Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01353/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01353-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Insurance Contract

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- 1 - 08cv1353-LAB (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WEYMAN H. COX II,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv1353-LAB (WMC)

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR A

vs. NEW TRIAL

PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY, UNUMPROVIDENT

CORPORATION, and DOES 1 through

10, inclusive,

Defendants.

This case was tried to a jury verdict on January 11-14 of this year. The jury found for

Paul Revere. Specifically, it found that Paul Revere did not breach a disability insurance

contract with Mr. Cox by attributing his disability — failing eyesight — to an illness rather than

an accident, which entitled Mr. Cox to a smaller payout under the insurance contract. On

February 25, 2011, Mr. Cox filed a motion for a new trial. The basis for the motion is Mr.

Cox’s contention that the Court provided an erroneous answer to a question from the jury

after it began deliberating. The question went to the critical issue in the case, and the Court

gave it substantial consideration and consulted extensively with counsel before answering

it. 

The jury’s question was whether two statements of Mr. Cox’s expert, Dr. Paul

Tornambe, on direct examination were admitted into evidence. The first statement was that

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tears in the vitreous caused by trauma are larger than tears that occur naturally. The second

statement was that Mr. Cox had a large tear in the vitreous of his left eye. Dr. Tornambe

made the first statement in the context of a general tutorial about the physiology of the eye,

and at the time counsel for Paul Revere did not object. He made the second statement

when, later in his testimony, he was asked if he’d formed an opinion as to the cause of the

retinal detachment in Mr. Cox’s left eye. This time, counsel for Paul Revere did object to Dr.

Tornambe’s statement and the Court sustained the objection. After a lengthy colloquy with

counsel for Mr. Cox and Paul Revere, the Court answered the jury’s question as to both

statements “No.”

The Court heard oral argument on the motion for a new trial on May 31, 2011 and

denied it. It explained the bases for its ruling at the hearing, and it issues this Order to

confirm the ruling and the rationale for it.

I. Dr. Tornambe’s Stricken Testimony

On direct examination, counsel for Mr. Cox asked Dr. Tornambe if he had an opinion

as to the cause of the retinal detachment in Mr. Cox’s left eye. Dr. Tornambe responded,

“The snowmobile accident.” (Jan. 12 Tr. at 32:6–8.) Counsel then asked what the basis for

that opinion was. Dr. Tornambe responded, 

I think there are three major areas. 

Number one is the close relationship of the trauma and the

development of the floaters and the retinal detachment. If you

just look at the odds, the incidence of retinal detachment, as I

said, five to ten per hundred thousand. So the chances of that

happening serendipitously on the same day or the day after a

trauma which does involve the head and say that that’s just

serendipity, it just happened, doesn’t make — isn’t logical to me.

The second is the finding of the large posterior tear. The tear

that he had . . .

(Id. at 32:9–20.) At this point counsel for Paul Revere objected on the ground that Dr.

Tornambe did not offer this basis for his opinion in his deposition. Indeed, when Dr.

Tornambe was asked during his deposition why he concluded that Mr. Cox’s retinal

detachment was caused by a snowmobiling spill as opposed to some other, natural cause,

he responded, “Just the temporal relationship.” (Tornambe Dep. at 42:6–10 (emphasis

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 There was little argument on the objection at the time, but counsel for Mr. Cox did 1

insist that Dr. Tornambe was not asked about the basis for his opinion during his deposition.

(Jan. 12 Tr. at 33:2–3 (“I’m very sure that this question was not asked in the way that we’re

talking about, your honor.”); Jan. 12 Tr. at 34:7–8 (“I can’t cite it in the deposition because

it wasn’t asked . . . .”).) Dr. Tornambe was, in fact, in no uncertain terms, asked to explain

the bases for his opinions during his deposition. “Q: Would you explain why it is that you

concluded that the retinal detachment was caused by the snowmobiling as opposed to some

other cause, such as myopia? A: Just the temporal relationship.” (Tornambe Dep. at

42:6–10.)

