Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00099/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00099-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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1 This action is one of a rash of similarly situated actions involving identical

counsel and similar or identical legal issues that have been removed to this District Court in the

last two months. The others include Ready v. River Birch Homes, Inc., Civil Action 07-0031-

WS-B; McRand v. Champion Homes of Boaz, Civil Action 07-0033-KD-M; Carstarphen v.

River Birch Homes, Inc., Civil Action 07-0055-WS-M; Waller v. Advantage Homes, Civil

Action 07-0115-BH-C; Hill v. River Birch Homes, Inc., Civil Action 07-0136-WS-B; Holmes v.

Kabco Builders, Inc., Civil Action 07-0069-WS-C; Sanders v. Gateway Homes, Inc., Civil

Action 07-0098-BH-C; Foster v. River Birch Homes, Inc., Civil Action 07-0117-BH-C; Smith v.

River Birch Homes, Inc., Civil Action 07-0118-BH-C; and Sloan v. River Birch Homes, Inc.,

Civil Action 07-0165-WS-B.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DARLENE BROWN, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0099-WS-C

 )

KABCO BUILDERS, INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 5). The

parties have exhaustively briefed the jurisdictional question presented, and the Motion is now

ripe for disposition.1

I. Background.

On January 12, 2007, plaintiff Darlene Brown initiated this action by filing a sprawling

34-page, 129-paragraph, 27-count Complaint against named defendants Kabco Builders,

Inc.(“Kabco”), Hambone’s Mobile Home Liquidators, Inc. (“Hambone”) and PFS Corp. (“PFS”)

in the Circuit Court of Clarke County, Alabama. The gravamen of the Complaint was Brown’s

contention that the 2005 Kabco mobile home that she purchased from Hambone on June 4, 2005

for the cash purchase price of $82,500 was defective, and that defendants had misrepresented

that the home was free from defects and that any defects the plaintiff might discover would be

promptly repaired to her satisfaction. According to the Complaint, when Brown brought the

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2 According to the Complaint, defendants breached these warranties by failing to

repair or otherwise cure certain enumerated defects (including structural defects, plumbing

defects, cracked walls, doors and windows that do not open or close properly, warped and bowed

walls, leaks, condensation, vapor barrier in the wrong location, and vinyl on gypsum in interior

side of exterior wall) in the mobile home. (Complaint, ¶¶ 96, 100.) The Complaint alleged that

plaintiff notified defendants of those defects and afforded them a reasonable opportunity to

comply with the warranty; and alternatively alleged that defendants knew or should have known

about the defects at the time of sale, or that the defects could not be cured. (Id., ¶¶ 97-99.)

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defects to defendants’ attention, defendants failed and refused to remedy them, in breach of their

warranty obligations.

On February 8, 2007, defendant Kabco, acting with the written consent of Hambone and

PFS, removed this action to this District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. Kabco

predicated subject matter jurisdiction on § 1331, which confers original jurisdiction to district

courts over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In particular, Kabco pointed to the Twenty-First Cause of Action, in

which Brown alleged that defendants had violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 2301 et seq. (“MMWA”), by breaching certain written warranties furnished to plaintiff

pursuant to the sales transaction.2

 The ad damnum clause of that MMWA cause of action

requested entry of judgment against defendants “in an amount less than the sum or value of

$50,000.00 (exclusive of interest and costs).” (Complaint, at 25.)

On February 9, 2007, plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand (doc. 5) for lack of federal

subject matter jurisdiction. This Motion hinges on the MMWA’s explicit exclusion of federal

jurisdiction for MMWA claims in which the amount in controversy is less than the sum or value

of $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs). See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). Plaintiff contends

that this jurisdictional hurdle is not satisfied here, and that federal jurisdiction is therefore

lacking. Kabco has submitted a memorandum of law in opposition, and the issue is now

squarely presented.

II. Legal Standard.

A removing defendant must establish the propriety of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441

and, therefore, bears the burden of establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction. Leonard v.

Enterprise Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A removing defendant bears the

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 2 of 12
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burden of proving proper federal jurisdiction.”). Because removal infringes upon state

sovereignty and implicates central concepts of federalism, removal statutes must be construed

narrowly, with all doubts resolved in favor of remand. See University of South Alabama v.

