Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03157/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03157-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY TOMBACK,

PLAINTIFF,

v.

UNUMPROVIDENT CORPORATION; PROVIDENT

LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY;

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE and DOES 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-3157 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR REMAND

Defendants Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company

(Provident) and UnumProvident Corporation (Unum) (collectively,

Removing Defendants) removed this disability insurance action to

federal court. Plaintiff moves for remand to State court, pointing

to the absence of complete diversity created by the Commissioner of

the California Department of Insurance as a named defendant. 

Removing Defendants oppose this motion, arguing that: 1) diversity

cannot be destroyed by the Commissioner sued in his official

capacity; 2) Plaintiff's claims against the Commissioner were made

in bad faith; and 3) all claims against the Commissioner are either

time-barred or fail to state a cause of action. The matter has
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been submitted on the papers. Having considered all of the papers

filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to

remand.

BACKGROUND

On January 18 1986, Defendant Provident issued a disability

insurance policy to Plaintiff. Provident is now a wholly owned

subsidiary of Unum, a corporation organized and existing under the

laws of Delaware, with its principal places of business in

Chattanooga, Tennessee and Portland, Maine. In letter dated

February 6, 2004, Unum ultimately rejected a disability benefits

claim made by Plaintiff. On June 23, 2005, Plaintiff filed suit in

San Francisco County Superior Court, alleging State law causes of

action against Removing Defendants for wrongfully denying him

benefits under the disability policy. Plaintiff also brought suit

against the Commissioner in his official capacity, requesting a

writ of mandamus ordering the Commissioner to revoke his approval

of the disability policy. On August 4, 2005, Removing Defendants,

claiming diversity jurisdiction, removed the complaint to federal

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Plaintiff seeks remand. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in State court to

federal district court so long as the district court could have

exercised original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(a). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that, if at any time

before judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over a case previously removed from State

court, the case must be remanded. On a motion to remand, the scope
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of the removal statute must be strictly construed. Gaus v. Miles,

Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). "The 'strong presumption'

against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has

the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Id. Courts

should resolve doubts as to removability in favor of remanding the

case to State court. Id.

 District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil

actions "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value

of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . 

citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When federal

subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of

citizenship, complete diversity must exist between the opposing

parties. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-

74 (1978). 

 A defendant may remove a case with a non-diverse defendant on

the basis of diversity jurisdiction and seek to persuade the

district court that this defendant was fraudulently joined. McCabe

v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). "If the

plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident

defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled

rules of the state, the joinder of the resident defendant is

fraudulent." Id. The burden of the defendant is not to show that

the joinder of the non-diverse party was for the purpose of

preventing removal because "it is universally thought that the

motive for joining such a defendant is immaterial." Albi v. Street

& Smith Publ'ns, 140 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1944). Instead, the

defendant must demonstrate that there is no possibility that the
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plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action in State

court against the alleged sham defendant. Id.; see also Ritchey v.

Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). Allegations

of the presence of a sham defendant can only succeed upon a showing

that there is an obvious failure to assert a cause of action

against that defendant under well-settled rules of State law. 

United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 761 (9th

Cir. 2002); Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067

(9th Cir. 2001); see also Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951

F.2d 42, 43 (5th Cir. 1992) ("In evaluating fraudulent joinder

claims, we must initially resolve . . . all ambiguities in the

controlling state law in favor of the non-removing party.")

DISCUSSION

I. The Commissioner as a Named Defendant Precludes Diversity

Jurisdiction

Removing Defendants argue that, because they are not citizens

of California and because the Commissioner has no citizenship for

diversity purposes, diversity jurisdiction is proper in this case. 

This argument is based on two premises. First, Removing Defendants

correctly point out that the Commissioner, in his official

capacity, is not a "citizen of California." See Morongo Band of

Mission Indians v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d

1376, 1382 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998) (State officers have "no

citizenship" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332). Second, Removing

Defendants contend that the Commissioner, as a non-citizen, should

be ignored for the purposes of analyzing diversity jurisdiction. 

This is incorrect. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Removing Defendants concede that "a lawsuit against a state

officer acting in his official capacity is treated as a suit

against the state itself, for which there is no diversity

jurisdiction." Defs.' Opp. at 6; see also Schwarzer et al.,

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 2:247. However, Removing

Defendants argue that, although an official-capacity defendant's

citizenship (or more precisely, lack thereof) "cannot be asserted

as a basis for establishing diversity" by plaintiffs, the same lack

of citizenship should not be allowed "to destroy diversity" when

defendants seek to remove to federal court. Defs.' Opp. at 6

(emphasis in original). 

