Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00309/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00309-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

George V. Austin,

Petitioner,

v.

R. GROUNDS, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15cv309-BAS (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER 

DENYING REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING 

[ECF No. 1]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Cynthia 

Bashant pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. On February 12, 2015, Petitioner, 

George V. Austin, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, commenced these 

habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner 

challenges the validity of his state court conviction for robbery, and the finding that he 

committed robbery, two counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and 

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two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great 

bodily injury, for the benefit of a criminal street gang. See Id. at 2. Respondent answered on 

June 24, 2015. ECF No. 10 (“Ans.”). Petitioner’s Traverse was filed on December 7, 2015.1 

(“Trav.”)

This Court has considered the Petition, Answer, Traverse and all supporting documents 

filed by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that 

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion in People v. 

Price and Austin, Appeal No. D060993. See Lodgment 5. This Court presumes the state 

court’s factual determinations to be correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the 

contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from such facts are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness).

Heveen Toma managed the Moonlight Market (store) located within the 

territory of the East Side Skyline Piru criminal street gang (Skyline gang) in the 

Skyline neighborhood of San Diego. In the evening of April 5, 2011, store 

employee Mukhles Daud was working the register while Heveen, Heveen’s cousin 

Karlos Toma and store employee Salwan Toma were busy loading cases of 

Hennessy liquor onto a truck parked in the store parking lot for transport to 

another location. As Karlos guarded the truck, Heveen, assisted by Salwan, used 

a dolly to take the cases from the storeroom, through the front door of the store, 

to the truck. Each case contained twelve 750 milliliter bottles of Hennessy, and 

each bottle sold for $30. Approximately 35 cases were loaded into the bed of 

the truck, and 20 smaller cases were loaded inside the truck’s cabin.

 

1

 The Traverse was due on July 27, 2015. ECF No. 9. The Court received Petitioner’s 

Traverse on December 7, 2015, and accepted the document on discrepancy on December 8, 

2015. ECF No. 13. Petitioner claims that he submitted his Traverse on July 1, 2015. ECF 

No. 14 at 1-2. Although there is no evidence substantiating Petitioner’s claim [see Docket], 

the Court accepts the Traverse and will consider the document.

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The jury viewed video taken from multiple surveillance cameras at the 

store that showed a black vehicle driven by a man later identified as Austin back 

into a parking space in front of the store. Five men, including Austin, exited the 

car. As Heveen came through the front door of the store with a dolly loaded 

with cases of Hennessy, the surveillance video shows Austin and another man 

later identified as Norman Berry smacking the cases of Hennessy. Heveen 

testified the men loudly said, “‘oh, this is mine’” and “‘give me that’” as they did 

so. Heveen continued walking to the truck to finish unloading the cases and 

returned to the store. Meanwhile, Austin purchased a bottle of Hennessy.

When he came back outside, Heveen observed Austin and Berry in a loud 

tone say to Karlos, “where are you guys going with that” and “give me that” and 

“I want to take some of that,” referring to the cases of Hennessy. Karlos 

responded, “You guys just have yourselves a good night. We’re just doing our 

jobs.” As Heveen loaded the cases of Hennessy onto the truck, Austin and Berry 

continued to ask where they were taking the Hennessy. Heveen testified he 

then went back into the store and told Salwan, “‘hurry up’” and “‘let’s try to 

finish,’” because he was concerned Austin, Berry and the rest of their group 

would attempt to take the Hennessy.

Heveen next heard Austin and Berry say, “‘this is Skyline,’” “‘[w]e’re going 

to follow you wherever you’re going to go [with the cases]’” and “‘this is our 

area.’” Heveen testified he associated these words and/or expressions with the 

fact that the men, including Austin and Berry, were part of a gang that was from 

the Skyline area, inasmuch as at the time of the incident Heveen had worked at 

the store for more than three years and knew gangs were located in the area. 

Berry also began “throwing gang sings up” as he and Austin paced back and 

forth in front of the store.

Heveen testified that just as they finished loading the Hennessy, Austin 

got into the black car and slowly moved it to another part of the store parking 

lot. Austin then exited the car and said, “‘Now you’re blocked in. You’re not 

going to go anywhere.” As this was occurring, Barry continued “throwing up . . . 

gang signs” and repeated “‘this is Skyline’” and “‘this is our area,’” and words to 

that effect.

After Austin threw a two-liter soda at Heveen and Karlos, Austin came 

around his car and said, “This is our Area. You guys are not going anywhere. 

We’re going to take your shit.”’ Austin and Berry also said, “‘this is Piru 

territory’” and repeated, “‘this is Skyline.’” The two also made gang signs with 

their hands.

Heveen testified that Karlos told him to call the police. Heveen called 911, 

but was unable to get an operator on the line. Nonetheless, at Karlos’s 

suggestion, Heveen pretended to speak to the police on his phone because he 

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was fearful of being robbed and hoped Austin, Berry and the others would just 

leave.

Austin, Berry and the others then got back in the black car. Before Berry 

got into the car, Heveen testified Berry went to the passenger side of the car and 

appeared to retrieve something and put it in his back pocket, such as a weapon. 

Berry then said, “I got something for you.” After they were all in the car, 

Heveen testified Austin revved the engine and, as also shown by the video, then 

drove the car towards Karlos, clipping him on the shin and causing him to fall 

onto the hood of the car.

As shown in the video and testified to by Heveen, Karlos then stood up on 

the hood of the car and stomped on the car’s windshield. The windshield 

cracked. As the black car started backing up, Karlos jumped off the hood, took 

off his jacket and angrily said, “‘Now come on. Get out [of] the car.’” The video 

shows Karlos then hitting the passenger side window of the car, which also was 

confirmed by Heveen’s testimony. 

The black car driven by Austin left the parking lot. Heveen testified the 

car quickly stopped next to a utility box, and the group of men then got out of 

the car and charged them. Heveen testified and the video surveillance from the 

store shows that Berry took a swing at Heveen, and Heveen swung back. 

Heveen also testified Austin had a knife estimated to be about five inches long in 

his hand when he got out of the car and came at Karlos, but Karlos grabbed a 

trash can lid and used it as a shield to ward off the attack. As the other men 

were attacking Karlos, Austin went to the truck loaded with Hennessy, grabbed 

two cases and threw them to the ground. Austin then tried to open the cases.

After Austin threw a third case of Hennessy to the ground, Heveen 

testified a group of about 10 to 15 people, including Price, came on the scene 

from the direction of Skyline. Some of these people joined in the fight. Others 

started throwing bottles of Hennessy at Heveen and Karlos from one of the cases 

Austin had thrown to the ground. Austin threw a bottle of Hennessy at Karlos, 

but he missed and the bottle hit the ground and shattered. Price punched Karlos 

and unsuccessfully attempted to hit Karlos with a bottle.

During the melee, Karlos was knocked to the ground. As Karlos lay on the 

ground, he was kicked and punched, including by a man in a black shirt later 

identified as Laquan Jordan who used his fists to “pound[] away” at Karlos. At 

the same time Jordan was punching Karlos in the face, Austin tried to stab 

Karlos. Several others also kicked Karlos, including Price. Heveen testified that 

he also saw Price throw a bottle of Hennessy at Karlos while Karlos lay on the 

ground.

While Karlos appeared to be unconscious on the ground, people were 

yelling “beat his ass.” In an effort to assist Karlos, Heveen punched Austin, who 

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in turn swung the knife at Heveen but missed. After a woman punched Heveen 

in the face, he got angry, picked up a bottle of Hennessy and threw it at Jordan, 

who was still punching Karlos. The bottle struck Jordan in the chest.

Austin next ran to the driver’s side of the black car and got inside. The 

others in the group followed, and the car driven by Austin left. Heveen saw Price 

and others run away. Heveen checked on Karlos, who lay motionless on the 

ground. As Heveen approached, he could hear Karlos “was having trouble 

breathing.” Karlos’s face was bloody, and his nose appeared to be badly broken. 

Salwan testified Karlos’s body was “shaking,” and Karlos was unresponsive.

Because Heveen estimated he had waited about six minutes for dispatch 

to pick up his 911 call, Heveen called the El Cajon Police Department, who was in

the process of transferring the call to the San Diego Police Department when 

Heveen flagged down a patrol car passing the store and reported the crime.

During the incident, Heveen was struck by three thrown bottles of 

Hennessy. Salwan and Mukhles also were struck by thrown bottles. Additionally, 

during the attack, Salwan testified he heard the words “Blood” and “Piru” being 

yelled by the attackers.

John Frazier testified he observed the attack from his vehicle while 

stopped at a stoplight near the store. From the car, he could smell something 

“strange in the air” and determined it was a “liquory” smell. He saw a group of 

African-American men trying to steal liquor from a parked truck that was being 

“frantically” defended by another man. Frazier said the group “viciously” 

attacked the man, including throwing bottles at him and kicking him while he lay 

on the ground. Frazier called 911 and then saw a group of men involved in the 

attack get inside a “dark-colored” sedan and speed away. Frazier followed the 

speeding sedan for a few miles in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a license 

plate number.

Patricia Ennis testified she observed the attack from the bus she was 

driving. Surveillance video of the incident taken from cameras on the bus was 

shown to the jury. Ennis stopped the bus and observed bottles being thrown by 

at least six African-American males at a man that she previously had seen yelling 

at occupants of a black car that was moving very slowly in the store parking lot. 

Shortly thereafter, Ennis saw the man who had been standing in the middle of 

the parking lot on the ground and observed several African-American men 

punching him. Ennis radioed dispatch and reported the attack. Ennis later told 

police she saw some of the men in the group take some of the bottles.

Karlos suffered numerous cuts and abrasions, and his broken nose 

required plastic surgery as a result of the attack. Karlos spent two or three days 

in the hospital following the attack.

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Police at the scene observed several broken bottles and areas of liquid on 

the asphalt of the store parking lot. Police estimated there were eight broken 

bottles and 12 bottles missing from the cases. Heveen testified that 36 bottles of 

Hennessy were broken, damaged or missing as a result of the incident and 

valued the store’s loss at about $1,000.

Police reviewed the video surveillance of the attack and recognized Austin 

as one of the attackers. Salwan and Mukhles each identified Austin in separate 

photographic lineups.

. . .

San Diego Police Detective Jon Brown testified as the prosecution’s gang 

expert. Detective Brown was a member of the gang unit and, as both a 

detective and a patrol officer, had investigated over 200 crimes involving the 

Skyline gang. Additionally, Detective Brown contacted hundreds of Skyline gang 

members and reviewed arrest reports and field interviews related to the Skyline 

gang.

Detective Brown testified that the Skyline gang then had about 400 

members, it has been in existence since the 1970’s, it is a “Blood set,” and its 

primary color is red. The Skyline gang is comprised of several smaller gangs, 

including one known as the O’Farrell Park gang. According to Detective Brown, 

the Skyline gang’s primary rival is the Lincoln Park gang, also a “Blood set.”

Detective Brown testified he was familiar with Austin based on his own 

contacts with Austin, his review of documents, including field interviews and 

from speaking with other law enforcement. Based on that information and based 

on Austin’s admission of being a gang member, Austin’s gang-related tattoos 

including “8 Piru 0” across his chest and from his review of the surveillance video 

showing Austin making hand signs that were consistent with the Skyline gang, 

Detective Brown opined that Austin was a member of the Skyline gang, going by 

the monikers “Gee” and “Monkey Blood.” Austin was known to associate with 

about 15 Skyline or O’Farrell Park gang members.

