Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05197/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-05197-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Tort Action

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANSA-EL BEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NANCY E. O’MALLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05197-EMC 

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND 

DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT

Docket Nos. 10, 12

Plaintiff Mansa-El: Bey©1initiated this lawsuit against four individuals in August 2019. 

The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Beeler. Judge Beeler granted Mr. Bey’s 

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e). See Docket No. 9 (order). Judge Beeler identified multiple deficiencies with the 

complaint – e.g., Mr. Bey had failed to specify any conduct on the part of three defendants and, as 

to the remaining defendant, he had at the very least immunity from suit (Eleventh Amendment and 

quasi-judicial). Nevertheless, she still gave Mr. Bey leave to file an amended complaint by 

September 12, 2019. After Mr. Bey failed to file an amended complaint, Judge Beeler issued a 

report and recommendation (“R&R”), in which she recommended that Mr. Bey’s complaint be 

dismissed for the reasons stated in her prior order. See Docket No. 10 (order). 

The report and recommendation (“R&R”) is currently pending before the Court. Mr. Bey 

did not file an objection to the R&R. He did, however, file an amended complaint. 

Although Mr. Bey did not provide an explanation as to why he did not comply with Judge 

Beeler’s order that the amended complaint be filed by September 12, 2019, the Court shall, in the 

 

1

In his papers, Mr. Bey has used the above punctuation and symbol in his name.

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interest of justice, still consider it. Like the original complaint, the amended complaint must be 

screened pursuant to § 1915(e).

In the amended complaint, Mr. Bey claims to be suing on his own behalf and on the behalf 

of others (including but not limited to companies). He now names as defendants twenty 

individuals (some government employees), four government entities or agencies, and five private 

companies. He asserts thirteen causes of action, without identifying which causes of action apply 

against which defendants.

There are multiple deficiencies with the amended complaint. They include the following.

1. Mr. Bey is not an attorney and therefore cannot bring claims on anyone’s behalf 

except his own. See Civ. L.R. 3-9.

2. For the vast majority of defendants, Mr. Bey fails to specify any action taken by 

them that resulted in injury to him. Judge Beeler pointed out this deficiency in Mr. Bey’s original 

complaint, see Docket No. 9 (Order at 2) (regarding original complaint, noting that allegations 

were made only with respect to Chad Finke; “[t]he complaint makes no allegations against the 

other three defendants”), but the problem continues to plague the amended complaint.

3. As noted above, Mr. Bey has failed to identify which causes of action apply to 

which defendants.

4. A number of the causes of action are not viable because the statutes do not give rise 

to a private cause of action. For example:

• Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1). See Walthour v. Herron, No. 10-

01495, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44221, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (“In this 

case, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his rights under the following federal 

criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247, 371 and 1951. These 

statutes do not provide a private right of action under which Plaintiff may 

sue.”).

• Violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (Counts and 13). See Burns v. United States, No. 

98-5117, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2068, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2000) (agreeing 

with the Court below that, inter alia, § 3302 does “‘not create a private right of 

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action for payment of monies or, by implication, for the return of her monies’”).

• Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Count 10). See Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 

F.3d 1467, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “18 U.S.C. § 1503 is a criminal 

statute that does not provide for a private cause of action”), overruled on other 

grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

• Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Count 12). See Pondexter v. Sec’y United 

States HUD, No. 19-1576, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27943, at *4 (3d Cir. Sep. 

17, 2019) (noting that plaintiff “raised claims of criminal collusion, conspiracy, 

and making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001” but “[t]hose claims fail 

because [he] lacks a private right of action”).

5. Other causes of action are clearly inapplicable. For example:

• Violation of 10 U.S.C. § 897 (Count 2). The statute provides: “Any person 

subject to this chapter who, except as provided by law, apprehends, arrests, or 

confines any person shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” 10 

U.S.C. § 897 (emphasis added).

• Violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Counts 6 and 7). The statutes 

concern antitrust violations.

• Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 6611 (Count 11). The statute provides in relevant part 

that, with certain exceptions, “[a] party to a Y2K action making a tort claim, 

other than a claim of intentional tort arising independent of a contract, may not 

recover damages for economic loss.” 15 U.S.C. § 6611(a) (emphasis added). 

6. Other causes of action are problematic because the legal basis for the cause of 

action is not clear. For example:

• Invalid use of legal authority (Count 4).

• Grand corruption (Count 8).2

 

2 The only potentially viable causes of action are conversion (Count 3) and deceit (Count 9) but, as 

noted above, it is not clear which defendants are being sued for those claims and on what basis. 

Moreover, depending on what acts are being challenged, defendants may be able to invoke 

immunities. Cf. Docket No. 9 (Order at 4) (regarding original complaint, noting that Mr. Finke 

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Finally, the Court notes that Mr. Bey’s amended complaint implicates state court criminal 

proceedings, see, e.g., FAC at 8-9 (alluding to false information used to support a probable cause 

declaration, filing of false or retaliatory charges, and a coerced plea agreement), and appears to 

seek not only damages but also injunctive relief that would likely impact state court decisions

already issued. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 4-6 (asking for a dismissal with prejudice of two superior court 

criminal matters3as well as a return of personal property). Accordingly, there are a number of 

doctrines that bar his suit, including Younger,

4 Rooker-Feldman,5

and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 

 

was protected by Eleventh Amendment and quasi-judicial immunities). Finally, as discussed 

below, even in the absence of immunities, there may be other doctrines that bar Mr. Bey’s suit 

given that it seems related to criminal proceedings against him in state court. 

3 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Bey recently removed one of the criminal 

matters to this District. Judge Gilliam, however, remanded the case. See People of State of Cal. v. 

Bey, No. 19-xr-90806 (N.D. Cal.).

4

Younger abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in 

overlapping principles of equity, comity, and federalism. Younger

cautions against federal interference with ongoing state criminal, 

civil, and administrative proceedings. Specifically, Younger

abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial 

proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicate[s] important state interests; 

(3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise 

constitutional challenges’; and (4) the requested relief seek[s] to 

enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state 

judicial proceeding.

Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

5

“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . , in general terms, prevents ‘a party losing in state court . . . 

from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States 

district court.’” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Essentially, the doctrine bars state-court losers complaining of 

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district 

court proceedings commenced from asking district courts to review 

and reject those judgments. Absent express statutory authorization, 

only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state 

court judgment. The clearest case for dismissal based on the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when a federal plaintiff asserts as a 

legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and 

seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision . . . . 

Id. at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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U.S. 477 (1994).

6

For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Mr. Bey’s amended complaint in its 

entirety. Because Mr. Bey has been given a clear opportunity to state claims sufficient under law, 

but has failed to do so, the dismissal is without leave to amend. Judgment shall be issued and the 

case closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 8, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

 

6 Heck “provides that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, or 

for other harm caused by actions which would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff 

must prove that his conviction or sentence is no longer valid, as a precondition to bringing suit.” 

Webb v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. C 11-00476 CRB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142574, at *17 (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 12, 2011); see also id. at *25-26 (adding that Heck can apply even when a plaintiff is no 

longer in custody).

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