Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00751/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-00751-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:227 Restrictions of Use of Telephone Equipment

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United States District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

COLIN R. BRICKMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

FACEBOOK, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-00751-TEH 

ORDER DENYING FACEBOOK’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

On August 9, 2016, Facebook filed a motion to dismiss Brickman’s First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 50. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 5.1, Facebook also filed a Notice of Constitutional Question to the Attorney General of 

the United States. ECF No. 51. And pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(c), the United States 

intervened in the case for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the 

TCPA. ECF No. 62. Brickman and the United States timely opposed Facebook’s motion 

to dismiss, ECF Nos. 55, 63; and Facebook timely replied. ECF No. 64. On September 

11, 2016, the Court requested supplemental briefing from both Brickman and Facebook 

addressing whether the TCPA and its exceptions would pass strict scrutiny. See ECF No. 

68. Both parties submitted supplemental briefing. ECF Nos. 71–72. A hearing was held 

on Facebook’s motion on January 23, 2017. After carefully considering the parties’ 

written and oral arguments, the Court DENIES Facebook’s motion for the reasons set forth 

below. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff Brickman’s First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”), unless otherwise stated, and are therefore accepted as true 

for the purposes of this motion. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 

(2007).

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Defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) owns and operates the online social 

networking service, www.facebook.com. ECF No. 43. (“FAC”) ¶ 5. There are more than 

156 million Facebook users in the United States, and more than 2 billion worldwide. Id. 

While Facebook does not own factories, physical product inventory, or saleable goods, it 

generates revenue from the activities of Facebook users. Id. ¶ 19. In fact, in its investment 

publications, Facebook defines each time a user engages on the Facebook platform as a 

“revenue-generating activity.” Id. ¶ 20. In an effort to increase user traffic, which in turn 

drives Facebook’s advertising revenue, Facebook sent out “Birthday Announcements 

Texts” to cell phones of Facebook users inviting them to engage with the Facebook 

platform. Id. ¶ 5.

Facebook employed computer software to send Birthday Announcement Texts to 

users. Id. ¶ 67. Facebook’s computer system, without any human intervention, reviews 

user data on a daily basis to identify users who have birthdays on a particular day; 

identifies the user’s Facebook friends who will receive the Birthday Text Announcement 

Texts for a particular user’s birthday; identifies the phone numbers of the Facebook 

friends that will receive the message; automatically inserts the name of the user celebrating 

a birthday into a form text in the appropriate language for each of the user’s Facebook 

friends, creates the Birthday Announcement Text; compiles a list of cell phone numbers to 

which it will send Birthday Text Announcements, stores those cell phone numbers in a 

queue, and then sends the text messages from that queue. Id. ¶¶ 66–73. 

On or about December 15, 2015, Facebook, through its short code SMS number 

32665033, texted Brickman’s cell phone number an unsolicited Birthday Announcement 

Text stating “Today is Jim Stewart’s birthday. Reply to post a wish on his Timeline or 

reply with 1 to post ‘Happy Birthday!’”. Id. ¶ 84. Although Brickman supplied Facebook 

his cell phone number, which is associated to his Facebook page, Brickman indicated in 

the Notification Settings of his Facebook account, prior to receiving the text message, that 

he did not want to receive any text messages from Facebook, and also did not activate text 

messaging for his cell phone. ¶¶ 2, 36, 79–82, 85. On February 2, 2016, Brickman filed a 

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putative class action suit against Facebook, alleging that Facebook violates the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) by sending unauthorized text messages. ECF No. 1. 

He seeks to represent the following class: “All individuals who received one or more 

Birthday Announcement Texts from Defendant to a cell phone through the use of an 

automated telephone dialing system at any time without their consent.” FAC ¶ 97. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) when a plaintiff’s 

allegations fail to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). Specifically, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to 

a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact 

as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Vasquez v. L.A. Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts are not “bound to accept 

as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 

omitted). Dismissal of claims that fail to meet this standard should be with leave to 

amend, unless it is clear that amendment could not possibly cure the complaint’s 

deficiencies. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). 

