Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-02212/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-02212-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MALCOLM HENSLEY, Guardian

Ad Litem for JOSHUA HENSLEY,

NO. CIV. S-01-2212 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HANEY-TURNER, LLC, RUSS

BROTHERS, INC., TAGHRID

MUHAREB and SHAFIG MUHAREB,

dba THE WAFFLE SHOP,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Haney-Turner,

LLC’s (“Haney-Turner”) motion to enforce settlement agreement and

for attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuing the motion.1 By

the motion, Haney-Turner seeks to compel co-defendants Taghrid

and Shafig Muhareb, dba The Waffle Shop (collectively, the

“Muharebs”), to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement

and release entered into by defendants with plaintiff Malcolm

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2 With its reply, Haney-Turner also moves to strike the

Declarations of Shafig Muhareb and Alice Chavez filed in support

of the opposition. (Objs. & Mtn. to Strike, filed Sept. 22,

2006.) The court DENIES the motion. The declarations provide

facts concerning the events that transpired after the litigation

ended, and those facts are important to the court’s general

understanding of the issues.

2

Hensley (“plaintiff”) in the above entitled matter (the

“Settlement Agreement”).2

For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS HaneyTurner’s motion; the Muharebs are directed to complete the

modifications to the subject premises as provided in the

Settlement Agreement no later than 90 days from the date of this

order. The court awards Haney-Turner, as the prevailing party on

the motion, $8,414.77 in attorney fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

On December 3, 2001, plaintiff brought a claim under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against defendants,

alleging various accessibility violations at the Muharebs’ The

Waffle Shop, located in Yuba City, California. The Muharebs

leased the restaurant facility (sometimes herein, the “Premises”)

from Haney-Turner. In May 2004, plaintiff entered a Settlement

Agreement with defendants, pursuant to which defendants paid

plaintiff $35,000.00 and the Muharebs agreed to perform certain

modifications to the property. (Turner Decl., filed July 17,

2006, Ex. A.) As to the required modifications, the Agreement

provided:

Defendants Taghrid and Shafig Muhareb, individually and

dba The Waffle Shop will undertake all of the 

modifications to the property as described in the 

report and plans dated December 16, 2002, prepared by 

expert George Dedekian, with no cap on the amount of

monies spent and with all modifications to be

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3 For purposes of this motion, the court does not need to

resolve the parties’ dispute over the reasons why the work was

not completed by the deadlines provided in the Agreement. (See

Chavez Decl. and Shafig Muhareb Decl., filed Sept. 12, 2006, and

Turner Decls., filed Sept. 22, 2006.) What is relevant to this

motion is that the parties agree further work is due under the

terms of the Agreement; it for this court to determine whether

the Muharebs are required to perform it.

3

completed within six months of the date of the

execution of this Agreement. Defendants Taghrid

and Shafig Muhareb will obtain the appropriate

building permits from the appropriate local

authority within one week of the execution of this

Agreement, and will commence work on the

property within two weeks of the execution of this

Agreement. Upon completion of the work by

Defendants Taghrid and Shafig Muhareb, they

will notify Mark Turner of Haney-Turner LLC, in

writing, that the work has been completed, and

Mr. Turner will be given the opportunity to

inspect the property to confirm that the work has

been completed as called out in the report and

plans prepared by expert George Dedekian as

referenced above.

(Id. at Ex. A, ¶ 7(c) at 3.) 

The Muharebs concede they have not completed the required

modifications. Specifically, they admit that the handrails,

pressure doors and ramp repairs have not been completed. (Opp’n,

filed Sept. 12, 2006, at 3.) They explain, in response to the

motion, that much of the work was delayed due to circumstances

beyond their control (i.e., permitting requirements by the city

which dictated plan revisions).3 Ultimately, the Muharebs state

that they did not complete the work because they were evicted

from the Premises. They maintain that the eviction excused their

further performance under the Agreement.

In January 2004, the Muharebs were served with a “Thirty-Day

Notice to Perform Covenant of Lease or Quit” for failure to

provide satisfactory proof of insurance as required by the lease. 

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4

(RJN, filed Sept. 22, 2006, Ex. B.) The Muharebs remained in

possession of the property following expiration of the 30 days

without providing adequate proof of insurance as requested. (Id.

at Ex. D.) In July 2004, a “Ten-Day Notice to Perform Covenant

of Lease or Quit” was served on the Muharebs. (Id. at Ex. C.) 

