Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02497/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02497-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID H. PICKUP, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB

vs.

EDMUND G. BROWN, et al., ORDER

Defendants.

/

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Senate Bill (SB) 1172 from taking effect on January 1,

2013. The bill prohibits licensed mental health professionals in California from engaging in

sexual orientation change efforts (“SOCE”) with minors. Plaintiffs, who are therapists, parents

and minors, contend SB 1172 violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Their

motion came on for hearing on November 30, 2012. Plaintiffs were represented by Matt Staver

in oral argument, and additionally in the courtroom by Daniel Schmid and Stephen Crampton. 

Defendants were represented by Deputy Attorney General Alexandra Gordon. Amicus Equality

California was represented by David Dinielli and Michelle Friedland in oral argument, and also

in the courtroom by Bram Alden, Christopher Stoll, Lika Miyake and Shannon Minter. After

careful consideration of the arguments made in the briefs and at argument, and having reviewed

the relevant legal authority, the court finds plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the merits so as

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to prevail at this stage of the litigation. For the reasons explained below, plaintiffs’ motion is

DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs in this case are David Pickup, Christopher Rosik, Ph.D., Joseph

Nicolosi, Ph.D., and Robert Vazzo, all licensed mental health professionals; the National

Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH); the American Association

of Christian Counselors (AACC); Jack and Jane Doe 1, on behalf of minor John Doe 1; and Jack

and Jane Doe 2, on behalf of minor John Doe 2. John Does 1 and 2 are patients of Dr. Nicolosi

(Decl. of Jack Doe 1 ¶ 10, ECF1 28-5; Decl. of Jack Doe 2 ¶¶ 13-14, ECF 28-5). Plaintiffs name

the following defendants: Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr.; Anna Caballero, Secretary of the

State and Consumer Services Agency of California; Kim Madsen, Executive Officer of the

California Board of Behavioral Sciences; Michael Erickson, Ph.D., President of the California

Board of Psychology; and Sharon Levine, President of the Medical Board of California.

Plaintiffs’ complaint, filed on October 4, 2012, challenges SB 1172, which adds

three provisions to California’s Business and Professions Code. The new law provides that a

mental health provider, as defined by the statute, shall not “engage in sexual orientation change

efforts with a person under 18 years of age.” Sexual orientation change efforts are defined as

“any practices . . . that seek to change an individual’s sexual orientation.” Plaintiffs assert six

constitutional claims, alleging SB 1172 violates: (1) the therapists’ right to free speech and the

minors’ right to receive information under the First Amendment; (2) the therapists’ right to

liberty of speech and the minors’ right to receive information under Article I § 2(a) of the

California Constitution; (3) the parents’ and minors’ right to free exercise of religion; (4) the

parents’ and minors’ right to free exercise and enjoyment of religion under Article I, § 4 of the

California Constitution; (5) the Jack and Jane Does’ parental rights under the First and

1

 ECF refers to “Electronic Case Filing,” and the number following it is the docket

number of the document referenced. 

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Fourteenth Amendment; and (6) the Jack and Jane Does’ parental rights under Article I, § 7 of

the California Constitution. (See generally ECF 1.)

On October 19, 2012, Equality California filed a motion to intervene as a party

defendant. (ECF 24.) Plaintiffs have opposed the motion and Equality California has filed a

reply. (ECF 56, 72.) The motion to intervene is resolved by separate order. 

On October 23, 2012, plaintiffs filed the pending amended motion for a

preliminary injunction. (ECF 29.) Defendants have opposed the motion and plaintiffs have filed

a reply. (ECF 48, 60.)

On November 21, 2012, the court granted Equality California’s request to file an

amicus brief and to participate in oral argument on the motion for a preliminary injunction. 

(ECF 67.) Equality California filed its amicus brief on November 21, 2012. (ECF 70.) 

II. BACKGROUND ON SOCE2

As passed by the Legislature, SB 1172 seeks to regulate therapy known as “sexual

orientation change efforts,” or SOCE (pronounced “sǀsh”). “The phrase sexual orientation

change efforts (SOCE) encompasses a variety of methods, including techniques derived from

psychoanalysis, behavioral therapy, and religious and spiritual counseling. These techniques

share the common goal of changing an individual's sexual orientation from homosexual to

heterosexual.” (ECF 52 ¶ 26 (emphasis in original).)

2

 This background is drawn from the filings by both parties. The parties have objected to

portions of the evidence submitted by their opponents. (See ECF 50, 64, 76.) Generally,

declarations and evidence supporting a preliminary injunction motion need not conform to the

standards for a summary judgment motion or to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Welker v.

Cicerone, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 n. 2 (C.D. Cal. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by

Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2007); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.

MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 11A FED. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2949

(2d ed. 1995) (“[I]nasmuch as the grant of a preliminary injunction is discretionary, the trial

court should be allowed to give even inadmissible evidence some weight when it is thought

advisable to do so in order to serve the primary purpose of preventing irreparable harm before a

trial can be had.”). Because the court’s decision here would be the same whether all or none of

the contested evidence is admissible, the court does not rule on objections at this stage of the

litigation.

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Modern SOCE traces its history to the mid-twentieth century, when

homosexuality was considered a form of disease.3 At that time, “many mental health

professionals sought to ‘cure’ [homosexuality] using a variety of techniques, including

psychotherapy, hormone treatments, aversive conditioning with nausea-inducing drugs,

lobotomy, electroshock, and castration.” Id. ¶ 27. Use of these practices has dropped

significantly in light of the current position of many American psychological and psychiatric

professionals that homosexuality is not a mental illness. Id. ¶ 28. “[M]ost practitioners [have]

stopped attempting to change sexual orientation and some [have taken] strong public stands

against such efforts.” Id. Plaintiff NARTH’s treatment guidelines recognize SOCE as “an

increasingly controversial subject.” (ECF 63-2 at 6.)

Despite the documented decline of use in therapeutic practice, “the visibility of

SOCE has increased in the last decade.”4

 (ECF 54-1 at 33.) The American Psychological

Association (“APA”) has observed that “most SOCE currently seem[s] directed to those holding

conservative religious and political beliefs, and recent research on SOCE includes almost

exclusively individuals who have strong religious beliefs.” Id. Plaintiff NARTH agrees that

deeply religious people account for the bulk of patients now seeking SOCE. (ECF 63-2 at 17.) 

(“Research indicates that the majority of people who present to clinicians with unwanted

same-sex attractions are motivated in part by deeply held religious values.”).

Modern day SOCE can be categorized as either aversion or nonaversion

treatments, with some practitioners utilizing techniques from both. Aversion treatments include

3

 Homosexuality was listed as a mental disorder in the first edition of what came to be

called the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“the DSM”), published in

1952. (ECF 52 ¶ 11.) Homosexuality was removed from the Manual in 1973. Id. ¶ 12. Two

years later, in 1975, the American Psychological Association (APA) affirmed that homosexuality

is not a mental illness and urged its membership to work towards dispelling the stigma of mental

illness associated with homosexuality. Id.

4

 The quoted report was published in 2009; “decade” presumably refers to the 10 years

preceding.

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practices “such as inducing nausea, vomiting, or paralysis; providing electric shocks; or having

the individual snap an elastic band around the wrist upon arousal by same-sex erotic images or

thoughts. Other examples of aversive behavioral treatments include covert sensitization, shame

aversion, systematic desensitization, orgasmic recondition, and satiation therapy.” (ECF 54-1 at

30.) Plaintiff NARTH recognizes the controversy aversion treatment presents within the

psychological and medical fields, as well as the potential harms to patients presented by such

therapies. See ECF 63-2 at 29. NARTH’s own treatment guidelines recommend avoiding some

aversion treatments. See id. (“. . . in light of current research and professional ethics, some

interventions for unwanted same-sex attractions and behavior are not recommended. These

include shock therapy and other aversive techniques, so-called reparenting therapies, and

coercive forms of religious prayer.”).

Nonaversive SOCE treatments center on “chang[ing] gay men’s and lesbians’

thought patterns by reframing desires, redirecting thoughts, or using hypnosis, with the goal of

changing sexual arousal, behavior, and orientation.” (ECF 54-1 at 30.) Such efforts often are

accomplished by an accompanying “educational process of dating skills, assertiveness, and

affection training with physical and social reinforcement to increase other-sex sexual behaviors.”

Id.

Plaintiff NARTH’s practice guidelines articulate the goal of SOCE as

“support[ing] the principle that individuals are capable of making their own choices in response

to same-sex attractions and [to] promote autonomy and self-determination.” (Id. at 21.) 

NARTH advises clinicians to accomplish this goal by “(a) acknowledging a client’s choice or

desire to seek intervention for unwanted same-sex attractions and behavior; (b) exploring why

these attractions and behaviors are distressing to the client...; © addressing the cultural and

political pressures surrounding choice in response to same-sex attractions; (d) discussing the

available range of professional therapies and resources...; (e) providing understandable 

/////

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information on outcome research related to change interventions...; and (f) obtaining informed

consent for treatment.” Id. (citations omitted).

III. SB 1172

A. The Statute Enacted by SB 1172

SB 1172 enacts the following new sections of the California Business and

Professions Code:

 865. For the purposes of this article, the following terms shall

have the following meanings:

(a) "Mental health provider" means a physician and surgeon

specializing in the practice of psychiatry, a psychologist, a

psychological assistant, intern, or trainee, a licensed marriage and

family therapist, a registered marriage and family therapist, intern,

or trainee, a licensed educational psychologist, a credentialed

school psychologist, a licensed clinical social worker, an associate

clinical social worker, a licensed professional clinical counselor, a

registered clinical counselor, intern, or trainee, or any other

person designated as a mental health professional under California

law or regulation.

