Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00916/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00916-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE CREAMER, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF TULARE, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-00916-DAD-EPG

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING 

THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO CLOSE 

THE CASE

(Doc. Nos. 24 and 25.) 

Plaintiff Bruce Creamer, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, commenced this civil 

rights action on June 17, 2015. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 23, 2015, plaintiff’s original 

complaint was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed with leave to amend. 

(Doc. No. 11.) Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint which was again screened and also

dismissed with leave to amend granted. (Doc. Nos. 12 and 13.) Thereafter, plaintiff filed a 

second amended complaint. (Doc. No. 15.) The court screened the second amended complaint 

and dismissed all claims brought therein by plaintiff against defendants Magistrate Judge Erica 

Grosjean and Tulare County Superior Court Judge Walter Gorelick with prejudice and without 

leave to amend. (Doc. No. 23 at 23.) In addition, the court also dismissed all claims brought by 

plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

(Id.) However, in dismissing the remaining claim brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the 

court again granted leave to amend. (Id.) In doing so, however, the undersigned made clear that 

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plaintiff was being granted “one final opportunity to amend his complaint only with respect to 

his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in keeping with the direction provided by this 

order.” (Id. at 12.)

On September 21, 2016, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (“TAC”) naming the 

following defendants: City of Tulare, current/former pro term mayor David Macedo, city 

manager Don Dorman, chief of police Jerry Breckinridge, officer Richard Garcia, officer James 

Ussery, officer Frank Furtaw, officer Greg Merrill, officer V. Medina, chief deputy city clerk 

Roxanne Yoder, officer Rosa Moreno, Action Towing, Inc., unnamed Doe contractor, and an 

unknown number of Doe defendants. (Doc. No. 24 at 1.) In his TAC, plaintiff alleges that the 

named defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. 

at 2.) The court has reviewed the TAC and concludes, for the reasons explained below, that 

plaintiff has again failed to state a cognizable claim against any of the defendants named in this 

action.1

I. Pleading Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must conduct a review of a pro se complaint to 

determine whether it “state[s] a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or 

malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If 

the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id.

A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8

and detailed factual allegations are not required, its allegations must also include the specificity 

 

1

 Notably, on three prior occasions plaintiff has received direction from this court regarding the 

deficiencies reflected in his previously filed complaints. Nonetheless, the allegations of 

plaintiff’s third amended complaint are largely identical to those set forth in his previously filed 

complaints.

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required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). However, while factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Finally, pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 

pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). See also Erickson, 551 

U.S. at 94.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff has included a timeline in his TAC, with largely identical allegations to those set 

forth in his prior complaints, in which he alleges the following. Plaintiff lives on property at 725 

W. San Joaquin Avenue in Tulare, California. As part of an unspecified business, plaintiff stored 

one or more vehicles on his property. The vehicles appear to have been kept in some state of 

disrepair. At some point in 2013 or 2014, defendant James Ussery, a code enforcement officer 

for the City of Tulare, left his business card on plaintiff’s door with a note asking plaintiff to 

contact him. On January 13, 2014, plaintiff received a Notice of Violation of Tulare Municipal 

Code § 7.28.030, which declares it a nuisance for any person to maintain (or fail to maintain) 

property under an enumerated list of conditions. The Notice was issued by defendant Richard 

Garcia and informed plaintiff that he had ten days to remedy the violation.

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On January 26, 2014, plaintiff received a letter from defendant Garcia informing plaintiff 

that he had been cited for violating Tulare Municipal Code § 7.28.030(P)(5)(d), which requires 

that: “Abandoned, dismantled, wrecked, inoperative vehicles, or parts thereof, on private 

property shall be stored in a completely enclosed building or structure.” On January 29, 2014, 

plaintiff sent a letter to the “City manager” in which he requested a hearing on the citation. (Doc. 

No. 24 at 6-7.) According to plaintiff, “defendant(s)” denied his request for a court hearing. (Id. 

at 7.) Two weeks later, on February 13, 2014, plaintiff received two letters from the Tulare 

Police Department informing him of the department’s intent to abate the nuisance under Tulare 

Municipal Code § 4.36.010 et seq., defining the removal procedure for abandoned, wrecked, 

dismantled, or inoperative vehicles. (Id.) On February 18, 2014, plaintiff delivered a letter to the 

police department, apparently challenging their authority under the Municipal Code to proceed in 

the manner indicated by their letters. (Id.) 

