Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00614/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00614-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALFREDO RITA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CYPRESS SECURITY, LLC, A 

CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY 

COMPANY D/B/A CYPRESS PRIVATE 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-00614-WHO 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND 

ORDER SETTING HEARING DATE AS 

TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 1

On February 5, 2016, defendant Cypress Security LLC d/b/a Cypress Private Security 

removed this action to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). Cypress argues that counts 1-5 of the plaintiffs’ complaint are 

preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, 

and that the court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining counts under 28 U.S.C. §§

13367, 1441(c). Dkt. No. 1 (“Removal Notice”). 

Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter 

jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 

546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “If at any time [after removal] and before final judgment it appears that 

the district courts lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c). This Court questions whether subject matter jurisdiction exists here. In Caterpillar, Inc. 

v. Williams, the Supreme Court stated that § 301 preemption applies only to “claims founded 

directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and claims substantially dependent 

on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted); see also Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 

1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on 

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United States District Court

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the basis of a federal defense, including a defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated 

in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only 

question truly at issue.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

 In Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., the Ninth Circuit established a two-step analysis to 

determine whether section 301 preempts a plaintiff’s claim. 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir.2007). 

A court must first “determine whether a particular right inheres in state law or, is instead grounded 

in a CBA.” Id. “If, however, the right exists independently of the CBA, [the court] must still 

consider whether it is nevertheless substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining 

agreement.” Id. at 1059 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “If the claim requires 

interpretation of the CBA, the claim is preempted; if the claim merely requires ‘looking to’ the 

CBA, it is not preempted. Although the ‘look to’/ ‘interpret’ distinction is often difficult to draw, 

when the meaning of the contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collectivebargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not 

require that the claim be extinguished.” Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply, No. 115-cv-01873-

LJO-SKO, 2016 WL 696503, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016). 

Here, the removal notice does not contain sufficient allegations to establish the 

applicability of the LMRA to this case. Cypress recognizes that the plaintiffs’ complaint does not 

reference their membership in a union or the existence of a collective bargaining agreement 

(“CBA”). Removal Notice ¶ 12. Nevertheless, Cypress asserts rather conclusorily that the 

remedies plaintiffs seek “arise under the LMRA § 301” and “require interpretation of the CBA.” 

Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. On this record, Cypress has not sufficiently alleged facts showing the need to 

interpret the CBA to resolve the claims in this case. 

To determine whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, Cypress must show cause 

by March 28, 2016 in a memorandum of no more than ten pages that explains why removal is 

proper. I am especially interested in the ways in which this case differs meaningfully from similar 

cases in this Circuit that have held that the LMRA did not preempt plaintiffs’ state law wage and 

hour claims and that removal, therefore, was improper. See, e.g., Asseko v. Guardsmark LLC, No. 

07-cv-4367-BZ, 2007 WL 4287551 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007); Densmore, 2016 WL 696503; 

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United States District Court

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Cosmo Lopez v. Sysco Corp., No. 15-cv-4420-JSW, Dkt. No. 25 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016); 

Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 65 F. Supp. 3d 932 (C.D. Cal. 2014). The 

memorandum shall address the Court’s concerns and identify the facts demonstrating that the 

CBA will need to be interpreted to resolve the claims in this case. Plaintiffs may file a response 

supporting or opposing removal by April 1, 2016 in a memorandum of no more than ten pages. 

The Court will request a reply brief if needed. 

The Court will hear this issue on April 13, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 2, 17th Floor. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2016 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

Case 3:16-cv-00614-WHO Document 13 Filed 03/22/16 Page 3 of 3