Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01817/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01817-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL KENNETH PORTER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv1817 JLS (PCL)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Doc. 76)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO CONTINUE;

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION;

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF

TIME

(Docs. 93, 95, & 101)

vs.

NURSE HOWARD, et al.,

Defendant.

On August 30, 2011, Plaintiff Samuel K. Porter, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants Howard, Hernandez,

Ault, and the California Department of Corrections (“C.D.C.R.”) for violations of his civil rights under

Title 42, United States Code § 1983. (Doc. 73.) Porter seeks money damages and an injunction

requiring Defendants to disclose the findings of a Crime Incident Report created in response to

Porter’s allegations and requiring Defendants to administer a polygraph test to Plaintiff. (Doc. 73, at

15.) Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC for failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

(Doc. 76, at 1-2.) Plaintiff filed an untimely Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to

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Dismiss. (Doc. 104.) No reply has been filed. Upon review of the SAC, Defendants’ motion, and

Plaintiff’s Opposition, this Court recommends that Defendants’ motion be GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Porter filed his original Complaint on August 30, 2010, and a First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) on November 23, 2010. (Docs. 1 & 13.) Defendants moved to dismiss and strike the FAC.

(Doc. 27.) This Court issued a Report and Recommendation for Order granting Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss and denying Defendants’ Motion to Strike, (doc. 56) which was adopted on July 29, 2011,

(doc. 64). Porter filed a Second Amended Complaint on August 20, 2011. (Doc. 73.) Defendants

filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, (doc. 76) on September 22, 2011, and

Porter filed an untimely Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on December 22, 2011, (doc.

104). 

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. The First and Second Amended Complaints

The SAC alleges two counts against Defendants. In the first count, Porter alleges Defendants

violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his Due Process

rights and his “right to file grievance (retaliatory).” In Count Two, Porter alleges Defendants violated

his First Amendment right to “address grievance,” his Eighth Amendment rights, and his Due Process

rights. (Doc. 73, at 10.) 

Porter’s FAC and SAC are substantially the same. However, in the SAC, Porter adds a new

count alleging violations of his First Amendment “right to address grievance.” (Doc. 73, at 10.) In

addition, the form provided for prisoner § 1983 complaints provides a place for plaintiffs to indicate

whether they have “sought and exhausted all forms of informal or formal relief from the proper

administrative officials” regarding the allegations in the complaint. (Doc. 73, at 14.) In Porter’s FAC,

he answered yes and stated that he made a crime incident report number FDP-09-07-0349 and inmate

appeal case number 09-09193/CAL-09-01376. (Doc. 13, at 8.) In Porter’s SAC, he also answered

yes but stated that when he tried to report the rape, the staff at Centinela ignored him or told him that

“there would be no record and [he] better keep his mouth quiet.” (Doc. 73, at 14.) He states that

“prison employees prevented [him]” from filing a 602 and he now wishes to take a “pro-active

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approach” by taking a polygraph examination to demonstrate the veracity of his allegations. (Doc.

73, at 14.)

B. The Second Amended Complaint

In his SAC, Porter alleges that he was raped by other inmates while incarcerated at Centinela

State Prison between 2007 and 2008 and that the rape was arranged by prison staff in retaliation for

his having informed on a warden at another prison. (Doc. 73, at 2-10.) Porter also alleges that prison

staff at all levels have engaged in a conspiracy to keep him quiet and that they “operate under a code

of silence.” (Doc. 73, at 9.) 

In support of these allegations, Porter claims that Defendant Howard, a prison nurse, recorded

the rape on her cell phone and that Defendant Hernandez told him, "the next time someone gives you

a knife you better use it" referring to a shank supplied to Porter by his cellmate prior to the rape. (Doc.

73, at 3-6.) According to the SAC, Porter tried to report the rape to Defendant Hernandez, but

Hernandez ignored it and took him to the nurse instead. (Doc. 73, at 6.) Porter claims Defendant

Howard laughed at him and told him prison staff were behind the rape. (Doc. 73, at 6.) At some

point, Porter went to the nurse's window and told Defendant Howard and another nurse that he would

make them take a polygraph, to which Howard responded, "we're going to keep you 'till the statute

of limitations runs out," prompting Porter to spit in the face of a second nurse, telling them, "you punk

ass mothafuckas I[‘m] going to get the F.B.I. and polygraph all you mothafuckas!" (Doc. 73, at 6-7.)

Porter alleges that he then wrote to the F.B.I. in San Diego, the United States District Court, Southern

District of California, the Department of Justice, and the Inspector General, but received no responses.

(Doc. 73, at 7.) He claims that an I.S.U. officer told him his letters "ain't going nowhere and no one's

going to believe you" and, that after such "tacit and open acknowledgment that they were going to

prevent [him] from filing anything [he] stopped." (Doc. 73, at 7.) 

