Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00253/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00253-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OPENWAVE MESSAGING, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OPEN-XCHANGE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-00253-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AMENDED 

COUNTERCLAIMS AND STRIKE 

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Re: Dkt. No. 50

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Openwave Messaging, Inc., moves to dismiss defendant Open-Xchange, Inc.’s 

amended Counterclaims 3 through 7 as insufficiently pleaded. Opewave also moves to strike 

Counterclaim 1 as redundant, and Affirmative Defenses 9 and 15 through 18 as insufficiently 

pleaded. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), I determined the motion is appropriate for resolution 

without oral argument and vacated the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, Openwave’s 

motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant and counterclaimant Open-Xchange, Inc. (“OX”), is a Delaware corporation 

and wholly-owned subsidiary of Open-Xchange AG, a German company. Amended 

Counterclaims and Answer (“Am. Countercl.”) (Dkt. No. 49) ¶ 8.1 OX “provides open-source 

commercial email software that customers integrate into their existing system’s infrastructure.” 

Id. ¶ 15. OX is licensed by OX Software GmbH, another Open-Xchange AG subsidiary, to 

distribute Open-Xchange software in the United States, Canada, and South America. Id. ¶ 8. 

 

1

The facts included are from the allegations in OX’s Amended Counterclaims, unless stated 

otherwise.

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Plaintiff Openwave, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San 

Mateo, California. Id. ¶ 9. Openwave is a “provider of commercial email platform software and 

services for telecommunications carriers.” Id.

A. Openwave and OX’s Business Relationship

In 2011, Openwave and OX began discussions to package OX’s email interface, OX 

Hosting Edition, with Openwave’s system. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. The parties entered into a “Mutual 

Confidentiality Agreement” in March 2011. Id. ¶ 21. In June 2011, the parties entered into a 

contract providing Openwave with a non-exclusive bulk license to OX Hosting Edition that 

Openwave could bundle with its own products, including Richmail, in exchange for a fixed 

payment to OX (“the OEM Agreement”). Id. ¶¶ 22-24. Openwave also paid ongoing license fees 

for any additional OX services that it sublicensed to its customers. Id. ¶ 23.

The OEM Agreement reserved OX’s ownership rights in OX Hosting Edition and did not 

convey the copyright or ownership of any OX product to Openwave. Id. ¶ 26. Instead, 

“Openwave was to own only modifications to OX Hosting Edition developed for or by Openwave 

that (a) relate specifically to an Openwave product and its management interface or graphical user 

interface (GUI), and (b) are not integral to the core product code for OX Hosting Edition.” Id.

¶ 26 (original emphasis removed). The OEM Agreement also included limited non-competition 

terms regarding specified customers that “required Openwave to be actively selling the OX 

Hosting Edition-based Richmail client as its primary webmail offering.” Id. ¶ 29. 

In 2012, the parties entered into a General Consulting Services Agreement for services to 

be performed by OX for Openwave. Id. ¶ 32. This agreement reserved OX’s ownership rights in 

its “Contractor Property,” including software programs and program code. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. It also 

provided Openwave with ownership rights in the “Deliverables,” excluding any of OX’s 

Contractor Property. Id. ¶ 33. OX retained an irrevocable license to the Deliverables. Id. ¶ 34.

B. Development of App Suite

In 2013, OX released a commercial version of App Suite, “a modular platform that allows 

customers to selectively bundle a range of services and features such as email, messaging, office 

productivity and file sharing.” Id. ¶ 35, 37. Open-Xchange GmbH developed App Suite and 

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Openwave was not involved. Id. ¶ 35-36. OX alleges that App Suite was a new product, and not 

a new version of OX Hosting Edition. Id. ¶¶ 38, 41. OX released App Suite version 7.4.2 in 

February 2014 and an updated version, 7.4.2-rev29, in December 2014.2 Id. ¶ 44.

Prior to its commercial release, OX told Openwave about App Suite. Id. ¶ 38. Openwave 

purchased App Suite licenses for specific Openwave customers from OX through several 

amendments to the OEM Agreement between December 2012 and June 2014. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. In 

June 2013, OX and Openwave executed Amendment No. 6, under which Openwave purchased 

licenses to sell App Suite to Virgin Media, a United Kingdom-based telecommunications provider. 

Id. ¶¶ 45-46. Openwave and Virgin Media then entered into an agreement relating to App Suite. 

Id. ¶ 47. The agreement contained a liquidated damages provision requiring payments to Virgin 

Media if Openwave did not fully implement Virgin Media’s email platform by 2015. Id. ¶ 48.

Openwave had OX create custom plugins for use with App Suite 7.4.2 that Openwave 

could implement for Virgin Media. Id. ¶ 49. These projects were put into seven Statements of 

Work, all governed by the General Consulting Services Agreement. Id. OX created the requested 

plugins, placed them in a repository accessible only by Openwave, and did not incorporate them 

into App Suite. Id. ¶ 50. OX provided several additional services for Openwave’s 

implementation of App Suite for Virgin Media, but Openwave was unable to meet its deadlines 

and, in January 2015, Virgin Media terminated its contract with Openwave. Id. ¶¶ 51, 53, 55-56. 

C. Openwave’s Alleged Competition with OX

Openwave went through a series of corporate reorganizations and ultimately merged with 

Critical Path, Inc. Id. ¶¶ 57, 60-61. Critical Path offered RichUI, a frontend solution that was 

competitive with OX Hosting Edition and, in part, App Suite. Id. ¶ 60. In 2014, OX discovered 

Openwave had been promoting RichUI instead of OX Hosting Edition or App Suite, despite the 

OEM Agreement’s non-competition provision. Id. ¶¶ 62-64. 

