Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02450/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02450-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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SVK 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jimmy Oram, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Mike Linderman, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-12-02450-PHX-FJM (BSB) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Jimmy Oram, who is a prisoner in the custody of the Arizona Department 

of Corrections (ADC), brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Defendant Mike Linderman, Charles Manning, Wexford Health Services (Wexford), Dr. 

Thomas Bell, and Cameron Lewis, Facility Health Administrator (FHA). (Doc. 41, 

Second Amend. Compl. (SAC).) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the 

remaining claims—Counts I through III. (Doc. 72.) Defendants Linderman and 

Manning, who are Defendants in Counts I and II only, file a separate cross-motion for 

summary judgment. (Doc. 99.) This Order addresses Counts I and II. Count III is 

addressed in a separate order. 

I. Background 

In Count I, Plaintiff claims his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his 

rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) are 

violated by Defendants Linderman and Manning’s policy of allowing religious groups to 

meet on their own for no more than 60 minutes once per week. Plaintiff claims that this 

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policy substantially burdens the practice of his religion because it does not allow him to

complete his weekly prescribed observances.

 In Count II, Plaintiff claims his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights were 

violated when Linderman and Manning denied Plaintiff’s request for an adult-sized 

prayer shawl. 

II. Governing Standards 

 A. Summary Judgment 

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its 

motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the 

moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party 

who must demonstrate the existence of a material factual. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). 

 B. Religious Claims 

“Inmates retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, ‘including its 

directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 

F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 

348 (1987)). To implicate the Free Exercise Clause, a prisoner must show that the belief 

at issue is both “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 

330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). If the inmate makes his initial showing, he must establish that 

prison officials substantially burden the practice of his religion by preventing him from 

engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur, 514 

F.3d at 884-85. 

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A regulation that burdens the First Amendment right to free exercise may be 

upheld only if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. 

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). This determination requires analysis of four factors: 

(1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate 

governmental interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right; (3) 

the impact the accommodation of the right will have on guards, other inmates, and the 

allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives. Id. at 90. 

 The inmate bears the burden of establishing prima facie that RLUIPA has been 

violated and that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened. Warsoldier, 418 

F.3d at 994. The government then bears the burden of proving that the substantial burden 

on the inmate’s religious practice both furthers a compelling governmental interest and is 

the least restrictive means of doing so. Id. at 995 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 

2000cc-2(b)). 

 C. Equal Protection 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); 

Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891. An equal protection claim may be established by showing that 

prison officials intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff based on his membership in 

a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Imp. v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 

702B03 (9th Cir. 2009), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated 

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Or. 

Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601B02 (2008).

In addition, an inmate “‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue’ as to whether he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith 

as compared to prisoners of other faiths” and that “officials intentionally acted in a 

discriminatory manner.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), 

abrogated on other grounds by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. Taking from Turner, the 

Court must consider whether “the difference between the defendants’ treatment of 

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[Plaintiff] and their treatment of [other] inmates is ‘reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests.’” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891.

III. Preliminary Issues 

A. No Damages under RLUIPA 

Damages are not available for official-capacity RLUIPA claims. Sossamon v. 

Texas, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011). In addition, this Court has consistently 

held that damages are not available against Defendants sued in their individual capacity 

under RLUIPA. See e.g., White v. Linderman, CV 11-8152-PCT-RCB (SPL) (Doc. 68); 

Harris v. Schriro, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (D. Ariz. 2009); Abdullah v. Schriro, CV 

08-0255-TUC-CKJ. Although the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on the issue, it has 

observed that four other circuit courts have held that RLUIPA does not provide for 

damage claims against prison officials. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, 639 

F.3d 916, 922 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2011). Other district courts within this Circuit have also 

found that RLUIPA does not provide for individual-capacity damage claims. See, e.g., 

Florer v. Bales- Johnson, 752 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1205-1206 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Parks v. 

Brooks, 2010 WL 5186071, at *1-2 (D. Nev. 2010); Sokolsky v. Voss, 2010 WL 2991522, 

at *2-4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (damages are also not available on official-capacity claims). 

 Because damages under RLUIPA are not available as a matter of law, claims for 

damages under RLUIPA are dismissed. 