 (b) (1) "Sexual orientation change efforts" means any practices by

mental health providers that seek to change an individual's sexual

orientation. This includes efforts to change behaviors or gender

expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic

attractions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.

 (2) "Sexual orientation change efforts" does not include

psychotherapies that: (A) provide acceptance, support, and

understanding of clients or the facilitation of clients' coping,

social support, and identity exploration and development,

including

sexual orientation-neutral interventions to prevent or address

unlawful conduct or unsafe sexual practices; and (B) do not seek to

change sexual orientation.

865.1. Under no circumstances shall a mental health provider

engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a patient under 18

years of age.

865.2. Any sexual orientation change efforts attempted on a

patient under 18 years of age by a mental health provider shall be

considered unprofessional conduct and shall subject a mental

health provider to discipline by the licensing entity for that mental

health provider.

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B. Legislative History

A California State Senator introduced SB 1172 on February 22, 2012, with the

stated intention of protecting California lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals from

“sham therapies” that aim to change their sexual orientation. Senate Judiciary Committee, SB

1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 5 (Cal. 2012); Complete Bill History of SB 1172 (Official California

Legislative Information maintained electronically by Legislative Counsel of California). 

Initially, the bill included provisions allowing former or current SOCE patients to sue a therapist

engaging in SOCE and requiring therapists who provide SOCE to adult patients to obtain a

patient’s signature on an informed consent form. Senate Committee on Business, Professions

and Economic Development, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 8-9 (Cal. 2012). Prior to final passage,

the draft bill was changed to remove these two provisions, leaving the sections set forth above. 

Senate Rules Committee: Third Reading, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 1 (Cal. 2012). The full

Senate passed a version of the bill on May 30, 2012, twenty-three votes to thirteen. Complete

Bill History of SB 1172. SB 1172 was then referred to the Assembly, where it cleared

committee to reach the floor. Id. After amending it several times, the Assembly passed the bill

on August 28, 2012, fifty-two to twenty-two. Id. The Senate then adopted the Assembly

amendments on August 30, on a vote of twenty-three to thirteen. Id. The Governor received the

bill on September 10 and signed it into law on September 30, 2012. Cal. Stats. 2012, ch. 835, p.

91.

Amicus Equality California was a primary sponsor of SB 1172, along with several

other organizations, including Lambda Legal, Gaylesta, Mental Health America of Northern

California and National Center for Lesbian Rights. Senate Rules Committee: Unfinished

Business, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 7-8 (Cal. 2012). Initially, the California Psychological

Association, California Association for Licensed Professional Clinic Counselors, California

Psychiatric Association and California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists opposed

the bill, on grounds that a statutory ban on a type of therapy was unprecedented, particularly the

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complete ban on SOCE for minors, even those who freely consent to the treatment. Senate

Committee on Business, Professions and Economic Development, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 9-

10 (Cal. 2012). These organizations also expressed concern that the proposed definition of

SOCE was too vague. Assembly Committee on Business, Professions and Consumer Protection,

SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 4 (Cal. 2012). Other organizations, including plaintiff NARTH, also

opposed the bill. Senate Rules Committee: Unfinished Business, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 8

(Cal. 2012). The California Psychological Association and California Association of Marriage

and Family Therapists eventually supported the bill.5 Senate Rules of Committee: Unfinished

Business, SB 1172, 2001-2012 Sess. 7 (Cal. 2012). At the time the bill was delivered to the

Governor, it was opposed by the American College of Pediatricians, California Catholic

Conference, Inc., Catholic Medical Association, Christian Medical and Dental Associations,

Church State Council, Liberty Counsel Action, NARTH, Pacific Justice Institute and Parents and

Friends of Ex-Gays and Gays. Id. The other professional organizations who had initially

opposed the bill, listed above, had withdrawn their opposition. See id.

During committee hearings, the Legislature addressed a potential conflict with

California Health & Safety Code § 124260, which allows minors who are twelve years of age or

older to consent to mental health treatments without parental approval. Senate Judiciary

Committee, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 6-8 (Cal. 2012). The Legislature ultimately concluded

that Section 124260 was meant to allow minors to access only helpful treatment and thus that SB

1172's goal of protecting minors from harmful treatment was not in conflict. Id.

In adopting SB 1172, the Legislature expressly relied on mental health

professional organizations’ research into the safety and efficacy of SOCE, and in particular the

report of the 2009 Task Force of the American Psychological Association (APA) titled

5

 At hearing, Equality California requested that the court take judicial notice of a letter

from the California Psychological Association expressing its support in light of amendments to

the bill. Plaintiffs’ counsel objected because he had not previously seen the letter. The court

declines to take notice of the letter or its contents. 

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Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation. The Legislature also referenced the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997),

holding that “sexual orientation treatment” of a Russian citizen including “sedative drugs and

hyponosis” constituted mental and physical torture, although the Legislature did not suggest the

treatment in Pitcherskaia was akin to current SOCE practices in California. Senate Rules

Committee: Third Reading, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 6 (Cal. 2012). The Legislature briefly

documented the history of treatment of homosexuality by mental health practitioners. Senate

Rules Committee: Unfinished Business, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 4-5 (Cal. 2012). It noted the

APA’s removal of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders (DSM) list of mental disorders in 1973, id. at 4; the further modification of the DSM

in the mid-1980s to eliminate the definition of those “in conflict with” their sexual orientation as

having a mental disorder, id. at 5; and the removal of the diagnosis of egodystonic6

homosexuality from the DSM in 1987. Id. The Legislature also noted the World Health

Organization’s removal of homosexuality from its International Classification of Disorders-10 in

1992, and shift to use of the term egodystonic homosexuality. Id.

The Legislature also reviewed the work of contemporary SOCE practitioners,

including plaintiff Nicolosi’s psychotherapeutic techniques, Senate Rules Committee: Third

Reading, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 6 (Cal. 2012), as well as NARTH’s view that homosexuals

can and should be allowed to change their sexual orientation through therapy, Assembly

Committee on Business, Professions and Consumer Protection, SB 1172, 2011-2012 Sess. 3

(Cal. 2012).

6

 The International Classification of Disorders-10 defines “egodystonic sexual

orientation” as: “The gender identity or sexual preference (heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual,

or prepubertal) is not in doubt, but the individual wishes it were different because of associated

psychological and behaviourial disorders, and may seek treatment in order to change it.” World

Health Organization, ICD-10, § F66.1 (May 2010).

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The final version of SB 1172 sets forth the Legislature’s findings, summarized

here:

• The major mental health professional organizations have recognized

homosexuality is “not a disease, disorder, illness, deficiency, or shortcoming” for nearly 40

years.

• The 2009 APA Task Force report “concluded that sexual orientation change

efforts can pose critical health risks to lesbian, gay, and bisexual people,” including among many

other effects “confusion, depression, guilt, helplessness, hopelessness, shame, social withdrawal,

suicidality, substance abuse, stress, disappointment, self-blame, decreased self-esteem and

authenticity to others, . . .”

• The APA, in a 2009 resolution, advised persons to avoid SOCE.

• The APA has resolved that SOCE does not have proven effectiveness and that

practitioners should refrain from engaging in the treatment. 

• The American School Counselor Association, American Academy of

Pediatrics, American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, National Association of

Social Workers, American Counseling Association Governing Council, American

Psychoanalytic Association and Pan American Health Organization of the World Health

Organization all have issued statements opposing SOCE. 

• In a 2012 article, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry

advised clinicians “there is no evidence that sexual orientation can be altered through therapy,

and [] attempts to do so may be harmful.” 

• In a 2009 article in the journal Pediatrics, documentation supported the

conclusion that “[m]inors who experience family rejection based on their sexual orientation face

especially serious health risks.”

The Legislature concluded that “California has a compelling interest in protecting

the physical and psychological well-being of minors, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and

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transgender youth, and in protecting its minors against exposure to serious harms caused by

sexual orientation change efforts.”

IV. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A. Standard

Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a

clear showing that the moving party is entitled to such relief. Winter v. Natural Res. Defense

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). As provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court

may issue a preliminary injunction to preserve the relative position of the parties pending a trial

on the merits. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). The party seeking

injunctive relief must show it “is likely to succeed on the merits, . . . is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that

an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

Before the Winter decision, the Ninth Circuit employed a “sliding scale” or

“serious questions” test, which allowed a court to balance the elements of the test “so that a

stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Alliance for the Wild

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v.

City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003)). Recently, the Circuit has found that its

“serious question” sliding scale test survived Winter: a court may issue a preliminary injunction

when the moving party raises serious questions going to the merits and demonstrates that the

balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor, so long as the court also considers the remaining

two prongs of the Winter test. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1134-35. However, a court need not reach

the other prongs if the moving party cannot as a threshold matter demonstrate a “fair chance of

success on the merits.” Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2008); internal quotations omitted).

/////

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B. Analysis

Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief is based only on their first and

fifth claims for relief: violation of the therapists’ free speech and violation of parental rights

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.7 (ECF 28 at 2.) The free speech claim supports

three separate arguments: SB 1172 violates plaintiff therapists’ rights by discriminating based on

viewpoint and/or content; SB 1172 violates plaintiff minors’ rights to receive information; and

SB 1172 is unconstitutionally vague. The court addresses each of these free speech arguments

and then turns to plaintiffs’ parental rights argument. Because the court determines plaintiffs do

not meet the threshold test of likelihood of prevailing on the merits on any claim, the court

addresses each of plaintiffs’ arguments only in light of Winter’s first prong. 

