Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01264/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01264-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL OSTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SOLANO; SOLANO 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 

and DOES 1 through 50, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-1264 JAM-AC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of 

Solano and Solano County Sheriff’s Department’s (collectively, 

“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #14). Plaintiff Michael 

Oster (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion (Doc. #18) and Defendants 

replied (Doc #20).1 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ 

motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendants previously moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

complaint and that motion was granted with leave to amend (Doc. 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for February 6, 2013.

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#12). On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #13). In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges two 

causes of action: (1) a Monell claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and (2) a First Amendment retaliation claim. Defendants 

now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC for failure to state a 

claim. 

Plaintiff was employed as Deputy Sheriff for the County of 

Solano from October 28, 2001 until July 10, 2010 when he 

resigned. Plaintiff allegedly resigned in 2010 after years of 

harassment, retaliatory and invasive investigations, 

surveillance, and unwarranted intrusions into his and his 

family’s lives. Plaintiff alleges that this occurred pursuant 

to a tacit policy in which senior management level officers of 

the Solano County Sheriff’s Department (“SCSD”) were allowed 

with impunity to follow laws and regulations they chose to 

follow while disregarding others, and they were allowed to 

harass and retaliate against certain disfavored SCSD employees 

who made complaints in a public forum. 

Plaintiff allegedly suffered the following derogatory, 

harassing, and retaliatory actions: In May 2002, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Solano County Sheriff’s Department 

(“SCSD”) assigned him to SCSD’s Canine Unit. The head of SCSD’s 

chapter of the Deputy Sheriff’s Association then allegedly 

threatened “to drag (Plaintiff) through the mud” unless 

Plaintiff resigned the Canine Unit Handler’s position, but

Plaintiff did not resign. FAC ¶ 14. Later in 2002, the Canine 

Unit manager allegedly threatened Plaintiff with termination 

after reading private emails between Plaintiff and the SCSD 

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Captain that questioned the manager’s competence. Plaintiff was 

allegedly forced to resign from the Canine Unit in late 2002 or 

face possible termination. 

In or about 2003, Plaintiff allegedly took time off to 

recuperate from an injured knee. In early 2004, once Plaintiff 

had returned to a light duty assignment, the SCSD Captain 

allegedly threatened Plaintiff with termination because a 

workers’ compensation supervisor allegedly lied to the Captain 

about details of Plaintiff’s injury. 

Plaintiff alleges that once he returned to active duty he 

was subject to undeserved employment actions by his superiors, 

including an involuntary transfer, having his workers’ 

compensation benefit payments delayed after a 2006 on-duty 

injury, having his request to wear a knee brace denied, 

undergoing a “bogus” investigation, and having his workers’ 

compensation benefits and medical treatment delayed after a 2007 

on-duty injury. 

Further, Plaintiff now alleges that he was arrested in June 

2010 for workers’ compensation fraud within mere days of sending 

a letter to his local government representatives “to complain 

of, among other things, the dangerous and lawless culture with 

the SCSD management and the negative impact this lawlessness 

would have on taxpaying citizens.” FAC ¶ 30.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal 

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Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to 

dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint 

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Assertions that 

are mere “legal conclusions,” however, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to 

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Dismissal is 

appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim 

supportable by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could 

not be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Discussion

1. Monell Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege 

sufficient facts to establish the requisite elements of a claim 

under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

690-91 (1978). Plaintiff responds that Defendants are trying to 

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impose the heightened pleading requirement of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 9. 

Under Monell, to prevail in a civil action against a local 

governmental entity, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that he 

possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; 

(2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 

‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s 

constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving 

force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt By & 

Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)).

In the FAC, as to the Monell claim, Plaintiff has added new 

allegations regarding an unofficial policy that allowed 

supervising officers to act outside of state laws and 

regulations, harass, retaliate against, demote, and terminate 

department employees who make internal and public complaints 

about the department’s workings. FAC ¶¶ 20, 21, 25, and 26. 

