Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01786/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01786-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kenneth Fitzgerald Palmer,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV 12-01786-PHX-JAT

 ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the Administrative Law 

Judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for supplemental security income under Title 

XVI of the Social Security Act. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On December 4, 2007, Plaintiff Kenneth Fitzgerald Palmer filed a Title XVI 

application for supplemental security income with the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), alleging that his disability began on 

December 1, 2007. (Record Transcript (“TR”) 22). Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially 

on April 18, 2008, and upon reconsideration it was denied again on December 2, 2008. 

(Id.). 

 Following the denials, on January 5, 2009, Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing 

with an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.). Plaintiff appeared and testified before 

the ALJ on April 20, 2010. (Id.). On June 22, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding 

that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of chronic low back pain with 

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radiculopathy, multilevel degenerative disc disease of his lumbar spine, hypertension, 

shortness of breath, a reading and a spelling disorder, probable borderline intellectual 

functioning, depression, anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and a 

history of opioid abuse in remission. (TR 24). The ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to 

perform any of his past relevant work. (TR 30). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

was not disabled under the Social Security Act because he retained the Residual 

Functional Capacity to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy. (TR 30-31). 

 Following the ALJ’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim, Plaintiff requested review of the 

ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social 

Security Administration. (TR 16). On June 25, 2012, the Appeals Council denied 

Plaintiff’s request for review. (TR 1). The Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s decision 

as the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id.). 

 On August 21, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Complaint with this Court for judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s decision denying his claim, which is the subject of this 

appeal. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has filed a brief (the “Brief”) seeking judicial review of the 

ALJ’s denial of her claim. (Doc. 17). In the Brief, Plaintiff argues that the Court should 

overturn the ALJ’s decision and remand the case with instructions to award benefits 

because the ALJ’s decision contains legal error as it lacks substantial justification to 

support the ALJ’s conclusions. (Id. at 39). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 

F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is more than a 

mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th 

Cir. 1998). 

 “The inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as 

would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant 

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v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). In determining 

whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, this Court considers the 

record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ’s conclusions and 

the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. 

“Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s 

conclusion which must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to 

draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 

(citations omitted). If there is sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner’s 

determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 

911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in 

medical testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before this 

Court, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, this Court must affirm 

it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). 

A. Definition of Disability 

 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

show among other things, that he is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). “The 

mere existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability.” Matthews v. 

Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 

642–43 (9th Cir. 1982)). Disability has “a severity and durational requirement for 

recognition under the [Social Security] Act that accords with the remedial purpose of the 

Act.” Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Svcs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(1)(A). A person is “under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment 

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or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but 

cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. at § 423(d)(2)(A). 

 “A claimant bears the burden of proving that an impairment is disabling.” 

Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680 (quoting Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Thus, “[t]he applicant must show that he is precluded from engaging in not only his 

‘previous work,’ but also from performing ‘any other kind of substantial gainful work’ 

due to such impairment.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). 

B. Five-Step Evaluation Process 

 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 

evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721 

(describing the sequential process). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the 

sequential process will end the ALJ’s inquiry and the claim will be denied. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, but the 

burden shifts to the ALJ at the final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

 The five steps are as follows: 

 First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

 Second, if the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ determines whether the 

claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the 

claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. at § 404.1520(c). 

Basic work activities means the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs.” Id. at § 

404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either be expected “to result in death” or “to 

last for a continuous period of twelve months.” Id. at § 404.1509 (incorporated by 

reference in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a de minimis 

screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

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 Third, having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the 

impairment “meets or medically equals the criteria of any of the listings in the Listing of 

Impairments in appendix 1, subpart P of 20 CFR part 404 (appendix 1).” SSR 12-2p, 

2012 WL 3104869 at *6 (July 25, 2012). If so, the claimant is found disabled without 

considering the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520(d). 

 When a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment under 

appendix 1, the ALJ will assess a claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Id. 

The ALJ bases the RFC assessment on all relevant evidence in the case record. Id. The 

ALJ considers the effects of all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, 

including impairments that are not severe. Id. 

 At steps 4 and 5, the ALJ uses the RFC assessment to determine whether the 

claimant is capable of doing any past relevant work (step 4) or any other work that exists 

in significant numbers in the national economy (step 5). Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). If 

the claimant is able to do any past relevant work, the ALJ will find that he or she is not 

disabled. Id. If the claimant is not able to do any past relevant work or does not have 

such work experience, the ALJ determines whether he or she can do any other work. Id. 

