Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00129/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David Bernard Clark, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Paul O’Connell, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 13-0129-TUC-JAS (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is David Bernard Clark’s Amended Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with 

the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 

and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report 

and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that 

the District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition 

with prejudice. 

Case 4:13-cv-00129-JAS Document 22 Filed 12/09/14 Page 1 of 13
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Clark’s conviction and sentence, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows:1

 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Clark was convicted of failing to 

register as a sex offender as required by A.R.S. § 13–3821. The trial 

court imposed an enhanced, “somewhat mitigated,” 3.5–year term of 

imprisonment. Thereafter, Clark initiated proceedings pursuant to Rule 

32, arguing in his petition that (1) Arizona's sex offender registration 

statute cannot be applied retroactively, (2) the registration requirement 

violates his right of protection against double jeopardy, (3) the 

registration requirement violates A.R.S. § 1–246, (4) his “sentence of 

imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and 

unusual punishment,” and (5) there was insufficient factual basis for his 

plea and a related “possible claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

 The trial court summarily denied relief on Clark's petition, 

concluding that this court had “considered and rejected” his arguments 

related to the sex offender registration statute in State v. Henry, 224 

Ariz. 164, 228 P.3d 900 (App. 2010), that Clark's sentence was not 

cruel and unusual punishment, and that “[t]he factual basis was more 

than sufficient to support [Clark]'s guilty plea.” 

State v. Clark, 2011 WL 1532368 (Ariz. App. Apr. 20, 2011); Ex. A (copy of 

decision).2

 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Id. 

Clark then sought review of the decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which 

initially granted review, but after oral argument vacated review as improvidently 

granted on May 8, 2012. Exs. B, C. 

 

1

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

2

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents’ Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 13). 

Case 4:13-cv-00129-JAS Document 22 Filed 12/09/14 Page 2 of 13
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 Petitioner commenced this action with the filing of his original petition on 

March 5, 2013 (Doc. 1). He subsequently filed the now pending amended petition on 

May 16, 2013. (Doc. 8). Clark raises one claim in the amended petition. He claims 

that his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender, his sentence and the 

continuing requirement that he register as a sex offender violate the Ex Post Facto 

Clause of the United States Constitution. Amended Petition, pp. 5-6. Clark raised 

this claim in his Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief. Id., Ex. 2, pp. 4-5. He 

also raised the claims in his petitions for review to both the the Arizona Court of 

Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exs. 5, 6. 

II. TIMELINESS 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

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recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 As noted above, the one-year AEDPA limitations period is tolled for the “time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). Here, Clark’s properly filed PCR petition remained pending until May 8, 

2012, when the Arizona Supreme Court vacated review as improvidently granted. 

Ex. C. See Lawrence v. Florida ̧ 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1), Clark then had one year to file his federal habeas corpus petition. By 

filing the original petition on March 5, 2013, Clark satisfied the deadline and his 

petition is timely. 

III. MERITS 

A. AEDPA Standards 

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect 

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court’s decision can be “contrary to” federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts “materially indistinguishable” from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court’s decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

B. Ex Post Facto Clause 

As Clark explains it in his Memorandum in Support of Amended Petition 

(Doc. 8-1), in 1982, when he was 18-years-old, he pled guilty to sexual misconduct, a 

class 2 felony, arising from an incident of consensual sex with a minor under 15 

years-old, and was sentenced to and successfully completed four years’ probation. 

At the time, Arizona did not have a sex offender registration statute. See State v. 

Henry, 224 Ariz. 164, 168, 228 P.3d 900, 904 (App. 2010). However, a year later, on 

July 27, 1983, Arizona enacted its modern sex offender registration statute, A.R.S. § 

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13-3821. State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 172-73, 829 P.2d 1221, 1218-19 (1992).

Under the statute, Clark was classified as a Level Three Offender, meaning that the 

statute applied to him to the greatest extent possible. On December 21, 2009, Clark 

was arrested for failing to register as required under the statute. On January 13, 

2010, pled guilty to the charge, a class 4 felony, and on February 12, 2010, was 

sentenced to a stipulated term of 3.5 years’ imprisonment. Clark contends that by 

requiring him to satisfy the registration requirements of A.R.S. § 13-3821, the State 

of Arizona has violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, 

article I, § 10, cl. 1. 

