Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00310/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00310-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. VALLEY,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0310 MCE KJM P

vs.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated as a result of the

medical care he received for a broken bone in his hand. Plaintiff and defendants all have moved

for summary judgment.

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I. Summary Judgment Standards Under Rule 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

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must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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 Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts is incorporated in his motion for summary 1

judgment, filed August 31, 2006 and renewed on November 13, 2007 in response to this court’s

order of September 27, 2007. The statement is signed under the penalty of perjury. 

 For this fact, defendants rely on plaintiff’s complaint, which is not signed under penalty 2

of perjury. However, the assertions in the complaint are, for the most part, echoed in plaintiff’s

statement of undisputed facts.

 Both parties have submitted a copy of a memo from the Advanced Imaging Center of 3

Roseville. Although defendant has provided the declaration of the custodian of medical records

at California State Prison-Sacramento (CSP-Sac) as a means of authenticating records from

plaintiff’s medical file, it does not appear that this declarant properly can authenticate a record

not created in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). See United

States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1990) (“For the records to be admissible, the

following foundational facts must be established through the custodian of the records or another

qualified witness: (1) the records must have been made or transmitted by a person with

knowledge at or near the time of the incident recorded; and (2) the record must have been kept in

the course of a regularly conducted business activity.”). The court accepts the record, however,

because neither party disputes its accuracy or admissibility. 

Plaintiff has not authenticated the pages of medical records he has attached to his motion. 

Defendants have not objected to these portions of the records, however, and they do appear to be

plaintiff’s records. The court will rely on them in resolving the pending motions. Fed. R. Evid.

901(a) & (b)(4).

4

On April 24, 2006, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

II. Facts

A. The Injury And Its Repair

On April 9, 2004, plaintiff injured his right hand in a fight with another inmate. 

Plaintiff’s Undisputed Fact (PUF) 1; Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (DUF) 1. 1 2

X-rays of plaintiff’s right hand showed a fracture of the middle phalanx. 

Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment (DMSJ), Ex. A at 2; Plaintiff’s Motion For

Summary Judgment (PMSJ), Exs. A-1 (CDCR Physician’s Progress Notes) & B-2 (report from

Advanced Imaging Center, Roseville). Shortly thereafter, Dr. Penner requested that plaintiff be 3

seen by an orthopedic surgeon for a consultation; he noted that the request was urgent and

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 See note 3 above. 4

 The Allen declaration is written in the form of interrogatories, but plaintiff has called it 5

an “affidavit–deposition hand written questions from plaintiff to Dr. Robert Allen M.D. . . .” As

it is signed under penalty of perjury and is not objected to, the court will treat it as a declaration. 

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plaintiff should be seen within two weeks. DMSJ, Ex. A at 3; PMSJ, Ex. D-4. In support of this

request, Dr. Penner submitted a form, attesting that treatment for plaintiff’s broken finger met

CDC standards for medical necessity. PMSJ, Ex. C-3. 

A follow up x-ray was ordered on May 7, 2004, and was taken on June 2, 2004. 

This x-ray showed no change in the alignment of the fracture. DMSJ, Ex. A at 4-6; PMSJ, Exs.

E-5 & F-6. 

On July 1, 2004, Dr. Robert Allen, an orthopedic surgeon, examined plaintiff and

recommended surgical repair of the fracture. DMSJ, Ex. A at 7-8 ; PMSJ, Ex. G-7. Plaintiff’s 4

finger was both swollen and painful during the examination. Plaintiff’s Opposition To Motion

For Summary Judgment (Opp’n), Ex. D, Declaration of Dr. Robert Allen (Allen Decl.) ¶¶ 3 & 4.5

On July 26, 2004, Dr. Penner submitted a request to have the surgery approved. DMSJ, Ex. A at

8; PMSJ, Ex. H-8. 

