Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05457/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05457-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 17, 2001 Decided July 13, 2001

No. 00-5457

Mohamed Al-Fayed and Punch Limited,

Appellants

v.

Central Intelligence Agency, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02092)

Mark S. Zaid argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

Gregg P. Leslie, Lucy A. Dalglish, David Sobel, Arthur B.

Spitzer and Kate Martin were on the brief for amici curiae

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al., in

support of appellants.

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Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was

filed, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice.

Before: Henderson, Tatel, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: This case raises an issue of first

impression: the standard of judicial review applicable to

agency denials of expedited processing under the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. s 552. We conclude that

district courts must review such denials de novo, rather than

defer to agency determinations. We further conclude that

the denials of expedition in this case survive de novo review

and, accordingly, we affirm the district court's refusal to

grant plaintiffs injunctive relief.

I

The plaintiffs in this case are Mohamed Al Fayed and

Punch Limited, a British magazine of political satire owned

and published by Al Fayed. They seek documents concerning events associated with the death of Diana Spencer,

Princess of Wales, and of Al Fayed's son, Dodi Al Fayed.

Together with their driver, Henri Paul, the two died in an

automobile accident in Paris on August 31, 1997. The French

government investigated the accident and concluded that it

was caused by Paul's intoxication and excessive speed. First

Am. Compl. pp 14-15.

Plaintiffs allege that the National Security Agency (NSA)

may have secretly recorded Princess Diana's telephone conversations. Id. p 63. They also contend that following the

automobile accident, a former British intelligence officer provided French investigators with evidence that Paul had been

secretly employed by the British foreign intelligence service

("MI6"). Id. p 18. Plaintiffs further allege, "[u]pon information and belief," that in 1998, at the behest of the British

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government, the United States denied that former officer

entry into this country to tell his story. Id. p 20.

Plaintiffs next claim that, later in 1998, Al Fayed was the

victim of an attempted fraud by Oswald LeWinter, a man

claiming connections to the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA), who tried to sell Al Fayed fabricated documents

indicating that MI6 was involved in the automobile crash.

After alerting the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), Al Fayed's representatives arranged to meet with

LeWinter in Vienna. When LeWinter arrived, he was arrested and incarcerated by Austrian authorities. Id. pp 24-42.

In a post-complaint affidavit, plaintiffs allege that the United

States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia promised

to prosecute those involved in LeWinter's fraudulent scheme,

but failed to do so. Macnamara Aff. p 25. They further

contend that the CIA and FBI may have been involved in

efforts to prevent those prosecutions. Id.; First Am. Compl.

pp 51, 52.

In July and August 2000, plaintiffs filed FOIA requests

with ten federal agencies and agency components, seeking the

expedited release of documents relating to the abovedescribed events.1 Shortly thereafter, they filed a complaint

in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, charging that the agencies had wrongfully withheld the

requested records. See 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(B). Plaintiffs

__________

1 The ten were: the CIA, NSA, FBI, Department of State,

Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department

of Justice, Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and United States Secret Service.

Plaintiffs' brief advises that since the filing of this appeal, one of the

agencies has been voluntarily dismissed from the case and five more

have completed processing plaintiffs' underlying document requests.

Reply Br. for Pls. at 1 n.1. The decisions of those six agencies,

therefore, are no longer subject to appeal. See 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(6)(E)(iv) ("A district court of the United States shall not

have jurisdiction to review an agency denial of expedited processing

of a request for records after the agency has provided a complete

response to the request."). The remaining appellees are the CIA,

NSA, FBI, and Department of State.

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also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction directing the

agencies to expedite the processing of the FOIA requests.

See id. s 552(a)(6)(E). In September 2000, the district court

denied the request for preliminary injunctive relief, Al-Fayed

v. CIA, No. 00-cv-2092 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2000), and plaintiffs

returned to the agencies to supplement the administrative

record and to seek expedition through administrative appeals.

Two months later, after amending their complaint, plaintiffs

filed a second motion asking the court to issue a preliminary

injunction requiring expedited processing. The court again

denied the motion. Al-Fayed v. CIA, No. 00-cv-2092 (D.D.C.

