Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_13-cv-00566/USCOURTS-almd-3_13-cv-00566-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Real Property

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

ARLYN RICE SIBILLE, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 3:13-CV-566-WKW

 ) [WO]

T.K. DAVIS, III and PATRICIA Y. )

DAVIS, )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action arises under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 

Alabama Code § 8-9A-1, et seq. Before the court is Defendants T. K. Davis III

and Patricia Y. Davis’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) or for more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure Rule 12(e). (Doc. # 6.) Also before the court is Defendants’ alternative 

motion to strike pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). (Doc. # 8.) 

Plaintiff Arlyn Rice Sibille has responded to both motions. (Docs. # 14, 15.) 

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(e) motions are due to be denied as moot 

based upon Plaintiff’s subsequent filing of an Amended Complaint and the 

alternative Rule 12(f) motion is due to be denied.

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A. Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(e) Motions

The Amended Complaint moots the pending Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(e) 

motions because it cures the pleading defects of which Defendants complain. See 

Rhodes v. Walgreen Co., No. 7:12cv3921, 2013 WL 3153737, at *3 (N.D. Ala. 

June 18, 2013) (“[W]hile an amended complaint often moots a pending motion to 

dismiss, if some of the defects raised in the original motion remain in the new 

pleading, the court simply may consider the motion as being addressed to the 

amended pleading. To hold otherwise would be to exalt form over substance.” 

(internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted)). First, Defendants argue 

that the original Complaint does not contain a short and plain jurisdictional 

statement required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1). Plaintiff previously 

represented that the jurisdictional statement in the original Complaint contained a 

typographical error and moved for leave to amend the complaint. (Doc. # 18.) 

The motion was granted (Doc. # 20), and Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint 

correcting the jurisdictional allegations. (Doc. # 21.) Thus, Defendants’ argument 

is moot.

Second, Defendants argue that the original Complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, ask 

the court to require Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 

12(e). Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to “state with particularity the 

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circumstances constituting fraud” in accordance with Rule 9(b). (Doc. # 7 at 4.) 

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s failure to state the value of the one-half undivided 

interest in the property, which Plaintiff alleges Defendants fraudulently transferred 

to Mrs. Davis’s name in an effort to hinder, delay, or defraud her in violation of the 

Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Defendants further argue that the 

original Complaint fails to state the basis for the allegations set forth in her original 

Complaint, which is the basis for their Rule 12(e) motion. Defendants request that 

Plaintiff satisfy these two defects pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(e).

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added the value of the one-half 

undivided interest of the property at issue in paragraph 14. (Doc. # 21.) Plaintiff 

also added paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint to set out further the basis for 

the allegations of her claim.

Rule 9(b) requires that a plaintiff “must state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other 

conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Davis, under the guise of good faith discussions to settle a 

debt owed, fraudulently transferred to his wife, Mrs. Davis, as a tenant in common, 

one of his primary assets. Plaintiff sufficiently sets forth the circumstances 

surrounding the transfer, listing the approximate dates of the discussions, as well as 

the date of the alleged fraudulent transfer. Based upon these allegations, the 

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Amended Complaint “state[s] with particularity the circumstances constituting 

fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Thus, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

and Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement are due to be denied as moot. 

B. Rule 12(f) Motion

Defendants alternatively move for an order striking paragraph 10 of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint because it improperly references inadmissible offers of 

compromise by and between a co-defendant in the related state court action. (Doc. 

# 8.) Paragraph 10 of the original Complaint and the Amended Complaint alleges

the following:

On or about April 27, 2011, Donald H. Allen, a co-signor of said 

promissory note and acting as the authorized representative of 

defendant T.K. Davis, met with plaintiff’s counsel in his office where 

Allen requested additional time so that he and defendant T. K. Davis 

III could make satisfactory arrangements with Plaintiff for payment.

(Doc. # 1 ¶ 10.) Defendants argue that this meeting between a co-defendant in the 

state court action and Plaintiff’s counsel “clearly falls within the purview of Fed. 

R. Evid. 408, which prohibits the use of compromise, offers and negotiations in 

civil cases.” (Doc. # 8, at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff responds that the facts set forth in 

paragraph 10 (and the added paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint) do not 

constitute a settlement offer and are relevant and material to the Davises’ intent to 

hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiff in her ability to collect the funds due to her 

pursuant to the promissory note subject of the state court action. (Doc. # 14 ¶ 2.) 

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She further argues that Rule 408 only applies to the claim at issue in the case-inchief and thus, is not applicable in this action against the Davises. Plaintiff’s 

argument is well taken.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court may strike from a 

pleading “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter.” “‘A motion to strike is a drastic remedy[,]’ which is 

disfavored by the courts and ‘will usually be denied unless the allegations have no 

possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties.’” 

Loucks v. Shorest, LLC, 282 F.R.D. 637, 638 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (quoting Augustus 

v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Escambia Cnty., Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 

1962)). Additionally, some district courts have observed that “Rule 408 disputes 

are more appropriately resolved in the context of a motion in limine instead of 

prematurely through a Rule 12(f) motion.” Sawo v. Drury Hotels Co., No. 

11cv2232, 2011 WL 3611400, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 15, 2011) (collecting cases).

The information alleged in paragraph 10 (and added paragraph 11) of the 

Amended Complaint is not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. The 

facts are relevant to the alleged fraudulent transfer and to Mr. Davis’s “conditions 

of . . . mind,” as required by Rule 9(b) when claiming fraud.

Furthermore, the facts of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Amended Complaint 

do not constitute an offer, discussions, or negotiations in an effort to settle this 

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lawsuit, and Plaintiff has provided an “arguably permissible use for paragraph [10] 

outside of the uses prohibited by Rule 408(a).” Sawo, 2011 WL 3611400, at*2

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 408(a)). The motion to strike will be denied, but the 

ultimate admissibility of evidence supporting the allegations in paragraph 10 is for 

the court to decide at a later stage. 

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss (Doc. # 6) and Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement 

(Doc. # 6) are DENIED as MOOT. It is further ORDERED that Defendants’ 

alternative motion to strike paragraph 10 (Doc. # 8) is DENIED. 

DONE this 14th day of November, 2013.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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