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Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 18, 2004 Decided May 21, 2004

No. 03-7037

STAFFAN I. KAEMPE,

APPELLANT

v.

GEORGE C. MYERS, JR., INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02636)

John R. Price argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant. Wayne R. Hartke entered an appearance.

James P. Schaller argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief was Benjamin R. Jacewicz.

Before: EDWARDS and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: This case arises out of attorney

George C. Myers’ representation of Staffan I. Kaempe in the

processing of a patent application for a hydraulic pump.

Kaempe sued Myers and Myers’ current and former law

firms, claiming that Myers converted Kaempe’s interest in

the patent by assigning that interest to a third party without

Kaempe’s consent. Kaempe further claimed that Myers committed legal malpractice by effecting the assignment in question, by failing to correct records at the U.S. Patent and

Trademark Office suggesting that an assignment had been

made and recorded, and by refusing to provide Kaempe with

copies of certain documents related to the patent application.

The District Court dismissed the conversion count of the

complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that an action

for conversion of patent rights is not recognized under District of Columbia law. The court granted summary judgment

to Myers on the malpractice claim on the grounds that

Kaempe failed, inter alia, to provide expert testimony establishing the applicable standard of care, as required under

D.C. law. Kaempe now appeals the District Court’s judgments on both claims.

First, it is unclear whether D.C. law recognizes an action

for conversion of patent rights, but it is unnecessary to reach

this issue. Even if D.C. law did permit such an action,

dismissal of the conversion claim was proper here, because

the complaint and related documents make clear that

Kaempe’s patent rights were not, in fact, assigned or otherwise conveyed. Second, Kaempe’s failure to provide expert

testimony in support of his malpractice action is fatal to this

claim. We therefore affirm the judgments of the District

Court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Context

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (‘‘PTO’’) is authorized by statute to grant and issue patents to inventors of ‘‘any

new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition

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of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.’’ 35

U.S.C. §§ 2, 101 (2000). A patent application must be filed

with the PTO in the name of the inventor or joint inventors of

the subject invention. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), 116 (2000).

While a patent application is pending, an applicant may file a

continuation-in-part (‘‘CIP’’) application for an invention having some subject matter in common with the original application and some new subject matter. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ,

PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 25-26 (3d ed. 2001). CIP applications are commonly made when, during the pendency of the

initial ‘‘parent’’ application, the inventor conceives of improvements to the subject of that application. See id. at 25.

A patent gives its owner the right to exclude others from

making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the

patented invention. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271 (2000). The

default rule is that the inventor or inventors own the patent

rights to the subject matter of the patent. See, e.g., Banks v.

Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Joint

owners – including those holding title by virtue of joint

inventorship – are each vested with an undivided share of the

patent rights. 5 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB’S

WALKER ON PATENTS § 19.39, at 461-62 (3d ed. 1986). Subject

to certain statutorily defined exceptions, a patent has the

attributes of personal property. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).

A patent owner or applicant may convey his or her rights in a

patent or patent application, in whole or in part, by means of

an assignment executed in writing. See id. Alternatively, an

owner may exempt others from the patent’s exclusionary

power by granting a license, which is essentially a promise by

the licensor not to sue the licensee for infringement. See U.S.

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

PROCEDURE § 301 (8th ed. rev. 2003) (‘‘MPEP’’).

If a patent assignment is not recorded with the PTO, it has

no legal effect against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, provided that party gives valuable consideration to acquire

an interest in the patent and has no notice of the prior

assignment. See 35 U.S.C. § 261. Recordation protects an

assignee against parties who later purport to acquire rights in

the assigned interest. See 5 LIPSCOMB, supra, § 19.10, at 356.

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PTO regulations provide for recordation of assignments, as

well as documents other than assignments that relate to a

patent or patent application but do not transfer or change

title. See 37 C.F.R. § 3.11(a) (2003); MPEP § 313. However, recordation is a purely ministerial act and does not reflect

any determination as to the validity of the document filed or

its effect, if any, on the title to a patent or patent application.

37 C.F.R. § 3.54 (2003); MPEP § 317.03.

B. Factual Background

In 1994, Staffan Kaempe invented a hydraulic pump (the

‘‘Cartridge Hydraulic Pump’’ or ‘‘pump’’) the components of

which are held together by the fluid-output pressure generated by the pump itself, thus eliminating the need for external

bolts or fasteners. Kaempe expected that this technology

would permit significant reduction in the size and weight of

hydraulic pumps and would ultimately replace conventional

pumps altogether. Kaempe revealed his invention to Dennis

Ewald, a longtime co-worker. In September 1997, Kaempe

and Ewald retained attorney George C. Myers to prepare and

process a U.S. patent application for the pump. Kaempe

alleges that he permitted Ewald to be named as a co-inventor

in the patent application in return for Ewald’s agreement to

pay the legal fees incurred in processing the application.

