Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05346/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05346-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 17, 2002 Decided March 8, 2002

No. 00-5346

Daniel J. Levitan and

Vincent L. Leonardo,

Appellants

v.

John D. Ashcroft,

Attorney General, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv00017)

Michael J. Golden, appointed by the court, argued the

cause as amicus curiae on the side of appellants. With him

on the briefs was Richard P. Bress.

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G. Michael Harvey, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Roscoe C. Howard Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig

Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney. David T. Smorodin, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Circuit Judge: Appellants are federal prisoners

who are practicing Catholic Christians. They challenge a

prison rule preventing them from consuming small amounts

of wine as part of the Catholic sacrament known as Communion. In the past, prison officials have allowed inmates to

consume wine under supervision during Communion. Under

the new rule, however, only the supervising chaplain is permitted to consume the wine. Appellants claim that this

prohibition violates their constitutional rights under the free

exercise clause of the First Amendment.

A prison regulation that impinges on inmates' constitutional

rights is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987);

O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). In this

case, the District Court granted summary judgment for the

prison officials on the ground that consuming wine during

Communion is not an essential aspect of appellants' religious

practice, one "which the believer may not violate at peril of

his soul." Levitan v. Reno, Civ. Action No. 99-0017, Mem.

Op. at 8 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2000) ("Mem. Op.") (quoting Ward v.

Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993)), reprinted in Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") 22. In reaching this result, the District

Court erred in holding that, to qualify for protection under

the First Amendment, a religious practice must be mandated

by the prisoners' religion. This holding finds no support in

our case law. The District Court also failed to perform the

balancing analysis required by Turner and O'Lone.

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We therefore reverse and remand the case to the District

Court for further proceedings.

I. Background

Appellants are incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in

Pensacola, Florida ("the prison"). They are self-described

Catholic Christians who were baptized as children. See Decl.

of Daniel J. Levitan ("Levitan Decl.") p 1, reprinted in J.A.

69; Decl. of Vincent Leonardo ("Leonardo Decl.") p 1, reprinted in J.A. 75. As part of their religion, they practice the

Eucharist sacrament, which is also called Holy Communion.

Levitan Decl. p 7, reprinted in J.A. 70; Leonardo Decl. p 4,

reprinted in J.A. 76. Communion is traditionally administered by a priest. After the priest consecrates bread and

wine (sometimes called "species" or "forms"), appellants believe that the bread transforms into the body of Jesus Christ,

their Messiah and Lord, and that the wine transforms into his

blood. This transformation is called transubstantiation. Am.

Compl. for Declaratory J. and Temporary and Permanent

Injunctive Relief ("Am. Compl.") p 28, reprinted in J.A. 31.

According to appellants' long-standing practice, after the

consecration, the priest, as well as the congregants, consume

the transubstantiated bread and wine. Levitan Decl. p 7,

reprinted in J.A. 70; Leonardo Decl. p 4, reprinted in J.A.

76; Am. Compl. p 28, reprinted in J.A. 31. The priest can

present the wine using several methods, including the chalice

(congregants sip directly from a cup the priest holds), the

spoon (congregants use a spoon to sip from a cup the priest

holds), the straw (congregants sip through a straw from a cup

the priest holds), and intinction (congregants dip the transubstantiated bread into the wine and then eat the bread). See

Br. of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Appellants ("Br. of

Appellants") at 5 n.7. In their complaint, appellants stated

their belief that it was "the command of the Lord Jesus

Christ to consume both bread and wine" during the Eucharist

sacrament. Am. Compl. p 33, reprinted in J.A. 32. They

further stated that the liturgical life of their church "revolves

around" the Eucharist ritual. Id. p 31.

