Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01119/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Wilber Gallegos-Duran,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents

CV-10-1119-PHX-SRB (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 24,

2010 (Doc. 1). On December 2, 2010, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 12). Petitioner

has not filed a reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner's direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized

the factual background as follows:

During the summer of 2007, victim B.L., an eleven year old girl

who is deaf, communicated to her Mother that she had been sexually

assaulted by Defendant Wilbur Gallegos-Duran. Gallegos-Duran, his

wife, and their infant daughter were living with B.L.'s Mother's family

at the time. B.L. told her Mother that one evening while she was

sleeping, Gallegos-Duran entered her room and had sex with her. She

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also said that on another occasion during an afternoon, Gallegos-Duran

had sex with her in the living room of their house. B. L.'s Mother

reported these incidents to the police. After interviewing both B.L. and

Gallegos-Duran, Detective Janina Austin arrested Gallegos-Duran.

(Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 2-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 12, are referenced herein as

"Exhibit ___.") Movant was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on two counts of

sexual conduct with a minor. (Id. at 3; Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial and was found guilty on the bedroom count, and

not guilty on the living room incident. (Exhibits C and D, Verdicts; Exhibit B, M.E.

7/31/08.) Petitioner was sentenced to 35 years in prison. (Exhibit E, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, and counsel ultimately filed an Opening Brief

(Exhibit F) evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. Petitioner filed a pro per

Supplemental Brief (Exhibit G). Petitioner's brief raised four claims:

1. His sentence was an abuse of discretion and not authorized by statute.

2. The trial judge and prosecutor made inappropriate comments, biasing the jury.

3. Insufficient evidence of guilt.

4. The victim's testimony was inconsistent, and failed to report other sexual

conduct, and the prosecutions' expert was permitted to offer various improper

testimony.

(Exhibit G at 4-5.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected each claim and affirmed Petitioner's conviction

and sentence. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec.)

Petitioner obtained an extension of time to file a petition for review. (Exhibit I, Order

10/6/09.) He did not seek such review, and the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate

on December 29, 2009. (Exhibit J, Mandate.) 

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D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner did not seek post-conviction relief. (Exhibit K, Docket; Petition, Doc. 1 at

4.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 24, 2010 (Doc. 1.) Petitioner’s Petition

asserts the following four grounds for relief:

1. Impartial Jury - Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an

impartial jury as a result of biasing comments from the judge and prosecutor.

2. Unauthorized Sentence - Petitioner was denied his Firth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to due process when he received a sentenced greater than

that authorized under the state's statute.

3. Insufficient Evidence - Petitioner was denied his Firth and Sixth Amendment

rights to due process when he was convicted on insufficient evidence.

4. Ineffective Assistance - Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the

improprieties in grounds 1 through 3.

Petitioner asserts that he raised all of these claims on direct appeal, with the exception of

Ground 4, which he asserts cannot be asserted on direct appeal. 

Response - On December 2, 2010, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”)

(Doc. 12). Respondents argue that Petitioner's claims were not fairly presented to the

Arizona Court of Appeals, thus his state remedies on them were not properly exhausted, and

are now procedurally defaulted. Respondents also address the merits of the claims.

Reply - The Court's service order (Doc. 7) gave Petitioner 30 days from service of the

Answer to reply. Petitioner has not done so and the time to do so has expired.

/ /

/ /

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims were never fairly presented to the state

courts, his state remedies were not properly exhausted and are now procedurally defaulted,

and thus his claims are barred from habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal habeas court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only

if available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)

(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104

(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Forum/Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

 b. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

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opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

c. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Ground 1 - Impartial Jury - For his Ground 1 for relief, Petitioner argues he was

denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury as a result of biasing comments from

the judge and prosecutor. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Respondents concede that the factual

allegations underlying this claim were presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in

Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, but argue that it was not presented as a federal constitutional

claim. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 10-11.)

Indeed, Petitioner did argue these facts to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his second

issue for review. (Exhibit G, Suppl. Brief at 4, 7-9.) However, in doing so, he made no

reference to any federal law. The only authorities he cited were the Arizona Code of Judicial

Conduct and Arizona Code of Judicial Administration. (Id. at 9.) The Arizona Court of

Appeals addressed the claim without any reference to federal law. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec.

at 5-6.)

Failure to alert the state court to the constitutional nature of the claim amounts to

failure to exhaust state remedies. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995). It is not

enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts

or that a "somewhat similar state law claim was made." Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6

(1982)(per curiam). 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds Petitioner's federal claim in Gourd 1 was not fairly

presented to the state courts, and thus his state remedies were not properly exhausted.

Ground 2 - Unauthorized Sentence - For his Ground 2 for relief, Petitioner argues

he was denied his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process when he received

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a sentence greater than that authorized under the state's statute. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.)

Respondents concede that the factual allegations underlying this claim were presented to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, but argue that it was not

presented as a federal constitutional claim. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 12.)

Indeed, Petitioner did argue these facts to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his first

issue for review. (Exhibit G, Suppl. Brief at 4, 6-7.) However, in doing so, he made no

reference to any federal law. The only authorities he cited were the Arizona sentencing

statutes. (Id. at 6-7.) The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the claim solely on the basis

of the Arizona statutes. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 4-5.)

Accordingly, the undersigned finds Petitioner's federal claim in Ground 2 was not

fairly presented to the state courts, and thus his state remedies were not properly exhausted.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366; Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

Ground 3 - Insufficient Evidence - For his Ground 3 for relief, Petitioner argues he

was denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process when he was convicted on

insufficient and false evidence. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) Respondents again concede that the

factual allegations underlying this claim were presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in

Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, but argue that it was not presented as a federal constitutional

claim. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 14-15.)

