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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2320

VERNARD CROCKETT,

Petitioner-Appellant.

v.

KIM BUTLER,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:13-cv-09231—Amy St. Eve, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 17, 2015

Before POSNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. In 2004, sixteen-year-old 

Jazmine Robinson was shot and killed in her Chicago home. 

Her boyfriend, petitioner Vernard Crockett, was convicted of 

first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery for his 

role in her death. He appealed, asserting that the evidence 

did not support his attempted armed robbery conviction and 

that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment had been violated. He prevailed on the first argument. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed his attempted 

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armed robbery conviction and ordered re-sentencing on the 

murder conviction.

After re-sentencing, Crockett filed a second appeal—this 

time challenging his first-degree murder conviction. He argued that without the conviction for attempted armed robbery, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of murder. He also renewed his Confrontation Clause claim. The 

Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Crockett’s murder conviction. After the Supreme Court of Illinois denied further review, Crockett filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief, 

finding that Crockett had procedurally defaulted both of his 

claims. Crockett v. Harrington, No. 13 C 9231, 2014 WL 

2535116 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2014). We agree, so we affirm denial of his petition.

I. Background

A. Crockett’s Trial

On January 20, 2004, sixteen-year-old Jazmine Robinson 

was shot and killed in the basement of her home in Chicago. 

An anonymous call led investigators to Crockett and his acquaintance Ronald Lamar. Lamar ultimately pled guilty but 

refused to testify against Crockett, who went to trial on 

charges of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery.

The prosecution relied heavily on evidence of conversations Crockett had with the police soon after Robinson’s 

murder. According to Detective Brian Johnson, Crockett offered police an alibi when they first interviewed him, on 

January 23, 2004. He claimed he had been at home playing 

video games on the afternoon of the murder. The police then 

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No. 14-2320 3

released Crockett from custody. Soon afterward, though, Detective Johnson spoke with Lamar, and that led him to order 

that Crockett be arrested. Crockett bases his Confrontation 

Clause claim on Detective Johnson’s testimony about his 

next conversation with Crockett after bringing him in the 

second time:

Q And during that conversation tell us 

what you said to the Defendant and 

what he said to you.

A At that point I told the Defendant that, 

you know, after speaking with Mr. Lamar that we believe that he had been 

present and actually killed [Jazmine] 

Robinson on the date in question. 

Crockett again denied involvement, but this time he provided a different alibi: he had been with his friends Tristan 

Campbell and Nicholas Brown when Robinson was murdered. As false alibis go, this was surely one of the worst ever. Detective Johnson quickly learned that both Campbell 

and Brown had actually been in police custody on the afternoon in question.

Assistant State’s Attorney Tim Carter also testified at trial. Carter interviewed Crockett on the evening of January 23, 

2004 and confronted him with his alibi statements. Crockett 

responded that he wanted “to be truthful” and then admitted he had been involved in the events leading up to Robinson’s death. According to Carter, Crockett said that Lamar 

had approached him the Sunday before the murder expressing his desire to “hit a lick”—that is, to rob someone. Crockett told Lamar that he knew Robinson was “holding money 

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for some guys” and offered to “set it up.” Crockett also said 

that he knew Robinson “wouldn’t go along with the robbery 

if she wasn’t threatened with a gun.” He knew Lamar would 

have one, though he said he did not want Lamar to shoot 

Robinson.

Carter further testified that Crockett admitted going to 

Robinson’s house with Lamar on January 20, 2004 on the 

pretense of looking at the results of her pregnancy test. Robinson let them in, brought them to the basement, and offered 

Crockett a glass of rum, which he left atop a freezer. Crockett 

asked Robinson to bring down a CD to play some music. He 

then signaled Lamar to go ahead with the robbery.

Once Robinson turned the music up, Lamar pulled out 

his gun and demanded money. Robinson showed no signs of 

complying. Lamar shot her in the back. Crockett admitted

fleeing when he heard the first shot. He said that he heard 

several more shots as he ran. 

That was the substance of Crockett’s first confession, according to prosecutor Carter. Carter also testified that he interviewed Crockett again later the same night, accompanied 

by other detectives. Crockett “basically told me the same 

thing” but “went into somewhat more detail about the planning of it and what happened and said some things a little 

bit differently.” Finally, Carter testified that the next day, 

January 24, 2004, he interviewed Crockett again and that he 

related “basically the same facts.”

