Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00290/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-00290-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID R. MARTELL,

Petitioner,

v.

MARION SPEARMAN,

Respondent.

Case No. 18-cv-00290-EMC 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

David R. Martell filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

to challenge his conviction from Santa Clara County Superior Court. Respondent has filed an 

answer to the petition, and Mr. Martell has filed a traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the 

petition is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Crime

Mr. Martell was tried along with Marcos Mendoza and Juan Javier Ramirez for the murder 

of Maurillo Garcia. The California Court of Appeal described the evidence presented at trial:

The jury heard two accounts of Maurillo Garcia's death. Tommy 

Gonzalez, an accomplice, provided one account. Tommy testified 

that he was drinking with fellow Norteño gang members in the front 

yard of his house when a suspected Sureño gang member started 

spray-painting on the street by the house, leading Tommy and 

several others to chase down and assault the Sureño. Salvador 

Rivas, an eyewitness, provided a second account. He testified that 

he was at a party at his father's house when he saw a group of five to 

seven men run toward and assault a man who was spray-painting in 

the street.

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1. Co–Perpetrator Tommy Gonzalez's Account

Tommy Gonzalez testified for the prosecution as part of a plea 

agreement whereby the prosecutor agreed to reduce his murder 

charge related to Maurillo Garcia's death to voluntary manslaughter 

in return for his truthful testimony at defendants' trial. Tommy lived 

at 436 Ezie St. with his mother, his brother Raymond Gonzalez, Jr. 

(Raymond Jr.), his nephew Raymond Gonzalez III (Raymond III), 

and others. Tommy had been a Norteño gang member since he was 

nine years old. His nickname was Beast because he fought 

frequently when he was incarcerated for a juvenile offense.

Tommy's friend Javier Barragan called him in the afternoon on 

August 27, 2011 and asked if he could come “kick back” at 

Tommy's house. Barragan arrived around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. with 

defendants Mendoza and Ramirez. Tommy knew Mendoza by the 

nickname Travieso and Ramirez by the nickname Smiley. Tommy 

testified that Barragan, Mendoza, and Ramirez were all part of a 

Norteño subset called San Jose Unidos. They all drank beers in the 

front yard and were eventually joined around 8:00 p.m. by defendant 

Martell, known to Tommy as Guerro. Tommy had not met Martell 

before, but Barragan assured him that Martell was “‘good people.’” 

At trial, Tommy identified all three defendants as the people who 

came to his house on August 27.

Around 10:00 p.m., Tommy saw a person (later identified as 

Maurillo Garcia) who looked like a Sureño gang member walk past 

the house twice within two minutes. Garcia walked to a stop sign 

where Richdale Avenue dead-ends into Ezie Street and spraypainted something on the ground while saying “Sur Trece Putos 

Calle.” Tommy perceived Garcia's actions as a challenge. Tommy 

ran toward Garcia, followed closely by Martell and then more 

distantly by Mendoza, Ramirez, and Barragan. Tommy swung at 

Garcia but missed; Garcia cut Tommy's stomach with a screwdriver.

Tommy backed up and “everybody jump[ed] on” Garcia. Mendoza 

and Ramirez were punching Garcia. Tommy did not see Martell or 

Barragan do any punching or kicking. Tommy and the others ran 

back to his mother's Cadillac that was parked in front of 436 Ezie St. 

and drove away.

2. Witness Salvador Rivas's Account

Salvador Rivas testified that on the night of the homicide he was 

attending a party at his father's house on Ezie Street, which faces the 

intersection of Richdale Avenue and Ezie Street. Rivas was in the 

garage and the garage door facing the street was open. Jose Garcia 

(Maurillo Garcia's brother, whom we refer to as Jose for clarity) 

walked by the house and Rivas's father invited Jose to have a beer.

Rivas noticed Maurillo Garcia spray-painting on the street near a 

stop sign. Five to seven men came from the direction of 436 Ezie 

St. and chased Garcia.2 Rivas heard someone yell “‘Get him’” and 

“‘Norte.’”

