Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01891/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01891-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIM DALE DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. POWELL, T. BOREM, L. SMALL,

K. OURS,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 10cv01891 CAB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 30]

Plaintiff Jim Dale Davis, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on August 31, 2010,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF No. 1]. The Defendants filed a

Motion to Dismiss Complaint, which was granted [ECF Nos. 17, 24-

25]. On September 30, 2011, Davis filed a First Amended Complaint

[ECF No. 26]. He subsequently sought leave to replace the second

page of the First Amended Complaint with a different page [ECF No.

27]. The Court granted his request and instructed the Clerk of the

Court to refile the First Amended Complaint with the replacement

page as a separate docket entry; this new filing would constitute,

and was docketed as, Davis's Second Amended Complaint, even though

it was titled "Frist [sic] Amended Complaint" [ECF No. 28].

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Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint was filed on October 6,

2011, along with exhibits [ECF No. 29].1 There, Davis argues in

count one that Defendants violated the First Amendment and the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

("RLUIPA") when they imposed a total ban on the purchase and

receipt of prayer oil by inmates for fourteen months. (Second Am.

Compl. 1, 3-8, ECF No. 29.) In count two, Plaintiff asserts that

Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause and retaliated

against him when they implemented an addendum to Department

Operations Manual ("DOM") supplement number 54030.7.1, which

provided that certain religious items ordered by inmates would be

counted as a quarterly package. (Id. at 9-10; see id. Attach. #2

Ex. U, at 39.) Warden Small signed the addendum on September 16,

2009. (Id.)2 All Defendants allegedly discriminated against Davis

because the religious items described in the addendum are

purportedly used only by practitioners of the Muslim faith. 

(Second Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff contends

Defendants retaliated and discriminated again on October 25, 2010,

when they implemented a policy that prayer oil orders from the

vendor, Union Supply, would not count as a quarterly package, but

orders from nonapproved vendors would. (Id. at 10.)

1

 Because the Second Amended Complaint and attachments are

not consecutively paginated, the Court will cite to them using the

page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing ("ECF") system. 

At times, Davis cites to the attachments using the page numbers

designated in the exhibits. In these instances, the Court will

also use the ECF system pagination.

2

 Although Davis has sued Defendant "L. Smalls," the Court

construes this as a typographical error, as "L. Small" has appeared

as one of the Defendants moving to dismiss.

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On October 13, 2011, the four named Defendants, Powell, Borem,

Small, and Ours, filed a Motion to Dismiss Second Amended

Complaint, which included a Memorandum of Points and Authorities

[ECF No. 30]. Davis filed his "Objection to Defendants Motion to

Dismiss Second Amended Compliant [sic]" on October 31, 2011, which

the Court construes as an Opposition [ECF No. 31]. On November 7,

2011, Defendants' Reply was filed [ECF No. 33]. 

The Court has reviewed the Second Amended Complaint and

attachments, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and attachment, Davis's

Opposition, and the Defendants' Reply. The Motion to Dismiss is

suitable for resolution on the papers. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the district court should

GRANT in part and DENY in part the Defendants' Motion. 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison. (Second

Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 29.) In count one, Davis asserts that he has

been a practicing Muslim and has used prayer oil for sixteen years. 

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff posits that using prayer oil is an

"obligatory act that [he] must do during the preformance [sic] of

his religion." (Id. (citing id. Attach. #1 Ex. A, at 4).) On

August 11, 2009, Defendant Powell and the Islamic chaplain issued a

religious chrono listing the religious articles Davis was

authorized to keep in his cell, which included eight ounces of

prayer oil per quarter. (Id. at 3-4 (citing id. Attach. #1 Exs. B,

C).) According to Plaintiff, the chaplain signed a religious item

approval list allowing Davis to purchase prayer oil from Halalco

Books, a vendor on Calipatria's authorized vendor list. (Id. at 4

(citing id. Attach. #1 Ex. D).) Davis alleges that on October 9,

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2009, Halalco Books sent his eight-ounce prayer oil order to

Calipatria with the approval form on the box; Defendant Borem

received the order sometime in October, but failed to forward the

package to Plaintiff. (Id. at 4, 7 (citing id. Attach. #1 Ex. E,

at 21).) 

Davis maintains that he waited several weeks for his prayer

oil before submitting an inmate grievance, to which prison

officials never responded. (Id. at 4.) On December 22, 2009,

Plaintiff submitted another grievance requesting that officials

deliver the prayer oil; the grievance was denied at the informal

level on January 5, 2010, because the "Hazmat Specialist,"

Defendant Ours, had "denied the introduction of oil into the

prison." (Id. (citing id. Attach. #1 Ex. F).) Plaintiff alleges

his subsequent appeals were denied at all levels; at the director's

level, it was determined that "[t]he oils were appropriately

confiscated as it was determined they pose a fire, health, and

safety hazard." (Id.; see id. Attach. #1 Ex. G, at 27.)

Defendant Ours allegedly never issued a memorandum explaining

why the oil was hazardous, and the decision was not supported by

any documentation or legitimate reason. (Second Am. Compl. 4-5,

ECF No. 29.) Davis maintains that on February 3, 2010, Defendant

Borem sent Plaintiff a letter indicating that his oil had been

returned to Halalco and that Defendants Ours, Small, and Powell had

concluded that prayer oil would no longer be allowed at Calipatria

because it posed a fire, health, and safety hazard. (Id. at 5

(citing id. Attach. #2 Ex. H).) In the letter, Borem explained

that the decision was based on the fire rating information on the

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"Materials Safety Data Sheet" ("MSDS"), but he did not identify the

MSDS or where he obtained it. (Id.) 

Davis argues that from August 11, 2009, to October 16, 2010, 

there was a "total ban" on the purchase and receipt of prayer oil

by inmates, denying him a "critical part" of his religion for

fourteen months. (Id.) Defendants' actions were allegedly without

any penological justification because if they followed protocol,

they would have known that the prayer oil from Halalco Books

complied with Calipatria's hazardous materials standards. (Id.) 

Davis contends that years earlier, on November 14, 2003,

Defendant Ours sent a memorandum to "department heads" regarding

the "Material Safety Sheet Binders," along with a copy of the

"Calipatria State Prison Hazardous Communication Plan." (Id. at 6

(citing id. Attach. #2 Ex. I).) The plan provided that a material

is "combustible" if its flash point is 100 degrees Fahrenheit and

above, and a material is "flammable" if its flash point is between

twenty and 100 degrees Fahrenheit. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that

the prayer oil provided by Halalco Books has a flash point between

189 and 195 degrees Fahrenheit and therefore is not flammable. 

(Id. (citing id. Attach. #2 Ex. J).) In comparison, pink hand soap

has a flash point of 212 degrees, and pink skin cleanser has a

flash point of 200 degrees. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #2 Exs. K,

L).) Davis argues that Defendants therefore knew that the Halalco

prayer oil complied with Calipatria's hazardous materials

standards, but they still banned the oil. (Id.) 

The Plaintiff contends that on July 12, 2010, the associate

warden responded to inmate correspondence and wrote, "Warden McEwen

and Calipatria staff have reviewed the matter, and find that there

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is no compelling reason to deny the oil from the vendors that have

been approved by the Institution in the past." (Id. Attach. #2 Ex.

M, at 22; see Second Am. Compl. 6-7, ECF No. 29.) Davis further

asserts that during the total ban on prayer oil, he was never

supplied an alternative prayer oil vendor. (See Second Am. Compl.

7, ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff states that while prison officials

ultimately provided the alternative vendor, Union Supply, this did

not occur until August 1, 2010. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #2 Ex.

O).)

On July 14, 2010, Davis received approval from the Islamic

chaplain to order prayer oil from Halalco Books. (Id. at 8 (citing

id. Attach. #2 Ex. R).) Halalco shipped Plaintiff a back order

five days later, and on July 27, 2010, Halalco shipped his "current

order." (Id. (citing id. Attach. #2 Ex. S).) Plaintiff insists

that the Defendants received the July 27, 2010 order, but did not

forward the oil to him until October 16, 2010. (Id.) Defendant

Borem returned one of Plaintiff's prayer oil orders to Halalco as

recently as January 18, 2011, even though Borem knew Halalco was an

approved vendor. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #2 Ex. T).) As a

result, Davis maintains that Defendants Powell, Borem, Small, and

Ours violated RLUIPA and the First Amendment by denying him access

to Islamic prayer oil without penological justification. (See id.

at 3-8.)

In count two, Davis alleges that Defendants conspired to force

him to purchase prayer oil from their preferred vendor, Union

Supply, instead of from Halalco Books, another approved Islamic

vendor. (Id. at 9.) On September 16, 2009, Warden Small issued an

addendum to DOM supplement 54030. (Id.) The addendum provided

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that when an inmate received a package from a religious specialty

vendor, it would be counted as a regular quarterly personal

package. (Id. Attach. #2 Ex. U, at 39.) Davis argues that the

addendum discriminates against him and other Muslim prisoners

because it only lists Muslim religious articles. (See Second Am.

Compl. 9, ECF No. 29.) The addendum also violates section

3190(i)(4) of the California Code of Regulations ("CCR"), title 15,

and was issued in retaliation for Davis's assertion of his First

Amendment rights. (Id.) Thirteen days later, on September 29,

2009, Plaintiff and other Muslim inmates filed a group appeal

contesting the discriminatory addendum, but it was denied. (Id.

(citing id. Attach. #2 Ex. V, at 41-45).)

The Plaintiff further argues that Defendants retaliated again

on October 25, 2010, when officials issued another addendum to DOM

supplement 54030, "stating that if Plaintiff ordered prayer oils

from Union Supply it would not be counted as a quarterly package

but if Plaintiff used a nondepartmentally approved vendor it would

be counted as a quarterly package." (Id. at 10.)3 Davis complains

that the provisions penalize him because packages from Halalco, his

preferred Islamic vendor, are treated as quarterly packages, but

packages from Union Supply are not. (See id.) Therefore,

Defendants violated RLUIPA, the First Amendment, section 3190(i)(4)

of the California Code of Regulations, and the Equal Protection

Clause. (Id.)

3

 Although Plaintiff cites to "Exhibit W," there are no

exhibits beyond "Exhibit V" attached to the Second Amended

Complaint or otherwise before the Court. 

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II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). "The old formula –-

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)]." Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain "enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

The court must accept as true all material allegations in the

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them,

and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188,

1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792

F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

"ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A

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dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there

"is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must "examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff." Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994)) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged[]"). "Nor is the court required to accept as

true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions

of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside

of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194,

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v.

Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). "The

focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint." 

Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes consideration of

"new" allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff's opposition to

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a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing

Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993)).

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is "particularly important in civil rights

cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not "supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). "The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claim." Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint "unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Doe v. United

States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before a pro se

civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must provide the

plaintiff with a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. Karim10 10cv01891 CAB(RBB)

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Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where amendment of a pro se

litigant's complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is

appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.

2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting "under color of state law"

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986).

III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

As to count one, Defendants Small, Powell, Borem, and Ours

argue that Davis fails to state a claim for relief under the First

Amendment because the temporary ban on prayer oil was reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests in not allowing

flammable materials into prison cells and controlling inmate

inventory. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5-7, ECF No.

