Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01548/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01548-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BITA TRADING, INC.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv1548 JM(WVG)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

vs.

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL

INSURANCE COMPANY; ALLIED

INSURANCE,

Defendants.

Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide”), also

erroneously sued as Allied Insurance, moves for summary judgment on grounds that

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the theft and entrustment provisionsin the Commercial

Insurance Policy issued to Plaintiff Bita Trading, Inc. (“Bita”). Bita opposes the

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, the court

grants summary judgment in favor of Nationwide and against Bita and instructs the

Clerk of Court to close the file.

BACKGROUND

On May 24, 2013, Bita commenced this action in the California Superior Court,

County of San Diego, by filing a form complaint alleging a single cause of action for

breach of an insurance contract. On July 2, 2013 Nationwide removed the action to

this court based upon diversity jurisdiction. (Ct. Dkt. 1).

In this insurance coverage action, Bita originally sought coverage under two

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different insurance policiesissued by Nationwide. This first policy, issued to Sorrento

Mesa Hand Car Wash & Spa, Inc. (“Sorrento” and the “Sorrento Policy”), as set forth

in this court’s January 6, 2014 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, provided

coverage to Sorrento under the Property Form at issue, and to both Sorrento and Bita

under the Liability Form. (Ct. Dkt. 25). As Bita’s claims arose solely under the

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Property Form, and not the Liability Form, the court granted partialsummary judgment

in favor of Nationwide and against Bita. 

Bita’s claims arise from the following generally described conduct. Bita owns

real property located on Mira Mesa Boulevard in San Diego, California. Effective

August 1, 2005, Bita entered into a 35-year Ground Lease with Sorrento for the

construction and operation of a car wash and related facilities. The car wash was built

in 2008 and operated through early 2012. Bita and Sorrento became involved in a

dispute over the property. On May 25, 2012, the Superior Court of San Diego County

terminated the lease, awarded monetary relief to Bita (in the amount of $812,873), and

restored possession to Bita. Bita asserts that Sorrento caused damage to the property

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in the amount of $750,000. (Ct. Dkt. 14-6; Sheena Decl. ¶7). Bita also represents that

only the car wash portion of the business opened on June 1, 2013, and that the

remaining portions of the operation, consisting of a convenience store, office and oil

change facility, have not been fully repaired and have not been fully placed in service. 

Bita’s claims under the Bita Commercial Policy, Nationwide policy No. ACP

CPP 7843309886, arise from damages to the property first discovered by Bita’s

property managers, Brian Crepeau and Michele Torres, on June 29, 2012. Upon

unlocking and entering the building, the propertymanagers discovered that fixtures and

property had been stolen and parts of the building damaged. As described in the San

Diego Police Department crime/incident report: 

 The court incorporates that order as if fully set forth herein. 1

 On June 29, 2012, the Sheriff restored possession to Bita. 2

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Building fixtures had been completely ripped out or off of the building’s

exterior and interior. Electric wiring, metal piping, carpet, and ceiling

covers were missing. Three large rooftop air-conditioning units were

removed and stolen. Lighting fixtures, both inside and outside the

building were also stolen. Thousands of dollars in damage was done to

the building.

(Statement of Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 5, 7). There were no signs of

forced entry, no windows or doors were broken, and the Deputy Sheriff had to gain

access to the building by unlocking the door with a key provided by Sorrento. (UMF

Nos. 8 - 10). 

Michele Torres reported the crime to the San Diego Police Department and a

report was prepared by Officer Bernard. Officer Bernard concluded that a burglary and

concurrent vandalismhad occurred. Nobody was ever prosecuted for the crime. (UMF

11, 12). 

On October 22, 2012, Bita submitted a sworn statement for a claimin the amount

of $731,498 for a loss due to theft and vandalism. (UMF 4). The amount of the claim

included replacing the stolen items and repairing the damage to the building caused by

the removal ofthe items (including the removal ofsome ofthe car washing equipment). 

On December 14, 2012, Nationwide denied the claimfor that portion of the loss caused

by theft and/or dishonest acts of persons to whom the property was entrusted. 

Nationwide did provide coverage for damage to the oil storage tanks on the property

as it considered such damage caused by vandalism, not related to the theft, as covered

within the Business Personal Property provision. (UMF 35). 

By means of the present summary judgment motion, Nationwide argues that the

evidentiary record demonstrates that Bita’s claims are barred by the theft and

entrustment provisions in the Commercial Policy. Bita opposes the motion.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Motion for Summary Judgment Standards

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine

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issue asto any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 698 (9th

Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the file which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that

the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating

the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). The opposing party cannot rest on

the mere allegations or denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and

by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). The opposing party also may not rely solely on

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Any doubt

asto the existence of any issue of material fact requires denial of the motion. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment,

when “‘the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with

evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence were

uncontroverted at trial.’” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)

(emphasis in original) (quoting International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d

1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992)).

