Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00138/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00138-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 8:287 Petition to Enforce INS Subpoena

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANJAYKUMAR LALLUBHAI

PATEL,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID STILL, et al.,

Respondents.

NO. C04-0138 TEH 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on March 2, 2005, on

Petitioner’s request for de novo review of his naturalization application after denial by the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”). Petitioner seeks a declaratory

judgment that he is entitled to be naturalized pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422 et seq. Having

carefully considered all of the evidence and testimony adduced at the hearing, the parties’ oral

and written submissions, and the entire record herein, the Court find as follows.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Sanjaykumar Lallubhai Patel (“Patel”) is a native and citizen of India and a

lawful permanent resident of the United States. To apply for an immigrant visa, Patel appeared

for an interview at the U.S. Consulate in Mumbai, India, on March 12, 1997. The interview was

conducted in English with an interpreter who translated into Hindi. Patel’s native language is

Gujarati, and Patel testified that the consular agents probably asked him if he wanted a Gujarati

interpreter. However, Patel told them that he spoke Hindi and consented to be interviewed in

Hindi in part because he thought there would only be a few questions. At no time during the
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1At the time, the INS, a division of the Department of Justice, processed naturalization

applications. After March 1, 2003, such procedures were assumed by the CIS, a division of the

Department of Homeland Security. 

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interview did Patel ask any questions or otherwise inform the staff that he had trouble

understanding the questions or the explanations of the documents that he would later sign.

A few weeks after the interview, Patel returned to the U.S. Consulate and was informed

that he would be granted a United States visa. At this second interview, Patel signed Form DS1810, Notice of Duty to Register with U.S. Selective Service. Pet’r Ex. 1. This form explains

that men between the ages of 18 and 26 when they enter the U.S. must register with the U.S.

Selective Service System, and that failure to register is a serious crime and may lead to denial

of U.S. citizenship. Id. The form also states that a person cannot register after he reaches age

26. Id. Patel signed the notice with the following pre-printed acknowledgment: “I hereby

state that I received a copy of this notice, that I have read and understand what is required, and I

understand that failure to comply with its requirement is a criminal act punishable by

imprisonment and/or a fine.” Id. The form was translated into Hindi for Patel at his visa

interview. Patel told the consular officer that he understood the requirement and agreed to

follow through with it when he got to the United States. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 36:22-

37:12. 

Patel entered the United States on April 19, 1997. At the time, he was 20 years old. 

When he arrived in the United States, he did not fill out the Selective Service form because,

according to Patel, he “forgot”. Id. at 38:21-24.

On April 22, 2002, Patel signed an application for naturalization from the United States

Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”).1 A friend of Patel filled out the form on his

behalf, asking Patel to provide the answers to some but not all of the questions. Section G of

the application form for naturalization is entitled “Selective Service Registration”; Question

33 under that section asks, “Are you a male who lived in the United States at any time between

your 18th and 26th birthdays in any status except as lawful nonimmigrant?” Ex.4 to Dulberg

Decl. at 9. The section also states that if the answer to the above question is “yes” and the
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applicant has not registered with the Selective Service, he must register before application for

naturalization, or else explain the failure to register. Id. On Patel’s application, the response

to Question 33 is “no” and, thus, there was no explanation for his failure to register. Id. 

Patel’s response to Question 33, however, was incorrect as he had been a lawful permanent

resident during the period between his 18th and 26th birthdays. Nonetheless, Patel signed the

application with the following pre-printed acknowledgment: “I certify under penalty of perjury

under the laws of the United States of America that this application, and the evidence submitted

with it, are all true and correct.” Id. at 10. 

In preparation for his naturalization test, Patel studied the INS preparation booklet. 

However, he read only twenty to thirty of the sample questions and did not read the part of the

booklet that explains the requirements for becoming a citizen, such as registering for the

Selective Service.

On May 14, 2002, Patel applied for naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. 

