Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05315/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05315-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT ALAN LETSINGER,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRESNO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPT, 

 et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 5315 OWW SMS P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.) 

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT

TO SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM

Robert Alan Letsinger (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on February 18, 2004, against the Fresno County Sheriff’s

Department and the Fresno County Jail Medical Services. Plaintiff alleges that he has been

denied medical treatment, that he has been forced to live in a cell with “raw sewage”, that his

mail is being interfered with, and that he has been denied religious and other services given to

inmates because he is a homosexual. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Case 1:04-cv-05315-OWW -SMS Document 9 Filed 06/06/05 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

Case 1:04-cv-05315-OWW -SMS Document 9 Filed 06/06/05 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

2. Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges he was denied medical services and a medical diet prescribed by a

physician. 

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

Case 1:04-cv-05315-OWW -SMS Document 9 Filed 06/06/05 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations fails to state a claim for relief because Plaintiff

does not link any individual to an act or omission giving rise to his Eighth Amendment Claim. 

3. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff next alleges he was placed in a cell where he was exposed to human feces and

urine for some days and was not given any cleaning agents. 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison

officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and

responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). 

Although the Eighth Amendment guarantees sanitation and hygiene, plaintiff has alleged

no facts linking any of the named defendants to any acts committed against him, and plaintiff has

Case 1:04-cv-05315-OWW -SMS Document 9 Filed 06/06/05 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

alleged no facts suggesting a deprivation so extreme that it rises to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982.)

4. Mail

Plaintiff alleges that he sent legal mail through the institutional mail system and it never

arrived at its destination and were not returned to the inmate. 

Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52

F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). The repeated and intentional withholding of unobjectionable

incoming mail violates the First Amendment, Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir.

1987), and “[a]ny practice or regulation that unduly delays an inmate’s incoming mail must be

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Rhinehart v. Gomez, No. C-95-0434-

VRW, 1998 WL 118179 *6 (N.D.Cal. Mar 2, 1998). However, “‘an isolated delay or some other

relatively short-term, non content-based disruption in the delivery . . .’” of mail does not support

a claim for relief under section 1983. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999), quoting

Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1987). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s general allegations are insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief

under section 1983 for violation of the First Amendment. Although plaintiff alleges that his

outgoing mail did not arrive at its destination, he does not allege specifically that any particular

individual was responsible for tampering with his mail. Further, it is unclear whether this is an

isolated incident or that it continuously happens to all or most of Plaintiff’s mail. In order to

state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate that his

incoming mail was delayed in such a manner that his rights under First Amendment were

violated. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment claim for

relief under Section 1983. 

5. Religious Exercise

Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied access to religious services. 

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall

make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 

U.S. Const., amend. I. The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First

Case 1:04-cv-05315-OWW -SMS Document 9 Filed 06/06/05 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,

482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). The Court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner’s free

exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives. 

Id.; McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F. 2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Prison regulations alleged to infringe on the religious exercise right must be evaluated

under the “reasonableness” test set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). O’Lone,

382 U.S. at 349; Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997)(recognizing that the

United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507

(1997), invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and restored the “reasonableness test”

as the applicable standard in free exercise challenges brought by prison inmates).

In determining the reasonableness of a challenged restriction on First Amendment rights,

the court considers four factors. First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the

prison regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it, and the

governmental objective must itself be a legitimate and neutral one. A second consideration is

whether alternative means of exercising the right on which the regulation impinges remain open

to prison inmates. A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted right will

have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources. Finally, the absence of

ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation. Allen v. Toombs, 827

F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89-91).

“In order to establish a free exercise violation, [plaintiff] must show the defendants

burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by

his faith.” Freeman at 736. Plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to state a cognizable

claim for relief based on a violation of his right to free exercise of religion. However, the Court

finds that the conclusory allegations contained in the Complaint are insufficient to state a claim

for relief. It is unclear that Defendants’ actions prevented him from engaging in conduct

mandated by his faith. In addition, Plaintiff fails to identify which defendants, if any, allegedly

violated his rights. 

Case 1:04-cv-05315-OWW -SMS Document 9 Filed 06/06/05 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

6. Equal Protection

Although somewhat unclear, Plaintiff may be attempting to make an equal protection

claim in that he alleges that he is being harassed in the forms above and in other ways because he

is a homosexual. 

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show

that defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of

inmates which included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)

(equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No.

14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City

of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 

In this case, because Plaintiff’s allegations are unclear and there are insufficient facts to

presume that this is Plaintiff’s intent, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff makes a viable Equal

Protection claim. Further, as with the other claims raised, Plaintiff does not link any individual

to an act or omission giving rise to an Equal Protection claim. 

C. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Having found that the complaint states no claims for relief and does not name any

“person” as a defendant, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure to state any claims

on which relief can be granted;

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint

form; and 

3. Within THIRTY (30) days of the date of service of this Order, Plaintiff SHALL

file an AMENDED COMPLAINT or indicate in writing whether he wishes to

Case 1:04-cv-05315-OWW -SMS Document 9 Filed 06/06/05 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

voluntarily dismiss the action.

Plaintiff’s failure to file an Amended Complaint in compliance with this order will result

in a Recommendation that the action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim

on which relief can be granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05315-OWW -SMS Document 9 Filed 06/06/05 Page 8 of 8