Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01255/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01255-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert D. Maguire, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Cathleen A. Coltrell, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01255-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants Cathleen Coltrell and John Carmichael have filed a counterclaim for 

civil extortion against Plaintiff Robert Maguire, alleging violations of A.R.S. § 13-

1804(6). Doc. 38 at 10. Plaintiff moves to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that it is barred by the statute of limitations. Doc. 34. The 

motion is fully briefed and no party seeks oral argument. The Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background. 

 Defendants assert the following facts in their answer to Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint. Doc. 38. In January 2006, Plaintiff and Coltrell began living together at a 

house Coltrell owned (the “Justine House”). Id. at 1. Plaintiff immediately began to pay 

Coltrell $1,500 per month, which Coltrell used in part to retire the mortgage that 

encumbered the house. Id. Plaintiff and Coltrell agreed to a “reasonable cost-sharing 

aspect to the arrangement when [Plaintiff] moved into the Justine House.” Id. at 2. 

 In 2008, Plaintiff suffered the failure of a business, and certain personal property 

was recorded in Coltrell’s name. Id. In 2009, Coltrell purchased another property (the 

“Milton House”) where both Plaintiff and Coltrell “took an active part” of negotiations 

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and renovation oversight. Id. While attempting to obtain financing to purchase the 

Milton House, a third party’s legal action against Plaintiff’s ex-wife damaged Plaintiff’s 

credit score and Coltrell agreed to purchase the Milton House solely in her name. Id. 

Plaintiff contributed financially to the purchase of the Milton House. Id. at 3. Plaintiff 

claims he provided $104,000 toward the $160,000 down payment. Id. In July of 2009, 

Plaintiff and Coltrell moved into the Milton House following its renovation. Id. 

 In February of 2013, while Plaintiff was out of the country, Coltrell notified him 

by telephone that she had met another man, Defendant John Carmichael, and that she 

intended to pursue a relationship with him. Id. Following Plaintiff’s return to Arizona, 

Coltrell asked Plaintiff to move out of the Milton House. Id. Shortly after Plaintiff 

moved out, Coltrell and Carmichael were married. Id.

 On March 10, 2013, Coltrell received an email from Plaintiff in which she claims 

he accepted her settlement offer of $25,000 to resolve all of his claims and right to 

payment. Id. at 7, 17. Coltrell paid Plaintiff the $25,000. Id. at 7. 

 On April 11, 2013, Coltrell received another email from Plaintiff (the “April 2013 

email”) demanding further payment of $50,987.86. Id. at 10, 19. The April 2013 email 

threatened to distribute personal and private information about Coltrell unless she paid 

the demand by April 29, 2013. Id. In response, Coltrell’s attorney sent Plaintiff a letter 

informing him that Coltrell was represented by counsel and instructing him not to contact 

her directly again. Doc. 40 at 24. 

 Coltrell sold the Justine House for $412,000 in June of 2013, and the Milton 

House for $800,000 in September of 2013. Doc. 38 at 4-5. In December of 2013, 

Plaintiff hired attorney David Carmichael on the recommendation of another attorney. 

Doc. 41-1 at 2. On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff’s attorney sent a demand letter directly to 

Coltrell. Doc. 40 at 4. The letter requested an accounting of assets and expressed hope 

that the matter could be settled without litigation. Id. at 18. 

 On May 7, 2014, Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants in Maricopa 

County Superior Court. Doc. 1. Defendants removed the action to this Court and filed 

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their answer and counterclaims. Id.; Doc. 4. Plaintiff has amended his complaint once. 

Doc. 33. Defendants have amended their answers and counterclaims twice. Docs. 7, 38. 

II. Legal Standard. 

“[T]he statute of limitations defense . . . may be raised by a motion to dismiss . . . 

