Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01394/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01394-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0001 Establishment of PTO

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 

OF CALIFORNIA; BECTON,

DICKINSON AND COMPANY;

SIRIGEN, INC.; and SIRIGEN II 

LIMITED,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

AFFYMETRIX, INC.; and LIFE 

TECHNOLOGIES CORP., 

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-01394-H-NLS

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY OF 

THE ’673 PATENT; 

[Doc. No. 362.]

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NONINFRINGEMENT OF CLAIM 2 OF 

THE ’673 PATENT; AND

[Doc. No. 363.]

(3) ISSUING SUPPLEMENTAL 

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

[Doc. No. 364.]

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On February 25, 2019, Defendants Affymetrix, Inc. and Life Technologies Corp. 

filed: (1) a motion for summary judgment of invalidity of U.S. Patent No. 8,110,673; (2) a 

motion for partial summary judgment of non-infringement of Claim 2 of U.S. Patent No. 

8,110,673; and (3) a motion for supplemental claim construction. (Doc. Nos. 362, 363, 

364.) On March 8, 2019, Plaintiffs the Regents of the University of California, Becton, 

Dickinson and Company, Sirigen, Inc., and Sirigen II Limited filed responses in opposition 

to Defendants’ motions. (Doc. Nos. 378-80.) On March 15, 2019, Defendants filed their 

replies. (Doc. No. 397-99.) 

The Court held a hearing on the matter on March 21, 2019. Donald R. Ware, Barbara 

Fiacco, Marco Quina and Jesse Hindman appeared for Plaintiffs. Douglas E. Lumish and 

Brent T. Watson appeared for Defendants. For the reasons below, the Court: (1) denies 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of invalidity of the ’673 patent; (2) grants 

summary adjudication of non-infringement of claim 2 of the ’673 patent; and (3) issues a 

supplemental claim construction order construing the claim term “n is an integer from 1 to 

about 10,000.”

Background

On February 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint for patent infringement 

in this action against Defendants, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 9,085,799, U.S. 

Patent No. 8,110,673, U.S. Patent No. 8,835,113, U.S. Patent No. 9,547,008, U.S. Patent 

No. 9,139,869, U.S. Patent No. 8,575,303, and U.S. Patent No. 8,455,613. 1

 (Doc. No. 101, 

FAC.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ “Super Bright Dyes” products 

infringe the patents-in-suit. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 41.)

On March 26, 2018, the Court issued a claim construction order, construing the 

disputed claim terms from the ’799 patent, the ’673 patent, and the ’113 patent. (Doc. No. 

138.) On May 1, 2018, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of 

non-infringement of the ’799 patent. (Doc. No. 170.) On May 14, 2018, the Court denied 

 

1 Plaintiffs no longer assert infringement of the ’869 patent in this action. (See Doc. No. 375 at 1.) 

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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’673 patent and the 

’113 patent. (Doc. No. 183.) 

On September 4, 2018, the Court issued a second claim construction order, 

construing the disputed claim terms from the ’008 patent, the ’869 patent, the ’303 patent, 

and the ’613 patent. (Doc. No. 274.) On November 13, 2018, the Court issued the current 

scheduling order for this action. (Doc. No. 331.) By the present motions, Defendants 

move: (1) for summary judgment of invalidity of ’673 patent for failure to satisfy the 

written description requirement; (2) for summary judgement of non-infringement of claim 

2 of the ’673 patent; and (3) for a supplemental claim construction order construing the 

term “n is an integer from 1 to about 10,000” from the ’613 patent, the ’303 patent, and the 

’008 patent. (Doc. Nos. 363-1, 376, 376-1.) 

Discussion

I. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standards for a Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing 

substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 

Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1031 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 

accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not 

preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors 

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving 

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party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the 

nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case that 

the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322-23; Jones v. Williams, 

791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth, by 

affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); 

accord Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). To carry 

this burden, the non-moving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his 

pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 

(1996) (“On summary judgment, . . . the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings.”). 

Rather, the nonmoving party “must present affirmative evidence . . . from which a jury 

might return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts and draw 

all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court should not weigh the evidence or make 

credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed.” Id. Further, the Court may consider other materials in the record 

not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); 

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity of the ’673 Patent

Defendants move for summary judgment of invalidity of claims 1 and 2 of the ’673 

patent on the grounds that those claims fail to satisfy the written description requirement. 

