Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-1_05-cv-00088/USCOURTS-ared-1_05-cv-00088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:0701 Maritime Subsidy Board

---

1

Doc. No. 6. 

2

Doc. No. 9.

3

Doc. No. 10.

1

IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

KEVIN GARDNER, et al. PLAINTIFFS

v. 1:05CV00088-WRW

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; COLONEL

WALLY WALTERS, DISTRICT ENGINEER, 

LITTLE ROCK DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS 

OF ENGINEERS; THOMAS S. PARK, OPERATIONS

MANAGER, GREERS FERRY PROJECT OFFICE; and

JOSEPH T. BENTON, III. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Pending is separate Defendants U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Colonel Wally

Walters, and Thomas S. Park’s (“Corps”) Motion to Dismiss.1 Plaintiffs (“Gardners”)

responded,2 the Corps filed a Reply,3 and the Gardners filed a Surreply. The Corps asserts

that this action is brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and that

Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Alternatively, the Corps

argues that there is no final agency action. 

I. Background

 The Gardners filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief asking that the 

Corps be required to issue them a permit for a private boat dock. The Gardners purchased

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 1 of 13
4

Doc. No. 1, Plaintiffs’ Exs. 1-3. 

5

Doc. No. 3. (Benton’s Answer to the complaint alleges that he is one of several

interested parties that participated in a community boat dock application that was submitted by

the previous owners of the Gardners’ property).

2

land and applied for the permit on a flowage easement of Greers Ferry Lake. The lake shore

is managed by the Corps. The previous owners of this property had already applied for and

were given permission to build a dock, but their permit application was placed in suspension,

pending the outcome of litigation challenging the validity of the Corps’ Shoreline

Management Plan. Before selling their home to the Gardners, the previous owners granted

an access easement to an association of land owners in the area. These land owners are

represented by Defendant Joseph Benton III (“Benton”), and also claim they are entitled to a

dock permit in the same location -- in the Gardners’ back yard. 

Shortly after buying the property, the Gardners contacted Mr. Thomas Park (“Park”),

Operations Manager of the Greers Ferry Project Office, to secure their dock permit.4

 Mr. 

Park has the authority to issue Shoreline Use Permits, such as dock permits. The Gardners

also met with Mr. Bennie Rorie (“Rorie”), Natural Resource Specialist with the Corps, to

confirm the site conditions for the dock.

During this application process, Rorie and Park discovered that a third-party --

Benton -- had a competing claim to the water flow easement.5 Based on this, the Corps

refused to issue a permit to the Gardners until the easement’s ownership was either

voluntarily settled or settled by a court order. 

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 2 of 13
6

28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02.

7

Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1985).

3

In its Answer and Motion to Dismiss, the Corps alleges that: (1) the Gardners have

been in a long-running land dispute over the boat dock; (2) this dispute involves a conflict

over access to the water easement, and a conflict over which party filed first for a permit; 

(3) an administrative appeal process is available under the Greers Ferry Shoreline

Management Plan; (4) the Gardners filed this lawsuit without following this process and

appealing to the Division Engineer; (5) under the Shoreline Management Plan, the Corps has

the most experience with managing limited shoreline resources; (6) the Gardners did not

exhaust their administrative remedy and are seeking to settle a local land dispute by

involving the Corps and the federal courts. In its Reply to the Gardners’ Response to the

Motion to Dismiss, the Corps also asserted there is no final agency action.

The Gardners counter that the administrative appeal process is futile because the

Corps has not denied their permit application, but has refused to consider it -- and this is not

the kind of decision that can be administratively appealed. 

The Gardners have also sued Benton and have asked that he be compelled to assert

any claims he may have in this action. Jurisdiction is asserted under the Declaratory

Judgment Act.6

II. Authority

 A. Exhaustion

It is well established that a plaintiff generally must exhaust his administrative

remedies before proceeding in federal court.7 Exhaustion is generally required because it

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 3 of 13
8

Id; see also Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 134 F.3d 409,

414 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of Am. v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 105

(D.C. Cir. 1986).

9

Id.

10Ace Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Federal Crop Insurance

Corporation, 440 F.3d 992, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Missouri v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 864,

871 (8th Cir. 1987)).

11In Home Health, Inc. v. Shalala, 272 F.3d 554, 559-61 (8th Cir. 2001). 

4

(1) prevents premature interference with agency processes; (2) allows the agency to function

efficiently and have an opportunity to correct its own errors; (3) affords the parties and the

courts the opportunity to benefit from the agency’s experience and expertise; (4) allows the

agency to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review; and (5) it promotes

effective and efficient judicial review by ensuring that such review is of a fully developed

factual record.8

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is favored, but may be excused by a limited

number of exceptions to the general rule.9 “A party may be excused from exhausting

administrative remedies if the complaint involves a legitimate constitutional claim, if

exhaustion would cause irreparable harm, if further administrative procedures would be

futile, or if the issues to be decided are primarily legal rather than factual.”10

A party that is challenging the agency action has the burden of proving that

exhaustion should be excused.11 The Gardners have the burden to show that they should be

excused because the administrative procedures would be futile. 