III. DISCUSSION

1. Brickman has Sufficiently Alleged a Violation of the TCPA.

A valid TCPA claim requires plaintiff to allege (1) Defendant called a cellular 

telephone number; (2) using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”); and (3) 

without the recipient’s prior express consent. Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 707 

F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). A text message is a “call” within the meaning of the 

TCPA. Sutterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009). The 

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TCPA defines an automated telephone dialing system as “equipment which has the 

capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential 

number generator; and to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit 

has determined this meaning to be “clear and unambiguous,” Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 951, 

and has clarified that in analyzing whether a device is an ATDS the Court’s “focus must be 

on whether the equipment has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be 

called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Meyer, 707 F.3d at 1043. 

Therefore, “a system need not actually store, produce, or call randomly or sequentially 

generated telephone numbers; it need only have the capacity to do it.” Id. (quoting 

Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 951). 

Additionally, pursuant to its authority to “prescribe regulations to implement the 

requirements” of the Act’s prohibitions, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2), the Federal 

Communications Commission (“FCC”) has issued a number of declaratory rulings on 

whether particular equipment qualifies as an ATDS. For example, the FCC has stated the 

basic functions of an ATDS are to “dial numbers without human intervention” and to “dial 

thousands of numbers in a short period of time,” In re Matter of Rules and Regulations 

Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7975 

(2015) (“2015 FCC Order”), and has also clarified that the ATDS definition “covers any 

equipment that has the specified capacity to generate numbers and dial them without 

human intervention regardless of whether the numbers called are randomly or sequentially 

generated or come from calling lists." In the Matter of Rules and Regulations 

Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 FCC Rcd. 15391, 

15392 n. 5 (2012) (emphasis in original) (“2012 FCC Order”). Moreover, the FCC has 

clarified that “[h]ow the human intervention element applies to a particular piece of 

equipment is specific to each individual piece of equipment, based on how the equipment 

functions and depends on human intervention, and is therefore a case-by-case 

determination.” 2015 FCC Order, at 7975. “This [C]ourt is bound by the FCC’s 

interpretations of the TCPA, unless those interpretations are invalidated by a court of 

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appeals”. Reardon v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 

2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2342 et seq. and Pac. Bell v. Pac-West Telecomm, Inc., 325 F.3d 

1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Here, Brickman alleges that Facebook employs computer software to send 

“Birthday Announcement Texts” without human intervention to users. FAC ¶ 67. More 

specifically, Brickman alleges Facebook’s computer system, without any human 

intervention, reviews user data on a daily basis to identify users who have birthdays on a 

particular day; identifies the users’ Facebook friends who will receive the Birthday Text 

Announcement Texts for a particular user’s birthday; identifies the cell phone numbers of 

the Facebook friends that will receive the message; automatically inserts the name of the 

user celebrating a birthday into a form text in the appropriate language for each of the 

user’s Facebook friends, creates the Birthday Announcement Text; compiles a list of cell 

phone numbers to which it will send Birthday Text Announcements, stores those cell 

phone numbers in a queue, and then causes the text messages to be sent from that queue. 

Id. ¶¶ 66–73. Brickman argues the alleged computer system is an ATDS because such a 

system has the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers without human intervention; 

and also because the system has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers using 

a random or sequential number generator, and to dial telephone numbers without human 

intervention. Id. ¶¶ 74–75. 

In contrast, Facebook contends Brickman has not sufficiently alleged a TCPA claim 

because the content of the birthday message and the context of the alleged birthday 

message, along with the absence of other messages, supports a finding that the text was the 

result of direct targeting following human intervention. ECF No. 50 (“Mot.”) at 8:7–10. 

In support of this, Defendants rely heavily on Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., No. 15-cv-00985-

JST, 2016 WL 1169365, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016), where the court examined 

whether a plaintiff had plausibly alleged a violation of the TCPA. The plaintiff there 

alleged that although he never provided his cell phone number to Facebook nor did he 

authorize it to send him messages, he had received text messages from an SMS short code 

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licensed to and operated by Facebook, using the following template: “Your Facebook 

account was accessed from [internet browser] at [time]. Log in for more info.” Id. at *1. 

