Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00574/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00574-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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The chambers copy of the Assignee’s reply was submitted in double-sided format. 

For future reference, the Assignee is directed to submit in single-sided format all chambers

copies of documents filed in the future. See Civil L.R. 3-4 (setting forth requirements for

“papers presented for filing”); Civil L.R. 3-4(c)(2) (providing “text must appear on one side

only”).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WINDMILL HEALTH PRODUCTS, LLC,,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SENSA PRODUCTS (ASSIGNMENT FOR

THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS), LLC

Defendant.

 /

No. C-15-0574 MMC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION FOR

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT;

VACATING HEARING

Before the Court is defendant Sensa Products (Assignment for the Benefit of

Creditors), LLC’s (“the Assignee”) “Motion to Strike and Motion for a More Definite

Statement,” filed March 18, 2015. Plaintiff Windmill Health Products, LLC (“Windmill”), has

filed opposition, to which the Assignee has replied.1

 Having read and considered the

papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems the matter

suitable for decision on the parties’ respective written submissions, VACATES the hearing

scheduled for June 12, 2015, and rules as follows.

//

Case 3:15-cv-00574-MMC Document 32 Filed 06/05/15 Page 1 of 3
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A. Motion to Strike

Windmill alleges that, under the terms of a settlement agreement between Windmill

and Sensa Products, LLC (“Sensa”), Sensa made the first and second, but not the third, of

twelve required installment payments. (See Compl. ¶¶ 8-11). Windmill also alleges that,

after Sensa failed to make the third payment, it “made a general assignment for the benefit

of creditors under California state law . . . to the Assignee” (see Compl. ¶ 12), and that the

Assignee subsequently demanded that Windmill return the first two payments (“the

Payments”) under the theory that said payments “were a preference pursuant to Section

1800(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure” (see Compl. ¶ 13). Windmill further

alleges it disputes that § 1800(b) applies to the Payments (see Compl. ¶ 14), and seeks a

declaration that it is “not obligated to return the Payments to Sensa” (see Compl. ¶ 16).

By the instant motion, the Assignee seeks an order striking from the complaint the

allegation that Sensa did not make the third payment owed under the terms of the

settlement agreement (see Compl. ¶ 14), on the asserted ground that said allegation is

“impertinent,” i.e., an allegation that “[does] not pertain, and [is] not necessary, to the

issues in question.” See Fantasy, Inc. v Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993),

rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

“[A]llegations supplying background or historical material or other matter of an

evidentiary nature will not be stricken unless unduly prejudicial to defendant.” LeDuc v.

Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Here, although

Windmill does not seek relief based on the alleged non-payment of the third installment

payment, the challenged allegation, as Windmill correctly observes, constitutes background

material. Further, the Assignee fails to show, let alone argue, the Assignee would be

prejudiced by the inclusion of such statement in the complaint. Rather, it argues the

challenged statement “is prejudicial because it paints Sensa . . . as a defaulting creditor

[sic].” (See Def.’s Reply at 11-12.) Assuming, arguendo, prejudice to Sensa rather than

the Assignee constitutes cognizable support for a motion to strike, the Assignee’s argument

here is unpersuasive, as the Assignee’s demand for a return of the Payments necessarily

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acknowledges Sensa’s inability to pay its debts. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

§ 1800(b) (providing assignee “may recover any transfer of property of the assignor . . . 

[m]ade while the assignor was insolvent”); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1800(a)(1) (defining

“insolvent” as “financial condition such that the sum of the person’s debts is greater than all

of the person’s property, at a fair valuation”).

According, the motion to strike will be denied.

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement

A party is entitled to a “more definite statement of a pleading” where the pleading “is

so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e).

Here, the prayer for relief seeks judgment in the form of a “declaration that Windmill

is not obligated to return the Payments to Sensa.” (See Compl., Prayer for Relief, at 2:27-

3:2.) The Assignee argues it is entitled to a more definite statement, for the asserted

reason that “Windmill’s claim does not tailor the scope of relief to any particular legal

theories, or statutes, or agreement.” (See Def.’s Mot. at 2:13-14.) The Court disagrees.

The text of the complaint sets forth the nature of the instant controversy, specifically,

a “dispute[ ]” as to whether “Section 1800(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure

applies to the Payments.” (See Compl. ¶ 14.) Reading the prayer in context, the Court

construes the complaint as seeking judgment in the form of a declaration that Windmill is

not obligated to return the Payments to the Assignee under § 1800(b).

Accordingly, the motion for a more definite statement will be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Assignee’s “Motion to Strike and Motion for a

More Definite Statement” is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2015 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-00574-MMC Document 32 Filed 06/05/15 Page 3 of 3