Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00743/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00743-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07cv0743

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANTZ E. ARNELL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv0743-LAB (RBB)

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE

vs. MOTION FOR RECUSAL

JUDGE W. McADAM, Department 8

Superior Court of California, County of

San Diego, South County Judicial

District,

Defendants.

On April 24, 2007, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Judge W. McAdam of the

Superior Court of California, alleging irregularities in connection with certain legal

proceedings before Judge McAdam. According to the complaint, which exceeds 170 pages

in length, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with a neighbor and was tried on criminal

charges before Judge McAdam. After being convicted and unsuccessfully attacking his

conviction, he now seeks damages against Judge McAdam. Judge McAdam is the only

named Defendant, although Plaintiff alleges corruption and incompetence on the part of

other judges and attorneys in the office of the District Attorney.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 14 Filed 07/10/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Judge Jones summarily recused without stating his reasons for doing so; his recusal

was not in response to a motion or other request by Plaintiff.

2

 Judge Burns’ “experience as a prosecutor and as a Superior Court Judge would be

invaluable if he was willing to impartially expose the pattern of misconduct that has led to this

case.” Motion for Recusal at 3:8–10.

- 2 - 07cv0743

This case was initially assigned to Judge Napoleon Jones, who recused,1 after which

the case was assigned to Judge James Lorenz, who recused following Plaintiff’s motion for

recusal. This case was then assigned to Judge Thomas Whelan, who recused following

Plaintiff’s motion for recusal. Thereafter, this case was assigned to Judge Larry Burns.

Plaintiff has moved ex parte for Judge Burns’ recusal.

The bases for Plaintiff’s ex parte motion are Judge Burns’ former employment in the

District Attorney’s office 22 years previously, and Plaintiff’s belief that Judge Burns has

friendly relationships with the state court judges against whom wrongdoing is alleged, as well

as with Judges Lorenz and Whelan. Plaintiff also, inexplicably, contends that Judge Burns

“owes his current position” to an unnamed political organization associated with the District

Attorney’s office. Plaintiff also appears to believe that Judge Burns has been a California

Superior Court judge,2 which is not accurate. Plaintiff’s theory is that Judge Burns would be

unwilling to expose misconduct in the state court and in the District Attorney’s office.

Recusal of federal judges is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Under § 144,

a party must show "personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse

party . . . ." Under § 455(b), a judge must disqualify himself if any of certain specific

conditions are met. None are applicable in this case. Under the broader provision of

§ 455(a), a judge is required to disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality

might reasonably be questioned.” The Ninth Circuit has explained that judges should only

recuse when there is good reason for doing so: “[A] judge has as strong a duty to sit when

there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.”

Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California, 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 14 Filed 07/10/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07cv0743

The inquiry into a judge's possible partiality is "an objective one, made from the

perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and

circumstances." Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 121 S.Ct. 25, 26, 147

L.Ed.2d 1048 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.) (citations omitted). 

The mere fact that a judge previously served in a government office that prosecuted

a defendant does not require recusal. United States v. Silver, 245 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir.

2001) (finding recusal was not warranted where judge had been a United States Attorney

while criminal defendant was being investigated by the U.S. Attorney’s office); Gravenmier

v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that recusal was not required even

where judge was of counsel to the United States Attorney’s office when the defendant was

tried and convicted of an unrelated charge). Furthermore, Judge Burns’ employment with

the District Attorney’s office ended 22 years in the past and would not raise reasonable

questions as to his impartiality in this case. See Silver, 245 F.3d at 1080 (noting ten-year

lapse between indictment in the case at bar, and the judge’s service in United States

Attorney’s office where defendant was investigated on an unrelated charge). 

The vague suggestion that persons who promoted Judge Burns' appointment as a

district court judge might resent or be disappointed by rulings adverse to Judge McAdam

does not counsel recusal. Matter of Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Reasonable,

well-informed observers of the federal judiciary understand that judges with political friends

or supporters regularly cast partisan interests aside and resolve cases on the facts and law.

Judges with tenure need not toady, and don't.") 

Judge Burns’ current collegial association with Judges Lorenz and Whelan does not

require recusal. Judges Lorenz specifically rejected all Plaintiff's suggested reasons for

recusal, and instead gave his relationship with Judge McAdam as his reason for recusal.

Judge Burns, however, is not personally acquainted with Judge McAdam. Judge Whelan

summarily recused without stating his reasons for doing so. Plaintiff appears to be implying

that the alleged biases of Judges Lorenz and Whelan should be imputed to Judge Burns,

which is incorrect. Furthermore, every judge in this District is a professional colleague of

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 14 Filed 07/10/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 07cv0743

these two judges; thus, even if the collegial relationship between Judge Burns and Judges

Lorenz and Whelan introduced a bias or appearance of impropriety, the rule of necessity

would render recusal inappropriate. Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth

Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213

(1980) (holding that the rule of necessity is an exception to the recusal requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 455)). 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 14 Filed 07/10/07 Page 4 of 4