Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01802/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-01802-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dennis Jenkins, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Medtronic Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-16-01802-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion to remand. Doc. 15. Defendants filed a response 

(Doc. 23), and Plaintiff elected not to reply. The Court concludes that oral argument will 

not aid in its decision.1

 For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background. 

 The allegations in the complaint are taken as true for purposes of this motion. 

Plaintiff is a 43-year-old resident of Phoenix, Arizona, who experiences chronic pain in 

his feet. Doc. 1-1 at 2-10 (“Complaint”), ¶ 9. Defendants Medtronic, Inc. and Medtronic 

USA, Inc. (collectively, “Medtronic”) are corporations organized under the laws of 

Delaware and Minnesota respectively. They market, warrant, and sell neurostimulators 

designed to relieve chronic pain without medication. ¶¶ 5-6, 9. Defendants Devin 

Nichols and Kelly Galloway (the “Individual Defendants”) are Medtronic employees who 

reside in Arizona. ¶¶ 7-8. 

 

1

 Defendants’ request for oral argument is therefore denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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 In an attempt to address his chronic foot pain, Plaintiff was implanted with a 

Medtronic neurostimulator on December 15, 2014. ¶ 11. Plaintiff relied on Medtronic’s 

representation that the battery used in its neurostimulator would last for nine years. 

¶¶ 12-16. The device was unsuccessful in relieving the pain in Plaintiff’s feet because 

the battery stopped working properly within two months of implantation. ¶¶ 17, 29. 

Plaintiff notified Medtronic that he was having problems with his device. ¶ 17. The 

Individual Defendants undertook to reprogram and readjust Plaintiff’s device in four 

reprogramming sessions that occurred in the offices of Plaintiff’s doctors. ¶¶ 18-19. 

Plaintiff alleges that, during these sessions, “the Medtronic representatives would 

increase the stimulation level of the device to dangerously high levels,” shocking him 

across his back. ¶ 20. On April 24, 2015, Plaintiff had the neurostimulator surgically 

removed. ¶ 25. The doctor who removed the device noted that its battery never 

functioned properly. ¶ 24. As a result of these events, Plaintiff now suffers from severe 

back pain. ¶ 25. 

 On May 6, 2016, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint in Maricopa 

County Superior Court. The complaint asserted a breach of warranty claim against 

Medtronic and a negligence claim against the Individual Defendants. The warranty claim 

alleges that (1) Medtronic warranted that its neurostimulator battery would last for nine 

years; (2) the battery on Plaintiff’s neurostimulator stopped working properly within two 

months; and (3) as a direct and proximate result, Plaintiff suffered economic and personal 

injuries. ¶¶ 26-31. The negligence claim alleges that (1) the Individual Defendants owed 

Plaintiff a duty to act with reasonable care when they reprogrammed and readjusted his 

neurostimulator; (2) the Individual Defendants breached this duty when they increased 

the stimulation level to dangerously high levels; and (3) as a direct and proximate result, 

Plaintiff suffered personal injuries. ¶¶ 32-35. Plaintiff alleges that Medtronic is 

vicariously liable for the conduct of the Individual Defendants. ¶ 36. 

 On June 7, 2016, Defendants removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, 

asserting federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Doc. 1. 

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II. Legal Standard. 

A civil case brought in state court may be removed to the federal court in the 

district where the action is pending if the federal district court would have had original 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal of an action arising under state law is not 

proper “if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a 

citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” § 1441(b)(2). “If at any time before 

final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 

shall be remanded.” § 1447(c). Section 1441 is strictly construed against removal. See 

Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002). The “strong 

presumption” against removal “means that the defendant always has the burden of 

establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 

1992) (citation omitted). Federal courts must remand a case to state court “if there is any 

doubt as to the right of removal.” Id.

