Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02776/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02776-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 891
Nature of Suit: Agricultural Acts
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2776

VLM FOOD TRADING 

INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ILLINOIS TRADING COMPANY,

THE OBEE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP,

and LAWRENCE N. OBERMAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 8154 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 24, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 21, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. This contract dispute between plaintiff VLM Food Trading International, Inc., a Canadian agricultural supplier, and defendant Illinois Trading Company, 

an Illinois produce reseller, comes to us for a second time.

(Illinois Trading is not the only defendant; its president and 

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a controlling partnership are also named.) The issue in the 

first appeal was whether the United Nations Convention on 

Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applies to the 

parties’ dispute. We held that it does. VLM Food Trading Int’l, 

Inc. v. Illinois Trading Co. (“VLM I”), 748 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 

2014). On remand the district court ruled that under the 

Convention a contested attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s 

trailing invoices was not a part of the parties’ contracts and 

granted summary judgment accordingly.

On appeal VLM challenges the judge’s analysis of the attorney’s fees provision under the Convention. VLM also 

takes issue with the judge’s decision to give two of the three 

defendants the benefit of this ruling even though an order of 

default had been entered against them.

We reject these arguments and affirm. The district judge 

correctly held that because Illinois Trading never expressly 

assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing 

invoices, under the Convention that term did not become a

part of the parties’ contracts. We also uphold the judge’s 

finding that VLM waived its right to rely on the entry of default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. 

I. Background

VLM is a Montreal-based agricultural supplier. Illinois 

Trading is a reseller of agricultural produce. We laid out the 

full history of this litigation in VLM I, see id. at 782–84, and 

recount the relevant facts for purposes of this second appeal.

Starting in June 2012, VLM sold frozen potatoes to Illinois Trading through nine separate transactions without incident. Illinois Trading then encountered financial difficulty 

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No. 14-2776 3

and failed to pay for the next nine shipments from VLM. The 

parties agree that each transaction occurred the same way. 

First, Illinois Trading sent a purchase order specifying the 

item, quantity, price, and place of delivery for the potatoes. 

Second, VLM responded with an e-mail confirming the 

terms of the sale. Third, VLM shipped the order and Illinois 

Trading accepted it. Finally, VLM followed up by mail with 

an invoice. Importantly for us, the trailing invoices included

a provision purporting to make Illinois Trading liable for interest and collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the 

contracts. 

When Illinois Trading stopped paying its invoices, VLM 

sued Illinois Trading; the Obee Family Partnership, which 

controlled Illinois Trading; and Lawrence Oberman, Illinois 

Trading’s president. The defendants’ first lawyer made an 

appearance but then withdrew. The defendants failed to hire 

another attorney in a timely fashion, and the deadline for 

filing an answer to VLM’s complaint came and went. Therefore, on January 12, 2013, the district court granted a motion 

by VLM for an entry of default against Illinois Trading, the 

Partnership, and Oberman. 

After belatedly securing new counsel, the defendants 

moved to vacate the entry of default. On February 12, 2013,

the judge held a hearing and vacated the default as to Oberman only. All three defendants then filed an answer, even 

though Illinois Trading and the Partnership had been 

deemed in default. The answer admitted that the defendants 

owed VLM the purchase price for the produce plus interest 

but contested liability for attorney’s fees. After a hearing on 

that issue, the judge applied Illinois’s version of the Uniform 

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Commercial Code and found that the attorney’s fees provision had been incorporated into the parties’ agreement. 

We reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applies. VLM I, 

748 F.3d at 787. On remand the judge applied the Convention and held that the attorney’s fees provision was not part 

of the contracts. The judge also found that Illinois Trading

and the Partnership could benefit from this ruling, despite 

the prior entry of default, because VLM waived the right to 

rely on the default by its litigation conduct before the first 

appeal and by failing to raise the default issue until its reply 

brief on remand.

II. Discussion

A. Attorney’s Fees Under the Convention

As we’ve explained, the last time this case was here, we 

resolved a choice-of-law question and held that the Convention controls the interpretation of the parties’ contracts. So 

our first question on this new appeal is whether the district 

judge correctly concluded that under the Convention the attorney’s fees provision was not incorporated into the parties’ 

contracts. We review de novo a district court’s interpretation 

of a contract. Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 

748, 763 (7th Cir. 2010). Treaties have the same legal effect as 

statutes, and therefore a district court’s interpretation of a 

treaty is reviewed de novo as well. Square D Co. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 438 F.3d 739, 747 (7th Cir. 2006).

