Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02251/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02251-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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 1 05CV2251 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOELLA G. SCHNELL,

 Plaintiff

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration,

 Defendant

 

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Civil No. 05-CV-2251-BEN(LSP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (11-1)

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (10-1)

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

 On December 19, 2002, Noella Schnell (Plaintiff) applied

for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act. (Administrative Record, hereinafter “R.” at

43-45.) Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (Defendant), denied the application both initially

and upon reconsideration. (R. at 24-27, 30-33.) On October 31,

2003, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ). (R. at 34, 38.) On July 14, 2004, the hearing was

held. Plaintiff and a vocational expert were present and

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 2 05CV2251 

testified. (R. at 260-313.) On January 13, 2005, the ALJ denied

Plaintiff’s application (R. at 15-21) and on October 14, 2005, the

Appeals Council declined to review the matter. (R. at 5-7.) On

December 12, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint for Judicial Review

& Remedy on Administrative Decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

On October, 10, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. On November 11, 2006, the Defendant filed a Cross

Motion for Summary Judgment. On November 9, 2006, the District

Judge assigned to this case referred the Motions for Summary

Judgment to the undersigned for Report and Recommendation. This

matter is now pending before the court.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Medical Background and Administrative Hearing

Plaintiff was born on December 21, 1963 and was 41 years

old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. (R. at 15.) 

Plaintiff has completed approximately 13 years of education, is

unmarried, and lives with her parents. (R. at 15, 297, 301.) 

Plaintiff’s relevant work experience includes working as a

secretary for over 10 years, grocery cashier work she performed

for over a year, and a parking lot attendant position she held for

17 months. (R. at 61-67, 95, 98.)

Plaintiff additionally worked as a Salvation Army “bell

ringer,” a cosmetologist, and an usher at the Palomar College

theater. Id. The ALJ did not take these jobs into account as

they were performed for short periods of time and did not qualify

as substantial gainful activities (SGA). See 20 C.F.R. 404.1572-

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1

 A positive ANA test is indicative of various diseases, can be druginduced, or even appear in normal persons. Antinuclear antibodies are

[a] group of antibodies that react against normal components

of the cell nucleus. These antibodies are present in a

variety of immunological diseases, including systemic lupus

erythematosus, progressive systemic sclorosis, Sjogren’s

syndrome, scleroderma, polymyositis, and dermatomyositis, and

in some persons taking hydralazine, procainamide, or

isoniazid. In addition, ANA is present in some normal

individuals.

Taber’s Cyclopedic Dictionary 138-39 (19th ed. 2001) (emphasis added).

 3 05CV2251 

.1573 (defining SGA).

Shortly before the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was a

student at Palomar College where she was enrolled in theater and

automotive repair courses. (R. at 262-63.) Plaintiff had been

attending Palomar College since at least 2003 and was able to

carry 9 unit class loads. (R. at 273-74.) She additionally worked

as an usher in the college theater for approximately three hours

per week. (R. at 262-63.)

In 1979, Plaintiff was involved in a skiing accident

whereby she sustained right shoulder injuries that never healed

properly. (R. at 180-83.) Plaintiff continues to have recurring

problems with periodic right shoulder dislocation and has been

diagnosed with “right shoulder instability.” (R. at 180-81, 183,

186.) Her treating and examining physicians unanimously agree

that use of Plaintiff’s right shoulder is limited to below the

shoulder area. (R. at 110, 186, 192, 198, 253.)

In addition to her shoulder injury, Plaintiff has

complained of, inter alia, photosensitivity, urinary tract

infections, generalized body aches, abdominal pain, joint pain,

generalized numbness, fatigue, and rashes. (R. at 128, 119, 146,

168, 183-86, 241.) Plaintiff also has a history of positive and

negative Antinuclear Antibodies (ANA)1

 tests that are indicative

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2

 SLE is “[a] chronic autoimmune inflammatory disease involving multiple

organ systems and marked by periodic acute episodes.” Id. at 1264. One is

diagnosed with SLE

if four or more of the following criteria are present, either at one

time or sequentially: 1. Butterfly rash; 2. raised, scaly discoid

skin lesions; 3. antinuclear antibodies...; 4. immunological

disorders including lupus erythematosus (LE) cells or other

autoantibodies; 5. pleuritis or pericaditis; 6. hemolytic anemia,

leukopenia..., lymphopenia..., or thrombocytopenia...; 7. oral or

nasopharyngeal ulcers; 8. nonerosive arthritis; 9. psychosis or

convulsions without clear cause; 10. photosensitivity skin rash; 11.

proteinuria...

Id.

3

 Voltaren is a “nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug” used for “relief of

the signs and symptoms of osteoarthritis...[and] rheumatoid arthritis.”

Physicians’ Desk Reference 2307-08 (61st ed. 2007).

 4 05CV2251 

of several diseases such as systemic lupus erythematosus (lupus or

SLE)2

. (R. at 130-31, 133-35, 227, 243.) Despite these complaints

and being evaluated by at least 10 separate doctors, Plaintiff has

never been positively diagnosed with any ailment beyond the right

shoulder injury.

The medical evidence in the record begins in 1990, when Dr.

William Pincus saw Plaintiff on a referral from Dr. Lawrence

Schnell. (R. at 133-35.) Dr. Pincus made a cautious diagnosis of

“systemic lupus erythematosis [sic] of a mild variety.” (R. at

135.) However, Dr. Pincus noted that, while this was the most

likely diagnosis, it was not a definitive one. Id. Dr. Pincus

also noted that Plaintiff reacted positively to the medication

Voltaren3: “Her response to [Voltaren] was excellent with almost

complete resolution of her discomfort.” Id. After this visit, the

record does not contain another medical visit until 1992. At that

time, Dr. Kaplan ordered a blood test that ultimately revealed

negative ANA results. (R. at 130-31.)

According to the record, the plaintiff did not see another

physician until 1998, when Dr. Birchall evaluated Plaintiff for

complaints of generalized body aches with fevers and chills for 3

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 5 05CV2251 

days. (R. at 128.) Dr. Birchall suspected an unspecified

infection and prescribed Cipro. Id. Plaintiff’s next medical

visit was four years later, in 2002.

The bulk of the Plaintiff’s medical records begin in 2002,

when at least 7 separate physicians examined Plaintiff. Plaintiff

predominantly complained of urinary tract infections, abdominal

pain, shoulder pain, and general joint pain. (R. at 114, 119, 159,

168, 172, 180.) Though Plaintiff reported to doctors that she had

been diagnosed with lupus, the medical record indicates that

Plaintiff did not have any lupus-related symptoms or ANA tests in

2002. During this time, Plaintiff began seeing one of her

treating physicians, Dr. Chen.