Between January 8, 2014 and April 18, 2014, defendant Tulare County, through Richard 

Garcia, located defendant Action Towing Inc. and together “defendant(s)” conspired and

trespassed on plaintiff’s property for the purpose of taking plaintiff’s property. (Id. at 9.) On 

April 18, 2014, defendants Richard Garcia, Greg Merrill, V. Medina, and no less than five other 

“unknown defendant(s) armed with weapons drawn and pointed at unarmed Plaintiff” arrived at 

plaintiff’s address. (Id.) They handcuffed plaintiff and “forcibly put Plaintiff on the concrete.” 

(Id.) “Other defendant(s) City employed agents broke into Plaintiff[’s] house damaging the 

property of Plaintiff.” (Id. at 7-8.) “Defendant(s) broke into and damage[d] Plaintiff[’s] garage 

structure, equipment shed building, fence, and other property.” (Id. at 8.) “The Defendant(s) and 

City employed contracted agents then took Plaintiff[’s] property away without Plaintiff[’s] 

consent or compensation.” (Id.) Plaintiff generally contends that “defendant(s)” breached the 

boundary of the search warrant provided to him and dated April 11, 2014. (Id.) “Defendant(s)” 

further gave plaintiff a document informing him that he would need to vacate the premises. (Id.) 

On April 22, 2014, the police department mailed plaintiff receipts for the property that had 

been seized, although plaintiff contends that not all the property seized was reflected on those 

receipts. On April 28, 2014, plaintiff received a notice from defendant Action Towing Inc. 

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regarding the placement of a lien on his vehicle(s). Plaintiff returned the form, along with a 

statement in which plaintiff alleged that Action Towing Inc. owed him a number of fees, 

including a $1,400 per week rental fee for holding each of his vehicles and a $75,000 per vehicle 

charge if any of his property could not be returned.

On May 9, 2014, plaintiff filed a notice of tort claim with the City Clerk for Tulare. On 

June 13, 2014, plaintiff sent defendant code enforcement officer Frank Furtaw an email 

requesting unspecified information, but received an automated “out of office” reply. On July 10, 

2014, plaintiff again sent an email to defendant Furtaw, but received a reply stating that Furtaw 

was no longer assigned to code enforcement. Plaintiff sent Furtaw another email informing him

that he would be named in plaintiff’s lawsuit. On July 20, 2014, plaintiff received a letter from 

defendant Garcia referring him to the Tulare County Superior Court.

On July 30, 2014, plaintiff emailed defendant city clerk Roxanne Yoder regarding 

information on how to sue the city. The next day another city clerk, Lori Heeszel, responded. On 

December 23, 2014, an unidentified police officer walked onto plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff 

asked him to leave, but the officer did not do so. Over the following four months, plaintiff 

attempted to investigate the Tulare Police Department, first by filing a police report with the

Tulare Police Department and later by calling the FBI. Plaintiff filed his original complaint in 

this court on June 12, 2015.

III. Discussion

A. First Claim: 42 U.S.C. § 1983

As plaintiff has previously been advised, to state a cognizable claim under § 1983, a 

plaintiff “must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 

States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color 

of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th 

Cir. 1980) (a plaintiff in a civil rights action must allege facts demonstrating how the conditions 

complained of resulted in a deprivation of his federal constitutional or statutory rights.) A 

plaintiff must also allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the 

deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“Because vicarious liability is 

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inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official 

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); 

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of 

Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

unless there is some affirmative link or connection alleged between a defendant’s actions and the 

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations, such as those made by plaintiff in his 

previously filed complaints in this action, are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Finally, to state such a claim the complaint must allege that every 

named defendant also acted with the requisite state of mind to violate the underlying 

constitutional provision. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012).

Below, the court will once again address the deficiencies of plaintiff’s operative complaint

before the court.

1. Defendant Officers and City Officials in their Official Capacities

As plaintiff has previously been advised, to state a cognizable claim against the defendant 

officers in their official capacities or, alternatively, against the City of Tulare, he must allege “that 

(1) the constitutional tort was the result of a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes 

the standard operating procedure of the local government entity;’ (2) the tortfeasor was an official 

whose acts fairly represent official policy such that the challenged action constituted official 

policy; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority ‘delegated that authority to, or ratified 

the decision of, a subordinate.’” (Doc. Nos. 13 at 7 and 23 at 6) (quoting Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 

962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008).

