Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01062/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01062-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT LIZARRAGA,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-1062 MCE JFM P

vs.

CHERYL K. PLILER, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1997 conviction on

charges of second degree murder, assault with intent to commit rape, false imprisonment, assault

by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, and forcible rape. He seeks relief on the

grounds that: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct (prosecutorial vindictiveness); (2) the

trial court erred when it denied petitioner’s motion to recuse the prosecutor; (3) his speedy trial

rights were violated; (4) the trial court erred when it denied petitioner’s motion for severance; (5)

the trial court erred when it denied petitioner’s motion for substitution of counsel; (6) the trial

court erred when it denied petitioner’s motions for a mistrial and a new trial; (7) there was

insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction; and (8) the trial court erred when it

excluded evidence of third party culpability. Upon careful consideration of the record and the

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 1 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 This statement of facts is taken from the December 17, 1999 opinion by the California

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 3-8, appended as

Exhibit 2 to Respondent’s Answer, filed on February 14, 2002. 

2

applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus

relief be denied.

 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

The San Joaquin County District Attorney charged the [petitioner]

by amended information on March 6, 1997, with the January 1996

murder of Kenneth Minier; the January 1996 assault with intent to

commit rape, attempted rape, kidnapping, false imprisonment,

battery with serious bodily injury, and assault by means of force

likely to produce great bodily injury of Michelle; and two August

1992 forcible rapes of Jennifer. The information also alleged as

strikes that the [petitioner] was convicted of robbery in 1976 and

1986.

During a jury trial, the kidnapping charge was dismissed at the

request of the prosecution. The jury acquitted the [petitioner] of

the attempted rape and the battery with serious bodily injury of

Michelle and convicted the [petitioner] of the second degree

murder of Kenneth Minier, assault with intent to commit rape,

false imprisonment, and assault by means of force likely to produce

great bodily injury of Michelle, and two forcible rapes of Jennifer. 

The jury also found true the two prior robbery convictions.

The trial court sentenced the [petitioner] as a third striker. It

imposed a term of 45 years to life (triple the minimum term) for

second degree murder. The court added to this term a consecutive

25 years to life for the assault with intent to commit rape for a total

indeterminate term of 70 years to life. As to the determinate term,

the court imposed the upper term of eight years for one of the

rapes. The court imposed a consecutive two years, one-third of the

middle term, for the other rape, for a total determinate term of 10

years. The court imposed sentence on the other charges on which

the [petitioner] was convicted but stayed those terms pursuant to

Penal Code section 654. Accordingly, the total term of

imprisonment in state prison is 80 years to life.

* * *

August 1992 Rapes of Jennifer

In August 1992, 18-year-old Jennifer lived with a family in

Manteca. The [petitioner], who was 40 years old at the time, was a

friend of the family and visited the residence on a day during that

month. That evening, Jennifer decided to walk to the store to get

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 2 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

some groceries. The [petitioner] offered to drive her there. She

accepted. They got into the car and the [petitioner] did not drive to

the store. Instead, he drove in the opposite direction. This scared

Jennifer, so she tried to get out of the car. The [petitioner]

prevented her from getting out by accelerating. He drove out of the

neighborhood and turned down a dirt road into an orchard.

After stopping the car, the [petitioner] went around to the

passenger side of the car and grabbed Jennifer. He threw a towel

down on the ground and told her to take off her clothes. Because

of the force he was using and her fear he would kill her, she

complied. He took off his own clothes and forced her down onto

the towel, holding her by the throat, mouth, and shoulders. She

could not breathe and felt like she was losing consciousness. 

While he was holding her down, he penetrated her but did not

ejaculate.

The [petitioner] told her to get up and put her clothes back on, then

forced her back into the car. He drove to another orchard, where

he told Jennifer to get out of the car. When she tried to escape, he

grabbed her by the hair. The struggle apparently excited the

[petitioner]. He put the towel down again, removed her clothing,

except for her top, and opened his pants. He again penetrated her,

and this time ejaculated. After the second rape, the [petitioner]

drove Jennifer back to her residence.

The [petitioner] claimed the intercourse was consensual, adding:

Jennifer went with him to get something at his house. She

suggested they go for a ride, and he drove to the orchards. She

initiated sexual relations twice. On the way back to the residence,

she became upset with him because he would not let her drive his

car.

January 1996 Crimes Against Michelle and Kenneth Minier

The [petitioner] lived in Manteca with Kenneth Minier, who was

63 at the time of his death, off and on for many years in a fatherson type relationship, although they were not related. In 1995, the

[petitioner] was seen at Minier’s residence frequently. In

September 1995, Minier obtained a restraining order against the

[petitioner]. In the application for the restraining order, Minier

stated the [petitioner] was stealing and pawning Minier’s property. 

When Minier attempted to throw him out, the [petitioner] made

threats, such as threatening to burn down the house. The

[petitioner] could not be trusted.

Minier was afraid of the [petitioner] because the [petitioner]

threatened to hurt him. His fears, as observed by a neighbor in

whom Minier confided, escalated in the latter part of 1995. 

Despite the restraining order, Minier, who was an “easygoing”

man, allowed the [petitioner] to return to the residence. On

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 3 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

December 31, 1995, Minier called 911 concerning his problems

with the [petitioner].

In the early morning hours of January 2, 1996, Michelle was

walking home from her boyfriend’s house when she accepted a ride

from the [petitioner]. While they talked and drank whiskey, the

[petitioner] drove out to the country. Michelle asked the

[petitioner] to take her to her brother’s house. He did so, but no

one was home. The [petitioner] insisted that Michelle come to his

house, the Minier residence, for a drink, but she wanted to go

home. She finally agreed to go to his house. When they arrived,

the [petitioner] grabbed her arm and led her to the front door. He

unlocked the door, and they went inside. Once in the house, the

[petitioner] gave Michelle some green liquor to drink.

After conversing with the [petitioner] for about 30 minutes,

Michelle started down the hallway to the bathroom. The

[petitioner] followed, grabbed her by the hair, and began hitting her

face. As the beating continued, Michelle fell to the floor, and the

[petitioner] began choking her with the gold chains she was

wearing around her neck. The [petitioner] dragged her into his

bedroom and onto his bed while they struggled. When the

[petitioner] let go of her chain and stopped choking her, she said,

“What is it you want from me? Sex or what?” He replied that he

did, so she took off her clothes. The [petitioner] turned around and

began walking toward the kitchen. Michelle saw her chance to

escape and ran out of the house naked. A woman saw her and gave

her a ride home.

At home, Michelle called the police. An officer came to her home,

and Michelle reported what had happened. The Manteca Police

Department obtained a search warrant for the Minier residence. 

Officers went to the residence on the afternoon of January 2, 1996,

to search for evidence of the attack on Michelle. They observed no

signs of forced entry into the house, and the house was locked. 

When no one responded to their knock and notice, they kicked

down the door. Once inside, they not only found evidence of the

attack on Michelle - her gold chain and her clothing - they also

found the dead body of Kenneth Minier, lying on his bed under a

heated electric blanket.

An investigation revealed a ligature mark on Minier’s neck from

strangulation. A black and orange rope was found in the room, and

fibers from the rope were on Minier’s bed near his head. Fibers

from the rope were also found in the [petitioner’s] bedroom and in

the hallway between the rooms.

Because Minier’s body was found under a heated electric blanket,

it was difficult to determine the exact time of death. Expert

estimates ranged anywhere from the evening of January 1, 1996, to

the morning of the next day.

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 4 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

The [petitioner] was arrested during the evening on January 2,

1996. He was bleeding from a cut on the right side of his face and

from injuries to his hands and wrists.

The [petitioner] asserted he did not remember what happened on

January 2, 1996, and with Michelle until he had a “spiritual

experience” in jail. An angel appeared to him, holding car keys. 

He then remembered that in his travels with Michelle she had his

keys and when she gave them back one of the keys was missing. 

The [petitioner] did not testify concerning details of what happened

with Michelle at the Minier residence.

Prior Bad Acts

In 1973, the [petitioner] gave a ride in his car to a 17-year-old

friend, Lucy. When the [petitioner] did not stop the car where she

expected him to, she tried to get out at a stop sign. The [petitioner]

grabbed her arm, preventing her from getting out of the car, and he

drove out into the country. He pulled into a field, where he

grabbed her and pushed her down onto the front seat. She began to

scream, but he choked her until she stopped. The [petitioner]

pulled her pants off and pushed her into the back seat. He tried to

penetrate her, but was unable to because he did not have an

erection. Another car pulled off the road, so the [petitioner]

jumped back into the front seat and drove back to town and left

Lucy at her sister’s house. The [petitioner] was convicted of

misdemeanor battery as a result of a plea bargain.

