Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_05-cv-01001/USCOURTS-ared-4_05-cv-01001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405 Review of HHS Decision

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

RUTHIE M. SEAWOOD Plaintiff

v. 4:05CV01001 SWW/HLJ

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration, Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States

District Judge Susan Webber Wright. The parties may file specific

written objections to these findings and recommendations and must

provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. An original

and two copies of the objections must be filed with the Clerk no

later than eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and

recommendations. A copy must be served on the opposing party. The

District Judge, even in the absence of objections, may reject these

proposed findings and recommendations in whole or in part.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Ruthie M. Seawood, has appealed the final decision of

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny her

claim for Disability Insurance benefits. Both parties have submitted

appeal briefs and the case is ready for decision.

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the

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Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

record as a whole and free of legal error. Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d

185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir.

1996).

 In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must

consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as

well as evidence that supports it; the Court may not, however,

reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial

evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v.

Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or

mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff alleged disability based on low back pain. (Tr. 79)

The Commissioner found that she was not disabled within the meaning

Case 4:05-cv-01001-SWW Document 11 Filed 09/08/06 Page 2 of 11
 1

The Hon. Mark S. Anderson.

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of the Social Security Act. The only issue before this Court is

whether the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Act is supported by substantial record

evidence.

After conducting an administrative hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge1 (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time

through April 8, 2005, the date of his decision. (Tr. 27-28) On

June 23, 2005, the Appeals Council received and considered additional

evidence and then denied Plaintiff's request for a review of the

ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. (Tr. 5-7) Plaintiff then filed her complaint

initiating this appeal. (Docket #2)

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence.

Plaintiff was 59 years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr.

299) She is a high school graduate with one year of college. (Tr.

85) She has past relevant work as a medical records/ward clerk,

receptionist, medical transcriptionist, file clerk, nursery school

attendant, products assembler, cook’s helper and home health aide.

(Tr. 26, 65-68, 300, 303, 331)

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the

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required five-step sequential evaluation process. The first step

involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)(2004).

If the claimant is, benefits are denied, regardless of medical

condition, age, education or work experience. Id. at § 404.1520(b).

Step 2 involves a determination of whether the claimant has an

impairment or combination of impairments which is “severe” and meets

the duration requirement. Id. at § 404.1520(4)(ii). If not,

benefits are denied. Id. A “severe” impairment significantly limits

a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. at

§ 404.1520(c).

Step 3 involves a determination of whether the severe

impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment. Id.,

§ 404.1520(a)(iii). If so, and the duration requirement is met,

benefits are awarded. Id.

If the claimant does not meet or equal a Listing, then a

residual functional capacity assessment is made. Id., § 404.1520(4).

This residual functional capacity assessment is utilized at Steps 4

and 5. Id.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity to perform past relevant

work. Id., § 404.1520(4)(iv). If so, benefits are denied. Id.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able

to make an adjustment to other work, given claimant's age, education

and work experience. Id., § 404.1520(4)(v). If so, benefits are

Case 4:05-cv-01001-SWW Document 11 Filed 09/08/06 Page 4 of 11
 2Toxic goiter characterized by diffuse hyperplasia of the thyroid

gland, a form of hyperthyroidism. PDR Medical Dictionary 515 (2d ed.

2000).

5

denied; if not, benefits are awarded. Id.

The ALJ found that, although Plaintiff had worked part-time, she

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged

onset date. (Tr. 27) He found that she had “severe” impairments, a

history of diagnosis and treatment for Grave’s disease2 which had been

maintained within adequate control, a history of hypertension

amenable to adequate medical control, a history of lumbar sprain and

a history of osteoarthritis of the knees and/or lumbar spine, but

that she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that met or equaled a Listing. Id. He judged that Plaintiff’s

allegations regarding the nature and severity of her impairments and

her resulting limitations were not totally credible. Id. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity for sedentary work. Id. He recognized that Plaintiff's

past relevant work as a medical records/ward clerk, receptionist and

medical transcriptionist, did not require the performance of workrelated activities precluded by her limitations, and that her

impairments did not prevent her performing that past relevant work.

Id. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.

Id.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to recognize that she

also suffered from mental impairments. (Br. 11-13) She conceded

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After the alleged onset date of September 29, 2003.

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that perhaps she could have returned to work at the light and

sedentary work levels from a strictly physical point of view. (Br.

11) In her Disability Report- Adult, she indicated that she stopped

working because of lower back pain. (Tr. 79) She also mentioned

that she could not stand more than three to four hours or lift more

than ten pounds. Id. In addition, her blood pressure was high and

her knee hurt. Id. There is no mention of mental impairment. Id.

She did not list any treating source for mental impairment. (Tr. 81-

82) She was taking no medication for mental problems. (Tr. 287) In

response to questioning by the ALJ, Plaintiff indicated that she was

not getting any counseling or treatment for depression or anxiety,

and the last time that she had was in September of 1999. (Tr. 320-

21) She was not taking any medications for depression or anxiety.

(Tr. 321) She was taking Trazadone, but that was more for sleep.

