Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_12-cv-03563/USCOURTS-alnd-4_12-cv-03563-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

JOEL HAPPY SIWE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:12-cv-3563-AKK-TMP

)

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This cause is before the court on the Petitioner’s objections to the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation dated May 19, 2014, and to the supplemental report

and recommendation dated June 30, 2014. Having now carefully reviewed and

considered de novo the two reports and recommendations, the objections to them, and

other relevant materials in the court file, the court concludes that the reports are due to

be and hereby areADOPTED, and the recommendations of dismissalwithout prejudice

are ACCEPTED IN PART and REJECTED IN PART. By separate order the court will

dismiss Petitioner’s claim for relief under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491,

150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001) as being premature, but will RECOMMIT this habeas action to

the magistrate judge with instructions to obtain a status update on Petitioner’s

immigration proceedings and to assess whether, in light of that new information,

FILED

 2014 Aug-28 PM 04:21

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:12-cv-03563-AKK-TMP Document 28 Filed 08/28/14 Page 1 of 4
constitutional due process may require habeasrelief with respect to Petitioner’s continued

mandatory detention under § 1226(c).

Read together, themagistrate judge’s two reports and recommendationsmake two

findings: (1) because there is no final order for the removal of the Petitioner, any claim

made under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001) is

premature and due to be dismissed without prejudice to asserting the claim when it

accrues; and (2) because there is no final order of removal, Petitioner’s entitlement to

release on bond pending completion of the immigration proceedings is controlled by the

mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Petitioner does not really challenge

the first of these conclusions, and acknowledges that his immigration proceedings are

again before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) following the decision of the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacating and remanding the previous final order of

removal. Because a final order of removal no longer exists (and the now-vacated one

previously entered was stayed), there is no triggering of the presumptive “removal

period” at the heart of Zadvydas. As such, Petitioner’s claim that Respondents have

detained him longer than the removal period is premature and must be dismissed

without prejudice. Petitioner is free to assert the claim when and if it accrues in the

future.

Petitioner’s main argument is that he is entitled to a bond hearing for an

individualized assessment of whether he is a flight risk or danger to the community. He

Case 4:12-cv-03563-AKK-TMP Document 28 Filed 08/28/14 Page 2 of 4
points out that Respondents have held him in actual, physical, continuous custody since

June 1, 2011, and that real constitutional due process questions arise if the mandatory

detention provisions of § 1226(c) apply to him. As the magistrate judge explained,

however, only half of this time qualifies as mandatory detention under § 1226(c). The

rest of Petitioner’s detention period followed the entry of the now-vacated final order

of removal, pursuant to § 1231, while Petitioner litigated the order of removal before the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Still, the court cannot ignore that Petitioner has been in

Homeland Security custody under § 1226(c) as a “criminal alien” for about 19 months.

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Nonetheless, at this juncture, the court cannot say that such a length of time necessarily

implicates due process concerns. There is no question that, at some point in time, a preorder-of-removal detention under § 1226(c) will implicate due process concerns. After

all, Homeland Security may not detain a “criminal alien” indefinitely while trying to

determine whether he should be removed. In this case, however, there is no evidence

of intentional or reckless delay in the administrative process. 

Although the court agrees with the magistrate judge that this period of time

probably does not yet implicate due process concerns, it is quickly approaching the outer

limit of the time due process can tolerate. While it is true that Petitioner has been a

 Petitioner was taken into custody on June 1, 2011. By early 2012, an immigration judge determined (erroneously,

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according to the Fifth Circuit) that Petitioner was not eligible for adjustment of his status from asylee to permanent

resident alien, and that determination was affirmed by the BIA on June 27, 2012, not quite thirteen months after

Petitioner was taken into custody. Petitioner appealed and the Fifth Circuit stayed removal. The next 20 months of

Petitioner’s incarceration occurred while the matter was pending before the Fifth Circuit, which vacated the prior

final order of removal and remanded to the BIA in February 2014. The magistrate judge correctly determined that

since February, Petitioner returned to the status of a “pre-order of removal” criminal alien, mandatorily detained

under § 1226(c). Therefore, the total time Petitioner has been incarcerated under § 1226(c) is now approaching 19

months.

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§1226(c) detainee for 19 months, he has been in actual, continuous custody for more

than three years. Because Petitioner’s continued incarceration will implicate due process

concern at some juncture, rather than dismissing this action without prejudice and

requiring the Petitioner to file a new habeas corpus petition in a matter of weeks or

months, the court will recommit this matter to the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge

is tasked with obtaining another status update from the Respondents and to then assess

whether the new information implicates due processin relation to Petitioner’s continued

detention and his right to an individualized bond hearing.

A separate order will be entered. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of the

foregoing to the Petitioner.

DATED this 28th day of August, 2014.

________________________________

 ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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