Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01170/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEAN MASOUD and TAREN MASOUD,

individually and as Guardians

Ad Litem for their minor

children ALAE M. and AMALIA

M.,

NO. CIV. S-06-1170 FCD EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Dean Masoud and Taren Masoud, on behalf of

themselves and as guardians ad litem for their minor children,

Alae M. (“Alae”) and Amalia M. (“Amalia”) (collectively,

“plaintiffs”), assert claims against defendants County of San

Joaquin (“the county”), its employees Stephanie Evans (“Evans”),

Arlene Miller (“Miller”), and Ken Egi (“Egi”) (collectively,

“county defendants”), the City of Stockton, and its employees

David Ambrose (“Ambrose”), Darren Sandoval (“Sandoval”), Sergeant

Osbourne (“Osbourne”) and Sergeant Leslie (“Leslie”)

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs.

E.D. Cal. L. R. 78-230(h).

2 All facts herein are taken from plaintiffs’ Complaint,

filed May 29, 2006.

2

(collectively, “city defendants”) for violations of their

constitutional rights under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. section 1983, and violations of state law. County

defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 Specifically, county

defendants contend that they are entitled to immunity from

plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims. For the reasons set

forth herein, defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED in part and

GRANTED in part.

BACKGROUND2

On May 31, 2005, plaintiff Dean Masoud was watching his

children Alae, then two years old, and Amalia, then seven months

old, while plaintiff Taren Masoud was at a hair appointment. 

(Pls.’ Compl., filed May 29, 2006 [“Compl.”] ¶¶ 36, 40.) At some

point in the early afternoon, Amalia fell asleep while being held

by Mr. Masoud, and he subsequently put her down to nap on the

master bed. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff asserts that he was

careful to surround Amalia with a wall of pillows because she had

rolled off that same bed a few days earlier and landed on the

carpeted floor. (Id.) Later, plaintiff was talking on the phone

to his brother in New York when he heard a light thud followed by

crying from the master bedroom. (Compl. ¶ 42.) He told his

brother that something had happened and hung up. (Id.)

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Initially, after picking up Amalia and examining her, Mr. 

Masoud noted no apparent injuries. (Compl. ¶ 43.) About a half

an hour later, however, when Amalia would not stop crying, Mr.

Masoud noticed that she was not moving her left leg and

determined that she needed medical attention. (Compl. ¶ 44.)

Mrs. Masoud was still not home, and Mr. Masoud attempted to reach

her on her cell phone approximately thirty-five times, to let her

know what had happened and because she had the car seats for both

children in her car. (Compl. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff finally reached

Mrs. Masoud, and she arrived home at 5:25 p.m. 

After leaving Alae with a neighbor, the couple took Amalia

to the hospital, arriving at approximately 6:15 p.m. (Compl. 46-

47.) X-rays were taken of the child’s leg and revealed that

Amalia had fractured her left femur above the knee. (Compl. ¶

48.) Plaintiffs were at the hospital for over five hours.

(Compl. ¶¶ 48-59.) 

At 11:15 p.m., police officers Osbourne, Ambrose, Sandoval

and Leslie arrived at the hospital and informed the Masouds that

a doctor had reported Amalia’s break as “suspicious” and that

they needed to investigate. (Compl. ¶ 56.) Mr. Masoud relayed

to the officers how Amalia had rolled off the bed, and Osbourne

asked if the officers could go to the house and see the bed. The

officers also wished to speak with Mr. Masoud’s brother to verify

Mr. Masoud’s version of the events, and Mr. Masoud had left his

cell phone containing his brother’s number at the house. (Compl.

¶ 58.) Mr. Masoud and Officer Sandoval left for the house, and

Mrs. Masoud and Amalia, accompanied by Ambrose, followed after

Amalia’s leg had been set in a cast.

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4

When Mr. Masoud and Sandoval arrived at the house, Mr.

Masoud called his brother. (Compl. ¶ 60.) Mr. Masoud’s brother

verified plaintiff’s version of the events to Sandoval. (Id.) 

