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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

TOBY JOE GUTIERREZ, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

. FlLl?D 

Urntcd StatQ$ C{mH of Appeals 

·renth Cfr:::uit 

JAN 7 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 88-1849 

DAN MORIARTY, Warden; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW 

MEXICO, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 85-732M) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Ann Steinmetz, Assistant Federal Public Defender, of Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Hal Stratton, Attorney General, and Bill Primm, Assistant Attorney 

General, of Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before MCKAY, SEYMOUR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 1 
Toby Joe Gutierrez brought this habeas corpus action pursuant 

to 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (1988) challenging the constitutionality of 

his conviction and sentence under New Mexico law for heroin 

traf fi.cking. A federal magistrate denied Gutierrez' motion for an 

evidentiary hearing and issued proposed findings recommending that 

relief be denied. The district court adopted the recommendation 

and Gutierrez appeals. Gutierrez contends that: (1) the State's 

failure to produce his co-defendant and a confidential informant 

denied his due process right to a fair trial; (2) the district 

court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his 

-claims arising from preindictment and pretrial delay; (3) the 

court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from counsel's 

failure to raise preindictment and pretrial delay; and (4) his 

life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We 

affirm. 

I. 

On July 12, 1979, Gutierrez and co-defendant Ruth Maestas 

were indicted on two counts of heroin trafficking that had 

allegedly occurred in March. A bench warrant for their arrest was 

also issued on July 12, although Gutierrez was not arrested until 

February 14, 1980. Maestas was never apprehended and the case 

against her was ultimately dropped. Gutierrez' public defender 

entered an appearance on February 25 and moved the court on March 

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14 for an order requiring the State to identify and produce the 

confidential informant who had taken part in the transactions 

underlying the indictment. Although the court granted the motion 

on April 7, the State did not respond until May 28 at which time 

the State named Leonard Alvarez as the informant but stated that 

Alvarez' whereabouts were unknown. 

A trial date of June 16, 1980, was extended upon Gutierrez' 

motion, and his trial commenced on August 21. Although Gutierrez' 

counsel pointed out to the court on the day of trial that the 

State-had never produced Alvarez, no motion objecting to that 

failure is in the record on appeal. Alvarez and Maestas did not 

appear at trial, and the State established its case against 

Gutierrez through the testimony of Solomon Luna, a narcotics agent 

with the New Mexico State Police, who worked undercover with the 

confidential informant he identified as Leonard Alvarez. 

According to Luna, he and Alvarez went to Maestas' home to set up 

a heroin deal. Maestas left the home to obtain the heroin and 

returned followed by three men, one of whom Luna identified as 

Gutierrez. Two sales of heroin occurred, in one of which 

Gutierrez allegedly provided the heroin. The court directed an 

acquittal on one count, and a jury convicted Gutierrez on the 

remaining count involving the deal in which the man Luna 

identified as Gutierrez had actually handed over the drug in 

Luna's presence. 

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Gutierrez was found to be a second offender under the state 

heroin trafficking statute and sentenced to life in prison. 

Gutierrez appealed, raising the State's failure to produce the 

informant and his attorney's failure to file motions attacking the 

preindictment and-,pretrial .delay. .The New Mexico Supreme Court 

remanded for reconsideration of the sentence. In so doing, the 

Court did not address the informant issue and stated with respect 

to preindictment and pretrial delay that "appellant's failure to 

raise the 'speedy trial' issue at the trial level and present a 

proper quantum of proof on the issue was a failure to preserve the 

· issue,-for appellate review. See State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 756, 

557 P.2d 1105 (1977)." Rec., vol. I, doc. 9, exh. D at 2. Upon 

resentencing, Gutierrez was again given a life term. After filing 

an unsuccessful petition for state post-conviction relief, 

Gutierrez brought the present action. 1 

II. 

Gutierrez asserts that the State's failure to produce the 

informant Alvarez or reveal his whereabouts deprived Gutierrez of 

his right to due process. It is clear that a defendant may be 

"denied due process by the failure of the government to produce 

the informant for interview, as ordered by the trial court." 

1 The district court held that Gutierrez had exhausted his 

state remedies as required by 25 u.s.c. § 2254, and the State does 

not challenge this holding on appeal. 

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United States v. Muse, 708 F.2d 513, 514 (10th Ci_r. 1983). 

Although "[t]he Government must use reasonable efforts to produce 

an informant so that a defendant may interview him or use him as a 

witness, .•• it is not the guarantor of an informant's presence 

at trial." Id. 

