Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00046/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00046-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID FRANKLIN COTNEY, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No.3:07cv46-WHA

) (WO) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

David Franklin Cotney, Jr. (“Cotney”) asks the court to vacate, set aside, or correct

his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After due consideration of Cotney’s § 2255

motion, the supporting and opposing submissions, and the record in this case, the court

concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not required and that, pursuant to Rule 8(a), Rules

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts, the motion should

be denied.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In this court on May 28, 2003, pursuant to a plea agreement, Cotney pled guilty to

conspiracy to manufacture 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and the use and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug

trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). On October 15, 2003, the court

sentenced Cotney to a total of 342 months’ imprisonment, comprising a term of 222 months

on the conspiracy count and a consecutive term of 120 months for the gun count. Cotney

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See Doc. No. 1. Although Cotneys’s § 2255 motion was date-stamped “received” in this court on

January 16, 2007, under the “mailbox rule,” the court deems it filed on the date Cotney delivered it to prison

authorities for mailing, October 12, 2006. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Washington

v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).

2

appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and on September 15, 2004, that court

affirmed his convictions and sentence. See United States v. Cotney, 120 Fed.Appx. 785 (11th

Cir. 2004) (unpublished). The Supreme Court subsequently remanded the case to the court

of appeals for further consideration of Cotney’s sentence in light of United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005). Cotney v. United States, 544 U.S. 1013 (2005). On September 12,

2005, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Cotney’s sentence. United States v. Cotney, 143

Fed.Appx. 290 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). On January 9, 2006, the Supreme Court

denied Cotney’s petition for writ of certiorari. Cotney v. United States, 546 U.S. 1130

(2006).

On January 9, 2007,1

 Cotney filed this § 2255 motion, in which he asserts that his

counsel was ineffective for the following reasons:

1. Counsel allowed the prosecutor and court to depart downwardly

only three levels for his substantial assistance to the

government, when federal courts customarily grant downward

departures of from 25-50 percent of the entire sentence.

2. Counsel failed to object to the amount of methamphetamine

attributed to him, resulting in imposition of a sentence higher

than what was justified by the evidence.

3. Counsel failed to object to the district court’s calculation of his

base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.

4. Counsel failed to introduce exculpatory photographic evidence

at sentencing that would have obviated application of an

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3

enhancement for obstruction of justice. 

5. Counsel failed to effectively challenge hearsay statements

adduced at sentencing and forming the basis of an aggravatingrole enhancement.

6. Counsel failed to object to the government’s breach of the terms

of the plea agreement.

The government answers that Cotney’s claims are meritless and therefore afford him

no basis for relief. (Doc. No. 6.) Cotney was allowed an opportunity to respond to the

government’s answer and has done so. (Doc. No. 8.) The court will address the issues.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the standards of Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1344 (11th

Cir. 2006). Under Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) that

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986)

(internal quotation marks omitted); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.

2000). A “reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland., 466 U.S. at 694.

Scrutiny of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential,” and the court indulges a

“strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was reasonable. Chandler, 218 F.3d at

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1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will “avoid second-guessing counsel’s

performance: It does not follow that any counsel who takes an approach [the court] would

not have chosen is guilty of rendering ineffective assistance.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and brackets omitted). Thus, “[g]iven the strong presumption in favor of competence, the

petitioner’s burden of persuasion – though the presumption is not insurmountable – is a

heavy one.” Id.

Unless a petitioner satisfies the showings required on both prongs of the Strickland

inquiry, relief should be denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, once a court

decides that one of the requisite showings has not been made, it need not decide whether the

other one has been. Id. at 697; Duren v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1998) (“if a

defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong, the court need not address the performance

prong”).

