Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-04098/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-04098-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH Z.,

Plaintiff, No. C 06-4098 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MENLO PARK CITY SCHOOL 

DISTRICT,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Defendant Menlo Park City School District’s (“defendant”) Motion for Summary

Judgment came on for hearing on May 23, 2007. Timothy Walton appeared for plaintiff

Sarah Z. (“plaintiff”); John Nibbelin appeared for defendant. Having read all the papers

submitted and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS

defendant’s motion for the following reasons and for the reasons stated at the hearing.

BACKGROUND

This cases arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §

1415. Plaintiff filed her original complaint on June 30, 2006 and amended her complaint on

April 5, 2007. In the first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendant deprived her of

“free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) under the IDEA by: (1) failing to provide

progress reports and report cards during the second and third terms of the 2004-2005

school year, when plaintiff was an eighth grader at the Hillview Middle School in Menlo

Park; (2) failing to implement behavior support services from March 2005-June 2005 as

required by plaintiff’s individualized education program (“IEP”); (3) failing to have a speech

therapist present at plaintiff’s November 4, 2004 IEP meeting; (4) failing to provide speech

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therapy after that meeting; and (5) refusing to provide tutoring services. She further alleges

violations of the IDEA on the basis that defendant: (1) violated her rights by denying

procedural due process; (2) violated her rights by failing to implement behavior support

services from March 2005-June 2005 as required by her IEP; (3) violated her rights by

failing to provide timely progress reports; and (4) violated her rights by failing to provide her

with a diploma or otherwise allow her to graduate. Plaintiff alleges in the second cause of

action that defendant violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §

794 on the basis that defendant (1) discriminated against her due to her disabling condition;

and (2) retaliated against her for asserting her rights under the law by forcing her to sit

facing a wall or a window without justification. Finally, plaintiff alleges breach of contract in

the third cause of action, wherein she asserts defendant breached a December 9, 2004

mediation agreement by not offering plaintiff additional time to take tests or the opportunity

to retake tests.

A. Statutory Background

The IDEA guarantees all disabled children a “free and appropriate public education

that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique

needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d). Free and appropriate public education means “special

education and related services that (A) have been provided at public expense, under public

supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State

educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary

school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the [IEP].” 

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). An IEP is “a written statement for each child with a disability that is

developed, reviewed and revised in accordance with [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)]” that includes,

among other things, “a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement

and functional performance,” “a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic

and functional goals,” “a description of how the child’s progress toward meeting the annual

goals . . . will be measured and when periodic reports on the progress the child is making

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toward meeting the annual goals . . . will be provided,” and “a statement of the special

education and related services . . . to be provided to the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). An

IEP must be in effect “for each child with a disability in the agency's jurisdiction.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(c)(2)(A). 

B. Factual Background

During the 2004-2005 academic year, plaintiff was an eighth grader at Hillview

Middle School. Prior to that year, plaintiff had been identified as having speech-language

impairment, and pursuant to the IDEA, defendant and plaintiff’s parents developed an IEP

for her. This IEP provided, among other things, for three hours per week of behavioral

support services and thirty minutes per month of speech therapy. Both services were

provided on a consulting basis.

Until March 2005, behavior support consultation services listed in plaintiff’s IEP were

provided by Frank Marone, who had an individual service agreement with defendant. The

defendant decided not to renew that contract which was set to expire in March 2005. On

March 17, 2005, defendant hired Method Management Consultants (“Method

Management”). Dr. Marone last provided services for plaintiff on March 3, 2005. Method

Management began providing her services on March 17, 2005, and provided her a total of

65.75 hours of behavioral services through the end of the 2004-2005 school year. These

services averaged 4.38 hours per week from March 7, 2005 through June 17, 2005,

although plaintiff’s IEP mandated only 3 hours per week of services for this period. 

During the 2004-2005 school year, defendant withheld plaintiff’s report card for the

second and third trimesters. Defendant did so after notifying plaintiff’s parents that plaintiff

had lost a textbook and had defaced a textbook, and that defendant would withhold report

cards pursuant to school policy until the textbooks were paid for. Plaintiffs parents did not

pay for the textbooks.