General Insurance Law Principles

Ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply to insurance contracts. “The

fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention

of the parties. If the contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.” Bank of

West v. Superior Court (Industrial Indemnity Co.), 2 Cal. 4th 1254 (1992). Where

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exclusions are clear, plain, and conspicuous, they will be enforced. Malcolm v.

Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal.App.4th 296, 3045 (1992). 

The Motion for Summary Judgment

The Motion pertains to three different policy provisions: the coverage

provisions, the Theft Exclusion, and the Entrustment Exclusion.

The Coverage Provision

The Bita Commercial Policy defines the scope of covered property in the

following manner.

A. Coverage

We will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered

Property at the premises described in the Declarations

caused by or resulted from any Covered Cause of Loss

1 Covered Property

Covered Property as used in this Coverage Part

means the type of property described in this 

section A 1, and limited in A 2, Property Not

Covered if a Limit of Insurance is shown in the

Declarations for that type of property

a Building, meaning the building or

structure described in the

Declarations including 

* * *

b Your Business Personal

Property located in or on the

building described in the

Declarations or in the open (or in

a vehicle) within 100 feet of the

described premises consisting of

the following unless otherwise

specified in the Declarations or on

the Your Business Personal

Property - Separation of Coverage

form

* * *

2 Property Not Covered

Bita construes the Coverage Provision to read that “property is ‘Not Covered’

when a policy limit isshown.” (Oppo. at p.1:12-13). As no limit for building coverage

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isincluded, Bita concludes that there is unlimited coverage for damage to the building. 

Seen in context of the Coverage Provision and the Declarations page, the court

concludes that Bita’s reading of this provision is unreasonable. While not a model of

clarity, the court, citing policy language, construesthis provision to mean that property

is covered “if a Limit of Insurance is shown in the Declarations for that type of

property (i.e. the building structure or business personal property as described in

provisions A (1)(a) and (b) and excluded by A(2)).” Turning to the Declarations page,

coverage is available for Extra Expense and Business Personal Property. ( NW 180). 

As building coverage is not identified in the Declarations Page, the court concludes

that the Commercial Policy does not include such coverage.

In sum, Nationwide has shown that coverage is afforded for loss of Business

Personal Property but not for the building.

The Theft Exclusion

The Bita Commercial Policy defines the Theft Exclusion in the following

manner. 

THEFT EXCLUSION

This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following

CAUSES OF LOSS SPECIAL FORM

The following is added to the EXCLUSIONS section

We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting

from theft

But we will pay for:

1. Loss or damage that occurs due to looting at the

time and place of a civil riot or commotion; or

2. Building damage caused by the breaking in or

exiting of burglars.

(UMF No. 34).

The word “theft” is

used in insurance policies in [its] common and ordinary meaning. Theft

involvesthe idea of a knowingly unlawful acquisition of property; that is,

a felonious taking of it from one who has both the actual possession and

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the apparent right of possession. In construing the word ‘theft’ it should

be given the usual meaning and understanding employed by persons in the

ordinary walks of life, and should be construed as common thought and

common speech now imagine and describe it. . . . It may well be that in a

prosecution for a crime, the strict rules of criminal law would require the

swindler to be charged with the particular crime that the facts constitute,

but it cannot be said that the contract of insurance was drawn to fit the

narrow limitations of criminal statutes.

Granger v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 108 Cal.App. 290, 294-95 (1930). Nationwide has the

burden of proving the applicability of the Theft Exclusion. See Minkler v. Safeco Ins.

Co. Of America, 49 Cal.4th 315, 322 (2010). 

To establish that the property was taken as a result of a theft, Nationwide must

first show that Sorrento did not have the right to the property taken by Sorrento. Upon

termination of the lease, which occurred on May 25, 2012, when the Superior Court of

San Diego County terminated the lease between Bita and Sorrento, Bita obtained title

to all improvements including “carpets, draperies, partitions, machinery, equipment and

fixtures.” (Ct. Dkt. 15-1 §8). The only other issue is whether the property was subject

to theft. 

With respect to the theft of property, Nationwide comesforward with substantial

evidence to show that the property was unlawfully removed from the premises. After

Sorrento’s lease was terminated by the Superior Court of San Diego on May 25, 2012,

Bita’s property managers, Brian Crepeau and Michelle Torres, gained entry to the

property on June 29, 2012. The Deputy Sheriff, using the key obtained from Sorrento,

entered the property with the property managers to discover that fixtures, electric

wiring, metal piping, carpet, ceiling tiles, rooftop air conditioning units, and other

equipment had been removed from the premises. There were no signs of forced entry

to the property. Michele Torres reported the incident to the San Diego Police

Department and Officer Bernard, after investigation, concluded that a burglary and

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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 concurrent vandalism had occurred.

