Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00276/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00276-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BALJIT KAUR, HARNOOR KAUR,

GURKIRAT SINGH, and THE ESTATE

OF KHEM SINGH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ED ALAMEIDA, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

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1:05-cv-00276 OWW 

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT

TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6)

(Docs. 39, 48)

I. INTRODUCTION

All defendants move to dismiss the complaint of plaintiffs

BALJIT KAUR, HARNOOR KAUR, GURKIRAT SINGH, and THE ESTATE OF KHEM

SINGH (“plaintiffs”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant RONALD ROSTON, M.D., filed a

separate motion to dismiss (Doc. 39) and the remaining defendants

filed a joint motion to dismiss (Doc. 48).

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This civil rights action arises out of events surrounding

the incarceration and death of Khem Singh (“Mr. Singh”), who was

at all relevant times a state prisoner at the Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California (“SATF”). This case

is brought on behalf of Mr. Singh by his wife, Baljit Kaur (who

is Mr. Singh’s successor-in-interest), his daughter Harnoor Kaur,

and his son Gurkirat Singh.

Plaintiffs filed their civil rights complaint on February

14, 2005. (Doc. 1, Compl.) Plaintiffs filed the operative First

Amended Complaint on March 24, 2005. (Doc. 13, “AC”) The

following eleven (11) claims are set forth in Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint:

(1) Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Violation of

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Failure to

Provide Adequate Medical Care);

(2) Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Violation of

First Amendment (Freedom of Religion);

(3) Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Violation of

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause

(Discrimination Based on Decedent’s Race and

National Origin);

(4) Violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act

of 1990 (“ADA”);

(5) Violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29

U.S.C. § 794);

(6) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Failure to

Train, Supervise, and Discipline;

(7) Violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, et seq. (Discrimination

Under Program Receiving Federal Financial

Assistance Based on Race and National Origin);

(8) Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Violation of

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Fourteenth Amendment Right to “Family Relations”;

(9) Violation of United States Treaty (International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Violation

of Fifth and Eighth Amendments (Cruel and Unusual

Punishment); Violation of United States Treaty

(International Convention on the Elimination of

all Forms of Racial Discrimination);

(10) Violation of Cal. Govt. Code § 845.6 (Failure to

Summon Medical Care); and

(11) Violation of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15600, et

seq. (Elder Abuse).

Dr. ROSTON moved to dismiss the complaint on May 20, 2005. 

(Doc. 39, Roston Mem.) The remaining defendants moved to dismiss

the complaint on July 22, 2005. (Doc. 48, Defs.’ Mem.) The

parties stipulated to move the date for oral argument on both

motions to September 12, 2005. (Doc. 53, Stipulation, filed July

29, 2005; Doc. 55, Order, filed August 5, 2005).

On July 27, 2005, plaintiffs filed opposition to Dr.

ROSTON’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 49, Pls.’ Opp. to Roston) On

August 26, 2005, plaintiffs filed opposition to the remaining

defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 59, Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.) 

Dr. ROSTON filed a reply to plaintiffs’ opposition on August 30,

2005. (Doc. 64, Roston Reply) The remaining defendants filed a

reply on September 6, 2005. (Doc. 67, Defs.’ Reply)

Oral argument was heard on September 12, 2005. Carolyn D.

Phillips, Esq., Catherine Campbell, Esq., and Robert Navarro,

Esq., appeared on behalf of plaintiffs, with Mr. Daniels, Esq.,

specially appearing. Alvin Gittisriboongul, Esq., appeared on

behalf of all defendants except Dr. Ronald Roston. Susan M.

Steward, Esq., appeared on behalf of Dr. Roston.

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III. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

A. Parties.

Khem Singh (“Mr. Singh”) was a state prisoner at SATF from

October 15, 2001 until his death on February 16, 2004. Mr. Singh

was convicted of child molestation (Cal. Penal Code § 288, lewd

or lascivious acts with a child under age 14) and was sentenced

to fifteen years to life with possibility of parole.

Mr. Singh was born March 30, 1931, in Punjab Province,

India. He was a life-long practicing Sikh and a priest in the

Sikh religion. Mr. Singh’s religious practices prohibited him

from eating meat, eggs, or food that was on the same plate as

meat. Mr. Singh’s religious practices also included wearing a

beard and turban and never cutting his hair. Mr. Singh’s only

language was Punjabi and he did not speak, read, or write

English. (AC ¶¶ 26, 28) 

At SATF, Mr. Singh was housed in Facility D5, a “sensitive

needs unit.” Facility D5 housed inmates who were disabled or

required protective custody. Mr. Singh was assigned to this unit

because he was disabled and in a wheelchair because of a deformed

left foot, did not speak English, and had been convicted and

sentenced for child molestation.

Plaintiff BALJIT KAUR is the widow of Khem Singh. BALJIT

KAUR is a native of Punjab Province, India, and does not speak,

read, or write English. (AC ¶ 6) Plaintiff HARNOOR KAUR is Mr.

Singh’s daughter and plaintiff GURIKAT SINGH is Mr. Singh’s son. 

Defendants MANDEEP SINGH and GURMEET KAUR are other children of

Mr. Singh, and are named solely as nominal defendants.

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1 Plaintiffs’ complaint contains allegations regarding Dr.

CASTILLO, although Dr. CASTILLO is not named as a defendant in

the caption. Plaintiffs asserts the failure to include Dr.

CASTILLO’s name was an oversight. Plaintiffs are granted LEAVE

TO AMEND their complaint add Dr. CASTILLO.

5

All defendants are sued in both their individual and

official capacities for purposes of the § 1983 claims. (Id. at

¶ 22)

Plaintiffs name as defendants several supervisory officials

of the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”). 

ED ALAMEIDA, JR. was at all relevant times the Director of the

CDC. SUZAAN STEINBERG is and was at all relevant times the

Director of Health Services for the CDC. WARDEN DARRELL ADAMS

was at all relevant times the Warden of SATF. CAPTAIN J.

PRUD’HOMME is and was at all relevant times the Captain of D

Facility at SATF. ACTING CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER DEERING, M.D.,

was at all relevant times the head physician at SATF. ALAMEIDA

and STEINBERG were DEERING, CHIEF PSYCHOLOGIST DOE 1, and CHIEF

PSYCHIATRIST DOE 2's supervisors.

Plaintiffs also name as defendants several CDC physicians. 

DRS. VIJAYA, M.D.; GILBERT V. GONZALEZ, M.D.; and HARVEY M.

HUANG, M.D., were at all relevant times physicians at SATF. 

Their supervisor was Dr. DEERING. Dr. DEERING is also alleged to

have personally treated Mr. Singh.

Plaintiffs name several CDC psychologists as defendants,

including DAVID UNDERWOOD, RONALD ROSTON, LESLIE KUBERSKI,

C. HIRBOUR, and Dr. CASTILLO.1 Their supervisors were defendants

ALAMEIDA and STEINBERG. In addition Dr. ROSTON was Mr. Singh’s

case manager. Plaintiffs also name psychiatrist NANDAN BHATT. 

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Finally, Plaintiffs name several members of the correctional

staff at SATF. E. J. CARRILLO is and was at all relevant times a

Correctional Lieutenant at SATF. PATTERSON, WILSON, WILLIAMS,

McKESSON, and HARTFIELD are and were at all relevant times

employed as CDC Correctional Officers at SATF.

