Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_98-cv-04043/USCOURTS-cand-3_98-cv-04043-34/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS1, Warden, San Quentin State 

Prison,

Respondent.

Case No. 98-cv-4043-SI 

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER GRANTING EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING AS TO CLAIM I AND 

DENYING CLAIMS A, H, P, AND Q

Re: Dkt. Nos. 346, 364, 376

On June 30, 2014, Petitioner filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities Regarding 

Claims, which renewed his request for an evidentiary hearing on five claims: A, H, P, I, and the 

consideration of extrinsic evidence subclaim of Claim Q. (Dkt. 346.) It also outlined the merits of 

those claims. Respondent filed an opposition and Petitioner replied. (Dkt. 364 and 376, 

respectively.) The matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the foregoing reasons, an 

evidentiary hearing is GRANTED as to Claim I. Claims A, H, except to the investigation of 

innocence subclaim, P, and the consideration of extrinsic evidence subclaim of Claim Q are 

DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187); attempted murder (id. § 664); 

robbery in an inhabited dwelling (id. § 213.5); and first-degree burglary (id. §§ 459-60). The jury 

 

1 Ron Davis is automatically substituted for his predecessor as the named Respondent pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

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found “special circumstances” of robbery and burglary felony-murder (id. § 190.2). The jury also 

found that Petitioner used a firearm in the commission of these offenses (id. § 12022.5), and 

inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the attempted murder, the robbery, and the 

burglary (id. § 12022.7). Following the penalty phase of his trial, the jury sentenced Petitioner to 

death.2

On July 20, 1992, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. Answer Ex. 92. The California Supreme Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on 

the specific question of whether Petitioner “is factually innocent of the murder of Willie Womble, 

in that his deceased brother, Timothy Johnson, committed the crime.” In re Johnson, 18 Cal.4th 

447, 451 (1998). The court appointed a referee, who made factual findings and credibility 

determinations following the hearing. Id. at 456-57. Ultimately, the referee held that Petitioner, 

not his brother, was present at the robbery and responsible for Willie Womble’s death. Id. at 456. 

The entirety of Petitioner’s state habeas petition was denied on the merits.

Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court in 1998. On March 10, 

2004, this Court granted Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on Claims A, H, I, P, and part of Claim 

Q. (Dkt. 119.) Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the grant of the evidentiary hearing as to 

Claim I, arguing under Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(3) that the Court manifestly failed “to consider material 

facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented” to it. (Dkt. 129.) The Court denied 

that motion. (Dkt. 131.)

Following the issuance of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), Respondent filed a 

second motion to reconsider the grant of an evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 277.) The Court granted 

that motion and asked the parties to brief Petitioner’s entitlement to relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) for Claims A, H, I, P, and the consideration of extrinsic evidence subclaim of Claim 

Q. (Dkt. 287.) The Court ultimately found that Petitioner had not shown that he was entitled to 

relief for these claims under § 2254(d)(1). (Order Regarding § 2254(d)(1), Dkt. 317.) The Order, 

however, noted that the California Supreme Court’s decision denying Claim I may have been an 

 

2

The factual background of this case has been set out at length in prior Court orders. See, e.g.,

Dkt. 119. Thus, it will not be repeated here.

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unreasonable interpretation of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) in light of that court’s

narrow framing of the claim and its refusal to allow Petitioner to submit alibi evidence to prove his 

innocence. (Order Regarding § 2254(d)(1) at 18, n. 7.) The Court asked the parties to brief what 

issues remained to be resolved and specifically requested the parties to address how much further 

factual development of the evidentiary claims was appropriate or necessary. (Order Regarding 

§ 2254(d)(1) at 24-25.) The parties have submitted their briefs on those issues. (Dkt. 346, 364, 

and 376.) Petitioner renews his request for an evidentiary hearing on all five claims and seeks 

habeas relief based on those claims.

DISCUSSION

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a federal court cannot 

grant relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In Pinholster, the Supreme Court held that in determining the 

reasonableness of a state court's ruling under § 2254(d)(1), federal courts are “limited to the record 

that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 563 U.S. at 181. The 

court explained that “evidence later introduced in federal court is irrelevant to § 2254(d)(1) 

review.” Id. at 184. Several circuit courts have concluded that under Pinholster, district courts 

should determine whether a petitioner’s claims survive the § 2254(d)(1) standard on the basis of 

the state record alone, without reliance on evidence developed in federal evidentiary hearings. 

See, e.g., Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831, 2011 WL 1458694 (7th Cir.2011); Jackson v. Kelly, 650 

F.3d 477, 2011 WL 1534571 (4th Cir.2011).

The Supreme Court in Pinholster did not hold that a district court would err by conducting 

an evidentiary hearing before deciding that a claim survives review under § 2254(d). 563 U.S. at 

203 n. 20 (“[W]e need not decide . . . whether a district court may ever choose to hold an 

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evidentiary hearing before it determines that § 2254(d) has been satisfied”); see also Schriro v. 

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (“Prior to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA), the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing was left generally to the sound 

discretion of district courts. That basic rule has not changed” (citations omitted)). Nevertheless, 

the Supreme Court noted that its decision was “consistent” with Landrigan and stated that in 

Landrigan, it:

explained that "b]ecause the deferential standards prescribed by 

§ 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must 

take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary 

hearing is appropriate." [Landrigan, 550 U.S.] at 474. In practical 

effect, we went on to note, this means that when the state-court 

record "precludes habeas relief under the limitations of § 2254(d), a 

district court is ‘not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.’" Id. at 

474 (citing with approval the Ninth Circuit’s recognition that "an 

evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by 

reference to the state court record" (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 183.

