Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00407/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00407-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Scott Michael Mediz, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-17-00407-TUC-RM (EJM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Petitioner Scott Michael Mediz filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“PWHC”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 17, 2017. (Doc. 1). The Court 

subsequently granted Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 15), and Petitioner 

filed an Amended PWHC on March 23, 2018. (Doc. 22). Petitioner raises two grounds for 

relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to ensure that the state was 

precluded from introducing improper evidence at trial (sub claim A), and for failing to 

investigate what inmate Darren Goldin reported about other inmates allegedly colluding 

with each other to testify against Petitioner (sub claim B); and (2) the Arizona courts failed 

to preserve Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 22). Petitioner requests that the Court vacate his convictions 

and sentences and remand this matter for a new trial. 

Respondents filed an Amended Answer contending that Petitioner’s first and third 

claims are procedurally defaulted and that Petitioner cannot show cause or prejudice for 

the default. (Doc. 23). Respondents further argue that the state court’s rejection of 

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Petitioner’s second claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Supreme Court law. (Doc. 23). 

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Markovich for a Report and Recommendation. The 

undersigned finds that Petitioner’s claims in sub claim A of Ground One and Ground Two 

are procedurally defaulted and barred from this Court’s review. The undersigned further 

finds that Petitioner does not demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage 

of justice to excuse the procedural default of his claims. The undersigned further finds that 

while sub claim B of Ground One is properly exhausted, Petitioner has not shown that the 

state court’s decision on the merits of this claim was an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court deny the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial and Sentencing

A Pima County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of kidnapping and firstdegree murder. (Doc. 10 Ex. L). In response to a special interrogatory, the jurors also found 

Petitioner guilty of both premeditated murder and felony murder. Petitioner was sentenced 

to natural life in prison on the first-degree murder charge and a concurrent 15.75-year term 

for the kidnapping charge. (Doc. 10 Ex. S). The Arizona COA summarized the facts of the 

case as follows: 

In November 2011, Mediz and his then-girlfriend, Sara Golden, lured the victim, J.L., to their house, where Mediz 

severely beat him. Mediz then wrapped J.L. in a sheet and placed him in the back of a hatchback vehicle. Mediz 

abandoned the vehicle and J.L. at a nearby convenience store. J.L. died as a result of the beating combined with positional asphyxiation from being in the vehicle. 

(Doc. 10 Ex. HH at 2). 

Following his conviction, Petitioner’s trial counsel, Joel Feinman, filed a motion to 

vacate judgment based on newly discovered material facts provided by inmate Darren 

Goldin that warranted further investigation. (Doc. 10 Ex. T). An affidavit from Goldin 

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alleged that he overheard inmates Christopher Brugada and Alvin McBride conspiring to 

coordinate their testimony that Petitioner wanted to borrow Brugada’s car to take the victim 

to the desert, not the hospital. Feinman stated he was unable to continue to represent 

Petitioner due to a conflict with the Pima County Public Defender’s Office.1

 The court 

granted Feinman’s motion to withdraw and appointed attorney Brick Storts to represented 

Petitioner. (Doc. 10 Exs. U, V). 

Attorney Storts filed a supplement to the motion to vacate judgment stating that 

there was newly discovered evidence placing the credibility and testimony of at least two, 

and possibly three, of the state’s witnesses at issue. (Doc. 10 Ex. W). Storts noted that 

Goldin’s affidavit was not received until after Petitioner’s trial and sentencing, but that the 

information was arguably available before trial. The supplement also stated a separate issue 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but noted that IAC claims can only be raised in a 

Rule 32 petition. 

The trial court held a hearing on Petitioner’s motion and ultimately denied the 

motion on July 5, 2013. (Doc. 10 Exs. Z, CC, DD). The court found that Petitioner had 

“not established that newly discovered material facts exist under the standards of Rule 32.1 

. . . [and e]ven were the evidence newly discovered, it would not have been sufficient to 

undermine the jury’s verdicts.” (Doc. 10 Ex. DD at 2). 

B. Direct Appeal 

Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Appointed counsel filed 

a brief presenting two issues for review: 1) the trial court erred by failing to preclude photos 

depicting racist tattoos on Petitioner and this evidence was prejudicial and denied Petitioner 

a fair trial; and 2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant Petitioner’s motion 

to vacate judgment. (Doc. 10 Ex. EE). 

The COA affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences but vacated the criminal 

restitution order. (Doc. 10 Ex. HH). Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court, which the court denied on April 21, 2015. (Doc. 22 Ex. 4). 

 

1

 Goldin was facing murder charges, and another attorney in Feinman’s office was representing one of the state’s primary witnesses against Goldin. (Doc. 10 Ex. T at 3). 

