Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05047/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05047-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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Plaintiff’s counsel is reminded that all future petitions for fees pursuant to the EAJA should include a calculation 1

 of the total amount of fees sought. The itemization sheet for time spent on work before this court should also be

listed in chronological order. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

SUSAN BROWN PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 06-5047

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Susan Brown appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On,

August 15, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 8). Plaintiff now moves for an award of

$2,649.45 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 19.00 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $125.00, and $274.45in expenses. (Doc. # 9-10). Defendant has filed a response,

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objecting to certain hours claimed. (Doc. # 11).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

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sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the file, we find plaintiff is a

prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

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However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). We find plaintiff's counsel entitled to

compensation at this rate. 

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims she spent working on this

case. Defendant argues that the total of 5.00 hours submitted on May 10, 2003, July 2, 2003, and

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January 20, 2006, should be deducted because it was work performed while plaintiff’s case was

pending before the administration. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir.

1984) (time spent at the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA). The

Complaint in this case was not filed until March 20, 2006. (Doc. # 1). We agree with defendant

that the work performed on the above referenced dates was work performed before the

administration. We also find the work performed on May 30, 2002, to be work performed before

the administration. Accordingly, 7.00 hours must be deducted from the total compensable time

sought by counsel.

Defendant further objects to 4.00 of the 11.00 hours submitted on March 15, 2006, March

17, 2006, and June 4, 2006, for the research, writing and preparation of plaintiff’s appeal brief.

The brief submitted to the court consisted of four pages of procedural background and facts and

four pages of argument and discussion. There were no unique or complex issues to be developed

in this particular case. We find that the time submitted for preparing this brief to be excessive.

Therefore we are reducing the number of hours submitted for the preparation of plaintiff’s brief

to 9.00 hours. Accordingly, 2.00 hours must be deducted from the total compensable time sought

by counsel.

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $274.45 in expenses incurred with regard to the

filing fee and postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $274.45 to

be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA

for: 10.00 (19.00-9.00) attorney hours, at the rate of $125.00 per hour, and $274.45 in expenses,

for a total attorney's fee award of $1,524.45. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not

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out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten

days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver

of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be

both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

Dated this 28th day of August 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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