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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United Smt~~ (,/,.iJf 1 ~f Appcais ·r~mh Utr:un: 

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&OBERT L liOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT STEWART, 

Plaintiff/Appellee, 

v. 

DONALD DONGES, 

Defendant/Appellant. 

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Nos. 88-2454 

& 88-3020 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CIV 87 0476JC) 

Stephen French, Walz & French, Albuquerque, New Mexico (M. Karen 

Kilgore, White, Koch, Kelly & McCarthy, P.A., Sante Fe, New 

Mexico, and Jerry A. Walz, Walz & French, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

with him on the brief) for Defendant-Appellant. 

Philip B. Davis, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Richard Rosenstock, 

Chama, New Mexico and Macon McCrossen, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, BROWN, District Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, of the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting 

by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 1 
This case presents the question of whether the filing of an 

interlocutory appeal from the denial of defendant's motion for 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity divests the district 

court of jurisdiction in the absence of a determination by the 

district court that the appeal is either frivolous or dilatory. 

We hold that it does, and because there was no such determination 

by the district court, it lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial 

in this matter as it did. We therefore vacate the district 

court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant also has by 

separate appeal raised the propriety of the district court's 

denial of his pretrial motion for summary judgment. We conclude 

that the district court correctly denied that motion. 

Accordingly, this matter must now be remanded to the district 

court for further proceedings. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND! 

Plaintiff-appellee Robert Stewart brought this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant-appellant Donald J. Donges for 

alleged violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments arising from the defendant's arrest of plaintiff for a 

reported larceny. Plaintiff alleged that defendant, a detective 

in the Rio Rancho, New Mexico, Police Department, conducted an 

inadequate investigation of the reported crime, made material 

1 For the sake of clarity, we set forth here only those 

procedural facts which are relevant to the jurisdictional issue. 

The factual allegations material to the denial of defendant's 

summary judgment motion appear in section II B, infra. 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 2 
misrepresentations and omissions in his affidavit in support of 

the warrant application, and then arrested plaintiff without 

probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. 

Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of 

qualified immunity. On August 12, 1988, the district court held a 

hearing on the motion. The district court denied that motion, 

holding that there were material facts in dispute. At that time, 

plaintiff's counsel engaged in the following colloquy with the 

court: 

THE COURT: I am going to deny the motion for summary 

judgment. I think there are several issues of fact that 

have not been resolved, and I cannot resolve them at 

this time, at this stage of the proceedings, so I will 

deny the motion. 

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL:] Thank you, your Honor. Your 

Honor, with respect to the Mitchell v. Forsyth Doctrine 

and with respect to the fact that we are on your 

trailing docket for September 12, may we inquire at this 

time of the defendant's intention to take an appeal to 

the Tenth Circuit from your denial of summary judgment? 

THE COURT: I think I have to grant them an 

interlocutory one. 

[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL:] I agree you have to, but, what I 

want to know is if they plan on doing it. I think that 

such appeal, with all due respect, would be frivolous 

and the Tenth Circuit has counseled against frivolous 

appeals. I don't want to lose my setting on your 

docket. . .. 

THE COURT: If they want to appeal, we will talk about 

that. I am not going to force them to make a decision 

at this moment. 

On August 15, 1988, the district court issued a written order 

denying defendant's summary judgment motion. 

On September 6, 1988, the district court denied defendant's 

oral motion for a stay of the trial proceedings pending appeal: 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 3 
This matter having come up on defendants' oral 

motion to vacate the current trial setting in this 

matter and to stay these proceedings pending resolution 

of defendant Donges' appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court 

of Appeals from the order denying his motion for summary 

judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the Court having 

considered the motion and having heard argument thereon 

and further being fully advised in the premises, finds 

it not to be well taken. Now therefore, 

It is ordered that defendants' motion to vacate the 

trial setting and for stay be, and hereby is, denied. 

On September 14, 1988, defendant filed his interlocutory 

appeal of the denial of summary judgment (No. 88-2454). After the 

notice of appeal was filed, the plaintiff evidently never sought 

to have the district court declare defendant's interlocutory 

appeal frivolous, nor did the defendant renew his request for a 

stay. Neither party sought to have this court stay the district 

court proceedings during the pendency of the appeal, and the case 

proceeded to trial before a jury. The district judge directed a 

verdict on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff at the 

end of the trial and submitted only the damages issue to the jury. 

The jury returned a verdict against defendant for $39,804 in 

compensatory damages and $47,000 in punitive damages. Defendant 

then took a second appeal to this court from that judgment (No. 

88-3020), which was consolidated with appeal No. 88-2454. Thus, 

we have before us both the appeal from the denial of summary 

judgment as well as the appeal from the final judgment entered in 

the plaintiff's favor. 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 4 
II. ANALYSIS 

A. Divestiture of Jurisdiction (Appeal No. 88-2454) 

As an initial matter, we must decide whether the defendant's 

interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity divested the district court of jurisdiction to 

conduct a trial. We hold that it did, and that because the trial 

was conducted without jurisdiction, it was a nullity. 

