) The Kosher Diet Program shall be administered in accordance 

with the provisions of this Article.

(1) A Chaplain designated by the RRC shall annually review each 

institution's processes for the procurement, storage, and distribution 

of Kosher Diet Program meals, and shall provide a report of the 

review to the Correctional Food Manager (CFM).

(2) Upon review of the CDCR Form 3030, Religious Diet Program 

Request, any Chaplain or the RRC shall determine inmate entry into 

the Kosher Diet Program.

(3) Only the RRC may make the determination to deny the CDCR 

Form 3030, Religious Diet Program Request.

(4) The RRC shall determine inmate compliance violations.

Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15, § 3054.2 (effective June 29, 2016).

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 3 of 22
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

incompatible with his requested diet. Docket No. 26-6 at 19 (“I understand that in order for me to 

participate in a Religious Diet Program, specific foods may be purchased and specialized food 

preparation practices may be utilized. Therefore I agree to the following conditions: . . . I may not 

purchase or consume any food items that are not part of my religious diet. I understand that my 

quarterly packages and canteen purchases may be routinely monitored.”). The agreement further 

provides that the prisoner will be warned the first time he violates a condition of the religious diet

and may be removed from the Religious Diet Program if he violates the conditions a second time 

within six months following a previous violation (although he may reapply six months thereafter). 

Id.

Defendants present undisputed evidence that the same considerations apply when deciding 

whether a prisoner may participate in the kosher diet program, regardless of whether he is a 

Messianic Jew or a traditional Jew. According to chaplain Shefflar, the Jewish chaplain at San 

Quentin: 

Both faiths base their kosher requirements on the Torah, a collection 

of books commonly referred to as the Old Testament or the Jewish 

Bible. Specifically, passages in the Book of Deuteronomy and the 

Book of Leviticus describe kosher dietary requirements. While 

Judaism and Messianic Judaism have many key differences, some of 

which are profound, the kosher diet requirements, also known as 

‘kashrut,’ are identical, based as they are on the exact same 

scripture. Docket No. 26-4 at 2. 

C. Mr. Zapata Requests a Kosher Diet

Mr. Zapata submitted a CDCR-3030 “religious diet program request” form dated 

August 27, 2016, requesting that he be provided a kosher diet and listing his religious/spiritual 

affiliation as “Judeo-Christianity/Messianic Judasim.” Docket No. 26-6 at 18 (error in source). In 

an attachment to his form, he discussed his religious practices and need for the kosher diet, as well 

as his argument that his request had to be processed under the new regulations and that he could 

not be denied a kosher diet just because he was not Jewish. Id. at 20-26.

Mr. Zapata submitted a CDCR-22 “inmate/parolee request for interview, item or service”

form dated August 28, 2016, stating that he wanted to be put on a kosher diet, and explaining that 

he had previously submitted a request and had been told that it had to be submitted to the Rabbi; 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 4 of 22
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

he urged that, under the new regulation, “any qualified chaplain has the authority to grant my 

request. Chaplains are still unaware, please notify them.” Docket No. 26-6 at 13. A “staff 

response” dated August 31, 2016, on that same CDCR form 22 stated “We met yesterday and the 

application is being forwarded.” Id.

There is another CDCR form 22 “inmate/parolee request for interview, item or service” 

with multiple dates on it from Mr. Zapata, which has no written response from staff. In the 

portion dated September 11, 2016, Mr. Zapata stated he was sending the request to Mr. Losacco 

and that he (Zapata) was trying to follow the new regulatory procedure “but was subject to former 

procedure” for his religious diet request. Docket No. 26-6 at 14.

Mr. Losacco learned of Mr. Zapata’s concern about the absence of a response to his 

application for a kosher diet. According to Mr. Losacco, the processing of the application had 

been delayed because it had been assigned to a chaplain who had cut back on his hours and 

eventually left the job, creating a “slight backlog of work that he had been assigned.” Docket No. 

26-8 at 2. Mr. Losacco spoke to Mr. Zapata and they “agreed that [Zapata] would submit a new 

application that [Losacco] would personally shepherd through the process and provide him with a 

decision on the request.” Docket No. 26-8 at 2. 

Mr. Zapata thus submitted a new request for a kosher diet dated October 1, 2016. Docket 

No. 26-8 at 9. The October 1, 2016 request is the one that was processed through completion.

