Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_15-cv-00533/USCOURTS-alnd-6_15-cv-00533-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

REBA H. FELL,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

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Case No. 6:15-cv-00533-TMP

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, Reba H. Fell, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application 

for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Fell timely pursued and exhausted 

her administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for 

review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to 

the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c). (Doc. 17). Accordingly, the court issues the following memorandum 

opinion.

FILED

 2016 Sep-28 PM 04:29

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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Ms. Fell was 46 years old on the date of the ALJ’s opinion. (Tr. at 30). Her

past work experience includes employment as a framer, furniture builder, and 

housekeeper. Id. Ms. Fell claims that she became disabled on April 1, 2009, due to

nerve damage from an injury of the left shoulder, arm, and neck, and anxiety. (Tr. 

at 270). The plaintiff also sought, and was awarded, a closed period of disability 

benefits from October 11, 2005 through October 11, 2006, immediately following 

the injury. 

When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the 

regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 

2001). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing 

substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If 

she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If she is not, the 

Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental 

impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These 

impairments must be severe and must meet the 12-month durational requirements 

before a claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the 

medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 

1971). An impairment is “severe” if it more than minimally affects the claimant’s 

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ability to perform substantial gainful work. If the claimant’s impairments are not 

severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of 

whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment 

listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within 

this category, she will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they 

do not, a determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity will be made 

and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). 

Residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is an assessment, based on all relevant 

evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability to do work despite her impairments. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.945(a)(1).

The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s 

impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past 

relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the 

claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. 

Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the 

claimant’s age, education, and past work experience, in order to determine if he or 

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she can do other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the 

claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden is on the 

Commissioner to demonstrate that other jobs exist which the claimant can 

perform; and, once that burden is met, the claimant must prove her inability to 

perform those jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 

1228 (11th Cir. 1999).

Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Fell last 

met the insured status requirement on December 31, 2009. (Tr. at 22). She 

further determined that Ms. Fell had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

between the alleged onset date of April 1, 2009, and the plaintiff’s date last insured. 

Id. The ALJ goes on to say that there is no record of work activity for the plaintiff 

since the alleged onset date. Id. According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s complex regional 

pain syndrome (“CRPS”), affecting the posterior aspects of the plaintiff’s left 

upper extremity, status post cervical spine fusion, anxiety disorder, and major 

depressive disorder are considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth in 

the regulations. Id. The ALJ also determined that the plaintiff suffered from the 

non-severe impairment of obesity. (Tr. at 23). She found that the plaintiff’s

impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. The ALJ did not find Ms. Fell’s 

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allegations related to pain and the impact of her impairments to be totally credible, 

and determined that she has the residual functional capacity to “perform light work 

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except with frequent performance of postural 

maneuvers but no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant should 

avoid overhead reaching, concentrated exposure to extreme cold and heat, and all 

exposure to dangerous moving unguarded machinery and unprotected heights. 

The claimant would be limited to unskilled work defined as understanding, 

remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, maintaining concentration and 

remaining on task for two hour periods throughout an eight-hour workday with all 

customary rest periods, and tolerating infrequent and well-explained workplace 

changes and occasional and non-intensive interaction with the general public.”

(Tr. at 23-24, 25).

According to the ALJ, Ms. Fell was unable to perform any of her past 

relevant work through her date last insured of December 31, 2009. (Tr. at 30). 

The plaintiff is a “younger individual,” and she has a “limited education,” as 

those terms are defined by the regulations. Id. The ALJ determined that 

“transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability 

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that 

the claimant is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job 

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skills.” Id. The ALJ found that Ms. Fell has the residual functional capacity to 

perform a significant range of light work. (Tr. at 31). Even though Plaintiff cannot 

perform the full range of light work, the ALJ used the vocational expert’s testimony

as a guideline for finding that there are a significant number of jobs in the national 

economy that she is capable of performing, such as ticket taker, bench 

assembler/small products, and information clerk. Id. The ALJ concluded her

findings by stating that Plaintiff “was not under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, at any time from April 1, 2009, the alleged onset date, through 

December 31, 2009, the date last insured.” Id.

II. Standard of Review

This court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act 

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there 

is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the 

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 

1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual findings of the 

Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions.

See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The court may not decide 

facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id.

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“The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act 

with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent 

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding 

from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 

1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Mar. 

Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this court finds that the 

evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the court must 

affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400.

No decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential standard [for 

review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in its entirety 

to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 

F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal 

standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 

1984).

The court must keep in mind that opinions such as whether a claimant is 

disabled, the nature and extent of a claimant’s residual functional capacity, and the 

application of vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, 

opinions on issues reserved to the commissioner because they are administrative 

findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or 

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decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). Whether the 

plaintiff meets the listing and is qualified for Social Security disability benefits is a 

question reserved for the ALJ, and the court “may not decide facts anew, reweigh 

the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Dyer v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, even if the court were to 

disagree with the ALJ about the significance of certain facts, the court has no power 

to reverse that finding as long as there is substantial evidence in the record 

supporting it. 

III. Discussion

Ms. Fell alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded for 

three reasons. First, she argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in her 

evaluation of the plaintiff’s chronic regional pain syndrome (“CRPS”). Second, 

the plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the various medical 

source opinions in the record. And, third, she asserts that the ALJ failed to 

articulate fully her reasons for rejecting the testimony of the plaintiff’s husband. 

A. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Plaintiff’s CRPS

According to the plaintiff, the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standard 

for assessing the plaintiff’s CRPS. She claims that the ALJ inappropriately applied 

Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 03-2p by failing to properly evaluate the plaintiff’s

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credibility or apply the Eleventh Circuit pain standard. An explanation regarding 

the identification and evaluation of CRPS under the Social Security Administration 

rules is provided by SSR 03-2p which states, as follows:

Policy Interpretation

What is RSDS/CRPS?

RSDS/CRPS is a chronic pain syndrome most often resulting from 

trauma to a single extremity. It can also result from diseases, surgery, 

or injury affecting other parts of the body. Even a minor injury can 

trigger RSDS/CRPS. The most common acute clinical manifestations 

include complaints of intense pain and findings indicative of 

autonomic dysfunction at the site of the precipitating trauma. Later, 

spontaneously occurring pain may be associated with abnormalities in 

the affected region involving the skin, subcutaneous tissue, and bone. 

It is characteristic of this syndrome that the degree of pain reported is 

out of proportion to the severity of the injury sustained by the 

individual. When left untreated, the signs and symptoms of the 

disorder may worsen over time. 

. . .

RSDS/CRPS constitutes a medically determinable impairment when 

it is documented by appropriate medical signs, symptoms, and 

laboratory findings, as discussed above. RSDS/CRPS may be the basis 

for a finding of “disability.” Disability may not be established on the 

basis of an individual’s statement of symptoms alone. 

For purposes of Social Security disability evaluation, RSDS/CRPS can 

be established in the presence of persistent complaints of pain that are 

typically out of proportion to the severity of any documented 

precipitant and one or more of the following clinically documented 

signs in the affected region at any time following the documented 

precipitant:

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• Swelling;

• Autonomic instability—seen as changes in skin color or texture, 

changes in sweating (decreased or excessive sweating), changes 

in skin temperature, and abnormal pilomotor erection 

(gooseflesh);

• Abnormal hair or nail growth (growth can be either too slow or 

too fast);

• Osteoporosis; or 

• Involuntary movements of the affected region of the initial 

injury.

When longitudinal treatment records document persistent limiting 

pain in an area where one or more of these abnormal signs has been 

documented at some point in time since the date of the precipitating 

injury, disability adjudicators can reliably determine that RSDS/CRPS 

is present and constitutes a medically determinable impairment. It 

may be noted in the treatment records that these signs are not present 

continuously, or the signs may be present at one examination and not 

appear at another. Transient findings are characteristic of 

RSDS/CRPS, and do not affect a finding that a medically 

determinable impairment is present. 

. . . 

Claims in which the individual alleges RSDS/CRPS are adjudicated 

using the sequential evaluation process, just as for any other 

impairment. Because finding that RSDS/CRPS is a medically 

determinable impairment requires the presence of chronic pain and 

one or more clinically documented signs in the affected region, the 

adjudicator can reliably find that pain is an expected symptom in this 

disorder. Other symptoms, including such things as extreme 

sensitivity to touch or pressure, or abnormal sensations of heat or cold, 

can also be associated with this disorder. Given that a variety of 

symptoms can be associated with RSDS/CRPS, once the disorder has 

been established as a medically determinable impairment, the 

adjudicator must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the extent to which 

the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do basis work activities. 

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For this purpose, whenever the individual’s statements about the 

intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other 

symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the 

adjudicator must make a finding on the credibility of the individual’s 

statement based on a consideration of the entire case record. This 

includes the medical signs and laboratory findings, the individual’s 

own statements about the symptoms, any statements and other 

information provided by treating or examining physicians or 

psychologists and other persons about the symptoms and how they 

affect the individual, and any other relevant evidence in the case 

record. Although symptoms alone cannot be the basis for finding a 

medically determinable impairment, once the existence of a medically 

determinable impairment has been established, an individual’s 

symptoms and the effect(s) of those symptoms on the individual’s 

ability to function must be considered both in determining impairment 

severity and in assessing the individual’s residual functional capacity 

(RFC), as appropriate. If the adjudicator finds that pain or other 

symptoms cause a limitation or restriction having more than a minimal 

effect on an individual’s ability to perform basis work activities, a 

“severe” impairment must be found to exist. See SSR 96-3p, “Titles 

II and XVI: Considering Allegations of Pain and Other Symptoms in 

Determining Whether a Medically Determinable Impairment is 

Severe” and SSR 96-7p, “Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms 

in Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual’s 

Statements.” 

SSR 03-2p, “Titles II and XVI: Evaluating Cases Involving Reflex Sympathetic 

Dystrophy Syndrome/Complex Regional Pain Syndrome, 2003 WL 22399117 

(October 20, 2003).

