Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00103/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00103-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW LLOYD CHANDLER, Civil No. 14-0103 GPC (BGS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

STU SHERMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION I.

Petitioner Matthew Lloyd Chandler, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenges his conviction in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD227785

for assault with a deadly weapon and burglary as well as weapons enhancements. (Pet.

at 6-38, ECF No. 1 (Pet.).) The Court has reviewed the Petition, the Answer and

1

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, the Traverse, the

lodgments, the record, and all the supporting documentssubmitted by both parties. For

the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends the Petition be DENIED.

Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer 1

to those imprinted by the Court's electronic case filing system.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to

be correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parle v.

Fraley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including

inferences properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness). The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal

opinion:

A. The People’s Case

1. “Other crimes” evidence (Evid. Code § 1101(b))

Over pretrial objection, the prosecution presented evidence under

Evidence Code section 1101(b) (discussedmore fully, post) thatChandler

committed theft in early 2009 at a Vons store.

2. May 18, 2010 burglary and grand theft of personal property

(counts 5 & 6)

Earl Hochdanner testified that at around 9:00 p.m. on May 18, he

was working as a shift supervisor at a CVS store. Hochdanner walked

into the storage area in the back of the store through a swinging door on

which there was a sign reading, “Employees Only Beyond This Point.” 

Hochdanner saw Chandler standing in the open doorway of the restricted

liquor cage, which is a large wooden cage wrapped in chicken wire with

a locked wooden door where cigarettes, liquor, and electronics were

stored. The liquor cage door had a hinge that made the door shut

automatically. The door handle locked automatically and, although the

door could be opened from the inside without a key, a key was needed to

open the door fromthe outside. Hochdanner observed that the liquor cage

light was on and the door was open. The liquor cage door had been

locked earlier and the light had been turned off.

When Chandler saw Hochdanner, Chandler first tried to close the

liquor cage door, but then opened it back up again. Hochdanner testified

that Chandler was wearing a large black backpack that “looked full.” 

Hochdanner asked Chandler what he was doing in the liquor cage. 

Chandler replied that he was looking for the bathroom and that someone

told him the bathroom was in the back. Hochdanner thought Chandler’s

statement was false because a store employee would have told Chandler

the bathrooms were located in the pharmacy area.

Hochdanner then asked Chandler what he had taken, and Chandler

responded that he had not taken anything. When Hochdanner asked

whether he could look in Chandler’s backpack, Chandler said, “Fuck no.” 

Hochdanner asked Chandler to leave the store and then walked him out

of the store and watched him leave.

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Hochdanner testified he went back to the liquor cage to see if

anything was missing and then told his manager he had caught someone

in the liquor cage. Hochdanner’s manager reminded himthat an inventory

had just been taken of the items in the liquor cage. Hochdanner checked

the cigarettes and determined that 30 cartons of cigarettes, totaling about

$1,500, were missing.

Hochdanner inspected the liquor cage to try to determine how

Chandler had opened the door and found that the chicken wire had been

clipped next to the door frame about a foot and a half below the level of

the door handle. The clipped wires looked like they had been pulled

apart. Hochdanner put his arm through the hole in the chicken wire and

was able to reach the door handle and open the door.

Hochdanner indicated that the store was equipped with a video

surveillance system, but the only camera in the rear area of the store

behind the swinging doors was by the receiving door “about 100 or 200”

feet away from the liquor cage and so nothing that happened inside the

cage would have been video recorded. Hochdanner testified that “[w]e

had video of the suspect walking in the store and walking out of the store

with me.” A video clip showing Chandler in the store that night was

played for the jury.

3. June 3, 2010: Assault with a deadly weapon (counts 1 & 2),

burglary (count 3), and making a criminal threat (count 4)

David Beeler testified that at around 4:50 p.m. on June 3, he was

working asthe assistant manager at the same CVS store. He went into the

back storage room, opened the liquor cage with his key, turned on the

light, and saw Chandler lying on his stomach inside the liquor cage. 

Beeler saw a few cartons of cigarettes and a beer on the floor next to a

backpack, about a foot away from Chandler. As Beeler was standing in

the doorway holding the door open, Chandler reached for the backpack

and stood up.

Chandler told Beeler, “I don’t have anything,” and opened the

backpack. Beeler recognized Chandler from a photograph of Chandler

taken at the store entrance on the night of the prior incident. The store

manager had shown the photograph to Beeler and told himto “keep an eye

out.”

As Beeler was standing in the liquor cage doorway, Chandler

walked toward him to get out of the cage, saying, “You ain’t got me. You

don’t got anything on me. You can’t do anything.” Beeler put his hand

out to stop Chandler from leaving and said, “Wait a minute. Wait, wait,

wait. You’re the guy from last time.” Chandler then reached into the

front right pocket of his pants, pulled out a standard box cutter knife, and

swung it at Beeler’s neck. Beeler testified that the box cutter came within

about three inches of his neck. Beeler fell back “in shock” out of the

liquor cage doorway, and Chandler walked out of the liquor cage and out

through storage room doors into the store.

Beeler stated he followed behind Chandler and tried to call 911

from his cell phone but was flustered and misdialed a couple of times. As

they passed the photo lab counter, Beeler, who was about 10 feet behind

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Chandler, yelled out to the photo clerk, Christina Liebelt, that Chandler

tried to stab him and for her to call 911. Beeler testified he had a hard

time speaking when he spoke to her, and she thought he was joking. 

Chandler, who became angry, stopped walking and said something like “I

ain’t got nothing on you” and then continued walking with Beeler again

following him. Beeler testified that as they exited the store through the

front entrance, Chandler told him, “You ain’t nothing to me. I’ll kill you. 

No problem.” Chandler walked across a parking lot toward a bus stop

with Beeler following him. Before they reached the bus stop, Chandler

turned around, took the box cutter out of his pocket again, and told Beeler

something to the effect that he had no problem killing Beeler, and Beeler

was nothing to him. Beeler testified that Chandler threatened him with

the box cutter he had used in the liquor cage, but this time it only came

within about a foot and a half of Beeler’s neck.

David Salo, a CVS cashier, testified he was working at the courtesy

booth in the front of the store that day when he saw Beeler and Chandler

walk past his register. According to Salo, Beeler and Chandler were “in

a heated conversation” and a “confrontation ofsome type” appeared to be

going on. Chandler was trying to get out of the store and was

aggressively pushing Beeler. Salo testified that Beeler “was trying to

delay [Chandler] until the police got there.” Chandler told Beeler in a

threatening way, “Get out of my way,” and Beeler said, “No, you’re not

going.” Salo also heard Chandler make some threatening comment like

“I’ll hurt you.” Chandler was gripping something in his hand, which Salo

thought was a box cutter.

Salo followed Beeler and Chandler after they left the store, but he

did not see Chandler brandish a weapon toward Beeler. Salo saw Beeler

come back. Salo then got into his truck and followed Chandler. Salo

stopped a police officer and gave information about the incident.