(Doc. No. 376 at 10.) In response, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should deny Defendants’ 

motion because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the written description issue 

that preclude summary judgment. (Doc. No. 379 at 1.) 

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i. Legal Standards

The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides that the “specification shall contain 

a written description of the invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. “‘[T]he test for 

sufficiency’ of a patent’s written description ‘is whether the disclosure of the application 

relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession 

of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.’” Centrak, Inc. v. Sonitor Techs., Inc., 

915 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 

F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the 

test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the 

perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification 

must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor 

actually invented the invention claimed.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.

The Federal Circuit has further explained that “determining whether a patent 

complies with the written description requirement will necessarily vary depending on the 

context. Specifically, the level of detail required to satisfy the written description 

requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity 

and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id. (citation omitted).

“‘Compliance with the written description requirement is a question of fact, but is 

amenable to summary judgment in cases where no reasonable fact finder could return a 

verdict for the non-moving party.’” ScriptPro LLC v. Innovation Assocs., Inc., 833 F.3d 

1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting PowerOasis, Inc. v. T–Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 

1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see also Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1351 (The written 

description “inquiry, as we have long held, is a question of fact.”); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst 

Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (characterizing the written 

description inquiry as “fact intensive”). “To overcome the presumption of validity of 

patents, the accused [infringer] must show that the claims lack a written description by 

clear and convincing evidence.” Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 645 F.3d 

1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1338 (Fed. 

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Cir. 2016); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). 

ii. Analysis

Defendants argue the Court should grant summary judgment of invalidity of the ’673 

patent because the specification fails to provide an adequate written description disclosure 

for the following claim limitation: that the “aggregation sensor compris[e] at least three 

first optically active units per second optically active unit.” (Doc. No. 376 at 1-2, 5-10.) 

In response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ motion should be denied because disputed 

issues of fact exist as to this written description issue. (Doc. No. 379 at 5-10.) 

Claim 1 of the ’673 patent claims “a[n] aggregation sensor soluble in a polar 

medium” that contains “at least three first optically active units per second optically active 

units.” ’673 Patent at 37:46-58. The parties agree that this claim language, in other words, 

permits the claimed polymer to contain up to 25% (a 1:3 ratio) second optically active 

units. (Doc. No. 376 at 2; Doc. No. 379 at 1.) 

Defendants argue that the ’673 patent fails to provide an adequate written description 

because the patents’ specification discloses that the inventors only possessed a polymer 

with up to 7% second optically active units, not up to 25% as claimed. (Doc. No. 376 at 

5-10.) In making this argument, Defendants primarily rely on the disclosure contained in 

example 6 of the ’673 patent’s specification. In example 6, the patentees describe that 

“PFPB polymers were prepared with 1, 2.5, 5, and 7% BT[, i.e., second optically active 

units],” but that their efforts to obtain a polymer with 9% second optically active units 

“were unsuccessful.” ’673 Patent at 32:6-9.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that disputed issues of fact exist as to the written 

description issue. (Doc. No. 379 at 5-10.) The specification of the ’673 patent discloses: 

“The aggregation sensor can comprise a ratio of first optically active units to second 

optically active units of at least three, at least four, at least six, at least nine, or at least 

nineteen, or more, so long as a sufficient quantity of second optically active units is 

provided so that energy may be transferred effectively when the sensor is aggregated.” 

’673 Patent at 10:22-28. In his report, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Swager, opines that this 

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disclosure is sufficient to convey to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors 

were in possession of the claimed subject matter. (Doc. No. 389-4, Swager Rebuttal Report 

¶¶ 333-36.) Dr. Swager further provides an explanation of how a person of ordinary skill 

would have recognized that the inventors possessed the claimed polymer with up to 25% 

second optically active units despite the description contained in example 6.

2

 This 

evidence when credited and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs is sufficient to 

create triable issues of fact precluding summary judgment of the written description issue. 

See Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635 F.3d 1373, 

1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Where there is a material dispute as to the credibility and weight 

that should be afforded to conflicting expert reports, summary judgment is usually 

inappropriate.”).

