Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02003/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02003-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael David Lendahl, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Warden Palosaari, et al.,

Respondents.

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CIV 07-2003-PHX-MHM (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Michael David Lendahl, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex – Douglas in Douglas, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1) in which he challenges his state court

convictions. Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. #9) on January 17, 2008, and Petitioner

filed a Reply on March 27, 2008 (Doc. #13).

BACKGROUND

On August 9, 2005, Petitioner was charged by direct complaint with one count of

Burglary in the Second Degree, a Class 3 felony, and one count of Forgery, a Class 4 felony.

(Doc. #9, Exh. A.) On August 15, 2005, Petitioner pled guilty to Burglary in the Second

Degree, a Class 3 felony. (Doc. #9, Exhs. B-E.) On September 12, 2005, the trial court

sentenced him to an aggravated term of seven years’ imprisonment in the Arizona

Department of Corrections. (Doc. #9, Exhs. F-G.)

On October 6, 2005, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. #9,

Exh. H.) After his appointed counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction

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Review by Counsel, stating that she could find no claims for relief to file on Petitioner’s

behalf, (Doc. #9, Exh. I), Petitioner filed his Pro-Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on

August 7, 2006. (Doc. #9, Exh. J.)

In his petition, he alleges that he stands “convicted of a crime that never occurred” and

claims ineffective assistance of counsel for: (a) allowing “proceedings to continue without

objection after being informed of the wrong information and location of the alleged

burglary”; (b) failing “to notify [Petitioner] that he had a right to a jury finding regarding any

alleged factors in aggravation of sentence”; (c) informing Petitioner “that he could not

withdraw his plea of guilty ... even though several paragraphs of the plea agreement

[mentioned] being able to withdraw plea”; (d) failing “to object to the use of [Petitioner’s]

prior record in direct violation of the plea agreement”; and (e) failing “to inform the court

that the cover page of the probation presentence report ... was actually recommending

sentence based on a Class 5 felony – not a Class 3, which would carry a substantially lesser

sentence.” (Doc. #9, Exh. J at 4-6.) Additionally, Petitioner asserts that “it was an abuse of

the trial court’s discretion to enhance the sentence and failed to say on the record what

factors in aggravation had been alleged, charged and proven allowing it to enhance

sentence.” (Doc. #9, Exh. J at 6-8.) The State, subsequently, filed a response, (Doc. #9, Exh.

K), and Petitioner filed a reply. (Doc. #9, Exh. L.)

Thereafter, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s petition. (Doc. #9, Exh. M.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals alleging the

following claims:

1. Whether the trial court arraigned Petitioner for the crime he stands

convicted of.

2. Whether [Petitioner’s] conviction for burglary of 6220 E. Hummingbird,

Paradise Valley, Az. is legal due to the fact that 6220 E. Hummingbird,

Paradise Valley, Az. was not the residence reported to Phoenix Police

Department as having been burglarized.

3. Whether the trial court erred in accepting [Petitioner’s] plea when the court

had the police report and direct complaint/information showing different

addresses for the burglarized residence.

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1

 The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, transportation,

importation, and exportation of intoxicating liquors and was repealed by the Twenty-First

Amendment.

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4. Whether [Petitioner] can be legally convicted of burglarizing a completely

different residence only because both of the residences are owned by the same

individual.

5. Whether [Petitioner’s] attorney was ineffective when she read incorrect

information into the record and instructed [Petitioner] to plead guilty.

6. Whether [Petitioner’s] attorney was ineffective when she allowed

proceedings to continue without [Petitioner] being arraigned for burglary of

6220 E. Hummingbird, Paradise Valley, Az.

7. Whether [Petitioner’s] attorney was ineffective when she failed to advise

[Petitioner] that he had a right to a jury trial on aggravating factors in support

of an aggravated prison term.

8. Whether [Petitioner’s] attorney was ineffective when she erroneously

advised him that he could not withdraw from plea agreement before

sentencing.

9. Whether [Petitioner] had a right to withdraw from his plea agreement.

10. Whether [Petitioner] knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to jury

trial or aggravating factors.

11. Whether [Petitioner’s] sentencing violated the United State Supreme

Court’s holdings in Apprendi and Blakely and the Arizona Supreme Court’s

holding in Henderson.

(Doc. #9, Exh. O at 2-4.) The State filed a response, (Doc. #9, Exh. P), and on October 2,

2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review. (Doc. #9, Exh. Q.)

