Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01614/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01614-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Aage Nost, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Lyle Broadhead, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 13-01614-TUC-JGZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

 

 Pending before the Court is Aage Nost’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 10) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules 

of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 1 of 9
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Initial Conviction 

 Following a jury trial, Nost was convicted of conspiracy and attempted 

harassment. Answer, Ex. A, p. 2. The trial court suspended the imposition of 

sentences and placed Nost on seven years’ probation. Ex. B, pp. 2. After filing a 

notice of appeal, Nost did not file an opening brief in the court of appeals and his 

appeal was therefore dismissed on March 4, 2005. Ex. C. Nost did not petition the 

Arizona Supreme Court for review. Ex. D. 

B. Probation Revocation 

 On February 22, 2005, the State filed a Petition to Revoke Probation, alleging 

Nost had failed to comply with the conditions of his probation. Ex. E. Nost did not 

appear for the initial hearing on the petition to revoke, and the trial court issued a 

warrant for his arrest. Ex. F.1

 When the violation hearing was ultimately held on 

August 6, 2010, Nost admitted a probation violation and, on August 13, 2010, the 

trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of which 

was five years. Exs. G, H. 

 Nost filed a Notice of Appeal on August 24, 2010, an Amended Notice of 

Appeal on August 26, 2010, and another Notice of Appeal on September 9, 2010. 

Ex. I. By Order dated October 4, 2010, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal, 

 

1

 Nost failed to appear at the initial appearance on March 7, 2005 and a warrant 

issued. His whereabouts were unknown until his arrest on the warrant on July 1, 

2010. Doc. 1-1, p. 88. 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 2 of 9
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

finding that it was taken from the entry of an admission of a probation violation and 

that such appeals were not permitted under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

27.9(e). Ex. J. The court of appeals issued its mandate on December 13, 2010. Ex. 

K. 

 Beginning on August 9, 2011, Nost filed various documents in the trial court, 

which the trial court collectively treated as a petition for post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”). Exs. L-P. By Order filed July 30, 2012, the court dismissed the PCR 

petition under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(c), explaining that: 

 The Petitioner has filed a number of documents before this 

Court. Despite the variety of captions, the various motions share a 

central claim; that this Court does not have jurisdiction over him or the 

charge for which he was convicted. These issues have repeatedly been 

raised in the past and this Court [has] ruled on them. The Petitioner’s 

claim is wholly without merit and lacks any legal or factual support. 

 

Ex. U, pp. 1-2. 

 On April 2, 2013, Nost filed a document entitled “Notice of Presentment of 

Writ of Habeas Corpus and Supporting Documents to Arizona Court of Appeals.” 

Ex. V, Att. 1. Although the filing was accompanied by a cover sheet prepared by the 

Pima County Legal Defender indicating it was a “Pro Se Notice of Appeal,” in an 

Order dated June 28, 2013, the court of appeals stated: 

[t]his court does not have original habeas corpus jurisdiction, and since 

petitioner seeks neither to invoke this court’s appellate jurisdiction nor 

to obtain review of the trial court’s rulings pursuant to Rule 32.9(c), 

Ariz. R. Crim. P., 

and dismissed the appeal, stating Ex. W. 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 3 of 9
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

 On July 31, 2013, Nost filed a “Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” 

in the Arizona Supreme Court. Ex. X. The Supreme Court denied the petition 

without comment on September 16, 2013. Ex. Y. 

C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 Nost instituted this action by filing his original Petition on November 1, 2013. 

Doc. 1. After the Court dismissed the original Petition, Nost filed the now pending 

Amended Petition on January 21, 2014. Doc. 10. In the petition, Nost raises four 

claims: (1) the indictment was defective; (2) the complaint and supporting affidavit 

were defective; (3) the trial court judge tampered/interfered with the jury; and (4) that 

the trial court lacked jurisdiction, which was an element of the charged offenses. Id., 

pp. 6-19. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. The Petition is untimely.

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 4 of 9
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 The limitation period for Nost’s habeas petition was triggered on “the date on 

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration 

of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The trial court 

sentenced Nost on July 15, 2004. Ex. B. He then appealed, but because he did not 

file an opening brief, the appeal was dismissed on March 4, 2005. Ex. C. Because 

Nost did not file a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court, his conviction 

became final on April 4, 2005. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 656 (2012) 

(for a state prisoner who does not seek review in the state’s highest court, the 

judgment becomes final on the date that the time for seeking such review expires). 

