Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-06979/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-06979-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Respondent did not file a reply. 1

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEMONTA RENNA MCBROOM,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ROBERT AYERS, Warden,

Respondents.

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No. C 06-6979 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket No. 4)

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that the Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) should have released him from

prison in 1993. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should not be

granted. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition and petitioner filed an opposition. 1

Based upon the papers submitted, the court concludes that the petition is untimely and will

DISMISS the instant petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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BACKGROUND

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of seven years-to-life in state prison after his 1977

conviction in Solano Superior Court for first degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187). Petitioner

does not challenge his original sentence or conviction in the instant petition. Rather, petitioner

claims that his sentence expired in 1993 under California’s Indeterminate Sentencing Law

(“ISL”), but that the Board has not released him from prison. Petitioner filed two unsuccessful

habeas petitions in the state superior court in 2005 and 2006. Petitioner then filed a habeas

petition with the state appellate court, which was denied. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition in

the state supreme court which was denied on May 10, 2006. Petitioner filed the instant petition

on August 14, 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The

petition was transferred to this court on November 8, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became

law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ

of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA’s one-year

limitation period applies to all habeas petitions filed by state prisoners, even if the petition

challenges a decision by an administrative board such as a parole board. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391

F.3d 1061, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2004).

 Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must

be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (A) the judgment became final after

the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (B) an impediment

to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action

prevented petitioner from filing; (C) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Where, as here, the petition

challenges an administrative action by a parole board, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies, and the

limitations period begins to run on the date on which “the factual predicate of the claim or claims

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Shelby, 391 F.3d

at 1066. Here, petitioner claims that under California’s ISL, his release date was set in 1993, and

that the Board violated his constitutional rights by failing to release him at that time. Petitioner

asserts that his continued incarceration beyond this ISL term is an ongoing violation of his

constitutional rights. Pet.’s Opp. at 3. The factual predicate for this claim is that the Board

rescinded petitioner’s parole date in 1992 and did not release him from custody when his ISL

term expired in 1993, a fact of which petitioner was certainly aware of at that time. Petitioner

argues that he did not know that his detention was illegal at that time, and that this delay was due

to ineffective assistance of counsel and the Board’s scheduling practices for parole suitability

hearings. Pet.’s Opp. at 5-6; Petition at 15-16.

However, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) the limitations period begins to run “‘when

the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the

prisoner recognizes their legal significance.’” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir.

2000). Petitioner asserts that his continued incarceration is an ongoing constitutional violation

and therefore the petition is timely. He asserts further that his claim is not about the failure to

grant parole but rather about the failure to release him because he has fully-served his sentence.

However, as the state superior court recognized, petitioner’s term of incarceration does not

exceed his original sentence, seven years-to-life, nor demonstrate that the time he has actually

served is constitutionally disproportionate to his crime of first degree murder. Petition,

Attachment (In re Application of Lemonta McBroom, Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, Solano County Superior Court, case no. FCR227749, December 14, 2005) at 2. Here,

the parole board rescinded petitioner’s originally set release date and has not since found him

suitable for parole. Based upon petitioner’s contentions, the unlawful portion of his sentence

began in 1993, when his ISL term allegedly expired and the Board failed to release him. As the

factual predicate of petitioner’s claim could have been discovered with the exercise of due

diligence in 1993, when his ISL term expired, that is when the limitation period commenced

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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Where, as here, the limitation period began to run prior to the enactment of AEDPA,

petitioner had until April 24, 1997 in which to file his federal habeas petition. Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The instant petition was not filed until 2006,

approximately nine years later. Thus, absent tolling, the instant petition is untimely.

The one-year statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the “time during which

a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner’s first state habeas

petition was not filed until 2005, long after the limitations period had expired in 1997. A state

habeas petition filed after AEDPA’s statute of limitations ended cannot toll the limitations

period. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not

permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed,”

even if the state petition was timely filed). Therefore, there is no basis for statutory tolling in this

case.

Because statutory tolling does not render the petition timely, the court must decide

whether equitable tolling saves the petition. The Supreme Court has “never squarely addressed

the question whether equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations,” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005), but Ninth Circuit authority holds that the one-year

limitation period may be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitations and not a

jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1, and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061 (1998), overruled in part on

other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999). Equitable tolling will not be available in most

cases because extensions of time should be granted only if “extraordinary circumstances beyond

a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the petitioner bears the burden of showing that this

“extraordinary exclusion” should apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir.

