Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00650/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00650-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Finding oral argument unnecessary, the court denies plaintiff’s request

for same.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thelma T. Springer, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 07-0650-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

AARP Investment Program )

Scudder Investments, )

)

Defendant. ) )

Currently pending before the court is a “Motion to Correct the

Record” by plaintiff pro se Thelma Springer (doc. 6). Also pending

is a “Motion to Dismiss” by defendant DWS Scudder Distributors,

Inc. (doc. 11), as well as a “Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s ‘Second

Reply to Defendant [sic] Motion to Dismiss’” (doc. 15) by

defendant.1

Background

On March 27, 2007, plaintiff Springer filed the present action

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2 Defendant explains that it was incorrectly named as “AARP, Investment

Program Scudder Investments[.]” Mot. (doc. 11) at 1. 

3 Ms. Springer is the only named plaintiff in this action; none of her

family members are named as plaintiffs.

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against “AARP, Investment Scudder Investments,”2 alleging that it

has refused to pay the “cash value of . . . accounts” held in the

name of her now deceased father. Co. (doc. 1) at 1 and 2. 

Plaintiff claims that she has been trying to obtain these funds,

totaling $13,187.90, from defendant since December 7, 1999. Id. at

3, ¶ 2 and at 1. In attempting to “close” her father’s account,

plaintiff alleges that defendant’s whole attitude” and

“insensitivity” has caused she and her “family3 . . . so much

emotional distress, words c[an] not explain.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff

further alleges that defendant has refused to “abide by” or

“obey[]” unspecified “Rule[s] of Court[]” or “Laws of Court[.]” Id.

at 2. 

According to defendant, plaintiff has supplied some, but not

all of the documentation necessary to release those funds. 

Defendant further claims that despite trying to “accommodate”

plaintiff, including sending her explanatory letters, and spending

countless “hours on the phone with her[,]” plaintiff has not done

“what is necessary to obtain the funds.” Mot. (doc. 11) at 2. 

Instead she filed the present lawsuit, which defendant is seeking

to have dismissed on several bases.

Discussion

I. Motion to Correct Record

Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion to Correct

Record” (doc. 6). The precise nature of the relief which plaintiff

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is seeking by this motion is unclear, but evidently when she filed

it, she had not yet received a ruling on her motion to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court granted that motion on July 2,

2007 (doc. 7), however, and a copy of that order was also mailed to

plaintiff on that date (doc. 8). Thus, because plaintiff has

received the relief which she appears to be seeking by this motion

to correct – a ruling on her IFP application – the court denies

this motion as moot.

II. Motion to Strike

Plaintiff properly and timely filed her “Reply to Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss” (doc. 12). Thereafter she filed a “Second Reply

to Defendant [sic] Motion to Dismiss” (doc. 14). Defendant is

moving to strike that Second Reply as an authorized sur-reply (doc.

15). Defendant’s position is well-taken. 

Despite her pro se status, plaintiff is nonetheless “bound by

the rules of procedure.” See Milsap v. U-Haul Truck Rental Co.,

2006 WL 3797731, at *16 (D.Ariz. 2006) (citing Ghazali v. Moran, 46

F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995)). Neither the Local Rules of Practice

for the District of Arizona, nor the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure allow for sur-replies. As this court has previously

indicated, it “sees no reason to extend briefing beyond that

contemplated in the federal rules and local rules governing civil

procedure.” Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corp. v. Renegade

Promotions, LLC, 2006 WL 2032805, at *5 n.2 (D.Ariz. 2006). 

Therefore, the court will not consider plaintiff’s Second Reply and

grants defendant’s motion to strike in that regard (doc. 15). See

id.

. . .

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III. Motion to Dismiss 

Defendant is moving to dismiss on four separate bases: (1)

lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) statute of limitations;

(3) failure to state a claim; and (4) improper service. The court

will consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first,

because “[j]urisdiction is what [this court’s] power rests upon.” 

