Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-01168/USCOURTS-almd-1_14-cv-01168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RICKY L. GRICE, # 142526 ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIV. ACT. NO. 1:14-cv-1168-MHT 

 ) (WO) 

LEEPOSEY DANIELS, et al. ) 

 ) 

 Respondents ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 This case is before the court on a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by state inmate Ricky L. Grice (“Grice”) on 

November 18, 2014. In his petition, as amended, Grice challenges the 

constitutionality of the January 4, 2011, decision of the Alabama Board of Pardons 

and Paroles (“Board”) setting his next parole consideration date for five years 

instead of three years as provided in the Board regulation in effect in 1985, when 

he committed the crime for which he was imprisoned. See Doc. Nos. 1, 13, 15 & 

25.1

 The Respondents contend that Grice’s petition is time-barred by the one-year 

 1

 Document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are those assigned by the Clerk of Court. References 

to exhibits (“Resp’ts Ex.”) are to those included with the Respondents’ Answer (Doc. No. 7). 

Page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF. 

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federal limitation period applicable to § 2254 petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

After reviewing the pleadings, evidentiary materials, and applicable law, the court 

concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required and that Grice’s petition should 

be denied as untimely. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Grice was convicted of murder in December 1985 in the Circuit Court of 

Houston County, Alabama, and was sentenced to life in prison. See Doc. No. 1 at 

1. At the time of Grice’s conviction in 1985, the Board’s regulations provided for 

a maximum set-off for the next parole consideration for an inmate denied parole of 

three years from the date of denial of parole. See Resp’ts Ex. O at 6-7 [Rules, 

Regulations and Procedures of the Board of Pardons and Paroles (1982, revised 

1986), former Ala. Adm. Code § 640-X-2-.02(8)]. In March 2001, the Board 

amended its regulations to alter the frequency of parole consideration from every 

three years to every five years from the date of denial of parole. See Resp’ts Ex. P 

at 8-9 [Rules, Regulations and Procedures of the Board of Pardons and Paroles 

(2001), Article Six, § 11]. 

 In April 2005, his initial parole consideration, Grice was denied parole, and 

the Board reset him for further parole consideration in April 2010, a five-year set 

off. Resp’ts Ex. M. On January 4, 2011, Grice was again denied parole, and he 

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was reset for further parole consideration by the Board in January 2016, again a 

five-year set-off. Resp’ts Ex. N. 

 On August 8, 2014, Grice filed a petition for a common-law writ of 

certiorari in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, challenging the 

constitutionality of the Board’s January 4, 2011, decision setting his next parole 

consideration for five years. Doc. No. 1-1. Grice argued that the Board was bound 

to follow its regulations in effect when he committed the crime for which he was 

incarcerated, specifically Ala. Adm. Code § 640-X-2-.02(8), which provided for a 

maximum set-off of three years from the date of denial of parole. Id. With his 

petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, Grice submitted an application for in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. 

 On August 13, 2014, the circuit court denied Grice’s IFP application, finding 

that Grice had $1,550 deposited into his prison account during the 12 months 

preceding his filing of his petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and thus 

was capable of paying the filing fee. Resp’ts Ex. D. On August 29, 2014, Grice 

filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

alleging that he was being denied his right of access to the courts because of the 

circuit court’s denial of his IFP application. Resp’ts Ex. K. On October 24, 2014, 

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied Grice’s mandamus petition. 

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Resp’ts Ex. L. Grice did not appeal the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ 

decision. 

 On November 18, 2014, Grice filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting among other things that the Board violated his 

constitutional rights by setting his next parole consideration date at five years 

instead of the three years provided in the Board’s regulations in effect when he 

committed his crime. He argues that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 

applying the amended regulation to him and that enforcement of the amended 

regulation in his case circumvents the Ex Post Facto Clause, violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s proscription against excessive punishment, and violates his right to 

equal protection. See, e.g., Doc. No. 1 at 5; Doc. No. 15 at 1-2; Doc. No. 25 at 1-3. 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides the statute of limitations for federal habeas 

petitions and states: 

 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of – 

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the 

time for seeking such review; 

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 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 

action; 

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right 

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, 

if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the 

claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence. 

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period 

of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Here, the Board decision that Grice challenges in his § 2254 petition 

occurred on January 4, 2011, when the Board reset him for further parole 

consideration in January 2016. Under Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 

2008), the one-year limitation period for Grice to apply for federal habeas relief 

runs from the date of the Board’s January 4, 2011, decision – which was “the date 

on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); see 

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Brown, 512 F.3d at 1307 n.1 (“We join our sister circuits in deciding that 

subsection D, and not subsection A, applies in this circumstance.”); Hawes v. 