The chaplain who reviewed the October 1 request referred the matter to the RRC. (Recall 

that, under the regulation, a chaplain can grant but cannot singlehandedly deny a request and 

instead must send it to the RRC for consideration.) The RRC denied Mr. Zapata’s request on or 

about November 14, 2016 based on his lack of understanding of the kosher requirements of his 

professed faith and his history of purchasing nonkosher items from the canteen. Docket No. 26-8 

at 2, 4. Mr. Losacco sent to Mr. Zapata a letter dated November 14 that stated: 

Your CDCR 3030, Religious Diet Request, was sent to the RRC 

religious diet subcommittee. Based on the information that you 

provided, which was carefully reviewed, you are being denied 

entrance into the [Jewish Kosher Diet (JKD) program]. In most 

cases when an inmate is denied, it is due to the fact that they were 

not able to satisfactorily demonstrate to the RRC that Judaism is 

their truly held religious belief. Either you are unfamiliar with 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 5 of 22
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Jewish law or the Shabbat. The reasons you gave in your appeal and 

the answers you gave the Rabbi to his questions during the CDCR 

3030 interview process, did not show that you are following/have 

self-discipline and devotion to Hashem. This of course, doesn’t 

preclude you from the JKD ever. Study the Torah, specifically the 

sections that cover the Sabbath, what you can and cannot eat, and 

why. Be sure to observe Jewish holidays; get a Jewish calendar if 

you do not already have one. Be cognizant of your canteen draws 

and make sure that you don’t accidentally order items that are not 

kosher. You may reapply six months after the date your denial was 

issued. In the meantime, you can be offered a least restrictive 

alternative in the form of a vegetarian diet or the religious meat 

alternative diet. [¶] I hope this has addressed your concerns. If you 

have any further questions or need advice please feel free to contact 

me or any of the chaplains.

Docket No. 26-6 at 12. On the CDCR-3030 form itself, Mr. Losacco gave a blunter assessment

and wrote in the “comments” box: “It is very evident that inmate Zapata has no clue as to Kosher 

or being Jewish.” Docket No. 26-8 at 9. 

Mr. Zapata states in his verified complaint that he “denies” the statements that he failed to 

provide sufficient answers about why he should receive the kosher diet. Docket No. 1 at 6. 

Mr. Zapata did not apply for the kosher program again while he remained at Pelican Bay, 

where he was housed for another eight months. 

In June 2017, Mr. Zapata was transferred to the California State Prison – Los Angeles 

County (CSP-LAC). He did not apply for that prison’s kosher diet program for six months. When 

Mr. Zapata finally applied, the CSP-LAC officials made their own assessment regarding his 

request: he was interviewed by a chaplain, who referred the matter to that prison’s RRC, which 

denied the request on December 26, 2017. The RRC at CSP-LAC determined that Mr. Zapata’s 

responses to the required questions did not demonstrate a need for a religious diet. As of October 

3, 2018 (i.e., the day before the motion for summary judgment was filed), Mr. Zapata had not 

renewed his request. Docket No. 26-7 at 3.

D. Mr. Zapata Regularly Purchases Nonkosher Food From The Canteen

Pelican Bay provides a canteen service that allows prisoners to purchase food, toiletries 

and miscellaneous items for personal use. Docket No. 26-1 at 1. To obtain items from the 

canteen, a prisoner submits an order form on which he checks the items he wants, after which his 

account is checked and funds are deducted to pay for the items that are then provided to the 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 6 of 22
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

prisoner. The order form contains information to assist prisoners who are following religious diets 

that require them to keep kosher. Specifically, a bold “K” appears on the order form next to the 

price of each food item that is kosher. Id. at 2. This allows prisoners keeping kosher to avoid 

nonkosher items.

The Pelican Bay canteen manager provided a copy of a printout of Mr. Zapata’s canteen 

purchasing history for the period of September through November 2016 to the Religious Review 

Committee in November 2016. Docket No. 26-1 at 1. That list shows that Mr. Zapata bought at 

least four nonkosher food items that were marked as nonkosher foods on the order form. See

Docket No. 26-1 at 5-10. Specifically, he bought four strawberry crush sodas. Docket No. 26-1 at 

10. He also bought 73 packets of “ramen chili,” id., which may or may not have been kosher as 

the only two chili products listed on the order form, id. at 5, are not marked as being kosher. 

