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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-3325 

EUGENE BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

LARRY J. PHILLIPS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 10-cv-3163 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge. 

____________________ 

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 2, 2015* — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 14, 2015 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and ROVNER,

Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Eugene Brown is civilly committed 

to the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center under Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. The Act 

 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral 

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and 

the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

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2 No. 14-3325 

authorizes detention of persons who are determined 

through a civil proceeding to be a “sexually violent person.” 

See 725 ILCS 207/40. Brown and 17 others confined at 

Rushville sued the facility’s officials and clinical staff under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. They allege that policies restricting their 

access to movies, video games, and video game consoles violate the First Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and only Brown appealed. Because the record does not contain a sufficient basis 

to conclude that the ban on movies and video games is reasonably related to the state’s interests in security and rehabilitation, we vacate the judgment in part. 

A “sexually violent person” includes someone who has 

been convicted of a sexually violent offense and “suffers 

from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable 

that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.” 725 

ILCS 207/5(f). Brown was convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual assault for raping adult women. See In re Commitment of Brown, No. 1-11-0732, 2012 WL 6962055, *1, *3–4 

(Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 30, 2012). He was diagnosed with paraphilia (specifically, sexual attraction to non-consenting women) 

and personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic 

traits. Id. at *4–5. If, as in Brown’s case, a court or jury finds 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is sexually violent, he is committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services “for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent 

person.” 725 ILCS 207/5(a), 207/35(f), 207/40(a). 

Before this lawsuit began, Rushville prohibited its residents from watching all R-rated movies and playing any Mrated video game. (The rating “M” for “mature” is defined 

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No. 14-3325 3

by the Entertainment Software Rating Board as denoting material that is “generally suitable for ages 17 and up” and may 

“contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content 

and/or strong language.” See ESRB Ratings Guide, 

ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, 

http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratings_guide.jsp (last visited 

Sept. 3, 2015).) After Brown sued to contend that these prohibitions violated the First Amendment, Rushville replaced 

its complete ban on all R and M-rated media with a list of 

banned movies and video games. In addition, after this suit 

began, Rushville discovered that two residents were using a 

video game console to access the internet to view forbidden 

material. So Rushville also banned residents from possessing 

video game consoles capable of accessing the internet. These 

new restrictions led Brown to contend that Rushville had retaliated against him for suing. 

The most recent list of censored content bans 353 movies 

and 232 video games. Rushville says that this list includes 

only movies “with sexual and/or graphic violent themes 

deemed especially counter-therapeutic.” Therapists at Rushville apparently review a movie or video game upon a resident’s request for the media. For example, one movie titled 

Immortals, an action film about the Greek demi-god Theseus, 

was banned because, according to a therapist’s review, the 

movie depicts a “[n]ude woman–seen from back and side, 

sex scenes (nothing is actually seen, but it is simulated), bare 

breasts[,] and implied sex” and “[s]trong bloody violence 

and [s]exuality.” 

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Relying 

on Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the defendants maintained that dual policies banning media content and game 

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consoles are constitutional because they are reasonably related to the state’s interests in rehabilitation and security. To 

support the ban on movies and video games, the defendants 

supplied two affidavits, one from Dr. Shan Jumper, a psychologist and the clinical director at Rushville (and a defendant), and Gregg Scott, the program director at Rushville 

(also a defendant). Dr. Jumper swears that the ban promotes 

“a safe and healthy environment,” but he does not explain 

why. Scott repeats Dr. Jumper’s conclusion, but also omits 

the basis for it. Scott states only that it “would be contrary” 

to treatment and security goals “to permit a resident to have 

uncontrolled access to movies and video games of his preference containing graphic depictions of violence, sex, drug 

use, and criminal culture when he is being detained and 

treated for a mental disorder related to a prior act(s) of sexual violence.” Brown criticized these opinions for two reasons: 

the clinical staff has never evaluated any detainee to assess 

whether watching sex and violence adversely affects them, 

and the affiants relied on common sense rather than any 

empirical data or research to support their conclusions. The 

defendants candidly acknowledged their lack of data, explaining that “[t]he analysis to determine if policies are reasonably related to the facility’s interest does not focus on an 

individual assessment and do not need to be supported by 

empirical evidence.” 

The defendants also offered evidence to justify, on both 

therapeutic and security grounds, the ban on game consoles. 

