Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-18-01463/USCOURTS-ca3-18-01463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 18-1463

_____________

MAUREEN RICCIO,

on behalf of herself and all others

similarly situated,

 Appellant

v.

SENTRY CREDIT, INC.;

JOHN DOES 1-25 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

District Court No. 3-17-cv-01773

District Judge: The Honorable Brian R. Martinotti

Argued February 19, 2020

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, AMBRO, 

CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, 

JR., SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS, 

PORTER, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

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(Filed: March 30, 2020)

Joseph K. Jones [ARGUED]

Benjamin J. Wolf

Jones Wolf & Kapasi

375 Passaic Avenue

Suite 100

Fairfield, NJ 07004

Counsel for Appellant

Jacob C. Cohn [ARGUED]

Gordon Reese Scully Mansukhani

Three Logan Square

1717 Arch Street, Suite 610

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Peter G. Siachos

Gordon Reese Scully Mansukhani

18 Columbia Turnpike

Suite 220

Florham Park, NJ 07932

Counsel for Appellee

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____________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________________

SMITH, Chief Judge.

This case presents a question of statutory 

interpretation: does 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) allow debtors 

to orally dispute a debt’s validity?

It also presents a question of stare decisis: should our 

en banc Court resolve a circuit conflict by overturning a 

three-decades-old panel decision which has been eroded

by intervening Supreme Court authority?

Because we answer both questions affirmatively, we 

will overrule Graziano v. Harrison’s contrary 

interpretation of § 1692g(a)(3) and affirm.

I

A

The statutory interpretation question arises from

language which appears in the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (FDCPA). The 

FDCPA protects against abusive debt collection practices 

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by imposing restrictions and obligations on third-party 

debt collectors. See §§ 1692b–1692j.

This case concerns one of those requirements: that debt 

collectors send debtors a letter notifying them of their right

to dispute the debt. See § 1692g. Section 1692g(a) 

specifies five things the letter, often called a “validation 

notice,” must include:

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt 

is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, 

within thirty days after receipt of the notice, 

disputes the validity of the debt, or any 

portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to 

be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies 

the debt collector in writing within the thirtyday period that the debt, or any portion 

thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will 

obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a 

judgment against the consumer and a copy of 

such verification or judgment will be mailed 

to the consumer by the debt collector; and

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(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s 

written request within the thirty-day period, 

the debt collector will provide the consumer 

with the name and address of the original 

creditor, if different from the current creditor.

The question presented is whether the letter must 

require all disputes to be in writing, or whether 

§ 1692g(a)(3) permits oral disputes.

Before answering that question, it is instructive to 

examine other protections the FDCPA provides when

debts are disputed. For instance, § 1692g(b) demands that:

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in 

writing within the thirty-day period described 

in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion 

thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer 

requests the name and address of the original 

creditor, the debt collector shall cease 

collection of the debt, or any disputed portion 

thereof, until the debt collector obtains 

verification of the debt or a copy of a 

judgment, or the name and address of the 

original creditor, and a copy of such 

verification or judgment, or name and 

address of the original creditor, is mailed to 

the consumer by the debt collector.

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In addition, debt collectors are prohibited from reporting

disputed debts to credit agencies without noting the fact of 

a dispute. See § 1692e(8) (prohibiting collectors from 

“[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any 

person credit information which is known or which should 

be known to be false, including the failure to communicate 

that a disputed debt is disputed”). Finally, collectors 

seeking payments on multiple debts owed by the same 

debtor cannot apply a payment to any disputed debts. See

§ 1692h (“If any consumer owes multiple debts and makes 

any single payment to any debt collector with respect to 

such debts, such debt collector may not apply such 

payment to any debt which is disputed by the consumer 

and, where applicable, shall apply such payment in 

accordance with the consumer’s directions.”).