Plaintiff’s IEP provided that her parents would be informed of her progress on

special education goals and objectives on a trimesterly basis during 2004-2005. Those

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goals and objectives were “to improve the quality of homework completion” and “to improve

test corrections.” Plaintiff’s resource teacher mailed her progress reports for the first and

second trimesters. He does not specifically remember mailing the third trimester report, but

it was his custom to do so. In addition, her CORE and science teachers sent her parents

bi-weekly reports by e-mail regarding her progress on homework and testing. Her math

teacher sent e-mail reports 5-10 times each trimester regarding plaintiff’s homework

completion. Plaintiff’s mother did not receive the “progress reports from teachers during

the second and third trimesters that other students’ parents received.” 

On November 4, 2004, plaintiff’s IEP team met to discuss plaintiff’s academic

progress. The speech therapist did not attend. Plaintiff’s IEP team agreed that a resource

specialist would be better suited to provide the case management services than the speech

therapist. Defendant claims that no one objected to discontinuing plaintiff’s speech

language consultation services. Plaintiff’s mother, however, claims she requested tutoring

services at the meeting, expressed disagreement with the proposal to eliminate speech

therapy, and informed the school that the speech therapist had to be present to discontinue

speech therapy services in accordance with the law. Speech therapy consultation services

for thirty minutes per month were terminated, and resource specialist services for thirty

minutes per week were added to plaintiff’s IEP. 

On December 9, 2004, defendant and plaintiff’s parents entered into a final

mediation agreement to resolve a dispute pending before the California Special Education

Hearing Office. Pursuant to that agreement, plaintiff’s IEP was amended to provide that

plaintiff would be given special seating, additional time to complete testing in certain

subjects, and the ability to retake a test if she earned a D or lower on a test. 

On May 12, 2005, at the annual IEP team meeting, plaintiff’s IEP team agreed that

test retakes should be discontinued because they were not helping plaintiff. Plaintiff’s

behavioral support providers, resource specialist, and each of plaintiff’s teachers attended

the meeting. Plaintiff’s mother did not attend the meeting, although she was provided with

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timely notice of the meeting. Plaintiff’s mother claims she told the school that she would

not attend the IEP meeting unless the speech therapist was planning to attend to explain

why the speech services needed to end. Plaintiff’s IEP was amended to discontinue the

test retake provision.

Plaintiff’s mother states that plaintiff told her that her science teacher forced her to

sit facing a wall once and facing a window once after the district entered into the mediated

agreement. All of plaintiff’s teachers deny doing so. None of plaintiff’s teachers were

aware of whether plaintiff’s parents filed complaints regarding plaintiff’s treatment at school. 

Plaintiff proceeded to high school after eighth grade. However, she did not receive

an eighth grade diploma or participate in graduation due to her grades.

C. Administrative Proceedings

Prior to filing the instant action, plaintiff raised four issues in a due process hearing

conducted pursuant to the IDEA before the Special Education Division of the California

Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”): (1) failure to provide progress reports and

report cards during the second and third terms of the 2004-2005 school year; (2) failure to

provide behavior support services from March 2005-June 2005 as required by plaintiff’s

IEP; (3) failure to have a speech therapist present at plaintiff’s November 4, 2004 IEP

meeting; and (4) whether plaintiff is entitled to relief. The OAH administrative law judge

(“ALJ”) resolved all issues in the defendant’s favor, after a two day hearing in which thirteen

witnesses testified. Specifically, the ALJ found that the District provided plaintiff’s parents

with all progress reports required under the IDEA, that the brief gap between termination of

Dr. Marone’s behavioral support services and initiation of services by Method Management

did not deny plaintiff a FAPE, and that the absence of a speech therapist at the November

4, 2004 IEP, while a procedural violation of the IDEA, did not deny plaintiff a FAPE, given

that the goals and objectives of plaintiff’s IEP were not related to speech services.

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

Summary Judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A

district court may review state administrative decisions under the IDEA by means of a

motion for summary judgment. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884,

891-92 (9th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, because a summary judgment motion in a case

challenging a decision by a state educational agency is “in substance an appeal from an

administrative decision,” it will not “fit well into any pigeonhole of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.” Id. at 892.

