Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01806/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01806-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Albert Ashpole, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-1806 PHX JWS (VAM)

)

Ivan Bustos, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

James Albert Ashpole ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner presents four grounds for relief in the petition. 

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5-15). Respondents filed an answer opposing the

granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 15). Petitioner filed a

response. (Doc. 18).

BACKGROUND

In an Amended Indictment, petitioner was charged with three

counts of fraudulent schemes and artifices, one count of attempted

fraudulent schemes and artifices, theft, 33 counts of sale of

unregistered securities, and one count of illegally conducting an

enterprise. (Doc. 15 at Exhibit T). Prior to trial, petitioner

filed a motion to proceed pro se. (Id. at Exhibit V). The trial

court granted the motion but counsel was appointed to act in an

advisory capacity. (Id. at Exhibit W).

In March, 1999, following a jury trial, petitioner was

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

convicted on all 39 counts. (Doc. 15 at Exhibit X). All of the

sentences handed down for these convictions were ordered to run

concurrently. The longest sentence was 9 years. (Id. at Exhibit

Y). 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal challenging his convictions. 

In his brief, petitioner presented one claim, to wit:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by accepting

[petitioner's] waiver of his right to counsel without

asking sufficient questions to determine that his waiver

of counsel was being mad[e] knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily?

(Doc. 15, Exhibit AA at p. 27). The Arizona Court of Appeals

issued a decision affirming petitioner's convictions and sentences

on August 24, 2000. (Doc. 15 at Exhibit DD). Petitioner filed

for review in the Arizona Supreme Court but the petition was

denied without comment on February 15, 2001. (Doc. 15 at Exhibit

FF). 

On April 2, 2001, petitioner filed a timely Notice of PostConviction Relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. (Doc. 15 at

Exhibit GG). In his petition, petitioner raised two grounds: 

1. The [trial judge] erred in permitting Petitioner to

proceed pro per. Petitioner's decision to proceed pro

per was not a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver

of his 6th Amendment right to counsel. The argument

pertains to all counts.

2. Petitioner was entitled to a jury determination on

the issue of whether Counts 1 & 2 involved amounts of

over $100,000 (one-hundred thousand dollars). That

finding was made by a sentencing court rather than the

jury. The petitioner was denied his right to a jury

determination on this issue in a violation of his 6th

Amendment right to trial by jury.

(Doc. 15, Exhibit II at p. 2).

The trial court dismissed the Rule 32 petition in an order

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

filed on February 22, 2002, finding that petitioner "failed to

present a colorable claim, ..." (Doc. 15 at Exhibit KK). 

Petitioner filed for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, but

raised only the following issue:

A. Did Petitioner knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily waive his Sixth Amendment right to be

represented by counsel at pretrial, trial and

sentencing?

(Id., Exhibit LL at p. 2). On February 21, 2003, the Arizona

Court of Appeals denied the petition for review. (Id. at Exhibit

NN). 

On May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a second petition for postconviction relief in the trial court raising a claim predicated on

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). (Doc. 15 at Exhibit

OO). In a minute entry dated June 11, 2003, the trial court

dismissed the petition, stating that petitioner's Apprendi claim

was raised in his first Rule 32 proceeding and is precluded from

consideration in a second Rule 32 pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a). (Id. at Exhibit PP). Petitioner moved for rehearing but

the motion was denied by the trial court. (Id. at Exhibit RR). 

Petitioner filed for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

In addition to raising his Apprendi claim, petitioner also raised

a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. 

(Id., Exhibit SS at pp. 2-7). The Arizona Court of Appeals denied

the petition for review without comment on September 10, 2004. 

(Id. at Exhibit TT). Petitioner filed for review in the Arizona

Supreme Court on November 1, 2004. In addition to his Apprendi

and ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claims, petitioner also

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

raised for the first time claims that his "flat time" sentence was

illegal and also raised a claim predicated on Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Id. at Exhibit UU). The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment on March 23,

2005. (Id. at Exhibit VV).

On September 28, 2004, before conclusion of his appeals in

his second PCR was complete, petitioner initiated a third petition

for post-conviction relief in the trial court. (Doc. 15 at

Exhibit WW). In his notice, petitioner stated he was raising a

Blakely claim based on a significant change in the law. (Id.,

Exhibit WW at p. 3). On October 13, 2004, the trial court issued

an order denying the petition and holding that petitioner's

Blakely claim, like a claim predicated on Apprendi, was not

retroactively applicable to convictions, like his, which have

become final by the completion of direct appellate review. (Id.,

Exhibit XX at pp. 1-2). Petitioner filed for review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals but that court denied review without

comment on August 11, 2005. (Id. at Exhibit ZZ).