The usual vocational considerations apply (age, education, and work experience). Id.; 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, then he 

is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work, he will be found disabled. As 

previously noted, the ALJ has the burden of proving the claimant can perform other 

substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

 With regard to steps 1-5 in this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff: (1) had satisfied 

the first step and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 4, 2007 

(TR 24); and (2) had fulfilled the second step and shown that he suffered from the 

following severe impairments: chronic low back pain with radiculopathy, multilevel 

degenerative disc disease of his lumbar spine, hypertension, shortness of breath, a reading 

and a spelling disorder, probable borderline intellectual functioning, depression, anxiety 

disorder, PTSD, and a history of opioid abuse in remission. (Id.). With regard to the 

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third step (3), the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in the 

regulations. (TR 24-26). Therefore, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC and found he 

had the capacity to perform light unskilled work as it is defined by the regulations at the 

light exertional level but with some specific restrictions. (TR 26, 29). As a result of this 

analysis, the ALJ found at the fourth step (4) that Plaintiff is “unable to perform any of 

his past relevant work” as a bus driver, transport driver, day laborer, or construction 

laborer. (TR 30). At the last step (5), however, relying on the testimony of a vocational 

expert, the ALJ found that given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC 

that Plaintiff is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work and performing 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy such as small products 

assembler, parking lot cashier, and pari-mutuel ticket seller. (TR 30-31). Thus, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. (TR 31). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff makes seven arguments for why the Court should overturn the ALJ’s 

decision and remand for an award of benefits. The Court will address each of Plaintiff’s 

arguments in turn. 

A. Whether the ALJ Properly Rejected the Assessment of Treating 

 Physician Abraham Kuruvilla, M.D. 

 In his decision, the ALJ expressly rejected the assessment of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician, Dr. Kuruvilla, regarding Plaintiff’s abilities. (TR 28-29). Plaintiff argues that 

the ALJ rejected Dr. Kuruvilla’s opinion without providing clear and convincing reasons. 

(Doc. 17 at 23-25). Plaintiff contends that because Dr. Kuruvilla’s assessment was 

“uncontradicted by any substantial evidence in this record, the standard that requires 

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion should apply.” 

(Id. at 23) (emphasis in original). 

 However, Dr. Kuruvilla’s assessment was clearly contradicted. As the ALJ 

explained, Dr. Kuruvilla “endorsed disability based on [Plaintiff’s] back impairment.” 

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(TR 28). Yet, as the ALJ further explained, another treating physician of Plaintiff’s, Dr. 

Porter, found Plaintiff’s “back impairment . . . would not preclude his ability to function” 

and Plaintiff “was able to engage in modified light activities with restrictions in spite of 

back impairment.” (TR 29) (emphasis in original). The ALJ expressly “reject[ed]” Dr. 

Kuruvilla’s opinion and “accord[ed] significant weight to Dr. Porter’s assessments.” 

(Id.). 

 The ALJ is not required to adopt the opinion of a treating physician such as Dr. 

Kuruvilla. The ALJ is merely required to make a decision supported by substantial 

evidence. As stated above, see supra Section II, if substantial evidence supports the 

Commissioner’s decision, this Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court will set aside the ALJ’s 

decision “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based on legal error.” 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less 

than a preponderance. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. 

 “Although a treating physician’s opinion is generally afforded the greatest weight 

in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of an 

impairment or the ultimate determination of disability.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 

1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751). “When there is a 

conflict between the opinions of a treating physician and an examining physician [ ] the 

ALJ may disregard the opinion of the treating physician only if he sets forth ‘specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing so.’” Id. 

(quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995)). Even the contrary opinion 

of a non-examining medical expert “may constitute substantial evidence when it is 

consistent with other independent evidence in the record.” Id. at 1149 (citing 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752). Dr. Porter’s contrary opinion is even more persuasive 

because he was not merely an examining physician, he was a treating physician himself. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ was required to give clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting Dr. Kuruvilla’s assessment is unfounded. The ALJ was 

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merely required to set forth specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. 

 The Court finds that the ALJ met this standard. The ALJ explained that he 

rejected Dr. Kuruvilla’s opinion for two reasons: first, because the opinion was 

“incongruent with the evidence as a whole,” and second, because the opinion did not 

appear to be “based on a longitudinal treatment history.” (TR 28-29). These are both 

specific and legitimate reasons for assigning less weight to Dr. Kuruvilla’s opinion. 

 The ALJ was also required to support these reasons with substantial evidence. 

The ALJ explained that he gave significant weight to Dr. Porter’s assessments because 

“they are generally consistent with the record as a whole.” (TR 29). Even the “opinion 

of a non-examining medical expert . . . may constitute substantial evidence when it is 

consistent with other independent evidence in the record.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 

(citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752). Therefore, Dr. Porter’s opinions, coming from a 

treating physician, constituted substantial evidence because, as the ALJ explained, they 

were consistent with the record. 