The Ten-Day Notice again requested satisfactory proof of

insurance according to the lease. (Id.) None was provided. 

(Id. at Ex. D.) 

Thereafter, on September 21, 2004, Haney-Turner filed an

unlawful detainer action against the Muharebs. (Id. at Ex. A.) 

Subsequently, Haney-Turner filed a motion for summary judgment on

the grounds that the Muharebs were in violation of multiple

portions of the lease, including, among other things, by failing

to provide satisfactory proof of insurance and by failing to

comply with the ADA resulting in a complaint being filed against

Haney-Turner and the Muharebs by plaintiff Hensley. (Id. at Ex.

F.) The motion was granted. (Id.) A Notice to Vacate ordered

that the Muharebs were required to vacate and deliver the

Premises to Haney-Turner on or before July 7, 2005. (Chavez

Decl., filed Sept. 12, 2006, Ex. J.)

 With respect to the relationship between Haney-Turner and

the Muharebs, the Settlement Agreement provided:

[Haney-Turner] and [the Muharebs], individually and

dba The Waffle Shop, do not waive any rights they 

have against each other, including breach of contract

claims, eviction claims, and/or other claims that

arose before or after the execution of this Agreement

that are related to the lease agreement that [HaneyTurner] and [the Muharebs] have with each other.

(Turner Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 5 at 3.)

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5

STANDARD

Pursuant to the parties’ Stipulation for Dismissal, filed

June 16, 2004, following execution of the Settlement Agreement,

the court retained jurisdiction “over all disputes between

(among) the parties arising out of the settlement agreement,

including but not limited to interpretation and enforcement of

the terms of the settlement agreement.” (Docket #41.) As such,

the court has proper jurisdiction over this matter.

ANALYSIS

1. Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement

The Muharebs do not dispute that under the terms of the

Settlement Agreement, they were obligated to perform the

requisite modifications to the Premises. Indeed, the Muharebs

completed some of the necessary work. Although, with respect to

the remaining work, they now maintain that they are not obligated

to perform the work due to their eviction from the property.

Their argument is unavailing for several reasons. First,

the Settlement Agreement does not condition the Muharebs’

performance on their possession of the property. (Turner Decl.,

Ex. A, ¶ 7(c) [the Muharebs “will undertake all the modifications

to the property as described in the report and plans dated

December 16, 2002, prepared by expert George Dedekian, with no

cap on the amount of monies spent and with all modifications to

be completed within six months of the date of the execution of

this Agreement.”]) Where the language of a contract is clear and

explicit, it must govern the contract’s interpretation. City of

El Cajon v. El Cajon Police Officers’ Ass’n, 49 Cal. App. 4th 64,

71 (1996). Here, the terms of the Settlement Agreement are

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clear, comprehensible and unambiguous. The Muharebs have not

cited any provision of the contract that supports their argument,

nor have they identified any ambiguity in the contract’s terms.

Stating their argument another way, the Muharebs next

contend that under the doctrine of frustration of purpose their

further performance under the Settlement Agreement is excused. 

For the doctrine to be applicable, the Muharebs must establish

that (1) the parties’ principal purpose in entering the contract

is substantially frustrated, Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v.

Twining, 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 314-15 (1963); (2) without fault

of their own, Dorn v. Goetz, 85 Cal. App. 2d 407, 411 (1948); and

(3) by the occurrence of an event, the non-occurrence of which

was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, Peoplesoft

U.S.A., Inc. v. Softeck, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1119 (N.D.

Cal. 2002). 

The Muharebs have not established these elements because (1)

the purpose of the Settlement Agreement was to settle liability

owed to plaintiff; (2) the Muharebs’ eviction was foreseeable;

and (3) the Muharebs were the cause of the eviction. Contrary to

the Muharebs’ protestations, the purpose of the Settlement

Agreement was clearly to settle plaintiff’s ADA claims against

defendants, not to allow the Muharebs to remain on the property

so long as they made the necessary modifications. The Settlement

Agreement provided that the purpose of the Agreement is to

“formalize termination of the Action and to settle, resolve,

satisfy, and discharge as to all Parties hereto the Released

Matters as defined in paragraph 4 . . . .” (Turner Decl., Ex. A,

at Recitals, ¶ B.) Paragraph 4 provided:

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7

The Parties hereby release and forever discharge 

each of the other Parties hereto, . . . which are 

based on facts or occurrences which are alleged in 

[Plaintiff’s] Complaint or which are based on the 

filing, prosecution or defense of the Complaint or 

based on any statement, representation, or admission 

made in connection with the prosecution or defense of 

the action.