Id. In 1997-99, Plaintiff was seen for adjustment disorder and

anxiety related to conflicts with fellow employees. (Tr. 198-205)

By September 1, 1999, she reported doing well, with no conflicts at

work and no medication. (Tr. 198) No return appointment was made,

and she was to call if she thought she needed to be seen. Id. The

ALJ considered her mental health history at some length. (Tr. 20-22)

He concluded that any symptoms and limitations during the relevant

time period3 were not “severe.” (Tr. 22) As the Court of Appeals

noted in Pyland v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 873, 878 (8th Cir. 1998): 

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Weight changes, heat or cold intolerance, change in bowel

habits, palpitations, tremor or lethargy. (Tr. 180)

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. . . evidence concerning ailments outside of the relevant

time period can support or elucidate the severity of a

condition. See Fowler, 866 F.2d at 252; Martonik, 773 F.2d

at 240-41. However, evidence outside the relevant time

period cannot serve as the only support for the disability

claim. Such a holding would be contrary to the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(c), which requires

proof of disability during the time for which it is

claimed. 

The ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety was

sufficient and his finding that they were not “severe” during the

relevant time period is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to understand the

nuances of her Grave’s disease, and failed to develop the record in

relation to it. (Br. 13-14) The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s Grave’s

disease. (Tr. 19-20) He found that it had been adequately

controlled. (Tr. 20) Although hyperthyroidism was diagnosed,

Plaintiff had none of the thyroid symptoms.4 (Tr. 180) She underwent

treatment with radioactive iodine. (Tr. 115) She was started on

Synthroid. (Tr. 171, 178) No significant symptoms were noted on

follow up. (Tr. 168, 171) The ALJ is permitted to issue a decision

without obtaining additional evidence as long as the record is

sufficient to make an informed decision. E.g., Anderson v. Shalala,

51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995). In this case, there was clearly

sufficient evidence upon which to base a decision. Furthermore, the

ALJ properly focused on Plaintiff's ability to function despite her

impairment, rather than on a diagnosis. Anderson v. Apfel, 996

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 5The ALJ also cited S.S.R. 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. (Tr.

23) That ruling tracks Polaski and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (c)(3) and

elaborates on them.

8

F.Supp 869, 873 (E.D. Ark. 1998). There must be a functional loss

establishing an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity

before disability occurs. Trenary v. Bowen, 898 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th

Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to consider her

impairments in combination. (Br. 14) The ALJ discussed Plaintiff's

impairments individually (Tr. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23) and in

combination (Tr. 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27). Furthermore, the

ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s limitations of function, which are a

cumulation of her impairments, at some length. (Tr. 18, 19, 20, 21,

22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27) Plaintiff's point is not well taken. See

Hajek v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1994); Browning v.

Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1992). 

Finally, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s credibility

determination. (Br. 14-15) The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective

complaints in light of Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.

1984).5 (Tr. 23-26)

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports

the degree of severity of subjective complaints alleged is

just one factor to be considered in evaluating the

credibility of the testimony and complaints. The

adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the

evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,

including the claimant's prior work record, and

observations by third parties and treating and examining

physicians relating to such matters as:

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1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of

medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the

claimant's subjective complaints solely on the basis of

personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as

a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

There is little objective support in the record for Plaintiff's

claim of disability. No evaluations showed medical conditions that

were disabling. Furthermore, inconsistencies between the medical

evidence and Plaintiff's subjective complaints gave reason to

discount those complaints. Richmond v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1141, 1443

(8th Cir. 1994). 

Given the lack of medical evidence in support of Plaintiff's

allegations, Plaintiff's daily activities, her functional

capabilities and the lack of restriction placed on Plaintiff by her

physicians, the ALJ could rightly discount Plaintiff's subjective

complaints. See, e.g., Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th

Cir. 2001) (ALJ may discount complaints inconsistent with the

evidence as a whole); Dodson v. Chater, 101 F.3d 533, 534 (8th Cir.

1996)(after full consideration of all evidence relating to subjective

complaints, ALJ may discount complaints if there are inconsistencies

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in evidence as a whole). 

In a partially completed Disability Supplemental Interview

Outline dated October 20, 2003 (Tr. 77), Plaintiff indicated that she

prepared meals, including sandwiches, frozen dinners, meats,

vegetables and desserts; paid bills, used a checkbook and counted

change; drove and walked for exercise or errands; attended church,

watched television, listened to the radio, read, visited friends and

relatives a little, sewed and watered her plants (Tr. 74). Those

activities are consistent with sedentary work.

The ALJ is not required to discuss each Polaski factor as long

as the analytical framework is recognized and considered. Pelkey v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 2006); Tucker v. Barnhart, 363

F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant “ignored” Plaintiff’s witness

statements. (Br. 15) The ALJ did not discuss them, no doubt because

they were submitted only to the Appeals Council. (Tr. 4, 8) The

Appeals Council explicitly noted that that additional evidence was

considered. (Tr. 5) 

The ALJ's credibility analysis was proper. He made express

credibility findings and gave multiple valid reasons for discrediting

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. E.g., Shelton v. Chater, 87 F.3d

992, 995 (8th Cir. 1996); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 258 (8th

Cir. 1996); Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1995).

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make

an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of

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the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his

findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence in the

record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. E.g.,

Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan,

956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).

There is ample evidence in the record as a whole that "a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion"

of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see

also Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The

Commissioner's decision is not based on legal error.

THEREFORE, the Court hereby affirms the final determination of

the Commissioner and dismisses Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 8th day of September, 2006.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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