Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02347/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02347-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN LINGAD, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:09-cv-02347-GEB-JFM

)

v. ) ORDER DECLINING TO EXERCISE

) SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK; MORTGAGEIT, ) OVER PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW

INC.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC ) CLAIMS

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; FRANK )

HOI CHEUNG WONG, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MortgageIT, Inc. (“MortgageIT”) has filed a dismissal motion

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in which it challenges 

the sufficiency of allegations in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, 

and a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike

certain portions of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. Plaintiff

filed a “Statement of Non-Opposition” in which Plaintiff states in

pertinent part:

Plaintiff’s original Complaint in this matter

contained a First Cause of Action under the Truth

in Lending Act, 15 U.s.C. § 1604 (“TILA”) and a

Fourth Cause of Action under the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2605

(“RESPA”). Plaintiff has subsequently filed his

First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 42) which

Case 2:09-cv-02347-GEB -JFM Document 55 Filed 04/13/10 Page 1 of 4
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removes these, and any other, federal causes of

action. Plaintiff hereby requests that all claims

against all Defendants herein be dismissed, without

prejudice, or, in the alternative, that Plaintiff

be granted leave to amend so as to clarify the

factual assertions regarding the roles, residence,

citizenship, and actions of the parties hereto, and

otherwise correct such deficiencies as are

addressed in the Defendants’ pending Motions

regarding Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

(Docket No. 42), herein. 

As the Court is aware, jurisdiction in this

matter was originally based upon “federal

questions” arising from Plaintiff’s Causes of

Action under TILA and RESPA. No issue has been

raised herein regarding diversity of the parties,

and Plaintiff asserts that no basis for “diversity”

jurisdiction exists in this cause. Accordingly, if

the TILA and RESPA claims are dismissed, or removed

through amendment, there is no proper basis for

federal jurisdiction over the remaining state law

issues. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests

that the Court dismiss all claims against all

Defendants herein, without prejudice, or, in the

alternative, grant the Plaintiff leave to amend his

Complaint as described above. 

(Pl.’s Statement of Non-Opposition 1:24-2:5.)

Since Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not contain 

a federal claim, the Court may decide, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3),

whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs.,

Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (suggesting

that district court may, but need not, sua sponte decide whether to

continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3) once all federal law claims have been dismissed). Under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] claim” if “the district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction

. . . .” The decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) should be informed by the values of economy,

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convenience, fairness and comity as delineated by the Supreme Court in

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1996). Acri,

114 F.3d at 1001. 

Since state courts have the primary responsibility for

developing and applying state law, the Gibbs values do not favor

retaining jurisdiction in this case. See Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001

(stating that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will point towards

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims” (quotations and citation omitted)); Curiel v. Barclays Capital

Real Estate Inc., No. S-09-3074 FCD/KJM, 2010 WL 729499, at *1 (E.D.

Cal. Mar. 2, 2010) (stating “primary responsibility for developing and

applying state law rests with the state courts” and declining to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of the federal

claims); Anderson v. Countrywide Fin., No. 2:08-cv-01220-GEB-GGH, 2009

WL 3368444, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009) (finding that “the Gibbs

values do not favor continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction”

once all federal claims have been resolved). Therefore, the Court

declines to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the

state law claims alleged in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and

they are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

Accordingly, this case shall be closed.

Dated: April 12, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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