[Footnote 2:] . . . Rivas’s testimony at trial regarding the 

chase was somewhat inconsistent. On direct examination, 

Rivas testified that one male led the chase and was followed 

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by the remaining people. On cross-examination, Rivas 

testified that two men led the chase but that one of them was 

slightly in front of the second, with the rest further behind 

the second man.

Rivas testified that Garcia ran but was tripped and fell, at which 

point all of the men who chased him started beating him. Rivas 

stated that everyone participated in the assault. Garcia managed to 

get up for a moment but the men knocked him down again and 

continued to beat him. Rivas testified that the men mostly kicked 

Garcia but some punches were also thrown. He could not clearly 

see any weapons. He saw something shiny but acknowledged it 

could have been a belt buckle. Rivas also could not see any of the 

attackers well enough to identify them in court. The attack lasted 

about 30 seconds. The men went back toward 436 Ezie St. and left 

in a Cadillac. One of the men might have left separately in a van.

Rivas described the assailants as Hispanic males between 20 and 30 

years old. He acknowledged that it was not very light outside the 

night of the homicide, that there were no streetlights in the area of 

Richdale where the homicide took place, and that there were some 

cars and trucks parked in the driveway of his father's house. He 

estimated his vantage point in the garage was 60 yards from the 

victim.

People v. Mendoza, No. H039705, slip op. at 3-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Opinion filed April 13, 2018). 

Additional evidence placed Mr. Martell, as well as his codefendants Mr. Mendoza and Mr. 

Ramirez, at the scene of the crime, but that need only be mentioned briefly because Mr. Martell 

does not dispute that he was present at the scene of the crime.1 Raymond Gonzalez, Jr. (i.e., 

Tommy Gonzalez’s brother) testified that Mr. Martell was among the men drinking with Tommy 

Gonzalez in the front yard of 436 Ezie Street on the evening of the homicide. Id. at 6. Raymond 

Gonzalez, III (i.e., Tommy Gonzalez’s nephew) denied at trial that the defendants were at 436 

Ezie Street that evening and was inconsistent in his statements to the police as to whether Mr. 

Martell was present that night; however, “at some point” during his interviews with police, “he 

identified a picture of Martell as a suspect.” Id. Police found a cell phone near the intersection of 

Richdale Avenue and Ezie Street the night of the homicide that was linked to Mr. Martell. Id. at 

10. Mr. Martell’s fingerprint was on a beer can found in the back yard at 436 Ezie Street, and his 

 

1 After the guilty verdict, Mr. Martell stopped challenging that he was present when the stabbing 

took place. See, e.g., Docket No. 1 at 16 (stating, in federal habeas petition, “[i]t is conceded that 

petitioner was not only drinking with the other co-defendants that evening, but also went with 

them to the vicinity where the homicide took place.”); Docket No. 12-31 at 28 (stating same in 

appellant’s opening brief).

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DNA was on a cigarette found in the front driveway of the house. When interviewed by police a 

few days after the homicide, Mr. Martell denied “repeatedly denied being on Ezie Street on 

August 27 and told the police he did not know anything about the homicide” but he “had scratches 

and abrasions on his hands,” id. at 13, that were consistent with having been in a fight.

There also was evidence regarding the defendants’ flight on the night of the killing.

Tommy testified that he drove the Cadillac away from 436 Ezie St. 

with Mendoza, Ramirez, Martell, and Barragan. While they were 

driving, Mendoza reportedly stated, “‘I got that nigga,’” and also 

stated that he “‘booked him’” 14 or 15 times. Ramirez said “I was 

carving that fool's face,” and then complained to Mendoza that “you 

fucking cut me, bitch.” Mendoza responded that Ramirez “shouldn't 

be getting in my way when I'm handling my business.” Ramirez had 

a deep cut on his hand.

Tommy testified that Barragan told him to drive to Peckerwood's 

(later identified as John Deleone's) apartment in the Thornbridge 

Apartments, which were near Ezie Street. Barragan asked for the 

weapons and Tommy reportedly saw a kitchen knife that had been 

used by Mendoza as well as a screwdriver. At some point, Martell 

said that he had dropped his phone somewhere. Tommy parked, 

they wiped down the car, and he and Barragan went upstairs to 

Deleone's apartment. Tommy or Barragan handed the weapons to 

Deleone, Deleone's girlfriend took them into the bathroom, and then 

“you hear the water running.”

