Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08066/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shawn Boyd,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-14-08066-PCT-ESW

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Shawn Boyd’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the 

Social Security Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of his claim for disability 

insurance benefits. Plaintiff filed his Title II Social Security Disability Insurance 

application in April 2010, alleging disability beginning December 20, 2008. 

This Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon the 

pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for 

a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction.1

 (Doc. 15). After reviewing the Administrative Record (“A.R.”), Plaintiff’s 

1 This case was reassigned to Hon. Eileen S. Willett on November 14, 2014. 

 

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Opening Brief (Doc. 20), and Defendant’s Response Brief (Doc. 23),2 the Court finds that 

the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and is free of harmful legal error. The decision is therefore affirmed.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Disability Analysis: Five-Step Evaluation

The Social Security Act provides for disability insurance benefits to those who 

have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a physical or mental 

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). To be eligible for benefits, the claimant must show that 

he or she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that 

prohibits him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. The claimant must 

also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a continuous period 

of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts an analysis 

consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four steps:3

Step One: Is the claimant engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity”? If so, the analysis ends and disability benefits are 

denied. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step two.

Step Two: Does the claimant have a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments? A severe 

impairment is one which significantly limits the claimant’s 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments, disability benefits 

are denied at this step. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step 

three.

Step Three: Is the impairment equivalent to one of a number 

of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges 

2 Plaintiff did not file a Reply brief. 

3 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,746 (9th Cir. 2007).

- 2 -

 

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity? 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or equals one 

of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively 

presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is 

presumed to be disabling, the ALJ proceeds to the fourth step 

of the analysis.

Step Four: Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 

performing work which the claimant performed in the past? 

If not, the claimant is “not disabled” and disability benefits 

are denied without continuing the analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(e). Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the last step. 

If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner:4

Step Five: Can the claimant perform other work in the 

national economy in light of his or her age, education, and 

work experience? The claimant is entitled to disability 

benefits only if he or she is unable to perform other work. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). Social Security is responsible for 

providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant 

can do, given the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, 

education, and work experience. Id.

B. Standard of Review Applicable to ALJ’s Determination

The Court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence 

and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although “substantial 

evidence” is less than a preponderance, it is more than a “mere scintilla.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 

4 Parra, 481 F.3d at 746.

- 3 -

 

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient 

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th 

Cir.1999) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it 

is the ALJ's conclusion that must be upheld.”); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 

(9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving 

conflicts, ambiguity, and determining credibility. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; see also

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Court must also consider the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an 

ALJ’s decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ’s decision need not be remanded or 

reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there 

remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error “does not 

negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion”) (citations omitted).

II. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, who was born in 1977, has experience working as an account manager, 

furniture deliverer, pizza deliverer, casino host, ticket seller, and coin machine repairer. 

(A.R. 65-66). Plaintiff alleges that on December 20, 2008, at the age of 30, he became 

unable to work due to Meniere’s disease. (A.R. 72, 96).

Plaintiff filed his initial application in April 2010 (A.R. 156), which Social 

Security denied on November 16, 2010. (A.R. 110). On June 10, 2011, upon Plaintiff’s 

request for reconsideration, Social Security affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s application. 

(A.R. 117). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. (A.R. 124). The ALJ held 

a hearing on November 13, 2012, during which Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. 

(A.R. 45-70). In his December 17, 2012 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not 

- 4 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disabled. (A.R. 1-6). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making 

the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6). 

On April 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

requesting judicial review and reversal of the ALJ’s decision.

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Disability Analysis

The ALJ completed all five steps of the disability analysis before finding that 

Plaintiff is not disabled and entitled to disability benefits. 

1. Step One: Engagement in “Substantial Gainful Activity”

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since December 20, 2008, the alleged disability onset date. (A.R. 13). Neither party 

disputes this determination.

2. Step Two: Presence of Medically Severe Impairment/Combination 

of Impairments 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following impairments that are severe when 

they are considered in combination: (i) Meniere’s disease with dizziness, vertigo, and 

imbalance; (ii) paroxysmal supraventricular tachycardia with recurrent arrhythmias; and 

(iii) an anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified (20 C.F.R. 404.1520 (c)). (A.R. 13). 

