Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02254/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02254-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John D., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Roger Vanderpool, Director of Arizona

Department of Public Safety; City of

Phoenix, a Municipality; John

Lindenmeier, City of Phoenix Police

Department, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-2254-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 50), Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 51), and Motion for Summary Disposition (Doc. 53). 

I. ARIZONA’S MEGAN’S LAW

Megan Kanka was a seven year old child that was abducted, raped, and murdered by

a man who lived in the house across the street from her. He had been convicted of sex

offenses against young girls twice before, but the Kanka family was unaware of his prior

history. Since Megan’s murder, every state has enacted some form of “Megan’s Law,” that

requires registration and notification for convicted sex offenders. 

Arizona law requires every convicted sex offender to register with the sheriff of the

county where the offender resides. A.R.S. § 13-3821(A) (Supp.1997). The information

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provided by the offender is forwarded to the Department of Public Safety (DPS) and to the

chief of police where the offender resides. A.R.S. § 13-3821(D). Law enforcement must

then prepare a risk assessment and categorize the offender. A.R.S § 13-3825(A)(2), (C). The

Arizona Sex Offender Assessment Screening Profile for Regulatory Community Notification

(Risk Assessment), used by law enforcement to establish what level of notification a

convicted sex offender will receive, is based on guidelines that were created by the State

Community Notification Guideline Committee. A.R.S. §13-3826. 

Each risk assessment category has different notification requirements. The statutes

provide for notification that is "based on the risk that a particular sex offender poses to the

community." A.R.S. §§ 13-3825 to -3826. If a sex offender is rated a level 1 offender, law

enforcement must give information about the offender only to other law enforcement

agencies and the people the offender lives with. A.R.S. §13-3826(E)(1)(b). If the offender

is assessed as level 2 or 3, notification must be made to the neighborhood where the sex

offender lives, local schools and daycare centers, community groups and prospective

employers. Levels 2 and 3 also include a flyer with a photo and physical description of the

offender, the offender’s address, and the crime the offender was convicted of. Additionally,

a flyer and a press release are given to the media, and the same information is published to

the DPS web site. A.R.S. §§ 13-3826(E)(1)(a), -3827(B). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The chronology of events leading up to this lawsuit, presented in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, is as follows. On February 28, 2005, Plaintiff John D. pled guilty to

attempted sexual exploitation of a minor for viewing child pornography on the internet. In

the plea agreement, Plaintiff agreed to registration as a sex offender. Detective Lindenmeier

used the Risk Assessment to determine what level of notification the Plaintiff would receive.

Plaintiff received a score of 22, which is within the level 2 offender category. On July 21,

2005, Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney left a message with Detective Lindenmeier’s

office in order to discuss Plaintiff’s notification level. Later that day, Detective Lindenmeier

returned the message, explaining that he would not discuss the notification level. Plaintiff

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disputes the finding that he is a level 2 offender and filed the §1983 action to challenge the

constitutionality of Arizona’s sex offender notification statute. 

To prepare for trial, Defendants wished to take the depositions of Plaintiff and

Plaintiff’s wife. The deposition notices were served on Plaintiff and his wife on January 5,

2006. Amended deposition notices were served on February 1, 2006. The depositions were

scheduled for March 22, 2006, nine days before the discovery deadline. On March 20, 2006,

Defendants’ counsel received a letter stating that Plaintiff’s counsel could not attend the

deposition because of another matter. Defendants’ counsel responded that she would move

the depositions only if Plaintiff’s counsel could persuade the Court to extend the discovery

and dispositive motion deadlines. Plaintiff’s counsel failed to contact either the Court or

Defendants’ counsel. On March 22, 2006, Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s wife, and Plaintiff’s counsel

did not appear for depositions. 

 Defendants filed a Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiff’s failure to appear for

depositions on March 30, 2006, and a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 3, 2006.

Plaintiff did not respond to either motion. On May 16, 2006, Defendants moved for

summary disposition of both motions. 

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Defendants submitted a Motion for Summary Disposition under Local Rule 7.2(i), on

May 16, 2006. The Rule states that motions can be summarily granted by the Court when

the adverse party fails to respond. Here, Defendants seek to have the Court grant two

motions: (1) a Motion for Sanctions for failure to appear for depositions, filed on March 30,

2006, and (2) a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on April 3, 2006. The Court discusses

each in turn. 

IV. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion for sanctions. Local Rule 7.2(i) allows the

Court to grant Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions outright. Despite the authorization of the

local rule, however, the Court will address the motion on the merits to explain what sanctions

it imposes, and the party it will impose them on.

