Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-02847/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-02847-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MICHEL HERMANGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-02847-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

[Re: ECF 28]

Plaintiff Michael Hermange, proceeding here pro se, was promoted to Facilities 

Maintenance Representative in Defendant County of Santa Clara’s Probation Department subject 

to his successful completion of a six month probationary period. At the end of the probationary 

period, Plaintiff was released. Plaintiff, who is Caucasian, contends that his release was the result 

of unlawful race discrimination, spearheaded by his direct manager Susana Alcantar, who is 

Hispanic. Defendant disputes this claim, arguing that Plaintiff did not competently perform his 

job duties.

Now before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sole 

claim for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 

et seq. See generally Mot., ECF 28. The Court has considered the briefing, the admissible 

evidence, and the argument presented at the hearing on February 21, 2019. For the reasons 

discussed below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

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I. UNDISPUTED FACTS1

A. Plaintiff’s Employment at the County Probation Department

Plaintiff Michael Hermange has worked for Defendant County of Santa Clara since August 

2006, when he began work as a General Maintenance Mechanic. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 5, 

ECF 28-1. In April 2010, Plaintiff applied for a promotion to become a Facilities Maintenance 

Representative (“FMR”) in the County’s Probation Department. Id. He was interviewed by 

Susana Alcantar, a program manager with the Probation Department, who became Plaintiff’s 

primary supervisor when he eventually was employed as an FMR. Hermange Decl. ISO MSJ 

Opp. at ¶ 2, ECF 32; Alcantar Decl. ISO MSJ ¶¶ 3–5, ECF 28-2. Ms. Alcantar is Hispanic. 

Hermange Decl., Ex. 226 at 2. His second interview was with four managers from the Probation 

Department—Ms. Alcantar, Vickie Gorley, Carolyn Joe, and Ted Bond. Id.

Plaintiff was hired as an FMR on May 17, 2010. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7. Pursuant to 

County ordinances, Plaintiff was required to successfully complete a six month probationary term 

before being hired on a permanent basis. See Santa Clara County, Cal. Ordinance Code § A25-

191; see also Capozzi Decl., Ex. A at 70:24–71:2. If Plaintiff did not perform successfully during 

this probationary period, he would be subject to release from the new position and would return to 

his previous position and grade. Id., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 12–13.

In his role as FMR, Plaintiff helped to maintain, properly equip, and regularly service the 

Probation Department’s fleet of over 150 vehicles, which are used to transport probation officers, 

clients, youth offenders, and arrestees. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff’s duties included “scheduling 

and coordinating with different units to monitor vehicle usage and required maintenance; 

maintaining an inventory of vehicle items such as gas cards, garage passes, first-aid kits, spare 

tires, etc.; maintaining mileage records and reporting mileage to the Facilities and Fleet 

Department; reserving special vehicles for out of county trips for Department use; processing 

service calls for facilities, and appointments for county vehicle maintenance; assisting and 

correcting deficiencies cited in health and fire inspections; and maintaining the Probation 

Department buildings and facilities” and “turning in a monthly trend report which is a summary of 

 

1 The facts set forth in this section are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

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his monthly activities.” Id.; see also Hermange Decl., Ex. 232. Plaintiff was trained on these 

duties by Ms. Alcantar. Id. ¶¶ 3–5.

Over the course of the next six months, Plaintiff and Ms. Alcantar’s relationship was 

tumultuous, to say the least. As described in greater detail below, Ms. Alcantar believes that 

Plaintiff consistently underperformed in his job duties, including turning in incomplete and 

incorrect assignments, turning in assignments late, needing to be retrained on simple tasks, failing 

to follow explicit directions on how to complete tasks, attempting shortcuts to perform tasks in a 

way he believed was more efficient, and resisting Ms. Alcantar’s instructions. See generally 

Alcantar Decl. Vickie Gorley, Ms. Alcantar’s direct supervisor, attended bi-weekly performance 

review meetings with Plaintiff and Ms. Alcantar. She supports Ms. Alcantar’s conclusions that 

Plaintiff was not performing his job duties successfully. See generally Gorley Decl. ISO MSJ, 

ECF. 28-3. Ms. Gorley is Caucasian. Hermange Decl. ¶ 14. Moreover, Ms. Alcantar does not 

believe Plaintiff had a good attitude, calling him “uncooperative,” “obstinate,” and “routinely 

abrasive” and recounting occasions on which Plaintiff became “very angry.” Alcantar Decl. ¶¶ 

13–15. 

Plaintiff refutes these claims. He says he was “fully capable of doing all [his] job duties 

and assignments as evidenced by the bi-weekly reviews which indicated no problems” and that he 

met all of his assigned deadlines. Hermange Decl. ¶ 7; Hermange Decl., Ex. 222; Opp. at 9. He 

testifies he was doing extra work, but that he was able to perform all of his tasks in a timely and 

complete fashion and without the need to be retrained. Hermange Decl., Ex. 200 (“Hermange 

Depo.”) at 67: 3–9, ECF 32-1; Hermange Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 232. He also claims that Ms. Alcantar is a 

racist, who never wanted to hire him and never planned to keep him past his probationary period. 

See generally Opp. He claims that she mistreated him, was aggressive toward him, baselessly 

found fault in everything he did, singled him out to perform humiliating tasks and to not receive 

certain benefits, and manufactured his alleged incompetence in order to get rid of him. See 

generally Opp.; Hermange Decl.; see also Hermange Depo. at 11:17–12:5.

B. Release and Post-Release Proceedings

After his probationary period, Plaintiff was released—that is, he was not awarded 

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permanent status and was returned to his previous position. On November 2, 2010, the 

Department sent Plaintiff a letter notifying him of his release. See Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex 7. 

In April 2011, the Santa Clara County Personnel Board upheld Plaintiff’s probationary 

release in a 3–2 decision. See Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex 9. The Board found that Plaintiff had 

violated Santa Clara County Merit System Rules Section A25-301 (a)(2) for “[i]nefficiency, 

incompetence, or negligence in the performance of duties, including failure to perform assigned 

task or failure to discharge duties in a prompt, competent and responsible manner.” Id. The Board 

did not find sufficient evidence to sustain a violation of the Merit System Rule, Article 11, Section 

A25-301(a)(5) for “[b]rutality in the performance of duties.”

On July 26, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission, and he received a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on February 26, 2016. 

Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Exs. 2 & 3. In his Charge of Discrimination, Plaintiff claimed that Ms. 

Alcantar is a racist and that he believes he has been discriminated against based on his race. Id. at 

Ex. A, Ex. 2.

C. Procedural History

On May 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action, alleging a single cause of 

action for discrimination based on race pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-5. See Compl., ECF 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Alcantar “hates 

white people” and that she manufactured the alleged deficiencies in Plaintiff’s performance. See 

Compl. ¶¶ 5a–b. He claims that he was released because he is Caucasian. 

II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a party can object to an opposing party’s 

declarations and evidentiary material if it is not in a form that “would be admissible in evidence.” 

Defendant objects to much of Plaintiff’s evidence. See Reply at 5–8, ECF 35. The Court 

discusses each objection in turn.

1. Hermange Decl. ¶ 3: Statements by Ted Bond

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part:

I was later greeted by Ted Bond who expressed his concerned [sic] that I would not 

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be treated fairly since Ms. Alcantar had not wanted to hire me. Mr. Bond shared that 

Ms. Alcantar said she did not like me and wanted to keep looking for another 

candidate. Ms. Alcantar had been told by Ms. Gorley that since I was fully qualified 

and the only applicant, she had to give me a chance or it would be discrimination. 

Ms. Alcantar replied “I can tell you right now he is not going to work out”. Mr. Bond 

told me to be careful because Ms. Alcantar does not like white people and will try to 

find an excuse to get rid of me.