In 1989 or 1990, during the summer, the [petitioner] took 12- or

13- year-old Ramona to get beer at a store. Afterward, he took her

to an orchard instead of taking her home. There, he pulled her into

the back seat, hit her, and took off her clothes. The [petitioner]

pulled down his own pants and tried to penetrate Ramona, but he

could not become erect. The [petitioner] became angry and hit her

again. He continued to attempt to penetrate her but was not

successful. Finally, he stopped his attempts and took Ramona

home. She did not report the incident to the authorities until she

was questioned after the [petitioner’s] 1996 crimes.

(People v. Lizarraga, et al., slip op. at 3-8.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 5 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at

different result. Early v. Packer, 573 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-406 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 6 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct (Vindictive Prosecution)

Petitioner’s first claim is that his right to due process was violated when the

prosecutor retaliated against him by amending the original information to add the previously

dismissed 1992 rape charges. The California Court of Appeal fairly described the background to

this claim as follows:

In 1993, during a single incident, the [petitioner] and his father

were both shot by Robert Menchaca. The [petitioner’s] father died

as a result of the wounds. The case against Menchaca was

assigned to Deputy District Attorney George H. Dunlap, Jr., and

the [petitioner] was to be a witness against Menchaca. However,

when the [petitioner] was arrested for the charges involving Minier

and Michelle, Dunlap agreed to a plea bargain with Menchaca to a

manslaughter conviction, due to the [petitioner’s] credibility

problems.

The district attorney filed a complaint against the [petitioner] in

January 1996, charging him with the attempted rape of Michelle

and the murder of Minier. In June 1996, after the Menchaca matter

was plea bargained to a manslaughter, the district attorney

amended the complaint in this action to allege the two 1992 rapes

of Jennifer. The [petitioner] asserts the charges for the 1992 rapes

were added because the [petitioner] refused to testify against

Menchaca without a deal as to the charges involving Minier and

Michelle. Based on this assertion, he contends the 1992 rape

charges should have been dismissed as a remedy for vindictive

prosecution.

(Opinion at 13.)

The state appellate court concluded that petitioner had waived this claim on

appeal because of his failure to properly raise it in the trial court. (Id. at 13-15.) The court also

opined, however, that the claim should be denied on the merits. The court explained its

reasoning as follows:

Even if we were to conclude the [petitioner] properly raised the

issue of vindictive prosecution in the superior court, we would

reject his claim. The prosecution did not try the 1992 rapes of

Jennifer earlier because she refused to testify. When the

prosecution filed the charges relating to the 1996 crimes, she

changed her mind and decided to testify. The statute of limitations

had not run. Any prosecutor would have been duty bound to

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 7 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

proceed on the 1992 rapes. Therefore, the allegation of vindictive

prosecution is without merit.

(Id. at 15-16.)

It is well established that a prosecutor violates a criminal defendant’s due process

rights if he exacts a price for a defendant's exercise of a clearly established right or punishes a

defendant for doing what the law plainly entitles him to do. See United States v. Goodwin, 457

U.S. 368, 372 (1982); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974). "To punish a person

because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most

basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to

penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional.'" Bordenkircher v.

Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citations omitted). To establish actual prosecutorial

vindictiveness, a defendant must show, through objective evidence, that the prosecutor acted

with genuine animus toward the defendant and the defendant would not have been prosecuted but

for that animus. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n. 12. In order to make the required showing, a

defendant must demonstrate that additional charges were brought "solely to 'penalize' the

defendant and could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion." Id.

If a defendant is unable to prove an improper motive with direct evidence, he may

present circumstances from which an improper vindictive motive may be presumed. Blackledge,

417 U.S. at 27. However, to invoke such a presumption, the circumstances must “pose a realistic

likelihood of ‘vindictiveness.’” Id. A presumption of vindictiveness is rarely applied to a

prosecutor’s pretrial decisions because “a prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise

[that] broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest in

prosecution.” Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382. Indeed, a prosecutor’s charging decision is

presumptively lawful. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364; United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.

456, 464 (1996). Accordingly, “a change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is

completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than a pretrial decision.” Goodwin,

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 8 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

457 U.S. at 381. When a presumption of vindictiveness is established, the burden shifts to the

government to present objective evidence justifying its conduct. Id. at 374. 

In his claim before this court, petitioner attempts to establish a vindictive motive

for the addition of the 1992 rape charges by alleging that the prosecutor “re-filed 1996 [sic]

dismissed rape allegations after telling defense attorney “He fucked Mr. Lizarraga.” (Am. Pet. at

5.) In his claim on direct appeal, petitioner explained his theory as follows:

Menchaca’s anticipated defense was “reasonable belief in the need

to self-defend.” Menchaca’s attorney made known his intent at

Menchaca’s trial to establish appellant’s violent temperament,

including testimony about the January, 1996 offenses, in order to

buttress Menchaca’s knowledge of appellant’s violent history, in

support of Menchaca’s self-defense theory. Appellant’s thenattorney, Tony Agbayani, would not permit appellant to be

questioned about charged crimes for which appellant had not yet

been tried, and Agbayani informed Dunlap that appellant would

exercise his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,

therefore would be “unavailable” as a witness, although appellant’s

testimony from Menchaca’s preliminary hearing could be used by

the prosecution.

But as appellant’s availability and crecibility as a witness in the

Menchaca case were compromised, in April, 1996 Dunlap entered

into a plea bargain with Menchaca in which the latter pled guilty to

manslaughter.

(Answer, Ex. 1 at 55.) In state court, petitioner argued that the prosecutor blamed petitioner for

forcing him to reduce the charges against Mr. Menchaca. (Id. at 55-56.) Petitioner stated that the

prosecutor told petitioner’s then-attorney that “he was going to screw [petitioner] for messing up

his case” and that “he had ‘fucked’ [petitioner]. (Id. at 56.) Petitioner also argued that the

situation presented in this case was more akin to a post-conviction attempt to punish him for

refusing to testify at Menchaca’s trial than a pretrial decision as to what charges to bring. (Id. at

66-67.) In this regard, he contended that the dismissal of the 1992 charges because of the

victim’s refusal to testify was tantamount to a conviction. (Id.) 

After a review of petitioner’s claim of vindictive prosecution made in this court

and in the state courts, it appears that petitioner is arguing the prosecutor improperly exacted a

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 9 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

price (the addition of the previously dismissed 1992 rape charges) in retaliation for petitioner’s

exercise of his right not to testify against Machaca unless he received a favorable plea bargain. 

Petitioner may also be alleging that the prosecutor’s motive was to punish him for making

himself an incredible witness by virtue of the crimes he committed against Minier and Michelle. 

His claim fails.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s decision to charge him

with the 1992 rapes was motivated by actual vindictiveness. Specifically, petitioner has failed to

show that the prosecutor added the 1992 rape charges to the indictment against petitioner

“solely” to punish petitioner for his failure to testify in the Menchaca case or that the addition of

those charges “could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” Goodwin,

457 U.S. at 380 n.12. As explained by the state appellate court, the charges against petitioner

were justified by the fact that the victim changed her mind and agreed to testify against petitioner

after it was clear that his criminal behavior was continuing and, indeed, had seriously escalated. 

Under these circumstances, virtually any prosecutor would have pursued these serious charges

against a criminal defendant. Regardless of whether the prosecutor was unhappy with the fact

that petitioner refused to testify against Menchaca absent a favorable plea agreement or that

petitioner had committed crimes which destroyed his credibility for the Menchaca trial, he had

valid prosecutorial reasons to charge petitioner with the two rapes he committed in 1992.

Petitioner has also failed to make a showing sufficient to raise a presumption of

vindictiveness or to overcome the presumption of prosecutorial regularity. First, contrary to

petitioner’s argument, this court does not find the prosecutor’s decision to charge petitioner with

the previously dismissed rape charges as a post-conviction action. Rather, the prosecutor made a

pretrial decision to charge petitioner with the 1992 rape charges because the victim changed her

mind and decided to testify. Further, the circumstances surrounding the addition of the 1992 rape

charges do not “pose a realistic likelihood of ‘vindictiveness.’” Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27. 

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 10 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

Rather, they reflect the fact that the 1992 rape charges could now be successfully prosecuted after

the victim’s change of mind. 

