Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01565/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01565-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN MANUEL GONZALES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 C.A. TERHUNE,

Defendant. /

No. C 03-01565 TEH

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion for New Trial or to Amend

Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). On June 28, 2006, this

Court granted this motion in part, and ordered an evidentiary hearing for the limited

purpose of hearing testimony from Mr. Greg Sakasegawa. Having carefully considered

this testimony and the parties’ post-evidentiary hearing briefs, the Court denies

Petitioner’s Rule 59 Motion to Amend Judgment for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

In its January 12, 2006 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, this

Court found, inter alia, that Petitioner did not prevail on his claim under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (“Brady claim”). Specifically, the Court held that while

the State had improperly suppressed exculpatory evidence – the identity of a

confidential witness, later identified as Greg Sakasegawa – Petitioner had not met his

burden with respect to the third prong of the Brady test which requires a showing of

Case 3:03-cv-01565-TEH Document 45 Filed 11/09/06 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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prejudice. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). As the Court explained,

prejudice will be found if the suppressed evidence was “material” to the accused's guilt

or punishment – that is, “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). A “‘reasonable probability’ [is] a

‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.; Anderson v.

Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds,

Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002)..

Petitioner focused on the fact that had Mr. Sakasegawa’s identity been timely

disclosed to Petitioner, Mr. Sakasegawa would have provided testimony favorable to

Petitioner at his trial. In particular, Petitioner argues, Mr. Sakasegawa would have

testified that the driver of the truck at issue had long hair, which was inconsistent with

the State’s theory that Petitioner (who had short hair) was the driver of the truck. This

Court concluded, however, that Mr. Sakasegawa’s initial statements to the police, as

reflected in the police report, indicated that Mr. Sakasegawa was not positive regarding

what he saw, and that given the wealth of other evidence against Petitioner, he could not

satisfy his burden of showing prejudice:

The testimony of a single witness – that he ‘believed [he] had seen long

hair on the driver of the pickup’ and was ‘left with the impression that the

driver was female though [he] could not be positive’ – would have been

received against a backdrop of extensive evidence of guilt. . . . ¶ [Given]

this wealth of circumstantial evidence, ths Court cannot say it would have

been objectively unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to

conclude that, had [Mr. Sakasegawa’s] identity been disclosed to the

defense, it was not reasonably probable that the result of the proceeding

would have been different.

January 12, 2006 Order at 32 (emphasis in original); Pet.’s Ex. A at p.2. Accordingly,

the Court denied Petitioner’s Brady claim.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant motion seeking to reverse this Court’s

judgment on Petitioner’s Brady claim under Rule 59. Petitioner argued that Mr.

Sakasegawa was, in fact, only uncertain regarding the driver’s gender, not the length of

hair, and therefore Petitioner could satisfy the third materiality prong of the Brady test. 

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United States District Court

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Petitioner also contended that this Court had improperly failed to grant his request for an

evidentiary hearing. On June 28, 2006, this Court granted a limited evidentiary hearing

to permit the Court to directly assess Mr. Sakasegawa’s proffered testimony and thus

determine whether the Court’s materiality analysis should be reconsidered. This hearing

was held on August 14, 2006, and the parties thereafter submitted post-evidentiary

hearing briefs.

II. DISCUSSION

At the evidentiary hearing, the Court closely evaluated Mr. Sakasegawa’s 

testimony and credibility in order to assess the likely impact such testimony would have

had on Petitioner’s trial. As the Court noted in it June 28, 2006 Order, Mr.

Sakasegawa’s testimony, “if credible, could have played a very significant role at trial

given that the backdrop of extensive culpatory evidence was largely circumstantial.” Id.

at 5. Having carefully observed Mr. Sakasegawa testify, however, and having evaluated

both the substance of his testimony and his demeanor, the Court is obliged to conclude

that Mr. Sakasegawa would likely have had little impact on the trial had he been called

to testify. 