In re Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

1. Citizenship

Evidently plaintiff is claiming subject matter jurisdiction

based upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

That statute provides in relevant part that district courts “shall

have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of

interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different

states[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 

Conspicuously absent from plaintiff’s complaint are any allegations

as to either her citizenship or that of the defendant corporation. 

Plaintiff simply alleges that she “reside[s] in Maricopa county[.]” 

Co. (doc. 1) at 1. As to the defendant, she alleges merely that it

“is a co[]rporation wh[ich] does business in Maricopa County, and

the City of Phoenix, Arizona.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations of

residency are insufficient to establish her citizenship for

purposes of section 1332, however.

“On more than one occasion, this court has recently explicated

“the simple allegations needed to establish a natural person's

state of citizenship[ ] under § 1332(a)(1)[.]” Home Buyers Warranty

Corp. v. Leighty, 2007 WL 4616687, at *3 (D.Ariz. 2007) (internal

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quotation marks and citations omitted). “More specifically:

To be a citizen of a state, a natural person must 

first be a citizen of the United States.... The 

natural person's state citizenship is then determined by

her state of domicile, not her state of residence. A

person's domicile is her permanent home, where she

resides with the intention to remain or to which she

intends to return.... A person residing in a given state

is not necessarily domiciled there, and thus is not

necessarily a citizen of that state.”

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added by court in Western World

Insurance Company v. Ramirez, 2007 WL 1839594, at *1 (D.Ariz.

2007)). “In Western World, [t]his court went on to explain that

[t]he distinction between domicile and residence is an

uncontroversial principle to which the Supreme Court has spoken

long ago: [A]n averment that a party resided within the State or

the district in which the suit was brought was not sufficient to

support the jurisdiction, because in the common use of words a

resident might not be a citizen, and therefore it was not stated

expressly and beyond ambiguity that he was a citizen of the State,

which was the fact on which the jurisdiction depended[.]” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“Applying these well settled diversity pleading requirements

to the present case,” plaintiff Springer’s failure to allege the

state of her citizenship “is fatal because” as “the party asserting

diversity jurisdiction[,]” she bears the burden of proof[.]” See

id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As this court

has also previously indicated, it “cannot simply assume the state

of citizenship” of an individual “based on where they reside or

have resided.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In light of the foregoing, the court finds, as it must,

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4 That is if, for example, plaintiff is a citizen of Arizona and

defendant is a citizen of a different state or states, then the diversity element

of section 1332 would be met. 

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that plaintiff has not properly alleged her citizenship as required

to invoke section 1332. 

“Corporations have dual citizenship for purposes of diversity

jurisdiction[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), “[a] corporation is

deemed to be a citizen of both the State in which it is

incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of

business.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Assuming, although it is not alleged, that defendant’s principal

place of business is in Arizona, and, again assuming, although it

is not alleged, that plaintiff is an Arizona citizen, that would

destroy diversity. At this juncture, however, given the incomplete

allegations as to citizenship of both plaintiff and defendant, the

court is unable to ascertain whether there is complete diversity of

citizenship here.

If these jurisdictional defects could be cured by amendment,4

“ordinarily the court would allow such amendment[.]” See id.

(citation omitted). As will be seen, however, even if plaintiff

could cure this particular defect, there are other obstacles to

this lawsuit which she cannot overcome. 

2. Amount in Controversy

Even if plaintiff had properly alleged diversity of

citizenship, defendant maintains that, nonetheless, it is entitled

to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the

amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00, another element

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necessary to establish jurisdiction under section 1332. In her

complaint plaintiff is seeking to recover $13,187.90, the face

value of her deceased father’s account with defendant. 

Additionally, she is seeking “treble damages” in the amount of

$39,563.70, $200,000.00 in damages for “emotional distress[,]” as

well as a “fine at the highest rate The Law allows[,]” and

unspecified “sanctions, fines, fees, and penalties the Law

allows[.]” Co. (doc. 1) at 3, ¶¶ 1; and 3-5. These additional

damage claims are “patently meritless[,]” according to defendants. 