 B. No Damages for First Amendment Official-Capacity Claims 

An action against a state official in his official capacity is not an action against the 

official but rather is an action against the official’s office, so damages are unavailable. 

Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, the Eleventh 

Amendment bars damages actions against state officials in their official capacity. Flint v. 

Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007). Official-capacity damage claims for 

First Amendment violations will be dismissed. 

IV. Count I 

 A. Background Facts 

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Plaintiff asserts that he is a gentile practitioner of Torah Observant Messianic 

Judaism (TOMJ). (PSOF ¶ 6.) He contends that one of the core tenets is observance of 

the Sabbath (Shabbat), which begins on Friday at sunset and ends on Saturday at sunset. 

(Id. ¶ 8.) He claims that the Friday evening observance consists of about 25 prayers and 

blessings and lasts 60-90 minutes and the Saturday morning observance involves prayers 

and blessings, readings from the Bible, and discussion by the congregation, all of which 

lasts up to 4 hours. (Id.) In his SAC, Plaintiff alleged that Shabbat also includes an 

evening convocation known as Ma’arn. (Doc. 41 at 5.) Religious services for TOMJ are 

currently limited to 60 minutes. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff argues that Native Americans are 

permitted Sweat Lodge ceremonies that are 3 to 4 hours long because they cannot 

complete the ceremony in only 60 minutes. (PSOF ¶ 10.) 

 Defendants assert that ADC incarcerates over 40,000 prisoners in ten prison 

complexes throughout Arizona, as well as in private and contracted facilities. (DSOF ¶ 

52.) The current ADC inmate population represents over forty different religions as 

declared by the inmates. (Id. ¶ 55.) Department Order (DO) 904: Inmate Religious 

Activities/Marriage Requests governs inmate religious practice. (Id. ¶ 54.) 

 The current policy for religious services provides that when no volunteer is 

assisting or conducting services, services are scheduled for 60 minutes. (Id. ¶ 74.) The 

60-minute time limit was established before Linderman and Manning became employed 

by the ADC. (Id. ¶ 75, Manning Decl. ¶ 17, Linderman Decl. ¶¶ 33, 48.) The Defendants 

are not aware of the specific considerations that went into making the decision to limit 

the time to an hour. (Manning Decl. ¶ 17, Linderman Decl. ¶ 48.) 

 Multi-faith gatherings are generally held once a week at each institutional unit, as 

arranged through the Chaplain in consultation with the Warden, Deputy Warden, or Chief 

of security. (DSOF ¶ 77.) Multi-faith services are scheduled for 60 minutes. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

Multi-faith gatherings are for religious groups that do not have identified volunteer 

leadership, that are not already scheduled for weekly ceremonies, and that have a 

sufficient number of inmates requesting group ceremonies. (DSOF ¶ 78.) Inmates 

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practicing a religion that does not have a volunteer are generally required to have their 

services during the Multi-faith services. (Id. ¶ 79.) An exception is made for the Jewish 

and Messianic Jewish inmates to observe Shabbat because Shabbat is observed on Friday 

evenings. (Id.) 

 In his SAC, Plaintiff seeks 3 hours to conduct Shabbat services on Friday. In a 

grievance, he proposed a 1-hour Friday observance and 2 hours Saturday to study in the 

dayroom. (Doc. PSOF ¶¶ 15-17, Ex. 7 (Doc. 75-6).) He further asserts that another 

alternative would be to allow 90 minutes on Friday evenings and then use the prison 

closed circuit television system to show Messianic Shabbat/Holiday studies that Plaintiff 

and others can watch from their assigned living areas. (Doc. 105 ¶ 99.) 

B. Free Exercise Analysis 

 1. Sincerely Held Belief and Substantial burden 

Defendants do not assert that Plaintiff does not have a sincerely held belief in 

Shabbat services. But Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants substantially burden 

the practice of his religion by preventing him from participating in 3-hour Shabbat 

services on Friday. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed 

to carry his burden. 

 RLUIPA does not define “substantial burden.” A substantial burden exists where 

the state “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate 

his beliefs.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18. Even where the compulsion to modify 

behavior may be indirect, “the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless 

substantial.” Id. at 718. In Warsoldier, the inmate challenged a grooming policy that 

forced him to choose between cutting his beard and being punished for violating the 

grooming policy. The Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause the grooming policy 

intentionally puts significant pressure on inmates such as Warsoldier to abandon their 

religious beliefs by cutting their hair, CDC’s grooming policy imposes a substantial 

burden on Warsoldier’s religious practice.” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 996. 

