Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06019/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06019-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 210
Nature of Suit: Land Condemnation
Cause of Action: 40:258(a) Public Buildings &amp; Property: Land Condemnation

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

14.02 ACRES OF LAND MORE OR )

LESS IN THE COUNTY OF FRESNO, )

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-03-6019 REC LJO

ORDER DISMISSING MOTION AS

MOOT AND GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, SUA SPONTE, IN

FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.

On August 1, 2005, the court was scheduled to hear Plaintiff

United States of America’s motion to exclude expert testimony and

request for an order establishing the burden of proof at trial. 

At the hearing, the parties informed the court that the parties

had stipulated to the value of the property in this eminent

domain action via their joint pretrial statement. See Doc. 128.

The Government then asserted that no viable issues remain

for trial because this court previously granted judgment on the

pleadings as to the propriety of the taking. See Reporter’s

Transcript “RT” at 9. Counsel for Maxine H. Sawyer, Mark Sawyer,

Harriet Leonard, Charles Sawyer, Andrew Klemm, Bradley Leonard,

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Ramon Echeveste, and Cecelia Echeveste (“Group Defendants”)

asserted that there are “viable issues for trial other than

valuation.” RT at 10. 

The court requested supplemental briefing requiring Group

Defendants to cite authority for the position that a trial may be

had as to the taking despite the entry of judgment on the

pleadings. The United States was given time to respond. This

supplemental briefing was completed on August 9, 2005. 

Upon due consideration of the written and oral arguments of

the parties and the record herein, the court has determined that

no issues remain for trial. The court therefore GRANTS summary

judgment sua sponte in favor of Plaintiff United States. 

I. General Background

The United States filed the instant action on July 29, 2003,

seeking to obtain easement rights through its power of eminent

domain to approximately 14.02 acres of land in western Fresno

County. The stated public use is the construction of a

transmission line that comprises part of the power transmission

system of the Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest Interie

Project. The project is administered by the Western Area Power

Administration under the United States Department of Energy.

On January 14, 2004, Group Defendants filed an answer to the

United States’ complaint challenging the attempt to condemn the

14.02 acres of disputed property and asserting eight affirmative

defenses. On May 3, 2004, the United States moved to strike

Group Defendants’ answer, or alternatively, for judgment on the

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

pleadings regarding the United States’ right to obtain an

easement interest in the 14.02 acres. Specifically, the United

States requested “judgment as to its right to take the subject

property.” See Doc. 67. 

On June 21, 2004, the court granted the motion for judgment

on the pleadings, thereby authorizing the United States’ right to

condemn the 14.02 acres for the stated purpose. See Doc. 95; see

also Doc. 130 at 3-4. In rejecting each of the eight affirmative

defenses raised by Group Defendants, the court concluded that

“WAPA was fully authorized by federal law to construct the Path

15 Project and to condemn the power line transmission easement

for it” and rejected Group Defendants’ attack as to the proposed

public use. Doc. 95 at 14, 26. The court held that there was

“no question that the Complaint alleges all that is required by

Rule 71A.” Id. at 39. 

Group Defendants appealed the order granting judgment on the

pleadings to the Ninth Circuit. See Doc. 100. The Ninth Circuit

dismissed the appeal as being of a non-final decision because a

“final decision in condemnation proceeding is one which

adjudicates all rights, ‘including . . . just compensation.’”

Order of 9th Cir., Doc. 117 (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324

U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). In other words, the court’s order was

non-appealable because it disposed with only a portion of the

case; the valuation issue remained.

On April 1, 2005, Group Defendants disclosed defendant Ramon

Echeveste and third-party Loretta Lynch of the University of

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Group Defendants argued that the motion was untimely 1

because the hearing date went beyond the date in the scheduling

order. The court was unavailable on both July 18 and July 25,

2005, and directed the United States to calendar the hearing for

August 1, 2005. The court hereby amends the scheduling order such

that the Pretrial Motion Hearing Deadline is August 1, 2005.

 To the extent counsel for Group Defendants asserted that 2

the United States’ “motion was not strictly couched in terms of

4

California Berkeley as Group Defendants’ possible experts. The

expert disclosure indicated that neither witness was a retained

expert. See Doc. 119. 

