Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01415/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

KATHOUM MUTAB, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA SCHIRO, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-1415-PHX-DGC (CRP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Kathoum Mutab, filed a federal habeas petition alleging a violation of

his Sixth Amendment rights, and requesting that his case be remanded for re-sentencing.

(Doc. 1). Petitioner argues that Blakely v. Washington applies and entitles him to a jury

determination of his aggravated sentence. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Because the petition was

filed after April 24, 1996, it is subject to the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Respondents refute the habeas petition, arguing that it is timebarred, and that Petitioner has failed to meet the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Respondents also contend that Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling under the AEDPA. Filing pro se, Petitioner argues that the AEDPA’s

one-year statute of limitations did not bar his petition under Section 2244(d)(1)(D) of the

AEDPA, which reads that the limitation period runs from “the date on which the factual

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predicate of the claim presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.”§ 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner did not file a reply to Respondents’ answer.

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Federal Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely, and that statutory and equitable tolling are not

applicable. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge, after her

independent review and analysis, deny the habeas petition. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

The State of Arizona originally charged petitioner with ten counts of child

molestation, one count of attempted child molestation, and three counts of sexual abuse.

(Doc. 10, Ex. E at 2). On February 20, 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner

pled guilty to four counts of child molestation. (Doc. 10, Ex. A). The trial court also set a

mitigation/sentencing hearing for March 22, 2004. (Doc. 10, Ex. B at 3). After the

mitigation/sentencing hear, on May 27, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated

twelve years in prison for one count of attempted child molestation, and three lifetime

probation terms for the other three counts of child molestation. (Doc. 10, Ex. C).

A. Direct Review

On August 12, 2004, Petitioner filed a timely of-right notice for post-conviction

relief, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 10, Ex. D). 

Petitioner submitted the of-right petition on February 22, 2005. (Doc. 10., Ex. E). The

Superior Court of Arizona denied the petition on April 8, 2005. (Doc. 10, Ex. H). On

May 3, 2005, Petitioner appealed the Superior Court’s decision to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, which denied Petitioner’s request for review on February 23, 2006. (Doc. 10,

Ex. I & J). Petitioner did not seek review from the Arizona Supreme Court during the

thirty day window available for him to do so. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). 

B. Collateral Appeal

Petitioner did not file a collateral appeal.

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C. Federal Appeal

 Petitioner filed his Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 25, 2007

(Doc. 1).

II. Discussion

This Report and Recommendation focuses on the timeliness of Petitioner’s federal

habeas petition. Petitioner’s argument that his petition is timely under Section 2244(d) of

the AEDPA is insufficient, and a review of the record supports Respondents’ contention

that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely. Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or

equitable tolling.

A. AEDPA Statute of Limitations

The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners right to

file federal habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). The statute of limitations begins to

run from the latest of: (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on

which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the

date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Id. 

Of these four possible triggers, the first is relevant to the present action. Here, the

statute of limitations under the AEDPA began on “the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit has held that an of-right

appeal for post-conviction relief is a form of direct review for purposes of determining the

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trigger date for the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Summers v. Schiro, 481 F.3d 710 (9th

Cir. 2007). Therefore, “AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run

until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or

until the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Id. at 711. 

In the case at hand, Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of attempted child

molestation and he was sentenced on May 27, 2004. Petitioner filed a timely of-right

post-conviction relief appeal in February 2005. After the trial court denied his postconviction appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for review asking the Arizona Court of

Appeals to review the trial court’s decision. The appellate court denied the petition for

review on February 23, 2006. Under Arizona law, Petitioner had thirty days to appeal to

the Arizona Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Petitioner did not appeal the

appellate court’s decision and his time to request review of that decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court expired on March 25, 2006.