The ALJ acknowledged that the plaintiff suffered from the severe 

impairment of CRPS. (Tr. at 22). Therefore, according to SSR 03-2p, the ALJ is 

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next to evaluate the limiting effect of the plaintiff’s symptoms, as with any other 

medically determinable impairment. There is no special or different analysis or

assessment that applies to CRPS. The ALJ addressed the claimant’s credibility 

along with the medical evidence and applied the pain standard. The ALJ addressed 

the plaintiff’s CRPS symptoms as follows:

The claimant alleges disability due to injuries to the neck and left 

shoulder and arm, nerve damage, anxiety, chronic pain, and major 

depressive disorder (Exhibits B2E and B14E). In May 2009, the 

claimant reported pain affected her ability to sleep and limited her 

ability to independently perform personal care items, do household 

chores, and yard work. The claimant also reported she needed 

reminders to take medications and accompaniment to go places, could 

only walk to the mailbox before stopping to rest, had problems getting 

along with others, did not spend time with others, and could not 

follow instruction or handle stress or changes in routine well. 

However, the claimant reported she was able to prepare simple meals, 

drive, shop in stores, handle money accounts, and sit in a recliner and 

watch television and read all day (Exhibit B4E). The claimant’s 

husband corroborated some of the claimant’s reports and added the 

claimant got nervous around people and dealing with changes but 

could walk 400-500 feet before stopping to rest, spend time with 

others, and attend church on a regular basis (Exhibit B3E). At the 

hearing in March 2013, the claimant testified she received a workers’ 

compensation settlement of $80,000 in April 2009 for an injury to her 

shoulder that included continuing medical coverage. She also testified 

that she experiences pain in her neck, arms, and shoulders with stress 

and movement making the pain worse. The claimant stated she was 

not able to do household chores and lies down all the time. 

Additionally, the claimant stated her hands go dead with pain in the 

fingertips coming and going and she experiences problems with 

memory and concentration. The claimant’s husband, William Fell, 

also testified at the hearing and stated the claimant use [sic] to handle 

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paperwork for his company, but she has experienced a decline in 

mental functioning to the point she cannot comprehend instructions. 

Additionally, he stated the claimant need [sic] her medications fixed 

for her with someone to check up on her to make sure she took as 

prescribed. . . . 

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that 

the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, the 

claimant’s and her husband’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

credible for the reasons explained in this decision.

The objective medical evidence is fully consistent with the above 

residual functional capacity and is inconsistent with allegations of 

disabling levels of pain and other subjective complaints. The record 

shows the claimant injured her neck and shoulder in a work place 

injury in October 2005 (Exhibit B8F). On March 18, 2008, the 

claimant was awarded a closed period of disability from October 2005 

through October 2006 for the injury. On that date the claimant signed 

a request for a closed period form that stated “the claimant agrees that 

medical improvement has occurred” (Exhibit B4A and B6D). The 

claimant testified at her July 2010 hearing that she did sign the form 

requesting a closed period of disability with medical improvement and 

in fact that nothing in her condition had changed since the day she 

signed the form and her previously alleged onset date of March 20, 

2008. As such, it is a reasonable inference from this evidence that 

medical improvement did occur from her October 2005 work-place 

injury and continued on until at least March 2008. The record shows 

January 2009 diagnostic imaging revealed an intact fusion with mild 

narrowing and shallow disc protrusion at the C5-6 disc without neural 

impingement of the cervical spinal cord and wide clavicle resection of 

the left shoulder with slightly elevated humeral head but intact joint 

with no evidence of residual or recurrent rotator cuff tear, 

subscapularis tendinopathy, or impingement. Clinical examination 

showed decreased range of motion of the claimant’s cervical spine and 

left shoulder but intact grip strength in both upper extremities (Exhibit 

B6F). In April 2009, Dr. Cornelius, a treating physician for the 

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claimant, reported the claimant’s physical position was similar to that 

of her MMPI finding two years earlier with hypersensitivity in the left 

scapula but examination showing inconsistent reports in the 

claimant’s range of motion of her left arm and ability to palpate along

the left upper extremity without difficulty (Exhibit B7F). The 

following month, the claimant reported she was able to take a trip 

down to Mobile, Alabama with her sister and managed the trip well 

and was able to enjoy herself (Exhibit B13F). The undersigned notes 

the distance for this trip would have been over 300 miles and four 

hours driving time one way indicating the ability to sit and travel for an 

extended period of time. Additionally, treatment records in August 

2009 noted the claimant was able to walk with a normal gait while 

wearing heeled shoes and maneuver a six and [a] half pound purse on 

her right arm. Dr. Cornelius noted in November 2009 that the pattern 

of pain demonstrated and reported by the claimant was unlikely to be 

significant for spinal pathology such as a herniated disc. Furthermore, 

the claimant continued to demonstrate a normal gait in early 2010 

despite her continu[ing] to wear heeled platform shoes (Exhibit B13F).

The undersigned also notes the record contains consultative 

examinations conducted after the claimant’s date last insured and 

finds this evidence further clarifies the picture in terms of the 

claimant’s physical functioning as it gives a reference to what the level 

of functioning continued to be after December 31, 2009. In August 

2010, Dr. Norwood examined the claimant and found no neurological 

deficits. While the claimant demonstrated variable power in testing 

left arm and shoulder, Dr. Norwood noted with distraction and 

repeated testing the claimant was able to show normal strength in all 

muscle groups of left arm including the left shoulder girdle muscles 

and the claimant’s reports of variable pinprick appreciation over the 

left arm were without consistent findings. In fact, clinical examination 

also showed good range of motion of the neck, low back, hips, knees, 

ankles, and right shoulder and arm, minimally antalgic gait, normal 

strength in the right upper extremity and lower extremities bilaterally, 

normal muscle tone and bulk in all extremities, no muscle spasm, 

ability to walk on heels and toes independently, arise from sitting 

position without assistance, oppose both thumbs and make fists 

bilaterally, use hand independently to open and close handicapped 

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accessible door and button and/or unbutton buttons, and her strength 

remained good even after repetitive exercise. Additionally, Dr. 