This court concludes that the facts of this case are more akin to those in

Bordenkircher and Goodwin, in which the United States Supreme Court rejected prosecutorial

vindictiveness claims arising from prosecutors’ decisions to indict defendants on more serious

charges after the defendants had rejected plea bargains. The Supreme Court reasoned that in the

"give-and-take" of plea bargaining, there is no retaliation so long as the defendant remains free to

accept or reject the plea. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. That was the case here. Although the

prosecutor may have harbored animosity against petitioner for the way things turned out with the

Menchaca trial, his decision to charge petitioner with the 1992 rapes was clearly a valid exercise

of prosecutorial discretion. The decision of the California Court of Appeal rejecting petitioner’s

claim of vindictive prosecution is not an unreasonable interpretation of the United States

Supreme Court cases cited above. Accordingly, petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct

should be denied.

B. Motion to Recuse

Petitioner’s next claim is that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial

court denied his motion to recuse the deputy district attorney who tried his case. He explains:

“Deputy Dunlap plea-bargained Menchaca murder case in which petitioner was not only a victim

but the only eye witness and amended the complaint against petitioner to alleged [sic] the 1992

rape case.” (Am. Pet. at 5.) Petitioner appears to be claiming that the trial court should have

granted his recusal motion for two reasons: (1) the prosecutor harbored bias against petitioner

because he refused/was unable to testify as a prosecution witness in the Menchaca case; and (2)

the prosecutor had a conflict of interest because he was attempting to use petitioner as a witness

in the Menchaca case while at the same time prosecuting him for criminal acts. (See Answer,

Ex. 1 at 74-92.)

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 11 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim on the grounds that it was not

properly raised in the trial court. The court explained its reasoning as follows:

In the superior court, the [petitioner] moved twice to recuse Dunlap

because he intended to call him as a witness. The trial court denied

the motion. On appeal, the [petitioner] contends that court abused

its discretion in denying the motion because Dunlap was biased

against the [petitioner] and because Dunlap had a conflict of

interest arising from the [petitioner’s] status as a witness in another

case Dunlap prosecuted. As can be seen from this brief summary,

the [petitioner] here seeks to establish error in the trial court’s

denial of the recusal motions based on two grounds not asserted in

the superior court, that is, perceived bias and conflict of interest. 

These two new assertions fail because, in the trial court, he sought

recusal solely based on Dunlap’s potential status as a witness.

* * *

“The rule is well settled that the theory upon which a case is tried

must be adhered to on appeal. A party is not permitted to change

his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To

permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but

manifestly unjust to the opposing litigant.” (citation omitted). 

Defense counsel at trial chose not to rely on the grounds urged on

appeal and, therefore, Judge Grande had no occasion to consider

them as independent grounds for recusing Dunlap. Since the

[petitioner] does not reassert on appeal his claim that Dunlap

should have been recused because he was a potential defense

witness, we need not consider whether Judge Grande properly

denied the motion to recuse on that ground. 

(Opinion at 16, 20.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s claim in this

regard on petition for review. (Answer, Ex. 3.) 

Respondent argues that this claim should be denied on the merits. He does not

argue that the claim is procedurally barred and has therefore waived any such defense. See

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 584-86 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the California courts denied

petitioner’s claim on procedural grounds, there is no state court decision on the merits of this

claim. When it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,

1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (AEDPA standard of review not applicable because state court did not reach

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 12 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

the merits of petitioner’s perjury claim). See also Miranda v. Bennett, 322 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir.

2003) (§ 2254(d) requires deference only to state court adjudication on the merits and not to a

disposition on procedural or other grounds); Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 2002)

(en banc) (defining “adjudication on the merits” to be a substantive, rather than a procedural,

decision); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1999) (court declined to apply deferential

AEDPA standard because of state court’s awareness of, and explicit reliance on, a procedural

ground to dismiss petitioner’s claim). Accordingly, this court will review de novo petitioner’s

claim that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court denied his recusal motion. 

Prosecutors are “traditionally accorded wide discretion . . . in the enforcement

process.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980). Nonetheless, 

[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into

the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible

factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise

serious constitutional questions.

Id. at 249-50. Similarly, it has long been recognized that

[a criminal prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary

party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to

govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at

all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not

that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . He may

prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so.

But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike

foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods

calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every

legitimate means to bring about a just one. 

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Accord Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton

et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987). These same principles apply with equal force to state

prosecutors. Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1989).

Nonetheless, the standards of neutrality for prosecutors are not as demanding as

those applied to judicial or quasi-judicial officers. Young, 481 U.S. at 810; Marshall, 446 U.S. at

249-50; Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 197 (6th Cir. 1989). This is because, unlike judges who

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 13 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

must always remain impartial, prosecutors are partisan advocates who are permitted to be zealous

in their enforcement of the law. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 248-50; Dick, 882 F.2d at 197. 

Accordingly, a petitioner claiming that a prosecutor bore a personal bias against him must

demonstrate that the fairness of his trial was affected and that he was thus prejudiced by the

prosecutor’s involvement. Dick, 882 F.2d at 196-97 (“[W]e are not persuaded that Mr. Dick’s

prosecution by a Commonwealth Attorney who may have been less than disinterested constituted

an irregularity ‘sufficiently fundamental’ to justify our setting aside the conviction in this case.”);

Gallo v. Kernan, 933 F. Supp. 878, 885 (N.D. Cal. 1996)(habeas relief denied where it was

claimed that the prosecutor demonstrated an improper personal and emotional bias against

petitioner by taking unprecedented actions, including visiting the victim in the hospital, attending

the victim’s divorce proceedings and taking positions adverse to petitioner, that the prosecutor

had not taken in similar cases), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s alleged bias should have

led to his recusal by the trial court. Even if the prosecutor was disappointed with the outcome of

the Menchaca case, petitioner has failed to show that the prosecutor’s personal feelings affected

the fairness of his trial. As discussed above, there is insufficient evidence that the prosecutor’s

actions in charging petitioner with the 1992 rapes of Jennifer were the result of bias. Instead, a

legitimate and unchallenged explanation for that decision is apparent from the record: the

victim’s change of mind enabled the prosecutor to introduce evidence demonstrating that in 1992

petitioner committed acts constituting rape. To the extent that petitioner faults the prosecutor for

failing to resolve his case by way of a plea agreement, his claim must fail. Whether to offer a

plea bargain is an area in which prosecutors are accorded relatively unfettered discretion. 

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to plea

bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.”); King v. Brown, 8 F.3d 1403,

1408 (9th Cir. 1993). Petitioner is correct in his assertion that the Due Process Clause entitles a

criminal defendant to an impartial and disinterested tribunal. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 14 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

136 (1955) (“Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases”). 

However, petitioner’s failure to point to any unfairness in his trial attributable to prosecutorial

bias is fatal to this claim.

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor had a conflict of

interest because he intended to use petitioner as a witness in the Menchaca trial at the same time

as he was prosecuting him for criminal acts. Petitioner has cited no cases, and the court has

found none, which hold that a prosecutor has a conflict of interest if he prosecutes a criminal

defendant who is a prosecution witness in another criminal proceeding. In fact, that scenario

occurs frequently in criminal courts. In any event, the record does not suggest that the prosecutor

made improper use at petitioner’s criminal trial of any information obtained in the Menchaca

case.

Petitioner has failed to make a showing that the deputy district attorney who tried

his case harbored such extreme personal bias or prejudice against him that his due process rights

were violated. He has also failed to demonstrate that a conflict of interest on the part of the

prosecutor prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling denying

his recusal motion on these grounds did not violate petitioner’s constitutional rights.

C. Speedy Trial

Petitioner claims that the delay in prosecuting him for the 1992 rapes violated his

rights to a speedy trial and due process. (Am. Pet. at 6.) The claim is stated, in full, as follows:

“Trial court violated petitioner’s right to a speedy speedy [sic] trial and due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment. The refiling and prosecuting three and one-half year old dismissed 1992

rape charges.” (Id.) In this claim, petitioner appears to be challenging the length of the delay

between the dismissal in 1992 of the rape charges and their refiling three and one-half years later. 

He does not appear to be challenging any delay which may have occurred after the filing of

charges in 1996. In other words, petitioner’s claim is that pre-indictment delay violated his

constitutional rights. 

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 15 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim for the following reasons:

The [petitioner] asserts the municipal court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss based on violation of his speedy trial rights. 

There was no motion to dismiss made in the superior court, and

there was no challenge in the superior court to any purported action

the municipal court may have taken with respect to speedy trial

rights. Since this appeal is a review of the superior court’s

judgment, review of the orders of the municipal court is beyond the

scope of the appeal. (See part I, above.)

