Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_05-cv-00618/USCOURTS-almd-3_05-cv-00618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1330 Breach of Contract

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY )

COMPANY OF AMERICA, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:05-cv-00618-WKW

) (WO)

ONESOURCE FACILITY SERVICES, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on the Motion to Remand (Doc. # 6) of the plaintiffs, Travelers

Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”), as subrogee of Tuskegee University, and

Tuskegee University. The defendant OneSource Facility Services, Inc. (“OneSource”), opposes the

motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be GRANTED. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In resolving a motion to remand a case, “the district court must evaluate the factual

allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . .” Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538

(11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). According to the plaintiffs, OneSource contracted with

Tuskegee University to provide cleaning and maintenance of the university campus, including the

“chiller plant,” the building that housed equipment necessary for the operation of the air conditioning

system for the main campus. Two transformers inside the chiller plant were damaged by water.

Plaintiffs contend that OneSource caused the damage.

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 The Court takes judicial notice that the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama, is only located in the 1

City of Tuskegee, Alabama.

 Because OneSource challenges only the interpretation of the forum selection clause, and because federal 2

common law and Alabama law are in accord regarding forum selection clauses that mandate an in-state Alabama

forum, the Court need not engage in an Erie analysis. Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 27 n.6. 

2

Travelers, a Connecticut corporation, and Tuskegee University, an Alabama corporation,

filed an action in the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama, on August 26, 2004, against

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OneSource, a Delaware corporation, and two Alabama corporations, Burch Corporation of America

and Burch Corporation. Plaintiffs contend that, as discovery progressed, it learned that the Burch

defendants were not responsible for the maintenance of the equipment that allegedly caused the

water damage. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the Burch defendants on June 28, 2005. 

OneSource removed this action on June 29, 2005, alleging complete diversity of citizenship

after the dismissal of the Burch defendants. Plaintiffs now move for remand on the basis that the

contract upon which this action arises contains a forum selection clause that bars removal of the case

from the Circuit Court of Macon County to this Court. The contract clause at issue contains both

choice of law and forum language: “The contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of

Alabama and that venue in any legal proceedings arising out of the contract or performance there

under shall be brought and maintained in City of Tuskegee, Macon County, Alabama.” OneSource

opposes the remand. 

II. STANDARD

Forum selection clauses are “prima facie valid and should be enforced” unless they are shown

to be unreasonable, unjust, or invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching. M/S Bremen v.

Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.

22 (1988). The Court may “remand a removed case when appropriate to enforce a forum selection 2

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 Venue in a removal action is determined by the removal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). OneSource is 3

correct in noting that venue is proper in the Eastern Division of the Middle District of Alabama, as this is the district

and division embracing the place from which the case is removed. However, the existence of proper venue here does

not preclude remand; forum selection by agreement of the parties is at issue here. 

 Federal district courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the forum state. Erie Railroad 4

Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine extends to choice-of-law questions. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor

Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Alabama follows the traditional conflict rule of lex loci contractus, which

states that the laws of the jurisdiction where the contract is made governs the contract, but Alabama also recognizes

the right of parties to choose a particular state’s laws to govern their contract. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. Brown,

582 So.2d 502, 506 (Ala. 1991).

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clause.” Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1263 n.26 (11th Cir. 1999). A forum selection

clause may constitute a waiver of a defendant’s right to remove an action to federal court. See id. 3

at 1260. “[I]n the context of removal based solely on diversity jurisdiction, ordinary contract

principles govern a contractual waiver.” Id. at 1261 (footnote omitted). “However, when ordinary

contract principles fail to elucidate a single reasonable interpretation for an ambiguous provision,

and instead the provision is subject to opposing, yet reasonable interpretation[s], an interpretation

is preferred which operates more strongly against the party from whom the words proceeded. Global

Satellite Communication Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations

and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

III. DISCUSSION

In light of the foregoing principles, this Court must first determine whether the forum

selection clause at issue – “. . . venue in any legal proceedings arising out of the contractual

performance there under shall be brought and maintained in City of Tuskegee, Macon

County, Alabama”– is “ambiguous . . . and . . . subject to opposing yet reasonable

interpretation[s].” Id. The Court applies Alabama principles of contract law to do so. Under 4

Alabama law, “[a]n ambiguity [in a contract] exists where a term is reasonably subject to more than

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one interpretation. The mere fact that adverse parties contend for different constructions does not

in itself force the conclusion that the disputed language is ambiguous.” Ex parte Awtrey Realty Co.,

827 So.2d 104, 107 (Ala. 2001) (citations omitted). Moreover, the parties cannot create ambiguities

by setting forth “strained or twisted reasoning.” See id. at 107-08. Nor does an undefined word or

phrase create an inherent ambiguity. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 817 So.2d 687,

692 (Ala. 2001). “To the contrary, where questions arise as to the meaning of an undefined word

or phrase, the court should simply give the undefined word or phrase the same meaning that a person

of ordinary intelligence would give it.” Id. (citation omitted).

OneSource has the burden of establishing the ambiguity it alleges. Blue Cross Blue Shield

of Alabama v. Rigas, __So.2d__, 2005 WL 2175451 (Ala. Sept. 9, 2005). Relying almost

exclusively on Global Satellite, OneSource advances several arguments in support of a finding of

ambiguity. 

