Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00992/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00992-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER CORDELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. ROBERT, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0992 TLN CKD P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on the Second Amended Complaint, in which plaintiff 

claims that defendants Robert and Auld, both nurses employed at Mule Creek State Prison, were 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (ECF No. 11 (“SAC”)).

Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim and, alternatively, for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff has filed an opposition, and defendant 

has filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 18 & 19.) For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned will 

recommend that defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be granted in part and 

denied in part. As to exhaustion, defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied without 

prejudice to renewal as a motion for summary judgment.

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I. Standard for Failure to State a Claim

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), 

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all 

doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 

869 (1969). The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider 

facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 

1388 (9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers 

filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). 

II. The SAC

Plaintiff alleges that in May 2014, he was diagnosed with emphysema with tumor-type 

nodules. (SAC at 3.

1

) Plaintiff was issued an inhaler and placed on a 30-45 day chronic care 

schedule. (Id.) 

As a senior nurse at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP), defendant Robert “was personally 

responsible to schedule all doctor appointments. In her absence, defendant [nurse] Auld assumed 

the responsibility. Both defendants either scheduled them personally, or ordered a scheduler to 

[do so].” (Id. at 14.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, between June 2014 and January 2015, when he was transferred to 

another prison, Robert and Auld repeatedly failed to “respond to plaintiff’s many medical request 

forms complaining of severe and chronic chest pain and breathing problems from his terminal 

illness[.]” (Id. at 14.) Defendants failed to schedule medical appointments in response to 

multiple requests by plaintiff during this period. (Id. at 5-11.) Robert knew plaintiff was on a 

 

1 References are to page numbers assigned by the court’s docketing system.

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chronic care program, requiring doctor’s appointments every 30-45 days, yet plaintiff went 

months without seeing a doctor “because no chronic care appointments were made for him by 

defendant Robert.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff “suffered physical harm from his severe and chronic pain 

for the time period October 1, 2014 to January 16, 2015, while under the defendants’ care at Mule 

Creek State Prison.” (Id. at 14.)

Plaintiff submitted multiple requests to see a doctor in December 2014 and January 2015. 

(Id. at 9-12.) On December 10, for example, he submitted a medical request form

complaining of a heavy feeling in my chest and a stabbing pain for 

the past 3 weeks, several times per day, and again requesting 

information on pending tests and a potential biopsy. The reply 

from defendant Auld was, “A PCP appointment is scheduled in less 

than one week.” Plaintiff never got an appointment with his PCP 

(doctor) in less than one week because defendant Auld never 

scheduled it.

(Id. at 9.) As to his December 23 medical request: 

It has now been three months since Plaintiff has seen his doctor. 

My chest pain and shortness of breath has been worsening. The 

chest pains are up to 7-8/10 and are interfering with my sleep, and 

thus my daily activities. Defendant Auld replied, “A chronic care 

appointment is scheduled in less than one week.” Plaintiff never 

had that appointment because defendant Auld never scheduled it.

(Id. at 11.)

Between June 2014 and his January 2015 transfer out of MCSP, plaintiff received the 

following medical care for his emphysema:

 An appointment with a registered nurse on June 9 (id. at 5); 

 An appointment with a registered nurse on June 26 (id.); 

 A scheduled doctor’s appointment on July 25, where he was sent away without seeing his 

doctor (id. at 6-7); 

 A pulmonary function test on September 2 (id. at 8); 

 A heart stress test on September 8 (id.); 

 A doctor’s appointment on September 30 (id. at 8-9); 

 An appointment with defendant Robert on December 16 (id. at 10); and

 A CAT scan (id. at 11). 

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On January 16, 2015, plaintiff was transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP). (Id.

at 12.) “Plaintiff got a thorough physical. His spirometer was 325; 400 is nominally considered 

low. He also complained of sharp stabbing pains in his chest.” (Id.)