After Mrs. Masoud arrived at the house, she was asked to go next

door and retrieve Alae. Although Alae was sleeping at the time,

Osbourne asked Mrs. Masoud to wake him up so that he could be

interviewed. (Compl. ¶ 61.) In the presence of Osbourne, Mrs.

Masoud asked Alae what had happened to Amalia, and Alae replied

“Amalia fell off the bed.” (Compl. ¶ 62.)

Ultimately, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Osbourne informed

plaintiffs that because the emergency room doctor had called

Child Protective Services, the children would have to be taken

into protective custody that night. (Compl. ¶ 63.) The Masouds

were told that if they refused to let their children be taken

into custody, they would be arrested. (Compl. ¶ 64.) 

Each of the officers allegedly informed the Masouds that

they would have the children back soon, if not the next day.

Osbourne and at least one other officer stated that the removal

was just “part of the procedure.” (Compl. ¶ 65.) Defendant

officers implied that the removal was not their decision, but

attributable to some other person or entity. (Id.) The children

were then taken outside, where a woman plaintiffs believe was an

employee or agent of the county was waiting with a minivan to

take the children. (Compl. ¶ 67.) Osbourne told the Masouds

that they would be contacted by a social worker the next morning. 

(Compl. ¶ 70.) 

The next day, defendant Egi, a case worker with the Human

Services Agency, a department of the county (Compl. ¶ 16),

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5

visited the Masouds at home. (Compl. ¶ 74.) He informed them

that there would be a hearing on June 3, 2005, at the courthouse

and that their children would probably be returned to them then. 

(Compl. ¶ 75.) In response to their questions, he also said they

would not need an attorney at the hearing. (Id.) Subsequently,

the case was transferred to defendant Evans, (Compl. ¶ 78), who

handled the case until the children were returned to their

parents six weeks later. (Compl. ¶ 76.) 

Prior to these events, the Masouds had no criminal or child

welfare history. (Compl. ¶ 74.) Plaintiffs allege that during

the six weeks the children remained in custody, defendants

committed a number of violations, including: (1) repeatedly

promising and failing to deliver Mrs. Masoud’s frozen breast milk

to Amalia, who was breastfeeding at the time and was allergic to

regular dairy milk (Compl. ¶¶ 66, 74, 77-79, 81, 88, 91); (2)

falsely assuring the Masouds that they did not need to be

represented by counsel at the initial hearing (Compl. ¶ 75); (3)

submitting the children for unauthorized medical examinations and

inoculations (Compl. ¶¶ 89-90); and (4) excluding exculpatory

evidence from the reports submitted to the juvenile court.

(Compl. ¶¶ 92, 94.)

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

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need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

Plaintiffs allege county defendants violated their right to

familial association, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,

through the continued detention of Alae and Amalia from the time

of removal until the family’s reunification six weeks later. 

Defendants contend that they are entitled to absolute immunity

for their actions. 

It is well established that courts grant absolute immunity

from liability to those individuals whose functions are necessary

to the judicial process. At early common law, this included such

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individuals as judges, grand jurors, and prosecutors. Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419, 424 (1976). This doctrine has been

extended to the actions of other state actors when they engage in

functions that are quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial. Kalina

v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 127 (1997) (citing Forrester v. White, 484

U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). 

The touchstone of the absolute immunity analysis is the

function performed, not the title of the actor. Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citing

Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)). “The relation of

the action to a judicial proceeding . . . is no longer a relevant

standard.” Id. at 897. Rather, the court should “look to

functions that enjoyed absolute immunity at common law in 1871"

when determining absolute immunity under section 1983. Id. The

burden is on the party claiming absolute immunity to identify the

function that received absolute immunity at common law that is a

counterpart to the party’s actions. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has extended absolute immunity to social

workers when they perform functions similar to those of a

prosecutor:

Although child services workers do not initiate

criminal proceedings, their responsibility for bringing

dependency proceedings, and their responsibility to

exercise independent judgment in determining when to

bring such proceedings, is not very different from the

responsibility of a criminal prosecutor. The social

worker must make a quick decision based on perhaps

incomplete information as to whether to commence

investigations and initiate proceedings against parents

who may have abused their children. The social

worker's independence, like that of a prosecutor, would

be compromised were the social worker constantly in

fear that a mistake could result in a time-consuming

and financially devastating civil suit. 

