Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02117/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02117-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 07cv2117

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS CORONA,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 07cv2117-BTM (NLS)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING IN PART AND

DECLINING TO ADOPT IN PART THE

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE; 

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND

(3) ISSUING A CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

V. M. ALMAGER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner was

convicted of attempted murder while personally using a handgun and acting for the benefit of

a street gang, and was sentenced to 42 years-to-life in state prison. He claims the prosecutor

acted with a racially discriminatory purpose when exercising peremptory challenges to remove

the only two African-American prospective jurors from his jury venire (Claim One), and that he

was denied the right to secure the presence of a defense witness (Claim Two). (Pet. at 6-9.)

Respondent has filed an Answer to the Petition, contending that habeas relief is unavailable

because the adjudication of Petitioner’s claims by the state courts was objectively reasonable,

and has lodged portions of the state court record. (Doc. Nos. 8, 10.)

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Presently before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) submitted by

United States Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes. (Doc. No. 11.) The Magistrate Judge

recommends granting habeas relief as to Claim One and denying relief as to Claim Two.

Respondent has filed Objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 16.) 

The Court has reviewed the R&R and the Objections thereto pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1), which provides that: “A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS IN FULL the Magistrate Judge’s findings

and conclusions with respect to Claim Two, and DENIES habeas relief as to that claim for the

reasons set forth in the R&R. The Court ADOPTS IN PART and DECLINES TO ADOPT

IN PART the Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions with respect to Claim One, and

DENIES habeas relief as to that claim for the reasons set forth below.

I. Claim One

Petitioner contends in Claim One that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated because the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove the only two

African-American jurors in his jury venire. (Pet. at 6-6a.) Specifically, he contends that all three

steps of the three-part test set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) were satisfied

because the two jurors, Edmund O. and George O., were members of a cognizable racial group,

the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove them, and the totality of the circumstances

raises an inference that the strikes were motivated by race. (Pet. at 6a.) Respondent contends

that the state appellate court’s determination that there was “substantial evidence to support the

trial court’s finding of no discriminatory purpose” is objectively reasonable, and habeas relief

is unavailable because the adjudication of Petitioner’s claim was consistent with clearly

established federal law. (Answer at 5-7.)

The Magistrate Judge found that the determination by the appellate court that the

prosecutor provided race-neutral reasons for striking the two jurors was based on an

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1

 Referring to People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 (1978), which predated Batson, where the

California Supreme Court held that “the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on

the sole ground of group bias violates” the California Constitution. Id. at 276. Because Petitioner

cannot establish a basis for habeas relief in this Court based on violations of state law or the state

constitution, the Court will analyze his claim under Batson. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991)

(“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the

Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.”) 

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unreasonable determination of the facts. (R&R at 14-19.) The Magistrate Judge also found that

the appellate court’s denial of the claim involved an unreasonable application of United States

Supreme Court law. (R&R at 19-22.) Respondent objects to these findings, contending that the

proper level of deference was not given to the findings of the state courts. (Obj. at 4-10.)

The Supreme Court, in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), which was decided

on the day the Batson/Wheeler1

 motion was initially heard at Petitioner’s trial, stated that the

Batson inquiry consists of three steps which “should by now be familiar”:

First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality

of the relevant facts give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Second,

once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State

to explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral

justifications for the strikes. Third, if a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the

trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved

purposeful racial discrimination.

Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 (internal citations, quotation marks and footnote omitted). 

In Johnson the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to strike all three of the

African-American jurors from the jury panel, and the trial judge did not seek an explanation

from the prosecutor. Id. at 164-65. Rather, the trial judge in Johnson “explained that her own

examination of the record had convinced her that the prosecutor’s strikes could be justified by

race-neutral reasons.” Id. at 165. Petitioner’s case here is similar. The defense objected to the

fact that the only two African-American jurors on the panel were removed by the prosecutor,

stating that: “I don’t see anything they could have found objectionable.” (Lodgment No. 2,

Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 53-54.) The trial judge, just before the evening recess, found that the

defense had not satisfied the first Batson step, and stated:

I’m not going to require [the prosecutor] to make a showing. I believe there was

sufficient indiction from both witnesses that gave rise to a peremptory challenge,

specifically with [George O.]. I had a substantial difficulty understanding him.

I think that probably translated into a difficulty, at least not a sophistication, in

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understanding English to the extent we are going to need it in this case based upon

what I believe to be the potential evidence. . . . With regard to [Edmund O.],

made several responses to family members that had criminal history, family

members from law enforcement. Also, there were some issues with regard to

those facing charges and having been victims of charges. I think there was

sufficient indication that a peremptory challenge was appropriate. The motion is

denied.

(RT 54.)

The defense requested a reconsideration of the Batson motion at the beginning of the

court proceedings the next morning on the basis that Johnson had been decided the previous day.

(RT 55.) The Court in Johnson invalidated California’s requirement that in order to make out

a prima facie case of discriminatory intent the defendant “must show that it is more likely than

not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group

bias.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168. The Court stated the proper standard as: “a defendant satisfies

the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge

to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Id. at 170.

