Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-18-02415/USCOURTS-ca7-18-02415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-2415 

LEONARD D. FUQUA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:14-cv-2484 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 27, 2020 — DECIDED APRIL 23, 2020 

____________________ 

Before BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal asks us to consider 

under which federal employee compensation act a postal 

worker’s claim of emotional distress must be resolved. 

I. 

Plaintiff Leonard Fuqua was a mail handler with the 

United States Postal Service at the O’Hare Airport mail center. 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
2 No. 18-2415 

That center was downsized and Fuqua was forced to transfer 

to a new location. He bid for placement at various other duty 

stations, but he did not receive placement within thirty miles 

of his home in suburban Chicago. When he was reassigned to 

a mail center in Kansas City, he refused to appear for work 

there and was fired. 

Fuqua alleged his termination caused him emotional distress so he made an administrative claim with the Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2671, et seq. The Postal Service denied his claim, ruling that 

his exclusive remedy was through an administrative proceeding before the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

Fuqua wrote that department asking whether he was eligible 

for compensation under that Act. The department responded 

it was unclear from his letter, and he was invited to submit a 

formal claim under the FECA. Instead, Fuqua sued the Postal 

Service and the United States for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but under the FTCA. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court 

lacked jurisdiction to hear Fuqua’s claim because his exclusive remedy was under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, and Fuqua 

appealed. 

This court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to stay the case pending a decision 

from the Department of Labor as to whether it would consider 

Fuqua’s claim under the FECA. Fuqua v. USPS, 607 F. App’x 

570 (7th Cir. 2015). We explained “when it is unclear whether 

the FECA covers a particular injury, federal courts defer to the 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
No. 18-2415 3

Secretary of Labor, staying litigation until the Secretary makes 

a final determination regarding coverage.” Id. at 572. 

The Department of Labor responded to Fuqua that ”[y]our 

claim for compensation is denied because the evidence is 

insufficient to establish that you were injured in the performance of duty as required by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.” Fuqua had submitted no documentation that 

he had provided timely notification of his work injury, had 

been diagnosed with a condition from an employment activity, or was injured while performing any duty of his employment. Fuqua was asked to complete a questionnaire and 

submit any supporting evidence within thirty days. 

Fuqua did so, alleging he was injured because of defendants’ “extreme and outrageous conduct refusing to allow 

[him] to become assigned a station closer to [his] residence.” 

But he did not submit any additional evidence and failed to 

provide specific details of his termination. So the department 

denied his claim under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, explaining “[e]motional conditions that arise out of 

administrative and personnel matters, such as termination of 

employment are usually covered only if the weight of the evidence supports that the employer acted in an abusive manner or erred in some way.” The department concluded that 

Fuqua had failed to establish “that the employing agency 

acted erroneously or abusively in terminating [his] employment.” 

The defendants then moved to dismiss Fuqua’s complaint 

in the district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They 

argued the department’s acceptance and adjudication of 

Fuqua’s claims under the FECA proved that Act applied to 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
4 No. 18-2415 

his claims and the department had exclusive jurisdiction. The 

district court agreed and dismissed Fuqua’s case.1 

Fuqua appealed pro se. After reviewing the case we decided counseled briefing and oral argument were appropriate. See FED. R. APP. P. 34 (a)(2)(C). Counsel was recruited for 

Fuqua2 and the parties were asked to address whether the district court properly dismissed this case on the ground that the 

Department of Labor had accepted exclusive jurisdiction under FECA over Fuqua’s claims. 

II. 

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack 

of jurisdiction. Sykes v. Cook Cty., 837 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 

2016). We may affirm a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on 

any ground supported in the record. Id. at 740; Knutson v. Vill. 

of Lakemoor, 932 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2019). 

A. 

First, we consider whether the district court erred in dismissing Fuqua’s emotional distress claim under the Federal 

Tort Claims Act for lack of jurisdiction. 

1 As a result of these same events, Fuqua also sued alleging age discrimination and for breach of his union’s duty of fair representation. The 

district court granted summary judgment for the Postal Service on the age 

discrimination claim and dismissed Fuqua’s claims related to the collective bargaining agreement. This court affirmed that decision. Fuqua v. 