. . . 

Given a hypothetical situation consistent with the facts involving the 

instant offenses in which four or five Skyline gang members came to a market 

located in their gang territory, harassed employees of the market and demanded 

alcohol while mentioning and/or displaying their gang affinity, and ultimately 

beat one of those employees while throwing gang signs, Detective Brown opined 

these hypothetical crimes were committed for the benefit of and in association 

with a criminal street gang.

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In that instance, Detective Brown noted there was a clear “association 

because the gang members are acting with each other. They’re telling the 

victims whatever gang set they’re from, so they’re not only assaulting them, but 

they’re letting them know who it is, which is going to create fear in the 

community. [¶] So the gang members get status because they’re putting in 

violent acts to up their status, and the gang gets the benefit because any time 

you get violent gang members, that reflects upon the gang and now the gang 

gets to be known as more violent, not only to rival gang members, but to 

community members that go to that market or just live in the area and happen 

to see it on the news.”

Detective Brown further opined that in considering the facts of the same 

hypothetical, such conduct by the gang members would promote, further or 

assist criminal conduct by the gang members because in that hypothetical 

instance gang members are “working as a team; they’re backing each other up. 

So even though one kind of starts to fight, they all jump in and they work as a 

team to have a group attack against the victims.”

Lodgment 5 at 3-12.

On June 9, 2011, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a five-count information 

charging Petitioner with robbery in violation of California (“Cal.”) Penal Code § 211 (count 1), 

two counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Cal. Penal 

Code § 245(a)(1) (counts 2 and 3), and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and by 

means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1) 

(counts 4 and 5). Lodgment 1 at 1-5. The information further alleged that Petitioner 

committed the offenses charged in Counts 1-5 for the benefit of a criminal street gang in 

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1), personally inflicted bodily injury upon a victim 

during the commission of the offenses charged in counts 1 and 3, as defined in Cal. Penal 

Code § 12022.7(a), and served one prior prison term within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code 

§§ 667.5(b), 668. Id. Following a trial, on September 16, 2011, a jury found Petitioner guilty 

on counts 1 through 5. Id. at 413-17. The jury found true the gang enhancements on 

counts 1 through 5, and not true the great bodily injury enhancements. Id. Petitioner 

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admitted the prison term prior. Id. at 418. On November 29, 2011, the trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to seventeen years in state prison. Id. at 420-21. 

On July 5, 2012, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, 

arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction in count 1, 

(2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on simple theft as the lesser included 

offense of robbery in count 1, (3) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the gang 

enhancement, and (4) that Petitioner’s abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the 

proper criminal conviction. Lodgment 3 at 13-44. Petitioner also joined “in all issues” that 

may “redound or accrue to his benefit” raised by Keshawn Price, his co-defendant and coappellant, including Price’s claim that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to 

bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancement allegation from the underlying substantive 

offenses. See Lodgment 3 at 45; see also Lodgment 5 at 17. On July 29, 2013, the Court of 

Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, but directed the trial court to correct the abstract of 

judgment.2 See Lodgment 5. 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court 

alleging the following: (1) a robbery is not committed where, during a fight, the defendant 

destroys the property of the other combatant without any removal of the property from the 

 

2 Petitioner argued on appeal, and the People agreed, that Petitioner’s abstract of judgment 

had to be corrected to reflect proper convictions because it stated that Petitioner was 

convicted of “assault with deadly weapon” on counts 2 through 5, whereas the verdict forms 

read that Petitioner was convicted of “assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury” 

on counts 2 and 3, and of “assault with deadly weapon/force likely to cause GBI [great bodily 

injury]” in counts 4 and 5. See Lodgments 3 at 43-44; 4 at 51-52. The California Court of 

Appeal directed the trial court to correct Petitioner’s abstract of judgment to “show that 

[Petitioner] was convicted of ‘assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury’ in counts 

2 and 3, and of ‘assault with deadly weapon/force likely to cause GBI [great bodily injury] in 

counts 4 and 5.” Lodgment 5 at 48.

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scene or apparent intent to take the property, and (2) the failure to instruct on Cal. Penal 

Code § 186.22 technical legal requirements to find the existence of a criminal street gang 

cannot be deemed harmless. Lodgment 6 at 8-18. The California Supreme Court summarily 

denied the petition without comment or citation to authority on October 30, 2013. 

Lodgment 7. On September 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the California Supreme Court alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to 

join Petitioner’s co-appellant’s claim that the trial court erroneously denied a motion to 

bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations. Lodgment 8. On December 10, 2014, the 

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition citing In re Clark, 3 Cal. 4th 750, 767-79 

(1993). Lodgment 9.

On February 10, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant petition asserting the following claims: 

(1) there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction in count 1, (2) the trial 

court violated his due process rights when it failed to instruct on simple theft as the lesser 

included offense of robbery in count 1, (3) the trial court violated his constitutional rights 

when it erroneously omitted a portion of the required jury instruction relating to the gang 

enhancement. See Pet. Petitioner asserts a fourth claim challenging the failure to bifurcate 

the gang enhancement allegations from the substantive crimes, although the parameters and 

constitutional basis of the claim are unclear.

3

 See id. In his Traverse, Petitioner raises a fifth

 

3 The Petition contains a page asserting a fourth ground but it contains no argument and 

merely states “please refer to Exhibit ‘D.’” Pet. at 9. Although there is a cover page for 

Exhibit D, it does not contain any documents. See id. at 53. In his Traverse, Petitioner 

addresses each ground for relief in a numbered heading. Trav. The fourth heading is titled 

“Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim is Colorable.” Id. at 24. In this section, 

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his due process rights because it failed to 

bifurcate the gang allegations from the substantive crimes and the admitted gang evidence 

unfairly prejudiced him. Id. at 24-26. Despite the heading, the argument does not mention 

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claim arguing that cumulative errors at his trial violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial 

and due process. See Trav. at 26-28.

SCOPE OF REVEIW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of 

review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is 

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C § 2254(d), as 

amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or

 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Respondent interpreted the fourth claim as asserting an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim and addresses the claim with regards to both trial and 

appellate counsel. Ans. at 21-22. Respondent notes that Petitioner presented the ineffective 

assistance of appellant counsel claim to the California Supreme Court in a habeas petition. 

See id.; see also Pet. at 79, 82. Because district courts must “construe pro se filings liberally,” 

see Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court construes Petitioner’s 

claims in Ground Four as alleging: the trial court violated Petitioner’s due process rights when 

it refused to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations from the substantive crimes, 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to argue for bifurcation of the gang allegations,

and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to join Petitioner’s co-appellant’s 

claim that the trial court erroneously denied a motion to bifurcate the gang allegations. 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In making this determination, a court may consider a lower court’s 

analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991) (authorizing a reviewing court to 

look through to the last reasoned state court decision). Summary denials are presumed to 

constitute adjudications on the merits unless “there is reason to think some other explanation 

for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99-100

(2011).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court: 

(1) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases”; or 

(2) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] 

precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law where the state court “‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] 

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). “[A] federal 

habeas court may not issue [a] writ simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 

75-76 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Clearly established federal law “refers 

to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of 

the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

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If the state court provided no explanation of its reasoning, “a habeas court must 

determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state 

court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree 

that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the 

Supreme Court].” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. In other words, a federal court may not grant 

habeas relief if any fairminded jurist could find the state court’s ruling consistent with relevant 

Supreme Court precedent.

 Finally, habeas relief also is available if the state court’s adjudication of a claim “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010). A state court’s decision will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless this Court finds that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state court. See Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 340; 

see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable minds 

reviewing the record might disagree” does not render a decision objectively unreasonable). 

This Court will presume that the state court’s factual findings are correct, and Petitioner may 

overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007).

DISCUSSION

A. Ground One: Insufficient Evidence to Support Robbery Conviction

Petitioner alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated 

because insufficient evidence existed to support the count 1 verdict finding that Petitioner 

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committed robbery.4 See Pet. at 7, 20-35; see also Trav. at 10. Petitioner argues that the 

factual record in this case establishes that (1) no taking occurred, (2) there was no force or 

fear directly used to accomplish a taking to the extent that one did occur, and (3) Petitioner 

did not have the requisite intent to steal. See Pet. at 27-35. Petitioner contends that his 

destruction of the Hennessy bottles during a fight does not constitute robbery, and that to 

hold so was an improper expansion of the crime. Id. at 20, 23. 

Respondent counters that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the 

finding that a taking occurred, that force and fear was used to accomplish the taking, and that 

Petitioner acted with the requisite intent to permanently deprive the store of its property when 

he destroyed the Hennessy. Ans. at 15. Respondent thus contends that the state appellate 

court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence was reasonable and 

habeas relief should be denied. See id.

Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition 

(Lodgment 7), the Court must “look through” the silent denial to the California Court of 

Appeal’s opinion (Lodgment 5). Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 n.3 (1991). The 

California Court of Appeal found that substantial evidence supported Petitioner’s robbery 

conviction. See Lodgment 5 at 32-33. In denying Petitioner’s appeal, the California Court of 

Appeal stated: 

 

4 In his Petition to this Court, Petitioner attached as exhibits photocopied pages entitled 

“Arguments Points and Authorities,” which appear to be taken from his petition for review filed 

in the California Court of Appeal, and references the exhibits to substantiate his claims. See

Pet. at 6-9, 20-52. Because it appears that Petitioner wishes to incorporate the arguments 

from his state appellate court’s petition into the instant Petition, and in light of the Ninth 

Circuit’s instruction that district courts must “construe pro se filings liberally,” see Allen, 408 

F.3d at 1153, this Court looks to the attached exhibits for further elaboration of Petitioner’s 

claims. 

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Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment 

(see People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 346-347), we conclude there is 

sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that Austin intended 

permanently to deprive the store of its property (i.e., the Hennessy). Even 

before the fight, the record shows that Austin and others from his group were 

demanding that they be given some of the Hennessy being loaded onto the truck 

by store employees. The record also shows that as store employees continued 

to load the Hennessy cases, Austin became more insistent, demanded to know 

what they were doing with the Hennessy, said “this is Skyline” and threatened to 

follow the truck loaded with the Hennessy.

The record also shows that Austin next got back into the black car he had 

driven to the store and moved it so that the loaded truck was now prevented 

from leaving the parking lot. After that, Austin exited his car and said, “Now 

you’re blocked in. You’re not going to go anywhere.” Austin then walked 

around his car and said, “This is our area. You guys are not going anywhere. 

We’re going to take your shit.” In addition, during this confrontation, Austin 

threw gang signs and told the concerned store employees, “this is Piru territory” 

and “this is Skyline.”

This evidence, which we conclude is substantial, supports the finding that 

Austin acted with the requisite intent to permanently deprive the store of its 

property once the fight began between the Skyline gang members and others 

associated with the gang, on the one hand, and the store employees on the 

other, when Austin pulled out a five-inch knife and attacked Karlos and then 

went to the truck that was being guarded by Karlos, picked up at least three 

cases of Hennessy and threw the cases onto the asphalt pavement; he also 

threw at least one bottle of Hennessy.

