Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01936/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01936-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL WAYNE KING, 

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

J. D. CHOKATOS, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:12-cv-01936-LJO-EPG-PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

BASED ON FAILURE TO EXHAUST 

CLAIMS BE GRANTED

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY DAYS

I. BACKGROUND

Darrell Wayne King (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights 

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action 

on November 29, 2012. (ECF No. 1.) This action now proceeds with the First Amended 

Complaint filed on September 2, 2014, alleging that Defendants J. Chokatos and M. Stringer

were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment and also liable for medical malpractice under California state law. (ECF No. 33.) 

On January 28, 2016, Chokatos and Stringer filed a motion for summary judgment 

under Rule 56 on the grounds that the undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

his available administrative remedies with respect to (1) all claims asserted against Stringer,

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and (2) any claims against Chokatos for conduct that occurred prior to October 31, 2011. (ECF 

No. 46.) On March 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 50.) 

Defendant Stringer filed a reply on May 12, 2016 (ECF No. 60), and Defendant Chokatos filed 

a reply on May 16, 2016 (ECF No. 62). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is now 

before the Court. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), presently incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”), 

where the events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred. Plaintiff’s 

factual allegations follow. 

In 2008, Plaintiff injured his spine and his injury worsened over the next three years. 

Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication. On July 25, 2011, Plaintiff collapsed when his legs 

lost function due to severe back pain. Plaintiff was placed on a stretcher and transported to the

prison’s medical clinic. On July 28, 2011, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Chokatos. Plaintiff 

reported severe spinal pain, numbness of his left leg and foot, and professed a need for a 

wheelchair. Dr. Chokatos failed to provide Plaintiff with a wheelchair or pain medication. Dr. 

Chokatos ordered an X-ray of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine. This X-ray revealed disc narrowing of 

the L1-L5 vertebrae and spondylosis. 

Plaintiff was again seen by Dr. Chokatos on August 2, 2011. Dr. Chokatos failed to 

order an MRI of Plaintiff’s spine and falsely stated in his notes that there were no abnormal 

orthopedic or neurological findings. On August 31, 2011, Plaintiff was examined by J. 

Fortune, PA-C. Mr. Fortune ordered an MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine and issued an order 

that authorized Plaintiff a lower tier and bunk assignment, and the use of a cane. Plaintiff’s 

pain and symptoms worsened over the next few weeks. An MRI revealed several degenerative 

changes, including a left disc extrusion that caused moderate to severe spinal stenosis in the left 

lateral recess and impingement of the left exiting nerve roots. 

On September 23, 2011, Randolph Wilson, PA-C, reviewed the MRI results and 

examined Plaintiff. Mr. Wilson provided Plaintiff with an order that authorized the use of a 

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cane and wheelchair for three months. Mr. Wilson also renewed Plaintiff’s prescription of pain 

medication. In addition, Mr. Wilson referred Plaintiff to a neurologist and ordered that at work 

Plaintiff must avoid prolonged standing, walking, and lifting over fifteen pounds. 

On September 24, 2011, Plaintiff approached Stringer to receive his daily pain 

medication. Stringer informed Plaintiff that his medication had not been refilled. Plaintiff 

became frustrated with Stringer, because this was the fourth time she failed to send a timely 

refill order to the pharmacy. Stringer then became irritated and said “you don’t need to take 

any meds.” From September 24, 2011, to September 26, 2011, Plaintiff did not receive pain 

medication, leaving him in severe pain.

On September 28, 2011, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Chokatos. Dr. Chokatos informed 

Plaintiff that “the LVN assigned to your building said that she saw you run up and down the 

stairs. I am taking your wheelchair and pain medication, because you don’t need them.” Dr. 

Chokatos declined Plaintiff’s request to call Plaintiff’s housing unit officers to confirm that

Plaintiff’s condition had left him unable to ambulate without assistance. However, Dr. 

Chokatos wrote in his notes that “no one with Plaintiff’s condition could run up and down a 

flight of stairs.” Dr. Chokatos ordered that Plaintiff’s pain medication be discontinued, his 

wheelchair and cane be confiscated, and that his lower cell and bunk assignments be revoked. 

Dr. Chokatos also changed King’s job limitations from “avoid prolonged standing, walking, 

and lifting” to “cannot continuously squat, crouch, crawl.” On October 13, 2011, Dr. 