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Rule 37(d) authorizes the Court to sanction a party who fails to appear for a deposition

after being served with proper notice. The Rule states in pertinent part: 

If a party ... fails to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition,

after being served with a proper notice, the court in which the action is

pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,

and among others it may take any action authorized under subparagraphs (A),

(B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in

addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney

advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's

fees, caused by the failure unless the court finds that the failure was

substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses

unjust.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d). Each of the elements of the rule has been satisfied. First, it is

undisputed that Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s wife, and Plaintiff’s counsel received notice of the

depositions. Second, by enclosing copies of the notice, Defendants have adequately

demonstrated to the Court that notice to the parties was proper. Third, the affidavit of the

Court reporter who was to take the depositions attests that Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s wife, and

Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear for the deposition. Therefore, Rule 37 directs the Court

to apply sanctions against the offending party unless the failure to appear was substantially

justified. 

To make an award of costs and fees, the Court must only determine whether those

failures were "substantially justified," within the meaning of Rule 37. Plaintiff’s counsel

made no attempt to contact Defense counsel personally to arrange an alternate date. A letter

sent only two days before a scheduled deposition, and less than two weeks before the

discovery deadline, afforded opposing counsel no meaningful opportunity to respond, and

is inadequate to substantially justify a failure to appear for depositions. Therefore, the Court

need only determine what sanctions are appropriate.

Plaintiff's failures to adhere to the discovery plan are due to a lack of diligence by its

counsel. Rule 37 sanctions must be applied both "to penalize those whose conduct may be

deemed to warrant such a sanction, and to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct

in the absence of such a deterrent." National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,

427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). If an attorney is responsible for the failure to provide discovery,

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Rules 37(b) and 37(d) permit the Court to hold that attorney personally liable for the award

of fees and expenses. In this instance it is appropriate for the attorney, and not the party, to

pay for the inconvenience he caused. 

Defendants ask the Court to impose two sanctions. First, Defendants claimed the

modest sum of $360 for two hours its counsel spent preparing for the deposition. Second,

Defendants request that Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s wife be barred from testifying at trial. To

determine an appropriate award, the Court first seeks to compensate the opposing party for

the time and expense of preparing the depositions. The Court agrees that the imposition of

$360 against Plaintiff’s attorney is reasonable. However, because the Court grants judgment

in favor of Defendants and this lawsuit will not reach the trial phase, it is unnecessary to

reach the issue of precluding Plaintiff from testifying.

V. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants also request the Court to summarily grant their Motion for Summary

Judgment. In Martinez v. Stanford, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a motion

for summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the opposing party violated a local

rule because the moving party has an affirmative duty under Rule 56 to demonstrate its

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 323 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56. In other words, despite the local rule that permits the Court to summarily grant

motions, the Court must analyze a Motion for Summary Judgment on the merits. Therefore,

in order to heed the mandate of Martinez, the Court examines the Motion for Summary

Judgment as if the Plaintiff had responded. 

Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, summary judgment is mandated,

“...against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

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Initially, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating to the Court the basis for the

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be unable

to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. In addition, the nonmoving party may

not oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by mere reliance on the

pleadings. See id. at 324. Because Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ motion, the

Court can only address the pleadings and the motion to determine whether basis exists to

deny the motion, however, it construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Defendants assert five grounds upon which the Court can conclude that Plaintiff is

unable to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact. Defendants’ arguments

consist of the following issues: (1) substantive due process; (2) procedural due process; (3)

vagueness; (4) equal protection; and (5) equal protection “class of one.” The Court addresses

each in turn. 

A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Defendants argue they should be granted judgment because the community

notification statute does not implicate a liberty interest. Implicitly, Defendants are arguing

that the notification statute should be analyzed under the rational relations level of scrutiny,

and that Plaintiff could not prevail under that standard. The Fourteenth Amendment’s

guarantee that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process

of law,” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, has been construed to provide heightened protection

against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. Reno

v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania

v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Conversely, if no fundamental right or liberty interest

is implicated, legislation is generally presumed valid and will be sustained if the

classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of

Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). If the Court applies

heightened scrutiny to the Arizona statute, it is more likely that a genuine issue will exist as

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to whether it violated Plaintiff’s rights. Therefore, the Court presents arguments for Plaintiff

that most accurately reflect whether heightened scrutiny should apply.

Plaintiff could make three arguments supporting his view that a heightened level of

scrutiny should be applied to his substantive due process claim: (1) his privacy rights have

been violated by the notification statute; (2) the Arizona statute infringes upon his right to

control the upbringing of his child; and (3) the notification statute creates a statutory privacy

interest that prevents disclosure of the information by law enforcement. 

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no fundamental privacy interest in keeping

the information disclosed by the notification statute private. In Doe v. Tandeske, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals held that persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses

do not have a fundamental right to be free from registration and notification. 361 F.3d 594,

597 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to heightened scrutiny review of the

Arizona statute merely because he wishes to keep the information of his conviction of a

sexual offense private. 

