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Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

February 15, 1991 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 86-1400; Parks v. Brown 

The court's opinion on rehearing was filed February 14, 1991. 

On page 6, line 4 the word "advocated" was misspelled. Please 

substitute this corrected page 6 for your copy in the opinion. 

tas 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBER~~HOECKER, Clerk 

~a~U,t£ Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 1 
The United States Supreme Court reversed our en bane 

decision, holding that the anti-sympathy instruction by itself did 

not violate Parks' constitutional rights. The Court held that 

Parks' argument advocated a new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. ___ , 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 

--' 109 s. Ct. 2934 (1989), and could not be applied 

retroactively. Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1260. According to the 

majority, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 u.s. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. 

Ohio, 438 U.S.586 (1978) 1 which predated Parks' trial, simply 

precluded the state from barring "relevant mitigating evidence 

from being presented and considered during the penalty phase of a 

capital trial. " Saffle, 110 s. Ct. at 1261. 4 The Court observed 

that Instruction .Nine did not restrict what mitigating evidence 

the jury could consider, but rather it addressed only how the jury 

could consider such evidence. Id. This "how/what distinction" 

was central to the court's analysis: 

Parks asks us to create a rule relating, not to what 

mitigating evidence the jury must consider in making its 

decision but to how it must consider the mitigating 

evidence. There is a simple and logical difference 

between rules that govern what factors the jury must be 

permitted to consider in making its sentencing decision, 

and rules that govern how the state may guide the jury 

in considering and weighing those factors in reaching a 

decision. 

We now review Parks' reserved claim that the 

prosecutor's anti-sympathy comments combined with Instruction Nine 

4 In Eddings, for example, the Court held that the sentencing 

judge committed constitutional error when he refused to consider 

mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant consisting of his 

family background and upbringing. Eddings, 455 u.s. at 117. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

PI L -s United S .c 1) tatcs Court of Ap~fs Tenth Cir::uit 

UNlTED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FfB 1 ~ 1S91 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBYN LEROY PARKS, ) 

) 

Petiti oner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 86-1400 

) 

JAMES SAFFLE*, Warden, ) 

Oklahoma State Penitentiary, ) Mc~ester, Oklahoma; ) 

LARRY MEACHUM, Superintendent, ) 

Oklahoma Department of Corrections; ) 

and ROBERT H. HENRY**, Attorney ) 

General, State of Oklahoma, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-84-1618-T) 

ON REHEARING EN BANC 

Mandy Welch, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Oklahoma Appellate 

Public Defender System, Norman, Oklahoma; (Vivian Berger, 

New York, New York, and Lewis Barber, Jr., Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, on the brief), for Petitioner-Appellant. 

* The court's previous opinions, reported at 840 F.2d 1496 

(lOth Cir. 1987) and 860 F.2d 1545 (lOth Cir. 1988), included John 

N. Brown, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, McAlester, 

Oklahoma, as a respondent-appellee. In this order the case 

caption has been amended to substitute James Saffle, the successor 

to John N. Brown, as Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 

McAlester, Oklahoma. 

** In this opinion on rehearing the caption has been amended to 

substitute Robert H. Henry, the successor to Michael c. TUrpen, as 

Attorney General, State of Oklahoma. 

Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 3 
Robert A. Nance, Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Chief, Federal 

Division (Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, with him 

on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, MCKAY, LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE, ANDERSON, TACHA, 

BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

The issue to be decided in this, our second en bane 

consideration of petitioner's habeas petition, is whether the 

prosecutor's anti-sympathy comments combined with an anti-sympathy 

instruction given by the court during the penalty stage of 

petitioner's capital trial influenced the jury improperly to 

discount mitigating evidence presented by the defendant. The 

United States Supreme Court in Saffle v. Parks, 110 s. Ct. 1257 

(1990), held that the anti-sympathy jury instruction by itself did 

not violate the defendant Robyn Leroy Parks' constitutional 

rights. The Supreme Court did not, however, address whether the 

prosecutor's anti-sympathy comments combined with the antisympathy instruction improperly influenced the jury. That issue 

is now before us on remand of this case from the Supreme Court. 

