Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-00950/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-00950-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYLVESTER OKORO et al,

Plaintiffs,

v

CITY OF OAKLAND et al,

Defendants. /

No C-02-0950 VRW

ORDER

This case arises out of the June 28-29, 2001, arrest and

detention of plaintiff Sylvester Okoro and the accompanying search

of his home by officers of the Oakland police department. 

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 USC §§ 1981, 1983 and state law. 

By order filed March 24, 2003, the court dismissed all defendants

except the City of Oakland (“defendant”) pursuant to FRCP 4 and

41(b). Doc #19. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the

ground that there is no evidence supporting municipal liability in

this case. Doc #38. For the reasons that follow, defendant’s

motion is GRANTED.

/

Case 3:02-cv-00950-VRW Document 57 Filed 04/29/05 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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I

The court first takes up two ministerial matters. First,

the court’s March 24, 2003, order (Doc #19) granted plaintiff leave

to move to file an amended complaint on or before May 22, 2003. He

did not do so. Accordingly, the operative complaint in this case

is the original complaint, Doc #1.

Second, in some early filings in this action, another

plaintiff -- Ava Robinson -- was named. As none of plaintiff’s

papers refers to her, the court can only assume that her claims are

abandoned. Accordingly, all claims by Ava Robinson against all

defendants are DISMISSED pursuant to FRCP 41(b) for failure to

prosecute. As he is the only remaining plaintiff, the court will

refer to Sylvester Okoro as “plaintiff.”

II

Local governments -- such as defendant -- are “persons”

subject to liability under 42 USC § 1983 where official policy or

custom causes a constitutional tort. See Monell v Department of

Social Services, 436 US 658, 690 (1978). But a city or county may

not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its

employees under the theory of respondeat superior. See Board of

County Commisioners v Brown, 520 US 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 US

at 691; Fuller v City of Oakland, 47 F3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir 1995). 

Rather, to impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation

of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the

plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this

policy amounts to deliberate indifference (or worse) to the

Case 3:02-cv-00950-VRW Document 57 Filed 04/29/05 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the

moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v

School District #40, 130 F3d 432, 438 (9th Cir 1997).

Liability based on a municipal policy may be satisfied in

one of three ways: (1) by showing that a city or county employee

committed the alleged constitutional violation under a formal

governmental policy or longstanding practice or custom that is the

customary operating procedure of the local government entity, see,

e g, Brass v County of Los Angeles, 328 F3d 1192, 1199-200 (9th Cir

2003); (2) by establishing that the individual who committed the

constitutional tort was an official with final policymaking

authority and that the challenged action itself was an act of

official governmental policy that was the result of a deliberate

choice made from among various alternatives, see, e g, Pembauer v

City of Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 482-83 (1986); or (3) by proving

that an official with final policymaking authority either delegated

policymaking authority to a subordinate or ratified a subordinate’s

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it, see, e g,

Webb v Carson City, 330 F3d 1158, 1165-66 (9th Cir 2003). See also

Fuller, 47 F3d at 1534; Gillette v Delmore, 979 F2d 1342, 1346-47

(9th Cir 1992). Proof of random acts or isolated incidents of

unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee are

insufficient to establish the existence of a municipal policy or

custom. See McDade v West, 223 F3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir 2000);

Trevino v Gates, 99 F3d 911, 918 (9th Cir 1996); Thompson v City of

Los Angeles, 885 F2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir 1989).

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that

plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact

Case 3:02-cv-00950-VRW Document 57 Filed 04/29/05 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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concerning the existence of a municipal policy or policymaker

decision that caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. The following quotation from plaintiff’s

opposition is representative of his argument in response to

defendant’s motion:

The whole scenario of the events carried by the

Police Officers against Plaintiff establishes

that Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments [sic] are violated. The issue that

remains would be whether the violations are the

direct and proximate result of Oakland City’s

customs, policy or condoned practices. 

Plaintiff is entitled to prove that the

violations of his rights are the direct and

proximate result of Oakland City’s customs,

policy or practices or condoned practices

during the trial of this case after the

discoveries are carried out, not at summary

judgment motion stage without any discovery or

disclosure.

