Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01050/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01050-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY E. WALKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

MINA BESHARA; FNU LUU; DAVID 

ROBLESS; AUDRA KING; JOSH 

BERGER; FNU STEVEN; REBECCA 

KORNBLUSH,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-01050-HBK (PC)

Initial Screening Order directing plaintiff to file an 

amended complaint 

(Doc. No. 1). 

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Order denying as moot (1) plaintiff’s motion for 

defendants to answer; and (2) motion to compel

(Doc. Nos. 8, 10)

Plaintiff Jeffrey E. Walker initiated this action by filing a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

complaint on July 30, 2020 while detained at the Coalinga State Hospital.

1

(Doc. No. 1). The 

then-assigned magistrate judge granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

on August 3, 2020. (Doc. No. 4). Also reviewed in this order are plaintiff’s “motion for 

defendants to answer” filed October 20, 2020, and motion to compel filed on December 9, 2020. 

(Docs. Nos. 8, 10). 

1 This matter was reassigned to the undersigned on November 17, 2020. (Doc. No. 9). 

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I. Screening Requirements and Standards of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that – the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious. . .[or] fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 

such relief.” Id. A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 

fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably 

meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at

327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however in artfully pleaded, has an 

arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it 

appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to 

relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log 

Owners Ass’n, Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Section 1983 allows a private citizen to sue for the deprivation of a right secured by 

federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017). To 

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a defendant acting under color of state law 

caused an alleged deprivation of a right secured by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Soo Park 

v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff can satisfy the causation 

requirement by showing either: (1) the defendant’s “personal involvement” in the alleged 

deprivation or (2) a “sufficient causal connection” between the defendant’s conduct as a 

supervisor and the alleged deprivation. See King v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 559 (9th 

Cir. 2018). 

During screening, the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, Hosp. 

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Tr., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.

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2003) (the court must construe pro se pleadings liberally and afford the pro se litigant the benefit 

of any doubt). The court is not required to accept conclusory allegations as true, unreasonable 

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 

624 (9th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible to survive screening, which requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quotation 

marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer 

possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability 

falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required 

to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 

2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

If the court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a 

pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of 

Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). A district court should not, however, advise the litigant 

on how to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial 

decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 

n.13.

Finally, examples of immunity from relief for consideration during screening, include, but 

are not limited to, quasi-judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, or qualified immunity. 

Additionally, a plaintiff may not recover monetary damages absent a showing of physical injury. 

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See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). In other words, to recover monetary damages, a plaintiff must allege 

physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimus, except when 

involving First Amendment claims. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626-28 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(surveying other circuit courts for the first time to address injury requirement for monetary 

damages, and agreeing with the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits on Prison Litigation Reform 

Act’s injury requirement).

II. Plaintiff’s Complaint 

Plaintiff initiated this action as a civil detainee at Coalinga State Hospital, where he 

appears to be receiving mental health treatment. (See generally Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff names the 

following defendants: (1) Mina Beshara; (2) FNU Luu; (3) David Robless; (4) Audra King; (5) 

Josh Berer; (6) FNU Steven; and (7) Rebecca Kornbluh; (8) Treatment Team John and Jane Does; 

(9) Involuntary Medical Hearing John and Jane Does November- 2016; (10) Involuntarily 

Medical Hearing John and Jane Does- December 2016; and (11) David Avilla. (Id. at 1-2). All 

claims appear to stem from incidents plaintiff alleges occurred in 2016, approximately four years 

prior to when plaintiff initiated this action. (See generally id.). The complaint is comprised of 34 

pages and includes 103 separate number averments. The averments are disjointed, rambling and 

confusing and appear in a diary-like fashion detailing various unrelated incidents plaintiff

experienced at different points in time with different staff, or other patients, at Coalinga State 

Hospital. 

To the extent discernable, it appears Plaintiff attempts to allege claims arising under the

Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments, considering it appears Plaintiff is civilly detained, not 

criminally confined, follow his criminal detention at the CDCR. The incidents giving rise to the 

cause of action appear to stem from Plaintiff being forcefully medicated when defendants instead 

could have housed Plaintiff in a single cell or being placed in under 1:1 observation necessitating 

male officials to directly observe him around-the-clock. (Id. at 5-7, 10, 17) (alleging Plaintiff 

could not get any sleep with male staff observing him). Plaintiff repeatedly refers to “male staff 

lil watching him in bed etc.” (Id. at 8). The “lil” to which Plaintiff refers is construed as 1:1 

observation, which is a method of direct observation for mental health patients. Plaintiff states 

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defendants knew “plaintiff had a history of flash backs and reoccurring remembrance of past 

sexual abuse if left in certain predicaments resulting in plaintiff being taken out to the hospitals 

on numerous occasions for sexual exams.” (Id. at 6). 

Plaintiff claims that he has suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder from a previous 

sexual assault in prison which “triggers” him when he has male staff watching him, or when he

sees Hispanic residents or staff, or gay staff, and causes him to experience anxiety attacks, chest 

pains, paranoia and results in him being administered psychotropic drugs against his will or taken 

to outside hospitals for examinations. (Id. at 7, 15). Thus, it appears these situations are those 

“certain predicaments” of which Plaintiff takes issue. Plaintiff includes details of his counseling 

sessions or “panel” interviews and admits that a state court order required that he be involuntarily 

medicated, and has a diagnosis of paranoia, bi-polar disorder and other mental health issues. (Id.

at 23-25). Plaintiff acknowledges that during a three-year time span when he was housed in a 

single cell, he was not triggered and did not require forced medication, or to be transported for

rape examinations. (Id. at 20). As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and any other relief 

the Court deems appropriate. (Id. at 31).