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C. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 

On May 14, 2015 Petitioner initiated proceedings in Pima County Superior Court 

for Rule 32 post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 10 Ex. II). Appointed counsel filed a 

petition presenting one issue for review: IAC when trial counsel failed to seek a court order 

to depose or timely request to take the deposition of inmate Goldin. (Doc. 10 Ex. JJ at 16). 

Petitioner argued that had trial counsel done so, he would have also discovered two 

additional inmate witnesses whose testimony could have been used to impeach the state’s 

inmate witnesses that testified against Petitioner. The trial court denied PCR on November 

23, 2015. (Doc. 10 Ex. MM). 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona COA on January 15, 2016, 

which granted review and denied relief on May 9, 2016. (Doc. Exs. NN & PP). Petitioner 

then filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court on June 6, 2016, which the 

court denied on September 30, 2016. (Doc. 22 Exs. 10 & 11). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) limits the 

federal court’s power to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state 

prisoner. First, the federal court may only consider petitions alleging that a person is in 

state custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Sections 2254(b) and (c) provide that the federal courts may not grant 

habeas corpus relief, with some exceptions, unless the petitioner exhausted state remedies. 

Additionally, if the petition includes a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state 

court proceedings, federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Finally, even if a 

constitutional error is found, a petitioner is not entitled to relief if the error was harmless. 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993) (on collateral review in § 2254 cases, 

court will deem an error harmless unless it had a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict”). 

A. Exhaustion 

 A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of 

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habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 

U.S. 838, 842 (1999). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts 

the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his federal claims by fairly presenting them to 

the state’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 

(“To provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present her 

claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of 

the claim.”). In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the highest court 

requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona 

COA, either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. 

Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931–33 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

 A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner describes both the operative facts and 

the federal legal theory upon which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 

2007). The petitioner must have “characterized the claims he raised in state proceedings 

specifically as federal claims.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2000), 

opinion amended and superseded, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). “If a petitioner fails to 

alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal 

claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.” Johnson 

v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, 

are insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

 However, “[a] habeas petitioner who [fails to properly exhaust] his federal claims 

in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion” if there are no state remedies 

still available to the petitioner. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). “This is 

often referred to as ‘technical’ exhaustion because although the claim was not actually 

exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy.” Thomas v. 

Schriro, 2009 WL 775417, *4 (D. Ariz. March 23, 2009). “If no state remedies are 

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currently available, a claim is technically exhausted,” but, as discussed below, the claim is 

procedurally defaulted and is only subject to federal habeas review in a narrow set of 

circumstances. Garcia v. Ryan, 2013 WL 4714370, *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2013). 

B. Procedural Default 

 If a petitioner fails to fairly present his claim to the state courts in a procedurally 

appropriate manner, the claim is procedurally defaulted and generally barred from federal 

habeas review. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802–05 (1991). There are two categories 

of procedural default. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was 

actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural 

grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30. Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted 

if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and “the court to which 

the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion 

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1; O’Sullivan, 

526 U.S. at 848 (when time for filing state court petition has expired, petitioner’s failure to 

timely present claims to state court results in a procedural default of those claims); Smith 

v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007) (failure to exhaust claims in state court 

resulted in procedural default of claims for federal habeas purposes when state’s rules for 

filing petition for post-conviction relief barred petitioner from returning to state court to 

exhaust his claims). 

 When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims, federal habeas review 

occurs only in limited circumstances. “A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted 

claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.” 

Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10. Cause requires a showing “that some objective factor external to 

the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule . . . [such 

as] a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to 

counsel, . . . or that some interference by officials made compliance impracticable.” Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Prejudice 

requires “showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, 

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but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original). The court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the 

petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982); Thomas 

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.10 (9th Cir. 1991). Additionally, a habeas petitioner “may 

also qualify for relief from his procedural default if he can show that the procedural default 

would result in a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 

1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). This exception 

to the procedural default rule is limited to habeas petitioners who can establish that “a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; see also Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; Cook, 538 F.3d at 

1028. 

