Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02432/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02432-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

SOPHIA WONG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security Administration, et al.,

Defendants. 

No. C 08-02432 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 4]

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is plaintiff Sophia Wong’s First Ex-parte Motion for Immediate Sua Sponte

Action from this Court: for the Court to Immediately (1) Stay Eviction Action, (2) Stay Sheriff’s

Eviction, and (3) Stay the San Francisco Housing Authority from Regaining Possession of Plaintiff’s

Lifelong Apartment, and (4) Stay the Defendants from Destroying the Life of Innocent Plaintiff

Sophia Wong (the “Motion”) [Docket No. 4]. Wong has asked the Court to issue a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) to stay her eviction from her apartment. Wong did not serve any

defendants with her ex parte request, claiming they would destroy evidence if served with process. 

She did not verify or declare her allegations, however. Further, Wong has apparently already been

evicted in a Superior Court action. Thus, as discussed below, the Court denies her request due to

mootness, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and for lack of proper service. 

BACKGROUND

Wong is allegedly mentally disabled and receives Social Security disability benefits. Mot.

at 2:2-5. She alleges her benefits go to a payee, whom she has named as a defendant, who did not

pay her rent for 15 months, resulting in her eviction by her landlord, the San Francisco Housing

Authority (the “SFHA”), in Superior Court case CUD-08-625494. Id. at 2:11-20, 3:17, 5:24-25. As

a result, she alleges she is now homeless. Id. at 1:1, 4:3-6, 4:15-16. On May 12, 2008, Wong filed a

complaint and the Motion in the Northern District of California. See Docket Nos. 1, 4. 

In her Motion, Wong requests the Court issue a TRO to: (1) overturn the judgment in case

Case 4:08-cv-02432-SBA Document 7 Filed 05/13/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

CUD-08-625494; (2) stay the Sheriffs’ eviction; (3) stay the granted possession; (4) stay the SFHA

from regaining possession of her apartment; (5) restore her to the only lifetime home she has ever

known; (6) prohibit the SFHA from imposing a five-year wait period for new housing; and (7) have

the United States Marshals seize her records when they serve her summons and simultaneously

change her payee. Id. at 3:17-25, 4:23-5:19. Wong did not serve her Motion on any defendants as

she alleges they have all the documentary evidence relevant to this matter, and some of them will

destroy these documents in their possession, upon receipt of process of service. Id. at 4:23-5:8.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Preliminary Injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 permits the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the

purpose of which is to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be

conducted. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2006);

LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes, 434 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). A party seeking a

preliminary injunction must show either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and

the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in its favor. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 462 F.3d

1194, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2006). These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in

which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases. 

LGS Architects, 434 F.3d at 1155; see also Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1174

(9th Cir. 2006) (the greater the relative hardship to the moving party, the less probability of success

must be shown to support the grant of a preliminary injunction).

Under the sliding scale theory, a party seeking an injunction “need not demonstrate that he

will succeed on the merits, but must at least show that his cause presents serious questions of law

worthy of litigation.” Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994). Additionally, in cases where the public interest may be

affected, the court must consider the public interest as a factor in balancing the hardships. Harris v.

Bd. of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2004). 

While a preliminary injunction will not be issued without security by the applicant under

Case 4:08-cv-02432-SBA Document 7 Filed 05/13/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), a district court has wide discretion in setting the amount of a

bond, and the bond amount may be zero if there is no evidence the party will suffer damages from

the injunction. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878,

882 (9th Cir. 2003).

II. Preliminary Injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil Local Rule 65-1

The Local Rules of the Northern District of California require certain documentation to

support an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order. Local Rule 65-1(a) requires that

An ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order must be accompanied by:

(1) A copy of the complaint;

(2) A separate memorandum of points and authorities in support of the

motion;

(3) The proposed temporary restraining order; and

(4) Such other documents in support of the motion which the party wishes

the Court to consider.

III. Preliminary Injunction Notice

In addition, “[u]nless relieved by order of a Judge for good cause shown, on or before the

day of an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order, counsel applying for the temporary

restraining order must deliver notice of such motion to opposing counsel or party.” N.D. Cal. Civ.

R. 65-1(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) further specifies the conditions for an ex parte

temporary restraining order, stating:

(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary restraining order

without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show

that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give

notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

Case 4:08-cv-02432-SBA Document 7 Filed 05/13/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

ANALYSIS

I. Wong’s first through fifth requests are denied as moot.

Where the only violation before the court is in the past, injunctive relief will only be

available where “there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation.” U.S. v. W. T. Grant

Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Here, Wong’s first through fifth requests are for a TRO to prevent

her eviction, but she repeatedly states she has already been evicted. Thus, the Court DENIES her

first through fifth requests as moot.

II. Wong’s first request is denied under Younger v. Ohio.

The Younger doctrine espouses a strong federal policy against federal court interference with

pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Middlesex County Ethics

Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); see also Hawaii Housing Auth. v.

Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1984) (“Under Younger-abstention doctrine, interests of comity and

federalism counsel federal courts to abstain from jurisdiction whenever federal claims have been or

could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests”);

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “[T]he driving principle behind Younger was that in matters

of special concern to the states, federal courts should avoid depriving the state courts of the

opportunity to adjudicate constitutional issues.” M&A Gabaee v. Community Redev. Agency of L.A.,

419 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.

