Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00584/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00584-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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Plaintiff has also filed a third motion for leave to amend her complaint (doc. 46). As

it is not yet ripe, we do not consider the amendments proposed in that motion.

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Claudia Cristina Rosen, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Community Education Centers, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-0584-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint

(doc. 34), defendant Community Education Center’s (“CEC”) response (doc. 37), and

plaintiff’s amended reply (doc. 44).1

 Defendant CEC owns and operates private prisons,

pursuant to a contract with the Arizona Department of Corrections. Since 2007, plaintiff has

been employed by CEC as an officer at Yuma Detention Center Facility. Antonio Morales

was also employed by defendant CEC, and was plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. Plaintiff

claims that on May 19, 2009, Morales assaulted and battered her. Plaintiff alleges that the

assault was based upon her gender.

In her first complaint, Plaintiff named Morales as a defendant (doc. 1). Following

Case 2:10-cv-00584-FJM Document 47 Filed 10/08/10 Page 1 of 8
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receipt of the complaint, defense counsel wrote to plaintiff’s counsel to outline perceived

deficiencies in several of the counts, including the claims for constructive discharge,

violation of public policy, wrongful retaliation, and wrongful termination. Response to

Motion to Amend, ex. A. Plaintiff subsequently filed a first amended complaint, which

asserted a new claim for negligent supervision against defendant CEC (doc. 19). Defense

counsel again wrote to plaintiff’s counsel, this time requesting the dismissal of the

constructive discharge, wrongful termination, and negligent supervision claims against CEC,

and the modification of the wrongful retaliation claim. Response to Motion to Amend, ex.

B. Plaintiff’s lawyer agreed to dismiss the wrongful termination and negligent supervision

claims, “if and only if” defendant agreed to forego a motion to dismiss and to timely file an

answer to plaintiff’s complaint, and reserved the right to move for the addition of claims later

“as circumstances may warrant.” Response to Motion to Amend, ex. C. The parties

stipulated to the dismissal of the wrongful termination and negligent supervision claims

against CEC (doc. 22), and CEC filed an answer (doc. 21). Additionally, plaintiff never

served Morales, and thus he was dismissed, pursuant to Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P. (doc. 26).

Plaintiff now seeks leave to assert a new claim against CEC for a violation of her civil

rights, revive her negligent supervision claim, bring Morales back in as a defendant, and add

a claim for assault and battery against Morales. Plaintiff’s motion was timely filed in

accordance with the Rule 16 Scheduling Order (doc. 30). Defendant opposes the motion on

the grounds of futility, bad faith, and dilatory motive.

I

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim for a violation of her civil rights is futile.

Plaintiff claims that defendants CEC and Morales conspired to deprive plaintiff of her First

Amendment right to petition the government for redress of her grievances by retaliating

against her for reporting the assault, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiff also

alleges that defendants further violated her rights by illegally obstructing the police

investigation of the assault and battery against her, and by “denying her right to not be

retaliated against for free speech, and her right to protection under Title VII, in violation of

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42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Amended Complaint, 38–39, ¶ 184.

Under Rule 15(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., we grant leave to amend pleadings when “justice

so requires.” We deny leave to amend on the basis of futility when the amended complaint

could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. See Townsend

v. University of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 486 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (the “basis for futility is more

accurately characterized as a failure to state a claim for relief.”). Therefore, we consider

whether plaintiff’s amended complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations” that

“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” for a violation of her civil rights. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

“Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for

violation of the rights it designates.” Great American Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.

Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2349 (1979). To state a claim under section

1985, plaintiff must allege that defendants (1) conspired; (2) for the purpose of depriving,

any person or class of persons of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities; and

(3) one or more of the conspirators did or caused to be done any act in furtherance of the

object of the conspiracy; whereby another was (4a) injured in his person or property or (4b)

deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a United States citizen. Griffin

v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102–03, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798–99 (1971). 

