Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02668/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02668-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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FILED U~ited Sc:m.-s Co~m of Appeais >r l ... ' l.fnt 1 (! J.lt 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

MAR 3 0 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

CHRIS WILLIAM SHUTE; MID-VALLEY ) 

HELICOPTERS, INC., an Oregon ) 

corporation, ) 

) 

Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, ) 

INC., a Utah corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant/Third-Party- ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & ) 

TELEGRAPH, d/b/a Mountain Bell, ) 

a Colorado corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant/Third-Party- ) 

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Third-Party-Defendant. ) 

No. 86-266 8 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. C-83-033 3G) 

Floyd A. Jensen of Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 

Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

H. James Clegg of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake Cit y, 

Utah (David G. Williams of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt 

Lake City, Utah, and Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him 

on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 86-2668 Document: 01019749134 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 1 
Before McKAY, McWILLIAMS, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

This diversity case comes to us on appeal from a jury verdict 

and judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Chris William Shute and MidValley Helicopters, Inc., and against defendant Mountain States 

Telephone and Telegraph Company as a result of an accident in 

which plaintiffs' helicopter collided with power lines adjacent to 

Mountain States' telephone wires. 

I. Facts 

In June 1982, Mid-Valley leased a helicopter to the National 

Forest Service and furnished two pilots, including Mr. Shute, to 

operate the helicopter. In late July 1982, the Forest Service 

obtained permission to use the helicopter to assist in locating 

squaw fish that previously had been implanted into the Green River 

in eastern Utah. 

Mr. Shute began the survey by overflying the river in a 

southwesterly direction to a point on the river several miles 

south of the eventual accident site . During this initial overflight , Mr. Shute maintained an altitude of approximately 500 feet 

and observed several instances of utility wires crossing the 

river. In order to conduct the survey, Mr. Shute flew northward 

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along the center of the river at approximately twenty to fifty 

feet above the surface and at the relatively slow speed of twenty 

miles per hour. Mr. Shute successfully overflew several utility 

wire crossings before reaching the accident site. Testimony indicated that the survey flight took place on a bright, sunny day and 

that visibility was excellent. 

The accident site involved five visible utility pol es and two 

separate sets of wires--one set of electrical transmission wires 

owned by Moon Lake Electric Association and one set of telephone 

wires owned by Mountain States (see diagram at Appendix l 

attached). Of the five poles, three were located on the west side 

of the river and the other two stood on the east. From 

Mr. Shute's left (west) to his right (east), the first two visible 

poles (pole nos. 1 and 2) belonged to Moon Lake. The next two 

poles (pole nos. 3 and 4), which were next to either bank of the 

river, belonged to Mountain States. The last and easternmost pole 

(pole no. 5) belonged to Moon Lake. 

Moon Lake installed its 3/8-inch thick power lines in 1952 on 

its own poles, two of which (pole nos. 2 and 5) stood 1007 feet 

apart on opposite sides of the Green River. In 1964, pursuant to 

a joint pole attachment agreement with Moon Lake, Mountain States 

attached its telephone lines to Moon Lake's poles below the power 

l i nes. However, because the tensile strength of the 1/10-inch 

thick telephone wires was not great enough to span the 1007 feet 

between Moon Lake's poles, Mountain States installed two of its 

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own poles (pole nos. 3 and 4), one on each side of the river, creati ng a shorte r span for the telephone lines. The telephone lines 

thus spanned the river approximately thirty feet below the Moon 

Lake power lines. The Moon Lake power lines were not attached to 

the new poles, but continued to span the 1007-foot distance 

between Moon Lake's poles. 

This configuration remained in place for eighteen years, 

until the accident in 1982. There had been no previous incidence 

of aircraft colliding with any of the wires. The accident site is 

located in a remote area of Utah that is not within any regularly 

traveled flight path and is ten miles from the nearest air strip. 

Mr. Shute testified that as the helicopter approached the 

accident site, he was able to observe Mountain States telephone 

wires which were 1/10-inch thick and had taken on a dark color. 