Under the hybrid standard applied by the Ninth Circuit, district courts must apply the

preponderance of the evidence standard while looking at the record as a whole and any

additional relevant evidence submitted by the parties. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)

(the court “shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings” and “hear additional

evidence at the request of a party” and “basing its decision on the preponderance of the

evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”). The court should

review the administrative decision for clear error when reviewing factual determinations, but

should review de novo the ultimate determination of the appropriateness of the educational

program. See Wartenberg, 59 F.3d at 891.

The district court’s role in making these determinations is limited. “[T]he provision

that a reviewing court base its decision on a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ is by no

means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy

for those of the school authorities which they review.” Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.

177, 206 (1982). Rather, the court is required to give “due weight” to the findings of the

state administrative proceeding. Id. In addition, “the party challenging the Hearing Officer’s

decision bears the burden of persuasion.” G.W. v. New Haven Unif. Sch. Dist., 2006 WL

2237749 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396,

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1399 (9th Cir. 1994). 

B. Defendant’s Motion

Defendant argues that the court should dismiss the majority of plaintiff’s claims

because plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to those claims. 

Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to exhaust her claims under the

Rehabilitation Act, her breach of contract claim, and her claims regarding defendant’s

alleged failure to provide a speech therapist and tutoring services. Defendant also

maintains that these claims, as well as the claims plaintiff did exhaust administratively, fail

on the merits.

1. Unexhausted Claims

The IDEA confers on disabled children and their parents the right to have complaints

resolved at a full adversary hearing before an impartial hearing officer under the auspices

of the relevant state or local educational agency. Witte by Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist.,

197 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 1999). The IDEA permits aggrieved parties who are

dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative process to "bring a civil action with

respect to the complaint presented [to the agency]," either in state court or in federal district

court. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).

“The IDEA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before

commencing suit if that person is ‘seeking relief that is also available under’ the IDEA.” 

Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. # 403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 U.S.C. §

1415(l)). This is true where requested relief includes money damages. Id. at 1050. “The

dispositive question generally is whether the plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be

redressed to any degree by the IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies. If so,

exhaustion of those remedies is required. If not, the claim necessarily falls outside the

IDEA's scope, and exhaustion is unnecessary. Where the IDEA's ability to remedy a

particular injury is unclear, exhaustion should be required to give educational agencies an

initial opportunity to ascertain and alleviate the alleged problem.” Id. “If a plaintiff is

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required to exhaust administrative remedies, but fails to, federal courts are without

jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claim.” Witte by Witte, 197 F.3d at 1274. 

At the prehearing conference before the ALJ, plaintiff’s mother agreed there were

four issues for hearing: (1) failing to provide progress reports and report cards during the

second and third terms of the 2004-2005 school year; (2) failing to provide behavior support

services from March 2005-June 2005 as required by plaintiff’s IEP; (3) failing to have a

speech therapist present at plaintiff’s November 4, 2004 IEP meeting; and (4) whether

plaintiff is entitled to relief. These four issues were reiterated prior to taking testimony at

the hearing, and again in the ALJ’s decision. The court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to hear

the following claims which plaintiff did not raise before the ALJ. 

a) Speech therapy and tutoring services

Plaintiff alleges here that she was denied a FAPE because defendant did not

provide speech therapy services after November 2004 or tutoring services. Plaintiff,

however, did not argue that the defendant denied her a FAPE by not offering such services

before the ALJ. Whether plaintiff should have been offered or needed tutoring or speech

language services in order to receive a FAPE are issues that must be administratively

exhausted before the district court can review them. See, e.g., Hoeft v. Tucson Unified

School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Exhaustion of the administrative

process allows for the exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state and local

agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a

complete factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first

opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children.”). 

Because plaintiff failed to exhaust this issue, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

decide it. 

While the ALJ did consider the procedural issue of whether her speech therapist was

required to attend an IEP meeting, this issue is separate and distinct from the substantive

question of whether speech therapy and tutoring services were required in order for plaintiff

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 Nor does plaintiff offer evidence to the court that she in fact required tutoring or

speech therapy in order to receive a FAPE. 

