Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00220/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BA

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ECMC,

Appellant,

v.

ALEXANDRA ELIZABETH 

ACOSTA-CONNIFF,

Appellee.

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CASE NO. 2:15-CV-220-WKW

 [WO]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The bankruptcy court determined that repayment of Appellee Alexandra 

Elizabeth Acosta-Conniff’s (“Conniff”) student loan debt would result in undue 

hardship under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), and it discharged the $112,00 debt. Appellant 

ECMC appeals the bankruptcy court’s decision. It asserts that the bankruptcy court 

erred in finding that Conniff satisfied the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part test governing 

the determination of undue hardship. See Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In re 

Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that the three-part 

test established in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 

F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam), “is the appropriate test for determining 

‘undue hardship’”). Ultimately this appeal resolves on a single element of that test: 

Conniff has failed to prove that “‘additional circumstances exist indicating that [her] 

state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of 

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the student loans,’” as required under Brunner’s second element. Id. at 1241

(quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). Accordingly, the decision of the bankruptcy 

court is due to be reversed with instructions for the bankruptcy court to enter 

judgment in favor of ECMC.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has jurisdiction to review the Order of the bankruptcy court under 

28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), which provides district courts with jurisdiction over appeals 

“from final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges entered in cases 

and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title.” 

Venue is proper because an appeal “shall be taken only to the district court for the 

judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.” Id. § 158(a).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Conniff filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on June 13, 2012. (Doc. # 1-3, 

at 1.) On January 31, 2013, the court granted a discharge in her bankruptcy case 

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727. She filed an adversary proceeding on March 21, 2013, 

seeking the discharge of her student loan debt owed to ECMC, a specialized student 

loan guarantor under the Federal Family Education Loan Program. (Doc. # 1-3, at 1–

2.) The bankruptcy court held a bench trial on January 26, 2015, and issued a written 

opinion on April 8, 2015. It determined that excepting Conniff’s student loan debt

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from discharge would cause her undue hardship; therefore, the bankruptcy court 

discharged her debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). (Doc. # 1-3, at 1, 14.) 

B. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision1

The following facts include those found by the bankruptcy court expressly in 

its oral and written pronouncements and implicitly through its adoption of Ms. 

Conniff’s trial testimony. (See Doc. # 2-11, at 77 (The bankruptcy court’s oral 

pronouncement at trial that Conniff has been “forthright and credible” and that it 

“accepts her testimony”); Doc. # 1-3, at 4 (The bankruptcy court’s written decision 

that “Conniff’s testimony was forthright and credible”).) ECMC, for the most part, 

has not challenged the bankruptcy court’s findings of facts, but instead argues that 

the findings of fact do not support the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law. 

At the time of trial, Conniff was a forty-four-year-old single mother of two 

healthy sons, who were fourteen and sixteen years old. (Doc. 1-3, at 2; Doc. # 2-11, 

at 13, 33.) The bankruptcy court found that Conniff owes ECMC approximately 

$112,000 as a result of educational loans. (Doc. # 1-3, at 2.) These loans have 

enabled Conniff to earn four degrees from Auburn University: (1) a bachelor of 

science in chemistry in 1993; (2) a master’s degree in learning disabilities in 1997;

																																																												 1 The appeal record has been supplemented with ECMC’s trial exhibits. (See Docs. # 19–

20.) 

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(3) a master’s degree in educational leadership in 2007; and (4) a Ph.D. in special 

education in 2007. (Doc. # 2-11, at 12, 40–41.) 

Conniff has been a teacher since 1997. Presently, she is a full-time public 

school teacher in Eufaula, Alabama. Having worked for the Eufaula City Board of 

Education since 2003, Ms. Conniff has earned tenure. For the majority of her career, 

Ms. Conniff has been a special education teacher; however, her health problems, 

which she describes as adult-onset Type II diabetes and morbid obesity, recently 

prompted her to seek a lateral transfer from a special education teacher to a secondary 

science teacher, where the work is less physical. (Doc. # 2-11, at 9, 12–13, 19.) 

Conniff’s educational degrees place her at “the top of the pay scale” for her 

position within her school district. (Doc. # 2-11, at 19.) Conniff is unsatisfied with 

her job to the extent that she says it “does not pay that well” even with the advanced 

educational degrees. (Doc. # 2-11, at 19.) She does not expect to receive significant 

pay increases in the future; however, she earns annual salary increases when 

approved by the State of Alabama and also is eligible for step increases in pay every 

three years. (Doc. # 2-11, at 26, 34–35.) 

