Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00799/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00799-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TIM HARDY and DARLENE HARDY, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF EL DORADO, DEPUTY 

SHERIFF DAVID COOK, TONY’S TOW, 

BONANZA AUTO DISMANTLERS, and 

DOES 1 through 50, 

 Defendants. 

 /

No. Civ. S-07-0799 RRB EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

 Plaintiffs Tim Hardy and Darlene Hardy (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) filed an action against the County of El Dorado 

(“County”), deputy sheriff David Cook (“Deputy Cook”), Tony’s 

Tow and Transport (“Tony’s Tow”) and Bonanza Auto Dismantlers 

(“Bonanza”) (collectively “Defendants”) alleging civil rights 

violations and a state law claim arising out of the seizure and 

removal of vehicles from their property. Defendants now move 

separately to dismiss each and every claim in the First Amended 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 1 of 39
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).1 For the reasons 

stated below, the motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in 

part.2

 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiffs are the owners of a fenced and gated hilly twoacre residential property located in El Dorado County at 9711 

Highway 193, Kelsey, California. FAC ¶ 1. Plaintiff Mr. Hardy 

allegedly restores classic vehicles as a hobby and vocation. 

Id. ¶ 12. Defendant Cook is a deputy sheriff for the County of 

El Dorado and was responsible for implementing the County’s 

vehicle abatement program. Id. ¶ 6. Defendant Tony’s Tow is a 

towing company that provided towing services in connection with 

the abatement of vehicles from Plaintiffs’ property. Id. ¶ 4. 

Defendant Bonanza is an auto wrecking yard that provided vehicle 

 

1

 The County and Deputy Cook move together to dismiss the 

first, second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh claims for 

relief alleged in the FAC. Tony’s Tow moves to dismiss the 

first, fourth, fifth and sixth claims for relief alleged in the 

FAC. Bonanza moves to dismiss the fifth and sixth claims for 

relief alleged in the FAC. 

2

 Inasmuch as the court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 2 of 39
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

abatement services in connection with the removal of vehicles 

from Plaintiffs’ property. Id. ¶ 5. 

 On or about April 26, 2005, Deputy Cook entered Plaintiffs’ 

property without notice or an inspection warrant, and without 

Plaintiffs’ consent or presence, for the purpose of inspecting a 

suspected nuisance condition. FAC ¶ 11. During the inspection, 

Deputy Cook placed County abatement notices on vehicular and 

non-vehicular items. Id. Deputy Cook did not question 

Mr. Hardy about the ownership of the vehicles, nor did he 

inquire into whether the vehicles were abandoned. Id.3

 On or about May 4, 2005, the County sent Plaintiffs a 

“Notice of Intention to Abate And Remove Abandoned, Wrecked, 

Dismantled, or Inoperative Vehicle or Parts Thereof as A Public 

Nuisance” (“Abatement Notice”) pursuant to El Dorado County 

Ordinance 10.16.010.4

 FAC ¶ 13, Exh. B. The Abatement Notice 

 

3

 Plaintiffs allege that the vehicles (and parts thereof) 

stored on their property are used for restoring classic vehicles 

and are neither “abandoned” nor are they “junk.” FAC ¶ 12. 

4

 El Dorado County Ordinance 10.16.010 is authorized under 

California Vehicle Code § 22660. FAC ¶ 3. Section 22660 

provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a city, 

county, or city and county may adopt an ordinance establishing 

procedures for the abatement and removal, as public nuisances, 

of abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicles or 

parts thereof from private or public property, and for the 

recovery, pursuant to Section 25845 or 38773.5 of the Government 

Code, or assumption by the local authority, of costs of 

administration and the removal.” 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 3 of 39
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

advised Plaintiffs that the County would commence abatement of 

the vehicles listed and described in the attachment to the 

Abatement Notice if Plaintiffs failed to abate the vehicles or 

request a hearing within 10-days from May, 4, 2005. Id., Exhs. 

B, C.5 On or about May 5, 2005, Deputy Cook entered Plaintiffs’ 

property again for the purpose of inspecting a suspected 

nuisance condition without a warrant and without Plaintiffs’ 

permission or consent. Id. ¶ 11.5. 

On or about June 24, 2005, the County, through its towing 

contractor Tony’s Tow, seized and removed approximately 

seventeen vehicles from Plaintiffs’ property. FAC ¶ 14.6

 On or 

about August 9, 2005, Tony’s Tow seized and removed 

approximately eighteen more vehicles from Plaintiffs’ property 

 

5

 Plaintiffs allege that the vehicles listed in the 

attachment to the Abatement Notice were not described in a 

consistent manner, nor were they described in a clear or 

accurate manner with respect to color and make. FAC ¶ 13. 

Plaintiffs further allege that the Abatement Notice did not 

describe how the condition of the vehicles violated the Vehicle 

Abatement Ordinance, nor did it specify how to avoid seizure and 

removal. Id.

6

 On June 28, 2005, Mr. Hardy requested an abatement hearing 

to address the County’s nuisance determination and removal of 

vehicles from his property. FAC ¶ 14.5. At the July 20, 2005, 

hearing, the Vehicle Abatement Hearing Officer concluded that 

the vehicles on Plaintiffs’ property were “abandoned” and posed 

a threat to public health, safety and welfare, in violation of 

the Vehicle Abatement Ordinance. Id. ¶ 14.6; Pl.’s Opp. to 

Def.’s Mtn. to Dismiss at 11:25-27, 12:1-11. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 4 of 39
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with an inspection warrant but without notice or Plaintiffs’ 

consent. Id. ¶ 15.7 

On or about August 31, 2005, Plaintiffs received a bill 

from the County in the amount of $4,982.00 purportedly 

representing the costs incurred in seizing and removing 

approximately thirty-five vehicles from Plaintiffs’ property. 

