Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00648/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00648-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:3601 Fair Housing Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAWSAN WARDA, and MAJID M.

TOMA,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 17cv648-WQH-JMA

ORDER

v.

SANTEE APARTMENTS LP,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Ex Parte Application for Temporary

Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3) filed by Plaintiffs

Majid M. Toma and Sawsan Warda (“Plaintiffs”) and the Motion to Dissolve the

Temporary Restraining Order and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary

Injunction (ECF No. 8) filed by Defendant Santee Apartments LP (“Defendant”).

I. Introduction

On March 30, 2017, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a Complaint (ECF

No. 1), a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), and the Ex Parte

Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(ECF No. 3). On March 30, 2017, the Court issued an order granting Plaintiffs’ motion

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4).

In their Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiffs contend that if the Court did not grant injunctive relief

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preventing Defendant from enforcing a lockout “against Plaintiffs based on a default

judgment in an Unlawful Detainer action[,]” Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm

by “be[ing] denied the opportunity . . . to reside in the community and environment of

the[ir] choice.” (ECF No. 3 at 1-2, 7). Plaintiffs contend that temporary injunctive

relief “is necessary to preserve the status quo so that this Court can make the

determination as to whether the intended denial of housing was motivated by

discrimination based on disability in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of

1988, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and related state

laws.” Id. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that there is a substantial likelihood they will prevail

on the merits because Defendant has refused to provide Plaintiffs with a reasonable

accommodation and has attempted to remove Plaintiffs from their rental unit “prior to

engaging in the interactive process as part of the reasonable accommodation request.” 

Id. Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he threatened injury to Plaintiffs far outweighs any

potential harm to Defendant” and issuing a temporary restraining order will not harm

the public interest. Id. at 7-8.

On March 30, 2017, the Court issued an order granting Plaintiffs’ request for a

temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 6). The Court found that Plaintiffs had

“identified immediate and irreparable injury which may result before Defendant can be

heard in opposition.” Id. at 2. The Court found that Plaintiffs had “made an adequate

attempt to provide Defendant with notice of this action and the Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order prior to any irreparable injury[,]” and found “that Plaintiffs have met

the requirements of Rule 65(b).” Id. The Court ordered that Defendant “is hereby

ENJOINED from taking any actions to prevent Plaintiffs’ continuous occupancy of

their rental unit, pending further order of this Court.” Id. at 2-3.

On April 4, 2017, Defendant filed Proof of Service (ECF No. 7) and the Motion

to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 8). On April 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a reply to

Defendant’s Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order and opposition. 

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(ECF No. 11). On April 6, 2017, the Court held a hearing regarding the temporary

restraining order, where counsel for both parties entered appearances and presented

argument to the Court. (ECF No. 12).

II. Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order and Opposition to

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 8)

A. Contentions of the Parties

Defendant contends that this Court is prohibited from entering temporary

injunctive relief by the Anti-Injunction Act. Defendant contends that the AntiInjunction Act “prohibits a federal district court from issuing a temporary restraining

order staying unlawful detainer proceedings in state court.” (ECF No. 8 at 11). 

Defendant contends that the injunction requested by Plaintiffs does not fall into any of

the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 11-14.

Plaintiffs contend that the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to the

Anti-Injunction Act applies to this case, so that this Court may issue the injunctive relief

requested by Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 11 at 3). Plaintiffs contend that another district court

has found that courts “can enjoin a state court eviction proceeding where certain

important housing rights are in jeopardy of being lost, such as housing subsidized under

the low-income Section 8 federal housing assistance program.” Id. (citing Sierra v. City

of New York, 528 F. Supp.2d 465, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). Plaintiffs contend they “are

recipients of subsidized housing under the federally funded Low Income Housing Tax

Credit Program (“LIHTC”)[,]” and “the potential loss of housing subsidized under the

LIHTC program is equally as devastating as losing Section 8 housing.” Id. at 4. 

Plaintiffs contend that “federal courts do have the authority to enjoin a landlord from

denying housing where the ‘necessary in aid of its jurisdiction’ exception extends to

cases where some federal injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court

from so interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to

seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide the case.” Id. at

3 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

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B. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(4) provides that “[o]n 2 days’ notice to the

party who obtained the [temporary restraining] order without notice--or on shorter

notice set by the court--the adverse party may appear and move to dissolve or modify

the order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4). Upon the filing of a motion to dissolve the

temporary restraining order, “[t]he court must . . . hear and decide the motion as

promptly as justice requires.” Id.

