Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Greg Moore, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Sean Garnand, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-00290-TUC-RM (LAB)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 120) 

and Motion for Clarification (Doc. 134). Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider and clarify 

its March 24, 2020 Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Assert the Law Enforcement 

Investigatory Privilege (Doc. 113). For the following reasons, the Motion for 

Reconsideration (Doc. 120) will be denied and the Motion for Clarification (Doc. 134) 

will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman issued an Order on December 13, 2019 

granting Defendants’ Motion to Assert the Law Enforcement Investigatory Privilege and 

denying Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery until resolution of their Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. (Doc. 74.) Plaintiffs appealed the 

portion of that Order granting the Motion to Assert the Law Enforcement Investigatory 

Privilege and filed an Objection. (Doc. 84.) Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s 

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Objection. (Docs. 92, 94.) On March 24, 2020, this Court issued a thirteen-page Order 

affirming Magistrate Judge Bowman’s Order, granting Defendants’ Motion to Assert the 

Law Enforcement Investigatory Privilege, and ordering Defendants to submit a detailed 

report on the status of the criminal investigation into the Forgeus Apartment fires and a 

predicted timeline for completion of the investigation to Magistrate Judge Leslie 

Bowman for in camera review. (Docs. 113, 121.)1 Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for 

Reconsideration on April 2, 2020. (Doc. 120.) Defendants submitted the status report to 

Judge Bowman on April 6, 2020. (Doc. 124.) The Court ordered Defendants to respond 

to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, with no reply allowed. (Doc. 123.) Plaintiffs 

filed the instant Motion for Clarification on April 16, 2020. (Doc. 134.) Defendants filed 

a Response to the Motion for Reconsideration on April 20, 2020. (Doc. 136.) Defendants 

have not filed a Response to the Motion for Clarification and the time for doing so has 

expired. LRCiv 7.2(c).

II. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs make three main arguments: (1) the 

Court misapprehended the nature of Plaintiff’s claims and, in so doing, erroneously 

concluded that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated how or why the discovery they seek is 

relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence (Doc. 

120 at 2-3); (2) the Court erred in finding that collateral estoppel applied to bar the 

discovery that Plaintiffs seek because (a) the Magistrate Judge did not reach the issue of 

collateral estoppel and (b) the discovery matter before this Court was not sufficiently 

similar to the state court action in which judgment was entered against Plaintiffs on the 

issue of discoverability of the documents to warrant application of the collateral estoppel 

doctrine (id. at 5-6); and (3) the Court erred in finding that disclosure of the documents 

would result in substantial prejudice to Defendants because it is false that Plaintiffs knew 

of the criminal investigation pertaining to them before initiating this lawsuit (id. at 7.)

1 The Court’s Order erroneously directed Defendants to submit the status report to 

Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Rateau. (Doc. 113.) The Order was amended (Doc. 121) to 

reflect that the report be submitted to the Magistrate Judge assigned to the case, 

Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman.

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Defendants’ Response addresses each of these arguments. (Doc. 136.) First, 

Defendants respond that the Court sufficiently considered the nature and extent of 

Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id. at 2.) Defendants respond that, even insofar as the Court did not 

address the Plaintiffs’ need or request for specific documents to the extent that Plaintiffs 

would, in retrospect, have liked, it is irrelevant because Plaintiffs had not previously 

shown in either their briefing or their objection “how discovery of the criminal 

investigation documents is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 

evidence and therefore have not shown that the documents they seek are within the scope 

of discovery.” (Doc. 113 at 10, Doc. 136 at 2-4.) Defendants further point out that 

Plaintiffs argue for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration that the documents 

they seek “may well hold crucial evidence” in support of their claims and that Plaintiffs 

did not show why that argument could not have been raised and developed earlier. (Doc. 

120 at 2-4; Doc. 136 at 5.) Indeed, Plaintiffs are in possession of hundreds of pages of 

redacted City of Tucson law enforcement documents and had every opportunity to make 

a case-specific showing of “substantial need” based on a review of those documents, yet 

failed to do so. (Doc. 136 at 5-6); United States v. Hardrives, Inc., No. 

CIV901656PHXRGSMM, 1991 WL 12008395, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 1991) (a party 

seeking privileged documents must show a substantial need for the information and an 

inability to obtain it by other means).