FAC ¶ 16. Following Plaintiffs’ refusal to pay this bill, the 

County brought a small claims action against Mr. Hardy seeking 

to recover its abatement costs. Id. ¶ 18. On October 17, 2006, 

judgment was entered against Mr. Hardy in the amount of 

$4,982.00, plus costs. Id. On April 12, 2007, the judgment was 

affirmed on appeal. Id. ¶ 18. 

 On April 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed the instant action 

against Defendants alleging civil rights violations and a state 

law claim. Docket at 3. On November 17, 2007, Plaintiffs 

amended their Complaint. Docket at 31. The operative Complaint 

alleges the following civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983: (1) unreasonable search and seizure;8

 (2) due process 

 

7

 Plaintiffs allege that Tony’s Tow subsequently sold some 

of the seized vehicles for less than market value in violation 

of Plaintiffs ownership rights and to avoid compliance with 

California vehicle code record keeping requirements. FAC ¶ 17. 

8

 This claim for relief is alleged against the County, 

Deputy Cook and Tony’s Tow. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 5 of 39
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

violation;9 (3) unlawful taking and substantive due process 

violation;10 (4)unreasonable search and seizure, due process 

violation and unlawful taking;11 (5) conspiracy;12 and (6) 

declaratory relief.13 FAC ¶¶ 20-40, 43-49. Additionally, 

Plaintiffs allege a state law intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim.14 Id. ¶¶ 41-42. Defendants now move 

separately to dismiss each and every claim in the FAC pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6). 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Rule 12(b)(6) 

 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a 

claim. A claim may be dismissed only if ‘it appears beyond 

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 

his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where there is no cognizable legal 

 

9

 This claim for relief is alleged against the County and 

Deputy Cook.

10 This claim for relief is alleged against the County. 

11 This claim for relief is alleged against the County and 

Tony’s Tow. 

12 This claim for relief is alleged against each and every 

defendant. 

13 This claim for relief is alleged against the County. 

14 This claim for relief is alleged against Tony’s Tow and 

Bonanza.

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 6 of 39
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

theory or there is an absence of sufficient facts alleged to 

support a cognizable legal theory. Id. The issue is not 

whether a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits but 

rather whether the claimant is entitled to proceed beyond the 

threshold in attempting to establish his or her claims. De La 

Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in 

the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff, Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995), and the court accepts all 

material allegations as true, as well as all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from them. Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732; 

Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The court, 

however, is not required to accept as true allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 

F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Nor do courts assume the truth 

of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of 

factual allegations, Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 

618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981), or that a plaintiff can prove facts 

different from those it has alleged. Associated Gen. 

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 

Carpenters, Inc., 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 7 of 39
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, 

leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines 

that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” 

Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 

F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see Thinket Ink Information 

Resources, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 

(9th Cir. 2004) (leave to amend should be granted unless 

amendment would be futile, i.e., the complaint can not be saved 

by amendment). 

B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 

 Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ first 

(unreasonable search and seizure), second (due process 

violation), third (unlawful taking and substantive due process 

violation), fourth (unreasonable search and seizure, due process 

violation and unlawful taking), fifth (conspiracy) and seventh 

(declaratory relief) claims for relief is appropriate because 

the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.15

 

15 As an initial matter, because the question of whether the 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine should have been raised through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion 

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 

court will treat the instant motion as one for dismissal under 

both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 8 of 39
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal district 

courts lack jurisdiction to exercise appellate review over final 

state court judgments. Henrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 

F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007); Mothershed v. Justices of the 

Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005). RookerFeldman, is a narrow doctrine, confined to “cases brought by 

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 

those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 

464 (2006); Henrichs, 474 F.3d at 613. The doctrine applies 

only in “limited circumstances,” where a party in effect seeks 

to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a 

lower federal court. Lance, 546 U.S. at 466; see Noel v. Hall, 

341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003); (where a federal plaintiff 

“complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state 

court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court,” the 

federal plaintiff has made a forbidden de facto appeal of the 

state court judgment). 

 

12(b)(1) (authorizing the court to dismiss an action for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 9 of 39
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Ninth Circuit has described the role of the RookerFeldman doctrine in the federal system as follows: “If a federal 

plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous 

decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court 

judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject 

matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the other 

hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 

illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does 

not bar jurisdiction.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164; see Jensen v. 

Foley, 295 F.3d 745, 747-48 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, generally speaking, bars a plaintiff from bringing a 

§ 1983 suit to remedy an injury inflicted by the state court’s 

decision. . . . Preclusion, on the other hand, applies when a 

federal plaintiff complains of an injury that was not caused by 

the state court, but which the state court has previously failed 

to rectify.”) (emphasis in original)).16 The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not override or supplant issue and claim 

preclusion doctrines. Henrichs, 474 F.3d at 613 (citing Exxon 

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). Thus, even if a federal suit is not 

 

16 “If there is simultaneously pending federal and state 

court litigation between the two parties dealing with the same 

or related issues, the federal district court in some 

circumstances may abstain or stay proceedings; or if there has 

been state court litigation that has already gone to judgment, 

the federal suit may be claim-precluded under § 1738. But in 

neither of these circumstances does Rooker-Feldman bar 

jurisdiction.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 10 of 39
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

barred by Rooker-Feldman, it might nonetheless be claimprecluded under res judicata principles. Maldonado v. Harris, 

370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the court of subject 

matter jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs’ claims. This is 

because the legal injury asserted by Plaintiffs did not arise 

out of the state court small claims judgment or the state 

administrative abatement hearing but rather out of the conduct 

of Defendants (i.e., adverse parties). See Noel, 341 F.3d at 

1163 (“where the federal plaintiff does not complain of a legal 

injury caused by a state court judgment, but rather a legal 

injury caused by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar 

jurisdiction.”). 

