Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01631/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01631-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN RHODES,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MADERA, ET AL.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:16-cv-01631-DAD-SKO

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH 30 DAYS LEAVE TO 

AMEND

(Doc. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 28, 2016, Plaintiff Benjamin Rhodes filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) 

against Madera County (“the County”)

1

; District Attorney for the County of Madera David Linn

(“Linn”); former District Attorney for the County of Madera Michael Kietz (“Kietz”); former 

Sheriff for the County of Madera John Anderson (“Anderson”); Deputy District Attorney for the 

County of Madera Nicolas Fogg (“Fogg”); and Detective for the Madera County Sheriff’s 

Department Robert Blehm (“Blehm”). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and pro 

 

1 Although the County of Madera is not included in the “Parties, Jurisdiction, and Venue” portion of the complaint, it 

is named in the caption of the lawsuit, and therefore the Court construes Plaintiff’s intent to name the County as a 

defendant in this matter.

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se. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

and WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

On October 1, 2014, Plaintiff accepted a position as a sworn Police Officer for the 

Chukchansi Tribal Police Department of the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (“Tribal 

Police”). (Doc. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 29.) During the course of that employment, Plaintiff was asked by 

the Tribal Council to investigate certain events at the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino (the 

“Casino”). (Id. ¶ 30.) Specifically, the Tribal Council requested the Tribal Police to search for 

“an audit required by the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) for compliance with the 

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.” (Id.) The NIGC had issued a “Temporary Closure Order” for 

the Casino if the audit was not received by October 27, 2014. (Id. ¶ 31.) The audit was being 

withheld by a “hostile faction” of the Tribe “who had previously taken over the [C]asino by force”

and “occupied the offices of the Tribal Gaming Commission (“TGC”)”. (Id. ¶ 32.)

On or about October 3, 2014, Chief of the Tribal Police, John Oliveira, met with Defendant 

Kietz at the Madera County District Attorney’s Offices to give “advance notice” of the Tribal 

Police’s intention to enter the TCG offices at the Casino. (Id. at p. 7.) Mr. Oliveira also “revealed 

the plan of operation” to Defendant Kietz and provided him with “documents supporting the 

operation.” (Id. at 7:3–5.) Mr. Oliveira also advised Defendant Kietz at that meeting of the 

possibility that “armed security guards” who were employees of Security Training Concepts 

(“STC”) “may be detained or arrested due to their history of violence.” (Id. ¶ 33; p. 7.) During 

that meeting, Defendant Kietz “expressed concern that the members of STC were non-Indian and 

that the Tribal Police would not have jurisdiction to detain or arrest non-Indians.” (Id. at p. 7.) 

Mr. Oliveira provided Defendant Kietz “with several federal case laws [sic] recognizing the 

inherent authority of Tribal Police to detain and arrest non-Indians, more specifically, the arrest 

and detention of non-Indians” in California, which is covered by Public Law 83-280 (18 U.S.C. 

§ 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360) (“Public Law 280”.) (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Public Law 280 

“confer[s] jurisdiction on certain states, to include the State of California, over most or all of 

Indian country within their borders . . . .” (Id. ¶ 13.) Mr. Oliveira followed up that meeting with 

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an email to Defendant Kietz on or about October 5, 2014, attaching “the case and laws discussed 

as well as a 2001 U.S. DOJ opinion supporting the arrest and/or detention of non-Indians in Public 

Law 280 states.” (Id. at pp. 7–8.)

On or about October 9, 2014, Plaintiff and six (6) other members of the Tribal Police went 

into the Casino to obtain a copy of the audit and “were confronted by armed private security 

guards employed by the hostile faction and by . . . [STC].” (Id. ¶ 33.) The Tribal Police “arrested

and detained several of the [STC] security guards for release to the Madera County Sheriff’s 

Department.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Defendant Anderson “appeared at the scene and made no attempt to 

discount the authority of the Tribal Police.,” but he did “explicitly express outrage at the Tribal 

Police placing non-Indians in handcuffs.” (Id. ¶ 36.)

Defendant Anderson “took the custody of the [STC] security guards for the hostile faction 

from the Tribal Police and removed them the premises.” (Id. ¶ 37.) “Unbeknownst to [] Plaintiff,

Defendant [] Anderson promptly released the hostile security guards on the scene (outside the 

[C]asino), which resulted in the same security guards returning inside and assaulting several Tribal 

Police officers within five minutes of their release.” (Id. ¶ 39.) During his visit to the Casino on 

October 9, 2014, Defendant Anderson “recognized [] Plaintiff as Tribal Police officers [sic] and 

made no attempts [sic] to arrest or obstruct [] Plaintiff [sic] from carrying out their [sic] official 

duties.” (Id. ¶ 38.)

