Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02642/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02642-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Billy Ray Snell, Jr.,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-02642-PHX-JAT (MTM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Billy Ray Snell, Jr. has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.)

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

Petitioner pled guilty in Arizona to a felony charge of failure to register as a sex 

offender in relation to prior convictions in Colorado. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality

of his Arizona conviction for failure to register, asserting that at the time he moved to 

Arizona, he would not have been required to register as a sex offender in Colorado. 

Petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was not timely filed under the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Accordingly, the Court recommends that 

the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The Court further recommends that 

Respondents’ Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record (doc. 21) be granted.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background.

On August 16, 2016, Petitioner pled guilty in Pinal County Superior Court to one 

count of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3821. (Doc. 17, Ex. 

C at 12). On September 13, 2016, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of five years of 

probation. (Doc. 17, Ex. D at 17).

B. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings.

Petitioner did not appeal his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals; instead, 

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief (PCR) under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure.1

1. First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On November 9, 2016, Petitioner filed a PCR notice pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32. (Doc. 17, Ex. E at 21). On June 8, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief. (Doc. 18, Ex. K at 3).2 Petitioner argued that his conviction violated the Full Faith 

and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and that his plea agreement was invalid 

due to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 6-12). On August 10, 2017, the Pinal County 

Superior Court denied the PCR petition on the merits. (Doc. 18, Ex. M at 62-63). Petitioner 

did not file a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

2. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On November 15, 2017, Petitioner filed a second notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(Doc. 18, Ex. N at 67), and on January 2, 2018, a second PCR petition, arguing that State 

1 On January 1, 2020, the Arizona Supreme Court amended the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, effective January 20, 2020. The amendments divided post-conviction relief 

procedures between defendants challenging a conviction at trial and defendants 

challenging a conviction pursuant to a plea. Because Petitioner’s proceedings in state court 

were governed by the pre-amendment Rules, any references to the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure in this Report are also to the pre-amendment Rules. See also Demaree 

v. Sanders, No. CV 18-00394-TUC-EJM, 2020 WL 2084582 *2 n.4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 30, 

2020).

2 On December 19, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief without the 

advice and consent of his counsel. (Doc. 17, Ex. H at 38). The Pinal County Superior Court

found the filing constituted improper “hybrid representation” and held it would “have no 

force or effect.” (Doc. 17, Ex. I at 49).

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v. Burbey, 403 P.3d 145 (Ariz. 2017) constituted an intervening change in Arizona state 

law that entitled Petitioner to relief. (Doc. 18, Ex. O at 71-74). On March 15, 2018, the 

Pinal County Superior Court rejected the second PCR petition, finding that Petitioner was 

precluded from attacking the factual basis of his plea agreement because Burbey did not 

represent an intervening change in state law entitling Petitioner to relief. (Doc. 18, Ex. R 

at 103-04). Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

3. Appeal of Probation Violation.

On May 10, 2018, after a hearing, the Pinal County Superior Court determined that 

Petitioner had violated his conditions of probation. (Doc. 18, Ex. S at 107, 124). Petitioner 

was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for the probation violation (doc. 19, Ex. V at 14). 

Petitioner appealed on June 12, 2018 (doc. 18, Ex. P at 81), arguing that the underlying 

conviction for which Petitioner was on probation was invalid, because the State of 

Colorado had not required Petitioner to register as a sex offender since 2010. (Id. at 84).

On March 4, 2019, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation of 

Petitioner’s probation. State v. Snell, No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0175, 2019 WL 1011162 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2019). The Court found that Petitioner could not in his appeal of his 

probation revocation attack the legal sufficiency of his underlying conviction. Id. at *1, 

citing State v. Herrera, 588 P.2d 305, 307 (Ariz. 1978). The Court noted: “Snell argued in 

his first petition for post-conviction relief that he ‘was no longer required to register in the 

state of Colorado.’ He was denied relief on that claim and failed to seek review. We 

therefore do not address the challenge to his conviction.” Snell, 2019 WL 1011162 at *1.

3

III. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On April 22, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1).

The Court summarized Petitioner’s claims as follows:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his previous underlying Colorado 

conviction was wrongfully used to subject him to Arizona’s sex offender 

3 Petitioner filed another four PCR petitions with the Pinal County Superior Court from 

May 23, 2018 to June 20, 2019. (Doc. 18, Ex. T at 127; doc. 19, Ex. Y at 24; doc. 19, Ex. 

BB at 42; doc. 20, Ex. II at 15-16). All four were denied as untimely and successive and

are not discussed further herein because they do not impact the timeliness of the Petition.