Scott asserted in his affidavit that the policy prevents “residents from frustrating their treatment by having unrestricted 

access to counter-therapeutic information, contacting the victims of their sexually violent offenses, or engaging in further 

crime.” The ban, he added, also prevents residents from usCase: 14-3325 Document: 33 Filed: 09/14/2015 Pages: 10
No. 14-3325 5

ing the console’s hard drive to smuggle “contraband” into 

the facility (like child pornography) and eliminates consoles 

as an “unregulated currency.” In response to Brown’s argument that the policy is overbroad because it need ban only 

Wi-Fi-enabled consoles, the defendants submitted an affidavit from Jason White, an information systems analyst at the 

facility. White stated that even if consoles could be purchased without Wi-Fi hardware, the consoles still could 

wirelessly connect to the internet by plugging into the console’s Ethernet or USB port a device that would convert the 

cable-only device to a wireless device. A resident could then 

connect to the internet in several ways, including simply 

asking outsiders to emit a wireless signal from a cell phone 

in the parking lot. 

The district court granted the defendants’ motions for 

summary judgment. First, it ruled that Turner’s reasonablerelationship standard, rather than the more exacting scrutiny 

that Brown preferred, applied to civil detainees. Then it assessed the restriction on movies and video games. It concluded that the affidavits of Dr. Jumper and Scott articulated 

“legitimate security, safety, and therapeutic goals which the 

restrictions are logically designed to achieve.” The court 

added that their conclusions are “rational based on the nature of the facility and the nature of the range of mental disorders from which the detainees suffer.” The court also applied Turner to conclude that the policy prohibiting most 

consoles is reasonably related to the facility’s interests in 

preventing residents from obtaining, storing, and trading 

pornography and “other counter-therapeutic materials.” Finally, because the policies do not violate the residents’ First 

Amendment rights, the court concluded that the retaliation 

claims also fail. 

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6 No. 14-3325 

Brown maintains on appeal that the district court erred in 

upholding Rushville’s bans. As a preliminary matter, we 

address what legal standard governs civil detainees’ First 

Amendment claims. Other circuits have applied Turner to 

evaluate civil detainees’ civil-rights claims. See Pesci v. Budz, 

730 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2013); Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 

690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir. 2012); Ahlers v. Rabinowitz, 

684 F.3d 53, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2012). We too have said that “it 

would not be too difficult to adopt [Turner’s reasonablerelationship] standard for claims by civil detainees,” so long 

as the standard is modified to recognize “the different legitimate interests that governments have with regard to prisoners as compared with civil detainees.” Lane v. Williams, 

689 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2012). One recognized difference 

is that “[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed 

are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of 

confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 

307, 321–22 (1982). We also have recognized as legitimate the 

state’s interests in the security of the facility and the incapacitation and treatment of civil detainees. Lane, 689 F.3d at 884; 

Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Keeping in mind the detainee’s and state’s interests when 

the state detains sexually violent persons, we think that 

Turner’s rational-relationship test provides the appropriate 

structure to analyze Brown’s claims. Turner requires that, for 

the state to restrain a civil detainee’s First Amendment 

rights, the restraint must be rationally connected to the 

state’s interests—here, security and the rehabilitation and 

treatment of sexually violent persons. To demonstrate the 

rational relationship, the state must “show more than a formalistic logical connection between a regulation and 

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No. 14-3325 7

[its institutional] objective.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 535 

(2006). Rather, it must present “some evidence to show that 

the restriction is justified.” King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 

415 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Applying this standard, we conclude that the defendants’ 

evidence at summary judgment is too feeble to justify the 

ban on movies and video games. Defendants argue that 

“common sense” justifies prohibiting sex offenders from 

viewing sexually explicit materials. See Waterman v. Farmer, 

183 F.3d 208, 214–15 (3d Cir. 1999) (although expert testimony and research showed an adequate connection between 

keeping pornography from incarcerated sex offenders and 

rehabilitating them, “common sense” also supports the ban). 

But, as we’ve recently said in other contexts, some data is 

needed to connect the goal of reducing the recidivism of sex 

offenders with a ban on their possessing legal adult pornography. See United States v. Taylor, No. 14-3790, 2015 WL 

4653148, *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (overturning a condition 

of supervised release that prohibited a person convicted of 

trafficking child pornography from possessing legal adult 

pornography; no evidence suggested that the legal material 

contributed to the illegal activity); United States v. Siegel, 

753 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that allowing a 

rapist of adult women access to legal pornography can decrease likelihood of recidivism because research shows that 

viewing legal pornography can be a safe outlet for sexual 

behavior). 

