Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_09-cv-01198/USCOURTS-alnd-2_09-cv-01198-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIFFANY ROWE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LIFESOUTH COMMUNITY BLOOD

CENTERS, INC.,

Defendant.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

CIVIL ACTION NO.

09-AR-1198-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs, Tiffany Rowe (“Rowe”) and Linda Williams

(“Williams”) (collectively the “named plaintiffs”), sued defendant

LifeSouth Community Blood Centers, Inc., (“LifeSouth”), alleging

various violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §

201, et seq. (“FLSA”). After filing several consents by opt-in

plaintiffs, the named plaintiffs filed a motion requesting a

conditional certification as a collective action and facilitation

of the notice as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the reasons

stated below, the named plaintiffs’ motion will be partially

granted, and an appropriate class notice will be approved.

FACTS

LifeSouth is a not-for-profit community blood center operating

in Florida, Georgia and Alabama, with corporate offices in

Gainesville, Florida. LifeSouth collects blood through donations at

its centers and through blood drives. It collects a majority of

its blood through the use of “Bloodmobiles”, which are buses that

FILED

 2010 Jan-11 PM 04:18

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 1 of 11
2

serve as blood collection units. Bloodmobiles leave from LifeSouth

centers and engage in blood collection in areas surrounding their

centers. Each Bloodmobile is staffed with employees from

LifeSouth’s Donor Services Department. Typically, each Bloodmobile

will have a Mobile Team Captain (“Team Captain”), a Donor Services

Team Lead (“Team Lead”), and one or more Donor Services Specialist

(“DSS”). Prior to 2008, the job title for Team Captains was Donor

Specialist Mobile Supervisor. On January 12, 2009, LifeSouth

changed the job of Team Captain from a non-exempt, hourly position

under the FLSA, to a salaried, FLSA exempt position.

Bloodmobiles are not equipped with a time clock. Therefore, an

employee working on a Bloodmobile cannot clock out for lunch. It is

LifeSouth’s policy, as a substitute for clocking in and out for

lunch, automatically to deduct fifteen (15) minutes of pay on each

day that an hourly Bloodmobile employee works more than six (6)

hours without clocking in and out more than once. Hourly employees

who do not work on Bloodmobiles are not deducted this fifteen (15)

minutes for lunch. By rule a Bloodmobile employee who is working so

as to be unable to take a full fifteen (15) minute lunch break is

obligated to notify the supervisor at the end of the day as to any

time worked during this fifteen minute lunch break.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs contend that each plaintiff, along with many

currently unidentified Bloodmobile employees, worked through lunch

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 2 of 11
3

“virtually every work day” in order to complete their work duties,

but were still subjected to the automatic fifteen (15) minute lunch

deduction. (Pl.’s Br. in Supp. at 2). Because of this, plaintiffs

allege that they frequently worked more than forty (40) hours in a

week, but were not paid for their overtime. Plaintiffs contend that

LifeSouth’s failure to pay the overtime is a violation of the FLSA.

Pursuant to FLSA § 216(b), plaintiffs seek to conditionally certify

a class of all current and former hourly wage LifeSouth employees

who have been employed within the three year period pre-dating the

filing of this case. (Pl.’s Mot. at 1). Under the FLSA, members of

such a conditionally certified class would receive notice of their

right to opt-in as plaintiffs. See Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores,

Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs’ original

proposed notice included a claim for “off-the-clock” work not

related to the automatic lunch deduction. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2).

Plaintiffs have since agreed to limit their claims to those

relating to the automatic lunch deduction. (Tr. of Hr’g Dec. 7,

2009 at 35-40).

Under the FLSA’s collective action provision, “[a]n action ...

may be maintained against any employer ... by any one or more

employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other

employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “Thus, to

maintain a collective action under the FLSA, plaintiffs must

demonstrate that they are similarly situated.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 3 of 11
4

1258. The Eleventh Circuit has established a two-step process by

which district courts are to manage FLSA collective actions. The

first stage is the “conditional certification” or “notice” stage.

Id. at 1260. The second stage is triggered by a defendant’s motion

for decertification, at which time the court has a more detailed

record and can make a more informed factual determination. Id. At

both stages, the decision of whether to certify a class,

conditional or final, hinges on whether the plaintiffs are

“similarly situated”. Id.

In the “conditional certification” or “notice” stage, the

standard for determining similarity is “fairly lenient” and

“flexible.” Id. at 1259 (citing Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins.

Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218). To meet this low standard, plaintiffs

only have to show that there is a “reasonable basis” for their

claim that there are other similarly situated employees. Morgan,

551 F.3d at 1259. Neither the FLSA nor the Eleventh Circuit has

provided a precise definition of the term “similarly situated”, but

the Eleventh Circuit has given some guidance, holding that a

district court should look to whether employees are “similarly

situated with respect to their job requirements and with regard to

their pay provisions.” Id. at 1259 (quoting Dybach v. State of Fla.

Dept. Of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991)).

Logically, in attempting to determine whether the proposed class is

made up of similarly situated employees, the court must also look

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 4 of 11
5

to whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated with respect to

the claims being made in the underlying lawsuit.

This court holds that even under the low threshold set out by

Morgan, in light of the remaining claims in the underlying lawsuit,

plaintiffs’ proposed class of “all current and former hourly

employees” is overly broad, insomuch as such comprehensive class 

cannot be similarly situated for notice purposes. However, this

court finds that a narrower class of all current and former hourly

employees who worked on Bloodmobiles and received an automatic

deduction as a substitute for a lunch period does constitute a

class of similarly situated employees for the purposes of notice

under the FLSA. 

Because plaintiffs have abandoned, at least for notice

purposes, any contention that LifeSouth failed to pay overtime for

“off-the-clock” work aside from the lunch period deduction, the

only employees who are “similarly situated” in relation to the

underlying lawsuit are those who, in fact, had a lunch period

automatically deducted from their time but who worked during it.

The only such individuals identified by the plaintiffs are

employees who work on Bloodmobiles. Both named plaintiffs and all

opt-in plaintiffs worked on Bloodmobiles. It would be a waste of

resources, both the court’s and the parties’, to send notice to

“all hourly employees” when the only employees who can truly be

“similarly situated” with respect to the alleged violation are

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 5 of 11
6

those who worked on Bloodmobiles. Also, because the violations

alleged will only apply to Bloodmobile employees that have had

automatic lunch deductions, the class should be further limited to

all hourly employees who have worked on a Bloodmobile and have

actually had an automatic lunch period deducted. 

The reduced and refined class of all LifeSouth Bloodmobile

employees who have had a lunch period deducted meets the Morgan and

Dybach requirements of similar job requirements and pay provisions.

Courts have made it clear that “similar job requirements” does not

mean that each member of the class has to hold the exact same job.

Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259 (citing Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d

1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996)). The employees working on the

Bloodmobiles had sufficiently similar job requirements in that they

all worked in blood collection on Bloodmobiles that did not have

time clocks. The requirement of similar pay provisions is also met,

as each class member is an hourly employee who has been subjected

to the automatic lunch deduction. Therefore, the class of all

hourly Bloodmobile employees who have been subjected to the

automatic lunch deduction meets the lenient standard articulated in

Hipp and Morgan. 

LifeSouth argues that any class that might be conditionally

certified should be further limited so as to exclude Team Captains,

because Team Captains are classified as “exempt” employees. While

it is true that LifeSouth currently classifies Team Captains as

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 6 of 11
7

exempt, it did not begin to do so until January 12, 2009. (Def.’s

Br. in Opp’n at 4). Therefore, Team Captains, such as named

plaintiff, Rowe, and opt-in plaintiff, Iris Anderson (“Anderson”),

who worked for LifeSouth at any point before January 12, 2009,

would be classified as “non-exempt” for at least some of the period

in question, and would be entitled to notice. Any Team Captain

hired after January 12, 2009, has only worked as a salaried

employee, and thus would not be included in a conditionally

certified class of hourly employees. Also, any Team Captains hired

after January 12, 2009 would never have been subjected to the

automatic lunch deduction, and would have no grounds to opt-in to

the class. 

In their complaint the named plaintiffs make a claim that the

January 12, 2009, change in status for Team Captains is an

“improper exemption” and thus a violation of the FLSA in and of

itself. However, they seek only to certify a class of current or

former hourly employees, a description that would not include Team

Captains hired after January 12, 2009. (Pl.’s Mot at 1).

Furthermore, plaintiffs do not seek to include the improper

exemption claim in their proposed notice. Therefore, the court will

treat said claim as abandoned. See id. at Ex. A. (Making no mention

of an “improper exemption” claim in the proposed description of the

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 7 of 11
1

On January 6, 2010, LifeSouth filed a “supplemental

evidentiary submission and memorandum of law”, arguing inter alia

that because of newly discovered evidence only one (1) plaintiff

with an “improper exemption” claim remained, and therefore such a

claim should not be certified. As discussed above, plaintiffs do

not seek to include such a claim in their notice or certify a

subclass of “Team Captains” at this time, and the court will not do

so. Therefore, LifeSouth’s supplement does not affect the analysis

in this opinion.