30.) The Defendants also maintain that Davis fails to state a

claim for relief under RLUIPA because regulating flammable prayer

oil furthers prison safety, which is a compelling governmental

interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving safety. 

(Id. at 10-11.)

With regard to count two, the four Defendants argue that

Davis's claims against them fail because he was not precluded from

ordering prayer oil; rather, he was merely required to order prayer

oil as part of a quarterly package. (Id. at 7-8.) Limiting inmate

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inventory to reduce contraband, theft, bartering, and gambling is a

legitimate penological interest. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also does

not allege a RLUIPA allegation, Defendants assert, because

requiring Davis to order religious supplies as a quarterly package

did not place a substantial burden on his religious practice. (Id.

at 11-12.) Plaintiff does not state an equal protection claim

because he fails to plead facts sufficient to show that the

provisions in the policy addendum were discriminatory. (Id. at 12-

14.) Further, Defendants Powell, Borem, and Ours urge that the

First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA causes of actions

fail because they are conclusory and lack factual support. (Id. at

14.)

Finally, the Defendants argue that they are entitled to

qualified immunity from liability on Davis's First and Fourteenth

Amendment claims. (Id. at 15-16.)

A. Violations of the California Code of Regulations

In count two of the Second Amended Complaint, Davis alleges

that the Defendants' conduct violated "RLUIPA and the [First]

Amendment and Equal Treatment Clause." (Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF

No. 29.) The gravamen of Plaintiff's allegations is that the

Defendants discriminated against him based on his religion. (See

id. at 9-10.) Davis also states that Defendants' conduct violated

section 3190(i)(4) of the California Code of Regulations. (Id. at

10.) Section 3190(i) provides that inmates shall be permitted

special purchases of authorized personal items from locallyapproved vendors, and staff must ensure that approved vendor

catalogs and order forms are available to qualifying inmates. Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3190(i). Special purchase items include

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"[r]eligious [i]tems subject to approval by institutional chaplain

and designated custody staff." Id. § 3190(i)(4).

Plaintiff cannot assert an independent cause of action based

on the purported violation of section 3190(i) of the California

Code of Regulations. "The existence of regulations such as these

governing the conduct of prison employees does not necessarily

entitle Plaintiff to sue civilly to enforce the regulations or to

sue for damages based on the violation of the regulations." K'Napp

v. Adams, No. 1:06-cv-01701-LJO-GSA (PC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

38682, at *12 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2009). There is no implied private

right of action under title fifteen of the California Code of

Regulations. Id. at *12-13. Because Davis's asserted violation of

section 3190(i) fails to state a claim for relief in count two, the

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this portion of count two should be

GRANTED.

B. Unauthorized Claims in Second Amended Complaint

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party may amend

its pleading within twenty-one days of service once as a matter of

course. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Thereafter, a party must obtain

leave of court or written consent from the opposing party. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Here, all of Davis's claims in his Complaint

were dismissed, and he was only given leave to amend his RLUIPA and

First Amendment causes of action. (Report & Recommendation 38-39,

ECF No. 24; see Order 2, ECF No. 25.) Plaintiff was not given

leave to add additional claims. (Id.) Nevertheless, in his Second

Amended Complaint, Davis improperly includes new allegations

against the Defendants for retaliation, conspiracy, and equal

protection.

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"Although an amendment filed without leave of court, when

leave is required, has no legal effect, the court has discretion to

treat the amendment as properly filed if the court would have

granted leave to amend had leave been sought." Taylor v. City of

San Bernardino, No. EDCV 09-240-MMM (MAN), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

140060, at *19-20 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) (citing Ritzer v.

Gerovicap Pharm. Corp., 162 F.R.D. 642, 644-45 (D. Nev. 1995);

Brockmeier v. Solano Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. CIV S-05-2090 MCE

EFB PS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40580, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 21,

2007)). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly stressed that

the court must remain guided by 'the underlying purpose of Rule 15

. . . to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the

pleadings or technicalities.'" Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (citation

omitted). Whether to give leave to amend rests in the sound

discretion of the district court. Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus.

Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996).

Courts typically consider five factors when determining

whether to grant a motion for leave to amend: (1) bad faith by the

moving party, (2) undue delay in seeking leave to amend, (3)

prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of an amendment, and

(5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. 

Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). 

"'Futility alone can justify the denial of a motion amend.'" Id.

(quoting Nunes v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2003). But

"[p]rejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor." 

Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S.

321, 330-31 (1971)). "Undue delay is delay that prejudices the

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nonmoving party or imposes unwarranted burdens on the court." BNSF

Ry. Co. v. San Joaquin Valley R.R. Co., No. 08-cv-01086-AWI (SMS),

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84694, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011) (citing

Mayreaux v. Louisiana Health Serv. and Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420,

427 (5th Cir. 2004)). Leave to amend "is not dependent on whether

the amendment will add causes of action or parties." DCD Programs,

Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987).

1. Retaliation

In count two, Davis alleges that the Defendants retaliated

against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. (Second Am.

Compl. 9, ECF No. 29.) Specifically, they implemented a

discriminatory policy on September 16, 2009, that penalized inmates

who ordered Muslim-specific religious items by requiring that the

order count as a quarterly package. (Id.) Davis states that

Defendants retaliated again on October 25, 2010, when they

indicated that if Plaintiff ordered prayer oil from Union Supply,

it would not be counted as a quarterly package, but if he used a

nonapproved vendor, it would. (Id. at 10.) Defendants do not

address Davis's retaliation claims in their Motion to Dismiss or

Reply. In his Opposition, Plaintiff asserts, "Defendants conceded

Plaintiff['s] retaliation argument on [page nine] of the SAC. 

Plaintiff will not further argue retaliation in this objection to

Defendants['] (DMOD) because of Defendants['] concession." (Opp'n

9, ECF No. 31.)

Because Plaintiff was not given leave to add new causes of

action and has included new retaliation claims without leave of

court, he has not complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a). As discussed previously, the Court has discretion to treat

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the retaliation allegations as properly included if it would have

granted Davis leave to add these claims had leave been sought. See

Taylor, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140060, at *19. The Court will look

to five factors to determine whether it would have given Plaintiff

leave to amend: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to

the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) previous

amendments. Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077.

Davis was given leave to amend his First Amendment and RLUIPA

claims. (See Report & Recommendation 38-39, ECF No. 24; Order 1-2,

ECF No. 25.) He ignored the Court's order and included additional

claims without authorization. This is some evidence of bad faith. 

See id. Plaintiff presumably knew of Defendants' conduct when he

filed his Complaint on August 31, 2010, but failed to characterize

the conduct as retaliatory until he filed his Second Amended

Complaint more than one year later on October 13, 2011. Davis's

delay and bad faith may suffice to deny a motion for leave to

amend. BNSF Ry. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84694, at *5. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff's delay is not undue because it will not

prejudice the Defendants or impose an unwarranted burden on the

court. See id. Even if these considerations are ignored, an

amendment to include retaliation claims may be futile.

"A prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are

not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). The Constitution provides

protections from "deliberate retaliation" by government officials

for an individual's exercise of First Amendment rights. See

Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1997);

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Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.

1989). Because retaliation by prison officials may chill an

inmate's exercise of legitimate First Amendment rights, retaliatory

conduct is actionable even if it would not otherwise rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d

1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 1989). Yet, retaliation claims are reviewed

with particular care because they are prone to abuse by prisoners. 

Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996); Colon v.

Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).

A plaintiff suing prison officials pursuant to § 1983 for

retaliation must allege sufficient facts that show that (1) "the

retaliated-against conduct is protected," (2) the "defendant took

adverse action against plaintiff," (3) there is a "causal

connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct,"

(4) the act "would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness,"

and (5) the conduct does not further a legitimate penological

interest. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.

2012). A plaintiff can allege retaliatory intent with a time line

of events from which retaliation can be inferred. See id.

(citations omitted). If the plaintiff's exercise of his

constitutional rights was not chilled (factor four), he must allege

that the defendant's actions caused him to suffer more than minimal

harm. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 n.11 (9th Cir.

2005). But see Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d

1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The test is objective -- whether an

official's acts would "'chill or silence a person of ordinary

firmness from future First Amendment activities. Mendocino Envtl.

Ctr., 192 F.3d at 130 (citation omitted).

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a. The September 16, 2009 addendum

Davis alleges that Defendants retaliated against him initially

by issuing an addendum to the Department Operations Manual (DOM) on

September 16, 2009, that implemented a discriminatory policy

requiring that only orders for Muslim religious items would be

counted as quarterly packages. (Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 29.) 

The Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that Defendants

Powell, Borem, and Ours were responsible for this policy, and an

amendment to include a retaliation claim against them would be

futile. An amendment to include a retaliation claim against Warden

Small, however, is not clearly futile. As to Defendant Small, the

elements of a retaliation claim have been pleaded.

First, Davis has asserted that Warden Small retaliated against

him for engaging in the constitutionally protected conduct of

obtaining items required to practice his religion. (Second Am.

Compl. 9, ECF No. 29); see Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 ("[T]he

plaintiff must allege that the retaliated-against conduct is

protected."); McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987)

("The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not

terminate at the prison door.").

Second, the facts pleaded are that Defendant Small took

adverse action against Davis and other Muslim inmates by

instituting a discriminatory policy making it more burdensome to

obtain items required to practice their religion or practice it as

easily as inmates of different faiths. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114.

The policy essentially forced Plaintiff to choose between ordering

Muslim religious items or other items, while other inmates could

order both. (See Second Am. Compl. Ex. U, at 39, ECF No. 29.)

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Third, Davis has asserted a causal link between the adverse

action and the protected conduct. Emeldi v. Univ. of Oregon, 673

F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that at the pleading

stage, a plaintiff need only assert that the protected activity and

the adverse action are not completely unrelated). Plaintiff

contends that the warden's retaliation was a substantial or

motivating factor behind the quarterly package policy, as shown by

the inherent discriminatory nature of the addendum. Id. at 1227

(noting that evidence of animus is relevant to proving causation);

Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271 ("It is thus undisputed that the warning

[the adverse action] was motivated by [the inmate's] protected

conduct [disrespectful language in a prisoner's grievance]. . . .). 

The policy lists religious articles that Davis insists are specific

to the Muslim faith, which, if true, supports the claim that Small

acted to retaliate. See Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095 n.6. (stating

that "animus to the class to which the plaintiff belongs" has been

treated as direct evidence).

The alleged chronology of events further supports a

retaliatory intent. See Emeldi, 673 F.3d at 1226. Small signed

and issued the policy purportedly targeting Davis and other Muslim

inmates on September 16, 2009; thirteen days later, on September

29, 2009, Plaintiff and other inmates filed a group appeal

challenging the policy as discriminatory. (Second Am. Compl. 9,

ECF No. 29; see id. Attach. #2 Ex. V, at 41-45.) On February 3,

2010, approximately five months later, all religious prayer oil at

Calipatria was banned. (Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 29; see id.

Attach. #2 Ex. H, at 2.)