On July 27, 2004, plaintiff submitted a health care request form, asking whether

surgery had been scheduled and complaining of pain. PMSJ, Ex. I-9. The nurse who examined

him continued plaintiff on Motrin for the pain and instructed him to wrap the finger in an Ace

bandage at night to protect it. Nurse Jones also faxed a note to the consult desk to check on the

progress in scheduling surgery. Id. 

On August 26, 2004, plaintiff submitted a grievance, assigned log number

H-04-01696, in which he complained of the delay in receiving approval for surgery to repair his

fractured finger and alleviate the pain. Compl., Ex. J. Dr. Penner responded that “the approval

for surgery is currently being handled at the headquarters level.” Id.

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 Plaintiff also argues that defendant Kernan was aware that medical staff members were 6

providing inmates with braces for small bone breaks, but ordered the practice discontinued

because inmates were making weapons with the braces. Opp’n at 4. He learned this, he avers, in

the conversation with Dr. Penner. Opp’n, Valley Decl. III. He avers that he wrote to defendant

Kernan about this policy in May 2004. Opp’n, Valley Decl. II. He did not include these

allegations in the complaint, which described his cause of action as one for medical delay that

caused pain and disfigurement. The court will not consider this attempt to broaden the claim at

the summary judgment stage when it appears plaintiff had this information at the time he filed

the complaint. 

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Plaintiff submitted additional health care request forms on September 2 and

October 26, 2004, complaining of pain and inquiring about the surgery. PMSJ, Exs. J-10 and K11. 

Although surgery was approved on September 7, 2004, it was not conducted until

December 10, 2004. DMSJ, Ex. A at 9; PMSJ, Ex. L-12. At follow-up appointments, the

surgeon noted that plaintiff was regaining range of motion and was no longer in pain. PMSJ,

Exs. N-14 & O-15. 

Dr. Allen, the orthopedic surgeon who operated on plaintiff’s hand, says that

“generally earlier treatment yields better results.” Allen Decl. ¶ 8. 

B. The Defendants’ Involvement In The Delay Of Treatment

 On June 7, 2004, plaintiff wrote a grievance addressed directly to the warden,

complaining that the medical department “has taken it upon itself to do nothing on matters of

broken fingers. . . .” Complaint (Compl.), Ex. J; Opposition to DMSJ (Opp’n), Ex. A, Second

Declaration Of Charles Valley (Valley Decl. II). Kernan does not remember having contact with 6

plaintiff during May or June 2004; he says that “if an inmate grievance regarding medical issues

is sent by an inmate to the Warden, the Warden’s secretary would redirect the grievance to the

appropriate medical personnel for a response.” DMSJ, Ex. B No. 5. He acknowledges, though,

that an inmate could send a letter directly to the warden’s office by using a “U-Save-Em”

envelope. DMSJ, Ex. B No. 4. 

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 In his complaint, plaintiff speculates that Woodford may not have received the letter 7

because he received no response. Compl., Continuation page at 4. 

 It appears Woodford relies solely on the speculation in plaintiff’s complaint. DMSJ at 8

5 & n.1. See note 7 above. 

 Although this conversation with Dr. Penner is hearsay, defendants have not objected to 9

plaintiff’s declaration or otherwise moved to strike it. Any objection is thus waived, particularly

in light of the Ninth Circuit’s recognition that courts are to be more lenient with the affidavits of

a party opposing summary judgment. Pfingston v. Ronan Engineering Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1003

(9th Cir. 2002); Scharf v. United States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1979). 

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In addition, plaintiff contends he wrote to Jeanne Woodford, who was then the

Director of CDC, complaining of the delay in receiving treatment. Opp’n, First Declaration of

Charles Valley (Valley Decl. I). Woodford has not submitted a declaration or other evidence

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denying receipt of plaintiff’s communications.

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Finally, plaintiff avers that sometime after his injury, he visited his treating

physician, Dr. Penner, who assured plaintiff he would prepare the documents necessary to secure

approval for plaintiff’s surgery. Opp’n, Third Declaration of Charles Valley (Valley Decl. III). 