Pl Opp (Doc #51) at 6:13-19.

Plaintiff gravely misunderstands the nature of summary

judgment. The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery

and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 323 (1986). 

On an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of

proof at trial -- as plaintiff would in establishing the existence

of a municipal policy or custom -- the moving party need only point

out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Id. This defendant has done. Having met this

initial burden, plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and, by

affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” FRCP 56(e). Plaintiff does

not even claim to have introduced evidence establishing a genuine

Case 3:02-cv-00950-VRW Document 57 Filed 04/29/05 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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issue for trial on the existence of a municipal policy or custom. 

And, indeed, the court’s review of the record discloses no such

evidence.

Plaintiff does refer to being “at summary judgment motion

stage without any discovery or disclosure.” Pl Opp (Doc #51) at

18-19. FRCP 56(f) provides that if a party opposing summary

judgment demonstrates a need for further discovery to obtain facts

essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may deny the

motion for summary judgment or continue the hearing to allow for

such discovery. See, e g, Margolis v Ryan, 140 F3d 850, 853 (9th

Cir 1998). But in making a Rule 56(f) motion, a party opposing

summary judgment must make clear “what information is sought and

how it would preclude summary judgment.” Id at 853; see, e g,

Nicholas v Wallenstein, 266 F3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir 2001). Such

reasons must be “presented by affidavit.” FRCP 56(f). Plaintiff

has not met the procedural requirements of Rule 56(f). 

Furthermore, even if the procedural requirements were met, the

court would deny a Rule 56(f) motion because plaintiff has had

ample time to conduct discovery: This case was filed over three

years ago, and the court has repeatedly been forced to urge the

parties to prosecute and defend the case. See Doc ##13, 19, 22,

36, 45. There has been ample time for discovery.

The court concludes that plaintiff has failed to

establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning the existence

of a policy or custom of defendant. Accordingly, defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on the first count of the complaint (42

USC § 1983) is GRANTED. Claims under 42 USC § 1981 against

municipalities are also subject to Monell’s “policy or custom”

Case 3:02-cv-00950-VRW Document 57 Filed 04/29/05 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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requirement. See Jet v Dallas Independent School District, 491 US

701, 735-36 (1989); Federation of African American Contractors v

City of Oakland, 96 F3d 1204, 1215 (9th Cir 1996). Accordingly,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the second count of the

complaint (42 USC § 1981) is GRANTED.

III

The remaining eight causes of action arise under

California state law. Defendant contends that all of these causes

of action are directed solely toward defendants who have been

dismissed. As a result, the parties’ memoranda do not join issue

on the merits of these claims. The court does not agree that the

claims are not directed at defendant. Fairly read, the complaint

can be taken to state tort and other causes of action against

defendant as well. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

these claims must be DENIED.

That said, counts 3 through 10 are claims that have not

been litigated in this court by motion or otherwise. The utter

absence of any evidence supporting the federal claims in this suit

suggests that to the extent any of plaintiff’s claims are viable,

they exist only under state law. Title 28 USC § 1367(c) provides

that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim * * * if * * * the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See

also Dyack v Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, 317 F3d

1030, 1037-38 (9th Cir 2003) (holding that dismissal of state law

claims is within the district court’s discretion following a grant

of summary judgment on federal claims). The court has granted

Case 3:02-cv-00950-VRW Document 57 Filed 04/29/05 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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summary judgment against plaintiff on all claims over which the

court had original federal question jurisdiction, and there appears

to be no basis for original jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 USC § 1367(c)(3), the court DECLINES to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law

claims. Plaintiff is, of course, free to refile such claims in

state court, subject to the tolling provisions of 28 USC § 1367(d).

IV

In sum, all claims by Ava Robinson against all defendants

are DISMISSED pursuant to FRCP 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc #38) is GRANTED. 

Pursuant to 28 USC § 1367(c)(3), the court DECLINES to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The

clerk is DIRECTED to close the file and TERMINATE all pending

motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:02-cv-00950-VRW Document 57 Filed 04/29/05 Page 7 of 7