Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01586/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01586-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ANDREW PARIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

GEORGE A. NEOTTI et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 10cv1586 JLS (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[ECF No. 13]

I. INTRODUCTION

Michael Andrew Paris (“Petitioner”), a California state prisoner, is proceeding with 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. In 2007, a San Diego Superior 

Court Jury convicted Petitioner of murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and 

permitting another to discharge a firearm from a vehicle (with gang enhancements on each 

count). (See ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2.) Petitioner asserts that his incarceration is unlawful 

because the prosecutor violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right against self 

incrimination by improperly commenting on his silence during closing argument. (ECF 

No. 13 at 3.)1 After reviewing the relevant material lodged with the Court and for the 

reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

 

1 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted 

by the Court’s electronic case filing system. 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 19, 2007, a jury convicted Petitioner of: (1) murder pursuant to Cal. 

Penal Code §187(a); (2) assault with a semiautomatic firearm pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 

§245(b); and (3) permitting another to discharge a firearm from a vehicle pursuant to Cal. 

Penal Code (3) §12034(b). (ECF No. 7-10 at 1-2.) “The jury found true allegations that 

in the course of committing murder, [Petitioner] personally and intentionally discharged a 

firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury and death (Cal. Penal Code 

§12022.53(d)), and that he committed all of the offenses for the benefit and at the direction 

of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).” (Id. at 

2.) The jury acquitted Petitioner of the attempted murder charge. (Id.)

After his conviction, Petitioner dismissed his trial counsel. (ECF No. 13-1 at 2.) He 

retained new counsel to assist him in filing a motion for new trial based on ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and various other grounds. (Id.)

The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for a new trial and sentenced him to an 

indeterminate term of 50 years to life for the murder plus a determinate term of 11 years 

for the assault charges. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court 

of Appeal. (Id.) In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions. (See ECF No. 7-10.) Regarding Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim, the 

court found no error under the application of Griffin v. California.

2

 

Petitioner appealed the decision to the California Supreme Court. (ECF. No 13-1 at 

4.) There, he raised two constitutional claims: (1) that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel; and (2) that he was “denied his Fifth Amendment 

right not to testify by the prosecutor’s improper comment on his silence pursuant to Griffin 

v. California.” (Id.) On November 10, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied the

petition for review without a written opinion. (Id. at 5.) 

 

2

 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding “[T]he Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either 

comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is 

evidence of guilt.”).

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On July 29, 2010, Petitioner filed his original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, containing both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims. (ECF 

No. 1.) On January 7, 2013, the Petition was dismissed without prejudice. (ECF No. 12.) 

The Court found that Petitioner had properly exhausted his Fifth Amendment claim but 

that he had failed to exhaust his Sixth Amendment claims.3 (Id. at 10-13.)

On February 20, 2013, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition containing his 

exhausted Fifth Amendment claim. (ECF No. 13.) Petitioner also filed a Motion to Stay 

his First Amended Petition. (ECF No. 14.) On June 21, 2013, Petitioner filed his Second 

Amended Petition, reasserting his Fifth Amendment claim and his allegedly newly 

exhausted Sixth Amendment claims.4 (ECF No. 16.) On July 3, 2013, the State 

(“Respondent”) filed a Motion to Dismiss both the First and Second Amended Petitions,

alleging that both Petitions were untimely. (ECF No. 17 at 2.) On September 20, 2013, 

the Court dismissed Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition with prejudice and denied as 

moot his Motion to Stay regarding his First Amended Petition. (ECF No. 20.) 

Petitioner appealed the decision to the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

(ECF No. 23.) On June 9, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court found that the challenged court

order did not dispose of all claims and that Petitioner’s exhausted Fifth Amendment claim 

was still pending. (ECF No. 27.) On July 24, 2014, the Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s 

Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of his appeal. (ECF No. 28.) On August 12, 2014, 

Respondent filed an Answer to Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim. (ECF No. 32.) 