Second, Defendants respond that the Court did not err when it found that collateral 

estoppel applies to bar Plaintiffs’ request for a second in camera review of the privileged

law enforcement materials. (Doc. 136 at 7-11.) Defendants contend that, as a matter of 

law, the district court’s consideration of the collateral estoppel issue was proper because a 

district court may affirm a Magistrate Judge’s decision based on a slightly different or 

additional ground. (Id. at 9-10.) Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs 

mischaracterize the collateral estoppel analysis in an effort to escape its preclusive effect 

on their requests for discovery of the law enforcement investigation documents. (Id.)

Third, Defendants point out that Plaintiffs did, in fact, know of the criminal 

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investigation into them related to the Forgeus Apartment fires prior to initiating this 

action, which is the second civil rights litigation commenced by Plaintiffs regarding this 

matter. (Id. at 6-7.) 

III. Standard of Review for Motion for Reconsideration

LRCiv 7.2(g) sets forth the standard under which a Court reviews a Motion for 

Reconsideration. It states: 

The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for 

reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest 

error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could 

not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable 

diligence. Any such motion shall point out with specificity 

the matters that the movant believes were overlooked or 

misapprehended by the Court, any new matters being brought 

to the Court's attention for the first time and the reasons they 

were not presented earlier, and any specific modifications 

being sought in the Court's Order. No motion for 

reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or written 

argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition 

to the motion that resulted in the Order. Failure to comply 

with this subsection may be grounds for denial of the motion.

In the District of Arizona, motions for reconsideration will be granted when:

(1) There are material differences in fact or law from 

that presented to the Court and, at the time of the Court's 

decision, the party moving for reconsideration could not have 

known of the factual or legal differences through reasonable 

diligence;

(2) There are new material facts that happened after 

the Court's decision;

(3) There has been a change in the law that was 

decided or enacted after the Court's decision; or

(4) The movant makes a convincing showing that the 

Court failed to consider material facts that were presented to 

the Court before the Court's decision.

Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 

2003). “Reconsideration is indicated in the face of the existence of new evidence, an 

intervening change in the law, or as necessary to prevent manifest injustice.” Navajo 

Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 

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1046 (9th Cir. 2003). Whether to grant reconsideration is within the sound discretion of 

the trial court. Id. A denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration does not raise new material facts or 

evidence that happened after the Court’s decision, nor does it raise an intervening change 

in law that would affect the Court’s decision. Plaintiffs also do not assert that any 

“material differences in fact or law” brought forward in their Motion for Reconsideration 

could not have been brought to the Court’s attention earlier with reasonable diligence.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration includes no discussion of the “reasonable 

diligence” standard. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Reconsideration rests upon an underlying, though not explicitly stated, assertion of either

manifest error or manifest injustice, including the possibility that “the Court failed to 

consider material facts that were presented to the Court before the Court's decision.” 

Motorola, Inc., 215 F.R.D. at 586. As explained below, the Court is satisfied that its 

Order (Doc. 113) was not the result of manifest error and did not result in manifest 

injustice and that it sufficiently considered the material facts presented by Plaintiffs in 

reaching its decision.

IV. Discussion of Motion for Reconsideration

First, the Court is satisfied that it sufficiently apprehended the nature of Plaintiffs’ 

claims and their arguments set forth in the underlying briefing and objection (Docs. 25, 

84) when it concluded that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated “how discovery of the 

criminal investigation documents is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 

admissible evidence and therefore have not shown that the documents they seek are 

within the scope of discovery.” (Doc. 113 at 10.) In their Motion for Reconsideration, 

Plaintiffs argue that the documents may contain “crucial evidence” to support their 

claims. (Doc. 120 at 2-4.) Yet nowhere in the briefing or objection upon which this Court 

based its findings did Plaintiffs explain with specificity which documents may contain 

“crucial evidence” or connect those documents to one or more of their civil rights claims.