The trial judge in Petitioner’s case indicated that he believed that he had always applied

the correct Johnson standard because he had always required the prosecutor to give reasons for

peremptory challenges whenever there was an inference of a discriminatory purpose. (RT 56.)

The trial judge stated that he still believed that “there hadn’t even been an inference of a

discriminatory purpose” in Petitioner’s case, and “[t]here were valid reasons that appeared to be

obvious to me on the record to support the challenges” irrespective of race, but in “an abundance

of caution” allowed the defense to renew the Batson motion. (RT 56-57.) The defense replied

that:

Your honor, first of all, when the court says the manner in which the

question posed to them was answered, I didn’t see anything. They were both

polite, well dressed, well groomed, appearing to be middle-class AfricanAmerican males. [¶] Edmund O. did indicate that he had in his family people that

were actually victims of gang violence. He also indicated that he had people in

his family that were connected to law enforcement. [¶] I personally didn’t see

any race-neutral explanation from what we knew about these two people, which

wasn’t very much, admittedly. [¶] I don’t think there was – and they were the

only two African-American people on the entire panel. So I think with that, there

is an inference that it was race-based. 

(RT 57.) 

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The trial judge then stated that: “I’ll reiterate what I said yesterday,” and continued as

follows:

The impression I got [from Edmund O.] certainly was that he was born in this

country and raised in this country. [¶] The impression I got from [George O.] was

– just based upon what I perceived to be a very thick accent, I, at times, had some

difficulty understanding him. He probably immigrated to this country and – is of

African descent and immigrated to this country. Not the fact that he’s Black or

immigrated, but the difficulty I had in understanding him, notwithstanding the

responses, would, in my mind, probably make him not the appropriate juror for

this particular case given the facts of this case. [¶] There are a series of, from

what I recall, some relatively complex issues that the jury is going to have to

resolve in the matter with regard to the sales of the cars and people coming over

and what they were doing. I thought there was a basis for it. . . . I’m going to have

the prosecutor go ahead and indicate his thoughts so that we make sure that we

cover what Johnson seems to require.

(RT 58.)

The prosecutor then stated:

With respect to [George O.], I echo the court’s thinking on it. That’s what

I had noted. [¶] Also, in my mind, I had thought – because of the responses that

he gave and the way that he gave them, I had trouble understanding him. I felt

that English was not his first language, at least it appeared to me to be the case

from when he answered questions in court. 

Because of the nature of this case, there’s going to be a lot of – I think the

court is right on that. There’s going to be a lot of terminology. This case is going

to be a lot based on street slang terms regarding the Mexican Mafia that I think it’s

going to be difficult for someone who English is not their first language to maybe

get up to speed on that and maybe comprehend that as much as a person who does

not have a language difficulty. That was the primary reason I kicked him. [¶]

The other reason was that I just didn’t get a feeling from him. I didn’t hear a lot

from him as far as someone who stood out to me as someone who would be a

good juror for me. [¶] The other people – and I think there are cases – I don’t

have them off the top of my head, but there are cases that state that it’s a proper

reason. I had people behind him that were – that I wanted to get on to the jury

more, people that I felt would be better jurors. I think that’s a proper reason in

and of itself, although not the primary reason, as I stated before. The primary

reason was the language barrier.

* * *

The big thing I noted with [Edmund O.] was that while he did have

relatives in law, he had three cousins, I think, that were murdered. And then when

we explored that more in depth with him, he actually said he had family members

that were Crips. [¶] To me, just the nature of this case and the fact that he’s had

such close ties with the issues that are going to surround this case, being that he

had family members who were murdered and that he had family members who

were Crips – and my understanding from it, the inference that I drew was that the

murders and the family members who were Crips were somehow related. That

may have been an inference that I drew, but it was one that I drew. There was a

relation. These weren’t completely separate incidents.

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And so based on those things, I felt – he also stated – I noted that he said

that the cops knew who did it. And he obviously didn’t – I don’t think he

expressed animosity towards the police. I didn’t get that feeling. But I just

thought that added into sort of the whole picture as someone who was just not

right for this case. [¶] In addition, I would note the order of these two men. And

I think that is another factor to consider. They were seated right next to each other

in line. It’s true that they were the only two African-American men on the panel.

But had one been No. 1 and the other been No. 50, I think it was basically because

they were next to each other that then obviously they are in a position where they

are going to get – they are ripe for going to be kicked. Had one been No. 50, I

don’t think we would have ever gotten to that issue.

(RT 58-61.)

Defense counsel and the trial judge then had the following exchange:

Defense: Your Honor, first of all, [George O.], I personally had no problem understanding

[George O]. It may be because I have an accent as well.

The Court: No.

