Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-02656/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-02656-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

RACHEL L. OLMSTEAD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-02656-NJV

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 16

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Rachel L. Olmstead, seeks judicial review of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 

decision denying her application for supplemental security income payments under Title XVI of 

the Social Security Act. Plaintiff‟s request for review of the ALJ‟s unfavorable decision was 

denied by the Appeals Council. The decision thus is the “final decision” of the Commissioner of 

Social Security, which this court may review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Both parties 

have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. (Docs. 7 & 12). The court therefore may 

decide the parties‟ cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the court 

will grant Plaintiff‟s motion for summary judgment, and will deny Defendant‟s motion for 

summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Commissioner‟s findings “as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be 

conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court has a limited scope of review and can only set 

aside a denial of benefits if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal 

error. Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). Substantial 

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evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 

F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 1997). “In determining whether the Commissioner‟s findings are 

supported by substantial evidence,” a district court must review the administrative record as a 

whole, considering “both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner‟s conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The 

Commissioner‟s conclusion is upheld where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was diagnosed with a history of mental impairments, including borderline 

personality disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, anxiety disorder, 

and PTSD. See, e.g. AR. 269, 271-72 & 388. Plaintiff reported suffering reoccurring trauma 

related to sexual abuse as a child and rape as a teenager. AR. 425. Plaintiff also reported a 

“strong history” of suicidal thoughts and attempts. AR. 428. 

THE FIVE STEP SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY

A person filing a claim for social security disability benefits (“the claimant”) must show 

that she has the “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” which has lasted or is expected to last for twelve or 

more months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.909. The ALJ must consider all evidence in the 

claimant‟s case record to determine disability (Id. § 416.920(a)(3)), and must use a five-step 

sequential evaluation to determine whether the claimant is disabled (Id. § 416.920). “[T]he ALJ 

has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant‟s interests 

are considered.” Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983).

Here, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff‟s application for benefits under the required five-step 

sequential evaluation. See AR. 17-24.

At Step One, the claimant bears the burden of showing she has not been engaged in 

“substantial gainful activity” since the alleged date the claimant became disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(b). If the claimant has worked and the work is found to be substantial gainful activity, 

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the claimant will be found not disabled. Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. AR. 19.

At Step Two, the claimant bears the burden of showing that she has a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). “An impairment is 

not severe if it is merely „a slight abnormality (or combination of slight abnormalities) that has no 

more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities.‟” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 

F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting S.S.R. No. 96–3(p) (1996)). The ALJ found that Plaintiff 

suffered the following severe impairments: affective disorder and personality disorder. AR. 20.

At Step Three, the ALJ compares the claimant‟s impairments to the impairments listed in 

appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). The claimant bears 

the burden of showing her impairments meet or equal an impairment in the listing. Id. If the 

claimant is successful, a disability is presumed and benefits are awarded. Id. If the claimant is 

unsuccessful, the ALJ assesses the claimant‟s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and proceeds 

to Step Four. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed 

impairments. AR. 20. Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC “to perform a full 

range of work at all exertional levels and is able to sustain simple, repetitive tasks equating to 

unskilled work with limited public contact.” AR. 21.

At Step Four, the ALJ determined that the transferability of job skills was irrelevant 

because Plaintiff had no past relevant work experience. AR. 23.

At Step Five, after considering the Plaintiff‟s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 

and after consulting the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, and finding that Plaintiff‟s nonexertional 

limitations had little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work, the ALJ determined 

that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can 

perform. AR. 23. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had “not been under a disability, as 

defined in the Social Security Act,” through the relevant time period. AR. 24.

//

//

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ISSUESS PRESENTED

Plaintiff raises four challenges to the ALJ‟s determination, arguing that: (1) “[t]he ALJ 

failed to discuss, or even cite, significant amounts of medical evidence related to claimants severe 

mental impairments;” (2) “[t] he ALJ‟s analysis of Dr. Segal‟s records was based on speculation 

and was inconsistent with the overall evidence of record, including Dr. Segal‟s notes;” (3) “[t]he 

ALJ‟s analysis fail[ed] to consider the Borderline Personality disorder;” and (4) “[t]he ALJ‟s 

reliance on the consultative examination was not supported by the overall record.” Pl.‟s Mot.

