Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04265/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04265-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MARVELL SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C-04-4265 MMC

ORDER GRANTING MARVELL’S

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND

COSTS PURSUANT TO 35 U.S.C. § 285;

VACATING HEARING

(Docket No. 65)

Before the Court is the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, filed August 26, 2005 by

defendant Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. (“Marvell”), in which Marvell argues it is entitled to

an award of fees and costs because plaintiff Realtek Semiconductor Corporation

(“Realtek”) knew or should have known Realtek could not prevail in the instant action at the

time the complaint was filed. Realtek has filed opposition to the motion, to which Marvell

has replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to

the motion, the Court finds the motion appropriate for determination without oral argument,

see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), and hereby VACATES the November 4, 2005 hearing. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2004, Realtek filed the instant action, alleging Marvell infringes U.S.

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Patent No. 6,433,608 (“the ‘608 patent”) by “making, using, selling, offering for sale,

importing and inducing others to use and sell gigabit Ethernet network controller chip

products, including but not limited to Marvell’s 88E8000, 88E8003, 88E8052, 88E1000,

88E1000S, and 88E1111 series products, and other products with similar functionality[.]”

(See Compl. ¶ 9.)

On February 25, 2005, Marvell served interrogatories on Realtek, in which Marvell

asked Realtek, in Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2, to describe any patent infringement analysis

of any Marvell product done at Realtek’s request and to identify all documents on which

Realtek relied to support its patent infringement claim. (See Compton Decl. Ex. A at 3-4;

see also Second Barkan Decl. ¶ 2.) In responses dated March 28, 2005, Realtek stated it

had acquired information relating to technical analysis of Marvell products from Chipworks,

Inc. (“Chipworks”), and that Realtek had produced the entire Chipworks report to Marvell. 

(See Compton Decl. Ex. A at 4.) The Chipworks report, titled “Marvell 88E1000-RJJ

GigabitEthernet Tranceiver Partial Circuit Analysis,” is dated May 31, 2001, and states it

was prepared exclusively for the use of Realtek. (See Menard Decl. Ex. F at RTL 000203-

204.) 

In Interrogatory No. 16, Marvell asked Realtek to describe the circumstances under

which it first learned Marvell was infringing the ’608 patent. (See Compton Decl. Ex. A at

13.) Realtek responded that it “first acquired detailed information regarding the accused

88E1000 product from the Chipworks report that Realtek received in December 2001.” 

(See id.)

In Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4, Marvell asked Realtek to identify the dates of

conception and reduction to practice for each asserted claim of the ’608 patent, to describe

the activities showing diligence from conception to reduction to practice, and to describe in

detail the facts and circumstances surrounding the invention of the subject matter

described in the ’608 patent. (See Compton Decl. Ex. A at 5.) Realtek did not respond in a

substantive manner to Interrogatory No. 3, stating only that it would provide relevant 

/ /

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1

 It is unclear whether Realtek’s full response to Interrogatory No. 4 has been

provided to the Court. 

2

 In Marvell’s Preliminary Invalidity Contentions, served April 28, 2005, Marvell

asserted that if the invention described in the ’608 patent was invented in Taiwan, the ’608

patent was not entitled to an invention date prior to its filing date, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 

§ 104. (See id. Ex. N at 3-4.)

3

documents from which responsive information could be obtained.1 (See id.) In a letter to

Realtek dated April 27, 2005, Marvell stated it believed Realtek’s responses to

Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4 were inadequate, and that Marvell was entitled to know

whether Realtek intended to assert a conception date prior to the filing date of the

application for the ’608 patent. (See Compton Decl. Ex. F at 1-2.) On June 16, 2005, after

the parties met and conferred about their discovery disputes, Realtek agreed that, no later

than June 23, 2005, it would either provide detailed substantive responses to

Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4 or, in the alternative, stipulate that “all the inventive activity for

the ’608 patent took place in Taiwan.”2

 (See Compton Decl. Ex. K at 1-2.) Realtek

provided neither the promised information nor stipulation by June 23, 2005, and on June

29, 2005, Magistrate Judge Spero ordered Realtek to either sign, within 24 hours, a

stipulation that all inventive activity of the ‘608 patent occurred only in Taiwan, or to

provide, within 48 hours, full and complete responses to Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4. (See

Compton Decl. Ex. L.) On June 30, 2005, Realtek signed a stipulation stating that “all

inventive activity for the ’608 patent, including all activity related to conception and practice,

took place in Taiwan.” (See Compton Decl. Ex. M.) 

