Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03857/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03857-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1. Petitioner moved to file a supplement to his traverse. Docket No. 10. The Court grants this

motion and accepts the supplement as filed. 

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ANTHONY MASON,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A.P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 06-3857 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

(Docket No. 10)

 Petitioner Anthony Mason, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a decision by the California Board of

Prison Terms (“Board”) that he is unsuitable for parole. The Court directed Respondent to show

cause why the cognizable claim should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer

addressing the merits of the petition, and Petitioner has filed a traverse. Having reviewed the 1

briefs and the underlying record, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief based

on the claim presented and will deny the petition. 

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Case 5:06-cv-03857-JF Document 11 Filed 05/20/08 Page 1 of 8
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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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BACKGROUND

The charges against Petitioner arose from his murder of his mother-in-law. An Alameda

Superior Court jury found Petitioner, who currently is in custody at Soledad State Prison, guilty

of second-degree murder (Cal. Pen. Code § 187) with the use of a deadly weapon (Id. §

12022(b)), and that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury (Id. § 1203.075). Ans., Ex.

A (Abstract of Judgment). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of sixteen years to

life. Id. 

The facts of the commitment offense were described by the California Court of Appeal as

follows: 

In 1982, [Petitioner] and another person [named Hall who lived near the victim]

went to the home of [Petitioner’s] 53-year-old mother-in-law, who was confined

to a wheelchair. [Petitioner] reported that his companion told him that she had a

large sum of money at her residence and the two men decided to rob [Petitioner’s]

mother-in-law while she was asleep. At trial, [Petitioner’s] companion testified

that [Petitioner’s] mother-in-law asked him to take her two-year-old

granddaughter outside, leaving [Petitioner] alone with his mother-in-law. 

According to [Petitioner’s] companion, about 15 to 30 minutes later, [Petitioner]

appeared and asked him for fresh clothing; [Petitioner] had blood on his clothing

and his shoes. The following day, after [Petitioner’s] wife became concerned

about her mother’s welfare, [Petitioner] accompanied his wife back to the home of

his mother-in-law. The mother-in-law was found dead inside the residence. She

had been stabbed eight times; four of the wounds were fatal.

[Petitioner] denied that he was the one who committed the murder. He claimed

that he remained outside while his companion entered the residence of his

mother-in-law. According to [Petitioner], his companion returned and told him

that the victim had tried to hit him with her cane. [Petitioner] asserted that his

companion stabbed her and took her money, which the two men divided.

[Petitioner] claimed that he got blood on himself after he went back into the

house. Once he became aware of the stabbing, [Petitioner] stated that he wanted

to call the police, but he did not call because his companion threatened him.

[Petitioner] maintained that he was innocent, but his companion, who was given

immunity for his testimony, testified against him. [].

[Petitioner] had no prior record of convictions. He had been arrested for a battery

on March 22, 1977, and for petty theft (§ 484) on December 28, 1981. Both

matters were dismissed.

While incarcerated, Mason had four official misconduct hearings known as “CDC

115s.” The first, in 1984, was for force and violence, and for threatening staff.

Mason had a CDC 115 in 1984 for possession of marijuana and currency and

another CDC 115 in June 1990 for being under the influence. He also had a CDC

115 in January 1990 for trafficking of narcotics.

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2. In 2006, the Board again found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. The cited opinion relates to

Petitioner’s state habeas petition challenging the 2006 decision by the Board. However,

Respondent has not suggested that the instant case may be moot because Petitioner’s current

confinement is a result of the 2006 decision and not the 2004 decision that is the subject of the

instant petition. 

3. Respondent contends that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 

instant petition because California inmates do not have a federally-protected due process right to

parole release. Ans. ¶ 10. However, controlling Ninth Circuit authority holds that Petitioner has

a federally-protected liberty interest in parole release. See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895,

902 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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In re Mason, No. A115088, 2007 WL 1123013, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007). 

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In 2004, the Board found Petitioner unsuitable for parole, citing as its reasons that “[t]he

offense was carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner,” in a way it also described as

“dispassionate” and “which demonstrates a disregard for human suffering.” Ans., Ex. C

(Transcript of Jul. 26, 2004 parole hearing) at 46. In response, Petitioner filed state habeas

petitions, all later denied, in the California superior, appellate, and supreme courts. Ans., P. & A.

at 3. Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in 2006.

As the basis of federal habeas relief, Petitioner alleges that the Board’s denial of parole is

not supported by sufficient evidence having indicia of reliability and therefore was arbitrary and

capricious. Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) at 2. 3

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively

unreasonable.’” Id. at 409. In examining whether the state court decision was objectively

unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court’s method as well as its result. 

Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). The standard for “objectively

unreasonable” is not “clear error” because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. The gloss

of error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s adjudication

of the claim “results in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The

court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the

petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1).

