Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00738/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00738-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

ELIZABETH D. HUNTER, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv738-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Elizabeth D. Hunter, applied for supplemental security income (“SSI”). 

Her application was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and 

received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, 

the ALJ issued a decision in which he found Plaintiff not disabled at any time through the 

date of the decision. The Appeals Council rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all 

proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social 

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

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Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 8); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of 

Impairments] 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

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 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines4

 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This Court 

 3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The 

same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited 

as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

4 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was forty-nine years old at the time she filed her application and had a 

limited education. Tr. 38. Plaintiff’s past relevant work was as a “train operator at a 

zoo,” “cashier/hostess,” “server,” “hotel manager,” and performing “banquet set-up.” Id. 

Following the administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ 

found Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 21, 2009, the 

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application date.” (Step 1) Tr. 32. At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from 

the following severe impairments: “disc bulge and protrusion in the lumbar spine, 

obesity, and status post fracture of left forearm.” Id. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff 

“does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 

equals one of the listed impairments.” (Step 3) Tr. 34. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

has the RFC to perform “nearly the full range of light work” with several restrictions. Id. 

The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff “is unable to perform any past relevant work.” 

(Step 4) Tr. 38. At Step 5, the ALJ found that, “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” and after consulting with 

the VE, “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform.” Tr. 39. The ALJ identified the following occupations as 

examples: “fingerprint clerk,” “garment washer, hand,” and “cloth examiner.” Id. 

Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as 

defined in the Social Security Act, since April 21, 2009, the date the application was 

filed.” Tr. 40. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents two issues for this court’s consideration in review of the ALJ’s 

decision: (1) whether “the ALJ’s Mental [RFC] findings are [] based on substantial 

evidence;” and (2) whether “the record supports a favorable finding under the Medical 

Vocational Rules (“MVR”).” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 4-5. The court will address each 

argument below. 

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V. DISCUSSION 

A. The Mental RFC Findings 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s mental RFC findings are not supported by 

substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues that there is an inconsistency in the ALJ’s 

determination. First, Plaintiff points to the ALJ’s findings using the Psychiatric Review 

Technique, where he found that Plaintiff had mild difficulties with regard to activities of 

daily living, social functioning and in concentration, persistence and pace. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 

11) at 8. Second, Plaintiff points to the RFC where “the ALJ found Plaintiff should work 

in a ‘low stress environment’ and a ‘low social contact environment with no responsible 

contact’ and only occasional contact with the public, any that occurs should be brief and 

‘superficial.’ She should primarily work alone and perform tasks that require little 

independent judgment with routine, not ‘rapid or multiple changes.’” Id. at 9 (quoting Tr. 

35). Plaintiff argues that these two findings conflict. 

 The court finds this argument to be without merit. To the extent that there are any 

inconsistencies between the report and the RFC, the limitations in the RFC are more 

severe than would be indicated in the Psychiatric Review Technique. Thus, the 

limitations in the RFC would encompass any limitations by the Psychiatric Review 

Technique, and more. Plaintiff is unable to show how she could have been harmed by the 

ALJ rendering a cautious RFC, giving her the benefit of any doubt. 

 Plaintiff also appears to argue that the mental RFC findings were flawed because 

“the ALJ failed to report a physician’s observation even in the context of a consultative 

physical examination in July 2009–‘The claimant is obviously depressed and cries 

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frequently,’” and because the ALJ focused on the Global Assessment of Functioning 

(GAF) score from December 2009 but ignored the mental health treatment from earlier in 

2009 based on a July 2008 GAF score. Id. at 10-11. 

 First, the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence of record. Dyer v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Second, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s 

assertions of depression, even noting Dr. May’s diagnosis of depression. Third, the GAF 

score mentioned by the ALJs was derived from the only source from whom Plaintiff 

sought treatment for her alleged mental impairments and was the most recent score. See

Tr. 32. See also, Ward v. Astrue, 2008 WL 1994978, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2008) 

(Absent evidence that an examiner assigned a GAF score based on his opinion regarding 

a patient’s ability to work, a GAF score is not entitled to any weight and does not 

translate to a specific finding as to functional limitations.). Even then, the ALJ stated that 

the score is not a “diagnostic value,” but helpful in evaluating the psychiatrists 

impressions of Plaintiff. Id. The court finds no error has occurred here. 

B. The Medical Vocational Rules 

 In the first part of this section of Plaintiff’s brief, Plaintiff discusses the ALJ’s use 

of the lack of “follow up treatment” in making the credibility determination regarding 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. Then Plaintiff shifts to an apparent argument 

regarding the ALJ’s use of the term “nearly the full range of light work” and how that is 

inconsistent considering all of the specific limitations immediately listed by the ALJ. 

Plaintiff then jumps into a statement regarding the ALJ’s obesity determination. Finally, 

Plaintiff attempts to wrap these together, arguing that the “ALJ’s RFC assessment would 

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better comport with the full range of sedentary work at best.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 12. 

None of these paragraphs contain a clear and sufficient argument for the court’s 

consideration. Indeed, the Commissioner appears at a loss as to how to respond, stating 

“[t]he Commissioner does not understand where Plaintiff is going with this argument, 

except, perhaps, to argue that a person who needs the option to sit and stand cannot 

perform light work.” Def.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at n.3. The commissioner also points out that 

Plaintiff made no original claim for obesity and even now makes no claim as to how her 

obesity would render her RFC improper. 

 The court would also point out that Plaintiff’s lack of “follow up treatment” was 

but one of the reasons listed by the ALJ to find her complaints to be less than credible. 

Indeed, the ALJ relied on the medical evidence of record which showed that Plaintiff’s 

complaints were exaggerated and inconsistent with statements she made to her own 

treating physicians. 

 Plaintiff’s suggestion that the RFC is flawed because the ALJ stated that Plaintiff 

could perform “nearly the full range of light work” and that she would be better suited for 

sedentary work is non-meritorious. Whether or not the ALJ should have used the term 

“nearly” does not change the fact that the ALJ specifically went beyond the use of the 

Medical Vocational Guidelines and sought testimony of the VE because Plaintiff’s 

“ability to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of [light work] ha[d] been 

impeded by [the] additional limitations.” Tr. 39. After considering the limitations in the 

RFC, the VE testified that the RFC there are jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff 

can perform. Tr. 39-40. Thus, no error occurred. Beyond that, Plaintiff fails to 

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specifically set forth any clear argument or point to any law in support in support of this 

issue. 5 The court finds that she has waived whatever argument she may have been trying 

to make here. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

 Done this 19th day of December, 2013. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

5

 The court would note that the only case citations contained within Plaintiff’s brief occur in the second to last 

paragraph and relate merely to the ALJ’s duty to develop the record. However, Plaintiff makes no specific argument 

that the ALJ failed to develop the record. 

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