Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05534/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-05534-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO GARZA,

Petitioner,

vs.

TOM CAREY,

Respondent.

Case No. CV F-01-5534 JKS

O R D E R

Antonio Garza was convicted of smuggling heroin into a California state prison where he

was an inmate. Garza had four prior felony convictions and thus received a sentence of twenty-five

years to life, plus additional consecutive one year sentences as a result of his prior convictions. He

appealed his conviction and at the same time appealed from the denial of a state habeas corpus

proceeding. Garza has thus exhausted his state remedies and properly presented this action to the

Court for resolution under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The California Court of Appeal set out the facts in detail and it is not necessary to repeat

them here. Section 2254 provides the standards to be followed in resolving the issues presented. 

See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (discussing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act and the standards to be employed in applying it to habeas petitions from state court);

Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (discussing the appropriate

standards). In this case the Court of Appeal concluded that no error occurred, but if one did it was

harmless beyond any reasonable doubt. Garza was found in possession of a number of balloons

containing heroin. He testified and admitted that he had secreted the balloons in his rectum, that he

was experienced in concealing smuggled merchandise, and was prepared to smuggle heroin if

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adequately compensated. He then told a story the Court of Appeal found to be unbelievable. 

Namely that he was given the balloons by a rival gang member who misrepresented that the

balloons contained money and offered Garza two balloons each containing $50 in payment for

smuggling the “money” past the guards and into the prison yard. Garza testified that he checked the

balloons and confirmed that money, not drugs, were contained within them. Under the

circumstances, the Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply the decisions of the United States

Supreme Court governing harmless error analysis in reaching its conclusions. See, e.g., Campbell,

408 F.3d at 1171–73. The Court of Appeal’s reasonable conclusion that any instructional error and

any ineffective assistance of counsel were harmless disposes of those two issues.

Garza complains of prosecutorial misconduct. The Court of Appeal found any error in the

prosecutor’s cross-examination of Garza harmless as well. This appears to be true. In any event,

there was no error. Garza, whose whole defense was based upon a discussion of the operations of

gangs within the prison and his ability to distinguish money in a balloon from heroin in a balloon,

was properly cross-examined about his experience with gangs and drugs.

Garza also complains of leg restraints, but it appears that the Court of Appeal is correct that

Garza, through counsel, agreed to leg restraints. Concerns about shackling prisoners relate to the

fear that the jury will automatically conclude that the person is dangerous and deserves to be in

prison. Here, the jury knew that Garza was already in prison serving a term. In the absence of any

evidence that any juror actually saw the shackles and drew an adverse inference against Garza, there

is no reason to question the agreement defense counsel made on Garza’s behalf.

Two issues require slightly more attention. First, Garza argues that he was denied a

Marsden hearing at which his complaints against his attorney could have been voiced. See, e.g.,

People v. Marsden, 465 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1970); People v. Dickey, 111 P.3d 921 (Cal. 2005). It appears

that California law is the same as federal law on the rules governing the right to substitute appointed

counsel mid-trial. See, e.g., Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1023–25 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The

Court of Appeal concluded that Garza never specifically asked to substitute counsel, a requirement

under California law to seek review of the denial of a Marsden hearing, nor did he point to anything

in the record showing that there had in fact been a breakdown in communications so severe that

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counsel in effect abandoned Garza. It is instructive that Garza claims ineffective assistance in his

habeas petition, but does not claim a breakdown in communication. It appears that Garza and

defense counsel were communicating, but were arguing over whether Garza should testify and what

witnesses should be called. The colloquy with the court made it clear that Garza had the right to

decide whether he would testify and he chose to do so. The record also makes it clear that the court

addressed Garza and counsel and confirmed that matters of trial tactics and strategy were left to the

appointed attorney and that this included what witnesses to call. These rulings are in conformity

with federal law. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026–27, n.8 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8

(1966) (discussing the respective roles of defendant and counsel in determining trial strategy)).

Finally, during his examination of the correctional officer who interviewed Garza after

giving him Miranda warnings, defense counsel elicited testimony that Garza had invoked his

Miranda rights but thereafter in casual conversation admitted that he had used a woman to smuggle

dope into the institution. Defense counsel initially objected out of the presence of the jury at a

sidebar and a motion to strike was granted directing the jury to disregard the testimony. The sidebar

was not recorded, so the basis for the court’s ruling was found by the Court of Appeal to be obscure. 

Inexplicably, defense counsel returned to the issue with the witness and again elicited testimony

about an alleged admission. It appears that defense counsel was attempting to show that the witness

was so biased that he would lie about Garza’s involvement. No further motion to strike was made

and no specific objection based upon Miranda was ever interposed. It is troublesome that the jury

specifically asked and was granted permission to rehear this exchange. If this were a circumstantial

evidence case this Court would hold a hearing to determine whether a motion to suppress should

have been brought pre-trial on Miranda grounds and, if the alleged admission regarding possession

of the heroin was found to be in violation of Miranda, whether a protective order against any

mention of it secured. Failure to seek suppression and a protective order may well have been

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). However, this is not a circumstantial evidence case. There was overwhelming direct

evidence of Garza’s knowing possession of smuggled heroin. The Court will therefore assume for

purposes of the record that Miranda was violated, and that Garza established the first prong of the

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Strickland test and proceed directly to the second prong—prejudice. When we evaluate prejudice it

is clear that the Court of Appeal was not unreasonably applying the harmless error standard. Garza

was caught with the goods and his exculpatory statement viewed in light of his testimony was

incredible. No reasonable juror would have failed to convict. Consideration of the alleged

admission would not have led to a different verdict.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

The petition for post conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. The Court

is of the view that a certificate of appealability should be addressed now, rather than after Garza’s

petition and the issues it presents fade from memory. The standard for granting a certificate of

appealability has been stated as follows: “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional

claims on the merits . . . [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” United States v. ZunoArce, 339 F.3d 886, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

The Court will grant a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in

its treatment of the Marsden issue and as a result prejudiced Garza, and (2) whether trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the Miranda issue. In all other

respects the court will deny a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Garza may seek a

certificate of appealability on the other issues directly from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

motions panel.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 3 day of August 2005.

/s/ James K. Singleton

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

United States District Judge 

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