Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01805/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01805-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARQUISE DEANGELO LOFTIS, 

Petitioner,

v. 

DEBBIE ASUNCION, Warden, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 17cv1805-MMA (NLS) 

ORDER 

 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITION; 

(2) DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL; 

(3) DISMISSING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND 

(4) DECLINING TO ISSUE 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Marquise Deangelo Loftis (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding 

pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254.1

 (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of 22 years and 

                                                                

1

 Although this case was randomly referred to United States Magistrate Judge Nita L. 

Stormes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the Court has determined that neither a 

Report and Recommendation nor oral argument is necessary for the disposition of this 

matter. See S.D. Cal. Civ.L.R. 71.1(d). 

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4 months in state prison following a 2010 guilty plea entered in the San Diego County 

Superior Court to attempted murder, carjacking, robbery and making a criminal threat, with 

admissions he used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury. (Id. at 1-2; Lodgment No. 

4, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 167-70.) Petitioner claims his state and federal rights were violated 

because he did not have a competency hearing prior to entering his plea (claim one), he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure of his trial counsel to investigate 

his mental condition which would have revealed he was incompetent to stand trial or enter 

a plea (claim two), the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw 

the plea because the prosecution did not refute his expert testimony showing he was not 

competent to enter a plea (claim three), his sentence is illegal because he was not competent 

to enter a plea (claim four), and the trial judge did not conduct a fair and impartial hearing 

on his motion to withdraw the plea (claim five). (ECF No. 1 at 7-21.) 

 Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, along with a Notice of 

Lodgment of the state court record and Petitioner’s prison medical records. (ECF Nos. 11-

12.) Respondent contends the Petition is facially untimely because it was filed nearly five 

years after the one-year statute of limitations began to run. (Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss [“MTD Mem.”] at 6-17.) Respondent argues 

that: (a) statutory tolling is not available for Petitioner’s state collateral review petitions 

because they were filed two and one-half years after the federal statute of limitations 

expired, (b) he is not entitled to equitable tolling based on his mental condition because his 

medical records indicate his condition is mild or moderate and has been effectively treated, 

and (c) the “actual innocence” exception to the statute of limitations does not apply because 

Petitioner has acknowledged that the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Id.) 

Petitioner has filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 15.) He concedes equitable tolling is 

necessary for his Petition to be timely, and argues it is available due to “lifelong organic 

brain/cognitive defects and severe mental illness” which prevent him from preparing and 

filing court pleadings. (Id. at 1.) He has also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel contending 

his mental condition prevents him from adequately opposing the motion to dismiss without 

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the assistance of counsel, and that counsel must be appointed if the Court conducts an 

evidentiary hearing or orders discovery on the issue of equitable tolling. (ECF No. 19.) 

 For the following reasons, the Court finds that the records presented in support and 

opposition to the instant motion, which range from Petitioner’s birth to the present, do not 

demonstrate a mental impairment sufficient to entitle him to equitable tolling, but even 

accepting as accurate and credible the antidotal evidence in his declarations that he suffered 

from such an impairment during the relevant time period, and allowing for statutory and 

equitable tolling to the fullest extent permissible under those facts, the Petition is untimely. 

The Court also finds the “actual innocence” exception to the statute of limitations does not 

excuse the untimely filing, and appointment of counsel is discretionary and unwarranted. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED, Respondent’s Motion 

to Dismiss is GRANTED, the Petition is DISMISSED with prejudice as untimely, and the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 In a 17-count Second Amended Information filed in the San Diego County Superior 

Court on May 3, 2010, Petitioner was charged with seven counts of assault with a firearm 

in violation of California Penal Code § 254(a)(2) (counts 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 14), six 

counts of robbery in violation of Penal Code § 211 (counts 2, 5, 7, 9, 12 and 15), one count 

of carjacking in violation of Penal Code § 215(a) (count 3), one count of attempted murder 

in violation of Penal Code § 187(a) (count 13), one count of making a criminal threat in 

violation of Penal Code § 422 (count 16), and one count of battery in violation of Penal 

Code § 242 (count 17). (CT 43-50.) Sentence enhancements alleged Petitioner personally 

used a handgun within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.5(a), personally inflicted great 

bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.7(a), intentionally and personally 

discharged a handgun within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.53(b), intentionally 

discharged a handgun within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.53(c), and intentionally 

and personally discharged a handgun which proximately caused great bodily injury within 

the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.53(d). (Id.) The charges are summarized as follows: 

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Counts 1-7; June 21, 2009; carjacking; assault with a firearm; robbery 

 Nickolas Bernstein and his two passengers gave Petitioner and his 

friend a ride home after a party. When Petitioner got out he pointed a handgun 

at Nickolas’ head, robbed all three men and took Bernstein’s car. 

Counts 8-9; June 26, 2009; assault with a firearm; robbery 

 Acel Cruz, the manager of a Chuck E. Cheese store, was counting 

receipts in his office when Petitioner entered, pointed a handgun at Cruz, and 

demanded money from an open safe and cash drawers. 

Counts 10-12; July 15, 2009; assault with a firearm; robbery 

 Officers Ramiro Meza and Michael Kosak were working as Trolley

Security Guards at the Encanto station when Petitioner approached Meza from 

behind, pointed a handgun at him, told him to get on the ground, and took his 

gun and ammunition clips. 

Counts 13-15; July 18, 2009; attempted murder; assault with a firearm; 

robbery 

 Officer David Reynoso was working as a Trolley Security Guard at the 

Grossmont station when Petitioner pointed a handgun at him and ordered him 

to give him his gun. Reynoso said “ok” and moved his hand toward his gun, 

at which point Petitioner shot him once in the shoulder and once in the groin, 

and took his gun. 

Counts 16-17; July 20, 2009; making a criminal threat; battery 

 Officer Donny Lamora was working as a Trolley Security Officer at the 

62nd street station when Petitioner approached, punched Lamora, formed the 

shape of a gun with his hand, and told him several times he was going to be 

the next guard to be shot. 

(CT 369-71.) 

A jury trial began on Monday, May 3, 2010, and a jury was empaneled at the end of 

the day on Tuesday, May 4. (CT 409-14.) Trial resumed on Thursday, May 6, the first 

and only day testimony was presented, with the prosecution calling eight witnesses. (CT 

415-18.) Nickolas Bernstein testified that he was driving his car with two friends as 

passengers when they were asked for a ride by Petitioner, who he identified in court, and a 

man with Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 5, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 112-15, 126.) When they 

arrived where Petitioner asked to be dropped off, he pulled out a handgun, pointed it at 

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Bernstein’s head, robbed him of his money and cell phone, and drove off in his car. (RT 

115-20.) Bernstein’s two friends testified to the same events, both identified Petitioner in 

court, and both testified he robbed them of their money and cell phones at gunpoint. (RT 

143-66.) Police officers and a criminalist testified that Bernstein’s vehicle was found with 

significant damage after being involved in a hit-and-run collision shortly after it was stolen, 

that a tube of Chapstick lip balm which did not belong to any of the victims and which 

contained Petitioner’s DNA was found inside the car where Petitioner was seated when 

Bernstein gave him a ride, and that Bernstein and his two friends thereafter identified 

Petitioner from a photographic lineup. (RT 179-82, 188-94, 210-11, 220.) The trial was 

adjourned for the day. 

The next day, Friday, May 7, Petitioner, who was in custody, did not appear due to 

“a medical issue,” and the trial was continued until Monday, May 10. (CT 419.) Petitioner 

appeared in jail clothes that Monday, and his court-appointed defense counsel, Daniel 

Cohen, informed the court Petitioner had not appeared the previous Friday because he had 

attempted to hang himself Friday morning, that he now appeared depressed and would 

provide only yes or no answers to counsel’s questions, and although he had been engaged 

and interested in plea negotiations on the previous Thursday he now said he did not care 

about anything and just wanted to die. (RT 244-46; CT 233-34.) Attorney Cohen informed 

the court that Petitioner had been given mood stabilizers and antidepressant drugs 

following his suicide attempt, and said: “In my opinion, it seemed to be that I was having 

a very hard time communicating with him in any sort of meaningful way that could assist 

me in the trial.” (RT 246.) Attorney Cohen said he was not aware of any mental issues 

prior to the suicide attempt, although he was aware Petitioner had twice previously been 

placed on suicide watch at the jail based on statements he made to his girlfriend and in a 

letter. (RT 247, 253.) The following exchanged then occurred:

Trial Judge: In terms of Mr. Loftis and his mental health status at the present 

time, I have to indicate that as a result of one of the motions in this case, I’ve 

had an opportunity to review recordings, audio recordings, of a number of 

conversations Mr. Loftis had. They appear to be conversations in later 

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summer, maybe early fall of last year, and from those, it would be clear to any 

reasonable listener that Mr. Loftis is quite an intelligent, articulate person. So 

I’m kind of surprised at this point that we’re addressing his ability to 

comprehend the proceedings due to some form of mental illness. And 

apparently, it isn’t that. The conclusion I reach from your comments is that 

he’s depressed, and apparently he’s depressed about the nature of the evidence 

in the case and the responsibility that he suffer some severe punishment. 

Would that be a fair assessment of the situation? 

Attorney Cohen: Yes and no. I think that the court is correct, and I think Mr. 

Loftis is an intelligent person, and I think he has the capabilities of 

understanding what’s going on. At least in the past, I haven’t made a 1368 

motion2

 because of the fact that he has been engaged. [¶] Where I differ from 

the court is I don’t feel this is a run-of-the-mill depression, mundane blues. 

I’m afraid that the depression he’s suffering from would qualify as a mental 

illness, and true depression can be extremely debilitating. Just because it’s 

something that some people suffer from and something that’s treatable doesn’t 

mean that it’s not a mental illness, that it’s not something that could affect the 

proceedings and his ability to understand what’s going on and to meaningfully 

communicate with me. 

(RT 247-48.) 

The trial judge then questioned Petitioner regarding his mental state and the effects 

of his medication. (RT 248-52.) Petitioner said he did not know why he decided not to 

dress out for court that day, indicated that after his suicide attempt he was given medication 

for depression, to stabilize his mood and to help him sleep, and when asked about his 

present mental state said: “I’m feeling bad because I’m never going to see my son again.” 

(Id.) The judge ruled the trial would continue, and called a 15-minute recess for Petitioner 

                                                                

2

 California Penal Code § 1368 requires “the trial court to initiate proceedings in order to 

determine a defendant’s present sanity if a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the 

mental competence of the defendant or [i]f counsel informs the court that he or she believes 

the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent. To be competent to stand trial, defendant 

must have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 

rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 

against him.” People v. Ramos, 34 Cal. 4th 494, 507 (2004) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

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to dress out if he wished to do so. (RT 252-54.) 

