Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04230/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04230-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY HIROSHI NAKASHIMA,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden, et al., 

Respondents. /

No. C 05-4230 WHA (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The

petition is directed to denial of parole.

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it,

and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For the

reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

STATEMENT

In 1986 petitioner pled guilty in Los Angeles County Superior Court to second degree

murder. He received a sentence of fifteen years to life in prison. In 2003 he was denied parole

for the sixth time; it is that parole decision he challenges here. He alleges that he has exhausted

these claims by way of state habeas petitions. 

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United States District Court

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DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of

law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong

applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies

the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support

granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state

trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

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1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and

convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory

assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres

v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

In the order to show cause petitioner’s issues were listed as being that (1) his due

process rights were denied when the Board denied parole for the sixth time based on the

circumstances of his crime; (2) denial of parole was in effect a breach of his plea agreement;

and (3) the Board’s consistent denial of almost all paroles violates due process. 

Among other things, respondent contends that California prisoner have no liberty

interest in parole and that if they do, the only due process protections available are a right to be

heard and a right to be informed of the basis for the denial – that is, respondent contends there

is no due process right to have the result supported by sufficient evidence. Because these

contentions go to whether petitioner has any due process rights at all in connection with parole,

and if he does, what those rights are, they will addressed first.

1. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. 

a. LIBERTY INTEREST

Respondent contends that California prisoners have no liberty interest in parole. 

Respondent is incorrect that Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), applies to parole decisions,

see Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (Sandin “does not affect the creation of

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liberty interests in parole under Greenholtz and Allen.”), and, applying the correct analysis, the

California parole statute does create a liberty interest protected by due process, see McQuillion

v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”). Respondent’s claim to the contrary is without

merit. 

b. DUE-PROCESS PROTECTIONS 

Respondent contends that even if California prisoners do have a liberty interest in

parole, the due process protections to which they are entitled by clearly-established Supreme

Court authority are limited to notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a statement of reasons for

denial. That is, he contends there is no due process right to have the decision supported by

“some evidence.” This position, however, has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which has

held that the Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by "some evidence in the

record", or is "otherwise arbitrary." Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying

"some evidence" standard used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (same). The evidence underlying the

Board’s decision must also have "some indicia of reliability." McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904;

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The some evidence standard identified in Hill is clearly established

federal law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. 

2. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

a. “BIGGS CLAIM”

In a line of relatively recent cases the Ninth Circuit has discussed the constitutionality of

denying parole when the only basis for denial is the circumstances of the offense. See Hayward

v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, (9th cir. 2008); Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 852-54 (9th Cir.

2007); Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-17 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In Biggs the court said that it might violate due process if the Board were to continue to

deny parole to a prisoner because of the facts of his or her offense and in the face of evidence of

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 The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the

record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1129 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined

in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985).

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rehabilitation. 334 F.3d at 916-17. No legal rationale for this statement was provided, and it

was unclear whether the court was suggesting that the continued denial of parole would be a

new sort of due process violation or whether it was simply expressing the thought that with the

passage of time the nature of the offense could cease to be “some evidence” that the prisoner

would be a danger if paroled.1

 This ambiguity was helpfully cleared up in Irons, where the

court clearly treated a “some evidence” claim as different from a “Biggs claim.” Irons, 505

F.3d at 853-54. It appears, putting together the brief discussions in Biggs and Irons, that the

court meant that at some point denial of parole based on long-ago and unchangeable factors,

when overwhelmed with positive evidence of rehabilitation, would be fundamentally unfair and

violate due process. As the dissenters from denial of rehearing en banc in Irons point out, in the

Ninth Circuit what otherwise might be dictum is controlling authority if the issue was presented

and decided, even if not strictly “necessary” to the decision. Irons v. Carey, 506 F.3d 951, —

(9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2007) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing and discussing

Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 751 n. 8 (9th Cir.2005)). 

Depending on whether the discussion of dictum in the dissent from denial of rehearing

en banc in Irons is correct, it thus may be that the Ninth Circuit has recognized that due process

right, which for convenience will be referred to in this opinion as a “Biggs claim.” Here,

petitioner’s first issue is a Biggs claim, in that he contends that using the long-ago

circumstances of his offense as grounds for denial for the sixth time, in the face of

overwhelming evidence of rehabilitation, violates due process.