On April 11, 2002, Dr. Chen first evaluated Plaintiff for

joint pain and Dr. Chen declined to complete Plaintiff’s

disability forms. (R. at 172.) On April 22, 2002, Dr. Chen

evaluated Plaintiff for similar complaints and advised Plaintiff

to engage in aerobic exercise and moderate activity. (R. at 171.) 

Next, on September 6, 2002, Dr. Chen evaluated Plaintiff. (R. at

150.) Plaintiff complained of right shoulder pain and stated she

was contemplating becoming an auto mechanic. Id. Dr. Chen advised

Plaintiff to avoid “mechanic work,” and wrote that Plaintiff would

have to engage in low impact work if no treatment was available

for her shoulder injury. Id. Dr. Chen referred Plaintiff to Dr.

Paul Milling for an orthopedic consultation.

Dr. Milling found Plaintiff had full range of motion in her

right shoulder but found it was tender and Plaintiff exhibited

signs of apprehension. (R. at 180.) Dr. Milling advised

Plaintiff to consider further shoulder surgery despite a decreased

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 One’s residual functional capacity is the most work a claimant can still

perform despite his or her impairment(s) and limitations. 20 C.F.R. 404.1545.

 6 05CV2251 

chance for success and likely loss of motion. Id. Dr. Milling

neither issued a diagnosis nor had an opinion about Plaintiff’s

work limitations. Dr. Milling’s evaluation was Plaintiff’s final

medical visit in 2002.

On March 14, 2003, Dr. Thomas Dorsey completed an

orthopedic consultation at the request of the Social Security

Administration (SSA). (R. at 183-86.) Dr. Dorsey’s examination

revealed Plaintiff was in general good health with “grossly

normal” range of motion in her shoulders, elbows, wrists, hips,

knees, and ankles. (R at 185.) Dr. Dorsey diagnosed Plaintiff

with “right shoulder instability” after a full examination. (R. at

186.) Dr. Dorsey’s examination revealed two other abnormalities

besides Plaintiff’s right shoulder injury: decreased sensation to

the fingers of Plaintiff’s right hand as compared to her left hand

and decreased sensation in Plaintiff’s right foot as compared to

her left foot. (R. at 285.) Dr. Dorsey’s evaluation concluded

with an opinion with respect to Plaintiff’s work limitations:

The patient apparently is able to do some type of

physical activities since the bilateral hands show

grease on them today. She should be doing no

overhead activities. Lifting and carrying to the

level of the waist would be 20 pounds occasionally

and 10 pounds frequently. There are no other

limitations.

(R. at 186.) Shortly after Plaintiff’s visit with Dr. Dorsey, the

SSA requested that a state agency medical expert assess

Plaintiff’s physical residual functional capacity4 (RFC).

On March 27, 2003, the state agency medical expert, Dr.

James Haaland, completed a consultative report for the SSA. (R. at

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 7 05CV2251 

189-200.) Dr. Haaland found Plaintiff had the ability to lift or

carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand or

walk for about 6 hours, and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.

(R. at 190.) Dr. Haaland found the Plaintiff could not perform

work above the shoulder level with her right arm. (R at 192.) Dr.

Haaland also noted: “The [claimant] is credible ref. the alleged

symptomology, but not its severity.” (R. at 194.)

On July 28, 2003, Plaintiff saw Dr. Chen, complaining of

fatigue for four months, weakness, and tenderness in all her

extremities. (R. at 146.) Dr. Chen found Plaintiff had a fading

rash on her chest, legs, and arms, ordered laboratory tests, and

prescribed over-the-counter allergy medication. Id. On August 15,

2003, Plaintiff’s test results indicated a positive ANA. (R. at

227.) On August 29, 2003, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Chen. Dr.

Chen took note of Plaintiff’s positive ANA test and her “[history]

of ‘mild lupus.’” (R. at 147.) However, Dr. Chen did not diagnose

Plaintiff with any ailment related to these findings and did not

prescribe additional medication. Id. Nonetheless, Dr. Chen

completed a “Physical Capacities Evaluation” form provided by

Plaintiff. (R. at 201-02.)

Portions of the opinion Dr. Chen expressed on this form

were consistent with those of other physicians while other

portions were inconsistent. See discussion infra part IV.D.i. 

Additionally, in response to questions on the form, Dr. Chen

delivered opinions that no other doctor had expressed. 

Additionally, the form contained fields for “Diagnosis,”

“Symptoms,” and “Type of Treatment (i.e., medications).” (R. at

202.) Based on “generalized pain [and] weakness” symptoms, Dr.

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5

 Diclofenac is a generic version of Voltaren. Physicians’ Desk Reference

2307 (61st ed. 2007).

6

 The exact date of this visit is unclear. It is clear that the visit took

place in July 2004. However, the exact date has been written over and appears to

be either a 6, 12, or 16. (R. at 241.)

 8 05CV2251 

Chen diagnosed Plaintiff with “possible lupus” with a treatment of

“diclofenac.”5

 Id. Dr. Chen’s report did not mention any right

shoulder limitations.

After the August 29, 2003 visit with Dr. Chen, the record

contains 10 separate medical visits. (R. at 143, 214, 210, 209,

207, 204, 218, 235, 240, 241 (in chronological order).) Plaintiff

had various complaints, both related and unrelated to the present

action. Most notably, during a June 1, 2004 visit with Dr. Chen,

Plaintiff reported: “feeling weak. Gets tired curling her hair. 

Feels like she’s really heavy.” (R. at 218.) Dr. Chen prescribed

Zantac and recommended gentle stretching and aerobic exercise (R.

at 218) and subsequently prescribed physical therapy 3 times per

week for 4 weeks (R. at 235). During a subsequent visit to Dr.

Birchall, Plaintiff was prescribed Voltaren for pain. (R. at 241.) 

Dr. Birchall noted that the etiology of Plaintiff’s pain

“remain[ed] elusive” and opined that she could work “6-8 hrs/day

with [illegible].”6 Id. From August 29, 2003 to July 14, 2004, no

doctor positively diagnosed Plaintiff with systemic lupus

erythematosus or any other ailment not heretofore discussed.

On July 14, 2004, an administrative hearing was held before

Administrative Law Judge Samuel Durso. (R. at 260-313.) The

Plaintiff testified on her own behalf.

