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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7804

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RONNIE BOWMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District

Judge. (CR-01-349; CA-05-677-3-22)

Argued: January 29, 2008 Decided: February 29, 2008

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and Liam

O’GRADY, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of

Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: John C. Massaro, ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.,

for Appellant. Mark C. Moore, Assistant United States Attorney,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rhonda L. Stewart, ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P.,

Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States

Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

We granted Ronnie Bowman a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) to consider: (1) whether there was an insufficient factual

basis to support Bowman’s guilty plea to distribution of a

controlled substance resulting in the death of another person, such

that the district court committed error in accepting Bowman’s

guilty plea to the charge; and (2) whether the district court erred

in its instruction regarding the elements of conspiracy to

distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21

U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). Concluding that both

issues were procedurally defaulted and that Bowman cannot show

cause and actual prejudice excusing said default, we affirm the

district court’s denial of Bowman’s motion made under 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2255 (West 2006). 

I.

The facts and procedural history are thoroughly laid out in

our opinion on Bowman’s direct appeal, United States v. Bowman, 348

F.3d 408 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Bowman I”), and we repeat them here only

as necessary to decide Bowman’s current § 2255 motion. A federal

grand jury sitting in the District of South Carolina indicted

Bowman, along with his girlfriend, Jerrilyn Gray, on March 20,

2001, charging Bowman and Gray in an eight-count indictment

relating to drug distribution. Relevant here, Count One charged

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Bowman with conspiracy to distribute one kilogram or more of

heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West

2000 & Supp. 2006), and Count Four charged Bowman with distribution

of heroin that resulted in the death of another person–-Bowman’s

friend and frequent customer, Mark Nunn–-in violation of 21

U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2. In a superseding

indictment filed September 21, 2005, Count Four was amended by

replacing the word “heroin” with the phrase “Schedule I and

Schedule II controlled substance(s).” (J.A. at 24.) 

Bowman’s trial began on October 22, 2001. We succinctly

summarized the subsequent events in Bowman I:

After the first day of trial, during which five witnesses

testified on behalf of the government, Bowman tendered a

guilty plea to Count 1 (conspiracy to distribute one

kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

846) and Count 4 (distribution of a controlled substance

that caused the death of another person in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)) pursuant to the terms of a

written plea agreement dated October 23, 2001. Under the

agreement, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining

three counts and to file a motion for a downward

departure to give Bowman a sentence of 22 years’

imprisonment, provided Bowman thereafter cooperate with

the government in several specified respects and tell the

truth. The parties’ agreement to a 22-year sentence was

subject to court approval and foreclosed the potential

life sentences that Bowman could otherwise have received

for the two counts. The agreement provided that if

Bowman failed to cooperate or failed to tell the truth,

he would be denied the benefit of the 22-year downward

departure, but he could not withdraw his guilty plea. In

addition, the government reserved the right to argue for

a maximum sentence.

During a lengthy plea colloquy conducted on October 23,

2001, in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11, the district court determined that Bowman’s

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plea was knowing and voluntary. During critical portions

of the colloquy, the court asked Bowman to state his

understanding of that portion of the proceeding in his

own words. Bowman thus testified under oath about his

understanding of the nature of the entire proceeding, the

nature of the charges, and the facts on which the charges

were based. The court also made repeated inquiries of

Bowman with respect to the nature of his relationship

with his attorney. Bowman stated that he was satisfied

with his attorney’s representation and that his attorney

“has been working hand in hand with me” and did

everything that Bowman asked him to do. At the

conclusion of the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court

stated:

It is the finding of the court in the case of

the U.S. versus Ronnie Bowman, also known as

“Young,” that the defendant knows his right to

a trial, knows the maximum possible

punishment, is fully competent and capable of

entering an informed plea, and that his plea

of guilty is a knowing and voluntary plea

supported by an independent basis in fact

containing each of the essential elements of

these offenses. His plea is, therefore,

accepted and he is now adjudged guilty of

those offenses.

Three weeks later, Bowman filed a pro se motion to

discharge his trial counsel, which the court granted.