We hold that the prosecutor's remarks, when considered in 

conjunction with the instructions given, did not have the effect 

of prohibiting the jury from considering any of Parks' mitigating 

evidence. Therefore, we affirm the order of the district court 

denying Parks' peitition for habeas relief. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 4 
FACTS 

In 1978, a jury found Parks guilty of murdering a gas station 

attendant whom he feared would inform the police of his use of a 

stolen credi t card. 1 During the sentencing phase of the trial, 

the trial judge allowed Parks to put on any mitigating evidence 

that he desired. Through his father's testimony, Parks put on 

evidence of his background, his broken home and various other 

experiences in his life. After both sides had presented their 

s entencing evidence, the jury was instructed that it could not 

impose the death penalty unless it found one or more specifically 

enumerated aggravating circumstances. The jury was further 

instructed that if it found aggravating circumstances, it must 

balance them against any mitigating circumstances it might find. 

A number of potential mitigating circumstances were listed in the 

jury instruction. However, the jury was advised that the 

mitigating circumstances listed in the instruction were not 

exclusive and that the "facts or evidence that may constitute an 

additional mitigating circumstance is for the jury to determine." 

Additionall y, the jury was given what is referred to as an antisympathy instruction (Instruction Nine), of which the most 

critical portion was as follows: "You must avoid any influence of 

sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor 

when imposing sentence. 112 

1 A more complete exposition of the facts is provided in our 

previous en bane opinion. Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (lOth 

Cir. 1988). 

2 The full instruction, Instruction No. 9 in the penalty trial, 

provided: 

[continued on next page ... ] 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 5 
At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of the trial, the 

jury sentenced Parks to death. Parks' conviction and sentence 

were affirmed on direct appeal by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

[ ..• continued from previous page] 

In arriving at your determination as to what 

sentence is appropriate under the law, you are 

authorized to consider all the facts and 

circumstances of this case whether presented 

by the State or the defendant and whether 

presented in the first proceeding or this 

sentencing proceeding. 

All of the previous instructions given 

you in the first part of this trial apply 

where applicable and must be considered along 

with these additional Instructions; 

together they contain all the law of any kind 

to be applied by you in this case, and the 

rules by which you are to weigh the evidence 

and determine the facts in issue. You must 

consider them all together, and not a part of 

them to the exclusion of the rest. 

You are the judges of the facts. The 

importance and worth of the evidence is for 

you to determine. You must avoid any 

influence of sympathy. sentiment, passion, 

prejudice, or other arbitrary factor when 

imposing sentence. You should discharge your 

duty as jurors impartially, conscientiously 

and faithfully under your oaths and return 

such verdict as the evidence warrants when 

measured by these Instructions. 

The Court has made rulings during the 

sentencing stage of this trial. In doing so, 

the Court has not expressed nor intimated in 

any way the conclusions to be reached by you 

in this case. The Court specifically has not 

expressed any opinion as to whether or not any 

statutory aggravating circumstances exist, or 

whether or not any mitigating circumstances 

exist. 

You must not use any method of chance in 

arriving at a verdict but must base it on the 

judgment of each juror concurring therein. 

[continued on next page .•• ] 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 6 
Appeals. Parks v. State, 651 P.2d 686 (Ok. Crim. App. 1982). The 

United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 459 U.S. 1155 

(1983). After seeking post-conviction relief in the state court, 

Parks filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal 

courts. One of the issues raised in his petition for habeas 

corpus was whether the use of Instruction Nine violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights. In a divided en bane opinion, this court 

concluded that Instruction Nine by itself violated Parks' 

constitutional rights by limiting Parks' right to have the jury 

consider relevant mitigating evidence. Parks, 860 F.2d at 1559. 

We accordingly granted the requested habeas relief without 

reaching the related issue raised by Parks of whether his 

constitutional rights were violated when the jury considered 

Instruction Nine in conjunction with the prosecutor's antisympathy comments. 3 

[ ..• continued from previous page] 

3 

You have already elected a Foreman. Your 

verdict must be unanimous. Proper forms of 

verdict will be furnished you from which you 

shall chose one to express your decision. 

When you have reached a verdict, all of you in 

a body must return it into open court. 

The law provides that you should now 

listen to and consider the further argument of 

counsel. 

(emphasis added). 

Justice O'Connor, in her concurring op1n1on in California v. 

Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 546 (1987), had called for a remand in that 

case to "determine whether the jury instructions, taken as a 

whole, and considered in combination with the prosecutor's closing 

argument, adequately informed the jury of its responsibility to 

consider all of the mitigating evidence introduced by the 

respondent." It is precisely this additional analysis that Parks 

raises in this related issue. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 7 
The United States Supreme Court reversed our en bane 

decision, holding that the anti-sympathy instruction by itself did 

not violate Parks' constitutional rights. The Court held that 

Parks' argument advoacted a new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 

u.s. ___ , 109 s. Ct. 2934 (1989) and Penry v. Lynauqh, 492 U.S. 

__ , 109 s. Ct. 2934 (1989), and could not be applied 

retroactively. Saffle, 110 s. Ct. at 1260. According to the 

majority, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. 

Ohio, 438 U.S.586 (1978), which predated Parks' trial, sLmply 

precluded the state from barring "relevant mitigating evidence 

from being presented and considered during the penalty phase of a 

capital trial." Saffle, 110 s. Ct. at 1261. 4 The Court observed 

that Instruction Nine did not restrict what mitigating evidence 

the jury could consider, but rather it addressed only how the jury 

could consider such evidence. Id. This "how/what distinction" 

was central to the court's analysis: 

Parks asks us to create a rule relating, not to what 

mitigating evidence the jury must consider in making its 

decision but to how it must consider the mitigating 

evidence. There is a simple and logical difference 

between rules that govern what factors the jury must be 

permitted to consider i n making its sentencing decision, 

and rules that govern how the state may guide the jury 

in considering and weighing those factors in reaching a 

decision. 

We now review Parks' reserved claim that the 

prosecutor's anti-sympathy comments combined with Instruction Nine 

4 In Eddings, for example, the Court held that the sentencing 

judge committed constitutional error when he refused to consider 

mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant consisting of his 

family background and upbringing. Eddings, 455 u.s. at 117. 

- 6 -

Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 8 
violated his constitutional rights. In accordance with the 

analysis set forth in the Supreme Court's opinion, we endeavor to 

determine whether the anti-sympathy comments complained of by the 

petitioner had the effect of precluding what mitigating evidence 

the jury could consider in sentencing as opposed to addressing how 

they could consider it. 

ANALYSIS 

In his brief petitioner points out several incidents where 

the prosecutor encouraged the jury to avoid the influence of 

sympathy. Two of the comments merely tracked Instruction Nine. 

Because the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 

Instruction Nine in Saffle, we cannot grant the petitioner's 

request for habeas relief based upon these two comments. 

The first of these, occurring in the voir dire portion of 

the tri al, merely informed the jury of how they were to consider 

the evidence--not what evidence they could consider. 

Of course the Court will instruct you that you 

should not allow sympathy, sentiment or prejudice to 

enter into your deliberations. And, frankly, that's 

just as cold blooded as you can put it. 

During this trial, not matter if you get to dislike 

me as an attorney or you don't like the way I part my 

hair or you don't like David Hood, or you think he looks 

real good and you think you ought to rule for it that 

way; as Judge Cannon told you, you can have your 

sympathies and your sentiment and your prejudices all 

you want to--you know you can be as sympathetic as you 

want to or you can be as prejudiced as you want to be, 

but you can't do it and sit on this jury. So that's 

just a real simple way that Judge Cannon put it to you. 

You cannot allow your sympathy, sentiment or 

prejudice to influence you in this case and sit on this 

jury. And now is the time for us to find out if you 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 9 
will eliminate any sympathy, sentiment or prejudice in 

this case. Will all of you do that? 

Tr. Vol. I at 86-87. 

The second comment, occurring during the prosecutor's final 

rebuttal argument at the closing of the sentencing phase of the 

trial, likewise limited how the jury was to consider the evidence: 

[The defense counsel's] closing arguments are 

really a pitch to you for sympathy--sympathy, or 

sentiment or prejudice; and you told me in voir dire you 

wouldn't do that. 

Well, it's just cold turkey. He either did it or 

he didn't. He either deserves the death penalty or he 

doesn't, you know. You leave the sympathy, and the 

sentiment and prejudice part out of it. 

Tr. Vol. vat 725-26. 

Both of these comments addressed only how the jury can 

consider the evidence--not what evidence it can consider. 

Therefore, under Saffle, these two comments pass constitutional 

muster. 

Several other comments arguably went beyond Instruction Nine. 

