Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00897/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00897-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHULA VISTA CITIZENS FOR JOBS

AND FAIR COMPETITION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 09cv0897 BEN (JMA)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT and GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

DONNA NORRIS, et al.,

Defendants,

 and

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Intervenor. 

I. INTRODUCTION

This case presents two questions of first impression. It asks whether the First Amendment

grants a corporation or association the right to serve as the official proponent of a local ballot

initiative. It also asks whether official proponents enjoy a First Amendment right to anonymity

during the period when signatures are being gathered. Having considered the arguments and the

evidence presented, this Court answers “no” to both questions. The plaintiffs also ask that certain

statutory requirements governing ballot initiatives be declared void for vagueness. The Court

finds those sections are sufficiently clear to pass constitutional muster. 

- 1 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 1 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs are the Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition (an

unincorporated association), the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. (a corporation), Lori

Kneebone and Larry Breitfelder (residents and registered voters of Chula Vista, California). The

Defendants are Chula Vista city officials sued in their official capacities. The State of California

has intervened to defend the constitutionality of California’s elections laws. 

Chula Vista Citizens and Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., attempted to propose an

initiative to be placed on the ballot in the City of Chula Vista, but it was rejected by the City Clerk. 

Then Kneebone and Breitfelder proposed an initiative and it was accepted and enough signatures

collected to place the initiative on the ballot. The ballot measure, known as “Proposition G,”

passed on June 8, 2010 by a margin of 55.75% to 44.25%.1

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint challenging state and municipal election laws as violating

the First Amendment: (a) by preventing corporations and associations from serving as official

proponents of Proposition G; and (b) by requiring the official proponents of Proposition G to

disclose their names during the time of circulating Proposition G for signature gathering. Plaintiffs

also challenge as too vague various terms in the statutes governing ballot initiatives. 

 Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all counts of

the Complaint.2 There are no genuine issues of material fact present and the motions are ripe for

decision. Having reviewed the evidence and arguments, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion and

grants Defendants’ motion.

1

 See, www.chulavistaca.gov/ City_Services/ Administrative_Services/ City_Clerk/ PDFs/

ElectionDayResultsComplete1911-2010_002.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). 

 Because Proposition G eventually qualified and passed, this case would be moot, but for the

exception for Constitutional injuries which are capable of repetition while evading judicial review. 

See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007); Farris v. Seabrook, 667 F.3d 1051,

1056 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The exception frequently arises in election cases.”). This case fits the

exception.

2

 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings and exhibits demonstrate that there are

no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

- 2 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 2 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. DISCUSSION

A. THE ELECTOR (OR NATURAL PERSON) REQUIREMENT

Only Electors May Be Official Proponents; Only Natural Persons May Be Electors

The California Constitution provides that its citizenry may propose laws for popular

consideration. Likewise, the City of Chula Vista Charter also permits its citizenry to propose

ordinances for the ballot. To begin the process, both Chula Vista and California require a ballot

initiative be officially and formally proposed by an “elector.” See City of Chula Vista Charter

§ 903; Cal. Elec. Code § 342. Section 903 of the City Charter states in part,

There are hereby reserved to the electors of the City the powers of

the initiative and referendum and of the recall of municipal elective

officers. 

(emphasis added). Chula Vista’s Charter incorporates the California Elections Code. Under

California Elections Code § 9202(a), to start the process a “proponent” must sign and file a notice

of intention with the text of the ballot initiative.3

 For state-wide measures, California Elections

Code § 342 defines an initiative proponent in terms of “electors,”

“Proponent or proponents of an initiative or referendum measure”

means, for statewide initiative and referendum measures, the elector

or electors who submit the text of a proposed initiative . . .

(emphasis added). California Elections Code § 321 defines an “elector” to be a natural person and

a resident, 

“Elector” means any person who is a United States citizen 18 years

of age or older and a resident of an election precinct at least 15 days

prior to an election. 

An “elector” may be a voter once he or she registers to vote. See Cal. Elec. Code § 359.

Consequently, only a natural person may be an official initiative proponent because the privilege is

restricted to “electors.” 

Plaintiffs do not disagree, but argue that the natural person requirement offends the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Consequently, Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare

3 See note 13 infra.

- 3 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 3 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California Elections Code §§ 342 and 9202 unconstitutional4 to the extent that they exclude

corporations and unincorporated associations from serving as official proponents of a municipal

ballot initiative. 

Though Corporations and Associations Have First Amendment Rights, 

They May Not Propose Legislation Through a California Ballot Initiative

Assuming that Plaintiffs have Article III standing,5 their arguments are unpersuasive. The

4

 Plaintiffs describe their case as both a facial and as-applied challenge. It is actually in the

nature of an as-applied challenge and will be adjudged as such. Generally, for Plaintiffs to succeed

in a facial challenge they must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act

would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State Grange v.

Wash. State Repub. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (citations omitted). “In the First Amendment

context, however, this Court recognizes a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be

invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in

relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587

(2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The elector requirement on its face obviously

does not burden the First Amendment rights of natural persons who want to be proponents of a ballot

initiative. Rather, it is only non-natural persons (such as the Chula Vista Citizens association and the

Associated Builders and Contractors corporation) who seek to qualify as proponents, for which the

natural person requirement is an impediment. Moreover, facial challenges are disfavored. Wash. State

Grange, 552 U.S. at 450. Federal courts exercise judicial restraint in applying the “strong medicine”

of declaring a law unconstitutional. One reason for restraint is that facial attacks “threaten to short

circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being

implemented. . . .” Id. at 451. 

5

 For federal court jurisdiction to exist under Article III, a plaintiff’s complaint must describe

an actual “case or controversy” or “injury-in-fact.” See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (Article III standing requirements). Plaintiffs have described an interest in

proposing Chula Vista municipal ballot initiatives, rather than state-wide ballot initiatives. That

interest and injury-in-fact affords these Plaintiffs Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality

of statutes bearing on local City of Chula Vista initiatives. However, the Complaint does not attack

directly the City Charter provision that prevents Plaintiffs from serving as proponents (i.e., the

“elector” requirement in § 903.) Defendant City of Chula Vista points out that the “elector

requirement is native to the Charter, being expressed in the first sentence of § 903.” 