After the recess, Petitioner entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. (RT 

255-64.) He waived his constitutional rights and pleaded guilty to attempted murder, 

carjacking, making a criminal threat and two counts of robbery, and admitted he personally 

used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury. (Id.) The twelve remaining 

counts (seven counts of assault with a firearm, four counts of robbery, and one count of 

battery) were dismissed, and the matter was continued to July 8, 2010 for sentencing on a 

stipulated term of 22 years and 4 months in prison. (Id.) Immediately after he entered the 

plea, the trial judge stated: “I do find, Mr. Loftis, that you are in full possession of your 

faculties. You’ve made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of your rights. I do 

accept the pleas of guilty, the admission on the special allegations that are attendant to 

those charges that you pled guilty to, and I accept your pleas of guilty.” (RT 262.) Attorney 

Cohen signed the change of plea form attesting he had explained the contents to Petitioner, 

that they had discussed the charges, possible defenses and consequences of the plea, and 

that he concurred in the plea and the waiver of constitutional rights. (CT 169.) Three days 

later Petitioner participated in a “free talk” with the prosecution in which he admitted he 

committed the crimes charged, and admitted involvement in an uncharged bank robbery. 

(Lodgment No. 4, Augmented Clerk’s Tr. at 8-9, 24-46.) 

On July 8, 2010, the date set for sentencing, attorney Cohen informed the court that 

Petitioner wished to file a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (CT 422.) Attorney 

Cohen did not join the motion, stating: “I don’t believe there’s a basis for [it].” (Lodgment 

No. 5, Augmented Reporter’s Tr., July 8, 2010 at 4.) He was relieved at that time, and new 

counsel, attorney Gary Roberts, was appointed on July 18, 2010. (CT 422.) 

Attorney Roberts filed a motion to withdraw the plea on October 20, 2010. (CT 175-

264.) The motion alleged Petitioner spent the weekend before his plea in a constantly 

illuminated “safety cell, aka, a rubber room” without clothing where he had difficulty 

sleeping, and at the time of the plea “had insufficient sleep and clarity of mind to be able 

to make a responsible decision whether to take a plea bargain requiring him to serve 22 

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years and four months in prison at 85% time.” (CT 268-69.) It was supported by jail 

medical records and a representation that Dr. Ellen Stein, a licensed clinical and forensic 

psychologist, was prepared to testify that Petitioner has borderline personality disorder. 

(CT 175-264.) On October 21, 2010, the motion was augmented to add an allegation of 

ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that: “It is difficult to understand how attorney 

Cohen could concur in the defendant’s plea and waiver of constitutional rights just after 

attorney Cohen said to the court, ‘I was having a very hard time communicating with him 

in any sort of meaningful way that could assist me in the trial.’” (CT 265-69.) 

On November 24, 2010, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to 

withdraw the guilty plea, at which Dr. Stein, Petitioner and a defense investigator testified. 

(RT 266-423.) Dr. Stein testified she diagnosed Petitioner with borderline personality 

disorder, thought disorder, depression and traumatic stress disorder, that his being housed 

in an isolation cell the weekend before his guilty plea as a result of his suicide attempt may 

have disoriented him, and it was unclear whether, by the time he entered his plea, he had 

recovered from any possible disorientation or even whether it would be obvious to a 

layperson if he had. (RT 275-83.) She opined that the trial court failed to ask the necessary 

questions to assess his competency, and neglected the effect of his medications when 

questioning him and making the determination whether to continue the trial. (RT 286.) 

Attorney Cohen represented that Petitioner was on mood stabilizers and antidepressants, 

but she clarified he was on mood stabilizers and antipsychotics. (Id.) Dr. Stein opined that 

a person with borderline personality disorder could knowingly and intelligently sign a plea 

agreement (RT 303-04), but that Petitioner’s “position was potentially quite compromised, 

and no one inquired of that.” (RT 335.) Several times she was asked directly if in her 

opinion the plea was not knowing and voluntarily (RT 334-35, 338, 350), but merely stated: 

“It wasn’t the ideal condition under which to have him make a voluntary, knowing 

judgment. . . . It appeared to me that would not have been the day to take an affirmation of 

his decision.” (RT 350-51.) The parties disagreed in their appellate briefs whether Dr. 

Stein offered a definitive opinion on the ultimate issue whether the plea was knowing and 

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voluntary. (Lodgment No. 1 at 16; Lodgment No. 2 at 17 n. 22.) 

On cross-examination, Dr. Stein said she took into consideration that: (a) Petitioner 

had received an “A” in a criminal law course at a San Diego community college; (b) jail 

records indicated that at 4:12 a.m. on May 10th he was alert, oriented, responsive and 

cooperative, and when he was returned to jail after entering his plea that day he told jail 

staff he took the deal for 22 years and that: “I know I can’t beat them. I’m not suicidal 

anymore.”; (d) the plea bargain he accepted had been on the table for the previous 90 days; 

(e) after the jury was selected Petitioner was recorded saying: “I’m convicted,” “I’m 

definitely going to jail for life,” “They’re going to see me in hell before I do life in a cell,” 

and “I got a problem accepting things that I don’t want to accept”; and (f) on the evening 

of the first and only day of trial testimony he was recorded asking his girlfriend: “How do 

you feel about me signing a deal . . . somewhere in the 20s, 22 maybe. It’s the same deal, 

but the deal ain’t going to be there much longer,” and telling her: “It’s kind of hard to fight 

when you got three people coming there and saying that it’s me and D.N.A.” (RT 305, 

309-16.) 

A defense investigator testified that the safety cell in which Petitioner was housed 

the weekend before he entered his guilty plea is constantly illuminated and monitored by 

video equipment, is about eight feet square with rubber-coated walls and floor, and has a 

hole in the floor for a toilet. (RT 354-64.) Petitioner testified that he was taken to a hospital 

after his suicide attempt on Friday morning, and was placed in a safety cell wearing only a 

smock when he returned to jail later that day. (RT 380.) When he tied the smock around 

his neck it was taken away, and he remained in the cell naked until Sunday morning when 

he was moved to an observation cell and medicated, where he remained until he was taken 

to court on Monday morning. (RT 381-83.) He said that when he signed the change of 

plea form attorney Cohen had to check the boxes for him because he was crying, and told 

him if he signed the plea agreement it would stop the trial and they could still negotiate 

with the District Attorney to lower his sentence. (RT 383-85.) He believed at that time 

that if the trial continued he would be convicted and sentenced to life in prison. (RT 385.) 

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He said a West Coast Crips gang member bullied him into committing the crimes, even 

though Petitioner was not a gang member, but attorney Cohen told him that a duress 

defense on that basis would be hard to prove. (RT 402-06.) Petitioner was disappointed 

that attorney Cohen wanted to stick with an “I didn’t do it” defense, which Petitioner 

thought would cause him to spend his life in prison, and felt he had no control over the 

case. (RT 408-09.) He said he was desperate to “put the brakes on” the trial, but denied 

that was why he tried to kill himself. (RT 409.) He said he took the deal because he knew 

he was going to be convicted, and participated in the free talk with the prosecutor three 

days after he entered his plea believing it was part of the negotiation to lower his sentence. 

(Lodgment No. 5, Augmented Reporter’s Tr., Nov. 24, 2010 at 21, 27.) The trial judge 

denied the motion to withdraw the plea, stating: 

And Mr. Loftis, I’ve gotten to know you a little bit just because I heard 

a lot of your conversations that have been taped, and I appreciate the impact 

that your incarceration and the charges have had on you. And I’m not 

dismissing that, and I want to assure you I listened carefully as your attorney 

presented the testimony of Dr. Stein. 

It was clear to me when I saw you May 10th that you were really down. 

There was no doubt in my mind. But the question that I was faced with was 

should the trial continue or was your mental state such that you simply 

couldn’t rationally continue with the trial and assist your attorney. And the 

purpose of my questions were to reach a conclusion regarding that issue. And 

I reached the conclusion after that brief interview that even though you truly 

were down, there was a lot of pressure on you, things were closing in, that you 

were lucid, coherent. You understood what I was saying, and even though 

you were reluctant to talk, you would talk. And that’s why I said the trial is 

going to continue. 

Mr. Roberts has made a very creative and powerful argument, “But, 

judge, you missed the important facts. It wasn’t just the way Mr. Loftis 

appeared in the courtroom, but it was what had happened to him or what he 

had done to himself over the past four days.” And I appreciate the time and 

effort he’s put into this on your behalf to try to flush out those circumstances. 

But my conclusion, after looking at the submission from your attorney, 

the submission from the District Attorney, and the testimony of Dr. Stein, is 

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that my decision to continue the trial and my conclusion that you made a 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea of guilty was on firm ground. 

And simply because when I went through very carefully the records 

that Mr. Roberts presented and the records that Ms. Irving presented, it seems 

to me that you were thinking about your case. You were aware of the facts of 

your case. You had talked to Mr. Cohen. Many of the jail tapes talked about 

getting feedback whether the case was going good, whether the case was 

going bad, whether the evidence was strong or weak. 

During the jury selection, you got the feeling that things weren’t going 

too well just because of your impression of the jurors. You communicated 

that to a friend. May 6th, you listened to Ms. Irving make an opening 

statement where she pieced everything together, put on the D.N.A. evidence, 

and put on the evidence of Mr. Bernstein and the other people that were in the 

car that you hijacked. 

After that, Mr. Cohen made mention of the fact that after the May 6th 

hearing, you seemed to be interested in the plea bargain. And that’s confirmed 

by your phone call that evening to a friend, that you really are seeing the 

evidence unfold, and there’s just too much evidence. The deal is not going to 

be on the table too much longer. 

I’m not dismissing at all the pressure that you were under, but I have to 

consider the pressure that any defendant is under when he’s charged with 

extremely serious crimes, and he’s facing trial, and the evidence looks kind of 

overwhelming. That’s pressure, per se, based upon the circumstance that you 

find yourself in. I don’t find that that pressure, based upon what Dr. Stein 

says is a borderline personality disorder, triggered something to the point 

where you did not understand what the plea was, what your rights were, what 

the consequences were. 

It’s quite clear you knew it was going to be 22 years because that’s what 

you’d been mulling over for some time and discussing, particularly with 

Marissa.3

 You were certainly aware of the circumstances of your case because 

                                                                

3

 After the jury was selected, Petitioner was recorded speaking to his girlfriend Marissa 

saying: “I’m convicted. That’s what I think because the jurors were on the cops’ side.” 