At around 5:00 p.m. that day, after being flagged down by a CVS

employee in the vicinity of the CVS store, San Diego Police Officer

Kristopher Spencer found Chandler a couple of blocks away. After

Chandler started to walk away, Officer Spencer and another officer drew

their service weapons and ordered Chandler to stop and get down to the

ground. Officer Spence took Chandler into custody “as a detention”

because he fit the description of the suspect. Chandler had a plain black

backpack with shoulder straps, which Officer Spencer impounded.

Officer Spencer searched the immediate area and in some small

hedges about 15 feet from where Chandler dropped to the ground, the

officers found a box cutter with an angled retractable blade and a pair of

wire cutters, which were also impounded.

B. The Defense Case

Chandler did not testify. Christina Liebelt, the CVS employee who

was working in the photo lab of the store on June 3, testified for the

defense. She testified that during the incident on that date Beeler told her

to call 911. Initially, she thought Beeler was kidding “because he has a

dry sense of humor” and makes jokes. Beeler again asked her to call 911

and said something like “[h]e tried to kill me” or “[h]e tried to cut me.” 

This prompted Liebelt to call 911. Liebelt testified she recognized

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Chandler from a picture she had seen of him. She stated she did not hear

Chandler, who was trying to leave the store, make any threats.

San Diego Police Officer Daniel Vaquero testified that he

investigated the June 3 incident and interviewed Beeler. Officer Vaquero

testified he did not collect any video from the store because “there was no

video of the assault in the back cage or in the middle of the store.” When

asked whether a second alleged attack took place near Liebelt’s photo

counter, Officer Vaquero replied, “I didn’t say that it happened during

[sic] the photo counter, sir.” At the defense counsel’s request, Officer

Vaquero refreshed his memory by reading the report he prepared and the

indicated that Beeler had told him the second attack took place near the

photo counter. 

On cross-examination, Officer Vaquero stated that Beeler was

upset, red, and shaking when the officer talked to him, and he had to

console Beeler by saying, It’s ok. You’re okay. You’re not hurt, and I

know this is hard, but it’s good that you’re reporting it.”

(Lodgment No. 11 at 3-11.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2010, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an

amended information charging Matthew Lloyd Chandler with two counts of assault

with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (counts

one and two), a violation of California Penal Code (Penal Code) § 245(a)(1), two

counts of burglary (counts three and five), a violation of Penal Code § 459, one count

of making a criminal threat (count four), a violation of Penal Code § 422, and one

count of grand theft of personal property (count six), a violation of Penal Code

§ 487(a). (Lodgment No. 2 at 0009-11.) As to counts one and two, the amended

information also alleged Chandler had personally used a deadly weapon, within the

meaning of Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(23), and as to counts three and four, the amended

information allegedChandler had personally used a deadly weapon, within the meaning

of Penal Code § 12022(b)(1). (Id.) In addition, the amended information alleged

Chandler had suffered thirteen prior felony convictions which rendered him ineligible

for probation, within the meaning of Penal Code § 1203(e)(4), eight prior convictions

for which he had served a prison sentence, within the meaning of Penal Code §§

667.5(b) and 668, one serious felony prior conviction, within the meaning of Penal

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Code §§ 667(a)(1), 668 and 1192.7(c), and one prior “strike” conviction, within the

meaning of Penal Code §§ 667(b) through (i), 1170.12, and 668. (Id.) 

Following a jury trial, a jury found Chandler guilty of counts one, three, and five,

and not guilty of counts two, four, and six. (Id. at 0214-19.) Chandler admitted he had

suffered the prior convictions as alleged. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 3 at 500-06.) He was

sentenced to fourteen years and four months in state prison. (Id. at 0167-68.)

Counsel for Chandler filed a direct appeal of his conviction in the California

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment No. 4.) While

that appeal was pending, Chandler filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San

Diego Superior Court, which the court denied because it lacked jurisdiction. 

(Lodgment No. 3.) Chandler then filed a document he entitled “Supplemental Brief”

and a habeas corpus petition in the state appellate court. (Lodgment Nos. 5-6.) The

state appellate court consolidated the direct appeal and the habeas corpus petition.

(Lodgment Nos. 8-9.) The state appellate court ultimately affirmed Chandler’s

convictions in an unpublished written opinion. (Lodgment No. 11.) Chandler then

filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition

without citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 12-13.) 

Following that denial, Chandler filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 14.) The superior court denied the

petition in a written opinion. (Lodgment No. 15.) Chandler then filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the California appellate court. (Lodgment No. 16.) The

appellate court denied the petition in a written, unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No.

17.)

On January 15, 2014, Chandler filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court [ECF No. 1]. Respondent filed an Answer and

Memorandum in Support of the Answer on March 11, 2014 [ECF No. 8]. Chandler

filed a Traverse on June 23, 2014 [ECF No. 17].

/ / /

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 IV. DISCUSSION

Chandler raises five claims in his Petition. First, Chandler argues the state trial

judge improperly excluded evidence of victim Beeler’s employment records and the

CVS employee manual. Second, Chandler contends the state trial judge improperly

permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of “other crimes” he had committed. 

Third, Chandler claims the prosecutor committedmisconduct. Fourth, Chandler argues

his counsel was ineffective. And fifth, Chandler contends the cumulative effect of all

the errors that occurred at his trial rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. (Pet. at 6-

38.) Respondent argues the state court’s resolution of the claims was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem.

of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 25-54 (Answer), ECF No. 8.) Respondent also argues that

Chandler’s claim regarding the erroneous admission of evidence (claim two) is not a

cognizable federal claim. (Id. at 24-28.)

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding

a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether

it agreeswith the state court’s determination;rather, the court applies an extraordinarily

deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively

unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung,

386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004).

/ / /

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A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases,

or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may

grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly

identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but

unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally,

the “unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more

than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of

clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumesit providesthe

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis

for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the

record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d

976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court

need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See

Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not

be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law,

for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principlesset forth by the

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at

72. 

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B. Exclusion of Evidence

In claim one, Chandler contends the state court improperly excluded evidence

of Beeler’s employment records and portions of the CVS employee manual that Beeler

violated by pursuing Chandler. (Pet. at 6-15.) Respondent contendsthe claimdoes not

state a federal question, and, in the alternative, the state court’s resolution of this claim

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. (Answer at 25-35.)

Chandler raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 12.) The state supreme court denied the petition

without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 13.) Accordingly, this Court must “look

through” to the state appellate court’s opinion as the basis for its analysis.

As Respondent correctly argues, to the extent Chandler is arguing the state court

improperly excluded the information about Beeler’s employment record and the CVS

employee manual under state law, he is not entitled to relief. Federal habeas relief is

not available for alleged violations of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Clearly established federal law, however, holds that the right to present evidence

and witnesses is essential to due process and is guaranteed by the compulsory process

clause of the Sixth Amendment. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988);

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,

19 (1967); Dunham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501, 1503 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit

has noted, however, that “[t]he defendant’s right to present evidence . . . is not absolute. 

Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Tinsley v. Borg, 895

F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1990). The exclusion of defense evidence is error only if it renders

the state proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 67.

The Ninth Circuit has identified five factors that should be considered when

deciding whether a court’s exclusion of defense evidence violatesthe constitution: “(1)

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the probative value of the excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3)

whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole

evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part

of the defense.” Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530; see also Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d

597, 600 (2000) (finding that “[Ninth Circuit] cases may be persuasive authority for

purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable

application’ of Supreme Court law. . . .”) The importance of the evidence must then

be balanced against the state’s interest in exclusion. Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530. To

overcome the state’s strong interest in the administration of its trials, the circumstances

of the exclusion must be “unusually compelling.” Perry, 713 F.2d at 1452. 

i. Beeler’s Employment Records

Defense counsel sought to admit evidence that Beeler was fired from his job at

another CVS store about five months after the June 3 incident involving Chandler. 

(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 41-43; Lodgment No. 2 at 0027-28.) Beeler was fired when

a customer who complained about service asked for Beeler’s name and Beeler threw

his identification down on the counter in front of her and told her she was not welcome

in the store any more. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 40-41.) Defense counsel asked to

conduct an Evidence Code § 402 hearing to determine whether Beeler had touched the

2

customer in any way during the altercation; counsel argued such evidence would

support Chandler’s claim that Beeler had physically blocked his exit from the store. 

(Id. at 42-43.) The court concluded the evidence was irrelevant. (Id. at 43.) The next

day, defense counsel asked the court for guidance on whether, depending on Beeler’s

testimony, the circumstances of his firing would become relevant. (Id. at 90.) The

court reiterated its ruling that the circumstances of Beeler’s firing were irrelevant, but

if Beeler were to testify in contradiction to the facts surrounding his termination,

/ / /

Evidence Code § 402 provides for a hearing “to determine the question of the admissibility 2

of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury.” (Cal. Evid. Code § 402 (West 2011 Desktop

Edition).

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such as stating “I am always polite to customers,” the evidence might come in as

impeachment. (Id. at 91-92.) The state court upheld the trial court’s decision:

We conclude the court acted within the broad scope ofits discretion

when it excluded as irrelevant the evidence proffered by the defense

regarding the termination of Beeler’s employment. Chandler sought to

introduce evidence that Beeler wasterminated in November 2010, almost

six months after the June 3 incident at issue in this case, based on an

incident at a different CVS store. That incident was so dissimilar in

nature to the June 3 incident at issue in this case that we conclude

Chandler had failed to meet his burden of showing the court acted in an

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner resulting in a manifest

miscarriage of justice. (See Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 9-10.) 

Specifically we conclude Chandler has failed to show that the proffered

evidence has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed

fact that is of consequence to the determination of this action.” (Evid.

Code, § 210), such as whether Beeler was the aggressor or was angry

during the June 3 incident as Chandler contends.

(Lodgment No. 11 at 16-17.)

In order to prove Chandler committed burglary, the prosecution had to show he

entered the CVS store with the intent to commit theft. Penal Code 459; Lodgment No.

2 at 0081. In order to prove Chandler committed an assault with a deadly weapon, the

prosecution had to prove he willfully committed an act with a weapon, other than a

firearm, that would directly and probably have resulted in the application of force to

a person, he knew the act would directly and probably result in the application of force

to a person, and he had the present ability to apply the force with the weapon. Penal

Code 245(a)(1); Lodgment No. 2 at 0078. The central issue in the case with regard to

the burglaries was intent. As to the assault charges, the central issue was Beeler’s

credibility, since Chandler asserted Beeler was the aggressor and disputed that an

assault occurred in the liquor cage. Beeler’s firing five months after the incident was

not probative of either Chandler’s intent or Beeler’s credibility. Thus this factor

weighs against Chandler. Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530. The evidence of Beeler’s firing

was both reliable and was capable of evaluation by the jury, and thus factors two and

three weigh in Chandler’s favor. Id. As to the fourth Tinsley factor, Beeler’s firing had

no relevance to either Chandler’s intent or Beeler’s credibility. Id. Moreover, Beeler

was thoroughly cross examined by defense counsel about his actions toward Chandler

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and impeached with several inconsistencies. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 225-60, 266-

69.) David Salo and Christina Liebelt testified they saw Beeler and Chandler’s

interaction as they left the store and that Beeler appeared to being trying to stop

Chandler from exiting. (Id. at 276-78; Lodgment No. 1, vol. 3 at 378-79.) Beeler’s

credibility was clearly impacted by this evidence. The jury acquittedChandler of count

two, the assault with a deadly weapon charge which allegedly occurred outside the

store, as well as count four, the criminal threat charge, in which Chandler was accused

of threatening Beeler inside the store. Finally, Beeler’s firing did not constitute a major

part of the defense. Chandler sought to convince the jury he did not intend to steal

anything from the CVS and did not threaten or assault Beeler with the box cutter. 

Beeler’s firing may have had marginal probative value with regard to Beeler’s temper,

but it did not shed much light on Chandler’s defense or impeach Beeler’s credibility. 

Id.

On the whole, the Tinsley factors weigh against the admission of Beeler’s

employment records and their exclusion did not render Chandler’s trial fundamentally

unfair. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. The state court’s resolution of this claim was therefore

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law, and Chandler is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

ii. The CVS Employee Manual

Chandler also sought to admit evidence that Beeler violated the CVS employee

manual when he followed Chandler out of the store. According to defense counsel,

Beeler told the responding officer Chandler attacked him once while he was in the

liquor cage and once by the photo counter inside the store. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at

35; vol. 3 at 369-71.) He then testified at trial the second attack occurred in the parking

lot. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 214-17.) The CVS employee manual states that an

employee is not to “pursue or chase a fleeing shoplifter” and that “[p]ursuit beyond the

entrance/exit of a store will not be tolerated, and may result in disciplinary action up

to and including termination.” (Lodgment No. 2 at 29-31.) Chandler contends the

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CVS employee manual would have impeached Beeler’s credibility about what

happened in the liquor cage and whether Beeler was lying about Chandler assaulting

or threatening Beeler. (Id.) The state appellate court found as follows:

With respect to the proffered evidence of the CVS policy manual

regarding the reporting of suspected shoplifting and treatment of

suspected shoplifters, we assume, without deciding, that the court erred

by excluding that evidence on the ground it was not relevant. [footnote

omitted.] As already noted, that evidence showed the CVS policy manual

instructed employees, “Do NOT pursue or chase a fleeing shoplifter” and

“Pursuit beyond the entrance/exit of a store will not be tolerated, and may

result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.” In light of

the evidence showing that following the incident on June 3, Beeler told

Officer Vaquero the second alleged attack by Chandler took place inside

the store, contradicting his testimony at trial that the second attack took

place outside the store in the parking lot, the evidence of the CVS policy

manual may have had a modicum of relevancy on the issue of Beeler’s

credibility.