The plaintiff also made a conclusory allegation that the text messages “were made with an 

ATDS” and that the “ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be 

called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Id. In determining whether the 

plaintiff’s conclusory allegation supported a claim for relief under the TCPA, the court 

analyzed “the content of the message, the context in which it was received, and the 

existence of similar messages.” Id. at *5. In doing so, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s

TCPA claim because his “allegations suggest[ed] that Facebook’s login notification 

messages [were] targeted to specific phone numbers and [were] triggered by attempts to 

log in to Facebook accounts associated with those phone numbers.” Id.

Facebook argues that Duguid warrants the same outcome here. First, Facebook 

argues the content of the message shows the text message was specifically targeted to 

Brickman because it identified a specific individual, with a specific connection to plaintiff, 

relating to a specific event on a specific date. Mot. at 9:23–27. And while Brickman 

alleges the use of a fill-in-the-blank template, Facebook argues such a template is strong 

evidence of the sort of specific targeting inconsistent with the use an ATDS. Id. at 9:27–

10:3. Second, in regard to the context of the message, Facebook argues the message does 

not suggest a generic marketing message that was sent en masse with an ATDS. Mot. at 

10:17-18. Again, this is because Facebook’s message was geared to a particular plaintiff 

about a particular event and because it was not a telemarketing advertisement. Mot. at 18–

24. Lastly, Facebook argues that because Brickman received the birthday text only once, 

the message is fully consistent with direct targeting and cuts against a finding that 

Facebook used an ATDS. Mot. at 2–5. 

While the call is certainly a close one, viewing Brickman’s allegations in the light 

most favorable to him, this Court finds he has alleged enough to support a TCPA claim 

against Facebook. First, in contrast to the plaintiff in Duguid, here, Brickman has alleged 

more than a conclusory allegation that Facebook used an ATDS to send out text messages 

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– he has alleged exactly how Facebook’s software determines who to text, how it gathers 

the contact information needed to send out texts, how it creates text messages, and how it 

sends them out, all without human intervention. Such equipment falls within the FCC’s 

definition of an ATDS, as the alleged equipment would have the “capacity to generate 

numbers and dial them without human intervention” even if the numbers came from a 

calling list. See 2015 FCC Order, at 8077. Second, here, peripheral considerations such as 

the content of Facebook’s text message, the context of the Facebook’s text message, and 

the existence of similar messages do not preclude a finding that Facebook employed an 

ATDS to send out the Birthday Announcement Texts. While Facebook’s Birthday 

Announcement Texts do suggest direct targeting of Brickman, based on the facts alleged it 

is plausible that Facebook could have used an ATDS to send out the targeted messages. 

This is especially true in a situation like this where Brickman alleges Facebook possessed

the particular information and technology needed to craft such targeted messages (i.e., cell 

phone numbers, users’ birthdays, friendship connections, etc.).1 See FAC ¶ 67. 

Facebook also attempts to strike down Brickman’s TCPA claim by arguing it was 

triggered by human intervention. Mot. at 12–14. Facebook argues the Birthday 

Announcement Text was triggered by human intervention because the following steps 

were taken: Brickman signed up for Facebook; linked his cell phone number to his profile; 

befriended Mr. Stewart on Facebook, who himself entered his birth date; and then decided 

to share that date with his Facebook friends. Mot. at 13:18–25. As mentioned above, 

whether human intervention exists is a case-by-case determination that requires the Court 

to analyze “how the equipment functions and depends on human intervention.” 2015 FCC 

Order, at 7975. In other words, the FCC requires the Court to determine to what extent 

human intervention is the impetus for the transmission of the challenged message. 

 

1

Facebook also cited to several other cases supporting its “content, context, and similar 

messages” argument, see, e.g., Flores v. Adir Int’l, LLC, No. CV 15-00076-AB, 2015 WL 

4340020 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015) and Weisberg v. Stripe, Inc., No. 16-cv-00584-JST, 

2016 WL 3971296 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2016), but these cases are distinguishable. Unlike 

the plaintiffs in these cases, Brickman has alleged, in sufficient detail, how Facebook’s 

software operates as an ATDS. 

