Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-05913/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-05913-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

THOMAS MEDEIROS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF PALO ALTO,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Plaintiff Thomas Medeiros, proceeding pro se, has brought suit against Defendant City of 

Palo Alto. Plaintiff asserts one claim against Defendant for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. 

ECF No. 33 (“Mot.”). Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the 

record in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Plaintiff was employed by A-1 Septic Tank Services, Inc. as a jetter, which involves

spraying a “high pressure water hose to remove grease from surfaces.” ECF No. 26 (third 

amended complaint, or “TAC”) at ¶ 7. On December 3, 2001, Plaintiff was assigned to provide 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 1 of 16
2

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

maintenance for a grease interceptor located at the Palo Alto Hills Golf and Country Club. Id. at ¶

8. A grease interceptor is “an underground device that filters and separates kitchen grease from 

water so as to prevent grease from entering the sewer system.” Id. Plaintiff left the Palo Alto Hills 

Golf and Country Club with a truck filled with grease. Id. at ¶ 14. 

As Plaintiff was driving away from the Palo Alto Hills Golf and Country Club, Plaintiff 

was stopped by Defendant’s employee Jackie Wilson and accused of “releasing the grease load 

into the sewer system causing a backup and eventual flow into the Matadero Creek.” Id. at ¶ 13. 

Defendant’s officials began to investigate Plaintiff for allegedly discharging grease from the 

grease interceptor into the municipal sewer because Defendant “deputized” certain employees to 

carry out criminal investigations of alleged environmental violations. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s employees deputized to investigate alleged 

environmental violations lacked training or knowledge “of proper criminal procedures when 

investigating environmental crimes” and lacked “training in the protection of a citizen’s 

constitutional rights when accused of a crime.” Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. Plaintiff claims that because of the 

deputized employees’ lack of training, Defendant failed to: “secure the crime scene”; “obtain 

obvious evidence of innocence”; “secure percipient witness testimony”; “recognize and supply 

exculpatory evidence”; and “preserve direct evidence regarding the alleged crimes.” Id. at ¶ 30. 

Plaintiff was indicted for a felony environmental crime in November 2003. Id. at ¶ 18. 

Plaintiff’s pleadings are unclear as to the specific crime with which Plaintiff was charged. Plaintiff

was tried and convicted of the crime in May 2005. Id. However, in 2007, Plaintiff’s conviction 

was overturned by the California Court of Appeal based on a lack of evidence. Id. at ¶ 18. The 

California Court of Appeal issued its remittitur on October 2, 2007. ECF No. 34-2.1

 

1 Defendant requests judicial notice of various judicial documents related to Plaintiff’s California 

prosecution and to Plaintiff’s subsequent civil lawsuit related to the prosecution. ECF No. 34. 

Defendant also requests judicial notice of documents referred to in the TAC. Id. A court “may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system.” United 

States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 

1992). A court also may take judicial notice of “documents incorporated by reference in the 

complaint.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, Defendant’s request 

for judicial notice is GRANTED because the documents for which Defendant seeks judicial notice 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 2 of 16
3

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff timely filed a government claim2 with Defendant on January 29, 2008. TAC at ¶

53. Defendant’s claims administrator, an outside company called George Hills Company, Inc.

(“George Hills Co.”), erroneously rejected Plaintiff’s claim as late in correspondence dated

February 7, 2008. Id. at ¶ 56. Plaintiff alleges that the “false information [from George Hills Co. 

about the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claim was] calculated to lead [Plaintiff], a pro per claim filer, not 

to file a lawsuit against [Defendant].” Id. at ¶ 55. Plaintiff further alleges that he “reasonably and 

justifiably relied upon these misrepresentations [by George Hills Co.], and believing he had no 

case to file, failed to file any lawsuit against [Defendant] within the two-year limitation period for 

personal injuries in the state of California.” Id. at ¶ 66.

Procedural History

Prior to the instant case, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against George Hills Co. in the California 

Superior Court for Sacramento County. The Court will first discuss the Superior Court case, and 

then the instant case.

1. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit before the Superior Court for Sacramento County

On February 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed suit against George Hills Co. in the Superior Court for 

Sacramento County. ECF No. 34-1 at 1.3 Plaintiff brought two claims: intentional 

misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. Id. These two claims were predicated on the 

fact that Plaintiff was misled by George Hills Co.’s mistaken statement that Plaintiff’s claim filed 

with Defendant was untimely in correspondence dated February 7, 2008. The Superior Court 

sustained two demurrers, the latter of which dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without leave to amend. 