C. Adjudication on the Merits and § 2254(d)

 The Ninth Circuit has held that “a state has ‘adjudicated’ a petitioner’s constitutional 

claim ‘on the merits’ for purposes of § 2254(d) when it has decided the petitioner’s right 

to post-conviction relief on the basis of the substance of the constitutional claim advanced, 

rather than denying the claim on the basis of a procedural or other rule precluding state 

court review of the merits.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If a habeas petition includes a claim that was properly exhausted, has not been 

procedurally defaulted, and was “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 

federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court cannot 

grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state court’s decision was 

contrary to federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme 

Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011); (2) 

that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state 

court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011). This standard is 

“difficult to meet.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. It is also a “highly deferential standard for 

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evaluating state court rulings . . . which demands that state court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (internal quotations 

and citation omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Ground One

Petitioner alleges two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In sub claim 

A, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the state 

was precluded from introducing photographs of Petitioner’s tattoos during trial. Petitioner 

contends that the photographs amounted to racially biased and prejudicial evidence that 

lead to the jury convicting him on improper grounds. In sub claim B, Petitioner alleges that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate what inmate Goldin reported about 

two other inmates who allegedly colluded to testify against Petitioner in exchange for 

favorable deals in their own criminal cases. Petitioner further contends that counsel’s 

ineffectiveness is to blame for the Arizona COA’s finding that the collusion evidence was 

not newly discovered because counsel knew about the evidence before trial. The Court will 

consider each claim in turn. 

i. Photographs 

In Arizona, exhaustion is satisfied if a petitioner presents the federal basis of his 

claims to the COA through either the direct appeal process or PCR proceedings. Claims 

for IAC are properly raised in a Rule 32 petition for PCR. Here, Petitioner raised one claim 

of IAC in his Rule 32 petition: trial counsel’s failure to seek a court order to depose Goldin 

or timely request to depose Goldin. Petitioner did not raise any claims in his Rule 32 

petition regarding trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies in failing to keep out the photographs 

of Petitioner’s tattoos. Asserting an IAC claim “based on one set of facts [presented to the 

state courts], does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on 

different facts” that were not presented to the state courts. Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 

736, 788 (D. Ariz. 2008); see also Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 

2005) (new allegations of IAC not previously raised before the state court cannot be 

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addressed on habeas review).2

Claims not previously presented to the state courts on either direct appeal or 

collateral review are generally barred from federal review because any attempt to return to 

state court to present them would be futile unless the claims fit into a narrow range of 

exceptions. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding claims not raised on 

direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) 

(petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). Because these 

rules have been found to be consistently and regularly followed, and because they are 

independent of federal law, either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, 

or their operation to preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally 

bar subsequent review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart v. 

Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(Rule 32 is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050–52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver 

and preclusion rules strictly applied in post-conviction proceedings). 

 Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness and preclusion prevent 

Petitioner from now exhausting sub claim A in state court. Accordingly, the claim is both 

technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted and thus not properly before this Court 

for review. See Crowell, 483 F.Supp.2d at 931–33; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; 

Garcia, 2013 WL 4714370 at * 8. 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless 

the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual prejudice, or 

establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of review. See Schlup v. 

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). Both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a 

procedural default, but the Court is not required to examine the existence of prejudice if 

the petitioner fails to establish cause. Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982); 

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.10 (9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner has failed to show 

 

2

 While Petitioner did argue on direct appeal that the trial court committed error by admitting the photographs, that is not sufficient to properly present and exhaust a claim of IAC for failing to have the photographs precluded. 

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cause for his procedural default of the claim, and the Court can glean none from the record 

before it. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316; Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. There was no objective 

factor external to the defense that impeded Petitioner’s efforts to comply with the state’s 

procedural rules; Petitioner simply failed to raise this specific IAC claim in his Rule 32 

petition. Thus, the Court need not examine the merits of sub claim A or the purported 

prejudice. In his Reply, Petitioner alleges that there is “no support that the claim of [IAC] 

was procedurally defaulted or precluded in the state court,” and summarily argues that he 

has established IAC under Strickland in a timely filed PWHC. (Doc. 26 at 2–3). Such 

conclusory statements fall far below the threshold to establish cause or prejudice.3

Accordingly, sub claim A is both technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted and not 

properly before this Court for review. 

ii. Goldin 

As noted above, Petitioner raised one issue of IAC in his Rule 32 petition—trial 

counsel’s failure to seek a court order to depose Goldin or timely request to depose Goldin. 

Petitioner also presented this argument to the COA in his petition for review. Accordingly, 

sub claim B was properly exhausted and will be reviewed on the merits by this Court. 

The factual basis for this claim was explained by the COA on Petitioner’s direct 

 

3

 While Petitioner notes that Respondents cite Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), 

Martinez does not stand for the general proposition stated by Petitioner that an IAC “claim serves to constitute cause and prejudice in order to excuse any procedural default.” (Doc. 26 at 3). In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at 

initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” 566 U.S. at 9. Martinez only provides cause for defaults that are caused by PCR counsel, and in this case Petitioner had the same 

counsel on PCR that he now has for this habeas action. Thus, Mr. Storts would have to 

plead and admit that he himself was ineffective for failing to raise an IAC claim regarding the photographs in the Rule 32 proceedings in order for Martinez to excuse the procedural default of this claim. See Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (for Petitioner 

to rely upon Martinez, Petitioner must “demonstrate[e] two things: (1) ‘counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was 

ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 

80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318)); see also Sexton v. Cozner, 679 

F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In order to show ineffectiveness of PCR counsel, [a 

petitioner] must show that PCR counsel’s failure to raise the claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective was an error ‘so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,’ and caused [the petitioner] prejudice.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)). 