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Fourth, Davis has pleaded facts indicating that Small's policy

would chill a person of ordinary firmness from practicing his

religion. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. A Muslim inmate would be

deterred from ordering Muslim articles to practice his religion

because his orders would count as quarterly packages; in contrast,

orders for religious items by inmates practicing other religions

would not count as quarterly packages. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at

1271. Whether Davis was actually chilled in his attempts to obtain

prayer oil is inconsequential. Medocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at

1300 (concluding it would be unjust to allow a defendant to escape

liability because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in the

protected activity).

Finally, Davis alleges that the adverse action did not

reasonably further a legitimate penological interest. (See Second

Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 29); Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. 

Defendants argue that the addendum was adopted to investigate

whether prayer oil is flammable and to regulate inmate purchases

and property to prevent theft, bartering, and other conduct that

may be a threat to the institution, which are legitimate interests. 

(See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, 11-12, ECF No. 30);

see Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2002)

(finding that reducing administrative costs, streamlining searches,

and monitoring inmate property are legitimate interests). 

Plaintiff's claim, however, is that the policy did not further any

interest because Small implemented it to retaliate against

Plaintiff for exercising his right to practice his religion by

ordering prayer oil. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th

Cir. 1985) (finding that plaintiff had adequately asserted that the

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retaliatory acts were not a reasonable exercise of authority and

did not further any legitimate correctional goal). Without

evidentiary support in the record, argument of defense counsel is

insufficient to establish that the September 16, 2009 addendum is a

regulation of the purchase of prayer oil that furthers a legitimate

penological interest.

Although Davis generally asserts that all Defendants

retaliated, the alleged facts are that Warden Small set the policy. 

Defendant Small did not move to dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation

claim. Even though it does not appear that Davis has exhausted

this cause of action, it may not be too late for him to do so,

unless this policy was superceded by Small's October 25, 2010

addendum. Based on these factors, an amendment to include a

retaliation claim against Warden Small for the allegedly

discriminatory addendum he approved on September 16, 2009, would

not clearly be futile. Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077. The district

court therefore should treat this retaliation claim against

Defendant Small as properly asserted. But the retaliation claim

against Powell, Borem, and Ours should not be treated as properly

included in the Second Amended Complaint because leave to add the

claim against these three Defendants should not be granted.

b. The October 25, 2010 addendum

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants retaliated again on

October 25, 2010, when they "issued another copy of the policy

addendum" indicating that if he ordered prayer oil from Defendants'

vendor, Union Supply, it would not count as a quarterly package;

however, an order from a nonapproved vendor would count as a

specialty package. (Second Am. Compl. 10, ECF No. 29.

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Davis has not alleged that ordering religious items from his

preferred vendor without it counting as a quarterly package is a

constitutionally protected activity. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. 

Plaintiff can purchase prayer oil from an approved vendor without

it counting as a quarterly package. Notably, there is no alleged

meaningful religious difference between the prayer oil sold by

Union Supply and nonapproved vendors. See Kensu v. Cason, No.

1:91-CV-300, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5468, at *45-47 (W.D. Mich. Mar.

29, 1996) (approving a prison policy requiring that religious oil

be ordered from the state-approved vendor because the plaintiff

failed to show any religious difference between Muslim and Buddhist

oil); see also Jesus Christ Prison Ministry v. Cal. Dep't Corr.,

456 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (finding that a

substantial burden was placed on plaintiff's religious exercise

when unique worship materials were unavailable through any approved

vendors).

Plaintiff, however, alleges that he is concerned that the

prayer oil from Union Supply may be contaminated, but he can trust

that the oil from his vendor is not. (Second Am. Compl. 10, ECF

No. 29.) Nevertheless, a conclusory allegation of contamination is

insufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683 (concluding

that "complaint does not contain any factual allegation sufficient

to plausibly suggest [officials'] discriminatory state of mind[]);

Kensu, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5468, at *45-47 (discussing failure to

establish any meaningful religious differences between Muslim or

Buddhist oil). Davis cannot allege that ordering prayer oil from

his vendor of choice is a constitutionally protected activity. See

Thomas v. Little, No. 07-1117-BRE/egb, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57568,

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at *15-18 (W.D. Tenn. July 6, 2009) (discussing approved-vendor

policy and determining that because the prayer oil that plaintiff

could buy from Union Supply was not alleged to be "unfit for his

religious ritual," the desire to order from his preferred vendor

was inconsequential under RLUIPA).

Because Davis has the option of obtaining religious items from

an approved vendor, the adverse action element is lacking. In this

context, a policy that orders from unapproved vendors are counted

as quarterly packages does not burden Davis's religious exercise. 

See id. at *17. But cf. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1270. ("Thus, the

mere threat of harm [transfer or disciplinary action] can be an

adverse action.") The October 25, 2009 addendum is not analogous

to the adverse action in Brodheim.

Davis has not asserted facts establishing a causal connection

between protected conduct and the claimed adverse action -- here,

the October 25, 2010 addendum. See Watison, 668 F.3d 1114. The

only exhibit on which Plaintiff relies, "Exhibit W," is not

attached to the Second Amended Complaint or otherwise before the

Court. (See Second Am. Compl. 10, ECF No. 29.) The October 2010

policy does not indicate animus toward Muslim inmates because they

can order from Union Supply without penalty, the same as all other

inmates. See Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095 n.6. (discussing animus

towards a class to which the plaintiff belongs as evidence of

discrimination against the plaintiff).

Plaintiff fails to allege the action would chill a person of

ordinary firmness from future conduct or that Davis suffered some

other harm. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114; Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269. 

Davis could either order religious items from an approved vendor or

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from his preferred vendor and have it count as a quarterly package. 

A reasonable inmate would not feel deterred from ordering prayer

oil under these circumstances. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 2171.

Finally, Plaintiff fails to assert that the Defendants'

implementation of the October 25, 2010 policy did not further a

legitimate penological interest. See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114.

An amendment to include a retaliation claim based on the

October 25, 2010 addendum would be futile as to all Defendants. 

Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077. Moreover, it is unclear whether Davis

has exhausted this retaliation cause of action. The claim should

not be treated as properly asserted.

2. Conspiracy

Similarly, Davis includes new claims for conspiracy in count

two without leave of court or the consent of the Defendants. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Davis alleges that all of the Defendants

conspired to violate his constitutional rights when they attempted

to force him to purchase prayer oil from their preferred vendor,

Union Supply. (Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 9.) The conspiracy

allegations are not further explained or elaborated. (See id.) In

their Motion, Defendants Powell, Borem, and Ours argue that

Plaintiff only makes a conclusory assertion that they conspired to

violate his rights. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 14, ECF

No. 30.) Defendant Small does not move to dismiss the conspiracy

claim. (See id.)

Although Davis was not given leave to add new causes of

action, the Court will consider the claims if it would have granted

Plaintiff leave to amend if he properly sought leave. See Taylor,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140060, at *19. The Court will consider bad

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faith, undue delay, prejudice, futility of amendment, and prior

amendments. Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077. As discussed above, Davis

exceeded the scope of the Court's order granting him leave to amend

his First Amended Complaint. (See Report & Recommendation 34-38,

ECF No. 24; Order 1-2, ECF No. 25.) This is evidence of bad faith. 

Davis knew of the Defendants' actions when he filed his Complaint

on August 31, 2010, but he failed to allege a conspiracy until he

filed his Second Amended Complaint on October 13, 2011. The delay

is not undue because it will not impose an unusual burden on the

Court or prejudice the Defendants. See BNSF Ry. Co., 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 84694, at *5. Because Defendants Powell, Borem, and

Ours move to dismiss the conspiracy claim, if their Motion should

be granted because Davis has failed to state a claim for relief,

the futility of amending dictates that the claim not be considered.

 To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

show (1) an agreement between the defendants to deprive the

plaintiff of a constitutional right, (2) an overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) a constitutional

deprivation. Garcia v. Grimm, No. 1:06-cv-225-WQH (PCL), 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 20522, at *24 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2011); see also

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856-57 (9th Cir.

1999). "To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not

know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at

least share the common objective of the conspiracy." United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th

Cir. 1989). Because conspiracies are secret agreements, "[a]

defendant's knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be

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inferred from circumstantial evidence and from evidence of the

defendant's actions." Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856-57.

To plead a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff must

allege facts with sufficient particularity to show an agreement or

a meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff's constitutional

rights. Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1177 n.3 (9th Cir.

2004); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d at 853; Woodrum v. Woodward

County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). "Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Ivey, 673

F.2d at 268; see Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.

1977).

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have required a plaintiff alleging

a conspiracy to violate civil rights to state specific facts to

support the existence of the claimed conspiracy. Olsen v. Idaho

State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2004)

(discussing conspiracy claim under § 1985); Harris v. Roderick, 126

F.3d 1189, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying heightened pleading

standard to Bivens conspiracy claims); Burns v. County of King, 883

F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) ("To state a claim for conspiracy to

violate one's constitutional rights under § 1983, the plaintiff

must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed

conspiracy."); accord Bashkin v. Hickman, No. 07cv0995-LAB(CAB),

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4326, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008).

First, Davis must allege an agreement between the Defendants

to deprive him of a constitutional right. Grimm, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 20522, at *24. The agreement need not be overt and can be

inferred from the actions of the Defendants. Crowe v. Cnty. of San

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Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010). The Plaintiff's claim is

that all of the Defendants "conspired to force him to purchase

prayer oils" from their vendor. (Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 29.) 

A conclusory statement that all the Defendants conspired to force

Davis to purchase oil from their vendor is insufficient. See

Crowe, 608 F.3d at 440; Secress v. Ullman, 147 F. App'x 636, 638

(9th Cir. 2005).

Second, Davis must allege that the Defendants committed an

overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Grimm, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 20522, at *24. There is no indication that the approved

vendor, Union Supply, did not sell authentic prayer oil. Plaintiff

does not attribute any specific acts to the Defendants, other than

his blanket accusation that they "conspired to force" him to order

oil from their vendor. (See Second Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 29.) 

To the extent Plaintiff claims they conspired to force him to use

their preferred vendor by issuing the October 25, 2010 addendum, an

overt act that caused injury is adequately alleged. See Gibson v.

United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986).

Finally, to state a claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must show

that he was deprived of a constitutional right. Garcia v. Grimm,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20522, at *24. Davis does not assert facts

sufficient to establish a constitutional right to order religious

items from his preferred vendor. See generally Thomas v. Little,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57568, at *15-18 (discussing approved-vendor

policy under First Amendment and RLUIPA).

Defendants Powell, Borem, and Ours have shown that their

Motion to Dismiss the improperly alleged conspiracy claims against

them should be GRANTED. Similarly, a conspiracy claim against

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Warden Small would be futile because Davis has not presented facts

illustrating that Defendant made an agreement with another to

deprive Davis of a constitutional right and acted in furtherance of

that agreement. See Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856-57. The conspiracy

cause of action alleged against Small is improperly included and

should be DISMISSED.

3. Equal Protection

Likewise, Davis improperly includes a new equal protection

claim in his amended pleading without leave to do so. (Report &

Recommendation 38-39, ECF No. 24; see Order 2, ECF No. 25.) He

argues in count two that the September 16, 2009 addendum counting

Muslim religious items as quarterly packages is discriminatory. 

(Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 29.) The policy only mentions

"prayer oil, [a] prayer rug, spiritual items, beads, etc.," which

Davis maintains are only Muslim religious articles. (Id.) Also,

Plaintiff urges that the October 25, 2010 addendum, stating that

religious item orders from Union Supply would not count as

quarterly packages is discriminatory. (Id. at 9-10.) Davis

complains that the October 2010 approved-vendor policy penalizes

him for ordering oil from his Muslim vendor, a reliable supplier of

noncontaminated religious items. (Id. at 10.)

As discussed in connection with Plaintiff's unauthorized

retaliation and conspiracy claims, the Court will consider whether

Davis would have been granted leave to amend if he properly sought

to add a new equal protection cause of action. See Johnson, 356

F.3d at 1077 (listing factors relevant to granting leave to amend);

Taylor, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140060, at *19.

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The Court has already concluded that including a new claim in

the Second Amended Complaint without authorization is evidence of

bad faith, and adding an alternate theory of liability will not

substantially prejudice the Defendants. Still, an amendment to

include the Fourteenth Amendment claims may be futile.

The Supreme Court has stated that "whenever the government

treats any person unequally because of his or her [membership in a

protected class], that person has suffered an injury that falls

squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's

guarantee of equal protection." Adherent Constructors, Inc. v.

Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995); see also Damiano v. Florida

Parole & Probation Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986)

(explaining that protected classes include race, religion, national

origin, and poverty). "The Constitution's equal protection

guarantee ensures that prison officials cannot discriminate against

particular religions." Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th

Cir. 1997), abrogated in part on other grounds by Shakur v.

Schriro, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). The Fourteenth

Amendment is not violated by unintentional conduct that may have a

disparate impact. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.

229, 239 (1976). "[A] plaintiff must show that the defendants

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the

plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

"Prisoners enjoy religious freedom and equal protection of the

law subject to restrictions and limitations necessitated by

legitimate penological interests." Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d at

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737. Prison officials "must afford a prisoner of a minority

religion 'a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable

to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to

conventional religious precepts.'" Id. (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405

U.S. 319, 322 (1972)); see Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891. Prisons need

not provide identical treatment to different faiths, but they must

make a "'good faith accommodation of the [prisoners'] rights in

light of practical considerations.'" Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Courts apply strict scrutiny "when distinctions are made on the

basis of a suspect class, like religion." Ass'n of Christian Schs.

Int'l v. Stearns, 362 F. App'x 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2010). If the

policy is "facially neutral," disproportionate impact on a

protected class can "satisfy the intent requirement only if it

tends to show that some invidious or discriminatory purpose

underlies the policy." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

686 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 264-66).

In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Small argues that Davis

does not plead that the discrimination is based on his membership

in a protected class because he does not allege that other inmates

had access to religious items that he did not. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 13, ECF No. 30.) "The memorandum does not

refer to the Muslim religion, nor does it exclude any other

religions from its application." (Id. at 13-14.) In fact, Small

contends, the addendum requires all religious orders to be counted

as quarterly packages and has universal application. (Id. at 13-

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14.) The addendum furthers the legitimate government interest in

controlling prisoner property to limit contraband. (Id. at 14.)

Davis counters by stating that chaplain approval is not

required if he uses Union Supply for religious specialty orders,

but it is required for nonapproved vendors. (Opp'n 8, ECF No. 31.) 

Plaintiff argues that ninety-five percent of prisoners at

Calipatria are not Muslim, and the addendum only mentions Muslim

religious items. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff asserts he is being

singled out because of his religion, and although section

3190(i)(4) of the California Code of Regulations allows inmates to

have special order purchases from locally approved vendors, Davis

contends that this package is different from the personal property

package based upon the inmate's privilege group status, referred to

in section 3190(e). (Id. at 7, 9 (citing Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3190 (2012)).)

Defendant Small argues in his Reply that Davis appears to

complain that he could not order from the vendor of his choice once

the October 25, 2010 addendum was issued. (See Reply 6, ECF No.

33.) Small asserts that choosing between vendors does not amount

to discrimination. (Id.) Also, the restriction serves a

legitimate penological interest because approving vendors in

advance reduces administrative costs, speeds up mail delivery to

inmates, and reduces the possibility of contraband. (Id.)

a. The September 16, 2009 addendum

To state an equal protection claim, Davis must allege that the

Defendants acted with the intent to discriminate against him based

on his membership in a protected class. Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. 

Because he asserts discrimination based on religion, which is a

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protected class, the strict scrutiny standard is applied. Ass'n of

Christian Schs. Int'l, 362 F. App'x at 646. If the policy is

facially neutral, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that

Small acted with a discriminatory purpose when enacting the policy,

resulting in a disproportionate impact. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 686.

The September 2009 policy provides, in relevant part:

The following course of action will be implemented

in Receiving and Release in regards to religious

packages:

. . . . 

2. Special orders for the following items: prayer oil,

[a] prayer rug, spiritual items, beads, etc., will

be considered a quarterly package. The arrival date

of the special order shall be the basis for the

eligibility determination.

(Second Am. Compl. Attach. #2 Ex. U, at 39, ECF No. 29.) Warden

Small signed the addendum. (Id.)

Although Davis's claim is that the policy targets only Muslim

religious purchases, the addendum does not list any religion and is

facially neutral. Lee, 250 F.3d at 686. Plaintiff has asserted a

discriminatory impact on the protected class of Muslim

practitioners because he and other Muslim inmates must count their

orders as quarterly packages and choose between religious articles

and other items. (Second Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 29.)

"'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as

volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that

the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course

of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'

its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Navarro v. Bock,

72 F.3d at 716 n.5 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442

U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Some of the "other evidence" that can

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establish discriminatory intent includes the "historical background

of the decision . . . particularly if it demonstrates there has

been a series of official actions taken for invidious

purposes . . . ." Id. at 716 (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The mere fact that a facially neutral

policy has a "foreseeably disproportionate impact" on a protected

group, without more, does not rise to the level of an equal

protection violation. Lee, 250 F.3d at 687.

Taken as a whole, Davis has alleged that the policy was

implemented by Warden Small, at least in part, "because of" its

adverse effects on Plaintiff and other Muslim inmates, as the

articles listed are items ordered by only Muslim prisoners. See

Navarro, 72 F.3d at 716. Davis submits that only five percent of

Calipatria inmates are Muslim, so limiting the policy to Muslimspecific items demonstrates inherent animus toward him and other

Muslims. (See Second Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 29; Opp'n 8-9, ECF

No. 31.); see also Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737-38 ("Such conduct . . .

was not directed at inmates of other faiths. We find this

sufficient to raise a genuine issue as to whether Muslim inmates'

access to Islamic services is reasonable in comparison to the

access of other inmates to their religious services.").

The strict scrutiny standard applies to Davis's claim "because

religion is a suspect class." See Ass'n of Christian Schs. Int'l,

362 F. App'x at 646 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to

University of California course approval policy that was not based

on a suspect classification); see, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543

U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (stating that racial classifications must be

narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests). 

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Plaintiff's claim is that the discriminatory addendum was issued

for the sole purpose of discriminating against Davis and other

Muslims. (See Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 29.) Without

substantiation, Defendants assert that the policy was implemented

for the administrative convenience of saving costs, streamlining

searches, and controlling inmate property. (See Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 30.) But see Frontiero v.

Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) ("'[A]dministrative

convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which

dictates constitutionality."); see also Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507-08

(finding the policy to house inmates of the same race together to

avoid racially motivated violence was not narrowly tailored to a

compelling interest in prison safety, even though race riots had

occurred). Moreover, the asserted goals are undermined by the

fact that the September 16, 2009 policy is alleged to restrict only

Muslim purchases to quarterly packages, but it does not impose

similar restrictions on articles purchased by worshipers ofother

religions.

At this pleading stage, Davis has alleged facts sufficient to

establish that the policy adopted by Small was enacted with

discriminatory intent and fails the strict scrutiny standard. 

Warden Small's Motion to Dismiss the equal protection claim

premised on the September 16, 2009 addendum should be DENIED. 

Although Defendants Powell, Borem, and Ours did not join in Small's

Motion, Davis does not present any facts indicating that they were

involved in the imposition of this policy. Without more, an

amendment to include an equal protection claim against Defendants

Powell, Borem, and Ours regarding the September 16, 2009 addendum

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would be futile, and the claim against them should not be treated

as properly asserted.

b. October 25, 2010 addendum

Davis also challenges the policy stating that orders from

approved vendors would not count as a quarterly package, but orders

from nonapproved vendors would. (See Second Am. Compl. 10, ECF No.

29.) Still, its provisions are facially neutral, and Davis does

not contend otherwise. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 686. Plaintiff

appears to claim is that the facially neutral policy had a

discriminatory impact, yet there are no allegations showing that

this addendum restricted Davis and other Muslim inmates more than

it restricted prisoners of other faiths.

Plaintiff has not pleaded that Defendants acted with

discriminatory intent. Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. Unlike the

September 2009 policy essentially requiring Davis and other Muslim

inmates to choose between religious items and other purchases, the

October 2010 addendum does not preclude the purchase of Muslim

items, as long as inmates order from vendors approved by the

prison. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 686. Davis can also order religious

items from his preferred, nonapproved vendor with chaplain

approval, and the order will count as a quarterly package. (See

Opp'n 8, ECF No. 31.)

Thus, an amendment to include an equal protection claim

against all four Defendants would be futile. Johnson, 356 F.3d at

1007. The district court should treat the equal cause of action in

count two based on the October 25, 2010 policy as improperly

alleged.

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C. Conclusory Allegations Against Defendants Powell, Borem, and

Ours in Count Two

In count two, Davis asserts claims for conspiracy,

retaliation, and discrimination against these three Defendants. 

(Second Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 29.) He concludes by arguing that

they also violated the First Amendment and RLUIPA. (Id. at 10.) 

Defendants Powell, Borem, and Ours maintain that these claims fail

because there are no specific allegations against them, and the

charges are conclusory and formulaic. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 14, ECF No. 30.)

To be liable under § 1983, a person acting under color of 

state law must cause the plaintiff to suffer the violation of a

constitutional right. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. "A person 'subjects'

another to the deprivation of a constitutional right . . . if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do

that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson

v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Sims v. Adams,

537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976)). Thus, the plaintiff must allege

that each defendant committed some act, or failed to act in a

particular way, that was the cause of the constitutional injury. 

Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1385 (11th Cir. 1982). A

plaintiff must link each defendant to the alleged § 1983 violation,

and the factual allegations must be sufficient to give the

defendants fair notice of the claim against them. Whiting v. Cnty.

of Riverside, No. 11-1603-CAS(CW), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30613, at

*17 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cnty., 88

F.3d 804, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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Plaintiff does not make any specific allegations against

Powell, Borem, or Ours in count two, other than a general assertion

that they "conspired to force Plaintiff to purchase prayer oils

from the[ir] vendor," and they retaliated and discriminated against

him. (Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 29.) As discussed above, Davis

fails to state a conspiracy claim against these three Defendants,

and their Motion to Dismiss should be granted. The retaliation and

equal protection claims against Powell, Borem, and Ours were

improperly included. Plaintiff does not attribute any other

unconstitutional behavior to these Defendants . (See id. at 9-10.) 

