Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00520/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00520-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES ERIC STEWART,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00520-AWI-SMS PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Charles Eric Stewart (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on May

1, 2006.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

The claim in this action arises from events that occurred at the California Correctional

Institution in Tehachapi, where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers

from grand mal seizures, and was issued a lower bunk/lower tier chrono as a result. Plaintiff alleges

that twice someone moved him to an upper tier, and while housed on the upper tier, he suffered a

seizure and fell down the metal staircase, injuring his neck, shoulder, and lower back.

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of deficiencies. First, plaintiff names the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) as a defendant. The Eleventh

Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state.

Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted);

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see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct

Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939

F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well

as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v.

California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)(concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state

agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College

Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Because CDCR is a state agency, it is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity from suit and plaintiff may not pursue a claim for relief against it in this

action.

Next, the Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of

the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

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of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

The only defendant named in this action besides CDCR is Warden Sullivan. Under section

1983, liabilitymay not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under

a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the

causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically

alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438,

441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983

for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either:

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy

‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional

violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some

facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts linking defendant Sullivan or any other individual to the

conduct complained of. In order to state a claim under section 1983, plaintiff must set forth facts

linking the violation complained of to an act or omission of one or more defendants. Plaintiff has

not done so and therefore fails to state any claims under section 1983. 

Finally, an allegation that plaintiff’s health or safetywas endangered falls within the purview

of the Eighth Amendment. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and

harsh, prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care,

and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe

conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate

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indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.

1998). The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which support a claim that any defendant “[knew] of and

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.

2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also

draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should

have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment,

no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002). Unless the danger to plaintiff was the result of someone’s deliberate

difference, plaintiff may not pursue a claim for relief under section 1983, regardless of the injury

sustained by plaintiff following his placement on an upper tier. 

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended

complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

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362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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