Defendant objects to all of these statements as inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule of 

Evidence (“FRE”) 802, and objects to the statements that Ms. Alcantar “does not like white 

people” and would “try to find an excuse to get rid of [Plaintiff]” as lacking foundation under FRE 

602 or inadmissible opinion testimony under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The recounted statements by Mr. Bond are hearsay introduced to 

prove the matter asserted, namely that Ms. Alcantar did not want to work with Plaintiff and aimed 

to terminate him because of his race. These statements are not subject to any valid hearsay 

exception. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the Court that Mr. Bond is unwilling to testify in this 

case, see Tr. At 4:2–18, ECF 41, thus the evidence would not be admissible at trial. Moreover, 

Mr. Bond’s statement that Ms. Alcantar does not like white people lacks foundation and is 

speculative because Mr. Bond’s opinion is not supported by any proffered facts.

2. Hermange Decl. ¶ 4: Statements by Carolyn Joe

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part:

Ms. [Carolyn] Joe said to me she needs to warn me that Ms. Alcantar is a racist and 

hates white people. Ms. Joe told me to watch out since Ms. Alcantar did not want me 

working for her and will most likely try to get rid of me. Ms. Joe suggested I 

document all my work and keep detailed notes. Ms. Joe informed me that Ms. 

Alcantar got rid of Christine Leonard, the woman previously doing my duties, who 

was also white.

Defendant objects to all of these statements as inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802, as 

lacking foundation under FRE 602, and as inadmissible opinion testimony under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The recounted statements by Ms. Joe are hearsay introduced to 

prove the matter asserted, namely that Ms. Alcantar was a racist, did not want to work with 

Plaintiff, and fired the previous white employee. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the Court that 

Ms. Joe is unwilling to testify in this case, see Tr. at 4:2–18, thus the evidence would not be 

admissible at trial. Moreover, Ms. Joe’s statement that Ms. Alcantar is a racist and would try to 

get rid of Plaintiff lacks foundation and is speculative because Ms. Joe’s opinion is not supported 

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by any proffered facts.

3. Hermange Decl. ¶ 7: Statements re: job responsibilities and performance

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part: 

JPD and Juvenile Hall are a full-time job for one person, but I was doing that job on 

top of the Fleet Scheduling and Facilities at APD that I had been hired for. I did the 

job of two people for the majority of the six months I work [sic] for probation. I 

received praise from many of the staff at both JPD Juvenile Hall and APD for the 

taking care of issues quickly and for my knowledge of the Building Systems.

Defendant objects that these statements lack foundation under FRE 602. 

Ruling: SUSTAINED. Plaintiff’s opinion that he did the work of two people lacks 

foundation, and his statement that he received praise from staff at JPD and APD is inadmissible 

hearsay if offered to prove that his job performance was adequate.

4. Hermange Decl. ¶ 82: Statements re: job responsibilities 

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part: 

These reports also show I was doing the job of two people because I was covering 

the FMR duties for the Juvenile Probation Department (JPD) and the Adult Probation 

Department (APD). I was performing the duties of Marilyn Rawlings at JPD because 

Ms. Rawlings had been gone since I started on May 17, 2010. It took three people to 

cover for me when I left.

Defendant objects that these statements lack foundation under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. Plaintiff’s opinion that he did the work of two people lacks 

foundation. Moreover, his statement that it took three people to cover for him when he left lacks 

foundation because he does not have personal knowledge as to what occurred at his former 

employment after he was released.

5. Hermange Decl. ¶ 14: Statement re standard procedure for probationary release

Plaintiff declares:

The way in which my Probationary Release was handled was not standard procedure. 

First, Sheila Mitchell, the Chief of Probation, came to my cube to introduced [sic] 

herself and said she wanted to meet me in person before she approved the release 

that Delores Nnam and Ms. Alcantar requested. Ms. Alcantar and Ms. Nnam 

prepared the release in Vickie Gorley’s, the white manager, name. Ms. Gorley had 

been on leave starting soon after I met with her regarding my mistreatment and 

harassment by Ms Alcantar and did not return until after I was served the release. 

Ms. Nnam had Ms. Joe sign the release in Ms. Gorley’s absence.

 

2 Defendant objects to ¶ 9, but the objections clearly apply to the content in ¶ 8.

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Defendant objects that these statements are speculative and should be excluded under FRE 

602. 

Ruling: SUSTAINED. Plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of the standard 

procedure for handling probationary releases. Although he recounts how his release was handled, 

he has no basis for his opinion that it was irregular. Also, he has no personal knowledge of what 

other individuals did outside his presence.

6. Hermange Decl. ¶ 16: Statements by Kimberly Gomez

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part: “Kimberly Gomez, from SEIU Local 521, investigated 

and came to the conclusion there was no evidence to support the release.” 

Defendant objects that this statement is inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802 and lacks 

foundation under FRE 602.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The statement includes inadmissible hearsay to the extent Plaintiff 

seeks to introduce Ms. Gomez’s conclusion for the truth of the matter asserted. Ms. Gomez’s 

conclusion is not an opposing party’s statement under FRE 801 because she works for the union, 

not the County. Moreover, Plaintiff does not say how he has personal knowledge of Ms. Gomez’s 

conclusion. 

7. Hermange Decl. ¶ 17: Statements by Lisa Dumanowski

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part: “Ms. [Lisa] Dumanowski contacted Ms. Gomez and 

illegally tried to prevent her from representing me by claiming I had anger issues and Ms. Gomez 

should not represent me.” 

Defendant objects that these statements are inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802 and lack 

foundation under FRE 602.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The statements lack foundation because Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated how he has personal knowledge of these actions.

8. Hermange Decl. ¶ 18: Statements re: the Personnel Board’s opinions

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part: “Despite the lack of evidence on the County’s part, the 

Personnel Board voted 3–2 to uphold the release with the three county employees voting for, in 

my opinion based solely on Ms. Alcantar’s false claims of rage, and the two independent members 

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voting against. The independent members later told me the release was without merit and it was 

obvious there was some other reason I was released.”

Defendant objects that Plaintiff’s assertions as to how and why the members of the 

Personnel Board decided his case are speculative and lacking foundation under FRE 602. 

Ruling: SUSTAINED. Plaintiff’s statements are mere speculation as to why the members 

of the Board upheld his release.

9. Hermange Decl. ¶ 19: Statements by Mr. Bond

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part: “Several months later, I attended a retirement party for 

Mr. Bond at the James Ranch facility, where Mr. Bond stated to all present the only reason I was 

no longer working at the Probation Department was because of my skin color.” 

Defendant objects that this statement is inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802. 

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The recounted statement by Mr. Bond is inadmissible hearsay, not 

subject to a valid exception. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the Court that Mr. Bond is 

unwilling to testify in this case, see Tr. at 4:2–18, thus the evidence would not be admissible at 

trial.

10. Hermange Decl. ¶ 20: Plaintiff’s pre-litigation contacts with County Executives

Plaintiff declares, in relevant part: 

I made several attempts to avoid litigation. I contacted the Deputy County Exec. Luke 

Leung asking him to investigate my claim that the release was not due to work 

performance but was instead racially motivated. Mr. Leung met with me for two 

hours and stated he would look into it, even though Mr. Leung later refused to take 

my calls or answer emails. I notified County Exec. Jeff Smith and Mr. Lueng by 

email that I would file a complaint with EEOC if I did not hear from them within 

thirty days . . . . I made another attempt to avoid litigation by contacting County 

Deputy Exec. Sylvia Gallegos asking her investigate [sic] my claims of 

discrimination. She declined and told me to sue.

