Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_05-cv-02913/USCOURTS-cand-1_05-cv-02913-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The Court has ruled on the parties’ other motions in limine in the Court’s Final Pretrial Order

(Doc. No. 282).

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

JAMES GODOY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

T. WADSWORTH, et al., 

Defendants. /

No. CV 05-2913 NJV

ORDER ON REMAINING MOTIONS IN

LIMINE (Doc. Nos. 233 & 237)

Before the Court are five motions in limine:1

 1) Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude

evidence of injuries to other inmates (Doc. No. 237); 2) Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine No. 2 that an

expert opinion is not necessary for the medical treatment claim; 3) Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine No.

4 that an expert opinion is not necessary for the excessive force claim; 4) Plaintiff’s Motion In

Limine No. 5 to exclude evidence of the conviction from the incident (Doc. No. 233); and

5) Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine No. 7 to exclude evidence of the commitment offense (Doc. No.

233). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments, and the

Case 1:05-cv-02913-NJV Document 284 Filed 01/12/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion

in limine to exclude evidence of injuries to other inmates and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motions In

Limine Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 7. 

A. Defendants’ Motion In Limine To Exclude Evidence of Injuries To Other Inmates

Defendants move in limine to exclude evidence of injuries to other inmates besides Plaintiff

(Doc. No. 237). Evidence of injuries to other inmates besides Plaintiff is relevant given the short

time frame of the December 2003 incident and Plaintiff’s legal argument regarding Defendants’

alleged per se liability. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. This evidence is therefore admissible. Fed. R. Evid.

402. Any potential prejudice resulting from the admission of this evidence may be overcome by

tailored jury instructions. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion

in limine to exclude evidence of injuries to other inmates. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motions In Limine Nos. 2 and 4 - Expert Opinions for Medical Treatment

and Excessive Force Claims

Plaintiff asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and state law assault and battery claim against

various Defendants based on his theory that Defendant guards used excessive force (Doc. No. 206). 

Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim and an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Dr. Everett

Allen challenging Dr. Allen’s medical treatment (Doc. No. 206). Plaintiff moves in limine for an

order finding that expert opinions are not needed for his claims based on the alleged excessive force

by Defendant prison guards and Dr. Allen’s medical treatment (Doc. No. 233). Defendants have not

filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motions. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that expert testimony is not required for his claim that

Defendants used excessive force. Depending on the individual circumstances, courts differ on

whether expert testimony is proper for excessive force claims. Compare Smith v. City of Hemet, 394

F.3d 689, 703 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (reversing grant of summary judgment) (finding that jury

may rely on expert testimony in determining “whether the officers’ use of force was unreasonable”);

Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that defendants’

use of force was excessive, relying in part on testimony by defendants’ use of force expert); Bates v.

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For the Northern District of California

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King County, 2007 WL 1412889, *3 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (admitting plaintiff’s police practices

expert, reasoning that “[t]he appropriate response by a police officer to a person resisting arrest is

not necessarily common knowledge. Expert testimony from an experienced law enforcement

professional would assist the jury in understanding whether a particular officer exerted excessive

force. The proper response of a police department to complaints about excessive force used by

officers is also not common knowledge. Expert testimony concerning the proper response would

thus help the jury to understand the facts and make an informed decision as to the department's

actions.”); with Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir.1999) (holding trial judge properly

excluded expert testimony in an excessive force case where the issue was whether the danger posed

by the suspect was sufficiently lethal and imminent to justify the use of deadly force and this issue

was “within lay competence”); Jimenez v. Sambrano, 2009 WL 2382622, *2 (S.D. Cal. July 31,

2009) (slip copy) (excluding defendants’ use of force expert where the determination of “whether

the force Defendants used was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”was within the jury’s knowledge,

did not involve complex facts, and ultimately, was a credibility determination for the jury).

The Court further agrees with Plaintiff that whether Dr. Allen’s alleged delay in summoning

an ambulance or failure to provide pain medication constitutes cruel and unusual punishment does

not require the “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” of an expert. See Fed. R. Evid.

702. 

While an expert is not required for Plaintiff’s excessive force or medical treatment claims,

however, the Court finds that expert testimony may be permitted on these issues if the expert meets

all requirements for expert testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 & 703; Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Therefore, the parties may attempt to put forth an

expert on these issues and if the Court admits the expert, the trier of fact will weigh the evidence. 

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine Nos. 2 and 4, but notes that an expert may

be permitted on these issues if the expert meets all requirements for expert testimony and the parties

appropriately disclosed the expert as required under the Case Management and Pretrial Order (Doc.

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No. 213). See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motions In Limine Nos. 5 and 7 - Exclude Evidence of The Conviction And

Commitment Offense

Plaintiff moves in limine to exclude evidence of his conviction resulting from the December

2003 incident and his commitment offense (Doc. No. 233). Evidence of Plaintiff’s conviction under

Cal. Penal Code § 69 resulting from the December 2003 incident is not admissible because its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, and/ or misleading the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Plaintiff also raised concerns that

introduction of this evidence was prejudicial, confusing, and/or misleading because Plaintiff’s Cal.

Penal Code § 69 conviction was the result of a plea to avoid a third strike felony offense. Evidence

of Plaintiff’s commitment offense is not relevant to the current civil rights action and is therefore

inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 & 404(b). The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion In

Limine Nos. 5 and 7, but holds that evidence of either Plaintiff’s conviction resulting from the

December 2003 incident or his commitment offense is admissible for the limited purpose of

impeachment. In the event that this evidence is admitted for impeachment purposes, Defendants are

limited to asking whether Plaintiff was convicted of a felony.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2010 

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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