A vocational expert, Connie Guillory, also testified at the

hearing. (R. at 306-10.) The ALJ asked Ms. Guillory two

hypothetical questions to determine whether Plaintiff could

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 9 05CV2251 

perform her past relevant work. The first hypothetical question

was based on Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity as described

by Dr. Lin, Dr. Dorsey, and Dr. Haaland. (R. at 307-08.) Ms.

Guillory responded that Plaintiff could return to her previous

cashier and secretary jobs but not the parking lot attendant

position. The second hypothetical was based solely on Dr. Chen’s

August 29, 2003 “Physical Capacities Evaluation” report. (R. at

308-09.) Ms. Guillory responded that the Plaintiff would not be

able to work if the information in the “Physical Capacities

Evaluation” report was true. (R. at 309.)

Before the ALJ concluded the administrative hearing, he ALJ

expressed doubts about Plaintiff’s lupus claims and Dr. Chen’s

August 29, 2003 findings. (R. at 310-12.) The ALJ expressed the

desire to further examine the lupus claim and ordered an

“internist endocrinologist examination.” (R. at 311.)

On September 11, 2004, Dr. Henry Lin, an internal medicine

specialist, examined Plaintiff. (R. at 245-54.) Dr. Lin reviewed

Plaintiff’s medical records and took notice of her lupus

complaint, the history of positive and negative tests, Plaintiff’s

history of shoulder injuries, and her complaints of general pain

and weakness. (R. at 245-46.) Dr. Lin’s physical examination

revealed that Plaintiff was in general good health and had full

range of motion in most of her extremities. (R. at 247-48.) Based

on this assessment, Dr. Lin opined that Plaintiff did not have

lupus and her only limitation was a right shoulder injury. (R. at

232.)

B. The ALJ’s Decision

On January, 13, 2005, the ALJ issued his decision. He

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 10 05CV2251 

determined that the Plaintiff “retain[ed] the residual functional

capacity to perform a range of light work.” (R. at 20.) The ALJ

credited her right shoulder impairment but discounted Plaintiff’s

lupus testimony. Id. In doing so, he set forth Plaintiff’s

relevant medical visits and cited a lack of reliable medical

evidence, conservative treatment, and lack of a definitive lupus

diagnosis. (R. at 19-20.) The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints of pain and weakness, citing lack of and

medical evidence for the pain and Plaintiff’s continued

activities. (R. at 19.)

Additionally, the ALJ discounted Dr. Chen’s August 29, 2003

report because

Dr. Chen’s opinion of work limitations [was] not

supported by the evidence of record considered as a

whole, including the records of Dr. Chen. The

claimant underwent intermittent sporadic treatment

and had generally unremarkable signs. The claimant’s

major complaint was shoulder dislocation and she did

not report signs or symptoms consistent with the

opinion of Dr. Chen as regards any continuous period

of not less than 12 months.

(R. at 18.) Because Ms. Guillory’s opinion, that Plaintiff could

not work, was based on Dr. Chen’s report, the ALJ disregarded her

opinion as well. (See R. at 20 (relying on the first hypothetical

posed to Ms. Guillory).)

The ALJ also disregarded Dr. Birchall’s July 2004 opinion

that Plaintiff could work 6-8 hours because “[n]o opinion is set

forth regarding duration, nor are there longitudinal objective

medical records in support of the opinion rendered.” (R. at 19.) 

Ultimately the ALJ determined Plaintiff was able to return to her

cashier and secretary positions and found she was not eligible for

disability benefits.

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 11 05CV2251 

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary of Applicable Law

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “Act”), as

amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons

who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical

or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D) (Supp. III 1982). 

Title XVI of the Act provides for the payment of disability

benefits to indigent persons under the Supplemental Security

Income (SSI) program. § 1382(a). Both titles of the Act define

“disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months...” Id. The Act further

provides that an individual

[S]hall be determined to be under a disability only

if his physical or mental impairment or impairments

are of such severity that he is not only unable to

do his previous work but cannot, considering his

age, education, and work experience, engage in any

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists

in the national economy, regardless of whether such

work exists in the immediate area in which he lives,

or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 

Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920 (1986). Step one determines whether the claimant is

engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If he is, disability

benefits are denied. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not,

the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether

the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of

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 12 05CV2251 

impairments. That determination is governed by the “severity

regulation” at issue in this case. The severity regulation

provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of 

impairments which significantly limits your physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities, we

will find that you do not have a severe impairment

and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not

consider your age, education, and work experience. 

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the

abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” §§

404.1521(b), 416.921(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include

“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “[c]apacities

for seeing, hearing, and speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying

out, and remembering simple instructions”; [u]se of judgment”;

“[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual

work situations”; and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work

setting.” Id. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 

If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the

third step, which determines whether the impairment is equivalent

to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary

acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful

activity. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,

App. 1 (1986). If the impairment meets or equals one of the

listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be

disabled. If the impairment is not one that is conclusively

presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth

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step, which determines whether the impairment prevents the

claimant from performing work he has performed in the past. If

the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not

disabled. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant cannot

perform his previous work, the fifth and final step of the process

determines whether he is able to perform other work in the

national economy in view of his age, education, and work

experience. The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only

if he is not able to perform other work. §§ 404.1520(f),

416.920(f). 

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

In a Social Security case, the Commissioner’s denial of benefits

“will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial

evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of

Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988)

(citing Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less

than a preponderance. Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th

Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “[I]t is such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039

(9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record as a whole,

examining both the evidence which supports the ALJ’s conclusions

and that which detracts therefrom. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d

993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). “In reaching his findings, the law

judge is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the

evidence.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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7 Plaintiff argues that the hearing transcript is accurate based on the

transcriber’s certification that the transcript was a “true and complete

transcription of the testimony.” (R. at 313; Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 2:4-15.)

However the court discovered at least one glaring error in the transcript: While

the hearing took place on July 14, 2004, the transcript is dated July 14, 2005.

(R. at 260.)

 14 05CV2251 

If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation,

the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749

F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, when the evidence is

inconclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of

conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.”

Schweiker, 694 F.2d at 642 (internal quotations and citation

omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ posed an incomplete

hypothetical question to Ms. Guillory and could not rely on her

response. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 4, 5:22-6:14.) Specifically,

Plaintiff points to a portion of the hypothetical question in

which the ALJ stated Plaintiff “may work above shoulder level with

the right upper extremity.” [R. at 308 (emphasis added)] 

Plaintiff argues the hypothetical question was incomplete because

Plaintiff cannot work above shoulder level and Ms. Guillory’s

subsequent response has no evidentiary value. Id. Defendant

responds by encouraging the court to “assume the ALJ said ‘no’

work above the shoulder rather than ‘may’ work above the shoulder”

because the ALJ knew about Plaintiff’s impairment and did not

suggest Plaintiff could perform above-shoulder work elsewhere in

the record. (Mem. Points Authorities Supp. Def.’s Cross-Mot.

