Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00782/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00782-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHINEHAS LAMONT PARKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY GOOLD, et al.,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-0782-LJO-MJS (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 8)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

(14) DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 4 & 8.)

Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he 

was given leave to amend (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 8) is 

before the Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

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determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names as Defendants (1) Stanislaus County District Attorney Goold, 

(2) Lead Investigator Bill Andrews,1and (3) Stanislaus County Board of Supervisors. 

 

1

Plaintiff variously alleges that Defendant Andrews is employed by the District Attorney, the Stanislaus 

County Board of Supervisors, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

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Plaintiff’s allegations can be summarized as follows: 

In October 1998, Defendant Goold sent Defendant Andrews to search Plaintiff’s 

residence (apparently shared with his girlfriend) and his cell at the Stanislaus County Jail 

for evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s claim of innocence in a murder investigation. Defendant 

Andrews conducted warrantless searches, retrieved documents from Plaintiff’s jail cell 

and from Plaintiff’s girlfriend as she left the courthouse, and read and copied legal 

documents intended for Plaintiff’s attorney detailing inconsistencies in the prosecution’s 

case against him. Defendant Andrews provided these documents to Defendant Goold. 

Officials at the jail informed Plaintiff that Defendant Andrews had made copies of 

his materials, Plaintiff contacted his attorney, and his attorney contacted Defendant 

Goold. Plaintiff’s attorney also sought to dismiss the charges or recuse Defendant Goold 

from the case. A hearing was held in November 1998. The trial judge apparently credited 

Defendant Goold’s testimony that he had not read the documents at issue or discussed 

them with Defendant Andrews. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and to 

recuse. Plaintiff contends that this ruling was erroneous. 

Plaintiff argues that this conduct violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that his rights were violated, monetary damages, and 

a judgment that his conviction was based on evidence that was the fruit of the poisonous 

tree.

IV. ANALYSIS

The conduct alleged by Plaintiff occurred in October and November 1998. This 

action was initiated on May 22, 2014, more than fifteen years later. (ECF No. 1.)

Federal law determines when a claim accrues, and under federal law, a claim 

accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis 

of the action.” Lukovsky v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004)).

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Here, Plaintiff knew of the injury which is the basis for the action no later than November 

1998.

“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling, 

including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with 

federal law.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (2004) (citing Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 

911, 914 (9th Cir.1999)). Although California’s statute of limitations for personal injury 

actions was extended from one year to two years effective January 1, 2003, the two-year 

statute of limitations does not apply retroactively to claims that accrued prior to January 

1, 2003, and as a result, the one-year statute of limitations applies in this case. Cal. Civ. 

Proc. Code § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Under California law, prisoners who at the 

time the cause of action accrued were either imprisoned on a criminal charge or serving 

a sentence of less than life for a criminal conviction enjoy a two-year tolling provision for 

damages actions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). Thus, Plaintiff had no more than three 

years from the date the cause of action accrued in which to file suit, if the cause of action 

accrued while plaintiff was incarcerated. Plaintiff filed this action fifteen years after it 

accrued. 

California's equitable tolling doctrine, which focuses on excusable delay by a 

plaintiff, may apply in proper circumstances. Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1051. However, 

Plaintiff has set forth no facts suggesting his delay in bringing this action was excusable. 

See id.

Given Plaintiff's allegations, this action is untimely and should be dismissed on 

that ground.2 Plaintiff previously was advised of these deficiencies but failed to cure 

them in his amended pleading. This failure is reasonably construed as reflecting his 

inability to do so. Further leave to amend would be futile and should be denied.

 

2

The Court’s prior screening order also addressed multiple substantive deficiencies in Plaintiff’s pleading. 

Those remain. However, given the patent statute of limitations bar to his proceeding, no useful purpose 

would be served in also addressing those substantive shortcomings here.

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. He 

previously was advised of this deficiency and afforded the opportunity to correct it. He 

failed to do so. Any further leave to amend reasonably appears futile and should be 

denied. 

The undersigned recommends that the action be dismissed with prejudice, that 

dismissal count as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the Clerk of the 

Court terminate any and all pending motions and close the case. 

The findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with the findings and recommendation, the 

parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to another party’s objections by filing a response within fourteen (14) days after being 

served with a copy of that party’s objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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