The Convention’s definition of the “loss” resulting from a 

breach of contract does not itself include attorney’s fees. See 

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 74, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3; 

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No. 14-2776 5

52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 2, 1987) (“Damages for breach of 

contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.”); see also Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, 

S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2002)

(finding the allocation of legal fees to be a procedural issue 

not addressed in the Convention itself and therefore applying the appropriate domestic law). To succeed, VLM must 

show that its contracts with Illinois Trading expressly made 

Illinois Trading liable for VLM’s attorney’s fees in the event 

of a breach. To determine whether the fees provision was 

expressly accepted by Illinois Trading, we need to know 

when the terms of their agreement became binding.

A contract is formed under the Convention when there is 

a valid offer and acceptance. An offer is valid if it is “sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to 

be bound in case of acceptance.” Convention art. 14(1). An 

offer is “sufficiently definite” if it “indicates the goods and 

expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and price.” Id. Once a valid offer has 

been extended, the offeree can accept by words or conduct, 

but not by silence or inactivity. Id. art. 18(1). An acceptance 

“becomes effective at the moment the indication of assent 

reaches the offeror.” Id. art. 18(2). Acceptance can also be 

demonstrated through the offeree’s conduct, if allowed “as a 

result of practices which the parties have established between themselves or of usage.” Id. art. 18(3).

So far so good—these contract principles are familiar and 

very similar to those expressed in the UCC. But as we noted

in VLM I, the Convention departs dramatically from the 

UCC by using the common-law “mirror image” rule (someCase: 14-2776 Document: 30 Filed: 01/21/2016 Pages: 16
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times called the “last shot” rule) to resolve “battles of the 

forms.” 748 F.3d at 785–86; see also Roser Techs., Inc. v. Carl 

Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 4852314, at *5 

(W.D. Pa. 2013) (“[W]ith respect to the battle of the forms, the 

determinative factor under the [Convention] is when the 

contract was formed. The terms of the contract are those embodied in the last offer (or counteroffer) made prior to a contract being formed.”). Under the mirror-image rule, as expressed in Article 19(1) of the Convention, “[a] reply to an 

offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the 

offer and constitutes a counter-offer.”1

Each Illinois Trading purchase order met all the Convention’s criteria for an offer; they included sufficiently definite 

terms, were directed to VLM specifically, and indicated that

Illinois Trading intended to be bound by VLM’s acceptance. 

See Convention art. 14(1). Each of VLM’s confirmation 

e-mails was, in turn, an effective acceptance of Illinois Trading’s offer because each one confirmed and accepted the 

terms of the purchase order. Id. art. 18(1).2 As such, the contracts were formed when Illinois Trading received VLM’s 

confirmation e-mails. Id. art. 18(2). The attorney’s fees provision was not part of the agreement described in the purchase 

orders and the e-mail confirmations; that term first appeared 

in the trailing invoices that were mailed to Illinois Trading

 1 Although Article 19(2) makes an exception for nonmaterial alterations 

to terms, Article 19(3) defines “materiality” broadly to include terms relating to price, payment, quantity, delivery, the “extent of one party’s 

liability,” or the settlement of disputes. Convention art. 19.

2 Even if there were no e-mail confirmations, VLM’s delivery of the potatoes would have constituted an acceptance by conduct. See id. art. 18(1).

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after VLM delivered the produce. 

Under the Convention VLM had already bound itself to 

the contracts proposed by Illinois Trading when it confirmed 

Illinois Trading’s purchase offer by e-mail. The attorney’s

fees provision therefore could not have been a counteroffer. 

Rather, as we said in VLM I, “[i]f the contracts were formed 

before Illinois Trading received VLM’s invoices—possibly via 

Illinois Trading’s purchase orders and VLM’s e-mail confirmations—then the attorney’s fees and interest provisions 

would be proposed modifications to the contracts.” 748 F.3d 

at 786. Under the mirror-image rule, a party does not have to 

object to a proposed modification in order to keep it from 

being incorporated; any term that is not “mirrored” in the 

offer and acceptance is excluded. Contracts can only be modified by agreement of the parties, Convention art. 29(1), and 

a party cannot accept an offer (including one for modification) by silence or inactivity, id. art. 18(1). Rather, a party can 

only accept an offer through statements or conduct (if the 

parties’ course of dealings allow for it). Id.

