Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05045/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05045-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARGARET L. GAUTHIER,

Plaintiff,

v.

RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SERVICES, 

et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-14-5045 EMC

ORDER DENYING (1) PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND AND (2)

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR IN

CAMERA HEARING; AND ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE

(Docket Nos. 19, 28, 37)

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Margaret L. Gauthier’s motion to remand. 

Having considered the briefs filed, the Court hereby deems the matter suitable for disposition on the

papers. The motion to remand is DENIED. 

In addition, Ms. Gauthier’s motions for an in camera hearing are DENIED.

Finally, as addressed below, the Court orders Ms. Gauthier to show cause as to why her

claims against Defendants Seterus, Inc.; Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”);

Sunset Mortgage, Inc.; and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) should not be

dismissed with prejudice, based on her failure to file opposition briefs to their motions to dismiss.

I. DISCUSSION

Ms. Gauthier initiated this lawsuit in state court. On November 14, 2014, Seterus and Fannie

Mae removed the action to federal court. Subsequently, Seterus and Fannie Mae moved to dismiss,

as did Sunset Mortgage and MERS, while Ms. Gauthier filed a motion to remand.

In her motion, Ms. Gauthier argues that the action should be remanded to state court for the

Case 3:14-cv-05045-EMC Document 38 Filed 01/20/15 Page 1 of 5
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For the Northern District of California

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 Seterus and Fannie Mae have provided uncontested evidence that the complaint that Ms.

Gauthier filed in state court consisted of 444 pages, not 669. See Stoltzman Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 (state

court docket sheet).

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following reasons: (1) Seterus and Fannie Mae failed to file, with their notice of removal, a complete

copy of the complaint she filed in state court; (2) Seterus and Fannie Mae failed to establish

diversity jurisdiction in their notice of removal; (3) Seterus and Fannie Mae failed to obtain the

consent of all other Defendants prior to removal; and (4) Seterus and Fannie Mae’s removal was

untimely. None of these arguments has merit. 

A. Complete Copy of Complaint

In her first argument, Ms. Gauthier contends that Seterus and Fannie Mae filed in federal

court only 63 out of 669 pages of her state court complaint.1

 Seterus and Fannie Mae do not dispute

that they filed only 63 pages of the complaint as part of their notice of removal. However, they

argue that this does not require a remand because 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) simply provides that a

removing defendant must file, along with its notice of removal, “a copy of all process, pleadings,

and orders served upon such defendant or defendants” (emphasis added), and they were served with

only 63 pages of the complaint, not 669. See Stoltzman Decl. ¶ 2. The Court agrees with Seterus

and Fannie Mae that § 1446(a) merely requires a removing defendant to file in federal court what

has been served on it. See Agee v. Huggins, 888 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (“If

Defendant was not served with a document, then Section 1446 does not require Defendant to file it

as part of his removal petition.”). And here, Ms. Gauthier has not provided any evidence to contest

Seterus and Fannie Mae’s evidence that they were served with only 63 pages of the complaint.

Moreover, even if Seterus and Fannie Mae had been served with a 669-page complaint and

filed only 63 pages of it, that still would not necessitate a remand. The Ninth Circuit has expressly

held that a removing defendant’s failure to attach a copy of the plaintiff’s complaint to the notice of

removal is a “’de minimis procedural defect’” which is “’curable’ even ‘after expiration of the

thirty-day removal period.’” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.

2013).

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B. Diversity Jurisdiction

In her second argument, Ms. Gauthier asserts that the Court should remand because Seterus

and Fannie Mae failed to establish that there is diversity jurisdiction over the instant action. 

But, as reflected in the notice of removal, Seterus and Fannie Mae’s basis for removal is federal

question jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction. See Not. of Removal ¶ 4 (invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1331

and listing federal claims asserted by Ms. Gauthier). Accordingly, Seterus and Fannie Mae’s failure

to allege, e.g., citizenship or amount in controversy is irrelevant. See Lyons v. Alaska Teamsters

Emplr. Serv. Corp., 188 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A federal court has removal jurisdiction

if the plaintiff’s claims are either exclusively federal or there is a separate and independent federal

question.”).