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Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2015). Considering the 

allegations put forth in Brickman’s FAC and viewing them in the light most favorable to 

him, the Court finds that Brickman’s and Mr. Stewart’s actions were not the impetus for

Facebook sending the Birthday Announcement Text. This is particularly true where 

Brickman alleges he gave Facebook his cell phone number but that his account settings 

gave Facebook “unambiguous notice” that it did not have consent to send him text 

messages. FAC ¶¶ 2, 78. Also, the FCC has stated equipment may be considered an 

ATDS regardless of whether the numbers come from a calling list. 2015 FCC Order, at 

8077. This FCC interpretation would mean nothing if merely adding phone numbers to a 

calling list – which would always undoubtedly require some human conduct – was deemed 

to constitute “human intervention.” This is not a situation like Weisberg, 2016 WL 

3971296, or Cours v. Life360, Inc., No. 16-cv-00805-THE, 2016 WL 4039279 (N.D. Cal. 

July 28, 2016), where automated messages were directly triggered by an individual’s

affirmative acts inviting such communications. Simply stated, this Court agrees with other 

courts which have determined that because a person will always be a but-for cause of any 

action’s machine, “human intervention” for purposes of the TCPA requires more than butfor causation. Sherman,150 F. Supp. 3d at 1219. Also in Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 14 

CV 2028, 14 CV 2752, 2014 WL 7005102, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2014), the Court 

refused to find “human intervention” existed where there was some evidence a computer 

software program could “pull numbers and dial them without a person ordering a specific 

system message.” Here, Brickman has alleged Facebook’s dialing system can do exactly 

that.

2. The Court Need Not Address Whether Brickman Granted Facebook Consent 

at the Motion to Dismiss Stage

While Facebook suggests that Brickman provided prior express consent to receive 

the text message from it, Brickman has continuously alleged that at all relevant times he 

indicated in the Notification Settings of his Facebook account that he did not consent to 

receive any text messages from Facebook, including the Birthday Announcement Texts. 

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FAC ¶¶ 2, 36, 79–82, 85. For purposes of this motion, the Court must “accept all material 

allegations of fact as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1249. Accordingly, while the issue may be disputed 

at a later time, the Court shall accept as true Brickman’s allegation that he did not provide 

consent to receive text messages from Facebook.

3. Constitutionality of the TCPA under the First Amendment

Because the Court finds that Brickman’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim 

under the TCPA, Facebook challenges the constitutionality of the TCPA under the First 

Amendment both as-applied and on its face. Mot. at 17. Because invalidating the TCPA 

would release Facebook from potential liability and therefore redress its injuries, Facebook 

has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the TCPA. McCormack v. Herzog, 788 

F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2015) (in order to challenge a statute, a plaintiff must show a 

realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s enforcement). The 

Court shall first address the facial challenge, and then the as-applied challenge. 

a. Facebook’s Facial Challenge

Facebook argues the recent Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 

2218 (2015), requires that the TCPA be subject to strict scrutiny. In Reed, the Court was 

analyzing the constitutionality of a town’s comprehensive sign code (“Sign Code”) that 

prohibited the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but exempted twenty-three 

categories of signs including ideological signs, political signs, and temporary directional 

signs. Id. at 2224. The scheme provided different regulations for different categories of 

signs. For example, ideological signs which were defined as signs “communicating a 

message or ideas” that did not fit in any other Sign Code category, could be up to twenty 

square feet and had no placement or time restrictions. Id. At the same time, “political 

signs,” which were defined as signs “designed to influence the outcome of an election,” 

could be up to thirty-two square feet and could only be displayed during an election 

season; and “Temporary Directional signs,” defined as “signs directing the public to a 

church or other ‘qualifying event,’” had to be limited to four signs or less, were limited to 

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six square feet, and could not be displayed more than twelve hours before the ‘qualifying 

event’ or beyond one hour after the event. Id.at 2224–25. 