Illinois Trading never made any statements indicating its 

acceptance of the proposed attorney’s fees modification. Indeed, the only possible activity that could have indicated

Illinois Trading’s acceptance of the proposed modification 

was its payment of the invoices. But that conduct is just as

consistent with Illinois Trading’s obligations under the original agreement as it is with any new acceptance. Furthermore, since VLM had already completely performed its duties under the original proposed agreement, it had no performance left to offer in consideration for any (gratuitous) 

agreement by Illinois Trading to assume liability for VLM’s 

attorney’s fees in the event of breach. See Contempo Design, 

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Inc. v. Chicago & Ne. Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 226 F.3d 

535, 550 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Indeed, the basic requirement that a 

contract needs consideration to be enforceable has a distinct 

function in this area of contract modification, a function very 

important in a case such as this one: to prevent coercive 

modifications.”).

Few American cases interpret the Convention, but those 

that exist support the conclusion that the contracts at issue 

here were formed by Illinois Trading’s purchase orders and 

VLM’s e-mail confirmations. Two previous cases involving 

forum-selection clauses are illustrative. In Château des 

Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 529 (9th 

Cir. 2003), the buyer made two oral contracts with the seller 

for wine corks. The corks were delivered in 11 shipments, 

and the seller sent separate invoices containing a forumselection clause. Sometimes the invoice would arrive with 

the shipments, sometimes before, and sometimes after. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit held that the forum-selection clause was 

not part of the contracts because the oral agreements had 

been sufficient to create complete and binding contracts, and 

“[n]othing in the Convention suggests that the failure to object to a party’s unilateral attempt to alter materially the 

terms of an otherwise valid agreement is an ‘agreement.’” Id. 

at 531. 

Likewise, in Solae, LLC v. Hershey Canada, Inc., 

557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457 (D. Del. 2008), the court concluded 

that the parties reached a binding contract after they agreed 

to the key terms of the deal. The court held that the forumselection clause printed on the seller’s trailing invoice could 

not modify that contract, even though the buyers had received the same invoices with the same forum-selection 

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No. 14-2776 9

clause for years prior to the dispute. Id.3

VLM contends that despite the contract-formation analysis prescribed by the Convention, the parties subjectively intended the attorney’s fees provision to apply. In VLM’s view

the Convention “commands” judges to consider extrinsic evidence to illuminate the parties’ intent. This argument relies 

largely on Article 8(3), which reads: “In determining the intent of a party ... [,] due consideration is to be given to all 

relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of 

the parties.” But the purpose of this intent test is to help 

courts interpret the statements and conduct of parties “according to [their] intent where the other party knew ... what 

that intent was.” Convention art. 8(1). Although VLM’s conduct—sending trailing invoices containing an attorney’s fees

provision—clearly indicates that VLM intended Illinois Trading to be liable for collection fees, there was never any indi-

 

3 We are aware of one “battle of the forms” case under the Convention in 

which the court found that the parties agreed to a new contract provision. In Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich International Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 

1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), the two parties had a lengthy course of dealing. At 

one point Chilewich had made an offer to Filanto to incorporate by reference a separate agreement that included a promise to arbitrate future 

disputes. Id. at 1230–31. Filanto accepted performance for several months 

before objecting. Id. at 1240. The court found that “Filanto was certainly 

under a duty to alert Chilewich in [a] timely fashion to its objections[,] ... 

particularly since Chilewich had repeatedly referred [Filanto] to the [offer document] and Filanto had had a copy of that document for some 

time.” Id. Filanto is distinguishable for several reasons, including the fact 

that Illinois Trading never relied on other provisions from VLM’s invoices in subsequent contracts or litigation and Illinois Trading never signed 

the invoices. See id. at 1241.

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cation of mutual intent at the time of contracting. Fee-shifting 

was never mentioned during any negotiations, and none of 

Illinois Trading’s subsequent conduct indicates that it agreed 

to pay VLM’s attorney’s fees.

Furthermore, VLM has not presented any evidence of 

Illinois Trading’s subjective intent to be bound by the attorney’s fees provision. Oberman testified that he had never 

seen the provision before the start of this litigation, and it 

was never discussed during contract negotiations or at any 

other point. The only person at Illinois Trading who knew 

about it was Illinois Trading’s bookkeeper, who processed 

the invoices. But this is weak evidence of Illinois Trading’s 

subjective intent. See CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol–Tuchel 

Elec., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 754 (D. Md. 2011) (The 

“General Conditions” printed on the seller’s order confirmation form were not incorporated into the contract under the 

Convention because, inter alia, “[t]he record shows that [the 

seller] sent its purchase confirmation forms directly to [the 

buyer’s] billing department, where no one with authority to 

enter into, modify, or otherwise accept any contracts 

worked. ... General Conditions were never discussed during 

their negotiations[,] and [the buyer’s executives] did not become aware of them until the defendant filed its motion to 

dismiss.”). And given the Convention’s mirror-image rule, 

Illinois Trading’s failure to object to the previous invoices is 

irrelevant because “a party’s multiple attempts to alter an 

agreement unilaterally do not so effect.” Châtueau des 

Charmes, 328 F.3d at 531.