(RT 313.) The same day he was recorded saying: “I’m definitely going to jail for life. The 

jury – the jury, they already think I’m guilty cuz I got so many charges. They’re going to 

see me in hell before I do life in a cell.” (Id.) After the first and only day of testimony, he 

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you listened to the full opening statement of Ms. Irving. In terms of voluntary, 

I thought maybe Dr. Stein would say, “yes, judge, this became involuntary.” 

But my feeling is that what I did on May 10th was to assure myself that 

you could continue with the trial. I felt comfortable that you understood my 

questions. You were giving lucid, coherent responses. And that’s all I wanted 

to do, was continue your day in court, so to speak. 

And then I was confronted with your decision to change your plea to 

guilty. Not only did I review the change of plea form with you, but I asked 

you some additional questions when I asked you if you understood everything, 

and I asked you specifically, and other promises made? I heard nothing about, 

“well, I’m told that this isn’t really the plea agreement; that I can whittle it 

down by discussing it with my attorney.” [¶] This is my time now. Your 

attorney has had several hours to present your case. 

You indicated through your attorney that you were really frustrated 

with Mr. Cohen. From what I gather in terms of your statements as to your 

factual basis for your defense of duress, that was just magical thinking on your 

part that that would be a viable defense. Any reasonable attorney, any 

competent attorney, would say it’s not going to work. When somebody says 

“you’ve got to show that you’re a good value to the gang, you’ve got to 

commit some crimes,” and you confront somebody with a gun in your hand, 

that is not going to qualify as duress. 

I cannot conclude this is ineffective assistance of counsel when this is 

not a rational defense. That’s not going to work. It’s simply not going to fly. 

That is not ineffective assistance of counsel. That’s a good attorney telling 

you the facts of life. 

Since there was going to be a plea agreement, your attorney is trying to 

do the best job he can for you, which is try to establish reasonable doubt. I, 

in fact, told you that first day, I was very impressed. That was the direction 

that Mr. Cohen was taking, and he was obviously prepared to do his best to 

establish reasonable doubt, in other words, to persuade the jurors that the 

people had not presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 

                                                                

told Marissa: “It’s looking bad” and: “It’s kind of hard to fight when you got three people 

coming in there saying that it’s me and D.N.A.”, and asked her what she thought of him 

taking a deal in the range of 22 years. (RT 314-15.) Excerpts of his recorded calls are in 

the record. (Lodgment No. 4, Augmented Clerk’s Tr. at 48-65.)

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doubt you committed this crime. 

As to was it an intelligent act considering all that you were facing, the 

sadness, the description of your mood? What you told me, the reason you 

were so down is because you were never going to see your son again. To me, 

it’s a lot of pressure, and it’s probably more than the average defendant faces. 

But I have a lot of cases where people are charged with very serious crimes, 

and they have to deal with the consequences. And you were trying to deal 

with them in the best way you knew how. 

Is it going to be a roll of the dice, see what happens at trial, or “I’m 

going to take advantage of what I’ve decided is going to be 18 years in prison 

rather than much more than that.” Neither of those options were particularly 

favorable. 

It’s clear from your jail conversations. I’m very comfortable in 

concluding that you weighed the options over a period of time. And after the 

reality of the evidence was presented, you did have a period of

decompensation. But when you appeared in my courtroom on May 10th, my 

conclusion was that you were rational, that you were able to understand the 

consequences of the plea, the rights that you gave up, and that it was a 

knowledgeable plea. So the motion to withdraw the plea is denied for those 

reasons. 

(RT 424-29.) 

On December 29, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to the stipulated term of 22 years 

and 4 months in state prison. (RT 453-55.) He filed a notice of appeal on January 7, 2011, 

and an opening brief on August 12, 2011, in which his appointed appellate counsel alleged 

the plea was not knowing and voluntary based on the evidence presented in support of the 

motion to withdraw the plea. (Lodgment No. 1.) The People responded on December 15, 

2011 (Lodgment No. 2), and Petitioner replied on January 6, 2012. (Lodgment No. 3.) On 

October 3, 2012, Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice of abandonment of appeal which stated 

that Petitioner had asked counsel to abandon the appeal. (Lodgment No. 6.) The appeal 

was dismissed as abandoned on October 5, 2012. (Lodgment No. 7.) As discussed below, 

the one-year statute of limitations to file a federal habeas petition began to run the next 

day, and, absent tolling, expired on October 7, 2013. 

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On May 6, 2016, over three and one half years after the statute of limitations began 

to run, Petitioner presumptively constructively4

 filed the first of his four pro se petitions 

seeking state collateral review of his guilty plea, a pro se “Notice of Motion and Motion to 

Vacate Judgment (Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis)” in the trial court. (Lodgment 

No. 8.) He alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection to his guilty 

plea due to his trial counsel’s failure to discover and present his school and medical records 

showing that he was not competent to enter his plea because he suffered from Stockholm 

syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a brain disorder arising from fetal narcotic 

ingestion. (Id.) On May 20, 2016, the court denied the petition on the basis that Petitioner 

had not demonstrated an unknown fact that would have prevented entry of judgment as 

required for coram nobis relief, that his school and medical records were insufficient to 

show he was legally insane at the time judgment was entered, and because state law 

provides that a writ of habeas corpus, not error coram nobis, is the proper vehicle to raise 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Lodgment No. 9.) He filed a similar pro se

pleading in the state appellate court on June 12, 2016. (Lodgment No. 10.) That petition 

was denied on June 21, 2016, in an order which stated: “The filing is treated as a petition 

for writ of error coram nobis. The petition is denied.” (Lodgment No. 11.) 

On August 3, 2016, he filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state 

supreme court raising claims similar to the ones presented here. (Lodgment No. 12.) That 

petition was denied on October 12, 2016, in an order which stated: “The petition for writ 

of habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.)” (Lodgment 

No 13.) Finally, on February 8, 2017, nearly four months after his first state habeas petition 

was denied, he filed a second pro se habeas petition in the California Supreme Court 

presenting the claims raised here. (Lodgment No. 14.) It was denied on August 9, 2017, 

                                                                

4

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purposes of the federal statute of limitations on the day they were handed to prison officials 

for mailing to the Court. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Absent indication otherwise, the Court will presume that is the date they are signed. 

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in an order that stated: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.” (Lodgment No. 15.) 

III. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS 

Petitioner alleges in claim one that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under California law, were violated by 

the failure to hold a competency hearing prior to entering his plea. (ECF No. 1 at 7-9.) He 

states he was incoherent, incompetent and heavily influenced by his medication, and 

attorney Cohen’s description of his mental state should have prompted a hearing. (Id.) 

In claim two he alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 

the California Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution due 

to attorney Cohen’s failure to object to him standing trial while incompetent, to conduct a 

pre-trial investigation into his competence, and by advising him during his guilty plea while 

incompetent. (Id. at 9-14.) He argues that although attorney Cohen requested a suspension 

of the trial proceedings based on his mental state, a full investigation would have shown 

he has suffered from mental illness starting when he was born with drugs and alcohol in 

his system and deprived of maternal love during his formative years, that he has a family 

history of mental illness and drug and alcohol problems, and at eleven years old was 

described by school officials as having had a head injury and being “overactive, 

hyperactive, overly aggressive, hard to care for and hard to discipline.” (Id.) 

In claim three he alleges his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution, and under California law, were violated when the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea because the prosecution did not refute the 

testimony of Dr. Stein that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. (Id. at 14-17.) 

In claim four he alleges the imposition of his sentence violated his rights under the 

California Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution because the court and his counsel were aware his competency was in 

doubt but failed to prevent him from accepting a plea deal. (Id. at 17-18.) 

Petitioner alleges in claim five that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated because he did not have a fair 

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and impartial hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea because the trial judge questioned 

witnesses with a prosecutorial bias and bullied defense counsel. (Id. at 18-21.) 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition, arguing it is facially untimely because the 

one-year statute of limitations began to run on October 5, 2012, when Petitioner abandoned 

his direct appeal, and he waited nearly five years before he initiated this action. (MTD 

Mem. at 6-7.) Respondent argues statutory tolling is unavailable for the time Petitioner’s 

state court pleadings were pending because they were filed after the federal limitations 

period expired. (Id. at 7-8.) Respondent contends the “actual innocence” gateway to avoid 

the statute of limitations does not apply because Petitioner admits that the evidence against 

him is strong. (Id. at 7-9.) Respondent argues that equitable tolling is unavailable because 

Petitioner’s mental impairment is treatable, transitory, and moderate to mild, and has not 

prevented him from pursuing numerous state and federal court actions. (Id. at 9-17.) 

Petitioner opposes the motion to dismiss, arguing that: “The sole dispute to be 

resolved here is: Did Mr. Loftis’ long established mental impairments continue to disable 

and prevent him from filing a federal habeas corpus between October 6, 2011 and August 

27, 2017, thus entitling him to equitable tolling? Or was treatment effective in treating his 

impairments.” (Pet.’s Opp. at 1.) He argues Respondent provides a narrow reading of his 

medical records and ignores the fact that the civil actions he filed while he was exhausting 

state court remedies in this case were not personally prepared by him but by other inmates 

at a time when “he had access to help that he did not have before,” and that “the level of 

comprehension necessary to understand the need to timely file was simply beyond [his] 

cognitive abilities.” (Id. at 1-21.) He supports his contentions with school records, prison 

and jail medical records, and declarations from himself, his wife Marissa, and several 

inmates who assisted him in preparing his pleadings who opine that his mental condition 

prevented him from personally preparing and filing pleadings. (Id. at 23-92.) 

A. Triggering Date of the Limitations Period 

The one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions pursuant to 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254 begins to run at the latest of— 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or 

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006). 

 The parties agree that § 2244(d)(1)(A) provides the triggering date, which is October 

5, 2012, the date the state court dismissed Petitioner’s direct appeal as abandoned. (MTD 

Mem. at 7; Pet.’s Opp. at 3.) The one-year federal statute of limitations began to run the 

next day, October 6, 2012. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(holding that “in computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by . . . any applicable 

statute, the day of the act, event, or default from the designated period of time begins to 

run shall not be included.”) One year later, October 5, 2013, was a Saturday, so the last 

day a federal habeas petition could be timely filed, absent tolling, was Monday, October 7, 

2013. The instant federal habeas Petition was presumptively constructively filed nearly 

five years later, on August 27, 2017, the date it is signed. Anthony, 236 F.3d at 574-75. 

 Because this action was commenced nearly five years after the statute of limitations 

began to run, Petitioner correctly concedes it is untimely absent tolling of the limitations 

period. He did not begin to seek state collateral review until three years and seven months 

after the limitations period began to run, and initiated this action 18 days after that review 

ended. Petitioner must therefore establish either that he is entitled to equitable tolling for 

nearly four years after he abandoned his appeal, or a combination of equitable and statutory 

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tolling for those four years. Because he seeks equitable tolling for that entire period, which 

would render statutory tolling unnecessary, the Court will address equitable tolling first. 