In analyzing the constitutionality of the Sign Code, the Court explained that courts 

must first determine whether the law is content neutral on its face. Id. at 2228. The Court 

further explained that “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny 

regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of 

‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” Id. A government regulation 

of speech is content-based “if [the] law applies to particular speech because of the topic 

discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Id. at 2227. The Court then applied this 

framework to the Sign Code and found it to be content-based because the restrictions that 

applied to any given sign “depend[ed] entirely on the communicative content of the sign.” 

Id. at 2227. Therefore, the Sign Code was subject to strict scrutiny and, to survive, the 

town was required to prove the restriction furthered a compelling interest and that it was 

narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 2231. 

The town claimed that the Sign Code furthered the compelling interests of 

preserving the Town’s aesthetic appeal and promoting traffic safety. Id. Yet, even while 

assuming these were compelling governmental interests, the Court found the Sign Code 

failed strict scrutiny because it was “hopelessly underinclusive.” Id. Specifically, the 

Court found that temporary direction signs were “no greater an eyesore” than ideological 

or political ones; that the code allowed “unlimited proliferation” of large ideological signs 

while strictly limiting the number, size, and duration of smaller ones; and that the town 

offered no reason to believe that directional signs posed a greater threat to traffic safety 

than ideological or political signs. Id. at 2231–32. In light of this underclusiveness, the 

Court struck the Sign Code down because “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an 

interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction on truthful speech, when it 

leaves appreciable damages to that supposedly vital interest prohibited.” Id. at 2232 

(quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 965, 780 (2002)). 

Applying Reed to the TCPA, Facebook argues the TCPA is content-based because 

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“it’s riddled with exceptions that ‘draw[] distinctions based on the message a speaker 

conveys.” Mot. at 19:1–3. In particular, Facebook points to three provisions in the TCPA: 

(1) an exemption applying to any “call made for emergency purposes” (47 U.S.C. § 

227(b)(1)(A)); (2) an exemption applying to any call “made solely to collect a debt owed 

to or guaranteed by the United States (Id. at § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)); and (3) a section 

empowering the FCC to exempt calls made with an ATDS to a cell phone number if the 

calls “are not charged to the called party” and are “in the interest of the privacy rights [the 

TCPA] is intended to protect” (Id. at § 227(b)(2)(C)). Mot. at 19–20. 

This Court agrees that the first two exceptions are content-based and therefore 

subject to strict scrutiny. Certainly, each of these exceptions would require a court to 

examine the content of the message that is conveyed in order to determine if a violation of 

the TCPA has occurred. Brickman’s and the government’s arguments to the contrary are 

not persuasive. First, Brickman argues the TCPA’s emergency exemption is contentneutral because whether a call or text falls within the exception depends on the situation

rather than the content of the message. ECF No. 55 (“Opp’n”), at 11:20–26. But such an 

interpretation would lead to puzzling results as it would mean that any message sent during 

a natural disaster or power outage would fall within the emergency exception, regardless of 

whether the message conveyed safety information, an advertisement, or a joke. This also 

runs counter to the statutory definition which defines emergency purposes as “calls made 

necessary in any situation affecting the health and safety of consumers.” 47 C.F.R. §

64.1200(f)(4). Whether a call is “necessary” in a situation affecting the health and safety 

of consumers would depend on the content of the call, not just whether an emergency 

situation exists. 

Second, Brickman argues the debt-collection exception is also content-neutral 

because the “exception is based on the called party’s debtor-creditor relationship with the 

government, not on the content of the message.” Opp’n at 12:1–4. This too is 

unconvincing. The plain language of the exception makes no reference whatsoever to the 

relationship of the parties. Rather the exception applies to all calls made to collect debt 

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owed or guaranteed by the United States. Brickman’s and the government’s cited 

authorities in support of this “relationship” argument are inapposite. In both Van Bergen v. 

Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995), where the court found a Minnesota statute 

regulating the use of automatic dialing-announcing devices to be content-neutral, and 

Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16-2059, 2017 WL 25482 (7th Cir. 2017), where 

the court found Indiana’s Automated Dialing Machine Statute to be content-neutral, the

statutes at issue expressly exempted calls from regulation based on a caller’s relationship

to the recipient, not content. 

The third exemption, however, is not a content-based restriction. During oral 

arguments, Facebook clarified it is not challenging any exceptions made under the FCC’s 

authority, nor is it arguing that the FCC has taken actions that are not consistent with the 

statute. Instead, Facebook is challenging the FCC’s authority to create exemptions to the 

TCPA because, Facebook argues, such authority “plainly calls for the scrutiny of the 

content of the message to determine whether it is consistent with the government’s views 

on privacy.” ECF No. 64 (“Reply”) at 15:17–18. This argument is unavailing. Although 

the statute empowers the FCC to create exceptions that promote the interest of privacy 

rights, there are content-neutral ways for the FCC to accomplish this. Indeed, like the 

statutes at issue in Van Bergen, 59 F.3d at 1545 n. 2, or Patriotic Veterans, 2017 WL 

25482, at *1, the FCC could create exceptions based on a party’s relationship. The mere 

possibility that the FCC could create a content-based exception at some later time does not 

render this exception to be content-based itself. 

In sum, this Court finds the emergency and government-debt exceptions to the 

TCPA to be content-based. Accordingly, Reed requires that the TCPA and the first two 

exemptions be subject to strict scrutiny. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. 

i. The TCPA Withstands Strict Scrutiny

In order to survive strict scrutiny, “the government [must] prove that the restriction 

furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Reed, 135 

S. Ct. at 2231. While strict scrutiny is a difficult standard to meet, the Supreme Court has 

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sought to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” 

Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (citation omitted). Here, the 

Court finds the TCPA survives strict scrutiny. 

1. The TCPA Serves a Compelling Interest

The government devoted several pages supporting its claim that there is a 

compelling government interest in protecting residential privacy. ECF No. 63 (“U.S. 

Opp’n”) at 17–19. Specifically, the government provided several Congressional records 

stating, inter alia, that the TCPA was enacted “to protect the privacy interests of residential 

telephone subscribers;” that Congress determined automated telephone calls to be “an 

invasion to privacy, an impediment to interstate commerce, and a disruption to essential 

public safety services;” and that Congress determined that enacting the TCPA was “the 

only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy 

invasion.” U.S. Opp’n at 18. Facebook assumes for purposes of this motion that 

promoting privacy is a compelling state interest. Reply at 22:20–21. 

The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized that “[t]he State’s interest in 

protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest 

order in a free and civilized society.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980); Frisby v. 

Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (same); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 

753, 775 (1994) (same); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (same). 

See also Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 (“Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to 

which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is 

surely an important value.”). Further, the Court has recognized that the interest in

residential privacy applies with greater force when individuals seek protection from 

unwanted speech and has explicitly recognized the Government’s ability to protect this 

freedom: 

One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the 

unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we expect 

individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear, 

[citations], the home is different. . . . [A] special benefit of the 

privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the 

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State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. 

Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not required 

to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the 

government may protect this freedom. 

Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484–85 (citations omitted). In accordance with this legal authority, and 

because neither party contests the matter, the Court holds the TCPA serves a compelling 

government interest in promoting residential privacy. 

2. The TCPA is Narrowly Tailored

Despite assuming the TCPA serves a compelling interest, Facebook argues the 

TCPA still cannot survive strict scrutiny because the TCPA is both underinclusive and 

overinclusive, and because there are less restrictive means of achieving the compelling 

interest. ECF No. 72 (“FB Supp.”) at 1:7–12. The Court addresses each point in turn. 

a. The TCPA is Not Underinclusive

The Supreme Court has recognized that while “underinclusivity raises a red flag, 

the First Amendment imposes no freestanding ‘underinclusiveness limitation.’” WilliamsYulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. After all, “[i]t is always somewhat counterintuitive to argue that 

a law violates the First Amendment by abridging too little speech.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). Yet, underinclusiveness of a statute can raise doubts as to whether the 

government is pursuing an interest it invokes or whether the statute furthers a compelling 

interest. Id. Because “[a] State need not address all aspects of a problem in one fell 

swoop,” the Supreme Court has “upheld laws – even under strict scrutiny – that 

conceivably could have restricted even greater amounts of speech in service of their stated 

interests.” Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015). 