Mot. (doc. 11) at 3. Thus, plaintiff cannot establish the

$75,000.00 threshold amount in controversy. Consequently,

defendant contends that the court must dismiss this action for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Courts “look no farther than the pleadings to determine the

amount in controversy unless ‘from the face of the pleadings, it is

apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover

the amount claimed.’” Kelly v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 377

F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indemn.

Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 

(1938)). “If it appear[s] to a legal certainty that the claim

cannot meet the statutory threshold, the suit should be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). That legal certainty standard is met here.

Plainly the $13,187.90 amount which plaintiff is seeking to

recover as the value of her father’s account is insufficient to

meet the $75,000.00 statutory minimum. Therefore, the court must

look at the other damages which plaintiff alleges to determine

whether she has satisfied section 1332's amount in controversy. 

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Although plaintiff is seeking $39,563.70 in “treble damages,”

nowhere does she provide a statutory basis for such damages. Thus,

the court declines to take this amount into account in determining

the amount in controversy here. Contra In re High Fructose Corn

Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 936 F.Supp. 530, 533 (C.D.Ill. 1996)

(treble damages could be included in determining whether plaintiff

met the amount in controversy where statute expressly mandates or

allows the payment of such damages). 

For a different reason, the court will not include the

$200,000.00 which plaintiff is seeking to recover for “emotional

distress” in considering whether plaintiff has pled the $75,000.00

amount in controversy. As will be more fully discussed below,

because plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for emotional

distress, she cannot rely on these particular damages to meet the

$75,000.00 threshold. 

In light of the foregoing, only the $13,187.90 in damages is 

properly considered in evaluating whether the complaint on its face

satisfies the amount in controversy. That amount is well below the

necessary $75,000.00 statutory minimum. Thus, the court finds that

the second element of jurisdiction under section 1332 has not been

shown on the face of plaintiff’s complaint. Because these

jurisdictional defects -- failure to properly allege the parties’

citizenship and failure to allege at least $75,000 in controversy 

-- arguably are curable the court will address the other reasons

which defendant contends mandate dismissal of this complaint. 

B. Statute of Limitations

In a diversity action, the law of the forum state governs the

applicable statute of limitations. Sonsteng v. Dominican Sisters

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of Ontario, Inc., 2007 WL 2984002, at *4 (D.Or. 2007) (citing

Bancorp Leasing and Fin. Corp. v. Agusta Aviation Corp., 813 F.2d

272, 274 (9th Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, the court will look to

Arizona law to determine the governing statute of limitations here.

When it does that, the court readily agrees with defendant that

plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.

1. Breach of Contract

Generously reading plaintiff’s complaint as alleging breach of

contract, the court finds that since the statute of limitations has

run with respect to such a claim. Arizona has a six year statute

of limitations for breach of written contract, which “includes all

suits brought to recover money without regard to any technical

distinction between debt and damages[.]” Arvizu v. AFSCME Local

Union 2384, 2005 WL 3434698, at *5 (D.Ariz. 2005) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also A.R.S. § 12-548

(West 2003). Plaintiff’s complaint can fairly be read as alleging

that as early as December 7, 1999, she began demanding that

defendant provide her with the funds in her deceased father’s

account. See Co. (doc. 1) at 1-2. Thus, by her own admission,

defendant’s first alleged breach occurred well beyond the six year

statute of limitations. 

Plaintiff fares no better if her complaint is construed as

asserting claims for breach of implied or oral contracts. Claims

of that type are governed by a three year statute of limitations. 

See A.R.S. § 12-543; see also Biddle v. Mountain States Telephone

and Telegraph Co., 629 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980) (under Arizona law,

three year statute of limitations governing oral contracts applied

to breach of contract action alleging breach of partly oral and

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partly written contract). Clearly then, with the alleged first

breach occurring on December 7, 1999, these claims are time barred

as well. 

2. Emotional Distress

“Arizona courts have concluded that the two-year limitations

period found in A.R.S. § 12-542 applies to IIED [intentional

infliction of emotional distress] claims.” St. George v. Home

Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2007 WL 604925, at *6 (D.Ariz. 2007) (citations

omitted). Here, plaintiff’s complaint does not include any

allegations of conduct by defendant within the two years prior to

March 27, 2007, the date she filed this action. Indeed, the

correspondence attached to her complaint indicates that evidently

plaintiff last contacted defendant sometime prior to January 7,

2003, requesting release of the funds from her father’s account. 

