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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22-7167 September Term, 2023 FILED ON: AUGUST 9, 2024 

DIANA C. VALLE, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

ANTONIS KARAGOUNIS, GOVERNOR, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:19-cv-03764) 

Before: PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia and on the briefs and oral argument of the parties. The panel has accorded 

the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. 

See D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is hereby 

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the judgment of the District Court be AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiffs—three separate groups of individuals—sued Rewind by Decades, a Washington, 

D.C., restaurant, after being required to prepay for their meals. They alleged race discrimination 

and various other claims. The District Court granted summary judgment to Defendants as to all 

claims. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm. 

I.

A.

Because we are reviewing the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants, 

we “take the following facts from the evidence and read them in the light most favorable to” 

Plaintiffs, the non-moving party, “drawing all reasonable inferences in [their] favor.” Cruz v. 

McAleenan, 931 F.3d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 

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This case concerns the experiences of eight Plaintiffs at Rewind by Decades (“Rewind”), 

a restaurant in Washington, D.C., that is adjacent to a nightclub and is open until 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. 

most nights. In separate instances, three groups of Plaintiffs—(1) the Valle family, (2) Tibe and 

Spence, and (3) Sullivan and Williams—were asked by waitstaff at Rewind to pay in advance of 

receiving or finishing food they had ordered.

Appellants Diana C. Valle, Necty Gasca, Claudia I. Gasca LeBaigue, and Alejandra Plazas 

(the “Valle Plaintiffs”), a family of Latina women, visited Rewind at around 2:00 a.m. in January 

2019. The Valle Plaintiffs were seated at a table and ordered food from their waitress. Before the 

Valle Plaintiffs received their order, their waitress asked them to pay for their food. When asked 

by the Plaintiffs why the family was being asked to prepay, the waitress stated that the restaurant 

was crowded and could get confusing, and that the restaurant had experienced “walk-offs.” J.A. 

73, 75, 87, 139. Valle and LeBaigue, upset at being asked to pay before receiving their order, told 

their waitress that the family’s order should be canceled and that they were leaving. Rewind staff 

then informed the Valle Plaintiffs that they needed to pay for the food they had already ordered 

before leaving. When the Valle Plaintiffs attempted to exit the restaurant, Rewind staff followed 

them outside and argued with them. Rewind’s manager then came outside and stated that the Valle 

Plaintiffs could leave.

Appellants Melle Poyry Tibe and Alexis Spence, who are Black, arrived at Rewind at 2:30 

a.m. in February 2019. Tibe and Spence were seated at a table and ordered food from their 

waitress. After a half-hour had passed without receiving their food, Tibe and Spence asked their 

waitress where their food was. The waitress responded that she had never put their order in, as 

they had not paid for their food. When Tibe and Spence asked why they would need to prepay for 

their food, their waitress informed them that requiring prepayment was Rewind’s “protocol.” J.A. 

303, 306, 351. Upset at being asked to prepay for their food, Tibe and Spence left Rewind.

Appellants Aliyah Y. Sullivan and Dwayne A. Williams, who are Black, attended a brunch 

buffet that Rewind offered on Sundays in November 2019. A waitress seated Sullivan and 

Williams at a table and informed them of the cost of the brunch. Williams and Sullivan then went 

to the buffet to get food and returned to their table. While Williams and Sullivan were eating, a 

waitress asked them if they were ready to pay for their food. Williams and Sullivan responded

that they were still eating. Rewind staff members then returned to the table two more times while 

Williams and Sullivan were eating to ask whether they were ready to pay for their food. The third 

time that a Rewind staff member returned, Sullivan asked the staff member why she and Williams 

were being asked to pay. Speaking loudly, the staff member responded that prepayment was 

Rewind’s “policy” and that this was just “how it works” at Rewind. J.A. 416. Sullivan and 

Williams paid for their food and departed Rewind.

B.

In December 2019, the Valle Plaintiffs, believing that Rewind had discriminated against 

them because of their race or national origin in asking them to prepay for their order, filed suit

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against Rewind. In addition to Rewind, the Valle Plaintiffs named as defendants Antonis 

Karagounis and Panorama Productions. Karagounis is Rewind’s Managing Partner. Panorama 

Productions is a “marketing, branding, and promotion company” owned in large part by 

Karagounis. J.A. 571.