 In rejecting Clark’s Ex Post Facto claim, the trial court and the Arizona Court 

of Appeals relied on State v. Henry, 228 P.3d 900 (Ariz. App. 2010), which in turn 

relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). In 

Smith, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Otte, 259 

F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), and held that an Alaska statute requiring those convicted of 

aggravated sex offenses to register every 90 days for life did not violate the Ex Post 

Facto Clause. 538 U.S. at 99-105. Clark argues that Smith is not controlling in this 

case because, unlike the petitioners in Smith, Clark was imprisoned, placed on 

probation and is seeking to have his conviction overturned. Additionally, Clark 

argues that the requirements of the Arizona statute render it much more punitive than 

the Alaska statute addressed in Smith. Specifically, he contends that the Arizona 

statute’s community notification provisions and sex offender registry website subject 

registrants, particularly in the internet age, to a humiliating display of personal 

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information and status as a sex offender. Clark’s arguments fail for a number of 

reasons. 

 Under AEDPA, the state court’s denial of relief is unreasonable if it correctly 

identifies the governing federal legal principle but applies it to a new set of facts in a 

way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends or fails to extend a clearly 

established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

Hernandez, 282 F.3d 1132. Because it is the last reasoned decision addressing 

Clark’s ex post facto claim, the Court must examine the trial court’s order denying 

the claim. Packer, 277 F.3d at 1101 (habeas court must examine last reasoned 

decision of a state court). Clark does not argue that the trial court unreasonably 

extended or failed to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context. 

Rather, he argues that the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle 

as set out by the Supreme Court in Smith, but then applied it to the facts of his case in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable. The Court disagrees. 

 Unlike the petitioners in Smith, Clark was actually imprisoned and placed on 

probation as a result of his violation of the Arizona registration requirements. He 

contends that his conviction and imprisonment makes his case “substantively 

distinguishable from Smith.” Petition, p. 6. He does not, however, cite any 

authority, much less Supreme Court authority, that seizes on this distinction in 

support of a finding that sex offender registration laws can violate the Ex Post Facto 

Clause. Even in the cases that involve petitioners who, like Clark, have been 

prosecuted for violation of registration requirements, this factor does not impact the 

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court’s analysis of the ex post facto implications of such statutes. For example, in 

United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit applied Smith 

to a defendant’s claim that requiring him to register pursuant to the federal Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., 

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 1043-1049. Despite the fact that the 

defendant was not merely prospectively challenging the application of SORNA, but 

was being prosecuted for failing to register, the court’s discussion never raises that 

distinction in rejecting the defendant’s ex post facto claim. See id. Nor would it 

make any sense if they had— the purpose of challenging the registration laws is not 

only to avoid the registrations obligations, but also the penalties associated with 

violating them. This is true whether the petitioner in a particular case has violated 

the provisions or not. 

 Clark next contends that Arizona registration requirements are decidedly more 

burdensome than the Alaska statute examined in Smith. Petition, pp. 6-10. He first 

notes that the extensive public access mandated through the community notifications 

provisions, found in A.R.S. §§ 13-3285 and 3286, and the sex offender registry 

website provision, found in A.R.S. § 3287, are not only a forced display of a scarlet 

letter, but also “shine a spotlight on that letter.” Petition, p. 6. These requirements, 

along with ever-increasing public access to the internet, create the potential for 

harassment and intimidation despite the website’s warning that the information 

should not be used for such purposes. As Clark argues, internet access has 

undoubtedly increased since the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith in 2003. 

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However, he cites no authority that undermines the holding in Smith that the use of 

the internet to disseminate truthful and otherwise publicly accessible information 

does not constitute punishment. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-99. Moreover, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that a state law which required government agencies to actively

notify the public of a sex offender’s status was not so punitive as to violate the Ex 

Post Facto Clause. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1997). The 

logic of that conclusion “remains sound in the wake of Smith,” because even the 

[a]ctive dissemination of an individual’s sex offender status does not 

alter the Court’s core reasoning that “stigma . . . results not from public 

display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate 

information about a criminal record, most of which is already public.” 

