Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-03949/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-03949-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adrian Duran Patterson,

Plaintiff

-vsT. Johnson, et al.,

Defendants.

CV-16-3949-PHX-GMS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

re Screening of Amended Complaint

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

This matter arises out of a complaint by Plaintiff, presently incarcerated in 

Stanley Correctional Institution, Stanley, Wisconsin, alleging a variety of injuries 

incurred while a pretrial detainee being extradited through Arizona to Wisconsin. 

II. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Plaintiff has filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A 

requires the Court to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. The Court must 

dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the Plaintiff has raised claims that are legally 

Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. 42 

U.S.C. ' 1997 applies the same standard to such complaints even if the defendants are 

not governmental entities, or officers or employees of a governmental entity. Id.

Because the undersigned concludes that such screening will be dispositive of some of 

Plaintiff’s claims, and the matter is heard on referral from the District Judge, the 

undersigned makes the following report and recommendations. 

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III. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Original Complaint

Plaintiff's original Complaint was filed November 14, 2016 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff 

named as Defendants: T. Johnson, the Deputy Chief of the Pinal County Sheriff’s 

Department (PCSD); Ernie Delgado, a PCSD Sergeant; Munoz, a PCSD Deputy; and 

“John Doe, et al,” who are identified as “Pinal County Sheriff’s Office Employee(s)” at 

the Pinal County Sheriff’s Detention Facility. Plaintiff’s claims arose out of an incident 

while he was confined as a pretrial detainee at the Pinal County Jail on behalf of the 

Wisconsin Department of Corrections. In the initial Screening Order entered February 

13, 2017 (Doc. 7), the Court described the factual background as follows:

On October 27, 2015, Plaintiff “was conveyed to the Pinal County 

Jail [PCJ] by U.S. Corrections, an agent of the Wisconsin 

Department of Corrections.” Upon arriving at PCJ, Plaintiff 

requested a “sandwich bag meal,” which was denied by “Deputy 

Jane Do[e] #1.” Plaintiff argued with “Jane Doe #1,” prompting 

“Sgt. Jane Doe” to intervene and yell “that’s it, he’s not staying 

here.” Sergeant Jane Doe then called the U.S. Correctional officials 

who were transporting Plaintiff back in the booking area where 

Plaintiff was located. The “Defendants, along with several others,” 

then placed Plaintiff in mechanical restraints. After placing Plaintiff 

in the restraints, Sergeant Jane Doe “removed a chemical spray 

device from her waist and threatened to spray the Plaintiff.” The 

“Defendants” then “forced and shoved him” back into the parking 

lot and into the transport van he had arrived in. After several 

minutes, Defendant Johnson opened the door to the van and “began 

to verbally threaten Plaintiff with physical bodily harm.” Johnson 

then closed the door of the van. After several more minutes, 

Defendant Delgado opened the door of the van and “threatened to 

attack Plaintiff with a police dog and threatened him with other 

bodily harm and abuse.” Delgado then closed the door of the van. 

After several more minutes, Delgado and Munoz opened the door, 

and shot Plaintiff with their tasers. The “Defendants” then pulled 

Plaintiff from the van, threw him to the ground, and repeatedly 

tasered him. Additionally, “one or more of the Defendants” placed a 

knee on Plaintiff’s face and pressed down with their body weight, 

causing him additional pain. Plaintiff also alleges that while this was 

occurring, “several John Doe Defendants [] stood by and did not 

intervene.” Delgado then picked Plaintiff up off the ground, while 

another John Doe Defendant “placed a mask over the head of the 

Plaintiff,” and secured him in a restraint chair. Delgado then twisted 

Plaintiff’s thumb in a painful manner, and also forced one of his 

knees down on Plaintiff’s arm, causing him additional pain. 

Defendant Johnson then placed a taser over Plaintiff’s heart, and 

discharged it at least three times. Plaintiff was then wheeled back 

into PCJ, where “the Defendants” refused to give him his 

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medications. The next day, Plaintiff was released to the U.S. 

Corrections officials, and, apparently transported to Wisconsin.

(Order 2/13/17, Doc. 7 at 3-4.) In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged Defendants 

used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourteenth (Count One) and Fourth 

Amendments (Counts Two and Three), an Eighth Amendment medical claim (Count 

Four), and well as four additional counts for violations of “A.R.S. § 12-2505” (Counts 

Five through Eight).

