Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01609/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACKIE M. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA MEDICAL FACILITY, 

et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-1609 DAD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

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These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 

U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 

this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp.

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff was placed in 

administrative segregation as punishment for an altercation that took place on May 7, 2014. On 

November 5, 2014, an inmate named Hunt was being escorted back to his cell in administrative 

segregation by Correctional Officers Anderson and Mazsk. Inmate Hunt and Correctional Officer 

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Mazsk engaged in a verbal altercation, which continued as Anderson and Mazsk placed inmate 

Hunt in his cell, with Hunt’s hands cuffed behind his back. Social Worker Theard attempted to 

defuse the situation. According to plaintiff, “[Correctional Officer] Partee just ran up to where 

Social Worker Theard was trying to calm thing[s] down and just pus[hed] pas[t] Mazsk and 

Anderson with the whole purpose of causing harm, and not using the new policy of cool down 

time for EOP and CCCMS inmate[s].” (Id. at 3.) Correctional Officers Partee and Mazsk then 

pepper-sprayed inmate Hunt. Plaintiff, who was in a nearby cell, was exposed to this pepper 

spray. As a result, plaintiff, who suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) 

and uses three inhalation devices, has experienced “harm to this day,” including “go[ing] man 

down three time[s].” (Id.) Plaintiff names six defendants in his complaint: California Medical 

Facility, Warden Robert T. Fox, Social Worker Theard, and Correctional Officers Partee, Mazsk, 

and Anderson. 

Plaintiff contends that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated in this incident. The 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by 

the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 

U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). In order to prevail on a 

claim of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must allege and prove that objectively he 

suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation and that subjectively prison officials acted with 

deliberate indifference in allowing or causing the deprivation to occur. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 298-99 (1991). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he is “both . . . 

aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). See also

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298–99, 302–03 (the official must actually know of the risk yet fail to take 

reasonable measures to ensure the prisoner’s safety). “If a [prison official] should have been 

aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no

matter how severe the risk.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). A “sufficiently culpable state 

of mind” requires that the conduct involve more than mere negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 

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847 (nothing less than recklessness in the criminal sense, that is, subjective disregard of a risk of 

harm of which the actor is actually aware, satisfies the “deliberate indifference” element of an 

Eighth Amendment claim). If the risk of harm was obvious, however, the trier of fact may infer 

that a defendant knew of the risk, but obviousness per se will not impart knowledge as a matter of 

law. Id. at 840–42.

The court finds that the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint fail to state a cognizable claim 

for relief under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has failed to allege that defendant Correctional 

Officers Partee and Mazsk both knew of the risks to plaintiff’s health and disregarded these risks

when they pepper-sprayed inmate Hunt. Plaintiff is cautioned that, in any amended complaint he 

may elect to file, he must allege how these defendants would have known of the risks to 

plaintiff’s health. “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Plaintiff has also failed to allege any actions by named defendants California Medical 

Facility, Warden Robert T. Fox, Social Worker Theard, and Correctional Officer Anderson that 

would give rise to liability on their parts under § 1983. Although the Federal Rules adopt a 

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim 

plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants 

engaged in that support plaintiff's claim. Id. 

Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2), his complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant plaintiff 

leave to file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, he must allege facts demonstrating how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the amended complaint must allege in 

specific terms how each named defendant is involved in the alleged violation of plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

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v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of 

official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number 

assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; plaintiff must file an original and 

two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with 

this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

Dated: August 7, 2015

DAD:10

john1609.14.new

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