(Id. at ¶ 4.) Thus, the Muharebs do not correctly state the

contract’s purpose, and that purpose, the settlement of

plaintiff’s liability claims, is not frustrated by the Muharebs’

eventual eviction from the property.

In similar regard, the Muharebs cannot demonstrate that

their subsequent eviction was the “occurrence of an event, the

non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the

contract was made.” “‘It is [well] settled that if parties have

contracted with reference [to the frustrating event] or have

contemplated the risks arising from it, they may not invoke the

doctrine of frustration to escape their obligations.’” Glenn R.

Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 70 Cal. 2d 666, 676 (1969)

(citation omitted). The Settlement Agreement makes clear that

the parties were aware of the lease between Haney-Turner and the

Muharebs and contemplated potential claims by these defendants

against one another. The Agreement stated:

[Haney-Turney] and [the Muharebs] individually and 

dba The Waffle Shop, do not waive any rights they 

have against each other, including breach of contract

claims, eviction claims, and/or other claims that 

arose before or after the execution of this Agreement 

that are related to the lease agreement that [Haney-Turner]

and [the Murharebs] dba Waffle Shop have with each other.

(Turner Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 5 at 3) (emphasis added.) In fact, at

the time they entered the Agreement, the Muharebs must have been

well aware of their potential eviction as they were served with

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4 While Haney-Turner does not seek herein relief for the

Muharebs’ untimely completion of the repairs, the court notes

that the Muharebs had a year, prior to their eviction, to

complete the modifications. The Agreement required the work to

be completed within six months of the execution of the Agreement

in May 2004, and even assuming the truth of the Muharebs’

explanations for certain delays due to permitting and plan

requirements, they have wholly failed to explain why the totality

of the work could not be completed prior to their eviction in

July 2005.

8

the Thirty-Day Notice to Perform Covenant of Lease or Quit in

January 2004, three months prior to the execution of the

Settlement Agreement. Thus, the Muharebs cannot demonstrate that

their eviction was not contemplated or foreseeable at the time

they entered into the Agreement.

Finally, the doctrine of frustration of purpose is further

made inapplicable here as the Muharebs’ caused their eviction. 

The Muharebs’ lost the unlawful detainer action and were ordered

to vacate the premises by the Sutter County Superior Court on

July 7, 2005. Thus, based on their own conduct in failing to

comply with the terms of the lease, the Muharebs were evicted

from the property. As such, in failing to meet any of the

required elements for application of the doctrine of frustration

of purpose, the Muharebs cannot invoke the doctrine to excuse

their further performance under the contract.

Accordingly, having conceded that further work is due under

the Settlement Agreement, the Muharebs are ordered to complete

the requisite work.4 In completing the work, the Muharebs shall

review Exhibit B to the declaration of George Dedekian

(“Dedekian”), filed July 17, 2006. As set forth in the

Settlement Agreement (¶ 7(c)), Dedekian prepared plans for the

modifications to the Premises so as to ensure compliance with the

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ADA. (Dedekian Decl., ¶ 1.) In February 2006, Haney-Turner

contacted Dedekian to evaluate the extent to which the

modifications had been completed. In March 2006, he conducted a

site survey of the Premises. In his opinion, “there remains

extensive modifications to be completed and/or corrected in order

for the Property to be in compliance with the [original] Plans.” 

(Id. at ¶ 2.) Exhibit B to his declaration is a report of the

modifications that, in his opinion, remain to be completed and

corrected under the original plans. (Id. at Ex. B.) Based upon

the record before it, the court is not capable of resolving the

parties’ dispute over what specific work is required to be

performed to bring the Premises into compliance with the original

plans. However, the court retains jurisdiction over this matter,

and the Muharebs are cautioned that their compliance is

controlled by the Settlement Agreement’s terms, which require

adherence to the plans prepared by Dedekian. (Turner Decl, Ex.

A, ¶ 7(c) [the Muharebs “will undertake all the 

modifications to the property as described in the report and

plans dated December 16, 2002, prepared by expert George

Dedekian”].) In that light, his declaration herein should be of

particular significance to the Muharebs as they complete the

modifications to the Premises. 

2. Attorney Fees

Paragraph 10 of the Settlement Agreement states:

[I]n the event that any action or proceeding is brought

to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing Party shall

be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs

against the non-prevailing Party or Parties, in addition

to all other relief to which that Party or those Parties

may be entitled.