One week later, on July 7, 2005, Marvell served Realtek with notice of its intention to

file a motion for terminating sanctions, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, on the ground that Realtek filed its complaint against Marvell when it “either

knew or should have known that its lawsuit is legally barred because the very product it

accuses of infringement is prior art to Realtek’s ‘608 patent.” (See Compton Decl. Ex. CC.) 

Specifically, Marvell stated that the Chipworks report, which was in Realtek’s possession

before it filed the instant action, showed the 88E1000 chip “was being actively

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 In Marvell’s Preliminary Invalidity Contentions, Marvell states that all of the accused

Marvell products are similarly situated, (see Compton Decl. Ex. N at 2-4); Realtek does not

argue to the contrary.

4

 It is undisputed that the application for the ‘608 patent was filed on January 2,

2001. (See Compl. Ex. A.) 

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manufactured and sold before any priority date or invention date to which the ‘608 patent

could be entitled.”3

 (See id.) Realtek did not immediately respond to the Rule 11 motion. 

(See Compton Decl. Ex. Q.)

On July 15, 2005, Marvell filed a motion for summary judgment of invalidity of the

’608 patent. In its motion, Marvell argued that the ’608 patent was invalid, pursuant to 35

U.S.C. § 102(a) and (g), because Marvell’s 88E1000 chip was both used by others and

invented in the United States prior to Realtek’s earliest possible invention date. (See

Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 6,433,608 Pursuant to 35

U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(g) (“Summary Judgment Motion”), filed July 15, 2005, at 1.) In

its motion for summary judgment, Marvell contended that because all the inventive activity

for the ‘608 patent took place in Taiwan, a country that was not a member of the World

Trade Organization (“WTO”) or a signatory to the North American Free Trade Agreement

(“NAFTA”) at the time the patent was filed, Realtek’s earliest possible invention date,

pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 104, was January 2, 2001, the date the application for the ’608

patent was filed.4 Marvell submitted evidence that its 88E1000 product was made and sold

during 2000, prior to the filing date of the application for the ’608 patent. (See, e.g., Quan

Decl., filed July 15, 2005, ¶ 6.) 

Upon receipt of Marvell’s motion for summary judgment, Realtek, by letter dated July

15, 2005, requested that Marvell “immediately provide all relevant documents and promptly

schedule [the] necessary depositions.” (See Compton Decl. Ex. P.) 

On July 29, 2005, Realtek filed a response to Marvell’s motion for summary

judgment, in which it notified the Court that Realtek believed the motion was moot because

it had provided Marvell, on July 28, 2005, with a covenant not to sue Marvell for

infringement of the ‘608 patent and had asked Marvell to stipulate to dismissal of the action. 

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(See Realtek’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment as Moot, filed July 29, 2005,

at 1 and Ex. A.) Thereafter, the Court dismissed the action as moot.

On August 26, 2005, Marvell filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees and costs

pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.

LEGAL STANDARD

In patent actions, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney

fees to the prevailing party.” See 35 U.S.C. § 285.

“A case may be deemed exceptional when there has been some material

inappropriate conduct related to the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or

inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or

unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, or like infractions.” See

Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc., v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

“Absent misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing the patent, sanctions may be

imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith,

and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.” Id. A party seeking an award of fees under

§ 285 must establish the predicate conduct by clear and convincing evidence. See

Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 

Even if the case is determined to be exceptional, the decision whether or not to

award attorneys’ fees is within the Court’s discretion. See Brooks, 393 F.3d at 1382. 

