Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01887/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01887-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs.

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ARI MAKINEN,

NO. CIV. S-06-01887 FCD/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DANIEL LITTLE and ANGIE

LITTLE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants Daniel

Little and Angie Little’s (collectively, “defendants”) motion to

dismiss plaintiff Ari Makinen’s (“plaintiff”) complaint due to

lack of standing and improper venue. In the alternative,

defendants move to transfer this action to the District Court for

the Western District of Oklahoma. For the reasons set forth

below, defendants’ motions are DENIED.1

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BACKGROUND

On or about November 14, 2004, the parties executed a “Truck

Modification Agreement” and transportation agreement while in El

Dorado County, California. (Pl.’s First Am. Verified Compl.,

filed Oct. 30, 2006 [“FAC”], 2:24-26.) Under these contracts,

defendants agreed to convert plaintiff’s 1995 Hummer H-1 from a

four-wheel drive vehicle to a six-wheel drive/steering vehicle.

(Id. at 2:26-27.) Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to defendants

in El Dorado County, where defendants took possession of the

vehicle and hauled it to Lawton, Oklahoma. (Id. at 3:8-12.) The

contracts provided that defendants would commence work on the

vehicle on or about November 15, 2004, and complete the

modifications by January 1, 2005. (Id. at 2:27-3:2.) Plaintiff

asserts that defendants assured him that the work staff necessary

to complete the tasks on his vehicle were available and would be

devoted to the vehicle’s modifications. (Id. at 3:4-6.)

In March 2005, two months after the agreed upon completion

date, plaintiff requested that defendants return the vehicle to

El Dorado County, California. (Id. at 3:14-15.) A year later,

in April 2006, defendants brought the vehicle to El Dorado

County, where plaintiff took possession of the vehicle. (Id. at

3:15-17.) Upon inspection of the vehicle, plaintiff found that

the modifications contracted for were incomplete and that the

vehicle could not be driven. (Id. at 3:17-19.) Plaintiff

contacted defendants regarding the condition of the vehicle. 

(Id. at 3:19.) 

In response to plaintiff’s complaints, defendants sent an

employee to El Dorado County to complete the tasks described in

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the Truck Modification Agreement and to make repairs to the

vehicle. (Id. at 3:20-21.) Defendants’ employee completed these

tasks at plaintiff’s place of business in El Dorado County. (Id.

at 22-23.) Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of defendants’

delay in delivering the vehicle with the modifications contracted

for by the parties, he suffered damages. Plaintiff brings claims

for breach of contract and fraud. (Id. at 7-8.) 

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s action on the

grounds of lack of standing to sue and improper venue. In the

alternative, defendants seek to transfer this action to an

alternate venue. 

ANALYSIS

A. Lack of Standing to Sue

Defendants seek dismissal on the ground that Ari Makinen

Enterprises, Inc. is not a party to the contract. In particular,

defendants contend that Ari Makinen Enterprises, Inc. lacks

standing to sue because the contract between the parties was

entered into and signed by plaintiff Ari Makinen, individually,

and not by Ari Makinen Enterprises, Inc. (Notice of Mot. and

Mot. to Dismiss, filed Oct. 4, 2006 [“Mot’n”], at 2:4-6.) 

Under Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(“Rule 17(a)”), an action shall be prosecuted in the name of the

real party in interest. Rule 17(a) also states that “[n]o action

shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the

name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has

been allowed ... for ratification of commencement of the action

by ... the real party in interest.” 

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After defendants filed this motion, plaintiff filed an

amended complaint correcting the identity of the real party in

interest. A substitution of plaintiffs is liberally allowed when

the change is merely formal and in no way alters the original

complaint’s factual allegations. See Raynor Bros. v. American

Cyanimid Co., 695 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir.) (stating that “when

the original plaintiff and the substituted plaintiff have

sufficient identity of interests, relation back of the amendment

is not prejudicial to the defendant”). Here, plaintiff’s first

amended complaint merely substituted plaintiff’s name in place of

the corporation and did not alter the factual allegations. The

substitution of individual plaintiff in the stead of plaintiff’s

corporation does not alter the allegations in the original

complaint. Plaintiff Ari Makinen is the real party in interest

because he signed the contract at issue in this litigation. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing to

sue is DENIED.

