Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01843/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01843-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv1843

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYRON THOMAS,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, et al.

Respondents.

 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 08-CV-1843-W (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I. Introduction

Petitioner Myron Thomas (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On May 2,

2005, Petitioner was convicted by jury in San Diego Superior Court case number

SCD179132 of second degree murder of Roderick Little (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a))

(count 1); assault with a machine gun and an assault weapon against Bobby Wilson,

Trina Green, and Courtney Henry (id. § 245(a)(3)) (counts 2, 3, and 4); and discharge of

a firearm from a motor vehicle at Courtney Henry (id. § 12034(c)) (count 5). (Lodgment

No. 3, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 11-15, 337-44, 437.01-02.) Petitioner contends (1)

his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an additional jury instruction

regarding self-defense, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support one of the great

bodily injury sentence enhancements, and (3) the trial court violated his due process

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 08cv1843

rights by admitting two uncharged acts into evidence. (See Pet. at 6-8.) 

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in support thereof, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all the supporting

documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that

the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

The following statement of facts is taken from the California Court of Appeal

opinion, People v. Myron Thomas, No. D047101, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2007). 

(Lodgment No. 1, Ex. 1.) This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The facts as found by the state

appellate court are as follows:

In November, 2003, Thomas was a Lance Corporal in the United States

Marine Corps. He qualified as a “certified expert” shooter and could hit a

silhouette from 500 yards away with an M-16 rifle. Although stationed at

Camp Pendleton, he was staying at the home of his supervisor, Sergeant

Kayzosky Sanders, along with Sanders’s girlfriend, Dustyn, and his

nephew, Kenneth Wortham. In his bedroom closet Sanders kept an AK47 that he had obtained from Wortham, who he had visited in Mississippi

in October 2003. Sanders brought the AK-47 to California to impress

others with it. 

Thomas testified that on Nov. 18, 2003, between 7:00 p.m. and 10:15

p.m., he drank alcohol and smoked marijuana dipped in formaldehyde at

Sanders’s home, while he waited to be picked up by his friends, Bernard

Jones, Kenneth Hall, and Kevin Moore. At approximately 10:00 p.m.,

these friends arrived, and they went to Club Metro, which is located on the

32nd Street naval base in San Diego. Thomas was kicked out of the club

because he was walking across the dance floor with a drink in his hand. 

While Thomas was outside, Jones and Jermaine Henderson apparently

bumped into each other accidentally inside the club, and an altercation

ensued between Jones’s friends and Henderson’s friends. The incident

ended, and the partying continued.

At approximately 11:30 that night, Thomas used his cellular phone to call

a friend, Glean Finley, Jr., to inform him of the altercation in the club and

ask if Finley was coming to the club. Thomas wanted Finley to join him

because he knew Finley would fight. However, Finley was sick, and did

not join them. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on November 19th, 2003,

Thomas called Wortham at Sanders’s house and said he was being

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 08cv1843

treated like a “fuck boy.” 

At approximately 1:30 a.m., after the club closed and the guests were

socializing outside, Henderson and Jones resumed their earlier argument. 

Henderson said he had a 9-millimeter gun, although Jones never saw it. 

The friends of Jones and Henderson were drawn into a large

confrontation. Thomas’s friend, Qwana Metoyer, was talking to him

outside and heard the argument. She grabbed his arm and told him,

“Let’s go.” He responded referring to Jones, “No, that’s my friend. If

something happens, I’m gonna be there.”

Military police officers broke up the altercation. Jones shook hands with

Richard Little, one of the men in Henderson’s party, and both groups

started retreating, although Henderson was still making threats. Thomas

walked up and, using profanities, threatened to fight Henderson. Jones

had to physically restrain Thomas. The group of friends returned to Hall’s

car and headed to the exit of the naval base. Hall was driving his car,

Jones was in the front passenger seat, Moore was in the left rear set, and

Thomas was in the right rear seat. When they approached the main gate,

a military police officer, Darrell Gordon, heard someone in Hall’s car say,

“We’re gonna do a 187,” which he understood to mean to shoot or murder

someone. A different passenger said, “Shh, there goes the military

police.” Someone responded, “I don’t give a fuck. We’re still going to do a

187.” Officer Gordon put his hand on his weapon and told his partner,

Juan Salazar, to take cover. Officer Salazar testified he also heard

someone in Hall’s car say, “We’re gonna do a 187.” 

Thomas and his friends drove to the parking lot of a nearby Del Taco

restaurant, located at the corner of 28th and Main Streets, which was

crowded with people who had been at the club. Thomas and Metoyer met

there, and he identified Henderson to her as the individual who had gotten

into the altercation with Jones in Club Metro. Later, Henderson walked

towards Jones, who was seated in the car. Jones told Hall to drive away. 