After his kosher diet request was denied, Mr. Zapata bought numerous nonkosher items 

from the prison canteens at Pelican Bay and CSP-LAC. Prison canteen purchasing history reports 

show that, from January 2017 through September 2018, Mr. Zapata “has consistently and 

repeatedly purchased nonkosher food products, including pork rinds, sausages, chili and smoked 

oysters, among other nonkosher items. In all, 411 nonkosher food items were purchased by 

Zapata during that period.” Docket No. 26-3 at 2.

Mr. Zapata acknowledges that he bought nonkosher items, but indicates that he is giving 

them to fellow inmates. Docket No. 27 at 18 (“when asked to bless a fellow inmate with a certain 

canteen item ‘I do,’ obeying Christ command to bless and give to those who request of you.”). He 

further declares that he “does not habitually purchase” nonkosher items for consumption. Id.

E. Mr. Zapata’s Inmate Appeals

Mr. Zapata filed an inmate appeal about his religious diet issue on October 4, 2016. 

Docket No. 26-6 at 8-11. (This inmate appeal was filed before the RRC had acted on his request.)

In his inmate appeal, Mr. Zapata described his problem thusly:

I’ve requested to participate in the Religious Diet Program CCR 

Title 15 § 3054.2(a)-(e) amended regulations in order to practice my 

religious and spiritual beliefs. I have followed the new standerized 

procedure for religious diets but this regulation is of no effect in 

Pelican Bay. My attempt to submit my kosher diet request was 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 7 of 22
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

subject to the former procedure of going through the Rabbi cause 

he’s Jewish handling Jewish Kosher Diets. Depriving me of a fair, 

equal and neutral determination of my participation in the Religious 

Diet Program in violation of § 3054.2(a)-(d), and (In re Garcia 

(2012) 202 Cal. App.4th 892), also the Federal Religious Land Use 

and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). Even if the 

Religious Review Committee made a consideration for eligibility 

but denied the request its determination is unlawful because the 

proper procedure was not followed, any other chaplain could have 

granted my request but never had the opportunity to do so. 

Docket No. 26-6 at 8, 10 (errors in source). The inmate appeal did not identify wrongdoing staff 

by name, although it did have attached a CDCR-22 form that had been sent to “CRM R. Lasaco” 

and complained about the handling of Mr. Zapata’s religious diet request. Docket No. 26-6 at 14. 

In the “action requested” portion of the form, Mr. Zapata stated that he wanted his kosher diet 

request to be granted and, apparently, to learn the status of his CDCR-3030 form requesting that 

diet. Id. at 8, 10.

The inmate appeal was stamped “bypassed” at the first level. The second-level decision

was signed by Defendant Warden Ducart, who denied Mr. Zapata’s appeal and listed the “issue” 

as “Inmate Zapata wants to be approved to be place[d] on the Jewish Kosher Diet (JKD).” Docket 

No. 26-6 at 7. Warden Ducart wrote that the RRC “has reservations as to your sincerity as it 

pertains to your truly held religious belief” based on Mr. Zapata’s answers to the rabbi during the 

religious diet request interview and referred Mr. Zapata to the RRC’s November 14, 2016, letter 

for further explanation. The third-level decision, denying the inmate appeal, was signed by 

Defendants Hodges and Voong. Docket No. 27 at 36-37. 

III. VENUE AND JURISDICTION

Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because the events or omissions 

giving rise to the complaint occurred at a prison in Del Norte County, which is located within the 

Northern District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1391(b). The Court has federal question jurisdiction over 

this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there 

is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against a party 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 8 of 22
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete 

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders 

all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is 

material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law, and a dispute about 

such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

In a typical summary judgment motion, a defendant moves for judgment against a plaintiff 

on the merits of his claim. In such a situation, the moving party bears the initial burden of 

identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of 

material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by 

his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ 

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

When a defendant moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense on which he 

bears the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with evidence that would entitle him to a 

directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 

1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative 

defense that must be raised in a motion for summary judgment. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 

1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). On a motion for summary judgment for nonexhaustion, the 

defendant has the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative remedy, and 

that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172. If the defendant carries that 

burden, the “burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is 

something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of proof remains with the 

defendant, however. Id. If material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and 

the “district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts” on the exhaustion question, id. at 

1166, “in the same manner a judge rather than a jury decides disputed factual questions relevant to 

jurisdiction and venue,” id. at 1170-71.

