Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00506/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00506-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR RAY DEERE, SR,

CDCR #F-94040,

Civil No. 11cv0506 JLS (POR)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE, GARNISHING $350.00

BALANCE FROM PRISONER’S

TRUST ACCOUNT [ECF No. 3];

AND

(2) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)

vs.

CALIPATRIA STATE PRISON

MEDICAL STAFF; JERRY BROWN,

Governor; L.S. McEWEN, Warden;

Defendants.

Arthur Ray Deere, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria

State Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court could conduct the required sua sponte screening,

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which is now the operative pleading.

Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 3].

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I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [ECF No. 3]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

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available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 3] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II.

INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must

subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening

and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that

fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to

the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing

the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at

845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir.

1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of

process is made on the opposing parties”).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

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Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated due to

overcrowding at Calipatria State Prison. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint speaks of his

conditions of confinement in general terms and rarely provides any specific factual allegation

pertaining to Plaintiff as an individual. Plaintiff phrases a majority of his claims as though he

is bringing this matter as a class action on behalf of all the inmates housed at Calipatria State

Prison. However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he has no authority to represent the

legal interest of any other party. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.1 (9th Cir.

1995); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987); see also

FED.R.CIV.P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least

one attorney of record in the attorney’s original name, or if the party is not represented by an

attorney, shall be signed by the party.”).

In addition, allegations of overcrowding, without additional facts, are insufficient to state

a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981).

Plaintiff alleges events such as wilted lettuce and stale bread. (See FAC at 5.) “[S]ubjection

of a prisoner to lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain

within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310,

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1314 (9th Cir. 1995). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, can be

restrictive and harsh. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 337. 

Plaintiff does allege that he was “infected with H-Plylori bacteria in 2008" due to the

conditions at Calipatria State Prison. (FAC at 5.) Plaintiff further alleges that medical staff were

“covering up” his medical condition. (Id.) “The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). A violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials

are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs. Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

To allege an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must “satisfy both the objective and

subjective components of a two-part test.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted). First, he must allege that prison officials deprived him of the “minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, he must allege the prison

official “acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference ... only if [he is alleged to] know[] of

and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under this standard, the official must be alleged to “be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed],” and must also be alleged to

also have drawn that inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted).

This “subjective approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. “Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,

without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1059 (alteration and citation omitted).

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Here, Plaintiff disagrees with the opinion of prison doctors that he has likely had this

condition since he was a child. Instead, Plaintiff argues, without any supporting facts, that he

must have contracted the medical issue while he was housed at Calipatria. Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint fails to identify any specific Defendant whom he claims is responsible for

his misdiagnosis. Thus, the Court cannot make a finding that he has sufficiently alleged

“deliberate indifference” on the part of any named Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to

indicate how any of the named Defendants failed to adequately treat his medical condition or

whether he suffered any harm as a result of the alleged inadequate medical care. 

C. Respondeat Superior claims

Plaintiff names Warden McEwen and Governor Jerry Brown as Defendants in this matter

but fails to set forth any factual allegations with regard to these Defendants in the body of

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold these

Defendants liable in their supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat superior

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993).

Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused

a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff

must allege personal acts by each individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection

to the constitutional violation at issue. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally

construed to support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendants McEwen or

Brown.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an

opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that

if his amended complaint fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 3] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45)

days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a Second Amended Complaint

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must

be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1.

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

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to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may

be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 24, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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