Instead, Plaintiffs attack the “elector” requirement found in the parallel state statutes

incorporated by Charter § 903. Thus, Plaintiffs’ arrow may have missed its mark. For example,

Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeks,

 A declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, the

requirement that a proponent of an initiative petition be a natural person, such that

associations, corporations, and organizations are excluded from serving as proponents. Cal.

Elec. Code § 9202, as incorporated by the Charter § 903. See Verified Complaint, at 41 ¶2 (emphasis added). Similarly, paragraph three of the prayer seeks,

A declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional, both facially and as applied, the

definition of ‘proponent’ in Cal. Elec. Code § 342, as incorporated by the Charter

§ 903.” 

Id. at 41 ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 

On the other hand, since Charter § 903 does incorporate provisions of the California Elections

Code, by challenging the complimentary state statutes found in §§ 342 and 9202, which are consistent

with the “elector” requirement in City Charter § 903, Plaintiffs impliedly challenge the city charter

provision, as well. Moreover, it is worth noting that Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ Article

- 4 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 4 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

main contention advanced by the Plaintiffs is that corporations and associations have a First

Amendment right to propose legislation in the form of a qualifying ballot initiative.6

 Their

argument relies upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision that “First Amendment protection

extends to corporations.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899-900 (2010) (“The Court has

thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be

treated differently under the First Amendment simply because associations are not ‘natural

persons.’”).7 Plaintiffs’ contention is both novel and breathtaking in its potential application. As

the City Defendants correctly point out, there is “no record that anybody has ever attacked a state

law similar to the elector requirement before . . . . None of the cases cited in plaintiffs’ motion

addresses the issue, even in dictum or by implication.” May a state or municipality

constitutionally limit its law-making machinery to natural person citizen electors? Or, must it also

allow associations and corporations to exercise law-making functions? Plaintiffs view the

question in terms of a corporation’s right to engage in protected political speech. Defendants, on

the other hand, view the question in terms of the rights of citizens to self govern.

Plaintiffs contend that the elector requirement impermissibly prohibits associational

speakers from speaking. The argument begins with the well-accepted position that advocating for

an initiative petition is core political speech. It continues with the also well-accepted idea that the

circulation of a ballot initiative involves core political speech. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,

421-22 (1988). Plaintiffs then attempt to stretch the idea of advocation and circulation to include

the mechanics of initiation. They argue that the act of proposing an initiative is also core political

III standing. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ standing will be assumed.

6 See Count 2 of the Complaint.

7

 Not all courts read Citizens United as granting corporations political speech rights

coextensive with the rights of individuals. See e.g., Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 2012 WL

177414 at *20 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012) (upholding ban on direct corporate contributions); Minn.

Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1132-34 (D. Minn. 2010) (same). 

- 5 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 5 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

speech and that corporations and associations are banned8 from speaking in that way. But the acts

of ballot initiation are qualitatively different than acts of engaging in the First Amendment dialog

of circulation or advocation. Angle v. Miller, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 833901*7 & n.5 (9th Cir. Mar.

14, 2012) (citing Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424-25) (“There is no First Amendment right to place an

initiative on the ballot.”)

The Power of the Initiative Is Reserved to the People of California

“The power of the citizen initiative has, since its inception, enjoyed a highly protected

status in California.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2011). Under

California’s constitutional form of government, “All political power is inherent in the people.” 

Cal. Const. art. II, § 1; Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d at 1196. While the state legislature passes most

laws, the people of California have retained for themselves the power to pass laws and amend their

Constitution. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 1; Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d at 1196 (“the sovereign people’s

initiative power is considered to be a fundamental right.”). The state constitution makes clear that

this initiative power belongs to people. Neither corporations nor unincorporated associations are

mentioned. Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part)

(“Corporations . . . are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our

Constitution was established.”). “The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and

amendments to the Constitution and to adopt them or reject them.” Cal. Const. art. II, § 8

(emphasis added); Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d at 1196. The Supreme Court of California describes

the initiative power held by California citizens:

The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to

provide for the initiative and referendum signifies one of the

outstanding achievements of the progressive movement of the early

1900's. Drafted in light of the theory that all power of government

ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of the

8

 Corporate and associational speech is not “banned” by the statutes at issue here in the sense

that there could be a criminal or civil penalty for speaking. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at

897 (law banning, backed by criminal penalty, corporation from making electioneering

communication). Neither the laws of California nor the City’s Charter penalize any person for

attempting to propose an initiative. There is no criminal or civic sanction which may be imposed for

“wrongdoers.” Put differently, even non-natural persons may attempt to propose an initiative,

advancing any viewpoint, without fear of government penalty. 

- 6 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 6 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the people, but as a

power reserved by them. 

Assoc. Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591-92 (1976) (citations

omitted); see also Costa v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 986, 1008-09 (2006) (describing the

initiative power of California electors). Just last year, the California Supreme Court described the

state’s initiative power as a power distinctly reserved to “people” or “electors:” 

Article II, section 1 of the California Constitution proclaims:

“All political power is inherent in the people. Government is

instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the

right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.” As

this court noted in Strauss: “This provision originated in one of the

initial sections of the Declaration of Rights contained in California’s

first Constitution (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 2), and reflects a

basic precept of our governmental system: that the people have the

constitutional right to alter or reform their government.” 

Although California’s original 1849 Constitution declared

that “all political power is inherent in the people,” it was not until 60

years later — in 1911 — that the California Constitution was

amended to afford the voters of California the authority to directly

propose and adopt state constitutional amendments and statutory

provisions through the initiative power.

Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal. 4th 1116 (2011) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). That is not to

say that corporations and associations may not promote, discuss, debate, underwrite, or advocate

for or against a ballot measure. But the position of official initiative proponent is a special role

springing from and confined by state law. As Perry points out, “[u]nder these and related statutory

provisions, the official proponents of an initiative measure are recognized as having a distinct role

— involving both authority and responsibilities that differ from other supporters of the measure

. . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 

For example, one would rightly expect the Governor and Attorney General to defend a

California law passed by popular initiative vote. But if for some unforseen reason no public

defense is mounted, it is only the official proponents who have standing to defend the initiative in

court. Perry v. Brown, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 372713 at *2, *9 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (“we do

know that California law confers on ‘initiative sponsors’ the authority ‘to defend, in lieu of public

officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State’”) (quoting Perry v. Brown, 52

Cal. 4th 1116). 

