Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02172/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02172-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARC ANDERSON, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

SEAWORLD PARKS AND 

ENTERTAINMENT, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 15-cv-02172-JSW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF 

MARC ANDERSON'S MOTION FOR 

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH 

PREJUDICE ON CONDITIONS SET 

FORTH HEREIN 

Dkt. No. 509 

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of Plaintiff Marc Anderson’s 

motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. The Court has considered the parties’ papers, 

relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it concludes the motion can be resolved 

without oral argument. The Court will GRANT the motion for voluntary dismissal, and it 

GRANTS, IN PART, AND DENIES, IN PART, Defendant’s requested conditions. 

The Court shall not repeat the facts or procedural history of this case with respect to Mr. 

Anderson’s claims, which have been set forth in several prior orders. Mr. Anderson moves to 

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Because Defendant answered and moved 

for summary judgment and has not stipulated to dismiss Mr. Anderson’s claims, he may only 

dismiss his claims by a court order “on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

41(a)(1)(i)-(ii), 41(a)(2). 

In order to resolve this motion, the Court must answer three questions: (1) whether to 

dismiss; (2) whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice; and (3) whether any 

conditions should be imposed. See, e.g., Williams v. Peralta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 227 F.R.D. 538, 

539 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Ultimately, the decision is a matter within the Court’s discretion. 

Case 4:15-cv-02172-JSW Document 514 Filed 03/04/20 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court 

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Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 96 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a court “should 

grant a motion for voluntary dismissal unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain 

legal prejudice as a result.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001).1 

With respect to the first two questions, Defendant does not oppose dismissal with prejudice 

if the Court adopts four proposed conditions. The Court concludes the request to dismiss should 

be granted. Based on the parties’ agreement, it also concludes that dismissal with prejudice is 

warranted. The Court turns to the third and final question, what conditions – if any – should be 

imposed?

First, Defendant argues the dismissal order should state the dismissal is not the result of 

any kind of settlement. Mr. Anderson does not oppose that condition. Accordingly, the Court’s 

Order will include the following language: “The dismissal is not the result of any settlement 

reached between Mr. Anderson and SeaWorld, and SeaWorld is not providing any compensation 

or other benefit of any kind to Mr. Anderson, his counsel or any other person or entity as a 

condition of or result of this dismissal.” 

Second, Defendant argues that a dismissal order should make clear that it preserves its 

right to pursue any claims or remedies against Mr. Anderson or his counsel. Mr. Anderson does 

not oppose this request but asks the Court to include additional language, which would clarify that 

Defendant’s reservation of rights does not create or revive any rights that Defendant may have 

waived or abandoned. The Court has considered Defendant’s proposal and it will adopt the 

abbreviated version of the condition set forth in Defendant’s proposed order. For that reason, the 

Court concludes that Mr. Anderson’s proposed language is not required to protect his rights or 

interests. 

Accordingly, the Court’s dismissal Order shall state that “SeaWorld’s rights to pursue any 

claims and remedies against Mr. Anderson or his counsel are preserved.” (See Dkt. No. 512-17, 

Defendant’s Proposed Order at 2:6-7.) 

1

 The term “legal prejudice” has been construed to mean “prejudice to some legal interest, 

some legal claims, some legal argument.” Smith, 263 F.3d at 976 (quoting Westlands, 100 F.3d at 

97). 

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United States District Court 

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Third, Defendant argues it should be declared the prevailing party on Mr. Anderson’s 

claims, but it states it is not asking for an award of fees or costs as a condition of dismissal. Mr. 

Anderson argues that this condition is unnecessary and premature. The Court declines to adopt 

this condition. However, the Court will clearly state that Defendant reserves all rights to argue 

that it is the prevailing party if it files a motion for costs or a motion for attorneys’ fees. 

Finally, Defendant argues that it should be entitled to present evidence relating to Mr. 

Anderson’s claims, including evidence adduced from Mr. Anderson’s sister, either by way of live 

testimony, deposition designations, or the inclusion of findings of fact in Ms. Nelson’s and Ms. 

Morizur’s trial on standing. In support of this condition, Defendant primarily relies on cases in 

which courts granted a plaintiff’s motion for a voluntary dismissal on the condition that the 

plaintiff respond to outstanding discovery. See, e.g., Roz v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., No. CV 

16-4418 SVW (JEMx), 2017 WL 6940512 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2017) (granting motion to compel 

deposition of named plaintiff and class representative where deposition noticed before plaintiff 

indicated his desire to withdraw from suit); Opperman v. Path, Inc., No. 13-cv-00453-JST, 2015 

WL 9311888, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (conditioning dismissal on plaintiff responding 

to outstanding discovery that would be relevant to class certification but denying request to require 

plaintiff to “respond[] to potential or hypothetical discovery”). 

Assuming for the sake of argument that it would be within the Court’s discretion to impose 

such a condition, the Court declines to do so in this case. In many of the cases on which 

Defendant relies, the courts determined that – at the discovery phase – the plaintiff at issue was 

likely to have “discoverable” information about issues that would be relevant to issues of class 

certification. As the Opperman court noted, “[t]he inability to conduct sufficient discovery for a 

defense can constitute legal prejudice.” 2015 WL 9311888, at *2 (citing Westlands Water Dist., 

100 F.3d at 97). Here, Defendant has the discovery it needs to defend against Ms. Morizur’s and 

Ms. Nelson’s arguments on standing. The Court views this as an evidentiary issue, and contrary to 

Defendant’s argument it concludes that Mr. Anderson’s testimony would not be relevant at trial. 

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s request to condition dismissal on the admission of such 

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testimony. Further, the Court will not hear that evidence at trial.2

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for voluntary dismissal on the 

conditions set forth in this Order. Because the Court did not adopt Mr. Anderson’s proposal with 

respect to Defendant’s second condition, he shall file a notice by no later than 4:00 p.m. on March 

5, 2020, as to whether he accepts the Court’s conditions. See Lau v. Glendora Unified Sch. Dist., 

792 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1986). 

In addition to their arguments on dismissal, the parties have argued about whether the 

Court should maintain or constrict the time limits it imposed at the pretrial conference. When the 

Court set the time limits for trial, Mr. Anderson still was a party and he and his sister were 

expected to testify. The Court also had not revisited its ruling excluding Ms. Fay as a witness. 

The parties SHALL file a joint updated witness list with time estimates for each witness by 12:00 

p.m. on March 6, 2020, so that it may determine whether it should adjust the previously set time 

limitations. 

Finally, Mr. Anderson’s decision not to pursue his claims and this motion came on the eve 

of a bench trial, which placed additional burdens on the parties and on the Court. The parties 

clearly have strong feelings about their respective positions on the merits of the standing issue as 

well as the merits of this case. However, the parties can engage in zealous advocacy without 

negatively characterizing of the opposing parties, their counsel, or their litigation strategies and 

positions. Therefore, the Court ADMONISHES the parties that it expects them to conduct this 

trial and all subsequent proceedings that may be necessary with civility and respect. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 4, 2020 

______________________________________ 

JEFFREY S. WHITE 

United States District Judge 

2

 The Court’s decision is premised on its view that the evidence is not relevant. It is not 

based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 

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