Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00514/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00514-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jorge Enrique Villa,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-11-0514-PHX-DGC (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on March 18, 2011 (Doc. 1). On July 15, 2011, Respondents filed their Answer 

(Doc. 11), and on December 5, 2011 a Supplement (Doc. 15). Petitioner has not replied

to the Answer or the Supplement, and the time to do so has now run.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Petitioner's direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

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summarized the factual background as follows:

Villa drove himself and three others to a liquor store. He 

parked directly behind another car in which a passenger was seated. 

Two passengers exited Villa's car and approached the other car with 

guns drawn. They removed the passenger of the other car at 

gunpoint and forced him into Villa's car. Villa then drove away with 

the victim in the car.

The police stopped Villa's car and questioned Villa after 

informing him of his Miranda rights. Villa told Officer Tyson Miller 

there was a gun on the rear floor of the car, and Miller also found a 

zip tie in Villa's pocket. Detective Jose Gamez interviewed Villa at 

the Police Department and during the interview, which was 

videotaped, Villa stated the gun might have been stolen.

The victim did not testify at trial because he could not be 

located. The State called F.Y., a Phoenix Police Department 

volunteer who was on a ride-along with the officers who stopped 

Villa, to testify about the victim's mental state. The volunteer 

testified that because he spoke Spanish, he interviewed the victim in 

Spanish and that the victim "was terrified, scared. He was extremely 

scared about the whole situation." Through his attorney, Villa cross 

examined the volunteer, and no statements made by the victim were 

admitted.

(Answer, Doc. 11, Exhibit M, Mem. Dec. at 2-3.) (Exhibits to the Answer are referenced 

hereinafter as "Exhibit ___.") 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner and co-defendant Juvenal Vique were indicted on charges of 

Kidnaping, Attempted Armed Robbery, Aggravated Assault. (Vique was also indicted 

on one count of weapons misconduct.) (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

Petitioner proceeded to trial and was convicted on Kidnaping and Aggravated 

Assault charges. (Exhibits E and F, Verdicts.) He was found not guilty on the charge of 

attempted armed robbery. (Exhibit M, Mem. Dec. at 4.) 

On May 6, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 9 and 7.5 years. 

(Exhibit H, Sentence.) 

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C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (Doc. J), and appointed counsel filed an 

Opening Brief (Exhibit K), asserting an inability to find an issue for appeal. Petitioner 

then filed a pro per Supplemental Brief (Exhibit L), raising four issues for review: 

(1) denial of a fair trial by admission of his statements;

(2) denial of his Sixth Amendment rights by hearsay testimony about 

the victim's statements;

(3) insufficient evidence; and

(4) denial of right to unanimous jury verdict by exclusion of jurors 

personal knowledge of scene. (Exhibit L at 2.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the appeal, concluding: (1) there was no 

abuse of discretion in admitting Petitioner's statements; (2) there was no hearsay because 

the testimony was limited to observations of the victim; (3) the evidence was sufficient 

to sustain the convictions; and (4) the trial judge properly instructed the juror that her 

personal experience was not evidence to be considered. (Exhibit M.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit N), which was denied on June 2, 

2010. 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari (Exhibit O), which was denied on 

November 8, 2010. (Exhibit R, U.S.S.Ct. Docket.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner did not seek post-conviction relief. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4.)

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E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 18, 2011 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

(1) Statements - he was denied a fair trial in violation of his Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights thorough admission of Petitioner's recorded 

statements;

(2) Confrontation - a violation of his right to confront witnesses under 

the Sixth Amendment by admission of testimony about the victim's statements;

(3) Insufficient Evidence - insufficient evidence supported his 

conviction in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as 

established by the not-guilty verdict on the armed robbery charge;

(4) Juror Personal Knowledge - violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to a unanimous verdict as a result of the jury 

instruction precluding a juror from considering personal knowledge of the liquor 

store scene.

Response - On July 15, 2011 Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) (Doc. 

11). Respondents argue that Grounds 1, 3, and 4 were not fairly presented to the state 

courts, are unexhausted, and are now procedurally defaulted. Respondents argue Ground 

2 is without merit.

Reply - Petitioner was given 30 days from service of the Response to reply in 

support of his Petition. (Order 4/5/11 at 3.) Petitioner did not do so.

