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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 17, 2015*

Decided February 18, 2015

Before

 WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

 DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 14-3039

PETER KOEHN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LAURI TOBIAS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Western Division.

No. 12 cv 50321

Philip G. Reinhard,

Judge.

O R D E R

Peter Koehn was fired from his tenured position as a school psychologist for 

Harvard Community Unit School District 50 in Harvard, Illinois. Koehn’s discharge 

came soon after he criticized curriculum changes for students receiving 

special-education services, but the Office of Civil Rights for the United States 

Department of Education was unable to substantiate Koehn’s claim of retaliation. He

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a)(2).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

 

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sued the members of the District 50 school board, the district’s superintendent, and a 

school principal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he was discharged without 

procedural due process and in retaliation for engaging in protected speech. The district 

court granted summary judgment for the District 50 defendants, and Koehn appeals. 

(Koehn also sued an employee of the Illinois State Board of Education, but she prevailed 

on a motion to dismiss and is not party to this appeal.) Although we uphold the adverse 

ruling on Koehn’s claim that his discharge violated the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, we conclude that a jury reasonably could find from the 

evidence of record that Koehn was fired on account of his speech. And since the 

defendants have not pursued, for purposes of this appeal, their contention that Koehn’s 

speech was not protected by the First Amendment, we vacate the grant of summary 

judgment on the retaliation claim and remand for further proceedings.

Because this appeal arises from a dismissal at summary judgment, we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Koehn, the non-moving party. See Taylor-Novotny 

v. Health Alliance Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 488 (7th Cir. 2014). For the most part the 

facts are not in dispute.

District 50 hired Koehn in July 2005. At the time, the school district served more 

than 2,000 students attending its high school, junior high, and elementary schools. 

Koehn initially served students at the junior high, but by December 2007 his duties had 

broadened to include students at all levels. He regularly evaluated students receiving 

special education services, and his written job description provided that he would report 

to the “District Special Education Coordinator.” The defendants have not identified 

anyone who held that title, though defendant Lauri Tobias was the coordinator at one of 

the elementary schools until June 2006, two years before she became the District 50 

superintendent. The defendants also admitted, in answering Koehn’s complaint, that 

Tobias was both superintendent and “Special Education Director” for the school district.

Tenured staff at District 50 were to be evaluated biennially, but Koehn received 

only one evaluation, in April 2008. That evaluation was signed by the former principals

of the junior high and one of District 50’s elementary schools. Neither principal is a 

defendant, and as far as this record shows, neither principal was designated as Koehn’s 

supervisor or was serving as District Special Education Coordinator. The evaluation was 

unfavorable and criticized Koehn’s performance during the 2007–2008 school year on 

several grounds, including that diagnostic evaluations required for student 

Individualized Education Programs were late or inadequate, that he was not following 

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his assigned schedule, and that some of his comments to and about staff had been 

inappropriate. Nothing was said in that evaluation about the 2006–2007 school year.

Koehn was not evaluated again in April 2010, when a review should have been 

scheduled. (At summary judgment the defendants did not offer an explanation, though 

defendant Margaret Segersten, the principal at the junior high since July 2009, told an 

investigator from the Office of Civil Rights that the 2010 evaluation “fell through the 

cracks.”) In July 2010 the school district renewed Koehn’s contract for the 2010–2011 

school year, apparently without qualification. That September, after the start of classes, 

Koehn discovered that Principal Segersten had ordered cuts in individualized 

instruction for some special education students at the junior high. Around September 10, 

Segersten called Koehn to a meeting to discuss those cuts. Koehn voiced concern that 

Segersten had violated federal and state law by reducing the amount of individualized 

instruction. Koehn thought those cuts had been made without adequately involving 

parents and the team of professionals responsible for developing Individualized

Education Programs.

Four weeks later, on October 7, Principal Segersten wrote Koehn directing him to 

attend an “investigatory meeting” on October 12 to discuss “job performance” and 

“conduct” deficiencies. In her letter Segersten accused Koehn of not providing and 

documenting special education services. She also accused him of disregarding District 50 

policies concerning attendance and Internet usage. Her letter warned that he could face 

discipline, including discharge. Koehn replied by e-mail that he would not attend 

without his choice of representative. Koehn asserted in his e-mail that Segersten was 

trying to bully him into accepting her decisions without exercising independent 

professional judgment, and he called the timing of her letter—“about the day after” he 

and some parents had discussed the junior high’s “lack of interventions” in math and 

reading—an “interesting coincidence.”