 Plaintiff attempts to mitigate the ALJ’s reasoning for rejecting Dr. Kuruvilla’s 

opinions by arguing that the ALJ was required to explain how Dr. Kuruvilla’s opinion 

was inconsistent with the record. (Doc. 17 at 23-24). The ALJ merely stated that the 

opinion was “incongruent with the evidence as a whole.” (TR 28). However, the ALJ 

did explain how the record was inconsistent with Dr. Kuruvilla’s conclusion that Plaintiff 

was disabled by laying out the objective medical evidence prior to addressing the medical 

opinion evidence. The ALJ began his RFC determination by outlining the significant 

medical evidence that led to his decision. (TR 26-27). The ALJ then addressed 

Plaintiff’s consultations with Paul Lynch, M.D., and how these consultations led the ALJ 

to conclude that Plaintiff’s back impairment was not disabling. (TR 27). The ALJ then 

addresses Plaintiff’s hypertension, cardiac issues, mental impairment allegations, and 

Plaintiff’s testimony, before finally addressing the medical opinion evidence. (TR 27-

28). The Court finds the ALJ sufficiently established what the record did and did not 

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show and the ALJ did not commit legal error by merely stating Dr. Kuruvilla’s findings 

were not consistent with the evidence as a whole after establishing that evidence. 

Further, by stating that Dr. Porter’s opinions were accorded significant weight because 

they were generally consistent with the record after establishing what the record 

demonstrated, the ALJ proffered substantial evidence for his findings. 

 Thus, the Court finds the ALJ articulated specific and legitimate reasons for 

disregarding the assessment of Plaintiff’s treating physician and he relied on substantial 

evidence (i.e. Dr. Porter’s assessment consistent with the medical record) in reaching his 

conclusion. At the very least, the evidence cited by the ALJ was susceptible to more than 

one rational interpretation. Therefore, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. See

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (“Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational 

interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion which must be upheld; and in reaching his 

findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence.”) 

(citations omitted). 

B. Whether the ALJ Properly Utilized the Assessment of Treating 

 Physician John Porter, M.D. 

 Next Plaintiff argues that the ALJ mischaracterized Dr. Porter’s assessment when 

the ALJ explained that Dr. Porter found “that the claimant was able to engage in modified 

light activities with restrictions.” (Doc. 17 at 26). Further, Plaintiff contends that the 

ALJ committed legal error when he discounted part of Dr. Porter’s assessment by merely 

stating “the record does not support that claimant’s pain would ‘frequently’ interfere with 

attention and concentration” without further explanation. (Id.). 

 The Court finds the ALJ did not err in how he considered Dr. Porter’s assessment. 

The ALJ made it clear that he considered both assessments submitted by Dr. Porter. (TR 

29). Turning to Dr. Porter’s assessments, these reports make it clear that Dr. Porter found 

Plaintiff retained the ability to occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds (TR 594), 

frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds (id.), stand and/or walk (with normal breaks) for a 

total of at least 2 hours in an 8 hour work day (id.), sit (with normal breaks) for a total of 

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less than 6 hours in an 8 hour work day (id.), use his hands frequently for every ability 

listed on the form (TR 595), and that Plaintiff’s pain affects but does not preclude his 

ability to function (TR 592). Given these findings, the ALJ concluded that “Dr. Porter 

opined that the claimant was able to engage in modified light activities with restrictions 

in spite of his back impairment.” (TR 29). The Court finds this characterization of Dr. 

Porter’s opinion is a reasonable assessment of Dr. Porter’s findings as they were selfexplanatory and did not require any further inferential steps. The ALJ’s conclusion was 

not a mischaracterization as Plaintiff contends. At the very least the evidence cited by the 

ALJ was susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Therefore, the ALJ’s 

conclusion must be upheld. See Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453. 

 Plaintiff further argues that the Vocational Expert’s (“VE’s”) testimony proves the 

ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Porter’s reports was a mischaracterization. (Doc. 17 at 25-26). 

In questioning the VE at the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE 

whether someone with the limitations listed by Dr. Porter could sustain work. (TR 65-

66). The VE answered that such a person would have difficulty sustaining employment. 

(TR 66). However, Plaintiff’s counsel and the VE made it clear that this conclusion was 

“due to the concentration deficits” that Dr. Porter found. (Id.). Dr. Porter found 

Plaintiff’s pain was sufficiently severe to frequently interfere with his attention and 

concentration (TR 592) and this specific finding was the linchpin of the VE’s answer. 

The ALJ explicitly addressed this point in his opinion and explained his assessment of 

this part of Dr. Porter’s report by stating “the record does not support that the claimant[’s] 

pain would ‘frequently’ interfere with attention and concentration.” (TR 29). Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s reliance on the VE’s answer to prove that the ALJ mischaracterized Dr. 

Porter’s findings is baseless because the VE’s answer was expressly based on this part of 

Dr. Porter’s report that the ALJ rejected. 

 The only question is whether the ALJ properly rejected this portion of Dr. Porter’s 

report, which he did in spite of Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary. As explained above, 

see supra Section III.A, the ALJ was merely required to give a specific and legitimate 

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reason for rejecting this part of Dr. Porter’s opinion supported by substantial evidence 

because this part of Dr. Porter’s opinion was contradicted by the two medical opinions 

concerning Plaintiff’s mental state that the ALJ cited. See (TR 29). The ALJ satisfied 

this standard in rejecting this part of Dr. Porter’s finding. Dr. Porter found Plaintiff’s 

pain would frequently interfere with attention and concentration, i.e. Plaintiff’s mental 

capabilities. (TR 592). As the ALJ cited, consultative examiner Brent Geary, Ph.D., and 

the state agency psychological medical consultant, Randall J. Garland, Ph.D., found that 

Plaintiff was not incapable and Plaintiff was capable, respectively, of meeting the mental 

or psychological demands of simple unskilled work with minimal public contact. (TR 

29). The ALJ explained that the “record does not support” Dr. Porter’s finding. (Id.). 

