Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00704/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00704-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EBRAHIM MUSSA MOHAMED,

Petitioner,

v.

CYNTHIA TAMPKINS,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15cv704-BEN(WVG)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

MOTION TO STAY

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 30, 2015, Ebrahim Mussa Mohamed (“Petitioner”), a California state 

prisoner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction for five counts of assault with 

a deadly weapon and one count of stalking. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his state 

court conviction on four distinct grounds. He contends that (1) the Trial Court erred by not 

obtaining Petitioner’s express waiver of right to testify; (2) Petitioner had ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and that (4)

Petitioner was given an “illegal sentence” by being charged with a crime unsupported by 

some of the evidence. (Doc. No. 1.) The Petition acknowledges that of the four claims, 

only the first has been properly exhausted. (Doc. No. 1 at 6-9.) Petitioner filed the instant 

Motion to Stay (“Motion”) his federal proceeding while he attempts to exhaust his three 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 11
2

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unexhausted claims. (Doc. No. 2.) Respondent Cynthia Tampkins (“Respondent”) timely 

filed an opposition. (Doc. No. 7.) Petitioner did not file a reply. Having reviewed all of the 

briefing submitted by the parties, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Motion be DENIED.

II. PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 

On March 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner simultaneously filed a Motion to Stay. (Doc. No. 2.) The 

Petition was dismissed without prejudice, allowing Petitioner until June 15, 2015, to submit 

proof of his inability to pay filing fees. (Doc. No. 3.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave 

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on May 20, 2015. (Doc. No. 4.) The Court reopened his 

matter and granted that motion. (Doc. No. 5.) On June 3, 2015, Petitioner renewed the 

instant Motion seeking to stay his Petition to allow him time to exhaust his claims. (Doc. 

No. 9.) On September 9, 2015, Respondent opposed Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. No. 7.) 

Nearly a month later, Petitioner requested an extension by which he could file a reply. 

(Doc. No. 11.) Although the Court granted Petitioner a month extension to November 5, 

2015, to enable him to file his reply, Petitioner failed to file a reply. (Doc. No. 12.) 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Petition includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Typically, a federal 

court may not consider a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner first exhausts his 

claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 

(1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (ruling that “mixed petitions,” i.e. those 

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, must be dismissed); see also Rhines v. 

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274-78 (2005). However, under limited circumstances, if a petitioner 

files a “mixed” habeas petition, he may request the petition be stayed and held in abeyance 

while he pursues his remaining unexhausted claims in state court. There are two alternative 

procedures that a petitioner may pursue in order to obtain a stay. The first is set forth in 

Kelly v. Small; the other is set forth in Rhines v. Weber. See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 

(9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 11
3

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2007); see also King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (ruling the Kelly

procedure remains available); see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274-78 (2005). 

Petitioner argues both the Kelly standard and Rhines procedure and attempts to argue that 

he complies with each standard.1 Each is discussed in turn below. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

a. The Kelly Procedure 

The stay and abeyance procedure set forth in Kelly v. Small requires the following 

three-step process: “(1) the petitioner amends his petition to delete any unexhausted claims; 

(2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing 

the petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims; and 

(3) the petitioner later amends his petition and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to 

the original petition.” King, 564 F.3d at 1135; see also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th 

Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, Petitioner’s Motion to Stay references the stay and abeyance procedure outlined in 

Kelly. (Doc. No. 2 at 1 stating the “Petition satisfies ‘Kelly vs Small’(sic); Mayle v. Felix”.)

Although Petitioner outlines the three-step process required to invoke the Kelly procedure, 

he has not followed the necessary steps, nor does he express any intent to do so. (Doc. No.

2 at 2.) Contrary to the requirements outlined in Kelly, Petitioner has neither submitted an 

amended Petition devoid of any unexhausted claims, nor has he requested that the Court 

dismiss his unexhausted claims. See King, 564 F.3d at 1135 (noting that a petitioner 

requesting the court dismiss unexhausted claims in order for petitioner to pursue the 

unexhausted claims in state court may be enough to invoke the Kelly procedure). 