Even assuming error, however, we reject Chandler’s claim that his

convictions of counts 1, 3, and 5 must be reversed because (he asserts) the

court’s error was prejudicial. Chandler contends we must apply the

harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386

U.S. 18, 24 to his claim because “the trial court's error in excluding the

evidence violated [his] federal constitutional rights.” [FN5 omitted]. We

reject this contention because the court’s assumed error does not rise to

the level of constitutional error. Chandler contends the court’s exclusion

of the evidence of Beeler’s employment records and the CVS policy

manual “deprived [him] of the ability to present a defense.” However, as

we now explain, the record does not support this contention.

The United StatesConstitution guarantees a criminal defendant “ ‘a

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (Crane v.

Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690.) The right to present a defense

generally requires that an accused have the opportunity “ ‘to present all

relevant evidence ofsignificant probative value to his defense.’ ” (People

v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684, quoting People v. Reader(1978) 82

Cal.App.3d 543, 553; original italics.) “Although the complete exclusion

of evidence intended to establish an accused’s defense may impair his or

her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a

minor orsubsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutionalright.”

(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 (Cunningham ), italics

added.) Furthermore, “[a] defendant’s right to present relevant evidence

is not unlimited” and may be restricted in circumstances where necessary

“ ‘ “to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial

process,” ’ ” such as adherence to standard rules of evidence. (United

States v. Scheffer (1998) 523 U.S. 303, 308; see also Taylor v. Illinois

(1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410.)

Here, the trial record demonstrates that Chandler had a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense. The court’s exclusion of the

evidence at issue here did not prevent Chandler from presenting other

evidence challenging Beeler’s credibility and supporting his defense that

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Beeler was not a credible prosecution witness, and that Beeler was angry

and the initial aggressor during the June 3 incident. For example, on

direct examination defense counsel asked Liebelt, the CVS employee who

was working in the photo lab area of the store, to describe what she

observed during the incident in front of the photo counter. Chandler’s

counsel elicited Liebelt’s testimony that Chandler was trying to leave the

store and then asked her whether Beeler was doing anything to “impede

[Chandler] fromleaving.” Liebelt testified thatBeeler “wastrying to kind

of position himself in front of [Chandler] or kind of block his way from

leaving the store.” Liebelt also stated that Beeler appeared to be agitated

and upset.

Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Beeler about his

actions during the June 3 incident and repeatedly asked him whether he

was angry at Chandler in the liquor cage area inside the store and in the

parking lot. He also vigorously questioned Beeler about the

inconsistencies in his accounts of where the alleged second attack

occurred.

In addition, defense counsel vigorously argued during his closing

arguments that Beeler lied to Officer Vaquero during his investigation of

the incident by telling the officer he had not followed Chandler outside

the store into the parking lot. Specifically, defense counsel told the jury

that Beeler “is willing to lie and, perhaps, he wasn’t supposed to follow

[Chandler] out of the store, but we have evidence that not only did he lie

to Officer Vaquero and walk out of the store, but he walked into the

parking lot [and] stayed sometimes within arm’s length of

[Chandler] . . . .” Defense counsel also argued that, “Officer Vaquero

stands up there and said [Beeler] looked like a man visibly shaken, but

that same man lies to Officer Vaquero. That’s the kind of man [Beeler]

is. He’s a man who will walk through that door, sit on that stand, swear

under penalty of perjury to tell the truth, get up there and say he followed

[Chandler] because he was so fearful, and then we have other witnesses

who have no reason to lie and who do tell the truth because they are

consistent with what happened.” Defense counsel also argued to the jury

that Beeler was “very angry” when he discovered Chandler inside the

liquor cage. Specifically, he told the jury, “Now, going back from the

swinging doors that are near the corral area, in the corral area when

[Chandler] starts all of this con job, Mr. Beeler is very angry and stands

in front of the door ... saying [, “Y]ou’re not just going to walk out of

here.[”]

Throughout his closing, defense counsel repeatedly attacked

Beeler’s credibility and his account of the incident. Counsel argued that

Beeler told Officer Vaquero that the second attack took place by the photo

counter where Liebelt was working, but testified at the preliminary

hearing and at trial that the second attack occurred in the parking lot.

Chandler’s counsel pointedly argued to the jury that “Beeler is not

credible.”

The foregoing record demonstratesthat the court’s exclusion of the

evidence did not prevent Chandler fromvigorously presenting the defense

that Beeler was not a credible witness and Beeler was both angry and the

initial aggressor during the June 3 incident. Because Chandler has failed

to show a “complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an

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accused’s defense” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 999), we

conclude he has failed to show the court's assumed error rises to the level

of constitutional error requiring the application of the Chapman harmless

error standard.

Because the court’s assumed error does not rise to the level of

constitutional error, the applicable harmless error standard is the one set

forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (See People v.

Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226–227[“[T]he application of ordinary

rules of evidence like Evidence Code section 352 does not implicate the

federal Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under the

‘reasonable probability’ standard of Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page

836.”].) Under the Watson standard, if a trial court erroneously excludes

evidence, the defendant must show on appeal that it is reasonably

probable he or she would have received a more favorable result had that

evidence been admitted. (Watson, at p. 836; People v. Rodrigues (1994)

8 Cal.4th 1060, 1125.)

Applying the Watson standard, we conclude Chandler has failed to

meet his burden of showing it is reasonably probable Chandler would

have received a more favorable result had the excluded evidence been

admitted. We begin by noting that the jury, by returning a verdict finding

Chandler not guilty of assaulting Beeler with a deadly weapon as charged

in count 2, acquitted Chandler of what defense counsel referred to as the

“second attack” during the June 3 incident. Chandler has failed to show

that, but for the exclusion of evidence, it is reasonably probable the jury

would have found him not guilty of count 1, which charged him with

assaulting Beeler with the box cutter knife inside the liquor cage. The

prosecution presented substantial evidence corroborating Beeler’s

testimony that Chandler had a backpack when he found Chandler inside

the liquor cage and that Chandler used a box cutter knife during the

assault. Specifically, the prosecution presented evidence that when the

police took Chandler into custody because he fit the description of the

suspect, he had a plain black backpack with shoulder straps, which was

impounded. Officer Spencer testified that when he searched the

immediate area where Chandler wastaken into custody, he found in some

small hedges, about 15 feet from where Chandler dropped to the ground,

a box cutter with an angled retractable blade and a pair of wire cutters,

which were also impounded.

In addition, Salo, the CVS cashier, corroboratedBeeler’s testimony

that as he and Chandler exited the store, Chandler told him, “I'll kill you.”

Specifically, Salo testified he heard Chandler make a threatening

comment like “I’ll hurt you.”

Chandler has also failed to show that, but for the exclusion of

evidence, it is reasonably probable the jury would have found him not

guilty of either the June 3 burglary charged in count 3 or the May 18

burglary of the same store as charged in count 5. For all of the foregoing

reasons, we conclude Chandler's contention that the court prejudicially

abused its discretion and deprived him of his constitutional right to

present a defense by excluding evidence of Beeler’s employment records

and the CVS policy manual is unavailing.