(Doc. 15-1) at 3-9. 

The ALJ’s failure to discuss significant medical evidence of record

Plaintiff argues that it was error for the ALJ to fail “to discuss, or even cite, significant 

amounts of medical evidence related to claimants severe mental impairments.” Pl.‟s Mot. (Doc. 

15-1) at 3. “Specifically, the ALJ failed to mention, much less discuss or explain weight given to, 

the records from Dr. Mary Bogle, Psy.D. of Clearlake Family Medical Clinic. There was also no 

mention or discussion of the records from Mendocino Community Mental Health.” Id. The 

Commissioner counters that “[n]one of the records that Plaintiff cites indicated any functional 

limitations and thus were not „medical opinions‟ as contemplated by the regulations.” Def.‟s Mot. 

(Doc. 16) at 2.

“Because a court must give „specific and legitimate reasons‟ for rejecting a treating 

doctor‟s opinions, it follows even more strongly that an ALJ cannot in its decision totally ignore a 

treating doctor and his or her notes, without even mentioning them.” Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 

1170, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2015). The Commissioner‟s suggestion that the court can simply ignore 

the ALJ‟s disregard of the medical records at issue because the records are not “medical opinions” 

ignores the Marsh decision and the regulations and misreads the records in question. 

Plaintiff summarizes the evidence in question as follows:

From Dr. Mary Bogle, PsyD (and one visit with and Julie Payette, APRN) of Clearlake 

Family Medical clinic:

5/21/13: Dr. Bogle. Ax I: PTSD, Major Dep d/o - severe, Panic d/o with agoraphobia, 

PTSD., GAF 49 (Ex. B9F/3.)

5/13/13: Nurse Payette. Ax. I Mixed bipolar disorder with generalized anxiety disorder and 

panic disorder. Axis V. GAF of 40. (Ex. B9F/6.)

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3/19/13: Dr. Bogle. 40 y/o divorced Caucasian female who present with a history of 

bipolar d/o and personality d/o. (She does not remember which one.). She has a history of 

6 suicide attempts and reports ideation but no plan or intent. She reports a history of sexual 

and physical abuse. Burns Anxiety Inventory indicates “severe” anxiety. PHQ-9 indicates 

“severe” depression and PTSD checklist is at 51, and she meets criteria for PTSD. She 

denies mood swings at present. Panic attacks occur a couple times a week. Ax. I Major 

Dep d/o - severe, Panic d/o with agoraphobia, PTSD; Ax. V GAF: 40. Symptoms stable at 

present. (AR 388.)

2/26/13: Dr. Bogle: Ax. I Major Dep d/o - severe, Anxiety d/o NOS, mood disorder NOS, 

R/o Panic d/o with agoraphobia, r/o PTSD; Ax. V GAF: 45. (AR 394.)

Mendocino Community Mental health records include:

9/28/11: Doug Rosoff, DO – chief Psychiatrist Dx: Bipolar depression, Obesity, PTSD. 

Fleeting suicidality. Poor support system. Medications: Klonopin, Abilfy, Cogentin, 

Cymbalta, Buproprion. (AR 271.)

7/19/11: E. Buxton, FNP A Bipolar with depression, PTSD, Personality Disorder (AR 

272.)

6/14/11: has low problems solving skills and low insights as to her role in the above 

situations. The meds seem to control the Bipolar and PTSD, but do not affect ct‟s inability 

to work, take care of her family or make good decisions.

A: Bipolar with depression, PTSD, Personality Disorder NOS. (AR 273.)