Medeiros v. George Hills Co., 2013 WL 174852, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2013). Plaintiff 

appealed, and on January 14, 2013, the California Court of Appeal reversed in part the Superior 

 

are properly noticeable.

2 California’s Government Claims Act requires a plaintiff to “timely file a claim for money or 

damages with the public entity” before bringing suit. Lozada v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 145 

Cal. App. 4th 1139, 1150-51 (2006). “The failure to do so bars the plaintiff from bringing suit 

against that entity.” Id. at 1051.

3 The Court will refer to the ECF-generated pagination of documents for which Defendant sought 

judicial notice because not every page is consecutively-paginated.

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 3 of 16
4

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Court’s dismissal of the suit, and remanded the suit back to the Superior Court. Id. at *5. On 

remand, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against George Hills Co., but George Hills 

Co. filed its answer and then moved for judgment on the pleadings. Medeiros v. George Hills Co., 

2015 WL 4086155, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 7, 2015). The Superior Court granted the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment in favor of George Hills Co. Id. at *1. Plaintiff 

once again appealed. On July 7, 2015, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. 

Id. The California Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for review on October 14, 2015. TAC 

at ¶ 70.

2. The Instant Case

On October 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging malicious prosecution under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 as the sole cause of action against Defendant City of Palo Alto. ECF No. 1 at 5. The 

case was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Howard Lloyd. On November 2, 2017, 

Magistrate Judge Lloyd entered an order reassigning the case to a District Judge; granted 

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis; and included a report and recommendation to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 4. In the report and recommendation, 

Magistrate Judge Lloyd noted that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant required that an 

alleged constitutional violation be the product of a municipal policy or custom, but that Plaintiff’s 

complaint “does not link his injury to a policy or custom” of Defendant. Id. Magistrate Judge 

Lloyd also noted, without deciding, that Plaintiff’s claim may be time barred because California 

has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Id. at 3-4.

On November 2, 2017, the case was reassigned to this Court. ECF No. 6. On November 3, 

2017, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint alleging malicious prosecution under § 1983 as the 

sole cause of action. ECF No. 7 at 4. On January 10, 2018, this Court adopted the report and 

recommendation, thereby dismissing the complaint and the first amended complaint with leave to 

amend because the first amended complaint did not cure the defects identified in the report and 

recommendation. ECF No. 10 at 5. The Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint and first amended 

complaint fail to link Plaintiff’s injury to a policy or custom of Defendant. Id. at 4. Moreover, the 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 4 of 16
5

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Court stated that “it is unclear how Plaintiff’s suit is not time barred.” Id.

On February 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint alleging malicious 

prosecution under § 1983 as the sole cause of action. ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 58-67. On December 4, 

2018, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and dismissed 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint without prejudice. ECF No. 25 at 4 (“December 4, 2018 

Order”). In particular, the Court held that “Plaintiff’s suit is time-barred under California’s twoyear statute of limitations for personal injury actions.” Id. at 3. The Court also held that “tolling 

would not save Plaintiff’s [second amended] complaint.” Id. However, the Court granted leave to 

amend because Plaintiff’s second amended complaint contained one allegation that equitable 

estoppel tolled the statute of limitations. Id. The Court warned Plaintiff that “unless Plaintiff can 

amend his complaint to allege facts against [Defendant] supporting his claim of equitable estoppel, 

the Court will have no choice but to dismiss [Plaintiff’s] claim[] with prejudice for being timebarred under California law.” Id. at 4.

On January 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a TAC alleging malicious prosecution under § 1983 as 

the sole cause of action. ECF No. 26 at 8. On March 24, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss 

the TAC. ECF No. 33 (“Mot.”). On April 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 42 

(“Opp.”). On April 23, Defendant filed a reply. ECF No. 43 (“Reply”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 5 of 16
6

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the

complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially 

noticeable facts, see Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look 

beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1995). Nor must the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 

the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2004).

Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether

to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 

15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant 

leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing 

amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the 

moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 

(9th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 6 of 16
7

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Defendant advances two arguments for why the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s sole claim 

for malicious prosecution. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is time barred because 

Plaintiff cannot establish equitable tolling for a period of time that would avoid the statute of 

limitations, and that equitable estoppel also does not apply. Second, Defendant asserts that the 

TAC fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution. The Court finds Defendant’s first argument 

dispositive, and thus, need not address Defendant’s second argument.

