Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_17-cv-00030/USCOURTS-akd-3_17-cv-00030-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

MAUREEN KEATING, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORDSTROM, INC., 

Defendant.

Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG

ORDER RE MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court at Docket 228 is Defendant Nordstrom, Inc.’s Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs Maureen Keating, Christina Freitag, and 

Nancy Rheeston responded in opposition at Docket 231 and Docket 232. 

Nordstrom replied at Docket 236. Oral argument was requested by Nordstrom, 

but was not necessary to the Court’s determination. 

BACKGROUND

This is a dispute about Nordstrom’s sales and advertising practices. The 

Court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history of the case at length

in its first order on summary judgment, and therefore will not do so extensively 

here.

1

 Briefly, in the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiffs 

Maureen Keating, Christina Freitag, and Nancy Rheeston allege violations by 

1 Docket 216.

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 1 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 2 of 21

Nordstrom of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code 

§§ 17200 et seq. (“UCL”), AS 45.50.471 et seq., Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices 

and Consumer Protection Act (“UTPA”), and California Civil Code §§ 1750 et seq., 

California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”).2 Plaintiffs also sought class 

certification for Nordstrom customers in Alaska and California affected by 

Nordstrom’s allegedly deceptive practices.3 

At issue in the current motion for summary judgment are Plaintiffs’ 

“preseason sale” and “summer sale” claims.4 Plaintiffs’ preseason sale claims 

arise from their allegations that Nordstrom “regularly advertises pre-season sales 

in which it purports to discount the prices of fashion items, which it buys in limited 

quantities” and does not intend to sell “at the purported full, regular price, and/or 

nor does it sell such items in any substantial quantities at the purported full value.”5 

Plaintiffs’ summer sale claims are based on Plaintiffs’ contention that: 

Nordstrom’s practices, including but not limited to the use of serrated 

hang tags, are designed to misstate and/or omit information about the 

prevailing market price for the goods offered in the summer sale by 

omitting the price at which these items were offered during the preseason (by removal of the lower part of the hang tag) and misstating 

2 Docket 73 at 16–22, ¶¶ 31–53. 

3 Docket 73 at 15, ¶ 28 (defining the class). 

4 The preseason sale is also referred to as the Anniversary Sale. See Docket 144 at 2, 

¶ 1 (Decl. Miller). Plaintiffs’ register error claims are not at issue in this motion. Docket 

228 at 3 n.1. 

5 Docket 73 at 4–5, ¶ 10. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 2 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 3 of 21

the amount of the discount being offered vis-à-vis the actual savings 

from the price at which substantial quantities were sold.6 

Plaintiffs’ summer sale claims are limited to those items that were on sale at the 

previous preseason sale.7

On April 19, 2019, Nordstrom filed a motion for partial summary judgment

on Plaintiffs’ preseason and summer sales pricing claims on three grounds: (1) 

that Plaintiffs Keating and Freitag lacked standing;8 (2) that Nordstrom’s sales 

practices were not deceptive as a matter of law because the goods that Plaintiffs 

purchased on sale were sold at full price either before or after the sale;

9 and (3) 

that Plaintiffs could not establish damages because they had paid less than the full 

value of the items they received.10 On November 8, 2019, the Court granted in 

part and denied in part Nordstrom’s motion.11 First, with respect to standing, the 

Court denied Nordstrom’s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Freitag’s claims

in light of outstanding discovery.12 It also denied Nordstrom’s motion for summary 

6 Docket 73 at 7, ¶ 12. 

7 Docket 91 at 17. 

8 Docket 143 at 8–10. 

9 Docket 143 at 10–12. 

10 Docket 143 at 12–16.

11 Docket 216. 

12 Docket 216 at 18–19. However, the Court noted that on the “existing record, the 

Court would grant summary judgment” as there was no evidence that Ms. Freitag had 

made a purchase at the preseason or summer sale. Docket 216 at 18. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 3 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 4 of 21

judgment on Ms. Keating’s claims arising from her 2013 purchases, without 

prejudice to renew.13 The Court granted Nordstrom summary judgment on Ms. 