Chokatos wrongfully removed Plaintiff from the disability placement program by falsely 

stating that there was “no evidence of a significant mobility impairment.”

On October 19, 2011, Plaintiff appeared before the Clinical Case Management Review 

Committee (“CCMRC”) regarding his continued complaints of pain. The CCMRC reviewed 

the medical evidence and concluded that Plaintiff’s complaints of pain and symptoms were 

consistent with all objective medical evidence. The CCMRC recommended that Plaintiff see a 

neurosurgeon, remain in a wheelchair, and receive pain medication. Dr. Chokatos ignored the 

CCMRC’s orders.

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On October 28, 2011, a neurosurgeon, Majid Rahimifar, M.D., evaluated Plaintiff and 

reviewed the medical records. Dr. Rahimifar diagnosed Plaintiff with spinal stenosis and a left 

foot drop resulting from a ruptured L4-L5 disc. Dr. Rahimifar recommended Plaintiff receive 

lower back surgery. Dr. Chokatos received Dr. Rahimifar’s medical report, but did not refer 

Plaintiff for lower back surgery.

On October 31, 2011, Plaintiff attended a medical appointment with Dr. Chokatos. Dr. 

Chokatos made Plaintiff sit and wait outside the medical clinic for over five hours. On two 

occasions, other inmates complained that Plaintiff’s back pain was progressively worsening. 

Each time an inmate complained, Dr. Chokatos stated “[Plaintiff] can either wait for his 

appointment or refuse it.” Dr. Chokatos was observed standing at the clinic door watching 

Plaintiff while laughing with the other medical staff. Plaintiff’s back pain became so severe 

that when he stood his legs gave out and he collapsed. The medical staff did not respond and 

Dr. Chokatos was observed watching Plaintiff through a window. Officers sounded the alarm 

for a medical emergency and strapped Plaintiff to a stretcher. Plaintiff was taken into Dr. 

Chokatos’s office. Plaintiff begged Dr. Chokatos to allow him to lie on his side instead of his 

back, which made the pain worse. Plaintiff’s pleas were ignored and he lost consciousness. 

Dr. Chokatos ordered medical staff to wheel Plaintiff’s gurney into the clinic holding cage. 

Plaintiff lost consciousness again because of the pain. He regained consciousness in the back 

of an ambulance in route to the hospital. At the hospital, Plaintiff was evaluated by Mr. 

Wilson, PA-C. Mr. Wilson ordered that Plaintiff be transferred to Bakersfield Memorial 

Hospital (“BMH”). At BMH, Plaintiff received emergency surgery to remove a herniated disc.

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON EXHAUSTION

A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement

Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) provides that 

A[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. ' 1983], or any 

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until 

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.@ 42 U.S.C. ' 1997e(a). Prisoners 

are required to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 

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549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief 

offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion 

requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 

532 (2002). 

An untimely or otherwise procedurally defective appeal will not satisfy the exhaustion 

requirement. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 

(2006). When an inmate's administrative grievance is improperly rejected on procedural 

grounds, however, exhaustion may be excused as “effectively unavailable.” Sapp v. Kimbrell,

623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224–26 (9th Cir.

2010) (warden's mistake rendered prisoner's administrative remedies “effectively unavailable”); 

Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (exhaustion excused where futile); 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff not required to proceed to third 

level where appeal granted at second level and no further relief was available).

The test for deciding whether a grievance procedure was unavailable uses an objective 

standard. Albino v. Baca (Albino I), 697 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]ffirmative 

actions by jail staff preventing proper exhaustion, even if done innocently, make administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable.” Id. at 1034. An inmate may demonstrate the unavailability 

of remedies by showing “(1) that jail staff affirmatively interfered with his ability to exhaust 

administrative remedies or (2) that the remedies were unknowable.” Id. at 1033. The inmate 

must make “a good-faith effort” to determine and comply with a prison's grievance procedures. 

Id. at 1035.

Because “there can be no absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, a 

defendant must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, whether at unexhausted 

levels of the grievance process or through awaiting the results of the relief already granted as a 

result of that process.” Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37.

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B. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

Administrative Grievance System

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the State of California provides its 

prisoners and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any policy, decision, action, 

condition, or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate 

as having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal.Code Regs.

tit. 15 § 3084.1(a). The process is initiated by submitting a CDCR Form 602 (“602 form”). Id.

at § 3084.2(a). 