Thomas was angry, loud and hostile, and tried to get out of the vehicle. 

Henderson cursed Jones and the occupants of Hall’s car. Jones saw

something shiny, that could have been a gun, in the area of Henderson’s

waistband. As Hall was exiting the parking lot, Jones heard Thomas say,

“I’m going to kill that nigger;” and, “Let’s go get that thing,” referring to the

AK-47.

At approximately 2:09 a.m., Thomas called Wortham at home, and

sounded excited and angry; he asked if the AK-47 was there, and said he

was coming home. Thomas returned to Sanders’s home, and repeated to

Wortham multiple times, “They tried to treat me like a fuck boy.” Thomas

also said he had gotten upset outside the club and had kicked some cars. 

He walked back and forth in the apartment, and went into Sanders’s

bedroom, where Sanders was asleep, and took the AK-47 from the closet. 

Thomas and his friends drove back to the Del Taco parking lot. En route,

they met two acquaintances, Desmond Dozier and Razaq Kafo, with

whom they had earlier discussed the night’s altercation. Dozier testified

he asked Jones if they had a weapon, and Jones said yes. During the

brief conversation, Dozier heard Kafo tell Thomas, “Go the fuck home.” 

Dozier also heard Thomas say something to the effect that, “No, I’m going

back over there to do something” and, “I’m going to cap that

motherfucker,” meaning Thomas was going to try and kill or shoot

someone. 

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 08cv1843

Sanders phoned Thomas at 2:16 a.m., a minute or two after Thomas had

left the house, and Thomas told him about the incident at Club Metro. 

Sanders told him to come home and not do anything stupid. Thomas

replied that he was on his way home. Thomas was at the Del Taco by

2:26 a.m., when he received a second call from Sanders, who was

concerned he had not returned home. At 2:35 a.m., Thomas telephoned

Metoyer’s cell phone, and the only thing he asked her was whether

Henderson was still in the parking lot. She told him Henderson was in

front of her car. Thomas told her he was almost home, and asked her to

call him when she got home.

Thomas testified he returned to the parking lot because “he wanted to go

and confront them and see what was going on and see if we could just

fight it out and get it over with.” Jones told Thomas to give him the AK-47,

but Thomas refused. Thomas testified that within a couple minutes after

his call to Metoyer, he heard one of his friends in the car say, “He’s got a

gun.” Thomas raised the AK-47 about four inches from the level of the

lowered window, and fired a first shot in the section of the Del Taco

parking lot where he saw Henderson. [Footnote omitted.] Jones testified

that after the first shot rang out, he reclined his seat to try to impede

Thomas from shooting again. However, Thomas fired five other shots in

rapid succession. Hall drove speedily out of the parking lot, and Thomas

stated, “I got that nigger,” in what Jones described as a “festive voice.” 

Back at Sanders’s house, Thomas bragged to Sanders and Wortham that

he had “busted at them fuck boys,” meaning he had shot them. Thomas

said he thought he hit three or four individuals in the legs. 

Metoyer saw Roderick Little on the ground in front of her car immediately

after she heard the gunshots. She called 911 to report the incident at 2:38

a.m. Thomas telephoned her after the shooting, and she recounted what

had happened. Thomas admitted under cross-examination that he did not

want her to suspect his involvement in the shooting; therefore, in that and

other phone conversations he had with her shortly thereafter, he

expressed surprise at the information she passed on to him. Metoyer

concluded Thomas was involved in the shooting because, “a few minutes

before the shots went off I just spoke with him and told him where the guy

was standing, and when we get off the phone the shots ring off.” When

the police arrived at the crime scene, she narrated to them her earlier

conversations with Thomas, and they instructed her to hand them her

phone if he called back. She did so, and as soon as the officer

responded, Thomas hung up the phone. 

The police arrived at the crime scene, administered CPR to Little and later

took him to the hospital, but approximately an hour later he died from

gunshot wounds to the pelvis. Bobby Wilson, an enlisted member of the

United States Navy, was standing in a circle with Little and some friends,

and within an arm’s length of Little. A bullet went through both of Wilson’s

legs, and he spent three nights recuperating in the hospital. He testified

regarding his injuries as follows: “[T]he bullet is lodged in my left leg, and

in my right leg I got complete sciatic nerve damage. So that pretty much

means that I can’t move my foot, I can’t move my toes, and it just burns.” 