B. General Allegations Against All Defendants.

Plaintiffs’ complaint is divided into two general categories

of allegations. First, plaintiffs’ complaint contains general

allegations against all defendants, which are described in this

section. Second, plaintiffs complaint contains specific

allegations against individual defendants, which are summarized

in the next section. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated during oral

argument on September 12, 2005 that the individual allegations

are based on reports and other documentation available to them at

the time the complaint was drafted. 

Plaintiffs generally allege that from the time of

Mr. Singh’s incarceration at SATF on October 15, 2001, until his

death on February 16, 2004, he did not receive adequate medical

or mental heath care. Plaintiffs allege that, despite Mr.

Singh’s symptoms of depression and suicidal tendencies,

defendants failed to properly examine or treat Mr. Singh. 

Plaintiffs allege that all correctional staff defendants at SATF

were aware the Mr. Singh was demonstrably mentally ill and knew

or should have known that he was suicidal. Despite this, they

failed to provide adequate medical care, and their neglect

eventually culminated in Mr. Singh’s death from a heart attack

and self-starvation on February 16, 2004. (AC ¶¶ 77, 96)

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Plaintiffs also contend that Mr. Singh was harassed,

insulted, and beaten by defendants, who were motivated by their

bias against Mr. Singh for his religion, ethnicity, and

conviction of child molestation. Plaintiffs allege that the

defendants substantially burdened Mr. Singh’s exercise of his

religious faith by denying him access to his religious texts;

denying him a religiously-mandated vegetarian diet and shower

before prayers; and by abusing, harassing, and insulting him

because of his religious beliefs. Defendants’ conduct resulted

in Mr. Singh becoming depressed “because he was unable to

practice the faith that sustained him,” which eventually led to

his death. (AC ¶ 102) 

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint contains a chronological

account of Mr. Singh’s tenure at SATF, from 2001 through the date

of his death on February 16, 2004. The allegations relating to

events and mistreatment in 2001 are not always attributed to a

named defendant.

On October 24, 2001, Mr. Singh was placed (by unnamed prison

employees) in administrative segregation because he had defecated

on himself and refused to wash. Plaintiffs allege such incidents

occurred several times. However, a translator was never provided

to Mr. Singh to explain the staffs’ actions or the disciplinary

process. (AC ¶ 35)

On November 9, 2001, unidentified prison staff were aware

that Mr. Singh was unable to care for himself, would not leave

his cell for meals, and was taken to his shower by a volunteer

inmate. An unidentified individual or individuals observed that

Mr. Singh needed to be transferred to a medical facility. (AC

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¶ 38)

On November 19, 2001, Mr. Singh was assaulted by his

cellmate, inmate McCuff. Plaintiffs allege that unidentified

defendants placed McCuff with Mr. Singh, even though they

purportedly knew that inmate McCuff had a history of assaulting

other inmates. (AC ¶ 36)

On December 19, 2001, Mr. Singh was admitted to the

Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF) at Corcoran for psychiatric

problems, including depression and a refusal to eat. An

unidentified individual conducted a mental health assessment

without an interpreter. This individual or individuals diagnosed

Mr. Singh with depression and prescribed a minor tranquilizer. 

(AC ¶ 39)

On December 20, 2001, Mr. Singh said through an interpreter

that he was not suicidal or depressed. He was not returned to

the general population until December 26, 2001. He initially

refused to go, but was told through an interpreter that he had to

go.

From December 27 through December 31, 2001, Mr. Singh was

placed on suicide watch because he had not eaten. On December

31, 2001, unidentified individuals notified unidentified custody

staff that Mr. Singh had not eaten for four days. The next event

outlined in the complaint took place on January 8, 2002, when

Dr. KUBERSKI did not complete a mental health or a suicide

assessment of Mr. Singh because there was no translator. The

events alleged to have taken place on and after January 8, 2002

are, for the most part, attributed to individual defendants and

are outlined in more detail below. 

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C. Allegations Against Individual Defendants.

1. Psychologist LESLIE KUBERSKI, Ph.D.

On January 8, 2002, defendant psychologist LESLIE KUBERSKI

“did not complete a mental health assessment or conduct a suicide

risk assessment of Mr. Singh, because of the lack of a

translator.” (AC ¶ 43) Dr. KUBERSKI did not make arrangements

to conduct an assessment with a translator. Mr. Singh was

removed from the mental health program on January 10, 2002. 

Defendants also allege that KUBERSKI failed to summon adequate

medical care. (AC ¶¶ 140-142)

2. Dr. CASTILLO, M.D. and Correctional Officer

WILSON.

On January 25, 2002, defendant Dr. CASTILLO admitted

Mr. Singh to CTF. Mr. Singh had not been eating. Dr. CASTILLO

concluded Mr. Singh was on a hunger strike and suffering from

starvation. Dr. CASTILLO “did nothing to protect Mr. Singh; he

did not place him on suicide watch; he did not ask for a complete

mental health assessment; he did not invoke hunger strike

protocols.” (AC ¶ 45)

Plaintiffs allege that on January 24, 2002, the day before

Dr. CASTILLO admitted Mr. Singh to CTF, defendant Correctional

Officer WILSON physically assaulted Mr. Singh by forcing him into

a shower. (AC ¶ 44)

3. Physician Dr. VIJAYA, M.D.

Plaintiffs allege Dr. VIJAYA was Mr. Singh’s physician. On

February 26, 2002, Dr. VIJAYA is alleged to have discharged

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Mr. Singh from CTF (where he had been since Dr. CASTILLO admitted

him on January 25, 2002) and returned him to the yard without any

plan for treatment. (AC ¶ 46) Mr. Singh had been on a liquid

diet while in CTF. Also, Plaintiffs allege that medical records

indicate no one was able to communicate with Mr. Singh while he

was in CTF because of lack of a translator. 

4. Correctional Officers Sgt. E. J. CARILLO and

Sgt. A. PATTERSON.

On March 26, 2002, five correctional officers, supervised by

Correctional Officers CARILLO and PATTERSON, forcibly removed

Mr. Singh from his cell. Mr. Singh suffered injury as a result. 

Plaintiffs allege Mr. Singh’s removal was the result of his

refusal to leave his cell until resolution of issues regarding

the denial of his legal mail, hearings, and visits. Mr. Singh

was told through an interpreter that he was required to leave his

cell before these issues were resolved, but the officers assert

he was resisting removal and “fighting.” At the time, Mr. Singh

weighed less than 110 pounds. (AC ¶ 48)

Plaintiffs also allege that defendants CARILLO and PATTERSON

failed to adequately train and supervise medical, mental health,

and correctional staff regarding policies and procedures for the

provision of medical and mental health care and suicide

prevention. (AC ¶ 120-121) Defendants CARILLO and PATTERSON are

also alleged to have failed to summon medical care. (AC ¶¶ 140-

142)

//

//

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5. Physician Dr. HARVEY HUANG, M.D. and Other Unnamed

Defendants.

After the removal of Mr. Singh from his cell on March 26,

2002, Mr. Singh as admitted to CTF. He was put in five-point

restraints and placed in an observation cell. Defendant HUANG

examined Mr. Singh without an interpreter. Defendant HUANG noted

that Mr. Singh did not shower, clean his toilet, or remove trash

from his cell. HUANG also noted Mr. Singh was agitated and

believed the staff were “after him.” HUANG diagnosed Mr. Singh

with paranoid schizophrenia and a delusional disorder. 