2002). The petitioner must establish two elements in order to be granted equitable tolling:

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pace, 544

U.S. at 419); see Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (petitioner’s lack of diligence in filing timely state and

federal petitions precluded equitable tolling); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999) (“When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure

to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.”). The

prisoner also must show that “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause of his

untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Where a

prisoner fails to show “any causal connection” between the grounds upon which he asserts a right

to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas application, the equitable

tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding

that where prisoner fails to show causal connection between self-representation on direct appeal

or physical and mental disabilities and inability to timely file petition, district court’s finding that

he was not entitled to equitable tolling where he had earlier filed a state habeas petition was not

clear error).

Whether equitable tolling is appropriate turns on an examination of detailed facts. Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). See, e.g., Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2005) (equitable tolling warranted for inmate’s eleven-month stay

in ad-seg because he was denied access to legal papers despite his repeated requests for them);

Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding equitable tolling warranted

where prison litigation coordinator promises the prisoner’s lawyer to obtain the prisoner’s

signature in time for filing a petition, but then breaks his promise, causing the petition to be late).

In noncapital cases, an attorney’s miscalculation of the limitations period and negligence

in general do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. 

Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (assuming without deciding that equitable

tolling applies to § 2244(d)(2); in case where prisoner has no constitutional right to counsel,

attorney miscalculation of limitations period not sufficient); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144,

1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing capital cases such as Beeler in which the petitioner has the

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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right to a habeas petition filed by counsel).

A pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154; cf. Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (illiteracy of pro se petitioner not

sufficient cause to avoid procedural bar); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir.

1998) (pro se status during state habeas proceedings did not justify equitable tolling); United

States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993) (pro se status, illiteracy, deafness and lack of

legal training not external factors excusing abuse of the writ). However, when a prisoner is

proceeding pro se, his allegations regarding diligence in filing a federal petition on time must be

construed liberally. Roy v. Lampert, 455 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Petitioner argues that the delay in challenging the unconstitutionality of his incarceration

after the alleged expiration of the term of his ISL sentence in 1993 is based upon ineffective

assistance of his counsel at his subsequent parole suitability hearings and the Board’s scheduling

practices for such hearings. Pet.’s Opp. at 5-6; Petition at 15-16. However, petitioner admits

that since 1993 he has had at least nine subsequent parole suitability hearings before the Board.

Notwithstanding petitioner’s allegation concerning the scheduling practices of the Board,

petitioner admits that he had an opportunity to appear before the Board at these subsequent

hearings to challenge his continued incarceration and failure to set his release date. Accordingly,

petitioner has not shown that the Board’s scheduling practices prevented him from filing a timely

federal petition.

Additionally, petitioner asserts that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance at his

subsequent parole hearings because the attorneys did not recognize that his continued

incarceration beyond the ISL term was illegal. However, as the state superior court noted in its

order denying petitioner’s second habeas petition, the Board must first determine that a prisoner

is suitable for parole before setting a base term and release date, citing to In Re Dannenberg, 34

Cal.4th 1061, 1091 (2005). Petition, Attachment (In Re Application of Lemonta Renna

McBroom, Order Denying Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus, Solano Superior Court, case no.

FCR232407, June 27, 2006) at 2. The superior court recognized that “a base term will only be

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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set after the prisoner has been deemed suitable for parole.” Id.

Because he has alleged no facts from which it may be inferred that his attorney in any

way impeded or prevented him from filing a timely federal petition or lulled him into believing

that such a petition would be filed, petitioner’s case is distinguishable from Spitsyn v. Moore,

345 F.3d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling appropriate where attorney was retained

to file and prepare petition, failed to do so, and disregarded requests to return files pertaining to

petitioner’s case until well after the date the petition was due). Accordingly, petitioner is not

entitled to equitable tolling for the alleged ineffective assistance of his counsel at his parole

hearings.

Under all of the circumstances, the court concludes that petitioner has not established

facts demonstrating he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Accordingly, the instant

petition is barred as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

CONCLUSION

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (docket no. 4) is GRANTED. 

The instant petition is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The clerk shall

terminate all pending motions and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

3/28/08

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