Defense: And certainly someone having an accent, I don’t think that’s a legitimate reason

for exercising a peremptory. [¶] There were absolutely no questions asked by

anyone as to whether he had sufficient command of the English language. So we

really don’t know about that. We are drawing conclusions. The prosecution and

the court is [sic] drawing conclusions from his accent. [¶] I would point out that

an accent does not necessarily indicate that the person doesn’t have a command

of the language or doesn’t understand. [¶] In regards to –

The Court: Let’s say, for example, that you are right and [the prosecutor] is mistaken in that

assumption; that it’s an incorrect assumption. I don’t believe that it was in this

particular case. But for the sake of argument, let’s say that it was an incorrect

assumption. [¶] Does that mean that because he exercises the challenge based

upon a good faith belief that that’s what would take place, that he should be

penalized for it with the loss of the panel that was picked? I don’t think that, in

and of itself, smacks of a discriminatory reason in the rejection.

Defense: Your Honor, it would appear to me if he had been concerned about that, he would

have asked some questions about that.

The Court: Okay.

Defense: In regards to [Edmund O.], again, there was certainly no animosity towards law

enforcement that was expressed. The fact that he had both family members who

were murdered and family members that were gang members, I think that cancels

each other out. [¶] The man was, I believe, a school custodian for a long period

of time. I believe his brother-in-law is in law enforcement. His friend’s daughter

is a police officer. He’s holding a city job. I don’t think that’s the type of person

that would be hostile to the prosecution’s arguments. [¶] Again, not enough

questions were asked of him; what his feelings are, whether or not he could given

an impartial consideration of the evidence relating to gangs in this case. So I still

submit that the challenges were made improperly, in violation of Batson. [¶] The

fact that they were sitting next to each other, they were drawn at random. I don’t

see how that adds anything to the prosecution’s argument.

The Court: Thank you. [¶] The motion is denied. (RT 61-62.)

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2

 The appellate and trial courts recognized, as does this Court, that although Petitioner, who is

Hispanic, was not the same race as the two African-American jurors, that distinction does not prevent

him from presenting a Batson challenge. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). Rather, it is one

factor to be considered both in determining whether a prima facie case has been made and whether the

prosecutor ultimately engaged in wrongful discrimination. Id. at 416.

-7- 07cv2117

Thus, the trial court found that the defense had not satisfied the first step of the Batson

inquiry because counsel had not shown a prima facie case of discrimination, but allowed the

prosecutor to state his reasons on the record out of an abundance of caution. The appellate court,

following a lengthy discussion, agreed that no prima facie case had been shown, concluding that:

Based on the trial court’s assessment that race-neutral reasons for the

exclusion were obvious, combined with the lack of racial ties between the excused

jurors, the defendant, and the victim, there is substantial evidence to support the

trial court’s finding that Corona did not make a prima facie showing of

discriminatory purpose.2

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Corona, No. D047501, slip op. at 15 (Cal.Ct.App. Oct. 26, 2006).)

The appellate court alternately found, after a lengthy discussion, that, assuming a prima

facie case had been presented:

We conclude the trial court made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate

whether the peremptory challenges were exercised for race-neutral reasons, and

there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of no

discriminatory purpose.

(Id. at 18.)

The Magistrate Judge correctly found, citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359

(1991), that the first step of the Batson inquiry was rendered moot when the prosecutor provided

race-neutral reasons for exercising his strikes and the trial judge ruled on the ultimate issue of

intentional discrimination. (R&R at 13.) The Court adopts this finding and will move on to the

second Batson step.

The second Batson step requires that “once the defendant has made out a prima facie case,

‘the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible

race-neutral justifications for the strikes.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168, quoting Batson, 476 U.S.

at 94. The Magistrate Judge found that the second Batson step had been satisfied because the

prosecutor gave facially race-neutral reasons for exercising both peremptory strikes. (R&R at

14.) For the following reasons, the Court adopts these findings.

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Petitioner here was found guilty of attempted murder for the benefit of a street gang.

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Corona, No. D047501, slip op. at 1.) Evidence was presented that

Petitioner was a gang member who shot another gang member five times at close range at the

behest of the Mexican Mafia gang leadership in connection to a drug debt. (Id. at 2-4.) The

Magistrate Judge correctly found that the reasons for striking Edmund O. were facially raceneutral. As set forth above, the prosecutor indicated that Edmund O. had informed the court that

he had three cousins who had been murdered, and had family members who belonged to the

Crips street gang. In addition, Edmund O. said he had been told by the police that they knew

who had murdered his family members but did not have sufficient evidence to bring charges, and

the prosecutor drew an inference that the murders were somehow related to the family’s gang

membership. The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the prosecutor offered

facially race-neutral reasons for challenging Edmund O., satisfying the second Batson step.

The prosecutor indicated that the “primary” reason he struck George O. was due to a

perceived difficulty in understanding English coupled with the fact that the case involved street

slang and gang terminology. (RT 58-59.) The prosecutor also indicated that: “I didn’t hear a

lot from him as far as someone who stood out to me as someone who would be a good juror for

me,” and indicated there were other jurors on the panel behind George O. he preferred. (RT 59.)