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(See Docs. 25, 84, 113.) That is why the Court determined that Plaintiffs had failed to 

show how the discovery they sought was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 

admissible evidence. Plaintiffs misconstrue the Court’s findings when they assert that the 

Court found that “nothing else in the City’s file is relevant.” (Doc. 120 at 3.) The Court 

made no determination as to the relevancy of the contested documents; it found that 

Plaintiffs had not demonstrated their relevancy or connection to their claims. Plaintiffs’

Motion for Reconsideration attempts to remedy this oversight by providing a more 

detailed explanation of their claims. (Doc. 120 at 2-4.) But as Plaintiffs have not shown 

why these arguments could not have been brought to the Court’s attention earlier with 

reasonable diligence, the Court may not use them as a basis to reconsider its Order. 

LRCiv 7.2(g). Nor does Plaintiffs’ explanation convince the Court that it committed 

manifest error when it concluded that the law enforcement privilege operates to bar 

discovery, at this stage in the litigation, of the criminal investigation documents Plaintiffs 

seek, regardless of their relevancy to Plaintiffs’ claims. (Doc. 113.)

Second, the Court is satisfied that, with respect to its findings on the collateral 

estoppel issue, Plaintiffs have not made “a convincing showing that the Court failed to 

consider material facts that were presented to the Court before the Court's decision” or 

shown manifest error. “[M]anifest error of law is not merely a party's disagreement with 

how the trial court applied the law. . . [n]or is manifest error demonstrated by the 

disappointment of the losing party.” Teamsters Local 617 Pension & Welfare Funds v. 

Apollo Grp., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 216, 231 (D. Ariz. 2012) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). Manifest error is “plain and indisputable” and “amounts to a complete disregard 

of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the record.” Id.

Plaintiffs contend that “the Magistrate Judge did not reach the Defendants’ 

argument on collateral estoppel.” (Doc. 120 at 5.) However, this does not preclude the 

Court from reaching the issue of collateral estoppel, which was in the record. See Suzuki 

v. Helicopter Consultants of Maui, Inc., 2016 WL 3753079, at *6 (D. Haw. July 8, 2016) 

(“the district court may affirm the magistrate judge’s ultimate conclusion on a different 

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basis”) (citing United States v. Pope, 686 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming the 

district court decision where the district court affirmed the magistrate on “slightly 

different grounds”)). Therefore, this argument does not provide a basis for 

reconsideration. Plaintiffs further contend that “the issue decided in the state court cannot 

be identical” because the state court decision did not balance the interests of Plaintiffs 

against those of Defendants and because “Plaintiffs’ standing in the Superior Court 

action, representing citizens of Arizona, has no parallel to their standing in this Court.” 

(Doc. 120 at 6.) Plaintiffs cite no authority to support the contention that these elements 

are essential elements of the collateral estoppel analysis or to show that the Court 

committed manifest error by not considering them in its collateral estoppel analysis. (Id.; 

see also Doc. 136 at 10-11); Teamsters, 282 F.R.D. at 231 (“manifest error of law is not 

merely a party's disagreement with how the trial court applied the law”).

Finally, the Court is satisfied that it did not err in finding that Defendants would 

suffer “substantial prejudice” were they required to disclose to Plaintiffs the law 

enforcement documents concerning the ongoing investigation of the Forgeus Apartment 

fire. (Doc. 113 at 11-12.) This conclusion is bolstered by the facts that Plaintiffs are 

subjects of the ongoing investigation and that, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ assertions to 

the contrary, they knew of the investigation before initiating this action. (Id.; Doc. 120 at 

7; Doc. 136 at 6-7.) In fact, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration does not dispute that 

they knew of the investigation before initiating this action, but instead attempts to 

mislead the Court by stating that they “commenced the first civil rights litigation” before 

they knew of the investigation. (Doc. 120 at 7.) The Court is aware that the instant matter 

is the second, not the first, civil rights litigation based on the events giving rise to 

Plaintiffs’ claims, and the apparent attempts to mislead the Court are not well-taken. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to demonstrate a substantial need for the 

documents (id. at 10), and in balancing the Plaintiffs’ stated need for the privileged 

documents against the prejudice to Defendants that would result from disclosure, the 

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Court is satisfied that it did not err in finding that the balance favored Defendants. (Id.); 

see Hardrives, 1991 WL 12008395 at *2-3, 5 (application of the law enforcement 

privilege must be balanced against the opposing party’s substantial need for the 

documents and its inability to obtain them by other means); Torres v. Goddard, 2010 WL 

3023272, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2010) (“The law enforcement investigatory privilege is 

based on the harm to law enforcement efforts which might arise from public disclosure of 

investigatory files.”)