III. Discussion

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8

The Complaint is difficult to decipher and confusing. It is devoid of sufficient factual 

support showing a causal connection between each of the named defendants and any alleged 

constitutional deprivations. The complaint names more than a dozen defendants, but lacks 

enough facts describing the who, what, where, when, and why of plaintiff’s claims. The 

complaint includes unrelated incidents against numerous unrelated defendants, based on separate 

factual scenarios that occurred at different times. Peppered throughout the complaint are 

conclusory claims that various named defendants failed to protect plaintiff but fails to state from 

who or what plaintiff needed protected. While it may be possible that plaintiff has a claim 

sounding in medical deliberate indifference, or a cruel and unusual conditions of confinement 

claim, relating to the forceful application of psychotropic medication to him against his will when 

a simple solution appears to be a single cell, or direct observation by female staff only, the current 

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complaint as written currently fails to state a claim because it appears various treating mental 

health professionals had a difference of opinion in how best to treat Plaintiff. 

While the Eighth Amendment entitles plaintiff to medical care, the Eighth Amendment is 

violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 

medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other 

grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 

F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). To state a claim for medical deliberate indifference, plaintiff 

must allege that the medical need was “serious” by demonstrating that a failure to treat “could 

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

And plaintiff must show that defendants’ response was deliberately indifferent by alleging that 

“the course of treatment the [medical officials] chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive 

risk to the plaintiff's health.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than medical negligence or malpractice, and a 

difference of opinion between medical professionals—or between a physician and the prisoner—

generally does not amount to deliberate indifference. See generally Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051 (9th Cir. 2004). Misdiagnosis alone is not a basis for a claim, see Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 

F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012), and a “mere delay” in treatment, “without more, is insufficient 

to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference,” Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison 

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff must show that a delay “would cause 

significant harm and that Defendants should have known this to be the case.” Hallett v. Morgan, 

296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002). A decision to avoid more effective medical treatment without 

a basis of professional judgment and instead based solely on cost may amount to deliberate 

indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; see also Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1019 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (discussing that cost-based decisions may amount to deliberate indifference in prisoner 

medical cases).

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In addition to the law set forth above, if plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he 

must be mindful of some general pleading requirements in filing an amended complaint. The

amended complaint must be a complete document and must not refer to the initial complaint. See

Local Rule 220 (E.D. Cal. 2019). The requirement exists because an amended complaint 

supersedes the original complaint and becomes the only operative complaint. 

Plaintiff should name only those defendants he believes participated in the alleged 

wrongdoing at issue. Here, plaintiff names many defendants, including the unidentified teams of 

individuals who decided to involuntarily medicate him. If he chooses to amend, plaintiff must 

name only those defendants who are alleged to have participated in the alleged wrongdoing to 

him and allege facts showing a causal link between the named defendant and the alleged 

constitutional violation. As set forth above, vague and conclusory allegations are not enough. To 

the extent Plaintiff believes he sets forth a failure to protect claim, the Complaint is entirely 

unclear who failed to protect him and what defendant(s) did not protect him from. It’s clear the 

sexual assault Plaintiff speaks of occurred years before while he was confined at a CDCR facility. 

Finally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a complaint to include all related

claims against a party and permit joinder of all defendants alleged to be liable for the “same 

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrence” where “any question of law or 

fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) and 20(a)(2). But 

the Rules do not permit conglomeration of unrelated claims against unrelated defendants in a 

single lawsuit. Unrelated claims must be filed in separate lawsuits. 

B. Other motions

Plaintiff filed a motion for defendants to “answer the complaint and to select a judge,” and 

a motion to compel seeking an order directing the U.S. Marshal to serve his complaint. (See Doc. 

Nos. 8, 10). The basis for plaintiff’s motions are understandable considering the instant case was 

filed in July 2020. However, plaintiff should note that the Eastern District of California, 

including the undersigned, has an extremely heavy docket caseload, as further evidenced by the 

Standing Order in Light of Ongoing Judicial Emergency issued in this district. Nevertheless, 

defendants are not required to respond to a complaint until the court screens the complaint and 

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until the court directs plaintiff to complete service of process forms and/or directs service of 

process. As described herein, plaintiff is permitted to file an amended complaint so he may 

attempt to sure his pleading deficiencies. Thus, plaintiff’s motions are denied as moot at this time 

based on the instant order. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the date on this order, plaintiff shall file an amended 

complaint on the attached civil rights complaint form.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for defendants to answer the complaint and to select a judge, and 

motion to compel seeking an order directing the U.S. Marshal to serve his complaint (Doc. Nos. 

8, 10) are denied as moot.

3. The Clerk of Court shall provide plaintiff a complaint form marked “Amended 

Complaint” bearing the instant case number for plaintiff’s use to file an amended complaint.

4. Plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with this order will result the recommendation that 

this case be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to comply with the court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2021 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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