 In addition, a substantial burden exists where government conduct “impose[s] a 

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significantly great restriction or onus upon [religious] exercise.” Id. at 995–96. In other 

words, “[t]he burden must be more than a mere inconvenience, and must prevent the 

plaintiff from engaging in [religious] conduct or having a religious experience[.]” 

Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 The present case is distinguishable from Warsoldier—Plaintiff does not claim that 

he is being threatened with disciplinary action or denied benefits. And it is undisputed 

that the ADC policy does not operate as an outright ban on congregate services for those 

practicing TOMJ—they are permitted weekly 60-minute periods for observance on 

Friday evening. Thus, the issue is whether the time limitation restriction creates a 

significantly great restriction or onus upon Plaintiff’s religious practice, is more than a 

mere inconvenience, and prevents Plaintiff from engaging in religious conduct or having 

a religious experience. 

 Plaintiff alleges that those unable to perform the Friday evening and Saturday 

morning observances in the manner described by him are deprived of the “rich spiritual 

lessons and experiences” and “forced to violate God’s commandments concerning 

Shabbat” and that those “who do not observe Shabbat are spiritually cut off from the 

commonwealth of Israel and the body of Yeshua.” (PSOF ¶ 9.) 

 But Plaintiff’s SAC seeks 3 hours for services on Friday; he seeks nothing for 

Saturday morning or Saturday evening. Elsewhere, he suggests 1 hour on Friday and 2 

hours on Saturday in the dayroom, or 90 minutes on Friday and access to the prison 

closed circuit television system to show Messianic Shabbat/Holiday studies that Plaintiff 

and others can watch from their assigned living areas. Plaintiff’s inconsistent positions 

regarding what would be satisfactory undermine his claim that he is substantially 

burdened by refusal to provide a 3-hour time period for services on Friday. The 3-hour 

period on Friday without any time on Saturday is itself inconsistent with his claim that he 

must engage in certain activities on Saturday. None of his alternatives seek 2 meetings 

on Saturdays, which Plaintiff asserted in his SAC was a requirement of Shabbat. And 

one of his alternatives suggests 1 hour on Fridays, which is what the policy now provides. 

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 Plaintiff’s varying and inconsistent alternatives show that he is not so burdened by 

denial of a 3-hour Shabbat service on Friday as to pressure him to abandon his beliefs, 

and he is plainly not prevented from engaging in religious conduct or having a religious 

experience, even as to Shabbat observances. The policy providing for weekly 60-minute 

services rather than 3-hour services is an inconvenience, not a substantial burden. 

 Finally, the Court need only consider the request for 3-hour Shabbat services on 

Friday as that is the only request made in the SAC. See Pickern v. Pier 1 Imps., Inc., 457 

F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 3. RLUIPA 

Alternatively, even if there is a triable issue of fact as to a substantial burden, the 

Court finds that Defendants establish a compelling interest in denying 3-hour weekly 

Shabbat services, that the present 60-minute time limitation is the least restrictive means 

of meeting its compelling interest, and that no injunctive relief is available from either 

Defendant. 

 a. Evidentiary Objections 

Regarding population, security, and space issues, Defendants offer the declarations 

of Chris Moody, currently the Warden at ASPC-Lewis, and Carson McWilliams, ADC 

Northern Regions Operations Director. (Doc. 100, Exs. 3, 5) Plaintiff objects to many 

assertions in these declarations, arguing that they are argument, hearsay, conclusions, 

speculations and unsupported because Moody and McWilliams are administrators and do 

not describe experience with security. (Doc. 105 ¶¶ 93-97.) Moody and McWilliams 

submit supplemental declarations, and Plaintiff moves to strike them. (Docs. 113, 114.) 

 The Court overrules Plaintiff’s general objections to the declarations of Moody 

and McWilliams; Plaintiff’s assertion that administrators are not qualified to testify 

regarding security is without merit as it relates to these declarants. Although declarations 

must be made with personal knowledge, a court can infer personal knowledge and 

competence to testify from the declarations themselves. See Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 

629 F.2d 603, 611 (9th Cir. 1980); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

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 Here, Moody is an ADC Warden and former ADC Deputy Warden of Operations 

and McWilliams is an ADC Division Director of Operations and a former ADC Warden. 