 

3 The district court found that Petitioner’s original petition was a “mixed petition” containing both 

exhausted and non-exhausted claims. (ECF No. 12 at 10-12.) Specifically, the district court found that 

the Petitioner argued five separate “sub-claims” under the Sixth Amendment to the California Supreme 

Court that had not been specifically and separately pled at the state court appellate level. (Id. at 7.) The 

exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s consideration of claims 

presented in habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 

(1982).

4 Petitioner alleges that, by this time, the California Supreme Court had decided against him regarding his

previously unexhausted Sixth Amendment Claims. (See ECF No. 16 at 5.) 

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This Report and Recommendation addresses Petitioner’s pending Fifth Amendment 

claim as set out in his First Amended Petition. (ECF No. 13.) 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2007, Petitioner was convicted by a San Diego Superior Court jury 

of the 2004 murder of Jeremy Hogan, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and permitting 

another to discharge a firearm from a vehicle. (ECF No. 7-10 at 1-2.) Petitioner was 

acquitted of the 2005 attempted murder of LaDonte Wilson. (Id. at 2.) The following 

factual summary is taken from the Court of Appeal decision affirming Petitioner’s 

conviction:5 

A. The Murder of Jeremy Hogan 

At about 7:34 p.m. on December 13, 2004, Jeremy Hogan was shot and killed 

in a drive-by shooting while he and his friend Alonzo Howell were in front of 

a house on Alvin Street. Alvin Street is in the neighborhood of Emerald Hills. 

About a dozen people were in front of the house at the time, including some 

members of the “Emerald Hills” street gang. Howell heard eight or nine shots 

and saw a black truck driving off. Deeone Lamar Manson was at the party 

and also heard the shots; she saw a black truck turning around a corner 

speeding away. Hogan died from a gunshot wound to his head. 

Two individuals who were in the black truck that day - Maurice Williams and 

Deondray Thomas - testified that [Petitioner] shot Hogan. Williams and 

Thomas both entered into agreements with the District Attorney’s office. 

According to Williams, earlier that day, he, Thomas and [Petitioner] had 

decided to go to the beach to smoke marijuana. Williams and Thomas were 

childhood friends who lived on Cardiff Street in a “Skyline” gang 

neighborhood, and Williams had only met [Petitioner] a few months earlier 

through Thomas. Williams is a Skyline gang associate. Williams drove 

[Petitioner’s] black truck with [Petitioner] in the front passenger seat and 

Thomas between them to Sunset Cliffs beach, where they smoked two 

“blunts” (marijuana cigars). On their way back, [Petitioner] told Williams to 

drive through Emerald Hills, where they ended up on Alvin Street. When he 

had traveled about five or six houses down, [Petitioner] stuck his upper body 

 

5 This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§2254(e)(1); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (stating that deference is owed to 

factual findings of both state trial and appellate courts).

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out of the window, said, “Fuck Emerald Hills,” and fired two shots with a gun. 

After [Petitioner] brought his body back into the car, Williams saw that he had 

a revolver. Williams, who was unarmed, had not known [Petitioner] or anyone 

else had a gun and there had been no discussion at the beach about doing any 

sort of shooting. Shocked, Williams initially slowed the truck down to about 

10 or 15 miles per hour, but then sped up when [Petitioner] said, “Go, go, go.” 

He turned right onto Imperial and got back on the freeway. The next morning, 

Williams read in the newspaper that a person had been killed on Alvin Street. 

Thomas, a Skyline gang member who spent a lot of time with [Petitioner], 

related the same story about taking [Petitioner’s] truck to the beach with 

[Petitioner] and Williams and returning via Emerald Hills. Before they left 

for the beach, [Petitioner] showed Thomas an old revolver that Thomas had 

never seen before. According to Thomas, before they turned onto Alvin 

Street, [Petitioner], who was in the passenger seat, removed the gun from his 

waistband, stuck the upper half of his body out of the window, and fired once 

or twice. Thomas did not hear [Petitioner] yell anything about Emerald before 

shooting. The next day, [Petitioner] told Thomas he had gotten a “K” (a 

“kill”) and seemed happy about it, and [Petitioner] later bragged about it to 

others, including William Trice, who testified at trial that in January 2005 

[Petitioner] told him he had “killed some guy from Emerald.”

