Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02748/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02748-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILMER AGUILAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15cv2748 H (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

GRANT OF RESPONDENT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Wilmer Aguilar (“Petitioner” or “Aguilar”) has filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 which: (1) challenges the sufficiency of

evidence presented at trial; (2) alleges that the trial court committed multiple errors; and

(3) contends that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence. [ECF No. 1 at 6-52.]

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss arguing the Petition should be dismissed 

because it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. [ECF No. 10-1 at 3:10-17.]

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Marilyn L. Huff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. After consideration of the 

Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 

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Support of the Motion as well as Lodgments and Exhibits submitted by the parties, the 

Court recommends Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED for the reasons set 

forth below.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 18, 2009, Aguilar was convicted in state court for burglary, robbery, false 

imprisonment, attempted carjacking, and kidnapping for robbery.

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[Lodgment 5.] The San 

Diego Superior Court sentenced Aguilar to serve a term of eight years to life in prison.

[Lodgment 3.] The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on May 24, 2011.

[ECF No. 1 at 53-85.] The California Supreme Court denied review on September 14, 

2011. [Lodgment 2.]

Aguilar filed his first habeas corpus petition in the San Diego Superior Court on 

December 17, 2014. [Lodgment 3.] The San Diego Superior Court denied the petition on 

January 30, 2015. [Lodgment 4.] 

On November 18, 2015, Aguilar filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal. [Lodgment 5.] The California Court of Appeal denied the 

petition on December 1, 2015. [Lodgment 6.]

Aguilar filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on 

January 4, 2016, which the court denied on April 13, 2016.2[Lodgment 7.]

Aguilar filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court on December 7, 

2015. [ECF No. 1.] Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on February 5, 2016. [ECF No.

10.] Aguilar filed an opposition to the motion on February 22, 2016. [ECF No. 12.] 

 

1 The San Diego Superior Court, in its order denying Aguilar’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, state 

that Aguilar was convicted on June 8, 2009. [Lodgment 4.] However, the petitioner and the reporter’s 

transcript indicate that the conviction occurred on June 18, 2009. [Lodgment 7.] The conviction date has 

no effect on the statutory or equitable tolling in this case, thus further inquiry into this issue is not 

necessary.

2

See Supreme Court of California’s disposition of Aguilar’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

CALIFORNIA APPELLATE COURTS CASE INFORMATION SYSTEM, 

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search.cfm?dist=0 (search by case number “S231602”; then follow 

“Disposition” hyperlink) (last updated June, 2, 2016).

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III. DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a petitioner has one year from the date his conviction is 

final to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (West 2006). The statute of limitations, however, is subject 

to both statutory and equitable tolling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Holland v. Florida, 

130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).

A. Timeliness of Petition

Respondent contends Aguilar’s Petition is untimely because it was filed three years

after the statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) expired on December 14, 

2012. [ECF No. 10-1 at 3:10-17.] As explained above, Aguilar had one year from the date 

his conviction became final to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court 

absent statutory or equitable tolling where applicable. 

Aguilar was convicted on June 18, 2009. [Lodgment 5.] Aguilar appealed the 

conviction, which was affirmed by the state appellate court on May 24, 2011. [ECF No. 1 

at 53-85.] The California Supreme Court denied review on September 14, 2011. 

[Lodgment 2.] Aguilar’s conviction became final ninety days later on December 13, 2011. 

See Sup Ct. R. 13.1, Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). The statute 

of limitations began to run on December 14, 2011, the day after the judgment became final 

and expired one year later on December 14, 2012. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A).

Absent any statutory or equitable tolling, Aguilar had until December 14, 2012, to 

file his federal habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), which states 

“[i]n computing any period of time prescribed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of the 

act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be 

included” to AEDPA). Aguilar’s federal habeas corpus petition was not filed until 

December 7, 2015. Accordingly, the petition is untimely by almost three years unless 

Aguilar is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.

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B. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not be 

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Aguilar filed his first state habeas corpus petition on December 17, 2014. [Lodgment 6.]

However, state habeas petitions filed after the statute of limitations period ends do not 

revive a limitations period that has already ended before the state petition was filed. See 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)(“section 2244(d) does not permit 

re-initiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”) 

Aguilar had until December 14, 2012, to file his federal habeas corpus petition. Aguilar

filed his first state habeas corpus petition more than two years after the December 14, 2012 

deadline. Consequently, Aguilar’s filing of his first state petition, and all subsequent

petitions, do not entitle him to any statutory tolling because the AEDPA deadline expired 

before any application for collateral review was filed. Unless equitable tolling applies, 

Aguilar’s federal petition, filed on December 7, 2015, is still untimely by three years.

C. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland, 130 S. 

Ct. at 2560. “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show, ‘(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way’ and prevented him from filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 

(2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).) Equitable tolling is 

unavailable in most cases, and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very 

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

As a basis for his entitlement to equitable tolling, Aguilar contends he was unable to 

file a federal habeas corpus petition because: (1) he can not read, write, or speak good 

English; (2) he lacked knowledge of the AEDPA guidelines and how to write a habeas

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corpus petition; and (3) his legal issues were inadequately explained to him. [ECF No. 12 

at 1-9.]

1. Language Barrier

Equitable tolling is appropriate in situations where the language barrier actually 

prevents timely filing. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). However, 

it does not automatically justify equitable tolling. Cobas v. Burgess, 306 F.3d 441, 444 (6th

Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Lack of proficiency in English is insufficient to justify 

equitable tolling, when the petitioner’s alleged lack of proficiency has not prevented him

from accessing the courts. Id. In order for equitable tolling to be justified, a non-English 

speaker must show that “during the running of the AEDPA time limitation, he was unable, 

despite diligent efforts, to procure either legal materials in his own language or translation 

from an inmate, library personnel, or other source.” Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070. The

burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that equitable tolling is appropriate. EspinozaMatthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Gaston v. Palmer, 417 

F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005))

Aguilar makes a vague and conclusory assertion that he can not “read, write, or speak 

good English.” [ECF No. 12 at 7.] However, the trial court transcripts make no indication 

that Aguilar required a court interpreter, nor does it indicate that a court interpreter was 

even present during the proceeding. [Lodgment 5.] This demonstrates that Aguilar 

understood English sufficiently to forego a court interpreter. Id. Further, the trial court 

transcripts indicate that Aguilar responded to the Judge in English. Id. In response to the 

Judge asking him if he wanted to postpone his sentencing, Aguilar responded “Yes I do.”

Id.

Aguilar’s case is analogous to Cobas v. Burgess, 306 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002), which 

is cited by the Ninth Circuit in Mendoza, where the petitioner claimed that he could not 

understand, read, or write English. Contrary to his claim, the petitioner was able to write a 

detailed letter to his attorney in English. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070 (citing Cobas, 306 

F.3d at 444). Further, in Cobas the petitioner had a court interpreter. [Lodgment 5.] The 

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court in Cobas held that the petitioner had not met the burden of proof to justify equitable 

tolling for lack of proficiency in English. Cobas, 306 F.3d at 444. Similarly this petitioner,

who during his trial did not need the assistance of a court interpreter and was able to 

respond to the Judge in English, has sufficient command of the English language to file a 

timely habeas petition. [Lodgment 5.] Aguilar has not met the burden of proof to show that 

hislack of English proficiency prevented him from accessing the courts, therefore equitable 

tolling is not justified. Cobas, 306 F.3d at 444. 3

Even if there was a finding that Aguilar could not read, write, or speak English 

proficiently, equitable tolling would still only be justified if the language barrier prevented 

him from timely filing a habeas corpus petition. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1069. For example, 

in Mendoza, the petitioner claimed that his lack of access to Spanish-language legal 

materials and inability to obtain a Spanish translator prevented him from learning about 

AEDPA’s deadline. Id. at 1067. The petitioner supported his claims through declarations 

from fellow Spanish-speaking inmates, which stated that the petitioner had been to the 

prison library in an attempt to get Spanish legal materials and a translator, but was 

unsuccessful. Id. at 1068. The court reasoned that the lack of Spanish-language legal 

materials in the prison law library and the petitioner’s incapability of finding a translator 

before the one-year deadline could constitute extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 1069.

Aguilar has provided no evidence to demonstrate that he even attempted and was 

unable, despite diligent efforts, to obtain legal materials in Spanish and/or a translator 

during the running of the AEDPA time limitation. [ECF No. 12 at 1-9.] Unlike Mendoza, 

where the petitioner had fellow inmate declarations to support his claims, Aguilar has not 

provided any evidence to show that the prison library lacked Spanish-language materials

or that the library staff only spoke English.4 Therefore, even if Aguilar could show that 

there was a sufficient language barrier to justify the claim of an extraordinary circumstance,

 

3 Aguilar does not claim the he lacked English proficiency, only that he could not “read, write, or speak 

English good.” [ECF No. 12 at 7.]

