Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01786/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01786-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Loren R. Shirk and Jennifer Rose,

individually and as husband and wife,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

United States of America, on behalf of

Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian

Affairs,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-01786-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Plaintiffs Loren Shirk and Jennifer Rose seek damages from Defendant United

States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for the allegedly

negligent actions of two Gila River Indian Community (“GRIC”) police officers. Now

before the Court is the United States’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. Legal Standard

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Therefore, federal jurisdiction is presumed not to

exist unless it is affirmatively shown. Id. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, an action may be challenged for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in

fact. Thornhill Pub. Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

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In evaluating such a motion, the court is not limited to the pleadings and may properly

consider extrinsic evidence and resolve factual disputes relevant to jurisdiction. Id.; Ass’n

of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Facts

A. Background

The issues presented by the United States’ motion to dismiss require some

background discussion. The GRIC is a federally recognized Indian tribe located in

Sacaton, Arizona. In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and

Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”), Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975)

(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n). Title I permits the Secretary of the Interior, and

therefore the BIA, to enter into self-determination contracts with tribal organizations in

which the tribal organizations agree to administer federally funded services that would

otherwise be provided by the BIA. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450b(j), 450f(a)(1); see also

Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 634 (2005). These self-determination

contracts, also known as 638 contracts, generally have a maximum term of three years. 

25 U.S.C. § 450j(c)(1)(A). Once a contract has been operated for a continuous period of

at least three years, it achieves “mature” status. Id. § 450b(h). At that point, the tribal

organization is eligible to provide the services identified in the contract for an indefinite

period of time. Id. § 450j(c)(1)(B). 

Congress followed the ISDEAA with the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994,

Pub. L. No. 103-413, Title II, 108 Stat. 4270 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa458hh). The goal of the Tribal Self-Governance Act is to transfer control over programs,

services, functions, and activities traditionally provided by the Department of the Interior

to participating tribes in an effort to promote tribal self-governance. See 25 U.S.C. §

458aa Note. The Act furthers that goal by authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to

negotiate annual funding agreements with participating tribes. Id. § 458cc(a). The

agreements permit tribes to plan, conduct, consolidate, redesign, administer and reallocate

funds among programs, services, functions, and activities traditionally administered by

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the Department of the Interior. Id. § 458cc(b). They are typically negotiated in what are

known as self-governance compacts.

In 1998, the BIA entered into a three-year self-determination contract (“Contract”)

with the GRIC in which the GRIC agreed to provide its own law enforcement services

through the administration of a federally funded Law Enforcement Program. According

to subsection (a)(2) of the Contract, the purpose of the Program is “to provide Law

Enforcement Services for the Gila River Indian Community” through provision of funds

“necessary to carry out uniform police activities, detention services, radio

communications, and criminal investigations.” In subsection (b)(3), the GRIC agreed “ to

administer the program, services, functions and activities . . . listed in subsection

(a)(2) . . . in accordance with the attached Statement of Work.” Section 102 of the

attached Statement of Work states:

The [GRIC] shall provide all necessary qualified and licensed personnel,

equipment, materials and services to perform all tribal law enforcement and

detention services on the Gila River Indian Reservation, including the

investigation of applicable Federal violations (major crimes).

The Statement of Work further provides, in relevant part:

102.2 The Contractor shall obtain all necessary licenses, permits, and

approvals required by local, State and Federal statutes to perform under

this contract.

102.3 The [GRIC] shall be responsible for the investigation of all offenses

enumerated in the Tribal Law and Order Code, United States Codes or

25 CFR as applicable.

102.4 In addition to Section 102.3 of this Contract, the [GRIC] shall assist the

BIA, other Federal and [S]tate Law enforcement officials in the

investigation of State or Federal offenses that occur on the Reservation.

102.5 Uniform Police. The Uniform Police Program provides police

protection and enforcement of Federal laws and laws of the Gila River

Indian Community. This enforcement is to assure the health, safety,

and welfare of the community, its visitors, and all personal and real

property. The [GRIC] shall be responsible for the following patrol and

protective services on the Reservation: . . . . 

B. Enforcement of all Tribal criminal and traffic laws, United States

Codes or 25 CFR as applicable, including all tribal ordinances. . . . .

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G. Patrol services on and off roadways and in the communities within

the boundaries of the Reservation.

102.8 Criminal Investigations. The Criminal Investigation Program has

primary investigative responsibilities for crimes committed on, or

involving, the Gila River Indian Community. This includes major

federal crimes and state crimes assimilated into the Federal statutes

under Title 18 U.S.C. 1153, including but not limited to, murder,

manslaughter, child sexual abuse, kidnapping, rape, assault, arson,

burglary, robbery, counterfeiting, embezzlement, and organized

criminal enterprises . . . within the community.