VLM also points to Article 9(1), which says that “parties 

are bound to any usage to which they have agreed and by 

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No. 14-2776 11

selves.” This clause doesn’t help for two reasons. First, there 

simply isn’t any established “practice” between Illinois 

Trading and VLM regarding liability for attorney’s fees. Yes, 

there’s a history of VLM printing the fee-shifting provision 

on invoices sent to Illinois Trading after delivery, but—as 

we’ve already observed—there’s no history of Illinois Trading acknowledging or accepting this provision as required 

under the mirror-image rule. Second, evidence of “usage” 

comes into play to clarify the meaning assigned to a contract

term (“usage” is listed in parallel and in contrast to “practices” in Article 19(1)). Here, no contract term is ambiguous 

and thus in need of clarification by evidence of usage. In 

other words, there’s no disagreement about what the attorney’s fees provision means; the only issue is whether it was 

part of the parties’ agreement. Cf. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. 

Neuromed Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CV 9344(SHS), 

2002 WL 465312, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (relying on 

industry practice to interpret the meaning of an ambiguous 

term in an uncontestably valid contract).

VLM also relies on MCC–Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. 

Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, 144 F.3d 1384, 1385 (11th Cir. 

1998), but that case doesn’t help it either. In MCC–Marble the 

court had to construe the terms of an oral agreement that 

was later memorialized by a form, written in Italian and 

provided by one of the parties, setting forth that party’s

standard terms. Under these circumstances, the Eleventh 

Circuit looked to the parties’ negotiations and conduct to 

evaluate the discrepancies between the oral and written 

agreements. Id. at 1389. Here, however, the timing and terms 

of Illinois Trading’s offer and VLM’s acceptance—both of 

which were in writing—are clear. MCC–Marble is inapposite. 

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12 No. 14-2776

Finally, the fact that some of Illinois Trading’s contracts 

with other vendors included fee-shifting provisions is not 

relevant under the mirror-image rule, nor is the fact that Illinois Trading paid attorney’s fees as part of its settlements 

with certain vendors. Nothing in the Convention indicates 

that common industry practices are automatically grafted 

onto contracts; rather, the content of each contract must be 

analyzed independently. Accordingly, the district judge’s

earlier decision (long since reversed) that fee-shifting is a 

standard industry practice has no relevance here.

For all these reasons, the judge properly applied the 

Convention and held that the parties’ contracts did not include the attorney’s fees provision.

B. VLM’s Waiver of the Entry of Default

But may Illinois Trading and the Partnership benefit from 

this ruling? The judge initially entered default against them 

but on remand held that VLM waived the right to rely on the 

entry of default. Orders setting aside an entry of default are 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. O’Brien v. R.J. O’Brien & Assocs., Inc., 998 F.2d 1394, 1402 (7th Cir. 1993).

The question of default in this case is a bit confused. The 

parties and the district court refer to a “default judgment” 

against Illinois Trading and the Partnership, but it’s far from 

clear that a default judgment was ever formally entered in 

this case. The confusion could have been avoided if the parties and the court had more strictly adhered to the principle 

that “[t]here are two stages in a default proceeding: the establishment of the default, and the actual entry of a default 

judgment. Once the default is established, and thus liability, 

the plaintiff still must establish his entitlement to the relief 

he seeks.” In re Catt, 368 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2004). This 

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No. 14-2776 13

two-step process is clearly outlined in Rule 55(a) (entry of 

default) and Rule 55(b) (default judgment) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. The basic effect of an entry of default (step one) is that “[u]pon default, the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint relating to liability are taken as 

true.” Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Prods., 

Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983). The defaulting party 

cannot contest the fact of his liability unless the entry of default is vacated under Rule 55(c). See 10 JAMES W.M. MOORE 

ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 55.32[1][a] (3d ed. 2013) 