With the assistance of new counsel, Bowman then filed a

motion on January 24, 2002, to withdraw his guilty plea.

The district court held hearings on this motion on May 2

and August 12, 2002. Bowman based his motion principally

on a toxicology report developed as part of the autopsy

of Mark Nunn, the victim referred to in Count 4. Because

the report indicated a finding of no heroin or fentanyl

in Nunn’s system, Bowman asserted that it showed that he

was not responsible for Nunn’s death, as charged in Count

4. Bowman also stated to the court that he was actually

innocent of the conduct charged in both Count 4 and Count

1. Finally, Bowman claimed that he did not have the

close assistance of competent counsel in that counsel

failed to review the toxicology report with him closely

and that counsel advised Bowman to enter a plea as to

both counts, regardless of Bowman’s guilt. To support

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Bowman

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conclusorily stated to the district court that he had

lied outright during his guilty-plea colloquy. 

Bowman I, 348 F.3d at 411-12. 

The district court declined to permit Bowman to withdraw his

guilty plea, a ruling we affirmed on appeal. Bowman I, 348 F.3d at

416-17. Of particular significance, in Bowman’s first appeal we

summarized his claim as follows:

Bowman’s principal argument rests on his claim that the

toxicology report prepared as part of Nunn's autopsy

indicated that Nunn had no heroin or fentanyl in his

system and therefore that Bowman could not have caused

Nunn's death by giving him heroin laced with fentanyl. 

Id. at 414.

We further noted that the Government “stated that it was

prepared to prove, through the testimony of an expert witness, that

a negative toxicology report was not unusual and that the evidence

in fact showed that Nunn's death was drug induced.” Id. at 415.

We also gave great weight to the fact that Bowman, under oath,

offered this proffer for his guilty plea to Count Four:

On around about August 15, 1999 a friend of mine named

Mark Nunn came to my house to purchase some heroin. He

was ill and sick and I gave him a bag. He went into my

bathroom and used it in my bathroom and came out, and the

results of using it, the dope, he OD'd.

Id.

On March 3, 2005, Bowman timely filed a § 2255 motion, raising

six grounds for relief, including the two grounds on which we

granted a COA. Bowman attached to his motion an affidavit from Dr.

Daniel Spitz, Chief Medical Examiner of Macomb County, Michigan.

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Based upon a reading of the autopsy and toxicology reports, Dr.

Spitz “found no evidence” that drugs caused or contributed to Mark

Nunn’s death and, instead, opined that Nunn died from cardiac

arrhythmia. (J.A. at 96-97.) On September 15, 2005, acting upon

the Government’s motion, the district court granted summary

judgment against Bowman. We initially granted Bowman a COA to

pursue his claim relating to Count Four, but later expanded the COA

to include the claim relating to Count One. We will address each

in turn.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions

regarding Bowman’s § 2255 motion, United States v. Brown, 155 F.3d

431, 434 (4th Cir. 1998), and its factual findings for clear error.

United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 395 (4th Cir. 2004). We are

permitted to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of the Government “on any legal and factual basis fairly

presented in the district court.” United States v. Hopkins, 268

F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Count Four

Bowman first contends that there was an insufficient factual

basis to support his guilty plea to Count Four of the indictment,

such that the district court committed error in accepting the plea.

In support of this argument, Bowman points us to the original

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toxicology report, Dr. Spitz’s expert report, and the fact that

Mark Nunn’s life insurance company paid out a claim even though it

included an exclusion for drug overdoses. Bowman, however, has an

extremely high hurdle to overcome on this claim: procedural

default. Because Bowman could have raised the absence of a factual

basis supporting his plea on direct appeal, see United States v.

Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652 (4th Cir. 2007) (vacating entry of guilty

plea on direct appeal where defendant “did not admit the necessary

mens rea before entering his plea and the record contained no

factual basis to support that element of the offense”), he has

procedurally defaulted this claim. Accordingly, “[i]n order to

collaterally attack a conviction or sentence based upon errors that

could have been but were not pursued on direct appeal, [Bowman]

must show cause and actual prejudice resulting from the errors of

which he complains or he must demonstrate that a miscarriage of

justice would result from the refusal of the court to entertain the

collateral attack.” United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490,

492-93 (4th Cir. 1999). “The existence of cause for a procedural

default must turn on something external to the defense, such as the

novelty of the claim or a denial of effective assistance of

counsel.” Id. at 493. A showing of cause and actual prejudice may

be excused if the movant can show actual innocence of the crime.

