Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00782/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00782-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

KIMBERLY COHELEY, )

)

Claimant, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 4:15-cv-782-CLS

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner, Social Security )

Administration, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claimant Kimberly Coheley commenced this action on May 8, 2015, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the

Commissioner, affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and

thereby denying her claim for a period of disability, disability insurance, and

supplemental security income benefits.

1 The case currently is before the court on

claimant’s motion to deem a prior claim as having been reopened for review by the

ALJ.

2 Upon consideration of the motion, the Commissioner’s response,3

and

claimant’s reply,

4

 the court concludes the motion is due to be granted. 

1

 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint). 

2

 Doc. no. 15. 

3

 Doc. no. 17. 

4

 Doc. no. 18. 

FILED

 2016 Mar-07 AM 09:34

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 1 of 9
Claimantfiled her previous claimfor a period of disability, disabilityinsurance,

and supplemental security income benefits on May 25, 2007, and alleged disability

as of May 24, 2007. Her claim was denied at the administrative level, and, after

conducting a hearing, an ALJ upheld the denial decision on July 29, 2009. The

Appeals Council denied claimant’srequestsfor review on April 25, 2011 and July 29,

2013.

5 Claimant subsequently filed an action for judicial review in this court, and

was assignedCase No. 2:13-cv-1810-VEH. JudgeVirginiaEmerson Hopkins entered

a memorandum opinion and order on December 1, 2014, affirming the

Commissioner’s decision that claimant was not disabled.

6 Claimant appealed Judge

Hopkins’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, but the appeal was

dismissed on July 28, 2015, for failure to prosecute.7

Claimant filed her current applications for benefits on October 5, 2010,

alleging disability as of July 25, 2009.

8 Those applications initially were denied at

5

 Tr. 18. 

6

See doc. no. 14 (Memorandum Opinion) and doc. no. 15 (Order) in Civil Action No. 2:13-

cv-1810-VEH. 

7

See Order of Dismissal entered on July 28, 2015, in Case No. 15-10383-D in the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals. 

8 Tr. 119, 123. The ALJ’s administrative opinion states that claimant’s applications for

benefits were filed on September 21, 2010. Tr. 18. But the application forms themselves clearly

state that they were filed on October 5, 2010. Tr. 119, 123. Moreover, it appears undisputed that

claimant intended to time her second application for benefits to take effect the day after the first

ALJ’s denial decision on July 29, 2009, but apparently a typographical or clerical error resulted in

the Commissioner listing her alleged onset date for her second application as July 25, 2009. 

2

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 2 of 9
the administrative level on January 6, 2011,9

and claimant appealed to an ALJ. 

During the August 30, 2013 administrative hearing, the following exchange occurred

between the ALJ and claimant’s counsel concerning the admission of additional

medical records:

ALJ: I’llstate for the record that I have reviewed these additional

records, and we’ll be sure that they go into the record as exhibits. I

believe that most, if not all of them, are also exhibits in the earlier case

that was decided by Judge Stephens, that was upheld by the Appeals

Council in July of this year.

Ms. Allenstein [claimant’s attorney], do you have any objection

to all of that entire case file being consolidated with this case file?

ATTY: No objection, Your Honor.

ALJ: All right. We’ll do that to give a longitudinal picture then.

(The exhibits previously identified were received into evidence

and made a part of the record.)10

The ALJ entered a decision denying plaintiff’s claims for benefits on

September 27, 2013.

11

In the hearing decision, the ALJ discussed three mental health

evaluations that had already been considered in connection with claimant’s previous

claim. First:

On March 5, 2008, David R. Wilson, PhD., consultatively

9

 Tr. 69-79.

10

 Tr. 43 (alteration and emphasis supplied). 

11

 Tr. 15-32. 

3

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 3 of 9
examined the claimant at the request of her attorney. Dr. Wilson opined

that the claimantsuffered frombipolar disorder and migraine headaches. 

He also assigned the claimant a global assessment of functioning of 48. 

Dr. Wilson opined that the claimant’s level of disturbance was “so

severe that it is highly unlikely that she will be able to maintain

employment . . . .[”]

On June 10, 2009, Dr. Wilson again evaluated the claimant at the

request of her attorney. He incorporated his previous examination into

this report by using italicized type for ease of differentiation. Dr.