As set forth in the R&R, case law supports a finding that difficulty with language has been held

to be a valid race-neutral reason to exercise a peremptory strike. (R&R at 14.) The Court adopts

the finding of the Magistrate Judge that the prosecutor offered facially race-neutral reasons for

challenging Edmund O., and that the second Batson step was satisfied.

The third Batson step provides that “‘[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial

court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial

discrimination.’” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168, quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995).

“[A] federal habeas court can only grant [the] petition if it was unreasonable to credit the

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson challenge.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333,

338 (2006). “[A] state court’s finding of the absence of discriminatory intent is ‘a pure issue of

fact’ accorded significant deference,” which “is necessary because a reviewing court, which

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analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make

credibility determinations.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). “[A] decision

adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented

in the state-court proceeding.” Id. at 340.

The Magistrate Judge found that the state court’s determination that the prosecutor did

not act out of a discriminatory purpose was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,

and separately concluded that the appellate court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s Batson claim

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. (R&R at 14-22.)

Because Respondent has objected to these findings and conclusions, the Court will conduct a de

novo review of these portions of the R&R. For the following reasons, the Court declines to

adopt the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge with respect to the third Batson step,

and finds that habeas relief is not available as to Claim One. 

a) Unreasonable determination of the facts

The Magistrate Judge found that the appellate court’s conclusion that the prosecutor and

trial judge drew legitimate inferences from George O.’s accent that he lacked proficiency in the

English language was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (R&R at 15.) The

Magistrate Judge noted that a thick accent does not automatically translate into lack of language

proficiency, and that the record here supports the opposite conclusion, that George O. was

proficient in English. (Id.) This finding was based on his grammatically correct responses on

voir dire, the lack of pauses in the proceedings or requests by the court reporter to repeat

answers, the fact that he was employed in the manufacturing field which established that he

could speak and understand English sufficiently to hold a job, and “most importantly” because

no one inquired into his English proficiency. (Id. at 15-16.) Thus, the Magistrate Judge found

there were no objective, factual grounds in the record to support the finding that the strike

appropriately rested on an inability to speak or understand English. (Id.) 

Respondent objects to these findings, contending that both the trial judge and the

prosecutor had difficulty understanding George O., and therefore the problem was self-evident,

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not requiring additional inquiry. (Obj. at 5.) Relying on Hernandez v. New York, Respondent

contends that this Court should not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the trial and

appellate courts where, as here, there was nothing inherently discriminatory about the stated

reasons. (Id., citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (stating, with respect to step two of the Batson

inquiry, that “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the

reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.”).) The passage cited to by Respondent from

Hernandez does not apply with respect to the third Batson step, where “a court must undertake

‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.’”

Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,

429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977). With respect to the third step, the Court may consider any “relevant

circumstances” which bear on the issue of whether the prosecutor used the peremptory

challenges with a racially discriminatory intent. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.

The entirety of the statements George O. made in court were his brief oral answers to the

written voir dire questions, which had been orally answered by 24 jurors before him:

Prospective Juror [George O]:

Manufacturing.

Single.

No children.

No prior jury duty

No friends in law enforcement and legal profession

I think I can be fair.

(Lodgment No. 3, Augmented RT. at 44.)

The experienced trial judge here indicated that, based on what he perceived to be a thick

accent, he had difficulty understanding George O. (RT 58.) The judge explained that “the

difficulty I had in understanding him, notwithstanding the responses, would, in my mind,

probably make him not the appropriate juror” in a case with “relatively complex issues that the

jury is going to have to resolve . . .” (Id.) (emphasis added). Thus, the record indicates the trial

judge took into consideration George O.’s “grammatically correct” responses to the voir dire

questions when drawing the inference. Likewise, the prosecutor drew his inference that George

O. would have difficulty understanding from the content and manner in which the responses

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were given, stating that: “because of the responses he gave and the way that he gave them, I had

trouble understanding him.” (RT 58-59.) The prosecutor, arguably not in a position to judge

the juror’s grammar, stated that: “This case is going to be a lot based on street slang terms

regarding the Mexican Mafia that I think it’s going to be difficult for someone who English is

not their first language to maybe get up to speed on that and maybe comprehend that as much

as a person who does not have a language difficulty.” (RT 59.)

The appellate court stated:

We defer to the trial court’s assessment that George O.’s strong accent was readily

apparent and made him difficult to understand; thus, the prosecutor could draw

inferences from this fact without further questioning. The prosecutor is not

required to present reasons that rise to the level of a challenge for cause, and could

reasonably decide to peremptorily challenge a juror whose English was difficult

to understand without further inquiry about his English language ability.

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Corona, No. D047501, slip op. at 16-17.)

