Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01204/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01204-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1All facts are taken from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC").

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHELLY NEWTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

P. ARPAIA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-1204 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 18]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants P. Arpaia, B. Marker, and C. Costigan's

Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 18]. Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties

in the papers submitted to the Court, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a

hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART P. Arpaia, B. Marker, and C.

Costigan's Motion to Dismiss.. 

BACKGROUND

Factual Background.1

1. Parties.

Plaintiff Shelly Newton ("Newton" or "Plaintiff") is an adult female African American who currently

resides in Contra Costa County, California. FAC at ¶ 3.

Defendants P. Arpaia ("Arpaia"), B. Marker ("Marker"), and C. Costigan ("Costigan") are

members of the California Highway Patrol ("CHP"), who, during the relevant period, were acting under

color of state law as peace officers within the State of California. Id. ¶ 4. 

2. Allegations.

On or about July 26, 2003, CHP Officers Arpaia and Marker detained Plaintiff on Highway 24, in

Contra Costa County, for an alleged traffic violation. Id. ¶ 9. Officers Arpaia and Marker issued Plaintiff a

citation and notice to appear and released Plaintiff from custody. Id. At the time of release, Arpaia and

Case 4:05-cv-01204-SBA Document 29 Filed 10/14/05 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Marker informed Plaintiffthat her license was suspended for an out-of-state vehicle code violation. Id. ¶ 10.

Plaintiff denied she was ever in the state in question. Id.

Officers Arpaia and Marker advised Plaintiff that she could not drive her vehicle away fromthe scene

because her license was suspended. Id. ¶ 11. They then called a tow truck for the purpose of towing Plaintiff's

vehicle to a storage facility. Id. They subsequently advised Plaintiff that she could use the shoulder of the

highway to exit the highway on foot, but claimed that they were required to escort pedestrians off of the

highway and to restrain them in handcuffs. Id. ¶ 12. 

When Plaintiff objected to being handcuffed, Officers Arpaia and Marker used force to handcuff

Plaintiff and placed her in the rear of their patrol vehicle. Id. ¶ 13. A hood was also placed over Plaintiff's

head. Id.¶ 14. Officers Arpaia and Marker then exited Highway 24 and were joined by CHP Officer

Costigan. Id. Officers Arapia and Marker then drove Plaintiff, who remained handcuffed in the back of the

vehicle, to the Martinez Detention Facility. Id. 

At the Martinez Detention Facility, Plaintiff was handcuffed to a metal bench in the receiving bay. Id.

Sheriff's Deputies StevenBrinkley("Brinkley"), Michelle Day ("Day"), and Kellie Martinez ("Martinez") found

Plaintiff handcuffed to the metal bench and attempted to pull her away from the bench while she was still

handcuffed to it. Id. ¶ 15. Deputies Brinkley, Day, and Martinez then took Plaintiff into a room, forced her

to lie face down on the floor, and removed Plaintiff'sshoes and jewelry. Id. ¶ 16. As a result of her detention,

Plaintiff suffered multiple injuries. Id. ¶ 17. 

B. Procedural Background.

On July 21, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Contra Costa County (referred to herein as the

"July 2004 Complaint"). The July 2004 Complaint alleged the following causes of action: (1) failure to train;

(2) "custom, usage, and policy"violations of42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) failure to supervise;(4) assault and battery;

and (5) excessive force. In the July 2004 Complaint, Plaintiff sought compensatory and special damages.

Plaintiff also requested "leave to amend th[e] complaint when the identity and capacity ofthe unidentified Sheriff

Deputies is ascertained, for leave to name them as parties Defendants herein, and leave to seek punitive

damages against them, jointly and severally." 

Case 4:05-cv-01204-SBA Document 29 Filed 10/14/05 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

On March 24, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint (referred to herein as the "March 2005 Complaint")

against defendants Arpaia, Marker, Costigan, Brinkley, Day and Martinez. The March 2005 Complaint

alleged the followingcauses ofaction:(1) violations ofthe Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (brought against

all defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) "failure to intercede" (brought againstCostigan only pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (3) violations of "California Civil Code Section 51-151.7" (brought against all

defendants); (4) assault and battery (brought against all defendants); (5) false arrest (brought against Arpaia

and Marker only); and (6) false imprisonment (brought against Arpaia and Marker only). 