(Lodgment No. 11 at 15-22.)

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Applying the Tinsley factors to the exclusion of the CVS manual, this Court

agrees the exclusion did not render Chandler’s trial fundamentally unfair. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 67. The CVS manual had no probative value on the central issue of Chandler’s

intent with regard to the burglary charges, but did have some probative value on the

central issue of Chandler’s defense to the other charges, that is, Beeler’s credibility. 

Chandler contended Beeler lied when he told Officer Vaquero Chandler attacked him

a second time inside the store. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 243.) Beeler later testified

at trial that Chandler’s second attack occurred in the parking lot of the store. (Id. at

215.) The CVS manual would have bolstered Chandler’s claim that Beeler lied to

Vaquero by providing a context and motive for the lie, which in turn would have

further impacted Beeler’s credibility. Thus, the first Tinsley factorissatisfied. Tinsley,

895 F.2d at 530. The evidence was reliable and was capable of being evaluated by the

jury, satisfying the second and third Tinsley factors as well. Id. 

TheCVS manual was not, however, the sole evidence on the question ofBeeler’s

credibility. Id. Defense counsel thoroughly cross examined Beeler about his

statements to Vaquero and the inconsistencies between those statements and Beeler’s

trial testimony. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 223-60, 266-69.) Defense counsel also

questioned Vaquero about Beeler’s statements, noting that Beeler told him the second

assault took place inside the store near the photo booth. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 3 at

368-69.) Specifically, Vaquero said Beeler told him he was “afraid for his life and he

stopped following [Chandler] as he exited the front door . . . .” (Id. at 371.) Although

Beeler testified he did not touch Chandler or try to physically stop him from leaving

the store, Christina Liebelt testified Beeler was trying to block Chandler from exiting

the store, putting his hands up in front of him; Liebelt also testified she did not hear

Chandler threaten Beeler as they passed by the photo booth, contradicting Beeler’s

testimony that Chandler said “I’ll kill you” as they walked out of the store. (Lodgment

No. 1, vol. 2 at 211-12; vol. 3 at 377-78.) Defense counsel also vigorously argued in

closing that Beeler was lying about his confrontation with Chandler, posing himself as

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the victim when in fact he was the aggressor. (Id. at 471-82.) Thus, the fourth Tinsley

factor weighs against admission of the evidence. Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530. 

Finally, whileBeeler’s credibility constituted a major part of Chandler’s defense,

the CVS manual was only a very small component of that defense. Id. The

inconsistencies between the statements Beeler gave to police and his trial testimony,

coupled with Liebelt’s testimony that Beeler was blocking Chandler’s exit from the

store were the focus of Chandler’s defense, and the CVS manual was only marginally

helpful to further impeach Beeler’s credibility. Thus, the fifth Tinsley factor weighs

only slightly in favor of admission. Id. On the whole, the Tinsley factors weigh only

mildly in Chandler’s favor.

Even if the evidence was wrongly excluded, asthe state appellate court assumed,

Chandler has not established the exclusion rendered his trial “fundamentally unfair,”

or that the exclusion had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 637 (1993) (stating that on federal

habeas review, the question this Court answer is whether the error had a “substantial

and injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. The defense was

able to impeach Beeler’s credibility sufficiently, as reflected in the jury’s verdict

wherein they acquitted Chandler of assaulting Beeler with a deadly weapon in the CVS

parking lot, and issuing a criminal threat to Beeler. (Lodgment No. 2 at 0214-19.) In

thisCourt’s view, the additional evidence impeaching Beeler’s credibility that the CVS

manual would have provided would not have altered the jury’s conclusions.

For all the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Chandler is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

C. Admission of “Other Crimes” Evidence

In claim two, Chandler contends the trial court improperly permitted the

prosecution to introduce evidence of other, uncharged crimes. (Pet. at 16-25.) During

in limine motions, the trial judge ruled the prosecution would be permitted to present

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testimony from a store security guard, Richard Alan Ross, who saw Chandler stealing

items from a Von’s grocery store in 2009. During the incident, Chandler was observed

by Ross and another store security guard with an empty black duffel bag inside his

shopping cart. Chandler walked to the far end of the dairy aisle and put 20 one-pound

blocks of cheese into his cart. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 128-29.) Chandler then

walked to another aisle farther away and put some Starbucks drinks and the cheese into

his duffel bag. (Id. at 130.) He then took the bag out of the cart, put it over his

shoulder, and walked out of the store. (Id.) Ross and the other security guard stopped

Chandler outside the store, took him into custody, and searched him. (Id. at 130-31.) 

Chandler did not have any money on him. (Id. at 131.) This evidence was admitted to

show Chandler’s intent with regard to the May 18 and June 3, 2010 incidents. 

(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 31.) The jury was instructed that the evidence presented by

Ross was relevant only to their determination of whether Chandler had the required

intent to commit burglary. The instruction read as follows:

To prove Count 5, which charges defendant with burglary of a CVS

STORE on May 18, 2010, the PEOPLE must prove that when the

defendant entered the building, he intended to commit theft.

To prove Count 3, which charges defendant with burglary of a CVS

STORE on June 3, 2010, the PEOPLE must prove that when the

defendant entered the building, he intended to commit theft.

The prosecution has presented evidence concerning a theft

committed by the defendant on Jan. 15, 2009, that is not charged in this

case.

You may consider this evidence only if the prosecution has proved

by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed

the uncharged offense on Jan. 15, 2009. Proof by a preponderance of the

evidence is a different burden of proof than proof beyond a reasonable

doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you

conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true. 

If the prosecution has not met this burden, you must disregard this

evidence entirely. 

If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged offense

on Jan. 15, 2009, you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence

for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not:

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! The defendant entered the CVS STORE on May 18, 2010 with the

intent to commit theft.

And whether or not

! The defendant entered the CVS STORE on June 3, 2010 with the

intent to commit theft.

Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose

Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant is disposed

to commit crime.

If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged

offense, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the

other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is

guilty of burglary as charged in Counts 3 and 5. The prosecution must

still prove each element of every charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Lodgment No. 2 at 0074-75.)

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, and

wrote as follows:

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence

Code sections 1101 and 352 by admitting Ross’s testimony regarding

Chandler’s uncharged prior act ofstealing merchandise from a Vons store

in January 2009. Ross’s testimony was relevant to prove a fact other than

Chandler’s disposition or propensity to commit the theft-related crimes

(burglary and grand theft of personal property) charged in this case in

counts 3, 5, and 6. Specifically, for purposes of Evidence Code section

1101(b), Ross’s testimony was relevant to prove Chandler acted with

intent to steal during the May 18 and June 3 incidents at the CVS store.

