Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01030/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-01030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EFRAIN GARCIA DEMARA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. RAMADAN, et al.,

 Defendants.

No. 1:24-cv-01030-SAB (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 

TO THIS ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(ECF No. 10)

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed November 7, 2024. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 

“seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

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1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 

at 969. 

II.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of 

the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Dr. Ramadan did not want to help Plaintiff with his left leg and requested ten million to 

assist Plaintiff. Warden Ken Clark gave Dr. Ramadan the job and freedom to do whatever he 

wants. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with 

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respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a condition precedent to filing a 

civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 

F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a 

precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to 

suit.” (citations omitted)). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison 

life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Further, the nature of the relief sought by the 

prisoner or the relief offered by the prison's administrative process is of no consequence. Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And, because the PLRA’s text and intent requires “proper” 

exhaustion, a prisoner does not satisfy the PLRA’s administrative grievance process if he files an 

untimely or procedurally defective grievance or appeal. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. A prisoner 

need not plead or prove exhaustion. Instead, it is an affirmative defense that must be proved by 

defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). A prison’s internal grievance process, not 

the PLRA, determines whether the grievance satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Id. at 

218. However, courts may dismiss a claim if failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the 

complaint. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014).

Based on the face of the complaint, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies 

prior to filing this case. On the form complaint, in response to the question whether Plaintiff 

completed the grievance process, he checks the box “no.” (ECF No. 10 at 2.) Thus, it appears 

that Plaintiff has not exhaust the administrative remedies prior to filing this action. In such 

instances, the Court would typically direct Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be 

dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust. However, as stated below, because Plaintiff 

fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and further amendment would be futile dismissal is 

warranted. 

B. Denial of Medical Treatment

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison 

medical treatment, an inmate must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” 

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Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate 

indifference consists of two parts. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal 

citations omitted). First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that 

failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted.) Second the plaintiff 

must show that the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. Id. The second 

prong is satisfied by showing “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or 

possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. Indifference “may appear 

when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be 

shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). However, an inadvertent or negligent failure to provide adequate medical care alone 

does not state a claim under § 1983. Id.

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner – or between medical 

professionals – concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 

F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 

1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that 

the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances 

and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] 

health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).). In addition, “[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Snow, 681 F.3d at 987-88, overruled in 

part on other grounds, Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1082-83; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

Here, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Ramada did not want to help Plaintiff with his left leg

unless he gave the doctor ten million dollars. However, Plaintiff fails to meet either the prongs 

for a claim of deliberate indifference. That is, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he suffered 

from a serious medical condition or that Dr. Ramada knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to 

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Plaintiff and disregarded such risk Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

C. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff contends that Warden Ken Clark is liable because he gave Dr. Ramadan the job 

and freedom to do whatever he wants. 

A supervisory official is liable under section 1983 if (1) the official is personally involved 

in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a “sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 

1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). “The 

requisite causal connection can be established ... by setting in motion a series of acts by others or 

by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or 

reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 

F.3d at 1207–08 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, a 

supervisor may “be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the 

training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional 

deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 

Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208). 

“Conclusory allegations that various prison officials knew or should have known about 

constitutional violations occurring against plaintiff simply because of their general supervisory 

role are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Sullivan v. Biter, No. 15-cv-00243, 

2017 WL 1540256, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207). In other words, to state a claim against any 

individual defendant based on supervisory liability, Plaintiff “must allege facts showing that the 

individual defendant participated in or directed the alleged violation, or knew of the violation and 

failed to act to prevent it.” Richard v. Holtrop, No. 15-cv-5632, 2016 WL 11520620, at *5 (C.D. 

Cal. May 12, 2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th 

Cir. 1998)) (“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual 

was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”). Supervisory liability is not an 

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independent cause of action under § 1983, and to state a claim against supervisory personnel 

Plaintiff must allege both an underlying constitutional violation and a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor's actions and the violation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207.

Here, it is clear that Plaintiff seeks to hold Warden Ken Clark vicariously liable under a 

theory of respondeat superior liability. However, the law does not allow for such a claim. 

Indeed, Plaintiff fails to set forth any factual allegations to state a cognizable underlying claim for 

deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Id.

D. Further Leave to Amend

If the court finds that a complaint or claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, 

the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Leave to amend should be 

granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a 

plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Cato v. 

United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to 

amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that 

the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (citation omitted). 

However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a claim cannot be cured by amendment, 

the Court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06.

Here, in light of Plaintiff’s failure to provide additional information about his claims 

despite specific instructions from the Court, further leave to amend would be futile and the first 

amended complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 

1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would 

be futile.”). Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, as with Plaintiff’s original complaint, fails to set 

forth any factual allegations to demonstrate that Dr. Ramadan acted with deliberate indifference 

to a serious medical need. Accordingly, further leave to amend the complaint should be denied.

IV.

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly 

assign a District Judge to this action.

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Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the instant action be dismissed, without 

further leave to amend, for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14)

days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights 

on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2024 

STANLEY A. BOONE

United States Magistrate Judge

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