Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01898/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01898-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ADRIAN BURRELL, an individual; 

and MICHAEL WALTON, an 

individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF VALLEJO, a municipal 

corporation; ANDREW BIDOU, in 

his official capacity as Chief 

of Police, DAVID MCLAUGHLIN, 

individually and in his official 

capacity as Police Officer for 

the CITY OF VALLEJO; and DOES 1-

50, individually and in their 

official capacities as Police 

Officers for the CITY OF 

VALLEJO, jointly and severally,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01898 WBS KJN 

ORDER

----oo0oo----

Defendants City of Vallejo (“the City”), Chief of 

Police for the City Andrew Bidou, and Officer David McLaughlin of 

the Vallejo Police Department (collectively “defendants”) move to 

dismiss or strike Paragraphs 29(a)-(j), (m), (o), (q)-(u) in 

Case 2:19-cv-01898-WBS-KJN Document 19 Filed 03/31/20 Page 1 of 6
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plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Mot. at 1 (Docket 

No. 14).) 

I. Background

Plaintiffs Adrian Burrell and Michael Walton are 

cousins. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 13 (Docket No. 5).) On 

January 22, 2019, Walton drove his motorcycle to visit Burrell at 

his home. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) After Walton pulled into Burrell’s 

driveway, Burrell saw a police car parked on the wrong side of 

the street behind Walton. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Burrell walked onto 

his front porch to investigate, only to find Officer McLaughlin 

standing outside of his patrol car with his gun pointed at 

Walton. (Id. ¶ 15.) Burrell called out to Officer McLaughlin, 

and Officer McLaughlin ordered Burrell to go back inside. (Id. ¶ 

16.) Burrell declined, and instead began filming the encounter 

from his porch. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

Officer McLaughlin approached Walton with his gun 

raised and again commanded Burrell to “get back,” although he had 

not left his porch. (Id. ¶ 18.) Then, Officer McLaughlin 

holstered his gun and rushed toward Burrell, accusing him of 

interfering with Walton’s stop. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) He grabbed 

Burrell around his arms, threw him into the outside wall of his 

home, and swung him into a wooden pillar on his porch. (Id. ¶¶ 

20, 23.) Officer McLaughlin handcuffed both Burrell and Walton 

and placed them in the back of his patrol car. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) 

He then cited Walton for speeding. (Id. ¶ 21.) Officer 

McLaughlin released the cousins, and Burrell was treated for 

injuries to his arm, shoulder, and head at the emergency room. 

(Id. ¶¶ 21-23.) 

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Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, a claim under Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against defendants for 

failure to train and for ratification of unconstitutional conduct

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 41-46.) Plaintiffs offer 

twenty-one incidents of alleged misconduct in Paragraph 29 to 

support this claim. (Id. ¶ 29.) Defendants now move to dismiss 

some of these examples under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), or in the alternative, strike the provisions under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (Docket No. 14.) 

II. Discussion

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) is supposed to test the legal sufficiency 

of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 

F.3d 1191, 1199-20 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, defendants argue not 

that plaintiff’s Monell claim should be dismissed but that only

paragraph 29(a)-(j), (m), (o), (q)-(u) should be dismissed 

because “[p]laintiffs have failed to allege how these incident[s] 

involving very different factual circumstances show a pattern and 

practice of conduct that would support a Monell claim” while 

conceding other portions of the same paragraph (subsections (k)-

(l), (n), and (p)) “could theoretically be related [to] the 

alleged incident here.” (Mot. at 4, 7.) Specifically, 

defendants seek to dismiss examples involving “shooting(s), 

deployment of weapon(s) like a taser, officers interacting with 

the mentally-ill, [and] the involvement of multiple officers” 

while leaving those “involving First Amendment-related 

arrests/use-of-force, officer allegedly going hands-on, alleged 

unlawful seizure, alleged failure to address handcuffing, and/or 

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an alleged incident involving McLaughlin.” (Id. at 4.) 

This request -- to dismiss specific subsections of a 

paragraph in a complaint, while not seeking to dismiss the entire 

claim -- does little to challenge the legal sufficiency of the 

claim as required under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ileto, 349 F.3d at

1199-20. Instead, defendants in effect ask the court to rewrite 

the complaint so as to include only examples of misconduct that 

“bear sufficient resemblance to the fact pattern at issue.” 

(Mot. at 7.) The court refuses to stretch the purposes of Rule 

12(b)(6) to encompass cosmetic alterations to the operative 

complaint. Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ motion 

to dismiss.1 

As an alternative to dismissing Paragraph 29(a)-(j), 

(m), (o), (q)-(u), defendants argue the provisions should be 

stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (Mot. at 

6-7.) Rule 12(f) provides that the court may “strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The

function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure 

of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues 

by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, 

Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) 

1 Defendants also moved to dismiss claims against Bidou 

and McLaughlin in their official capacities. (Mot. at 10.) In 

their opposition, plaintiffs agree that they improperly listed 

defendants Bidou and McLaughlin in their official capacities and 

request leave to amend their complaint to list defendants Bidou 

and McLaughlin in their individual capacities alone. (Opp. to 

Mot. (“Opp.”) at 15 (Docket No. 17).) In light of the parties’ 

agreement, the court will permit plaintiffs to amend their 

complaint. 

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(quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 

1993), rev’d on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantastic, Inc., 510 

U.S. 517 (1994)). Whether to grant a motion to strike is within

the court’s discretion. Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 

1000 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Motions to strike are generally disfavored because they 

are often used to delay resolving the case on the merits. See

Barnes v. AT&T Pens. Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 

2d 1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citation omitted). “Motions to 

strike should not be granted unless the matter to be stricken 

clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of the 

litigation or unless prejudice would result to the moving party 

from denial of the motion.” Delgado v. Marketsource, Inc., No. 

17-CV-07370-LHK, 2019 WL 1904216, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2019) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Although defendants 

argue that the examples they seek to strike in Paragraph 29(a)-

(j), (m), (o), (q)-(u) are irrelevant because they involve “very 

different conduct” than the facts in this case, the motion does 

not suggest that defendants would be prejudiced if the motion

were denied. (Mot. at 4.) Accordingly, the court will deny 

defendants’ motion to strike. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss or strike portions of Paragraph 29 of the First Amended 

Complaint (Docket No. 14) be, and the same thereby is, DENIED. 

Within 10 days from the date this Order is filed plaintiff shall 

file an amended complaint striking all allegations against 

defendants Bidou and McLaughlin in their official capacity.

///

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Dated: March 30, 2020

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