Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00181/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00181-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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1

 Defendant requested oral argument in connection with its Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt. 76). The parties have had the opportunity to submit evidence and briefing.

Accordingly, the Court finds the pending motion for summary judgment suitable for decision

without oral argument and Defendant’s request is denied. See LRCiv 7.2(f), 56.2.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cindy M. Gil,

Plaintiff, 

v.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 07-0181-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s (“JPMorgan Chase”)

Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Legitimate Non-discriminatory Reason and Pretext (Dkt.

76). JPMorgan Chase brought this motion pursuant to the Court’s order permitting a motion

for summary judgment regarding these issues (Dkt. 69). Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s

Motion to Exclude Evidence, which is contained in her response (Dkt. 87), and Motion to

Strike (Dkt. 89). Having considered the parties’ memoranda and other submissions, the

Court now issues this Memorandum of Decision and Order granting Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation claims.1

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The Court will remand Plaintiff’s remaining claim under the Arizona Wage Act to Maricopa

County Superior Court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Cindy Gil (“Plaintiff”) began working in 1997 with Bank One, which later

merged with JPMorgan Chase. From 1999 until her termination on March 8, 2006, Plaintiff

was a Home Loan Sales Originator (“Loan Originator”) in the Home Equity lending

department (Dkt. 59, Def.’s Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) ¶ 1). Plaintiff reported to

Supervisor Kevin Fish, who in turn reported to Manager Laura Gregory (Id. ¶ 2). JPMorgan

Chase trained Plaintiff on its computerized loan application system, but it allegedly did not

really train her for North Carolina (Id. ¶ 3; Dkt. 88, Pl.’s Second Statement of Facts

(“PSSOF”) ¶ 12). Plaintiff had a low loan quality error rate (DSOF ¶ 3). JPMorgan Chase

also trained Plaintiff on its Home Equity Employee Standards policy, which expressly

prohibits falsification of loan applications (Id.). As a Loan Originator, Plaintiff answered

telephone calls from prospective customers seeking home equity loans (Id. ¶ 4). When

speaking with a potential new customer, Loan Originators must obtain the amount of loan

desired and the value of the property (e.g., the “loan-to-value” ratio), which they input into

JPMorgan Chase’s computer system (Id. ¶ 5). The Loan Originator then obtains a computergenerated interest rate based on the customer’s loan-to-value ratio (Id. ¶ 6).

As a Loan Originator, Plaintiff received a base salary and could earn bonus

compensation (e.g., incentive pay or commissions) in accordance with JPMorgan Chase’s

Direct Lending Loan Center Sales Loan Originator Compensation Plan and Policy Statement

(the “Incentive Pay Plan”) (Id. ¶ 8). Under the Incentive Pay Plan, participants who fail to

comply with the plan’s policies and standards may be denied all or a portion of their

compensation and be subject to termination (Id. ¶ 11). Furthermore, the Incentive Pay Plan

terms do not guarantee payment of incentive pay to any participant (Id.). As a result of the

work performed, generally when a Loan Originator loans more money, the Loan Originator

may receive more incentive pay (Id. ¶ 13). When Loan Originators are terminated for cause,

JPMorgan Chase pays them only on loans that close on or before the Loan Originator’s last

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day of work (Id. ¶ 14). When Loan Originators are not terminated for cause but are

voluntarily terminated or transferred, JPMorgan Chase pays them on loans that close up to

30 days after termination (Dkt. 61, Pl.’s First Statement of Facts (“PFSOF”) ¶ 11; Dkt. 59,

Ex. 4, Incentive Pay Plan § I.2.1).

On the morning of February 16, 2006, Plaintiff spoke to a JPMorgan Chase customer

from North Carolina, Michael Mariaca (DSOF ¶ 15). According to JPMorgan Chase, Mr.

Mariaca sought a $20,000 home equity loan and stated his property value as $130,000 (Id.

¶ 15). Plaintiff input Mr. Mariaca’s stated property value of $130,000 into the computer

system, which generated an 11.6% interest rate based upon the loan-to-value ratio of

$20,000:$130,000 (Id. ¶ 16-17). Plaintiff then changed Mr. Mariaca’s property value from

$130,000 to $250,000, which generated a much lower interest rate of 8.95% (Id. ¶ 18).

