Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00613/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00613-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Respondents appear to have made a clerical error in the preparation of their exhibits filed

in support of their Answer. For example, Respondents cite repeatedly to portions of transcript

attached as Exhibit P (Answer, pg. 12, n. 3), but Exhibit P contains only one page of trial transcript,

and it is not a page cited in Respondents' Answer. (See also this Court's discussion at pg. 17, lines

7-14 of this R&R).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Marquis Lee Johnson,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-05-613-PHX-EHC (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Marquis Lee Johnson, who is presently confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") (Doc. No. 1), Respondents' Response to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Answer")1

 (Doc. No. 13), and Petitioner's Reply (Doc.

No. 14). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after independent review,

deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On, July 7, 1999, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Maricopa County Superior

Court on seven counts: Count 1, drive-by shooting, a class 2 dangerous felony; Counts 2 and

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 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), "a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct." 

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3, aggravated assault, class 3 dangerous felonies; Counts 4, 5 and 6, endangerment, class 6

dangerous felonies; and Count 7, unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle, a class 5

felony.2

 (Answer, Ex. P, pgs. 73-77; Ex. A.) According to the facts as summarized in

Petitioner's opening brief on direct appeal, Jennifer Stewart and Frank Malone were driving

with their three children, ages six months to three years, and stopped at a red light. (Answer,

Ex. C, pg. 3.) A white Cadillac pulled up to the right of their car and a man fired nine or ten

shots from a nine-millimeter handgun into their car. (Id.) An eye-witness at the scene

described the driver as a dark-complected man wearing a black spandex-type hat. (Id., pg.

4.) An officer responding to the scene spotted the white Cadillac and engaged in a highspeed chase. (Id., pg. 5.) The driver of the Cadillac eventually jumped out of the car and

ran; police pursued him in and out of buildings and eventually lost sight of him. (Id.) Police

established a perimeter and began clearing apartments. (Id.) They spotted Petitioner hiding

in the bushes and ordered him out; police found a cell phone and a black hat in the bushes

where Petitioner had been hiding. (Id.) When apprehended, Petitioner was wearing a bulletproof vest. (Id.) Police discovered in the Cadillac a black hair net and a cellular phone

adapter compatible with the phone found in the bushes where Petitioner had been hiding.

(Id., pg. 7.) Frank Malone identified Petitioner as the shooter shortly after he was

apprehended. (Id., pg. 4.) 

Petitioner testified at trial that at the time of the crime, he was waiting for his boss to

pick him up when he heard noises and saw police. (Id.) Petitioner jumped into the bushes

to hide from police because he had outstanding traffic warrants. (Id.) Petitioner testified that

he was wearing the black hat discovered in the bushes, but that the hat was angora, not

spandex. (Id.) Petitioner denied being near the scene of the crime, denied owning a Cadillac

or a nine-millimeter gun, and denied shooting at the victims. (Id.) 

On January 14, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to multiple consecutive and concurrent

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terms of imprisonment totaling 19.5 years. (Answer, Ex. B.) Petitioner timely appealed his

conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising a single claim: that Petitioner was

entitled to an additional eleven days of pre-sentence credit. (Ex. C, pgs. 10 & 12.) On

November 2, 2000, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision granting

Petitioner the requested relief and affirming the judgment as modified. (Answer, Ex. A.)

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) 

On February 6, 2001, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief under Rule 32,

Ariz. R. Crim. P. (Answer, Ex. F.) Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief

on March 6, 2002, in which he identified fifteen issues but raised 14 claims of prosecutorial

misconduct, 8 claims of abuse of judicial discretion and 15 ineffective assistance of counsel

claims. (Answer, Ex. G.) On August 2, 2002, the trial court issued a minute entry addressing

Petitioner's claims; the trial court concluded that Petitioner's claims of prosecutorial

misconduct and abuse of judicial discretion were precluded because Petitioner had failed to

present them in his direct appeal, and that Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel were without merit. (Answer, Ex. I.) The trial court accordingly dismissed

Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. Id.

Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of the trial court's

dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, filing the same brief that he had filed with

the trial court. (Answer, Ex. J.) On March 2, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied

review without comment. (Answer, Ex. K.) Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for review

in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. L.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review

without comment on October 5, 2004. (Answer, Ex. M.) 

