Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02120/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN TWYNE, Civil No. 09-2120 BEN (POR)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

I.D. CLAY, et al.,

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Shawn Twyne, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction San Diego County Superior

Court case number SCN193132 for driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with a blood alcohol

concentration of .08 or more and driving on a suspended or revoked license. (Lodgment No. 1 at 0053-

55.) The petition presents five claims. (See Pet. at 6-10.1

) 

This case is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 72.1(d)(4)

for Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court respectfully recommends that the Petition be DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct;

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C.. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings

of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion denying Twyne’s direct appeal of his convictions.

About 2:00 a.m. on March 25, 2005, Officers Michael Kelley and Brian Kennedy

observed Twyne’s vehicle drift from the slow to the middle freeway lane; weave within

the slow lane; change lanes directly in front of another vehicle; and suddenly accelerate

from 70 to 80 miles per hour. Officer Kelley turned on his emergency lights to stop

Twyne. Twyne moved over to the slow lane, passed a freeway exit, and began to stop

his vehicle in the slow lane. Officer Kennedy spoke over the P.A. system and repeatedly

instructed Twyne to move his vehicle out of the lanes. Twyne slowly moved his vehicle

and stopped on the shoulder of the freeway. Again speaking over the P.A. system,

Officer Kennedy told Twyne to drive to the next exit and exit the freeway. Twyne

complied.

Twyne acknowledged to the officers that his license was suspended. Officer

Kelley observed that Twyne appeared intoxicated: his eyes were red and watery, his

breath smelled of alcohol, his speech was slurred, and his appearance was unkempt.

Twyne did not perform well on field sobriety tests. A blood test administered at the

detention facility showed a blood alcohol level of .19.

Testifying on his own behalf, Twyne presented a necessity defense. He claimed

that he was forced to drive when the designated driver who was driving the vehicle got

into an argument with her husband and abandoned Twyne and the other passengers in

the vehicle on the side of the freeway.

The jury found Twyne guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (count 1,

Veh. Code [footnote omitted] § 23152, subd. (a)); driving with a .08 percent or more

blood alcohol level (count 2, § 23152, subd. (b)); and misdemeanor driving with a

suspended or revoked license (count 3, § 14601.1, subd.(a)). Twyne admitted that he had

incurred a prior prison term and a strike prior conviction based on a 1998 conviction for

making a criminal threat. At a bench trial, the court found that within 10 years of the

current offenses Twyne had suffered three separate prior convictions for driving under

the influence (two in 1996 and one in 2002), which elevated the current convictions on

counts 1 and 2 from misdemeanors to felonies. (§ 23550, subd. (a)).

(Lodgment No. 7 at 1-2.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 27, 2005, the San Diego County District Attorney filed an information charging

Twyne with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a violation of California Vehicle

Code section 23152(a), driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or more, a violation of Vehicle

Code

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section 23152(b), and one count of driving on a suspended or revoked license, a violation of Vehicle

Code section 14601.1(a). (Lodgment No. 1 at 0005-07.) The information also alleged Twyne had

suffered three prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood

alcohol level of .08 percent or more, a prior conviction for which he served a prison term within the

meaning of Penal Code section 667.5(b) and 668, and a “strike” prior within the meaning of Penal Code

sections 667(b) – (i), 1170.12 and 668, California’s Three Strikes Law. (Id. at 0006-08.) 

Following a jury trial, Twyne was convicted of all counts. (Id. at 0053-55.) Twyne admitted

he suffered the prior prison term and the strike prior conviction. (Lodgment No. 3 at 140-43.) After

a bench trial, the state trial judge found the prior driving under the influence convictions to be true,

which elevated his driving under the influence convictions to felonies pursuant to Vehicle Code § 23550

(a). (Id. at146-56; Cal. Veh. Code § 23350(a).) On November 17, 2006, the trial court declined to strike

the prior strike conviction and sentenced Twyne to a total of seven years in prison. (Id. at 166.) 

Twyne appealed his conviction and filed a concurrent pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 4,

5.) The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeal and habeas corpus petition and denied both in a

written, unpublished opinion filed January 30, 2008. (Lodgment No. 7.) 