Keating’s preseason and summer sales claims pursuant to the UCL and CLRA 

arising from her 2017 purchases, as those purchases were made after the filing of 

the complaint;

14 however, the Court denied the motion as it related to her claims 

under the UTPA, where “[a]ctual injury as a result of deception” is not required.15

Next, the Court denied Nordstrom’s motion for summary judgment with respect to 

liability.

16 Finally, on the issue of damages, the Court granted summary judgment 

to Nordstrom on Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary restitution, but not on their claims 

for other monetary relief under the CLRA and UTPA.17 

On December 3, 2019, finding that Plaintiffs had failed to file a motion for 

class certification by the October 31, 2019 deadline, the Court ordered Plaintiffs’ 

class allegations stricken from the complaint.18 

13 Docket 216 at 22. 

14 The Court found that “these post-complaint 2017 purchases cannot form the basis for 

a cause of action under the CLRA or the UCL, which both require actual reliance on the 

alleged misrepresentations.” Docket 216 at 19. 

15 Docket 216 at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Odom v. Fairbanks Mem’l Hosp., 999 

P.2d 123, 131–32 (Alaska 2000)). 

16 Docket 216 at 27. 

17 Docket 216 at 34. 

18 Docket 227 at 6. As the Court indicated in its order, it had extended the class 

certification deadline on multiple occasions at Plaintiffs’ request, yet Plaintiffs still failed 

to file a timely motion. Docket 227 at 5. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 4 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 5 of 21

On December 19, 2019, Nordstrom filed the instant motion for partial 

summary judgment.

19

 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to grant summary 

judgment if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”20 When 

considering a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is 

to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”21 To 

reach the level of a genuine dispute, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”22 If the evidence provided by 

the nonmoving party is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” summary 

judgment is appropriate.23 

19 Docket 228. Nordstrom did not renew its motion in all respects, explaining that it is 

“taking a targeted approach and . . . renewing its motion only on issues that should 

unquestionably be resolved on summary judgment.” Docket 228 at 2. 

20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

21 Moldex-Metric, Inc. v. McKeon Prods., Inc., 891 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 

(1986)).

22 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

23 Id. at 249–50.

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 5 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 6 of 21

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial burden of 

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial.”24 However, “[w]hen 

the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only 

point out ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 

case.’”

25 Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party 

“may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading,”

but must provide evidence that “set[s] forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.”

26 In determining whether to grant or deny summary 

judgment, a court need not “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable 

fact.”27 A court is entitled to “rely on the nonmoving party to identify with 

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.”28

DISCUSSION

Nordstrom moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ preseason and 

summer sales pricing claims on two grounds.29 First, Nordstrom moves for 

24 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).

25 Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). 

26 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

27 Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v. Combined 

Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)). 

28 Id. (quoting Richards, 55 F.3d at 251). 

29 Nordstrom did not renew its motion for summary judgment on the basis that Ms. 

Keating lacked standing or that Nordstrom’s sales practices were not deceptive as a 

matter of law. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 6 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 7 of 21

summary judgment on Ms. Freitag’s preseason claims for lack of standing.30 

Second, Nordstrom seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary 

damages in connection with their preseason sales claims under the CLRA and 

UTPA.

31

 The Court addresses each of Nordstrom’s grounds for summary 

judgment in turn. 

I. Plaintiff Freitag’s Standing 

Nordstrom contends that Ms. Freitag cannot “establish . . . that she made a 

purchase either at the Preseason Sale or during the Summer Sale of an item 

offered at the Preseason Sale that year.”

32

 Accordingly, Nordstrom concludes she

does not have standing to bring a claim under either California or Alaska law.

33

 In 

their limited opposition, Plaintiffs state that they do not oppose Nordstrom’s motion 

on this claim.

34

As the Court explained in its prior order on summary judgment, Plaintiffs 

have not set forth any evidence or particularized facts about purchases by Ms. 