JPMorgan Chase alleges that in order to change Mr. Mariaca’s property value after she

entered it as $130,000, Plaintiff had to navigate her way through a multi-step, manual process

that could not have been done accidentally (Id. ¶ 20). Mr. Mariaca committed to the loan

based upon the 8.95% interest rate, which made Plaintiff eligible to earn incentive pay on the

loan after it closed (Id. ¶ 21). As part of the closing process, Mr. Mariaca’s property was

appraised at approximately $130,000 and not $250,000 (Id. ¶ 23).

JP Morgan Chase reviewed a recording of the call, which led it to discover that Mr.

Mariaca had twice disclosed a value of $130,000 during the call (Id. ¶¶ 24-25). On or about

March 1, 2006, Loan Closing Supervisor Nancy Anders emailed Plaintiff’s supervisors, Mr.

Fish and Ms. Gregory, of the problem with Mr. Mariaca’s application (Id. ¶ 25). Ms. Anders

stated in her email that Mr. Mariaca clearly stated twice the value of his home as $130,000

and Plaintiff should have approved the loan at 11.6% (Id. ¶ 25). After receiving Ms.

Anders’s email, Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish listened to the call and verified that Mr. Mariaca

had stated his value at $130.000 (Id. ¶ 27). Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish also examined the

record of the call created by JPMorgan Chase’s Retail Credit Organization System (“RCO”),

which is a computerized loan origination platform for home equity lending (Id. ¶ 28). Based

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upon the call recording and the RCO records, Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish concluded that

Plaintiff had deliberately falsified Mr. Mariaca’s loan application (Id. ¶ 30). 

On March 6, 2006, Ms. Gregory wrote Human Resources Business Partner Ambrose

Wilson an email stating that she had listened to the call, reviewed the RCO records, and

concluded that Plaintiff had increased Mr. Mariaca’s property value for the interest rate quote

(Id. ¶ 33). The same day, Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish instructed Plaintiff to listen to a

recording of the call (Id. ¶ 34). Then, Ms. Gregory discussed with Plaintiff her conclusion

that Plaintiff had falsified the value of the customer’s property in order to obtain a lower

interest rate (Id. ¶ 35).

After discussing the matter with Human Resources, Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish signed

a Recommendation for Termination form on March 7, 2006 (Id. ¶ 39). The next day,

JPMorgan Chase terminated Plaintiff’s employment (Id.).

On April 2, 2007, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint asserting two claims: (1) sex

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, et seq. and (2) violation of the Arizona Wage Act, A.R.S. § 23-350 et seq. After

ruling on an earlier motion for summary judgment, the Court permitted Plaintiff to file a

Second Amended Complaint in order to correct the name of Defendant (Dkt. 90).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law

determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the

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evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden

of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment

need not produce evidence “in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid

summary judgment.” Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant “may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint

Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Strike

Plaintiff continues to disregard the Court’s rules and directives. Furthermore, Plaintiff

repeatedly raises the same issues that the Court has already ruled upon.

Plaintiff previously made improper objections to evidence despite the Court’s

directive to comply with Local Rule 7.2(m)(2). The rule establishes that a party must object

to evidence in its responsive statement of facts, and an objection may not be presented in a

separate filing. LRCiv 7.2(m)(2). Plaintiff has again made improper objections by filing a

separate motion to strike and objecting to evidence in her response, rather than her responsive

statement of facts. Plaintiff has continually disregarded proper procedures, and the Court has

already advised Plaintiff to comply with the rules (See Dkts. 68, 69, 72, and 75).