Conniff reported her monthly income and expenses on Schedules I and J, and 

the bankruptcy court relied principally upon those schedules, as supplemented by the 

trial evidence, to determine Conniff’s disposable income. Conniff earns a monthly 

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net salary of approximately $2,9502 and receives approximately $500 a month in 

child support. Additionally, on a monthly basis, she incurs around $3,487 in 

expenses. Conniff’s Schedules I and J reveal a monthly shortfall of $33.3 (Doc. # 1-

3, at 11 n.5.) The bankruptcy court determined that Conniff’s monthly payment on 

her $112,000 debt to ECMC would be $915 for fifteen years.

4

 (Doc. # 1-3, at 2.) 

After earning her Ph.D. in 2007, Conniff has applied in her school district for 

higher-paying positions, most recently in 2012, but so far without success. These 

positions include assistant principal, principal, special education coordinator, federal 

programs coordinator, and superintendent. (Doc. # 2-11, at 18–19, 40.) Conniff has 

not applied for jobs outside of her school system. She maintains that she could lose 

her seniority and tenure if she obtained employment in another school district. 

Conniff also has support from family and friends in Eufaula and, for that additional 

reason, does not feel it is in her best financial interest to leave the area. (Doc. # 2-

11, at 18–19; Doc. # 1-3, at 3.)

																																																												 2 The bankruptcy court rounded down Conniff’s monthly take-home pay from $2,954 to

$2,950. By the time of trial, Conniff had received a bump in her salary based upon across-theboard annual raises, and her monthly gross earnings were $4,950 per month, or $59,400 per year. 

(Doc. # 2-11, at 26.)

3

 The bankruptcy court’s opinion contains a typographical error in note 5. In her Schedule 

I, Conniff reported her monthly income as $3,454, not $3,487.

4 The bankruptcy court calculated the monthly payment based on a fifteen-year term at an 

interest rate of 5.5%. The parties accept that calculation on appeal, and, thus, the court does the 

same.

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Conniff has been able to earn additional income through extra jobs, including

providing language translations for the board of education and working as an adjunct 

professor in Montgomery, Alabama. She testified, however, that she incurs

additional costs for “gas, childcare, and eating out” and that these additional costs

are often more than the additional income earned. (Doc. # 2-11, at 16.)

Conniff has paid more than $9,000 toward her loans, but the loans have been 

in a deferral status for several years. (Doc. # 1-3, at 3–4.) There is no evidence that 

she has applied for the Income-Contingent Repayment Plan (“ICRP”), 34 C.F.R. 

§ 685.209, which lowers a debtor’s payment in response to hardship based upon a 

specified formula.

After setting forth its factual findings, the bankruptcy court turned to the 

governing law. It recognized that the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Second 

Circuit’s three-part test in Brunner for determinations of undue hardship under 

§ 523(a)(8). (Doc. # 1-3, at 8–9.) Under the Brunner test, in order to show undue 

hardship, a debtor must establish:

“(1) that [he or she] cannot maintain, based on current income and 

expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents 

if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist 

indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant 

portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the 

debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.”

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In re Cox, 338 F.3d at 1241 (quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). Applying Brunner’s 

three elements to its findings of fact, the bankruptcy court determined that repayment 

of the student loan debt would cause Conniff “undue hardship” under § 523(a)(8). 

First, it concluded that “the information contained on Schedules I and J and 

the evidence offered at trial” demonstrate that “it is readily apparent that Conniff 

could not make that [$915] payment and support herself and her children with a 

minimal standard of living.” (Doc. # 1-3, at 2–3.) The bankruptcy court did not 

indicate whether it had determined that all of the Schedule J expenses were 

reasonable and necessary for the support of Conniff and her two dependent sons. 

The record is mostly silent as to this fact-bound undertaking. The bankruptcy court 

did observe, however, that Conniff “could eliminate the voluntary pension 

contribution” of $220 per month and “perhaps squeeze a couple of hundred more out 

of her budget.” (Doc. # 1-3, at 11.) It also noted that “one may quibble about 

expenses such as cable television” (Doc. # 1-2, at 12), but it did not make a finding 

whether this expense, which is listed on Conniff’s Schedule J, was reasonable or not. 

The bankruptcy court also acknowledged ECMC’s trial testimony that Conniff 

is eligible for the ICRP, and that, under the ICRP, her monthly payment would be 

$346 for 120 months, at which point the remainder of the loans would be forgiven. 