Norwood administered nerve conduction and EMG studies on the 

claimant’s left arm with result showing no evidence of left cervical 

radiculopathy, left carpal tunnel syndrome, or other neuropathy in the 

left arm (Exhibit B16F). Furthermore, the undersigned notes his 

evidence is consistent with the subsequent findings on the claimant’s 

October 2012 consultative examination which revealed only limited 

range of motion in the claimant’s shoulders with normal range of 

motion in her neck, elbows, lumbar spine, hips, knees, and ankles with 

intact sensation to pin prick, position, and vibration (Exhibit B19F). 

Thus the undersigned finds the objective medical evidence does not 

demonstrate abnormalities which would interfere with the claimant's 

ability to perform the range of work identified above for the time 

period in question. 

The course of medical treatment and the use of medication in this case 

are not consistent with disabling levels of pain and other complaints. 

While the claimant alleges disability in April 2009, review of the 

record shows the claimant had not been seen by Dr. Berke, treating 

physician, for over a year and a half before she was treated in January 

2009 for reports of neck and left shoulder pain reaching a 6/10 pain 

level (Exhibit B6F). The record shows the claimant also sought 

treatment in January 2009 from Dr. Cornelius, pain management 

specialist, with reports of overdoing it with working around the house. 

There was no additional treatment sought by the claimant until April 

2009 when the claimant was treated for emotional distress and suicidal 

ideation, but in an effort to accurately assess the claimant’s condition, 

Dr. Cornelius also examined the claimant and noted the claimant’s 

physical functioning was similar to that of her MMPI evaluation two 

years prior and her issues seemed to stem mostly from increasing 

mental symptoms. Despite this episode, the record shows the 

claimant improved to the point that she was able to make a trip with 

her sister to Mobile, Alabama with no significant difficulties in May 

2009 and then in August 2009 the claimant reported she was able to 

perform household chores and attend church services on a regular 

basis. Treatment records show significant improvement in the 

claimant’s reported symptoms with the claimant reporting a 50 

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percent improvement in her pain levels in November 2009 resulting in 

her feeling like her old self. This improvement continued through 

December 31, 2009 with the claimant reporting on 5/10 pain levels as 

of January 2010 and an upwards of 60 percent improvement in pain

levels with her condition noted as stable as of April 2010 (Exhibits B7F 

and B13F). Furthermore, there is no indication in these treatment 

notes that the claimant requested frequent changes to her medication 

regime or sought alternative treatment modality, such as referral for 

biofeedback, a TENS unit, or physical therapy if the prescribed 

medications were not effective. Therefore, the undersigned finds that 

the course of medical treatment in this case does not bolster the 

claimant’s credibility with respect to the degree of her pain and other 

subjective complaints. 

The claimant reported inconsistent abilities in her daily activities 

report and the undersigned finds these reports are inconsistent with 

disabling levels of pain. While the claimant reported in her disability 

paperwork that pain affected her ability to independently perform 

personal care items and do household chores, the record shows the 

claimant reported to treating physicians that she was in fact able to 

perform some household chores and other activities of daily living. In 

January 2009, the claimant reported overdoing it working around the 

house and then as of August 2009 she reported cleaning bathrooms, 

dusting, and doing other activities of daily living. Additionally, 

treatment records noted the claimant was consistently very well 

groomed with jewelry on each finger, hair fixed, nails done, and full 

makeup applied. The claimant was also noted to frequently wear 

heeled platform shoes and be able to maneuver a purse weighing over 

six pounds with no difficulties in her gait indicated (Exhibits B7F, 

B13F, and B21F). Furthermore, the record shows the claimant 

reported being able to prepare simple meals, drive, shop in stores, 

handle money accounts, watch television, and read (Exhibits B4E and 

B8F). The undersigned finds the claimant’s reported daily activities 

show the claimant is not as limited as she has alleged and thus do not 

add credibility to the claimant’s allegations that her impairments 

prevent her from being able to perform any type of work activity. 

. . . 

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Finally, 20 C.F.R. 404.1529 requires the undersigned to consider the 

claimant’s work history in assessing her credibility. The claimant’s 

earnings record shows very low lifetime earnings with a significant 

break of at least two years prior to her returning to work in 2004 

(Exhibit B9D). The record shows the claimant was injured in an 

October 2005 work-related injury for which she requested a closed 

period of disability for one year and received a workers’ compensation 

settlement in the amount of $80,000 with continuing medical 

coverage in January 2008 (Exhibits B5D and B6D). Despite the 

claimant’s stipulation of medical improvement after October 2006 and 

testimony that [her] condition remained relatively the same up until at 

least March 2008, the claimant did not return to work. However, 

treatment records do note the claimant consistently reported in 2009 

and 2010 that she remained mostly at home attending to the duties 

about the house and being able to drive herself unencumbered from 

distances as great as Birmingham, Alabama, some one to two hours 

away (Exhibits B7F and B13F). Additionally, the undersigned notes 

the record contains reports by the claimant’s husband noting the 

claimant did all the business account work for his business at one point 

but it is unclear so [sic] to the time period in which she performed this 

work activity (Exhibits B17F and hearing). Furthermore, treatment 

records show in January 2012 the claimant requested information on 

Vocational Rehabilitation training and state she had started putting in 

applications at local facilities, including nursing homes, looking for 

employment (Exhibit B21F). As such, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant’s work history does not lend great support to the credibility 

of her statements about her inability to work because of her pain and 

other subjective complaints.

