Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-03264/USCOURTS-ca3-23-03264-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 23-3264

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SURENDER MALHAN; MARYANN PETRI; MICHAEL VOLPE,

Appellants

v.

CHRISTINE N. BEYER, Commissioner of New Jersey Dept. of Children and Families;

HEIDI W. CURRI; DAVID KATZ; PETER J. MELCHIONNE; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL NEW JERSEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-22-cv-06353)

District Judge: Hon. Susan D. Wigenton

_______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

November 4, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 30, 2024)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 23-3264 Document: 29 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/30/2024
2

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Surender Malhan, Maryann Petri, and Michael Volpe appeal the 

dismissal with prejudice of their First Amendment challenge to two state court orders. 

Seeing no substantive error in the District Court dismissing their claims but a technical 

one in its failure to do so without prejudice, we will vacate and remand for entry of a 

corrected order.

The District Court’s dismissal was premised, among other things, on its 

conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because all Appellees are shielded by 

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, judicial immunity, or quasi-judicial 

immunity. Although that conclusion was itself fatal to Appellants’ claims, they failed to 

address immunity at all in their opening brief on appeal and thus forfeited any opposition. 

That is because “consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) and Third 

Circuit Local Appellate Rule 28.1, . . . [an] opening brief must set forth and address each 

argument the appellant wishes to pursue in an appeal.” Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of 

Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017). Where the brief does not do 

so, “appellants simply [have] not appeal[ed] the district court’s conclusion[,] . . . and thus 

we do not consider [the] issue.”1

 Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793, 795 n.1 (3d Cir. 

1 Although we may “reach a forfeited issue in civil cases [in] truly exceptional 

circumstances,” that “narrow” exception is inapplicable here. Barna, 877 F.3d at 147

(internal quotation and citation omitted); see also id. (explaining “exceptional 

circumstances” exist where “refusal to reach the issue would result in a miscarriage of 

justice” or “manifest injustice” would result). Even in their reply brief, Appellants do not 

engage the substance of the District Court’s immunity analysis or ask the panel to look 

past their forfeiture.

Case: 23-3264 Document: 29 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/30/2024
3

1987). In view of Appellants’ forfeiture here, we will not disturb the District Court’s 

immunity rulings and consequent dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, there was a small but significant error in the order of dismissal. 

When a court dismisses a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the “res judicata 

effect” of such a decision “is limited to the question of jurisdiction,” and, because it is not 

an adjudication on the merits, “[t]he disposition of such a case [should] . . . be without 

prejudice.” In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw” Prods. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 155–56

(3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Where, as here, the district court 

instead has dismissed the case “with prejudice,” we generally “follow the dictates of our 

case law in the interest of clarity and consistency, and . . . require the District Court to 

amend its order.” Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1999). 

We do so here and will vacate and remand for that limited purpose.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order of dismissal

and remand for the limited purpose of entering such order without prejudice. 

Case: 23-3264 Document: 29 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/30/2024