Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01967/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01967-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1319 Pollutants &amp; Permit Violations

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

WATERKEEPERS NORTHERN

CALIFORNIA, a non-profit

corporation, doing business as

DELTAKEEPER, and BILL

JENNINGS, an individual;

No. CIV-S-00-1967 MCE/PAN

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

AG INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING,

INC., a corporation; and

CLAUDE E. BROWN, an

individual;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This is an action for violation of the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., hereinafter

referred to as the “Clean Water Act.” 

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2

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants AG Industrial Manufacturing,

Inc. and its president, Claude E. Brown, have repeatedly

discharged industrial pollution into the Mokelumne River and the

San Joaquin River Delta ever since Defendants became subject to

the provisions of the Clean Water Act in 1992. Plaintiffs now

move for summary judgment, or alternatively for summary

adjudication of claims, on grounds that the evidence demonstrates

as a matter of law Defendants’ continuing failure to comply with

the requirements of the Clean Water Act. Defendants, in turn,

have filed their own cross-motion for summary judgment or summary

adjudication. As set forth below, while summary judgment is

denied as to both parties, summary adjudication as to certain

claims will be granted.

STATUTORY OVERVIEW

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251,

et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the “Clean Water Act” or

“CWA”), was adopted by Congress in 1972 “to restore and maintain

the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s

waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). To effectuate that goal, the CWA

prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into “navigable waters”,

unless such discharge is in compliance with CWA provisions. 33

U.S.C. § 1311(a), 1342(b)-(c). The term “navigable waters” is

interpreted broadly to include any canal, ditch or storm sewer

system which ultimately, either directly or indirectly, flows

(even if only periodically) into a waterway of the United States. 

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3

Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District, 243 F.3d 526, 534

(9 Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, th

1342 (11 Cir. 1997). th

The CWA does authorize the discharge of limited amounts of

pollutants pursuant to permits obtained pursuant to the National

Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”). The

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), however, which is

responsible for CWA enforcement authority, has delegated

enforcement duties in California, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §

1342(p), to the State of California, acting through its State

Water Resources Control Board (the “State Board”). In November

1991, the State Board issued Water Quality Order 91-13-DWQ

(“State Order”) which created a statewide general permit for

industrial storm water dischargers. This Order, as subsequently

amended, prohibits discharges which (1) cause or threaten to

cause pollution, contamination, or nuisance; (2) adversely impact

human health or the environment; or (3) cause or contribute to an

exceedance of any applicable water quality standards contained in

a Statewide Water Quality Control Plan or an applicable Regional

Water Board plan. State Order, Section A.2, C.1-2, attached to

the Decl. of Andrew Packard as Ex. A.

 Dischargers of industrial pollutants are required to submit

a Notice of Intent (“NOI”) to the State Board, signifying their

intent to comply with the provisions of the State Order.

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4

Thereafter, the facility operator must develop and implement a

written Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (“SWPPP”) that

identifies both on-site sources of pollutants and best management

practices (“BMPs”) designed to prevent or reduce discharge of

those pollutants into storm water.

Implemented BMPs must meet the standards of Best Available

Technology Economically Achievable (“BAT”) for toxic pollutants

and Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology (“BCT) for

conventional pollutants like total suspended solids. State

Order, Section B.3. Where BMPs outlined within a facility’s

SWPPP are inadequate in eliminating pollutant discharge, the

facility must revise and update the SWPPP with further efforts to

improve the quality of its discharge.

A discharging facility must also, in addition to formulating

an adequate SWPPP, perform water monitoring and submit periodic

reports concerning the results of its monitoring efforts.

Numeric limitations on pollutant discharges are required for

industrial facilities with specified Standard Industrial Codes

(“SICs”). If a facility is not designated by its SIC (as set

forth in 40 C.F.R. Subchapter N) as being subject to such numeric

limitations, the facility must still meet EPA benchmark values,

which are defined as follows:

The “benchmarks are the pollutant concentrations above which

EPA determined represents a level of concern. The level of

concern is a concentration at which a storm water discharge

could potentially impair, or contribute to impairing, water

quality or affect human health from ingestion of water or

fish. The benchmarks are also viewed by EPA as a level,

that if below, a facility represents little potential for

water quality concern. As such , the benchmarks also

provide an appropriate level to determine whether a

facility’s storm water pollution prevention measures are

successfully implemented. 

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The benchmark concentrations are not effluent limitations

and should not be interpreted or adopted as such. These

values are merely levels which EPA has used to determine if

a storm water discharge from any given facility merits

further monitoring to insure that the facility has been

successful in implementing a storm water pollution

prevention plan. As such these levels represent a target

concentration for a facility to achieve through

implementation of pollution prevention measures at the

facility.

See Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 189, Friday, September 29,

1995 (emphasis added).

The California Toxics Rule (“CTR”), established effective

May 18, 2000, sets forth water quality standards applicable to

toxic pollutants such as lead, cadmium, copper and zinc in storm

water discharges within the State of California. The CTR

imposes numeric pollutant limitations generally more stringent

than the EPA benchmarks for protected waterways in California,

and required that such limitations be satisfied even for

facilities whose SICs would not otherwise subject them to such

limitations. For purposes of this case, the CTR specifically

applies to the Mokelumne River.