(Doc. # 1-3, at 12.) However, the bankruptcy court used $915 as the benchmark for 

assessing whether Conniff met Brunner’s first element (Doc. # 1-3, at 2) and 

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concluded that “[t]he availability of an [ICRP] does not preclude the possibility of a 

discharge where, as here, the undue hardship requirement is met” (Doc. # 1-3, at 12). 

See also Doc. # 1-3, at 11 (opining that, even if “Conniff could eliminate the 

voluntary pension contribution and perhaps squeeze a couple of hundred more out 

of her budget,” she still would be “considerably short of meeting a required payment 

of $915 per month”).)5 

Second, at trial, the bankruptcy court orally pronounced that Conniff had 

satisfied the second Brunner element because the “State of Alabama does not pay its 

teachers very well” and does not “pay much premium for the additional degrees.” 

(Doc. # 2-11, at 78.) It noted that any significant raise in teachers’ pay in Alabama 

was unlikely for the near future. In its written opinion, the bankruptcy court observed 

that, “[b]ased upon Conniff’s testimony and the Court’s general knowledge of 

teachers’ level of pay (derived from thousands of bankruptcy cases per year filed in 

this Court by debtors—some of which are filed by teachers), . . . Conniff’s pay is not 

likely to significantly increase in the near future.” (Doc. # 1-3, at 3.) It concluded 

that, based upon “the evidence offered at trial,” including Conniff’s testimony, “there 

																																																												 5 Conniff also testified that she applied three times with a different loan forgiveness 

program that would have absolved $17,500 of her debt for each five-year consecutive period that 

she taught special education in a rural area. She said, however, that her application was denied 

each time because she had consolidated an eligible loan with an ineligible loan. (Doc. # 2-11, 

at 42.) She did not provide any evidence of these applications or denials. (Doc. # 2-11, at 45.) 

Whether she would have been eligible if she had modified her application is unanswered on the 

bankruptcy court’s record.

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was nothing in [Conniff’s] circumstances which [was] likely to change in the future” 

(Doc. # 1-3, at 11), and that “much of the [future] savings from the emancipation of 

her children” would likely be offset by the cessation of child support payments (Doc. 

# 1-3, at 13).

Third, the bankruptcy court found that Conniff acted in good faith to repay her 

student loan debt. It concluded that Conniff demonstrated good faith based upon the 

“actual payments” she made “over a period of years” and her efforts in applying for 

partial loan forgiveness under the program for teachers who taught in a rural area for 

five consecutive years, see supra note 5. (Doc. # 1-3, at 13.) 

Based upon its conclusion that Conniff had demonstrated each of the three 

Brunner elements, the bankruptcy court discharged Conniff’s debt. ECMC appeals.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The determination of whether the repayment of student loans imposes an 

“undue hardship” is a mixed question of fact and law. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. 

Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007). The bankruptcy 

court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. The district court must 

“independently examine the law and draw its own conclusions after applying the law 

to the facts” and then “may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s 

judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for further proceedings.” Ky. 

Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Norris (In re Norris), 239 B.R. 247, 249 (M.D. 

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Ala. 1999) (quoting Prestwood v. United States (In re Prestwood), 185 B.R. 358, 

360 (M.D. Ala. 1995), and Fed. R. Bank. P. 8013 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The factual findings of the bankruptcy court are reviewed for clear error. In re 

Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1324. A finding of fact “is clearly erroneous when, although 

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. 

City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citation, internal quotation 

marks, and alterations omitted). When considering a bankruptcy appeal, the district 

court is not “authorized to make independent factual findings; that is the function of 

the bankruptcy court.” Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Sublett (In re Sublett), 895 

F.2d 1381, 1384 (11th Cir. 1990). “If the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are 

silent or ambiguous as to an outcome determinative factual question, the district 

court must remand the case to the bankruptcy court for the necessary factual 

determination.” Id. (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Pursuant to § 523(a)(8), student loans presumptively are nondischargeable in 

bankruptcy. In re Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1324. There is a narrow exception when 

failing to discharge the student loans in bankruptcy would “impose an undue 

hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” § 523(a)(8); (see also Doc. 

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# 1-3, at 6 (explaining that “[t]his undue hardship provision is actually an exception 

to an exception”).) Congress enacted § 523(a)(8) amid reports that students were 

abusing the fresh start policy of the bankruptcy code by filing for bankruptcy and 

then seeking discharge of their student loans after graduation. Educ. Credit Mgmt. 