Even if Petitioner were to invoke the Kelly procedure, a petitioner is only allowed to 

add his newly-exhausted claims if the newly-exhausted claims are timely under the Anti-

 

1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that both avenues are to a petitioner. See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1143 

(9th Cir. 2009) (Holding that despite the Rhines decision, the earlier decided “three-step stay-andabeyance procedure outlined in Kelly remains available.”) 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 11
4

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) or relate back to the previously 

exhausted claims. See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2009). “[A] new 

claim does not “relate back” to the filing of an exhausted petition simply because it arises 

from ‘the same trial, conviction, or sentence.’” Id. quoting Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 

662-64 (2005). Rather, a petition relates back where it rests on the same or a similar set of 

facts. For example, in Marquez v. Rawers, the petitioner attempted to challenge the 

Governor’s decision to deny him parole. 2008 WL 704298, No. CV-F-03-6508 (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 4, 2008). The petitioner’s first habeas petition was timely exhausted and alleged that 

his parole denial was based on insufficient evidence. Id. at *7. The second habeas petition 

was not timely exhausted, and, alleged that the Governor’s decision to deny him parole 

constituted an ex post facto violation. Id. The District Court found that the second petition 

related back to the first petition because the petitioner “challenge[d] one action (the denial 

of parole) taken by one actor (the Governor).” Id. The District Court contrasted this to the 

facts presented in Mayle v. Felix, where the petitioner sought to relate unexhausted claims 

challenging the petitioner’s out of court interrogation responses to exhausted claims 

challenging an out of court statement made by a third party witness. Id. There, the District 

Court explained, the claims involved “a completely different set of facts.” Id. 

Even if Petitioner were to seek a Kelly stay, the Court questions whether Petitioner 

would ultimately succeed in amending his petition to include the three presently

unexhausted claims. It appears that Petitioner has already surpassed the AEDPA statute of 

limitations as the Petition was filed nearly fifteen months after his state court case became 

final.

2 Thus, any amendments would likely be untimely unless they relate back to 

 

2 Petitioner’s appeal in the California Supreme Court was finalized on January 21, 2014. The filing of a 

petition for federal habeas corpus relief does not toll AEDPA's statute of limitations (unlike an application 

for state habeas corpus relief, which does). See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001). Petitioner 

filed his petition in this Court on March 30, 2015. Petitioner had only one year and ninety days to timely 

file claims in this Court. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When a petitioner 

fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, the AEDPA's one-year limitations 

period begins to run on the date the ninety-day period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires.”) All 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 11
5

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioners’ sole exhausted claim. See id. 1142. 

A comparison between Petitioner’s claims reveals that the three unexhausted claims 

do not stem from the same set of facts as Petitioner’s sole exhausted claim. Petitioner’s 

singular exhausted claim alleges that the Trial Court erred by failing to obtain Petitioner’s 

express waiver of his right to testify. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) In stark contrast, Petitioner’s 

remaining three claims do not even reference Petitioner’s express waiver of his right to 

testify. Instead, each purports to be a new claim arising out of Petitioner’s representation 

at both the trial and appellate phases, and challenging the evidence supporting Petitioner’s 

ultimate sentence. 

For sake of illustration, the Court reviews each of the unexhausted claims in 

comparison to Petitioner’s single exhausted claim.

3

 Petitioner’s exhausted claim alleges 

that the Trial Court failed to obtain an express waiver of Petitioner’s right to testify. The 

appellate court decision frames the issue as “the Trial Court’s error” and finds that the 

evidence presented was a sufficient basis for the Trial Court to “reasonably conclude 

[Petitioner] Mohamed implicitly waived his right to testify at trial.” (App. Ct. Dec., at 4-

6.)4 Nothing in the decision refers to a claim against his trial counsel. Rather the Court 

cites to the record that demonstrated “outside the jury’s presence during trial, Mohamed 

was present when his counsel agreed with the Trial Court that if he (Mohamed) testified, 

his prior stalking conviction would be admissible for impeachment purposes.5 At that time, 

Mohamed made no statement indicating he wanted to testify.” Id. at 4. 