Koehn did not attend the October 12 meeting. Two days later Principal Segersten 

wrote again rescheduling the session and warning that Koehn could not “dictate” terms 

or “set conditions.” Koehn replied on October 15 with a sharply worded e-mail 

demanding documentation that Segersten was authorized to discipline, or even 

supervise, him. Segersten did not answer this demand. At summary judgment the 

defendants did not dispute Koehn’s assertion, citing his job description, that 

Superintendent Tobias, not Segersten, would have been his direct supervisor at this time 

(a role she would have assumed after becoming superintendent more than two years 

before). Nor did the defendants submit any evidence that Segersten’s position as 

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principal of the junior high imparted authority to convene an “investigatory meeting” 

about Koehn’s performance as a psychologist with district-wide responsibilities.

After receiving Principal Segersten’s second letter, Koehn shared his concerns 

about cutting individualized instruction with a “Principal Education Consultant” 

employed by the Illinois State Board of Education. Koehn copied Superintendent Tobias 

on this communication. Tobias had received a copy of Segersten’s first letter 

commanding Koehn to attend an “investigatory meeting,” but at summary judgment the 

defendants did not introduce evidence that Tobias knew about or approved in advance 

Segersten’s plan for this meeting. On October 18 the superintendent directed Koehn to 

meet with Segersten and said his e-mails to Segersten had been vitriolic and 

unprofessional.

That meeting occurred on October 20, and Superintendent Tobias also attended. 

Eight days later Tobias notified Koehn that she had investigated the reductions in 

individualized instruction at the junior high but found no impropriety. Days later, on 

November 2, Principal Segersten recommended that the school board issue Koehn a 

notice of remedial warning for “unprofessional and insubordinate conduct.” Segersten’s 

recommendation prompted Koehn to send an e-mail on November 3 to every District 50 

board member and employee accusing her of trying to “besmirch” his professional 

reputation and retaliating because he had shared with the Illinois State Board of 

Education his “serious allegations about her conduct as it relates to special education 

rights of many students and their parents.” The school board approved Segersten’s 

recommendation. Koehn was warned to communicate with administrators and staff in a 

“professional, respectful and appropriate manner,” to report his absences promptly, and 

to modify the way he completed written evaluations of students in special education.

Koehn did not relent about Principal Segersten’s revisions to special education 

programming at the junior high, and during November and December 2010 he 

continued rallying support to reverse those changes. In mid-November he spoke out at a 

meeting attended not only by District 50 special education staff but also the Principal 

Education Consultant he had contacted at the Illinois State Board of Education in 

October. At work Koehn also reviewed confidential student files and wrote letters and 

e-mails to Segersten and the school board.

Later that month Segersten accused Koehn of not properly reporting his absences 

and told him not to use work resources to further his effort at overturning her changes. 

Then a week later, on December 7, Superintendent Tobias instructed Koehn to attend a 

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second investigatory meeting with her and Segersten. That meeting was rescheduled 13 

times because, by the defendants’ admission, Koehn was ill and missed almost three 

weeks of school. The meeting eventually occurred on January 18, 2011.

Six days later Superintendent Tobias recommended that the school board fire 

Koehn. As reasons she cited concerns about Koehn’s observations and written 

psychological reports for three special education students and his access of confidential 

records for five other special education students. Tobias further asserted that Koehn had 

engaged in “inappropriate communications,” including asking questions “designed to 

attack Ms. Segersten’s decisions” when the Principal Education Consultant from the 

state met with District 50 special education staff in November 2010. Tobias also singled 

out an e-mail that Koehn had sent District 50 board members alerting them—in Tobias’s 

words—“to a case law update about school officials who disregard constitutional 

rights.” Finally, Tobias accused Koehn of failing to appear numerous times for the 

meeting ultimately held on January 18, as well as twice using the wrong procedure in 

November 2010 to call in sick. Koehn was invited to appear before the board and to 

address those charges in a closed session. He declined, thinking that any defense would 

be futile. On January 31 the board met and voted to discharge Koehn, giving the same 

reasons underlying Tobias’s recommendation. Koehn filed but then withdrew an 

administrative appeal.

