Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00361/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00361-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

William Elvis Holland, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00361-PHX-PGR (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 William Elvis Holland filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, challenging his 

convictions in the Maricopa County Superior Court on three counts of sexual conduct 

with a minor. Respondents claim the Petition should be dismissed because it is untimely 

and because the claims are either unexhausted or procedurally barred. As described 

below, the Court recommends that Holland’s Amended Petition be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 On March 18, 2009, a jury in the Maricopa County Superior Court found William 

Elvis Holland guilty on two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor and one 

count of molestation of a child. (Doc. 10, Ex. C) The Court subsequently sentenced 

Holland to 17 years in prison to be followed by lifetime probation. (Doc. 10, Ex. D) 

 Holland timely appealed. (Doc. 10, Exs. E, F) His attorney found no arguable 

issues and filed a brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals in accordance with Anders v. 

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California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). (Doc. 10, Ex. G) His attorney also requested that 

Holland be permitted to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. (Doc. 10, Ex. H) 

Holland did not do so. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Holland’s convictions. 

(Doc. 10, Ex. I) Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that the Superior Court’s 

instructions for the jury to disregard the statements made by a witness regarding events 

that occurred in Alaska (“Alaska Testimony”) was not a fundamental error. Id. The 

Court reasoned that, in light of testimony by the victim and by Holland, the verdict would 

not have been different if the jury had not heard the Alaska testimony. Id. The Court did 

not review any other part of the trial for fundamental error. Holland did not move for 

reconsideration and did not petition to the Arizona Supreme Court for review. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. K) The Court of Appeals issued its order and mandate on May 13, 2010. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. J) 

 On June 24, 2010, Holland filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in Maricopa 

County Superior Court. (Doc. 10, Ex. L) Holland was appointed counsel who 

subsequently notified the Court that there were no viable issues under Rule 32 and then 

requested, and received, an extension to allow Holland to file a pro per Petition. (Doc. 

10, Exs. P, Q, R) As relevant here, the Petition argued that (1) the admission of the 

Alaska Testimony denied Holland a fair trial; (2) Holland was prejudiced when the 

Superior Court allowed the trial to continue after it appeared that a witness was 

attempting to coach the victim through her testimony (“Coached Testimony”); (3) a 

witness should have been precluded because her testimony was not timely disclosed 

(“Untimely Witness Testimony”); (4) Holland received ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel because his attorneys did not argue that the Coached Testimony was 

prejudicial. (Doc. 10, Ex. S) 

 After his Petition was fully briefed, the Superior Court denied Holland’s Petition. 

(Doc. 10, Exs. T, U, V) Specifically, the Court found that the Alaska Testimony claim 

was precluded by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(2) because the claim was 

raised on appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals where it was “adjudicated on the merits 

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against Holland,” the Coached Testimony and the Untimely Testimony claims were 

precluded by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) because Holland “failed to 

raise the issues on [direct] appeal,” and that Holland did not “set forth a colorable claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 10, Ex. V) 

 Holland then timely petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. (Doc. 10, 

Ex. W) At the completion of briefing, the Court of Appeals denied his petition for review 

on January 31, 2014. (Doc. 10, Exs. X, Y, Z) Holland did not appeal that denial to the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 10, Ex. AA) 

 On February 27, 2015, Holland filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in 

this Court which was dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend because he 

had used the full name of the minor victim. (Docs. 1, 4) On April 24, 2015, Holland 

filed his Amended Petition (Doc. 5) Respondents contend that his Amended Petition is 

untimely and not entitled to equitable tolling, and that Holland’s claims are unexhausted 

and procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 10) 

ANALYSIS 

Respondents’ first argument is that Holland’s Amended Petition is untimely and 

should be dismissed. As described below, the Court finds that Holland’s Amended 

Petition relates back to his timely filed first Petition. Accordingly, this argument is not 

well taken. 

 Timeliness of Petition. A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state 

court conviction is required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily 

tolled during the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the 

State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

 On May 13, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate in Holland’s 

direct appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. J) Holland then had 35 days, until June 17, 2010, to timely 

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initiate post-conviction relief. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a); State v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535, 

573 P.2d 1388, 1389 (1978). Instead, Holland did not file his notice of post-conviction 

relief until June 24, 2010, seven days after the deadline. (Doc 10, Ex. L) Isley v. Ariz. 

Dept. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The language and 

structure of the Arizona post-conviction rules demonstrate that the proceedings begin 

with the filing of the Notice.”) This means that the one-year period of limitations ran for 

seven days. 