 

2

In contrast, Openwave alleges that App Suite is “an updated version of OX’s email user 

interface, falling within the definition ‘OX Hosting Edition’ in the OEM Agreement.” SAC ¶ 64. 

Openwave further alleges that more recent versions of App Suite “contain the modified software 

developed for and by Openwave, which belongs to Openwave pursuant to the express terms of the 

OEM Agreement.” Id. Additionally, Openwave alleges that it is the copyright owner of OpenXchange App Suite Frontend 7.4.2-rev29, which is incorporated into App Suite. SAC ¶ 79.

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That same year, Open-Xchange GmbH and Openwave submitted competing bids for a 

contract with unidentified “Company O.” Id. ¶ 71. Openwave’s then CEO sent to Company O’s 

senior management a letter with “disparaging statements about [Open-Xchange AG and its 

subsidiaries’] financial capabilities, experience managing large projects, and alleged unreliability 

of open source software and the open source approach.” Id. ¶ 71 n.2. 

D. Termination of the OEM Agreement

In late 2015, OX learned that Openwave implemented App Suite and OX Drive for SMX 

Ltd., a New Zealand company, and made App Suite available for download through servers 

provided by Openwave. Id. ¶ 76. OX did not grant Openwave a license to sell App Suite or OX 

Drive to SMX, and Openwave did not make any payments to OX for this ability. Id. OX 

considered this a material breach and, in November 2015, gave notice to Openwave that it 

intended to terminate the OEM Agreement. Id. ¶ 77. On January 20, 2016, OX sent Openwave a 

letter confirming the termination. Id. 

The OEM Agreement specified that, upon its termination, Openwave would immediately 

cease using any names, logos, trademarks, or identifier used by OX. Id. ¶ 83. However, from the 

OEM Agreement’s termination until May 2016, Openwave continued to market and use “App 

Suite,” a common law trademark and identifier of OX, on its website and later on its acquirer 

Synchronoss Technologies, Inc.’s website.

3

 Id. ¶¶ 83, 85, 90. Openwave also falsely stated on its 

website that App Suite is a product that Openwave is able to offer. Id. ¶ 88. In addition, 

Openwave continued to use OX’s name and logo on Openwave’s or Synchronoss’s website, 

stating that OX was a partner of Synchronoss. Id. ¶¶ 86-87. 

Several customers informed OX that “Openwave’s association with the App Suite name 

has tarnished their impression of the App Suite product as a result of Openwave’s notoriety for 

poor services and performance.” Id. ¶ 89. Openwave’s use of the App Suite and OX names on 

Openwave’s and Synchronoss’s websites damaged OX’s business reputation and resulted in lost 

sales to OX. Id.

 

3

Synchronoss acquired Openwave in March 2016. Am. Counterclaim ¶ 92. 

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Sometime after Synchronoss acquired Openwave, an Openwave customer located in 

Europe met with Openwave/Synchronoss representatives. Id. ¶ 92. The customer indicated it was 

terminating its relationship with Openwave and switching to a different platform. Id. “In 

response, senior leadership at Openwave/Synchronoss immediately began denigrating [OX], and 

told the customer it had a ‘worldwide’ lawsuit against [OX] which would cause it to incur such 

high costs that [OX] will go bankrupt.” Id.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 14, 2016, Openwave filed a complaint against OX asserting eleven claims. 

Complaint (Dkt. No. 1). OX filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 18) that I granted in part, with 

leave to amend (Dkt. No. 38). Openwave subsequently filed two amended complaints, asserting 

thirteen claims in its Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” Dkt. No. 42): copyright infringement, 

false advertising under the Lanham Act, misappropriation of trade secrets under federal and 

California law, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, tortious interference with contract and prospective business relationships, false 

advertising and unfair business practices under California law, common law unfair competition, 

fraud, and quantum meruit. OX filed its counterclaims and answer (Dkt. No. 45), which 

Openwave moved to dismiss (Dkt. No. 46). In response, OX filed its Amended Counterclaims 

and Answer, asserting affirmative defenses and seven counterclaims: (1) declaratory judgment of 

non-infringement of copyright; (2) declaratory judgment of invalidity of copyright; (3) breach of 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) breach of contract; (5) false advertising under the 

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (6) false advertising under California Business and Professions 

Code §§ 17500, 17505 (“FAL”); and (7) unfair competition under California Business and 

Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”). Dkt. No. 49. Openwave now moves to dismiss 

Counterclaims 3 through 7, and to strike Counterclaim 1 and Affirmative Defenses 9 and 15 

through 18. Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”) (Dkt. No. 50). 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

In moving to dismiss counterclaims, “[t]he standards that apply to the complaint apply to 

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the counterclaims as well.” Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. v. Mercury Payment Sys., LLC, No. 14-

cv-0437-CW, 2016 WL 304764, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016). Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss if a claim fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the claimant must allege “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). There must be “more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. While courts do not require “heightened 

fact pleading of specifics,” a claim must be supported by facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), a party must “state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake,” including “the who, what, when, where, and how of 

the misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, “Rule 9(b) requires only that the circumstances of 

fraud be stated with particularity; other facts may be pleaded generally, or in accordance with Rule 

8.” United States ex rel. Lee v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts all of the 

factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Usher v. 