In denying Gutierrez relief on this ground, the district 

court relied entirely on United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 

U.S. 858 (1982), which requires that a defendant "at least make 

some plausible showing of how [the missing witness'] testimony 

would have been both material and favorable to his defense." Id. 

at 867. On appeal Gutierrez argues that Valenzuela-Bernal is 

factually distinguishable and that the lower court erred in 

applying the standard articulated in that case rather than what 

Gutierrez perceives to be the less demanding standard set out in 

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 

The Court in Roviaro considered a situation in which the 

government had not identified or produced an informant who "was 

the sole participant, other than the accused, in the transaction 

charged. The informer was the only witness in a position to 

amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses. 

Moreover, a government witness testified that [the informant] 

denied knowing [the accused] or ever having seen him before." Id. 

at 64-65. Under these circumstances, the Court held that 

withholding disclosure was prejudicial error because the 

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informant's "possible testimony was highly relevant and might have 

been helpful to the defense." Id. at 63-64. 

In Valenzuela-Bernal, the defendant, who was charged with 

bringing an illegal alien into the United States,~wc;1s arrested 

along with three illegal aliens as they crossed a border 

checkpoint. The government detained one of the three to provide a 

basis for the charge against the defendant, while the other two 

were deported before they were interviewed by the defendant upon 

the government's determination that they possessed no evidence 

··material to the defense. In finding no prejudicial error arising 

from the deportation, the Court concluded that the defendant had 

to offer "a plausible showing that the testimony of the deported 

witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense, 

in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available 

witnesses." 458 U.S. at 873. Significantly, the Court observed 

that the defendant "was present throughout the commission of the 

crime," and that he was therefore in a position to offer a 

plausible explanation of the aid he would have received from the 

testimony of the missing witnesses. Id. at 871 & n.8. 

We see no conflict in the standards the Court applied in the 

two cases discussed above. As stated by the Court in Roviaro and 

as applied in Valenzuela-Bernal, assessment of whether 

nondisclosure or nonproduction of a witness is erroneous "must 

depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into 

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consideration•the crime charged, the possible defenses, the 

possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other 

relevant factors." 353 U.S. at 62. The adequacy of the showing 

of materiality is thus a product of these relevant factors in a 

particular case. -

Here, as distinguished from Roviaro, the informant was not 

the only person other than the accused present at the scene of the 

crime. Unlike the situation in Valenzuela-Bernal, Gutierrez' 

defense was that he was not present when the crime was committed 

and was misidentified by the State's witness. Although the 

question is a close one, we conclude that Gutierrez has failed to 

establish a constitutional violation arising from the State's 

failure to produce the informant. Gutierrez claims that because 

he was not present at the commission of the crime, he cannot do 

more than state that the missing informant, if he testified 

truthfully, would corroborate Gutierrez' story. Under some 

circumstances, this claim alone might constitute a plausible 

showing of how the informant's testimony would have been 

sufficiently "relevant and helpful to the defense, or ... 

essential to a fair determination of a cause" to require the 

government to produce the informant. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61. 

The state trial court here obviously thought that Gutierrez should 

have had access to the informant because it ordered the State to 

reveal the informant's whereabouts. When the State did not do so, 

however, Gutierrez did not file any motion in the trial court. 

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Moreover, although Gutierrez' defense was that he was not at the 

scene of the crime and was misidentified by Luna, Gutierrez did 

not respond to the State's demand for notice of an intent to 

present an alibi defense. Finally, at least three other people 

were present at the scene of the crime, .including c.o-defendant 

Maestas whom Gutierrez knew. The record, however, contains no 

evidence that Gutierrez attempted to interview or subpoena 

Maestas, or to ascertain the identity of the other witnesses and 

support his defense through their testimony. Thus, even assuming 

that the state trial court was correct in ordering the informant 

disclosed and that the State therefore had a duty to exercise due 

diligence in producing him, under the circumstances of this case 

its alleged failure to do so did not deprive Gutierrez of his 

right to a fair trial. See,~, United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 

120, 130-31 (1st Cir. 1987). Applying the same analysis, we 

conclude that Gutierrez likewise suffered no constitutional 

deprivation arising from the absence of his co-defendant. 

III. 

Gutierrez contends that the district court erred in refusing 

to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claims asserting 

constitutional violations arising from preindictment and pretrial 

delay. The court concluded that the state supreme court had 

expressly invoked its procedural bar based on Gutierrez' failure 

to raise these issues properly in state district court. The 

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district court rejected Gutierrez' argument that federal habeas 

review is nonetheless available because New Mexico has a 

fundamental error exception to its procedural bar analogous to the 

Oklahoma exception recognized by the Supreme Court in Ake v. 