He used crutches for over six months, and at the time of trial needed to

wear a brace to help him walk.

Courtney Henry, an enlisted member of the United States Navy, suffered a

gunshot wound that penetrated and exited the upper thigh area of his left

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 08cv1843

leg. He spent one night in the hospital. Trina Green received a gunshot

wound on her leg and needed to use crutches for approximately a weekand-a-half. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Ex. 1 at 3-8.)

III. Procedural Background

On December 21, 2004, the District Attorney for the County of San Diego filed a

Second Amended Information charging Petitioner and a co-defendant, Kenneth Hall,

with one count of murder, three counts of assault with a machine gun and an assault

weapon, and one count of discharge with a firearm from a motor vehicle. (CT at 11-15.) 

On May 2, 2005, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder of Roderick

Little (count 1); assault with a machine gun and an assault weapon against Bobby

Wilson, Trina Green, and Courtney Henry (counts 2, 3, and 4); and discharge of a

firearm from a motor vehicle at Courtney Henry (count 5). (Id. at 337-44, 437.01-.02.) 

The jury also found true allegations of intentional and personal discharge of a firearm,

an AK-47 assault weapon, causing great bodily injury or death in violation of Cal. Penal

Code § 12022.53(d) during the commission of the offenses set forth in counts 1 and 5;

intentional and personal discharge of a firearm, an AK-47 assault weapon, in violation of

§ 12022.53(c) during the commission of the offenses set forth in counts 1 and 5;

personal use of an AK-47 assault weapon in violation of § 12022.5(b) during the

commission of the offenses set forth in counts 1 through 5; personal infliction of great

bodily injury in violation of § 12022.7(a) during the commission of the offense set forth in

count 2; and infliction of great bodily injury in violation of § 12022.55 during the

commission of the offense set forth in count 2. (Id. at 337-44, 437.01-.02; 539-40.) 

Petitioner was sentenced on August 15, 2005 to an indeterminate term of 65 years to

life plus 23 years and 4 months. (CT at 437.01, 538-40.) 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One (“California Court of Appeal”). (Lodgment Nos. 5-7.) On March 21, 2007,

in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Ex. 1.) Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the California

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 08cv1843

Supreme Court (see Lodgment No. 1), which was denied without comment on June 20,

2007 (Pet., Ex. 1).

On October 9, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent initially filed a

motion to dismiss, which was denied on November 30, 2009. (Doc. No. 13.)

Respondent subsequently filed an Answer on March 1, 2010, and Petitioner filed a

Traverse on March 29, 2009. (Doc. Nos. 18, 19.) 

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of review

for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The current Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently

than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 08cv1843

the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for

its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record

to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d

976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need

not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],” the state court decision will

not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel For Failure to Request Pinpoint

Jury Instruction Regarding Effect of Prior Threats

Petitioner contends his trial counsel, Marc Carlos, rendered him ineffective

assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on the principle that “a defendant is

entitled to act more quickly and harshly in self-defense if he has previously been

threatened by the victim.” (Pet. at 6.) Petitioner states that given that trial testimony

demonstrated that Henderson had previously threatened him and his companions,

stated that he had a gun, and in fact had a gun, his counsel’s performance was deficient

for not requesting such an instruction. (Pet. at 6.) 

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for review filed in the California

Supreme Court on direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 1.) That court denied the claim

without citation of authority. (Pet., Ex. 1.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through”

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 08cv1843

the state supreme court’s denial to the state appellate court’s opinion as the basis for its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In denying Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, the California Court of Appeal stated: 

Thomas contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to

request a jury instruction to the effect that “a defendant can act more

quickly and take harsher measures in self-defense when he has received

prior threats from the victim.” [Footnote omitted.] The familiar twopronged test for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, outlined in

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686-687, requires a

defendant to demonstrate the attorney’s deficient performance and

resulting prejudice because there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s conduct, the defendant would have received a more favorable

outcome. If the second prong of prejudice is not established, the

reviewing court should reject the claim without analyzing the first prong. 

(People v. Kipp, [18 Cal. 4th 349, 366-367 (1998)].) Here, we have no

need to analyze the first prong.

The trial court instructed regarding self-defense with CALJIC Nos. 5.12,

5.13, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, [5.17] in seriatim . . . . as follows:

“The killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable and not unlawful

when the person who does the killing actually and reasonably believes:

“1. That there is imminent danger and that the other person

will either kill him or cause him great bodily injury; and

“2. That it is necessary under the circumstances for him to

use, in self-defense, force or means that might cause the

death of the other person for the purpose of avoiding death

or great bodily injury to himself.