First, defendant argues that plaintiff cannot show that there was a conspiracy, because

a corporation cannot conspire with its agents or employees acting within the scope of their

employment. Although defendant claims that it is “well-settled” that a corporation cannot

conspire with its employees, they cite no binding precedent to that effect. In fact, there is

some disagreement about the applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to actions

under section 1985, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not yet

addressed the issue. See Mustafa v. Clark County School Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1181 (9th

Cir. 1998) (“This circuit has not yet addressed whether individual members of a single

governmental entity can form a ‘conspiracy’ within the meaning of section 1985.”). See also

Dickerson v. Alachua County Com’n, 200 F.3d 761, 769, n.9 (11th Cir. 2000) (reviewing the

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state of the law on the applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to section

1985(3) claims in different circuits). Moreover, even if a corporation cannot conspire with

itself for purposes of a section 1985 claim, “an intracorporate conspiracy may be established

where individual defendants are also named and those defendants act outside the scope of

their employment for personal reasons.” Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553, 556 (8th

Cir. 1987). 

In her amended complaint, plaintiff does allege that Morales assaulted and battered

her while performing his normal course of duties, in accordance with his employment

contract with defendant CEC. Amended Complaint, 7, ¶ 25. But we do not interpret this

assertion to necessarily mean that Morales was operating on behalf of CEC when he

allegedly assaulted and battered plaintiff. Certainly such violence was not in the normal

course of his duties, even if it allegedly occurred while Morales was performing his usual

work. 

However, this does not mean that plaintiff has asserted factual allegations that could

plausibly entitle her to relief under section 1985. While it is theoretically possible that CEC

conspired with other employees or former employees to deprive plaintiff of her civil rights,

she offers no allegations to substantiate such an unlikely scenario. The generalized

accusation that defendants CEC, Morales, and unnamed employees conspired to deprive

plaintiff of her rights, without any indication of the nature of the conspiracy, is insufficient.

Therefore, plaintiff has not stated a claim for the element of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3). 

Additionally, plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish the second element

of a section 1985 claim, the deprivation of plaintiff’s right with a discriminatory purpose.

A right created by Title VII is not actionable under § 1985(3). Great American, 442 U.S. at

378, 99 S.Ct. at 2352. Thus, plaintiff must show defendant deprived her of another right with

“invidiously discriminatory animus.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798. That

discriminatory animus must arise from plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. “Section

1985(3) extends beyond race only when the class in question can show that there has been

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a governmental determination that its members require and warrant special federal assistance

in protecting their civil rights.” Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001).

Individuals who wish to petition the government are not such a group, and are therefore not

protected by section 1985. Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1538 (9th Cir. 1992).

Plaintiff claims that it is possible that CEC and its employees conspired to deprive

plaintiff of her First Amendment right to petition the government because she is female.

Women can constitute a protected class. See Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Reichardt,

591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979) (“women purchasers of disability insurance are a sufficient

class”). Plaintiff thus characterizes her claim as an assertion that defendant CEC and its

employees, who were operating outside the scope of their employment, conspired to deprive

her of her First Amendment right to petition the government for redress, and did so because

she is a woman. This is purely speculative, and plaintiff does not offer factual allegations

to back up her hypothetical discriminatory animus that motivated the alleged deprivation of

her rights. Therefore, plaintiff has not sufficiently plead the second element of a conspiracy

claim. 

We also deny leave to amend to assert any claims for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff references section 1983 in her claim for a violation of her civil rights, but she has

not alleged that any defendant operated under color of law. Any claim under section 1983

fails as a matter of law. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598,

1604 (1970).

Because her proposed claim for a violation of her civil rights is futile, we deny leave

to amend to add the claim. 

II

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s proposed claim for negligent supervision is futile

because under the Arizona Workers’ Compensation Act, the right to recover pursuant to the

statute is the “exclusive remedy against the employer or any co-employee acting in the scope

of his employment,” unless the injury is caused by defendant’s “wilful misconduct.” A.R.S.