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 9 of 22
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is 

based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder

v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff’s verified complaint 

as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, 

plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were 

not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). Mr. Zapata’s complaint is made 

under penalty of perjury and therefore is considered as evidence.

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 

Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must 

be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn from the 

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or 

any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until 

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion 

in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); 

Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856-57 (2016) (mandatory language of § 1997e(a) forecloses 

judicial discretion to craft exceptions to the requirement). Section 1997e(a) requires “proper 

exhaustion” of available administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). 

Proper exhaustion requires using all steps of an administrative process and complying with 

“deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id. at 90. 

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal 

administratively “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff 

that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or her 

health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available 

administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through three formal levels of 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 10 of 22
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

appeal and receive a decision from the Secretary of the CDCR or his designee. Id. § 3084.1(b), § 

3084.7(d)(3). 

The amount of detail in an administrative grievance necessary to properly exhaust a claim 

is determined by the prison’s applicable grievance procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 

(2007). California prisoners are required to lodge their administrative complaints on a CDCR-602 

form and are required to “list all staff member(s) involved and shall describe their involvement in 

the issue. To assist in the identification of staff members, the inmate or parolee shall include the 

staff member’s last name, first initial, title or position, if known, and the dates of the staff 

member's involvement in the issue under appeal. . . . The inmate or parolee shall state all facts 

known and available to him/her regarding the issue being appealed at the time of submitting” the 

inmate appeal. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3-4).

Significantly, however, a prisoner “need not exhaust unavailable [remedies].” Ross, 136 

S. Ct. at 1858 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court listed three circumstances in which an 

“administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” 

Id. at 1859. An administrative remedy is unavailable if: (1) “it operates as a simple dead end—

with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) it is 

“so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use”; or (3) “prison administrators 

thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, 

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1859–60. With regard to the second, “incapable of use” 

sort of unavailable remedy, the Supreme Court explained that this may occur where “some 

mechanism exists to provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it.” Id. at 

1859. It is not enough that the administrative process is susceptible of multiple reasonable 

interpretations; rather, the administrative process must be “essentially ‘unknowable’ – so that no 

ordinary prisoner can make sense of what it demands.” Id. 

The unavailable versus available remedies distinction saves the day for Mr. Zapata. 

Defendants argue that Mr. Zapata did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his claims 

against Defendants Ducart, Voong, and Hodges – whose alleged liability rests solely on their 

actions in denying Mr. Zapata’s inmate appeal, i.e., Warden Ducart denied the second-level appeal 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 11 of 22
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

and Messrs. Hodges and Voong denied the third-level appeal -- because he did not name them in 

the one administrative appeal he filed about his religious diet. Under the specific circumstances of 

this case, the Court concludes that Defendants have not shown that there was an available remedy 

for Mr. Zapata to use to complain about the actions of Defendants Ducart, Voong, and Hodges in 

denying Mr. Zapata’s original appeal.

The administrative appeals system is confusing (at best) and impossible to use (at worst)

for a California prisoner attempting to pursue a grievance against an official based on the official’s 

denial of an inmate appeal. No regulation specifically addresses how a prisoner may exhaust 

administrative remedies if he wishes to complain about the official’s denial of the original inmate 

appeal. Various provisions in the regulations point in different directions, ultimately resulting in a 

scheme that is, practically speaking, incapable of use to challenge this particular sort of conduct. 

First, the time limits pose an almost insurmountable obstacle for a new appeal about the 

denial of the original appeal.3 A prisoner must submit an appeal within 30 days of the event or 

decision being appealed (15 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b)), yet the third-level decision is 

not due until 60 days after the third-level appeal is submitted (id. at § 3084.8(c)(3)).

4

 Thus, the 

 

3 To reduce confusion, the Court in this section uses the terms “original appeal” and “new appeal” 

to distinguish between the appeal about the basic prison condition being complained about (i.e., 

the “original appeal”), and the appeal about the denial of that original appeal (i.e., the “new 

appeal”).

4 Section 3084.8 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations provides, in relevant part:

(a) Time limits for reviewing appeals shall commence upon the date 

of receipt of the appeal form by the appeals coordinator.

(b) Except as described in subsection 3084.8(b)(4), an inmate or 

parolee must submit the appeal within 30 calendar days of:

(1) The occurrence of the event or decision being appealed, or;

(2) Upon first having knowledge of the action or decision being 

appealed, or;

(3) Upon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response to an 

appeal filed.

