Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-04482/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-04482-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN F. MAUCK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARLES J. MCKEE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.18-cv-04482-NC 

ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART 

AND OVERRULING IN PART 

OBJECTIONS RE: 

DISCOVERY LETTER BRIEF

Re: Dkt. No. 50

Before the Court is the parties’ discovery letter brief regarding Defendants’ 

assertion of the attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege with respect to various 

documents and deposition questions directed at the County of Monterey’s claim 

management or processing procedures. See Dkt. No. 50. Plaintiff Steven F. Mauck 

requests that the Court overrule Defendants’ attorney-client privilege objections. For the 

following reasons, the Court rules as follows.

Attorney-client privilege exists “(1) [w]hen legal advice of any kind is sought (2) 

from a professional legal adviser in his or her capacity as such, (3) the communications 

relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are, at the client's 

instance, permanently protected (7) from disclosure by the client or by the legal adviser (8) 

unless the protection be waived.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 306 F.R.D. 234, 237 

(N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting U.S. v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Here, Defendants object to questioning by Mauck relating to several documents 

regarding the County’s claim processing procedures. For example, in Mauck’s deposition 

of defendant Charles McKee, County Counsel for co-defendant County of Monterey, he 

asked McKee about an email sent to him by another county employee regarding how the 

County handles legal claims. See Dkt. No. 53, Ex. A (“McKee Depo.”) at 147:18–25; see 

also Ex. B. Mauck also asked McKee about an August 10, 2016, meeting discussing 

Intercare general liability claims processing. McKee Depo. at 148:23–149:11. These 

questions appear to be directed at communications protected by the attorney-client 

privilege. They concern legal advice made from an attorney, McKee and other County 

counsel, to a client, the County of Monterey.

Likewise, most of Mauck’s questions directed at the other witnesses, Leslie Girard, 

Gary Giboney, and Michael Miller, are similarly protected because Mauck’s questions ask 

the witnesses to provide commentary on the criticisms and reports levied against the 

County’s claims processing procedure. See, e.g., Girard Depo. at 109:24–110:1 (“Did you 

ever communicate to Mr. Mauck that you agreed with the litigation management guide 

provided by Intercare?”); Giboney Depo. at 55:15–16 (“Other than the LA model, do you 

recall other models that were discussed?”); id. at 83:5–6 (“And to your mind did [the 

Morgan report] identify significant exposure risk to the county?”). Because the subject 

matter of the communications is legal in nature, much of Mauck’s questioning would 

reveal legal advice to the County on how to process legal claims. Thus, the Court 

SUSTAINS in part Defendants’ objections.

The attorney-client privilege may be waived. See In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 

F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012). Privilege may be expressly waived “when a party 

discloses privileged information to a third party who is not bound by the privilege, or 

otherwise shows disregard for the privilege by making the information public.” Bittaker v. 

Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. Evid. 502(a).

Here, Mauck argues that Defendants waived the privilege by publicly disclosing the 

White Nelson report and producing the Meyers Nave report. As to the Meyers Nave 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

report, Defendants waived the privilege as to all documents produced to Mauck in 

connection with that report. See Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th 

Cir. 1992) (“voluntary disclosure of a privileged attorney communication to a third party 

constitutes waiver of privilege”) (citing Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgmt, 

647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)). Production of the Meyers Nave report, however, does 

not constitute broad subject-matter waiver of the County’s claims procedures because that 

report focused on Mauck’s retaliation claims, not the County’s claims procedures. See id.

(disclosure of documents involving subsidiary tax issues did not waive privilege as to all 

documents involving the more general tax deferral issue). Accordingly, the Court 

OVERRULES Defendants’ objections to the extent they relate to documents already 

produced to Mauck. The Court otherwise SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections.

As to the White Nelson report, Mauck has not shown that its disclosure amounts to 

a blanket subject-matter waiver of all materials relating to the County’s claims processing 

procedures. According to Defendants, the report apparently contained only “high-level, 

summarized information.” Mauck does not dispute Defendants’ characterization of the 

report. Subject-matter waiver is limited to matters actually disclosed, not “every document 

or communication that touched on the more general . . . question.” Chevron, 974 F.2d at 

1162; see also Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[t]he breadth 

of the waiver finding, untethered to the subject-matter disclosed, constitutes a particularly 

injurious privilege ruling.”). Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ objection.

In sum, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objections as to the extent they relate to 

documents already produced in connection with the Meyer Nave report. The Court 

otherwise SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2019 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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