B. The Ineffective Assistance Claims

1. Failure to Argue for “Customary” Downward Departure

Cotney maintains that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue at sentencing

that it is customary for federal courts to award defendants reductions of from 25-50 percent

in their sentences when granting motions for downward departure based on substantial

assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. See § 2255 Motion (Doc. No. 1) at 5-5a. According to

Cotney, his counsel’s failure to present this argument to the court resulted in his receiving

only a three-level downward departure for assisting the government. Id.

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Cotney’s claim in this regard is completely unsupported. Not only does he fail to

present any evidence that courts customarily award sentence reductions of 25-50 percent

when granting downward departures under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, but he fails also to point to any

facts indicating that he was entitled to a downward departure greater than the three-level

reduction recommended by the prosecution and granted by the court in his case. In an

apparent effort to suggest he did not receive the reduction to which he was entitled, Cotney

asserts that “[t]he court awarded Cotney’s co-defendants a very substantial reduction in

sentence for the same cooperation and participation.” See § 2255 Motion (Doc. No. 1) at 5a.

While Cotney presents no facts in support of this claim, a review of the transcript of the

October 15, 2003, hearing at which Cotney and two of his codefendants were sentenced

reveals that those two codefendants – Allen Lee Nelson and Jonathan Boyd Weldon – were

awarded the same three-level reduction for substantial assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 that

the court awarded Cotney. See Sentence Hearing at 190-92 & 196-97. Cotney’s claim is

baseless.

Because Cotney fails to show that his counsel’s performance in this regard was

deficient and that such performance prejudiced his case, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89,

he is not entitled to any relief based on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2. Failure to Object to Attributed Drug Amount

Cotney contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object

to the amount of methamphetamine attributed to him, resulting, he says, in the district court’s

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2

If “50 grams or more of methamphetamine ... or 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance

(continued...)

6

imposition of a sentence significantly higher than what was justified by the evidence. See

§ 2255 Motion (Doc. No. 1) at 5b-5d.

At the sentence hearing, the government presented evidence that laboratory analysis

of substances seized from a meth lab operated by Cotney revealed that these substances

contained a total of 229.70 grams of pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, a precursor chemical

used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. See Sentence Hearing at 44-49. Melissa

Marie Kelly, a chemist for the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that based

on an estimated yield of between 50% to 75%, which she said was the typical yield of

methamphetamine from pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, the pseudoephedrine hydrochloride

seized from Cotney’s lab would be expected to produce approximately 155.61 grams of

methamphetamine. Sentence Hearing at 50-55. 

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the district court may calculate potential

methamphetamine yield based upon seized precursor chemicals. United States v. Carroll,

6 F.3d 735, 742-43 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Smith, 240 F.3d 927, 930-31

(11th Cir. 2001) (courts may estimate quantity of methamphetamine based on quantity of

precursors). In the instant case, the theoretical yield of 155.61 grams of methamphetamine

easily met the threshold amount of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine set forth at 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), the statute that determined the sentencing range for Cotney’s

drug conviction.2

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2

(...continued)

containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine” is involved, § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) provides for a

sentence of from 10 years to life. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).

7

Cotney maintains that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that he should

instead have been sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii), which provides for a sentence of

from 5 to 40 years where “5 grams or more of methamphetamine ... or 50 grams or more of

a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine” is involved.

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). Cotney’s argument in this regard is apparently based on

his erroneous assumption that because the pseudoephedrine hydrochloride was part of a

mixture when it was seized, the threshold amount for sentencing him under

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) was 500 grams or more of methamphetamine mixture. See 21 U.S.C.

841(b)(1)(A)(viii). However, the theoretical-yield analysis allows the court to “separate” a

precursor chemical from any mixture in which it may be found and to then calculate the

potential yield of methamphetamine itself, again separated from any mixture in which it

could theoretically be found. See Smith, 240 F.3d at 930-31; Carroll, 6 F.3d at 742-43. In

this case, the theoretical yield – approximately 155.61 grams – represented a quantity of

methamphetamine itself, and did not represent “a mixture or substance containing a

detectable amount of methamphetamine.” This amount met the threshold amount set forth

in § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly for resolution of this

issue, when pleading guilty, Cotney expressly admitted that it was his intent to manufacture

the threshold amount of at least 50 grams of methamphetamine. See Change of Plea Hearing

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3

Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines addresses the “Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing,

Exporting, Trafficking, or Possession; Continuing Criminal Enterprise” by assigning a base offense level

through the application of predetermined ranges to drug weights. At the time of Cotney’s sentencing, the

Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory.