B. Equitable Tolling 

In order to be entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, Petitioner must 

show: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

631, 649 (2010). “[E]quitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

(under AEDPA) is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 

292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner bears the burden of showing “extraordinary 

circumstances” were the cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence. 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court is required to ensure the 

record is sufficiently developed when a petitioner “makes ‘a good faith allegation that 

would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2006), quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth 

Circuit has held: 

[W]e conclude that eligibility for equitable tolling due to mental 

impairment requires the petitioner to meet a two-part test: 

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

‘extraordinary circumstance’ beyond his control by demonstrating the 

impairment was so severe that either 

 (a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally 

understand the need to timely file, or 

 (b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable to personally 

prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing. 

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims 

to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made 

it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the 

circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance. 

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Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). 

As a starting point, the Court will look at the evidence presented at the evidentiary 

hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea and Petitioner’s decision to abandon his appeal. 

Although those events occurred prior to the start of the statute of limitations, they are 

relevant because the abandonment of the appeal occurred the day before the limitations 

period began to run, when Petitioner seeks to begin equitable tolling, because the Court is 

required to consider the “totality of the circumstances” when determining if equitable 

tolling is available, id., and because Petitioner contends his “once stable condition fully 

deteriorated long before the period he seeks tolling and continued to restrain him during 

the entire period.” (Pet.’s Opp. at 2.) As set forth in detail above, the trial judge and 

Petitioner’s counsel both agreed Petitioner is an intelligent and articulate person. The 

record shows that during trial he engaged in plea negotiations with counsel, discussed the 

plea with his girlfriend, and received an “A” in a community college criminal law course. 

He accepted the plea after the first day of trial testimony, when he admitted he realized he 

was going to be convicted, and informed jail officials later that day he had accepted the 

plea offer and was no longer suicidal. Although Dr. Stein diagnosed him with borderline 

personality disorder, she said that under the proper circumstances someone with that 

disorder could knowingly and intelligently enter a plea, and the parties disagreed whether 

she was ultimately able to say with certainty that the plea was not knowing and voluntary, 

or merely that it was unclear whether he had recovered sufficiently from his weekend in 

isolation to be able to enter such a plea. The trial judge found the plea was knowing and 

voluntary, and none of the three attorneys who represented Petitioner ever indicated he was 

not competent to enter a plea, to be sentenced, or to abandon his appeal. 

More significantly, there is no support in the trial record that Petitioner could not at 

that time understand the need to timely challenge his plea. Rather, the court minutes 

indicate that on the day originally set for sentencing: “Atty Cohen informs Court that 

defendant wishes to make his own motion to withdraw plea. Atty Cohen does not 

participate in this motion. The Court relieves Atty Cohen and appoints new counsel thru 

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O.A.C.” (CT 422.) The notice of abandonment of appeal states: “Pursuant to rule 8.316 

of the California Rules of Court, I, Christian C. Buckley, attorney of record for appellant 

Marquise Deangelo Loftis in the above-entitled matter, hereby abandons this appeal on 

behalf of, and at the request of, Mr. Loftis and request that it be dismissed. Mr. Loftis 

informed me of his decision on October 3, 2012.” (Lodgment No. 6) (emphasis added). 

Thus, not only does the record indicate Petitioner personally and timely decided to 

withdraw his plea, it shows he personally and timely decided to abandon his appeal. 

Respondent speculates Petitioner abandoned his appeal in order to avoid a longer 

sentence should the appeal succeed and the matter be remanded for trial, (MTD Mem. at 

16-17), whereas, as set forth below, Petitioner contends it was an irrational decision arising 

from his mental impairment. By timely abandoning his appeal, Petitioner avoided the 

possibility of losing the benefit of his plea bargain, which provided he was convicted of 

only five of the 17 charges against him, and sentenced to less than 23 years with a minimum 

of 18 years. The dismissed counts included seven counts of assault with a firearm with 

exposure of 14 years on each count, and four counts of armed robbery with exposure of 25 

years on each count. (CT 182-89, 379.) The record of the evidentiary hearing shows he 

was aware that he faced life in prison if convicted on all or most of the counts, and was 

aware that the evidence presented against him on the first day of trial was strong enough 

to convict him of carjacking, three counts of assault with a handgun, and three counts of 

armed robbery. 

Accordingly, the events surrounding Petitioner’s guilty plea, his timely decision to 

file a pro se motion to withdraw the plea, and his timely decision to abandon his appeal 

prior to the risk of losing the benefit of a generous plea bargain, do not support a conclusion 

that, at that time “his mental impairment was an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ beyond his 

control . . . so severe that . . . [he] was unable rationally or factually to personally understand 

the need to timely” seek relief, so as to warrant equitable tolling. Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-

1100; see also United States v. Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(“[Not] every suicide attempt inevitably creates a doubt concerning the defendant’s 

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competency.”); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 645-46 (9th Cir. 2004) (defendant’s 

decision not to wear civilian clothes during trial did not create a genuine doubt as to his 

competency). 

Turning to the period which Petitioner seeks equitable tolling, from October 6, 2012, 

the day the statute of limitations began to run, until August 27, 2017, when this action was 

initiated, nearly five years, he needs equitable or statutory tolling for that entire period, less 

one year. See Grant v. Swarthout, 862 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2017) (“If a prisoner can 

demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling for a certain period of time, that period 

will be subtracted from the total number of days that have passed. If, after those days are 

subtracted, less than 365 days have passed, the prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus will 

be accepted as timely.”) He filed five pro se state court collateral review petitions 

challenging his guilty plea during the period he seeks equitable tolling. Even to the extent 

he initially incorrectly chose coram nobis rather than habeas corpus for relief in the first of 

those petitions, and coram nobis and coram vobis in the second, those would constitute 

legal errors, and are not something which shows he was “unable rationally or factually to 

personally understand the need to timely file,” or that his “mental state rendered him unable 

to personally prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-

1100. His personal decisions to timely seek to withdraw his plea and timely abandon his 

appeal, and his filing of four pro se state collateral review petitions challenging his plea, 

on its face, falls short of surmounting the “very high” threshold necessary to show the 

existence of “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control [which] make it 

impossible to file a petition on time.” Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107; Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066 

(“[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest 

the exceptions swallow the rule.”) 

Petitioner presents evidence in the form of medical records, school records and 

declarations, which he contends establish that beginning with his entrance into the prison 

system shortly after sentencing he was never competent to prepare and file his own 

petitions and had to rely on other inmates to prepare and file them for him. However, as 

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will be seen, Petitioner’s own evidence demonstrates that beginning in late 2014, about 

three years before he initiated this action, he was seeking assistance from other inmates to 

challenge his plea, and by July 2015 he had access to such assistance which permitted him 

to file nearly a dozen different pro se pleadings in state and federal court, as well as timely 

pursue prison administrative remedies. The evidence establishes that, even if equitable 

tolling is available based on his mental condition, it would have ended over two years 

before he initiated this action on August 27, 2017. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100 

(holding that the mental impairment must have “made it impossible to meet the filing 

deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to 

assistance.”) (emphasis added); Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (holding that “extraordinary 

circumstances” must be the actual cause of the untimeliness). 

The records before the Court in support and opposition to the motion to dismiss 

range from Petitioner’s birth to the present. Petitioner presents school records showing 

that his mother reported “maternal and paternal family histories are significant for ADHD, 

depression, school learning behavior, and speech/language problems, and special education 

services. The paternal side family history also is significant for alcohol problems, 

emotional problems and mental hospitalization.” (Pet. Ex. M.) She indicated that from his 

birth until five years of age he “was overactive, hyperactive, overly aggressive, hard to care 

for and hard to discipline,” and although she reported a head injury, the records indicate 

that “no details regarding the head injury were available.” (Id.) Petitioner was diagnosed 

with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in May 1996, when he was five years old, 

and prescribed Ritalin. (Pet. Ex. K.) Ritalin was discontinued in November 1998, while 

he was in third grade, because it caused depression as a side effect. (Pet. Ex. L.) An 

October 6, 1998, report from a school psychologist, when he was in third grade, reported a 

history of frequent out-of-control behavior from kindergarten to the first part of second 

grade, and indicates that he was “identified with a Specific Learning Disability” as he 

entered third grade, where he was physically aggressive. (Pet. Ex. N.) An Individualized 

Education Program assessment in May 2000 states he was removed from the general 

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education campus and placed in a special school because he “has been unable to build or 

maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers, teachers, administrative, and 

other adults in the general education setting . . . extraordinary methods and specially trained 

instructors are required to meet his behavioral needs.” (Pet. Ex. N.) 

Petitioner’s prison medical records show that when he entered the prison system on 

January 6, 2011, he informed prison officials he had been diagnosed with borderline 

personality disorder, was experiencing withdrawal from cocaine and PCP, heard voices 

and had suicidal thoughts. (Lodgment No. 16 at 210, 216.) He was interviewed and 

reported to be “cooperative, polite, good grooming, good eye contact, speech normal 

rate/vol., thoughts linear with normal rate and flow, no associations noted, no delusions 

identified, mood euthymic, affect congruent, denies SI/HI, denies AH/VH, I/J poor, 

cognition clear, speech spontaneous, not responding to internal stimuli, AIMS – negative.” 

(Id. at 262.) The initial diagnosis by prison doctors on January 20, 2011, was paranoid 

schizophrenia with moderate functional impairment, and with symptoms which were 

moderate, mild and improving. (Id. at 240-45.) Upon entering the state prison system he 

informed doctors that he did not want to be medicated (id. at 262), but on February 1, 2011, 

he filed an inmate request indicating: “I need meds for my mood” (id. at 159), and was 

prescribed Geodon several days later, and Citalopram and Hydroxyzine a month later. (Id. 

at 185-211, 235, 262.) By June 2011, the diagnosis changed to adjustment disorder and 

borderline personality disorder, and it was again noted that he “was cooperative, he 

presented as alert, good hygiene, oriented x4, thought process was linear and logical, does 

not appear to be responding to internal stimuli, appetite is good (eating 3 meals), he denied 

SI, HI, AH, VH, PI, and depressive or anxiety symptoms.” (Id. at 247-48.) 

