Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00267/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00267-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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The Court notes that Defendant Pima County urges that Barbara LaWall is not a proper

party to this lawsuit because Plaintiff failed to name her in the case caption, and her name does not

appear anywhere in the body of the complaint.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

STEVEN MONTES, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

STATE OF ARIZONA; CITY OF

TUCSON, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-0267-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed his pro se [Fifth Amended] Complaint [Doc. 93]. On

May 11, 2012, Defendants Pima County and Pima County Attorney Barbara LaWall filed

their Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint by Pima County and Pima County Attorney

Barbara LaWall [Doc. 94].1

 On May 16, 2012 Plaintiff filed what the Court has construed

as a Motion for Recusal [Doc. 95]. On May 22, 2012, Defendant Wood Stock Builders Inc.

filed its Joinder in Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 98] and the City of

Tucson Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint [Doc. 99]. On May 23, 2012,

the Arizona State Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss State Defendants Named in Fifth

Amended Complaint Filed May 4, 2012 [Doc. 100]. The Court will screen Plaintiff’s [Fifth

Amended] Complaint [Doc. 93] and rule on the pending motions at this time.

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It appears that Plaintiff’s “Complaint” was addressed to the “Judicial Council of the 9th

Circuit” which forms the basis for Plaintiff’s motion for recusal.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 29, 2012, this Court issued its Order [Doc. 88] screening Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. 7]. This Order [Doc. 88] also disposed of several pending

motions to dismiss and other motions for miscellaneous relief. The Court dismissed

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. 7] and allowed Plaintiff thirty (30) days to file

a Fifth Amended Complaint. See Order 2/29/2012 [Doc. 88]. Additionally, the Court stated

that “[t]he only potentially cognizable claims remaining are a §§ 1983 or 1985 claim arising

from the abatement proceedings.” Id. At 16. After two (2) extensions of time, Plaintiff filed

his seventy-four (74) page [Fifth Amended] Complaint [Doc. 93].

II. MOTION FOR RECUSAL

On May 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed a “Complaint” that states that it is in response to

Document 94 in the above captioned case.2

 See Motion for Recusal [Doc. 95]. The Court

has construed this document as a motion for recusal in light of the language contained

therein. Plaintiff states that “[b]ecause of the family politics that exists [sic] in my family out

of respect for President Bush Senior, I am not allowed to request that Judge Jorgenson

Recuse [sic] herself from my case.” Id. at 9. The majority of the motion, however,

delineates the “several reasons [Judge Cindy K. Jorgenson has] for stepping down from the

hearing of facts in my case.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff avers that the Court “has chosen not to [step

down] in order to protect the defendant’s [sic] while ‘Working Under Color of Federal Law’

and in her own capacity to cause more damage to my case, and to allow the defendants

further retaliation against me.” Id.

Section 455, Title 28, of the United States Code delineates grounds requiring a judge’s

recusal. That section states in relevant part:

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall

disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might

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reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding;

(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in

controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served

during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge

or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such

capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning

the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the

particular case in controversy;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or

minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the

subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any

other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the

proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse or a person within the third degree of

relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(I) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or

trustee of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be

substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material

witness in the proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b). None of the aforementioned reasons are applicable in this case.

“The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. [§ 455] is ‘whether a reasonable person with

knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.’” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Mayes

v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984)). “The ‘reasonable person’ is not someone

who is ‘hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,’ but rather is a ‘well-informed, thoughtful

observer.’” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008).

Additionally, Section 455(a) “is limited by the ‘extrajudicial source’ factor which

generally requires as the basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions formed or

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statements made by the judge during the course of [litigation].” Id. at 914; Clemens v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. for the Cental Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Nichols

v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995)). “Almost invariably, [court rulings] are proper

grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct.

1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). Moreover, “a judge has ‘as strong a duty to sit when

there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.’”

Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995)).

Indeed, it is well established law that absent a legitimate reason for recusal, a judge has a

duty to hear the cases assigned. U.S. v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2008) (judicial oath

obligates judges to perform duties faithfully and impartially in the administration of justice).

Plaintiff’s motion is devoid of any evidence of actual bias or other facts suggesting

that recusal is appropriate. He complains that the Court’s failure to grant him additional time

“to turn in all of the evidence I had on both of the named defendants above . . . [prevented

this Court from making] an honest assessment of evidence as to whether or not to dismiss the

defendants from [his] case.” Def.’s Mot. for Recusal [Doc. 95] at 2. On December 15, 2011,

Plaintiff filed hundreds of pages of exhibits with the Court. See Docs. 74-80. These were

filed well after the initial deadline for a response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and were

all considered by this Court in its February 29, 2012 Order [Doc. 88]. There being no basis

for disqualification or recusal, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal [Doc. 95] is denied.

III. FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed his pro se [Fifth Amended] Complaint [Doc. 93]. As

an initial matter, seventy-four pages hardly qualifies as a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Rule 8, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The Court will screen the Complaint and dismiss it for the reasons that

follow.

A. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff, in his initial paragraphs, takes umbrage with the standard of review utilized

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by this Court in screening his Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. 7] and ruling on the motions

to dismiss. See Pl.’s [Fifth Amended] Compl. [Doc. 93] ¶¶ 1-8. The Court will construe

these paragraphs as a motion for reconsideration.

“The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a

showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have

been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv. 7.2(g). Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the following is

shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s decision;

(3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) satisfaction of the judgment;

or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); School Dist. No. 1J,

Multnomah County v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Subparagraph (6)

requires a showing that the grounds justifying relief are extraordinary; mere dissatisfaction

with the court’s order or belief that the court is wrong in its decision are not adequate

grounds for relief. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338,

1341 (9th Cir. 1981). Mere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for

reconsideration. See Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572, 1573 (D. Haw. 1988).

Plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority or new facts to support a motion for

reconsideration. Accordingly, such motion is denied.

B. Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff avers that he has a right to counsel in this civil action. Pl.’s [Fifth Amended]

Compl. [Doc. 93] at ¶ 16. This is an inaccurate statement of the law; however, the Court

construes Plaintiff’s statements as a request for counsel. The Court may request an attorney

to represent a person proceeding in forma pauperis who is unable to employ counsel. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court does not have the power to make a mandatory appointment of

counsel, but allows the Court to request assistance from volunteer counsel. Id.; United States

v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986). In determining whether to request the

assistance of an attorney, the Court considers the "likelihood of success on the merits and the

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ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate [his] claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal

issues involved." Richards v. Harper, 864 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1988), quoting Weygandt

v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525

(9th Cir. 1997) (court may ask counsel to represent indigent litigant under § 1915 only in

"exceptional circumstances"). 

Plaintiff points to his mental disabilities as grounds requiring appointment of counsel.

There is no evidence before this Court to suggest the presence of “exceptional

circumstances” warranting appointment of counsel. Plaintiff has not provided any further

information to support a finding of a likelihood of success. As such, Plaintiff cannot show

a likelihood of success, only a dispute. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff's difficulty

in presenting his claims pro se is not based on the complexity of the legal issues involved but

rather on the general difficulty of litigating pro se. See generally Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789

F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, the Court will not appoint counsel.

C. Complaint

Plaintiff’s [Fifth Amended] Complaint [Doc. 93] largely reiterates a more detailed

factual basis for claims dismissed by this Court without leave to amend. Order 2/29/12 [Doc.

88]. The Court declines the invitation to repeat all of the reasons that these claims fail.

1. §§ 1983 and 1985 Claims

Regarding the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims Plaintiff alleges arising from the abatement

proceedings, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable cause of action. To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the conduct about which he complains

was committed by a person acting under the color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived

him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th

Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional claim, a plaintiff must allege that he

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

Further, to state a claim, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that

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show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). For an individual to be liable

in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the official acted as a result of a policy,

practice, or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.

2001). Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a defendant’s

position as the supervisor of a someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional

rights does not make him liable. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor in his individual capacity,

“is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated

in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.”

Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

Plaintiff admits that “Woodstock Builders was [sic] had a signed Court Order by City

Court Judge Leavitt to Abate [sic] plaintiff’s property located at 5401 E. 30th Street, Tucson,

Arizona 85711[.]” Pl.’s [Fifth Amended] Compl. [Doc. 93] at ¶ 218. Despite this, Plaintiff

continues to contend that Woodstock Builders “entered plaintiff’s property illegally and

without the owner’s consent began stealing all of plaintiff [sic] valuables.” Id. Plaintiff does

not specify any individuals that violated his civil rights, nor does he demonstrate how he was

deprived of a constitutional right. Plaintiff’s [Fifth Amended] Complaint [Doc. 93] is devoid

of any factual basis to support a cause of action pursuant to § 1983.

Further, as this Court has stated previously, to state a conspiracy claim to interfere

with civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), “a plaintiff must allege []: (1) a conspiracy;

(2) for the purposes of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons

of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and

(3) an act in the furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his

person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.”

Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Addisu v. Fred

Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, “the plaintiff must state specific

facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Olsen v. Idaho State Board of

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Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819,

821 (9th Cir. 1989)). In order “to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must

first have a cognizable claim under § 1983. Olsen, 363 F.3d at 930. An essential

requirement for a § 1985(3) claim is that there must be some racial or other class-based

“invidious discriminatory animus” for the conspiracy. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health

Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993), quoting Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Because Plaintiff

does not have a cognizable claim pursuant to § 1983, and there is no evidence of racial or

other class-based animus, his § 1985 conspiracy claim must fail. Accordingly, Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. Review of State Court Judgment

Plaintiff continues to seek review of thE June 3, 2011 abatement order issued by the

Tucson City Court. Pl.’s [Fifth Amended] Compl. [Doc. 93] at ¶ 235. As this Court

previously stated, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes a district court from reviewing

state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150,

68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483,

103 S.Ct. 1303, 1316, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1527, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Accordingly, this Court

lacks jurisdiction to review the state court abatement order.

3. Conclusion

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s [Fifth Amended] Complaint [Doc. 93] fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this matter.

IV. MOTIONS TO DISMISS

In light of the foregoing, Defendants Pima County and Barbara LaWall’s Motion to

Dismiss Amended Complaint by Pima County and Pima County Attorney Barbara LaWall

[Doc. 94] and Defendant Wood Stock Builders Inc. filed its Joinder in Motion to Dismiss and

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 98].are denied as moot.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal [Doc. 95] is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s [Fifth Amended] Complaint [Doc.93] is DISMISSED.

3. Defendants Pima County and Barbara LaWall’s Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint by Pima County and Pima County Attorney Barbara LaWall [Doc. 94] is

DENIED AS MOOT.

4. Defendant Wood Stock Builders Inc. filed its Joinder in Motion to Dismiss and

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 98] is DENIED AS MOOT.

5. The City of Tucson Defendants [sic] Motion to Dismiss Complaint [Doc. 99]

is DENIED AS MOOT.

6. The Arizona State Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss State Defendants

Named in Fifth Amended Complaint Filed May 4, 2012 [Doc. 100] is DENIED AS MOOT.

7. The Clerk of the Court shall close its file in this matter.

DATED this 5th day of June, 2012.

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