(emphases added). 

Later, in 2003, the GRIC entered into a self-governance compact (“Compact”)

with the BIA. The Compact authorizes the GRIC to administer any programs previously

administered under the authority of the ISDEAA as well as any new programs identified

in the annual funding agreement (“AFA”) attached to and incorporated into the Compact

by reference. The AFA refers to the GRIC Law Enforcement Program established in the

1998 Contract, including the Uniform Police and Criminal Investigations components of

the program. Article V of the Compact states, in pertinent part:

Section 3 – Federal Tort Claims Act coverage; Insurance.

(a) The Community is deemed by the Act to be covered under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), while performing programs, services,

functions and activities under this Compact and any funding agreement

incorporated herein. . . . .

(c) Funds provided under a funding agreement may be used to purchase

such additional liability and other insurance as is prudent in the judgment of

the Community for its protection and the protection of its employees.

B. Events Giving Rise to Plaintiffs’ Claims

On October 19, 2006, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Detective Michael Lancaster

and Sergeant Hilario Tanakeyowma, two GRIC police officers, were traveling

northbound on State Route 587 in a GRIC Police Department vehicle. They had attended

a mandatory police terrorism training class in Tucson, Arizona, and were returning to

Sergeant Tanakeyowma’s residence in Chandler, Arizona. At the time, both officers were

Arizona Peace Officer Standards Training (“AZ POST”) certified. In addition, Sergeant

Tanakeyowma was carrying a Special Law Enforcement Commission from the BIA.

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As the officers were approaching the intersection of Chandler Heights Road and

State Route 87/Arizona Avenue, outside the boundaries of the Gila River Indian

Reservation, they observed a white compact vehicle driving erratically. The driver of the

vehicle was later determined to be Leshedrick Sanford, a paroled felon. The officers

activated their emergency lights and siren and began to pursue Sanford. When Sanford

came to a stop first in line at a red light at the intersection of Ocotillo road and State

Route 87/Arizona Avenue, the officers pulled up behind him. As Detective Lancaster

exited the police vehicle to “make contact” with Sanford, Sanford accelerated and drove

through the red light into the intersection, where he collided with Plaintiff Loren Shirk,

who was traveling eastbound on Ocotillo Road on a motorcycle. 

Sanford, who was under the influence of alcohol, immediately fled the scene on

foot but was apprehended and arrested by the two officers shortly thereafter. He

subsequently pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault with prior felony convictions

and one count of leaving the scene of a serious injury accident, both in violation of

Arizona law, and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. 

Shirk, who was thrown from his motorcycle, sustained serious physical injuries as

a result of the collision. He initially sued Detective Lancaster, Sergeant Tanakeyowma,

and the City of Chandler for damages in the Maricopa County Superior Court, but the

court dismissed the case as to the officers on grounds of sovereign immunity and as to the

City of Chandler under A.R.S. § 13-3874(B), which immunizes the state and its political

subdivisions from liability for the acts of tribal police officers appointed by the BIA or

the governing body of an Indian tribe. Shirk and his wife, Jennifer Rose, now seek

damages from the United States under the FTCA. 

IV. Analysis

Under well-established principles of sovereign immunity, the United States is

immune from suit except to the extent it consents to be sued. United States v. Dalm, 494

U.S. 596, 608 (1990). The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-2680, provides for a

limited waiver of the United States’ immunity “in a defined category of cases involving

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negligence committed by federal employees in the course of their employment.” 

Alvarado v. Table Mt. Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dolan

v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006) (internal quotes omitted)); see 28

U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). For purposes of the waiver, federal employees include “officers or

employees of any federal agency” and “persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an

official capacity.” Id. § 2671. 

Here, Plaintiffs have sued the United States under the FTCA for the alleged

negligence of Officers Lancaster and Tanakeyowma. The existence of jurisdiction

therefore turns on whether Officers Lancaster and Tanakeyowma, employees of the GRIC

Police Department, qualify as “federal employees” acting “in the course of their

employment” for purposes of the FTCA. 

A. GRIC’s Contract/Compact with the BIA

As explained above, the GRIC was under contract with the BIA for the provision

of law enforcement services at the time of the accident underlying Plaintiffs’ claims. In

Pub. L. No. 101-512, Title III, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915, 1959 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §

450f Note), Congress extended FTCA coverage as follows: 

With respect to claims resulting from the performance of functions . . . under a

contract, grant agreement, or any other agreement or compact authorized by the

Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 . . . , an Indian

tribe, tribal organization or Indian contractor is deemed hereafter to be part of the

Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior . . . while carrying out any

such contract or agreement and its employees are deemed employees of the

Bureau . . . while acting within the scope of their employment in carrying out the

contract or agreement . . . .

