Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01073/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01073-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN BATIESTE GREENE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

FAY SERVICING, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.19-cv-01073-JSC 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE 

APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 23

Plaintiff John Batieste Greene, Jr. sued Fay Servicing, LLC (“Fay Servicing”), U.S. Bank, 

National Association (“U.S. Bank”), and Affinia Default Services, LLC (“Affinia”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”) in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Contra Costa, 

alleging violations of California law arising out of foreclosure proceedings.1 (Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. 

A.)2 Defendants timely removed the action to this Court asserting federal question jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(b), and alternatively, diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1332, 1441(b). (Dkt. No. 1.) Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s ex parte application 

for a temporary restraining order seeking to stop the foreclosure sale scheduled for March 28, 

2019. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing, and having had the benefit of oral 

argument on March 28, 2019, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s application. 

BACKGROUND

I. Complaint Allegations and Judicially Noticeable Facts

The following background is taken from Plaintiff’s complaint in the instant action and 

 

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 5, 10, 12.) 

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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facts in the related action, also before this Court: Greene v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 18-cv06689-JSC. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendants have improperly proceeded 

with foreclosure proceedings despite Plaintiff’s submission of a loan modification application. 

Plaintiff has at all relevant times owned and resided at the subject property located at 1795 

Meadows Avenue, Pittsburg, CA 94565. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶ 11.) In November 2005, Plaintiff 

obtained a loan of $599,000 from World Savings Bank, secured by a deed of trust. Greene, 2018 

WL 6832092, at *1. The loan was assigned to Wells Fargo in 2009 following a corporate merger. 

Id. 

On September 23, 2013, the trustee recorded a Notice of Default against the subject 

property. Id. Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy thereafter and entered into a Chapter 13 Plan. Id. 

Plaintiff was unable to make payments under the Plan, and on August 1, 2018, the bankruptcy 

court granted Wells Fargo relief from automatic stay following Plaintiff’s default. Id.

On September 20, 2018, Wells Fargo recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale, indicating that 

Plaintiff was in default under the Deed and a public auction would take place on October 22, 2018. 

Id. Wells Fargo subsequently postponed the trustee’s sale until January 10, 2019.3 Id. 

“Thereafter, Defendant U.S. Bank acquired the beneficial interest in the loan while Defendant Fay 

Servicing” became the servicer. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶ 12.) Defendant Affinia remains the trustee. 

(Id.) 

In December 2018, “Plaintiff submitted a complete loan modification” application to Fay 

Servicing. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Fay Servicing acknowledged receipt of Plaintiff’s “complete” application 

by letter dated December 28, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 16.) The letter informed Plaintiff that Fay Servicing 

could not “conduct a foreclosure sale before evaluating” his complete application. (Id. at ¶ 17.) 

The complaint asserts that “Defendants have not issued a written determination of Plaintiff’s 

complete loan modification application,” and impermissibly scheduled a foreclosure sale despite 

 

3 After becoming the servicer, Fay Servicing “instructed its trustee to postpone the sale while it 

was reviewing Plaintiff’s loan modification application.” (Dkt. No. 29-12 at ¶ 14.) The sale was 

then postponed from January 10, 2019 until February 11, 2019 “per lender/servicer request” and 

then again until February 25, 2019 “per lender/servicer request.” (Id.) The sale was then 

postponed further and is currently scheduled for March 28, 2019.

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failing to provide such written determination. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-38.) 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his complaint in state court on January 24, 2019 seeking damages and 

injunctive relief for alleged violations of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (“HBOR”), 

California Civil Code § 2924.11, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), 

California Civil Code § 1788, and the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business and 

Professions Code § 17200. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Plaintiff then filed an ex parte application for a 

temporary restraining order on February 22, 2019, seeking to stop the foreclosure sale of the 

subject property scheduled for February 25, 2019. (Dkt. No. 25-2, Ex. B.) The state court granted 

Plaintiff’s application by adopting his proposed order and set a hearing on Plaintiff’s request for a 

preliminary injunction for March 27, 2019. (Dkt. No. 25-3, Ex. C.) Defendants removed the 

action to federal court on February 27, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

Thereafter, on referral from Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler, (Dkt. No. 20), this Court 

issued an order relating the case to Greene v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 18-cv-06689-JSC, 

(Dkt. No. 21), and the case was reassigned to the undersigned on March 27, 2019. Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 7), and Plaintiff’s motion to remand, (Dkt. No. 11), are currently 

pending. Plaintiff filed the instant TRO application on March 26, 2019. (Dkt. No. 23.) 