(“The effect of an entry of default, if not set aside, is to establish the liability of the defaulting party as a basis for default 

judgment. After defaulting, a party has no right to dispute 

the issue of liability.”). At the same time, however, the entry

of default “does not of itself determine rights.” United States 

v. Borchardt, 470 F.2d 257, 260 (7th Cir. 1972). That role is reserved for a default judgment. Here, there was an entry of 

default, but not a default judgment.4

Moreover, on remand the judge found that VLM waived 

its right to rely on the entry of default against Illinois Trad-

 4 VLM filed a “Motion for Entry of Default” that specifically invoked 

Rule 55(a). In response the judge granted the motion for “entry of default,” not a default judgment. VLM, in turn, never “appl[ied] to the 

court for a default judgment” as required by Rule 55(b)(2), and, regardless, the hearing at which the judge entered the default was held less 

than seven days after VLM had filed its 55(a) motion, below the minimum time period allowed under Rule 55(b)(2) between a request for default judgment and the entry of such judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 55. Indeed, at a hearing held just a few days after the entry of default, a lawyer

representing an unrelated defendant (the Transportation Alliance Bank) 

correctly stated that “[t]here was an entry of default, but I don’t believe 

there’s been an entry of judgment.”

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ing and the Partnership. This finding rested on statements 

made by VLM’s lawyer at the February 12, 2013 hearing (before the first appeal) and on VLM’s failure to raise the default issue in its opening brief on remand.

At the February 12 hearing, VLM’s lawyer discussed

“narrow[ing] next week’s [merits] hearing to just the attorney’s fees issue instead of running up the principal and the 

interest all over again when that’s already been admitted in 

the record now.” This statement doesn’t shed much light on 

the default question. It’s possible that VLM’s lawyer was assuming that only Oberman could contest liability for attorney’s fees and the other defendants were limited to challenging the amount of the fees. On the other hand, perhaps the 

parties and the court were proceeding on the assumption 

that all three defendants could contest liability for fees as 

well as the amount. This statement simply doesn’t permit an 

inference one way or another. Without more, we cannot conclude from this single statement alone that VLM “intentionally relinquished” a known right. King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635, 

641 (7th Cir. 2014). 

But the second source of waiver identified by the judge 

adds something more to the analysis. VLM never mentioned

the default issue in its opening brief to the district court on 

remand. Instead, VLM waited until its reply brief to raise the 

default issue. In the judge’s view, that was too late to give 

Illinois Trading and the Partnership notice of the argument 

and an opportunity to respond.

As a general matter, it’s possible to waive questions of a 

defendant’s default status. See, e.g., Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 

648 F.3d 779, 790 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[B]y choosing in the district court not to avail themselves of Rules 55(c) and 60(b), 

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and electing in their papers filed with Judge Wilson not to 

‘re-argue the propriety of the default itself,’ the Companies 

can be charged with intentionally and tactically relinquishing known rights—which is normally called ‘waiver’—with 

respect to the order of default.”); Ciccarello v. Jos. Schlitz 

Brewing Co., 1 F.R.D. 491, 493–94 (S.D. W. Va. 1940) (holding 

that the plaintiff’s consent to the defaulted defendant’s requests for continuances constituted a waiver of the default 

under West Virginia law).5 We think the judge reasonably

concluded that VLM waived its right to rely on the earlier 

entry of default by waiting until its reply brief on remand to

raise the issue.6

 

5 See also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 276 (2014) (“A waiver of the right to judgment following a default need not be express, but may be implied in law 

by conduct or circumstances inconsistent with the right. A plaintiff will 

be held to have waived the defendant’s default where the plaintiff voluntarily extends the time for the defendant to plead or appear, or goes to 

trial without objection, accepts a pleading filed out of time, or files a replication to a pleading so filed.”) (footnotes omitted); James L. Buchwalter, 

Annotation, Waiver of Right to Default Judgment, 64 A.L.R.5th 163 (1998) 

(“The moving party, typically a plaintiff, ... may waive the right to a default judgment by performing certain actions, or failing to do certain actions, that demonstrate an intentional relinquishment of the right to 

judgment.”).

6 An alternative rationale appears to provide additional support for this 

result. In Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554 (1872), the Supreme Court 

held that it would be “unseemly and absurd, as well as unauthorized by 

law,” for a default judgment to be entered against one defendant if his 

codefendants, who were jointly liable, were cleared on the merits. We 

have applied this rule on several occasions. See Home Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Adco 

Oil. Co., 154 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1998) (The lower court’s mistake was 

to enter a “default judgment against [the defaulter], as opposed to a notation of default. In a suit against multiple defendants a default judgment 

should not be entered against one until the matter has been resolved as 

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 AFFIRMED.

 

to all.”); Douglas v. Metro Rental Servs., Inc., 827 F.2d 252, 255 (7th Cir. 

1987); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1257–58 (7th Cir. 

1980). Because the Frow rule wasn’t raised here, however, we do not rely 

on it. 

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