Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00092/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1330 Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINA HOLMES,

Plaintiff,

v.

THUNDER VALLEY CASINO RESORT, 

et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-00092-TLN-KJN PS

ORDER

Plaintiff Christina Holmes, who is proceeding without counsel in this action, has

requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1(ECF No. 2.) 

Plaintiff’s application in support of her request to proceed in forma pauperis makes the showing 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Accordingly, the undersigned grants plaintiff’s request to 

proceed in forma pauperis.

I. Legal Standards

The determination that plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the 

required inquiry. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court is directed to dismiss the case at 

any time if it determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or 

 

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This action proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to Eastern District of California

Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against 

an immune defendant.

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an 

arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 

S. Ct. at 1949. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 

(2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 

(1972); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Unless it is clear 

that no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma 

pauperis is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before dismissal. See Noll v. Carlson, 

809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1230.

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II. Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that she was “physically assaulted,” “pushed,” “detained,” and 

“threatened” by her coworkers, including the named codefendant, Amy Kieng. (ECF No. 1 at 2-

3.) She alleges that her coworkers made racially motivated questions and statements regarding 

her hair and nails and “made references to [her] having a tail.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that 

representatives of her employer, defendant Thunder Valley Casino Resort, refused to transfer her 

out of her department, allowed hostile coworkers to transfer to her shift, and asked her to cut her 

nails. (Id.) She further alleges that these acts were committed because of her race, color, sex, and 

age. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff attaches to her complaint right to sue letters from the Department 

of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”). (ECF No. 1 at 6-10.) Plaintiff also attaches two pages from the Thunder 

Valley Casino Resort employee handbook, one of which details Thunder Valley Casino Resort’s 

workplace violence and association policies, and the other of which is an unsigned employee 

acknowledgement form. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5.) Construing the complaint liberally, plaintiff alleges 

a claim of breach of contract, as well as apparent claims for employment discrimination, disparate

treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII and the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act.

2

 (ECF No. 1 at 1-3).

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The court notes that the attached employee acknowledgement form indicates that the Thunder 

Valley Casino Resort may be owned and operated by a federally-recognized Indian tribe. (ECF 

No. 1 at 5.) If true, this would raise serious sovereign immunity questions that could potentially 

bar several of plaintiff’s claims. Furthermore, Indian tribes are not “employers” for purposes of 

an employment claim under Title VII, therefore making them immune to claims brought pursuant 

to Title VII’s provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Nevertheless, the allegations of plaintiff’s 

complaint as they are currently constituted only vaguely allude to the possibility that the Thunder 

Valley Casino Resort may be owned by a federally-recognized Indian tribe, and do not 

affirmatively provide information as to the ownership of the Thunder Valley Casino or the 

employment relationship of the named codefendants with regard to that entity. Accordingly, 

given the fact that the court is required to construe all allegations in a light most favorable to 

plaintiff, the fact that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense, and the other fundamental 

deficiencies in plaintiff’s allegations discussed below, the court acknowledges but does not reach 

these potential issues at this juncture.

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III. Plaintiff’s Claims

A. Breach of Contract

First, plaintiff claims that the conduct alleged against defendants in the complaint 

constituted a breach of contract. The elements required to state a breach of contract claim under 

California law are: “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for 

nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” McVicar 

v. Goodman Glob., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Oasis West Realty, 

LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 820 (2011)). “Under the federal rules, a plaintiff may set forth 

the contract verbatim in the complaint or plead it, as indicated, by exhibit, or plead it according to 

its legal effect.” Boland, Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1102 (E.D.

Cal. 2010).

Here, plaintiff appears to allege that the workplace violence policy referenced in her 

allegations and attached to the complaint constituted a contract or a term of a contract which 

existed between her and her employer, defendant Thunder Valley Casino. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) 

However, it is unclear whether the alleged contract is independent from or a subset of the general 

employment contract between plaintiff and her employer. Accordingly, it cannot be reasonably 

inferred from the complaint’s allegations that plaintiff performed her part of the contract by 

carrying out her duties as an employee. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5.) Therefore, plaintiff fails to properly 

allege the second element of a breach of contract claim.

Furthermore, as to the third element, plaintiff alleges that the acts of violence discussed in 

the discrimination claims breach the contract. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges further that 

“[w]hen there is an incident among team members . . . there is a due diligence that surveillance be 

verified/checked immediately.” (Id.) However, plaintiff does not allege that this is a contractual 

obligation of defendants, and the attached pages, at best, reveal promises to “promptly 

investigate” and “take such action as [the employer] deems necessary” if there are reports of 

violence. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) There is no indication in the allegations of the complaint that a 

contractual obligation existed to prevent discrimination, violence, or to check surveillance. (Id.) 