See Co. (doc. 1), exh. 4 thereto. Thus, to the extent plaintiff is

asserting a claim for IIED, this claim, too, is time-barred. 

Accordingly, the court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss this

action as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

C. Failure to State a Claim

Even if plaintiff’s IIED claim was not barred by the statute

of limitations, defendant would, nevertheless, be entitled to

dismissal on the grounds that she has failed to state a claim under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). An IIED claim, “requires proof of three

elements: first, the conduct of the defendant must be extreme and

outrageous; second, the defendant must either intend to cause

emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that

such distress will result from his conduct; and third, severe

emotional distress must indeed occur as a result of defendant’s

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conduct.” St. George, 2007 WL 604925, at *4 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “Under the first element, a

plaintiff may recover for [IIED] only where the defendant’s acts

are so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In the present case, the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint

fall far short of alleging the type of conduct, just described,

which is necessary to sustain an IIED cause of action. Simply

reciting, as plaintiff does, that she has suffered “much emotional

distress” is not sufficient to allege a claim for IIED. See Co.

(doc. 1) at 2. To be sure, plaintiff does allege that defendant

was “insensitiv[e][,]” id.; but “[a]n IIED claim cannot arise out

of conduct which merely hurts one’s feelings.” St. George, 2007 WL

604925, at *4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Further, the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s complaint belie her

contentions that defendant “has ignored every attempt, every demand

and every request made[]” to have her father’s funds released or

transferred to plaintiff. Co. (doc. 1) at 2. Moreover, even if

defendant’s conduct is deemed “unjustifiable, it does not

necessarily rise to the level of atrocious and beyond all possible

bounds of decency that would cause an average member of the

community to believe it is outrageous.” See St. George, 2007 WL

604925, at *4 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Given the demanding standard to which IIED claims are subjected,

and given the relatively innocuous nature of the allegations in

plaintiff’s complaint, the court easily concludes that she has

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5 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), absent “good cause,” a

plaintiff has 120 days after the complaint is filed in which to properly serve a

defendant. Here, the complaint was filed on March 27, 2007. Thus, plaintiff had

until July 25, 2007, by which to timely serve the complaint. 

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failed to state a claim for IIED. Thus, defendant’s motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted to the extent

plaintiff’s complaint can be read as attempting to assert a cause

of action for IIED. 

D. Improper Service

Initially, defendant also urged dismissal asserting that it

was not properly served in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, in

that it was served via regular mail, without the necessary “signed

and returned receipt.” See Mot. (doc. 11) at 7 (internal quotation

and citation omitted). Given that improper service and the fact

that the 120 day time frame for filing of the complaint has

expired,5

 initially defendant took the position that the court must

dismiss this action. 

Since the filing of this motion, however, on July 26, 2007,

defendant was served via “certified return receipt” mail. Doc. 9. 

Evidently because of that, defendant is no longer pursuing

dismissal based upon improper service, as it does not mention that

argument in its Reply. In its Reply, however, defendant continues

to persist in arguing for dismissal on the three other grounds

discussed above. Therefore, the court finds that defendant has

abandoned its argument that the complaint should be dismissed for

improper service, and necessarily denies defendant’s motion to

dismiss on this basis. 

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s “Motion to Correct the Record” (doc. 6) is

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DENIED as moot;

(2) Defendant’s “Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s ‘Second Reply to

Defendant [sic] Motion to Dismiss’” (doc. 15) is GRANTED; and

(3) Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss” (doc. 11) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. It is DENIED insofar as it is based upon

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper service, but it is

GRANTED based upon the statute of limitations and, with respect to

the IIED claim because plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege

such a claim. 

DATED this 31st day of March, 2008.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

Case 2:07-cv-00650-RCB Document 17 Filed 03/31/08 Page 13 of 13