On December 19, 2002, the INS sent Patel a notice instructing him to appear on February 26,

2003, for a naturalization interview. The notice instructed Patel that he must bring with him to

the interview: the interview notice, his alien registration card (green card), his passport, and

“any evidence of Selective Service Registration.” Patel was in India getting married when the

notice arrived, but a friend called him, read the notice to him, and told him that he only needed

to bring his passport and green card to the interview. Patel did read the notice when he

returned on February 9, 2003.

On February 26, 2003, Patel appeared as instructed for his naturalization interview. At

that interview, the INS found that Patel was a person of good moral character and that he had

met the English and history requirements. However, Patel’s application was not granted

because he had not registered for the Selective Service. After being informed that he needed

to register, Patel went the following day to register with his younger brother, who was also

applying for naturalization. Although his brother was able to register because he had not yet

turned 26, Patel’s application was refused because he had reached age 26 on December 25,

2002.
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2Patel testified that he received no mail from the Selective Service, but the parties did

not explore whether Patel in fact received the Selective Service correspondence. Because

resolution of this issue of fact does not affect the ultimate outcome of this decision, the Court

does not make a specific finding on this point.

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Patel sent an inquiry to the Selective Service regarding his registration status, and the

Selective Service responded in a letter dated March 26, 2003. The Selective Service System

informed Patel that he was not registered and that a person cannot register after attaining age

26. In addition, the letter noted that the Selective Service had sent Patel “one or more pieces

of correspondence informing [him] of the requirement to register, which were not returned as

undeliverable.”2 Ex. C to Daw. Decl. The letter also cited to Section 12(g) of the Military

Selective Service Act, which states that a person may not be denied a right under federal law

for failing to register for the Selective Service if he can demonstrate “by a preponderance of

the evidence that the failure to register was not a knowing and wilful failure to register.” Id. 

On May 7, 2003, the Selective Service System again notified Patel that his registration form

could not be processed because of his age. On June 24, 2003, the newly formed CIS

determined that Patel was ineligible for naturalization because he knowingly and wilfully failed

to register for Selective Service and, therefore, could not demonstrate that he was “disposed to

the good order and happiness of the United States and he has obeyed the laws which may result

from the process prescribed by the Constitution.” Ex. D to Daw. Decl.

Patel timely appealed the CIS’s determination. On September 3, 2003, Patel appeared

for his appeals hearing, at which he testified that (1) he did not understand the Selective

Service requirement until his interview for naturalization on February 26, 2003, and (2) he

tried to register the next day but was not allowed to register because he was over age 26. On

September 16, 2003, the CIS issued its decision denying Patel’s appeal.

On January 12, 2004, Patel brought the instant action pursuant to Section 310(c) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) seeking de novo review of the denial of his

naturalization application.
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ANALYSIS

I.

Patel is eligible for naturalization pursuant to INA §§ 310 et seq. [8 U.S.C. §§ 1421 et

seq.]. This Court has jurisdiction to grant Patel’s naturalization application pursuant to INA

§ 310(c) [8 U.S.C. §1421(c)]. Under that section, review of a denial of naturalization by a

United States district court shall be de novo and the court shall make its own findings of fact

and conclusions of law. Id. 

II.

The CIS denied Patel naturalization based on his failure to register for the Selective

Service. Under 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 453(a) and 456(a), all males between the ages of 18 and 26

who are citizens or residing in the United States, except aliens in lawful nonimmigrant status,

must register for the Selective Service. Presidential Proc. No. 4771 of July 2, 1980 § 1-101,

94 Stats. 3775 (1980). However, section 12(g) of the Military Selective Service Act provides

that:

A person may not be denied a right, privilege, or benefit under Federal

law by reason of failure to present himself for and submit to

registration under section 3 [section 453 of this Appendix] if – (1) the

requirement for the person to so register has terminated or become

inapplicable to the person; and (2) the person shows by a

preponderance of the evidence that the failure of the person to register

was not a knowing and wilful failure to register. 