As an initial matter, a claim of malicious prosecution accrues when a conviction is 

reversed on appeal. Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the 

cause of action for the “tort of malicious prosecution . . . accrued when [a defendant’s] conviction 

was reversed on appeal.”); see also Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A 

malicious prosecution cause of action does not accrue until the case has been terminated in favor 

of the accused.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim brought under § 1983 accrued on 

October 2, 2007, the date of the California Court of Appeal’s remittitur overturning Plaintiff’s 

conviction. Moreover, “Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1’s two-year statute of limitations applies to 

section 1983 actions in federal district court in California.” Jackson v. McMillen, 249 Fed. App’x 

530, 531 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004)). Thus, 

unless tolled, the statute of limitations would have run on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim 

on October 2, 2009, two years after the date of the Court of Appeal’s remittitur. So, unless 

Plaintiff shows that “equitable tolling or equitable estoppel” applies here, the instant action is time 

barred. Lujan v. Ford, 716 Fed. App’x 699, 700 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Douglas v. Noelle, 567 

F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

Thus, below, the Court first discusses whether equitable tolling saves Plaintiff’s malicious 

prosecution claim under § 1983 from being time barred, and then whether equitable estoppel saves 

Plaintiff’s claim from being time barred.

Equitable Tolling

In its December 4, 2018 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 

because the Court determined that Plaintiff’s suit was time barred and that tolling could not save 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 7 of 16
8

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the complaint. ECF No. 25 at 3. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court granted 

leave to amend. Id. at 4. Plaintiff has now filed his third amended complaint, reasserting the same 

malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. After reviewing Plaintiff’s TAC, the Court agrees with 

Defendant that Plaintiff’s fourth attempt at stating a claim fails, especially because the Court’s 

December 4, 2018 Order provided Plaintiff with notice that Plaintiff’s suit was time barred and 

that tolling could not save the suit.

“Federal courts . . . apply a forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling . 

. . .” Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Under California law, the statute of 

limitations is equitably tolled if “possessing several legal remedies, . . . [plaintiff], reasonably and 

in good faith, pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.” Addison v. 

State of Cal., 21 Cal.3d 313, 317 (1978). “[T]he effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations 

period stops running during the tolling event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event 

has concluded.” Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003) (emphasis in original). 

The Court, like Defendant, has identified four time periods to consider for potential tolling. 

The first period runs from accrual of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim on October 2, 2007, 

when the California Court of Appeal issued its remittitur and the state court decision overturning 

Plaintiff’s conviction became final, to Plaintiff’s submission of a government claim form to

Defendant on January 29, 2008. The second period runs from Plaintiff’s filing of a government 

claim form with Defendant on January 29, 2008 to George Hills Co.’s response to Plaintiff’s 

government claim form on February 7, 2008. The third period runs from February 7, 2008—the 

date of George Hills Co.’s written response to Plaintiff’s claim form in which George Hills Co. 

made the erroneous statement that Plaintiff’s claim was untimely—to February 8, 2010, when 

Plaintiff filed suit in Superior Court for Sacramento County against George Hills Co. The fourth 

period runs from February 8, 2010, when Plaintiff initiated suit against George Hills Co. in

Superior Court, to October 14, 2015, when the California Supreme Court denied review of the 

Court of Appeal’s decision affirming the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state court lawsuit against George 

Hills Co. Below, the Court discusses each period in turn.

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 8 of 16
9

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1. Period One: Accrual of Malicious Prosecution Claim (October 2, 2007) to 

Plaintiff’s Submission of a Government Claim Form (January 29, 2008)

The first period runs from the date of accrual of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim 

(October 2, 2007) to Plaintiff’s submission of a government claim form to Defendant (January 29, 

2008). During this period, the statute of limitations was not tolled because Plaintiff did not pursue 

any legal remedy “designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.” Addison, 21 Cal.3d at 

317. Thus, during the first period, the statute of limitations ran for 119 days without a tolling 

event.

2. Period Two: Plaintiff’s Submission of a Government Claim Form (January 29, 

2008) to George Hills Co.’s Response Erroneously Denying Plaintiff’s Claim as 

Untimely (February 7, 2008)

The second period runs from the date Plaintiff submitted a government claim form to 

Defendant (January 29, 2008) to the date George Hills Co. responded to Plaintiff’s claim by 

incorrectly denying Plaintiff’s claim as untimely (February 7, 2008). 