Crockett testified in his own defense and told a very different story. According to Crockett, on January 20, 2004, he 

had planned to visit Robinson alone to see the results of her 

pregnancy test. He met Lamar on the way and asked him to 

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come too. Crockett confirmed that Robinson had given him 

the glass of rum and played music, but he testified that Lamar had pulled out a gun unexpectedly. Crockett testified 

that both he and Robinson had asked Lamar to put the gun 

away, and that he and Lamar had argued heatedly about the 

weapon. According to Crockett, Robinson then pushed Lamar from behind, and Lamar then shoved Robinson to the 

ground and shot her. Crockett admitted fleeing at that point. 

He admitted he did not report the shooting to the police, 

claiming he was afraid for his and his loved ones’ safety. 

Crockett also denied making the statements prosecutor 

Carter described, testifying that he had told Carter “the story 

that I just told you all.”

The jury found Crockett guilty of both first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery. He was sentenced to forty-two years for the murder and a consecutive term of ten 

years for attempted armed robbery.

B. First Appeal

On direct appeal, Crockett argued that the State had 

failed to establish the corpus delicti of attempted armed robbery. Under the corpus delicti doctrine, the state must prove 

with evidence other than the defendant’s confession that the 

crime was actually committed. People v. Lara, 983 N.E.2d 959, 

964 (Ill. 2012). Crockett argued that his conviction ran afoul 

of the corpus delicti rule because the only evidence of an attempted armed robbery was his own confession. As a corollary, he argued that the invalid robbery conviction had affected his sentence on the murder conviction, and he requested re-sentencing. Finally, he argued that Detective 

Johnson’s testimony about his conversation with Lamar that 

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led the police back to Crockett violated the Confrontation 

Clause.

The Illinois Appellate Court agreed with the first argument, holding that no independent evidence corroborated 

Crockett’s confession that an attempted armed robbery had 

occurred. Because the court could not be certain that the attempted armed robbery conviction had not influenced the 

murder sentence, it also ordered re-sentencing on the murder conviction, as Crockett had requested. The court rejected 

the Confrontation Clause claim, however, holding that Detective Johnson’s testimony had simply described police investigatory procedure and was not testimonial in nature. 

Crockett did not file a petition for leave to appeal the Illinois 

Appellate Court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Illinois.

C. Second Appeal

Crockett again received a forty-two-year sentence for the 

first-degree murder conviction and again appealed. He renewed the Confrontation Clause claim from his first appeal, 

but he also raised an entirely new issue: that the earlier decision setting aside his attempted armed robbery conviction 

also meant there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 

first-degree murder conviction.

To explain, a defendant commits first-degree murder under Illinois law if he kills an individual without lawful justification and: (1) “intends to kill or do great bodily 

harm . . . or knows that such acts will cause death”; (2) 

“knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or 

great bodily harm”; or (3) “is attempting or committing a 

forcible felony other than second degree murder.” 720 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/9-1(a). Crockett argued that without the atCase: 14-2320 Document: 35 Filed: 11/17/2015 Pages: 14
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tempted armed robbery conviction, a conviction of felony 

murder under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-1(a)(3) could no longer 

stand. He also argued that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to sustain a conviction on either of the other two theories.

In the second appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held 

that Crockett had waived any challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting his first-degree murder conviction 

by failing to raise it during his first appeal. In Illinois, waiver 

“will be found where a defendant fails to raise an issue in his 

initial appeal and attempts to raise it for the first time in his 

second appeal.” People v. Crockett, No. 1-10-3685, 2012 WL 

6953467, at *4 (Ill. App. Sept. 28, 2012), citing People v. Young, 

504 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ill. App. 1987). The state court found 

that Crockett’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge “was a 

logical corollary to his challenge to the attempted armed 

robbery conviction,” making it “practicable and logical” to 

raise the two together. Id.

The court held further that Crockett’s sufficiency challenge failed on the merits because the evidence supported a 

finding of guilt by accountability. In Illinois, accountability 

“is established where the State proves beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant either shared the criminal intent of 

the principal or there was a common criminal design.” 

Crockett, 2012 WL 6953467, at *6, citing People v. Perez, 725 

N.E.2d 1258, 1264–65 (Ill. 2000). According to the Illinois 

Appellate Court, the “evidence need only prove that the defendant had the specific intent to promote or facilitate a 

crime, which need not be the actual crime for which he was 

charged.” Id. at *7 (emphasis in original), citing People v. 