8

at 11. In any event, the sentence actually imposed by the court under § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii)

was within the statutory range in which Cotney maintains he was entitled to be sentenced

under § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii).

For these reasons, there would have been no merit to any objection by counsel that

Cotney’s sentence should have been determined pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) based on

50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. Accordingly,

Cotney fails to demonstrate deficient performance in this regard by counsel or any resulting

prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. This allegation of ineffective assistance of

counsel lacks merit.

3. Failure to Object to Calculation of Base Offense Level

In a claim related to his previous claim, Cotney argues that his counsel was ineffective

for failing to join with counsel for his codefendants in objecting to the district court’s

calculation of his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. See § 2255 Motion

(Doc. No. 1) at 5e; see also 5b-5c.

At sentencing, the government argued that the base offense level for Cotney and his

codefendants for their manufacture of methamphetamine should be set at 34 pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,3

 based on the evidence indicating that, under a theoretical-yield analysis,

the seized pseudoephedrine hydrochloride would be expected to produce approximately

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4

The district court found authority for this method of calculating the base offense level in Judge

Carnes’s concurring opinion in United States v. Blaylock, 275 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the

Sentencing Guidelines, where “there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the

offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment.

(n.12). In resolving sentencing factors, the court may consider any information with sufficient indicia of

reliability to support its probable accuracy. See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a).

9

155.61 grams of methamphetamine. See Drug Quantity Table, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3)

(providing for a base offense level of 34 for an offense involving “at least 150 G but less than

500 G of Methamphetamine (actual)”). Counsel for codefendants Nelson and Weldon

objected to the government’s position, arguing that since the methamphetamine that could

be derived from the precursor chemicals was theoretical and had not actually been produced,

the 155.61 grams of methamphetamine was not “actual” methamphetamine for purposes of

the Guidelines and so the base offense level for the methamphetamine at issue should be

controlled by § 2D1.1(c)(7) of the Drug Quantity Table, which sets forth a base offense level

of 26 for an offense involving “[a]t least 50 G but less than 200 G of Methamphetamine.”

See Sentence Hearing at 155-66. The district court overruled the objections by counsel for

Nelson and Weldon and declined to use 26 as the base offense level for any of the

defendants, including Cotney. Id. at 172-74 & 180. However, the court also declined to

accept the government’s recommendation that the base offense level for Cotney and his

codefendants be set at 34 as provided by U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). Instead, the court found

that, under the facts of the case, the most simple and direct method of calculating the base

offense level for the methamphetamine offense was to use the Drug Quantity Table for

precursor chemicals set forth at U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11.4

 See Sentence Hearing at 173-74. Thus,

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based on the evidence of 229.70 grams of seized pseudoephedrine hydrochloride, the district

court set the base offense level for Cotney and each of his codefendants at 32. See Sentence

Hearing at 173-74; see also Drug Quantity Table, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11(d)(4) (providing for

a base offense level of 32 for an offense involving “[a]t least 100 G but less than 300 G of

Pseudoephedrine”).