Our analysis of this question begins with the axiomatic 

premise that "a federal district court and a court of appeals 

should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case 

simultaneously. The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of 

jurisdictional significance--it confers jurisdiction on the court 

of appeals and divests the district court of its control over 

those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. 

Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per 

curiam). See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 

470 u.s. 3737, 379 (1985). 

Ordinarily the principle works the other way as well, and 

courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to review orders of the 

district court until there is a "final decision" from the district 

court under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. However, the Supreme Court has held 

that there is a small class of decisions "which finally determine 

claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted 

in the action, too important to be denied review and too 

independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 

consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 5 
Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541, 546 (1949). For 

appeals of decisions falling within the collateral order 

exception, the Court has given 28 u.s.c. § 1291 a "practical 

rather than a technical construction," and held that these types 

of interlocutory appeals ought to be treated as appeals from final 

decisions. Id. For example, in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 

651, 657-62 (1977), the Court held that the pretrial denial of a 

motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds falls 

within the "'collateral order' exception to the final judgment 

rule first announced in Cohen." The Court explained that such 

rulings constitute the trial court's final rejection of the double 

jeopardy claim, the double jeopardy claim is independent of the 

criminal prosecution, and the defendant's right not to be exposed 

to double jeopardy might be irretrievably lost if pretrial 

appellate review were not available. Id. at 657-62. 

·In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 u.s. 511, 530 (1985), the Supreme 

Court relied on Abney and held that the denial of a defendant's 

motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity was also a 

collateral order for which interlocutory appeal was available. 

The Court explained that a public official's entitlement to 

qualified immunity for actions not in violation of clearly 

established law "is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the 

other burdens of litigation. The entitlement is an 

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and, 

like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is 

erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id. at 526 (emphasis "in 

original). The Court further reasoned that the district court's 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 6 
"denial of summary judgment finally and conclusively determines 

the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial." Id. at 527 

(emphasis in original). And finally, the Court concluded that, 

like the immunity from trial implicated in a motion to dismiss an 

indictment based on double jeopardy, a motion for immunity from 

trial based on qualified immunity was "separate from the merits of 

the underlying action for purposes of the Cohen test." Id. at 

528-29. Because an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary 

judgment based on qualified immunity satisfied all of the criteria 

of Cohen and Abney, the Court held that such appeals were from 

collateral orders and could be taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Because the defendant's notice of interlocutory appeal in 

this case from the denial of his motion for summary judgment was 

timely filed and clearly proper under Mitchell, 2 we must next 

establish what the jurisdictional effect of that action was. We 

begin with the unassailable general proposition that the filing of 

a notice of appeal, whether from a true final judgment or from a 

2 The Court in Mitchell held "that a district court's denial of 

a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an 

issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning 

of 28 u.s.c. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final 

judgment." Id. at 530 (emphasis added). Although Mitchell's 

authorization for interlocutory appeals of rulings denying summary 

judgment based on qualified immunity was seemingly limited to 

those involving purely legal issues, this court has held that 

"[t]he Supreme Court's approval of an interlocutory appeal in a 

fact-specific case like Anderson [v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 

(1987)], in which the district court denied a pretrial qualified 

immunity defense motion, compels us to take an appeal, we believe, 

in all cases in which the denial is grounded upon a finding that 

disputed material facts exist in the case. Our task in such an 

appeal is . . . to determine whether . . . there exists a conflict 

sufficiently material to defendants' claim of immunity to require 

them to stand trial." DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason, 

Co., 844 F.2d 714, 719 (lOth Cir. 1988). The appeal in this case, 

therefore, falls squarely within DeVargas. 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 7 
decision within the collateral order exception, "is an event of 

jurisdictional significance--it confers jurisdiction on the court 

of appeals and divests the district court of its control over 

those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. 

Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). See 

Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 n.5 (lOth Cir. 1989); Garcia 

v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 818 F.2d 713, 721 (lOth Cir. 

1987) ("Filing a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. 

P. 3 transfers the matter from the district court to the court of 

appeals. The district court is thus divested of jurisdiction. 

Any subsequent action by it is null and void." (citations 

omitted) ) ; J. Moore & B. Ward, 9 Moore's Federal Practice, ,r 

203.11 at 3-45, 3-46 (2d ed. 1990). 3 

The divestiture of jurisdiction occasioned by the filing of a 

notice of appeal is especially significant when the appeal is an 

interlocutory one. Unlike an appeal from a final judgment, an 

interlocutory appeal disrupts ongoing proceedings in the district 

court. When the interlocutory appeal is from the denial of a 

motion to dismiss an indictment based on double jeopardy or from 

the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified 

immunity, the central issue in the appeal is the defendant's 

asserted right not to have to proceed to trial. The interruption 

3 The district court only retains jurisdiction over tangential 

matters such as determining "the propriety and amount of 

attorney's fees," Garcia, 818 F.2d at 721, and performing "certain 

ministerial functions in aid of the appeal, such as correcting 

clerical mistakes in the record, approving appeal bonds, and 

issuing stays or injunctions pending the appeal." C. Wright, A. 

Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, 16 Federal Practice and 

Procedure, § 3949 at 359 (1977). 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 8 
of the trial proceedings is the central reason and justification 

for authorizing such an interlocutory appeal in the first place. 

"[W]hen an interlocutory appeal is taken, the district court 

[only] retains jurisdiction to proceed with matters not involved 

in that appeal." Garcia, 818 F.2d at 721. Therefore, in such 

cases the divestiture of jurisdiction brought about by the 

defendant's filing of a notice of appeal is virtually complete, 

leaving the district court with jurisdiction only over peripheral 

matters unrelated to the disputed right not to have defend the 

prosecution or action at trial. In contrast to some interlocutory 

appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) that challenge discrete orders 

that can be carved out and isolated from the remainder of the 

case, a motion to dismiss the entire proceeding based on a defense 

of double jeopardy or qualified immunity cannot be so isolated. 

If the defense is valid, then no part of the action should proceed 

against the defendant. In that regard, an interlocutory appeal 

from an order refusing to dismiss on double jeopardy or qualified 

immunity grounds relates to the entire action and, therefore, it 

divests the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with any 

part of the action against an appealing defendant. See Apostol v. 

Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1989); cf. Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("Until this threshold 

immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed."). 

Because the district court is divested of jurisdiction to 

proceed to trial by the filing of a notice of interlocutory appeal 

raising a double jeopardy or qualified immunity issue, there is 

the risk that such interlocutory appeals will be subject to abuse. 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 9 
.As this court has previously explained in the double jeopardy 

context, 

the divestiture of jurisdiction rule, applicable 

generally when a defendant files a notice of appeal, 

should not leave the trial court powerless to prevent 

intentional dilatory tactics by enabling a defendant 

unilaterally to obtain a continuance at any time prior 

to trial by merely filing a motion, however frivolous, 

and appealing the trial court's denial thereof. 

United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 936-37 (lOth Cir. 1982). 

The court in Hines held that this potential misuse of 

interlocutory review could be prevented if the district court "(1) 

after a hearing and, (2) for substantial reasons given, (3) found 

the claim to be frivolous." Id. at 937 (numbering added). Upon 

such a procedure and an explicit finding that the claim raised on 

appeal was frivolous, the district "court should not be held 

divested of jurisdiction." Id. However, the court cautioned that 

"[t]his procedure is necessary" in order to prevent the 

divestiture of jurisdiction. Id. In Hines, the district court 

had held a hearing on the defendants' motion for abatement of the 

scheduled trial pending resolution of their Abney appeals. Id. at 

936. After the hearing, the district court issued an order in 

which it 

found that the arguments supporting the double jeopardy 

claims were frivolous and without merit, that the denial 

of the motions to dismiss and the pleas of double 

jeopardy and the subsequent filing of defendants' 

notices of appeal did not divest the district court of 

jurisdiction, and that the motion to abate proceedings 

pending appeal should be denied. 

Id. On appeal, this court held that such a finding of 

frivolousness enabled the district court to retain jurisdiction 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 10 
and to proceed to trial absent intervention by the court of 

4 appeals. Id. at 937. 

In Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1989), 

the Seventh Circuit applied the same analysis in the context of an 

interlocutory appeal based on qualified immunity, and it adopted a 

procedure for preventing abusive appeals which virtually mirrors 

the procedure established in the double jeopardy context by this 

court in Hines: 5 

Defendants may take [Mitchell v.] Forsyth appeals for 

tactical as well as strategic reasons: disappointed by 

the denial of a continuance, they may help themselves to 

postponement by lodging a notice of appeal. Proceedings 

masquerading as [Mitchell v.] Forsyth appeals but in 

fact not presenting genuine claims of immunity create 

still further problems. 

Courts are not helpless in the face of 

manipulation. District judges lose power to proceed 

with trial because the defendants' entitlement to block 

trial is the focus of the appeal. If the claim of 

immunity is a sham, however, the notice of appeal does 

not transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals, and 

so does not stop the district court in its tracks. 

Id. at 1338-39 (emphasis added). The court in Apostol held that 

under these circumstances, or where the defendant has forfeited 

the right to interlocutory appeal by not filing timely notice, "a 

district court may certify to the court of appeals that the appeal 

4 Although in Hines the district court determined that the 

defendants' motion was frivolous, it is clear that the court was 

properly focused on whether the appeal from that motion was 

frivolous and whether the appeal should delay the trial because 

the determination was made after the motion had been denied and 

the notice of appeal filed. See id. at 936. The district court 

specifically stated as part of its frivolousness ruling that the 

defendants' notices of appeal did not divest it of jurisdiction. 

Id. 

5 Interlocutory double jeopardy appeals are "so 

parallel to [Mitchell v.] Forsyth appeals that the 

freely transferable." Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1339. 