The Court can infer from their positions their knowledge of security issues at ADC. In 

addition, the supplemental declarations make clear that these declarants have extensive 

personal knowledge of ADC security matters. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is denied. 

 b. Compelling Interest and Least Restrictive Means 

It is beyond dispute that security in a prison is a compelling government interest. 

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 998. Defendants’ evidence also demonstrates that based on 

security and space considerations, Defendants’ 60-minute policy is the least restrictive 

means of meeting compelling government interests. 

 Defendants contend that extending religious services to three hours without a 

volunteer presents a significant security concern because it would either leave inmates 

largely unsupervised for extended periods of time or require staff to be taken away from 

their regular duties to supervise the inmates. (DSOF ¶ 93, Moody at ¶ 6; McWilliams at 

¶ 6.) A volunteer leading a service provides a degree of supervision. (Id.) 

 As to the time allotted for Sweat Lodge ceremonies, Defendants acknowledge that 

the ceremonies are conducted over a 3- to 4-hour period; but it is undisputed that the 

inmates are only in the lodge for 15 to 20 minutes at a time before they are required to 

take a break of 10 to 15 minutes before re-entering for 4 or 5 rounds. (Id. ¶ 82, 102.) In 

addition, Sweat Lodge ceremonies are only conducted when there is wood available for 

the inmates to use and when security considerations, such as staffing levels, allow. The 

last Sweat Lodge ceremony that was held at ASPC-Lewis was on October 24, 2013. (Id.

¶¶ 83, 85.) When Native American inmates are not able to participate in a Sweat Lodge 

ceremony, they are able to attend multi-faith services and participate in a Talking Circle 

and are limited to 60-minute services. (Id. ¶¶ 87-88.) 

 Defendants contend that the location of the Sweat Lodges versus other religious 

ceremonies is relevant to both security and space issues. The undisputed evidence shows 

that Sweat Lodges have limited access as well as high visibility. (DSOF ¶¶ 101-104; 

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PSOF2 ¶¶ 101-104.) They are located in separate, specifically designated locations. 

(DSOF ¶ 104, Moody Decl. ¶ 8, McWilliams Decl. ¶ 12.) They are in areas where they 

are visible to staff on the unit at all times, and security staff is able to conduct checks of 

the area in the course of their regular duties. (DSOF ¶ 103, Moody at ¶ 7; McWilliams at 

¶ 11.) Based on the forgoing, Defendants contend that it more difficult for inmates to 

smuggle weapons or other unauthorized items into Sweat Lodges. (DSOF ¶ 103.) 

 In contrast, the rooms where Multi-faith gatherings are held are also used for other 

activities such as visitation and education; these rooms are accessible to a wider range of 

inmates and non-inmates on a much more frequent basis than the Sweat Lodges. (DSOF 

¶ 95.) Therefore, these areas must be checked regularly; extending services would 

require additional checks. Depending on the custody level, security staff will either have 

to be stationed there the entire time it is in use or will have to check it periodically. 

(DSOF ¶ 96, McWilliams Decl. ¶ 7.) 

 Defendants assert that if religious services were extended to weekly, 3-hour 

services, with its current staffing levels, ASPC-Lewis would be unable to accommodate 

them. (DSOF ¶ 99, Moody at ¶ 12.) Moreover, Defendants contend, and Plaintiff does 

not dispute, that space is an issue because there are only so many areas in each given unit 

where religious ceremonies can be held. (DSOF ¶ 100, McWilliams at ¶ 9; Moody at ¶ 

9.) The longer each religious service, the less space and time is available for other 

activities. (DSOF ¶ 99, Moody at ¶ 12.) There would also be significant scheduling 

conflicts due to the mixed use purpose of most of the rooms that would have to be used 

and increased security measures such as more frequent checks would have to be instituted 

and would strain the resources of the prison. (Id.) 

 The Court finds that Defendants have carried their burden to demonstrate 

compelling interests in limiting Shabbat services to 60-minutes on Friday evenings and 

that prison official considered other alternatives such as extending the services and using 

other spaces but that the current policy is the least restrictive means of furthering the 

compelling interests. 