The cold record here cannot adequately convey the circumstances which were present in

the courtroom which gave rise to the trial judge’s finding that the prosecutor’s motive in

challenging George O. was genuinely race-neutral, as this Court “is not as well positioned as the

trial court is to make” that determination. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339. If this Court were sitting

as an appellate court, it might find that the prosecutor should have been required to determine

the extent of George O.’s language ability. See United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 840 (9th

Cir. 1993) (“So long as the prosecutor (or the defendant, for that matter) can convince the district

court that the potential juror who is being struck in fact has difficulty with English, the

justification is race-neutral.”). However, as the Court in Hernandez noted:

Deference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes

particular sense in this context because, as we noted in Batson, the finding

“largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.” 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21. In the

typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether

counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.

There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence

often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with

the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on

demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985), citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S.

1025, 1038 (1984).

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (emphasis added).

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The present case is one where the genuineness of the prosecutor’s motive with respect

to George O. “lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province,” and the “best evidence [is] the

demeanor of the [prosecutor].” Id. The failure to inquire into George O.’s command of the

English language, which may have justified the prosecutor’s inference, refuted it or left the issue

unresolved, is simply one factor to consider in determining whether the prosecutor’s motive in

exercising the peremptory challenge was motivated by race. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 (noting

that while Batson step two looks to the reasonableness of the asserted nonracial motive, step

three turns on the genuineness of the motive). As set forth above, defense counsel argued at the

Batson motion that there had not been an adequate inquiry into George O.’s proficiency in

English, and that if it was a legitimate concern he would have expected the prosecutor to conduct

a further inquiry. (RT 61-62.) The trial judge disagreed that the prosecutor had made an

incorrect assumption regarding George O.’s English proficiency, but took that possibility into

consideration when making his finding that the prosecutor had a genuinely non-racial motive.

(RT 61-62.) The lack of further inquiry was also identified as a valid factor for consideration

in the third Batson step by the appellate court. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Corona, No.

D047501, slip op. at 16-17.)

Thus, the trial and appellate courts considered the lack of further inquiry into George O.’s

English proficiency before ruling on the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent. The fact that

the prosecutor did not inquire further into George O.’s proficiency in English, but based his

inference on George O.’s thick accent, which even the trial judge found difficult to understand,

does not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the state courts’ findings regarding the genuineness

of the prosecutor’s motives. Although it is one factor to be considered, it is not strong enough,

either standing alone or in conjunction with the other factors this Court must consider, which

includes the fact that Petitioner was not the same race as the challenged jurors, to support a

conclusion that it “was unreasonable to credit the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the

Batson challenge.” Rice, 546 U.S. at 338. Even assuming the Magistrate Judge is correct that

the cold transcript of George O.’s brief voir dire establishes a proficiency in English, or that the

prosecutor drew an incorrect assumption in that regard, it is the trial judge’s credibility

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determination, to which the appellate court deferred based on the trial judge’s “sincere and

reasoned effort to evaluate whether the peremptory challenges were exercised for race-neutral

reasons,” (id. at 18), which is entitled to deference, and to which this Court “is not as well

positioned as the trial court is to make.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339. The fact that reasonable

jurists can disagree on this issue is further support for a finding that the state appellate court did

not base its decision on an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts.

Although the lack of further inquiry into George O.’s English proficiency was the “most

important” factor considered by the Magistrate Judge in demonstrating that the appellate court

based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts, the R&R also found a lack of

support for the prosecutor’s stated reason that George O. would have trouble understanding gang

terminology and street slang since the prosecutor indicated that all the jurors were going to be

presented with expert testimony in order to understand the complex issues in the case related to

street slang. (R&R at 16.) Respondent objects to this finding, contending it fails to

acknowledge a difference between explaining confusing terminology and truly understanding

the subtleties involved in a language, a distinction which sometimes requires a translator to be

in court even when a witness has a working understanding of the relevant language. (Obj. at 5-

6.)

The introduction of expert witness testimony, particularly with respect to gang culture,

has been acknowledged as important to assist juries for reasons independent from considerations

of language ability. Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009), citing People v.

Olguin, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1355, 1371 (1994) (“The requirements for expert testimony are that it

relate to a subject sufficiently beyond common experience as to assist the trier of fact . . .”). The

necessity to present expert testimony regarding gang culture and slang was due to an expected

lack of sophistication of the jurors with gang culture, something common to all jurors. That

concern was compounded by George O.’s perceived lack of sophistication with the English

language which would make it more difficult for him to understand that information. This factor

does not support a finding of pretext, and the Court declines to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s

finding in this regard.