American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that strict construction of

removal statutes derives from “significant federalism concerns” raised by removal jurisdiction);

Whitt v. Sherman Int’l Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) (expressing preference for

remand where removal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d

1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (uncertainties regarding removal are resolved in favor of remand);

Newman v. Spectrum Stores, Inc., 109 F. Supp.2d 1342, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“Because

federal court jurisdiction is limited, the Eleventh Circuit favors remand of removed cases where

federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear.”).

III. Analysis.

A. The Jurisdictional Amount and the Legal Certainty Test.

In removing this action to federal court, Kabco relied exclusively on the MMWA cause

of action, which it maintained gives rise to federal question jurisdiction. From the face of the

statute, however, it is clear that original federal jurisdiction exists over a MMWA cause of action

only if the amount in controversy is at least $50,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B); Ansari v.

Bella Automotive Group, Inc., 145 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 1998); Torres-Fuentes v.

Motorambar, Inc., 396 F.3d 474, 475-76 (1st Cir. 2005); Grubbs v. Pioneer Housing, Inc., 75 F.

Supp.2d 1323, 1326 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (“in order for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction of a

claim under the [MMWA], the amount in controversy must be at least $50,000, exclusive of

interests and costs”). In determining whether the $50,000 threshold is satisfied, the Eleventh

Circuit has found that “the amount in controversy for purposes of [the MMWA] does not include

damages flowing from any pendent state law claim brought by a plaintiff.” Ansari, 145 F.3d at

1272; see also Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 188 F.3d 1294, 1297 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999)

(reaffirming that the only claims a district court could consider in determining whether §

2310(d)(3) jurisdictional amount was satisfied were claims under MMWA for breach of

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 3 of 12
3 See also Grant v. Cavalier Mfg, Inc., 229 F. Supp.2d 1332, 1334 (M.D. Ala.

2002) (“In determining the amount in controversy, courts should only look to the actual claim

brought under the MMWA.”); Matthews v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, 92 F. Supp.2d 1285,

1288 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (“[I]n determining whether the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000,

exclusive of interests and costs, the undersigned focuses on the lone Magnuson-Moss Warranty

Act claim asserted by the plaintiffs in their complaint and does not consider the damages flowing

from the numerous state law claims asserted by the plaintiffs.”).

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warranty).3

 Furthermore, in making this calculation in the MMWA context, “resort to state law

is proper in determining the applicable measure of damages.” MacKenzie v. Chrysler Corp., 607

F.2d 1162, 1166 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402, 405 (7th

Cir. 2004) (looking to state law to determine remedies available and potential amount in

controversy in MMWA claim).

The ad damnum clause of Brown’s MMWA cause of action expressly demands judgment

against defendants “in an amount less than the sum or value of $50,000.00 (exclusive of interest

and costs).” (Complaint, at 25.) Where, as here, a plaintiff specifically pleads a damages

amount below the jurisdictional threshold, the Eleventh Circuit has found that such a pleading

“deserves deference and a presumption of truth. We will not assume - unless given reason to do

so - that plaintiff’s counsel has falsely represented, or simply does not appreciate, the value of

his client’s case.” Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. If a defendant removes the case to federal court,

notwithstanding the plaintiff’s specific pleading of a sub-jurisdictional minimum damages

amount, then in order to avoid remand that “defendant must prove to a legal certainty that

plaintiff’s claim must exceed” the jurisdictional amount. Id. Thus, to obtain a federal forum, a

removing defendant must establish that “an award below the jurisdictional amount would be

outside the range of permissible awards because the case is clearly worth more than $50,000.” 

Id. at 1096; see also Sapp v. AT & T Corp., 215 F. Supp.2d 1273, 1278 (M.D. Ala. 2002)

(applying Burns to render it incumbent on removing defendant to prove to legal certainty that

any recovery by plaintiff must exceed jurisdictional amount, where plaintiff expressly limited

damages sought in complaint to amount below jurisdictional minimum); Lindsay v. American

General Life & Accident Ins. Co., 133 F. Supp.2d 1271, 1274 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (opining that the

“legal certainty” test is “strict” and is not satisfied unless removing defendant shows to a legal

certainty that award below jurisdictional amount would be outside range of legally permissible

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 4 of 12
4 Burns was a case in which federal removal jurisdiction was predicated on

diversity of citizenship, rather than a federal question by virtue of an MMWA cause of action. 

Nonetheless, there is no logical reason to believe that the Burns “legal certainty” test would not

apply with equal force to the MMWA jurisdictional threshold, and both sides have relied on the

Burns standard in framing their respective arguments. Accordingly, the Court will do the same.