The Court applied a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause analysis to 

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, and thus dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

claims (Counts Two and Three), but ordered a response from Defendants Johnson, 

Delgado and Munoz on the Fourteenth Amendment claim (Count One). The Court also 

found that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2505 related only to reduction of damages based on 

comparative negligence, and did not establish a basis for a civil suit. Accordingly, 

Counts Five, Six, Seven and Eight were dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court 

further found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim of deliberate indifference to medical 

needs because he failed to allege facts to show deliberate indifference, and instead 

simply alleged a denial of medications, and failed identify the particular defendants who 

engaged in deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Court Four was dismissed. Finally, the 

Court dismissed the fictitiously named defendants as unservable as a practical matter, but 

acknowledged Plaintiff’s right to attempt to discovery the identity of such defendants 

through discovery and thereafter to amend and name them. (Order 2/13/17, Doc. 7.) 

B. First Amended Complaint

In response to the initial Screening Order, Plaintiff filed his First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 10). This amended complaint incorporates the following changes.

Plaintiff eliminates Defendants John Doe; retains Defendants (1) Johnson, (2) 

Delgado, and (3) Munoz; and adds the following officers of the Pinal County Sheriff’s 

Department: (4) Deputy L. Flores, (5) Sergeant Jane Doe #1, and (6) Sergeant Jane Doe 

#2. 

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Plaintiff asserts the same factual allegations, with the following modifications: 

The denial of a sandwich meal is attributed to Deputy Jane Doe #2. He alleges that 

ensuing verbal argument occurred with Jane Doe #1, and that it was an exercise of 

protected free speech, and it was Jane Doe #1 who yelled Plaintiff was not staying and 

called back U.S. Corrections, and threatened to spray Plaintiff. (Amend. Compl., Doc. 10 

at Statement of Facts, ¶¶ 1-4.) He itemizes that the officers restraining Plaintiff were 

Defendants Johnson, Delgado, Munoz, Flores, Jane Doe #2 and Sgt. Jane Doe #1. (Id. at 

¶ 4.) He adds the threat of being tasered caused him to fear for his safety, and was a 

conspiracy (Id. at ¶ 5.) He asserts that Defendants Johson, Delgado, Munoz, Flores, Jane 

Doe #1and Jane Doe #2 acted in concert and conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his 

constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶ 8.) He alleges the threats from Johnson and Delgaod were 

an assault and were in retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercise of free speech. (Id. a ¶¶ 9-10.) 

He argues the tasering amounted to an unlawful, Fourth Amendment seizure, and an 

aggravated assault under Arizona law. (Id. at ¶11.) He alleges that due to the restraints, 

he had little capacity to resist. (Id. at ¶ 15.) He clarifies that it was Defendants Delgado, 

Munoz, and Flores who then removed Plaintiff from the vehicle, and they and Defendant 

Johnson then twisted Plaintiff’s hands, writs and ankles, and one of them placed their 

knee on Plaintiff’s face. (Id. at ¶ 16.) He clarifies that it was Defendants Sgt. Jane Doe 

#1 and Deputy Jane Doe #2 who failed to intervene. (Id. at ¶ 17.) He now alleges he 

was masked by “a defendant.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) He argues that return to the building was a 

false imprisonment. (Id. at ¶ 21.) He now alleges that the Defendants conduct was not 

explained to Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff was never charged with a crime or issued any 

citations. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-26.) He adds allegations that as a result of Defendants’ conduct, 

he suffered a loss of liberty time, physical discomfort, inconvenience, and a substantial 

risk of harm. (Id. at ¶ 33.) 

Plaintiff now references his Statement of Facts and alleges that Defendant’s 

conduct amounted to: Count 1, a denial of due process of law, in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment (id. at 3); Count 2, an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 

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Amendment (id. at 4); Count 3, use of physical force in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment (id. at 5); Count 4, a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in 

violation of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id. at 5A); Count 5, an unlawful detention (id. at 5B); 

Count 6, a use of excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (id. at 5C); Count 7, 

retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment Rights (id. at 5D); Count 8, 

excessive force in violation of state criminal laws on assault (id. at 5E); Count 9, a threat 

to safety in violation of state criminal laws on assault (id. at 5F); and Count 10, false 

imprisonment, in violation of state criminal laws on unlawful imprisonment (id. at 5G). 