Howerton, 335 F. App’x 882, 884 (11th Cir. 2009) (following Brown). Therefore, 

absent statutory or equitable tolling, Grice had until January 4, 2012, to file a 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 petition considered timely. 

 In Alabama, there is no direct appeal procedure by which an inmate can 

appeal decisions of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles. A petition for a 

common-law writ of certiorari filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County is 

the proper method to challenge such a ruling by the Board. Samuels v. Alabama 

Board of Pardons & Paroles, 687 So.2d 1287 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Ellard v. 

State, 474 So.2d 743 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), aff’d, 474 So.2d 758 (Ala. 1985). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the time during which a properly filed application 

for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is not counted toward 

the one-year federal limitation period for filing a § 2254 petition for habeas corpus 

relief. Consequently, a properly filed petition for a common-law writ of certiorari 

in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County will activate the tolling provision of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, Grice’s filing of a petition for a common-law writ 

of certiorari in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on August 8, 2014, could not 

toll the limitation period under § 2244(d)(2) – even if that petition had been 

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properly filed2

 – because the federal limitation period ran unabated during the oneyear period between January 4, 2011, and January 4, 2012, and had already expired 

before the petition for a common-law writ of certiorari was filed. See Tinker v. 

Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (a state court petition filed following 

expiration of the federal limitations period cannot toll that period because there is 

no period remaining to be tolled); Hawes, 335 Fed. App’x at 884 (same). 

 The limitation period may be equitably tolled “when a movant untimely files 

because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and 

unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th 

Cir. 1999). See also Rich v. Dep’t of Corr. State of Fla., 317 Fed. App’x 881, 882 

(11th Cir. 2008). Grice seems to argue that the limitation period should be 

equitably tolled in his case – and the untimeliness of his § 2254 petition excused – 

because the law library where he was incarcerated did not have a copy of the 

Board’s previous regulations available so that he did not discover the Board had 

amended its old rule (with the maximum three-year set-off for parole 

consideration) before the limitation period for him to file his § 2254 petition 

 2

 Because Grice’s IFP application was denied and he did not pay the filing fee with the 

circuit court, his common-law writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County was 

not a “properly filed” state petition for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See Ex parte 

McWilliams, 812 So.2d 318, 321-22 (Ala. 2001) (“[T]he circuit court could not obtain subjectmatter jurisdiction to consider a postconviction petition without first collecting a docket fee or 

granting a proper request to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis."); Goldsmith v. State, 709 

So.2d 1352, 1353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). 

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elapsed. See Doc. No. 12 at 5-6; Doc. No. 29. Cursory assertions regarding the 

inadequacy of a prison law library are insufficient to warrant equitable tolling of 

the statute of limitations. See Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th 

Cir. 2000. Moreover, ignorance of the law is an insufficient rationale for equitable 

tolling. See Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171-73 (5th Cir. 2000); Fisher v. 

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999). Consequently, the court concludes 

that Grice is not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period.3

 Under the circumstances of this case, the one-year limitation period 

contained in § 2244(d) expired on January 4, 2012. Because Grice did not file his 

§ 2254 petition until November 18, 2014, his petition is time-barred and his claims 

are not subject to habeas review.4

III. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that 

the petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Grice be denied as untimely under 28 

U.S.C. 2244(d) and that this case be dismissed with prejudice. 

 It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this 

 3

 Grice also has not demonstrated that the limitation period in his case is controlled by a 

subsection of the statute other than § 2244(d)(1)(D) (see § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(C)). 

4

 With regard to Grice’s Ex Post Facto Clause claim, the court would note that the 

Board’s amendment to its regulation increasing the set-off date for parole consideration from a 

maximum of three years following denial to the current five-year maximum does not does not 

create a significant risk of increased punishment for Grice and thus does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation. See Carey v. Danford, No. 2:10cv772-MEF, 2013 WL 3450919, at *9-

10 (M.D. Ala. July 9, 2013) (applying Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000)). 

Case 1:14-cv-01168-MHT-CSC Document 30 Filed 12/22/16 Page 8 of 9
Recommendation or before January 5, 2017. A party must specifically identify 

the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which 

objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be 

considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings 

and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

will bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and 

factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to 

challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and 

legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of 

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 

1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th 

Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) 

(en banc). 

 Done this 22nd day of December, 2016. 

 /s/ Charles S. Coody 

 CHARLES S. COODY 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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