 Thereafter, the period of limitations remained tolled until the Court of Appeals 

denied Holland’s petition for review from the Superior Court’s denial of his petition for 

post-conviction relief on Friday, January 31, 2014. (Doc. 10, Ex. Z) On the following 

Monday, February 3, 2014, the time period began for Holland to file a petition for review 

with the Arizona Supreme Court and it ended 35 days later on March 10, 2014. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 1.3(a), 31.19(a). See also State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 261, 782 P.2d 737 (1989) 

(applying Rule 1.3(a) to Rule 31.3 deadline for notices of appeal); State v. Savage, 117 

Ariz. 535, 573 P.2d 1388 (1978) (applying Rule 1.3(a) to Rule 32.9(c) deadline for 

petition for review from denial of motion for rehearing in PCR proceeding); and State v. 

Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 786 P.3d 956 (1990) (citing applying Rule 1.3 to time for notice 

of appeal delivered to attorneys’ courthouse internal mailbox). 

 Holland did not file anything with the Arizona Supreme Court and so his one year 

clock began again on March 10, 2014. Because Holland had already used seven days of 

his one year clock, he only had 358 days remaining. Thus, he had to file his Habeas 

Petition in this Court by March 3, 2015. He did, but his first Petition was dismissed 

without prejudice and with leave to amend so that Holland could edit out the victim’s 

name. (Docs. 1, 4) He then filed his Amended Petition on April 24, 2015. (Doc. 5) 

Because both of Holland’s Petitions “state claims that are tied to a common core of 

operative facts, relation back will be in order.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005). 

Thus, his Amended Petition relates back to his first Petition and so the claims in the 

Amended Petition are timely. 

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 However, even though Holland’s Amended Petition is timely, most of the claims 

were not exhausted or are subject to a procedural bar and, therefore, cannot be reviewed 

on the merits. 

 Exhaustion. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before 

this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), 

(c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting 

claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan 

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To be fairly presented, 

a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the specific federal legal 

theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 

162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Bars. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied procedural 

bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express procedural 

bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural bar “that is 

both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the 

court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of federal 

law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits”); 

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist when a state 

strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); 

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

Alaska Testimony. Holland’s Amended Petition argues that the Alaska Testimony 

violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although Holland never raised this (or 

any other) claim in his direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals did address the Alaska 

Testimony on state law grounds. (Doc. 10, Ex. I) However, Holland did not raise the 

federal nature of the Alaska Testimony claim in state court and so this claim is not 

exhausted for purposes of Holland’s Amended Petition. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162-63 (citing 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971)) (“for purposes of exhausting state remedies, a 

claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal 

constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to 

relief”). Moreover, the Alaska Testimony claim is now subject to an implied procedural 

bar because no state remedies remain available to Holland. 

Coached Testimony. Holland’s first claim, that the admission of the Coached 

Testimony violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment, is subject to an express 

procedural bar. In its review of Holland’s Petition of Post-Conviction Relief, the 

Superior Court found that this claim was precluded by Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.3(a)(3), because it should have been raised on direct appeal. (Doc. 10, Ex. 

V) Since the Superior Court dismissed this claim based on a procedural bar “that is both 

‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the Court’s 

decision,” Holland’s Coached Testimony claim is subject to an express procedural bar. 

Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. 

Untimely Witness Testimony. Holland’s Amended Petition argues that the 

Untimely Witness provided testimony that was inconclusive and only based on her own 

opinion. In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Holland only raised the question of 

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when this witness’ testimony was disclosed and he did not challenge the substance of her 

testimony. Since the issue raised in the Amended Petition was not raised in State Court, 

the claim is unexhausted because Holland did not properly exhaust state remedies by 

fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 843-45. The Untimely Witness Testimony is also subject 

to an implied procedural bar because if Holland were to return to state court to address it, 

the claim would be precluded since he could have raised it on appeal but did not. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). 

 A close review of Holland’s Amended Petition shows that he has not demonstrated 

either cause or actual prejudice to excuse the default nor has he presented any evidence 

that would prove a miscarriage of justice. (Doc. 5) Accordingly, Holland cannot 

overcome the procedural default for these three claims. 

 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Holland’s final two claims are that he received 

ineffective assistance of appellate and post-conviction claims. Neither of these claims is 

well taken. First, although Holland has claimed that he received ineffective assistance of 

post-conviction counsel, he cannot do so because “[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence 

of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a 

ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). See 

also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (“There is no constitutional right to 

an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.”).

 Although Respondents did not address Holland’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel, the Court has concluded that this claim is also without merit. Holland 

claims that filing an Anders brief was ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel 

did not raise the Coached Testimony claim. The Court notes that Holland did not raise 

the Coached Testimony claim in a pro per brief on direct appeal and the Arizona Court of 

Appeals did not consider it as a possible fundamental error. 

 Holland’s claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails because an 

Anders brief, without more, is not enough to establish that Holland received ineffective 

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assistance of counsel. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744-45; United States v. Garcia, 232 F.3d 

897, n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (“To the extent that Garcia contends he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel on appeal because counsel did not raise these issues and instead 

filed an Anders brief, this contention is meritless because counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to raise these meritless claims.”) 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that William Elvis Holland’s Amended 

Petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the 

Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not 

find the ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

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order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 16th day of December, 2015. 

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