(ECF No. 7-10 at 3-4.) 

B. The Maurice Williams Shooting and Petitioner’s Threats 

Days after Hogan’s murder, Thomas, Thomas’s brother, and [Petitioner] came 

to Williams’s house and accused him of being a “snitch,” resulting in an 

altercation in which Williams hit [Petitioner]. At about the same time, 

Thomas’s brother and [Petitioner] tried to hide the weapon on the side of 

Williams’s house.

A couple of months later, detectives came to Williams’s house to talk to him 

about the [Hogan] murder. Williams did not want to cooperate because he 

feared getting in trouble with police and also with Skyline gang members. He 

spoke briefly with detectives outside where others driving by saw them.

In October 2005, Williams was sitting in his car when someone ran up, yelled, 

“Fuck you,” and shot six rounds into his car, striking Williams twice in the 

arm. Williams later pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter under an 

agreement with the District Attorney’s office. The day before he signed the 

agreement, he was in protective custody when someone pointed out that 

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[Petitioner] was calling out to him from a different area. When he looked over, 

[Petitioner] made a talking motion with his right hand and then a slashing 

motion across his neck with his finger. Williams took that to be at threat 

because of his cooperation with authorities.

(Id. at 5.) 

C. The Drive-By Shooting of LaDonte Wilson’s Residence 

On July 10, 2005, LaDonte Wilson was standing with his father and brother 

outside his house on Federal Avenue when he was shot at by Thomas, who 

was a passenger in [Petitioner’s] burgundy Cadillac. Earlier that evening, 

Thomas had left a party with [Petitioner], Lloyd Dawson and fellow Skyline 

gang member Bernard Clemons, after drinking and smoking marijuana. 

[Petitioner] drove his Cadillac with Thomas behind him in the rear passenger 

seat and Dawson in the front passenger seat. Both Thomas and Clemons were 

armed. The men drove for 20 to 30 minutes, eventually getting close to a 

neighborhood claimed by “Lincoln Park,” an enemy gang. As they drove 

down Federal Boulevard, they approached a crowd and [Petitioner] said,

“There is somebody out there . . . right over here to the left.” Thomas pulled 

out his gun and fired five shots out the back window to “scare” the individuals. 

[Petitioner], laughing, picked up speed and left. Shortly afterwards, the men 

were detained by police.

(Id. at 5-6.) 

D. Petitioner’s Recorded Conversation with William Trice 

On July 23, 2005, William Trice and Petitioner were placed in the back of a patrol 

car; the conversation that followed was recorded. (ECF 7-4 at 6.) At one point during the 

conversation, Petitioner stated that Deondray Thomas had “snitched on [him] about that 

shit about Emerald Hills.” (Id. at 8.) Trice replied, “You going to jail?” (Id.) Petitioner 

responded, “Most likely.” (Id.)

Later, [Petitioner] said to Trice, “They gonna get me, they gonna get me for a longlong time. If you snitch on me I’m done.” (Id. at 11.) Petitioner expressed his concern that 

Deondray Thomas may have told the detectives about the fact that Petitioner was bragging 

about getting a “K.” (Id. at 12.) “[Deondray] said Alonzo said it. He said that Alonzo said 

that-that I told ‘em, that I bragged to him that I had K . . . That I was telling everybody, 

yeah I got a K . . . .” (Id.) 

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Towards the end of the conversation, Trice said, “I know Reece [Maurice Williams]

is telling.” (Id. at 17.) Petitioner remarked: “Yeah . . . I’m not even gonna tell him I know. 

