Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08087/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

James Bright, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-08087-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff James Bright seeks judicial review of the 

Commissioner’s decision finding him not disabled. Doc. 13. For the reasons that follow, 

the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion. 

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income on December 2, 2009, alleging disability beginning October 1, 2008. Doc. 11 at 

130-143. A hearing was held on March 29, 2012,1

 and the Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application on April 26, 2012. Doc. 11 at 71-78. Requests for 

review were denied by the Social Security Administration and the Office of Disability 

Adjudication and Review, at which time the ALJ’s opinion became the Commissioner’s 

final decision. Doc. 13 at 3. 

 

1

 The hearing transcript is dated March 29, 2013. Doc. 11 at 36. It is the 

Commissioner’s assertion and this Court’s understanding that this was a scrivener’s error and that the hearing was held in 2012, prior to issuance of the Commissioner’s April 2012 decision. Doc. 19 at 7 n. 2. 

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II. Legal Standard. 

 Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). It is the ALJ and “not the 

reviewing court [that] must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can 

support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” 

Matney on Behalf of Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 

Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that if there is sufficient 

evidence to support the Commissioner's determination, the Court cannot substitute its 

own determination). 

 Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a sequential five-step 

evaluation. The claimant must show (1) he is not currently engaged in substantial gainful 

employment, (2) he has a severe physical or mental impairment, and (3) the impairment 

meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

precludes him from performing his past work. If at any step the Commissioner 

determines that a claimant is or is not disabled, the analysis ends; otherwise it proceeds to 

step five. If the claimant establishes his burden through step four, the Commissioner 

bears the burden at step five of showing that the claimant has the RFC to perform other 

work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 

.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

III. Analysis. 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment 

since October 1, 2008, and that he has severe impairments of obesity and low back pain 

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and non-severe mental impairments of paranoid schizophrenia and a history of alcohol 

abuse. Doc. 11 at 73. The ALJ found, however, that these impairments do not equal the 

severity of a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404 and that his residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) does not preclude him from performing his past work as a waiter. Id. at 

74-75. In so concluding, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision is incorrect on two grounds, both related 

to Plaintiff’s schizophrenia. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misinterpreted evidence 

to his detriment. Doc. 13 at 2. Specifically, he argues the ALJ’s decision to accord 

substantial weight to the opinions of Dr. Javine and the state medical consultant, Dr. 

Pereyra, was error. Id. at 4-6. Second, he argues that the ALJ rejected treating source 

opinion contrary to law and regulation. Id. at 2. Specifically, he asserts that the ALJ 

should not have discounted the opinion of nurse practitioner Williams. Scattered 

throughout both claims of error, Plaintiff argues that his Global Assessment of 

Functioning (“GAF”) scores and assessments do not support the ALJ’s findings. 

 A. Opinions of Drs. Javine and Pereyra. 

 In evaluating medical opinions, an ALJ is directed to give greater weight to 

treating sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). In this case, none of the physicians who 

offered medical opinions were treating physicians. Doc. 11 at 10. The ALJ nonetheless 

was tasked with weighing all medical opinions offered. In determining what weight to 

give to such opinions, the ALJ should give more weight to opinions from examining or 

treating doctors, and to medical opinions that are supportable, consistent with the record 

as a whole, or from a specialist in her area of specialty. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The 

ALJ may also consider other facts including the source’s understanding of the disability 

program and the extent to which she is familiar with other factors of the case. Id. 

 The ALJ gave “substantial weight” to the medical opinions of Dr. Javine, who 

examined the Plaintiff in 2010 and found that her paranoid schizophrenia would not 

“impose any limitations for 12 months.” Doc. 11 at 281.2

 Plaintiff asserts this was error, 

 

2

 Dr. Javine did not, as Plaintiff asserts, find that “there would be no impairment 

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in part because his GAF scores were relatively high during this period and an assessment 

during that time, therefore, was misrepresentative. Doc. 13 at 5. 

 Even if it is true that Dr. Javine’s examination occurred during a relatively stable 

time for Plaintiff, the Court cannot agree with Plaintiff that the ALJ “based his entire 

decision on the assessment of the one-time examiner.” Id. Rather, the ALJ accorded Dr. 