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 4. Turner First Amendment Analysis 

As noted, Plaintiff fails to show that the policy substantially burdens the practice 

of his religion. But even if it does, the policy is constitutional under the Turner test. 

 a. Constitutional Violation 

The first Turner factor requires a valid, rational connection between the regulation 

and the legitimate governmental interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Court finds that 

the ADC policy is rationally connected to a legitimate need to maintain secure and 

orderly prison operations in a fiscally-responsible manner while at the same time 

accommodating the needs of thousands of prisoners for religious services. Symington, 

197 F.3d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1999) (“as long as it is plausible that prison officials believed 

the policy would further a legitimate objective, the governmental defendant should 

prevail on Turner’s first prong”). The Court also finds that the different time limit for 

Sweat Lodges is rationally connected to legitimate penolgical interests because inmates 

must leave and return to Sweat Lodges over a period of time, few Sweat Lodges are 

actually held, and Native American inmates are limited to the same 60-minutes for their 

Talking Circles.

 As to the second Turner factor—whether there are alternative means of exercising 

the right that remain open to inmates, the relevant inquiry “is not whether the inmate has 

an alternative means of engaging in a particular religious practice that he or she claims is 

being affected; rather [the court is] to determine whether the inmate has been denied all 

means of religious expression.” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993). The 

lack of a 3-hour time period for Shabbat services has not denied Plaintiff all means of 

religious expression; in fact, he is able to participate in weekly Shabbat observances. He 

can also possess printed religious material and pray and study on his own. (DSOF ¶ 89.) 

 The Court finds that Defendants demonstrate that permitting 3-hour Shabbat 

services would have a substantial burden on the prison due to staff resources needed for 

security and due to space considerations. The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s SAC does 

not pose a ready alternative to the policy. 

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 b. Qualified Immunity 

Even if Plaintiff can demonstrate a constitutional violation under Turner, the Court 

finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment damage 

claim. 

 Here, ADC policy provides for 60-minute religious services for all faith groups 

not led by a volunteer and who meet in a room not designated solely for that purpose. 

Plaintiff does not demonstrate a clearly-established right to longer services for his 

religious group, which meets in a space not designated solely for that purpose. 

Moreover, “[t]he qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken 

judgments.” Dunn, 621 F.3d at 1204-05. The record establishes that the restriction on 

Shabbat services to 60 minutes was not made arbitrarily or irrationally. See Overton v. 

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003). 

C. Equal Protection 

As noted, to show a violation under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the defendant acted with a discriminatory intent or purpose that was 

based upon the plaintiff=s membership in a protected class, Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082, 

and he “‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue’ as to whether 

he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith as compared to prisoners of 

other faiths” and that “officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner.” 

Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737. 

 The equal protection claim relates to the additional time permitted for Sweat 

Lodge ceremonies. Plaintiff fails to create a triable issue of fact regarding this claim. 

Prison officials are not required to provide identical facilities or services for different 

religious faiths; rather, they must make a good faith accommodation of rights in light of 

practical considerations. See Freeman, 125 F. 2d at 737. Plaintiff’s reliance on 

McReaken v. Schriro is misplaced. (Doc. 104 at 21-22, citing McReaken, 2011 WL 

1988077 (D. Ariz. May 23, 2011).) The district court in McReaken found there was no 

question that Native American Sweat Lodges were treated differently than other religious 

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services but also found the policy differences were reasonably related to legitimate 

penological concerns. McReaken, at 2011 WL 1988077, *3-5. 

 Likewise, in the present case, the same Turner analysis that requires rejection of 

the free-exercise claim, requires rejection of the equal protection claim. The legitimate 

interests of security and space justify the 60-minute limitation on Shabbat services. In 

addition, for the reasons discussed in the free exercise claim analysis, the Court finds that 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regarding damage claim for any violation 

of equal protection. 

D. Linderman and Manning 

The Court has already determined that Plaintiff cannot sue Defendants for 

damages in their individual capacities. His only claim is against each Defendant in his 

official capacity for injunctive relief. The evidence shows that security and space 

concerns justify ADC’s limitation on the time for group services and that these 

Defendants have no authority to act with regard to these concerns such that they could 

provide the relief sought. 