Corp. v. McLeroy (In re McLeroy), 250 B.R. 873, 878 (N.D. Tex. 2000). Congress 

added subsection 8 “in order to protect the United States Treasury, as well as to 

protect the solvency of the guaranteed student loan program.” Id.; see also In re 

Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he debate in the main focused on 

the twin goals of rescuing the student loan program from fiscal doom and preventing 

abuse of the bankruptcy process by undeserving debtors.”).

Amendments to § 523(a)(8) over the years increasingly have limited debtors’ 

abilities to discharge student loans and have clarified “that Congress intended to 

make it difficult for debtors to obtain a discharge of their student loan indebtedness.” 

In re Cox, 338 F.3d at 1243; see also Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (noting “clear 

congressional intent . . . to make the discharge of student loans more difficult than 

that of other nonexcepted debt”).

While § 523(a)(8) does not define “undue hardship,” the Eleventh Circuit has 

adopted the three-part Brunner test as the standard for such a determination.6 In re

Cox, 338 F.3d at 1241. The debtor has the burden to show all three parts by a 

																																																												 6 The Brunner elements are set out supra in Part II.B.

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preponderance of the evidence. See In re Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1324; see also 

Brightful v. Penn. Higher. Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 

327–28 (3d Cir. 2001) (“If one of the elements of the [Brunner] test is not proven, . . . 

the student loans cannot be discharged.”).

Adopting the Brunner test, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the test “is an 

effective tool in analyzing” undue hardship, which it defined as “not the mere 

inability to pay, but an inability to pay that is likely to continue for a significant 

time.” In re Cox, 338 F.3d at 1242. It disagreed with the contention that the test 

produces “harsh and sometimes absurd results,” noting that

[t]he government is not twisting the arms of potential students. The 

decision of whether to borrow for a college education lies with the 

individual; absent an expression to the contrary, the government does 

not guarantee the student’s future financial success. If the leveraged 

investment of an education does not generate the return the borrower 

anticipated, the student, not the taxpayers, must accept the 

consequences of the decision to borrow.

Id. (quoting In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993)).

The Third Circuit has opined that the Brunner test is to be “strictly construed: 

equitable concerns or other extraneous factors not contemplated by the test may not 

be imported” into the undue hardship analysis. In re Brightful, 267 F.3d at 328. And 

the Eleventh Circuit has echoed that “there is no evidence of an intent to permit 

judicially created exceptions to § 523(a)(8) via the ‘fresh start’ principle.” In re Cox, 

338 F.3d at 1243.

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ECMC disputes the finding of undue hardship. ECMC asserts that the 

bankruptcy court erred in finding that Conniff had met each of the three elements of 

the Brunner test and consequently erred in its ultimate conclusion of undue hardship. 

(Doc. # 11, at 2.) For the reasons that follow, Conniff fails to sustain her burden 

under the second element of the Brunner test and is not entitled to a discharge of her 

student-loan debt. It is unnecessary, therefore, to address the first and third 

elements.7 Before discussing Brunner’s second prong, the court will comment on

ECMC’s general argument that the bankruptcy court misapplied the Brunner 

standard by giving undue weight to the discharge policies that preceded the 1998 

amendments to § 523(a)(8).

B. History of Student Loan Dischargeability

The bankruptcy court relayed the history of the dischargeability of student 

loans beginning with the first exception to the discharge of such debts in 1977. (Doc. 

# 1-3, at 6–7.) It highlighted that Brunner and other similar landmark cases preceded 

the 1998 amendments by which Congress eliminated time-based restrictions for 

																																																												 7 Because this appeal resolves on the Brunner’s second element, it is unnecessary to 

determine (1) whether under Brunner’s first element a remand would be required for further factual 

findings on the reasonableness and necessity of Conniff’s expenses and for consideration of 

Conniff’s eligibility for the ICRP, see Wieckiewicz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 443 F. App’x 

449, 451 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Wieckiewicz’s eligibility under the [ICRP] would play a substantial 

role in whether he would be able to show undue hardship under Brunner.”) or (2) whether under 

Brunner’s third element, Conniff has met her burden of proof to demonstrate good-faith efforts to 

repay the loans.

