Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01279/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01279-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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16-cv-1279-JLS (WVG)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES EMMETT FARR,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-cv-1279-JLS (WVG)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION

(ECF No. 2)

Presently before the Court is plaintiff James Emmett Farr’s Motion for TRO & 

Preliminary Injunction (Motion), (ECF No. 2), as well as Farr’s declaration and 

documentation in support of this Motion, (ECF No. 1-2). Farr, a prisoner at Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility, requests a temporary restraining order enjoining the 

Defendants from: 

(a) placing Plaintiff in Administrative Segregation and subsequently 

depriving him of his legal papers and books; (b) attempting to place Plaintiff 

on [sic] a Facility housing a documented enemy; (c) falsifying Rules Violation 

Reports against Plaintiff and, (d) . . . “physically” assaulting Plaintiff.

(Mot. at 1.)1 

/ / /

 

1 Pinpoint citations to docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF page number electronically stamped at the 

top of each page. 

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Farr alleges that defendant Paramo, the warden of the Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility, violated his constitutional rights by (1) failing to maintain an 

adequate grievance procedure, which allowed corrections officials to mistreat Farr 

“without fear of accountability or punishment”; (2) failing to train, discipline, and 

supervise corrections officials; and (3) failing to implement quality control policies and 

procedures. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 12–13.) Farr further claims that Paramo was “fully 

aware of the pervasive policies and practices with respect to RJD’s grievance system but 

did not take adequate steps to correct these poor policies and practices.” (Id. at 15.) Farr 

also alleges that various correctional officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 

physically assaulting him. (Id. at 14–15.) 

The same standard governs TROs and preliminary injunctions. Stuhlbard Int’l Sales 

Co. v. John D. Brush and Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A plaintiff seeking 

a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural 

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–

90 (2008)); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 

(9th Cir. 2009). This is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 

showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. To warrant 

injunctive relief, irreparable injury must be more than merely possible. See Midgett v. TriCnty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 254 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2001). Rather, the plaintiff 

must show “that he faces a real or immediate threat” that he will suffer irreparable harm. 

Id. The Court may grant a TRO without notice to the adverse party upon a showing of 

specific facts in an affidavit, declaration, or verified complaint “that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can 

be heard in opposition” and reasons why notice should not be required. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 65(b)(1); Civ. L.R. 83.3(g)(2). 

A review of the record reveals that this extraordinary remedy is not warranted here. 

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Even if the Court credited Farr’s allegations—both in his declaration, (ECF No. 1-2, at 8–

19), and his Complaint—as true, Farr has not presented a case of sufficiently real or 

immediate irreparable injury. Rather, his allegations focus on incidents that have already 

occurred. For example, Farr describes a past incident of physical abuse by various 

correctional officers. (See Farr Decl. ¶¶ 1–13.) Even assuming this incident unfolded as 

Farr describes, there is no credible evidence that this will happen again at the hands of the 

Defendants, thereby justifying entry of a temporary restraining order or preliminary 

injunction ordering the Defendants not to physically assault Farr. Similarly, Farr has not

presented evidence that would warrant entry of an order by this Court at this early stage in 

these proceedings interfering with prison official’s ability to run the prison, in particular 

through disciplinary actions taken against Farr in response to future conduct. There is 

therefore no basis to enjoin the Defendants from placing Farr in administrative segregation. 

By Farr’s own admission, “there is a chance” that he will be assaulted or placed in 

administrative segregation again, but a mere chance of these events occurring does not 

suggest he is actually likely to suffer irreparable harm. Likewise, there is insufficient 

evidence to show that the Defendants will falsify rules violations in the future. 

With respect to Farr’s request that the Court enjoin the Defendants from placing him 

in a facility with a “documented enemy,” Farr has not met his burden of showing immediate 

irreparable harm or that he is likely to succeed on the merits. Although prison officials are 

obligated to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners, Farr has not 

met his burden of showing that he will actually be harmed if he is moved to the facility in 

question and that the Defendants have acted or will act with deliberate indifference to his 

safety in this regard. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986).

Accordingly, Farr’s request for a temporary restraining order is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2016

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