5 The Court similarly rejects Kabco’s related argument that the relief sought on all

of plaintiff’s state-law express warranty claims may be considered in determining the amount in

controversy because all of those state-law claims “are governed by the Magnuson-Moss

Warranty Act.” (Notice of Removal, ¶ 18.) This remarkable assertion implies that the MMWA

mandates superpreemption of state-law claims for breach of express warranty, such that those

state-law claims are governed by the MMWA, regardless of how they were pleaded. The Court

is unaware of any authority, and defendants have cited none, ascribing such extraordinary

preemptive qualities to the MMWA. Indeed, the only case cited by defendants on this point is

Matthews v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, 92 F. Supp.2d 1285 (S.D. Ala. 2000). Kabco seizes

on language in Matthews wherein the court looked to a “breach of warranty” count to determine

the § 2310(d)(3) amount in controversy. But that construction misconstrues the circumstances in

Matthews. Indeed, the Matthews court turned to the breach of warranty count in the very next

paragraph after indicating that the court would focus exclusively on the MMWA claim, and not

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outcomes).4

 The central battleground animating the Motion to Remand is whether defendants

have met their burden of proving to a legal certainty that Brown could not permissibly recover

less than $50,000 on her MMWA cause of action.

B. Application of the Legal Certainty Test.

In its Notice of Removal and the ensuing briefing on the Motion to Remand, Kabco has

proffered a series of arguments in an attempt to satisfy the “legal certainty” test. As an initial

matter, Kabco points to the ad damnum clauses of several of the pendent state-law causes of

action, in which plaintiff requested relief including rescission of the contract and a refund of all

amounts paid by plaintiff. (Notice of Removal, at 5.) Because the contract value exceeded

$82,000, Kabco contends, the jurisdictional amount would necessarily be satisfied if Brown

received these remedies. As previously noted supra, however, the law in this Circuit is clear that

the only claim that may be considered in determining whether the § 2310(d)(3) jurisdictional

threshold has been satisfied is the MMWA claim, and that the accompanying state-law claims

may not be weighed in that inquiry. See Boyd, 188 F.3d at 1296 n.5; Ansari, 145 F.3d at 1272. 

As such, the relief sought in non-MMWA claims is of no consequence in the § 2310(d)(3)

analysis.5

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 5 of 12
any state-law claims, in determining whether the $50,000 minimum was in controversy. 92 F.

Supp.2d at 1288. This context strongly suggests that the “breach of warranty” claim mentioned

was in fact the MMWA cause of action. Accordingly, Matthews lends no support to defendants’

efforts to import the ad damnum clauses from state-law breach of warranty claims into the

analysis of the MMWA jurisdictional threshold. More generally, the text of the MMWA allows

a plaintiff who is damaged by a defendant’s failure “to comply with any obligation under this

chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract,” to sue in state court

or, in certain limited circumstances, federal court. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). This provision

cannot logically be read as mandating that all state-law claims for breach of warranty filed in

state court are automatically, necessarily governed by the MMWA, irrespective of how the

plaintiff (the master of her complaint) has framed them.

6 Kabco answers plaintiff’s “limited warranty” point by asserting that under

Alabama law a limited warranty is treated as a full warranty when it fails of its essential purpose. 

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Next, Kabco maintains that the “legal certainty” requirement is satisfied because the

statutory remedy for violation of the MMWA is as follows: “[I]f the product ... contains a defect

or malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to remedy defects or

malfunctions in such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund

for, or replacement without charge of, such product ....” 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (emphasis

added). Kabco reasons that, because Brown has requested rescission or a refund in some of her

state-law causes of action (but not the MMWA count), she has effectively elected a refund for §

2304 purposes. The purchase price of the mobile home having been $82,500 and plaintiff being

entitled to a refund of that purchase price if she prevails, Kabco continues, the lowest point in the

range of permissible awards for the MMWA cause of action would be $82,500, and any

diminution of that value would be improper. This reasoning suffers from two glaring flaws. 

