Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-01143/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-01143-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:25 Clayton Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CASCADES COMPUTER INNOVATION LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

RPX CORPORATION, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-01143-YGR 

ORDER DISMISSING STATE LAW CLAIMS 

WITH PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 201

On February 23, 2016, the Court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings

as to the four federal antitrust claims (Counts I-IV) asserted in the First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 

No. 94 (“FAC”)). Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 12-CV-01143, 2016 

WL 705982, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016). Thereafter, the parties submitted briefs addressing 

the remaining state law claims—Count V (for violation of the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code §§ 16700 et seq.) and Count VI (for violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law

(“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.). (Dkt. Nos. 202-03, 205-06.)

The parties agree that the state law claims should be dismissed, but disagree as to whether 

the dismissal should be with prejudice. Plaintiff argues “the Court should simply decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). (Dkt. 

No. 202 at 1-2.) Defendants contend the state law claims should be dismissed with prejudice, on 

the merits, for the same reasons warranting dismissal of the federal claims. (Dkt. No. 203 at 1.) 

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized 

by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). The supplemental 

jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides, in relevant part:

Case 4:12-cv-01143-YGR Document 207 Filed 03/25/16 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original 

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 

over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In construing the bounds of the federal courts’ reach, a state law claim is 

understood as part of the same case or controversy when it shares a “common nucleus of operative 

fact” with the federal claims and the state and federal claims would normally be tried together. 

Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1367(c) states that a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental 

state law claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims 

over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 

original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons 

for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Typically, “[w]here a district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for 

resolution, it should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.” 

Wade v. Regional Credit Assoc., 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996). However, “[t]he decision 

whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal 

claims have been dismissed lies within the district court’s discretion.” Foster v. Wilson, 504 F.3d 

1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). For instance, it may be appropriate to maintain jurisdiction over 

surviving state law claims in the interest of judicial economy. See Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & 

Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Peter Turner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 

No. C-11-1427 EMC, 2012 WL 6631490, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (“Declining to 

exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction over [remaining state law claims] would serve no purpose, as 

a state court would have to waste judicial resources to reach the same obvious conclusion” 

regarding the claims’ futility.).

Case 4:12-cv-01143-YGR Document 207 Filed 03/25/16 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Here, the Court finds that judicial economy warrants dismissal of the remaining claims 

with prejudice, as the state law claims are inadequate for the same reasons as discussed at length in 

the Court’s February 23, 2016 Order in connection with the federal antitrust claims. In connection 

with earlier motions to dismiss, plaintiff previously conceded that, at least for purposes of those 

wide-ranging motions, the state law claims “live or die” with the federal claims. (Dkt. No. 103 at 

39.)

As to Count V for violation of the Cartwright Act, the Ninth Circuit has “recognized that 

Cartwright Act claims raise basically the same issues as do Sherman Act claims.” McGlinchy v. 

Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 812 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Flagship Theatres of Palm 

Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc., 198 Cal. App. 4th 1366, 1378 (2011) (noting federal law’s 

antitrust injury requirement applies to claims under the Cartwright Act). The Cartwright Act 

claim at issue is premised entirely on the same allegations that were found insufficient in the 

Court’s February 23, 2016 Order. Thus, requiring the state court to re-adjudicate the issues 

relating to this futile claim would be an unnecessary waste of judicial resources.

As to Count VI for violation of the UCL, in light of the failure of all other claims, plaintiff 

has failed to allege any unlawful practice by defendants. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior 

Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383 (1992) (“Unlawful business activity proscribed under section 17200 

includes anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is 

forbidden by law.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, the complaint fails to 

plausibly allege “conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the 

policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation 

of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. 

v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 (1999); see also Yanting Zhang v. Superior 

Court, 57 Cal. 4th 364, 372 (2013) (“[T]o bring a UCL action, a private plaintiff must be able to 

show economic injury caused by unfair competition.”). Therefore, remanding this futile claim to 

state court would also constitute a waste of judicial resources.

Accordingly, Counts V and VI are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants shall submit 

a proposed form of judgment, approved as to form by plaintiff, within five (5) business days of the 

Case 4:12-cv-01143-YGR Document 207 Filed 03/25/16 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 2, 2016 

______________________________________ 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:12-cv-01143-YGR Document 207 Filed 03/25/16 Page 4 of 4