- 7 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 7 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Like the State, the people of Chula Vista in adopting a governing charter, reserved to

themselves, as electors, the power of the city ballot initiative. In view of the self-governance

model adopted by the citizens of Chula Vista and of California, the elector requirement makes

good public policy sense, since the act of proposing a ballot initiative is the first step in an act of

law-making. The State argues, and Perry recognizes, that there are several legislation-related

examples where the actors must be electors and thus natural persons. For example, only electors

are allowed to vote. Only electors are allowed to run for office. Only electors may sign

nominating papers necessary to qualify candidates for the ballot. Only electors (as elected

legislators) are allowed to introduce bills to the legislature. Thus, it is entirely consistent that only

a natural person elector may be an official ballot initiative proponent.

Plaintiffs do not come to terms with the idea that the natural person citizens of Chula Vista

may constitutionally reserve to themselves the power to make law, for their argument overlooks

the essence of self-government. Brown, 2012 WL 372713 at *10 (“The People of California are

largely free to structure their system of governance as they choose.”). Permitting a corporation or

association to be a ballot initiative proponent could lead to local laws being proposed by foreigners

unready to contribute to the city or bear the responsibility of citizenship. Worse, corporations with

assets, operations, or shareholders located outside the city, state, or country might propose

initiatives adversely affecting the welfare of citizens of Chula Vista, in order to gain a business

advantage elsewhere. Likewise, associations of people who live and work in other locales, could

propose laws to their own advantage or the disadvantage of Chula Vistans. Even harmless or wellmeant initiatives, could drown out the legislative ideas of the City’s citizens. By requiring

proponents to be electors, Chula Vista protects its initiative process from becoming a tool of

foreigners and artificial entities. That is a choice the people of the City of Chula Vista may freely

make without running afoul of the First Amendment.

Proposing a Ballot Initiative is Part of a Legislative Process

The State of California points out in its brief that “the submission of an initiative petition is

the first step in a legislative process.” According to the State, “because an initiative petition is a

- 8 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 8 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

legislative document, it is legitimately limited to members of the legislative body, in this case the

electorate.”9 Id. The California Supreme Court underscores the distinction between an official

proponent and all other supporters of a ballot measure. “[T]he official proponents of an initiative

measure are recognized as having a distinct role — involving both authority and responsibilities

that differ from other supporters of the measure.” Perry, 52 Cal. 4th 1116; see also S.F. FortyNiners v. Nishoika, 75 Cal. App. 4th 637, 648 (1999) (“The initiative petition with its notice of

intention is not a handbill or campaign flyer – it is an official election document . . . . It is the

constitutionally and legislatively sanctioned method by which an election is obtained on a given

proposal.”). 

States are allowed “significant flexibility” in designing their own initiative systems. Doe v.

Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (“To the extent a regulation concerns the effect of a particular

activity in that process, the government will be afforded substantial latitude to enforce that

regulation.”). In this case, the elector requirement is a reasonable state restriction on who may

officially energize the ballot initiative machinery. “These mechanisms of direct democracy are not

compelled by the Federal Constitution. It is instead up to the people of each State, acting in their

sovereign capacity, to decide whether and how to permit legislation by popular action.” Id. at

2827 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). “As the Court properly recognizes, each of these structural

decisions inevitably affects – at least to some degree – the individual’s right to speak about

political issues and to associate with others for political ends.” Id. at 2827-28 (citations and

internal quotations omitted). “Regulations of this nature, however, stand a step removed from the

communicative aspect of petitioning, and the ability of the States to impose them can scarcely be

doubted.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). The elector (or natural person)

9

 Plaintiffs point to state court decisions where associations and corporations acted as ballot

initiative proponents. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. App. 4th

1013 (1992); Save Stanislaus Area Farm Economy v. Bd. of Supervisors, 13 Cal. App. 4th 141 (1993);

Alliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae v. Wade, 108 Cal. App. 4th 123 (2003). None of these cases

address the question of whether an association or corporation may be an official proponent under state

law nor the federal constitutional implications. Instead, they concern other questions such as the

legality of the proposed initiative or the satisfaction of the numerosity requirement for collected

signatures. Certainly, the official ballot measure proponents recently discussed in Perry were natural

person electors of California.

- 9 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 9 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

requirement is premised upon the distinction between an elector who proposes a measure, and all

other persons who may evaluate and advocate for or against its passage. It is a step removed from

restrictions on speech and debate. It is a rational, reasonable, and constitutional choice by the

people of Chula Vista acting in their sovereign capacity, to fashion rules for lawmaking by popular

initiative. Consequently, the restriction does not trench on the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to

otherwise engage in core political speech.

Moreover, the elector requirement is not subject to strict scrutiny, as Plaintiffs assert. If

Chula Vista Charter § 903 restricted core political speech, it would need a compelling interest and

it would need to be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. However, the preferred protections

for core political speech are out of place in the context of ballot initiative mechanics. Serving in

the position of an official ballot initiative proponent is not pure speech. It is a legislative act. But,

even assuming for the sake of argument, that serving as an official proponent is speech to some

degree, it is speech a large step removed from the core communicative aspect of circulating a

petition and publicly advocating for its passage or defeat. It is speech much closer to the

mechanics of the ballot initiative process. 

“It is by no means necessary for a State to prove” that measures to control the mechanics of

the ballot initiative process “are narrowly tailored to its interests.” Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2827

(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788). “To require that every voting,

ballot, and campaign regulation be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest ‘would tie the

hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.’” Buckley v.

Am. Const. Law Found. (“Buckley II”), 525 U.S. 182, 206 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring)

(quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)). Thus, strict scrutiny

is not the appropriate test for the elector requirement. Instead, it is a regulation for which the

Supreme Court recognizes that states and municipalities are given leeway. It this case, the elector

requirement is a rational, reasonable, and necessary measure to protect Chula Vista’s form of selfgovernment. But, it is not the end of the matter. 

Plaintiffs offer another argument against the requirement that a proponent be a natural

- 10 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 10 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

person, again relying on Citizens United. They argue that by not permitting corporations and

associations to act as official proponents, the natural person requirement forces these non-natural

persons to speak by proxy through the mouths of their members. The Achilles’ heel of this

contention is that the argument assumes in the first place that the First Amendment grants

corporations and associations the right to officially propose a ballot initiative. As discussed above,

however, Chula Vista and California reserve only to electors the power to engage the machinery of

lawmaking by ballot initiative. Since an elector must be a natural person and resident, and since

corporations and associations are not natural persons and may not be residents, the speech-byproxy concept does not fit. An association may perhaps persuade one of its members or a

corporation may persuade an employee to propose a ballot initiative. But ultimately it is the

natural person’s right and choice to be an official proponent. 