Freitag at either a preseason or summer sale, and therefore cannot establish that 

she suffered an injury traceable to Nordstrom’s allegedly unlawful conduct.35 The 

30 Docket 228 at 7–8. 

31 Docket 228 at 9–13. 

32 Docket 228 at 7. 

33 Docket 228 at 7–8. 

34 Docket 231 at 1. 

35 Docket 216 at 18. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 7 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 8 of 21

Court gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to supplement the record, but they have not 

done so. Accordingly, the Court grants Nordstrom’s motion for summary judgment 

as to Ms. Freitag’s preseason and summer sale claims. 

II. Plaintiffs’ Claims for Monetary Damages 

Nordstrom contends that it is entitled to summary judgment of Ms. Keating’s

and Ms. Rheeston’s claims for monetary damages arising from the remaining 

preseason and summer sales claims. The Court previously granted summary 

judgment to Nordstrom on Plaintiffs’ damages claim to the extent they sought 

restitution (thereby eliminating Plaintiffs’ UCL claims). Accordingly, the remaining 

monetary damages claims are in connection with Ms. Keating and Ms. Rheeston’s 

CLRA and UTPA claims.36 Nordstrom contends that “Plaintiffs still have not 

presented any evidence of actual damages” and that because “Plaintiffs purchased 

items at prices lower than the full price, and the items were sold at full price either 

just a few days before or a few days after their purchases . . . [t]hey thus still cannot 

present any evidence that they received something worth less than the price they 

paid.”37 Nordstrom maintains that the CLRA requires a plaintiff to prove actual 

damages to obtain relief, citing a handful of California state and federal court 

36 Ms. Keating’s claims based on her 2013 purchase remain under both statutes, but 

Ms. Keating’s claims based on her 2017 purchase remain only under the UTPA, as the 

Court previously granted summary judgment to Nordstrom on her claims under the UCL 

and CLRA arising from her post-complaint purchase. Docket 216 at 19–20. 

37 Docket 228 at 9–10. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 8 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 9 of 21

decisions.

38

 Nordstrom also maintains that under the UTPA, a plaintiff must prove 

that she suffered an “ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of an 

unlawful act to get actual damages or statutory penalties.39 Nordstrom asserts that 

a plain reading of the statute’s “ascertainable loss of money or property” language 

requires “a showing of actual loss – that is, actual damages.”40 

Plaintiffs, for their part, propose a full-refund model of damages, contending 

that their “actual damages should be measured as the price they paid for a 

38 Docket 228 at 11–12 (collecting cases). Among Nordstrom’s cited cases are Harmon 

v. Hilton Group, Wehlage v. EmpRes Healthcare, Inc., and In re iPhone Application 

Litigation; in each, the District Court for the Northern District of California granted the 

defendant’s motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s CLRA claim for failure to allege any damages, 

a requirement for standing under the statute. See Wehlage v. EmpRes Healthcare, Inc., 

791 F. Supp. 2d 774, 784 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Plaintiff has not alleged that [defendants] . . 

. deceived her in the sale of services to her and that she suffered damages as a result. 

Accordingly, the Court grants the . . . motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CLRA claims.”); In re 

iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 20, 2011) (“Plaintiffs have not alleged ‘any damage’ as a result of Defendants’ 

alleged actions. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim necessarily fails.”); Harmon v. Hilton 

Grp., No. C-11-03677-JCS, 2011 WL 5914004, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011) 

(“Plaintiff’s CLRA claim fails on the basis that he has not alleged any facts showing that 

he has standing to bring his CLRA claim.”). However, this Court held that Plaintiffs’ SAC 

is sufficient to state a claim under the CLRA. Docket 91 at 20. As this Court previously 

noted, the CLRA’s damage requirement for purposes of standing “is a capacious one 

that includes any pecuniary damage as well as opportunity costs and transaction costs 

that result when a consumer is misled by deceptive marketing practices.” Docket 216 

at 8 (quoting Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013), as amended 

on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (July 8, 2013), 2013 WL 3368981 (9th Cir. 2013)).