 Defendants claim they were not involved in decisions regarding the timerestriction policies. (DSOF ¶ 67, Manning Decl. ¶ 11; Linderman Decl. ¶ 18.) But the 

issue here is not Defendants’ personal responsibility for the alleged RLUIPA violation, 

but whether their duties and responsibilities are such that, if Plaintiff prevails, they have 

the authority to grant him relief. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, n. 12 (9th Cir 

2004); Sebra v. Neville, 801 F.2d 1135, 1039 (9th Cir. 1986) (lack of authority to order 

the requested transfer precludes the plaintiff from obtaining injunctive relief against the 

defendant). 

 Plaintiff asserts that he and his fellow congregants “have asked security and the 

chaplaincy for more time” for services and that “[s]ecurity had no objections, but left it 

up to the chaplaincy.” (PSOF ¶ 2.) This is inadmissible hearsay because Plaintiff fails to 

identify who “security” is. The undisputed evidence shows that Linderman is the 

Administrator of Pastoral Services. The ADC policy regarding religious worship 

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provides that activities are based on several factors, including space and time 

considerations and safety and security issues. (Doc. 100, Linderman Decl., Attach. C, 

DO 904.03 § 1.5.2.) Defendants assert that Linderman does not have the authority to 

overrule decisions based on security consideration. (DSOF ¶¶ 134-135.) Plaintiff 

disputes this based on Linderman’s general duty to make recommendations to the 

Division Director. (PSOF ¶ 2.) But even a duty to make recommendations would not 

give Linderman the authority to overrule decisions made on security. 

 As to Manning, Defendants argue that the claims appear to be based on Plaintiff’s 

mistaken assumption that Manning is the “Division Director for Support Services” and 

his duties therefore include “approving or denying policies relative to religious practices 

and observances.” (Doc. 99 at 18; ref. Doc. 73 ¶ 3.) In fact, Manning is the Program 

Systems Administrator and has never held the position or filled the role of Division 

Director. (DSOF ¶¶ 48-49.) Plaintiff provides no evidence that Manning has the 

authority to approve or deny policies related to religious practices. (DSOF ¶ 134; PSOF ¶ 

134.) That kind of policy change would have to be effected at the Director’s level in 

conjunction with the Offender Operations Division. (Id.) The Court overrules Plaintiff’s 

objection based on hearsay. (See PSOF2 ¶ 136.) 

 The Court has found that the evidence shows that the 60-minute limitation is a 

function of security and space issues and that there is no evidence that either Defendant 

has authority to change religious policy insofar as that policy is determined by security 

and space concerns. 

 In sum, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 

claims regarding the length of the Shabbat service and grant summary judgment to 

Defendants. 

V. Count II 

 A. Background Facts 

Plaintiff asserts that one of the core observances of TOMJ is the adorning of a 

shawl. (PSOF ¶ 22.) He contends that a shawl must be large enough to cover the head 

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and torso and have tassels 9′′-10′′ that extend below the waist. Plaintiff seeks a shawl 

measuring 72′′ by 22′′, while the shawl authorized by ADC policy is 60′′ by 20′′. (Id. ¶¶ 

25; DSOF ¶ 25.) 

 Plaintiff submitted an Inmate Grievance regarding the purchase of his shawl, 

claiming that the current size restriction of 60′′ by 20′′ was unrealistic, and that his family 

did an internet search and stated there was no such size available. (DSOF ¶ 146.) 

Linderman responded and advised that Plaintiff could request a larger size through the 

purchase process based upon lack of availability, but that he had located smaller shawls 

through an internet search. (DSOF ¶ 148.) Linderman also advised that Christian Book 

Distributors, the same source that Plaintiff referred to as not having a smaller shawl, had 

one that was 63′′ by 15′′, and that while it exceeded the currently approved dimensions, it 

had a better chance of being approved than a 6-foot shawl. (DSOF ¶ 150.) 

 Plaintiff appealed and the Director advised that shorter prayer shawls were 

available from a number of sources and provided a list of the sources. (DSOF ¶¶ 154, 

156-157.)) 