In stark contrast to Petitioner’s exhausted claim, are Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

 

claims should have been exhausted and filed on or before April 21, 2015. As discussed herein, Petitioner 

has only filed one exhausted claim before this Court before this date. 

3

“Mayle requires a comparison of a petitioner's new claims to the properly exhausted claims left pending 

in federal court.” King, 564 F.3d at 1142. 

4 The Court located the state appellate court decision via the online state court records available at 

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=41&doc_id=2021352&doc

_no=D062414.

5 The California Court of Appeal decision notes that Petitioner has a prior conviction for stalking and has 

been convicted of a prior strike. (App. Ct. Dec., at 3.) 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 11
6

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner alleges ineffective of assistance by his trial counsel. Notably, Petitioner makes 

no argument that his trial counsel was ineffective because she did not warn him about the 

impact of his own refusal to testify. Instead, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because trial counsel failed to (1) fully inform Petitioner of the pending charges; 

(2) fully investigate the case; (3) negotiate a plea bargain; and (4) because trial counsel was 

vindictive in representing Petitioner. (Doc. No. 2 at 18-23.) Much of Petitioner’s claim 

attacks his trial counsel’s failure to locate exculpatory third party witnesses. He claims that 

she failed to “investigate the possibilities that the prosecutions (sic) witnesses were coersed 

(sic) by police personnel.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7:13-16.) He also claims that his attorney failed 

to obtain statements from the “victim, who was definitely for the defense.” (Id. at 10:28-

11:2.) Petitioner contends that “phone calls were made by Defendant. It was nothing to 

get that witness to turn on the DA and back the Defendant.” (Id. at 11:2-5.)6 Nothing in 

Petitioner’s argument references his own failure to testify, nor does he claim that his 

counsel influenced his decision not to testify. 

Petitioner also claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective. In this claim,

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel failed to argue the many ways the trial 

counsel was ineffective. (Doc. No. 2 at 13-17.) As above, Petitioner makes no reference to 

his failure to testify at his trial. 

Petitioner’s final unexhausted claim, which he characterizes as “Illegal Sentence,”

sets forth Petitioner’s belief that he was charged with an incorrect crime unsupported by 

the evidence elicited at trial. In this claim, Petitioner argues the evidence presented did not 

support the charges or ultimate sentence. (Doc. No. 2 at 24-27.) He points to testimony by 

 

6 As summarized by the California Court of Appeal Petitioner’s conviction stems from five accounts of 

assault with a deadly weapon and one of stalking against his ex-girlfriend. The victim was interviewed 

by police, who determined that she “feared for her life.” (App. Ct. Dec., at 3.) According to documents 

and transcripts attached to the Petition, at the preliminary hearing Petitioner admitted to receiving a phone 

call with Petitioner from prison. (Doc. No. 1 at 50-90.) At the preliminary hearing, the victim also recanted 

and refuted much of the information she had earlier shared with the police and the detective. She informed 

the Trial Court that Petitioner had apologized, and said “he would be different.” Id. at 61:2-17.)

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 11
7

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the victim at the preliminary hearing refuting the information in the police files. (Id.) 

However, nothing pertains to any argument that if Petitioner had testified, the sentence 

would have been impacted. Accordingly, the Court finds that as presently alleged, none of 

Petitioner’s three unexhausted claims relate to, or even reference his exhausted claim that 

the Trial Court erred by not obtaining Petitioner’s express waiver of his right to testify.

Thus, even though Petitioner does not invoke the Kelly procedures, it is highly doubtful

that an attempt by Petitioner to file an amended petition under Kelly would be successful 

as his unexhausted claims appear time barred. 

b. The Rhines Procedure 

According to Rhines, a District Court may stay and hold in abeyance a “mixed” 

habeas petition to allow a petitioner time to return to state court and pursue unexhausted 

claims. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276. This is available when (1) the petitioner has good cause 

for failing to exhaust all claims; (2) the petitioner’s unexhausted claims are potentially 

meritorious; and (3) the petitioner did not intentionally engage in dilatory litigation tactics. 

