Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_04-cv-00377/USCOURTS-alsd-2_04-cv-00377-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JEFFREY SCOTT JONES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Case No.: 04-377-BH-B

)

LINDEN CITY BOARD OF )

EDUCATION, and WALTER DAVIS, )

Individually and in his official capacity as )

Superintendent of Education of )

Linden City Schools, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

The Court issues this Order as its holding on a question of state law relevant to the application of

federallawat issue in this matter. In their Brief supporting a Motion (Doc. 28-2) for Summary Judgment

andReply(Doc.71)toPlaintiff’sResponse to thatsame Motionfor SummaryJudgment,Defendantsassert

that Superintendant Walter Davis is not a “finalpolicymakingauthority”suchthathis actions hold the Linden

City School Board (hereinafter, “School Board”) liable under §1983. The Court agrees. 

Under §1983, a government entity (here, the School Board) maynot be held liable for the act of

employees simply under a theoryofrespondeat superior. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of the City of

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, “only those officials who have finalpolicymaking authority

may render the municipality liable under § 1983.” Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir.

2005). Determination of whether a particular official has final policymaking authority, however, is a

question of state law. Id. (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). Though

having alreadydenied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court now addresses the issue of

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whether Superintendent Walter Davis hasfinalpolicymaking authority because “the identification of those

officials whose decisions represent the official policy of the local government unit is itself a legal question

to be resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury.” Jett, 491 U.S. at 737. 

Therefore, the Court examinesAlabama “stateand localpositive law”indeterminingwhether Davis

possesses the requisite final policymaking authority to render the School Board potentially liable for his

actions. See Cooper, 403 F.3d at 1221. Defendants submit Alabama Code §16-12-16 is clear that

superintendents do not have the final authority to hire, promote or terminate employees. Rather, as the

statute states, “[t]he city superintendent of schools shall nominate ... for appointment bythe cityboard of

educationallprincipals, teachers,supervisors...recommend themfor promotion ...[and] recommend for

dismissal ... .” Ala. Code §16-12-16 (1975)(emphasis added). The statute is clear that the final act of

appointment, promotion or termination lies solely with the Board. Furthermore, the Alabama Supreme

Court has likewise interpreted Alabama law as not providing superintendents the power to finalize an

employment actionwithout concurrence ofthe school board. Marsh v. Birmingham Bd. of Education,

349 So.2d 34, 35 (Ala. 1977). Marsh, 349 So.2d at 35. Though it is clear the superintendent and the

school board act in concert regarding employment actions, it isthe finalact of authorization that makes the

schoolboard, not the superintendent, the “final policymaking authority.” As the Eleventh Circuit has held,

“[a] governmental employee is considered a ‘finalpolicymaker’ for governmental liability purposes only if

his decisions have legal effect without further actionbythe governing body, and ifthe governing bodylacks

the power to reverse the employee’s decision.” Kamensky v. Dean, 2005 WL 2224840, *2 (11th Cir.

2005)(citing Holloman ex. rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004))(internal

quotations omitted). Under Alabama law, it is clear that although not involved in a large majority of the

selection process, the school board certainly has the power to reverse or deny the superintendent’s

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recommendation.

Though Plaintiff asserts that Linden City’s local school board regulations alter the responsibilities

as they are presented in the state statute, the Court does not find that such regulations require the school

board to merely “rubberstamp”the employment actionrecommendations ofthe superintendent. The Court

interprets the regulations cited by Plaintiff (Pl.’s Br. Opp., Doc. 69, p.6)(citing Exs. 30 & 31, Doc. 70) as

only providing that it is the superintendent’s duty to recommend personnel for employment or promotion

and that the school board shall not make such decisions without a recommended candidate before them.

In no way do the regulations require the board to hire all employees presented by the superintendent.

Therefore, the local regulations only seemto enforce the state statutorypolicyof cooperation between the

superintendent and the school board in such decisions. 

Though the Court does not find that Defendant Superintendent Davis is a “final policymaking

authority” for the purpose of imputing liability on the School Board for his actions, Plaintiff’s claims for

municipal liability are not defeated. It is well established that violations of constitutional rights by a

government employee can impose municipal liability under §1983 when they are taken pursuant to a

government “policy” or “custom.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. In addition to contending that the School

Board is liable for alleged discrimination based on “failing to adequately promulgate, disseminate, and

enforce a racial harassment and/or discriminationand/or retaliationpolicies,” Plaintiff also submits that the

School Board “failed to take any prompt and effective remedial action reasonably calculated to result in

the preventionand/or remedy ofracialdiscriminationand/or retaliationofplaintiff.” (Am. Comp. ¶60-61).

As the EleventhCircuit has noted, “a municipality’s failure to correct the constitutionally offensive actions

of its employees canrise to the levelof a customor policyifthe municipality tacitly authorizes these actions

or displays deliberate indifference towards the misconduct.” Griffen v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d

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1295, 1308 (11thCir. 2001)(citing Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11thCir.1987)). It is clear

in the Complaint that Plaintiff does not base the School Board’s culpability solely on Davis’s position as

a “finalpolicymaking authority.” Rather, Plaintiff seems to assert his claims against the School Board based

upona theoryofgovernmentalcustomor policystemming fromthe Board’sratificationofDavis’sselection

process and recommended candidates and/or failure to remedy such alleged discriminatory conduct. 

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Defendant Superintendent Walter Davis, as a matter of law, is not a “final

policymaking authority” such that his actions would automatically impute liability upon the the LindenCity

SchoolBoard. However, contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Davis’sstatus as a non-“finalpolicymaking

authority” does not summarily defeat Plaintiff’s claims of municipal liability against the School Board. 

So ORDERED, this 21st day of September, 2005.

s/ W. B. Hand

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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