Plaintiffs also argue that the elector requirement creates an impermissible unconstitutional

condition by forcing corporations and associations to choose between two protected rights: 

Chula Vista Citizens ‘may either engage in the protected political speech inherent in

initiative petitions by revealing one of their members as the proponent of their initiative, or

they may allow their members to associate without being revealed to the government. They

may not, however, exercise both their right to speak and their right to privacy in their

associations.’ 

Like the ill-fitting speech-by-proxy argument, however, this argument also relies on the premise

that an association has a right to officially propose a ballot initiative. Once again, however, that

right is permissibly reserved to natural person electors. Neither corporations nor unincorporated

associations have the right to engage in the “speech” of officially proposing a ballot measure. 

To sum up, since California and Chula Vista utilize the ballot initiative as a method of

making law, and each restrict law-makers to natural person electors rather than artificial person

associations and corporations, this Court holds that the elector requirement is constitutional. 

B. THE OFFICIAL PROPONENT NAME DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT

During the process of proposing and qualifying an initiative for a Chula Vista election, the

name of the official proponent is required to be disclosed at three times. First, at the filing of the

Notice of Intent to Circulate a Petition. Second, during the newspaper publication of the Notice of

- 11 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 11 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Intent. Third, when the copies of the Notice of Intent are circulated for voter signatures. The

Plaintiff proponents do not object to the disclosure requirement in the first two instances. Indeed,

they have already disclosed their names in the process of qualifying Proposition G for the ballot.

Instead, Plaintiffs challenge the mandatory disclosure of their names as official proponents 

on the text of the proposition used by circulators to solicit voter signatures.10 In so doing,

Plaintiffs raise another question of first impression. They contend that the identity requirement

defeats their First Amendment right to engage in anonymous political speech. Once again, this

Court disagrees. The First Amendment right to speak anonymously is not absolute. In the context

of a ballot initiative, the burden on speech is weighed against the People’s need for disclosure. As

will be discussed below, in this case, the burden on Plaintiffs’ speech is slight and the interests of

the government representing the People are substantial.

The individual Plaintiffs, Lori Kneebone and Larry Breitfelder, were the official

proponents of Proposition G. They took the necessary steps to place their ballot initiative before

the voters of the City of Chula Vista in a city-wide election. The individual Plaintiffs have the

requisite Article III standing to challenge the proponent name disclosure requirement.11 

To understand Plaintiffs’ argument, a review of the statutory scheme is helpful. Section

903 of the Chula Vista City Charter governs local ballot initiatives. It also incorporates provisions

of the California Elections Code.12 The California Elections Code, in turn, addresses in sections

10 Plaintiffs describe this as both a facial and an as-applied constitutional challenge. However, 

in their papers they do not argue the facial challenge. Perhaps for good reason. For a successful facial

challenge, Plaintiffs would have to establish how the disclosure requirement is unconstitutional in all

of its applications, or if not all, at least in “a substantial number of its applications . . . judged in

relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449; Stevens, 130

S. Ct. at 1587. California’s healthy ballot initiative experience tends to demonstrate that most

proponents have no First Amendment objection to disclosing their names on circulated petitions. 

Instead of establishing unconstitutional applications to other individuals, Plaintiffs focus their

argument on themselves. Consequently, their action is treated as an as-applied challenge. 

11 The individual Plaintiffs say they intend to initiate other local ballot initiatives. If they do,

they will have to comply with these same laws in the future. Because of the asserted injury-in-fact,

they possess Article III standing. 

12 Section 903 of the Chula Vista City Charter states,

There are hereby reserved to the electors of the City the powers of the

initiative and referendum . . . . The provisions of the Election Code of

- 12 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 12 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9202, 9205, and 9207, the process by which a ballot initiative may be placed on the ballot. 

Election Code § 9202(a) describes the first step and requires a proponent to sign his or her name

to a “Notice of Intent to Circulate Petition.”13 The next step requires publication of the Notice of

Intent in a newspaper of general circulation. Cal. Elec. Code § 9205. The third step requires

circulating copies of the Notice of Intent and gathering signatures from registered voters.14

Anonymous Speech Under the First Amendment

Kneebone and Breitfelder argue that they enjoy a First Amendment right to engage in

anonymous political speech. They contend the third step name disclosure requirement trenches on

that right. Plaintiffs are correct that the First Amendment right to free speech includes a right to

speak anonymously. This is especially true for political speech. The Supreme Court observes, 

Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent

practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a

shield from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the

Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular

individuals from retaliation – and their ideas from suppression – at the hand of an

intolerant society.

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citations omitted). In that regard,

the Ninth Circuit notes that protection for anonymous speech under the First Amendment “was

first articulated a half-century ago in the context of political speech,” if not earlier. In re

the State of California, as the same now exists or may hereafter be

amended governing the initiative and referendum . . . shall apply to the

use thereof in the City so far as such provisions of the Elections Code

are not in conflict with this Charter.

13 California Elections Code § 9202(a) states in relevant part,

Before circulating an initiative petition in any city, the proponents of

the matter shall file with the elections official a notice of the intention

to do so, which shall be accompanied by the written text of the

initiative . . . . The notice shall be signed by at least one, but not more

than three, proponents . . . . 

14 California Elections Code § 9207 states,

The proponents may commence to circulate the petitions among the

voters of the city of signatures by any registered voter of the city after

publication or posting, or both, as required by Section 9205, of the title

and summary prepared by the city attorney. Each section of the

petition shall bear a copy of the notice of intention and the title and

summary prepared by the city attorney. 