I’m just gonna fuck him up. Nah we can’t fuck with him right away ‘cause they gonna, 

he’s gonna snitch then.” (Id.)

E. Trial – Witness Testimony

During Petitioner’s trial, the prosecution called Deondray Thomas, Maurice 

Williams, William Trice, and LaDonte Wilson to testify for the prosecution’s case-in-chief. 

(See ECF No. 7-13 at 19-20.) Additionally, LaDonte Wilson was permitted to testify about 

a prior incident involving himself and Petitioner: 

At trial, the court gave the jury a limiting instruction [footnote omitted] and 

permitted the prosecutor to present evidence of two prior uncharged incidents 

involving [Petitioner] occurring in September 2004. Specifically, Wilson 

testified that on September 12, 2004, he was waiting in a liquor store parking 

lot for his cousin to get off work when [Petitioner] pulled up in his black truck 

with his head hanging out the window, saying “You ‘Lincoln’ niggers are 

slipping” and “Skyline.” [Petitioner] also said, “I could have shot you, shot 

you guys.” Wilson responded, “I ain’t from nowhere and ain’t nobody from 

‘Lincoln’ over here, so I ain’t slipping,” and then walked away, feeling it was 

unsafe to stay. Wilson understood [Petitioner’s] comment to mean Wilson 

was not watching his back like he should be. 

The next night, Wilson was in the same parking lot when he heard multiple 

gunshots and was struck three times, in the right arm, right hip side, and left 

foot. Though Wilson never saw the assailant, at some point he told 

investigating detectives that [Petitioner] was involved since they had had a 

confrontation the previous night. According to Wilson, after the incident, 

[Petitioner] drove through his neighborhood multiple times in his truck, a red 

car and a blue truck, waving gang signs and yelling, “Skyline.” 

(ECF No. 7-10 at 6-7.) 

F. Trial – Prosecutor’s Closing Argument 

During the defense’s closing remarks, defense counsel mentioned to the jury that the 

prosecution witnesses, Deondray Thomas, Maurice Williams and William Trice, had 

cooperated with the District Attorney’s office. (ECF No. 7-10 at 28.) In her rebuttal 

argument, the prosecutor stated:

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Deondray Thomas, Maurice Williams, and William Trice, yes, they all talked 

to the police, and I talked to you about that in my opening statement. They 

took the stand. They testified, and they answered questions, whether they 

were asked by the D.A., myself, or whether they were asked by defense 

counsel. And you had an opportunity to listen to them. They admitted they 

smoked weed. They admitted they’re gang members. They admitted that they 

committed these crimes that they were involved in and they were convicted

of it, and they came forward with all of that.

(Id. at 24, FN 8). Near the end of her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor delivered the 

following charge to the jury:

In conclusion, you have to ask yourselves, if he [Petitioner] didn’t commit this

murder, explain those statements in the back seat of the patrol car. Just explain 

them. Why is he after Maurice Williams? Why is he threatening Maurice 

Williams? Why is he threatening Maurice Williams a week before trial here, 

December 22nd, two weeks before trial? Why? Why is he going like this 

(indicating)? [¶] LaDonte Wilson had been harassed by this defendant for 

approximately ten months, started on September [] 12th[,] 2004, when they 

had their first confrontation, and then it ended on July 10th, 2005 when he 

was with his brother and father and was shot at. [¶] You saw, [Wilson] didn’t 

want to testify here. He hated being here, but he did it. And he is angry. He 

is angry that it had to happen, that he has to be careful and cautious when he 

is standing in front of his own home with his father and his brother. He has 

to watch his back for cars. Don’t go to the corner store, get down, run. That 

is how he had to live his life, because this defendant chose to run around his 

neighborhood and look for trouble.