On February 23, 2005, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

federal court. In his Petition, Petitioner presents twenty-one claims for relief:

1. Ground 1: Prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Petitioner's

due process rights when he failed to timely disclose evidence;

2. Ground 2: Prosecutor failed timely to disclose evidence, thereby preventing

Petitioner's trial counsel from providing effective assistance of counsel;

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3. Ground 3: Prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Petitioner's

due process rights when he cross-examined Petitioner regarding his alibi;

4. Ground 4: Prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Petitioner's

due process rights when prosecutor identified the victim's car by model during

questioning;

5. Grounds 5, 6, 7, 8: Prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in violation of

Petitioner's due process rights when prosecutor misstated the evidence during his

closing argument;

6. Ground 9: Petitioner's due process rights were violated when the court prohibited his

trial counsel from admitting evidence of his leg injury as part of his defense; 

7. Ground 10: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel

failed to present alibi testimony and medical evidence of Petitioner's injury;

8. Ground 11: Petitioner's confrontation clause rights were violated when one of the

victims offered testimony that contradicted the testimony of a police officer regarding

statements made by the victim at the scene;

9. Ground 12: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial

counsel failed to file a motion for a new finding of probable cause;

10. Ground 13: Petitioner's due process rights were violated when a copy of the grand

jury transcript was never filed with the trial court;

11. Ground 14: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when his appellate

counsel failed to raise issues that Petitioner thought should be raised on appeal;

12. Ground 15: Prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in violation of

Petitioner's due process rights when prosecutor vouched for witness during closing

argument;

13. Ground 16: Prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in violation of

Petitioner's due process rights when prosecutor accused Petitioner of lying during

closing argument;

14. Ground 17: Prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in violation of

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Petitioner's due process rights when he made unfair arguments about fingerprint

evidence during closing argument;

15. Ground 18: Petitioner's due process rights were violated when one of the victims

offered testimony that was not in the police report of her interview with police;

16. Ground 19: Petitioner's due process rights were violated when he was asked a

question by a jury member that he could not answer without referencing the fact that

he was currently incarcerated;

17. Ground 20: The state's indictment of Petitioner for multiple charges arising out of the

same incident violated the double jeopardy clause of the Sixth Amendment; and

18. Ground 21: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial

counsel failed to file pre-trial motions.

(Petition, pgs. 5-37.)

Respondents contend that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner has failed

to exhaust his state court remedies as to all claims except his claims for ineffective assistance

of counsel, which Respondents claim are without merit. 

In his Reply, Petitioner blames his failure to exhaust his state court remedies on his

appellate counsel, arguing that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when his

appellate counsel elected to argue only one issue in his direct appeal. Petitioner also disputes

Respondents' argument that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in his Petition

are without merit.

DISCUSSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be denied because Petitioner has

failed to exhaust his state court remedies with respect to Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13,

15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, and because Grounds 2, 10, 12, 14, and 21, are without merit.

A. Exhaustion

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971.) First enunciated in Ex parte

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Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a

procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an

appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation

obviated before resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

The requirement is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state

courts' role in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989)

(citation omitted). The requirement is also based on a pragmatic consideration that fully

exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a complete factual record once they reach

federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest

court, either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will

consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). A petitioner must have also presented his claim in a

procedural context in which its merits will be considered. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.

346, 351 (1989). A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review on

exhaustion grounds in either of two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in

federal court if it was actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on

state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second,

the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if the petitioner failed to present the

claim in a necessary state court and "the court to which the petitioner would be required to

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims

procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim in

state court, a federal court will not review the claim unless the petitioner shows "cause and

prejudice" for the failure to present the constitutional issue to the state court, or makes a

colorable showing of actual innocence. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996);

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

Respondents contend in their Answer that this Court is precluded from considering

Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, of the Petition, i.e. all claims

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 See Answer, Ex. G, pgs. 4-6 (Ground 1), pg. 18 (Ground 2), pg. 8 (Ground 3), pgs. 6-7

(Ground 4), pgs. 9-12 (Grounds 5, 6, 7, 8), pgs. 15-16 (Ground 10), pg. 13 (Ground 11), pgs. 21-22

(Ground 12), pg. 15 (Ground 13), pg. 22 (Ground 14), pg. 12 (Ground 15), pgs. 8-9 (Ground 16),

pg. 11 (Ground 17), pg. 7 (Ground 18), pg. 12 (Ground 19), pgs. 14-15 (Ground 20), pg. 18 (Ground

21). 

