Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02258/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02258-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DELARM,

Plaintiff,

v.

G. GROWE, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 15-cv-2258 KJM KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 6, 2016, the undersigned dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with 

leave to amend. (ECF No. 7.) Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint. (ECF 

No. 10.) For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his right to access the courts in connection with his 

federal habeas corpus petition. The original complaint identified this petition as having been filed 

in this court and assigned case number CIV S-11-0750 CKD P. It is clear that the amended 

complaint refers to the same petition. On December 1, 2011, the court in CIV S-11-cv-0750 

CKD P granted respondent’s motion to dismiss on grounds that the petition was barred by the 

statute of limitations.1 In the order granting the motion to dismiss, the court in CIV S 11-cv-0750 

 

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 Judicial notice may be taken of court records. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 

635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981).

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CKD P rejected the plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled to equitable tolling due to inadequate

access to the law library and photocopy services. 

In the instant action, plaintiff raises three claims alleging violation of his constitutional 

right to access the courts in connection with the dismissal of his federal habeas petition. Plaintiff 

seeks money damages. 

In his first access to the courts claim, plaintiff alleges that he was unable to file a timely 

federal habeas petition due to inadequate access to the law library and photocopying services. In 

essence, plaintiff raises the claim for equitable tolling raised in CIV S-11-cv-0750 CKD P.

In his second access to the courts claim, plaintiff alleges that his requests for records that 

would have supported his claim for equitable tolling were improperly denied. These records 

apparently would have demonstrated that he did not receive adequate access to the law library and 

photocopy services. Plaintiff alleges that he requested these records in support of his appeal from 

the district court order dismissing his habeas petition as untimely. 

In his third access to the courts claim, plaintiff alleges that other requests for records that 

would have supported his claim for equitable tolling were denied. Plaintiff alleges that these 

records would have been submitted to the district court in support of his motion for relief from 

judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s access to the courts 

claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for 

a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or 

speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” 512 

U.S. 477, 481 (1994). Thus, a plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action to recover damages for 

“harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render [his] conviction or sentence invalid” 

when his sentence and conviction have not previously been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, 

or called into question upon issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court. Id. at 486–87. 

The Seventh Circuit, and several Ninth Circuit district courts, have held that until an 

inmate’s conviction or sentence has been overturned, he cannot bring claims for damages for 

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denial of access to legal materials or legal assistance to aid him in challenging some aspect of his 

conviction or sentence. The undersigned quotes herein from Koch v. Jester, 2014 WL 3783961 at 

*5 (D. Or. 2014), which addressed this issue:

Although the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the intersection of the 

First Amendment and Heck as they apply to an inmate's claim for 

denial of access to the courts, the Seventh Circuit and several 

district courts in the Ninth Circuit have addressed the issue and held 

Heck bars such claims. For example, in Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 

429 (7th Cir. 2012), the plaintiff brought a claim under § 1983 for 

damages against prison officials alleging they denied him access to 

the courts in violation of the First Amendment when they prevented 

him from using library resources to prepare a motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. The plaintiff's conviction had not been reversed, 

expunged, declared invalid, or called into question upon issuance of 

a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court before the plaintiff filed 

his § 1983 action. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's 

claim on the ground that it was barred by Heck because the 

plaintiff's conviction had not been reversed. The plaintiff asserted 

the “favorable termination requirement of Heck ... [was] 

inapplicable because an award of damages for having been denied 

an opportunity to research his motion to withdraw his plea or his 

right to appeal his sentence would not necessarily imply that his 

conviction or sentence is invalid.” Id. at 432. Specifically, the 

plaintiff asserted 

his access-to-courts claim [did] not challenge directly his 

underlying criminal conviction, despite the fact that ... he 

sought access to the courts to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Invoking Lewis v. Casey ... and Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

U.S. 403 (2002), [the plaintiff] further argue[d] that “the 

loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of 

relief” can form the basis of an access-to-courts claim. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added). Consequently, 

[the plaintiff] maintain[ed] that he need only demonstrate 

that his lost, underlying claim—here, a lost opportunity to 

withdraw a guilty plea or to appeal—would have been nonfrivolous or “arguable,” not that it would have been 

successful.

Id. at 433. The district court rejected the plaintiff's argument and 

granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that “a 

favorable determination on [the plaintiff's] damages claim 

necessarily would imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] 

conviction,” and, therefore, the plaintiff's claim was barred by 

Heck. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court and noted the 

plaintiff's argument gave “too crabbed a reading to the scope of the 

bar established in Heck.” Id. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that it 

had concluded in an earlier case (Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531 

(7th Cir. 1999)) “‘that only prospective relief is available in a 

prisoner's suit complaining of denial of access to the courts unless 

he has succeeded in getting his conviction annulled, since otherwise 

an effort to obtain damages would be blocked by Heck.’” Burd, 

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702 F.3d at 433 (quoting Hoard, 175 F.3d at 533). Although the 

Seven Circuit acknowledged that ruling “seem[s] paradoxical 

alongside Lewis's holding that a § 1983 plaintiff in an access-tocourts case needs only a non-frivolous, rather than meritorious, 

claim,” the Seventh Circuit, nevertheless, concluded the following 

after examining Lewis, Heck, and other cases:

Because the underlying claim for which [the plaintiff] 

sought access to the prison law library was the opportunity 

to withdraw his guilty plea, he cannot demonstrate the 

requisite injury without demonstrating that there is merit to 

his claim that he should have been able to withdraw the 

plea. Such a showing necessarily would implicate the 

validity of the judgment of conviction that he incurred on 

account of that guilty plea. The rule in Heck forbids the 

maintenance of such a damages action until the plaintiff can 

demonstrate his injury by establishing the invalidity of the 

underlying judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that [the 

plaintiff] has not established a basis for recovering any type 

of damage relief under § 1983.

Id. at 434–35.

District courts in the Ninth Circuit have followed the reasoning of 

the Seventh Circuit and concluded pursuant to Heck that, until their 

conviction or sentence has been overturned, inmates cannot bring 

claims for damages for denial of access to legal materials or legal 

assistance to aid them in challenging some aspect of their 

conviction or sentence. See, e.g., Gregory v. County of San Diego, 

No. 13-cv- 1016 WQH JMA, 2013 WL 5670928, at *5 (S.D.Cal. 

Oct.15, 2013); Collins v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3: 10-cv-0697 

RCJ V, 2011 WL 768709, at *2 (D.Nev. Jan.26, 2011); Cole v. 

Sisto, Civ. No. S–09–0364 KJM P, 2009 WL 2230795, at *4 

(E.D.Cal. July 24, 2009).

Koch v. Jester, 2014 WL 3783961 at * 5.

The undersigned agrees with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and the district courts 

discussed above, that claims by prisoners for damages based on alleged denial of access to the 

law library, etc., to aid them in challenging some aspect of their conviction or sentence, are Heck 

barred unless the conviction or sentence has been overturned. Plaintiff is claiming that by 

denying him his right to access the courts, as alleged, he was prevented from filing a timely 

federal petition. Accordingly, because plaintiff’s conviction has not been overturned, his access 

to the courts claims are Heck barred. On these grounds, this action should be dismissed.

On October 30, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion requesting service of the original complaint. 

(ECF No. 3.) Because the court dismissed the original complaint with leave to amend, plaintiff’s 

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motion for service is denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for service (ECF No. 3) 

is denied; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: April 29, 2016

Del2258.dis

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