Plaintiffs allege that Dr. HUANG’s medical assessment was

inadequate because he had no interpreter, did not conduct a

psychiatric assessment, and never spoke with Mr. Singh.

During this period (March 26, 2002 through April 3, 2002) at

CTF, plaintiffs also allege that a mental health assessment was

completed by DOE Defendant 4, without an interpreter. Mr. Singh

is alleged to have been found illogical, argumentative,

controlling, paranoid, and having poor insight, judgment, and

reality contact. (AC ¶ 50) Plaintiffs further allege that

unidentified individuals conducted an “interdisciplinary care

plan and team review” concluded that Mr. Singh was “anxious with

delusional thoughts and reality distortion” and that “all staff

were responsible to help Mr. Singh become free of his delusion. 

(AC ¶ 51) Plaintiffs allege that nothing was done to follow

these recommendations. (AC ¶ 52)

6. Physician Dr. DEERING, M.D.

On June 17, 2002, Mr. Singh was taken to the emergency room

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based on a report that he had not eaten in two or three days. 

Dr. DEERING is alleged to have verbally ordered Mr. Singh

returned back to his cell. Plaintiffs allege that Dr. DEERING

issued this order without a translator, and further that he

ordered no follow-up, did no assessment, and did not order a

special diet, despite his awareness that Mr. Singh was ill. (AC

¶ 53)

On January 4, 2004, Correctional Officer HARTFIELD contacted

medical staff to advise them that Mr. Singh had not eaten for two

weeks. On January 20, 2004, Mr. Singh refused to leave his cell

for a medical appointment. Plaintiffs allege Dr. DEERING was

notified of Mr. Singh’s refusal to eat, but did nothing in spite

of Mr. Singh’s known deterioration. (AC ¶ 75)

Plaintiffs also allege that Dr. DEERING failed to properly

train medical, psychological and correctional staff regarding

policies and procedures for the provision of medical and mental

health care and suicide prevention. (AC ¶ 120-124) Plaintiffs

allege that Dr. DEERING was aware of McKESSON’s “psychological

instability and brutality against inmates.” (AC ¶ 84) 

Plaintiffs do not allege Dr. DEERING was aware of McKESSON’s

brutality against Mr. Singh in particular.

7. Psychologist Dr. RONALD ROSTON, Ph.D.

On October 16, 2002, Mr. Singh requested a mental health

intervention in a letter written in Punjabi. On November 4,

2002, Dr. ROSTON completed an assessment through an interpreter. 

Dr. ROSTON formulated a treatment plan through which Mr. Singh

was to learn to communicate “non-verbally.” Plaintiffs allege

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this plan was never followed.

Plaintiffs allege that Dr. ROSTON also diagnosed Mr. Singh

as having chronic depression, an adjustment disorder, and an

obsessive-compulsive personality disorder with narcissistic and

paranoid characteristics. Dr. ROSTON noted that Mr. Singh was a

vegetarian and needed more grains and vegetables in his diet. 

Dr. ROSTON recommended that a follow-up exam should be conducted

every 90 days. Plaintiffs allege neither recommendation was ever

implemented. (AC ¶ 54)

On November 20, 2002, Dr. ROSTON “observed Mr. Singh at

prayer in his cell and concluded he was ‘probably as devout as he

claims.’” Dr. ROSTON also decided that Mr. Singh did not show

any of the signs of mental illness he had diagnosed on November

4. ROSTON then discharged Mr. Singh from mental health

treatment. (AC ¶ 55)

On January 21, 2003, Plaintiffs allege Dr. ROSTON again saw

Mr. Singh and “admitted [Mr. Singh] suffered from mild

depression” due to Mr. Singh’s problems getting vegetarian food

and showering before prayers. (AC ¶ 58)

8. Correctional Officer S. WILLIAMS.

On April 20, 2003, Correctional Officer WILLIAMS grabbed a

makeshift turban off of Mr. Singh’s head and threw it away. 

WILLIAMS also complained that Mr. Singh held up the food line

whenever he would ask for meat to be removed from his food tray. 

(AC ¶ 62)

9. Correctional Officers McKESSON and HARTFIELD.

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On September 7, 2003, Officer McKESSON gave Mr. Singh an

unsatisfactory work performance evaluation. Plaintiffs allege

that McKESSON gave Mr. Singh an unsatisfactory evaluation based

on his conviction, his religion, his ethnic identity, and

McKESSON’s belief Mr. Singh was associated with Islamic

terrorism. (AC ¶ 63)

Plaintiffs also allege that McKESSON often interfered with

Mr. Singh’s efforts to be served only vegetables at meal times. 

(AC ¶ 34)

On October 29, 2003, McKESSON, along with defendant

HARTFIELD, put inmate Grecu in Mr. Singh’s cell. Inmate Grecu

had a history of in-custody assaults. Inmate Grecu beat

Mr. Singh. (AC ¶ 66) Plaintiffs allege McKESSON’s actions were

motivated by his biases against Mr. Singh.

Sometime in October, 2003, when Mr. Singh’s family came to

visit him, McKESSON falsely told the prison’s visiting staff that

Mr. Singh had refused the visit from his family. (AC ¶ 67)

On December 9, 2003, defendant McKESSON wilfully slammed Mr.

Singh’s hand in the cell door and told defendant HARTFILED not to

allow Mr. Singh any medical care for the injury. After that

date, plaintiffs allege Mr. Singh never left his cell, stopped

eating, and steadily lost weight. (AC ¶ 71)

After September 11, 2001, plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Singh

was repeatedly and increasingly abused, threatened, and insulted

by defendants McKESSON and HARTFIELD. (AC ¶ 78) Plaintiffs

alleged McKESSON engaged in the following harassment of

Mr. Singh: (a) berating Mr. Singh and locking him in his cell as

punishment for Mr. Singh’s failure to perform his duties as

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porter because of his language and physical barriers; (b) calling

Mr. Singh a “Taliban,” “Bin Laden,” and “rag head”; (c) telling

Mr. Singh to take the towel off his head; (d) telling ADA inmate

helpers not to give assistance to Mr. Singh; (e) telling ADA

inmate helpers to fabricate records of having assisted Mr. Singh;

(f) hitting Mr. Singh on the head; (g) throwing Mr. Singh on the

ground of his cell after an earthquake; (h) pushing Mr. Singh

back into his cell; (i) tearing up Mr. Singh’s religious altar;

(j) ripping the turban (a sheet) off Mr. Singh’s head and forcing

him to sign a trust account withdrawal to pay for the torn sheet;

(k) taunting Mr. Singh by asking him to come out of his cell and

then slamming the door before he could get out; (l) participating

in systematic brutality as part of a group of SATF officers

called “The Green Wall.” (AC ¶¶ 79-81, 85)

Defendant HARTFIELD, a control booth officer, is alleged to

have frequently refused to allow Mr. Singh to leave his cell to

eat, go to the yard to sit in the shade, or leave his cell to use

the telephone. (AC ¶ 83)

10. Psychologist C. HIRBOUR, Ph.D.

On November 13, 2003, defendant HIRBOUR, a psychologist, saw

Mr. Singh in his cell. HIRBOUR “found Mr. Singh ‘praying and

gesturing wildly,’ but could not evaluate him absent an

interpreter and recommended he be seen by a physician in a week.” 