The United States filed a motion to exclude the expert

testimony of both witnesses. The United states argued that Group

Defendants violated Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure because Group Defendants’ experts did not provide

the United States with reports. In its motion, the United States

specified that it was seeking to prohibit Group Defendants “from

introducing expert testimony in support of their valuation claims

at trial.” Pl.’s Mot.(Doc. 123) at 5. The motion also sought an

order setting forth the burdens of proof at trial and the

sequence in which the parties would present evidence. 

Group Defendants argued in response that the United States’

motion was untimely, procedurally improper and frivolous.

On Friday, July 29, 2005, the parties filed their Joint

Pretrial Statement. See Doc. 128. The parties agree that the

“value of the property taken is $7,374.32.” Id. at 3. 

II. The United States’ Motion is Moot1

The United States moved to exclude expert testimony as it

related to Group Defendants’ valuation claims at trial. Pl.’s 2

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

excluding valuation experts, it was couched in terms of excluding

all experts,” counsel is incorrect. RT at 7. The United States

specifically argued that “Group Defendants are prohibited from

introducing expert testimony in support of their valuation claims

at trial.” Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 123) at 5 (emphasis added). 

5

Mot. at 5; RT at 9. As the parties have stipulated that the

value of the property is $7,374.32, the issue no longer needs to

be decided at trial and the United States’ motion to exclude

expert testimony is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

The United States also sought an order from the court

establishing the burden of proof at the valuation trial because

“it is well established that the landowner has the burden of

establishing the fair market value of the property subject to

condemnation.” United States v. 174.12 Acres of Land, 671 F.2d

313, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United States ex rel T.V.A.

v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 63 S. Ct. 1047, 87 L. Ed. 1390

(1943)). This request is likewise DISMISSED AS MOOT.

III. Summary Judgment is Appropriate

A. The Condemnation Process

Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs

condemnation proceedings. It “contemplates a two-step procedure. 

In the first step, the government announces what land it needs, 

and the landowners are given a full opportunity to present, in

their answers, objections or defenses they have to the taking. 

Any defenses so raised are ruled upon by the court.” Gov’t of

Virgin Islands v. 19.623 Acres of Land, 536 F.2d 566, 569 (3d

Cir. 1976). In the second step, the issue of just compensation

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The court inadvertently omitted the word “jury” in its 3

prior order, see Doc. 130 at 5:12-13. The court did not intend to

imply that a court trial as to the propriety of the taking is never

allowed by Rule 71A; a court trial may indeed be appropriate as to

affirmative defenses not rejected by a dispositive motion.

6

is determined. Id. It is only as to the second step that a

party has a right to a jury trial; all other legal and factual

issues are to be decided by the trial court. See Fed. R. Civ. 3

P. 71A(h); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 20, 25 L. Ed.

2d 12, 90 S. Ct. 803 (1970); United States v. Certain Parcels of

Land, 509 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 1975). 

Rule 71A specifies that “except as otherwise provided by

this rule” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the

procedure for the condemnation of real and personal property.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A(a). Rule 71A does not preclude a pre-trial

motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12. 

B. Summary Judgment is Appropriate

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A court has the inherent power to enter summary judgment sua

sponte, so long as notice is provided to the losing party. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265,

106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). 

At the hearing on the motion to exclude, counsel for Group

Defendants asserted that they could “proceed with a certain cause

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Group Defendants take issue with the four page limitation 4

imposed by the court’s order. Given that the court requested only

a citation to a case or statute, nothing more, the page limit was

not inappropriate.

 These issues mirror the affirmative defenses raised by 5

Group Defendants in their answer. 

7

of action, namely the defense to the complaint to which Ms.

Lynch’s expert testimony relates.” RT at 4 (emphasis added). 