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The Magistrate Judge also found pretext arising from the other reason the prosecutor gave

for striking George O., namely, that: “that I just didn’t get a feeling from him. I didn’t hear a

lot from him as far as someone who stood out to me as someone who would be a good juror for

me.” (RT 59.) The Magistrate Judge found that this reason was “both without tangible support

in the record and unbelievable,” because there were no additional questions asked of George O.

regarding his beliefs and experiences. (R&R at 16.) It is true that there were no follow-up

questions asked of George O. following his initial responses that he worked in manufacturing,

was single without children, had no prior jury experience and no friends in law enforcement, and

thought he could be fair. (Lodgment No. 3, Augmented RT at 44.) However, the lack of followup questions to George O. does not support a finding of racially discriminatory motive for the

reasons discussed above. In addition, the prosecutor was entitled to rely on his “feeling”

regarding George O.’s ability to serve as a juror based on the answers given to the written voir

dire questions. Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that

prosecutor’s evaluation of a juror’s demeanor, tone, and facial expression may lead to a “hunch”

or “suspicion” that the juror might be biased, and that a peremptory challenge based on this

reason would be legitimate.), citing, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994)

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] trial lawyer’s judgments about a juror’s sympathies are

sometimes based on experienced hunches and educated guesses, derived from a juror’s responses

at voir dire or a juror’s ‘bare looks and gestures.’”); United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1555

(9th Cir. 1996) (“Peremptory challenges are based upon professional judgment and educated

hunches rather than research.”). The fact that the prosecutor expressed a feeling that George O.

would not be a good juror for him based on what he heard on voir dire without inquiring further

does not, alone or in conjunction with the other factors, support a finding of pretext, and the

Court declines to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions in this regard.

Respondent also objects to the finding and conclusions in the R&R that Ninth Circuit

authority, namely Green v. Lamarque, 532 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008), Kesser v. Cambra, 465

F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006) and McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2000), support a

finding that the prosecutor’s proffered reasons were pretextual. (Obj. at 6.) These cases are

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distinguishable from Petitioner’s case because they either involve instances where the prosecutor

offered reasons which did not exist, see Kesser, 465 F.3d at 363-65; McClain, 217 F.2d at 1221-

22, involved overtly race-based reasons, see Kesser, 465 F.3d at 362, involved internally

inconsistent reasons, id. at 367, or involved situations where comparative analysis demonstrated

obvious pretext, see Green, 532 F.3d at 1031-33; Kesser, 465 F.3d at 362-71; McClain, 217 F.3d

at 1221-23. Here, the fact that George O. was difficult for the trial judge and the prosecutor to

understand due to his thick accent is established by the record, and as set forth above is facially

race-neutral. The inference drawn from that fact that George O. had a thick accent, namely, that

English was probably not George O.’s first language and he might have difficulty understanding

and making himself understood, is not in any manner overtly racist. The Magistrate Judge’s

finding that these cases support habeas relief was based on the earlier finding, which the Court

has declined to adopt, that the failure to inquire into George O.’s proficiency in English

demonstrated that the prosecutor’s stated reason that he would have difficulty understanding

English sufficiently to serve as a juror was a pretext. However, for the reasons discussed above,

the Court finds that evidence to be insufficient to satisfy Batson’s third step. The Court declines

to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the state appellate court’s adjudication of Claim One

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

B) Unreasonable application of clearly established federal law

The Magistrate Judge found that the appellate court’s adjudication of Claim One involved

an unreasonable application of Batson and its progeny. (R&R at 19-22.) Respondent has

objected to this finding, and the Court will conduct a de novo review of this portion of the R&R.

The Magistrate Judge found that the order in which the trial judge took the Batson steps

was contrary to Batson and its progeny, and the appellate court’s failure to recognize the trial

court’s mistake in that regard amounted to an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. (R&R at 19.) The Magistrate Judge found the trial judge erred when he sua sponte

stated that George O.’s accent, and the inference of a lack of English proficiency drawn from

it, was a sufficient reason for the prosecutor’s strike before ruling on whether a prima facie case

had been made or before asking the prosecutor to provide a reason. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge

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also found that the appellate court impermissibly substituted the reasons given by the trial judge

for the reasons given by the prosecutor. (Id.) As set forth above, the trial judge, in response to

the defense Batson motion, indicated that the defense had not made a prima facie showing of

discrimination because there were obvious race-neutral reasons in the record as to why the two

jurors were struck. (RT 54.) The judge, therefore, did not require the prosecutor to state his

reasons for exercising the peremptory strikes. (Id.) Upon reconsideration of the motion the day

after Johnson was decided, the trial judge reiterated his finding regarding lack of a prima facie

case. (RT 57-58.) Out of an abundance of caution, however, the trial judge proceeded as if a

prima facie case had been stated and invited the prosecutor to state his reasons for the challenges

on the record, and then denied the motion after hearing from the defense. (RT 58-62.) It

therefore appears that the Batson steps were taken in the proper order. 

Even if the steps were taken out of order, it is clearly established that the order of taking

the Batson steps is not rigid. Rather, the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor who gives

reasons without being asked to do so by the trial judge merely renders step one moot.

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 (“This departure from the normal course of proceeding need not

concern us.”) There is no clearly established federal law which prevents the trial judge, when

stating the reasons why no prima facie case has been shown, from articulating reasons why a

peremptory challenge may have been motivated by reasons other than race. The Ninth Circuit’s

opinion in Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2004), cited in the R&R as holding that the

procedure used by the trial judge in this case is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

law (R&R at 19), does not support a finding that clearly established federal law was transgressed

in this respect. The court in Paulino refused to defer to the appellate court’s finding that there

was no prima facie showing of bias, and conducted a de novo review of the issue, because the

state appellate court had applied the standard rejected in Johnson. Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1090.