Porter claims that the conspiracy against him was widespread and included prison staff,

administration, and inmates. (Doc. 73, at 6-9.) The purported conspiracy was intended to keep Porter

"quiet" and staff implemented it by "sporadically" raping him and going through his possessions to

see what he had written. (Doc. 73, at 6-9.) Specifically, he alleges that approximately one year after

the initial rape, he was transferred to Corcoran and that, immediately after arrival, he was raped again

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1

The court is not bound to entertain claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless, such

as claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28

(1989) (statute governing in forma pauperis proceedings accords judges not only the authority to

dismiss claims based on indisputably meritless legal theories, but also the power to pierce the veil of

a complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those which are fantastical or delusional); Franklin v.

Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 (9th Cir. 1984) (“District courts have the authority to dismiss

complaints founded on wholly fanciful factual allegations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

(internal citations and quotations omitted). While this Court is not presently making a finding that the

SAC’s factual allegations are wholly fanciful, we do admit that we are wary of many of Plaintiff’s

allegations. 

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and then periodically thereafter. (Doc. 73, at 9.) He alleges this initial rape following the transfer was

filmed on a cell phone by Captain Jennings and that staff threatened him and preventing him from

reporting the rape until he told staff psychologist J. Ault in 2009. (Doc. 73, at 9-14.) Porter claims

that Ault wore an earpiece during their interview and that he was able to hear Defendant Howard's

voice on the other end of the earpiece. (Doc. 73, at 12.) He goes on to allege that Ault was "reluctant"

during the interview and told him, "they don't like what you're doing" and that she didn't want any part

of it. (Doc. 73, at 12.)

Porter also alleges that after being moved to Corcoran he “ was tired of sporadically being

raped, I pissed in my cellie’s toothpaste he got real sick . . . from then on I didn’t sleep til he went to

school . . these acts coupled with the fact that I saw 4 I.S.U. start relaying information they all turned

away from me and said ‘we cant talk to you.’” (Doc. 73, at 9.) In addition, the SAC states “I am going

to draft a preliminary injunction requesting . . . an x-ray to show I have had a tapeworm I have

expelled it 3 times and these people are sabotaging my test (stool results)1

.” (Doc. 73, at 8.)

This Court takes judicial notice of case number 10cv1811, filed in the Eastern District of

California, in which Porter makes nearly identical factual allegations against different Defendants.

This Court also takes notice of case number 9cv1566, which contains allegations that are substantially

similar to those in the FAC and SAC and that was dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1). We also take notice of case number 11cv2021, also dismissed as frivolous, in which

Porter alleged Eighth Amendment violations related to a tapeworm and sought an injunction requiring

the defendants in that case to submit to polygraph testing. 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants moved to dismiss Porter’s complaint on the grounds that he failed to exhaust

administrative remedies and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 76, at 2.) Defendants base their 12(b)(6) motion on grounds

that Defendant C.D.C.R. is immune under the Eleventh Amendment and Plaintiff does not state a

cause of action against Defendant Ault. (Doc. 76, at 2.) Plaintiff bases his Opposition on Defendants

“failure to recognize that [Department Operations Manual] Section Article 44 Prison Rape Elimination

Policy . . . as the only available remedy” and on Defendant’s “procrastination” indicating that they

intended to discourage reporting of sexual abuse, and on Defendant C.D.C.R.’s failure to administer

a polygraph to Plaintiff and Defendants. (Doc. 104, at 1.)

For the following reasons, this Court agrees with Defendants and recommends that Porter’s

SAC be dismissed.

A. Exhaustion

Defendants moved to dismiss Porter’s SAC on grounds that he failed to exhaust administrative

remedies. Construing Porter’s SAC and Opposition liberally, it appears he argues in the alternative

that he either (1) exhausted his administrative remedies by sending letters detailing his allegations to

other agencies outside the C.D.C.R.; or (2) is excused from the exhaustion requirement because he

was prevented from exhausting his administrative remedies by prison staff.

A careful review of the record indicates that Porter filed many grievances while incarcerated,

but that only one grievance mentioned rape. That sole grievance cannot suffice to exhaust his

administrative remedies because (1) Porter filed it long after the 15 day period provided in California

prison regulations to file a grievance following an adverse event; and (2) the grievance did not give

prison officials fair notice of the problem and an opportunity to correct the problem because it focused

on Porter’s desire for a single cell. Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (To exhaust

administrative remedies a prison grievance must alert the prison to the “nature of the wrong for which

redress is sought.”) Moreover, to the extent that Porter claims that his letters to law enforcement

agencies or to the courts served to exhaust his administrative remedies, they do not. Finally, because

Porter made extensive use of the inmate grievance system for other matters and because Porter alleges

threatening and spitting at prison staff, his allegations that he failed to properly exhaust because prison

officials caused him duress, intimidated or threatened him, or otherwise prevented him from filing

grievances are simply incredible.