As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned notes the record 

contains medical source statements from multiple parties and all the 

statements have been reviewed and considered by the undersigned. In 

April 2013, Dr. Ragland, the claimant’s general practitioner, opined 

the claimant would be unable to perform any work on an eight-hour 

per day or forty-hour per week basis and she would miss work more 

than two days per month on average and be unable to concentrate and 

stay a [sic] task for two hour periods of time (Exhibit B26F). The 

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undersigned gives little weight to Dr. Ragland’s opinion as it is not 

consistent with her own treatment records or the medical evidence as 

a whole for the time period in question. Dr. Ragland treated the 

claimant in May 2008 for poison oak exposure at which time the 

claimant requested weight loss medication and made no complaints of 

severe pain or frequent symptoms that would support Dr. Ragland’s 

April 2013 opinion (Exhibit B5F). Furthermore, Dr. Ragland’s 

subsequent treatment of the claimant in March 2009, the month prior 

to the claimant’s alleged onset date, show[s] she only complained of 

cold-like symptoms including congestion and cough (Exhibit B12F). 

As such, the undersigned does not find Dr. Ragland’s opinion in 

regards to the time period in question for this decision. Additionally, 

the undersigned notes the record contains a medical source statement 

regarding the claimant’s physical functioning by Dr. Norwood, 

consultative neurologist. Dr. Norwood opined in August 2010 that 

the claimant could lift and/or carry 50 pounds frequently and 100 

pounds occasionally, sit for two hours in an eight-hour workday. He 

further opined the claimant could frequently climb ladders and stairs 

and continuously reach, overhead reach, handle[,] finger, feel, push, 

pull, use foot controls, and perform postural maneuvers based upon 

finding no clear radicular features or evidence of neurologic deficit on 

examination or diagnostic testing (Exhibit B16F). The undersigned 

has considered Dr. Norwood’s opinion and gives it some weight due 

to his specialization in this field of medicine leaving him well qualified 

to evaluate restrictions from a neurologic perspective and also the 

opinion’s consistency with Dr. Norwood’s own examination of the 

claimant. However, the undersigned finds the record as a whole 

shows abnormalities on clinical examination and objective diagnostic 

imaging that support the claimant’s functioning was more limited as of 

December 2009 than expressed in Dr. Norwood’s opinion. 

. . . 

Accordingly, based upon the substantial weight of the objective 

medical evidence, the claimant’s course of treatment, her level of daily 

activity, her work history, and the medical source opinions of record, 

which have been given appropriate weight for the reasons cited above, 

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the undersigned finds that the claimant retains the residual functional 

capacity for the reduced range of light work identified above.

(Tr. at 24-30).

The plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed “to recognize Fell’s subjective 

complaints that are consistent with the diagnosis of CRPS.” (Doc. 14, p. 8). She 

points out that SSR 03-2p recognizes that one of the characteristics of CRPS is 

complaint of pain disproportional to the severity of the precipitating injury or 

condition. From this, she contends that it is not surprising that she has severe pain 

even with little evidence of a physical condition that can cause pain.

The ALJ noted that the plaintiff had the severe impairment of CRPS along 

with anxiety and depression. (Tr. at 22). She also noted that “the claimant’s 

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of 

the alleged symptoms. . . .” (Tr. at 25). The ALJ did not ignore the plaintiff’s 

CRPS determination. In this case, the plaintiff’s severe impairment is one which is 

recognized to be difficult to diagnose and the medical records of which may include 

transient or irregular findings of a variety of symptoms, one of which is a presence 

of more severe pain than “should” be caused by an underlying injury. However, 

SSR 03-2p discussing CRPS is clear that the presence of a severe medically 

determinable impairment alone is not sufficient to require a finding of disability. 

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The plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations must be evaluated in the same way 

symptoms and limitations are evaluated for any other medically determinable 

limitation that does not meet or equal a listing. Merely the existence of CRPS does 

not dictate a finding of disability; the ALJ must still determine whether the 

condition precludes gainful employment. 

The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ inappropriately applied the Eleventh 

Circuit’s pain standard to the plaintiff’s subjective allegations of disabling pain. 

Subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms may establish the presence of a 

disabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 

F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish disability based upon pain and other 

subjective symptoms, “[t]he pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying 

medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the 

severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively 

determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably 

expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 

(11th Cir. 2005) (citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)); see 

also Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986). The ALJ is permitted 

to discredit the claimant’s subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms if she 

articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 

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1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (1996) 

(“[T]he adjudicator must carefully consider the individual’s statements about 

symptoms with the rest of the relevant evidence in the case record in reaching a 

conclusion about the credibility of the individual’s statements.”). Although the 

Eleventh Circuit does not require explicit findings as to a claimant’s credibility, 

“‘the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court.’” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 

(quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562). “[P]articular phrases or formulations” do not 

have to be cited in an ALJ’s credibility determination, but it cannot be a “broad 

rejection which is “not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to 

conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.” Id. 