The forum selection clause in Global Satellite stated, in relevant part, “Venue shall be in

Broward County, Florida. . . . The parties . . . herein expressly waive the right to contest any issues

regarding venue or in personam jurisdiction and agree in the event of litigation to submit to the

jurisdiction of Broward County, Florida,” Global Satellite, 378 F.3d at 1271. The Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals found the phrase “submit to the jurisdiction of Broward County, Florida” to be

vague and imprecise “because it names only a geographical unit, [which is] host to several forums”

and the Court “can only guess which of these it intended to designate.” Id. The court in Global

Satellite thus held that particular clause to be ambiguous.

OneSource first faults the drafter of the contract, Tuskegee University, for failure to designate

a particular forum in Tuskegee, Macon County, Alabama. (Def. Br., at 4.) OneSource correctly

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 The change of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, is inapplicable here.

5

 Beehive, Bacon Level, Cowpens, and Frog Eye are communities located within the Eastern Division of 6

the Middle District of Alabama.

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acknowledges that “this Court is not located in Macon County, Alabama,” but goes on to incorrectly

allege “. . . neither was the federal district court in Global Satellite located in Broward County,

[Florida].” But, in fact, Global Satellite firmly established that the “district courts for the Southern

District of Florida are located in the cities of Fort Lauderdale (in Broward County), [citing other

geographical locations] . . . .” Global Satellite, at 1271-72 (emphasis added). The Global court

further noted that Broward County was “host to several forums,” meaning that there were both

federal and state courts sitting in that county. Id. 

Assuredly, Tuskegee, Macon County, Alabama is not “host to several forums.” The district

courts of the Middle District of Alabama sit by statutory designation in Montgomery, Dothan, and

Opelika, not in Tuskegee. 28 U.S.C. § 81(b)(3). The only forum for a civil action of this magnitude

in Tuskegee is the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama – a state court. OneSource insists that

it is theoretically possible, under 28 U.S.C. §1404(c), to order “any civil action to be tried at any 5

place within the division in which it is pending.” (Def. Br., at 5.) Assuming arguendo that the Court

has such authority, the likelihood of the Court ordering the trial of this case to be held in Tuskegee

is about the same as the likelihood of ordering the trial to be held in Beehive, Bacon Level,

Cowpens, or Frog Eye – which is to say, not at all likely. 

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To conceive that either of these parties, when negotiating this contract, entertained the idea

that the clause in question referred to a federal district court in the Middle District of Alabama would

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 Most courts that have been asked to interpret similarly-worded clauses have concluded that the federal 7

court of the district embracing the county named in the clause is not a permissible forum. See, e.g., Paolina v. Argyll

Equities, L.L.C., No. SA-05-CA-0342-XR, 2005 WL 2147931, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2005) (collecting cases).

 OneSource does not contend that “any legal proceedings arising out of the contract or performance there 8

under” is ambiguous. Nor does it contend that the forum selection clause is not mandatory.

 Given their ordinary meaning, “brought” in its present tense means to “initiate,” Merriam-Webster

9

Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/brought/ (last visited March 23, 2006), and “maintained” means

to “keep in an existing state.” Id., http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/maintained/ (last visited March 23, 2006). (Here,

the latter is construed “to keep in an existing state court.”) 

 OneSource further contends that the clause at issue is even more vague and imprecise than the one in 10

Global Satellite because it makes no mention of words such as “submit to,” “jurisdiction,” or “waiver.” However, a

waiver need not “include explicit words such as ‘waiver of right of removal,’” Waters v. Browning-Ferris Indus.,

Inc., 252 F.3d 796, 797 (5th Cir. 2001), and the use of those words in Global Satellite actually confused the issue.

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be patently unreasonable and a strained construction. The clause is not ambiguous for the failure to

designate a particular forum in Tuskegee. There is no other forum in Tuskegee.7

OneSource’s second reason to conclude that the clause is ambiguous is that “removal is not

forbidden because it is possible for the court to conduct the instant action in Tuskegee, Macon

County, Alabama.” (Def. Br. at 5(emphasis added).) At first blush this argument seems to be the

same as previously discussed because of the reference to the possibility of holding court in Tuskegee.

In fact, this argument relates to whether the clause in question constitutes a waiver by OneSource

of its right to remove in a diversity action. This analysis is intertwined with the discussion of

ambiguity. 

The phrase “shall be brought and maintained” is the operative phrase as to waiver of the right

of removal. In the context of civil litigation, “brought” can only mean “filed,” and “maintained,” 8

especially when conjunctive to “brought,” can only mean “kept.” OneSource did not address the 9

meaning and force of these words and has not demonstrated that they are vague or imprecise.10

While the subject clause is not an example of brilliant legal drafting, neither does it lend itself to

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more than one reasonable interpretation: any legal proceeding arising out of this contract shall be

filed and kept in the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama. The clause is unambiguous and

constitutes a clear waiver of any right to removal.

OneSource’s last argument is that removal is not inconsistent with the forum selection clause.

In view of the above findings that the language is not reasonably susceptible to two or more

meanings, this argument is without merit.

IV. CONCLUSION

The forum selection clause is unambiguous. In its contract with Tuskegee University,

OneSource agreed to waive its right to remove to federal court any action arising from the contract.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. # 6) is GRANTED, and this

cause is hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama. The Clerk is

DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand. 

DONE this the 23rd day of March, 2006.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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