This determination is undisputed. 

3. Step Three: Presence of Listed Impairment(s) 

The ALJ stated that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 13-15). Neither party 

disputes the ALJ’s determination at this step.

4. Step Four: Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), subject to several 

restrictions. (A.R. 15). The ALJ assessed that Plaintiff is limited to unskilled work and 

is unable to lift any more than ten pounds occasionally. In addition, the ALJ found that 

- 5 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff is restricted from climbing, crawling, or kneeling, and may only occasionally 

crouch or squat. Finally, Plaintiff is restricted from exposure to unprotected heights and 

driving. (Id.). 

Based on the RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform his past 

relevant work. (A.R. 19). Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s assessed RFC, arguing that the 

ALJ mischaracterized and improperly weighed the evidence. Plaintiff also argues that 

the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record.

5. Step Five: Capacity to Perform Other Work 

At the November 2012 hearing, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified that given 

Plaintiff’s assessed RFC, age, work experience, and education level, Plaintiff would be 

able to work the unskilled jobs of document preparer, surveillance monitor, and telephone 

operator. The ALJ adopted the VE’s testimony and found that the jobs identified by the 

VE exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (A.R. 20). 

Plaintiff asserts that there are an insignificant number of document preparer, 

surveillance monitor, and telephone operator jobs existing in the State of Arizona. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ thereby failed to meet the burden at step five by establishing 

that Plaintiff can perform other work existing in significant numbers.

C. Plaintiff’s Challenge to the ALJ’s Analysis at Step Four

1. The ALJ Did Not Mischaracterize the Evidence in Discrediting 

Plaintiff’s Testimony 

When evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff’s testimony regarding subjective pain 

or symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 

586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). In the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment “which could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff does not have to show that the 

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptoms. Rather, 

- 6 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a plaintiff must only show that it could have caused some degree of the symptoms. 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). 

If a plaintiff meets the first step, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ 

can only reject a plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of his or her symptoms by 

offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The 

ALJ cannot rely on general findings. The ALJ must identify specifically what testimony 

is not credible and what evidence undermines the plaintiff’s complaints. Berry v. Astrue, 

622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). In weighing a plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ can 

consider many factors including: a plaintiff’s reputation for truthfulness, prior 

inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, unexplained or inadequately explained 

failure to seek treatment, and the plaintiff’s daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see 

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (Social Security must consider whether there are 

conflicts between a claimant’s statements and the rest of the evidence). In addition, 

although the lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain 

testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his or her credibility analysis. Burch 

v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c); Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (while subjective pain testimony cannot be 

rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, 

the evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain 

and its disabling effects). 

Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misinterpreted the evidence when evaluating 

Plaintiff’s credibility. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously stated that Plaintiff 

alleged debilitating pain. (Doc. 20 at 4). In his decision, the ALJ stated that “I conclude 

that [Plaintiff’s] allegations of debilitating pain and disabling functional limitations are 

not fully credible.” (A.R. 19). While it is correct that Plaintiff alleged debilitating 

dizziness and fatigue, not debilitating pain, Plaintiff must show that the ALJ’s error is 

harmful. “The burden is on the party claiming error to demonstrate not only the error, but 

- 7 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

also that it affected his “substantial rights,” which is to say, not merely his procedural 

rights.” Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility is discussed in Section 5 of the ALJ’s 

decision. (A.R. 36). The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony are 

as follows: 

 1. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily activities are not as limited as expected 

given Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling symptoms. (A.R. 19). For example, evidence in 

the record indicates that Plaintiff drives his wife to school every day and takes care of his 

two young children. Plaintiff also goes to church every week, goes to the grocery store, 

and performs household chores. In addition, Plaintiff rides a stationary bike three times 

weekly for about five to ten minutes. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of disability benefits where claimant could “take care of her 

personal needs, prepare easy meals, do light housework, and shop for some groceries”); 

see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (“Even where [daily] activities suggest some difficulty 

functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant's testimony to the extent 

that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.”).

