Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01589/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01589-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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For the Northern District of California

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT WEAVER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-1589 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

On August 18, 2006, this Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Applying the six factors set forth in Cleveland v. City of

Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court held that defendant had failed to meet its

burden to demonstrate that the ambulance-assigned firefighters/paramedics had the requisite

“responsibility” for fire suppression. 

On September 22, 2006, defendant sought leave to file a motion for reconsideration based upon

an Opinion Letter issued on June 1, 2006 by the United States Department of Labor. In that opinion

letter, the Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, found that certain dual function

firefighter/paramedics have firefighting responsibilities, and thus qualify for the partial overtime

exception under section 7(k) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court granted defendant leave by

order filed September 26, 2006. The parties have briefed the motion and submitted the matter to the

Court without oral argument. 

Defendant contends that the Department of Labor’s June 1, 2006 Opinion Letter constitutes a

“material change” in the law, and also that the Opinion Letter raises new factual issues that require

Case 3:03-cv-01589-SI Document 174 Filed 12/19/06 Page 1 of 3
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 Defendant again argues that the Court should not have limited its analysis to only those shifts

when H3s are assigned to ambulances. However, as the Court stated in the August 18, 2006 order,

defendant’s position is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cleveland.

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further development. The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, the Court notes that the June 1, 2006

Opinion Letter is guidance, and is not binding on the Court. See Christensen v. Harris Co., 529 U.S.

576, 587 (2000) (opinion letter entitled to “some respect” but not Chevron deference). 

More importantly, the Opinion Letter does not change the law in any way, but rather applies the

factors set forth in Cleveland to the facts presented in the request for the Opinion Letter – the same

factors applied by this Court in its August 18, 2006 summary judgment order. Although defendant is

correct that there are some factual similarities between this case and the situation described in the

Opinion Letter, in the Court’s view there are two critical differences. In reaching the conclusion that

the dual function firefighter/paramedics were responsible for fire suppression, the Opinion Letter noted

(1) “to the extent medical emergencies exist, and to utilize their paramedic training, they are expected

to provide emergency medical services as their primary responsibility, but also routinely perform fire

suppression duties alongside their firefighting colleagues when not needed for medical care”; and (2)

“they are routinely ordered to perform fire suppression duties, to attend fire suppression training, and

to present fire prevention awareness programs.” Baumgartner Decl. Ex. A at 2 (emphasis added). Here,

as discussed in the August 18, 2006 order, defendant has failed to submit evidence that the ambulanceassigned firefighter/paramedics were “routinely ordered to perform fire suppression duties.” 

Defendant also contends that the Opinion Letter raises new factual issues thatwere not developed

in the parties’ summary judgment briefing. Specifically, defendant contends that the City should be

allowed to submit evidence regarding (1) the frequency with which H3s serve as Incident Commanders;

(2) the frequency and pattern with which H3s rotate between assignments; and (3) “details concerning

the actual time spent by any firefighter in fire suppression duties.” The Court finds that all of this

evidence could have been submitted in conjunction with the City’s motion for summary judgment. As

discussed above, the Opinion Letter did not change the law, and thus to the extent the evidence

defendant wishes to introduce was relevant,

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 it was always relevant and defendant should have submitted

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that evidence earlier. The fact that defendant would like to adopt a different approach after its

unsuccessful motion for summary judgment is not a basis for granting reconsideration. Finally, the

Court notes that defendant’s current position is at odds with its explicit statement at the summary

judgment hearing that the factual record was sufficient for the purpose of deciding the instant motions.

See August 18, 2006 Order at 4:1-3. 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons the Court DENIES defendant’s motion for

reconsideration. (Docket No. 168).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-01589-SI Document 174 Filed 12/19/06 Page 3 of 3