Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_06-cv-06069/USCOURTS-arwd-6_06-cv-06069-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1121 Trademark Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

TROTT'S WOODPRODUCTS, INC.,

d/b/a DIAMOND DOORS PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-6069

AMERICAN CABINET DOORS & MORE,

INC., and DEBBIE TUCKER,

Individually DEFENDANTS

O R D E R

On the 12th day of February, 2007, came on for hearing the

plaintiff's Application For Temporary Restraining Order For False

Advertisement, Unfair Competition, And Deceptive Trade Practices

(document #3), and from said application, the response thereto,

the evidence presented at the hearing, and the arguments of

counsel, the Court finds and orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff Trott's WoodProducts, Inc., d/b/a Diamond

Doors ("Diamond Doors") alleges that defendants American Cabinet

Doors and More, Inc. ("American Cabinet Doors") and Debbie Tucker

("Tucker") violated the Lanham Act and Arkansas law. Count I of

the Complaint alleges a violation of the Lanham Act by false

advertising; Count II alleges unfair competition under Arkansas

common law; Count III alleges violation of the Lanham Act by

false designation of origin; and Count IV alleges deceptive trade

practices. 

The gravamen of the claim, in each case, is that American

Cabinet Doors is using - to illustrate its sales brochure -

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photographs of sample cabinet doors produced by Diamond Doors

which were taken for use in illustrating Diamond Doors' own sales

brochure.

Diamond Doors also alleges that Tucker, who used to work for

Diamond Doors, took original photos, price lists, customer lists,

and manufacturing information when she left the employment of

Diamond Doors, and is using it to further the business interests

of American Cabinet Doors.

Defendants deny the material allegations of the Complaint,

arguing that the pictures of cabinet doors are simply pictures of

generic types and styles of cabinet doors used throughout the

industry.

Upon motion of Diamond Doors, the Court now takes up the

issue of whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate as

to any of its claims.

2. In order to establish its right to preliminary

injunctive relief, Diamond Doors must satisfy the four factors set

out in Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. CL Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109

(8th Cir. 1981):

* Is there a threat of irreparable harm to Diamond Doors?

* What is the balance between harm to Diamond Doors if

injunctive relief is not granted, and harm to the

defendants if it is granted?

* What is the probability that Diamond Doors will succeed

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on the merits?

* What is the public interest?

3. The Likelihood of Irreparable Harm:

Turning first to the touchstone of injunctive relief -

irreparable harm - the Court finds that Diamond Doors produced no

evidence of irreparable harm at the hearing, and indeed, no

evidence of harm at all. One customer called to its attention

that advertising materials received from American Cabinet Doors

appeared to contain photographs of sample doors manufactured by

Diamond Doors, but there was no evidence of harm flowing

therefrom.

The Court is aware that “[i]n cases of trademark

infringement, irreparable harm is presumed from proof of

likelihood of success on the merits.” Solutech, Inc. v. Solutech

Consulting Services, Inc., 153 F.Supp.2d 1082 (E.D. Mo. 2000).

However, as explained infra, paragraph 4, Diamond Doors has not

shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its trademark

infringement claim, and thus the Court will not presume damages at

this stage of the proceedings.

3. The Balance of Harms:

There is little evidence as to the balance of harms as

between the litigants. There is no showing that American Cabinet

Doors would be harmed by having to stop using the sales brochure

it currently uses, but considering that Diamond Doors has shown no

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harm if American Cabinet Doors continues to use the sales

brochure, this factor carries no weight in the Court's analysis.

4. The Probability of Success on the Merits:

(a) Count I alleges violation of the Lanham Act by false

advertising. To establish such a claim, Diamond Doors must prove:

* a false statement of fact by American Cabinet Doors

about its own or another's product;

* which has deceived, or has a tendency to deceive, a

substantial segment of the advertising audience;

* which is material, in that it is likely to influence a

purchasing decision;

* which has entered interstate commerce; and

* which injures, or is likely to injure, Diamond Doors.

American Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387

(8th Cir. 2004).

Diamond Doors' proof failed to satisfy these criteria. There

was no evidence that the photos in question deceived - or had a

tendency to deceive - a substantial segment of the advertising

audience. Nor was there evidence that if any deception were to

occur, it would be likely to influence a purchasing decision, or

to injure Diamond Doors. The only evidence that even touched on

these points was that one of Diamond Doors' customers received a

brochure from American Cabinet Doors which it perceived as

containing photos of Diamond Doors' products. The customer called

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this to the attention of Diamond Doors, but there was no evidence

that the brochure influenced the customer, or resulted in any lost

sales for Diamond Doors. 

(b) Count II alleges unfair competition under Arkansas

common law. That law provides that when a trademark "has acquired

a secondary meaning, the original user has a property right which

equity will protect against unfair appropriation by a competitor."

Tri-County Funeral Service, Inc. v. Eddie Howard Funeral Home,

Inc., 330 Ark. 789, 957 S.W.2d 694 (1997). 