 2. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff stated that he stopped working due to a businessrelated layoff rather than because of his impairments.5

 (A.R. 19). A claimant’s work 

record is a proper consideration in weighing Plaintiff’s credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1284-85 (stating that a claimant’s work record is one of the factors an ALJ is to consider 

in weighing a claimant’s credibility). 

3. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s demeanor did not support Plaintiff’s 

allegations. (A.R. 19). See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (an ALJ’s 

5 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not mischaracterize the evidence in 

making this finding. Plaintiff’s last day of employment was December 20, 2008, where 

Plaintiff worked as a slot service host. (A.R. 187). At the November 13, 2012 hearing, 

the ALJ asked “How come you stopped working for the casino in 2008?” (A.R. 54). Plaintiff responded “I was later laid off from that job due to the economy.” (Id.). The 

evaluation by Doris Javine, Ph.D. also reported that Plaintiff was laid off due to the 

economy. (A.R. 284). Dr. Oluyemisi Olubi also reported that Plaintiff was laid off due to the economy in December 2008. (A.R. 332).

- 8 -

 

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

personal observations may be used in “the overall evaluation of the credibility of the 

individual’s statements”).

The above reasons provided by the ALJ for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony are 

specific, clear, convincing, and are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Any 

error in the ALJ’s reference to “allegations of debilitating pain” is harmless as (i) the ALJ 

provided other proper reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and (ii) the 

error would not alter the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate nondisability determination. See 

Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008). 

2. The ALJ Properly Weighed the Medical Records

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, there are three 

categories of physicians: (i) treating physicians, who actually treat the claimant; (2) 

examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining 

physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, more weight should be given to a treating physician’s 

opinion than to the opinion of a non-treating physician. Id. An ALJ cannot reject a 

treating physician’s opinion in favor of another physician’s opinion without first 

providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence, such 

as finding that a treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with and not supported by the 

record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (ALJ must consider whether an opinion is 

consistent with the record as a whole); see also Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th 

Cir.2002); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (finding it not improper for an ALJ to reject a 

treating physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with the record). 

Despite Plaintiff’s contention (Doc. 20 at 6), the opinions of Drs. Kwiatkowski 

and Olubi with respect to Plaintiff’s vertigo, dizziness, and fatigue are contradicted by the 

opinions of other doctors. For example, Dr. Glenn Kunsman diagnosed Plaintiff with 

vertigo, but opined that Plaintiff’s condition would not impose any limitations for 12 

continuous months. (A.R. 276). Consultative examiner Dr. Sarah Shepherd opined that 

- 9 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

despite Plaintiff’s diagnosis of Meniere’s disease, Plaintiff is not precluded from work. 

(A.R. 254-58). Since the opinions of Drs. Kwiatkowski and Olubi are contradicted, the 

ALJ must provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of the treating 

doctors. 

1. Dr. Terrance Kwiatkowski

The ALJ discussed Dr. Kwiatkowski’s February 21, 2011 letter, which states that 

Plaintiff “would have a significant amount of difficulty holding down a solid job” due to 

Plaintiff’s vertigo. The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion. Plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion. (Doc. 20 at 5). 

In explaining why Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion was given little weight, the ALJ 

stated that the opinion is not supported by the medical records. This is a specific and 

legitimate reason for giving the opinion little weight. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 

947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, 

including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 

supported by clinical findings.”). 

The ALJ also found that Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion is inconsistent with other 

substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ noted that Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion is 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, such as caring for his children, 

driving a car, and grocery shopping. This is a specific and legitimate reason for 

discounting a physician’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (ALJ must consider 

whether an opinion is consistent with the record as a whole); see also Batson, 359 F.3d at 

1195 (9th Cir.2004); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.2002); Tommasetti,

533 F.3d at 1041 (finding it not improper for an ALJ to reject a treating physician’s 

opinion that is inconsistent with the record). 