Twyne filed a second habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No

8.) The state court denied the petition in a written, unpublished order filed September 18, 2008.

(Lodgment No. 9.) Twyne then filed another habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal,

which that court denied in a written unpublished opinion dated March 5, 2009. (Lodgment Nos. 10, 11.)

Twyne filed a fourth habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court on March 17, 2009, which

the Supreme Court denied without citation of authority on August 26, 2009. (Lodgment Nos. 12, 13.)

On September 25, 2009, Twyne filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and

exhibits in this Court. (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-1.) On April 26, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer and Points

and Authorities in Support of the Answer. (Doc. Nos. 22, 22-1.) Petitioner replied with his Traverse

on May 5, 2010. (Doc. 24.)

/ / /

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will

not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal

court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court

applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was

objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d

872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct,

and Twyne carries the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applied

a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case

differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state

court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably

applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application”

clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief,

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

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to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme

Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state

court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal

law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme

Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

B. Analysis

Twyne alleges five claims in his petition. First, he claims there was insufficient evidence to

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had suffered the prior driving under the influence

convictions which elevated the current driving under the influence charge to a felony. (Pet. at 6.)

Second, Twyne argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by falsely claiming the records of Twyne’s

2002 prior conviction were certified. (Pet. at 7.) In claim three, Twyne alleges the prosecutor

committed misconduct by introducing fabricated records to prove the validity of Twyne’s prior

convictions. (Pet. at 8.) Fourth, Twyne contends his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel when they failed to object or raise an argument with regard to the admissibility

of the 2002 prior conviction records. (Pet. at 9.) Fifth, Twyne claims the prosecutor presented

insufficient evidence at his preliminary hearing to bind him over for trial. (Pet at 10.) 

Respondent counters that the state court’s denial of claims one through four was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Answer at 12-19.) As to claim five, Respondent contends it fails to state a claim upon which federal

habeas relief can be granted. (Id. at 20-21.)

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence (claim one)

In his first claim, Twyne argues there was insufficient evidence presented to support the trial

judge’s conclusion that he had suffered the three prior driving under the influence convictions. (Pet. at

6.) Specifically, Twyne contends the documents the prosecutor presented at the court trial on the prior

convictions were not the official record and that the prosecutor did not properly prove the authenticity

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and accuracy of the documents. (Pet. at 6.) Respondent contends the state court’s denial of this claim

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Twyne raised this claim in the habeas corpus petition he filed concurrently with his direct appeal.

(Lodgment No. 5.) The state appellate court denied the claim on the merits. (Lodgment No. 7 at 7-11.)

He then raised this claim in the two habeas corpus petitions he filed in the state appellate court on

August 14, 2008 and March 5, 2009. (Lodgment Nos. 8, 10.) The state appellate courts denied both

petitions, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767 (1993) and stating that “[t]he issue was raised and

rejected in the prior petition [and] [a]bsent a change in the applicable law or the facts, a reviewing court

will not consider repeated applications for habeas corpus presenting claims previously rejected.”

(Lodgment Nos. 9, 11.) Twyne then exhausted the claim by raising it in the habeas corpus petition he

filed in the California Supreme Court on March 17, 2009; the California Supreme Court denied the

petition without citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 12, 13.) This Court must “look through” to the

last reasoned state court decision as the basis for its analysis of this claim which, in this case, is the state

appellate court’s opinion denying Twyne’s direct appeal and consolidated habeas corpus petition. See

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The state appellate court on direct appeal wrote:

Regarding his first argument, the prosecution alleged that Twyne had committed

prior driving under the influence (DUI) offenses on June 18, 2002, February 26, 1996,

and February 24, 1996. At the bench trial on the three alleged prior DUI convictions,

the prosecution presented booking photographs and fingerprint cards for the current 2005

offense and the 2002 offense. A fingerprint expert testified that the fingerprint cards for

the 2005 and 2002 offenses were for the same person.

