Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01910/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01910-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\NLS\JamesR&R.wpd -1- 11cv1910

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELMER DWAYNE JAMES, Civil No. 11-1910 IEG (NLS)

Petitioner,

REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

RE DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Elmer Dwayne James (“James” or “Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition” or “Pet.”).

He challenges his San Diego Superior Court conviction in case number SCD216879.

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the basis that James has not exhausted

his state court remedies as to the sole claim presented in the Petition. After a thorough review

of the Petition, Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and all supporting documents, this Court

recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be DENIED. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 2009, a jury found James guilty of first degree robbery (Cal. Penal Code

§ 211). (Resp’t Lodgment No. 1 at 50-51; 154-55.) Petitioner admitted to having a prior

Case 3:11-cv-01910-IEG-NLS Document 8 Filed 02/01/12 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\NLS\JamesR&R.wpd -2- 11cv1910

conviction which qualified as a “prison prior” under Cal. Penal Code §§ 667.5(b), 668. (Resp’s

Lodgment No. 1 at 155.) On June 16, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to five years’

imprisonment. (Id. at 129, 163.)

On November 30, 2009, James appealed his conviction in the California Court of Appeal,

claiming his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused to grant immunity to

a potential defense witness, Diemiekia Reed. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 3.) On August 19, 2010,

the appellate court denied James’ claim and affirmed his convictions in a reasoned decision.

(Resp’t Lodgment No. 6.) On September 21, 2010, James filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 7.) In it, James raised the same claim he

presented in his appeal to the appellate court. (See id.) The California Supreme Court denied

his petition without comment or citation on October 27, 2010. (Resp’t Lodgment No. 8.) James

did not pursue habeas relief in the state courts. (See Pet. at 5-6.)

On August 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court.

(ECF No. 1.) In his Petition, James raises a single claim, alleging that “[t]rial counsel’s failures

deprived [him] of [his] Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” (Pet. at 6.)

Specifically, he contends that his defense attorney was ineffective when he failed to object to

or appeal the prosecutor’s and trial court’s decisions not to grant immunity to potential defense

witness Diemieka Reed. (Id.) On November 4, 2011, Respondent filed the instant motion to

dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust state judicial remedies. (ECF. No. 6.) Petitioner did

not file an opposition. 

III. DISCUSSION

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length

of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust state judicial

remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court with a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 367,

365 (1995). If the claim was not presented to the state’s highest court on direct appeal, state

Case 3:11-cv-01910-IEG-NLS Document 8 Filed 02/01/12 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\NLS\JamesR&R.wpd -3- 11cv1910

collateral remedies must be exhausted. Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir.

1986). “The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies with the petitioner.”

Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997); see Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619

(4th Cir. 1998); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Oyler v. Allenbrand,

23 F.3d 292, 300 (10th Cir. 1994); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994).

However, even where a claim has not been presented to the state’s highest court if a

petitioner no longer has state court remedies available to him, he has satisfied the technical

requirements of exhaustion. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A

habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”), quoting

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(c) (West 2006)

(“An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the

State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise,

by any available procedure, the question presented.”) In such a situation the claim would likely

be procedurally defaulted in this Court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (holding that a procedural

default arises when a petitioner has “failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement

would now find the claims procedurally barred”). 

Here, James raised only one claim in the state courts – that his due process rights were

violated when the trial court declined to grant immunity to a potential defense witness. (See

Resp’t Lodgment Nos. 3, 7.) Thus, James has not presented his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim to the California Supreme Court. However, based on California’s rule barring untimely

petitions for post-conviction relief, which the United States Supreme Court has found to be

clearly established and consistently applied, Petitioner has satisfied the technical requirement

for exhaustion because he no longer has state court remedies available with respect to his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1120,

1125-31 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness requirement providing that a prisoner must

seek habeas relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from the time the petitioner or

Case 3:11-cv-01910-IEG-NLS Document 8 Filed 02/01/12 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\NLS\JamesR&R.wpd -4- 11cv1910

counsel knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information offered in support of the

claim and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly established and consistently applied), citing

In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 805 (1998) (holding that a habeas claim “that is substantially

delayed” will not be considered unless “the petitioner can demonstrate ‘good cause’ for the

delay.”) The United States Supreme Court has stated that federal habeas courts should not treat

California’s timeliness rules as differing significantly from other states which consider petitions

untimely after unexplained delays of thirty or sixty days. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S 189, 199-

201 (2006), citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002). 

James could have presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the state

appellate court in a habeas petition filed along with is direct appeal as early as November 2009.

Based on Petitioner’s unexplained delay of two years and counting in presenting the claim, it

appears that he has no available state court remedies remaining for the claims, which arose

during his trial and appellate proceedings, and he has therefore met the technical requirements

of exhaustion as to these claims. Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621 n.5; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

Accordingly, the Court recommends Respondent’s motion to dismiss be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing

that Judgment be entered DENYING the Motion to Dismiss the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 17, 2012, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than February 24, 2012. The parties are advised that

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-01910-IEG-NLS Document 8 Filed 02/01/12 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\NLS\JamesR&R.wpd -5- 11cv1910

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 1, 2012

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:11-cv-01910-IEG-NLS Document 8 Filed 02/01/12 Page 5 of 5