Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00407/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00407-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD LOUIS GAHR,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC ARNOLD,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00407-HSG 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner has filed this pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. For the reasons set forth below, this petition will be DISMISSED as moot.

DISCUSSION

I. Background

In December 1992, a Contra Costa County jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree 

murder, Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (1992), and found true a firearm enhancement, Cal. Penal Code 

§ 12022.5(a) (1992). Docket No. 1 (“Pet.”) at 1. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of nineteenyears-to-life. Id. 

On April 4, 2012, Petitioner had his third parole hearing before the Board of Parole 

Hearings (“BPH”). See Pet. at 18.1The BPH found Petitioner unsuitable for parole, and deferred 

his next parole consideration for three years pursuant to Marsy’s Law2(also referred to as 

Proposition 9). See Docket No. 1-1 at 115.

 

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In citing to the petition, the Court cites to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic 

docketing system, which are found on the upper right-hand corner of each page. 

2 Marsy’s Law increased the minimum deferral period between parole hearings from one to three 

years, and the maximum deferral period from five to fifteen years. Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 

638 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011). Marsy’s Law is codified at section 3041.5(b)(3) of the 

California Penal Code.

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On January 28, 2015, Petitioner commenced the instant action by filing a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.3See Pet. At the time of filing, Petitioner was incarcerated 

at California State Prison – Solano, in Vacaville, California. Id. at 1. 

On March 3, 2015, Petitioner was granted parole at his parole consideration hearing. See

Docket No. 8 at 2 n. 2. 

On May 11, 2015, the Court found that, liberally construed, the petition stated a cognizable 

claim that the BPH’s use of Marsy’s Law to set Petitioner’s next parole hearing in three years 

violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Docket No. 7 at 2–3.4

On June 23, 2015, Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it is 

untimely, that Petitioner is a class member in Gilman v. Brown, et al. (Case Nos. 14-15614, 14-

15680) where the same Ex Post Facto claim is on review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit;5and that Petitioner’s claim is outside the scope of habeas corpus because prevailing 

on the claim would not necessarily accelerate Petitioner’s release from prison. See Docket No. 8. 

Petitioner filed an opposition on July 20, 2015, see Docket No. 9, and Respondent filed a reply on 

July 27, 2015, see Docket No. 10. 

On August 4, 2015, Petitioner was released from prison, and he is currently on parole. See

Docket No. 11 at 3.

//

//

 

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Petitioner initially, and correctly, named Eric Arnold, the warden of California State Prison –

Solano, as the respondent in this action. Because Petitioner has since been released on parole, 

Scott Kernan, the Secretary of California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is 

considered Petitioner’s custodian and is substituted as the proper respondent in this case, pursuant 

to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing 

Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254.

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The Court dismissed Petitioner’s other two claims – a due process claim that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the parole denial, and an Eighth Amendment claim that his sentence was 

disproportionate to the crime – for failure to state federal constitutional claims. See Docket No. 7 

at 2–4. 

5 On February 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit found inter alia that Marsy’s Law did not violate the Ex 

Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution because the petition to advance process set forth in 

the California Penal Code, whereby an inmate can advance his parole suitability hearing, afforded 

relief from the classwide risk of lengthened incarceration posed by Marsy’s Law. Gilman v. 

Brown, et al., Nos. 14-15613 and 14-15680, slip op. at 18–29 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2016).

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II. Analysis

The case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Federal Constitution deprives the 

Court of jurisdiction to hear moot cases. Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 71

(1983); NAACP., Western Region v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). “To 

satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some actual 

injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y, 464 U.S. 

at 70; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); NAACP, Western 

Region, 743 F.2d at 1353. “‘[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not 

merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 

67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 

415 U.S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Neither party has briefed the 

issue of mootness in these proceedings, although Respondent raised the issue of mootness in a 

footnote in the motion to dismiss. See Docket No. 8 at 2 n. 2. However, the Court must consider 

jurisdictional issues even when they are not raised by the parties. Bernhardt v. County of Los 

Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner was convicted in 1992 for second-degree murder and was sentenced to a 

term of nineteen-years-to-life in prison. See Pet. at 1. On March 1, 2015, the BPH granted 

Petitioner parole. See Docket No. 8 at 2 n. 2. On August 4, 2015, Petitioner was released from 

prison, and he is currently on parole. See Docket No. 11 at 3. The primary relief requested by 

Petitioner is a new parole hearing and release on parole.6See Pet. at 68. Petitioner has been

released on parole and he remains on parole at the present time. There is no further relief that the 

Court can grant Petitioner, and this petition is therefore moot. Cf. Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 

832, 837 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). Accordingly, the instant 

 

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Petitioner has additional requests in his prayer for relief, but the ultimate purposes of these 

requests are to secure his release on parole. Specifically, Petitioner requested that the Court issue 

an order to show cause; that the Court appoint counsel; that the Court issue an order allowing for 

expansion of the record as necessary; that the Court issue a briefing schedule; that the Court grant 

an evidentiary hearing for any unresolved factual or material issues; that the Court rule that there 

is no evidence supporting a finding of unsuitability for parole; that the Court order that Petitioner 

be granted a new parole hearing within sixty days of the Court’s order; and that the Court declare

Petitioner’s rights in the new parole hearing. See Pet. at 68.

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petition is therefore DISMISSED as moot.

III. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, Petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED as 

moot; Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition (Docket No. 8) is also DISMISSED as moot; 

and a certificate of appealability is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to substitute Scott Kernan, the 

Secretary of California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as the proper respondent 

in this case, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 2(a) of the 

Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

3/1/2016

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