Mr. Sakasegawa was clearly reluctant to testify and appeared pursuant to a

subpoena. He presented as an unusually uncomfortable witness who was unable to 

testify consistently through a direct and cross-examination. He explained that the truck

at issue passed by during the evening while it was dark but that he could see into the side

window because he was sitting in a parked vehicle under a streetlight. On direct

examination he testified that he was “positive” from this view that the driver had long

hair (R.T. at 17). On redirect, he testified he was “probably 99.9 percent” sure that the

driver had about shoulder length hair. On cross, however, he testified as follows:

Q: And you said the driver had long hair. Are you sure of that as you sit here

today?

A. Not definitely positive.

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United States District Court

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1 Petitioner also emphasizes that this testimony on cross-examination was

inconsistent with declarations signed by Mr. Sakasegawa. Sufficient questions were

raised, however, about Mr. Sakasegawa’s understanding of the declarations at the time

they were signed to give this point substantial weight.

2 For example, questions were raised as to Mr. Sakasegawa’s ability to see

clearly into the side window as the truck passed by. He testified that the rear window

was tinted and could not confirm that the side windows were not. Rather, he stated

“To my knowledge, I don’t know if the side windows were tinted.” (R.T. at 27). 

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Q. Isn’t it true that you told me and my colleagues a couple of weeks ago that

you weren’t sure that the driver had long hair?

A. I don’t know if they had long hair or not.

The Court: That’s what you told them two weeks ago or that’s what you’re telling

the Court now?

A: That’s what I have said since this thing happened, started happening.

Q: In fact, didn’t you tell us that you weren’t sure that what you saw was

actually long hair versus a clothing, maybe a hood or some other article of clothing?

A. (No audible response). 

Petitioner argues that this exchange should be disregarded because Mr.

Sakasegawa was confused by the cross-examination and could not have meant what he

said. While Mr. Sakasegawa was plainly uncomfortable and nervous during the

evidentiary hearing, the Court has difficulty dismissing this exchange as a botched

response. Mr. Sakasegawa stated affirmatively, twice in a row, that he was not positive

or sure if the driver had long hair. He then failed to respond to or object to defense

counsel’s assertion that he (Mr. Sakasegawa) had previously told counsel that he wasn’t

sure of what he saw. The Court is not persuaded that Mr. Sakasegawa was so unnerved

that he had no cognizance of what he was saying on the critical issue of the hearing;

rather, it appeared that Mr. Sakasegawa was unable to maintain his certainty under the

pressure of a cross examination.1

 In light of this and other questions raised regarding the

reliability of Mr. Sakasegawa’s testimony,2

 the Court was left with the belief that, if the

evidentiary hearing was any guide, sufficient questions about Mr. Sakasegawa’s memory

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and reliability, combined with his shaky demeanor, would have severely compromised

his effectiveness and credibility as a witness. 

When the Court initially denied Petitioner’s Brady claim, it was based partly on

the factual premise – which in turn was based on the Court’s interpretation of the police

report – that Mr. Sakasegawa was not positive about the truck driver’s hair or gender. 

While the Court was willing to entertain the fact that this premise was incorrect, in light

of the evidentiary hearing, the Court is no longer persuaded that there are clear grounds

to revisit its analysis.

 As this Court further explained, where, as here, the state court denies a Brady

claim without discussion, the federal court is required to conduct an “independent

review” of the record. Based on this independent review, this Court must determine

whether the state courts “clearly erred” in denying the Brady claim. See Pirtle v.

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). (“Under such circumstances [where there

is no state court reasoning provided], we independently review the record to determine

whether the state court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law.”). Thus,

“although we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate

decision.” Id. 

Here, after independently reviewing the record, including the record of the

evidentiary hearing, this Court can not say that the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s

Brady claim was clearly error. Rather, the Court concludes the facts are essentially in

the same posture as when the Court considered the issue in its January 12, 2006 Order. 

At best, Mr. Sakasegawa had a passing glimpse into the side window of a moving

vehicle, and with respect to that glimpse the police report, as well as Mr. Sakasegawa’s

testimony, indicates a lack of certainty as to what he saw. Accordingly, the Court

affirms its original ruling, for the reasons set forth therein, and finds that a state court

could have reasonably found, without committing clear error, that the failure to disclose

Mr. Sakasegawa did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial court

proceedings, given the extensive evidence against Petitioner.

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Accordingly, and good cause appearing, the Court denies Petitioner’s Petition to

Amend the Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: Nov. 9, 2006 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

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