Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01884/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01884-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PAUL WESLEY DALY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-01884 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On October 1, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 10) on February 7, 2008.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. 

I Procedural History

In 1991, Petitioner was convicted by a jury on two

counts of molestation of a child, classified as dangerous crimes

against children and class 2 felonies. See Answer, Exh. A.

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Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive 12-year terms of

imprisonment for these convictions. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner

took a direct appeal of his convictions and sentences, alleging

the trial court erred by precluding his counsel from questioning

his mother about Petitioner’s truthfulness. Id., Exh. B. The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of that

decision on March 3, 1993. See id., Exh. C & Exh. D.

Petitioner filed an action for post-conviction relief

on June 22, 1993, pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. See id., Exh. E. Petitioner was appointed counsel

to represent him in these proceedings. Id., Exh. E & Exh. F.

On December 6, 1993, Petitioner’s appointed counsel averred to

the state court that she could find no meritorious issues to

raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner did not

file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and his Rule

32 action was dismissed on February 16, 1994. See id., Exh. G.

Petitioner filed six subsequent actions for postconviction relief in the Arizona state court, in 1997, 2002, two

in 2004, 2005, and 2006. All of these actions for state postconviction relief were dismissed by the state Superior Court,

inter alia, because the petitions were not timely filed pursuant

to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and because the

claims were precluded by Petitioner’s failure to raise them on

direct appeal or in his first Rule 32 action. See id., Exhs. HU. The Superior Court dismissed the last action for postconviction relief on October 6, 2006, and the Arizona Court of

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Appeals declined jurisdiction over a petition for special action

filed by Petitioner on February 8, 2007. See id., Exhs. T & U.

In his petition for federal habeas relief, filed

October 1, 2007, Petitioner asserts his conviction must be

vacated because: (1) His Fifth Amendment right to due process,

his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, and his Fourteenth

Amendment right to equal protection were violated because

“insufficient and incorrect” evidence was presented to the grand

jury and to the trial jury, i.e., hearsay evidence regarding a

twenty-year-old prior conviction; (2) His trial counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective, inter alia, because counsel

failed to fully investigate the victim for the purpose of

introducing impeachment evidence and because counsel did not

move to allow Petitioner’s release on the basis of a polygraph

test; (3) His right to be free of double jeopardy was violated

by the use of a prior conviction to indicate propensity and to

enhance his sentence; (4) His sentences constitute cruel and

unusual punishment. In his habeas petition Petitioner further

contends his state convictions were not final until 2007, due to

his appellate counsel’s failure to raise and properly exhaust

legitimate issues in the state courts.

II Analysis

The petition is barred by the statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 

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Petitioner is a state prisoner whose conviction became

final on or about June 3, 1993, ninety days after the Arizona

Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences, when the time expired for seeking certiorari from the

United States Supreme Court. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520

U.S. 518, 527, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1525 (1997) (noting that the

defendant’s conviction became final when his time for filing a

petition for a writ of certiorari expired); Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, Petitioner’s

state conviction became final prior to April 24, 1996, the

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (“AEDPA”). See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on

other grounds by Calderon v. Kelly, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc). Additionally, the AEDPA required state prisoners

whose convictions became final before April 24, 1996, to file

their petitions for federal habeas corpus relief from those

convictions by April 25, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The running of this one-year

statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state convictions

which became final before April 24, 1996, was suspended during

any period when “a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim [was] pending” in any state court.

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2007); see also Calderon

(Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1286-87; Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d

325, 327-28 (4th Cir. 2000); Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223,

1226 (10th Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, the statute of limitations on Petitioner’s

action for federal habeas relief began to run on April 24, 1996,

and expired on April 25, 1997, unless it was tolled during that

time period by the pendency of a properly-filed action for state

post-conviction relief. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042

(9th Cir. 2001). 

Petitioner’s various actions for state post-conviction

relief filed after April 24, 1996, specifically the action filed

January 22, 1997, did not toll the applicable statute of

limitations because the untimely Rule 32 actions were not

“properly filed” applications for state post-conviction relief.

See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807,

1811-12 (2005). Furthermore, even allowing that the 1997 Rule

32 action did toll the statute of limitations, Petitioner still

allowed more than one year to pass from the conclusion of this

proceeding in 1997, before he filed his next action for state

post-conviction relief in 2002. Any state post-conviction

action filed after the statute of limitations regarding

Petitioner’s federal habeas action had expired did not “restart”

the statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th

Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir.

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1 This holding does not affect a petitioner’s ability to

raise claims involving a change in the law made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or claims

involving newly-discovered evidence of innocence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2007). Absent those circumstances, which are

not present here, the strict application of the jurisdictional

deadline is appropriate in a collateral proceeding and is now

established Supreme Court precedent. See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at

2365–66.

-6-

2001). 

The undersigned has previously reasoned that section

2254 habeas applicants are no longer entitled to consideration

of the merits of their untimely petitions based on the doctrine

that the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled. The

Supreme Court recently concluded section 2254 petitioners are

not entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations because this does not comport with the plain meaning

of the statute. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365

(2007) (holding that “time limits enacted by Congress” are

“jurisdictional” and rejecting the argument that the federal

courts could craft an “equitable” exception to the

jurisdictional requirement).1 But see Lawrence v. Florida, 127

S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (assuming, without deciding, that

section 2244(d) provides for equitable tolling); Diaz v. Kelly,

___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 199846, at *3 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding the

conclusion in Bowles does not apply to the AEDPA).

However, were the Court to conclude the law might

provide for the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations,

Petitioner is still not entitled to the benefit of this doctrine.

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A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125 S. Ct. at 1814-15.

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition. See Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir.

2008) (holding the petitioner has a strong burden to plead

specific facts supporting their claim of extraordinary

circumstances); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.

2005) (“Each of the cases in which equitable tolling has been

applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state officials

or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”). Compare

Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Faught v. Butler, 135 Fed. App.

92, 93 (9th Cir. 2005). A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance

of the law, and lack of representation during the applicable

filing period do not constitute extraordinary circumstances

justifying equitable tolling because such circumstances are not

“extraordinary.” See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th

Cir. 2004). 

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking

equitable tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence

“throughout the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219

F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d

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153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999). Petitioner did not act with reasonable

diligence throughout the time period he seeks to toll, i.e., 1996

through 2007. Despite Petitioner’s claim that he did not file

his habeas petition because he was exhausting his claims in the

state courts, Petitioner allowed at least four years to pass

after his conviction became final before he filed any state

action for post-conviction relief. Additionally, with regard to

the time period he seeks to toll, Petitioner allowed almost five

years to pass, from 1997 through 2002, without pursuing any

avenue of federal, or state, post-conviction or habeas relief

and, therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner did not act

with the requisite reasonable diligence which would warrant

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See Pace, 125

S. Ct. at 1814-15; Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.

1998) (rejecting a claim to equitable tolling where the

petitioner “provided no specificity regarding the alleged lack

of access and the steps he took to diligently pursue his federal

claims”). Compare Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969-72 (9th Cir.

2006).

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year period specified by the AEDPA for convictions which

became final before passage of the statute. Because Petitioner’s

1997 state action for post-conviction relief was not “properly

filed,” it did not toll the statute of limitations with regard

to Petitioner’s federal habeas claims. Additionally, none of

Petitioner’s subsequent actions for state post-conviction relief

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“restarted” the statute of limitations after it expired. The

undersigned further concludes that, assuming equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations were a doctrine available to

Petitioner, Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing

equitable tolling is warranted.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Daly’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

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in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 13th day of March, 2008.

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