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appeal: 

Mediz learned about C.B. [Brugada] and A.M.’s [McBride’s] collusion several months before his trial began from a fellow 

prison inmate, D.G. [Goldin], who claimed to have overheard 

the two men planning to coordinate their testimony. Mediz 

conveyed this information to his trial counsel. His trial counsel 

then contacted D.G.’s attorney, who stated that D.G. was 

“delusional, and thinks he knows things he does not,” and that the attorney would not allow D.G. to “testify at trial, or give any interviews on the matter.” After receiving this information, 

Mediz’s counsel decided not to pursue the matter further and informed Mediz of his decision. After Mediz’s trial was 

completed, D.G. submitted an affidavit reciting what he already told Mediz and included the names of A.M. and C.B.’s 

cellmates who also had heard them conspiring. Those inmates additionally testified that D.W. was also involved in the 

collusion. 

(Doc. 10 Ex. HH at 8–9). 

a. Legal standard 

The Supreme Court established a two-part test for evaluating IAC claims in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish that his trial counsel was 

ineffective under Strickland, Petitioner must show: (1) that his trial counsel’s performance 

was deficient; and (2) that trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner’s 

defense. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688, 694). To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that “counsel made 

errors so serious . . . that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–688. 

The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the 

decisions made by defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 

1173 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have 

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

The Ninth Circuit “h[as] explained that ‘[r]eview of counsel’s performance is highly 

deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide 

range of reasonable representation.’” Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting Hensley v. Crist, 67 

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F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995)). “The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be 

evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the 

circumstances[.]” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Additionally, “[a] 

fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not 

constitute ineffective assistance. Id. 

Even where trial counsel’s performance is deficient, Petitioner must also establish 

prejudice in order to prevail on an IAC claim. To establish prejudice, Petitioner “must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Under the 

prejudice factor, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not 

warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on 

the judgment.” Id. at 691. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 

conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. Further, because failure to make the required 

showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats the claim, the court need not 

address both factors where one is lacking. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697–700; LaGrand v. 

Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both deficiency and 

prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other). 

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court’s review of the state court’s 

decision on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is subject to another level of 

deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–699 (2002). This creates a “doubly deferential” 

review standard in which a habeas petitioner must show not only that there was a violation 

of Strickland, but also that the state court’s resolution of the claim was more than wrong, 

it was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. See Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 

6; Bell, 535 U.S. at 698–99; Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25; Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 

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171 (2011) (federal habeas court’s review of state court’s decision on ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim is “doubly deferential”). 

b. Analysis

For purposes of federal habeas review, Petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

the post-conviction relief court, in ruling that trial counsel was not ineffective, applied 

Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner. In making this determination, “the 

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable,” but “whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 105. Here, the state court’s finding that Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to seek a court order to depose Goldin was without merit is supported 

by the record before this Court and was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.

4

 

First, in denying Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition, the trial court found that Petitioner’s 

claim did not meet the threshold for Strickland, commenting that the “assertion that the 

investigation of the collusion claim here would have first resulted in an effective 

impeachment, and then to a different result, is thin gruel for a Rule 32 Petition.” (Doc. 10 

Ex MM at 1). In considering the deficient performance prong, the court found that 

Petitioner’s defense—that he did not have the requisite mens rea for first or second degree 

murder because he was being controlled by his girlfriend—did not depend on whether 

Petitioner wanted to dump the victim’s body in the desert or take him to the hospital. Id. at 

2. And, trial counsel stated that he did not want to further investigate the alleged collusion 

because he did not want to highlight another witness who might be helpful to the state, and 

because he had credible information from Goldin’s attorney that Goldin was delusional. 

Id. The court explained that: 

Each reason supports a tactical or strategic decision as sound 

4

 “AEDPA directs federal courts to train their attention on the particular reasons why each state court that considered a prisoner’s claims denied relief. When more than one state court 

has adjudicated a claim, the federal court analyzes the last ‘reasoned’ state court decision.” 

Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005)). However, where “the last 

reasoned decision adopted or substantially incorporated the reasoning from a previous decision . . . it [is] reasonable for the reviewing court to look at both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision.” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093. 