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dischargeability and opined that “[a] denial of discharge of a student loan then was 

not a life sentence of nondischargeability, as it is now.” (Doc. # 1-3, at 8.) It 

concluded its historical analysis by determining that 

what one may consider to be an undue hardship where a debtor is 

required to pay a debt of a few thousand dollars, which may ultimately 

be discharged in five or seven years, may be quite different than what 

one may consider to be an undue hardship of a debt in the amount of 

$100,000 or more, which will not discharge for the life of the debtor.

(Doc. # 1-3, at 8; see also Doc. # 2-11, at 77 (observing that the elimination of the 

statutory time-based restrictions for dischargeability is a “significant factor . . . to be 

considered”).)

The bankruptcy court identified the Brunner test as the governing standard in 

the Eleventh Circuit. (Doc. # 1-3, at 9.) It is not entirely clear, though, whether the 

bankruptcy court’s ultimate conclusion of undue hardship credited Congress’s 1998 

tightening of the reigns on the dischargeability of student-loan debts or whether the 

conclusion sought to provide an equitable escape from a perceived “life sentence” of 

debt. (Doc. # 1-3, at 8.) As noted in In re Cox, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the 

argument that Brunner’s test rendered unduly severe results in light of the subsequent 

1998 amendments to § 523(a)(8). It recognized that “Congress’s intent to make it 

harder for a student to shift his debt responsibility onto the taxpayer is clear from the 

1998 amendments.” 338 F.3d at 1242. 

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Review of the bankruptcy court’s analysis of Brunner’s second element will 

be conducted without taking into account equitable considerations.

C. Additional Circumstances

The second element of the Brunner test requires that additional circumstances 

exist such that the debtor’s present inability to repay the student loan and maintain a 

minimal standard of living “‘is likely to persist for a significant portion of the 

repayment period of the student loans.’” In re Cox, 338 F.3d at 1241 (quoting 

Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). “Requiring evidence not only of current inability to pay 

but also of additional, exceptional circumstances, strongly suggestive of continuing 

inability to repay over an extended period of time, more reliably guarantees that the 

hardship presented is ‘undue.’” Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. Hence, the second factor 

“clearly reflects the congressional imperative that the debtor’s hardship must be 

more than the normal hardship that accompanies any bankruptcy.” Educ. Credit 

Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 401 (4th Cir. 2005).

As one bankruptcy court in this circuit has commented, “The Eleventh Circuit 

has not provided clear guidance on applying [Brunner’s] prong two other than to 

embrace the ‘certainty of hopelessness’ standard.” Williams v. Am. Educ. Serv. (In 

re Williams), 492 B.R. 79, 87 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2013) (quoting In re Mosley, 494 

F.3d at 1326). In Mosley, the Eleventh Circuit cited approvingly the Third Circuit’s 

portrayal of the second Brunner element as requiring the debtor to show that “there 

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is a ‘certainty of hopelessness’ that [he or she] will be able to repay the loans within 

the repayment period.” In re Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1326 (quoting In re Brightful, 267 

F.3d at 328). Other circuits also have addressed Brunner’s second prong. 

In Brightful, the Third Circuit opined that the debtor “must prove ‘a total 

incapacity . . . in the future to pay [her] debts for reasons not within [her] control,’”

and it emphasized that the second Brunner element is “a demanding requirement.” 

267 F.3d at 328 (quoting Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re 

Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 307 (3d Cir. 1995)). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, while not

foreclosing the possibility that there could be circumstances within the debtor’s 

control that qualify as additional circumstances, explained that “the debtor cannot 

purposely choose to live a lifestyle that prevents her from repaying her student loans. 

Thus, the debtor cannot have a reasonable opportunity to improve her financial 

situation, yet choose not to do so.” Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re Nys), 446 

F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2006). But “[a]t the same time,” the debtor is not at fault 

“for having made reasonable choices that now inhibit her ability to substantially 

increase her income in the future.”8 Id.

																																																												 8 Some courts also have interpreted Brunner’s second element to include only a 

circumstance that affects the debtor’s future earning potential that “was either not present when 

the debtor applied for the loans or has since been exacerbated.” Douglas v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. 

Corp., (In re Douglas), 366 B.R. 241, 257 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) (citation, internal quotation 

marks, and emphasis omitted). ECMC advocates this position; however, on this record, it is 

unnecessary for purposes of this appeal to determine whether the additional circumstances must

post-date the student loans to qualify under Brunner. 

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Against the foregoing backdrop of legal principles, ECMC argues that Conniff 

has not presented additional circumstances that render it virtually hopeless that she

will be able to repay her loans within the repayment period. (Doc. # 11, at 29–32.) 