Moreover, he alleges that “Plaintiff’s superiors were aware at 

all relevant times of the Department’s unofficial policy, and 

that this awareness and failure to act amounts to deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s [c]onstitutional rights of free 

speech and petitioning the government of grievances.” Id. ¶ 21.

Although detailed factual allegations similar to those 

required under FRCP 9 are not required under FRCP 8, a claim 

must set forth sufficient factual content that allows the “court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Unlike in 

the original complaint, Plaintiff now identifies a 

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constitutional right of which he was allegedly deprived--free 

speech and petitioning the government of grievances. However, 

Plaintiff does not identify how his constitutional right to free 

speech was violated, or any facts to show the existence of a

custom or policy, or any facts to support the allegation of 

deliberate indifference. To sufficiently state a claim under 

Monell, it is not enough to state that there is a policy and the 

policy amounted to deliberate indifference; there must be facts 

showing the plausibility of those statements. Id.; see also Via 

v. City of Fairfield, 833 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (E.D. Cal. 

2011) (noting “[s]ince Iqbal, courts have repeatedly rejected 

such conclusory allegations that lack factual content from which 

one could plausibly infer Monell liability”). Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s bare allegations of the Monell elements are 

insufficient.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to allege 

sufficient facts for a Monell claim, the Court dismisses 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Plaintiff gives no 

indication of what more he could plead to state a claim, 

signaling that indeed there are no additional facts Plaintiff 

could include in the complaint were he granted leave to amend. 

Therefore, the Court dismisses this claim without leave to 

amend.

2. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim for failure to allege that Plaintiff engaged 

in constitutionally protected speech. Plaintiff argues that he 

has sufficiently alleged that his letter addressed a matter of 

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legitimate public concern.

To state a claim against a government employer for 

violating the First Amendment, an employee must show (1) that he 

engaged in protected speech; (2) that the employer took an 

“adverse employment action” and (3) that his speech was a 

“substantial or motivating” factor for the adverse employment 

action. Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citations omitted). 

A public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected 

if it addresses a matter of legitimate public concern. Id. For 

instance, speech regarding corruption in government can be

protected speech depending on the statements. See, e.g., 

Lambert v. Richard, 59 F.3d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1995) (9th Cir.

1995) (holding that speech regarding a supervisor who mismanaged 

the library department and treated employees in an abusive and 

intimidating manner was a matter of public concern); Allen v. 

Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 431 amended, 828 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 

1987) (noting that speech “related to the competency of ... 

management as well as the efficient performance of [government] 

duties” addressed a matter of public concern). 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he wrote “to his local 

government representatives to complain of, among other things, 

the dangerous and lawless culture within the SCSD management and 

the negative impact this lawlessness would have on taxpaying 

citizens.” FAC ¶ 30. Plaintiff did not attach the letter to 

the FAC, which would have been the clearest indication of the 

content of Plaintiff’s speech, but, as the parties agree, 

Plaintiff is not at this point required to do so. Opp. at 5; 

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Reply at 4. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to provide 

sufficient facts to support his allegations because the terms 

“dangerous” and “unlawfulness” are too vague and conclusory to 

allow the Court to determine whether Plaintiff’s speech was a 

matter of public concern. See Armstrong v. California State 

Corr. Inst., 1:10-CV-01856 OWW, 2011 WL 773425, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 25, 2011) (holding that the term “illegalities” as used by 

the plaintiff was vague and conclusory to demonstrate that she 

was engaged in speech of public concern). Because Plaintiff has 

failed to allege the first element of a First Amendment 

retaliation claim, the Court does not find it necessary to 

analyze the other two elements.2

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second cause of action is 

dismissed. The Court denies Plaintiff leave to amend because 

Plaintiff has had two opportunities to properly plead this claim 

and has been unable to do so. The Court finds that any further 

amendment would be futile.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2013

 

2 Defendants request judicial notice of a 2010 Press Release 

announcing Plaintiff’s arrest (Doc. #14). However, the Court 

finds the press release unnecessary for the determination of this 

motion and therefore, Defendants’ request for judicial notice is 

denied.

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