2004) (federal courts should “avoid unwarranted determinations of federal constitutional law”). 

“Absent ‘extraordinary circumstances’, abstention in favor of state judicial proceedings is

required if the state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests, and

(3) provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims.” Hirsh v. Justices of

Supreme Ct. of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam); see also Canatella v. California,

404 F.3d 1106, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2005); San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145

F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). 

If the state court proceedings were undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, or

if some other “extraordinary circumstances” exist, a district court need not abstain under Younger. 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 54; Dubinka v. Judges of Super. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 225 (9th Cir. 1994). An

Case 4:08-cv-02432-SBA Document 7 Filed 05/13/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

example of “extraordinary circumstances” is when the statute involved is “flagrantly and patently

violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in

whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” Younger, 401 U.S.

at 53-54. For the following three reasons, the Court abstains from granting Wong’s first request,

under Younger.

A. Ongoing State Proceedings

The dispositive issue as to whether there are ongoing state proceedings is whether the state

proceedings were underway prior to initiation of the federal proceedings. See Wiener v. County of

San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994). Wong alleges she has already been evicted by an

unlawful detainer action brought by the SFHA. Thus, state proceedings were underway before she

filed this action. Further, state court proceedings “are deemed on-going for purposes of Younger

abstention until state appellate review is completed.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 969 n.4

(9th Cir. 2004). Thus, until Wong has exhausted her state rights of appeal, this Court should abstain

from interfering in “ongoing state proceedings.”

B. Important State Interests

“The importance of the interest is measured by considering its significance broadly, rather

than focusing on the state’s interest in the resolution of an individual case.” Baffert v. Cal. Horse

Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1075 (2003). Here California

has an important interest in protecting real property transfers and leasehold estates, which have

historically and traditionally been the domain of the states, and not the federal government. Thus,

the state interests here support the Court abstaining under Younger.

C. Adequate Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims

For Younger abstention to apply, a party “need be accorded only an opportunity to fairly

pursue [its] constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings.” Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,

337 (1977). “Younger requires only the absence of ‘procedural bars’ to raising a federal claim in the

state proceedings.” Communications Telesystems Int’l v. California Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d

1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999). The burden rests with the plaintiff to show that it is procedurally barred

from raising its federal claims in the state court proceedings. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14. 

Case 4:08-cv-02432-SBA Document 7 Filed 05/13/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Otherwise, there is a presumption that state courts provide an adequate forum for the adjudication of

federal claims. Id. at 15. In this case, Wong has alleged violations of the Social Security Act

(“SSA”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mot. at 1. (Her pleadings, however, do not support any claim under

§ 1983.) To the extent, she seeks immediate relief barring her eviction, predicated on the

misdirection of her Social Security payments, a federal forum will not provide her a better venue

than a state forum, in terms of fighting her eviction. Thus, this Younger factor encourages the Court

to abstain from Wong’s eviction action.

III. Wong’s sixth request is denied as indirectly moot.

To obtain a TRO, Wong must clear the Ninth Circuit’s test which balances the degree of

irreparable harm against the probability of success. LGS Architects, 434 F.3d at 1155; see also

Harper, 445 F.3d at 1174. In her sixth request, Wong alleges that as she has been evicted, she must

wait five years under SFHA regulations before re-applying for housing. Mot. at 3:8-10. The Court

may not grant a TRO to invalidate the SFHA regulation, because it is merely triggered by Wong’s

eviction, which has already occurred, and for which the Court is unable to grant a TRO. Thus, her

sixth request is indirectly moot.

IV. Wong’s seventh request is denied as premature and legally groundless.

In her seventh request, Wong asks the Court to send Marshals to seize records when they

serve her summons. Wong’s request for In Forma Pauperis status is pending [Docket No. 3], and

thus the Court has not yet determined whether the Marshals will effect service for her. Further,

Wong has failed to provide the Court with any legal authority for her request.

V. Wong’s requests are denied for inadequate service.

Wong asks the Court to issue a TRO against defendants, without notice to them, on the

grounds they will destroy evidence if they are tipped off to her action. Wong, however, failed to

verify her Motion or supply a declaration, as required by Rule 65(b)(1)(A), providing specific

grounds as to why notice should be excused in this matter. Further, bare naked allegations, even

under oath, that defendants will destroy records to conceal their alleged illegal activities, when such

records are most likely also held by the SSA, are poor support for the fairly extreme measure of

issuing an order without notice to an affected party. The Court thus denies Wong’s request for a

Case 4:08-cv-02432-SBA Document 7 Filed 05/13/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

TRO.

CONCLUSION

The Court denies plaintiff Sophia Wong’s First Ex-parte Motion for Immediate Sua Sponte

Action from this Court: for the Court to Immediately (1) Stay Eviction Action, (2) Stay Sheriff’s

Eviction, and (3) Stay the San Francisco Housing Authority from Regaining Possession of Plaintiff’s

Lifelong Apartment, and (4) Stay the Defendants from Destroying the Life of Innocent Plaintiff

Sophia Wong (the “Motion”) [Docket No. 4]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 13, 2008 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

Case 4:08-cv-02432-SBA Document 7 Filed 05/13/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WONG et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ASTRUE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-02432 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on May 14, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Sophia Wong

1230 Market Street, #731

San Francisco, CA 94102

Dated: May 13, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:08-cv-02432-SBA Document 7 Filed 05/13/08 Page 8 of 8