Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05503/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05503-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer to the petition, and

Petitioner’s traverse to Respondent’s answer.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 JAVIER ACEVEDO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

D. ADAMS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

CV F 03 5503 OWW LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Due to the death of Magistrate Judge Hollis G. Best and the

appointment of Magistrate Judge William M. Wunderlich, by order dated May 2, 2004, this case was

reassigned to the undersigned for all further proceedings.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, following his conviction by

jury trial on June 8, 1998, of possession and sale of methamphetamine in violation of Cal. Health &

Safety Code §§ 11378 and 11379(a). See Exhibit 1, Declaration of Lisa Tillman in Support of

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Declaration”). On June 22, 1998,

Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate term of 8 years in state prison. Id. 

Petitioner was received at California State Prison, Corcoran, on November 10, 1999. See

Exhibit 2, Declaration.

On October 21, 2001, Petitioner was issued a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) for making

verbal threats to prison staff. See Exhibit 3, Declaration. 

On October 22, 2001, Petitioner was placed in administrative segregation because he was

found to present an immediate threat to the safety of others and he was a danger to institutional

security. See Exhibit 4, Declaration.

On October 31, 2001, Petitioner appeared before the Institution Classification Committee

(“ICC”) for his annual review. See Exhibit 5, Declaration. The ICC found him to be a threat to the

safety and security of the institution and therefore ordered him retained in administrative segregation

pending completion of the RVR process. Id. The ICC noted that Petitioner had received two serious

rule violation reports during the rating period and that Petitioner had remained a Level III inmate

with a classification score of 50. Id. 

On December 3, 2001, a disciplinary hearing was held on the RVR in abstentia as Petitioner

had refused to attend the hearing. See Exhibit 3, Declaration. Petitioner was found guilty of the rules

violation charge of threatening staff. Id. He was assessed a worktime credit forfeiture of thirty (30)

days. Id. In addition, he was referred to the ICC for program and custody review. Id.

On December 27, 2001, Petitioner appeared before the ICC for a thirty (30) day review. See

Exhibit 6, Declaration. The ICC noted that the hearing was conducted by the same lieutenant who

initiated the RVR. Id. Therefore, the ICC referred the RVR to the chief disciplinary officer with the

recommendation that the RVR be reheard. Id.

On February 1, 2002, a disciplinary hearing was conducted on the RVR. See Exhibit 7,

Declaration. A different officer conducted the hearing and found Petitioner guilty of threatening

staff. Id. Petitioner was assessed thirty (30) days of worktime credit forfeiture, he was confined to

quarters for fifteen (15) days with credit for time served, and he was assessed forty (40) hours of

disciplinary detention with credit for time served. Id. In addition, Petitioner was referred to the ICC

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

for program and custody review. Id.

On February 14, 2002, the ICC held a thirty (30) day review. See Exhibit 8, Answer. The ICC

noted that Petitioner had been found guilty of threatening staff, which is a “SHUable” offense. Id.

Therefore, the ICC imposed a 5 month midrange term in the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”). Id. The

ICC also recommended that Petitioner be transferred to the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and

State Prison (“SATF”) or California Correction Institution (“CCI”), both Level IV facilities. Id. On

June 2, 2002, Petitioner was transferred to SATF. See Exhibit 9, Declaration.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed and exhausted his administrative appeals with respect to his

classification.

On December 6, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kings

County Superior Court. See Exhibit 10, Declaration. On December 31, 2002, the Kings County

Superior Court denied the petition. See Exhibit 11, Declaration. On January 16, 2003, Petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “5th DCA”). See Exhibit 12, Declaration. On February 27, 2003, the petition was denied

without comment or citation to authority. Id. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Supreme Court. See Exhibit 13, Declaration. On April 9, 2003, the petition was

summarily denied without comment or citation to authority. Id.

On April 23, 2003, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in this Court. Following a

preliminary review of the petition, the Court ordered Petitioner to file a first amended petition. On

May 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a first amended petition. On September 8, 2003, the Court granted

leave to Petitioner to file a second amended petition. On September 19, 2003, Petitioner filed a

second amended petition. In the second amended petition, Petitioner challenges his placement in the

SHU following rehearing because a SHU term was never contemplated in the first hearing. Petitioner

contends this is in violation of Cal. Code of Reg., title 15, section 3312(b)(2). In addition, Petitioner

complains that he was deprived of his due process rights during the RVR disciplinary hearing.

On December 29, 2003, Respondent filed an answer to the second amended petition.

Respondent concedes Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies.

On January 30, 2004, Petitioner filed a traverse. 

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 4

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This account is taken from the RVR prepared by Officer J. Poblete dated October 21, 2001:

On October 21, 2001, at approximately 1840 hours, while I was dispensing PM

medication to Inmate ACEVEDO’s celly in 3C01-202, Inmate AVEVDO [sic], H-80759,

made a verbal comment to me. “You and me, we gonna have a big day.” I asked ACEVEDO

what he meant, but he refused to answer my question. Inmate ACEVEDO also stated, “Well,

it’s my birthday on October 30th.” I then asked him, “What’s your birthday got do with me?”