Various California and federal courts diverge on the question of whether filing a 

government claim tolls the time for filing a § 1983 claim. For instance, the McMahon v. Albany 

Unified School Dist. court held that the plaintiff’s government claim “is not sufficient to toll the 

statute of limitations on his section 1983 action.” 104 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1292 (2002). On the 

other hand, the Ninth Circuit held “the plaintiffs . . . [are] entitled to equitable tolling” during the 

pendency of a state law claim submitted to a state entity. Lucchesi v. Bar-O Boys Ranch, 353 F.3d 

691, 693, 696 (9th Cir. 2003).

However, the Court need not resolve the question of whether to toll the statute of 

limitations during the pendency of Plaintiff’s claim submitted to Defendant because Defendant 

states that for the “purposes of this motion, the [Defendant] assumes that the Ninth Circuit 

decision in Lucchesi controls and that the submission of the government claim form tolled the 

running of the limitations period.” Mot. at 6. Thus, during the nine days that elapsed between 

January 29, 2008 and February 7, 2008, the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s § 1983 action was 

tolled. 

3. Period 3: George Hills Co.’s Response Erroneously Denying Plaintiff’s Claim as 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 9 of 16
10

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Untimely (February 7, 2008) to the Date Plaintiff Filed Suit in Superior Court 

against George Hills Co. (February 8, 2010)

The third period runs from the date of George Hills Co.’s correspondence with Plaintiff 

denying Plaintiff’s government claim against Defendant (February 7, 2008) to the date Plaintiff 

sued George Hills Co. in the Superior Court for Sacramento County (February 8, 2010). 

Here, for the “purposes of this motion, [D]efendant does not contest tolling from February 

7, 2008 to February 8, 2010.” Mot. at 8. Thus, during the 732 days that elapsed between February 

7, 2008 to February 8, 2010, the statute of limitations was tolled.

4. Period 4: The Date Plaintiff Filed Suit in Superior Court against George Hills Co. 

(February 8, 2010) to the Date the California Supreme Court Denied Plaintiff’s 

Petition for Review of the Court of Appeal and Superior Court’s Decisions to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Case against George Hills Co. (October 14, 2015)

The fourth period runs from the date Plaintiff brought suit in the Superior Court for 

Sacramento County against George Hills Co. (February 8, 2010) to the date the California 

Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision affirming 

the Superior Court’s grant of a demurrer (October 14, 2015). 

Defendant argues that there is no equitable tolling during the fourth period because the 

malicious prosecution claim alleged in the instant action is distinct from the misrepresentation 

claims alleged in Plaintiff’s California lawsuit against George Hills Co. Mot. at 8-9. The Court 

finds Defendant’s argument persuasive. 

“California has long refused to apply the equitable tolling doctrine to toll the statute of 

limitations on a claim for a distinct wrong that was not the basis of the earlier proceeding.” 

Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in 

original). For instance, in Loehr v. Ventura Cty. Cmty. College Dist., the plaintiff was fired from 

his position as superintendent and chief executive officer of the Ventura County Community 

College District. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1076 (1983). The Loehr plaintiff brought suit in federal 

court against the community college district, the board of trustees of the community college 

district, and three trustees. Loehr v. Ventura Cty. Cmty. College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The plaintiff sued for “deprivations of his liberty and property” under § 1983 because 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 10 of 16
11

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the plaintiff believed his termination to be unfair and wrong. Id. About two years after he was 

discharged, the Loehr plaintiff also brought suit in California state court for, inter alia, “breach of 

contract, tortious breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conspiracy and 

failure to prevent conspiracy to wrongfully interfere with a business relationship and to induce 

breach of contract.” Loehr, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1077. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff’s 

suit in California state court was barred by a statute of limitations because plaintiff’s federal case 

did not equitably toll the claims plaintiff brought in state court. Id. at 1084. Specifically, the Court 

of Appeal stated that a “comparison of the federal and state court actions demonstrates that the two 

are substantially dissimilar as to both the remedies they seek and the wrongs they allege,” even 

though the plaintiff’s federal and state actions were both predicated on his alleged wrongful 

termination. Id. at 1086.

The instant case is analogous to Loehr. Plaintiff’s state court lawsuit against George Hills 

Co. brought two causes of action: intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. 