2

 To make out a prima facie case for discrimination under section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff must show that she is disabled, that she is otherwise qualified to

participate in a given activity and meets the essential eligibility requirements of the school,

was dismissed solely because of her disability, and that defendant received federal funding or

is a public entity. Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 816 (9th Cir. 1999). To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation under section 504, plaintiff must show that: (1) she

engaged in a protected activity; (2) defendant knew she was involved in the protected activity;

(3) an adverse action was taken against her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the

protected activity and the adverse action. Alex G. v. Bd. of Trs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1128

(E.D. Cal. 2005).

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to receive a FAPE, an issue the ALJ did not consider.1

 

b) Denial of procedural due process in violation of the IDEA

Plaintiff alleges a broad procedural due process claim for violation of the IDEA. 

Plaintiff, however, has only exhausted the alleged procedural violations of the IDEA she

raised before the ALJ. This claim, therefore, is not exhausted to the extent it encompasses

procedural violations other than the speech therapist’s failure to attend the IEP meeting or

the other issues explicitly addressed by the ALJ. See Robb, 308 F.3d at 1049.

c) Failure to provide diploma

 Plaintiff maintains that the school violated the IDEA by failing to provide her with a

diploma or to allow her to graduate from middle school. Plaintiff never raised this issue at

the due process hearing, and this claim is therefore not exhausted. See Robb, 308 F.3d at

1049.

d) Violations of the Rehabilitation Act 

At the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel conceded that plaintiff failed to exhaust her claims

under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.2

 As plaintiff concedes, both

her claims for denial of access to services and for retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act

had to be administratively exhausted. See, e.g., S.M. v. West Contra Costa County Unified

Sch. Dist., No. C 06-6653 CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5280 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (The IDEA’s

exhaustion requirement “applies to causes of action based on the IDEA as well as causes

of actions based on other federal statutes, such as the ADA or section 1983.” The “Ninth

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Circuit has held ‘that when a plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any

degree by the IDEA's administrative procedures and remedies, exhaustion of those

remedies is required.’”) (quoting Robb, 308 F.3d at 1049).

 Plaintiff’s allegation that she was denied equal access to defendant’s programs

certainly could have been considered by the ALJ. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim similarly

relates to educational placements and services and requires exhaustion. See 20 U.S.C. §

1415(b)(6) (this complaint provision of the IDEA affords the "opportunity to present

complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or

educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child"); see also

M.T.V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir. 2006) (“whether claims

asserting the rights of disabled children are brought pursuant to the IDEA, the ADA, Section

504, or the Constitution, they must first be exhausted in state administrative proceedings”). 

e) Breach of contract

On December 9, 2004, plaintiff and defendants entered into a final mediation

agreement, which stated that “Sarah’s IEP will be amended to include” certain

accommodations, including “additional time to complete testing in Math, Science, and Core

subjects” and the “opportunity within a week to retake test[s]” for those subjects in which

plaintiff earned a D or F. Plaintiff’s teachers all declare that they complied with the test

retake provision as long as it was part of plaintiff’s IEP. Defendant, however, concedes that

at plaintiff’s annual IEP team meeting on May 12, 2005, her IEP team agreed that plaintiff’s

test retakes should be discontinued because they had not assisted her in improving her

grades. 

The mediation agreement provided that plaintiff’s IEP would be amended to include

certain provisions. Those provisions were implemented. Then, six months later, plaintiff’s

IEP team amended her IEP to remove the test retake provision, which apparently was not

helping plaintiff. This amendment does not breach the express terms of the contract, as

the contract does not prohibit amendment of the IEP. The breach of contract claim is

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 As for plaintiff’s claim regarding breach of the provision allowing extra test-taking time,

all of plaintiff’s teachers state they provided her with extra time to take tests. Even if this claim

were exhausted, which it is not, plaintiff’s mother’s statement that “Sarah’s teachers

nevertheless failed to allow extra time for exams” is conclusory and lacks foundation and basis

for personal knowledge.

