Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01641/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01641-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1641

TEREZ COOK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANTHONY O’NEILL and TODD BALDWIN,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 09-CV-87 — Patricia J. Gorence, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED AUGUST 4, 2015— DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2015

____________________

Before POSNER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff, a prison inmate, filed 

suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two Marinette County 

(Wisconsin) Sheriff’s Department detectives, accusing them 

of having arrested him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He seeks $25,000 in compensatory and $50,000 

in punitive damages for the arrest and accompanying detention, seizure of personal property that he claims was worth 

$10,000, and infliction of emotional distress.

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He had committed an ugly home robbery in 2005 and 

been arrested nine days later in the apartment of a girlfriend, 

later his fiancée, Stacy Thede. Convicted in a Wisconsin state 

court of armed robbery, armed burglary, battery, theft of 

moveable property, mistreatment of an animal resulting in 

the animal’s (a dog’s) death, and false imprisonment, he was

sentenced to 40 years in prison to be followed by 18 years of 

extended supervision.

In the present case, the civil case, the defendant officers 

moved for summary judgment on the ground that Thede 

had consented to their entry into the apartment, where they 

had discovered and arrested Cook. When asked at Cook’s 

criminal trial whether she’d “let them [the officers] in,” 

Thede had testified “Yes,” but in the civil case she submitted 

an affidavit which states that when she had testified that she 

“let them in” she had meant that she “did not tell them to 

leave or did not object directly to them, but let them remain.” The district court granted summary judgment for the 

officers on the basis of their defense of consent, rejecting 

Thede’s affidavit as inconsistent with her testimony at the 

criminal trial.

The two detectives from Marinette County, accompanied 

by two officers from the Sheboygan City Police Department

who are not defendants in Cook’s suit, had arrived at 

Thede’s apartment house at about 11:00 a.m. on May 31, 

2005. The apartment house was in Sheboygan, though the 

robbery had occurred in Peshtigo, in Marinette County in 

northeastern Wisconsin, more than 150 miles from Sheboygan. That’s why the detectives were from Marinette 

County but the other officers were from Sheboygan—they

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No. 14-1641 3

would be familiar with the city and provide security for the 

detectives.

The detectives wanted to talk to Thede because they’d 

discovered that Cook’s robbery accomplice had been carrying a cellphone when he was arrested and a search of the 

cellphone had revealed calls to a phone registered to Thede.

According to their affidavits, the detectives thought the cellphone might have been used by the other suspect (who 

turned out to be Cook) on the night of the robbery. At the 

time, the detectives did not know that suspect’s legal name 

but knew that he went by “BN” (short for “Bad News”) and

by “Rex,” since a witness had reported obtaining gloves and 

duct tape for “BN” (also known as “Rex”) and driving with 

him to and from the robbery site.

The detectives buzzed for Thede at the building entrance. 

In response, without asking who they were, she pushed the 

button in her apartment that enabled entry to the building 

and met them in the hallway outside the apartment. Explaining that they needed to ask her some questions, they asked 

her whether there was anyone in the apartment. According 

to Thede and some contemporary police reports (including 

the report of one of the two Marinette detectives), she said 

yes, “a friend.” According to the other detective, and to a 

later affidavit by the detective whose initial report had said 

that Thede had not named her friend, she had told them that

“News” was in the apartment.

Thede asked the detectives in the hall whether she could 

reenter her apartment and change out of her pajamas before 

talking further with them. They said she could. She reentered, and either closed the door to the apartment or left it 

ajar. The officers opened the door (or if it was already slightCase: 14-1641 Document: 45 Filed: 09/23/2015 Pages: 16
4 No. 14-1641

ly open, opened it further) in order to be able to see into the 

apartment. They heard her talking to someone in another 

room, and while standing in the doorway without as yet 

having entered the apartment they yelled that she should 

bring the person she was talking to (who was Cook, with 

whom she was talking in a bedroom) into the living room 

where the officers could see him. When he appeared, they 

recognized him as the robbery suspect. They then entered 

the apartment. Within minutes the Sheboygan police officers 

arrested him after a warrant check revealed an outstanding 

arrest warrant against him for violating parole.