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4. The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the commitment offense

was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;” (2) previous record of

violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; (5) psychological factors such

as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;” and (6) prison

misconduct. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The circumstances tending to show suitability are:

(1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense

was committed as a result of stress which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman Syndrome; (6)

lack of criminal history; (7) age is such that it reduces the possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for

future including development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional activities that indicate

ability to function within the law. Id. § 2402(d).

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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B. Petitioner’s Claim

The Board complies with due process provided that there is “some evidence” to support

its decision. A parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the board’s decision

is not supported by “some evidence in the record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Sass v. California

Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting “some evidence” standard

for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)); see

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). Additionally, the evidence

underlying the Board’s decision must have some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at

904. Accordingly, if the Board’s determination of parole suitability is to satisfy due process,

there must be some evidence, with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v.

Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904.

In assessing whether there is “some evidence” to support the Board’s denial of parole,

this Court must consider the regulations that guide the Board in making its parole suitability

determinations. The Board is to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b). Section 2402(a) states that “[t]he panel shall first determine whether the

life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life

prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” The

regulations enumerate various circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is

suitable for parole. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)-(d).

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5. Petitioner stated that he falsely admitted drug use so that he would be discharged from military

service. Ans., Ex. C at 17 & Ex. E at 2.

6. Petitioner’s last two infractions involved being under the influence of alcohol and concealing

balloons containing heroin and cocaine in his anal cavity. Ans., Ex. C at 19, 26. 

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim

is without merit. The record shows that there was “some evidence” to support the Board’s parole

decision, based not only on the circumstances of the commitment offense, but also on other

relevant considerations. After a full hearing, the Board concluded that Petitioner was not suitable

for parole and “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if

released from prison.” Ans., Ex. C at 46. The Board noted that “the victim, who was confined to

a wheelchair, was stabbed eight times, four of them fatally.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he offense was

carried out in a manner which demonstrates a disregard for human suffering.” Id. 

In addition to the nature and circumstances of the commitment offense, the Board

considered other parole suitability factors, such as Petitioner’s unstable social history, his

psychological reports and the opposition of law enforcement officials to parole. The record

contains evidence that Petitioner has an unstable social history, including drug and alcohol use

that led to a discharge from the military. Id. at 17; Ans., Ex. E (March 2003 Psychological 5

Evaluation) at 2. Petitioner’s lack of truthfulness, as indicated in his psychological report, was

expressly noted by the Board. One report stated that “[Petitioner] denied ever confessing [to the

crime], but admitted lying to police and then saying later he was afraid to tell the truth because

his friend had threatened to kill his son if he told.” Id. at 30. “[Petitioner] told of deceiving his

ex-wife, saying, ‘I went to the bedroom [where my mother-in-law’s corpse was located] and

pretended to be surprised (that her mother was dead).’” Ans., Ex. E (March 2003 Psychological

Evaluation) at 4. The Board, though commending Petitioner for having been “disciplinary-free”

for fourteen years, expressed deep concern that Petitioner may not have been entirely truthful 6

and concluded that Petitioner “needs to participate in self-help and substance abuse programs

in order to face, discuss, understand, and cope with stress in a nondestructive manner.” Ans., Ex.

C at 48. It found that “[u]ntil progress is made, [Petitioner] continues to be unpredictable and a

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7. Petitioner also claims that the Board’s high number of parole denials “demonstrat[es] a

systematic bias against normally granting parole.” Pet. at 13. The Board’s actions in other cases

are irrelevant. The Board’s duty is to conduct an individualized determination based on the

specific facts of each individual case, which it has done here. 

8. Petitioner also contends that the Board’s decision does not comport with the recommended

sentence in California’s Sentencing Matrix. Petition at 13. This claim is without merit. The

Board is under no duty to apply the matrix once it has determined that a prisoner is unsuitable for

parole. In Re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1069, 1071 (2005). 

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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threat to others.” Id. The Board also noted that the Alameda County District Attorney and the

Oakland Police Department had expressed their opposition to Petitioner’s parole. Id. Because

some evidence exists to support the Board’s finding of unsuitability, the Board’s decision has

complied with the requirements of due process. Although he asserts that the evidence used by

the Board was unreliable, Petitioner has not shown any evidence to support this assertion. 

7 8

Because the Board complied with the requirements of due process, Petitioner’s claim is

without merit. Therefore, under the highly deferential standard imposed by AEDPA, the Court

concludes that the state court’s determination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), (2).

CONCLUSION

Applying the highly deferential standard imposed by AEDPA, this Court concludes that

the state court’s determination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), (2). 

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state court proceedings and parole hearing. The petition

for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: __________________ 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

5/15/08

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