The record at this point does not contain a basis for linking the ban on media content to Rushville’s therapeutic or 

security goals. The defendants, through Dr. Jumper and 

Scott, have offered a conclusion that eliminating “counterCase: 14-3325 Document: 33 Filed: 09/14/2015 Pages: 10
8 No. 14-3325 

therapeutic” images of graphic content furthers a resident’s 

treatment and security. But a bare assertion that Rushville’s 

ban on sexual material promotes treatment is insufficient to 

justify summary judgment on a First Amendment claim. 

See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing dismissal of First Amendment challenge to keeping sexually explicit magazines from all prisoners, reasoning that 

mere assertion of rehabilitative effect is inadequate); Wolf v. 

Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 2002) (reversing decision 

upholding restriction on R-rated and NC-17-rated movies in 

federal prison where “brief, conclusory statement” drawing 

connection between policy and penological interest insufficient). 

The defendants’ assertions are insufficient to justify 

summary judgment no matter whether they are treated as 

lay or expert opinions. The defendants apparently offered 

the affidavits as lay opinion testimony, since they did not 

comply with the rules of civil procedure required to submit 

expert affidavits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Meyers v. Nat’l R.R. 

Passenger Corp., 619 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2010). But the affidavits do not disclose what “perceptions” the lay opinions 

are based on, so they do not comply with Federal Rule of 

Evidence 701 (lay opinions must be “rationally based on 

witness’s perception”). The opinions would be entitled to no 

more weight if we considered them from an expert because 

“[a]n expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies 

nothing of value to the judicial process.” Wendler & Ezra, 

P.C. v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 521 F.3d 790, 791 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. 

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); Rowe v. Gibson, No. 14-3316, 

2015 WL 4934970, *5 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2015); Finn v. Warren 

Cnty., 768 F.3d 441, 452 (6th Cir. 2014); Guile v. United States, 

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No. 14-3325 9

422 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 2005). And although a party who 

is qualified may serve as an expert witness, see Braun v. 

Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 238 (7th Cir. 1996), Tagatz v. 

Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1042 (7th Cir. 1988), we’ve 

recently observed that an opinion lacking a legitimate basis, 

received from a defendant who is proffered as an expert, is 

insufficient to justify summary judgment. See Rowe, 2015 WL 

4934970 at *9. Thus summary judgment here was premature; 

further proceedings are needed to see what the defendants 

based their opinions on. 

The ban on video game consoles capable of accessing the 

internet is another matter—the record evidence shows that 

in two ways the policy bears a rational relationship to the 

facility’s interest in security. First, consoles capable of accessing the internet allow detainees to contact victims of their 

crimes; the ban on these consoles thus advances the state’s 

interest in protecting the public. Second, because these consoles permit inmates to download, manipulate, share, and 

store illegal pornography, the ban also promotes the state’s 

legitimate interest in preventing crime. Because this evidence went unrebutted, summary judgment on the consoleban claim was proper. 

Summary judgment for the defendants also was proper 

with respect to Brown’s retaliation claims. First, Brown cannot show that Rushville’s decision to replace its universal 

ban on movies and games, and censor only listed movies 

and games, was “likely to deter First Amendment activity in 

the future.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012). 

The modified policy, which Rushville enacted after Brown 

sued, is less restrictive than the one it replaced. Second, as to 

the policy prohibiting game consoles, it is irrelevant if RushCase: 14-3325 Document: 33 Filed: 09/14/2015 Pages: 10
10 No. 14-3325 

ville may have had a retaliatory motive for enacting it if, as 

we’ve concluded, the policy also is supported by a legitimate 

reason. See Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 

2009) (en banc) (“The Supreme Court did not search for ‘pretext’ in Turner; it asked instead whether a rule is rationally 

related to a legitimate goal); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567–68 (9th Cir. 2004) (prisoner’s retaliation claim fails 

where action taken serves legitimate correctional goal). 

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment with respect to 

Brown’s challenge to the policy restricting his access to movies and video games, and REMAND for further proceedings. 

Brown has abandoned his request for monetary damages, so 

the only defendant remaining on remand is Gregg Scott, the 

current program director responsible for implementing policies at Rushville. In all other respects we AFFIRM the district 

court’s judgment. 

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