The Valle Plaintiffs then twice amended their complaint to add claims asserted by Tibe, 

Spence, Sullivan, and Williams. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint now includes 

claims by three groups of plaintiffs—the Valle Plaintiffs; Tibe and Spence; and Sullivan and 

Williams. All Plaintiffs brought discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title II of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code 

§ 2-1402.31(a)(1). In addition, all Plaintiffs brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. Separately, the Valle Plaintiffs and Sullivan and Williams brought assault claims; they 

alleged that they were assaulted when Rewind staff reacted to their protests to prepaying for their 

food. The Valle Plaintiffs alone brought a claim for false imprisonment.

On December 7, 2022, following the close of discovery, the District Court granted 

summary judgment to Defendants on all claims. See Valle v. Karagounis, No. 19-cv-03764, 2022 

WL 17485644 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2022). Plaintiffs now appeal.

II.

This Court reviews “de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment.” 

Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper only 

if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘the evidence 

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Arrington, 473 

F.3d at 333 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

A.

We first address Plaintiffs’ claims that Rewind’s requests that they prepay for their food 

constituted discrimination on the basis of race or national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981;

42 U.S.C. § 2000a; and the DCHRA, D.C. Code § 2-1402.31(a)(1).

1

 We affirm the District Court’s 

grant of summary judgment to Defendants as to Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.

To begin with, we hold that we lack jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under Title II of the 

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. A plaintiff who files suit under Title II of the Civil Rights 

Act may seek only injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C § 2000a-3(a). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated 

that they have standing to seek such relief. Plaintiffs may not premise their standing for injunctive

relief on a past injury, and they have not established that the alleged discrimination is likely to 

1 Although it does not affect our analysis, we note that while Section 1981 covers discrimination on the 

basis of race, it does not cover discrimination on the basis of national origin. See Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie 

Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

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recur. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103–05 (1983). Plaintiffs’ complaint says 

nothing about the likelihood of the discrimination they allege happening again; indeed, they have 

not indicated that they intend to return to Rewind.

Turning to Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the DCHRA, we 

hold that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants.

Before the District Court, Defendants stated that they had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for asking Plaintiffs to prepay for their food—that prepayment was Rewind’s policy. 

Defendants explained that because Rewind is a busy restaurant and is open late, it requires patrons 

to either prepay when ordering food or to put down a credit card to open a tab. Similarly, 

Defendants stated that Rewind requires patrons attending its brunch buffet to either purchase a 

ticket in advance or to pay upon arrival; to do otherwise, Defendants elaborated, would make it 

too difficult for Rewind staff to keep track of who had paid for their food. 

Plaintiffs do not materially dispute that requiring prepayment is Rewind’s policy. Because 

Rewind has accordingly presented a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for its actions, to 

survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must produce “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 

find” that Defendants’ “asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason” and that 

Defendants “intentionally discriminated” against Plaintiffs. Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 

F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden. Crucially, no Plaintiff offered evidence that he 

or she had seen a white patron order food at Rewind without being asked to prepay. The closest 

Plaintiffs come is the testimony of Plaintiff Tibe, who stated that she had seen a table of white 

patrons pay after finishing eating their food. But Tibe also stated that she did not see those same 

white patrons order their food. So the white patrons could have opened a tab before ordering their 

food, in compliance with Rewind’s policy. On this thin record, we think that no reasonable jury 

could conclude that Rewind did not require similarly situated white patrons to prepay for meals, 

even while imposing that requirement on Black and Latina patrons.

In addition to contending that Rewind applied its prepayment policy in a discriminatory 

manner, Plaintiffs also briefly suggest that the policy was adopted for discriminatory reasons. 