Defendants note that the ’673 patent’s specification never describes any 

experimental work with a polymer with a BT content over 9%, and the ’673 patent’s 

inventors never made a polymer with a BT content higher than 7%. (Doc. No. 376 at 1-3; 

Doc. No. 407 at 1.) But “the written description requirement does not demand either 

examples or an actual reduction to practice.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352; see Alcon Research 

Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It is well settled that an 

invention may be patented before it is actually reduced to practice. Similarly, a patentee is 

not required to provide actual working examples.” (citation omitted)); LizardTech, Inc. v. 

Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“A claim will not be 

invalidated on section 112 grounds simply because the embodiments of the specification 

do not contain examples explicitly covering the full scope of the claim language.”). In 

sum, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of invalidity of the ’673 

patent. 

 

2 Defendants argue that Dr. Swager’s testimony regarding example 6 is not credible in light of the 

testimony from Dr. Guillermo Bazan, one of the named inventors of the ’673 patent. (Doc. No. 376 at 9-

10.) But at the summary judgment stage, the Court cannot make credibility determinations, and the 

testimony of Dr. Bazan must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 255; Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. 

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C. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Noninfringement of 

Claim 2 of the ’673 Patent

Defendants move for partial summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 2 of 

the ’673 patent. (Doc. No. 363-1 at 1.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to offer 

any evidence of infringement as to this particular claim. (Id.) Defendants explain that 

although Plaintiffs identified claim 2 of the ’673 patent in their infringement contentions, 

Plaintiffs’ infringement expert, Dr. Swager, failed to offer any infringement analysis or 

opinion for claim 2 of the ’673 patent in his expert report. (Id.)

In response, Plaintiffs explain that in an effort to streamline their case at the expert 

report stage, they elected not to offer any expert testimony on claim 2 of the ’673 patent in 

his expert report, in effect, moving claim 2 into their pool of unelected claims. (Doc. No. 

378 at 1.) Plaintiffs argue that they should be permitted to narrow their case without the 

Court entering a summary judgment of non-infringement. (Id.) 

“A patentee ordinarily bears the burden of proving infringement.” Medtronic, Inc. 

v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014). This is true even in 

declaratory judgment actions. “[W]hen [an accused infringer] seeks a declaratory 

judgment against a patentee to establish that there is no infringement, the burden of proving 

infringement remains with the patentee.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiffs specifically alleged infringement of claim 2 of the ’673 patent in the 

operative complaint, (Doc. No. 101 ¶ 61), and, in response, Defendants filed a counterclaim 

for a declaration of non-infringement of the ’673 patent. (Doc. No. 104 ¶ 138-41.)

Plaintiffs then elected not to present any infringement evidence for claim 2 of the ’673 

patent in this action. (Doc. No. 378 at 1.) 

The Court recognizes that it is often helpful to allow parties in an action for patent 

infringement to narrow the scope of their dispute by dropping certain patent claims from 

the action. Nevertheless, under these circumstances where Plaintiffs specifically alleged 

infringement of the claim at issue and included the claim in both its infringement 

contentions and its election of asserted claims, Defendants brought a counterclaim for a 

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declaratory judgment of non-infringement, and Plaintiffs then declined to present any 

infringement evidence as to the claim, it is appropriate to grant summary adjudication of 

that claim. As such, the Court enters summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ assertion of 

infringement as to claim 2 of the ’673 patent. See Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 

745 F.3d 1180, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“If an accused infringer has filed a counterclaim, 

then the patentee has notice that, even if it drops its infringement claims, the issue of 

infringement remains to be litigated.”). 

II. Defendants’ Motion for Supplemental Claim Construction

Defendants move for a supplemental claim construction order. (Doc. No. 376-1.) 

Specifically, Defendants argue that a dispute has arisen between the parties regarding the 

proper scope of the claim term “n is an integer from 1 to about 10,000” from Structure 

Patents (the ’613 patent, the ’303 patent, and the ’008 patent), and, thus, the Court should 

enter a supplemental claim construction order construing the claim term and resolving the 

parties’ dispute. (Id. at 1-4.) 

A. The Structure Patents (the ’613 patent, the ’303 patent, and the ’008 patent)

The invention disclosed in the ’613 patent, the ’303 patent, and the ’008 patent relate 

to “neutral conjugated water-soluble polymers with linkers along the polymer main chain 

structure and terminal end capping units.” ’613 Patent at (57) (abstract).