B. Improper Venue 

Defendants assert that this district is an improper venue

because a substantial amount of work was not performed in

California and all of their witnesses reside in Oklahoma. 

Plaintiff argues that California is a proper venue because a

substantial part of the events occurred in California. (Opp’n at

4.) 

Venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. In particular,

section 1391(a)(2) provides that “a civil action wherein

jurisdiction is filed only on diversity of citizenship may . . .

be brought only in ... a judicial district in which a substantial

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part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject

of the action is situated. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (West 2006). 

Although it is possible to find proper venue in more than one

district, plaintiffs must show that a substantial part of the

events giving rise to their claims arose in the chosen district. 

See Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131,

1136 (N.D. Cal. 2000). In contract actions, relevant factors to

consider in determining whether venue is proper include the

following: (1) where the contract was signed; (2) where the

negotiations took place; and, (3) where the performance or breach

occurred. See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1076

(9th Cir. 2001). 

The parties agree that the Truck Modification Agreement was

signed in California. However, the parties do not agree on the

location of where negotiations of the contract took place. 

Defendants contend that the contract was primarily negotiated in

Oklahoma, but admit that some negotiations took place in

California. (Mot’n at 4:8-10.) Plaintiff contends that the

contract was negotiated in California. (FAC at 2:10-11.) 

The parties also dispute whether performance and breach of

contract occurred in California. In determining the location of

where performance or breach of the contract occurred, the court

focuses on the activities of defendants rather than the

activities of plaintiff. See Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321

F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (11th Cir. 2003); See also Woodke v. Dahm, 70

F.3d 983, 985 (8th Cir. 1995). Defendants executed the Truck

Modification Agreement in California, hauled the vehicle from

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California to Oklahoma, and returned the vehicle to California. 

(FAC at 2-3.) Defendants also agreed to complete the

modifications to the vehicle in approximately six weeks, between

November 15, 2004 and January 1, 2005. (FAC at 2:27-3:2.) 

Defendants, however, delivered the vehicle to plaintiff in El

Dorado County nearly a year-and-a-half later. (FAC at 3:15-17.) 

Subsequently, defendants sent a mechanic to California to make

repairs to the vehicle. (FAC at 3:20-23.) The mechanic spent

three months repairing the vehicle at plaintiff’s place of

business in El Dorado County. (Decl. of Joe Brleitich, filed

Nov. 13, 2006.) Plaintiff also contends that defendants made

false representations of their expertise and knowledge of Hummer

vehicles while in California. (FAC at 5:19-25.) Plaintiff’s

cause of action for fraud arises from these representations.

Although the vehicle was in Oklahoma for over a year for

modifications, the contract was signed in California, the

contract was at least partially, if not entirely, negotiated in

California, defendants’ mechanic spent three months repairing the

vehicle in California, and the representations giving rise to

plaintiff’s fraud claim were made in California. Based upon the

facts before it, the court cannot find that venue is improper in

this district. See Rodriguez, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1136 (indicating

that proper venue is not necessarily found in the district where

a predominate portion of the events occurred but rather, in a

district where a substantial part of the events occurred that

gave rise to plaintiff’s claim). Therefore, because a

substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiff’s breach

of contract and fraud claims took place in California, the court

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2 The court does not consider defendants’ motion to

transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) because this district is

a proper venue to litigate this action.

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finds that this district is a proper venue to litigate this

action. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground of improper

venue is DENIED.2

C. Transfer of Venue

In the alternative, defendants seek to transfer this action

to the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 

Defendants assert that the Oklahoma district court is a more

convenient venue for their witnesses than this district. (Mot’n

at 4:11-23.) Plaintiff, however, contends that defendants have

not met their heavy burden of showing that transfer of venue,

under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), is warranted. (Opp’n at 6:26-7:10.)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may “for the

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice

. . . transfer any civil action to any other district where it

might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). A defendant

moving to transfer venue under § 1404(a) must satisfy both of the

following requirements: (1) the transferee district is one in

which the action might have been brought originally; and, (2)

transfer will enhance the convenience of the parties and

witnesses, and is in the interests of justice. See Van Dusen v.

Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). In considering the second

requirement, the court employs a case by case analysis, which may

include evaluation of the following factors: (1) the plaintiff’s

choice of forum; (2) the respective parties’ contacts with the

forum; (3) the availability of compulsory process; (4) the

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3 Defendants assert the District Court for the Western

District of Oklahoma is a proper venue to litigate this action

for two reasons: (1) that court holds personal jurisdiction over

them; and, (2) defendants’ witnesses reside in that district.

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convenience of parties and witnesses; and, (5) judicial economy. 

See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th

Cir. 2000).

Assuming that the Western District of Oklahoma is a proper

venue, defendants’ showing, in light of the factors described in

Jones, is insufficient to persuade the court that transfer of

venue is appropriate.3 Courts generally afford considerable

weight to plaintiff’s choice of forum. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d

730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, plaintiff brought the instant

action in this forum and his choice of forum should not be

disturbed unless defendants “make a strong showing of

inconvenience to warrant” such a transfer. Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff has substantial contacts with this forum because

of his residence in El Dorado County and ownership of a

commercial tour business in this forum. Defendants, however,

argue that their contact with this forum is limited because they

primarily conduct their vehicle modification business in

Oklahoma. However, defendants had the following contacts with

this forum: the execution of the Truck Modification Agreement in

El Dorado County; the hauling of plaintiff’s vehicle from El

Dorado County to Oklahoma; the return of plaintiff’s vehicle to

El Dorado County; and, the subsequent repair of plaintiff’s

vehicle in El Dorado County.

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4 Defendants also identified Butch and Gordon Heying

(“Heyings”) as potential witnesses from Oklahoma that would

suffer hardship if summoned to testify in California. The

Heyings, however, were never contacted by defendants concerning

their potential testimony. In addition, the Heyings are willing

to travel to California to testify. (Decl. of Butch Heying,

filed Nov. 13, 2006; Decl. of Gordon Heying, filed Nov. 13,

2006.) 

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The convenience of witnesses is considered the most

important factor in a transfer of venue analysis. L.A. Memorial

Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 501

(C.D. Cal. 1981). Defendants contend that the availability of

compulsory process is a factor which weighs in favor of transfer

from this district because defendants have identified witnesses

from Oklahoma that will be summoned for trial but cannot be

compelled to travel to California. Defendants list 28 potential

witnesses from Oklahoma that would suffer hardship in traveling

to California for trial. (Decl. of Daniel Little in Reply to

Pl.’s Opposition to Mot. to Dismiss, filed Nov. 9, 2006

[“Reply”]). Among these witnesses, defendants identify Joe

Brleitich, a mechanic who worked on the vehicle in both Oklahoma

and California, as their “key witness.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendants

allege that Mr. Brleitich cannot afford to travel to California

to testify and cannot be compelled to do so. (Id.) However,

defendants never contacted Mr. Brleitich about testifying at

trial or whether traveling to California would be inconvenient.

(Decl. of Joe Brleitich, filed Nov. 13, 2006, ¶ 4.) In fact, Mr.

Brleitich now lives in California and is willing to testify in

this case. (Id. ¶¶ 1 & 3.)4 Since defendants’ “key witness”

resides in California and is subject to compulsory service of

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process in California, this factor does not weigh in defendants’

favor. 

 This district has a significant interest in having local

interests decided at home. See Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 21 F.3d

509, 512 (9th Cir. 2000)(suggesting that local courts have an

interest in adjudicating disputes arising from its forum). In

this case, plaintiff’s breach of contract claim arose from an

agreement executed in this forum between resident plaintiff and

out-of-state defendants. Further, plaintiff’s claim for fraud

stemmed from alleged misrepresentations made by out-of-state

defendants in this forum.

On balance, defendants have not met their heavy burden of

showing sufficient inconvenience to themselves or non-party

witnesses in having the trial held in this district. Therefore,

defendants’ motion to transfer venue is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 27, 2006.

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