- 13 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 13 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Talley v. California, 362

U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960)). Anonymous political speech in the United States actually goes back much

farther than 50 years. “Undoubtedly the most famous pieces of anonymous American political

advocacy are The Federalist Papers, penned by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John

Jay, but published under the pseudonym ‘Publius.’” Id. at 1172-73 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at

344 n.6). Nevertheless, the government may place limits on anonymous speech. “The right to

speak, whether anonymously or otherwise, is not unlimited, however, and the degree of scrutiny

varies depending on the circumstances and the type of speech at issue.” Id. (citing Meyer v. Grant,

486 U.S. 414 (1988)).

For their part, Plaintiffs rely heavily on McIntyre and ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d

979 (9th Cir. 2004). They argue that under McIntyre and Heller, the First Amendment protects

their right to anonymously propose a ballot initiative. However, while both cases involved ballot

initiatives, neither McIntyre nor Heller consider whether an official proponent of a ballot initiative

enjoys a right to anonymity. McIntyre concerned “an individual leafleteer who, within her local

community, spoke her mind, but sometimes not her name,” and was fined $100 for omitting her

name from her leaflets. 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Heller, likewise concerned an

organization whose members wished to distribute anonymous flyers about an existing ballot

initiative. 378 F.3d 979; see also Hatchett v. Barland, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 4336740 (E.D.

Wis. Sept. 14, 2011) (individual sanctioned for mailing anonymous postcards about existing ballot

measures).

Neither McIntyre nor Heller address the question raised by this case: whether a proponent

of a ballot initiative may remove his or her name from copies of the notice of intent circulated by

signature gatherers, and still qualify the measure for an election. Some cases have focused on

those who do the footwork of circulating petitions and gathering signatures.15 Other cases have

15 See e.g., Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found. (“Buckley II”), 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Washington

Initiatives Now! v. Rippie (“WIN”), 213 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). 

- 14 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 14 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

considered anonymous speech for ballot initiative signers.16 And still other cases have evaluated

disclosure requirements for those who contribute money to a ballot initiative campaign and those

who spend money advocating for and against ballot initiatives.17 However, no decision cited by

the parties or found by this Court has recognized a First Amendment right to anonymously

propose a ballot measure or, having recognized such a right weighed a state’s competing interests

in requiring the public disclosure of the proponent’s identity. 

Plaintiffs next argue that the issue decided in Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found. (“Buckley

II”), 525 U.S. 182 (1999) and Washington Initiatives Now! v. Rippie (“WIN”), 213 F.3d 1132 (9th

Cir. 2000) – “whether government may ban anonymous petition circulation” – is the same as in

this case. But the issue is not the same. Buckley II and WIN deal with the rights of workers who

gather initiative signatures. Circulators of ballot initiatives have a recognized First Amendment

right to maintain their own anonymity at the point in time when a circulator engages in speech

with a person whose signature he is soliciting. On this basis, Buckley II struck down a Colorado

law that required circulators to wear a name badge. 525 U.S. at 198-99. Buckley II was troubled

by the fact that a circulator was required to disclose his identity at a time “when reaction to the

circulator’s message is immediate and ‘may be the most intense, emotional, and unreasoned.’” Id.

at 199. The circulator was thus exposed to a “risk of ‘heat of the moment’ harassment.” Id.

WIN’s facts are closer, but still concern only circulators.18

16 See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).

17 See Family PAC v. McKeena, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 266111 (9th Cir. Jan 31, 2012)

(disclosure of identity of small dollar contributors); Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.

2010) (same); Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2009)

(disclosure of de minimis contributors); Human Life of Wash. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th

Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011) (disclosure of expenditures for ballot measure

advocacy); Cal. Pro-Life Council v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); Cal. Pro-Life

Council v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, __ F. Supp.

2d. __, 2011 WL 5507204 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) (disclosure of contributors). 

18 WIN concerned a Washington requirement that petition circulators report their names and

addresses at a later time. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the circulators’ right to anonymity

outweighed the state’s interest in combating fraud and the state’s interest in informing voters. WIN, 213 F.3d at 1139-40. Significantly, WIN discounted Washington’s informational interest because the

informational interest was served by other requirements – including another requirement that provided

a way for Washington voters to learn who had proposed the ballot measure. Id. 

- 15 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 15 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

But Plaintiffs Kneebone and Breitfelder are not circulators; they are the official proponents. 

As is common with ballot initiative campaigns, Plaintiffs hired professional circulators to gather

signatures. As a result, these Plaintiffs were not exposed to the same risk of “heat of the moment”

harassment faced by circulators in Buckley II. Since Plaintiffs here are not circulators, and the

difference is significant, neither Buckley II nor WIN is controlling. 

Limits on Anonymous Speech

The Ninth Circuit has said that “the right to speak, whether anonymously or otherwise, is

not unlimited.” In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173. It is important to point out

that the proponent name disclosure requirement is not a prohibition on speech and does not

criminalize speech. Instead, it requires Breitfelder and Kneebone to disclose their identity as

official proponents of the legislation. As the Supreme Court observes, disclosure requirements

“may burden the ability to speak [or not speak], but they . . . do not prevent anyone from

speaking.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (citations omitted). For testing the constitutionality

of a disclosure requirement, the government burden on speech must pass exacting scrutiny,

“meaning that it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Human

Life of Wash. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477

(2011); see also Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (exacting scrutiny applies where a statute imposes

disclosure requirement rather than a prohibition on speech).

California argues that it has two important interests related to the disclosure requirement

that outweigh a proponent’s right to anonymity: (1) an electoral informational interest; and (2) an

interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process.19

California’s Informational Interest

In its brief, California describes its informational interest: “because the right to propose

19 The government does not assert an interest in preventing corruption. There is usually no

state interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption where a ballot measure is concerned. “Referenda

are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases

involving candidate elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.” First Nat’l

Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978). On the other hand, “preserving the integrity of

the electoral process” is an “interest[] of the highest importance.” Id. at 788-89. 

- 16 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 16 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

initiative legislation is limited to electors, there is an important interest in providing information as

to who is formally proposing legislation.” Much has been written recently about a state’s

informational interest in connection with ballot measure campaigns. Most recently, the Ninth

Circuit observed, “[w]e have repeatedly recognized an important (and even compelling)

informational interest in requiring ballot measure committees to disclose information about

contributions.” Family PAC v. McKeena, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 266111 at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 31,

2012) (emphasis added). In Human Life, the Ninth Circuit described at length the informational

interests at play when it comes to ballot initiatives. 624 F.3d 990 passim. The Ninth Circuit

explained, “[p]roviding information to the electorate is vital to the efficient functioning of the

marketplace of ideas, and thus to advancing the democratic objectives underlying the First

Amendment . . . . Thus, by revealing information about the contributors to and participants in public

discourse and debate, disclosure laws help ensure that voters have the facts they need to evaluate

the various messages competing for their attention.” Id. at 1005. Human Life highlighted the need

to know who is speaking during a ballot initiative election. The court remarked, “we have

frequently reiterated . . . that in the cacophony of political communications through which

California voters must pick out meaningful and accurate messages . . . being able to evaluate who is

doing the talking is of great importance.” Id. at 1006 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). In this way, Human Life reiterates that a state’s informational interest in “who is doing

the talking” is substantial for a ballot measure campaign. 