Brennan, 645 F. App’x 519 (7th Cir. 2016). 

2 We thank Randall Schmidt and Michael Cardoza of the Edwin F. 

Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the University of Chicago Law School for their 

helpful service in this case to Fuqua and to the court. 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
No. 18-2415 5

Under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, a federal employee is compensated for personal injuries sustained 

while performing his duties without proof of negligence by 

the government. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). Modeled on state workers’ 

compensation statutes, these benefits are intended to be the 

exclusive remedy of the injured employee. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). 

When a federal employee’s injury falls within the scope of the 

FECA, its administrative process controls and the employee 

may not sue the government under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), seeking damages for the injuries. See 

Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 192–94 

(1983) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)); see also Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 

F.3d 894, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding federal employee injured on job had exclusive remedy in FECA, not FTCA). 

The Secretary of Labor has exclusive authority to administer FECA claims and to decide questions arising under that 

Act, including whether a claim is covered. 5 U.S.C. § 8145. The 

Secretary’s decision to allow or to deny payment under that 

Act is “not subject to review by another official of the United 

States or by a court by mandamus or otherwise.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 8128(b)(2). Indeed, the Federal Employees’ Compensation 

Act “contains an ‘unambiguous and comprehensive’ provision barring any judicial review of the Secretary of Labor’s 

determination of FECA coverage. Consequently, the courts 

have no jurisdiction over FTCA claims where the Secretary 

determines that FECA applies.” Southwest Marine, Inc. v. 

Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 90 (1991) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). This bar applies even when employees are 

not entitled to any benefits, such as when the Secretary of Labor decides that an injury is not compensable under the 

FECA. 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
6 No. 18-2415 

Because the Secretary has sole authority to administer the 

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, the courts’ jurisdiction is limited to considering whether a “substantial question” of coverage exists under the FECA. White v. United 

States, 143 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1998). Such a “substantial 

question” does not exist if it is certain as a matter of law that 

the Secretary would find the claim outside the scope of that 

Act. Id. If there is a “substantial question” of coverage, a plaintiff cannot pursue a tort claim unless the Secretary determines 

that the FECA does not apply. Id.; Bennett v. Barnett, 210 F.3d 

272, 277 (5th Cir. 2000).

Earlier in this case, this court followed this legal framework and decided that a “substantial question” of coverage 

existed under the FECA. We stayed the case pending the Secretary of Labor’s resolution of the issue. 607 F. App’x at 572. 

Fuqua was asked to present evidence supporting his allegations. But he submitted only two documents relating to his 

treatment by licensed professional counselors (not a qualified 

physician, as the FECA requires), and a two-page letter he authored which provided no details about his termination. The 

Secretary then exercised jurisdiction over Fuqua’s claim and 

denied it for lack of evidence. The denial was based on lack of 

proof, not lack of coverage. See Bennett, 210 F.3d at 277, n.7 

(“Had the Secretary of Labor agreed with [plaintiff], the Secretary would have dismissed the claim for lack of coverage; 

however, the dismissal was based on lack of proof.”). The 

“substantial question” of coverage was answered when the 

Secretary exercised jurisdiction and dismissed the claims for 

insufficient evidence. 

Fuqua attempts to carve out an exception to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision. 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
No. 18-2415 7

He focuses on the ruling of the department’s hearing examiner: “Emotional conditions that arise out of administrative 

and personnel matters, such as termination of employment, 

are usually covered by FECA only if the weight of the evidence supports that the employer acted in an abusive manner 

or erred in some way.” (emphases supplied). Fuqua reads this 

decision as any emotional distress claim not resulting from 

abusive or erroneous conduct by the employer is not covered 

by the FECA. 

But the inquiry is different. At issue is whether the injury, 

not the conduct, is within the scope of that Act. See White, 143 

F.3d at 234 (deciding substantial question of coverage based 

upon plaintiff’s injuries within the Act). In its decision the department correctly considered the injury, not the conduct: 

“Under the FECA, your injury and/or medical condition must 

have arisen during the course of employment ... .” (emphasis 

added). 