It is clear from this record that, had Cotney’s counsel joined with the counsel for his

codefendants in objecting to the district court’s calculation of the base offense level for the

methamphetamine offense, Cotney’s counsel would have been similarly unsuccessful. First,

the district court specifically rejected the argument that the base offense level should be

controlled by U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7), which would have provided for a base offense level

of 26. Any such argument by Cotney’s counsel would likewise have been rejected by the

court. Next, had the district court elected to determine the base offense level under U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1 using the theoretical-yield method, as was urged by the government, it could

properly have done so using U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) (“at least 150 G but less than 500 G of

Methamphetamine (actual)”), which would have put Cotney’s base offense level at 34. In

the Sentencing Guidelines, the term “methamphetamine (actual)” refers to the weight of the

controlled substance, methamphetamine, itself. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (n. B). The term

methamphetamine with no qualifier refers to a mixture of methamphetamine and other

substances. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (n. A). These definitions were overlooked by counsel for

Nelson and Weldon in their arguments at sentencing, and are overlooked by Cotney in his

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Although in response to questioning by counsel for one of Cotney’s codefendants, Kelly stated that

the expected methamphetamine yield was not actual methamphetamine, it is clear from the context of the

questions and answers that Kelly’s statements in this regard refer to the question of whether the

methamphetamine itself in fact existed and not to the question of whether the methamphetamine was

contained within a mixture or other substance:

Q: You write in your report that this would have theoretically yielded 77.95, 35.65, and

42.01 grams of methamphetamine, correct?

A: Correct.

Q: You did not use the phrase “actual methamphetamine.”

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. Is there a difference from methamphetamine and actual methamphetamine in the

world of DFS [Department of Forensic Sciences]?

A: Actual methamphetamine would be if we had a sample of methamphetamine that we had

to quantitate. Theoretically, we had no methamphetamine, so we’re working with the

starting material.

Q: Okay. So basically, this was potential methamphetamine.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: All right. We might call it executory methamphetamine, a platonic, ideal

methamphetamine. It was not actual meth.

(continued...)

11

instant argument. Although the expected yield of methamphetamine from the precursor

chemicals was indeed “theoretical” and the methamphetamine did not in fact exist, the

approximation of 155.61 grams of methamphetamine was not of a mixture or substance

containing methamphetamine, but rather of methamphetamine itself. That is, when the

chemist, Kelly, testified regarding the theoretical yield from the pseudoephedrine

hydrochloride, she was not hypothesizing a quantity of a mixture or substance containing

methamphetamine, but rather a quantity of actual methamphetamine itself.5

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5

(...continued)

A: No. It was not actual meth.

Sentence Hearing at 51-52.

The meaning of “actual methamphetamine” discussed in the above-quoted exchange is clearly not

the meaning assigned to “actual methamphetamine” as it is used in the Sentencing Guidelines, where actual

methamphetamine refers to the amount of methamphetamine itself, as distinguished from a mixture of

methamphetamine and other substances. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (n. A & n. B). Indeed, it would seem to defy

common sense that Kelly, when using the theoretical-yield method to calculate the expected yield from the

precursor chemicals, would posit quantities of methamphetamine within a theoretical mixture instead of

simply calculating the amount of methamphetamine itself that could be produced.

12

From all the above, three things are apparent: (1) Cotney’s counsel would not have

prevailed if he had raised the argument propounded by counsel for his codefendants and

rejected by the district court; (2) if the district court had chosen to sentence Cotney under the

provisions of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 instead of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11, the resulting base offense level

would have been 34, as set forth in § 2D1.1(c)(3), and not 26, as provided in § 2D1.1(c)(7);

and (3) the district court’s decision to calculate Cotney’s sentence using the precursor

chemical table in § 2D1.11 resulted in a lower base offense level, 32, than Cotney otherwise

would have received had his base offense level been determined by reference to U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1. Consequently, this court concludes that Cotney has failed to demonstrate deficient

performance by counsel or any resulting prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89.

Therefore, he is not entitled to any relief based on this claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

4. Failure to Introduce Exculpatory Evidence Regarding

Alleged Obstruction of Justice

Cotney argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to introduce

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Cotney’s misstatements to the probation officer were material, because his knowledge of whether

it was police who were raiding the meth lab was relevant with regard to an enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3A1.2(b)(1), which concerned whether he had reasonable cause to know that the individual at whom he

(continued...)