The ALJ determined that the plaintiff in the instant case met the first step of 

the pain standard, that she provided evidence of an underlying medical condition. 

See Dyer, 395 at 1210. However, the ALJ found that the plaintiff failed either to 

show objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the pain or that the 

medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise 

to the alleged pain. Id. The ALJ explained that the plaintiff’s subjective testimony 

of pain was inconsistent with the medical record, as well as her description of her 

daily activities. As set out above, the ALJ cited both the medical record as well as 

the plaintiff’s own testimony to support her determination that the plaintiff’s 

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subjective pain testimony is not credible. The determination of credibility is left to 

the ALJ and the ALJ is entitled to discredit the plaintiff’s credibility so long as she 

articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Here, the ALJ meets her 

burden. The ALJ did not improperly analyze the plaintiff’s CRPS under SSR 03-

2p.

B. Medical Source Opinions

The plaintiff also finds fault in the ALJ’s determination based on her analysis 

of medical source opinions, including the plaintiff’s treating physicians Dr. Doleys

and Vanessa Ragland, D.O. A treating physician’s testimony is entitled to 

“substantial or considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” 

Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal 

quotations omitted). The weight to be afforded a medical opinion regarding the 

nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments depends, among other things, upon 

the examining and treating relationship the medical source had with the claimant, 

the evidence the medical source presents to support the opinion, how consistent 

the opinion is with the record as a whole, and the specialty of the medical source. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Furthermore, “good cause” exists for 

an ALJ to not give a treating physician’s opinion substantial weight when the

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“(1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence 

supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or 

inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 

1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440); see also Edwards v. 

Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that “good cause” existed 

where the opinion was contradicted by other notations in the physician’s own 

record).

The court must also keep in mind that opinions such as whether a claimant is 

disabled, the claimant’s residual functional capacity, and the application of 

vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on 

issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that 

are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of 

disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). The Court is interested in the 

doctors’ evaluations of the claimant’s “condition and the medical consequences 

thereof, not their opinions of the legal consequences of his [or her] condition.” 

Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Such statements by a physician are relevant to the ALJ’s 

findings, but they are not determinative, as it is the ALJ who bears the 

responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity. See, e.g., 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1546(c).

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On July 20, 2010, Dr. Doleys completed a medical source statement noting 

that he had seen the plaintiff every 2-3 months from April 2009. (Tr. at 478). He 

opined that the plaintiff would not be able to sustain work activity for a regular 40-

hour work week. Id. The ALJ addressed Dr. Doleys’ opinion as follows:

In regards to the claimant’s mental functioning, the record shows 

several medical source opinions from different sources. However, 

review of the record as a whole shows the claimant’s mental 

functioning declined in April 2009 for a very short period of time due 

to lack of proper treatment and therapy, but significantly improved 

after completing a treatment program and she functions with 

moderate mental impairment on a continuing basis. The undersigned 

gives little weight to Dr. Doley[s’] July 2010 opinion that the claimant 

cannot sustain work activity on a regular and continuing basis, as 

neither the complete record nor Dr. Doley[s’] own records support 

this conclusion (Exhibit B14F). This opinion is not a specific 

assessment of the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairments 

and based solely upon the subjective reports of symptoms and 

limitations provided to him by the claimant. Yet, as explained 

elsewhere in this decision, there exist good reasons for questioning the 

reliability of the claimant’s subjective complaints. Furthermore, Dr. 

Doley[s’] own reports chronicle the claimant with a history of 

posturing and within a few months of expressing his opinion, Dr. 

Doley[s] noted the claimant reported significant improvement since 

treatment began with increased activities. Due to the inconsistencies 

of the record and the doctor’s opinion, Dr. Doley[s’] opinion is 

accordingly rendered less persuasive. 

(Tr. at 29). In short, the ALJ found that Dr. Doley’s opinion that plaintiff could 

not work was inconsistent with his own treatment notes of her, supplying good 

cause to give less weight to the opinion. 

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The plaintiff was hospitalized for suicidal ideation on April 3, 2009. (Tr. at 

415). After the plaintiff was released from the hospital, Dr. Doleys reported that 

the plaintiff exhibited emotional improvement, but not improved physical 

functioning. (Tr. at 480). Dr. Doleys recommended that the plaintiff continue 

out-patient treatment. Id. The plaintiff’s first visit to Dr. Doleys was on August 

10, 2009, during which the plaintiff reported cleaning bathrooms, dusting, and 

other activities of daily living that her medication enabled her to do. (Tr. at 471). 

The plaintiff also reported avoiding crowds and fear of touch. Id. Dr. Doleys 

stated that the plaintiff suffered from “activity avoidance and anticipatory pain.” 

Id. On November 4, 2009, Dr. Doleys noted that the plaintiff’s affect was 

“strained,” but less tearful than past visits. (Tr. at 469). On January 27, 2010

(only a month after plaintiff’s last date insured), Dr. Doleys noted that the plaintiff 

“continues to report that she is 50% improved.” (Tr. at 465). The plaintiff also 

rated her pain at 5/10, and stated she was “substantially better” on Effexor. Id. 