The opinions of Dr. Geary and Dr. Garland were accorded “significant weight” because 

they were consistent the overall record which the ALJ explained throughout his decision. 

Accordingly, the ALJ met the legal standard for rejecting a contradicted opinion and did 

not commit legal error by rejecting this portion of Dr. Porter’s findings. 

C. Whether the ALJ Erred by Not Addressing the Assessment of Treating 

 Psychologist Vimal Abhyanker, M.D.

 Dr. Abhyanker assessed and treated Plaintiff’s mental conditions. Dr. Abhyanker 

submitted two reports at issue where he expressed Plaintiff was unable to work (TR 270-

275; TR 313) and where he found Plaintiff suffered from a series of moderate and 

moderately severe limitations (TR 384-85). In reaching his decision, the ALJ did not 

address Dr. Abhyanker’s conclusions. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Abhyanker “assessed 

limitations the [VE] found would preclude sustained work. [Tr. 64-65.] The ALJ 

decision ignores this important evidence.” (Doc. 17 at 26). 

 In making a determination of disability, the ALJ must develop the record and 

interpret the medical evidence. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1996). 

An ALJ must assess a claimant’s RFC “based on all the relevant medical and other 

evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does 

not indicate that such evidence was not considered in his decision. Black v. Apfel, 143 

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F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998). “[I]n interpreting the evidence and developing the record, 

the ALJ does not need to ‘discuss every piece of evidence.’” Howard ex rel. Wolff v. 

Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (affirming district 

court’s holding that the ALJ was not required to discuss every piece of evidence and that 

the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence). “However, if the ALJ rejects 

significant probative evidence, he must explain why. Lusardi v. Astrue, 350 F. App'x 

169, 173 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 

1984)). 

 Thus, the issue is whether Dr. Abhyanker’s opinion was significant or probative. 

The Court finds that it was. Dr. Abhyanker was a treating physician of Plaintiff’s. The 

VE explicitly found that with the limitations set forth in Dr. Abhyanker’s “Medical 

Assessment of the Patient’s Ability to Perform Work Related Activity” (TR 384-85) that 

Plaintiff would be unable to “sustain employment because of the totality of all the 

effects” addressed. (TR 64-65). The ALJ did not address this evidence in any way. 

 Nevertheless, the Court finds this oversight by the ALJ does not constitute 

grounds for remand or an automatic award of benefits. By not addressing Dr. 

Abhyanker’s conclusion the ALJ committed harmless error. “An ALJ’s error is harmless 

where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination. In other words, in 

each case we look at the record as a whole to determine whether the error alters the 

outcome of the case.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation 

and citations omitted). Dr. Abhyanker’s opinion was not supported by the record as it 

was contradicted by the opinions of Dr. Geary and Dr. Garland, to which the ALJ 

accorded significant weight. (TR 29) The ALJ’s description of the record as a whole, 

which the ALJ cited as the reason he gave significant weight to these opinions, shows 

there were strong reasons to reject Dr. Abhyanker’s opinion and the VE’s testimony 

based solely on Dr. Abhyanker’s opinion. Isham v. Barnhart, 163 F. App’x 473, 475 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (“even if the ALJ had failed to address [treating physician’s opinion], such a 

failure would be harmless error because there were strong reasons to reject [treating 

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physician’s] opinion.”). 

 Further, the ALJ considered Dr. Abhyanker’s opinion. As the ALJ made clear in 

determining Plaintiff’s RFC, he reached his conclusion “after careful consideration of the 

entire record.” (TR 26). Dr. Garland’s assessment also specifically referenced Dr. 

Ahbyanker’s conclusions in reaching his contrary opinion. (TR 338). In addition, Dr. 

Abhyanker’s opinion could also have been accorded less weight by the ALJ because the 

part of his opinion in question (TR 384-85) was merely a conclusory checklist that was 

not supported by objective evidence. Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (treating physician’s opinion is only entitled to minimal weight when it is 

conclusory, it is in the form of a checklist and is not supported by objective evidence); 

Martel v. Colvin, C 11-02961 CRB, 2013 WL 1196879, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2013) 

(citing Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir.1996)) (“an ALJ may permissibly 

reject a check-off report that does not contain any explanation” of the bases of the 

examiner’s conclusions.). The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be 

overturned “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750. The Court finds the ALJ’s decision was based on 

substantial evidence and the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s conclusion. 

D. Whether the ALJ Properly Rejected Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 

 Next Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding his testimony was not credible 

and by not providing clear and convincing reasons for rejecting it. (Doc. 17 at 28-30). 

