Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05104/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05104-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON BREEDEN, et. al.

Plaintiffs,

 v.

BENCHMARK LENDING GROUP, INC., and

DOES 1-200, inclusive, 

Defendants.

 

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No. 04-05104 SC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR

CERTIFICATION OF FRCP

23 CLASS ACTION 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, former telemarketing loan officers, brought this

action against their former employer, Defendant Benchmark Lending

Group, Inc. (“Benchmark”), alleging that Benchmark violated the

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq., and

California labor laws by improperly classifying Plaintiffs as

“exempt,” failing to pay overtime and wages, and for failing to

provide meal breaks and rest breaks. Plaintiffs further assert

that they are entitled to waiting time penalties for Benchmark's

allegedly willful failure to pay all compensation due at the time

of termination, and also seek injunctive relief under the

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California Unfair Practices Act. In a February 10, 2005 order,

this Court conditionally certified a collective class under the

FLSA for the purpose of providing notice to potential class

members with respect to Plaintiffs' federal claims. Plaintiffs

now move to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23 for their remaining California state law claims. For the

reasons set forth herein, this Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to

certify a Rule 23 class on the sole issue of whether Plaintiffs

were properly classified as exempt, and DENIES Plaintiffs' motion

in all other respects. 

II. BACKGROUND

The four named plaintiffs in this action worked as “loan

officers” at Benchmark’s in-house telemarketing loan center

located in Santa Rosa, California. Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Cert.

Class at 2-3 (“Pls.’ Mem.”). Each of the named plaintiffs began

working for Benchmark in 2003 and each left Benchmark in 2004. 

Def. Mem. Opp’n. Mot. Cert. Class at 3-4 (“Def. Mem.”). During

their tenure at the Santa Rosa facility, Plaintiffs’ duties

included placing calls to and answering calls from prospective

borrowers, providing potential customers with information related

to Benchmark’s financial products, and keeping borrowers appraised

of the status of financing efforts. Decl. Garry Goodman ¶3. All

loan officers, including named Plaintiffs and the putative class,

worked in a single office in contiguous cubicles, performed

substantially the same duties, and were compensated substantially

the same way. Joint Case Mgmnt. Stmnt. ¶2. 

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Benchmark admits that it treated all loan officers as

“exempt” under state and federal law, and consequently did not

maintain time cards for these employees. Id. Consistent with

this classification, Benchmark did not pay overtime wages to loan

officers. Id. Plaintiffs further allege, and Benchmark denies,

that they did not receive compensation commensurate with either

their agreed-upon rate of pay or state and federal minimum wage

standards; that Benchmark did not allow loan officers to take

adequate meal breaks or rest breaks as required by California law;

and that Benchmark made improper deductions from Plaintiffs’

paychecks. Id ¶4. Plaintiffs filed this action to recoup what

they characterize as unpaid wages, and also seek monetary waiting

time penalties for Benchmark's alleged willful failure to pay all

compensation due to each loan officer at the conclusion of his or

her employment with Benchmark. 

In a February 10, 2005 order, this Court conditionally

certified a collective class under the FLSA with respect to 

Plaintiffs’ federal claims. Plaintiffs now move to certify the

remaining state law claims as a class under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Plaintiffs' Claims

Before discussing the suitability of certifying Plaintiffs'

claims as a class under Rule 23, it is necessary to decipher

exactly which claims Plaintiffs would have this Court certify. In

this respect, Plaintiffs' filings have been less than clear, and,

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in some respects, appear to try to obtain Rule 23 certification

for certain claims without indicating why those claims meet the

standards established by the Rule. 

For example, Plaintiffs have consistently stressed that the

principal issue in this case is whether Benchmark properly

classified Plaintiffs as exempt. See, e.g., Pls.' Mem. at 1, 3. 

All other issues, Plaintiffs contend, "are simply a matter of

damages." Id at 3. Although Plaintiffs have dedicated a great

deal of their moving papers to documenting the suitability of the

classification issue for Rule 23 class treatment, nary a sentence

is dedicated to demonstrating why the remaining substantive

issues--failure to pay overtime, failure to provide meal breaks,

and failure to pay all straight time wages--are also appropriate

for class certification. Plaintiffs may assert that they have

made the proper showing for Rule 23 certification by including two

phrases in the complaint that allege, on information and belief,

that Plaintiffs and members of the putative class worked overtime

and were not given meal or rest breaks. Complaint, ¶¶ 45-46; 51-

55. The Court notes that although it must accept the substantive

allegations of the complaint as true, see Blackie v. Barrack, 524

F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975), it is equally clear that

"sufficient information to form a reasonable judgment" is

required, see id., and that unsubstantiated allegations that

merely parrot the Rule's requirements are inadequate. See

Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th

Cir. 1977); see also Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457

U.S. 147, 157-58 (1982) (noting that the court may not presume

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1

 Courts have broad discretion to define the issues

appropriate for class treatment, see, e.g., Simon v. Phillip Morris

Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 29-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), including the power to

certify issues sua sponte. See United States Parole Com'n v.

