Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04624/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04624-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Plaintiff’s claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress

have been dismissed.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WADE ROBERTSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SHIRAZ QADRI, AVENIR RESTAURANT

GROUP, INC. and GREG ST. CLAIRE,

Defendants. /

No. C06-04624 JF (HRL)

ORDER:

1. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

STAY OF DISCOVERY, PROTECTIVE

ORDER AND APPOINTMENT OF A

SPECIAL MASTER;

2. DENYING DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST

FOR SANCTIONS;

3. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

COMPEL RE PAIZ DEPOSITION;

4. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

COMPEL RE QADRI DEPOSITION; AND

5. DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS

[Re: Docket Nos. 47, 68, 74, 77]

This is a tort action for alleged false imprisonment and false arrest1 stemming from a

dispute over a bar tab at Nola’s Restaurant and Bar (“Restaurant”) and subsequent events which

culminated in plaintiff’s DUI arrest. The Third Amended Complaint (the current and operative

pleading) alleges diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff Wade Robertson is a California attorney who

is proceeding pro se. According to the complaint, on the night in question, plaintiff had been a

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 103 Filed 04/20/07 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

patron at the Restaurant. Plaintiff claims that defendant Qadri, the Restaurant’s general

manager, falsely imprisoned him for seventeen minutes at the bar. The complaint further

alleges that, after plaintiff left the Restaurant, Qadri conducted a (false) citizen’s arrest by

summoning a police officer and reporting that plaintiff was getting into a car to drive while

intoxicated. Defendants deny any wrongdoing. According to them, plaintiff attempted to settle

his final bill and discussed a discrepancy with Qadri. They contend that plaintiff’s subsequent

arrest was the consequence of his own decision to drive while intoxicated. Plaintiff denies

having consumed any alcohol.

Presently before this court are the parties’ discovery motions relating to the conduct of

the depositions of Qadri and John Paiz, a bartender who worked at the Restaurant on the night

in question. Plaintiff deposed Qadri for approximately 1 hour (excluding breaks). The next

day, plaintiff deposed Paiz, who was being represented by defense counsel. Paiz’s examination

lasted for about 2.5 hours (excluding breaks). Defendants contend that plaintiff conducted the

depositions in a vexatious and harassing manner. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(4), they now

move to stay discovery and for a protective order. Defendants agree to produce Qadri and Paiz

so that their depositions may be completed; however, they request that a special master be

appointed to oversee the remainder of all depositions to be taken in this action. Additionally,

defendants contend that plaintiff’s conduct warrants the imposition of monetary sanctions.

Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion and has filed counter-motions to compel testimony

from Qadri and Paiz. He asserts that defense counsel made improper objections and unilaterally

terminated the depositions without justification. He also claims that defense counsel and

defendant St. Claire engaged in unprofessional and demeaning conduct designed to disrupt the

examination. With respect to defendant Qadri, plaintiff seeks an order requiring Qadri to (a)

provide written answers to the questions he refused to answer in deposition; and (b) appear for

another day of deposition (minus the time that he has already appeared for examination). As for

Paiz, plaintiff moves for an order requiring Paiz to provide written answers to the questions he

refused to answer in deposition. Nonetheless, plaintiff also requests that the court terminate

Paiz’s deposition.

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 103 Filed 04/20/07 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2 Plaintiff asserts a host of evidentiary objections to a number of statements

made by defense counsel, Patrick Kerwin, in two separate declarations. Generally, the

disputed statements comprise defense counsel’s characterization of (a) the ultimate issues of

liability; (b) the conduct of this lawsuit generally; and (c) the conduct of the Qadri and Paiz

depositions. Plaintiff objects that the statements were made without establishing personal

knowledge of the matters asserted, are argumentative, constitute inadmissible hearsay, are

unsupported by the record, and violate Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Indeed, much of defense counsel’s

declarations appear to merely replicate the arguments and assertions in defendants’ briefs. 

At any rate, this court is not ruling upon the merits of the parties’ claims and defenses. For

purposes of resolving the instant discovery dispute, this court has based its findings upon its

independent review of the Qadri and Paiz deposition transcripts.

3

The parties’ arguments made in support of and in opposition to their respective motions

are the same, and the court will treat both motions together in this order. Upon consideration of

the papers filed by the parties,2

 as well as the arguments presented at the March 20, 2007

hearing, this court issues the following order:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Stay of Discovery

At the time defendants’ discovery motion was filed, their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint was pending before the District Court. They requested that all

discovery be stayed pending the resolution of that motion. Since then, however, the District

Court has ruled on defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for a stay

of discovery is DENIED AS MOOT.