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1. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff has a cause of action against anyone who under color of

state law deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F.Supp 2d 1090, 1096

(S.D. Cal. 1999). However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PRLA”) amended 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a) and requires a prisoner to exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to bringing suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over prison conditions. Exhaustion is mandatory and a prisoner must properly

exhaust available administrative remedies by complying with the procedures set out by the prison

system. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91-94 (2006). In other words, when a prisoner attempts to

exhaust via alternate methods, such as writing letters, the prisoner will not meet the exhaustion

requirement. See Panaro v. Ciry of North Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2005) (participation

in internal affairs investigation in lieu of using the prison’s internal grievance procedure is not

sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA);and see Townes v. Paul, 407 F. Supp.2d

1210, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (filing of a “citizen’s complaint” in lieu of the prison’s administrative

grievance process was not sufficient to exhaust under PLRA).

Nonexhaustion under § 1997(e) is an affirmative defense that defendants have the burden of

raising and proving. Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. ___ (2007); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119

(9th Cir. 2003). A defendant must show that some relief remains available whether at unexhausted

levels of the grievance process or through awaiting results of the relief already granted as a result of

that process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). "Relevant evidence" sufficient

to demonstrate a prisoner's failure to exhaust "include[s] statutes, regulations, and other official

directives that explain the scope of the administrative review process; documentary or testimonial

evidence from prison officials who administer the review process; and information provided to the

prisoner concerning the operation of the grievance procedure . . . ." Id.

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court may look beyond the pleadings

and resolve disputed issues of fact. Wyatt,315 F.3d at 1119-20; see Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (permitting the consideration of affidavits

submitted by the parties on a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies). If the

court finds that the prisoner has failed to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal

of the claim without prejudice. Wyatt,315 F.3d at 1120. Generally, a court should grant pro se

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litigants leave to amend, however, the court may exercise its discretion and deny leave to amend when

it is clear that the plaintiff cannot allege any set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. See

Zenith Radio Corp. V. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971); Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1988).

2. Administrative Remedies Available to California Prisoners

A California state prisoner must exhaust the administrative remedies available through the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). A prisoner may appeal any

decision, action, condition, or policy of the CDCR which the prisoner can demonstrate as having an

adverse effect upon his or her welfare. Cal. Code Regs. tit.15, §§ 3084.1(a) & 3084.2. In order to

exhaust administrative remedies, California Prison Regulations require a prisoner to first file an

informal grievance by filling out an Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form 602 and seek relief through

discussion with the appropriate staff member. Id. § 3084.1(a). If the prisoner is not satisfied with the

resolution of the informal complaint, then there are three further levels of formal review. The first two

levels of review are conducted by the Appeals Coordinator and the Warden, respectively, at the

institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated. Cal. Code Regs. tit.15 § 3084.5(b-d). The third (or

“Director’s”) level of review is made to the Director of the California Department of Corrections, and

a prisoner is required to proceed through each of these levels of review in order to exhaust. Id. §

3084.1(b); and see Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.Supp 1235 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (finding exhaustion where

prisoner at least attempted to appeal through each level, though he never received a response from the

second and third levels). 

3. Porter’s Inmate Grievances

Defendants have submitted declarations from the Appeals Coordinators at each of the prisons

in which Porter was incarcerated. (Docs. 27-3 through 27-13.) On July 25, 2009, Porter submitted

an inmate/parolee appeal form CDC 602, which was stamped received on July 30, 2009, and given

a log number 0901376. (Doc. 27-7, at 13.) This was the only grievance among many grievances

submitted by Porter that mentions rape. (Docs. 27-3 through 27-13.) On that 602 form, Porter

described his problem as follows:

On July 22, 2009 I again gave information to C.D.C.R. of a staff orchestrated rape

because of retaliation of warden’s embezzling money. I told a psychologist I believe

her name is J. Ault although I like Ms. Ault and think her very professional, I disagree

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 Porter’s writing fills the space provided for inmates to describe the problem on the 602 form

and ends with an arrow, however there are no additional pages in the record that appear to be

associated with the quoted text.

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with her rejection of giving me single cell status. I have been complaining both

medically and through the mental health department nightmares & paranoia because

of the traumatic situations (rapes) I offered a written narrative due to the lengthy

subject but Ms. Ault said no thanks. I want to sleep a good night sleep and feel safe.

It should be duly noted that this decisions by Mrs. Ault . . .2

(Doc. 27-2, at 20.)

Porter requested the following action in response to his problem: "to be given single cell status

and if denied a written explanation as to why. I also now request investigation and a polygraph

examination." (Doc. 27-7, at 20.) He also attached regulations prescribing the methods by which

inmates should be assigned to housing. (Doc. 27-7, at 33-34.) 