Oklahoma, .470. U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985) •.. Accordingly,. the court 

applied the cause and prejudice standard mandated by Wainwright v. 

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), when a habeas petitioner seeks federal 

review of a defaulted claim. On appeal, Gutierrez reiterates his 

argument that New Mexico has a fundamental error exception to its 

procedural bar analogous to that described in Ake, and also argues 

that-the New Mexico Supreme Court actually considered the merits 

of the claim in any event. 

As quoted above, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the 

preindictment and pretrial delay claims by stating that the 

failure to raise the issue "at the trial level and present a 

proper quantum of proof on the issue was a failure to preserve the 

issue for appellate review," citing State v. Elliott, 89 N.M. 756, 

557 P.2d 1105 (1977). See rec., vol. I, doc. 9, exh. D at 2. 

Gutierrez argues that in so stating the state court considered the 

merits of the claims, pointing to the court's reference to a 

"proper quantum of proof" and to the court's citation to Elliott, 

a case in which the court reviewed the merits of a defaulted 

claim. 

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The Supreme Court has held that federal habeas review of a 

defaulted claim is not precluded unless the state court opinion 

contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on its 

procedural bar. See Harris v. Reed, 109 s. Ct. 1038, 1043 (1989). 

State court.opinions that. contain ambiguous references to state 

law do not constitute a plain statement within the meaning of 

Harris. See id. at 1042-43. We need not determine here whether 

the New Mexico Supreme Court clearly, explicitly, and 

unambiguously relied on its procedural bar rule. Even if the 

Court did so, we hold that federal review is nonetheless available 

because the bar, as applied in New Mexico to the claims at issue, 

does not constitute an adequate state ground precluding 

consideration on habeas. 

Federal habeas review of a defaulted federal claim is 

precluded when the state court has disposed of the claim on a 

procedural ground "that is both 'independent' of the merits of the 

federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's decision." 

Harris, 109 S. Ct. at 1042-43. A state procedural default ruling 

is not independent if application of the bar depends on an 

antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Ake, 

470 U.S. at 74-75. A state's application of the bar is not 

adequate unless it is "'strictly or regularly followed.'" Johnson 

v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981, 1987 (1988)(citation 

omitted)(quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982)). 

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A. 

In assessing whether New Mexico's procedural bar is an 

independent state law ground, we begin .. by pointing out that New 

Mexico draws a clear distinction between fundamental rights and 

fundamental errors when determining the applicability of its bar. 

See,~, State v. Isiah, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293, 297 (1989); 

State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322, 330-32, cert. denied, 

Clark v. New Mexico, 110 s. Ct. 291 (1989); State v. Escamilla, 

107 N~M. 510, 760 P.2d 1276, 1281-82 (1988). As these cases set 

out, under New Mexico law a defaulted claim of denial of a 

fundamental right (or federal constitutional right) is subject to 

waiver; the court may exercise its discretion whether to hear the 

merits. On the other hand, the New Mexico courts do not permit 

waiver of fundamental error, which the courts define narrowly. 

See,~, Isiah, 781 P.2d at 297 (fundamental error if innocence 

indisputable or guilt so doubtful as to shock the conscience); 

Clark, 772 P.2d at 331 (fundamental error if miscarriage of 

justice); State v. Lujan, 103 N.M. 667, 712 P.2d 13, 19 (Ct. App. 

1985)(fundamental error if denial of due process of law), cert. 

denied, 103 N.M. 740, 713 P.2d 556 (1986). Review of a defaulted 

fundamental-right claim is therefore only mandatory when denial of 

the right gives rise to a question of fundamental error as defined 

by state law. 

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Thus, unlike Oklahoma, New Mexico does not equate fundamental 

error with federal constitutional error. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 75. 

In New Mexico, unlike Oklahoma, a state court's unambiguous 

statement that a federal constitutional claim is waived does not 

necessarily mean that the court considered the merits of the 

claim. Rather, the court could have considered the alleged denial 

on the merits and found no resulting fundamental error, as defined 

by state law. Or, the court could instead have merely assumed the 

existence of a violation of a fundamental right and found no 

resulting fundamental error. Or, the court could have done 

neither of the above, but instead found no fundamental error due 

to overwhelming evidence of guilt, and then exercised its 

discretion not to review the defaulted fundamental-right claim. 