Defendant objects that the testimony is irrelevant under FRE 401, contains inadmissible 

hearsay under FRE 802, and lacks foundation under FRE 602. 

Ruling: SUSTAINED. This evidence is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims of race 

discrimination; he does not allege that any of these individuals participated in any allegedly 

discriminatory conduct.

11. Hermange Depo. at 10:21–23: Statements re comments on first day

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Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: “I was given a heads up on my first day 

on the job that [Ms. Alcantar] didn’t want me there and she doesn’t like white people.” 

Defendant objects that this statement contains inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. This statement is apparently in reference to Mr. Bond’s and Ms. 

Joe’s statements from objection nos. 1 and 2 above, which the Court has deemed inadmissible. To 

the extent someone else told Plaintiff that Ms. Alcantar does not like white people, the statement is 

inadmissible for the same reasons as objections nos. 1 and 2.

12. Hermange Depo. at 11:3–11: Statement re first belief of racial discrimination

When asked when he first believed his probationary release was based on racial 

discrimination, Plaintiff testified as follows:

Well, it started on the first week I was on the job working with her. She -- Ms. 

Alcantar would point out different people that she said were problem employees and 

people that she didn’t like, and there was a pattern of the people she didn’t like were 

Caucasian managers and employees.

Defendant objects that this statement is inadmissible speculative opinion not rationally 

based on Plaintiff’s perception and thus inadmissible under FRE 701.

Ruling: OVERRULED. Plaintiff has firsthand knowledge of Ms. Alcantar’s statements 

and whether the managers and employees about whom Ms. Alcantar commented appear to be 

Caucasian.

13. Hermange Depo. at 16:1–18: Statements re EEOC

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

And one thing I think should be noted with the investigation, the EEOC never 

contacted me to ask me any questions about my charge of discrimination. They never 

assigned the case. They never had the opportunity to do an investigation, so it was 

actually a lack of investigation. They said they received a response from the County, 

and based solely on the response from the County, they dismissed the case without 

ever contacting asking me to clarify anything.

Defendant objects that these statements are irrelevant under FRE 401 and inadmissible 

hearsay under FRE 802.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The statements are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claim of racial 

discrimination, except to the extent they demonstrated he exhausted his administrative remedies 

with the EEOC. Because Defendant does not argue Plaintiff failed to exhaust these remedies, the 

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statement is inadmissible as irrelevant.

14. Hermange Depo. at 16:19–17:12: Statements by Sylvia Gallegos

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

I contacted the County exec’s office and asked them to investigate my claims . . . . 

Before I filed a lawsuit, I made an attempt to avoid filing the lawsuit, and I spoke to 

Sylvia Gallegos. . . . She was a deputy county executive, and told her I wanted the 

County to look into my claims, and she said that they would not do it unless I filed a 

lawsuit. . . . She would not discuss anything having to do with it. She just told me if 

I wanted the County to look into it, that I would have to follow file [sic] a lawsuit.

Defendant objects that these statements are irrelevant under FRE 401 and inadmissible 

hearsay under FRE 802.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. This evidence is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims of race 

discrimination; he does not allege that Sylvia Gallegos participated in any allegedly discriminatory 

conduct.

15. Hermange Depo. at 29:7–30:7: Statements re November meeting with Delores3

Nnam and Patricia McClure

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

[My union representative (Patricia McClure), Dolores Nnam, and I] went item per 

item down all the evidence that was submitted for the release of me over at Adult 

Probation, and I had a written proof that all the documentation was either irrelevant 

or false. The claims of like wrong mileage were false that had been disproven at least 

two times previous to that meeting where I have the originals that show there was no 

mistakes made. 

Dolores completely ignored all the evidence that I brought to her. She also -- one 

of the claims in the release was I didn’t take notes, and I provided for her four spiralbound notebooks completely full of notes from every day that I was there at work, 

and that was the only thing that she responds to in this decision.

She said that did show her that I did take notes, but she said she has no way to 

tell when the notes were written, so she’s not -- well, she says she doesn’t know when 

they were written, and she ignored all the other evidence that I brought her that 

proved that everything in the release was either irrelevant or false.

Defendant objects on the basis that this testimony (1) concerns a meeting pertaining to the 

administrative process after Plaintiff received his probationary release and thus is irrelevant under 

FRE 401, and (2) contains inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802.

Ruling: OVERRULED. Plaintiff argues that Delores Nnam was involved in his release. 

 

3 The documents indicate that Ms. Nnam’s name is spelled with an “e,” not an “o” as transcribed 

by the court reporter during Plaintiff’s deposition.

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This meeting occurred soon afterward and is relevant to Ms. Nnam’s actions with respect to the 

release and the evidence allegedly contradicting the underlying reasons for the release. Moreover, 

to the extent Plaintiff recounts Ms. Nnam’s statements, they are admissions of an opposing party.

16. Hermange Depo. at 42:8–43:22: Meeting with Sheila Mitchell

Plaintiff testified at his deposition that before he was released, the Chief of the Probation 

Department Sheila Mitchell, an African-American woman, came to meet him, saying “she wanted 

to see who [he] was because Dolores [Nnam] and Susie [Alcantar] had requested to release [him], 

and she wanted to see who [he] was before she approved it.” And he responded by saying 

“Whatever they’re telling you is false. There’s two sides to the story, and I’ve done a good job 

here.” After which Ms. Mitchell just walked away and said, “it was nice meeting you.”

Defendant objects that this recounted interaction is irrelevant under FRE 401.

Ruling: OVERRULED. This testimony is relevant to demonstrate that Ms. Nnam and Ms. 

Alcantar were involved in the request to release Plaintiff and that Ms. Mitchell may have been 

involved in approving that request. 

17. Hermange Depo. at 47:12–224: Statements about Probation’s hiring practices

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition:

Q. Well, what is your basis for your belief that they might be racist, Sheila Mitchell 

and --

A. Because the hiring practice at Adult Probation, there is almost no Caucasian 

managers there. They’re all either black, Hispanic and almost all female, so there’s 

an agenda there that they are promoting, and I didn’t fit their agenda, and that’s just 

based on the numbers of people they hire and who they hire.

Q. So all the managers are either women, Hispanic or African-American?

A. Not all, but the majority.

Defendant objects to this testimony as speculative opinion testimony lacking foundation 

under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED as to the following portion: “ . . . so there’s an agenda there that 

they are promoting, and I didn’t fit their agenda, and that’s just based on the numbers of people 

 

4 The County objects to Hermange Depo. at 58:12–22, but its objection clearly applies to 47:12–

22.

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they hire and who they hire.” The statement lacks foundation and is speculative. Moreover, 

Plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of the ethnicities and genders of the managers in the 

Probation Department during the time he was not employed there. OVERRULED as to the 

ethnicities and genders of the managers during his employment. While an employee of the 

Probation Department, Plaintiff could have firsthand knowledge of the perceived ethnicity of the 

managers in the Department.

18. Hermange Depo. at 67:3–10: Statements about Ms. Alcantar’s supervisees

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

There was a facilities maintenance representative that was on leave that [Ms. 

Alcantar] was a supervisor for, but that person was on leave pretty much from the 

time I started, and she was not allowed to come back to work. She was a Caucasian 

woman, and they wouldn’t let her come back to work. She was the other [Facilities 

Maintenance Representative].

Defendant objects to this evidence as speculative opinion testimony lacking foundation 

under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED for lack of foundation to the extent Plaintiff testifies that the other 

woman was “not allowed to come back to work” and “they wouldn’t let her come back to work”; 

OVERRULED to the extent Plaintiff testifies that the woman was Caucasian and was on leave 

while he worked there. Plaintiff could have personal knowledge of these latter facts.