Supplement – On November 15, 2011, the Court reached a preliminary 

conclusion that grounds 1, 3, and 4 were fairly presented and properly exhausted. 

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Respondents were ordered to supplement their response and the record to address the 

merits of these claims, and Petitioner was given thirty days to reply. (Order 11/15/11, 

Doc. 13). 

On December 5, 2011 Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer (Doc. 15), 

arguing: (a) Ground One merely raises a state law evidentiary claim; (b) Ground Three is 

without merit because evidence concerning the non-testifying victim was limited to the 

witness’s observations, and Petitioner offers nothing to overcome the presumption of 

correctness applicable to the state court’s findings; and (c) Ground Four is without merit 

because the judge properly instructed the jurors to disregard extrinsic evidence, and 

Petitioner offers nothing to suggest the jurors failed to do so.

Again, Petitioner did not reply.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 1, 3 and 4 were never 

fairly presented to the state courts, his state remedies were not properly exhausted and 

are now procedurally defaulted, and thus his claims are barred from habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal habeas court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims 

only if available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 

3 (1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

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650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

a. Proper Forum/Proceeding

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

 b. Fair Presentment

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, 

but must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a 

"fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his 

constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 

(1971). A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has 

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is 

based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds, 

Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

c. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Ground 1 - Recorded Statement - For his Ground 1 for relief, Petitioner argues he 

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was denied a fair trial in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

thorough admission of Petitioner's recorded statements. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents concede that the factual allegations underlying this claim were presented to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals in Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, but argue that it was not 

fairly presented as a federal constitutional claim. (Answer, Doc. 12 at 11.) Respondents 

conceded that Petitioner made "a broad reference to the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments," but argue that was not sufficient to alert the state courts to the substance 

of his federal claim. (Id.) 

Petitioner asserted:

Just prior to trial, defense counsel learned that the prosecution was 

going to play a tape-recorded interview of Appellant wherein he 

opined that guns he had previously purchased on the streets were 

probably stolen. 

(Exhibit L, Supp. Br. at 3.)

It is not enough, however, to assert the same facts. Rather, to have fairly 

presented his claim, "the petitioner must have either referenced specific provisions of the 

federal constitution or cited to federal or state cases involving the legal standard for a 

federal constitutional violation." Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

In arguing this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner stated:

Appellant contends that the prejudicial affect [sic] of the statements 

substantially out-weighed their probative value and served to 

mislead the jury. See Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid., 17 A.R.S. As a 

result, he was denied a fair trial in violation of the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. 

(Id.)

In Castillo, the court found a lack of fair presentation where the petitioner had 

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simply argued that “'[b]ecause this improper evidence was admitted, Appellant was 

denied a fair trial in violation of the United States and the Arizona Constitutions.' ” 399 

F.3d at 1000-1001. The court found it inadequate because "[i]t did not reference, as we 

require, any specific provision of the U.S. Constitution on which he rested his claim." 

Id. at 1001.

Here, in contrast, Petitioner did not simply assert a vague constitutional right, but 

explicitly referenced the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in support of his claim. 

Respondents make no suggestion what further reference was necessary to alert the state 

courts to the constitutional nature of his claims. For example, Respondents do not assert 

that the Arizona Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would somehow relate 

to the facts, such that the intent to reference the U.S. Constitution would have been 

unclear. Indeed, amendments to the Arizona Constitution are not separately enumerated, 

but are engrossed in the original Articles. 

In support of their assertion that Petitioner's explicit references were inadequate, 

Respondents cite Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005), and Rose v. 

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005). (Answer, Doc. 11 at 11.) However, in 

Fields, the petitioner had not referenced any particular constitutional provision, but had 

simply raised "broad constitutional principles" such as "fair trial" or "due process." 

Fields, 401 F.3d at 1022. Here, however, Petitioner explicitly referenced the 

constitutional provisions.

In Rose, the Petitioner had asserted to the state courts an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim founded upon a failure to raise a number of issues. The Ninth Circuit 

found that this was insufficient to fairly present Petitioner's Fifth Amendment Claim, 

which was only one of several listed claims not raised by trial and appellate counsel. 