See,~, Isiah, 781 P.2d at 297. In sum, a state court in New 

Mexico may invoke the procedural bar without the necessity of 

ruling on the federal constitutional claim. As a general rule, 

therefore, application of New Mexico's procedural bar rule 

constitutes an independent state ground because it does not 

require a ruling on the merits of the federal claim. 

B. 

Nonetheless, the rule is not "adequate" under Harris and its 

predecessor cases because New Mexico does not follow its 

procedural bar rule strictly or regularly when dealing with 

defaulted claims of preindictment or pretrial delay. As an 

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initial matter, we point out that although the New Mexico courts 

have often stated that the general rule in that state "does not 

permit review of a question not properly preserved below," 

Escamilla, 760 P.2d at 1281, the courts have also often stated 

that they "may exercise discretion to consider fundamental rights 

that may have been infringed without preservation of error." Id. 

at 1282 (emphasis added); see Clark, 772 P.2d at 330 (review of a 

defaulted fundamental-right claim is discretionary). Our research 

has discovered no case articulating the parameters within which 

the New Mexico courts exercise this discretion, and it appears 

that ··there are no standards governing those courts' discretionary 

review of cases raising defaulted fundamental constitutional 

rights absent fundamental error. When assessing the adequacy of 

the New Mexico procedural bar rule, we must therefore recognize 

that the New Mexico state courts have expressly reserved their 

unfettered discretion to waive the rule. This circumstance argues 

against the conclusion that the courts apply the rule regularly 

and evenhandedly. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 

U.S. 229, 233-34 (1969) (where state court had not applied its 

rule so consistently as to amount to self-denial of the power to 

entertain the federal claim if it wished to do so, federal court 

review not barred). 

Turning specifically to New Mexico's treatment of claims of 

the type at issue here, we recognize that New Mexico did apply a 

waiver rule to such claims in some decisions handed down before 

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the Supreme Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 

(1972). See,~, State v. Rodriguez, 83 N.M. 180, 489 P.2d 1178 

(N.M. 1971); Raburn v. Nash, 78 N.M. 385, 431 P.2d 874, 876 

(N.M.), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 999 (1967); State v. Ford, 81 

N.M. 556, 469 P.2d 535,. 537. (Ct. App. 197.0); Patterson v. State, 

81 N.M. 210, 465 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1970). These early cases all 

apply the demand-waiver doctrine. In Barker, the Supreme Court 

rejected "the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy 

trial forever waives his right." 407 U.S. at 528. Instead, the 

court held that "the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert 

his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered 

in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right." Id. (emphasis 

added). Significantly, even when New Mexico followed the 

demand-waiver approach, the courts sometimes did consider speedy 

trial claims on the merits despite the lack of a proper demand. 

See Dalrymple v. State, 78 N.M. 368, 431 P.2d 746 (1967); State v. 

Baca, 82 N.M. 144, 477 P.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1970). 

The Court in Barker identified four factors to be considered 

in determining whether a defendant's speedy trial right had been 

denied: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the 

defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 

defendant." Id. at 530. Although the New Mexico courts have 

continued to state after Barker that a defendant may waive his 

right to a speedy trial by failing to assert the claim properly 

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( 

below, those courts have nonetheless frequently considered the 

merits of the claim. 2 

In State v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 774 P.2d 440 (1989), the 

state supreme court pointed ou~ that .. the defendant's attempt to 

preserve his speedy trial rights in the trial court was untimely, 

but then stated that this fact did "not end [its] inquiry." Id. 

at 443. The defendant in Mendoza made two attempts to protect his 

speedy trial rights. First, he asserted them at a competency 

hearing held Nov. 17, 1987, one year after he was charged, 

released on bond, arraigned, and had entered a plea of not guilty. 

Second, he filed a motion on the day scheduled for trial. The New 

Mexico Supreme Court clearly stated that the November attempt was 

untimely. See id. ("Moreover, defense counsel's reservation of 

his client's rights when the suspension of the proceedings was 

lifted in November 1987 must be evaluated in light of its 

untimeliness ... . II ) . The obvious inference from this statement 

is that the subsequent motion on the day of trial was also 

untimely. Nonetheless, the court went on to analyze the claim on 

its merits under the four factors set out in Barker. In so doing, 

the court did not hold that the untimeliness resulted in a 

2 In State v. Bishop, 108 N.M. 105, 766 P.2d 1339 (Ct. App. 

1988), the court did not address a defendant's default of the 

issue on appeal by failing to raise it properly in the trial 

court. Rather, the court's discussion in that case was directed 

to the defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the right in 

the trial court by the defendant's express agreement that a 

certain period of time was to be deducted from the state-imposed 

speedy trial time limits. 