39 Docket 228 at 10 (quoting AS 45.50.471). 

40 Docket 228 at 11. Nordstrom also cites this Court’s decision in Sec. Alarm Fin. 

Enters., L.P. v. Alder Holdings, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-00102-SLG, 2017 WL 506237, at *4 (D. 

Alaska Feb. 7, 2017), where the Court granted summary judgment to the counterclaim 

defendant on claims for damages and statutory penalties under the UTPA because the 

counterclaimant failed to present evidence of actual damages. Docket 228 at 11. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 9 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 10 of 21

purchase they otherwise would not have bought.”41 Plaintiffs maintain that “they 

would not have made their purchases but for Nordstrom’s claims that the items 

were on sale at a considerable discount and would only be available at a higher 

price if not purchased during the sale.”42 Ms. Keating declares: “I would not have 

spent any money at all because I would not have made the purchase at all.”43 And

Ms. Rheeston states:

I was not aware when I made my purchase that Nordstrom was not 

going to raise the price, and indeed I bought it only because I thought 

I was saving money. . . . I would not have bought it at all but for my 

reliance on Nordstrom’s false representations. . . . [I]t was only worth 

$28.90 to me on the day I bought it, if it had a value of $150 and if it 

was only going to be available at $42.95 or more on future dates, not 

less. I got neither the value nor the savings and thus I calculate my 

damages at the full price I paid because I would not have bought this

item but for the false representations, and would otherwise have 

$28.90 in my pocket.44

Plaintiffs assert that “the crux of this case is that Nordstrom made that 

representation that the goods were worth more than Keating or Rheeston paid,” 

whereas, in fact, “neither Rheeston nor Keating received extra value rather they 

41 Docket 231 at 3. 

42 Docket 231 at 2. 

43 Docket 233 at 5 (Decl. Keating). Ms. Keating further maintains that: “I would not have 

bought the Treasure & Bond wrap had I known that the discount I was getting was not 

50%, and the reference price was the market for only 3 percent of total sales, I would 

not have felt compelled to jump on the offer.” Docket 233 at 4.

44 Docket 235 at 4–5 (Decl. Rheeston) (emphasis in original). Ms. Rheeston adds: “I 

bought those items (the two pairs of shoes in 2010 and the 2013 beauty box and all the 

other items I purchased over the years at Nordstrom) because I believed Nordstrom’s 

advertising at the time of my purchase that Nordstrom was going to raise the prices for 

all future sales and I had to buy them before the price went up.” Docket 235 at 4.

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 10 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 11 of 21

paid what was in effect the true market value.”45 Plaintiffs add that both Ms. 

Keating and Ms. Rheeston “were disappointed in the quality of the goods they 

purchased.”

46

 Plaintiffs cite Veera v. Banana Republic as holding that “wasted 

time and even embarrassment from deceptive advertising [are] damages under 

the CLRA.”47 However, in Veera, the Court of Appeal of California was evaluating

whether the plaintiffs’ allegations that they had been misled by sale advertisements

and purchased items out of embarrassment and frustration were economic injuries

sufficient to confer standing under the CLRA.48 It found that plaintiffs had “raised 

a triable issue whether they lost ‘money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in 

fact.’”49 The Veera court did not hold, as Plaintiffs suggest, that wasted time and 

embarrassment are a basis for monetary damages, without more.

In response to Plaintiffs’ proposed damages model, Defendant maintains

that “[c]ourts have repeatedly and unanimously rejected such a full refund measure 

of damages in these types of cases,” citing to Chowning v. Kohl’s Department

Stores, Inc., and Stathakos v. Columbia Sportswear Company.

50

 However, those 

45 Docket 231 at 3. 

46 Docket 231 at 3. 

47 Docket 231 at 3 (citing 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)).

48 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 789. To establish standing under the CLRA, a plaintiff must show 

not only that the defendant’s conduct was deceptive, but also that it caused them harm. 

Id. at 776 n.3. 