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Federal law has long prohibited prisoners from consuming

alcohol. See 18 U.S.C. s 1791 (2000) (setting forth punishments for possessing contraband, including alcohol, in prison);

28 C.F.R. s 541.13 (2000) (making possession and use of

alcohol in federal prisons sanctionable). Until recently, however, prison officials have permitted the chaplain to administer small amounts of wine to Catholic inmates during Communion, through intinction, with precautions. Levitan Decl.

pp 3-4, reprinted in J.A. 69-70; Leonardo Decl. p 3, reprinted

in J.A. 75-76; Am. Compl. p 3, reprinted in J.A. 24. In 1997,

however, the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of

Prisons ("BOP") issued Program Statement Number 5360.07,

relating to "Religious Beliefs and Practices." BOP Program

Statement No. 5360.07 (Aug. 25, 1997), reprinted in J.A. 44.

Paragraph 19 deals with sacramental wine. It provides in

relevant part:

Sacramental wine is necessary for the worship of some

faith groups, i.e., the requirements of the ritual cannot be

satisfied without the use of wine. In those cases only,

the staff or contract chaplain may consume small

amounts of wine for performance of the ritual.

Id. p 19, reprinted in J.A. 45. There is no provision in the

rule allowing prisoners to consume wine under any circumstances. Since the policy was implemented in mid-1998,

appellants have been prevented from consuming wine during

Communion. Instead, the prison chaplain consumes the wine

himself, while the inmates consume only the bread. Levitan

Decl.pp 4-6, reprinted in J.A. 70; Leonardo Decl. p 3, reprinted in J.A. 76.

Appellant Daniel Levitan, acting pro se, brought suit

against the Attorney General and the Director of the BOP

(collectively, "the Government"), alleging that the Program

Statement violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights.

He subsequently amended his complaint to add additional

plaintiffs, all of whom were then inmates at the prison.

Appellants did not allege violations of the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act (RFRA) as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. s 2000bb-1

et seq. (1994 & Supp. 2001). They have indicated, however,

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that they will seek to amend their complaint to add allegations under RFRA if the case is remanded. Br. of Appellants

at 19 n.14.

Appellees moved for summary judgment before the District

Court. In support of their motion, appellees submitted the

declaration of Susan VanBaalen, a Catholic nun with degrees

in divinity and theology, who was employed by the BOP.

Decl. of Susan VanBaalen ("VanBaalen Decl."), reprinted in

J.A. 50-52. In her declaration, Sister VanBaalen contended

that the Catholic religion does not require congregants to

consume the wine during Communion. Rather, Sister VanBaalen asserted that those who receive Communion under the

form of bread alone "are not deprived of any grace necessary

for salvation," id. p 3, reprinted in J.A. 51, and that consuming the bread alone is rooted in a long tradition that the

Church recognizes as one of the ways in which Communion

may be received, id. p 5. Sister VanBaalen also stated that

Communion "has a more complete form as a sign when it is

received under the forms of both bread and wine." Id. p 4.

Appellees also obtained a letter to the same effect from the

Roman Catholic Bishop of the Diocese in which the prison is

located. Letter from Most Reverend John H. Ricard, S.S.J.

to Sister Susan VanBaalen (Aug. 3, 1999), reprinted in J.A.

60-61. The Bishop noted that a number of Catholic parishes

in his Diocese offer parishioners Communion without wine for

the congregants. Id.

The District Court granted appellees' motion for summary

judgment. See Levitan v. Reno, Civ. Action No. 99-0017

(Judgment) (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2000), reprinted in J.A. 14. In

its accompanying memorandum opinion, the District Court

acknowledged that "correctional institutions may be required

to accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of inmates," because prisoners retain the right to freedom of

religion. Mem. Op. at 5, reprinted in J.A. 19. The District

Court recited the established test that a prisoner's right to

observe his religion in prison may be circumscribed when the

infringement is reasonably related to a legitimate penological

interest. Id. (citing O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348). The court also

listed the factors used to determine the reasonableness of

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restrictions on prisoners' rights as set forth in Turner, 482

U.S. at 89-90. Id. It noted that the prison officials had not

provided any justification for the changed policy regarding

inmates' consumption of wine during Communion. Id. at 6,

reprinted in J.A. 20. The court declined, however, to apply

the Turner factors or to make the O'Lone determination.