Defendants Fay Servicing and U.S. Bank oppose the application. (Dkt. No. 29.) 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts may judicially notice an adjudicative fact 

if it is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: “(1) is generally known within the trial court’s 

territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

In opposition to Plaintiff’s TRO application, Defendants request judicial notice of ten 

exhibits: (1) “Deed of Trust dated November 23, 2005 and recorded on December 1, 2005 in the 

Contra Costa County Recorder’s Office”; (2) “Assignment of Deed of Trust from Wells Fargo 

Bank to U.S. Bank, National Association, as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust 

dated November 28, 2018 and recorded on November 28, 2018 in the Contra Costa County 

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Recorder’s Office”; (3) “Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust dated 

September 23, 2013 and recorded on September 24, 2013 in the Contra Costa County Recorder’s 

Office”; (4) “Notice of Trustee’s Sale recorded on September 20, 2018 in the Contra Costa County 

Recorder’s Office”; (5)-(8) PACER document reports for actions involving Plaintiff in this Court 

and U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California (Oakland); (9) “First Amended 

Chapter 13 Plan on behalf of [Plaintiff] filed . . . in U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Norther District of 

California (Oakland)”; and (10) “Declaration of Debtor in Support of First Amended Application 

to Modify Chapter 13 Plan, filed on behalf of [Plaintiff] . . . in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 

Northern District of California (Oakland)”. (Dkt. No. 29-1, Exs. 1-10.)

The Court has previously taken judicial notice of most of these documents in the related 

action, see Greene, 2018 WL 6832092, at *2-3, and all are appropriate for judicial notice pursuant 

to Rule 201(b) as undisputed matters of public record. See Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 

1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that judicial notice is appropriate for “undisputed matters of 

public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts.”) (internal citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the Court grants judicial notice of the proffered exhibits. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is “substantially identical” 

to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. 

Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under the original Winter standard, a party 

must show ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 

the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.’” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “Under the 

‘sliding scale’ variant of the Winter standard, if a plaintiff can only show that there are serious 

questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a 

preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s 

favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

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DISCUSSION

A. The State Court TRO has Expired

As a preliminary matter, the TRO issued by the state court prior to Defendants’ removal 

has expired. The rule in these circumstances is that “[a]n ex parte temporary restraining order 

issued by a state court prior to removal remains in force after removal no longer than it would 

have remained in effect under state law, but in no event does the order remain in force longer than 

the time limitations imposed by Rule 65(b), measured from the date of removal.” Granny Goose 

Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439-40 

(1974). Under Rule 65(b), a TRO “expires at the time after entry—not to exceed 14 days—that 

the court sets, unless before that time the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period or the 

adverse party consents to a longer extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (emphasis added). 

Here, the TRO was issued in state court on February 22, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 123.) 

Defendants removed the action to this Court on February 27, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1.) Thus, under 

Granny Goose and Rule 65(b), the state court-ordered TRO expired on March 13, 2019. 

B. Plaintiff Fails to Meet his TRO Burden

Plaintiff’s instant TRO application fails to show either a likelihood of success on the merits 

of his claims or serious questions going to the merits. 

Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing a likelihood of success, or even serious 

questions, going to the merits of his HBOR “dual-tracking” claim. Plaintiff bases all his claims on 

Defendants’ proceeding with foreclosure despite Fay Servicing’s acknowledged receipt of 

Plaintiff’s “complete” loan modification application on December 28, 2018, (see Dkt. No. 1-2 at 

30), and then going forward with the trustee’s sale without having issued a written determination 

on the loan modification request, in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.11(a). While the complaint 

alleges that “Defendants have not issued a written determination of Plaintiff’s complete loan 

modification application,” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶ 36), the record before the Court shows that allegation 

is not true. Defendants have submitted evidence that Fay Servicing issued a loan modification 

denial on January 7, 2019. (See Dkt. Nos. 29-12 ¶ 11; 29-14 at 1.) Defendants’ state court filings 

prior to removal specifically alleged and attached the January 7, 2019 loan modification denial, 

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and such filings were attached to Defendants’ Notice of Removal, (see Dkt. No. 1-2 at 117). 