Petitioner presents documents showing he was placed in the prison’s Enhanced 

Outpatient Program from May 2013 through June 2016. (Pet.’s Opp. at 27-51.) They show 

he was proscribed psychotropic medication shortly after he entered the program, but the 

psychotropic medication was discontinued in late 2014 or early 2015. (Id.) By 2017, he 

continued to receive treatment for “depression, major, recurrent,” but was rated as being at 

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a low risk for suicide since he had not attempted suicide again after his initial attempt prior 

to his guilty plea, his thought process was linear, his attention, concentration and thought 

content were adequate, and he was a good candidate to be transferred to a lower level of 

care. (Lodgment No. 16 at 87-89, 112-14.) In late 2017 he was taking medication for 

depression “related to being in prison and/or environmental factors,” but reported the 

medication helped and had no side effects, and he indicated that he was “getting ready to 

be discharged from [the Enhanced Outpatient Program].” (Id. at 93-95, 118.) 

Respondent argues the records show that Petitioner’s worst period was when he 

entered his plea, a time when his own expert said his condition was transitory, and points 

out that his counsel on the motion to withdraw the plea did not express any doubt as to his 

ability to be sentenced. (MTD Mem. at 14-17.) Respondent also argues the record is 

sufficiently developed to make a determination regarding equitable tolling, and it fails to 

demonstrate a mental or medical condition sufficiently severe as required to show under 

Bills it was not possible for Petitioner to meet the filing deadline for his federal Petition. 

(Id., citing Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 772-73 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that district 

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold evidentiary hearing on equitable 

tolling where it had access to extensive medical records which indicated petitioner’s 

“relevant mental functions were either ‘good’ or ‘within normal limits,’” and where he 

“managed to file several petitions for post-conviction relief in state court during the time” 

he was seeking equitable tolling), citing Laws, 351 F.3d at 924 (“Of course, a petitioner’s 

statement, even if sworn, need not convince a court that equitable tolling is justified should 

countervailing evidence be introduced.”)) 

Petitioner argues that despite the fact that his medical records report his thinking as 

logical and linear, his paranoid schizophrenia, as diagnosed by prison doctors, has caused 

him to lose touch with reality and prevented him from understanding the need to timely 

file court documents. (Pet.’s Opp. at 18.) He argues that his “once stable condition fully 

deteriorated long before the period he seeks tolling and continued to restrain him during 

the entire period.” (Id. at 2.) He contends that while his “appeal was pending [from January 

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7, 2011 to October 5, 2012] he fell into a severe psychosis that caused him to believe his 

appellate attorney was a state spy planted to sabotage Loftis, which led to the irrational 

abandonment of his appeal.” (Id. at 3.) Finally, he argues that his placement in the 

Enhanced Outreach Program for approximately six years shows that the prison medical 

professionals believed he was severely mentally impaired. (Id. at 11, 17-19.) 

Petitioner presents several declarations as evidence he was not competent to prepare 

and file his own court pleadings. He states in his own declaration that he started to “fall 

apart mentally and physically” almost immediately upon arrival into the prison system, 

where he was housed at the R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego during his 

first eleven months, and where “the majority of the time [he] was in 24 hour cell 

confinement.” (Id. at 52.) During that time he was given medication which “helped with 

the voices and sleep, but I was always tired, . . . and I slept a lot. I was on these medications 

for a few years, then I took others that had the same effect or worse.” (Id. at 52-53.) He 

was then transferred to the California State Prison-Sacramento, where a riot caused him to 

witness inmates being shot, stabbed and beaten, which resulted in a lockdown, during 

which he began hallucinating. (Id. at 53.) He began losing sleep during the second year 

of incarceration because he thought his cellmate and the correctional officers were trying 

to kill him. (Id.) 

Petitioner states that in mid-2012, he was transferred to the California State PrisonLos Angeles and placed in the Enhanced Outpatient Program, but had “the same thoughts 

and feelings because of my mental illness, and they caused me to make bad decisions, like 

dropping my appeal and getting into trouble.” (Id.) He informed his counsel on October 

3, 2012, that he wished to abandon his appeal. (Lodgment No. 6.) He states that: “If I 

hadn’t had a mental crash I would not have dropped my appeal, because I wanted to go 

home.” (Pet.’s Opp. at 53.) “In late 2012 or early 2013, my cellmate Lionel Tholmer tried 

to teach me what I needed to know to file a[n] appeal, but I could not understand what I 

was reading, because I couldn’t concentrate, my thoughts were scattered, and I easily got 

tired after trying to read – my mental impairments kept control over me.” (Id. at 53-54.) 

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He states that Inmate Tholmer agreed to file his appeal “but was helping so many people 

he did not get to me [before] I was sent back to [R. J. Donovan in San Diego] in early 

2013.” (Id. at 54.) Petitioner states: “No help for post-conviction relief was available at 

[R. J. Donovan] until around June 2014, when my cellmate Gennaire Harris sought help 

from his friend Dave for me, but the help consisted of trying to teach me law, which was 

impossible because of my impairments.” (Id.) In late 2014, he paid an inmate to file an 

appeal, but the inmate took his money and did not file anything. (Id.) 

Petitioner states that: “Available assistance did not come until summer 2015, when 

Tholmer was transferred to [R. J. Donovan] and became my cellmate.” (Id.) He says that 

Tholmer “took complete control of what needed to be done for my post-conviction relief, 

and filed the petition for writ of coram nobis in the state superior court and appealed the 

denial to the state appellate court, then filed my state writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court.” (Id.) After those petitions were “denied for pleading deficiencies,” and 

while the first state supreme court habeas petition was pending, Petitioner was transferred 

back to Los Angeles, where: “I now had access to a lot of assistance, because of Tholmer 

researching and writing the first state petitions, I was now able to articulate my claims by 

showing other inmates his work then they could help me. With Tholmer’s work I was able 

to secure help from inmate Derrick Oden, who filed my second habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court, and then prepared my federal habeas corpus.” (Id. at 54-55.) 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s declaration indicates that he began seeking assistance from other 

inmates shortly after he abandoned his appeal on October 5, 2012, when the statute of 

limitations began to run, and although he at first encountered obstacles, he obtained the 

assistance necessary to collaterally challenge his plea in the summer of 2015, more than 

two years before he initiated this action on August 27, 2017. 

Petitioner presents the declaration of Marissa Loftis, who states that she has been his 

wife since June 21, 2014, that when she first met him in 2006 he was very socially awkward 

and depressed, and before his arrest in 2009 he was child-like, wanted to fit in with his 

friends, and was easily manipulated. (Id. at 56-57.) She helped him with his community 

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college school work while he struggled with mental illness, and during his incarceration he 

told her the correctional staff, his lawyer, the judge and the prosecutor were plotting against 

him, which she later realized were delusions. (Id. at 57-58.) He had mood swings and was 

paranoid during their visits in 2012 and 2013. (Id. at 59.) Finally, she states that when he 

abandoned his appeal he “didn’t even seem like it was a big deal and claimed it was due to 

the people involved in his case setting him up.” (Id. at 59-60.) 

Petitioner presents a declaration from Michael Kinley, his cellmate in 2012 in Los 

Angeles, who states that he witnessed Petitioner “suffering from mental illness so bad that 

he had trouble completing his daily chores,” was paranoid, and “expressed crazy beliefs 

that he was a political prisoner.” (Id. at 61-62.) Kinley states that Petitioner wanted to fire 

his attorney, so Kinley introduced him to a jailhouse lawyer, inmate Lionel Tholmer. (Id. 

at 62.) When Petitioner was transferred back to Los Angeles in late 2016 (id. at 54), Kinley 

said: “I believe he [was] a lot better than last time we were together.” (Id. at 62.) 

Lionel Tholmer states in his declaration that in 2012 he was incarcerated with 

Petitioner in Los Angeles, where Petitioner “frequently had trouble” with cellmates and 

correctional staff, believed his appellate attorney was colluding with the trial judge and 

other state workers to keep him in prison, and, in Tholmer’s opinion, would not have 

abandoned his appeal but for his mental illness. (Id. at 63-64.) When Tholmer advised 

Petitioner not to abandon his appeal, Petitioner accused him of working with the state 

against him. (Id. at 64.) He states that while they were cellmates in Los Angeles: “I was 

exposed to external symptoms of what I believe were psychosis. These included, but not 

limited to, believing his family had a special connection to President Obama and writing 

coded messages to President Obama multiple times to secure his freedom; hallucinations; 

extreme paranoia; irrational thinking; verbal outburst; and mixing his own beliefs up with 

what was actually real.” (Id.) Tholmer was transferred to R. J. Donovan in July 2015, 

where Petitioner was confined at the time, and states that he “immediately began fighting 

on Loftis’s behalf . . . by filing several state habeas corpus actions regarding prison 

conditions, and investigating post-conviction relief claims for him.” (Id. at 65.) Tholmer 

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states that he conducted the necessary investigation through which he obtained the school 

records Petitioner has presented here and to the state court, which Tholmer indicates were 

necessary to prepare Petitioner’s state collateral review petitions, and that in his opinion 

Petitioner could not have prepared those petitions without help. (Id. at 65-66.) 

A declaration from inmate Gennaire Harris describes Petitioner’s behavior while 

they were incarcerated together in 2013, and states “the entire time I was incarcerated with 

Loftis, he would not have been able to properly communicate with a jailhouse lawyer to 

assist him with filing a petition.” (Id. at 68-71.) A declaration from inmate David Saxton 

describes efforts he made to teach Petitioner how to collaterally challenge his conviction 

in late 2013 through mid-2014. (Id. at 73-90.) Finally, Ciron Springfield states in his 

declaration that he met Petitioner in the law library in 2017, and researched and filed the 

opposition to this motion to dismiss because Petitioner is “mentally slow and had no 

understanding of law or its application, or how to prepare a motion.” (Id. at 91-92.) 

As set forth above, in order to be entitled to equitable tolling, Petitioner must not 

only show that his “mental state rendered him unable to personally prepare a habeas 

petition and effectuate its filing,” which he fails to show through his medical and school 

records but attempts to establish through his declarations, he must also “show that the 

mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the 

circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 

1099-1100 (emphasis added). “The mental impairment must be so debilitating that it is the 

but for cause of the delay, and even in cases of debilitating impairment the petitioner must 

still demonstrate diligence.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 

2014). A determination “whether there are grounds for equitable tolling [is] highly factdependent.” Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The records presented do not support a finding that Petitioner suffered from a mental 

impairment so debilitating that it “rendered him unable to personally prepare a habeas 

petition and effectuate its filing,” or “unable rationally or factually to personally understand 

the need to timely file [a federal habeas action].” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100. Rather, they 

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indicate Petitioner suffers from depression and has been diagnosed with borderline 

personality disorder, adjustment disorder, and paranoid schizophrenia, with only moderate 

impairments reported, and a linear and logical thought process. 