2

In his TAC plaintiff once again has failed to allege any facts explaining what role 

defendants David Macedo, Don Dorman, Roxanne Yoder (collectively, the “city officials”), Jerry 

Breckinridge, Greg Merrill, V. Medina, Rosa Moreno, James Ussery, Frank Furtaw, Richard 

 

2

 See also Ulrich v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Garcia (collectively, the “officers”) played, if any, in the alleged violation of his constitutional 

rights. (See Doc. Nos. 13 at 5 and 23 at 7) (advising plaintiff that he had failed to allege facts 

explaining the roles the named defendants had played with respect to the alleged violations of his 

constitutional rights). Instead, plaintiff once again merely alleges that city employees broke into 

his house, damaged property, and took away his property without compensation without ever 

specifically alleging what action or actions each of the named defendant engaged in. (Doc. Nos.

13 at 5; 23 at 7; 24 at 6–7.)

It is true that plaintiff has alleged that defendant Richard Garcia was the officer who cited 

him and was involved in the abatement action. (See Doc. No. 24 at 6.) It is also true that plaintiff

now alleges that defendants Richard Garcia, Greg Merrill, and V. Medina and “no less than 5 

other unknown defendant(s) armed with assault weapons drawn and pointed at unarmed Plaintiff 

[t]respassed on private property and forcibly put Plaintiff in handcuff[s] and forcibly put Plaintiff 

on the concrete.” (Id. at 7.) However, such conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a 

cognizable § 1983 claim. Indeed, plaintiff does not even allege what Richard Garcia, Greg 

Merrill, and V. Medina each did nor do his allegations make clear whether each of these three 

named defendants allegedly had assault weapons drawn and pointed at plaintiff. Accordingly, the 

allegations of the TAC fail to link the acts of any of the named defendants to the alleged 

constitutional violations. Furthermore, in his TAC plaintiff does not allege that the defendants 

acted with the requisite state of mind to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Finally, in his 

TAC plaintiff has failed to allege that the claimed constitutional violations resulting from the 

actions of any of these defendants, including the City of Tulare, were part of a “longstanding 

practice or custom,” were acts which represented an official policy, or were carried out by an 

official who ratified the decision of a subordinate.

Accordingly, all of plaintiff’s claims against defendants the City of Tulare, David 

Macedo, Don Dorman, Roxanne Yoder, Jerry Breckinridge, Greg Merrill, V. Medina, Rosa 

Moreno, James Ussery, Frank Furtaw, and Richard Garcia in their official capacity must be

dismissed.

/////

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2. Defendant Officers and City Officials in their Individual Capacities

In his TAC plaintiff has alleged at least two potential § 1983 claims against the defendant 

officers and city officials in their individual capacities. Below, the court will address these 

potential claims.

i. Illegal search and seizure

“A warrant cannot pass constitutional muster if the scope of the related search or seizure 

exceeds that permitted by the terms of the validly issued warrant.” Pac. Marine Center, Inc. v. 

Silva, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1280 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1123, 

1134 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010)). “A valid warrant must describe particularly the places that officers 

may search and the types of items that they may seize.” Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 

1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006). “This requirement exists to prevent[ ] general, exploratory searches 

and indiscriminate rummaging through a person’s belongings.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Spilotro,800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted)).

Here, plaintiff alleges in his TAC that, on April 18, 2014, “[o]ther defendant(s) City 

employed agents” broke into his house, damaged property, seized property without consent or 

compensation, and breached the boundary of an unlawful search warrant. (Doc. No. 24 at 7–8.) 

Plaintiff alleges that the “defendant(s) City employed agents” were acting under color of state law 

when they conducted the search. (Id. at .)3 While plaintiff has attached numerous exhibits to his 

complaint, the search warrant is not one of them. More importantly, as noted in the court’s prior 

screening orders, “[p]laintiff has [again] not identified which officers were involved in the 

search.” (Doc. Nos. 13 at 7 and 23 at 8.) Indeed, the court specifically advised plaintiff in its 

prior screening orders as follows:

Plaintiff has named a number of defendants but has not explained 

how they are involved in the alleged constitutional violations. In 

amending his complaint, Plaintiff should explain how each 

defendant participated in the deprivation of his rights.

(Doc. Nos. 13 at 7 and 23 at 8.) Despite being specifically directed to do so, plaintiff has once 

 

3

This allegation is certainly plausible. See Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 

2006) (“State employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor”) (quoting

West, 487 U.S. at 48). 