 For this reason, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar 

subject matter jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs’ claims. 

C. First Claim: Unreasonable Search and Seizure 

 1. Collateral Estoppel 

 The County, Deputy Cook and Tony’s Tow argue that dismissal 

of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is appropriate pursuant to 

the doctrine of collateral estoppel because Plaintiffs had a 

“full and fair” opportunity to litigate the issues raised by 

this claim in the administrative vehicle abatement hearing. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 11 of 39
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may 

properly be raised via a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Azadpour v. Sun Microsystems, 

Inc., 2007 WL 988185, * 3-4 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Thompson 

v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 1994) (res 

judicata challenges may properly be raised via a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)); Day 

v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992) (res judicata, 

normally an affirmative defense, may be upheld on a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion “when all relevant facts are shown by the 

court’s own records”). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give “full 

faith and credit” to judgments of state courts. “Section 1738 

does not allow federal courts to employ their own preclusion 

rules in determining the preclusive effect of state judgments. 

‘Rather, it . . . commands a federal court to accept the rules 

chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken.’” Noel, 

341 F.3d at 1166; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 

U.S. 367, 373 (1996). The doctrines of collateral estoppel and 

res judicata apply in a § 1983 case to a state court judgment on 

a constitutional claim, assuming that the party against whom an 

earlier court decision is asserted had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue decided by the first court. 

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980). Federal courts “give 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 12 of 39
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those 

judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which 

the judgments emerged.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 466; Maldonado, 370 

F.3d at 951. 

 Under California law, “collateral estoppel has been found 

to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding 

if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous 

[proceeding] is identical to the one which is sought to be 

relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a final 

judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom 

collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a 

party at the prior [proceeding].” People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 

1215, 1240 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]nly 

issues actually litigated in the initial action may be precluded 

from the second proceeding under the collateral estoppel 

doctrine.” Id. An issue was actually litigated if it was 

properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and was 

submitted for determination, and was determined. Id. The party 

asserting collateral estoppel bears a “heavy” burden of proving 

the doctrine’s factors. Kemp Bros. Const., Inc. v. Titan Elec. 

Corp., 146 Cal. App. 4th 1474, 1482 (2007). 

Based on the foregoing principles, the court concludes that 

Defendants’ have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that 

the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Plaintiffs’ Fourth 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 13 of 39
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Amendment claim. In particular, Defendants’ did not show that 

any of the issues underlying Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim 

were raised, submitted for determination, or determined in the 

abatement hearing. A review of the abatement hearing transcript 

reveals that the El Dorado County Zoning Administrator did not 

address any Fourth Amendment issues during the abatement 

hearing.17 Rather, the hearing addressed whether Plaintiff owned 

 

17 The district court takes judicial notice of the abatement 

hearing transcript and the Zoning Administrator’s Order. The 

County and Deputy Cook have supplied the court with a copy of 

the transcript and the Zoning Administrator’s notice of 

determination and requested that the court take judicial notice 

of these documents pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence. Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exhs. 5-A, 5-B, 6 

(Docket at 12). The court may take notice of facts that are 

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b). Judicial notice is properly taken of transcripts, 

orders and decisions made by other courts or administrative 

agencies. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality 

Management Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(taking judicial notice of oral argument transcript); Holder v. 

Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial 

notice of a state court decision and the briefs filed in that 

court to determine if an issue was raised and decided by the 

state court for res judicata purposes); In re American 

Continental/Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1537 

(9th Cir. 1996) (when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a 

district court may take into account judicially noticeable 

materials such as publicly available records and transcripts 

from judicial proceedings “in related or underlying cases which 

have a direct relation to the matters at issue” without 

converting the dismissal to a summary judgment.) rev’d on other 

grounds sub nom. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & 

Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998); Papai v. Harbor Tug and Barge Co.,

67 F.3d 203, 207 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 

520 U.S. 548 (1997) (taking judicial notice of a decision and 

order of an Administrative Law Judge). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 14 of 39
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the subject vehicles, and whether the vehicles were “abandoned” 

in violation of the Vehicle Abatement Ordinance. Indeed, the 

purpose of the abatement hearing was to determine whether the 

vehicles on Plaintiffs’ property constituted a public nuisance 

in violation of El Dorado County Ordinance 10.16.010,18 not 

whether Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were violated. As 

such, Plaintiffs did not have a “full and fair” opportunity to 

litigate their Fourth Amendment claim in the earlier abatement 

proceeding. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is 

not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

 For these reasons, dismissal of this claim is not 

appropriate. 

2. Open Fields Doctrine 

 Alternatively, the County, Deputy Cook and Tony’s Tow argue 

that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is 

appropriate because Plaintiffs do not have a reasonable 

 

 

18 El Dorado County Ordinance 10.16.080 states that the 

relevant facts and testimony in a vehicle abatement hearing 

include: “testimony on the condition of the vehicle or part 

thereof and the circumstances concerning its location on the 

private property or public property.” Because municipal 

ordinances are a proper subject for judicial notice, see Santa 

Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 

1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006), the court takes judicial notice of El 

Dorado County Ordinance 10.16.010. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 15 of 39
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

expectation of privacy in the area where their vehicles were 

removed from under the “open fields” doctrine. 

 “It is clear that the warrant requirement of the fourth 

amendment applies to entries onto private land to search for and 

abate suspected nuisances.” Conner v. City of Santa Ana,

897 F.2d 1487, 1490 (9th Cir. 1990) (footnote omitted) (citing 

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504-07 (1978)); Schneider v. 

County of San Diego, 28 F.3d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1994).19 Entry to 

abate a known nuisance also falls within the warrant requirement 

of the Fourth Amendment. Conner, 897 F.2d at 1490. It is also 

clear that the impoundment of an automobile is a seizure within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Miranda v. City of 

Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “[A]bsent exigent circumstances, ‘officials engaged in the 

abatement of a public nuisance must have a warrant’ to enter an 

enclosed backyard; ‘it is the prospective invasion of 

constitutionally protected interests by an entry onto property 

and not the purpose of the entry which calls forth the warrant 

requirement.’ ” Conner, 897 F.2d at 1490-91; see Schneider, 28 

 

19 The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people 

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 

the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 

seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 16 of 39
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F.3d at 91 (“‘[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of 

cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 

unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search 

warrant.’”); see also Miranda, 429 F.3d at 862 (“‘A seizure 

conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established 

and well delineated exceptions.’”). One exception to the 

warrant requirement is the “open fields” doctrine, which 

provides that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “open 

fields” from government interference or surveillance because 

individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

such areas. See Schneider, 28 F.3d at 91-2.20

 In the present case, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Fourth 

Amendment claim is inappropriate because the FAC alleges 

 

20 In Schneider, the Ninth Circuit held that the warrantless 

entry onto private property not being used as the plaintiff’s 

home, to tow several dilapidated vehicles, was analogous to a 

warrantless seizure of automobiles on public streets and did not 

require a warrant. Schneider, 28 F.3d at 91-3. Because the 

warrantless seizure did not impinge on any legitimate privacy 

interest, the court held that the previously held abatement 

hearing was sufficient to establish the validity and 

reasonableness of the seizure. Id. Schneider is 

distinguishable from the instant case insofar as the subject 

vehicles in that case were visible from a public road and were 

seized from a property where the plaintiff did not reside. 

Here, the subject vehicles were seized from Plaintiffs’ primary 

residence and only some of the vehicles were visible to the 

public. As such, construing the allegations in the Complaint in 

the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Schneider does not 

compel dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim at this 

stage in the litigation. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 17 of 39
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sufficient facts to state a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim. 

In particular, the FAC alleges that the County and Deputy Cook 

violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights when Deputy Cook 

entered Plaintiffs’ fenced and gated property on or about 

April 26, 2005, and on or about May 5, 2005, for the purpose of 

inspecting a suspected nuisance condition without an inspection 

warrant and without Plaintiffs’ consent or permission. FAC 

¶ 21.5. The FAC further alleges that the County, Deputy Cook 

and Tony’s Tow violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights on 

June, 24, 2005, when Tony’s Tow entered Plaintiffs’ property and 

seized Plaintiffs’ vehicles without an inspection warrant and 

without Plaintiffs’ consent or permission. Id. ¶ 22. Finally, 

the FAC alleges that the County, Deputy Cook and Tony’s Tow 

violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights in August 2005, 

when Deputy Cook and Tony’s Tow entered Plaintiffs’ property and 

seized vehicles with an inspection warrant but without 

Plaintiffs’ presence as required by the warrant. Id. ¶ 23. 

Such pleading is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See

Conner, 897 F.2d at 1491-2 (the Fourth Amendment protected 

plaintiffs from the City’s warrantless entry onto their property 

and from the warrantless seizure of their automobiles because 

they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their enclosed, 

fenced private yard). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 18 of 39
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 While the County, Deputy Cook and Tony’s Tow argue that 

dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs did not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where their 

vehicles were taken from based on the “open fields” doctrine, 

the court finds that this argument is more appropriately 

addressed in a motion for summary judgment.21 This is because 

the applicability of the “open fields” doctrine is a factintensive inquiry that requires the evaluation of evidence 

outside the pleadings.22 As such, resolution of this factspecific issue is more appropriately addressed at the summary 

judgment stage of the litigation. 

 For these reasons, dismissal of this claim is 

inappropriate. 

 

21 The FAC alleges that Plaintiffs’ property is a fully 

fenced and gated residential property that is hilly and covered 

with trees and other vegetation. FAC ¶ 1. The FAC further 

alleges that “[n]ot all of the vehicles parked on the property 

could be seen from the highway below.” Id. ¶ 11. Such 

allegations are sufficient to avoid dismissal since it is 

unclear from the face of the Complaint whether Plaintiffs’ 

expectation of privacy was insufficient to support a cognizable 

Fourth Amendment claim under the “open fields” doctrine. 

22 The Fourth Amendment protects the home and its curtilage 

(i.e., the area to which extends the intimate activity 

associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies 

of life), but not the “open fields.” United States v. Dunn, 480 

U.S. 294, 307 (1987). In Dunn, the Court explained that 

“curtilage questions are often resolved through evaluation of 

four factors: ‘the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage 

to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure 

surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area 

is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area 

from observation by people passing by.’” Id.

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 19 of 39
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D. Second Claim: Due Process Violation 

 The County and Deputy Cook argue that dismissal of 

Plaintiffs’ due process claim is appropriate because Plaintiffs 

were given sufficient notice of the County’s determination that 

a nuisance condition existed on their property and were provided 

an opportunity to be heard regarding this determination, i.e., 

Plaintiffs were afforded an opportunity to be heard at a 

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner regarding the 

County’s nuisance determination before being deprived of their 

vehicles. 

 “‘Loss of the use and enjoyment of a car deprives the owner 

of a property interest that may be taken from him only in 

accordance with the Due Process Clause.’” Schneider, 28 F.3d at 

92. The fundamental requirement of due process is the 

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 

manner before the government deprives a person of a protected 

liberty or property interest. Conner, 897 F.2d at 1492; 

Schneider, 28 F.3d at 92; Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S. 

252, 261 (1987). “For the notice to satisfy due process, it 

must ‘be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required 

information.’” Schneider, 28 F.3d at 92. 

 In the present case, the County sent Plaintiffs a “Notice 

of Intent to Abate” on May 5, 2005, authorizing the abatement 

and removal from their property as a public nuisance “abandoned, 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 20 of 39
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicle[s] or parts thereof” 

if Plaintiffs did not take action to remedy the situation or 

request a hearing within ten-days. FAC, Exh. B.23 The specific 

vehicles subject to abatement were identified and described in 

an attachment to the Abatement Notice. FAC, Exh. C. While 

Plaintiffs claim that they did not receive the County’s 

Abatement Notice until May 27, 2005, because Mr. Hardy was “away 

on business,” Plaintiffs concede that they were aware of the 

County’s intent to abate the subject vehicles on May 27, 2005 

and that the County did not begin removing vehicles until 

June 24, 2005, nearly one month later. FAC ¶¶ 13-14. 

 Accordingly, because Plaintiffs did not take action to 

remedy the nuisance condition on their property or request a 

hearing within 10-days of receiving notice of the County’s 

intent to abate the nuisance condition, and because Plaintiffs’ 

failure to take advantage of the opportunity to request a 

hearing or abate the vehicles does not render the process 

provided to them constitutionally insufficient, this claim is 

dismissed.24 Moreover, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ failure to 

 

23 Documents attached to the Complaint are treated as part 

of the Complaint and may be considered in ruling on a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and 

Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

24 While Plaintiffs assert that their due process rights 

were violated because the Abatement Notice failed to describe 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 21 of 39
22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

request a pre-deprivation hearing, it is undisputed that they 

 

the vehicles to be abated with sufficient particularly, FAC 

¶ 26, the attachment to the Abatement Notice contradicts this 

assertion because it provides a description of the sixty-nine 

vehicles subject to abatement. FAC, Exh. C. Therefore, 

Plaintiffs had proper notice of the specific vehicles subject to 

abatement as a public nuisance. Additionally, to the extent 

that Plaintiffs assert that the County’s Abatement Notice was 

deficient because it did not provide complete and/or accurate 

information regarding the condition of the vehicles subject to 

abatement, FAC ¶ 26, the plain language of the Abatement Notice 

belies this assertion. The Abatement Notice expressly states 

that the vehicles (or parts thereof) identified constitute a 

public nuisance as they have been determined to be either 

“abandoned, wrecked, dismantled or inoperative.” FAC, Exh. B. 

Thus, even without knowing the precise complaint, any reasonable 

person would conclude that the County’s Abatement Notice could 

be countered by a demonstration that the vehicles were in good 

operable condition. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs 

assert that the County violated their due process rights by 

failing to clearly inform them that they had 10-days from the 

date of the Abatement Notice to take corrective action in order 

to avoid abatement, the plain language of the Abatement Notice 

contradicts this assertion. FAC, Exh. B. The Abatement Notice 

clearly states that the County believed the vehicles (described 

in the attachment) to be either “abandoned,” “wrecked,” 

“dismantled,” or “inoperative,” and that Plaintiffs could avoid 

abatement by removing the vehicles or by requesting a public 

hearing within 10-days. FAC, Exhs. B, C. While the Abatement 

Notice does contain a handwritten note written by Deputy Cook 

stating that the removal of vehicles would commence on May 3, 

2005 (FAC, Exh. B), this does not, as Plaintiffs argue, cancel 

the terms of the Notice. Reading the note in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiffs’, it creates, at best, an ambiguity as 

to the removal date. It does not, however, create an inference 

that the terms of the Abatement Notice were cancelled. This is 

so because the Abatement Notice is dated May 4, 2005, the day 

after the handwritten note stated that removal would commence. 

Thus, by the time Plaintiffs’ received the Abatement Notice 

Deputy Cook’s note was meaningless and/or superseded by the 

written terms of the Abatement Notice. Regardless, Plaintiffs 

could have easily resolved this ambiguity by calling Deputy Cook 

(with the number provided in the handwritten note) anytime 

before abatement commenced on June 24, 2005, nearly two-months 

later. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 22 of 39
23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

were afforded a post-deprivation hearing to challenge the 

County’s nuisance determination.25

 For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ due process claim is 

dismissed. Because amendment would be futile, this claim is 

dismissed with prejudice.26

 

25 On July 20, 2005, Plaintiffs were granted an abatement 

appeal hearing following the removal of approximately seventeen 

vehicles from their property. FAC ¶ 14.6. At this hearing, the 

El Dorado County Zoning Administrator concluded that the 

vehicles were subject to abatement under the ordinance because 

they were “abandoned” and posed a threat to the public health, 

safety and welfare, in violation of the Vehicle Abatement 

Ordinance. Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mt. to Dismiss at 11:22-27, 

12:1-11; Def’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exhs. 5-A, 5-B. 

26 To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to allege a due 

process claim on the basis that the County, through its Zoning 

Administrator, violated their due process rights by not 

permitting the presentation of certain evidence at the abatement 

hearing (FAC ¶ 29.5), such pleading is insufficient to state a 

cognizable due process claim. As discussed above, because 

Plaintiffs were afforded a pre-deprivation opportunity to be 

heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner regarding 

the County’s nuisance determination before being deprived of 

their vehicles, they cannot state a cognizable due process 

claim. Alternatively, such a claim is barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine because it seeks review of a state court 

action. See Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 607 (district courts do not 

have jurisdiction over challenges to state-court decisions in 

particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if 

those challenges allege that the state court’s action was 

unconstitutional); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt 

or undo a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether the 

state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a 

full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims); Noel, 341 

F.3d at 1154 (under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court 

does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct 

appeal from the final judgment of a state court). Plaintiffs 

remedy for this alleged wrong was to seek judicial review as 

authorized under Cal.Civ.Pro.Code § 1094.5. See Noel, 341 F.3d 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 23 of 39
24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