Tommy testified that Barragan's brother Junior picked the group up 

from Deleone's apartment about ten minutes after they arrived and 

drove them to Barragan's mother's house near the Oakridge Mall.

The group stayed at Barragan's mother's house for a short time. 

Martell left separately before the others.

Id. at 7-9. Mr. Deleone testified that he did not see Mr. Martell that night. Mr. Deleone also 

testified that Mr. “Barragan was a Norteno who was affiliated with San Jose Unidos. Deleone 

acknowledged that he identified Ramirez at the grand jury hearing as a member of San Jose 

Unidos but testified at trial that ‘I might have misspoke when you asked me that question.’” Id. at 

9.

The pathologist who had performed the autopsy testified that Mr. Garcia “suffered 15 stab 

wounds to his face, chest, abdomen, thighs, arms, right foot, and lower back,” as well as three 

incised wounds (i.e., wounds that are longer than they are deep) and multiple blunt-force injuries. 

Id. at 12. Although he could not be certain, the pathologist “testified that the structure of the stab 

wounds indicated the possibility that two weapons were used: one with a single-edged blade and 

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another with a double-edged blade.” Id. The pathologist opined that the cause of death was 

multiple stab wounds to the head, trunk and extremities. Id.

There also was evidence suggesting intimidation of witnesses. Mr. Deleone testified that 

“he was punched in the mouth by an inmate while in custody in the Santa Clara County Jail in 

May 2012. Deleone was told that the attack had been ordered by ‘the Nortenos’ because Deleone 

had made statements to the police related to defendants’ case.” Id. at 14-15. Mr. Deleone was put 

in protective custody and thereafter asked to be relocated and to be escorted to and from testifying 

at trial because he feared for his life. Id. Tommy Gonzalez testified that Mr. Barragan’s brother 

told him “that his a nephew and his brother (presumably meaning Raymond Jr. and Raymond III) 

‘are snitching on me and on everybody’ and asked Tommy if he knew where they were. Tommy 

withheld the information [from Mr. Barragan’s brother] because he feared for both his and his 

family’s safety.” Id. at 15. Mr. Rivas testified that, in October 2011, someone spray-painted 

graffiti on his garage, including the letters “XIV.” Id. (A gang expert testified that the number 14 

is among the common names, signs and symbols for the Norteno gang. Id. at 32.) Mr. Rivas

“feared for his family’s safety and believed the graffiti was related to him talking to the police 

because the graffiti occurred within two hours after he received a subpoena to testify in 

defendants’ case.” Id. at 15.

The defense case included the following: A man who worked with Mr. Martell as a 

furniture mover testified that it was common for employees to get scratches while at work. Id. A 

defense investigator testified that the distance between the place where the victim was stabbed and 

the garage at 452 Ezie Street (i.e., from where Mr. Rivas had seen the attack) was 198 feet and that 

there would have been almost no light from the moon on the night of the homicide. Id. 

B. Procedural History

Following the jury trial in Santa Clara County Superior Court, Mr. Martell was convicted

of second degree murder, see Cal Penal Code § 187, and was found to have committed the murder 

for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, id. at §

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186.22(b)(1)(C).2 Mr. Martell also was found to have had a prior juvenile adjudication that 

qualified as a prior strike conviction, id. at § 667(b)(i). The court sentenced him to 15 years to life 

in prison for the murder and stayed the sentence on the gang enhancement. Docket No. 12-5 at 

309 (SCT 299).

Mr. Martell appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction in a 

reasoned decision, and the California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review. 

Mr. Martell then filed this action to obtain a federal writ of habeas corpus. He alleges in 

his petition that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and the gang enhancement. 

Respondent has filed an answer. Mr. Martell has filed a traverse. The matter is now ready for 

decision.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition 

concerns the conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Santa Clara County, California, 

which is within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 

to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of 

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

 

2 Codefendants Mr. Mendoza and Mr. Ramirez also were convicted of second degree murder with 

a gang enhancement. 