A defendant may petition the superior court for a writ of mandate

or prohibition when the municipal court denies a motion to dismiss

based on denial of speedy trial rights. (See People v. Flores,

(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 475, 479-480.) The [petitioner] apparently

made no effort by any means to obtain review of the municipal

court order denying his motion to dismiss.

The [petitioner] also asserts he moved in the superior court for

mistrial based on violation of his speedy trial rights and that he

subsequently filed a motion for new trial based on the claim that

the loss of evidence concerning the 1992 rapes prejudiced his

defense. The right to speedy trial, however, is deemed waived

unless the defendant both objects to the date set and thereafter files

a timely motion to dismiss. (People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d

139, 146.) In the superior court, the [petitioner] did not move to

dismiss based on a speedy trial violation. He is therefore deemed

to have consented to the delay. (Ibid.) His contention on appeal

that the delay with respect to the 1992 rape charges deprived him

of his due process right to a speedy trial is without merit.

(Opinion at 20-21.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s claim in this

regard on petition for review. (Answer, Ex. 3.) Respondent defends this claim on the merits. 

The Fifth Amendment due process clause protects against “oppressive” preindictment delay. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 (1977). However, because of

statutory safeguards in the form of statutes of limitation, “the Due Process Clause has a limited

role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.” Id. at 789. Courts must apply a two-part test

to determine whether pre-indictment delay results in a denial of due process: (1) the defendant

must prove actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay; and (2) the length of the delay,

when balanced against the reason for the delay, must offend those "fundamental conceptions of

justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." United States v. Sherlock, 962

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 16 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790). Moreover, a petitioner

claiming pre-accusation delay “carries a ‘heavy burden’ of showing actual prejudice that is

‘definite and not speculative.’” United States v. Ross, 123 F. 3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1997)

(citations omitted). It is not enough to assert that the memories of witnesses have faded over

time (Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1988), nor is it sufficient to assert that

testimony was lost if the expected content of that testimony was generally speculative and/or

cumulative. Ross, 123 F.3d at 1186-87. Unless actual prejudice can be demonstrated by the

petitioner, the reason for the delay in question need not be considered. Id. at 1186. 

In his “speedy trial” claim before this court, petitioner does not describe any

prejudice suffered from the three and one-half year delay between the dismissal of the rape

charges in 1992 and their refiling in 1996. During argument on his unsuccessful motion for

mistrial in the Superior Court, petitioner’s counsel argued that substantial evidence, including

photographs, items seized from petitioner’s car, and clothes, had been destroyed since the case

was dismissed in 1992. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 1840.) Later in the trial,

petitioner, in pro per, filed a motion for new trial, in which he informed the court that he was

“deprived of viewing” the following evidence: (1) a bottle containing the victim’s fingerprints;

(2) cigarette butts from the victim’s cigarettes; (3) bloody sheets; and (4) an enlarged photograph

depicting a spoon with white powder. (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 598.) Petitioner

also asserted, without elaboration, that “evidence was destroyed.” (Id.) At the hearing on the

motion for new trial, petitioner’s counsel explained that the 1992 rape charges 

had originally been set for a trial and then were dismissed and the

Police Department destroyed several items.

We had a Hitch motion about that, possibly in front of Manteca,

which is why the Court may not be completely familiar with it.

Then I believe it was raised again here. And it was found to be

items of less than persuasive evidentiary value. There was gum,

gum wrappers, Coke, things like that that the officer testified,

either here or in Manteca, that they were items that would

disintegrate anyway.

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 17 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

(RT at 2729.) Petitioner also addressed the court on the motion for new trial, explaining as

follows:

There was a Pepto-Bismol bottle. Items that would prove, along

with the receipt in a bag in my vehicle, that proved that we made

this stop at this store and contradict this road, whatever this gal

said, down Union, down Wawona, and down Manteca Road.

My question is, she was never questioned, how did we get to 251

Martha Street?

The police report, if you was to read it, says that he were on

Yosemite, made a left, south on Union, made a left, heading east

on Wawona, then south on Manteca Road. How did we ever get to

251 Martha Street?

Those items were in my car with the receipt. The time and date

and the name of the store, that proves we made a stop. That proves

this girl was lying on the stand. And that evidence was destroyed.

* * *

From the ‘92 case, there is a listing of several colored [sic] of

underwear in the police report, of items confiscated or taken in

possession of the Police Department. Therefore, the DNA testing

was never done on her panties. 

She stated up on the stand, “yes, those are my panties.”

But in the police report, we got pink, we got white, and red panties,

along with red shorts.

I requested DNA testing be done for body fluids from Mrs.

whatever she is now, Medeiros, Schultz, whatever she is, and it

was never done.

* * *

But, yes, again, the prosecution was allowed numerous blow-ups

for their prosecuting of me. And I was not allowed one simple

blow-up for my defense.

(Id. at 2731-34.)

Petitioner’s counsel made further comments on the motion, stating as follows:

MR. PIGGOTT: Judge, I just might for the record indicate Mr.

Lizarraga is absolutely correct that he did ask for a DNA testing. 

And I made a decision that it certainly was not worth the cost. Not

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 18 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

because we were not being provided the money, the Court

responded to every request I made for funds.

THE COURT: You did indeed.

MR. PIGGOTT: But there was no chemical evidence whatsoever

about the rapist in that case. It was completely an identification, he

is the one.

So – and there was no indication that there might even be seminal

fluid or that somebody else might have placed seminal fluid.

So it really had no evidentiary value, and I made the decision not to

do that, because it is very costly to do a DNA test. And if it

doesn’t prove anything.

I agree with Mr. Lizarraga he requested that, and I made the

decision not to do it.

And as far as the picture goes, I also, at the time, I decided that it

really didn’t show anything, and there wasn’t a need to do it. It

wasn’t I was denied the right to have blow-ups. I certainly was. 

Even Mr. Dunlap offered to blow up any pictures I would have

given the request for, and I gave a request for some and I got them.

But I didn’t think that established anything, so we had an in-court

motion, there is a record of that, and just decided there was no need

to blow it up if we weren’t going to be able to use it. 

(Id. at 2734-36.) The trial court subsequently denied the motion for new trial, stating as follows: 

All right. The Court will deny the motion for a new trial under

1181 of the California Penal Code. It appears that all T’s were

crossed and all I’s were dotted. There does not appear to be any

allegations set forth in 1181 that would support a motion for new

trial. So the motion is denied then. 

(Id. at 2736.)

After a review of the record, this court concludes that petitioner has failed to

establish “actual, non-speculative prejudice” from the two and one-half year delay in refiling the

1992 rape charges. The record contains no evidence that destruction of evidence after the

original case was dismissed prejudiced petitioner’s trial in 1996. Rather, the expected relevance

of any of the destroyed evidence is generally speculative. The court also notes that the

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 19 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner’s “speedy trial” claim is concerned with postindictment delay, it should still be denied. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . ." U.S. Const.,

Amend. VI. This amendment protects only against post-indictment delay. United States v.

Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). The Sixth Amendment does not proscribe all delay of the

trial of a criminal defendant. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has “qualified the literal

sweep of the provision by specifically recognizing the relevance of four separate enquiries: 

whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal

defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right

to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.” Doggett v. United

States, 505 U.S. 647, 650-51 (1992) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972));

McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d

1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). No one of these four factors is either a necessary or a sufficient

condition to support a finding that there has been a deprivation of the constitutional right to a

speedy trial. Rather, these factors are related and must be considered together. Barker, 407 U.S.

at 533. However, the first factor, length of delay, "is to some extent a triggering mechanism. 

Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into

the other factors that go into the balance." Id. at 530. Courts have generally found postaccusation delay "presumptively prejudicial" when it begins to approach one year. Doggett, 505

U.S. at 652, n.1.

The two and one-half year delay between the dismissal of the rape charges in 1992

and their refiling in 1996 is more than one year in length and is, therefore, presumptively

prejudicial. Accordingly, the court must inquire into the other factors set forth in Barker. The

reason for the delay in this case was not for an improper purpose. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 325

(it would be improper for the prosecution to intentionally delay in order “to gain some tactical

advantage over [defendants] or to harass them”). As noted by the California Court of Appeal,

petitioner did not assert his right to a speedy trial in the Superior Court. See Barker, 407 U.S. at

531-32 (“The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary

weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that

failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a

speedy trial.”). Finally, it is the fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant, that weighs most

heavily in the evaluation of this claim. Valentine, 783 F.2d at 1417. As explained above, the

record does not demonstrate that petitioner was prejudiced by the delay in bringing the 1992 rape

charges to trial. There is no evidence that the delay in bringing the case to trial was for any

improper purpose or that the prosecution improperly sought to lengthen these proceedings. 