4/12/11: “...has absolutely no boundaries and has been warned many many times by 

landlord and by provider not to allow multiple people to live in the apartment and to stop 

the late night parties. She is out of touch with reality when she lets various friends of her 

daughters live at the apartment and be noisy at night. Ct has had prior evictions and been 

homeless numerous times. Meds include Abilify, Cymbalta, Wellbutrin, Klonopin, 

Cogentin, However it is doubtful that more medications will modify client‟s behavior and 

lack of judgment and insights....A: Bipolar with depression, PTSD, Personality Disorder 

NOS, Family dysfunction (AR 275.)

Pl.‟s Mot. (Doc. 15-1) at 4-5. 

“Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable 

medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), 

including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), 

and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Certainly the notes of Dr. Bogle

which contained diagnoses of PTSD, major depressive disorder - severe, and panic disorder with 

agoraphobia reflected “judgments about the nature and severity” of Plaintiff‟s impairments, 

including diagnosis. The ALJ‟s failure to discuss and evaluate these statements and opinions was 

error. This is especially true where the RFC included limitations on Plaintiff‟s interaction with the 

public and Dr. Bogle diagnosed panic disorder with agoraphobia. The court is unable to determine 

whether Dr. Bogle‟s opinions or statements were incorporated within the RFC, or were rejected, 

either properly or improperly, because the ALJ makes no mention of them. Moreover, while the 

ALJ found Plaintiff suffered the severe impairment of affective disorder at Step Two, the ALJ did 

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not explain whether that included Dr. Bogle‟s impressions of PTSD, depression, and panic 

disorder, and to what degree, or whether he rejected the statements. 

In addition, the ALJ erred where he failed to discuss the opinions of the nurse practitioner 

at Mendocino Community Mental Health. Whether or not the nurse practitioner qualified as a 

“other acceptable medical source,”

1

or was simply an “other source,” makes no difference. This is

because “[t]he ALJ may discount testimony from these „other sources‟ if the ALJ „gives reasons 

germane to each witness for doing so.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotations omitted) (articulating standard for the treatments of physician‟s assistant‟s 

opinions). The ALJ gave no reasons for discounting the evidence from the nurse practitioner at 

Mendocino Community Mental Health. The error here is especially egregious where the nurse 

practitioner saw Plaintiff on several occasions and her records make direct references to Plaintiff‟s 

limitations and ability to work. See supra (“The meds seem to control the Bipolar and PTSD, but 

do not affect ct‟s inability to work, take care of her family or make good decisions.”). In contrast, 

the ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff‟s “nonexertional limitations had little or no effect on the 

occupational base of unskilled work” and on that basis applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 

did not consult a Vocational Expert, and found that “there are jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform.” AR. 23.

Taking these two errors together, the ALJ‟s failure to discuss the treating physician‟s 

notes, Marsh, 792 F.3d at 1172-73, and the failure to provide germane reasons to discount the 

nurse practitioner‟s opinions, Molina, 674 F.3d 1111, the court finds that it is unable to review 

properly the ALJ‟s determination. The court does not find this error to be harmless given the 

severity of limitations expressed, especially those of the “other sources.” See Marsh 792 F.3d at 

1173.

Moreover, the error affects the whole of the ALJ‟s decision because, as discussed above, 

the error invades the final determination regarding availability of jobs as well as the initial Step 

Two determination. Plaintiff‟s other claims for relief all revolve around or center on the opinions 

 

1

 See Molina, v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012)

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by Dr. Bogle or those from Mendocino Community Mental Health. For example, Plaintiff‟s 

challenge to the ALJ‟s analysis of Dr. Segal‟s opinions is based in part on the opinion of Dr. 

Bogle. Accordingly, the court finds it appropriate to decline ruling on Plaintiff‟s other claims. 

See Haverlock v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-2393 DAD, 2014 WL 670202, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 

2014) (“In light of the remand required by the ALJ‟s error at step two, the court need not address 

[P]laintiff‟s remaining claims.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Plaintiff‟s motion for summary 

judgment, and DENIES Defendant‟s motion for summary judgment. The court hereby 

REMANDS this matter for further proceedings in accordance with this Order.

A separate judgment will issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2016

______________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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