Therefore, Defendants Borem, Ours, and Powell's Motion to Dismiss

the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims against them in count two of

the Second Amended Complaint should be GRANTED. Because Davis

could not plead any additional facts to cure the deficiencies in

his pleadings and has already been given leave to amend, he should

not be given further leave to amend his claims against Defendants

Powell, Borem, and Ours in count two. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

D. First Amendment

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, made

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, "forbids

all laws 'prohibiting the free exercise' of religion." McDaniel v.

Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 620 (1978) (citing U.S. Const. amend. I). The

clause protects a person's right to hold a particular religious

belief and the right to engage in conduct motivated by that belief. 

Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). "[T]he 'exercise of

religion' often involves not only belief and profession [of belief]

but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts

. . . ."). Id.

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"The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does

not terminate at the prison door." McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197

(citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Bell

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). To be entitled to

protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,

the claim must involve a sincerely held religious belief. Malik v.

Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). In

order to establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show

that the defendants burdened the practice of his sincerely-held

religious beliefs. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d at 884-85.

A prisoner's First Amendment right to freely exercise his

religious beliefs, however, is "necessarily limited by the fact of

incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate

correctional goals or to maintain prison security." McElyea, 833

F.2d at 197 (citing O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 342). The competing

interests are balanced by determining whether the restriction is

"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." O'Lone,

482 U.S. at 353; see also Anderson v. Angelone, 123 F.3d 1197,

1198 (9th Cir. 1997). The regulation cannot be an "exaggerated

response to prison concerns." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 80

(1987).

In Turner, the Court announced the standard for determining

the reasonableness of a prison regulation that infringes on

prisoners' constitutional rights. More recently, the Court

clarified the Turner standard:

[F]our factors are relevant in deciding whether a prison

regulation affecting a constitutional right . . .

withstands constitutional challenge: [1] whether the

regulation has a "'valid, rational connection'" to a

legitimate governmental interest; [2] whether

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alternative means are open to inmates to exercise the

asserted right; [3] what impact an accommodation of the

right would have on guards and inmates and prison

resources; and [4] whether there are "ready

alternatives" to the regulation.

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (citing Turner, 482

U.S. at 89-91). "The burden, moreover, is not on the State to

prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to

disprove it." Id.

Legitimate penological interests include "security, order,

and rehabilitation." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413

(1974); see also Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S.

__, __, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1527 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting)

(noting that strip searches are reasonably related to finding

injuries, preventing spread of disease, minimizing gang violence,

and detecting contraband, which are legitimate penological

interests); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546-47 (finding that the

protection of inmates and staff is a legitimate penological

interest). "Maintaining safety and order at these institutions

requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have

substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions for the

problems they face." Florence, 566 U.S. at __, 132 S. Ct. at

1515; see also Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (holding

that courts generally defer to prison official's judgment because

problems in prisons are complex and courts are not equipped to

manage prisons). Although Turner dealt with the reasonableness of

prison regulations, the same analysis has been applied to

individual acts preventing a prisoner from engaging in a religious

practice. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 594-95 (2d Cir.

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2003). The Turner standard applies to Davis's Second Amended

Complaint.

1. Count one: temporary total ban on Islamic prayer oil

In their Motion to Dismiss, Small, Powell, Borem, and Ours

contend that prayer oil was temporarily banned while officials

investigated whether it was flammable and attempted to control

prisoner inventory. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF

No. 30.) Plaintiff counters that although Defendants based their

decision on the material safety data sheets ("MSDS"), the MSDS

provided by Halalco Books would have shown that the prayer oil was

not flammable. (Opp'n 2, ECF No. 31.) In their Reply, Defendants

assert that Davis includes a memorandum written by Defendant Ours

more than six years before the confiscation of Davis's prayer oil. 

(Reply 3, ECF No. 33 (citing Second Am. Compl Attach. #2 Ex. I,

ECF No. 29).) Also, the material safety data sheet from Halalco

that Plaintiff attaches is undated. (Id. (citing Second Am.

Compl. Attach. #2 Ex. J, ECF No. 29).) Defendants further argue

that Plaintiff did not plead that Ours reviewed or relied on the

Halalco document when making the decision to ban the prayer oil

from Calipatria. (Id.)

In the Second Amended Complaint, Davis maintains that the

Defendants violated his First Amendment rights when they banned

prayer oil from Calipatria without any penological justification. 

(See Second Am. Compl. 3-8, ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff asserts that

in the Islamic religion, the use of prayer oil is obligatory. 

(Id. at 3 (citing id. Attach. #1 Ex. A).) On August 11, 2009,

Defendant Powell authorized Davis to purchase eight ounces of

prayer oil per quarter; Plaintiff began purchasing prayer oil from

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Halalco Books, a Calipatria-approved vendor. (Id. at 4.) On

October 9, 2009, Halalco sent Davis's prayer oil order to him at

Calipatria, but he never received it. (Id.) Plaintiff argues

that Defendant Ours's decision to ban prayer oil was not supported

by evidence, and Ours never provided an explanation for

implementing the ban. (Id. at 4-5.)

Then on February 3, 2010, Defendant Borem sent Plaintiff a

letter stating that his prayer oil had been returned to Halalco

and that Defendants Ours, Small, and Powell had concluded that

prayer oil would no longer be allowed at Calipatria because it

posed a fire, health, and safety threat. (Id. at 5.) Borem did

not indicate which data sheet was used to determine flammability. 

(Id.) According to Plaintiff, there was a "total ban" of prayer

oil from August 11, 2009, to October 16, 2010. (Id.) Defendant

Ours, on November 14, 2003, had sent a memorandum to department

heads containing an explanation of how to determine whether a

material is flammable. (Id. at 6.) Davis asserts that based on

this explanation, Defendants Ours, Small, and Powell knew the

Halalco prayer oil was within the hazardous materials guidelines

for Calipatria. (Id.)

Also, Associate Warden Anderson's July 12, 2010 letter stated

that the new Calipatria warden and staff found there was no

compelling reason to ban prayer oil. (Id. at 6-7.) Davis was not

given an alternative prayer oil vendor until August 1, 2010, when

Defendants provided the Union Supply catalog. (Id. at 7.) 

Defendant Borem allegedly knew that Davis's October 9, 2009 order

from Halalco Books contained religious items, but Borem still

returned the prayer oil to Halalco on February 3, 2010. (Id. at

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7-8.) Plaintiff argues that he again received authorization to

order prayer oil, but Borem failed to deliver Davis's July 17 and

18, 2010 prayer oil orders until October 16, 2010. (Id.) Borem

continued to return prayer oil to Halalco on the ground that it

was not an approved vendor, even though it had been approved as

early as July 12, 2010. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff complains,

the Defendants violated his First Amendment rights. (Id.)

a. Rationally related to a legitimate interest

Defendants contend that the first Turner factor weighs in

their favor because there is a rational connection between the

temporary ban and the penological interest of preventing inmate

possession of flammable material. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 5-6, ECF No. 30.) Defendants claim the exhibits attached

to the Second Amended Complaint show the prayer oil was, in fact,

flammable. (Id. at 6 (citing Second Am. Compl. Attach. #2 Ex. H,

ECF No. 29).) Even if the oil was not flammable, prison officials

were entitled to determine whether it was because they have an

interest in regulating prisoner purchases and property. (Id.)

Controlling prisoner property reduces administrative costs and

streamlines the process of searching cells as well as monitoring

inmate property. (Id.)

Davis argues that Defendants' actions were speculative and

based on an exaggerated claim that the oil was flammable;

Defendants therefore had no legitimate penological justification

to ban the oil while they determined whether it was flammable. 

(Opp'n 2-3, ECF No. 31.) Davis insists that the MSDS and shipping

MSDS information from Halalco Books showed the prayer oil was not

flammable. (See id. at 6 (citing Second Am. Compl. Exs. I, J).) 

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Plaintiff points out that Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1162

(C.D. Cal. 2008), one case cited by Defendants, only deals with

limiting the quantity of prayer oil, not a total ban. Davis

identifies one court that found a total ban of prayer oil

unconstitutional. (Opp'n 2-3 (citing Munir v. Scott, 792 F. Supp.

1472, 1482-83 (E.D. Mich. 1992), rev'd, Munir v. Scott, 12 F.3d

213 (6th Cir. 1993)).) Plaintiff also distinguishes another case

cited by Defendants, Davis v. Flores, No. 1:08-cv-1177, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 4417 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2011), aff'd in part and

vacated in part, No. 11-15296, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10673 (9th

Cir. May 25, 2012). (Opp'n at 6, ECF No. 31.) In Davis v.

Flores, the prisoners retained access to prayer oil in the chapel,

and the total ban only applied to the Muslim imam bringing prayer

oil into the prison. (Id.)

The first Turner factor looks to whether the prison

regulation is rationally related to a legitimate penological

interest. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006)

(justifications for prison policy set forth in summary judgment

motion). The Defendants assert the following three legitimate

governmental interests for banning prayer oil: (1) preventing

fire hazards in cells, (2) regulating prisoner purchases and

property to prevent theft, bartering, gambling, or hiding

contraband, and (3) reducing administrative costs, streamlining

cell searches, and monitoring inmate property. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 30.) All three reasons can be

legitimate penological interests. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873,

879 (9th Cir. 1993) (following a bench trial, appellate court

upheld restriction of prayer candles in cells because of fire

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hazard); Davis v. Flores, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4417, at *31-33,

40 (granting summary judgment and upholding temporary ban on

inmates' possession of prayer oil in cells due to imam smuggling

contraband into the prison using prayer oil bottles); Lewis v.

Ollision, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (considering attachment to

complaint and stating that regulating prayer oil purchases is

related to a legitimate interest in preventing certain conduct,

such as theft, bartering, gambling, hiding contraband); Verhagen,

220 F. Supp. 2d at 953 (granting summary judgment and finding that

reducing costs, streamlining searches, and monitoring inmate

property are legitimate interests).

The prison regulation must be rationally related to the

legitimate interest. Beard, 548 U.S. at 529. A ban on flammable

prayer oil because of fire concerns can be rationally related to

prison safety concerns. See Glass v. Scribner, No. 1:05-cv-0457-

LJO(DLB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20518, at *17-23 (E.D. Cal. Mar.

17, 2008) (granting summary judgment and finding that a temporary

ban on prayer oil after inmates left burning prayer oil unattended

in cells was rationally related to the legitimate interest in

prison safety). But a ban on nonflammable prayer oil does not

further prison safety and is an exaggerated response to

speculative concerns. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

Davis has alleged facts sufficient to establish that the

prayer oil was not flammable, and the ban was not based on

legitimate flammability concerns. (Second Am. Compl. 5-6, ECF No.

