Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01958/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01958-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABDERRAHIM SADDAS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv1958 JM(CAB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND; DENYING MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER; DENYING MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO; CITY COUNCIL;

CITY ATTORNEY; MAYOR; CHIEF OF

POLICE; and POLICE OFFICER M.

KNUTSON,

Defendants.

Before the court are three separate motions: Defendant City of San Diego’s

(“City”) motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement; Plaintiff

Abderrahim Saddas’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction; and Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the

court finds the matters presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For

the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted; the motion for injunctive

relief is denied, and the motion for sanctions is denied. The court also grants Plaintiff

20 days leave to amend from the date of entry of this order.

BACKGROUND

On September 8, 2009 Plaintiff commenced this federal question action alleging

that Defendants City of San Diego, City Council, City Attorney, Mayor, Chief of

Case 3:09-cv-01958-JM-CAB Document 39 Filed 11/23/09 Page 1 of 7
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Police, and Police Officer M. Knutson (collectively “Defendants”) violated, among

other statutes, his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff broadly alleges that all

Defendants conspired 

“to refrain from enforcing the laws against each other and the San Diego Police Department in an endeavor to defraud the United States, the State

of California and the people of San Diego of their intangible right to (1) rule of law; (2) the execution and enforcement of all laws, ordinances, and

policies of the City; (3) the operation and control of the Police

Department; and (4) the honest services of government officers and

employees.”

(Compl. 7). The Complaint then cites extensively from the criminal complaint filed

against former City Council Members Ralph Inzunza and Michael Zucchet, (Compl.

¶¶12-15), cites several pages of legal authorities, (Compl. ¶¶20-27), and numerous other

allegations not germane to Plaintiff’s claims. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants arise from an incident which occurred on

July 20, 2009 at a Chevron gasoline station located on Balboa Avenue in San Diego,

California. (Compl. ¶¶101, 183-189). Plaintiff alleges that he engaged in a “heated

exchange of words” with employees at the gas station. The employee reported the

incident to the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”). On the same date, the SDPD

maintained surveillance of Plaintiff’s home. Later that day Plaintiff was stopped while

driving on Route 163. Plaintiff alleges that a Channel 8 news team arrived in “a

coordinated event for the evil purpose of fanning the flames of anti-immigration, proracism and pro-discrimination, while using the media to conceal police alleged

conspiratorial misconduct and promoting media commercial and advertisements and

need for aggressive racial profiling of U.S. citizens and foreign exchange students from

the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan and Iran.” (Compl. ¶91). Plaintiff was removed

from his car “so that he might be photographed and videotaped by Channel 8 News. [It]

was designed to promote a government-endorsed program of civil rights violations and

deliberate indifference.” (Compl. ¶92). 

Plaintiff alleges that the police made an “unconstitutional traffic stop,” (Compl.

¶94), and then unlawfully searched his vehicle. (Compl. ¶97). Shortly after Plaintiff

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was arrested, the police did a drive-by line-up with a male employee from the gas

station. (Compl. ¶101(F)). Apparently, Officer Knutson provided Plaintiff with a

Notice to Appear, charging him with violation of Cal. Penal Code. §415(3). (Compl.

¶117). Further, Plaintiff alleges that after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the

SDPD engaged in racial profiling and that he was a victim of such profiling because he

is a naturalized U.S. citizen of African race from the country of Morocco. (Compl.

¶¶114, 117, 121). 

On July 28, 2009 Plaintiff was ticketed for failure to wear a seatbelt. (Compl.

¶123). This was related to the alleged unlawful arrest on Route 163 and a further act

of “the war on terror; the conspiracy to discriminate against immigrants from Africa,

the Middle East and Arabia. . . .” Id. 

On August 28, 2009 Plaintiff discovered that the misdemeanor criminal charge

and the Notice to Appear citation had been rejected by the City Attorney’s office for

prosecution. (Compl. ¶41). Plaintiff alleges that he did not engage in “fighting words”

as identified in Cal.Penal Code §415(3). No charges are currently pending against

Plaintiff. Plaintiff requested that the City Attorney confirm that no charges are pending

against him. However, Plaintiff did not receive any response. (Compl. ¶42). On July

30, 2009 Plaintiff filed a tort claim with the City. On August 25, 2009, the City denied

Plaintiff’s tort claim.

Based upon the above generally described conduct, Plaintiff alleges eight causes

of action: (1) municipal liability against all Defendants under Monell v. Dept. of Soc.

Serv. Of The City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (2) violation of Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights, 42 U.S.C. §1983; (3) violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

right to personal security, 42 U.S.C. §1983; (4) violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment right to liberty in personal effects, 42 U.S.C. §1983; (5) violation of

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth amendment right to travel, 42 U.S.C. §1983; (6) violation of

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to pursue his occupation, 42 U.S.C. §1983; (7)

conspiracy to intentional infliction of emotional distress, 42 U.S.C. §1983; and (8)

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preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION

City’s Motion to Dismiss

City moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8's

requirement to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Federal Rules require that

allegations “be simple, concise and direct.” McHenry v. Renne, 74 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th

Cir. 1996). Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court

must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt.