The District Court instead determined, relying on Sister

VanBaalen's declaration, that appellants had not claimed that

they were deprived of "a vital part of their religion." Id. at 8,

reprinted in J.A. 22. The court distinguished between "a

religious practice which is a positive expression of belief and a

religious commandment which the believer may not violate at

peril of his soul." Id. (quoting Walsh, 1 F.3d at 878). The

court finally found that appellants had failed to show that the

BOP rule prevented them from participating in "an essential

aspect of their faiths' religious practice." Id. Appellants

appealed. A panel of this court appointed amicus curiae to

argue on appellants' behalf. See Levitan v. Ashcroft, No.

00-5346 (Order) (Apr. 13, 2001).

II. Discussion

We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment

de novo. Summers v. Dep't of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1078

(D.C. Cir. 1998). A court grants summary judgment only

when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and

... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must resolve doubts

and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the opposing

party. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811,

814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

A. The Constitutional Framework

It is well established that prisoners retain constitutional

rights in prison, including free exercise rights under the First

Amendment. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974);

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 (1972). The Supreme

Court has held that "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all

constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and

confinement in prison." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545

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(1979) (citations omitted). Yet, lawful incarceration "brings

about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations

underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.

266, 285 (1948).

In Turner, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for

adjudicating prisoners' constitutional claims. It held that

"when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional

rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests." 482 U.S. at 89. The Court

set forth four factors relevant to this determination. First,

there must be a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate interest put forth to justify it. Id.

Second, there must be a determination whether the prisoners

retain alternative means of exercising their asserted rights.

Id. at 90. Third, there must be an assessment of the impact

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have

on guards, other inmates, and prison resources. Id. Finally,

"the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation." Id. The Turner Court

applied these factors to uphold a regulation barring correspondence between inmates, while striking down a regulation

prohibiting inmate marriages. Id. at 91-99.

A week after deciding Turner, the Court decided O'Lone,

in which it applied Turner to prisoners' free exercise claims.

482 U.S. at 350-53. The Court conducted the requisite factintensive analysis and concluded that a prison rule preventing

prisoners from attending a Muslim prayer service when they

were working outside was adequately supported by specific

concerns of prison administration. Id. In reaching this

result, the Court in O'Lone did not doubt that the disputed

rule impinged on the prisoners' constitutional rights. Id. at

349-52. Rather, the Court held that "the regulations alleged

to infringe constitutional rights were reasonably related to

legitimate penological objectives." Id. at 353.

In this case, the parties agree that the free exercise rights

of prisoners are governed by the Supreme Court's analysis in

Turner and O'Lone. In particular, the Government does not

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argue that the Supreme Court's holding in Employment

Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494

U.S. 872 (1990), alters the Turner and O'Lone analysis in

cases concerning infringements on prisoners' constitutional

rights to practice their religions. In Smith, the Supreme

Court held that the free exercise clause did not exempt

religious individuals from complying with valid, neutral laws

of general applicability, even if those laws arguably impinged

on their religious practices. 494 U.S. at 878-79. Many courts

have grappled with the question of how the Court's decision

in Smith interacts with the prisoner-specific test set forth in

Turner and O'Lone. One possibility is that Smith supplanted

the Turner analysis, because Smith can be read to say that

religious inmates should never be entitled to exemptions from

generally applicable, religion-neutral prison regulations. Another possibility is that Smith simply has no application in the

unique and highly regulated prison context, so Turner and

O'Lone continue to govern. A third possibility is that both

Smith and O'Lone/Turner are applicable, but at different

stages of analysis. Under this view, Smith is relevant in

determining the scope of a person's free exercise right in the

first instance, while Turner and O'Lone are employed in

determining how that right may be circumscribed in the

specialized prison context. Thus, a prisoner asserting a right

to smoke marijuana for religious purposes in prison would

never reach the Turner analysis, because he would lack a

First Amendment right under Smith to smoke marijuana in

the first instance, whether in prison or elsewhere.