The Clean Water Act is a strict liability statute. To

establish a violation, a plaintiff need only prove that the terms

and conditions of a defendant’s NPDES permit (or, in California,

the provisions of the State Order) were breached. See 33 U.S.C. 

§§ 1311(a), 1342(k); see also Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. City

and County of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1392 (D. Ha. 1993)

(“courts throughout the county have held that NPDES compliance is

a matter of strict liability and a defendant’s intent and good

faith are irrelevant”).

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A citizens suit like the instant lawsuit may be filed

“against any... person who is alleged to be in violation of... an

effluent standard of limitation under this chapter. 33 U.S.C. §

1365(a)(1). The term “effluent standard of limitation under this

chapter” is broadly defined to include “unlawful” discharges of

pollutants (33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1) and 1311 (a)), as well as 

violations of any “permit or any condition thereof” (33 U.S.C. §

1365(f)(6). 

The CWA provides that dischargers found to be in violation

of their permits/orders may be ordered to pay civil penalties of

up to $27,500 per day for each violation. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d)

(as amended by 40 C.F.R. § 19.1 - 19.4 (Dec. 31, 1996), 1365(a);

State Order, Section C.15.a.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Defendant AG Industrial Manufacturing, Inc. (hereinafter

“AIM”) is an industrial manufacturing facility engaged in the

fabrication of agriculture machinery, especially equipment used

in harvesting wine grapes. The business, which employs

approximately 40 people, has been located at 110 South Beckman

Rd. in Lodi, California, since its inception in 1980. Defendant

Claude E. Brown is President of AIM, and has served in that

capacity since the company was formed. Currently, AIM has a net

worth of approximately $907,000.

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AIM disputes this, indicating that it recently has 1

installed domed structures over fabrication areas, which are no

longer exposed to the weather.

Although this Court initially granted summary judgment in 2

favor of AIM on grounds that this notice was jurisdictionally

deficient, the Ninth Circuit disagreed and remanded the matter

for further consideration on the merits of the claims presented. 

Consequently, this Memorandum will not address issues pertaining

to the sufficiency of WaterKeepers’ June 28, 2000 notice.

7

Plaintiff WaterKeepers Northern California (hereinafter

“WaterKeepers”) is a non-profit corporation dedicated to the

preservation and protection of the San Francisco Bay and the

Delta estuary. WaterKeepers alleges its investigation of the AIM

premises, which began on or about August 8, 1999, revealed

fabrication activities generating industrial pollutants that

occurred outside in uncovered areas exposed to rainfall.1

WaterKeepers further contends that AIM’s facility contains

rusting equipment and parts also exposed to the weather, and

points to the presence of oily stains, waste materials and

debris. Because of exposure to storm water flows and lack of

essential structural controls like grading, berming and roofing,

WaterKeepers further alleges that both storm water flows and wash

water from clean-up activities contain industrial contaminants.

On June 28, 2000, Waterkeepers sent a letter to AIM putting

them on notice of these alleged shortcomings, and charging AIM

with violations of the Clean Water Act, as well as violations of

the various California regulations designed to implement the

provisions of the CWA, including the State Order. Despite 2

WaterKeepers claim that “extensive investigation” preceded this

notice, no testing of dust or storm water discharge was

undertaken beforehand. 

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In fact, the only investigation that took place consisted of

photographs taken by a WaterKeepers member, Plaintiff Bill

Jennings, on August 8, 1999 along with a short subsequent visit

by Jennings and an environmental engineer, Steven Bond. That

visit was so abbreviated that Mr. Bond did not even get out of

the car.

AIM’s two shareholders, Mr. Brown and Plant Manager Paul

Burkner, allege they were unaware of the CWA or its potential

applicability to the AIM facility until receiving WaterKeepers’

June 28, 2000 letter. Because AIM’s SIC numbers are 3500 and

3523, its facility is not subject to regulation under 40 C.F.R.

Subchapter N and, as enumerated above, AIM is consequently not

bound to specific effluent limitations on that basis, although

with the advent of the CTR in May of 2000 it was subject to

effluent limitation as to certain pollutants, including zinc,

lead, copper, aluminum and lead.

While Claude Brown remained unsure as to whether the CWA in

fact applied to their facility, he discovered that other

businesses in the Lodi area that received similar notices from

WaterKeepers and had retained a licensed engineer, Dan Barber, to

assist them with compliance efforts. Brown ultimately retained

Mr. Barber.

With Dan Barber’s assistance, AIM submitted a NOI to signify

its intent to comply with the State’s Order on July 7, 2000, less

than two weeks after receiving notification from WaterKeepers

that it was operating without the necessary NOI. 

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WaterKeepers has alleged that these violations were present 3

at the time of the filing of the complaint. Although AIM argues

that it had corrected any violations prior to that time, and

contends that this actions is therefore barred under Gwaltney of

(continued...)

9

AIM thereafter proceeded with development of an SWPPP, which was

adopted on July 21, 2000 and included BMPs intended to mitigate

any pollutant discharge from its facility. By October 4, 2000,

less than two months later, AIM installed a containment and

partial storm water treatment system consisting of berms and an

oil/water separator drain at a total expense of over $32,0000. 