Removing Defendants' distinction has no basis in the text of

the removal statute or any precedent in this or any other circuit. 

Although infrequently raised, Removing Defendants' novel argument

has been rejected by other courts. Jakoubek v. Fortis Benefits

Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (D. Neb. 2003); Batton v.

Georgia Gulf, 261 F. Supp. 2d 575, 583 (M.D. La. 2003); see also

California v. Steelcase Inc.,792 F. Supp 84, 86 (C.D. Cal 1992)

("[F]or diversity purposes, a state is not a citizen of itself. 

Therefore, it cannot sue or be sued in a diversity action."). 

In Batton, the court rejected an argument identical to that

raised by Removing Defendants after examining the diversity statute

and concluding, "Nowhere is there any provision allowing diversity

jurisdiction where a non-citizen state is a party. Clearly,

Congress contemplated the situation of non-citizens and

specifically allowed for suits by those non-citizens it thought

appropriate." 261 F. Supp. 2d at 582. The court in Jakoubek
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similarly found the plain language of the statute dispositive,

stating that "28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) grants federal diversity

jurisdiction only when plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of

different states. Since the State defendants are not citizens,

they and the plaintiff cannot be citizens of different states." 

301 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. The Court agrees with the reasoning of

the Batton and Jakoubek courts and concludes that diversity

jurisdiction does not exist here because the Commissioner, a noncitizen, is a defendant. 

Removing Defendants mistakenly point to Garamendi v. Allstate,

47 F.3d 350 (9th Cir. 1995) and American Re-Insurance Company v.

Insurance Commissioner of the State of California, 527 F. Supp. 444

(C.D. Cal 1981), in an attempt to contradict the principle that

diversity jurisdiction is normally improper for official capacity

suits. These cases are distinguishable, however, because, as

indicated in the captions of each case, the Commissioner was sued

in his capacity as liquidator of the respective insurance

companies. See Allstate, 47 F.3d at 350 ("GARAMENDI, Insurance

Commissioner of the State of California, in his capacity as

Liquidator of Mission Insurance Company"); Am. Re-Insurance Co.,

527 F. Supp. at 444 ("The INSURANCE COMMISSION OF the STATE OF

CALIFORNIA, as liquidator of Signal Insurance Company and of

Imperial Insurance Company"). 

The existence of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is

based on an examination of the citizenship of the real parties in

interest. Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460-61 (1980). 

Because the real party in interest in suits involving a State
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official as liquidator is the company itself, such suits may

proceed under diversity jurisdiction. General Ry. Signal Co. v.

Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 705 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, although

the basis of diversity jurisdiction went unaddressed in Garamendi

and American Re-Insurance Company because diversity was

unchallenged, it seems likely that these courts simply applied the

settled rule that "[t]he addition to a lawsuit of a purely nominal

party--the holder of the stakes of the dispute between the

plaintiff and the original defendant--does not affect diversity

jurisdiction.” Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR

Realty, Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Matchett

v. Wold, 818 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1987). 

Removing Defendants argue that the fact that the Commissioner

was acting as a liquidator in Garamendi and American Re-Insurance

provides no basis for reasoned distinction. Citing Garris v.

Carpenter, 33 Cal. App. 2d 649, 656 (1939), Removing Defendants

argue that the Commissioner as liquidator acts in his official

capacity "in behalf of the state." See also Cal. Ins. Code § 1059

(in performance of any of his statutory duties the Commissioner

"shall be deemed to be a public officer acting in his official

capacity on behalf of the State"). However, the fact that the

Commissioner as liquidator acts in his official capacity on behalf

of the State does not settle whether he is a nominal party for

purposes of diversity. See General Ry. Signal Co., 921 F.2d at 705

n.3 (official as liquidator nominal party to diversity suit).

