Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00104/USCOURTS-almd-1_10-cv-00104-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONNELL FLOURNOY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:10-CV-104-MHT

) [WO] 

SKIP DUFFIE, CCO STAFF, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff filed this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action while incarcerated at the Houston

County Jail located in Dothan, Alabama. This action is pending against Gary Knight, 1

Director of the Houston County Work Release Program [“HCWRP”], Skip Duffie, a

probation officer for HCWRP, and Veronica Alvardo, a former employee of HCWRP.2

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when he was removed from

HCWRP because he suffers from disabilities. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary

damages and requests trial by jury. 

3

Defendants filed an answer, special report, supplemental special report, and relevant

supporting evidentiary materials addressing Plaintiff’s claims for relief. The court then

 Since filing this action, Plaintiff has been released from prison.

1

 These designations were correct at the time the action was filed. 2

Plaintiff’s claims against Houston County Commissioner Mark Culver and Lieutenants Napa and 3

Jones with D.S.I. Security were previously dismissed in accordance with the prior proceedings and orders

of the court. See Doc. Nos. 4, 12.

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informed Plaintiff that Defendants’ special report may, at any time, be treated as a motion

for summary judgment, and the court explained to Plaintiff the proper manner in which to

respond to a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a response to the special report

filed by Defendants. Thus, this case is now pending on Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, the evidentiary materials filed in support

thereof, and the response filed by Plaintiff, the court concludes that Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving 4

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and 4

deciding summary-judgment motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision,

“[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c),

changing only one word – genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of

a summary-judgment determination.” Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary

judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and,

therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

2

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for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings,

discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of

material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at

322-24.

 Defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any

genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims properly before this court. Thus,

the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings,

that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604,

608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to

properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of

fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other

materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials

– including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it.”). A

genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that

would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at

1263. 

3

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In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to

survive Defendants’ properly supported motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff is required

to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting

his claim(s) for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable .

. . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50. 

A plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient evidence to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995); Fullman v.

Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). Consequently, when a party fails to make

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be

granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Barnes v. Southwest

Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1987). Where all the materials before the court

indicate that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the party moving for

summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987).

4

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Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro

se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing a genuine dispute of material fact.

Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus,

Plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard of elementary

principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate

a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment. 

Matsushita, supra. 

II. BACKGROUND

In December 2009 Judge Little of the Circuit Court for Houston County, Alabama,

sentenced Plaintiff to a fifteen year sentence with 1 year split to be served at HCWRP.

Within three weeks of Plaintiff’s arrival at HCWRP, Defendant Alvarado deemed Plaintiff

unemployable due to medical conditions and issued a delinquency report against him. 

Following issuance of the delinquency report, Plaintiff was transferred to the Houston

County Jail. On January 12, 2010, Plaintiff’s probation was revoked. He complains that

Defendants’ determination that he was medicallyunfit to performwork at HCWRP subjected

him to termination in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal

protection. (Doc. No. 1). 5

While Plaintiff claims in his complaint that Defendants’ action violated his rights under the 5

“Disabilities Act,” the “Social Security Act,” and the “Handicapped Act,” in his opposition to Defendants’

5

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Defendants’ evidence reflects that Judge Little sentenced Plaintiff on December 3,

2009 to a fifteen year sentence with a one year split to be served at HCWRP. As an

alternative form of sentencing, inmates from the city or county jails located in Houston

Countymay be released for the purpose of employment at HCWRP or for other rehabilitative

purposes at the discretion of judicial officers with the Houston County state court system. 

Following Plaintiff’s assignment to HCWRP, he was interviewed by Defendant Duffie on

December 9, 2009. Defendant Duffie informed Plaintiff of the conditions and requirements

of HCWRP made the subject of Judge Little’s December 3, 2009 sentencing order. At the

time of the interview, Plaintiff filled out a supplemental sheet wherein he indicated that he

wore a backbrace and was officially disabled but that he was able to work. (Doc. No. 18,

Exs. 1, A; Doc. No. 24, Ex. 2.) 