[C]itizens, acting as lawmakers, have an interest in knowing who is

lobbying for their vote . . . . Indeed, the provision of this information

is particularly critical in the ballot measure context, especially when

one considers that ballot-measure language is typically confusing, and

the long-term policy ramifications of the ballot measure are often

unknown. If nothing else, knowing who backs or opposes a given

initiative will give voters a pretty good idea of who stands to benefit

from the legislation. 

Id. at 1007-08 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Human Life evaluated Washington’s burden on ballot measure spending, rather than nonfinancial advocacy. While not directly on point, the case illustrates the notion that a state’s

informational interest may be just as strong in the context of a ballot measure campaign as it is in a

candidate campaign for public office. As one court recently observed, “[t]he Ninth Circuit . . . has

- 17 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 17 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

held that the informational interest applies even more strongly in the context of ballot initiatives.” 

Justice v. Hosemann, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 5326057, at *10 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 3, 2011). 

To reiterate, Plaintiffs argue that McIntyre should control and that the right to political

anonymity outweighs California’s informational interest. But, the Ninth Circuit has traveled down

a parallel road before. In California Pro-Life Council v. Getman, the Ninth Circuit explained,

“[l]ike the Court in McIntyre, [the plaintiff] asks us to disregard California’s informational interest

in disclosure and hold that ballot-measure advocacy is absolutely protected speech. We think

McIntyre is distinguishable from the case at bar, as the McIntyre Court itself observed.” 328 F.3d

1088, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003). Getman described California’s informational interest:

Voters act as legislators in the ballot-measure context, and interest

groups and individuals advocating a measure’s defeat or passage act

as lobbyists; both groups aim at pressuring the public to pass or

defeat legislation. We think Californians, as lawmakers, have an

interest in knowing who is lobbying for their vote, just as members of

Congress may require lobbyists to disclose who is paying for the

lobbyists’ services and how much.

Id. at 1106 (citation omitted). California voters, as lawmakers, have a substantial informational

interest in knowing the identity of those soliciting their votes. California voters, as lawmakers, also

have a substantial interest in knowing the identity of the official sponsors of a ballot initiative who

seek their signature approval to put the measure to a public vote. Cf. Cal. Pro-Life Council v.

Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We note that in the context of disclosure

requirements, the government’s interest in providing the electorate with information related to

election and ballot issues is well-established.”). It may be true, as Plaintiffs argue, that “the best

test of truth is the power to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” See McIntyre,

514 U.S. at 347 n.11. And it may be that “[p]eople are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of

an anonymous writing” and can “evaluate its anonymity along with its message.” Id. But it is also

true that, “[o]f course, the identity of the source is helpful in evaluating ideas.” Id. 

California has made its own decision. For purposes of ballot measure signature gathering,

the State has decided that it is in the best interest of its voters (as petition signers) to know the name

of a ballot measure’s official proponent. California has a legitimate and substantial interest in

fostering an informed and educated electorate. See Caruso v. Yamhill Cnty., 422 F.3d 848, 861 (9th

- 18 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 18 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1786 (2006). Section 9207, by requiring the circulated petition

to bear a copy of the Notice of Intent, which in turn discloses the names of the official proponents,

is directly related to that informational interest. Section 9207 thus plays a role by which California

voters may inform themselves in exercising control of their government (i.e., determining whether

an issue has enough merit to be placed on the election ballot). Because the disclosure requirement

that the Plaintiffs identify themselves as official proponents during the gathering of signatures is

substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest, the statutory scheme survives

exacting scrutiny. 

California’s Interest In the Integrity of the Electoral Process

California also asserts an interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process. The

State explains that this interest is not limited to preventing fraud, but “extends more generally to

promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process.” The interest is similar to

Washington’s interest recognized by the Supreme Court as important in Reed. Reed found, “[t]he

State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process is undoubtedly important.” 130

S. Ct. at 2819; see also Buckley II, 525 U.S. at 191 (“States allowing ballot initiatives have

considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the initiative process.”).

Plaintiffs point out that questions as to whether the name of the proponent is fraudulent or

authentic, could be answered by the first two required proponent name disclosures in the California

scheme. But the disclosure requirement goes to preserving the electoral process in another way. 

As discussed previously, the right to act as an official proponent is limited to electors. An elector is

a living natural person, residing within the political subdivision, and able to register to vote. By

requiring a proponent’s name to appear on the circulated copy of the ballot initiative, the local

voters who consider the initiative may recognize whether the proponent qualifies as an elector. 

Thus, the disclosure requirement also serves the government interest in “promoting transparency

and accountability in the electoral process.” Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2819-20.

Because California’s informational interest and its interest in preserving the integrity of the

electoral process is served by the proponent identity disclosure requirement on circulated petitions,

and because the dual interests reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on the First Amendment

- 19 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 19 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

rights of official proponents, the statutes survive exacting scrutiny on their face. 

The Burden As Applied to Plaintiffs’ Speech

Plaintiffs also attempt to demonstrate the burden as applied specifically to Kneebone and

Breitfelder. Unfortunately, the evidence demonstrates only a slight burden on Kneebone’s and

Breitfelder’s right to speak anonymously. 

The Supreme Court explains that “those resisting disclosure can prevail under the First

Amendment if they can show ‘a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of personal

information will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials

or private parties.’” Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2820 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976))

(emphasis added); see also Family PAC, 2012 WL 266111 at *4 (“The Court explained that in an

atypical case presenting a bona fide threat of harassment or retaliation, an aggrieved party could

seek an exemption from compelled disclosure by making a sufficient evidentiary showing in an asapplied challenge.”). 