V. APPLICABLE LAW

A. AMENDMENT OF RIGHT

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), a Plaintiff may amend their 

complaint once as a matter of course where no answer has yet been served. Plaintiff has 

not previously amended, and no defendant has yet answered the original Complaint. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has the right to make the instant amendment.

B. SCREENING OF ' 1983 COMPLAINTS

28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires the Court to screen complaints brought by prisoners 

seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental 

entity. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the Plaintiff has raised 

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 42 U.S.C. § 1997 applies the same standard to 

such complaints even if the defendants are not governmental entities, or officers or 

employees of a governmental entity. 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the -

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defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific 

factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess 

whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed,

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).

VI. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. FICTITIOUSLY NAMED DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff continues to attribute various conduct to fictitiously named defendants, 

this time identifying them as “Sergeant Jane Doe #1,” and “Deputy Jane Doe #2.” For 

the same reasons expressed in the Court’s screening Order (Doc. 7 at 7-8), these 

Defendants should be dismissed without prejudice.

B. PREVIOUSLY APPROVED CLAIMS – COUNT 1 (14TH AMENDMENT)

In screening the original Complaint, the Court ordered a response from 

Defendants Johnson, Delgado and Munoz on the Fourteenth Amendment claim for 

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excessive force. Plaintiff’s modifications do not alter the sufficiency of this claim. 

Moreover, Plaintiff includes allegations against Deputy Flores, including allegations that 

Flores participated in: restraining Plaintiff (Amend. Compl., Statement of Facts at ¶ 4); 

and twisting Plaintiff’s extremities (id. at ¶ 16). 

Accordingly, a response to Count 1 should be required from Defendants Johnson, 

Delgado, Munoz and Flores.

C. RESURRECTED CLAIMS – COUNTS 2 & 3 (4TH AMENDMENT)

Plaintiff has resurrected his Fourth Amendment Claims in Counts 2 and 3. 

Although Plaintiff has included conclusory allegations that Defendants’ conduct 

violated his Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable seizure. (Amend. Compl., 

Doc. 10, Statement of Facts at ¶ 8.) In dismissing these claims from the original 

Complaint, the Court observed:

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and not the 

Fourth or Eighth Amendment, applies to the use of excessive force 

against pretrial detainees that amounts to punishment. Kingsley v. 

Hendrickson, ___ U.S.___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002).

(Order 2/13/17, Doc. 7 at 4.) Plaintiff continues to argue that he was a pretrial detainee. 

(Amend. Compl., Doc. 10, Statement of Facts at ¶ 5.) Accordingly, Counts Two and 

Three should be dismissed.

D. NEW CLAIMS

Count 4 – Conspiracy – In Count 4, Plaintiff now alleges that Defendants 

conspired to deprive him of his rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Amend. 

Compl., Doc. 10 at 5A.) Liability exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conspiracies to 

deny a person’s civil rights. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir. 1962). But here, 

Plaintiff references conspiracies to violate inapplicable rights. In addition to the 

Fourteenth Amendment violations referenced in Count One, he references again a Fourth 

Amendment right regarding physical force and a First Amendment right regarding 

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retaliation. Because, as discussed in connection with Counts Two and Three, the Fourth 

Amendment is inapplicable to Plaintiff as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff had no pertinent 

rights under the Fourth Amendment which Defendants could have conspired to violate.

Moreover, “[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one's constitutional rights 

under section 1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the 

claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, 

Plaintiff points to the actions in concert by all defendants, the statement between the 

defendants regarding tasering Plaintiff (Amend. Compl., Doc. 10, Statement of Facts, ¶ 

6), and an unexplained conversation among two of the defendants (id. at 8). 

“[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not 

suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy...they must be 

placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel 

conduct that could just as well be independent action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). Certainly an unexplained conversation would not provide such 

a context.