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621 at 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The

rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro

se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential elements of

claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of

official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646,

649 (9th Cir. 1984) (conclusory allegations unsupported by facts are insufficient to state

a claim under section 1983.) “The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.”

Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Here, the court concludes that the complaint, consisting of 72 pages of writings

with 276 paragraphs of allegations and 41 pages of exhibits, is unnecessary long, replete

with redundancy, and contains numerous largely irrelevant allegations. For example,

the complaint dedicates several pages to discussing a prior corruption trial involving the

San Diego Counsel, (Compl. ¶¶12-15), quotes extensively from the City Charter and

California Constitution, (Compl. ¶¶16-27), purports to recite incidents where the City

and others engaged in unlawful warrantless arrests, (Compl. ¶32), and sets forth

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numerous paragraphs discussing racial profiling and terrorism, (Compl. ¶¶108-119,

124-173). 

In broad brush, all of Plaintiff’s claims arise pursuant to Section 1983 of the Civil

Rights Act. Section 1983 provides that,

Every person who, under the color of any statute ... subjects ... any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely

provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). To state a claim pursuant to section 1983, a plaintiff

must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution and laws

of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by

a person acting under the color of the law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, (1988). In

addition, where a plaintiff asserts a section 1983 claim against a municipality based on

the actions of its employees, the plaintiff must establish that the acts complained of

were taken pursuant to a policy or practice of the municipality. See Monell, 436 U.S.

at 658.

While the court grants the motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 8,

the court also grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to file to an amended complaint. Plaintiff

alleges several Section 1983 claims arising under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. With respect to these claims the court notes as follows: (1) the basis for

the First Amendment Claim is not clear from the complaint - further allegations are

required to state a claim. (2) The basis for Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment claims are also not sufficiently identified in the complaint. With respect

to the false arrest/imprisonment claim, Plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege that the

Officer lacked probable cause to arrest him. The court has identified several of the

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1

 In order to assist Plaintiff in filing an amended complaint, the court further notes, as do

Defendants, that Plaintiff must identify by name the individual defendants. While the individual City

employees may be sued in their official capacities, they must be individually named. The rule cited

by Plaintiff, Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d), only applies in the case where a properly named public officer

defendant dies during the pendency of the lawsuit. Similarly Plaintiff must make proper service of

process on the individual defendants. 

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complaint’s shortcomings in order to assist Plaintiff in filing an amended complaint.1

Plaintiff is instructed to file a shorter complaint identifying, in a clear, concise,

and direct manner, only those allegations which show that he is entitled to relief.

Plaintiff need not set forth in the complaint a discussion of legal authorities nor

allegations that relate to cases involving other individuals.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction

Preliminary injunctive relief is available if the party meets one of two tests: "(1)

a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips in its favor." Arcamuzi v.

Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987). "These two

formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of

irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases." Id. Under both

formulations, however, the party must demonstrate a "fair chance of success on the

merits" and a "significant threat of irreparable injury." Id. Further, if a case implicates

the public interest, the court also must consider this factor. Caribbean Marine Svcs. v.

Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

On the merits, Plaintiff contends that he was falsely accused of having violated

Cal. Pen.Code §415(3) for using profanity in a public place. (Motion at p.2:1-3). The

court notes that it could not locate any admissible evidence in support of this assertion.

Even if Plaintiff were to submit some evidence in support of the merits of his claim, the

court notes that Plaintiff fails to establish a significant threat of irreparable harm. As

noted by Plaintiff, Deputy City Attorney Michelle A. Garland informed Plaintiff that

“there are no charges currently pending in the Superior Court regarding the July 20.,

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2009 alleged false arrest and false accusation of a crime.” (Motion at ¶18). While

Plaintiff was also informed that “charges could be informed at a later date,” such a

statement fails to establish a significant threat of irreparable injury. 

Moreover, the court is not inclined, on the present record, to restrain the City

from acting on the Notice to Appear. Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),

federal courts may not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings absent

extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 45-46. Absent extraordinary circumstances,

abstention under Younger is required when: (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing;

(2) the state proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings

afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal issue. Columbia Basis Apartment

Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2001). Unless Plaintiff demonstrates

extraordinary circumstances, these three criteria appear satisfied.

In sum, the court denies the motion for injunctive relief.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

The thrust of Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is that there was no legitimate basis

for the City to file a motion to dismiss and therefore he is entitled to sanctions. Because

City’s motion has some merit, the court denies Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. 

In sum, the motion to dismiss is granted, the motion for injunctive relief is

denied, the motion for sanctions is denied, and Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to

amend from the date of entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 23, 2009

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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