11 

closely 

principles are 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 11 
is frivolous and get on with the trial." Id. at 1339. The court 

was clear that it is the plaintiff's burden to obtain a 

determination that the defendant's appeal is frivolous or 

dilatory. "In the absence of the district court's reasoned 

finding of frivolousness or forfeiture, ... the trial is 

automatically put off; it should not be necessary for the 

defendants to come to this court, hat in hand, seeking relief that 

is already theirs by virtue of [Mitchell v.J Forsyth, which 

authorizes pre-trial appeals." Id. (first emphasis added). The 

court explained that it is only after the district court has 

determined the defendant's appeal to be frivolous or forfeited 

that the defendant must seek a stay from the court of appeals to 

prevent the trial from proceeding. Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1339. At 

that point, the frivolousness or forfeiture determination is 

reviewable because "we have jurisdiction to determine our 

jurisdiction." Id. 

Hines and Apostol both recognized that it is the district 

court's certification of the defendant's appeal as frivolous or 

forfeited rather than merely the fact that the appeal is frivolous 

which allows the district court to retain jurisdiction to conduct 

a trial. Other courts have similarly emphasized the need for a 

clear and reasoned finding of frivolousness or forfeiture by the 

district court in order to prevent the automatic divestiture of 

jurisdiction. See, ~' United States v. Leppo, 634 F.2d 101, 

105 (3d Cir. 1980) (district court must have found the motion to 

be frivolous and must have supported its conclusion by written 

findings in order to prevent an interlocutory double jeopardy 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 12 
appeal from divesting it of jurisdiction); United States v. 

Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied 

447 u.s. 926 (1980) ("Henceforth, the district courts, in any 

denial of a double jeopardy motion, should make written findings 

determining whether the motion is frivolous or nonfrivolous. 

If nonfrivolous, of course, the trial cannot proceed until 

a determination is made of the merits of an appeal."). This rule 

provides valuable certainty and clarity by creating a bright 

jurisdictional line between the district court and the circuit 

court. A contrary rule which would allocate jurisdiction upon the 

actuality of whether the appeal is frivolous rather than upon the 

district court's certification of frivolousness, would give rise 

to unwarranted confusion and uncertainty as district court 

jurisdiction could never be known until after the appellate court 

had ruled. Once a notice of appeal on an appealable issue such as 

qualified immunity is filed, the status quo is that the district 

court has lost jurisdiction to proceed. To regain jurisdiction, 

it must take the affirmative step of certifying the appeal as 

frivolous or forfeited, and until that step is taken it simply 

lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. 6 

6 Plaintiff argues that because the defendants in Hines had 

applied to this court for a stay of the proceedings, no 

divestiture of jurisdiction takes place in the absence of such an 

application. We disagree. The court in Hines recognized that it 

is the filing of the notice of interlocutory appeal itself that 

operates to divest the district court of jurisdiction. See id. at 

937. The court approved the certification of frivolousness or 

dilatory tactics as the only means for the district court to 

prevent that automatic divestiture: "'in the absence of a finding 

that the motion is frivolous, the trial court must suspend its 

proceedings once a notice of appeal is filed.'" Hines, 689 F.2d 

at 937 (quoting United States v. Leppo, 634 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 

[Footnote continued on next page ... ] 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 13 
Applying these principles to the case before us, we must 

determine if the district court made a reasoned determination that 

the defendant's interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion 

for summary judgment was either frivolous or forfeited. 7 We 

conclude that it did not. 8 

[ .•. footnote continued] 

1980)) (emphasis added). Motions for a stay pursuant to Fed. R. 

App. P. 8 or for a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition under 

28 U.S.C. § 1651 are potential remedies available to defendant to 

enforce his right not to be required to proceed to trial in a 

court that has lost jurisdiction over him because of his 

interlocutory appeal. But remedies should not be confused with 

rights. Defendants' right not to be tried while an interlocutory 

appeal is pending on qualified immunity arises "automatically" 

upon the appeal and "it should not be necessary for the defendants 

to come to this court, hat in hand, seeking relief that is theirs 

by virtue of Forsyth." Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1339. The standards 

that must be met to secure such extraordinary relief are very 

high, and thus the denial of such relief or the failure to grant 

such relief at the appellate level would ordinarily be without 

prejudice to the right of the defendant to argue the lack of 

frivolousness of his interlocutory appeal when the matter is 

considered by the appellate court on its merits. 

7 Plaintiff argues that Apostol established "new law" and that 

if this court adopts the reasoning of Apostol, it should not be 

applied to this case. We disagree. Applying the test set forth 

in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), we hold that the 

rule we apply was clearly foreshadowed by Hines and Apostol, and 

that the three part test of Chevron does not preclude application 

of this rule to this case. We do not, of course, address the 

potential application of this rule to any other cases that may not 

yet be final. 