10:21-26.) Neither party provided evidence to the Court or

verified whether the error was made by the ALJ or transcriber.7

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 15 05CV2251 

The Court finds the Defendant’s argument unpersuasive and cannot

assume the ALJ stated “may” but meant “no.”

Plaintiff’s argument is also unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s

selective quotation of the record excludes the first half of the

ALJ’s sentence. The full sentence reads: “She would need to avoid

overhead controls, working –- may work above the shoulder level

with the right upper extremity . . .” (R. at 308.) Taken as a

whole, the ALJ’s sentence is at best unclear since it appears that

the ALJ states the Plaintiff is simultaneously able and unable to

work above shoulder level. Had the hearing ended immediately

after Ms. Guillory’s response to this question, there would be

sufficient cause to remand this case. However, the hearing

continued and Plaintiff questioned Ms. Guillory shortly after the

ALJ’s unclear hypothetical question. Plaintiff ultimately

clarified the ALJ’s question.

Plaintiff’s examination of Ms. Guillory consisted of one

question:

Q I just have one question and that is, with the first

hypothetical which I believe corresponds to Exhibit 5F

[Record pages 189-200] –- but nevertheless, would the

Claimant or the hypothetical person be able to perform the

Claimant’s past relevant work if her lifting and carrying

were limited to the level of the waist for the 20 pounds

occasionally and the level of the waist at 10 pounds

frequently, so all her lifting and carrying would be at the

waist level?

(R. at 309.) This hypothetical question restricted Plaintiff’s

activity to waist level. The limitation posed in Plaintiff’s

hypothetical question is more restrictive than Plaintiff’s actual

abilities because Plaintiff is capable of performing work from the

waist to the shoulder area. Yet, despite this more restrictive

hypothetical question, Ms. Guillory responded that such a

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condition would not preclude Plaintiff from performing her past

secretarial position and could still perform 65%-80% of cashier

jobs comparable to her past position. (R. at 310.)

In sum, it appears that the ALJ’s hypothetical question was

unclear at best. However, Plaintiff’s subsequent restrictive

hypothetical question served to clarify the ALJ’s unclear

hypothetical question. Plaintiff’s hypothetical question also

provided sufficient evidence in the record to convince the Court

that Ms. Guillory’s opinion was based on factors that reflected

Plaintiff’s true residual functional capacity. The ALJ was

present at the hearing and heard Ms. Guillory’s response to

Plaintiff’s more restrictive hypothetical question. Therefore,

the Court finds that, while the ALJ may have asked an unclear

question, Plaintiff’s subsequent questioning clarified the ALJ’s

hypothetical question. Therefore, the ALJ could reasonably rely

on Ms. Guillory’s subsequent answers.

B. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus.

In positing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity to Ms.

Guillory, the ALJ excluded Plaintiff’s lupus claim while including

her photosensitivity. The ALJ did this because

Dr. Chen notes a diagnosis of possible lupus, but

that diagnosis is not clinically confirmed. In fact,

Dr. Pincus, a rheumatologist, specializing in the

treatment of conditions such as lupus, opined that

the claimant had only mild lupus, at most, but did

note definitively diagnose the claimant with that

condition. Regardless, Dr. Pincus indicated that the

claimant had had an excellent response to treatment

with her medications, including Voltaren.

. . .

I also note that the treatment records reflect only

intermittent reports of the claimant’s purported

symptomology with sporadic conservative treatment and

inconsistent laboratory findings. No physician of

record has opined . . . that the claimant’s

impairments are more limiting than found by the

undersigned [Administrative] Law Judge.

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28 8

 Photosensitivity is “[s]ensitivity to light either because of an

autoimmune illness, such as systemic lupus erythematosus, or because of the use

of application of sensitizing drugs or chemicals.” Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical

Dictionary supra note 1 at 1651-52.

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(R. at 17, 20.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by “determining

Plaintiff’s lupus was not a severe impairment.” (Pl.’s Mem. Supp.

Summ. J. 17.) Plaintiff appears to argue that Plaintiff has lupus

because photosensitivity is a symptom of lupus and is not related

to Plaintiff’s shoulder impairment. Id. at 17:17-20. She then

argues that her lupus is a severe impairment because doctors and

Ms. Guillory have opined that her photosensitivity prevents

outdoor work. Id. Defendant seemingly accepts that Plaintiff has

lupus but argues Plaintiff failed to establish that her

photosensitivity significantly limited her ability to perform

basic work activities, such as walking, sitting, and lifting, and

thus does not qualify as a severe impairment. (Mem. Points

Authorities Supp. Def.’s Cross-Mot. 15:18-27.) This Court does

not have to reach Defendant’s severity argument since substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff does not have

lupus.

Since the record contains factors that simultaneously

support and refute Plaintiff’s lupus claim, it is solely within

the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict. Sample v.

Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). The first set of

factors in support of Plaintiff’s lupus claim include three

positive ANA tests (R. at 133-135, 227, 243), one episode of skin

rashes (R. at 146, 143), and photosensitivity.8 However, the

record also contains one negative ANA test. (R. at 130-31.) While

this evidence lends support to Plaintiff’s lupus claim, the most

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9

 See supra note 1.

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significant factor weighing against Plaintiff’s claim is the

noticeable lack of any definitive lupus diagnosis. Of the 13

physicians who saw Plaintiff, none positively diagnosed Plaintiff

with lupus and only three opined about the presence of lupus. Of

these latter physicians, one unequivocally stated Plaintiff did

not have lupus (R. at 249) while two cautiously opined Plaintiff

may have lupus (R. at 133-35, 201-02).

Dr. Pincus was the first doctor to suggest plaintiff may

have lupus. Based on Plaintiff’s “rash, leukopenia, ultraviolet

sensitivity and arthralgia,” Dr. Pincus made a cautious diagnosis

of “systemic lupus erythematosis [sic] of a mild variety.” (R. at

135 (emphasis added).) Dr. Pincus noted that this was not a

definitive diagnosis. Specifically he wrote: “I suggest that the

patient possibly has systemic lupus . . . At least this diagnosis

is a working diagnosis and should be the first considered given

the findings so outlined.” Id. (emphasis added). In concluding

his report, Dr. Pincus further wrote: “In conclusion, I feel the

most likely diagnosis, but not definite, is systemic lupus

erythematosis [sic] of a mild nature.” Id. (emphasis added). Dr.