Although Austin does not dispute other elements of his robbery conviction, 

we note this same evidence also supports the taking finding (see People v. Hill

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 852 [noting that the “‘taking element of robbery has two 

necessary elements, gaining possession of the victim’s property and asporting or 

carrying away the loot”’ and noting that to “satisfy the asportation requirement 

for robbery . . . ‘it is not necessary that the property be taken out of the physical 

presence of the victim’” and that “slight movement” is sufficient to satisfy the 

asportation requirement]) and the finding that the taking occurred by means of 

“force of fear” (see § 211; see also People v. Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 

210 [noting that the “force” required for robbery must be at least “a quantum 

more than that which is needed merely to take the property . . . of the victim”]; 

Miller v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 216, 222 [noting that the force or 

fear element of robbery is satisfied when the defendant uses force or fear (i) to 

acquire initially the victim’s property and/or (ii) to retain, escape with or destroy 

it]).

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Id. at 32-34.

The clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims in the 

criminal context is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Jackson claims face a 

high bar in federal habeas proceedings. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012). 

In Jackson, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated, 

and an applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief, “if it is found that upon the record 

evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. In making this determination, habeas courts 

must respect “the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve 

evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the 

jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 

1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). “[C]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be 

sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Cordova Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Reyes–Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

“Although it might have been possible to draw a different inference from the evidence, [a 

federal habeas court is] required to resolve that conflict in favor of the prosecution.” Ngo v. 

Giurbino, 651 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Coleman, 132 S.Ct. at 2062 (stating 

that “a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the

evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The 

federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively 

unreasonable.’”) (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam)); Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 326 (“[A] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that 

supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the 

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record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must 

defer to that resolution.”). Federal habeas courts also must analyze Jackson claims “with 

explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” 

Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

324 n.16). When assessing the evidence presented at trial, a reviewing court must conduct a 

thorough review of the state court record. See Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 

1997). 

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[a]n additional layer of deference is added to 

this standard by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which obliges [Petitioner] to demonstrate that the state 

court’s adjudication entailed an unreasonable application of the quoted Jackson standard.” 

Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 

1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005)). In Juan H., the Ninth Circuit first reviewed the standard of 

review applied by the state appellate court to a sufficiency of the evidence claim, and found 

that although the state court did not cite to the relevant federal case law, “such a citation is 

not required ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 

contradicts’ Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 1275 n.12 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 

8 (2003) (per curiam)). Accordingly, it falls to this Court to determine whether the state 

appellate court opinion “reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson . . . to the facts of 

this case.” Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotation omitted).

In this case, Petitioner was convicted of one count of robbery in violation of Cal. Penal 

Code § 211. Lodgment 1 at 413; see also id. at 4265. The trial court instructed the jury on 

the elements of the crime as follows: (1) “[t]he defendant took property that was not his 

own”; (2) “[t]he property was taken from another person’s possession and immediate 

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presence”; (3) “[t]he property was taken against that person’s will”; (4) “[t]he defendant used 

force or fear to take the property or to prevent the person from resisting”; and (5) “[w]hen 

the defendant used force or fear to take the property, he intended to deprive the owner of it 

permanently.” Id. at 104, 4005-06; see also CALCRIM No. 1600. Petitioner challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence and argues that “there was no intent to steal, no taking, and no 

force or fear directly used to accomplish the taking to the extent one occurred.” See Pet. at 

23, 27-35. After a review of the state court record, this Court finds that there was substantial 

evidence supporting the jury’s determination that each of the above elements was established. 

1. Taking Finding

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that a 

taking occurred. See Pet. at 30-32; Trav. at 15. Petitioner concedes to handling and 

damaging the Hennessy bottles, but argues that no taking occurred because “all of the actions 

involved the moving of the Hennessy toward the store employees rather than away from 

them.” Pet. at 30; see also Trav. at 14. 

Pursuant to California law, “[t]he taking element of the robbery has two necessary 

elements, gaining possession of the victim’s property and asporting or carrying away the loot.” 

Velderrain v. Busby, 2015 WL 2188734, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015) (quoting People v. Hill,

17 Cal. 4th 800, 852 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted, 2015 WL 2193750, 

at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2015). In order to “satisfy the asportation requirement for robbery, no 

great movement is required, and it is not necessary that the property be taken out of the 

physical presence of the victim. Slight movement is enough to satisfy the asportation 

requirement.” See id. 

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During the trial, Heveen Toma, a Moonlite Liquor store employee, testified that he saw 

Petitioner grab three cases of Hennessy from the truck, throw the cases to the ground, and 

throw at least one bottle of Hennessy “at someone.” See Lodgment 1 at 2098, 2186-88,

2194-95, 2730. Mukhles Daud, another Moonlite Liquor store employee, also testified that he 

saw Petitioner take one case of Hennessy out of the truck, open it, and throw bottles. Id. at 

2704-05, 2730-31. As such, the store employees’ testimony provides substantial evidence 

supporting the “taking” element because Petitioner gained possession of several boxes of 

Hennessey by taking them from the employees’ possession, moving them from the truck to 

the parking lot, and then breaking or throwing at least one bottle. See Velderrain, 2015 WL 

2188734, at *8 (finding that “[t]estimony concerning petitioner’s access to the [property at 

issue] and the displacement of the [property] support a finding of asportation by petitioner.”). 

Accordingly, the trial record contains substantial evidence supporting the jury’s finding that a 

taking by Petitioner occurred. 

2. Taking Occurred by Force or Fear

Petitioner contends that even if a taking occurred, there was insufficient evidence to 

conclude that it occurred by force or fear. See Pet. at 32-25; Trav. at 14. In support, 

Petitioner asserts that “for a robbery to have occurred in this case, force or fear must have 

been used to complete the taking of the Hennessy.” Pet. at 32. Petitioner argues that the 

incident at issue was a “parking lot brawl caused by [his] and his co-participant’s actions on 

that night and Karlos’ aggression to them,” and that the altercation “had nothing to do with 

the Hennessy.” Id. at 34. Respondent quotes the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal 

addressing the claim and asserts that the taking “occurred by means of ‘force or fear.’” Ans. 

at 15 (quoting Lodgment 5 at 33-34). 

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This Court’s review of the trial record establishes that there was sufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s finding that the taking occurred by means of force or fear. The record 

shows that before the fight, Petitioner engaged in acts that placed the store employees in fear 

that Petitioner and his cohorts would rob them. Heveen Toma testified that Petitioner and 

another individual repeatedly demanded to know where the store employees were taking the 

Hennessy and stated that they wanted some of the Hennessy. See Lodgment 1 at 2097-98, 

2154-55. Both Heveen Toma and Salwan Toma testified that Petitioner threatened to follow 

the truck loaded with the Hennessy. See id. at 2155-56, 2249, 2299, 2468. Heveen Toma 

also testified that Petitioner moved his car to block the truck loaded with Hennessy and said, 

“I’m going to follow you. You guys are blocked in. You’re not going to go anywhere. I’m 

going to take all that.” Id. at 2299; see also id. at 2165. Additionally, Heveen Toma testified 

that Petitioner threw a plastic bottle and said, “This is our area. You guys are not going 

anywhere. We’re going to take your shit.” Id. at 2168-69. 

Petitioner also announced his affiliation with the Skyline Piru criminal street gang. 

Heveen Toma testified that Petitioner threw up gang signs and said, “This is Skyline,” “This is 

our area,” and “This is Piru territory.” See id. at 2156, 2160-61, 2165, 2299, 2469. Gang 

Expert Jon Brown testified that Petitioner was a documented Eastside Skyline Piru gang 

member and that gang signs are meant to intimidate or create fear. See id. at 3347, 3414-23, 

3440-64, 3469, 3471, 3494-96.

A reasonable trier of fact can conclude from this evidence that Petitioner used force or 

fear to take the Hennessy. To further support this contention, both Heveen Toma and Salwan 

Toma testified that they were afraid that they were going to be robbed based on Petitioner’s 

actions. See id. at 2155-56, 2173, 2300, 2475. Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial 

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showed that Petitioner used the threat of physical violence to instill fear in the store 

employees. Heveen Toma testified, and the video surveillance footage admitted at trial 

shows, that Petitioner hit Karlos Toma with his car. See id. at 2173, 2262-63, 2357-58. 

Moreover, Heveen Toma testified that Petitioner approached the truck full of Hennessy 

wielding a knife. See id. at 2183-86. 

In sum, the state court record shows that Petitioner threatened the store employees, 

demanded to know what they were doing with the cases of Hennessy, blocked the truck 

loaded with the Hennessy from leaving, hit one of the employees with a car, and uttered his 

gang name and threw up gang signs. As such, there was overwhelming evidence to support 

the jury’s conclusion that Petitioner used force and instilled fear in the store employees to 

accomplish the taking of the Hennessy.

3. Intent to Permanently Deprive 

Petitioner contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that he 

acted with the requisite intent to permanently deprive the store of its property, the Hennessy,

because he only intended to use the Hennessy as a weapon during the fight, not to steal it. 

See Pet. at 21, 27-30; Trav. at 14-15. Petitioner further challenges Respondent’s argument 

and the state court’s finding that intent to destroy property is sufficient to satisfy the requisite 

intent to steal, required for a robbery conviction. See id. 

Pursuant to California law, a taking for the purposes of robbery occurs “even if the 

defendant’s sole intent is to destroy the property.” People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 58 (1980), 

overruled on another ground in People v. Martinez, 20 Cal. 4th 225, 234-39 (1999); see also

People v. Davis, 19 Cal. 4th 301, 309 (1998) (an intent to permanently deprive can arise when 

the defendant asserts control over the property in a manner that creates a “substantial risk of 

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permanent loss”); People v. Mumm, 98 Cal. App. 4th 812, 819 (2002) (same). This Court’s 

review of the trial record establishes that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s 

determination that Petitioner had the requisite intent. 

The record shows that before the fight Petitioner and others from his group were 

focused on the Hennessy that the store employees were loading onto the truck and repeatedly 

expressed an intent to take the Hennessey. Store employees Heveen Toma and Mukhles 

Daud testified that Petitioner smacked the cases of Hennessy and loudly stated, “Oh, this is 

mine” and “Give me that.” See Lodgment 1 at 2149, 2718-19. The video surveillance footage, 

which was shown to the jury, shows Petitioner slapping the cases of Hennessy. See id. at 

2278. Heveen Toma further testified that as the store employees continued to load the 

Hennessy cases onto the truck, Petitioner continued to talk to the employees, demanded to 

know where they were taking the Hennessy, and threatened to follow the truck loaded with 

the Hennessy. See id. at 2154-56, 2468. Salwan Toma also testified that Petitioner and his 

cohorts repeatedly stated they wanted some of the Hennessy and threatened “[i]f you guys 

leave, we’re going to follow you.” See id. at 2464, 2468. 

The record shows that Petitioner got back into the car he had driven to the store and 

moved it so that the truck loaded with the Hennessy was blocked from leaving the parking lot. 

See id. at 2467. Heveen Toma testified that Petitioner exited his car and said, “Now you’re 

blocked in. You’re not going to go anywhere.” Id. at 2165, 2299. Heveen Toma further 

testified that Petitioner then walked around his car and said, “This is our area. You guys are 

not going anywhere. We’re going to take your shit.” Id. at 2168. 