Examples of factors that may be considered in determining whether to award attorneys’

fees under § 285 are “the closeness of the case, the tactics of counsel, the conduct of the

parties, and any other factors that may contribute to a fair allocation of the burden of

litigation as between winner and loser.” See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace,

Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 

DISCUSSION

Marvell argues that it is entitled to fees, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, because 

Realtek knew or should have known, before the instant action was filed, that Marvell’s

products were prior art to the ’608 patent, and because Realtek refused to provide answers

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to interrogatories and deliberately prolonged discovery as to the relevant invention date of

the ‘608 patent.

A. Prevailing Party

“Determination of the prevailing party is based on the relation of the litigation results

to the overall objective of the litigation[.]” Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc., v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.,

393 F.3d at 1381. Here, because Realtek’s lawsuit against Marvell has been dismissed in

its entirety, Marvell is the prevailing party.

B. Frivolous Lawsuit

Marvell argues it is entitled to an award of fees because Realtek should have known

that its patent infringement claim was not meritorious before it filed its complaint, i.e., that

Realtek filed a “frivolous” lawsuit. (See Mot. at 2:11-13); see also Haynes Int’l, Inc. v.

Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“A frivolous infringement suit is one

which the patentee knew or, on reasonable investigation, should have known, was

baseless.”) As noted, “[a]bsent misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing the

patent, sanctions may be imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is

brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.” Brooks, 393

F.3d at 1381. 

1. Subjective Bad Faith

If “the patentee is manifestly unreasonable in assessing infringement, while

continuing to assert infringement in court, an inference is proper of bad faith, whether

grounded in or denominated wrongful intent, recklessness, or gross negligence.” See

Eltech Systems Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1990). “A party

confronted with the difficulty of proving what is in an adversary’s mind must be at liberty to

prove facts establishing that that adversary should have known, i.e. to prove facts that

render the ‘I didn’t know’ excuse unacceptable.” Id. at 810. This is not to suggest that a

showing of simple negligence will suffice. As the Federal Circuit has observed, however,

“studied ignorance” is not the same thing as simple negligence. See id.

In the instant case, although Realtek denies knowing that the ‘608 patent was invalid

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 The mark “(M)” represents a registered mask work.

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at the time it filed suit, (see Opp. at 3), it has admitted to relying on the Chipworks report for

its pre-suit investigation. (See Compton Decl. Ex. A at 4, 13.) The Chipworks report

states, at the bottom of the first page of text: “All of the information in this report was

derived by Chipworks from high magnification photographs and microscopy observations of

the following sample: Marvell, 88E1000-RJJ Gigabit Ethernet Transceiver; 0040 date code;

(M)©2000 MARVELL E1000 die markings.” (See Mernard Decl. Ex. F at RTL 000206.) 

Page nine of the report, titled “Device Summary Sheet,” under the sub-heading “Part

Identification,” identifies the analyzed product as follows: “Manufacturer: Marvell

Semiconductor, Inc.; Part Number: 88E1000-RJJ; Type: Gigabit Ethernet Transceiver; Die

Markings: (M)©2000 MARVELL E1000; Date Code: 0040.”5

 (See id. at RTL 000214.) 

Nearly every page of the report following page nine repeats the “part identification”

information, including “(M)©2000 MARVELL” and “Date Code 0040,” at the bottom right

corner of the page. (See, e.g., id. at RTL 00216.) Also included is a photograph of the

subject chip, showing the above-described die markings. (See id.) 

Marvell argues that Realtek should have recognized that the 2000 mask work and

copyright dates indicated that the chip in question had been manufactured in 2000. Marvell

further argues that if Realtek had any doubts about the significance of the 2000 mask work

and copyright dates, it should have contacted Chipworks to determine when the chip was

purchased. Marvell submits evidence that, on December 6, 2000, Chipworks purchased an

Intel network card containing the chip in question, and received it the following day,

December 7, 2000. (See Menard Decl. ¶¶ 2-7.) Realtek provides no explanation as to why

the 2000 mask work and copyright dates did not provide notice that the chip analyzed in the

Chipworks report was manufactured and in use by the public in 2000.