“A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a

homicide. To justify taking the life of another in self-defense, the

circumstances must be such as would excite the fears of a reasonable

person placed in a similar position, and the party killing must act under the

influence of those fears alone. The danger must be apparent, present,

immediate and instantly dealt with, or must so appear at the time to the

slayer as a reasonable person, and the killing must be done under a wellfounded belief that it is necessary to save [one’s self] from death or great

bodily harm. [CALJIC 5.12] 

“Homicide is justifiable and not unlawful when committed by any person in

the defense of himself if he actually and reasonably believed that the

individual killed intended to commit a forcible and atrocious crime and that

there was imminent danger of that crime being accomplished. A person

may act upon appearances whether the danger is real or merely apparent. 

[CALJIC 5.13]

“The reasonable ground of apprehension does not require actual danger,

but it does require (1) that the person about to kill another be confronted

by the appearance of a peril such as has been mentioned; (2) that the

appearance of peril arouse in his mind an actual belief and fear of the

existence of that peril; (3) that a reasonable person in the same situation,

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 08cv1843

seeing and knowing the same facts, would justifiably have, and would be

justified in having, the same fear, and (4) that the killing be done under the

influence of that fear alone. [CALJIC 5.14]

“Upon a trial of a charge of murder, a killing is lawful if it was justifiable or

excusable. The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the homicide was unlawful, that is, not justifiable or

excusable. If you have a reasonable doubt that the homicide was

unlawful, you must find the defendant not guilty. [CALJIC 5.15]

“A forcible and atrocious crime, as mentioned in these instructions, is any

felony that by its nature and the manner of its commission threatens, or is

reasonably believed by the defendant to threaten life or great bodily injury

so as to instill in him a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury. 

[CALJIC 5.16]

“A person who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief in

the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury

kills unlawfully but does not harbor malice aforethought and is not guilty,

therefore, of murder. This would be so even though a reasonable person

in the same situation, seeing and knowing the same facts, would not have

had the same belief. Such an actual but unreasonable belief is not a

defense to the crime of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. 

“As used in this instruction, an ‘imminent’ peril or danger means one that

is apparent, present, immediate and must be instantly dealt with, or must

so appear at the time to the slayer. 

“However, this principle is not available, and malice aforethought is not

negated, if the defendant, by his unlawful or wrongful conduct, created the

circumstances which legally justified his adversary’s use of force.

“This principle applies equally to a person who kills in purported selfdefense or purported defense of another person.” [CALJIC 5.17]

Trial courts are not required to give instructions ― such as the one

Thomas now suggests ― that are redundant or that do not further

illuminate the legal standards at issue. (People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.

4th 599, 648.) Thomas’s claim fails because the jury was instructed with

CALJIC No. 5.17, which adequately covers the issue of an instant reaction

being justifiable in the event of a threat; it states: “[An] ‘imminent’ peril or

danger means one that is apparent, present, immediate and must be

instantly dealt with, or must so appear at the time to the slayer.” Thomas’s

attorney specifically referred to this instruction in his closing argument: 

“Must be apparent, gun. You look over, the guy has a gun. Must be

present, gun. He has a gun. He’s threatened to kill us. And instantly

dealt with, fired.” (Emphasis added.)

The jury heard Thomas’s testimony regarding his interactions with

Henderson at Club Metro and at the Del Taco parking lot, including his

claim he fired the shots when Henderson flashed a gun in his waistband. 

The jury was thoroughly instructed regarding self-defense, the elements of

the crime of homicide in the second degree ― including the requisite

intent ― and the prosecution’s burden of proof. Manifestly, the jury did

not need the suggested instruction. Under the circumstances, Thomas

was not prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to request the suggested

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 08cv1843

instruction. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Ex. 1 at 17-20.) 

Under clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law, to establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show that: (1) “counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694

(1984). “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to

approach the inquiry in the same order or to even address both components of the

inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697. “In

particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies.” Id.

It is settled under California law that a defendant asserting self-defense is

entitled, upon request, to a pinpoint instruction on the effect of prior threats against the

defendant on the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. People v. Garvin, 110

Cal. App. 4th 484, 488 (2003). Assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s trial counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing to request

the instruction, however, Petitioner was not prejudiced as a result because there was no

reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a result more favorable to

Petitioner even if such an instruction had been given. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95. 