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procedural default or invoke its bar rule as an alternative basis 

for its decision. 

In State v. Gallegos, 109 N.M. 55, 781 P.2d 783 (Ct. App. 

1989), although the defendant filed.a.speedy trial motion in the 

district court, the court of appeals did not indicate whether the 

motion was timely. However, in reviewing the speedy trial claim 

on the merits, the court held that the defendant's assertion of 

preindictment delay was inconsistent with waiting six months after 

indictment to bring the matter to the court's attention. The 

court did not refer to procedural default, and weighed the delay 

under Barker as a factor in considering the merits of the claim. 

Id. at 791. 

In State v. Urban, 108 N.M. 744, 779 P.2d 121 (Ct. App.), 

cert. denied, 108 N.M. 713, 778 P.2d 911 (1989), the court was 

presented with an alleged denial of due process arising from 

preindictment delay which the defendant had failed to develop 

properly below. Although the court there held that the 

defendant's motion asserting preindictment delay was timely, the 

court also held that the motion was nevertheless deficient because 

it was not accompanied by the required offer of proof of 

prejudice. The court viewed the necessary proffer as a 

requirement equivalent to timeliness and stated that the lack of 

such a requirement may result in waiver. Id. at 125. The court 

pointed out that constitutional rights can be waived by the 

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failure to assert them in a timely manner, but then performed 

fundamental error analysis and, upon considering the merits, found 

no prejudice resulting from the delay sufficient to constitute a 

denial of due process.

3 

In sum, the New Mexico courts clearly have not applied their 

procedural bar rule strictly and regularly to claims of speedy 

trial violations and preindictment delay. Indeed, it may well be 

that after Mendoza, New Mexico will always apply a Barker v. Wingo 

constitutional analysis when the state speedy trial six-month 

limitation is passed. In Mendoza, the court specifically stated 

that the untimeliness of the assertion of speedy trial rights 

"does not end our inquiry. Whenever there is a delay of more than 

six months between the time of arraignment and the date of the 

trial, [the Barker] factors are to be considered in determining 

whether a defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial." 

774 P.2d at 443 (emphasis added). It is certainly possible to 

read Mendoza as creating an exception to the New Mexico 

fundamental-error rule in speedy trial cases, mandating a 

constitutional assessment when the state statute is violated. If 

this is in fact the case, federal habeas review is available 

because application of the state's procedural bar, involving as it 

3 Although these cases were all decided after the New Mexico 

Supreme Court's decision at issue here, we note that the Supreme 

Court has considered decisions issued before, after, and 

contemporaneously with the state court decision under review. See 

Dugger v. Adams, 109 s. Ct. 1211, 1217 n.6 (majority opinion) & 

1220-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1989). 

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does a required assessment of federal constitutional error on the 

merits, is not independent. 

Accordingly, we conclude that New Mexico's invocation of its 

procedural bar rule in this case, to the extent it did so, does 

not preclude federal habeas review. As discussed above, the rule 

is not adequate because the state courts do not apply the rule 

consistently to these claims. Moreover, the rule may well no 

longer be independent as to these claims in view of New Mexico's 

treatment of them in Mendoza. Although the federal district court 

therefore erred in holding federal review of the delay claims 

themselves unavailable, we need not remand because that court did 

in fact reach the merits of· those claims in addressing whether 

Gutierrez had established cause for his procedural default within 

the meaning of Wainwright v. Sykes. Gutierrez argued below as 

cause for his default that his trial counsel was constitutionally 

inadequate in failing to properly raise the issue in state court. 

As the district court recognized, this claim requires 

consideration of the merits of the delay claims. We can thus 

address both the delay claims themselves and the adequacy of 

counsel claim raised on appeal by reviewing the district court's 

resolution below of Gutierrez assertion of incompetent counsel. 

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IV. 

Gutierrez contends that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel when his attorney failed to properly assert preindictment 

and pretrial delay in state court .. To establish ineffective 

counsel, Gutierrez must show both that his attorney's performance 

was deficient and that these deficiencies were prejudicial to his 

defense. · See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

It is obvious that if the delay claims that the attorney did not 

raise are without merit, Gutierrez suffered no prejudice by his 

counsel's failure. 

A. 

Preindictment delay rises to a constitutional violation when 

the defense is substantially prejudiced by the delay and the 

reasons for the prosecutor's delay are improper. See Martinez v. 