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other than ineffective assistance of counsel, on the merits, because Petitioner failed to

exhaust those claims within the state system and now those claims are procedurally

defaulted. The Court agrees with Respondent’s contention as to Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,

11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, and finds that Ground 9 was not properly raised in the state

court.

Petitioner did not present Ground 9 in his direct appeal or in his state court habeas

petition. Although Petitioner argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

introduce medical records of his leg injury (Answer, Ex. G, pg. 15-16), he did not allege that

his due process rights were violated by the court's limitations on the scope of Petitioner's own

testimony regarding his injury. Accordingly, the constitutional ground for Ground 9 was

never presented to the state courts and cannot be raised for the first time in federal court. See

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277 (1971) (holding that it is not sufficient to raise only the

facts supporting the claim; rather, "the constitutional claim ... inherent in those facts" must

be brought to the attention of the state court). Petitioner is now precluded by Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from obtaining relief on Ground 9 in state court

absent an applicable exception, which he does not assert. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b);

32.1(d)-(h); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d at 997, 987 & n.5 (2002) (finding no state court

remedies and noting that petitioner did not raise any exceptions to Rule 32.2(a)). Thus,

Ground 9 is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

749-50 (1991) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); Thomas v. Goldsmith,

979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, were presented in

Petitioner's state court habeas petition.3

 However, Petitioner presented only one claim in his

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 Petitioner's failure to include his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his direct appeal

does not constitute a waiver of those claims because, under Arizona law, such claims are not to be

raised on direct appeal, but in post-conviction relief proceedings. See State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1,

3, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (2002). 

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direct appeal: that Petitioner was entitled to additional eleven days of pre-sentence credit.

The trial court accordingly denied Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of judicial

discretion claims on the grounds that Petitioner had failed to raise those claims on direct

appeal, and had therefore waived them pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3), Ariz. R. Crim. P.4

(Answer, Ex. I, pg. 1.) Rule 32.2(a)(3) constitutes an independent and adequate state ground

justifying a procedural default. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). Thus,

Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, are procedurally defaulted,

absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991) (citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted); Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Petitioner attributes his failure to raise Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17,

18, 19, and 20, to his appellate counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. (Reply, pgs. 2-4.)

According to Petitioner, he instructed his appellate counsel to raise these issues on appeal,

but appellate counsel refused to present them because she found them to be without merit.

(Petition, Ground 14.) 

Appellate counsel's decision to present only the sentencing issue on appeal does not

constitute cause excusing the procedural default unless it rose to the level of ineffective

assistance of counsel. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) (citing Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-492 (1986)). For the reasons stated in the Section (B)(iii)(d)

below, appellate counsel's decision to present only the sentencing issue on appeal did not rise

to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate cause and prejudice, and has procedurally defaulted Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,

9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the petition be

denied with respect to these grounds.

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B. Merits

i. Standard of Review

On habeas review, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness when fairly supported by the record. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426

(1985). The presumption of correctness also applies to a state appellate court's findings of

fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981). The question presented in a state prisoner's

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is "whether the state proceedings satisfied due process."

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner's confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). General improprieties occurring in state

proceedings are cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently

violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state court determinations on state law questions."); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1158

(9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has held in the habeas context that "this Court will not

review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on

a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The provisions of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) govern this case and pose special

burdens. Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc). Under AEDPA,

when reviewing a state criminal conviction, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus

only if a state court proceeding "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established

Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth" in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but "nevertheless arrives at a

result different from" that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A

state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if "the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle" from a Supreme Court decision

"but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In

considering whether a state court has unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, "a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."

Id. at 411; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). In conducting habeas review, we

"presum[e] that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002).