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 4 of 13
12McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147 (1992) (emphasis added).

133 Kenneth Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.07 (1st ed.1958).

14McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146.

155 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 704. 

16Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178-79 (1997). 

17Industrial Customers N.W. Util. v. Bonneville Power, 408 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir.

2005).

5

 An administrative remedy will be deemed futile if there is no doubt that the agency

cannot provide relief.12 The question, then, is whether the Division Engineer has the power

to grant relief to the Gardners by issuing a dock permit. 

In some cases, exhaustion is excused when it “would be futile because of the

certainty of an adverse decision.”13 This exception is limited to instances in which “the

litigant’s interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government’s interests in the

efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to further.”14 

 B. Finality

 The APA provides for review of agency action but only if the action is final.15 An

administrative action is final if it marks the consummation of the agency’s decision-making

process and if it “determines rights or obligations from which legal consequences will

flow.”16 “The finality doctrine is concerned with whether the initial decision maker has

arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.”17 

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 5 of 13
185 U.S.C. § 702.

195 U.S.C. § 704.

205 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) and (2) (emphasis added).

21Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).

22Id. at 830; see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993); I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987).

23Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1975).

6

 C. Judicial Review

The APA’s provisions for judicial review of “agency actions” are contained in 

5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Those provisions state that any person “adversely affected or

aggrieved” by agency action,18 including a failure to act, is entitled to judicial review as long

as the action is a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy.”19

But, before gaining access to federal courts, a party must first clear the hurdle of 5

U.S.C § 701(a). This subsection gives courts the power of review, except under the

following circumstances: (1) the statute, on which the action is based, precludes judicial

review; or (2) the action is committed to an agency’s discretion by law.20

 The second exception is a very narrow one, and is only applicable in those rare

instances where, there is no law to apply.21 Under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), if no judicial

standards are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion,

then it is impossible to evaluate agency action for abuse of discretion.22 In considering

whether administrative action is capable of judicial review under the APA, the test is not

whether a statute, lacks applicable law, but, whether, in a given case, there is no law to be

applied.23 Thus, the existence of some law that is generally applicable to the subject matter

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 6 of 13
24Arizona Power Authority v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1977).

25Id. at 832, (citing FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929)).

26State of Iowa ex. Rel. Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Alliance

for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp. 2d 166 (D. D.C. 2000).

27Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F.Supp. 2d 459 (D. Conn. 2006).

28City of Santa Clara, Cal. v. Andrus, 573 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1978); Michigan Dept. of

State v. U.S., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. Mich. 2001). 

7

will not necessarily remove agency discretion. There is law to apply, only if a specific statute

or regulation limits the agency’s discretion to act in the specific manner which is

challenged.24

 When an agency refuses to act, it does not exercise coercive power over an

individual’s liberty or property rights, and, thus, does not infringe upon areas that courts

often are called upon to protect. In contrast, when an agency affirmatively acts as an

enforcer, the action can be reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its

enforcement power.25 Typically a decision not to act is considered discretionary and outside

judicial review. But, courts have drawn a distinction between an agency’s decision not to act

with respect to an entire class, as opposed to decisions that affect only one individual.26

When a statute or act contains no standard governing a denial of a waiver request, and

when the waiver affects only one party, then the denial is not subject to judicial review.27

Similarly, agency decisions to deny the allocation of electric power to a single city, or to

refuse to grant an exemption to one state, are not subject to judicial review.28 An agency’s

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 7 of 13
29Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

30Wyte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).

31Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 4.

3228 U.S.C. § 2201; see also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 57; Calderron v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740

(1998).

33Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316 (1945) (citations omitted).

8

decision not to renew an examiner’s authority is also unreviewable.29 Finally, a prosecutor’s

decision not to prosecute cannot be reviewed.30

In determining whether a matter has been committed solely to agency discretion,

consideration is given to the nature of the administrative action at issue and the language and

structure of the legal standards. In other words, when the action’s nature is not affirmative

action, and when it applies only to a single party -- generally, it is within the agency’s

discretion and is not reviewable. Moreover, the language of the underlying regulation or

statute is important. When a statute or regulation uses the word “may,” it lacks a clear legal

guideline.31 

D. Jurisdiction under The Declaratory Judgment Act

The Declaratory Judgment Act states “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its

jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal

relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or

could be sought.”32 The Act is available in federal courts only in cases involving an actual

case or controversy, and it may not be used for securing an advisory opinion for controversy

that has not arisen.33

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 8 of 13
3428 U.S.C. § 2201.

35Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); A.G. Edwards & Sons,

Inc. v. Public Bldg. Commission, 921 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1990).

36Collin County v. Homeowners Assn. for Values Essential to Neighborhoods, 915 F.2d

167 (5th Cir. 1990).

37Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 672.

38Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 562 F.2d 418 (1977).

3928 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Labickas v. Arkansas State University, 78 F.3d 333, 334

(8th Cir. 1996); McLaurin v. Prater, CO-1, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1994).