At the time of the events giving rise to the Complaint in this action, California prisoners 

were required to submit appeals within thirty calendar days of the event being appealed, and the 

process was initiated by submission of the appeal at the first level. Id. at §§ 3084.7(a), 

3084.8(c). Three levels of appeal were involved, including the first level, second level, and 

third level. Id. at § 3084.7. The third level of review exhausts administrative remedies. Id. at 

§ 3084.7(d)(3). In order to satisfy § 1997e(a), California state prisoners are required to use this 

process to exhaust their claims prior to filing suit. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85; McKinney, 311 

F.3d. at 1199-1201.

C. Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust

The failure to exhaust in compliance with section 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense 

under which Defendant has the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones,

549 U.S. at 216; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). On April 3, 2014, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a decision overruling Wyatt with 

respect to the proper procedural device for raising the affirmative defense of exhaustion under § 

1997e(a). Albino v. Baca (Albino II), 747 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

Following the decision in Albino II, defendants may raise exhaustion deficiencies as an 

affirmative defense under § 1997e(a) in either (1) a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6)1or (2) a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. If the Court concludes that 

 

1 Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are only appropriate “[i]n the rare event a failure to exhaust is clear on 

the face of the complaint.” Albino II, 747 F.3d at 1162.

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Plaintiff has failed to exhaust, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice of the portions 

of the complaint barred by § 1997e(e). Jones, 549 U.S. at 223–24; Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 

1164, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005).

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there “is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); Albino II, 747 F.3d at 1169 (“If there is a genuine dispute about material facts, 

summary judgment will not be granted.”) A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must 

support the assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory 

answers, or other materials, or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or 

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 

support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Court may consider other materials in the 

record not cited to by the parties, but is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen 

v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. 

Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). In judging the evidence at the 

summary judgment stage, the Court “must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of 

Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court must liberally construe 

Plaintiff's filings because he is a pro se prisoner. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

In a summary judgment motion for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the 

defendants have the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative remedy, 

and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino II, 747 F.3d at 1172. If the 

defendants carry that burden, “the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence 

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of 

proof remains with defendants, however. Id. “If material facts are disputed, summary 

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judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.”

Id. at 1166.

IV. DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS (DUF)2

1. During the time period relevant to the operative complaint, Plaintiff Darrell 

Wayne King (J-96720) was a prisoner within the custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and was incarcerated 

at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”). (ECF No. 33 at 2:7-9.)3

2. An inmate appeal or administrative remedy process was available for Plaintiff’s 

use at PVSP. (ECF No. 33 at 2:19-20.)4

3. Between July 28, 2011, and November 29, 2012, Plaintiff submitted six appeals 

that were received by the PVSP appeals office. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 4; 

Navarro Declaration, ¶ 3.)5

4. Appeal number PVSP-HC-11046975 was received by the PVSP Appeals Office 

on September 27, 2011. (Navarro Declaration, ¶ 4.)6

5. Appeal number PVSP-HC-11046975 was rejected on September 28, 2011, 

because the appeal cited no material adverse effect and presented multiple 

appeal issues. (Navarro Declaration, ¶ 4, Exhibit A.)7

 

2 Defendant submits these facts for purposes of this motion only. (ECF No. 46-2 at 1:20.)

3

(DUF 1.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (ECF No. 50 at 1:28.)

4

(DUF 2.) Plaintiff disputes this fact. (Id. at 2:5-16.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the appeals coordinator 

failed to timely respond or respond at all to several of Plaintiff’s inmate appeals. However, Plaintiff was able to 

successfully pursue several claims. For example, Plaintiff complained of “systemic failures to process [a] 

grievance as mandated” because he was not given a log number for a 602 form in a request for interview form. 

Plaintiff’s request was granted, but the appeal was denied. (Morgan Declaration, ECF No. 46-3 at 35-51). This 

demonstrates that an administrative remedy process was available for Plaintiff. 

5

(DUF 3.) Plaintiff disputes this fact. (ECF No. 50 at 2:22-24.) Plaintiff states he filed an additional 602 form on 

October 29, 2011. (King Declaration, ECF No. 50 at 24.) This fact is more properly stated as follows: between

July 28, 2011, and November 29, 2012, Plaintiff submitted seven appeals that were received by the PVSP appeals 

office. 

6

(DUF 4.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (ECF No. 50 at 3:2.) 