First, it ignores the fact that the statutory remedies set forth in § 2304 do not apply to limited

warranties of the kind invoked by Brown, but instead apply exclusively to full warranties. See

MacKenzie, 607 F.2d at 1166 n.7 (“The remedies set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 2304 are applicable

only to ‘full’ warranties, those meeting the requirements of that section.”) (emphasis added);

Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imports, Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 919 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (§ 2304 applies to

“full warranties,” not “limited warranties”); Schimmer, 384 F.3d at 405 (limited warranties under

MMWA are not subject to § 2304 and are thus not subject to its substantive remedies, including

refund of purchase price).6 As neither side suggests that the limited warranty at issue in this case

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 6 of 12
It appears to be a correct statement of Alabama law that, where a limited warranty fails of its

essential purpose, the contractual limitation of remedies is of no force and effect. See, e.g.,

Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Harrell, 431 So.2d 156, 164 (Ala. 1983) (observing that a

contract limitation of remedies in a warranty will not be allowed when circumstances cause the

exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose); Ala. Code § 7-2-719(2) (“Where

circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may

be had as provided in this title.”). But defendants do not explain why Alabama state law should

override the specific statutory provisions in the MMWA as to the prerequisites that must be

satisfied for § 2304 remedies to apply. It is the terms of the MMWA, and not Alabama state law,

that govern whether § 2304(a)(4) remedies are available to a purchaser. Defendants point to

nothing in the MMWA or its interpretive caselaw that would require, or even permit, the

recharacterization of a limited warranty to a full warranty, as those terms are used in 15 U.S.C. §

2303(a), for purposes of determining eligibility for a refund under § 2304(a)(4). To the contrary,

the MacKenzie court expressly stated that a warranty is a “full warranty” under 15 U.S.C. § 2304

only if it meets the requirements of that section. 607 F.2d at 1166 n.7. MacKenzie certainly

cannot support the proposition that Alabama law, rather than the statutory terms themselves,

should be applied in deciding whether a warranty is a “full warranty” for § 2304 purposes. Of

course, it is generally true that state law is used in determining the measure of damages under the

MMWA. See generally MacKenzie, 607 F.2d at 1166 (“resort to state law is proper in

determining the applicable measure of damages under the [MMWA]”); Schimmer, 384 F.3d at

405 (looking to state law to determine remedies available in MMWA case). But that general

proposition in no way usurps or negates the specific requirements of § 2304. 

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satisfies the requirements of § 2304, it appears highly unlikely that the refund remedy prescribed

by § 2304 is even available to plaintiff in this case.

Second, even if Brown, upon prevailing in the MMWA cause of action, were entitled to a

refund of the purchase price of her mobile home, it is far from certain that her damages could

never dip below $50,000. As mentioned, the purchase price of the home was $82,500. If Brown

were to prevail on her MMWA claim and secure a refund, Kabco assumes that the full purchase

price must necessarily be refunded to her. That assumption is incorrect. Appellate courts have

recognized that a plaintiff who revokes acceptance and receives a refund of the purchase price

under the MMWA must surrender possession of the good to the seller and must afford the seller

a credit for the value that the purchaser received from his use of the good while it was in his

possession. See Schimmer, 384 F.3d at 405 (for purposes of § 2310(d) amount in controversy, if

plaintiff is permitted to receive refund of purchase price of vehicle, seller can re-take possession

of vehicle and can receive credit for value that plaintiff received from use of vehicle while it was

in his possession); Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc., 410 F.3d 879, 884-85 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 7 of 12
7 The appellate cases cited above originate in the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits,

which appear to be the only federal appeals courts to have considered this question. The

undersigned has not located, and the parties have not cited, any Eleventh Circuit decision

quantifying the value of a revocation of acceptance remedy in the MMWA context; however,

given that the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuit approach stands without appreciable criticism

from other courts or even from defendants in this case, the Court will apply it here.

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that even if purchase price exceeds amount in controversy and even if plaintiff is entitled to

refund, MMWA amount in controversy requirement may not be satisfied because contract price

must be reduced by present value of vehicle and value that plaintiff obtained from it); SamuelBassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 402 (3rd Cir. 2004) (declaring that for