City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). But the court is not required to accept as 

true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes a court to “strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(f). The function of a motion to strike “is to avoid the expenditure of time and money 

that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” 

Sidney–Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1983). Motions to strike are 

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generally disfavored and “should not be granted unless the matter to be stricken clearly could have 

no possible bearing on the subject of the litigation.” Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F.

Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004). In addition, courts often require some showing of 

prejudice by the moving party before granting a motion to strike. Hernandez v. Dutch Goose, Inc., 

No. C 13-03537 LB, 2013 WL 5781476, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013).

“If the court is in doubt as to whether the challenged matter may raise an issue of fact or 

law, the motion to strike should be denied, leaving an assessment of the sufficiency of the 

allegations for adjudication on the merits.” Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Oahu Air Conditioning 

Serv., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090-91 (E.D. Cal. 2014). In resolving a motion to strike, I 

view the pleadings in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Platte Anchor Bolt, 352 F.

Supp. 2d at 1057.

DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

Openwave moves to dismiss Counterclaims 5, 6, and 7 for lack of standing and 

Counterclaims 3 through 7 for failure to meet the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b). 

A. OX’s Standing under the Lanham Act, FAL, and UCL

1. Lanham Act—Counterclaim 5

Counterclaim 5 for false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act alleges that, after the 

OEM Agreement terminated, Openwave made a series of false and misleading statements online, 

including using OX’s logo, listing OX as a Synchronoss partner, and stating that Openwave offers 

App Suite. Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 134-137. Openwave argues that the counterclaim should be 

dismissed because OX failed to allege an injury sufficient to confer standing and OX’s allegations 

are conclusory and contradictory. Mot. at 8, 10. 

Openwave asserts that OX failed to adequately plead that it suffered an injury proximately 

caused by the alleged false and misleading statements. Mot. at 9. “To invoke the Lanham Act’s 

cause of action for false advertising, a plaintiff must plead (and ultimately prove) an injury to a 

commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by the defendant’s 

misrepresentations.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1395 

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(2014). To demonstrate proximate cause, a party “ordinarily must show economic or reputational 

injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising; and that that 

occurs when deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the plaintiff.” Id. at 

1391. 

OX alleges that Openwave’s false and misleading statements caused lost sales and harm to 

its business reputation. Am. Countercl. ¶ 144. Regarding its reputation, OX alleges that: (1) it 

“has been informed by several customers that Openwave’s association with the App Suite name 

has tarnished their impression of the App Suite product as a result of Openwave’s notoriety for 

poor services and performance”; and (2) the use of the App Suite and OX names on Openwave’s 

and Synchronoss’s websites after the termination of the OEM Agreement damaged OX’s 

reputation. Id. Regarding lost sales, OX alleges that Openwave’s use of the App Suite and OX 

names after termination of the OEM Agreement caused “potential customers to mistakenly turn to 

Openwave when seeking App Suite or [OX] products and services, and the sales or inquiries of 

[OX] or Openwave products resulting from this false advertising should rightly have gone to 

[OX].” Id.

Openwave argues that these alleged injuries are conclusory and fail to demonstrate 

proximate cause because (i) “OX does not explain how Openwave’s alleged use of the App Suite 

name or OX name on its website for three months, when the parties have been in business together 

for five years . . ., somehow resulted in concrete harm,” (ii) OX does not allege that, “absent 

Openwave’s alleged false and misleading statements, these unidentified potential customers would 

have bought OX’s products and services,” and (iii) OX does not allege that “these unidentified 

potential customers actually bought products or services from Openwave as a direct result of the 

alleged false and misleading statements.” Mot. at 9; Reply (Dkt. No. 54) at 5. Because the 

allegations are conclusory, Openwave argues, I should disregard them and dismiss Counterclaim 5 

for lack of standing. Mot. at 9-10. 

I disagree. “[T]he proximate-cause requirement generally bars suits for alleged harm that 

is ‘too remote’ from the defendant’s unlawful conduct.” Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1390. Here, OX 

alleges that it lost sales because of Openwave’s use of the App Suite and OX names. “[D]iversion 

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of sales to a direct competitor may be the paradigmatic direct injury from false advertising.” Id. at 

1393. OX also alleges that Openwave’s use of the App Suite and OX names tarnished OX’s 

reputation with several customers because of “Openwave’s association with the App Suite name” 

and “notoriety for poor services and performance.” Am. Countercl. ¶ 144. Openwave argues that 

OX must plead the customers’ names, the specific timeframes when they told OX their views were

tarnished, and which specific individuals were present. Reply at 4 n.6. This is too granular at the 

pleading stage; discovery may provide these details. OX’s allegations sufficiently establish a 

plausible proximate causal relationship between Openwave’s alleged conduct and OX’s alleged 

injury. 

Openwave also contends that Counterclaim 5 should be dismissed without leave to amend 

because OX’s injury allegations, added in its Amended Counterclaims, contradict other allegations 

in both OX’s original Counterclaims and Amended Counterclaims. Mot. at 10. Courts may

dismiss a claim as not plausible where its supporting factual allegations are contradictory. See, 

e.g., Alatraqchi v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-03156 JSC, 2013 WL 4517756, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Aug. 22, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss claim for employment discrimination because the 

allegations were contradictory as to whether plaintiff was an employee or independent contractor); 

Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (Alsup, J.) (granting 

motion to dismiss where antitrust claim did not plausibly allege an independent market because 

the allegations were internally contradictory). A court may deny leave to amend where it would 

not be possible to amend “without contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

First, Openwave asserts that OX’s alleged injuries contradict allegations that OX’s 

business has been successful generally and specifically against Openwave.4 Mot. at 10; Reply at 

5; Am. Countercl. ¶ 4. Not so. It is possible for a corporation to suffer economic and reputational 

 

4 Openwave points to the allegation that “[OX’s] business has been thriving. Its share of the 

market has grown year over year, dramatically outpacing Openwave. In competitive bids against 

Openwave, [OX] has won the business. Other customers have come to [OX] after concluding that 

Openwave’s products and services are inadequate.” Mot. at 10; Am. Countercl. ¶ 4.