Thus, the only specific fact of conspiracy proffered by Plaintiff is his assertion 

that he “overheard one of the defendants state to another, ‘Let’s just tase him and be 

done with it.’” (Amend. Compl., Doc. 10, Statement of Facts, ¶ 6.) Even if that 

statement were sufficient, Plaintiff fails to attribute that statement to any particular 

defendant. Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Delgado and Munoz eventually 

employed the tasers, and that Delgado told Munoz where to target the taser, Plaintiff fails 

to proffer any reason to find this as evidence of an agreement to deprive Plaintiff of his 

constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, Count Four fails to adequately state a claim of conspiracy to violate 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and should be dismissed.

Count 5 – Unlawful Detention – In Count Five, Plaintiff alleges that the conduct 

of the defendants resulted in a violation of his “constitutional right to be free from 

unlawful detention.” However, Plaintiff fails to proffer any facts to show that his 

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detention was unlawful, merely that the conditions under which he was detained 

amounted to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Plaintiff does not 

allege any facts to show that he was not properly in the custody of the various officers, 

merely that they purportedly misbehaved in the course of that detention.

Accordingly, Count Five fails to adequately state a claim.

Count 6 – Excessive Force – In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges that some officer 

employed excessive force. Because excessive force claims of pretrial detainees are 

governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, see Kingsley, supra, this count is duplicative of 

Count One. 

Accordingly, Count Six fails to adequately state an additional claim, and should 

be dismissed.

Count 7 – First Amendment Retaliation – In Count Seven, Plaintiff alleges that 

the conduct of the Defendants was in retaliation for his exercise of free speech protected 

by the first amendment. 

There are five basic elements for a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation:

(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and 

that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). “A prisoner suing prison 

officials under [§] 1983 for retaliation must allege that he [or she] was retaliated against 

for exercising his [or her] constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not 

advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and 

discipline.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 

Further, the prisoner must demonstrate that her or his First Amendment rights were 

chilled or infringed by the alleged retaliatory action. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 

449 (9th Cir. 2000).

The only speech to which Plaintiff refers was the verbal disagreement which 

resulted from the denial of his request for a meal. (Amend. Compl., Doc. 10, Statement 

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of Facts at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jane Doe #1 responded by refusing to 

accept Plaintiff as a prisoner. Plaintiff proffers no facts to show that the rejection of 

Plaintiff did not reasonably advance a legitimate institutional goal. To the contrary, the 

more plausible explanation is that the Defendant determined that Plaintiff was not a good 

fit for the County’s detention facility in light of the fact that the denial of a meal in 

booking resulted in a verbal disagreement. 

Moreover, Plaintiff proffers no facts to show that the resulting altercations with 

the other officers was in retaliation for such free speech, rather than in response to 

Plaintiff’s ensuing demeanor and behavior. 

Further, Plaintiff proffers no facts to show that his exercise of his First 

Amendment rights was objectively chilled by Defendants’ conduct. Given Plaintiff’s 

resulting return to Wisconsin, the Court is left to speculate how or why such chilling 

would have resulted. 

Accordingly, Count Seven fails to adequately state a claim, and should be 

dismissed.

Count 8 – State Law Assault

In Count 8, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Johnson, Delgado, Munoz and Flores’ 

conduct amounted to excessive force in violation of the State’s assault and aggravated 

assault criminal statutes, because the officers touched Plaintiff with the intent to injure 

him. (Amend. Pet. at 5E.) 

“In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 

related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 

same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a). “Nonfederal claims are part of the 

same ‘case’ as federal claims when they derive from a common nucleus of operative fact 

and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial 

proceeding.” Trustees of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Desert 

Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations 

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omitted). Here, Petitioner’s state law claim for “assault” is founded upon the same facts 

which give rise to his Fourteenth Amendment claims, and thus are part of the same 

controversy. 

Neither of the state criminal statutes cited by Plaintiff include any explicit private 

right of action. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203, 13-1204. But that does not mean there is 

no private right arising under the statute. “[A] duty of care and the attendant standard of 

conduct may be found in a statute silent on the issue of civil liability.” Ontiveros v. 

Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 510, 667 P.2d 200, 210 (1983). However, Plaintiff points to no 

Arizona authority finding such a private right of action, and the undersigned has found 

none.