50 U.S.C. app. § 462(g) (emphasis added). Thus, in order to prevail on his claim, Patel must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not knowingly and wilfully fail to

register for the Selective Service. Id.

In the criminal context, courts interpret a knowing and wilful failure to register with the

Selective Service to require a showing of “deliberate purpose” not to comply with the

Selective Service Act. Ward v. U.S., 344 U.S. 924 (1953); Graves v. U.S., 252 F.2d 878,

881-82 (9th Cir. 1958) (“the words ‘knowingly fail or neglect to perform’, etc., require[] proof
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of the ‘usual criminal intent’”); U.S. v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515, 519 (D. Mass. 1968)

(“wilfully” . . . means intentionally, deliberately, or voluntarily). Thus, in the criminal context,

the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally failed to

register. Id. The Eighth Circuit has held that this burden to prove criminal intent may be

satisfied by “proof of facts and circumstances which establish that the defendant possessed

knowledge of an obligation . . . which he did not perform.” U.S. v. Klotz, 500 F.2d 580, 581-

82 (8th Cir. 1974).

In this case, which arises in the civil context, Patel has the burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he did not knowingly and wilfully fail to register. Thus, he

must produce evidence that would negate knowledge and criminal intent, such as mistake of

fact or law, duress, or incompetence. 

Patel argues that he did not knowingly and wilfully fail to register because he did not

understand the requirement to register. It is a generally held principle that ignorance or

mistake of the law is no excuse. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68

(1910); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); Liparota v. United States, 471

U.S. 419, 441 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). This rule is founded on a fear “that its absence

would encourage and reward public ignorance of the law to the detriment of our organized legal

system, and would encourage universal pleas of ignorance of the law that would constantly

pose confusing and, to a great extent, insolvable issues of fact to juries and judges, thereby

bogging down our adjudicative system.” U.S. v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 954 (D.C. Cir.1976)

(Merhige, J., concurring). 

However, the United States Supreme Court has permitted a defense of ignorance of the

law in the context of registration laws. See Lambert, 355 U.S. 225. In Lambert, the Court

held that “actual knowledge of the duty to register, or proof of the probability of knowledge,

and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction . . . can stand.” Id. at 229. 

The defendant in Lambert was convicted of violating a felon registration ordinance that made it

unlawful for any felon to be or remain in Los Angeles for a period of more than five days

without registering. Defendant was fined $250 and placed on probation for three years. The
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3The Ninth Circuit analogized the knowledge standard to one of “deliberate ignorance”

in the context of criminal law. Id. at 1158; see also U.S. v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th

Cir. 1976). 

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Supreme Court found that the nature of the ordinance was such that a person wholly passive and

unaware of any wrongdoing could be criminally condemned. Id. at 228. As this conflicted with

the due process requirement of notice, a conviction without showing knowledge of the duty to

register could not stand. Id. In the present matter, Patel faces punishment for a passive failure

to register over a period of five years. Although Patel does not face criminal condemnation,

the statute is explicit in requiring a showing of a lack of knowledge and intent in order to avoid

deprivation of the right to naturalization. Therefore, it is appropriate to permit a defense of

ignorance of the law in this context.

Nonetheless, Patel has failed to persuade the Court that he did not have knowledge of

the requirement to register. Id. at 229. In the context of a civil action, knowledge can be

inferred if the evidence shows that the person had information that would lead a reasonably

prudent person to inquire as to the facts, despite a lack of evidence that the person had actually

inquired and learned the facts. See New El Rey Sausage Company, Inc. v. INS, 925 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991); see also 3 Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 104.24 (5th ed.). In New El Rey, the

Ninth Circuit employed this “constructive knowledge” standard in the context of a civil

immigration suit. A Special Agent with the INS ran a check on the immigration status of the

employees of New El Rey and found that nine employees were presumed unauthorized unless

they could provide their employer with valid employment authorization. Id. at 1155. Two of

the nine cited employees insisted they were authorized to work but produced no documentation

of valid employment authorization. Id. New El Rey nonetheless retained the two employees. 