The plaintiff’s “[m]ood was much more stable” than it had been in the past. (Tr. 

at 465-66). On April 21, 2010, Dr. Doleys stated that the plaintiff avoids a good 

deal of social contact and remains mostly at home “attending to duties about the 

house.” (Tr. at 462). He also stated that the plaintiff “continues to have a more 

stable mood th[a]n when she was first seen,” and that her condition was stable. Id. 

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Dr. Doleys stated in his note from July 9, 2010, that the plaintiff was not 

anticipated to improve significantly, that she is “incapacitated” for 2 to 3 days per 

week and avoids crowds, but the plaintiff drove without problems to the doctor’s 

office in Birmingham. (Tr. at 457). 

On January 25, 2011, Dr. Doleys noted that the plaintiff had begun reducing 

her opioid pain medication and exhibited minimal pain behavior with some 

apprehensiveness and anxiousness. (Tr. at 554). On July 7, 2011, the plaintiff 

“continue[d] to do fairly well” on her medication and was not particularly 

depressed, despite appearing fairly anxious. (Tr. at 547). On January 4, 2012, Dr. 

Doleys noted that the plaintiff was doing “fairly well,” had no signs of 

psychological distress, and was discussing her need for a job. (Tr. at 545). In his 

notes from March 20, 2012, Dr. Doleys noted that the plaintiff has moderate to 

severe depression with ongoing pharmacological management. (Tr. at 542). On 

September 5, 2012, Dr. Doleys noted that the plaintiff was somewhat sullen, but 

that she exhibited minimal pain behaviors and used no assistive devices. (Tr. at 

534). A survey of Doleys’ medical records indicates that the ALJ’s findings with 

regard to Doleys’ opinion statement is supported by substantial evidence 

On April 9, 2013, Dr. Ragland, the plaintiff’s general practitioner, wrote a 

letter detailing her assessment of the plaintiff’s health. She noted that the plaintiff 

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suffers from depression and anxiety resulting from chronic pain. (Tr. at 590). Dr. 

Ragland opined that the plaintiff would miss more than two days per month of work 

and is unable to stay on task for two hours at a time. Id. The ALJ also addressed 

Ragland’s opinion letter:

In April 2013, Dr. Ragland, the claimant’s general practitioner, opined 

the claimant would be unable to perform any work on an eight-hour 

per day or forty-hour per week basis and she would miss work more 

than two days per month on average and be unable to concentrate and 

stay [on] a task for two hour periods of time (Exhibit B26F). The 

undersigned gives little weight to Dr. Ragland’s opinion as it is not 

consistent with her own treatment records or the medical evidence as 

a whole for the time period in question. Dr. Ragland treated the 

claimant in May 2008 for poison oak exposure at which time the 

claimant requested weight loss medication and made no complaints of 

severe pain or frequent symptoms that would support Dr. Ragland’s 

April 2013 opinion (Exhibit B5F). Furthermore, Dr. Ragland’s 

subsequent treatment of the claimant in March 2009, the month prior 

to the claimant’s alleged onset date, show she only complained of 

cold-like symptoms including congestion and cough (Exhibit B12F). 

As such, the undersigned does not find Dr. Ragland’s own treatment 

records nor the objective medical evidence as a whole support Dr. 

Ragland’s opinion in regards to the time period in question for this 

decision. 

(Tr. at 28-29).

The plaintiff saw Dr. Ragland on March 9, 2007, and did not report 

depression or anxiety during her appointment. (Tr. at 400). On January 6 and 

January 23, 2008, the plaintiff saw Dr. Ragland for ear pain. (Tr. at 398-99). She 

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reported no depression or anxiety at her January 6 visit, and no notes were made for 

the January 23 visit. Id. The plaintiff also reported no anxiety or depression on 

May 6 or May 16, 2008. (Tr. at 396). On September 16, 2008, the plaintiff saw Dr. 

Ragland and reported no anxiety or depression. (Tr. at 395). On March 21, 2009, 

the plaintiff saw Dr. Ragland for sinus congestion, cough, and headache, but 

reported no anxiety, depression, or severe pain. (Tr. at 456). The plaintiff 

reported no anxiety, depression, or severe pain on September 8 or September 14, 

2011. (Tr. at 519-20). On July 13, 2012, the plaintiff saw Ragland for menopause 

symptoms. (Tr. at 518). The plaintiff visited Ragland on August 23, 2012, and 

reported abdominal pain. (Tr. at 517). Ragland’s notes indicate that she suspects 

gallbladder issues. Id. 

In her notes from February 5, 2013, Dr. Ragland assessed the plaintiff as 

having menopause syndrome, muscle pain, chest pain, and joint pain at multiple 

sites. (Tr. at 591). The plaintiff was instructed to continue her medication and was 

referred to a rheumatologist for evaluation. (Tr. at 591-92). Dr. Ragland signed-off 

on notes on February 25, 2013, and the plaintiff came in for a procedure related to 

menopause. (Tr. at 593). Again, a longitudinal examination of the Dr. Ragland’s 

Records indicates that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

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There simply is nothing recorded in Dr. Ragland’s treatment notes indicating the 

plaintiff suffered from a debilitating medical or psychological condition. 