The administrative record indicates that Porter was interviewed by Correctional Counselor II,

M. Whitman on August 28, 2009, and that his appeal was partially granted. (Doc. 27-7, at 35.)

Whitman’s written response to the grievance acknowledges Porter’s willingness to submit to

polygraph testing to “prove the veracity of [his] allegations” and indicates that on July 31, 2009,

Crime Incident Report number CAL-FDP-09-07-0349 was completed to address Porter’s rape

allegations, but that the report did not contain any evidence to substantiate Porter’s claims. (Doc. 27-

7, at 35.) In addition, Whitman wrote that a review of Porter’s Central File did not reveal any history

of sexual predatory abuse of or by Porter with the exception of the allegation Porter made to

Defendant Ault. (Doc. 27-7, at 35.) The response then explains the criteria for single cell housing and

the reasons that Porter did not qualify for a single cell. (Doc. 27-7, at 35.) 

Dissatisfied with the response, Porter resubmitted his grievance, requesting second level

review. (Doc. 27-7, at 33.) Porter explained the reason he was dissatisfied with the first level

response as follows: “I am dissatisfied no single cell status my interviews were equivalent to

testimony per [Department Operations Manual] I can get this status with information I also submitted

declarations! See further explanations and attached documents.” (Doc. 27-7, at 33.) Porter attached

a lengthy explanation, telling corrections officers “first and foremost you are in the state of California

and you are to abide by its laws!” (Doc. 27-7, at 37.) Porter went on to quote various regulations and

to detail the ways in which his claims of rape were not adequately investigated. (Doc. 27-7, at 37-38.)

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In particular, Porter described various reasons that a polygraph should be administered. (Doc. 27-7,

at 37-38.) He also complained that he had not been given a “chrono” documenting information

gathered by classification staff Miller and Whitman relevant to his eligibility for single cell status.

(Doc. 27-7, at 37-38.) Porter stated that he had stayed quiet because he had been “scared and paranoid

due to the level of personnel involved” but that he had been in contact with the F.B.I. and the federal

courts and that “it would be strategic to grant me single cell status as it may stop the process of this

602.” (Doc. 27-7, at 37-38.) 

Porter also attached copies of a letter addressed to the courts and the California Department

of Justice and a declaration. (Doc. 27-7, at 39-45.) In the letter, he described some personal

altercations that he had experienced with his child's mother prior to his incarceration, and mentioned

snitching on the warden. (Doc. 27-7, at 39-45.) He wrote “it is obvious that the warden’s wife and

my son's mother got together” and described a conspiracy with Officers Lowe and Jennings to drug

him with coffee and have inmates rape him at Corcoran. (Doc. 27-7, at 40.) In the declaration, Porter

wrote, “I have been the victim of staff orchestrated inmate rapes as a result of my grievances and a[n]

incident that happen on the street with my baby’s mama. I request a lawyer and a federal

investigation.” (Doc. 27-7, at 43.) The declaration describes threats made by a warden’s wife as a

result of Porter’s snitching to the authorities. Porter volunteered to take a polygraph to prove his

allegations were true; described some trouble he had participated in as a gang member; described

being housed with rival gang members at Corcoran; being raped by the husband of Porter’s “baby’s

mama;”and being told by one of the “orchestrators” that he had H.I.V., but that his test would continue

to be negative unless he told a particular story. (Doc. 27-7, at 43-45.) 

Together, the letter and declaration consume 7 pages of difficult to comprehend handwriting.

Porter mentions Defendant Hernandez only twice between the two documents. The first mention

alleges that “Hernandez showed he knew about the incident before and after the fact because the next

day he told me ‘the next time somebody gives you something you better use it.’” (Doc. 27-7, at 41.)

The second mention of Defendant Hernandez is in the declaration and states “I was told by Capt.

Hernandez ‘somebody’s going to have a talk with you.’ This is prison jargon for someone’s going to

fight with you.” (Doc. 27-7, at 43.) Defendant Howard is also only mentioned twice in the two

documents. Porter wrote that Nurse Howard worked on “A” yard, and photographed incidents with

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her cell phone. (Doc. 27-7, at 44-45.) 

Nowhere in either the letter or the declaration, did Porter request that Defendants or staff be

investigated for their alleged participation in a rape conspiracy. Rather, Porter repeatedly requested

investigation under the prison regulations governing determination of inmate housing classification.

Each of his requests for additional investigation is immediately followed by, and closely tied to, a

request for single cell status. (Doc. 27-7, at 31-52.) For example, when Porter complained of not

receiving a "chrono" documenting information gathered relevant to his classification, he specifically

cited regulations pertaining to housing classifications. (Doc. 27-7, at 38.) According to Porter, the

regulations require the classification committee to review an inmate's central file as well as other

available information and require the committee to make their decision the basis of inmate interviews,

which are to be documented in a “chrono.” (Doc. 27-7, at 38.) 