Dr. Penner told plaintiff, however, that the “medical health care review committee had sent

orders to prison doctors and prison review committee’s [sic] not to put in medical providers [sic]

request for small bone breaks because the success rate on surgery was small. . . .” Id.9

Plaintiff has supported his third declaration with materials he received in

discovery: copies of grievances submitted by other CSP-Sac inmates complaining of the

treatment they had received (or not) for small bone breaks. Opp’n, Ex. E. For example, in Log

No. 04-00402, the Director’s Level response noted the inmate was scheduled for surgery in

August 2004 to repair the finger fracture that occurred in December 2003. In Log No. 04-00727,

the inmate complained about the delay in receiving surgery for his fractured surgery and the pain

he was suffering as a result. In Log No. 04-1546, the inmate’s grievance about his care was

denied at the Director’s Level because the fracture had healed on its own, which had prompted

the Medical Authorization Review committee to deny a consultation with an orthopedic

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 The final grievance in this group, Log No. 05-02133, complains more about Dr.

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Allen’s performance than of the prison’s initial response to his broken finger. 

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specialist; the resolution noted that the inmate still complained of pain and should visit the

institution’s doctors for pain management. In the grievance associated with this resolution, the

inmate notes that “pain killers will not fix my broken hand.” In Log No. 05-949, the Director’s

Level decision observes that the injury to plaintiff’s hand, suffered in February 2005, was not

surgically repaired until August 2005 and that part of the delay was caused by U.C. Davis

Medical Center’s rescheduling the surgery. In Log No. 04-1329, the inmate complained that his

finger, broken in April 2004, was not healing properly; the first level response to the appeal noted

that the inmate had seen an orthopedist in July 2004 and the “results are pending.” In Log No.

05-00900, the inmate complained he was denied surgery even though Dr. Allen had told him

hand surgery was necessary; the second level response notes the request would be resubmitted to

the Medical Authorization Review Committee. In Log No. 05-804, the inmate sought treatment

for a swollen, deformed thumb; the second level reviewer referred the matter to the Chief

Medical Officer of SVSP, where the inmate had been transferred. In Log No. 05-1713, the

inmate contended he was being given the run around when he asked to see a doctor for follow-up

care and surgery for a broken wrist; at the first level, the reviewer granted the grievance because

the inmate had been scheduled to see a doctor.10

 Defendant Kernan disavows knowledge of a policy directing medical staff to not

request surgery for small bone breaks: “Defendant is unaware of any policy regarding how to

treat certain injuries or illnesses. Defendant is informed and believes that treating physicians and

medical staff would determine the most appropriate course of treatment for any particular

injury.” DMSJ, Ex. B No. 7. 

Defendant Kanan does not address any policy and does not recall whether she

acted as chair of the Health Care Review Committee from April until December 2004 or whether

she delegated this duty to someone else. DMSJ, Ex. C No. 2. 

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III. Analysis

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Supreme Court held that

inadequate medical care did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under

section 1983 unless the mistreatment rose to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.”

In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of

two parts. First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by

demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant's

response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This second

prong-defendant's response to the need was deliberately

indifferent-is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to

respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm

caused by the indifference. Indifference may appear when prison

officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison

physicians provide medical care.

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations & quotations omitted); see

also McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir.1992), overruled in part on other grounds,

WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). 

There is no Eighth Amendment violation if any delay in treatment is not harmful. 

Shapely v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Com’rs., 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). However,

unnecessary continuation of pain may constitute the “harm” necessary to establish an Eighth

Amendment violation from delay in providing medical care. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. 

A supervisor may be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation if he or she was

made aware of the problem and failed to act or if he or she promulgated or enforced a policy

under which unconstitutional practices occurred. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d at 1098; Black v.

Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). 

Defendants appear to concede that plaintiff’s broken finger and the resulting pain

were serious medical needs. They argue, however, that they were neither involved in his care,

nor did they promulgate or enforce an unconstitutional policy. 