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from Plaintiffs' alleged injuries that other members of the class

have also suffered injury). 

In this respect, it is relevant that aside from the

aforementioned phrases included in the complaint, neither the

moving papers nor the declarations filed therewith provide any

support for Plaintiffs' contention that class certification is

appropriate for their claims of unpaid overtime, missed break

periods, and waiting time penalties. 

Plaintiffs may well be correct in their assertion that, aside

from the dispute regarding the proper classification of loan

officers, "[e]very other issue relates to damages and can be

resolved either through undisputed records...sampling or through a

Class member claim process." Pls.' Mem. at 1. But Plaintiffs

just as surely cannot avoid the strictures of Rule 23 by

repeatedly stressing the appropriateness of class treatment with

respect to the issue of whether Plaintiffs were properly

classified as exempt, while neglecting to provide the court with

any information that would tend to establish that Plaintiffs'

substantive claims alleging violations of state law are also fit

for class certification. Rule 23 does not permit such an end-run

around its requirements, and consequently, neither will this

Court. Accordingly, the Court will consider whether Plaintiffs'

claim that Benchmark improperly classified them as exempt is

proper for class certification under Rule 23.1 Should Plaintiffs

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Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980). 

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prevail in showing that Benchmark improperly classified loan

officers as exempt, they will have the opportunity to proceed with

their claims in an appropriate fashion, whether that entails a

renewed motion for class certification, classwide sampling, or

such other methods as are deemed acceptable by Plaintiffs and

proper by the Court. 

 B. Class Certification Under FRCP 23

The Eighth Circuit has described class actions as “an

invention of equity mothered by the practical necessity of

providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not

disable large groups of individuals, united in interest, from

enforcing their equitable rights, nor grant them immunity from

their equitable wrongs.” Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168

F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948). Plaintiffs bear the burden of

establishing that the proposed class meets the requirements of

Rule 23. See Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d

1304 (9th Cir. 1977). The first step requires Plaintiffs to

demonstrate that the four provisions of Rule 23(a) are met. Rule

23(a) provides that: 

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as

representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class

is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,

(2) there are questions of law and fact common to the class,

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are

typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 

If Plaintiffs are able to carry their burden as to this first

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2 In their motion for class certification, Plaintiffs note

that "this class is to be certified under FRCP 23(b)(3), as well as

FRCP 23(b)(1) and (2)...." Pls.' Mem. at 8. However, whereas

Plaintiffs discuss the requirements set forth by Rule 23(b)(3) in

their filings, they have not included a similar discussion with

respect to Rule 23(b)(1) or (2). Accordingly, this Court construes

the present motion as a motion to certify under §(b)(3) of Rule 23

only. 

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step, they must then demonstrate that they are entitled to class

certification under at least one of the three Rule 23(b)

categories.2 In determining whether to certify a proposed class,

courts are directed to take the substantive allegations of the

complaint as true, see Mateo v. M/S Kiso, 805 F. Supp. 761, 771

(9th Cir. 1991), but are also under the obligation to undertake a

“rigorous analysis” of whether the class allegations meet the

requirements of Rule 23. See Chamberlin v. Ford Motor Co., 402

F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2005) quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v.

Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). Courts are not obligated to accept

"conclusory or generic allegations regarding the suitability of

the litigation for resolution through class action." Mateo, 805

F. Supp. at 771.

1. Numerosity

There is no absolute minimum number of plaintiffs necessary

to demonstrate that the putative class is so numerous so as to

render joinder impracticable. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest,

Inc. v. Equal Opportunity Employment Com'n, 446 U.S. 318, 330

(1980). Joinder has been deemed impracticable in cases involving

as few as 25 class members, see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda

Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 463 (C.D. Pa. 1968), and a survey of

representative cases indicates that, generally speaking, classes

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consisting of more than 75 members usually satisfy the numerosity

requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). See 7A Wright, Miller & Kane

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d §1762 (2005). Here,

Benchmark has admitted that the putative class consists of over

236 members. Joint Case Mgmnt. Stmnt. ¶2. The Court finds that

joinder of so many plaintiffs would be impracticable. Numerosity

is therefore satisfied. 

