Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01120/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

 

This is a mortgage foreclosure case brought by Plaintiff against numerous “corporate” and 

doe defendants. Plaintiff seeks relief under California law causes of action only. On July 17, 

2015, Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) removed the case from the Fresno 

County Superior Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 1. Chase alleges that 

no other defendant has been served with the Complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court will 

remand this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Legal Standard

 A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 

sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 

& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441) is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 

599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 

F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of 

the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

PAMELA LINTHICUM,

Plaintiff

v.

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al.,

Defendant

CASE NO. 1:15-CV-01120-AWI-GSA 

ORDER REMANDING MATTER TO 

THE FRESNO COUNTY SUPERIOR 

COURT

Case 1:15-cv-01120-AWI-GSA Document 3 Filed 07/21/15 Page 1 of 4
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jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 

F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means 

that “the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; 

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a 

removed case “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 

instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 

(9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson 

v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is 

mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see 

California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, the court 

“must dismiss a case when it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not a 

party has filed a motion.” Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995). 

 Federal courts may exercise “diversity jurisdiction” when the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000 and the parties are in complete diversity, i.e. that citizenship of each plaintiff is 

different from that of each defendant. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1043; Matheson v. Progressive 

Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Absent 

unusual circumstances, a party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege 

affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant parties.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2002). “National banking associations” are deemed “citizens of the States 

in which they are respectively located,” 28 U.S.C. § 1348, and a national bank is “located” only in 

the state designated as its main office. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318-19 

(2006); Rouse v. Wachovia Mort., FSB, 747 F.3d 707, 708 (9th Cir. 2014). A corporation is 

deemed a citizen of its state of incorporation and its principal place of business, i.e. its “nerve 

center.” Harris v. Rand, 682 F.3d 846, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2012). A limited liability corporation is a 

citizen of all of the states of which its owners/members are citizens. Johnson v. Columbia Props. 

Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). Finally, a natural person is a citizens of the 

state in which she is domiciled, not the state in which she resides. Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857. 

Case 1:15-cv-01120-AWI-GSA Document 3 Filed 07/21/15 Page 2 of 4
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Discussion

 The Notice of Removal sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen of California. See 

Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857. The Notice of Removal sufficiently alleges that Chase is a national 

banking association whose main office is in Ohio. See Rouse, 747 F.3d at 708. Furthermore, 

given Chase’s citation to a national bank list from the United States Treasury Department, the 

Court will assume that U.S. Bank, N.A. is a national banking association whose main office is in 

Delaware. See id. However, there are problems with the citizenship of the remaining defendants. 

Relying on documents from the California Secretary of State’s Office, Chase alleges that 

defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) is incorporated in Delaware with a principal 

place of business in Florida, and that defendant Western Progressive, LLC (“Western”) is 

incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Luxembourg City. The problem is 

that the principal place of business and state of incorporation do not determine the citizenship of 

an LLC; rather an LLC’s citizenship is the same as the citizenship of its members/owners. 

Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2014); Segundo 

Suenos, LLC v. Jones, 494 Fed. Appx. 732, 735 (9th Cir. 2012); Johnson, 437 F.3d at 899. 

Without allegations addressing the citizenship of an LLC’s members/owners, a removing 

defendant fails to satisfy its burden of showing complete diversity. Lindley Contours, LLC v. 

AABB Fitness Holdings, Inc., 414 Fed. Appx. 62, 64 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Segundo Suenos, 

494 Fed. Appx. at 735; Johnson, 437 F.3d at 899-900. Because Chase makes no allegations 

regarding the citizenship of Ocwen’s and Western’s respective members/owners, Chase has failed 

to show complete diversity and invoke this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See id. 

Courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction over removed actions sua sponte. 

United Investors, 360 F.3d at 967. There is a strong presumption against subject matter 

jurisdiction that a removing defendant must overcome, and any doubt over subject matter 

jurisdiction results in a remand. See Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter, 582 

F.3d at 1042. Chase has failed to overcome the strong presumption against jurisdiction. 

Therefore, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction and must remand this case to the 

Fresno County Superior. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257; Page, 45 F.3d at 133. 

Case 1:15-cv-01120-AWI-GSA Document 3 Filed 07/21/15 Page 3 of 4
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 ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is REMANDED forthwith to the 

Fresno County Superior Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) due to a lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 21, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 1:15-cv-01120-AWI-GSA Document 3 Filed 07/21/15 Page 4 of 4