The reasons for rejecting Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion are supported by substantial 

evidence. For instance, in May 4, 2009, Dr. Kanokrat Suksompoth opined that Plaintiff 

was “getting better” with medication and is helping his wife do business at home as 

Plaintiff was now unemployed. (A.R. 243). An October 19, 2010 medical record reflects 

- 10 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that Plaintiff stated his dizziness is better controlled with current medication, and Plaintiff 

denied having fatigue and vertigo. (A.R. 249-50). On May 7, 2012, Dr. Richard Alfafara 

reported that Plaintiff was doing well and has rare episodes of dizziness from Meniere’s 

disease. (A.R. 323). This medical record also reflects that Plaintiff did not report fatigue, 

weakness, or tinnitus. (A.R. 324).

Moreover, Dr. Kunsman’s April 16, 2011 report, which is dated approximately 

two months after Dr. Kwiatkowski’s letter, indicates that Plaintiff is able to drive and 

“appears to have no difficulty with vertigo while driving.” (A.R. 276). This supports the 

ALJ’s finding that Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities of 

daily living. As the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Kwiatkowski’s are specific, 

legitimate, and are supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ 

properly weighed Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion.

2. Dr. Oluyemisi Olubi

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Olubi, completed a Fatigue Questionnaire dated 

May 14, 2012. (A.R. 331-33). Dr. Olubi indicated that Plaintiff had a level of fatigue 

that impaired Plaintiff’s abilities in a number of areas. The ALJ gave the findings 

reduced weight, explaining that the findings are contained in a form consisting of 

checked boxes without further explanation. (A.R. 17). This is a proper reason for giving 

the opinion reduced weight. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. The ALJ also found Dr. 

Olubi’s assessment less persuasive as it is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ability to wash 

dishes, help with laundry, drive a car, ride a stationary bike, lift weights, and take out the 

trash. 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s reasons for giving Dr. Olubi’s opinion less weight. 

Yet Plaintiff does not explain why he believes the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Olubi’s 

opinion due to it being contained in a “check box” form. See Carmickle v. 

Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to address one of the 

ALJ’s findings as the claimant’s briefing failed to argue the issue with specificity) (citing 

Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1164 (9th Cir.2003) (noting 

- 11 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that we “ordinarily will not consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and 

distinctly argued in an appellant's opening brief”)). Instead, Plaintiff states 

“Interestingly, the capacities set forth by the state agency physicians, whose opinions are 

given moderate weight are also offered in the form of a check box.” This assertion is 

incorrect. For example, the ALJ gave moderate weight to Dr. Kunsman’s opinion, which 

was written in a narrative format. The ALJ also gave moderate weight to Dr. Shepherd’s 

opinion. While some of Dr. Shepherd’s finding are contained in a “check box” format, 

Dr. Shepherd’s opinion also includes narrative discussion unlike Dr. Olubi’s opinion. 

Regarding the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Olubi’s assessment is inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, Plaintiff states that Plaintiff’s “condition has 

worsened more recently and has not even been driving in the last several months. Dr. 

Olubi’s opinion was offered during this worsening of condition.” (Doc. 20 at 6). Yet on 

May 7, 2012, just one week prior to Dr. Olubi’s assessment, Dr. Alfafara reported that 

Plaintiff was doing well and did not have fatigue symptoms. (A.R. 323-34). Dr. Alfafara 

also reported that Plaintiff was alert and well-oriented. (A.R. 324). 

It is well-settled that an ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving 

evidentiary conflicts, ambiguities, and determining credibility. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 

750; see also Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. If the evidence can rationally be interpreted in 

more than one way, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s interpretation. Mayes v. Massanari, 

276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court does not find that the ALJ committed 

harmful error in giving Dr. Olubi’s assessment less weight.

3. State Agency Physicians

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s reliance on the State agency physicians’ opinions by 

arguing that the State agency physicians “are not specialists in vertigo and, on a one-time 

basis, cannot judge the claimant’s capacities with regard to that ongoing vertigo.” (Doc. 