8 Recognizing the need for a frivolousness determination, 

plaintiff has filed with this court a "Motion For Determination 

That The District Court Can Rule On Motion For Certification Of 

Frivolousness And Forfeiture Pending Before It." On November 22, 

1989, plaintiff filed a "Motion for Certification of Frivolousness 

and Forfeiture" in the district court. On January 5, 1989, the 

district court sua sponte stayed all proceedings relevant to that 

motion pending a determination by this court of its jurisdiction 

to rule on the motion. Plaintiff's motion to this court must be 

denied because it comes too late to validate a trial that has 

already been conducted without jurisdiction. Only a pretrial 

determination of frivolousness or forfeiture can return 

jurisdiction to the district court during the pendency of an 

[Footnote continued on next page ... ] 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 14 
In denying the defendant's motion for a stay of the 

proceedings pending appeal (which was made before the notice of 

appeal was filed), the district court ruled that it found the 

motion was "not to be well taken." R. Vol. II, Doc. 219. Because 

that ruling nowhere addressed frivolousness or forfeiture, it 

cannot constitute a finding sufficient to have prevented a 

divestiture of jurisdiction. The district court might simply have 

been concluding that the motion for a stay was not well taken 

because no notice of appeal had yet been filed, or perhaps the 

court erroneously was applying the Fed. R. App. P. 8 standard of 

"likelihood of success on the merits" rather than a frivolousness 

standard in reaching its conclusion. There is simply no way for 

us to determine the basis of the court's ruling on the record 

before us. The fact that the district court's ruling on the 

defendant's motion to stay in this case is subject to multiple 

interpretations demonstrates the importance of Hines' requirement 

that the district court expressly state substantial-reasons for 

finding the appeal to be frivolous or forfeited. That requirement 

avoids the "confusion or waste of time resulting from having the 

same issues before two courts at the same time." United States v. 

Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 

3192, 110 S. Ct. 56 (1989) (quoting United States v. Clairborne, 

727 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 u.s. 829 (1984)). 

[ .•. footnote continued] 

interlocutory appeal under Mitchell. Once the notice of appeal 

divests the district court of jurisdiction, "[a]ny subsequent 

action by it is null and void." Garcia v. Burlington Northern 

R.R. Co., 818 F.2d 713, 721 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 15 
Plaintiff argues that the district court's order directing a 

verdict in favor of the plaintiff is tantamount to a determination 

of frivolousness. This argument is without merit because a 

directed verdict requires application of a different standard than 

a frivolousness determination. A judge could grant a directed 

verdict even if there was a bona-fide doubt about the law so long 

as the evidence pointed in only one direction. Yet an appeal 

challenging the judge's interpretation of the law would not be 

frivolous. Compare Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284, 1288 

(lOth Cir. 1986), with Zimmerman v. First FederalS & L Ass'n, 848 

F.2d 1047, 1051 (lOth Cir. 1988). In any event, the directed 

verdict ruling came at the end of trial rather than at the outset 

and hence could not validate the trial. 

In conclusion, we hold that because the district court made 

no certification that the defendant's appeal from the denial of 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity was frivolous or 

forfeited, the district court was automatically divested of 

jurisdiction. Because the subsequent trial was conducted without 

jurisdiction, the court's judgment is without effect. In the next 

subsection, we hold that the district court correctly denied the 

defendant's motion for summary judgment due to a dispute of 

material fact, and thus we must remand for further proceedings. 9 

9 Given that the interlocutory appeal authorized by Mitchell v. 

Forsyth is designed to protect a governmental defendant's asserted 

right not to have defend against suit at trial, our holding might 

at first appear to produce the anomalous result of subjecting the 

defendant to a second trial in order to safeguard his right to 

avoid the first one. However, we believe that our holding at 

least partially vindicates defendant's qualified immunity rights 

by not enforcing a judgment against him that was the product of 

[Footnote continued on next page ... ] 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 16 
B. Denial of Summary Judgment (Appeal No. 88-3080) 

The district court denied defendant's motion for summary 

judgment, ruling that there were material facts in dispute such 

that summary judgment was inappropriate. As discussed above, an 

interlocutory appeal may be taken in all cases where the denial of 

defendant's qualified immunity summary judgment motion is 

"grounded upon a finding that disputed material facts exist in the 

case." DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., 844 F.2d 

714 (lOth Cir. 1988). The following standards and procedures 

apply when qualified immunity is raised as a defense in a motion 

for summary judgment and our review of the district court's 

conclusion is guided accordingly: 

"In an attempt to balance the need to preserve an 

avenue for vindication of constitutional rights with the 

desire to shield public officials from undue 

interference in the performance of their duties as a 

result of baseless claims, the Court [has] adopted an 

objective test to determine whether the doctrine of 

qualified immunity applies." Pueblo Neighborhood Health 

Centers, Inc., v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (lOth Cir. 

1988). The test for qualified immunity is whether 

defendants violated "clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982). "If the law at that time was not clearly 

established, an official could not reasonably be 

expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, 

nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law 

[ ..• footnote continued] 

trial unsupported by jurisdiction, while at the same time ensuring 

that the rights of future governmental defendants are protected. 