20

government’s case against petitioner for the 1992 rapes was strong. The victim testified at length

about the events and was subject to extensive cross-examination. (See e.g., RT at 1208-86.) She

unequivocally identified petitioner as the perpetrator. (Id.) A significant portion of the victim’s

testimony was corroborated by her housemate at the time. (Id. at 1287-1321.) Further, the length

of the delay in refiling the rape charges, when balanced against the reason for the delay – the fact

that the victim finally agreed to testify – does not offend “fundamental conceptions of justice.” 

Accordingly, this claim should be denied.2

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 20 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Accordingly, to the extent petitioner is raising a Sixth Amendment claim, it should be denied.

3

 At the time petitioner filed his motion to sever, the California Supreme Court had not

decided whether Evidence Code section 1108 violated a defendant’s due process rights. The

California Supreme Court now has held that California Evidence Code section 1108 does not

21

D. Severance of Charges

Petitioner’s next claim is that his rights to due process and a fair trial were

violated when the trial court denied his motion to sever trial of the 1992 rape charges from the

trial of the other counts against petitioner. Petitioner’s claim in this regard was rejected by the

California Court of Appeal in a reasoned decision on direct appeal and was summarily denied by

the California Supreme Court on petition for review. The state appellate court described the

claim and the background facts as follows:

Before trial, the [petitioner] moved to sever the 1992 rape charges

from the 1996 attempted rape and murder charges. He claimed that

his intended defenses to the 1992 rape charges and 1996 attempted

rape charges were inconsistent because as to the 1992 rape charges

his defense was to be consent while the defense to the 1996

attempted rape charges was to be that he was under the influence of

drugs or alcohol and the alleged victim tried to rob him. He also

claimed the rape charges were likely to inflame the jury and

influence the jurors with respect to the murder case, which was

based on circumstantial evidence. The [petitioner] also speculated

that Evidence Code section 1108 might be found unconstitutional

and, in that instance, the evidence would not be cross-admissible. 

The trial court denied the motion to sever. It determined that there

was no substantial inconsistency in the defenses the [petitioner]

intended to proffer. Although the court denied the motion, it did so

without prejudice so that the [petitioner] could renew the motion if

some further development in the law or if the evidence associated

with this case resulted in a lack of cross-admissibility. The

[petitioner] did not renew the motion during trial.

The [petitioner] asserts the trial court abused its discretion in

denying the motion to sever because the joinder or three weak

cases prejudiced him. Specifically, he claims the trial court should

have severed the 1992 rape charges from the 1996 attempted rape

and murder charges. He does not contend the 1996 attempted rape

charges should have been severed from the 1996 murder charge. 

(Opinion at 21-22.)3 

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 21 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

violate due process because “the policy considerations favoring the exclusion of evidence of

uncharged sexual offenses are outweighed in criminal sexual offense cases by the policy

considerations favoring the admission of such evidence.” People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903,

911 (1999) (quoting People v. Fitch, 55 Cal. App. 4th 172, 181-82 (1997)). 

22

After an analysis of state law, the state appellate court concluded that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to sever. The court

explained its reasoning as follows:

First, much of the evidence supporting the 1992 rape charges is

cross-admissible with the evidence supporting the 1996 attempted

rape charge, which was joined without objection or motion to sever

to the murder charge. The evidence concerning the rape and

attempted rape charges was cross-admissible under Penal Code

section 1108, which allows the prosecution to present evidence of

the defendant’s commission of other sexual offenses to prove the

commission of the sexual offense charged. The [petitioner], in his

opening brief, mentions that “certain evidence . . . was not crossadmissible.” (Italics added.) Nonetheless, he makes no effort to

specify what was that “certain evidence.” Nor does he attempt to

establish why such unspecified evidence was prejudicial. 

Accordingly, he has not carried his burden of showing that the

cross-admissibility factor weighed in favor of severance.

Second, this case does not present a situation in which any of the

charges was likely to inflame the jury against the [petitioner]. All

of the charges were very serious and involved assaultive behavior.

And third, this case does not involve charges carrying the death

penalty.

Before we consider the [petitioner’s] argument concerning the

joinder of three allegedly weak cases, we note that we could end

our analysis here because the [petitioner] has not shown prejudice

through lack of cross-admissibility. (See People v. Bradford

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315, 1316.) “Cross-admissibility suffices

to negate prejudice. . . .” (Ibid.)

It is highly unlikely the outcome on any of the charges was altered

by a “spillover” effect. As the [petitioner] points out, the 1992

rape charges were based on direct evidence and the 1996 murder

charge was based on circumstantial evidence. The evidence

concerning each charge, though, strongly established the

[petitioner’s] guilt. Furthermore, since the evidence was crossadmissible, severance of the 1992 rape charges from the 1996

attempted rape and murder charges would not have resulted in 

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 22 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

 In California, “[r]efusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on

the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the

charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a ‘weak’ case has been

joined with a ‘strong’ case, or with another ‘weak’ case, so that the ‘spillover’ effect of aggregate

evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4)

any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a ‘capital

case.’” People v. Sapp, 31 Cal. 4th 240, 258 (2003) (quoting People v. Bradford, 15 Cal. 4th

1229, 1315 (1997)). 

23

different evidence being presented to the jury, for the most part. 

The “spillover” effect was not a legitimate concern. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

the [petitioner’s] motion to sever the 1992 rape charges from the

1996 attempted rape and murder charges.

(Id. at 24-25.)4

The question presented in this federal habeas corpus petition is whether the state

appellate court’s adjudication of this issue resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. Habeas relief is appropriate only

where the “simultaneous trial of more than one offense . . . actually render[ed] petitioner’s state

trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process.” Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d

765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

See also Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004); Park v. California, 202 F.3d

1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]mproper joinder does not,

in itself, violate the Constitution.” United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986). “Rather,

misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so

great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Id. “The requisite level of

prejudice is reached only if the impermissible joinder had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 638 (quoting Sandoval , 241

F.3d at 772). A reviewing court “must consider on a count by count basis whether the trial on a

particular count was fundamentally unfair in light of that count’s joinder with one or more other

charges.” Featherstone, 948 F.2d at 1503. 

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 23 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

24

A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on severance motions. Herd v.

Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir. 1986). The relevant factors are judicial economy and

prejudice. United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1320 n.3 (9th Cir.), amended 798 F.2d 1250

(9th Cir. 1986). A reviewing court must consider: (1) whether strong evidence of one count is

presented with relatively weak evidence on another count; (2) whether the evidence of the other

count is cross-admissible; and (3) whether the state trial court admonished the jury as to the

limited use of the other crimes evidence. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084-86 (9th

Cir. 1998). Even if the evidence is not cross-admissible, joinder generally does not result in

prejudice if the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct and the jury is properly instructed

so that it may compartmentalize the evidence. Id. at 1085-86; see also United States v. Johnson,

820 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1987). 

As found by the state appellate court, the evidence on all counts against petitioner

was relatively strong, notwithstanding the fact that the 1992 rape case was based on direct

evidence whereas the 1996 murder charge was based on circumstantial evidence. Also, evidence

on the rape and attempted rape charges was cross-admissible. Further, petitioner’s jury was

instructed to consider each count separately and was admonished on the limited use of other

crimes evidence. (CT at 425, 479.) Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying petitioner’s severance motion.

Even assuming arguendo that the state trial court erred in denying petitioner’s

motion for severance, petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by joinder of the

charges against him. The crimes charged against petitioner were clearly distinct and the jury

should have been easily able to distinguish the evidence introduced with respect to one charge

from that introduced in the others. There is no evidence that the jury was confused or was unable

to consider separately the evidence which pertained to each charged crime. The evidence

supporting petitioner’s convictions was not unequal, none of the offenses was significantly more

inflammatory than the other and there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of each

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 24 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

25

offense without use of evidence introduced with respect to the other. Under these circumstances,

consolidation of the 1992 rape charges with the other charges against petitioner did not have a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Accordingly,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

E. Marsden Motion

In his fifth claim, petitioner contends that the trial court violated his rights to

effective assistance of counsel and due process when it denied his motion for substitution of

counsel. The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim in a reasoned decision on direct

appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily denied the claim on petition for review. The

state appellate court summarized the background surrounding this claim as follows:

Before trial, the [petitioner] moved to replace his appointed

counsel, Patrick Piggott. (People v. Marsden, (1970) 2 Cal.3d

118). He asserted Piggott lied to him, did not visit him enough,

and was not adequately investigating the case. He also claimed

Piggott was not communicating well with him and, as a result, the

[petitioner] could not trust him, although he conceded that Piggott

is “very highly qualified.” When the trial court asked Piggott to

respond, he agreed that the communication between the [petitioner]

and him was “fairly nonproductive for whatever reasons.” Piggott

continued: 

“Shortly after I began representing [petitioner] we had some

misunderstandings. I filed a [Penal Code section] 1368 [motion to

determine the (petitioner’s) competence to stand trial]. Part of that

was based on [petitioner] telling me about visits from angels. My

concern was this information he’s giving me coming from visions

or from his memory. The 1368 doctors, I forget who they were at

this point, one of them recommended perhaps he should have an

attorney that believed in paranormal. Paranormal experiences are

not necessarily unusual.”