E. Third Claim: Unlawful Taking and Substantive Due Process 

 Violation 

 1. Unlawful Taking 

 Plaintiffs seek to state an unlawful taking claim based on 

the seizure and removal of vehicles from their property without 

just compensation. However, because Plaintiffs’ vehicles were 

seized and removed based on the County’s determination that the 

vehicles constituted a public nuisance, Plaintiffs cannot state 

a cognizable takings claim because their vehicles were taken 

pursuant to a valid exercise of police power for which no 

compensation is due. See City of Costa Mesa v. Soffer, 11 

Cal.App.4th 378, 382-83 (1992); see also Porter v. Diblasio, 93 

F.3d 301, 310 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that no compensation is 

due for the state’s seizure and disposal of neglected animals 

under the Takings Clause because it is “analogous to the state’s 

 

at 1154 (a party disappointed by a decision of a state court may 

seek reversal of that decision by appealing to a higher state 

court, then to the highest state court, and then to the United 

States Supreme Court, but never to a federal district court). 

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to allege a due 

process claim on the basis that the County erred in concluding 

that their vehicles were “abandoned” (FAC ¶ 27), such pleading 

is insufficient to state a cognizable due process claim. This 

claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See

Carter, 36 Cal. 4th at 1240. The identical issue was 

necessarily decided against Mr. Hardy at the abatement hearing 

in a final judgment on the merits (FAC ¶ 14.6), from which 

Plaintiffs had the right to seek judicial review under Cal. Civ. 

Pro. Code § 1094.5. Def.’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exhs. 

5-A, 5-B, 9. As such, Plaintiffs are barred from relitigating 

this issue. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 24 of 39
25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

traditional power to take action to abate a nuisance,” for which 

the Fifth Amendment does not require compensation); Keystone 

Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 n.22 

(1987) (“Courts have consistently held that a State need not 

provide compensation when it diminishes or destroys the value of 

property by stopping illegal activity or abating a public 

nuisance.”).27 Moreover, because the vehicles were not taken for 

public use, Plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation under 

the Fifth Amendment. See Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 

1200, n. 26 (5th Cir. 1981) (if private property is taken but 

not taken for public use, the property owner does not have a 

claim for compensation under the Fifth Amendment but may have a 

claim under § 1983 for deprivation of property without due 

process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment). 

 For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim is 

dismissed. Because amendment would be futile, this claim is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

 

27 The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of “private 

property . . . for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. 

Const. amend. V. “An allegation that private property for which 

no compensation is due has been taken is insufficient to sustain 

a Fifth Amendment claim because it is the taking without just 

compensation that is constitutionally prohibited.” Washington 

Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 271 F.3d 835 

(9th Cir. 2001); see Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1129 

(9th Cir. 1997) (“The Fifth Amendment is not offended by the 

government taking property, but only by the government taking 

property without just compensation.”) (citing Williamson County 

Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 25 of 39
26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 2. Substantive Due Process 

 Plaintiffs seek to state a substantive due process claim 

predicated upon the County’s purported unlawful taking of 

Plaintiffs’ vehicles without just compensation and due process 

of law. However, because the Fifth Amendment provides explicit 

limitations on the type of government conduct challenged by this 

claim, this Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee 

of substantive due process, guides the analysis of Plaintiffs’ 

claim. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 

1996) (where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual 

source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of 

government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized 

notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for 

analyzing a claim) abrogated on other grounds as recognized in 

Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 

2007 WL 4225774 (9th Cir. 2007).28

For this reason, this claim is dismissed. Because 

amendment would be futile, this claim is dismissed with 

prejudice. 

 

28 “The Fifth Amendment’s ‘Takings Clause,’ made applicable 

to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that 

‘private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without 

just compensation’. The amendment also provides that ‘[n]o 

person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without due 

process of law.’” Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1320 (citations 

omitted). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 26 of 39
27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F. Fourth Claim: Unreasonable Search and Seizure, Due 

 Process Violation and Unlawful Taking 

 Plaintiffs seek to state an unreasonable search and seizure 

claim against the County, Deputy Cook and Tony’s Tow as well as 

due process and unlawful takings claims against the County. 

However, because the allegations stated in this claim are 

duplicative of the allegations set forth in claims one, two and 

three, dismissal of this claim is appropriate. This claim does 

not allege facts supporting an independently cognizable claim 

for relief.29 

 For this reason, this claim is dismissed. Because 

amendment would be futile, this claim is dismissed with 

prejudice. 

G. Fifth Claim: Conspiracy 

 Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ conspiracy 

claim is appropriate because Plaintiffs did not allege facts 

sufficient to establish an agreement and a meeting of the minds 

among defendants to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

 

29 This claim is titled “Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” To 

the extent that Plaintiffs seek to state a claim for violation 

of § 1983, this is improper. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare 

Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (§ 1983 was 

enacted to ensure that an individual had a civil cause of action 

to redress deprivations of rights secured under the 

constitution, not to provide any substantive rights (i.e., there 

can be no claim for a violation of § 1983 because it is merely a 

remedy to redress constitutional violations and does not in 

itself provide for any rights, substantive or otherwise)). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 27 of 39
28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 To establish liability for a conspiracy to violate one’s 

constitutional rights under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate 

the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate 

constitutional rights. See Mendocino Environmental Center v. 

Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999). “The 

defendants must have, by some concerted action, intended to 

accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming 

another which results in damage.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks, alteration, and citation omitted). “Such an agreement 

need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of 

circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.” 

Id. “To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not 

know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at 

least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Id. at 

1302 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “To state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one’s 

constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must 

state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed 

conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th 

Cir. 1989); see also Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 

F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2004). Conclusory allegations of 

conspiracy are not enough to support a § 1983 conspiracy claim. 