On October 23, 1997, Kaempe and Ewald executed a written agreement (the ‘‘October 1997 Agreement’’), providing in

relevant part:

Ewald and Kaempe agree that to cause the further

development, manufacture and distribution of the

Cartridge Hydraulic Pump, they shall form a corporation (hereinafter ‘‘the Corporation’’) and execute a

non-exclusive license to the Corporation of the patent for the Cartridge Hydraulic Pump for a term of

the life of the patent.

Def. Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. I (hereinafter ‘‘Def. Ex. I’’),

reprinted in App. 9, 10. In December of that same year,

Kaempe and Ewald formed a corporation under Illinois law –

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Cartridge Technology Hydraulics, L.L.C. (‘‘CTH’’) – to manufacture, sell, and distribute the Cartridge Hydraulic Pump.

Myers filed the patent application for the pump with the

PTO on January 30, 1998. In September of 1998, Kaempe

and Ewald requested that Myers prepare a CIP application

for a new pump, incorporating some claims of the original

pump and some new claims. At some point during the

following year, however, a dispute arose between Kaempe and

Ewald, and in mid-January of 1999, Kaempe’s employment

with CTH was terminated. On January 29, 1999, Ewald –

allegedly without Kaempe’s authorization – forwarded to

Myers a copy of the October 1997 Agreement accompanied by

a letter directing Myers to ‘‘file this assignment with the U.S.

Patent Office and advise me if this is not sufficient.’’ Compl.

¶ 14. The following week, Myers prepared forms for Ewald

and Kaempe to assign the patent application to CTH, but

Kaempe never received or executed any such document.

Around this same time, Kaempe was removed as a manager

of CTH. Id. ¶ 17.

In mid-February 1999, Kaempe retained attorney Bradford

Lyerla, of the law firm of Ryndak & Lyerla, to represent him.

In at least two letters and numerous phone calls and emails

over the course of the following months, Lyerla requested

that Myers provide Kaempe with copies of documents related

to the patent application, including the draft CIP application

for the new pump. Myers ultimately sent part of Kaempe’s

file, but he never sent the draft CIP application. As a result,

Kaempe did not file the CIP application before the filing

deadline, and the claims in the CIP application were not made

part of the patent that ultimately issued. See id. ¶¶ 20-26.

Kaempe alleges that Myers incorrectly told him that he

could not turn over the draft CIP application without Ewald’s

approval. Id. ¶ 25. Myers, in contrast, asserted that he

refused to turn over the CIP application because Kaempe and

Ewald had not paid for his services in preparing the application. Myers Dep. of June 18, 2000, at 109, App. 218. The

record indicates that, on April 21, 1999, Myers sent Kaempe’s

new attorneys a bill for services and a letter requesting that

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Kaempe pay half of the bill, apparently in response to

Kaempe’s request for the draft CIP application. See Letter

from George Myers to James Ryndak, of Ryndak & Lyerla

(April 21, 1999), App. 411. Just two days earlier, Kaempe

petitioned the PTO to revoke Myers’ power of attorney,

asserting that a dispute had arisen between the inventors and

that Myers had refused to provide Kaempe with information

about the application without Ewald’s consent. See Compl.

Ex. L, App. 115.

Meanwhile, at some point in February 1999, Myers had

filed for recordation with the PTO certain documents related

to the patent application. On the required PTO cover sheet

for the filing, Myers designated the ‘‘nature of conveyance’’ to

be recorded as ‘‘other’’ (as opposed to ‘‘assignment,’’ ‘‘security

agreement,’’ ‘‘merger,’’ or ‘‘change of name’’), and identified

the documents to be recorded as ‘‘Agreement and Articles of

Organization.’’ Def. Ex. I, App. 138. In May of 1999, the

PTO sent Myers a ‘‘Notice of Recordation of Assignment

Document.’’ Compl. Ex. N, App. 44. This notice indicated

that the ‘‘agreement and articles of organization [dated

10/23/1997]’’ had been recorded on February 25, 1999, and

identified Kaempe and Ewald as the ‘‘assignors’’ and CTH as

the ‘‘assignee.’’ Id. The notice further indicated that the

documents were recorded at Reel 9784, Frame 0898. Id.