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Here, Petitioner does not seek to raise a claim merely subsumed in a separate 

ineffectiveness claim, but the same claim under the same constitutional provisions assert 

to the state courts.

Respondents point to the fact that the state court disposed of the claim only on 

state law grounds. While a state court's actual consideration of a federal claim may 

result in exhaustion, see Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir.1984) 

("[t]here is no better evidence of exhaustion than a state court's actual consideration of 

the relevant constitutional issue"), the state court's actual consideration of a claim is not 

necessary to a finding that it was fairly presented. "Failure of a state appellate court to 

mention a federal claim does not mean the claim was not presented to it." Dye v. 

Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 3 (2005). "It is too obvious to merit extended discussion that 

whether the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) has been satisfied cannot 

turn upon whether a state appellate court chooses to ignore in its opinion a federal 

constitutional claim squarely raised in petitioner's brief in the state court." Smith v. 

Digmon, 434 U.S. 332, 334 (1978).

The undersigned finds the federal claims in Ground One of Petitioner's Petition 

were fairly presented and properly exhausted.

Ground 2: Victim's Hearsay - Respondents concede that Ground 2 was fairly 

presented and Petitioner's state remedies properly exhausted.

Ground 3: Confrontation - For his Ground 3, Petitioner argues that insufficient 

evidence supported his conviction in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights, as established by the not-guilty verdict on the armed robbery charge. Without 

explanation, Respondents argue this claim was not presented as a federal claim. 

However, Petitioner cited to the leading federal cases on insufficient evidence, including 

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In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (Fourteenth Amendment's "Due Process Clause 

protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 

every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged"), and Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) ("Winship presupposes as an essential of the due 

process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer 

the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence 

necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every 

element of the offense"). (Exhibit L. Supp. Br. at 4-5.)

“A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis 

for his claim in a state-court petition or brief ... by citing in conjunction with the claim 

the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal 

grounds, or by simply labeling the claim ‘federal.’ ” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 

32(2004).

The undersigned finds the federal claims in Ground Three of Petitioner's Petition 

were fairly presented and properly exhausted.

Ground 4: Juror's Knowledge of Scene - For Ground 4 of his Petition, Petitioner 

asserts the violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a 

unanimous verdict as a result of the jury instruction precluding a juror from considering 

personal knowledge of the liquor store scene. In his brief to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, Petitioner argued:

Appellant contends the trial court's words instructing Juror #3 not to 

consider her personal experience in assessing his defense and the 

facts of the case violated his right to a unanimous jury, in violation 

of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

(Exhibit L, Supp. Br. at 5.)

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Again, Respondents argue that Petitioner's references to the specific constitutional 

provisions on which he now relies was inadequate to apprise the state courts of the 

federal nature of his claims. Respondents are in error. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999. 

The undersigned finds the federal claims in Ground Four of Petitioner's Petition 

were fairly presented and properly exhausted.

d. Summary Re Exhaustion – Based upon the foregoing the undersigned finds 

that all of Petitioner’s grounds for relief were fairly presented to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals and his state remedies properly exhausted.

B. MERITS OF GROUND ONE: PETITIONER'S RECORDED STATEMENTS

For his Ground One for relief, Petitioner argues he was denied a fair trial in 

violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights thorough admission of his 

recorded statement in which he “admitted the gun in his car might have been stolen” 

(Exhibit M, Mem. Dec. at 5), on the basis that the prejudicial effect of the statements 

outweighed their probative value. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Respondents argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals properly concluded that 

Petitioner’s statements were admissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence 403, and that in 

any event Petitioner asserts nothing more than a violation of state evidentiary law, which 

is insufficient to make out a federal constitutional claim.

To the extent that Petitioner simply contends that the Arizona Court of Appeals 

improperly applied state law, he fails to set out a cognizable claim. A state court 

determination of state law is not subject to review in a federal habeas court. Bains v. 

Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) ("federal court is bound by the state court's 

interpretations of state law"). 

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A federal habeas court, of course, cannot review questions of state 

evidence law. On federal habeas review, we may consider only 

whether the petitioner's conviction violated constitutional norms. 

Even where it appears that evidence was erroneously admitted, a 

federal court will interfere only if it appears that its admission 

violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair trial. 

Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9

th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner does not suggest why the admission of this evidence violated 

fundamental due process and the right to a fair trial, beyond his simple argument that its 

prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. He raised the same terse argument 

before the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exhibit L, Supp. Brief at 3.).

Presumably, Petitioner is concerned that the jury would improperly make an 

inference that his possession of a stolen gun was evidence by itself of his guilty of the 

charges. However, as recognized by the Arizona Court of Appeals, there was another, 

permissible inference from the statement.

At trial, just before the videotape was played for the jury, 

[Detective] Gamez testified a kidnapper may want to use a stolen 

gun because such a weapon cannot be traced. Accordingly, the

superior court found Villa's interview statement was probative of 

intent and also that it was not "unfairly prejudicial." We conclude 

the court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.

(Exhibit M, Mem. Dec. at 6.) Petitioner offers nothing to suggest that this conclusion 

was not supported by the record.

The existence of that permissible influence precludes the finding of a denial of 

due process.

Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from 

the evidence can its admission violate due process. Even then, the

evidence must “be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair 

trial.” Only under such circumstances can it be inferred that the jury 

must have used the evidence for an improper purpose.

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9

th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See also 

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Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S 62 (1991) (admission of relevant evidence not a violation of 

due process, even if prejudicial). 

Accordingly, Ground One is without merit and must be denied.

C. MERITS OF GROUND TWO: VICTIM HEARSAY

For his Ground Two for relief, Petitioner argues his right to confront witnesses 

under the Sixth Amendment was violated by admission of testimony by Phoenix Police 

Department volunteer Yepez [“Lopez”]1about the victim's statements. Petitioner argues 

that Yepez testified that the victim “had told him that he was terrified and scared over all 

that had happened.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Respondents counter that under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), 

only testimonial statements are barred under the Confrontation Clause, and that the 

statements by the victim to volunteer Lopez were not testimonial. Moreover, 

Respondents contend that Lopez never testified about statements from the victim, but 

rather only his observations of the victim. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 15-16.) 

Victim’s Statements Were Testimonial - In Crawford, the Court clarified that 

the Confrontation Clause was not concerned with all hearsay, but only with ex parte

“testimony.” The Court acknowledged that “testimony” might occur before a police 

officer, as well as in a courtroom, but testimony was not the result of every encounter 

with police officers. Rather, testimony was derived from “interrogations.” 541 U.S. at 

52-53. 

In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), the Court was required to apply its 

 

1

The police department volunteer is identified in the transcript as “Frank Lopez” and as 

“Frank Yepez”. (Exhibit C, R.T. 2/28/08 at 3, 7.)

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decision in Crawford to a victim’s 911 call. Because the call was in the midst of the 

attack and “its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 

emergency” rather than simply to collect facts to identify a perpetrator and further a 

prosecution, the statements were not “testimony.” However, once the perpetrator had 

left, and the 911 operator continued to “pose a battery of questions,” the interchange 

became “interrogation.” Id. at 828-829,

Recently, in Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011), the Court further 

explained that determining whether an interchange with officials had the “primary 

purpose of interrogation” requires an “objective analysis of the circumstances of the 

encounter and the statements and actions of the parties to it.” Id. at 1156. In making that 

determination “the existence of an ‘ongoing emergency’ at the time of an encounter 

between an individual and the police is among the most important circumstances 

informing the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation.” Id. at 1157. The Court noted that 

an interchange may transform from response to emergency to interrogation “if a 

perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is apprehended, or as in Davis, flees with little 

prospect of posing a threat to the public.” Id. at 1159. 

The Bryant Court also identified the “informality” of the questioning as a relevant 

factor, and contrasted the questioning in that case “in an exposed, public area, prior to 

the arrival of emergency medical services, and in an disorganized fashion” with the 

“formal station-house interrogation in Crawford.” Id. at 1160.

Here, Yepez’s questioning of the victim is the equivalent of the second half of the 

911 call in Davis. Officer Matthews testified that he was the first responder, and he had 

handcuffed everyone in the vehicle upon pulling it over. (Exhibit B, R.T. 2/27/08 at 81, 

88.) Officer Miller testified that Petitioner was the first person removed from the vehicle 

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(even before the victim) and was immediately placed in custody. (Id. at 104.) Yepez 

testified that his questioning of the victim occurred “possibly ten minutes after...the 

vehicle was pulled over.” (Exhibit C, R.T. 2/28/08 at 9.) Thus, the victim’s statement 

were made after the perpetrator’s had been detained, and no emergency was continuing. 