Furthermore, Plaintiff previously raised the issues that she raises again in her

objections to evidence and motion to strike. Plaintiff again argues that JPMorgan Chase

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should not be allowed to introduce testimony other than the tape itself because JPMorgan

Chase allegedly wrongfully destroyed the tape. In ruling on the earlier motion for summary

judgment, the Court found that although the tape would be the best evidence, Plaintiff has

not shown JPMorgan Chase destroyed the original tape in bad faith so that other evidence

of the recording’s contents is inadmissible (Dkt. 69). Although the tape has not been

produced, individuals can still testify to the effect that the tape had on their state of mind

when deciding whether to terminate Plaintiff. Plaintiff simply repeats her earlier argument,

and the Court has already determined this issue. To the extent that Plaintiff’s objections and

motion to strike request the Court to reconsider the issue, Plaintiff has not met the standard

for reconsideration. Plaintiff’s objections are overruled and her motion is denied.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

JPMorgan Chase seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims, asserting there are

no genuine issues of disputed fact from which a jury could conclude that it discriminated and

retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of Title VII. Specifically, JPMorgan Chase asserts

that the evidence shows it terminated Plaintiff for a legitimate non-discriminatory reason

when her supervisors concluded she had deliberately falsified information on a loan

application, and there is no evidence of pretext. Therefore, JPMorgan Chase is entitled to

summary judgment on her claims of retaliation and sex discrimination under Title VII.

I. Sex Discrimination

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a sex discrimination claim against

JPMorgan Chase for “terminating Plaintiff and treating her differently than male employees

in similar situations” (Dkt. 10, ¶ 13). Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis

of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

A. Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must offer proof that (1) she

is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she experienced

an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside her protected

class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse

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employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then

defendant has the burden of producing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its

employment decision. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). If

defendant meets this burden, plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of material fact that

defendant’s reason is a pretext for discrimination – i.e., the reason is false or the true reason

was a discriminatory one. See id.

The Court previously found that Plaintiff produced the minimal requisite degree of

proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination (Dkt. 69). The burden

then shifted to JPMorgan Chase to produce evidence of a legitimate and non-discriminatory

reason for terminating Plaintiff. Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir.

2003).

B. Legitimate and Non-discriminatory Reasons

By presenting evidence of Plaintiff’s improper and potentially fraudulent conduct

regarding a home loan, JPMorgan Chase has met its burden of showing that it terminated

Plaintiff for legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons (See DSOF ¶ 42). After Mr.

Mariaca’s property was appraised at $130,000 and not $250,000, JPMorgan Chase

employees reviewed a recording of the call and discovered that Mr. Mariaca had twice

disclosed the value of $130,000 (Id. ¶ 24). Ms. Anders informed Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish

of this discovery by email (Id. ¶ 25). Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish listened to the call and also

examined the RCO records (Id. ¶ 27-28). Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish had Plaintiff listen to

a recording of the call, and Ms. Gregory “discussed with Plaintiff her conclusion that

Plaintiff had falsified the value of the customer’s property in order to obtain a lower interest

rate” (Id. ¶¶ 34-35; PFSOF ¶¶ 34-35). After their investigation, Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish

recommended Plaintiff’s termination (DSOF ¶ 39).

Based on the evidence obtained during JPMorgan Chase’s investigation of Plaintiff,

Ms. Gregory concluded that Plaintiff had deliberately falsified information on a loan

application (Id. ¶ 42). Ms. Gregory declared, “[m]y decision to terminate [Plaintiff’s]

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employment was based solely upon my conclusion that she had deliberately falsified

information on a loan application and nothing to do with [Plaintiff’s] sex, female” (Dkt. 59,

Ex. 2, Decl. of Laura Gregory ¶ 40). Similarly, Mr. Fish concluded that Plaintiff’s conduct

was inappropriate and had legitimate concerns about potential loan fraud, and therefore he

recommended Plaintiff’s termination (DSOF ¶ 39). In fact, there was a consensus between

Human Resources, Ms. Gregory, and Mr. Fish that Plaintiff should be terminated (Id.). By

producing evidence that it was concerned about Plaintiff’s workplace misconduct based on

its investigation, JPMorgan Chase has met its burden of demonstrating a legitimate and

non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment.