V. Motion for Clarification

In a separate Motion for Clarification (Doc. 134), Plaintiffs move the Court to 

clarify the portion of its Order in which it directed Defendants to submit “a detailed 

report on the status of the criminal investigation into the Forgeus Apartment fires and a 

predicted timeline for completion of the investigation to Magistrate Judge [Leslie 

Bowman] for in camera review” (Doc. 113). Plaintiffs move the Court to address the 

following questions:

(1) What obligation is there on the Magistrate Judge to assess 

the Defendants’ in camera report with the due process 

constraints requiring a finite limit on the stay?2

(2) What obligation is there on the Magistrate Judge to report 

to this Court and report on the record, the length of time 

Defendants project their investigations to go on and 

whether that projection is reasonable and necessary in 

light of the absolute need to preserve evidence of the 

Defendants’ actions going back three years?

(3) What right do the Plaintiffs have to know and, if 

necessary, oppose any finding of the Magistrate Judge that 

the stay already burdening Plaintiffs be extended for any 

additional period of time?

(4) Will this Court, as the other cases have, give the 

Defendants a deadline to conclude their investigations and 

bring charges against the Plaintiffs, or, if the Defendants 

do not do so within that deadline, lift the stay so that 

2 Plaintiffs characterize the application of the law enforcement privilege to the documents 

they seek as a “stay.” While this characterization is not technically correct, as this case 

has not been stayed, the Court acknowledges that the application of the law enforcement 

privilege effectively operates to prevent Plaintiffs from further litigating the 

discoverability of the documents they seek. 

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Plaintiffs’ due process rights are vindicated and their 

claims not damaged by the passage of time and loss of 

evidence?

(Doc. 134 at 5-6.)

“Private litigants have certain rights and. . . the Department of Justice may not 

retain documents indefinitely and keep them from disclosure on a statement that the 

investigation is still continuing. There must be a reasonable terminus.” United States v. 

Hardrives, Inc., 1991 WL 12008395, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 1991). “Of course the 

District Court has a broad discretion in granting or denying stays so as to coordinate the 

business of the court efficiently and sensibly. This discretion, however, may be abused by 

a stay of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need.” McSurely v. McClellan, 

426 F.2d 664, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (internal quotations omitted).

The Court finds that, given the circumstances of this case, due process requires a 

reasonable limitation on the length of Defendants’ criminal investigation into Plaintiffs’ 

potential involvement in the Forgeus Apartment fires. While the integrity of the ongoing 

criminal investigation constitutes a “pressing need” that justifies Plaintiffs’ lack of access 

to the criminal investigation documents pursuant to the law enforcement investigatory 

privilege (Doc. 113), Plaintiffs’ due process rights mandate that Defendants not extend 

the length of the investigation indefinitely. As the facts underlying this civil litigation are 

now more than three years old (Doc. 134 at 5), the Court finds that Defendants must 

determine and provide to the Magistrate Judge an anticipated “reasonable terminus” of 

the ongoing criminal investigation into Plaintiffs. See Hardrives, 1991 WL 12008395 at 

*5.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 120) is 

denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Clarification (Doc. 134) 

is granted in part and denied in part, as follows:

. . . .

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(1) The Motion for Clarification is granted to the extent that Defendants must 

provide to Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman an anticipated “reasonable 

terminus” of the ongoing criminal investigation into Plaintiffs’ potential 

involvement in the Forgeus Apartment fires. This information may be provided 

ex parte and in camera. Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman shall consider

Defendants’ submitted report and projected timeline (see Doc. 124) and the 

anticipated reasonable terminus of the investigation to ensure that Plaintiffs’ 

claims in this action are litigated consistent with their due process rights and 

applicable case law, including ascertaining a reasonable terminus to 

Defendants’ criminal investigation of Plaintiffs and adjusting the discovery 

schedule accordingly.

(2) The Motion for Clarification is denied in all other respects.

Dated this 8th day of May, 2020.

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