He also testified that he observed each of the poles between which 

the power lines and telephone wires were suspended. However, 

Mr. Shute testified that he was unable to see the silver colored 

Moon Lake power lines that were suspended 30 feet above the telephone lines and not attached to the shorter Mountain States poles 

{3 and 4). As he approached the line crossing, Mr. Shute observed 

the five visible poles and assumed that both sets of wires were 

attached to all the poles. Accordingly, Mr. Shute assumed that by 

c limbing to an elevation high enough to clear the two poles closest to the river (Mountain States poles 3 and 4 to which only the 

telephone lines were attached}, he would safely clear all wires. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2668 Document: 01019749134 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 4 
The helicopter gained sufficient altitude that it cleared the telephone wires, but it struck the Moon Lake power lines that were 

suspended above the telephone lines. The collision caused the 

power lines to act as a tether around the helicopter's rotor mast 

and the helicopter crashed, injuring Mr. Shute and destroying the 

helicopter. 

Plaintiffs brought this action against Mountain States and 

Moon Lake claiming that the two were negligent in the design and 

maintenance of the wire configuration at the accident site. The 

defendants argued that the accident was due to Mr. Shute's negligence in piloting the helicopter. The jury returned a verdict 

apportioning negligence to the various parties as follows: 

Mr. Shute 8%, Moon Lake 32%, and Mountain States 60%. Prior to 

the entry of judgment on the verdict, Moon Lake settled with the 

plaintiffs and is not involved in this appeal. 

Mountain States now argues that the district court erred in 

not awarding Mountain States judgment as a matter of law because 

Mountain States owed no duty to the plaintiffs either in the construction or maintenance of the wire configuration. Mountain 

States also challenges the judgment on the ground that there was 

not sufficient evidence for the jury's verdict and on the further 

ground that the trial court erred in giving its instructions to 

the jury on the issue of negligence. For the reasons discussed 

below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2668 Document: 01019749134 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 5 
II. Duty 

Mountain States based several motions, including motions for 

summary judgment and for directed verdict, primarily on the claim 

that it owed no duty to plaintiffs and thus cannot be held liable 

for negligence. In determining whether the district court was 

correct in denying the motions, we must decide whether Mountain 

States owed a duty to plai ntiff. 

Because federal jurisdiction here is based on diversity under 

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), we must apply the substantive law of the 

state in which the accident occurred, in this case Utah l aw. See 

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 u.s. 64 (1938); Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288, ·290 (lOth Cir. 1977). Applying Utah law, 

we agree with Mountain States• assertion that in order to recover 

based on negligence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed 

a duty to that plaintiff. See Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 

1360, 1363 (Utah 1986). The question of whether a duty exists is 

a question of law for the court to decide. Id. Accordingly, we 

review de novo the duty issue. See In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 

836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

In their briefs, the parties argue at length as to the proper 

duty analysis and as to what factors must be considered in determining whether a duty was owed. Despite this lengthy discussion 

and our own exhaustive research, we can identify no clear statement as to which factors must be considered under Utah law. Likewise, we find no cases from Utah with sufficient factual similarity to help us decide the duty issue involved here. We are thus 

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Appellate Case: 86-2668 Document: 01019749134 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 6 
left to decide whether in this rather unique case plaintiffs 

should be protected from the type of hazard created by the wires. 

In so doing, we have little more than policy to guide us in the 

absence of specific precedent. See Thode , Tort Analysis: DutyRisk v . Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions 

Between Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1, 26-28. Indeed, we 

find the following description of duty particularly meaningful: 

The statement that there is or i s not a duty begs the 

essential question--whether the plaintiff's interests 

are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's 

conduct. It is therefore not surpri sing to find that 

the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has been 

formulated. It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself ••.• 

[I)t should be recognized that "duty" is not sacrosanct 

in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of 

those considerations of poli cy which lead the law to say 

that the plaintiff is entitled to protection. 