1. Therapists’ Free Speech Rights And Discrimination Based On Viewpoint

Or Content

Plaintiffs argue that SB 1172 unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of

viewpoint, by prohibiting licensed mental health providers from “even mentioning the viewpoint

that unwanted same-sex attractions can be changed”; they say the bill instead mandates that

counselors “espouse one viewpoint regarding same-sex sexual attractions, i.e., that they . . .

cannot be stopped . . . .” Plaintiffs contend this discrimination against a particular viewpoint

cannot withstand strict scrutiny, even if the statute is interpreted as merely restricting content

rather than viewpoint. (ECF 28 at 8-9.) Defendants respond that SB 1172 is not viewpoint or

content discriminatory because the statute regulates conduct, not speech. They argue that SB

1172 does not prohibit licensed mental health professionals from mentioning SOCE to minors. 

7

 Plaintiffs assert parallel free speech, free exercise, and parental rights claims under the

United States Constitution (claims 1, 3, and 5) and the California Constitution (claims 2, 4, and

6). Defendants argue in their opposition that claims under the California Constitution are barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. (ECF 48 at 24 (citing Pennhurst State Schs. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 119 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment precludes federal courts from

hearing claims against state officials on the basis of state law)).) Because plaintiffs do not assert

a separate analytical basis for their claims under the California Constitution, this court treats the

two claims as identical for the purposes of this motion and does not reach the immunity issue.

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Defendants also contend SB 1172 does not improperly single out a particular viewpoint because

the Legislature did not exclude heterosexual minors from the statute’s coverage. (ECF 48 at 18-

20.) In reply, plaintiffs urge that defendants have not met their burden in justifying the statute’s

restrictions on their First Amendment rights. They also argue the statute is not a content-neutral

licensing scheme but rather “dictate[s] the content of what is said in therapy.” Because

“psychotherapy is a series of conversations” and the “relationship between the psychotherapist

and client is founded upon speech,” they say, SB 1172 regulates speech, not conduct. (ECF 60

at 8.) 

a. Content and Viewpoint Discrimination 

“Content discrimination occurs when the government chooses the subjects that

may be discussed, while viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government prohibits speech

by particular speakers, thereby suppressing a particular view about a subject.” Giebel v.

Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations, quotation marks omitted). 

Viewpoint discrimination is a “subset or particular instance of the more general phenomenon of

content discrimination . . . . [T]he distinction is not a precise one.” Rosenberger v. Rector and

Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995). Whether a statute is contentbased may be determined from the text of the statute itself: “if the statute describes speech by

content, then it is content based.” G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1071

(9th Cir. 2006). “Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” R.A.V. v. City of St.

Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 

The Ninth Circuit considered content and viewpoint discrimination in Conant v.

Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2002), a case upon which plaintiffs rely. In Conant, the

Circuit addressed whether the government could investigate a physician or revoke a physician’s

license to prescribe controlled substances when the only basis for such action was the

physician’s professional recommendation for the use of marijuana. The policy at issue in Conant

was released by the Director of the Office of the National Drug Policy Council and was

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formulated after two states decriminalized the use of marijuana for limited medical purposes. Id.

at 632 n.1. The court described the policy as seeking “to punish physicians on the basis of [ ]

doctor-patient communications,” because only those conversations that included a discussion of

the medicinal use of marijuana triggered the policy. Id. at 637. It found the policy was not only

content-based, but viewpoint discriminatory, because it precluded the discussion of marijuana

and also condemned the expression of any opinion that marijuana might help a particular patient. 

Id. The court recognized that the First Amendment protects physician speech because “an

integral component of the practice of medicine is the communication between a doctor and a

patient,” something the law recognizes through the application of the physician-patient privilege. 

The basis of the privilege, the court said, is that “‘barriers to full disclosure would impair

diagnosis or treatment.’” Id. at 636 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).

The government’s policy thus infringed the physician’s First Amendment speech because it 

prevented the doctor from exercising medical judgment in recommending a form of treatment he

or she believed might benefit a patient. Id. at 638. Conant did not consider whether the

government’s restriction on prescribing medical marijuana or using medical marijuana as a

treatment would raise any First Amendment concerns. 

Similarly, in Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, No. 11–22026–Civ, 2012 WL 3064336

(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012), a district court considered a Florida statute that prevented a medical

care provider from asking a patient about gun ownership and recording any information about

gun ownership in a patient’s records, subject to a few exceptions. The court described the act as

imposing “content-based restrictions on practitioners’ speech” because it “regulate[s]

practitioners’ inquiries [and] record-keeping . . .” on only one subject. Id. at *7. It observed

that the law was “different from so many other laws involving practitioners’ speech” because “it

aims to restrict a practitioner’s ability to provide truthful, non-misleading information to a

patient . . . . The purpose of preventative medicine is to discuss with a patient topics that . . .

informs [sic] the patient about general concerns that may arise in the future.” Id. at *9. The

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court in Wollschlaeger found that the law burdened the doctor-patient relationship by prohibiting

speech necessary to the practice of preventative medicine and thereby preventing patients from

receiving truthful, non-misleading information. Id. at *12.8

Here, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of

their claim that SB 1172 will subject mental health professionals to discipline if they merely

recommend SOCE to minor patients, or discuss it with them, or even present them with literature

about SOCE. This case is thus unlike Conant, where the government was unable “to articulate

exactly what speech [was] proscribed, describing it only in terms of speech the patient believes

to be a recommendation of marijuana.” Id. at 639. Here, in contrast, the state’s insistence that

the statute bars treatment only, and not the mention of SOCE or a referral to a religious

counselor or out-of-state practitioner, is consistent with a fair reading of the statute itself. (ECF

48 at 18-19.)

According to the statute, SOCE is any “practices” aimed at changing a person’s

sexual orientation. As the law itself does not define either “practices” or “change,” the court

construes the terms in accordance with their "ordinary or natural meaning." Federal Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994); Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624

F.3d 990, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1477 (2011). A “practice”

is “the application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed to the theory or principles of

it,” and the transitive verb “to change” is to “make (a thing) other than it was; to render

different.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1126, 236 (12th ed. 2011).9

 As defined,

8

 In an earlier order granting the physicians’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the

court said the statute restricted a practitioner’s freedom to inquire about or discuss a certain

subject. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2011).

9

 To define statutory terms in this order, the court examined several different

dictionaries, including the one cited here and MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE (10th ed.

1996), COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2005), WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976) and AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY ONLINE. Because

the court’s survey yielded no material difference in definitions, the court cites to one leading

dictionary.

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then, what SB 1172 proscribes is actions designed to effect a difference, not recommendations or

mere discussions of SOCE. This fact distinguishes SB 1172 from the policy at issue in Conant

or the law at issue in Wollschlaeger, as SB 1172 does not on its face penalize a mental health

professional’s exercise of judgment in simply informing a minor patient that he or she might

benefit from SOCE; it also does not prohibit speech necessary to the therapist’s practice. 

Moreover, the statute does not preclude a minor’s taking information from a licensed mental

health professional and then locating someone other than a licensed professional to provide

SOCE. Cf. Sorrel v. IMS Health, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011) (“[a]n

individual’s right to speak is implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to

‘restraints on the way in which the information might be used’”) (quoting Seattle Times Co. v.

Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)). The SOCE therapy regulated by SB 1172 is conduct. 

The court also must determine, however, whether the statute’s restriction on

engaging in SOCE itself, distinct from discussion or recommendation of SOCE, violates a

licensed professional’s First Amendment rights as plaintiffs claim. 

b. First Amendment Rights

In making their conflicting arguments with respect to the First Amendment, both

parties cite to the Ninth Circuit case of National Association for the Advancement of

Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000) (“NAAP”).

NAAP involved a challenge to provisions of California’s licensing laws establishing certain

educational requirements for a person to be licensed as a psychologist. The individual plaintiffs,

who had not completed all the required courses despite their other, substantial educational

accomplishments, alleged that the licensing scheme violated their substantive due process and

First Amendment rights. The Circuit first considered the extent to which speech was implicated,

noting that a course of conduct may be regulated even if it is “‘in part initiated, evidenced, or

carried out through means of language, either spoken, or written, or printed.’” Id. at 1053

(quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). It rejected NAAP’s

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claim that psychoanalysis is “pure speech,” quoting the district court’s determination that “‘the

key component of psychoanalysis is the treatment of emotional suffering and depression, not

speech . . . . That psychoanalysts employ speech to treat their clients does not entitle them, or

their profession, to special First Amendment protection.’” Id. at 1054 (emphasis in original);10

see also STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS AND NURSING 1394,

1763 (7th ed. 2012) (defining “psychotherapy” as “[t]reatment of emotional, behavioral,

personality, and psychiatric disorders based primarily on verbal or nonverbal communication and

interventions with the patient, in contrast to treatments using chemical and physical measures”

and “therapy” as the “systematic treatment of a disease, dysfunction, or disorder,” and in

psychiatry and clinical psychology, as “psychotherapy”); CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY 1537 (12th ed. 2011) (defining “treatment” as “management in the application of

remedies; medical . . . application or service” and “action . . . towards a person”); CAL. BUS. &

PROF. CODE § 4996.9 ( defining psychotherapy as the use of “methods . . . to assist a person . . .

to achieve a better psychosocial adaptation . . . to modify internal and external conditions which

affect individuals, groups or communities in respect to behavior, emotions, and thinking). 