Pincus also noted that Plaintiff had reacted positively to the

medication Voltaren: “Her response to [Voltaren]9

 was excellent

with almost complete resolution of her discomfort.” Id. No other

physician made a reference to lupus from 1990 to August 29, 2003,

when Dr. Chen saw Plaintiff.

On August 29, 2003, Dr. Chen stated Plaintiff had “possible

lupus.” (R. at 202 (emphasis added).) Dr. Chen made this

diagnosis only once despite having seen Plaintiff a total of 8

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28 10 Dr. Chen also took clinical notes on the same day she completed

Plaintiff’s Physical Capacity Assessment form. (R. at 147.) While Dr. Chen noted

that Plaintiff had a “[history] of ‘mild lupus,’” her notes do not contain a

specific diagnosis. Id. Rather, “possible lupus” only appears on Plaintiff’s

Physical Capacity Evaluation form. (R. at 202.)

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times.10 Dr. Pincus’s and Dr. Chen’s diagnoses stand in contrast

to Dr. Lin’s diagnosis.

Dr. Lin opined that plaintiff did not have lupus. In doing

so, he provided the reasoning behind his conclusion:

Claimant...[had] two mildly positive ANA tests in the

past. The claimant does not have any other signs or

symptoms that would suggest she has lupus. The ANA

is not specific for lupus and the test in only mildly

positive in the claimant’s case. She states she has

had intermittent negative ANA tests in the past.

(R. at 249 (emphasis added).) 

Ultimately the record contains one opinion that Plaintiff

does not have lupus, two cautious opinions that Plaintiff may have

lupus, and no definitive diagnosis that Plaintiff has lupus. The

present case is not one in which the ALJ ignored a conclusive

diagnosis. See, e.g., Petersen v. Barnhart, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS

31627 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Dr. Wambaugh diagnosed Petersen as having

had multiple sclerosis (‘MS’) since at least 1991. The ALJ failed

to credit Dr. Wambaugh’s diagnosis by concluding that Petersen had

only ‘possible multiple sclerosis.’”). Here, Plaintiff only as

“possible lupus,” at the very best.

Based on a review of the record, the ALJ’s decision to

discount Plaintiff’s lupus claim is supported by substantial

evidence. Hence, the ALJ did not err by excluding lupus from his

disability determination.

C. Plaintiff’s Subjective Pain and Symptoms.

During the administrative hearing, Plaintiff reported

severe pain and other symptoms in addition to her medically

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11 Contrary to Plaintiff’s testimony of near-incapacitation, Plaintiff also

testified that she attends at least one community college class per day (R. at

281), sometimes drives a 1979 Chevrolet pickup truck (R. at 275-76), helps her

mother with household chores (R. at 297), and works as an usher at the Palomar

College theater, (R. at 262-63).

 20 05CV2251 

confirmed shoulder impairment and limitations. Specifically,

Plaintiff testified:

Well, I have problems with everything [INAUDIBLE] I

mean I just have a lot of pain in my arms, in my

shoulders, in my knees. I can’t support –- seem to

support my weight. I can’t hold a book up. I can’t

type without my fingers cramping. I have to lay

down. I mean, I just have to rest every -– all the

time. I just have to –- I start something and it’s

within minutes that I can’t continue.

[R. at 294 (alteration in original)] Plaintiff also testified

that she could not lift more than 5 pounds because her arms “give

in” on her (R. at 298), and spends most of her day lying down and

resting (R. at 300).11 As discussed below, the ALJ must credit

this testimony if the record contains objective medical evidence

supporting it.

To properly reject a claimant’s subjective pain claim, “an

ALJ must make specific findings justifying that decision.” Fair v.

Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the initial

burden is on the claimant: “(1) she must produce objective medical

evidence of an impairment or impairments; and (2) she must show

that the impairment or combination of impairments could reasonably

be expected to (not that it did in fact) produce some degree of

symptom.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)

(emphasis in original); Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407-08

(9th Cir. 1986). “This is a threshold requirement that cannot be

overlooked.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 602 n.1.

A review of the record reveals that Plaintiff’s only

diagnosed impairment was her right shoulder impairment. Thus,

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Plaintiff’s only diagnosed impairment precluded performance of

above-shoulder work but cannot reasonably be expected to cause

Plaintiff to experience the ailments she described in her

testimony. While it appears that Plaintiff periodically displayed

symptoms of lupus, no doctor ever diagnosed her with lupus. Since

physicians are in the best position to make such diagnoses, an ALJ

should not be expected to make a diagnosis himself if a claimant’s

own physicians do not.

Since the record does not contain objective medical

evidence suggesting the existence of pain, the ALJ may disregard

the testimony after making specific findings to explain his

decision. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir.

1990); Bates v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 1059, 1072 (9th Cir. 1990). In

the present case, the ALJ set forth several reasons for rejecting

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and related symptoms.

(R. at 21.) The ALJ explained:

Although she alleges carpal tunnel symptoms,

electrodiagnostic testing on May 15, 2002 and June 29, 2004

was negative. Although the claimant argued that her

difficulties with sitting, use of her arms and hands, and

stamina, would preclude work on a regular and continuing

basis, the limited medical findings of record do not

reflect ongoing signs of symptoms consistent with the

claimant’s allegations. Indeed, the claimant’s medication,

Voltaren, Tylenol, and aspirin control her symptoms without

disabling side effects. Moreover, the claimant is

currently attending Palomar College, where she works part

time, three days per week.

. . . The claimant’s predominant treatment was for her

recurring right shoulder dislocation, which condition was

under control and managed conservatively. I also note that

treatment records reflect only intermittent reports of the

claimant’s purported symptomology with sporadic

conservative treatment and inconsistent laboratory

findings. . . . No physician of record has opined, as

regards any continuous period of note less than 12 months,

that the claimant’s impairments are more limiting than

found by the undersigned [Administrative] Law Judge.

(R at 19-20.)

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 The ALJ’s reasons are persuasive and not contradicted by

the record. Ultimately, the record contains substantial evidence

of only one impairment: right shoulder instability. Since the

record does not contain substantial evidence of other ailments and

proper reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective pain and

symptoms were set forth, the ALJ’s decision to disregard

Plaintiff’s subjective testimony was not in error.

D. Treating Physicians’ Opinions.

In denying Plaintiff’s claim, the ALJ also discounted the

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians: Dr. Chen and Dr.