13

exculpatory photographs at his sentence hearing. See § 2255 Motion (Doc. No. 1) at 6a-6b.

When police officers raided Cotney’s meth lab, Cotney ran into the woods

surrounding the lab. The officers followed, and one of the officers released his canine

partner to assist in the pursuit. Cotney shot and killed the police dog. Cotney then pointed

his weapon – a sawed-off shotgun – in the direction of one of the officers before other

officers were able to apprehend him.

During his presentence interview with the probation officer with respect to preparation

of the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Cotney denied knowing that the individuals

who raided his meth lab and pursued him into the woods were police officers, and he claimed

that at least one arresting officer was not wearing a uniform. Cotney testified at the sentence

hearing, where he continued to insist that he had not known these individuals were police

officers. The government presented testimony from several of the officers, who maintained

that their attire had clearly indicated they were police and that they had also verbally

identified themselves to Cotney as police multiple times before he fled. The district court

credited the officers’ version of events and accepted the PSI’s recommendation that a twolevel enhancement for obstruction of justice be applied to Cotney pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1, comment. (n. 4(h)), because he had provided materially false information to the

probation officer.6

 See PSI at 9 ¶ 32; Sentence Hearing at 176-77. 

Case 3:07-cv-00046-WHA-CSC Document 9 Filed 11/21/08 Page 13 of 19
(...continued)

pointed his gun was a police officer.

7

At the sentence hearing, one of the officers identified Government Exhibit # 5 as the tactical vest

he wore during the raid. Sentence Hearing at 66-67. 

14

Cotney contends that, at the time of the sentence hearing, his counsel had possession

of photographs showing the officers at the arrest scene dressed in civilian clothes. According

to Cotney, his counsel should have offered these photographs into evidence at sentencing in

order to demonstrate that the officers committed perjury by testifying that they were wearing

attire identifying them as police when they raided the meth lab. Cotney maintains that had

these photographs been introduced by counsel, they would have demonstrated the truth of

his version of events, and the district court would not have imposed the obstruction-of-justice

enhancement for providing false information to the probation officer.

With his § 2255 motion, Cotney submitted four photographs purportedly depicting

three of the police officers who raided the meth lab wearing civilian clothes at the arrest

scene. Assuming, without knowing, that these photographs indeed depict three of the

participating police officers at the arrest scene, the photographs prove very little. At the

sentence hearing, several of the officers who participated in the raid testified that they were

wearing tactical police vests with the word “Police” in large letters on the front and back over

their civilian clothing at the time of the raid.7

 The photographs now presented by Cotney,

of officers near the arrest scene at some undetermined time after the raid and after Cotney’s

arrest, no longer wearing the tactical police vests, do not demonstrate that the vests were not

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worn by the officers at the time of the raid and wholly fail to prove that the officers

committed perjury when testifying that their attire had indicated they were police and that

they had verbally identified themselves to Cotney as police multiple times. Consequently,

this court concludes that Cotney has failed to demonstrate deficient performance by counsel

in this regard or any resulting prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. He is not

entitled to any relief based on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

5. Failure to Challenge Hearsay Statements Supporting

Aggravating-role Enhancement

Cotney contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge hearsay

statements adduced at sentencing and forming the basis of an aggravating-role enhancement

imposed by the district court. See § 2255 Motion (Doc. No. 1) at 6c.

At the sentence hearing, Drug Enforcement Agent Raymond DeJohn testified that one

of Cotney’s codefendants, Allen Lee Nelson, had avowed that Cotney organized the meth

lab and was to receive the majority of the methamphetamine to sell. Sentence Hearing at 20-

21. Also testifying on this point was Clay Stewart, an investigator with the Chambers

County Sheriff’s Department. Stewart testified that, based on Cotney’s own proffer, he

believed Cotney had organized the operation and acquired the necessary supplies. Id. at 82-

87. The district court found Nelson’s statements to be credible and, over an objection by

Cotney’s counsel, imposed a two-level role enhancement against Cotney under U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(c). See Sentence Hearing at 179. 