19. Hermange Depo. at 99:25–100:25: Statements by Rebecca Flores

Plaintiff recounted at his deposition a discussion he had with Rebecca Flores, the Equal 

Opportunity officer at Adult Probation, during June or July of his employment. Ms. Flores told 

him that “she felt [he] was being mistreated by Ms. Alcantar, and she wanted to know why I 

hadn’t filed a grievance about the mistreatment. Namely her number one concern was me having 

to dig through the trash twice a day. She said it was humiliating, and she couldn’t believe that I 

would put up with that.” 

Defendant objects that this testimony contains inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802.

Ruling: OVERRULED. As an equal opportunity officer for Adult Probation, Ms. Flores’s 

statements could be admissible at trial as an opposing party’s statement under FRE 801(d)(2).

20. Hermange Depo. at 102:9–16: Statements by Ted Bond

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Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

Q. Okay. And the first interrogatory inquires of you regarding each and every 

instance of being told that you should expect to be let go from the position of FMR 

because Susana Alcantar did not want to work with and you responded Ted Bond 

and Carolyn Joe.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So when did Ted Bond tell you that?

A. On the first morning that I was at work.

Defendant objects to these statements as inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802 and as 

speculative opinion testimony under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The recounted statements are based on inadmissible hearsay not 

subject to a valid exception. The Court has held that Mr. Bond’s statements to Plaintiff regarding 

Ms. Alcantar are inadmissible. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the Court that Ms. Joe and Mr. 

Bond are unwilling to testify in this case, see Tr. at 4:2–18, thus the evidence would not be 

admissible at trial. Moreover, the statements lack foundation and are speculative because they are 

not supported by any proffered facts.

21. Hermange Depo. at 103:7–23: Statements by Ted Bond

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

Q. And so the first time [Mr. Bond] ever made any comments about her to you was 

the first day on the job?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he say?

A. He said that [Ms. Alcantar] didn’t want me working there and that she was going 

to try to get rid of me, and that Vickie Gorley forced her to hire me, and he said that 

she was -- wanted to put the job out on the open competitive so she could get who 

she wanted in the position, and when she was told that I was fully qualified and they’d 

have to give me the opportunity, Ted said that she told the -- the managers there, I’ll 

tell you right now, he’s not going to work out.

Q. Did Ted say which managers that Susana told this to?

A. All three of the managers that were with Susana. That was Vickie Gorley, Carolyn 

Joe and Ted Bond.

Defendant objects to these statements as inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802 and as 

speculative opinion testimony under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The recounted statements by Mr. Bond are hearsay (and double 

hearsay) statements, not subject to any valid hearsay exception. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed 

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the Court that Mr. Bond is unwilling to testify in this case, see Tr. at 4:2–18, thus the evidence 

would not be admissible at trial.

22. Hermange Depo. at 106:9–16: Statements by Carolyn Joe

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

Q. Now, what about -- you mentioned Carolyn Joe, and when did Carolyn Joe tell 

you that Alcantar didn’t like you?

A. The same morning. It was right after Ted left. A few minutes later, she had walked 

up and told me that basically, the exact same thing that Ted did, that Susie doesn’t 

want me working there and she’s going to try to fire me.

Defendant objects to these statements as inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802 and as 

speculative opinion testimony under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The recounted statements by Ms. Joe are hearsay statements, not 

subject to any valid hearsay exception. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the Court that Ms. Joe is 

unwilling to testify in this case, see Tr. at 4:2–18, thus the evidence would not be admissible at 

trial. Moreover, Ms. Joe’s statement that Ms. Alcantar would try to get rid of Plaintiff lacks 

foundation and is speculative because Ms. Joe’s recounted opinion is not supported by any 

proffered facts.

23. Hermange Depo. at 106:17–23: Statements by Carolyn Joe

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

Q. Did she make any comments at that time about Susana being a racist?

A. Yes. She actually used the word. She said, Susie’s a racist. She hates white people.

Q. Was this conversation out in the open or was it private that you had with -- with 

Carolyn?

A. It was in my cubicle, also.

Defendant objects to these statements as inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802 and as 

speculative opinion testimony under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The recounted statements by Ms. Joe are hearsay statements, not 

subject to any valid hearsay exception. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the Court that Ms. Joe is 

unwilling to testify in this case, see Tr. at 4:2–18, ECF 41, thus the evidence would not be 

admissible at trial. Moreover, Ms. Joe’s statement that Ms. Alcantar is a racist lacks foundation 

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and is speculative because Ms. Joe’s recounted opinion is not supported by any proffered facts. 

24. Hermange Depo. at 108:8–15: Statements re job duties

Plaintiff testified to the following at his deposition: 

They actually had to split up the job -- two to three different people are doing the job 

I was doing. They have one person doing the fleet part of it exclusively, and then 

they have a person that’s doing facilities, and apparently, I’m told he had an assistant 

to help him do it, and I was doing all those tasks on my own and keeping up with it 

until I was bogged down with false reports.

Defendant objects to these statements as inadmissible hearsay under FRE 802 and as 

speculative opinion testimony under FRE 701.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. Plaintiff does not have personal knowledge as to what occurred at 

his former employment after he was terminated; the statements lack foundation and recounts 

inadmissible hearsay.

25. Pl. Exhibit 2295 – Letter from County Counsel to Plaintiff dated May 11, 2018

Plaintiff attaches as an exhibit to his declaration a letter dated May 11, 2018 from the 

County to Plaintiff regarding a public records request by Plaintiff. 

Defendant objects that this document is irrelevant under FRE 401 and 403.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The letter is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claim for race discrimination.

26. Pl. Exhibit 235 – Emails regarding Plaintiff’s Administrative Remedies

Plaintiff attaches as an exhibit to his declaration an email exchange between him, his union 

representatives, and individuals in the Probation Department, regarding Plaintiff’s right to take 

part in an administrative review process. 

Defendant objects that this document is irrelevant under FRE 401 and 403.

Ruling: SUSTAINED. The letter is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claim for race discrimination.

27. Pl. Exhibit 243 – Plaintiff’s Emails to Luke Leung

Plaintiff attaches as an exhibit to his declaration an email exchange between him and Luke 

Leung, a County executive, in May 2011 and July 2011, regarding whether the County would 

investigate Plaintiff’s discrimination claim.

 

5 All exhibits to the Hermange Declaration are located at ECF 32-1.

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Defendant objects that the document is irrelevant under FRE 401 and 403. 

Ruling: SUSTAINED. This evidence is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims of race 

discrimination; he does not allege that Luke Leung participated in any allegedly discriminatory 

conduct.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“A party is entitled to summary judgment if the ‘movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” City of 

Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a)). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if there is sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248–49.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of 

the basis for the motion, and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material 

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the moving party 

must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or 

defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element 

to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz 

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 

produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. Id. at 1103. If the nonmoving party does not 

produce evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to 

summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “The court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” 

City of Pomona, 750 F.3d at 1049. In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, “the 

Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and is required to 

draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” First Pac. Networks, Inc. v. 

Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 891 F. Supp. 510, 513–14 (N.D. Cal. 1995). “[T]he ‘mere existence of a 

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scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position’” is insufficient to defeat a motion for 

summary judgment. Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). “‘Where the record taken 

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 

genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. McDonnell Douglas Standard 

In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court held that a burden-shifting framework applies 

to Title VII claims. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Under this framework, the plaintiff 

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.; Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 

F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010). To establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must show: “(1) that 

they are members of a protected class; (2) that they were qualified for their positions and 

performing their jobs satisfactorily; (3) that they experienced adverse employment actions; and (4) 

that similarly situated individuals outside [their] protected class were treated more favorably, or 

other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of 

discrimination.” Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) 

(alteration in original); see also Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2008). “At the 

summary judgment stage, the requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case is 

minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Lyons v. 

