Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00937/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00937-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage

District, individually and on behalf of its

landowners within the San Carlos

Irrigation Project, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

United States of America, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV-05-937-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or transfer. Doc.

#16. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss and deny

the motion to transfer.

Background

Plaintiff San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District contains 50,000 acres of nonIndian land within the San Carlos Irrigation Project (“Project”), a federal irrigation project

that also serves 50,000 acres of land on the Gila River Indian Reservation. Defendants are

responsible for the operation and maintenance (“O&M”) of the Project pursuant to various

agreements, statutes, and regulations. This action principally involves disputes regarding

the amount of O&M costs and the process by which Plaintiff is charged for them.

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint and motion for injunctive relief

on March 29, 2005. Docs. ##1-3. The complaint alleges that the action arises under the

Constit ut ion of the United States and various federal statutes, including the Administrative

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1

 Defendants have withdrawn their motion with respect to count seven of the

complaint, an alleged violation of the White-Leavitt Act, 25 U.S.C. § 389. Doc. #21 at 12.

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Procedure Act (“ APA”), which permits judicial review of certain federal agency actions.

Doc. #1 ¶ 1. The complaint purp ort s to state ten claims and seeks injunctive, declaratory,

and other non-monetary relief. Id. ¶¶ 77-129. 

The Court denied Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief on count one of the

complaint on April 5, 2005. Doc. #9. Following a case management conference on May 11,

2005, the Court ordered the parties t o brief jurisdictional issues raised by Tucson Airport

Authority v. General Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1998). Docs. ##11-13.

Defendants filed the present motion and a supporting memorandum. Docs. ##16-17.

Defendants move the Court to either dismiss the action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or transfer it to the Court

of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Id. Plaintiff has filed a resp onse and

Defendants have filed a reply. Docs. ##18, 21.1

Discussion

I. The Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff has the burden of establishing the Court’s jurisdict ion. See Indus.

Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The party asserting

jurisdiction has the burden of proving all jurisdict ional facts.”); Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction. . . . It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction,

and the burden of est ablishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”)

(citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all

civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Doc. #1

¶ 1. The jurisdictional analysis cannot focus solely on § 1331, however, “because the

claims in t his case are . . . against the federal government, and thus are barred by sovereign

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2

 Defendants contend that count s two and three of the complaint violate the money

damages limitation on APA jurisdict ion. Doc. #16 at 11 n.3. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff

seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, an adequate remedy for Plaintiff’s claims is not

available elsewhere, and “the fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay

money to another is not sufficient reason to characterize the relief as ‘money damages.’”

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988). 

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immunity unless the government has consented to suit.” N. Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753

F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1985); see Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1983)

(“Section 1331 does not waive the government’s sovereign immunity from suit.”).

The APA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain claims

brought under § 1331. See Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 673

(9th Cir. 1993). Section 702 of the APA provides:

An action in a court of the Unit ed St ates seeking relief other than monetary

damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof

acted or failed to act . . . shall not be dismissed nor relief t herein be denied on

the ground that it is against the United States . . . . Nothing herein . . .

confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to

suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.

5 U.S.C. § 702. In addition, § 704 of the APA provides that “[a]gency actions made

reviewable by st atute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy

in a court are subject t o judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Thus, the APA waives sovereign

immunity for Plaintiff’s claims if (1) t he claims are not for money damages, (2) an adequate

remedy for the claims is not available elsewhere, and (3) the claims do not seek relief

expressly or impliedly forbidden by another statute. See Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d

at 645.

Defendants argue t hat Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the third prong of this test

because they are contractually based and thus impliedly forbidden by the Tucker Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1491. Doc. #17 at 9-11 (citing Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 645).2 Plaintiff

argues that its “claims are based solely upon statutes, regulations, and other sources of

federal law” and that the Tucker Act does not preclude a claim brought under t he APA that

is “contract-related” but that ultimately rests on statutory rights. Doc. #18 at 1-2, 8.