Romero, 661 F.2d 143, 144 (10th Cir. 1981)(per curiam). We agree 

with the district court that the preindictment delay claim must 

fail because Gutierrez has not alleged any facts to establish a 

causal link between his counsel's failure and the required 

prejudice to his defense. The only prejudice asserted by 

Gutierrez arising from the delay in this case is related to the 

disappearance of Alvarez and Maestas. The record contains no 

evidence tending to show that the unavailability of these 

witnesses was due to the delay; indeed, Gutierrez has failed or 

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refused to provide the names of people who might establish when 

Maestas disappeared. Absent any evidence establishing the point 

at which these witnesses became unavailable, Gutierrez has not 

shown that the witnesses would have appeared to testify at trial 

absent the excessive delay. ,. . . Moreover,- as discussed in Part I I, 

supra, we have concluded that Gutierrez was not denied a fair 

trial by their unavailability. Under these circumstances, 

Gutierrez has not shown the prejudice required to establish 

unconstitutional preindictment delay. 

B. 

In assessing whether pretrial delay has deprived a defendant 

of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, a court must 

balance four factors: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, 

the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 

defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; United States v. Jenkins, 

701 F.2d 850, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1983). Prejudice to a defendant 

in the speedy trial context may arise from oppressive pretrial 

incarceration, a defendant's anxiety and concern, and impairment 

of the defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Jenkins, 701 F.2d at 

857. Here, as with his preindictment delay claim, Gutierrez has 

alleged only that his defense was impaired by the disappearance of 

Alvarez and Maestas. We have already concluded that Gutierrez has 

failed to establish that the unavailability of these witnesses was 

caused by the delay or that his right to a fair trial was denied 

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by their absence. Accordingly, we must balance this lack of 

actual prejudice against the other relevant factors in assessing 

whether Gutierrez was denied his right to a speedy trial. 

The lower court found that while the twelve month delay from 

indictment to trial, some of which was admittedly attributable to 

defendant, was sufficiently lengthy to trigger speedy trial 

analysis, the length was not itself exceptional. The court noted 

that if overcrowded dockets had caused the delay, it weighed 

against the State, but held that this factor nonetheless provided 

little support for the speedy trial claim. Finally, the court 

held that Gutierrez' failure to assert his right between 

indictment and arrest did not undermine his claim because he did 

not know of the charges until he was arrested. However, the court 

further held that counsel's failure to assert the claim between 

arrest and trial should be considered an exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment given the deficiencies in the claim. Upon 

balancing the Barker factors, the court concluded that Gutierrez 

had not established denial of his right to a speedy trial. We are 

persuaded by this analysis. The length of delay was not 

inordinate, the reason for the delay weighed only slightly against 

the State, Gutierrez' assertion of his right weighed slightly in 

his favor at most, and he has failed to establish any prejudice 

arising from the delay. Under these circumstances, Gutierrez has 

not made out a claim for unconstitutional pretrial delay. Accord 

Jenkins, 701 F.2d at 857-58. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 21 
Because we conclude that Gutierrez' preindictment and 

pretrial delay claims are without merit, we likewise conclude that 

he has failed to show the prejudice necessary to establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

v. 

Finally, we address Gutierrez' claim that a life sentence for 

distributing a "miniscule" amount of heroin is cruel and unusual 

punishment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "sentences that are 

disproportionate to the crime committed." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 

277, 284 (1983). In this case, Gutierrez' sentence was the result 

not only of a single sale of a small amount of heroin, but of his 

status as a repeat drug offender. Recidivism is a factor 

justifying a sentence that considers not only a person's "most 

recent offense but also .•. the propensities he has demonstrated 

over a period of time during which he has been convicted of and 

sentenced for other crimes." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 

(1980). Moreover, we point out that the life sentence challenged 

here resulted in approximately seven years of actual imprisonment. 

The availability of parole is relevant to determining whether the 

length of a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. See Solem, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 22 
463 U.S. at 297. Accordingly, we conclude that Gutierrez' 

sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 

The judgment of the district court if AFFIRMED. 

-23-

Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 23 
No. 88-1849, Toby Joe Gutierrez v. Dan Moriarty, etc., et al. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part: 

I concur in part II of the majority opinion, and in the 

result. However, -I respectfully dissent with respect to the 

process by which the majority reaches that result. Procedural bar 

precludes consideration of Gutierrez's speedy trial claim. 