C. Pretext

Plaintiff is now required to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of

fact as to whether JPMorgan Chase’s legitimate and non-discriminatory reason was a mere

pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff “can show pretext directly, by showing that

discrimination more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the

employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence” because it is inconsistent or otherwise not

believable. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641; Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d

1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005). “To show pretext using circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must

put forward specific and substantial evidence challenging the credibility of the employer’s

motives.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642; Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222

(9th Cir. 1998) (“[Circumstantial] evidence of ‘pretense’ must be ‘specific’ and ‘substantial’

in order to create a triable issue with respect to whether the employer intended to

discriminate on the basis of sex.”).

Plaintiff has not advanced any arguments to establish pretext. In fact, the word

“pretext” does not even appear in Plaintiff’s response. The Court permitted an additional

motion for summary judgment specifically to address the issues of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons and pretext for Plaintiff’s sex discrimination and retaliation claims

(Dkt. 69). Plaintiff is mistaken that Defendant’s second motion for summary judgment is “no

different” than Defendant’s first motion for summary judgment and should be denied for this

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reason (Dkt. 87, 1:17-19). The Court denied JPMorgan Chase’s first motion for summary

judgment because Plaintiff was unable to respond to JPMorgan Chase’s arguments regarding

a legitimate non-discriminatory reason and pretext. Defendant raised these arguments for the

first time in its reply, and therefore, the Court declined to consider them without first giving

Plaintiff an opportunity to respond. Despite the Court affording Plaintiff an opportunity to

respond to the issue of pretext, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to create

a genuine issue of fact as to whether JPMorgan Chase’s legitimate and non-discriminatory

reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.

Plaintiff has not advanced any direct or indirect evidence showing that Ms. Gregory’s,

Mr. Fish’s, or JPMorgan Chase’s motives were discriminatory. Plaintiff does not argue that

Ms. Gregory or Mr. Fish were biased against Plaintiff based on her gender. Plaintiff focuses

much of her response on Mr. Tullock and Mr. Reese, who she argues are similarly situated

male employees who were treated more favorably than her, which is the fourth element for

establishing a prima facie case under Title VII. As the same evidence that makes out a prima

facie case may be relied upon to establish pretext, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s argument

as her position regarding pretext. See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 732 (9th

Cir. 1986). At most, though, Plaintiff’s discussion of Mr. Tullock and Mr. Reese allows the

Court to infer that JPMorgan Chase conducted its investigation of her in a different manner

from other investigations. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, for the

reasons discussed below, this argument does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether JPMorgan Chase terminated Plaintiff because she is a woman.

1. Ms. Gregory’s or Mr. Fish’s Intent Does Not Demonstrate Pretext

Plaintiff has offered no direct evidence of discriminatory intent. “Direct evidence is

evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or

presumption.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in

original). Where an individual who exhibits bias has significant influence or leverage over

the formal decision maker, such evidence is sufficient evidence of discrimination to defeat

summary judgment. Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1040 n.5.

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Plaintiff has not alleged that anyone made any sexually discriminatory statements

about her or displayed a discriminatory attitude toward her. In fact, Plaintiff submitted

evidence of excellent performance reviews by Mr. Fish, her direct supervisor (Dkt. 61, Ex.

H-3; Dkt. 88, Ex. B). At the end of 2005, which was just months before her March 2006

termination, Mr. Fish reported:

Cindy received her Lending Authority in November and has been held to

full goals and standards since that time. She has exceeded volume goals and

has passed her quality audits both months averaging over $4.5 million in

volume with a cumulative error rate less than 2%. She was December’s top

producer for our team with over $4.6 million in volume. Cindy has great

conversions from Call to Application, Application to Vendor and Vendor to

Book. She excels in each of the fundamentals of the job itself, but could

benefit from more focus on the additional criteria such as One Protect and

Service Observes. Cindy also has a strong grasp of product knowledge and is

self motivated towards her individual improvements.

Id. In previous years, Plaintiff received performance ratings of “exceptional achievement”

in 2000 and 2001, “exceeds expectations” in 2002, and “meets expectations” in 2003 and

2004 (PSSOF ¶ 2). Up until the time of the alleged fraud, Plaintiff has not shown that her

supervisor made any discriminatory, or even negative, comments about her. In fact, the

performance review shows that her supervisor valued her work. Plaintiff has not produced

any evidence that Mr. Fish or JPMorgan Chase discriminated against her before her

termination.