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added).) He also indicated that none of the physical attributes of a traumatic retinal

detachment — which would surely include a large posterior tear — were noted in the report

of the first ophthalmologist to treat Mr. Cox. (Id. at 40:23–41:13.) 

In addition, neither of Dr. Tornambe’s expert reports singled out the size of Mr. Cox’s

vitreous tear as a basis for his conclusion that his retinal detachment was caused by trauma,

at least in clear and specific terms. His first report, prepared on August 12, 2009, merely

noted, “The distortion OS is secondary to the detachment sustained within a few days of the

snow mobile trip and to a high degree of medical probability, was caused by the falls taken

during the snowmobile ride.” (Kojima Decl., Ex. C at C2.) His second report, prepared after

he was deposed, went into slightly more detail:

After reviewing these documents I have come to the conclusion

that beyond reasonable medical probability, the snowmobile

accident was the major contributing factor for the retinal

detachment Mr. Cox sustained in the left eye. I base this

opinion on a thirty-two year experience treating thousands of

patients with retinal detachments, the type of injury sustained

and the proximity of the injury to the development of the retinal

detachment . . . .

The ‘go and stop’ forces sustained during this snowmobile

accident are sufficient to result in a tear and a retinal

detachment. The symptoms his wife vividly relates on the car

ride home the day of the accident and on the plane ride home

the day following the accident are consistent with a torn retina

and an early retinal detachment. The proximity of the accident

and his symptoms make it to a high degree of medical

probability that the accident played a direct role in the

development of the retinal detachment.

(Kojima Decl., Ex. D at D1–2.)

After hearing Paul Revere’s objection to Dr. Tornambe’s testimony, the Court

considered Dr. Tornambe’s deposition and his two reports and sustained the objection.

1

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 At the recent hearing, counsel for Mr. Cox alluded to discussions between counsel

2

about Dr. Tornambe sitting for a second deposition after he submitted his second report.

The implication, as the Court understood it, was that counsel for Mr. Cox fulfilled his duty to

supplement Dr. Tornambe’s first report under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2) by submitting his

second report, and that Paul Revere strategically sat on its hands because it got favorable

answers from Dr. Tornambe during his deposition. The Court rejects Mr. Cox’s contention

for two reasons. The first is that the second report, even if regarded as a supplemental

disclosure, did not adequately disclose the opinion at issue under Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(B)(i). (See Jan. 14 Tr. at 110:10–14.) The second report contained only a vague

supplemental disclosure that masked a critical opinion and was plainly inadequate to alert

Paul Revere to the specifics of the opinion, or even to the gist of it The second problem is

that counsel for Mr. Cox never raised this issue prior to or during trial. If he believed Paul

Revere was stubbornly refusing to pursue a supplemental disclosure in order to preserve an

objection to one of Dr. Tornambe’s opinions, he could have raised that with the Court at any

time.

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(Jan 12 Tr. at 35:7–9.) 

There is no getting around the fact that when Dr. Tornambe was asked during his

deposition why he concluded Mr. Cox’s retinal tear was caused by trauma, he said, “Just the

temporal relationship.” His first expert report made no mention of the size of the vitreous

tear, and his second report made only a cryptic reference to “the type of injury sustained” as

a basis for his conclusion that Mr. Cox’s snowmobiling spills caused his retinal detachment.

2

This could mean anything, really. Dr. Tornambe testified, for example, that a snowmobile

spill, or even sudden stops on a snowmobile, can cause a retinal tear, without any reference

whatsoever to the nature of that tear. (Jan. 12 Tr. at 36:14–25.) By saying “the type of injury

sustained” supports the conclusion that “the snowmobile accident was the major contributing

factor for the retinal detachment,” perhaps Dr. Tornambe was making only that point. 

The Court also rejects Mr. Cox’s argument that when Dr. Tornambe offered the

excluded testimony on cross-examination, counsel for Paul Revere didn’t object to it. That’s

inaccurate. Here is how the exchange went:

Q: Now, assuming that Mr. Cox had not taken any

snowmobile spills and he had presented to your office

either for examination or for treatment with complaints of

feathers or specks in his eyes, would you entertain a

possibility that the detachment had been spontaneous?