ECF No. 34-1 at 2, 4. The causes of action in Plaintiff’s state court case were predicated on 

George Hills Co.’s incorrect representation that Plaintiff’s government claim submitted to 

Defendant was untimely. Id. at 3-4. By contrast, in the instant case, Plaintiff brought a malicious 

prosecution cause of action under § 1983 against Defendant City of Palo Alto because, inter alia: 

Defendant “lacked probable cause to instigate criminal charges against [Plaintiff],” TAC at ¶ 44; 

“[t]o the extent [Plaintiff] might have had probable cause to believe [Defendant] committed the 

crimes alleged by [Plaintiff], further facts were easily available to [Defendant] with proper 

investigation to extinguish any belief that probable cause was factually present,” id. at ¶ 46; and 

“[Defendant] acted with malice in its actions described herein and did not seek out prosecution out 

of a concern for public justice,” id. at ¶ 47.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant in the instant action are predicated on the 

circumstances surrounding Defendant’s investigation into Plaintiff for allegedly dumping grease 

into the public sewers. However, Plaintiff’s claims against George Hills Co. in the state court 

action were predicated on George Hills Co.’s wrongful rejection of Plaintiff’s government claim 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 11 of 16
12

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

for being untimely. The state court action and the federal court action involve distinct defendants, 

distinct acts, distinct facts, and thus, distinct wrongs. Indeed, Plaintiff’s claims in the instant 

federal court case and claims in the state court case are even more distinct than the claims in 

Loehr, where the federal court case and state court case were both predicated on the Loehr

plaintiff’s termination.

In sum, the pendency of Plaintiff’s state court action against George Hills Co. from 

February 8, 2010 to October 14, 2015 did not toll the statute of limitations.

5. Summary

As discussed above, the statute of limitations was tolled twice (during periods 2 and 3) for 

a total of 741 days. Therefore, the last day Plaintiff could have filed this action before the statute 

of limitations had run was October 12, 2011. Plaintiff filed the instant suit on October 16, 2017, 

which is 2,196 days, or more than six years, after the statute of limitations had run. ECF No. 1.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the pendency of Plaintiff’s state lawsuit against 

George Hills Co. between February 8, 2010 to October 14, 2015 tolled the statute of limitations, 

the instant suit would still be time barred. Plaintiff would have had to file suit by June 16, 2017. 

However, June 16, 2017 is four months before Plaintiff actually initiated the instant action on 

October 16, 2017. ECF No. 1.

Thus, equitable tolling does not save the instant case from being time barred under the 

two-year statute of limitations. Next, the Court discusses whether equitable estoppel renders the 

instant suit timely-filed.

Equitable Estoppel

In its December 4, 2018 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 

because the Court determined that Plaintiff’s suit was time barred and that tolling could not save 

the complaint. ECF No. 25 at 3. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution because Plaintiff’s 

second amended complaint alluded to equitable estoppel, which might render Plaintiff’s suit 

timely filed, the Court granted leave to amend. Id. at 4. Plaintiff has now filed his third amended 

complaint, reasserting the same malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. After reviewing 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 12 of 16
13

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff’s TAC, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s fourth attempt at stating a claim 

fails, especially because the Court’s December 4, 2018 Order provided notice that “unless Plaintiff 

can amend his complaint to allege facts against [Defendant] supporting his claim of equitable 

estoppel, the Court will have no choice but to dismiss his claims with prejudice for being timebarred under California law.” Id. at 4.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that equitable estoppel applies “so as to justify barring [Defendant] 

from asserting a statute of limitations defense.” Opp. at 4. However, Defendant argues that 

equitable estoppel does not apply here because Plaintiff failed to file suit against Defendant within 

a reasonable period of time after Plaintiff discovered that his government claim form submitted to 

Defendant was incorrectly determined to be untimely. Reply at 1-2. Defendant has the better 

argument.

To prove equitable estoppel, “(1) the party to be estopped must be appraised of the facts; 

(2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the 

estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true 

state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” Schafer v. City of Los Angeles, 

237 Cal. App. 4th 1250, 1261 (2015). “Equitable estoppel does not extend the statute of 

limitations but rather comes into play only after the limitations period has run and addresses itself 

to the circumstances in which a party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a 

defense to an admittedly untimely action because his conduct has induced another into forbearing 

suit within the applicable limitations period.” Cordova v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 129 Cal. App. 4th 

89, 96 (2005). Moreover, equitable estoppel does not indefinitely extend the time to file suit. A 

plaintiff must proceed “diligently [in filing suit] once the truth is discovered.” Lantzy, 31 Cal.4th 

at 384. 