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992). “Typically, to

establish factual innocence a petitioner must demonstrate actual

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factual innocence of the offense of conviction, i.e., that

petitioner did not commit the crime of which he was convicted.”

Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 494. A movant must meet this burden with

“clear and convincing evidence.” Id.

Bowman claims that, because his appellate counsel was

ineffective, he can show cause for his procedural default. “To

establish cause for [his] default based upon ineffective assistance

of counsel, [Bowman] must show that [his] attorney[‘s] performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that [he]

suffered prejudice as a result.” Id. at 493. “Counsel’s failure

to pursue a basis for appeal by reason of a mere miscalculation of

the likelihood of success does not constitute constitutionally

ineffective representation.” Id. Applying this standard, Bowman

cannot show his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to

raise this claim on direct appeal. In our earlier opinion we noted

that Bowman, under oath, admitted his guilt to Count Four and

failed to “proffer[] any reason why the government’s proposed

testimony explaining the [absence of heroin or fentanyl in the

toxicology] report would be false or irrational.” Bowman I, 348

F.3d at 414. Given this conclusion, it is difficult to see how

Bowman’s appellate counsel was ineffective; his failure to bring

this claim was not even a miscalculation given our conclusion

regarding the factual basis supporting Bowman’s plea on Count Four.

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Nor can Bowman show his actual innocence by clear and

convincing evidence. Indeed, Bowman has fallen far short of this

demanding burden. None of Bowman’s “new” evidence explains how the

Government’s alternate theory, which was to be proffered by an

expert who actually viewed Nunn’s body, was “false or irrational.”

Id. at 414. As the district court properly noted, Dr. Spitz’s

affidavit “adds little to the findings” in this case, given that

the original toxicology report showed an absence of drugs in Nunn’s

system.

Thus, because Bowman has procedurally defaulted his claim that

there was no factual basis for his guilty plea to Count Four, and

because Bowman cannot show either that cause and actual prejudice

excuses this default or that he is actually innocent, the district

court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of the

Government.

B. Count One

Bowman next contends that, during his initial Rule 11

colloquy, the district court committed error by failing to inform

him that drug quantity is an element of the offense and that,

absent such error, he would not have pleaded guilty to Count One.

Bowman did not raise this claim on direct review, so it, too, is

procedurally defaulted. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139,

144-46 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, Bowman must again meet the cause and

actual prejudice standard. Moreover, in deciding if any error

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actually prejudiced Bowman, we note that violations of Rule 11 are

subject to harmless error, such that we may grant Bowman relief on

this claim only if the Rule 11 violation “affected the defendant’s

substantial rights.” United States v. Defusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117

(4th Cir. 1991).

Without delving into whether Bowman can show cause for his

procedural default, we simply conclude that, because any error

during Bowman’s Rule 11 colloquy could not have affected Bowman’s

substantial rights, Bowman cannot show actual prejudice excusing

his procedural default. Bowman admitted during the colloquy to his

involvement in distributing more than a kilogram of heroin, and we

noted in our earlier opinion that the Government had put forth one

witness who “testified to buying 3000-4000 ‘bags’ of heroin from

Bowman through daily transactions over a period of years.” Bowman

I, 348 F.3d at 415. Indeed, “other witnesses testified in

laborious detail about hundreds of transactions over a period of

four years, involving the sale of thousands of bags of heroin.”

Id. Because any error would not affect Bowman’s substantial

rights, he cannot show actual prejudice and the district court

correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Government on

this claim. 

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III.

In sum, Bowman’s § 2255 motion in many ways simply recasts

arguments we considered in Bowman I. Accordingly, and for the

aforementioned reasons, the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the Government is hereby

 AFFIRMED.

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