Absent any tolling, the one-year limitations period commenced to the following day 

and, because Nost did not “properly file” anything in the ensuing year, expired on 

April 5, 2006. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 5 of 9
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended 

before the state petition was filed.”) 

 B. Nost is not entitled to equitable tolling.

 “Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time’ and ‘the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.’” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 

919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations 

period “only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” 

Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). “The high threshold of 

extraordinary circumstances is necessary lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. 

 In relation to tolling, Nost asserts that he has “provided sufficient law . . . to 

show there is no time limit” on his habeas filing. Reply (Doc. 27), p. 17. Contrary 

to his assertion, the Court is pretty sure that there is a time limit for the filing of 

habeas petitions and that there is sufficient law, which is discussed above, to support 

that conclusion. Other than his argument that the petition was not subject to time 

limits, Nost does not offer any additional explanation to support the delayed filing of 

the petition. As such, Nost has not presented the “extraordinary circumstances 

beyond [his] control” that would support equitable tolling. 

 This evaluation is not altered by the fact that Nost’s probation was revoked 

after the AEDPA limitations period had expired. All four of the claims alleged in 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 6 of 9
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Nost’s Amended Petition arose in relation to his original conviction. Because the 

factual predicate for each of these claims was known at the time of conviction, and 

did not arise at the time of Nost’s probation revocation proceeding, the limitations 

period was unaffected by the probation revocation proceeding. See, e.g., Mattern v. 

Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 494 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f the 

factual predicate for the claims was not known until some later date, such as the date 

on which he was sentenced for the probation revocation, the later date would be the 

trigger for the limitations period.”); see also, Udom v. Warden, San Diego Corr. 

Facility, 2011 WL 6426637, at *2 (C.D.Cal. Nov.22, 2011) (dismissing petition as 

untimely where probation revocation “did not alter the time period during which 

Petitioner could permissibly bring an appeal challenging the underlying conviction”);

Hathcock v. McDonough, 2008 WL 2814868, at *5 (S.D.Fla. July 22, 2008) (finding 

petition untimely where “the subsequent probation revocation does not resurrect, toll 

or otherwise extend the one year limitation period as to the challenges to [the] 

underlying conviction and term of probation”). 

C. Nost has not established actual innocence. 

 In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013), the Supreme Court held that 

actual innocence, “if proved,” serves as an exception to the AEDPA statute of 

limitations. 133 S.Ct. at 1928. However, the Court noted that tenable claims of 

actual innocence are rare and require a petitioner to “show that it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” 

133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 7 of 9
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

 Nost’s actual innocence claim does not satisfy this standard. Nost bases his 

claim of actual innocence on the trial court’s alleged failure to properly instruct the 

jury and on his assertion that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear his case. 

Reply, Doc. 27, pp.18-20. These claims allege legal defects in his conviction, which 

do not support a claim of actual innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 

623 (1998) (“[A]ctual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal 

insufficiency.”). 

 Additionally, actual innocence claims are available to allow the court to look 

at new evidence “that was either excluded or unavailable at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 327–28. None of the four grounds alleged in the Amended Petition involve any 

“new evidence.” Each of Nost’s claims is purely legal and does not involve evidence 

that was either not available or not presented at trial. He claims that the indictment 

and complaint were defective, that the the trial court judge tampered/interfered with 

the jury; and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Nowhere in his claims or in his 

Reply does he offer any evidence of actual innocence. Moreover, the factual and 

legal predicates to each of his claims arose at least by the time of his conviction and 

any evidence that might support the claims was available at the time of trial. Thus, 

nothing Nost offers in the instant proceeding causes the Court to believe that, if the 

evidence had been offered at trial, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted Nost. As such, Nost's claim of actual innocence does not save 

the petition from dismissal based on its untimely filing. 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 8 of 9
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Nost’s Amended Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 10). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of 

this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District 

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a 

response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this action should be 

designated case number: CV 13-01614-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely file objections 

to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 10th day of August, 2015. 

 

Case 4:13-cv-01614-JGZ Document 36 Filed 08/10/15 Page 9 of 9