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the opinions of 

consulting psychologist Bonnie Atkinson.1

 The ALJ said of Atkinson’s opinion 

that “[t]he undersigned also gives little weight to the June 2009 opinion by Dr. 

Atkinson, consultative psychologist indicating the claimant did not have sufficient 

judgment to make acceptable work decisions or manage her own funds as evidence 

of record received after this opinion was provided shows the claimant is not as 

limited as expressed in this opinion (Exhibit B8F).” (Tr. at 29). The plaintiff 

contends that the ALJ failed to evaluate Atkinson’s opinion as it relates to the 

plaintiff’s mental functioning. This argument is without merit, however, because 

the ALJ clearly discussed Atkinson’s opinion and determined, specifically, that 

later records showed that the plaintiff’s abilities were not as limited as Atkinson 

opined. (Tr. at 29). The ALJ was within her discretion to give little or no weight to 

Atkinson’s assessment because it was inconsistent with other psychological 

evidence and plaintiff’s own testimony concerning her daily acitvities. 

The plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s failure to go into more detail about 

Atkinson’s report, particularly Atkinson’s diagnosis of Chronic Pain Disorder. 

 1

 The plaintiff also states that the ALJ gave some weight to consulting psychologist Barry Wood. 

However, the ALJ states that Wood’s opinion, along with that of state agency psychological 

consultant Dr. Estock, are most consistent with the evidence in the record. 

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However, the fact that the ALJ did not go into detail does not constitute a failure to 

consider Atkinson’s opinion. The ALJ is not required to refer to every piece of 

evidence in her determination so long as her denial of the plaintiff’s claim is not an 

arbitrary dismissal that does not consider the plaintiff’s medical condition as a 

whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted). A review of the ALJ’s RFC determination persuades the court that the 

ALJ did consider the plaintiff’s medical condition as a whole. Accordingly, the 

ALJ’s findings regarding Atkinson’s opinion are supported by substantial evidence. 

C. Third-Party Testimony

Finally, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly address the thirdparty function report and testimony by the plaintiff’s husband, William Fell. The 

plaintiff argues that, though the ALJ determined that Fell’s testimony was not 

credible, she failed to articulate specific reasons for the determination. As for 

Fell’s testimony, the ALJ stated that,

The claimant’s husband, William Fell, also testified at the hearing and 

stated the claimant use[d] to handle paperwork for his company, but 

she has experienced a decline in mental functioning to the point she 

cannot comprehend instructions. Additionally, he stated the claimant 

need[s] her medications fixed for her with someone to check up on her 

to make sure she took as prescribed. The claimant’s husband also 

testified the claimant could not drive and spent her time reading her 

Bible, sitting in the recliner or sofa, riding around in the car with her 

husband, and then lying down. The claimant’s husband further 

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testified he does not like to leave the claimant alone and he would take 

her to work with him or have one of his employees go an[d] check on 

her if he was unable to leave work himself.

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that 

the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 

be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, the 

claimant’s and her husband’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

credible for the reasons explained in this decision.

(Tr. at 25). 

Third-party testimony by a lay-person is considered “other source” 

testimony in the Code of Federal Regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(4). 

According to the C.F.R., such evidence may be used “to show the severity of [the 

claimant’s] impairment(s) and how it affects your ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1513(d). Such evidence is owed no particular weight under the rules. 

Accordingly, it is within the purview of the ALJ to determine that the testimony of 

the plaintiff’s husband is not credible. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 06-3p further 

addresses the evaluation of such evidence, explaining: 

In considering evidence from “non-medical sources” who have not 

seen the individual in a professional capacity in connection with their 

impairments, such as spouses, parents, friends, and neighbors, it 

would be appropriate to consider such factors as the nature and extent 

of the relationship, whether the evidence is consistent with other 

evidence, and any other factors that tend to support or refute the 

evidence. 

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Explanation of the Consideration Given to Opinions From “Other 

Sources”

Since there is a requirement to consider all relevant evidence in an 

individual’s case record, the case record should reflect the 

consideration of opinions from medical sources who are not 

“acceptable medical sources” and from “non-medical sources” who 

have seen the claimant in their professional capacity. Although there 

is a distinction between what an adjudicator must consider and what 

the adjudicator must explain in the disability determination or 

decision, the adjudicator generally should explain the weight given to 

opinions from these “other sources,” or otherwise ensure that the 

discussion of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a 

claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning, 

when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case. 

SSR 06-03p, Titles II and XVI:II and XVI: Considering Opinions and Other 

Evidence From Sources Who are not “Acceptable Medical Sources” in Disability 

Claims; Considering Decisions on Disability by Other Governmental and 

Nongovernmental Agencies, 2006 WL 2329939 (August 9, 2006).

Although the ALJ did not explain precisely which elements of Fell’s 

testimony conflict with certain medical evidence in the record, the ALJ did note 

that she found the testimony not to be credible in a way that is sufficient to allow 

the court to follow the ALJ’s reasoning, fulfilling her obligation under 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1513 and SSR 06-03p. 

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IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Fell’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be 

entered affirming the Commissioner’s determination and dismissing this action.

DONE this 28th day of September, 2016.

_______________________________

T. MICHAEL PUTNAM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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