On April 20, 2005, Arpaia, Marker, and Costigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the March 2005

Complaint. On April 25, 2005, Martinez, Brinkley, and Day filed a Motion to Dismiss the March 2005

Complaint.

On June 28, 2005, the Court issued an Order granting Arpaia, Marker and Costigan's Motion to

Dismiss and granting Martinez, Brinkley, and Day's Motion to Dismiss. The portion of Plaintiff's first cause of

action that referred to alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment were dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff'sthird causes ofactionagainst Brinkley, Day, and Martinezwas dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's

fourth cause of action against all ofthe defendantswas also dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, Plaintiff's

fifth and sixth causes of action against Arpaia and Marker were dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff was

granted leave to file an amended complaint.

On July 27, 2005, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint alleges

the following causes of action: (1) violationof the Fourth Amendment brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(against Arpaia and Marker); (2) "failure to intercede" brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against

Costigan); and (3) "excess force violation of the Fourth Amendment" brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(against Brinkley, Day, and Martinez). 

On August 4, 2005, Martinez, Brinkley, and Day filed their answer to the First Amended Complaint.

Also on August 4, 2005, Arpaia, Marker, and Costigan filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.

On September 23, 2005, Plaintiff dismissed with prejudice the July 2004 Complaint against Contra

Costa County. On September 28, 2005, Plaintiff dismissed Brinkley, Day, and Martinez from the action

Case 4:05-cv-01204-SBA Document 29 Filed 10/14/05 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

pursuant to settlement. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted only if it

appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For purposes ofsuch a motion,

the complaint is construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded factual allegations

are taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Everest & Jennings, Inc. v. American

Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). Allreasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of

the plaintiff. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997).

The court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory allegations cast in the form

of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); See Miranda

v. Clark County, Nev., 279 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]onclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."); Sprewell v. Golden

State Warriors, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.

1988) ("[C]onclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim.").

When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, "leave to amend should be granted unless

the court determines that the allegationofother facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly

cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.

1986). The Court should consider factors such as "the presence or absence ofundue delay, bad faith, dilatory

motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party

and futility ofthe proposed amendment." Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.

1989). Of these factors, prejudice to the opposing party is the most important. See Jackson v. Bank of

Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401

U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971)). Leave to amend is properly denied "where the amendment would be futile."

Case 4:05-cv-01204-SBA Document 29 Filed 10/14/05 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment is mentioned in paragraph 6 and paragraph 26.

5

DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In their Motion to Dismiss, Arpaia, Marker, and Costigan (collectively, "Defendants") first move to

dismiss Plaintiff's first cause of action on the grounds that Plaintiff has alleged only a Fourth, and not a

Fourteenth, Amendment violation. This issue was previously addressed in the Court's June 28, 2005 Order.

Specifically, the Court reviewed the factual allegations in Plaintiff's complaint and concluded that Plaintiff's 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim was most properly characterized as a claim asserting wrongful conduct during an arrest

or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, since Plaintiff conceded that she was not asserting

violations of either the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the

portion of Plaintiff's first cause of action referring to the Fourteenth Amendment was dismissed. Contrary to

Defendants' assertions, the allegations supporting the first cause of action in the First Amended Complaint do

not actually refer to the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, Plaintiff concedes, in her opposition, that she is not

pursuing such a claim against any of the remaining Defendants. However, Defendants are correct that certain

other paragraphs2in the First Amended Complaint erroneously refer to alleged Fourteenth Amendment

violations. Accordingly, to address the ambiguity created by Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss the first cause of action is GRANTED IN PART and all references to the Fourteenth

Amendment in the First Amended Complaint are STRICKEN. 

B. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for "Failure to Intercede."

Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of action, which is brought against Costigan

pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for an alleged failure to intercede on Plaintiff's behalf during the allegedly unlawful

arrest and purported use of excessive force. Defendants' Motion is premised on the fact that Plaintiff admits,

in her First Amended Complaint, that Costigan was not initially present atthe scene when Plaintiff was placed

under arrest. In response, Plaintiff argues that the facts in the First Amended Complaint, when viewed in the

light most favorable to her, are sufficient to state a claim against Costigan because Costigan was not only

Case 4:05-cv-01204-SBA Document 29 Filed 10/14/05 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3For example, in Cunningham, the case had proceeded to summary judgment and thus the court was

able to determine, based on the undisputed facts, that the defendant officers had no "realistic opportunity" to

intercede. Id. at 1290; see also Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1433 (10th Cir. 1984)

("Plaintiffs presented evidence suggestingthatDunegan could have prevented orstopped Officer Wertz' assault

on [the plaintiff] . . . [t]hus the trial court properly denied Dunegan's motion for a directed verdict."); Bruner

v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[P]laintiff was entitled to have his case against defendants

. . . submitted to the jury upon his having offered testimony that he was beaten by unknown officers in their

presence."). 

6

"constructively present at the scene via the CHP radio dispatch," but also "actually met with Defendants Arpaia

ad [sic] Marker at or near the Alhambra off ramp from highway 24 while they [were] en route" with Plaintiff.

Defendants are correct that there "is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983." Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, Costigan can only be held liable for Arpaia and Marker's

alleged constitutional violations under Plaintiff's second cause of action if he "participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Id. Further, in a failure to intercede

claim, such liability can attach only if Costigan actually had an opportunity to intercede. Cunningham v.

Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is also correct, however, that, when considering

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, this Court is required to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff

and to take all properly pleaded factual allegations as true. See Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 421 (1969). The Court

is also required to resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. Jacobson, 105 F.3d at 1296.

Defendants' argument therefore suffers from several fatal defects. First, Defendants' argument requires the

Court to construe the facts in the light most favorable to Defendants and to conclude, as a matter of law, that

Costigan could not have had an opportunity to intervene merely because he was initially participating in the

arrest through radio dispatch. This, however, the Court cannot do at the present stage in the litigation and

Defendants have not provided the Court with any authorities that suggest otherwise.3 Second, Defendants

focus solely on Plaintiff's claim for excessive force, and therefore overlook the fact that Plaintiff has also stated

a more basic "unreasonable search and seizure"Fourth Amendment claim relating to her arrest. Since Plaintiff

has alleged thatCostiganwas, in fact, physically present while Plaintiff was being held in Arpaia and Marker's

police vehicle, the mere fact that Costigan was initially corresponding with Arpaia and Marker through the

Case 4:05-cv-01204-SBA Document 29 Filed 10/14/05 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4This allegation also makes Defendants' argument that Plaintiff has not established causation

unpersuasive. Plaintiff has clearly alleged that Costigan directly participated in the purportedly unlawful "seizure

of her person" and that she suffered mental anguish as a result. See FAC at ¶ 27. 

7

radio is irrelevant.4 Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of action is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants Arpaia, Marker, and Costigan's Motion to Dismiss

[Docket No. 18] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants' Motion relating to

Plaintiff'sfirst cause of action is GRANTED IN PART and Plaintiff'sreferences to the Fourteenth Amendment

in paragraphs 6 and 26 of the First Amended Complaint are STRICKEN. Defendants' request to dismiss

Plaintiff's second cause of action is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Case Management Conference, currently scheduled for

October18, 2005 at 1:00 p.m. is VACATED. The parties shall appear for a telephonic Case Management

Conference onWednesday, November 16, 2005 at 3:15 p.m. The parties shall meet and conferpriorto

the conference and shall prepare a joint Case Management Conference Statement which shall be filed no later

than ten (10) days prior to the Case Management Conference. Plaintiff shall be responsible for filing the

statement as well as for arranging the conference call. All parties shall be on the line and shall call (510) 637-

3559 at the above indicated date and time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: 10/14/05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-01204-SBA Document 29 Filed 10/14/05 Page 7 of 7