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“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A 

federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state 

court’s application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 409.

The state-court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). “When there has been one 

reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that 

judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. When 

confronted with an unexplained decision from the last state court to have been presented with the 

issue, “the federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related statecourt decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained 

decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The 

presumption that a later summary denial rests on the same reasoning as the earlier reasoned 

decision is a rebuttable presumption and can be overcome by strong evidence. Kernan v. 

Hinojosa, 136 S. Ct. 1603, 1605-06 (2016). 

V. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence To Support The Murder Conviction

Mr. Martell contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for 

second degree murder. He urges that, because eyewitness Rivas’ account of the crime was not 

credible and there was no evidence that Mr. Martell knew any alleged coperpetrator other than Mr. 

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Barragan, there was insufficient evidence to support Mr. Martell’s conviction under the naturaland-probable-consequences doctrine. Docket No. 1 at 6-7.

1. State Appellate Court’s Rejection of Claim

The California Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Martell’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. 

As stated above, “we review the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence 

that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable 

trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” ([People v.] Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th [297,] 331 [Cal. 

1998)].)

Based on the instructions the jury received, we assume the jury 

found Martell guilty of second degree murder under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine based on the following implicit 

findings: Martell personally assaulted Garcia; Martell aided and 

abetted Mendoza and Ramirez (and possibly others) in their assault 

of Garcia; one or more of the perpetrators to that assault murdered 

Garcia; and a reasonable person in Martell's position would have or 

should have known that murder was a reasonably foreseeable 

consequence of the group assault.

People v. Mendoza, slip op. at 62. 

Mr. Martell’s primary argument on appeal was that Mr. Rivas’ testimony as to what he saw 

on the night of the murder was not credible as a matter of law because of the conditions under 

which he viewed the attack. The state appellate court disagreed. 

Rivas testified that five to seven men came from the direction of 436 

Ezie St., chased Garcia, and knocked him down. Those men “were 

all participating” in the assault that followed, which included mostly 

kicking but also some punching. Rivas acknowledged that it was 

not very light outside that night, that there were no streetlights near 

the victim's location on Richdale, and that his vantage point in the 

garage was about 60 yards from the victim. A defense investigator 

testified that the distance between Rivas and the victim was around 

66 yards and that, based on information from the Internet, there 

would have been almost no light coming from the moon on the night 

of the homicide. Martell's trial counsel did not elicit testimony from

any witness (expert or otherwise) regarding how well one might be 

able to see an assault occurring under similar circumstances as those 

experienced by Rivas. . . .

Contrary to Martell's argument, Rivas's credibility as an eyewitness 

was a quintessential jury question. Rivas testified about what he 

saw that night and acknowledged factors (including distance and 

lighting) that might affect how the jury would weigh his testimony.

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Attorneys for Martell and Ramirez cross-examined Rivas at length 

about the lighting conditions and distance from which he witnessed 

the homicide.

It is not unreasonable as a matter of law that someone could see 

whether a group of five to seven men were all participating in an 

assault occurring about 60 yards from the eyewitness despite poor 

lighting conditions. The defense provided no expert testimony to 

call into question Rivas's ability to see under those circumstances, 

much less testimony that could discredit Rivas's account as a matter 

of law. Martell cannot discredit Rivas's testimony by simply 

labeling it an “improbable and extraordinary visual feat” on appeal.

The jury was free to weigh Rivas's credibility and decide whether 

his testimony should be credited. Based on defendants' convictions, 

we infer that the jury found Rivas's testimony credible, a finding we 

must defer to on appeal. (People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 

749.)

People v. Mendoza, slip op. at 62-63. 

Having determined that the jury reasonably could have credited Mr. Rivas’ testimony that 

he saw all the men attacking the victim, the state appellate court then considered Mr. Martell’s 

argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of murder. The state appellate court 

determined that there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Martell aided and abetted in the assault on 

Mr. Garcia, and in turn that there was sufficient evidence to show that the murder was a natural 

and probable consequence of that assault.