Plaintiff’s TRO application and supporting declarations do not address this evidence or directly 

dispute that his loan modification request was, in fact, denied in writing. Instead, Plaintiff’s 

declaration in support of his TRO application includes as an exhibit only Fay Servicing’s

December 2018 letter acknowledging receipt of his complete application and makes no mention of 

the denial letter. (See Dkt. No. 24-1, Ex. A.) Thus, the undisputed evidence in the record is that 

Plaintiff’s loan modification request was denied in writing in early January and Plaintiff did not 

appeal the denial; therefore, proceeding with the trustee’s sale will not violate the HBOR, Cal. 

Civ. Code §§ 2924.11(a),(b).4 In other words, not only does Plaintiff fail to show a likelihood of 

success or serious questions going to the merits of his HBOR claims based on Defendants’ alleged 

failure to issue a written determination on his loan modification application, the record 

demonstrates that Fay Servicing did issue a written determination. 

Plaintiff’s claims under the RFDCPA are similarly deficient. Plaintiff alleges violations of

the RFDCPA under California Civil Code § 1788.10(e) based on “Defendants’ use of a Notice of 

Trustee Sale on Plaintiff’s home, despite the prohibition on dual tracking, as well as alleged 

violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692f.

5

 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 47-52.) Plaintiff’s RFDCPA 

claims fail for the same reasons these exact violations failed in the related action. See Greene, 

2018 WL 6832092, at *8-11 (dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s RFDCPA claims asserting 

violations of Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.10(e) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692f, because the 

claims were unavailable as a matter of law). The Court incorporates by reference its analysis in 

the related action, and concludes that the neither the complaint in this action nor Plaintiff’s TRO 

application counsel a different result. 

Plaintiff likewise fails to show either a likelihood of success on the merits or serious 

 

4 The January 2019 denial letter states that Plaintiff had 30 days to appeal the denial (until 

February 7, 2019), (Dkt. No. 29-14 at 2), and there is no indication in the record that Plaintiff did 

so. 

5 Section 1788.17 of the RFDCPA provides, in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other 

provision of this title, every debt collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall 

comply with the provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692j, inclusive, of, and shall be subject to the 

remedies in Section 1692k of, Title 15 of the United States Code.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. 

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questions going to the merits of his UCL claim. In the related action, the Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s UCL claim for failure to adequately allege “facts giving rise to a reasonable inference 

that Plaintiff’s injury—impending foreclosure—was caused by [the defendants’] conduct.” See

Greene, 2018 WL 6832092, at *11-12. The Court noted that the record instead showed that 

“Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and obtained a confirmed Chapter 13 Plan, defaulted on that Plan, 

and Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings after that default.” Id. at *11. Plaintiff then 

amended his complaint and the Court subsequently dismissed the UCL claim in the first amended 

complaint for the same reason—Plaintiff failed to adequately allege causation. See Greene, 18-cv06689-JSC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2019), Dkt. No. 36 at 14-16. 

The same analysis applies here. Plaintiff provides no allegations giving rise to a 

reasonable inference that the impending foreclosure was caused by Defendants’ conduct. In other 

words, there is nothing in the record that remotely suggests that Plaintiff’s default of the Chapter 

13 Plan was caused by Defendants. Indeed, the bankruptcy court filings refute that assertion and 

show that Plaintiff defaulted on the Plan due to financial hardship.

6

 (Dkt. No. 29-11, Ex. 10 at 1); 

see also Amer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 17-cv-03872-JCS, 2017 WL 4865564, at *12-13 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017) (dismissing UCL claim for lack of standing where plaintiff failed to 

show causation by alleging no conduct by defendant “contributing to his initial default,” but 

instead, “allege[d] that he defaulted on his loan because he began to experience financial hardship 

... and began falling behind on [his] mortgage payments”); DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 

10-CV-01390-LHK, 2011 WL 311376, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2011) (same).

Because Plaintiff’s TRO application fails to show either a likelihood of success on the 

merits of any of his claims or serious questions going to their merits, his application fails. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s application for a temporary 

 

6 Plaintiff’s Declaration of Debtor in Support of First Amended Application to Modify Chapter 13 

Plan, filed in bankruptcy court in September 2018, states, in pertinent part: “The reason for the 

modification of the Chapter 13 plan is that my income has reduced. I have been on temporary 

disability since September 2017 and it is unknown when I will return to work.” (Dkt. No. 29-11, 

Ex. 10 at 1.)

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restraining order. 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand, (Dkt. No. 11), is rescheduled for hearing on April 18, 2019 at 

2:00 p.m.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 23.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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