(4) There shall be no time limits for allegations of sexual violence or 

staff sexual misconduct.

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 12 of 22
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

time to file a new appeal about a second-level denial of the original appeal can expire before the 

third-level decision is issued on the original appeal. Filing a new appeal about the denial of the 

original appeal at the second level before the third-level decision is issued on the original appeal 

may cause the prisoner to run afoul of another provision that appears to allow appeals only for 

conditions or decisions “that the inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect 

upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Id. at § 3084.1(a); see also id. at § 3084.6(b)(2) 

(allowing cancellation of appeal if prisoner fails to demonstrate a material adverse effect on his or 

her welfare).

5 A prisoner may not be able to demonstrate that the second-level denial of the 

 

(c) All appeals shall be responded to and returned to the inmate or 

parolee by staff within the following time limits, unless exempted 

pursuant to the provisions of subsections 3084.8(f) and (g):

(1) First level responses shall be completed within 30 working days 

from date of receipt by the appeals coordinator.

(2) Second level responses shall be completed within 30 working 

days from date of receipt by the appeals coordinator.

(3) Third level responses shall be completed within 60 working days 

from date of receipt by the third level Appeals Chief.

5 Section 3084.6 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations provides, in relevant part:

(b) An appeal may be rejected for any of the following reasons, 

which include, but are not limited to:

(1) The appeal concerns an anticipated action or decision.

(2) The appellant has failed to demonstrate a material adverse effect 

on his or her welfare as defined in subsection 3084(c).

(3) The inmate or parolee has exceeded the allowable number of 

appeals filed in a 14 calendar day period pursuant to the provisions 

of subsection 3084.1(f).

. . . .

(15) The inmate or parolee has submitted the appeal for processing 

at an inappropriate level bypassing required lower level(s) of 

review, e.g., submitting an appeal at the third level prior to lower 

level review.

(16) The appeal issue or complaint emphasis has been changed at 

some point in the process to the extent that the issue is entirely new, 

and the required lower levels of review and assessment have thereby 

been circumvented.

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 13 of 22
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

original appeal has had a material adverse effect upon his health, safety, or welfare when there is a

third-level appeal on the original appeal pending that might (if granted) make the issue moot. But 

waiting until the third-level decision on the original appeal is issued to then file a new appeal 

about the second-level denial risks the possibility that the appeal will be cancelled for exceeding 

the 30-day time limits. The prisoner cannot avoid the time trap by including an allegation in his 

original appeal that any future denial of that original appeal would be a violation of his rights by 

the person who denies the appeal because an appeal can be rejected if it is about “an anticipated 

action or decision.” Id. at § 3084.6(b)(1).

Second, the conflicting regulations do not allow a prisoner to figure out the appropriate 

level at which to file a new appeal complaining about the denial of an original appeal or how that 

appeal will be handled. Take, for example, a prisoner who wants to file a new appeal about a 

second-level denial of the original appeal. The first level does not appear proper because an 

 

(c) An appeal may be cancelled for any of the following reasons, 

which include, but are not limited to:

(1) The action or decision being appealed is not within the 

jurisdiction of the department.

(2) The appeal duplicates an inmate or parolee's previous appeal 

upon which a decision has been rendered or is pending.

. . . .

(4) Time limits for submitting the appeal are exceeded even though 

the inmate or parolee had the opportunity to submit within the 

prescribed time constraints. In determining whether the time limit 

has been exceeded, the appeals coordinator shall consider whether 

the issue being appealed occurred on a specific date or is ongoing. If 

the issue is ongoing, which may include but is not limited to, 

continuing lockdowns, retention in segregated housing, or an 

ongoing program closure, the inmate or parolee may appeal any time 

during the duration of the event; however, the inmate or parolee is 

precluded from filing another appeal on the same issue unless a 

change in circumstances creates a new issue.

. . . .

(11) The issue under appeal has been resolved at a previous level.

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 14 of 22
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

official cannot review the decision of someone higher in rank. Id. at § 3084.7(d)(1)(B).

6 The 

 

6 Section 3084.7 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations provides, in relevant part:

(a) All appeals shall be initially submitted and screened at the first 

level unless the first level is exempted. The appeals coordinator may 

bypass the first level for appeal of:

(1) A policy, procedure or regulation implemented by the 

department.