On February 12, 2015, Plaintiff had his first chronic care 

appointment [at SVSP]. After reviewing plaintiff’s files, plaintiff’s 

new doctor (PCP) raised his medical risk to high, due to his 

emphysema. This determination was based on the same 

information defendants Robert and Auld had at MCSP. Plaintiff’s 

new PCP also ordered another CAT scan stat. It was done one 

week later and showed signs of pericardial effusion not evident on 

the last CT scan. Such a condition is known to cause chest pains. 

. . . 

On March 27, 2015, . . . I had an appointment to review the CAT 

scan results and do an Asthma Control Assessment Tool (ACAT) to 

determine the current status of my emphysema. The results of this 

test indicated very poor control of Plaintiff’s emphysema.

(Id. at 12-13.) 

Plaintiff was prescribed two new types of inhalers and, within forty days, his ACAT score 

“improved from 3 of 25 to 17 of 25, from poor control to not good control. Also, plaintiff’s chest 

pains and shortness of breath are improved, greatly.” (Id. at 13.)

III. Standard for Deliberate Indifference 

Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 

violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000).

In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096. First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that 

“failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 

Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 

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or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 

“must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839.

A showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional 

violation. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-

106. A difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, 

nor does a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of 

medical treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, 

mere delay of medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate 

medical indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 

1985). Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, 

the prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 

known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

IV. Analysis 

Courts in this district have considered prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims based on 

medical staff’s failure to schedule appointments. In Butler v. Jong Jeoung Moon, 2011 WL 

1103123, *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011), plaintiff alleged that two doctors and a nurse “failed to 

secure follow-up appointments and treatment for Plaintiff for his many ailments.” The court 

found that, absent allegations that defendants were “aware that plaintiff needed follow-up 

appointments and knowingly or callously failed to make those appointments knowing of the 

excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health from such failure and that Plaintiff suffered harm as a result,” 

plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See also Burgess v. Raya, 2013 WL

4459867, *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013) (defendant’s alleged failure to schedule doctor’s 

appointment per plaintiff’s request “demonstrates negligence at best.”).

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Here, construing the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendants were 

aware that plaintiff required chronic care appointments every 30-45 days for his emphysema. 

Defendants were responsible for scheduling plaintiff’s medical appointments, and they were 

aware he submitted numerous requests to be seen by a physician for his symptoms.

Between April 2014 and January 2015, according to the complaint, there were gaps in

plaintiff’s medical care for emphysema. In July, in response to plaintiff’s requests, Robert 

informed him that he had a doctor’s appointment scheduled for July 21. (ECF No. 11 at 6.) The 

appointment “occurred on July 25, 2014 instead”; however, after plaintiff waited for over two 

hours, “the clinic officer sent plaintiff away without seeing his doctor.” (Id. at 7.) Defendant 

Robert did not schedule a replacement appointment for plaintiff. (Id.) While these allegations 

may show Robert was negligent, they do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Plaintiff did not have a doctor’s appointment in August; however, in September, he 

underwent two diagnostic tests and saw a doctor on September 30. 

Plaintiff does not allege that he requested an appointment or received medical care in 

October.

In November, plaintiff submitted a medical request for “an update on the tests the doctor 

planned to order.” (Id. at 9.) He expressed concern that his tumors were potentially malignant. 

(Id.) Auld responded that a Primary Care Physician (“PCP”) appointment was scheduled for the 

last week of the month; however, that appointment did not occur. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts there was 

no appointment because “Auld never scheduled it.” (Id.) 

Similarly, on December 10, plaintiff submitted a request complaining of “a heavy feeling 

in my chest and a stabbing pain for the past three weeks, several times per day,” to which Auld 

replied that a PCP appointment was scheduled “in less than one week.” (Id.) No such 

appointment occurred “because defendant Auld never scheduled it.” (Id.) 

On December 13, plaintiff requested to see his doctor after two-and-a-half months without 

a chronic care appointment. (Id. at 10.) Robert responded that plaintiff had an appointment on 

December 16. (Id.) On that day, plaintiff did not have a doctor’s appointment (“because 

defendant Robert never scheduled it”); however, he had a RN visit with Robert. (Id.) Plaintiff 

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complained of “increasing chest pains, both intensity and duration, and that it appeared as though 

his inhalers were becoming less effective.” (Id.) Robert told plaintiff he had a December 18 

doctor appointment; however, Robert did not schedule the appointment and it did not occur. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, despite his additional requests for care, Auld and Robert did not 

schedule chronic care appointments in late December 2014 and early January 2015. (Id. at 11.) 