Birchall. The ALJ rejected Dr. Chen’s views, as expressed in the

Physical Capacity Assessment form, because “[the] opinion is

conclusory, is set forth on a checklist form supplied by counsel,

and provides no supporting objective medical data consistent

therewith.” (R. at 17.) Similarly, the ALJ discounted Dr.

Birchall’s opinion that Plaintiff could work between 6 and 8 hours

because “[n]o opinion is set forth regarding duration, nor are

there longitudinal objective medical records in support of the

opinion rendered.” (R. at 19.)

Initially, Plaintiff argues that the opinions of Drs. Chen

and Birchall should not have been discounted based on the doctors’

status as Plaintiff’s treating physicians. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ.

J. 19:5-22:11.) However, nothing in the record suggests that the

ALJ ever doubted Dr. Chen or Dr. Birchall’s designations as

treating physicians. Plaintiff then argues that the ALJ failed to

discuss conflicting medical evidence or give convincing reasons

for rejecting the doctors’ opinions. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J.

22:12-24:15) Plaintiff also questions the ALJ’s rejection of the

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Physical Capacity Assessment form and argues that other forms the

ALJ accepted were also checklist forms. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J.

21:5-20.) Defendant responds that the ALJ properly discounted

these treating physicians’ opinions and gave clear and convincing

reasons for doing so. (Mem. Points Authorities Supp. Def.’s CrossMot. 16:6-18:5.)

The opinions of treating physicians carry substantial weight

in the disability determination. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). “The treating physician’s opinion is

not, however, necessarily conclusive as to either a physical

condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” Id. “The ALJ may

disregard the treating physician’s opinion whether or not that

opinion is contradicted.” Id. To ignore a treating physician’s

opinion, the ALJ must provide “specific, legitimate reasons for

doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.”

Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). For

example, an ALJ may disregard an opinion because it is “brief and

conclusory in form with little in the way of clinical finding to

support [it’s] conclusion . . .” Id. (quoting Young v. Heckler,

803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986) (alteration in original). 

Finally, if the ALJ ignores uncontroverted medical evidence, he

must provide clear and convincing reasons to support his decision.

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. If the ALJ ignores controverted

opinions, he must provide specific, legitimate reasons for doing

so. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001).

(i) Dr. Chen’s Opinions.

Based on the record, Dr. Chen’s assessment as a whole cannot

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be categorized as either consistent or inconsistent with the

record because some elements of her opinion are consistent with

the record while others are not. For example, Dr. Chen opined,

and other physicians agreed, that Plaintiff could sit for 6 hours

at one time and for 6 hours in an 8-hour day; Plaintiff could also

lift and carry 0-10 pounds continuously and 21-25 pounds

occasionally. (R. at 201.) However, Dr. Chen’s opinion that

Plaintiff could stand and walk for 4 hours at one time and for 4

hours during and 8-hour day was inconsistent with Dr. Haaland’s

opinion that Plaintiff could do both for 6 hours. (R. at 190.) 

Dr. Chen also set forth opinions that are neither consistent nor

inconsistent with the record because she was the only physician to

opine about the subject. For example, Dr. Chen opined that

Plaintiff could not “sustain capacity to perform work at a

consistent pace for 8 hours,” could not work “without needing more

than one 5 minute break per hour,” could not “complete a normal

workday without interruptions from physical symptoms,” and would

miss 3-4 days of work per month. (R. at 202.) No other doctor

reached the same conclusions, as those doctors had not been asked

the specific questions contained in the form Plaintiff provided to

Dr. Chen.

However, Dr. Chen’s opinion is in conflict with opinions

elsewhere in the record based on Ms. Guillory’s opinion that

Plaintiff could not work if the assumptions in the ALJ’s second 

hypothetical were true. These assumptions were based entirely on

Dr. Chen’s opinions as set forth in the Physical Capacity

Assessment form. (See R. at 309.) In this sense, Dr. Chen’s

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opinions are controverted. Nonetheless, because the opinion

itself contains a mixture of consistent and inconsistent opinions,

the Court evaluates the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Chen’s opinion

under the more stringent “clear and convincing reasons” standard. 

Even under this standard, the ALJ’s three stated reasons for

disregarding Dr. Chen’s opinion are persuasive.

First, substantial evidence from the record supports the

ALJ’s determination that Dr. Chen’s opinions lack a basis in

objective medical evidence. Of the 11 times Dr. Chen saw

Plaintiff, including 2 referrals to other doctors, Plaintiff’s

complaints consisted of: urinary tract infections (R. at 159,

168), pain in various parts of her body (R. at 171, 172, 180),

weakness and tiredness (R. at 146, 218), and a rash (R. at 146). 

However, as the ALJ notes, Dr. Chen’s treatment regimen remained

conservative. For example, Dr. Chen recommended that Plaintiff

engage in “aerobic exercise [and] mod[erate] activity” (R. at

171), “[t]old [Plaintiff] to do stretching and aerobic exercise,”

(R. at 218), and prescribed physical therapy (R. at 235). 

Finally, Dr. Chen never definitively diagnosed Plaintiff with any

ailment besides right shoulder instability, despite her history

with Plaintiff and one positive ANA test. Dr. Chen even opined

that Plaintiff would have to do “very low impact work” if her

shoulder injury did not improve. (R. at 110, 150.) Therefore, the

record supports the ALJ’s first stated reason for rejecting Dr.

Chen’s opinion.

The ALJ’s final two reasons for rejecting Dr. Chen’s opinion

are interrelated. The ALJ correctly states that the opinions on

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the checklist form are conclusory because Dr. Chen provided no

explanation for any of the conclusions on the form or anywhere

else in the record. Additionally, Dr. Chen’s entries on the

checklist form itself are invalid because Dr. Chen’s own medical

records do not provide an objective basis for those entries.

Checklist forms and conclusory statements are not per se

invalid. Because Dr. Chen had a treatment relationship with

Plaintiff, a conclusory checklist form may be valid if her medical

records provide support for opinions expressed on the form. See,

e.g., Batson v. Comm’r of the SSA, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2004) (“The dissent contends . . . that it is wrong to view

one of [the doctor’s] reports, in isolation, as a checklist. We

respectfully disagree. [The doctor’s] treatment notes do not

provide objective medical evidence of the limitations asserted in

his report . . .”) (emphasis added). Hence while a checklist that

does not explain its conclusions is per se invalid if a nontreating physician completes it, the same cannot be said when a

claimant’s treating physician completes the same form.

In the present case, like Batson, while Dr. Chen is

Plaintiff’s treating physician, her opinions are conclusory and 

not supported by her own medical records. Therefore, based on a

review of the record and the preceding analysis, the Court finds

that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

Dr. Chen’s opinion.

