Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00231/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00231-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Vernon Rawls, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County, et al., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-231-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed

by Defendants Maricopa County and County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (“the County

Defendants”) (Dkt. # 5) and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Marciano Murillo

(“Murillo”). (Dkt. #15.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Murillo’s motion

and grants the County Defendants’ motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Vernon Rawls raises the following allegations against the County

Defendants, Murillo, and Officer Brian Solla: In October of 2008, Plaintiff was an inmate

at the Durango Jail in Maricopa County, Arizona. (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 7.) On October 8, 2008, at

approximately 10:00 p.m., Plaintiff was sleeping in his bunk when several officers, including

Murillo, entered Plaintiff’s cell and ordered the inmates to leave. (Id. at ¶ 8.) According to

Plaintiff, the officers ordered the inmates to vacate their cell to permit the officers to search

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the cell without the inmates being present. Plaintiff, who was allegedly sleeping soundly due

to sleep medication provided by authorities at the jail, attempted to comply with the officers’

order by waking up and attempting to climb down from his bunk to leave the cell. (Id.) One

or more of the officers, including Murillo, however, apparently did not feel that Plaintiff was

moving from his bunk and out of the cell fast enough. These officers grabbed Plaintiff and

forcibly threw him to the floor. (Id. at ¶ 9.) As a result of this violent use of force, Plaintiff’s

knee struck a hard object, allegedly causing severe injuries. (Id.) 

On February 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendants’ excessive

force violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleges negligence pursuant to Arizona law.

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations

. . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The plausibility standard “asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads

facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555) (internal citations omitted).

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll

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allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations, however, are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a

motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

DISCUSSION

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of

state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It does not create any

substantive rights; instead, it is a vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge the actions of

government officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to recover under § 1983, a plaintiff

must show the violation of a right protected by the Constitution or federal law, that was

proximately caused by conduct of a “person” named as a defendant acting under color of

state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To prevail under § 1983,

a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the state official acted with deliberate indifference. See

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). When a plaintiff raises a claim against

a municipality pursuant to §1983, he or she must further allege facts demonstrating that the

municipality itself caused the constitutional violation. Id. at 388. According to the Ninth

Circuit, there are two routes to municipal liability under the statute. The first route applies

when a plaintiff sets forth facts indicating that the municipality inflicted a constitutional

injury through its policy, custom, or practice. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d

1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). Alternatively, a plaintiff may allege municipal liability through

facts showing that “the municipality was on actual or constructive notice that its omission

would likely result in a constitutional violation,” and yet failed to act. Id. at 1186.

Plaintiff has adequately alleged all the required elements of a § 1983 claim against

Murillo. First, Plaintiff has alleged a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment civil rights.

According to Plaintiff, he was physically grabbed and thrown to the floor by use of excessive

force. (Dkt. #1.) Similarly, Plaintiff has alleged that the constitutional violation was caused

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To the extent that the County Defendants argue in their Reply brief (Dkt. #12) that

Maricopa County cannot be liable for the events alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, because it

does not operate the Durango Jail, that argument is not properly before the Court.

Defendants have waived that argument, at least for the purposes of the instant motion, by

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by the defendants acting under color of law. In his Complaint, he alleges that the violations

of his rights were caused by Murillo, through his use of unreasonable and excessive force in

throwing Plaintiff to the floor. These actions caused Plaintiff’s knee to strike a hard object,

causing severe injuries. (Id.) As an officer of Maricopa County acting pursuant to his duties

as an officer, it further appears that Murillo was acting under color of law. The violent

nature of the conduct implies that officer Murillo acted with deliberate indifference.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a claim against Murillo.

Regarding the County Defendants, Plaintiff may have raised a state law claim for

negligence – e.g. negligent supervision, hiring, or training, but a § 1983 action against a

municipality requires something more. A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for failure

to train its police force when it can be proven that the municipality acted recklessly,

intentionally, or with gross negligence. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 382. At a minimum, it

requires “reckless indifference” by the governmental entity to the rights of the plaintiff. In

his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the County Defendants “owed [him] a duty to use

reasonable care in hiring, training, and supervising [its] officers[,] including Murillo.” (Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants breached this duty by failing to properly and

adequately hire, train[,] and supervise [its] officers.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the County

Defendants have an unlawful policy, custom, or practice, with regard to the amount of force

used when clearing cells. Plaintiff must plead more facts, however, to state a claim under §

1983. Additional facts are necessary to determine, for example, whether the county ignored

a problem among its corrections officers indicating that additional training in the use of force

was necessary, or that the county was otherwise deliberately indifferent in refusing to provide

special training. Absent such facts, Plaintiff has pled only a “formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action,” which is insufficient under Twombly. 550 U.S. at 555.1

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failing to raise it in their opening brief, and raising it only in their reply memorandum. See

Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Further, the parties have not addressed whether in the absence of a federal claim

against the County Defendants, the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state negligence claim against the County Defendants. Generally, federal courts do not

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims when the federal claim is

dismissed. See Carlsbad Tech. Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1865 (2009) (holding

that a district court has discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction when the court has

dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction). Nevertheless, because Plaintiff

has stated a claim against Officer Murillo, and because the state claims against the County

Defendants arise from the same operative facts, the court in its discretion will exercise

supplemental jurisdiction in this case. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Defendant Murillo’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. #15)

is DENIED. 

2. Maricopa County’s and Joseph Arpaio’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State

a Claim (Dkt. #5) is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and DENIED as

to his state-law claim for negligence.

3. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the County Defendants is DISMISSED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff will have thirty days (30) or until July 22, 2010, to file an

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff shall also file with the Court and the County Defendants a

redline version indicating all changes from the Complaint and the Amended Complaint.

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2010.

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