On June 15, 2005, petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus

petition raising the following grounds for relief:

GROUND I: Under the Sixth Amendment, Apprendi, Blakely

and Shepard Cases my sentence is illegal because the

penalty was beyond presumptive and was not submitted to

a jury for proof.

GROUND II: This conviction violates the 5th Amendment

ban on double jeopardy, multiple punishments for a

single offense.

GROUND III: Petitioner had ineffective assistance of

counsel in that counsel failed to raise Apprendi claims

regarding an illegal sentence.

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

GROUND IV: My sentence as carried out is discriminatory in 

violation of due process of law as AZ R.S. 41-1604.07

and 41-1604.14 are applied and again denied to me.

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5,8,11 and 13).

DISCUSSION

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall

not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

1. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered exhausted

if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment, the claims

must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate

somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796

F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal

claim must have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the petitioner need not recite

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

"book and verse on the federal constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at

277-78 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state courts or that a "somewhat

similar state law claim was made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

If state remedies are not available because the

petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may refuse

to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

9

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1

 Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel, (citation

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

omitted), or that "some interference by officials,"

(citation omitted), made compliance impracticable, would

constitute cause under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause for

the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

2. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Respondents contend that each one of petitioner's four

grounds for relief are procedurally barred from consideration on

federal habeas corpus review. 

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

a. Ground I

In Ground I, petitioner argues that his sentence was illegal

in light of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, most particularly,

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Specifically, he contends the

holdings in these cases render his sentence "illegal because the

penalty was beyond presumptive and was not submitted to a jury for

proof." (Doc. 1 at p. 5). 

Respondents contend petitioner did not fairly present these

claims in state court and they are now procedurally barred from

consideration in a federal habeas petition.

As a preliminary matter, in Scardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025,

1038 (9th Cir. 2005), the court held that Blakely v. Washington

"does not apply retroactively to a conviction that was final

before that decision was announced." See also U.S. v. SanchezCervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 671 (9th Cir.) ("we hold that Apprendi

does not apply retroactively to cases on initial collateral

review"), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 939 (2002). 

In this case, plaintiff's direct appeal was finalized in midMay, 2001, after the 90-day period for filing a petition for writ

of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court elapsed following the

Arizona Supreme Court's denial of review on February 15, 2001. 

(Doc. 15, Exhibit FF). As a result, Blakely, which was not

decided until 2004, does not apply to petitioner's case. With

respect to Apprendi, that case was decided in 2000, before

petitioner's convictions were finalized and thus may be considered

on federal habeas review if the Apprendi claim was properly

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

exhausted in state court. 

Irrespective of the issue of retroactivity, respondents

assert that petitioner's Apprendi claim is procedurally barred

from consideration on federal habeas review. They contend

petitioner did not raise an Apprendi claim on direct appeal. They

further assert that petitioner did not raise such a claim in his

petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. They further

note that, although petitioner did raise such a claim in his

second post-conviction proceeding, the trial court applied a

procedural bar in dismissing it and, thus, the claim was not

"fairly presented" in state court and is procedurally defaulted.

Review of the record supports respondents' contention.

Petitioner did not present his Apprendi claim on direct appeal. 

(Doc. 15, Exhibits AA, FF). Petitioner raised an Apprendi claim

in his initial Rule 32 petition, (Doc. 15, Exhibit II at p. 2),

but failed to present the issue to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 15, Exhibit LL at p. 2). As a result, petitioner did not

satisfy the requirement that he "fairly present" this claim in

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991). 

Petitioner did attempt to raise this claim once again in his

second Rule 32 proceeding but that proceeding was dismissed by the

trial court on procedural grounds and, thus, was not "fairly

presented" in state court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a).

Petitioner has presented no cause for failing to properly

exhaust this claim in state court either on appeal or in his first

Rule 32 proceeding. As a result, petitioner's Apprendi claim is

procedurally defaulted. The Court may still consider a

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

procedurally defaulted claim if petitioner can present

extraordinary circumstances showing that failure to consider the

claim will result in the conviction of someone who is actually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 

However, petitioner's Apprendi claim is relevant only to his

sentence, not his convictions and he has made no colorable claim

of "actual innocence." As a result the claims presented in Ground

I should be denied.

b. Ground II

In Ground II petitioner contends his conviction violates the

Fifth Amendment's ban on double jeopardy. Specifically,

petitioner asserts "he is entitled to 5th Amendment protection and

relief because he was tried before the Az. Corporation Commission

on Counts 3-32 and 37-39 of the indictment, found guilty and a

$50,000 fine imposed." (Doc. 1 at p. 8). As a result, he alleges

his criminal conviction "for the exact same acts/offenses in

Superior Court of Maricopa [County] violated his 5th Amendment

right to be free from multiple punishments of the same offense

..." (Id.). 