The district court refused to consider Thede’s affidavit,

which we mentioned earlier, as evidence in this case on the 

ground that it was a “sham.” A “sham affidavit” is an affidavit that is inadmissible because it contradicts the affiant’s

previous testimony (here, testimony Thede had given in the 

criminal prosecution of Cook) unless the earlier testimony 

was ambiguous, confusing, or the result of a memory lapse. 

Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2006); 

Bank of Illinois v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Systems, 75 F.3d 

1162, 1168–71 (7th Cir. 1996). Thede’s affidavit was amplification rather than contradiction, and so was not within the 

“sham” exclusionary rule. But the affidavit doesn’t help 

Cook’s case. It acknowledges that Thede agreed to speak 

with the officers, and although it says that she agreed to 

speak with them in the hallway it must have been obvious to 

her that the conversation was more likely to take place in the 

apartment than in the hallway outside it. What reason 

would she have to talk to four police officers in a public corridor—except to conceal Cook? But whether she consented 

to talk to them only in the hallway is irrelevant, because no

conversation took place; it would have been about Cook’s 

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No. 14-1641 5

whereabouts, which the officers discovered the moment they

saw him. Thede’s affidavit was therefore inadmissible, 

though not because it was a sham affidavit but because it 

was irrelevant.

The officers’ decision to hold open the door to the apartment so that they could see into the living room while Thede 

was getting dressed elsewhere in the apartment was simple 

prudence and thus within the scope of the “exigent circumstances” (i.e., emergency) exception to the requirement of a 

warrant. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856–63

(2011). Even if she didn’t identify the “friend” in the apartment as “News” (a question on which the evidence is in conflict), given the connection, evidenced by cellphone records,

between her and Cook’s accomplice, the “friend” in the 

apartment could well be “BN” (that is, Cook)—a violent, 

dangerous criminal, who might well be (though it turned 

out that he wasn’t) armed and dangerous. Had the officers

waited for Thede to get dressed and open the door to the 

apartment they might have found themselves six inches 

from the barrel of a gun. As in protective-sweep cases, the 

officers were justified in taking reasonable precautions to 

minimize the danger to themselves. Maryland v. Buie, 494 

U.S. 325, 333–35 (1990). Had they out of an abundance of 

caution instead removed themselves from potential danger, 

the suspect might have escaped. Compare Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100–01 (1990).

We thus needn’t decide whether, as the district court 

found, Thede consented to the officers’ entry into her apartment. Their opening the door (without entering) was prudent given the potential danger that the “friend” might pose. 

Once they saw him, they knew he was the suspect in the 

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robbery that they were investigating, and it would be absurd 

to think that they should have turned and left and applied 

for a search warrant. Think of what might have ensued had 

they been required to run off to get a search warrant before 

they could lawfully enter the apartment and arrest Cook. As 

soon as they left to get the warrant he would have split. 

True, some of the four officers might have remained in the 

hallway (while the others went to get a search warrant) and 

followed Cook as he fled. But he might have shaken off the 

tail, and still be at large today. Once he had left the apartment and they recognized him as the robbery suspect, they 

would have had probable cause to arrest him (or at the least 

to stop him long enough to do a warrant check), and they

could have done this without a search warrant because the 

hallway was a public space. But he might not have remained 

there. He might have outrun them. Moreover, Thede’s

apartment was on the second floor; Cook could have jumped 

out of a back window and fled without being seen by any of 

the officers.

Cook’s lawyer makes much of the fact that when the police saw Cook, Thede became upset and the police pulled her 

into the hallway to prevent her from interfering with their 

conversation with Cook. We can’t see the relevance of this 

contretemps; Thede is not the plaintiff.

Now suppose Thede and Cook had been co-owners or 

co-occupants of the apartment and one or both of them had

objected to entry by the police, and in addition that there 

had been no emergency justifying entry. Would that have 

changed the outcome of this case? No. The warrant to arrest 

Cook for violating parole is the key to this conclusion. The 

Supreme Court said in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602–

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No. 14-1641 7

03 (1980), “that an arrest warrant requirement may afford 

less protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will 

suffice to interpose the magistrate’s determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen. If there 

is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to 

persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to 

the officers of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in 

which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the 

suspect is within.” That was a dictum, but a considered rather than a casual one, and the lower courts including our 

own have treated it as a rule. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 285–86 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. 

Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262–64 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 423–24 (6th Cir. 2008).

It’s true that the warrants involved in the Payton case 

were for felonies, whereas the warrant in our case was for a 

parole violation, which might not be a felony (the record is 

silent on this point). But persons on parole have a diminished right of privacy, because parole is a form of custody, 

and so an arrest warrant for violation of parole would entitle

officers to enter the parolee’s home to arrest him. United 

States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 200 (1st Cir. 2006); see also

United States v. Hollis, 780 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (11th Cir. 2015); 

United States v. Collins, 699 F.3d 1039, 1041–42 (8th Cir. 2012); 

United States v. Thomas, supra, 429 F.3d at 285–86. Anyway 

Cook was not a resident of Thede’s apartment, and obviously the subject of an arrest warrant has no greater expectation 

of privacy if he is visiting someone rather than being at 

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home. United States v. Jackson, supra, 576 F.3d at 467–68; see 

also United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 

1983) (en banc).

The arrest warrant was all that the police needed in order 

to be justified in arresting Cook (setting to one side their justification based on an emergency situation). They didn’t 

know there was a warrant for his arrest, however, and we 

must consider whether that should matter. We think not, 

though not because of the “collective knowledge” doctrine, 

which allows an officer to stop, search, or arrest a suspect at 

the direction of his superiors even if the officer lacks firsthand knowledge of facts that would justify the action. See 

United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232–33 (1985). The officers who arrested Cook had not been told to arrest him because of the warrant outstanding against him; had they been 

told, they could have arrested him lawfully without knowing the basis on which the warrant had been issued. But 

what they did in arresting Cook was exactly what they 

would have done had they known about the warrant. They 

did the right thing without knowing it was the right thing; 

and since they did the right thing Cook has no valid objection.

Suppose there are outstanding arrest warrants for two 

persons, X and Y. One police officer has the warrant for X; 

he doesn’t know there is a warrant outstanding for Y as well. 

The officer arrests Y, mistakenly thinking that he is X. Is that 

a false arrest? Or is it serendipity? It’s the latter, and should 

not be punished by awarding damages to Y. Cf. Patton v. 

Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 1987). Notice the 

analogy to the “inevitable discovery” doctrine of Nix v. WilCase: 14-1641 Document: 45 Filed: 09/23/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1641 9

liams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44 (1984); see United States v. Witzlib, 

2015 WL 4664340, at *1–2 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2015).

Officers who enter premises without reasonable belief 

that they will find the person for whom they have a warrant 

will still be liable when their quarry turns out not to be present, and that should be sufficient to discourage officers 

from entering homes when they have no basis to believe 

they’ll find the suspect there. But that is beside the point of 

the present case. The officers didn’t enter Thede’s apartment

until they saw Cook and thus knew they’d found their suspect.

All this to one side, there is no basis for any of the damages that Cook seeks; and damages are the only relief that he 

does seek. “Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to 

any claim under Section 1983 against police officers for 

wrongful arrest.” Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 548 

(7th Cir. 2006). And that is when there’s no warrant—here 

there was one. Once Cook acknowledged to the officers that 

his street names were “BN” and “Rex,” there was additional

probable cause to arrest him for the robbery. As for damages 

for loss of personal property of Cook seized by the police 

and not returned, that property was seized after Thede, following Cook’s arrest, had consented to a search of the 

apartment. As it was her apartment, not Cook’s (he was not 

a joint tenant), she had authority to consent. As for damages 

for emotional distress caused by the entry of the police into 

the apartment, there is no basis for thinking that the arrest 

caused Cook more emotional distress than had the police 

entered clutching the arrest warrant. Given Cook’s recent 

commission of a violent robbery, moreover, it is hard to believe that the sight of police officers caused him emotional 

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distress; he is not the sensitive plant of which Shelley wrote 

in a poem of that name: “A Sensitive Plant in a garden 

grew,/ And the young winds fed it with silver dew,/ And it 

opened its fan-like leaves to the light,/ And closed them beneath the kisses of Night.”

Nominal or punitive damages are out of the question, 

too, given the arrest warrant. Any award of damages to 

Cook arising out of the entry of the police into the apartment 

that was not his would be a pure windfall. See Habitat Education Center v. U.S. Forest Service, 607 F.3d 453, 460–61 (7th Cir. 