Plaintiffs offer scant support for their as-applied challenge. Both Kneebone and Breitfelder

willingly disclosed their identity in two prior disclosures: on the initial Notice of Intent filing and

later on the published copy of the Notice of Intent. Theses actions by Kneebone and Breitfelder

undercut the claim of a severe burden on their right to anonymous speech. At the same time, absent

is evidence of any actual threats or harassment. Complicating the evidentiary presentation is the

fact that both Kneebone and Breitfelder were active in other public ways during the campaign.

Rather than maintaining a low public profile consistent with a desire for anonymity, both

Kneebone and Breitfelder participated fully in public debate over Proposition G. For example, both

proponents appeared before the Chula Vista City Council on two occasions to speak in support of

the ballot initiative. Those meetings were broadcast on public television. Then, Kneebone and

Breitfelder signed the “Rebuttal to the Argument Against Proposition G” that was printed in the

pre-election Voter Information pamphlet. That pamphlet is mailed to all registered voters. 

Kneebone’s name and photograph also appeared on two election mailers in support of the ballot

initiative sent to residents of Chula Vista. And Kneebone and Breitfelder featured in a video in

support of the ballot initiative that was posted on YouTube and on the “Yes on G” website. At the

- 20 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 20 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

same time, Breitfelder was president of The Chula Vista Taxpayers Association which publicly

supported Proposition G and sent out mailers to voters to that effect. As part of his own campaign

for City Councilman he told the League of Women Voters that he was an advocate for Proposition

G. He also expressed his support for the ballot initiative on his campaign website and in his

campaign literature.

For the as-applied challenge, the strongest evidence is Kneebone’s own statement that she

feared harassment. In her statement she says that she feared harassment from union members after

revealing her name on the circulated petition. However, while she may have feared harassment, she

has not shown instances of actual harassment. Without more, she is unable to show that there is a

reasonable probability of future harassment. Even if she were able to show actual harassment,

Plaintiffs would still have to draw a connection between the harassment suffered and the disclosure

of her name on the circulated petition. That task would be complicated by Kneebone’s various

other public statements.

The as-applied showing for Breitfelder, though different, is no stronger. Breitfelder believes

he was subjected to “reprisals” during his own campaign for City Councilman as a result of being

identified as a proponent of the ballot initiative. Breitfelder, in more ways than Kneebone, placed

himself in the middle of the public political discourse over Proposition G. Breitfelder was a

candidate for public office. He identifies the “reprisals” as being negative election campaign

literature highlighting his own candidacy as anti-union. The campaign literature20 reads: 

Pat’s Opponent, Larry Breitfelder is: -An anti-worker activist and was

the spokesperson for the discriminatory Yes on G campaign -Backed

by anti-union contractors who are driving down workplace standards

and benefits. Larry Breitfelder, The Anti-Union Candidate. 

Rather than a “reprisal” in the sense Reed uses the term, this type of political advertisement is

commonplace and core political speech. As detailed above, however, Breitfelder was active in

supporting Proposition G in many ways, including tying his support to his own candidacy for

20 The campaign mailer itself is political speech. It does not clearly advocate for or against the

election or defeat of either candidate. It communicates information about Breitfelder’s candidate

positions regarding unions. As with all such pieces, if the reader is against unions, he will like

candidate Breitfelder’s position; if the reader is for unions, she will dislike candidate Breitfelder’s

positions. The literature does not identify Breitfelders’ identity as an official proponent of Proposition

G. It does identify Breitfelder as a spokesperson for the “Yes on G” campaign.

- 21 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 21 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

office. Consequently, accurate speech by a candidate’s political opponents does not qualify as a

reprisal. And even if it did, it is not clearly tied to the proponent name disclosure requirement. 

Further undercutting the as-applied challenge is the evidence that Kneebone and Breitfelder

objected to disclosure based on reasons other than a desire to speak anonymously. They explained

in depositions that the reason they did not want their names on the circulated petition was not a

desire to maintain anonymity, or a desire that Proposition G be judged solely on its merits. Quite

the opposite. They both explained that they wanted voters to know that the “correct” sponsor of the

ballot initiative was the Association of Builders and Contractors, Inc. and the Chula Vista Citizens

for Jobs and Fair Competition. For example, Kneebone testified,21

Waters: My question there, Ms. Kneebone, is: It appears to me that

you have taken numerous opportunities to make it public in

Chula Vista that you support Proposition G. Why – what is

your objection to – how is it that you want to remain

anonymous?

Kneebone: I guess I would still have to go back to the point where I just felt it

was more important that it be known that it was that Chula Vista

Citizens group through the ABC than just me.

Waters: Okay. But would it be fair to say, then, it’s not so much that

you wanted to be anonymous, but you thought that somebody

– some other organization’s name ought to be there than you?

Kneebone: Yes.

Waters: And the other organizations would be ABC and Chula Vista

Citizens –

Kneebone: Yes.

Similarly, Breitfelder testified,22

Johnson: Okay. Would you have preferred that Chula Vista Citizens or

ABC had been named proponent of Proposition G?

Breitfelder: At that point, yes.

Johnson: At what point are you referring to?

Breitfelder: During the petition phase, I believe that should have been the

21 See Pl. Mot. for Summary Judgment, Exh. 6 (Dep. of Lori Kneebone dated Mar. 15, 2011),

at 32:4 to 32:19; see also Exh. 6, at 71:3 to 71:14 (same).

22 See Pl. Mot. for Summary Judgment, Exh. 7 (Dep. of Larry Breitfelder dated Mar. 15, 2011),

at 107:8 to 107:25 (attorney objections omitted). 

- 22 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 22 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

focus.

Johnson: So on the circulated version –

Breitfelder: Circulated version.

Johnson: – you would have preferred the organizations that were the

financial backers?

. . . 

Breitfelder: Yes. At that point in the process, I believe it would have been

better and most important – or most appropriate and most

beneficial for the community for the Chula Vista

organizations to have been identified.

This testimony suggests that Kneebone and Breitfelder were not interested in engaging in

anonymous political speech so much as they were interested in voters being informed of the names

of the organizational sponsors of Proposition G. Consequently, Plaintiffs have not made the

particularized showing required for an as-applied challenge. Plaintiffs’ hurdle is not high, but it is

a hurdle. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2823 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (“speakers must be able

to obtain an as-applied exemption without clearing a high evidentiary hurdle”). Plaintiffs need

show “only a reasonable probability that disclosure will lead to threats, harassment, or reprisals.” 