(AC ¶ 68) Plaintiffs allege that HIRBOUR erroneously concluded

that Mr. Singh did not have mental health issues. 

On December 2, 2003, HIRBOUR once again saw Mr. Singh. 

Plaintiffs allege Mr. Singh was visibly thin, withdrawn, and had

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not been eating. HIRBOUR nevertheless recommended that Mr. Singh

be discharged to the general population “when applicable.” (AC

¶ 70)

11. Defendant Psychologist UNDERWOOD, Ph.D.

On December 22, 2003, defendant UNDERWOOD went to Mr.

Singh’s cell to conduct a mental health assessment. Defendant

HARTFIELD had requested psychiatric intervention because

Mr. Singh had not eaten or showered for 30 days. (AC ¶ 73) 

12. Defendant Psychiatrist BHATT, M.D.

In December 2003, plaintiffs allege that defendant BHATT

denied medical care to Mr. Singh when BHATT refused to see

Mr. Singh unless he came to the clinic. (AC ¶ 73) Plaintiffs

allege BHATT failed to summon medical care for Mr. Singh. (AC

¶¶ 140-142)

13. Defendant GONZALEZ, M.D.

On January 20, 2004, defendant GONZALEZ, the yard doctor,

was notified of Mr. Singh’s refusal to leave his cell for an

appointment, but did nothing in spite of Mr. Singh’s known

deterioration. (AC ¶ 75) Plaintiffs allege that GONZALEZ failed

to summon medical care. (AC ¶¶ 140-141)

14. Defendants ED ALAMEIDA, SUZAAN STEINBERG, DARREL

ADAMS, and PRUD’HOMME.

Plaintiffs allege that as Director of the CDC during times

relevant to this action, defendant ALAMEIDA was responsible for

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2 Defendants listed in ¶ 97 are: ADAMS, PRUD’HOMME,

DEERING, Chief Psychologist (Doe 1), Chief Psychiatrist (Doe 2),

CARILLO, PATTERSON, and Does 3 through 26.

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the CDC’s policies, practices, and procedures as well as the

conduct of CDC employees. (AC ¶ 9)

Plaintiffs allege that as Director of the CDC’s Health

Services, defendant STEINBERG was responsible for CDC’s health

care policies, practices, and procedures and the conduct of CDC’s

medical staff. (AC ¶ 10)

Plaintiffs allege that as Warden of SATF, defendant ADAMS

was responsible for SATF’s policies, practices, and procedures as

well as the conduct of SATF employees. (AC ¶ 11) Plaintiffs

allege that ADAMS was aware of defendant McKESSON’s

“psychological instability and brutality against inmates,” and

that inmates filed numerous appeals alleging brutality, insults,

and endangering conduct by McKESSON. (AC ¶ 84)

Plaintiffs allege that defendant PRUD’HOMME, as the

supervisor in charge of Facility D, had the authority and

responsibility to ensure that Mr. Singh received access to

adequate medical and mental health care. (AC ¶ 97)

Plaintiffs allege that “[a] January 2003 Management Review

Audit by the Office of the Inspector General, which September 23,

2005 detailed serious, systemic failures in the delivery of

medical and mental health care to SATF prisoners, placed these

defendants2 on notice of said failures....” (AC ¶ 97)

//

//

//

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IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to attack a

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is

disfavored and rarely granted: “[a] complaint should not be

dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In deciding whether to

grant a motion to dismiss, the court “accept[s] all factual

allegations of the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” TwoRivers v. Lewis,

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999).

“The court need not, however, accept as true allegations

that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For

example, matters of public record may be considered under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 201, including pleadings, orders and other papers filed

with the court or records of administrative bodies. See Lee v.

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be

accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981).

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“Where the facts and dates alleged in a complaint

demonstrate that the complaint is barred by the statute of

limitations, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion

should be granted.” Ritchie v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 2d

1120, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2002). There is no requirement, however,

that affirmative defenses, including statutes of limitation,

appear on the face of the complaint. Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc.

v. Carpenters Local 1065, 430 F.2d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1970).

“When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute

of limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the

complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit

the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon v.

Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (1980); see also TwoRivers,

174 F.3d at 991.

V. ANALYSIS

A. Statute of Limitations for Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims.

1. Whether Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims Against Certain

Defendants Are Time-Barred.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ federal claims for against

defendants KUBERSKI, CASTILLO, VIJAYA, and ROSTON are timebarred.

The parties agree that applicable statute of limitations for

claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, and the American Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is

the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury

actions. Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001); see

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also Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137

n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002). California’s statute of limitations for

personal injuries under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1 therefore apply

here.

Until January 1, 2003, the statute of limitations in

California was one year. Knox, 260 F.3d at 1014. Effective

January 1, 2003, personal injury actions in California became

subject to a two-year statute of limitations period pursuant to

section 335.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the two-year

limitation period does not apply retroactively to causes of

action accruing before the effective date of § 335.1. Maldonado

v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004).

State law also governs the tolling of a limitations period. 

Martinez v. Gomez, 137 F.3d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998). Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a) tolls the limitations period for

actions brought by an individual who is serving a criminal

sentence “for a term less than life.” The limitations period may

be tolled for up to two years. Id. Because Mr. Singh was a

prisoner serving a term sentence, § 352.1(a) applies to toll the

limitations period for two years for claims brought on his

behalf.

The limitations period for the § 1983, Rehabilitation Act,

and ADA claims brought on Mr. Singh’s behalf accruing before

January 1, 2003 is three (3) years. The complaint was filed on

March 15, 2005. Therefore, claims accruing before March 15,

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3 The limitations period for claims accruing after January

1, 2003 is four (4) years. The statutory period for claims

accruing after January 1, 2003 has not yet expired and is not in

issue.

4 Claims brought on Mr. Singh’s behalf are distinguished

from the claims brought on behalf of the living plaintiffs for

their injury, which is the loss of their family member and

accrues on the day of Mr. Singh’s death.

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barred.3

“Although state law prescribes the statute of limitations

applicable to section 1983 claims, federal law governs the time

of accrual.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th

Cir. 1986). “Under federal law, a cause of action generally

accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury which is the basis of his action.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs allege incidents on particular dates as to

KUBERSKI, CASTILLO, VIJAYA, and ROSTON. All of these dates are

in 2002. Each claim brought on behalf of Mr. Singh for the

injuries suffered by him accrued when Mr. Singh knew or should

have known of the injury that was the basis of his action.4 As

stated above, the claims accruing before March 15, 2002 are timebarred.

As an initial matter, all of the individual allegations

against Dr. ROSTON are alleged to have occurred after March 15,

2002 and are therefore not time-barred. Dr. ROSTON’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ federal claims on statute of limitations

grounds is DENIED.