Petitioner states he presented this claim both on direct

appeal and in his first Rule 32 petition. Review of the record

shows he did not raise this issue in either of these proceedings. 

Petitioner did present this claim in his second Rule 32 petition. 

(Doc. 15, Exhibit OO at p. 5). Respondents contend this did not

constitute fair presentation of the claim and that the trial court

properly dismissed his second Rule 32 on procedural grounds. 

Review of the trial court's order confirms this fact. The

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

Court dismissed the second Rule 32 on procedural grounds, noting

his Apprendi claim was raised in his first Rule 32 and citing

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) which prohibits raising a claim that was

"[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in a previous

collateral proceeding ..." (Doc. 15 at Exhibit PP). As a result,

petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in state court. 

Because the time to present this claim in state court has long

since passed, the claim is technically exhausted. Such technical

exhaustion is not proper exhaustion and the claim is procedurally

defaulted unless petitioner can show cause and prejudice for

failing to raise it in state court in a procedurally proper

manner. Petitioner has shown no cause, nor has he demonstrated

extraordinary circumstances/actual innocence warranting

consideration of the claim despite the procedural default. 

Finally, petitioner raised this issue in his second Rule 32

as a violation of state law. (See Doc. 15 at Exhibits OO at p. 5

and SS at pp. 3,8). Thus, the federal nature of the claim he now

raises on habeas review was never presented in state court. For

all these reasons, Ground II is procedurally defaulted and should

be denied.

c. Ground III

In Ground III petitioner appears to contend his appellate

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise an

Apprendi claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 1 at pp. 11-12). To the

extent this claim also encompasses a claim of ineffective

assistance of post-conviction relief counsel for failing to raise

this claim in any of his Rule 32 proceedings, such a claim is not

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

cognizable on habeas review. See Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425,

428-29 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).

Petitioner indicates he raised a claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise an Apprendi

violation in both his first and second Rule 32 petitions. (Doc. 

1 at p. 11). Respondents deny petitioner raised this claim in his

first petition, agree that he raised the claim in his second, but

argue that because the trial court dismissed his second Rule 32

petition on procedural grounds, (see Doc. 15 at Exhibit PP), he

did not "fairly present" the claim in state court and the claim is

procedurally barred from consideration on federal habeas review. 

(Doc. 15 at pp. 16-17).

The Magistrate Judge agrees that petitioner did not raise a

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his first

Rule 32 petition. (See Doc. 15, Exhibit II). Further, even if he

did raise such a claim in his second Rule 32, the trial court

dismissed that petition on procedural grounds which decision was

affirmed on review. (Doc. 15, Exhibits PP, TT and VV). 

In sum, petitioner failed to exhaust Ground III. He has not

presented cause for failing to properly exhaust the substance of

the claim raised in Ground III in state court. The claim is now

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has failed to present a

colorable claim of actual innocence which would permit the court

to ignore the procedural default and consider this claim on the

merits.

d. Ground IV

In Ground IV, petitioner contends his sentence was carried

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 16

out in a "discriminatory" fashion, in terms of calculating his

eligibility for earned release credits, in violation of Arizona

law. (Doc. 1 at p. 13). This claim does not raise a federal

issue. Petitioner predicates this claim solely on an alleged

violation of state law. The only reference to federal law is his

concluding remark that "[t]here can be no justification for

Arizona giving 2 standards of "earned release credit" under U.S.

Constitutional Law standards." (Doc. 1 at p. 15). This cursory,

unspecific reference to "U.S. Constitutional Law standards" is

insufficient to raise a federal question. See Hiivala v. Wood,

195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) ("... general appeals to broad

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection,

and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish

exhaustion."). Petitioner's failure to raise a federal claim in

Ground IV means the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claim

on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

In addition, by his own acknowledgment, petitioner did not

raise this claim, in any form, in any of his state court

proceedings. (See Doc. 1 at p. 13). Examination of his state

court filings included in the habeas record supports this fact. 

Ground IV of the habeas petition should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 17

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 5th day of January, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-01806-JWS Document 22 Filed 01/06/06 Page 17 of 17