(Id. at 24.) Petitioner’s trial counsel then moved for a mistrial and claimed that the 

prosecutor’s comments violated the Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 

(ECF No. 13-1 at 15.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for retrial and 

subsequently provided the jury with the following instruction: 

A defendant has an absolute constitutional right not to testify. He or she may 

rely on the state of the evidence and argue that the People have failed to prove 

the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Do not consider, for any reason at all, 

the fact that the defendant did not testify. Do not discuss that fact during your 

deliberations or let it influence your decision in any way. 

(ECF No. 7-10 at 28-29.)

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under the 

AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the 

merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. 

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court 

is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, 

the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state 

court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 

(2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).

The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state 

court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but 

unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the 

“unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than 

incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly 

established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for 

the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-

06 (1991). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas 

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corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result 

of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision 

will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. 

Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing 

principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its 

decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. More specifically, clearly established federal law 

refers to “the holdings as opposed to the dicta, of [the] decisions.” Howes v. Felds, 132 S. 

Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012). 

Federal courts cannot rely solely on their own precedent to grant habeas relief. Lopez 

v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2014) (“We have emphasized, time and again, that the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, prohibits 

the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a 

particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly established.’”). A circuit court cannot “refine 

or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that 

this Court has not announced.” Id. at 4. 

Instead, where no decision of the Supreme Court “squarely addresses” an issue or 

provides a “categorical answer” to the question before the state court, §2254(d)(1) bars 

relief because the state’s adjudication of the issue cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, Supreme Court law. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008)

(per curiam). In other words, an abstract rule that has not been clearly established by the 

Supreme Court cannot be used to grant a petitioner habeas relief. See Lopez, 135 S. Ct. at 

4.

V. DISCUSSION

In his sole remaining claim, Petitioner alleges that he was denied his Fifth 

Amendment right not to testify when the prosecutor improperly commented on his silence. 

(ECF No. 13-1 at 14.) First, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor improperly commented 

on Petitioner’s silence by indirectly comparing his choice to remain silent with the 

witnesses’ willingness to testify, namely William Trice, Deondray Thomas, Maurice 

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Williams, and LaDonte Wilson. (Id. at 17-18.) Second, prosecutor’s concluding comment 

to the jury to “just explain” was an indirect challenge to him to “take the witness stand and 

explain” his verbal and non-verbal statements to William Trice, Deondray Thomas, and 

Maurice Williams. (Id. at 15-16.) Accordingly, Petitioner argues that the Court of 

Appeal’s ruling - that the challenged comments did not rise to the level of Griffin error -

“involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal Law.” (ECF No. 13-

1 at 15.) Petitioner primarily relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Griffin v. 

California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Respondent asserts the state court’s determination of this 

claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law. (ECF No. 32 at 13.)

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, and it 

was denied in an unpublished opinion. (ECF No. 7-10.) Petitioner then raised the issue in 

petition for review to the California Supreme Court, which denied the claim without 

comment. (ECF. No 13-1 at 5.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state 

appellate court’s decision denying the claim as the basis for its opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

805-06. The state appellate court denied the claim as follows:

Here, the prosecutor’s challenged remarks are plainly read as asking the jurors

to reconcile for themselves (“In conclusion, you have to ask yourselves . . .”) 

whether there was an innocent explanation for [Petitioner’s] threat to 

Williams and comments to Trice in the patrol car, suggesting there was no 

such explanation for [Petitioner’s] words and actions. We are not persuaded 

by [Petitioner’s] attempts to characterize this comment as a challenge to him 

to “take the witness stand and ‘explain’ [his] verbal and non verbal statements 

he made to William Trice, Deondray Thomas and Maurice Williams.” In 

reading the entirety of the remarks, the prosecutor in no way suggested that 

the jury should look to [Petitioner] for an explanation. Rather, in our view, 

this is the kind of fair comment on the state of the evidence (or the absence 

thereof) that occurred in Sanders [People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475] 

rather than a suggestion that the prosecution’s evidence was not, or should 

have been, personally contradicted by [Petitioner].