Petitioner then timely filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 16,

2007. (Doc. #1.) In his Petition, he raises the following claims:

In Ground I, Petitioner contends that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process because he was arraigned for burglary of a particular residence – the Glen

Rosa property – but was convicted of burglarizing a completely different residence – the

Hummingbird property. (Doc. #1 at 5.)

In Ground II, Petitioner alleges he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process and his Eighteenth Amendment right to be free from unlawful incarceration.1

 (Doc.

#1 at 6.) He claims his conviction and incarceration for burglarizing the Hummingbird

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property are illegal because the Glen Rosa property was the property that had been

burglarized and, therefore, he was convicted of a crime that never occurred. (Doc. #1 at 6.)

In Ground III, Petitioner asserts a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights because: (1) the trial court failed to ensure that Petitioner was “entering plea to the

right charge and crime” and erred in accepting a plea for a crime that never occurred; (2)

Petitioner was told by his attorney that he could not withdraw from the plea agreement “even

though he was being convicted of a crime that never happened”; and (3) the “sentencing

judge aggravated [the] sentence without any factors in aggravation being charged, pled, or

proven.” (Doc. #1 at 7.)

In Ground IV, Petitioner contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel. (Doc. #1 at 8.)

In Ground V, Petitioner claims he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process because his sentence was aggravated “without his case being heard by a jury.” (Doc.

#1 at 9.) He contends he was never informed of his right to a trial on the aggravating factors

and, therefore, his waiver of the right to a jury trial was not knowing and voluntary. (Doc.

#1 at 9.)

In Ground VI, Petitioner alleges he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process because the sentencing judge aggravated Petitioner’s sentence without the

aggravating factors being charged, pled, or proven. (Doc. #1 at 10.)

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that with the exception of Ground IV – subpart

3, all of the claims presented in Petitioner’s habeas petition are procedurally defaulted. (Doc.

#9 at 8-17.) As to Ground IV – subpart 3, in which Petitioner alleges that he was denied his

Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to

inform him that he had a right to a jury trial on any aggravating factors, Respondents concede

that Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies, but argue that Petitioner cannot prevail on

the merits. (Doc. #9 at 13-15.)

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A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process, is insufficient

to achieve fair presentation. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 163 (1996)); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an

underlying federal legal theory.”). Similarly, a federal claim is not exhausted merely because

its factual basis was presented to the state courts on state law grounds – a “mere similarity

between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway,

223 F.3d at 987-88 (quotations omitted); see Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77.

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Even when a claim’s federal basis is “self-evident,” or the claim would have been

decided on the same considerations under state or federal law, a petitioner must still present

the federal claim to the state courts explicitly, “either by citing federal law or the decisions

of federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations

omitted), amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32

(2004) (claim not fairly presented when state court “must read beyond a petition or a brief

... that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim” to discover implicit federal claim).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Harris

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 519-20 (1982). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. See id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. See Teague v. Lane,

489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-05 (9th Cir. 1989). The

federal court will not consider these claims unless the petitioner can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

Pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external

cause that prevented him from following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly

presenting his claim. “A showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can

show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to

comply with the State’s procedural rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as

government interference or reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson

v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Ignorance of the State’s procedural rules or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of

legal training and a petitioner’s mental condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause”

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for a petitioner’s failure to fairly present his claim. Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,”

the Supreme Court has made clear that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a

Constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See

Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96.

1. Ground I

In Ground I, Petitioner contends that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process because he was arraigned for burglary of a particular residence – the Glen

Rosa property – but was convicted of burglarizing a completely different residence – the

Hummingbird property. (Doc. #1 at 5.) In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner

alleges that he was “convicted of a crime that never occurred” and claims ineffective

assistance of counsel for several reasons. (Doc. #9, Exh. J at 4-6.) Additionally, Petitioner

states that the trial court abused its discretion by enhancing his sentencing. (Doc. #9, Exh.

J at 6-8.) Petitioner never raised a claim that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process because he was arraigned for burglary of a particular residence, but was

convicted of burglarizing a completely different residence – until his Petition for Review to

the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. #9, Exh. O at 2-4, 10-11.)