Petitioner has properly exhausted the following grounds, alleging that he was denied

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments: 

• Ground 2: the prosecutor failed timely to disclose evidence, thereby preventing

Petitioner's trial counsel from providing effective assistance of counsel,

• Ground 10: trial counsel failed to present alibi testimony and medical evidence

of Petitioner's injury, 

• Ground 12: trial counsel failed to file a motion for a new finding of probable

cause, 

• Ground 14: appellate counsel failed to raise issues that Petitioner thought

should be raised on appeal, and 

• Ground 21: trial counsel failed to file pre-trial motions.

ii. Trial court's decision was not contrary to federal law

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s decision was contrary to

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federal law. In considering the Rule 32 petition, the trial court applied the appropriate

federal law. The trial court concluded that "Defendant has failed to raise a colorable claim

and has failed to establish both prongs of State v. Salazar, 46 Ariz. 540, 707 P.2d 944 (1985);

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 558, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984)." (Answer, Ex. I, pg. 2.)

Strickland v. Washington is the leading United States Supreme Court case governing

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 

iii. Trial court's decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law

In addition, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court application of

federal law to the facts was unreasonable. The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the

right to counsel, but the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. at 686. The burden of proof on Petitioner to show ineffective assistance is twopronged. First, Petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, in that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as "counsel." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. In demonstrating a deficient performance, Petitioner must show that the

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. Judicial

scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, since there is a "strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the “wide range of professional

assistance.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. 689). 

Second, in proving ineffectiveness, Petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. To prove prejudice,

Petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors and

omissions, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A reasonable

probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove that counsel was ineffective.

Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989). A habeas petitioner is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing or habeas relief when “he has alleged facts [in his petition] which,

if proven, would entitle him to relief. . . . Notice pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is

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expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.” O’Bremski v.

Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). 

The trial court concluded that 

As to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Court

notes that defendant refused to agree to exclusion of Rule 8 time when his trial

counsel requested additional time to prepare for trial. Defendant was advised

by this Court that any post-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

would be difficult to raise since defendant did not agree to allow his own

attorney sufficient time to prepare for trial. Defendant was advised clearly that

he had the opportunity to allow his counsel, Stephen Johnson, additional time

to prepare but defendant insisted that he did not want to waive any Rule 8

time. Defendant has raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, many of which are tactical decisions made by trial counsel. The

Court finds that defendant has failed to raise a colorable claim.

(Answer, Ex. I, pg. 2.) The Court agrees with the trial court that, to the extent Petitioner now

claims his trial counsel was not fully prepared for trial, that argument is undermined by

Petitioner's own refusal to permit his trial counsel adequate time to prepare. (Answer, Ex.

R, pgs. 4a-14a.) In addition, the Court concludes that there are insufficient facts in the record

supporting Petitioner's claim that his trial counsel's performance fell below the standard of

care, and therefore the trial court reasonably applied the governing federal law to the facts

before it.

a. Ground 2: 

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor failed timely to disclose evidence, thereby

preventing Petitioner's trial counsel from providing effective assistance of counsel. The facts

alleged in support of this claim, however, are almost entirely related to allegedly

inappropriate conduct by the prosecution, not by defense counsel. Petitioner cannot attempt

to resurrect a defaulted prosecutorial misconduct claim in the form of an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. To the extent that Ground 2 is based on conduct of the

prosecution, it fails to allege a deficiency in his defense counsel's performance and therefore

fails to present facts to support a Strickland claim.

The only wrongdoing on the part of trial counsel that Petitioner alleges in Ground 2

is his trial counsel's failure to file a written motion for disclosure of police supplements and

police reports. (Reply, pg. 7.) The record indicates that Petitioner was initially represented

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by a public defender. Stephen Johnson was appointed as counsel for Petitioner after the

public defender indicated a conflict in representation. (Reply, Ex. E, pgs. 171-72.) Prior to

Mr. Johnson's appointment, the public defender made an oral motion for disclosure of the

police supplements and reports, and was instructed by the Court that a written motion would

need to be filed. (Reply, Ex. E, pg. 172.) No such motion was filed by either the public

defender or Mr. Johnson. (Id.) 

Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file the discovery motion,

however, because the supplements that would have been produced in response to the motion

did not contain exculpatory evidence. Mr. Johnson moved for a mistrial upon discovering

that the prosecution had failed to disclose a police supplement that would have been

disclosed had defense counsel filed its discovery motion. (Reply, Ex. E, pg. 168.) Mr.