However, to reject the subjective testimony of a claimant, the ALJ must only make 

specific findings based on the record. The District Court of California has addressed this 

issue in a well-reasoned opinion and this Court has adopted that Court’s reasoning before 

in concluding that to the extent there is actually any principled distinction between the 

two standards, the ALJ must make specific findings supported by the record to explain 

his credibility evaluation.1

 

1

 The District Court of California set forth its reasoning as follows: 

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In Bunnell, the court addressed confusion regarding the 

standard for evaluating the credibility of subjective complaints 

and endorsed the standard set forth in Cotton v. Bowen, 799 

F.2d 1403 (9th Cir.1986), Varney v. Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, 846 F.2d 581, 583–584 (9th Cir.1988) and 

Gamer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 815 F.2d 

1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1987). Bunnell, 949 F.2d at 345. The socalled “Cotton standard” requires the claimant to produce 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that is 

reasonably likely to be the cause of the alleged pain. Once 

that evidence is produced, the adjudicator may not reject a 

claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of 

objective medical evidence fully corroborating the alleged 

severity of the pain. Bunnell, 949 F.2d at 343, 345 (citing 

Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407). Rather, the adjudicator must 

“specifically make findings which support this conclusion. 

These findings, properly supported by the record, must be 

sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the 

adjudicator rejected the testimony on permissible grounds and 

did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding 

pain.” Bunnell, 949 F.2d at 345–46 (internal citation and 

quotation omitted). 

Some subsequent decisions have stated that, unless there is 

affirmative evidence that a claimant is malingering, the ALJ 

must articulate “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting 

subjective complaints. See, e.g., Morgan v. Commissioner of 

the Social Security Administration, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th 

Cir.1999); Regennitter v. Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration, 166 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir.1999); Reddick, 

157 F.3d at 722; Light, 119 F.3d at 792; Lester v. Chater, 81 

F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.1995); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; 

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir.1995); 

Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.1993). Other 

decisions state that the ALJ must make specific findings based 

on the record, but do not use the “clear and convincing” 

formula. See, e.g., Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113–14 

(9th Cir.1999); Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th 

Cir.1998); Chavez v. Department of Health and Human 

Services, 103 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir.1996); Byrnes v. Shalala, 

60 F.3d 639, 641–42 (9th Cir.1995); Moncada, 60 F.3d at 524; 

Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749–50 (9th Cir.1995) (per 

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 Turning to the ALJ’s decision in this case, the Court finds the ALJ did in fact 

 

curiam); Flaten v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 

44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir.1995). 

The “clear and convincing” language appears to have been 

derived from Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683 (9th 

Cir.1989), which states that “[t]he Secretary’s reasons for 

rejecting excess symptom testimony must be clear and 

convincing if medical evidence establishes an objective basis 

for some degree of the symptom and no evidence affirmatively 

suggests that the claimant was malingering.” Swenson, 876 

F.2d at 687 (citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1455 

(9th Cir.1984)). In Gallant, however, the court did not hold, 

or even affirmatively state, that an ALJ is required to provide 

“clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting excess pain 

testimony whenever there is no evidence of malingering. 

Instead, the court merely observed that no witness had testified 

that the claimant was malingering, that “[n]o clear and 

convincing reasons were provided by the ALJ” for his 

rejection of the claimant’s testimony, and that the evidence 

relied on by the ALJ for his credibility evaluation was 

“insubstantial.” Gallant, 753 F .2d at 1455, 1456. 

Bunnell did not cite either Gallant or Swenson, and neither 

Bunnell nor the cases it did cite with approval (that is, Cotton, 

Varney, and Gamer) use the “clear and convincing” formula. 

It thus appears that the “clear and convincing” standard is an 

unwarranted elaboration of the substantial evidence standard 

of review, and that it was not part of the Cotton test adopted in 

Bunnell, where the en banc court attempted to clarify the law. 

Any difference between the standards may be more apparent 

than real. There does not appear to be any principled 

distinction between the two standards as they have been 

applied. To the extent that there is or may be a conflict, 

however, Bunnell must control since it was an en banc 

decision. Accordingly, this Court will adhere to Bunnell’s

requirement that the ALJ make “specific findings” supported 

by the record to explain his credibility evaluation, rather than 

imposing the arguably more exacting “clear and convincing” 

requirement suggested by Morgan and its predecessors. 

Ballard v. Apfel, No. CV 99-2195-AJW, 2000 WL 1899797, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 

2000). 