England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (citing Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)) 

(internal quotation marks, alteration, and emphasis omitted).

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production, but not persuasion, 

shifts to the employer to articulate one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the 

challenged actions. Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1155. If this burden is met, the plaintiff “must then raise a 

triable issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reasons for [the employee’s] 

termination[ ] are mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id.

Absent direct evidence of discrimination, to establish pretext the employee must offer 

“specific, substantial evidence of pretext.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 

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1994), as amended on denial of reh’g (July 14, 1994) (quoting Steckl v. Motorola, 703 F.2d 392, 

393 (9th Cir. 1983)). Evidence of pretext must be considered cumulatively. Chuang v. Univ. of 

Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). “The plaintiff may show pretext 

either (1) by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer, or (2) by 

showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence because it is 

inconsistent or otherwise unbelievable.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dept. 424 F.3d 1027, 

1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220–22 (9th Cir. 

1998)).

1. Plaintiff Makes a Prima Facie Claim for Discrimination

Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of race discrimination. He is a member of a 

protected class (Caucasian individuals), who was qualified for his position. He experienced an 

adverse employment action because he was released and not given a permanent position. As 

discussed in more detail below, he alleges that he was singled out for mistreatment by his Hispanic 

manager, and he provides some evidence that he was performing his job duties effectively. 

To establish satisfactory job performance, Plaintiff must produce “substantial evidence of 

satisfactory job performance sufficient to create a jury question on this issue.” Douglas v. 

Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981). At the prima facie stage, the plaintiff need not 

“eliminate the possibility that he was laid off for inadequate job performance,” because such a 

requirement would “conflate the minimal inference needed to establish a prima facie case with the 

specific, substantial showing” required at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. 

Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2002). Given that 

Plaintiff provides some evidence that he was performing his job adequately, such as performance 

reviews with little negative feedback and some positive feedback. See Hermange Decl., Ex. 222.

Accordingly, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima 

facie case of race discrimination.

2. Defendant Proffers Legitimate Reasons for Terminating Plaintiff

Defendant argues that it has proffered legitimate reasons for releasing Plaintiff based on 

“Plaintiff’s failure to perform assigned duties and his abrasive and uncooperative attitude with 

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supervisors.” Mot. at 12. 

As a general matter, Ms. Alcantar and Ms. Gorley both submit declarations testifying that 

“Plaintiff repeatedly submitted work that was incorrect, incomplete, or late,” that he “routinely 

missed” deadlines, that he “lack[ed] interest in following instructions,” that he “failed to 

demonstrate basic responsibility and complete assignments,” and “failed to follow simple 

instructions.” Opp. at 13–15 (citing Capozzi Decl., Ex. A., Ex. 7; Alcantar Decl. ¶¶ 5–12; Gorley 

Decl. ¶¶ 5–6, 8–10; Capozzi Decl., Ex. A. at 62:12–66:7). Despite training and efforts by Ms. 

Alcantar and Ms. Gorley, Plaintiff’s performance did not improve. Id. at 15 (citing Gorley Decl. 

¶¶ 5–6, 8–10; Alcantar Decl. ¶¶ 7–10). They also testify that he had an abrasive and 

uncooperative attitude, that he would resist training efforts, and that eventually Ms. Alcantar no 

longer felt safe meeting with him because he once became angry and threatening. Id. at 15–16 

(citing Capozzi Decl., Ex. A., Ex. 7; Alcantar Decl. ¶¶ 5, 9, 13; Gorley Decl. ¶ 6).

Plaintiff refutes these conclusions, attesting that he was “fully capable of doing all his job 

duties and assignments” and that his tasks were straightforward and he was able to perform them 

without further instruction. See Opp. at 8; Hermange Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 232. In support of this, he 

submits his bi-weekly review reports, written by Ms. Alcantar, which he believes show he was 

completing his job duties and never needed to be retrained. Hermange Decl., Ex. 222. The reports 

largely reflect Plaintiff’s story. See, e.g., ECF 32-1 at 5 (“This task was completed by the due date 

and came out very well.”). However, there are a few notes in these reviews that comport with Ms. 

Alcantar’s and Ms. Gorley’s testimony that Plaintiff had some issues. See, e.g., ECF 32-1 at 47 

(Plaintiff “taken off of Facility duty to comprehend Fleet portion of his tasks”); id. at 50 (“Follow 

up is still very needed in this area and learning to think outside the box to take different measures 

to get answers that he needs is still in the works.”); id. at 51 (“He needs to be more careful with 

emails.”); id. at 52 (reviewing areas of needed improvement). Plaintiff does not refute that he 

sometimes would not follow Ms. Alcantar’s instructions because he believed they were “wrong 

and redundant” and “add[ed] extra steps to stuff.” Hermange Depo. at 62:12–66:7.

More specifically, Defendant points to several instances in which it says Plaintiff 

performed inadequately or acted unprofessionally that demonstrate that it has proffered legitimate 

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reasons for Plaintiff’s release. Plaintiff provides a contrary interpretation for many, but not all, of 

these instances. The Court discusses each incident in turn and whether Plaintiff offers evidence to 

the contrary.

a. Specific Incidents of Plaintiff’s Alleged Performance Issues

May 2010 Monthly Odometer Report: On May 18, 2010, Ms. Alcantar trained Plaintiff on 

how to complete a monthly odometer report, instructing him to manually calculate the mileage of 

the vehicles and provide Ms. Alcantar a copy of the report on a monthly basis. Capozzi Decl., Ex. 

A, Ex. 7 at 3–4. Ms. Alcantar wanted Plaintiff to enter the information manually to check 

Plaintiff’s understanding of the process, check his ability to do the required math, and to identify 

any discrepancies in the report. Id.; Alcantar Decl. ¶ 8. The report needed to be accurate to ensure 

the Department was correctly charged and the vehicles were timely serviced. Id. Instead of 

manually calculating the mileage, as instructed, Plaintiff used the computer and did not provide a 

manual report to Ms. Alcantar. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 3–4; see Gorley Decl. ¶ 5. When 

Ms. Alcantar confronted Plaintiff about not following instructions, he responded by saying his 

way was “faster.” Id. Plaintiff does not offer contrary evidence or testimony.

Plaintiff’s Notetaking: Ms. Alcantar states that Plaintiff refused to take notes despite her 

requests that he do so. According to Ms. Alcantar, she consistently asked and reminded Plaintiff 

to take notes, including of step-by-step tasks she was demonstrating to him and of information 

necessary to complete his duties. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 4–5; Alcantar ¶¶ 7, 9. Plaintiff 

allegedly routinely indicated that he did not understand the need to take notes or that he thought it 

was a waste of time. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 4–5; Alcantar ¶¶ 7, 9. Plaintiff testifies that 

he “took extensive notes and documented his daily activities” and that he never refused to take 

notes. Hermange Decl. ¶ 10. He says he has nearly four notebooks worth of notes demonstrating 

the sufficiency of his work. Id.; Hermange Depo. at 29:22–30:1–2, 31:15–23, 66:14–25; see also 

Hermange Decl. ¶ 11.

May Box Moving Incident: On May 24, 2010, during Plaintiff’s first week on the job, Ms. 