Therefore, plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to indicate that defendants breached the terms of 

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the alleged contract.

Finally, plaintiff alleges that she should receive damages in the form of severance pay

equal to three years of gross pay under her employment contract. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) However, 

plaintiff does not allege that she was hired for a term, or that, if she was a term employee, the 

term would end in three years. Nor does plaintiff allege a contractual provision that entitles her to 

severance pay upon the conditions alleged in the complaint. To the contrary, the employee 

acknowledgement page of the alleged employee handbook attached to the complaint indicates 

that the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant Thunder Valley Casino Resort

was at will. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Therefore, plaintiff does not allege facts entitling her to the 

requested contractual damages. Because plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to sustain all the 

elements of a breach of contract claim, such a claim must be dismissed.

B. Employment-Related Claims

Plaintiff also appears to allege facts related to various employment-related discrimination 

claims, appearing to couch them in terms of a breach of contract. Plaintiff fails to allege a viable 

breach of contract claim for the reasons discussed above. Liberally construing plaintiff’s

complaint, however, it appears that plaintiff attempts to also assert independent claims for race 

and gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and for age discrimination 

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 et seq. (“ADEA”). In 

particular, it appears that plaintiff attempts to state claims for disparate treatment and hostile work 

environment based on her membership in the three alleged protected classes, and for retaliation

after she reported defendants’ actions to the DFEH and the EEOC, all of which are cognizable

claims under both Title VII and the ADEA. As the legal standards for these three types of claims 

are generally the same under both Title VII and the AEDA, the court will jointly consider 

plaintiff’s claims under both bodies of law. See Stevens v. Cty. of San Mateo, 267 F. App’x 684, 

685-86 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the same standards to disparate treatment, hostile work 

environment, and retaliation claims under Title VII and the ADEA and considering the claims 

together.)

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1. Disparate Treatment

First plaintiff alleges that she was subject to disparate employment treatment by her 

employer based on her age, gender, and race. The elements of a prima facie case of disparate 

treatment are that: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) plaintiff performed her job 

satisfactorily or was qualified for the position sought; (3) plaintiff was subject to an adverse 

employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated 

more favorably. Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008); Chuang 

v. Univ. of California Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000); Pejic v. 

Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1988); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Similarly situated individuals do not need to be identical, but they must be similar in all 

material respects. Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006)). In order to be similarly situated, the 

comparative employees must have been dealt with by the same supervisor, been subjected to the 

same standards and have engaged in similar conduct as the plaintiff. See Vasquez v. County of 

Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff bears the responsibility of showing that 

similarly situated coworkers were treated differently. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).

Here, plaintiff clearly alleges that she is a “[b]lack female card dealer ... over 40 years 

old,” thereby meeting the first element with regard to her claims based on age, gender, and race. 

(ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff appears to allege several incidents as adverse employment actions, and 

alleges that they were taken because of her age, gender, and race. These include defendants’

failure to enforce the workplace violence policy, failure to check surveillance, refusal to transfer 

plaintiff to another department, failure to prevent certain team members from transferring to 

plaintiff’s shift, and request that plaintiff cut her nails. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) Therefore, plaintiff 

alleges facts sufficient to meet the third element of a disparate treatment claim.

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However, plaintiff fails to allege that she satisfactorily performed her position as a card 

dealer or whether she was qualified for the position she alleges she sought outside of the Table 

Games department. Moreover, she does not allege the existence of other employees at Thunder 

Valley Casino Resort who, except for their membership in one of the alleged protected classes,

were similarly situated to plaintiff and were treated more favorably under similar circumstances. 

Because the complaint contains no allegations showing that plaintiff meets the second and fourth

elements for a prima facie case, plaintiff fails to state a claim for disparate treatment.

2. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff also appears to assert a hostile work environment claim under Title VII and the 

AEDA. In order to plead a cognizable hostile work environment claim, plaintiff must be able to 

show that her workplace was both subjectively and objectively hostile, i.e., “she must show that 

she perceived her work environment to be hostile, and that a reasonable person in her position 

would perceive it to be so.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 

(9th Cir. 2005). She must also be able to show that the harassment took place because of her 

membership in a protected category. See id.