§ 23-1022(A). Defendant contends that a claim for negligent conduct by supervisors is

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precluded by the statute. See Irvin Investors, Inc. v. Superior Court In and For County, 166

Ariz. 113, 115, 800 P.2d 979, 981 (Ct.App. 1990) (citing Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38,

734 P.2d 580 (1987)) (fellow employee’s sexual harassment of plaintiff was an “unexpected

injury-causing event” within the coverage of the compensation statute); see also Mosakowski

v. PSS World Medical, Inc., 329 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1131 (D.Ariz. 2003). 

Plaintiff argues that the claim is not futile because it is possible that “some set of

facts” may show that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by actions taken outside the scope of

any defendant’s employment, but for which CEC would be liable. Plaintiff also claims that

because her injuries were allegedly caused by defendant Morales’s assault, a clearly

intentional act, her claims falls within the “willful misconduct” exception to the Worker’s

Compensation statute.

We conclude that plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim is futile. First, plaintiff’s

highly speculative “some set of facts” does not constitute “well-pleaded factual allegations.”

Iqbal, __ U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Second, in her complaint, plaintiff alleges that

defendant CEC knew or should have known about the “harassers’” wrongful conduct, and

was in a position to intervene to protect plaintiff, which it failed to do. Thus, plaintiff asserts

her negligent supervision claim against CEC, not Morales or any other employee. However,

plaintiff does not explain how a corporate defendant could have been acting outside the scope

of employment, but in a manner for which it would be liable. Third, the culpability at issue

in her negligent supervision claim is that of defendant CEC, not that of Morales. Therefore,

even if Morales acted willfully when he allegedly assaulted plaintiff, plaintiff’s claim for

negligent supervision does not come under the wilful misconduct exception. 

Plaintiff’s claim for negligent supervision fails as a matter of law. Because we deny

leave to amend due to futility, we need not address defendant’s argument that the reassertion

of this claim constitutes bad faith on the part of plaintiff.

III

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s attempt to reassert claims against Morales is made

in bad faith and demonstrates a dilatory motive. Plaintiff named Morales in her first

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complaint, but never served him. Plaintiff later dismissed Morales (as well as three other

named defendants and all fictitious defendants), pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(I), Fed. R. Civ.

P. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s attempt to re-name Morales, triggering a new 120 day

service period, is an end run around Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P., and our scheduling order,

which required the dismissal of any party not yet served, unless parties showed cause for the

failure to serve (doc. 24). Plaintiff counters that defendant’s allegations of bad faith ignore

that plaintiff expressly reserved the right to move to add claims at a later time, “as

circumstances may warrant.” Plaintiff further claims that because Morales was never served,

there is no prejudice in renaming him. Last, plaintiff explains that she had hoped to hold off

on deciding whether to name Morales until the criminal charges against him, stemming from

the alleged assault, were resolved. However, because that case is still ongoing, plaintiff

decided to proceed with her claims against Morales. 

In determining whether to grant leave to amend, we consider the presence of bad faith

and dilatory motive. See United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d

1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001). We share defendant’s concern about the inefficiency of naming,

dropping, and then renaming a defendant. Additionally, plaintiff’s contention that she

wanted to decide whether or not to name Morales after the resolution of the criminal case

does not explain why she named him in her first complaint. However, we agree with plaintiff

that the addition of the claims against Morales does not prejudice him, as he has not yet had

to respond to plaintiff’s complaint. Moreover, under Rule 15(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., we grant

leave to amend freely. We conclude that justice requires that plaintiff have the opportunity

to seek redress against the individual she believes assaulted her. Nevertheless, plaintiff better

serve Morales promptly so that he may comply with our Rule 16 order.

V

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART plaintiff’s

motion to amend (doc. 34). IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiff leave to amend to

assert claims against Antonio Morales. IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiff leave to

assert a claim for a violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for negligent

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supervision. 

DATED this 7th day of October, 2010.

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