To the extent [Petitioner] argues the prosecutor sought to compare his silence 

with the willingness of Thomas, Trice and Williams to testify akin to what 

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occurred in People v. Guzman, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 1282, we likewise 

cannot agree. Here, the prosecutor followed her comments about Thomas, 

Trice and Williams by telling the jury that [Petitioner] sought to discredit them 

due to their cooperation with the District Attorney’s office. The prosecutor 

acknowledged that they were not necessarily upstanding persons, and that the 

jury might disagree with the fact that they had severed ties with their families 

and received deals. The comments were directed to the credibility of these 

witnesses, and not a comparison between those witnesses and [Petitioner] as 

done in Guzman. (See Guzman, at pp. 1286-1290.) The prosecutor’s 

comments about those witnesses and her request to jurors to explain 

[Petitioner’s] statements for themselves is separated by 23 pages of transcript. 

It is not reasonably likely that the jury construed these widely separated 

comments regarding the main prosecution witnesses and [Petitioner] as a 

reflection on [Petitioner’s] silence. 

Assuming arguendo there was Griffin error, the error was harmless. The jury 

was instructed as follows: “A defendant has an absolute constitutional right 

not to testify. He or she may rely on the state of the evidence and argue that 

the People have failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Do 

not consider, for any reason at all, the fact that the defendant did not testify. 

Do not discuss that fact during your deliberations or let it influence your 

decision in any way.” (CALCRIM No. 355.) “Jurors are presumed to 

understand and follow the court’s instructions” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 

Cal.4th 619, 662.) [Petitioner] has not pointed to evidence or any matter in 

the record rebutting that “crucial assumption.” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 93, 139.) This, combined with the strong evidence of [Petitioner’s] 

guilt, convinces us beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have 

convicted him of his offenses even if the prosecutor had refrained from 

making her challenged comments. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 

18, 24; People v. Hardy, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 154.)

(ECF No. 7-10 at 27-29 (emphasis in original).)

A. The Prosecutor’s Statements Did Not Violate Clearly Established Federal Law

In Griffin, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the 

prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is 

evidence of guilt.” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. The prosecutor’s statements in the instant 

case did not directly call attention to Petitioner’s decision not to testify at trial. Petitioner 

nonetheless argues that the prosecutor’s statements amount to “an implied reference to 

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petitioner’s silence and failure to testify . . . .” (ECF No. 13-1 at 15.) “The prosecutor’s 

argument gave the jury a license to consider in their deliberations petitioner’s failure to 

‘just explain’ his comments in the back seat of the patrol car to William Trice and his 

alleged threat to Maurice Williams not to testify prior to trial.” (Id.) Petitioner argues that 

the Court in Griffin held that a “prosecutor cannot comment, directly or indirectly, on the 

defendant’s failure to testify in his defense.” (ECF No. 13-1 at 15.) This is an overbroad 

reading of Griffin. 

The Supreme Court has explained that Griffin only “addressed prosecutorial 

comment[s] which baldly stated to the jury that the defendant must have known what the 

disputed facts were, but that he had refused to take the stand to deny or explain them.” 

United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988). Griffin did not clearly establish that a 

defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated by prosecutorial comments that indirectly 

reference a defendant’s failure to testify. Id.; see also Melendez v. Grounds, 2013 WL 

1662355, at *12 (N.D. Cal. April 17, 2013). 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that while “a direct comment about the 

defendant’s failure to testify always violates Griffin, a prosecutor’s indirect comment 

violates Griffin only ‘if it is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant’s failure 

to testify, or is of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to 

be a comment on the failure to testify.’” Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 912 (9th Cir. 2006),

(citing Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

In the instant case, the prosecutor stated the following in her rebuttal argument:

In conclusion, you have to ask yourselves, if he [Petitioner] didn’t commit this

murder, explain those statements in the back seat of the patrol car. Just explain 

them. Why is he after Maurice Williams? Why is he threatening Maurice 

Williams? Why is he threatening Maurice Williams a week before trial here, 

December 22nd, two weeks before trial? Why? Why is he going like this 

(indicating)? [¶] LaDonte Wilson had been harassed by this defendant for 

approximately ten months, started on September [] 12th[,] 2004, when they 

had their first confrontation, and then it ended on July 10th, 2005 when he 

was with his brother and father and was shot at. [¶] You saw, [Wilson] didn’t 

want to testify here. He hated being here, but he did it. And he is angry. He 

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is angry that it had to happen, that he has to be careful and cautious when he 

is standing in front of his own home with his father and his brother. He has 

to watch his back for cars. Don’t go to the corner store, get down, run. That 

is how he had to live his life, because this defendant chose to run around his 

neighborhood and look for trouble.

(ECF No. 7-10 at 24.) The state court found that the prosecutor was simply commenting 

on the state of the evidence. (ECF No. 7-10 at 27-29.) This Court agrees with the state 

court’s conclusion that the prosecutor was asking the jury to ask themselves whether an 

innocent explanation exists for Petitioner’s threat to Williams and comments to Trice in 

the patrol car. The comment served to argue the implausibility of any scenario whereby 

Petitioner would threaten these witnesses for perceived cooperation, if Petitioner had not 

committed the murder. Petitioner himself acknowledges that Griffin “does not extend to 

comments on the state of evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material 

evidence or to call logical witnesses.” (ECF No. 13-1 at 16.) See, e.g., U.S. v. LopezAlvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1992) (a prosecutor may properly comment upon 

the defendant’s failure to present exculpatory evidence so long as it is not phrased to call 

attention to defendant’s failure to testify). 

The above comment does not amount to a direct comment on Petitioner’s failure to 

take the stand, nor was it is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant’s failure 

to testify, nor was it of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take 

it to be a comment on Petitioner’s failure to testify. Hovey, 458 F.3d at 912. 

As to the second comment at issue, the prosecutor stated:

Deondray Thomas, Maurice Williams, and William Trice, yes, they all talked 

to the police, and I talked to you about that in my opening statement. They 

took the stand. They testified, and they answered questions, whether they 

were asked by the D.A., myself, or whether they were asked by defense 

counsel. And you had an opportunity to listen to them. They admitted they 

smoked weed. They admitted they’re gang members. They admitted that they 

committed these crimes that they were involved in and they were convicted 

of it, and they came forward with all of that.

//

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(ECF No. 7-10 at 24, FN 8; see also ECF No. 7-25 at 42.) Petitioner alleges that this 

comment indirectly compared his choice to remain silent with the witnesses’ willingness 

to testify. (ECF No. 13-1 at 15.) The state court found that this comment was aimed at the 

credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. (ECF No. 7-10 at 27-29.) “[T]he prosecutor 

followed her comments about Thomas, Trice and Williams by telling the jury that 

[Petitioner] sought to discredit them due to their cooperation with the District Attorney’s 

office.” (Id.; see also ECF No. 7-25 at 42.)

The state court reasonably concluded that no Griffin error occurred. The 

prosecutor’s statement during rebuttal argument was not a direct attack on petitioner’s

failure to testify. Nor did the comment indirectly attack, or call attention to, petitioner’s 

failure to testify. The comment was made in rebuttal to defense counsel’s argument that

the testimony offered by the prosecution’s three main witnesses was not credible. (ECF 

No. 7-25 at 5.) “[S]ome of the pivotal testimony consisted of the testimony of three 

witnesses, Mr. Trice, Mr. Williams, and Mr. Thomas, all of whom had much in common, 

and their commonality is what I think individually and collectively makes them 

unbelievable . . . .” (Id.) Defense counsel concluded his closing argument with the 

following statement: “I urge you to do the right thing, and I urge you to find Mr. Paris not 

guilty, and reject the testimony of Mr. Trice, Williams, and Thomas, and find him not 

guilty.” (Id. at 38.)