(2) A policy or procedure implemented by the institution head.

(3) An issue that cannot be resolved at the division head level such 

as Associate Warden, Associate Regional Parole Administrator, 

CALPIA manager or equivalent.

(4) Serious disciplinary infractions.

(b) The second level is for review of appeals denied or not otherwise 

resolved to the appellant's satisfaction at the first level, or for which 

the first level is otherwise waived by these regulations. The second 

level shall be completed prior to the appellant filing at the third level 

as described in subsection 3084.7(c).

. . . .

(c) The third level is for review of appeals not resolved at the second 

level, or:

(1) When the inmate or parolee appeals alleged third level staff 

misconduct or appeals a third level cancellation decision or action.

(2) In the event of involuntary psychiatric transfers as provided in 

subsection 3084.9(b).

(d) Level of staff member conducting review.

(1) Appeal responses shall not be reviewed and approved by a staff 

person who:

(A) Participated in the event or decision being appealed. This does 

not preclude the involvement of staff who may have participated in 

the event or decision being appealed, so long as their involvement 

with the appeal response is necessary in order to determine the facts 

or to provide administrative remedy, and the staff person is not the 

reviewing authority and/or their involvement in the process will not 

compromise the integrity or outcome of the process.

(B) Is of a lower administrative rank than any participating staff. 

This does not preclude the use of staff, at a lower level than the staff 

whose actions or decisions are being appealed, to research the 

appeal issue.

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 15 of 22
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

second level does not appear to be the proper place to file because an official generally is not 

allowed to review his own decision-making. Id. at § 3084.7(d)(1)(A). And the third level does 

not appear to be the proper place to file because the appeal can be rejected for not first seeking 

lower level review. Id. at § 3084.6(b)(15).

Finally, the regulations are at least unclear whether an appeal about the denial of an earlier 

appeal would be allowed at all. An appeal can be cancelled if it duplicates a previous appeal on 

which a decision has been rendered or is pending. Id. at § 3084.6(c)(2). And if an appeal is about 

an ongoing problem, the prisoner is precluded from filing another appeal on the same issue 

“unless a change in circumstances creates a new issue.” Id. at § 3084.6(c)(4).

In sum, the administrative appeals system set up for California prisoners has too many 

contradictions as to when to file, what level to file at, and whether a new appeal may be filed at all 

to challenge the denial of an original appeal. The contradictory information and various hurdles 

set up in the regulations go well beyond mere ambiguities and reach the level of an unnavigable 

system for the ordinary prisoner wanting to file a new appeal about the denial of an original 

appeal. The Court therefore concludes that California does not provide an “available” 

administrative remedy for a prisoner who wishes to grieve that an official reviewing his original 

appeal has wrongly decided that appeal because the scheme is “so opaque” that it is “practically 

speaking, incapable of use.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859; see, e.g., Williams v. Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 

125 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A close review of the regulations shows, contrary to defendants’ assertions at 

 

(C) Participated in the review of a lower level appeal refiled at a 

higher level.

(2) Second level review shall be conducted by the hiring authority or 

designee at a level no lower than Chief Deputy Warden, Deputy 

Regional Parole Administrator, or the equivalent.

(3) The third level review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on an 

appeal, and shall be conducted by a designated representative under 

the supervision of the third level Appeals Chief or equivalent. The 

third level of review exhausts administrative remedies; however, this 

does not preclude amending a finding previously made at the third 

level.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7.

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 16 of 22
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

oral argument, that an ‘appeal’ in Williams’s circumstance is, indeed, subject to time limitations 

and procedural hurdles that in all but the rarest of circumstances would preclude him from 

pursuing his unfiled and unanswered grievance, and that are, in any event, ‘so confusing that . . . 

no reasonable prisoner can use them.’”) (omission in original) (quoting Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859). 

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defense of 

nonexhaustion of administrative appeals because they have not carried their burden to prove that 

there was an available administrative remedy for Mr. Zapata with regard to the conduct of 

Defendants Ducart, Hodges and Voong. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(en banc) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on issue of 

exhaustion because defendants did not carry their initial burden of proving their affirmative 

defense that there was an available administrative remedy that prisoner plaintiff failed to exhaust).