Once again, the issue before this court is whether these comments, 

when viewed in conjunction with Instruction Nine, violated Parks' 

constitutional rights. Because we conclude that there was not "a 

reasonable likelihood" that the prosecutors comments were applied 

by the jury in a way that interfered with the jury's consideration 

of constitutionally relevant evidence, we deny the petitioner's 

request for habeas relif. See Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 

1190, 1198 (1990). 5 

5 In Boyde, the Court held that the "reasonable likelihood" 

standard was the correct standard to use when reviewing the 

constitutionality of a jury instruction in a capital case. The 

court implicitly also applied the "reasonable likelihood" standard 

(continued on next page . . . ] 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 10 
All of these comments occurred in the voir dire portion of 

the trial. For example, when the prosecutor was addressing an 

individual venireman, he asked, "unless the court instructs you 

that under the law, if a fellow has a different lifestyle that 

entitles him to commit a murder, you wouldn't allow that to 

influence you, would you?" Tr. Vol. I at 124. The prosecutor 

went on to ask that prospective juror: "And no matter what his 

lifestyle was, if the state proves to your satisfaction beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he is guilty, then irregardless of his 

lifestyle, you wouldn't let that influence your verdict, would 

you?" Id. at 124-24. A little later during the voir dire, the 

prosecutor asked a welfare department employee whether he 

sympathized with welfare recipients "solely for the reason that 

it's necessary that they come in and get welfare payments." When 

he responded, "[n]o, sir," the prosecutor followed by stating: 

And, in any event, you wouldn't consider a different 

lifestyle as--if it's--unless the court so instructs you 

that if you have a different lifestyle that it's all 

right to go out and do things that other people can't 

do, you wouldn't feel like a different lifestyle would 

give anyone a right to do anything that is in violation 

of the law, would you? 

Id. at 155. 

It is far from clear that these comments refer to what the 

jury could consider as mitigating evidence. In any event, these 

[ •• • continued from previous page] 

when it reviewed the impact of the prosecutor's comments and their 

effect upon the jury's understanding of the relevant inst~uction. 

Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1200. We note, however, that while the same 

standard applies when reviewing, both the jury instructions and 

the prosecutor's comments, because the prosecutor's comments by 

their nature carry less weight with the jury than jury 

instructions, the likelihood that the comments influenced the jury 

is generally less. See note 6 & accompanying text, infra. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 11 
comments were directed towards a finding of guilt--not towards a 

determination of Parks' sentence. Given the nature of these 

comments as made in this case, and further given the timing of 

them during the voir dire portion of the trial, ~ Coury v. 

Livesay, 868 F.2d 842, 845-46 (6th Cir. 1989), we conclude that 

there is not a reasonable likelihood the jurors here understood 

the challenged instruction and comments to preclude consideration 

of relevant mitigating evidence offered by Parks. 

Any harm caused by these comments would have been further 

minimized because Instruction Five (given during the penalty phase 

of the trial) unambiguously instructed the jury that it could 

consider any mitigating evidence: 

You are further instructed that mitigating 

circumstances, if any, must be considered by you ..•• 

You are not limited in your consideration to the minimum 

mitigating circumstances set out herein, and you may 

consider any other or additional mitigating 

circumstances, if any, that you ·may find from the 

evidence to exist in this case. What facts or evidence 

that may constitute an additional mitigating 

circumstance is for the jury to determine. 

. . . . (emphasis added). 

Furthermore, arguments of counsel are not viewed as having 

the same force as jury instructions, Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1200. 6 

Finally, in his closing argument at the end of the sentencing 

phase, the prosecutor himself made it clear that the jury could 

consider any mitigating evidence: "And, now the court also tells 

you, you can consider anything else that you want to, to mitigate 

6 Twice during the ~rial, the judge made it clear that he, and not 

the attorneys, was ~n charge of presenting the law to the jury. 

Tr. Vol. I at 68; Tr. Vol . IV at 609. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 12 
the penalty of death and the term of life. You can consider 

anything you want to in addition to what he's told you." Tr. Vol. 

v at 703-04. Therefore, we cannot accept petitioner's argument 

that there is a reasonable likelihood that these two prosecutorial 

comments occurring during the voir dire portion of the trial 

affected the jury's understanding of Instruction Nine in such a 

way that it felt precluded from considering relevant mitigating 

evidence. 

CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court's denial of Parks' petition for 

habeas corpus, and we VACATE our order of May 14, 1990 wherein we 

had ordered the state to notify this court in writing before 

attempting to set a new execution date for petitioner. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1400 Document: 01019726098 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 13