That the question of whether Chandler acted with intent to steal was a

factual issue at trial is shown by the court’s jury instructions. The court

instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 1700 that, in order to find

Chandler guilty of burglary as charged in counts 3 and 5, the prosecution

wasrequired to prove beyond a reasonable doubt thatChandler acted with

the specific intent to commit theft when he entered the building. The

court also instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 1800 that, in order to

find Chandler guilty of grand theft as charged in count 6, the prosecution

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Chandler took the

property with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of it. In

addition, the court instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 1800 that a

theft occurs when (1) the defendant takes possession of property owned

by someone else; (2) the defendant takes the property without the owner’s

consent; (3) when the defendant takes the property, he intends to deprive

the owner of it permanently or to remove it from the owner's possession

for so extended a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a

major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property; and (4) the

defendant moves the property and keeps it for any period of time.

/ / /

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On the issue of whether the charged offenses and the uncharged

2009 theft were sufficiently similar to support the inference that Chandler

probably harbored the same intent to steal in each instance (Ewoldt, supra,

7 Cal.4th at p. 402), substantial evidence shows that the May 18 and June

3 incidents at the CVS store share a number of distinctive similarities with

the 2009 theft incident at the Vons. In all three incidents, Chandler

targeted commercial retail businesses. In all three incidents, Chandler

used a large backpack and went to a remote part of the store with intent

to commit theft. Also, the charged and uncharged incidents occurred less

than one year apart, and the CVS store was located in the same general

area as the Vons store. Because only the “least degree of similarity”

between the uncharged misconduct and the charged offenses is required

in order to prove intent (Ewoldt at p. 402), we conclude the similarities

between Chandler’s prior uncharged theft at the Vons in 2009 and the

burglary and grand theft offenses he was charged with committing at the

nearby CVS store in 2010 are sufficient to support the court’s decision to

admit the other crimes evidence of the 2009 theft incident. We thus

conclude that Ross’s testimony was admissible under Evidence Code

section 1101(b) to prove the specific intent elements of the burglary and

grand theft offenses charged in counts 3, 5, and 6.

We also conclude that Chandler has failed to meet his burden of

showing that the probative value of the evidence ofthe 2009 theft incident

was substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would

necessitate undue consumption of time, or create a substantial danger of

undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. 

(§ 352; People v. Cadge, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 609.) The presentation of

Ross’s testimony regarding the 2009 incident did not necessitate undue

consumption of time, as shown by the fact that his testimony is set forth

on only eight pages of the reporter’s transcript. The evidence of

Chandler’s conduct during the 2009 incident is no more inflammatory

than the evidence of his behavior during the two 2010 incidents at issue

in this case. All three incidents involved an accusation that Chandler

acted with intent to commit theft at a retail business. Chandler’s claim

that admission of the evidence of the 2009 theft incident was “highly

prejudicial” is refuted by the fact that the jury found he was not guilty of

(1) committing a second assault upon Beeler with a deadly weapon on

June 3, as charged in count 2; (2) making a criminal threat against Beeler

on June 3, as charged in count 4; and (3) committing grand theft on May

18, as charged in count 6. Also, the court gave a limiting instruction

concerning the other crimes evidence, using a modified version of

CALCRIM No. 375 (discussed, ante ). Absent a showing to the contrary,

we must presume the jury followed that instruction. (People v. Yeoman

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 139.)

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting under Evidence Code section 1101(b) the

evidence of the 2009 theft incident.

(Lodgment No. 11 at 28-30.)

As previously noted, state evidentiary rulings are not generally subject to federal

habeas review. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70. Thus, to the extent Chandler contends the

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evidence was admitted in violation of state law, he is not entitled to relief. Id. The

admission of evidence can violate a petitioner’s due process right, however, if the

challenged evidence was so prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Id. 

at 67. Only if a jury can draw no permissible inferences from the challenged evidence

can the admission be fundamentally unfair. Mammal v. Van de Camp, 926 F.2d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 1991).

As the state court noted, the “other crimes” evidence was admitted to show

Chandler’s intent with regard to the burglary charges. The prior theft incident, in which

Chandler also used a large black backpack and went to a remote part of the store to

commit his theft, was relevant and probative of the disputed element of whether

Chandler had the requisite intent to commit burglary. The jury was given limiting

instructions directing it consider the “other crimes” evidence only for the purpose of

deciding whether Chandler entered the CVS stores with the intent to commit burglary. 

(Lodgment No. 2 at 0074-75.) Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions they are

given. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 170 (2006)

In any event, as Respondent correctly notes, the Ninth Circuit has stated that

there is no clearly established Supreme Court law which holds that evidence of other

crimes is inadmissible or violates due process because the Supreme Court expressly

reserved deciding that issue in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991). See

Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d

860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006). Where there is no clearly established Supreme Court law, a

state court’s denial of a claim cannot be said to be contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court law. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S.

70, 76-77 (2006). As the Ninth Circuit has noted:

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the

admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Although the Court

has been clear that a writshould be issued when constitutional errors have

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, [citation omitted], it has not yet

made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial

evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance

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of the writ. Absent such “clearly established Federal law,” we cannot

conclude that the state court’s ruling was an “unreasonable application.”

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Williams, 529 U.S.

at 375 and Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77).

For the foregoing reasons, Chandler is not entitled to federal habeas corpusrelief

as to this claim. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Chandler next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when she “failed

to disclose [exculpatory] evidence in possession of investigative agencies, [and]

knowingly allow[ed] exculpatory evidence to be destroyed in bad faith and

misrepresentation.” (Pet. at 26.) Essentially, Chandler contends the prosecutor knew

the store surveillance video contained exculpatory evidence and misrepresented both

the existence of the video and the contents of the video, then failed to preserve that

evidence, in violation of his due process rights. (Id. at 26-32.) Respondent argues the

state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 41-48.)

The facts underpinning this claim are as follows: Prior to trial, defense counsel

made an in limine motion to sanction the prosecution for its failure to preserve video

surveillance tapes of the June 3, 2010, incident. Counsel contended that video tapes

of the interior of the store existed, they would support the defense contention that

Chandler did not threaten Beeler, that Beeler was not afraid of Chandler but rather was

physically blocking his exit from the store, and that Chandler did not have a box cutter

in his hands as he exited the CVS store. (Lodgment No. 2 at 0024-26.) Counsel also

noted that Chandler had asked his prior attorney to get the surveillance tape, had

attempted to secure the surveillance tape while he was representing himself, and that

the tape had now been destroyed. (Id.) As a sanction, counsel asked for a dismissal of

the assault with a deadly weapon charges or a jury instruction which told jurorsto view

the assault charges with skepticism because the prosecution did not preserve the

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surveillance tape. (Id.) At the hearing on the in limine motions, the trial judge

concluded the prosecution did not have an affirmative obligation to gather evidence for

the defense, and that there was no evidence the prosecution ever had possession of the

CVS surveillance tape; no sanction was imposed. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 57-61.) 

Later that day, new information came to light. The prosecutor told the court and

counsel that she had spoken to Officer Vaquero, and he had told her the following:

[MS. FURNARI:] I did confirm with Officer Vaquero who was —

who reported to the CVS store that night or that late afternoon after the

defendant was taken into custody. He made an attempt to view store

surveillance video. He watched for about a 30-minute period to see if he

could see any video showing either the defendant inside the store or Mr.