Dec. 11, 2000) ("December Opinion").2

In its December 2000 opinion, the district court concluded

that none of the factors relevant to granting preliminary

relief pointed in plaintiffs' favor. Plaintiffs could not show

that: (1) they had a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits; (2) they would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted; (3) granting the injunction would not

injure other parties (for example, those requestors over whom

plaintiffs would take precedence if the injunction were issued); or (4) the public interest would be furthered by the

injunction. Id. at 4, 13-16. The court focused primarily on

the first factor--plaintiffs' likelihood of success--and noted

that under FOIA, plaintiffs are entitled to expedited processing of their requests only if they demonstrate a "compelling

need" for expedition. 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I). As a

__________

2 Plaintiffs' motion was styled as a "Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, Or, in the Alternative, to Compel Expedited Processing." The district court treated the motion as one seeking a preliminary injunction, noting that

the same factors apply in evaluating requests for preliminary

injunctions and temporary restraining orders, see December Opinion at 4 n.2, and that plaintiffs "offer no additional basis which

justifies an order compelling expedited processing," id. at 16.

Plaintiffs still have not articulated how an "order to compel" would

differ from their requested injunctive relief. In any event, because

the grant of any form of relief turns on whether plaintiffs can meet

the FOIA criteria for expedited processing, we will treat all three of

their requests as essentially equivalent.

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threshold matter, the court determined that it should not

review de novo the agencies' findings concerning "compelling

need," but rather should apply "an 'abuse of discretion' or

'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review." December

Opinion at 6. Applying that standard, the district court

concluded that the agencies did not abuse their discretion in

determining that there was no "compelling need" for expedited processing. Id. at 13.3

II

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's December 2000 denial

of their motion for a preliminary injunction requiring expedited processing of their FOIA requests. The only issue before

this court is whether those requests qualify for expedited

treatment under the statute. Because the agencies have not

yet completed processing the document requests themselves,

the sufficiency of their searches for responsive documents, as

well as the merits of any exemptions from production they

might eventually claim, are not before us.

As the district court noted, in considering a plaintiff's

request for a preliminary injunction a court must weigh four

factors: (1) whether the plaintiff has a substantial likelihood

of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff would

suffer irreparable injury were an injunction not granted; (3)

whether an injunction would substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) whether the grant of an injunction

would further the public interest. See, e.g., Serono Labs.,

Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We

"review the district court's weighing of the preliminary injunction factors under the abuse of discretion standard, and

its findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.

[T]o the extent the district court's decision hinges on questions of law, however, our review is essentially de novo." Id.

at 1318 (citations and internal quotations omitted). On this

appeal, the parties principally dispute the first factor--wheth-

__________

3 In a footnote, the court stated that it would have reached the

same conclusion even if it had applied a de novo standard. December Opinion at 13 n.6; see infra note 9.

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er plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits. For the reasons stated in the district court's opinion,

we agree that the other factors counsel against granting

plaintiffs relief. See December Opinion at 14-16. Accordingly, our decision regarding plaintiffs' likelihood of success on

the merits will effectively decide whether plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction. See Serono Labs., Inc., 158

F.3d at 1326.

Plaintiffs raise two challenges to the district court's decision that they are unlikely to succeed on the merits. First,

they argue that the court applied an improperly deferential

standard of review to the agencies' determinations that there

is no "compelling need" for expedited treatment. Plaintiffs

claim that the court should have reviewed those determinations de novo--anew, without any deference to the agencies.

Second, plaintiffs contend that there is in fact a "compelling

need" for expedited treatment, and that the court therefore

erred in denying them preliminary relief. The Reporters

Committee for Freedom of the Press, joined by other public

interest organizations, has filed an amicus curiae brief supporting plaintiffs' contention that de novo review is required,

but taking no position as to whether expedited review is

warranted in this case. We consider the appropriate standard of review--both for the district court and for this

court--in this Part, and the application of that standard to

plaintiffs' request for expedition in Part III.