The Garris case cited by Removing Defendants supports the

proposition that the Commissioner as liquidator may be a nominal
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party because he acts merely as "holder of the stakes of the

dispute." Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., 204 F.3d at

873; see Garris, 33 Cal. App. 2d at 655 (in his role as liquidator,

the Commissioner's function "is that of a minister of the court in

possession of the property, to the end of conserving the rights of

everybody having any interest.") Removing Defendants do not argue,

nor could they, that the Commissioner is a nominal party in this

case. Therefore, because there is no evidence that the courts in

Garamendi and American Re-Insurance Company developed a new

exception to settled diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence, the

Court declines to interpret these cases to allow diversity

jurisdiction in this case. 

II. Fraudulent Joinder

Despite the absence of complete diversity, Removing Defendants

may proceed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction if they can

demonstrate that the Commissioner was fraudulently joined. McCabe,

811 F.2d at 1339.

A. Bad Faith 

Removing Defendants contend that Plaintiff's counsel routinely

joins the Commissioner in insurance cases in order to avoid federal

court, without ever pursuing legal redress or even initiating

discovery in the claims against him. Removing Defendants support

this contention by citing other cases in which Plaintiff's counsel,

Plaintiff's counsel's firm and one other unidentified plaintiffs'

firm filed suits against Removing Defendants (or other non-resident

insurance companies) and the Commissioner or other State officials. 

They state that counsel never pursued claims alleged against the
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Commissioner or State officials in these cases. Hockel Decl. at 2-

6. Removing Defendants also claim that Plaintiff's counsel's

dismissal of an unrelated insurance case before another judge of

this Court, who had previously ruled against Plaintiff's counsel on

a similar remand issue, evidences forum-shopping. Id., Exs. C, D,

F. In light of this evidence, Removing Defendants argue that the

joinder of the Commissioner was in bad faith and therefore

fraudulent. However, as noted above, this circuit has foreclosed

analysis of a plaintiff's intentions in cases of alleged fraudulent

joinder:

It is universally thought that the motive for 

joining . . . a defendant is immaterial. It is only

where the plaintiff has not, in fact, a cause of action

against the . . . defendant, and has no reasonable ground

for supposing he has, and yet joins him in order to evade

the jurisdiction of the federal court, that the joinder

can be said to be fraudulent, entitling the real

defendant to a removal.

Albi, 140 F.2d at 312.

In other words, "the phrase 'fraudulent joinder' is something

of a misnomer. It is a term of art; it . . . is merely the rubric

applied when a court finds either that no cause of action is stated

against the nondiverse Defendant, or in fact no cause of action

exists." Grennell v. Western Southern Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp.

2d 390, 394 n.5 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); see also McCabe, 811 F.2d at

1139 ("Fraudulent joinder is a term of art. If the plaintiff fails

to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the

failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state, the

joinder of the resident defendant is fraudulent.")

Removing Defendants' reliance on the statement in Rock Island
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1

 To the extent that Lewis v. Time, Inc. reads the "and" in

Wilson as an "or" it is not persuasive. 83 F.R.D. 455, 465 (C.D.

Cal. 1979) (stating "a joinder is also fraudulent although a cause

of action is stated if in fact no cause of action exists, or there

is no intention to secure a joint judgment" and finding that the

tenuous nature of plaintiff's claim along with evidence of last10

& Pacific Railway Company v. Schwyart, suggesting that the Court

will examine whether a plaintiff has a "real intention to get a . .

. judgment," is unavailing. 227 U.S. 184, 194 (1913). The

analysis in that case addressed whether or not the plaintiff had a

viable claim and the Court made clear that "the motive of the

plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect the right to remove." 

Id. at 193. In Wilson v. Republican Iron & Steel Company, also

cited by Removing Defendants, the Court found fraudulent joinder

based upon undisputed allegations that the plaintiff "knew all

along, [that the non-diverse defendant] was not guilty of any joint

negligence with the [diverse defendant], was not present when the

plaintiff's injuries were received, and did no act or deed which

caused or contributed to such injuries." 257 U.S. 92, 94, 98

(1921). The Court noted that the defendants could establish

fraudulent joinder by showing that claims against the non-diverse

defendant were "without any reasonable basis in fact and without

any purpose to prosecute the cause in good faith." 257 U.S. 92, 98

(1921). 