 

American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 98). In light of Smith and its ensuing application 

by the Ninth Circuit, this Court cannot conclude that the state court’s rejection of 

Clark’s argument on this point was unreasonable. 

 Clark also contends that the Arizona statute’s criminal penalties and $250 

assessment render the statute punitive for purposes of ex post facto analysis. The 

former contention, that the criminal penalties constitute punishment, is dispelled by 

Smith. Like the Arizona statute, the Alaska statute found constitutional in that case 

imposed criminal penalties, including felony penalties for certain violations. See 

Smith, 538 U.S. at 96; see also Alaska Stat. §§ 11.56.835 and 11.56.840 (describing 

criminal penalties for violation of registration requirements). 

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 As for the monetary assessment, the Court assumes Clark is referring to the 

assessment imposed under A.R.S. § 13-3824 for failing to comply with the 

registration requirements. In support of his contention that such an assessment is 

punitive, Clark cites Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F.Supp.2d 897 (E.D. Wis. 2012). In that 

case, the district court did conclude that the assessment at issue did violate the Ex 

Post Facto Clause. Id. at 909. At the root of the decision, however, was the fact that 

the assessment was annual and applied to offenders who had been discharged from 

their sentences. Id. Thus, the Wisconsin assessment at issue in Raemisch is readily 

distinguished from the one-time assessment imposed upon conviction under the 

Arizona statute. Moreover, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district 

court’s conclusion, finding that the annual registration fee was not punitive. Mueller 

v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (2014). 

 Clark next contends that lifetime in-person registration constitutes an 

affirmative disability or restraint that renders the Arizona statute unconstitutional. 

Petition, pp. 12-13. In Smith, the Court found that Alaska’s registration 

requirements, requiring lifetime registration for more serious offenders, imposed no 

physical restraint therefore imposed only a negligible disability. 538 U.S. at 89, 101. 

The Court explained that any negative impact on a registrant’s employment or 

housing prospects resulted not from the registration requirements, but from the fact 

of conviction. Id. at 101. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding, the Ninth 

Circuit has concluded that registration statutes like Arizona’s which require lifetime, 

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in-person registration every 90 days did not impose any constitutionally significant 

affirmative disability. Masto, 670 F.3d at 1056. 

 Clark’s last substantial argument is that the Arizona statute is rendered 

unconstitutional because it imposes lifetime registration obligations on all offenders 

and offers no mechanism to seek relief. Petition, pp. 16-18. To the extent this claim 

alleges a procedural due process violation, it is foreclosed. The Supreme Court has 

concluded that, once an individual has been convicted of a sex offense, no further 

process is required before imposing sex offender conditions. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. 

Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003) (concluding that “the law’s requirements turn 

on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact that a convicted offender has already had a 

procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest”). 

 Also foreclosed is Clark’s argument that the Arizona statue is excessive in 

scope because it does not offer individualized review for those subject to its 

requirements. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that Alaska could make “reasonable 

categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular 

regulatory consequences.” 538 U.S. at 103. The Court explained that “[t]he State’s 

determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather 

than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the 

statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id. at 104; see also Masto, 

670 F.3d at 1057 (finding Nevada’s registration requirements were not excessive and 

did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). 

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 Despite the Supreme Court authority weighing heavily against him, Clark 

offers Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009), to bolster his argument. In 

Wallace, however, the Indiana Supreme Court expressly stated that it evaluating the 

registration requirements under the Indiana Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause and 

that the inquiry required “an independent analysis . . . .” Id. at 378. That 

independent analysis led the court to conclude that the Indiana statute, at least as 

applied to Wallace, “violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the 

Indiana Constitution . . . .” Id. at 384. The analysis being based on the Indiana 

Constitution, it does not impact upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Smith and the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent application of Smith. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Clark’s Amended Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

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within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without 

first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 13-0129-TUC-JAS. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 9th day of December, 2014. 

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