3

Additional evidence supporting the theft of the personal property consists of the

insurance claim filed by Bita. Bita characterized the loss as “Vandalism - Theft. ” 4

Moreover, at the deposition of Mr. Ahmad, he admitted that he removed and sold

numerous components of the car wash. The items removed included arches,

attachments, lights, six blowers, a water pump, a pressure washer, a computer, and

other items. Officer Bernard testified, from his personal observations of the property,

that he “was convinced that a burglary occurred based on the theft of several fixtures

and the air conditioning units.” (Nationwide Exh. 6, 12:24 - 13:6). The evidence also 5

showsthat Ahmad contacted Leonard Whatley, the principal of Eco Construction, and

informed him of a way to get some of the money back that Sorrento still owed Eco

Construction for electrical work performed on the car wash. Whatley met Ahmad at

the property and Ahmad advised Whatley that he had been evicted from the property

and that he was going to remove all of the personal property from the site. Whatley

observed Ahmad’s employees removing some of the property. Ahmad also informed

Whatley that he had rented a storage unit to store the removed property. Ahmad

offered Whatley some of the items in exchange for monies owed to Eco Construction. 

Bita objects to a portion of the testimony of Michelle Torres. Bita provides no 3

context or argument as to these objections. At her deposition, Torres testified that she

suspected Sorrento of the damage and theft. (Nationwide Exh. 4, 19:13-33). Although

she testified that she did not have any proof, she suspected Sorrento was the

responsible party because, in part, the premises were locked and no windows or doors

were broken. Bita objectsto the testimony based upon lack of personal knowledge and

hearsay. The court rejects these objections because, for the reasons elaborated at the

time of the depositions, the testimony consists of her impressions and conclusions

based upon the facts personally known by her. Further, the statements were made by

Bita’s agents and properly considered authorized admissions as well as statements

against interest. 

Bita objects to the statements “vandalism - theft” under FRE 602. This

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objection is not well taken becauseBita itself made these statements and they constitute

party admissions. See Rule 801(d)(2).

Bita objects to this evidence on grounds of “Rule 602; hearsay.” Bita provides 5

no context or argument as to these objections. The court rejects these arguments as

Officer Bernard testifies asto his personal observations and based upon the statements

by Bita’s agents, Torres and Crepau.

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Whatley declined the offer.

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Nationwide also identifies that the lease with the new tenant, Soapy Joe’s,

provided that the “Lessee acknowledges that the prior tenants removed certain

improvements, equipment and fixturesfromthe Premises.” (Exh. 11, section 2.2). The

principal of Soapy Joe’s informed the contractor performing repair work on the site that

the prior tenant, Ahmad, had brought workersto remove everything from the property. 

(UMF 28). 

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Bita also argues that Nationwide must both establish the identity of the actor and

that the actor had criminal intent to remove the property. Under California law, the

theft exclusion applies even if the actor is unknown and criminal intent not shown. See

Granger v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 108 Cal.App. 290, 294-95. In Certain Underwriters

at Lloyds London v. Law, 570 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2009), thieves climbed onto the roof

to steal copper tubing. In the process, the thieves destroyed portions of exterior panels

that housed air-conditioning equipment and broke the equipment to steal the tubing. 

The value of the stolen property was $2,500 but the resulting damage was about

$200,000. The court concluded that the entire loss was excluded under the theft

exclusion because “damage done in furtherance of a theft or attempted theft is damage

that falls within the theft exclusion of the instant policy.” Under these authorities, the

theft exclusion would bar the claim for both the stolen property and damages to the

building. 

Bita objects to much of the Whatley testimony on grounds of Rule 602 and

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hearsay. With respect to the statements of Ahmad, astestified to by Whatley, Whatley,

as a party to the conversations, possessed personal knowledge of the conversations. 

Further, many of the statements by Ahmad would be admissible as statements of his

existing state of mind with respect to future actions he would undertake, as well as

declarations against his interests, exposing him to civil and possible criminal liability. 

Bita objects to the lease it entered into with Soapy Joe’s on the ground of lack 7

of personal knowledge. The difficulty with this argument is that Bita’s principal,

Javanfar, authenticated the document and, moreover, signed and initiated the document. 

The court rejects the evidentiary objections to the lease between Bita and Soapy Joe’s,

although the lease has minimal probative value when compared to all the other

evidence properly considered. 

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Bita argues that Ahmad only admitted to removing equipment and machinery

components of the car wash and that Ahmad could have “mistakenly believed [the

items] were trade fixtures he could remove under the lease.” (Oppo. at p.7:4-5). 