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as any decision to pursue the collusion angle. It is completely rational to calculate that Mr. Feinman’s strategy of pursuing the “under the sway” defense would have been undermined at 

worst, confused at best, if he had presented the collusion angle. This is especially true given that, at trial, the two witnesses 

testified differently. If they had indeed colluded, they colluded badly. 

When a trial lawyer abandons certain defenses and focuses on 

others, that is a quintessential trial tactic. The tactic did not 

work here, but there is no indication that raising the specter of colluding witnesses would have helped. 

. . . 

Mr. Feinman’s decision not to pursue an interview with Mr. 

Goldin, whether because it did not advance his defense theory 

and might have harmed the defense, and/or because Mr. 

Feinman believed that Mr. Goldin was delusional, was rational. 

It is fair to assume that Mr. Feinman accepted Mr. Goldin’s own attorney’s estimation of his credibility and decided that chasing this white rabbit would have been, at best, a waste of 

time. That is a much more reasonable conclusion than that Mr. 

Feinman is inept. 

Nothing in the Petition indicates that the defense counsel’s 

choice was other than a tactical or strategic one. Because the 

witnesses did not even testify as if they had colluded, Mr. 

Feinman’s choice appears also to have had the benefit of being the right choice. 

Id. In considering the prejudice prong, the court further found that even if trial counsel’s 

actions were inept rather than tactical or strategic, Petitioner had failed to show a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different. Id. at 2–3. 

As the court explained,

Here, the allegation is that the defense counsel would have had 

the basis for impeaching the testimony of two witnesses who, allegedly colluded to tell the same story. They did not tell the same story in the material way that would have undermined the 

State’s case. Attacking a witness’s credibility on the basis that he colluded to align his testimony with another witness on a material point at which their testimony was not aligned, is unlikely to have made a dime’s worth of difference. 

Id. at 3. Thus, the court concluded that Petitioner had failed to present a colorable claim. 

Second, in denying relief on Petitioner’s petition for review, the COA rejected 

Petitioner’s arguments that trial counsel’s decision was not tactical and that discrediting 

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the witnesses was crucial to Petitioner’s defense. (Doc. 10 Ex. PP). The court explained 

that: 

Even if we agree with Mediz that competent counsel would 

have sought to depose the inmate, he has not shown resulting prejudice. He does not disagree with the trial court that the 

witnesses gave inconsistent accounts. Whatever value the 

collusion testimony might have had is considerably diluted by those inconsistencies, in part because it significantly undermines the notion that there was any collusion at all. And, as we noted in our decision on appeal, the evidence against Mediz was overwhelming. 

Id. at 3. The court further noted that Petitioner failed to explain in his Rule 32 petition how 

the evidence related to the jury’s unanimous finding of felony murder, as he focused his 

arguments on the premeditated murder conviction. Id. For the first time in his petition for 

review, Petitioner alleged that the collusion evidence would have aided his defense theory 

that he did not kidnap the victim but intended to take him to the hospital.5

 However, the 

COA does not address arguments not first raised below. The COA thus concluded that 

Petitioner had failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 

32 petition. 

 When reviewing a claim of IAC, this Court “begin[s] with the premise that under 

the circumstances, the challenged action [] might be considered sound trial strategy . . . 

[and w]e affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons . . . counsel may have had 

for proceeding as they did.” Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted) (second alteration in original), cert. denied sub 

nom., Elmore v. Holbrook, 137 S. Ct. 3, reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 583 (2016). “As long as 

defense counsel uses a sound trial strategy, employing that strategy does not constitute 

deficient performance.” Elmore, 799 F.3d at 1250 (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). Further, “[no decision of the Supreme Court] suggests . . . that the indigent 

defendant has a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous 

points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not 

 

5

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the hospital or the desert, the jury’s kidnapping finding could have also been based on 

Petitioner restraining the victim with duct tape in the house. 

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to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). To require otherwise 

would “seriously undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord 

with counsel’s professional evaluation.” Id.

Here, based on this Court’s review of the record, trial counsel’s decision not to 

further investigate Goldin or seek to depose him could be considered sound trial strategy. 

First, Feinman testified at the hearing on Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment that he 

relied on the information given to him by Goldin’s counsel that Goldin was delusional and 

thinks that he knows things that he does not.6

 (Doc. 10 Ex. CC at 43). Goldin’s counsel did 

not tell Feinman anything that he didn’t already know—all Goldin knew was that Alvin 

McBride was going to snitch on Petitioner and a man named Chris B had witnessed the 

murder, but Feinman already had that information and knew both men were going to be 

witnesses at trial, and Feinman already had or was going to interview both men before trial. 

