Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01129/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01129-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE FELIZ ORTIZ LEON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF MERCED, a municipal 

corporation, MERCED POLICE 

DEPARTMENT OFFICER BRYAN 

SAELEE, individually, MERCED 

POLICE DEPARTMENT CHIEF NORM 

ANDRADE, in his official 

capacity, and DOES 1 through 

50, jointly and severally,

Defendants.

No. 1:14-CV-01129-GEB-SAB 

ORDER GRANTING EACH DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Each of the following Defendants filed a dismissal 

motion challenging the sufficiency of claims alleged in 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”): Defendants City of 

Merced (“the City”), Merced Police Department (“MPD”), Officer 

Bryan Saelee (“Saelee”), and MPD Chief Norm Andrade (“Andrade”). 

Plaintiff alleges the following California claims in his SAC:

false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence; and federal due 

process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each claim is premised on 

allegations that each Defendant caused Plaintiff to be wrongfully 

arrested and detained as a consequence of Saelee’s placement of 

Plaintiff’s address in an MPD database, following which Plaintiff 

was misidentified as Jose Ortiz, the suspect in a domestic 

Case 1:14-cv-01129-GEB-SAB Document 36 Filed 05/29/15 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

violence investigation. 

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following allegations in the SAC concern the 

motion. “MPD maintains a database of [information about] 

suspects” including a suspect’s address. (SAC ¶ 17, ECF No. 27.) 

When a new address is input into the database, “the database 

over-writes” and replaces the previously entered address. (Id.) 

Information in the database is used to “generate[] MPD documents” 

that are “forwarded to the Merced County District Attorney’s 

Office, the Merced County Superior Court, and other government 

agencies, [that] rely on [such information] . . . [for the 

purpose of] either arrest[ing] individuals . . . or . . .

summon[ing] [them] . . . to court or elsewhere.” (Id.) 

Saelee had “knowledge of how the [MPD database] is set 

up and functions,” and “wrote Plaintiff’s address on a document 

... filed with the MPD in relation to a 2012 case involving the 

real suspect, Jose Ortiz,” who was a suspect in several domestic 

violence-related crimes against his ex-wife. (SAC ¶¶ 1, 19.) 

Plaintiff and Jose Ortiz have different heights, weights, dates 

of birth, and live in different cities. (Id. ¶ 1.) However, 

“[d]esignating Plaintiff’s address as [Jose Ortiz’s address]...

misidentified Plaintiff as the suspect since [Jose Ortiz’s] name 

is included in Plaintiff’s name.” (Id. ¶ 30.) 

The information in the MDP database was “forwarded to

... the District Attorney and other agencies[,] . . . [and 

thereby] creat[ed] the unmistakable . . . impression” that 

Plaintiff’s address was the address of [the real suspect] Jose 

Ortiz. (SAC ¶ 30.) “As a result of being misidentified” as Jose 

Case 1:14-cv-01129-GEB-SAB Document 36 Filed 05/29/15 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Ortiz, Plaintiff “was summoned and, after complying [with the 

summons], . . . was seized and imprisoned” in the Merced County 

Jail “[o]n or about June 18, 2013.” (Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.) On July 1, 

2013, the Merced County Superior Court “determined [Plaintiff] 

unequivocally was not the suspect in the pending criminal 

matters.” (Id. ¶ 26.) 

Plaintiff alleges his arrest and detention was “a 

foreseeable consequence” of Saelee’s placement of the wrong 

address in the MDP database since “any reasonably trained officer 

would know” that when a summons is issued, “[a]rrests are made... 

and identities are sorted out later [, and that t]he default 

practice is to arrest[, and] law enforcement errs on the side of 

taking perceived suspects into custody” before “sorting out 

identity issues.” (SAC ¶ 30.) 

Plaintiff alleges the City and Andrade are responsible 

for his arrest and detention since they failed to maintain 

sufficient quality control policies for operation of the MPD 

database, and failed to adequately train employees on how to 

ensure accurate address information was entered into the

database.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Caviness v. 

Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

Case 1:14-cv-01129-GEB-SAB Document 36 Filed 05/29/15 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 

(2007)). “For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all 

well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe 

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th 

Cir. 2012). However, the court does “not accept legal conclusions 

in the complaint as true, even if cast in the form of factual 

allegations.” Lacano Inv., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071 

(9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Negligence, and 

Violation of Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights

Saelee and the City each seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

false imprisonment, false arrest, and negligence claims. The 

claims against the City are alleged under California Government 

Code section 815.2, which creates liability against a public 

entity for actions of an employee that would “give[] rise to a 

cause of action against that employee.” Saelee also seeks 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim. Saelee and the City 

argue:

Plaintiff appears to imply it is plausible an 

incorrect address was the sole reason he was 

arrested, [not withstanding] the other 

allegations that Plaintiff is not Jose Ortiz, 

but Jose Ortiz Leon, [and that he has a 

different date of birth, height, and weight 

than the Jose Ortiz.]

(Not. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss SAC 5:1-6, ECF No. 28.)

