Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-01002/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-01002-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 05:8101 Workmen's Compensation Benefits

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Plaintiff also named a number of fictitious defendants. Federal courts do not allow 1

fictitious party practice. New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1094 n.1 (11th

Cir. 1997) (“[F]ictitious party practice is not permitted in federal court.”). Therefore, the

fictional defendants are due to be dismissed. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Risk Enterprise Mgmt.

Ltd., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1279 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (DeMent, J.) (dismissing sua sponte

fictional defendants).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ASHBY SHAWN BRYANT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:06-cv-1002-MEF

) (WO)

WAUSAU UNDERWRITERS )

INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On October 6, 2006, Plaintiff Ashby Shawn Bryant (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against

Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company (“Wausau”) and Madix, Inc. (“Madix”) in the

Circuit Court of Coosa County. On November 3, 2006, Wausau and Madix (collectively 1

“Defendants”) filed a Notice of Removal in this Court (Doc. # 1). On the same day,

Defendants filed a Motion to Sever and Remand (Doc. # 5). On November 22, 2006,

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand (Doc. # 8). Those motions are presently before the Court.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is due to be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s

motion is due to be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

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I. Standard of Review

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.

1994); Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983).

As such, they only have the power to hear cases that they have been authorized to hear by the

Constitution or the Congress of the United States. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Federal

courts have federal question jurisdiction over civil actions that arise “under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal courts have diversity

jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states, in which the jurisdictional

amount of greater than $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, is met. See 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a)(1).

The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing that subject matter

jurisdiction exists and removal is appropriate. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. Because federal

court jurisdiction is limited and removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns,

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that it favors remand of removed cases when

federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear, explaining that “removal statutes are construed

narrowly; where plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved

in favor of remand.” Id.

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II. Background

Plaintiff claims that on or about March 14, 2006 he suffered a ruptured disc in his

neck while performing his job duties as an employee of Madix. He contends that his neck,

shoulder, and arm are permanently disabled and that he now suffers permanent total

disability.

Count I of the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is owed workers’ compensation benefits

from Madix. Plaintiff seeks the “compensation, medical expenses and other benefits to

which [he] is entitled under the Workers’ Compensation Act of 1992 of the State of

Alabama.” (Doc. 1 Ex. C at 4.) He also seeks costs and expenses.

Count II alleges that Defendants are liable for the tort of outrage due to their failure

to authorize a surgery that an orthopedic surgeon recommended Plaintiff undergo. Plaintiff

claims that this failure was intentional or reckless. He alleges that “Defendants’ actions are

so severe and outrageous that they exceed the bounds of decency.” (Doc. 1 Ex. C at 8.) He

seeks compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and interest.

III. Discussion

The parties agree that Count I should be remanded. “A civil action in any State court

arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any

district court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). The parties’ motions are due to be

GRANTED to the extent that they seek to remand Count I of the Complaint.

The parties disagree as to whether Count II should be remanded. Plaintiff does not

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dispute that Count II was properly removed based on diversity jurisdiction. However, he

argues that his claims may not be severed, and therefore that both should be remanded. He

contends that the claims may not be severed because they (1) are part of one action, (2) have

not been severed in state court, and (3) are intertwined such that severing them would

“compromise[] both justice and judicial economy.” (Doc. 8 at 2.) He does not cite any

support for these propositions. The Court is not convinced that it is precluded from severing

Plaintiff’s claims. It will grant the motion to sever should it determine that Count II is

properly before the Court.

Plaintiff argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) prohibits remand of Count II because his

outrage claim arises under Alabama’s workers’ compensation laws. The Court agrees that

Plaintiff’s outrage claim may not be removed to this Court if it “arises under” the Alabama

Workers’ Compensation Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). In Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055

(11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit held that a claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a

workers’ compensation claim, a statutory cause of action, arose under Alabama’s workers’

compensation laws. Id. at 1060. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the retaliatory discharge

cause of action was “an integral part of Alabama’s workers’ compensation regime,” having

been “passed to enhance the efficacy of the overall workers’ compensation system” and

codified with the rest of the workers’ compensation laws. Id. The court stated that cases

focusing on whether common law causes of action arise under state workers’ compensation

laws were inapposite. Id. at 1059. It noted that the Seventh Circuit held that a court-created

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retaliatory discharge claim for filing for workers’ compensation did not arise under the

workers’ compensation laws. See id. (citing Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722

(7th Cir. 1994)). The court also cited with approval Fourth Circuit precedent holding that

an intentional tort action did not arise under state workers’ compensation laws for purposes

of § 1445(c). See Reed, 206 F.3d at 1060 (citing Arthur v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,

58 F.3d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1995)).

Outrage is a common law intentional tort. A cause of action for outrage, even if based

on a denial of a workers’ compensation claim, is not “an integral part of Alabama’s workers’

compensation regime.” See id. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s outrage claim does not

arise under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act. Therefore, § 1445(c) does not require

that Count II be remanded. The Court finds that Count II was properly removed based on

diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion toRemand is due to be DENIED with

respect to Count II, and Defendants’ Motion to Sever and Remand is due to be GRANTED

with respect to severance of Plaintiff’s claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED that

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. # 8) filed November 22, 2006, is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED as to Count I and DENIED

as to Count II.

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2. Defendants’ Motion to Sever and Remand (Doc. # 5) filed November 3, 2006,

is GRANTED.

3. Counts I and II are SEVERED.

4. Count I is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Coosa County, Alabama.

5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand.

6. Plaintiff’s claims against the fictional defendants are DISMISSED.

DONE this the 18 day of April, 2007. th

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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