Wilson noted the claimant’s report of not being on any medication for

her bipolar disorder as it made her zombie.[sic] She reported that she

now had ups and downs and some difficulty with focus, but that she felt

fine. She reported reading, using the computer, and cross-stitching. The

claimantreported that her counselor atCED [Cherokee-Etowah-DeKalb

Mental Health Center] did not take the time to talk with her. The

claimant reported being in a relationship, her daughter was doing great,

and then stated that she had “lost her life.” The claimant denied any

recent use of alcohol or illegal drugs. Dr. Wilson noted the claimant to

be alert and oriented with appropriate appearance. She had intact

thought processes, but talked continually such that he had to interrupt

her. She had poor judgment and insight. The claimant reported that she

liked to watch television and sit “on the front porch listening to kids and

critters and talking to mama and daddy and checking my email on the

computer.” She stated that she still attended church and expressed a

desire to attend the upcoming Bible school. The claimant had a good

fund of general information and good mental recall. She could perform

simple math and more complex calculation with intelligence estimated

to be within the low average range. She had a mild problem with shorttermmemory. Upon testing with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality

Inventory II (MMPI), the claimant had somatic complaints and concerns

as well as depression, variable moods, became anxious and obsessed a

lot, and became manic. Dr. Wilson again opined that the claimant had

difficulties due to bipolar disorder due to not getting the treatment and

medication needed such that she would have difficulty maintaining

employment. He again assigned a global assessment of functioning of

4

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 4 of 9
48 . . . .

12

Additionally:

On August 5, 2011, Dr. Grant complete[d] a medical source

statement wherein he checked boxes that indicated the claimant had

extreme limitation in her ability to understand and remember complex

instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods;

and complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions

from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent

pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. He

indicated that claimant had extreme limitation in her ability to get along

with co-workers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral

extremes. He indicated the claimant had marked limitation in her ability

to respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors, or work in close

proximity to others without being distracted by them. The claimant had

marked difficulty in her ability to understand and remember simple

instructions as well asthe ability to perform activities within a schedule,

maintain regular attendance, or be punctual within customarytolerances. 

Dr. Grant indicated that the claimant had moderate limitation in her

ability to remember work-like procedures, carry out short, simple

instructions, make simple work-related decisions, and sustain an

ordinary routine without special supervision. He opined the claimant

had only mild limitation in her ability to interact appropriately with the

general public, ask simple questions, request assistance, or to maintain

socially appropriate behavior, be aware of normal hazards, take

precautionsfor hazards, and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and

cleanliness . . . .

13

The ALJ ultimately decided to afford Dr. Wilson’s opinions only little weight,

stating:

12

 Tr. 25-26 (alterations supplied, citations to the record omitted). 

13 Tr. 27 (alteration supplied, citations to the record omitted). Dr. Grant’s assessment was

rendered after the first ALJ’s decision, but it was submitted to the Appeals Council in support of

claimant’s request for review of that decision.

5

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 5 of 9
As stated in the previous decision, while Dr. Wilson did actually

examine the claimant, there is no evidence that he had access to the

claimant’s entire medical record. His opinions appeared to be based

solely on two examinations and the claimant’s self-report. Dr. Wilson

opined that the claimant’s “level of disturbance wasso severe that it was

unlikely thatshe would be able to maintain employment.” This opinion

is simply not consistent with the medical record as a whole. 

Additionally, two years after these opinions were rendered (in May

2011), the claimant spent time as a volunteer at a warehouse helping

storm victims while making presentations to CED where she received

global assessments of functioning with consistentsteady increases over

a six-month period from March through August 2011. Therefore, little

weight is given to his assessments.

14

 

He afforded no weight to Dr. Grant’s assessment, reasoning: 

The claimant presented to CED on March 11, 2011; May 10, 2011; July

22, 2011; and August 3, 2011. During those visits, the claimant’s global

assessment of functioning increased from 59 to 60 to 62. The claimant

was observed to be stable and to have level, appropriate mood . . . . 

Such reports are simply inconsistent with the medical source statement

of August 5, 2011, that showed marked and extreme limitations. The

statement is inconsistent with [Dr. Grant’s] own treating records.