Marvell further submits evidence that the “0040 date code” indicates the product was

manufactured in the 40th week of the year 2000. (See Quan Decl. ¶ 2.) Realtek argues,

without citation to any declaration or other evidence, that it could not have been expected

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to know the meaning of Marvell’s date code. Assuming, arguendo, that Realtek did not

know the meaning of Marvell’s date code, Realtek, as noted, provides no explanation as to

why the 2000 mask work and copyright dates did not put Realtek on notice that the chip in

question was manufactured and in use by the public in 2000. Nor does Realtek explain

why Realtek, having been apprised by Chipworks that the Marvell chip analyzed by

Chipworks was stamped with a coded date of manufacture, failed to contact Chipworks to

ascertain that date. Accordingly, the evidence is undisputed that Realtek had notice, prior

to filing suit, that the chip analyzed in the Chipworks report was manufactured and in use

by the public in 2000.

Marvell further argues, and Realtek does not dispute, that the earliest invention date

Realtek could assert for the ‘608 patent is the filing date of the patent, January 2, 2001. 

Subject to exceptions not relevant here, an inventor may not establish a date of invention

by reference to activities in any foreign country other than a NAFTA country or WTO

member country. See 35 U.S.C. § 104(a). As noted, Realtek has stipulated that all

inventive activity relating to the ‘608 patent occurred in Taiwan. (See Compton Decl. Ex.

M.) Taiwan was not a NAFTA or WTO member country at the time the ‘608 patent was

filed. (See Compton Decl. Exs. Y and Z.) Although Taiwan later joined the WTO, (see id.

Ex. Z), the Patent and Trademark Office has stated that the effective date for proving

inventive activity in a foreign country, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 104, is “the date the country

becomes a member of the WTO.” (See id. Ex. Y at 5.) Thus, Marvell correctly states that

any inventive activity Realtek conducted in Taiwan prior to January 2, 2001, the date it filed

the application for the ’608 patent, is irrelevant under § 104 because Taiwan was not a

WTO member at the time the patent application was filed. Realtek does not argue to the

contrary.

In sum, Realtek knew or with a minimum of effort could have known the following

facts well before it filed the instant lawsuit on October 7, 2004: (1) all of the inventive

activity for the ‘608 patent occurred in Taiwan; (2) Taiwan was not a member of the WTO

or a NAFTA country at the time the ‘608 patent was filed; (3) inventive activity taking place

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 As noted, Realtek cannot seek to excuse its conduct by resort to “studied

ignorance.” See Eltech, 903 F.2d at 810.

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in non-WTO or non-NAFTA member countries is irrelevant for purposes of establishing

invention dates in the United States; (4) the Marvell product accused of infringement was

copyrighted and made in 2000; and (5) the accused product was made and sold to the

public prior to the date the ‘608 patent was filed.

Realtek argues that it acted in good faith, because as soon as Marvell revealed the

meaning of the “0040" date code to Realtek, it voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit and

executed a covenant not to sue Marvell. As noted, however, Realtek should have known,

prior to filing suit, that it could not prevail on its lawsuit against Marvell. As Marvell

accurately observed in the course of the parties’ correspondence, Realtek initiated the

instant litigation “without investigating the facts staring them in the face.” (See Compton

Decl. Ex. X at 3.) Moreover, Realtek does not explain why it continued to pursue the

instant lawsuit after April 8, 2005, the date on which Marvell produced sales data showing

numerous sales of the accused product during the year 2000, (see Compton Decl. ¶ 16 and

Ex. O), or after April 28, 2005, the date on which Marvell served its preliminary invalidity

contentions stating that the accused products had been reduced to practice in 2000, (see

Compton Decl. ¶ 15 and Ex. N at 2.) 