MMWA claim, party asserting federal jurisdiction must allege cost of replacement vehicle,

minus both the present value of the defective vehicle and the value that plaintiff received from

defective vehicle).7

Simply put, then, the value of any refund / revocation of acceptance remedy that Brown

might receive is not simply the $82,500 purchase price for the mobile home. Plaintiff does not

automatically, necessarily stand to gain $82,500 or more if she prevails on a claim for refund

based on breach of warranty. If she prevails on a MMWA claim to revoke her acceptance, then

she will have to return the mobile home to defendants in order to receive that refund. That

mobile home may (or may not) have some resale or salvage value, which plaintiff will lose by

relinquishing possession of the home. Moreover, defendants will be entitled to a credit on the

refund price for the value that Brown received from use of the mobile home while it was in her

possession. Thus, correctly stated, the true value of any refund remedy that plaintiff might

receive, and hence the true amount in controversy, equals the difference between the original

purchase price of the mobile home and the value of the mobile home in its present state, with that

figure reduced additionally by the value of plaintiff’s beneficial use of the mobile home in the

interim. See Schimmer, 384 F.3d at 405-06 (plaintiff’s “true money damages - and

concomitantly, the true amount in controversy - would equal only the difference between the

price of the new car and the worth of the allegedly defective car, reduced by his beneficial use of

the defective car”). What is the value of those offsetting amounts? Perhaps the parties intend to

call expert or fact witnesses at trial to offer facts and opinions as to the resale or salvage value of

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 8 of 12
8 To be sure, Kabco maintains in its brief that if plaintiff’s allegations that the

alleged defects in the mobile home cannot be cured are correct, then “the home should be

considered entirely without value.” (Defendant’s Brief (doc. 15), ¶ 8.) That conclusion does not

necessarily follow from the premise. It is not difficult to envision a vast array of “incurable

defects” in a home that would not reduce the home’s value to zero. Nor does the potentiality

(and at this stage, it is nothing more than that) that certain repairs to the home may cost more

than the value of the home necessarily reduce the value of the home to zero, as Kabco argues. 

(Id., ¶ 10.) Besides, there are many scenarios under which Brown could prevail on her MMWA

cause of action without the jury also finding incurable defects or repairs exceeding the home’s

value. Those possible outcomes defeat Kabco’s argument that Brown must necessarily recover

more than $50,000 if she prevails on her MMWA cause of action and that any sub-$50,000

damages award would be legally impermissible.

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the mobile home, and the value that plaintiff derived from living in it. Irrespective of their

intentions, that determination cannot be made today to any degree of certainty, much less to a

legal certainty, as would be needed to override the Complaint’s unequivocal declaration that the

relief sought on the MMWA cause of action is less than $50,000.8

More generally, the parties agree that under Alabama law, damages recoverable under a

breach of warranty claim are measured by “the difference ... between the value of the goods

accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted. ... In a proper case

any incidental and consequential damages ... may also be recovered.” Ala.Code § 7-2-714(2) &

(3); see also Matthews v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, 92 F. Supp.2d 1285, 1288 (S.D. Ala.

2000). The value of the goods accepted and the amounts of any incidental and consequential

damages are both speculative and indeterminate at this time. It is possible that, as Kabco

maintains, plaintiff might prove that the mobile home is entirely without value in its present

condition or that plaintiff’s incidental and consequential damages are sufficiently high to justify

an award in excess of $50,000, when coupled with the difference in value calculation. But it is

far from a legal certainty that this result must necessarily attach, or that damages could never fall

below $50,000, if plaintiff prevails on her MMWA cause of action.

Kabco urges the Court to follow an unpublished decision from the Eleventh Circuit, Allen

v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 2005 WL 3096631 (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2005). In Allen, the

plaintiffs filed suit in state court based on a transaction in which they purchased an allegedly

defective 2002 Lexus for $66,678.65. The defendant removed based on diversity of citizenship,

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 9 of 12
9 The specific allegation in the Complaint that plaintiff seeks less than $50,000 is

reinforced by the Affidavit of J. Charles McCorquodale (doc. 17), in which plaintiff’s counsel

expressly avers that the matter in controversy “is less than the sum of $50,000 as to all of

Plaintiff’s claims arising under the [MMWA].” Id. Such post-removal evidence is generally

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alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that

the defendant had met its burden of proving the amount in controversy by noting that one

component of the plaintiffs’ damages request had a value of $66,678.65, and also listing the

other aspects of the plaintiffs’ damages claim. The Allen court deemed this sufficient. Kabco’s

reliance on Allen is misplaced because, as a threshold matter, Allen is unpublished and therefore

not binding. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding

precedent.”); United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000). More importantly,

defendants here can derive no solace from Allen because the plaintiffs in that case had failed to

plead a specific amount of damages, such that the Allen defendant was subject to the much lower

“preponderance of the evidence” threshold of proof, rather than the rigorous “legal certainty”

test, to establish federal jurisdiction. Allen, 2005 WL 3096631, *2. Simply put, Kabco’s burden

of proving federal jurisdiction is substantially more onerous than that confronting the Allen

defendant. There is no indication in Allen as to whether the defendant in that case might have

satisfied the “legal certainty” standard; thus, Allen does not bolster Kabco’s position.