Id. In fining New El Rey for employing two unauthorized workers, the administrative law judge

found that New El Rey had constructive knowledge of its workers’ unauthorized status because

the INS had provided the company with specific, detailed information regarding the workers. 

Id. at 1157. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.3 The present matter is likewise a civil case in which

the INS, and the U.S. Department of State, provided Patel with specific, detailed information
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regarding the requirement to register, and Patel failed to follow up on that information. In both

situations, the “constructive knowledge” standard provides incentive to individuals and

businesses to be aware of and comply with U.S. laws and regulations in order to avoid

sanctions.

Further, in the context of a criminal failure to register for the Selective Service,

knowledge of a requirement to register may be inferred by circumstantial evidence relating to a

party’s conduct or activities. U.S. v. Boucher, 509 F.2d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 1975). In Boucher,

the Eighth Circuit overturned the conviction of a defendant who had failed to timely register

because “the prosecution presented no direct evidence that [the defendant] had actual

knowledge of the registration requirement . . . nor any background information . . . that might

aid a factfinder in inferring that [the defendant] became aware of the obligation to register.” Id.

at 992. Although general publicity about the requirement of registration for the draft was not

sufficient to infer knowledge, knowledge could be inferred where the government had provided

proof that defendant was aware of the requirement. Likewise, here, Respondents do not argue

that Patel had knowledge based on a general public awareness of the need to register, but

instead based on specific evidence that the INS and the Department of State had made Patel

aware of the requirement. 

Patel argues that the definition of knowledge under § 462(g) is actual and not

constructive knowledge, citing McDonald v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2005). In

McDonald, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) began deportation proceedings against an alien after a

finding that she had knowingly engaged in voter fraud in violation of state law. The alien

defendant had voted but had not been aware that she was not eligible to vote. By mistake, she

had originally checked the box marked “citizen” on her application for a driver’s license and

subsequently received a voter registration confirmation card in the mail. Defendant interpreted

the card as confirming her eligibility to vote; voted; and, at her naturalization interview,

informed the agent that she had voted in the last election. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found

that the IJ had used the wrong definition of “knowingly” as defined by the state criminal law for
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voter fraud, and that the defendant did not have the requisite mens rea because she had not been

actually aware that she was ineligible to vote.

This Court declines to adopt the McDonald standard in this case for the following two

reasons: First, the definition of knowing under the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.

App. §§ 451 et seq. is distinct from the definition under the state law in McDonald, and that

state law is not applicable to this case. As noted above, knowing in the context of failure to

register for the Selective Service may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances and

may be a credibility determination. Boucher, 509 F.2d at 994; U.S. v. Saunders, 435 F.2d 683

(5th Cir. 1970) (evidence of requisite intent to evade the draft was a credibility choice for the

district court). Second, the Ninth Circuit in McDonald explicitly noted that it refused the

“should have known” standard in that case because the defendant faced criminal conviction. 

McDonald, 400 F.3d at 689; see also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (deportation,

though not a penal sanction, surpasses in severity most criminal penalties and so may require a

showing of moral culpability). The case at bar is a civil case in which the sanction is not

deportation, nor any comparable penal sanction, but only a five-year delay in naturalization. 

Thus, the reasoning used in McDonald to hold the government to a criminal definition of

“knowing” as opposed to a civil “should have known” standard is not applicable here. 

Patel makes two additional procedural arguments, analogizing to asylum law, to attempt

to persuade this Court that he had no knowledge of the requirement to register. First, Patel

argues that, by law, where he asserts a plausible reason for his failure to register – that he did

not understand the requirement – and the INS fails to produce any other plausible reason,

Patel’s reason must be presumed to be the most plausible. Patel bases this argument for

presumptive credibility on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d

509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (“If there is no evidence of a legitimate prosecutorial purpose for a

government’s harassment of a person . . . there arises a presumption that the motive for asylum

is political.”). This Court does not find this argument persuasive. The statutory language of 50

U.S.C. § 462(g) regarding failure to register for Selective Service implies no such

presumption. Further, Patel has failed to show how asylum law is applicable to the present
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matter. Moreover, even if Patel’s reason for failing to register is presumed to be plausible, the

INS has successfully rebutted the presumption by demonstrating that Patel had knowledge but

failed to act on it.