Even accepting the factual allegations in the declarations as true, they establish 

Petitioner was seeking “access to assistance” from other inmates as far back as late 2012, 

about five years before he filed his federal habeas Petition. The declarations also establish 

that by at least July 2015, his medical or mental condition did not prevent him from 

accepting inmate Tholmer’s assistance in pursuing state collateral relief, and thereafter had 

the ability, with the assistance of other inmates, to seek federal habeas relief. (Pet.’s Opp. 

at 54, 65.) As Respondent points out (MTD Mem. at 16), Petitioner’s mental condition did 

not prevent him from filing and settling three pro se civil rights actions in this Court 

challenging conditions of his confinement, which provide further support for Petitioner’s 

statement that after inmate Tholmer began assisting him in July 2015, he was able, with 

assistance of other inmates, to prepare and timely file state and federal court pleadings.5

 

(See Pet.’s Opp. at 17.) 

                                                                

5

 This Court’s record shows Petitioner was able to prepare, file and settle three pro se civil 

rights actions in this Court, which included the timely exhaustion of prison administrative 

remedies and three underlying state habeas petitions. These include: (1) a pro se civil rights 

complaint which alleged a First Amendment violation for failure to accommodate his 

religious need for a special diet, presumptively constructively filed on August 15, 2016 and 

settled on December 22, 2017. (See So.Dist.Ca.Civil Case No. 16cv2094-BTM (KSC), 

ECF Nos. 1, 19.) In that case, Petitioner indicated he timely sought relief through the 

prison administrative appeal system beginning on December 28, 2015. (Id., ECF No. 1 at 

6, 9); (2) a pro se civil rights complaint which was presumptively constructively filed on 

July 28, 2016 and settled on December 12, 2017, which alleged Petitioner was placed in 

administrative segregation in retaliation for submitting a July 15, 2015 inmate grievance. 

(See So.Dist.Ca.Civil Case No. 16cv2093-AJB (RBB), ECF Nos. 1, 20.) In that case he 

indicated he timely sought relief through the prison administrative appeal system beginning 

on August 11, 2013. (Id., ECF No. 1 at 6, 20); and (3) a pro se civil rights complaint 

presumptively constructively filed on June 16, 2016 and settled on December 12, 2017, 

which alleged a denial of his right to appeal a disciplinary action by the refusal to process 

a December 14, 2014 inmate grievance. (See So.Dist.Ca.Civil Case No. 16cv1593-MMA 

(WVG), ECF Nos. 1, 29.) He indicated in that case that he sought habeas relief in the state 

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“The Court should examine whether the petitioner’s mental impairment prevented 

him from locating assistance . . . the existence of such help would be highly relevant to the 

question of whether a petitioner’s mental condition made it impossible to file a timely 

petition.” Id. Accepting the statements in the declarations filed by Petitioner as accurate 

and credible, they provide, at best, for equitable tolling until July 2015, when he was able 

to seek out and take advantage of assistance of other inmates irrespective of his mental 

impairment. With that assistance he pursued nearly a dozen pro se actions, and the delay 

in seeking federal habeas relief was not caused by any extraordinary circumstances. See 

Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that “reliance on helpers 

who were transferred or too busy to attend to his petitions . . . are hardly extraordinary 

[circumstances] given the vicissitudes of prison life, and there is no indication in the record 

that they made it ‘impossible’ for him to file on time.”) Rather, the record demonstrates 

that after July 2015, Petitioner understood the need for assistance, was able to secure such 

assistance in the process of exhausting his federal claims in anticipation of filing his federal 

petition, and was able to cooperate and monitor that assistance. Ninth Circuit authority 

precludes equitable tolling after that time because, rather than file a federal habeas petition 

when he was able in July 2015, he waited over two years to do so while he filed nearly a 

dozen other pro se petitions and complaints instead. He fails to demonstrate that his mental 

impairment caused him to miss the federal deadline, and there is no indication in the 

medical records that his mental impairment prevented him from understanding the need to 

timely file a federal habeas petition. His declarations show he procured assistance for a 

                                                                

superior, appellate and supreme courts before filing his federal complaint, and attached a 

copy of a state supreme court pro se habeas petition, dated November 12, 2015, which 

indicates that the appellate court habeas petition was denied on September 30, 2015. (Id. 

ECF No. 1 at 29-30.) With those three civil rights cases, one of which had three state 

habeas exhaustion petitions, plus the four state collateral review petitions filed in this case, 

and the instant Petition, the record shows Petitioner was able to initiate at least 11 pro se

state and federal court petitions and complaints since he began receiving assistance in July 

2015, in addition to filing prison administrative appeals prior to that time. 

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wide range of legal issues, and utilized that assistance to procure additional assistance to 

collaterally challenge his guilty plea in state court while at the same time timely exhausting 

prison administrative remedies as a prerequisite to litigating claims alleging a failure to 

accommodate his religious diet, retaliation for filing prison grievances, and denial of his 

right to pursue prison grievances. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100 (“The ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ inquiry in the second prong considers whether the petitioner’s impairment 

was a but-for cause of any delay. Thus, a petitioner’s mental impairment might justify 

equitable tolling if it interferes with the ability to understand the need for assistance, the 

ability to secure it, or the ability to cooperate with or monitor assistance the petitioner does 

secure.”); Yow Ming Yeh, 751 F.3d at 1078 (holding that facts showing petitioner 

“repeatedly sought administrative and judicial remedies, . . . was able to make requests for 

assistance . . . [and] was able to file a state habeas petition in three different California 

venues . . . refute a claim of impairment so debilitating that one could not ‘rationally or 

factually’ understand the meaning of a deadline.”), quoting Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100; 

see also Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (noting that the burden is on petitioner to show the 

“extraordinary circumstances” caused his untimeliness under a “fact-specific inquiry”); 

Laws, 351 F.3d at 922-23 (stating that equitable tolling is available only where mental 

impairment somehow made filing a timely habeas petition impossible). The totality of the 

circumstances do not support a finding that his mental impairment prevented him from 

understanding the need to timely file a federal habeas petition, or was the proximate cause 

of his delay in filing a federal habeas petition once he had secured assistance. 

There is also no basis to find that although Petitioner was able to file state habeas 

petitions in order to exhaust state court remedies prior to filing his federal habeas Petition, 

he is entitled to equitable tolling during the exhaustion process simply because he was not 

able to file a federal petition until he successfully exhausted state court remedies. See Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005) (observing that a state prisoner concerned that 

his attempts to exhaust federal habeas claims in state court might discover only at the end 

that his state petitions did not toll the statute of limitations because they were procedurally 

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deficient under state law, can file a “protective” habeas petition in federal court and request 

“the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are 

exhausted.”) There is no indication that procedure was unavailable. See id. (“A 

petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely will 

ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to file in federal court.”), citing Rhines v. Weber, 

544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005) (holding that if a petitioner had good cause for failing to exhaust, 

his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and did not engage in intentionally 

dilatory tactics, “it would likely be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay 

and dismiss” a mixed petition.); Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding 

that Rhines applies to fully unexhausted petitions). 

In sum, if Petitioner receives the benefit of equitable tolling from October 6, 2012, 

when the limitations period began to run, and ending at the latest on July 31, 2015, when 

he had assistance in pursuing state collateral review in this case, he had one year from 

August 1, 2015 in which to timely file his federal habeas Petition. He initiated this action 

on August 27, 2017, a delay of more than two years. Assuming the one-year statute of 

limitations began to run on August 1, 2015, he allowed 279 days to expire before it could 

have begun being statutorily tolled when he began one complete round of state collateral 

review when he filed his first coram nobis petition on May 6, 2016. Thus, 86 days would 

have remained on the limitations period at the beginning of any possible statutory tolling. 

As discussed below, his one complete round of state collateral review ended when his 

second and final state habeas petition was denied on August 9, 2017, 18 days before he 

initiated this action on August 27, 2017. Assuming he is entitled to equitable tolling 

beginning soon after he was incarcerated and continuing until he secured assistance from 

other inmates sufficient to prepare and file court pleadings, and assuming he is entitled to 

statutory tolling for the entire period he was seeking state collateral review, his federal 

Petition would have been filed 68 days (86-18=68) before expiration of the statute of 

limitations. See Grant, 862 F.3d at 918 (“If a prisoner can demonstrate that he is entitled 

to equitable tolling for a certain period of time, that period will be subtracted from the total 

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number of days that have passed. If, after those days are subtracted, less than 365 days 

have passed, the prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus will be accepted as timely.”) 

Accordingly, even with the most generous equitable tolling available, he must still show 

he is entitled to statutory tolling arising from his state collateral review petitions. 

C. Statutory Tolling 

The statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending” in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). If Petitioner was “properly pursuing” his 

state court remedies, “the one-year statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first 

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final 

collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled in 

part by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225 (2002) (holding that the statute of limitations 

is not statutorily tolled during gaps between state petitions if the delay is “unreasonable” 

under California law). If the limitations period had expired when Petitioner began seeking 

state collateral review, statutory tolling is not available for any state petition. Jiminez v. 

Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that state post-conviction petitions filed 

after expiration of the limitations period are ineligible for statutory tolling). 

Petitioner began seeking collateral review when he presumptively constructively 

filed his first pro se coram nobis petition in the superior court on May 6, 2016, three years 

and seven months after the limitations period began to run on October 6, 2012. (Lodgment 

No. 8.) His final state collateral review petition was denied on August 9, 2017, 18 days 

before he initiated this action. (Lodgment No. 15.) In order for his state collateral review 

petitions to have been filed prior to expiration of the federal statute of limitations, he needs 

equitable tolling for at least two years and seven months beginning on October 6, 2012. 

As set forth above, the longest amount of equitable tolling available would have ended on 

July 31, 2015, and the one-year statute of limitations ran for 279 days before it would have 

been stopped on May 6, 2016 with the filing of the first state collateral review petition. 

Thus, accepting the facts as alleged by Petitioner as true, and assuming equitable tolling is 

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available through July 31, 2015, he began seeking state collateral review of his guilty plea 

with 86 days remaining on the one-year limitations period. Under that scenario, his state 

collateral review petitions would be eligible to statutorily toll the limitations period. 

The first of his state collateral review petitions was presumptively constructively 

filed in the superior court on May 6, 2016, a pro se petition titled: “Notice of Motion and 

Motion to Vacate Judgment (Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis.)” (Lodgment No. 8.) 

Petitioner alleged he was incompetent to enter a plea and that his trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to investigate his mental state, and only became aware of those claims 

when he obtained his school records “after trial while assigned to mental health evaluation 

in the prison.” (Id. at 10, 12.) The court denied the petition on the basis that Petitioner had 

not identified an unknown fact that would have prevented entry of judgment as required to 

warrant coram nobis relief, that his medical and school records did not demonstrate he was 

legally insane which would have prevented rendition of judgment so as to support coram 

nobis relief, and that state law provides that a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not coram 

nobis, is the proper avenue for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Lodgment No. 