A

The standard of review to be applied by a district court to

agency expedition determinations is a question of law, which

this court must itself decide de novo. Id. at 1318. The

district court concluded that it should apply the deferential

standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), which empowers a reviewing court to set aside agency

action only when it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." December Opinion at 8 (quoting 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A)). The APA,

however, "provides a default standard of judicial review ...

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where a statute does not otherwise provide a standard."

Dickson v. Sec'y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1404 n.12 (D.C. Cir.

1995); see Workplace Health & Safety Council v. Reich, 56

F.3d 1465, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In this case, FOIA sets

forth its own standard of judicial review, rendering the APA

standard inapposite.

In 1996, Congress amended FOIA to provide for expedited

processing of requests for agency records. See Electronic

Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L.

104-231, s 8, 110 Stat. 3048, 3051-52. Pursuant to those

amendments, codified at paragraph 6(E) of 5 U.S.C. s 552(a),

agencies are to promulgate regulations "providing for expedited processing of requests for records--(I) in cases in which

the person requesting the records demonstrates a compelling

need; and (II) in other cases determined by the agency." 5

U.S.C. s 552(a)(6)(E)(i). Agencies are directed to "process as

soon as practicable any request for records to which [they

have] granted expedited processing." Id. s 552(a)(6)(E)(iii).

The amendments further provide that an agency decision "to

deny ... a request for expedited processing ... shall be

subject to judicial review under paragraph (4), except that the

judicial review shall be based on the record before the agency

at the time of the determination." Id.

The cross-referenced paragraph (4) is the provision that

authorizes judicial review of an agency's decision to withhold

records from a FOIA requestor. It states in relevant part:

On complaint, the district court ... has jurisdiction to

enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and

to order the production of any agency records improperly

withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court

shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine

the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be

withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency

to sustain its action.

Id. s 552(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Although it is not absolutely clear that the cross-reference in paragraph 6(E) was

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intended to include paragraph (4)'s de novo standard of

review, that is surely the most straightforward reading of the

statute. Indeed, that reading is virtually compelled by the

language of paragraph 6(E), which states that the denial of

expedition "shall be subject to judicial review under paragraph (4), except that the judicial review shall be based on the

record before the agency at the time of the determination."

Id. s 552(a)(6)(E)(iii) (emphasis added). Because paragraph

(6)(E) directs that paragraph (4) shall govern review of

denials of expedition with only one exception, and because

that exception does not involve the de novo review mandated

by paragraph (4), the logical conclusion is that de novo review

is the proper standard for a district court to apply to a denial

of expedition.4

The government defends the deferential review employed

by the district court on three principal grounds. First, it

argues that review limited to "the record before the agency at

the time of the determination," id., is a hallmark of deferential review under the APA. But while that language plainly

instructs courts as to which record to review, and directs

them not to look to material submitted after the agency has

made its decision, it does not command courts to review that

record deferentially rather than de novo. Indeed, that de

novo review is compatible with a limitation on the scope of the

record to be reviewed is confirmed by another paragraph of

FOIA. That paragraph authorizes judicial review of agency

decisions regarding fee waivers for processing FOIA requests. Id. s 552(a)(4)(A)(vii). Although Congress likewise

limited that review "to the record before the agency," it

__________

4 We note that although paragraph (4) also provides that where

the agency withholds records, "the burden is on the agency to

sustain its action," 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(B), paragraph (6)(E) expressly provides that it is "the person requesting the records" who

must "demonstrat[e] a compelling need" for expedition, id.

s 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 25 (1996)

("The requestor would bear the burden of showing that expedition

is appropriate."). At oral argument, plaintiffs agreed that it is their

burden to demonstrate "compelling need."

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nonetheless expressly provided that "the court shall determine the matter de novo." Id.

Seizing upon this express provision for de novo review of

fee-waiver decisions, the government next argues that Congress must not have intended that de novo review apply to

decisions regarding expedition, else it would have expressly

said so--just as it did for fee waivers--rather than ambiguously cross-reference paragraph (4). We disagree. As discussed above, although the cross-reference is not absolutely

clear, it can hardly be called ambiguous. Moreover, the

provision regarding expedited processing was added to FOIA

in 1996. At that time, the sections providing for de novo

review of decisions to deny fee waivers and to withhold

documents were already in place. That being the case, it is

not surprising that Congress chose merely to cross-reference

an existing paragraph, rather than to restate the applicable

standard of review.5

Third, the government argues that courts should give deference to the agencies' determinations because the agencies

have particular expertise concerning which FOIA requests

merit expedition. But even if the statute's language were not

dispositive with respect to the standard of review, this would

not be a case for deference to agency expertise. FOIA

directs the agencies to provide expedited processing where a

requestor demonstrates "compelling need," id.

s 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(II), and there is no reason to believe that the

agencies have expertise on that subject.

As one part of its expertise argument, the government

contends that an agency is better positioned than a court to

assess the volume of other requests pending before the

__________

5 It is true that Congress could also have used a crossreference when it added the provision for de novo review of feewaiver decisions in 1986, because the provision regarding review of

withholding decisions was already in place at that time. See Pub.

L. No. 99-570, s 1803, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-49, 3207-50 (1986)

(codified at 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(A)). But the decision of the 1986

Congress to restate the standard tells us nothing about the intentions of the 1996 Congress in using a cross-reference.

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agency. That is true, but irrelevant. Nothing in the statute

or the legislative history suggests that "compelling need"

turns on the volume of other pending requests. To the

contrary, FOIA provides its own definition of "compelling

need," a definition that includes no reference to the workload

of the agency:

For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "compelling

need" means--

(I) that a failure to obtain requested records on an

expedited basis ... could reasonably be expected to pose

an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an

individual; or

(II) with respect to a request made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating information, urgency to

inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal

Government activity.

5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(6)(E)(v). See also infra Part III (discussing legislative history).

Noting that the second branch of the above definition of

"compelling need" includes a requirement of "urgency to

inform the public," the government next argues that, because

agencies receive a wide range of FOIA requests, they have

expertise regarding the relative urgency of any particular

request. But while each agency may be in a position to

assess the urgency of a request relative to that of other

requests it has previously received, no single agency is positioned to measure the urgency of a request relative to requests received throughout the government. Because "compelling need," like other FOIA terms, sets a government-wide

rather than agency-specific standard, such agency-specific

"expertise" is of no significance. See Tax Analysts v. IRS,

117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The meaning of FOIA

should be the same no matter which agency is asked to

produce its records.").

Indeed, the government's expertise argument illuminates

the larger problem with its plea for deferential review. Were

district courts required to defer to agency determinations of

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"compelling need," they would have to affirm disparate (albeit, reasonable) decisions reached by different agencies regarding the same request. As the government agreed at oral

argument, however, Congress did not contemplate such a

result. Indeed, it is precisely because FOIA's terms apply

government-wide that we generally decline to accord deference to agency interpretations of the statute, as we would

otherwise do under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See, e.g.,

Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 613 (noting that "we will not defer

to an agency's view of FOIA's meaning" because "[n]o one

federal agency administers FOIA" and "[o]ne agency's interpretation of FOIA is therefore no more deserving of judicial

respect than the interpretation of any other agency"); Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States

Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining

to accord Chevron deference to Justice Department interpretation of FOIA exemptions because FOIA "applies to all

government agencies, and thus no one executive branch entity

is entrusted with its primary interpretation"), rev'd on other

grounds, 489 U.S. 749 (1989). For the same reason, we

decline to permit district courts to defer to agency determinations of "compelling need."

As is true with respect to other FOIA provisions, the

provision for expedited processing authorizes an agency to

promulgate regulations to effectuate that provision. 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(6)(E)(i). Although this mandate empowers each

agency to issue regulations setting forth the procedures by

which it will make expedition determinations,6 it does not

authorize an agency to offer its own definition of "compelling

need." That term is defined by FOIA itself, and because the

definition applies across the government, district courts may

__________

6 See 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(6)(E)(ii) ("[R]egulations under this subparagraph must ensure--(I) that a determination of whether to

provide expedited processing shall be made, and notice of the

determination shall be provided to the person making the request,

within 10 days after the date of the request; and (II) expeditious

consideration of administrative appeals of such determinations of

whether to provide expedited processing.").

