Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02118/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

LLOYD IRVIN TAYLOR, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 13cr1390-MMA 

Related Case No. 16cv2118-MMA 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO VACATE UNDER 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 

[Doc. No. 133] 

 On June 30, 2014, a jury found Defendant Lloyd Irvin Taylor guilty of three counts 

of making a false statement on a United States passport application, in violation of Title 

18, United States Code, section 1542; one count of engaging in a corrupt endeavor to 

obstruct and impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws, in violation of 

Title 26, section 7212(a); two counts of tax evasion, in violation of Title 26, section 7201; 

seven counts of making a false statement to a federally insured financial institution, in 

violation of Title 18, section 1014; and five counts of aggravated identity theft, in 

violation of Title 18, section 1028A. See Doc. No. 98. On November 17, 2014, the 

Court sentenced Defendant to a 57 month term of imprisonment, five years of supervised 

release, and restitution in the amount of $2,241,691.08, to the victim, the Internal 

Revenue Service. See Doc. No. 113. 

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 Defendant now collaterally challenges his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255. See Doc. Nos. 133, 138, 140. Defendant raises multiple claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The government has filed a response, to which 

Defendant replied. See Doc. Nos. 144, 145. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

DENIES Defendant’s motion. 

DISCUSSION1

1. Legal Standard 

 If a defendant in a federal criminal case collaterally challenges his conviction or 

sentence, he must do so pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 

1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). Under section 2255, a court may grant relief to a defendant 

who challenges the imposition or length of his incarceration on the ground that: (1) the 

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the 

court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of 

the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral 

attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A defendant must allege specific facts that, if true, entitle 

him to relief. See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2004); United 

States v. Rodrigues, 347 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

 The Court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing when the issues can be 

conclusively decided on the basis of the existing record. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see United 

States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Hearst, 

638 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.1980)). The Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing 

in this case because the motion, on its face, conclusively demonstrates that Defendant is 

not entitled to relief. 

                                               

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 The Court adopts the factual background as set forth by the government in its response brief. See Doc. 

No. 144 at 2-3. 

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2. Analysis 

 Defendant raises eight separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To 

prevail on such a claim, a defendant must show both that his counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the deficiency in his counsel’s 

performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). There 

is a “strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct was reasonable. Id. at 689. To establish 

deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel did more than just 

commit an error, but rather that counsel performed outside the “wide range of 

professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. With respect to prejudice, a defendant 

must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id at 694. A “reasonable 

probability” means “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 

conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). 

 a) Claim One: Dismissal of Count 4 

 Defendant argues in his first claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

by failing to move for dismissal of Count 4 of the Superseding Indictment. Defendant 

was charged in Count 4 with corruptly obstructing and impeding and endeavoring to 

obstruct and impede the administration of the Internal Revenue Code, in violation of Title 

26, Section 7212(a), which provides in pertinent part: 

Whoever corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or 

impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be 

fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both . . . 

26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Defendant contends that his trial counsel should have moved to 

dismiss the charge because the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, as 

the words “obstructs or impedes” did not place Defendant on notice that his charged acts 

were prohibited. 

The Superseding Indictment charged Defendant with (a) opening and maintaining 

financial accounts in the names of stolen identities; (b) opening and maintaining financial 

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accounts in the names of non-existent churches; (c) paying for personal expenses with 

funds from these nominee financial accounts; and (d) converting his funds to gold coins 

and other precious metals. Each of these acts results in a misrepresentation of the state of 

Defendant’s finances to the IRS, and by necessary implication, obstructs and impedes the 

IRS from administering the internal revenue laws applicable to Defendant. Thus, 

Defendant had notice that his conduct was unlawful. Moreover, every circuit to consider 

a vagueness challenge to Section 7212(a) has found the statute constitutional. See United 

States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474 (4th 

Cir. 1994); United States v. Hanson, 2 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Mitchell, 

985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1992); 

United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1991). As such, Defendant’s trial 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of Count 4. See Baumann v. 