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction

is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008). The standard for issuing a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining

order under Rule 65 are the same. See Quiroga v. Chen, 735 F. Supp.2d 1226, 1228 (D.

Nev. 2010) (“Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard

applicable to preliminary injunctions.”). “The stringent restrictions imposed

by . . . Rule 65 on the availability of ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the

fact that our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken before

reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a

dispute.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438-39

(1974).

The Anti-Injunction Act prevents federal courts from enjoining pending state

court proceedings, unless the requested injunction falls within one of the listed

exceptions in the statute. The Anti-Injunction Act states that

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or

effectuate its judgments.

28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he anti-injunction statute goes

back almost to the beginnings of our history as a Nation[,]” and “the consistent

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understanding”of the statute “has been that its basic purpose is to prevent needless

friction between state and federal courts.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231-33

(1972) (citation omitted). “[T]he [Anti-Injunction] Act’s core message is one of respect

for state courts[; t]he Act broadly commands that those tribunals ‘shall remain free from

interference by federal courts.’” Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 306 (2011)

(quoting Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eg’rs., 398 U.S. 281, 282

(1970)).

C. Anti-Injunction Act

Courts have concluded that a request to issue an injunction staying an unlawful

detainer action in federal court is prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. See, e.g., Gray

v. Bakersfield Parks, LP, Case No. 1:16-cv-01860-LJO-JLT, 2016 WL 7229112, at *2

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016) (“Numerous district courts in California have found that the

Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal district court from issuing a TRO staying

unlawful detainer proceedings in state court.”). In this case, Defendant filed an

unlawful detainer action against Plaintiffs on January 18, 2017 in the Superior Court

of California, County of San Diego. (ECF No. 8-2 at 39-41). On January 31, 2017, the

clerk of the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, issued a default

judgment against Plaintiffs. Id. at 74-75. The default judgment states that “Santee

Apartments, LP . . . is entitled to possession of the premises located at 11059 Woodside

Avenue #1, Santee, CA 92071[.]” Id. at 75. Counsel for Defendant states in a

declaration that the state court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the default on

March 29, 2017, and that “Defendant proceeded with the Writ of Possession and

lockout occurred on March 30, 2017, prior to the initial hearing on the subject TRO and

Motion for Preliminary Injunction.” (ECF No. 8-2 at 5; Adkins Decl. at ¶¶ 18-19).

Plaintiffs contend the requested injunction is not barred by the Anti-Injunction

Act because “the state court proceeding has been terminated, and this Court directed the

injunction solely at Defendant, and not the state court, nor the prior state court

proceeding.” (ECF No. 11 at 5). However, the Anti-Injunction Act’s “mandate extends

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not only to injunctions affecting pending proceedings, but also to injunctions against

the execution or enforcement of state judgments.” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474

F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Anti-Injunction Act

bars a federal court from issuing an injunction of the writ of possession arising from a

state unlawful detainer action. See id. (“An injunction may not be used to evade the

dictates of the [Anti-Injunction] Act if the injunction effectively blocks a state court

judgment.”). The Court concludes that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits this Court

from issuing an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the default judgment and writ

of possession contained in the default judgment entered by the clerk of the Superior

Court of California, County of San Diego on January 31, 2017 (ECF No. 8-2 at 74-75)

– unless an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applies to the injunction requested by

Plaintiffs.

The Anti-Injunction Act presents “an absolute prohibition [] against enjoining

state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically

defined exceptions.” Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 286. The Court of Appeals has found

that “the exceptions to the Anti–Injunction Act must be construed narrowly and doubts

as to the propriety of a federal injunction against a state court proceeding should be

resolved in favor of permitting the state action to proceed.” Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d

730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987).

i. First Exception: Expressly Authorized by Congress

Under the first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the federal court may grant

an injunction to stay a state court proceeding “as expressly authorized by Act of

Congress[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. In Mitchum v. Foster, the Supreme Court considered

whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fell under the first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 407

U.S. at 236-37. The Supreme Court held that “a federal law need not expressly

authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to qualify as an exception.” 

Id. at 237. Rather, the test to determine whether the first exception applies “is whether

an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal

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court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court

proceeding.” Id. at 238. After determining that the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 demonstrated the statute’s purpose was to allow “the federal courts . . . to protect

the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,” the Supreme Court

concluded that the statute “f[ell] within the ‘expressly authorized’ exception of” the

Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 242-43.