In the days following the October 9, 2014, incident, the Madera County Sheriff’s 

Department “initiated an investigation into whether [] Plaintiff and the nine sworn Tribal Police 

officers violated California state law in the performance of their duties.” (Id. ¶ 40.) On October 

31, 2014, Defendant Kietz “filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff alleging 27 felony counts 

to include kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault with a firearm, and illegal use of a stun gun.” 

(Id. ¶ 41.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Kietz filed a criminal complaint “only days prior to 

the local election in which he was running for re-election as Madera County District Attorney in

the hopes of increasing support from constituents.” (Id. at p. 8.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant 

[] Linn was quoted in the local newspaper during his campaign for Madera County District 

Attorney calling the criminal complaint filed by Defendant [] Kietz a political decision and not 

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one in the interest of justice.” (Id.)

“An arrest warrant was issued for Plaintiff on or about October 31, 2014,” and “[o]n or 

about November 4, 2014, Plaintiff was arrested in Bluffton, SC and held for 38 days there.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff thereafter was “transported across county and remained in Madera County Jail for an 

additional 7 days before bonding out.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a loss of “over 

$40,000 required by a bonding company in order to post bail and be released from jail.” (Id.) 

According to Plaintiff, on or about May 19, 2016, “all charges listed in the criminal company were 

dismissed in favor of [] Plaintiff.” (Id.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

alleging Fourth Amendment claims for malicious prosecution, and claims for “arrest without 

probable cause” and “false arrest.” Plaintiff also alleges claims for “failure to properly train,” as 

well as a cause of action under the California Tort Claims Act for “intentional emotional distress.”

III. SCREENING STANDARD

In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 

each case, and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of 

poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a 

claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be 

cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

The Court’s screening of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is governed by the 

following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim 

for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable 

legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff 

must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each 

defendant fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, 

e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 

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F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, 

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, since 

plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations of the Complaint liberally and 

must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a 

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal 

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were 

not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Further, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 

citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (To avoid dismissal for 

failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (internal citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Shall Be Dismissed.

1. Defendants Linn, Kietz, Anderson, Fogg, and Blehm Sued for Damages in 

Their Official Capacities Are Not “Persons” Under § 1983.

In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any 

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 

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by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 

or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” (emphasis added).

Although unclear, it appears that Plaintiff’s causes of action under § 1983 are brought 

against Defendants Linn, Kietz, Anderson, Fogg, and Blehm in their official capacity. (Compl. ¶¶ 

2–6.) “[S]tate officials sued in their official capacities . . . are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of 

§ 1983 . . . .” Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars actions for 

damages against state officials who are sued in their official capacities in federal court.” Dittman 

v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999). By contrast, a state official sued in his official 

capacity for “prospective injunctive relief” is considered a “person” under § 1983, and the 

Eleventh Amendment does not bar such claims. See Flint, 488 F.3d at 825.

Plaintiff seeks money damages against Defendants Linn, Kietz, Anderson, Fogg, and 

Blehm, not prospective injunctive relief. (Compl. at 10 (“Prayer for Relief”).) To the extent that 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are brought against Defendants Linn, Kietz, Anderson, Fogg, and Blehm 

in their official capacities, they are not cognizable.

Plaintiff, however, alleges in his Complaint:

Upon information and belief, all above-named Defendants, were acting within the 

course and scope of their authority and employment at all relevant times herein 

(collectively the “Defendants”). If it turns out through discovery that these 

employee/defendants were not acting within the course and scope of their 

employment, Plaintiff will seek to amend or conform this complaint to the 

evidence.

(Id. ¶ 7.) Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to attempt to 

state claims under § 1983 against the named individual defendants in their personal capacities. 

“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions 

he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Liability in a 

personal-capacity suit can be demonstrated by showing that the official, acting under color of state 

law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. See id. at 166.