W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the 

Law of Torts 357-58 (5th ed . 1984). 

Although we recognize that the duty a na lysis described above 

lacks structure and certainty, we nevertheless conclude that it is 

our task simply to decide based on the best factors we can identify whether Mountain States owed any du ty . After considering 

carefully the evidence in the record and the parties• arguments, 

we hold that Mountain States did owe a duty of reasonable care t o 

plaintiffs. The district court did not err when it denied 

Mountain States• motions and allowed the jury to decide the issue 

of negligence. 

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It is important to note that our holding is heavily influenced and limited by the unique facts and circumstances of this 

case. Undisputed evidence in the record shows that pilots who 

encounter power and telephone lines will use the height of the 

supporting poles as a measure of how high they must fly in order 

safely to clear the lines. Because pilots are trained to observe 

poles instead of the less visible wires, the unique wire-pole configuration used by Mountain States created a greater hazard to 

low-flying aircraft approaching the lines than a normal wire configuration. If a normal configuration had been used, approaching 

aircraft would have had a much lower probability of striking the 

power lines involved here. Consequently, we conclude that when a 

wire configuration like the one used by Mountain States is 

installed, the owner(s) of the wires owes a duty of reasonable 

care to any aircraft pilots who may encounter the wires. 1 The 

question of whether the owner has breached that duty is therefore 

a proper question for the trier of fact. 

Mountain States urges us to adopt the analysis of several 

other courts that have been confronted with the duty issue in wire 

strike cases. We acknowledge that a number of cases cited by 

Mountain States stand either for the proposition that no duty 

existed or that the defendants breached no duty when aircraft collided with wires. See Lea v. Baumann Surgical Supplies, Inc., 321 

1 The facts of this case do not require us to decide whether 

Mountain States would have owed any duty to the plaintiff if 

Mountain States had used a normal wire configuration. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2668 Document: 01019749134 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 8 
So.2d 844 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Bayman v. Clearwater Power·co., 15 

Wash. App. 566, 550 P.2d 554 (1976); Gunn v. Edison Sault Elec. 

Co., 24 Mich. App. 43, 179 N.W.2d 680 (1970); Columbia Helicopters, Inc. v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 946 (D. Or. 1969); 

Walker v. Texas Elec. Service Co., 499 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App. 

1973). We also note, however, that several courts have reached 

the opposite conclusion on the duty issue and have allowed the 

triers of fact to consider the negligence issue. See, ~, Smith 

v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 699 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1983); 

McCauley v. United States, 470 F.2d 137 {9th Cir. 1972); United 

States v. Washington, 351 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1965); Weber v. 

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 209 Kan. 273, 497 P.2d 118 

(1972): El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 145 

(9th Cir. 1965); Mills v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 355 ~.2d 781 

(Wash. 1960); Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. 

520, 123 A.2d 636 (1956). Our holding relies on none of these 

cases because each of them is distinguishable from the case before 

us. No case that we have found either in the parties' briefs or 

through our own research has involved a wire configuration like 

the one involved here. For this reason, we are not persuaded to 

follow the analysis used in previous wire strike cases. 

In its brief, Mountain States argues at length that it can 

owe no duty where the type of harm suffered by a plaintiff was not 

a foreseeable consequence of Mountain States' actions. Mountain 

States also makes much of the fact that the wires were located at 

low elevation in a sparsely populated area far from the nearest 

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Appellate Case: 86-2668 Document: 01019749134 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 9 
airport. First we note that the Utah courts have not adequately 

outlined the elements required to find a duty. Specifically, we 

have found no statement by a Utah court that the duty question 

depends on foreseeability alone. Nevertheless, we now proceed to 

analyze the foreseeability issue on the assumption that the Utah 

courts may have implicitly adopted the foreseeability requirement; 

or if faced directly with this issue the Utah courts would adopt 

the apparent majority view that duty requires foreseeability. See 

w. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on 

the Law of Torts § 43 at 280 (5th ed. 1984); Annotation~ Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence and Proximate Cause, 100 