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again failed to allege which of the defendants were involved in the search or how each defendant 

participated in that allegedly unlawful search. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to plead a 

cognizable Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 against any of the named defendants in their 

individual capacities.

ii. Procedural due process

Plaintiff in his TAC, once again appears to be attempting to allege that his due process 

rights were violated because he was denied a hearing prior to or in connection with the seizure of 

his property. “To obtain relief on a procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must establish the 

existence of ‘(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of 

the interest by the government; and (3) lack of process.’” Stamas v. Cnty. of Madera, 795 

F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th 

Cir. 2008)). “[P]rocedural due process claims do not ‘deal with the substance of the challenged 

decisions, but with the process by which they were reached’.” Id. (quoting Halverson v. Skagit 

Cnty., 42 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1994)). “The due process clause does not prohibit every 

deprivation by the state of an individual’s property. Only those deprivations carried out without 

due process are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Halverson, 42 F.3d at 1260. “‘Ordinarily, 

due process of law requires [notice and] an opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to the 

deprivation of a significant property interest.’” Id.

In his TAC plaintiff alleges that “Defendant(s) and City employed contracted agents” took 

plaintiff’s property without consent or compensation. (Doc. No. 24 at 8.) Although according to 

the allegations of the TAC the “city manager” appears to have provided plaintiff advance notice 

that his property would be seized, plaintiff alleges “Inside Rebuttal was their Hearing Request 

form. In which Plaintiff Requested to be heard in a State or County Court. . . . This court hearing 

was denied to Plaintiff by defendant(s).” (Doc. No. 24 at 6–7.) Thus, plaintiff alleges in 

conclusory fashion that he requested a hearing and that his request was denied. Plaintiff’s 

allegations in this regard are, however, vague and insufficient. The court has previously advised 

plaintiff that “[i]n amending his complaint, Plaintiff should explain how each defendant 

participated in the deprivation of his rights.” (Doc. Nos. 13 at 7 and 23 at 9.) Plaintiff has simply 

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failed to do so with respect to his due process claim yet again.

3. Remaining Defendants 

Plaintiff has named several additional individuals as defendants in the caption of his TAC. 

However, in order to state a claim against these individuals plaintiff must allege facts 

demonstrating that each of these defendants personally participated in the deprivation of his 

rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. A complaint must be clear as to whom a plaintiff is suing and for 

what wrongs. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim must be stated 

clearly enough to provide each defendant fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading. Id. at 

1180. Here, for instance, plaintiff has identified Action Towing Inc. and John Doe contractor in 

the heading of his TAC, but alleges in the body of the TAC only that Tulare County, through its 

employee Richard Garcia, “locate[d] a contractor defendant (Action towing INC.) and together 

defendant(s) conspired to and trespassed on Plaintiffs’ property for the purpose of taking 

Plaintiffs’ property.” (Doc. No. 24 at 9.) Such conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a 

cognizable claim. Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts in the body of the TAC tying Action 

Towing Inc. or John Doe contractor to any constitutional violation alleged. In the absence of 

factual allegations tying these potential defendants to any wrongdoing alleged, the court must 

dismiss plaintiff’s claims against these remaining potential defendants identified only in the 

caption of plaintiff’s TAC.

Finally, the court notes that plaintiff was previously advised that he should “carefully 

consider which [d]efendants were actually involved in the sequence of events he alleges, as he 

can only pursue relief against those specific individuals.” (Doc. Nos. 13 at 9 and 23 at 10.) In 

identifying these additional individuals and entities as defendants in the caption of his TAC with 

no factual allegations relating to them in the body of the TAC, plaintiff has ignored the direction 

provided by the court in its previous orders.

IV. Leave To Amend

The undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff could amend his TAC to 

remedy the defects noted above with respect to his attempted § 1983 claims against the named 

defendants. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, 

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and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 

(9th Cir.1988). See also Klamath–Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 

1276, 1293 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the court does 

not have to allow futile amendments). Here, plaintiff has been advised by the court in three prior 

screening orders of the deficiencies of his allegations. (Doc. Nos. 11 at 3–5; 13 at 5; 23 at 5–10.) 

In addition, plaintiff has been provided guidance by the court in those orders as to what was 

required to cure the noted deficiencies. (Id.) Plaintiff has failed to correct those deficiencies 

despite being provided three opportunities to do so. Moreover, the TAC before the court now is 

essentially the same as the complaints addressed by the court in the prior screening orders. (Doc. 

Nos. 12; 15; 24.) In the last screening order, the court specifically warned plaintiff that it was 

granting “one final opportunity [for plaintiff] to amend his complaint.” (Doc. No. 23 at 12.) The

court can only conclude at this point that allowing further amendments would be futile. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s TAC will be dismissed without further leave to amend.

V. Conclusion

For all of the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiff’s third amended complaint (Doc. No. 24) is dismissed without leave to amend

due to plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim; 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for entrance of amended complaint (Doc. No. 25) is dismissed as 

having been rendered moot by this order; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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