Alcantar asked Plaintiff to move some boxes for her. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 4; Alcantar 

Decl. ¶ 15; Hermange Decl. ¶ 6. Ms. Alcantar told Plaintiff, “Mike, watch your back” or “Hey 

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Mike, watch your back!” Alcantar Decl. ¶ 15; Hermange Decl. ¶ 6. Ms. Alcantar says she was 

worried Plaintiff was going to hurt himself. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff responded by saying 

something like “You need to be careful how you say that” or “You better be careful with what you 

say, someone got in trouble saying that.” Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 4; Alcantar Decl. ¶ 15; 

Hermange Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff says his response was in reference to a separate incident in which 

Labor Relations released a memorandum saying that “Watch your back” could be considered a 

threat of physical violence. Hermange Decl. ¶ 6. Ms. Alcantar asked Plaintiff if he thought she 

was threatening him and he responded “No.” Id. Ms. Alcantar believed that Plaintiff’s tone was 

“abrupt and abrasive” and “totally uncalled for given the circumstances.” Alcantar Decl. ¶ 15. 

Plaintiff says “[he] was trying to be jovial and just sharing, you know, trying to get a rapport and 

comradery with her.” Hermange Depo. at 82:8–10. Plaintiff says Ms. Alcantar “abruptly stalked 

off before [he] could tell her about the [related] incident.” Hermange Decl. ¶ 6.

July Monthly Odometer Review Meeting: In July 2010, Ms. Alcantar met with Plaintiff at 

a performance review meeting to discuss the July monthly odometer report. At the meeting Ms. 

Alcantar told Plaintiff he had inaccurately reported the mileage for several vehicles. Capozzi 

Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 5. Ms. Alcantar states that Plaintiff “started to get very defensive” and made 

comments to Ms. Alcantar about how she was giving him too much work, intimidating him, and 

bullying him. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 13. According to her, Plaintiff “stood and began pounding the 

table” and “leaning toward her while she was sitting down,” and Ms. Alcantar “felt very 

threatened.” Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 5; Alcantar Decl. ¶ 13. Apparently discussing this 

same meeting, Plaintiff says he was able to prove to her that there were no mistakes in the report. 

Opp. at 9. He says Ms. Alcantar checked with another employee about this, and when she 

returned, she started speaking to Plaintiff “in an angry voice” and yelling at him. Hermange Depo. 

at 90:1–93:23. He does not mention his demeanor, but it is worth noting that with respect to this 

incident the Personnel Board did not find sufficient evidence to sustain a violation of the Merit 

System Rule, Article 11, Section A25-301(a)(5) for “[b]rutality in the performance of duties” by 

Plaintiff.

Review of Probation Department’s Annual Report: On June 3, 2010, Ms. Alcantar 

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instructed Plaintiff to read the Department’s annual report to learn about the Department’s various 

units and their vehicle needs. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 6. Plaintiff had until June 18, 2010 

to return the report, but he did not return it by that date. Id. When Ms. Alcantar spoke to Plaintiff 

about the report on July 23, 2010, he told her he “glanced at it.” Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 6. 

Plaintiff does not offer any evidence to the contrary, except his general statement that he never 

missed a deadline. Opp. at 9.

August Fleet User Report: On August 20, 2010, Ms. Alcantar instructed Plaintiff to 

complete a fleet user report by meeting with the vehicle fleet users and determining their vehicle 

needs. Id. She says the deadline to complete this task was September 13, 2010. Plaintiff missed 

this deadline. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 12. Ms. Alcantar gave him multiple extensions to September 20, 

2010 and October 1, 2010, and Plaintiff missed both extended deadlines. Id. He did not submit 

the report until October 4, 2010, and she says that the report was incomplete; Plaintiff had only 

interviewed 23 out of 49 of the fleet users. Id.; Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 6–7. Ms. Alcantar 

had to assign the task to another person so it could be completed. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff 

says he was never given a due date for this assignment and that he completed the assignment as 

instructed (interviewing only some of the vehicle fleet users), and he provides evidence that the 

assignment was more limited than what Ms. Alcantar claims. Hermange Decl., Ex. 222; ECF 32-1 

at 50, 52; Hermange Decl., Ex. 223.

Computer Skills: When he was interviewed, Plaintiff indicated that he had proficient 

computer skills, including knowing how to use Microsoft programs such as Excel. Capozzi Decl., 

Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 7; Gorley Decl. at ¶ 7. During his employment, however, Ms. Gorley came to 

believe that he did not have such skills, because he could not properly generate and format 

documents. Gorley Decl. ¶ 7. She says that his Microsoft Excel skills did not improve, even after 

he took a class. Id.; Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, dep Ex. 7 at 7. Plaintiff states that he created from 

scratch in Excel trend reports documenting the work he was doing at multiple facilities, which he 

claims demonstrates he had sufficient computer skills. Hermange Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 231.

September Performance Counseling: On September 13, 2010, at a review meeting, Ms. 

Alcantar informed Plaintiff that his performance would need to improve in several areas before the 

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end of probationary period on November 15, 2010. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 8. Ms. 

Alcantar listed several areas of improvement, including following-up on outstanding assignments 

until they are completed, handling specific assignment without assistance, being assertive and 

professional in carrying out duties, and following supervisor’s instructions and directives. Id. at 

8–9.

September 2010 Odometer Report: On September 20, 2010, Ms. Alcantar sent Plaintiff an 

email requesting that he complete a report regarding the fleet vehicles’ mileages. The email 

provided instructions on how to complete the report. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 9. Plaintiff 

requested further instructions from Ms. Alcantar, which she provided. Id. He turned in several 

versions of the report on September 21, 2010, each of which was incorrect. Id. On September 23, 

2010, Plaintiff asked for further instruction, which Ms. Alcantar provided. Ms. Alcantar extended 

Plaintiff’s deadline to October 4, 2010, and again to October 7, 2010. Id. Ms. Alcantar says 

Plaintiff missed this deadline without informing Ms. Alcantar that he could not meet it, and that he 

turned in the report on October 8, 2010. Id. Plaintiff does not offer any evidence to the contrary 

except his general statement that he never missed a deadline. Opp. at 9.

Reformatting of Master Vehicle Log: In training Plaintiff on how to complete the Master 

Vehicle Log, Ms. Alcantar told Plaintiff not to change the format of the document. Id. at 10. The 

formatting of the report was familiar to all managers in the Department and allowed them to 

evaluate both the vehicles and their user trends. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 6. On October 19, 2010, Ms. 

Alcantar noticed that Plaintiff had changed the format. When she asked him about this, he 

responded that he had “changed it a little bit.” Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 10; see Alcantar 

Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff told Ms. Alcantar that he had changed it because he “assumed it would help 

[her].” Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 10. Plaintiff does not offer evidence or testimony to the 

contrary. 

September and October Fleet Inventory Reports: Though Plaintiff was supposed to submit 

the monthly fleet inventory reports in the last week of each month, Ms. Alcantar alleges he failed 

to timely submit them in both September and October, submitting both a week after they were due 

and only after prompting from Ms. Alcantar. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff says specifically that 

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he met this deadline. Opp. at 9.

Need to Hire Help for Plaintiff’s Duties: Ms. Alcantar avers that because Plaintiff could 

not effectively handle all of his assignments and because Ms. Alcantar had to spend a lot of time 

completing and correcting his work and supervising Plaintiff, Ms. Alcantar’s unit in the 

Department had to hire two additional temporary personnel. Id. ¶ 14. The unit had never needed 

to hire additional help in the past; the three people in Plaintiff’s position previously did not need 

their workloads reduced. Id. Plaintiff does not offer evidence or testimony to the contrary, except 

to say that he was doing more work than his position usually required. See Hermange Depo. at 

67:3–9.

Retraining Efforts: Ms. Alcantar avers that throughout Plaintiff’s employment, he 

consistently needed retraining because his work was not satisfactory. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 8; Capozzi 

Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 11–12. She says she provided him hands-on training “almost daily” on his 

tasks and held several retraining sessions for him. Alcantar Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8. And she testifies that, at 

times, Plaintiff was unwilling to follow or even review the established procedures and processes 

for his tasks. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Plaintiff avers that he was never retrained during the probationary 

period, as evidenced by the lack of any reference to such retraining in his bi-weekly reviews. 

