Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00610/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00610-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIRGIL L. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, ART

VENEGAS, HARRISON SUGAWARA,

LAURA ABE, D. ROSEN, MICHAEL

GALIPEAU, et al.,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-01-610 DFL PAN

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Defendant Harrison Sugawara (“Sugawara”) renews his motion

for qualified immunity. For the reasons stated below, the court

DENIES Sugawara’s motion. 

I.

On October, 29, 2003, the court denied Sugawara’s motion for

summary judgment. (10/29/2003 Order at 4-5.) The court found

that a factual dispute precluded finding that Sugawara was

entitled to qualified immunity because “Sugawara assert[ed] that

. . . he was trapped in the car door and Brown was using his car

as a deadly weapon against him,” and “Brown denie[d] these

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assertions and claim[ed] that Sugawara shot him for no reason.” 

(Id. at 5.) The court noted that “if, as Brown asserts, Sugawara

shot him as he drove away, with no indication that Brown was an

immediate danger to Sugawara or others, it should have been clear

to Sugawara that shooting Brown would violate his constitutional

rights.” (Id.) Therefore, the court allowed the case to proceed

on Brown’s “assertion that the officers shot him ‘for no reason’

and that he ‘did not drive his car toward or into said

Defendants.’” (Id.) 

On November 8, 2005, the court allowed Sugawara to renew his

motion for summary judgment based on Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.

194 (2004).” (11/8/2005 Order.) On January 24, 2006, the court

requested supplemental briefing on what material facts remained

in dispute. (1/24/2006 Order.)

II.

Sugawara renews his motion for summary judgment arguing that

he is entitled to qualified immunity based on two recent

decisions: (1) Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 125 S.Ct. 596

(2004); and (2) Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110 (9th

Cir. 2005). (Mot. at 3-8.) “A moving party may renew a motion

for summary judgment notwithstanding denial of an earlier motion

by showing a different set of facts or some other reason

justifying renewal of the motion.” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v.

Hoffman La Roche Inc., 148 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 

In Brosseau, the Court found that a police officer, Rochelle

Brosseau, was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting Kenneth

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Haugen in the back as Haugen attempted to flee in his vehicle. 

543 U.S. at 597. Sugawara argues that the facts in Brosseau are

similar to his situation. (Mot. at 5.) He claims that Brown,

like Haugen, was armed with a deadly weapon, a car, when he

failed to respond to a police officer. (Id.) In addition,

Sugawara asserts that he knew that the other officers were in the

path of Brown’s vehicle. (Id.) Therefore, Sugawara concludes

that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he acted to

protect his fellow officers. (Id.) 

In Blanford, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s

grant of qualified immunity to police officers who shot Blanford

after he refused to drop his weapon. 406 F.3d at 1113-1115. The

court found that the officers’ had probable cause to believe that

Blanford posed a threat because he “was armed, refused to give up

his weapon, was not surrounded, and was trying to get inside a

private residence . . . .” Id. at 1117-18. 

Sugawara argues that his situation was similar to the

officers in Blanford. (Mot. at 6.) Like those officers,

Sugawara claims that he realized that Brown would not obey his

command to stop the car. (Id. at 7.) In addition, Sugawara

asserts that Brown posed an actual risk to the other individuals

located at the scene. (Id.) 

In support of his argument, Sugawara includes three

additional pieces of evidence: (1) Abe’s statement that she saw

Sugawara caught in the driver’s side door of Brown’s vehicle and

she thought that Brown was going to kill Sugawara (Abe Decl. ¶

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5); (2) Abe’s statement that Brown drove towards her and the

other officers (Id. ¶ 6); and (3) Sugawara’s claim that he was

concerned about the other officers in the area and the danger

Brown would pose to the public if he fled the scene (Sugawara

Decl. ¶ 13). 

Brown responds by introducing testimony by Sugawara from

Brown’s preliminary hearing in Sacramento County Superior Court

on May 19, 1999. At that hearing, Sugawara testified that at the

time of the “actual shooting,” he did not see the other police

officers in front of Brown’s vehicle. (Ex. A to Def.’s Supp.

Brief at 14.) This appears to contradict Sugawara’s statement in

his declaration “that there were other officers in the vicinity

of the sidewalk on the west side of the street who were in danger

if Brown continued speeding forward without turning.” (Sugawara

Decl. ¶ 13.) It might also conflict with Abe’s statement that

Brown drove towards her and the other officers. (Abe Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Although the timing of the events described by Sugawara at the

hearing is unclear, his statements raise a dispute of material

fact as to whether Brown drove towards Abe and the other officers

and whether Sugawara was in position to see the other officers. 

In addition, Sugawara testified that at the time he fired

the first shot at Brown, he “had already let go because I think

what I did was, I let go with my left hand to get - - grab my

right hand to shoot, and at that point I was - - I was away from

the car.” (Ex. A to Def.’s Supp. Brief at 21-22.) This

contradicts Sugwara’s declaration and testimony from earlier in

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the deposition that he separated himself from Brown’s vehicle

after firing the first shot. (Sugawara Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, 14; Ex. A

to Def.’s Supp. Brief at 13-14.) It also contradicts Abe’s

statement that Sugwara fired the first shot while still clinging

to Brown’s car door. (Supp. Abe Decl. ¶ 22.) Sugwara’s

testimony also raises a dispute of material fact as to whether he

was caught in door of Brown’s vehicle when he fired the first

shot. See Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding that the district court did not err in finding that the

disputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, created a triable issue of fact). Therefore, the

court DENIES Sugawara’s renewed motion for summary judgment.

III.

For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES Sugawara’s

renewed motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/29/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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