 At the same time, that therapy is conduct, as discussed above, does not

necessarily mean the First Amendment has no application: “conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued

with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments.’” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. State of Wash.,

418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)); Schneider v. Amador Cnty., No. CIV S-10-3242, 2011 WL 3876015,

10 Plaintiffs cite to that portion of NAAP finding the licensing scheme to be contentneutral in part because “[n]othing in the statutes prevents licensed therapists from utilizing

psychoanalytical methods . . . ,” and that the licensing scheme “was not adopted because of any

disagreement with psychoanalytical theory.” NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1055, 1056. Plaintiffs argue

that SB 1172 in contrast was adopted precisely because of the state’s disagreement with a

particular analytical theory and that the law prevents them from using certain psychoanalytical

methods. While the cited discussion in NAAP gives the court pause, it is dicta and does not

control the resolution of the nature of SOCE therapy for First Amendment purposes in this case,

given the other controlling precedent this court must apply. 

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at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 1, 2011), recommendation adopted in 2011 WL 4766445 (E.D. Cal. Sep.

29, 2011). The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that “an apparently limitless variety of

conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to

express an idea.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S 367, 376 (1968); City of Dallas v. Stanglin,

490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (rejecting the idea that every activity with “some kernel of expression” is

entitled to First Amendment protection). Instead, it has extended First Amendment protection to

conduct only when “‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message [is] present, and . . . the

likelihood [is] great that the message w[ill] be understood by those who view it.” Anderson v.

City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Spence, 428 U.S. at 409-

11; process of tattooing entitled to First Amendment protection because the end product, the

tattoo, is pure speech); Giebel, 244 F.3d at 1187 (handbill entitled to First Amendment

protection because it was designed to convey information). “If combining speech and conduct

were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into

‘speech’ simply by talking about it.” Rumsfield v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc.,

547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).

 Courts reaching the question have found that the provision of healthcare and

other forms of treatment is not expressive conduct. O’Brien v. United States Dept. Of Health &

Human Servs., No. 4:12–CV–476 (CEJ), 2012 WL 4481208, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Sep. 28, 2012)

(“Neither the doctor’s conduct in prescribing nor the patient’s conduct in receiving

contraceptives is inherently expressive. Giving or receiving health care is not a statement in the

same sense as wearing a black armband or burning a flag.” (internal citations omitted)); see

Abigail Alliance For Better Access v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D. D.C. 2007) (collecting

cases finding no constitutional right of access to particular medical treatments reasonably

prohibited by the government); Martin v. Campbell, No. 09-4077, 2010 WL 1692074 (W.D. Ark.

Apr. 23, 2010) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a statute preventing acupuncturists

from prescribing, administering or dispensing certain drugs); People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697,

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703-04 (1979) (“the selection of a particular procedure is a medical matter” to which privacy

status does not attach); Sharrer v. Zettel, No. C 04-00042 SI, 2005 WL 885129, at *7 (N.D. Cal.

Mar. 7, 2005) (in rejecting claim that plaintiffs had a constitutional right to consult denturist,11

court found no fundamental right to choose type of medical treatment or particular health care

provider); State Dept. of Health v. Hinze, 441 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Neb. Jun. 16 1989) (practice of

medicine itself is not protected by the First Amendment). Given the weight of the authority on

the question and the nature of the record before the court, plaintiff therapists have not shown

they are likely to succeed in bearing their burden of showing that the First Amendment applies to

SOCE treatment; they have not shown that the treatment, the end product of which is a change of

behavior, is expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment protection. See ECF 54-2 at 12;

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984) (even though

government bears burden of justifying restrictions on First Amendment interests, “it is the

obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to demonstrate that

the First Amendment even applies”). Accordingly, because plaintiffs have not shown they will

be able to establish that SOCE therapy is expressive speech and thus within First Amendment

purview, the court need not reach the argument advanced by defendants and amicus Equality

California, that SB 1172's restrictions satisfy the intermediate test established in United States v.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring showing that incidental burden on First

Amendment freedoms is justified by neutral regulation promoting a substantial government

interest that would not be achieved as effectively without the regulation). 

Plaintiffs also are not likely to succeed on the merits of the therapists’ First

Amendment claims, given judicial recognition of the state’s role in regulating the medical

profession. See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (“There is perhaps no

profession more properly open to such regulation than that which embraces the practitioners of

11 A denturist is a healthcare provider trained in the use of removable prosthetic

appliances to treat maladies of the human head and neck. Sharrer, 2005 WL 885129, at *1.

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medicine.”); see also Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926) (“High medical authority being

in conflict as to the medicinal value of spirituous and vinous liquors taken as a beverage, it

would, indeed, be strange if Congress lacked the power to determine that the necessities of the

liquor problem require a limitation of permissible prescriptions.”). In Planned Parenthood of

Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court

rejected a number of challenges to the requirement that doctors provide certain information to

women seeking abortions. In a short passage, the Court rejected the doctors’ claim that the

regulations compelled speech, saying that a physician’s First Amendment right to speak “as part

of the practice of medicine” is “subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.” As

one Court of Appeals has observed, Casey means that strict scrutiny does not apply to a claim

that regulations compelled a physician to provide specified information to women seeking

abortions. Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th

Cir. 2012) (stating “the three sentences with which the Court disposed of the First Amendment

claims are, if anything, the antithesis of strict scrutiny”). See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,

200 (1991) (upholding restrictions on funding for abortion counseling; “The doctor is always

free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program.”);

NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1054 (concluding that “[t]he communication that occurs during

psychoanalysis is entitled to constitutional protection, but it is not immune from regulation”);

Shultz v. Wells, No. 2:09cv646-WKW, 2010 WL 1141452, at *9-10 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2010),

recommendation adopted in 2010 WL 1191444 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 22, 2010) (finding no

constitutional infirmity in disciplining a chiropractor for telling a patient to throw away medicine

prescribed by a physician, in light of fact that chiropractors could not prescribe). 

Plaintiffs point to the case of Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.

533 (2001). But in that case, the Supreme Court rejected regulations that restricted legal services

lawyers from advising their clients and advocating that welfare laws were unconstitutional

because the government had not reasonably controlled the message in the limited public forum it

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had created by subsidizing the legal services. Id. at 543-44. The instant case does not involve

speech in a limited public forum. 

This case instead is more like Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447

(1978), in which the Court rejected a lawyer’s challenge to professional discipline for his inperson solicitation of clients. In so doing it observed that a lawyer’s solicitation is only

marginally related to First Amendment concerns and so falls within the state’s “proper sphere of

economic and professional regulation,” particularly in light of the state’s “special responsibility”

for maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions. Id. at 459, 460. 

As SOCE therapy is subject to the state’s legitimate control over the professions,

SB 1172's restrictions on therapy do not implicate fundamental rights and are not properly

evaluated under strict scrutiny review, but rather under the rational basis test. NAAP, 228 F.3d at

1050 (applying rational basis test after deciding that challenged mental health professional

licensing scheme did not implicate a fundamental right). Applying the rational basis test, the

reviewing court presumes the constitutionality of the state action by requiring those challenging

the legislative judgment to “convince the court that the legislative facts on which the

classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the

governmental decisionmaker.” Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)). The

state action need not even actually advance its stated purpose; the court instead inquires whether

“the government could have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did.” Id. (internal quotations

and citation omitted). As examined below, SB 1172 passes the rational basis test. See pages 42-

22 infra. Plaintiff therapists are not likely to prevail on the merits on their First Amendment

claim.

2. Minors’ Free Speech Rights and Prevention of Receipt of Information

about SOCE

Plaintiffs argue that SB 1172 violates minors’ First Amendment rights by

preventing them from being able to receive or hear about SOCE. (ECF 28 at 28-29.) The

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government may burden children’s right to free speech under the First Amendment, but “only in

relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.

205, 212-13 (1975). “The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like

actions of adults. . . . A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, wellrounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.” Prince v.

Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). The government’s interest in the well-being of

children exists apart from the government’s interest in supporting parents’ efforts to protect their

children. See Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968). Thus, the Supreme

Court “ha[s] sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of

youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected

rights.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).

The First Amendment protects listeners’ right to receive information. Bd. of

Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982); Stanley

v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). Communication between doctors and patients can

implicate patients’ rights to free speech. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 636. The court has already

concluded that SB 1172's restrictions on SOCE do not implicate the First Amendment right to

free speech in analyzing plaintiff therapists’ claim. The minors’ claim is but the “flip side of that

coin,” id. at 643 (Kozinski, J., concurring), and subject to a similar, more exacting analysis, see

Pico, 457 U.S. at 867. Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the minor plaintiffs’

claim.12

3. Vagueness

Plaintiffs make three primary vagueness arguments as part of their First

Amendment due process challenge: First, plaintiffs maintain “SB 1172 leaves the therapist

12 The court is sympathetic to the fact that minor plaintiffs' courses of therapy will be

disrupted once SB 1172 goes into effect. However, in the applicable legal framework, this

concern is relevant to the question of irreparable harm, which the court does not reach here, as

opposed to the merits of the minors’ claims.

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guessing since it does not define . . . the foundational concept of ‘sexual orientation.’” (ECF 28

at 14.) Second, plaintiffs maintain “SB 1172 also fails to address . . . what counsel therapists

may provide to minors who identify themselves as bisexual.” (Id. at 16.) Finally, plaintiffs

argue, “the lack of any specified geographic boundaries further obscures the reach of the bill”

because “SB 1172 could presumably cover [w]eb videos, radio broadcasts or electronic

transmissions into California that provide SOCE or referrals to counselors who provide SOCE.” 