4 Aguilar states in his petition that he diligently sought help from others. [ECF. No.12 at 2.] However, he 

does not contend that he sought help from others for translation purposes. Id.

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he has failed to demonstrate that he pursued his rights diligently within the AEDPA time 

limitation. Relief is not warranted when conclusory allegations are made without any 

explanation of the basis for the allegations. People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). 

The burden of proof is on Aguilar to show that equitable tolling is appropriate. Aguilar has 

not produced any evidence to support his claim that he can not read, write, or speak English 

well enough, nor that he was diligent in seeking Spanish-language legal materials or a 

translator. Espinoza-Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026. Thus, it is RECOMMENDED that the 

Court find Aguilar has failed to demonstrate that the language barrier created an 

extraordinary circumstance which prevented him from timely filing a habeas corpus 

petition within the year-long AEDPA limitations period.

2. Lack of Legal Sophistication

Aguilar also contends that his habeas corpus petition was untimely because he lacked 

knowledge of the AEDPA guidelines and how to write a habeas corpus petition. [ECF. 

No.12 at 2.] A pro se petition is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.5 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Aguilar stated that he did not know or understand the AEDPA guidelines. [ECF. No.12 at 

2.] However, in Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit

held that the petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the AEDPA limitations period was

not an extraordinary circumstance that warranted equitable tolling. Similar to Rasberry, 

where the petitioner claimed he was unaware of the correct AEDPA limitations period,

Aguilar contends that he did not know or understand the AEDPA guidelines. See Id. [ECF. 

No.12 at 2.] Yet, lack of legal sophistication and ignorance of the law are not extraordinary 

circumstances that warrant equitable tolling. See Id. Aguilar also claims that he lacked the 

knowledge of how to produce papers to the court. [ECF. No.12 at 2.] However, equitable 

 

5 Aguilar argues that he should be held to the good cause standard applied in Riner v. Crawford, 415 F. 

Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Nev. 2006). In Riner, the court held that the good cause standard was applicable in a 

request for stay and abeyance of a federal habeas petition pending exhaustion of unexhausted state 

claims. Id. at 1210. However, exhaustion is not an issue in this case and Aguilar is not requesting a stay 

and abeyance, thus the good cause standard used in Riner is inapplicable to Aguilar’s request for 

equitable tolling.

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tolling is not appropriate because a “pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, 

by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”

6

Id. Therefore, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court find Aguilar has failed to show his ignorance of the law 

is an extraordinary circumstance which prevented him from timely filing a habeas corpus 

petition.

3. Inadequate Inmate Assistance

Aguilar also argues that the inmates helping him with the habeas corpus petition did 

not understand his legal issues, and therefore did not adequately explain the legal issues to 

him. [ECF. No.12 at 3.] Even though Aguilar’s inmate helpers may not have adequately 

explained the legal issues to him, it does not relieve him of his personal responsibility to 

comply with the AEDPA guidelines. The Ninth Circuit has advised: “the fact that an inmate 

law clerk was assisting in drafting the state petition does not relieve [him] from the personal 

responsibility of complying with the law.” Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220(10th Cir. 2000)). Aguilar has failed 

to demonstrate how his inadequate understanding of the legal issues made it impossible for 

him to file within the year-long AEDPA limitations period.

7 See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 

993 (9th Cir. 2009). Consequently, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court find equitable 

tolling is not warranted and Aguilar’s federal petition is thus untimely.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court issue 

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) directing 

that Judgment be entered dismissing the Petition with prejudice.

 

6 Aguilar states that his lack of legal sophistication argument is due to his limited English skills. [ECF

No. 12 at 7.] However, as previously stated in Section III(C)(1), Aguilar has not shown that he lacked 

proficiency in English and even if he did, the language barrier does not justify equitable tolling under the 

facts presented.

7

In order to receive equitable tolling, the petitioner must show that the extraordinary circumstance made

it impossible to file a timely petition. Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 7 (citing Roy v. Lampert, 465 F. 3d 964, 969 

(9th Cir. 2006)). 

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 8, 2016, any party to this action may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than July 22, 2016. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 

1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: June 14, 2016

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