Second, Plaintiff alleged that if he continues to be labeled as a level 2 offender, his

wife will take his son away. This allegation could be construed as an infringement upon

Plaintiff’s ability to direct the education and upbringing of his child, a fundamental liberty

interest that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,

400 (1923). However, this argument fails because the deprivation would occur not because

of state action, but rather, because of the private actions of a party motivated by the indirect

costs that registration entails. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment offers

no shield against private conduct, “however discriminatory and wrongful.” Jackson v.

Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974). Therefore, Plaintiff will not be able to

establish that he is entitled to heightened scrutiny of Arizona’s statute because of the actions

of his wife. 

Third, Defendants argue the community notification statute does not create a statutory

privacy interest such that the Plaintiff could bring a substantive due process claim for police

use of the information. A.R.S. § 13-2823 states, “Except for use by law enforcement officers

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and for dissemination as provided in § 41-1750, a statement, photograph or fingerprint

required by this article shall not be made available to any person.” (emphasis added).

Further, A.R.S. §§ 13-3825 to -3826 require law enforcement officers to disclose information

about a sex offender to the community. Together, these statutes cannot be read to mean that

sex offenders are protected from law enforcement’s use of the information. Arizona’s

Megan’s Law was enacted specifically to require law enforcement officials to use the

information. To construe the statutes otherwise would defeat the legislature’s intent to arm

the community with sex offender information so that it can protect itself from recidivists.

Plaintiff failed to establish that he is entitled to heightened scrutiny analysis, thus, he can

challenge the Arizona notification statute only under the rational basis test.

Because the Arizona statute implicates neither a fundamental right nor a liberty

interest, the government need only demonstrate that the statute serves a legitimate purpose.

Here, the law’s purpose is to protect public safety and “forestall future incidents of sexual

abuse by notifying those who may well encounter a potential recidivist.” Arizona Dept. of

Public Safety v. Superior Court, 190 Ariz. 490, 495, 949 P.2d 983, 988 (App. 1997). The

state has a reasonable and legitimate interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of

its citizens, and community notification is rationally related to achieving that interest by

alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community. Therefore, even in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts do not demonstrate that his substantive due process

rights under the United States Constitution have been violated. 

B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Defendants also argue Plaintiff was not entitled to a separate hearing after his

conviction to determine what level of notification he would be assigned. They claim his

participation in the criminal justice system furnished all the procedural due process he is

entitled to. Although Defendants correctly identify that community notification is authorized

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only as a consequence of conviction for a sex crime, they misstate the significant of factual

hearings in the context of due process claims. 

In Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003), the Supreme

Court held that Connecticut’s Megan’s Law did not deprive a Defendant of procedural due

process when it required notification after conviction without a hearing. The Court reasoned

that a hearing would be irrelevant because the law imposed notification requirements upon

the basis of the conviction alone. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). It held that in order to assert the

right to a hearing under the due process clause, a Plaintiff must show that the facts they seek

to establish in that hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme. Id. at 8 (emphasis

added). Here, the facts the Plaintiff seeks establish are relevant under Arizona’s statutory

scheme. Unlike Connecticut, Arizona does not base notification upon conviction alone, but

instead, “scores” each registrant and bases the level of notification upon the seriousness of

the underlying offense and the offender’s probability of recidivism. Thus, where Plaintiff

can point to facts that are relevant under the statutory scheme, he is entitled to a due process

hearing in able to contest those facts. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he has been denied a due process

hearing. Arizona’s notification law provides for a procedure so that a registrant can

challenge his notification level. A.R.S. § 13-3826(E)(2) directed the Community

Notification Guidelines Committee to “Develop and recommend a process for a sex offender

to request a notification level review and for the court to determine if a sex offender

notification level may be reduced or the offender is no longer required to register.” Although

the record contains testimony by the Plaintiff’s attorney that she attempted to contact the

officer who assigned the Plaintiff his notification level, there is no evidence that Plaintiff

appealed his classification in any other manner, such as through the state court or an

administrative agency. 

This Court cannot assume that Plaintiff’s due process rights have been violated simply

because Plaintiff failed to pursue his grievance in the state system or respond to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the notification

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committee never created the procedure that he could utilize to appeal his notification level.

However, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586-87 (1986). Facially, the statute provides the procedural due process that Plaintiff claims

he has been denied. Without evidence of Arizona’s denial of Plaintiff’s rights, the Court

finds no Constitutional offense in Arizona’s statute, and no triable issue of fact with which

Plaintiff could defeat the Motion for Summary Judgment. 

C. VAGUENESS 

Defendants next argue that Arizona’s notification statute is not unconstitutionally

vague, and thus, should be upheld. An act is unconstitutionally vague when it fails to define

clearly what actions it prohibits, depriving the public of fair notice as to what is prohibited,

and encouraging arbitrary enforcement. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 705 (2000). Thus,

to survive vagueness review, a statute must “(1) define the offense with sufficient

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited; and (2) establish

standards to permit police to enforce the law in a non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner.”