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Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 812 F.2d 1154,

1157 (9th Cir. 1987). When it applies, the shield of absolute

immunity protects even against allegations of negligence,

falsifying evidence, abuse of discretion or bad faith during the

initiation and pursuit of dependency proceedings. See e.g. Doe

v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (failure to

investigate possible exculpatory evidence and fabricated

evidence); Mabe v. San Bernadino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th

Cir. 2001) (social worker alleged to have improperly conducted

the investigation and falsified evidence in juvenile court

proceedings); Hennessey v. State of Wash., Dep't of Soc. & Health

Serv., 627 F. Supp. 137, 140 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (caseworker

allegedly divulged false and misleading information to county

prosecutor, prompting initiation of child dependency

proceedings); Pepper v. Alexander, 599 F. Supp. 523, 526-27

(D.N.M. 1984) (employees allegedly acted in bad faith in

instituting proceeding to deprive plaintiff of parental rights).

However, to the extent “that social workers also make

discretionary decisions and recommendations that are not

functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions, only

qualified, not absolute immunity, is available.” Miller, 335

F.3d at 898. Thus, the question of whether absolute or qualified

immunity applies is a highly factual inquiry that may not easily

be resolved at the initial pleading stage. See id. at 899

(finding that the lower court did not err in ordering limited

discovery on the functions performed by the social workers, in

order to rule on a motion to dismiss based on immunity).

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Here, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated their

constitutional right to familial association through the

unreasonable and continued detention of the children. (Compl. ¶¶

108-11.) Plaintiffs claim that defendants (1) presented false

information to the juvenile court to get a court order justifying

the detention, (2) unreasonably detained the children during the

period between the removal and the initial detention hearing, and

(3) failed to comply with California law requiring social workers

to make a reasonable investigation and to consider reasonable

alternatives to removal in cases of suspected child abuse. 

As discussed above, defendants are entitled to absolute

immunity for actions that were prosecutorial in nature and that

aided them “in the preparation or presentation of [the] case to

the juvenile court.” Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157. The submission

of papers and testimony to the juvenile court has long been

recognized as prosecutorial in nature and entitled to absolute

immunity. See Parkes v. County of San Diego, 345 F. Supp. 2d

1071, 1086-87 (S.D. Cal. 2004); Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 826. In

addition, social workers enjoy absolute immunity where they are

acting pursuant to a valid court order. Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1109.

Defendants are therefore entitled to absolute immunity from the

claim that they submitted false or incomplete information to the

juvenile court. 

However, the validity of the detention of the children prior

to the actual institution of dependency proceedings depends on

whether exigent circumstances existed, and the reasonableness of

defendants’ actions in light of these circumstances. See Wallis

v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 1999). Whether

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plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due process was violated by

defendants’ failure to comply with the applicable California laws

is a similarly fact-specific inquiry. Thus, with regard to

plaintiffs’ other allegations, the court cannot determine, on the

limited facts before it, whether these actions were quasiprosecutorial in nature or taken pursuant to a valid court order

and thus, covered by absolute immunity.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

section 1983 claims against them is GRANTED as to the allegation

that they falsely or improperly submitted information to the

juvenile court. The motion is DENIED as to all other portions of

this claim. 

II. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs also bring pendant state law claims for (1)

violation of California Civil Code section 52.1, (2) intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and (3) battery.

A. California Civil Code Section 52.1

Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action alleges violations of

California Civil Code section 52.1 against the individually-named

defendants. Section 52.1 provides that “any individual whose

exercise or enjoyment of constitutional rights . . . has been

interfered with” by “threats, intimidation or coercion” may bring

a civil action on his or her own behalf. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims for violations of

section 52.1 should be dismissed because plaintiffs do not allege

facts that rise to the level of “threats, intimidation or

coercion” within the meaning of the statute.