The defenses to the complaint can be none other than the

affirmative defenses that were raised by Group Defendants in

their answer, as Rule 71A specifies that the answer is the only

filing in which defenses may be raised. As these defenses were

rejected in the order granting judgment on the pleadings, the

court provided Group Defendants with the opportunity to

demonstrate that there remain issues for trial. The court

specifically requested legal authority - “what case or statute”4

- for the proposition that a party may, after judgment on the

pleadings is entered against it, present evidence as to the

issues decided in the decision granting judgment on the

pleadings. Doc. 130 at 6. 

Group Defendants assert that there “can be no question that

Group Defendants have the right to a court trial on the issues

they have set forth in their Joint Pretrial Statement.” Defs.’ 5

Statement at 2. The court disagrees.

The legal authority cited by Group Defendants is largely

inapposite and is unpersuasive. None of the authorities involve

an order granting judgment on the pleadings and its subsequent

effect in a takings case. Two involve the doctrine of claim

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The United States’ assertion that such a request would be 6

governed by Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is

8

preclusion / res judicata, which is not relevant here as no party

has sought to assert preclusion based on an earlier case. 

See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000) (discussing

preclusive effect of prior case ending in consent judgment);

Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969

(Ct. Cl. 1967) (discussing preclusive effect of prior patent case

in subsequent litigation involving different party). Another

involves a finding that a district court exceeded its authority

when it dismissed a case as a sanction for violation of the

scheduling order in a separate but related case. Atchison, T. &

S.F. Ry. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1998). This

case is also irrelevant. 

Group Defendants also argue that an entry of summary

judgment sua sponte would be “in derogation of the Federal Rules”

and that the judgment on the pleadings does not support summary

judgment because a non-final judgment may be reconsidered. 

Defs.’ Statement at 4. Group Defendants are correct that a court

may reconsider its prior rulings in a case. Jeffries v. Wood,

114 F.3d 1484, 1510 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008

(1997). However, the law of the case doctrine “enables the court

to treat its own interlocutory rulings as final and go on with

the business of deciding the rest of the case.” Id. Moreover,

as the United States points out, Group Defendants have not

requested reconsideration. The potential for reconsideration 6

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

mistaken. Local Rule 78-230(k) governs motions for reconsideration

of non-final orders; Rule 60 applies only to final judgments. E.D.

Cal. R. 78-230(k). 

9

does not prohibit a court from proceeding with a case. 

Group Defendants assert that “there has been no motion for

summary judgment or any other type of dispositive motion on

Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Defs.’ Statement at 2. Group Defendants

are incorrect. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is a

dispositive motion to be decided by a district court. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (listing mechanisms for dispositive

determinations that may not be designated to magistrate judges);

see also Boskoff v. Yano, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Haw.

2001). The granting of judgment on the pleadings was a

dispositive determination as to the issue of the taking. It was

not a final determination of the entire case only because Rule

71A provides for a separate trial as to just compensation.

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is

essentially the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; both

challenge the “legal sufficiency of a parties’ allegations.” 

Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed. Civ. Pro.

Before Trial § 9.319 (The Rutter Group 2005) (“Schwarzer”). In

deciding the motion a court must, as this court did, construe the

pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Doc. 95 at 10. In granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of

the United States and rejecting the affirmative defenses raised

by Group Defendants, the court determined that it appeared beyond

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

doubt that Group Defendants could prove no set of facts in

support of their defenses that would entitle them to relief. See

Doc. 95 at 10-11 (quoting Rule 12(b)(6) standard of Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Schwarzer § 9:335. 

This determination was and is dispositive as to the affirmative

defenses.

The order granting judgment on the pleadings eliminated any

factual issues as to the propriety of the taking. The parties’

stipulation in the joint pretrial statement eliminates any

factual issues as to the issue of just compensation. No genuine

issue of material fact remains in this case. 

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED summary judgment is hereby

GRANTED, sua sponte, in favor of Plaintiff United States.

FURTHER ORDERED that the United States’ motion to exclude

expert testimony is DISMISSED as moot.

FURTHER ORDERED that the United States shall, within 5

business days, lodge with the court a proposed order appropriate

to dispose of this case, including findings of fact and

conclusions of law, if appropriate. Judgment shall be entered

after the court receives, reviews and adopts the proposed order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-06019-REC -LJO Document 136 Filed 09/14/05 Page 10 of 10