Beeler in the store or the two of them together.

He reports, asis consistent with his police report, that he did not see

any video of the defendant either entering or exiting the store and that he

does not believe that the cameras would pick up anything going on

besides the entryway and the cash registers. But he did not see any video

that night of the entering or exiting of the store.

He did say that the two witnesses, Mike Hochdanner and David

Beeler, referred to video, but he believed it was the video relating the

prior incident on May 18.

I spoke to Mr. Hochdanner. There was a little bit of a discrepancy. 

He said that he believed that there was video copied by law enforcement

on the night of June 3rd. He believes that Mr. Beeler had a still shot

paused on the store surveillance camera showing the defendant just

coming in through the front door. He believes he provided some blank

CD’s to an officer or officers that night for them to make copies but he

never saw any copied version that law enforcement might have taken

away.

Then he talked to Mr. Beeler. He said about three weeks after the

incident, three weeks after June 3rd, his L.P.O., loss prevention officer,

came to the store and waslooking for some video, and he believesthat the

L.P.O. pulled up the defendant entering and exiting the store and Mr.

Beeler himself exiting the store after the defendant. 

But he didn’t see any video showing the rest of the store, and he

was not in the room. If any copy was provided at any time to San Diego

Police Department officers, he believesthat the L.P.O. was making a copy

to put in the store’s internal loss prevention file.

So I just wanted to make defense counsel and the court aware that

we do not believe that there’s any video in law enforcement possession of

the June 3rd incident, and if there was video that existed, with respect to

/ / /

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CVS having it in their possession, we believe that it may have — if it did

exist, it was only of the defendant entering and exiting the store.

(Id. at 63-65.)

Voicing concern about the series of events, the trial judge delayed the start of

trial until the following morning to give defense counsel time to contact any possible

witnesses regarding the surveillance tape. (Id. at 81.) Eventually, the trial judge

concluded there was “no convincing authority that requires the prosecution to collect

evidence such that Trombetta would be implicated if they failed to preserve it and

Brady would be implicated if they failed to turn it over.” (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 3 at

309.) He denied the motion to dismiss the assault charges or, in the alternative, instruct

the jury to view the assault charges with skepticism. (Id. at 313-14.)

It is not clear to the Court that that this claim is exhausted. Chandler did not

explicitly raise this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme

Court, which is the only document he filed in the California Supreme Court. The

petition for review only states that “Petitioner asserted 23 claims in his habeas corpus

petition,” and “Petitioner adopts the statement presented in the Court of Appeal’s

decision for purposes of this petition.” (Lodgment No. 12 at 28.) There was no

concomitant habeas corpus petition filed in the California Supreme Court which raised

this claim. Respondent does not, however, contend the claim is unexhausted. (See

Answer at 46.) In any event, if it is not exhausted, this Court may deny the petition if

it is “perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant

must establish three things: (1) the evidence wassuppressed by the prosecution, either

willfully or inadvertently, (2) the withheld evidence was either exculpatory or

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impeachment material, and (3) the evidence was material to the defense. Benn v.

Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473

U.S. 667, 676, 678 (1985) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).) 

“Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or material, only if it undermines confidence in the

outcome of the trial. Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Agurs,

427 U.S. at 111-12). “Moreover, we analyze all of the suppressed evidence together,

using the same type of analysis that we employ to determine prejudice in ineffective

assistance of counsel cases.” Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 and United States v.

Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1986).) 

The Ninth Circuit has noted that “[t]he Supreme Court limited Brady’s reach in

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 [citations omitted] (1984) and Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 [citations omitted] (1988).” Richter v. Hickman, 521 F.2d

1222, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008), reversed on other grounds by Harrington v. Richter, __

U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). “Trombetta holds that, for the Brady standard to apply,

“evidence must . . . possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence

was destroyed,” and “Youngblood holds that the State’s failure to preserve ‘potentially

useful’ evidence does not constitute a due process violation unless the defendant can

show bad faith on the part of the police.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Chandler has not established any of the requirementsto establish a Brady claim. 

First, the record does not show the prosecution suppressed or failed to disclose the

existence of the CVS surveillance tape, only that they did not secure it themselves. 

Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052-53. Moreover, Chandler has not established the CVS

surveillance tape was exculpatory or contained impeachment material. In the June 3

incident, Chandler was convicted of assaulting Beeler with a deadly weapon in the

liquor cage area and burglary of the CVS store; both charges also alleged Chandler

personally used a deadly weapon. (Lodgment No. 2 at 0009-11.) He was acquitted of

the second assault outside the store and making a criminal threat. (Id. at 0214-19.) The

camera views inside the CVS store were of the check stands, the customer service

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booth, the two entrances to the store, and two views of the sales floor. (Lodgment No.

1, vol. 2 at 159-60 (discussing video surveillance of the May 18 incident at the same

store).) The record convincingly establishes no video surveillance existed of the liquor

cage area where Chandler’s assault on Beeler with the box cutter occurred. Thus, any

video that could have been obtained would not have assisted Chandler in his defense

as to that charge. As to the burglary charge, the jury was required find Chandler

entered the CVS store with the intent to commit theft, and Chandler has not established

how the video would have shed light on his intent. See Penal Code § 459. 

Video of the interior of the store may have been relevant to Chandler’s claim he

did not have a box cutter in his hand and to impeach Beeler’s credibility. If the video

showed Beeler lied about Chandler verbally threatening him at the photo booth area or

that Chandler did not have a box cutter in his hand, it may have convinced the jury

Beeler was also lying about the assault inside the liquor cage. But Chandler provides

no convincing evidence the surveillance video would have shown any of these things,

and other evidence supports the conclusion that the video, if it existed would not have

assisted Chandler’s defense. David Salo testified that he saw something in Chandler’s

hand, which he thought was a box cutter, while Beeler and Chandler were in a heated

conversation and walking toward the store exit. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 274-75,

297.) Salo said Chandler was “being very aggressive[,] pushing Mr. Beeler — trying

to push Mr. Beeler out or to get out [of] his way . . . .” (Id. at 274-75.) A box cutter

was found in the bushes 10-15 feet away from Chandler. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 3 at

333-36.) 

For the same reasons, Chandler has also not established video surveillance tapes

of the June 3 incident were material to his defense and the Court’s confidence in the

outcome of the trial is not undermined. Benn, 283 F.3d 1052-53. There is no

convincing evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that surveillance tapes

would have further impeached Beeler’s credibility to such a degree that the jury’s

decision would have been different. Id.

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Chandler has also not established a Trombetta/Youngblood violation. As

discussed above, Chandler has not established that any video surveillance had “an

exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed.” Richter, 521

F.2d at 1234. Nor has he established failure to preserve the surveillance tape was due

to “bad faith on the part of the police.” Id. As Respondent points out, at most, the

police and the prosecutor were guilty of negligence when they failed to obtain or

preserve any surveillance video. There is no evidence in the record of bad faith. Id.