2. Parties’ Motions re Qadri’s Deposition

Defendants move for a protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(4). They claim that

plaintiff repeatedly asked questions about irrelevant and private matters solely to harass Qadri,

waste time and increase costs. Plaintiff moves to compel Qadri’s answers to several deposition

questions, arguing that defense counsel improperly instructed Qadri not to answer questions in

violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1). He also argues that defendants improperly and unilaterally

terminated the deposition.

Rule 30(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] person may

instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a

limitation directed by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4).” FED.R.CIV.P.

30(d)(1) (emphasis added). Insofar as defendants are seeking relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 103 Filed 04/20/07 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3 Here, the court refers to the questions by the number assigned to them by

plaintiff. (See Plaintiff’s “Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony from the Defendants Re: 

Qadri,” Ex. B).

4

30(d)(4), the court does not find, at the outset, that counsel’s instructions not to answer or his

termination of the deposition were improper.

Nevertheless, defendants maintain that Qadri should not now be compelled to answer

the fifteen or so questions which are the subject of plaintiff’s motion to compel. (See Plaintiff’s

“Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony from the Defendants Re: Qadri,” Exs. B, F, G and

J). Based upon its review of the Qadri deposition transcript, this court rules as follows:

Plaintiff’s motion to compel answers to Question Nos. 1-6, 14 and 15 is DENIED.3

Even under the broad standard of relevance set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), plaintiff has

failed to show the relevance of questions seeking information about (a) whether Qadri has ever

been arrested, (b) whether Qadri has ever been cited by a police officer for any alcohol-related

incident, (c) Qadri’s social security number, telephone number and cell phone number, (d)

Qadri’s prior employment history, (e) whether Qadri is able to make impromptu staff

scheduling changes, and (f) whether a staff schedule is physically posted.

Plaintiff’s motion as to Question No. 10 (see Mot., Ex. B) is GRANTED. Here, plaintiff

apparently sought to confirm certain points about the Restaurant’s business. Defendants

objected to the question on the ground that it misstated Qadri’s prior testimony. Plaintiff

apparently also takes issue with defense counsel’s comment to “clean [the question] up.” (See

Robertson Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A (Qadri Depo. at (46:10-48:6)). Perhaps plaintiff could have rephrased the question to eliminate the basis for the objection. Nevertheless, whether or not the

question misstates Qadri’s testimony, the record will speak for itself. Qadri could have

answered, subject to the stated objection. To the extent plaintiff chooses to pursue this question

when Qadri’s deposition is resumed, Qadri shall answer.

Plaintiff’s motion as to Question Nos. 7, 8, 9, 11-13 (see Mot., Ex. B) and the questions

identified in his motion at Exhibits F and G is GRANTED. The court concludes that plaintiff

fairly should be given some leeway to explore the Restaurant’s business operations, corporate

structure and staff. To the extent Qadri has an understanding of the term “business operations,”

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4 The court refers to the questions at issue by the number assigned to them by

plaintiff. (See Plaintiff’s “Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony from the Defendants Re: 

Paiz,” Ex. B).

5

plaintiff is entitled to know Qadri’s (a) understanding of that term and (b) answer based on that

understanding.

However, plaintiff’s request to have Qadri answer deposition questions in writing is

DENIED. Qadri’s deposition will be resumed as set out below.

3. Parties’ Motions re Paiz’s Deposition

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(4), defendants argue that a protective order is also

warranted as to Paiz’s deposition. They claim that plaintiff conducted Paiz’s deposition in a

similarly vexatious manner. Plaintiff moves to compel Paiz to answer several deposition

questions, arguing that defense counsel improperly instructed Qadri not to answer questions in

violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1). He also argues that the examination was unfairly cut short

because he had not been given prior notice of Paiz’s scheduling conflict that day.

For the reasons stated above in connection with defendant Qadri, the court does not find,

at the outset, that defense counsel’s instructions not to answer were improper. Although

plaintiff now complains that he was not given prior notice of Paiz’s scheduling conflict, the

record shows that at the end of his deposition session, the parties mutually agreed to continue

Paiz’s deposition. (Robertson Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A (Paiz Depo. at 155:11-18)). Plaintiff contends

that defendants’ instant discovery motion is contrary to the agreement to continue Paiz’s

deposition. However, defendants are entitled to have their motion for protective order resolved

before Paiz’s deposition is resumed. See FED.R.CIV.P. 30(d)(4) (“Upon demand of the

objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition must be suspended for the time

necessary to make a motion for an order.”).