Plaintiff responds: 

[His arrest] was the proximate result of 

Case 1:14-cv-01129-GEB-SAB Document 36 Filed 05/29/15 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

SAELEE’s conduct—notwithstanding . . . [that 

he was physically arrested by someone other 

than Saelee and] despite the differences in 

identifying features between Plaintiff and 

the real suspect—because [the fact that 

Plaintiff was arrested before it was 

determined whether he was in fact Jose Ortiz] 

. . . was not [a] highly unusual or an 

extraordinary response to Plaintiff appearing 

in response to the summons for the suspect, 

[Jose Ortiz]. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss SAC (“Opp’n”) 11:15-18, ECF No. 

32.) Plaintiff argues Saelee knew Plaintiff would be arrested 

when he responded to the summons sent to his address since a 

police officer “knows the steps that transpire in the process of 

taking suspects into custody or summoning criminal defendants” 

and that when an individual responds to a summons, he or she is 

arrested. (Opp’n 20:11-16.) 

To plead each claim Plaintiff must plausibly allege

that each movant caused the injuries about which he complains.

See Boyd v. City of Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1053 (N.D. 

Cal. 2006) (“To establish a claim of false arrest or false 

imprisonment, Plaintiff must prove . . . that the harm [suffered] 

was substantially caused by the Defendant’s conduct.”) (emphasis 

added) (citing Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715-16 

(1994)); Carlsen v. Koivumaki, 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 892 (2014)

(“The elements of any negligence cause of action are duty, breach 

of duty, proximate cause, and damages.”) (emphasis added); Harper 

v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In 

a § 1983 action, the plaintiff . . . must demonstrate that the 

defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed 

injury.”) (quotation omitted, emphasis added). Plaintiff is 

required to plausibly establish both cause in fact and proximate 

Case 1:14-cv-01129-GEB-SAB Document 36 Filed 05/29/15 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

cause. See e.g. Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 31 Cal. App. 

4th 1409, 1414-15 (1995) (“Causation . . . includes both cause in 

fact and proximate-legal causation: the former reflects the 

necessity of a sufficient factual nexus between the negligent 

conduct and the injury while the latter represents the legal 

determination encompassing all the ill-defined considerations of 

policy which go to limit liability once cause in fact has been 

established.”); Smith v. Harrington, No. C 12-03533, 2015 WL 

1407292, at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) (“To meet [the 

federal] causation requirement, the plaintiff must establish both 

causation-in-fact . . . and proximate causation . . . . A 

defendant's conduct is a cause-in-fact . . . if it is a “but-for” 

cause of the injury. And a defendant's conduct is a proximate... 

cause . . . if there is ‘a sufficient causal link between the act 

or omission of a defendant and any injury suffered by the 

plaintiff to justify the imposition of liability.’”). 

Plaintiff alleges Saelee caused his arrest and 

detention by placing Plaintiff’s address in the MPD database

since whoever arrested him did so based solely on Plaintiff’s 

address in the database. However, this conclusory allegation is 

insufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims 

against Saelee are dismissed. 

Further, Plaintiff’s state claims against the City are 

also dismissed since they are alleged under California Government 

Code section 815.2, and therefore depend on Plaintiff alleging a 

plausible claim against Saelee, which he has not done. 

B. Monell Claim

Case 1:14-cv-01129-GEB-SAB Document 36 Filed 05/29/15 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

The City and Andrade seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

Monell claim, alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing since 

Plaintiff has not pled a plausible due process claim against 

Saelee, the Monell claim also is not actionable.

Plaintiff responds that even if his claim against 

Saelee fails, the Monell claim is sufficiently pled since he 

alleges the City and Andrade “fail[ed] to institute reasonable 

quality control procedures . . . for requiring verification” of 

information in the database, and failed “to institute quality 

control procedures to prevent the wrongful overwriting of a[] 

[suspect’s] address,” and these failures “caused or permitted” 

the false imprisonment of innocent persons. (Opp’n 27:3-6; 26:13-

19.) 

The “Monell claim,” refers to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), in which 

the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may use § 1983 to pursue 

a claim against a local government if plaintiff’s injuries were 

the result of a government policy, custom or practice. Liability 

against a municipality, such as City, may be established in one 

of three ways: “(1) when implementation of its official policies 

or established customs inflict[] the constitutional injury;... 

(2) when its omissions or failure to act amounts to a policy of 

“deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights; or (3) when 

an official with final policymaking authority ratifies a 

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Clouthier v. Cnty of 

Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(synthesizing authority). To allege a plausible Monell claim, a 

plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality’s “policies are 

Case 1:14-cv-01129-GEB-SAB Document 36 Filed 05/29/15 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.” City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (emphasis added, 

brackets in original). Since Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged 

Saelee violated his due process rights, neither the City nor 

Andrade can be liable under § 1983. See Quintanilla v. City of 

Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating no Monell

liability when plaintiff failed to show the individual officer

inflicted a constitutional harm); see also Simmons v. Navajo 

Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because . . . 

there was no underlying constitutional violation, [Plaintiff] 

cannot maintain a claim for municipal liability.”). 

Therefore, Plaintiff has not plausibly pled the 

causation element of a Monell claim, and this claim is dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, each Defendant’s dismissal 

motion is GRANTED. However, Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14) 

days leave from the date on which this order is filed to file a 

Third Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies in any claim 

dismissed. 

Dated: May 28, 2015

Case 1:14-cv-01129-GEB-SAB Document 36 Filed 05/29/15 Page 8 of 8