Since Petitioner failed to raise this claim in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,

he did not fairly present it to the state court. While Petitioner did raise this claim in his

Petition for Review, the presentation of a claim for the first time to an appellate court with

discretionary review does not constitute fair presentation. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d

896, 915-19 (9th Cir. 2004). By failing to fairly present this claim in state court, Petitioner

has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have

a remedy if he returned to the state court to present this claim. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-

99; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 and 32.4(a). As a result, this claim is procedurally defaulted. Since

this claim is procedurally defaulted, and because Petitioner has failed to prove cause and

prejudice, or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default, the

Court will recommend that this claim be denied.

///

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2. Ground II

In Ground II, Petitioner asserts that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process and his Eighteenth Amendment right to be free from unlawful incarceration.

(Doc. #1 at 6.) He claims his conviction and incarceration for burglarizing the Hummingbird

property are illegal because the Glen Rosa property was the property that had been

burglarized and, therefore, he was convicted of a crime that never occurred. (Doc. #1 at 6.)

Petitioner, however, did not fairly present this alleged denial of his Fourteenth Amendment

rights to the state court because he did not raise this claim in either his Petition for PostConviction Relief or his Petition for Review. (Doc. #9, Exhs. J at 4-6; O at 2-4.) As

previously stated, a petitioner must present a federal claim to the state courts explicitly, either

by citing to federal law or to a federal court decision. See Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. Petitioner

did neither here.

Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies, and he would no longer have

a remedy if he returned to the state court to present this claim. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-

99; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 and 32.4(a). As such, this claim is procedurally defaulted. Because

this claim is procedurally defaulted, and since Petitioner has failed to prove cause and

prejudice, or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default, the

Court will recommend that this claim be denied.

3. Ground III

In Ground III, Petitioner alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights because: (1) the trial court failed to ensure that Petitioner was “entering plea to the

right charge and crime” and erred in accepting a plea for a crime that never occurred; (2)

Petitioner was told by his attorney that he could not withdraw from the plea agreement “even

though he was being convicted of a crime that never happened”; and (3) the “sentencing

judge aggravated [the] sentence without any factors in aggravation being charged, pled, or

proven.” (Doc. #1 at 7.) The Court has addressed the first part of this claim in Ground II.

As for Petitioner’s claim that his rights were violated because his attorney told him he could

not withdraw from his plea agreement, that claim is included in Ground IV and addressed

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2

 Ground IV – subpart 3 will be addressed in the Court’s Merits Analysis within this

Recommendation.

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below. Finally, Petitioner’s claim that the trial court wrongly aggravated his sentence is

included in Ground VI addressed below.

4. Ground IV

In Ground IV, Petitioner contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel. (Doc. #1 at 8.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that (1) his

attorney “read incorrect information into the factual record and instructed [him] to plead

guilty”; (2) his attorney “allowed proceedings to continue without [Petitioner] being

arraigned for burglary of 6220 E. Hummingbird, Paradise Valley, AZ”; (3) his attorney

“never explained that he had a right to a jury trial on aggravating factors”; (4) his attorney

“told him he could not withdraw his guilty plea even though he was being convicted of a

crime that never occurred”; and (5) his attorney for his post-conviction proceedings had a

“conflict of interest ... due to her having previously been an Assistant Attorney General for

State of Arizona.”2

 (Doc. #1 at 8.)

The record reveals that Petitioner did raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. He alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for:

(a) allowing “proceedings to continue without objection after being informed of the wrong

information and location of the alleged burglary”; (b) failing “to notify [Petitioner] that he

had a right to a jury finding regarding any alleged factors in aggravation of sentence”; (c)

informing Petitioner “that he could not withdraw his plea of guilty ... even though several

paragraphs of the plea agreement [mentioned] being able to withdraw plea”; (d) failing “to

object to the use of [Petitioner’s] prior record in direct violation of the plea agreement”; and

(e) failing “to inform the court that the cover page of the probation presentence report ... was

actually recommending sentence based on a Class 5 felony – not a Class 3, which would

carry a substantially lesser sentence.” (Doc. #9, Exh. J at 4-6.)

In his Petition for Review, however, Petitioner argued that his attorney was ineffective

for: (a) “read[ing] incorrect information into the record and instruct[ing] [Petitioner] to plead

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guilty”; (b) “allow[ing] proceedings to continue without [Petitioner] being arraigned for

burglary of 6220 E. Hummingbird, Paradise Valley, Az”; (c) “fail[ing] to advise [Petitioner]

that he had a right to a jury trial on aggravating factors in support of an aggravated prison

term”; and (d) “advis[ing] [Petitioner] him that he could not withdraw from [his] plea

agreement before sentencing.” (Doc. #9, Exh. O at 2-4.)