III. Analysis 

 Defendants argue that diversity jurisdiction exists because (1) the Individual 

Defendants were fraudulently joined, (2) there is complete diversity between Plaintiff and 

the properly joined defendants, and (3) more than $75,000 is at stake. In the Ninth 

Circuit, “[j]oinder of a non-diverse defendant is deemed fraudulent, and the defendant’s 

presence in the lawsuit is ignored for purposes of determining diversity, if the plaintiff 

fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious 

according to the settled rules of the state.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 

1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). Thus, 

“the fraudulent joinder inquiry focuses on the validity of the legal theory being asserted 

against the non-diverse defendant,” without requiring a finding that the plaintiff acted 

with fraudulent intent. Davis v. Prentiss Props. Ltd., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1114 

(C.D. Cal. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 District courts in the Ninth Circuit have noted that “[t]he problem with the 

fraudulent joinder inquiry is that the Court must consider the validity of a claim that 

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defeats diversity, a claim over which the Court has no jurisdiction.” Id. “Only by 

considering the merits of the non-diverse claim can the Court be assured of jurisdiction 

over any of the claims in the case.” Id. “The Court must therefore walk a very fine line: 

it must consider the merits of a matter without assuming jurisdiction over it.” Id. To 

accommodate this balancing act, courts have noted that “some room must exist between 

the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), for example, and a finding of fraudulent 

joinder.” Id. at 1115. To constitute fraudulent joinder, claims against the non-diverse 

party must not only be unsuccessful, they must be untenable. Id. The Davis case 

concluded that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an appropriate 

standard. Id. Under Rule 11, “a party whose claim is not frivolous may legitimately 

present that claim to an appropriate court to have the claim considered.” Id. “The fact 

that the party may lose or even the fact that the party will probably lose does not affect 

the party’s right to present its claim, make its arguments, and receive a ruling from a 

court with proper jurisdiction.” Id.

 Thus, even “‘where it is doubtful whether the complaint states a cause of action 

against the resident defendant, the doubt is ordinarily resolved in favor of the retention of 

the case in state court.’” Ballesteros v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wisc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 

1070, 1072 (D. Ariz. 2006) (quoting Albi v. Street & Smith Publ’ns, 140 F.2d 310, 312 

(9th Cir. 1944)). Indeed, even a “‘glimmer of hope’ that plaintiff can establish [the] 

claim is sufficient to preclude application of [the] fraudulent joinder doctrine.” Id. 

(quoting Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 466 (4th Cir. 1999)). This fraudulent joinder 

standard based on Rule 11 has been cited with approval throughout the Ninth Circuit. 

See In re: Bard IVC Filters Products Liab. Litig., No. 2641, 2016 WL 2347430, at *2 (D. 

Ariz. May 4, 2016); Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank NA, No. CV11-02286-PHXGMS, 2011 WL 6019311, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 5, 2011); Bellecci v. GTE Sprint 

Commc’ns Corp., No. C-02-03974-WHA, 2003 WL 151538, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 

2003); see also Jennings-Frye v. NYK Logistics Americas Inc., No. 2:10-cv-09737-JHNEX, 2011 WL 642653, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011); Lujan v. Girardi & Keese, No. 

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CV09-00017, 2009 WL 5216906, at *6 (D. Guam Dec. 29, 2009). 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim against the Individual Defendants is 

obviously deficient under Arizona law because he cannot show that the Individual 

Defendants owed him a duty of care. Doc. 23 at 6-12. The Court does not agree. In 

Arizona, “every person is under a duty to avoid creating situations which pose an 

unreasonable risk of harm to others.” Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 233 (Ariz. 2007) 

(citation and quotation mark omitted). Stated differently, “[a]n actor ordinarily has a 

duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical 

harm.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 7 (2010). Plaintiff alleges 

that the Individual Defendants reprogrammed and readjusted a neurostimulator implanted 

in his back. Complaint ¶ 19. Because such conduct entails a risk of physical harm, there 

is a reasonable possibility that an Arizona court would find that the Individual 

Defendants were under a duty to exercise reasonable care. 