Piggott explained that he and the [petitioner] had a conflict

concerning whether certain evidence relating to prior sexual

offenses would be admissible under Evidence Code section 1108. 

The [petitioner] believed a San Francisco Superior Court case that

limited admissibility was controlling. Piggott disagreed. Piggott

described his investigation of the case, including the activities of

the appointed investigator, and his efforts to communicate with the

[petitioner]. He informed the court that he felt the [petitioner] was

irrational about some of the issues they discussed.

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 25 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

26

The trial court then explained to the [petitioner], at length, the

process of investigating the case and preparing for trial. The court

informed the [petitioner] that the concerns the [petitioner] had

raised about inadequate investigation and failure of Piggott to visit

the [petitioner] were unfounded because the case was being

investigated by both the appointed investigator and Piggott and that

the visits to the [petitioner] by the investigator and Piggott were

furthering his defense. The [petitioner] and Piggott both agreed to

work harder.

(Opinion at 26-27.) 

The state appellate court denied petitioner’s claim on the grounds that: (1) the

conflict between petitioner and his counsel could not have been “irreconcilable” because both

parties agreed to work harder to make the relationship work; (2) counsel’s concern about

petitioner’s mental health did not constitute an irreconcilable conflict because “courts are never

required to condition appointments of attorneys on whether they believe in the paranormal;” (3)

petitioner’s disagreement over counsel’s trial tactics was insufficient to warrant appointment of

new counsel; (4) petitioner’s complaints about events that took place after the hearing on the

Marsden motion were irrelevant to the court’s consideration of the motion; and (5) by

petitioner’s acquiescence to the continued representation of Piggott during trial, petitioner

signaled that he was satisfied with Piggott. The court stated, “we cannot reverse based on the

failure to grant a Marsden motion the defendant did not make.” (Id. at 29.) 

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to the assistance of

counsel in a criminal prosecution. Such assistance must be effective and competent. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Where a defendant is proceeding with the assistance of

counsel, he may move to dismiss or substitute counsel, whether appointed or retained. The grant

or denial of such a motion may depend on its timeliness and the nature of the conflict between

the defendant and current counsel. United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.

1986). In assessing a federal trial court’s decision to deny a motion to substitute counsel on

direct appeal, the court looks at three factors: "'(1) timeliness of the motion to dismiss counsel;

(2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 26 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of

communication preventing an adequate defense.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d

693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979)). See also, United States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000);

United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by

United States v. Norby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000).

The Ninth Circuit Court Appeals has ruled that in assessing such a claim

in the context of a § 2254 proceeding such as this, the focus is different than that on direct

review. In Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) the court stated: 

Our primary reason for accepting this case for en banc review was

to correct the standard of review we have been using to examine

the constitutionality of a state court’s handling of a motion to

substitute appointed counsel based on allegations of an

irreconcilable conflict. In Bland, we said that the test is whether a

state court’s denial of such a motion was for an “abuse of

discretion.” Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475.

 

* * *

[O]ur only concern when reviewing the constitutionality of a statecourt conviction is whether the petitioner is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See also Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546. 115 L.Ed. 640 (1991) (“The

[habeas] court does not review a judgment but the lawfulness of

the petitioner’s custody simpliciter.”) (emphasis in original). A

particular abuse of discretion by a state court may amount also to a

violation of the Constitution, but not every state court abuse of

discretion has the same effect. Accordingly, to the extent that they

conflict with this opinion, we overrule Bland and Crandell v.

Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998).

Id. at 1024-25 (footnotes omitted).

In Schell the court determined that it was “well established and clear that the Sixth

Amendment requires on the record an appropriate inquiry into the grounds of such a motion, and

that the matter be resolved on the merits before the case goes forward.” 218 F.3d at 1025. See

also Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Thus, the state trial court’s 

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 27 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

28

summary denial of a defendant’s motion for new counsel without further inquiry violated the

Sixth Amendment.”) 

Under such an inquiry the state trial court’s handling of the motion to substitute

appointed counsel in this case certainly passes constitutional muster. Petitioner was given a full

opportunity to air his complaints about counsel's performance. The trial court allowed petitioner

the opportunity to fully explain his position regarding his counsel on the record. The court

focused on and fully explored the nature of the conflicts, as expressed by petitioner. This court

finds that the trial court made an adequate inquiry into petitioner's complaints and resolved the

matter on the merits before proceeding with the case. 

Moreover, even under the prior “abuse of discretion” standard of review, it

appears that the state trial court’s resolution of the motions was appropriate. After inquiry, it

appeared that the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was not so great that it resulted

in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. As noted by the state appellate

court, petitioner agreed to continue with current counsel and the entire trial was prosecuted

without further complaint by petitioner. Even though petitioner and counsel may have disagreed

about whether petitioner should have pursued an insanity defense and/or various other matters,

the disagreements did not prove so substantial that counsel was unable to present an adequate

defense. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying petitioner’s request for

new counsel. See United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1990) (no error in

failing to offer defendant substitute counsel where the crux of the problem was defendant’s anger

at his attorney’s refusal to raise defenses to the charges which the attorney considered frivolous).

Because the denial of petitioner’s motions for appointment of substitute counsel

were not an abuse of the state court’s discretion, no Constitutional violation is presented. Schell

v. Witek, 218 F.3d at 1025. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim. 

/////

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 28 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

29

F. Admission into Evidence of Petitioner’s Statements to Michelle

Petitioner’s next claim is that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

petitioner’s motions for a mistrial and a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim in a reasoned decision on direct appeal and

the California Supreme Court summarily denied it on petition for review. The state appellate

court explained the facts surrounding this claim as follows:

Soon after the 1996 crimes against Michelle, she gave a statement

to a detective. The last part of the interview occurred as follows:

“[Detective:] ‘So [are] there any details you can remember at all

right now that – ’

“[Michelle:] ‘Yeah. I remember him telling me that he was a killer

in the truck.’

“[Detective:] ‘He told you that?’

“[Michelle:] ‘He kills people for money or something like that.’

“[Detective:] ‘And did he elaborate on that?’

“[Michelle:] ‘Uh, well, vaguely. We were going towards Stockton. 

I can’t even believe I was in this man’s truck. I’m in shock. He

said something like, “Yeah, I kill people for money.”’

“[Detective:] ‘Okay.’

“[Michelle:] ‘He did say that. I – I go, “Really? Are you going to

kill me?” He said, “No.”’

“[Detective:] ‘Okay. Well, at this point, the interview –

supplemental interview with Michelle [ ] is terminated.’” 

The [petitioner] made a motion in limine to exclude the

[petitioner’s] statements to Michelle concerning his killing for

money. Prosecutor Dunlap opposed the motion, stating that it

should be admitted to show the [petitioner] was bragging about

being a killer. The court noted that the statement might be relevant

if it inspired fear in Michelle, to get her to cooperate. The trial

court granted the motion in limine to exclude the statement. 

However, the court told the prosecution it could “renew the

motion,” outside the presence of the jury, if it felt it could show

admissibility.

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 29 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

30

Again before trial, the prosecution raised the issue. Dunlap stated:

“I think the statement that ‘I’m a killer’ shows a complete lack of

remorse for dead individuals, and shows his actions as bravado in

going back to the very house where he killed. [¶] I don’t

understand why we are not allowed to bring in statements of the

[petitioner] that reflect his willingness to talk about killing people,

when that’s exactly what he’s charged with.” The court reiterated

its position that the prosecution would need to show admissibility

before the statement could be admitted.

Later, Michelle testified at trial. After her testimony, the tape of

her interview with the detective was played for the jury by the

prosecution. In violation of the court’s order excluding the

statement about killing for money, the tape had not been edited to

remove the statement.