[i]f the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon v. Dean 

Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Graham v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 

821 (9th Cir. 1979)). The “‘complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond 

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the 

claim.’” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 

Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

III. Analysis. 

 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ civil extortion counterclaim was filed beyond the 

one-year statute of limitations in A.R.S. § 12-541(5). Doc. 34. Defendants do not 

dispute that a one-year limitation period applies. See Doc. 40. The April email, which 

serves as the basis of Defendants’ civil extortion claim, was sent on April 11, 2013. 

Doc. 38 at 10. Defendants first filed their counterclaim for civil extortion more than 14 

months later on June 23, 2014. Doc. 4. 

 Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff’s violation of 

A.R.S. § 13-1804 was a continuing violation that should toll the statute of limitations, and 

(2) the Court must treat Defendants’ extortion claim as a recoupment defense that is not 

subject to the statute of limitations. See Doc. 40. These arguments are not persuasive. 

 First, Plaintiff’s actions do not support a continuing violation. The theory of 

continuing violations is an equitable doctrine that “prevent[s] a defendant from using its 

earlier conduct to avoid liability for later illegal conduct of the same sort.” O'Loghlin v. 

Cnty. of Orange, 229 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000). To establish a continuing violation, 

the asserting party must show a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within 

the limitations period. Green v. L.A. Cnty. Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1480 

(9th Cir. 1989). A “continuing violation” is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not 

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by continual ill effects from an original violation. Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 

(9th Cir. 1981). Defendants’ claim falls short of this standard. 

 Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s continuing acts of extortion are demonstrated by 

the following facts: (1) Plaintiff hired David Carmichael, a cousin of John Carmichael, as 

his attorney; (2) David Carmichael sent a demand letter to Coltrell on her anniversary; 

(3) David Carmichael showed a private photograph to Coltrell at her deposition in order 

to demonstrate Plaintiff’s knowledge of, and access to, her personal life; and (4) David 

Carmichael sent a letter directly to Coltrell when she was represented by counsel, and the 

letter made reference to the “intrusive nature of litigation.” Doc. 40 at 3-4. These 

litigation-related events do not allege unlawful behavior by Plaintiff, much less continual 

unlawful behavior. The Court concludes that the limitations period for the extortion 

counterclaim was not tolled by these activities. The claim is therefore barred by the oneyear statute of limitations. 

 Although not raised by Plaintiff, the Court also seriously doubts that the criminal 

statute relied on by Defendants, A.R.S. § 13-1804(6), gives rise to a civil cause of action. 

Under Arizona law, “no private cause of action should be inferred based on a criminal 

statute where there is no indication whatsoever that the legislature intended to protect any 

special group by creating a private cause of action by a member of that group.” Phoenix 

Baptist Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Aiken, 877 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Ariz. App. 1994). 

Section 13-1804(6) contains no indication that the legislature had such intent. 

 Nor does Defendants’ civil extortion claim constitute a recoupment defense. A 

recoupment defense must arise from the existence of “some feature of the transaction 

upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded.” Aetna Finance Co. v. Pasquali, 626 P.2d 

1103, 1105 (Ariz. App. 1981). Where a lawsuit, like this one, is based on claims such as 

breach of contract, the recoupment defense must “arise out of mutual obligations or 

covenants of the . . . transaction upon which [the] suit [is] founded.” Id. Defendants’ 

civil extortion claim does not arise out of the dealings between Plaintiff and Coltrell 

before their relationship ended, “but is an affirmative action which exacts a penalty for an 

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independent wrong.” Id. It therefore is not a recoupment defense. Id. 

 Defendants ask the Court to permit them to amend their counterclaim to allege that 

“Plaintiff continued his campaign of extortion by continuing to threaten Cathleen 

Carmichael in 2014.” Doc. 40 at 6. For reasons explained above, this amendment would 

not save the counterclaim. The motion to amend will therefore be denied. 

 IT IS ORDERED 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 34) is granted. 

 2. Defendant’s motion to amend (Doc. 40) is denied. 

 Dated this 4th day of February, 2015. 

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