Inmate ACEVEDO replied, “I don’t know, you tell me?” I walked away from Inmate

ACEVEDO’s cell and immediately notified Sergeant R. Spriester. Previously on June 11,

2001, Inmate ACEVEDO was placed in Ad/Seg from 3C Facility after receiving a CDC-115

from the writer (for verbally disrespecting the writer). On October 16, 2001, at approximately

1630 hours, Inmate ACEVEDO made a verbal comment to the writer. “So you’re wearing an

OC pepper spray now?” While Inmate ACEVEDO was receiving insulin injection in 3C

Facility Clinic (Inmate ACEVEDO was released to 3C Facility from Ad/Seg as of October

15, 2001.). On October 18, 2001, at approximately 1700 hours, Inmate ACEVEDO was

escorted to the 3C Clinic, by Officer R. Heatherly, to receive his insulin injection. After

Inmate ACEVEDO injected himself with his insulin injection, he asked me to give him an

Insta-Glucose paste. I then replied “no” and explained that Insta-Glucose paste will only be

given to diabetic inmates who show signs and symptoms of low blood sugar (hypoglycemia).

I also explained to ACEVEDO that if he feels that his blood sugar is low, I’m willing to test

his blood sugar right now and give him Insta-Glucose paste if necessary. Inmate ACEVEDO

became argumentative and said to the writer, “You stupid fuck!” I asked Officer Heatherly to

confirm what Inmate ACEVEDO had called me; Officer Heatherly said, “Yes, he called you

a stupid fuck.” I then informed ACEVEDO that I will write him a CDC-115 for verbally

disrespecting me. Inmate ACEVEDO’s statements, when combined lead me to believe that

his behavior is a threat to my personal safety. Inmate ACEVEDO is aware of this report.

See Exhibit 3 & 7, Declaration.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, Petitioner challenges the execution of his sentence. At the time the

petition was filed, Petitioner was incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison located in Corcoran,

California, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 5

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Prisoners cannot be entirely deprived of their constitutional rights, but their rights may be

diminished by the needs and objectives of the institutional environment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 555 (1974). Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, so a

prisoner is not afforded the full panoply of rights in such proceedings. Id. at 556. Thus, a prisoner’s

due process rights are moderated by the “legitimate institutional needs” of a prison. Bostic v.

Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Superintendent, etc. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-

455 (1984).

However, when a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time credits,

due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of at least 24 hours of the

disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional

goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement

by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Hill, 472 U.S.

at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-567. In addition, due process required that the decision be supported

by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, citing United States ex rel. Vatauer v. Commissioner of

Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner contends he was denied his due process rights because he was issued a 5-month

term in the SHU following his rehearing on the RVR. Petitioner contends the 5-month term was

greater than the discipline issued in the first hearing in violation of Cal. Code of Reg., title 15,

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 6

section 3312. 

Cal. Code of Reg., title 15, section 3312(b)(2) provides:

Except upon discovery of information or evidence not available or reasonably discoverable at

the time of a disciplinary action, an order for a different method of discipline or for rehearing

of the charges shall not result in greater penalty or more severe action than that originally

taken.

(Emphasis added.)

In his first hearing, Petitioner was not issued a term in the SHU. He was issued a worktime

credit forfeiture of thirty (30) days and referred to the ICC for program and custody review. See

Exhibit 3, Declaration. However, Petitioner was also not issued a term in the SHU upon rehearing.

See Exhibit 7, Declaration. The SHU term was imposed by the ICC for the security of the institution

following the ICC’s thirty (30) day review, because Petitioner had been found guilty of threatening

staff. See Exhibit 8, Declaration. In addition to the SHU term, the ICC recommended that Petitioner

be reclassified and transferred to a higher level security prison. Id. These recommendations were not

disciplinary and were not issued out of the RVR hearing. Therefore, they do not run afoul of Cal.

Code of Reg., title 15, section 3312(b)(2). 

With respect Petitioner’s challenge to the RVR hearing, it is clear all due process

requirements were met. First, the RVR shows, and Petitioner does not deny, that he was provided

with 24 hours advance written notice of the disciplinary charges. See Exhibits 3 & 7, Declaration. In

fact, a copy of the RVR was given to Petitioner on January 9, 2002, and the rehearing was held on

February 1, 2002. See Exhibit 7, Declaration. Second, Petitioner was provided with an opportunity to

call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense. Id. Petitioner’s request to call

Inmate Chavez as a witness was granted; however, Inmate Chavez was unavailable as he had been

transferred to Pleasant Valley State Prison on December 11, 2001. Id. Therefore, the hearing officer

assumed that Chavez would have collaborated Petitioner’s statements. Id. Third, Petitioner

acknowledged receiving a written statement from the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the

reasons for the disciplinary action. Id. In addition, the decision was supported by “some evidence.”

Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. The hearing officer relied on Officer’s Poblete’s statements in the RVR which

contained various threatening statements made by Petitioner, as well as Petitioner’s own admission

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U.S . District Court

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of having told Officer Poblete, “When I get out of here, you and me will get together and settle our

differences.” Id. 

It is true that Petitioner’s first hearing was conducted by the same officer who initiated the

RVR against Petitioner. However, this procedural defect was corrected by the ICC when it ordered a

rehearing by the chief disciplinary officer. See Exhibit 6, Declaration. Therefore, the disciplinary

hearing process on the RVR comported with all constitutional due process requirements. The

petition should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DENIED and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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