2. Commonality

The second requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the claims of

the class members share in common "questions of law and fact." 

This requirement has been given a permissive interpretation, and

"[a]ll questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the

rule." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.

1998). For the purposes of this motion, the only question is

whether the putative class members share common questions of law

and fact in proving that Benchmark improperly classified them as

exempt under California law. Since all class members were treated

as exempt, and all performed the same job at the same facility,

they have demonstrated that they share questions of law and fact

in common, and accordingly have demonstrated that their claim

meets the standard of Rule 23(a)(2).

3. Typicality

The third component of Rule 23(a) requires a showing that the

claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of the

claims and defenses of the class as a whole. As the Ninth Circuit

has noted, "representative claims are 'typical' if they are

reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they

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need not be substantially identical." Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. 

Again, the claims of the class representatives are, for the

purposes of this motion, precisely the same as the claims of the

other class members. Benchmark has admitted that all loan

officers were classified the same way, paid similarly, and

performed substantially the same duties. Joint Case Mgmnt. Stmnt.

¶2. The claims and defenses of the class representatives satisfy

the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3). 

4. Fair and Adequate Representation

Finally, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative

parties will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the

class." Plaintiffs must prevail on two criteria in order to

satisfy the requirements of this provision: (1) class

representatives and their counsel must be free from irreconcilable

conflicts of interest with absent members of the class, and (2)

named plaintiffs and their counsel must demonstrate their ability

to prosecute the action competently and vigorously on behalf of

absent class members. See Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures,

Inc., 583 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Benchmark challenges the adequacy of representation by the

class representatives in this case by claiming that the named

representatives lacked the commitment to the job that other

members of the putative class possessed, and that several

instances where two named plaintiffs allegedly violated

Benchmark's employee code of conduct demonstrate a "lack of

integrity or credibility" such that they are unfit class

representatives. Def. Mem. at 14. These arguments are

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unavailing. First, only one of the named plaintiffs must be an

adequate class representative in order to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4). 

See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartending Trust Fund v.

Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Second, in order to demonstrate that the named representatives are

inadequate, the party opposing certification must show that any

conflicts between the class members are serious and

irreconcilable. See Sosona v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975). 

Benchmark has proffered evidence tending to show that at

least several former co-workers complained of unsolicited sexual

advances and innuendo by one of the named plaintiffs, along with

additional evidence purporting to show that another named

plaintiff was uncommitted to his position with Benchmark. See,

e.g., Decl. Gretchen LaSage ¶¶ 9-11. However, these facts are

insufficient to overcome the burden imposed on a party challenging

the adequacy of the named representatives. This conclusion draws

additional support when considered against the backdrop of the

sole issue for which class certification is being considered--

whether Benchmark properly classified loan officers as exempt. 

Whatever differences may exist between the representatives and the

putative class members within the realm of such issues as

commitment to the job, hours worked, or personal goals with

respect to the outcome of this litigation are ameliorated by the

narrow scope of the issue being considered for certification. The

class representatives are adequate because their interests in

resolving the question of whether loan officers were properly

classified by Benchmark are the same as all other members of the

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putative class, regardless of personality conflicts or other

differences between class members.

Benchmark has not questioned the adequacy of Plaintiffs'

counsel in this case. In the absence of a basis for questioning

counsel's competence, the named plaintiffs' choice of counsel will

not be disturbed. See Mateo, 805 F. Supp. at 771. This Court

therefore finds that the named plaintiffs and their counsel will

adequately represent the interests of the class.

5. Questions of Law and Fact Predominate

The first part of Rule 23(b)(3) requires that classes to be

certified under that subsection present claims where "common

questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting

only individual members." The Ninth Circuit has endorsed the

proposition that "when common questions present a significant

aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the

class in a single adjudication, there is a clear justification for

handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an

individual basis." Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022, citing 7A Wright,

Miller & Kane Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d §1778 (1986). 

In this case, the parties generally agree that putative class

members all performed the same duties at the same location, and

were all treated as exempt under state and federal law. Joint

Case Mgmnt. Stmnt. ¶2. Although it appears that the parties

disagree as to whether a subsection of the class Benchmark

designated as "independent contractors" were actually loan

officers like the other putative class members, this issue will

not predominate over the common factual and legal issues

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pertaining to the putative class' claim. See id. Accordingly,

this Court finds that common questions of law and fact will

predominate over all other questions.

6. Superiority

Finally, a party seeking class certification under Rule

23(b)(3) must demonstrate that class treatment is the superior

method of resolving the dispute. District courts must consider

potential alternatives to proceeding under Rule 23, see Valentino

v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1235, (9th Cir. 1996), but

decisions as to these criteria are afforded "broad discretion"

upon review. See Kamm v. California City Development Co., 509

F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975). 

