Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01820/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01820-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD M. RAMOS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 12-CV-1820- IEG (RBB)

ORDER:

1. GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS;

[Doc. No. 4]

2. GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND.

vs.

U.S. BANK, et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). [Doc. No. 4.] For the reasons below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

This case concerns a July 27, 2005 mortgage loan to Plaintiffs Ronald M. and Eunice C.

Ramos. [See Doc. No. 1 Ex. A.] Proceeding pro se, Plaintiffs filed a complaint on April 27, 2012

in San Diego County Superior Court alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), as

well as state law claims for negligent misrepresentation, recission, fraud, unfair business practices

under California Business and Professions Code § 17200, and to quiet title. [Doc. No. 1 Ex. A.] 

On July 23, 2012, Defendants removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 1 at

3.] On May 23, 2012, Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 8.] Plaintiffs

filed an opposition on August 20, 2012, [Doc. No. 6], and Defendants filed a reply on August 31,

2012, [Doc. No. 7].

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LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) test the sufficiency of this required showing. New Mexico State Investment Council v.

Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011). “Dismissal is proper when the

complaint does not make out a cognizable legal theory or does not allege sufficient facts to support

a cognizable legal theory.” Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th

Cir. 2011). And though pro se complaints enjoy “the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), Rule 8 still demands sufficient factual matter to plausibly state a

claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

DISCUSSION

1. TILA Claims

The Court liberally construes the complaint as asserting TILA claims for both damages and

recission, [see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635, 1640], but finds both barred by applicable statutes of limitation

and repose. TILA damages claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitation that may, under

certain circumstances, be equitably tolled. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). 

TILA recission claims are subject to a three-year statute of repose, which constitutes an absolute

bar and thus to which equitable tolling is unavailable. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,

412 (1998). Both statutes run from the date the subject loan was consummated. See King, 784 F.2d

at 915; see also McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on April 27, 2012, nearly seven years after the date the

subject loan was consummated, July 27, 2005.1

 [See Doc. No. 1 Ex. A at 17.] And no basis for

1 Plaintiffs’ opposition relies on Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1989),

to argue that the subject loan was not consummated at issuance because securitization of the loan

rendered the ultimate source of funding unknown. [See Doc. No. 6 at 6-7.] But in Jackson, the Ninth

Circuit merely held that a contract conditioned on lender identification was invalid where no lender

was identified; it did not hold that all loans remain unconsummated as long as the ultimate source of

the lender’s funding remains unknown. 890 F.2d at 121. Here, a lender was plainly identified, [Doc.

No. 1 Ex. A at 17], and the loan was consummated regardless of how or by whom the lender was

ultimately funded. See e.g., Buie v. Palm Springs Motors, Inc., 2001 WL 34570064, at *3 (C.D. Cal.

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equitable tolling has been pled. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1045 (equitable tolling only available

“in situations where, despite all due diligence, the party . . . is unable to obtain vital information

bearing on the existence of the claim”). Plaintiff’s TILA claims are thus untimely and barred. See

King, 784 F.2d at 915. Because amendment could potentially provide a basis for equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations, Plaintiff’s TILA claims for damages are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. But as the statute of repose is an absolute bar, and amendment would thus be futile,

Plaintiff’s TILA claims for recission are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

2. State Law Claims

Having “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” the Court hereby

“decline[s] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010)

(where “all federal-law claims are eliminated,” “declin[ing] jurisdiction over the remaining statelaw claims” is proper). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims for negligent misrepresentation,

recission, fraud, unfair business practices, and to quiet title are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s claims under state law and for damages under TILA

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s claims for recission under TILA are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a first amended complaint no

later 21 days after the filing of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 14, 2012 ______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

May 14, 2001) (distinguishing Jackson on these grounds). Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s rationale were

sound, the complaint alleges no factual basis in support. [See Doc. No. 1 Ex A.] Indeed, the

complaint contains not a single allegation as to when or what Plaintiffs knew in regard to the loan’s

consummation, source of funding, or securitization, nor any allegation of when the loan was in fact

consummated under Plaintiffs’ theory. [Id.] Thus, dismissal is proper. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at

1041 (“Dismissal is proper when the complaint . . . does not allege sufficient facts to support a

cognizable legal theory.”).

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