To the extent Plaintiff wishes to proceed with his malicious prosecution claim under 

§ 1983 against the individual defendants in their personal capacities, he must plead tortious 

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conduct by the defendant under the elements of a state law malicious prosecution claim, as well as 

allege that the defendants acted under color of state law for the purpose of denying him equal 

protection or another a specific constitutional right. Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149 F.3d 951, 

961 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In 

order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the 

defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the 

purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.”); Usher v. City 

of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (a malicious prosecution claim is not generally 

cognizable federally if the state judicial system provides a remedy, but “an exception exists to the 

general rule when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal 

protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional 

rights”). In addition, to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must 

establish that the prior proceedings terminated in such a manner as to indicate his innocence, and 

that charges were not withdrawn on the basis of a compromise among the parties. Awabdy, 368 

F. 3d at 1068 (emphasis added). See also Sanders v. Matthew, No. 15-CV-395 LJO-EPG, 2016 

WL 7210115, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2016) (dismissing the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution 

claim where the plaintiff pleaded nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge, resulting in a felony 

charge being dismissed, because the allegations showed that the proceedings had not “terminated 

in such a manner as to indicate his innocence.”).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that state prosecutors are entitled to absolute prosecutorial 

immunity from claims under §1983 when they are acting pursuant to their official role as advocate 

for the state performing functions “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 

process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Courts have held that the filing of a 

criminal complaint in state court is an activity protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See, 

e.g., Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding district court’s 

finding on summary judgment that the decision to file a criminal complaint against the defendant 

in state court was protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.); Geiche v. City & Cty. of San 

Francisco, No. C 08–3233 JL, 2009 WL 1948830, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2009) (“Here, named 

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defendant Steger is alleged to have done (and in fact did) nothing more than sign the charging 

instrument against Plaintiff. Filing the criminal complaint was an essential part of instigating the 

criminal prosecution and such conduct is entitled to absolute immunity.”) (citing Demery v. 

Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home 

Village, 723 F.2d 675, 679 (9th Cir.1984); Freeman on Behalf of the Sanctuary v. Hittle, 708 F.2d 

442, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)).

2. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Against Defendant County of Madera (Counts I–

III), as well as His “Failure to Properly Train” Claim (Count V), Are 

Insufficiently Pleaded.

Under longstanding Supreme Court authority, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 

1983 simply because it employs an individual accused of, or who has engaged in, illegal or 

unconstitutional conduct. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that 

“[a] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, 

a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory”); see also Bd.

of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (“[I]t is not enough 

[under Monell ] for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the 

municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the 

municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.”). Because there is no respondeat 

superior liability under § 1983, counties and municipalities may be sued under § 1983 only upon a 

showing that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional tort. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 

691. “A local government entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the plaintiff alleges 

that the action inflicting injury flowed from either an explicitly adopted or a tacitly authorized 

[governmental] policy.” Ortez v. Washington Cty., State of Or., 88 F.3d 804, 811 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citation and quotations omitted) (alteration in original). “[L]ocal governments, like any other 

§ 1983 ‘person,’ . . . may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 

‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official 

decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. A local governmental entity may also 

“be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train 

caused the constitutional violation.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 123 

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(1992). “In particular . . . the inadequate training of police officers could be characterized as the 

cause of the constitutional tort if—and only if—the failure to train amounted to ‘deliberate 

indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. (citing City of 

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that a policy or custom existed to cause the alleged 

malicious prosecution (Count I), the “Arrest Without Probable Cause” (Count II), or the “False 

Arrest” (Count III) by Madera County employees. Elsewhere in the Complaint, however, Plaintiff 

purports to bring a claim for “Failure to Properly Train” (Count V), but do not identify the 

statutory or common law basis for this claim. In the absence of any specified legal basis, “Failure 

to Properly Train” is not a cognizable claim.

However, by alleging in Count V that “Defendants failed to properly train sheriff’s 

department and district attorney personnel in Public Law 280 resulting in negligent and criminal 

behavior” (Compl. at 9:26–27), it appears that Plaintiff is attempting in Count V to state a claim 

against Defendant County of Madera under § 1983 for municipal liability. Accordingly, the Court 

shall dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant County of Madera without prejudice and 

with leave to amend in order to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to attempt to state a claim under 

§ 1983 against the County for injury caused by an official policy or custom.

B. Plaintiff’s Claim for “Intentional Emotional Distress” Under the California Tort 

Claims Act (Count IV) Shall Be Dismissed.

Under the California Tort Claims Act, a plaintiff may not maintain an action for damages 

against a public entity or a public employee unless he timely files a notice of tort claim. Cal. 

Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4 & 950.2; Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 

1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The California Tort Claims Act requires, as a condition precedent to suit 

against a public entity, the timely presentation of a written claim and the rejection of the claim in 

whole or in part.”). “Compliance with the claims statutes is mandatory; and failure to file a claim 

is fatal to the cause of action.” City of San Jose v. Sup. Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 447, 454 (1974) (internal 

citations omitted). “Complaints that do not allege facts demonstrating either that a claim was 

timely presented or that compliance with the claims statute is excused are subject to [dismissal] for 

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not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 

Cal. 4th 201, 209 (2007); accord Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477.

Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts in his complaint demonstrating that he has

complied with the California Tort Claims Act by timely filing a notice of tort claim with the 

appropriate entities. Therefore, Plaintiff’s “intentional emotional distress” cause of action under 

the California Tort Claims Act against Defendants shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

See Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Shirk, 42 Cal.4th at 209.

Further, under California law, a public entity is not liable for a claim brought by a plaintiff 

unless liability is provided for by statute or required by the state or federal constitution. Cal. Gov.

Code § 815; Lundeen Coatings Corp. v. Dep’t of Water & Power for the City of Los Angeles, 232 

Cal. App.3d 816, 832 (1991); see also Munoz v. City of Union City, 148 Cal. App. 4th 173, 182, 

(2007) (“‘[D]irect tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them 

to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care.’”) (citations and quotations omitted). 

Therefore, in order to state a cause of action for government tort liability, “every fact essential to 

the existence of statutory liability must be plead[ed] with particularity, including the existence of a 

statutory duty.” Freitag v. City of San Diego Harbor Police, No. 11–CV–2999–IEG (JMA), 2012 

WL 160051, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012) (citing Zuniga v. Housing Auth., 41 Cal. App. 4th 82, 

96 (1995) abrogated on other grounds by Zelig v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112 (2002)). 

Plaintiff does not identify in his Complaint what statute or statutes establish the County of 

Madera’s liability. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim under the California Torts Claim Act against 

Defendant County of Madera should also be dismissed on this basis.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that California Government Code § 821.6 provides 

prosecutorial immunity for public employees for “injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting 

any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts 

maliciously and without probable cause.” Id. § 821.6. “California courts construe section 821.6 

broadly in furtherance of its purpose to protect public employees in the performance of their 

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prosecutorial duties from the threat of harassment through civil suits.”

2

 Gillan v. City of San 

Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1048 (2007). Section 821.6 “immunizes not only the act of filing 

or prosecuting a judicial or administrative complaint, but also extends to actions taken in 

preparation for such formal proceedings.” Id. (citing Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, 28 Cal. 

App. 4th 1205, 1209–10 (1994)).

A defendant is immune from liability pursuant to § 821.6 if: (1) he was an employee of the 

County; (2) Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by acts committed by the defendant in instituting or 

prosecuting a judicial or administrative proceeding; and (3) the defendant’s conduct while 

instituting or prosecuting the proceeding was within the scope of her employment. Cameron v. 

Buether, No. 09-CV-2498-IEG, 2010 WL 2635098, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2010) (citing Amylou 

R., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1209–10 (1994)). If these requirements are met, immunity attaches 

even if the defendant acted “maliciously and without probable cause.” See Cal. Gov’t Code § 

821.6.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state law tort claim under the California Tort 

Claims Act, Count IV, without prejudice and with leave to amend to attempt to state a claim

pursuant to the above.

C. Plaintiff May File An Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state cognizable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under 

state tort law against Defendants. However, “Rule 15(a) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] 

is very liberal and leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’” 

AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

former version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should 

freely give leave when justice so requires.”). As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he shall be given 

an opportunity to amend his claims to cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he can do so in 

good faith.

//

 

2

Immunity under Government Code section 821.6 is not limited to claims for malicious prosecution, but also extends 

to other causes of action arising from conduct protected under the statute, including intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. See Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1435–37 (1988).

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Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 

Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The amended complaint 

must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Rule 220 of the 

Local Rules of the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Once Plaintiff files

an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, 

in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding 

new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 

2007). If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to cure the deficiencies identified 

above, the Court will recommend that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without 

leave to amend.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND;

2. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first 

amended complaint; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be recommended for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 3, 2017 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-01631-DAD-SKO Document 5 Filed 02/03/17 Page 12 of 12