Indeed, Petitioner did argue these facts to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his third

and fourth issues for review. (Exhibit G, Suppl. Brief at 4-5, 10-15.) However, in doing so,

the made no reference to any federal constitutional guarantee, and the only federal authorities

he cited were United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997) and United States v.

Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1993). (Id. at 14, 16.) 

Petitioner cited Bighead for the proposition that the prosecution's expert was

improperly permitted to testify about extra-judicial statements by a trial witness. (Exhibit G

at 14.) Bighead involved an assertion that an expert's credibility determinations failed to pass

the Federal standard for expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert was not a constitutional decision, but was based upon

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the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, citation to Bighead would not have alerted the state

courts to the assertion of a federal constitutional claim. 

Petitioner cited Toledo for the proposition that the prosecution's expert should not

have been permitted to testify on the behavioral characteristics of an abused child because

of her inability to determine which children had actually been abused. (Exhibit G at 15.)

And, Toledo addressed the admissibility of expert opinion in a federal prosecution under

Federal evidentiary law. Citation to Toledo would not have alerted the state court to the

assertion of a federal due process claim. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed the claim solely on the basis of the Arizona

law on credibility determinations. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. at 5-6.)

Accordingly, the undersigned finds Petitioner's federal claim in Ground 3 was not

fairly presented to the state courts, and thus his state remedies were not properly exhausted.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366; Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

Ground 4 - Ineffective Assistance - For his Ground 4 for relief, Petitioner argues he

was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel

failed to object to the improprieties in grounds 1 through 3. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) Petitioner

acknowledges that he has not presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, but

argues that it could not be presented on direct appeal. (Id.)

Indeed, Arizona directs that claims of ineffective assistance be brought in a Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002)

("Accordingly, we reiterate that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in

Rule 32 proceedings. Any such claims improvidently raised in a direct appeal, henceforth,

will not be addressed by appellate courts regardless of merit."). That does not, however,

explain Petitioner's failure to raise his ineffectiveness claim in a Rule 32 proceeding. See

Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38 (“to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32").

Accordingly, the undersigned finds Petitioner's federal claim in Ground 4 was not

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fairly presented to the state courts, and thus his state remedies were not properly exhausted.

Summary re Exhaustion - Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds that

Petition has failed to establish fair presentation and proper exhaustion of his state remedies

on any of his grounds for relief.

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis,

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally defaulted"

and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of a

procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a

“miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11

(1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to

the state courts, and thus they are procedurally defaulted. Respondents generally rely upon

Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time bar, set out in Ariz.

R. Crim. Proc. 32.4(a). (Answer, Doc. 12 at 8.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for review of

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a

subsequent PCR Petition. Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process,

a claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post conviction relief that "has been

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply shows

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1

 Some types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type of

waiver required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz. at

450, 46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission),

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived by

omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal sentence

(waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge conflict of

interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 2008).

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"that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous collateral

proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the

State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently'

[did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those

constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes

216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). In coming to its prescription in

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel,

(2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under

the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz.

at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071.1

Here, Petitioner’s unexhausted claims do not fit within the list of claims identified as

requiring a personal waiver. Nor are they of the same character. 

Therefore, it appears that other than his ineffective assistance claim in Ground 4

(which should have been brought in a timely PCR proceeding) Petitioner’s claims would be

precluded by his failure to raise them in an earlier proceeding.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred

from raising any of his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within

ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance

of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett,

185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting

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that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That

time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the

category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to timeliness bar).

Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to his claims. Nor

does it appear that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the excepted claims as

follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1(d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner, like Petitioner, who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence.

Petitioner asserts no newly discovered evidence, and his underlying factual assertions

have all been previously argued to the state courts. Where a claim is based on "newly

discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state courts, the evidence is

no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no application.

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Paragraph (f) has no application because Petitioner's appeal was timely.

Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in the

law since his last PCR proceeding. 

Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application to

Petitioner’s procedural claims. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 404, 166 P.3d 945, 959

(App. 2007) (32.1(h) did not apply where petitioner had “not established that trial error

...amounts to a claim of actual innocence”). 

Summary - Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that review through Arizona’s

direct appeal and post-conviction relief process is no longer possible for Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims, and that the unexhausted claims are now procedurally defaulted, and

absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence, must be dismissed with

prejudice.

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123. "Because

of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court

'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274

(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The

Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily turn on some objective

factor external to petitioner, for instance:

 ... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by officials",

made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this

standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

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Here, Petitioner does not proffer any good cause to excuse his failures to exhaust, but

relies solely on the purported merits of his claims. 

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho

State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to

establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation

has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited to actual

innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice"

exception to exhaustion outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal

Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc., §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth

Circuit has expressly limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d

933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Petitioner makes no pretense of asserting his actual innocence. While he asserts

the evidence against him was legally insufficient, that is not adequate to avoid his procedural

default. Rather, his "procedural default could be excused if he could show actual, factual

innocence, not just legal insufficiency of the evidence." U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 965

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, Petitioner's procedural defaults may not be avoided, and his procedurally

defaulted claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

B. MERITS

Respondents argue the merits of Petitioner's various claims. Because the undersigned

concludes that Petitioner's claims are plainly procedurally defaulted, the merits of the claims

are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

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habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth herein,

the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts

this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be

denied.

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed May 24, 2010 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3), unless otherwise

permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation shall not exceed ten

(10) pages. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc),

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins

v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: October 17, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\10-1119-001r RR 11 10 04 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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