In other words, considering the totality of the evidence before the jury (see id. at 695),

there is no reasonable probability that, had the instruction been given, the jury would

have concluded that Petitioner acted in self-defense. The trial court gave six

instructions related to self-defense, which instructed the jury to consider all the

circumstances as they were known to or appeared to Petitioner at the time of the

shooting. Petitioner, and other witnesses, gave extensive testimony on the events

leading up to the shooting, including the threats allegedly made by Henderson, both at

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 08cv1843

Club Metro and in the Del Taco parking lot, and Petitioner’s trial counsel thoroughly

aired the topics of Henderson’s prior threats and self-defense during closing argument:

Now, what’s going on through the minds of the individuals in the car? We

know that at the Club Metro parking lot he’s [Henderson’s] throwing down

the threats. He’s tapping the waistband and he’s saying, “Neener, neener,

neener, nine-millimeter, nine-millimeter, I’ve got a gun. Third Ward New

Orleans.” He’s basically bragging about what a bad area of town he’s

from. [¶] He’s saying, “Come on, I gotcha. Come on,” same thing, “Come

on, come on, come on.” Sees them in the car, sees them in the parking

lot of the Del Taco, “I told you guys if I saw you again I’d kill you. I told

you,” still screaming at them. . . . [T]hen he lifts his shirt. . . . It was a

handgun, showing that he had a handgun, he’s ready to use a handgun,

combined with threats that were made at the Club Metro, once again at

the Del Taco. He’s going to kill us. He’s going to shoot us. If he sees us

again he’s obviously crazy enough to do it. What are we going to do? 

What are we going to do? . . . . [¶] We know from Jones and from other

witnesses, there’s no talk of killing anybody. There’s no talk of capping

anybody. There’s no talk of using the gun. There is talk of taking care of

things, of confronting, of fighting, which is what Mr. Thomas wanted to do. 

He wanted to confront this guy and his friends and have a fight, because

that’s what they know to do. They want to defend themselves and fight. 

[¶] But the problem is, if these guys have got a gun, they’ve got to be able

to protect themselves.

. . . .

[J]ustifiable homicide allows you to use deadly force when there is

imminent danger that the other person will either kill or cause you bodily

injury, and it’s necessary under the circumstances for him to use in selfdefense force or means that might cause the death of the person, for the

purpose of avoiding death or great bodily injury to himself. [¶] The

important part right here is once you go down to the bottom, the danger

must be apparent, must be present, must be immediate and instantly dealt

with, or must so appear at the time to the slayer as a reasonable person,

and the killing must be done under a well-founded belief that it’s

necessary to save one’s life or -- you can make the inference -- another

person’s life from death or great bodily harm. [¶] Must be apparent, gun. 

You look over, the guy has a gun. Must be present, gun. He has a gun. 

Must be immediate. He’s pointing the gun. He’s threatened to kill us. 

And instantly dealt with, fired.

. . . .

[T]he scenario that [Thomas] explained -- you know, Jermaine Henderson

did have a gun. He did threaten him with a gun. He did have that in his

mind. Someone said “gun” in the car. He explained how he held it with

his left hand. Another witness said he depressed the line of fire by leaning

backwards. You know, it could have happened that way.

(Lodgment No. 4, Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 2844-45, 2856, 2862.)

It is unlikely that the jury, upon hearing the evidence, the instructions given, and

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 08cv1843

the argument of defense counsel would have failed to give Petitioner’s position full

consideration. The jury had sufficient instruction to consider whether Henderson’s prior

threats provided reasonable grounds for Petitioner to fear for his safety, and concluded

that they did not. The additional instruction would have added very little, if anything, to

the jury’s deliberations. 

Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that, had the jury

been instructed on the effect of prior threats, it would have reached a different verdict. 

The Court accordingly finds that the California Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Strickland, and the claim should be denied.

C. Insufficiency of the Evidence as to Great Bodily Injury Enhancement

Petitioner contends that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support

the jury’s finding as true the allegation that he intentionally and personally discharged a

firearm causing great bodily injury in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d) during

the commission of the crime against Courtney Henry. (Pet. at 7.) Petitioner argues that

the only evidence presented concerning the nature of the testimony was Henry’s

testimony, and Henry testified only that he felt something burning go through his leg,

walked to his car, drove to the naval base, and spent the night in the hospital. (Id.) 

According to Petitioner, the wound was a “through-and-through wound to the upper left

thigh [which] required no stitches and caused no residual or continuing problems.” (Id.) 

Petitioner contends there was no evidence that Henry’s injury was “significant or

substantial.” (Traverse at 4.) 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

We reject Thomas’s contention that, “The 25-year-to-life enhancement

imposed on count 5 for personally discharging a weapon causing great

bodily injury must be stricken because the record does not contain

substantial evidence showing [Courtney Henry] suffered great bodily

injury.” 