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registration statute. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that Arizona’s sex 

offender registration statute is unconstitutional as applied to out-of-state 

convictions. In Ground Three, he alleges that Arizona’s sex offender 

registration statute violates the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250. In Ground Four, he alleges that Arizona’s sex 

offender registration statute violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to 

out-of-state convictions.

(Doc. 10 at 2). Respondents filed their Response (doc. 16) on December 5, 2019 and a 

Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record (doc. 21) on December 9, 2019.4 On January 

10, 2020, Petitioner submitted a Reply (doc. 23).

5

IV. TIMELINESS. 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

Whether a petition is barred by the statute of limitations is a threshold issue that must be 

resolved before considering other procedural issues or the merits of individual claims.

The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period “from the latest of . . . the date 

on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration 

of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because Petitioner pled 

guilty, his first PCR proceeding is considered “of-right” rather than collateral review;

accordingly, the statute of limitations under AEDPA did not begin to run until the 

conclusion of his first PCR proceeding. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 

2007) (“Because a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form of direct review, AEDPA’s oneyear statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for seeking 

such proceeding or review.”). Here, upon denial by the Pinal County Superior Court of 

4 Through inadvertence, Respondents did not file Exhibits KK through NN with this Court 

at the time the Response was submitted. The Court recommends that Respondents’ motion 

be granted.

5 Petitioner’s Reply was untimely filed, as it was submitted on January 10, 2020, six days 

after the deadline to file provided in the Court’s September 10, 2019 Scheduling Order. 

(Doc. 10).

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Petitioner’s first PCR petition on August 10, 2017, (Doc. 18, Ex. M at 62), Petitioner had 

a 35-day window to file a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals; his 

Petition for Review was required to be filed by September 15, 2017. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

1.3(a)(5), 32.9(c)(1)(A). Therefore, absent tolling of the AEDPA limitations period, 

Petitioner was required to file his Petition for Habeas Corpus by September 14, 2018. 

A. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction review 

is pending upon filing of a notice of post-conviction relief. See, Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of 

Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A 

proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the court 

in which the conviction occurred.”). 

Petitioner’s time to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus did not expire on September 

14, 2018, because he is entitled to tolling of his second PCR proceeding. An application is 

“properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 when “its delivery and acceptance are in 

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U.S. 4, 8 (2000). Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g) permits an applicant to seek postconviction 

relief where “there has been a significant change in the law” that “would probably” 

overturn an applicant’s conviction or sentence. Moreover, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) 

exempts Rule 32.1(g) claims from the procedural bar against second or successive PCR 

filings, unless they were previously adjudicated in a PCR proceeding.

Even though Petitioner did not prevail on his second PCR petition, it was “properly 

filed” for purposes of statutory tolling. An applicant need not present a successful claim 

for relief at the state court to receive statutory tolling in federal court. Artuz, 531 U.S. at 9

(“[T]he question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the 

question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious and free of 

procedural bar.”) (emphasis in original). As the second PCR court recognized, the issue as 

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to whether Petitioner could attack the factual basis for the plea was precluded “unless the 

issue is one which may be raised under Rule 32.1(g) as a significant change in the law.” 

(Doc. 18, Ex. R at 104). The second PCR was therefore filed “in compliance with the 

applicable laws and rules governing filings” for purposes of deciding whether the second 

PCR proceeding tolled the AEDPA statute of limitations. Artuz, 531 U.S. at 10-11.

Petitioner filed his second PCR notice on November 15, 2017. (Doc. 18, Ex. N at 

67). Therefore, the AEDPA statute of limitations was tolled from November 15, 2017 until

either March 16, 2018, when the Pinal County Superior Court denied post-conviction relief

(doc. 18, Ex. R. at 103), or until April 21, 2018, the day after expiration of Petitioner’s

thirty-five (35) day period to seek review of the denial.

6

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling while his third post-conviction relief 

proceeding was pending. A state petition that is not filed within the state’s required time 

limit is not “properly filed,” and therefore not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely 

under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. 

Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely state post–conviction petition 

was not “properly filed” under the AEDPA’s tolling provision). Petitioner’s third, fourth, 

fifth, and sixth PCR proceedings were dismissed on timeliness grounds. (Doc. 19, Ex. U at 

3, Ex. AA at 39; Doc. 20, Ex. GG at 9, Ex. JJ at 19). Therefore, they are not considered 

“properly filed” and do not entitle Petitioner to statutory tolling. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to tolling of the limitations period under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); the tolling occurred from November 15, 2017 to either March 16, 

2018 or April 21, 2018.