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not defer to any individual agency's effort to elaborate upon

that definition--whether through case-specific determinations

or through regulations. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(declining to defer to an FDA regulation defining the meaning

of "trade secrets" under FOIA, because to do so "would

produce an intolerable situation in which different agencies

could adopt inconsistent interpretations of the FOIA").7

B

Having concluded that a district court must review de novo

an agency's denial of a request for expedition under FOIA,

there remains the question of what standard this court should

apply when reviewing the district court's own decision. The

statute itself does not directly address the standard of appellate review.8 In the typical FOIA case concerning the with-

__________

7 We note one caveat concerning deference to agency FOIA

regulations. FOIA directs each agency to promulgate regulations

providing for expedited processing, not only "in cases in which the

person requesting the records demonstrates a compelling need," but

also "in other cases determined by the agency." 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(6)(E)(i) (emphasis added). According to the legislative

history, the latter provision gives an agency "latitude to expand the

criteria for expedited access" beyond cases of "compelling need."

H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 26. A regulation promulgated in response to such an express delegation of authority to an individual

agency is entitled to judicial deference, see United States v. Mead

Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2171 (2001), as is each agency's reasonable

interpretation of its own such regulations, see United States v.

Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 121 S. Ct. 1433, 1444-45 (2001).

We have examined the defendant agencies' FOIA regulations applicable to this case, and conclude that to the extent those regulations

expand the criteria for expedited processing beyond "compelling

need," the agencies reasonably determined that plaintiffs' requests

did not meet the expanded criteria.

8 The cross-referenced judicial review provision states that

"[o]n complaint, the district court ... has jurisdiction to enjoin the

agency.... In such a case the court shall determine the matter de

novo...." 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Although it

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holding of requested documents, the appellate standard is

rarely in doubt. In such cases, the district court normally

has decided an issue, such as the applicability of a claimed

FOIA exemption, on summary judgment, thereby reducing

the question on appeal to whether there is a genuine issue of

material fact regarding the exemption's applicability. See,

e.g., Billington v. United States Dep't of Justice, 233 F.3d

581, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Summers v. Dep't of Justice,

140 F.3d 1077, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Because the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is itself a question of

law, see Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1988);

10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure s 2720, at 331 (3d ed.

1998), we review such cases de novo, see Summers, 140 F.3d

at 1080.

In this case, however, the district court did not rule on a

motion for summary judgment, but rather ruled on plaintiffs'

motion for a preliminary injunction. On appeal from such a

ruling, we review the district court's conclusions of law de

novo, but review its findings of fact only for clear error. See

Serono Labs., Inc., 158 F.3d at 1318; see also Schlefer v.

United States, 702 F.2d 233, 236 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting

that the court would have employed deferential rather than

de novo review had the district court's FOIA decision turned

on "resolution of a fact controversy" rather than summary

judgment); 1 James T. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure s 8:35, at 316-17 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that appellate

courts apply the "clearly erroneous" test in FOIA appeals

where "the issue is one of conflicting facts and competing

inferences"). The issue, then, is whether a district court's

determination of "compelling need" is a question of law or

fact.

As we discuss in Part III below, a number of elements go

into an analysis of whether "compelling need" exists. Both

__________

could be argued otherwise, the term "the court" in the second

sentence appears to refer to the district court mentioned in the

first. See generally S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 8 (1965) (explaining the

importance of a de novo proceeding in the district court).

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plaintiffs and the government agreed at oral argument that

the ultimate conclusion will often rest on important underlying facts: for example, the credibility of a claimant's allegations regarding governmental activity, the existence of a

threat to physical safety, or whether an issue is the subject of

current news coverage. District court findings regarding

such factual matters are reviewed for clear error. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); see also Cooter

& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990) (noting

that "[i]ssues involving credibility are normally considered

factual matters"). The ultimate question of whether a plaintiff has demonstrated "compelling need," however, involves

the application of a legal standard to a set of underlying facts,

and hence may perhaps best be classified as a mixed question

of law and fact. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.