Johnson argued that the supplement contained fingerprint evidence that would have

demonstrated that his client's fingerprints were not found at the scene. (Reply, Ex. E, pg.

169.) The trial court reviewed the supplement, however, and concluded that it stated only

that no fingerprints could be lifted from the scene. (Reply, Ex. E, pg. 170-71.) The

fingerprint evidence would only have been exculpatory if it had demonstrated that someone's

fingerprints were found at the scene, but not Petitioner's. Because the evidence did not

support such a conclusion, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors and omissions, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

b. Ground 10: 

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to present alibi testimony and medical

evidence of Petitioner's injury. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel should

have called as alibi witnesses Petitioner's boss, who Petitioner claims was on his way to pick

him up at the time he was arrested, and Petitioner's neighbor, who Petitioner claims to have

visited just before he was arrested. Petitioner further alleges that his trial counsel should

have called his doctor as a witness to testify that Petitioner had previously been shot in the

leg and was not physically capable of fleeing the scene.

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Petitioner does not present the Court with any evidence that his boss or his neighbor

were willing to testify on his behalf. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove

that counsel was ineffective. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989). In

addition, even if Petitioner's boss had testified, he would not have been able to establish an

alibi for Petitioner because he was not with Petitioner when the crime was committed.

Furthermore, Petitioner admits that his trial counsel retained a private investigator to attempt

to locate Petitioner's neighbors to establish an alibi defense, and that the private investigator

left cards on all of Petitioner's neighbors doors, but was never contacted. (Reply, pg. 10.)

Petitioner's trial counsel therefore made a reasonable effort to locate alibi witnesses, and

cannot be held responsible for the neighbors' failure to contact him. 

Defense counsel's failure to present Petitioner's medical records at trial appears to

have been a strategic decision. The records document Petitioner's recovery from a gunshot

wound to the leg, and close with the notation that "the patient is painless and walking fullweight bearing." (Answer, Ex. N.) Thus, they do not support, but refute, Petitioner's claim

that he could not flee the pursuing officers on foot. Instead of producing these records at

trial, defense counsel elicited more limited and favorable testimony from Petitioner; on direct

examination, Petitioner testified that in 1998, he was shot in the right shin and the left leg

above the knee, and that he could not sprint or run fast as a result. (Reply, Ex. E, pg. 133.)

A tactical decision by counsel with which the Petitioner disagrees cannot form the basis of

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir.

2001). 

c. Ground 12:

Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights were violated when his counsel failed

to file a motion for a new finding of probable cause. Petitioner believes that his counsel

should have filed such a motion because transcripts from the grand jury proceeding were

never filed with the court. According to Petitioner, the grand jury transcripts might have

provided grounds for him to be "released and/or afforded a new grand jury proceeding with

his appearance there and/or given an opportunity to view the preliminary examination of his

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case, and/or not be sitting in prison with 19.5 years without grand jury transcripts to know

what contributed to his loss of liberty." (Reply, pg. 14.) Petitioner has failed to demonstrate,

however, that his counsel was deficient in failing to file a motion for a new finding of

probable cause, because Petitioner has not presented the Court with evidence from which it

could conclude that the motion would have been justified. Petitioner has not provided the

Court with a copy of the grand jury transcript or suggested which portions of the grand jury

transcript reflect an error in the proceedings. The Court notes that in May, 2004, Petitioner

was advised that the grand jury transcript from his trial court proceedings was available with

the superior court clerk's office and could be obtained for a copying fee. (Reply, Ex. U.)

Whether Petitioner ever ordered the transcript or not is unclear, but the record demonstrates

that he had the opportunity to do so. Because mere speculation does not constitute grounds

for habeas relief, Shah, 878 F.2d at 1161, Petitioner's Ground 12 is without merit.

d. Ground 14: 

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise any

claims in his direct appeal other than the sentencing issue that was presented. Specifically,

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel should have raised the issues that he presents

in his petition. The Court disagrees.

Even if Petitioner could demonstrate that his appellate counsel was deficient in failing

to present Ground 9 in his direct appeal, Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

arising from that deficiency would nonetheless be precluded from this Court's review,

because Petitioner failed to exhaust that claim in his state court post-conviction proceedings.

Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 were presented to the state court in

Petitioner's post-conviction proceedings, where they were found waived because Petitioner

had not raised them in his appeal. Thus, if Petitioner can demonstrate that his counsel was

deficient in failing to raise those grounds on appeal, and that Petitioner was prejudiced as a

result, Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief.

Petitioner admits that he sent his appellate counsel "voluminous issues which included

Brady issues, ineffective assistance of counsel issues, prosecutorial misconduct issues,

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judge's abuse of discretion issues and all claims for relief included in this writ." (Petition,

Ground 14.) Petitioner also admits that his appellate counsel told him that she had reviewed

the issues that he presented and found them to be without merit. (Id.) The process of

"‘winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on' those more likely to prevail,

far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy."

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-752

(1983). The Court concludes that appellate counsel's decision not to include Grounds 1, 3,

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 in Petitioner's appeal was reasonable in light of the

fact that those claims did not present a strong likelihood of reversal. To the contrary, those

claims lack merit for the following reasons.

In Ground 1, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct

by failing timely to disclose the state's evidence. Petitioner fails to demonstrate, however,

how the evidence would have been exculpatory if it had been produced earlier. Thus,

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that, but for appellate counsel's failure to raise Ground 1 in his

appeal, the outcome of his proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688. 

In Ground 3, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct when he asked Petitioner why he had not told his "alibi" story to anyone prior

to trial. Petitioner claims that in asking this question, the prosecutor impeached Petitioner

with his post-arrest silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). This

argument would have been without merit on appeal, however, because Doyle, which held

that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits impeachment on the basis

of a defendant's silence following Miranda warnings, does not apply to cross-examination

that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements. See Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S.

404, 408 (1980). Such questioning makes no unfair use of silence because a defendant who

voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.

Id. In the present case, Petitioner voluntarily spoke to police after being given his Miranda

rights. (Answer, Ex. R, pg. 37.) To the extent that the prosecutor's question touched upon

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statements made by Petitioner to police (and this Court notes that whether the prosecutor's

question even went that far is doubtful), it did not violate Doyle's protection, because

Petitioner did not remain silent following his arrest.

In Ground 4, Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct when he substantively embellished upon a police witness' testimony in direct

examination by referring to the model of the car (a white Cadillac) from which the shots were

fired, when the witness had made no such specification in his previous testimony. Other

evidence at trial incontrovertibly established, however, that the shots were fired from a white

Cadillac, a fact Petitioner that does not dispute. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how he

was harmed by the wording of the prosecutor's question.

Grounds 5, 6, 7 and 8 allege prosecutorial misconduct based on statements made by

the prosecutor during closing arguments that Petitioner claims were not supported by the

evidence. Ground 5 takes issue with the prosecutor's comment that Officer Vasquez was

looking for a man named "Shawn" during the pursuit. Although Respondents claim that

Officer Vasquez testified that he learned during the chase that the suspect's name was Shawn,

the citation offered to the record by Respondents does not support that assertion, and the

portions of the record containing Officer Vasquez's testimony were not provided to the Court

by the Respondents. The Court notes that trial transcripts provided by Petitioner indicate that

Officer Vasquez testified that when the crime was first reported to him, he was given a

description of the suspect vehicle, but that the name of the suspect was not transmitted to him

"at that time." (Reply, Ex. D, pg. 113.) Nevertheless, even if the prosecutor did misstate

Officer Vasquez's testimony during trial, it would not have been grounds for a reversal. The

test for prosecutorial misconduct under Arizona law is whether the misconduct affected the

jury's ability to fairly assess the evidence. State v. Rosas-Hernandez, 202 Ariz. 212, 213, 42

P.3d 1177, 1183 (App. 2002) (citing State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 35, 906 P.2d 542, 568

(1995)). To require reversal, the misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it

permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial. Id., 202 Ariz. At 219, 42 P.3d at 1184 (citation

omitted). Even if the jury was erroneously informed that Officer Vasquez was looking for

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a suspect named Shawn during pursuit, that error would not reasonably affect their ability

to fairly assess the evidence presented. 