7

(DUF 5.) Plaintiff disputes this fact. (Id. at 3:9-11.) However a review of the evidence reveals that appeal 

number PVSP-HC-11046975 was rejected because the appeal cited no material adverse effect and presented 

multiple appeal issues. (Navarro Declaration, ECF No. 46-4 at 5.)

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6. Plaintiff did not submit appeal number PVSP-HC-11046975 to the second or 

third level of review. (Navarro Declaration, ¶ 5.)8

7. Appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 was received by the PVSP Appeals Office 

on December 13, 2011. (Navarro Declaration, ¶ 5.)9

8. Second level review of appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 was completed on 

Febuary 9, 2012, and this appeal was partially granted in that a confidential 

inquiry had been conducted which found that PVSP staff had not violated 

CDCR policy. (Navarro Declaration, ¶ 5.)10

9. Appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 was submitted to the Office of Appeals for 

third level review and was denied on July 10, 2012. (Robinson Declaration, ¶ 

7.)11

10. The CDCR Form 602 Inmate Appeal/Grievance Form submitted by Plaintiff for 

appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 addresses an incident concerning Defendant 

Chokatos which occurred on October 31, 2011, and does not reference any prior 

acts, mistreatment or deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Chokatos. 

(Navarro Declaration, Exhibit B.)12

11. The CDCR Form 602 Inmate Appeal/Grievance Form submitted by Plaintiff for 

appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 does not identify or name Defendant 

Stringer, nor does it contain any reference to events occurring between 

September 24, 2011, and September 28, 2011. (Navarro Declaration, Exhibit 

B.)13

 

8

(DUF 6.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (ECF No. 50 at 3:17.)

9

(DUF 7.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 3:22.)

10 (DUF 8.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 4:2.)

11 (DUF 9.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 4:8.)

12 (DUF 10.) Plaintiff disputes this fact. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff claims that the appeal alleged misconduct by 

Chokatos that occurred prior to October 31, 2011. Plaintiff claims that supporting documents, an interview in 

support of the appeal, and appeals associated with the second and third level reference misconduct by Chokatos 

that occurred prior to October 31, 2011. This fact is more properly stated as follows: the initial CDCR Form 602 

submitted by Plaintiff for appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 does not reference any other acts, mistreatment or 

deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Chokatos prior to October 31, 2011. 

13 (DUF 11.) Plaintiff disputes this fact. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff claims that 602 form’s associated with the third 

level of appeal and an interview alleged misconduct by Defendant Stringer. This fact is more properly stated as 

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12. On December 23, 2011, Plaintiff submitted an appeal to the PVSP Appeals 

Office that was screened out and cancelled on December 28, 2011, prior [to] the 

assignment of a log number because it was not submitted within required time 

constraints. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 5, Exhibit B.)14

13. Appeal number PVSP-A-12-000084 was received by the PVSP Appeals Office 

on January 23, 2012. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 6.)15

14. Second level review of appeal number PVSP-A-12-000084 was completed on 

March 6, 2012, and this appeal was partially granted in that the cancelled appeal 

submitted by Plaintiff on December 23, 2011, would be accepted for review if 

resubmitted by Plaintiff. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 6.)16

15. Plaintiff did not submit appeal number PVSP-A-12-000084 for third level 

review. (Voong Declaration, ¶ 8.)17

16. Appeal number PVSP-A-12-00123 was received by the PVSP Appeals Office 

on January 31, 2012. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 7.)18

17. Second level review of appeal number PVSP-A-12-00123 was completed on 

March 20, 2012, and this appeal was partially granted in that a confidential 

inquiry had been conducted which found that PVSP staff had not violated 

CDCR policy. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 7, Exhibit D.)19

18. Plaintiff did not submit PVSP-A-12-00123 for third level review. (Voong 

Declaration, ¶ 8.)20

 

follows: the initial CDCR 602 Form submitted by Plaintiff for appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 does not 

identify or name Defendant Stringer, nor does it contain any reference to events occurring between September 24, 

2011, and September 28, 2011. 

14 (DUF 12.) Plaintiff disputes this fact. (Id. at 6:14-19.) However, Plaintiff has not provided supporting 

evidence. Therefore, Plaintiff has not created a genuine dispute of this fact.

15 (DUF 13.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 6:24.)

16 (DUF 14.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 7:4.)

17 (DUF 15.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 7:9.)

18 (DUF 16.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 7:14.)

