Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00937/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00937-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER SOLIS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et al., 

 Defendants.

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Case No. 1:14-cv-00937----BAM 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 

TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS 

ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

(ECF No. 11)

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

Screening Order

Plaintiff Javier Solis (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), filed on August 31, 2015, is 

currently before the Court for screening. In the TAC, Plaintiff names the City of Ceres Police 

Department, along with Officers Griebel, Quiroz, Niewenhuis, King and Albonetti in their 

individual and official capacities. 

Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro per. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is 

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frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Persons proceeding pro se are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to 

have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted). However, to survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, 

which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere 

consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Plaintiff’s Allegations

On or about December 28, 2012, Officer Griebel rammed Plaintiff to the ground as he 

rode a bicycle, which resulted in Plaintiff and his bicycle being pinned under the patrol car.1 

Officers Quiroz and Griebel forcefully extracted Plaintiff from underneath the patrol car and 

handcuffed him while repeatedly commanding Plaintiff to quit resisting. After extracting and 

handcuffing Plaintiff, Officers Quiroz and Griebel raised Plaintiff to a standing position and 

 

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In his original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Officers Perry and Quiroz engaged in the wrongful conduct. In his 

first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the wrongful acts were committed by Deputy Burns, Deputy Stevens 

and Officer Daley. Officer Burns, Deputy Stevens and Officer Daley were not named in the SAC, and Plaintiff 

alleged that Officers Perry and Quiroz engaged in wrongful conduct. In the TAC, Plaintiff omits Officer Perry and 

alleges that certain of the acts were committed by Officer Griebel. 

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dragged him fifteen feet from the patrol car. Plaintiff asserts that they did so to ensure they 

would be out of the car’s camera ranges. Officers Quiroz and Griebel slammed Plaintiff to the 

ground. Officer Griebel put his knee into Plaintiff’s back, applied weight, and proceeded to 

punch Plaintiff in and about his neck, back of head and shoulders. Plaintiff was struck between 

five and fifteen times. When Officer Griebel stood up, Officer Quiroz took his place and struck 

Plaintiff in the same manner approximately ten times. 

Officers Niewenhuis, King and Albonetti arrived at the scene and observed their fellow 

officers administering the beating and ignored their duty to intervene. Plaintiff alleges that these 

officers had a duty to protect him from the officers that were beating him. Plaintiff further 

alleges that Officer King made misstatements in his use of force of report. 

Plaintiff further alleges that the City of Ceres Police Department fosters an environment 

of brutality and officer misconduct. Plaintiff contends that the city has a large number of 

complaints for a department its size and at the time of the incident was not investigating 

complaints in a timely or thorough manner. Plaintiff also contends that supervisors ignored 

reports of officers administering beatings on a regular basis and had or should have had 

knowledge of a group of six officers that acted in concert to rid the community of undesirables. 

Plaintiff asserts that a small part of the community was aware of this group, its tactics and their 

apparent impunity. Plaintiff alleges that the deliberate inaction of the Police Department let to a 

policy and environment of unlawful tactics, including false arrests, beatings and other 

misconduct. Plaintiff further alleges that officials were unreasonably ignorant to these tactics or 

turned a blind eye. The Police Department has since terminated several officers for their actions.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $500,000 for injuries to his hip, 

knee and neck, and punitive damages in the amount of $2,000,000. 

Discussion

A. Official Capacity Claims 

“There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government 

officials, for under Monell [v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ] ... 

local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.” 

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Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985). Thus, suits against a public entity and its 

official in his or her official capacity may be duplicative. See Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 

F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A suit against a governmental officer in his official capacity is 

equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity itself”). “Personal-capacity suits seek to 

impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. 

Official-capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only another way of pleading an action 

against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice 

and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be 

treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165–66 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s claim against the officers in their official capacities is duplicative of his claim 

against the public entity that employs the officers. Therefore, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims 

against the officers are subject to dismissal as redundant. 

B. City of Ceres Police Department

Plaintiff names the City of Ceres Police Department. A claim for civil rights violations 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a “person” acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. Local governmental units, such as counties or municipalities, are considered “persons” 

within the meaning of Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 

(1989). However, municipal departments and sub-units, including police departments, are 

generally not considered “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. United States v. Kama, 

394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (municipal police departments 

and bureaus are generally not considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 

see also Sanders v. Aranas, No. 1:06-CV-1574 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 268972, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 29, 2008) (Fresno Police Department not a proper defendant because it is a sub-department 

of the City of Fresno and is not a person within the meaning of § 1983).

The City of Ceres Police Department is not a proper defendants and the Court will 

recommend that it be dismissed from this action. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to sue the 

City of Ceres itself, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to demonstrate that the City of Ceres maintained 

a deliberate policy, custom or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional 

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violations. See City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (requiring direct 

causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation; 

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at

694–695 (a claim against a local governmental unit for municipal liability requires an allegation 

that “a deliberate policy, custom or practice ... was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional 

violation ... suffered” ). Accordingly, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against the City of 

Ceres. 

C. Excessive Force

“Under the Fourth Amendment, officers may only use such force as is ‘objectively 

reasonable’ under the circumstances.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir.

2001) (citing Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). The inquiry is whether Defendants’ 

actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, 

without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410,

415 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). The nature and quality of the intrusion on 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment interests must be balanced against the countervailing 

governmental interests at stake. Id. Factors may include the severity of the incident giving rise 

to the use of force, whether Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the safety of Defendants or 

others, and whether Plaintiff was actively attempting to avoid being subdued or brought under 

control. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation 

omitted).

At the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable excessive 

force claim against Defendants Griebel and Quiroz. 

D. Failure to Intercede

Police officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the 

constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 

(9th Cir. 2000). However, officers only can be held liable for failing to intercede only if they 

had an opportunity to intercede. Id. (officers not present at time of shooting could not be held 

liable for failing to intercede to prevent the shooting). 

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At the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim for 

failure to intercede against Defendants Niewenhuis, King and Albonetti.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff states a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Griebel and 

Quiroz in their individual capacities for excessive force, along with a cognizable claim against 

Defendants Niewenhuis, King and Albonetti in their individual capacities for failure to intercede. 

However, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against the City of Ceres Police Department 

or City of Ceres. The Court therefore recommends that these defendants be dismissed from this 

action. As Plaintiff has been provided with multiple opportunities to amend his complaint, the 

Court does not recommend further leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, the Clerk of the Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to assign a 

District Judge to this action. 

Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, filed on August 31, 

2015, against Defendants Griebel and Quiroz in their individual capacities for excessive force in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment and against Defendants Niewenhuis, King and Albonetti in 

their individual capacities for failure to intercede; 

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed as 

redundant; and

3. Defendants City of Ceres Police Department and City of Ceres be dismissed from 

this action. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may 

file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the 

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magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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