When the last state court of review clearly holds that a 

federal constitutional issue has been forfeited due to a violation 

of state procedural rules, and the finding rests on adequate and 

independent state law grounds, then such a finding of procedural 

default bars federal habeas review of the federal claim. See 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989); Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 

506, 509-10 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 393 (1990). The 

majority opinion recognizes this rule, but holds that the New 

Mexico procedural bar rule as applied to speedy trial claims does 

not rest on adequate state grounds because it is not regularly 

followed. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988). This 

is a narrow holding, despite stray and nonbinding dicta in the 

majority opinion regarding the independence of the state ground, 

and whether the state court clearly invoked procedural bar (which 

it manifestly did). 

Many New Mexico cases, in a variety of different contexts, 

recite and apply the general rule that "[o]n appeal, a reviewing 

court will not consider issues not raised in the trial court." 

State v. Muise, 707 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); see 

State v. Elliott, 557 P.2d 1105, 1107 (N.M. 1977); State v. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 24 
Bidegain, 541 P.2d 971, 976 (N.M. 1975); State v. Aull, 435 P.2d 

437 (N.M. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 927 (1968); State v. 

Lucero, 725 P.2d 266, 269-70 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); State v. 

Edgington, 663 P.2d 374, 377 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 662 

P.2d 645, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 940 (1983); State v. Bolen, 545 

P.2d 1025, 1026 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 546 P.2d 70 (1976); 

State v. Vallejos, 519 P.2d 135, 139 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974); State 

v. Baca, 472 P.2d 651, 651 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 472 P.2d 

984 (1970); see also New Mexico Supreme Court Rules of Appellate 

Procedure ("SCRA") 12-216 (1986). The New Mexico courts have 

stated repeatedly that constitutional rights, including the right 

to a speedy trial, can be waived. See,~, State v. Mendoza, 

774 P.2d 440, 442 (N.M. 1989); Raburn v. Nash, 431 P.2d 874, 876 

(N.M. Ct. App.), petition dismissed, 389 U.S. 999 (1967); State v. 

Urban, 779 P.2d 121, 125 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Bishop, 

766 P.2d 1339, 1342-43 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Baird, 568 

P.2d 204, 205 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff'd, 568 P.2d 193 (1977). 

The majority opinion relies on three cases for its conclusion 

that the New Mexico courts do not follow their own procedural bar 

rules where speedy trial claims are concerned: State v. Mendoza, 

774 P.2d 440 (N.M. 1989), State v. Gallegos, 781 P.2d 783 (N.M. 

Ct. App. 1989), and State v. Urban, 779 P.2d 121 (N.M. Ct. App.), 

cert. denied, 778 P.2d 911 (1989). Those cases are easily distinguished from the situation involved here. Mendoza, Gallegos, and 

Urban each addressed circumstances in which speedy trial 

challenges were raised in the trial court. In the case before us 

the speedy trial issue was not raised at all in the trial court. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 25 
Thus, the character of the default that was presented to the New 

Mexico Supreme Court was different. 

In Gallegos and Urban there was no procedural bar because 

timely motions were made before the trial court. In Gallegos the 

court stated .llwe affirm the trial court's denial. of defendant's 

motion to dismiss two of the counts for speedy trial violations." 

781 P.2d at 787 (emphasis added). And, it went on to reemphasize 

the point, by stating: "[a]t the outset, we note that, although 

defendant moved in the district court to dismiss all the counts 

for speedy trial violations, he does not appeal the denial of his 

motion on the counts involving the Sundance case." Id. at 789 

(emphasis added). The appellate court then addressed the appeal· 

from the denial of the motions to dismiss in the two cases to 

which the appeal applied. 

In Urban, the court begins its discussion by stating that 

"[d]efendant appeals his conviction for shoplifting, contending 

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 

indictment on sixth amendment speedy trial and fourteenth amend-· 

ment due process grounds." 779 P.2d at 122. Thereafter, the 

entire discussion in the court of appeals was whether or not the 

motion in the trial court was timely. The court concluded: 

[f]or all of these reasons, we conclude that Rule 5-

601(C) lists several motions that must be raised before 

trial but need not be raised at arraignment or within 

twenty days thereafter. See State v. Aragon. 

Defendant's motion was based on two objections, both of 

which were directed at the initiation of the 

prosecution. Therefore, defendant's motion was timely. 

Id. at 123-24 (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 26 
Mendoza also involved a timely motion seeking dismissal for 

violation of the New Mexico statutory speedy trial time limits. 

There was no question in that case of procedural bar since the 

motion in the trial court was obviously timely and the appeal 

properly perfected. The majority opinion's strained attempt to 

reconstruct these cases in a way to achieve some equivalence with 

the type of case before us includes the necessity of building on 

an "inference" it draws from Mendoza. See supra text following 

note 2. 