Miscichowski, 493 N.E.2d 135, 141 (Ill. App. 1986). Applying 

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that standard and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the state court held that the evidence showed that Crockett intended to promote or facilitate 

armed robbery when he knowingly aided Lamar in planning 

and committing the robbery, making him “accountable under the common design rule for the victim’s murder.” Id. at 

*8.

As for the Confrontation Clause claim, the Illinois Appellate Court noted that it had rejected the same claim in the 

first appeal, so the trial court had lacked the authority to 

consider it on remand. Id. at *8. The appellate court then rejected the claim based on the law of the case. Id. In the second appeal, Crockett petitioned for leave to appeal to the 

Supreme Court of Illinois, but that court denied his petition.

D. Habeas Corpus Proceedings

Crockett then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief, 

concluding that Crockett had procedurally defaulted both 

claims and that he had not shown that actual innocence excused the default. We granted a certificate of appealability 

on the merits of both claims, as well as the preliminary questions of procedural default. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 

II. Analysis

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus. Peterson v. Douma, 751 F.3d 524, 529 

(7th Cir. 2014). Because Crockett is in state custody, the case 

is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 

Under AEDPA, we review deferentially the decision of the 

last state court to address Crockett’s claims on the merits. 

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Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2012). A federal 

court may grant habeas corpus relief on a claim only if the 

state court’s adjudication on the merits of the claim was 

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The district court rejected both of Crockett’s claims on 

procedural grounds, however, so before we might turn to 

their merits, we must resolve the threshold questions, 

whether procedural defaults bar us from reaching those 

claims at all. “Whether a party has procedurally defaulted 

his claim is a question of law that we review de novo.” 

Malone v. Walls, 538 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2008).

A. Confrontation Clause 

The district court rejected Crockett’s Confrontation 

Clause claim because he failed to present it for one full 

round of state court review. Before seeking federal habeas 

relief, state prisoners must “give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking 

one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); 

see also Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2004) 

(petitioner “must raise the issue at each and every level in 

the state court system, including levels at which review is 

discretionary rather than mandatory”). 

During his first appeal, Crockett presented his Confrontation Clause claim to the Illinois Appellate Court but did 

not seek review by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Under 

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O’Sullivan, that means Crockett has procedurally defaulted 

this claim. He also has not shown “cause and prejudice” or 

actual innocence to excuse his default. See Spreitzer v. 

Schomig, 219 F.3d 639, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing exceptions to procedural default).1

Crockett’s second appeal could not cure his earlier default, even though he petitioned for leave to appeal to the 

Supreme Court of Illinois in the second appeal. When faced 

with the same Confrontation Clause claim a second time, the 

Illinois Appellate Court rejected it based not on the merits 

but on the law of the case doctrine: a previous decision on 

the merits by an appellate court is final and conclusive in a 

second appeal in the same case. People v. McNair, 486 N.E.2d 

941, 943 (Ill. App. 1985). Accordingly, the Supreme Court of 

Illinois never had the chance to address the Confrontation 

Clause claim on the merits. The district court correctly found 

procedural default, and we also cannot reach the merits of 

this claim.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Crockett’s other claim is that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his murder conviction. He argues that the 

Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably applied Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979), which teaches that an applicant can win habeas corpus relief under § 2254 if “upon the 

record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact 

could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

 1 In the district court, Crockett argued that he was actually innocent, 

but he has not pressed that argument here.

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Again, Crockett faces a procedural hurdle. The Illinois 

Appellate Court found that he had waived his sufficiency-ofthe-evidence challenge to his murder conviction by failing to 

raise it in his first appeal. In federal habeas cases under 

§ 2254, federal courts may not address the merits of a claim 

that the state court resolved on “a state law ground that is 

both independent of the federal question and adequate to 

support the judgment.” Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 

591 (7th Cir. 2010). This doctrine stems from equitable considerations of federalism and comity, and it protects the 

states’ interests in correcting their own courts’ mistakes. 

Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 268 (7th Cir. 2014). Crockett 

challenges only the adequacy of the asserted state law 

ground in this case. Whether a state procedural ruling is 

“adequate” is a question of federal law. Lee v. Kemna, 534 

U.S. 362, 375 (2002), quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 

422 (1965).