Even if this court were to entertain the exception for which 

Fuqua advocates, federal courts have not recognized Federal 

Tort Claims Act jurisdiction over emotional distress claims 

when the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act provides 

coverage. See Spinelli v. Goss, 446 F.3d 159, 160–62 (D.C. Cir. 

2006) (remanding for district court to enter order dismissing 

claims under FTCA and noting Secretary’s decision that 

FECA covered plaintiff’s emotional and psychological injuries “settles the matter”); Bennett, 210 F.3d at 277 (reversing 

plaintiff’s damage award because district court lacked jurisdiction over emotional distress claim under FTCA when Secretary ruled the same emotional distress injury was covered 

by FECA); Swafford v. United States, 998 F.2d 837, 839-40 (10th 

Cir. 1993) (holding that federal employee who received 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
8 No. 18-2415 

benefits under FECA for work-related mental distress could 

not maintain FTCA suit against the government because 

FECA covered that injury and was exclusive remedy); 

McDaniel v. United States, 970 F.2d 194, 195–197 (6th Cir. 1992) 

(affirming dismissal of FTCA claim for lack of jurisdiction because the Secretary determined FECA covered postal 

worker’s emotional injuries); Teplitsky v. Bureau of Comp., et al., 

288 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d as modified, 398 F.2d 820, 

821 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding postal worker could not sue under 

FTCA for damages for cruelty and other torts because awards 

under FECA are exclusive). 

Although a federal employee may receive benefits under 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act for job-related 

mental distress, such a claim cannot be maintained under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act when the FECA applies. 

B. 

The defendants also ask us to affirm on a ground not relied 

on below: that the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 1001 

et seq., precludes an employment-related claim of emotional 

distress such as this under FTCA. 

The Postal Reorganization Act sets out a comprehensive 

system of employment rights which precludes other employment-related claims. See Roman v. USPS, 821 F.2d 382, 386 (7th 

Cir. 1987). That Act provides that the Civil Service Reform 

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., relating to adverse employment 

actions, applies to postal service employees. See 39 U.S.C. 

§ 1005(a)(1). So postal employees may challenge “prohibited 

personnel practices” under the Civil Service Reform Act. See

Jense v. Runyon, 990 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (D. Utah 1998) (citing 

5 U.S.C. § 2302 definition of “prohibited personnel 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
No. 18-2415 9

practices”). “A residual statute like the FTCA [] cannot co-exist with a comprehensive employment relations scheme” like 

the Civil Service Reform Act. American Postal Workers Union, 

AFL-CIO v. USPS, 940 F.2d 704, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (refusing 

“to permit the appellants to use the FTCA as a means of circumventing” the Postal Reorganization Act). 

Fuqua concedes a federal employee alleging an employment-related tort claim subject to the Civil Service Reform Act 

may not bring an action under the FTCA. But he argues “the 

mere fact that a postal employee’s tort claims arise out of a 

federal employment relationship does not mean that the 

claimed torts are employment-related as a matter of law or 

necessarily involve prohibited personnel practices as defined 

by the [Civil Service Reform Act].” 

A “personnel action” under the Civil Service Reform Act 

is defined as including “(iv) a detail, transfer, or reassignment.” 

5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Fuqua lists examples of what is not considered a “personnel action,” such as 

assault, battery, false imprisonment, and wiretapping. But 

Fuqua did not allege any such actions. He claimed he was terminated as a result of “extreme and outrageous conduct refusing to allow [Fuqua] to become assigned a station closer to 

[his] residence.” (emphasis added). Fuqua’s allegation falls 

within the “transfer, or reassignment” definition of “personnel action,” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iv), so he has no claim under the FTCA. The Postal Reorganization Act, incorporating 

the Civil Service Reform Act, precludes such a claim. We decline Fuqua’s request to remand this case to the district court 

for a factual determination whether his complained-of conduct falls within the definition of a personnel action, as no 

doubt “transfer, or reassignment” does. 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10
10 No. 18-2415 

III. 

The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act applied to 

Fuqua’s claim, its administrative scheme ran its course, and 

his claim for emotional distress was denied for lack of evidence. The district court correctly ruled it had no subject matter jurisdiction over his claims under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act. So we AFFIRM its judgment. 

Case: 18-2415 Document: 37 Filed: 04/23/2020 Pages: 10