The documents recorded at this location are the PTO cover

sheet, CTH’s Articles of Organization, and the October 1997

Agreement. Def. Ex. I, App. 9-14, 138-41. In a subsequent

letter to Ewald and again in a bill for services, Myers

referred to the documents filed with the PTO as an ‘‘assignment’’ of the patent application. See Letter from George

Myers to Dennis Ewald (June 17, 1999), Compl. Ex. M, App.

117; Invoice for Legal Services Rendered Through February

28, 1999, Compl. Ex. F, App. 107.

In May of 2000, the PTO issued its decision on Kaempe’s

petition to revoke Myers’ power of attorney. See Compl. Ex.

P, App. 120. The PTO denied the petition in part, because it

was not signed by Ewald or his representative. The PTO

agreed, however, that ‘‘in order to assure that all interests

are properly and effectively represented, all further correUSCA Case #03-7037 Document #823555 Filed: 05/21/2004 Page 6 of 14
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spondence to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) must

be signed by’’ both Lyerla and Myers, who remained Ewald’s

attorney of record. Id., App. 121. The decision noted that

‘‘inspection of PTO assignment records reveals that both

named inventors have assigned their entire right ti[t]le and

interest herein to an assignee.’’ Id. On November 28, 2000,

the PTO issued a patent for the pump, listing Kaempe and

Ewald as inventors.

C. Proceedings Below

On December 20, 2001, Kaempe filed suit against Myers

and Myers’ former and current law firms (collectively

‘‘Myers’’) in the District Court. In Count I of the complaint,

Kaempe claimed that Myers had unlawfully converted

Kaempe’s interest in the patent by causing it to be assigned –

without Kaempe’s authorization – to CTH. In Count II,

Kaempe claimed that Myers had committed legal malpractice

by causing the assignment in question, by failing to correct

the PTO’s records suggesting that Kaempe’s interest had

been assigned, and by refusing to provide Kaempe the draft

CIP application upon request.

Myers moved for dismissal of Count I for failure to state a

claim, arguing that under District of Columbia law – which

the parties agreed governed – intangible property such as

Kaempe’s interest in the patent could not be the subject of an

action for conversion. Myers argued in the alternative that

no assignment had occurred. On March 22, 2002, the District

Court dismissed Count I, finding that Kaempe’s patent rights

could not be the subject of an action for conversion under

D.C. law. Kaempe v. Myers, Civ. Action No. 01-2636, slip op.

at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2002). On March 5, 2003, the District

Court granted Myers’ motion for summary judgment on

Count II of the complaint on the grounds that Kaempe had

not provided expert testimony on the applicable standard of

care, had not demonstrated that Myers’ actions were the

proximate cause of any injury to Kaempe, and had not proven

damages. Kaempe v. Myers, Civ. Action No. 01-2636, slip op.

at 5-11 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2003). Kaempe appealed, challenging

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both the dismissal of the conversion count and the award of

summary judgment to Myers on the malpractice count.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Conversion Claim

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only if

‘‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’’

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). We review de

novo the District Court’s dismissal of the conversion count,

accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true and

giving Kaempe the benefit of all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from such allegations. Browning v. Clinton,

292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). However, we will not

accept ‘‘inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are

unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint’’ or ‘‘legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.’’ Id.

(quoting Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271,

1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Nor must we accept as true the

complaint’s factual allegations insofar as they contradict exhibits to the complaint or matters subject to judicial notice.

See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002).

Having reviewed the relevant case law, we conclude that it

remains unclear whether D.C. law would permit an action for

conversion of patent rights. The D.C. courts have never

ruled on whether, or under what circumstances, intangible

property of this nature can be the subject of a suit for

conversion. Some jurisdictions might permit such an action.

See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030-35 (9th Cir.

2003) (holding that California law permits an action for

conversion of an internet domain name); Dethmers Mfg. Co.,

Inc. v. Automatic Equip. Mfg. Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1006-

07 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (collecting relevant cases and holding

that Nebraska law might permit an action for conversion of

an unpatented idea); Curtis Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Plasti-Clip

Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1212, 1233-34 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that

New Hampshire law permits an action for conversion of novel

ideas embodied in a design); see also Val D. Ricks, Comment,

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The Conversion of Intangible Property: Bursting the Ancient

Trover Bottle With New Wine, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1681,

1701-02 n.74 (collecting cases involving actions for conversion

of intangible property). However, Maryland law, to which

the D.C. courts might look for guidance, see Conesco Indus.,

Ltd. v. Conforti & Eisele, Inc., 627 F.2d 312, 315-16 (D.C. Cir.

1980), almost certainly would not: The Maryland Court of

Appeals has held that an action for conversion of intangible

property will lie only where such property is merged in a

transferrable document and the document itself is converted.

