Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01079/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01079-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORRIS LA’MONT COFFEE, )

aka MORRIS LA’MONT COFFEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

D. K. SISTO, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:07-CV-01079 SMS HC

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #18]

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION AND

DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO ENTER

JUDGMENT

ORDER DECLINING ISSUANCE OF

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties having voluntarily consented to exercise of Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), by order dated November 2, 2007, this case was

assigned to the undersigned for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following his conviction by plea

of no contest on May 21, 2002, to false imprisonment in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 236, and

intimidation of a witness with force or threat of force in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(c)(1).

Case 1:07-cv-01079-SMS Document 21 Filed 11/08/07 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Lodged Document” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent in support of his motion to dismiss. 1

See People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979). 2

Although the petition was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court on September 30, 2005, the petition was dated 3

September 15, 2005. In Houston v. Lack, the Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is deemed filed

on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court clerk. Houston

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied the rule to assess the timeliness of

federal habeas filings under the AEDPA limitations period. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9 Cir. 2001), citing th

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). Therefore under the mailbox rule, the Court deems the

petition filed on September 15, 2005, the date Petitioner presumably handed his petition to prison authorities for mailing.

The petition was denied, among other reasons, as untimely pursuant to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770 (1998). 4

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

See Lodged Doc. No. 1. Petitioner admitted allegations of having suffered three prior serious felony 1

convictions within the meaning of California’s three strikes law, and he admitted having served a

prior prison term. Id. The court struck the two prior convictions and sentenced Petitioner on June 18,

2002, to serve a determinate term of 10 years and 4 months in state prison. Id. 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “Fifth DCA”) by filing a Wende brief. On February 3, 2003, the Fifth DCA dismissed 2

the appeal pursuant to Petitioner’s request. See Lodged Doc. No. 2. Petitioner did not seek a petition

for review in the California Supreme Court.

Petitioner then filed nine post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the judgment in

the state courts, all petitions for writ of habeas corpus, as follows:

1. Fresno County Superior Court

Filed: September 15, 2005 ; 3

Denied : October 26, 2005; 4

2. Fresno County Superior Court

Filed: October 26, 2005; 

Denied: November 22, 2005;

3. Fifth DCA

Filed: December 12, 2005;

Denied: December 22, 2005;

4. Fifth DCA

Filed: February 1, 2006;

Denied: February 9, 2006;

5. California Supreme Court

Filed: March 28, 2006;

Denied: November 15, 2006;

Case 1:07-cv-01079-SMS Document 21 Filed 11/08/07 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

6. California Supreme Court

Filed: April 12, 2006;

Denied: November 15, 2006;

7. Fresno County Superior Court

Filed: February 16, 2007;

Denied: February 23, 2007;

8. Fifth DCA

Filed: March 14, 2007;

Denied: March 22, 2007;

9. California Supreme Court

Filed: April 2, 2007;

Denied: May 9, 2007.

See Lodged Docs. Nos. 3-19.

On July 2, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Sacramento Division of this Court. By order dated July 26, 2007, the matter was transferred to the

Fresno Division. On October 9, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being

filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner filed an

opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss on October 29, 2007. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

Case 1:07-cv-01079-SMS Document 21 Filed 11/08/07 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on July 2, 2007, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the Fifth DCA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal at his request on

Case 1:07-cv-01079-SMS Document 21 Filed 11/08/07 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

February 3, 2003. According to California Rules of Court § 8.500(e)(1), the decision became final

upon expiration of ten days following dismissal. Therefore, direct review concluded on February 13,

2003, and the statute of limitations commenced the following day. Petitioner had one year until

February 13, 2004, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However,

Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition until July 2, 2007, over three years beyond the due date. 

Absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. th

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or determined by

the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements for statutory

tolling. Id.

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on February 14, 2003, and expired on

February 13, 2004. Petitioner did not file his first state petition until September 15, 2005, which was

over a year and a half beyond the expiration of the limitations period. Because the limitations period

had already expired, the collateral challenge had no tolling consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d

1001, 1003 (9 Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already th

run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL

1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Likewise, the subsequent petitions did not operate to toll the statute of

limitations. 

Case 1:07-cv-01079-SMS Document 21 Filed 11/08/07 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 506 U.S. 466 (2000). 5

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

D. Statutory Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)

Petitioner seeks to invoke the statutory tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) states that the limitation period shall run from “the date on which

the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” The objective standard in determining when time begins to run under

Section 2241(d)(1)(D) is “when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the

important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150 (9 Cir.2001), quoting, Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7 Cir.2000). Petitioner th th

claims in his opposition to Respondent’s motion that the factual predicate for the instant claims did

not become known until some time in 2007 when he discovered the Apprendi line of cases. 5

In this case, Petitioner knew the important facts or could have discovered the factual

predicate for his claims through due diligence prior to 2007. Apprendi was decided in 2000, which

was prior to the date of his conviction. Thus, the relevant facts could have been discovered by

Petitioner well before 2007.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). 

Petitioner argues he should be given equitable tolling because he suffers from mental illness

and is required to take certain medications, to wit, Zoloft and Risperdal. He claims these medications

cause drowsiness and short-term memory loss among other side effects. This claim is belied by the

Case 1:07-cv-01079-SMS Document 21 Filed 11/08/07 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 7

fact that during the last six years (the time Petitioner claims he was taking these medications), he

managed to file nine (9) petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the state courts. Most of those petitions

were filed very soon after the previous petition had been denied. Thus, the alleged hindrances of

drowsiness and memory loss did not hamper him from proceeding through the state courts. 

He further argues he should be given equitable tolling because he has a very limited

understanding of criminal law and court procedures. Petitioner’s claim of ignorance of the law is

insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905,

909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but th

insufficient to establish cause); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir.2000); Fisher v. th

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5 Cir. 1999); Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). th

Petitioner’s circumstances are no different than the majority of incarcerated prisoners attempting to

file petitions for writ of habeas corpus. If lack of legal training and ignorance of the law were 

excuses for not complying with the limitations period, Congress would never have enacted the

AEDPA as most incarcerated prisoners share these same problems. And as pointed out above,

Petitioner managed to file nine (9) state petitions despite this purported impediment. Accordingly, 

the Court finds no reason to equitably toll the limitations period.

E. Certificate of Appealability

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

 (a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court

of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

 (c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

Case 1:07-cv-01079-SMS Document 21 Filed 11/08/07 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 8

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability

“if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at

1040.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED;

2) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period;

3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent; and

4) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-01079-SMS Document 21 Filed 11/08/07 Page 8 of 8