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5 The Muharebs cross-moved for attorney fees incurred in

opposing the motion; however, as the non-prevailing party, they

are not entitled to an award of fees. (Id.)

6 Haney-Turner requested in its reply total fees in the

amount of $7,666.47, which included $350.00 for two hours of

expected work in traveling to and appearing at the hearing on the

motion. However, no hearing was held as the court submitted the

matter on the briefs; accordingly, the court reduces the amount

requested by $350.00.

7 The court notes that the Muharebs did not challenge the

requested fees and costs as unreasonable; rather, they simply

contended Haney-Turner would not prevail on the motion and thus,

would not be entitled to an award of fees at all. As such, the

court could award the requested amounts on the basis of the

Muharebs’ lack of opposition. Nevertheless, the court has

independently reviewed the reasonableness of the amounts

requested.

10

(Turner Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 10 at 4.) For the reasons set forth

above, Haney-Turner is the prevailing party on this motion

seeking to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and

thus it is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs.5

In total, Haney-Turner requests attorney fees in the amount of

$7,316.476 ($1,789.47 for preparation of the motion and $5,527.00

for preparation of the reply) and $3,145.30 in costs associated

with Dedekian’s site survey report (Dedekian Decl., ¶ 3.)7

 To determine reasonable attorney fees, the court must

multiply “the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The court finds the

requested rates, of $225.00 for partners and $175.00 for

associates, reasonable. However, with respect to the number of

hours expended, the court finds the amount of time spent on the

reply unreasonable in some respects. Id. at 434 (the district

court must consider only those hours which are reasonably

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expended, excluding any “excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary” hours). In support of the reply, Haney-Turner filed

the declaration of Kimberly A. Steffenson of Rich, Ridge, Morris

& Iverson (“Rich Ridge”), who provided an itemized statement of

the work she and her firm performed at Haney-Turner’s counsel of

record, Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant’s (“Porter Scott”)

request. (Steffenson Decl., filed Sept. 22, 2006.) The total

amount of fees requested by Rich Ridge is $2,047.00. (Id. at Ex.

A.) Said work dated back to February 2006. (Id.) 

However, in its moving papers, filed by Porter Scott, HaneyTurner did not request fees for Rich Ridge’s work on the case. 

In his reply declaration, counsel for Haney-Turner, Terence

Cassidy of Porter Scott, explained, for the first time, that the

legal services of Rich Ridge were “required” in preparation of

the “Motion and Reply brief.” (Cassidy Decl., filed Sept. 22,

2006, ¶ 5.) “Specifically, the law office of [Rich Ridge] were

[sic] required to consult George Dedekian regarding modifications

per the Settlement Agreement, review pleadings, assist with the

declaration of Mark Turner and correspond with our office

regarding the eviction proceedings raised by the Muharebs in

their opposition.” (Id.) 

If Rich Ridge’s work on the case was necessary to the

motion, fees for their work should have been included in the

moving papers, not mentioned for the first time in the reply. 

Moreover, it has not been clearly explained why Rich Ridge and

Ms. Steffenson were necessary to perform the above stated tasks. 

It would appear Porter Scott could have performed these duties,

as it is counsel of record for Haney-Turner in this case, not

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8 While it was not made clear from Haney-Turner’s papers,

it appears from the documents attached to the Request for

Judicial Notice that Rich Ridge represented Haney-Turner in the

unlawful detainer action.

12

Rich Ridge.8 Additionally, the majority of Rich Ridge’s work

appears to be duplicative of Porter Scott’s work. Ultimately, it

is Haney-Turner’s burden to substantiate the reasonableness of

the fees requested, and with respect to the fees of Rich Ridge

the court finds that it has not done so. Accordingly, the court

reduces the amount of fees requested by $2,047.00, and thus

awards Haney-Turner, $5,269.47.

As to Haney-Turner’s request for costs, the Muharebs have

not challenged the reasonableness of the work performed by

Dedekian and the court finds his site survey necessary to the

motion, and thus awards costs of $3,145.30 for his work.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Haney-Turner’s

motion to enforce settlement agreement. The Muharebs are

directed to complete the requisite modifications to the Premises

as set forth in the Settlement Agreement no later than 90 days

from the date of this order. As the prevailing party on the

motion, the court awards Haney-Turner total attorney fees and

costs in the amount of $8,414.77. Said monies shall be paid to 

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Haney-Turner within 60 days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: September 28, 2006

 /s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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