B. Religious Freedom Claims

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend I. “The 

first of the two Clauses, commonly called the Establishment Clause, commands a separation of 

church and state. The second, the Free Exercise Clause, requires government respect for, and 

noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our Nation's people.” Cutter v. 

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). In order to establish a Free Exercise Clause violation, a 

prisoner must show a defendant burdened the practice of his religion without any justification 

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883–84 

(9th Cir. 2008). “To merit protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a 

religious claim must” be rooted in religious belief, rather than secular concerns, and “must be 

sincerely held; the First Amendment does not extend to ‘so-called religions which . . . are 

obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity.’” 

Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (omission in original). 

Prisoners’ religious freedoms also are protected by the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. RLUIPA provides: “No 

government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 17 of 22
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 [which includes state prisons], even if the 

burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that 

imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 

interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). For an RLUIPA claim, the plaintiff-prisoner must show that the 

government has imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise, which is a burden that 

imposes “significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.” San Jose Christian Coll. v. 

Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). As with a Free Exercise Clause claim, under 

RLUIPA, “a prisoner’s request for an accommodation of a religious practice must be sincerely 

based on a religious belief and not some other motivation.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 

(2015).

Defendants make a single argument against both the First Amendment and RLUIPA 

claims. They argue that Mr. Zapata’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims fail because he does

not have a sincerely held religious belief. They urge that Mr. Zapata’s request for a kosher diet 

properly was rejected because Mr. Zapata’s lack of knowledge regarding his professed faith and 

its kosher laws, as well as his repeated purchases of nonkosher items, showed that he “did not 

have a sincerely held religious belief that required him to keep kosher.” Docket No. 26 at 12.

Prison officials may examine the sincerity of a prisoner’s religious belief before providing 

him a religious diet. See generally Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“prison 

officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner's religiosity, asserted as the basis for a 

requested accommodation, is authentic”); Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763, 771 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“It is appropriate for prison authorities to deny a special diet if an inmate is not sincere in his 

religious beliefs.”) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987)); Lute v. Jonson, 

2012 WL 913749, *7 (D. Idaho March 16, 2012) (“Although ‘backsliding’ or nonobservance of a 

religious practice is not dispositive, it is evidence of a prisoner's religious insincerity . . . 

Purchasing nonkosher foods—both before and after his kosher diet request—is completely 

inconsistent with Plaintiff's professed religious belief.”). Although Mr. Zapata’s purchases of 

many foods inconsistent with a kosher diet likely would make a strong impact on a jury, it cannot 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 18 of 22
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

be said as a matter of law that his canteen activities show that his religious beliefs were insincere.

Although prison officials may examine the sincerity of a prisoner’s religious belief and 

conclude that he is not sincere, it does not follow that they are entitled to summary judgment on 

that basis. Many courts have determined that the sincerity of a prisoner’s religious belief is a 

question of fact for the jury and that it is inappropriate for a court to grant summary judgment on a 

First Amendment or RLUIPA claim based on a plaintiff’s alleged lack of sincerity. See Monson v. 

Steward, 2017 WL 2882709, *9 (D. Or. July 6, 2017); Dean v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 108 F. Supp.

3d 702, 711 (D. Ariz. 2014) (finding that defendants raised material questions of fact regarding 

plaintiff's sincerely held beliefs); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 298 (6th Cir. 2010) (sincerity of 

prisoner’s beliefs does not turn on the prisoner’s objective knowledge of his religion); Johnson v. 

Nev. Bd. of Prison Comm'rs, 2013 WL 5428423, at *2-3 (D. Nev. Sept. 26, 2013) (although 

defendants produced evidence that plaintiff's beliefs were not sincerely held, the question “must 

ultimately be resolved by the trier of fact”); White v. Linderman, 2013 WL 4496364, at *5 (D. 

Ariz. Aug. 22, 2013) (“‘backsliding’ or non-observance of a religious practice is not sufficient to 

establish as a matter of law that [plaintiff] is insincere in his religious beliefs”); Monts v. Arpaio, 

2012 WL 160246, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2012) (although plaintiff presented a “weak” case for 

the sincerity of his religious belief, it still presented a question of fact).