Further, both Mukhles Daud and Heveen Toma testified that Petitioner grabbed cases of 

Hennessy from the truck and threw them to the ground. See id. at 2186-88, 2730-31. The 

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record also indicates that Petitioner threw at least one bottle of Hennessy. Id. at 2194-95, 

2730. When Petitioner threw the cases of Hennessy to the ground and the bottle of Hennessy 

at someone, he destroyed some of the store’s Hennessy, thereby permanently depriving the 

store of its property. 

Petitioner asserts that he only intended to use the Hennessey as a weapon during the 

fight and that he did not intent to steal it. See Pet. at 21, 27-30; Trav. at 14-15. However, as 

set forth above, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Petitioner 

intended to permanently deprive the store of its property. The Court must respect “the 

province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and 

draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all conflicts 

in a manner that supports the verdict.” Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358. In sum, this Court 

concludes that the trial record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that by 

threatening to forcibly take the Hennessey from the store employees and then throwing the 

cases of Hennessy to the ground and throwing at least one bottle of Hennessy, Petitioner 

intended to permanently deprive the store of its property, the Hennessy. See Davis, 19 Cal. 

4th at 309 (an intent to permanently deprive can arise when the defendant asserts control 

over the property in a manner that creates a “substantial risk of permanent loss”); Mumm, 98 

Cal. App. 4th at 819 (2002) (same).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court finds that 

there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that 

Petitioner committed a robbery, as charged in count 1. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (“[T]he 

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

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beyond a reasonable doubt.”). As a result, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, and 

did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence 

claim be DENIED.

B. Ground Two: The Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to Instruct on Lesser 

Included Offense

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his right to due process 

and fair trial by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of theft. See Pet. at 

7, 37-42; Trav. at 16-21. In support, Petitioner alleges that one of the key evidentiary 

questions during his trial was whether he “moved and damaged the Hennessy by use of force 

or fear,” and argues that if the lesser included offense instruction was given, the jury could 

have concluded that a theft, as opposed to robbery, occurred. See Pet. at 37-38, 41-42; Trav. 

at 20-21. Petitioner explains that general force and fear of fight are not sufficient to support a 

robbery conviction, and that the “acts constituting the theft of the property must be directly 

accomplished through specific force and fear.” Pet. at 41-42. Petitioner appears to allege that 

no specific force or fear was involved in the destruction of property because he and the store 

employees merely used the Hennessy bottles as tools during the fight and the conduct was 

devoid of any other intent. See id.; see also Lodgment 6 at 8. Petitioner further argues that 

the trial court’s failure to give the lesser included offense instruction was not harmless, and 

that the error prevented him from presenting a complete defense. See Trav. at 20. 

Respondent argues that the trial court’s alleged failure to instruct is not a federal claim, 

and thus should be denied. Ans. at 15-16. To the extent federal due process requires a trial 

court to give a lesser offense instruction, Respondent submits that such instruction is required 

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only when the evidence warrants it. Id. at 16-17. Respondent further maintains that because 

there was no evidence in this case to suggest that Petitioner committed theft, and not 

robbery, Petitioner’s right to present a complete defense was not “unquestionably violated,” 

and that any alleged error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Id. at 

16. Respondent thus asserts that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. See

id. at 15-17. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim and stated the following:

 [W]e conclude on this record that no reasonable jury could find that Austin 

committed a simple theft rather than a robbery because the evidence in the 

record overwhelmingly shows that Austin used force and/or fear when he 

mentioned his gang affiliation, threw up gang signs at the same time he 

demanded the employees of the store turn over the Hennessy, and wielded a 

five-inch knife immediately before he threw the cases of Hennessy onto the 

pavement.

 However, even assuming the trial court erred in failing sua sponte to 

instruct the jury that it was entitled to find theft as a lesser included offense of 

robbery, we conclude that error was harmless. 

. . . 

 Here, any evidence that Austin committed a mere theft (i.e., did not use 

force or fear in the taking of the Hennessy) was relatively weak when compared 

to the substantial and significant evidence (summarized ante) in the record 

supporting the finding that Austin took (i.e., destroyed) the Hennessy by use of 

force and/or with fear. Our conclusion the error was harmless is buttressed, 

moreover, by the fact the jury found that Austin committed four counts of assault 

by means likely to produce great bodily injury and assault with a deadly weapon 

and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, which findings 

strongly suggest that the jury believed force was utilized in the taking of the 

property.

Lodgment 5 at 35-36.

To the extent that Petitioner alleges that the state trial court violated state law when it 

did not instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of theft, the claim is not subject to 

federal habeas review. Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) 

(“the failure of a state court to instruct on a lesser offense [in a non-capital case] fails to 

present a federal constitutional question and will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus 

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proceeding.”). Only claims alleging a violation of “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States” are cognizable on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (stating that “it is not the province of a federal habeas 

court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”); Matylinsky v. Budge, 

577 F.3d 1083, 1094 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). 

 To the extent Petitioner alleges that the omission violated his federal constitutional 

rights, this Court will consider the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). There is, however, no 

clearly established federal law on this issue because the United States Supreme Court 

expressly declined to rule on whether a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included 

offense in a non-capital case violates the federal constitution. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 

625, 638 n.14 (1980); see also Powell v. Hatcher, 407 Fed.App’x 226, 227 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(denying habeas relief and noting that in Beck, the Supreme Court expressly declined to rule 

on the issue); United States v. Rivera–Alonzo, 584 F.3d 829, 834 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In the 

context of a habeas corpus review of a state court conviction, we have stated that there is no 

clearly established federal constitutional right to lesser included instructions in non-capital 

cases.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, under the standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d), habeas relief is unavailable on this claim as this Court cannot find that the state 

appellate court “unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Additionally, while “the defendant’s right to adequate jury instructions on his or her 

theory of the case might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the [foregoing] general 

rule,” that is not the situation here. See Solis, 219 F.3d at 929; see also Clark v. Brown, 450 

F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (state court’s jury instructions violate due process if they deny 

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the criminal defendant “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”) (quoting 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). The Due Process Clause entitles a 

defendant to “an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence 

sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” See Hagenno v. Yarborough, 253 F.App’x 

702, 704 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988)); see also

Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002). However, failure to instruct on a 

defense theory amounts to an error only if “the theory is legally sound and the evidence in the

case makes [the theory] applicable.” Clark, 450 F.3d at 904-05. 

Pursuant to California law, “theft is a lesser included offense of robbery, the difference 

being that robbery includes the added element of force or fear.” See Madril v. Harrington, 

2013 WL 1089751, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2013) (citing People v. Burns, 172 Cal. App. 4th 

1251, 1259 (2009)), aff’d, 581 F. App’x 661 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Cal. Penal Code § 211. 

Petitioner argues that he merely used the Hennessy bottles as a tool during the fight, and that 

there was no specific force or fear involved in the destruction of property. See Pet. at 41-42; 

see also Trav. at 14-15. However, as discussed in detail above, the evidence presented at 

Petitioner’s trial established that Petitioner threatened the store employees, demanded to 

know what they were doing with the cases of Hennessy, blocked the truck containing the 

Hennessy from leaving, demanded the Hennessy be given to him, hit one of the employees 

with a car, uttered his gang name and threw up gang signs, and wielded a knife immediately 

before throwing the cases of Hennessy onto the parking lot. As such, there was overwhelming 

evidence that the Hennessy was taken by force and fear, and a rational jury would not have 

been able to convict Petitioner of theft and acquit him of robbery. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not err when it did not give the lesser included offense instruction on theft. See Madril, 

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2013 WL 1089751, at *9 (finding that a rational jury would not have been able to convict 

petitioner of theft and acquit him of robbery, and that there was no trial court error in refusing 

to give a lesser included offense instruction, where substantial evidence at trial established 

that the items at issue were taken by force and fear). 

Further, Petitioner has not provided anything other than mere speculation that the 

alleged failure to instruct on the lesser offense of theft impacted in any way the jury’s decision 

to convict him of robbery charged in count 1. As correctly pointed out by the state appellate 

court, even if the trial court committed an instructional error, the error was harmless in light of 

the jury finding that Petitioner committed four counts of assault by means likely to produce 

great bodily injury and assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce 

great bodily injury, which demonstrated the jury’s belief that force was utilized in the taking of 

the property. See Lodgments 1 at 413-17; 5 at 36; see also Clark, 450 F.3d at 904-05 (failure 

to instruct on a defense theory amounts to an error only if “the theory is legally sound and the 

evidence in the case makes [the theory] applicable.”). 

Because there is no U.S. Supreme Court law requiring a trial judge to instruct on a 

lesser included crime in a non-capital case like this one, and because there was little, if any, 

evidence to support the lesser included offense instruction, the state court’s rejection of 

Petitioner’s claim of instructional error was not contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable 

application of, any clearly established federal law, nor an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that 

Petitioner’s Second Ground for relief be DENIED.

///

///

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C. Ground Three: Omission of the Portion of CALCRIM No. 1401 Defining

 the Term “Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity”

Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights were violated because the trial court 

erroneously omitted the required portion of CALCRIM No. 1401 defining the term “pattern of 

criminal gang activity,” and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 

thereby justifying the reversal of the gang enhancements. See Pet. at 8, 44-52; Trav. at 22-

24. In support, Petitioner argues that the omitted portion of the jury instruction was “detailed, 

legally complex, and not otherwise covered by other portions of the instructions,” and that as 

a result of the omission, the jury did not find the existence of a criminal street gang, as 

defined in Cal. Penal Code § 186.22. See Pet. at 50; Trav. at 23. Petitioner further states that 

the prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged 

offense, and appears to argue that the trial court’s jury instruction relieved the prosecution of 

this burden, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and his due process 

rights. See Trav. at 24.

Respondent submits that the state court reasonably determined that Petitioner’s 

constitutional rights were not violated by the omission of a portion of the gang-enhancement 

instruction. Ans. at 17. Respondent acknowledges that the trial court did not define the term 

“pattern of criminal gang activity,” but argues that “in light of the evidence and the instruction 

as a whole,” the omission did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. See id. at 17-

20. Respondent thus asserts that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this 

claim. Id. at 21.

Petitioner presented his instructional error claim to the California Supreme Court in a 

petition for review, which was summarily denied without a statement or reasoning or citation 

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of authority. Lodgments 6 at 14-18; 7. Petitioner presented this claim to the California Court 

of Appeal. See Lodgments 3 at 34-43; 5 at 36-47. The state appellate court denied the claim 

in a reasoned opinion. Lodgment 5 at 35-47. The Court will therefore look through the silent 

denial by the state supreme court to the appellate court’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804 n.3.

 After reviewing the modified CALCRIM No. 1401 jury instruction given at Petitioner’s trial 

and the omitted portion of the instruction defining a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” the 

California Court of Appeal reasoned as follows:

The record shows that the parties specifically discussed the predicate acts 

that would be admitted to show a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” with the 

defense arguing only two such predicate acts should be admissible and the 

People arguing that they should be allowed to introduce evidence of three such 

acts. The court agreed with the People in ruling as follows:

“Penal Code [section] 186.22, subdivision parentheses small (f) defines a 

criminal street gang as an ‘ongoing organization, association or group of three or 

more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities 

the commission’–and the language used is ‘of one or more of the criminal acts 

enumerated in paragraphs 1 to 33, inclusive of Penal Code [section] 186.22 

subdivision (e),’ and then there’s some additional language.