Allied Inv. Corp. v. Jasen, 731 A.2d 957, 965 (Md. 1999).

In any event, we need not reach this issue to dispose of the

conversion claim. Even if D.C. law recognized an action for

conversion of patent rights, Kaempe’s complaint nevertheless

fails to state a claim for conversion. It simply cannot be

inferred from the complaint and related documents that

Kaempe’s patent rights were assigned or otherwise conveyed.

Under D.C. law, an action for conversion is recognized only

when a defendant has unlawfully exercised ‘‘ownership, dominion or control over the personal property of another in

denial or repudiation of his rights thereto.’’ Shea v. Fridley,

123 A.2d 358, 361 (D.C. 1956). Where there has been no

dispossession of property rights, there can be no action for

conversion. Dismissal therefore was proper.

Kaempe’s complaint asserts that ‘‘Myers performed legal

services which caused [CTH] to acquire ownership in a valuable Patent to which it was not entitled.’’ Compl. ¶ 37. This

claim is premised entirely on the statements by the PTO and

by Myers referring to the documents filed for recordation

with the PTO as an ‘‘assignment.’’ The complaint notes that

Myers referred to the documents filed with the PTO as an

‘‘assignment’’ in a letter and a bill. Id. ¶¶ 16, 27. But the

complaint relies primarily on the ‘‘Notice of Recordation of

Assignment Document’’ issued by the PTO in May 1999,

which identifies Kaempe and Ewald as the ‘‘assignors’’ and

CTH as the ‘‘assignee’’ of the pump patent. Id. ¶ 38. The

complaint also cites the patent examiner’s decision disposing

of Kaempe’s petition to revoke Myers’ power of attorney, in

which the examiner stated that PTO records showed that

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Kaempe and Ewald had assigned their interests in the patent

to a third party. Id. ¶ 39. Based on these statements, the

complaint asserts that ‘‘[i]t would appear from an examination

of the records that the October 23, 1997 letter of intent [i.e.,

the October 1997 Agreement] was filed with the United

States Patent Office by Myers in a successful attempt to

cause the Patent Office to grant an Assignment of the Patent

to CTH.’’ Id. at ¶ 40.

However, nothing in the complaint or the remainder of the

record before us purports to show that any assignment of the

patent was actually made. On the contrary, it is quite clear

that the only documents filed with the PTO were the October

1997 Agreement and the CTH Articles of Organization, and

that neither of these instruments assigns or otherwise conveys Kaempe’s patent interests. The complaint in no way

suggests that any ‘‘assignment’’ was filed with the PTO.

Indeed, Kaempe’s counsel conceded at oral argument that

only the October 1997 Agreement and the CTH Articles of

Organization were filed for recordation, see Oral Arg. Tr. at

3:00.0. The record fully confirms this.

The PTO’s ‘‘Notice of Recordation of Assignment Document,’’ appended to the complaint, identifies the recorded

documents as ‘‘agreement and articles of organization’’ with a

document date of October 23, 1997. Compl. Ex. N, App. 118.

On the cover sheet for the filing, Myers identified the ‘‘nature

of conveyance’’ as ‘‘other,’’ not as an ‘‘assignment,’’ and he

identified the documents filed as ‘‘agreement and articles of

incorporation’’ with a document date of October 23, 1997. See

Def. Ex. I, App. 138. And the documents recorded at Reel

9784, Frame 0898 – identified in the complaint as the site at

which the PTO recorded the purported ‘‘assignment’’ – include only the cover sheet, the October 1997 Agreement, and

the CTH Articles of Organization. See id., App. 9-14, 138-41.

The documents recorded by the PTO were not attached to

Kaempe’s complaint. However, the cited documents are public records subject to judicial notice on a motion to dismiss.

See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621,

624 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.12 (2003) (stating

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that PTO assignment records are open to public inspection);

Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 192 n.4 (8th Cir.

1982) (holding that the court may take judicial notice of PTO

filings). It is also clear that these documents – which were

appended to Myers’ motion to dismiss and whose authenticity

is not disputed – may be considered here because they are

referred to in the complaint and are integral to Kaempe’s

conversion claim. See, e.g., United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d

903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282

F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997);

Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997);

Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d

429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993).