19 (DUF 17.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 7:22.)

20 (DUF 18.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 7:27.)

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19. Appeal number PVSP-A-12-00610 was received by the PVSP Appeals Office 

on March 19, 2012. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 8.)21

20. Appeal number PVSP-A-12-00610 was cancelled prior to review because 

Plaintiff withdrew this appeal on April 30, 2012. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 8.)22

21. Plaintiff did not submit appeal number PVSP-A-12-00610 for second or third 

level review. (Morgan Declaration, ¶ 8; Voong Declaration, ¶ 8.)23

V. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for (1) all 

claims asserted against Stringer; and (2) any claims against Chokatos that occurred prior to

October 31, 2011.

Defendants provide evidence that between July 28, 2011 and November 29, 2012, 

Plaintiff submitted six appeals that were received by the PVSP Appeals Office. (DUF 3; 

Morgan Declaration, ¶ 4; Navarro Declaration, ¶ 3.) Only appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 

was fully exhausted. (ECF No. 46-1 at 9:3-4.) 

Defendants claim that PVSP-SC-11000300 does not address or place at issue any of the 

alleged conduct of Stringer or any of Chokatos’ conduct that occurred prior to October 31, 

2011. In addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust this appeal because 

PVSP-SC-11000300 was submitted more than thirty days after such conduct occurred. 

VII. PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION

Plaintiff claims that PVSP-SC-11000300 addressed the allegations regarding Stringer. 

In order to support his assertion, Plaintiff points to his third level appeal and supplemental 

documents that were submitted with the grievance. This includes an interview Plaintiff had 

with prison officials regarding the appeal, and a medical report indicating that an LVN reported 

that Plaintiff does not require pain medication or a wheel chair. In addition, Plaintiff asserts he 

filed an additional 602 form on October, 29, 2011. This grievance alleged that Stringer made 

 

21 (DUF 19.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 8:4.)

22 (DUF 20.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 8:10.)

23 (DUF 21.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. (Id. at 8:16.)

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false statements and refused to provide Plaintiff his prescribed medication. Plaintiff states that 

this appeal was improperly rejected by prison officials and as a result his administrative 

remedies were effectively unavailable. Plaintiff also argues that the 602 forms filed for the 

second and third level for appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300, and supporting documents 

attached to the 602 forms should have alerted prison officials to Chokatos’ alleged conduct that 

occurred prior to October 31, 2011. 

VIII. DISCUSSION

Based on an examination of Defendant’s Undisputed Facts and the evidence in the 

record, the Court finds that Defendants have meet their burden and Plaintiff did not exhaust the 

appeals process for all claims against Stringer and any claims against Chokatos that occurred 

prior to October 31, 2011.

A. Appeal Number PVSP-SC-11000300

It is uncontested that appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 obtained a decision at all 

three levels. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a prisoner has exhausted his or 

her administrative remedies “if prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a 

decision on the merits of the grievance at each available step of the administrative process.”

Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2016). This is because “when prison officials 

address the merits of a prisoner’s grievance instead of enforcing a procedural bar, the state’s 

interests in administrative exhaustion has been served.” Id. at 657. 

In this case, prison officials addressed the merits of appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 

and did not enforce any procedural bar. Therefore, the Defendants’ argument that summary 

judgment should be granted because PVSP-SC-11003000 was untimely fails.

Defendants also argue that appeal number PVSP-SC-11000300 does not address any of 

Stringer’s conduct and any of Chokatos’ conduct that occurred prior to October 31, 2011. 

Under the PLRA, a grievance “ ‘suffices [to exhaust a claim] if it alerts the prison to the nature 

of the wrong for which redress is sought.’ ” Reyes, 810 F.3d at 659 (quoting Sapp, 623 F.3d at 

824). The grievance is simply required to alert prison staff to a problem and is not required to 

include legal theories. Id. 