A.L.R.2d 942, 945 {1965). 

we are not persuaded that Mr. Shute's accident was wholly 

unforeseeable. Aircraft are now used at widely varying altitudes 

for numerous purposes, such as wildlife and geological surveying, 

scouting, and recreational sightseeing. 2 We cannot say that it 

was unforeseeable that at some time a pilot would undertake a lowlevel flight near the wires. As long as some air traffic was 

likely to encounter the wires, it was foreseeable that a pilot 

would be "fooled'' by the wire-pole configuration and strike the 

2 Mountain States argues that foreseeability must be judged 

according to conditions existing in 1964 when the configuration 

came to be. In response, we simply note that Mountain States had 

a duty to maintain its lines in reasonably safe condition. Cf. 

Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393, 

395 (Utah 1970). This duty makes relevant any foreseeable 

consequences caused by the configuration in the years after 1964. 

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power lines. 

Mountain States argues further that if a duty is imposed in 

this case, the burden of guarding against similar accidents will 

be enormous. We agree that the burden involved in eliminating a 

risk is relevant to the duty issue. Indeed, in one of its rare 

statements on the duty issue, the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 

"Whether the law imposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the 

burden of guarding against it and the consequences of p l acing that 

burden upon defendant, must also be taken into account." 3 Little 

v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 54-55 (Utah 

1983) (quoting Lance v. Senior, 36 Ill.2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231 

(1967)). We do not agree, however, that our holding imposes on 

Mountain States a burden that outweighs the risk involved in this 

case. Despite Mountain States• claim that a finding of duty makes 

it an insurer of the safety of all its lines, under our holding 

Mountain States' burden i s l imited to marking lines whose wirepole configurations are similar to those involved in this case. 

Testimony in the record shows that there are few instances in 

which this type of configuration is used . Further, the cost of 

3 This type of risk-benefi t analysis was f irst applied by the 

Second Circuit in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 

169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) {Hand, J.). See also w. Keeton, D. Dobbs, 

R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 173 

(5th ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts§§ 291-93 (1965). 

Although this analysis has been used primarily in determining 

whether conduct was unreasonable (the negligence issue), we 

interpret the Utah Supreme Court's statement in Little as an 

application of the risk-benefit formula in determining the duty 

issue. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2668 Document: 01019749134 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 11 
marking lines in those few places is small compared to the gravity 

of the harm caused when a collision occurs. It is our judgment, 

therefore, that although the probability of this type of accident 

is low, the overall risk (i . e., the probability multipli ed by the 

gravity of harm} outweighs the limited burden imposed by our holding. Consequently, we are not persuaded by Mountain States' claim 

that the burden of guarding against this type of accident is too 

great. 

III. Sufficiency of Evidence 

Mountain States next challenges the jury's verdict claiming 

that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding of 

negligence. Here, our review is "limited to the inquiry as to 

whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the 

jury's or court's conclusion, viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party.'' Kitchens v. Bryan County 

Nat'! Bank, 825 F.2d 248, 251 (lOth Cir. 1987). Moreover, the 

jury "has the exclusive function of appraising credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony, drawing inferences 

from the facts established, resolving conflicts in the evidence, 

and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact." Id. at 251. 

Applying these principl es to the present case, we conclude 

that sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to pl aintiffs' we note that 

there was testimony showing that pilots avoid wires by observing 

and overflying poles. The record also shows that relati vely 

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inexpensive markers can be used where wires present an unusually 

high risk to aviators. Mountain States never requested that Moon 

Lake attach any such markers to its lines. Finally, the record 

shows that although low-level flights were uncommon in the area 

around the accident site, flights had taken place on occasion. 

Based on this information, the jury could reasonably find Mountain 

States negligent; and the verdict easily survives Mountain States• 

challenge. 