29.) He contends that the total ban had no rational connection to

prison safety because the oil is nonflammable. See O'Lone, 482

U.S. at 350-51 (1987) (discussing rational connection between

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prison security and prison policy). But cf. Hammons v. Saffle,

348 F.3d 1250, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary

judgment that found logical connection between prison regulation

that banned inmates' in-cell prayer oil possession and preventing

illegal drug use because inmates could still purchase and possess

prayer oil in designated, supervised areas).

b. Alternative means

Defendants assert that the second Turner factor also weighs

in their favor because Davis had alternative methods of practicing

his religion. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No.

30.) He was authorized to receive the Holy Qur'an, Miswak (tooth

sticks), a religious medallion, a prayer rug, prayer caps, a Kudra

shirt, prayer beads, and a Hadith. (Id.) Davis could pray in his

cell and use these items. (Id.) The Plaintiff counters that he

did not have any alternative because prayer oil use is required by

his religion. (Opp'n 3-4, ECF No. 31.) Davis maintains that

"prison officials must give inmates a reasonable opportunity to

exercise their religious belief without fear of penalty." (Id. at

4.) In their Reply, Defendants posit that the second Turner

factor does not consider whether Davis had "alternative prayer

oils," but whether he had alternatives means of practicing his

religion. (Reply 4, ECF No. 33.)

The second Turner factor is whether the prisoner had

alternative means to exercise his religious right. Beard, 548

U.S. at 529. Davis pleads that he did not have a reasonable

alternative to practice his religion because the use of prayer oil

is a "central" part of his religious practice; he adds that he had

no other means of acquiring prayer oil. (Opp'n 4, ECF No. 31.) 

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But see Hammons, 348 F.3d at 1256 (finding the plaintiff's lack of

in-cell access to prayer oil did not "eradicate the value of his

prayers" because he had the alternative of accessing and using his

prayer oil through volunteer chaplains); O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352-

53 (discussing that while prisoners on work detail are unable to

attend Jumu'ah services, they can still participate in other

Muslim ceremonies and practices). Davis did not have access to

prayer oil anywhere within the prison, and due to the total ban,

he contends that he could not conduct a practice central to his

religious beliefs. "Alternatives . . . need not be ideal,

however; they need only be available. Here, the alternatives are

of sufficient utility that they give some support to the

regulations, particularly in a context where visitation is

limited, not completely withdrawn." Overton, 539 U.S. at 135

(determining that a policy limiting who may visit a prisoner

passes the Turner test because the inmate may still write or call

persons not allowed to visit); see O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352-53. 

Plaintiff has alleged he was not provided an alternative to a

central tenant of his religion for approximately fourteen months;

the second Turner factor weighs in Davis's favor.

c. Impact of accommodation

Defendants contend that accommodating Plaintiff's request for

prayer oil would "impact guards, other inmates, and the allocation

of prison resources generally." (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 7, ECF No. 30.) They also argue that even though the prayer

oil was ultimately found not to be flammable, prison officials had

an interest in verifying the flammability of the oil, reducing

administrative costs, and streamlining the search of prisoners

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cells and property. (Id. at 6-7.) Davis argues the Defendants

relied on the false assumption that the prayer oil was flammable. 

(Opp'n 5, ECF No. 31.)

Under the third factor in Turner, courts look to the impact

that an accommodation would have on the guards, other prisoners,

and prison resources. Beard, 548 U.S. at 529. Indeed, allowing

inmates to use and possess flammable prayer oil raises safety

concerns and would financially impact the prison because each

inmate's prayer oil use would have to be monitored. See Glass,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20518, at *22. But as discussed, Plaintiff

has sufficiently pleaded that the oil was not flammable and that

the Defendants did not have a legitimate basis for believing it

was. Defendants' claim that the ban saved administrative costs

and streamlined cell searches is insufficient. Calipatria

previously allowed prayer oil, and continuing to do so would not

impose a significant administrative burden. Additionally, guards

still conduct cell searches, and it is not apparent that

possessing prayer oil makes cell searches particularly burdensome. 

See Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 950-51 (finding that specifically

restricting what items an inmate may possess is not the least

restrictive means to controlling administrative costs); Cf. Curry

v. Dep't of Corr., C-09-3408 EMC(pr), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38464,

at *30-31 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012) (discussing the burden imposed

by allowing inmates to possess prayer oil in their cells while a

ban on oil was implemented). Thus, the third Turner factor also

weighs in Davis's favor.

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d. Ready alternatives

Defendants argue that Davis's claim fails under the fourth

Turner factor because they ultimately provided an alternative

prayer oil vendor, although there was no alternative in the

interim. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 30.) 

Plaintiff responds that Defendants waited fourteen months before

they provided him with an alternative prayer oil vendor on October

16, 2010. (Opp'n 5-6, ECF No. 31.) In their Reply, Defendants

maintain that neither the Plaintiff nor Defendants have identified

any reasonable alternative to the total ban. (Reply 4, ECF No.

33.)

Under this final factor, courts determine whether there are

ready alternatives to the regulation. Beard, 548 U.S. at 529. 

The Defendants could have restricted inmate access to prayer oil

to an area where use could be monitored, such as the prison's

chapel. See Davis v. Flores, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4417, at *28,

39-40 (finding that the policy banning in-cell prayer oil after

Muslim imam used prayer oil bottles to smuggle contraband into the

prison passed the Turner test because inmates could still use oil

in the prison chapel). If the Defendants allowed inmates to use

the prayer oil during chapel time, the imam could oversee the

prisoners' use and could implement procedures to minimize or

eliminate the risk of fire. See Pogue v. Woodford, CIV S-05-1873

MCE(GGH), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75943, at *46 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25,

2009) (deciding that the ban on in-cell prayer oil use passed the

Turner test because inmates could keep their oil in the chapel

unless they complied with the fire marshall's requirements for incell use). This factor also favors Davis.

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Based on the above, Davis has sufficiently alleged a First

Amendment violation with respect to the temporary, total ban on

prayer oil. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Davis's First Amendment

claim in count one should be DENIED.

2. Count two: restricting religious items to quarterly

packages

In count two, Davis claims his First Amendment rights were

violated on September 16, 2009, when Defendant Small approved a

policy addendum indicating that certain religious items would be

counted as quarterly packages. (Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 29.) 

The items listed in the policy, however, are items used only by

Muslim inmates. (See id.) Plaintiff contends that the policy was

amended again on October 25, 2010, stating that orders from Union

Supply, an approved vendor, would not be counted as quarterly

packages, but orders from unapproved vendors would. (Id. at 10.) 

As a result, Defendant Small violated Davis's First Amendment

rights. (Id.)

Defendant Small argues that Plaintiff failed to plead that

Small prevented him from practicing his religion, which Davis must

allege before the Turner factors are applied. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF No. 30.) The September 16, 2009

policy addendum did not prevent Davis from ordering prayer oil;

rather, it merely required him to order the oil as a quarterly

package if he chose to order from an unapproved vendor. (Id.) 

Plaintiff only complains that he is unable to order from his

vendor of choice, but approving vendors in advance furthers

legitimate penological interests, increasing the speed of delivery

and reducing the possibility of contraband. (Reply 6, ECF No.

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33.) Moreover, encouraging an inmate to order from an approved

Muslim vendor instead of another does not impose a substantial

burden on his ability to practice Islam. (Id. at 6-7.)

Defendant Small also contends that even if the Turner factors

were applied, the alleged facts demonstrate a rational connection

between the policy and the legitimate interest in limiting inmate

property to reduce contraband. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 8, ECF No. 30.) Further, allowing more inmate packages creates

additional work for the guards and requires a greater allocation

of prison resources. (Id.) Finally, Small contends there is no

need for ready alternatives to ordering prayer oil because

plaintiff can still order it as part of a quarterly package. 

(Id.)

In his Opposition, Davis argues that the policies did not

limit the amount of oil he could order or the frequency; also,

Defendants never punished him for theft, gambling, or bartering. 

(Opp'n 7, ECF No. 31.)

Davis must initially allege a sincere belief that his ability

to practice his religion was burdened by the Defendant's

regulation of his purchase of prayer oil. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at

884-85. Davis was able to practice his religion because he was

not denied all access to prayer oil and could still order oil in

quarterly packages. See Sareini v. Burnett, 08-13961-BC, 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34525, at *11-13 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2011)

(approving policy that restricted certain religious items because

the policy merely made it more difficult to practice plaintiff's

religion but did not impose a substantial burden). Plaintiff has

alleged the policy makes it more difficult to decide when, and

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from whom, to order prayer oil; yet, increased difficulty may be

insufficient to show a substantial burden. See id. Davis does

not present facts showing that the policy implemented by Small

prevented him from engaging in a practice fundamental to his

faith.

Warden Small's Motion to Dismiss Davis's First Amendment

claim for restricting religious items to quarterly packages,

alleged in count two, should be GRANTED. See Sareini, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 34525, at *12. Because additional facts could not

cure the deficiencies described, Davis should not be given further

leave to amend. See James, 221 F.3d at 1077.

E. RLUIPA

RLUIPA provides a statutory basis for "protect[ing] prisoners

and other institutionalized people from government infringement on

their practice of religion." Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d

1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). The Act states: 

No government shall impose a substantial

burden on the religious exercise of a person

residing in or confined to an institution, as

defined in section 1997 of this title, even if

the burden results from a rule of general

applicability, unless the government

demonstrates that imposition of the burden on

that person --

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling

governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of

furthering that compelling governmental

interest.

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a) (West 2003).

A plaintiff asserting a RLUIPA violation has the initial

burden of alleging a prima facie claim that the challenged state

action constitutes a "substantial burden on the exercise of his

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religious beliefs." Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994

(9th Cir. 2005). If the plaintiff meets this burden, the state

must prove that "any substantial burden . . . is both 'in

furtherance of a compelling governmental interest' and the 'least

restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc1(a); § 2000cc-2(b)); see Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888-89.

Although RLUIPA does not articulate what constitutes a

"substantial burden" on religious exercise, the Ninth Circuit has

defined the term according to its plain language. San Jose

Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th

Cir. 2004). Specifically, state action imposes a "substantial

burden" on religion when the regulation or policy "'denies [an

important benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious

belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to

modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.'" Warsoldier, 418

F.3d at 995 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd.

of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)). 

Recently, the Ninth Circuit stated "that a 'substantial burden is

imposed . . . when individuals are . . . coerced to act contrary

to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal

sanctions." Perkel v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 365 F. App'x 755,

756 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)). The statute defines "religious

exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); see Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888.

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RLUIPA is construed broadly and in favor of the prisoner's

right to exercise his religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc3(g); Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995. Nonetheless, "[a] prison's

'accommodation of religious observances' should not be elevated

'over an institution's need to maintain order and safety.'" Rouse

v. Van Boening, No. C09-5655 RBL/KLS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

139734, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2010) (quoting Cutter v.

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005)). Prison security constitutes

a compelling state interest, and courts must give deference to

prison officials' expertise in this area. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725

n.13. Courts should not, however, automatically rubber stamp a

prison official's judgment. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 190

(4th Cir. 2006).