Facebook argues that TCPA’s speech restrictions are “hopelessly underinclusive” 

under Reed because texts about emergencies or government debt are no less intrusive to 

privacy than other types of calls. Mot. at 21. However, the Sign Code in Reed is

distinguishable from this case. First, in Reed the Court was addressing a Sign Code that 

sought to preserve the aesthetics of the town and to promote traffic safety by prohibiting 

outdoor signs without a permit. Yet the ordinance itself provided twenty-three exceptions. 

Here, in contrast, the TCPA is not “riddled with exceptions” as it only contains only two

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exceptions, with the possibility for the FCC to set other exceptions in the future.2 

Second, unlike the Sign Code in Reed which allowed “unlimited proliferation” of 

one type of sign while strictly limiting a different type of sign, here, neither exception 

allows for unlimited proliferation of any type of call. Emergency calls by their statutory 

definition would only be allowed under limited circumstances, for a limited time, and for 

limited purposes.3 Moreover, Congress determined that banning such automated or 

prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to 

receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the 

health and safety of the consume, is the only effective means of protecting telephone 

consumers from the nuisance and privacy invasion.” Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(12), 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (emphasis added). In other 

words, Congress carefully balanced the interests in the health and safety of consumers with 

the interests in protecting privacy and determined the emergency call exception was 

carefully tailored to address both interests. 

The government debt exception would likewise be limited by the fact that such calls 

would only be made to those who owe a debt to the federal government. On a related note, 

the Supreme Court has recognized that the “United States and its agencies . . . are not 

subject to the TCPA’s prohibitions because no statute lifts their immunity.” CampbellEwald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016). In other words, the government-debt 

exception to the TCPA does not present a First Amendment problem because it merely 

carves out an exception for something the federal government is already entitled to do, and 

government speech is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. Pleasant Grove City, Utah 

v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) (The government’s own speech is exempt from 

First Amendment scrutiny); see also Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Com’n, 586 

 

2 As stated above, Facebook has stated it is not contesting any exemptions created under 

the FCC’s authority to create exemptions under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(2)(C). See supra

Section III.3.a. 

3 Notably, in Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232, the Court recognized that a speech regulation 

narrowly tailored to address the challenges of protecting safety “well might survive strict 

scrutiny.”

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F.3d 1219, 1220 (9th Cir. 2009) (“government speech [] is immune to challenge under the 

First Amendment”). And even assuming this newly-added exception4 were to be invalid, it 

would not deem the entire TCPA to be unconstitutional because the exception would be 

severable from the remainder of the statute. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931–32 

(1983) (“invalid portions of a statute are to be severed unless it is evident that the 

Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,

independently of that which is not.”)

Indeed, the Reed court stated that a law cannot justify a restriction on speech in the 

name of a vital interest, “when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital 

interest unprohibited.” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232. Here, the TCPA’s exemptions leave 

negligible damage to the statutes interest in protecting privacy. In sum, the Court finds the 

exceptions to the TCPA are narrow and not underinclusive to the degree it is “hopeless”, 

nor to the degree that it allows “unlimited proliferation” of privacy intrusions, nor to the 

degree that it leaves “appreciable damage” to its vital interest in protecting residential 

privacy. 

b. The TCPA is Not Overinclusive

Facebook also argues the TCPA is overinclusive because “in purporting to target 

the ill of unwanted telemarketing it sweeps in speech that facilitates social connections.” 