The analysis as to KUBERSKI, CASTILLO, and VIJAYA is

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slightly different. Plaintiffs allege that on January 8, 2002,

KUBERSKI failed to adequately assess Mr. Singh’s condition; on

January 25, 2002, CASTILLO admitted Mr. Singh to CTF, determined

he was suffering from starvation, but did not thing to protect

Mr. Singh; on February 26, 2002, VIJAYA discharged Mr. Singh from

CTF without any treatment or plan for future treatment. All of

these events occurred before March 15, 2002, and therefore fall

outside the statutory period. The federal claims against

KUBERSKI, CASTILLO, and VIJAYA based on these events (as well as

all other claims based on events accruing before March 15, 2002)

are barred by the statute of limitations to the extent the

limitations period is not tolled.

As discussed below, however, it is not clear from

plaintiffs’ allegations that equitable tolling and/or tolling

under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a) on insanity grounds would not

apply here. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the federal claims

against KUBERSKI, CASTILLO, and VIJAYA on statute of limitations

grounds is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Whether the Statute of Limitations for Claims

Accruing Before March 15, 2002 Is Tolled.

“When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the

statute of limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions

of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not

permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” 

Jablon, 614 F.2d at 682; see also TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. If

plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to permit

tolling, then defendants’ motion to dismiss on statute of

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limitations grounds must be denied. 

Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations should be

tolled based on two alternate legal grounds. First, plaintiffs

argue that the statute should be tolled pursuant to Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 352(a), which acts to toll the limitations periods

during the time of the claimant’s disability, including insanity. 

Second, plaintiffs argue that equitable tolling should apply to

toll the statute.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a) provides that “[i]f a person

entitled to bring an action is...at the time the cause of action

accrued...insane, the time of disability is not part of the time

limited for the commencement of the action.” The inquiry to

determine whether a person is insane under § 352(a) is whether

the person is sufficiently aware of the nature or effects of his

acts to be able to comprehend such business transactions as the

hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal action. Hsu

v. Mt. Zion Hosp., 259 Cal. App. 2d 562, 574 (1968); Feeley v.

S. Pac. Transp. Co., 234 Cal. App. 3d 949, 952 (1991). Actual

psychiatric illness is not required. Id. 

Equitable tolling allows a court to suspend the running of

the statute when the balance of equities favors the plaintiff. 

Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 370 (2003). The purpose

of equitable tolling is “to prevent the unjust technical

forfeiture of causes of action, where the defendant would suffer

no prejudice.” Id. A court may apply equitable tolling when the

injustice to plaintiff outweighs the possibility of prejudice to

the defendant. See id. at 371.

Reading plaintiffs’ allegations with the required

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liberality, it is not clear that Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a) or

equitable tolling do not apply. Plaintiffs allege that when Mr.

Singh was incarcerated in August 2001, he was healthy and welladjusted. However, within a week of being placed at SATF in

October 2001, Mr. Singh “was defecating on himself and refusing

to wash.” Mr. Singh is alleged to have had ongoing problems with

depression, hygiene, and refusal to eat, from October 2001 until

his death in February 2004. While defendants distinguish some of

the cases cited by plaintiffs, they offer no persuasive argument

as to how any purported prejudice they would suffer would

outweigh the injustice to plaintiffs if they were precluded from

bringing these claims. Taken as true, it is not clear from

plaintiffs’ allegations that Mr. Singh was capable of

understanding his affairs or of understanding complicated

business transactions such as hiring an attorney or bringing a

lawsuit.

The allegations, if proved, are sufficient to support

tolling of the statute of limitations for claims brought on Mr.

Singh’s behalf commencing October 2001. However, whether the

statute was actually tolled is a fact-based inquiry, more

appropriately decided at the fact-finding stages of the

litigation. Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ federal

claims on statute of limitations grounds are DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

3. Continuing Violations Doctrine.

Plaintiffs argue that claims based on events occurring

before March 15, 2002 are not time-barred because they are

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actionable as continuing violations. The continuing violations

doctrine can preserve claims that are related to allegations

falling outside a limitations period. The continuing violations

doctrine has been applied in § 1983 actions. See RK Ventures,

Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002);

Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara,

344 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2003); Thompson v. City of Shasta Lake,

314 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2004). The doctrine has

also been applied to claims arising under other civil rights laws

such as the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See Cherosky v.

Hendrson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2003); Douglas v. Cal.

Dept. of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2001).

Before the United States Supreme Court addressed the

continuing violations doctrine in Nat’l R.R. Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101 (2002), there were two ways to establish a

continuing violation. See Carpinteria, 344 F.3d at 828; Douglas,

271 F.3d at 822 (in a case decided before Morgan, Ninth Circuit

notes that it “ha[s] recognized two methods by which a plaintiff

may establish a continuing violation” (citing Gutowski v. County

of Placer, 108 F.3d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1997)). First, the

“related acts” theory holds that discriminatory acts that fall

outside the statutory period, but are “related and similar to”

acts within the statutory period is actionable. See id. Second,

the “continuing policy” theory holds that a continuing policy or

practice of discrimination that operated at least in part within

the limitations period is actionable. See id. 

However, as the Ninth Circuit noted recently, the United

States Supreme Court in Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, overruled the

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“related acts” test:

Morgan overruled previous Ninth Circuit authority

holding that, if a discriminatory act was “related and

similar to” acts that took place outside the

limitations period, all the related acts--including the

earlier acts--were actionable as part of a continuing

violation. [citation] Morgan held that “discrete

discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred,

even when they are related to acts alleged in timely

filed charges.”

RK Ventures, 307 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Morgan, 122 S.Ct. at

2072); see also Carpinteria, 344 F.3d at 828 (noting that the

Supreme Court in Morgan invalidated the “related acts” method of

establishing a continuing violation....”). 

The claims accruing before March 15, 2002 cannot be saved

under the related acts theory of the continuing violations

doctrine, as this theory has been overruled and is no longer the

law.

4. Conclusion.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ federal claims on

statute of limitations grounds are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE on

the basis that it is not determinable from plaintiffs’

allegations that the statute of limitations would not be

equitably tolled and/or tolled under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 352(a) on insanity (lack of mental capacity) grounds.

B. Defendants’ Arguments Regarding Causation.

Defendants distinguish between the claims brought on behalf

of Mr. Singh for the injuries he suffered during his lifetime and

the claims brought on behalf of Mr. Singh’s wife and children for

their injury, i.e., the loss they suffered due to Mr. Singh’s

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death. Defendants argue that the claims that are brought by

plaintiffs on their own behalf, and that are based on Mr. Singh’s

death, should be dismissed as to those defendants who cannot, as

a matter of law, be causally linked to Mr. Singh’s death. 

Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot establish

causation of Mr. Singh’s death as to KUBERSKI, CASTILLO, and

VIJAYA.

Plaintiffs’ specific allegations against these three

individual defendants are that they failed to adequately treat or

assess Mr. Singh’s medical and mental health conditions on

particular occasions. Defendants argue that “it would stretch

one’s imagination and logic to assert that these individual

defendants’ remote, insular and discrete interactions with

decdent were actual or legal causes of decedent’s death.” (Doc.

67, Defs.’ Reply 7) Defendants cite Van Ort v. Estate of

Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1996), to support their

argument that, while causation is usually a question of fact for

the jury to decide, causation can be resolved as a matter of law

when reasonable persons could not dispute the absence of

causation. Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. Van Ort was

an appeal from the district court’s granting of a judgment as a

matter of law. Defendants cite no cases in which the court

decided the causation issue at the pleading stage. This issue is

not appropriately decided on a motion to dismiss.