The court found that the defendant, who was Black, had in fact made out a prima facie case of

discrimination based on statistical disparities where five of the prosecutor’s six peremptory

challenges were used to remove five of the six Black jurors on the panel, and held that the trial

court erred in relying on its own speculation as to what might have been the prosecutor’s reasons

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and never requiring the prosecutor to explain her actual motivations for the challenges. Id. at

1090-92. The Paulino court remanded the case to the district court for a hearing in order to

permit the state “an opportunity to present evidence as to the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons

for the apparently-biased pattern of peremptories, and determine whether the prosecutor violated

Batson.” Id. at 1092. Thus, the Paulino court never actually found a Batson violation, and that

case supports the proposition that the strict order of the Batson steps are sublimated to the

ultimate determination of whether the prosecutor acted with racially discriminatory intent. The

Magistrate Judge’s finding in this regard was understandably based on the previous finding,

which the Court has declined to adopt, that the prosecutor acted with a racially-discriminatory

motive when challenging George O. The Court also declines to adopt this finding. 

The Magistrate Judge found that the failure of the state courts to adequately investigate

the unsupported reason for George O.’s strike, as required by Batson’s third step, combined with

the questionable strike of Edmund O., the only other African-American on the panel, was an

unreasonable application of Batson. (R&R at 19-20.) In addition, the Magistrate Judge found

that when the strikes of George O. and Edmund O. are considered together, the reasons appear

even more pretextual, and the appellate court erred in failing to consider the two jurors together.

(Id. at 20-21.) Respondent objects to these findings, contending that an independent analysis of

the two jurors was proper because the state court clearly found that the strikes were not racially

motivated and had no occasion to discuss them in conjunction, other than its general obligation

under Batson to consider all the relevant circumstances. (Obj. at 9.) 

The appellate court noted the correct legal standard for analyzing Batson claims, and

discussed both jurors when determining whether there was racial discrimination. (Lodgment No.

7, People v. Corona, No. D047501, slip op. at 9-17.) The appellate court was aware that the only

two African-American jurors on the panel were struck, noting that it was what prompted defense

counsel to bring the Batson motion. (Id. at 6.) The appellate court’s finding that neither juror

was dismissed for racially motivated reasons was objectively reasonable and supported by the

record, and the race-neutral reasons provided for the challenge to each juror were specifically

tailored to the individual jurors and were entirely dissimilar. There being no connection between

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the two challenges, other than the race of the jurors which was taken into consideration, the

appellate court was not obligated to discuss the effect of one challenge on the other. The

Magistrate Judge’s finding in this regard was based on the previous finding, which the Court has

declined to adopt, that the prosecutor acted with a racially-discriminatory motive when

challenging George O., and the Court also declines to adopt this finding. 

The Magistrate Judge next found that the comparative analysis conducted by the appellate

court between Edmund O. and Juror No. 11 was flawed because there was no evidence to

support the prosecutor’s inference of a relationship between Edmund O.’s murdered cousins and

their gang membership. (R&R at 21.) Respondent objects to this finding on the basis that it

substitutes the judgment of this Court on this issue for that of the state court. (Obj. at 9.)

The appellate court stated:

Juror No. 11 and Edmund O. were not similarly situated so as to show that

the prosecutor excused Edmund O. because of his race. Edmund O., unlike Juror

No. 11, had experienced the murders of three cousins, and law enforcement had

failed to prosecute those responsible for the murders. Even though Edmund O.

stated this experience would not bias him, the prosecutor was entitled to reject this

statement and decide not to risk keeping a juror who might have some resentment

towards law enforcement. Given Edmund O.’s family history involving gangs and

murders, the trial court could reasonably credit the prosecutor’s overall assessment

that Edmund O. was not a desirable juror for the prosecution because he had

experiences too closely associated with the circumstances of the current case. The

fact that Juror No. 11 also had family ties to gangs does not override the trial

court’s conclusion the prosecutor was not setting forth sham reasons regarding

Edmund O.

(Lodgment No. 7, People v. Corona, No. D047501, slip op. at 18.)

In response to defense counsel’s question to the jurors as to whether their experience with

gang activity would make it more likely for them to convict, Juror No. 11 stated:

Juror No. 11: I just have uncles and cousins who are involved or who were gang

members. But nothing really like – they had been incarcerated.

Defense Counsel: Were any of them involved in any National City Gangs?

Juror No. 11: Yes. One cousin.

Defense Counsel: Does your experience with your cousins, does that – do you think that that

will affect your decision as to whether or not it was Mr. Corona that

committed this offense?

Juror No. 11: I believe not.

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Defense Counsel: You are pretty sure about that?

Juror No. 11: Yes.

(Lodgment No. 3, Augmented RT at 87.)

Edmund O. responded to that question as follows:

Edmund O.: My mother had some property and had gang activity. They sent her a note

from the city. Basically, she was compelled to sell the property because

she couldn’t control what was happening on her property. It was because

of gangs.