Most Courts of Appeals have taken the second approach,

simply continuing to apply Turner and O'Lone in analyzing

prisoners' constitutional rights. See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 956-58 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying Turner

factors to prisoner's free exercise claim); Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481-87 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Turner to

a prison grooming regulation and declining to apply Smith);

Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486, 489-91 (5th Cir. 2000)

(applying Turner and O'Lone to prisoner's free exercise

claim); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51-60 (3d Cir. 2000) (en

banc) (applying Turner factors to prisoner's religious right to

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have special diet in prison); Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244,

1247-49 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying Turner and O'Lone

and noting that because the government had not argued that

Smith required a different standard, the court would not

decide the issue); Walsh, 1 F.3d at 876-77 (declining to

depart from Turner and distinguishing Smith); Salaam v.

Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that

Smith does not affect the Turner/O'Lone analysis); see also

Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting

in dicta that Smith was not a prison case and it "did not

purport to overrule or limit Turner and O'Lone; and the

Supreme Court has instructed us to leave the overruling of its

decisions to it"). But see Hines v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 148

F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding a prison grooming regulation under both Smith and O'Lone).

In this case, the Government does not contend that Smith

alters the Turner/O'Lone analysis of prisoners' free exercise

claims. Accordingly, we will apply the Turner/O'Lone legal

framework to appellants' claims.

B. Impingement is Not Determined by Whether the Religious Practice is "Mandatory"

The District Court correctly identified O'Lone and Turner

as the framework for analyzing rules that impinged on prisoners' constitutional rights. It found, however, that the BOP

rule did not impinge on appellants' constitutional rights in the

first place, because it did not prohibit them from participating

in a mandatory religious practice. Or, as the District Court

put it, appellants' constitutional rights were not infringed

because a Catholic is not required to take wine at Communion

"at peril of his soul." The District Court erred in this

holding.

A requirement that a religious practice be mandatory to

warrant First Amendment protection finds no support in the

cases of the Supreme Court or of this court. Insofar as

appellees suggest that this court articulated such a requirement in Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, reh'g denied, 265

F.3d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed sub nom.

Henderson v. Stanton, 70 U.S.L.W. 3445 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2002)

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(No. 01-978), they misread that case. In Henderson we held

that a rule banning the sale of t-shirts on the National Mall

did not substantially burden the religious practices of evangelical Christians who believed that they were obliged to

preach the gospel by all available means. Henderson, 253

F.3d at 16; see also Henderson, 265 F.3d at 1074 (denying

petition for rehearing). We noted that the plaintiffs in

Henderson could not claim that the regulation "forces them to

engage in conduct that their religion forbids or that it prevents them from engaging in conduct their religion requires."

Henderson, 253 F.3d at 16. Henderson does not suggest,

however, that the plaintiffs had to make such a showing in

order to demonstrate an impingement on their religious exercise.

The fact that a regulation affects a mandatory religious

practice is, obviously, relevant evidence of an infringement on

the free exercise of religion. But that is far from the only

circumstance in which a rule impinges on free exercise. In

Henderson, we mentioned "required" religious conduct in the

context of a list of many scenarios that might have suggested

that the ban on t-shirts substantially burdened the plaintiffs'

religious freedom. Id. at 16-17. We noted that the plaintiffs

had not attempted to sell t-shirts everywhere people congregate; that the regulation did not constrain conduct that

manifested some central tenet of their beliefs; and that the

plaintiffs had not treated selling t-shirts on the Mall as rising

to a high level of significance in their religion. Id. In short,

the court did not hold that, in order to demonstrate that a

Government rule impinges on the free exercise of religion, a

plaintiff must first show that the rule is directed at a practice

deemed by the religion's believers to be "mandatory." This is

not the law.

Nor would such a requirement make sense. Under the

District Court's formulation, religions that lack the concepts

of commandments necessary for the salvation of the soul

would find themselves outside the scope of First Amendment

protection altogether. Nothing in the free exercise clause

suggests that it only protects religions that incorporate mandatory tenets.