8

lawsuit).1

The inquiry required before conditionally certifying a class

does not end with the determination of whether the proposed class

is similarly situated. To certify a collective action a plaintiff

must also show that other employees actually desire to participate

in the lawsuit. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259; Harper v. Lovett’s

Buffet, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 358, 362 (M.D. Ala. 1999). To meet this

burden, a plaintiff files written notices of consent to join the

lawsuit from other employees before moving for conditional

certification. White v. Osmose, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1316

(M.D. Ala. 2002). To date, eleven (11) individuals have filed

consents to opt-in to the lawsuit (the “opt-in plaintiffs”), to go

along with the two (2) named plaintiffs. All plaintiffs worked for

LifeSouth in Donor Services at some time as either DSSs, Team

Leads, or Donor Specialist Mobile Supervisors/Team Captains. In

other words, all plaintiffs worked on Bloodmobiles. Two of the optin plaintiffs ended their employment with LifeSouth more than three

years before their opt-in date, and are thus barred by the statute

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 8 of 11
9

of limitations. (Def.’s Br. in Opp’n at 10-13). One more opt-in

plaintiff never had an automatic lunch deduction taken while she

worked at LifeSouth. Id. at 15. Thus, remaining in the reduced

present class are the two named plaintiffs and eight (8) opt-in

plaintiffs. Of the remaining plaintiffs, eight (8) are or were

employed at LifeSouth’s Birmingham, Alabama branch, and two (2) are

or were employed at LifeSouth’s Wiregrass, Alabama branch.

In deciding whether plaintiffs have met their burden of

showing that other employees desire to opt-in, the court must weigh

the number of consents filed against the size and geographic

disparity of the entire class. See Rodgers v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,

No. 05-770, 2006 WL 752831, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22,

2006)(refusing to conditionally certify class when there were only

two opt-in plaintiffs out of over 250,000 employees in thirty-six

(36) states). In this case there are a total of ten (10) plaintiffs

employed at two (2) different LifeSouth branches, both located in

Alabama. As previously discussed, LifeSouth operates in three

states, and the refined class of Bloodmobile workers would

encompass approximately two-hundred (200) to three-hundred (300)

current or former employees. (Tr. of Hr’g Dec. 7, 2009 at 5). The

plaintiffs in this case have met their burden of showing that other

employees desire to opt-in. Ten (10) plaintiffs out of a maximum

potential class of three-hundred (300) is a ratio sufficient to

meet the lenient standard of the “notice” phase. While there are

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 9 of 11
10

now only opt-in plaintiffs from two branches, and those branches

are in the same state, there is at least a showing of interest in

the lawsuit beyond a single branch. With LifeSouth being a regional

employer operating in three states, this court finds that issuing

a notice in all three states is appropriate.

Finally, the parties disagree about whether the conditional

certification and notice should include LifeSouth employees for the

three years prior to the date of suit or the period should be

limited to two years. The statute of limitations for violations of

the FLSA is generally two years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2006).

However, if a plaintiff’s claim arises from a willful violation,

the statute of limitations period is extended to three years. Id.

Plaintiffs have alleged willfulness in this case. LifeSouth argues

that plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidentiary support

for a claim of willfulness. Courts considering this issue have

routinely held that such an argument is not appropriate for the

initial certification phase, but rather is suited for the

decertification phase or inclusion in a motion for summary

judgment. See White, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 n. 9. In the

conditional certification phase, when an allegation of willfulness

has been made, courts have generally used the three-year temporal

period. See id. LifeSouth has cited no case in which a district

court has limited its conditional certification to a two-year

period when there has been an allegation of willfulness. This court

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 10 of 11
11

agrees that the allegation of willfulness gets the plaintiffs, at

least in this initial stage, the three-year period. Furthermore,

were this court required to find whether there is a scintilla of

evidence to support a claim of willfulness at this early stage in

the proceedings, it would find the existence of a scintilla.

Plaintiffs have alleged a systematic FLSA violation stemming from

a pay policy intentionally implemented by LifeSouth. At this

“lenient” stage of the proceedings, this allegation is enough to

support notice to employees over a three-period. While the threeyear period will be used for notice purposes, it is necessary to

explain the distinction between the two-year and three-year periods

to potential plaintiffs. Therefore, the distinction between the two

periods, either of which may ultimately be used, will be included

in the notice. The question of whether a violation can be willful

as to one plaintiff and not as to another will be dealt with if and

when it arises, as will the fixing of a date upon which LifeSouth

was first willful, if it ever was, in its violation, if it violated

the FLSA.

DONE this 11th day of January, 2010.

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:09-cv-01198-WMA Document 40 Filed 01/11/10 Page 11 of 11