(Id. at 17; emphasis in original.)13

Due process demands that any statutory proscription be sufficiently precise “to

provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it

prohibits.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). A statute lacking the requisite precision must be struck down for

vagueness. Id.

However, “perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of

regulations that restrict expressive activity.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794

(1989) (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110.) Indeed, voiding a democratically enacted statute on

grounds it is unduly vague is an extreme remedy. The Ninth Circuit has explained that facial

invalidation for vagueness “is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the

[Supreme] Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” California Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of

Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). When addressing a facial vagueness challenge, as 

here, the court “should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all

of its applications.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,

494-95 (1982); accord Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dept., 578 F.3d 1133, 1146

13 Plaintiffs also argue that the statute acts as an unconstitutional prior restraint on

expression. The court already has found that SB 1172 does not proscribe expression, but rather

conduct. Plaintiffs also contend SB 1172 improperly vests unbridled discretion in a public

official. Plaintiffs’ argument in this regard is unavailing because, as described below, the statute

is sufficiently clear such that no public official is given limitless discretion. Plaintiffs have not

shown a likelihood of success on the merits based on these theories.

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(2009) (a statute will survive a facial vagueness challenge so long as “it is clear what the statute

proscribes in the vast majority of its intended applications”); Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at

1151 (“[U]ncertainty at a statute’s margins will not warrant facial invalidation if it is clear what

the statute proscribes in the vast majority of its intended applications.”).

An additional analytical nuance exists where the statutory proscription purports to

regulate a targeted industry or profession. That is, 

if the statutory prohibition involves conduct of a select group of

persons having specialized knowledge, and the challenged

phraseology is indigenous to the idiom of that class, the standard is

lowered and a court may uphold a statute which uses words or phrases

having a technical or other special meaning, well enough known to

enable those within its reach to correctly apply them.

United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1289 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Precious Metals

Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 620 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1980), in turn

quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); internal quotations

omitted).

a. “Sexual Orientation” 

Plaintiffs’ argument attacking the term “sexual orientation” as undefined, as well

as the corresponding lack of guidance to a therapist regarding when or if he or she has begun to

engage in prohibited SOCE therapy, cites the APA Task Force, which noted that “[s]ame-sex

sexual attractions and behavior occur in the context of a variety of sexual orientations . . . and . . .

is fluid or has an indefinite outcome.” (ECF 28 at 14.) In response, defendants argue that

plaintiffs, as practitioners of SOCE, cannot allege the term “sexual orientation” is vague;

moreover, they say, the term “sexual orientation” is well understood within the mental health

field generally. “To practicing psychologists, it is a term of ‘common understanding . . . to

which no [practitioner] is a stranger.’” (Id. at 19.) Defendants also argue the statute proscribes

only the discrete act of attempting, through sexual orientation change efforts, to alter the sexual

orientation of a minor. (Id. at 20.)

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SB 1172 does proscribe that which the named plaintiff therapists themselves

admit to practicing and therefore must understand: therapy the sole purpose of which is to alter

the sexual orientation of a patient, namely SOCE.14 The court is unpersuaded that the term

“sexual orientation” is unduly vague. Plaintiffs rely on Keyishian v. Board of Regents of

University of State of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589, 599 (1967), which held that a statute prohibiting

employing any teacher who “advocates, advises, or teaches the doctrine of forceful overthrow of

the government” was unconstitutionally vague because “[i]t w[ould] prohibit the employment of

one who merely advocates the doctrine in the abstract without any attempt to indoctrinate

others.” Id. For example, the Court inquired whether “the teacher who carries a copy of the

Communist Manifesto on a public street” violates the statute. Id. Keyishian is not analogous to

this case: the term “sexual orientation” does not create uncertainty as to what a therapist can and

cannot do, as was the case for teachers in Keyishian; rather it is what the statute proscribes.15

Unlike in Keyishian, the statute expressly targets a specific form of therapy known to the

community in which it is practiced. 

The court also finds the term “sexual orientation” is neither linguistically nor

semantically vague. The definition of the term is clear: “[A] person’s sexual identity in relation

to the gender to whom he or she is usually attracted; [ ] the fact of being heterosexual, bisexual,

or homosexual.” CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1321 (12th ed. 2011). This definition

14 As noted at the hearing, some plaintiffs are organizations with nearly 50,000 members,

such as AACC. (See ECF 1 ¶ 26.) This fact does not change the analysis. The declarations

submitted by representatives of NARTH and AACC show those organizations are dedicated to

"eliminat[ing] [a person's] unwanted same-sex attractions and the psychological factors that are

typically associated with a homosexual lifestyle." (Pruden Decl., ECF 28-3 ¶ 4; see also

generally Scalise Decl., ECF 28-4.) The court is not persuaded that persons who have chosen to 

join the plaintiff organizations may not be able to comprehend SB 1172's definition of SOCE as

"practices . . . that seek to change an individual's sexual orientation."

15 Defendants’ reliance on Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct.

2705 (2010) for the proposition that the therapist plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of

success on the merits because they “engage[] in conduct that is ‘clearly proscribed’ by the

statute” is unpersuasive. (ECF 48 at 17:11-13.) Holder involved an “as applied” challenge,

whereas plaintiffs here attack SB 1172 facially. Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2712.

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is reinforced by a litany of California statutes. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.6 (defining

sexual orientation as “heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality”); CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 51(e)(6) (referencing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926®)16 (same); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.56(h)

(same).17

One other federal court, after canvassing other decisions, determined the term

sexual orientation is not unconstitutionally vague. See Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp.

2d 528, 545-47 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (relying on Black’s dictionary definition, rejecting vagueness

challenge to statute banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation), rev’d on other

grounds, 53 Fed. Appx. 740 (6th Cir. 2002). That court concluded, “[t]he definitions of ‘sexual

orientation’ . . . are consistent with the meanings attributed to those terms by common usage,”

namely heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality. Id.

Because plaintiffs use the term themselves to describe the sexual orientation

change therapy they practice, the standard of review is lower. The “statutory prohibition

involves conduct of a select group of persons having specialized knowledge, and the challenged

phraseology is indigenous to the idiom of that class . . . .” Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1289. 

Plaintiff therapists “well enough know” what the statute proscribes. Id.

b. Treatment Allowed and Disallowed

In complaining that SB 1172 fails to clarify the forms of therapy covered by the

statute, plaintiffs point out the new law does not address what therapists may do when visited by

minors who identify themselves as bisexual. They argue “there is simply no way to determine a

proper course of action when a [bisexual] questioning person enters [a therapist’s] office.” (ECF

16 The California Legislature amended this Government Code section in 2012. See 2012

Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 287 (A.B. 1964) (WEST); 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 448 (A.B. 2370)

(WEST); 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 457 (S.B. 1381) (WEST); 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 701

(A.B. 2386) (WEST). These amendments, however, did not alter the statute’s definition of

sexual orientation.

17 The common definition of the term sexual orientation does not, as plaintiffs’ counsel

suggested at hearing, include “pederasty.”

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28 at 17.) In its amicus brief, EQCA notes the statute defines the term “sexual orientation

change efforts” as “any practices by mental health providers that seek to change an individual’s

sexual orientation,” such as efforts to “change behaviors or gender expressions, or to eliminate or

reduce sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.” (Amicus

at 14, ECF 70.) The statute also lists a number of psychotherapeutic techniques that do not fall

within the statutory proscription. (Id.) Defendants point out the statute “does not prohibit

mental health providers from counseling parties that homosexuality is morally wrong and should

be changed, so long as they do not engage a minor in a course of treatment designed to change

their sexual orientation.” (ECF 48 at 20.) Such a course of treatment “requires a concerted

application of psychological techniques and principles” in order to “chang[e] deeply rooted

feelings and behaviors.” (Id.)

While the statute does not go into the level of detail plaintiffs suggest is needed,

on its face the new law is clear enough: mental health providers, as defined by the statute, may

not implement practices designed for the specific purpose of changing an individual’s sexual

orientation. The record is replete with specific explanations and examples of what SOCE can

entail, including from plaintiffs themselves.18 As explained above, such practices include both

aversive and non-aversive techniques: inducing nausea, vomiting, or paralysis; providing

electric shocks; or having the individual snap an elastic band around the wrist when aroused by

same-sex erotic images or thoughts, as well as attempting to alter thought patterns by reframing

desires, redirecting thoughts, or using hypnosis. It is these forms of therapy, implemented with

the intent to alter the patient’s sexual orientation, that the statute prohibits. 

18 The declaration submitted by plaintiff therapist Dr. Nicolosi expressly describes the

types of therapeutic techniques SOCE practitioners employ in their efforts to alter a patient’s

sexual orientation. (See Nicolosi Decl. ¶ 9) (discussing what his “SOCE counseling consists of

. . .”). The declarations submitted by plaintiff therapists also demonstrate that they provide their

minor patients with detailed informed consent of the nature of SOCE therapy. (See id. ¶ 6

(“Prior to engaging in SOCE Counseling with patients, I provide them an extensive consent form

that outlines the nature of the treatment.”)); see also Rosik Decl. ¶ 9 (explaining that he provides

patients “advanced informed consent,” which “explains his therapeutic approach.”)).

