Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03803/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-03803-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

RAKESH DHINGRA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant. 

Case No: C 16-03803 SBA

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

FOR DAMAGES / PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND 

DENYING APPLICATION TO 

PROCEED IFP AS MOOT

On July 7, 2016, Plaintiff Rakesh Dhingra (“Dhingra”) filed the instant pro se action, 

Dkt. 1, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), Dkt. 2. Having read 

and considered the papers filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the 

Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiff’s action without prejudice and DENIES his IFP 

application as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. THE PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTION1

In July 2000, Dhingra, who was then 40 years old, contacted a minor girl using the 

Internet-based America Online instant messenger (“IM”) service. Over the course of 

several days, Dhingra and the minor engaged in extensive IM conversations that included 

 1 The parties are familiar with the facts of the prior criminal action, which are 

summarized herein only to the extent that they are pertinent to the instant action. 

Case 4:16-cv-03803-SBA Document 6 Filed 09/27/16 Page 1 of 7
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

sexual topics. The girl stated on multiple occasions that she was only 14 years old, and 

Dhingra repeatedly acknowledged the minor’s age. 

Dhingra and the girl arranged to meet at a local community college on July 10, 2000. 

During that in-person encounter, Dhingra engaged in sexual activity with the minor in his 

automobile. The minor reported the incident to a teacher, and then, with the teacher’s 

urging, to local law enforcement officials. Local law enforcement officials arrested 

Dhingra after covertly arranging a second meeting between him and the minor. On July 14, 

2000, local law enforcement officials contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigations 

(“FBI”), including Agent Charles Esposito, to further investigate the offense. 

The United States obtained an indictment against Dhingra for one count of using the 

internet to solicit sexual activity from a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Case 

No. 01-cv-40144-SBA, Dkt. 1. A jury found Dhingra guilty of that offense, and the Court 

imposed a sentence of 24 months in custody and three years of supervised release. Id., Dkt. 

72, 86. Upon Dhingra’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. Id., Dkt. 115. 

 B. THE INSTANT ACTION

On July 7, 2016, Dhingra filed the instant action, naming as defendant the United 

States of America. Dkt. 1. In a single pleading, Dhingra brings both a civil complaint for 

damages and a petition for writ of error coram nobis. 

Dhingra alleges that the “purported minor” victim of his criminal offense was 

actually an adult and an “undercover FBI Agent/Informer.” Compl. ¶ 8. According to 

Dhingra, FBI Agent Chuck Esposito “sent a baby faced adult” to meet Dhingra on July 10, 

2000, as part of a “cyber squad operation . . . to catch persons who had been actively 

looking for illegal sexual conduct with minors.” Id. ¶¶ 5, 12. During that encounter, this 

“adult person pretending to be a minor and with a changed identity under FBI witness 

protection program . . . was running the show and acted as an ADULT . . . .” Id. ¶ 10. 

Dhingra further alleges that the FBI changed this agent’s “identity to a minor under 

the witness protection program in order to make a false arrest, falsely prosecute and falsely 

convict and imprison [him].” Compl. ¶ 13. According to Dhingra, the FBI also confiscated 

Case 4:16-cv-03803-SBA Document 6 Filed 09/27/16 Page 2 of 7
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

his computer on the pretext of a lawful arrest; fabricated evidence against him regarding 

this “fictitious minor”; committed perjury by presenting this fiction to the jury at his trial; 

and “caus[ed] libel, slander, and severe emotional distress” as a result of his false 

prosecution and conviction. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22, 30-31, 36-37, 39. 

Dhingra claims that this undercover sting and subsequent prosecution was a 

“fraudulent and exhibitionist propaganda act by the secret and undercover wing of FBI 

cyber squad to gain sympathy from the tax payers and on behalf of rape and assault victims 

since most of such cases go unreported and FBI is unable to do anything.” Compl. ¶ 10(g). 

Based on the foregoing, Dhingra alleges in his civil complaint seven causes of action 

for: (1) False Arrest and False Imprisonment on a Fictitious Federal Indictment; 

(2) Conspiracy with Local Law Authorities for False Arrest of Plaintiff on Fictitious 

Probable Cause; (3) Unlawful Confiscation of Plaintiff’s Personal Property; (4) Deceit by 

Fabrication of Evidence in the Federal Court and Lying to the Jury; (5) Fraud by 

Obstruction of Justice and Perjury in a Federal Court; (6) Defamation, Libel and Slander; 

and (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

Additionally, in his petition for writ of error coram nobis, Dhingra moves to vacate 

his criminal conviction. Among other things, Dhingra prays for compensatory damages in 

excess of $35 million, punitive and exemplary damages, an order overturning his criminal 

conviction, and an order requiring an apology from the FBI. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 A court may authorize the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees 

by a litigant who demonstrates that he is unable to pay. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1). The Court 

“shall dismiss” such an action, however, if it determines that: (A) the allegation of poverty 

is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim 

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

Case 4:16-cv-03803-SBA Document 6 Filed 09/27/16 Page 3 of 7
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. CIVIL COMPLAINT

Construed liberally, Dhingra’s civil complaint raises claims under Bivens and/or the 

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).2 These claims are frivolous. See Martin v. Sias, 88 

F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)) (“A 

complaint ‘is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.’”). 

 A Bivens action will lie against a federal defendant in his or her individual capacity; 

such action will not lie against a defendant in his or her official capacity, a federal agency, 

or the United States. W. Radio Servs. Co., 578 F.3d at 1119 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 

U.S. 471, 484 (1994)); Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988); DalyMurphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Dhingra names as defendant the 

United States. Thus, insofar as he alleges constitutional violations for unlawful arrest, 

unlawful seizure of property, and/or various deprivations of his right to due process, the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity bars these claims. See Thomas-Lazear, 815 F.2d at 1207. 

 A claim under the FTCA will lie against the United States. However, the FTCA 

bars a claimant from filing suit until he exhausts his administrative remedies. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2675(a) (“An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for 

money damages . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the 

appropriate federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the 

agency . . . .”); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). The exhaustion 

requirement is jurisdictional. Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citing Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000)). Dhingra did not exhaust 

his claims. Thus, insofar as he alleges tort claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, 

 2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971), authorizes money damages claims against individual federal officials for 

constitutional violations. See W. Radio Servs. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 1116, 

1122 (9th Cir. 2009). The FTCA authorizes claims for money damages against the United 

States for injuries arising out of its employees’ tortious acts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-

2680; see also Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 4:16-cv-03803-SBA Document 6 Filed 09/27/16 Page 4 of 7
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

malicious prosecution, fraud, defamation, libel, slander, and/or intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, such claims are subject to dismissal. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. 

 Moreover, all of Dhingra’s civil claims are barred by the principles enunciated in 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff 

bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior criminal conviction, unless that conviction had 

already been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid. Id. at 486-87. The Heck 

bar also applies to Bivens and FTCA claims. See Martin, 88 F.3d at 775 (applying 

rationale of Heck to Bivens claims); Erlin v. United States, 364 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 

2004) (applying rationale of Heck to FTCA claims). 

 Here, although Dhingra articulates his claims as a variety of constitutional violations 

and/or torts, the claims all hinge upon the allegation that Dhingra’s arrest, prosecution, and 

conviction were fraudulent in light of the purported fiction that the victim of his offense 

was a minor. Because a “judgment in favor of [Dhingra] would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction,” which has not been vacated or set aside, his civil complaint 

must be dismissed. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see, e.g., Francis v. United States, No. 07-

6125 JSW, 2008 WL 4279692, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2008), aff’d, 376 F. App’x 792 

(9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing tort claims, including conspiracy, invasion of privacy, libel, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, as barred by Heck). 

 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Dhingra’s civil claims without prejudice to 

renewal if and when he succeeds in vacating his conviction. 

B. PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS

 In his petition for writ of error coram nobis, Dhingra incorporates and restates all of 

the allegations set forth in his civil complaint. Compl. ¶ 40. Based on these allegations, 

Dhingra moves to vacate his “fraudulent and deceitful conviction.” Id. ¶ 41. 

 A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy authorized under the All 

Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to challenge the validity of a criminal conviction. See 

Case 4:16-cv-03803-SBA Document 6 Filed 09/27/16 Page 5 of 7
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 503-513 (1954). To qualify for coram nobis relief, 

a petitioner must show that: (1) a more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons exist 

for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences exist from the conviction 

sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III; and (4) the error is of 

the most fundamental character. United States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987)). These 

requirements are conjunctive, such that failure to meet any one of them is fatal. MatusLeva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Dhingra’s petition fails to satisfy the requirements for coram nobis relief and is 

frivolous. As a threshold matter, Dhingra fails to provide a valid reason for the 14-year 

delay in attacking his conviction. Specifically, on October 6, 2003, Dhingra filed a motion 

in which he questioned whether the victim “was in fact or possibly could be an Agent of the 

FBI . . . .” Dkt 106 at 2. Dhingra does not show that he exercised due diligence in pursuing 

this claim, even though he questioned the victim’s status as a purported FBI agent as far 

back as 13 years ago. See Riedl, 496 F.3d at 1007 (coram nobis relief is unavailable if the 

petitioner “did not exercise due diligence”); Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 594 (discovery of 

new evidence constitutes a valid reason for delay if the petition could not have discovered 

the evidence earlier); see also Martinez v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1076 (D. 

Haw. 2000), aff’d 17 F. App’x 517 (9th Cir. 2001) (“delay is not justified if the petitioner 

was aware of a potential ground for relief earlier, but did not choose to pursue it”). 

 Furthermore, even at this juncture, Dhingra’s petition is devoid of any facts

supporting his assertion that the minor victim of his criminal offense was actually “an 

ADULT FBI Agent/Informer.” Compl. ¶ 13. During the underlying criminal trial, the 

minor victim testified under oath that she met Dhingra when she was fourteen years old and 

had just completed her freshman year in high school. In the face of that evidence, Dhingra 

offers no new evidence at all, but mere speculation. This showing is insufficient to 

establish error of a fundamental character in his criminal proceeding. Cf. United States v. 

Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 573 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that, in order to be entitled to coram 

Case 4:16-cv-03803-SBA Document 6 Filed 09/27/16 Page 6 of 7
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

nobis relief, a petitioner’s allegations must “specifically delineate the factual basis of his 

claim,” and; the petitioner in that case was entitled to a hearing where “his charge [was] 

fortified by an affidavit which set[] forth clear factual averments giving rise to a serious 

question as to [certain evidence presented at his trial]”). 

 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Dhingra’s petition without prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

 1. Dhingra’s civil complaint for damages and petition for writ of error coram 

nobis are DISMISSED without prejudice. 

 2. Dhingra’s application to proceed IFP is DENIED as moot. 

3. The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending matters. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 9/27/2016 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

Case 4:16-cv-03803-SBA Document 6 Filed 09/27/16 Page 7 of 7