As for the ten questions that plaintiff says Paiz should now be compelled to answer, this

court has also read the entire transcript of Paiz’s deposition. Based upon that review:

Plaintiff’s motion to compel answers to Question Nos. 1-6 and 8-10 is DENIED.4

 All of

these questions were previously or eventually answered by Paiz. (See Robertson Decl., ¶ 5, Ex.

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A, (Paiz Depo. at 12:3-17, 20:7-21:6, 23:16-22, 24:1-7, 27:8-15, 30:6-20, 53:5-54:14, 58:5-22,

124:4-24, 140:12-17, 143:11-14)).

Plaintiff’s motion to compel Paiz’s answer to Question No. 7 is GRANTED. Plaintiff

apparently seeks information about why police officers might enter the Restaurant. Defendants

object that the question is argumentative and calls for speculation. Nonetheless, the court

concludes that Paiz can answer to the extent he knows. If he truly does not know, then Paiz can

say so. Plaintiff’s request for order directing Paiz to answer Question No. 7 in writing,

however, is DENIED.

Curiously, plaintiff also seeks an order terminating Paiz’s deposition. Plaintiff

apparently feels that any further examination will be fruitless, given the past conduct of defense

counsel and defendants. Plaintiff’s request to terminate the deposition nonetheless is rather

odd, particularly when he also claims that he has not had a fair opportunity to examine Paiz. 

This court declines to order the deposition terminated. In any event, no such order is necessary

– plaintiff is free to depose Paiz or not as he chooses.

4. The Parties’ Motions for Sanctions

Each side argues that the opposing party has engaged in unprofessional and

inappropriate conduct justifying an award of monetary sanctions. Plaintiff correctly notes that

defendants did not file a separate motion for sanctions as required by the court’s Civil Local

Rules. At the motion hearing, plaintiff also made a pitch to have defendants’ attorney

disqualified and replaced with new counsel.

As noted above, this court has carefully reviewed the transcripts of the Qadri and Paiz

depositions in their entirety. The record presented indicates that neither side’s conduct has been

particularly commendable. Accordingly, the court DENIES sanctions to both sides.

5. Defendants’ Motion to Appoint a Special Master

Defendants argue that a special master is needed to supervise all depositions. Plaintiff

contends that a special master is unnecessary, and he declines, in any event, to split the costs

associated with any such appointment.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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7

Based on the record presented, and to the extent that plaintiff intends to continue to

examine witnesses himself, this court finds that some sort of supervision is necessary; and, this

court agrees to supervise the remainder of Qadri’s deposition as set out below. Nonetheless, the

court emphasizes that the instant discovery motions present an unfortunate state of affairs

requiring judicial intervention of a nature which this court has not previously been called upon

to provide – and one which it is not inclined to provide more than once. Additionally, if the

parties and counsel continue to find that they are unable to comport themselves with civility and

basic professionalism, the court will revisit the question of appointing a special master, with the

costs to be split by both sides.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for the appointment of a special master is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff indicates that he presently does not intend to proceed with

Paiz’s deposition. This court will supervise the remainder of Qadri’s deposition. The

deposition will be limited to two additional hours, without prejudice to plaintiff to request more

time (subject to the seven-hour limit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 30), provided that plaintiff has been

efficient in his examination and can demonstrate that more time is necessary for a fair

examination. Plaintiff shall be responsible for securing a court reporter. The parties shall

meet/confer and then contact this court’s chambers with proposed mutually agreeable

dates/times for the resumption of Qadri’s deposition. The court will deal firmly with any

unprofessional or inappropriate conduct during the deposition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

April 20, 2007

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 103 Filed 04/20/07 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A copy of this order will be mailed to:

Wade Robertson

Post Office Box 20185

Stanford, CA 94309

Pro Se Plaintiff

Patrick C. Kerwin 

Kerwin & Kerwin, LLP

968 Woodside Road

P.O. Box 610148

Redwood City, CA 94061-0148

Counsel for Defendant

Dated: _____________________________

Chambers of Magistrate Judge Lloyd

4/20/07 /s/

Case 5:06-cv-04624-JF Document 103 Filed 04/20/07 Page 8 of 8