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essentially a claim that plaintiff’s IEP was improperly amended at the May 12, 2005 IEP

meeting. This claim, therefore, should have been raised before the ALJ, because it relates

to plaintiff’s special education services. See Robb, 308 F.3d at 1049. Plaintiff has not

exhausted this claim, and the court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. 

In addition, even if plaintiff were not required to exhaust this claim, she introduces no

facts to show that the test retake provision was helping her or that she was harmed by the

removal of that provision from her IEP. Without evidence of damages, her claim fails for

this additional reason. See Lortz v. Connell, 273 Cal. App. 2d 286, 290 (1969) (damages

are essential element of breach of contract claim).3

2. Exhausted Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that defendant: (1) denied her a FAPE and deprived

her other IDEA rights by failing to provide her with behavioral support services as required

by her IEP; (2) denied her a FAPE and deprived her of other IDEA rights by failing to

provide her with progress reports and timely progress reports; (3) denied her a FAPE by

failing to provide her with report cards; and (4) failed to provide her a FAPE because the

speech therapist did not attend the November 4, 2004 IEP meeting. The ALJ denied

plaintiff relief on all of these issues. Giving “due weight” to the hearing officer’s report,

reviewing the parties’ additional evidence (including plaintiff’s mother’s declaration), and

making an “independent judgment that a preponderance of the evidence supported the

hearing officer's findings and conclusions,” the court finds that defendant did not violate the

IDEA. See Wartenberg, 59 F.3d at 892.

a) Behavioral support services

“[W]hen a school district does not perform exactly as called for by the IEP, the

district does not violate the IDEA unless it is shown to have materially failed to implement

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 Marone himself speculates that his termination was due to issues of “personalities”

mentioning that his relationship with school personnel seemed to develop some “fractures.”

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the child's IEP. A material failure occurs when the services provided to a disabled child fall

significantly short of those required by the IEP.” Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker

School Dist., 481 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, the undisputed facts are that defendant did not renew Dr. Marone’s service

contract with the school because of concerns regarding his performance.4

 Plaintiff’s

parents were informed that the services Dr. Marone had been providing for plaintiff would

be provided by Method Management. Dr. Marone’s last services occurred on March 3,

2005. Method management began providing consultation services on March 17, 2005. 

While consulting services provided in March were a little below the amount provided for in

plaintiff’s IEP, the services were in full-swing in April, and the hours of services per week

from March 2005 through June 2005 averaged over 4 hours per week, as opposed to the 3

hours per week mandated by plaintiff’s IEP.

 The ALJ found this error was harmless, due to the short period of missed behavioral

consultation time and the fact that plaintiff was being closely monitored by her teachers and

counselor. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that the brief gap in her behavioral services

in March 2005 resulted in a material failure in implementation of her IEP. See Clyde K. V.

Puyallup School Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1994) (party challenging hearing

officer’s decision bears burden of persuasion). This brief gap in services did not result in

the denial of a FAPE for plaintiff or otherwise violate the IDEA.

b) Progress reports and report cards

There is no disputed evidence about provision of plaintiff’s IDEA mandated progress

reports. Plaintiff’s IEP provided that her parents would be informed of her progress on

special education goals and objectives on a trimesterly basis during 2004-2005. Those

goals were “to improve the quality of homework completion” and “to improve test

corrections.” All plaintiff’s mother states is that during the second and third trimesters, she

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did not receive the progress reports “from teachers . . . that other students’ parents

received”. But defendant has submitted evidence that plaintiff’s resource teacher mailed

plaintiff progress reports at the end of each trimester of the 2004-2005 school year. He has

a clear recollection of having sent the report at the end of the first and second trimesters. 

He does not have a specific recollection of having done so at the end of the third trimester,

but it was his custom to do so. In addition, plaintiff’s eighth grade CORE subject teacher

and science teacher each sent plaintiff’s parents bi-weekly reports specifically addressing

whether plaintiff was completing her class work, whether she was receiving low test scores,

whether her work was satisfactory, and whether she needed to make up tests. Her math

teacher similarly sent reports five to ten times each trimester regarding homework

completion. 