Burns, 883 F.2d at 821; Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 

1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989); see Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 28 of 39
29

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In order to survive a motion to 

dismiss, plaintiffs alleging a conspiracy to deprive them of 

their constitutional rights must ‘include in their complaint 

nonconclusory allegations containing evidence of unlawful intent 

or face dismissal. . . .’”). A plaintiff can satisfy the 

heightened pleading standard required for § 1983 conspiracy 

claims by alleging “which defendants conspired, how they 

conspired and how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of his 

constitutional rights. . . .” Harris, 126 F.3d at 1196. 

 In the present case, the FAC alleges that the County, 

Deputy Cook, Tony’s Tow and Bonanza illegally conspired to 

deprive Plaintiffs of their property in violation of their civil 

rights and their ownership rights. FAC ¶ 40. The FAC further 

alleges that in furtherance of this conspiracy the defendants 

agreed to seize thirty-one vehicles and cause ownership to be 

transferred to themselves or to others for value without 

providing Plaintiffs with just compensation or due process of 

law. Id. Such conclusory pleading is insufficient to satisfy 

the heightened pleading requirements for a § 1983 conspiracy 

claim. The allegations do not allege an agreement or meeting of 

the minds among the defendants to deprive Plaintiffs’ of their 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 29 of 39
30

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

constitutional rights.30 Nor do the allegations set forth a 

basis by which a conspiracy could be inferred. 

 For these reasons, this claim is dismissed. 

H. Sixth Claim: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

 Tony’s Tow and Bonanza argue that dismissal of this claim 

is appropriate because the FAC does not allege conduct that is 

so extreme and outrageous to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized community. 

 “The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous 

conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of 

causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing 

emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or 

extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate 

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s 

outrageous conduct.” Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Co.,

100 Cal. App. 4th 736, 744-45 (2002); Tekle ex rel. Tekle v. 

U.S. 457 F.3d 1088, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress the plaintiff is required to show severe 

emotional distress resulting from outrageous conduct on the part 

 

30 For instance, Plaintiffs do not allege that Deputy Cook 

ever had any interaction with Tony’s Tow or Bonanza before or 

after the removal of vehicles from their property. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 30 of 39
31

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the defendant. Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. 

California, 144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 231 (1983). Severe emotional 

distress means emotional distress of such substantial quantity 

or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized 

society should be expected to endure it. Id. Behavior may be 

considered outrageous if a defendant: (1) abuses a relation or 

position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s 

interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries 

through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or 

unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to 

result in illness through mental distress. Id. at 230. “The 

fact that conduct might be termed outrageous is not itself 

sufficient. ‘The tort calls for intentional, or at least 

reckless conduct-- conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged 

in with the realization that injury will result.’” Ess v. 

Eskaton Properties, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 4th 120, 130 (2002). 

“The conduct must be of a nature that is especially calculated 

to cause mental distress of a very serious kind. Moreover, to 

support the cause of action, ‘[i]t is not enough that the 

conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct 

directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a 

plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.’” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 31 of 39
32

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 In the present case, Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim is premised upon Tony’s Tow and 

Bonanza’s participation in: (1) entering Plaintiffs’ property 

without permission or consent and seizing thirty-one vehicles; 

(2) destroying and/or selling Plaintiffs’ vehicles; and (3) 

conspiring to deprive Plaintiffs of their ownership rights in 

such vehicles. FAC ¶ 42. Plaintiffs allege that this conduct 

caused Plaintiff to suffer extreme mental distress, fright, 

terror, humiliation and embarrassment. Id. Such conclusory 

pleading is insufficient to state a cognizable intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim against either Tony’s Tow 

or Bonanza. The FAC does not plead facts showing that Tony’s 

Tow or Bonanza’s conduct was outrageous, or that it was 

intentional or reckless conduct intended to inflict injury, or 

engaged in with the realization that injury will result, or that 

the conduct caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe or extreme 

emotional distress. Moreover, the FAC is devoid of facts 

supporting the inference that the conduct was so severe that “no 

reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to 

endure it.” 

 For these reasons, this claim is dismissed. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 32 of 39
33

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Seventh Claim: Declaratory Relief Claim 

 The County argues that dismissal of this claim is 

appropriate because there is no current, actual controversy 

between the parties, i.e., Plaintiffs do not have standing. 

 Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a district court “may 

declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested 

party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is 

or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). A district court may 

issue a declaratory judgment only in “a case of actual 

controversy within its jurisdiction.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs’ 

declaratory relief claim seeks a declaration of the parties’ 

respective rights and obligations regarding whether the County 

was required to obtain a warrant before entering Plaintiffs’ 

property to inspect for a nuisance condition. FAC ¶ 44. 

Additionally, Plaintiffs seek a declaration of the parties’ 

respective rights and obligations regarding whether the County 

can recover the costs it incurred in removing Plaintiffs’ 

vehicles. Id. ¶ 46. 

 With respect to whether the County was required to obtain a 

warrant before entering Plaintiffs’ property to inspect for a 

suspected nuisance condition, the court finds that Plaintiffs 

have alleged sufficient facts to state a cognizable declaratory 

relief claim. An actual controversy exists between the parties 

as to whether the County was, and is, required to obtain an 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 33 of 39
34

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

inspection warrant before entering and removing vehicles from 

Plaintiffs’ property during the implementation of the Vehicle 

Abatement Ordinance. Because this issue is likely to arise in 

the future, as Mr. Hardy intends on continuing to restore cars 

on his property (FAC ¶ 49), the parties have adverse legal 

interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 

issuance of a declaratory judgment on this issue. With respect 

to whether the County can recover the costs incurred in removing 

vehicles from Plaintiffs’ property, the court finds that 

Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a cognizable 

declaratory relief claim. An actual controversy exists between 

the parties as to whether the County can recover the costs it 

incurred in removing vehicles from Plaintiffs’ property pursuant 

to the Vehicle Abatement Ordinance. Because this issue is 

likely to arise in the future, as Mr. Hardy intends on 

continuing to restore cars on his property (FAC ¶ 49), the 

parties have adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and 

reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment on 

this issue. 