However, the Fair Housing Act does not satisfy the first exception to the AntiInjunction Act when a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a state court unlawful detainer action

because the Fair Housing Act is not a federal statute that “could be given its intended

scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.” Id. at 238. See Gray, 2016 WL

7229112, at *3 (finding the first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply

because “it is not at all clear that the Fair Housing Act ‘could be given its intended

scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding’”) (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at

238). The first exception has been found to not apply to the Fair Housing Act because

the statute can be enforced in both state and federal courts. See id. at *2; 42 U.S.C. §

3613(a)(1)(A) (“An aggrieved person may commence a civil action [under the Fair

Housing Act] in an appropriate United States district court or State court”). Given that

Plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Act claim is enforceable in both state and federal court, the

Court finds that the first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is inapplicable to the

injunction requested by Plaintiffs to prevent the enforcement of the default judgment

and writ of possession contained in the default judgment entered by the clerk of the

Superior Court of California, County of San Diego on January 31, 2017 (ECF No. 8-2

at 74-75).1

 See also Sierra, 528 F. Supp.2d at 468 (“Since the Fair Housing Act is

expressly enforceable in both state and federal courts, no stay of a state action is

required to secure its intended scope, and consequently the first exception to the

1

 Plaintiffs have not identified – and the Court has been unable to locate – any precedent holding that Plaintiffs’ other federal claim brought under Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794 falls within any exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.

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Anti–Injunction Act is here inapplicable.”).

ii. Second Exception: Necessary in Aid of its Jurisdiction

Under the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, a federal court may issue

an injunction of state court proceedings when “necessary in aid of [the federal court’s]

jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Court of Appeals has stated that “the

necessary-in-aid-of-jurisdiction exception applies to in rem proceedings where the

federal court has jurisdiction over the res and the state court proceedings might interfere

with that.” Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir.

2008). This exception has also been applied in federal in rem proceedings where a

subsequent state court proceeding could interfere with previous federal court

jurisdiction over a res, and in cases involving advanced federal in personam litigation

or when a case is removed from state court. See Le v. 1st Nat. Lending Servs., No.

13–CV–01344–LHK, 2013 WL 2555556, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2013). The Supreme

Court held that this exception is satisfied, along with the related third exception to the

Anti-Injunction Act discussed below, when “some federal injunctive relief may be

necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court’s

consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court’s

flexibility and authority to decide that case.” Atl. Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295.

Plaintiffs rely on Sierra v. City of New York and two other district court decisions

to demonstrate that the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applies to this

matter, such that the Court may issue an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the

default judgment and writ of possession contained in the default judgment entered by

the clerk of the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego on January 31, 2017

(ECF No. 8-2 at 74-75). In Sierra, a New York district court stated that

[s]ome courts . . . have taken the view that the exception extends beyond in rem cases to cases that, while technically in personam, are analogous

to in rem cases, or, even more broadly, to cases where some federal

injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide the case[.]

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528 F. Supp.2d at 468. The court in Sierra highlighted two district court cases where

courts took a “broader interpretation of the” second exception to the Anti-Injunction

Act, and issued injunctions to state court housing proceedings. Id. (citing McNeill v.

N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Lattimore v. Nw. Co-op

Homes Ass’n, No. Civ.A. 90–0049 RCL, 1990 WL 10521534 (D. D.C. Mar. 26, 1990)). 

However, the Sierra court observed that in both McNeill and Lattimore, those district

courts applied the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act because “the plaintiffs

were unable to raise their federal claims in the state court proceedings they sought to

enjoin.” Id.

In McNeill, the court found the second exception did not apply because the

plaintiffs “ha[d] been terminated from the Section 8 program due to circumstances

beyond their control without adequate notice and without any opportunity to challenge

termination” in the state court proceeding. 719 F. Supp. at 256. The court found that

“[u]nless eviction proceedings are stayed long enough to adjudicate plaintiffs’ alleged

right to retroactive reinstatement in the Section 8 program, plaintiffs will be evicted

before this case can be decided.” Id. However, the court found that the plaintiffs did

not have the opportunity to challenge the termination of their Section 8 status because

the state court where the plaintiffs were being sued for eviction did “not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims for retroactive reinstatement of their Section

8 assistance; nor d[id] it have power to issue relief on those claims.” Id. at 241, 255-56. 