This Court has already addressed whether Petitioner has made the requisite showing under 

§ 2254(d)(1). It has not, however, addressed whether Petitioner has made an alternate showing 

under § 2254(d)(2). It now does so.

1. EVIDENTIARY HEARING FOR CLAIM I

Petitioner’s Claim I alleges that he is innocent of capital murder. In the Order Regarding 

§ 2254(d)(1), the Court stated:

If Petitioner additionally had submitted compelling alibi evidence at 

the state-court evidentiary hearing, he might have proved his 

innocence. Petitioner intended to submit alibi evidence at the 

hearing, but the referee did not permit him to do so. The Supreme 

Court of California upheld the referee’s decision, finding that “the 

record fails to demonstrate that petitioner had actual alibi evidence 

to present or what it might have been.” But the record could not 

contain alibi evidence precisely because the referee did not permit 

Petitioner to present it. The state court’s reasoning in this regard is 

entirely circular and, accordingly, unreasonable.

(Order Regarding § 2254(d)(1) at 18-19, n. 7.) 

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Petitioner argues that the California Supreme Court’s exclusion of his alibi evidence was 

unreasonable and that the state court record supports the conclusion that Tim Johnson committed 

the murder of Willie Womble. (Reply at 25-27.)

Respondent argues that the California Supreme Court decision preventing the inclusion of 

Petitioner’s alibi evidence was not unreasonable because there is no United States Supreme Court 

authority “setting forth the minimum standards for state evidentiary hearings in habeas cases 

generally, much less on a claim such as that here.” (Opposition at 30.) He states that Petitioner 

was not prepared to present any actual alibi evidence at the hearing and that Petitioner failed to 

make an offer of proof as to what alibi evidence he possessed and, therefore, the California 

Supreme Court could not make a judgment as to whether such evidence was properly excluded. 

(Opposition at 32.) Respondent also argues that an evidentiary hearing would be improper 

because Petitioner is not entitled to relief on a freestanding actual innocence claim. (Opposition at 

24.)

Challenges under § 2254(d)(2) fall into two general categories. “First, a petitioner may 

challenge the substance of the state court’s findings and attempt to show that those findings are 

not supported by substantial evidence in the state court record. . . . Second, a petitioner may 

challenge the fact-finding process itself on the ground that it was deficient in some material way.” 

Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 

999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). An unreasonable determination of the facts occurs where the state 

court fails to consider and weigh highly probative, relevant evidence, central to the petitioner’s 

claim, that was properly presented and made part of the state-court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d. 992, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F .3d 984, 

1000 (9th Cir.2014). In Hibbler, the Ninth Circuit stressed that a state court is not required to hold 

an evidentiary hearing on every factual issue, so long as “the state court reasonably concluded that 

the evidence already adduced was sufficient to resolve the factual question.” 693 F.3d at 1147 

(citing Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

The Court has reviewed the briefing, the record, and the transcript of the state court 

proceedings and concludes that the California Supreme Court’s denial of Claim I was an 

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unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the evidence presented to it. The California 

Supreme Court’s fact-finding process was unreasonable in light of its restrictive narrowing of the 

claim presented to it and its refusal to consider Petitioner’s alibi evidence, which could resolve the 

factual question of innocence. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is ordered on Petitioner’s 

actual innocence claim.

2. CLAIMS A, H, P, AND Q

In its March 30, 2012 order, the Court evaluated the merits of Claims A, H, P, and the 

consideration of extrinsic evidence subclaim of Claim Q and found that the California Supreme 

Court’s denial of these claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). (Dkt. 321 at 2.) The Order, 

however, called for additional briefing as to what evidentiary issues remained to be resolved. 

(Dkt. 321 at 3.)

Petitioner’s briefing on Claims A, H, P, and the subclaim of Claim Q reiterates the merits 

of the claims, rehashing arguments this Court has already considered and rejected. Because 

Petitioner has presented nothing new that would cause the Court to reconsider its finding that the 

California Supreme Court’s denial of these claims was not an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or an unreasonable determination of the 

facts under § 2254(d)(2), these claims are denied. 

The exception to this is the subclaim of Claim H that alleges ineffective assistance of 

counsel during the guilt phase of Petitioner’s trial based on counsel’s failure to investigate and 

discover the evidence presented in connection with Claim I. Because, as noted above, the 

California Supreme Court’s denial of Claim I was an unreasonable determination of the facts on 

that claim, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling on this related subclaim. The merits 

of this subclaim will be addressed following the evidentiary hearing on Claim I.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing is GRANTED as to 

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Claim I. To facilitate preparation for the hearing, the Court will hold a case management 

conference on July 7, 2016 at 11:00 a.m. in Courtroom No. 1. The parties shall come prepared to 

discuss administration of the evidentiary hearing, including witnesses to be called and any pre- or 

post-hearing briefing the parties wish to submit.

Claims A, H, except to the extent that it alleges ineffective assistance of counsel during the 

guilt phase of Petitioner’s trial based on counsel’s failure to investigate and discover the evidence 

presented in connection with Claim I, P and the consideration of extrinsic evidence subclaim of 

Claim Q are DENIED.

A ruling on the investigation of innocence subclaim of Claim H is DEFERRED until after 

the evidentiary hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2016

________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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