The court agrees that Conniff has not satisfied her burden under Brunner’s second 

element.

The bankruptcy court’s written decision does not identify specifically any 

“additional circumstances” but concludes generally that, “[b]ased upon Conniff’s 

testimony, there is nothing in her circumstances which is likely to change in the 

future.” (Doc. # 1-3, at 13.) At trial, however, the bankruptcy court highlighted that, 

in Conniff’s present job as an Alabama public-school teacher, her salary is not likely 

to increase during a significant portion of the repayment period. (See, e.g., Doc. # 2-

11, at 78, in which the bankruptcy court observed that the “State of Alabama does 

not pay its teachers very well” and does not “pay much premium for the additional 

degrees” and took notice that “at least in the near future it’s unlikely that teachers’ 

pay is going to increase in the State of Alabama very much”). Conniff, echoing the 

bankruptcy court, contends that her salary cap in the Eufaula public-school system

is pivotal in the analysis of Brunner’s second element. More specifically, Conniff 

argues that she has shown additional circumstances because she has reached the peak 

of her pay in her present position, she is unlikely to find a higher-paying job in the 

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same geographical area, and her tenured status and family support make it financially 

impracticable for her to look for work outside her school district.

Even assuming as true a general premise that, in the State of Alabama, a 

public-school teacher with advanced degrees is undercompensated and lacks 

significant potential for pay increases, that premise is insufficient to sustain 

Conniff’s burden of proving the additional circumstances prong of the Brunner

“undue hardship” test for several reasons. Conniff’s student loans have financed her 

advanced degrees, which undisputedly have enabled her to earn more income than 

she could have earned without the degrees. Although she is not satisfied with the 

pay the advanced degrees ultimately have yielded, Conniff chose to earn four 

degrees, funded primarily by student loans, in her preferred career path of education 

with a general understanding of the benefits she would obtain from the degrees 

versus the costs. She admits specifically that she decided to obtain another student 

loan to earn her pinnacle Ph.D. in special education and agreed to repay it, knowing 

how the cost of the Ph.D. compared with the increase in pay it would provide. (Doc. 

# 2-11, at 31.) Conniff finds herself in circumstances largely of her own informed 

decision-making, which although not dispositive, is a consideration. See In re 

Brightful, 267 F.3d at 328. 

Other courts in persuasive opinions similarly have rejected arguments that 

additional circumstances exist when the debtor contends that he or she is trapped in 

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a career choice that lacks significant future earning potential. In Matthews-Hamad

v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Matthews-Hamad), 377 B.R. 415 

(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007), for instance, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor had 

not shown additional circumstances, even though her $30,445 salary was “at the top 

of her profession” and she was unlikely to find a higher-paying job in her field that 

offered the flexible schedule she needed to care for her disabled daughter. Id. at 422. 

It found that “the fact that a debtor has a low-paying job without much upside earning 

potential is not enough to satisfy th[e second] prong of the Brunner test.” Id. (citing, 

among other cases, Frushour, 433 F.3d at 401, for Frushour’s conclusion that, 

“‘[h]aving a low-paying job . . . does not in itself provide undue hardship’ where 

debtor was voluntarily employed in her preferred field as decorative painter”); see 

also U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 

2003) (stating that “nothing in the Bankruptcy Code suggests that a debtor may 

choose to work only in the field in which he was trained, obtain a low-paying job, 

and then claim it would be an undue hardship to repay his student loans”). 

Additionally, although the concerns Conniff raises about losing tenure and 

family support if she leaves the geographical area for a higher-paying job are 

understandable, her decision to stay in the area also is one she made of her own 

volition after measured deliberations. Again, as she testified, she incurred additional 

student loan debt to acquire a Ph.D., knowing the approximate salary increase she 

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would obtain with the advanced degree if she chose to remain in the same school 

district and knowing the indirect financial savings she would receive by leaning on 

friends and family in the area to assist with childcare and other expenses. Relatedly, 

to the extent that her decision to remain in the same school district is tied principally 

to the financial savings her family provides for the care of her dependent sons, 

Conniff has not shown that childcare expenses will persist for a significant portion 

of the fifteen-year repayment period, given that at the time of the adversary 

proceeding her sons were ages fourteen and sixteen.9 

The bankruptcy court found, though, that “much of the [future] savings from 

the emancipation of [Conniff’s] children” will be offset by the cessation of child 

support payments (Doc. # 1-3, at 13). This finding is clearly erroneous. Conniff 

provided limited evidence of how much she spends on her children per month. There 

is testimony, but little more than this, that Conniff pays $300 a month for lunches 

for her children and herself, $222 for family health insurance, a Verizon payment 

ranging from $134 to $278 that covers cell phone service and a data plan for three 

iPhones, and around $100 quarterly for life insurance policies on her sons. This 

evidence does not permit an informed weighing of Conniff’s future childcare savings 

against the $500 monthly child support payment she receives. Conniff’s failure to 