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Defendant Kernan is entitled to summary judgment. Although plaintiff avers he

addressed a grievance directly to the warden’s office, he does not rebut defendant Kernan’s

assertion that he was not aware of plaintiff’s medical problems and would not have become

aware of them because his secretary would have routed any medical care grievance to other

officials. Moreover, plaintiff has presented nothing suggesting that defendant Kernan otherwise

became aware of plaintiff’s particular problem or of a policy regarding surgery for small bone

breaks. 

However, neither plaintiff nor defendants Woodford and Kanan are entitled to

summary judgment. Plaintiff swears he notified defendant Woodford of his problems in securing

treatment for his injury; she has presented nothing but argument suggesting she did not receive

the letters. As the Ninth Circuit has instructed, plaintiff “is entitled to an inference at the

summary judgment stage” that defendant Woodford received the letter he swore he sent to her. 

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d at 1098. Nevertheless, plaintiff has not presented enough evidence to

support his claim for summary judgment against defendant Woodford, for he does not clearly

identify what information he provided to defendant Woodford that would establish as a matter of

law that her failure to act constituted deliberate indifference. Indeed, in one portion of one of his

declarations, he suggests he sent her copies of his grievances, while in another, he suggests that

these documents were in fact sent to the Inmate Appeals Branch of CDC. Valley Decl. I. 

Plaintiff has presented evidence that the Medical Health Care Review Committee

had implemented an informal policy to discourage prison doctors from seeking surgical repair for

small bone breaks, a policy that led to pain and deformity for plaintiff and other inmates at CSPSac. A reasonable jury could find that defendant Kanan, the chair of the committee, was aware

of any such policy, a finding that precludes summary judgment in her favor. However, because

plaintiff has not at this point linked defendant Kanan directly to the policy, he is not entitled to

summary judgment on the issue. 

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Defendants Woodford and Kanan also argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity. 

Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a particular

sequence of questions to be considered in determining whether qualified immunity exists. The

court must consider this threshold question: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional

right?" Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated if the facts were as alleged, the inquiry

ends and defendants prevail. Id. The court has found that taken in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, the evidence of defendant Woodford’s awareness of plaintiff’s medical problems and

defendant Kanan’s involvement in the policy of denying or delaying treatment for small bone

breaks constitutes deliberate indifference. 

If, however, 

a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties'

submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right

was clearly established.... “The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right.”... The relevant, dispositive

inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.

Id. at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The reasonableness of

a defendant’s conduct is judged “against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.”

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). The defendant should not be subject to liability

if the law at that time did not clearly establish that the defendant’s actions would violate the

Constitution. Id. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “the qualified immunity inquiry must

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be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case.” Id. The court must determine whether

the contours of the right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he was doing violated that right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. “Sufficient clarity” for the

purposes of the qualified immunity inquiry does not require precedent directly on point; it is

sufficient if “unlawfulness is apparent in light of preexisting law. . . .” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263

F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001).

Estelle established the general proposition that prison officials may not act with

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,” 429 U.S. at 106, and noted specifically that

deliberate indifference might be shown by officials’ intentionally “delaying access to medical

care.” Id. at 104-05. In the Ninth Circuit, as well, the law was clear that a harmful delay in the

provision of medical care could constitute deliberate indifference. Hutchinson v. United States,

833 F.2d. 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). In 2004, a reasonable prison official would have understood

that instituting a policy that could delay medical treatment for serious medical needs would be

unlawful. 

Similarly, at the time of plaintiff’s attempts to secure surgery for his broken

finger, the law was clear that a prison official who failed to act despite an awareness that inaction

carried a risk of harm to the inmate violated the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A reasonable prison official would have understood that ignoring an

inmate’s complaints of pain, deformity and delayed medical treament would be unlawful. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied;

2. Defendant Woodford and Kanan’s motion for summary judgment be denied;

3. Defendant Kernan’s motion for summary judgment be granted; and

4. Dates for the submission of pretrial statements, pretrial conference and trial be

set if the district court adopts these findings and recommendations. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 13, 2008.

2/vall0310.157

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