Second, Patel analogizes to asylum law to contend that his testimony alone is sufficient

to satisfy his burden of proof if that testimony is detailed, credible, and plausible. Ladha v.

INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897-901 (9th Cir. 2001). Again, Patel fails to demonstrate how asylum

laws are applicable to this civil case in which Patel is not facing deportation and is making no

attempt to demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution” in his home country. As noted

above, in determining proof of knowledge, this Court may take into consideration

circumstantial evidence in addition to Patel’s testimony. See Boucher, 509 F.2d at 994. 

Applying the above legal analysis to this case, the Court finds, for the reasons discussed

below, that the record supports an inference that Patel had knowledge of the requirement to

register with the Selective Service, and that Patel has failed to produce sufficient evidence to

negate that inference. First, at his second visa interview at the United States Consulate in

Mumbai, Patel signed Form DS-1810, Notice of Duty to Register with U.S. Selective Service,

which clearly states that all men between 18 and 26 must register for the Selective Service

upon entry into the United States, that it is not possible to register after the age of 26, and that

failure to register may lead to a denial of U.S. citizenship. Agents at the Consulate translated

parts of this form into Hindi for Patel. Although Patel’s native language is Gujarati, he made

no indication to the agents that he preferred to conduct his interviews in Gujarati rather than

Hindi, nor did he ask to have the document translated, in whole or in part, into Gujarati. Patel

told the agents that he spoke Hindi and made no indication that he did not understand the

interview or the content of the documents. Moreover, he acknowledged to the agents that he

understood the requirement that “when you go to the United States, you had to fill it out,

selective service form. And send in Post Office.” RT 36:11-13.

Second, Patel had further opportunities to have knowledge of and to fulfill the Selective

Service registration requirement before his 26th birthday. Five years after Patel’s arrival in the

United States, on May 14, 2002, Patel applied for naturalization. The naturalization application
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that Patel signed and submitted, with the aid of his friend, contained questions regarding the

Selective Service requirement. Patel had the opportunity to read or have translated for him this

document pertinent to the requirements for naturalization. In addition, Patel testified that he

prepared for the naturalization test using a booklet that the INS provided. The booklet contains

an explanation of the requirements for citizenship, including registration for Selective Service.

Finally, on December 19, 2002, the INS sent Patel a notification of his naturalization

interview, clearly stating that he must bring any evidence of Selective Service registration to

the interview. Patel was in India at the time, but a friend called to tell him about the interview

appointment. Patel had a further opportunity to inquire into the requirements for naturalization

at that time. Patel read the notice upon return to the United States in February 2003, but did

not understand what “evidence of Selective Service Registration” meant. At each of these

points in time, Patel had the opportunity to learn about the Selective Service requirement. It

can be inferred from the above that Patel had knowledge of the registration requirement.

Patel seeks to negate this inference by arguing that his lack of understanding of the

Hindi and English languages caused him to misunderstand the Selective Service requirement

for naturalization. This Court finds this argument unpersuasive. At his second interview in

Mumbai, Patel knew that he had to sign a form and mail it in when he arrived in the United

States, and he admits that he simply forgot to do so. Then, after having lived in the United

States for five years, Patel had multiple opportunities to inform himself about the

requirements for naturalization, including the Selective Service requirement. During that time,

he was in regular contact with English speakers through his duties as a desk clerk at a

residential hotel and later when he leased and managed a residential hotel in partnership with

his brother. At his naturalization interview, he met the English language requirement. Further,

he had opportunities to have INS documentation translated for him. This Court finds that Patel

has failed to sufficiently prove that he did not understand, nor have the opportunity to inform

himself of, the Selective Service requirement. 