49 Id. at 781. 

50 Docket 238 at 4 (citing Chowning v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. CV 15-08673 RGK 

(SPx), 2016 WL 1072129, at *5–8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016), aff’d 733 F. App’x 404 (9th 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 11 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 12 of 21

courts rejected a full refund model for restitutionary damages, not for actual 

damages, which are at issue here.

51

 

In addition to restitutionary relief—which this Court previously addressed—

the UTPA and the CLRA provide for damages, attorney fees, and costs, and any 

other relief the court deems proper.52 Nordstrom contends that Plaintiffs have “not 

presented any evidence of actual damages.”

53 However, both Ms. Keating and 

Ms. Rheeston declared that they would not have purchased the items they did but 

for Nordstrom’s allegedly unlawful representations, and that they were damaged 

in the full amount that they spent on the items.54 Nordstrom disputes the relevance 

of Plaintiffs’ representations, emphasizing that Plaintiffs “cannot present any 

evidence that they received something worth less than the price they paid.”55 

Cir. 2018) and Stathakos v. Columbia Sportswear Co., No. 15-cv-04543-YGR, 2017 WL 

1957063, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2017)). 

51 Stathakos, 2017 WL 1957063, at *9 n.7. (“[T]he Court’s discussion . . . is limited to 

restitution under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA. Plaintiffs may attempt to pursue other 

measures of restitution not discussed below, or damages calculations under the 

CLRA.”); Chowning, 2016 WL 1072129, at *7 (“[T]he Court analyzes Plaintiff’s proposed 

restitution models.”). But see Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. SA CV 12-0215 FMO 

(RNBx), 2015 WL 1526559, at *6 (C.D. Cal. March 23, 2015) (“Here, plaintiff has 

presented evidence that every dollar she spent was as a result of JCPenney’s alleged 

false advertising, and defendant cites no evidence to the contrary or any evidence to 

demonstrate that a full refund would not be proper under the facts of this case.” 

(citations to briefing omitted)). 

52 AS 45.50.531, 45.50.537; Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a)(1)–(5), (e); see also Doe 1 v. AOL 

LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

53 Docket 228 at 3. 

54 Docket 231 at 2. 

55 Docket 228 at 10. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 12 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 13 of 21

However, for the reasons discussed below, Nordstrom has not established that it 

is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining monetary damages claims 

under the UTPA and the CLRA.

1. The UTPA

The UTPA provides that:

A person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as a 

result of another person’s act or practice declared unlawful by AS 

45.50.471 may bring a civil action to recover for each unlawful act or 

practice three times the actual damage or $500, whichever is greater. 

The court may provide other relief it considers necessary and 

proper.56 

Nordstrom correctly notes that a plaintiff must prove actual damages to 

recover monetary relief under the UTPA.57 Here, Plaintiffs have put forth evidence 

that they were damaged in the full amount of the price they paid for their purchases. 

Ms. Keating and Ms. Rheeston declare that they would not have purchased the 

items absent Nordstrom’s allegedly deceptive advertising practices, and that the 

items they purchased only had value to them insofar as they were getting the deal 

they thought they were getting.58 Defendant responds that Plaintiffs received items 

with real value, pointing to the full-price sale of those items, either before or after 

56 AS 45.50.531. 

57 Docket 228 at 11 (citing Sec. Alarm Fin. Enters., L.P. v. Alder Holdings, LLC, No. 3:13-

cv-00102-SLG, 2017 WL 506237, at *4 (D. Alaska, Feb. 7, 2017)); see also Garrison v. 

Dixon, 19 P.3d 1229, 1235 n.22 (Alaska 2001) (“[T]he claims ultimately failed on 

summary judgment because plaintiffs could show no monetary losses, as required for a 

private action under AS 45.50.531(a)”). 

58 Docket 233 at 4–5; Docket 235 at 4–5. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 13 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 14 of 21

Plaintiffs purchased them.59 However, accepting Plaintiffs’ evidence as true, and 

drawing all justifiable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, a reasonable factfinder could 

conclude that Ms. Keating and Ms. Rheeston suffered an ascertainable loss of 

money in connection with their preseason and summer season purchases. 

Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute for trial on this topic, and Nordstrom’s 

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims for monetary 

damages under the UTPA is DENIED. 

2. The CLRA 

The CLRA provides that: 

(a) Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or 

employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to 

be unlawful by Section 1770 may bring an action against that person 

to recover or obtain any of the following:

(1) Actual damages, but in no case shall the total award of 

damages in a class action be less than one thousand dollars 

($1,000).

(2) An order enjoining the methods, acts, or practices.

(3) Restitution of property.

(4) Punitive damages.

(5) Any other relief that the court deems proper.60

59 Docket 228 at 10. 

60 Cal. Civ. Code § 1780.

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 14 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 15 of 21

Thus, under the CLRA, damages and restitution are different remedies; as one 

court explained, “[d]amages under the CLRA are a legal remedy, intended to 

compensate those who suffer actual damage” and are a “different remed[y]” than 

“restitution under the False Advertising and Unfair Competition Laws.”

61

 

As discussed in this Court’s prior order on summary judgment, there is no 

exclusive model for calculating restitution under the CLRA, but the “price paid less 

value received” is a commonly invoked model.

62

 Similarly, there is no lone model 

for calculating actual damages. The CLRA itself does not define “actual damages,” 

and a review of CLRA case law in this Circuit reveals the use of different models.

For instance, some courts have approved of the “market approach” to assess 

actual damages.

63 This approach is adopted from California Civil Code Section 

61 Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 

As one legislator stated regarding the remedies under the CLRA, they are intended “to 

provide the consumer the ability to ‘rescind unfair business transactions, collect 

damages, and stop future bad practices.’” 1 CA Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law § 

19.09 (quoting Hayes, Report Relative to Assembly Bill 292, 4 Cal. Assem. J. 8464 at 

8465). 

62 Docket 216 at 30 (collecting cases). 

63 See, e.g., Paz v. Playtex Prods., No. 07-cv-2133-JM, 2008 WL 111046, at *3 (S.D. 

Cal. Jan. 10, 2008) (“For a CLRA award of damages, Plaintiff is entitled to his actual 

damages consisting of ‘the difference between the actual value of that with which the 

defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received, together with 

any additional damage arising from the particular transaction.’” (quoting Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 3343(a)); Zakaria v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 15-cv-00200-JAK, 2017 WL 9512587, at 

*20 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2017), aff’d 755 Fed. Appx. 623 (9th Cir. 2018) (same); Wiener v. 

Dannon Co., 255 F.R.D. 658, 670 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[A]ctual damages for these [CLRA] 

claims can be calculated by subtracting the value of the Products without the claimed 

health benefits . . . from the price that the particular class member is able to prove he or 

she paid.”). 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 15 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 16 of 21

3343(a), which governs fraudulent sales and provides that “[o]ne defrauded in the 

purchase, sale or exchange of property is entitled to recover the difference 

between the actual value of that with which the defrauded person parted and the 

actual value of that which he received, together with any additional damage arising 

from the particular transaction.” Other courts have defined “actual damages” more 

broadly, to mean “those which compensate someone for the harm from which he 

or she has been proven to currently suffer.”64

Here, Plaintiffs have proposed a full-refund model of damages. Although 

some courts have held that a “full-refund model is an inappropriate measure of 

damages unless the plaintiff can prove the product conferred no benefits,”

65 those 

holdings have been either in the context of restitutionary damages, or in cases 

where “the plaintiffs did not contend that consumers never would have purchased 

the product absent the claims on the label,” as Plaintiffs do here.

66

 Nordstrom has 

not cited any binding case law—and the Court has not found any—that expressly 

precludes Plaintiffs’ full-refund model of actual damages under these 

circumstances.

67

 

64 Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146–47 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 

(quoting Saunders v. Taylor, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).

65 Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 867, 898–99 (N. D. Cal. 2016) 

(collecting cases). 