AIM also initiated a sweeping program to collect dust and

particulate matter generated as a result of its industrial

activities.

Despite these efforts, and AIM’s expenditure of over $32,000

in consulting fees to Dan Barber in addition to the cost of the

BMPs outlined above, WaterKeepers initiated the present lawsuit

against AIM on September 12, 2000, even though WaterKeepers had

received AIM’s SWPPP beforehand and had not put AIM on notice as

to any perceived shortcomings of that SWPPP. WaterKeepers’

complaint contains five causes of action. AIM is alleged 1) to

have wrongfully discharged pollutants without an NPDES Permit in

violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); 2) to have discharged

contaminated storm water in violation of the State’s Order,

pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1342; 3) to have discharged

non-storm water in violation of the Order and 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311

and 1342; 4) to have failed to develop and implement an adequate

SWPPP as required by the Order; and 5) to have failed to develop

an Adequate Monitoring and Reporting Program.3

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(...continued) 3

Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49

(1987), in fact Gwaltney requires only an allegation of ongoing

noncompliance at the time a complaint is filed. Id. at 64. 

WaterKeepers has made such allegations here, as recognized by the

Ninth Circuit’s previous assessment of this case in 

WaterKeepers Northern California v. AG Industrial Mfg. Inc., 375

F.3d 913 (9 Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit recognized that th

WaterKeepers’ complaint clearly alleges continuing and recurring

violations of the CWA. Id. at 921, n. 7. This means that AIM

cannot rely, for example, on allegations that there was no

rainfall between the time the CTR was implemented on May 18,

2000, and the time the instant complaint was filed on September

12, 2000, to allege that no violation of the CTR, and, in turn,

the CWA, occurred. WaterKeepers’ allegations that the CWA was

being violated at the time it filed this complaint are sufficient

for jurisdictional purposes, and as discussed below, the merits

of WaterKeepers’ claim in this case in fact hinges on the results

of later testing.

10

Although AIM is not subject to specific effluent limitations

as a non-Subchapter N discharger, WaterKeepers nonetheless points

to Special Conditions C(1) and C(2) of the Order, which precludes

any pollutant discharge which causes, or threatens to cause,

impairment of beneficial uses of an affected waterway. Because

that portion of the Mokelumne River passing through Lodi has been

classified by the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control

Board (“CVRWQCB”) as a protected waterway due to zinc and copper

impairment, WaterKeepers claims that AIM is subject to those

conditions. WaterKeepers allege that AIM has consequently

violated the Order’s provisions ever since the October 1, 1992

deadline it established for developing and implementing an

adequate SWPPP.

WaterKeepers further alleges that because the California

Toxics Rule became effective as to the pertinent portion of the

Mokelumne River as Of May 18, 2000, that Rule created further,

and more restrictive, limitations on AIM after that time.

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The parties have consecutively numbered the various 4

undisputed facts alleged in this matter. Subsequent references

to those facts will be denominated as “Fact”, followed by

citation to the Fact number in question.

11

While it is undisputed that AIM submitted an SWPPP prior to

commencement of this complaint, WaterKeepers alleges that the 

provisions of that SWPPP are inadequate. While it appears

undisputed that the oil/water separator was successful in

removing total organic compounds (“TOCs”) and total suspended

solids (“TSSs”) from AIM’s storm water discharges (see Statement

of Undisputed Fact No. 222), and while it was those oil and 4

grease related pollutants that figured prominently in

WaterKeepers’ initial criticism of AIM’s facility maintenance and

operation, WaterKeepers’ primary thrust at this point revolves

around the alleged presence of dissolved metals in AIM’s storm

water runoff following implementation of its SWPPP.

According to WaterKeepers, neither the separator nor the

berming addresses the presence of those metals. It is undisputed

that testing performed in conjunction with AIM’s SWPPP continues

to reveal the presence of lead, zinc, copper, iron and aluminum

well in excess of both EPA Benchmark levels and the standards set

forth in the CTR. (Fact No. 107). WaterKeepers contends that

this testing shows conclusively that AIM has not implemented

proper BMPs, and is consequently liable under the CWA. AIM

counters by arguing that it did not initially address the

presence of many of those metals, and in particular lead, zinc,

and copper, because it does not use those materials in its

manufacturing processes.

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During the course of the May 16, 2005 oral argument in this 5

matter, however, counsel for AIM did admit that AIM uses a

“modest” amount of copper in its manufacturing operations.

12

AIM alleges that, in attempting to discover the source of

these elevated metal levels, it has performed testing on both

corrugated metal roofing and a galvanized chain link fence that

encircles its premises. AIM argues that its analysis in that

regard reveals that both the fence and roof are leaching metals

into the storm runoff, especially zinc, and to a lesser extent,

lead and copper. It has coated both the roof and portions of the

fence in question in order to minimize any further metals runoff. 

(Fact No. 116; Brown Decl., ¶ 37).