Patel has the further burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not

have intent to fail to register for the Selective Service. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(g); Ward, 344
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U.S. 924; Graves, 252 F.2d 878. Patel argues that, in order for this Court to make a finding of

intent, Respondent must prove a deliberate act of evasion on the part of the Patel. However,

Patel’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ward, a criminal case, to support this

argument is misplaced. First, the Court in Ward required the government to prove, beyond a

reasonable doubt, deliberate purpose on the part of defendant for failure to register. Ward,

344 U.S. at 924 (1953). Proof of a deliberate act would meet this burden. However, Patel, and

not the INS, has the burden of proof in this case, and Patel must produce evidence negating

criminal intent. In addition, in Ward, the Court based a finding of lack of deliberate purpose on

the content of the record. Id. The record in that case contained evidence that the defendant had

made a good-faith attempt to comply with the registration laws by providing the Selective

Service with an updated address for his employer. Ward v. U.S., 195 F.2d 441, 442 (5th Cir.

1952). This evidence supported an inference against criminal intent. Id. Here, Patel fails to

produce any evidence of a good-faith attempt to comply with the Selective Service Act before

the requisite age of 26 years old.

Under the Eighth Circuit interpretation of knowing and wilful, a showing of knowledge

and failure to register is sufficient to infer intent in the criminal context. U.S. v. Klotz, 500

F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1974). However, the case law is unclear as to whether a defendant may

raise a good-faith defense for failure to comply with registration laws in order to negate the

inference of intent. See Ward v. U.S., 344 U.S. 924 (1953), rev’g 195 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.

1952) (Supreme Court reversed Circuit Court’s finding of deliberate purpose on part of

petitioner not to comply with the Selective Service Act based on the record, but made no ruling

on whether the Circuit Court erred in affirming the denial of a jury instruction on a good-faith

defense). Patel argues that he may assert a claim of good-faith to negate an inference of 

wilful failure to comply with the law based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cheek v. U.S.,

498 U.S. 111 (1985). In Cheek, the Supreme Court found that, in the context of criminal tax

offenses, “wilfulness . . . requires . . . that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the

defendant knew of this duty and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated the duty.” Id. at

201. Thus, the defendant may assert a good-faith defense, that he or she in good-faith believed
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that he or she was in compliance with the law, “whether or not the claimed belief or

misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.” Id. at 202. The Ninth Circuit has specifically

noted that Cheek represents an exception to the traditional definition of wilfulness that “turns

entirely on the special treatment of criminal tax offenses . . . due to the complexity of tax

laws.” U.S. v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993). Patel has made no showing –

nor does the Court believe – that the INS laws governing naturalization, nor specifically the

INS requirement to register for the Selective Service, achieve the level of complexity of

United States tax laws.

Even if, arguendo, this Court allowed Patel to assert a good-faith belief that he was in

compliance with the law, the record fails to adequately support that assertion. Patel has failed

to produce evidence that he made any good-faith attempt to register with the Selective Service

or to inform himself of his duties as a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Patel’s

attempt to register immediately following his naturalization interview occurred five years after

he originally became aware of the duty and after the statutory window for registration had

passed; thus, it is insufficient proof to convince the Court that his failure to register was not

intentional. Accordingly, in light of all of the above, this Court finds that Patel knowingly and

wilfully failed to register for the Selective Service.

 

III.

Patel next argues that a knowing and wilful failure to register with the Selective Service

cannot, as a matter of law, preclude a finding of favorable disposition to the good order and

happiness of the United States and therefore does not preclude naturalization. Patel bears the

burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he meets all the requirements

for naturalization. 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(b). To be eligible for naturalization, Patel must establish

that, during the five year period before the filing of his naturalization application, he “has been

and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of

the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.” 