"[P]rison officials bear the burden of establishing that the

restriction challenged is the 'least restrictive alternative to

achieve' a compelling governmental interest." Alvarez v. Hill,

518 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Warsoldier, 418 F.3d

at 998). "If prison officials meet th[is] standard, the prison

regulation passes muster under RLUIPA, regardless of the burden it

imposes on religious exercise." Greene v. Solano Cnty. Jail, 513

F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2008). Officials cannot justify

restrictions by merely claiming the regulation is necessary to

maintain order and security. Id. at 989-90. The Ninth Circuit

has also held, "[A]n outright ban on a particular religious

exercise is a substantial burden on that exercise." Id. at 988.

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1. Count one: temporary ban on prayer oil

a. Substantial burden

To state a claim under RLUIPA, Plaintiff must sufficiently

allege the regulation substantially burdened his religious

practice. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994. The Defendants do not

appear to challenge the allegation that a temporary prayer oil ban

imposed a substantial burden on Davis's religious practice. (See

Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 10-11, ECF No. 30.) A prison

policy imposes a substantial burden when it "intentionally puts

significant pressure on inmates . . . to abandon their religious

beliefs." Id. at 996. For a burden to be substantial, the Ninth

Circuit has required it to be "oppressive" to a "significantly

great extent," so as to make the religious practice "effectively

impracticable." San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034-35. 

The religious practice must be important to the religion, and the

challenged restriction must impose a substantial burden on the

ability to practice the plaintiff's religion. See Riggins v.

Clarke, 403 F. App'x 292, 295 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, a complete

ban on prayer oil - a practice mandated by the Islamic religion -

placed a substantial burden on Davis's exercise of his religion. 

See Charles, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 948 (finding that a prison's total

ban on prayer oil might substantially burden religious exercise). 

The ban forced Davis to abandon a practice mandated by his

religion. See Greene, 513 F.3d at 988 (stating that a complete

ban on a religious practice is a substantial burden).

b. Compelling interest

After Davis has shown a substantial burden, the onus shifts

to the Defendants to show the temporary ban on prayer oil was in

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furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. See

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995.

Defendants argue that they temporarily halted shipments of

prayer oil to determine whether the oil was flammable and to

locate an alternative prayer oil vendor. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 10-11, ECF No. 30.) They assert that courts have

upheld temporary bans on prayer oil and restrictions on the amount

of prayer oil an inmate may possess. (Id.) The ban furthers a

compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means

of furthering the interest; once the prayer oil was found not to

be flammable, Defendants located an alternate vendor and lifted

the ban. (Id. at 11.) In his Opposition, Davis contends

Defendants knew the prayer oil was not flammable and notes that

they still have not provided an MSDS showing the oil was

flammable. (Opp'n 1, ECF No. 31.)

Prison safety and security are compelling governmental

interests. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13; Johnson v. California,

543 U.S. at 514; see also Ward, 1 F.3d at 879 (upholding a ban on

prayer candles in inmate cells due to fire concerns under Turner). 

A ban on potentially flammable materials furthers the compelling

state interest of maintaining safety and security within prisons

because cell fires threaten inmates and staff. See Klem, 497 F.3d

at 283-84. Nevertheless, the total ban on prayer oil must have

been in furtherance of the compelling interest of prison safety. 

See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994. It is unclear whether the

Defendants had any legitimate basis for believing the oil was

flammable, and even a temporary ban on nonflammable prayer oil

does not further the compelling interest in prison safety. See

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Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 284 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding

that a policy limiting the number of books inmates may possess in

their cells does not further the compelling interest of prison

safety because a decrease in books does not reduce the risk of incell fires). At a minimum, Davis sufficiently pleaded that

Defendants had no legitimate basis for believing that the oil was

flammable and banning the oil; therefore, the ban was not in

furtherance of a compelling interest.

c. Least restrictive means

Even if banning all oil furthered a compelling interest, the

policy must also have been the least restrictive means of

achieving the governmental interest. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at

999. Defendants must have "actually considered" alternatives and

rejected them before instituting the prayer oil ban. See id. 

Here, Defendants do not allege that they considered alternatives

or explain why alternatives were not feasible or an equally

efficient means of maintaining prison safety or any other

governmental interest. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

7-9, ECF No. 30; Reply 6-7, ECF No. 33.) Defendants make a

blanket assertion that the total ban was the least restrictive

means of achieving safety, but this alone is insufficient. 

Greene, 513 F.3d at 990.

Defendants could have restricted where inmates had access to

prayer oil or instituted requirements that must be met before

inmates may possess prayer oil in their cell. See Pogue, 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75943, at *46 (approving policy banning prayer

oil because inmates could still have oil in their cell if they

complied with fire marshall's requirements, and they could access

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prayer oil at chapel); Glass, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20518, at *20-

23 (finding that the in-cell prayer oil restriction was not

unconstitutional because inmates could still use the oil at

chapel). The Defendants have not stated that it would be

impracticable to allow inmates to use prayer oil during chapel and

under the supervision of the Muslim imam. See Davis v. Flores,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4417, at *46-47. Davis has alleged facts

indicating that Defendants made no attempt to consider less

extreme measures of furthering prison safety before instituting

the total ban on prayer oil. "There is no basis in this case for

a court . . . to declare the least restrictive means test

satisfied without any substantive explanation from prison

officials." See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 192 (footnote omitted). 

The Defendants Motion to Dismiss Davis's RLUIPA claim against them

in count one should be DENIED.

2. Count two: restricting religious items to quarterly

packages

Davis additionally asserts that Warden Small's addendum

requiring that certain religious orders and orders from

nonapproved vendors be counted as quarterly packages, but orders

from Union Supply would not be counted as quarterly packages,

violates RLUIPA. (Second Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 29.)

Davis must assert that the policy substantially burdened his

religious practices. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994. Plaintiff

has not pleaded facts establishing a substantial burden because he

still had access to prayer oil by ordering it as part of a

quarterly package. See Thomas v. Little, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

57568, at *15 n.5 (finding no substantial burden because inmates

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could still order prayer oil, even if restricted to one vendor). 

As discussed above, Davis has only alleged that the policies make

it more difficult for him to order prayer oil from his preferred

vendor; this is not the equivalent of a substantial burden. See

Sareini v. Burnett, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34525, at *12. An

inmate does not suffer a substantial burden just because the

prison fails to "fully provide all the benefits than an inmate

desires for religious accommodation . . . ." Hartman v. Cal.

Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:10-cv-00045-LJO-SMS, 2010 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 41522, at *45 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2010) (citing

Sefeldeen v. Alameida, 238 F. App'x 204, 206 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

For example, "[p]risoners do not have a constitutional right to

the religious advisor of their choice." Id. at *46 (citing BlairBey v. Nix, 963 F.2d 162, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1992). Similarly,

Davis does not have a constitutional right to a vendor of his

choice. A "satisfactory accommodation" is the touchstone. Id. at

*45.

For these reasons, Defendant Small's Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims against him in count two should be

GRANTED without leave to amend.

F. Qualified Imnmunity

All of the Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified

immunity from liability on the First and Fourteenth Amendment

claims because they did not violate clearly established

constitutional law, and they reasonably believed their conduct was

lawful. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15-16, ECF No. 30;

Reply 7, ECF No. 33.) They also assert that courts have approved

temporary bans on prayer oil when faced with security concerns and

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that prison officials are not required to provide prisoners with a

special order for religious items. (Id. at 16.) Defendant Ours

posits that Plaintiff has not cited any case law holding that

prison officials cannot institute a temporary ban on prayer oil to

determine flammability. (Reply 7, ECF No. 33.) Defendants Small,

Borem, and Powell contend that they relied on the hazardous

materials specialist's determination that prayer oil was

flammable, so their conduct was reasonable. (Id.) Finally, Small

asserts there is no federal law holding that inmates are entitled

to order religious supplies in a manner different from ordinary

supplies. (Id.) Thus, Small alleges, he is also entitled to

qualified immunity from liability on the First and Fourteenth

Amendment claims against him in count two. (Id.)

"Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from

money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2)

that the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the

challenged conduct." Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. __, , 131 S.

Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)); see also Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th

Cir. 2006). This immunity protects "all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

When considering a claim for qualified immunity, courts

engage in a two-part inquiry: Do the facts show that the

defendant violated a constitutional right, and was the right

clearly established at the time of the defendant's purported

misconduct? Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th

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Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232

(2009)). A right is clearly established if the contours of the

right are so clear that a reasonable official would understand his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Dunn v.

Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard

ensures that government officials are on notice of the illegality

of their conduct before they are subjected to suit. Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citation omitted). "This is not

to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity

unless the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful . . . ." Id.

The Supreme Court recently found that the sequence of this

two-step inquiry is no longer "an inflexible requirement." 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Thus, it is within the court's

discretion to decide which step to address first. Id.; see Delia,

621 F.3d at 1075; Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d

964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010)). If the Defendants' conduct does not

amount to a constitutional violation, or the violation was not

clearly established, or the Defendants' actions reflect a

reasonable mistake as to what the law requires, they are entitled

to qualified immunity. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d

463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007)); see James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646,

651 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 235).

1. First Amendment

As previously discussed, the First Amendment claims against

all the Defendants in count two should be dismissed. The

qualified immunity inquiry may end here. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236

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("In some cases, a discussion of why the relevant facts do not

violate clearly established law may make it apparent that in fact

the relevant facts do not make out a constitutional violation at

all."); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) ("If no

constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity."); Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d at 1199

(stating that courts can grant qualified immunity on the basis of

the clearly established prong alone) (citing Rowland, 606 F.3d at

651). Thus, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim

for civil damages against them in count two should be GRANTED

because they are entitled to qualified immunity.

As to Davis's First Amendment claims in count one, however,

dismissal is not appropriate. Therefore, the Court will consider

whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

a. Violation of a constitutional right

In count one, Davis argues that Defendants Powell, Borem,

Ours, and Small violated his First Amendment right to practice his

religion by enforcing a temporary ban on Islamic prayer oil. (See

Second Am. Compl. 3-8, ECF No. 29). As outlined above, Davis has

sufficiently pleaded that the Defendants' conduct violated his

First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion.

b. Whether the right was clearly established

"Whether a right is clearly establishes turns on the

'objective legal reasonableness of the action, addressed in light

of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it

was taken.'" Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232,

1241 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242-43). "This

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is 'a two-part inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the state

official's conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law could

a reasonable state official have believed his conduct was

lawful?'" Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Jeffers, 267

F.3d at 910); Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir.

1995).

First, the law governing the Defendants' conduct was clearly

established. "Whether the right is clearly established in a

particular case is judged as of the date of the incident alleged,

and is a pure question of law." Phillips v. Hust, 338 F. Supp. 2d

1148, 1162 (D. Or. 2003) (citing Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988

F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993)). "[T]he right alleged to have been

violated must not be so broadly defined as to 'convert the rule of

qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of

virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of

extremely abstract rights.'" Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1288

(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). "On

the other hand, . . . the right can not be so narrowly construed

so as to 'define away all potential claims.'" Id. (quoting Kelley

v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Here, Davis's right to practice his religion, including

manners of worship mandated by his faith, was clearly established. 

See McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197 (citing O'Lone, 482 U.S. 342; Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545). In 1997, the Ninth Circuit made clear

that prison officials can only restrict inmate's religious

practices required by their faith if their justification is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Id. The

Supreme Court articulated that the four-prong Turner analysis is

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used to balance inmate's rights and determine what is reasonably

related. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-53.