A: If there was no history — if I said “Is there any history of

trauma?” and he said “No,” it would be consistent with a

nontraumatic detachment with the exception, as I told

you, that the size and the posterior location of the tear is

unusual.

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Q: Doctor, we’ve already established that that testimony is

not important here.

A: Okay. I was just trying to answer your question.

Q: Thank you. I appreciate that.

(Id. at 55:23–56:6.) If nothing else, the manner in which counsel for Paul Revere interrupted

Dr. Tornambe here was an objection. More to the point, it was an objection that referenced

his earlier objection, which the Court sustained, to Dr. Tornambe’s testimony on direct

examination that the size of Mr. Cox’s vitreous tear was suggestive of trauma. 

The bottom line is this: Rule 26 requires that an expert’s report contain “a complete

statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them,” as

well as “the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). It should “set forth the substance of the direct examination.” The Advisory

Committee notes even suggest that a proper expert report should minimize the need for a

deposition. See also Salgado by Salgado v. General Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 742 n.6

(7th Cir. 1998) (“The report must be complete such that opposing counsel is not forced to

depose an expert in order to avoid ambush at trial; and moreover the report must be

sufficiently complete so as to shorten or decrease the need for expert depositions and thus

to conserve resources.”). These standards are not to be taken lightly. Under the Federal

Rules, “an evasive or incomplete disclosure . . . must be treated as a failure to disclose . . . .”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). And more importantly, what isn’t disclosed isn’t admissible. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). See also Goodman v. Staples, No. 10-15021, 2011 WL 1651246 at *9

(9th Cir. May 3, 2011) (“Rules 37 ‘gives teeth’ to Rule 26's disclosure requirements by

forbidding the use at trial of any information that is not properly disclosed.”). With these

standards in mind, it is inconceivable that Dr. Tornambe’s two reports adequately disclosed

his apparent opinion that the size of Mr. Cox’s vitreous tear suggests his retinal detachment

was caused by trauma rather than natural factors. 

Counsel for Mr. Cox even concedes that the testimony of Dr. Tornambe at issue was

not included in his reports, but he retreats to the position, which the Court has rejected, that

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 It bears emphasizing that Dr. Tornambe said nothing about the size of Mr. Cox’s 3

vitreous tear outside of his stricken testimony, in spite of his counsel’s wishful recollection

that he did. (See Jan. 14 Tr. at 103:8–12; 104:4–6.) Thus, it’s a losing argument that the

Court struck an opinion on causation that was not properly disclosed under Rule 26, whereas

the jury’s question went to the admissibility of a statement on the particulars of Mr. Cox’s

retinal detachment. That statement was made as a prelude to, and was inseparable from,

the excluded opinion. The stringent disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i) would

be meaningless if the minor premises of an excluded expert opinion were themselves

admissible as freestanding facts, for the jury to then assemble into precisely the opinion that

was properly excluded. It is true that the jury asked only about the admissibility of Dr.

Tornambe’s statement that Mr. Cox had large vitreous tears in his left eye. (Kojima Decl.,

Ex. G.) But it was clear to the Court that, taken in context, the jury’s question implicated

precisely the opinion of Dr. Tornambe that the Court instructed it not to consider. (See Jan.

14 Tr. at 98:6–15 (“In the context of this note, although it can be said that, well, this is really

just asking about what he saw when he examined the eye, I think it is so close to what was

excluded that my own judgment tells me someone remembers this and is forgetting that the

Court had admonished the jury to disregard this and not let that play part in the

deliberations.”); 103:1–2; and 103:13–24.)

- 6 - 08cv1353-LAB (WMc)

Dr. Tornambe was not asked for that testimony during his deposition:

Court: You can’t make a claim affirmatively that Dr. Tornambe

expressed the opinion that this was injury rather than sickness

based on an examination and the tearing of the eyes and he

said that in advance. It is nowhere in those reports. It wasn’t in

the deposition either. It is no answer to say that, well, he wasn’t

asked. He is your witness. You have an affirmative obligation

to give the other side his opinions that he is going to offer. It

wasn’t in the report. It was properly excluded . . . .