Id. at 277-78. Petitioner’s declaration accompanying the Motion indicates that he seeks to 

utilize the stay and abeyance procedure set forth in Rhines and argues that he satisfies the 

three required elements. (See Doc. No. 9 at 7) (arguing that “circumstances beyond ones 

control” is good cause for delay); (Doc. No. 9 at 5) (arguing that Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims are meritorious). 

Petitioner contends there is good cause for the stay. Good cause “turns on whether 

the petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence,” to justify 

the failure to exhaust all claims in state court. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 

2014). The Court must interpret whether a petitioner has “good cause” for a failure to 

exhaust in light of the Supreme Court's instruction in Rhines that the District Court should 

only stay mixed petitions in “limited circumstances.” Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661

(9th Cir. 2005). As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Wooten v. Kirkland, the Court “must be 

mindful that AEDPA aims to encourage the finality of sentences and to encourage

petitioners to exhaust their claims in state court before filing in federal court.” Wooten v. 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 11
8

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-77). 

Petitioner claims that there is good cause to grant a stay because his appellate counsel 

“failed to inform him of the California Supreme Court’s decision” denying his Petition for 

Review in January 2014, and also failed to notify him of the requirements of AEDPA. 

(Doc. No. 9 at 4.) However, Petitioner makes no attempt to explain why he delayed from 

his trial date in 2013 to bring claims regarding his trial counsel or the ultimate sentence he 

was issued. The law requires Petitioner to pursue claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel diligently, and absent good cause, a stay will not issue. See Frluckaj v. Small, 

2009 WL 393776, at * 5-6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2009) (finding that where petitioner was 

aware of a particular claim and could have presented it to state courts before filing federal 

habeas petition, petitioner had not shown “good cause” under Rhines); Smith v. Horel, 2008 

WL 2038855, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2008) (finding no good cause for petitioner’s failure 

to exhaust a claim where “[t]rial counsel’s alleged deficient performance was known or 

should have been known to Petitioner during or shortly after his trial”). 

Moreover, as present in this case, courts will not relax the strict requirements of the 

law merely because Petitioner is self-represented or ignorant of the law requiring him to 

file within the required timeframe. See e.g., Hernandez v. California, 2010 WL 1854416, 

at *2–*3 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2010) (concluding that limited education, lack of legal 

assistance, and routine restrictions on law library access were insufficient to satisfy the 

Rhines good cause requirement); Hamilton v. Clark, 2010 WL 530111, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb.9, 2010) (“Ignorance of the law and limited access to a law library are common among 

pro se prisoners and do not constitute good cause for failure to exhaust.”); Barno v. 

Hernandez, 2009 WL 2448435, at *6–*7 (S.D. Cal. Apr.17, 2009) (limited library access, 

and lack of legal knowledge and literacy do not establish good cause); Smith v. Giurbino, 

2008 WL 80983, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan.7, 2008) (holding that “lack of legal knowledge and 

self-representation do not, in and of themselves, constitute good cause.”); Calvert v. 

Daniels, 2006 WL 2527639, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Aug.28, 2006) (“The Court finds that the 

mere fact that a petitioner is acting pro se or lacks knowledge of the law does not establish 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 11
9

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

‘good cause’ under Rhines.”); Riseley v. Warden, Pleasant Valley State Prison, 2006 WL 

1652657, at *2 n. 3 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2006) (“The mere fact that a petitioner is pro se or 

lacks knowledge of the law is insufficient to satisfy the cause prong.”). 

Petitioner’s only argument to support good cause points to information that his 

appellate attorney purportedly failed to provide him. However, Petitioner makes no 

attempt to explain his own lack of diligence to bring his claims against his trial counsel or 

challenge his sentence as illegal. His claims for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

relate to his appellate lawyer’s failure to raise issues against his trial counsel in his appeal 

– a claim he must have known about when he reviewed his appeal. Whether Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel notified him of the Supreme Court’s decision in January 2015 or not, 

Petitioner was aware of each of his three unexhausted claims well before that date. 