Responding to a defense objection and despite the court’s earlier

ruling that the statement was not admissible, Dunlap incorrectly

argued that the court had not made a ruling on the motion in limine

but had reserved the issue to determine whether the statement

caused Michelle to fear the [petitioner] and cooperate by taking off

her clothes. He also stated that defense counsel had indicated a

desire to use the taped statement in the defense case, so he went

ahead and presented it in the prosecution’s case. He asserted the

statement was admissible because Michelle had testified she took

her clothes off because of her fear the [petitioner] would kill her. 

Based on this argument, the trial court then concluded the

statement was admissible. It determined that the probative value

on the limited issue of the state of mind of Michelle outweighed

the prejudicial effect.

Defense counsel immediately moved orally for mistrial. He did not

state a ground for the mistrial. The court did not reference or rule

on the motion for mistrial. As noted, it instead held the statement

was admissible.

After trial, the [petitioner], himself, filed a motion for new trial. 

As one of the grounds, he asserted: “Judge Frank Grande violated

his own order at the In Limine Motion. The judge ordered the jury

not to hear certain things. The jury would not be allowed to hear

part of the tape where Michelle B[.] stated, ‘I was a professional

killer.’ The jury heard that part and again the jury was

contaminated and reached an opinion of [petitioner] before the trail

[sic] was over.” The trial court denied the motion for new trial. 

(Opinion at 32-35.)

On direct appeal, as in this court, petitioner argued that the motions for mistrial

and new trial should have been granted based on the misconduct of the prosecutor in playing the

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 30 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

31

offending portion of the tape for the jury in violation of the trial judge’s rulings. The Court of

Appeal agreed that the prosecutor committed gross misconduct in ignoring the trial judge’s

previous rulings and intentionally eliciting inadmissible testimony. (Id. at 35-37.) However, the

court concluded that the misconduct was harmless and, therefore, did not justify reversal. (Id.) 

The court explained its reasoning as follows:

The [petitioner] did not object specifically to the prosecution’s

presentation of the statement attributed to the [petitioner] by

Michelle on the ground it constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 

Accordingly, the trial court never had the opportunity to rule on the

motion for mistrial or motion for new trial on that basis. Instead,

the court found the evidence was admissible on the issue of

Michelle’s state of mind.

As to the murder of Minier, there was no evidence he killed Minier

for money; therefore, the statement appears to have had no

relevance to that charge. As to the attempted rape of Michelle,

however, the trial court pointed out that the statement could be

relevant if it were shown the statement affected her state of mind

and influenced her to cooperate with the [petitioner] for fear he

would kill or hurt her. At the time the court held the statement

admissible, Michelle’s state of mind was in issue. Defense counsel

implied through a number of questions on cross-examination that

the encounter was not coercive. The court’s conclusion that the

evidence was not unduly prejudicial was appropriate in light of the

probative value of the evidence.

Accordingly, the trial court acted properly in determining the

evidence was admissible and was not asked to find prosecutorial

misconduct. Although the prosecutor’s tactics were unacceptable,

there was no error and the [petitioner] was not prejudiced.

(Id. at 37-38.)

"To succeed on a motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct, a

defendant must show first that the prosecution engaged in improper conduct and second that it

was more probable than not that the prosecutor's conduct 'materially affected the fairness of the

trial.'" United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.

Smith, 893 F.2d 1573, 1583 (9th Cir.1990). Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor committed

misconduct when he improperly introduced evidence of Michelle’s inflammatory statements,

petitioner has failed to show that the misconduct “materially” affected the fairness of his trial. 

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 31 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to consider the question of whether

the AEDPA requires an additional degree of deference to state courts’ resolution of sufficiency of

the evidence claims. See Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (2004); Chein v. Shumsky, 373

F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). Because petitioner’s claim fails under the Jackson standard this

court also need not decide whether the enactment of the AEDPA altered that test for purposes of

federal habeas proceedings. 

32

As explained by the state appellate court, evidence that petitioner told Michelle he was a paid

killer was relevant to rebut any defense suggestion that Michelle’s actions in complying with

petitioner’s requests were voluntary or consensual. Further, the statement had little relevance to

the charge of murder, since the prosecution was not operating under a theory that the murder was

for hire. Under these circumstances, the relevance of petitioner’s statement outweighed any

possible prejudice. This court also notes the state court’s observation that the trial court was not

called upon to rule on a motion for new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. The

trial court did not err in failing to grant a motion that was not presented to it. 

The decision of the California Court of Appeal that petitioner failed to show

prejudice from the prosecutor’s misconduct is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

United States Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim.

G. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of

the murder of Minier. 

There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979). See also Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “Put

another way, the dispositive question under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could

reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d

978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318).5 The federal habeas court

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 32 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

33

determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive elements of the criminal

offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983. It is

the province of the jury to ‘resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. “The

question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether

rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d

303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The decision of the state court of appeal is the last reasoned state court rejection

of petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim. The state court rejected the claim as follows:

The [petitioner] attacks several specific aspects of the evidence

against him. We consider each specific attack and then explain

why the evidence sufficiently established he was the one who

killed Minier. Since the [petitioner] does not challenge any

element of the murder conviction except his identity as the killer,

we do not discuss any other element.

The [petitioner] finds the evidence of his own threats against

Minier “unpersuasive.” He states: “[A]lthough Minier obtained a

‘stay-away’ order in 1995, Minier himself essentially revoked that

order by permitting appellant to move back into his house on

occasion. Viewed in the very best light, Minier invoked the

protection of the restraining order haphazardly, when he felt like it. 

That was not the action of a man in fear for his life.” The

[petitioner] goes on to argue Minier was calm when officers

responded to his 911 call on December 31, 1995, and did not

indicate the [petitioner] had threatened him.

Contrary to the [petitioner’s] assessment, the evidence concerning

the restraining orders against the [petitioner] and Minier’s 911 call

just a day or two before he was murdered is highly incriminating to

the [petitioner]. In September 1995, less than four months before

his death, Minier filed an application for a restraining order against

the [petitioner]. In support of the application, Minier stated, in

part: “All I want for him is to just leave the house, but he won’t –

but he won’t do that and I’m not capable of literally throwing him

out. And when I do not – when I lock him out, then he has made

various threats like, ‘I’ll burn the house down.’”

Although Minier let the [petitioner] return to the house after he

obtained the restraining order, Minier called 911 on the morning of

December 31, 1995. Also, Minier told his neighbor he was afraid

of the [petitioner] in 1995. That fear grew as the year progressed. 

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 33 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

34

The [petitioner] threatened to burn down Minier’s house and

personally threatened Minier. The last few times the neighbor

spoke to Minier, in the latter part of 1995, Minier was very upset. 

Thus, there was evidence of escalating threats by the [petitioner]

against Minier in 1995.

The [petitioner] asserts the typewritten note about Minier being the

recipient of some of the [petitioner’s] evil actions had “no

evidentiary value whatsoever as it cannot be determined when it

was written.” The [petitioner] overstates the significance of the

absence of a date on the note. Because the note was in a place of

ready access in the house, it could be inferred the note was of

recent vintage. Furthermore, the evidence that the [petitioner’s]

threats and actions toward Minier during the latter part of 1995

would also point to an authorship date around that period of time. 

The note was not so devoid of evidentiary value as the [petitioner]

would have us think.

Mostly because of the fact Minier’s dead body was under a warm

electric blanket, it was difficult for the experts to specify a time of

death. For various reasons, they concluded the time of death was

anywhere from the evening of January 1, 1996, to the morning of

the next day. The [petitioner] contends he had alibis for “twothirds of the time-span within which Minier could have been

murdered.” There is no support for his contention of insufficient

evidence in the fact that he was not available to commit the crime

during two-thirds of the period of time in which it may have been

committed. Construing the evidence in favor of the judgment, it

shows he had plenty of time to commit the crime.

The [petitioner] attempts to minimize the evidence of incriminating

rope fibers found in his room by suggesting that the officers may

have tracked the fibers between the rooms. This is nothing more

than a jury argument. The jury is authorized to weigh the evidence. 

We are not so authorized. Instead, the presence in the

[petitioner’s] room of fibers from the rope that was used to kill

Minier can be used to infer the [petitioner] killed Minier than

tracked the fibers himself into his room or that the [petitioner]

possessed the rope in his room and took it to Minier’s room to

murder him, leaving fibers behind.