Realtek further argues that Marvell’s failure to immediately assert the defense that

Marvell’s products are prior art to the ’608 patent demonstrates the issue was not initially

apparent to either party, and, thus, Realtek did not act in bad faith by filing the instant

lawsuit. Marvell had no basis for raising the issue, however, until it learned that the

inventive activity for the ’608 patent took place in Taiwan. Realtek, on the other hand, was

aware or should have been aware of where its own inventive activity took place prior to the

filing of the instant action.6

A patent is invalid if “the invention was known or used by others in this country . . .

before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.” See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Here,

Realtek knew or should have known, before filing the instant lawsuit, that it had no chance

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of success on the merits of its infringement claim, because Marvell’s allegedly infringing

product was made and sold before the invention date of the ’608 patent. As noted, if “the

patentee is manifestly unreasonable in assessing infringement, while continuing to assert

infringement in court, an inference is proper of bad faith, whether grounded in or

denominated wrongful intent, recklessness, or gross negligence.” See Eltech, 903 F.2d at 

811.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Realtek acted in subjective bad faith by filing the

instant action against Marvell. 

2. Objectively Baseless Litigation

A lawsuit is objectively baseless when “no reasonable litigant could realistically

expect success on the merits.” See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures

Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). For the reasons set forth above, the instant litigation

was objectively baseless, because no reasonable litigant could have expected to prevail on

a claim of patent infringement when the allegedly infringing product constitutes invalidating

prior art.

3. Summary

 For the reasons set forth in detail above, the Court finds the instant litigation (1) was

brought in subjective bad faith and (2) the litigation was objectively baseless.

Accordingly, the Court finds the instant case is “exceptional” within the meaning of

35 U.S.C. § 285.

C. Litigation Misconduct

Marvell further argues it is entitled to fees under § 285 because Realtek, in addition

to filing and maintaining a frivolous lawsuit, engaged in litigation misconduct by ignoring its

discovery obligations. In particular, Marvell argues that Realtek “dragg[ed] out discovery on

the only issue needed to ripen the case for summary judgment; i.e., the invention date of

Realtek’s ’608 patent.” (See Motion at 2.) 

The Federal Circuit has held that a case “may be deemed exceptional when there

has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter in litigation. See

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Brooks, 393 F.3d at 1381. 

As noted, Realtek failed to provide a substantive response to Marvell’s

interrogatories directed to the circumstances surrounding the invention of the subject

matter claimed in the ’608 patent. (See Compton Decl. Ex. A at 5.) Marvel submits

evidence that it repeatedly expressed its concerns to Realtek, beginning on April 27, 2005,

about the sufficiency of Realtek’s interrogatory responses. (See id. Exs. F-J.) When the

parties met and conferred on June 16, 2005, Realtek’s counsel told Marvell’s counsel he

was unaware of any activity related to the invention claimed in the ’608 patent that took

place outside of Taiwan, that he hoped to be able to confirm that fact within a week, and he

anticipated that once he was able to obtain such confirmation, Realtek would so stipulate. 

(See DeBruine Decl. ¶ 8; see also Compton Decl. Ex. K.) Nevertheless, Realtek did not

provide a stipulation to that effect until June 30, 2005, when ordered to do so by Magistrate

Judge Spero. 

Although Realtek has offered an explanation for the delay, the Court need not

determine whether Realtek has provided adequate justification for such delay, because

Realtek has provided no explanation for its initial refusal to provide a substantive response

to Marvell’s interrogatories. Moreover, once Marvell filed its Rule 11 and summary

judgment motions, Realtek, despite its having been made aware of Marvell’s invalidity

defense and provided with all the relevant dates, demanded that additional depositions be

scheduled, and then refused to cooperate in scheduling them. (See Compton Decl. Exs. P,

W.) Realtek fails to provide any explanation for such discovery abuses.

Whether categorized as protracting a “frivolous lawsuit” or as “misconduct,”

Realtek’s failure to comply with its discovery obligations and its prolongation of discovery

on a crucial issue in the case further supports a finding that the instant action presents an

“exceptional case.” 

D. Discretion To Award Fees

As previously noted, once a court determines a case to be exceptional within the

meaning of § 285, the decision whether or not to award attorneys’ fees is within the court’s

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 Rule 11 provides that a motion for sanctions made under that rule “shall not be filed

with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days of the service of the motion . . . , the

challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or

appropriately corrected.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). As noted, Marvell’s motion for

sanctions was served July 7, 2005, and Realtek waited until July 28, 2005, twenty-one days

later, to provide Marvell with a covenant not to sue Marvell for infringement of the ‘608

patent and to ask Marvell to stipulate to dismissal of the action. (See Realtek’s Opposition

to Motion for Summary Judgment as Moot, filed July 29, 2005, at 1 and Ex. A.) 

