Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02208/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02208-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2208

___________

Kevin L. Nitsche, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

CEO of Osage Valley Electric *

Cooperative, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 15, 2006

Filed: May 8, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, HEANEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Kevin L. Nitsche (Nitsche) appeals the district court’s1

 grant of summary

judgment in favor of Osage Valley Electric Cooperative (Osage Valley) on Nitsche’s

sexual harassment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat.

§§ 213.010 to 213.137. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

In April 1979, Nitsche began working for Osage Valley, a cooperative

providing electric services in rural Missouri. Nitsche initially worked on Osage

Valley’s brush crew and later joined the line crew, where he ultimately became a line

foreman. Nitsche complains that throughout his employment he was subjected to

unwanted sexual banter by another line foreman, Steven Hanson (Hanson), who had

seniority over Nitsche but did not have authority to fire Nitsche, reduce his salary, or

control his hours. The sexual banter was about females, and Nitsche found Hanson’s

banter highly offensive. 

As examples of Hanson’s conduct, Nitsche cites several incidents occurring

over the course of approximately twenty years. In 1982, while Nitsche, Hanson, and

another Osage Valley male employee were traveling in a work truck, Hanson asked

Nitsche how many wheels a menstrual cycle had. Nitsche answered “three,”

prompting Hanson to tease Nitsche and later repeat the incident to other male

coworkers. About fifteen years ago, another incident occurred while Nitsche and

several other Osage Valley employees were playing poker at Hanson’s home. Hanson

played a pornographic video for those in attendance, which upset Nitsche and caused

him to leave Hanson’s home. On multiple occasions, Hanson told Nitsche he would

need to have a Pap smear. Frequently over the years, Hanson examined Playboy

magazines in Nitsche’s presence and encouraged Nitsche to look at the pictures of

naked women portrayed in the magazines. Nitsche had never seen a Playboy or other

similar magazine before. On one occasion when a couple of pages of one magazine

were stuck together, Hanson told Nitsche, “look it here, you stuck the pages together.

You shot your wad.” Nitsche also blamed Hanson for putting snakes and mice in

Nitsche’s lunch box, which Nitsche’s wife discovered later when cleaning the lunch

box. In October 2001, Hanson posted a picture of a donkey over Osage Valley

employee Bobby Fennewald’s engagement picture, which was located on a company

bulletin board, along with a drawing of a penis. 

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The poem read:

There once was a man who hauled molasses

At common sense he barely passes

For he forgot to tie down his load

And dumped it on the road

These people are known as dumbasses!

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According to Nitsche, neither Hanson nor any other Osage Valley employee

ever asked Nitsche to engage in any sexual activity. However, on two or three

occasions five to ten years before, Hanson stuck a shovel between Nitsche’s legs and

rubbed Nitsche with it. Hanson also called Nitsche “stub” because of the size of

Nitsche’s fingers and remarked a man with stubby fingers has a short penis. In

Nitsche’s presence, Hanson referred to female genitalia using crude slang names,

pretended he had a pubic hair in his mouth, and made lewd comments concerning

women. Nitsche testified Hanson liked to embarrass him in front of other people and

continued to make inappropriate comments because Hanson was “trying to keep

[Nitsche] on edge” and knew the comments bothered Nitsche. Nitsche admitted he

laughed at some jokes told by Hanson or other Osage Valley employees (but not the

“dirty jokes”) and “like[d] it when people pick on [him].” Although Hanson also told

jokes to women, he told off-color jokes or jokes with a sexual connotation only to men

and would cease telling such a joke if a woman came near. 

In February 2001, Hanson and a few other employees authored a belittling

poem2

 implicitly referencing Nitsche, who had spilled a container of molasses from

his truck onto the road. Someone placed the poem on a company bulletin board.

Nitsche reported this incident to Daryl Veatch (Veatch), Osage Valley Assistant

General Manager, and also to Osage Valley’s then-president Mickey Chapman, who

advised Nitsche that concerns of a personal nature should be brought to the attention

of Jon McClure (McClure), Osage Valley’s General Manager and Chief Executive

Officer. Nitsche did not immediately speak to McClure about the poem. 

On December 7, 2001, Nitsche threatened Osage Valley employee Clint Bennett

(Bennett) at work and questioned Bennett on why he told another coworker of

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Nitsche originally named the CEO of Osage Valley as the defendant in this

matter, but on July 27, 2004, the district court, over Osage Valley’s objection, granted

Nitsche leave to amend the complaint to change the named defendant to Osage Valley.

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Nitsche’s earlier physical altercation with another employee. Nitsche’s confrontation

with Bennett was over whether Nitsche had hit the other employee once or multiple

times. Following this incident, McClure held a meeting with Nitsche and Bennett,

told Nitsche to go home and think about his job, and asked Nitsche to return to work

the following Monday, December 10. Nitsche met with McClure on December 10,

at which time he reported the February 2001 poem incident to McClure. McClure

then removed Nitsche from active employment, advised him to complete an anger

management counseling program, having arranged an appointment for Nitsche, and

stated he could not return to work until Osage Valley was satisfied Nitsche

successfully completed counseling. During his absence from work, Nitsche used

accumulated sick leave and vacation time through June 17, 2002, and thereafter

received long-term disability benefits until June 8, 2004, while working on his farm

raising cattle. Osage Valley ultimately discharged Nitsche from employment.

On April 11, 2002, Nitsche filed a charge against Osage Valley with the

Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) and the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging sex discrimination and sexual harassment

based on Hanson’s conduct. Nitsche received right to sue letters from the MCHR on

August 18, 2003, and from the EEOC on September 16, 2003. 

On December 15, 2003, Nitsche filed suit against Osage Valley,3

 alleging

sexual harassment by way of unwanted sexual banter about females, in violation of

Title VII and the MHRA. Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment in

favor of Osage Valley, concluding (1) there was insufficient evidence to establish

Hanson’s harassing conduct toward Nitsche was based on sex; (2) the harassment did

not affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment because Hanson’s conduct did

not rise to the level of actionable hostile work environment sexual harassment; and (3)

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In its brief, Osage Valley argues the district court abused its discretion in

granting Nitsche leave to file an amended complaint to change the named defendant

from “CEO of Osage Valley” to “Osage Valley.” We need not address this argument

given Osage Valley’s failure to file a cross-appeal on this issue. See El Paso Natural

Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479 (1999) (“Absent a cross appeal, an appellee

. . . may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder

or of lessening the rights of his adversary.” (internal quotation omitted)); see, e.g.,

Bethea v. Levi Strauss & Co., 916 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1990) (“It is well-settled

that failure to file a cross-appeal prohibits an appellee from attempting to enlarge [its]

rights or lessen [its] adversary’s rights.” (citing Morley Constr. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co.,

300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 538 (1931); Johnson v.

U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 586 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.7 (8th Cir. 1978))). We therefore limit our

review to the issues raised in Nitsche’s appeal.

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there was insufficient evidence Osage Valley either knew or should have known of

the alleged harassing conduct. Nitsche appeals.4

 

II. DISCUSSION

Our standard of review is a familiar one. We review de novo the district court’s

grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Nitsche, the nonmoving party. See LeGrand v. Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394

F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 335 (2005). Under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

We analyze Nitsche’s claims under both Title VII and the MHRA in the same manner.

See Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Our

analysis is the same for both the state and federal claims because decisions under the

various federal employment discrimination statutes are applicable and authoritative

under the [MHRA] as well as federal law.” (citation omitted)).

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Discrimination based on sex that

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creates a hostile or abusive working environment violates Title VII. Harris v. Forklift

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1377 (8th

Cir. 1996). To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual

harassment, Nitsche must demonstrate: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was

subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the

harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) his

employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper

remedial action. See McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 542 (8th

Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Because we conclude Nitsche failed to raise a genuine

issue of fact regarding whether the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege

of employment, we affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of

Osage Valley.

“Harassment affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment if it is

‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment

and create an abusive working environment.’” Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d

835, 840 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Nitsche must clear a high

threshold to demonstrate actionable harm, for “complaints attacking the ordinary

tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, genderrelated jokes, and occasional teasing” obtain no remedy. See Faragher v. City of Boca

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). “[A] sexually

objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one

that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact

did perceive to be so.” Id. at 787 (citation omitted). To be actionable, the conduct

complained of must be extreme in nature and not merely rude or unpleasant.

LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1101 (citation omitted). Allegations of a few isolated or

sporadic incidents will not suffice; rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate the alleged

harassment was “so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work

environment.” Tuggle v. Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 720 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scusa

v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 1999)). Such standards are

demanding, for “Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment” and is

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not “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). In determining whether a work

environment was sufficiently hostile or abusive, we examine the totality of the

circumstances, including whether the discriminatory conduct was frequent and severe;

whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, as opposed to merely an

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work

performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 

Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent persuades us Hanson’s conduct

did not create an actionable hostile work environment. Given this court’s rejection of

claims premised on equally or more egregious facts than those set forth here, see

LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1102 (collecting cases), and Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300

F.3d 928, 935 (8th Cir. 2002), we conclude Nitsche fails to demonstrate the

harassment he encountered was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of his employment and create a hostile work environment. Viewing the evidence,

both objectively and subjectively, in the light most favorable to Nitsche, Hanson’s

behavior, albeit crude and immature, occurred sporadically over the course of

approximately twenty years, was not physically violent or threatening, and did not

unreasonably interfere with Nitsche’s work performance. Although sexual content

was abundant in Hanson’s repertoire of ribaldry, “the Supreme Court has never held

that ‘workplace harassment . . . is automatically discrimination because of sex merely

because the words used have sexual content or connotations.’” Scusa, 181 F.3d at 967

(quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80). We also note Hanson’s caricature incident occurring

in October 2001 did not relate to Nitsche, the snakes and mice in Nitsche’s lunch box

and the molasses poem did not involve any sexual conduct or connotation, and

Hanson’s display of a pornographic video following a poker game occurred at

Hanson’s home, not the Osage Valley workplace. Further, Hanson’s other comments

were not so frequent, intimidating, offensive, or hostile to have poisoned the work

environment. Keeping in mind “Title VII is ‘not designed to purge the workplace of

vulgarity,’” Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50

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Because we agree with the district court that Nitsche is unable to prove any

material fact question as to the fourth element of his prima facie case, we need not

address the remaining elements. See, e.g., Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior

Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2005).

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F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)), we conclude Nitsche fails to demonstrate an actionable

hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.5

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Osage Valley. 

______________________________

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