Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00213/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00213-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shaykh Muhammad Al Saud,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Clarence W. Dupnik, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0213-TUC-JAS-LCK

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Shaykh Muhammad Al Saud, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State 

Prison in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Kimmins for Report and Recommendation.1

 Before this Court are the 

Amended Petition (Doc. 7), Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, and Petitioner’s Response 

to the motion (Docs. 33, 37). The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after 

its independent review of the record, grant the motion to dismiss the Petition without 

prejudice on the ground that it is premature.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In the Superior Court of Pima County, Petitioner pled guilty to kidnapping on May 

11, 2015. (Doc. 33, Ex. B.) On May 21, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction 

Relief (PCR). (Id., Ex. C.) The trial court dismissed the notice as premature because 

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 This case was referred to the current Magistrate Judge on May 10, 2016. (Doc. 38.) 

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Petitioner had not been sentenced. (Id., Ex. D at 2.) Petitioner sought review in the court 

of appeals but the request was denied on January 6, 2016, because it was premature to 

seek post-conviction relief. (Id., Exs. E, F.) 

 On July 27, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. (Doc. 33, 

Exs. B, G.) On July 29, Petitioner filed a PCR Notice. (Id., Ex. H.) The court appointed 

counsel and ordered that the record be prepared. (Id., Ex. I.) To date, a PCR Petition has 

not been filed; the most recent extension allowed Petitioner until November 27, 2016, in 

which to file the petition. (Mtn to Extend Time and Order to Extend Time, State v. Al 

Saud, No. CR-20130740 (Super. Ct. Pima Cnty. Sept. 26, and Oct. 18, 2016).)2

 Prior to sentencing, Petitioner filed his initial petition in this Court on May 22, 

2015, followed by an amendment on July 6, 2015. (Docs. 1, 7.) 

DISCUSSION

 Respondents request dismissal of this matter for failure to exhaust state remedies. 

Before the federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must 

exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). Exhaustion in this case requires presentation of the 

claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th 

Cir. 1999); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Review of the state court docket reveals that Petitioner has a Rule 32 (PCR) ofright proceeding pending in state court (see supra note 2), which is the functional 

equivalent of a direct appeal. See Summers v. Shriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 

2007). A petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies if he has a state appeal pending 

at the time he files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal 

court. Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[w]hen . . . 

an appeal of a state criminal conviction is pending, a would be habeas corpus petitioner 

must await the outcome of his appeal before his state remedies are exhausted, even where 

 2

 These documents have not been filed in this case; however, the Court reviewed 

them on the superior court website, http://www.agave.cosc.pima.gov/AgavePartners/. 

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the issue to be challenged in the writ of habeas corpus has been finally settled in the state 

courts.”); Evans v. Ryan, No. CV-16-08-67-PCT-DLR (BSB), 2016 WL 4394184, at *2 

(D. Ariz. June 14, 2016) (recommending dismissal of habeas corpus petition as premature 

when Rule 32 of-right petition pending in state court), adopted, 2016 WL 4271863 (D. 

Ariz. Aug. 15, 2016); Martineau v. Elliot, No. CIV 08-1214-PHX-SMM (JRI), 2008 WL 

3582811, at *1 (D. Ariz., Aug. 13, 2008) (denying habeas corpus petition as premature 

where petitioner presently had a Rule 32 petition pending). 

 In response to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues that he did seek review in 

the court of appeals from the denial of his first PCR Notice, which exhausted his claims. 

Petitioner’s original appellate action was denied as premature because he initiated it prior 

to sentencing and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4 provides that a notice should 

be filed after the entry of judgment and sentencing. (Doc. 33, Ex. F at 2.) Petitioner did 

not present any claims to the appellate court in the manner required by the state courts, 

therefore, he did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement through that proceeding. See 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916-18 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Next, Petitioner alleges he is entitled to seek relief from federal court because state 

courts do not have jurisdiction over him due to foreign sovereign immunity. The Foreign 

Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides immunity from suit (except as provided in 

the Act) in any court of this country, federal or state, for foreign states. See Samantar v. 

Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 310, 326 (2010) (holding that foreign officials do not come within 

the FSIA). It does not offer any protection for individuals. Id. Finally, Petitioner argues 

he was coerced to plead guilty because his attorneys told him he would be sentenced to 

death or life in prison because of his race and religion. This is a substantive argument not 

responsive to the issue of exhaustion and whether his petition was filed prematurely. 

 Considering the pending Rule 32 “of-right” proceeding, which could affect 

Petitioner’s convictions and, ultimately, these proceedings, it is inappropriate for this 

Court to rule on Petitioner’s claims at this 

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time.3 See Sherwood, 716 F.2d at 634; Henderson v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 

2013) (stating that “Sherwood stands for the proposition that a district court may not 

adjudicate a federal habeas petition while a petitioner’s direct state appeal is pending.”). 

Additionally, Petitioner will suffer no prejudice as a result of a dismissal without 

prejudice. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (holding that a petition filed 

after a prior petition has been dismissed for failure to exhaust before the district court 

adjudicated any claims is not a second or successive petition). Because this habeas corpus 

proceeding is premature, the Court recommends that the Petition be dismissed without 

prejudice.4

RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order GRANTING the motion to dismiss (Doc. 33) the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus without prejudice as premature. 

 3

 Recently, Petitioner was granted PCR relief in a separate matter pending before the Maricopa County Superior Court. See Min. Entry, State v. Al Saud, No. CR2013-

112072-001 SE / CR2014-112041-001 DT (Super. Ct. Maricopa Cnty. Sept. 7, 2016). The Maricopa court vacated Petitioner’s plea agreements because (in accord with those 

agreements) the court had imposed sentences to run concurrently with the not-yet- imposed sentences in the Pima County case challenged in the instant action. (Id.) 

However, the Pima court subsequently determined its sentence should be consecutive to 

the Maricopa sentences. (See Doc. 33, Ex. G at 10, 16-17, 19.) Because the terms of the 

Maricopa plea agreements were not met, the court vacated them. The Maricopa documents were reviewed on the website for the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court, http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/index.htm. 

4 The parties do not address whether the Court should stay the Petition and hold it 

in abeyance in accordance with Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005) and Mena 

v. Long, 813 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2016) (granting district courts discretion to stay a fully unexhausted petition). However, the Court does not recommend that procedure in this case. The Supreme Court recognizes that petitioners who are “reasonably confused” 

about timeliness rules may file “protective” petitions in federal court and ask the court to stay and abey the federal habeas corpus proceedings under Rhines until the state remedies 

are exhausted. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005). By protectively filing a habeas corpus petition, a petitioner may comply with the one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas corpus petitions. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Here, because 

Petitioner’s Rule 32 “of-right” proceeding, a form of direct appeal, is still pending, the one-year limitations period has not commenced; therefore, there is no need to hold this 

proceeding in abeyance to prevent a statute of limitations problem. See id. Thus, 

dismissing the Petition under the circumstances of this case will not prejudice Petitioner. This case is in contrast to Mena, in which the petitioner had completed a direct appeal and one state court collateral proceeding. 813 F.3d at 909. 

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 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District 

Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are 

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CIV 15-213-TUC-JAS. 

 Dated this 8th day of November, 2016. 

Honorable Lynnette C. Kimmins

United States Magistrate Judge

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