Moreover, while Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish may have had significant influence or

leverage over the formal decision to terminate Plaintiff because they recommended Plaintiff’s

termination, Plaintiff has not shown that they exhibited any bias toward her. See

Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1040 n.5. First, Plaintiff has not shown that Ms. Gregory or

Mr. Fish made the ultimate termination decision because Plaintiff only alleges that they

recommended termination. Even if they had significant influence over the formal decision,

Plaintiff has offered no evidence that their decision was motivated by gender bias. In his

deposition, Mr. Fish testified that his termination recommendation was “based on the

information [he] had” (Dkt. 59, Ex. 8, 14: 4-7). Moreover, “[a]s a personal preference of

having her as a producer on [his] team, [he] would have liked to have kept [Plaintiff]” (Id.).

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Furthermore, Plaintiff has offered no evidence of discriminatory remarks made by any other

person who assisted in the investigation or who ultimately decided upon Plaintiff’s

termination. In addition to failing to present evidence that Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish had any

bias toward her, Plaintiff produces no direct evidence that the person ultimately responsible

for termination decisions was motivated by discriminatory intent.

2. The Manner of Investigation Does Not Demonstrate Pretext

Although Plaintiff does not expressly argue such, the Court construes Plaintiff’s focus

on Mr. Tullock and Mr. Reese as an argument that the manner in which JPMorgan

investigated her demonstrates pretext because similarly situated males were disciplined

lightly or not at all while she was terminated. Plaintiff presents evidence that she knew of

JPMorgan Chase’s progressive policy for non-intentional acts (PSSOF ¶ 5). Employees

receive a coaching and counseling session, and sometimes they receive an action plan (Id.).

If the non-intentional act occurs again, then the employee receives a written warning (Id.).

JPMorgan Chase never disciplined or warned Plaintiff before her termination (Id. ¶ 6). On

the other hand, Plaintiff concedes that “[a]n employee would only be terminated without a

warning if he/she performed an intentional act, such as theft, came to work intoxicated, or

engaged in fighting” (Id. ¶ 5). Plaintiff’s assertions of circumstantial evidence do not create

a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.

JPMorgan Chase has established that it terminated Plaintiff for alleged fraud, an

intentional act. Plaintiff has not argued that the reason for JPMorgan Chase’s termination

was discriminatory. Instead, Plaintiff denies falsifying customer-stated information, and she

argues that JPMorgan Chase’s determination about the alleged fraud was wrong (Dkt. 60,

9:24; Dkt. 87, 5:18-19). Plaintiff maintains that she did not intend to commit fraud because

she had not performed loan applications for properties in North Carolina before Bank One

merged with JPMorgan Chase, she found the North Carolina formula confusing, and she was

tired that day (PFSOF ¶ 31; Dkt. 88, Ex. A, Decl. of Cindy M. Gil ¶ 7). The Court must view

the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and therefore, the Court will assume

Plaintiff’s explanations are true. However, even if JPMorgan Chase incorrectly determined

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that Plaintiff committed fraud, Plaintiff has not shown that this determination was

discriminatory. While JPMorgan Chase’s reason for terminating Plaintiff could have been

wrong or unfounded, it was not discriminatory.

Plaintiff also relies on the differences in JPMorgan Chase’s discipline between her and

two males, Mr. Tullock and Mr. Reese. Showing that JPMorgan Chase treated similarly

situated employees outside Plaintiff’s protected class more favorably would be probative of

pretext. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. However, individuals are only similarly situated

when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct. Id. In the present case, Plaintiff

has failed to present any evidence that either of the two males were accused of similar

misconduct or misconduct of comparable seriousness. See id. (plaintiff failed to produce

sufficient evidence of pretext where the individuals to which he compared himself were not

similarly situated because they did not hold similar jobs and were not involved in same type

of offense). Although there is evidence that JPMorgan Chase followed different procedures

in the investigations of two males, Plaintiff has conceded that JPMorgan Chase follows a

different procedure when it believes an employee committed an intentional act. JPMorgan

Chase contends that it found Plaintiff’s actions intentional while Mr. Tullock’s and Mr.