Porter’s grievance was denied at the second level. The memorandum documenting the denial

defined the issue by stating “ it is the appellant’s position that he should be allowed single cell status

since he claims he has been the victim of numerous sexual assaults. The appellant requests single cell

status.” (Doc. 27-7, at 46.) The denial cited prison regulations governing housing assignments and

stated that Porter had not provided any proof that the alleged sexual assaults took place and that there

was no evidence in Porter’s central file to support the allegations. (Doc. 27-7, at 46.) It also noted,

“there is not even any evidence that the appellant ever reported [the] sexual assaults until he

mentioned it to [m]ental [h]ealth staff during an interview in July 2009.” (Doc. 27-7, at 37-38.) 

Porter then requested a Director’s Level review, stating that he was dissatisfied with the second

level response. Porter complained that prison officials had inadequately investigated his rape claims

by not administering a polygraph examination to prove the truth of his rape conspiracy allegations.

Porter also claimed the F.B.I. wrote to Porter stating that the prison had been informed of Porter’s

letters to “Sacramento.” (Doc. 27-7, at 32, 48.) Porter detailed the steps he believed the Department

of Corrections was required to take in order to investigate his allegations in compliance with prison

regulations. (Doc. 27-7, at 48.) Porter wrote "I request that I be single cell status. To give you a taste

of the veracity of my allegations I pose this challenge that when the first incident happened at

Centinela . . . [corrections officers] told [him] that [you] can write who [you] want ain’t nothing going

to happen.” (Doc. 27-7, at 48.) He stated that he had submitted several memoranda with titles such

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as “Clarification of Single Cell Status Requirements” and “Double Cell Housing Policy.” (Doc. 27,

at 48.) He wrote, “you persistently want to keep me double celled, and I am willing to prove the

veracity of my allegation toward staff in detail through polygraph yet you still won’t give me single

cell status?” (Doc. 27-7, at 48-49.)

On May 21, 2010, Porter’s appeal was again denied at the Director’s Level. (Doc. 27-7, at 51.)

The letter denying his appeal defines Porters argument as follows: “It is the appellant’s position that

he disagrees with the psychologist’s decision to not give him single cell status. The appellant claims

this is in retaliation because on July 22, 2009, he gave information that ‘CDCR of staff orchestrated

rapes because of retaliation of warden’s embezzling money.’” (Doc. 27-7, at 51.) The Director’s

decision found that Porter had failed to support his request for single cell status with sufficient

documentation, and that it had been appropriately determined that Porter met the criteria for double

cell housing. (Doc. 27-7, at 51.) The decision also stated that Porter had added new issues and

requests to his appeal, and that those issues were not being addressed as they served to extend the

appeal beyond the initial problem and the initially requested action.. (Doc. 27-7, at 51.) 

Porter did not file any additional appeals regarding the alleged rape conspiracy or other new

issues he raised during the appeal process. 

3. Application of PLRA to Porter’s Inmate Grievance

In his Opposition, Porter does not argue that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies

by using the inmate grievance process provided by the California Prison system. Rather, Porter

contends that he should not be required to do so because the “Prison Rape Elimination Policy” was

the only available remedy and constitutes a separate administrative review process. (Doc. 104, at 1-5.)

Porter claims that Defendants failed to follow C.D.C.R. policies pertaining to prison rape. (Doc. 104,

at 1, 3.) He claims that those policies outline certain procedures for investigation of rape allegations

and that those procedures entitle him to obtain polygraph investigations of himself or of Defendants

in order to prove that his allegations that he was afraid of Defendants are true. (Doc. 104, at 7.) 

Porter also argues that Defendants failure to take a polygraph examination demonstrates that

his allegations are true - essentially he argues that if they were not engaged in a conspiracy, there

would be no reason not to take the examination. (Doc. 104, at 6-10.) His Opposition focuses on his

allegations that Defendants have not given him any copies of video or audio recordings made during

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their interviews following his allegations of rape. Porter argues that Defendants’ failure to produce

these materials shows that they operate under a “code of silence” and “are trying to cover-up.” (Doc.

104, at10-20.) 

Exhaustion as required by the PLRA is not only mandatory but a prison must also properly

exhaust available administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91-94 (2006) (emphasis

added) “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

procedural rules.” Id. The above described grievance was filed at Calipatria on July 25, 2009, but the

rape alleged in the SAC occurred in 2007 at Centinela. Because prisoners are required to file a

grievance within 15 days of the offending event, Porter’s sole grievance related to being raped was

untimely. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.6(c); (Docs. 73, at 2-3; 13, at 12.) Porter’s arguments that

his correspondence with the courts, the F.B.I., the California Department of Justice, and other agencies

served to notify the prison of the alleged rape, thereby excusing his failure to file a timely inmate

appeal regarding the issue are unavailing. Such correspondence was not in compliance with the

procedures set out by the prison system and did not constitute proper exhaustion.

