Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00085/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00085-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAQUEL BARRIOS-HAUNSCHILD,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11CV085 MMA (BLM)

NOTICE AND ORDER RE:

vs. TENTATIVE RULINGS

AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC,

Defendant.

Currently pending before the Court, and set for hearing on Monday, April 25, 2011, are

Plaintiff Raquel Barrios-Haunschild’s ex parte application for a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”) [Doc. No. 4], and Defendant Aurora Loan Services, LLC’s (“Aurora”) motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 2]. Having

considered the parties’ submissions, and in anticipation of Monday’s hearing, the Court issues the

following tentative rulings:

(1) The Court tentatively DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte request for a TRO to restrain

Defendant from selling the real property located at 13424 Montecito Glen, San Diego, California

[Doc. No. 4]. Plaintiff has not demonstrated the exigency required for ex parte relief because she

has not shown there is any trustee’s sale to enjoin nor any sale currently pending on the property. 

See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,129 S.Ct. 365, 375 (2008) (injunctive relief will not

be issued “simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury”); Chambers Civ. R. II

(the Court will entertain an ex parte application for a TRO only in “extraordinary circumstances”).

Case 3:11-cv-00085-MMA-BLM Document 12 Filed 04/22/11 Page 1 of 4
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Moreover, Plaintiff has not established she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims because

the application fails to adequately analyze the merits of each of her claims. Winter, 129 S.Ct. at

374 (2008). Nor does Plaintiff’s application or complaint allege an ability to tender the full

amount of the debt owed, which is generally a prerequisite for seeking to set aside the sale of the

property. See Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (N.D. Cal.

2009). 

(2) The Court tentatively GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Court

tentatively DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s first claim for breach of contract. 

Plaintiff cannot allege Aurora breached the Special Forbearance Agreement (“Agreement”) when

it foreclosed on the subject property because the foreclosure proceedings were instituted after the

Agreement expired. (Compl. Exh. A, Attachment A ¶a.2; Compl. ¶10.) Plaintiff also does not

allege she met the conditions of Aurora’s offer by providing the requisite financial documents. 

Plaintiff is tentatively GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND her breach of contract claim to the

extent she can allege she timely provided Aurora the “detailed hardship letter that is signed and

dated,” and “financial information statement that is completed and signed by all parties.” The

Court further finds leave to amend is tentatively warranted because Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim is not preempted by the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”). Mincey v. World Savings

Bank, FSB, 614 F. Supp. 2d 610, 643 (D.S.C. 2008) (“[A] breach of contract claim is not

preempted [by HOLA] to the extent that it alleges a conventional breach of contract claim.”); In re

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litigation, 491 F.3d 638, 641-43 (7th Cir. 2007).

(3) The Court tentatively DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s second and third

claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation. Among other reasons, Plaintiff cannot

allege Aurora made false and fraudulent representations that it would not foreclose on her property

if she made timely payments. The Agreement unambiguously provides that her tender of payment

is not intended to be acceptance of a workout plan or loan modification by Aurora, and that

Aurora's forbearance from exercising its rights or remedies ceased upon expiration of the

Agreement on April 1, 2010. (Compl., Exh. A, Attachment A, ¶a.2.)

Case 3:11-cv-00085-MMA-BLM Document 12 Filed 04/22/11 Page 2 of 4
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(4) The Court tentatively DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s fourth claim

for declaratory relief because the claim is not a stand-alone claim, and Plaintiff’s other substantive

claims are tentatively dismissed. Team Enterprises, LLC v. Western Inv. Real Estate Trust,721 F.

Supp. 2d 898, 911 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“declaratory relief claim falls with the demise of . . . other

claims and the absence of a cognizable justiciable controversy”).

(5) The Court tentatively DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's fifth claim for

quiet title. Before a borrower can challenge a foreclosure sale, the “tender rule” requires that the

borrower’s complaint show tender or the ability to tender the secured debt, Karlsen, v. American

Sav. & Loan Assn., 15 Cal. App.3d 112, 117 (1971), unless requiring a showing of ability to tender

would be inequitable, see Pantoja, 640 F.Supp.2d at 1184 (citation omitted). Plaintiff's complaint

is devoid of facts showing an ability to tender the debt, nor does she allege it would be inequitable

to require her to allege ability an to tender. 

Although Plaintiff might be able to allege tender of the amount owed, the Court tentatively

finds her quiet title claim should nonetheless be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to

amend because the claim is preempted by HOLA. Plaintiff’s quiet title claim is based on her

allegations concerning the trustee’s sale of the property. (Compl. ¶¶ 33, 10 (“Defendant . . .

fail[ed] to provide Plaintiff with a more permanent home retention option, and [retained] Plaintiff's

property at foreclosure sale.”) Her claim attacks the initiation of the foreclosure process,

implicating the “[p]rocessing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of . . . mortgages,” and

therefore is expressly preempted under 12 C.F.R. section 560.2(b). See, Becker v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., Inc., 2011 WL 1103439 *19 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (quiet title claim based on factual

allegations of a “wrongful foreclosure” is preempted by HOLA).

(6) The Court tentatively DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s sixth claim for

violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200. Plaintiff has not established

standing to bring a section 17200 claim because she has not pled she lost money or property as a

result of Defendant’s unfair competition or business practices. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204;

Daro v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 1098 (2007). Plaintiff cannot show Aurora

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unconditionally offered her a more permanent home retention offer because the offer was

expressly conditioned on her providing the required financial documents. (Compl., Exh. B.) 

Plaintiff’s claim for lost money also does not satisfy section 17200's standing requirement because

she was already obligated to make payments under the terms of her promissory note.

(7) The Court tentatively DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s seventh claim for

violation of California Civil Code section 2923.6 because section 2923.6(b) does not create a

private right of action for borrowers. Mabry v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 222 (2010)

(“[s]ection 2923.6 merely expresses the hope that lenders will offer loan modifications on certain

terms”); Pantoja, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1188 (section 2923.6 does not create a private right of action).

(8) The Court tentatively DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's eighth claim for

violation of California Civil Code section 2923.5. Under the plain language of section 2923.5, the

only remedy provided is a postponement of the sale before it happens. Here, the foreclosure sale

has already occurred. Also, “the overwhelming weight of authority has held that a claim under §

2923.5 is preempted by HOLA.” Taguinod v. World Sav. Bank, FSB, --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2010 WL

5185845 *8 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 

The parties are advised the Court’s rulings are tentative, and that barring stipulation to the

Court’s tentative rulings, the Court will entertain oral argument at the hearing on April 25, 2011.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 22, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00085-MMA-BLM Document 12 Filed 04/22/11 Page 4 of 4