Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02463/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02463-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Patricia M. Vroom, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Jeh Johnson, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02463-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 The parties have jointly moved for a protective order claiming that such an order is 

necessary in this case because documents may be produced which are “attorney work 

product,” “attorney client communications,” “protected by the deliberative process 

privilege,” or “Plaintiff’s medical records.” Doc. 46 at 2. However, in their proposed 

protective order, it says that parties may designate as confidential anything counsel 

determines is “necessary to protect the interests of the client.” Doc. 46-1 at 1. 

 Generally, global protective orders are not appropriate. See AGA Shareholders, 

LLC v. CSK Auto, Inc., 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2007). Rule 26(c) 

requires a party seeking a protective order to show good cause for issuance of such an 

order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “For good cause to exist under Rule 26(c), ‘the party 

seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result 

if no protective order is granted.’” AGA Shareholders, 2007 WL 4225450, at *1 

(emphasis added) (quoting Phillips v. G.M. Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 

2002)). The party seeking protection “must make a ‘particularized showing of good 

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cause with respect to [each] individual document.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting San 

Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

 In their motion, the parties attempted to make a particularized showing that some 

of the documents to be disclosed are privileged. However, in the actual proposed 

protective order submitted to the Court, the parties included unacceptable, generalized 

language allowing counsel to mark virtually anything confidential without counsel first 

making a good faith determination that the documents are in fact privileged. As a result, 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for a protective order (Doc. 46) is denied 

without prejudice. 

 Dated this 10th day of August, 2015. 

 

Case 2:14-cv-02463-JAT Document 47 Filed 08/10/15 Page 2 of 2