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The simplicity of the statute also cuts against plaintiffs’ argument. At bottom, the

proscription is discernable to a reasonable person, and particularly to a mental health

professional: any psychotherapeutic intent to change sexual orientation is not allowed by any

licensed professional. Cf. United States v. Kuffel, 1 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying

vagueness challenge to sentencing statute, in part, because of the “simple wording of th[e]

statute.”). Nothing in SB 1172 prevents a therapist from mentioning the existence of SOCE,

recommending a book on SOCE or recommending SOCE treatment by another unlicensed

person such as a religious figure.19 (ECF 28 at 16.) The statute does not require affirmation of a

patient’s homosexuality. Id. Even if, “at the margins,” there is some conjectural uncertainty as

to what the statute proscribes, such uncertainty is insufficient to void the statute for vagueness

because “it is clear what the statute proscribes in the vast majority of its intended applications,”

Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1151, namely therapy intended to alter a patient’s sexual

orientation.

c. Geographic Reach

Plaintiffs’ argument based on the lack of geographic boundaries notes that SB

1172 could cover a California-licensed counselor who also is licensed in other jurisdictions and

who offers SOCE in states outside of California. (Id. at 18.) Defendants respond that the statute

“does not prohibit, on its face or otherwise, web videos, radio broadcasts, or electronic

transmissions into California about SOCE.” (Id. at 20.) 

Here, the statute does not subject a licensed mental health professional to

discipline for merely sending “[w]eb videos, radio broadcasts or electronic transmission[s] into

California.” (ECF 28 at 17.) If a mental health professional licensed by California is engaging a

19 Dr. Nicolosi has described SOCE therapy as a “long-term process, and one that is in

fact most probably lifelong.” (JOSEPH NICOLOSI, PH.D., REPARATIVE THERAPY OF MALE

HOMOSEXUALITY, 165-168 (1997), attached as Exhibit 2 to the Stein Declaration, ECF 54). The

mere mention of SOCE’s existence is inconsistent with the extensive and long-term efforts

plaintiffs indicate are necessary to effectuate SOCE.

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patient in therapy intended to alter that patient’s sexual orientation via video conference, or other

remote medium, only then is that therapist subject to discipline. 

In sum, based on the record before the court, there is a general understanding of

what SOCE encompasses and the statute surpasses the bar set for minimal clarity. Plaintiffs are

not likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that SB 1172 is unconstitutionally vague.

4. Parents’ Fundamental Rights

Plaintiffs assert that the parental right at issue in this case, of choosing a particular

mental health therapy for one’s children, is a fundamental right that California cannot infringe

without satisfying strict scrutiny. (ECF 28 at 22 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80

(2000) (Thomas, J. concurring)).) Plaintiffs contend SB 1172 “tramples” upon parents’

fundamental interest in the care, custody, and control of children by preventing parents from

caring for their children’s mental health as the parents see fit.20 (Id. at 18.) Analogizing to

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,

534-35 (1925), plaintiffs aver SB 1172 operates in the same unconstitutional manner as the stateimposed educational programs in those cases, which prevented parents from choosing German

language instruction and private school education for their children. Plaintiffs say SB 1172 in

the same way prevents parents from choosing SOCE therapy for their children. (ECF 28 at 20-

22.)

Plaintiffs further contend parents’ right to make decisions regarding their

children’s mental health is specifically protected, even when that decision is not agreeable to the

child or involves risks. (Id. at 19 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).) Neither

state officials nor federal courts, plaintiffs maintain, are equipped to review such parental

20 Plaintiffs define the parental right at issue as choosing mental health treatment for

one’s children. (ECF 28 at 18, 22). In their moving papers, plaintiffs do not attempt to argue

parental rights based upon freedom of religion, although free exercise arguments are contained in

their fourth and fifth claims for relief. (ECF 1 at 43-45.) Therefore, the court does not address

the Free Exercise Clause in deciding this motion.

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decisions. (Id. (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 603-04).) Finally, plaintiffs claim defendants have

no proof that SOCE therapy is harmful, but rather rely upon “mere[ ] policy statements by

organizations politically opposed to SOCE therapy” that are “anecdotal [and] speculative.” 

(ECF 28 at 22; ECF 60 at 11.) Because SOCE therapy is harmless, children are not protected by

proscribing it; therefore, plaintiffs conclude, California has no compelling interest in SB 1172

that justifies its encroachment on fundamental parental rights. (ECF 60 at 11.)

Defendants argue SB 1172 does not infringe any fundamental rights and should

be upheld because it is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” (ECF 48 at 24 (citing

NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1047).) Defendants contend there is no fundamental or privacy right in

choosing a particular type of medical treatment, whether on behalf of oneself or one’s children. 

(Id. at 21.) Defendants cite Ninth and Tenth Circuit cases in which the courts held cancer

patients did not have a privacy interest in choosing a treatment the FDA had not deemed safe and

effective. Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam);

Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980).

Parents do of course have a fundamental interest in the general care, custody, and

control of their children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14

(1972); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01. This interest is “perhaps the

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” recognized by the Supreme Court. Troxel, 530 U.S.

at 65. State action that infringes upon this fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny. Fields

v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1208 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 447 F.3d 1187 (2006) (per

curiam), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1089 (2006) ; see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (“Where

fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake . . . we must searchingly examine the

interests that the State seeks to promote . . . .”). In addition, the Supreme Court has found there

is a “traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.” 

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602).

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This fundamental parental interest is not without limitation, however. Prince, 321

U.S. at 166; Fields, 427 F.3d at 1204. “[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting

parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and [ ] this includes, to

some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.” Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. State

action that does not affect a fundamental right is reviewed under the rational basis test. Fields,

427 F.3d at 1208. State actions that have prevailed over conflicting parental rights in the face of

rational basis review include requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting child labor,

and compelling school vaccinations. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. Moreover, the Supreme Court has

declared states have a compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). In short, limitations to parental rights may exist where “harm to the physical

or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been

demonstrated or may be properly inferred.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230; see also Runyon v.

McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976) (no fundamental parental right to educate children in private

segregated schools); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) (upholding a

compulsory inoculation statute); Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206 (parental rights do not encompass the

right to direct how a public school teaches children, even when the curriculum includes graphic

sexual content); Hooks v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2000)

(parental rights did not encompass the right to have state-funded speech therapy for homeschooled children); Carnohan, 616 F.2d at 1122) (no fundamental right to access drugs the FDA

has not deemed safe and effective); Hutchins v. Dist. of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (upholding a municipality’s curfew for minors).

Here, as discussed below, the court finds there is no fundamental or privacy right

to choose a specific mental health treatment the state has reasonably deemed harmful to minors. 

No such right follows from the line of cases beginning with Meyer, nor is it specifically

enumerated in other substantive due process cases.

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a. Definition of Right

The Supreme Court instructs that substantive due process analysis “must begin

with a careful description of the asserted right[,] for the more general is the right's description,

i.e., the free movement of people, the easier is the extension of substantive due process.” 

Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)); see also Michael H.

v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989 ) (Scalia, J., for the court but joined in footnote only

by Rehnquist, C.J.) (proper level of generality at which to describe the right is “the most specific

level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be

identified”). “And the ‘doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care

whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’” Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538 (quoting

Flores, 507 U.S. at 302).

Here, plaintiffs frame the contested right as encompassing: parents’ interest in

the care, custody, and control of their children; parents’ right to care for the mental health of

their children as the parents see fit; and parents’ right to choose a specific form of counseling for

their children. (ECF 28 at 18, 21.) Defendants, in contrast, frame the contested right as the

privacy interest or fundamental right in choosing a particular type of medical treatment or

medical provider, either on one’s own or one’s children’s behalf. (ECF 48 at 21.) 

The court defines the right at issue in this case as the right to choose a specific

mental health treatment that the state has deemed harmful to minors. This definition is

consistent with plaintiffs’ description of the contested right in similar terms. (See ECF 28 at 18,

21.) It also is the most specific level at which the court has been able to identify precedent

addressing the protection accorded analogous asserted rights. Cf. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206

(parental rights do not encompass the right to direct how a public school teaches children, even

when the curriculum includes graphic sexual content); Carnohan, 616 F.2d at 1122 (no

fundamental interest in choosing a drug the FDA has not found safe or effective).

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Although parental rights and other substantive due process rights, such as privacy,

have traditionally been developed through distinct frameworks, the Supreme Court has intimated

the two types of right may be “no more than verbal variations of a single constitutional right.” 

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 n.15 (1976) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53

(1973)). Nevertheless, the Runyon Court addressed parental and privacy rights separately. This

court follows the Runyon Court’s blueprint and examines each type of right in turn.

b. Parental Rights

i. Meyer Line of Cases

The line of cases beginning with Meyer “evince[s] the principle that the state

cannot prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program . . . that is, the state does

not have the power to ‘standardize its children’ or ‘foster a homogenous people.’” Fields, 427

F.3d at 1205 (quoting Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir.

1995), abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2010)). 

Meyer and its progeny are distinguishable from the instant case in three important ways. First,

the contested state actions in the Meyer cases constituted comprehensive and total interference

with a parental right. Thus, the Court broadly defined the fundamental right at issue in each case

as parents’ interest in the care, custody, and control of their children. Second, as the Court in

Yoder noted, none of the Meyer cases dealt with an instance in which “any harm to the physical

or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been

demonstrated or may be properly inferred.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230. Third, plaintiffs in the

Meyer cases, with the exception of Pierce, brought as-applied challenges after being criminally

convicted of violating the challenged statutes (Meyers and Yoder) or after being negatively

affected by the implemented statute (Troxel). Such as-applied challenges require plaintiffs to

meet a lower burden to demonstrate unconstitutionality than does the facial challenge mounted

here. See Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 686 F.3d 1085, 1086 (9th Cir. 2012) (facial challenge is

“the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no

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set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid”) (quoting United States v.