9, People v. Loftis, No. SCE 292832, order at 2-3 (Cal.Sup.Ct. May 20, 2016), quoting 

People v. Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1474 (1987) (“A writ of coram nobis permits the 

court which rendered judgment to ‘reconsider it and give relief from errors of fact.’ The 

writ will properly issue only when the petitioner can establish three elements: (1) that some 

fact existed which, without his fault or negligence, was not presented to the court at the 

trial and which would have prevented the rendition of the judgment; (2) that the new 

evidence does not go to the merits of the issues of fact determined at trial; and (3) that he 

did not know nor could he have, with due diligence, discovered the facts upon which he 

relies any sooner than the point at which he petitions for the writ.”)) 

Petitioner presumptively constructively filed a similar pro se petition in the appellate 

court on June 12, 2016, a 23-day gap between the denial by the lower court and the filing 

in the appellate court, but added to the title “coram//vobis, and supporting verification.” 

(Lodgment No. 10.) It was denied 9 days later, on June 21, 2016, with an order which 

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stated: “The ‘notice of motion and motion to vacate judgment (petition for writ of error 

coram nobis//coram vobis()), and supporting verification’ has been read and considered by 

Justices Benke, Nares, and Irion. The filing is treated as a petition for writ of error coram 

nobis. The petition is denied.” (Lodgment No. 11, People v. Loftis, No. D070508, order 

at 1 (Cal.App.Ct. June 21, 2016).) Because there is no indication to the contrary, the Court 

presumes the appellate court denied the coram nobis petition on the same basis it was 

denied by the superior court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991). 

Both of those petitions would, if they were filed prior to expiration of the one-year 

federal statute of limitations, and if they were timely under state law, provide statutory 

tolling because there is no indication they were “lodged in the wrong court or office, or 

formatted improperly.” Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005), citing 

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-9 (2000) (“the question whether an application has been 

‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the 

application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.”) However, if they were untimely 

under state law, they would not statutorily toll the limitations period. See Pace, 544 U.S. 

at 417 (holding that petitions which are untimely under state law are not “properly filed” 

and do not support statutory tolling). 

Neither the state superior or appellate court discussed or mentioned the timeliness 

of those petitions, other than the superior court noting that an application for coram nobis

relief is improper unless Petitioner can establish “that he did not know nor could he have, 

with due diligence, discovered the facts upon which he relies any sooner than the point at 

which he petitions for the writ.” (Lodgment No. 9, People v. Loftis, No. SCE 292832, 

order at 2, quoting Soriano, 194 Cal.App.3d at 1474). In the absence of any clear indication 

a particular state petition was timely, a federal court “must itself examine the delay in each 

case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.” Evans 

v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006). There is no need to determine if the first two petitions 

were timely under state law because, even giving Petitioner the benefit of statutory tolling 

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for the 47 days they were pending, including the gap between them, he still requires an 

additional 346 days (393-47=346) of statutory tolling. Grant, 862 F.3d at 918. 

Rather than continuing seeking coram nobis relief, Petitioner next presumptively 

constructively filed a pro se habeas petition in the state supreme court on August 3, 2016, 

a gap of 17 days between the denial by the appellate court and the filing in the supreme 

court. (Lodgment No. 12.) That petition was denied 69 days later, on October 12, 2016, 

with a citation to Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474. (Lodgment No. 13.) A citation to page 474 of 

the Duvall opinion “may mean ‘the available state remedies have not been exhausted as 

the California Supreme Court has not been given the required fair opportunity to correct 

the constitutional violation.’” Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 869 (9th Cir. 2007) (en 

banc) (Opinion of Ikuta, Circuit Judge, dissenting), quoting Harris v. Superior Court, 500 

F.2d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Pombrio v. Hense, 631 F.Supp.2d 1247, 1251-52 

(C.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that a Duvall citation points to a correctable defect and therefore 

does not support exhaustion). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that a citation to Duvall may 

be an indication the claims were not pled with sufficient particularity, and is therefore in 

the nature of a demurrer, which does not prevent a finding that the petition was “properly 

filed” so as to support statutory tolling. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1039, citing Artuz, 531 U.S. 

at 9. Thus, if that state habeas petition was filed prior to expiration of the federal limitations 

period, and if it was timely under state law, statutory tolling could be appropriate while it 

was pending. In addition, if that habeas petition was a continuation of Petitioner’s one full 

round of state collateral review, statutory tolling could be available for the entire time he 

was proceeding with that full round of state post-conviction relief, including the 17-day 

gap between the denial of appellate court coram nobis relief and the filing of the habeas 

petition. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. With the benefit of tolling for that entire round of state 

collateral review up to the denial of that first state habeas petition, a period of 160 days, he 

still requires 233 days (393-160=233) of statutory tolling. 

Finally, on February 8, 2017, Petitioner presumptively constructively filed a second 

pro se habeas petition in the state supreme court, which is nearly identical to the Petition 

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filed here, a gap of 118 days where nothing was pending from when the first state supreme 

court habeas petition was denied until the second was filed. (Lodgment No. 14.) The 

second state habeas petition was pending for 183 days before it was denied on August 9, 

2017, in an order which stated: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.” (Lodgment 

No. 15.) If that second state habeas petition began a new round of state collateral review, 

the 118-day gap between habeas petitions would be categorically ineligible to support 

statutory tolling. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). The limitations 

period would have expired 86 days after the first state habeas petition was denied, during 

the 118-day gap while there was no state collateral review petition pending. However, if 

that second state supreme court habeas petition was “limited to an elaboration of the facts 

relating to the claims in the first petition,” that is, if it “simply attempted to correct the 

deficiencies” in the prior petition, which it purported to do (see Lodgment No. 14 at 9), and 

which the citation to Duvall seems to suggest was necessary for proper exhaustion of state 

court remedies, it would be considered part of the first complete round of post-conviction 

relief. King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by 

Chavis, 546 U.S. at 197. In that case the limitations period would be statutorily tolled 

while the two state supreme court habeas petitions were pending, provided they were both 

timely filed under state law. Pace, 544 U.S. at 414. It would also be statutorily tolled 

during the gap between them, provided the 118-day gap, or nearly four months, did not 

constitute an unreasonable delay under state law. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-26 (holding that 

the statute of limitations is not statutorily tolled during gaps between petitions if the delay 

is “unreasonable” under California law, that a reasonable delay under California law does 

not differ significantly from other states which allow 30 to 45 days between filings, and 

that statutory tolling would not apply to an unjustified four and one-half month gap). 

Unlike the gaps between his first three state petitions of 23 and 17 days respectively, 

the 118-day gap between the denial of the first state habeas petition and the filing of the 

second is too long to support tolling unless it was properly justified under state law. Id.; 

see also Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048 (rejecting statutory tolling for unjustified gaps of 101 

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and 115 days), citing In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 302-03 (1949) (holding that a petitioner 

who did not appeal, did not request a trial on the issue of his sanity, and had several prior 

collateral challenges denied, must justify a delay in seeking collateral review); see also 

Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting statutory tolling for unjustified 

gap of 146 days); Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011) (same for gap 

of 81 days, and recognizing that district courts in the Ninth Circuit have rejected statutory 

tolling for gaps of 93 days and 97 days). Petitioner must show his two state habeas petitions 

were timely under state law, and must show adequate justification for the 118-day gap. 

As set forth above, Petitioner explained to the state superior court that his delay in 

seeking coram nobis relief was due to the fact that he only came into possession of his 

school records when he began receiving mental health services in prison, and argued that 

if he or his trial counsel had been aware of those records before trial they would have 

triggered competency proceedings. (Lodgment No. 8 at 10.) He cannot rely on that excuse 

to justify his 118-day gap between state habeas petitions. See Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226 

(holding that “the delay between the date his conviction became final and the date he first 

sought state postconviction relief [is] a matter irrelevant to the question whether his 

application was ‘pending’ during the four and one-half month interval [between filings].”) 

In any case, he proffered a different excuse when attempting to justify in the state court the 

delay in seeking habeas relief, including the 118-day gap between state habeas petitions. 

He alleged, as he does here, that his mental illness prevented him from preparing legal 

pleadings on his own and he had to rely on other inmates for assistance, which he also gave 

as the reason for the 17-day gap between the denial of his coram nobis petition by the 

appellate court and the filing of his first state habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 12 at 6; 

Lodgment No. 14 at 25.) That explanation, provided to the state supreme court on August 

3, 2016 and February 8, 2017 respectively (id.), was provided in the midst of the nearly 

one dozen pro se state and federal petitions and complaints he filed in 2015 and 2016 with 

the assistance of other inmates. (See footnote 4, supra.) Thus, the record does not show 

his mental condition or his need to rely on other inmates for assistance prevented him from 

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timely seeking state habeas relief. Rather, it shows that on February 8, 2017, at which time 

at least nine of his pro se state and federal actions had already been filed (id.), he presented 

to the California Supreme Court a habeas petition which for the first and only time fullyexhausted state court remedies as to the federal claims presented here. 

Neither has he shown that the same excuse which caused a 17-day gap between the 

denial by the appellate court and the filing of the first supreme court petition could render 

the 118-day gap between the filings of the two state supreme court petitions reasonable 

under state law. He states in his declaration that inmate Tholmer prepared and filed the 

first state habeas petition, and while it was pending Petitioner was transferred to Los 

Angeles, where he was incarcerated when that petition was denied. (Pet.’s Opp. at 54.) He 

states that while incarcerated in Los Angeles: “I now had access to a lot of assistance, 

because of Tholmer researching and writing the first state petitions, I was now able to 

articulate my claims by showing other inmates his work then they could help me. With 

Tholmer’s work I was able to secure help from inmate Derrick Oden, who filed my second 

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court.” (Id. at 54-55.) By his own admission the 

transfer took place before the first state habeas petition was denied, and when it was denied 

he had sufficient assistance at the new prison to file the second state habeas petition. 

Because Petitioner was clearly able to seek state habeas relief with the assistance of 

other inmates during the 118-day gap, about four months, between state habeas petitions, 

the excuse he proffered to the state habeas courts for that delay, that he was not able to 

timely do so due to his mental condition, precludes a finding that they delay was reasonable 

under state law, and statutory tolling is not available during that gap. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 

225-26 (observing that statutory tolling would not apply if a four and one-half month gap 

between state habeas petitions was unreasonable under California law). Thus, even with 

statutory tolling from May 6, 2016, when state collateral review began, at which time 86 

days remained on the federal one-year statute of limitations, until October 12, 2016, when 

the first state habeas petition was denied, the statute of limitations expired 86 days later, 

during the 118-day gap between state habeas petitions. 