Because the Wilson Court required both an absence of any

reasonable basis for the suit and no intention to prosecute, it is

not in conflict with the statement in Rock Island that "the motive

of the plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect the right to

remove." 227 U.S. at 193.1

 Removing Defendants have not
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minute joinder of a California corporation solely for the purpose

of defeating diversity established fraudulent joinder). The

correct standard is delineated elsewhere in that case. See id. at

460 ("'Fraudulent joinder' is a term of art, it does not reflect on

the integrity of plaintiff or counsel but is merely the rubric

applied when a court finds either that no cause of action is stated

against the nondiverse defendant, or in fact no cause of action

exists. In other words, a joinder is fraudulent if there is no

real intention to get a joint judgment, and there is no colorable

ground for so claiming.") (citations and alterations omitted). The

Third Circuit precedent relied upon by Removing Defendants, Batoff

v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992), traces

back to similar misinterpretation of Wilson by a California

district court. See Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d

26 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Goldberg v. CPC International, Inc., 495

F. Supp. 233 239 (N.D. Cal. 1980)). However, the Goldberg court

provides no support for Removing Defendants' theory. See id. at

239 ("It is immaterial that plaintiff may have been motivated by a

purpose to defeat removal.")

11

established that Plaintiff's claim against the Commissioner has no

reasonable basis in fact, and have not satisfied the Wilson test. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that evidence of Plaintiff's

counsel's alleged lack of intention to pursue relief against the

Commissioner does not establish fraudulent joinder. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

Removing Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner. Removing

Defendants argue that, because the Commissioner's decision to

approve the insurance policy occurred in approximately January,

1986, the month Plaintiff's insurance policy issued, and

Plaintiff's complaint was not filed until June 23, 2005,

Plaintiff's request for a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner

is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court must therefore

address the manner in which the Commissioner's decisions are

reviewed under California law. 
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For the Northern District of California

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1. Judicial Review of Commissioner's Decisions

The issuance of a disability policy in California requires

approval from the Commissioner. Van Ness v. Blue Cross of

California, 87 Cal. App. 4th 364, 368 (2001); see also Cal. Ins.

Code § 10290. The Commissioner may give explicit endorsement to a

policy by "written approval" or implicit consent by failing to act

within thirty days of receipt of the copy of the policy that must

be sent to the Commissioner by the insurer. Id. The Commissioner

may also, with good cause, revoke approval for any policy that does

not comply with the California Insurance Code. 10 Cal. Code Regs.

§ 2196.4(a). The Commissioner's actions are subject to judicial

review pursuant to California Insurance Code § 12940. Review of

the Commissioner's decision to approve an insurance policy is

governed by the California Code of Civil Procedure. Cal. Ins. Code

§ 10295.1(h). 

The California Code of Civil Procedure allows a writ of

mandamus to be issued "by any court to any . . . person, to compel

the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a

duty resulting from an office, trust or station.” Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 1085(a). The Commissioner is thus subject to the writ due

to the requirement that he “perform all duties imposed on him or

her by the [Insurance Code] and other laws regulating the business

of insurance" and "enforce the execution of those provisions and

laws.” Cal. Ins. Code § 12921(a). 

In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks an order mandating that the

Commissioner perform the duties imposed upon him by law to correct

the disability policy so that it conforms with California State law
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and to revoke his original approval of the disability policy. 

Compl. at 24, 25. Ninth Circuit and California case law suggests

that such a writ is proper and Removing Defendants do not contest

the use of the writ in this case. See Peterson v. American Life &

Health Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 404, 410 (9th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff "may

petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the Commissioner to

revoke his approval"); Van Ness, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 371-72

(insured may petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the

commission to revoke approval). 

2. Statute of Limitations

To determine the applicable statute of limitations for a writ

of mandamus, the Court must turn to California State law. 

California Insurance Code § 10291.5(h) states that:

any action taken by the commissioner under this section

is subject to review by the courts of this state and

proceedings on review shall be in accordance with the

Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding any other

provision of law to the contrary, petition for any such

review may be filed at any time before the effective date

of the action taken by the commissioner. 

Removing Defendants argue that, because section 10291.5(h)

does not supply its own statute of limitations, the applicable

statute of limitations is the three-year limitation provided by

California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(a) for "an action upon a

liability created by statute." Plaintiff presents no alternative

statute of limitations. However, Plaintiff disputes Removing

Defendants' contention that it is the Commissioner's approval of

the policy which triggers the running of the statutory clock. 

No California decisions directly address this issue. However,

at least five judges in this District have addressed the statute of
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limitations for this precise application of the writ of mandamus. 