“The determination of whether the harm resulting to the victim constitutes

great bodily injury is a question of fact, and the finding will be upheld if

there is sufficient evidence to sustain it. [Citation.] ‘A fine line can divide

an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 08cv1843

quite meet the description. Clearly it is the trier of fact that must in most

situations make this determination.’” (People v. Lopez (1986) 176 Cal.

App. 3d 460, 464-465.)

Here, Henry’s injuries are similar to those found sufficient to constitute

great bodily injury by the court in Lopez. Henry was felled by the bullet

that penetrated and exited his upper left thigh; he felt a burning through

his leg, and spent a night in the hospital for treatment of his wound. Such

evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of great bodily injury.

 (Lodgment No. 1, Ex. 1 at 22.) 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that a

criminal defendant may be convicted only “upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of

every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A habeas petitioner challenging a state criminal conviction

based upon the insufficiency of evidence is entitled to relief “if it is found that upon the

evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The

critical inquiry “is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 318-19 (emphasis in original). 

In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court must look to the

applicable state law defining the substantive elements of the crime. Id. at 324 & n.16. 

Under California law, any person who, in the commission of the crime of discharge of a

firearm from a motor vehicle (Cal. Penal Code § 12034(c)), “personally and intentionally

discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury, as defined in Section

12022.7 . . . shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in

the state prison for 25 years to life.” Id. § 12022.53(d). Section 12022.7 defines “great

bodily injury” as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” Id. § 12022.7(f). “A fine

line can divide an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not

quite meet the description. Clearly it is the trier of fact that must in most situations make

the determination.” People v. Lopez, 176 Cal. App. 3d 460 (1986). 

In Lopez, the California appellate court upheld a finding of great bodily injury to

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 08cv1843

two victims of gunshot wounds. One victim, who was shot in the hip, felt nothing except

hitting the ground. The other was shot in the leg, with the bullet penetrating and exiting

the thigh. She felt “fire” in her leg but was able to drag the other victim to safety. Id. at

462. Neither of the victims sought or received medical treatment for their injuries. Id. at

463 n.5. 

Here, the record supports the California Court of Appeal’s determination that a

rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner caused great

bodily injury to Henry. With regard to his injuries, Henry testified that he suffered a

gunshot wound to his upper left thigh, and that he felt a burning in his leg at the time he

was shot. (RT at 414-15). The bullet went through and came out the other side. (Id. at

415.) He spent one night in the hospital, but did not receive any stitches and has not

had any residual or continuing problems as a result of the gunshot. (Id.) Under

California law, it cannot be said that this evidence was insufficient to support a finding of

great bodily injury. Indeed, given that Henry’s gunshot wound was severe enough to

require hospitalization, it is clear that his injury was at least as substantial, and perhaps

even more so, than the injuries sustained by the victims in Lopez. 

In light of California law, and given the record at trial, a rational trier of fact could

have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner caused great bodily injury to

Henry. Accordingly, the claim should be denied.

D. Admission of Two Uncharged Acts Involving the AK-47 Into Evidence

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s admission of two uncharged acts

involving the AK-47 used in the shooting violated his right to due process. (Pet. at 8;

Traverse at 4-6.) He argues that the admission of evidence concerning two incidents

involving Petitioner and the AK-47, one before the subject shooting and one after, was

prejudicial evidence of bad character and propensity for assaulting people with firearms,

and that there were no permissible inferences the jury could have drawn from the

evidence. (Id.) In denying Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

Thomas contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his

uncharged misconduct of firing an AK-47 outside of Club Hollywood, and

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 08cv1843

testimony regarding an incident in Los Angeles.

Thomas, through a motion in limine, had sought to exclude evidence

regarding these two uncharged acts of misconduct, which he claimed

were irrelevant, and impermissible propensity evidence aimed at showing

he was a “dangerous individual who uses a gun.” The court denied the

motion, ruling that under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b),

such evidence was not propensity evidence, and was admissible to prove

Thomas’s knowledge, opportunity, motive and absence of mistake. 

Moreover, its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The court

reiterated this reasoning in its ruling on a motion for new trial.

With respect to the first uncharged incident, the jury heard testimony that

on November 14, 2003, five days before the Del Taco incident, Thomas

and some friends went to Club Hollywood in downtown San Diego. Inside

the club, one of Thomas’s friends had a scuffle with his ex-girlfriend and

her date. After the club closed, the earlier scuffle erupted into a melee

between members of Thomas’s party and some other men. Thomas

testified he retrieved the AK-47 from the car he had arrived in and fired a

total of five shots into the air. Afterwards, according to a witness, Thomas

was bragging and excited.