[1.] Evidence Supporting Aider and Abettor Liability

“[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct 

areas: (a) the direct perpetrator's actus reus—a crime committed by 

the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor's mens rea—

knowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and an intent to 

assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and 

abettor's actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact 

assists the achievement of the crime.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 

Cal.4th 1219, 1225 (Perez); [Cal. Penal Code] § 31 [“All persons 

concerned in the commission of a crime ..., whether they directly 

commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its 

commission ..., are principals in any crime so committed.”].)

There was ample evidence that a perpetrator assaulted Garcia, 

including Tommy's testimony that Ramirez and Mendoza punched 

Garcia; Mendoza's hearsay statement to Tommy that he “‘booked’” 

Garcia 14 or 15 times; and Dr. O'Hara's testimony that Garcia 

received numerous stab wounds, lacerations, and blunt-force trauma.

There was also evidence showing that Martell assisted in the attack 

by personally assaulting Garcia. Martell “concede[s] here that 

Martell was not only drinking with the other co-defendants that 

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evening, but also went with them to the vicinity where the homicide

took place.” Rivas testified that the people who ran from 436 Ezie 

St. (a group that Martell now concedes he was a part of) “were all 

participating” in the assault on Garcia. Detective Vallejo testified 

that when he interrogated Martell four days after the assault, Martell 

had scratches or abrasions on his hands. And Tommy testified that 

Martell left the scene of the homicide with the other defendants.

Though the foregoing evidence was challenged by calling into 

question Rivas's ability to see and by offering an innocent 

explanation for the scratches on Martell's hands (that he had 

sustained the injuries at work), those challenges were only to the 

weight of the evidence. A reasonable trier of fact could have found 

that Martell assisted the other defendants by personally assaulting 

Garcia. (Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.)

As for Martell's mens rea, the prosecutor had to show not only 

Martell's knowledge of the perpetrators' unlawful intent but also 

Martell's intent to assist the perpetrators. (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th 

at p. 1225.) The evidence supported a finding that Martell was 

present and directly participated in the assault. Based on that 

evidence, the jury could find both that Martell had knowledge of the 

other perpetrators' intent (because he could see them assaulting 

Garcia), and that Martell intended to assist those other perpetrators 

by actively assaulting Garcia.

Martell's arguments to the contrary all go to the weight of the 

evidence rather than to its sufficiency to support a conviction.

Martell argues that Rivas “never testified as to when he heard” the 

perpetrators yell, meaning those statements could not support a 

finding that Martell knew of the perpetrators' intent. But the jury 

could reasonably infer that whoever yelled “‘Get him’” would do so 

before assaulting Garcia, thus supporting a finding that Martell 

became apprised of the perpetrators' intent in advance. Martell also 

argues that he was intoxicated, which he deems “important in 

evaluating the motive of [an] intoxicated 20–year–old following 

others [to] where the homicide eventually occurred.” But, as 

already discussed, the jury was properly instructed regarding 

voluntary intoxication and its decision to convict Martell supports an 

inference that the jury determined that voluntary intoxication did not 

negate Martell's specific intent to aid and abet. . . .

[2.] Evidence Supporting Martell’s Murder Conviction

Martell argues that even if there was sufficient evidence that he 

assaulted Garcia and aided and abetted the other perpetrators' 

assault, the evidence was nonetheless insufficient to show that 

murder was a natural and probable consequence of the assault. “‘A 

person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of 

not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other 

crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a 

natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.’” (Medina, 

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920, brackets in Medina.) A nontarget 

offense is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense if 

a reasonable person in the defendant's position should have known 

that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence 

of the intended crime the defendant aided and abetted. (Ibid.)

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Whether the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable 

consequence “is a factual issue to be resolved by the jury.” (Ibid.)

Tommy testified that he, Barragan, Martell, Mendoza, and Ramirez 

all ran toward Garcia, and Rivas testified that everyone in the group 

who ran after Garcia participated in the assault by punching or 

kicking Garcia. Based on that evidence, a jury could reasonably 

conclude that a reasonable person in Martell's position should have 

known that Garcia's death would be a foreseeable consequence of 

five men assaulting one victim.