Mr. Horrow: I understand that, your honor. I have to make my

record with respect to Dr. Tornambe. He was not asked that

question in his deposition. And had he been asked that question

in his deposition, he would have offered that testimony.

Court: You acknowledge that he didn’t put it in his report either?

Mr. Horrow: I acknowledge that . . . .

(Jan. 14 Tr. at 101:4–25.)

 With all of this in mind, the Court stands by its exclusion of Dr. Tornambe’s testimony

that the size of Mr. Cox’s vitreous tear supports his conclusion that the snowmobile accident

caused Mr. Cox’s retinal detachment. It was appropriate, therefore, to answer “No” to the

jury’s question whether Dr. Tornambe’s statement that Mr. Cox had a large vitreous tear in

his left eye was admitted evidence. Counsel for Mr. Cox, before making his record at trial, 3

as much as agreed with this:

Mr. Horrow: I believe the answer to question number one should

be “Yes” because there is actual testimony from Dr. Tornambe

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answering that question specifically on the record.

With respect to number two, that would be a “No” and I would

understand that.

(Id. at 107:9–13.) The Court finds no error in its answer of “No” with respect to Dr.

Tornambe’s second statement, and therefore no basis for a new trial.

A final point: Mr. Cox now takes the position that the size of his vitreous tear was in

evidence because it was mentioned in the report of Dr. Smith, the retinal surgeon who saw

him after he suffered the detachment. That is true as far as Dr. Smith’s report goes. Dr.

Smith’s report observed:

There is a rhegmatogenous retinal detachment extending from

approximately five o’clock clockwise around to the nine o’clock

position, with a very large tear with a radial component which is

quite posteriorly positioned.

(Horrow Decl., Ex. D.) Here is the problem with that argument: the jury’s question asked

whether two statements of Dr. Tornambe were admitted into evidence. (Kojima Decl, Ex.

G.) It did not ask whether the mere fact that Mr. Cox had a large vitreous tear was admitted

into evidence. That would have been a very different question that required a very different

answer because, as Mr. Cox correctly argues, this fact was indicated in the report of Dr.

Smith. 

II. Dr. Tornambe’s Tutorial

The Court now turns to the jury’s question, which it also answered “No,” regarding the

admissibility of Dr. Tornambe’s statement that tears in the vitreous caused by trauma are

particularly large. 

Shortly after Dr. Tornambe took the stand and recited his credentials, he was asked

by counsel for Mr. Cox to explain “how the eye works and where the retina is.” (Jan. 12 Tr.

at 16:16–17.) Dr. Tornambe stood down from the witness stand and, with a marker and an

easel pad, did that. In the course of this tutorial he said:

Now, if a tear occurs gently, usually the tears will be little

horseshoes. That’s the way that they happen. And you can get

a bunch of them. I did a fellow last week that had 14 tears

between there and there (indicating), a bunch of little ones. It

just happens spontaneously.

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 The Court acknowledges now that its initial inclination was to admit the general 4

tutorial of Dr. Tornambe because counsel for Paul Revere didn’t object to it. (Jan. 14 Tr. at

102:16–22; 105:1–6.) But neither this inclination, nor Paul Revere’s non-opposition on the

spot to Dr. Tornambe’s tutorial, are binding. The moment it became apparent to Paul

Revere that Dr. Tornambe was attempting to offer an opinion he had not previously

disclosed, it objected and the Court sustained the objection. It is not unfair to Mr. Cox that

the Court ultimately applied this objection retroactively to Dr. Tornambe’s tutorial, to make

it clear to the jury that his opinion about the size of Mr. Cox’s vitreous tear being indicative

of trauma was not admitted into evidence. See Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss and

Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1329 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]rial courts have broad discretion in making

evidence rulings and handling late objections.”). Anyway, he could not have cured the failure

to disclose given the strictures of Rule 26(a) and 37(c).

- 8 - 08cv1353-LAB (WMc)

With trauma, because the retina doesn’t have a chance to recoil,

the tears frequently are bigger. And they tend to extend more

posteriorly, so they tend to be larger and go back further. Okay?