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harm but continue to be successful overall. And even if OX won competitive bids over Openwave 

or attracted some of Openwave’s customers, that does not necessarily mean that OX did not lose 

sales or suffer reputational harm from Openwave’s alleged use of the App Suite and OX names. 

Second, Openwave argues that it is contradictory to allege that Openwave has a bad 

reputation and is failing in the market, yet is taking OX’s customers.5 Reply at 6. OX argues that 

Openwave “capitalized on [OX’s] goodwill to try to boost its own reputation.” Opposition 

(“Oppo.”) (Dkt. No. 53) at 7. Taking OX’s allegations to be true—that it had a stronger 

reputation than Openwave—it is possible for Openwave to use the reputable App Suite and OX’s 

names to attract OX’s potential customers. These allegations, therefore, are consistent.

While OX must ultimately prove its injuries, its allegations of reputational harm and lost 

sales proximately caused by Openwave’s false statements are sufficient at the pleading stage. 

Openwave’s motion to dismiss Counterclaim 5 for lack of standing is DENIED.

2. FAL and UCL—Counterclaims 6 and 7

Counterclaims 6 and 7 under the FAL and UCL are based on the same alleged conduct 

underlying Counterclaim 5: after the OEM Agreement terminated, Openwave made false and 

misleading statements online, including using OX’s logo, listing OX as a Synchronoss partner, 

and stating that Openwave offers App Suite. Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 134-137, 147, 153. Openwave 

argues that Counterclaims 6 and 7 should be dismissed because OX lacks standing under the FAL 

and UCL.

6

 Mot. at 11-12.

To demonstrate standing under the FAL and UCL, a party must “(1) establish a loss or 

deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and 

(2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or 

false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 

310, 322 (2011) (original emphasis). 

 

5 Openwave points to the following allegations: “Openwave is not a strong competitor,” and 

“Openwave has suffered the natural consequences of those failures in the market: unsatisfied, 

departing customers and flagging sales.” Mot. at 10; Am. Countercl. ¶ 3. 

6 Openwave also asserts that OX’s alleged injury of lost sales is conclusory and contradictory. But 

as discussed above, OX this allegation is sufficiently pleaded.

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Openwave argues that OX lacks standing to bring its FAL and UCL claims because it

failed to plead causation. It asserts that OX does not sufficiently allege that “customers actually 

relied on the alleged false and misleading statements and that the purported false statements were 

an immediate cause of the alleged injury to OX.” Mot. at 12. As an initial matter, the parties 

dispute whether the “actual reliance” requirement from consumer cases decided under the UCL 

post-Proposition 64 applies to a competitor case like this one.7 Oppo. 9; Reply 7-9. However, 

even under Openwave’s position—that OX must plead facts showing customers relied on its 

allegedly false representations—I find that OX has adequately alleged customer reliance. 

Here, OX alleges that Openwave’s continued use of the App Suite and OX names after the 

termination of the OEM Agreement “resulted in lost sales to [OX] by causing potential customers 

to mistakenly turn to Openwave when seeking App Suite or [OX] products and services.” Am. 

Countercl. ¶ 89. OX similarly alleges it suffered harm “since prospective buyers drawn by 

Openwave’s use of the App Suite and [OX] names made inquiries to and purchases from 

Openwave, rather than directly from [OX], under the mistaken belief that Openwave can offer 

[OX] products and services.” Id. ¶ 149. These allegations plausibly demonstrate that customers 

actually relied on the alleged false statements.

Openwave’s motion to dismiss Counterclaims 6 and 7 for lack of standing is DENIED.

B. Particularity under Rule 9(b)—Counterclaims 3-7

Openwave also moves to dismiss for failure to meet the particularity requirement of Rule 

9(b) the following: Counterclaim 3 for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 

Counterclaim 4 for breach of contract; Counterclaims 5 and 6 for false advertising under the 

Lanham Act and the FAL; and Counterclaim 7 for unfair competition under the UCL. Mot. at 13.

 

7

In consumer cases, a plaintiff “must demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive or 

misleading statements.” Kwikset Corp., 51 Cal. 4th at 326. “Consequently, a plaintiff must show 

that the misrepresentation was an immediate cause of the injury-producing conduct.” Id. at 327. 

But a “plaintiff is not required to allege that [the challenged] misrepresentations were the sole or 

even the decisive cause of the injury-producing conduct.” Id. (internal citations omitted; alteration 

in original).

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1. Applicability of Rule 9(b)

Rule 9(b) provides a heightened pleading standard for allegations of fraud. OX does not 

dispute that the Lanham Act, FAL, and UCL claims are subject to Rule 9(b), but argues that it 

does not apply to Counterclaim 3 for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and 

Counterclaim 4 for breach of contract. Oppo. at 10. 