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3 Plaintiffs also allege that the city police officers

engaged in “the threat of violence, coercion, menace and/or

duress” when they physically removed the children from the home

and threatened to arrest the Masouds if they refused. (Compl. ¶¶

64, 115.) Because the city defendants have not filed a motion to

dismiss, the court does not address whether these allegations are

sufficient to state a cause of action under section 52.1. 

11

Plaintiffs allege that, through the removal and continued

detention of the children, defendants have violated their Fourth

“and/or” Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as their rights

under Article One, section thirteen of the California

Constitution, “each . . . without due process of law.” (Compl. ¶

114.) Plaintiffs allege that each of the individually-named

defendants intruded on plaintiffs’ rights “with the threat of

violence, coercion, menace and/or duress.” Specifically, they

allege that defendant Egi engaged in coercion when he represented

to the Masouds that they would not need an attorney at the

initial detention hearing. (Compl. ¶ 115.) Plaintiffs make no

specific allegations with regard to any of the other individual

county defendants.3

While no California court has interpreted the terms

“threats, coercion, or intimidation,” “the context of this

section makes it clear that the statute is meant to protect

against violence or the threat of violence.” Rabkin v. Dean, 856

F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also Cole v. Doe 1 thru 2

Officers of the Emeryville Police Dept., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1084,

1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding sufficient facts alleged where

police used law enforcement authority to effectuate a stop,

detention, and search without probable cause). Additionally, the

California Supreme Court recently noted that “section 52.1 does

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4 Plaintiffs also allege that county defendants, to the

extent that they made the initial decision to remove the children

from the home, are somehow liable for the physical force and

threats made by law enforcement in effecting that removal. 

However, plaintiffs cite no authority in support of their theory

of vicarious liability. Moreover, plaintiffs have not alleged

any facts that would justify imputing liability for the officers’

alleged threats onto county defendants. Consequently, absent

clear authority, the court declines to extend section 52.1

liability that far. See Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior

Court, 38 Cal. App. 4th 141, 144-45 (1995) (declining to extend

liability under section 52.1 “to fashion derivative liability for

persons not present and not witnessing the actionable conduct” in

the absence of clear legislative intent). 

5 Because the court found that plaintiffs failed to state

a claim under section 52.1, the court does not address the issue

of immunity relating to that claim.

12

not extend to all ordinary tort actions . . . its provisions are

limited to threats, intimidation or coercion that interferes with

a constitutional or statutory right.” Venegas v. County of L.A.,

32 Cal. 4th 820, 843 (2004). 

Here, plaintiffs do not allege that Egi made any threats,

express or implied, subjected them to any physical confrontation,

or used any actual force. Even given the liberal pleading

standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), plaintiffs

have not stated sufficient facts to support their allegation that

any of the individual county defendants used threats, coercion,

or intimidation.4 Egi’s statement, whether or not it was

misleading, does not rise to the level of the exceptional type of

tort section 52.1 was intended to cover. Consequently,

defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED. 

B. State Law Immunities

Defendants contend that they are entitled to statutory

immunity from liability for all of plaintiffs’ state law claims.5

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6 Plaintiffs have alleged that each of the defendants was

“acting either individually and outside the scope of their [sic]

employment, or within the scope, purpose and authority of their .

. . employment.” (Compl. ¶ 33.) Defendants argue that

plaintiffs cannot simultaneously plead such inconsistent facts in

an effort to hold the individuals and the county liable. Even if

these claims are inconsistent, plaintiffs are entitled to plead

in the alternative at this stage in the litigation. Fed. Rules

Civ. Proc. 8(e)(2); accord Henry v. Daytop Village, 42 F.3d 89

(2d Cir. 1994).

13

California Government Code section 821.6 provides: “A public

employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or

prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the

scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without

probable cause.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6. Under this law,

public employees are generally immune from suit for all actions

taken while instituting or prosecuting judicial or administrative

proceedings, whether or not the acts were lawfully performed. 

Rosenthal v. Vogt, 229 Cal. App. 3d 69, 75 (1991); Randle v. City

and County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. App. 3d 449, 457 (1986). 

