Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06525/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06525-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY DEAN PALMER,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. HICINBOTHOM, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 6525 AWI LJO P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc.

22) 

 Henry Dean Palmer (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant

action on October 31, 2003. On October 27, 2005, Defendant Hicinbothom moved to dismiss

the action on the grounds that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, Plaintiff did not

exhaust his administrative remedies, and Plaintiff did not state a claim against the Defendant.

(Doc. 22.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion on December 8, 2005. 

On November 28, 2005, Defendant Cervantez waived service of the Complaint. 

Defendant J.L. Garcia also waived service on December 13, 2005. 

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On December 13, 2005, Defendants Cervantez and Garcia moved to join the Motion to

Dismiss filed by Defendant Hicinbothom. Plaintiff opposed the Motion on January 17, 2006. 

Having read the moving papers, the Court finds good cause to grant Defendants Cervantez and

Garcia’s Motion to join in the pending Motion to Dismiss. The request was granted. 

A. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The events at issue in this action occurred while Plaintiff was confined at California State

Prison, Corcoran, where Plaintiff is currently incarcerated. Plaintiff names Facility Captain

Hicinbothom, and Correctional Counselors Garcia and Cervantez as Defendants. Plaintiff

alleges that on or about June 11,2002, when he was transferred to Corcoran, the named

Defendants classified Plaintiff and assigned him to a job he could not physically perform in

disregard of his medical disability which was documented in his central file. Plaintiff suffered an

injury as a result of the job assignment. Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages. 

B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues. See Elliott v. City of Union

City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-802 (9th Cir. 1994). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Kimes v. Stone, 84

F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir.1996). Because Section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations,

federal courts should borrow state statues of limitations for personal injury actions in section

1983 suits. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Torres v. City of Santa Ana, 108

F.3d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1997); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). 

At the time Plaintiff’s claim accrued, the applicable statute of limitations in California for

Section 1983 claims was one year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,

927 (9th Cir. 2004) (Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1, extending the statute of limitations from one year to

two years, does not apply to claims that accrued prior to January 1, 2003). 

In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitation, the court should

also borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. See

Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). Pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure

section 352.1, a two-year limit on tolling is imposed on prisoners. Section 352.1 provides, in

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1The Court does not address Defendants argument concerning equitable tolling for a state cause of action as

the Amended Complaint does not allege a state claim of negligence. See Court Doc. 12.

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pertinent part, as follows:

(a) If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing

with Section 335), is, at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a

criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term

less than for life, the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the

commencement of the action, not to exceed two years. 

Cal.Code.Civ.P. 352.1 (emphasis added.) Thus, incarcerated plaintiffs generally have three years

from the date that the cause of action accrued in which to file suit, if the cause of action accrued

while said plaintiff was incarcerated or was serving a term of incarceration of less than life.

In this case, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim accrued on or about June 11, 2002. 

(Amended Complaint at 3B.) Thus, Plaintiff would have one year from June 11, 2002, to timely

file his civil action. This action was not filed, however, until October 31, 2003. 

Defendants further contend that Plaintiff is not eligible for the two year statutory tolling

period because Plaintiff was not serving a criminal sentence of less than life imprisonment. 

(Motion at 4.) According to the documentation provided by Defendants, Plaintiff is serving a life

sentence. (Exh. A, Motion to Dismiss.) As such, Plaintiff is not eligible for statutory tolling and

the instant action is barred by the statute of limitations. 

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that his claims should not be barred because he was still

trying to obtain medical treatment and medication on January 12, 2003. (Opposition at 2.) 

However, Plaintiff’s objection is unpersuasive as the Eighth Amendment claim raised in this

action does not concern Plaintiff’s medical care but the alleged indifference to Plaintiff’s health

and safety when Defendants assigned him to a job that he could not physically perform without

potential injury. (Amended Complaint.) 

Accordingly, in light of the above, the Court finds the instant action barred by the statute

of limitations.1

C. EXHAUSTION

Defendants also argue that the claim raised is unexhausted. 

