Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02932/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02932-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAN JORGENS and

JOHN EIBENSTEINER,,

Plaintiffs,

NO. CIV. S-06-2932 LKK/DAD

v.

P & V, INC., and PATRICK

VARGASON,

O R D E R

Defendants.

 /

This case involves a motor vehicle accident that occurred in

Idaho. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss

for improper venue, or, in the alternative, to transfer for

improper venue or convenience. The court resolves the matter based

on the papers and without oral argument. For the reasons set forth

below, the court grants the motion to transfer.

I. Background

This is a diversity action arising out of a motor vehicle

collision that occurred in the state of Idaho on December 29, 2004.

Compl. ¶ 6-8. The collision involved plaintiffs Jan Jorgens and

John Eibensteiner, who reside in California, and defendant Patrick

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Vargason, who resides in Idaho. Id. ¶ 3, 4. Plaintiffs allege

that defendant Vargason was operating the vehicle in the course and

scope of his employment with defendant P&V, Inc. (“P&V”), which is

alleged to have its principal place of business in Idaho. Id. ¶

5, 8.

The complaint alleges that venue is proper in this district

because “all the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction

of this district as defendants are inter-state long haul truckers

with ‘minimum contacts’ within this district and this [d]istrict

is the ‘most convenient forum’ as Plaintiffs’ doctors are all

located within this district.” Compl. ¶ 2.

II. Standard

A. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue

In civil actions where jurisdiction is found solely on

diversity of citizenship, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

This statutory provision provides in relevant part:

A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on

diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise

provided by law, be brought only in 

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if

all defendants reside in the same State, 

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of

the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the

subject of the action is situated, or 

(3) a judicial district in which the defendants are

subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action

is commenced, if there is no district in which the action

may otherwise be brought.

Furthermore, a corporation is “deemed to reside in any judicial

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district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the

time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. 1391(c).

B. Motion to Transfer for Improper Venue or Convenience

If venue is improper in this district, then the court may

transfer the case to any district or division in which it could

have been brought if it is in the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1406(a). Similarly, for the convenience of parties and

witnesses, a district court may transfer any civil action to any

other district or division where it might have been brought if it

is in the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). However,

defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant

upsetting plaintiff's choice of forum. Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). 

III. Analysis

A. Venue is Improper in this District

Venue is clearly improper in this district. Section 1391(a)

sets forth three bases for venue in diversity actions. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1391(a). First, plaintiffs contend that venue in this district

is proper under the first basis, i.e., “a judicial district where

any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.”

42 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1). It is undisputed that both defendants

share the common residence of Idaho. Plaintiffs further argue that

defendant P&V also resides in California, because a corporation

resides in any district where it is subject to personal

jurisdiction, and defendant P&V has sufficient minimum contacts

with California. Plaintiffs then read Section 1391(a)(1) as

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allowing suit to be brought in any district in which one of the

defendants reside (e.g., California), so long as all defendants

live in the same state (e.g., Idaho). 

Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant P&V had sufficient

minimum contacts with California, venue would be improper in any

district in this state. Plaintiffs have read the venue statute too

literally. It is true that nothing in the Section 1391(a)(1)

states that the district in which any defendant resides must be the

same state in which all defendants reside. But “[t]he whole point

of § 1391(a)(1) would, in fact, be utterly thwarted if it could be

transformed from a statute providing that defendants could be sued

in judicial districts reasonably near their homes to a statute

permitting a clever plaintiff's counsel to drag defendants clear

across the country when they have the misfortune to have a

corporation as a codefendant.” Jonathan Siegel, What Statutory

Drafting Errors Can Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 309, 318 (2001). See also Ariz. State Bd. for

Charter Sch. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir.

2006) (cautioning against statutory interpretations that would

produce absurd results).

Other courts also have rejected the interpretation of the

venue statute that plaintiffs now propose. See Dashman v. Peter

Letterese & Assocs., 999 F. Supp. 553, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)

(“Section 1391(a)(1) cannot be read, however, to mean that as long

as all defendants reside in the same state, venue is proper in a

district in some other state where any corporate defendant happens

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to be subject to personal jurisdiction. The language of §

1391(a)(1) contemplates venue in a judicial district within the

state in which all defendants reside.”). 

Second, the accident that gave rise to the present cause of

action occurred in Idaho, and the District of Idaho is therefore

the “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” under Section

1391(a)(2). Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, the fact that

plaintiffs were treated in California does not make venue in this

district proper. See Wisland v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 119 F.3d

733, 736 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that medical treatment

creates venue under Section 1391(a)(2) and holding that "the events

giving rise to [plaintiff's] action involve the alleged negligence

of the defendants in South Dakota, not the nature of [plaintiff's]

medical treatment in Wisconsin"); Smith v. Fortenberry, 903 F.

Supp. 1018, 1020 (E.D. La. 1995). 

Third, if there was not a district in which the action could

otherwise be brought, any district where a defendant is subject to

personal jurisdiction would be proper under Section 1391(a)(3).

However, because the action clearly could be brought in the

District of Idaho, because the defendants reside there (satisfying

Section 1391(a)(1)), and the events giving rise to the cause of

action occurred in Idaho (satisfying Section 1391(a)(2)), this

subsection does not apply. Accordingly, venue is improper in this

district.

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B. Venue is Proper in the District of Idaho

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), when an action is filed in the

wrong district, the district court may dismiss the action, or, in

the interests of justice, may use its discretion to transfer a

civil action to any other district where it might have been

properly brought. Because dismissal of an action that could be

brought elsewhere is “time consuming and justice-defeating,” the

normal course is to transfer in the interest of justice rather than

to dismiss. Miller v. Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1990).

Because all defendants reside in the state of Idaho, and

because Idaho is where the events giving rise to the claim

occurred, the court finds that the Eastern District of California

is an improper venue and that the U.S. District of Idaho is the

proper one. 

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue is DENIED.

Defendants’ motion to transfer to the U.S. District Court for the

District of Idaho is GRANTED.

This action is hereby transferred to the U.S. District Court

for the District of Idaho.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 15, 2007.

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