Ground IV – subpart 1 consists of Petitioner’s claim that his attorney wrongly read

information into the record and instructed him to plead guilty. Because Petitioner did not

raise this claim in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, he did not fairly present it to the

state court. See, e.g., Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-78 (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to

present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.”). Since

returning to state court would be futile under Arizona’s procedural rules, this claim is

procedurally defaulted. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 and 32.4(a).

Because this claim is procedurally defaulted, and because Petitioner has failed to prove cause

and prejudice, or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default,

the Court will recommend that this claim be denied.

Subpart 2 consists of Petitioner’s claim that his attorney “allowed proceedings to

continue without [Petitioner] being arraigned for burglary of 6220 E. Hummingbird, Paradise

Valley, AZ.” Again, Petitioner did not raise this specific claim in his Petition for PostConviction Relief, and thus it was not fairly presented to the state court. See, e.g., Picard,

404 U.S. at 275-78. Since a return to state court would be futile under Arizona’s procedural

rules, this claim is procedurally defaulted. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99, Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2 and 32.4(a). Because this claim is procedurally defaulted, and because Petitioner has

failed to prove cause and prejudice, or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice

to excuse the default, the Court will recommend that this claim be denied.

In subpart 4, Petitioner argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of

counsel by telling “him he could not withdraw his guilty plea even though he was being

convicted of a crime that never occurred.” In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,

however, Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his

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counsel informed him “that he could not withdraw his plea of guilty ... even though several

paragraphs of the plea agreement [mentioned] being able to withdraw plea.” (Doc. #9, Exh.

J at 5-6.) In his Petition for Review, Petitioner claimed ineffective assistance when his

attorney “advised him that he could not withdraw from [his] plea agreement before

sentencing.” (Doc. #9, Exh. O at 3.) Thus, Petitioner did not present the specific claim set

forth in his habeas petition to the state court and, as such, did not fairly present it. See, e.g.,

Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-78. Moreover, because a return to state court would be futile under

Arizona’s procedural rules, the claim is procedurally defaulted. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-

99; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 and 32.4(a). Because this claim is procedurally defaulted, and

because Petitioner has failed to prove cause and prejudice, or the existence of a fundamental

miscarriage of justice to excuse the default, the Court will recommend that this claim be

denied.

Finally, subpart 5 consists of Petitioner’s claim that his attorney for his postconviction proceedings had a “conflict of interest ... due to her having previously been an

Assistant Attorney General for State of Arizona.” Petitioner did not raise this claim in his

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and has thus failed to fairly present it to the state court.

See, e.g., Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-78. Further, because a return to state court would be futile

under Arizona’s procedural rules, the claim is procedurally defaulted. See Teague, 489 U.S.

at 297-99, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 and 32.4(a).

Although Petitioner claims that he did not raise this alleged conflict of interest

previously because he was unaware of it, he provides no reason why he could not have

learned of this information earlier, and thus no reason why he would be allowed to present

this claim in state court in a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 (e) (to bring claim of newly discovered evidence, petitioner must show

that he “exercised due diligence in securing the newly discovered facts.”) Moreover,

Petitioner has not attempted to establish cause and prejudice sufficient to allow him to bring

this claim, or the existence of a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default.

Thus, the Court will recommend that this claim be denied.

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5. Ground V

In Ground V, Petitioner claims he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process because his sentence was aggravated “without his case being heard by a jury.” (Doc.

#1 at 9.) He asserts he was never informed of his right to a trial on the aggravating factors

and, therefore, his waiver of the right to a jury trial was not knowing and voluntary. (Doc.

#1 at 9.)

In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner argues that “it was an abuse of

the trial court’s discretion to enhance the sentence and failed to say on the record what

factors in aggravation had been alleged, charged and proven allowing it to enhance

sentence.” (Doc. #9, Exh. J at 6-8.) Accordingly, Petitioner did not raise the claim alleged

in his habeas petition until his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc.

#9, Exh. O at 3, 8.) The presentation of a claim for the first time to an appellate court with

discretionary review does not constitute fair presentation. See Casey, 386 F.3d at 915-19.