66 Id. at 899. 

67 Nordstrom also relies on Wilens v. TD Waterhouse Group, Inc., where the Court of 

Appeal of California affirmed the trial court’s denial of class certification, reasoning that 

the class was inappropriate because each member would have to litigate numerous 

factually unique questions about their entitlement to damages. Docket 228 at 12 (citing 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 16 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 17 of 21

Nordstrom relies on Krueger v. Wyeth, a recent federal district court case 

applying California law.

68

 In Krueger, the court concluded that “actual damage” 

under the CLRA is the “difference between the actual value of that with which the 

defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received,”69

adopting the definition from California Civil Code Section 3343(a).70 However, as 

mentioned above, the so-called market approach derived from Section 3343(a) is 

not the only model for calculating damages. Accordingly, to the extent that the 

Krueger court adopted that model as the exclusive model for actual damages 

under the CLRA, this Court declines to follow its approach. As one court reasoned 

in refusing to “interpret ‘any damage’ in the CLRA as measurable only under the 

calculation provided for fraud claims in section 3343,” the “Ninth Circuit has . . . 

noted that even though CLRA and UCL claims may be ‘said to be “grounded in 

15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 271, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). At issue was an allegedly unconscionable 

contractual provision in the named plaintiff’s agreement with the defendant, which allowed 

the defendant to unilaterally terminate access to a stock trading site. Wilens, 15 Cal. Rptr. 

3d at 273. The court found that the “case d[id] not lend itself to the presumption that each 

class member suffered damage by the mere insertion of the termination without notice 

provision in the . . . agreement.” Id. at 276. Wilens stands only for the uncontroversial 

proposition that a plaintiff must prove some damages in order to recover under the CLRA 

and that the particular class under consideration was not well suited for certification as 

there were many distinct factual inquiries into damages. Id. at 277. 

68 Docket 228 at 12 (citing 396 F. Supp. 3d 931, 950 (S.D. Cal. 2019)).

69 396 F. Supp. 3d 931, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 

Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 42–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).

70 The Krueger court relies on Colgan in support of its definition of actual damages. Id.

(quoting Colgan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42–43). However, the Colgan court did not purport 

to define “actual damages,” instead commenting only that “[t]o determine the amount of

actual damages for a CLRA award, the trial court applied a market approach as set forth 

in Civil Code Section 3343, subdivision (a).” 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42–43.

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 17 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 18 of 21

fraud” or to “sound in fraud, . . . [f]raud is not an essential element of a claim under 

these statutes.’”71 Moreover, the market approach adopted in Krueger and Colgan

is, in effect, a restitutionary measure insofar as it involves “‘the return of the excess 

of what the plaintiff gave the defendant over the value of what the plaintiff 

received.’”

72

 But the CLRA distinguishes between restitutionary and actual 

damages, as do courts interpreting the CLRA, including Colgan.

73

 For this 

additional reason, the Court finds that actual damages under the CLRA are not 

confined to the market approach of Section 3343(a). 

The Krueger court also distinguished between the objective and subjective 

valuation of the product at hand.74 It noted that in affirming a district court’s holding 

71 Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:11-cv-02890-WBS, 2016 WL 2899026, at *21 n.5 

(E.D. Cal. May 18, 2016) (second omission and alteration in original) (quoting Vess v. 

Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003). The court noted that 

the defendant “ha[d] not cited a single decision from the California Supreme Court or 

California appellate courts holding that section 3343 . . . provides the exclusive 

measure of damages for CLRA claims.”. Id.

72 Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 713 (Cal. 2000) (defining 

restitution). 

73 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 59 (“[A] trial court could, when assessing damages under the 

CLRA, apply standards different from those the trial court might use when ordering 

restitution . . . .” (emphasis in original). See also Chowning v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 

No. CV 15-08673 RGK (SPx), 2016 WL 1072129 (C.D. Cal. March 15, 2016) 

(“[R]estitution, as distinguished from damages, must account for any value the plaintiff 

received.” (citing Cortez, 999 P.2d at 712)).