Furthermore, plaintiffs’ allegations relating to these three

individual defendants are not limited to the specific allegations

of events occurring on particular dates. As plaintiffs’ counsel

stated during oral argument, plaintiffs’ complaint contains

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specific allegations as to individual defendants based upon

medical and other records collected to date. Plaintiffs’

complaint also contains general allegations that relate to all of

the defendants, including allegations of ongoing conduct that

eventually led to Mr. Singh’s death. On defendants’ narrow

interpretation of the complaint, no one would be responsible for

Mr. Singh’s death because no individual defendant is alleged to

have struck the fatal blow.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss on causation grounds are

DENIED.

C. First Cause of Action (§ 1983 Claim for Failure to

Provide Adequate Medical Care).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ first claim for relief

fails to state a claim against defendants CARILLO, PATTERSON,

WILLIAMS, and HARTFIELD, who were correctional staff at SATF, and

also that plaintiffs fail to state a claim against ROSTON. 

Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief is brought under § 1983 on the

basis that defendants, individually and collectively, violated

Mr. Singh’s 8th and 14th Amendment rights by failing to provide

adequate medical care.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and

unusual punishments” places duties on prison officials to provide

humane conditions of confinement, including “ensur[ing] that

inmates receive adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical

care....” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In the

medical context, a prison official violates an inmate’s Eight

Amendment rights if he exhibits a deliberate indifference to the

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5 The individual allegations against the four correctional

officers are as follows. On March 26, 2002, CARILLO and

PATTERSON are alleged to have supervised five (5) correctional

officers forcibly remove Mr. Singh from his cell after he refused

to exit. On October 29, 2003, HARTFIELD is alleged to have had a

role in assigning to Mr. Singh’s cell an inmate who had a history

of assaulting other inmates. Mr. Singh was later attacked by

this inmate. On April 20, 2003, WILLIAMS grabbed a makeshift

turban off of Mr. Singh’s head and threw it away. WILLIAMS also

complained that Mr. Singh held up the food line whenever he would

ask for meat to be removed from his food tray. (AC ¶ 62) 

6 The allegations against ROSTON are generally that,

approximately two weeks after diagnosing Mr. Singh with

depression and other psychological disorders, he decided that Mr.

Singh was not suffering from any mental illness. ROSTON, a

psychologist, conducted an assessment of Mr. Singh on November 4,

2002. ROSTON diagnosed Mr. Singh with depression, an adjustment

disorder, and an obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. 

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inmate’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). Mere

negligence is not sufficient. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06; see

Seiter, 501 U.S. at 305. The test is whether prison officials,

acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a

sufficiently substantial “risk of serious danger to his future

health.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.

Plaintiffs’ individual allegations against CARILLO,

PATTERSON, WILLIAMS, and HARTFIELD, who are all correctional

officers, relate to incidents of alleged harassment, abuse, and

assault that occurred on particular dates.5 The individual

allegations against these defendants do not necessarily relate to

Mr. Singh’s medical care. The individual allegations against

ROSTON also relate to incidents that occurred on particular

dates, although these allegations do relate to Mr. Singh’s

medical care.6

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ROSTON recommended follow-up every 90 days, as well as a

vegetarian diet. On November 20, 2002, ROSTON “observed

Mr. Singh at prayer in his cell and concluded he was ‘probably as

devout as he claims.’” ROSTON also decided that Mr. Singh did

not show any of the signs of mental illness he had diagnosed on

November 4. ROSTON then discharged Mr. Singh from mental health

treatment. (AC ¶ 55) Approximately two months later, on January

21, 2003, ROSTON again saw Mr. Singh and “admitted [Mr. Singh]

suffered from mild depression” due to Mr. Singh’s problems

getting vegetarian food and showering before prayers. (AC ¶ 58)

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Defendants argue that the individual allegations are

insufficient to state inadequate medical care claims against

them. However, plaintiffs’ complaint contains general

allegations against all defendants relating to inadequate medical

care. All that is necessary to state a claim for inadequate

medical care under the Eighth Amendment is that the prison

official exhibited deliberate indifference to the inmate’s

serious medical needs. Estelle, 429, U.S. at 104; Seiter, 501

U.S. at 303-04.

The facts alleged here, if proven, are sufficient to

establish that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference

to Mr. Singh’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Mr. Singh was starving himself, refusing to attend

meals, and refusing to wash. He became emaciated. Plaintiffs

allege that all defendants were aware of these behaviors and

symptoms but did nothing. Eventually, Mr. Singh died. Whether

each individual defendant actually acted with deliberate

indifference to Mr. Singh’s medical needs is a question for the

fact-finder and is not appropriately decided on a motion to

dismiss. On a motion to dismiss, all the plaintiff’s allegations

are taken as true. Here, plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient

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7 Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment for inadequate medical care should be

dismissed because it is subsumed by its claim under the Eighth

Amendment. Defendants’ argument is rhetorical and irrelevant to

the main issue of whether plaintiffs actually state a claim for

inadequate medical care. Defendants cite no cases dismissing a

Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim as being

subsumed by a claim under the Eighth Amendment. The standards of

care under the Fourteenth Amendment are at least as great as

those under the Eighth Amendment. See Davis v. County of Nassau,

355 F. Supp. 2d 668, 674 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing City of Revere

v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)); see also Jones v.

Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). Because the

standards are the same, it is unnecessary to determine which

amendment applies.

31

to state an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim

for inadequate medical care (First Cause of Action) are DENIED.

7

D. Second Cause of Action (§ 1983 Claim for Violation of

First Amendment Freedom of Religion).

Plaintiffs assert that defendants violated Mr. Singh’s First

Amendment rights by, among other things, denying him a vegetarian

diet; denying him access to his religious texts; denying him

access to showers before prayers; and abusing him because of his

religious beliefs. (AC ¶ 12) Drs. VIJAYA, BHATT, DEERING,

HUANG, KUBERSKI, UNDERWOOD, GONZALEZ, and ROSTON are physicians,

psychologists, and psychiatrists who treated Mr. Singh and are

referred to as the “medical defendants” by the parties. 

Defendants argue that the First Amendment claim should be

dismissed as to the medical defendants because the allegations

regarding the individual medical defendants relate to the

adequacy of the medical care received by Mr. Singh and do not

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relate to any effort to thwart Mr. Singh’s religious practices. 

Plaintiffs argue, once again, that their allegations against all

defendants are sufficient to state a claim for violation of

Mr. Singh’s First Amendment right to freedom of religion.

Prisoners do not relinquish their First Amendment rights

upon entering prison. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,

348 (1987). “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the

First Amendment [citation], including its directive that no law

shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” Id. However,

prisons may restrict prisoners’ constitutional rights as long as

the restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. Id.; Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir.

1991).

Defendants do not argue that plaintiffs’ factual allegations

are insufficient to support a free exercise claim. Instead,

defendants argue plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting that

the acts or omissions of the individual medical defendants caused

the alleged deprivation of Mr. Singh’s First Amendment right to

freedom of religion. Defendants’ argument is once again based

upon their attempted distinction between the individual

allegations against particular defendants and the general

allegations against all defendants. Defendants’ argument is not

persuasive.