People v. Mendoza, slip op. at 63-66 (second brackets and bracketed section numbers added).

As the last reasoned decision from a state court, the California Court of Appeal’s decision 

is the decision to which § 2254(d) is applied. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Mr. Martell is 

entitled to habeas relief only if the California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law from the U.S. Supreme Court, or was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

2. Analysis of Federal Constitutional Claims

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A court reviewing a conviction does not 

determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but 

rather determines whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Only if no rational trier of 

fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may a court conclude that the 

evidence is insufficient. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. The “prosecution need not affirmatively 

‘rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt,’” and the reviewing federal court “‘faced with a 

record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume – even if it does not 

affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the 

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’” Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992) 

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). 

“Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the 

evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors ‘draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

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to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319). “[O]n habeas review, a federal court may not overturn a state court decision 

rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge” unless “the state court decision was objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, it was not an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, any Supreme Court holding 

for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the 

jury’s determination that Mr. Martell committed second degree murder. It was entirely consistent 

with Jackson for the California Court of Appeal to determine that it was for the jury, not the 

reviewing court, to determine whether Mr. Rivas’ account of the attack was credible. Under

Jackson, a jury’s credibility determinations are “entitled to near-total deference.” Bruce v. 

Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

where defendant argued that victim’s “account of being molested on a bed along-side four other 

sleeping children is inherently implausible”). Although Mr. Rivas was viewing the events from a 

distance of about 180-198 feet in a poorly lit area at nighttime, no evidence showed it to be an 

impossibility for him to see the events. This Court, like the state appellate court, must defer to the 

jury’s implicit determination that Mr. Rivas was credible in testifying as to what he saw. Here, the 

jury rationally could have determined that Mr. Rivas was credible and had seen the attack. Mr. 

Rivas testified:

Q: So what happens as they run?

A: He starts running towards further down Richdale, and the first 

guy that walked towards him tripped him, and then they all ganged 

up on him.

Q: What did they do?

A: They just started beating him up.

Q: This is in the middle of Richdale?

A: Yes.

Q: Did they all participate in beating him up?

A: Yes.

Q: What do you see as far as this beating goes?

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A: They just had him on the floor. The guy on the floor, the one 

that was tagging, manages to get up. They knock him down a 

second time, and then from then he is just down.

Q: How did they knock him down?

A: They tackled him down.

Q: And did basically all the group participate in attacking him, 

tackling him, putting him down, that sort of thing?

A: Yes.

Q: For instance, did you see one guy that wasn’t doing anything, 

just watching, or were they all participating?

A: They were all participating.

Q: And what did you see happening – punches, kicks? What do 

you see?

A: Mostly kicks.

Q: Did you [sic] anything that looks like punches?

A: Yes, punches. 

RT 725-26 (emphasis added). Mr. Rivas also testified that he did not see any weapons in the 

attack which lasted “maybe around 30 seconds.” RT 726-27.

Mr. Rivas’ testimony established that Mr. Martell took part in the assault because Mr. 

Martell was in the group whose members all attacked the victim. Although Mr. Rivas did not 

identify Mr. Martell as one of the assailants, Tommy Gonzalez had identified Mr. Martell as one 

of the people who chased after and was in the group that attacked the victim.) Thus, it was not 

unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that the jury rationally could have 

determined that Mr. Rivas had seen all of the members of the group attacking the victim.