Id. at 43, 44, 55. Second, Feinman did not want to end up in a situation where he would 

depose Goldin with the prosecutor present and potentially learn information that could be 

used against Petitioner, essentially giving the state another witness against his client. Id. at 

45, 55. Third, trial counsel’s defense strategy was that Petitioner did not have the requisite 

mens rea for first or second degree murder because he was being controlled and 

manipulated the entire time by his girlfriend. Id. at 39. Feinman stated the information from 

Goldin was not material to his defense. Id. at 44.7

 All of these reasons support a finding 

that trial counsel made a reasonable, strategic choice not to investigate Goldin further. See

Gustave v. U.S., 627 F.2d 901, 904 (1980) (“Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in 

itself sufficient to support a charge of inadequate representation.”). 

While Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s actions were the result of a failure to 

 

6

 Goldin’s counsel also testified at the hearing and stated that Goldin had “delusions of 

grandeur” and is “a person who thinks he can talk his way out of a tin can.” (Doc. 10 Ex. 

Z at 45, 48, 49). 

77 As the trial court noted on Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment, “[a]t base level, the Defendant did not need the intent to kill Mr. Lewis, he only needed the intent to commit 

kidnapping (of which the jury also found him guilty), and in the course of committing the kidnapping or the fleeing therefrom, he had to have caused the victim’s death;” thus, 

whether Petitioner intended to take the victim to the hospital or dump his body in the desert was irrelevant in light of the facts and the actual verdicts. (Doc. 10 Ex. DD at 3). 

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investigate and not a strategic decision, the Strickland quote that Petitioner himself cited 

in his petition for review to the COA8

 is telling: 

[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than 

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 

makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the 

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. Here, Feinman testified under oath that when Petitioner 

relayed the information about Goldin, Feinman contacted Goldin’s counsel. Feinman relied 

on Goldin’s counsel’s assertions, as an officer of the court, that Goldin did not have any 

information that Feinman did not already know, and that Goldin had illusions of grandeur 

and believed he knew things he did not. Feinman fulfilled his duty to make a reasonable 

investigation into what Goldin might know, and then determined that further investigation 

was not warranted for the reasons explained above. 

The Court wholly rejects Petitioner’s assertion that trial counsel knew he was 

ineffective and that that is why he withdrew as Petitioner’s counsel. See Doc. 26 at 11. This 

contention is belied by the record, which makes clear that trial counsel motioned to 

withdraw after he discovered that another attorney from the Pima County Public 

Defender’s office was representing an inmate who was testifying against Goldin. Trial 

counsel was ethically and legally obligated to withdraw because of this inner office 

conflict. 

As to prejudice,9

 the undersigned further finds that Petitioner has not shown a 

 

8 See Doc. 10 Ex. NN at 17–18. 

9

 The state made a number of arguments as to why Petitioner’s prejudice argument failed: First, the inmate witnesses who allegedly colluded actually testified differently. Second, Goldin was not credible and having him testify against the state’s witnesses would have 

had little if any effect on the outcome. Third, the evidence against Petitioner was strong. Fourth, trial counsel impeached the state’s inmate witnesses through other means, including their drug use and criminal history, and questioned Brugada about his alleged discussions with McBride. Finally, it is unlikely that the collusion evidence would have 

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reasonable probability that the evidence would have probably changed the verdict. As the 

COA explained, there was “overwhelming evidence” that Mediz committed kidnapping 

and first-degree murder: 

The evidence established that Mediz and Golden thought J.L. had inappropriately touched Golden’s daughter. They called and sent text messages to multiple people the morning of the murder and asked them to bring J.L. to their house. They told two of those people they wanted to kill J.L. Golden then hired 

a taxi to bring J.L. to the house. After J.L. arrived, Mediz beat 

J.L. and duct-taped his hands and ankles together. J.L.’s injuries included four fractured ribs, a split thyroid cartilage, and abrasions, bruising and swelling to his torso, arms, neck, and back. 

Mediz then wrapped J.L., who was still alive at that point, in a sheet, duct-taped the sheet around J.L., and put him into the back of a hatchback car. Shortly after leaving, the car got a flat tire and Mediz pulled into a convenience store. While there, 

Mediz heard police sirens, “panicked,” covered J.L.’s body with a spare tire and blanket, and then ran off and hid in the 

desert. J.L. died of suffocation before police arrived. During questioning by the police, Mediz admitted to beating J.L., duct- taping his hands, placing him in the hatchback, and covering his body and leaving it at the convenience store. 