Hermange Decl. ¶ 7; Hermange Decl., Ex. 222. He says his tasks were straightforward and he was 

able to perform them without further instruction. Id. ¶ 9. And he says that Ms. Alcantar provided 

limited training and would often tell him she did not have time to train him and that he needed to 

figure things out on his own. Hermange Depo. at 62:15–17; see also Hermange Decl. ¶ 11.

Biweekly Performance Counseling: Ms. Gorley and Ms. Alcantar aver that Plaintiff 

continually failed in his job responsibilities in the first several months of his employment. 

Alcantar Decl. ¶¶ 5–8; Gorley Decl. at ¶¶ 8–11. As a result, in September 2010, Mmes. Gorley 

and Alcantar began meeting with Plaintiff in bi-weekly performance counseling sessions to 

address his performance and attitude. Gorley Decl. ¶ 8. They say that these sessions did not help 

him improve on either front. Id. Plaintiff does not refute that these sessions occurred, but argues 

generally that he was not underperforming.

b. Defendant’s Evidence Presents Legitimate Reasons for Releasing 

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Plaintiff

Inadequate work performance constitutes a legitimate reason for disciplinary action. See 

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Aragon, 292 F.3d 

at 661 (“[Plaintiff’s] poor job performance . . . constitute[s] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for terminating [Plaintiff’s] employment with [Defendant].”). Other courts have found that an 

employee’s inability to successfully complete job duties in a timely and accurate manner is a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to terminate the employee. See, e.g., Millsaps v. Pinal Cty. 

Superior Court Dep't of Adult Prob., No. CV-09-00761-PHX-ROS, 2011 WL 13190176, at *2 (D. 

Ariz. Mar. 30, 2011), aff’d sub nom. Millsaps v. Pinal Cty. Superior Court, 494 F. App’x 821 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (finding defendant proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason where employee was 

given several unsatisfactory reviews and failed to complete several of his job duties); Scott v. 

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 F. Supp. 2d 961, 979 (D. Or. 2005) (finding employer articulated 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason where employee failed to complete all elements of certain 

job duties on numerous occasions).

Defendant’s evidence demonstrates that it believed Plaintiff’s job performance was 

inadequate, and thus that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to release him. Though 

Plaintiff believes he was performing the job well, Ms. Alcantar and Ms. Gorley found that 

Plaintiff consistently failed to perform sufficiently throughout his six months of employment. 

Though Plaintiff may believe he was doing an adequate job, the question is not whether his 

performance was adequate, but rather “whether there [is] sufficient evidence of unsatisfactory 

performance to be a legitimate concern of his employer.” Douglas, 656 F.2d at 533 n.5. 

More specifically, as shown above, Plaintiff’s bi-weekly reviews contain some evidence 

that Plaintiff needed to improve in certain areas, as claimed by Ms. Alcantar. See, e.g., ECF 32-1 

at 47, 50–52; see also Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 at 8. Mmes. Alcantar and Gorley’s belief that 

he was underperforming is also supported by Ms. Alcantar’s hiring two additional staffers to help 

with Plaintiff’s duties and the need for biweekly performance counseling between Plaintiff and 

Mmes. Alcantar and Gorley. Moreover, Plaintiff does not refute that he sometimes would not 

follow Ms. Alcantar’s instructions because he believed they were “wrong and redundant” and 

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“adding extra steps to stuff,” Hermange Depo. at 62:12–66:7, such as with respect to the May 

2010 monthly odometer report and the reformatting of the master vehicle log. And he does not 

specifically refute that he missed at least two deadlines with respect to reviewing the Department’s 

annual report and turning in the September 2010 Odometer Report on time. Finally, the Personnel 

Board confirmed that it believed Plaintiff had violated Santa Clara County Merit System Rules 

Section A25-301 (a)(2) for “[i]nefficiency, incompetence, or negligence in the performance of 

duties, including failure to perform assigned task or failure to discharge duties in a prompt, 

competent and responsible manner.” Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex 9. 

Given this evidence of Plaintiff’s inadequate work performance, Defendant has proffered 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s release.

3. Plaintiff Has Not Provided Specific, Substantial Evidence of Pretext

Plaintiff points to several actions by various employees of Defendant that he believes 

demonstrate that Defendant’s proffered reason is simply pretext for discrimination based on race. 

Before setting forth that evidence, the Court notes that Plaintiff alleges that only Ms. Alcantar 

acted with a racist intent; he does not so allege for any other individual. The Court first discusses 

Plaintiff’s evidence and then determines that he does not meet his burden in demonstrating that a 

reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant released him because of his race.

c. Plaintiff’s Alleged Evidence of Pretext

Plaintiff presents evidence relating to the actions of several County employees that he 

believes demonstrates that the County released him because of his race.

i. Ms. Alcantar

Plaintiff says that “Ms. Alcantar went to extremes to find fault in every interaction with 

[him],” called him unprofessional for baseless reasons, and generally mistreated him. See Opp. at 

11; see also Opp. at 18. He says that she mistreated him regularly, speaking to him in a rude and 

aggressive manner and constantly scolding him unnecessarily. Hermange Depo. at 11:17–12:5.

He also claims (without citing any evidence) that Ms. Alcantar hired “almost exclusively 

female Hispanics” and wanted Mr. Hermange out of the FMR role so one of her female Hispanic 

staffers could take over. Opp. at 11. He states (without evidence) that when he left, the role was 

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given to Frances Francis, a Hispanic woman. Id. He claims that two other men who later filled

the FMR position were also Hispanic. Id. He also testifies that a majority of the managers in the 

Probation Department are either women, Hispanic or African-American. Hermange Depo. at 

47:14–22.

He also claims that Ms. Alcantar made specific statements and took specific actions that he 

found to be discriminatory. Ms. Alcantar does not refute that she said or did any of these things, 

though she says that she never discriminated against him based on his race and only ever treated

him fairly. Alcantar Decl. ¶ 16.

Statement re Interview Applicants: After his first interview, Plaintiff asked Ms. Alcantar 

when he would know whether he got a second interview, and she responded that they had to 

review other applicants first. Hermange Depo. at 115:18–116:25; Hermange Decl. ¶ 2. Plaintiff 

asked Ms. Alcantar how many other applicants there were, and she answered that she was not 

allowed to say. Id. Plaintiff says he was the only applicant, so he believes this statement by Ms. 

Alcantar shows she “had a discriminatory agenda towards” Plaintiff from the beginning. Opp. at 

11.

Statements re Caucasian Managers: Plaintiff testifies that in his first week on the job, Ms. 

Alcantar “would point out different people that she said were problem employees and people that 

she didn’t like, and there was a pattern of the people she didn’t like were Caucasian managers and 

employees.” Hermange Depo. at 11:6–11. 

Business Cards, Work Cell Phone, and Lunches: Plaintiff testifies that the County’s 

procedure is that new employees get business cards. Hermange Decl. ¶ 12. He says Ms. Alcantar 

treated him differently because when he asked if he should order himself business cards in his first 

week, Ms. Alcantar responded that he would not get cards until after his probationary period 

ended. Id. Likewise, he says Ms. Alcantar would not order him a work phone even though it is 

“an essential tool” to his role as an FMR. Id. He also says that he was excluded from staff 

lunches. Opp. at 13.