																																																												 9 It is notable also that Conniff has presented no reason that would preclude her healthy 

teenaged sons from helping relieve some of the financial strain, for example, by taking over the 

lawn chores.

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provide an adequate evidentiary record on this point required the bankruptcy court 

to have to speculate as to the amount of child-related costs she incurs and thus will 

eventually save. She has failed to present evidence to support a finding that, in the 

calculus of predicting future income, the termination of child support is “likely [to] 

offset[ ] much of the savings from the emancipation of her children.” (Doc. # 1-3, 

at 13); cf. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Carter, 279 B.R. 872, 874, 878 (M.D. Ga. 

2002) (no undue hardship where the debtor failed to show that her childcare costs 

were likely to remain the same in the future). 

Furthermore, Conniff’s future ability to earn extra income to repay her 

educational loans is not bleak. See In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 401 (“While [the 

debtor’s present financial condition is certainly not desirable, the second Brunner

factor is prospective in nature and looks for exceptional circumstances beyond the 

debtor’s current situation.”). Conniff has acknowledged that additional sources of 

income will be easier to pursue when her sons are emancipated. In particular, the 

unspecified costs for childcare and “eating out” that Conniff incurs for working extra 

jobs, which include providing translations for the board of education and working as 

an adjunct professor in Montgomery, will diminish as her teenaged sons age. (Doc. 

# 2-11, at 16); see In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 402 (Since the second Brunner element 

“looks to the future, it is not implausible to think that [the debtor’s] childcare costs 

will drop as her child progresses in school.”). Additionally, Conniff’s testimony 

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establishes that annual pay raises, even if in her opinion they are small, are not 

foreclosed and that she will receive step increases in pay every three years. Her 

testimony demonstrates also that there are higher-paying jobs available in school 

administration within her district for which her advanced degrees render her

qualified. (See Doc. # 2-11, at 40–41.) There is no evidence that she is precluded 

from applying again for future openings. These opportunities show a prospect for

increased income in the future. In re Mallinckrodt, 274 B.R. 560, 567–58 (S.D. Fla. 

2002) (finding that, under Brunner’s second element, the debtor “has the burden to 

prove that he cannot earn more money in the years to come,” id. at 567, and that the 

debtor had not demonstrated additional circumstances because he had future 

“opportunities to earn more income,” id. at 568).

Finally, a comparison of Conniff’s circumstances against those the debtor in 

Mosley faced further illustrates why Conniff has failed to show “a certainty of 

hopelessness that [she] will be able to repay the loans within the repayment period.” 

In re Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1326 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

Mosley debtor amassed $45,000 in student debt for college, but was unable to 

graduate or perform manual labor jobs after he suffered serious injuries in an 

accident. He later was committed to a mental health facility, diagnosed with 

depression and anxiety, and prescribed medications that rendered “him unable ‘to 

function.’” Id. at 1323. His circumstances worsened; he became homeless, had no 

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automobile, and survived on food stamps and disability benefits. The Eleventh 

Circuit held that “Mosley’s evidence of medical problems, lack of skills, and dire 

living conditions support[ed] the bankruptcy court’s finding that it is highly unlikely 

he will become able to repay his loans.” Id. at 1326–27.		

Conniff’s circumstances stand in stark contrast to the certain hopelessness the 

debtor in Mosley faced. Notwithstanding her medical conditions, Conniff has been 

able to maintain steady full-time employment, earning nearly $60,000 annually at 

the time of her adversary proceedings, and there is no indication that she will not 

retain her tenured job, with the potential for some salary raises, should she choose to 

remain in her school district.10 Moreover, unlike the debtor in Mosley, Conniff holds 

multiple marketable degrees. She graduated from college with a bachelor’s degree, 

holds two master’s degrees, and has earned her Ph.D. She has a roof over her head, 

an automobile, and food for the table. Her circumstances do not qualify as 

“additional” within the meaning of Brunner’s second element.11

																																																												 10 It is notable that, although not a dispositive factor, Conniff’s professional job earns her 

more than the median income in her area. FY 2015 HUD Income Limits show that the median 

income for a family of four in rural Alabama is $48,500. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. Office 

of Policy Dev. & Research, FY 2015 HUD Income Limits Briefing Material, 38 (Mar. 10, 2015), 

http://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/il15/index.html. The median income for a family of 

three in rural Alabama is $43,650. See id. at 9 (indicating that the percentage adjustment for a 

family of three is 90%).