It also was not an unreasonable application of Jackson for the California Court of Appeal

to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support a determination that Mr. Martell aided 

and abetted the assault on the victim. California law requires proof of a crime committed by the 

direct perpetrator, the aider and abettor’s “‘knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent 

and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends,’” and “‘conduct by the aider and abettor 

that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.’” People v. Mendoza, slip op. at 63 quoting 

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People v. Perez, 35 Cal. 4th at 1225).3 The state appellate court reasonably determined that there 

was sufficient evidence that a perpetrator assaulted the victim based on the following evidence: 

Mr. Rivas testified to the group attack; Tommy Gonzalez testified Mr. Martell was in the group,

that Messrs. Ramirez and Mendoza punched the victim, and that Mr. Mendoza said that he 

“‘booked’” the victim 14-15 times; and the pathologist testified that the victim had received 

numerous knife wounds and blunt-force traumas. Id. at 64. The state appellate court also 

reasonably determined that there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Martell assisted in the attack by 

personally assaulting the victim: Mr. Rivas testified to seeing the victim attacked by all the 

members of the group of which Mr. Martell was a part; a detective testified that Mr. Martell had 

scratches or abrasions on his hands when interrogated four days after the assault; and Tommy 

Gonzalez testified that Mr. Martell fled the scene of the homicide with the other defendants. Id. 

The California Court of Appeal also reasonably determined that the evidence supporting a finding 

that Mr. Martell was present and directly participated in the attack and therefore “had knowledge 

of the other perpetrators’ intent (because he could see them assaulting Garcia), and that Martell

intended to assist those other perpetrators by actively assaulting Garcia.” Id. at 64-65. 

The California Court of Appeal reasonably determined that there was sufficient evidence to 

support the murder conviction based on the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine, i.e., that

Mr. Martell is guilty because murder was a natural and probable consequence of the assault in 

which Mr. Martell took part. As the appellate court explained, under California law, a person who 

knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the target offense but also of any 

other nontarget offense the perpetrator commits “‘that is a natural and probable consequence of the 

intended crime.’” Id. at 65 (quoting People v. Medina, 46 Cal. 4th 913, 920 (Cal. 2009)). 

Liability under the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine turns on foreseeability, and 

whether the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence is a question of fact for the 

 

3 A state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the 

challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 

U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). This Court thus is bound by the 

California Court of Appeal’s determination that these are the elements of aiding-and-abetting 

liability under California law.

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jury. Id. Tommy Gonzalez testified that he and the others (including Mr. Martell) ran toward Mr. 

Garcia, and Mr. Rivas testified that everyone in the group that ran after Mr. Garcia also 

participated in the assault by punching or kicking Mr. Garcia. Given this testimony, it was not 

unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that a rational trier of fact could find 

that a reasonable person in Mr. Martell’s position should have known that Mr. Garcia’s death 

would be a foreseeable consequence of five men assaulting one victim. 

In an effort to argue that he should not be held liable under the natural-and-probableconsequences doctrine, Mr. Martell tries to distance himself from the other participants in the 

attack by urging that the only person he knew at the gathering at Tommy Gonzalez’s house was 

Mr. Barragan. His argument fails because it does not matter how well he knew the other 

participants in the attack. As discussed above, the evidence at trial was sufficient for the jury to 

conclude that he knew of the other attackers’ intent and his intent to assist them in the attack, 

regardless of the gang evidence. 

The California Court of Appeal did not discuss the gang evidence in its evaluation of the 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the murder conviction. But if one considers 

the gang evidence, that evidence provides an even stronger foundation on which the jury’s guilty

verdict could rest. Even if there was no evidence that Mr. Martell personally knew anyone other 

than Mr. Barragan before he arrived at Tommy Gonzalez’s house, there was evidence that he and 

the other attackers were Nortenos. Although Mr. Martell had not had any recent arrests and there 

was no evidence that he was a member of any particular Norteno subset, evidence was presented 

that, in 2008, Mr. “Martell admitted committing assault with a deadly weapon with a gang 

enhancement in San Jose as a juvenile.” Id. at 34.4 The gang expert testified that he thought Mr. 

Martell was an active Norteno gang member not affiliated with any gang subset based on Mr. 

Martell’s tattoos, the presence of his name on a jail kite found after the homicide, his criminal 

history, his mode of dress, and his admission in a 2011 field interview that he had been a Norteno 

 

4 The gang expert testified that, in the 2008 incident, Mr. “Martell was in a group of ‘Northerners’ 

that challenged another group to a fight ‘by calling them “Scraps” and yelling out “Norte,”’” 

which led to a fight in which one of the people called “Scraps” was stabbed. People v. Mendoza, 

slip op. at 34. 