There was no Brady or Trombetta/Youngblood violation in Chandler’s case. 

Thus, he is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Chandler asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the CVS

surveillance tape, and that trial counsel had a conflict of interest because his previous

attorneys were co-workers of counsel’s. (Pet. at 33-37.) He also contendstrial counsel

failed to object to the prosecutor presenting perjured testimony by Beeler. (Id.)

As with the preceding claim, it is not clear to this Court that Chandler’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims are exhausted because he did not explicitly

raise them in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court, 

(Lodgment No. 12 at 28). Further, Respondent does not contend the claim is

unexhausted. (See Answer at 46.) Nevertheless, this Court may deny the petition if it

is “perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” 

Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624. 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his

attorney’s representation fell belowan objective standard ofreasonableness. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. He must also show he was prejudiced

by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing that “there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

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proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart,

506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Further, Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance . . . be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There

is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Id. at 686-87. TheCourt need not address both the deficiency

prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of

either one. Id. at 697.

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky,

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d)

are both highly deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations omitted). 

These standards are “difficult to meet” and “demand[] that state court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011). Federal habeasrelief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions

in the state criminal justice systems,” and not simply as a means of error correction. 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979). 

“Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was denied a fair trial.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

i. Failure to Secure the CVS Surveillance Tape

Chandler first contends counsel was ineffective for failing to secure the June 3

CVS store surveillance tape. (Pet. at 33-36.) Chandler was arrested on June 3 and his

first court appearance wasJune 8, 2010. (Lodgment No. 2 at 0173.) On June 22, 2010,

he was granted permission to represent himself and did so until August 18, 2010, when

the Alternate Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent him. (Id. at 0179,

0187.) Surveillance tapes were kept by CVS for a maximum of six weeks, then taped

over. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 68.) Thus, any surveillance tape was destroyed by

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approximately July 15, 2010. Accordingly, only Chandler’s first attorney’s

performance is at issue in this claim.

Even if Chandler’s attorney should have obtained the surveillance tape before

it was destroyed, Chandler has not shown he was prejudiced by this failure because he

has not established that, had counsel obtained the tape, “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As discussed above in

section IV(D) of this R&R, the record establishes there were no video cameras

recording the liquor cage area and there was nothing on the tape that would have

exonerated Chandler of the June 3 burglary charge. As to the weapons enhancements,

other evidence, including Salo’s testimony and the fact that a box cutter wasfound near

Chandler when he was arrested, was sufficient on its own to support the jury’s

conclusion that Chandler was armed with a box cutter during the burglary. (See

Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 297; vol. 3 at 333.) Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief

as to this claim.

ii. Conflict of Interest

Chandler also argues his trial counsel had a conflict of interest that compromised

his defense, namely, that Chandler’s two previous attorneys were co-workers of trial

counsel. This conflict ofinterest, according toChandler, compromised his defense and 

resulted in counsel failing to argue that the previous attorneys failed to conduct an

adequate pre-trial investigation. (Pet. at 36.)

Chandler’s claim is conclusory. He provides no evidence that counsel suffered

from a conflict of interest. Nor does he state what investigation, other than obtaining

the CVS surveillance tape, counsel should have performed or how any evidence

gleaned from that investigation would have assisted his defense. Conclusory

allegations cannot form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief. James v. Borg, 24

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). He is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

/ / /

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iii. Failure to Object to Presentation of Perjured Testimony

Finally, Chandler claims counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s use

of “perjured testimony,” i.e., Beeler’s testimony. (Pet. at 36.) A prosecutor commits

misconduct when she “(1) presents evidence that is “actually false,” (2) “[knows] or

should have known that the testimony was actually false,” and (3) “the false testimony

was actually material.” United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-71 (1959)); see also

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). However, the presentation of

conflicting versions of events, without more, does not constitute knowing presentation

of false evidence. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1364 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Here, the alleged perjured testimony consists of nothing more than conflicting

versions of events. Specifically, Beeler testified Chandler assaulted him with a box

cutter in the liquor cage area, then threatened him while they were walking out of the

store together in a heated exchange. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 2 at 206-17.) Chandler

contended that Beeler was the aggressor, lied about his confrontation with Chandler,

and physically tried to stop Beeler from leaving the store. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 2 at

225-60, 265-68, 290, 294; vol. 3 at 377-78,471-82.) Any objection to Beeler’s

testimony as “perjured” would have been baseless and counsel is not required to make

baseless objections. See Trilo v. Biter, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 2695531 (9th Cir. June

16, 2014). In addition, Chandler has not established he was prejudiced by counsel’s

failure to object to Beeler’s version of events because it is clear any objection would

have been overruled as unfounded.

F. Cumulative Error

Finally, Chandler contends the cumulative effect of the errors committed at his

trial denied him his right to fair trial. (Pet. at 38.) Respondent counters that the state

court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 54.)

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Chandler raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 12.) That court denied the claim without citation of

authority. (Lodgment No. 13.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the

state appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501

U.S. at 805-06. That court agreed with Respondent, finding that although the trial

court erred by excluding evidence of the CVS employee manual, there wasinsufficient

evidence of cumulative error. (Lodgment No. 11 at 36.) 

“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple

trial court errors violates due process where it renders the resulting trial fundamentally

unfair.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)); see also Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d

1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). “The cumulative effect of multiple errors can violate due

process even where no single error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or

would independently warrant reversal.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927; see also United States

v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that where no single trial error

in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant habeas relief, “the cumulative effect

of multiple errors may still prejudice a defendant”). Where “there are a number of

errors at trial, ‘a balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error review’ is far less effective

than analyzing the overall effect of all the errors in the context of the evidence

introduced at trial against the defendant.” Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1381 (quoting United

States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)). Cumulative error warrants

habeas relief only where the combined effect of the errors had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (quoting

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

The appellate court did not find any error, stating that “[w]ith respect to the

proffered evidence of the CVS policy manual regarding the reporting of suspected

shoplifting and treatment of suspected shoplifters, we assume, without deciding, that

the court erred by excluding that evidence on the ground it was not relevant.” 

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(Lodgment No. 11 at 17) (italics added). The state appellate court further concluded

that any error did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, and this Court

agrees. Where “there is no single constitutional error . . . there is nothing to accumulate

to a level of a constitutional violation.” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th

Cir. 2002); see also Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 523-24 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that

“[b]ecause we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no

cumulative prejudice is possible”). Moreover, Chandler has not suffered the “effect

of multiple trial court errors” such that his due process rights were violated and he is

entitled to federal habeas relief. See Parle, 505 F.3d at 927. Accordingly, Chandler

is not entitled to relief for his cumulative error claim. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(4)

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

Court issue an order: (1) approving and adopting thisReport and Recommendation, and

(2) directing thatJudgment be entered DENYING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 20, 2014 any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

ITIS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than November 7, 2014. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 16, 2014 ______________________________

 Bernard G. Skomal

 United States Magistrate Judge

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