But c.f. United States v. Rumpf, 576 F.2d 818, 821 (lOth Cir. 

1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 893 (1978) (where Abney was decided 

after trial had been held and appeal was pending, court of appeals 

would not apply Abney retroactively and order another trial). 

Moreover, since we cannot say with certainty whether or not there 

will even be a second trial, that possibility should not govern 

our analysis. 

17 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 17 
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful." 

Id. The qualified immunity defense "provides ample 

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 

u.s. 335, 341 (1986). 

Because of the important values protected by 

qualified immunity, the procedures to be followed when 

this particular affirmative defense is raised differ 

from those applicable to most other affirmative 

defenses. Once a defendant raises the defense of 

qualified immunity as a defense to an action, "[t]he 

plaintiff carries the burden of convincing the court 

that the law was clearly established." Pueblo 

Neighborhood, 847 F.2d at 645. The plaintiff must "come 

forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show 

both that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the 

law and that the law was clearly established when the 

alleged violation occurred." Id. at 646. Only after 

plaintiff has shown a violation of a clearly established 

right does the defendant assume the normal burden of a 

movant for summary judgment of establishing that no 

material facts remain in dispute that would defeat her 

or his claim of qualified immunity. See id. Thus, 

unless and until the plaintiff is able to make the 

required showing that defendant's conduct violated a 

"clearly established" right, the government official is 

properly spared the burden and expense of proceeding any 

further. 

Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1456-57 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

The district court in this case denied defendant's motion for 

summary judgment solely based on the existence of material factual 

disputes. Thus, implicitly the district court must have concluded 

that plaintiff had carried his initial burden of alleging conduct 

in violation of clearly established law. We first review the 

plaintiff's allegations before proceeding to discuss the 

applicable case law. 

18 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 18 
1. Plaintiff's Allegations 

After conducting an investigation, defendant Donges prepared 

an affidavit and presented it to the Assistant District Attorney 

for approval. The defendant's affidavit offered in support of the 

arrest warrant application provided as follows: 

December 4, 1985[.] Ms. Jane MacKenzie notified the Rio 

Rancho Police Department that she believed that Mr. Rod 

Stewart, who had been staying at her residence, located 

at 1365 Sunset Road, Rio Rancho, Sandoval County, New 

Mexico, had removed from her residence one Sylvania 

color television set, one stereo system, one clock, one 

Polaroid camera and two Coleman sleeping bags. She 

advised that Mr. Stewart had been staying with her 

husband at his residence for a period of time. When she 

went to the residence she observed these items missing 

and notified authorities. 

December 7, 1985 Mr. Stewart was located in the parking 

lot of the Anchor Inn by Officers Jordan and Acosta. 

Affiant met with these officers in the parking lot and 

advised Mr. Stewart of the nature of this investigation. 

Mr. Stewart agreed to allow officers to search his 

apartment for the stolen property. Upon arrival the 

search was conducted and two Coleman sleeping bags were 

located in the rear bedroom of his apartment. Mr. 

Stewart stated that Mr. MacKenzie had allowed him to 

take the sleeping bags from the residence. 

Affiant contacted Mr. Tony Trianfo, polygrapher for 

Sandoval County District Attorney's Office, in order to 

administer a polygragh examination to Mr. Stewart in 

regards to his alleged involvement in the theft of the 

aforementioned property. 

On January 7, 1986 Mr. Trianfo advised affiant that he 

had, in fact, administered the requested examination to 

Mr. Stewart and that Mr. Stewart, in his opinion, was 

deceptive. 

Affiant is a full time, certified and salaried peace 

officer in the State of New Mexico with over 4! years of 

criminal investigative experience. 

Affiant prays that a warrant will issued for Mr. 

Stewart's arrest. [The following additional handwritten 

statement appears on the affidavit:] Affiant believes 

that Mr. MacKenzie did not give consent for these items 

due to the fact that victim was in treatment at the time 

according to Mrs. MacKenzie. 

19 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 19 
R. Vol. I, Doc. 147, Exhibit 8. The Assistant District Attorney 

approved the sufficiency of the affidavit, and a warrant for 

Stewart's arrest was obtained from the local magistrate. Stewart 

was then arrested by Detective Donges on January 8, 1986. The 

charges against Stewart were ultimately dismissed in September 

1986. 

Plaintiff alleged that sometime after December 7, 1985, but 

before Stewart was arrested, Rio Rancho police officer Rusty Brown 

told Detective Donges that Mr. MacKenzie had been bragging at the 

Anchor Inn that he had caused Stewart trouble by accusing him of 

taking the sleeping bags; that Mr. MacKenzie said he had made the 

false accusation as part of an insurance scam; and that Detective 

Donges needed to investigate the case further. See R. Vol. I, 

Doc. 147 at 5. Defendant denied that Officer Brown ever made any 

such statements. See R. Vol. II, Doc. 198 at 3. 