Assuming for purposes of this discussion that Biggs and Irons recognized an abstract

due process right not to have parole repeatedly denied on the basis of the facts of one’s crime

and in the face of extensive evidence of rehabilitation, and also assuming arguendo that the

right was violated in petitioner’s case, petitioner still cannot obtain relief on this theory, because

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2 Petitioner phrased this claim in his petition as a Biggs claim, but in the discussion in

the attachment he includes one sentence which suggests that he also may be attempting to

claim that the decision was not supported by some evidence, namely: “There was absolutely

no evidence submitted that would support a finding of unsuitability” (Pet. at 8). As noted

above, due process requires that the Board’s decision be supported by “some evidence.” In

this case there was evidence that petitioner hog-tied the victim so he would strangle himself

if he attempted to escape; evidently the victim did try, because he was asphyxiated (Exh. 3 at

15). The cruel and sadistic nature of the crime, with the evidence that petitioner’s parole

employment plans were weak, was some evidence to support the denial of parole.

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there is no clearly-established United States Supreme Court authority recognizing a Biggs

claim. The state courts’ rulings therefore could not be contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).2

b. Breach of Plea Agreement

Petitioner contends that his plea agreement provided that he would plead to second

degree murder, with an implied term that he would be paroled upon serving the minimum time. 

He says that the Board violated the agreement by treating his conviction as if it were for firstdegree murder, and by not releasing him at the time contemplated by the plea agreement.

Respondent contends that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner’s

minimum eligible parole date was in October of 1996, at which time he would have learned that

the plea agreement was not going to be performed as he claims he expected. Under Section 

2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year limitation period starts on the date on which "the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence." The time begins "'when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover)

the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.'" Hasan v.

Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). The one-year statute of limitations thus began

running in October of 1996, roughly nine years before this petition was filed. Petitioner’s

contention that the statute of limitations begins running anew at each denial obviously is

incorrect, at least to the extent that his plea agreement claim is that he was not released at the

minimum eligible parole date, although it has merit as to the part of his claim in which he

contends that the Board is treating his offense as first-degree murder. The minimum eligible

parole date claim, however, is barred by the statute of limitations.

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3 Although petitioner does not state it as a separate issue, he does refer in his

discussion of the plea agreement issue to the “matrix” used to set parole terms for prisoners

who have been found suitable for parole (Pet. at 14). Under state law the matrices come into

play only after a prisoner has been found suitable for parole, see In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.

4th 1069, 1071 (Cal. 2005), so petitioner did not have a due process right created by state

law to have the Board apply the matrix, and of course there is no such direct federal right. 

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Petitioner also contends that the Board is violating the plea agreement by denying parole

based on facts which, had they been tried and proved, would have supported a first-degree

murder conviction. The plea bargain called for a sentence of fifteen years to life (Pet. Exh. D at

3, 7 (plea proceeding)), and that is what petitioner received (Ans. at Exh. 1). Although plaintiff

contends he is being punished as if he had pled to first-degree murder, he in fact is receiving the

parole consideration to which his fifteen-to-life sentence entitles him. First degree murder is

punishable by death, life without parole, or a term of twenty-five years to life. Cal. Penal Code

§ 190(a). If petitioner had been convicted of first-degree murder, he would not even yet have

served his minimum sentence. This claim is without merit.3 

c. Bias

Petitioner contends that the Board was biased, as evidenced by the infrequency with

which it granted parole.

The record shows that the Board reviewed the evidence extensively and discussed it

with petitioner and his attorney (Exh. 3 at 7-48). The Board’s decision explains the facts it

relied upon in finding him not suitable for parole (id. at 49-55). Both these factors tend to

negate the accusation of bias, and petitioner has not provided any evidence that would show

otherwise. This claim is without merit.

 CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 21 , 2008. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

G:\PRO-SE\WHA\HC.05\NAKASHIMA230.RUL.wpd 

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