In granting summary judgment for Superintendent Tobias, Principal Segersten, 

and the members of the school board, the district court first concluded that Koehn’s own 

actions disproved his claim that he was denied procedural due process in connection 

with the loss of his job. The court reasoned that Koehn had been invited to defend 

himself at a meeting of the District 50 school board but chose not to do so. On the

First Amendment claim, the district court agreed with Koehn that a jury could find at 

least some protected speech on this record, particularly in light of his effort to involve an

employee of the Illinois State Board of Education, who was outside his chain of 

command. On this subject the court rejected the defendants’ argument that Koehn had 

spoken only as a school psychologist discharging his official duties and never as a 

private citizen. But, the court continued, Koehn did not provide enough evidence for a 

jury to reasonably conclude that his speech motivated the defendants to fire him. And, 

the court added, the defendants provided convincing evidence that they would have 

terminated Koehn’s employment for reasons separate from his protected speech.

On appeal Koehn first argues that the district court improperly dismissed his 

First Amendment retaliation claim. To avoid summary judgment on his claim for 

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retaliation, Koehn had to offer evidence that he suffered a deprivation because of 

constitutionally protected speech. See Diadenko v. Folino, 741 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2013).

Advocating for special education students was a principal part of Koehn’s job, so the 

district court was faced with deciding if Koehn’s evidence would permit finding that he 

spoke out, at least in some instances, as a private citizen about a matter of public 

concern. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (holding that “when public 

employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 

speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 

insulate their communications from employer discipline”); Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 

650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). The court answered that question affirmatively, and the 

defendants, by leaving this conclusion unchallenged on appeal, have abandoned for 

purposes of this appeal their contention that Koehn did not engage in protected speech. 

See Door Systems, Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Systems, Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 1996) (“An 

appellee is not required to advance every possible ground for affirmance; and should the 

case be remanded it can advance the additional grounds in the district court, provided 

they have not been waived in that court.”). Thus our focus here is causation.

Koehn’s initial burden was to offer evidence that his protected activity motivated 

the defendants’ decision to fire him. See Diadenko, 741 F.3d at 756. He argues that he 

presented a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence sufficient to satisfy this 

burden. See Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 637, 643 (7th Cir. 2013); Pagel v. 

TIN Inc., 695 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2012). We agree.

Considering the evidence as a whole and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

Koehn’s favor, see Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 644, 647, a jury could find that 

Superintendent Tobias and Principal Segersten were content to let Koehn’s alleged 

deficiencies “fall through the cracks” until he began speaking up about the propriety of 

Segersten’s changes to the special education program. No one from District 50 

disciplined Koehn or even formally evaluated his performance from April 2008 until 

soon after his first allegations of illegality in September 2010. See Diadenko, 741 F.3d at

756 (explaining that adverse actions that “follow ‘close on the heels’ of protected speech 

can give rise to an inference of retaliation”); Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 939 

(7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that inference of retaliation arose when adverse action 

occurred two weeks after protected activity); Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 43 

(5th Cir. 1992) (describing as “surprising” that problems with plaintiff’s performance 

“suddenly” surfaced after protected activity).

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Moreover, a jury might reasonably be skeptical about Superintendent Tobias’s 

reasons for wanting Koehn fired. See Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 643–44 (explaining that 

evidence of pretext can be circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive). For one thing, 

Tobias’s recommendation to the school board only thinly veils her displeasure with 

Koehn’s meddling. Chief among her accusations is that Koehn asked “inappropriate” 

questions “designed to attack” Principal Segersten’s program cuts during a meeting 

with District 50 special education staff and an interested official from the state education 

board—a gathering of professionals where the topic of those cuts surely was relevant. 

Tobias also insisted that Koehn had no “legitimate educational interest” in reviewing 

records of certain special education students, but that accusation is never explained. 