Petitioner's arguments with respect to Grounds 6, 7, and 8 are unsupported by the

record. In Ground 6, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor's statement in closing that one of

the victims, Frank Malone, identified Petitioner following his arrest, was not supported by

the evidence. One of the arresting officers, Officer Winward, testified, however, that Malone

identified Petitioner following his arrest. (Answer, Ex. O, pg. 107-108.) In Ground 7,

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor's statement that victim Jennifer Stewart told police at

the scene that she could identify her assailant if she saw him again was not supported by the

evidence. The record indicates, however, that Officer Winward testified that Jennifer

Stewart told him exactly that. (Answer, Ex. O, pg. 111.) In Ground 8, Petitioner claims that

the prosecutor misstated the evidence during closing when he argued that Jennifer Stewart

"told the police officer that she could see the defendant's lips moving. She couldn't actually

hear the words, but they were something to the effect of 'I am going to kill you, I'm going to

kill all of you.'" (Answer, Ex. Q, pg. 34-35.) That portion of the closing argument was

supported by the testimony of Officer Winward and Jennifer Stewart. (Answer, Ex. O, pg.

111; Reply, Ex. E, pg. 64.) Thus, Petitioner's arguments with respect to these Grounds are

without merit.

In Grounds 11 and 18, Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights were violated

when witnesses gave conflicting testimony during his trial. Petitioner does not have a

constitutional right to a trial free of contradicting evidence; to the extent that evidence is in

conflict, the jury must weigh the credibility of the witnesses. 

In Ground 13, Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated because a

copy of the grand jury transcript was not filed with the clerk of the court. As explained in

Section (B)(iii)(c), above, Petitioner has not presented any evidence to suggest that his

proceedings would have reached a different result if he had been provided with a copy of the

grand jury transcript in a timely manner.

In Ground 15, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by

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vouching for a witness during his closing. The statement that Petitioner takes issue with,

however – asking jurors if they would always remember the face of the assailant who pointed

a gun at their children, and stating that the prosecutor believed that they would – did not

constitute vouching. See State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 444, 72 P.3d 831, 841 (2003) ("A

prosecutor impermissibly vouches for a witness by placing the prestige of the government

behind its witnesses or suggesting that information not presented to the jury supports a

witness' testimony.").

In Ground 16, Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated when the

prosecutor attacked Petitioner's credibility during closing argument. The prosecutor was

entitled, however, to point out inconsistencies in Petitioner's testimony during closing

argument. Accordingly, this was not a valid ground for appeal.

In Ground 17, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor erred by arguing in his rebuttal

closing argument that if exculpatory fingerprint evidence had existed, the defense would have

produced it at trial. During Petitioner's trial, his defense counsel argued that "there is not a

fingerprint expert here. Ask yourself why. Why wouldn't the state put a fingerprint expert

on the stand? And the answer is because my client's fingerprints were found nowhere. . . .

Mr. Leister, the technician who does the ballistics, I asked him, you did not do the

fingerprints, did you, but to your knowledge, fingerprints were done . . . obviously

fingerprints were done. . . No fingerprint was found of my client's in there." (Answer, Ex.

Q, pgs. 45-46.) During his rebuttal, the prosecutor asked the jury "Do you really think – if

we're going to engage in the sort of speculation that we have here – if evidence of somebody

else's fingerprints on the car would have been found that you wouldn't have heard about it?"

(Id. at pg. 61.) Even if this statement improperly implied that Petitioner had the burden of

proof, the prosecutor's conduct would not have been grounds for appeal. Defense counsel

objected to the prosecutor's argument, but did not request a curative instruction. The rule in

Arizona is that ordinarily alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be objected to and a curative

instruction requested so that the trial court has a chance to cure the error. See State v. White,

115 Ariz. 199, 564 P.2d 888 (1977) (citing Rutledge v. State, 41 Ariz. 48, 15 P.2d 255

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(1932)). If no curative instruction is requested, reversible error has not occurred unless it

appears affirmatively from the circumstances of the trial that the conduct of the prosecutor

has been such that it must be presumed to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Id. 