 For these reasons, dismissal of this claim is not 

appropriate. 

J. Municipal Liability 

 The County argues that dismissal of each and every § 1983 

civil rights claim alleged against it in the FAC is appropriate 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 34 of 39
35

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because there is no allegation that an official policy or custom 

of the County was the moving force behind the alleged 

constitutional deprivations. 

 “Local government entities are considered ‘persons’ for 

purposes of § 1983 and can be sued directly for monetary, 

declaratory, or injunctive relief where ‘the action that is 

alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted 

and promulgated by that body’s officers.’” Anderson v. Warner, 

451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of 

Soc. Servs. of New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). “To 

impose liability on a local governmental entity for failing to 

act to preserve constitutional rights, a section 1983 plaintiff 

must establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of 

which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; 

(3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the 

plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the 

‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt v. 

Pierce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992); Anderson, 451 F.3d 

at 1070. There also must be a “direct causal link” between the 

policy or custom and the injury, and plaintiff must be able to 

demonstrate that the injury resulted from a “permanent and well 

settled practice.” Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070. In order to be 

a “moving force” behind a constitutional deprivation, the 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 35 of 39
36

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“identified deficiency” in a local governmental entity’s policy 

must be “closely related to the ultimate injury.” See Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1196 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“‘In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under section 

1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even if the 

claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the 

individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, 

custom, or practice.’” Estate of Amos ex rel. Amos v. City of 

Page, Arizona, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 In the present case, Plaintiffs allege that the County 

violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights in connection with the seizure and removal of vehicles 

from their property via the implementation of the Vehicle 

Abatement Ordinance. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the 

County violated their Fourth Amendment rights when Deputy Cook 

entered their property on or about April 26, 2005 and on or 

about May 5, 2005, without a warrant and without Plaintiffs’ 

consent or permission, for the purpose of inspecting a nuisance 

condition pursuant to the County’s Vehicle Abatement Ordinance. 

FAC ¶¶ 11, 11.5, 11.6, 21, 21.5.31 Additionally, Plaintiffs 

 

31 The FAC states that “[t]his case concerns the wrongful 

taking of plaintiff’ property by defendants. Plaintiffs 

property was taken by defendants in the course of the 

unconstitutional implementation of the County of El Dorado’s 

Vehicle Abatement Program found at Chapter 10.16 of the 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 36 of 39
37

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

allege that the County violated their Fourth Amendment rights on 

June 24, 2005 when it directed Tony’s Tow to enter their 

property for the purpose of removing vehicles without an 

inspection warrant and without Plaintiffs’ consent or 

permission. Id. ¶¶ 14, 22. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that 

the County violated their Fourth Amendment rights in or about 

August 9, 2005 when Deputy Cook and Tony’s Tow entered their 

property for the purpose of removing vehicles with an inspection 

warrant but without Plaintiffs’ consent or presence as required 

by the warrant. Id. ¶¶ 15, 23. 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Plaintiffs 

have alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable Fourth 

Amendment claim against the County. The allegations in the FAC 

sufficiently state that Tony’s Tow and Deputy Cook’s 

implementation of the Vehicle Abatement Ordinance was the moving 

force behind the Fourth Amendment deprivations. See Gillette v. 

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992) (a § 1983 

plaintiff may establish municipal liability by proving that an 

employee committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant 

to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or 

 

Municipal Code.” FAC at 1:22-26. The FAC further alleges that 

Deputy Cook’s conduct in furtherance of his implementation of 

the Vehicle Abatement Ordinance was based on his interpretation 

that Section 10.16.040(B) of the Ordinance does not require an 

inspection warrant to enter Plaintiffs’ property. Id. ¶ 11.6. 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 37 of 39
38

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the 

local governmental entity). Accordingly, dismissal of 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim against the County is 

inappropriate.

 With respect to Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim, the 

court finds that, as discussed above, Plaintiffs cannot state a 

cognizable takings claim against the County because the vehicles 

were taken pursuant to a valid exercise of police power for 

which no compensation is due, and because the vehicles were not 

taken for public use.32 Finally, with respect to the Fourteenth 

Amendment, the court finds that, as discussed above, Plaintiffs 

cannot state a cognizable due process claim against the County 

because Plaintiffs were afforded a pre-deprivation opportunity 

to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 

regarding the County’s nuisance determination before being 

deprived of their vehicles. 

 For these reasons, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Fourth 

Amendment claim against the County is inappropriate. However, 

 

32 Additionally, as discussed above, Plaintiffs cannot state 

a cognizable substantive due process claim against the County 

because the Fifth Amendment provides explicit limitations on the 

type of conduct challenged by this claim. See Armendariz, 75 

F.3d at 1319 (where a particular amendment provides an explicit 

textual source of constitutional protection against a particular 

sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more 

generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the 

guide for analyzing a claim). 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 38 of 39
39

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

dismissal of Plaintiffs’ due process, substantive due process 

and takings claims against the County is appropriate. Because 

amendment of Plaintiffs’ due process, substantive due process 

and takings claims would be futile, these claims are dismissed 

with prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the motions to dismiss are 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2008. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

Case 2:07-cv-00799-JAM-EFB Document 58 Filed 01/29/08 Page 39 of 39