 In August 2012, Linderman received a letter from Plaintiff stating that he was 

unable to find a shawl that met the size requirements. (DSOF 158) Linderman advised 

that there were shawls available in the approved size and that they could be found under 

listings for children or youth. (DSOF ¶ 159.) A non-exhaustive search of the websites 

resulted in finding seven styles of shawls that come in sizes within the approved 

dimensions. (DSOF ¶ 160.) Rabbis from both Orthodox and Messianic Judaism have 

advised that there is no size restriction or requirement for a prayer shawl, and that any 

designation of “child-sized” or “youth” is a sales designation, not a religious designation. 

(DSOF ¶ 167.) 

Defendants argue that the only complaint Plaintiff made with respect to the current 

size limitation on prayer shawls is that he was unable to find one within the approved 

dimensions. (DSOF ¶¶ 142, 144, 146, 152, 154, 158, 161.)

B. Religious Claims Analysis 

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 1. Sincerely Held Belief and Substantial Burden 

 As with the prior claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to carry his burden that 

Defendants substantially burden the practice of his religion by limiting the size of the 

permissible shawl to 60′′ by 20′′ rather than 72′′ by 22′′. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. 

 It appears from Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment that he is now claiming 

only that Defendants do not permit him to possess a larger shawl and that the 60′′ by 20′′

limitation is not valid. (Doc. 72 at 8.) He does not assert that he is unable to purchase a 

shawl within the required dimensions.1

 

 Because the restriction on the size of the shawl does not result in imposition of a 

penalty, such as discipline or denial of benefits, compare with Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 

996, and it is undisputed that ADC does not impose an outright ban on possessing a 

shawl, compare with Greene, 513 F.3d at 988, the issue is whether the size limitation 

creates a significantly great restriction or onus upon Plaintiff’s religious practice, is more 

than a mere inconvenience, or prevents Plaintiff from engaging in religious conduct or 

having a religious experience. 

 Plaintiff asserts that wearing the shawl is a core observance of TOMJ and that it 

must be large enough to cover the head and torso and have tassels 9′′-10′′ that extend 

below the waist. But the policy permits Plaintiff to wear a shawl, and it is clear to the 

Court that a 60" shawl will cover the head and most if not all of the torso. Although the 

 1

 Defendants are correct that Plaintiff did not actually assert in his initial grievance 

documents that the approved size is too small or complain that the approved size is for 

children. The Court has already determined, however, that Plaintiff exhausted his 

administrative remedies on this claim. (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff initially complains only that 

72′′ by 22′′ is the smallest he can find. (Doc. 100, Ex. G, Inmate Letter dated 7/25/2011, 

Inmate Letter dated 8/15/2100, Inmate Grievance dated 8/25/2011 (Docs. 100-1 at 126, 

123, 116).) In his in Grievance Appeal, he complains that the shawl identified by 

Kingsland is for a bar mitzvah and not ceremonially appropriate for an adult and that 

another shawl does not have tassels; the final Grievance Appeal to the Director does not 

complain that the approved size is inappropriate. (Id., Inmate Grievance Appeal dated 

10/12/2011, Inmate Grievance Appeal dated 10/21/11(Docs. 100-1 at 114, 110).) 

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tassels may not extend below Plaintiff’s waist, Plaintiff fails to explain how that will 

substantially burden the practice of his religion. As noted, Plaintiff’s grievance 

documents complain only once about an inappropriate size; he never claims that the 

shawl must cover his head and torso and have fringe extending below his waist. 

Plaintiff’s literature regarding the wearing of the shawl makes no reference to its size. 

 Plaintiff does not claim that he is unable to purchase a shawl within the approved 

size. The Court finds that the policy does not pressure Plaintiff to abandon his beliefs 

and he is not prevented from engaging in religious conduct or having a religious 

experience, including the wearing of a shawl. The size limitation is an inconvenience, 

not a substantial burden. 

 2. Qualified Immunity 

The Court also finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the 

First Amendment damage claim regarding the size of the approved shawl. Plaintiff does 

not demonstrate a clearly-established right to a larger one, and even if there was a 

constitutional violation, “[t]he qualified immunity standard gives ample room for 

mistaken judgments.” Dunn, 621 F.3d at 1204-05 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 72), Defendants Linderman and Manning’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 99), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 114). 

 (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 72) on Counts I and II and 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 114) are denied. 

 (3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 99) is granted, Counts I 

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and II are dismissed with prejudice, and Defendants Linderman and Manning are 

dismissed. 

 Dated this 9th day of June, 2014. 

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