Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00605/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00605-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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1 06cv605 BTM(AJB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HIT ENTERTAINMENT, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06cv605 BTM(AJB)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

vs. PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION

NATIONAL DISCOUNT COSTUME CO.,

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting

in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Summary Judgment (“Summary Judgment Order”)

filed on March 26, 2008. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Motion

Defendants’ procedural challenge to Plaintiffs’ motion lacks merit. In this circuit, a

court may correct its own error of law under the “mistake” component of Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b)(1). A motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) must be filed no more than a year after the

entry of the order. Fed. R. Civ. P 60(c)(1). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion is not untimely.

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B. Reconsideration of Trademark Claims

Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred in finding that they had not presented evidence

regarding who bought the allegedly infringing costumes, how the costumes were used, and

what marketing channels were utilized. Plaintiffs claim that the Court overlooked

uncontested evidence on these points. The Court disagrees.

In their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs claimed that the adult-size costumes

at issue were sold to costume stores and entertainment companies for use at parties and

other “live” theatrical appearances for children. Plaintiffs emphasized their concern that

children would believe that adults wearing the knock-off costumes were the actual character.

Based on Plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court understood that Plaintiffs’ focus was on the

likelihood of post-purchase confusion – i.e., confusion experienced by children or parents at

the alleged parties and “live” events. See, e.g., Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc. v.

Surgical Technologies, Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that post-purchase

confusion – confusion on the part of someone other than the purchaser – can establish the

required likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act). Thus, the Court looked to what

evidence there was regarding purchasers using the costumes to entertain young children and

how these parties or other performances were marketed or advertised.

Courts do not consider the similarity of marks in the abstract, but, rather, “in light of

the way the marks are encountered in the marketplace . . . .” Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen

Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1984). Therefore, it is important to consider the context

in which the marks were encountered and who the audience was.

Here, although Plaintiffs claimed that the costumes were purchased by costume

stores and entertainment companies who used them at parties and other live appearances

for children, Plaintiffs did not present specific evidence that this was the case. Plaintiffs point

to invoices (Ex. 25 to Weisz Decl.) which show that the allegedly infringing costumes were

sold to companies with names such as Kidz Party, Suzy the Clown, Razzle Kidazzle, and My

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 Other purchasers had more generic names such as Broadway Costumes,

Imagination, Inc., LP Costumes, and Best Entertainment.

3 06cv605 BTM(AJB)

Daddy’s Entertainment.1 Although one could surmise that companies with names like this

might use the costumes at children’s parties or other live appearances, no evidence was

presented that this was actually the case. Plaintiffs reference the declarations of Roxanne

D’Ambrosa and Joyce Slocum. However, these declarations do not set forth facts regarding

how the costumes were being used.

Similarly, no evidence was presented regarding the marketing channels used to

promote the alleged children’s events. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should be looking at

the marketing channels used by defendants themselves, not the marketing channels used

by defendants’ customers, However, as explained above, Plaintiffs were arguing postpurchase confusion, making the marketing by defendants’ customers relevant.

Absent sufficient evidence that the costumes were being used in live performances

for children, the Court determined that there was a triable issue with respect to the likelihood

of confusion. Even if Plaintiffs are now claiming that Defendants’ direct customers were likely

to be confused by the knock-off costumes, the Court still finds that summary judgment is not

warranted. As adults dealing in costumes and/or character items, Defendants’ direct

customers might know that there are no authorized adult costumes of protected characters

such as Plaintiffs’ and might have a more discerning eye regarding the authenticity of such

products. 

The Court reminds Plaintiffs that “[b]ecause of the intensely factual nature of

trademark disputes, summary judgment is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.”

Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008). Considering all of the

Sleekcraft factors, the Court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the likelihood of confusion.

C. Copyright Infringement

Plaintiffs do not claim that the Court overlooked any evidence in denying summary

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judgment on Plaintiffs’ copyright claims. Instead, Plaintiffs just reassert their argument that

there is substantial similarity between their protected characters and the allegedly infringing

costumes, particularly with respect to the “Barney” characters. The Court remains convinced

that the issue of intrinsic similarity must be decided by the jury.

D. Liability of Ai Quach

Again, Plaintiffs do not point out any evidence overlooked by the Court in connection

with its denial of summary judgment against Ai Quach. Plaintiffs reiterate that the evidence

shows that Ai Quach was involved in Costume Enterprises, Inc., during a portion of the

relevant time period. However, as explained in the Court’s Summary Judgment Order, in

order for Quach to be held personally liable, there must be evidence that he was personally

involved in the corporation’s acts of infringement. Plaintiffs did not present evidence of

Quach’s active participation in any acts of infringement. Therefore, Plaintiffs did not, as they

claim, make an initial showing that Quach was personally liable, and the burden of proof was

not shifted to Quach. 

 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 7, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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