Reese’s actions were due to inexperience or very bad customer service, respectively (Dkt.

58, 11:11-13:11). Furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown any evidence that Mr. Tullock’s

supervisors believed he had made deliberate misrepresentations (Id. at 13:2-4). 

In addition, Plaintiff has not shown that Ms. Gregory and Mr. Fish, the persons who

recommended Plaintiff’s termination, conducted both investigations of the two male

employees. JPMorgan Chase maintains that Mr. Reese was not within Ms. Gregory’s chain

of command, and Ms. Gregory did not make decisions regarding his employment (Dkt. 59,

Ex. 2, Decl. of Laura Gregory ¶ 38; Dkt. 64, Ex. 1, Gregory Dep. 100:12-16). Plaintiff has

not shown otherwise. This is significant because the individual in charge of an investigation

has tremendous influence over how the investigation is conducted. See Hollins v. Atlantic

Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that, to be similarly situated, an

employee must have the same supervisor, be subject to the same standards, and have engaged

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in the same conduct), cited with approval in, Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642 n.17; Wheeler v.

Aventis Pharms., 360 F.3d 853, 859 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that technique employed during

an investigation is a matter of business judgment).

The most significant flaw in Plaintiff’s attempt to rely on JPMorgan Chase’s

investigatory techniques as evidence of pretext is that Plaintiff has offered no evidence that

JPMorgan’s reason for terminating her was not its true motive or that its explanation for her

termination is unworthy of credence. See Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743 (9th

Cir. 2004) (plaintiff may prove pretext either directly by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence). Plaintiff has admitted that she

entered incorrect information into the computer on a customer’s loan application in violation

of JPMorgan Chase’s Home Equity Employee Standards policy (DSOF ¶¶ 39-41). Although

Plaintiff contends that she should not have been terminated for cause, she testified three times

in her deposition, “I made an honest mistake” (Dkt. 59, Ex. 2, 5:23, 88:4-16). While Plaintiff

argues that her actions were unintentional, she does not argue that JPMorgan Chase’s belief

that she acted intentionally was not based on good faith or had discriminatory intent behind

it. Essentially, Plaintiff contends the investigation of her was pretext simply because the

decision to terminate her was erroneous. The issue before this Court, however, is not

whether JPMorgan Chase’s conclusions were correct; instead, the issue is whether JPMorgan

Chase conducted a thorough investigation and whether they made credibility determinations

reasonably and in good faith. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063

(9th Cir. 2002) (material fact is not whether employee actually committed misconduct, but

rather, whether employer “honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason is .

. . baseless”) (citation omitted). In the present case, the evidence shows that JPMorgan Chase

conducted a thorough investigation and made reasonable, good faith credibility

determinations (See DSOF ¶¶ 23-41). Differences in the type of discipline in the instant case

and other investigations are not evidence that JPMorgan Chase was motivated by

discriminatory intent, or that JPMorgan Chase’s explanation is not believable for some other

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reason. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642. Nothing in the record contradicts the fact that

JPMorgan Chase honestly and reasonably believed that Plaintiff’s conduct was inappropriate

and potentially fraudulent (DSOF ¶ 30). See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1063. Thus, even

assuming that JPMorgan Chase could have performed a better investigation or its conclusion

was incorrect, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that JPMorgan’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were a pretext.

Plaintiff has not offered any direct evidence that JPMorgan Chase was motivated by

discriminatory intent. Nor has she shown that JPMorgan Chase’s explanation is not

believable for some other reason. To show pretext using circumstantial evidence, Plaintiff

was required to put forward specific and substantial evidence challenging the credibility of

JPMorgan Chase’s motives. She has failed to do so.

II. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Dkt. 10, First Am. Compl. ¶ 14). To establish a prima facie

retaliation claim under Title VII, an employee must show that (1) she engaged in a protected

activity; (2) her employer subjected her to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal

link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Passantino v. Johnson &

Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000); Ray v. Henderson, 217

F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969

(9th Cir. 2002). If a plaintiff has shown a prima facie retaliation claim, then the burden shifts

to the defendant to furnish legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment

action. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240.