With respect to the second uncharged incident, the jury heard testimony

that three days after the Del Taco shooting, Thomas and his friends,

including Sanders and Wortham, drove different cars from San Diego to

Los Angeles for a party. Sanders took the AK-47 with him, and left it in

the trunk of the car he rode in. At the party, Thomas got into an

altercation with another marine named “Carrymocasin,” who was wrestling

another individual outside the door, thus blocking Thomas’s way. Thomas

said something to the effect that he had “busted on somebody and he

would do it again,” meaning he had shot somebody. Sanders helped

separate Thomas and Carrymocasin, who were cursing at each other. 

Sanders told Wortham and some other friends to grab Thomas and put

him in the car. Afterwards, Thomas was angry and told Sanders “Give me

the fucking keys” to the trunk of the car, because he wanted to reach the

AK-47. Sanders refused to give him the keys. Thomas’s friends had to

physically push Thomas toward the car. 

Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes other than those

currently charged is not admissible to prove that the defendant is a person

of bad character or has a criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged

crimes is admissible to prove, among other things, the identity of the

perpetrator of the charged crimes, the existence of a common design or

plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or the intent with which the

perpetrator acted in the commission of the charged crimes. (Evidence

Code, § 1101.) “[I]n order to be admissible to negate a defense of

accident or mistake, the uncharged misconduct must be similar to the

charged conduct. [Citation.] ‘The least degree of similarity (between the

uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove

intent.’” (People v. Burnett (2003) 110 Cal. App. 4th 868, 881.) “On

appeal, the trial court’s determination of this issue, being essentially a

determination of relevance, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People

v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 349, 369.) Any prejudice related to the

admissibility of prior uncharged crimes is of the sort “inherent whenever

other crimes evidence is admitted.” (Id. at p. 372.)

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 08cv1843

Thomas’s trial testimony supported the defense of accident. Specifically,

he claimed that when he and his friends returned to the Del Taco parking

lot with the AK-47, he heard one of them say, “He’s got a gun.” Thomas

looked around, saw Henderson lift his shirt and expose a gun. Thomas

“proceeded to pull up on the weapon with my left hand. At that same time

Moore grabbed my shirt and Hall was letting the back seat down, and then

the AK-47 fired.” 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into testimony

evidence regarding the Club Hollywood incident because such evidence

was relevant to prove Thomas had the opportunity to use the gun,

although it did not belong to him. Moreover, such evidence was relevant

to impeach Thomas’s claim the Del Taco shooting was accidental.

Thomas’s statement made during the incident in Los Angeles ― that he

had previously “busted” an individual and would do it again ― was a party

admission and admissible as such. (Evid. Code, § 1220; People v.

Homing (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 871, 898.) The testimony that Thomas had a

scuffle with Carrymocasin and afterwards tried to get the AK-47 from the

trunk was admissible to place that statement in context. Thomas’s due

process rights were not violated by admission of this uncharged act

because in light of the totality of the evidence, it was not so prejudicial as

to render his trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.

4th 903, 913.)

At any rate, any error was harmless because it was not reasonably

probable the jury would have reached a more favorable result absent

evidence of the prior uncharged incidents. (People v. Watson (1956) 46

Cal. 2d 818, 836.) The jury rejected a first-degree murder charge and

instead convicted Thomas of second-degree murder. In the face of the

overwhelming evidence establishing Thomas’s culpability, including his

own testimony that he fired the gun, no more favorable result was likely. 

On this record, it is safe to say the jury, consistent with the court’s

instruction with CALJIC 2.50 regarding evidence of other uncharged

crimes, rejected the notion that Thomas had a propensity to commit

violence based on the uncharged offenses. Otherwise, it would have

convicted him of first-degree murder. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.

App. 4th 1009, 1023.) 

(Lodgment No. 1, Ex. 1 at 8-12.)

The admission of evidence is an issue of state law. Holley v. Yarborough, 568

F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). “Simple errors of state law do not warrant federal

habeas relief.” Id. (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)). On federal

habeas, the sole issue is whether the petitioner’s conviction violated constitutional

norms. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Reiger v.

Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The dispositive issue is . . . whether

the trial court committed an error which rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 08cv1843

unfair that it violated federal due process.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

“A habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden in showing a due process violation

based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir.

2005). The Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions that violate

‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352

(1990). “Under AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of evidence that render a

trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of federal habeas corpus relief if not

forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as laid out by the Supreme Court.” 

Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. There is no clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the U.S. Supreme Court, on the issue of “whether a state law would violate the Due

Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to

commit a charged crime.” Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5.)). There is also no clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, on the issue of whether “admission of irrelevant

or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation.” Id. Thus, it cannot

be said that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of this claim was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Additionally, pursuant to Jammal, “[o]nly if there are no permissible inferences

the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process.” Jammal,

926 F.2d at 920. Here, as the state appellate court determined, there were rational

inferences, not constitutionally impermissible, that the jury could draw from the evidence

of the other incidents involving the AK-47: Namely, that the evidence impeached

Petitioner’s defense that the shooting was accidental, and that it established that

Petitioner had the opportunity to use the AK-47 though it did not belong to him. 

Petitioner argues, in response, that he did not rely on the defense of accident, but rather

self-defense, and that there was no need to admit evidence of the other incidents

involving the AK-47 to show opportunity because there was no dispute that he used the

AK-47 on the night in question. (Traverse at 4-5.) 

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18 08cv1843

Petitioner’s attempt to depict his defense as resting solely upon a theory of selfdefense, and not on accident, is belied by the evidence in the trial record. Petitioner

provided the following testimony at trial:

Q. You are telling these juries that the whole thing was an accident; is that

right?

A. Yes, sir.

. . .

Q. Where any of those shots intentional or were all six accidental?

A. No. None of them were intentional.

. . .

Q. All right. Now, you said at that moment a number of things occur

simultaneously, right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You say Moore is grabbing your left shoulder to try and pull you down? 

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And Jones is reclining his seat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at that same time, you’re pulling the trigger six times?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Accidentally?

A. Yes, sir.

. . .

Q. Okay, so now your testimony is that all of the shots might have been

impacted by Moore touching you? Is that what you are now telling us?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And all of the shots also might have been impacted by the training that

you got in the military?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But every one of those shots was accidental; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. Every shot was not intentional.

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19 08cv1843

(RT at 1851, 1856, 1971, 2064.) Therefore, Petitioner’s argument that the evidence

was not needed to rebut a defense of accident is without merit.

In order to prove that Petitioner was guilty of murder and assault, the prosecution

had to demonstrate, inter alia, that Petitioner acted with malice aforethought (murder)

and acted willfully (assault), both of which relate to whether Petitioner’s actions were

intentional. Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 240; CALJIC 8.10 (murder--defined), 8.11 (“malice

aforethought”--defined), 9.00 (assault--defined). Evidence is relevant if it tends to make

any fact relevant to the elements of the crime more or less probable. McKinney v.

Rees, 993 F.2d , 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1993). The evidence concerning the other

incidents involving the AK-47 was admissible to dispute Petitioner’s claim that he that he

did not intend to shoot the AK-47 on the night in question and that the shooting was

accidental. Because it is not the case that there were no permissible inferences the jury

could draw from the evidence of the other incidents involving the AK-47 (see Jammal,

926 F.2d at 920), admission of that evidence did not violate due process. 

Furthermore, the jury received an instruction regarding its consideration of the

evidence of Petitioner’s uncharged conduct relating to the AK-47, which provided in

relevant part: 

This evidence, if believed, may not be considered by you to prove that a

defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to

commit crimes. It may be considered by you only for the limited purpose

of determining if it tends to show:

The existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime

charged[.]

(CT at 253.) The Court must presume that the jury followed the instructions to consider

only the permissible inferences. See Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1173.

The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Petitioner’s right to due process

was not violated was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of

federal law. Accordingly, this Court recommends that this claim be denied.

//

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20 08cv1843

E. The Attorney General is Not a Proper Respondent and Should Be

Dismissed

Respondent also contends that Petitioner has improperly named J. Brown, the

Attorney General of the State of California, as a respondent in this action. Rule 2 of the

Rules following § 2254 provides that the state officer having custody of the petitioner

shall be named as respondent. Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Only if the petitioner

is not yet in custody pursuant to the state-court judgment being contested should both

the officer having present custody of the petitioner and the attorney general of the state

in which the judgment was entered be named as respondents. Rule 2(b), 28 U.S.C. foll.

§ 2254. 

Here, there is no basis for Petitioner to have named the Attorney General as a

respondent in this action. Therefore, the Court recommends that the Attorney General

of the State of California be dismissed as a named respondent from this action.

V. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned magistrate

judge finds that Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to federal habeas relief

under the applicable legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment

be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Thomas J.

Whelan, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than January 6, 2011, any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later

than January 26, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21 08cv1843

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 7, 2010

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01843-W-JMA Document 20 Filed 12/07/10 Page 21 of 21