B

We first considered the import of § 1692g(a)(3) in 

Graziano. See 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991). There, a threejudge panel expressed “the view that, given the entire 

structure of section 1692g, subsection (a)(3) must be read 

to require that a dispute, to be effective, must be in 

writing”:

Adopting [a contrary] reading of the statute 

would thus create a situation in which, upon 

the debtor’s non-written dispute, the debt 

collector would be without any statutory 

ground for assuming that the debt was valid, 

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but nevertheless would not be required to 

verify the debt or to advise the debtor of the 

identity of the original creditor and would be 

permitted to continue debt collection efforts. 

We see no reason to attribute to Congress an 

intent to create so incoherent a system. We 

also note that there are strong reasons to 

prefer that a dispute of a debt collection be in 

writing: a writing creates a lasting record of 

the fact that the debt has been disputed, and 

thus avoids a source of potential conflicts.

Id. at 112; accord Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery 

Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (“In 

Graziano v. Harrison, we specifically concluded that 

‘subsection (a)(3), like subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5), 

contemplates that any dispute, to be effective, must be in 

writing.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Graziano, 950 F.3d 

at 112)).

C

In the matter now before us, Maureen Riccio fell 

behind on payments to M-Shell Consumer Oils. Sentry 

Credit bought the debt and sought to collect on it. So it 

sent Riccio a letter containing the following notification:

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Compl. Ex. A.

Riccio sued,1 alleging the letter violated § 1692g(a)(3) 

by providing a debtor with multiple options for contacting 

Sentry Credit rather than explicitly requiring any dispute 

be in writing. App. 53-54. Sentry Credit agreed that it had 

to require Riccio to dispute the debt in writing under 

1 The FDCPA authorizes private actions and imposes strict 

liability for violations, with statutory damages up to $1000 

and potential fee-shifting. See § 1692k.

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Graziano, but the company viewed its letter as complying

with that requirement. It therefore moved for judgment on 

the pleadings, and the District Court granted the motion.

See 2018 WL 638748, at *4-6 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2018).

Riccio timely appealed. The District Court exercised 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review statutory interpretation 

questions de novo. See United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 

160, 162 (3d Cir. 2020).

II

As noted, a panel of this Court previously concluded

§ 1692g(a)(3) requires that “any dispute, to be effective, 

must be in writing.” Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112. Yet reading 

the statutory text with fresh eyes—and more importantly, 

with the past three decades of Supreme Court statutoryinterpretation caselaw—we think § 1692g(a)(3) permits 

oral disputes. 

A

We begin by looking at § 1692g(a)(3) itself. That

provision refers only to “disputes,” without specifying oral 

or written. Used generally, the word fairly encompasses 

both forms of communication. See, e.g., Dispute, Oxford 

English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“To discuss, debate, or 

argue (a question); . . . To argue against, contest, 

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controvert; To call in question or contest the validity or 

accuracy of a statement, etc., or the existence of a thing.”).

We must read § 1692g as a whole. Subsection (a)(3) 

merely calls for “the consumer” to “dispute[] the validity 

of the debt” in order to rebut the statutory presumption of 

validity. But (a)(4) requires “the consumer [to] notif[y] the 

debt collector in writing” before forcing the collector to 

mail documentation verifying the debt. (emphasis added). 

And (a)(5) similarly demands that the consumer make a 

“written request within the thirty-day period” to compel 

the collector to “provide the consumer with the name and 

address of the original creditor, if different from the 

current creditor.” (emphasis added). Subsection (b) then 

echoes (a)(4) and (5), obliging collectors to “cease 

collection . . . until . . . obtain[ing] verification” if the 

debtor “notifie[d] the debt collector” of a dispute or 

requested the creditor’s identity “in writing.” (emphasis 

added). That intra-section variation strongly signals that 

§ 1692g permits oral disputes. “We refrain from 

concluding here that the differing language in the [various] 

subsections has the same meaning in each.” Russello v. 

United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).

We must also consider the entirety of the FDCPA. Like 

§ 1692g(a)(3)—but unlike (a)(4), (a)(5), and (b)—

§§ 1692e(8) and 1692h also discuss “dispute[s]” without 

specifying a method of communication. That inter-section 

variation amplifies the variation within § 1692g and, in 

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our view, refutes Riccio’s suggestion that Congress 

inadvertently omitted a writing requirement from 

§ 1692g(a)(3). “[W]here Congress includes particular 

language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 

section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 

inclusion or exclusion.” Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim 

Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).

Finally, we consider one of the most venerable of our 

interpretive canons: the rule against surplusage. See

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he 

Court will avoid a reading which renders some words 

altogether redundant.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 

U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (using this canon to 

interpret U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2). Collectively, the 

text of § 1692g(a)(3), (a)(4), and (b) signifies that if a 

debtor makes the effort to dispute the debt in writing, the 

collector must immediately stop collecting, verify the 

debt, and respond. Yet if the debtor merely disputes the 

debt orally, the collector can continue attempts to collect 

the debt. It will, though, eventually have to prove the 

debt’s validity.

Injecting a writing requirement into (a)(3) effectively 

strikes that provision from the statute. It is a truism that if 

a debt isn’t presumed valid, the debt collector must 

eventually verify it. Subsection (a)(3) merely restates that 

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point: if the debtor disputes the debt, the collector must 

verify it at some point down the road. But (a)(4) and (b) 

demand that if the debtor disputes the debt in writing, the 

collector must prove its validity immediately. So if every 

dispute must be conveyed in writing, collectors must prove 

every debt immediately—no collector can ever count on 

its future ability to prove a debt. Put differently, inserting 

a writing requirement into (a)(3) means that every dispute 

triggers (a)(4) and (b). That simply can’t be right. If every 

dispute triggers (a)(4) and (b), then (a)(3) has no 

independent effect.

* * *

The upshot: § 1692g(a)(3)’s plain meaning permits a 

debtor to dispute a debt orally. And when a “‘statute’s 

language is plain, the sole function of the courts’—at least 

where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—

‘is to enforce it according to its terms.’” Hartford 

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 

U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair 

Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).

Riccio tries using this absurd-result exception to 

shoehorn a writing requirement into § 1692g(a)(3).2 But 

2 Riccio also uses United States v. American Trucking 

Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940), to argue she need 

not show that permitting oral disputes would be absurd, 

just that it would be unreasonable. Simply put, that 

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that dog won’t hunt. “An absurd interpretation is one that 

‘defies rationality or renders the statute nonsensical and 

superfluous.’” Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. 

Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United 

States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013)). As 

long as Congress could have any conceivable justification 

for a result—even if the result carries negative 

consequences—that result cannot be absurd. See United 

States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012) 

(“[S]tandard interpretive doctrine . . . defines an ‘absurd 

result’ as an outcome so contrary to perceived social 

values that Congress could not have ‘intended’ it.” 

(quoting John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 

Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2390 (2003))); Hanif v. Attorney Gen., 

694 F.3d 479, 487 (3d Cir. 2012); see also In re Visteon 

Corp., 612 F.3d 210, 234 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Virtually all 

laws would be absurd if judged by whether they 

accomplish a perfect solution to an underlying legislative 

concern.”).

misrepresents the current state of the law. To depart from 

a statute’s plain meaning today, the text must dictate a 

result so unreasonable that it amounts to an absurdity. See

Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978); 

see also MORI Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 

503, 537-39 (2011) (detailing American Trucking 

Associations’s practical abrogation).

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Reading § 1692g(a)(3) to permit oral disputes falls far

short of the high bar this Court has set. In fact, allowing 

oral disputes makes sense: it provides debtors multiple 

methods to dispute debts while assigning various rights 

depending on the method.3 An oral dispute can still defeat 

the presumption of validity, still prevent collectors from 

reporting the debt without noting the dispute, and still 

preclude debt collectors holding multiple debts of the 

same debtor from applying a payment to the disputed debt. 

It just doesn’t force the debt collector to immediately stop, 

verify, and respond in the way the FDCPA requires if a 

dispute is in writing. That’s hardly absurd. If nothing else, 

it is easier to prove written disputes and therefore easier to 

enforce the additional protections that attach.4

3 On this point, it bears noting that purposively reading the 

FDCPA underscores our textual conclusion. At bottom, 

expanding the ways a debtor can dispute a debt’s validity 

makes it easier for debtors to invoke its protections. So 

demanding written disputes not only flouts the FDCPA’s

text—it also hoodwinks the Act’s purpose.

4 Relatedly, at oral argument, Riccio’s counsel argued that 

permitting oral disputes would spawn conundrums over 

the “magic words” that distinguish a formal dispute from 

informal grumbling. Oral Argument at 3:16, 4:57 (Feb. 19, 

2020), https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/

audio/18-1463Ricciov.%20SentryCreditInc.mp3; see also

id. at 6:05, 50:31. We think district courts are more than 

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Lest any doubt remains, Lamie v. United States Trustee

should settle the matter. There, the Supreme Court refused 

to “read an absent word into [a] statute” despite “an 

apparent legislative drafting error” that rendered the 

statute “awkward, and even ungrammatical.” 540 U.S. 

526, 530-38 (2004). “With a plain, nonabsurd meaning in 

view, we need not proceed in this way,” the Court said, 

noting their “longstanding” “unwillingness to soften the 

import of Congress’ chosen words even if we believe the 

words lead to a harsh outcome.” Id. at 538.

So too here. Even if we thought Congress inadvertently 

omitted a writing requirement from § 1692g(a)(3), and 

even if we thought permitting oral disputes precipitated an 

incoherent system, we must still recognize the validity of

oral disputes based on § 1692g’s plain meaning. “If 

Congress enacted into law something different from what 

it intended, then it should amend the statute . . . . ‘It is 

beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting 

errors, and to provide for what we might think . . . is the 

preferred result.’” Id. at 542 (second omission in original) 

(quoting United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 

(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).

capable of that linedrawing. In fact, they already do it 

when reviewing a debtor’s written communication.

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B

Other courts have reached the same conclusion. The 

Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits reject a writing 

requirement, openly splitting with Graziano. See Clark v. 

Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 490-91 (4th 

Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & 

Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2013); 

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1080-81 

(9th Cir. 2005). And without noting the split, the First, 

Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have taken the same 

position. See Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd., 897 F.3d 747, 757-

58 (6th Cir. 2018); Evans v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 

LLC, 889 F.3d 337, 347 n.6 (7th Cir. 2018); Sayles v. 

Advanced Recovery Sys., Inc., 865 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th 

Cir. 2017); Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., 160 F.3d 64, 66-

67 (1st Cir. 1998).

C

In sum, we no longer think § 1692g(a)(3) requires

written disputes. Simply put, “Congress did not write the 

statute that way.” United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 

773 (1979). Subsections (a)(4), (a)(5), and (b) command a 

written dispute; (a)(3) does not. “We would not presume 

to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in 

draftsmanship.” Russello, 464 U.S. at 23.

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III

The foregoing details our reasoning, and our 

disagreement with Graziano. Yet we must consider 

whether stare decisis justifies our upholding that 

precedent. “Stare decisis—in English, the idea that today’s 

Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is ‘a 

foundation stone of the rule of law.’” Kimble v. Marvel 

Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (quoting 

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 

(2014)). To be sure, stare decisis “is not an inexorable 

command,” but it is critical to “promote[] the evenhanded, 

predictable, and consistent development of legal 

principles, foster[] reliance on judicial decisions, and 

contribute[] to the actual and perceived integrity of the 

judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 

(1991). In fact, sometimes it “means sticking to some 

wrong decisions.” Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409. After all, “it 

is usually ‘more important that the applicable rule of law 

be settled than that it be settled right.’” Id. (quoting Burnet 

v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) 

(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). That’s especially true in 

statutory interpretation cases like this one, because

Congress can correct unintended interpretations. See id. at 

2409-10.

Before overruling its own precedent, the Supreme 

Court looks for “‘special justification[s]’ [] over and above 

the belief ‘that the precedent was wrongly decided.’” 

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Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. 

Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014)). Those 

include “the quality of [the prior case]’s reasoning, the 

workability of the rule it established, its consistency with 

other related decisions, developments since the decision 

was handed down, and reliance on the decision.” Janus v. 

AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-79 (2018). Though we, 

as a lower court, “play a different role in the federal 

system,” we join virtually every other Circuit in weighing 

those same considerations before overturning our own 

caselaw. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 

871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also United States 

v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 564 U.S. 

1 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. United 

States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 310 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc); 

United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918-19 (9th Cir. 

2007) (en banc); Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216 

(11th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 

Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed.

Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 

722 (2002); Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 461, 

467 (1st Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 481 

(2005); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 

1137-38 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); McKinney v. Pate, 20 

F.3d 1550, 1565 n.21 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

We also consider three factors unique to courts of 

appeals. First, prior en banc decisions carry more stare 

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decisis weight than prior panel decisions. See United 

States v. Games-Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1124 (10th Cir. 

2012) (Gorsuch, J., dissental) (“[I]t is surely 

uncontroversial to suggest that the point of the en banc

process, the very reason for its existence, is to correct 

grave errors in panel precedents when they become 

apparent, even if the panel precedents in question happen 

to be old or involve questions of statutory or regulatory 

interpretation.”); Igartua v. United States, 654 F.3d 99, 

100 (1st Cir. 2011) (statement of Lynch, C.J., and Boudin 

& Howard, JJ.) (declining “to reopen settled issues which 

have already been given en banc treatment”); McKinney, 

20 F.3d at 1565 n.21 (“It must be recalled that this is the 

first time this court sitting en banc has addressed this issue; 

thus, the implications of stare decisis are less weighty than 

if we were overturning a precedent established by the court 

en banc.”). See generally Letter from Justice Sandra Day 

O’Connor to Ret. Justice Byron R. White (June 23, 1998), 

published in Review of the Report by the Commission on 

Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 

Regarding the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 

Reorganization Act: Hearing on S. 253 Before the 

Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. 

Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 71 (1999) 

[hereinafter Ninth Circuit Review] (“It is important to the 

federal system as a whole that the Courts of Appeals utilize 

en banc review to correct panel errors within the circuit 

that are likely to otherwise come before the Supreme 

Court.”); Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Ret. Justice 

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Byron R. White (Aug. 21, 1998), published in Ninth 

Circuit Review 72 (“[T]he function of en banc hearings . . 

. is not only to eliminate intra-circuit conflicts, but also to 

correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly 

wrong. . . . The disproportionate segment of [the Supreme 

Court’s] discretionary docket that is consistently devoted 

to reviewing [a court of appeals’s] judgments, and to 

reversing them by lop-sided margins, suggests that this 

error-reduction function is not being performed 

effectively.”).

Second, “[w]hile we generally ‘decide cases before us 

based on our own examination of the issue, not on the 

views of other jurisdictions,’ the[] more recent [contrary] 

decisions [from other circuits] suggest that we should 

‘consider whether the reasoning applied by our colleagues 

elsewhere is persuasive.’” Bastardo-Vale v. Attorney 

Gen., 934 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting 

In re Grossman’s Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(en banc)); see also United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 

414 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Although . . . it is rarely 

appropriate to overrule circuit precedent just to move from 

one side of a [circuit] conflict to another, reconsideration 

is more appropriate when [we] can eliminate the conflict 

by overruling a decision that lacks support elsewhere.”); 

cf. Wagner v. PennWest Farm Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909, 

912 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In light of such an array of 

[unanimous] precedent [from other courts of appeals], we 

would require a compelling basis to hold otherwise before 

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effecting a circuit split.”); Butler Cty. Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Heckler, 780 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]his Court 

should be reluctant to contradict the unanimous position 

of other circuits.”).

Third, “on rare occasions a circuit precedent, though 

not directly overruled or superseded, nonetheless might 

crumble” if “case law postdating ‘the original decision, 

although not directly controlling, nevertheless offers a 

sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light 

of fresh developments, would change its collective 

mind.’” Stewart, 230 F.3d at 467 (quoting Williams v. 

Ashland Eng’g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995)).

All three factors support overturning Graziano. Given 

Lamie and other recent Supreme Court decisions, we 

believe the panel that decided Graziano would decide it 

differently today. And what’s more, Graziano was only a 

panel decision; our en banc Court has never expressed a 

view on the issue presented. By expressing our view today, 

we put an end to a circuit split and restore national 

uniformity to the meaning of § 1692g.

Traditional stare decisis considerations point in the 

same direction. For starters, district courts applying 

Graziano have split over whether identical language 

violates its rule. See Cadillo v. Stoneleigh Recovery 

Assocs., LLC, No. 17-7472, 2019 WL 1091391, at *4 

(D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2019) (collecting cases), appeal docketed, 

19-2811 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 2019).

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Additionally, “the growth of judicial doctrine” has 

undermined Graziano’s reasoning. Patterson v. McClean 

Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), superseded on 

other grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 

No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. 

Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 383 (2004). Recall 

how Graziano framed its own conclusion: “subsection 

(a)(3) . . . contemplates that any dispute, to be effective, 

must be in writing.” 950 F.2d at 112 (emphasis added). 

That is a curious verb choice, since it suggests the panel 

thought § 1692g(a)(3) meant something other than what it 

says. See, e.g., Contemplate, Oxford English Dictionary 

(2d ed. 1989) (“To have in view, look for, expect, take into 

account as a contingency to be provided for. To have in 

view as a purpose; to intend, purpose.”).

But that is not how we read statutes today. In the years 

before Graziano, the Supreme Court engaged in statutory 

interpretation with statements like, “[a]bsent a clearly 

expressed legislative intention to the contrary, th[e 

statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as 

conclusive.” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE 

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (emphasis 

added). In the years since Graziano, the Court has 

instructed us “that [the] legislature says . . . what it means 

and means . . . what it says.” Henson v. Santander 

Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017) 

(alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Dodd v. 

United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005)). In other words, 

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“[a]s Justice Kagan recently stated, ‘we’re all textualists 

now.’” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory 

Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2118 (2016) 

(reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)) 

(quoting Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A 

Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes at 

8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://perma.cc/BCF-FEFR). We 

decline to breathe new life into Graziano’s atextual 

interpretation of § 1692g(a)(3), an interpretation that has 

already made us the “legal last-man-standing” among the 

courts of appeals. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2411.

Moreover, any legitimate reliance interests seem 

minimal. Overturning Graziano merely requires debt 

collectors to prospectively tweak their collection notice 

template. If anything, since debt collectors may operate 

nationwide, overturning Graziano should make their job

easier by allowing them to use the same form no matter 

where a debtor resides. By contrast, resuscitating

Graziano would mean collectors must use one notice in 

Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and the Virgin 

Islands, but another everywhere else. And overturning 

Graziano helps debtors too, since the case’s atextual rule 

requires more than the statutory text mandates for them to 

dispute a debt’s validity. See supra note 3 and 

accompanying text.

* * *

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By today’s standards, Graziano’s “reasoning was 

clearly wrong”; changes in the way we interpret statutes 

“have unmoored the case from its doctrinal anchors.” 

Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 180 (3d Cir. 2013) 

(Smith, J., concurring). Both traditional stare decisis 

principles and considerations unique to courts of appeals 

convince us that Graziano should be, and now is, 

overruled.

IV

Perhaps anticipating the result we announce today, 

Riccio asks us to curb our holding’s retroactive application 

so that Graziano still governs her claim. Her only support 

for that argument is New Jersey precedent allowing statecourt judges to limit a holding’s retroactive application 

“when ‘considerations of fairness and justice, related to 

reasonable surprise and prejudice to those affected’

counsel [them] to do so.” Malinowski v. Jacobs, 915 A.2d 

513, 517 (N.J. 2007) (quoting N.J. Election Law Enf’t 

Comm’n v. Citizens to Make Mayor–Council Gov’t Work, 

526 A.2d 1069, 1073 (N.J. 1987)).

Yet federal courts follow a different rule. Our holding 

today “is the controlling interpretation of federal law and 

must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open 

on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether 

such events predate or postdate our announcement of the 

rule.” Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 

(1993). “[W]e can scarcely permit ‘the substantive law [to] 

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shift and spring’ according to ‘the particular equities of 

[individual parties’] claims’ of actual reliance on an old 

rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the new 

rule.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting James B. Beam 

Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991) 

(opinion of Souter, J.)). We will, therefore, apply to this 

case our new rule that debt collectors need not require 

debtors to dispute the validity of their debt in writing.5

5 We do not suggest that debt collectors who sent 

Graziano-compliant letters before today will be on the 

hook for failing to foresee our change in the law. Just as 

collectors who act “in good faith in conformity with any 

[agency] advisory opinion” cannot be liable if that 

“opinion is amended, rescinded, or” judicially invalidated, 

§ 1692k(e), collectors should not be penalized for goodfaith compliance with then-governing caselaw. To that 

end, we note district courts can withhold damages for 

unintentional errors, § 1692k(b), award no damages for 

trivial violations, § 1692k(a)(1), and even award 

attorney’s fees to the collector if the debtor’s suit “was 

brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment,” 

§ 1692k(a)(3). See generally Jerman v. Carlisle, 

McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 597-

99 (2010). We have confidence in district courts to 

exercise that discretion appropriately.

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V

Our new rule dooms Riccio’s claim. As we and several 

other Circuits have held, debt collection notices must 

intelligibly convey the § 1692g(a) requirements. See

Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d Cir. 

2000) (collecting cases). Put another way, a hypothetical 

“least sophisticated debtor” should be able to read the 

notice and reasonably discern her rights. Id.; cf. United 

States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 

1996) (noting the least sophisticated debtor standard “also 

prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic 

interpretations of collection notices by preserving a 

quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of 

understanding and willingness to read with care”).6

Sentry Credit’s collection notice easily clears that bar. 

Its plainspoken language reproduces § 1692g(a)(3)–(5) 

nearly word-for-word, alerting the least sophisticated 

debtor of her rights as effectively as does the statute itself. 

6 Although Judge Matey reaches the same conclusion as 

the Court, it is his view that the atextual “least 

sophisticated debtor” test announced in Graziano warrants 

reexamination. See Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 

F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that the “least 

sophisticated debtor” requirement “appears nowhere in the 

text of the statute”). In his view, in an appropriate case, we 

should revisit whether that standard comports with the 

ordinary meaning of the FDCPA.

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A collection notice can never mislead the least 

sophisticated debtor by relying on the language Congress 

chose. And since that’s all this notice did, Sentry Credit 

did not violate § 1692g.

VI

In short, we conclude that debt collection notices sent 

under § 1692g need not require that disputes be expressed

in writing. In doing so, we overrule Graziano’s contrary 

holding. Because Sentry Credit’s notice perfectly tracked 

§ 1692g’s text, we will affirm the judgment of the District 

Court.

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