If the defendant meets that burden, then the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of

demonstrating that the reason was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Id. The

plaintiff may show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062.

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Circumstantial evidence relied on to show pretext must be “both specific and substantial.”

Id.

Previously, the Court ruled that only Plaintiff’s unpaid March commissions are at

issue. Additionally, the Court held that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity by filing her

charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC on March 8, 2006 and suffered an adverse

employment action by not receiving the March commissions. After this ruling, Plaintiff

sought leave to amend her complaint for the third time in order to add the allegation that

JPMorgan Chase delayed payment of her February and March 1-8, 2006 commissions (Dkt.

85). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint (Dkt. 98).

A. Causal Link

To establish causation for the unpaid March commissions, Plaintiff relied solely on

timing (Dkt. 60, 13:22). On March 7, 2006, the day of her termination, Plaintiff alleges that

Mr. Fish told Plaintiff she would be paid her March commissions (Dkt. 88, Ex. A, Decl. of

Cindy M. Gil ¶ 13). On the same day, Plaintiff informed Mr. Fish and Mr. Gregory that she

believed she was being fired because of sex discrimination, and on the next day, Plaintiff

filed her charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9). Plaintiff asserts that a

causal connection between the March 8, 2006 EEOC charge and JPMorgan Chase’s decision

not to pay her March commission may be inferred from the temporal proximity. While this

assertion is accurate, see Miller, 797 F.2d at 731, it is also problematic.

Proximity of time between protected activity and an adverse action may support an

inference of causation. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244. “It is [also] important to emphasize that it

is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case,

and temporal proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis from which an inference can

be drawn.” Porter v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added)

(citing Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)). Thus, the

Court must look not only to timing but to all of the circumstances to determine whether an

inference of causation is possible. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 978 (9th

Cir. 2003).

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At the time of the first motion for summary judgment, JPMorgan Chase had not

clearly demonstrated an alternative reason or other circumstances that the Court must look

to for determining whether a causation inference is possible (Dkt. 69, 13:4-6). JPMorgan

Chase also did not clearly submit a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for denying the

March commissions in its motion so that Plaintiff could respond to it. 

JPMorgan Chase asserts it paid Plaintiff her full March 2006 commissions in

accordance with its policy (Dkt. 76, 8:24-9:17). Plaintiff has not responded to this argument.

The Incentive Pay Plan states that “Participants who fail to comply with the policies and

standards identified herein may be denied all or a portion of their Compensation and be

subject to corrective action, up to and including termination” (Dkt. 59, Ex. 4, Incentive Pay

Plan § H.2). Under the Incentive Pay Plan’s monthly commission terms, “[a] Participant who

is involuntarily terminated for cause will be paid incentives for loans that book up to and

including the last day the Participant actively worked, as long as the performance criteria

outlined in the terms and conditions have been met for the measurement period” (Id. at §

I.2.4) (emphasis in original). Different terms apply for voluntary terminations or transfers,

involuntary terminations due to a reduction in force or job elimination, or leave of absence

or termination as a result of death (See id. at § I.2.1-3). JPMorgan Chase maintains it paid

Plaintiff all her wages due because she was terminated for cause (Dkt. 76, 9:8-17).

Furthermore, it maintains that the decision to pay Plaintiff only for her March 1st - 8th

commissions, and not for loans that closed after March 8, 2006, was based upon the terms

of its Incentive Pay Plan and not retaliation for Plaintiff’s EEOC charge (Id.). JPMorgan

Chase further asserts there is no evidence to the contrary (Id.). Indeed, Plaintiff has failed

to produce evidence that she was ever the subject of gender animus.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a causal link as a matter of law,

because she presents no evidence – other than the proximity in time between the protected

activity and the adverse action – to support an inference of causation. Under the

circumstances of this case, the proximity in time between Plaintiff’s EEOC charge and the

adverse employment action indicates very little about causation because – before she

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engaged in the protected activity – Plaintiff had already been informed of the loan fraud

accusations against her and been terminated (PSSOF ¶¶ 12-14). Thus, rather than raising an

inference of retaliation or causation, the proximity in timing here was legitimately dictated

by external forces. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272-74 (2001)

(“Employers need not suspend previously planned transfers upon discovering that a Title VII

suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet

definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of causality.”).