Fraud is not an essential element for either Counterclaim 3 or 4. “[I]n a case where fraud 

is not an essential element of a claim, only allegations (‘averments’) of fraudulent conduct must 

satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Allegations of non-fraudulent conduct 

need satisfy only the . . . pleading standards of Rule 8(a).” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1105. The question, 

therefore, is whether some portion of Counterclaims 3 and 4 either expressly allege “fraud” or 

allege “facts that necessarily constitute fraud (even if the word ‘fraud’ is not used).”8 Id. In 

California, the elements of a cause of action for fraud are: “(a) misrepresentation (false 

representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent 

to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” Kearns v. 

Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 

Inc., 15 Cal.4th 951, 974 (1997)) (original removed). 

For its breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, OX alleges that 

Openwave unfairly interfered with OX’s rights to receive benefits under the OEM Agreement by 

promoting RichUI instead of OX Hosting Edition and disparaging OX. Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 116, 

117. For instance, OX alleges that when Open-Xchange GmbH and Openwave submitted 

competing bids to unidentified “Company O” in 2014, Openwave’s then CEO sent to Company 

O’s senior management a letter that “concerned disparaging statements about [Open-Xchange AG 

 

8 OX points to Ronpak, Inc. v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., which held “[a] breach of contract 

claim falls outside the reach of Rule 9(b) because such a claim does not require intent to defraud, a 

false representation, or other elements of fraudulent misrepresentation.” No. 14-cv-4038-JST, 

2015 WL 179560, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2015). However, the same court in a later decision 

referred to Ronpak’s holding as a general statement and went on to find that a claim for relief for 

breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing did contain an 

averment of fraud that was subject to Rule 9(b). Steinberg v. Provident Funding Associates, L.P., 

No. 15-cv-3743-JST, 2016 WL 3361815, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2016). There is no brightline 

rule that Rule 9(b) does not apply to breach of contract claims. The focus is on the specific 

allegations supporting the claim.

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and its subsidiaries’] financial capabilities, experience managing large projects, and alleged 

unreliability of open source software and the open source approach.” Am. Countercl. ¶ 71 n.2. 

Neither the allegations that Openwave promoted a competitive product nor the allegations of 

disparaging statements “sound in fraud,” and therefore Counterclaim 3 is not subject to Rule 9(b). 

For its breach of contract claim, OX alleges that Openwave breached the OEM Agreement 

by: (i) selling App Suite and OX Drive to SMX, a New Zealand-based email provider, without a 

license from OX; (ii) continuing to market and use “App Suite” on its website after termination of 

the OEM Agreement; and (iii) continuing to use OX’s name and logo on its website after 

termination of the OEM Agreement. Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 123-125, 129-130. The first alleged 

breach does not include allegations of misrepresentation to SMX or other fraudulent behavior. 

Therefore, the first allegation is not subject to Rule 9(b). The second and third allegations are 

repeatedly referred to as “false and misleading” statements later in the Amended Counterclaims 

and provide factual support for Counterclaims 5, 6, and 7. Therefore, these allegations are subject 

to Rule 9(b).

2. Sufficiency of Allegations

Under Rule 9(b), a party must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 

or mistake,” including “the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.” Vess, 

317 F.3d at 1106 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Frenzel v. AliphCom, 76 F. Supp. 3d 

999, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547-48 (9th 

Cir.1994), superseded by statute on other grounds) ( “[A] plaintiff must identify ‘the time, place, 

and content of [the] alleged misrepresentation[s],’ as well as the ‘circumstances indicating 

falseness’ or ‘manner in which the representations at issue were false and misleading.’”). 

However, “Rule 9(b) requires only that the circumstances of fraud be stated with particularity; 

other facts may be pleaded generally, or in accordance with Rule 8.” Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 

at 992. The purpose of Rule 9(b)’s heightened specificity requirement is “to give defendants 

notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can 

defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Swartz, 476 

F.3d at 764 (citation omitted). 

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a. Counterclaims 5, 6, and 7—False Advertising and Unfair Competition

Openwave asserts that OX failed to meet the Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleadings standard for 

the Lanham Act, FAL, and UCL claims. OX relies on the same set of facts to support all three of 

these counterclaims. Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate the sufficiency of the factual 

allegations for these counterclaims together.

OX alleges that from the OEM Agreement’s termination until May 2016, Openwave 

continued to market and use “App Suite” on its website and later on Synchronoss’s website. Am. 

Countercl. ¶¶ 83, 85, 90. Openwave also allegedly continued to use OX’s name and logo on 

Openwave’s or Synchronoss’s website, stating that OX was a partner of Synchronoss. Id. ¶¶ 86-

87. OX attached screenshots of the alleged statements as exhibits to its Amended Counterclaims. 

Id., Exs. A, B. These statements are alleged to be false and misleading because the OEM 

Agreement specified that, upon its termination, Openwave would immediately cease using any of 

OX’s names, logos, trademarks, or identifiers. Id. ¶ 83. 

The purpose behind Rule 9(b) has been satisfied here. Openwave has been given sufficient 

information on “what” the alleged false statements were, “when” the statements were given, 

“who” made the statements, and “where” the statements took place. Openwave, therefore, has 

sufficient notice “of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so 

that [it] can defend against the charge.” Swartz, 476 F.3d at 764 (citation omitted). 

Openwave points to four allegations relevant to Counterclaims 5, 6, and 7 that it argues are 

insufficient under Rule 9(b).9 However, all four relate to OX’s allegations of injury. As discussed 

above, OX has sufficiently pleaded plausible injuries for its Lanham Act, FAL, and UCL claims. 