(ii) Dr. Birchall’s opinion.

It would seem that an opinion affirming the Plaintiff’s 

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ability to work up to and including 8 hours per day would support

the ALJ’s ultimate decision. However, the ALJ discounted Dr.

Birchall’s opinion because it lacked a basis in objective medical

evidence. The ALJ’s reasoning is persuasive. Dr. Birchall could

not reasonably opine that Plaintiff could work 6, 7, or 8 hours if

his medical records do not support that opinion. Dr. Birchall’s

records reveal that he was unclear about the cause of Plaintiff’s

complaints. (R. at 240-41.) However, despite Dr. Birchall’s

writing that the “etiology remains unclear” for Plaintiff’s pain

and further evaluation was needed, he simultaneously issued an

opinion about Plaintiff’s work limitations. (R. at 241.) However,

he did not explain why he believed Plaintiff could work between 6

and 8 hours. Hence, the opinion was conclusory. Furthermore,

because of the uncertainty in Dr. Birchall’s records, any opinions

about work limitations--even if they support the ALJ’s

conclusions--are unsupportable. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in

discounting the Dr. Birchall’s opinion.

In sum, both Dr. Birchall and Dr. Chen issued conclusory

opinions that lacked sufficient objective medical support. The

ALJ also included these doctors’ findings in his decision before

discounting them and explained why he discounted them. (R. at 16-

20.) Therefore, based on a review of the record and the preceding

analysis, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in discounting

Dr. Chen and Dr. Birchall’s opinions. Furthermore, since Dr.

Chen’s opinion was the basis for the ALJ’s second hypothetical

question, the Court also finds that the ALJ did not err in 

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ignoring Ms. Guillory’s response to that question.

E. Development of the Record and Plaintiff’s Past Job Duties.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to sufficiently

develop the record by not fully exploring the duties of her past

relevant work and resolving a conflict between the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles’ (DOT) description of Plaintiff’s jobs and her

jobs as actually performed. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 9:15-

11:17.) Additionally Plaintiff argues that her cashier position

does not qualify as substantial gainful activity (SGA) because her

income failed to meet minimum SGA requirements. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp.

Summ. J. 13:23-14:4.) Defendant responds that the ALJ

sufficiently developed the record and did not have a duty to

resolve any conflict because none was apparent. (Mem. Points

Authorities Supp. Def.’s Cross-Mot. 12:26-13:11.) Defendant also

argues that income requirements are not determinative of a job’s

SGA status and the cashier position qualifies as SGA since

Plaintiff was able to consistently work in that capacity. (Mem.

Points Authorities Supp. Def.’s Cross-Mot. 13:12-25.)

An ALJ has the “duty to fully and fairly develop the record

and to assure that the claimant’s interests are considered.” Brown

v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). A claimant is not

considered disabled if she can perform a job either as she

actually performed it or as it is generally performed. S.S.R. 82-

61. In the present case, the ALJ ended the disability

determination in step four when he determined:

7. The claimant’s past relevant work experience as a 

 cashier or secretary did not require the performance of 

 work-related activities precluded by the above 

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 limitation(s).

8. The claimant’s impairment does not prevent the 

 claimant from performing her past relevant work.

[R. at 21 (emphasis added)]

The ALJ’s decision does not specify whether he believed

Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as actually

performed or as generally performed. Therefore, the court

evaluates each job under both standards to see whether substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination.

(1) Cashier as actually performed.

(i) Cashier position qualifies as SGA.

Plaintiff’s contention that her cashier position does not

qualify as SGA is unpersuasive. Plaintiff selectively directs the

court to the 2001 calendar year, in which she made an average of

$350.19 per month, and notes her average income that year was

below the suggested threshold of $700. (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J.

13:23-14:4.); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1547(b)(2)(ii) (explaining the

method of calculating income standards). Plaintiff’s reliance on

this income factor is misplaced. The Code of Federal Regulations

state: “Generally, if you worked for substantial earnings, we will

find that you are able to do substantial gainful activity. 

However, the fact that your earnings were not substantial will not

necessarily show that you are not able to do substantial gainful

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(a)(1). The record also reveals

that Plaintiff did meet the average income recommendations under

Section 404.1574.

Plaintiff testified that she worked as a cashier in 1998. (R. 

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at 270.) This corresponds with the position Plaintiff described

in her Work History Report. (R. at 67.) Plaintiff earned

$8,027.54 in 1998 - an average of $668.96 per month. (R. at 50.) 

Plaintiff’s average income is above the $500 guideline for 1998.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2)(ii). As the guidelines indicate, the

fulfillment of this factor alone suggests Plaintiff engaged in

substantial gainful activity in 1998. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2). 

Plaintiff’s reliance on the 2001 income is misplaced since

Plaintiff’s 1998 income satisfied Section 404.1574. Therefore,

the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s 1998 cashier position. 20

C.F.R. 404.1560(b)(1) (“Past relevant work is work that you have

done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful

activity, and that lasted long enough for your to learn it.”).

(ii) ALJ did not err.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately develop

the record by not inquiring into Plaintiff’s cashier duties.

(Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 9:24-10:14.) The ALJ may determine the

nature of Plaintiff’s past job duties from one of two acceptable

sources: “a properly completed vocational report, SSR 82-61, and

the claimant’s own testimony, SSR 82-41.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249

F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff completed a vocational report in which she

describes her cashier duties: “Cash register operations Completing

of balance sheet at end of shift.” (R. at 67.) She further listed

the position’s lifting and carrying requirements: “occasionally it

would require stocking inventory + preparing displays, that 

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required lite [sic] lifting.” Id. The ALJ did not question

Plaintiff about any additional duties during the administrative

hearings. However, unlike Plaintiff’s secretary position, see

discussion infra Part IV.E.1., the record does not indicate that

Plaintiff’s cashier position involved duties not generally

associated with the position.

Having reviewed the “vocational statement of record,” Ms.

Guillory testified that “[t]he position of cashier is classified

as light work, semi-skilled, actually and customarily performed

are consistent.” (R. at 307.) Furthermore, when Plaintiff posited

the more restrictive limitation discussed in Part IV.A, Ms.

Guillory responded: “The cashier position, the one she was

actually performing, would be fine, because –- as she described

it. It would be fine as actually performed.” [R. at 310 (emphasis

added)]

Although the ALJ did not question Plaintiff about her cashier

job, the vocational report provided an independent source upon

which the ALJ could rely. The vocational report also provided Ms.

Guillory with information with which she opined whether Plaintiff

could perform her cashier position as actually performed. Ms.

Guillory’s testimony indicates that she indeed considered

Plaintiff’s description of her duties. Id. Thus, the record

demonstrates that the ALJ did not err and fully developed the

record with regard to plaintiff’s cashier job as actually

performed. The ALJ did not err because the he reasonably found

that Plaintiff could perform her cashier job as actually performed

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and it is not necessary to analyze this position as generally

performed.

(2) Secretary as actually performed.

Plaintiff’s secretary position as actually performed is

governed by the same analysis as her cashier position. See

discussion supra Part IV.E.1.ii. When the Court evaluates the

secretary position under that standard, the Court finds that the

ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff could return to her secretary

position as actually performed.

First, Plaintiff omitted the secretary position as she

completed her vocational report. (See R. at 61-68.) Therefore,

this form is of no use in evaluating her past secretarial work

duties. The only other available source is Plaintiff’s own

testimony.

Plaintiff’s testimony relating to her secretarial duties

appears on pages 265 and 269 of the record. The extent of the

ALJ’s questioning was limited to asking whether she was a

“clerical secretary for a chiropractor” and “primarily . . . did

secretarial work. (R. at 265, 269.) “Secretarial work” is a broad

occupational description with varying duties. Plaintiff did not

explain what her actual duties were. The ALJ did not ask what

Plaintiff’s duties were. Therefore Plaintiff’s testimony does not

provided evidence upon which the ALJ could rely to determine

whether she could still perform her secretary job as actually

performed. However, this error is harmless if the ALJ reasonably

concluded that Plaintiff could perform her secretary job as 

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generally performed.

(3) Secretary job as generally performed

In response to the ALJ’s question, Plaintiff testified that

her past position was primarily secretarial. (R. at 269.) However,

Plaintiff also mentioned that her secretary position may have

included duties above and beyond a purely secretarial position.

(See R. at 268 (“I worked –- see, I was a medical assistant. 

That’s why I stayed for approximately 10 years.”).) Despite

hearing the Plaintiff mention this, the ALJ failed to inquire into

the nature of any duties Plaintiff may have performed as a medical

secretary.

Without conducting this inquiry, and with no other evidence

to judge Plaintiff’s duties, the ALJ asked Ms. Guillory to assess

the position’s skill and extertional demands. (R. at 307.) Ms.

Guillory testified that the secretary position was classified as

“sedentary skilled work” and “as actually and generally performed

appear[ed] to be consistent.” Id. (emphasis added). It is unclear

upon what Ms. Guillory based this opinion, especially since

Plaintiff testified that her secretary position may have involved

unspecified medical tasks. Indeed, the record does not provide

any evidence upon which Ms. Guillory could have based her opinion

that the secretary position as actually performed was consistent

with the position as generally performed. Consequently, the ALJ

failed to develop the record with respect to Plaintiff’s secretary

work to provide the basis for Ms. Guillory’s determination that

the position as actually performed was consistent with the 

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position as generally performed.

Ultimately, since the ALJ erred in developing the record and

had an insufficient basis to assess the secretary position, he

could not have reasonably found that Plaintiff could return to

perform the secretary job, either as actually performed and as

generally performed.

(3) Harmless error

Since the ALJ erred, the court must determine whether the

error requires remand. In the Social Security context, one

situation in which an ALJ commits harmless error is “where the

mistake was nonprejudical to the claimant or irrelevant to the

ALJ’s ultimate disability conclusion.” Stout v. Comm’r, SSA, 454

F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, while the ALJ erred by not

developing the record with respect to Plaintiff’s secretarial

duties, his error was harmless because he properly found Plaintiff

could perform her past cashier job.

While the record does not support the ALJ’s determination

that Plaintiff could work as a secretary, substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff could work as a

cashier. This is true whether the ALJ determined Plaintiff could

perform the cashier position as either actually performed or

generally performed. Ultimately, Plaintiff can still perform at

least one of her past relevant jobs. Thus, Plaintiff was not

prejudiced by the ALJ’s error. Nothing would be gained by

remanding this case to determine whether Plaintiff could actually

perform the secretary position in addition to the cashier 

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position.

(4) Duty to resolve conflict

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to determine whether

there was a conflict between Plaintiff’s actual past work duties

and the description of her jobs in the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles (DOT). (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 10:19-13:22.) Plaintiff

reads the Social Security Rulings as imposing an affirmative duty

on the ALJ to ask about any discrepancies, whether or not any are

apparent. Id. Defendant indicates that Plaintiff does not state

whether such a discrepancy actually exists and argues that the ALJ

has a duty to investigate description discrepancies only where

they exist. (Mem. Points Authorities Supp. Def.’s Cross-Mot.

12:26-13:11.)

The Social Security Rulings state, in pertinent part:

Occupational evidence provided by a VE . . . generally

should be consistent with the occupational information

supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent

unresolved conflict between VE . . . evidence and the

DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable

explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE 

. . . evidence to support a determination or decision

about whether the claimant is disabled. At the hearings

level, as part of the adjudicator's duty to fully

develop the record, the adjudicator will inquire, on the

record, as to whether or not there is such consistency.

S.S.R. 00-4p. In the present case, the ALJ asked Ms. Guillory to

“assess for us the skill level and exertional level of the

Claimant’s past work.” (R. at 307.) Ms. Guillory responded to the

ALJ’s inquiry, identified the skill and exertional levels of each

relevant job, and testified that each was consistent. 

Specifically, Ms. Guillory testified that “[t]he position of 

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cashier is classified as light work, semi-skilled, actually and 

customarily performed are consistent.” Id. Though the ALJ did not

explicitly ask Ms. Guillory whether there was a conflict, his

questioning clearly satisfied S.S.R. 00-4p. See S.S.R. 00-4p

(providing “Exertional level” and “Skill Level” as examples of the

consistency inquiry).

Furthermore, since Ms. Guillory stated there was no conflict,

the ALJ was under no obligation to “elicit a reasonable

explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE . . .

evidence to support a determination or decision about whether the

claimant is disabled.” S.S.R. 00-4p. Therefore, the court finds

that the ALJ satisfied his duty under S.S.R. 00-4p and, because

the descriptions were consistent, was under no obligation to

further examine the issue.

V. CONCLUSION

After reviewing the administrative record as a whole,

weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the

ALJ’s conclusion, the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific,

legitimate reasons for his conclusion. In addition, substantial

evidence exists to support the ALJ’s findings. Therefore, this

Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

DENIED, and Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 8, 2007, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 15, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 22, 2007

Hon. Leo S. Papas

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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