The causal inference that may be drawn from the temporal proximity fails to persuade

the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated JPMorgan Chase, or that

JPMorgan Chase’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at

1062. The Court should not look only at the length of time, without regard to factual

circumstances, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 978

(“In some cases, the totality of the facts may form such a clear picture that a district court

would be justified in granting summary judgment, either for or against a plaintiff, on the

issue of retaliatory motive . . .”). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated JPMorgan Chase, or that the JPMorgan Chase’s proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence. Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. The totality of the facts

“form such a clear picture” to justify granting summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan

Chase on the issue of retaliatory motives. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 978.

B. Pretext

Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of

retaliation, summary judgment will be granted for JPMorgan Chase because it has presented

evidence of legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for not paying the commissions.

JPMorgan Chase paid Plaintiff her commissions in accordance with its Home Equity

Employee Standards policies regarding termination for cause. Furthermore, JPMorgan Chase

terminated Plaintiff for cause for committing loan fraud, and Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that reason was pretextual. Supra at 8-14. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff could

establish a prima facie case based on temporal proximity, she has not produced evidence

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2

 In her Complaint, Plaintiff only alleged JPMorgan Chase’s failure to provide Plaintiff her

commissions earned in March 2006 and made no mention of the delayed February or March 1st -

8th commissions (Dkt. 10, Am. Compl. ¶ 23).

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sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that JPMorgan Chase’s nonpayment of

her commissions in accordance with its policy was mere pretext for retaliation.

“When a motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party may not rest upon

mere allegations [or] denials of pleadings, but [its] response must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Brinson, 53 F.3d at 1049; see Celotex, 477

U.S. at 324 (“Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”). This

principle is especially important here because the parties filed the motions for summary

judgment after substantial discovery, and discovery has closed. JPMorgan Chase has shown

that “there is an absence of evidence to support [Plaintiff’s] case.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at

325. Furthermore, although Plaintiff made a prima facie showing on her disparate treatment

claim and, possibly, her retaliation claim, she failed to produce any evidence to create a

genuine issue of material fact that JPMorgan’s legitimate reasons for terminating her were

pretextual. See id. at 323. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment in JPMorgan

Chase’s favor on Count One.

III. Arizona Wage Act

In Count 2, Plaintiff seeks treble damages under the Arizona Wage Act, A.R.S. § 23-

350 et seq., for JPMorgan Chase’s failure to pay her commissions earned in March 2006

(Dkt. 10, Am. Compl. ¶ 23).2

 The Court previously held that Plaintiff raised a dispute over

a genuine issue of material fact that she is entitled to the March commissions under

JPMorgan Chase’s Incentive Pay Plan.

However, Plaintiff has alleged her March 8th - 31st commissions total $4,261.41

(PFSOF ¶ 61). Even if this amount is trebled, it results in a maximum of $12,784.23 that she

is entitled to under the Arizona statute, which is below the minimum amount in controversy

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required for diversity jurisdiction. Furthermore, as summary judgment has been granted in

JPMorgan Chase’s favor on the federal Title VII claims, the Court declines to exercise

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Arizona Wage Act claim and will remand it to Maricopa County

Superior Court.

CONCLUSION

Summary judgment is proper as to Plaintiff’s claims of sex discrimination and

retaliation under Title VII. Both of Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff

has not shown that JPMorgan Chase’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating

her were pretext. On the other hand, Plaintiff has raised a dispute over a genuine issue of

material fact for her Arizona Wage Act claim, but the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction

over it.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Dkt. 89) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant JPMorgan Chase’s Motion for

Summary Judgment RE: Legitimate Non-discriminatory Reason and Pretext (Dkt. 76) is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in

JPMorgan Chase’s favor on Plaintiff’s claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in

violation of Title VII under Count One of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 91).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s remaining claim under the Arizona

Wage Act, A.R.S. § 23-355, is REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of Arizona

in and for the County of Maricopa for all further proceedings.

DATED this 9th day of June, 2009.

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