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Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995, “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Section 1997e(a)

exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534

U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of

the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the

administrative process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). "All 'available' remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need

not meet federal standards, nor must they be 'plain, speedy, and effective." ' Porter, 534 U.S. at

524 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 739 n. 5). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney

v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir.2002). Plaintiff may not exhaust while the suit is

pending. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201.

The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for

prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084, et seq. “Any inmate or parolee under the

department’s jurisdiction may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can reasonably demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Id. at

3084.1(a). Four levels of appeal are involved, including the informal level, first formal level,

second formal level, and third formal level, also known as the “Director’s Level.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit 15, § 3084.5 (2004). 

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of

exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to meet this

burden, Defendants must show that further administrative remedies are available to Plaintiff. 

Brown v. Valoff, -- F.3d--, 422 F.3d 926, 2005 WL 2129069, *7 (9th Cir.2005). The Ninth

Circuit has also found exhaustion when a prisoner has demonstrated that his grievance has been

rejected as untimely and he could "go no further in the prison's administrative system; no

remedies remained available to him." Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir.2005). 

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The failure to exhaust nonjudicial administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is

subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt,

315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365,

368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of

fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. If the court concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust

administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Id. The Ninth

Circuit has rejected a total exhaustion rule and thus, a court is not required to dismiss an entire

action when a Section 1983 complaint contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Lira v.

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 2005 WL 2850115 (9th Cir. 2005.) 

In this case, Plaintiff’s claim arose on or about June 11, 2002. However, according to the

documentary evidence provided by Defendants, Plaintiff did not file any inmate appeal

concerning the claim at issue in this case. (Exh. C, Grannis Decl.) Defendants do provide copies

of an inmate appeal assigned Log No. COR 03-224 wherein Plaintiff complained about

inadequate medical care for an injury he sustained on November 17, 2002. (Attach. A of Exhibit

C, Motion to Dismiss.) 

In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that he did exhaust and that the attachments provided

demonstrate this. However, upon examination of the documents, the Court finds that they are

identical to those provided by Defendants concerning inadequate medical care (Log. No. COR

03-224). Plaintiff provides no other evidence demonstrating that he raised the claim concerning

the inappropriate job assignment at any administrative level. 

Plaintiff argues that the fact he was complaining about medical treatment from the injury

sustained as a result of the inappropriate assignment is evidence he exhausted, however, this is

not so. Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires that inmates, in their grievances,

place prison personnel on fair notice as to the events that subsequently give rise to suit. Here,

however, every piece of documentation provided by both parties indicates that Plaintiff only ever

complained about the adequacy of the medical care he was receiving. Such a contention is

insufficient to put the administration on notice that Plaintiff was making an Eighth Amendment

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claim of deliberate indifference.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies

with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim and dismissal is appropriate. 

D. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

A Rule 12(b)(6) Motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claim or claims stated in the

Complaint. “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v.

California Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint

in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in

the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869

(1969). The federal system is one of notice pleading. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307

F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions,

with limited exceptions,” none of which apply to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Discovery and

summary judgment motions - not motions to dismiss - “define disputed facts” and “dispose of

unmeritorious claims.” Id. at 512. “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail

but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear

on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” 

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not

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be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) the Court has a statutory duty to

screen complaints in cases such as this and dismiss any claims that fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Given the

requirements of the PLRA, the Court is disinclined to view with favor a subsequent motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

In the instant case, the Court conducted a preliminary screening of the case on March 5,

2004, and on June 6, 2005. On June 6, 2005, the Court determined that the Amended Complaint

stated a cognizable claim for relief against the Defendants for their failure to consider Plaintiff’s

medical condition, which was apparent from his central file, when they assigned him to a job he

could not physically perform. As a result of this placement, Plaintiff sustained injury. Under the

facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint, the Court again finds that Plaintiff sufficiently states

a cognizable Eighth Amendment Claim. (Doc. 12.) The Court will therefore, recommend that

the Motion to Dismiss on this ground be denied. 

E. RECOMMENDATION 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART and that the action be DISMISSED as barred by the statute of

limitations and for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. 

The Court HEREBY ORDERS that these Findings and Recommendations be submitted

to the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States

District Court, Eastern District of California. Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with

a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written Objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the Objections shall be served

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and filed within TEN (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

Objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file Objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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