. . .

I don’t see a basis for excluding the People’s evidence of three predicate acts 

based on their representation, the offer of proof made by the People.”

Lodgment 5 at 36-40. The appellate court further examined the evidence presented by the 

prosecution to establish the predicate acts and the Skyline gang members’ alleged pattern of 

criminal activity as follows:

[T]he People proffered the testimony of their gang expert, Detective 

Brown. He testified the primary activities of the Skyline gang included “murders, 

shootings, robberies, drug deals, stolen cars, burglaries, financial crimes such as 

counterfeiting [and] fake I.D.’s[.]”

Detective Brown opined that Skyline gang members “either individually or 

collectively [have] engaged in a pattern of criminal street gang activity.” 

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Id. at 40. The California Court of Appeal then reviewed Detective Brown’s testimony 

pertaining to the January 12, 2009 incident, which resulted in the conviction of a Skyline gang 

member Jeovani Jackson; the June 9, 2007 incident, which led to the convictions of a Skyline 

gang member Charles Neal and an O’Farrell gang member Maurice Tucker; and the November 

2009 incident, which involved another Skyline gang member, Adrian Cody. Id. at 40-43. The 

appellate court noted that the trial court admitted as exhibits certified copies of Jackson’s 

criminal conviction based on his guilty plea of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Cal.

Penal Code § 245(a)(2), and admission of gang and weapons allegations; Neal’s criminal 

conviction of October 2010 for the murder of Cleveland and stated that the record “show[ed] 

that Tucker also was convicted for that crime in August 2011”; and Cody’s criminal conviction 

for aiding and abetting a robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 211. Id.

Further, the appellate court reviewed the prosecution’s closing argument summarizing

the above evidence and arguing that the Skyline gang committed a “pattern of criminal 

activity.” Id. at 43-44. Additionally, the California Court of Appeal referenced Petitioner’s 

counsel’s and Petitioner’s co-defendant’s counsel’s closing arguments:

Austin’s counsel in his closing did not address whether the Skyline gang engaged 

in a “pattern of criminal activity” for purposes of being a “criminal street gang.” 

Price’s counsel, however discussed the three predicate acts presented by the 

People, but he did so not with respect to the issue of “pattern of criminal gang 

activity” but rather with respect to whether the People had proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the Skyline gang engaged in sufficient “primary activities.”

Id. at 43-45. Based on the above analysis, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the 

trial court’s error in failing to instruct on the term “pattern of criminal gang activity” to 

establish that the Skyline gang was a “criminal street gang” was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. at 47. The appellate court reasoned as follows:

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In looking at CALCRIM No. 1401, we note the jury was specifically 

instructed that it could not find a “pattern of criminal gang activity” “unless all of 

you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these requirements were 

committed, but you do not have to all agree on which crimes were committed.” 

Moreover, the jury was also told that the People have the burden to prove each 

allegation of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt and that if the People 

did not meet this burden, it was required to find the gang enhancement had not 

been proved.

What is more, the record shows there were three predicate acts proffered 

by the People. Neither Austin nor Price contend that any of the three predicate 

acts do not meet the criteria for establishing a “pattern of criminal gang activity” 

as provided in section 186.22, subdivision (e) and, in any event, our independent 

review of this issue confirms that the three predicate acts do in fact satisfy 

subdivision (e) of section 186.22.

In light of the argument of the prosecutor during closing regarding the 

three specific predicate acts proffered by the People to prove a “pattern of 

criminal gang activity” and the finding of the jury that the People proved at least

two such acts beyond a reasonable doubt (see § 186.22, subd. (e)), we conclude 

the trial court’s error in failing to instruct on the meaning of “pattern of criminal 

gang activity” in then-applicable CALCRIM No. 1401 to establish the Skyline gang 

was a “criminal street gang” within the meaning of the law was harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)

Id. at 46-47 (footnote omitted).

Generally, challenges to jury instructions based solely on alleged errors of state law do 

not state cognizable claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state 

law.”). To establish a federal constitutional claim based on missing or incorrect jury 

instructions, petitioner bears an “especially heavy” burden and must show that the jury 

instruction error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” 

Clark, 450 F.3d at 904 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973) and Hendricks v. 

Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 

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(1991). “This standard for instructional error applies to ambiguous or omitted instructions.” 

Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001). The instruction may not be judged 

in artificial isolation; rather, it must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole 

and the entire trial record, including the arguments of counsel. See Oquendo v. Jacquez, 2011 

WL 3205351, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2011) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72). If the challenged 

instruction is found to have violated a petitioner’s constitutional right, a habeas petitioner is 

not entitled to relief unless the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); 

Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61-62 (2008). 

“The Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to 

trial by jury, taken together, entitle a criminal defendant to a jury determination that he is 

guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000) (citation omitted); see also United States v. 

Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995). “A failure by the jury to find an element of a crime, 

including a fact which enhances a sentence, is susceptible to harmless error analysis.”

Jackson, 2015 WL 456547, at *6 (citing Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220 (2006); 

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1999)).

Petitioner was convicted of robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 211 (count 1), two 

counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 245(a)(1) (counts 2 and 3), and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and by means 

of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1) 

(counts 4 and 5). Lodgment 1 at 413-17. The jury also found true the allegation pursuant to 

Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1) that Petitioner committed the offenses charged in counts 1-5 

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for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Id. Petitioner argues that his gang enhancements 

must be reversed because the trial court committed an error by omitting the portion of 

CALCRIM No. 1401 that defines a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” and that the error was 

not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Pet. at 44-45. Petitioner appears to argue that 

the trial court’s alleged error violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and the 

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, by depriving him of a jury determination that he is 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the enhancement. See Trav. at 24. 

To obtain a gang enhancement under California law, the prosecution is required to 

prove that: (1) petitioner committed a felony “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 

association with any criminal street gang,” and (2) petitioner committed the crime “with the 

specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.” See

Cal. Penal Code 186.22(b)(1); Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 2011). To 

establish the existence of a “criminal street gang,” the prosecution must offer evidence that 

the gang is an ongoing association of at least three people with a common name or identifying 

sign or symbol, and that one of the group’s primary activities is “the commission of one or 

more of the criminal acts enumerated in [Cal. Penal Code] § 186.22(e), and whose members, 

individually or collectively, have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity . . . .” Martinez

v. Biter, 2015 WL 3407930, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citing People v. Hernandez, 33 Cal. 4th 1040, 1047 (2004) and People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal.

4th 605, 616-17 (1996)); see also Cal. Penal Code §§ 186.22 (e) & (f). The term “pattern of 

criminal gang activity” is defined as the “commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy 

to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more of the 

following offenses, provided at least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of 

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this chapter5 and the last of those offenses occurred within three years after a prior offense, 

and the offenses were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons.” Cal. 

Penal Code § 186.22(e). 

The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 1401 as 

follows:

If you find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts One 

through Five, you must then decide whether, for each crime, the People have 

proved the additional allegation that the defendant committed that crime for the 

benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. You 

must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and 

return a separate finding for each crime.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction 

of, or in association with a criminal street gang;

AND

2. The defendant intended to assist, further, or promote criminal conduct 

by gang members.

A criminal street gang is any ongoing organization, association, or group 

of three or more persons, whether formal or informal:

1. That has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol;

2. That has, as one or more of its primary activities, the commission of 

murder, attempted murder, assault, robbery, firearms, or firearms 

offenses;

 AND

3. Whose members, whether acting alone or together engage in or have 

engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

 

5

 The effective date of the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act at issue 

is September 26, 1988. See Martinez, 2015 WL 3407930, at *8 n.2.

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In order to qualify as a primary activity, the crime must be one of the 

group’s chief or principal activities rather than an occasional act committed by 

one or more persons who happen to be members of the group.

The crimes, if any, that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity, need 

not be gang-related.

The People need not prove that the defendant is an active or current 

member of the alleged criminal street gang.

If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case, you may consider 

that crime in deciding whether one of the group’s primary activities was 

commission of that crime and whether a pattern of criminal gang activity has 

been proved.

You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity unless 

all of you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these requirements were 

committed, but you do not have to all agree on which crimes were committed.

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a 

reasonable doubt. If the People have not met the burden, you must find that 

the allegation has not been proved.

Lodgment 1 at 112-13. The trial court’s instruction omitted the following definition:

A pattern of criminal gang activity, as used here, means:

1. [The] (commission of[,] [or]/ attempted commission of[,][or]/conspiracy to 

commit[,] [or]/ solicitation to commit[,] [or]/ conviction of[,] [or]/ 

(Having/having) a juvenile petition sustained for commission of):

<Give 1A if the crime or crimes are in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), 

(31)–(33).>

1A. (any combination of two or more of the following crimes/[,][or] two or 

more occurrences of [one or more of the following crimes]:) 

___________<insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–

(25), (31)–(33)6>

 

6 The relevant portion of Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(e) lists the following crimes:

(1) Assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great 

bodily injury, as defined in Section 245.

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[OR]

1B. [at least one of the following crimes:] _____________<insert one or 

more crimes from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)–(25), (31)–(33)>;

AND

[at least one of the following crimes:] ______________<insert one or more 

crimes in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(26)–(30)>;

2. At least one of those crimes was committed after September 26, 1988;

3. The most recent crime occurred within three years of one of the earlier 

crimes;

AND

4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions or were personally 

committed by two or more persons.

See CALCRIM No. 1401; Pet. at 39-40.

Because the trial court’s modified CALCRIM No. 1401 instruction omitted the definition 

of the term “pattern of criminal gang activity,” this Court must examine whether the trial 

court’s error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637; Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61-62. 

During Petitioner’s trial, the prosecution offered the testimony of their gang expert, Jon

Brown, a detective in the gang unit of the San Diego Police Department. Lodgment 1 at 

3347. Detective Brown testified that the “primary activities” of the Skyline gang included 

“murders, shootings, robberies, drug deals, stolen cars, burglaries, financial crimes such as 

 

(2) Robbery, as defined in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 211) of Title 8 of 

Part 1.

(3) Unlawful homicide or manslaughter, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing 

with Section 187) of Title 8 of Part 1.

Cal. Penal Code § 186.22.

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counterfeiting [and] fake I.D.’s,” and the possession of weapons. Id. at 3405. Detective 

Brown further testified about three predicate crimes to establish the Skyline gang’s “pattern of 

criminal street gang activity” as follows:

Q: Now, have Skyline gang members either individually or collectively engaged 

in a pattern of criminal street gang activity?

A: Yes, they have.

Q: Are you familiar with a man by the name of Jeovani Jackson?

A: I am.

Q: And how are you familiar with Mr. Jackson?

A: Jeovani Jackson was a Skyline gang member.

I believe it was January of ‘09, Jorkim Rose, who was a rival Lincoln Park 

gang member, was walking down 54th and Imperial, he’s confronted by four 

black males, one of the black males asks him “what’s up?” He doesn’t 

immediately recognize him, but when he turned around, one of the black males 

tells him–Skyline Black males tells him “I’ll smoke you right here.” 

And he realized he knows that suspect, which turned out to be Jeovani 

Jackson, from doing jail time with him on three different stents. 