//

6 The Ninth Circuit in Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) stated 

that when review under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32 is collateral as opposed to “of-right,” the 

tolling period lasted “at least” until the PCR notice was summarily dismissed. The Court 

did not address whether tolling terminates on the exact day the reviewing court issues its 

decision, or if tolling continues until the period to seek review of the adverse decision 

elapses. See Holemen v. Ryan, No. CV-12-02350-PHX-SRB, 2013 WL 3716603 *4-9 (D. 

Ariz. July 15, 2013).

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B. Gap Tolling

The Petitioner is not entitled to toll the time gap between the first two PCR 

proceedings. The time to review the denial of Petitioner’s first PCR petition expired on 

September 14, 2017; Petitioner did not file a second PCR notice until November 15, 2017. 

The time between those two dates counts against the one-year limitations period unless 

Petitioner satisfies the Ninth Circuit’s test set forth in King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

First, we ask whether the petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to an 

elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition. If not, these 

petitions constitute a “new round” and the gap between the rounds is not 

tolled. But if the petitioner simply attempted to correct the deficiencies, then 

the petitioner is still making “proper use of state court procedures,” and his 

application is still “pending” for tolling purposes. We thus construe the new 

petitions as part of the first “full round” of collateral review. We then ask 

whether they were ultimately denied on the merits or deemed untimely. In 

the former event, the time gap between the petitions is tolled; in the latter 

event it is not.

King, 340 F.3d at 823 (citations omitted); see also Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 

1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Petitioner’s second PCR petition asserted that intervening changes in 

Arizona law made a previously non-cognizable claim cognizable. (Doc. 19, Ex. O at 71-

74). Following King, the time between PCR petitions is not tolled, because the second 

PCR was not an “elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition.” See 

also Brown v. Escapule, No. CV-15-00510-PHX-DJH, 2018 WL 2322784 *3 (D. Ariz. 

May 22, 2018).

7

Because Petitioner is not entitled to toll the time gap between the first and second 

PCR proceedings, the AEDPA statute of limitations ran for sixty-two (62) days between 

September 14, 2017, the date the first PCR proceeding concluded, and November 15, 2017, 

when the second PCR proceeding was filed. Accordingly, Petitioner had 303 days from 

either March 16, 2018 or April 21, 2018 to file a timely Petition for Habeas Corpus. 

//

7 Petitioner is also not able to toll the gap between the filing of any of the later PCR petitions 

because the subsequent PCR notices were denied on procedural grounds as untimely or 

precluded.

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C. Relation Back.

Petitioner states in his Reply that he originally filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus on June 7, 2018, docketed by this Court as Case No. 18-CV-01776-JAT-MHB.

(Doc. 23 at 2.) The Court dismissed that Petition on July 31, 2018, noting that Petitioner 

was required to exhaust all administrative remedies in state court before proceeding to 

federal court. (Doc. 8, 18-CV-01776 at 2).8 Petitioner characterizes this Court’s dismissal 

as permitting him one year from the conclusion of his appeal before the Arizona Court of 

Appeals to file his Petition for Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 23, 19-CV-02642 at 2). According to 

Petitioner, because the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its decision on March 4, 2019, the 

AEDPA statute of limitations did not expire until March 4, 2020, rendering the Petition

(filed on April 22, 2019) timely. (Id.). While Petitioner does not use the term “relation 

back,” his argument is apparently that the present Petition is timely because its claims 

“relate back” to the 2018 Petition.

Petitioner is not correct that his present Petition relates back to the 2018 Petition. 

The “relation back” rule of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and (c) is construed more narrowly in the 

context of habeas proceedings. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662 (2005). The “relation 

back” rule in habeas proceedings requires new claims “to relate back to claims properly 

contained in the original petition—that is, those claims that were exhausted at the time of 

filing.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1142 (9th Cir. 2009). However, as noted by this Court 

in dismissing the earlier Petition for Habeas Corpus, Petitioner’s claims in his 2018 Petition 

were not exhausted at time of filing. (Doc. 8, 18-CV-01776 at 2). Therefore, the present 

Petition does not “relate back” to the 2018 Petition.

D. Calculation of Timeliness.

Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the first and second PCR proceedings, but not for 

the sixty-two (62) day gap between the two proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner had 303 

days from either March 16, 2018 or April 21, 2018 to file the Petition. Using either date, 

8 Because the dismissal of the 2018 Petition for Habeas Corpus was not a “decision on the 

merits,” the current Petition is not “second or successive” under the AEDPA. See Green v. 

White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1002 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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the Petition was untimely and should be denied. 