Moreover, OX notes that it cannot plead more specific facts regarding its injury because “whether 

‘potential customers actually bought products or services from Openwave as a direct result of the 

alleged false and misleading statements’ are facts that are uniquely in the possession of Openwave 

and those third parties.” Oppo. at 5. 

 

9 Openwave lists 14 allegations related to several different counterclaims that it argues are 

insufficient under Rule 9(b). However, only the last four are relevant to Counterclaims 5, 6, and 7. 

See Mot. at 14-16.

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Openwave’s motion to dismiss Counterclaims 5, 6, and 7 for failure to meet the Rule 9(b) 

particularity standard is DENIED.

b. Counterclaims 3 and 4—Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 

Dealing and Breach of Contract

To the extent that OX relies on averments of fraud to support Counterclaim 4 for breach of 

contract, its “allegations should be ‘disregarded’ or ‘stripped from the claim’” if they fail to satisfy 

Rule 9(b). Vess, 317 F.3d at 1105 (internal citations omitted). However, as with Counterclaims 5, 

6, and 7, the allegations regarding Openwave’s continued use of the App Suite and OX names 

after the termination of the OEM Agreement are sufficiently alleged to meet Rule 9(b) for its 

breach of the contract counterclaim. 

Openwave further argues that even if Rule 9(b) does not apply, Counterclaims 3 and 4 are 

still insufficiently pleaded because they “rest entirely on ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Mot. at 17. Openwave refers back to 

the list of 14 allegations from various parts of the Amended Counterclaims that it argued were 

insufficiently pleaded under Rule 9(b) as also insufficient under Rule 8(a). Reply at 11. 

“The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ‘imposes upon each party [to a 

contract] a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” Ronpak, 

2015 WL 179560, at *5 (citing McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC, 159 Cal. App. 4th 784, 798 

(2008)). “The duty is meant to ensure that neither party will do anything that would ‘injure the 

right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.’” Id. (citing Wolf v. Walt Disney 

Pictures & Television, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1120 (2008)). But a claim for breach of the 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not “impose substantive duties or limits on the 

contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement.” Agosta v. 

Astor, 120 Cal. App. 4th 596, 607 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

OX alleges that the OEM Agreement implies “a promise that . . . the parties will not 

unfairly interfere with the right of the other party to receive benefits.” Am. Countercl. ¶ 113. OX 

further alleges that Openwave unfairly interfered with this right by promoting RichUI, a 

competing product, over OX Hosting Edition to Softbank and three other companies. Id. ¶¶ 63, 

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65, 116. Additionally, OX alleges that Openwave disparaged OX, for example, to a company for 

which Openwave and an OX affiliate company had submitted competing bids. Id. ¶¶ 71, 117. As 

a result of this conduct, OX alleged that it incurred damages including “the lost benefit of work 

that it performed to secure customers for Openwave and license payments for the customers who 

switched to RichUI.” Id. ¶ 119. These allegations support a plausible claim for breach of the 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

To establish breach of contract, a party must demonstrate the following elements: “(1) the 

contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) 

the resulting damages to plaintiff.” Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 22 Cal. App. 3d 

1371, 1388 (1990). OX alleges the parties entered into the OEM Agreement. Am. Countercl. ¶ 

121. It alleges that it performed all its duties under the agreement, including providing support on 

the Openwave-Virgin Media project in connection with Amendment No. 6. Id. ¶¶ 50, 51, 122. It

alleges that Openwave breached the agreement in three ways: (i) selling App Suite and OX Drive 

to SMX without a license from OX; (ii) continuing to market and use “App Suite” on its website 

after termination of the OEM Agreement; and (iii) continuing to use OX’s name and logo on its 

website after termination of the OEM Agreement. Id. ¶¶ 123-125, 129-130. And, it alleges that it 

suffered damages, including loss of its good will and reputation, and lost sales or profits. Id. at 

131. These plausible allegations support the claim for breach of contract.

Openwave’s motion to dismiss Counterclaims 3 and 4 for failure to state a claim is 

DENIED.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

A. Counterclaim 1 for Declaratory Relief

Openwave argues I should strike with prejudice OX’s first amended counterclaim for 

declaratory relief of non-infringement as redundant of OX’s affirmative defenses and denial of 

liability. Mot. at 7. A court “has complete discretion whether to hear a counterclaim for 

declaratory judgment.” Stickrath v. Globalstar, Inc., No. 07-cv-1941-TEH, 2008 WL 2050990, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008). “Numerous courts have used that discretion to dismiss 

counterclaims under [Rule] 12(f) where they are either the ‘mirror image’ of claims in the 

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complaint or redundant of affirmative defenses.” Id. But “it is not always appropriate to strike 

declaratory judgment counterclaims simply because they concern the same subject matter or arise 

from the same transaction as the complaint.” Id. at *4. In deciding whether to strike a declaratory 

judgment counterclaim, a “court should focus on whether the counterclaims serve any useful 

purpose and should dismiss or strike a redundant counterclaim only when it is clear that there is a 

complete identity of factual and legal issues between the complaint and the counterclaim.” Id.

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In addition, courts often require some showing 

of prejudice by the moving party. Hernandez, 2013 WL 5781476, at *5. 

Counterclaim 1 seeks a declaratory judgment that OX “has not infringed any copyright 

Openwave claims to hold as to Open-Xchange App Suite Frontend 7.4.2-rev29.” Am. Countercl. ¶ 

102. It alleges that: (i) OX is the owner of the right to distribute and license App Suite; (ii) OX 

Software GmbH owns all intellectual property rights in App Suite; and (iii) even if Openwave 

acquired ownership rights in App Suite 7.4.2-rev 29, OX would have a license to it under the 

parties’ agreements. Id. ¶¶ 94-98. 