Rule 23(b)(3) enumerates four factors deemed "pertinent" to

the resolution of whether class certification is superior. The

first factor is "the interest of members of the class in

individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate

actions." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A). Courts have found that

where damages sought by each class member are not large, class

members have a reduced interest in individually controlling a

separate action. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Institute,

Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) amended by 273 F.3d

1226. 

In this case, Plaintiffs have asserted that the amount of

damages for each individual plaintiff is likely to be "relatively

small." Pls.' Mem. at 16. Even those members of the putative

class who could potentially submit the largest claims for damages-

-those who were relatively high wage earners and who are able to

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substantiate claims of significant overtime worked, improper

deductions, and rest breaks missed--are nonetheless unlikely to

present the court with the kinds of multi-million dollar claims

frequently at issue in Rule 23 class actions. Accordingly, this

Court finds that since the claims involved in this case appear to

be relatively small, the interest of the individual Plaintiffs in

personally controlling the litigation is similarly small, a factor

that supports certification of a class as a superior method of

resolving this dispute.

The second factor to consider is "the extent and nature of

any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or

against members of the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(B). 

Because this Court is not aware of any currently pending related

claims involving the class members, this factor does not weigh

against a finding of superiority.

The third factor to be examined in assessing superiority is

"the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the

litigation of the claims in the particular forum." FED. R. CIV.

P. 23(b)(3)(C). Benchmark apparently argues that it is

undesirable to concentrate this litigation in federal court

because of the availability of administrative proceedings before

the California Labor Commissioner, which, Defendant asserts,

provides "remedies...[that] are faster, cheaper, and provide more

complete relief." Def. Mem. at 15. Plaintiffs counter by noting

that "[n]o administrative remedy has been pursued, and certainly

no administrative relief has been obtained." Pls.' Reply Mem. at

4. Both sides miss the mark. In Zinser, the Ninth Circuit noted

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its approval of the approach taken by the District Court in Haley

v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643 (C.D. Cal. 1996), where the

court considered the location of the parties, witnesses, and

evidence in determining whether a class should be certified under

section (b)(3)(C) of Rule 23. Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1191. In this

case, since the parties, evidence, and witnesses are all likely to

be located relatively close to this particular forum, this Court

does not perceive any reason why section (b)(3)(C) counsels

against certifying the putative class. 

Finally, section (b)(3)(D) directs courts to consider "the

difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class

action." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D). The court in Zinser

affirmed a decision by the lower court refusing to certify a class

because the complexities of class treatment "weigh[ed] heavily

against class certification." 253 F.3d at 1192. Courts from

other circuits have considered the size of the class, the

difficulties in complying with notice requirements, and other

special individual issues in determining whether class treatment

is superior. See 7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice &

Procedure: Civil 3d § 1780 (2005) (citing cases). Because the

putative class is relatively small and does not present either the

kinds of specialized issues that require individual resolution or

other difficulties that would make class treatment particularly

problematic, this Court concludes that certification is

appropriate under section (b)(3)(D). 

// 

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, Plaintiffs' claim that they were wrongly classified

as exempt under state law is appropriate for class certification

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3). Given

that many of the important facts in this case have been admitted

by the parties, as well as the fact that all class members had the

same job in the same facility, the preliminary question of whether

loan officers were properly classified as exempt should be

susceptible to efficient and speedy resolution for all class

members. If Plaintiffs are correct in their assertions that they

were improperly classified, they will have the opportunity to

propose a system by which they may demonstrate the extent of their

damages, if any, on each of their substantive claims, including a

renewed motion for Rule 23 class certification. However, before

considering any evidence or argument with respect to those

particular claims, this Court finds that a more expedient course

to take is to first resolve the potentially dispositive issue of

Plaintiffs' proper classification, especially where most facts

relevant to that question have been admitted by the parties. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to

certify a class pursuant to Rule 23 is GRANTED only with respect

to the question of whether Plaintiffs were properly classified as

exempt employees, and DENIED in all other respects.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall send notice of

this Court's order certifying a class to all class members by July

22, 2005. The form and content of such notice has been

established by the Court and provided to the parties. Defendants

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shall furnish Plaintiffs with the complete names and last known

addresses of all class members. 

AND IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a

status conference on November 18, 2005, at 10:00am in Courtroom 1,

17th floor. The parties shall file one joint case management

statement with the Court 10 days before the status conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2005

 /s/ Samuel Conti 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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