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make specific findings supported by the record in explaining why he disregarded 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. First, the ALJ found the record failed to support a 

disabling impairment even though Plaintiff complained of severe low back pain with 

radiation to his legs. (TR 26-29). Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s January 

2008 physical examination and Plaintiff’s February 2008 MRI and nerve conduction 

study did not support Plaintiff’s allegations. (TR 26-27). While an ALJ may not reject a 

claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on lack of objective medical evidence to 

fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain, see Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856-57; Fair, 885 

F.2d at 602, the lack of objective medical evidence supporting the claimant’s claims may 

support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant is not credible. See Batson v. Comm’r of the 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Second, the ALJ found the record shows Plaintiff has poorly complied with 

psychotropic medication prescriptions to address his mental impairments, Plaintiff failed 

to attempt a radiofrequency ablation in spite of Plaintiff’s testimony to the contrary, and 

the few spikes in Plaintiff’s blood pressure appeared to have been caused by noncompliance with hypertension medication. (TR 27, 28). “[U]nexplained, or 

inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of 

treatment” is a relevant factor in assessing credibility of testimony. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 

947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir.1991); see also Meanal v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (ALJ may consider Social Security disability claimant’s failure to follow 

treatment advice as a factor in assessing Social Security disability claimant’s credibility). 

 Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments could be effectively controlled 

with medication. (TR 27-28). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s hypertension is well 

controlled by medication and Plaintiff himself testified at the hearing that medication 

helps his back pain and that he has virtually no side effects, which was corroborated by 

Dr. Lynch’s treatment notes. (TR 27). “Impairments that can be controlled effectively 

with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for 

[disability] benefits.” Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th 

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Cir. 2006) (citing Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004)); Lovelace v. 

Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1987); Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 

1983) (affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s impairments were 

responsive to medication)). 

 Finally, the ALJ found the record also showed Plaintiff was “not significantly 

limited in his functional capacity to any extent that would qualify the impairments as 

disabling” due to his daily activities. (TR 28). See Matthews, 10 F.3d at 679-80 (Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals upheld ALJ’s rejection of a claimant’s subjective complaints 

where ALJ found claimant’s performance of daily activities like housecleaning, light 

gardening, and shopping undermined claimant’s assertion of disabling pain.). The ALJ 

noted that Plaintiff is able to prepare simple meals, tend to his personal needs, visit his 

girlfriend, travel out of state, walk, drive, pay bills, count change, shop at the grocery 

store, and handle a savings account and bank book. (TR 28). Further, progress notes 

from 2008 and 2009 from Southwest Behavioral Health Services showed Plaintiff’s 

insight and judgment were good, Plaintiff was described as “cheerful and in a good 

mood” and as “emotionally stable,” Plaintiff moved into a new house with his children he 

was happy about, and Plaintiff himself reported that “everything in his life was fine.” 

(Id.). The ALJ found while Plaintiff’s intellectual difficulties are substantiated by the 

record, there is no evidence that they would preclude basic unskilled work activity. (Id.). 

 The Court finds the ALJ’s credibility finding was a “reasonable interpretation” of 

the evidence and was supported by substantial evidence in the record, accordingly, “it is 

not [the Court’s] role to second-guess it.” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d 

at 604). Therefore, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

E. Whether the ALJ Erred by According Significant Weight to the 

 Assessments of State Agency Psychologists 

 The ALJ accorded significant weight to the reports of Dr. Geary, the consultative 

examining psychologist that examined Plaintiff at the request of the state agency, and Dr. 

Garland, the state agency psychologist that examined the evidence. (TR 29). Plaintiff 

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argues that Dr. Geary did not conclude that Plaintiff could meet the mental demands of 

simple unskilled work, Dr. Geary merely did not conclude that Plaintiff could not meet 

these mental demands. (Doc. 17 at 31). Thus, Plaintiff concludes that the ALJ’s reliance 

on Dr. Geary’s assessment for finding that Plaintiff could perform this work is 

unfounded. (Id.). Further, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give enough evidence 

for relying so heavily on the opinion of a non-examining reviewer of Plaintiff’s medical 

record such as Dr. Garland. (Doc. 17 at 32). 

 The Court finds the evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s decision. First, the 

ALJ reasonably interpreted the evidence provided by Dr. Geary’s assessment. Dr. Geary 

found that Plaintiff exhibited difficulty with orientation, maintenance of attention and 

concentration, calculation, spelling, comparative thinking, expression of common sense 

reasoning, and abstraction, noting Plaintiff was unable to correctly recite the alphabet. 

However, Dr. Geary found Plaintiff had no limitations in understanding and memory and 

“mild” limitations in concentration when alone, but “moderate” limitations when he was 

around others. Further, Dr. Geary found Plaintiff had “moderate” limitations in 

persistence, social interaction, and adaptation. (TR 328-334). Dr. Geary made no 

statement to the effect of whether or not Plaintiff could perform unskilled work. In his 

decision, the ALJ summarized these findings, assigned significant weight to Dr. Geary’s 

assessment because “it is generally consistent with the overall record,” and noted “that in 

spite of the claimant’s impairments, Dr. Geary did not conclude that the claimant could 

not meet the mental or psychological demands of simple unskilled work with minimal 

public contact consistent with the [ALJ’s] decision in this case.” (TR 29). 

 Dr. Garland found Plaintiff was “not significantly limited” in most areas, 

including: remembering locations and work-like procedures, understanding, 

remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, sustaining an ordinary routine, 

making simple work-related decisions, and maintaining socially appropriate behavior. 