In comparison, Openwave’s first claim alleges that it is the copyright owner of App Suite 

Frontend 7.4.2-rev29 (“Openwave 29”) and that OX has infringed this copyright. SAC ¶¶ 79, 132, 

134-144. OX’s first affirmative defense states, “Openwave’s copyright claim is barred, in whole 

or in part, by its lack of ownership of the alleged copyrights asserted, as described more fully in 

[OX’s] counterclaims[.]” Am. Countercl. at 46. OX’s second affirmative defense states, 

“Openwave’s copyright claim is barred, in whole or in part, because Openwave granted [OX] a 

perpetual license to any works it developed for Openwave, as stated in the parties’ General 

Consulting Services Agreement.” Id.

The parties disagree on whether Counterclaim 1 “serve[s] any useful purpose.” See 

Stickrath, 2008 WL 2050990, at *4. OX argues Counterclaim 1 will resolve uncertainty that 

resulted from this lawsuit, “which has caused [OX’s] actual and prospective customers to express 

concern about Openwave’s claimed interest in App Suite and what it means for them.” Oppo. at 4. 

OX also asserts that Counterclaim 1 “lays the foundation for an early motion for summary 

judgment motion on the straightforward, threshold issue of ownership,” and that Openwave would 

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not suffer any prejudice from the counterclaim. Id. Openwave argues that Counterclaim 1 only 

denies Openwave’s first claim and reiterates OX’s affirmative defenses, adding nothing to this 

action. MTD at 7, Reply at 1. 

Although it is unclear to me whether Conterclaim 1 serves any useful purpose, Openwave 

has not identified any prejudice that it would suffer if this counterclaim is not struck. This case is 

still in its early stages. Lacking any harm to Openwave, I will not strike Counterclaim 1 at this 

time.

B. Affirmative Defenses 9 and 15-18

Openwave argues that Affirmative Defenses 9 and 15 through 18 should be struck as 

insufficiently pleaded. As a threshold matter, the parties disagree on whether the Twombly/Iqbal

standard or a lower “fair notice” standard applies to affirmative defenses. I have previously 

agreed with my colleagues in this district that the Twombly/Iqbal standard applies to affirmative 

defenses. See BlackBerry Ltd. v. Typo Prod. LLC, No. 14-cv-00023-WHO, 2014 WL 1867009, at 

*4-5 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2014).

However, the Ninth Circuit subsequently decided Kohler v. Flava Enterprises, Inc., 779 

F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2015). Kohler affirmed a district court’s finding that an affirmative defense 

was adequately pleaded, stating, “the ‘fair notice’ required by the pleading standards only requires 

describing the defense in ‘general terms.’” Id. at 1019. OX points to an Eastern District of 

California decision that construed Kohler as holding that the “fair notice” standard, rather than 

Twombly-Iqbal, applies to affirmative defenses. See Castellano v. Access Premier Realty7, Inc., 

No. 15-cv-0407, 2015 WL 7423821, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015). In fact, every Eastern 

District of California court to evaluate the pleading standard for affirmative defenses in light of 

Kohler has found that the fair notice standard applies. Bcompany v. Courtesy OldsmobileCadillac, Inc., No. 15-cv-01137, 2016 WL 615335, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (collecting 

cases). Only two decisions in this district have discussed Kohler. The first found that Kohler “did 

not specifically hold . . . that the Twombly/Iqbal standard does not apply to the pleading of 

affirmative defenses.” Perez v. Wells Fargo & Company, No. 14-cv-0989-PJH, 2015 WL 

5567746, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015). In the second, the court declined to decide whether the 

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Twombly/Iqbal standard continues to apply after Kohler because the defendant’s affirmative 

defenses were insufficient even under the “fair notice” standard. Barrilleaux v. Mendocino Cty., 

No. 14-cv-01373-TEH, 2016 WL 1298860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2016).

I need not decide which standard should apply after Kohler because, as discussed below, 

OX’s affirmative defenses are sufficiently pleaded even under the more demanding

Twombly/Iqbal standard. Under this standard, “a defense need not include extensive factual 

allegations,” but “bare statements reciting mere legal conclusions may not be sufficient.” Perez v. 

Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C., No. 11-cv-03323-LHK, 2012 WL 1029425, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 26, 2012). “In other words, the simple listing of ‘a series of conclusory statements asserting 

the existence of an affirmative defense without stating a reason why that affirmative defense might 

exist’ is not sufficient.” Hernandez, 2013 WL 5781476, at *4.

1. Affirmative Defense 9—Waiver and Estoppel 

OX’s Affirmative Defense 9 for waiver and estoppel is:

Openwave’s claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and 

estoppel, including without limitation because Openwave replaced 

[OX’s] front end products with its own products after the acquisition 

of Critical Path, and because Openwave has conducted itself and 

entered into agreements acknowledging that it does not own the 

copyrighted works at issue. The OEM Agreement and related 

agreements state that OX Hosting Edition is the property of [OX], 

and state that [OX] retains ownership of any copyright that 

comprises the core of its products. As alleged more fully in [OX’s]

counterclaims, Openwave has represented to its customers and to 

[OX] that it recognizes that App Suite is a new product and not an 

updated version of OX Hosting Edition; Openwave has 

acknowledged that it needed to either amend the OEM Agreement 

or enter into a new agreement in order to distribute App Suite; and 

Openwave has acknowledged that it had a limited number of seat 

licenses for OX Hosting Edition, which would not be the case if 

Openwave actually owned OX Hosting Edition.