The prosecution introduced evidence that the house was tidy and

locked and Minier was not robbed to prove he was not killed by an

intruder. The [petitioner] seeks to discredit this evidence by

showing the [petitioner] was not a tidy person and, indeed, had a

messy room. Therefore, if he had killed Minier he would have left

a mess. Again, this was argument for the jury, not for a reviewing

court. There was a reasonable inference of the [petitioner’s] guilt

to be drawn from the condition of the house because an occupant

of the house would not have to break in and would be less likely to

ransack it.

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 34 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

35

Taken as a whole, the circumstantial evidence of the [petitioner’s]

guilt with regard to the murder of Minier is strong. The

[petitioner] misused and threatened Minier and abused his trust. In

1995, Minier’s fear of the [petitioner] grew, as evidenced by the

restraining order, Minier’s complaints to his neighbor, and his 911

call. The [petitioner] had access to the home during the time

period in which Minier was murdered. Fibers from the rope that

was used to kill Minier were found in the [petitioner’s] bedroom. 

And the [petitioner] used the same method, choking the victim, he

had used on previous victims of his crimes of violence. The

manner in which Minier was killed and the condition of the house

indicated Minier was killed by someone with ready access to the

house. In fact, the [petitioner] was in the house assaulting a

woman at a time either just before or just after he murdered Minier. 

The logical and reasonable inference is that the [petitioner] killed

Minier. Accordingly, the [petitioner’s] sufficiency of evidence

argument is without merit.

(Opinion at 39-42.)

After reviewing the entire record, this court finds that the state court’s conclusion

that there was sufficient evidence to establish petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not

an unreasonable application of the federal due process standards set forth above. The state

court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor was it

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, this claim should be denied.

H. Exclusion of Evidence

Petitioner’s final claim is that the trial court violated his rights pursuant to the

Sixth Amendment when it excluded evidence regarding his defense of “third party culpability.” 

(Attach. to Am. Pet. at 5.) The claim is stated, in full, as follows:

Trial court violated petitioner’s constitutional rights under the sixth

amendment. Trial court excluded certain evidence regarding

petitioner’s defense of “third party culpability” to count 1, the

murder of Ken Minier, which prevented petitioner from fully

presenting that defense.

(Id.) Petitioner’s claim in this regard was rejected by the California Court of Appeal in a

reasoned decision on direct appeal and was summarily denied by the California Supreme Court

on petition for review. The state appellate court described the claim and its resolution as follows:

/////

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 35 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

36

Before trial, the defense notified the trial court it had three different

theories of third party culpability. First, someone associated with

Menchaca, the killer of the [petitioner’s] father, killed Minier in

order to pin the crime on the [petitioner] and defeat his credibility

as a witness against Menchaca. Second, Minier was a child

molester as evidenced by photographs found in the house of him

and teenaged boys. One of those boys or a friend or family

member killed Minier in revenge. (The parties agreed Minier was

a child molester.) And third, the killer was Timothy Pruden, the

boyfriend of the [petitioner’s] victim, Michelle. The court

excluded the photographs referenced in the second theory, above,

after the defense and prosecution agreed that evidence should be

presented to the jury some other way, for example, by stipulation. 

Although no evidence of either the first or third theory was, by

then, offered, the trial court did not preclude the defense from

thereafter raising its theories of third party culpability at trial.

Later, defense counsel reported to the court and the prosecution

that it had located one of the victims depicted in the photographs

found in Minier’s home. That victim told a defense investigator

“that Mr. Minier had been threatened by a family in San Jose

concerning activities with a juvenile boy . . . .” Court and counsel

agreed more investigation was necessary before relevance and

admissibility could be determined. Apparently, at some point

during the proceedings, the trial court may have ruled that evidence

of a threat from the San Jose family was inadmissible. The

[petitioner] does not give a record citation for this ruling; however,

the prosecution, outside the presence of the jury during the defense

case just before the molestation victim was to testify, mentioned

that the court had “already ruled on the threats.” Later the same

day as the comment by the prosecution, defense counsel stated: “I

just want to say one more time for the record that I’m really

concerned that other threats to Mr. Minier are not admissible.” 

The trial court responded that the defense could “raise a reasonable

doubt that somebody else killed [Minier], but you can’t do it by

rank hearsay.”

Obviously, there are some holes in the record as it is referred to in

the [petitioner’s] brief. There is no citation to the rather lengthy

record where the trial court purportedly ruled on the admissibility

of the alleged threat against Minier by a family in San Jose. While

there is a later reference to “threats” that had been excluded, there

is no clear indication it referred to the San Jose family. Since the

record presented by the [petitioner] is inadequately presented for

our consideration, the contention that the trial court improperly

excluded evidence of third party culpability is waived. (See Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 15(a) [“The statement of any matter in the

record shall be supported by appropriate reference to the record.”].)

Nonetheless, the [petitioner] appears to assert the exclusion of the

San Jose threat was error because it was admissible hearsay

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 36 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

37

relevant to third party culpability evidence. We reject this

assertion both because the record, such as it is, reflects it is

inadmissible hearsay and because it was too attenuated to support a

finding of third party culpability.

The [petitioner] contends Minier admitted to the witness that a San

Jose family had threatened him. He asserts this statement is

admissible because it is a statement against Minier’s penal interest. 

He is mistaken. Only a statement that Minier had committed

molestations would be against his penal interest, not a statement

that someone had threatened him, which is not inculpatory. 

(citations omitted.)

Furthermore, the bare fact someone in San Jose threatened Minier

in some unspecified way for having molested a family member is

insufficient to warrant admissibility as evidence of third party

culpability. (See People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 684-686

[third party’s anger toward victim insufficient to require trial court

to admit evidence linking him to perpetration of crime].) This

vague statement is not direct or circumstantial evidence linking a

third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. (People v.

Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1017.) Accordingly, the trial

court did not err in excluding it.

(Opinion at 43-46.)

Petitioner’s claim in this court is also vague and conclusory and should be rejected

on that basis. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)) (“‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief’”). It should also be denied on the merits.

An evidentiary ruling, based on state law, may not be set aside in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding unless it “render[ed] the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to

violate due process.” Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Whelchel

v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th

Cir. 1993). Criminal defendants have a constitutional right, implicit in the Sixth Amendment, to

present a defense; this right is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v.

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (“[T]he

Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense.’”) However, “that right is not unlimited.” Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 37 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

38

Cir. 2002). The right to present a defense is restricted "to assure both fairness and reliability in

the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973). 

Thus, a state law justification for exclusion of evidence does not abridge a criminal defendant’s

right to present a defense unless it is "arbitrary or disproportionate" and "infringe[s] upon a

weighty interest of the accused." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). See also

Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-91 (discussion of the tension between the discretion of state courts to 

exclude evidence at trial and the federal constitutional right to “present a complete defense”);

Greene, 288 F.3d at 1090. 

The United States Supreme Court has not articulated the specific set of

circumstances under which a criminal defendant must be permitted to introduce evidence of

third-party culpability. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has determined that where the

proferred evidence simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against a third party and does

not directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense, the evidence may be

excluded. See People of Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir.1993) (citing

Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir.1983)). A defendant’s "undeniably strong"

interest in introducing evidence of third-party culpability must be balanced against the state's

"compelling" interest in reliable and efficient trials. Rushen, 713 F.2d at 1451-1452. Under

California law, a criminal defendant has a right to present evidence of third party culpability if it

is capable of raising a reasonable doubt about his own guilt. See Spivey, 194 F.3d at 978 (citing

People v. Hall, 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 (1986)). In order for evidence of another suspect to be

admissible, however, "there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to

the actual perpetration of the crime." Hall, 41 Cal.3d at 833. Motive or opportunity is not

enough. Id.

Petitioner has failed to present “substantial evidence” linking any other person to

the murder of Minier. Indeed, the evidence described by the California Court of Appeal does not

even raise a possible ground of suspicion against any particular person or group of persons. At

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 38 of 39
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

39

most, petitioner’s “evidence” is speculative and impermissibly vague. Further, evidence that

some family members of a juvenile allegedly molested by Minier issued unspecific threats

against Minier would not necessarily establish petitioner’s innocence and is extremely weak

compared with the evidence that the petitioner committed the crime. On balance, the state’s right

to reliable and efficient trials outweighs petitioner’s right to present unsupported allegations

against unidentified persons. The decision of the state appellate court that petitioner’s

constitutional rights were not violated by the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of third-party

culpability is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal authority and should not be

set aside.

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 14, 2005.

008;liza1062.hc

Case 2:01-cv-01062-MCE -JFM Document 13 Filed 07/15/05 Page 39 of 39