Dr. Garland also found Plaintiff was “moderately limited” in maintaining attention and 

concentration for extended periods, working in coordination with or proximity to others 

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without being distracted by them, completing a normal workday and workweek, 

interacting appropriately with the general public, accepting instructions and responding to 

criticism from supervisors, getting along with co-workers or peers, and responding 

appropriately to changes in a work setting. (TR 336-37). However, unlike Dr. Geary, 

Dr. Garland did state a conclusion and found that based on these findings Plaintiff was 

able to meet the “basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work on 

a sustained basis, particularly in settings of minimal contact with the general public.” 

(TR 338). The ALJ also summarized these findings, accorded significant weight to Dr. 

Garland’s assessment because it too was consistent with the weight of the record, and 

cited Dr. Garland’s finding that overall the claimant would be able to perform unskilled 

work. (TR 29). 

 Regarding Dr. Geary’s report, nothing about the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Geary’s 

report is mischaracterized or untrue. Plaintiff has not shown how any of the limitations 

outlined by Dr. Geary would prevent or invalidate the ALJ’s determined RFC. Indeed, 

Dr. Garland made substantially similar findings to Dr. Geary and arrived at the 

conclusion that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work requiring no contact with the 

public. The ALJ relied on this conclusion by Dr. Garland to arrive at the same 

conclusion in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC properly 

incorporated the limitations identified by both Dr. Geary and Dr. Garland. The ALJ 

translated Plaintiff’s condition, including the mental limitations assessed by Dr. Geary, 

into the restrictions outlined in Plaintiff’s RFC. 

 Further, the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Geary’s assessment was consistent with the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 

1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008). In Stubbs-Danielson, an examining physician, Dr. McCollum, 

stated that the claimant had a slow pace in thinking and actions and that she was 

“moderately limited” in her ability to perform at a consistent pace without an 

unreasonable number and length of rest periods and “mildly limited” in several other 

mental functioning areas. 539 F.3d at 1173. Dr. McCollum did not assess whether the 

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claimant could perform unskilled work on a sustained basis. Id. A state agency nonexamining psychologist, Dr. Eather, also found the claimant had several substantially 

similar moderate limitations in mental areas. Id. However, Dr. Eather did state a 

conclusion and found that based on his findings claimant could perform simple work 

without public contact. Id. The ALJ’s RFC mirrored Dr. Eather’s conclusion. Id. The 

claimant argued that the RFC finding did not capture the pace and mental limitations 

identified by Dr. McCollom and Dr. Eather. Id. The Court of Appeals found that the 

ALJ translated the claimant’s condition, as outlined by both Dr. McCollom and Dr. 

Eather, “into the only concrete restrictions available to him—Dr. Eather’s recommended 

restriction to ‘simple tasks.’” Id. at 1174. The Court of Appeals explained that Dr. 

Eather’s assessment was consistent with Dr. McCollom’s assessment and the ALJ’s 

reliance on Dr. Eather’s assessment then properly incorporated Dr. McCollum’s 

assessment as well. Id. 

 In this case, similar to Dr. Eather’s assessment in Stubbs-Danielson, Dr. Garland’s 

assessment incorporates Dr. Geary’s assessment and the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Geary’s 

findings was proper. Further, the ALJ cited specific findings by Dr. Garland that both 

Dr. Garland and the ALJ found were supported by the record. (TR 29). Accordingly, the 

ALJ properly relied on Dr. Garland’s findings as well. The Court finds the ALJ did not 

err in how he utilized the assessments of either Dr. Geary or Dr. Garland in determining 

Plaintiff’s RFC. 

F. Whether the ALJ Erred in Determining Plaintiff’s Mental Functional 

 Capacity 33-35/28-29 

 Next Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding Plaintiff could perform 

“unskilled work” because he did not perform a “function-by-function” assessment in 

evaluating Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity. (Doc. 17 at 33-35). Plaintiff 

explains that SSR 96-8p requires a function-by-function analysis of a claimant’s 

limitations or restrictions. (Id. at 33). Plaintiff heavily quotes from SSR 96-8p and SSR 

85-15 in making his point. See (Id. at 33-34). However, Plaintiff fails to explain how 

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these rulings apply to the case at bar and how the ALJ in this case specifically failed to 

meet this standard. Plaintiff begins his argument with one sentence stating what the ALJ 

concluded, then ends the argument with the conclusory statement—“[a]s such, the ALJ’s 

mental RFC assessment of ‘unskilled work’ fell short of the required function-byfunction assessment.” (Id. at 34). Plaintiff does no more to analyze the facts of this case. 

Plaintiff’s mere conclusion is unpersuasive. 

 Plaintiff fails to point out what functions the ALJ allegedly failed to consider. In 

making his RFC determination, the ALJ took into account those limitations for which 

there was record support that did not depend on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

“Preparing a function-by-function analysis for medical conditions or impairments that the 

ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the record is unnecessary. See SSR 96–8p.” 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Further, the ALJ’s conclusion did properly analyze Plaintiff’s ability to function. 