Plaintiffs allege generally that all defendants denied

Mr. Singh a vegetarian diet; denied him access to his religious

texts; denied him access to showers before prayers; and abused

him because of his religious beliefs. (AC ¶ 102) Plaintiffs

also allege specifically that Dr. ROSTON was aware of Mr. Singh’s

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vegetarianism and had the authority to recommend a diet change

and did recommend such a change, although his recommendation was

never implemented. (AC ¶ 54) The allegation of denial of a

vegetarian diet extends to the other medical defendants as well. 

(AC ¶¶ 101-03) It is not appropriate on a motion to dismiss a

complaint that alleges all defendants acted to infringe First

Amendment rights, to decide which individual defendants actually

restricted Mr. Singh’s religious practices in these ways and if

so, whether these restrictions were reasonably related to the

prison’s penological interests. Defendants’ motions to dismiss

plaintiffs’ First Amendment free exercise claim (Second Cause of

Action) are DENIED.

E. Third Cause of Action (§ 1983 Claim for Violation of

14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause).

Defendants argue plaintiffs fail to state a claim against

the medical defendants (i.e., VIJAYA, BHATT, DEERING, HUANG,

KUBERSKI, UNDERWOOD, GONZALEZ, and ROSTON) for violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a

plaintiff must [allege] that the defendants acted with an intent

or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon

membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs allege that all

defendants violated Mr. Singh’s right to equal protection under

the law by intentionally discriminating against him based on his

race and national origin. (AC ¶ 104-105) Plaintiffs

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specifically allege that the medical defendants failed to provide

Mr. Singh proper medical care, mistreated him, and/or ignored him

because of his race and nationality. (AC ¶ 31) Defendants argue

that plaintiffs’ allegations against the medical defendants

pertain to the quality of the medical care rendered by them. 

Defendants argue plaintiffs fail to state an equal protection

claim because they fail to allege facts that show defendants

intentionally provided inadequate medical care to Mr. Singh

because of his race and/or nationality.

Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim is averred generally. 

This is all that is required by Rules 8(a) and 9(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants’ motions to dismiss

plaintiffs’ equal protection claim (Third Cause of Action) are

DENIED.

F. Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action (Violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 & Violation of

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).

Defendants argue there is no private right of action against

individual defendants under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation

Act. Defendants argue that these claims should be dismissed

against all defendants to the extent they are sued in their

individual capacities. In their opposition, plaintiffs

mischaracterize defendants’ argument, stating that defendants

argue there is no private right of action under the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs cite no authority to oppose

defendants’ argument that no ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim can

be brought against individual employees of a public entity. 

During oral argument, plaintiffs conceded that there is no such

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8 Neither party raises the issue whether supervisory

officials can be sued in their official capacities for injunctive

relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Neither party

cites Miranda v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir.

2003), a Ninth Circuit case holding that officials can be sued

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individual liability under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Defendants are correct that actions under the ADA and

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act cannot be maintained

against individual actors. Alsbrook v. Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999,

1005 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1999) (no individual liability under ADA),

cert. granted in part sub nom., Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 528 U.S.

1146, cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001; Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d

344 (9th Cir. 2000) (no individual liability under ADA), implicit

overruling on other grounds recognized by Radaszewiski ex. rel.

Radaszewiski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 2004); Thomas

v. Nakatani, 128 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692 (D. Haw. 2000) (no

individual liability under ADA); Gary v. Georgia Dept. of Human

Res., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1371 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (no individual

liability under ADA); Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Public Welfare,

157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 531 (citing cases); Valder v. City of Grand

Forks, 217 F.R.D. 491, 494 (D.N.D. 2003) (no individual liability

under either ADA or Rehabilitation Act); but see Guckenberger. v.

Boston Univ., 957 F. Supp. 306, 323 (D. Mass. 1997) (individual

who has authority to accept or reject federal funds can be liable

under Rehabilitation Act) (citing U.S. Dept. of Transp. v.

Paralyzed Veterans of Amer., 477 U.S. 597, 605-606 (1986)).

Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims (Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action)

against all defendants are GRANTED.

8

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for injunctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act in

their official capacities under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908); see also Radaszewski, 383 F.3d at 606. Plaintiffs do not

seek injunctive relief in their complaint.

9 ROSTON is not named in the Sixth Claim. Plaintiffs

contend this was inadvertent omission. Plaintiffs are granted

LEAVE TO AMEND to add Dr. ROSTON to the Sixth Claim.

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G. Sixth Cause of Action (§ 1983 Violation for Failure to

Train, Supervise, and Discipline).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to state an official

capacity § 1983 claim against defendants ALAMEIDA, STEINBERG, and

ADAMS.9 Plaintiffs concede that, to the extent official capacity

claims are alleged against these defendants, they are barred by

the Eleventh Amendment.

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs fail to state

individual capacity § 1983 claims against defendants ALAMEIDA,

STEINBERG, ADAMS, PRUD’HOMME, CARILLO, PATTERSON, and ROSTON for

failure to adequately train, supervise, and discipline their

subordinates. Defendants argue that plaintiffs attempt to impose

liability on these officials based solely on their role as

supervisors. Plaintiffs deny that their allegations relate only

to these defendants’ official duties, and assert that the

allegations relate to the supervisory defendants’ individual

knowledge of Mr. Singh’s situation and are therefore sufficient

to state individual capacity claims against them.

Liability may be imposed against an official in his

individual capacity under § 1983 for failure to adequately train,

supervise, or discipline. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d

630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). Individual liability “is imposed

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against a supervisory official...for his own culpable action or

inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his

subordinates....” Larez, 946 F.2d at 646 (internal quotations

and citations omitted); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d

1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 937

(9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] supervisor may be liable if there exists

either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional

deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.”).

Plaintiffs’ complaint contains general allegations regarding

the responsibilities and duties of the supervisory defendants,

including Dr. ROSTON. (AC ¶¶ 8-12, 14, 17-19) Plaintiffs also

cite the January 2003 Management Review Audit by the Office of

the Inspector General, which detailed systemic failures in the

delivery of medical and mental health care to SATF prisoners. 

However, these general allegations are insufficient to state

individual capacity claims against the supervisory defendants as

to the injuries suffered by Mr. Singh. Defendant is correct

that, to state an individual capacity § 1983 claim based on

supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege facts that support

individual involvement in the alleged deprivations of

constitutional rights, or at least a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged deprivation.

Plaintiffs’ complaint does contain several factual

allegations that support individual knowledge and involvement of

some (although not all) of the supervisory defendants in the

alleged deprivations of Mr. Singh’s rights. Plaintiffs allege

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that defendant ADAMS was aware of complaints regarding McKESSON,

who is alleged to have repeatedly brutalized Mr. Singh. (AC

¶ 84) Plaintiffs also allege that PATTERSON and CARILLO were

supervising five correctional officers who forcibly removed

Mr. Singh from his cell, injuring him. (AC ¶ 48) These factual

allegations are sufficient to state a claim for supervisory

liability against ADAMS, PATTERSON, and CARILLO. See Harris v.

Roderick, 12 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs also

indicated during oral argument that they alleged that other

inmates wrote letters to correctional officials trying to bring

to their attention that there was an inmate at SATF (i.e., Mr.

Singh) who was not eating and was dying. However, this

allegation is not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against a

supervisor, since no supervisor was identified.

