Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01150/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01150-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHARLES HOUFF, individually and as 

successor-in-interest to Decedent 

Amelian Houff, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:22-cv-01150-MCE-JDP 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Through the present action, Plaintiffs Charles and Olivia Houff, individually and as 

successors-in-interest to Decedent Amelian Houff (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), seek to 

recover from Defendants City of Sacramento and County of Sacramento (collectively, 

“Defendants”) for injuries sustained when Amelian was involved in a car accident that 

followed a high-speed pursuit by City of Sacramento police officers. Presently before the 

Court is the County of Sacramento’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it for 

failure to state a claim. ECF No. 12.1 

1 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) 

“requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order 

to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A 

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations. 

Case 2:22-cv-01150-DC-JDP Document 18 Filed 12/20/22 Page 1 of 2
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

The operative Complaint fails to allege any facts implicating the County of 

Sacramento with regard to Plaintiffs’ federal causes of action. Those claims are thus 

DISMISSED with leave to amend, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Accordingly, the City’s Motion to Dismiss, 

ECF No. 12, is GRANTED with leave to amend. Not later than twenty (20) days 

following the date this Memorandum and Order is electronically filed, Plaintiff may, but is 

not required to, file an amended complaint. If no amended complaint is timely filed, the 

causes of action dismissed by virtue of this Order will be deemed dismissed with 

prejudice upon no further notice to the parties. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 20, 2022 

However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 

§ 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts 

that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). 

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement 

to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some 

factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of 

providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. 

(citing Wright & Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the 

line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “a well-pleaded 

complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 

‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974)). 

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to grant leave to 

amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, [or] futility of [the] amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be 

considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors merit equal weight. 

Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing 

DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is 

proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. 

v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave 

need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 

 

Case 2:22-cv-01150-DC-JDP Document 18 Filed 12/20/22 Page 2 of 2