74 Krueger v. Wyeth, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 3d 931, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (emphasizing that 

the court must “look to what actually occurred, taking into consideration that which the 

Plaintiff did, in fact, receive and the market value of the product”). 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 18 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 19 of 21

that a class-wide damages model was inadequate, the Ninth Circuit recently 

explained that: 

Under California consumer protection laws, plaintiffs can measure 

class-wide damages using methods that evaluate what a consumer 

would have been willing to pay for the product had it been labeled 

accurately. Such methods must, however, reflect supply-side 

considerations and marketplace realities that would affect product 

pricing.75

However, where, as here, the Plaintiffs are not representing a class, their 

subjective model of damages does not present the same challenges as it would if 

applied to class-wide damages. Plaintiffs’ full-refund model of damages 

corresponds with their theory of liability, and while they may ultimately fail to prove 

their damages, they have produced sufficient evidence that a reasonable factfinder 

could conclude they suffered actual damages. Thus, whether Plaintiffs can prove 

damages to a reasonable certainty on the basis of their full-refund model is a 

question of fact that should be decided at trial. For the aforementioned reasons, 

Nordstrom’s motion for summary judgment on monetary damages arising from 

Plaintiffs Keating’s and Rheeston’s preseason and summer sales claims is 

DENIED. 

III. Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary Objections 

In addition to their partial opposition, Plaintiffs also filed objections to the 

evidence offered by Nordstrom in support of its renewed motion for summary 

75 Id. (quoting Zakaria v. Gerber Prods. Co., 755 Fed. Appx. 623, 624 (9th Cir. 2019)). 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 19 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 20 of 21

judgment.76 Plaintiffs contend that much of the evidence introduced through Jay 

Ramsey’s and Daniel Miller’s declarations contains conclusory statements that are 

inadmissible hearsay and/or lacking in foundation.77 Specifically, Plaintiffs object 

to the charts introduced in Mr. Ramsey’s declaration and his “conclusory 

statements” about them, maintaining that he is not qualified to comment on the 

data, and that the underlying data is unauthenticated.

78

 Plaintiffs also take issue

with how Mr. Ramsey presents the data, challenging some of the exclusions and 

cutoffs.79 Plaintiffs similarly object to Daniel Miller’s declaration, contending that it 

is based on inadmissible hearsay and unsupported by any evidence in the 

record.80 Moreover, Plaintiffs object to Mr. Miller’s conclusion that “substantial 

quantities” of product were sold at full price, maintaining that was a “material fact 

which must go to the jury.”81 

The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections, but does not rely 

on the data presented in either Mr. Ramsey’s or Mr. Miller’s declaration to resolve 

the questions of standing and damages at issue in this motion. Accordingly, the 

Court will not further address Plaintiffs’ objections at this time.

76 Docket 232. 

77 Docket 232 at 1. 

78 Docket 232 at 2–3. 

79 Docket 232 at 2–4. 

80 Docket 232 at 6–9. 

81 Docket 232 at 8. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 20 of 21
Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG, Keating, et al. v. Nordstrom

Order re Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Page 21 of 21

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Nordstrom’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment at Docket 228 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 

Nordstrom’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Freitag’s Preseason and 

Summer Sales claims for lack of standing is GRANTED and her preseason 

and summer sales claims under the CLRA and UTPA are dismissed with 

prejudice. 

Nordstrom’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Keating’s and Ms. 

Rheeston’s claims for monetary damages under the CLRA and the UTPA 

based on the preseason and summer sale claims is DENIED. 

A trial setting conference is set for May 5, 2020 at 11:00 AM.

82 Due to the 

coronavirus pandemic, the Court and all parties shall appear telephonically at this 

hearing by calling (877) 402-9753 on a land line, five minutes prior to the hearing, 

and dialing in with access code 6288202.

DATED this 10th day of April, 2020 at Anchorage, Alaska.

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

82 See Alaska District Court Miscellaneous General Order 20-11, Suspension of Court 

Proceedings, Effective March 30, 2020. 

Case 3:17-cv-00030-SLG Document 237 Filed 04/10/20 Page 21 of 21