Id. (citations omitted). 

In other words, Plaintiffs could have presented specific evidence of past or present

harassment, a pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility, or an array of evidence

to meet the standard. Id. (citations omitted). But Plaintiffs’ evidence does not meet the standard. 

The one instance of a possible reprisal came in the form of a campaign advertisement describing

Mr. Breitfelder as “anti-union” and a supporter of Proposition G. That evidence is ambiguous. The

stances taken by Breitfelder in his role as a candidate for public office were publicized in a myriad

of other ways and open to public comment.23 In contrast, there is no evidence that one or more of

the thousands of registered Chula Vista voters who were approached to sign the circulated petition

saw the names of Breitfelder and Kneebone and threatened or harassed the proponents. In addition,

the deposition testimony undercuts Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim that their desire for

23 As a general matter, it has never been suggested that core political speech may be considered

a “reprisal” in response to a mandated election disclosure, which in turn would permit avoiding the

mandated disclosure.

- 23 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 23 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

anonymity rested upon a desire that the public consider only the merits of the proposition without

prejudgment. The deposition testimony shows that what the proponents really wanted is better

disclosure so that the public would have more information with which to judge the merits of the

proposition. In essence, Breitfelder and Kneebone wanted to satisfy the same informational interest

identified by the government. 

To sum up, the California disclosure requirement imposed only slight burdens on Plaintiffs’

right to engage in anonymous political speech, as applied to them. Therefore, the as-applied

challenge fails.

C. THE VAGUENESS CHALLENGES

Plaintiffs and the State also move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ vagueness

challenges in Counts 3, 4, and 5. “[W]e insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a

reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly . . . . [W]here a

vague statute ‘abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit

the exercise of those freedoms.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)

(citations omitted). Nevertheless, “‘perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required

even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.’” United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830,

1845 (2008) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)). 

“Proponent” and “Publish” Are Not Vague Terms 

In Count 3, Plaintiffs attack as unconstitutionally vague, the term “proponent” and “publish”

as used in California Elections Code § 342. They argue that because a “proponent” is defined as

“the person or persons who publish a notice or intention to circulate petitions,” then an association

may be a proponent when an association publishes the notice. They argue, that publishing means

paying for the publication. They then contend that since Chula Vista Citizens actually paid for the

publishing of the notice of intention for Proposition G, then Chula Vista Citizens may be the

official proponent. 

This Court discerns no such ambiguity or vagueness. A statute that implicates free speech

rights “will survive a facial challenge so long as it is clear what the statute proscribes in the vast

majority of its intended applications Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dept., 578 F.3d

- 24 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 24 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1133, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Men of ordinary intelligence would understand that 

the general “proponent” language of the state provision dealing with local initiatives, is clarified by

the specific “elector” language found in Chula Vista Charter § 903. In this way, the state statutes

simply leave to each municipality to choose which persons may propose a local initiative. Read in

context, California Elections Code 342 is not susceptible to Plaintiffs’ reading that an association or

incorporation may become an official proponent merely by paying for cost of publication. It is only

by tearing the terms out of their overall context that ambiguity may be created. The terms are not

unconstitutionally vague.

“Bear a Copy” Is Not a Vague Phrase

In Count 4, Plaintiffs attack as unconstitutionally vague the “bear a copy” requirement

contained in California Elections Code § 9207. When the proponents of a ballot initiative begin the

process of circulating the petitions, Section 9207 requires each section of the petition to “bear a

copy of the notice of intention.” They argue that § 9207 is not clear whether a copy must include

the names of the official proponents. They argue that California Elections Code § 9202 permits the

circulated copy to be less than an exact copy and that a substantially correct copy, but a copy

without proponents names, should qualify. 

Again, this Court discerns no such ambiguity or vagueness. Section 9202 contains language

to be used for the introduction of the notice of intent. That introductory language need not be exact. 

Section 9202's leniency in the creation of the notice of intent cannot be reasonably imported into §

9207 and read as permitting something less than a complete copy of the notice of intent. Even if it

could, it cannot be reasonably argued that the omission of the important element of the proponents’

names would be in substantial compliance with the bear-a-copy language of § 9207. “A law is

unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is

prohibited, or is so indefinite as to allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Human Life,

624 F.3d at 1019 (citations omitted). The phrase is not susceptible to arbitrary enforcement.

“In Substantially the Following Form” Is Not a Vague Phrase

In Count 5, Plaintiffs attack as unconstitutionally vague the phrase “in substantially the

- 25 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 25 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

following form” requirement contained in California Elections Code § 9202.24 Plaintiffs argue that

people of reasonable intelligence cannot discern what is meant by the phrase “in substantially the

following form.” This Court discerns little ambiguity and none sufficient to find the statute void for

vagueness. The statutory terms attacked by Plaintiffs as being vague (“proponent,” “copy,” and

“substantially in the following form”) are more precise than the sorts of terms that the Supreme

Court has previously struck down as vague and they do not expose Plaintiffs to criminal or civil

sanctions. Cf., Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1020 n.10 (disclosure law imposed civil penalties and

criminal penalties). The Supreme Court explains, “[w]e have in the past struck down statutes that

tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant’s conduct was ‘annoying’ or ‘indecent’ – wholly

subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.” 

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010) (citations omitted). Because

the statutory terms at issue here are clear in their application to Plaintiffs’ conduct and are not tied

to criminal culpability, the vagueness challenges fail. Id.

IV. CONCLUSION

The elector (or natural person) requirement to be an official ballot initiative proponent is a

constitutionally permissible restriction for self-government. Likewise, the official proponent name

disclosure requirement on the circulated petitions is a permissible burden on the right to anonymous

speech. Finally, none of the statutory terms challenged are so vague as to offend the Constitution. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Defendants’ cross-motion for

summary judgment is granted. Judgment shall be entered for the Defendants on all Counts.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 22, 2012

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

24 Section 9202 provides, “The notice . . . shall be in substantially the following form: 

Notice of Intent to Circulate Petition 

Notice is hereby given by the persons whose names appear hereon of

their intention to circulate the petition within the City of __________

for the purpose of ____________. A statement of the reasons of the

proposed action as contemplated in the petition is as follows: [blank]”

- 26 - 09cv0897

Case 3:09-cv-00897-BEN-JMA Document 70 Filed 03/22/12 Page 26 of 26