By failing to fairly present this claim in state court, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state

court remedies. Furthermore, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to the

state court to present this claim. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 and

32.4(a). As a result, this claim is procedurally defaulted. Because this claim is procedurally

defaulted, and because Petitioner has failed to prove cause and prejudice, or the existence of

a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default, the Court will recommend that this

claim be denied.

6. Ground VI

 In Ground VI, Petitioner alleges he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process because the sentencing judge aggravated Petitioner’s sentence without the

aggravating factors being charged, pled, or proven. (Doc. #1 at 10.)

In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner asserts that “it was an abuse of

the trial court’s discretion to enhance the sentence and failed to say on the record what

factors in aggravation had been alleged, charged and proven allowing it to enhance

sentence.” (Doc. #9, Exh. J at 6-8.) Petitioner’s argument and case citations on this issue,

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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however, deal with his right to be advised of the right to a jury trial on the aggravators, and

the requirement of a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right. (Doc. #9, Exh. J at 6-8.)

Not until his Petition for Review did Petitioner argue that the trial court erred by not having

a jury find the aggravating factors. (Doc. #9, Exh. O at 3, 8-10.) Even then, Petitioner

provided no argument or case citations for the proposition that the trial court erred by finding

an aggravating factor that had not been charged or pled. (Doc. #9, Exh. O at 3, 8-10.) See

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. Thus, Petitioner did not fairly present this claim to the state court.

By failing to fairly present this claim in state court, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state

court remedies. Additionally, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to the

state court to present this claim. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 and

32.4(a). As such, this claim is procedurally defaulted. Because this claim is procedurally

defaulted, and because Petitioner has failed to prove cause and prejudice, or the existence of

a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the default, the Court will recommend that this

claim be denied.

B. Merits Analysis

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Pursuant to the AEDPA3

, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the State

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). “When applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last

reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson, 360 F.3d at 1055.

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A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing

rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground IV – subpart 3, Petitioner contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel. (Doc. #1 at 8.) Specifically, Petitioner argues

that his attorney “never explained that he had a right to a jury trial on aggravating factors.”

(Doc. #1 at 8.)

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail

on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment

in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

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done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceedings would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining

whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286. “If

it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,

which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697).

Here, the record establishes both that Petitioner’s attorney acted reasonably and that

Petitioner could not have suffered any prejudice even if his attorney did not. First, the record

demonstrates that Petitioner’s attorney discussed the waiver of his right to a jury trial with

him prior to his guilty plea. Petitioner avowed by initialing paragraph ten and signing the

plea agreement that “I have discussed the case and my constitutional rights with my lawyer.”

(Doc. #9, Exh. B at 2.) Petitioner also informed the trial court that he had read the plea

agreement, placed his initials next to the numbered paragraphs, signed the plea agreement,

and had discussed it with his attorney before he did so. (Doc. #9, Exh. D at 4.)

The record also establishes that Petitioner was fully informed of his right to a jury trial

and waived that right, and thus could have suffered no prejudice even if his attorney failed

to discuss the matter with him. The plea agreement indicated that Petitioner waived his right

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to a jury trial at sentencing and agreed to judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the

evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of his sentence. (Doc. #9, Exh. B at 2.) Paragraph

seven of the plea agreement explicitly explained that “the defendant consents to judicial

factfinding by preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of sentence

... .” (Doc. #9, Exh. B at 2.) And paragraph ten of the plea agreement stated that “I

understand that by pleading GUILTY I will be waiving and giving up my right ... to a trial

by jury to determine guilt and to determine any fact used to impose a sentence ... .” (Doc.

#9, Exh. B at 2) (emphasis original.)

At the change of plea hearing, the trial court also explained this right to Petitioner,

who waived it:

THE COURT: In Paragraph 7 of your plea agreement, you consented to

judicial fact finding by a preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or

enhancements of sentence. That paragraph also tells me making the

sentencing determination, the Court is not bound by the rules of evidence. Do

you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Doc. #9, Exh. D at 8-9.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court’s decision regarding Petitioner's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law or

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state court’s decision is consistent

with Strickland. The Court will, therefore, recommend that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim be denied.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that, with the exception of Ground IV – subpart 3, all of the claims

presented in Petitioner’s habeas petition are procedurally defaulted, and that Ground IV –

subpart 3, fails on the merits, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1) be DENIED and DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE;

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 27th day of August, 2008.

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