Plaintiffs explain that when Plaintiff Gasca asked a Rewind waitress why the Valle Plaintiffs were 

being asked to pay before receiving their order, the waitress responded that prepayment was 

Rewind’s policy; the waitress allegedly elaborated that Rewind had “had problems with people of 

color before that had not paid and so that’s why it’s a policy now.”2

 J.A. 160. But this statement, 

2 We note that, in its opinion granting summary judgment to Defendants, the District Court observed that 

Plaintiff Gasca made this claim “through an interpreter.” See Valle, 2022 WL 17485644, at *2. On appeal, 

Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred in dismissing Gasca’s testimony on this basis. See Valle Br. at 

40. Such a basis for rejecting Gasca’s testimony would indeed be troubling, and to the extent that 

Defendants raised arguments that Gasca’s testimony was unreliable solely on this basis, those arguments 

would be inappropriate. We do not, however, understand the District Court’s conclusion to rely on this 

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alone, is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. The statement to which Plaintiffs point was 

offered by a Rewind waitress; Plaintiffs have not attempted to show that that waitress was a 

decisionmaker behind the adoption of the policy, or that she had any basis to know the reasons 

behind the adoption of the policy. See Little v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 91 A.3d 1020, 1025 

(D.C. 2014) (“To prove discrimination by direct evidence, ‘the plaintiff must present evidence of 

conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision making process that may be viewed as 

directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude . . . .’” (quoting Jung v. George Washington 

Univ., 875 A.2d 95, 111 (D.C. 2005)).

We accordingly affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on 

Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.

B.

Plaintiffs also appeal the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to 

Defendants as to their intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claims. “This tort 

requires conduct so ‘outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible 

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 

community.’” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Bernstein v. 

Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 1075 (D.C. 1991)); see also District of Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 

788, 800 (D.C. 2010). To prevail on a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must show “(1) ‘extreme and 

outrageous’ conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes 

the plaintiff ‘severe emotional distress.’” Kotsch v. District of Columbia, 924 A.2d 1040, 1045 

(D.C. 2007) (citation omitted). The defendant’s actions must also “proximately cause the plaintiff 

emotional upset ‘of so acute a nature that harmful physical consequences might be not unlikely to 

result.’” Sere v. Grp. Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1982) (citation omitted).

In support of their IIED claims, the Valle Plaintiffs emphasize that Rewind staff publicly 

and falsely accused them of a crime, assaulted them, and chased them out of the restaurant when 

they refused to prepay for their food. Sullivan and Williams, like the Valle Plaintiffs, argue that 

they were publicly and falsely accused of a crime.

We affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants as to all three 

groups of Plaintiffs’ IIED claims. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs have forfeited any challenge to 

the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to Tibe and Spence’s IIED claims by failing to 

raise any argument regarding those claims in their opening brief. See Al-Tamini v. Adelson, 916 

F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in his opening 

brief.”). As to the Valle Plaintiffs’ and Sullivan and Williams’s claims, we conclude that, even

assuming that all of the conduct those Plaintiffs point to is true, the conduct does not amount to 

IIED. As this Court has explained, the tort of IIED “is reserved for truly outrageous behavior.” 

Browning, 292 F.3d at 248. IIED has been found where, for example, “the defendant gave the 

basis, notwithstanding its offhanded reference to the interpreter. Rather, we understand the District Court 

to deem Gasca’s account to be insufficient, on its own, to withstand summary judgment.

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plaintiff’s home address to a third person who the defendant should have expected 

would . . . threaten the plaintiff’s life,” id. (citing Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818–20 (D.C. 

1998)), and where a landlord hired workers to harass and intimidate his tenants when the tenants 

were on a rent strike, Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 934–35 (D.C. 1995). The 

conduct to which Plaintiffs point is, while perhaps objectionable, not “outrageous.” Browning, 

292 F.3d at 248.

C.

We turn next to the assault claims pressed by the Valle Plaintiffs and Sullivan and 

Williams. The tort of assault involves intentionally putting another in apprehension of an 

immediate and harmful or offensive contact. See Madden v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 756, 

757 (D.C. 1973); see also Person v. Child.’s Hosp. Nat’l Med. Ctr., 562 A.2d 648, 650 (D.C. 

1989). To prevail on their assault claims, Plaintiffs must show (1) that Defendants acted intending 

to cause a harmful or offensive contact or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, (2) that 

Plaintiffs were put in reasonable apprehension of such contact, and (3) that a reasonable person in 

Plaintiffs’ position would have experienced the same apprehension. See, e.g., STANDARDIZED 

CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 19.01 (Richard W. Stevens ed., 2024 

rev. ed. 2024); Acosta Orellana v. CropLife Int’l, 711 F. Supp. 2d 81, 92 (D.D.C. 2010); Collier 

v. District of Columbia, 46 F. Supp. 3d 6, 14 (D.D.C. 2014).