Plaintiff’s mother’s vague declaration that she did not receive reports that “other

students’ parents received” does not establish that plaintiff did not receive the reports

described in her IEP. It is not clear what reports “other students received”, which students

this statement refers to, which teachers’ reports this statement refers to, or whether other

students’ IEP’s required the same type of reports. 

As for report cards, the parties agree that defendant withheld plaintiff’s report card

after the second and third trimesters of the 2004-2005 school year. Defendant informed

plaintiff’s parents several times that plaintiff had missing and damaged textbooks. 

Defendant informed plaintiff’s parents that it was the school’s policy to withhold report cards

in such circumstances until the textbooks were paid for. This in fact, was the school’s

policy. Plaintiff’s responses to defendant’s request for admissions concede this. Plaintiff’s

parents would not pay for the textbooks. Plaintiff’s mother declares that various employees

of the school district were unable to explain which books were lost or damaged and that

they made conflicting statements about the books. Providing report cards, however, is not

controlled by the IDEA. The IDEA requires that the IEP document contain a description of

“when periodic reports on the progress the child is making toward meeting the [student’s]

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annual goals . . . will be provided.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(3)(ii). As discussed above,

defendant provided plaintiff with progress reports. Plaintiff’s teachers also sent plaintiff

mid-trimester grade reports during the 2004-2005 school year. Defendant is therefore

entitled to summary judgment on these issues. 

c) Speech therapist attendance at IEP meeting

The ALJ found that defendant’s failure to have a speech language therapist present

at plaintiff’s November 4, 2004 IEP meeting was harmless error. IDEA procedural errors

are subject to harmless error analysis and constitute denial of a FAPE only where they

“resulted in a loss of educational opportunity or significantly restricted parental participation

in the IEP formation.” Virginia S. v. Dep't of Educ., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1518 (D. Haw.

2007) (citing M.L. v. Federal Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 652 (9th Cir. 2005) (Gould, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment5

). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)

(“In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing officer may find that a child did not

receive a [FAPE] only if the procedural inadequacies . . . impeded the child's right to a free

appropriate public education; significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in

the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education

to the parents' child; or . . . caused a deprivation of educational benefits.”). “[E]rror in

composition of an IEP team” is not always prejudicial nor does it always result in denial of a

FAPE. M.L., 394 F.3d at 656. 

Plaintiff’s special education goals in her IEP prior to the November 4, 2004 IEP

meeting were “to improve the quality of homework completion” and “to improve test

corrections.” The IEP provided for 30 minutes per month of speech therapy consultation

service from a district specialist. At that November meeting, speech therapy services were

removed from plaintiff’s IEP, and 30 minutes per week of services from plaintiff’s resource

teacher to help plaintiff function in a general education setting and understand the

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curriculum (among other things) were added to the IEP. Plaintiff’s level of services

increased fourfold after that IEP meeting. Michael Dunn (special education specialist),

assistant principal Joy Shmueli, plaintiff’s core teacher, plaintiff’s mother, and Frank

Marone attended the meeting. The evidence shows that plaintiff’s resource teacher was

better suited to help plaintiff meet her IEP goals, which were unrelated to speech therapy. 

The ALJ also found that Ms. Jo Camper, the speech therapist, was in agreement to exit

plaintiff from speech services. See ALJ Op. at 4 ¶ 11. Plaintiff has not disputed this

finding. Nor has plaintiff submitted evidence that her speech therapy provided her with an

educational benefit. Therefore, there is not a “strong likelihood that [educational]

opportunities” for plaintiff “would have been better considered” had the speech therapist

attended the IEP meeting, given that speech therapy was not identified as one of plaintiff’s

educational goals, other special education specialists who had more contact with plaintiff

were at the meeting, and the speech therapist apparently told the ALJ that she was in

agreement to exit plaintiff from speech services. See M.L., 394 F.3d at 657. 

Nor is there any evidence (or argument) that the absence of the speech therapist

significantly restricted parental participation. To the contrary, plaintiff’s mother attended

that November IEP meeting. Summary judgment on this issue is proper.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion. This order

terminates the case and any pending motions. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2007

____________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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