IV. Conclusion.

In a case where federal removal jurisdiction is predicated on a claim under the MMWA,

jurisdiction exists only where the defendant proves “to a legal certainty that plaintiff, if she

prevailed, would not recover below $50,000.” Burns, 31 F.3d at 1097. The removing defendant

has not satisfied this daunting threshold. There are simply too many intangibles and unknowns

concerning the present value of the mobile home, the value derived by plaintiff from her use of

the mobile home, and any incidental and consequential damages she faced. The Court cannot

conclude on this record that a jury award of less than $50,000 on Brown’s MMWA cause of

action would be legally impermissible. For that reason, the undersigned finds that Kabco has

failed to meet its burden of overcoming the deference and presumption of truth that attaches to

the $50,000 cap recited in the specific amount-in-controversy allegations set forth in the TwentyFirst Cause of Action in the Complaint.9

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 10 of 12
permissible in assessing removal jurisdiction, provided the jurisdictional facts that support

removal are judged as of the time of removal. See Sierminski v. Transouth Financial Corp., 216

F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000). Defendants have filed a Motion to Strike (doc. 18) the Affidavit

as lacking personal knowledge, not addressing the facts at the time of removal, being conclusory,

and making legal conclusions that invade the province of the Court. These objections are

meritless. In weighing motions to remand, courts in this Circuit credit representations of counsel

that their clients will neither seek nor accept recovery exceeding the jurisdictional amount. See,

e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 808 (11th Cir. 2003)

(crediting plaintiff’s counsel’s representation in motion to remand that plaintiff does not seek

and would not accept damages in excess of jurisdictional amount); Matthews, 92 F. Supp.2d at

1289 (similar). The McCorquodale Affidavit is akin to those circumstances, and in any event is

cumulative of statements offered in the Complaint and briefs. While this Affidavit is not as

effective as those filed by plaintiff’s counsel in related cases (as it does not expressly state that

plaintiff will neither seek nor request recovery in excess of $50,000 on the MMWA cause of

action), the Court is satisfied that the McCorquodale Affidavit is grounded in personal

knowledge, reflects the state of affairs obtaining as of the time of removal (inasmuch as it echoes

the amount-in-controversy allegations of the Complaint), and is not otherwise improper;

therefore, the Motion to Strike is denied.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff’s counsel would be wise to heed the cautionary

admonition of Matthews, wherein the court found that the removing defendants had failed to

prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy in a MMWA claim exceeded $50,000,

based in part on plaintiffs’ counsel’s representation that they would neither seek nor accept an

amount in excess of $40,000 on their breach of warranty claim. 92 F. Supp.2d at 1289. In so

ruling, the Matthews court cautioned plaintiffs that, if they later amended their complaint to seek

damages in excess of that jurisdictional threshold, suggesting that they were engaging in

manipulative forum-shopping chicanery, the court would not hesitate to impose “swift” and

“painful” sanctions upon application. Id.; see also Federated, 329 F.3d at 808 & n.6 (observing

that plaintiff’s counsel are officers of the court and subject to Rule 11 sanctions for making

representations for improper purposes, and that motions for sanctions may be initiated and

decided even after underlying case has been resolved and is no longer pending); Burns, 31 F.3d

at 1095 (presuming that plaintiff’s counsel recognizes that representations regarding amount in

controversy “have important legal consequences and, therefore, raise significant ethical

implications for a court officer”). Having unequivocally committed his client to a $50,000 cap

on recovery in both the Complaint and his Affidavit, plaintiff’s counsel is expected scrupulously

to honor the commitment in the state court proceedings.

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Defendants having failed to satisfy their burden of establishing that federal removal

jurisdiction is proper, plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 5) is due to be, and the same hereby is,

granted. Because subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, this action is hereby remanded to the

Circuit Court of Clarke County, Alabama for further proceedings. Defendant Kabco’s Motion to

Strike Affidavit (doc. 18) is denied.

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DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of March, 2007.

 s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00099-WS-C Document 19 Filed 03/15/07 Page 12 of 12