20 at 4). The State agency physicians in this case are licensed physicians. Under Social 

Security’s regulations, licensed physicians are acceptable medical sources who may offer 

opinions regarding a claimant’s impairments and limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

- 12 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

404.1513(a)(1),(c). Plaintiff does not cite any authority and there is no evidence in the 

record to support Plaintiff’s contention that the State agency physicians were not 

qualified to evaluate an individual suffering from vertigo. The Court thus finds that 

Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit.

4. Full and Fair Development of the Record

While an ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that a 

claimant’s interests are considered, that duty is triggered only when there is ambiguous 

evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. 

Mayes, 76 F.3d at 459-60 (the ALJ’s duty to develop the record does not allow a claimant 

to shift the claimant’s own burden of proving disability to the ALJ). Plaintiff is 

ultimately responsible for providing the evidence to be used in making the RFC finding. 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995) (a claimant bears the burden of 

proving entitlement to disability benefits). 

Dr. Kwiatkowski allegedly specializes in Meniere’s disease and vertigo. Plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ should have sought the opinion of a physician who specializes in the 

area of Meniere’s disease and vertigo before rejecting Dr. Kwiatkowski’s opinion in 

favor of the opinions of the State agency physicians who do not specialize in the area. 

Plaintiff failed to raise this issue in his administrative proceedings. Accordingly, the 

issue has been waived. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 

that “at least when claimants are represented by counsel, they must raise all issues and 

evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal”); Phillips v. 

Colvin, 593 Fed.Appx. 683 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s ruling that an issue 

was waived where claimant failed to raise it at the administrative level). As the Court 

does not find that a manifest injustice will occur, Plaintiff’s failure to preserve the issue 

on appeal will not be excused. See Meanel, 172 at 1115. 

Moreover, even if Plaintiff did preserve the issue on appeal, the Court does not 

find that the record is ambiguous or inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the 

- 13 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence. The ALJ’s duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure Plaintiff’s 

interests are considered was therefore not triggered. 

D. Plaintiff’s Challenge at Step Five: Plaintiff’s Ability to Perform Other 

Work in the National Economy Existing in Significant Numbers

At the fifth step of the disability analysis, the burden rests on the Commissioner to 

show that the claimant can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the 

national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Lockwood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). An ALJ’s decision must be upheld if 

significant jobs exist either regionally or nationally. Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 390 

(9th Cir. 2012) (“If we find either of the two numbers ‘significant,’ then we must uphold 

the ALJ's decision.”); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. But the 

ALJ adopted the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform three jobs: (i) document 

preparer; (ii) surveillance monitor; and (iii) telephone operator. The ALJ also adopted 

the VE’s testimony that the job of document preparer has 268 positions in Arizona and 

15,000 positions in the national economy; the job of surveillance system monitor has 70 

positions in Arizona and 3,500 positions nationwide; and the job of telephone operator 

has 62 positions in Arizona and 3,500 nationwide positions. (A.R. 66-67). Combined, 

there are 400 jobs in Arizona and 22,000 jobs nationally that Plaintiff could perform. 

Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner did not meet the burden of establishing that 

the jobs the VE identified that Plaintiff could perform exist in significant numbers in the 

economy. To support his argument, Plaintiff argues that 400 jobs in the State of Arizona 

is an insignificant number. Plaintiff, however, does not assert that 22,000 jobs nationally 

is an insignificant number. Based on Ninth Circuit case law, the Court finds that 22,000 

jobs is a significant number of national jobs. See Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 740 F.3d 519, 528-29 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 25,000 is a significant number 

of national jobs and referencing Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997), 

which held that 200 jobs in Iowa is a significant number). Therefore, under Beltran,

- 14 -

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 14 of 15
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff has failed to show that the Commissioner did not meet the burden at step five in 

establishing that Plaintiff can perform other work in the national economy that exists in 

significant numbers. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported 

by substantial evidence and free from reversible error. Accordingly, the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 22nd day of May, 2015. 

- 15 - 

Case 3:14-cv-08066-ESW Document 25 Filed 05/22/15 Page 15 of 15