Ahmad denied any theft of the property. One difficulty with this argument isthat Bita,

through the express terms of the ground lease between Bita and Sorrento, obtained title

to all improvementsincluding “carpets, draperies, partitions,machinery, equipment and

fixtures.” (Ct. Dkt. 15-1 §8). In other words, the removal of the components of the car

wash, and the other identified equipment and personal property, was wrongful on the

part of Ahmad and constitutes theft for purposes of the Theft Exclusion. 

While the court concludes that the Theft Exclusion applies to bar Bita from

recouping losses related to the theft of equipment, machinery, fixtures and personal

property, and the concurrent damage to the building caused by the theft, incidents of

vandalism present a distinct issue. Bita also argues that certain acts of vandalism are

covered events. For example, someone poured sugar or another substance into the oil

storage tanks. Nationwide paid for the damages to the tanks because it concluded that

the damage was the result of vandalism, and not theft. The other act of vandalism

identified by the parties is the damage caused by pouring thin-set cement into a drain

or drains. The record does not establish whether Nationwide paid to repair this

damage. In any event, acts of pure vandalism, that is, acts done solely to cause damage

and do not involve damage caused by the removal of property, fall outside the Theft

Exclusion.

In sum, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Nationwide and against

Bita on the applicability of the Theft Exclusion. Damages to personal property or

fixtures, and the resulting damage to the building related to the removal and theft of the

personal property or fixtures, are not covered losses pursuant to the Theft Exclusion. 

The Entrustment Exclusion

The Bita Commercial Policy definesthe Entrustment Exclusion in the following

manner:

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B. Exclusions

2. We will not pay for loss or damage caused by

or resulting from any of the following.

h. Dishonest or criminal act by you,

any of your partners, members,

officers, managers, employees

(including leased employees),

directors, trustees, authorized

representatives, or anyone to

whom you entrust the property for

any purpose.

(UMF 32).

Nationwide argues that the Entrustment Exclusion applies to bar Bita’s claim. 

In Su v. New Century Ins. Services, Inc., 2013 WL 5775160 (C.D. Cal. 2013), the

plaintiff purchased an “all-risk” insurance policy from New Century. The plaintiff

leased the commercial property to the tenant. After a period of time, the tenant turned

possession of the property back to plaintiff after it filed for bankruptcy. Water damage

occurred to the propertywhen an unidentified contractorremoved climate control units

from the roof because the tenant told the contractor that it could take the units as

payment for work previously performed for the tenant. The plaintiff made a claim for

the property damage and New Century argued that the claim was barred by the

Entrustment Exclusion. On summary judgment, the district court concluded, in

reliance upon California law, that the Entrustment Exclusion, similar to the one at issue

in this case, “has been found to be unambiguous as a matter of law and specifically

applicable to lessees.” Id. at *4 (citing Atlas Assurance Co. v. McCombs Corp., 146

Cal.App.3d 135, 144 (1983). The court also noted that even if the damage was caused

by vandalism and theft, “the entrustment exclusion applies to any such acts performed

by anyone to whom the property is entrusted. Even if the loss occurs after the

entrustment of the property has terminated, the exclusion still applies so long as there

is a ‘causal connection between the act of entrustment and the resulting loss.’” Id.

(quoting Bainbridge, Inc. v. Calfarm Ins. Co., 2004 WL 2650892, at *6

(Cal.Ct.App.2004).

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Bita contendsthat the Entrustment Exclusion does not apply because there is no

admissible evidence that Sorrento damaged the property and that the State Court

Judgment of May 25, 2012 terminated the lease and that Bita was simply seeking to

regain possession. The difficulty with these argumentsis that the damages to business

personal property and fixtures were indisputably subject to vandalism and theft by

Sorrento or its agents. While the tenancy of Sorrento appears to have been terminated 8

on May 25, 2012, there remains the “causal connection between the act of entrustment

and the resulting loss.” Id. That is, the damage to the property was caused by Bita’s

lessee. Furthermore, in its lease with Soapy Joe’s, Bita explicitly required Soapy Joe’s

to acknowledge that the “prior tenant removed certain improvements, equipment and

fixtures from the Premises.” (Exh. 11, § 2.2). 

Under these circumstances, the court concludes that the Entrustment Exclusion

bars Bita’s property damages claim. The evidentiary record shows that Eco

Construction principal Leonard Whatley personally observed property being removed

by Sorrento. Sorrento also informed Whatley that he could remove the air conditioning

units in partial payment of monies owed to Eco Construction. Soapy Joe’s contractor

Riad Cody also testified that he was also informed by Bita’s agent that the former

tenant was responsible for the property damage. Furthermore, asset forth above, there

is substantial evidence establishing that Sorrento and its agents were the parties

responsible for the damages caused to the property. As such, Bita’s claims are barred

by the Entrustment Exclusion.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

 The evidentiary challenges by Bita are discussed in the previous section.

8

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In sum, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Nationwide and against

Bita on its breach of contract claim. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment

in favor of Nationwide and against Bita and to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 3, 2015

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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