The Valle Plaintiffs argue that they reasonably apprehended a harmful or offensive contact 

as a result of the “intimidating and aggressive” actions of Rewind’s staff in response to the Valle 

Plaintiffs’ refusal to pay for their food. Valle Br. at 47. The Valle Plaintiffs emphasize that two 

Rewind staff members blocked their path out of the restaurant and that Rewind staff stood close 

to the Plaintiffs.

We conclude that no reasonable jury could find that the Valle Plaintiffs were assaulted by 

Defendants. At worst, it appears that Defendants threatened to call the police on the Valle 

Plaintiffs and may have gotten physically close to them. Nothing about that alleged conduct 

indicates that Defendants intended for their conduct to cause apprehension of a harmful contact, 

nor that it would appear to a reasonable person that a harmful contact was actually “imminent.” 

Person, 562 A.2d at 650. The alleged conduct does not amount to assault.

Sullivan and Williams’s assault claims fare no better. Sullivan and Williams argue that 

they were assaulted when, after they refused to pay for their brunch, a male Rewind staff member 

approached their table and, in a raised voice, demanded that they prepay for their meal. On those 

thin facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Sullivan and Williams were put in reasonable 

apprehension of a harmful contact.

We accordingly affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants as 

to the Valle Plaintiffs’ and Sullivan and Williams’s assault claims.

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D.

The Valle Plaintiffs alone brought a claim for false imprisonment and now challenge the 

District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants. “A successful claim of false 

imprisonment requires a plaintiff to establish (1) the detention or restraint of one against his will 

and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention or restraint.” Doe v. Safeway, Inc., 88 A.3d 131, 132 

(D.C. 2014); see also Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 404 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C. 

1979). To constitute detention, the “restraint of [a plaintiff’s] freedom of movement . . . must have 

been total.” Faniel, 404 A.2d at 151. “In determining whether particular conduct constitutes false 

arrest or imprisonment it is not the subjective state of mind of the plaintiff but, rather, the ‘actions 

or words of the defendant [which] must at least furnish a basis for a reasonable apprehension of 

present confinement.’” Dent v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 459 A.2d 1042, 1044 (D.C. 1982) (alteration 

in original) (citation omitted). And it is “not enough for [a] plaintiff to feel ‘mentally restrained’ 

by the actions of the defendant.” Faniel, 404 A.2d at 151 (citation omitted). “Submission to the 

mere verbal direction of another, unaccompanied by force or threats of any character does not 

constitute false imprisonment.” Id. at 152. “[F]alse imprisonment historically has been viewed as 

an intentional tort; . . . only an act intended to impose confinement or known by the actor to be 

substantially certain of doing so generates the common law tort of false imprisonment.” Johnson 

v. United States, 547 F.2d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).

On appeal, the Valle Plaintiffs emphasize that their deposition testimony shows that 

Rewind’s staff blocked their exit from Rewind when the Plaintiffs tried to leave and that, when 

the Plaintiffs did leave, Rewind’s security guards “chased them into the street, and trapped them 

outside the restaurant.” Valle Br. at 57. The Valle Plaintiffs also note that, when Rewind’s 

manager joined them and Rewind’s “bouncers” outside, the manager told the bouncers to “let them 

go.” Valle Br. at 10, 57. 

We hold that no reasonable jury could conclude from the record that the Valle Plaintiffs 

were falsely imprisoned by Defendants. For starters, the Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants 

actually restrained them. The Valle Plaintiffs argue that Rewind’s “bouncers” blocked their path 

out of the restaurant, but the record also reflects that the Valle Plaintiffs were, in fact, able to leave 

Rewind. And there is no evidence that the Valle Plaintiffs were prevented from leaving while they 

were outside of Rewind; Plaintiffs do not allege that they tried to walk away or even objected to 

speaking to Rewind staff outside of the restaurant. See Faniel, 404 A.2d at 153 (holding that a 

plaintiff had not shown false imprisonment where the plaintiff did not “object” or “manifest a 

desire to leave”).

We affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants as to the Valle 

Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim.

* * *

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 Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely 

petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41. 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

 Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk 

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