Defense Counsel: Did she have to sell at a loss?

Edmund O.: She got market value, but gang activity depressed the market value.

Defense Counsel: Anything else?

Edmund O.: I have two cousins who were in the Crips.

Defense Counsel: The fact that – if you hear that Mr. Corona is a gang member, would that

automatically cause you to convict?

Edmund O.: No.

Defense Counsel: Would that by itself lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving that it was

Mr. Corona who committed this act?

Edmund O.: No.

(Id. at 85.)

The trial judge asked all the jurors whether they had friends or relatives who had been

victims of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, or any crime involving the use of a firearm.

(Id. at 63.) Juror No. 11 did not report any such incidents. However, with respect to Edmund

O., the following exchange took place:

The Court: When did the incident take place, sir?

Edmund O.: About 10 years ago.

The Court: Was it reported to an investigating agency?

Edmund O.: Yes.

The Court: Was a case filed on the matter?

Edmund O.: Not enough evidence. But I had three cousins murdered.

The Court: At the same time?

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3

 The Magistrate Judge found that there was no support in the record for the prosecutor’s

inference that there was a connection between the murders in Edmund O.’s family and his family

members who were involved in gangs. (R&R at 21.) Although the cold voir dire transcript appears to

bear this out (all relevant remarks made by Edmund O. during voir dire are set forth above), it appears

that defense counsel drew the same inference, as she stated during the Batson motion that: “[Edmund

O.] did indicate that he had in his family people that were actually victims of gang violence.” (RT 57.)

The Court does not need to determine whether this was a reasonable inference because the appellate

court did not consider it when addressing this aspect of Petitioner’s claim. (See Lodgment No. 7, People

v. Corona, No. D047501, slip op. at 19.) However, this is an excellent example of why the Supreme

Court has cautioned against relying too heavily on voir dire transcripts in the Batson context.

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364.

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Edmund O.: No. Different. One of them was – had a cousin and daughter killed and another

cousin.

The Court: You said there wasn’t enough evidence. They didn’t know who did it?

Edmund O.: The detectives met with us and told us who did it, but they said they couldn’t

bring it forth.

The Court: Where did this take place?

Edmund O.: San Diego.

The Court: How do you feel about that decision that law enforcement made in the case that

they couldn’t go forward? Besides being disappointed, did you see their point or

did you think there was plenty of evidence to go forward?

Edmund O.: No, they didn’t have no witnesses. They said they couldn’t make a case, but they

knew who did it.

The Court: Anything about that situation that you feel would prevent you from acting as a fair

juror in our case?

Edmund O.: No.

The Court: Do you think you could set aside any opinions, attitudes, feelings that might have

been generated in that case and decide Mr. Corona’s matter solely upon the

evidence I present to you?

Edmund O.: I believe so.3

(Id. at 68-69.)

The jurors were also asked if they had friends or relatives in law enforcement, and Juror

No. 11 answered that he did not. (Lodgment No. 3, Augmented RT at 47.) Edmund O.,

however, indicated that: “I have two cousins in law enforcement. One worked in the prison and

one worked in the police department. Both of them are dead. I also have a cousin that works

in the Chicago Police Department as a detective.” (Id. at 44.)

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The two jurors were not sufficiently similarly situated so as to draw an inference that the

prosecutor was acting with a racially discriminatory purpose when he challenged Edmund O.

but not Juror No. 11. Although both jurors had relatives involved in gangs, Juror No. 11

reported no involvement with the authorities with respect to his relatives, and no relatives who

had been the victim of gun-related violence. Edmund O. reported that his mother had to sell

property due to gang activity. Edmund O. also stated that he had three cousins who were

murdered and that the authorities knew who the killers were but did not prosecute. Edmund O.

also had several relatives in law enforcement whereas Juror No. 11 had none. The appellate

court’s finding that “Edmund O.’s family history involving gangs and murders” was sufficient

to distinguish him from Juror No. 11 for comparative analysis purposes is not objectively

unreasonable. Even if one might speculate that certain aspects of Edmund O.’s background

might make him more favorable to the prosecution than Juror No. 11, that alone does not upend

the entirety of the trial judge’s and the California Court of Appeal’s conclusions that the

prosecutor’s exercise of peremptories was not racially motivated. This Court holds that the state

court’s decision is far from unreasonable and was in fact a reasonable determination of the facts

and application of Supreme Court law. Therefore, habeas relief cannot be granted on Claim

One. 

II. Claim Two

The Court adopts in full the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge with respect

to Claim Two, to which there are no objections. Habeas relief is DENIED as to Claim Two for

the reasons set forth in the R&R.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

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III. Conclusion and Order

The Court ADOPTS IN PART AND DECLINES TO ADOPT IN PART the findings

and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as set forth in this Order, and DENIES the Petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. The Court ISSUES a Certificate of Appealability as to all claims

presented in the Petition. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 5, 2009

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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