Defendant Alvarado, the job location specialist at HCWRP, worked with Plaintiff for

three weeks in an effort to find him a suitable job. She subsequently informed Defendant

Duffie that Plaintiff was unemployable due to disabilities which made it difficult for him to

engage in full-time employment. She further informed Defendant Duffie that Plaintiff

indicated he had difficulty working. (Doc. No. 18, Ex. 1, Doc. No. 24, Exs. 2, A.) 

On December 30, 2009 Defendant Duffie, at Defendant Knight’s direction, instituted

dispositive motion he abandons any such alleged causes of action. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that he has

“raised clear constitutional grounds in his complaint that show Defendants’ failure to give Plaintiff an equal

protection and due process right[]to participate in the HoustonCounty Work Release Programonce assigned

due to his handicapes [sic] and disabilities.” (Doc. No. 20 at 1.) The court’s April 14, 2010 order, which

explained to Plaintiff how to respond to a motion for summary judgment, clearly states that if Plaintiff “fails

to respond to the written report with respect to each of the claims raised in his complaint, the court will treat

this failure as an abandonment of these claims and shall proceed as justice requires.” (Doc. No. 19 at 1.)

6

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a disciplinary report on Plaintiff based on his failure to complywith the conditions, rules, and

regulations of HCWRP. Plaintiff received a copy of the delinquency report which

recommended that he be returned to the Houston County Jail pending a Community

Correctional Revocation hearing scheduled for January 12, 2010. Following the January

12 hearing where Plaintiff was allowed to testify and given the opportunity to cross examine

witnesses, Judge Lori Ingram ordered Plaintiff removed from HCWRP for his failure to

obtain or maintain employment, a violation of the terms and conditions of his probation.

Finding that no measure short of confinement would adequately protect the community from

further criminal activity by the offender or avoid depreciating the seriousness of the

violation, Judge Ingram directed Plaintiff be recommitted to the Alabama Department of

Corrections. (Doc. No. 18, Exs. 1, B, C, D; Doc. No. 24, Ex. 2) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Request for Injunctive Relief

As noted, Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. The transfer or release of a prisoner

renders moot any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Cnty. of Los Angeles v.

Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); see also Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir.

1985) (past exposure to even illegal conduct does not in and of itself show a pending case

or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing present injury

7

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or real and immediate threat of repeated injury). Because the records before the court clearly

reflect that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, his request for injunctive relief has been

rendered moot. 

B. Due Process

The loss of liberty occasioned by parole revocation requires that parolees be accorded

due process. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The same due process requirements

apply in probation revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).

However, “the full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal prosecution] does not

apply to parole [or probation] revocations.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 

In order to revoke parole or probation, there must be “(1) a formal finding that a probationer

or parolee has committed a violation and (2) a determination that the violation was serious

enough to warrant reimposing the probationer’s or parolee’s original sentence.” United

States v. Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Due process

requires that “the final revocation of probation must be preceded by a hearing, although the

factfinding body need not be composed of judges or lawyers.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S.

606, 611-12 (1985) (citations omitted). As part of this hearing, the probationer is “entitled

to written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against

him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary

evidence; a neutral hearing body; [ ] a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence

8

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relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. . . ; [and an opportunity] to cross-examine

adverse witnesses, unless the hearing body specifically finds good cause for not allowing

confrontation.” Id. at 612.

Here, Plaintiff has not shown that these due process requirements were not satisfied.

The procedural obligations required by federal law were fulfilled. Plaintiff received written

notice regarding the specific nature of his violations and the supporting evidence, and he had

a hearing that comported with the constitutional requirements of due process. Accordingly,

Defendants are due to be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s due process claim. 