The October 1997 Agreement and the CTH Articles of

Organization clearly do not assign or otherwise convey

Kaempe’s rights in the patent. The October 1997 Agreement

is, as Kaempe’s complaint indicates, an ‘‘initial letter of understanding.’’ Compl. ¶¶ 14, 40. At most, the agreement commits Kaempe and Ewald, at some future time, to form a

corporation and grant to it a non-exclusive license in the

patent. The Articles of Organization obviously do not affect

Kaempe’s patent interests. The statements by the PTO and

Myers referring to the filing as an ‘‘assignment’’ – which

appear to be the sole basis of the conversion claim – have no

legal effect and are therefore irrelevant. Contrary to

Kaempe’s assertion, the PTO’s misstatements do not in any

way effect any conveyance of Kaempe’s interests. The PTO

has no authority to ‘‘grant’’ an assignment: As noted above,

recordation is a ministerial act and reflects no determination

as to the legal validity of the document filed or its effect, if

any, on title to the patent or patent application. See 37

C.F.R. § 3.54; MPEP § 317.03. And Myers’ misidentification of the filing in correspondence and bills, though odd,

likewise has no effect on Kaempe’s title. Calling the PTO

filing an ‘‘assignment’’ – which clearly it was not – does not

make it so.

In short, it cannot be inferred from the complaint or the

related documents properly before us that Kaempe’s interest

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in the patent was assigned or that he was otherwise dispossessed of any portion of that interest. The complaint therefore failed to state a claim for conversion.

B. Attorney Malpractice Claim

We review de novo the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment to Myers on the attorney malpractice claim, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Kaempe, the

nonmoving party. E.g., Cruz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 356 F.3d

320, 328 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate

only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment

in the movant’s favor is proper as a matter of law. FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the

party bearing the burden of proof at trial – in this case,

Kaempe – must provide evidence showing that there is a

triable issue as to each element essential to that party’s claim.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Kaempe claims that Myers committed malpractice by (1)

assigning his rights in the patent without Kaempe’s consent;

(2) failing to correct the PTO’s misstatements that an assignment had been made and recorded; and (3) failing to provide

Kaempe with a copy of the draft CIP application upon

request. To establish a prima facie case of attorney malpractice under D.C. law, the plaintiff must establish the applicable

standard of care, that the attorney violated the standard, and

that the violation caused a legally cognizable injury. O’Neil

v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C. 1982). In order to meet

the first of these requirements, the plaintiff ‘‘must present

expert testimony establishing the standard of care unless the

attorney’s lack of care and skill is so obvious that the trier of

fact can find negligence as a matter of common knowledge.’’

Id. Kaempe presented no expert testimony on the standard

of care applicable to his claims, but argues that he was not

required to do so because his claims fall within the ‘‘common

knowledge’’ exception. We disagree.

Examples of attorney actions (or failures to act) that fall

within the ‘‘common knowledge’’ exception include: allowing

the statute of limitations to run on a client’s claim, see id. at

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342; permitting entry of default judgment against the client,

see id.; failing to instruct the client to answer interrogatories,

see id. at 342 n.6; failing to allege affirmative defenses, see

id.; failing to file tax returns, see id.; failing to follow the

client’s explicit instructions, see id.; Hamilton v. Needham,

519 A.2d 172, 175 (D.C. 1986); and billing a client for time not

spent providing services, see Shapiro Lifschitz & Shram, P.C.

v. R.E. Hazard, Jr., 97 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2000). The

alleged errors cited by Kaempe are not similarly obvious, and

knowledge of the standard of care applicable to Kaempe’s

claims clearly is not within the province of a lay juror.

As to the allegation that Myers committed legal malpractice by assigning Kaempe’s interest in the patent without his

consent, we have already concluded that the factual premise

is unfounded. And we think it is well beyond the ken of the

average juror to know whether an attorney in Myers’ position

had any duty to correct the PTO’s records to the extent that

they erroneously suggested that an assignment had been

recorded, and, if so, what the nature of that duty would be.

As to Myers’ failure to provide copies of the draft CIP

application on request, Myers provided essentially uncontested evidence that he withheld the application because he had

not been paid for his services in preparing it, and that

Kaempe had notice of this fact. This evidence included

Myers’ deposition testimony, as well as a letter and a bill for

services apparently sent to Kaempe’s new attorneys in response to Kaempe’s request for the CIP application. Whether Myers had any duty to turn over the documents under

these circumstances is not a matter of common knowledge.

In summary, none of Kaempe’s claims falls within the

common knowledge exception, and he therefore was required

to provide expert testimony establishing the applicable standard of care. In neglecting to do so, he failed to establish a

triable issue as to a key element of his malpractice claim,

making summary judgment for Myers proper.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm on alternative

grounds the District Court’s dismissal of the conversion claim

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and we affirm the award of summary judgment to Myers on

the legal malpractice claim.

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