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The Tucker Act gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over “any claim

against the United States founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the United

States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Act permits the Court of Federal Claims to award

money damages, but “‘impliedly forbids’ declaratory and injunctive relief and precludes

a § 702 waiver of sovereign immunit y .” N. Side Lumber, 753 F.2d at 1485; see Tucson

Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 646; Spectrum Leasing Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 891, 893

(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is clear from the APA’s legislat ive hist ory that section 702's waiver of

sovereign immunity may not be used to circumvent the jurisdictional and remedial

limitations of the T ucker Act.”). Thus, in a case such as this where Plaintiff is seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff’s claims are

contractually or statutorily based. If contract ually based, the Court lacks jurisdiction. See

Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 646 (citing N. Star Alaska v. United States, 14 F.3d 36,

37 (9th Cir. 1994) (“N. Star Alaska III”)). 

Whether or not claims are contractually based for p urp oses of the Tucker Act

“‘depends both on the source of the rights upon which [P]laintiff bases it s claims, and the

t y p e of relief sought (or appropriate).’” Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Megapulse v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1982)), rev’d on other grounds,

Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230 (2005); see N. Star Alaska III, 14 F.3d at 37 (adopting the

Megapulse test). Where claims asserted in district court are based on a contract, seek a

declaration of contract rights, or do not exist independent of a contract, they are barred by

the Tucker Act. Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 646-47.

A. Counts Two, Four, Six, Eight, and Nine.

Counts two, four, six, eight, and nine allege violations of or seek relief under the

Rep ay ment Contract between Plaintiff and the United States. See Doc. #1 ¶¶ 87-88,

89(b)(1), 97(a), 104-05, 107(a)(1), 113, 120, 122-23. Plaintiff nonetheless argues that these

claims are not based on contract for purposes of the Tucker Act because the Repayment

Cont ract has been incorporated into the Code of Federal Regulations. Doc. #18 at 2-3, 8-10

(citing 25 C.F.R. § 137.4; N. Side Lumber, 753 F.3d at 1485).

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The Court disagrees. The Code of Federal Regulat ions provides that the

administration, rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the Project, including O&M

assessments, are governed by the 1924 Act and the Repayment Contract. See 25 C.F.R. §§

137.4, 171.1. The terms of the Repayment Contract are not independently set forth in the

regulations; rather, the regulations refer to the contract as the source of rights and

obligations between the parties. The counts in question rely primarily on the terms of the

Repayment Contract, and the Court cannot conclude that these claims are based on federal

law merely because the contract is identified in federal regulations as the source of the

parties’ rights. The claims “ do not exist independent of” that contract. Tucson Airport

Auth., 136 F.3d at 647; see also Spectrum Leasing, 764 F.2d at 894 (“ Sp ectrum seeks an

injunction requiring the government to pay monies owed for computer hardware. T he right

to these payment is created in the first inst ance by the contract, not by the Debt

Collections Act. The DCA, even if it applied, confers no such right in the absence of the

contract itself.”); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v . United States, 780 F.2d 74, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

(“The question presented by the complaint could be phrased as whether the contract

forbids termination under these conditions. That the termination also arguably violates

certain other regulations does not transform the action int o one based solely on those

regulations.”). Because counts two, four, six, eight , and nine are founded primarily on the

Repayment Contract, the Tucker Act bars this Court from proceeding, the APA therefore

does not waive sovereign immunit y , and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See

id.

Plaintiff’s reliance on North Side Lumber is misplaced. The plaintiff in that case

alleged that its contractual obligations could not be enforced by the government because

to do so would violate federal statutes. 753 F.2d at 1484. The Ninth Circuit held that the

Tucker Act did not limit the district court’s jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim because

it did “not seek a declaration of contract right s against the government. Rather, it ask[ed]

for a declaration that, whatever the content of those right s, federal statutes preclude[d] the

government from enforcing them.” Id. at 1486. Unlike the plaintiffs in North Side Lumber,

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Plaint iff in this case is not asking for a declaration of the federal regulations’ effect on it s

contract rights against the Government, what ever the content of those rights might be.

