Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00290/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00290-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jennifer L. Matthews, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of 

Social Security,

Defendant. 

 

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No. CIV 11-290-TUC-LAB

ORDER

Pending before the court is the plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), filed on March 18, 2013. (Doc. 41)

The plaintiff filed this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner for

Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In an order issued on July 12, 2012, this court

reversed the Commissioner’s final decision and remanded the case for payment of benefits. On

February 11, 2013, this court granted the plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of

$5,001.20 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Doc. 40)

In the pending motion, the plaintiff’s counsel moves for an order allowing him 25 percent of the

claimant’s past-due benefit award pursuant to their contingent-fee agreement, less the amount

already awarded under the EAJA. Neither the claimant nor the Commissioner filed a response

to the motion.

Case 4:11-cv-00290-LAB Document 42 Filed 08/22/13 Page 1 of 3
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Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman presides over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(c). (Doc. 19)

Discussion

In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 122 S.Ct. 1817 (2002), the Supreme Court

considered the interplay between social security contingent-fee agreements and the dictates of

42 U.S.C.A. § 406(b)(1)(A), which reads in pertinent part as follows: 

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this

subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may

determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such

representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to

which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .

42 U.S.C.A. § 406(b)(1)(A). 

The Court held “that § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements.” Id. at 808,

1829. “[I]nstead, §406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those

agreements.” Id. at 809, 1829.

When considering a fee request, the court should start with the agreement and then test

it for reasonableness. Id. at 808, 1828. Recovery may be reduced because of the quality of the

representation, because of unreasonable delay, or because “the benefits are large in comparison

to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.” Id. 

In the pending motion, counsel moves for an award of $20,401.50, which is 25% of the

claimant’s past-due benefits in accordance with the contingent-fee agreement. (Doc. 41) He

asserts he and his paralegal spent 28.6 hours on the case resulting an effective hourly rate of

$713.34. (Doc. 41, p. 6) 

Upon review of the case file, the court finds that counsel’s prosecution of this action fell

within the broad range of competent representation. The court finds no reason to reduce the

award based on the quality of the representation. Neither did counsel engage in unreasonable

delay. The court is concerned by the size of the award in relation to the number of hours spent.

The Ninth Circuit, however, has approved effective hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902

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without finding that they are unreasonable. See Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2009) (Clifton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), filed

on March 18, 2013, is GRANTED. (Doc. 41) Counsel is awarded $20,401.50 less the

$5,001.20 previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) resulting in a net

award of $15,400.30.

DATED this 22nd day of August, 2013.

Case 4:11-cv-00290-LAB Document 42 Filed 08/22/13 Page 3 of 3