Petitioner’s direct review for purposes of the AEDPA, therefore, concluded on

March 25, 2006. The AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began running the

following day, March 26, 2006. Absent any tolling periods, Petitioner’s window for

filing a federal habeas petition expired on March 25, 2007. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the AEDPA’s limitation period expires

on the one year anniversary of the date on which it begins to run). Petitioner, however,

did not submit his petition until July 24, 2007, months past this deadline. 

Two other triggers for the start of the limitations period merit a short discussion

here. Petitioner argues the trigger date for the statute of limitations in his case is governed

by subsection (D) of § 2241(d)(1). (Doc. 1, at 11). This subsection states that the statute

of limitations may begin to run from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28

U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1)(D). In the case at hand, the factual predicate for Petitioner’s claim

has remained constant, and was known to Petitioner and Respondent. Petitioner makes

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no argument that the factual predicate changed after the judgment was final. Therefore,

the factual predicate would not provide a later start date for the limitations period than

that outlined above, and is, therefore, not an accurate trigger for the statute of limitations.

While Petitioner fails to explain why he believes subsection (D) is the appropriate

trigger, his belief appears linked to his argument on the merits. Petitioner argues that

Blakely v. Washington revealed his constitutional right to have any aggravated sentence

beyond the statutory maximum decided by a jury, and that the court’s failure to do so in

his case violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury because he received an

aggravated sentence. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The subsection (C) trigger is more closely

aligned with this argument, but it is still an incorrect trigger. That subsection states that

the statute of limitations begins to run from “the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review.” Accordingly, Petitioner may be attempting to argue that the date on which the

statute of limitations began to run ought to be the date that Blakely was decided and this

constitutional right was recognized. However, Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004,

only one month after the Petitioner’s initial sentencing, before his notice of postconviction relief was filed and long before his judgment was final. It is not, therefore,

later than the first triggering mechanism discussed, and is not the correct start date for the

limitations period.

The AEDPA’s statute of limitations began to run on the date that Petitioner’s

judgment became final, March, 26, 2006. The limitations period expired one year later on

March 26, 2007. Petitioner failed to file his petition prior to the expiration of that

limitation period. If a petitioner fails to file a habeas petition by the expiration of the

limitations period, he is barred from doing so unless the limitations period is statutorily or

equitably tolled. 

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B. Tolling

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is statutorily tolled while a “properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be properly filed, the

application for review must be filed while time remains on the statute of limitations.

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). It must also be timely under state law.

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15 (2005). In the case before this court,

however, Petitioner never filed for a collateral review, so statutory tolling is not available.

The Court may also permit the late filing of a federal habeas petition on the basis

of equitable tolling. Equitable tolling is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) to ensure

that technical requirements do not prevent an unjust technical forfeiture of causes of

action. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008). It is available if

extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time. See, e.g., Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Despite this allowance, however, the burden on the petitioner to prove that

equitable tolling is applicable is very high. The petitioner must show “(1) that he has

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood

in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Those extraordinary circumstances must be “beyond

a prisoner’s control” and must “make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is not permitted in cases

where the prisoner’s own oversight, miscalculation or negligence contributed to the

failure to file the petition. Harris, 515 F.3d at 1054. Additionally, a prisoner’s lack of

legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable

tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).

In the case at hand, Petitioner argues that, after receiving the state appellate court’s

denial of his petition, he did not know he could appeal to any other court. (Doc. 1). In

July, 2007, he learned from a friend that he could bring his case to federal court in a

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habeas petition, at which time he argues that he diligently brought the petition to the

court. Id. Without more, the Court finds that the Petitioner’s lack of knowledge or

understanding of the applicable deadlines and possibilities for petition in this case does

not entitle the Petitioner to equitable tolling.

III. Recommendation

The Court finds that Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely, and that

neither statutory nor equitable tolling applies. The Court does not reach the merits of

Petitioner’s allegations. The Court recommends that the District Judge, after his

independent review and analysis, enter an order dismissing the Federal Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 626(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that

any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV-07-1415-

PHX-DGC.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to

Petitioner and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 6th day of August, 2009.

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