In determining immunity under section 821.6, “[t]he critical

question . . . is whether [the actions] were part of the

initiation or prosecution process. If they were, then they were

protected by the immunity provided by . . . section 821.6.” 

Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 1498-99 (1989). 

See also Kayfetz v. State of CA, 156 Cal. App. 3d 491, 496 (1984)

("[the] issue is whether the [action] is part of the

'prosecution' of a proceeding within the meaning of this

section."). Furthermore, “immunity under section 821.6 applies

only where public employees have acted . . . ‘within the scope

of their employment.’”6 Javor v. Taggart, 98 Cal. App. 4th 795,

809 (2002). 

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Additionally, California Government Code section 820.2

states: 

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public

employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his

act or omission where the act or omission was the

result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him,

whether or not such discretion be abused.

Cal Gov’t Code § 820.2. This type of immunity applies only to

deliberate and considered decisions in which a conscious

balancing of the risks took place. Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal.

4th 972, 981 (1995) (citing Johnson v. State of CA, 69 Cal. 2d

782, 795 fn.8 (1962)).

California courts have applied these immunities quite

expansively to social workers, and the protection afforded by

these statutes is arguably much broader than the federal immunity

discussed above. See e.g. Alicia T. v. County of L.A., 222 Cal.

App. 3d 869 (1990) (finding social worker immune from claims of

negligence and intentional misconduct for mistakenly removing a

child); Jenkins v. County of Orange, 212 Cal. App. 3d 278 (1989)

(holding social worker immune from claims, inter alia, that she

disregarded evidence and misrepresented information to the

court).

However, California Government Code section 820.21 abrogates

social worker immunity for certain malicious acts. Specifically,

section 820.21 provides that social workers are not immune from

liability for the following acts, if committed with malice: (1)

perjury; (2) fabrication of evidence; (3) failure to disclose

known exculpatory evidence; or (4) obtaining testimony by duress. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.21(a). As defined in the statute, “malice”

means “conduct that is intended . . . to cause injury to the

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plaintiff or despicable conduct that is carried on . . . with a

willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of

others.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.21(b).

1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action alleges intentional

infliction of emotional distress against each of the

individually-named defendants. Specifically, plaintiffs allege

that the “facts and circumstances surrounding” the removal of the

children, as well as a wide variety of actions taken by the

defendants during the children’s detention, were intended to

cause severe emotional distress “and/or were done with reckless

disregard for the likelihood of causing the plaintiffs severe

emotional distress.” (Compl. ¶ 119.)

Specifically, plaintiffs point to: (1) defendants’ promises

and subsequent failures to deliver Mrs. Masoud’s breast milk to

Amalia; (2) the performance of physical examinations of the

children without the parents’ knowledge or consent; (3)

inoculations that were given to the children while they were in

foster care; (4) Egi’s statement that the Masouds did not need an

attorney at the initial hearing; (5) representations by various

defendants that the children would be returned soon; and (6)

half-truths and the omission of exculpatory information in the

reports submitted to the court. (Compl. ¶ 119.)

Defendants are entitled to immunity for those acts that were

part of the initiation and prosecution of child dependency

proceedings, or were the result of a considered exercise of

discretion, with the exception of certain acts committed with

malice. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 821.6, 820.2, 820.21. The performance

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of the physical examinations is part of the initiation and

prosecution of the dependency proceedings. California Welfare

and Institutions Code section 324.5 permits the physical

examination of suspected victims of child abuse by a medical

professional. Moreover, the statute specifically provides for

the submission of the results of this examination to the

dependency court. Id. The results of the medical examination

are part of both the investigation and prosecution the dependency

proceedings. See Parkes, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1083-84 (referring

to a medical examination of an alleged child abuse victim as an

“evidentiary examination”). Therefore, defendants are entitled

to immunity for this action under Government Code section 821.6.