Federal regulations further explain that while clauses in self-determination contracts and

self-governance compacts regarding FTCA coverage are not required, the following is an

optional clause that may be used to clarify the scope of FTCA coverage:

For purposes of Federal Tort Claims Act coverage, the contractor and its

employees . . . are deemed to be employees of the Federal government while

performing work under this contract. This status is not changed by the source

of the funds used by the Tribe/Consortium to pay the employee’s salary and

benefits unless the employee receives additional compensation for performing

covered services from anyone other than the contractor.

25 C.F.R. § 900.186 (self-determination contracts).

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For purposes of Federal Tort Claims Act coverage, the Tribe/Consortium and

its employees . . . are deemed to be employees of the Federal government

while performing work under this AFA. This status is not changed by the

source of the funds used by the Tribe/Consortium to pay the employee’s salary

and benefits unless the employee receives additional compensation for

performing covered services from anyone other than the Tribe/Consortium.

25 C.F.R. § 1000.275 (self-governance compacts). Pursuant to the above provisions,

tribal employees are deemed federal employees for purposes of the FTCA to the extent

they act within the scope of their employment, as defined by an ISDEAA contract. 

Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2004).

In this case, it is unmistakably clear from the language of the GRIC’s Contract

with the BIA, as incorporated into the Compact, that the BIA contemplated the execution

of GRIC law enforcement functions solely within the boundaries of the Gila River Indian

Reservation. Section 102 of the Contract’s Statement of Work charges the GRIC with

providing all necessary means “to perform all tribal law enforcement and detention

services on the Gila River Indian Reservation . . . .” (emphasis added). Section 102.4

further requires the GRIC to “assist the BIA, other Federal and State Law enforcement

officials in the investigation of State or Federal offenses that occur on the Reservation.” 

(emphasis added). Section 102.5 similarly limits required patrol and protective services

to within the Reservation. Finally, section 102.8 provides that criminal investigators have

“primary investigative responsibilities for crimes committed on, or involving, the Gila

River Indian Community.” (emphasis added).

Furthermore, aside from section 102.4, which merely requires the GRIC to assist

federal and state law enforcement officials in the investigation of federal and state

offenses that occur on the Reservation, the Contract contemplates only the enforcement of

federal and tribal law. As mentioned above, section 102 of the Statement of Work

generally requires the GRIC to provide the means necessary to enforce tribal law and

investigate those federal violations that qualify as major crimes. Section 102.3 further

provides that the GRIC is “responsible for the investigation of all offenses enumerated in

the Tribal Law and Order Code, United States Codes or 25 CFR as applicable.” 

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Similarly, section 102.5 provides only for “police protection and enforcement of Federal

laws and laws of the Gila River Indian Community.” Lastly, section 102.8 requires

investigation of “major federal crimes and state crimes assimilated into the Federal

statutes under Title 18 U.S.C. 1153 . . . .” 

Here, it is undisputed that Officers Lancaster and Tanakeyowma were outside the

boundaries of the Reservation when they attempted to make contact with Sanford in his

vehicle. That alone is enough to place the officers’ conduct outside the scope of the

Contract. Even if that were not enough, the officers were not attempting to enforce either

federal or tribal law, the only law contemplated by the Contract. Plaintiffs argue that the

officers could have been attempting to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 13, but the language of that

statute clearly defeats the argument. 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) criminalizes conduct within

federal jurisdiction that would be punishable under state law if committed within state

jurisdiction. Furthermore, subsection 13(b)(1) merely distinguishes between state and

federal punishment for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol,

providing that any limitations on the right to operate a motor vehicle imposed under 18

U.S.C. § 13 “shall apply only to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the

United States.” Plaintiffs have presented no persuasive evidence that State Route

87/Arizona Avenue, the location at which Sanford was apprehended, is within the

territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Because Sanford was within Arizona’s

jurisdiction, only Arizona’s driving laws applied to him. 

Plaintiffs also argue that because an AZ POST certification authorizes an officer to

enforce Arizona law, and because the Contract requires all GRIC criminal investigators to

be “certified Peace Officers,” Officers Lancaster and Tanakeyowma were acting pursuant

to the Contract by pursuing Sanford for a violation of Arizona law. The argument is

unavailing. While it is true that AZ POST-certified tribal police officers are authorized to

exercise “all law enforcement powers of peace officers in [Arizona],” A.R.S. § 13-

3874(A), nothing in the Contract requires or even permits GRIC police officers to enforce

state law. The certification requirement appears to be no more than a training

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In their briefs, Plaintiffs emphasize that the State of Arizona claims immunity from

suit for the actions of tribal officers who are AZ POST-certified. See A.R.S. § 13-3874(B).