To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint may be understood to allege a claim that his

transfer to a more secure correctional facility amounted to a due process violation, he is

likewise entitled to no relief as such action, while more burdensome on an inmate, is “within

the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to

impose.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,

245-46 (1983) (a prisoner has no constitutional right to be confined in a particular

institution); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995). In general, “as long as the

conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence

imposed on him . . . the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment

by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 460-61 (1989) (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). 

9

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C. Equal Protection

Plaintiff claims that Defendants denied him equal protection when, following his

admission to HCWRP, he was subsequently removed because of his disability(s). The

Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The equal

protection clause ‘is essentiallya direction that all persons similarlysituated should be treated

alike.’” Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 261 (11th Cir. 1989), quoting City of

Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A disparate

treatment claimrequires establishing that similarlysituated inmates were not similarlytreated

and that prison officials engaged in invidious discrimination based on race, religion, national

origin, poverty, or some other constitutionally protected interest. See Nordlinger v. Hahn,

505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (the Equal Protection Clause “simply keeps governmental

decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”); 

Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and Prob.

Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986). 

Additionally, to succeed on an equal protection challenge, Plaintiff must demonstrate

the existence of discriminatory intent; arbitrary application of prison rules without

discriminatoryintent is insufficient to demonstrate a violation ofthe Equal ProtectionClause. 

Jones v. White, 992 F.2d 1548, 1573 (11th Cir. 1993); E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d

1107 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, in order to state a viable equal protection claim, Plaintiff must

10

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first make a threshold showing that he was similarly situated in the relevant aspects to those

who received more favorable or different treatment. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736,

746-47 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no equal protection violation where security-related policy

treated male and female prisoners differently because male prisoners in a certain prison were

more numerous and had been convicted of more violent offenses). “Bare allegations that

‘other’ applicants, even ‘all other’ applicants, were treated differently do not state an equal

protection claim; a complaint must attempt to show in some fashion that these ‘other’

applicants were situated similarly to the Plaintiff.” GJR Inv., Inc. v. Escambia, 132 F.3d

1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Norvell v. State of Ill., 373 U.S. 20, 423 (1963)

(“[e]xact equality is no prerequisite of equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the

Fourteenth Amendment.”). 

Plaintiff must also show that Defendants acted with intent to discriminate against

him. 

[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in

a . . . disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of . . . discriminatory intent or

purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 

Discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected .

. . a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite

of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.

Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted);

see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). In a case such as this one, where

Plaintiff challenges the actions of custodial officials, exceptionally clear proof of

11

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discrimination is required. Fuller v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307,

1310 (11th Cir. 1988). Evidence which merely indicates disparity of treatment is insufficient

to show discriminatory intent. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington v.

Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Further, conclusory allegations or assertions of personal

belief of disparate treatment or discriminatory intent are insufficient. GJR Inv., Inc. v. Cnty.

of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1998); Coon v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d

1563, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987).

Neither disabilitynor age is a suspect classification under the EqualProtectionClause, 

see Bd. of Trustess of Univ. Of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S., 356, 366-67 (2001), and inmates

themselves do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitling such persons to “strict

scrutiny” of disparate government treatment. Here, what Plaintiff complains of is his

disappointment in not being allowed to remain at HCWRP despite his inability and/or

unwillingness to meet the conditions required for selection and retention at the work release

center. Plaintiffregards this conduct as actionable unequal treatment. Nevertheless, Plaintiff

does not allege that he was subjected to any tangible unequal treatment by Defendants’

conduct such as their decision to terminate his participation in HCWRP being based upon a

constitutionally protected interest. As a matter of law, therefore, the allegations supporting

this claim, without more, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Summary

judgment is, therefore, due to be granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s equal

protection claim. 

12

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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as supplemented (Doc. Nos. 18, 24), 

be GRANTED;

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendants;

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice; and

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against Plaintiff for which execution may

issue.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before September 21, 2012, the parties may file objections to

the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that

this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33

13

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(11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en

banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).

Done this 7th day of September, 2012.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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