INA §316(a)(3) [8 U.S.C. §1427(a)(3)], U.S. v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1168 (9th Cir.
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2004). All doubts regarding eligibility are resolved against the petitioner. Berenyi v. INS, 385

U.S. 630, 637 (1967).

The INS, now the CIS, is “the agency primarily charged by Congress to implement the

public policy underlying the [naturalization] laws.” INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982). 

On June 18, 1999, the INS issued Policy Memo 52 to provide guidance to field officers

regarding the effect of a failure to register for Selective Service on an applicant’s eligibility

for naturalization. This memo provides that “[a] man between 26 and 31 years of age who was

required to register for the Selective Service and who knowingly and wilfully failed to register

cannot demonstrate that he is eligible for naturalization” because he cannot show that he was

“well-disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.” Ex. 6 to Daw Decl. at 4.

When a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” and the agency

entrusted with administering the statute has interpreted the statutory scheme, “the question for

the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). If the

agency reasonably interprets the statute, then the court accords “considerable weight” to the

agency’s interpretation. Id. at 844-45. However, “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion

letters – like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement

guidelines, all of which lack the force of law – do not warrant Chevron-style deference.” 

Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Instead, such interpretations are

“‘entitled to respect’ . . . but only to the extent that those interpretations have ‘the power to

persuade.’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, here, the Court must give some deference to the

interpretation of the “well disposed” naturalization requirement contained in INS Policy Memo

52, but it is not required to apply the high level of deference articulated in Chevron.

Neither the INA nor federal regulations delineate a per se rule that failure to register

for Selective Service precludes a finding of being well disposed to the good order and

happiness of the United States and thus precludes a grant of naturalization. The federal

regulations do, however, provide some guidance in interpreting the phrase: “Attachment

implies a depth of conviction which would lead to active support of the Constitution. 
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Attachment and favorable disposition relate to mental attitude, and contemplate the exclusion

from citizenship of an applicant who is hostile to the basic form of government of the United

States, or who disbelieves in the principles of the Constitution.” 8 C.F.R. § 316.11(a). The

regulations also provide that, “[a]t a minimum, the applicant shall . . . demonstrat[e] an

acceptance of the democratic, representational process established by the Constitution [and] a

willingness to obey the laws which may result from that process.” 8 C.F.R. § 316.11(b).

Courts have found that the question of attachment and favorable disposition “requires

ascertainment of . . . [the applicant’s] state of mind . . . and that can be fathomed only by the

credibility of what he says and the reflection of his inner views by his outward conduct.” In re

Pet. for Naturalization of Jorge Vivino Daniel Arbesu, 347 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (E.D. La.

1972) (citing In re Petition of Edward Sittler, 197 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff’d,

Sittler v. U.S., 316 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1963)). Courts take into consideration the credibility of

the petitioner on the witness stand, outward conduct, and reputation in the community. See e.g.

Sittler, 316 F.2d 312. 

Deliberate violation of laws, regulations, and ordinances by an applicant for

naturalization indicates to some extent the absence of will to abide by the principles of the

Constitution. Federal regulations provide that, where such violations reach the level of a crime

involving moral turpitude, the applicant is barred from naturalization for failure to show good

moral character. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(1). However, minor violations that are not inimical

to the good order of the United States are not necessarily a bar to naturalization. See Yin-Shin

Woo v. U.S., 288 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1961) (repeated and deliberate disregard of parking

regulations does not preclude a finding that applicant is “well-disposed”); Puciaty v. I.N.S., 125

F. Supp. 2d 1035 (D. Haw. 2000) (applicant’s failure to pay civil judgment or have judgment

set aside is not sufficient to deny naturalization).

Patel’s failure to register for the Selective Service is most analogous to the situation in

Gambino v. Pomeroy, 562 F. Supp. 974 (D.N.J. 1982), in which the district court found that a

resident alien failed to show eligibility for naturalization based on his failure to file federal and

state tax returns over a period of three years. In both Gambino and the present matter,
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petitioners have passively failed to comply with a U.S. law for which both severe criminal and

civil sanctions could result but which does not neatly fall into the category of crimes of moral

turpitude.