Based upon the evidence in the record, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's argument

regarding defense counsel's failure to produce exculpatory fingerprint evidence resulted in

a miscarriage of justice. Defense counsel opened the door to speculation about the meaning

of the lack of fingerprint evidence, arguing that the absence of fingerprints supported an

inference of innocence. The prosecutor's response to that argument did nothing more than

present the jury with an alternate inference. See State ex rel. McDougall v. Corcoran, 153

Ariz. 157, 160, 735 P.2d 767, 770 (1987) ("It strikes us as elemental fairness to allow the

State to comment upon the defense's failure to adduce potentially exculpatory evidence to

which defendant had access when defendant is attacking the accuracy of the State's

evidence.").

 In Ground 19, Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated when he was

asked a question by a juror that he could not answer without referencing the fact that he was

currently incarcerated. Petitioner had testified during trial that he always wore a bullet-proof

vest. One of the jurors asked him why he was not wearing a bullet-proof vest in the

courtroom, and Petitioner answered "Because I'm – I knew I was coming in here for trial."

(Reply, Ex. E, pg. 158.) Petitioner claims that the real reason that he was not wearing a

bullet-proof vest was because he was in prison, but that he could not answer the question

honestly because he knew that the jury was not supposed to know that he was incarcerated.

Petitioner claims that by allowing the jury question to be asked, the court made Petitioner

look like a liar in front of the jury. (Reply, pg. 22.) As a threshold matter, the Court

questions whether Petitioner's answer to the question was actually false, or simply a carefully

crafted, but truthful, response. Regardless, Petitioner's argument assumes that the jury knew

that the "real" reason Petitioner was not wearing a vest was because he was incarcerated.

The jury was not presented with evidence of Petitioner's incarceration, and there is no

evidence to suggest that the jury question undermined Petitioner's credibility. 

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In Ground 20, Petitioner claims that his convictions for drive-by shooting, assault and

endangerment violate the double jeopardy clause. The test to determine whether the

violation of two statutory provisions constitutes two offenses or only one is whether each

provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. See Todd v. State,

917 P.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304

(1932)). Because the offenses of drive-by shooting, aggravated assault and endangerment

contain different elements, see A.R.S. §§ 13-1209, A.R.S. § 13-1204 and A.R.S. § 13-1201,

this assertion is without merit.

In sum, the numerous arguments that Petitioner believes his appellate counsel should

have raised on appeal are without legal merit. Failure to take futile action can never be

deficient performance. Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly,

Petitioner's appellate counsel was not unreasonable in deciding not to raise these issues on

appeal. Petitioner has failed to rebut the strong presumption that his appellate counsel's

performance fell within the wide range of professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689. Accordingly, Ground 14 is without merit.

e. Ground 21: 

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to prepare

adequately for trial. Specifically, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel should have (a)

filed a motion to compel discovery, (b) filed a motion in limine to preclude admission of his

bullet-proof vest into evidence, (c) deposed the victims, (d) objected, rather than stipulated,

to the admission of a photo found in Petitioner's home, which was entered without a warrant,

(e) objected to testimony offered at trial, (f) objected to the juror question regarding why

Petitioner was not wearing a bullet-proof vest, (g) impeached victim Jennifer Stewart, (h)

objected to the admission of evidence that Petitioner gave police a fake name and fake birth

date when he was arrested, and that trial counsel (i) failed to file a motion for a new finding

of probable cause, (j) failed to interview witnesses, (k) failed to establish a meaningful

relationship with Petitioner, (l) failed to present medical evidence of Plaintiff's injury, and

(m) failed promptly to interview Plaintiff. 

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These arguments are without merit. Several of these allegations (a, i and l) are

duplications of other grounds alleged in the petition, and are without merit for the reasons

previously stated. Other allegations (f, g and h) challenge trial counsel's failure to take an

action which, for the reasons stated in Section B(iii)(d) above, would have been futile. To

the extent that Petitioner complains that his counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial (b,

c, d, k, m), the arguments are disingenuous in light of Petitioner's refusal to agree to exclude

time in order for his counsel to prepare. Finally, Petitioner fails to allege how he was

prejudiced by any of these alleged failures. 

The trial court's decision to deny petitioner's state habeas petition was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, federal law. In addition, Petitioner does not contend, and

the Court finds no evidence from which to conclude, that the trial court's decision was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge further recommends denying the

petition with respect to Grounds 2, 10, 12, 14 and 21.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 9th day of March, 2007.

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