The only recent case from New Mexico which has addressed the 

situation in which a speedy trial claim was not raised at all in 

the trial court, expressly holds that in such a circumstance the 

issue is procedurally barred. State v. Valdez, 790 P.2d 1040 

(N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, U.S. __ (1990). 1 In Valdez, 

the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated: 

Defendant also contends that he was denied his 

sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Determination 

of whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial requires weighing four 

factors: length of the delay, reason for the delay, 

assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. 

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Zurla v. 

1 It does not matter that the court in Valdez went on to reject 

the speedy trial claim on the merits, for we view that disposition, in the context of the case, as clearly an alternative 

holding. A state court may make alternative holdings on the 

merits and on procedural bar: 

a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a 

federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very 

definition, the adequate and independent state-ground 

doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state 

holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court's 

judgment, even when the state court also relies on 

federal law. 

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10 (emphasis in original). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 27 
State, 109 N.M. 640, 789 P.2d 588 (1990); State v. 

Grissom, 106 N.M. 555, 746 P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1987). 

The principal stumbling block for defendant is his 

failure to raise his constitutional claim in the 

district court. In the portion of defendant's brief-inchief that addresses the constitutional claim, defendant 

states, "Mr. Valdez asserted his right in a motion 

before trial," and cites to the taped transcript for the 

day of trial. The state's answer brief points. out, 

however, that defendant's trial counsel never claimed 

violation of a constitutional right and never argued the 

four factors set out in Barker. Defendant's reply brief 

does not address the constitutional claim. Our review 

of the transcript shows that trial counsel discussed 

only violation of this state's six-month rules. 

Because defendant did not raise the constitutional 

claim until this appeal, there were no district court 

proceedings to develop fully the facts relating to the 

Barker factors, and the district court had no 

opportunity to weigh them. In a similar circumstance, a 

federal court of appeals wrote: 

Although defendants and their counsel are 

allowed considerable leeway in delaying their 

demand for a speedy trial before the trial 

court, the issue must be raised at some point. 

A complete failure to raise it in the trial 

court, as was the case here, precludes our 

consideration of the issue on appeal, for the 

simple reason that there is nothing to review. 

There is no decision of the district court 

weighing the factors considered and no record 

from which we could independently evaluate the 

government's conduct. [Citations and footnote 

omitted.) 

United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 

1975), cert. denied sub nom., Benigno v. United States, 

423 U.S. 1059 (1976). 

In short. nothing in the record suggests such a striking 

violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial 

that it would be appropriate to consider that issue for 

the first time on appeal. See SCRA 1986, 12-216(B). 

Id. at 1044 (emphasis added).2 

2 It is entirely appropriate to focus on the single most recent 

case from a state appellate court since the state courts are to be 

expected to follow current teachings of the United States Supreme 

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Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 28 
The majority's electrorunicroscope approach to dissecting the 

New Mexico cases is consistent only with the dissenting opinion 

approach in Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, reh'g denied, 109 S.Ct, 

1770 (1989), and such recent cases as Meadows v. Legursky, 904 

F.2d 903 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5850 (1990), 

The majority opinions in those cases took a more supportive view 

of the state's applications of their procedural bar rules than the 

dissenting judges wanted to take. 

In sum, the majority opinion is wrong on procedural bar for 

two reasons. First, it misinterprets and incorrectly ana~yzes and 

applies New Mexico case law. Second, it approaches its. orocedural 

bar analysis with an apparent set of presumptions which I find 

unacceptable: that the state courts are not faithful to their own 

rules, and are seemingly unaware of how to apply them; and, that 

we ought to strain to permit federal habeas review and avoid 

finding procedural bar on state grounds. In my view, the 

presumptions must be exactly the opposite. Rather than going out 

of the way to imagine fatal defects in state cases so as to deny 

state courts the privilege of applying their own procedural bar 

rules, I would accord a presumption of regularity to state court 

applications of state rules. 3 

Court. Meadows v. Legursky, 904 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 5850 (1990), is an example of reliance on 

a single state court case to demonstrate regularity for "adequate" 

state ground purposes--a point about which the dissent in that 

case complains. Id. at 914. 

3 Thus, for instance, in Dugger v. Adems, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 

n. 6 ( 1989), the Supreme Court brushed as __ de the fact that Florida 

courts may have not been perfectly antiseptic with respect to 

procedural default rules in cases raisi~g Caldwell issues 

(Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1849 Document: 010110012221 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 29 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent 

to that part of the majority opinion referred to above. 

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