The prosecution also presented certified copies of the complaints and plea forms

for the 2002 and 1996 offenses. In the plea form for the 2002 offense, Twyne admitted

that he had incurred the two 1996 DUI convictions. Based on this admission, as well as

signatures on the three plea forms that appeared to be the same, the prosecution argued

the two 1996 convictions had been proven. Although conceding that the conviction for

the 2002 offense had been proven, Twyne’s counsel contended there was insufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Twyne had incurred the 1996

convictions.

The trial court concluded the 1996 convictions had been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt, noting that Twyne admitted them in the plea form for the 2002 offense

and there was not dispute that he was the person in the 2002 offense.

The record supports a finding that the 1996 convictions were incurred and that

Twyne is the person who incurred them. In his writ petition, Twyne has not made any

showing that the certified copies of the 2002 and 1996 plea forms were fabricated or

/ / /

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erroneous, or that he is not the person who committed the 1996 offenses. He has failed

to present a prima facie case for relief as to this ground.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 10-11.)

In assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Supreme Court has stated that “‘the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979)). In determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented, the Court must accept the

elements of the crime as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, n.16; Aponte v. Gomez, 993

F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that federal courts are “bound by a state court’s construction of

its own penal statutes”). During the trial on the priors, the prosecutor introduced the following evidence:

1. testimony by fingerprint analyst Andrea Duncan that the booking photo and

fingerprints from the 2002 DUI conviction matched the booking photo and fingerprints

from Twyne’s 2006 (current) DUI case. (Lodgment No. 3 at 147-149, 151-52); 

2. a certified copy of the charging documents and the plea forms, signed under penalty

of perjury, from Twyne’s 2002 DUI conviction in which Twyne admits he suffered two

prior DUI convictions in 1996 in case nos. T165561 and T165048. (Id. at 150-52;

Lodgment No. 14.)

3. certified copies of the charging documents and plea forms from Twyne’s 1996 prior

convictions in case nos. T165561 and T165048. (Lodgment No. 3 at 151-52; Lodgment

No. 1 at 0066-94.)

The prosecutor argued that, taken together, this evidence proved that Twyne had suffered three

prior convictions. First, the fingerprint expert’s testimony established that the fingerprints from the

current 2006 case and the 2002 case were from the same person. (Lodgment No. 3 at 154.) Second, in

the plea form from his 2002 prior conviction, Twyne admitted to suffering the two 1996 DUI

convictions in case nos. T165561 and T165048. (Id.) Third, the signature on the 2002 plea form

matched the signatures on the 1996 plea forms. (Id.) Twyne’s attorney admitted the validity of the 2002

conviction, but disputed there was sufficient proof Twyne had suffered the two 1996 convictions

because “counsel’s opinion that the signatures appear to be the same” was not enough to establish the

validity of the prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 153.) Twyne’s attorney could not

explain how Twyne’s

/ / /

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2002 admission under penalty of perjury that he suffered the 1996 prior convictions was insufficient to

establish the validity of the 1996 prior convictions. (Id. at 154.)

Twyne’s main attack on the sufficiency of the evidence that he suffered the prior convictions is

his allegation that the charging documents and plea forms from the 2002 conviction were not certified

copies. His argument is based on the lack of a certification stamp on the copies of the documents

contained in the Clerk’s Transcript which were admitted as exhibit five to establish his 2002 DUI

conviction. (See Lodgment No. 1 at 0057-66.) The prosecutor, court clerk and state appellate court all

indicated the documents were certified copies. (See Lodgment No. 1 at 0056; Lodgment No. 3 at 149-

50; Lodgment No. 7 at 10-11.) Due to this discrepancy, the Court directed Respondent to obtain a copy

of both sides of each page of the original exhibit number 5 from the state court file. (See Order dated

February 4, 2011). Respondent complied with this request on February 22, 2011. (See Doc. no. 36.)

The copy of exhibit five lodged by Respondent contains a stamp on the back of the last page indicating

the documents admitted in state court establishing the validity of Twyne’s 2002 DUI conviction were

certified copies, as both the state court trial record and the state appellate court opinion indicate. (See

Lodgment No at 0056; Lodgment No. 7 at 10-11.) It appears that the page containing the certification

stamp was inadvertently not copied for the official transcript.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could

have concluded that Twyne had suffered the three prior convictions. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. The

fingerprint expert’s testimony established that the fingerprints from the 2002 conviction and the 2005

arrest were from the same person. There was no dispute that Twyne was the individual arrested in 2005.