His next doctor’s appointment occurred at SVSP. (Id. at 12.) 

Resolving all doubts in plaintiff’s favor, between November 2014 and January 2015, 

Auld and Robert were aware that he was not being examined by a doctor at prescribed intervals 

and that his worsening symptoms put him at risk of serious harm, yet they did not schedule 

plaintiff to see a doctor despite his multiple requests.

From plaintiff’s subsequent medical assessments at SVSP, it can be inferred that plaintiff 

was harmed by his inability to see a doctor at monthly intervals at MCSP. Once at SVSP, he was 

determined to be at high medical risk from emphysema, given another CAT scan that revealed 

new information, and prescribed inhalers that improved his symptoms. Moreover, plaintiff 

alleges that he “suffered physical harm from his severe and chronic pain for the time period 

October 1, 2014 to January 16, 2015, while under the defendants’ care at Mule Creek State 

Prison.” (Id. at 14.)

The undersigned concludes that plaintiff’s allegations as to the months of November 2014, 

December 2014, and January 2015 until plaintiff’s transfer are sufficient to state medical 

indifference claims against Robert and Auld. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim should be denied as to this period and otherwise granted. 

V. Exhaustion of Remedies

Alternatively, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies. 

Section 1997(e)(a) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that “[n]o action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, . . . until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a) (also known as 

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)). A prisoner must exhaust his administrative 

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remedies before he commences suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199–1201 (9th Cir. 

2002). Failure to comply with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense that 

must be raised and proved by the defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). “[I]t is the 

prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. at 

218. 

In the Ninth Circuit, a defendant may raise the issue of administrative exhaustion in either 

(1) a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), in the rare event the failure to exhaust is clear 

on the face of the complaint, or (2) a motion for summary judgment. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 

1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 

An untimely or otherwise procedurally defective appeal will not satisfy the exhaustion 

requirement. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). When an inmate’s administrative 

grievance is improperly rejected on procedural grounds, however, exhaustion may be excused as 

“effectively unavailable.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Nunez v. 

Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224–26 (9th Cir. 2010) (warden’s mistake rendered prisoner’s 

administrative remedies “effectively unavailable”); Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (exhaustion excused where futile); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(plaintiff not required to proceed to third level where appeal granted at second level and no 

further relief was available).

Here, on the portion of the court’s form concerning administrative remedies, plaintiff 

indicates that he did not appeal his request for relief to the highest administrative level. (SAC at 

3.) In the space provided for an explanation, plaintiff states: “Defendants failed to respond within 

time limits.” (Id.) In the body of the SAC, he describes filing an emergency medical appeal on 

December 18, 2014. (Id. at 10.) In opposition to the motion, plaintiff asserts that he pursued 

inmate appeals to the extent they were available to him. (ECF No. 18 at 17.) 

Without a record of plaintiff’s attempts to seek redress through the inmate appeals 

process, the undersigned cannot rule out the possibility that administrative remedies were 

“effectively unavailable.” In order to consider any evidence of plaintiff’s attempts to exhaust, the 

district court should deny defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust without prejudice 

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to renewal as a motion for summary judgment. To conserve defendants’ time and resources, any 

such motion should be due after the district court either adopts or rejects these findings and 

recommendations, thereby determining which claims shall go forward. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 17) be granted in part and denied in part as follows: 

1. Granted as to plaintiff’s claims against Robert and Auld stemming from allegations of 

events prior to November 2014;

2. Denied as to plaintiff’s claims against Robert and Auld stemming from allegations of 

events between November 2014 and January 2015; and

3. Denied without prejudice as to defendants’ arguments that the SAC should be 

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. No later than thirty days from the 

district court’s ruling on these findings and recommendations, defendants may renew their 

exhaustion argument in a motion for summary judgment. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: April 26, 2016

2 / cord0992.mtd_ex

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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