Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00903/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00903-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)(1), John Dovey is hereby substituted as

the defendant in this action for Jeanne Woodford. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNIE LEE BUTLER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-0903 MCE KJM P

vs.

JOHN DOVEY,1

Director of the California

Department of Corrections,

Defendant. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a California prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an

action for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff sues the Director of the

California Department of Corrections in his official capacity, and seeks injunctive and

declaratory relief. Before the court is defendant’s November 5, 2004 motion for summary

judgment.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

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1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On March 2, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

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 Plaintiff asserts three causes of action in his June 18, 2003 amended complaint. Am.

Compl. at 8-9. The first cause of action was dismissed by order of the district judge on April 8,

2005. Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action remain active. 

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II. Plaintiff’s Allegations2

Plaintiff claims his rights under the Eighth Amendment and under the Americans

With Disabilities Act (ADA) are being violated by prison officials’ failure to house plaintiff in a

cell by himself. Plaintiff asserts he has a mental problem that causes him to get into fights with

cellmates, and prison officials are demonstrating deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety by

not celling him alone.

III. Eighth Amendment

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1991)

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To prove an Eighth Amendment

claim for failure to protect an inmate from violence, the inmate must show that he was

incarcerated under conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm,” and that a prison

official displayed “deliberate indifference” to that risk. Id. at 834. Defendant argues, among

other things, that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether any prison

official is being deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s safety by not celling him alone. 

“[R]unning a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise,

planning and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the

legislative and executive branches of government.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987). 

For this reason, the court must afford deference to the administrative decisions of prison officials. 

Id. 

From the record, it appears that plaintiff was last examined by a mental health

professional on February 17, 2004 when plaintiff arrived at Pelican Bay State Prison. Mem. 

P. & A. in Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. (MSJ), Ex. A at 82. The professional noted at that time that

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 Plaintiff also presents evidence indicating that he has been involved in two additional

altercations. Pl.’s Decl. in Supp. of Opp’n (Pl.’s Decl.) at ¶¶ 31-32; Opp’n, Ex. A at 1-2. But

plaintiff fails to provide evidence that either altercation was with a cellmate.

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plaintiff had no mental health needs and that plaintiff did not wish to participate in any sort of

mental health treatment program. Id. Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence suggesting this is

not an accurate assessment of plaintiff’s current condition. Plaintiff himself provides evidence

indicating that on October 26, 2004 he appeared before a classification committee and was found

to be free of mental health services needs. Opp’n at 7 & Ex. A at 73. At that hearing, plaintiff

also indicated he would abstain from violence. Id., Ex. A at 73.

The record before the court contains evidence indicating plaintiff has been

involved in three altercations with cellmates over the last six years.3 These events occurred in

October 1999, id., Ex. A at 3-5, October 2002, id., Ex. A at 30-32, and January 2003, MSJ, Ex. A

at 66. But plaintiff fails to present any evidence suggesting these incidents were due to a mental

illness. After the 2002 incident, plaintiff was reported by a mental health professional as having

no signs of psychosis. Id., Ex. A at 65. With respect to January 2003 incident, the correctional

officer who responded to the fight said both inmates strongly smelled of alcohol. Id., Ex. A at

66. A clinician who examined plaintiff shortly after this fight indicated that plaintiff did not

suffer from psychosis and was stable without taking medication. Id., Ex. A at 67. 

Plaintiff has presented evidence from early 2002 indicating that various

Department of Corrections health officials have thought that plaintiff suffers from some sort of

mental impairment, Opp’n, Ex. A at 14-15, 42, but defendant presents ample evidence with his

motion suggesting plaintiff does not currently suffer from a mental illness. See MSJ at 3-9, 

Ex. A.

Considering the record before the court, there is no evidence creating a triable fact

as to whether the Director or any other prison official is being deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s safety by housing plaintiff in a cell with another person. In plaintiff’s most recent

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 In his reply to plaintiff’s opposition defendant acknowledges that plaintiff alleges an

ADA claim and asserts the claim fails. Defendant presents no law in support of his position. In

any case, it is not appropriate to make new arguments in a reply. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed.,

497 U.S. 871, 894-95 (1990).

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evaluation he was found not to be mentally ill. Plaintiff has not sought mental health treatment

nor has it been determined that he should be subjected to treatment against his will. Plaintiff has

presented nothing that should cause the Director or any other person making custodial decisions

about plaintiff to disregard the opinion of the mental health professional that evaluated plaintiff,

and nothing suggesting that failure to disregard the opinion of that professional amounts to

deliberate indifference. Defendant should be granted summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

IV. ADA

Plaintiff claims that his being celled alone is mandated by the ADA. While

defendant does not challenge plaintiff’s ADA claim,4 plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim.

Persons covered by the ADA are:

individual[s] with a disability who, with or without reasonable

modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of

architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the

provision of auxiliary aids and services, meet . . . the essential

eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the

participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12131.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that plaintiff’s disability is that he is mentally

ill, plaintiff is still not covered by the ADA in this instance because he is not seeking

participation in a “program” or “activity,” or the “receipt of services.” See Pennsylvania Dept. of

Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (prison related “programs,” “services,” or

“activities” under 42 U.S.C. § 12131 include, for example, recreational activities, medical

services, educational programs, vocational programs and contact visitation). Even if singlecelling could loosely be described as a program or activity from which plaintiff is denied

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participation, or a service plaintiff does not receive, plaintiff does not allege, nor does any

evidence before the court suggest, that plaintiff is being denied participation or the receipt of

services because of his purported disability. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted under the ADA. See Weinreich v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114

F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997) (to state a claim under the ADA, plaintiff must assert, among other

things, that his disability is the reason he is excluded from participation in a program or activity,

or denied a service).

In light of the foregoing the court will recommend, sue sponte, that plaintiff’s

ADA claim be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (court has the authority to dismiss, at any time, claims brought by those

proceeding in forma pauperis for, among other things, failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted).

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s November 5, 2004 motion for summary judgment be granted;

2. Defendant be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim; and 

3. Plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities Act claim be dismissed with prejudice

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

/////

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 7, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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butl0903.57

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