The certified copies of the 2002 prior conviction contain an admission by Twyne, under penalty of

perjury, that he suffered the two 1996 prior DUI convictions. The certified copies of Twyne’s 1996 DUI

convictions in case nos. T165561 and T165048 were admitted into evidence. Moreover, the trial judge,

as the trier of fact, was entitled to make a factual determination as to whether the signatures on the plea

forms from the 2002 and 1996 prior convictions were the same. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the

prosecution need not affirmatively ‘rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt,’” and the reviewing

court “faced with a record of historical facts that support conflicting inferences must presume – even

if it does not affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor

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of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992)

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). 

For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of Twyne’s sufficiency of the evidence claim

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, nor

was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13. He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

2. Prosecutorial Misconduct (claims two and three)

Next, Twyne alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct in two ways. First, he contends the

prosecutor misled the trial court into believing that the exhibits he was introducing into evidence to

prove Twyne had suffered three prior convictions, listed as exhibits five through seven, were certified

copies of the documents related to those convictions. (Pet. at 7, claim two). Second, he contends the

prosecutor presented altered evidence and suppressed exculpatory evidence. (Id. at 8, claim three.)

Respondent counters that the state court’s denial of these claims was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Twyne raised these claim in the habeas corpus petition he filed in the California Supreme Court

on March 17 2009. (See Lodgment No. 12 at 3-8.) That court denied the petition without citation of

authority. (See Lodgment No. 13.) Thus, there is no state court decision to which this Court can “look

through.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. This Court must conduct an independent review of the record to

determine whether the state court’s denial of the claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

 “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).

“It is not enough that the prosecutor’s remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.”

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Rather, a prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her actions “‘so

infect[s]. . . the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Id.

(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).) “Moreover, the appropriate standard of

review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is ‘the narrow one of due process, and not the broad

exercise of supervisory power.’” Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642). 

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As Respondent correctly notes, where a prosecutor is accused of presenting false or altered

evidence or testimony, “the petitioner must show that (1) the . . . evidence was actually false, (2) the

prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the false

testimony was actually material.” United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-71 (1959)); see also United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Where a prosecutor is accused of withholding exculpatory evidence, a

petitioner must show: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or

inadvertently; (2) the withheld evidence was exculpatory or impeachment material; and (3) he was

prejudiced by the failure to disclose. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Benn v.

Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 678

(1985) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976)). “Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or

material, only if it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (citing

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111-12). “Moreover, we analyze all of the suppressed

evidence together, using the same type of analysis that we employ to determine prejudice in ineffective

assistance of counsel cases.” Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 and United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d

682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1986)).

As explained above, the page on which the certification stamp for the 2002 prior DUI conviction

documents appeared was inadvertently not copied as part of the Clerk’s Transcript. (See Lodgment No.

1 at 0057-66.) The actual documents that were admitted in state court, however, were certified copies,

as Lodgment No. 14 establishes. (See Lodgment No. 14.) Thus, the prosecutor did not, as Twyne

alleges, present false or altered evidence. Twyne has also not established the prosecutor withheld

exculpatory evidence. He has not shown what, if any, exculpatory evidence was suppressed by the

prosecution, how any such evidence was exculpatory, or how he was prejudiced by any such

suppression. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. In the absence of any evidence to support this claim,

it must be denied. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that “[c]onclusory allegations

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief”). 

Accordingly, Twyne is not entitled to relief as to these claims because he has not established the

state court’s denial was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme

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Court law. Nor has he established that that the state court’s denial of the claims was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (claim four)

Twyne argues both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Specifically, he contends trial

counsel should have challenged the admissibility of the documents associated with the 2002 prior DUI

conviction because they were not certified copies. (Pet. at 9.) He also contends appellate counsel

should have raised this challenge on appeal. (Id.) Respondent counters that the state court’s denial of

these claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 11-13.)