Although perhaps not conducted with the formality of a station house interrogation, there 

is no indication of a disorganized questioning in the confusion of the moment. 

Moreover, Yepez testified that his questioning of the victim was “about what happened.” 

(Id. at 8.) Thus, considering all the circumstances, it is clear the statements were 

intended to relate the then past events, were “testimonial” and subject to the 

confrontation clause. 

Introduction of Testimony - The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that 

Yepez’s testimony “did not constitute hearsay because he did not recount any statement 

made by the victim.” (Exhibit M, Mem. Dec. at 7.) However, the record could be read 

to the contrary:

Q And did you speak to the victim because you are fluent in 

Spanish?

A Yes, I did.

Q And was that victim's name Simon Arenas Rio?

A Yes, sir.

Q And I am not going to ask you any of the contents of the 

conversation. You did ask him about what happened?

A Yes, I did, sir.

Q And how would you describe him that night, was he afraid 

or scared or anything?

A He was terrified, scared. And, you know, overall that 

happened, you know, speaking to the victim was -- he was 

extremely scared about the whole situation.

MR. MAYER: All right, thank you. Nothing further.

(Exhibit C, R.T. 2/28/08 at 8.) The witness’s statement “...speaking to the victim was - -

he was extremely scared” could be construed as testimony as to the victim’s statements 

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to Yepez.

However, there is a well established presumption of correctness of state court 

findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which 

states that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to 

be correct” and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut the presumption by “clear 

and convincing evidence.”2 The undersigned cannot find that the interpretation of 

Yepez’s testimony as a relation of Yepez’s observations, as opposed to a relation of the 

victim’s statements, has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to be incorrect. 

The record reasonably admits of both interpretations. Even if the undersigned might be 

inclined to find that the record leans more towards a finding that the testimony was 

hearsay, the degree of tilt would not begin to approach “clear and convincing.”

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show that the testimony was a violation of 

the Confrontation Clause, and his Ground Two must be denied.

D. MERITS OF GROUND THREE: INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

For his Ground Three for relief, Petitioner argues that insufficient evidence 

supported his conviction in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as 

established by the not-guilty verdict on the armed robbery charge. Petitioner argues that 

the armed robbery allegations were “an essential element of kidnapping, therefore the 

acquittal on that charge rendered the remaining evidence insufficient to uphold the 

kidnapping conviction.” He further argues that without the wrongly admitted hearsay 

 

2 Because the Arizona Court of Appeals did not address the merits of Petitioner’s Sixth 

Amendment Claim, this Court does not apply the prescription in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 

that a grant of habeas relief must be limited to decisions on the merit that are “based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding”. The presumption of correctness of factual determinations applies 

despite the absence of a decision on the merits of the federal claim.

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testimony of the victim addressed in Ground Two, there was insufficient evidence to 

convict him on the assault charge. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.)

Respondents argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the armed 

robbery was not an element of the kidnapping offense, but that it was sufficient to 

produce evidence that Petitioner’s “conduct in restraining the victim with the intent to 

place him ‘in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury’ constituted 

kidnapping.” (Exhibit M, Mem. Dec. at 8, quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1304(A)(4)( 

(Supp. 2008).) Respondents argue that under the standard in Jackson v. Virginia, 442 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979), this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, as well as under the deferential standards applicable to state habeas 

cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Supp. Answer, Doc. 15 at 5-7.) 

Proof of Robbery Not Required - With regard to the armed robbery acquittal, 

Petitioner’s argument is foreclosed by the holding of the Arizona Court of Appeals that 

commission of the armed robbery was not necessary to satisfy the elements of the crime 

of kidnapping under Arizona law. As noted above, a state court determination of state 

law is not subject to review in a federal habeas court. Bains, 204 F.3d at 971. 