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Furthermore, even if Petitioner could justify the 118-day gap under state law, unless 

he can show that both of his state habeas petitions were timely under state law he is not 

entitled to statutory tolling while they were pending or for the gap between them. See Pace, 

544 U.S. at 414 (“What we intimated in Saffold we now hold: When a postconviction 

petition is untimely under state law, ‘that (is) the end of the matter’ for purposes of” 

statutory tolling.) The California Supreme Court order which denied the second habeas 

petition is silent as to the reason for the denial, and the first habeas petition was denied by 

that court with a citation to Duvall, which, as set forth above, suggests the claims were 

presented in a manner which failed to exhaust state court remedies for federal habeas 

purposes. Thus, neither provides an indication of timeliness as to the six-year delay from 

entering his guilty plea on May 10, 2010, to first seeking state collateral review of his plea 

on May 6, 2016, or the nearly seven-year delay in finally presenting his claims in a manner 

which exhausted state court remedies on February 8, 2017. See Chavis, 546 U.S. at 197 

(“the fact that the California Supreme Court did not include the words ‘on the merits’ in its 

order denying Chavis relief makes it less likely, not more likely, that the California 

Supreme Court believed that Chavis’ 3-year delay was reasonable.”) 

In the absence of any clear indication a particular state petition was timely, a federal 

court “must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would 

have held in respect to timeliness.” Id. at 198. If the facts upon which Petitioner sought 

habeas relief in the state court were known to him at the time he entered his plea, both of 

his state habeas petitions are clearly untimely under state law. See Walker v. Martin, 562 

U.S. 307, 312-21 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness rule requiring that a petitioner 

must seek relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from the time the petitioner or 

counsel knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information offered in support of 

the claim and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly established and consistently applied); 

In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 797-98 (1993) (“the general rule is still that, absent justification 

for the failure to present all known claims in a single, timely petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, successive and/or untimely petitions will be summarily denied.”) 

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Petitioner contended in his state coram nobis petition that he did not become aware 

of his claims (that he was not competent to enter a plea and that his trial counsel could have 

proven it if he had investigated his mental health history), until he came into possession of 

his own school records sometime after he entered the prison system in 2010, and prior to 

filing his first petition for state collateral review on May 6, 2016. (See Lodgment No. 8 at 

10.) The declaration of inmate Tholmer states he obtained those records in the course of 

assisting Petitioner in investigating his claims beginning in July 2015. (Pet.’s Opp. at 65.) 

The superior court found those records did not support the claims. (Lodgment No. 9, 

People v. Loftis, No. SCE 292832, order at 3.) He presented those same records in support 

of his state habeas petitions. (Compare Lodgment No. 8 [ECF No. 12-15 at 31-95] with 

Lodgment No. 12 [ECF No. 12-19 at 31-86] and Lodgment No. 14 [ECF No. 12-21 at 86-

129].) The justification he provided for failing to timely seek state habeas relief is different 

from that given in the first coram nobis petition, and is identical to his argument here for 

equitable tolling, that he lacks the ability to draft pleadings due to his mental illness and is 

at the mercy of fellow inmates to draft pleadings for him. (Lodgment No. 12 [ECF No. 12-

19 at 6]; Lodgment No. 14 [ECF No. 12-21 at 25].) 

Even assuming Petitioner adequately justified his delay in seeking coram nobis relief 

because he did so soon after he came into possession of his own school records sometime 

between July 2015 and May 2016, the justification he provided for seeking habeas relief in 

October 2016 and February 2017 does not support a finding his state habeas petitions were 

timely under state law. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998) (“Substantial delay 

is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should 

have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the 

claim. . . . A petitioner bears the burden of establishing, through his or her specific 

allegations, which may be supported by any relevant exhibits, the absence of substantial 

delay.”) As set forth above, there is no support for his contention that by February 8, 2017, 

when he filed his second state habeas petition, around a year or more after he states he 

discovered the facts upon which he sought relief, when he had already filed at least six pro 

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se petitions in state court, that he had established the absence of a substantial delay. 

Accordingly, the second state habeas petition was clearly not timely filed under California 

law, which precludes statutory tolling while it was pending or during the four-month gap 

between the two state habeas petitions. 

D. Tolling Summary 

The one-year federal statute of limitations began to run on October 6, 2012. 

Petitioner waited three years and seven months before seeking state collateral review on 

May 6, 2016. Although Petitioner does not establish an entitlement to equitable tolling 

based on his medical records alone, assuming it is available based on the declarations he 

has submitted, it would have ended, at the latest, on July 31, 2015. Absent statutory tolling, 

he would have had 365 days in which to file his federal habeas Petition. He began seeking 

state collateral review 279 days later, on May 6, 2016, at which time 86 days would have 

remained on the limitations period. Statutory tolling, to the fullest extent possible, is 

available from May 6, 2016 until the denial of the first state habeas petition on October 12, 

2016. He is not entitled to further statutory tolling because he unreasonably delayed in 

filing his second state habeas petition after the first was denied, and because even if that 

delay is excused by his transfer between state prisons the second state habeas petition was 

clearly untimely under state law as his excuse for being unable to file that petition was 

belied by his filing nearly a dozen pro se petitions. Any available statutory tolling therefore 

ended, at the latest, on October 12, 2016, and the limitations period expired 86 days later, 

on January 7, 2017. Petitioner filed his federal habeas Petition on August 27, 2017, which, 

even with the benefit of the longest periods of tolling available based on the facts alleged 

by him, was over seven months after the federal one-year statute of limitations expired. 

E. Actual Innocence Gateway 

A federal habeas petitioner may avoid the consequences of failing to file within the 

one-year statute of limitations if he can satisfy the “actual innocence” exception to 

untimeliness set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). “In order to pass 

through Schlup’s gateway, and have an otherwise barred constitutional claim heard on the 

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merits, a petitioner must show that, in light of all the evidence, including evidence not 

introduced at trial, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found 

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-76 (9th 

Cir. 2002), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

Petitioner interrupted the trial proceedings after the first day of testimony by entering 

his guilty plea, during which he admitted he was guilty of five of the seventeen charges 

and admitted he personally used a handgun and personally inflicted great bodily injury. 

(RT 261-62.) On the first and only day of trial testimony three eyewitnesses identified him 

in court as the man who robbed them at gunpoint, and evidence was presented that his 

DNA was found on a tube of lip balm found in the car he stole where he had been sitting. 

(RT 112-220.) He stated that he accepted the plea bargain because he was convinced he 

would be found guilty (Lodgment No. 5, Augmented Reporter’s Tr., Nov. 24, 2010 at 27), 

and admitted his guilt during the free talk. (Lodgment No. 4, Augmented Clerk’s Tr. at 8-

9, 24-46.) He is clearly not entitled to excuse his untimeliness as a result of the actual 

innocence gateway. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; Majoy, 296 F.3d at 775-76. 

F. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

Petitioner contends appointment of counsel is warranted because, based on the 

evidence presented in support of equitable tolling, he is unable to adequately oppose the 

motion to dismiss without the assistance of counsel, and that appointment of counsel is 

required if the Court conducts an evidentiary hearing or orders discovery. (ECF No. 19.) 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus actions by 

state prisoners. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 

1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may 

obtain representation whenever the court “determines that the interests of justice so 

require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th 

Cir. 1990); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984). The interests of justice 

require appointment of counsel when the court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the 

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petition or utilizes the discovery process. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d 

at 728; Rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; Rule 6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The 

appointment of counsel is discretionary where no evidentiary hearing or discovery is 

necessary. Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728. 

“Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief are not entitled to appointed 

counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is 

necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196; Knaubert, 791 

F.2d at 728-29. Failure to appoint counsel may result in a due process violation if the issues 

involved are too complex for the petitioner. Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948, 950 (8th 

Cir. 1970). “A district court should consider the legal complexity of the case, the factual 

complexity of the case, the petitioner’s ability to investigate and present his claim, and any 

other relevant factors.” Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1994). 

The record does not support Petitioner’s contention that the issues are too complex 

for him to proceed without an attorney. When he first sought to withdraw his plea he was 

represented by counsel yet indicated a desire to timely file a pro se motion to withdraw, 

and was represented by counsel when he decided to abandon his appeal of the denial of 

that motion. His federal Petition articulates his claims well, and his opposition to the 

motion to dismiss demonstrates he has an understanding of this case and the legal issues 

involved. Even accounting for his contention that other inmates drafted his federal Petition 

and his opposition, Petitioner’s declaration supports a finding that he understands the 

nature of these proceedings and has the ability to articulate the necessary factual support 

for his position, in particular his need for equitable tolling, which is primarily a factual 

inquiry. See Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (“Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted 

is a ‘fact-specific inquiry.’”), quoting Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 

2001). The factual record is adequately developed here, and there is no indication that an 

attorney would have presented additional facts or a more compelling argument to excuse 

his five-year delay in seeking federal habeas relief to challenge his guilty plea. Under such 

circumstances, there is no abuse of discretion in denying a state prisoner’s request for 

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appointment of counsel, as it is simply not warranted by the interests of justice. See 

LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In addition, neither discovery nor an evidentiary hearing are required to resolve what 

Petitioner contends is the only issue presently before the Court, the issue of equitable 

tolling. The Court has determined that Petitioner’s allegations, even if true, do not warrant 

equitable tolling sufficient to render his federal Petition timely. Therefore, no evidentiary 

hearing or further development of the record is necessary. See Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 

(holding that a habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when his or her 

allegations, if true, would support equitable tolling); Roberts, 627 F.3d at 773 (holding that 

district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold evidentiary hearing on 

equitable tolling where it had access to extensive medical records which indicated 

petitioner’s “relevant mental functions were either ‘good’ or ‘within normal limits,’” and 

where he “managed to file several petitions for post-conviction relief in state court during 

the time” he was seeking equitable tolling), citing Laws, 351 F.3d at 924 (“Of course, a 

petitioner’s statement, even if sworn, need not convince a court that equitable tolling is 

justified should countervailing evidence be introduced.”)) Rather, where, as here, “the 

issues involved can be properly resolved on the basis of the state court record, a district 

court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for court-appointed counsel.” 

Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). The Court finds that the “interests 

of justice” do not warrant the appointment of counsel in this case. 

G. Certificate of Appealability 

Finally, the federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require 

a district court that dismisses or denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of 

appealability in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. 

§ 2254. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is 

DENIED, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED with prejudice as untimely. Further, the Court 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court is instructed to 

terminate the case and enter judgment in favor of Respondent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 25, 2018

 _____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

United States District Judge 

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