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It is undisputed that in Plaintiff’s initial 602 form for appeal number PVSP-SC11000300, Plaintiff failed to name Stringer or address any of Stringer’s conduct. (ECF No. 46-

6 at 11-12.) While an inmate is not required to “identify responsible parties or otherwise to

signal who ultimately be sued” (Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824), the grievance must alert the prison to 

the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought. Reyes, 810 F.3d at 659. In his initial 602 

form, Plaintiff did not reference any events prior to October 31, 2011. (ECF No. 46-6 at 11-

12). Instead, Plaintiff solely referred to an event that occurred at a medical clinic on October 

31, 2011. 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that his claim against Stringer was exhausted because 

during an interview during the appeal process, he mentioned Stringer’s conduct. In addition, 

Plaintiff identified Stringer at the third level in the appeal process. However, this is not 

sufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to Stringer. See Randolph v. Nix, 

No. 1:12-CV-00392-LJO, 2015 WL 5432622, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s 

identification of [Defendant] at a stage in the appeal process after the filing of the initial CDCR 

602 form is not sufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies.”). A prisoner does not 

exhaust administrative remedies when he or she includes new issues or persons from one level 

of review to another. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b); see also Sapp, 623 F.3d at 825

(“[A]n inmate must first present a complaint at the first level of the administrative process.”); 

Dawkins v. Butler, No. 09CV1053 JLS DHB, 2013 WL 2475870, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 

2013) (“Inmates must file separate appeals for each grievance and may not change the appeal 

issue from one level of review to another.”). Moreover, the ability to waive a procedural 

default ripens only if “prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a decision on 

the merits of the grievance at each available step of the administrative process.” Reyes, 810 

F.3d at 658; see also Bulkin v. Ochoa, No. 113CV00388DADDLBPC, 2016 WL 1267265, at 

*2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2016). 

Similarly, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust his remedies concerning any of 

Chokatos’ conduct which occurred prior to October 31, 2011. Plaintiff argues that in his third 

level appeal he referenced misconduct by Chokatos that occurred prior to October 31, 2011. 

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However, as discussed above, a prisoner does not exhaust administrative remedies when he 

includes new issues from one level of review to another. Plaintiff also states that documents

attached to his grievance concerned misconduct that occurred prior to October 31, 2011. The 

Court disagrees that attaching documents referencing other incidents can exhaust issues 

regarding those incidents. The supporting documents attached to the initial appeal did not

sufficiently alert prison officials to a grievance regarding Chokatos’ conduct that occurred prior 

to October 31, 2011 given that they were not referenced in the grievance itself. See Sapp, 623 

F.3d at 824. Moreover, the prison did not address those issues in the appeals process and thus 

did not waive any timeliness argument with regard to those other issues.

B. CDCR 602 Form Filed on October 29, 2011

Plaintiff also argues that prison officials improperly rejected a grievance filed on 

October 29, 2011. (Plaintiff’s Opposition, ECF No. 50, 34:8-10). Plaintiff asserts the 

grievance was rejected by prison staff and returned without a response. (Plaintiff’s 

Declaration, ECF No. 50, 10:7-8). In the grievance, Plaintiff alleged that Stringer failed to 

deliver Plaintiff’s medication and made false statements to Chokatos. (Plaintiff’s Declaration, 

Exhibit 6, ECF No. 50, 24). As a result of the prison staff’s error, Plaintiff argues that he was 

not required to fully exhaust this appeal.

Exhaustion is not required under the PLRA when improper screening of an inmate’s 

grievances renders administrative remedies unavailable. Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823. As discussed 

above, an inmate may demonstrate the unavailability of remedies by showing “(1) that jail staff 

affirmatively interfered with his ability to exhaust administrative remedies or (2) that the 

remedies were unknowable.” Albino I, 697 F.3d at 1033. 

It appears on the face of this appeal that it was untimely. The grievance mentions 

making a complaint to Stringer on September 24, 2011 and then learning that Stringer had 

supplied false information to Chokatos on September 28, 2011. The appeal is dated October 

29, 2011, which is more than 30 days after the underlying events. The CDCR was thus within 

their discretion to reject the appeal. 

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Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence demonstrating that he attempted to 

challenge the rejection of this grievance. “If Plaintiff had taken steps to challenge the rejection 

of [this grievance], but [the PVSP] Appeals Coordinator refused to review his appeal, such 

evidence might suggest that Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust should be excused.” Beard v. 

Pennington, No. 14-CV-03128-YGR (PR), 2015 WL 7293652, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 

2015). Moreover, there is evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff has successfully filed an appeal

at through the Director’s level of review indicating that the appeals process was generally 

available.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that under the undisputed facts, Plaintiff 

failed to exhaust his remedies for all his claims against Stringer and any claims against 

Chokatos that for conduct that occurred prior to October 31, 2011. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY 

RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on January 28, 

2016, be GRANTED.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within thirty 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate 

Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 

(9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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