2. Clearly Established Law 

Although the parties devote large portions of their briefs to 

a discussion of cases decided after the events at issue took 

place, in determining whether defendant violated plaintiff's 

clearly established rights, we may consider only those decisions 

decided prior to the allegedly unlawful arrest of plaintiff. "'A 

plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or 

statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified 

immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly 

established at the time of the conduct at issue.'" Lutz v. Weld 

County School Dist. No. 6, 784 F.2d 340, 343 (lOth Cir. 1986) 

20 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 20 
(quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1983) (emphasis 

added)). 

The affidavit in support of the warrant request in this case 

has sufficient indicia of probable cause for a reasonable officer 

to believe that there was probable cause. The affidavit detailed 

a victim's report, the suspect's opportunity to have stolen the 

goods, and the discovery of some of the goods which were reported 

stolen in the suspect's apartment during a consensual search, as 

well as a polygraph examination indicating deceptive responses. 

Plaintiff makes no substantive argument that the facts set forth 

in the affidavit would not give rise to probable cause. Instead, 

plaintiff focuses on defendant's alleged failure to disclose in 

the affidavit the information which plaintiff claims was reported 

to defendant by Officer Brown. 10 Therefore, we must determine 

whether it was clearly established at the time of plaintiff's 

arrest that making omissions of the type alleged from an affidavit 

givea to obtain an arrest warrant violated plaintiff's rights 

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We conclude that it 

was. 

10 Plaintiff asserts that there are three other "disputed 

material facts" which support the district court's ruling. 

Plaintiff claims defendant omitted from his affidavit the fact 

that Mrs. MacKenzie's statement (that her husband could not have 

consented to Stewart's use of the sleeping bags because he was in 

the hospital) conflicted with the dates given in the police 

report. However, there was no factual dispute on this point as 

defendant acknowledged the omission. Defendant also acknowledged 

omitting from the affidavit the fact that Mr. MacKenzie was in an 

alcohol rehabilitation program. Finally, there was not a factual 

dispute about whether Donges told the Assistant District Attorney 

that he had not attempted to interview Mr. MacKenzie. In any 

event, because we hold that there was at least one material fact 

in dispute, we do not address plaintiff's other alleged factual 

disputes concerning either omissions or misrepresentations. 

21 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 21 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court 

held that: 

where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary 

showing that a false statement knowingly, or with 

reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the 

affiant, and if the allegedly false statement is 

necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth 

Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the 

defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing 

the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is 

established by the defendant by a preponderance of the 

evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set 

to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is 

insufficient to establish probable cause, the search 

warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search 

excluded to the same extent as if the probable cause was 

lacking on the face of the warrant. 

Id. at 155-56. The Court emphasized that a defendant must make 

"allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for 

the truth .•. [a]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake 

are insufficient." Id. at 171. However, the Supreme Court in 

Franks did not determine whether a defendant was entitled to such 

a hearing in order to attempt to show deliberate or reckless 

omissions of material information from an affidavit. 

Prior to the time of plaintiff's arrest in this case, the 

Tenth Circuit had not addressed whether the standards of Franks 

governed omissions as well as affirmative misstatements. 11 

However, several of the other circuits had indicated that the 

"deliberate falsehood" and "reckless disregard" standards of 

11 The court has since suggested that a material omission from 

a warrant application may violate the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment in the same manner as a deliberate misstatement of a 

material fact does. See United States v. Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 

1498-99 (lOth Cir. 1989) (applying Franks and holding that the 

defendant "did not make a substantial preliminary showing that the 

warrant affidavits contained deliberate falsehoods, or false 

statements or omissions made with reckless disregard for the 

truth" (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)). 

22 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 22 
Franks applied to material omissions, as well as affirmative 

falsehoods. 12 See, ~' United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 

1482, 1486-87 n.l (9th Cir. 1985); Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277, 

281 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The Franks rationale applies with equal 

force where police officers secure a warrant through the 

intentional or reckless omission of material facts." (emphasis in 

original)); United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir.) 

("Omissions from an affidavit that are claimed to be material are 

governed by [Franks v. Delaware]), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 841 

(1985); United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1984) 

("[w]e acknowledge that the rationale of Franks applies to 

omissions") (cases cited), cert. denied, 470 u.s. 1003 (1985); 

United states v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("the 

reasoning of Franks 'logically extends . to material 

omissions'" (quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 4.4 (Supp. 

1982))); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 959 

(11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th 

Cir. 1980) ("allegations of material omissions [are] to be treated 

essentially similarly to claims of material misstatements") . 13 

12 Morfin v. Albuquerque Public Schools, 906 F.2d 1434 (lOth 

Cir. 1990) ("In the absence of contemporary Tenth Circuit 

precedent directly concerning the issue, we may look to the law of 

other circuits when deciding whether or not a right was clearly 

established.") 

13 Whether the omitted statement was material is determined by 

examining the affidavit as if the omitted information had been 

included and inquiring if the affidavit would still have given 

rise to probable cause for the warrant. 