Trash Sorting: Plaintiff avers that Ms. Alcantar treated him differently by assigning him 

the task of “sorting through all the trash, compost and recycle bins throughout Adult Probation” 

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twice a day. Hermange Decl. ¶ 13; Hermange Depo. at 83:13–25. He testifies that “[n]o other 

person before or after [him] has been given this assignment.” Hermange Decl. ¶ 13; Opp. at 18. 

The assignment “was humiliating” and took time away from Plaintiff’s ability to complete his 

regular duties. Id. In fact, the conduct was so unusual that Ms. Flores, the equal opportunity 

officer, pulled Plaintiff aside “to express her concern about [the] mistreatment” and telling him he 

“should file a grievance.” Id.

Ms. Alcantar’s Alleged Fear of Plaintiff: Plaintiff testifies that Ms. Alcantar told the 

Personnel Board that she was releasing Plaintiff because she feared for her life and was afraid to 

be around him; however, she was willing to serve his Probationary Release on him in a secluded 

conference room, an area with limited access and few other people around. Hermange Decl. ¶ 15; 

Hermange Depo. at 72:1–21. He believes this demonstrates that she was lying to the Personnel 

Board.

ii. Ms. Vickie Gorley

Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Gorley wrongly stated in Plaintiff’s release that he cost the 

Department money when he ordered a gas card for another employee. Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, Ex. 7 

at 7; Opp. at 14. Plaintiff also claims that Ms. Gorley testified falsely at the Personnel Board 

hearing as to Plaintiff’s job duties and that his job performance was poor. Hermange Decl. ¶ 18; 

Hermange Depo., Ex. 250 at 32:16–22. However, Plaintiff does not believe that Ms. Gorley ever 

discriminated against him based on his race. See Capozzi Decl., Ex. A, 53:2–53:7.

iii. Ms. Delores Nnam

Defendant does not mention Ms. Delores Nnam in its motion or reply. Plaintiff testifies 

that Ms. Nnam, along with Ms. Alcantar, requested Plaintiff’s release. See Hermange Depo. 42:8–

43:22; Hermange Decl. ¶ 16. But she was also allowed to conduct his administrative review 

process when he challenged his release, so he believes this was a conflict of interest. Hermange 

Decl. ¶ 16; Hermange Depo. at 42: 15–19. As part of that process, Plaintiff showed Ms. Nnam 

some of his notes from his time of employment, but she did not believe that this evidence 

demonstrated his release was unwarranted. Hermange Depo. at 29:12–30:7. Plaintiff believes she 

was attempting to cover for his discriminatory release.

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d. Plaintiff Has Not Sufficiently Demonstrated Pretext

Put simply, Plaintiff has “produced no facts which, if believed, would have shown pretext 

and thus tendered an issue for trial.” Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983). 

He does not present any direct evidence of discrimination—evidence that requires no inference by 

the Court—so he must prove his case through specific and substantial circumstantial evidence. 

See Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890; Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1112. But he has not shown either (1) that 

“unlawful discrimination more likely motivated” Defendant to release him than the proffered 

justification; or (2) that “Defendant’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence because it is 

inconsistent or otherwise unbelievable.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dept. 424 F.3d 1027, 

1037 (9th Cir. 2005).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff asserts that only Ms. Alcantar had racist intent. But the 

evidence shows that Ms. Gorley, Ms. Nnam, and Ms. Sheila Mitchell (head of the Probation 

Department) were all involved in the decision to release Plaintiff. See Hermange Depo. 42:8–

43:22; Hermange Decl. ¶ 16; Gorley Decl. ¶ 11. In fact, Ms. Alcantar testifies that she did not 

have decision-making authority for Plaintiff’s release; she could only recommend it. Alcantar 

Decl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff does not offer any reason for the Court to infer that these three individuals 

offered Plaintiff’s poor performance as a reason for his release as mere pretext for discrimination. 

His only argument is that he disagrees about the quality of his performance. But “an employee’s 

subjective personal judgments of [his] competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996). And an employee 

“cannot simply show the employer’s decision was wrong, mistaken or unwise” to establish 

pretext. Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 746 (9th Cir. 

2011).

Similarly, Plaintiff’s references to the Department’s hiring practices do not support an 

inference of pretext. He claims that a majority of the managers are either women, Hispanic, or

African-American. Not only does this claim lack any basis in evidence, but it also does not 

support an inference of racial discrimination. First, it is possible that many of these managers are 

Caucasian women. Second, he does not allege that Ms. Alcantar (the only one with alleged racist 

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intent) has any hand in hiring managers. And third, the Ninth Circuit does not consider proffered 

statistical evidence persuasive when it is “derived from an extremely small universe,” because it 

“has little predictive value.” Aragon, 292 F.3d at 663. Plaintiff does not tell the Court how many 

managers there are or that the sample size is large enough to be meaningful.

This last reason also applies to Ms. Alcantar’s alleged (though not evidenced) hiring 

practices. Though Plaintiff claims Ms. Alcantar hired “almost exclusively female Hispanics,” he 

does not provide a sample size for this conclusion. And the fact that she may have hired three 

Hispanic individuals for the role after him, this small sample size “presents no stark pattern, nor 

does it account for possible nondiscriminatory variables.” Id. The same could be said for Ms. 

Alcantar’s statements about certain Caucasian employees—Plaintiff provides no sample size for 

how many individuals Ms. Alcantar may have made such comments about; he does not say she 

never made such comments about non-Caucasian individuals; and he does not account for any 

nondiscriminatory variables that could account for her beliefs about these individuals, such as job 

performance.

Finally, Ms. Alcantar’s alleged mistreatment of Plaintiff does not amount to pretext for 

race discrimination. Plaintiff submits no admissible evidence connecting Ms. Alcantar’s treatment 

of him to his race. At this step, Plaintiff must point to evidence “that discrimination was the real 

reason” for his release. Franett-Fergus v. Omak Sch. Dist. 19, 743 F. App’x 855, 858 (9th Cir. 

2018); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (“Whatever the employer’s 

decisionmaking process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s 

protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the 

outcome.”). Plaintiff does not, for example, identify any similarly-situated person “who (1) 

exhibited similar job performance and conduct as Plaintiff; and (2) was not terminated.” Zhang v. 

Cty. of Monterey, No. 17-CV-00007-LHK, 2018 WL 1933588, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2018), 

appeal docketed No. 18-15955 (9th Cir.); cf. Vasquez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 

(9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 2, 2004) (“A showing that the County treated similarly situated 

employees outside [plaintiff’s] protected class more favorably would be probative of pretext.”). 

Nor does he show that Ms. Alcantar treated other Caucasians poorly, or otherwise showed favor to 

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non-Caucasians over Caucasians, as opposed to treating Plaintiff alone more poorly than everyone 

else. In fact, Plaintiff admits that Ms. Alcantar treated him in a manner unlike anyone else, 

including other Caucasian employees. See Hermange Decl. ¶ 13; Opp. at 18 (testimony about 

sorting trash).

These facts point not to race discrimination, but instead to a toxic relationship between Ms. 

Alcantar and Plaintiff; a fact that has no bearing on whether Ms. Alcantar acted with racial 

animus. See Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (“That [a manager] may 

have harbored hostility and treated [the plaintiff] unfairly standing alone is not probative of gender 

based animus.”); see also Zhang, 2018 WL 1933588, at *12 (finding no pretext where plaintiff 

presented evidence that she was left out of meetings and that her manager did not give her the 

necessary help because the plaintiff had not shown that similarly-situated, non-Chinese employees 

were not treated in this way, or that the plaintiff was treated this way because of her ethnicity).

Ultimately, Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact that Defendant’s proffered 

reasons for terminating him are pretext for race discrimination. For this reason, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination under 

Title VII. 

V. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

as to his only claim. The Court having dismissed Plaintiff’s only claim, the Clerk is directed to 

close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2019

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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