C. Consent of Defendants

Ms. Gauthier argues next that Seterus and Fannie Mae’s removal “is defective or inadequate

for failure to get unanimous consent of each of the multiple defendants identified in the

Complaint[].” Mot. at 5. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the general rule that “all

defendants in a state action must join in the petition for removal” applies “only to defendants

properly joined and served in the action” – i.e., “‘a party not served need not be joined’ in a petition

for removal.” Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988); see also 28

U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (“When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all

defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the

action.”) (emphasis added).

At the time of removal, Seterus and Fannie Mae had notice (from the state court docket

sheet) that two other Defendants had already been or may already have been served: Residential

Mortgage Services (“RMS”) and Doonan, Graves & Longoria LLC (“DG&L”). See Stoltzman

Decl., Ex. 1 (state court docket sheet). Assuming that both RMS and DG&L had been properly

served, then Ms. Gauthier has a basis for arguing that, before actually removing the case, Seterus

and Fannie Mae should have obtained the consent of RMS and DG&L to removal. But even if there

were both proper service on RMS and DG&L and a failure by Seterus and Fannie Mae to obtain

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 While Ms. Gauthier challenges whether Seterus and Fannie Mae actually served her with a

copy of the notice of removal on November 14 (Ms. Gauthier maintains that she did not receive a

copy of the notice of removal until December 1, 2014), that is a different issue.

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consent pre-removal, a remand still would not be required here because the problem is capable of

being cured. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

“All defendants who have been “properly . . . served in the action”

must join a petition for removal. If this is not true when the notice of

removal is filed, the district court may allow the removing defendants

to cure the defect by obtaining joinder of all defendants prior to the

entry of judgment. 

Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2011).

In the instant action, there is evidence to support consent by both RMS and DG&L. See

Stoltzman Decl. ¶ 5 (stating that counsel for Suntrust Mortgage “had spoken to counsel for [RMS],

and had obtained consent from [RMS] to remove this action”); Docket No. 24 (DG&L’s opposition

to motion to remand). Accordingly, any problem has been cured prior to the entry of judgment and

remand is not necessary.

D. Timeliness of Removal

Finally, to the extent Ms. Gauthier argues that there should be a remand because Seterus and

Fannie Mae did not timely remove, the Court does not agree. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), “[t]he

notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the

defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for

relief upon which such action or proceeding is based . . . .” Here, Seterus and Fannie Mae claim that

the complaint – though filed on October 9, 2014 – was not actually served until October 17, 2014. 

See Not. of Removal ¶ 2. Because Ms. Gauthier has not disputed the October 17 service date, the

removal – on November 14, 2014 – was timely.2

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Ms. Gauthier’s motion to remand.

The Court also denies Ms. Gauthier’s motions for an in camera hearing. Ms. Gauthier has

asked for such a hearing “to review privileged and confidential information that relates to the case,

pending motions, etc.” but has failed to identify what privileged and confidential information is at

issue and why it has any bearing on either her motion to remand or the pending motions to dismiss

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filed by Seterus, Fannie Mae, Suntrust Mortgage, and MERS.

Finally, the Court hereby orders Ms. Gauthier to show cause as to why her claims

against Seterus, Fannie Mae, Suntrust Mortgage, and MERS should not be dismissed with

prejudice, based on her failure to file any opposition to their motions to dismiss. Ms.

Gauthier’s response to this order to show cause shall be filed by February 19, 2015. Ms.

Gauthier is forewarned that, if she fails to file a response to the order to show cause by

February 19, 2015, then the Court shall dismiss, with prejudice, her claims against Seterus,

Fannie Mae, Suntrust Mortgage, and MERS.

The Court temporarily VACATES the February 5, 2015 hearing on Seterus, Fannie Mae,

Suntrust Mortgage, and MERS’s motions to dismiss pending the resolution of the order to show

cause.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 19, 28 and 37. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 20, 2015

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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