2010); Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 302–05 (7th Cir. 1992).

The entry (if that is how peeking into the living room 

should be described) was justified by the need to protect the 

police officers from a possible assault by Cook; and at worst

the entry was a harmless error because of the existence of the 

warrant and the absence of any possible entitlement to damages. The judgment for the defendants is therefore

AFFIRMED.

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No. 14-1641 11

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. I 

agree we must affirm the judgment. All members of the panel 

agree we should affirm on a ground not briefed in this court: 

there was a warrant for Cook’s arrest, which meant the officers’ entry was justified even though they did not know about 

the warrant at the moment they entered Stacy Thede’s apartment. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1980); 

United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2009). On 

other issues addressed in the majority opinion, however, my 

views differ.

After reviewing the original briefs filed while plaintiff 

Cook was acting pro se, another panel of this court ordered 

recruitment of counsel and briefing on two issues. The first 

was the appropriate standard of review for the district court’s 

decision to exclude Thede’s affidavit explaining that she did 

not give her consent to the officers to enter her apartment. The 

second was whether, if Thede’s affidavit is considered, the record supports denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and we directed the parties to address the significance 

of Gerald M. v. Conneely, 858 F.2d 378, 385 (7th Cir. 1988), and 

cases following it. As requested, attorney Barack S. Echols and 

his colleagues at Kirkland & Ellis have provided able representation to Cook, for which the court is grateful.

I agree we do not need to decide the standard-of-review 

question here. Under any standard, I agree with the majority’s

conclusion that Thede’s affidavit was not a “sham” on the issue of consent for the police to enter her apartment. Ante at 4. 

Further explanation of that conclusion is needed, though.

During Cook’s criminal trial, Thede had been asked just 

one leading question on the issue of consent to enter:

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Q Did the detectives come in the apartment?

A Yes.

Q You let them in?

A Yes.

In her affidavit in this civil case, Thede explained that she had 

meant that once the police officers had entered her apartment

without her consent, she did not tell them to leave and did not 

object directly to their entry. She had not intended to give 

them permission to enter. She had simply not objected after 

they had entered without her permission. Thede testified in 

her affidavit that she told the detectives she was willing to talk 

with them in the hallway outside her door, that she closed the 

door when she went back in the apartment to change clothes, 

and that she never consented to allow them in.

Merely answering the door does not give police consent to 

enter a home. United States v. Sabo, 724 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 

2013), citing Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2004) 

(genuine issue of fact on consent to enter home required reversal of summary judgment for officer on Fourth Amendment claim); cf. United States v. Risner, 593 F.3d 692, 694–95 

(7th Cir. 2010) (consent to enter implied when resident called 

911 for emergency help). Closing the door was a clear signal 

the officers did not have Thede’s consent to enter. Thede’s affidavit is sufficient to distinguish this case from Gerald M., 858 

F.2d at 385, and thus to defeat summary judgment on both the 

merits and qualified immunity.

It is also well established, however, that a witness cannot 

create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment by contradicting her unequivocal prior testimony, at least not without a good explanation. E.g., AdelmanCase: 14-1641 Document: 45 Filed: 09/23/2015 Pages: 16
No. 14-1641 13

Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 520–21 (7th Cir. 1988). 

Thede’s trial testimony that she “let” the officers in was not 

unequivocal testimony, at least on the constitutional issue that 

arises in this civil suit.

To say that a person has “let” someone else enter her residence can cover a broad spectrum of actions and intentions. It 

could mean that the resident warmly welcomed the visitor. It 

could also mean only that the resident did not try to obstruct 

physically an unwelcome visitor’s entry. Or it could mean 

anything in between those two extremes.

The consent needed to allow police to enter a residence 

without a warrant lies along that continuum. The issue is 

whether, in light of the totality of circumstances, the resident 

indicated voluntary consent for the police to enter. See 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); Sabo, 724 

F.3d at 893–94 (resident gave implied consent by answering 

door and, in response to officer’s request to enter, stepping 

back and to the side to allow officer to enter); United States v. 

Risner, 593 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 2010).