Similarly, even if the grievance had been timely, it would not have been sufficient to exhaust

administrative remedies for the claims in Porter’s SAC. In California, prison regulations are silent

as to the factual specificity required in an inmate grievance, therefore a grievance suffices if it alerts

prison officials to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought. Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d

1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). Porter first mentioned the alleged rape conspiracy in materials he attached

to his request for second level review of his grievance - materials that were acknowledged in the

denial at the Director’s Level as raising “new issues.”. In those materials, Porter wrote “it is obvious

the warden’s wife and my son’s mother got together . . . I have been the victim of staff orchestrated

rapes because of grievances and an incident on the street with my baby’s momma.” This was not

Porter’s first mention that he had been raped, but it was the first shift in his grievance from focusing

solely on single cell status to discussing a broader “conspiracy.” Even so, Porter’s grievance did not

seek redress for the rapes. At all levels of the grievance process, Porter focused on his desire for

single cell status and to have either himself or prison staff polygraph tested in furtherance of getting

single cell status. Porter referred to the alleged rape as the source of his nightmares and paranoia,

which caused him to seek single cell status. He wrote that he was “dissatisfied no single cell status”

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and that granting him single cell status might “stop the process of this 602.” (Doc. 27-7, at 33, 37-38.)

His grievance also indicated that he wanted additional investigation of his rape allegations

through polygraph testing - a subject he also raises in his SAC. However there is no constitutional

right to an adequate investigation. Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007). The

administrative record indicates that Porter previously acknowledged that prison staff interviewed him

following his report of the rape. (Doc. 27-7, at 38.) Moreover, Prison staff investigated the matter,

prepared a crime incident report, and provided Porter with a copy of the incident report. See Dooley

v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1983 where

Plaintiff’s rights were not actually violated or were already vindicated). 

Prison staff determined that Porter was not eligible to be single celled and this determination

is not the subject of the present complaint, nor is it the proper subject matter for a civil rights

complaint under § 1983. Prison officials rightly continued to focus on housing as the primary subject

of his grievance and Porter, who is very familiar with the grievance process could have filed an

additional 602 raising his new issues. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2010)

(inmate grievance was properly screened out when it contained mixed messages). Defendants have

submitted relevant evidence, in the form of affidavits, describing Porter’s entire grievance record

showing that Porter failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the issues in the

present complaint. Therefore, Porter has the burden to come forward with evidence showing that he

did exhaust his administrative remedies, but he failed to produce any evidence whatsoever showing

that he did so.

4. Availability of Administrative Remedies

Finally, to the extent that Porter alleges that he was unable to exhaust his administrative

remedies because prison officials intimidated him, told him his mail was going nowhere, told him

nothing would happen if he filed a grievance, “placed him in duress,” or otherwise prevented him from

doing so, those allegations are simply not credible. The PLRA does not require a prisoner to exhaust

administrative remedies that are “effectively unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997c(a); Nunez v. Duncan,

591 F.3d. 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (a prisoner was excused from the exhaustion requirement where

he was prevented from exhausting by the prison itself). Similarly, there are certain exceptions to

timely filing of grievances, such as where an inmate lacks access to the necessary forms because of

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hospitalization or inmate lockdowns. Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009). If a

plaintiff claims he was prevented from exhausting by threats from prison staff, he must show “(1) the

threat actually did deter the plaintiff inmate from . . . pursuing a particular part of the process; and (2)

the threat is one that would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from . . .

pursuing the part of the grievance process that the inmate failed to exhaust. Turner v. Burnside, 541

F.3d 1077, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 2008). In addition, where a prisoner lacks a “reasonable good faith

belief” that administrative remedies are unavailable, exhaustion will not generally be excused. See

Sapp, 623 F.3d at 822; Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2010).

To support his claims that staff prevented him from filing a grievance, Porter states that

corrections officers, ignored him, told him they would not make a record of his complaints, and that

his “mail was going nowhere”. (Doc. 73, at 14.) In addition, he conclusively states that prison

officials prevented him from filing a grievance and that the “Defendants and their constituents

threatened and prevented [him] from reporting the incident.” (Doc. 73, at 9.) 

Porter was incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison from March 10, 2009 through the time he

filed the present complaint on August 30, 2010. (Doc. 27-7, at 3.) While at Calipatria, Porter filed

12 inmate appeals. (Doc. 27-7, at 3.) Porter filed six inmate appeals while incarcerated at Centinela

Sate Prison - where the alleged events occurred - from June 13, 2007, through June 25, 2008. (Doc.

27-4, at 2-3.) Porter was also housed at Ironwood State Prison, where he filed twelve appeals and

Corcoran State Prison, where he filed two appeals. (Docs. 27-10, at 3-6 & 27-3, at 2.) Of the many

inmate appeals filed by Porter, the grievance described above is the only one in which he mentions

being raped. (Doc. 27-7, at 3-6.) 