That the State claims immunity does not require the United States or even the tribe to waive

immunity. It is for each governmental organization to decide whether or not to waive

immunity.

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requirement, imposed to ensure than all tribal officers are sufficiently qualified to meet

the demands of their positions. The above interpretation is further bolstered by the

express purpose of the Contract, which is to provide for the enforcement of federal and

tribal law on the Gila River Indian Reservation. Because the officers were not acting in

accordance with that purpose when they pursued Sanford for a violation of state law

outside the Gila River Indian Reservation, Congress’ extension of FTCA coverage to

tribal employees acting pursuant to an ISDEAA contract provides no basis for jurisdiction

in this case.1

B. Officer Tanakeyowma’s Special Law Enforcement Commission

Plaintiffs maintain, in the alternative, that FTCA coverage extends to Sergeant

Tanakeyowma by virtue of the Special Law Enforcement Commission (“SLEC”) he was

carrying. The Secretary of the Interior, and therefore the BIA, is authorized to issue

SLECs to tribal officers pursuant to the Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act of 1990

(“ILERA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809, which provides, in part:

The Secretary may enter into an agreement for the use . . . of the personnel or

facilities of a Federal, tribal, State, or other government agency to aid in the

enforcement or carrying out in Indian country of a law of either the United

States or an Indian tribe that has authorized the Secretary to enforce tribal

laws. The Secretary may authorize a law enforcement officer of such an

agency to perform any activity the Secretary may authorize under [25 U.S.C.

§ 2803]. 

Id. § 2804(a); see also Hebert v. United States, 438 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 2006). SLECs

are typically governed by deputation agreements. See id. Tribal officers who receive

SLECs are cross-deputized as BIA law enforcement officers. Id. 

Absent evidence to the contrary, the assumption is that tribal officers carrying

SLECs are deemed federal employees for purposes of the FTCA only to the extent they

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act within the scope of authority granted to them under the SLEC. Therefore, the scope

of SLEC authority must be determined. A sensible place to begin is the language of the

ILERA, which authorizes the BIA to issue SLECs to tribal officers “to aid in the

enforcement or carrying out in Indian country of a law of either the United States or an

Indian tribe . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 2804(a). The statute itself appears to confine SLEC

authority to the enforcement of federal and tribal law. A notice issued by the BIA in 2004

bolsters that conclusion. It states, “SLECs support the sovereignty of tribes by allowing

tribal law enforcement officers to enforce Federal law, to investigate Federal crimes, and

to protect the rights of people in Indian country . . . .” Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 6321 (Feb.

10, 2004). It further explains that tribal officers carrying SLECs are “fully qualified to

enforce Federal law and to perform functions which would otherwise be performed by

BIA officers . . . .” Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 6321 (Feb. 10, 2004); see also Cabazon Band of

Mission Indians v. Smith, 388 F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 6321 and

discussing the scope of SLEC authority). 

Here, Sergeant Tanakeyowma was not enforcing federal or tribal law at the time of

the incident. He pursued Sanford outside the boundaries of the Gila River Indian

Reservation after he observed Sanford’s erratic driving, which, as explained above, was

no more than a violation of Arizona law. There is no evidence that Sergeant

Tanakeyowma’s SLEC authorized him to enforce Arizona law, on or off Indian lands,

and therefore no indication that he is deemed a federal employee for purposes of the

FTCA while enforcing Arizona law. See Hebert, 438 F.3d at 487 (because tribal officers

were not enforcing federal law, they were not acting “in accordance with any special

commission to assist the Bureau of Indian Affairs with providing law enforcement

services”). 

Plaintiffs point out, however, that pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2804(a), the BIA may

authorize tribal officers to perform any activity authorized under 25 U.S.C. § 2803. 

Under section 2803, the Secretary “may” authorize BIA employees to assist “any Federal,

tribal, State, or local law enforcement agency” in the enforcement of that agency’s laws

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or regulations “when requested.” Id. § 2803(8). The argument lacks merit. First, there is

no evidence that Sergeant Tanakeyowma’s SLEC did in fact authorize him to assist a

state agency in the enforcement of state law. Second, there is no evidence that any

agency requested his assistance in apprehending Sanford. Therefore, Sergeant

Tanakeyowma’s SLEC provides no basis for subjecting the United States to suit here. 

The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ other contentions and finds them unavailing. 

Therefore, the claims must be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the United States’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

19) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment dismissing this action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 26th day of August, 2010.

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