In Cook’s criminal trial, there was no effort to pin Thede 

down to specific facts that would have placed her account at 

a specific point on that continuum between a warm welcome 

and coercion. That’s not surprising. Consent simply did not 

matter in that trial. (In their own testimony in the criminal 

trial, the officers did not even address the question of consent.) Thede was thus entirely within her rights in explaining 

in the affidavit what she had meant in her vague trial testimony on the point.

The sham doctrine must be applied with caution. It’s too 

easy otherwise for a district court to start making credibility 

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determinations as part of the summary judgment process: 

“Few honest witnesses testify at any length without at least 

occasional lapses of memory or needs for correction or clarification.” Castro v. DeVry University, Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 571 (7th 

Cir. 2015); accord, e.g., Bank of Illinois v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Systems, 75 F.3d 1162, 1169–70 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting 

need for caution: affidavit can be excluded as sham only 

where witness has given “clear answers to unambiguous 

questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of 

material fact”); Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 769 (7th 

Cir. 1999) (allowing defense witness’s affidavit to change deposition testimony after witness consulted relevant records);

see also Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., 760 F.3d 198, 

205–06 (2d Cir. 2014) (sham doctrine did not bar witness’s affidavit explaining earlier testimony); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e) (deponent must be allowed 30 days to review transcript and to 

make changes in substance or form of testimony).

Thede’s unexplained answer to one vague question in the 

criminal trial is just the sort of testimony that can properly be 

explained by a more detailed affidavit. The district court erred 

by granting summary judgment on the theory that the officers 

had consent to enter Thede’s apartment, and the majority does 

not find otherwise.1

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s view that the officers were entitled to summary judgment on the theory that 

exigent circumstances justified their entry into the apartment 

 1 The majority’s statement that Thede’s affidavit was “irrelevant,” 

ante at 5, is difficult to square with the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment and the district court’s decision that we are reviewing. Both relied exclusively on the issue of consent, based entirely on Thede’s ambiguous trial testimony.

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No. 14-1641 15

without either a warrant or consent. That theory was rejected 

by the district court and was not briefed for our court. In fact, 

the detectives had filed an earlier motion for summary judgment based on exigent circumstances. The district court denied that motion. See Cook v. O’Neill, No. 09-CV-87, Dkt. 55 

(E.D. Wis. March 7, 2011).

The officers’ actions were not consistent with a theory of 

exigent circumstances. Defendant Baldwin testified that 

Thede told them someone named “News” (a version of Cook’s 

nicknames, “Bad News” or “BN”) was in the apartment, so 

that Baldwin was immediately concerned for the safety of the 

officers and the public. Baldwin’s account is disputed, though, 

and other evidence shows that the officers then allowed 

Thede to return to the apartment to change her clothes.

That is not the response of officers who believe that exigent circumstances justify immediate entry to deal with an 

imminent threat to officer safety. Nor was there any indication 

that Thede or anyone else was in danger or that evidence was 

about to be destroyed. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, —, 

131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856–57 (2011) (summarizing exigent circumstances exception); Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 993 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (rejecting exigent circumstance rationale as a matter 

of law even where officers “arrived at a disorderly scene” and 

suspect was known to “get[] violent sometimes”).

Unjustified entry into a home is the “chief evil” against 

which the Fourth Amendment was directed, Sabo, 724 F.3d at 

893, quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980), so 

the bar for exigent circumstances is higher than what was 

shown by the undisputed evidence here. See, e.g., United 

States v. Venters, 539 F.3d 801, 807–09 (7th Cir. 2008) (warrantless entry justified where officers knew that children had been 

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in house for several days where adults were manufacturing 

methamphetamine, posing great risk to bystanders, but court 

emphasized narrowness of exigent circumstances finding). In 

my view, the district court was correct to deny summary judgment on a theory of exigent circumstances. The majority errs 

by reversing that determination and stretching the concept 

too far, especially without briefing and argument on the theory.

In the end, however, I agree we must affirm summary 

judgment for the defendants. If the facts were as plaintiff contends, the officers were lucky. It turned out there was already 

an active warrant for plaintiff’s arrest for a parole violation, 

even though the defendant officers did not know about it. See 

United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2009). I see 

no reason not to give the officer-defendants the benefit of the 

Jackson approach despite their lack of knowledge. If Thede

herself, on the other hand, were asserting a Fourth Amendment claim, on this record she would be entitled to a jury trial.

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