United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal 

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 

b) Claims Two, Six, and Seven: Restitution 

Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on 

several grounds to the restitution portion of his sentence. First, Defendant contends in 

Claims Two and Seven that the Court should not have imposed restitution based on 

Defendant’s tax liability for the years 2004, 2005, and 2006, which fall outside the 

applicable six year statute of limitations for prosecuting the charged offenses. This claim 

fails, as the Ninth Circuit has held that tax liability may be included in the Court’s 

sentencing calculation regardless of whether the statute of limitations prohibits 

prosecution for the underlying violation(s) of the tax laws. United States v. Yip, 592 F.3d 

1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Second, Defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

when he failed to object to the excessive restitution amount, particularly the inclusion of 

prejudgment interest. This claim similarly lacks merit. Trial counsel did object generally 

to the restitution amount, and any objection regarding the amount of prejudgment interest 

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would have been unlikely to change the ultimate result, as prejudgment interest may be 

included in a restitution order. United States v. Morgan, 376 F.3d 1002, 1014 (9th Cir. 

2004); see also United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 626 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Foregone 

interest is one aspect of the victim’s actual loss, and thus may be part of the victim’s 

compensation.”). 

c) Claims Three, Four, and Five: Sentencing 

Defendant raises three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with regards to 

trial counsel’s representation during sentencing. Defendant argues in Claim Three that 

trial counsel should have objected to the imposition of a two-level increase to the offense 

level for the use of “special skills.” Defendant contends in Claim Four that trial counsel 

compounded the error by failing to object to the two-level increase to the base offense 

level due to the use of “sophisticated means.” 

Pursuant to Section 2T1.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines, Defendant’s base 

offense level was increased by two levels because the Court found that the offenses in 

this case involved sophisticated means. The Court further adjusted the offense level 

upward by two levels under Section 3B1.3, finding that Defendant used special skills to 

facilitate the commission of the offenses. Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the record 

clearly establishes that his trial counsel objected thoroughly to the imposition of both 

sentencing enhancements. See Sentencing Hearing Transcript, Doc. No. 117; see also 

Sentencing Memorandum, Doc. No. 105. 

In Claim Five, Defendant argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 

failing to file objections to the Pre-Sentence Report, prepared by Defendant himself and 

sent to counsel via mail. Defendant attaches these objections as Exhibit “G” to his 2255 

motion. A review of the record demonstrates that trial counsel filed a lengthy sentencing 

memorandum, which directly addressed many facts and issues raised in the Pre-Sentence 

Report, as well as Defendant’s own objections. Counsel was not ineffective for filing a 

thoughtful and well-written sentencing memorandum in lieu of Defendant’s pro se

submission. 

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d) Claim Eight: Supervised Release 

Finally, Defendant argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to object to the Court’s imposition of a five-year term of supervised release. 

However, a five-year term was authorized under statute, recommended by United States 

Probation, and within the Court’s discretion to impose. Even if counsel had objected to 

the length of the term, Defendant cannot show that the result would have been different. 

Furthermore, defense counsel did object, on a number of grounds, to the substantive 

conditions of supervised release. The Court considered those objections carefully prior to 

entering judgment. 

3. Conclusion

 In sum, based on the findings and conclusions set forth above, Defendant’s claims 

lack merit. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to collateral relief. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

 Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States 

District Courts provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A defendant must 

obtain a certificate of appealability before pursuing any appeal from a final order in a 

Section 2255 proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). When the denial of a Section 

2255 motion is based on the merits of the claims in the motion, a district court should 

issue a certificate of appealability only when the appeal presents a “substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The defendant must 

show that reasonable jurists could debate whether the issues should have been resolved 

differently or are “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000), quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 

(1983), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Mendez v. 

Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 771 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 The Court has carefully reviewed Defendant’s 2255 motion and considered the 

record as a whole. Because Defendant has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

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of a constitutional right, and because the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not 

debate the denial of Defendant’s motion, the Court declines to issue a certificate of 

appealability. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s 2255 motion. The Court 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court is instructed to 

enter judgment in accordance herewith and close the related civil case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: April 7, 2017 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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