(Doc. 10 Ex. HH at 5–6) (footnote omitted). The undersigned has thoroughly reviewed the 

record, including the transcripts from Petitioner’s criminal trial, and it is replete with 

evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. As the lower courts have noted, while Goldin 

alleged that McBride and Brugada colluded to tell the same story about Petitioner’s intent 

to dump the victim’s body in the desert, that is not how the inmate witnesses actually 

testified at trial.10 Thus, as the Rule 32 court stated, if they did indeed collude, they did so 

 

changed the verdict because the testimony was conflicting, and the court found that what Petitioner intended to do with the body was not material. (Doc. 10 Ex. KK at 11–12). 10 Brugada testified that when he was at Mediz’s home, no one talked about helping the victim or taking him anywhere. (Doc. 10 Ex. H at 32). Brugada recalled that Dan Wolfley did say something about taking the victim to the hospital, but he could not remember if that was when they were at the house or after they left. Id. at 32–33. Brugada had no idea what, if anything, Petitioner planned to do with the victim, and he did not hear Petitioner say anything about what he planned to do with him. Id. at 60. 

 Brugada admitted that at the time of the events, he was working as a confidential information for TPD, but denied that anyone tried to get him to make a case against Petitioner. Id. at 42–43. He further admitted that he agreed to cooperate with the state in this case in exchange for the state telling the judge in his own criminal case that he was 

being cooperative. Id. at 96. 

 Brugada denied speaking to McBride about McBride’s involvement in the case, and 

denied speaking to McBride about his (Brugada’s) involvement in the case. Id. at 95. 

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badly. Moreover, to the extent that there was a discrepancy in the trial testimony as to what 

Petitioner intended to do with the victim’s body, the jury’s findings did not depend on 

whether Petitioner intended to take the victim to a hospital, leave him at a bus stop, or 

dispose of him in the desert. 

Accordingly, the state court’s finding that Petitioner’s IAC claim was without merit 

is supported by the record before this Court and was not an objectively unreasonable 

application of Strickland. The undersigned therefore recommends that the District Court 

deny relief on sub claim B. 

B. Ground Two 

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that the Arizona courts failed to preserve his 

rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner specifically 

contends that the trial court violated his due process rights when it found that there was 

insufficient evidence on his motion to vacate judgment, and when it denied PCR without 

holding a hearing. (Doc. 22 at 16). Petitioner further contends that the state court decisions 

involved an unreasonable application of federal law to the facts of Petitioner’s case. (Doc. 

22 at 18). 

i. Insufficient Evidence 

As to Petitioner’s claim that the trial court violated his due process rights when it 

found there was insufficient evidence on the motion to vacate judgment, the Court finds 

that Petitioner failed to present this specific, federal constitutional issue to the state courts. 

On direct appeal Petitioner argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

grant his motion to vacate judgment. (Doc. 10 Ex. EE at 18). However, Petitioner presented 

 

 McBride testified that Petitioner told him that he duct-taped the victim to make sure 

he was secure; the victim was unconscious at that point but Petitioner did not know if he was dead or not.(Doc. 10 Ex. J at 25). Then Petitioner put the victim in the trunk and said 

he was going to the desert to get rid of the body. Id. at 25–26; 68. 

 Petitioner said he told the guy that brought him the car that he was going to take the victim to the hospital, but Petitioner never intended to do that—he planned to get rid of the body the whole time. Id. at 68. 

 McBride admitted that he approached the state about providing information on Petitioner’s case. Id. at 27. McBride ended up getting a favorable plea in his own criminal case, and admitted that he wanted to testify against Petitioner to get a deal in his case. Id. 

at 27, 43. 

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the claim as a state law issue, contending that the evidence met the requirements for “newly 

discovered” under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1. Petitioner did not argue on direct appeal that the 

trial court’s denial of the motion to vacate judgment violated either controlling United 

States Supreme Court law or the United States Constitution. As respondents note, 

Petitioner did cite Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), in his brief, but did not actually 

make a federal, constitutional law claim.11 Rather, Petitioner cited Davis to support his 

argument that the newly discovered evidence would have changed the verdict. See Doc. 10 

Ex. EE at 26. 

A petitioner does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement “by presenting the state 

courts only with the facts necessary to state a claim for relief[;]” the specific constitutional 

right allegedly violated must also be identified. Grey v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63 

(1996); see also Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (a claim is not 

“fairly presented” to the state court unless the petitioner “specifically indicated to that court 

that those claims were based on federal law”).12 The crux of Petitioner’s claim on direct 

 

11 In Davis, 415 U.S. 308, the Supreme Court held that the refusal to allow a defendant to 

cross-examine a key prosecution witness to show his probation status following an adjudication of juvenile delinquency denied the defendant his constitutional right to confront witnesses, notwithstanding the state’s policy of protecting anonymity of juvenile offenders. Petitioner here makes no such claim under the confrontation clause in his 

PWHC, nor did he make such a claim in the state courts. 

12 As this Court has explained: 

Fair presentation requires a petitioner to describe both the 

operative facts and the federal legal theory to the state courts. 