 Defendants cite several cases applying the learned intermediary doctrine for the 

proposition that sales representatives working for medical device or pharmaceutical 

companies generally do not have a duty to warn patients. Doc. 23 at 10. These cases are 

inapposite. Plaintiff does not allege that the Individual Defendants violated a duty to 

warn; he alleges that they negligently manipulated a device implanted in his back. 

 Defendants argue that the Individual Defendants cannot be liable because they 

were taking direction from Plaintiff’s doctor when they manipulated his device. Id. 

Defendants do not cite any Arizona authority holding that a non-physician is immunized 

from liability for acts taken at the direction of a physician. Even if such authority exists, 

Defendants’ argument fails for want of any evidence that the Individual Defendants were 

taking directions from Plaintiff’s doctor when they increased the stimulation level of his 

neurostimulator. An Arizona court would not grant a motion to dismiss based on an 

unsupported factual premise. See McDonald v. City of Prescott, 5 P.3d 900, 901 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 2000) (Arizona courts must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff 

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on a motion to dismiss).2

 Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient factual allegations 

to state a claim against the Individual Defendants under Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Whether that is true is 

immaterial: the fraudulent joinder analysis looks to whether the claim against the resident 

defendant is viable under “the settled rules of the state,” Morris, 236 F.3d at 1067 

(emphasis added), and federal courts therefore look to the state’s pleading standard in 

determining whether a claim against a resident defendant is viable, see Edwea, Inc. v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. H-10-2970, 2010 WL 5099607, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 

2010) (collecting cases). Arizona has not adopted the Twombly and Iqbal pleading 

standards, Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344 (2008), and Defendants do not 

argue that the claim against the Individual Defendants is obviously deficient under 

Arizona’s “notice pleading standard,” Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 867 (Ariz. 

2012). Nor would such an argument be well taken. Plaintiff alleges that the Individual 

Defendants reprogrammed and readjusted his neurostimulator four times between 

December 15, 2014 and February 13, 2015, that they increased the stimulation level of 

the device to dangerously high levels during these sessions, that these increases produced 

shocks across his back like a cattle prod, and that he was injured as a result. Complaint 

¶¶ 19-20, 22, 25. There is a reasonable possibility that an Arizona court would find these 

allegations sufficient to state a claim under its notice pleading standard. 

 

2

 This evidentiary gap distinguishes Wilssens v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 09-60792-

CIV, 2009 WL 9151079 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2009), and Suckow v. Medtronic, Inc., 971 F. 

Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Nev. 2013). In Wilssens, the plaintiff asserted a negligence claim against a Medtronic representative who allegedly misprogrammed his medical device. See 2009 WL 9151079 at *1. The representative provided a declaration stating that she was acting on the physician’s direction when she programmed the device. See id. at *7. 

The court relied on this declaration in finding the claim non-viable. See id. (claim was 

non-viable because plaintiff was unable to “overcome [the representative’s] statement that she acted at the direction of a physician when she programmed Plaintiff’s . . . device”). Similarly, the Medtronic representative in Suckow provided a declaration stating that any work he performed on the plaintiff’s device was done at the request of a physician. See 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. The court relied on this evidence – and 

plaintiff’s failure to contest removal – in finding the claim against the representative was not viable. See id. at 1047-48. 

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 As noted above, federal courts must remand cases to state court “if there is any 

doubt as to the right of removal.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Furthermore, doubts regarding 

fraudulent joinder are resolved in favor of remand. Albi, 140 F.2d at 312. For the 

reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Defendants have not carried their burden of 

showing that the Individual Defendants were fraudulently joined or that removal was 

proper. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 15) is granted. 

2. Defendants’ request for judicial notice (Doc. 13), Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss (Doc. 14), and Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 26) are found to 

be moot. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall remand this case to Maricopa County Superior 

Court. 

Dated this 5th day of August, 2016. 

Case 2:16-cv-01802-DGC Document 27 Filed 08/05/16 Page 7 of 7