Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00574/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00574-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANTONIO D. DAVIS, #212703, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:07-CV-574-MEF

) [WO]

)

RICHARD ALLEN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by

Antonio D. Davis [“Daivs”], a state inmate, against Richard Allen, Commissioner of the

Alabama Department of Corrections, and Deborah Stutts, an officer employed by the

Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles. Davis complains the defendants denied him due

process in determining his classification level. Assupport for his complaint, Davis alleges

defendant Stutts placed false information in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report [“PSI

Report”] regarding the facts underlying a murder conviction imposed upon him by the

Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama on September 6, 2000. Specifically, Davis

asserts Stutts prepared the PSI Report which “contain[s] untrue and false statements ... that

Plaintiff struck the victim with the pistol prior to shooting him.” Plaintiff’s Complaint -

Court Doc. No. 1 at 8. Davis also complains defendant Allen should be held liable for the

decision of correctional classification personnel “to deny [Davis] eligibility for ...

Case 2:07-cv-00574-MEF-WC Document 25 Filed 08/27/09 Page 1 of 14
 Effective December 1, 2007, “[t]he language of Rule 56 [was] amended ... to make the rule[] more easily 1

understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes ... are stylistic only.”

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minimum custody or lower level placement of institution” based on the alleged false

information. Id. Davis seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary

damages from the defendants for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. 

The defendants filed special reports supported by relevant evidentiary materials

addressing Davis’ claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court

deems it appropriate to treat these reports as motions for summary judgment. Order of

October 16, 2007 - Court Doc. No. 15. Thus, this case is now pending on the defendants’

motions for summary judgment. Upon consideration of such motions, the evidentiary

materials filed in support thereof and Davis’ response in opposition to the motions, the

court concludes that the defendants’ motions for summary judgment are due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c)

(Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving 1

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance

remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

3

for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including

pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of

material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at

322-324. 

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine issue of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to his case exists.

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; th

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and

supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own

pleading; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for

trial.”). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces

evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor.

Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

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must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motions for

summary judgment, Davis is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which

would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e)(1), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ...

or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250.

“A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice;

there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory th

allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue

of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001); th

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory th

assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to

withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant th

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of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own

conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739

F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is th

not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth

specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at

trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest

Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case th

the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of

fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, th

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the th

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only th

factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

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the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the th

party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In

cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be

reduced to admissible form indicates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary

judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where

pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine

issue as to a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (to establish a genuine

issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable

trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

issue of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906

F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate th

this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In

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this case, Davis fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine issue of material fact in order to

preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, supra. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

With respect to any claims Davis lodges against defendants Allen and Stutts in their

official capacities, they are entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages. Official

capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, ... treated as a suit against the

entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official may not be sued

in his [or her] official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment

immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104

S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252

(1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of

Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not th

abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from

claims brought against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116

F.3d 1419, 1429 (11 Cir. 1997); Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11 Cir. 1984) th th

(The absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages extended in Spaulding v. Nielsen,

599 F.2d 728, 729 (5 Cir. 1979) “to a federal probation officer [for the preparation of and th

submission of a pre-sentence report in a criminal case is] equally applicable to a state

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probation officer.”). 

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the defendants are state actors entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages

from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Georgia

Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11 Cir. 1994). Thus, defendants th

Allen and Stutts are entitled to absolute immunity from those claims for monetary relief

presented against them in their official capacities. Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th

Cir. 1989).

B. Respondeat Superior - Commissioner Richard Allen

Upon review of the complaint, it is clear that defendant Allen is sued solely due to

his position as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections. However, the

law is well settled that “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.” Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11 Cir. 2004); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 th

F.3d 1228, 1234 (11 Cir. 2003) (concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the th

basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269

(11 Cir.1999), citing Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11 Cir. 1994) (42 th th

U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions

of subordinates/employees under either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability); Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County, Florida, 402 F.3d

Case 2:07-cv-00574-MEF-WC Document 25 Filed 08/27/09 Page 8 of 14
 Although Neitzke interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the analysis 2

contained therein remains applicable to the present statute.

9

1092, 1115-1116 (11 Cir. 2005) (a prisoner simply cannot rely on theories of vicarious th

liability or respondeat superior to establish liability). Thus, defendant Allen is liable in the

present cause of action only if he “personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional

conduct or [if] there is a causal connection between [his] actions ... and the alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11 Cir. 2003) th

(citation omitted). 