Rather, Plaintiff is asking the Court to determine and enforce its right s under the

Repayment Cont ract. Such a claim is not governed by North Side Lumber. See Tucson

Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 647.

B. Counts Three and Five.

Count s three and five allege violations of due process with respect to Defendants’

decisions to terminate water deliveries and approve a $30-per-acre assessment rate for

fiscal year 2005. Doc. #1 ¶¶ 90-93, 98-102. The question of jurisdiction over these claims

is more difficult than the question of jurisdiction over the other counts. For the reasons

that follow, however, the Court concludes that these claims also must be dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges in count three that the decision to terminate water deliveries has

deprived Plaintiff “of a vested property right to water.” Doc. #1 ¶ 93. Plaintiff alleges in

count five that the decision to approve a $30-per-acre assessment and the refusal to

provide Plaint iff access to Project records has deprived Plaintiff “of vested property

rights.” Id. ¶¶ 100, 102. The Ninth Circuit “has held that constitutional claims based on a

contractual property interest fall within the Tucker Act and may not be brought in district

court.” Doe, 329 F.3d at 1142 (citing Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 647-48; emphasis

added). The initial question, then, is whether the property rights Plaintiff claims to have

lost derive from contract or some other source. 

Count three alleges that the lost property is water – water lost when the Acting

Project Manager decided to terminate water deliveries. See Doc. #1 ¶ ¶ 91-93. Count five

appears to be focused on the Plaintiff’s property int erest in money – the Assistant

Secretary’s approval of the FY 2005 O&M assessment – and, arguably, in access to Project

records – the BIA’s refusal to grant Plaint iff access to such records. Id. ¶¶ 99-102. The

sources of Plaintiff’s property interest in Project water are the contract s, st at utes and

regulations establishing Plaintiff’s right to that water. T he sources of Plaintiff’s interest

in the money paid as assessments would be Plaintiff’s ownership of that money and the

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general laws that govern ownership of financial assets. The source of Plaintiff’s right of

access to Project records, if it could be called a property right, would appear to be the

Repayment Contract provisions affording such access. Id. Thus, the sources of the

property interests at issue in counts three and five are both contractual and legal. T his

combination does not render an obvious answer to the jurisdictional question. The Ninth

Circuit teaches that constitutional claims based on a “contractual property interest” fall

wit hin t he T ucker Act and may not be brought in district court, but has not clearly

answered the question of whether partially-contract-based property interests may underlie

a due process claim in district court. See Doe, 329 F.3d at 1142.

Closer consideration of counts three and five convinces the Court, however, that

jurisdiction should be declined because adjudication of the claims necessarily would entail

consideration and construction of the Repayment Contract. Count three concerns

termination of Plaintiff’s water supply. Defendants’ right to terminate that supply is

granted in the Repayment Contract. See Doc. #1 Ex. 3 at 20. Count five concerns the FY

2005 O&M assessment. The procedures for est ablishing such an assessment are also

found in the Repayment Contract. Id. at 7-8, 16. Plaintiff’s access to Project records, also

an issue in count five, likewise is addressed in the Repayment Contract. Id. at 19. Thus,

even though Plaintiff frames counts three and five as due process claims, adjudication of

those claims would entail consideration of the Repayment Contract terms that govern

Defendant’s challenged actions. T he Court concludes that this necessary examination of

contractual issues renders Plaintiff’s due process claims sufficiently contractual to deprive

the Court of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. T he Ninth Circuit has held that “the Tucker

Act prevents constitutional claims that are dependent on rights under a government

contract from being brought in the district court.” Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at

647-48. Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have described this holding as “broad” and have

noted that it differs from t he holdings of other courts which permit contract-related

constitutional claims to be asserted in district court. Doe, 329 F.3d at 1142 n.4. Because

count s three and five would entail an evaluation of contracts between Plaintiff and

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3

 Plaintiff’s reliance on Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2001), is misplaced

because that case involved the alleged breach of fiduciary duties “grounded in the very

nature of the government-Indian relationship.” Id. at 1086. 