Further, in the context of performance of military service, 8 U.S.C. § 1425 prohibits

naturalization of any person who evades induction into the armed forces. See also In re Dunn,

14 I. & N. Dec. 160 (1972). Courts have further found that refusal to take an oath to bear arms

or perform non-combative military service may bar naturalization, unless the applicant shows a

sincere conscientious objection to the oath. See U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929)

(refusal to bear arms supports a finding against applicant’s favorable disposition to the

principles of the U.S. Constitution); see also Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 63-64

(1953) (refusal to bear arms due to religious conviction is not a barrier to citizenship); In re

Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970) (extending the exemption to non-religious

conscientious objectors). Patel’s failure to register for the Selective Service shows a mental

attitude and unfavorable disposition to the duties of a United States citizen that is similar to the

attitude of a person who evades induction into the military or who refuses to bear arms and

makes no showing of a conscientious objection. 

Patel argues that his good moral character and reputation in the community show that he

is “well disposed” to the good order of the United States. The CIS has found Patel to be a

person of good moral character, and his reputation and general conduct have been shown to be

good. Patel has made sworn statements that he is willing to bear arms on behalf of the United

States and to uphold the constitution of the United States. He has never been subject to a

criminal prosecution for violation of a United States law and he has paid his taxes since his

arrival in 1997. Further, Patel has produced eight witnesses who testify that he is a hard

worker and well respected in the community. In his sworn testimony, Patel states that he is a

man of “strong family values and tradition,” a dedicated son and husband, a hard worker who

volunteers his free time to assist colleagues, and a religious man active in his temple. 

Although a showing of good moral character is one factor pertinent to its

determination, this Court must consider all relevant evidence in analyzing whether Patel is
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4Based on the facts of this case, the Court need not rule on the validity of INS Policy

Memo 52. It remains possible that an applicant might be able to demonstrate eligibility for

naturalization even if he knowingly and wilfully failed to register for the Selective Service. 

For the reasons discussed above, however, Patel has not done so.

17

well-disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States . See Sittler, 316 F. Supp.

at 312 (petitioner, a voluntary member of the Nazi party, had shown himself to be of good

moral character but failed to demonstrate an attachment to the United States). Even if the

Court were to reject the per se rule contained in INS Policy Memo 52, Patel’s knowing and

wilful failure to register for the Selective Service nonetheless weighs heavily against a grant of

eligibility for naturalization. Patel has shown an indifference to the laws and regulations of the

United States. He has further shown a disregard for the duties imposed on all male United

States citizens to abide by Selective Service laws and an unfounded disrespect for the United

States institution that protects and defends our democracy. An applicant for citizenship must

show a readiness and willingness to obey the laws that stem from the democratic and

representative process established by the Constitution. Patel has failed to show this

readiness.4

IV.

New immigrants to the United States must navigate a difficult and complex new system

of laws upon arrival in this country, often with linguistic and cultural impediments and with

limited resources. Nonetheless, they have a duty to make every effort to understand and

comply with the processes of their new government. In this case, Patel repeatedly stated that

he understood the requirements of registering for the Selective Service, including signing a

sworn statement that he knew he had to register upon arrival in the United States. Patel also

had multiple opportunities to remind himself of the Selective Service requirement during the

naturalization process, but he neglected to do so; for example, Patel failed to read the

complete booklet of information the government provided to him with his application for

naturalization and instead only reviewed a handful of test questions. 
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Faced with a petitioner who admits that he understood the Selective Service

requirement but forgot – over a period of over five years – to complete his registration,

despite readily available information reminding him of the requirement, this Court simply

cannot conclude that Patel has demonstrated a favorable disposition to the laws, good order,

and happiness of the United States. Consequently, after giving careful review to all the above

evidence and legal arguments, this Court must DENY Patel’s appeal for naturalization. The

Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 08/10/05 /s/ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT