Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02216/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02216-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 10cv2216

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LISA ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10 CV 2216 MMA (AJB)

ORDER:

 (1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

[Doc. No. 9]

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM;

and

(3) DENYING MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT AS

MOOT

[Doc. No. 10]

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants

On October 26, 2010, Plaintiff Lisa Anderson and her daughter, Elise J. Anderson, filed a pro

se complaint alleging intentional discrimination by public social services [Doc. No. 1], along with a

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]. Only

Lisa Anderson signed the complaint. On October 27, 2010, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to

Proceed IFP because the Court could not determine whether Plaintiff was indigent within the meaning

of the IFP statute, and informed Plaintiff Lisa that she does not have authority to appear as an attorney

on her daughter Elise’s behalf [Doc. No. 4]. On November 16, 2010, Plaintiff Lisa Anderson filed

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 10cv2216

a First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 6], naming only herself as a plaintiff, along with a second

Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 7]. The Court again denied Plaintiff’s motion on December 6, 2010,

finding that Plaintiff was not indigent with the meaning of the IFP statute based on the information

presented [Doc. No. 7]. Plaintiff was given until January 10, 2011, to submit an amended motion to

proceed IFP or pay the required filing fee. On January 10, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a third Motion

to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 9], along with a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint [Doc.

No. 10]. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed

IFP, and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All partiesinstituting any civil action,suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe United States,

except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. §

1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the

plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes,

493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). “To

proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.

1965). 

When presented with an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must first determine

if the applicant satisfies the economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Franklin

v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1984). Section 1915(a) does not require an applicant

to demonstrate absolute destitution. See Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339

(1948). 

On January 10, 2011, Plaintiff filed a third Motion to Proceed IFP, which indicates that her

monthly expenses are approximately equal to her monthly income of $929. In addition to rent and

storage fees, Plaintiff has now indicated that her monthly food expenses total $180, and that bills and

miscellaneous expenses total approximately $100 per month, bringing her monthly expenses to

approximately $913. The Court finds this new information cures the deficiencies outlined in the

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

As noted in the Court’s December 6, 2010 Order, Elise is not a minor [Doc. No. 7].

- 3 - 10cv2216

Court’s December 6, 2010 Order, and that Plaintiff has now satisfied the IFP requirements.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 9].

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)

I. Legal Standard

When a plaintiffseeksto proceed IFP, the complaint issubject to mandatory screening and the

Court must order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally

construe a pro se’s pleadings. Id. In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). For the reasons set forth

below, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

II. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff’s FAC is difficult to comprehend, and it is unclear when many of the alleged events

occurred because they are undated and are not in chronological order. However, Plaintiff’s FAC

appears to describe numerous encounters over the course of approximately 10 years between herself,

her daughter Elise Janine Anderson,1

 employees of the San Diego Regional Center (“SDRC”),

Walden’s Family Mental Health Services (“Walden’s”), the Office of Human Rights and Advocacy

(“OHRA”), and Elise’s foster parents. Based on these events, Plaintiff purports to allege that she was

discriminated against by Defendants on the basis of her race, mental disability, and gender [Doc. No.

6].

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

It appears these events likely occurred during the years 1999–2000. The FAC also alludes

to another incident where Plaintiff’s visitation rights were taken away and she was “forced to leave

the services,” but it is unclear when this incident took place [FAC ¶ 38]. 

- 4 - 10cv2216

The FAC primarily describes Defendants’ alleged interference with Plaintiff’s desire to see,

talk to, and care for her daughter Elise. For example, the FAC indicates that in 1999, Elise was placed

in a group home while in state custody, and Plaintiff was able to visit Elise until a group of social

workers made deals to “cut out” Plaintiff from her daughter’s life [FAC ¶¶ 1, 4–5]. Additionally,

Plaintiff alleges that on one occasion she attempted to pray with Elise and social workers subsequently

threatened to call the police if Plaintiff did not leave the group home facility [FAC ¶ 11]. Plaintiff

alleges that employees of SDRC interrupted prayers on other occasions, terminated visits with

Plaintiff’s daughter without Plaintiff’s knowledge, monitored phone calls, and forced Elise to hang

up on Plaintiff on one occasion2 [FAC ¶¶ 10, 13, 15–18, 22]. The FAC also alleges that in 2004,

Defendant Estella Gonzales disconnected Elise’s phone and may have interfered with Plaintiff’s

ability to visit Elise [FAC ¶ 43]. Additionally, while Plaintiff was talking to Elise on the phone on one

occasion, she could hear the “sound of a clamorous pan” and Defendants Estella and Ruben in the

background [FAC ¶ 47]. Similarly, the FAC alleges Defendants Lourdes and Jesse tried to prevent

Plaintiff from contacting Elise [FAC ¶ 57]. When Plaintiff contacted the Office of Human Rights and

Advocacy Services regarding her desire to speak to and see her daughter, she was told that her

daughter had “privacy rights not to talk with her” and that information about Elise would not be

divulged to Plaintiff [FAC ¶ 67].

Plaintiff and her daughter are African-American, and a number of paragraphs in the FAC

describe statements or conversations concerning race. For example, Plaintiff alleges that in 2007,

Defendant Estella “pointed out a finger toward [Elise’s] black legs with a frown on her face” and

“talked about her black skin” on another occasion [FAC ¶¶ 39, 48]. Plaintiff indicates that Elise once

said “she did not want to be black,” and Elise had little contact with blacks or knowledge of black

history [FAC ¶¶ 31, 46]. Plaintiff alleges that on one occasion when she came to “the home,” a

woman “called her a nigger” [FAC ¶ 66]. The FAC, however, does not identify who used this ethnic

slur, nor if the statement was connected to Defendants’ alleged interference with Plaintiff’s ability to

see and communicate with her daughter.

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Plaintiff has not established any ground that would allow her to pursue alleged injuries

suffered by Elise. 

- 5 - 10cv2216

In addition, the FAC describes Plaintiff’s concern for her daughter’s well-being, and is replete

with descriptions of harm allegedly suffered by Elise. For example, the FAC alleges that in 1999,

Plaintiff noticed Elise’s arms were swollen and when Plaintiff inquired, Defendants told her that Elise

had harmed herself and was placed on suicide watch [FAC ¶ 8]. Additionally, Plaintiff indicates that

Elise sounded “sad, lonely, and afraid on the phone” [FAC ¶ 17], and that in 2004, Elise had a scar

on her forehead and puncture wounds on her knuckles [FAC ¶ 23]. Plaintiff also raises concern

regarding the condition of her daughter’s abdominal area [FAC ¶ 33] and the food that she was eating

while under Defendants’ care [FAC ¶ 63]. 

III. SUA SPONTE SCREENING

a. Standing

As a preliminary matter, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has standing to assert her

discrimination claims, as much of the conduct alleged concerns Plaintiff’s daughter Elise, rather than

Plaintiff. In order to maintain a lawsuit, an individual must have standing to do so. See Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The standing doctrine addresses the question of “whether the

litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

498 (1975). In order to have standing, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning

that a legally protected interest, which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical, has been invaded. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560–61 (1992). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of. Third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.

 To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against her, she must articulate the

specific unlawful actions by Defendants that invaded her legally protected interests, not those of her

daughter.3 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot raise concerns regarding the quality of care Elise received

because Plaintiff lacks standing do to so. Further, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims stem from being

denied communication with or information about her daughter, an adult, it is not clear that Plaintiff

has been denied a legally protected interest. 

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” to include anyone with a disability

“who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of

architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services,

meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs

or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

5

The ADA broadly “defines ‘public entity’ as ‘any State or local government [and] any

department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local

government.’” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

12131(1)). “Public entity” as defined within the statute does not include individuals. 42 U.S.C. §

12131(1). 

- 6 - 10cv2216

b. Statute of Limitations

In order to maintain an action, it must be timely filed within the statute of limitations. Many

courts have noted that claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are best

characterized as personal injury actions and are therefore subject to the two-yearstatute of limitations

period set forth in Cal. Code. Civ. P. § 335.1. See Donoghue v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d 926, 930

(9th Cir. 1987); Kemp v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 2889224 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that the one-year state statute of limitations applicable

to claims brought under § 1983 is applicable to claims brought under § 2000d. Taylor v. Regents of

Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, (9th Cir. 1993). Because many of the allegations in the FAC are undated

and are not in chronological order, it is difficult to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims have been

timely filed. In addition, many of the incidents alleged appear to have occurred between one and

eleven years prior to the date Plaintiff filed her initial complaint, which would put them well outside

the limitation periods. 

c. Disability Discrimination Claims

In her “Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Risley of OHRA intentionally

discriminated against her by reason of her mental disability [FAC ¶ 70], and that all other named

defendants caused Plaintiff injuries [FAC ¶ 73]. The Court construes these allegations as alleging

discrimination on the basis of mental disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

42 U.S.C. § 12132 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794. 

i. Americans with Disabilities Act

In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) she has a

disability;4

 (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s5

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s mental disability is not mentioned in the “Facts” section of

the FAC. The only potential reference to Plaintiff’s mental disability in this section is found in

Paragraph 47, which indicates that Elise told Plaintiff that “[P]laintiff Lisa was sick” and that Elise

did not want to talk to her. 

- 7 - 10cv2216

services, programs, or activities; (3) she was excluded from participation in or denied the benefit in

question, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial

of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of her disability. McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d

1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004). Because the ADA prohibits discrimination in the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, the proper defendant is the public entity or an official acting in his or her

official capacity. Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 501 n. 7 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Caesar v. Horel,

2010 WL 4393894, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2010) (“The proper defendants to Plaintiff’s disability

discrimination claims are the public entities that allegedly denied him equal access to their

programs”).

Plaintiff has alleged that she is a “qualified individual who has mental illness” [FAC p. 2] and

the Court construes the FAC as indicating that SDRC and Walden’s are “public entities” [FAC p. 2].

However, even assuming that Plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability” and that SDRC and

Walden’s are “public entities” for purposes of the ADA, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to properly

allege a claim for discrimination on the basis of mental disability under Title II of the ADA. 

First, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is asserting a claim against Defendants in their individual

or official capacities. To the extent Plaintiff wishes to maintain a Title II claim, she must provide

allegations of wrongful conduct by Defendants in their official capacities. Second, Plaintiff has not

shown that she is qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of the “public entities” named in the

FAC. Although the FAC indicates that Elise was a “consumer” of SDRC and that Elise has some

connection to Walden’s through her foster parents [FAC pp. 1–3], there are no factual allegations

regarding Plaintiff’s connection to the entities or that she is entitled to receive benefits from them.

Lastly, Plaintiff has failed to show that she was excluded or denied services, programs, or

activities because of her mental disability. Plaintiff has alleged interference with her desire to see

Elise and speak to her over the phone because of loud noises, force, or threats [FAC ¶¶ 13, 15–17, 38,

43, 47, 57]. However, none of the allegations, even liberally construed, give rise to an inference that

this interference was because of Plaintiff’s mental disability.6

 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 10cv2216

Plaintiff has failed to allege the elements required to state a claim for discrimination on the basis of

disability under the ADA. 

ii. Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a general civil rights provision “to prevent

discrimination against all handicapped individuals . . . in employment, housing, transportation,

education, health services, or any other Federally-aided programs.” Alexopulos v. San Francisco

Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 554 (1987). Section 504 provides: “No otherwise qualified

individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or

activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794, plaintiff must

allege that “(1) [s]he is an individual with a disability; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified to receive the

benefit; (3) [s]he was denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of [her] disability; and (4)

the program receives federal financial assistance.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135

(9th Cir. 2001). Whereas the ADA applies only to public entities, the Rehabilitation Act proscribes

discrimination by all federally-funded programs. 

As previously noted, the FAC is devoid of any facts indicating Plaintiff was denied any

benefits by reason of her disability, or that she was qualified to receive certain benefits. The Court

therefore finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for discrimination under

the Rehabilitation Act. 

d. Racial Discrimination Claims

Based on Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” [FAC p. 12], the Court further construes Plaintiff’s

FAC as alleging racial discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d.

Section 2000d, which is part of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, forbids any person or institution

which receives federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000d. For a Title VI claim, the injury arises when a person is excluded from participation

in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving

federal funding because of race, color or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; see also Epileptic

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Plaintiff must allege both that the defendant is an entity engaging in racial discrimination and

that it is receiving federal funding. Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th

Cir. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241

F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001). As the Court previously noted, it is unclear in what capacity Plaintiff is

suing each Defendant. 

- 9 - 10cv2216

Foundation v. City and County of Maui, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Haw. 2003). A complaint need

only allege that the defendant is engaging in discrimination.7

 Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys., 29

F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Although the FAC describes exchanges where race was discussed and incidents where Plaintiff

was allegedly prevented from communicating with her daughter, there is no meaningful connection

between Plaintiff’s race, the discussion of race, and the way Plaintiff was allegedly treated by the

Defendants. Specifically, it is not clear from the FAC that Plaintiff was denied any benefits or

prevented from communicating with her daughter because of her race. For example, although the

FAC indicates that Defendant Estella made comments about the color of Elise’s skin and frowned

[FAC ¶¶ 46, 48], there are no facts that indicate Defendant Estella prevented Plaintiff from

communicating with her daughter or otherwise discriminated against her because of her race. For this

reason, the Court finds the FAC, as currently pled, fails to state a claim for race discrimination under

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 

e. Gender Discrimination Claims

Similarly, the FAC fails to state a cognizable claim for gender discrimination. There are no

factual allegations that identify how Defendants’ alleged conduct is connected to Plaintiff’s gender,

or that males were provided services, opportunities, or access that Plaintiff was denied because she

is female. Instead, the FAC only contains conclusory statements that Defendants engaged in

discriminatory practices because of Plaintiff’s race, disability, and gender [FAC p. 14]. Without more,

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for gender discrimination. 

III. Leave to Amend

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(b). In this circuit, “[a] pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 10cv2216

unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809

F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s mandated dismissal of an IFP complaint allows a district court to grant leave to

amend); Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (“As a general matter, this court has

long sought to ensure that pro se litigants do not unwittingly fall victim to procedural requirements

that they may, with some assistance from the court, be able to satisfy.”). Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES the complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a Second Amended Complaint,

consistent with this Order, that addresses the deficiencies identified above. Plaintiff is advised,

however, that if her amended complaint fails to cure the pleading deficiencies noted above, her

complaint may be dismissed with prejudice and without further leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is GRANTED [Doc.

No. 9]; 

2. Plaintiff’s FAC is DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend. Plaintiff

is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date this Order is Filed in which to file a Second Amended

Complaint that curesthe deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CA. CIV.LR. 15.1.

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Second Amended Complaint will be

considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

3. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint

AS MOOT [Doc. No. 10], because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s FAC with leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-02216-MMA-MDD Document 13 Filed 03/30/11 Page 10 of 10