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Many cherished religious practices are performed devoutly

by adherents who nonetheless do not or cannot insist that

those practices are mandated. Neither the Supreme Court

nor this court has ever adopted a rule limiting protection to

practices that are compelled by a litigant's religion. We

decline to adopt such a rule today.

C. The Impingement Threshold

The fact that the First Amendment does not protect only

compelled religious conduct does not mean that the Constitution forbids all constraints on religiously motivated conduct,

however trivial. Instead, the First Amendment is implicated

when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to

inconsequential, burden on the litigant's religious practice.

Our cases make clear that this threshold showing must be

made before the First Amendment is implicated. See Branch

Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(holding that, to sustain its claim under either the Constitution or RFRA, a plaintiff must first establish that its free

exercise right has been substantially burdened). This requirement accords with the Supreme Court's discussion in

O'Lone, which assumed the importance of the relevant ritual

to the prisoners. See 482 U.S. at 351.

In determining whether a litigant has met the threshold

requirement, a court must consider several factors. The

litigant's beliefs must be sincere and the practices at issue

must be of a religious nature. See Church of the Lukumi

Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).

The challenged rule must also burden a central tenet or

important practice of the litigant's religion.

We are mindful of the Supreme Court's warning that

judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin

to "the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.' " Smith, 494 U.S. at 887

(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982)

(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Univ. of

Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same).

Nonetheless, it is sometimes the case that litigants can make

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no credible showing that the affected practice is either central

or important in their religious scheme. See Henderson, 253

F.3d at 17. In such cases, the de minimis burden imposed

by the challenged law is not constitutionally cognizable. Id.

In other cases, in which the practice at issue is indisputably

an important component of the litigants' religious scheme, see,

e.g., City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531 (noting that petitioners'

assertion that animal sacrifice was an integral part of their

religion was neither bizarre nor incredible), such evidence

may be relevant to overcome any claim that the impact of the

challenged law is de minimis. Moreover, a rule that bans a

practice that is not "central" to an adherent's religious practice might nonetheless impose a substantial burden, if the

practice is important and based on a sincere religious belief.

A court may also consider whether the litigants' beliefs find

any support in the religion to which they subscribe, or

whether the litigants are merely relying on a self-serving

view of religious practice. This inquiry is not a matter of

deciding whether appellants' beliefs accord in every particular

with the religious orthodoxy of their church. See Smith, 494

U.S. at 887 (holding that courts should not question the

"validity of particular litigants' interpretations" of their

creeds) (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699

(1989)). Nor is it a matter of adjudicating intrafaith differences in practice or belief. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the

Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (holding

that "it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or [another member of

his faith] more correctly perceived the commands of their

common faith," because "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural

interpretation"). Instead, a court may determine whether

the litigants' views have any basis whatsoever in the creed or

community on which they purport to rest their claim. For

example, a Catholic litigant who asserted that it was part of

his religion to wear sunglasses would be making a claim "so

bizarre ... as not to be entitled to protection" under the

First Amendment. Id. at 715. The litigant's assertion of a

view so totally foreign to the creed with which he claimed to

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affiliate might well lead the court to question his sincerity. It

is therefore unlikely that a litigant challenging a rule limiting

his right to wear sunglasses could satisfy the threshold

requirement.

In the instant case, the District Court apparently assumed

that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the threshold test, because

the religious practice at issue was not mandatory. As noted

above, the trial court's ruling on this point was in error.

Therefore, on remand, the District Court must first determine whether plaintiffs' claim passes the threshold test, and

then consider whether plaintiffs have met their burden under

the Turner/O'Lone test. We explain below.

D. What Must Be Done on Remand

We remand to the District Court to determine whether

appellants have met the threshold requirement of showing a

substantial burden on the free exercise of their religion. They

certainly have raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the question, rendering the District Court's grant of

summary judgment inappropriate. Appellees did not contest

that appellants' beliefs are both religious and sincerely held.