Not always. Not a hundred percent of cases. But when you see

a big posterior tear, that is more commonly associated with a

traumatic event.

(Id. at 24:1–11.) Counsel for Paul Revere did not object to this testimony, which the Court

and counsel for Paul Revere recognized when considering how to respond to the jury’s note.

(Jan. 14 Tr. at 105:5; 95:5–6.) But it was also unclear to counsel for Paul Revere, at the

time, that an objection was necessary, because Dr. Tornambe hadn’t yet offered his

excluded opinion, and indeed, the opinion wasn’t foreseeable based on his expert reports

and deposition testimony. An objection is timely so long as it’s made “as soon as the

opponent knows, or should know, that the objection is applicable.” Jerden v. Amstutz, 430

F.3d 1231, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2005). When counsel for Paul Revere objected to Dr.

Tornambe’s opinion that the size of Mr. Cox’s vitreous tear was indicative of trauma, that was

conceivably a permissible, albeit belated, objection to Dr. Tornambe’s tutorial that, generally

speaking, large tears are indicative of trauma. (Jan. 14 Tr. at 93:25–94:6. (“The objection

came a little bit late. And I think it was because maybe Mr. Maguire didn’t anticipate that he

was going to offer a different opinion.”).) 

4

Mr. Cox takes the position now that Dr. Tornambe’s statement in his tutorial about the

size of vitreous tears was a general medical statement, and therefore shouldn’t have been

excluded from evidence. (Id. at 99:5–9; 100:1–14; 102:13–15.) This begs the question,

though, whether the statement has any relevance independent of Dr. Tornambe’s excluded

opinion. It is hard to see how it does. Perhaps Mr. Cox is hoping that the general medical

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statement about large vitreous tears being suggestive of trauma, coupled with the indication

in Dr. Smith’s report, which Dr. Tornambe reviewed, that the tear in Mr. Cox’s vitreous was

“very large,” suffices to get the excluded opinion in, albeit indirectly. It doesn’t. The

physiology of the eye as it relates to a casual analysis of retinal detachments is not a matter

of common knowledge and therefore necessitates expert testimony. Moody v. Maine Cent.

R. Co., 823 F.2d 693, 695 (1st Cir. 1987). Mr. Cox cannot ask the jury to reach an expert

opinion for itself after the Court has forbidden an expert from offering that very opinion,

simply because the premises of the opinion can be found in isolation somewhere in the trial

record. Were it otherwise, every time a court sustains an objection to an expert’s opinion

on the ground that it was not properly disclosed, it would have to scour the entire trial record

up until the time the objection was made of evidence that implicates the excluded opinion.

Because Dr. Tornambe’s tutorial is meaningful only in relation to an excluded opinion,

the Court sensibly excluded the general statement as well. As it explained at the time:

I agree more particularly with Mr. Maguire’s other point that the

only relevance that the statement about larger tears having most

likely being or having the tendency to be connected with trauma.

The only relevance to that would be in relation to some

admissible opinion, and there is none here. And there is a great

probative danger to me to parse this and answer the one

question “Yes,” the second question “No.”

And the probative danger, I find, and likely the prejudice to the

defense would be that the jury would misuse that information as

an opinion rather than just part of a tutorial on the eye. I agree

wholeheartedly with the characterization that it was in that

context that the statement about the size of the tear was made.

And given that thereafter, there was an objection. There was an

exclusion of evidence relating to that forming a basis for finding

that this tear resulted from injury rather than sickness. It would

be too tempting and too likely, in my judgment, that the jury

would misuse that information for a prohibited purpose.

The Court is going to answer this by sending a note back in that

reads as follows: “The answer as to both statements is ‘No.’”

(Jan. 14 Tr. at 110:15–111:10.) The Court stands by that answer now. Dr. Tornambe’s

opinion that the size of the tear in Mr. Cox’s vitreous was indicative of trauma was properly

excluded. His earlier statement that large tears are indicative of trauma had no significance

or probative value independent of that excluded opinion. 