While WaterKeepers denies that only the fence and/or roof is

responsible for the presence of such metals in AIM’s storm water,

it has failed to come forward with evidence showing that either

lead, zinc or copper are in fact otherwise in use at the 5

facility. With respect to zinc, for example, while WaterKeepers

attempts to argue that AIM’s product list shows it uses a certain

kind of solder containing zinc, AIM counters by pointing out that

the particular solder in question is only used for repairs offsite. No evidence is presented to show that zinc is used in

manufacturing operations and consequently comes from anywhere

other than the fence and/or roof. AIM points to the Order’s

provisions which only require testing of pollutants “that are

likely to be present... in significant quantities.” State Order,

Section B, ¶ 5.c.ii. Because the metals at issue were not used

in its manufacturing operations, AIM consequently maintains that

no testing was indicated.

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It is undisputed that the type of facility operated by AIM 6

is identified in Category 10 of Attachment 1 of the State Order,

and that consequently AIM is a Category 10 discharger. Fact No.

223.

The State Order, at Attachment 4, ¶ 9, specifically defines 7

“Storm Water Associated with Industrial Activity” for a Category

10 discharger as “...storm water discharges... where material

handling equipment or activities, raw materials, intermediate

products, final products, waste materials, by-products, or

industrial machinery are exposed to storm water.” The Order goes

on to exclude for Category 10 discharges “areas located on plant

lands separate from the plants’s industrial activities... as

long as the drainage from the excluded areas is not mixed with

storm water drained from the above described areas....” Id.

13

While AIM, as a Category 10 discharger under the terms of 6

the State Order, is subject to an exemption from compliance for

pollutants not generated from industrial processes themselves,

and although AIM claims it falls within that exemption because

both the fence and roof are “separate from the plant’s industrial

activities”, WaterKeepers alleges that because any water coming

into contact with the fence/roof is mixed with storm water

directly coming into contact with industrial components, and that

therefore all the runoff by definition must comply with CTR

standards.7

In addition to arguing that AIM’s SWPPP is per se inadequate

because of the continuing presence of metals even after

implementation of BMPs, WaterKeepers also points to certain

inadequacies in the SWPPP itself, including most notably the

contention that the site map contained within the SWPPP does not

meet applicable guidelines. WaterKeepers goes on to contend that

AIM has also failed to adequately monitor its emissions as

required by the terms of the State Order. 

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Finally, WaterKeepers also advances the argument that in addition

to generating non-compliant storm water, AIM also is liable for

the emission of polluted non-storm water discharge generated, for

example, by truck and equipment washing at its facility.

Although it is undisputed that absolutely no contaminant

testing was done prior to issuance of the June 2000 Notice to

AIM, WaterKeepers nonetheless takes the position in this lawsuit

that AIM should be assessed with civil penalties for all past

violations of the State Order within the applicable statute of

limitations period, or since 1995. Using that time period and

after referring to precipitation tables showing all significant

rainfall events in the Lodi area, WaterKeepers contends in its

motion that AIM has violated the CWA on at least 237 separate

occasions since September 12, 1995. Citing Section 309(d) of the

CWA, which calls for a maximum civil penalty of $27,500 for each

violation (see 3 U.S.C. § 1319(d) and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)),

WaterKeepers alleges that total fines of between $87,375,000 and

$96,112,500 are indicated. Although WaterKeepers goes on to

suggest that a more reasonable fine in this instance would be

$5,000,000, that figure is still well in excess of AIM’s net

worth in the amount of $907,000.

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STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962). 

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Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56 by

showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting the

motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Genuine factual issues must exist that

“can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-631 (9 Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. th

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

ANALYSIS

A. Discharge of Pollutants without a Permit.

In its First Cause of Action, WaterKeepers alleges that

Plaintiffs are discharging pollutants without a valid Notice of

Intent (“NOI”) in place as required by Section 301(a) of the CWA,

33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1342(p)(2)(B). As indicated above,

while the CWA requires individual polluters to obtain an NPDES

permit for any industrial discharge, the EPA has delegated to the

states, and in this case California, the authority to administer

CWA compliance through a statewide general permit (the “State

Order”), for which dischargers must submit a NOI. 

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Although the language of the First Cause of Action also refers to

the discharge, by AIM, of pollutants in violation of the State

Order, that claim relates to the Second Cause of Action (alleging

discharge of contaminated storm water in violation of the State

Order’s conditions), and the First Cause of Action itself is

denominated specifically as targeting only AIM’s alleged

discharge without the necessary permit (here a NOI and ensuing

SWPPP).

Although WaterKeepers alleges that AIM has impermissibly

failed to takes steps to subject itself to the CWA ever since it

was required to do so on March 30, 1992, the fact remains that

AIM filed a NOI to comply with the provisions of the Order on

July 7, 2000, and proceeded to submit a SWPPP on July 21, 2000. 

Both these dates are well before the instant complaint was filed

on September 12, 2000. 