If an affidavit can be challenged because of material 

omissions, the literal Franks approach no longer seems 

adequate because, by their nature, omissions cannot be 

deleted. One method would be to delete those 

[Footnote continued on next page ... ] 

23 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 23 
Therefore, we hold that at the time defendant submitted his 

affidavit and arrested plaintiff, it was a clearly established 

violation of plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 

knowingly or recklessly omit from an arrest affidavit information 

which, if included, would have vitiated probable cause.

14 

[ •.. footnote continued] 

technically true, though misleading, statements 

contained in the affidavit to which the omissions 

pertain. However, this approach may not always be 

effective, especially when the government omits an 

entire set of facts and it is unclear that they 

contradict any single statement in the affidavit but 

rather call the entire affidavit into doubt. (For 

example, an affidavit listing facts that might give rise 

to probable cause but omitting adverse facts would not 

make the individual alleged facts misleading in 

themselves.) A better approach, therefore, would be to 

delete false or misleading statements and insert the 

omitted truths revealed at the suppression hearing. 

Ippolito, 774 F.2d at 1487 n.1; see Williams, 737 F.2d at 604; 

West Point-Pepperell, 689 F.2d at 959; Martin, 615 F.2d at 328. 

Thus, not every omission of relevant information will be regarded 

as "material." The omitted information must be so probative as to 

negate probable cause. We do not, in this case, need to define 

the parameters of materiality with any greater precision because 

here we are dealing only with an alleged recanting of the sole 

accusation upon which the arrest warrant was predicated. Our 

holding is limited to a conclusion that this omission is material. 

14 Our conclusion that the law was "clearly established" does 

not necessarily imply that it was frivolous for defendant to argue 

otherwise in his interlocutory appeal. As long as there was no 

controlling Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent at the time 

and it required an extension of the holding in Franks to establish 

a duty on behalf of the defendant not to withhold material 

information from the search warrant affidavit, we cannot 

necessarily say that an appeal arguing that the law was therefore 

not clearly established was "frivolous," a "sham," Apostol, 870 

F.2d at 1339, or "wholly without merit," Zimmerman, 848 F.2d at 

1051. A frivolousness standard is not only a more difficult 

standard to meet than a "clearly established" standard, it must be 

kept in mind that the "clearly established" standard is applied to 

the state of the law while the "frivolousness" standard asks not 

what the law was, but whether it could even be argued that the law 

was not clearly established. However, for purposes of this appeal 

we need not determine whether the appeal was, in fact, frivolous. 

24 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 24 
We further hold it was clearly established at the time of 

plaintiff's arrest that it would be highly material whether 

Officer Brown told defendant that Mr. MacKenzie had recanted on 

his accusation. Franks does not extend to immaterial omissions. 

See ~' United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied 449 u.s. 824 (1980) (failure to disclose that 

informant was defendant's estranged wife is immaterial under 

Franks because magistrate could still have found probable cause 

had that information been included); United States v. Williams, 

737 F.2d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 

(1985) (where omitted fact was of marginal value, no violation 

occurred under Franks). However, we can conceive of few omissions 

which would be more material than the failure to disclose that the 

main complainant had recanted his testimony and confessed it was a 

fabrication. If Officer Brown had in fact told Donges that 

information before the warrant against Stewart was obtained, then 

Stewart's failure to disclose that fact in his affidavit would be 

a reckless omission of a material fact in violation of plaintiff's 

clearly established rights because the affidavit would not support 

probable cause if it were modified so as to include that 

exculpatory evidence. Because the parties' summary judgment 

briefs disputed whether Brown did inform defendant of MacKenzie's 

recantation, "a triable conflict on [a] fact[] material to 

defendant['s] defense" existed such that we conclude that "there 

25 

Appellate Case: 88-3020 Document: 01019708220 Date Filed: 09/17/1990 Page: 25 
exists a conflict sufficiently material to require [defendant] to 

stand trial." DeVargas, 844 F.2d at 719. 15 

III. CONCLUSION 

Defendant's timely notice of interlocutory appeal divested 

the district court of jurisdiction because the district court did 

not declare his appeal frivolous. Because the trial held by the 

district court was conducted without jurisdiction and is therefore 

a nullity, we VACATE the district court's ruling directing a 

verdict in favor of plaintiff and the subsequent award of damages 

by the jury. We AFFIRM the district court's ruling denying 

defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified 

immunity because there was a factual dispute material to a 

determination of whether the defendant recklessly omitted a 

critical fact from the affidavit he submitted in seeking a warrant 

for the arrest of plaintiff. Accordingly, we REMAND for-further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

15 Because we hold that it was clearly established that an 

officer was liable under § 1983 for deliberate or reckless 

omissions of information vitiating probable cause, we do not 

consider whether the parameters of an officer's liability for 

failing to recognize that the facts stated in an affidavit do not 

support probable cause were clearly established. Likewise, we do 

not address defendant's argument that once probable cause is 

established, an officer has no duty to investigate further. 

26 

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