IV. Jury Instructions 

As a fi nal matter, we consider Mountain States' claim that 

the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the issue of 

negligence. When we examine a challenge to jury instructions, we 

review the record as a whole to determine whether the instructions 

state the law that governs and provide the jury with an ample 

understanding of the issues and the standards applicable. Big 

Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1271 

(lOth Cir. 1988). We consider the court's instructions as a whole 

to determine not whether the instructions were flawless in every 

particular but whether the jury was misled in any way and whether 

it had an understanding of the issues and its duty to decide those 

issues. Id. Accordingly, our standard of review is as follows: 

11 [A]n error in jury instructions will mandate reversal of a judgment only if the error is determined to have been prejudicial, 

based on a review of the record as a whole." Id. at 1271 n.l9 

(quoting Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888 , 895 (lOth Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2668 Document: 01019749134 Date Filed: 03/30/1990 Page: 13 
1984)). 

Mountain States complains that the court misled the jury by 

instructing it to use what amounted to a strict liability standard 

instead of a negligence standard by stating: 

If you find that at the time of its construction, the 

power line erected by Moon Lake Electric Company was 

reasonably safe to aircraft, but that after t he 

additional poles and lines were added by [Mountain 

States], an unsafe and misleading hazard was presented 

to aircraft, you must decide which of the defendants was 

negligent and, if both, apportion it to them. 

Record, vol . 2, at 1426. Mountain States advances the same strict 

liability argument with respect to the court's statement that 

"defendant [Mountain States] has a duty to construct its facilities so that they are not dangerous to aircraft, reasonably to be 

expected in the area." Id. at 1427. Specifically, Mountain 

States alerts us to the court's failure to mention that a risk 

must be unreasonable in order for negligence to exist. Having 

read the record as a whole, we find that Mountain States' argument 

is based on a distorted reading of the instructions. Immediately 

preceding the above-quoted passages, the court stated: 

To find that negligence was committed by any 

defendant, you must first find that the injury incurred 

was reasonably foreseeable. As related to this case, in 

order to f i nd negligence on the part of defendants, Moon 

Lake and/or [Mountain States], you must find that a reasonable or prudent person similarly situated in circumstances would have reasonably anticipated that the utility wires as constructed and maintained in the 

particular location, posed an unreasonable threat to 

aircraft. 

Failure to anticipate and guard against a happening 

which would not have arisen but for exceptional or 

highly unusual circumstances is not negligence unl ess 

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you find that such happening was reasonably foreseeable 

and reasonably could have been expected or contemplated. 

The degree of care required is to reasonably safeguard against contacts which according to human knowledge and experience are reasonably foreseeable. 

You are instructed that Moon Lake and [Mountain 

States] are required to exercise reasonable care and 

precaution in installing and maintaining transmission 

lines. This duty extends to persons whom those defendants should reasonably anticipate might be present and 

exposed to danger at that location. 

The defendants are not insurer's of the safety of 

their lines. 

Id. at 1425-26. Later in the instructions, the court went on to 

state: 

A person cannot be held negligent for failing to 

respond to the existence of air traffic, or changed circumstances such as increase or fluctuations in aircraft 

activity unless he actually knew or reasonably should 

have known about such air traffic. Thus, unless you 

find that defendants, or either of them actually knew or 

reasonably should have known of the air traffic in the 

vicinity of the accident site subsequent to the construction of the poles and wires, you cannot hold them 

negligent for failing to respond to such. 

Id. at 1428. 

Considering the instructions and the record as a whole, we 

conclude that Mountain States was not prejudiced by the statements 

about which it complains. In the context of the entire set of 

instructions, we decline even to say that an error was made. 

V. Conclusion 

We hold that in the unique circumstances of this case, 

Mountain States owed a duty of reasonable care to plaintiffs. 

Thus, the district court did not err when it submitted the case to 

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the jury on the issue of negligence. We hold further that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict. Finally, we reject 

Mountain States' challenge to the court's jury instructions 

because, taken as a whole, the instructions adequately informed 

the jury as to its charge and any flaws contained in the instructions fell short of prejudicial error. 

AFFIRMED. 

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