In determining whether alleged conduct creates an objectively hostile work environment, 

courts “must assess all the circumstances, ‘including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 

its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Id. (quoting Clark 

Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001). “Simple teasing, offhand comments, 

and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 

terms and conditions of employment.” Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Faragher v. 

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).

Here, plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to show an objectively hostile work 

environment. More specifically, she fails to plead any facts indicating the frequency of the 

alleged discriminatory conduct or provide any indication as to how the alleged conduct interfered 

with her work performance. For example, plaintiff alleges “Claim V: Other – I have been 

detained by a Floor Supervisor and threatened by a Pit Manager” (ECF No. 1 at 3), but does not 

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allege any facts indicating when these incidents took place in relation to the other alleged 

conduct, the duration of the alleged detainment, or the nature of the alleged threats. The other 

conduct alleged in the complaint is also described in similarly vague terms that do not provide a 

context sufficient for the court to determine that plaintiff meets the objective criteria for a hostile 

work environment claim. Without greater factual detail, the court cannot determine that the acts

alleged were more than isolated incidents, even when the allegations of the complaint are read in 

a light most favorable to plaintiff. Therefore, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to 

sustain hostile work environment claim.

3. Retaliation

Finally, it also appears that plaintiff attempts to allege a claim for retaliation based on her 

filing complaints with the DFEH and the EEOC. The elements of a prima facie retaliation claim 

are: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment 

action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment 

action. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2008). Protected activity 

includes filing a complaint alleging unlawful employment practices by an employer. Dawson v. 

Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2011). For the purposes of a retaliation claim, an adverse 

employment action can be any action that well might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from 

making or supporting a charge of discrimination, and is not limited to actions affecting the terms 

and conditions of employment. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 

(2006). The causal link can be inferred from circumstantial facts such as the employer’s 

knowledge of the protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected activity and 

the adverse action. Dawson, 630 F.3d at 936.

Here, plaintiff alleges that she engaged in protected activity by contacting the DFEH and 

the EEOC, therefore meeting the first element. (ECF No. 1 at 2). She also alleges that she was 

pushed by a pit manager, among other conduct. (Id.) Being pushed by a manager might well 

dissuade a person from making or supporting a charge of discrimination and therefore plaintiff 

has alleged facts sufficient to meet the second element. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68. In addition, 

other conduct alleged in the complaint could also meet the “adverse employment action” 

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standard. However, plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that defendants’ alleged conduct 

was carried out specifically as retaliation for plaintiff filing claims with the DFEH and the EEOC. 

For instance, plaintiff alleges that she was pushed by a pit manager in “retaliation,” but does not 

allege that it was in retaliation with regard to plaintiff having filed claims with the DFEH and the 

EEOC. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) To the contrary, she alleges in her complaint that this conduct by the 

pit manager was among the incidents she described in her complaints to the two agencies, 

therefore showing that such conduct occurred prior to her filings with the DFEH and the EEOC, 

rather than having been caused by plaintiff’s protected action. (Id.) Furthermore, plaintiff does 

not allege when any of the alleged incidents took place, whether any incidents occurred after she 

filed her claims, or whether the named defendants were aware that plaintiff had filed claims with 

the DFEH and the EEOC. Therefore, plaintiff fails to plead the existence of a plausible causal 

link between the alleged conduct and the alleged protected activity. Accordingly, the complaint

fails to state a retaliation claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint fail to state a 

cognizable claim against defendants. Nevertheless, in light of plaintiff’s pro se status, and 

because it is plausible that further amendments to the pleading might cure the defects in her 

allegations discussed above, the court grants plaintiff leave to amend. Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448 (9th 

Cir. 1987); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1230.

If plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, it shall be captioned “First Amended 

Complaint”; shall be no longer than 20 pages; shall correct the deficiencies outlined in this order; 

and shall be filed within 28 days of this order.

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in order 

to make plaintiff’s first amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and once the first amended complaint is 

filed, the original complaint no longer serves any function in the case.

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Finally, nothing in this order requires plaintiff to file a first amended complaint. If 

plaintiff determines that she is unable to amend her complaint in compliance with the court’s 

order at this juncture, she may alternatively file a notice of voluntary dismissal of her claims 

without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) within 28 days of 

this order.

Accordingly, for the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, but with leave to amend.

3. Within 28 days of this order, plaintiff shall file either a first amended complaint in 

compliance with this order, or a notice of voluntary dismissal of the action without 

prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 

4. Failure to file either a first amended complaint in compliance with this order or a 

notice of voluntary dismissal by the required deadline may result in a recommendation 

that the action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 22, 2016

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