Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05013/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05013-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 528
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

FREDERICK BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5013

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00121-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G. 

Bruggink.

______________________ 

Decided: June 5, 2015

______________________ 

FREDERICK BROWN, Garland, TX, pro se.

MICHAEL DUANE AUSTIN, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, 

JR., CLAUDIA BURKE. 

______________________ 

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2 BROWN v. US

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Frederick Brown filed a complaint in the U.S. Court of 

Federal Claims alleging that garnishment by the Social 

Security Administration (“SSA”) of his social security 

disability benefits violated the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(“FTCA”). Compl. ¶ 1 (“This action arises under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§§ 2401(b), 1346(b), 

2671-80, as hereinafter more fully applies.”). The Court of 

Federal Claims dismissed Mr. Brown’s case for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction and denied his motion to 

amend his complaint and motion to transfer. Mr. Brown 

appeals. Because Mr. Brown has not shown any reversible error by the Court of Federal Claims, we affirm. 

DISCUSSION

Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which 

we review de novo. Rick’s Mushroom Serv. v. United 

States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2008). On this 

question, Mr. Brown’s sole contention in his opening brief 

is that the Court of Federal Claims erred in relying on 28 

U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2013) because that statutory provision is applicable to claims of no more than $10,000, 

whereas Mr. Brown claims in excess of $10,000. Mr. 

Brown argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1491 should have been the 

relevant authority to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 

Mr. Brown’s contention is misplaced because the 

$10,000 limit is a provision in the Little Tucker Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). The Court of Federal Claims, however, did not rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) to dismiss Mr. 

Brown’s case. Rather, the Court of Federal Claims cited 

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), which is the codification of the 

FTCA that Mr. Brown asserted as the basis of his claim. 

See Brown v. United States, No. 14-121C, 2014 WL 

3686140, at *2 (Fed. Cl. July 16, 2014). We discern no 

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BROWN v. US 3

error in the Court of Federal Claims’ citation to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(b)(1). 

Moreover, the Court of Federal Claims specifically 

held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Id. This is the same provision that Mr. Brown urges as the proper authority. There 

is thus no dispute that the Court of Federal Claims applied the correct statute. Under the Tucker Act, the Court 

of Federal Claims thoroughly analyzed whether it had 

jurisdiction over each of Mr. Brown’s claims. We discern 

no error in the Court of Federal Claims’ holding that it 

lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 over any of Mr. 

Brown’s claims.

On reply, Mr. Brown raises for the first time an additional jurisdictional basis under the Indian Tucker Act, 28 

US.C § 1505. This theory was absent in Mr. Brown’s 

complaint and briefings in the Court of Federal Claims, 

and in his opening appeal brief. “It is the general rule, of 

course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an 

issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 

U.S. 106, 120 (1976). Even if we were to consider Mr. 

Brown’s new theory, it does not appear that the Indian 

Tucker Act, in granting jurisdiction “in favor of any tribe, 

band, or other identifiable group of American Indians,” 

would provide the Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction over Mr. Brown’s personal claim for social security 

disability benefits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1505. Mr. Brown’s 

new theory on reply, therefore, does not show that the 

Court of Federal Claims erred in dismissing his case for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The decision on a motion for leave to amend complaint 

lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which 

we review for abuse of discretion. Cencast Servs. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The 

Court of Federal Claims reasoned that it would be futile 

to grant Mr. Brown leave to amend his complaint because 

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4 BROWN v. US

it would “not have jurisdiction over any of the allegations 

raised in the proposed amendment.” Brown, 2014 WL 

3686140, at *4. Mr. Brown contends that the denial of 

leave to amend was in “complete disregard of [his proposed amendment] which stated that the violations of the 

Federal Government was not pursuant to the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C[.] § 1346 . . . .” Reply Br. 5. As discussed 

earlier, the Court of Federal Claims’ decision was not 

based on the Little Tucker Act. Mr. Brown’s statement 

about the Little Tucker Act in his proposed amendment 

would not have addressed the Court of Federal Claims’ 

reasons for concluding that it lacked of jurisdiction over 

his claims. As such, Mr. Brown has not shown that the 

Court of Federal Claims abused its discretion in denying 

leave to amend the complaint.

We also review the Court of Federal Claims’ decision 

on a motion to transfer the case to another court for abuse 

of discretion. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., 521 F.3d at 1342. 

Section 405 of Title 42 of the United States Code specifies 

the exclusive mechanism for determining the right to 

Social Security benefits, and provides exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts over appeals from Social Security determinations denying benefits. The Court of Federal 

Claims reasoned that, in order for Mr. Brown to sue in 

district court, he would be required first to exhaust his 

administrative remedies with the SSA within certain time 

periods. Brown, 2014 WL 3686140, at *4-5. The Court of 

Federal Claims further reasoned that it was presented 

with no facts to suggest that a district court would have 

jurisdiction over Mr. Brown’s claims and concluded that it 

would not be in the interest of justice to transfer the case 

to a district court. Id. Despite these detailed bases in the 

Court of Federal Claims’ order, Mr. Brown contends that 

the Court of Federal Claims “did not rule on the Appellant 

[sic] on the transfer motion” without further explanation 

on why he believes the Court of Federal Claims erred. 

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BROWN v. US 5

Appellant’s Br. 2. We conclude that the Court of Federal 

Claims properly denied Mr. Brown’s motion to transfer.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own. 

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