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since he was 12 years old. Id. at 34-35. The gang expert also testified as to the Norteno gang’s 

violent ways: the Norteno gang is an informal gang that has about 2,000 members; the “primary 

activities of the Norteno gang include assault with a deadly weapon, homicide, drive-by shootings, 

car theft, robbery, and burglary. Norteno gang members commonly carry weapons for protection 

and for use in attacks. Violence is common and is used to gain respect from other gang members 

and to intimidate non-gang members.” People v. Mendoza, slip op. at 32. The gang expert opined 

that the homicide was gang-related and benefited the Norteno gang by increasing the gang’s 

respectability and intimidating others in the neighborhood. Id. at 36. The evidence allowed the 

jury to determine that: Mr. Martell was a Norteno who accompanied another Norteno (Mr. 

Barragan) to a gathering in a Norteno neighborhood; while there, a rival gang member spraypainted rival gang graffiti in the neighborhood and taunted the socializing Nortenos; Mr. Martell 

and the other Nortenos ran toward the victim and one of them shouted “get him” and “Norte”; and 

the Nortenos attacked the victim. The evidence also allowed the jury to find that Mr. Martell 

participated in the assault with the other Nortenos, fled with them after the attack, and later 

provided a false alibi to the police. The foregoing evidence, with the other evidence discussed 

above, provided ample evidence from which the jury reasonably could infer that Mr. Martell knew 

of and shared his companions’ intent to assault the victim, and that a reasonable person in Mr. 

Martell’s shoes would have known that the victim’s death would be a foreseeable consequence of 

the five Nortenos assaulting one victim from a rival gang. 

The argument heading in Mr. Martell’s habeas petition states: “The insufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain the guilty verdict as to second degree murder and gang enhancement charge 

violated Martell’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Docket No. 1 at 12 (emphasis 

added). Respondent urges that, despite the argument heading, there is no actual argument 

challenging the sufficiency of the gang enhancement and any such claim would be unexhausted 

because no such claim was included in the petition for review to the California Supreme Court. 

See Docket No. 12-1 at 13 n.15. The Court agrees. The text of Mr. Martell’s petition and traverse 

only pertains to the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine, which is a theory of liability of 

murder and is not a theory of liability on the gang enhancement. He argues, for example, that he 

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was found guilty “under the natural and probable consequences doctrine under the assumption that 

Petitioner was a gang member and knew all co-defendants and that they were gang members. 

Which Petitioner denies knowing co-defendants which goes to the weight of the argument of the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a second degree murder conviction.” Docket No. 17 at 2

(emphasis added). This Court understands Mr. Martell to be challenging only the murder 

conviction and not the sufficiency of the evidence to support the gang enhancement itself. 

Because the Court does not understand Mr. Martell to be challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence for the gang enhancement, it need not reach the issue of what to do with an unexhausted 

claim such as that one would be.

Mr. Martell also argues that this was not a situation in which gang members were out 

looking for trouble and that instead the men were peaceably socializing and were very intoxicated. 

Docket No. 1 at 16-17. As to his allegedly intoxicated state, the California Court of Appeal 

explained that the jury had been instructed properly on intoxication and implicitly determined that 

it did not negate the specific intent to aid and abet. As to the allegedly peaceful purpose for the 

gathering at 436 Ezie Street, such evidence does nothing to undermine the verdict because, 

regardless of the original purpose of the gathering, the evidence was sufficient to support the 

jury’s determinations that Mr. Martell was an aider and abettor in the assault of the victim and was 

liable for the murder as a natural and probable consequence of the assault. 

To grant relief, this Court would have to conclude that “the state court’s determination that 

a rational jury could have found that there was sufficient evidence of guilt, i.e., that each required 

element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was objectively unreasonable.” Boyer v. 

Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2011). That conclusion cannot be made here. Mr. 

Martell fails to show that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of his claim was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, Jackson. He is not entitled to the writ on his claim. 

B. No Certificate of Appealability

A certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in 

which “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a certificate of 

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appealability is DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. 

The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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