Beyond these few specific allegations against ADAMS,

PATTERSON, and CARILLO, however, plaintiffs identified no

allegations or paragraphs in their complaint that support the

personal involvement of the supervisory officials in the

deprivation of Mr. Singh’s constitutional rights. Defendants’

motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims against

ADAMS, PATTERSON, and CARILLO for supervisory liability is

DENIED. Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ individual

capacity claims against the remaining supervisory officials

(Sixth Cause of Action) is GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND.

H. Seventh Cause of Action (Title VI of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 52 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ Title VI claim should be

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dismissed because such a claim cannot be sustained against

individual defendants. As with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims, plaintiffs again misinterpret defendants’ argument,

responding that a private right of action is available under

Title VI. Defendants do not argue that no private right of

action is available.

Defendants cite several cases holding that no Title VI

action can be maintained against an individual defendant. 

Jackson v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (S.D.

Tex. 1996); Powers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1295,

1311 (S.D. Ala. 2000). Plaintiffs cite no authority to the

contrary, although during oral argument they requested

opportunity to research the issue further. Defendants’ motions

to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VI claim (Seventh Cause of Action)

are GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND.

I. Eighth Cause of Action (§ 1983 Claim for Violation of

Fourteenth Amendment Right to Family Relations).

Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to state a claim for

violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights to family relations

against KUBERSKI, WILSON, CASTILLO, CARILLO, PATTERSON, HUANG,

DEERING, and ROSTON. Defendants argue that these defendants’

actions were too remote in time from the death of Mr. Singh to

have caused it. As discussed above, causation issues are not

properly decided on a motion to dismiss. Defendants’ motions to

dismiss plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment family relations claim

(Eighth Cause of Action) are DENIED.

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J. Ninth Cause of Action (Violation of U.S. Treaties).

All defendants argue there is no private right of action

under these treaties and cite two cases in support, White v.

Paulson, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Johnson v.

Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 1000 (D.D.C. 2005). These cases

stand for the principle a treaty gives rise to a private right of

action either if it is “self-executing,” i.e., if it expressly or

impliedly creates a private right of action to enforce the rights

described in the treaty, or if Congress enacts authorizing

legislation. See also Raffington v. Cangemi, 399 F.3d 900, (8th

Cir. 2005) (“the [Convention Against Torture] is a non-selfexecuting treaty, which means there is no direct right of action

for violation of the treaty, only for violation of any domestic

law implementing the treaty). 

Plaintiffs do not argue that the treaties at issue here,

i.e., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms

of Racial Discrimination, are self-executing. Plaintiffs cite no

authority holding that Congress has passed legislation

authorizing a private right of action under either of these

treaties. Plaintiffs instead argue that the Eighth Amendment

authorizes a private right of action under these treaties. 

Plaintiffs cite no authority in support of this contention. 

Their argument is not persuasive. Defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claims under U.S. treaties (Ninth Cause of Action) is

GRANTED. The dismissal of plaintiffs’ Ninth Claim does not

resolve plaintiffs’ ability to argue that treaties establish

minimum standards of conduct under the Eighth Amendment that are

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binding on the Department of Corrections. 

K. Tenth and Eleventh Causes of Action (Supplemental State

Claims).

1. Statute of Limitations.

Defendants first argue that plaintiffs’ supplemental state

law claims (Failure to Summon Medical Care under Cal. Govt. Code

§ 845.6; and Elder Abuse under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15600,

et seq.) are barred by the statute of limitations. Tolling under

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1 does not operate to toll the

statutory period for prisoners’ state claims as it does for

federal claims. In addition, disability (insanity) tolling under

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352 does not apply to the state claims at

issue here. Claims accruing before January 1, 2003, are

therefore subject to a one-year statute of limitations and are

barred, subject to any equitable tolling. For the same reasons

discussed above, however, it is not clear based on the facts

alleged in the complaint that equitable tolling does not apply. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ supplemental state

claims (Tenth and Eleventh Causes of Action) on statute of

limitations grounds is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Eleventh Claim (Failure to Summon Medical Care,

Cal. Govt. Code § 845.6).

Defendants argue that, even if not time-barred, plaintiffs

cannot state a claim for failure to summon medical care against

the medical defendants. Defendants cite a California case in

support of this argument, Nelson v. State of Cal., 139 Cal. App.

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3d 72, 79-81 (1982), and assert that this case held that a claim

for medical malpractice could not be used to ground a cause of

action for failure to summon medical care under § 845.6. Nelson

distinguished between claims for failure to adequately treat

(i.e., medical malpractice) and claims for failure to summon

medical care when the prison official knows or should know the

prisoner is in immediate need of medical care (i.e., Cal. Govt.

Code § 845.6).

Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that their allegations

are sufficient. Plaintiffs point to the following allegations:

the medical defendants were aware Mr. Singh was dying of

malnutrition, but did nothing; and that the medical defendants

were aware Mr. Singh was mentally ill and suicidal, but they

failed to seek or provide mental health services for him. (AC

¶¶ 65, 96) These allegations, however, do not support that the

medical defendants are liable for failure to seek medical care

for Mr. Singh’s need for immediate attention. Additionally,

Plaintiffs do not distinguish Nelson and cite no authority

supporting that their allegations are the types of acts or

omissions that are actionable under § 845.6. Defendants’ motion

to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for failure to summon adequate

medical care (Tenth Cause of Action) against the medical

defendants is GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendants WILLIAMS and HARTFIELD also argue that plaintiffs

cannot state a claim for failure to summon medical care against

them. These arguments are based on Defendants’ distinction

between plaintiffs’ allegations regarding individual defendants

as opposed to plaintiffs’ general allegations. For the same

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reasons discussed above, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ § 845.6 claim on these grounds is DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to

dismiss plaintiffs’:

(a) federal claims on statute of limitations and

causation grounds is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

(b) First Cause of Action (§ 1983 Eighth Amendment

inadequate medical care) is DENIED;

(c) Second Cause of Action (§ 1983 First Amendment

freedom of religion) is DENIED;

(d) Third Cause of Action (§ 1983 Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection) is DENIED;

(e) Fourth Cause of Action (Americans With

Disabilities Act) is GRANTED;

(f) Fifth Cause of Action (Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973) is GRANTED;

(g) Sixth Cause of Action (Monell Violation) against

ALAMEIDA, STEINBERG, and ADAMS is GRANTED on

Eleventh Amendment grounds; 

(h) Sixth Cause of Action (§ 1983 Individual

Supervisory Liability) against ADAMS, PATTERSON,

and CARILLO is DENIED; Sixth Cause of Action

against the other supervisory defendants is

GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND;

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(i) Seventh Cause of Action (Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964) is GRANTED with LEAVE TO

AMEND;

(j) Eighth Cause of Action (§ 1983 Fourteenth

Amendment right to family relations) is DENIED;

(k) Ninth Cause of Action (U.S. Treaties) is GRANTED;

and

(l) Tenth Cause of Action (supplemental state claim

for failure to summon medical care) against the

medical defendants is GRANTED with LEAVE TO AMEND;

and

(m) Tenth and Eleventh Causes of Action (supplemental

state claims) on statute of limitations grounds is

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Any amended complaint shall be filed within 20 days of

service of this order.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October _4__, 2005. 

/s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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