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Defendants, the Court concludes that they must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

C. Count Ten.

Plaintiff alleges in count ten that Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty to

Plaint iff and its landowners by, among other things, overcharging for O&M costs in the

fiscal year 2005 assessment and refusing to disclose the Project’s records and books. Doc.

#1 ¶ 128. Although count ten sounds in tort, it is rooted in the contractual relationship

between the United States and Plaintiff. Count ten explicit ly alleges that the Plaintiff’s

landowners entrusted t heir water rights to the United States through the Landowners’

Agreements with the Secretary of the Interior. Id. ¶ 126 (citing Ex. 2 at 5-6). The complaint

further alleges that, pursuant to the Repayment Contract, the O&M charge to be paid by

Plaintiff “must be ‘fixed annually by the Secretary of the Interior’” and Defendants must

“make the books and accounts of the Project available to [Plaintiff].” Id. ¶¶ 20, 71 (citing

Ex. 3 at 8, 19). Because count t en “ is essentially for breach of contract, the Tucker Act

does ap p ly, even though the breach could also be said to be tortious.” Woodbury v.

United States, 313 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1963). The Court accordingly lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over count ten. See id. (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over

a breach of fiduciary duty claim because “the claim [was] in substance a breach of contract

claim”).3

II. The Motion to Transfer.

Defendants state that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the Court must transfer the

claims over which it lacks jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims if it is in the interest

of justice to do so. Doc. #16 at 13. Plaintiff requests that “any claims over which the Court

finds jurisdiction lacking be transferred to the Court of Federal Claims as appropriate under

28 U.S.C. § 1631.” Doc. #18 at 16.

The Court may transfer claims to the Court of Federal Claims only if the claims

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“could have been brought” there at the time they were filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1631. As Plaintiff

acknowledges, however, the Court of Federal Claims “ can provide no remedy for the

[Plaintiff’s] claims” because it “does not have jurisdiction to hear [Plaintiff’s] requests for

equitable and prospective relief[.]” Doc. #18 at 6-7; see Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at

646; N. Side Lumber, 753 F.2d at 1485. The Court accordingly must deny the motion to

transfer and will dismiss counts two through six and eight through ten for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9t h Cir. 1985) (“Where

a suit has not been consented to by t he Unit ed States, dismissal of the action is

required.”); Charles v. Rice, 28 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the transfer

of a claim to the Court of Federal Claims “would be to no avail” because that court lacked

jurisdiction to hear the claim); Billops v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 725 F.2d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir.

1984) (same).

III. Conclusion.

The Court recognizes that its decision “imposes on [Plaintiff] a burden that perhap s

may be both inefficient and unfair.” Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 648. T he Court ’s

decision, however, is “dict ated by the principles of sovereign immunity and the limited

jurisdiction of federal courts, which only Congress – and not this court – can change.” Id.

As the Ninth Circuit has explained: “The fact that the Court of Federal Claims has no

power to grant [equitable relief on] a cont ract does not mean that a suit for [equitable relief]

can be brought in the district court. The Tucker Act is a limited waiver of sovereign

immunity for contract actions; equitable cont ract remedies denied to the Court of Federal

Claims are not within the waiver and may not be enforced against the United States at all.”

Doe, 329 F.3d at 1141-42; see M-S-R Pub. Power Agency v. Bonneville Power Admin., 297

F.3d 833, 840 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing claims that “sound[ed] in contract” and st ating:

“Where, as here, petitioner seeks equitable relief rather than damages, he may go

wanting.”) (citing N. Star Alaska, 9 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1993)).

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ mot ion to dismiss and/or transfer (Doc. #16) is

granted in part and denied in part as set forth in this order.

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The Court will set a status conference by separate order.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2005.

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