However, Arizona recognizes a private right of action for battery, the common 

law tort that arises out of what has become known in criminal law as assault. See Duncan 

v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 309, ¶ 9, 70 P.3d 435, 438 (2003) (“An 

actor is subject to liability to another for battery if the actor intentionally engages in an 

act that results in harmful or offensive contact with the person of another.”).

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Count 8 adequately states a claim for common law 

battery, and a response to Count 8 should be required from Defendants Johnson, 

Delgado, Munoz and Flores.

Count 9 – State Law Threat to Safety – In Count Nine, Plaintiff cites Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-1302(A)(2) and (3), and argues that Defendant Sergeant Jane Doe #1 put 

Plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury. Because this defendant 

is to be dismissed, and no other Defendant is identified, Count 9 should be dismissed.

Count 10 – State Law False Imprisonment – In Count Ten, Plaintiff argues that 

the “defendants acted as a unit” and unlawfully imprisoned Plaintiff. Arizona recognizes 

a cause of action for false imprisonment. 

The essential element necessary to constitute either false arrest or 

false imprisonment is unlawful detention. A detention which occurs 

pursuant to legal authority, such as a valid warrant, is not an 

unlawful detention. If the arrest or imprisonment has occurred 

pursuant to valid legal process, the fact that the action was procured 

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maliciously and without probable cause does not constitute false 

arrest or false imprisonment; the proper remedy under such 

circumstances is an action for malicious prosecution. 

Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298, 300, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (1975). See also Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-1301(2) (restricting defining of “restrain” to restricting movement 

“without legal authority”). 

Plaintiff fails to offer facts to show that his detention was unlawful. To the 

contrary, he argues that he was a pretrial detainee being extradited to Wisconsin. The 

detention by jails of prisoners being extradited is authorized by Arizona statute:

The officer or persons executing the governor's warrant of arrest, or 

the agent of the demanding state to whom the prisoner may have 

been delivered may, when necessary, confine the prisoner in the jail 

of any county or city through which he may pass; and the keeper of 

such jail must receive and safely keep the prisoner until the officer 

or person having charge of him is ready to proceed on his route, 

such officer or person being chargeable with the expense of 

keeping.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3852. 

Accordingly, Count Ten fails to adequately state a claim.

E. SUMMARY

Based upon the forgoing, the Court should dismiss Defendants Sergeant Jane Doe 

#1 and Deputy Jane Doe #2, and Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Nine, and 

Ten. A response to Counts One and Eight should be required of Defendants Johnson, 

Delgado, Munoz and Flores.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A, 

that Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Nine, and Ten of the First Amended 

Complaint be dismissed, without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A, that 

Defendants Sergeant Jane Doe #1 and Deputy Jane Doe #2 be dismissed, without 

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prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that service on Defendants Johnson, 

Delgado, Munoz and Flores.be ordered, and they be required to respond to the First 

Amended Complaint by entry of an order that provides as follows:.

(1) The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including both 

summons and request for waiver forms for said Defendants.

(2) Plaintiff shall complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of the Court 

within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(3) The United States Marshal shall retain the Summons, a copy of such amended 

complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(4) The United States Marshal shall notify said Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants shall include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal shall file waivers of service of the summons or requests for waivers 

that were returned as undeliverable as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service of 

summons is not returned by Defendants within thirty days from the date the request for 

waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal shall:

(a) Personally serve copies of the Summons, such amended 

Complaint and this Order upon Defendants pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Within ten days after personal service is effected, file the return 

of service for the Defendants, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a 

waiver of service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in 

effecting service upon the Defendants. The costs of service shall be enumerated 

on the return of service form (USM-285) and shall include the costs incurred by 

the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of the Summons, such amended 

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complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms 

(USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally 

served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(5) Defendants who agree to waive service of the Summons and such 

amended complaint shall return signed waiver forms to the United State Marshal, 

and not to Plaintiff.

(6) Said Defendants shall answer such amended complaint or otherwise respond 

by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 

12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(7) Any answer or responsive pleading shall state the specific Defendant(s) by 

name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, responsive pleading, 

or other motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant(s) by name on 

whose behalf it is filed.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file 

objections to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be 

considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute 

a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. 

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Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 27, 2017

16-3949o RR 17 03 21 re Screen 1st Amend Compl.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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