Reese, 541 U.S. at 28, 124 S. Ct. 1347. It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before 

the state court or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was 

raised. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28, 124 S. Ct. 1347 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the 

court to federal nature of the claim). Rather, the habeas 

petitioner must cite in state court to the specific constitutional 

guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. 

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 

(9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th 

Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th 

Cir.2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked reference 

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appeal was a state law issue—that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant 

the motion to vacate judgment because the collusion evidence was both newly discovered 

and would have probably changed the verdict at trial. Petitioner did not state a factual basis 

for a claim under Davis or any federal constitutional provisions. Thus, Petitioner failed to 

properly present the federal basis for his claim to the COA. 

Habeas is not the remedy for every legal error, nor is it a forum for petitioners to 

argue alleged errors in the state PCR process. See Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“a petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process is not 

addressable through habeas corpus proceedings”). “[I]t is not the province of a federal 

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors 

of state law”). This Court presumes that the state court properly applied the law, see, e.g., 

Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 655 (2004); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (state court decisions must “be given the benefit of the doubt”), and gives deference 

to the trier of fact, Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 

591 (1982). Petitioner also cannot transform his state law claims into federal ones merely 

by asserting a violation of due process. See Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 

1999); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Further, as Respondents note, this claim is really just a reiteration of Petitioner’s 

newly discovered evidence claim, and is co-terminus with Petitioner’s claim that trial 

 to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). 

Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of the United 

States” does not preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63, 116 S. Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 

(1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or 

if the claim would be decided “on the same considerations” 

under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal 

nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts....” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A 

state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court 

if the court must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27, 124 S. 

Ct. 1347. 

Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 764–65 (D. Ariz. 2008). 

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counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the alleged collusion. See Doc. 22 at 16 

(Petitioner arguing that while the state courts and prosecution said the collusion evidence 

would not have changed the outcome of the case, none of the judges were privy to the 

totality of the evidence presented at trial because different judges presided over the trial, 

motion to vacate judgment, and the Rule 32); see Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 

438 n.6 (1983) (“the Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a 

finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules”); Curtis v. Montgomery, 552 

F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2009) (a petitioner cannot recast his state law claim as a federal 

constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence); see also Herrera v. Collins, 

506 U.S. 390 (1993) (claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence is not 

ground for federal habeas relief). 

ii. Denial of PCR Hearing 

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it denied 

PCR without holding a hearing. While Petitioner did request a hearing in his Rule 32 

petition (Doc. 10 Ex. JJ at 21), Petitioner stated in his petition for review to the COA 

following the denial of his Rule 32 petition that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary 

because the two-day hearing on Petitioner’s motion to vacate judgment was sufficient for 

the court to rely on. (Doc. 10 Ex. NN at 2 n.1; Ex. PP at 3 n.1). The Court further notes 

that this argument is premised on the state court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing under 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, and thus concerns a state law issue not cognizable on federal habeas 

review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68; Franzen, 877 F.2d at 26. 

iii. Unreasonable Application of Law 

Finally, as to Petitioner’s claim that the state court decisions on his claims were 

based on an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court law to the facts of 

Petitioner’s case, the Court finds that this is essentially a restatement of the argument in 

Ground One, that the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland to Petitioner’s IAC 

claim. As this argument has already been discussed above, the Court will not address it 

further here. To the extent that Petitioner alleges additional error in the state court 

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decisions, Petitioner fails to make any meaningful argument on this point and the Court 

will not address it further. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (a 

petitioner’s conclusory suggestion that a constitutional right has been violated falls “far 

short of stating a valid claim of constitutional violation”). 

In sum, none of the federal constitutional claims that Petitioner attempts to assert in 

Ground Two were fairly presented to the state courts. Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

regarding timeliness and preclusion prevent Petitioner from now exhausting the claims in 

Ground Two in state court. Accordingly, these claims are both technically exhausted and 

procedurally defaulted and thus not properly before this Court for review. See Crowell, 483 

F.Supp.2d at 931–33; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n. 1; Garcia, 2013 WL 4714370 at * 

8. Further, Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice for the procedural default of 

his claims. There was no objective factor external to the defense which impeded 

Petitioner’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rules; Petitioner simply failed to 

allege the specific federal constitutional nature of the claims in state court. See Murray, 

477 U.S. at 488; see also Engle, 456 U.S. at 134 n.43 (the court need not examine the 

existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause). Accordingly, the 

undersigned recommends that habeas relief on the merits of Ground Two is precluded. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION 

 In conclusion, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court 

DENY Petitioner Scott Michael Mediz’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 22). 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id. 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the District 

Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

. . . 

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 Dated this 7th day of August, 2019. 

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