Only one district court found that the statute of limitations began

to run on the date of the Commissioner's approval of a policy. See

Borsuk v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. C-03-630 VRW (Def.

Ex. F). The remaining four courts were unwilling to hold

categorically that the statutory clock began to run on the date of

the Commissioner's approval because a plaintiff may not have

sufficient notice of his or her injury until the insurance company

rejects the claim. See Brazina v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 271

F. Supp. 2d 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Sullivan v. Unum Life Ins. Co.

of Amer., 2004 WL 828561 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Glick v. UnumProvident

Corp., No. C 03-4025 WHA (N.D. Cal. 2004); Maiolino v.

UnumProvident Corp., 2004 WL 941235 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

In finding that the statute of limitations had expired, the

Borsuk court summarily concluded that "Borsuk was on notice . . .

no later than . . . the date he agreed to the terms of the policy"

and that the statute began to run either on the date of that

agreement or on the date the Commissioner approved the policy. 

Borsuk at 18. Because the Borsuk court did not provide the basis

for its decision on this matter, the Court finds that decision

unpersuasive. 

In Brazina, the court did not address the triggering of the

statute of limitations directly, but did reject the defendants'

argument that the writ of mandamus was unavailable at any time

after the effective date of the Commissioner's decision. 271 F.

Supp. 2d at 1170 (citing Econ. Empowerment Found. v. Quackenbush,

65 Cal. App. 4th 1397, 1402 (1998)). Despite the fact that the
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plaintiff filed suit fourteen years after the issuance of the

policy, the Brazina court stated that "it seems likely that a

California court would interpret the language [of section

10291.5(h)] to allow this action to proceed." Id. at 1171. 

Sullivan, Maiolino, and Glick directly addressed the statute

of limitations and, finding the issue of when the statute begins to

run to be uncertain, construed the ambiguity in favor of granting

remand because a cause of action had been stated. In Sullivan, the

court concluded, "It seems unfair to hold categorically that

Plaintiff had notice of the way defendants would administer the

policy before Unum denied him benefits" and therefore decided that

a claim had been stated and remand was appropriate because the

complaint had been filed within three years of the denial of

benefits. 2004 WL 828561 at *4. Maiolino and Glick adopted

similar reasoning. Maiolino 2004 WL 941235 at *5 (granting remand

in the absence of well-settled rules of State law on the statute of

limitations issue); Glick, at 3-4 (noting that although defendants'

contention that the statute of limitations had expired might

ultimately prevail in State court, defendants had not met their

high burden of establishing the absence of a viable claim against

the Commissioner.) 

The reasoning of these cases is blostered by California State

law, which states that a cause of action accrues "upon the

occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action," 

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of La Habra, 25 Cal. 4th 809,

815 (2001), and that the event triggering the statute of

limitations may be modified "where it would be manifestly unjust to
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2 Because the Court finds in Plaintiff's favor on this issue,

the Court declines to address Plaintiff's argument that Removing

Defendants' notice of removal is procedurally defective due to

their failure to secure the consent of the Commissioner. 

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deprive a plaintiff of a cause of action before he is aware he has

been injured." Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 230 Cal. App. 3d

1125, 1150 (1991). As noted by the Sullivan court, it is doubtful

that insurance policy holders would be aware of the harm posed by

the Commissioner's approval of ambiguous terms in their policies

before they "had notice of the way [insurers] would administer the

policy" to deny them benefits. Sullivan, 2004 WL 828561 at *4. 

Furthermore, it is unreasonable to assume that policy holders would

be "put on notice" of the injury caused by the Commissioner's

approval of an illegal policy simply by his inaction (i.e. his

failure to act to disapprove of the policy within thirty days). 

See Cal. Ins. Code § 10290(b). 

These observations are not to suggest that Plaintiff will

necessarily succeed in persuading a State court to follow his

suggested application of the statute of limitations. However,

because of the unsettled nature of State law, the Court must

construe ambiguities in favor of remand. See Dodson, 951 F.2d at

43. Therefore, the Court cannot find that on the face of the

pleading Plaintiff's claim for a writ of mandate is barred by the

statute of limitations.2

Because Plaintiff has asserted a viable claim against the

Commissioner under State law, and because the Commissioner's

presence in this suit destroys the diversity of citizenship

required for removal, the Court has no jurisdiction over this case.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion for remand is

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/13/05

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge