Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00876/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00876-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

GLORIA L. JOHNSON-ESTER as guardian ) 

and on behalf of MONTELL JOHNSON, a/k/a ) 

MARCELLUS BATES, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CASE NO.: 09-CV-5384 

 ) 

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor ) Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

of the State of California, MATTHEW CATE, ) 

Secretary of the California Department of ) 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, ROBIN ) 

DEZEMBER, Chief Deputy Secretary of Health ) 

Care Services for the California Department of ) 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, and UNKNOWN ) 

DEFENDANTS A, B, and C, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiffs Gloria L. Johnson-Ester and Montell Johnson seek to enjoin the return of 

Johnson, an inmate in the Illinois prison system, to the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Defendants Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of the State of 

California, and Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation,1

 have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, transfer [18] this § 1983 action to 

the district where Defendants reside, specifically, the Eastern District of California. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to transfer venue [18] and declines 

to address Defendants’ alternative motion to dismiss. 

 

1

 The motion to dismiss or to change venue is brought only by Defendants Schwarzenegger and Cate. 

Defendant Robin Dezember, Chief Services for the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, has not yet been served with the complaint. 

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I. Background 

A. Executive Agreement between Illinois and California 

In 1998, Montell Johnson was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in California and 

sentenced to life without parole. In December 1998, former-Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois and 

former-Governor Pete Wilson of California signed an Executive Agreement for the extradition of 

Johnson to the State of Illinois for prosecution of four counts of murder. The Executive 

Agreement specifically stated that Johnson would be “made available” to the State of California 

for placement within the CDCR upon the commutation of his Illinois death sentence. In 1999, 

Johnson was convicted of murder in Illinois and sentenced to death. This death sentence was 

commuted to forty years in 2003. While serving his Illinois sentence, Johnson was diagnosed 

with multiple sclerosis (“MS”). By April 2006, he had been diagnosed as a paraplegic with 

advanced secondary progressive MS, and former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich granted 

Johnson’s petition for medical clemency in 2008. Mr. Johnson currently remains in the custody 

of Illinois prison officials, but California prison officials seek transfer of Mr. Johnson to their 

custody under the Executive Agreement. 

B. 2007 Lawsuit between Plaintiffs and Illinois Prison Officials 

In July 2007, Plaintiffs in this action filed a separate lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, 

alleging that Johnson’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the correctional facility 

where he was housed failed to render adequate medical care and further alleging that Plaintiff 

Gloria Johnson-Ester’s First Amendment rights were violated when the warden at the same 

facility prevented Ms. Johnson-Ester from visiting and communicating with her son. The issues 

raised in that lawsuit are now pending before this Court on Defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment. Since both cases involve claims relating to the medical care of the same individual, 

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Montell Johnson, this 2009 case was reassigned from District Judge Charles Kocoras to this 

Court on October 14, 2009. 

This Court is familiar with the contentions of Plaintiffs in both actions concerning the 

proposed transfer of Mr. Johnson from Illinois to California prison officials. Johnson clearly has 

serious, well-documented health issues. In fact, on the suggestion and with the agreement of the 

parties, in the earlier filed case, the Court has appointed a medical expert (see Fed. R. Evid. 706) 

to examine Mr. Johnson and provide input into his fitness for such a transfer. In early March 

2010, the court-appointed medical expert, Dr. Demetrios Skias, examined Johnson to determine 

his fitness for a transfer to California. In a report provided to the Court on March 3 (and 

supplemented early in the following week), Dr. Skias opined as follows: 

In summary, Mr. Johnson is in an advanced stage of multiple sclerosis with many 

severe and fixed neurological deficits. At this stage, sudden change of the 

neurologic status from this disease is very unlikely to occur. Therefore, from the 

neurological point of view, and in my opinion, the patient can, with reasonable 

degree of safety, be transported to outside this State provided the appropriate 

ambulance transport and support is provided * * * * Additionally, the patient has 

to be cleared medically for travel by his current primary care physicians, or other 

internists, just prior to departure to ensure that there are no last minute medical 

complications, including infections, pulmonary and cardiovascular problems, or 

from any other body system, that could adversely, albeit temporarily, impact the 

neurologic status and possibly reduce the margin of safety during travel. 

Having advised the parties that Dr. Skias has rendered his opinion, the Court now turns to the 

question of whether this district is a proper venue for Plaintiffs’ lawsuit against the California 

state officials. 

II. Analysis 

A. Venue 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) allows for a motion to dismiss due to improper 

venue. See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. M/V Orsula, 354 F.3d 603, 606-07 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2003). The 

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district court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district 

or division in which it could have been brought,” any case filed in the wrong venue. 28 U.S.C. § 

1406(a). Venue statutes serve the purpose of “protecting a defendant from the inconvenience of 

having to defend an action in a trial court that is either remote from the defendant’s residence or 

from the place where the acts underlying the controversy occurred.” VE Holding Corp. v. 

Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing that venue is proper. Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 420 F.2d 1182, 1184 

(7th Cir. 1969). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of venue, the court should take all 

allegations in the complaint as true (unless contradicted by affidavit), draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of plaintiff, and may examine facts outside the complaint. See ISA Chicago 

Wholesale, Inc. v. Swisher Intern., Inc., 2009 WL 3152785, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2009) 

(citations omitted). 

Defendants contend that venue is not proper in the Northern District of Illinois, and that 

this case should be transferred to the Eastern District of California. In a federal question case, 

such as a controversy under § 1983, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides: 

A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship 

may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial 

district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) 

a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise 

to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the 

action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if 

there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(3). Under the first statutory basis for venue, the residence of these 

Defendants is where they perform their duties. Berry v. N.Y. Sate Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 808 F. 

Supp. 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“It is settled law that under § 1391 the ‘residence’ of public 

officers such as these defendants means his or her ‘official’ and not ‘actual’ residence”). 

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Defendant Schwarzenegger performs his official duties at the state capitol building in 

Sacramento, California, and Defendant Cate performs his official duties in the CDCR 

Headquarters building, also located in Sacramento. Pursuant to § 1391(b)(1), venue would be 

proper in the Eastern District of California because all Defendants are residents of that district. 

 Plaintiffs do not quibble with whether venue is proper in the Eastern District of 

California. Instead, Plaintiffs insist that venue also is proper in the Northern District of Illinois 

under § 1391(b)(2).2 Section 1391(b)(2) provides that venue is proper in a district where a 

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. The test is not 

whether a majority of the activities pertaining to the case were performed in a particular district, 

but whether a substantial portion of the activities giving rise to the claim occurred in the 

particular district. See Pfeiffer v. Insty Prints, 1993 WL 443403, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 1993). 

Generally, courts in this circuit, as well as sister circuits, focus on the activities of the defendant, 

not the plaintiff, in making venue decisions under § 1391(b)(2). See Woodke v. Dahm, 70 F.3d 

983, 985 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that courts should “focus on relevant activities of the defendant, 

not of the plaintiff,” in making venue decisions); Moran Industries, Inc. v. Higdon, 2008 WL 

4874114, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2008) (citing Woodke) (same); PKWare, Inc. v. Meade, 79 F. 

Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (“In determining where substantial parts of the underlying 

events occurred I focus on the activities of the defendant and not those of the plaintiff.”). While 

that concern is not explicitly stated in (b)(2), it comports with the general theory that “[v]enue 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 usually respects defendants’ interests.” Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal 

Workers’ Nat. Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 2000). The 

test for venue under § 1391 looks not to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, but rather to the 

 

2

 Since neither Schwarzenegger nor Cate reside in Illinois, § 1391(a)(1) does not provide for venue in 

Illinois. 

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location of the events giving rise to the cause of action. See Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. 

Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d. Cir. 1994). Even focusing on the relevant activities of the 

defendant, fairness still is insured by the requirement that the events in the district be 

“substantial.” 

Invoking § 1391(b)(2), Plaintiffs’ complaint states that venue is proper in this district 

because “Mr. Johnson is incarcerated in this District and some or all of Defendants’ actions 

relating to the rendition of Mr. Johnson have occurred within this District.” Plaintiffs point out 

that Johnson, who is the subject of the Executive Agreement that Defendants seek to enforce, 

currently is located in this District. Plaintiffs theorize that while Defendants may have decided, 

from their offices in Sacramento, that Johnson should be returned to California, Defendants’ 

efforts and activities directed toward that end have occurred in Illinois, in the form of 

communications directed to Illinois officials designed to facilitate the return of Johnson. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Johnson’s attorneys “have been told that it is California’s 

‘official position’ that Mr. Johnson be returned to California to serve his sentence there,” and 

that “[t]he CDCR and Governor Schwarzenegger’s office have communicated the same to the 

Illinois Department of Corrections.” Plaintiffs also allege that “[o]n August 5, counsel for the 

CDCR communicated to James Doran of the Illinois Attorney General’s Office that (1) the 

CDCR ‘is expecting’ Mr. Johnson’s rendition pursuant to the Executive Agreement, and (2) 

Defendant Dezember and/or unknown Defendants A, B or C refuse to provide a treatment plan 

for Mr. Johnson’s care.” Plaintiffs concede that under ordinary circumstances – for instance, if 

Johnson were in good health and if Plaintiffs did not have concerns about the provision of 

adequate health care in the California prison system – they would not be complaining about the 

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California officials’ decision to enforce the Executive Agreement. However, because these two 

factors arguably are present, Plaintiffs have challenged the extradition decisions of Defendants.3

 

While Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that at least some of the events giving rise to this 

lawsuit occurred in California, Plaintiffs contend that communications between California and 

Illinois officials are sufficient to establish venue under § 1391(b)(2). See, e.g., Chemical Waste 

Management, Inc. v. Sims, 870 F. Supp. 870, 875 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that the test is “not 

whether a majority of the activities pertaining to the case were performed in a particular district, 

but whether a substantial portion of the activities giving rise to the claim occurred in the 

particular district.”). However, the first paragraph of Plaintiffs’ complaint, as well as Plaintiffs’ 

clear purpose in bringing this lawsuit, undermines their assertion: 

This action for injunctive relief arises out of the efforts of the Defendants to 

enforce a 1998 Executive Agreement * * * between the Governors of the States of 

Illinois and California for what the Executive Agreement calls the “rendition of 

Marcellus Bates, a/k/a Montell Johnson,” to California. Mr. Johnson suffers from 

advanced multiple sclerosis and is completely bedridden and dependant on others 

for care. Defendants seek to place Mr. Johnson in the custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) without performing any 

review of this medical condition, making any provision for his medical care, or 

showing that, in spite of California’s unconstitutional inability to provide medical 

care to its prisoners, California has the means, the funds, the desire, the ability and 

the intention of actually caring for Mr. Johnson. 

Pls. Compl. 1. Based on Plaintiffs’ own allegations, the substantial events and issues giving rise 

to this lawsuit are not Defendants’ communications about California’s intention to seek the 

return of Johnson. While those communications may be contacts (minimal, at best) that the 

California Defendants have had with the State of Illinois, they are not “substantial” events 

pertaining to this lawsuit. See Cottman Transmission, 36 F.3d at 294. The substantial 

 

3

 Plaintiffs do not seek relief in this lawsuit for the commutation and clemency decisions that occurred in 

Illinois, which rendered Johnson available to the state of California under the Executive Agreement. Nor 

do they contest in this lawsuit the decision between the two states’ governors to enter into the Executive 

Agreement. 

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allegations in this lawsuit surround the capacity of a California prison to care for a person in 

Johnson’s state of chronically poor health. 

Stated another way, the communications between the California Defendants and the State 

of Illinois are not independently significant, but rather are incidental to the cause of action. In 

communicating with Illinois, Defendants were merely reporting ongoing decisions and activities 

of the California political and prison authorities, presumably as a courtesy to the Illinois officials 

who view themselves as contractually bound to honor the Executive Agreement. Compare 

Pfeiffer, 1993 WL 443403, at *3 (finding that facts alleged in complaint and documents 

submitted by plaintiff only supported that the phone calls and correspondence relied upon 

informed plaintiff about ongoing contractual activities in Milwaukee, and did not constitute the 

performance of those contractual obligations), with Master Tech Products, Inc. v. Smith, 181 F. 

Supp. 2d 910, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that making telephone calls and sending agreements 

were more than “part of the historical predicate” for the RICO claim; rather, they were the 

“essence of the claim and form[ed] a substantial part of the events giving rise to it”). In this 

case, as in both Pfeiffer and Master Tech, phone calls and written correspondence have been 

exchanged between the California Defendants and either Illinois officials or Plaintiffs’ 

representatives. However, as in Pfeiffer, the communications of which Plaintiffs provide 

evidence do not pertain directly to the conduct underlying this lawsuit; rather, the 

communications merely inform Plaintiffs of ongoing events, after the California Defendants 

made the decision that serves as the basis for this lawsuit and incidental to the condition of the 

California prison system. 

Parenthetically, it should be noted that as this case proceeds on the merits, the discovery 

will not be about these incidental communications between Illinois and California officials. 

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Rather, discovery will focus on the state of the California prison system, and, more specifically, 

the availability of sufficient health care in the prisons. While Johnson’s health clearly is relevant 

to the issues in this case (but for his health problems, Plaintiffs concede that they would not 

challenge his return to California), it is not the basis of this lawsuit. Moreover, Johnson’s health 

problems have been well-documented – including in Dr. Skias’ recent report – and those records 

easily can be brought to the attention of the court in the Eastern District of California. 

Conversely, evidence relating to the fitness of the California prison system and its 

capacity to care for an inmate with advanced MS is found entirely within the state of California. 

In fact, currently pending in the California federal courts is a class action concerning the 

provision of medical care for CDCR inmates. See Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-01-1351 

THE (N.D. Cal. April 5, 2001) (class action, now in the remedial phases of litigation, that 

encompasses “all prisoners in the custody of the CDC[R] with serious medical needs”). 

Defendants themselves certainly are key witnesses in this case, and they, as well as the prison 

officials and doctors who would be responsible for Johnson’s care, all reside in California. In 

addition, the documents pertaining to these individuals and to the resources available to the 

California prison system also would be in California, and some of the pertinent materials in fact 

may already have been produced in the Plata litigation. 

In sum, Plaintiffs’ complaint arises from the current state of the prison health care system 

in California and from decisions made in California by California state officials, such as seeking 

Johnson’s return to California to serve his California sentence for voluntary manslaughter and 

refusing to provide a health care plan for Johnson prior to receiving him. For these reasons, the 

substantial portion of the activities giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the Eastern 

District of California, and the communications identified by Plaintiffs between the California 

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Defendants and the State of Illinois are merely incidental to Plaintiffs’ cause of action and cannot 

serve as the basis for venue in this district. See Pfeiffer, 1993 WL 443403, at *3 (acts intended 

to inform plaintiffs about contractual activities, in contrast to acts constituting performance of the 

contract, do not ground venue); Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger, & Harrison, 

1994 WL 74860, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1994) (same). Accordingly, the Court, in the 

interests of justice and in lieu of dismissing this case without prejudice, will transfer this case to 

the Eastern District of California. Because the Court concludes that transfer is appropriate on § 

1406(a) grounds,4 the Court declines to address – and expresses no view on – Defendants’ 

arguments regarding dismissal. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to transfer [18] this 

case to the Eastern District of California. 

 

Dated: March 25, 2010 

 ____________________________________ 

 Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

 United States District Judge

 

4

 Because the Court determines that transfer to the Eastern District of California is appropriate under § 

1406(a), the Court need not address any alternative arguments for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). If 

the Court had found that venue is proper in this district under a § 1406 analysis, it would have addressed 

the question of whether the Eastern District of California nevertheless constitutes a superior forum for 

litigating this case under a § 1404 analysis. However, before undertaking a § 1404(a) analysis, the Court 

would have requested additional briefing from the parties, as the parties provided only general details 

about many of the § 1404 considerations. 

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