In addition, defendants are entitled to immunity for any

alleged representations to the Masouds regarding the timing of

the return of the children. Whether or when children who have

been taken into protective custody will be returned to their

parents is the very issue which juvenile dependency proceedings

are designed to resolve. Resolution of this issue necessarily

depends on the course the investigation takes, the cooperation of

the parents involved, and the ultimate rulings of the juvenile

court. Estimates by social workers as to whether or when

children will be reunited with their parents are essentially

tantamount to an evaluation of the prosecutorial case as it

stands at a given time. Such statements are part of the

prosecution of dependency proceedings. Consequently, any

representations of this nature by defendants in the instant case

are covered by the immunity conferred under section 821.6.

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Although submissions by social workers to the juvenile

court, including the omission of exculpatory evidence, would

normally be covered by complete immunity under section 821.6 (See

Jenkins, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 283-84), plaintiffs have

successfully invoked the exception under section 820.21. 

Plaintiffs have generally averred that “[d]efendants are guilty

of oppression, fraud, and/or malice” by way of their acts and

omissions. (Compl. ¶ 100.) At this early stage, such

generalized pleading is sufficient to invoke the exception to the

general grant of governmental immunity for false submissions or

the exclusion of exculpatory evidence during the juvenile

dependency proceedings. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9(b) (“Malice,

intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be

averred generally.”). Thus, defendants are not entitled to

immunity from the claims that they maliciously either submitted

false information to the courts or that they omitted exculpatory

information from their reports.

As to plaintiffs other allegations regarding defendants’

actions, the court cannot, at this time, determine that those

actions were covered by immunity as a matter of law. Defendants’

alleged promises and failures to deliver breast milk to Amalia,

the administration of inoculations to the children, and Egi’s

representation to the Masouds that they did not need an attorney,

cannot affirmatively be said to be part of the initiation or

prosecution of the dependency proceedings based upon the facts

presently before the court. Additionally, the court cannot

determine at this stage in the proceedings whether these actions

were taken as the result of a considered exercise of discretion,

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7 Although plaintiffs’ Complaint states this as a cause

of action against the Human Services Agency of San Joaquin County

(“Agency”), plaintiffs also allege the Agency is a department of

the county, and thus have properly served the county in this

suit. (Compl. ¶ 30.)

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and thus entitled to immunity under section 820.2. Defendants’

motion must be denied as to immunity for these allegations at

this time. 

As set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim

is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

2. Battery

Plaintiffs Alae and Amalia also bring a fifth cause of

action for battery against the county.7 Specifically, plaintiffs

allege that Alae and Amalia were subjected to physical

examinations “and/or inoculations” while in the “care, custody

and control” of the county. (Compl. ¶¶ 122-124.) Plaintiffs do

not identify the individuals who allegedly committed the battery. 

Public entities in California are generally immune from

direct tort liability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. “[D]irect tort

liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute

declaring them to be liable.” Munoz v. City of Union City, 120

Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1112 (2004). California law does impose

liability on public entities for acts committed by their

employees while in the scope of employment. Cal. Gov’t Code §

815.2. However, a public entity is not liable for an injury

resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity where the employee is immune from liability. Cal. Gov’t

Code § 815.2(b). “If the agent or employee is exonerated, the

principal or employer cannot be held vicariously liable.” Munoz,

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120 Cal. App. 4th at 1113. Liability only attaches “if and when

it is adjudged that the employee” acted tortiously. Id.

Additionally, because public entities can only act through

individuals, “unless the employee is identified, the trier of

fact will not be able to determine if the elements needed to

assert vicarious liability have been proved. Thus, the doctrine

clearly contemplates that the negligent employee whose conduct is

sought to be attributed to the employer at least be specifically

identified, if not joined as a defendant.” Id. 

Until plaintiffs can identify the individuals responsible

for the battery and their respective relationships with the

county, they cannot maintain a claim for battery against the

county. The county is immune from direct claims for battery

under section 815.2. Consequently, defendants’ motion to dismiss

this claim is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court finds as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ federal

claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED as to

plaintiffs’ claim based upon false or improper

submissions to the juvenile court and DENIED as to all

other claims.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law

claim for violation of civil rights brought under

California Civil Code section 52.1 is GRANTED.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

is GRANTED as to claims arising from the physical

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examinations of the children and representations about

when they would be returned. The motion is DENIED as

to all other claims.

4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state law

claim for battery is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 8, 2006

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