Porter’s voluminous grievances, letters to other law enforcement agencies, acts of spitting on

prison staff and threatening them with litigation and investigation all indicate that Porter was not in

the least bit intimidated by corrections officers. On the contrary, in his own pleadings and other

filings, Porter paints the picture of a man who was aggressive and belligerent towards corrections

staff. In addition, counter to his assertion that prison staff made no record when he attempted to report

the rape, his rape allegations are documented in the record in the form of Porter’s untimely grievance

related to the rape and in the Crime Incident Report related to the rape. (Doc. 27-7.) In addition,

counter to Porter’s allegations that prison officials intercepted his mail to other agencies, he stated that

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he did receive return mail from the F.B.I.; that he would be able to obtain records from the F.B.I.

documenting his correspondence to them; and that the F.B.I. is required to notify the prison of his

complaints. (Docs. 27-7, at 49, & 104, at 6.)

Nonetheless, Porter insists that administrative remedies were “unavailable” to him. (Doc. 104,

at 5.) He argues that none of the rules apply to him because the Prison Rape Elimination Act

(“PREA”) was the only available remedy. Porter focuses on CDCR rules requiring that all rape

allegations be investigated and documented in writing and complains that when he tried to get a copy

of the written documentation related to his allegations, he only got “an abridged version” because

prison officials wanted to keep the full version “hidden” from him. (Doc. 104, at 6.) Porter goes on

to admit however, that he “finally got a copy.” (Doc. 104, at 6.) His Opposition continues for a

lengthy, mostly illegible thirty pages full of internal contradictions all designed to convince this Court

that there is a conspiracy which would be revealed if only Porter could force everyone to take

polygraph tests. (Doc. 104.) 

Even assuming a conspiracy to keep Porter quiet actually exists, the PLRA requires a prisoner

to exhaust administrative remedies exactly as set out by the prison system before bringing suit in

federal court for any reason. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J. Joined by Souter, J., and

Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (acknowledging that the PLRA, as interpreted by the majority, would create

a procedural bar even in tragic cases where prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights are infringed such

as in cases of prison rape facilitated by guards). California prison regulations clearly set out a

grievance process, which does not include the PREA. Moreover, the 30 grievances filed by Porter

during his incarceration make abundantly clear that the grievance system was available to Porter. 

For all of the above reasons, Porter’s SAC makes clear that there is no set of facts that he can

allege, which will overcome the lack of exhaustion. Accordingly, his SAC should be dismissed

without prejudice and leave to amend should be denied.

B. Failure to State a Claim Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

1. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is proper where the complaint does not have factual

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 It is not clear from the record that Defendant Ault has been served with a summons or copy

of the SAC. However, Defendants have not disputed valid service and have included arguments

specific to Ault in their Motion to Dismiss.

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allegations sufficient to establish plausible as opposed to merely possible or speculative entitlement

to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This Court must accept as true

all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and

must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,

534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). However, legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations need not be accepted as true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Detailed factual allegations are not required to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

but a complaint must contain more than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action. Id.

Where a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th

Cir. 1988). While vague and conclusory allegations will not withstand a motion to dismiss, the court

must supply a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies before the complaint may be dismissed. Id. at

623-24. However, as with litigants represented by counsel, where amendment of a pro se litigant’s

complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. Id.

2. Defendant J. Ault3

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff has a cause of action against anyone who under color of

state law deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F.Supp 2d 1090, 1096

(S.D. Cal. 1999). Therefore, to make out a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead that

(1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the

Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.

Denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987). A plaintiff must also demonstrate that each defendant personally

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state enough facts, taken as true, to state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ___ (2009). “Where the well

pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

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complaint has alleged- but it has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Porter alleged that Ault acted under color of law because she was a prison psychologist. (Doc.

73, at 2.) But the only allegations regarding Ault’s conduct in the SAC are that, after an interview

with Porter, she stated “they don’t like what you’re doing,” and “I don’t want nothing to do with this.”

(Doc. 73, at 12.) Porter does not link these utterances with any specific allegations that Ault was a

member of any conspiracy, but rather, states that Ault “was reluctant” during interviews because, he

believed, she feared staff “retaliation.” (Doc. 73, at 12.) Taking Porter’s allegations against Ault as

true, Porter’s interpretation does not amount to more than pure speculation that she participated in any

conspiracy. Moreover, the alleged rape occurred two years earlier than Porter’s contact with Ault and

at a different prison. As stated in Ashcroft, this Court does not reject Porter’s allegations “on the

ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical” but because the alleged statements are as consistent

with Ault’s non-participation in any alleged conspiracy as with her participation. As a mental health

professional, Ault should have wide latitude to discuss various matters or express opinions as to

inmate behavior. Without any context or other allegations to specifically link the alleged statements

to a conspiracy against Porter, the allegations against her are conceivable, but not plausible. As such,

the allegations against Ault are insufficient to state a claim for relief and any claims against her should

be dismissed.

3. Defendant C.D.C.R.

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an

unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.

1991) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)); S. Pac. Transp.

Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 508 (9th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Amendment's

jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and departments as defendants, and applies

whether the relief sought is legal or equitable in nature. Id. State departments of corrections are state

agencies, immune from suit under §1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1989). The

C.D.C.R. is immune from suit, and therefore, Porter has not stated a claim against the C.D.C.R. and

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his claims against it must be dismissed under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 

4. First Amendment Claims

Porter’s SAC alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated when Defendants

threatened him by telling him to keep quiet, that his mail was going nowhere, that no one would

believe him, and when he was raped again after his transfer to Corcoran. (Docs. 73, at 6-12; & 104,

at 20-21.) He alleges that the Defendants “prevented him from reporting the incident until the day [he]

told the psychologist Dr. J. Ault,” and the Defendants “used the custom of the code of silence to back

each other’s wrongdoing so they don’t inform on each other if too many employees are involved.”

(Doc. 73, at 9-10) Porter states “no employee of the C.D.C.R. came up and told me we’re not going

to retaliate against you now it’s ok to report. In fact, Dr. J. Ault was the only one to listen.” (Doc. 73,

at 12.) Porter also complains that the prison blocked communication with the warden because

anything he wrote that might jeopardize an employee’s employment never made it to the warden.

(Doc. 73, at 13.) Porter also relies on “insidious statements which [he] was able to hear” but does not

identify the content of the statements nor who made the statements. (Doc. 73, at 12.) In Count One

of the SAC alleging Eighth Amendment violations, Porter alleged that Defendant Hernandez told

Porter, “we’re going to teach you to keep your mouth shut” and that Defendant Howard told Porter,

“I don’t like your ass and we going to show you shut your mouth and leave people alone.” (Doc. 73,

at 4.)

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because

of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449

(9th Cir.2000); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815–16 (9th Cir. 1994)). In determining whether an

inmate’s ability to exercise his First Amendment rights was chilled the inquiry is whether the conduct

would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment Activities. Rhodes,

408 F.3d at 569. 

The right to file an inmate grievance falls under protected conduct. See Id. at 567 (citing

Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). Generally, on a motion to dismiss, a court must

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accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint. However, courts are not bound to accept as true

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. Bare allegations of

arbitrary retaliation are not enough, by themselves, to avoid dismissal. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d

527, 532 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985). Dismissal may be warranted when there is no factual support for the

allegations or the factual support is contradicted by facts that the court can notice or that are apparent

in the record. Id. 

Porter’s statements that at Centinela and Corcoran, he tried to report the “incidents” but “they

gave a negative response or just walked away [and] put Plaintiff in a state of fear it would happen

again” scarcely amount to more than legal conclusions and fail to identify conduct by Defendants.

(Doc. 73, at 12.) No staff from Corcoran has been named as a Defendant. Similarly, “negative

responses,” walking away, and similar statements do not give rise to more than the possibility of

misconduct. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at ___. As such they are too vague to state a claim. Similarly,

Porter’s references to “insidious statements” and “code of silence” are also too vague to state a claim.

He does not say who threatened him or how the threats prevented him from exercising his First

Amendment rights. Moreover, Porter’s arguments that he was prevented from reporting the rape are

contradicted by facts in the record that are noticeable by this Court, namely Porter’s extensive use of

the grievance process for a variety of matters, as well as his statements that he threatened Defendants

and spit at a prison nurse. Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. Porter’s allegations that Defendants Howard and

Hernandez promised to teach Porter to keep his mouth shut appear to relate either to the rape itself,

or to another “incident that happened on the street.” They too, are vague and insufficient to state a

claim. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (mere verbal harassment or

abuse does not violate the Constitution). Finally, Porter’s blanket statement that Defendants prevented

the filing of a grievance amounts to a legal conclusion and is also insufficient to state a claim for First

Amendment retaliation.

Porter’s First Amendment Claims should be dismissed. If leave to amend is granted, Porter

should be instructed to adhere to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, requiring a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to the relief.” Fed. R.Civ. Proc. 8. He must

demonstrate, via clear and concise statements, when and how each Defendant retaliated by preventing

him from exercising his First Amendment rights.

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IV.` OTHER MOTIONS

Also pending on the docket are Porter’s Motion to Continue, Motion for Polygraph

Examination, and Motion for Extension of Time to File a Response. (Docs. 93, 95. & 101.) 

Because Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue, (doc. 93) appears to be a motion to compel certain

discovery, it is DENIED as premature. 

For the reasons stated in our previous Order Denying Porter’s Motion for Order to Polygraph,

(doc. 58), Porter’s Motion for Polygraph Examination, (doc. 95) is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Response, (doc. 101), is DENIED as moot.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends granting Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Sammartino, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. Any written objections to this Report and

Recommendation must be filed with the Court and a copy served on all parties on or before March

19, 2012. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any

reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before April 9, 2012. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of this Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: February 27, 2012

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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