273, 289-90 n.19 (1982). The appropriate standard of appellate review for such mixed questions is often difficult to

determine. Id. Compare Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-99 (holding that district court findings of "reasonable suspicion" and

"probable cause" should be reviewed de novo), with Buford v.

United States, 121 S. Ct. 1276, 1279-81 (2001) (reviewing

deferentially a district court's decision as to whether prior

convictions are "related" under the Sentencing Guidelines),

and Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 399-405 (applying unitary

abuse-of-discretion standard to review of a district court's

imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

11).

For two reasons, we need not decide whether our review of

the district court's decision should be deferential or de novo

in order to dispose of the present case. First, the district

court did not conduct a de novo review to determine "compelling need," but rather deferred to the views of the agencies.

See, e.g., December Opinion at 7 ("[T]he Court will not apply

de novo review to the agencies' determinations at issue in this

case.").9 Under these circumstances, were we to defer to the

__________

9 Although the district court stated in a footnote that it would

reach the same conclusion even if it were to apply a de novo

standard, its rationale was that plaintiffs' requests had failed to

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district court, we would effectively be deferring to the agencies; thus, no court would have performed the de novo review

that the statute requires at least the district court to perform.

Second, as discussed below, we would reach the same conclusion as that reached by the district court--that plaintiffs have

failed to demonstrate "compelling need"--regardless whether

we review the court's determination deferentially or de

novo.10 Accordingly, we will analyze the case using the

standard most favorable to the plaintiffs--de novo review--

and leave for another day the question of which standard this

court should generally apply when reviewing a district court's

determination of "compelling need."

III

We now turn to an examination of plaintiffs' claim that they

have "demonstrate[d] a compelling need" for the expedited

processing of their FOIA requests. 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I). As noted above, FOIA's definition of

"compelling need" has two branches: "(I) that a failure to

obtain requested records on an expedited basis ... could

reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life

or physical safety of an individual; or (II) with respect to a

request made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating

information, urgency to inform the public concerning actual

or alleged Federal Government activity." Id.

s 552(a)(6)(E)(v). Plaintiffs claim "compelling need" only

under the second branch, and the government does not

contest that at least one of the plaintiffs, Punch Limited,

__________

meet "the requisite agency criteria for expedited processing." December Opinion at 13 n.6. As discussed above, the various agencies' criteria should play no role in a de novo review.

10 Indeed, this case is so clear that, even reviewed deferentially,

any other conclusion would constitute an abuse of discretion.

Hence, there is no reason to remand the case for redetermination

by the district court. Cf. United States v. Fenner, 147 F.3d 360,

363 (4th Cir. 1998) ("We need not remand to permit the district

court to exercise its discretion to depart if its decision to do so on

remand would constitute an abuse of discretion.").

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qualifies as an entity "primarily engaged in disseminating

information." Accordingly, the remaining question is whether plaintiffs have demonstrated the requisite "urgency to

inform."

The relevant legislative history, to which both the government and appellants refer, offers considerable assistance in

interpreting "urgency to inform." As an overarching principle, the legislative history declares that "[t]he specified categories for compelling need are intended to be narrowly

applied." H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 26 (1996). Congress'

rationale for a narrow application is clear: "Given the finite

resources generally available for fulfilling FOIA requests,

unduly generous use of the expedited processing procedure

would unfairly disadvantage other requestors who do not

qualify for its treatment." Id. Indeed, an unduly generous

approach would also disadvantage those requestors who do

qualify for expedition, because prioritizing all requests would

effectively prioritize none.

The legislative history provides the following, more specific

guidance as well:

The standard of "urgency to inform" requires that the

information requested should pertain to a matter of a

current exigency to the American public and that a

reasonable person might conclude that the consequences

of delaying a response to a FOIA request would compromise a significant recognized interest. The public's right

to know, although a significant and important value,

would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy this standard.