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).

In Meyer, the Nebraska statute at issue prohibited any person, “individually or as

a teacher,” from teaching modern foreign languages in any “private, denominational, parochial,

or public school” to children below the Eighth Grade. 262 U.S. at 396. The Court scrutinized

the statute under something akin to the rational basis test, concluding the statute was “arbitrary

and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state.” Id. at 403. The

statute also prescribed criminal punishment for violators; the plaintiff had already been tried and

convicted. Id. at 396. In effect, the statute enacted a total ban on the teaching of modern

languages to children below the Eighth Grade, as it prohibited any person, not just state-licensed

or professional teachers, from teaching in these languages, even in religious schools. The Court

also found no evidence that such language instruction would harm children; the laudable goal of

encouraging civic participation through monolingualism was insufficient justification. Id. at

403.

In contrast, SB 1172 bars parents only from seeking SOCE through state-licensed

mental health professionals. SB 1172 § 2(865)(a) (restricting prohibition to state-licensed

“mental health providers”). It does not enact a comprehensive and total ban; parents can still

seek SOCE or its equivalent through religious institutions or other unlicensed providers. SB

1172 also does not impose criminal punishment. And the California Legislature relied upon the

expertise of ten different mental health professional organizations who have discouraged or

opposed SOCE as a “cure” for homosexuality, SB 1172 § 1(a)-(l), some of which deem SOCE a

violation of ethical principles. SB 1172 § 1(l) (noting statement of Pan American Health

Organization). The Legislature also relied on studies indicating minors who face family

rejection based on their sexual orientation face especially serious health risks. SB 1172 § 1(m). 

No such indication of harm was before the Court in Meyer. See 262 U.S. at 403. 

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Pierce is even more readily distinguishable from this case. There, an Oregon

statute required every eight- to sixteen-year-old child to attend public school, 268 U.S. at 530,

effectively foreclosing all other education options, including private religious schooling and

home schooling. The Court determined the prohibited activity in which the plaintiff educational

corporations engaged, private and religious primary education, was not inherently harmful to

children, but rather was “long regarded as useful and meritorious.” Id. at 534. In contrast, SB

1172 does not foreclose all parents’ options to seek SOCE. On the record before it, the court is

not prepared to second-guess the Legislature’s determination that SOCE therapy cannot at this

point be considered “long regarded as useful and meritorious.”

Yoder, in which Amish parents successfully contested a Wisconsin statute

requiring formal public or private school attendance until age sixteen, is similarly

distinguishable. 406 U.S. at 207. Plaintiffs in that case relied largely upon the Free Exercise

Clause, a claim plaintiffs do not rely on in this motion. See id. at 213. The Yoder plaintiffs

contended it was fundamental to the Amish faith that their children not be educated outside the

Amish community, and the Amish Community did not provide formal schooling that satisfied

the statute. Id. The Wisconsin statute acted as a comprehensive and total bar to plaintiffs’

religious practices, and plaintiffs had been criminally charged, tried, and convicted of violating

the statute by refusing to send their children to school. Id. at 208. The Court in Yoder found no

evidence the Wisconsin statute prevented harm. Id. at 230-32. Here, in contrast, SB 1172 does

not impede parents’ religious or moral convictions because it proscribes SOCE only as

performed by state-licensed mental health professionals, and the California Legislature relied on

more than hypothetical information. 

Plaintiffs also rely on the parental rights case of Troxel. There, the Court

invalidated a Washington statute that interfered with parents’ decisions on visitation rights. 530

U.S. at 67. The statute was “breathtakingly broad”: the Court found it effectively allowed a state

court to “disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation

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whenever a third party affected by the decision file[d] a visitation petition, based solely on the

judge's determination of the child's best interests.” Id. (emphasis in original). When the plaintiff

in Troxel brought her challenge, Washington had already implemented the statute, and the

plaintiff’s children’s grandparents had been awarded visitation rights over her objection. Id. at

62. The serious nature of the parental right at issue in Troxel, coupled with the unbounded

judicial discretion vested by the “best interests” standard, distinguish the statute in Troxel from

SB 1172. Preventing state-licensed mental health professionals from providing SOCE to minors

is not equivalent to empowering state officers to override parents’ decisions on who should be

allowed have to familial visits with their children. Also in Troxel, the visitation statute required

no showing of harm, and the state of Washington made no showing to counter the plaintiff’s asapplied challenge. Id. at 68.

ii. Prince and Fields

Prince, in which the Supreme Court identified limitations to the parental right at

issue in Meyer, is more similar to the instant case than any of the Meyer cases. In Prince, the

Court upheld a Massachusetts statute prohibiting twelve to eighteen year olds from selling

magazines, newspapers, and periodicals on city streets or in any public place. Prince, 321 U.S.

at 160-61. Whoever furnished such items to minors could be criminally sanctioned. Id. at 161. 

The plaintiff was cited under this statute when she took her minor niece with her to preach about

their Jehovah’s Witness faith and to sell related magazines on a public street. Id. at 161-63. The

plaintiff argued the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional because it did not target activity

that poses a “clear and present danger” to a child; the child was in no danger when she was

simply preaching the Gospel and selling church magazines on a public street in the company of

her legal guardian. Id. at 167.

The Court in Prince upheld the statute as applied, noting the state’s greater

authority over children’s activities than adults’. Id. at 168. While recognizing the fundamental

right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children as determined in Pierce, the

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Court found that the “family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest.” Id. at 166-67. 

It observed that a democratic state depends on children developing into healthy maturity as

citizens, and states can secure this goal “against impeding restraints and dangers, within a broad

range of selection.” Id. Child labor, the Court found, is crippling, and time on the streets carries

with it many “possible harms.” Id. Even if a child is not engaged in child labor per se, but is

evangelizing in the company of a parent, harmful possibilities still attach, such as “emotional

excitement and psychological or physical injury.” Id. at 170. Parents may choose to martyr

themselves, but they may not “make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age

of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.” Id.

As did the state of Massachusetts in Prince, California here has determined to

protect minors from particular conduct in the interest of preventing possible harm. Parents’

interest in choosing a mental health therapy for their children is not beyond state regulation; if

the state determines a therapy is potentially harmful to minors, it may prohibit minors from

receiving that therapy from state-licensed therapists. Cf. id. at 166-67. In other words, parents

may not conscript the state-regulated mental health profession into treating their children with a

potentially harmful therapy before those children have reached the age of majority. Cf. id. at

168-70.

The differences between Prince and this case serve only to strengthen the

conclusion that this case should be decided as Prince was. First, SB 1172 is a more limited

regulation than that in Prince, in that it is not an “absolute prohibition” of the regulated conduct. 

See id. at 168. Minors can still receive SOCE treatment from non-licensed providers. Second,

SB 1172 does not impose criminal penalties; instead, mental health professionals who violate the

statute are subject to professional disciplinary action. Third, the plaintiff in Prince faced a lower

threshold in proving the statute unconstitutional because she brought an as-applied challenge, id.

at 159, whereas here plaintiffs bring a facial challenge. See Patel, 686 F.3d at 1086.

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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, in company with the First and Sixth Circuits, has

held that parental rights do not encompass the analogous right to direct how a public school

teaches children, even when the curriculum includes graphic sexual content. Fields, 427 F.3d at

1206; Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2005) (parents do not

have a fundamental right to direct how a public school teaches their children); Brown, 68 F.3d at

529 (“We think it is fundamentally different for the state to say to a parent, ‘You can't teach your

child German or send him to a parochial school,’ than for the parent to say to the state, ‘You

can't teach my child subjects that are morally offensive to me.’”). 

In Fields, parents contended a survey the school administered to their children

violated parents’ fundamental rights because the survey contained sexually-explicit questions. 

427 F.3d at 1200. The school administered the survey to discover whether some children

suffered psychological impediments to learning. Id. Parents argued they had a fundamental

right to introduce their children to sexual matters as they saw fit. Id. The court rejected this

argument, holding that parents have the “right to inform their children when and as they wish on

the subject of sex; they have no constitutional right, however, to prevent a public school from

providing its students with whatever information it wishes to provide, sexual or otherwise, when

and as the school determines that it is appropriate to do so.” Id. at 1206. Parents did not have

the right to compel public schools to follow their “idiosyncratic views” about what information

schools can dispense. Id. “‘While parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to

send their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental right generally to direct how a

public school teaches their child.’” Id. (quoting Blau, 401 F.3d at 395-96; emphases in original).

The analogy to Fields in this case is strong. Parents have the right to teach their

children whatever they wish regarding sexual orientation, and retain the right to obtain SOCE

from unlicensed providers, including religious figures. Parents do not, however, have the right

to prevent a state from proscribing the practice of a particular therapy when the state reasonably

determines such proscription is appropriate. In the face of California’s legislative determination

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that homosexuality is not an illness to be treated with SOCE, based upon identified medical and

scientific information, some parents’ desire to obtain SOCE from licensed professionals is

equivalent to parents seeking to compel schools to deliver messages conforming to parents’ own

moral views. While parents have a fundamental right to decide whether to avail themselves of

state-regulated mental health professionals, they do not have a fundamental right to direct the

state’s regulation of those professionals. Cf. Blau, 401 F.3d at 395-96.