As an exemplary claim, Claim 1 of the ’303 Patent provides:

1. A water soluble conjugated polymer having the structure of Formula (Ia):

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wherein:

each R is independently a non-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility 

in water in excess of 10 mg/mL;

MU is a polymer modifying unit or band gap modifying unit that is evenly or 

randomly distributed along the polymer main chain and is optionally 

substituted with one or more optionally substituted substituents selected from 

halogen, hydroxyl, C1-C12 alkyl, C2-C12 alkene, C2-C12 alkyne, C3-C12

cycloalkyl, C1-C12 haloalkyl, C1-C12 alkoxy, C2-C18 (hetero)aryloxy, C2-C18

(hetero)arylamino, (CH2)x′(OCH2CH2)y′OCH3 where each x′ is independently 

an integer from 0-20, y′ is independently an integer from 0 to 50, or a C2-C18

(hetero)aryl group;

each optional linker L1 and L2 are aryl or heteroaryl groups evenly or 

randomly distributed along the polymer main chain and are substituted with 

one or more pendant chains terminated with a functional group selected from 

amine, carbamate, carboxylic acid, carboxylate, maleimide, activated esters, 

N-hydroxysuccinimidyl, hydrazines, hydrazids, hydrazones, azide, alkyne, 

aldehydes, thiols, and protected groups thereof for conjugation to another 

substrate, molecule or biomolecule;

G1 and G2 are each independently selected from hydrogen, halogen, alkyne, 

optionally substituted aryl, optionally substituted heteroaryl, halogen 

substituted aryl, boronic acid substituted aryl, boronic ester substituted aryl, 

boronic esters, boronic acids, optionally substituted fluorine and aryl or 

heteroaryl substituted with one or more pendant chains terminated with a 

functional group, molecule or biomolecule selected from amine, carbamate, 

carboxylic acid, carboxylate, maleimide, activated esters, Nhydroxysuccinimidyl, hydrazines, hydrazids, hydrazones, azide, alkyne, 

aldehydes, thiols, and protected groups thereof for conjugation to another 

substrate, molecule or biomolecule;

wherein the polymer comprises at least 1 functional group selected from 

amine, carbamate, carboxylic acid, carboxylate, maleimide, activated esters, 

N-hydroxysuccinimidyl, hydrazines, hydrazids, hydrazones, azide, alkyne, 

aldehydes, and thiols within G1, G2, L1 or L2 that allows, for functional 

conjugation to another molecule, substrate or biomolecule;

n is an integer from 1 to about 10,000; and

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a, b, c and d define the mol % of each unit within the structure which each can 

be evenly or randomly repeated and where a is a mol % from 10 to 100%, b 

is a mol % from 0 to 90%, and each c and d are mol % from 0 to 25%.

’303 Patent at 239:29-240:56. 

B. Legal Standards for Claim Construction

Claim construction is an issue of law for the court to decide. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. 

v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015); Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 

370, 372 (1996). Although claim construction is ultimately a question of law, “subsidiary 

factfinding is sometimes necessary.” Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 838.

“The purpose of claim construction is to ‘determin[e] the meaning and scope of the 

patent claims asserted to be infringed.’” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. 

Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that 

the ‘claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to 

exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

Claim terms “‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning[,]’” which 

“is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question 

at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312–13. “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of 

claim language as understood by a [PHOSITA] may be readily apparent even to lay judges, 

and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely 

accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. “However, in many 

cases, the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is not readily 

apparent.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360. If the meaning of the term is not readily apparent, 

the court must look to “those sources available to the public that show what a person of 

skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean,” including intrinsic 

and extrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. A court should begin with the 

intrinsic record, which consists of the language of the claims, the patent specification, and, 

if in evidence, the prosecution history of the asserted patent. Id.; see also Vederi, LLC v. 

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Google, Inc., 744 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In construing claims, this court relies 

primarily on the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history.”).

In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court should first look to the 

language of the claims. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582; see also Comark Commc’ns v. 

Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The appropriate starting point . . . is 

always with the language of the asserted claim itself.”). The context in which a disputed 

term is used in the asserted claims may provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of 

the term. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In addition, the context in which the disputed 

term is used in other claims, both asserted and unasserted, may provide guidance because 

“the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in 

other claims.” Id. Furthermore, a disputed term should be construed “consistently with its 

appearance in other places in the same claim or in other claims of the same patent.” 

Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001); accord

Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008); see also Paragon Sols., LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) (“We apply a presumption that the same terms appearing in different portions of the 

claims should be given the same meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, 

“‘[a] claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over 

one that does not do so.’” Vederi, 744 F.3d 1383.

A court must also read claims “in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 979; see 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (“The specification shall conclude with 

one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter 

which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”). “‘Apart from the claim 

language itself, the specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a claim term.’” 

Vederi, 744 F.3d at 1382. For example, “a claim construction that excludes [a] preferred 

embodiment [described in the specification] ‘is rarely, if ever, correct and would require 

highly persuasive evidentiary support.’” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo 

Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

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But “[t]he written description part of the specification does not delimit the right to 

exclude. That is the function and purpose of claims.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, 

Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Therefore, “it is improper to read 

limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the 

only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the 

patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 

1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The patentee is entitled to the full scope of his claims, and we will not 

limit him to his preferred embodiment or import a limitation from the specification into the 

claims.”).

In most situations, analysis of the intrinsic evidence will resolve claim construction 

disputes. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. However, “[w]here the 

intrinsic record is ambiguous, and when necessary,” district courts may “rely on extrinsic 

evidence, which ‘consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, 

including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.’” Power 

Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317). A court must evaluate all extrinsic evidence in 

light of the intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. “Extrinsic evidence may not be 

used ‘to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.’” 

Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Bell 

Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence . . . may not be used to vary, contradict, expand, or limit the 

claim language from how it is defined, even by implication, in the specification or file 

history.”); Vederi, 744 F.3d at 1382 (“[E]xtrinsic evidence may be less reliable than the 

intrinsic evidence.”). In cases where subsidiary facts contained in the extrinsic evidence 

“are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic 

evidence.” Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.

“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation 

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present in a patent’s asserted claims.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362. In certain situations, 

it is appropriate for a court to determine that a claim term needs no construction and its 

plain and ordinary meaning applies. See id.; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. But “[a] 

determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary 

meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when 

reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.” O2 Micro, 

521 F.3d at 1361. If the parties dispute the scope of a certain claim term, it is the court’s 

duty to resolve the dispute. Id. at 1362; accord Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring 

Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

C. Analysis of the Claim Term “n is an integer from 1 to about 10,000”

Defendants propose that the term “n is an integer from 1 to about 10,000” be 

construed as “the average number of repeat units, which may be calculated from the 

average molecular weight: n=M/M0.”3

 (Doc. No. 376-1 at 1, 5; Doc. No. 407-1 at 1.) 

Plaintiffs propose that the term be construed as “n is the number of repeat units in an 

individual polymer molecule.” (Doc. No. 389 at 3 & n.1.) Because the parties dispute the 

scope of this claim term, the Court must resolve the parties’ dispute. See O2 Micro, 521 

F.3d at 1361; Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318. 

The Court begins its analysis of the parties’ dispute by analyzing the intrinsic record, 

the claim language and the specification. The intrinsic record does not support Defendants’ 

proposed construction. Defendants propose that the Court construe the term “n is an integer 

from 1 to about 10,000” to be the average number of repeat units, which can be calculated 

from the average molecular weight as represented by the formula “n=M/M0.” (Doc. No. 

376-1 at 5.) But neither the claims nor the specification of the Structure Patents ever define

 

3 The Court notes that Defendants’ claim construction briefing contains typographical errors for the 

claim language at issue. Defendants at times write the claim term at issue as “n is an integer from about 

1 to about 10,000.” (See, e.g., Doc. No. 376-1 at 1.) At other times, Defendants write the claim term as 

“n is an integer from about 1 to 10,000.” (See, e.g., Doc. No. 407-1 at 1, 3.) Both of these are incorrect. 

The claim term as written in claim 1 of the ’303 patent is “n is an integer from 1 to about 10,000.” ’303 

Patent at 240:51; see also id. at 3:1, 24:5.