The ALJ’s conclusion was that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform 

“light unskilled work as light work is defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) and 416.968(a), 

respectively.” (TR 26). Then the ALJ specifically found Plaintiff “require[d] work with 

limited public interaction and/or contact.” (Id.). Turning to the regulations the ALJ 

conspicuously cited, 

Unskilled work is work which needs little or no judgment to 

do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short 

period of time . . . . [A] person can usually learn to do the job 

in 30 days, and little specific vocational preparation and 

judgment are needed. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a). The Court finds that the ALJ adequately performed a functional 

analysis and expressed Plaintiff’s mental limitations by specifically finding that Plaintiff 

“required[d] work with limited public interaction and/or contact” and also by 

incorporating by reference the specific functional limitations from the regulatory 

definition of unskilled work. (TR 26). 

 Plaintiff also argues this case is similar to a recent case decided by the Court, 

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Pronovost v. Astrue, No. 12-cv-01168-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL1092902 (D. Ariz. Mar. 15, 

2013). In Pronovost, the Commissioner conceded the ALJ’s decision was deficient 

because the ALJ merely limited the claimant to “unskilled work” with some physical 

restrictions without providing detailed functional limitations for the claimant’s mental 

impairments as required by SSR 85-16. The Commissioner moved for remand for further 

proceedings rather than remand for benefits as the claimant requested. The Court agreed 

with the Commissioner and remanded the case for further proceedings. 

 However, the ALJ in this case, unlike the ALJ in Pronovost, did more than simply 

limit Plaintiff to “unskilled work” with some physical restrictions. As explained above, 

the ALJ limited Plaintiff to unskilled work per the specific definition in the regulations 

and specifically addressed Plaintiff’s mental capacity by limiting Plaintiff to work with 

limited public interaction and/or contact. Accordingly, the ALJ adequately determined 

Plaintiff’s mental functional capacity. 

G. Whether the ALJ Determined Plaintiff’s RFC Based on the Record 

 Finally Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain how the medical evidence 

supported his RFC assessment. (Doc. 17 at 35-37). Plaintiff concedes that the ALJ 

discussed the medical evidence, but argues that the ALJ did not consider Plaintiff’s 

individual limitations and apply them when determining Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at 37). 

Essentially, Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ’s use of a hypothetical when 

questioning the VE did not incorporate Plaintiff’s specific limitations and was proof that 

the ALJ did not consider Plaintiff’s capacities. (Id. at 36). 

 When questioning the VE, the ALJ asked the VE to consider someone, 

45 years old that was limited to light, unskilled work . . . . 

And there would be postural restrictions. There would be no 

crawling or climbing or crouching or squatting or kneeling, 

and there would be lower extremity limitations, so there 

would be no use of the legs or feet for pushing or pulling or 

foot or leg controls. No interaction with the public. In other 

words, it would be a job working with things, not people. 

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And the job would offer a sit-stand option so that the 

employee could actually alternate between sitting and 

standing during a normal workday without affecting their 

productivity. 

Now, are there jobs that fit that hypothetical that exist in the 

national economy? 

(TR 60-61). To which the VE answered in the affirmative and named three jobs that fit 

this profile. (TR 61-62). 

 The Court finds the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s RFC supports the ALJ’s 

ultimate determination of that RFC with substantial evidence. As discussed above, see 

supra Section II, substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. “The inquiry here is whether the record, read 

as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the 

conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (citation omitted). In his 

assessment, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s back pain and the evidence, Plaintiff’s 

hypertension, cardiac issues, Plaintiff’s mental impairments, his daily activities and 

limitations, Plaintiff’s substance abuse, his testimony, and the medical opinion evidence. 

(TR 26-29). All of this information led to the determination that Plaintiff could perform 

light unskilled work “as light work is defined by” the regulations—i.e. work which needs 

little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of 

time . . . . [A] person can usually learn to do the job in 30 days, and little specific 

vocational preparation and judgment are needed. 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a). This definition 

of unskilled work was used in by the ALJ in his hypothetical posed to the VE. Further, 

the ALJ added Plaintiff’s specific limitations to the hypothetical as the ALJ had 

determined them to be based on the specific evidence he discussed—i.e. Plaintiff’s 

postural restrictions, back limitations, mental limitations, and functionality limitations. 

The ALJ’s discussion of the evidence supports the hypothetical question he posed to the 

VE. Consequently, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

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 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within 

the meaning the Social Security Act. Though oral argument was requested on the 

Motion, because both the parties submitted memoranda discussing the law and evidence 

in support of their positions and oral argument would not have aided the Court’s 

decisional process, the Court will vacate the oral argument concerning this matter. See 

e.g., Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); Lake at Las Vegas Investors 

Group, Inc. v. Pacific. Dev. Malibu Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is 

AFFIRMED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly and vacate the oral argument concerning this matter set for August 7, 2013, 

at 04:00 PM (Doc. 26). The judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court. 

Dated this 30th day of July, 2013. 

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