In the present case, there are triable issues of fact as to whether Mr. Zapata’s request for a 

kosher diet was based on a sincere religious belief. There is a triable issue of fact as to whether 

Mr. Zapata was consuming nonkosher food. Defendants present evidence that he regularly 

purchased nonkosher food from the prison canteen; Mr. Zapata indicates that he gave nonkosher 

food away to other inmates. If he consumed nonkosher food, a trier of fact might consider that 

evidence to decide that Mr. Zapata did not have a sincerely held religious belief in the need to 

keep kosher. See McElyea, 833 F.2d at 196 (whether prisoner was sincere in desiring a kosher diet 

despite reports of nonkosher food consumption presented a triable issue, defeating summary 

judgment motion). There also is a triable issue of fact as to whether Mr. Zapata was ignorant of 

basic principles of kosher diets and his professed religion. Defendants present evidence that 

suggests that Mr. Zapata did not sufficiently understand the religious beliefs that supposedly 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 19 of 22
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

supported his demand for a kosher diet; Mr. Zapata denies that he did not understand the religious 

belief. Mr. Zapata’s CDCR-3030 request form had an attachment in which he discussed his 

religious practices and need for the kosher diet. If Mr. Zapata lacked basic knowledge about his 

professed religion and its kosher diet requirements, the trier of fact might conclude that his request 

for a kosher diet was not based on a sincerely held religious belief. These questions of fact cannot 

be resolved at the summary judgment stage. 

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment because there are triable issues of fact 

regarding whether Mr. Zapata had a sincerely held religious belief that he was required to keep 

kosher to practice his Messianic Jewish religion.

C. Qualified Immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a twopronged test to determine whether qualified immunity exists. First, the court asks: “Taken in the 

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's 

conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated if the 

facts were as alleged, the inquiry ends and defendants prevail. See id. If, however, “a violation 

could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to 

ask whether the right was clearly established. . . . ‘The contours of the right must be sufficiently 

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ . . . The 

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it 

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted.” Id. at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (internal 

citation omitted)). Although Saucier required courts to address the questions in the particular 

sequence set out above, courts now have the discretion to decide which prong to address first, in 

light of the particular circumstances of each case. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 

(2009). 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 20 of 22
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The same triable issues of fact about the sincerity of Mr. Zapata’s religious beliefs that 

preclude summary judgment for Defendants on the merits of Mr. Zapata’s First Amendment claim 

also preclude summary judgment in their favor on the qualified immunity defense. Viewed in the 

light most favorable to Mr. Zapata, the evidence shows that he made a request for a kosher diet 

and explained that he needed a kosher diet to practice his religion as a Messianic Jew. Taking the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Zapata, it would be clear to a reasonable correctional 

official that a Free Exercise violation would occur by denying a kosher diet to a prisoner who 

explained that he needed a kosher diet to practice his religion as a Messianic Jew. Although 

existing case law allowed prison officials to question the sincerity of a prisoner’s religious beliefs, 

the evidence does not so clearly point to Mr. Zapata’s religious belief as being insincere that a 

reasonable official would have understood that he could deny the kosher diet. 

D. Referral To Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program

This case appears a good candidate for the court’s mediation program. Good cause 

appearing therefor, this case is now referred to Magistrate Judge Illman for mediation or 

settlement proceedings pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. The proceedings will 

take place within 120 days of the date this order is filed. Magistrate Judge Illman will coordinate 

a time and date for mediation or settlement proceedings with all interested parties and/or their 

representatives and, within five days after the conclusion of the proceedings, file with the Court a 

report for the prisoner mediation or settlement proceedings. 

Plaintiff must attend and participate in the mediation or settlement conference proceedings. 

The conference may be set up so that he will appear in person, by videoconference or by telephone 

-- and he must attend whatever format Magistrate Judge Illman chooses. Plaintiff is cautioned that 

he may be sanctioned for failure to comply with an order to participate in a mediation or 

settlement conference, and such sanctions may include dismissal of part or all of the action. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a), (f), and 41(b).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

Docket No. 26. 

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 21 of 22
22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s reply to their reply brief is GRANTED. Docket 

No. 32. The Local Rules do not allow for a reply to a reply brief. See N.D. Local Rule 7-3(d) 

(“Once a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, papers or letters may be filed without prior 

Court approval” other than objections or new legal decisions). Plaintiff did not seek, or obtain, 

permission to file a reply.

This action is now referred to Magistrate Judge Illman for mediation or settlement 

proceedings pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. The Clerk shall send a copy of 

this order to Magistrate Judge Illman. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 13, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:17-cv-02557-EMC Document 33 Filed 06/13/19 Page 22 of 22