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). 

The Court reviewed the statute and finds it meets the standard articulated in Kolender.

The statute clearly defines the duties and responsibilities of the government and the

registrant; the statute gives clear notice of what actions will trigger registration and what

registration will entail. Further, the statute clearly defines the procedures law enforcement

officials must use with every registrant to ensure enforcement of the notification statute is

uniform. The risk assessment is based on statutorily-mandated guidelines promulgated by

the committee. The Court agrees with Defendants that Arizona’s community notification

statute survives a vagueness challenge, and presents no genuine issue of fact for trial.

D. EQUAL PROTECTION

Defendants next argue that an equal protection challenge to Arizona’s community

notification statute also fails because the statute’s classifications survive rational basis

scrutiny. Regulation is subject to rational basis scrutiny unless it discriminates against

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members of a suspect class or implicates a fundamental right. Green v. City of Tucson, 340

F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has resolved both issues

regarding sex offenders. In United States v. Lemay, it held that sex offenders are not a

suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. 260 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 (9th Cir.

2001). In Tandeske, it held that persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do

not have a fundamental right to be free from registration and notification statutes. 361 F.3d

at 597. Together, these cases demonstrate that sex offender notification laws implicate

neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right. Accordingly, Arizona’s classification scheme

is subject only to the rational basis test. 

For the purposes of equal protection, a statute is constitutional under the rational basis

test when “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational

basis for” it. FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). In other words,

where there are any plausible reasons for legislative action, the Court’s inquiry is at an end.

Arizona’s community notification statute makes two distinctions. First, it requires

notification for sex offenders but not other dangerous felons. Second, it places sex offenders

into different notification categories based upon their dangerousness to the community. For

the Plaintiff to prevail, the classifications must be irrational.

“Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation ... States thus have a vital interest in

rehabilitating convicted sex offenders.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32-33 (2002) (plurality

opinion). In light of this threat and the likelihood of re-offense for this class of felons, the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that even lifetime registration requirements are

rationally related to the State’s interest in protecting the public. Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d

1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 2005). Further, distinctions among felons generally are clearly

permissible. The criminal code differentiates among all felons based upon the legislature’s

determination of the severity of the crime, the effect of deterrence, and other policy

considerations. The fact that community notification reporting requirements are civil is

immaterial. Arizona’s determination that certain convicted sex offenders are more

dangerous, and thus subject to greater notification requirements, is rationally related to

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providing the public with notification commensurate to the danger posed by those sexual

offenders. Therefore, Arizona’s classifications and sub-classifications for sex offender

registration are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose and, accordingly,

present no triable issue of fact.

E. EQUAL PROTECTION “CLASS OF ONE”

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot successfully bring a “class of one” equal

protection claim. Generally, the Equal Protection Clause ensures that “all persons similarly

situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439. However, the equal protection

guarantee protects not only groups, but individuals who would constitute a “class of one.”

Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings,

Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir.2002). Together, these rules establish that even

where an actor is uniquely situated, that actor’s equal protection rights can still be violated.

Where, as here, state action does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification,

Plaintiff can establish a “class of one” equal protection claim in two ways. First, he could

demonstrate he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and

that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.

Second, Plaintiff could demonstrate that selective enforcement of valid laws is a pretext for

the improper motive of discriminating against him personally. See Freeman v. City of Santa

Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to make either showing required to bring a “class of one” equal

protection claim. The record is devoid of facts that demonstrate; (1) Defendants acted

intentionally against Plaintiff, (2) laws were selectively enforced against Plaintiff as a pretext

to discriminate against him specifically, (3) Plaintiff was treated differently from others, or

(4) others similarly situated were treated better than Plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to produce any

evidence to persuade the Court that the proffered reason for the notification level he has

received is objectively false. If anything, the record reflects the assigning officer’s

unwillingness to speak to Defendants’ counsel merely underscores his desire to avoid the

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appearance of impropriety. Without more, the Court cannot determine that the notification

level Plaintiff received lacks a rational basis.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Court’s examination of Arizona’s Megan’s Law leads it to the determination that

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a material issue of fact exists regarding whether the statute

violates his due process or equal protection rights, is unconstitutionally vague, or fails the

rational relations test of constitutionality. Further, the unprofessional conduct of Plaintiff’s

attorney in this matter requires the Court to impose sanctions on him. 

Based upon the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 50) is GRANTED

IN PART, and Mr. Nicholas Hentoff is hereby sanctioned $360; Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Disposition (Doc. 53) is DENIED as moot; and Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 51) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly. 

DATED this 19th day of July, 2006.

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