Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02632/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02632-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD W. WHATLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. ARCINIEGA; DANIEL PARAMO; G. 

STRATTON; S. DAVIS,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

AND 

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

Reginald W. Whatley (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1.) Upon filing 

the Complaint, Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1914(a), but instead filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement. The 

Court construes Plaintiff’s filing of his inmate trust account statement as a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2.)

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

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United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a 

prisoner and he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the full 

entire fee in “increments,” see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), 

regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & 

(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the 

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the . . . six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the 

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the 

Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust 

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2. See 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account activity

which shows he has a current balance of $0.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding 

that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s 

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IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 

balance of the filing fee owed must be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. INITIAL SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND

1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA 

also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by 

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, 

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as 

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, 

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are simply not 

“sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Verbal Harassment

On March 20, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that he was talking to a correctional officer 

about a mental health class when Defendant Arciniega told him to go into the holding 

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cell. (See Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff indicated that he was still speaking to the other 

correctional officer. (Id.) He contends that Arciniega told him he “did not care and to 

get into the cell.” (Id.) When Plaintiff again refused he claims Arciniega told him “you

think you tough but you not, I read your case - what you in for, it’s some foul shit.” (Id.) 

This alleged statement was said in front of other inmates according to Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Allegations of verbal harassment and abuse by themselves fail to state a claim 

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 

1997); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended, 135 F.3d 1318 

(9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and assaultive comments by prison guard not enough to 

implicate Eighth Amendment); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 

1987) (directing vulgar language at prisoner does not state constitutional claim); Burton 

v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99 (8th Cir.1986) (“[M]ere words, without more, do not 

invade a federally protected right.”). Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant placed 

him in harm’s way by identifying the offense for which he is currently incarcerated in the 

presence of his fellow inmates, see Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 

(9th Cir. 1989) (deliberately labeling a prisoner a snitch in the presence of other inmates 

may state a claim for violation of right to be protected from violence while in state 

custody); nor does he claim the comments were said in retaliation for his having 

exercised any constitutional right. See, e.g., Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (“A prisoner suing prison officials under section 1983 for retaliation must 

allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the 

retaliatory action does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving 

institutional order and discipline.”). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s harassment claims are 

subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

D. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendants Paramo, Stratton and Davis liable, in their 

supervisory capacities, for the verbal harassment experienced by Plaintiff. “Because 

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vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency 

of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiffs must 

“allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” 

to state a claim).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege sufficient factual allegations and includes no 

details as to what these Defendants personally did, or failed to do, to violate Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “demands 

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555, 570).

Plaintiff’s pleading must include sufficient “factual content which allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the [defendant is] liable for the misconduct 

alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and he must describe personal acts by each Defendant 

showing a direct causal connection to a violation of specific constitutional rights. See 

Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Causation is, of course, a required element of 

a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). 

A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates if 

the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and 

with deliberate indifference failed to prevent them. See Maxwell, 708 F.3d at 1086. Such 

liability is not sufficiently alleged here. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

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claims are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim, and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 

621 F.3d at 1004.

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). All 

payments shall be clearly identified by the name and number assigned to this action. 

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS

him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

5. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

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§ 1983” for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 5, 2016

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