Exclusion of Yepez Testimony Not Required - With regard to the testimony by 

Yepez, for the reasons discussed hereinabove, Petitioner has failed to establish that any 

hearsay testimony was admitted. Rather, this Court must presume the correctness of the 

state court’s conclusion that Yepez testified only as to his personal observations of the 

victim. This Court is simply not free to adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the 

evidence at trial as constituting Yepez testifying “that Rios had told him that he was 

scared.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) 

Direct Proof of Apprehension Not Required – Nor does Petitioner show that 

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the evidence, viewed as simply a statement of Yepez’s observations, was insufficient to 

show the victim’s reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury. Petitioner 

offers nothing to establish that direct testimony of the victim is necessary to establish 

such apprehension. Other jurisdictions hold that it does not.

There is, moreover, no requirement that the victim of an assault 

actually testify to his or her own state of mind. If the circumstances 

are such as would ordinarily induce fear in the mind of a reasonable 

person, then the victim may properly be found to have been in fear. 

L.R..W. v. State, 848 S.2d 1263 (Fla. App. 2003). There is nothing in Arizona’s statute 

explicitly requiring such evidence.

Here, there was testimony that the victim was extracted from a vehicle with the 

perpetrators pointing a gun to his head. (Exhibit B, R.T. 2/27/08 at 46.) There is no 

suggestion that the victim would have had any reason to not feel fear upon this 

occurrence, e.g. there is no suggestion that he was part of staging a scene, engaging in 

mutual horseplay, etc. That evidence was sufficient to establish that the victim was in 

apprehension of harm.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground Three is without merit.

E. MERITS OF GROUND FOUR: JUROR’S KNOWLEDGE OF SCENE

For his Ground Four for relief, Petitioner argues that he suffered a violation of his 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a unanimous verdict as a result of the 

jury instruction precluding a juror from considering personal knowledge of the liquor 

store scene. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) 

Respondents argue that the constitution does not require that jurors be permitted 

to consider such extrinsic evidence. (Supp. Answer, Doc. 15 at 7-8.) Respondents also 

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argue that Petitioner provides no basis for finding that the juror ignored the instruction to 

disregard the personal knowledge. (Id. at 8.) However, the undersigned does not 

understand Petitioner to argue that the instruction wasn’t followed, but rather that it 

should not have been given. 

Petitioner points to no authority (and certainly no Supreme Court authority) 

holding that a defendant has a right to allow jurors to consider their extrinsic knowledge 

about the alleged crime, whether it be knowledge of events, persons or places. The 

located Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that a limiting instruction may properly be 

employed.

In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally 

accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors...a 

juror must be as ‘indifferent as he stands unsworne.’ His verdict 

must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial.

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). While “[i]t is not required...that the jurors be 

totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved,” id., it may be a denial of an impartial 

jury when such personal knowledge is injected into the juries’ deliberations, id. at 723.

The Ninth Circuit has observed: 

The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to an “impartial” jury, 

not to an ignorant one...That is not to say that all juror experience is 

proper grist for the deliberative mill.

Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871, 879 (9

th Cir. 2004). See also Personal values or 

knowledge of jurors—Consideration or disclosure of jurors' personal experiences, 75B 

Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1416.

Here, Petitioner offers no suggestion that the juror’s knowledge of the place of the 

crime differed from the evidence at trial, rendered that juror biased, or would have 

otherwise affected that juror’s verdict. Moreover, while the introduction of the juror’s 

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personal experience may not have amounted to error, that does not mean that its 

exclusion was error. To the contrary, mandating its consideration would be counter to 

Petitioner’s right to a verdict “based upon the evidence developed at the trial.” 

Petitioner has failed to offer any basis to find merit in his Ground Four, and the 

undersigned has found none. Therefore, the claim must be denied.

F. SUMMARY

Contrary to Respondents’ assertions that Grounds 1, 3 and 4 were procedurally 

defaulted, the undersigned has found they were fairly presented and Petitioner’s state 

remedies properly exhausted. However, each of Petitioner’s grounds for relief are 

without merit and must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

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(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set 

forth herein, the underlying constitutional claims are plainly without merit, and 

reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed March 18, 2011 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

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VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. See also Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 

Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a 

response to the objections. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3), unless otherwise 

permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation shall not exceed 

ten (10) pages. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of 

the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 26, 2012

11-0514r RR 12 03 15 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:11-cv-00514-DGC Document 16 Filed 03/26/12 Page 22 of 22