15

Claimant never requested the ALJ or the Appeals Council to reopen her

previous claim. Even so, she assertsthat the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Wilson’s and

Dr. Grant’s opinions in the present case amounted to a de facto reopening of the

previous claim. Asthe Eleventh Circuit held in Sherrod v. Chater, 74 F.3d 243 (11th

Cir. 1996):

14

 Tr. 29 (emphasis supplied). 

15

 Tr. 29 (record citations omitted). 

6

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 6 of 9
The district court’sjurisdiction in this case islimited by the Social

Security Act, and judicial review only exists over “final decisions of the

[Commissioner].” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). As a general matter, district

courts do not have jurisdiction over the [Commissioner]’s refusal to

reopen a claim since such a refusal is not a “final decision” within the

meaning of section 405(g). Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-08, 97

S. Ct. 980, 985-86, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977); Stone v. Heckler, 778 F.2d

645, 646-47 (11th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, subject matter jurisdiction

will exist in those cases where “a social security claim is in fact

reopened and reconsidered on the merits to any extent on the

administrative level.” Macon v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11thCir.

1991); see also Passopulos v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 642, 645-46 (11th Cir.

1992). 

Sherrod, 74 F.3d at 245 (alteration and all emphasis supplied). 

It cannot be denied that the ALJ in the present matter reconsidered the merits

of claimant’s prior claim to some extent. The ALJ specifically discussed medical

evidence that had been submitted in support of the prior claim, and he made a finding

that he agreed with the manner in which the previous ALJ treated that evidence. The

Commissioner assertsthat the “ALJ’s consideration of [Dr. Wilson’s and Dr. Grant’s]

opinions did not amount to a reconsideration of the prior decision on the merits, given

his stated purpose for consolidating the older evidence from the prior claim with the

current case file.”16 The Commissioner also points out that the current ALJ “did not

disturb” the previous ALJ’sfindings about the doctors’ opinions.

17 Those two points

16 Doc. no. 17 (Commissioner’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Prior Claim

Reopened), at 4 (alteration supplied). 

17

Id. 

7

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 7 of 9
are not relevant, however, because the case law does not carve out any exception for

situations in which an ALJ reviews evidence from a prior decision to obtain context

— that is, “to give a longitudinal picture” of the claimant’s condition over time —

or when he agrees with the previous ALJ’s findings. Instead, the only exception is

when the ALJreviewsthe prior opinion in order to determine whether the new claims

are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233,

1237 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he Secretary must be allowed to evaluate newly proffered

evidence to determine whether to reopen the case. . . . If the Secretary merely

considers newly proffered evidencewithout reconsidering the merits of the previously

denied application, then he has not reopened that application. . . .) (alteration

supplied, citations omitted). 

By reviewing the merits of claimant’s prior claim, the ALJ de facto reopened

that claim. Accordingly, claimant’s motion to deem her prior claim as reopened is

GRANTED. That does not mean, however, that every aspect of the prior claim will

be reviewed. As the Eleventh Circuit held in Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1079

(11th Cir. 1996):

When we determine that an ALJ has reopened a prior decision, we have

jurisdiction to review the prior decision to the extent that it has been

reopened. See Robertson v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 1992)

(per curiam). On review, our task is to determine if the Secretary’s

denial of disability is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §

8

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 8 of 9
405(g) (Supp. 1995). We have the “power to enter, upon the pleadings

and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing.” Id. If we determine that the errors in a prior

decision would entitle the claimant to benefits that he has been denied,

then we should remand the case for a reexamination of the prior closed

application. See Jelinek v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 507, 509-11 (8th Cir.

1985).

Thus, the court will consider claimant’s prior claims to be reopened, but only for

purposes of reconsidering the opinions of Drs. Wilson and Grant. 

The court recognizes that the parties may wish to submit additional briefs to

addresses issues from the reopened prior claim.

18 Claimant must file any such brief

on or before March 21, 2016. The Commissioner may file a response brief on or

before April 4, 2016. 

DONE this 7th day of March, 2016.

______________________________

United States District Judge

18 The parties already have submitted briefs on the issue of claimant’s disability. See doc.

no. 10 (claimant’s brief); doc. no. 13 (Commissioner’s brief); doc. no. 15 (claimant’s reply brief). 

9

Case 4:15-cv-00782-CLS Document 19 Filed 03/07/16 Page 9 of 9