11 Courts have found that debtors did not establish additional circumstances in situations 

more dire than the circumstances Conniff endures. These decisions show that courts give little 

weight to present hardships in assessing a debtor’s future prospects and ability to pay. See Spence 

v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Spence), 541 F.3d 538, 544 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding no 

additional circumstances despite debtor’s low-paying job and her diabetes and high blood pressure 

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V. CONCLUSION

Although Conniff admittedly finds herself in undesirable financial difficulties, 

she ultimately must bear the consequences of her decision to obtain loans in order to 

pursue her multiple educational goals. See In re Cox, 338 F.3d at 1242 (“If the 

leveraged investment of an education does not generate the return the borrower 

anticipated, the student, not the taxpayers, must accept the consequences of the 

																																																												

because the ailments did not affect her ability to work full-time and the low-paying job was the 

choice of the debtor, as she had a master’s degree and had completed Ph.D. course work, which 

would have allowed her to seek higher-paying employment); Tirch v. Penn. Higher Educ. 

Assistance Agency (In re Tirch), 409 F.3d 677, 681–82 (6th Cir. 2005) (determining that the debtor 

had failed to show how her condition prevented her from working and thus had failed to establish 

additional circumstances, even though she was not currently employed and testified that she did 

not know when or if she would be able to return to work); In re Brightful, 267 F.3d at 330 

(overturning bankruptcy court’s finding of additional circumstances based on emotional and 

psychiatric problems of the debtor because there was no indication of how these problems kept her 

from being “gainfully employed”; determining that because the debtor was “intelligent, physically 

healthy, currently employed, possess[ing] useful skills as a legal secretary, and [had] no 

extraordinary, non-discretionary expenses,” she failed to satisfy the burden of showing additional 

circumstances); Ng-A-Qui v. Coll. Assist (In re Ng-A-Qui), No. 14-1551, 2015 WL 5923363, at *8 

(9th Cir. B.A.P. 2015) (affirming bankruptcy court’s finding of no additional circumstances 

because, although the debtor was currently unemployed, she was “healthy, well-educated, and 

well-spoken”; the court also noted that the debtor had made only two attempts to secure 

employment since 2012); Trudel v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Trudel), 514 B.R. 219, 228 (6th Cir. 

B.A.P. 2014) (affirming bankruptcy court’s finding of no additional circumstances because the 

debtor failed to establish that her medical issues prevented her from improving her financial 

condition, even though her medical issues prevented her from working more than thirty-two hours 

a week); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Boykin (In re Boykin), 313 B.R. 516, 522–23 (M.D. Ga. 

2004) (rejecting bankruptcy court’s conclusion that additional circumstances existed where the 

debtors did not have a college degree or marketable skills above a minimum wage level, debtors 

had two young children, one debtor had back problems, and one debtor had dysgraphia; the district 

court did not find these circumstances to be “unique” or “extraordinary” but reversed the decision 

on other grounds); In re Mallinckrodt, 274 B.R. at 567–68 (reversing decision of the bankruptcy 

court that additional circumstances existed, because although the debtor had not been able to earn 

money in the past, he had potential sources of income and he had not proven “significant barriers” 

to such gainful employment).

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decision to borrow.”). She has failed to show that her purported “inability to pay [is] 

likely to continue for a significant time, such that there is a certainty of hopelessness 

that [she] will be able to repay the loans within the repayment period.” In re Mosley, 

494 F.3d at 1326 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the 

bankruptcy court erred in concluding that Conniff met her burden of establishing the 

second Brunner element; therefore, its ultimate conclusion that Conniff’s student 

loan debt was dischargeable under § 523(a)(8) must be reversed. 

It is ORDERED that the bankruptcy court’s March 25, 2015 judgment is 

REVERSED and that this action is REMANDED to the bankruptcy court for an entry 

of judgment in favor of Appellant ECMC.

A final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 2nd day of May, 2016. 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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