Jeovani Jackson shoots Jorkim four times: once through the neck, once in 

the chest, and I believe in the back and buttocks area. 

Seandell Jones, who was an O’Farrell Park gang member, was 

subsequently I.D.’d in that as one of the other black males.

Seandel Jones and Jeovani Jackson were subsequently arrested and 

prosecuted for the case.

Id. at 3406-07. The prosecution also introduced a certified copy of Jackson’s May 8, 2009 

criminal conviction based on his guilty plea of assault with a deadly weapon, pursuant to Cal. 

Penal Code § 245(a)(2), and an admission of gang and weapons allegations. Id. at 3407-08; 

see also id. at 59-73.

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Detective Brown then testified about Charles Neal, a documented Skyline gang 

member, and Maurice Tucker, an O’Farrell gang member, and their involvement in an incident 

that took place on June 9, 2007:

Q: What about [Mr. Neal’s] behavior on June 9th, 2007 formed your opinion 

that he has committed a predicate crime?

A: Well, June 9th is a significant day because it goes back to 6/9 day, June 9th, 

which is specific to a Skyline subset. 

On June 9th, there was a party–like a carnival up at M.L.K. Block, 6500 

Block of Skyline. There was a bunch of Skyline O’Farrell gang members hanging 

out. A car drove through the parking lot, and the car was occupied by a group 

of rival Lincoln Park Blood Gang members. They mad-dogged him, gave them 

mean stares as they passed through the lot.

The car subsequently parked, a bunch of rival gang members confronted 

the Skyline gang members at the carnival. Police intervened, and the two 

groups separated.

Maurice Tucker, who is from O’Farrell, goes by Tuck Bo, and Charles Neal, 

who goes by Choo-Choo from Skyline, were very upset of the fact that Lincoln 

Park Bloods would come into Skyline gang territory and disrespect them by 

showing up at this carnival when they know that that’s Skyline, not Lincoln Park. 

So Mr. Tucker and Mr. Neal decided to go out riding, put in work. They 

subsequently–they had a previous contact with a Lincoln Park gang member by 

the name of Stephen Cleveland a couple months prior at a Little Wayne concert. 

They knew Mr. Cleveland lived over at the 200 block of 65th Street, which is in 

Skyline’s area. They drove down to Mr. Cleveland’s house, saw him hanging out, 

confronted him, subsequently shot and killed him.

Q: Now, Mr. Cleveland, was he a Lincoln Park gang member?

A: Yes, he was.

Q: And you mentioned that Mr. Tucker was an O’Farrell Park gang member; is 

that right?

A: That’s correct.

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Id. at 3409-11. Further, the prosecution introduced a certified copy of Neal’s 2010 conviction 

for the second-degree murder of Stephen Cleveland, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 187(a). 

See id. at 3411-12; see also id. at 74-79. 

Finally, Detective Brown testified about the criminal activity of Adrian Cody, a Skyline 

gang member, as follows:

Q: [H]as Mr. Cody engaged in any behavior that forms this predicate pattern of 

criminal activity?

A: Yes, he has.

Q: What conduct are you aware of [that] Mr. Cody [has] committed?

A: In November of 2009, Adrian Cody, who was a Skyline gang member, Joseph 

Brown, who is a Skyline gang member–I’m sorry. No–O’Farrell Park gang 

member–Leon Moore, who was an O’Farrell Park gang member, and Diamond 

Barbie, who is a Skyline gang member, drove to a medical marijuana place, a 

medical marijuana distribution . . . co-op, Mr. Cody stayed in the car, Mr. Brown, 

Moore, and Barbie all entered the store. 

Mr. Moore and Brown had handguns, they robbed the distillery of 25 jars 

of marijuana. While Barbie and Moore were stealing the marijuana, Mr. Brown 

was pistol-whipping the customers and the employees. They subsequently fled 

the store, got into the gateway car which was driven by Mr. Cody. One of the 

clerks followed the car, the car subsequently crashed.

 

Mr. Brown, Mr. Moore and Mr. Barbie were arrested at the scene or in the 

close proximity of it. The two guns and the medical marijuana were recovered 

from the vehicle.

Mr. Cody left paperwork–probation paperwork, and his DNA was left on 

the air bag to the car, and he was subsequently convicted of the crime as well.

Id. at 3412-14. The prosecution introduced a certified copy of Cody’s conviction for aiding and 

abetting a robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 211. Id. at 3414; see also id. at 80-90.

Additionally, as noted by the California Court of Appeal, the prosecution discussed each 

of the above predicate crimes during closing argument in asserting that the Skyline gang had 

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engaged in a “pattern of criminal activity.” See id. at 4039-40; see also Lodgment 5 at 43-44. 

Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury that:

Skyline has, in fact, committed a pattern of criminal activity that qualifies 

as primary activities. The reason Skyline is different from any other organization 

is that they exist to commit criminal acts, and they thrive on violent acts, and 

you heard about some of those:

Charles Neal, a known associated of Mr. Austin, committed a murder, and 

you heard a little bit about the context of that murder, that it was a murder 

related from some perceived disrespect by the murderers; you heard about 

Jeovani Jackson, a rival of Skyline in which Mr. Jackson, I believe, shot at the 

victim in that particular case, not killing him. You heard about Adrian Cody, the 

Skyline gang member with O’Farrell Park gang members who robbed the 

marijuana dispensary for money and marijuana. These are all part of their 

enumerated patterns of criminal activity.

Lodgment 1 at 4039-40.

Furthermore, as correctly noted by the state appellate court, Petitioner’s counsel did not 

address whether the Skyline gang engaged in a “pattern of criminal activity” for purposes of 

being a “criminal street gang” in his closing argument. See Lodgments 1 at 4147-53; 5 at 44. 

The attorney for Petitioner’s co-defendant stated during his closing argument that:

The district attorney presented three what they call, predicate acts. 

That’s these blue folders that we have. One of them is a case from 2009, 

January 2009; one is a case from 2007, and one is a case from–again 2009.

“In order to qualify as a primary activity the crime must be one of the 

group’s chief or principal activities rather than an occasional act committed by 

one or more persons who happen to be members of the group.” How would you 

ever prove that? If you wanted to establish that murder was a primary activity 

of the street gang and you knew that an occasional act of murder committed by 

one or more persons who happen to be members of the group is not enough, 

what kind of evidence would you want?

Well, you would probably want a lot of evidence about activities, about 

crimes. You would probably want a list of them, specifics. You’d want dates, 

you’d want defendants. You’d want all kinds of evidence to establish that a 

particular crime was not just an occasional act committed by one or more 

persons who happen to be members of the group.

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Did you get any of that through Detective Brown? I don’t recall any of 

that evidence being presented to you other than he said that’s–in his opinion, 

these crimes are one of the principal activities, and that’s all he did. He didn’t go 

any further.

Lodgment 1 at 4202-03. Accordingly, Petitioner’s co-defendant’s counsel only disputed 

whether the predicate offenses identified by Detective Brown were the Skyline gang’s “primary 

activities,” but did not dispute that the three predicate offenses occurred or that they 

constituted a “pattern of criminal gang activity.”

Therefore, as discussed in detail above, at Petitioner’s trial, the prosecution presented 

Detective Brown’s testimony that Skyline gang’s primary activities included possession of 

weapons, murders, shootings, robberies, drug deals, stolen cars, burglaries, and financial 

crimes. See id. at 3405. Additionally, the prosecution presented evidence regarding three 

predicate crimes: (1) on May 8, 2009, a Skyline gang member Jeovani Jackson pled guilty to 

assault with a deadly weapon, and to gang and weapons allegations, (2) on October 2010, a 

Skyline gang member Charles Neal was convicted of second degree murder, and (3) on 

April 6, 2010, Skyline gang member Adrian Cody was convicted of aiding and abetting a 

robbery. See id. at 3406-14, 3708. Further, the prosecution referenced the above predicate 

offenses during closing and argued that they were “all part of [the Skyline Gang’s] enumerated 

patterns of criminal activity,” and that the “Skyline gang [had] committed a pattern of criminal 

activity that qualifies as primary activities.” Id. at 4039-40. The trial court instructed the jury 

as follows: “[y]ou may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity unless all of 

you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these requirements were committed, but you 

do not have to all agree on which crimes were committed,” and that the prosecution had the 

burden to prove each allegation of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 113. 

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The jury found true the allegation pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1) that Petitioner 

committed the offenses charged in counts 1-5 for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Id. at 

413-17. 

Additionally, the three predicate offenses presented by the prosecution are listed in Cal. 

Penal Code 186.22(e) as establishing a “pattern of criminal activity,” were committed on 

separate occasions, and within the time frame mandated by the statute. Finally, as pointed 

out by the state appellate court, Plaintiff’s counsel did not address the Skyline gang’s alleged 

pattern of criminal activity during closing, and Petitioner’s co-defendant’s counsel only 

disputed whether the predicate offenses were the Skyline gang’s “primary activities.” See id.

at 4202-03. 

A thorough review of the record reveals that the trial court’s error in omitting the 

portion of CALCRIM No. 1401 defining the term “pattern of criminal gang activity” did not have 

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Hines v. 

Harrington, 2010 WL 4025608, at *16-17 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (analyzing the 

requirements of Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(e) to establish a “pattern of criminal gang activity” 

and finding that “to the extent the modified [CALCRIM No. 1401] instruction may have 

misrepresented the precise statutorily enumerated crimes that the jury must find, any 

instructional error was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that the jury 

would not have found the gang allegations to be true had the challenged instruction more 

precisely defined the statutorily enumerated crimes,” where, inter alia, the jury was presented 

with the evidence of prior convictions for crimes committed by other gang members, which 

were enumerated in the statute); see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 17 (“[W]here a reviewing court 

concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and 

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supported by overwhelming evidence, such that jury verdict would have been the same absent 

the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.”); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 

637; Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61-62. Accordingly, this Court finds that the California Court of 

Appeal’s decision denying Petitioner’s instructional error claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The Court, thus RECOMMENDS

that this claim be DENIED. 

D. Ground Four

As set forth above, the Court interprets Ground Four as asserting the following claims: 

the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate gang enhancement allegations from the substantive 

crimes, ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to argue for bifurcation of the gang 

allegations, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to join Petitioner’s coappellant’s claim that the trial court erroneously denied a motion to bifurcate the gang 

allegations. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also Pet. at 15-16; Trav. at 25-27. 

Respondent asserts that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel, that his 

“bifurcation claim was unavailing,” and that Petitioner’s claim in Ground Four is meritless.7 

Ans. at 21-22.

///

 

7 Respondent states that Petitioner’s claim in Ground Four is subject to a procedural bar but 

asserts that the claim is more easily resolved on the merits. Ans. at 21-22. Although the 

Court has discretion to raise the procedural default issue sua sponte where “to do so serves 

the interests of justice, comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency,” Windham v. Merkle, 163 

F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 1998), the Court finds such interests would not be served. See

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Procedural bar issues are not 

infrequently more complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well 

make sense in some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the same.”). 