Javine’s findings substantial weight in part because “the overall record supports these 

findings.” Doc. 11 at 77. In addition to Dr. Javine’s findings, the ALJ considered the 

symptoms noted in Plaintiff’s medical records, including treatment notes from Mojave 

Mental Health where Plaintiff received treatment, the claimant’s testimony and 

assertions, statements from Plaintiff’s sister, his GAF scores over time, the opinion of 

Nurse Practitioner Williams, and the findings of a state agency medical consultant. Id. at 

76-77. Although the ALJ gave different weight to evidence from different sources, the 

Court cannot conclude that he based his entire decision on Dr. Javine’s 2010 evaluation. 

Nevertheless, given that Dr. Javine’s evaluation was the only evaluation offered by a 

physician who had physically examined Plaintiff, it was appropriate for the ALJ to accord 

Dr. Javine’s opinion substantial weight. 

 The ALJ also considered the opinion of the state agency medical consultant, Dr. 

Pereyra. The ALJ found this opinion to be “supported by the great weight of the 

evidence in the record,” and therefore gave it substantial weight. Doc. 11 at 77. This 

also was not error. Because the state agency medical consultant was not an examining or 

treating source, it was appropriate for the ALJ to accord the opinion substantial deference 

only if it aligned with the weight of the other evidence in the record. The ALJ found that 

it did. Dr. Pereyra’s opinion comported with that of Dr. Javine, as well as with his 

medical records that the ALJ found show that “absent alcohol abuse, the claimant is 

mentally stable and functions well on his medication regime.” Doc. 11 at 77. Dr. 

Pereyra’s opinion also aligned with the opinion of Dr. Zuess, another state agency 

 lasting for the requisite 12 consecutive month.” Doc. 13 at 8. Rather, he opined that the impairment would not impose any limitation lasting that long. 

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physician, who found that the Plaintiff’s functional limitations were mild or non-existent. 

Doc. 11 at 293. The ALJ afforded appropriate weight to Dr. Pereyra’s opinion. 

 B. Opinion of Nurse Practitioner Williams. 

 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in giving little weight to the opinion of Nurse 

Practitioner Sandra Williams because she was a treating source and her opinion should 

therefore have been given substantial weight under the regulations. Doc. 13 at 6. The 

court cannot agree. 

 Under the regulations, “[m]edical opinions are statements from physicians and 

psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature 

and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, 

what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (emphasis added). Social Security guidelines clarify that “only 

acceptable medical sources can provide medical opinions,” and “only acceptable medical 

sources can be considered treating sources.” SSR 06-03p, citing 20 C.F.R. § 1527(a(2) 

and 416.927(a)(2). Nurse Practitioners “are not acceptable medical sources.” SSR 06-

03p. The ALJ did not err in so finding. 

 Williams’ opinion is still opinion evidence, as it is “based on special knowledge of 

the individual and may provide insight into the severity of the impairment(s) and how it 

affects the individual’s ability to function.” SSR 06-03p. But it was reasonable for the 

ALJ to find that it was not entitled to the substantial weight that an acceptable medical 

source opinion would receive, and to accord it little weight. Doc. 11 at 77. This is 

particularly true given the other reservations the ALJ expressed about Williams’ opinion, 

including that it was not supported by the overall record (particularly the progress notes 

from Ms. Williams’ employer, Mojave Mental Health),3

 as well as the fact that it did not 

 

3

 Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Zuess’ evaluation corroborates Ms. Williams’ opinion. The Court does not agree. Dr. Zuess found that Plaintiff “has a good ability to remember and understand simple and detailed instructions as well as work place procedures” (Doc. 11 at 299), that he has a desire to work (id. at 295), and generally that his functional limitations were mild to non-existent (id. at 293). 

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address the impact of Plaintiff’s alcohol abuse and noncompliance with medications.4 Id. 

The ALJ gave appropriate weight to Ms. Williams’ opinion. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 13) is denied. The Clerk shall 

terminate this action. 

 Dated this 19th day of December, 2013. 

 

4

 Dr. Javine’s opinion, which the court accorded substantial weight, did take into account Plaintiff’s problems with alcohol. Doc. 11 at 275-79. 

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