Moreover, simple ignorance of the one year statute of limitations does not excuse 

Petitioner’s noncompliance. Accordingly, the Court cannot find that there is “good cause” 

to grant a stay. 

Petitioner also argues that his claims are meritorious and therefore merit a stay under 

Rhines. The Court disagrees. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel, petitioner must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984). A deficient performance is one that is “outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance.” Id. at 689. Prejudice requires “showing that counsel's errors were 

so serious as to deprive [a criminal] defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Id. at 687. Counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made 

all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. 

Petitioner’s second claim merely attacks his appellate counsel as ineffective for 

failing to argue the many ways the trial counsel was ineffective. (Doc. No. 2 at 13-17.) 

Petitioner’s third claim alleges many of the same deficiencies, but directly against trial 

counsel claiming that trial counsel failed to (1) fully inform Petitioner of the pending 

charges; (2) fully investigate the case; (3) negotiate a plea bargain; and (4) that trial counsel 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 11
10

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was vindictive in representing Petitioner. (Doc. No. 2 at 18-23.) The Petition includes 

incomplete, and at times, unidentified transcripts, but Petitioner’s Motion does not cite 

specific portions of the transcripts. If anything, the transcripts demonstrate that he was 

unable to convince the Trial Court his trial counsel was ineffective – he states that his 

attorney “apparently did not care about this case. She just took me to trial.” (Doc. No. 1, 

49:14-15.) However, upon questioning, his trial counsel confirmed that Petitioner “would 

not enter into a time waiver,” and “said under no circumstances would he waive his right 

to a speedy trial.” (Doc. No. 1, 44:7-45:7.) 

Petitioner claims that two days into trial, before a verdict was reached, trial counsel

told him to return for sentencing, presumably implying trial counsel’s lack of confidence 

in a favorable outcome and corresponding lack of effort on her part to represent him. (Doc. 

No. 1, 37:24 – 38:19.) However, the Trial Court expressed skepticism and indicated a 

general disbelief at Petitioner’s contention. (Doc. No. 1, 38:22.) When questioned,

Petitioner’s trial counsel explained that she told Petitioner he would “have to come back 

[to court] as long as the jury is deliberating ... you will be here available for a verdict when 

one becomes available.” (Doc. No. 1, 45:25-46:2.) She denied telling Petitioner he would 

need to return for sentencing two days into trial. (Doc. No. 1, 46:3-6.) Petitioner also raised 

an argument that his counsel did not adequately warn him of a twenty year sentence, 

claiming that otherwise he would have taken the plea deal offered. (Doc. No. 1, 39:5-21.) 

However, the Trial Court clarified that Petitioner was present at the arraignment and knew 

what his charges were. (Doc. No. 1, 40:18-25.) Petitioner’s trial counsel confirmed that her 

notes indicate she did warn Petitioner of a potential twenty year sentence. (Doc. No. 1, 

42:2-15.) 

Petitioner offers even less evidence regarding his claims against his appellate 

counsel, only providing a correspondence indicating that his appellate counsel returned 

various documents to Petitioner in January 2015. Petitioner makes no argument as to why 

he has a likelihood of success on these claims. Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates little to 

no likelihood of success on claims against either his trial counsel or his appellate counsel 

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 11
11

15cv704-BEN(WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for ineffective assistance. 

As to Petitioner’s claim arguing “Illegal Sentence,” his allegations are vague, but

attempt to point to testimony supporting a lesser crime. Petitioner makes no argument 

explaining how any of the attached transcripts support his claims, nor does he provide any 

specific citations to portions of the transcripts. Moreover, upon review, the Court cannot 

identify anything in Petitioner’s array of attached transcripts from various Court hearings 

that rises to any showing of merit. With scant evidence and contradictory witness 

transcripts, Petitioner fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim 

for “Illegal Sentence.” Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no cause to grant a stay 

under Rhines to allow Petitioner to pursue his unexhausted claims.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Motion to 

Stay be DENIED. This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the 

provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 23, 2016, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than March 9, 2016. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 3, 2016

Case 3:15-cv-00704-WQH-WVG Document 21 Filed 02/03/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 11