Am. Countercl. at 48.

Openwave argues that this affirmative defense should be struck because OX has not 

alleged that “Openwave intended to waive its rights or had the necessary intent under the doctrines 

of waiver and estoppel.” Mot. at 18. OX replies it has provided detailed factual allegations that 

Openwave “widely represented that it does not own a copyright in App Suit and that it has no right 

to distribute App Suite under the OEM Agreement except by amendment” in support of its defense 

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that Openwave “waived any claim to the contrary and should be estopped from pursuing such 

claims.” Oppo. at 13.

“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its 

existence and the intent to relinquish it.” Catch a Wave, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. C 12-

05791 WHA, 2013 WL 1996134, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2013) (striking affirmative defense for 

waiver under Twombly/Iqbal standard for failure “to explain how or when plaintiff intentionally 

relinquished any known right”). Estoppel requires four elements: “(1) the party to be estopped 

must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the 

part asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of 

the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury.” Id. at *3. Here, OX 

alleged ample facts that plausibly support OX’s position that Openwave’s behavior amounts to an 

admission or, at least, an indication that Openwave did not own a copyright in App Suite. 

Openwave’s motion to strike Affirmative Defense 9 is DENIED.

2. Affirmative Defenses 15 and 16—Disclosure and Trade Secrets Known or 

Readily Ascertainable

OX’s Affirmative Defense 15 for disclosure is:

Openwave’s claims for trade secret misappropriation are barred, in 

whole or in part, because it disclosed the purported trade secrets 

without any conditions of confidentiality. This includes disclosure of 

its purported trade secrets to [OX], to Openwave’s customers, and to 

the public, without any conditions of confidentiality.

Am. Countercl. at 50. OX’s Affirmative Defense 16 for alleged trade secrets known or readily 

ascertainable states:

Openwave’s claims for trade secret misappropriation are barred, in 

whole or in part, because its alleged trade secrets are known or 

readily ascertainable by the relevant industry and/or by persons who 

could obtain economic value, if any, from their information and 

were in the public domain. This includes customer information and 

information about Openwave products, which are subjects of 

discussion by Openwave’s customers and potential customers and 

other individuals and entities who participate in the market for 

Openwave and [OX’s] products and services.

Id. at 50.

Openwave argues that these affirmative defenses are insufficient because OX failed to 

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allege “the circumstances surrounding Openwave’s disclosure of its trade secrets ‘without any 

conditions of confidentiality’ including . . . when, where and how such trade secrets were 

disclosed and by whom and to whom.” Mot. at 19. OX contends that Openwave has not cited any 

authority justifying application of Rule 9(b) to affirmative defenses. Oppo. at 14. For pleading 

purposes, OX has stated enough, and the motion to strike is DENIED.

3. Affirmative Defense 17—No Improper Means

OX’s Affirmative Defense 17 for no improper means is:

Openwave’s claims for trade secret misappropriation are barred, in 

whole or in part, because [OX] did not obtain any purported trade 

secrets by improper means.

Am. Countercl. at 51.

Openwave argues that this affirmative defense is insufficient because Openwave “did not 

allege that OX obtained Openwave’s trade secrets solely through improper means” and that it is 

“immaterial whether OX obtained the trade secrets through proper or improper means as the 

unauthorized use of the trade secrets, regardless of how obtained, is prohibited.” Mot. at 20, 

Reply at 14 (original emphasis). OX responds that I should not strike the affirmative defense 

because OX “may in fact have initially obtained purported trade secrets through a proper means 

and then misused them.” Oppo. at 14 (original emphasis). 

It is not clear whether the manner in which OX obtained Openwave’s trade secrets or OX’s 

use of the same will matter to Openwave’s trade secret misappropriation claims. Where there is 

any “doubt as to whether the challenged matter may raise an issue of fact or law, the motion to 

strike should be denied, leaving an assessment of the sufficiency of the allegations for adjudication 

on the merits.” See Carolina Cas. Ins. Co, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-91. The motion to strike 

Affirmative Defense 17 is DENIED.

4. Affirmative Defense 18—Wrong Party

OX’s Affirmative Defense 18 for wrong party is:

Openwave’s claims for false advertising, trade secret 

misappropriation, tortious interference, unfair competition, and 

fraud (Counts II–IV and VII–XII) are barred, in whole or in part, 

because it has sued the wrong party. Many of its allegations pertain 

to actions Openwave asserts to have occurred outside of the 

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Americas, and therefore these actions were not and could not have 

been performed by [OX], which only operates in North America, 

Central America, and South America. The geographic nature of 

Openwave’s allegations suggest that these claims are more properly 

asserted against one or more of the European Open-Xchange 

entities, such as Open-Xchange AG, Open-Xchange GmbH, or 

Open-Xchange Srl.

Am. Countercl. at 51.

Openwave argues that this affirmative defense is insufficient because OX did not “identify 

specifically which entity or entities were responsible for which alleged acts or omissions.” Mot. at 

21. However, OX has sufficiently pleaded that it only operates in North and South America and 

is, therefore, the wrong party to sue for conduct outside of that area. OX’s affirmative defense 

suggests, without disclosing, which entities might be responsible. Openwave cites no case law 

that would require OX to plead more. The motion to strike Affirmative Defense 18 is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss Counterclaims 3 through 7, to strike 

Counterclaim 1 and to strike Affirmative Defenses 9 and 15 through 18 is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 28, 2016

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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