Cotney challenged this enhancement on appeal, arguing that there was insufficient

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8

U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 provides that the sentencing court may rely on “relevant hearsay without regard

to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient

indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”

16

evidence to support the enhancement because the district court improperly relied on Nelson’s

hearsay statements. After noting that hearsay is generally admissible at sentencing, provided

that such statements have sufficient indicia of reliability, the Eleventh Circuit found that

Nelson’s hearsay statements were properly admitted because (1) Investigator Stewart’s

testimony supported the reliability of Nelson’s statements, (2) the court found the statements

credible, and (3) the defense had an opportunity to rebut the testimony.8

 See United States

v. Cotney, 120 Fed.Appx. 785 at *9-10 (11th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (citing United States

v. Anderton, 136 F.3d 747, 751 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the court held there was

sufficient evidence to support the aggravating-role enhancement. Id. 

Cotney does not suggest how his counsel could have prevented the hearsay statements

from being introduced and used against him at sentencing. Nor has he proffered any

evidence that could have been introduced to successfully rebut the hearsay testimony. Under

the circumstances, this court concludes that Cotney has failed to demonstrate that his counsel

rendered ineffective assistance. Therefore, is not entitled to § 2255 relief based on this claim.

6. Failure to Object to Breach of Plea Agreement

Cotney contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object

to the government’s breach of the terms of the plea agreement. See § 2255 Motion (Doc. No.

1) at 6c-6d. According to Cotney, the government agreed not to argue that Cotney’s

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9

Generally, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years.

However, § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) provides, in pertinent part, that a person who, in relation to a drug trafficking

crime uses or carries a firearm “shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime ... if the firearm is

discharged, be sentenced to not less than 10 years.” 

10The plea agreement contained a provision whereby the government reserved the right to inform the

court and the probation office of “all facts pertinent to the sentencing process, including all relevant

information concerning the offenses and the defendant’s background.” Plea Agreement at 3. 

17

discharge of the firearm he possessed warranted a 10-year sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).9

 Id. He maintains that the government reneged on this term of the

agreement at sentencing and that his counsel’s failure to object to the government’s alleged

breach resulted in his receiving a sentence five years in excess of what was agreed upon. Id.

For purposes of § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), whether a defendant discharged a firearm is a

sentencing factor, not requiring proof at trial or that it be set forth in the indictment. See

Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556 (2002); United States v. Dean, 517 F.3d 1224,

1229-30 (11th Cir. 2008). Notwithstanding Cotney’s claim, the plea agreement did not

contain any provision in which the government agreed not to argue that Cotney’s discharge

of the firearm warranted a 10-year sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). See Plea Agreement

at 3. Nor did the plea agreement contain a provision whereby the government agreed to

make any specific sentencing recommendation.10 Id. During the guilty plea colloquy in this

case, Cotney expressly affirmed to the magistrate judge that he had read the plea agreement,

reviewed it with his counsel before signing it, and understood its terms. See Change of Plea

Hearing at 4-5. Cotney also affirmed to the court that, other than the plea agreement, no one

had made any promises to him to get him to plead guilty. Id. at 5. In addition, Cotney stated

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that he understood that until the probation office completed a presentence report, his exact

sentence could not be determined and that any sentence that might be imposed could be

different from any estimate his counsel had given him. Id. at 7.

There is no support in the record for Cotney’s assertion that the government breached

the plea agreement in his case. Consequently, Cotney has failed to show that his counsel’s

performance in this regard was deficient and that such performance prejudiced his case. As

such, he is not entitled to any relief based on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed by Cotney be denied, as the claims therein entitle him to no relief.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before December 4, 2008. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See

Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Done this 21st day of November, 2008.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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