While WaterKeepers’ complaint appears to seek redress for

AIM’s failure to submit a NOI earlier, it is undisputed that

WaterKeepers performed no testing on any discharge from the AIM

facility prior to commencement of this action. Beyond mere

conjecture, WaterKeepers has no proof that AIM was discharging

pollutants in excess of maximum levels until after this action

was filed, and AIM began testing its storm water discharges

pursuant to its SWPPP. Consequently WaterKeepers has no proof

that AIM was required to submit to the Order sooner than it did,

and because AIM did file a NOI prior to the filing of this

lawsuit there can be no violation for failure to obtain a permit

as envisioned by the First Cause of Action. Hence summary

adjudication as to that claim in favor of AIM should be granted.

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B. Discharge of Contaminated Storm Water.

Through its Second Cause of Action, WaterKeepers asserts

that AIM is liable under the CWA, as implemented by the State

Order, for discharge of polluted storm water from its facility

into storm drains ultimately flowing into the Mokelumne River.

In opposing WaterKeepers’ motion and through its own cross

motion for summary judgment, AIM spends substantial time in

arguing that WaterKeepers has not established that its storm

water flows either generally into a “navigable water” of the

United States (so as to be subject to the provisions of the CWA),

or specifically into the Mokelumne River in this instance. That

argument can be summarily dispatched, however, inasmuch as the

term “navigable water” broadly encompasses any manmade canal of

storm sewer system that may ultimately flow into a waterway of

the United States at some juncture. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent,

243 F.3d at 534. Given that interpretation, the fact that AIM’s

storm water flows into the City of Lodi’s storm drain system is

enough to trigger CWA protection since it is undisputed that

under some circumstances, and at certain times, that system

ultimately flows into the Mokelumne.

AIM’s argument that its water quality must be measured at

the time storm water actually flows into a navigable water (as

opposed to the time it exits the AIM facility) is equally

misplaced. As WaterKeepers points out, accepting AIM’s argument

in this regard would essentially make it impossible to determine

just what pollutants were discharged from the AIM facility.

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Moreover, AIM’s argument amounts to a contention that it is

entitled to a dilution credit for other storm water discharge. A

dilution credit is a limited regulatory exception that must be

preceded by a site specific mixing zone study. See Lazerow

Decl., Ex. F, Implementation Plan, §§ 1.4.1, 1.4.2.2, pp. 13-15,

and Appendix 5. It is undisputed that AIM’s current permit does

not provide for a mixing zone, and it is further uncontroverted

that AIM has never applied for any dilution credit. Fact Nos.

249, 250. Hence the concept of a dilution credit/mixing zone is

inapplicable to this case.

We must next address the merits of WaterKeepers’ claim that

AIM is violating the CWA through its storm water discharge. 

Analyzing that question necessarily entails an assessment of the

various types of pollutants allegedly discharged by AIM. In

order to rule in favor of either party as a matter of law, the

Court must decide whether WaterKeepers has conclusively

established that certain pollutants are being discharged, or

alternatively whether AIM can establish that WaterKeepers has

come forward with no evidence to show that any violation

occurred, hence militating in favor of summary judgment on AIM’s

behalf. 

As indicated above, it appears to be undisputed that the

oil-water separator installed by AIM as a BMP has eliminated

petrochemical residues like TOCs and TSSs as polluting factors in

AIM’s stormwater discharge. See WaterKeepers’ response to Fact

No. 222 (“WaterKeepers are not alleging that Defendants have

failed to achieve BCT for TOC and TSS”). 

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While the State Order also mandates that storm water 8

discharge be analyzed for pH and specific conductance,

WaterKeepers has presented no evidence suggesting violations in

those areas.

20

The remaining substances at issue are various dissolved metals.8

It is uncontroverted that storm water discharged from the AIM

facility on December 14, 2000 and March 2, 2001 exceeded the CTR

criteria for both zinc and copper. (Fact Nos. 101, 103). It is

further undisputed that on November 12, 2001, discharge of not

only copper and zinc, but also aluminum, iron and lead, exceeded

the CTR. (Fact No. 105). 

AIM argues that it does not use either zinc or lead in its

manufacturing processes. It asserts that testing done on a

corrugated metal roof, as well as the chain link fence

surrounding the AIM facility, suggests that those structural

components, as opposed to anything associated with industrial

processes that are subject to CWA provisions, are responsible for

testing detection of those metals. As indicated above, a

Category 10 discharger like AIM is not required under the terms

of the State Order to monitor storm water discharge coming from

plant areas not directly associated with industrial activity

unless discharge from those areas is mixed with industrial

runoff. In addition, to the extent that dissolved metals are not

likely to be present in “significant quantities”, AIM is not

required to monitor the presence of such substances in any event. 

State Order, Section B, ¶ 5.c.ii.

Given these criteria, and in light of evidence submitted by

AIM, summary adjudication as to dissolved metals in AIM’s storm

water discharge cannot be had. 

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First, there are triable issues with respect to whether AIM uses

certain of the metals in its industrial processes at all, let

alone whether they are used in significant enough quantities to

require monitoring. While WaterKeepers initially argued, for

instance, that one type of solder used by AIM contained zinc, AIM

has refuted that argument through evidence that that particular

kind of solder was used only for off-site work. In addition,

although WaterKeepers has pointed out that collected particulate

matter (sweepings) taken from the AIM facility show elevated lead

concentrations, AIM still claims that it uses no lead in its

manufacturing operations, and claims that such sweepings may

relate to a prior industrial tenant at its plant site. At a

minimum, this creates a triable issue of fact. Moreover, aside

from the admission, by counsel for AIM at oral argument on this

motion, that AIM uses a “modest” amount of copper in its

operations, there is otherwise no discussion of that issue in the

papers and the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that

copper was used in a significant enough way to require AIM’s

testing for that metal. Finally, although testing has revealed

levels of aluminum and iron that exceed (in some instances only

slightly) CTR criteria, the papers do not illuminate whether

those substances are used in AIM’s industrial activities in a

significant enough quantity to have warranted monitoring.

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See State Order, at Attachment 4, ¶ 9, as discussed in n. 9

7, supra.

22

Although WaterKeepers correctly points out that the State

Order makes AIM (as a Category 10 discharger under the terms of

said Order) liable for pollutant exceedances if storm water

polluted as a result of contact with AIM’s industrial processes

is “mixed” with pollutants emanating from other, non-industrial

portions of the company’s physical plant like the corrugated

metal roof or chain link fence. In that instance, under the 9

terms of the State Order, AIM would be liable for elevated

pollutant levels in their entirety even though some of the

pollutants would have been exempt under the terms of the Order

had they not been combined with strictly industrial run-off.

Whether or not storm water coming into contact with

industrial areas of the AIM facility was “mixed” with areas that

would not be subject to the purview of the State Order, like the

roof or fence, necessarily entails factual assessment not

amenable to determination on summary judgment. AIM has presented

evidence, for example, to show that the fence and/or roof leach

both zinc and copper into storm water. Whether contaminated

runoff from those areas is mixed with water coming into contact

with other areas of the AIM plant that are subject to the State

Order is also a question of fact.

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The only other activity cited by WaterKeepers appears to 10

involve air conditioning condensate which, prior to installation

of the oil/water separator drain, flowed through an outfill pipe

at the east side of South Beckman Road. That pipe was eliminated

though construction of the separator drain, and in any event air

conditioning condensate is exempt from monitoring under the State

Order. State Order, D.1a at p. 5.

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C. Discharge of Contaminated Non-Storm Water.

In its Third Cause of Action, WaterKeepers argues that AIM

is also liable for discharging pollutants through its dispersal

of non-storm water. It appears to base that contention solely on

an allegation that hosing and washing have been observed at the

facility, as well as on the fact that AIM’s July 21, 2000 SWPPP

lists certain BMPs to be followed with respect to truck and

equipment washing. The Declaration of Claude Brown, however,

states that water is not used to clean equipment or parts, and

explains that the little water that is used in AIM’s

manufacturing operations is not discharged into the storm water

system. Brown Decl., ¶ 20.

WaterKeepers’ claim that hosing and washing have been

observed appears to relate only to one instance where an employee

was observed using a hose. No evidence was presented that 10

water from this hose was exiting the AIM facility through the

storm water drain. In addition, while WaterKeepers points to two

photographs of what appears to be a man pushing water located in

the gutter adjacent to the AIM facility, those photographs do not

indicate just what the man is doing, or whether the puddle at

issue represents non-storm water or the remaining vestiges of a

precipitation event. 

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The mere fact that AIM’s initial SWPPP contains a section 11

pertaining to BMPs for non-storm water discharges dos not itself

create a triable issue of fact given AIM’s claim that it

currently emits no such discharge, and WaterKeepers’ failure to

present any competent evidence to the contrary. AIM claims that

its SWPPP contained a section on non-storm water discharges

solely as a precautionary measure.

24

They are not in themselves sufficient to create a triable issue

of fact. AIM is entitled to summary adjudication as to the Third

Cause of Action.11

D. Failure to Develop and Implement an Adequate SWPPP.

In attacking the adequacy of AIM’s SWPPP in its Fourth Cause

of Action, WaterKeepers takes issue with multiple components of

both the initial SWPPP, and the SWPPP as amended by AIM in June

of 2001. WaterKeepers alleges that AIM has not identified all

“significant materials” and potential pollution sources as it is

required to do under the terms of the State Order. See State

Order, Sections A.2, A.6, A.7. Pointing to the elevated levels

of dissolved metals detected after implementation of the SWPPP,

WaterKeepers argues that the presence of those metals in AIM’s

industrial activities has not been properly disclosed. It

asserts that no reference is made to raw materials or to

intermediate, final or finished products handled and stored on

site. Fact No. 87. WaterKeepers also claims that activities

generating particulate dust (in which lead was detected) have not

been detailed.

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With respect to BMPs designed to reduce or prevent

pollutants in storm water, WaterKeepers goes on to assert that

AIM’s SWPPP contains no discussion whatsoever of the

effectiveness of each BMP in alleviating pollutant discharge, and

does not identify BMPs for certain types of pollutants like

contaminated materials tracked from certain areas of the facility

to other areas that are exposed to storm water flows. In related

fashion, WaterKeepers further asserts that the site map required

by AIM’s SWPPP fails, even after its amendment, to adequately

drainage areas within its facility boundaries, to identify storm

water discharge and sampling points, and to identify areas of

soil erosion, particularly with respect to the employee parking

lot. 

AIM takes issue with these assertions, claiming that is

required to sample only for mineral elements likely to be present

in a significant amount. State Order, Section B, ¶ 5.c.ii at p.

27. As already discussed above, it claims that because it does

not use certain of the dissolved metals in its manufacturing

operations, it was not required to disclose those metals in its

SWPPP. While that may be true for certain of the metals at issue

like zinc and copper, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of

law that the same conclusion is warranted for lead given the

detection of metal shavings at the facility containing

substantial lead. That creates, at minimum, a triable issue of

fact.

WaterKeepers’ other criticisms of AIM’s SWPPP also raise

numerous factual issues not amenable to determination through

summary judgment. 

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WaterKeepers further alleges that the site map is 12

inadequate in not identifying where significant spills or leaks

have occurred, as required by Section A.4.d of the State Order. 

AIM counters by arguing that the area of oil staining identified

by WaterKeepers in that regard was caused by prior occupants of

the site, and that consequently AIM was not required to disclose

the existence of that area on its site map. This also creates a

triable issue of fact with respect to the cause and origin of the

stains, and any resulting obligation on the part of AIM. See

Fact Nos. 138, 235, 236.

26

Whether or not AIM’s use of an aggressive sweeping program to

deal with tracking issues, for example, cannot be decided as a

matter of law. Similarly, the technical inadequacies of AIM’s

site map in terms of drainage flow and erosion potential is also

not an appropriate candidate for resolution through summary

judgment, whether in favor of either AIM or WaterKeepers.12

Summary adjudication as to the Fourth Cause of Action is

therefore denied.

E. Failure to Develop an Adequate Monitoring Program.

As part of its monitoring and reporting obligations under

the Order, a permittee like AIM must conduct visual observations

of storm water from one storm event per month during the wet

season, take storm water samples at every discharge location from

at least two storms each year (one of which should be the first

storm of the season), analyze the samples for specific

contaminants and file annual reports with the Regional Board

summarizing the visual observations and results of sample

analyses. State Order, Sections B.3-B.5, B.14. 

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WaterKeepers argues that AIM failed to perform the required

monthly visual inspections, asserting that its claim that no

significant rainfall occurred during certain months is

contradicted by publicly available rain data. WaterKeepers

further claims that AIM failed to sample storm water from the

first storm of the 2000-01 rainy season, as it was required to

do. WaterKeepers also contends that AIM’s first annual report

was submitted a week late.

Resolution of these issues, like the claimed inadequacies of

the SWPPP itself as identified by WaterKeepers, all are

inappropriate on summary judgment. AIM’s contention that it was

not obligated to test water from the first storm of the season on

October 10 and 11, 2000, for example, is premised on an argument

that the interceptor drain was surrounded by crushed rock at that

time that served to absorb the storm water before it could enter

the drain. That raises issues of fact, as does the issue of

whether testing of certain contaminants like lead was performed

with too high a detection limit to pass muster under the

monitoring requirements. Finally, as already indicated above,

there is a factual issue with respect to whether AIM was required

to test for lead in the first place, given its assertion that no

lead was used in its manufacturing process versus WaterKeepers’

argument that shaving samples from the facility disclosed lead in

significant amounts. Summary adjudication as to the Fifth Cause

of Action cannot be granted.

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F. Liability of Claude Brown.

Although it is undisputed that AIM is a corporation (Fact

No. 134), WaterKeepers nonetheless contends that AIM’s President,

Claude Brown, is subject to personal liability under the CWA

pursuant to the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine. It is

undisputed that Mr. Brown runs day to day operations at the AIM

facility, and is responsible for compliance with environmental

laws and regulations, like the CWA. Fact Nos. 12-15).

33 U.S.C. § 1319[c)(6) provides that in addition to the

definition of a “person” subject to enforcement action under the

CWA (§ 1362(5) includes a corporation within that definition),

any responsible corporate officer may also be held liable. In

its motion for summary judgment, AIM argues that Mr. Brown must

be dismissed as a defendant because WaterKeepers has failed to

demonstrate that Mr. Brown knew that AIM was committing any CWA

violations.

In United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9 Cir. 1998), th

the Ninth Circuit considered the application of the responsible

corporate officer doctrine in the context of a CWA case. In that

case, the defendant, who was President of a company which

manufactured chemical products, including acid cleaners and

heavy-duty alkaline compounds, personally ordered the discharge

of wastewater residue already refused by the local sewer

authority. Because the defendant faced criminal charges under

the CWA, the Ninth Circuit considered the scope of the

responsible corporate officer doctrine as it applied to the

defendant.

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Significantly, the Iverson court determined that the

principles of an earlier Supreme Court case, United States v.

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), applied under the CWA. 162

F.3d at 1023. Dotterweich opined that “[t]he offense (there a

violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) is

committed... by all who do have... a responsible share in the

furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.” 

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284.

A later case also cited approvingly by Iverson, United

States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 668 (1978) held that a corporate

president cannot escape liability, teven if he delegated

decision-making control over the activity in question to a

subordinate. Park found that the question for the jury is

whether the corporate officer had “authority with respect to the

conditions that formed the basis of the alleged violations.” Id.

at 674. After considering Park, the Iverson court found that its

refinement of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine

applied under the CWA. Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1024.

AIM correctly points out that Iverson is a criminal case

with facts more egregious than those of the case at bar. 

Nonetheless, the responsible corporate officer doctrine has been

applied to both criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., United

States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557, 561 (6 Cir. 1985). th

This Court cannot say as a matter of law that Claude Brown is not

liable in this matter, and consequently his request for summary

adjudication is denied. 

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F. Motion to Strike Declaration of Daniel K. Barber.

To support both its opposition to WaterKeepers’ Motion for

summary judgment and in support of its own cross-motion in that

regard, AIM has submitted a lengthy, 32 page declaration from

Daniel K. Barber, the environmental engineer it retained to

develop both an adequate SWPPP, and to assist AIM in the

monitoring and testing required by the SWPPP. WaterKeepers has

moved to strike portions of the Barber declaration, primarily on

grounds that portions of that declaration go beyond the scope of

Mr. Barber’s August 15, 2001 expert report. WaterKeepers argues

that is would be prejudiced if Barber is now permitted to offer

opinions outside the parameters of his report, which formed the

basis of WaterKeepers’ October 5, 2001 deposition of Mr. Barber. 

WaterKeepers further argues that certain statements made by

Barber, particularly with respect to information he obtained from

Claude Brown to the effect that no significant petrochemical

spills had occurred at AIM’s facility, and concerning Brown’s

statement to Barber that AIM uses no lead in its manufacturing

processes, should be excluded as inadmissible hearsay.

In opposition, AIM points out that Barber is not only an

expert witness, but also the individual retained by AIM to ensure

its compliance with the provisions of the State Order. As such,

AIM contends that Barber is also a percipient witness as to the

steps he took, after his expert report itself was submitted, in 

furtherance of that objective. According to AIM, it provided

ample notice to WaterKeepers of Mr. Barber’s activities in that

regard. 

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Prior to Mr. Barber’s October 5, 2001 deposition, for example,

counsel for AIM provided WaterKeepers with a draft declaration

that both updated Mr. Barber’s efforts and put WaterKeepers on

notice that additional events to ensure compliance would likely

occur. Moreover, in stipulating to extend discovery from January

18, 2002 to April 18, 2002, counsel for AIM told WaterKeepers

that Mr. Barber was taking additional steps to investigate the

source of ongoing zinc discharge, including the possibility that

the galvanized chain link fence at the AIM facility was

responsible for that discharge. WaterKeepers declined to further

depose Mr. Barber despite the fact that this was specifically

discussed. AIM’s counsel also indicated his willingness to

further extend the discovery cut off date, a suggestion not taken

up by WaterKeepers.

In essence, WaterKeepers position is that Barber was

obligated to prepare a formal supplemental expert report, and

because he did not do so WaterKeepers claims prejudice in not

being able to reexamine Barber on the basis of such a report. 

AIM counters that in fact WaterKeepers was amply apprised of what

was happening as outlined above, and that much of Barber’s

activities were as a percipient witness in any event not subject

to the strictures of expert disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) and 37{c)(1).

Under the circumstances, WaterKeepers’ arguments appear to

parse technicalities too closely. Barber’s ongoing efforts to

achieve CWA compliance on AIM’s behalf are in a percipient

witness capacity, and in any event counsel for AIM appear to have

kept WaterKeepers informed as to just what Barber was doing. 

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Given that fact, WaterKeepers’ efforts to claim prejudice appear

to miss the mark, and Mr. Barber’s failure to provide a

supplemental report will not invalidate the opinions expressed in

the declaration at issue herein.

WaterKeepers’ remaining objections to the Barber declaration

are also overruled. Contrary to WaterKeepers’ assertions to the

contrary, the matters in question are relevant. In addition, 

while the Barber declaration does refer to certain statements

made by Claude Brown as indicated above, those statements are

made in the context of actions taken by Mr. Barber (in preparing

the site map with respect to oily staining at the facility and

with respect to what Mr. Barber did to test for lead) and are

consequently not being offered for the truth of the matter

asserted. Hence they do not constitute inadmissible hearsay

within the context of the Barber declaration. Finally,

WaterKeepers’ assertion that Mr. Barber’s testing with respect to

zinc discharge from galvanized fencing does not run afoul of

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 703 in terms of scientific

methodology.

For these reasons, WaterKeepers’ Motion to Strike is denied,

except with respect to those portions of ¶ 54 of the Barber

Declaration which AIM has agreed to withdraw. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, neither WaterKeepers nor AIM

has established their entitlement to summary judgment as to this

entire action. Consequently both their requests in that regard

are denied. Summary adjudication in favor of AIM, however, is

granted as to the First and Third Causes of Action. Summary

adjudication is otherwise denied. In addition, WaterKeepers’

Motion to Strike the Declaration of Daniel K. Barber is also

denied, except with respect to those portions of ¶ 54 of said

declaration which AIM has agreed to withdraw. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 19, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:00-cv-01967-MCE -PAN Document 170 Filed 08/19/05 Page 33 of 33