Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_11-cv-00732/USCOURTS-alnd-1_11-cv-00732-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

ROGER D. HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CVS CAREMARK

CORPORATION a/k/a C’S

PHARMACY,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:11-CV-732-VEH 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Roger D. Harris, asserted a claim, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)

against defendant C’S Caremark Corporation, a/k/a C’S Pharmacy, for wrongful

termination because of his age. 

The case proceeded to trial , and on November 8, 2013, the jury rendered a

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verdict, finding all of the following from the preponderance of the evidence:

1. That C’S terminated Mr. Harris because of his age.

2. That Mr. Harris should be awarded damagesin the amount of $400,000.

CVS’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part but was denied as to this claim. 1

See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Doc 58.

FILED

 2014 Feb-25 AM 09:37

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:11-cv-00732-VEH Document 146 Filed 02/25/14 Page 1 of 6
and that 

3. C’S willfully violated the law.

Verdict, Doc. 105.

On November 14, 2013, the court entered final judgment in favor of Mr. Harris

and against C’S in the amount of $800,000.

Now before the court is C’S’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of

Law. (Doc. 119). Mr. Harris has filed his Brief in Opposition (doc. 139) and C’S has

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filed its Reply in Support (doc. 141). Accordingly, the motion is ripe for

determination.

II. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1) states, in pertinent part, that

[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and

the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may:

(A) resolve the issue against the party; and

(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the

party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law,

can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable

finding on that issue.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A motion pursuant to Rule 50(a) “may be made at any time

C’S filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (doc. 101) at the close of Mr. Harris’s 2

evidence, and a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (doc. 101) at the close of all of the

evidence. The court, as is its practice, reserved ruling on both motions.

Case 1:11-cv-00732-VEH Document 146 Filed 02/25/14 Page 2 of 6
before the case issubmitted to the jury,” and it must “specify the judgment sought and

the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2).

If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of

law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted

the action to the jury subject to the court’s later deciding the legal

questions raised by the motion. No later than 10 days after the entry of

judgment — or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a

verdict, no later than 10 days after the jury was discharged — the

movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and

may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. 

In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may:

(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a

verdict;

(2) order a new trial; or

(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).3

The Eleventh Circuit’s standard governing Rule 50 motions for judgment as

a matter of law is “well established”:

If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor

of one party that the Court believesthat reasonable men could not arrive

at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other

hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is,

evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded

men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different

conclusions, the motionsshould be denied, and the case submitted to the

jury . . . [I]t is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of the

facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences,

and determine the credibility of witnesses.

CVS did not request, in the alternative, a new trial. 3

Case 1:11-cv-00732-VEH Document 146 Filed 02/25/14 Page 3 of 6
Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir.

2001) (quoting Watts v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 842 F.2d 307, 309-10 (11th Cir.

1988) (per curiam) (citation omitted)).

C’S argues that Mr. Harris did not present sufficient evidence to discredit all

of C’S’s reasons for his discharge. C’S’s argument regarding liquidated damages is

set out in its entirety below.

There is not enough evidence for the jury to find a willful violation of

the ADEA, because Plaintiff has not met the reasons for his discharge.

The absence of evidence that age was the “but for” cause of Plaintiff’s

discharge is also absence of evidence that C’S willfully violated the

ADEA.

Doc. 119 at 40.

By omission, C’S concedes that Mr. Harris made out a prima facie case of age

discrimination in employment. In essence, C’S argues that the jury had to believe its

proffered reasons for Mr. Harris’s termination because Mr. Harris’s evidence was not

sufficient to show that they were pretextual. However, whether or not to believe that

a defendant’s proferred reasons (whether singularly or considered as a whole) are

pretextual is a classic jury issue, especially where, as here, the defendant’s proferred

reasons were in some instances contradicted by the defendant’s contemporaneous

documents (whether or not Mr. Harris met specific goals) or were self-contradicting

(Mr. Harris should have kept a customer happy by filling a prescription for twice the

dosage that the doctor had authorized, so that the customer could save money by

Case 1:11-cv-00732-VEH Document 146 Filed 02/25/14 Page 4 of 6
“pill-splitting”; Mr. Harris mistakenly filled a customer prescription at four timesthe

authorized dosage), and, in any event, there was no one action or omission by Mr.

Harris that was testified to as being sufficient alone or in conjunction with others as

a mandating his termination. Instead, C’S’s witnessestestified that all the known acts

and omissions were considered in reaching the decision to terminate him. Thus, the

decision was inherently subjective, and the jury did not believe that the stated

reasons, alone orin combination, were the true reason that Mr. Harris wasterminated.

Instead, the jury determined that Mr. Harris had proved, by a preponderance of the

evidence, “[t]hat C’S terminated Mr. Harris because of his age.” (Verdict, doc. 105)

(emphasis added). 

Although the jury could have believed C’S, there was sufficient evidence that

the jury could have found C’S’s reasons pretextual. Further, as C’S’s entire motion

as to willfulness is premised upon there being insufficient evidence to sustain

liability, the court necessarily finds that there was sufficient evidence that the jury

could have found that C’S’s actions were willful.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is due to

be, and hereby is, DENIED. The stay previously entered in this case regarding posttrial motions remains in effect pending the court’s ruling on C’S’s Motion Pursuant

Case 1:11-cv-00732-VEH Document 146 Filed 02/25/14 Page 5 of 6
to Rule 59 for New Trial or Remittitur (doc. 120).

DONE this the 25th day of February, 2014.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

Case 1:11-cv-00732-VEH Document 146 Filed 02/25/14 Page 6 of 6