Because the state court eviction proceeding “d[id] not give plaintiffs an adequate forum

to challenge the termination of their Section 8 assistance[,]” the court found that “the

‘in aid of jurisdiction’ exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applie[d]” to the plaintiffs’

requested injunction – and the court issued a preliminary injunction staying the state

court proceedings. Id. at 256, 256 n.29.

Similarly, in Lattimore, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction staying a

state court eviction proceeding. 1990 WL 10521534, at *1, *7. The court found that

the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applied to the proposed injunction

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because the plaintiff was prohibited from raising the claims that she brought in federal

court “as a defense to the eviction proceeding in [the state] Superior Court because,

under the rules of the Landlord and Tenant Branch, only an equitable defense of

recoupment or set-off, or a counterclaim for a money judgment based on the payment

of rent or on expenditures claimed as credits against rent or for equitable relief related

to the premises may be claimed as a defense.” Id. at *4. The court concluded that the

second exception applied and issued a preliminary injunction staying the state court

eviction proceeding because it found that the state court “was not able to consider what

seems to be the heart of the plaintiff’s case.” Id. at *5, *7. 

By contrast, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that they were unable to

present any of their claims in the state court unlawful detainer action. In particular,

Plaintiffs were permitted to bring their Fair Housing Act claim in the state court

unlawful detainer action as an affirmative defense. See Gray, 2016 WL 7229112, at *3

(“The Fair Housing Act can be raised as a defense in a California unlawful detainer

action”); Thomas v. Hous. Auth of the Cty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 04–6970 MMM

(RCx), 2005 WL 6136432, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2005) (raising Fair Housing Act

affirmative defense to California state court unlawful detainer action); Sierra, 528 F.

Supp.2d at 468 (finding the plaintiff could raise her “Fair Housing Act [claim] as an

affirmative defense to the eviction proceeding” under New York law). Unlike the

plaintiffs in McNeill and Lattimore, Plaintiffs were not “unable to raise their federal

claims in the state court proceedings they s[eek] to enjoin[.]” Sierra, 528 F. Supp.2d

at 468. The Court finds that the second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act does not

apply to the injunction requested by Plaintiffs to prevent the enforcement of the default

judgment and writ of possession contained in the default judgment entered by the clerk

of the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego on January 31, 2017 (ECF

No. 8-2 at 74-75). See also Gray, 2016 WL 7229112, at *3 (finding that the second

“exception does not apply to stay unlawful detainer actions, especially previously filed

state court actions” and that the “exception is inapplicable here, where Plaintiff seeks

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to enjoin a previously filed state court unlawful detainer action.”); Le, 2013 WL

2555556, at *2 (“[C]ourts have repeatedly found that” the second “exception does not

apply to stay unlawful detainer actions, especially previously filed state court actions.”).

iii. Third Exception: Protect the Federal Court’s Judgments

Under the third exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, “a federal court [may]

enjoin a state proceeding only in rare cases, when necessary to ‘protect or effectuate

[the federal court’s] judgments.’” Smith, 564 U.S. at 302 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283). 

The third exception, or the ‘relitigation’ exception, “authorizes an injunction to prevent

state litigation of a claim or issue that previously was presented to and decided by the

federal court.” Id. at 306 (citation and quotation marks omitted). This exception is

inapplicable to the circumstances of this case because this Court has not rendered any

judgment. See Le, 2013 WL 2555556, at *2 (finding the third exception did not apply

to a request to stay a state court unlawful detainer proceedings because the federal

“[c]ourt has yet to reach any judgment in this case.”). As there is no other “former

federal adjudication” of Plaintiff’s claims, the third ‘relitigation’ exception is

inapplicable to the injunction requested by Plaintiffs to prevent the enforcement of the

default judgment and writ of possession contained in the default judgment entered by

the clerk of the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego on January 31, 2017

(ECF No. 8-2 at 74-75). Smith, 564 U.S. at 318.

IV. Conclusion

The Court concludes that none of the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act

apply to the injunction requested by Plaintiffs in their Ex Parte Application for

Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3) and

their reply to Defendant’s Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order and

opposition (ECF No. 11). Therefore, the Court is prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act

from issuing an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the default judgment and writ

of possession contained in the default judgment entered by the clerk of the Superior

Court of California, County of San Diego on January 31, 2017 (ECF No. 8-2 at 74-75).

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4),

Defendant’s Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 8) is

granted. The temporary restraining order entered by this Court on March 30, 2017

(ECF No. 6) is hereby DISSOLVED.

DATED: April 11, 2017

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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