FB Supp. at 3:16–18. In support of this argument, Facebook cites to congressional 

findings in support of the TCPA where Congress repeatedly identified telemarketing as a 

threat to privacy. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act § 2. But the TCPA is quite 

limited in what it prohibits. It only restricts calls made using an ATDS without the prior 

express consent of the recipient. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(a). In other words, the TCPA 

does not restrict individuals from receiving any content they want to receive – speech that 

would otherwise be prohibited by the TCPA is immediately removed from the purview of 

the statute once express consent is provided. If individuals want to receive speech from 

 

4

The government-debt exception was added to the TCPA in 2015. See Bipartisan Budget 

Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 301, 129 Stat. 584, 588 (2015) 

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Facebook that facilitates social connections, they are not prohibited from doing so. 

Accordingly, this Court finds the TCPA is not overinclusive.

3. Facebook’s Suggested Alternatives Are Not Effective

Lastly, Facebook argues that the TCPA is not narrowly tailored because there are 

less restrictive alternatives that can regulate robocalls. FB Supp. at 4:15–22. The Supreme 

Court has explained that “[l]ess restrictive alternatives must be at least as effective in 

achieving the legitimate purpose that statute was enacted to serve.” Reno v. Am. Civil 

Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). Facebook suggests that two other courts have 

already recognized less restrictive alternatives for “protecting residential privacy and 

tranquility from unwanted and intrusive robocalls.” Mot. at 22. Specifically, Facebook 

points to Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 406 (4th Cir. 2015), where the court found 

plausible alternatives to include time-of-day limitations, mandatory disclosure of the 

caller’s identity, and do-not-call lists. But in Cahaly, the court only found these 

alternatives to be plausible because the “government [] offered no evidence showing that 

these alternatives would not be effective in achieving its interest.” Id. Facebook also 

points to Gresham v. Rutledge, No. 4:16CV00241 JLH, 2016 WL 4027901, at *4 and nn. 

17–19 (E.D. Ark. July 27, 2016), where the Court recognized plausible less restrictive 

alternatives to include time-of-day limitations, disconnection requirements, and 

prohibitions on calls to emergency lines. Id. But similar to Cahaly, the government in 

Gresham did not contest these three alternatives and “therefore fail[ed] to demonstrate that 

no less restrictive alternative [was] available.” Id. 

Here, in contrast to the defendants in Cahaly and Gresham, the Government is 

contesting the validity of Facebook’s proposed alternatives. And this Court agrees that 

Facebook’s proposals would not “be at least as effective” as the TCPA in achieving 

residential privacy. Time-of-day limitations would not achieve the same privacy 

objectives because even though such a restriction may designate the span of time in which 

callers can intrude on an individual’s privacy, it would also designate a time for intrusive 

phone calls. Mandatory disclosure of a caller’s identity and disconnection requirements 

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would also not be as effective in achieving residential privacy because these would not 

prevent the privacy intrusion from the phone call in the first place. Do-not-call lists would 

also not be a plausible less restrictive alternative because placing the burden on consumers 

to opt-out of intrusive calls, rather than requiring consumers to opt-in, would obviously not 

be as effective in achieving residential privacy. Lastly, a prohibition on calls to emergency 

lines is already incorporated into the TCPA at § 227(b)(1)(a)(i). 

Facebook also briefly suggested in its supplemental brief and during oral arguments 

that the TCPA could be more narrowly tailored by pointing to §§ 227(b)(1)(B) and § 

227(b)(1)(C) which Facebook claims exempt noncommercial calls on residential and fax 

lines from TCPA restrictions. FB Supp. at 5:5–7. But under Facebook’s own analysis, 

such restrictions would also be content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. 

In sum, the Court finds Facebook has presented no plausible less restrictive 

alternative that would at least be as effective in protecting privacy as the TCPA. 

b. Facebook’s As-Applied Challenge Fails

Because Facebook’s facial challenge fails, so too does its as-applied challenge. The 

Court need not, and does not, undergo this analysis because even assuming Facebook’s 

text message was not commercial speech, the TCPA withstands strict scrutiny. 

Accordingly, Facebook’s as-applied challenge fails. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, the Court finds Brickman has sufficiently alleged 

a violation of the TCPA and that the TCPA is constitutional. Accordingly Facebook’s 

Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/27/17 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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