The concept of "secondary meaning" is explained as follows:

There are certain names, marks, and symbols which in

their primary sense are merely generic or descriptive

and do not ordinarily indicate the origin of goods or

services. Such names, marks, or symbols, when used in

their primary sense, cannot form the subject matter of

a trade or service mark. However, a name, mark, or

symbol by long and exclusive use and advertising by one

person in the sale of his goods and services may become

so associated in the public mind with such goods or

services that it serves to identify them and distinguish

them from the goods or services of others. When such an

association exists, the name, mark, or symbol is said to

have acquired "secondary meaning" in which the original

user has a property right which equity will protect

against unfair appropriation by a competitor.

Tri-County, supra, quoting Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Liberty

Insurance Co. of Texas, 185 F.Supp. 895 (E.D. Ark. 1960). 

To the extent that they might be considered trade marks at

all, the photographs here - being nothing more than examples of

styles of cabinet doors - fall into the generic category and are

not protectible under Arkansas common law.

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To the extent that - as Diamond Doors alleges in its

Complaint - the use of the photographs by American Cabinet Doors

infringes the alleged trademark "Diamond Doors," it presented no

evidence to support that theory. The testimony of John Swisher,

who has worked for Diamond Doors, American Cabinet Doors, and

another door manufacturer, and is currently the production manager

for American Cabinet Doors, was to the effect that it would take

a highly trained eye such as his, with years in the business, to

look at any of the types of cabinet door which are standard in the

trade and determine - as between two different manufacturers -

which one made it. The Court's own observation of demonstrative

evidence at trial bears that out. Since the name "Diamond Doors"

was not used by American Cabinet Doors, there was no association

in the advertising materials of American Cabinet Doors with

Diamond Doors, and therefore no chance that a customer would

confuse the products of the two companies.

(c) To prove a claim of false designation of origin under

the Lanham Act, as alleged in Count III, the first step is to

establish that a mark is protectible. Use of a protected mark is

a prerequisite to finding a Lanham Act violation. DaimlerChrysler

AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003).

In Lanham Act jurisprudence, trademarks are categorized as

either generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary. A generic

mark is never protectible, and descriptive marks generally are not

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protectible, while suggestive and arbitrary marks are "inherently

distinctive and protectible." Schwan's IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza

Co., 460 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2006).

The evidence at the hearing was that Diamond Doors had made

sample cabinet doors in the styles it produces, and then had

photographs taken of those sample doors which it used in putting

together a sales brochure. The gravamen of its Complaint is that

defendants, without permission, used those same photographs to put

together a brochure advertising the cabinet doors produced by

American Cabinet Doors. There was no evidence that American

Cabinet Doors used the mark "Diamond Doors," but only the pictures

of cabinet doors.

The evidence was to the effect that the pictures merely

depicted styles of cabinet doors which are commonly produced in

the industry. None of them was a style of door originated by or

unique to Diamond Doors. They were, at best, only a generic mark

and not entitled to trademark protection under the Lanham Act.

Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, Diamond Doors

contends that it should prevail under the teachings of Truck

Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.

1976). That case is distinguishable, in that the design there

photographed was one which had acquired secondary meaning. The

court therein noted that the unfairness of Fruehauf's conduct was

in "using the photograph of (TESCO's) trailer to trade upon the

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reputation of (TESCO) and to confuse potential customers as to the

source of origin of the trailer pictured on the sales literature."

536 F.2d at 1216. Here there is no evidence of acquired secondary

meaning, no evidence that any customer might be confused, and

nothing upon which to base a finding that American Cabinet Doors

was - or had any possibility of - trading on the reputation of

Diamond Doors.

(d) To prevail on Count IV, the Arkansas Deceptive Trade

Practices Act ("ADTPA") claim, Diamond Doors must prove that

American Cabinet Doors knowingly made "a false representation as

to the . . . sponsorship. . . of goods or services." A.C.A. §4-

88-107(a)(1). Diamond Doors also must establish that it has

suffered "actual damage or injury as a result of an offense or

violation as defined" in the ADTPA. A.C.A. §4-88-113(f). As

noted above, Diamond Doors failed to adduce any evidence of actual

damage.

The Court concludes, from the foregoing, that Diamond Doors

has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of any of its

claims.

5. The Public Interest:

The public interest is served both by enforcing valid

trademark protection and by encouraging free competition. Thus,

to the extent either party's position has merit, the public

interest would weigh in its favor. Because the Court has found

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the likelihood that Diamond Doors would succeed on any claim to be

small, this factor weighs in favor of American Cabinet Doors.

6. Because Diamond Doors has failed to demonstrate its

entitlement to injunctive relief, its motion for same will be

denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Application For

Temporary Restraining Order For False Advertisement, Unfair

Competition, And Deceptive Trade Practices (document #3) is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 26th day of February, 2007.

 /s/ Jimm Larry Hendren 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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