What Tobias apparently suspected, and what Koehn appears to concede, is that he 

examined some student files while trying to build a case that Segersten’s changes were 

detrimental to the affected students. The defendants did not dispute that Koehn’s 

position as school psychologist required him to serve these students like all others, and it 

seems an odd accusation to call his inquiry illegitimate simply because it might 

undermine Segersten’s unilateral changes. Other reasons given by Tobias also ring 

hollow. She asserted that Koehn had not offered a “reasonable excuse” justifying 

multiple postponements of the “investigatory meeting” held on January 18, 2011, yet the 

defendants concede that Koehn was unavailable because of an extended “illness” (which 

they deride as “just stress”). Similarly, Tobias cited Koehn for twice using e-mail instead 

of a computerized attendance program to report absences from work. And some of her 

criticisms of Koehn’s report writing (e.g., not using a child’s “legal” name in the heading, 

placing “background information” at the beginning of the report, and not defining 

acronyms) seem trivial, especially since Koehn presented evidence that 

Principal Segersten had refused his requests for examples of properly completed 

psychological reports.

In many cases, evidence that would permit a jury reasonably to find that protected 

speech motivated adverse action would not, as Koehn asserts, end the inquiry at 

summary judgment. A defendant might introduce evidence of non-pretextual reasons 

that would have led to the same adverse action even if the plaintiff had not engaged in 

protected speech. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285–87 (1977);

Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 252 (7th Cir. 2012); Diadenko, 741 F.3d at 756. But the 

plaintiff must then be given an opportunity to present evidence that the proffered 

reasons for the adverse action were pretextual and that the real reason was retaliatory 

animus. See Thayer, 705 F.3d at 252. Here Koehn did not need further evidence that the 

defendants’ stated reasons for firing him actually were cover for a retaliatory motive. 

See Valentino v. Village of South Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2009). The 

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timing of District 50’s sudden preoccupation with Koehn’s job performance, many 

months after he was due to be evaluated, is “too convenient” to allow summary 

judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim. See id. at 673–74; see also Peele v. 

Burch, 722 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Our role at this stage is to decide if there is a 

factual dispute, not which side of the dispute is right.”).

On the other hand, Koehn is on much weaker footing in contesting summary 

judgment for the defendants on his claim that he was fired in violation of his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to procedural due process. He asserts that the members of the school

board demonstrated they were biased when they accepted Superintendent Tobias’s 

recommendation for dismissal in the face of evidence that she and Principal Segersten 

were retaliating against him and violating “special education rules.” The defendants 

concede that Koehn, as a tenured employee, had a protected property interest in his 

position. See Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 673 (7th Cir. 2001); Gleason v. Board of Educ. 

of City of Chicago, 792 F.2d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 1986). The question for us is whether the 

undisputed evidence establishes that Koehn received a fair hearing conducted by an 

impartial decision-maker. See Head v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 794, 803–04 

(7th Cir. 2000).

Adjudicators are presumed to act in an unbiased manner. Id. at 804. To overcome 

this presumption, Koehn needed to provide “substantial evidence of actual or potential 

bias,” such as evidence that the board members had prejudged his case, had a personal 

animus against him, or had a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Id.; 

Hostrop v. Bd. of Jr. Coll. Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 575–76 (7th Cir. 1975). Koehn has

presented no evidence of this sort.

Koehn also contends, as he did in the district court, that before he was fired he 

should have been given all of the materials reviewed by Superintendent Tobias in 

concluding that the cuts to individualized instruction were made lawfully. According to 

Koehn, these materials would have strengthened his position before the school board. 

But Koehn misses the point: He passed over the opportunity to address the school board, 

and his failure to take advantage of either the pre-deprivation or post-deprivation 

procedures available to him forecloses his challenging those procedures as deficient. 

See Leavell v. Illinois Dep't of Natural Resources, 600 F.3d 798, 806 (7th Cir. 2010); Hudson v. 

City of Chicago, 374 F.3d 554, 563 (7th Cir. 2004).

We have considered and rejected Koehn’s remaining contentions. Accordingly, we 

VACATE the grant of summary judgment on his First Amendment claim and REMAND 

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for further proceedings on that claim. In all other respects we AFFIRM the district court’s 

judgment.

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