12

discretion. See Brooks, 393 F.3d at 1382. Factors to be considered in determining

whether to award attorneys’ fees include “the closeness of the case, the tactics of counsel,

the conduct of the parties, and any other factors that may contribute to a fair allocation of

the burden of litigation as between winner and loser.” See S.C. Johnson, 781 F.2d at 201.

Here, the case was never close. For the reasons set forth above, Realtek knew or

clearly could have known prior to filing suit that it would not prevail. In addition, Realtek

has not justified its failure to provide discovery on the key issue, specifically, the invention

date of the ’608 patent, or its decision to wait until the last moment to dismiss the case.7

“The purpose of Section 285 is to reimburse a party injured when forced to undergo

an exceptional case.” Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 753 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (internal

quotation omitted). Here, Realtek wasted Marvell’s time and resources by instituting and

dragging out a case it should never have filed.

Accordingly, the Court finds that an award of fees against Realtek is appropriate. E.

Amount of Attorneys’ Fees

The Federal Circuit has held that, in awarding fees under § 285, “courts should not

be, and have not been, limited to ordinary reimbursement of only those amounts paid by

the injured party for purely legal services of lawyers, or precluded from ordinary

reimbursement of legitimate expenses defendant was unfairly forced to pay.” See Mathis v.

Spears, 857 F.2d at 754. Consequently, courts may determine “the compensatory

quantum of the award, including the amount of attorney fees, what if any expenses shall be

included, and the rate of prejudgment interest, if any, on the award.” See id.

Here, Marvell seeks an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $541,215.50, plus

litigation expenses (in addition to those set forth in its separately-filed bill of costs) in the

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amount of $35,830.72, for a total award of $577,046.22 in fees and expenses incurred

through October 2005. (See Barkan Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9; Second Barkan Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10; Third

Barkan Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10.)8

 Marvell does not seek an award of prejudgment interest. Realtek

has not challenged the amount of fees and costs sought by Marvell, but rather relies

entirely on its argument that Marvell is not entitled to any award of fees and costs.

The Court has reviewed Marvell’s statement of services, fees and costs and finds

that Marvell has adequately supported the amounts claimed. Marvell has included a

statement of services performed, a summary of the time spent, the hourly rates charged,

and biographical information for each person who worked on the case. (See Barkan Decl.

Exs. A-C; Second Barkan Decl. Exs. B and C; Third Barkan Decl. Ex. A.) 

Marvell has brought to the Court’s attention an agreement between Marvell and its

attorneys whereby it will receive a credit of $27,821.68 in recognition of Marvell’s providing

its attorneys with a certain volume of work, primarily on other matters, over a defined period

of time. (See Second Barkan Decl. at ¶ 12:16-20.) Because the purpose of § 285 is to

reimburse the injured party, see Mathis, 857 F.2d at 753, not to award more than the party

was required to pay, the Court will reduce the total award by the credited amount. 

Accordingly, the Court will award Marvell a total of $549,224.54 in fees and

expenses incurred through October 2005.

F. Additional Sanctions Under Court’s Inherent Powers

Finally, Marvell argues, the Court should invoke its inherent powers to further

sanction Realtek “in whatever amount the Court deems appropriate to deter [Realtek’s]

abuse of the judicial process and the Court’s resources.” (See Motion at 16.)

Federal courts have the inherent power to “assess attorney’s fees when a party has

acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” See Chambers v.

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) (internal quotation and citation omitted). When

there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately redressed

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under a statute or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, “the court ordinarily

should rely on [that authority] rather than the inherent power.” See id. at 50.

Because the Court has adequately compensated Marvell by means of an award of

fees and costs, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, it declines to invoke its inherent power to

further sanction Realtek.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Marvell’s motion for attorneys’ fees and

expenses, in the total amount of $549,224.54. This ruling is without prejudice to Marvell’s

seeking additional costs pursuant to its pending bill of costs. 

This order terminates Docket No. 65.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 18, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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