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1. The Trial Court’s Alleged Error in Failing to Bifurcate the Gang 

Enhancement Allegations from the Substantive Crimes 

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s refusal to bifurcate the gang enhancement 

allegations from the substantive crimes “resulted in a totally unfair trial based on character 

and propensity evidence,” and “denied Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process of law, a 

fair trial, and a reliable guilt and penalty determination.” See supra text accompanying note 3,

see also Pet. at 15-16; Trav. at 25-26. In support, Petitioner asserts that the prosecution was 

allowed to “present a parade of police officers in front of the jury for two weeks,” the jury 

heard testimony that “Petitioner was a gang member and only cared about doing crimes of 

robberies, [] murder, and rapes,” and claims that the error had a substantial and injurious 

effect on the jury’s verdict. See Pet. at 16; Trav. at 25-27. 

The only court to address Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to 

bifurcate the gang enhancements was the California Court of Appeal,8 which stated the 

following:

As the trial court here recognized in its well-reasoned discussion of the 

issue, a court has discretion to bifurcate trial issues, including enhancements. 

(See People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1048; People v. Calderon

(1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 74-75.) “In cases not involving the gang enhancement, we 

have held that evidence of gang membership is potentially prejudicial and should 

not be admitted if its probative value is minimal. [Citation]. But evidence of 

gang membership is often relevant to, and admissible regarding, the charged 

offense. Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of the 

gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal 

enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity, motive, modus 

operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues 

 

8

 In the California Court of Appeal, Petitioner joined his co-appellant’s claim alleging a denial 

of fair trial resulting from the trial court’s failure to bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancement 

allegations from the underlying substantive offenses. See Lodgment 3 at 45; see also

Lodgment 5 at 17. Petitioner did not raise the claim before the California Supreme Court on 

direct or collateral review. See Lodgments 6 and 8.

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pertinent to guilt of the charged crime. [Citations.] To the extent the evidence 

supporting the gang enhancement would be admissible at a trial of guilt, any 

inference of prejudice would be dispelled, and bifurcation would not be 

necessary. [Citation.]” (People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1049-

1050.) “Accordingly, when the evidence sought to be severed relates to a 

charged offense, the ‘burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly 

establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the 

charges be separately tried.’” (Id. at p. 1050.)

These rules guide our analysis. Here, the trial court properly exercised its 

discretion when it denied defendants’ motion to bifurcate because the gang 

evidence clearly was relevant to the charged offenses of both Price and Austin. 

The gang enhancement codified in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) was 

attached to each of the charged offenses brought against Price and Austin. 

Moreover, we note that like the defendant in People v. Hernandez, the record in 

the instant case shows that Austin and others in his group clearly and 

unequivocally made their gang status and affiliation relevant when they began 

flashing gang signs and making gang-related statements such as “Piru,” “Blood,” 

“this is Skyline” and “this is our area” when first demanding store employees give 

them the Hennessy and later, during the attack.

Indeed, the evidence in the record shows that the store was located in the 

heart of the Skyline gang’s territory and that as soon as Austin and his group 

rushed the store, at least 10 to 15 other people—including Price, who was a 

member of the same or related gang as Austin—joined in the attack. The record 

further shows that several Skyline gang members lived in homes in close 

proximity to the store. This evidence supports the inference that the attack on 

the store employees was a coordinated effort by the gang.

Thus, the gang evidence was admissible to explain not only the reason 

these 10 or 15 additional people joined in the attack, as further explained by the 

People’s gang expert that members of a gang are expected to back each other 

and put in work for the gang, but also to show the intent and motive of the 

group, including Price and Austin, in connection with the robbery of the 

Hennessey and/or the assault of the store employees who, despite the group’s 

threats, refused to turn over the Hennessy. (See People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 1050.)

That the jury heard testimony unrelated to the attack—including evidence 

of predicate acts of other members of the Skyline gang offered to prove the 

section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) gang enhancement and evidence of prior 

contacts between law enforcement and Price and/or Austin in connection with 

their gang membership and affiliation—does not mean the trial court improperly 

exercised its discretion in denying bifurcation. As recognized by our Supreme 

Court in People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 1050, “[e]ven if some of 

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the evidence offered to prove the gang enhancement would be inadmissible at a 

trial of the substantive crime itself—for example, if some of it might be excluded 

under Evidence Code section 352 as unduly prejudicial when no gang 

enhancement is charged—a court may still deny bifurcation.” On this record, we 

conclude Price did not satisfy his burden to show a “substantial danger of undue 

prejudice” when the court denied his bifurcation motion. (Ibid.) 

We also agree with the People that any purported error by the trial court 

in refusing to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations from the substantive 

chargers was harmless under any harmless error standard of review. (See 

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 45 

Cal.2d 818, 836). As noted ante, most of the gang evidence admitted at trial 

was relevant to the substantive charges brought against Price and Austin on the 

issues of motive, intent and even identity.

In addition, the court instructed the jury regarding the limited use of the 

gang evidence, including that such evidence was not admissible to show a 

defendant was a person of “bad character” or had a “disposition to commit 

crime.” We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions (see People v. 

Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803), and there is nothing in the record in the 

instant case to suggest otherwise. In fact, given that Price admitted he was a 

member of the Skyline gang and given the connection between the gang 

evidence and the substantive offenses as discussed ante, it appears the jury 

followed the court’s instructions inasmuch as the jury acquitted Price of counts 1, 

4 and 5.

Lodgment 5 at 21-25.

State evidentiary rulings are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding unless 

federal constitutional rights are affected. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68; Gordon v. Duran, 895 

F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990). Failure to bifurcate a gang enhancement fails to state a federal 

question. See Ramirez v. Almager, 619 F. Supp. 2d 881, 900 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also United 

States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986) (“Improper joinder does not, in itself, violate the 

Constitution.”). Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner argues that the state court erred in 

denying his motion to bifurcate the gang evidence, the claim does not present a federal 

question.

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However, misjoinder violates the Constitution where it results in prejudice so great as to 

deny a defendant his right to a fair trial. Lane, 474 U.S. at 446 n.8; see also Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (habeas relief unavailable unless joinder “actually 

render[ed] petitioner’s state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process”); 

Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 771-72 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). The requisite prejudice is 

established “if the impermissible joinder had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 772 (citing Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1086 (9th 

Cir. 1998)); Davis, 384 F.3d at 638.

In evaluating prejudice for failure to bifurcate, “the Ninth Circuit focuses particularly on 

cross-admissibility of evidence and the danger of ‘spillover’ from one charge to another, 

especially where one charge or set of charges is weaker than another.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 

638 (citing Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772 and Bean, 163 F.3d at 1084). “[T]he risk of undue 

prejudice is particularly great whenever joinder of counts allows evidence of other crimes to be 

introduced in a trial where the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible.” Sandoval, 241 F.3d 

at 772 (citation omitted). However, prejudice “does not arise from joinder when the evidence 

of each crime is simple and distinct, even in the absence of cross-admissibility.” Bean, 163 

F.3d at 1085. Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court’s decision to 

deny bifurcation rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 

1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

In this case, the trial court found that “there [wa]s not a sufficient basis to conclude 

that there [wa]s a substantial danger of prejudice if the allegations [we]re not bifurcated,” and 

reasoned as follows:

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[T]he real question is: if the People’s theory is that the crime was 

committed, the motivation for the crime was in association with gang activity. 

Assuming a bifurcation, what evidence that would come in with the allegation 

would not come in without it if the motivation is that this was committed for the 

benefit of the gang? Because obviously if the same evidence would come in 

irrespective, there’s no basis for bifurcating the allegation.

. . . 

[Defense counsel] argues there’s no evidence of gang—there’s no 

evidence of intent when they pulled up. I can’t say there’s no evidence without 

hearing the evidence. But clearly the People are going to be relying on and 

proving intent and gang affiliation or gang intent circumstantial evidence, and 

the jury is going to be instructed at the end of trial, if there are two reasonable 

interpretations, one points to innocence and one points to guilt, then they must 

accept the interpretation consistent with innocence.

But that’s very different from saying that there is no evidence of 

something. The evidence is circumstantial; it’s for the jury to decide what it 

proves. That’s the court’s obligation during in limine hearings to try the case and 

decide whether it’s the defense version that’s true or the People’s version. 

Obviously they are two very different versions, and there may be three very 

different versions. I don’t know. But certainly the People’s version was all of 

this was gang related.

. . . 

So evaluating the People’s theory of the case and the offer of proof—and 

that’s all I can go by at this point is the offer of proof and keeping in mind what 

the defense theory of the case is—I find that there is not a sufficient basis to 

conclude that there is a substantial danger of prejudice if the allegations are not 

bifurcated, so I’m going to deny the request for bifurcation of the gang 

allegations at this time.

Lodgment 1 at 1160-61, 1192-93, 1199 (emphasis added). After the conclusion of the 

percipient witness testimony, Petitioner’s trial counsel and Price’s counsel renewed their 

motion to bifurcate, arguing that the trial evidence mandated bifurcation. Id. at 2901-02. The 

trial judge denied the motion, stating that: “[t]here is nothing in the evidence that I’ve heard 

that would cause me to change my previous ruling, so the request to bifurcate is denied.” Id.

at 2903.

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The Ninth Circuit evaluates prejudice for failure to bifurcate by focusing on crossadmissibility of evidence and the danger of spillover from one charge to another. See Davis, 

384 F.3d at 638; Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772; Bean, 163 F.3d at 1084. As discussed in detail 

earlier in this Report and Recommendation, the trial evidence established that Petitioner was a 

documented Skyline gang member, the Moonlight Liquor store, where the events at issue 

occurred, was located in the Skyline’s gang territory, and Petitioner and other members of his 

group injected their gang status and affiliation into the substantive crimes by threatening store 

employees, flashing gang signs, and making gang-related statements prior to and during the 

commission of the crimes. Lodgment 1 at 2155-56, 2160-61, 2165, 2299, 2469, 3399-3401, 

3404, 3495-96. As such, the gang evidence was relevant to the substantive charges brought 

against Petitioner and the trial and appellate courts correctly concluded that most of the gang 

evidence would have been admissible in a separate trial to prove Petitioner’s motive, intent 

and identity. Such “cross-admissibility dispels the prejudicial impact of joining all counts in the 

same trial.” See Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772; see also Windham, 163 F.3d at 1103-04 (finding 

that the admission of gang evidence did not violate defendant’s right to fair trial, in violation of 

due process, where the gang evidence was relevant to establish motive in committing the 

charged crimes); Bernoudy v. Adams, 2011 WL 4500047, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2011) 

(finding that “testimony regarding gang codes of territorialism, respect and disrespect, 

intimidation, and backing each other up, was highly relevant to establish a possible motive for 

[petitioner’s] crime,” where petitioner was a member of the 87 Gangster Crip gang, the crime 

was committed in the “heart” of the gang’s territory, and petitioner and his cohorts felt that 

they had been disrespected). 

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However, as noted by the trial court, evidence of the predicate crimes committed by 

other Skyline gang members which was offered during Petitioner’s trial to establish the gang 

allegations under Cal. Penal Code § 186(b)(1) would not have been cross-admissible. The 

potential prejudicial impact of this evidence was minimized because the evidence was 

presented in summary fashion by a police detective and via certified conviction documents. 

See Lodgment 1 at 3405-14; see also supra pp. 37-40. In addition, the trial court instructed 

the jury that the gang evidence was not admissible to show that Petitioner was a person of 

“bad character” or had a “disposition to commit crime,” and that the jury could not be 

influenced by prejudice or sentiment. See Lodgment 1 at 91, 114-15; CALCRIM No. 1403; 

CALCRIM No. 200; see also Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (stating that a jury 

is presumed to follow the judge’s instructions); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 782 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citing Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 179 (2006)) (same). Petitioner has not provided 

any evidence that the jury did not follow the trial court’s instructions. 

