Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00125/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00125-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The District Defendants’ request for oral argument is denied. There was an adequate

opportunity to present written argument, and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision.

LRCiv. 7.2(f); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

2

 Jabari Overstreet was a minor at the time of filing, but was substituted as Plaintiff

in place of his parents once he reached the age of majority. (Doc. 78.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jabari Overstreet,

Plaintiff,

v.

City of Phoenix et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-12-125-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Phoenix Union High School District’s, Luis Lemus’,

Craig Pletenik’s and Lee Fernwault’s (the “District” Defendants) Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 70.) For the reasons that follow, the District Defendants’ motion is granted

in part, denied in part, and the case is dismissed.1

BACKGROUND

This case arises from a January 19, 2011, altercation between Plaintiff Jabari

Overstreet, school security guards, and City of Phoenix Police Officer George Pizarro. (Doc.

1.) On January 19, 2012, Plaintiff’s parents2

 filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against

the City of Phoenix, the Phoenix Union High School District, Daniel Mendez, Luis Lemus,

George Pizarro, Craig Pletnik, and Lee Fernwault. (Id.) The complaint sought relief on three

Case 2:12-cv-00125-SMM Document 79 Filed 03/12/14 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

§ 1983 causes of action and six state-law causes of action: (1) unreasonable search and

seizure and excessive force; (2) equal protection; (3) substantive due process; (4) false

arrest/imprisonment; (5) assault; (6) battery; (7) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision;

(8) defamation and false light; and (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 9-

16.) Count 2 was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipulation (Doc. 39), and Count 3 was

dismissed with prejudice upon the District Defendants’ unanswered motion (Doc. 62).

Judge Campbell entered an Order granting the City of Phoenix judgment on the

pleadings regarding Counts 3, 7, 8, and 9; dismissing Officer Pizarro without prejudice; and

dismissing the City of Phoenix from Counts 1 and 4. (Doc. 63.) The parties subsequently

stipulated to dismissing the City of Phoenix and Officer Pizarro from the action with

prejudice. (Doc. 68.) Thereafter, Plaintiff served his initial disclosure on the day discovery

closed. (Docs. 45; 69.)

The District Defendants’ present motion for summary judgment seeks: dismissal of

the entire case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b); dismissal of Defendant

Daniel Mendez for lack of service; dismissal of the Phoenix Union High School District from

Counts 1 and 4 for legal insufficiency; and dismissal of Count 8 for legal insufficiency. (Doc.

70.) Plaintiff’s response opposed dismissal under Rule 41(b), but consented to dismissal of

Defendant Mendez and also consented to dismissal of Counts 1 and 8. (Doc. 75 at 4-5.) The

District Defendants’ reply reiterated their earlier arguments, but also noted that with the

dismissal of Count 1, all the federal causes of action have been dismissed. (Doc. 77 at 3-4.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction [if] . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “A district court’s decision whether to exercise

[supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original

jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639

(2009). This discretion is guided by “considerations of judicial economy, convenience and

Case 2:12-cv-00125-SMM Document 79 Filed 03/12/14 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

fairness to litigants.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

“In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over

the remaining state-law claims.” Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir.

2010) (alteration omitted) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7

(1988), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d

649, 654 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004)).

There is a two-year statute of limitations on tort actions. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”)

§ 12-542. However, if an action is timely commenced but “is terminated in any manner other

than . . . a final judgment on the merits, the plaintiff . . may commence a new action for the

same cause after the expiration of the time so limited and within six months after such

termination.” Id. § 12-504. Arizona’s savings statute “provid[es] automatic relief” if a timely,

diligently prosecuted, and otherwise proper action is dismissed involuntarily for reasons

unrelated to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. Jepson v. New, 164 Ariz. 265, 271, 792 P.2d

728, 734 (1990).

DISCUSSION

The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this action arises from the federal

questions presented in Counts 1-3. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Counts 2 and 3 have already been dismissed. (Docs. 39, 62.) Now, the District Defendants

move the Court to, inter alia, dismiss all remaining claims with prejudice (Doc. 70); Plaintiff

actually requests the Court grant the District Defendants’ motion as to his remaining § 1983

claim in Count 1 (Doc. 75 at 4-5). Although the complaint is unclear as to which Defendants

Count 1 pertained, Plaintiff unequivocally states that Count 1 is not one of his remaining

claims for relief. (Id. at 5.) Consequently, the Court dismisses Count 1 with prejudice.

Considerations of judicial economy and convenience militate against the exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction, especially given Plaintiff’s inability to serve the most important

Defendant, Daniel Mendez. Fairness in this case turns on whether Plaintiff will be denied an

Case 2:12-cv-00125-SMM Document 79 Filed 03/12/14 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

adjudication on the merits of his remaining claims. Even though the limitations period has

run on Plaintiff’s state-law claims, he will be able to reinstate those claims in state court if

the action is dismissed involuntarily for reasons—other than abatement or lack of

prosecution—unrelated to its merits. See Janson ex rel. Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470,

472-74, 808 P.2d 1222, 1224-26 (1991) (quoting Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533,

539, 109 N.E. 594, 596 (1915) (Cardozo, J.)) (“[T]he saving statute’s ‘broad and liberal

purpose is not to be frittered away by any narrow construction.’ ”); Templer v. Zele, 166

Ariz. 390, 391, 803 P.2d 111, 112 (App. 1990) (holding A.R.S. § 12-504 applies to actions

commenced outside of Arizona). As a result, Plaintiff will not be denied an adjudication on

the merits of his remaining state-law claims if the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over those claims. Therefore, dismissal is not unfair to Plaintiff and “the balance

of factors does not tip in favor of retaining the state-law claims.” Sanford, 625 F.3d at 561.

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses Plaintiff’s state-law

claims without prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting in part the District Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment solely on the dismissal with prejudice of Count 1. (Doc. 70.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing without prejudice all remaining claims

against all remaining Defendants pursuant to the Court’s discretion to decline supplementary

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot the District Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment in all other regards.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall terminate the case.

DATED this 11th day of March, 2014.

Case 2:12-cv-00125-SMM Document 79 Filed 03/12/14 Page 4 of 4