The court in Fields also considered the practicalities of expanding parents’

fundamental rights to include the right to prevent public schools from delivering information

some parents find morally objectionable. 427 F.3d at 1207. The court could find no

constitutional reason to distinguish the concern in Fields from “any of the countless moral,

religious, or philosophical objections that parents might have to other decisions of the School

District — whether those objections regard information concerning guns, violence, the military,

gay marriage, racial equality, slavery, the dissection of animals, or the teaching of scientificallyvalidated theories of the origins of life.” Id. The court reasoned that schools cannot be expected

to accommodate the moral or religious concerns of every parent, as such an obligation would be

impossible to satisfy. Id. Plaintiffs here wish to prevent California from regulating mental

health professionals in a manner that contravenes plaintiffs’ personal views. 

The court finds that the parental rights question in this case is resolved by the

Supreme Court’s decision in Prince and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fields. Prince, 321 U.S.

158; Fields, 427 F.3d 1197.

c. Privacy Rights

Plaintiffs’ contention that parents have a protected privacy right in making

decisions regarding their children’s mental health also fails. (ECF 28 at 19.) As discussed

below, the Supreme Court’s Parham case does not stand for plaintiffs’ proposition, and neither

does the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Carnohan, which accords with the Tenth Circuit’s

Rutherford decision. (See ECF 48 at 21-23.)

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i. Parham

In Parham v. J.R,, minor children sought a declaratory judgment that a Georgia

statute enabling parents to voluntarily institutionalize their minor children violated the minors’

substantive due process rights. 442 U.S. at 587. The minor plaintiffs contended the statute

severely deprived them of liberty, as they could be institutionalized against their will if their

parents so elected. Id. at 597. Mental health professionals were required to review each

proposed patient to ensure institutionalization was warranted. Id. Plaintiffs asserted that due

process demanded a formal or quasi-formal hearing before institutionalization could occur. Id.

at 603. The primary constitutional interests in tension were those of the parents against those of

the children. Id. The Court examined the Meyer line of cases to determine its illumination of

parents’ rights in the face of minors asserting contrary interests. Id. at 603. The Court in

Parham upheld the statute, finding that the mental health professionals’ independent prior

determination of necessity for each institutionalization was sufficient to prevent commitment in

violation of the minors’ interests. Id. at 602.

In Parham, unlike here, parents and the state were on the same side; the Court

was not deciding a contest between parents’ and states’ interests, but confirmed parents’ right to

make mental health decisions on behalf of their minor children but against the children.21 In

Parham, the Court relied on the interests of the state to reach its holding that favored parents’

rights. Id. at 605-08 (intimating the parents’ interests and the state’s parens patriae interests

were aligned). At the same time, the Court recognized “a state is not without constitutional

control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is

jeopardized.” Id. at 603 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230 and Prince, 321 U.S. at 366). However,

/////

21 Here, there is no indication the interests of the plaintiff parents and children are not

aligned. See ECF 71 (court’s order granting parents guardian ad litem status). Plaintiff’s

argument at hearing that Parham requires a showing of more than mere risk is inapposite; such a

rule applies when parents’ interests are in tension with their children’s interests. Id at 603.

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the Court distinguished Yoder and Prince as it did Meyer and Pierce, as they were not applicable

to a conflict between parents and children. Id.

ii. Carnohan and Rutherford

The cases of Carnohan and Rutherford are closer than Parham to the case at bar. 

In both cases, terminally-ill cancer patients sought equitable determinations that the federal

government could not inhibit them from utilizing a cancer drug the FDA had not approved. 

Carnohan, 616 F.2d at 1121; Rutherford, 616 F.2d at 456. The plaintiffs based their claims upon

individual privacy interests established in Roe and other substantive due process cases. 

Carnohan, 616 F.2d at 1122; Rutherford, 616 F.2d at 457. Both courts held that the plaintiffs’

protected fundamental right is a patient’s decision whether to seek treatment or not; but a

patient’s “selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medication, is within the area of

governmental interest in protecting health.” See Carnohan, 616 F.2d at 1122 (“Constitutional

rights of privacy and personal liberty do not give individuals the right to obtain laetrile free of

the lawful exercise of government police power.”); Rutherford, 616 F.2d at 457. Both cases

support the proposition that no privacy right exists to access pharmaceutical treatments the

government reasonably has deemed harmful, or has not deemed safe.22

By analogy, plaintiffs in this case do not have a fundamental right to receive a

therapy that California has deemed harmful and ineffective. Carnohan, 616 F.2d at 1122;

Rutherford, 616 F.2d at 457; see also NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1050 (“substantive due process rights

do not extend to the choice of type of treatment”; noting Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that

“‘most federal courts have held that a patient does not have a constitutional right to obtain a

particular type of treatment . . . if the government has reasonably prohibited that type of

treatment . . . .” (quoting Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1994)). California’s

22 Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions at hearing, laetrile was not a controlled substance. It

was subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Carnohan, 616 F.2d

at 1121.

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governmental interest in protecting public health, deriving from its police power, enables it to

prohibit certain treatments without infringing on plaintiffs’ fundamental privacy rights. The

plaintiffs in Carnohan and Rutherford did not prevail despite having been diagnosed with

terminal cancer. Plaintiffs in this action are seeking treatment in the face of the Legislature’s

reasonable determination that there is no illness to treat. Although plaintiffs here base their

claim upon the Meyer line of parental rights cases, and not upon the individual privacy and

liberty rights addressed in Rutherford and Carnohan, the Supreme Court as noted has intimated

that these rights are simple variations of a single constitutional right. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179

n.15. This court finds no meaningful distinction to make a difference here. SB 1172 thus is

subject to rational basis review.

c. The Rational Basis Test

While plaintiffs’ briefing focuses on strict scrutiny, ECF 28 at 22, plaintiffs’

counsel clarified his position at argument that SB 1172 also fails the rational basis test. Plaintiffs

argue that California’s legislative findings provide no concrete evidence that SOCE harms

minors, taking aim in particular at the APA Task Force report and asserting it concedes there

have been no studies of SOCE’s harmfulness to children or adolescents. (Id. at 22; ECF 60 at 3-

5, 11.) Plaintiffs provide declarations in support of their contention that the APA report is

“scientifically flawed, biased,” based upon anecdotal and speculative policy statements, and

presents no consensus on SOCE’s efficacy, even on adults. (ECF 60 at 4, 11.) 

Defendants argue that SB 1172 does satisfy the rational basis standard. They

assert that states have a compelling, not just legitimate, interest in regulating access to mental

health treatments and providers and that the California Legislature rationally determined that SB

1172 would promote this important interest. (ECF 48 at 22, 24-25.) Defendants claim this

legislative determination was based on “hard data and expert opinion,” that at a minimum: 

1) SOCE therapy is unproven and potentially harmful; and 2) homosexuality is not a disease or

condition that warrants treatment. (Id. at 25.) 

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The APA report on which the Legislature relied includes the following: 

[T]here is a dearth of scientifically sound research on the safety of

SOCE. Early and recent research studies provide no clear

indication of the prevalence of harmful outcomes among people

who have undergone efforts to change their sexual orientation or

the frequency of occurrence of harm because no study to date of

adequate scientific rigor has been explicitly designed to do so.

Thus, we cannot conclude how likely it is that harm will occur

from SOCE. However, studies . . . indicate that attempts to change

sexual orientation may cause or exacerbate distress and poor

mental health in some individuals, including depression and

suicidal thoughts. 

(ECF 54-1 at 50.) The APA report also “found no empirical evidence that providing any type of

therapy in childhood can alter adult same-sex orientation.” (Id. at 87.)

As noted above, the California Legislature also relied upon the expertise of nine

other mental health professional organizations who have discouraged or opposed SOCE as a

“cure” for homosexuality. SB 1172 § 1(a)-(l). Some of these organizations deem SOCE a

violation of ethical principles. SB 1172 § 1(l). The Legislature also cited to studies indicating

minors who face family rejection based on their sexual orientation face especially serious health

risks. SB 1172 § 1(m). 

On the record before it, the court concludes that SB 1172 is “rationally related to

a legitimate state interest.” See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1208.23 SB 1172's stated purpose is the

protection of the “physical and psychological well-being of minors.” SB 1172 § 1(n). This is

more than a “legitimate” interest: it is a significant, if not compelling, interest according to

Supreme Court precedent. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230; Prince, 321 U.S. at

166. SB 1172 is rationally related to this interest because it prohibits a therapeutic practice

deemed unproven and potentially harmful to minors by ten professional associations of mental

health experts. Even assuming plaintiffs’ criticisms of the APA report are true, plaintiffs still

have not carried their burden of demonstrating that the facts on which the Legislature says SB

23 Because rational basis review applies here, plaintiffs’ reliance on Video Software

Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (2009), is misplaced. 

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1172 is based cannot “reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” 

NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1050. The findings, recommended practices, and opinions of ten professional

associations of mental health experts is no small quantum of information. Even if all of the

studies and reports upon which the California Legislature relied were inconclusive or flawed, SB

1172 still would be a valid legislative enactment. A legislative choice such as this “is not subject

to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or

empirical data.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc. 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); see also Ginsberg,

390 U.S. at 642-43 (finding a statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to minors had a

rational basis even though studies about its harmfulness were inconclusive); Moore v. Detroit

Sch. Reform Bd., 293 F.3d 352, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding state law as rational even

though legislature relied upon “anecdotes collected from newspapers” rather than studies). 

SB 1172 need not “actually advance its stated purpose”; it is enough that “the

government could have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did.” NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1050. 

The court need not engage in an exercise of legislative mind reading to find the California

Legislature and the state’s Governor could have had a legitimate reason for enacting SB 1172.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 4, 2012.

44

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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