Finally, this case did not involve a situation where a strong evidentiary case was joined 

with a much weaker case “in the hope that the cumulation of the evidence would lead to 

convictions in both cases.” See Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772. As discussed in more detail 

throughout this Report and Recommendation, there was overwhelming evidence establishing 

Petitioner’s guilt for the substantive crimes and for the gang enhancement allegations. 

Accordingly, in light of the strength of the evidence against Petitioner on both the 

substantive crimes and the gang enhancement allegations, the cross-admissibility of the vast 

majority of the evidence, the limiting instructions given to the jury, and the manner in which 

gang evidence that was not cross-admissible was presented, Petitioner has not established 

that his due process rights were violated, that he received an unfair trial, or that he was 

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unduly prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to bifurcate. See Haygood v. Walker, 2010 WL 

7408533, at *17 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2010) (finding no prejudice resulting from the trial court’s 

refusal to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegation, where the gang evidence was 

admissible to prove petitioner’s motive and intent); Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772-73 (finding that 

petitioner was not prejudiced by joinder of murder and attempted murder charges, where 

evidence from each set of offenses would have been admissible at trial for other offenses in 

light of evidence linking all offenses, and where the state’s case against petitioner on both sets 

of crimes was strong); Palma v. Cate, 2012 WL 1059925, at *7-8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2012) 

(concluding that petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated by the trial court’s refusal 

to bifurcate the gang enhancement because the jury “would have been made aware of a 

significant amount of gang testimony even if there had been separate trial”); Cisneros v. 

Harrington, 2012 WL 3150610, at *15-16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (finding that the trial 

court’s failure to bifurcate did not violate petitioner’s due process, where the gang allegation 

was “inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses,” and where, inter alia, petitioner was 

tied to the TMC gang and the crime was committed in the area that was being taken over by 

the TMC gang).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner also appears to allege that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 

for bifurcation of the gang allegations, and that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance because he failed to join Petitioner’s co-appellant’s claim that the trial court 

erroneously denied a motion to bifurcate gang allegations. See supra text accompanying

note 3; see also Pet. at 79, 82, 102-03; Trav. at 24-26. In support, Petitioner merely argues

that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence relating to his gang membership. See

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Pet. at 15-16; Trav. at 24-26. Respondent maintains that Petitioner received effective 

assistance of counsel. Ans. at 21-22.

Under clearly established federal law, “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of 

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of 

the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prove ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that 

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. The proper measure of 

attorney performance is “simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 

688. “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance;” that is, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 

trial strategy. Id. at 689-90. To determine whether errors of counsel prejudiced the defense, 

a court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury” and consider 

whether “the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would 

reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.” Id. at 696. The Court need not 

address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a 

sufficient showing of either one. Id. at 697. 

The Strickland standard applies equally to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel. Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 995 

(2002). “Defense counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise all nonfrivolous issues 

on appeal.” McGee v. Dexter, 2010 WL 2044526, at *11 (C.D. Cal. April 19, 2012) (citing 

Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d 1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Appellate counsel’s failure to raise an 

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issue on direct appeal cannot constitute ineffective assistance when the ‘appeal would not 

have provided grounds for reversal.’” Id. (quoting Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 

(9th Cir. 2001)). 

(a) Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to argue for 

bifurcation of the gang allegation from the underlying charges fails on both prongs. See Pet. 

at 9; Trav. at 24-26. Before trial, Petitioner’s attorney moved to bifurcate the gang 

enhancement allegations from the substantive crimes. See Lodgment 1 at 1158-59; see also

id. at 1189. On August 17, 2011, the trial court held an in limine hearing on Petitioner’s 

motion to bifurcate and after extensive arguments by the parties, denied the motion. Id. at 

1160-91, 1199. On September 1, 2011, after the completion of the percipient witness 

testimony, Petitioner’s trial counsel renewed the motion to bifurcate, arguing that the trial 

evidence established the requisite danger of prejudice requiring bifurcation. Id. at 2900-03. 

The trial court considered counsel’s argument but concluded that the trial evidence did not 

change his pretrial ruling and denied the renewed motion to bifurcate. Id. at 2903. 

Accordingly, the undisputed evidence establishes that Petitioner’s trial counsel acted 

reasonably because he was aware of the legal issue and argued appropriately and forcefully 

for bifurcation on two separate occasions. The fact that the trial court ruled against counsel 

does not make counsel’s performance constitutionally deficient. See Viltz v. McEwen, 2013 WL 

5775337, at *24-25 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (finding that Petitioner’s trial counsel’s conduct 

was reasonable and that the trial counsel was not ineffective, where the counsel argued his 

position to the court, but lost the motion). 

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Even if Petitioner could establish that his trial counsel’s conduct was constitutionally 

deficient, Petitioner has not established “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” See

id. at 694. Petitioner does not identify what actions counsel should have taken or how such 

actions would have resulted in a different result. As discussed above, the majority of the gang 

evidence admitted at trial was relevant to the substantive crimes on the issues of motive,

intent and identity, the trial court minimized any prejudice by instructing the jury on the 

limited use of the gang evidence, and the evidence that was not cross-admissible was 

presented in a summary, non-inflammatory fashion. As such, and as held by the appellate 

court, the trial court correctly determined that bifurcation was not warranted. Petitioner thus 

fails to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficient performance and 

cannot satisfy his burden under Strickland.

(b) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

To the extent Petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he 

failed to join Petitioner’s co-appellant’s claim that the trial court erroneously denied a motion 

to bifurcate gang allegations, the claim also fails on both prongs. See Pet. at 9, 79, 82, 102-

03; Trav. at 24. Petitioner’s appellate counsel specifically stated in his brief to the California 

Court of Appeal that Petitioner “joins in the issues, points, and authorities raised by his coappellant that may redound or accrue to his benefit.” Lodgment 3 at 45. One of the claims 

raised by Petitioner’s co-appellant Price in his appeal to the California Court of Appeal alleged a 

denial of a fair trial resulting from the trial court’s refusal to bifurcate gang allegations from 

the substantive offenses. See Lodgment 5 at 17; see also Pet. at 83-100. The California Court 

of Appeal acknowledged in its opinion that “Price joined in any and all contentions raised by 

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[Petitioner] that would accrue to his benefit and vice versa,” and addressed the merits of the 

bifurcation claim. See Lodgment 5 at 3 n.3 (emphasis added); id. at 17-25. As such, contrary 

to Petitioner’s assertions, his appellate counsel did join Price’s claim alleging that the trial court 

erroneously denied a motion to bifurcate gang allegations. Petitioner thus cannot establish 

that his appellate counsel’s performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; 

Bailey, 263 F.3d at 1028.

Even if Petitioner could satisfy the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel 

test, he has not and cannot satisfy the second prong. As discussed above, the California Court 

of Appeal specifically considered the claim that the trial court erroneously denied the motion to 

bifurcate gang allegations and found that the trial court’s refusal to try the gang allegations 

separately from the substantive offenses did not result in an unfair trial. See Lodgment 5 at 

17-25. Because the state appellate court considered Petitioner’s bifurcation claim and denied 

it, Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s alleged failure. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Bailey, 263 F.3d at 1028.

Petitioner fails to establish that his trial and appellate counsels’ performances were

deficient or that the allegedly deficient performances prejudiced his defense. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687. Petitioner also fails to establish that his due process rights were violated by 

the trial court’s refusal to bifurcate gang allegations from the substantive charges brought 

against him. The Court therefore finds Petitioner’s claims in Ground Four to be without merit 

and RECOMMENDS that they be DENIED.

9

 

9 The Court reaches the same conclusion regardless of whether the claims are reviewed de 

novo or reviewed utilizing the deferential AEDPA standard of review to the appellate court’s 

reasoned denial of the trial court’s failure to bifurcate and the California Supreme Court’s 

denial of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99-102; 

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E. Cumulative Errors Claim

Petitioner appears to raise a new claim in his Traverse arguing that “the cumulative 

errors of [his] trial denied [him] his rights to a fundamentally fair trial and due process.” Trav. 

at 26-28. In support, Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

robbery conviction, that the trial court failed to properly give a lesser included theft instruction, 

omitted a portion of CALCRIM No. 1401 definition of a pattern of criminal gang activity, and 

failed to bifurcate gang allegations.

10

If the claim is not presented in the Petition but is presented for the first time in the 

Traverse, the Court has discretion to consider it or refuse to consider it because Petitioner was 

specifically warned in this Court’s March 24, 2015 Order directing a response to the Petition 

[ECF No. 6 at 3] that his Traverse “shall not raise new grounds for relief that were not 

asserted in the Petition.” See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(stating that court may ignore issue raised for first time in traverse when scope of traverse has 

been specifically limited by court order and petitioner ignores order to file a separate pleading 

indicating intent to raise claim); see also Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 930 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (“Arguments raised for the first time in petitioner’s reply brief are deemed 

 

see also Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that when the state 

court reaches the merits of the claim but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, 

“although we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate 

decision”); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that even if state 

court does not address the constitutional issue, where the reasoning of the state court is 

relevant to resolution of the constitutional issue, that reasoning must be part of federal habeas 

court’s consideration even under a de novo review). 

10 Petitioner did not include his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his cumulative errors 

argument (see Trav.), but even if the claim were included, the Court’s conclusion would not 

change. 

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waived.”); Collins v. Uribe, 564 F. App’x 343, 343-44 (9th Cir. 2014) (same); but see

Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that district court erred in 

failing to address issue raised in traverse). The Court will exercise its discretion to consider 

this claim because Petitioner’s allegations that the accumulation of the alleged trial errors in 

his case violated his federal constitutional rights are intertwined with the other claims in his 

Petition.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the combined effect of discrete trial errors, even when 

none of them individually warrants relief, can in some circumstances have a substantial and 

injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 302-03 (1973)); Alcala v. Woodford, 334 

F.3d 862, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003)). Relief for cumulative prejudice necessarily presupposes 

that the Court will find substantial error occurred in connection with at least one of the 

petitioner’s claims. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because we 

conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is 

possible.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Larson, 460 F.3d 1200, 1217 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(rejecting cumulative error claim where the court discovered no error in the defendants’ trial). 

Petitioner has not established that any constitutional error occurred in his case. See supra, 

Sections A-D. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s cumulative error claim 

be DENIED.

F. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Pet. at 16; Trav. 

at 8, 19. A federal court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing is governed by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(2), which provides:

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If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court 

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless 

the applicant shows that—

(A) the claim relies on—

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously made unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

“Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues 

which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000). Here, Petitioner generally argues that he “raises a colorable claim 

for relief,” and that in cases “where there has not been a state or federal hearing on the[] 

claim[s], the court must grant a hearing.” Pet. at 16. However, Petitioner does not establish 

that his request relies on a new rule of constitutional law, or a factual predicate that could not 

have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See id.; Trav. 

Similarly, Petitioner has not alleged facts that would be sufficient to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 

found him guilty of the underlying offense. See id. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District

Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) 

directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than February 26, 2016, any party to this 

action may file written objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than March 25, 2016. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections 

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/29/2016

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