9

The Declaratory Judgment Act34 provides a particular form of relief. It does not

confer non-existent jurisdiction,35 but only allows additional remedies.36 The Act enlarged

the remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction.37 Only

when the plaintiff has an independent source of subject matter jurisdiction, such as diversity

jurisdiction, is it permissible to proceed under the Declaratory Judgment Act.38

E. Supplemental Jurisdiction 

In some cases a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims

that are related to the federal claim. But, if the claim is based on state law, a court may

“decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . [if] the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Congress unambiguously gave district courts

discretion to dismiss supplemental state law claims when all federal claims have been

dismissed.39

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 9 of 13
40McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147.

41Id.

10

III. Discussion

The Gardners have asked for a permit to build a private dock, and the Corps has

refused to consider their request because of a conflicting easement. The Corps’ position is

that the Gardners must settle the property dispute before it will issue either party the desired

permit. The Gardners argue that because they have met all the Corps’ permit requirements,

the Corps should be compelled to issue the permit. 

The initial decision to table both permit applications, until the property dispute is

settled, was made by Rorie and Park. This is only the first step in the process. An

administrative remedy will be deemed futile only when there is no doubt that the agency is

incapable of granting relief.40 The Gardners have the burden of showing that an appeal

would be futile because the Division Engineer is hamstrung. 

 Plaintiffs have failed to raise doubt about the Division Engineer’s ability, and his

power to override the Rorie/ Parks’ decision. According to the Corps, it is not its policy to

issue permits when there are competing claims. However, there is no authority that the

Division Engineer is bound by such policy. Finally, the Gardners have not shown that their

interest in obtaining an immediate dock permit outweighs the Corps’ interests in maintaining

their administrative autonomy.41 Since the Gardners have not used the appeal process, there

is no final agency action. 

However, even if the Gardners had demonstrated that they exhausted the

administrative process, they have failed to clear the hurdle set out in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 10 of 13
42Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.

4316 U.S.C. § 460d.

4436 C.F.R. § 327.30.

11

The Corps’ decision to deny a dock permit is an action that is committed to an agency’s

discretion by law.

A refusal to issue a permit is not an affirmative action, it is a decision not to act. 

Typically, this is the kind of decision that has been deemed “absolutely discretionary.”42 In

addition, the Corps’ action affects one party, not an entire class, and it does not have wideranging consequences. 

Additionally, there are no legal standards to apply in this case. The Gardners assert

that the regulations compel the Corps to issue permits, once the requirements are met. I

disagree. 

The applicable regulations are found at 36 C.F.R. § 327.30, known as the Shoreline

Management on Civil Works Projects. This regulation was enacted under the Authority of

the 1944 Flood Control Act.43 The purpose of the regulation is to make sure that, in

managing the shoreline, the Corps protects the public and the environment:

It is the policy of the Chief of Engineers to protect and manage shorelines of all

Civil Works water resource development projects under Corps’ jurisdiction in a

manner which will promote the safe and healthful use of these shorelines by the

public while maintaining environmental safeguards to ensure a quality resource

for use by the public. The objectives of all management actions will be to achieve

a balance between permitted private uses and resource protection for general

public use.44 

The Corps is not required to give every private citizen a dock permit, but, it is

charged with managing the shore to prevent floods, safety hazards, and environmental

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 11 of 13
4533 C.F.R. § 327.30 (d)(2) (emphasis added).

4633 C.F.R. § 327.30 (e)(5)(i)(emphasis added).

12

damage. In this case, denying the Gardners a dock permit will have no affect on flood

control, public safety, or the environment. 

When it comes to authorizing the use of the shoreline by private parties, the Corps is

given discretion, and this is shown by the consistent use of the word “may,” in the applicable

regulation. For instance, the following statements are contained in the shoreline regulation: 

“Private shoreline uses may be authorized in designated areas consistent with approved use

allocations specified in Shoreline Management Plans;”45 and “Limited Development Areas

are those areas in which private facilities and/or activities may be allowed.”46 

Because this particular situation does not include issues of public access, public

safety, flood control, or environmental management, there are no guidelines to apply. The

Corps, as owner and manager of the shoreline, has absolute discretion to permit private use. 

Again, this matter is not subject to judicial review. 

The Gardners also sued Benton, claiming original jurisdiction under the APA and

asking for relief under the Declaratory Act. Even though there is diversity between the

Gardners and Benton, the Complaint does not claim diversity as an independent ground for

jurisdiction and does not ask for a ruling on the easement dispute. Instead, the Complaint

asks that Benton be compelled to assert his claim for the dock permit. Because the Corps is

dismissed from this case, no controversy remains as to the dock permit. 

The easement dispute between the Gardners and Benton is a matter of state law. The

Gardners filed this action under the APA, which was the basis for original jurisdiction. 

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 12 of 13
13

Because the Corps is not liable under the APA, and the only remaining issue is one that

arises under state law, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this a claim. The

Corps’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the claim against Benton for declaratory relief

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 2007.

 /s/Wm. R. Wilson, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00088-BRW Document 17 Filed 01/03/07 Page 13 of 13