Using the March 16, 2018 date (the date the Pinal County Superior Court denied 

Petitioner’s second PCR petition), the Petition was untimely by ninety-eight (98) days, as 

it was required to be filed by January 14, 2019 (303 days from March 16, 2018). The 

Petition was filed on April 22, 2019.

Using the April 21, 2018 date (the date of expiration of Petitioner’s opportunity to 

seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals of the March 16, 2018 denial of his second 

PCR petition), the Petition was untimely by sixty-three (63) days, as it was required to be 

filed by February 18, 2019 (303 days from April 21, 2018). Petitioner did not file his 

untimely Petition until April 22, 2019. 

V. EQUITABLE RELIEF.

An untimely petitioner may still obtain review if petitioner can demonstrate that 

relief is warranted on equitable grounds. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable relief.

A. Equitable Tolling.

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. “A petitioner who seeks equitable 

tolling of AEDPA’s one–year filing deadline must show that (1) some ‘extraordinary 

circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and (2) he has diligently pursued his 

rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Equitable tolling is only appropriate 

when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to 

file a timely habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a petition 

on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010).

As Petitioner argued that the Petition is timely (doc. 1-1, Petition at 8), Petitioner 

did not identify any extenuating circumstances that prevented him from filing on time. 

Nothing in the record suggests that Petitioner was prevented from filing a timely Petition 

by external forces out of Petitioner’s control. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met the “very 

high bar” necessary to trigger equitable tolling. Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 

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1077 (9th Cir. 2014).

B. Actual Innocence.

Petitioner has not made a showing of actual innocence. Petitioner can avoid 

procedural default if he can demonstrate that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would 

result from this Court’s failure to reach the merits of his claim. “Actual innocence, if 

proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment 

is a procedural bar . . . [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] petitioner is actually 

innocent when he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.” Alaimalo v. United 

States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). Actual innocence is demonstrated when a 

Petitioner shows “in light of subsequent case law, that he cannot, as a legal matter, have 

committed the alleged crime.” Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014).

In Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding, the Pinal County Superior Court rejected 

Petitioner’s argument that a subsequent change in Arizona law established that Petitioner 

was innocent of having violated A.R.S. § 13-3821. The Court noted: 

[t]here is no change in the applicable statutes or case law. This is a case in 

which the defendant reduced his risk of a higher sentence by entering into a 

plea agreement that waived this same legal argument. This issue is now 

precluded because the alleged change in law is not a “transformative event” 

or a “clear break from the past” as defined in Shrum. 

(Doc. 19, Ex. R at 104).

Federal courts are required to defer to state courts on questions of state law in 

habeas proceedings. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (“We have repeatedly 

held that a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct 

appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”). 

Because the PCR court’s decision is a state court interpretation of state law, this Court is 

bound by its holding. Therefore, Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing of actual 

innocence warrant review of his untimely Petition.

//

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Petitioner points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nichols v. United States, 136 

S.Ct. 1113 (2016) as an intervening decision that establishes that Petitioner is actually 

innocent. (Doc. 1 at 10-11). However, nothing in Nichols calls into question the validity of 

Arizona’s registration statutes; Nichols merely stands for the proposition that SORNA does 

not require a sex offender to update their registration in a state where they no longer reside. 

Nichols, 136 S.Ct. at 1118. (“SORNA’s plain text—in particular, §16913(a)’s consistent 

use of the present tense—therefore did not require Nichols to update his registration in 

Kansas once he no longer resided there.”) Nichols does not establish Petitioner’s actual 

innocence.

Petitioner also cites to Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010). Carr is 

inapposite -- it discusses whether a sex offender could be prosecuted under federal law for 

failing to re-register after moving to a different state prior to the enactment of SORNA. 

Carr, 560 U.S. at 441. (“Among its provisions, [SORNA] established a federal criminal 

offense covering, inter alia, any person who [...] knowingly fails to register or update a 

registration.”) (emphasis added). Carr does not establish limitations on conduct that may 

be criminalized by state legislatures; the crime for which Petitioner was convicted was 

codified in A.R.S. § 13-3821. 

Because Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Court should apply equitable 

tolling, and because Petitioner has not shown that he is actually innocent, the Court 

concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable relief from the untimely filing of his 

Petition. Accordingly, the Petition should be denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims 

are untimely without excuse. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

//

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents’ Motion for Leave to 

Supplement the Record (doc. 21) be GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural 

ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days to file a 

response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 2nd day of June, 2020.

Honorable Michael T. Morrissey

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:19-cv-02642-JAT Document 26 Filed 06/02/20 Page 12 of 12