Twyne raised these claim in the habeas corpus petition he filed in the California Supreme Court

on March 17, 2009. (See Lodgment No. 12. at 8-10.) That court denied the petition without citation of

authority. (See Lodgment No. 13.) Thus, there is no underlying state court decision to which this Court

can “look through.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. Accordingly, this Court must conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the state court’s denial of the claim is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

To prevail on a claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in federal court, Twyne must have

first established in state court that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “This requires a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be “highly

deferential.” Id. at 689. Second, he must have shown counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the

defense, such that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s errors.. Id.

at 687. On federal habeas review, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, [but]

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”

Harrington v. Richter, No. 09-587, slip op. at 16 (U.S., Jan. 19, 2011). “The proper standard for

evaluating [a] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective . . . is that enunciated in Strickland.” Smith

v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986)). To

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establish prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Twyne must have shown

in state court a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal absent counsel’s errors.

Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). With regard to both claims, “[t]he

performance component need not be addressed first ‘[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness

claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should

be followed.’” Id., n. 144 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

As with his preceding claims, Twyne argues the charging documents and plea forms associated

with his 2002 DUI conviction were not admissible because they were not certified copies, and counsel

should have objected to their admissibility. (Pet. at 9.) As previously discussed, the page of the 2002

prior conviction documents containing the certification stamp was inadvertently not copied for the

Clerk’s Transcript. The actual documents admitted in state court, however, were certified copies of

those documents. (See Lodgment No. 14.) Accordingly, Twyne has not established counsel was

ineffective because there were no grounds upon which counsel could object to the admission of the

documents, nor did Twyne suffer any prejudice as a result of counsel’s failure to object. See Strickland,

466 U.S. at 686-89. For the same reasons, Twyne has not shown appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise this claim on appeal. There is no reasonable possibility that he would have prevailed on

appeal if counsel had raised this claim See Smith, 528 U.S. at 285.

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of these claims is neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Twyne is not entitled to relief

as to these claims.

4. Errors in the Preliminary Hearing (claim five)

Finally, Twyne claims that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to establish he had

suffered the prior DUI convictions and strike prior as alleged in the complaint and that the state trial

judge did not bind him over for trial on those allegations. (Pet. at 10.) Respondent contends Twyne is

not entitled to relief because his claim is a matter of state law only, citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 70. Respondent also argues the denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, that the trial judge did hold him to answer on the

DUI charges and DUI prior convictions, and that under California law, the prosecutor was not required

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to prove the prior strike conviction at the preliminary hearing. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 14-

15.)

Twyne raised this claim in the habeas corpus petition he filed in the California Supreme Court

on March 17 2009. (See Lodgment No. 12. at 10-11.) That court denied the petition without citation

of authority. (See Lodgment No. 13.) Thus, there is no lower court decision to which this Court can

“look through.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. Accordingly, this Court must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s denial of the claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

First, as Respondent correctly notes, contrary to Twyne’s claim, the record establishes that the

state judge did hold Twyne to answer for the all of the offenses alleged in the complaint. (Lodgment

No. 2 at 15.) Second, Respondent is also correct that there is no federal constitutional right to a

preliminary hearing; as such, Twyne’s complaints about how the preliminary hearing was conducted

are matters of state law, for which he is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. See Ramirez v. State

of Ariz, 437 F.2d 119, 119-120 (9th Cir. 1971). Third, California law does not require the prosecutor

to prove strike priors at the preliminary hearing stage. People v. Casillas, 92 Cal. App. 4th 171, 181-82

(citing Miranda v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 4th 902, 909 (1995)). Finally, any doubt regarding the

quantum of proof presented at the preliminary hearing has been dispelled by Twyne’s subsequent

conviction for charges and true findings of the prior convictions as alleged. See U.S. v. Mechanik, 475

U.S. 66, 70 (1986) (stating that a jury’s guilty verdict “means not only that there was probable cause to

believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond

a reasonable doubt [and that] any error in the grand jury proceedings . . .was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt”); see also U.S. v. Caruto, 627 F.3d 759, 767 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, and he is therefore not entitled

to relief as to this claim. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Roger T.

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Benitez under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(c) of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 11, 2011, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than April 25, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.

See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 11, 2011

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

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