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or refer to the term “n is an integer from 1 to about 10,000” as representing the average 

number of repeat units. Further, the formula “n=M/M0” is found nowhere is either the 

claim language or the specification of the Structure Patents. 

Plaintiffs argue that the claim language’s use of the word “integer” actually counsels

against Defendants’ proposed construction. The Court agrees. An “integer” is defined as 

“[a] number which is not a fraction; a whole number.” OED ONLINE available at

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/integer (March 2019); see also THE 

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 909 (4th Ed. 2000) (“integer . . 

. 1. A member of the set of positive whole numbers {1, 2, 3, . . .}, negative whole numbers 

{-1, -2, -3, . . .}, and zero {0}”). (See also Doc. No. 407-1 at 3 (“an integer, i.e., a whole 

number”).) Plaintiffs correctly explain that this contradicts Defendants’ proposed 

construction because an average number of repeat units calculated based on an entire 

polymer sample can, and mostly likely would, be a fraction, not a whole number. (Doc. 

No. 389 at 5.) 

In response, Defendants argue that the claim language’s use of the word “integer” 

does not negate their proposed construction. (Doc. No. 407-1 at 3-4.) Defendants explain 

that although the claim language uses the word “integer,” the claim term in full states that 

“‘n is an integer from about 1 to 10,000.’” (Id. at 3.) Defendants argue that the phrase 

“from about” clarifies that the term integer is intended to be a rounded off approximation. 

(Id.) But the problem with this argument is that the claim language at issue does not 

actually contain the phrase “from about.” Claim 1 of the ’303 patent actually states: “n is

an integer from 1 to about 10,000.” ’303 Patent at 240:51. The word “about” only modifies 

the second number in the claim language and not the first number. Thus, the claim 

language does not imply that the word “integer” is only meant to represent a rounded off 

approximation. Further, Defendants fail to explain why if the claimed term “integer” is 

simply meant to be a rounded off approximation, the claims use the word “integer” rather 

than a different word like “number.” As such, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument.

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Defendants argue that the language in dependent claim 25 of the ’303 Patent supports 

their proposed construction. (Doc. No. 376-1 at 8-9.) Dependent claim 25 of the ’303 

Patent claims: “The water soluble conjugated polymer of claim 1, comprising a minimum 

number average molecular weight of greater than 40,000 g/mol and a water solubility of 

greater than 50 mg/mL in pure water or a phosphate buffered saline solution.” ’303 Patent 

at 254:12-16. This claim language does not support Defendants’ proposed construction. 

To the contrary, this claim language shows that when the inventors wanted to claim an 

average molecular weight, they used the term “average molecular weight.” Further, it is 

of no consequence that dependent claim 25 utilizes the term “average molecular weight” 

because “[u]nder the doctrine of claim differentiation, dependent claims are presumed to 

be of narrower scope than the independent claims from which they depend.” AK Steel 

Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see Trustees of Columbia 

Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, 

an independent claim is not restricted by an added limitation in a dependent claim. Trustees 

of Columbia Univ., 811 F.3d at 1370. As a result, Defendants cannot rely a limitation 

contained in dependent claim 25 in an effort to restrict the scope of independent claim 1 of 

the ’303 patent.

In support of their proposed construction for this claim term, Defendants primarily 

rely on extrinsic evidence, specifically a Polymer Chemistry textbook. (Doc. No. 376-1 at 

5 (citing Doc. No. 368-11, Ex. N at 3).) But “extrinsic evidence . . . may not be used to 

vary, contradict, expand, or limit the claim language from how it is defined, even by 

implication, in the specification or file history.” Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad 

Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2001). As explained above, the 

definition provided in Defendants’ extrinsic evidence contradicts the language contained 

in the claims, in particular the claimed requirement that “n” be an “integer.” 

In sum, the Court adopts Plaintiffs’ proposed construction for this claim term, and 

the Court rejects Defendants’ proposed construction. The Court construes the claim term 

“n is an integer from 1 to about 10,000” as “n is the number of repeat units in an individual 

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polymer molecule.”

Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

of invalidity of the ’673 patent, and the Court grants Defendants’ motion for partial 

summary judgment of non-infringement of claim 2 of the ’673 patent. In addition, the 

Court issues the above supplemental claim construction order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 21, 2019

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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