Id. In addition, the statute requires that the request concern

"actual or alleged Federal Government activity." 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II). Thus, in determining whether requestors have demonstrated "urgency to inform," and hence "compelling need," courts must consider at least three factors: (1)

whether the request concerns a matter of current exigency to

the American public; (2) whether the consequences of delaying a response would compromise a significant recognized

interest; and (3) whether the request concerns federal government activity. The legislative history also indicates that

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"[t]he credibility of a requestor" is a relevant consideration.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 26.

Plaintiffs' claim of urgency founders upon the first of these

factors. Their complaint and request for expedition focuses

on records relating to the deaths of Princess Diana and Dodi

Al Fayed in a 1997 automobile accident, and specifically on

records relating to allegations that the NSA taped the

Princess' telephone calls, that in 1998 the United States

denied entry to an informant with information about the

involvement of MI6 in the accident, and that in 1998 Mohamed Al Fayed was the victim of an attempted fraud.

Assuming the credibility of these allegations, which the government disputes, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their

FOIA requests relate to "a matter of a current exigency to

the American public." Id. All of the events and alleged

events occurred two to three years before plaintiffs made

their requests for expedited processing. Although these topics may continue to be newsworthy, none of the events at

issue is the subject of a currently unfolding story.

Plaintiffs contend that at least one of their requests--that

for documents regarding the fraud scheme--does not merely

concern a subject of historical interest, but extends to events

that occurred just prior to the filing of their amended complaint. At that time, the United States Attorney's Office for

the District of Columbia advised Al Fayed's representatives

that it had insufficient evidence to prosecute participants in

the attempted fraud. Plaintiffs allege that by declining to

prosecute, the Office broke its promise to those representatives, perhaps due to pressure from the CIA and FBI. Again

putting the credibility of these disputed allegations to one

side, plaintiffs' claims do not meet the standard of "urgency

to inform." Even if the information sought is properly characterized as "current," it cannot fairly be said to concern a

matter of "exigency to the American public." There is no

evidence in the record11 that there is substantial interest,

__________

11 See 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(6)(E)(iii) ("[J]udicial review shall be

based on the record before the agency at the time of the determination.").

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either on the part of the American public or the media, in this

particular aspect of plaintiffs' allegations. Indeed, the record

does not contain any news reports on the subject of the

United States Attorney's alleged refusal to prosecute, other

than reports on the press conference plaintiffs held to announce the filing of their complaint. See Pls. Ex. 12 (J.A.

324-329); see also December Opinion at 11 n.4. Such evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the request concerns

a matter of current exigency. Moreover, plaintiffs have not

demonstrated any "significant adverse consequence" that

would result if their request for expedited processing of these

or any other documents were denied, and they therefore

received the documents later rather than sooner. See H.R.

Rep. No. 104-795, at 26 ("By requiring a 'compelling need,' the

expedited access procedure is intended to be limited to circumstances in which a delay in obtaining information can

reasonably be foreseen to cause a significant adverse consequence to a recognized interest.").12

IV

We conclude that a district court must apply de novo

review to agency denials of expedited processing under

FOIA. In this case, the agencies' denials survive de novo

review because plaintiffs have not demonstrated a "compelling need" for the requested records. We do not decide

whether plaintiffs will ultimately be entitled to the documents

they seek--only that the agencies are not required to give

__________

12 In their second request for injunctive relief from the district

court, plaintiffs suggested that their request was urgent because

they " 'question[ed] the integrity and conduct of federal government

officials' who 'with the forthcoming change of a presidential administration' " might soon leave the government. December Opinion at

15 n.8 (quoting Zaid Aff. pp 10-11). On the record before the

agency, the district court properly regarded this argument as

speculative, both because there was no evidence that plaintiffs'

allegations "involve[d] federal employees who will not remain with

the government," and because the claim that public officials cannot

be held accountable "if they are no longer with the government is

conjectural." Id.

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plaintiffs' requests priority over those made by other media

representatives or the public at large. The order of the

district court, denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, is

Affirmed.

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