Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03001/USCOURTS-caDC-10-03001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 23, 2011 Decided December 20, 2011

No. 10-3001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JONATHAN L. FRANKLIN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:04-cr-00128-1)

Michael E. Lawlor, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Sicilia C. 

Englert, appointed by the court.

Stratton C. Strand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth 

Trosman, Sherri L. Berthrong, and John Dominguez, 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #10-3001 Document #1348600 Filed: 12/20/2011 Page 1 of 4
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: After a jury trial, Jonathan 

Franklin was convicted of serious drug offenses and 

sentenced to life in prison. He contends that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel when he declined the 

prosecution’s plea deal proposal and instead went to trial. 

The District Court rejected his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

* * *

In October 2005, Jonathan Franklin was indicted by a 

federal grand jury for his role in operating a massive D.C. 

drug ring. Within the multi-count indictment, three counts –

the RICO conspiracy, Continuing Criminal Enterprise (or 

CCE), and murder in aid of racketeering counts – carried 

mandatory life sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1); 18 

U.S.C. § 1963(a); 21 U.S.C. § 848(b).

At trial, Franklin and his counsel embarked on a 

concession strategy: They conceded guilt to less serious 

charges in an effort to build credibility with the jury and avoid 

convictions on the counts that carried lengthier sentences, 

including the counts with mandatory life sentences. The 

strategy almost worked: A jury found Franklin not guilty on 

several counts, including murder. But the jury found Franklin 

guilty on many other counts, including the RICO and CCE 

counts. Therefore, as required by law, the District Court 

sentenced Franklin to life imprisonment.

On direct appeal, we rejected most of Franklin’s 

challenges to his conviction and sentence. See United States 

v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Consistent with our 

common practice, we remanded his claim of ineffective 

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assistance of counsel for analysis in the first instance by the 

District Court.

On remand to the District Court, Franklin argued that his 

counsel had been deficient in proposing the concession 

strategy without conveying the risk that Franklin could still 

receive a life sentence even if acquitted on the RICO, CCE, 

and murder counts. The situation facing Franklin was this: If 

acquitted on the RICO, CCE, and murder counts, he would 

avoid a mandatory life sentence. But depending on which (if 

any) other counts he was convicted of, the District Court still 

might have discretion under the relevant statutes to impose a 

life sentence. Indeed, the advisory sentencing range under the 

Sentencing Guidelines could itself rise to life imprisonment 

even with acquittals on the RICO, CCE, and murder counts.

Franklin said he did not realize all of this when he agreed 

to go with the concession strategy. In particular, he claimed 

that he was not aware that he still might receive a life 

sentence even if acquitted on the RICO, CCE, and murder

counts. (Franklin’s trial counsel contested Franklin’s

assertion, but that dispute is not relevant for present 

purposes.) Franklin contended that, had he known the full 

situation, he would have accepted a plea deal to avoid any 

possibility of life imprisonment – even though a deal would 

have required him to cooperate with the Government and 

testify against his brother and cousin, who were codefendants.

But the District Court did not believe Franklin’s

testimony: “[T]he Court does not credit Mr. Franklin’s 

assertion that he would have accepted the Government’s 

cooperation plea offer and testified against his brother and 

cousin had he known that he could have received a life 

sentence under the concession strategy.” United States v. 

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Franklin, No. 04-128-1, slip op. at 18 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2009) 

(emphasis omitted).

We find no basis in the record to disturb the District 

Court’s credibility finding. As a result, Franklin cannot show 

a reasonable probability that he would have pled guilty – and 

thus received a sentence of less than life imprisonment – if he 

had been fully informed of the sentencing permutations. He 

therefore cannot show the required “reasonable probability”

that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

In light of our disposition and the arguments raised by the 

parties, we need not consider the more fundamental legal 

question whether a defendant such as Franklin – who receives 

a fair trial but claims he would have pled guilty had he 

received effective assistance of counsel – can state a claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Cf. Lafler v. Cooper, No. 

10-209 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2011).

* * *

We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

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