Davis does not allege that defendant Allen personally participated in decisions

regarding his classification. Additionally, it is undisputed that defendant Allen is not

involved in the inmate classification process. Moreover, Davis fails to present any facts

which indicate a causal relationship between an action undertaken or policy enacted by

defendant Allen and the alleged constitutional deprivation. A supervisory official “may

be liable only for implementing a policy that is ‘itself [ ] a repudiation of constitutional

rights’ and ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’ Grandstaff v. City of Borger,

767 F.2d 161, 169, 170 (5 Cir.1985).” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736 (5 Cir. 2006). th th

Consequently, the claims lodged against defendant Allen lack an arguable basis in law and

are therefore subject to summary dismissal in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Additionally, as

2

determined below, Davis is entitled to no relief from this court on his false information

Case 2:07-cv-00574-MEF-WC Document 25 Filed 08/27/09 Page 9 of 14
 Although defendant Allen argues the claim against him is barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and 3

res judicata, the state case on which he relies was dismissed without prejudice by the Circuit Court of Montgomery

County, Alabama. Exhibit 2 to the October 15, 2007 Special Report of Defendant Allen - Court Doc. No. 14-3

at 3. Moreover, there is no indication in the record of this case that the state court addressed the merits of Davis’

claim in issuing the order of dismissal. Thus, this court deems it inappropriate to bar the instant case of action

under either collateral estoppel or res judicata. 

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claim.3

C. The False Information Claim

Davis asserts defendant Stutts placed false information in his Pre-Sentence

Investigation Report indicating that he repeatedly struck the victim with a pistol prior to

shooting the victim in the head. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 8. Davis

contends classification personnel relied on the information contained in the aforementioned

report to deny him a less restrictive custody classification. Id. It is undisputed that

classification officials relied on the information contained in the pre-sentence report during

the classification process. However, the defendants do not admit the information actually

utilized in the decision-making process is false and deny any knowing reliance on false

information when making the challenged classification decisions. Defendant Stutts’

Exhibit B (August 2, 2007 Affidavit of Deborah Stutts) - Court Doc. No. 9-3 at 2 (“At the

time I submitted this report [in November of 2000], I believed the factual statements

contained therein to be true, but did not have first-hand knowledge of the those facts. I

necessarily relied on sources that I believed and continue to believe to be credible. I do

not know that anything contained in that report is untrue.”). 

In Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437 (11 Cir. 1991), the Court held that reliance th

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on admittedly false information to deny a prisoner consideration for parole was arbitrary

and capricious treatment violative of the Constitution. The appellate court carefully

distinguished the Monroe holding from its prior decision in Slocum v. Georgia State Bd.

of Pardons and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982).

th

Our holding today does not conflict with our earlier holding in

Slocum, supra. In Slocum, the plaintiff, who had been denied

parole, made the conclusory allegation that the Board must

have relied upon erroneous information because otherwise the

Board would surely have granted him parole. Slocum, 678

F.2d at 941. The plaintiff then sought to assert a due process

right to examine his prison file for the alleged errors. Unlike

the instant case, in Slocum the state did not admit that it had

relied upon false information in denying parole nor did the

plaintiff present any evidence that his prison file even

contained any false information. We held in Slocum that

prisoners do not state a due process claim by merely asserting

that erroneous information may have been used during their

parole consideration. Id. at 942. We also determined that

prisoners do not have a due process right to examine their

prison files as part of a general fishing expedition in search of

false information that could possibly exist in their files. Id. In

the case at bar, we are confronted with prison authorities who

admit that information contained in Monroe’s files is false and

that they relied upon such information, at least in part, to deny

Monroe parole and to classify him as a sex offender. As we

stated, the parole statute does not authorize state officials to

rely on knowingly false information in their determinations.

Thomas [v. Sellers], 691 F.2d [487] at 489 [(11 Cir. 1982)].

th

Monroe, 932 F.3d at 1442.

Slocum controls the disposition of the instant case. Defendant Stutts maintains that

the information she relied on at the time she prepared the Pre-Sentence Investigation

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Report was correct and, to her knowledge, the information contained in such report remains

accurate. Moreover, there is no evidence before the court that classification personnel

relied on information they knew to be false during any stage of the classification process.

Specifically, there is no admission by either defendant that the information utilized in

denying Davis a lower custody classification is false, incorrect or erroneous. The record

in this case therefore establishes that neither defendant Stutts nor correctional personnel

relied on admittedly false information. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff is entitled to

no relief as a matter of law and summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the

defendants on his false information claim.

D. Custody Classification

To the extent Davis maintains he is entitled to placement in a lower custody

classification because he meets the eligibility criteria for such classification, he is entitled

to no relief as an inmate confined in the Alabama prison system has no constitutionally

protected interest in the procedure affecting his classification level because the resulting

restraint, without more, does not impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 484 (1995); Francis v. Fox, 838 F.2d 1147 (11 Cir. 1988); Jones v. Diamond, 594 th

F.2d 997 (5 Cir. 1979). th

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

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1. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before September 9, 2009 the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

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DONE this 27th day of August, 2009.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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