See Br. for Appellees at 7 n.7. The record also includes

evidence that the practice of taking wine with Communion is

important in terms of appellants' religious beliefs. For example, the record indicates that appellants have regularly attended Mass and taken wine at Communion throughout their

incarceration and for years prior to their incarceration. See

Levitan Decl.pp 3, 7, reprinted in J.A. 69-70; Leonardo Decl.

pp 3-4, reprinted in J.A. 75-76. This suggests that taking

wine with Communion is not an unimportant part of appellants' religious practice. In their complaint, appellants also

alleged that they believed it to be the command of the Lord

Jesus Christ to consume both bread and wine, because the

sign of Communion is more complete when given under both

species, although no similar statements appear in their declarations. Am. Compl. p 33, reprinted in J.A. 32.

The record further indicates that the practice of consuming

wine during Communion has a readily identifiable basis in the

practices of many Catholics and in church doctrine. Sister

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VanBaalen's declaration confirms that appellants' belief that

Communion is more complete as a sign when received under

both species has a basis in their creed. VanBaalen Decl. p 4,

reprinted in J.A. 51. The record additionally demonstrates

that taking wine with Communion is a practice that was

recognized in many of the religious settings in which appellants have practiced, including in their various places of

incarceration. Levitan Decl. p 3, reprinted in J.A. 69-70

(stating that appellant was given wine with Communion,

presumably by Catholic prison chaplains, at prisons in Petersburg, Virginia; Yazoo City, Mississippi; and Pensacola). In

short, the taking of wine with Communion cannot be viewed

as a trumped-up practice that appellants have conveniently

labeled "religious." The fact that some other Catholics only

consume the species of bread is not dispositive, nor are the

statements of clergy that the taking of wine by congregants is

not a mandatory element of the ritual.

While appellants have raised a genuine issue of fact regarding the threshold test, the exact nature of their belief in

wine's religious importance is not entirely clear. Some of the

most fervent statements of their beliefs appear in their

complaint but not in their respective declarations. Rather

than prejudge the issue, we remand so that the District Court

can make the required determination. And regardless of its

decision on the threshold inquiry, the District Court should

also conduct the appropriate balancing analysis under Turner

and O'Lone to determine whether the BOP regulation is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. If

there is any future appeal in this case, the appellate court

may benefit from findings by the District Court on both the

threshold issue and the Turner/O'Lone test.

The Turner and O'Lone inquiry should focus on whether

the change in regulatory regimes - from one in which Catholic inmates could consume wine through intinction to one in

which only the chaplain is permitted to consume wine - is

justified by a legitimate penological interest. In making this

assessment, the District Court must bear in mind that, under

the new rule, the prison still allows alcohol to be consumed on

the prison grounds and in prisoners' presence under the

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supervision of the chaplain. The narrow question will be

whether the ban on the chaplain's actually administering wine

to the inmates, as opposed to merely drinking it in their

presence, is justified.

While the four Turner factors are not a mandatory part of

the balancing test, the Supreme Court held them out as

relevant and useful. First, the District Court should determine whether there is a valid, rational connection between the

prohibition and any legitimate governmental interest put

forward to justify it. The relationship between the interest

and the rule must be rational, so that if the interest were the

prevention of drunkenness among inmates, the prison would

have to explain how that interest is implicated by the negligible amount of wine ingested through intinction. Under the

second Turner factor, the District Court should consider

whether the inmates have alternatives open to them. Third,

the District Court should consider the impact on the prison

and on other inmates of allowing the Catholic prisoners to

consume wine along with the chaplain during Communion.

Finally, the court should consider the availability of alternatives to the rule. Under this prong, the court should evaluate

any asserted problems with the previous policy of allowing

inmates to consume small amounts of wine during Communion. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91. Because appellees

submitted no evidence relevant to the Turner and O'Lone

analysis, the District Court should conduct further factfinding on this issue.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the

District Court and remand the case to the District Court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

USCA Case #00-5346 Document #663866 Filed: 03/08/2002 Page 15 of 15