Here, Plaintiff appears to argue that the instant suit is timely because George Hills Co., on 

behalf of Defendant, misrepresented that Plaintiff’s “claim was too late for consideration,” which 

“was designed to avoid [Plaintiff from] knowing the true facts that his claim was timely and 

should have bene reviewed on the merits.” TAC at ¶ 59. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 13 of 16
14

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Defendant’s “misrepresentations and legal omissions in its response letter [to Plaintiff’s 

government claim] was to suppress any inclination of [Plaintiff] to file a lawsuit against 

[Defendant].” Id. at ¶ 60. Thus, Plaintiff “submits that [Defendant] should not be allowed to assert 

any statute of limitations defense.” Id. at ¶ 71.

The Court finds that equitable estoppel does not prevent Defendant from asserting a statute 

of limitations defense because Plaintiff did not act “diligently” in filing the instant suit after 

Plaintiff discovered that his government claim form was timely filed. Plaintiff has failed to allege 

when exactly he discovered the error in George Hills Co.’s representation that Plaintiff’s claim 

was untimely. However, Plaintiff certainly discovered the “truth” before February 8, 2008, when 

Plaintiff filed suit against George Hills Co. in the Superior Court for Sacramento County and 

alleged that George Hills Co. made “false representations in that Plaintiff was induced to believe 

he did not have a timely claim against the City of Palo Alto.” ECF No. 34-1 at 3. Thus, Plaintiff 

waited more than nine years after discovering the “true state of facts” on at least February 8, 2008

before commencing the instant suit on October 16, 2017. Schafer, 237 Cal. App. 4th at 1261.

However, courts have found that a plaintiff was not diligent in commencing suit after 

discovering the “true state of facts” for time periods much shorter than the nine years in the instant 

case. For instance, in Gundogdu v. King Mai, Inc., the plaintiffs were made aware of the true state 

of facts by February 11, 2004 at the latest, and did not bring suit until April 2006. 171 Cal. App. 

4th 310, 317 (2009). The Gundogdu court held that the approximately two-year delay between the 

plaintiffs discovering the truth and filing suit indicated that plaintiffs did not “proceed diligently 

once the truth was discovered.” Id. Another court has held that a delay of four years demonstrated 

nondiligence. Eason v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 5608129, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2017)

(“The suit here is simply a four year old afterthought . . . . Plaintiff has not been diligent.”); see 

also Schramm v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 12882882, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 

2012) (20-month delay “insufficient to demonstrate diligence”); Akin v. Duro-Last, Inc., 2016 WL 

659221, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2016) (five-year delay does not demonstrate diligence); 

Lefkowitz v. Wirta, 2014 WL 129634, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2014) (seven-year delay does 

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 14 of 16
15

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

not demonstrate diligence). 

In sum, the equitable estoppel doctrine requires diligence in filing suit after a plaintiff 

discovers the truth. Here, Plaintiff waited at least nine years after discovering that George Hills 

Co. erroneously rejected Plaintiff’s government claim for being untimely before Plaintiff instituted 

the instant suit. Thus, Plaintiff was not diligent in bringing the instant claim, so equitable estoppel 

does not apply here. 

Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss because even with equitable 

tolling, Plaintiff’s suit is untimely. Moreover, equitable estoppel does not apply here to excuse 

Plaintiff’s noncompliance with the two-year statute of limitations. The Court finds that granting 

leave to amend would be futile and unduly prejudicial to Defendant. Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 

532. Plaintiff has already had 4 opportunities to clearly state and allege facts in support of 

Plaintiff’s claim. From the Court’s December 4, 2018 Order, Plaintiff had notice that the Court 

believed Plaintiff’s claim to be time barred by a statute of limitations, and that tolling could not 

save the claim. ECF No. 25 at 3. In addition, the Court warned that if Plaintiff “fails to cure the 

deficiencies identified in this order, the deficient claim will be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 4.

The December 4, 2018 Order also stated that “unless Plaintiff can amend his complaint . . . 

supporting his claim of equitable estoppel, the Court will have no choice but to dismiss his claims 

with prejudice for being time-barred.” Id. Despite these warnings, the TAC fails to cure the 

deficiencies previously identified by the Court. Any amendment would be futile because 

Plaintiff’s suit fails as a matter of law, as neither equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel can save 

the suit from being time barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, it would be unduly 

prejudicial to require Defendant to litigate a case that fails as a matter of law. Thus, leave to 

amend is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss with 

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 15 of 16
16

Case No. 17-CV-05913-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Dated: June 21, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:17-cv-05913-LHK Document 47 Filed 06/21/19 Page 16 of 16