The record also establishes that, in lieu of simply answering “No,” the Court

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 The case on which Mr. Cox relies here, United States v. Walker, is distinguishable 5

anyway. The jury’s question in that case was a hypothetical that invited the court to weigh

in on a criminal defendant’s guilt: “Our interpretation of Count I is that the defendant had to

have the intent to steal and purloin the Sea Wind before leaving the Palmyra area. If we

were to determine that the intent occurred at a later time on the trip to Hawaii, would that

necessitate a not guilty verdict on Count I?” 575 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1978). In that

context, a court’s hesitation to provide a “Yes” or “No” answer is perfectly understandable.

Here, though, the statements of Dr. Tornambe either were or were not admitted into

evidence, and the jury merely asked for the Court to clarify an earlier legal ruling. 

- 10 - 08cv1353-LAB (WMc)

contemplated telling the jury that Dr. Tornambe’s general medical statement was admitted

into evidence, but could only be considered within the context of his tutorial on the

physiology of the eye. (Jan. 14 Tr. at 94:11–15.) Counsel for Mr. Cox, afraid that this would

focus the jury on his failure to disclose Dr. Tornambe’s opinion, objected to this approach

and insisted that if the Court was inclined to answer “No,” it should leave it at that. (Id. at

99:16–24.) 

“No” was the right answer to the jury’s question. A final point: Mr. Cox now argues

that the Court should have either avoided answering the jury’s question in the first place, or

else avoided providing a categorical “Yes” or “No” answer. Had the jury’s question gone to

the weight or meaning of the evidence presented, Mr. Cox would have a point. United States

v. Ayeni, 374 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[W]here a jury’s questions relate to a factual

matter, a substantive reply . . . risks interfering with the jury’s exclusive responsibility for

resolving factual questions.”). But the jury’s question here whether certain testimony was

admitted into evidence was purely legal. It would have been wholly inappropriate for the

Court to leave the question alone by telling the jurors to rely on their own recollection. Also,

with all due respect to Mr. Cox, his argument isn’t really that “Yes” and “No” answers to jury

questions are disfavored; it’s that “No” was the wrong answer to the jury’s question in this

case. He obviously wouldn’t take the position that “Yes” and “No” answers are disfavored 5

if the Court had answered “Yes.” 

III. Conclusion

An erroneous jury instruction, and presumably an erroneous response to a jury’s

question, can be grounds for a new trial. Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187

(9th Cir. 1990). The Court does not find that its answer of “No” to the jury’s question in this

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 For whatever it is worth, the Court has doubts that its answer to the jury’s question 6

cost Mr. Cox a favorable verdict, even if it were to credit Jeffrey Rogers’ declaration, which

is plainly inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). First, if the opinion had been

properly disclosed, Paul Revere would have been prepared to cross-examine Dr. Tornambe

on it, or to offer contradictory expert testimony, or to tailor its own expert’s testimony to

discount the opinion. Second, the Rogers declaration suggests that if both statements of Dr.

Tornambe had been admissible, the jury’s vote would have favored Mr. Cox. But counsel

for Mr. Cox concedes that the Court reasonably excluded the second of Dr. Tornambe’s

statements. (Jan. 14 Tr. at 107:12–13.) The Rogers declaration says nothing about where

the jury would have stood had the Court answered “Yes” as to Dr. Tornambe’s first statement

and “No” as to the second. Third, the jury was presented with another theory of causation

— namely the temporal relationship between the snowmobiling spills and the retinal

detachment — and rejected it. In light of the jury’s rejection of Mr. Cox’s chief theory of

causation, it is purely speculative to assert that the Court’s “No” answer to the jury’s question

was a game changer.

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case was erroneous. To the contrary, the Court finds on review that it was the correct

answer. If Mr. Cox wanted the jury to consider that the size of the tear in Mr. Cox’s vitreous

was suggestive of trauma, that opinion should have been disclosed, in clear terms, in an

expert report provided to Paul Revere. It was not. That opinion, and the premises of that

opinion, were therefore properly excluded. Mr. Cox’s motion for a new trial is DENIED. 

6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 8, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01353-LAB-WVG Document 141 Filed 06/09/11 Page 11 of 11