Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02272/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02272-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405rs Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAFAA ELEA AZIEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15cv2272-CAB-JLB

ORDER REGARDING MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES [Doc. No. 

22]

On December 27, 2016, Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“Report”) to grant Plaintiff Wafaa Aziez’s motion for summary 

judgment and to deny Defendant Berryhill’s cross-motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 

No. 19.] On January 19, 2017, this Court issued an order adopting the Report, granting 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and denying Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment. [Doc. No. 20.] On April 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. 

[Doc. No. 22.] On May 4, 2017, Defendant filed an opposition to the motion. [Doc. No. 

24.] On May 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed a reply to the opposition. [Doc. No. 25.] After a 

careful review of the submissions of the parties, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion 

for attorneys’ fees.

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has submitted an application for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal 

Access to Justice Act, (“EAJA”) 28 U.S.C. section 2412. Defendant opposes the motion 

on the grounds that the government's position was substantially justified and that the fees 

requested are unreasonable. The Court grants plaintiff's application, as set forth below.

The EAJA shifts the burden of attorney's fees from the private litigant to the 

government in order to reduce the chance that the expense of legal representation will 

deter defense against unreasonable government action. Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 

580, 582 (9th Cir.1984). “[A] litigant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs if (1) [s]he is 

the prevailing party, (2) the government fails to show that its position was substantially 

justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust, and (3) the requested 

attorney's fees and costs are reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Carbonell v. INS, 

429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Perez–Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th 

Cir.2002)) (further citation omitted).

A. Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

An applicant for Social Security benefits who receives a remand under sentence 

four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether the applicant 

later succeeds in obtaining the requested benefits. Shalala v. Shaefar, 509 U.S. 292, 302, 

113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993); Garnica v. Astrue, 378 Fed. Appx. 680, 681 

(9th Cir. 2010). The Court remanded this action to the ALJ pursuant to sentence four of 

42 U.S.C. section 405(g). [Doc. Nos. 19, 20.] Plaintiff is therefore a prevailing party. See

Shalala, 509 U.S. at 302.

B. The Commissioner has not shown that her position was substantially justified.

The government bears the burden of showing that its position was, as a whole, 

substantially justified. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir.2001) 

(“Gutierrez II ”). To meet this standard, the government must advance a position that is 

“justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a 

reasonable person.” Le v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.2008) (citation and 

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internal quotations omitted). In making this determination, a court “must focus on two 

questions: first, whether the government was substantially justified in taking its original 

action; and, second, whether the government was substantially justified in defending the 

validity of the action in court.” Gutierrez II, 274 F.3d at 1258–59 (quotations, citations, 

and modifications omitted). The Commissioner must show that her position was 

substantially justified “with respect to the issue on which the court based its remand.” 

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir.1995). It is an abuse of discretion to find 

“that an agency's position was substantially justified when the agency's position was 

based on violations of ... the agency's own regulations....” Gutierrez II, 274 F.3d at 1259–

60 (citing Mendenhall v. NTSB, 92 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.1996)).

Here, the Commissioner’s position with respect to the issues on which the Court 

based its remand was not substantially justified. This Court found the Commissioner 

committed the following two errors of law and fact: (1) the ALJ did not meet the “clear 

and convincing” standard to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony [Doc. No. 19 at 16]; (2) 

Plaintiff presented a colorable claim of somatoform disorder and the ALJ failed to even 

mention it [Doc. No. 19 at 18]. For the reasons set forth in the Report, the 

Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified. [See generally, Doc. No. 19.] 

Moreover, given that several errors were made by the ALJ, the government’s position is 

not substantially justified. See Herron v. Colvin, 585 Fed. Appx. 511, 512-13 (9th Cir. 

2014)(where ALJ made a series of legal errors, the government’s position was not 

substantially justified). Finally, given that the underlying government position was not 

substantially justified, the government was also not substantially justified in defending 

the previous action. See Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (citations omitted). 

/ / / / / 

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C. The requested attorney's fees are reasonable.

Plaintiff's counsel seeks an order awarding a total of $17,165.50 in attorney's fees. 

In the original motion, Plaintiff requested $17,466.07 in attorneys’ fees. That amount 

accounts for 12.2 hours of attorney time at the 2015 rate of $190.28 per hour and 73.1

hours of attorney time at 2016 rate of $192.68 per hour, plus an additional 5.5 hours 

($1,059.74) for preparation of the fees motion. [Doc. No. 22-2 at 2-3.] The 

Commissioner argues that the number of hours Plaintiff's attorneys claim to have spent 

litigating this action is unreasonable. Specifically, the Commissioner asserts that the work 

could have been accomplished in 33.5 hours and suggests an award of $7,482.29. [Doc. 

No. 24 at 18.] In reply, Plaintiff agrees to a 5.1 hour reduction for time that is duplicative 

or clerical, and requests an additional 9 hours of for preparation of the reply, for a total of 

$17,165.50 in fees. [Doc. No. 25 at 9.]

The EAJA directs the court to award reasonable fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 

In determining whether a fee is reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the 

reasonable hourly rate, and the results obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 

154 (1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983), abrogated on other grounds 

by Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, (1989); 

Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 515 (9th 

Cir.2000); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.1998).

Here, the Commissioner does not dispute the reasonableness of the rates, but rather 

the number of hours expended. The Court finds that the requested rates, based upon the 

EAJA rate found on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals website, are reasonable.

As to the number of hours expended, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted detailed 

billing records showing the number of hours expended for each task. [Doc. No. 22-4 –

22-5.] The Commissioner disputes the reasonableness of the hours spent on particular 

tasks and then suggests what she thinks would have been a reasonable amount of time for

each task. [Doc. No. 24.] However, the Court sees no reason to dispute Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s representation that all hours were reasonably expended, especially after 

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Plaintiff’s request was adjusted in the reply. The Administrative Record in this case was 

over 800 pages long, and Plaintiff had complicated physical and mental health diagnoses, 

all of which had to be evaluated against Social Security regulations and guidelines. 

Given the complexity of the matter, as well as the fact that Plaintiff’s counsel submitted 

over 40 pages of briefing in this matter (not including the motion for attorneys’ fees), 

85.7 hours of attorney time is not unreasonable. See Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 

1212, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2000).1 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is 

GRANTED in the amount of $16,539.88. 

Dated: June 13, 2017

 

1 Given the concessions made in the reply as to duplicative and clerical hours, the Court declines to 

award an additional 9 hours for preparation of the reply.

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