Considered in this context, there is no reason to believe that the jury would have 

interpreted the prosecutor’s statement as a comment on Petitioner’s failure to testify. 

Instead, the jury likely would have understood the prosecutor to be pointing out the aspects 

and circumstances of the witnesses’ testimony that the jury could appropriately use to 

assess their credibility. In fact, the prosecutor specifically stated, “These are all things that 

you can look at in determining whether or not you believe the witness.” (ECF No. 7-25 at 

43.) The comment was not of “such a character that the jury would naturally and 

necessarily take [it] to be a comment on the failure” of Petitioner to testify. Lincoln, 807 

F.2d at 809. 

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B. Harmless Error 

Even if a court were to find that the prosecutor commented indirectly on the

petitioner’s decision not to testify, reversal of a conviction is only required if: “(1) the 

commentary is extensive; (2) an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to the jury as a 

basis for the conviction; and (3) where there is evidence that could have supported 

acquittal.” Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Lincoln, 807 F.2d 

at 809).

Here, any Griffin error was harmless. The prosecutor’s statements were minimal 

and brief in the context of rebuttal closing arguments, consisting of less than a page in an 

argument that spanned twenty-eight pages. (ECF No. 7-25 at 40-68.) Furthermore, the 

comments at issue were separated by 23 pages of transcript. (ECF No. 7-10 at 27-29.) “It 

is not reasonably likely that the jury construed these widely separated comments regarding 

the main prosecution witnesses and [Petitioner] as a reflection on [Petitioner’s] silence.” 

(Id.) 

The prosecutor did not stress to the jury that they should find Petitioner guilty of the 

charges because he did not testify. Rather, as discussed above, the comments were made: 

(1) to point to the absence of an innocent explanation for Petitioner’s actions against 

Williams and his threats against Trice; and (2) in an attempt to appropriately rehabilitate 

the witnesses’ credibility. Moreover, the trial court expressly instructed the jury that: 

A defendant has an absolute constitutional right not to testify. He or she may 

rely on the state of the evidence and argue that the People have failed to prove 

the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Do not consider, for any reason at all, 

the fact that the defendant did not testify. Do not discuss that fact during your 

deliberations or let it influence your decision in any way. 

(ECF No. 7-10 at 28-29.) The jury is presumed to have followed these instructions, and 

Petitioner points to no basis in the record for finding that it did not. See Fields v. Brown, 

503 F.3d 755, 782 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Kansas v. March, 548 U.S. 163, 179 (2006)). 

Finally, on habeas review, Petitioner must establish that any Griffin error had a 

“substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.” Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 

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588 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). The evidence presented at trial against 

Petitioner was substantial. As accurately summarized in Respondent’s Answer:

Both Williams and Thomas testified that [Petitioner] was the shooter, 

witnesses at the scene reported hearing someone say, “We’ll get you, Mike” 

and described a truck matching the description of the one owned by 

[Petitioner] as the vehicle from which the fatal shot was fired. [Petitioner]

had threatened Wilson before the assault on July 10, 2005, and [Petitioner]

had been seen driving around Wilson’s neighborhood flashing gang signs and 

claiming his membership in the rival Skyline gang. The prosecution’s expert 

testified that Skyline gang members were rivals with both the Lincoln and the 

Emerald Hills gangs. Hogan’s murder occurred in Emerald Hills territory and 

the assault against Wilson occurred in Lincoln territory. [Furthermore, 

Petitioner’s] own statements betrayed his anxiety at the prospect that Williams 

may have implicated him in the Hogan murder.

(ECF No. 32 at 20.)

Given the high standard on federal habeas review, the trial court’s instructions to the 

jury, and the strong evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, it is not conceivable to this Court that 

the jury would have come to a different conclusion had the prosecutor not made the 

comments Petitioner complains of. 

For all the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not established the state court’s denial 

of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (2002). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief on this claim.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue 

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing 

that judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 13, 2015, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

//

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than August 27, 2015. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2015

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