In assessing the adequacy of a state procedural ruling, 

federal courts do not review the merits of the state court’s 

application of its own procedural rules. See Lee v. Foster, 750 

F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, we ask whether the rule 

invoked was “firmly established and regularly followed.” 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009), quoting Lee v. Kemna, 

534 U.S. at 376. If so, federal review is barred, absent a showing of either cause and prejudice or actual innocence, and 

neither has been shown here. If a rule has been applied “infrequently, unexpectedly, or freakishly,” however, it may not 

be adequate, for “the lack of notice and consistency may 

show that the state is discriminating against the federal 

rights asserted.” Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910 F.2d 1379, 1383 

(7th Cir. 1990).

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The Illinois Appellate Court held that Crockett had 

waived his Jackson challenge to the sufficiency of the murder 

evidence because he could have presented it in his first appeal but did not. The state calls this the “First Appeal Rule.” 

See, e.g., Village of Ringwood v. Foster, 986 N.E.2d 662, 671 (Ill. 

App. 2013); People v. Young, 504 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ill. App. 

1987).

Crockett acknowledges that the First Appeal Rule is 

“firmly established and regularly followed in Illinois.” He 

argues, however, that its application in his case was inappropriate and unexpected because he could not have raised 

his Jackson challenge in his first appeal. Cf. Village of Ringwood, 986 N.E.2d at 671 (where “a question was open to consideration in a prior appeal and it could have been presented 

but was not, the question will be deemed to be waived”) (emphasis added), quoting Turner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 

380 N.E.2d 477, 481 (Ill. App. 1978). This is so, Crockett argues, because his Jackson challenge depended on his first obtaining a reversal of his attempted armed robbery conviction.

Reversal of the attempted armed robbery conviction was 

a needed foundation for the Jackson challenge to the murder 

conviction, but the Illinois court did not act unfairly by finding that Crockett still could have raised both challenges in 

the same appeal. Parties frequently raise contingent arguments simultaneously. In fact, Crockett actually raised a different argument in his first appeal that, like his new Jackson

challenge, hinged on a favorable outcome to his corpus delicti

challenge to his attempted armed robbery conviction. He argued—successfully—that if the appellate court reversed his 

attempted armed robbery conviction, it should also remand 

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No. 14-2320 13

the case for re-sentencing on the remaining murder conviction to ensure the improper robbery conviction did not influence the original sentence. There is no reason he could not 

have done the same with the contingent Jackson challenge he 

raised in the second appeal. The Illinois Appellate Court’s 

application of the First Appeal Rule to his case therefore was 

not “unexpected” or “freakish.” As an adequate and independent state law ground for the court’s decision, it bars 

federal review of the merits of Crockett’s Jackson challenge.

Even if Crockett could somehow overcome that bar, his 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim would still fail on the merits. Federal habeas corpus relief is not available to correct 

perceived errors of state law. Bates v. McCaughtry, 934 F.2d 

99, 102 (7th Cir. 1991), quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 

(1984). A claim that the state court “misunderstood the substantive requirements of state law,” for example, does not 

present a true Jackson challenge and is not cognizable under 

§ 2254. Bates, 934 F.2d at 102; see also Curtis v. Montgomery, 

552 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting Jackson challenge 

where petitioner was “impermissibly attempting to use a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to press his preferred interpretation of Illinois law”). 

Though Crockett argues otherwise, his Jackson challenge 

is really a claim that the Illinois court misinterpreted state 

law. In his view, the Illinois accountability statute, 720 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/5-2, requires the State to prove that he and 

Lamar shared a common design to commit a murder if he is 

to be held accountable for the murder. The Illinois Appellate 

Court rejected that claim as a matter of state law, holding 

that the theory of accountability requires only that the evidence prove the defendant had the specific intent to promote 

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or facilitate “a crime, which need not be the actual crime for 

which he was charged.” Crockett, 2012 WL 6953467, at *7 

(emphasis in original). Whether the Illinois Appellate Court 

is correct or not in its interpretation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 

5/5-2, is “beyond the reach of a federal court on collateral attack.” Bates, 934 F.2d at 103. 

Accordingly, the district court correctly found that 

Crockett procedurally defaulted his claims. Crockett’s Jackson

claim also fails on the merits because at its core it challenges 

the state court’s interpretation of Illinois law, which is not 

cognizable under § 2254. 

AFFIRMED.

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