Second, a reasonable prison official in the Defendants'

positions would believe that his or her conduct was unlawful. See

Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 761-62 (9th Cir. 2012). "The

relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear

to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. If the law

did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be

clearly unlawful, qualified immunity is appropriate. Id.

Qualified immunity must be viewed in the context of Davis's

claims against each Defendant. See Nampa Classical Acad. v.

Goesling, 714 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1090 n.14 (D. Idaho 2010). 

"Reasonable extrapolations of prior law to circumstances where it

would have been apparent to reasonable officers will suffice to

determine reasonableness in particular circumstances." Barnes v.

Denney, No. CIV S-07-1380 GGH P, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25251, at

*61 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010) (citing Burke v. County of Alameda,

586 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009)). Dismissal, however, is

inappropriate unless the Court can determine that qualified

immunity applies, based on the complaint itself. Clinton v.

Green, No. CV 08-4180-DOC(OP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10374, at *20

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012) (citing Groten v. California, 251 F.3d

844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001)), adopted by Clinton v. Green, No. CV 08-

4180-DOC(OP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10353 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25,

2012).

At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff "does not need to

show with great specificity how each defendant contributed to the

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violation of his constitutional rights. Rather, he must state the

allegations generally so as to provide notice to the defendants

and alert the court as to what conduct violated clearly

established law." Real v. Walker, No. 2:09-cv-3273 GEB KJN P,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28045, at *52 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012)

(quoting Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d

1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007)), adopted by Real v. Walker, No. 2:09-

cv-3273 GEB KJN P, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45650 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30,

2012).

Here, Warden Small joined in the decision to ban prayer oil

from Calipatria because he concurred with Defendant Ours that

religious prayer oil was flammable. (See Second Am. Compl.

Attach. #2 Ex. H, ECF No. 29.) Defendant Ours, the associate

hazardous material specialist, Warden Small, and the prison fire

chief agreed that religious prayer oil posed a "fire, health and

safety hazard." (Id.) Community Partnership Manager Powell

notified "R & R Sergeant" Borem on February 1, 2010, that the

decision to ban oil was made. (Id.) The February 3, 2012 letter

notifying Davis of the policy banning all prayer oil was signed by

Defendant Borem. (Id.) All of the Defendants participated in the

decision to ban the oil, which was "based on the fire rating

information obtained from the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)." 

(Id.) Defendants also noted, "The institution [is] in the process

of approving a vendor to sell non-flammable religious oils via the

institutional canteen." (Id.)

A reasonable prison official in each Defendant's position

would have known that imposing a total ban of payer oil would

violate an inmate's right to exercise his religion unless the ban

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was rationally related to a legitimate interest. See Beard, 548

U.S. at 529 (discussing the Turner factors). A reasonable

official would also know that banning prayer oil entirely would

not be rationally related to prison safety unless the oil was

reasonably believed to pose a fire hazard or be flammable. See

Glass, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20518, at *17-18 (holding that a ban

on prayer oil was rationally related to prison safety after

inmates left burning prayer oil unattended). As discussed

previously, Davis has sufficiently pleaded that the defendants had

no legitimate basis for believing that the prayer oil was

flammable. Further, the Defendants would have received the 2003

memorandum explaining which flash points were acceptable. (See

Second Am. Compl. Attach. #2 Ex. I, ECF No. 29.)

Defendants argue that case law allowed temporary bans when

faced with security or safety concerns. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 16, ECF No. 30 (citing Davis v. Flores, 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 4417, at *40).) This argument, however, suffers from

two deficiencies. First, Davis was decided in 2011, after the

Defendants implemented the prayer oil ban in 2010. The relevant

inquiry is whether the law was clearly established at the time the

prayer oil ban was implemented, not one year later. See Ashcroft,

563 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2080. Second, Davis v. Flores did

not address a total prayer oil ban. Rather, the court upheld a

ban on prayer oil in inmate cells because the Muslim imam had been

smuggling contraband into the prison using prayer oil bottles. 

See Davis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4417, at *40. Also, the inmates

still had access to prayer oil in the chapel. Id. The Defendants

therefore have not identified case law allowing prison officials

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to implement a total ban on nonflammable prayer oil without

providing any alternatives.

At this stage in the pleadings, Defendants Small, Ours,

Powell, and Borem should not be granted qualified immunity, and

their Motion to Dismiss the First Amendment claims in count one on

this basis should be DENIED.

2. Equal Protection

The Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity with respect to the equal protection allegations. (Mot.

Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15-16, ECF No. 30; Reply 7, ECF

No. 33.) As discussed previously, Plaintiff fails to state a

equal protection claims against Powell, Borem, and Ours in count

two, and these claims should be dismissed. The qualified immunity

inquiry may therefore end here. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201; Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d at 1199. The

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based on their qualified immunity

from liability for civil damages should be GRANTED. Similarly,

the equal protection claim against Defendant Small in count two

concerning the October 2010 addendum fails to state a claim. 

Therefore, Small's Motion to Dismiss on this ground as to the

October addendum should also be GRANTED.

As to the equal protection claim against Warden Small in

count two for the September 2009 policy, however, Davis has

pleaded a violation. Therefore, the Court will analyze wether

Small may avail himself of qualified immunity from liability based

on the September policy.

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a. Violation of a constitutional right

Defendant Small purportedly discriminated against Davis and

other Muslim inmates when he implemented the discriminatory

September 16, 2009 policy addendum that only penalizes inmates who

order Muslim religious articles. (See Second Am. Compl. 9-10, ECF

No. 29.) Inmates retain their right to be free from invidious

discrimination based on their religion. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. at

321-22. The policy's limitation on Muslim special orders did not

apply to non-Muslim religious items; this disparate impact on a

protected class can show that Small acted with discriminatory

intent "if some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the

policy." See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d at 686. 

Additionally, the personal property package policy is not a

narrowly tailored measure that furthers a compelling governmental

interest sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. See

Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. at 505. Plaintiff has adequately

alleged that Defendant Small violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights.

b. Whether the right was clearly established

The law governing the Defendants Small's conduct -- Davis's

right to be free from invidious discrimination on the basis of his

religion -- was clearly established. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. at

321-22. Prison officials cannot discriminate on the basis of

religion and must provide inmates with a reasonable opportunity to

pursue their faith. Id. at 322.

A reasonable prison official in Warden Small's position would

know that the claimed conduct was unlawful. The policy addendum

allegedly lists only Muslim religious articles as items that must

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be counted as quarterly packages; only Muslim inmates would

therefore be unable to place special orders for both religious and

other personal items, while other inmates could order both. A

reasonable official would know that treating inmates of one faith

differently from inmates of another faith was unconstitutional. 

See Ass'n of Christian Schs. Int'l, 362 F. App'x at 646; see also

Bess v. Alameida, No. CIV S-03-2498 GEB DAD P, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 63871, at *73-74 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007) (denying

qualified immunity on equal protection grounds because it was

clearly established that inmates have a right not to be

intentionally treated differently because of their religion). The

allegation that the listed items are only used by Muslim inmates

suggests that Small acted with discriminatory intent when he

created a policy that purportedly had a disparate impact on Muslim

inmates. See Navarro, 72 F.3d at 716 n.5 (stating that

discriminatory intent can be shown if an official acts "because

of" the adverse effects upon an identifiable group).

Further, Davis maintains that the discriminatory policy does

not further a compelling interest. There is no evidentiary basis

for determining whether a legitimate penological interest is the

basis for the policy. Defendant Small would have known that

implementing a policy that affects only Muslim inmates would be

unconstitutional if it was issued solely for administrative

convenience. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 ("[A]ny statutory

scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the

purpose of achieving administrative convenience . . . involves the

'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the

[Constitution] . . . .'") (emphasis added) (citing Reed v. Reed,

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404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971)). Regardless, Defendant did not impose

similar restrictions on religious items purchased by practitioners

of other faiths. The total ban on prayer oil shortly after

implementing the personal property package policy also indicates

animus towards Muslim inmates at Calipatria. See Watison, 668

F.3d at 1114. Defendant Small is not entitled to qualified

immunity at this stage in the proceedings. See Groten, 251 F.3d

at 851. His Motion to Dismiss the equal protection claim

regarding the September 2009 addendum on qualified immunity

grounds should be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

Davis's references to violations of the California Code of

Regulations are not separate causes of action. Defendants' Motion

to Dismiss this portion of count two should be GRANTED without

leave to amend.

The Plaintiff improperly includes several new causes of

action in count two of his Second Amended Complaint. First, an

amendment to include a retaliation claim in count two against

Defendant Small for the addendum he approved on September 16,

2009, would not clearly be futile. The district court should

treat this retaliation claim as properly asserted. Small's Motion

to Dismiss this claim should be DENIED. A retaliation claim

against Small for the October 25, 2010 policy, however, would be

futile; this claim should not be considered. Small's Motion to

Dismiss this claim should be GRANTED without leave to amend. 

Retaliation claims against Defendants Powell, Borem, and Ours for

the September 2009 and October 2010 policies would also be futile. 

Their Motion to Dismiss both retaliation claims against them

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should be GRANTED without leave to amend. Second, Defendants

Powell, Borem, and Ours's Motion to Dismiss the conspiracy causes

of action against them in count two should be GRANTED without

leave to amend; an amendment to include a conspiracy claim against

Defendant Small would be futile, and the conspiracy claim against

him should be DISMISSED without leave to amend. Third, Small's

Motion to Dismiss the equal protection claim in count two

regarding the September 16, 2009 policy addendum should be DENIED. 

An amendment to include an equal protection claim against Powell,

Borem, and Ours for this policy would be futile and should be

DISMISSED without leave to amend. Likewise, an amendment to

include an equal protection cause of action against all Defendants

based on the October 25, 2010 policy would be futile and should be

DISMISSED without leave to amend.

The Motion to Dismiss the First Amendment and RLUIPA causes

of action against all Defendants in count one should be DENIED; in

count two, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the First Amendment

and RLUIPA claims should be GRANTED without leave to amend.

All of the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for

the First Amendment claims against them in count two, and their

Motion to Dismiss Davis's claim for civil damages on this basis

should be GRANTED. The Defendants are not, however, entitled to

qualified immunity as to the First Amendment allegations in count

one, and their Motion to Dismiss on this basis should be DENIED.

Defendants Ours, Powell, and Borem's Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's claim for civil damages for the equal protection

violation alleged in count two on qualified immunity grounds

should be GRANTED. Defendant Small is not immune from damages

70 10cv01891 CAB(RBB)

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attributable to the equal protection claim against him in count

two for the September 2009 policy. His Motion to Dismiss on this

ground should be DENIED. Small is, however, entitled to qualified

immunity for the equal protection claim against him in count two,

focusing on the October 2010 addendum, and his Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's claim for civil damages for this claim should be

GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to United

States District Court Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties or

before August 24, 2012. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 7,

2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157

(9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: July 25, 2012 ___________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Bencivengo

 All Parties of Record

K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\_1983\PRISONER\DAVIS1891\R&R re MTD SAC.wpd 71 10cv01891 CAB(RBB)

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