Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02246/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02246-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1367 Other Property Damage

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN H. LUCORE, SR., JUDY L. 

LUCORE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

US BANK, NA, as Trustee for the 

Certificate Holders of Bank of America 

Funding Corporation Mortgage PassThrough Certificates, Series 2006-H, and 

DOES 1–10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-CV-2246 JLS (MDD)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER

(ECF No. 60)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs Steven H. Lucore and Judy L. Lucore’s Ex 

Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or Preliminary Injunction,

(“TRO MTN,” ECF No. 60). Defendant U.S. Bank, NA filed a Response in Opposition to, 

(“Opp’n,” ECF No. 63), and Plaintiffs filed a Reply in Support of, (“Reply,” ECF No. 65), 

Plaintiffs’ Motion. After considering the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary and temporary injunction that a 

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court may issue without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, 

the movant “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 

result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

65(b)(1)(A). The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo pending a full hearing on 

the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. The same standard governs TROs and preliminary 

injunctions. Stuhlbard Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush and Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 

(9th Cir. 2001). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 

likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citing 

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City 

of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 691 F. 

Supp. 2d 1204, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 

In the Ninth Circuit, “serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships 

that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so 

long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the 

injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 

1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding that this “sliding 

scale” approach survives after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter). A TRO is an 

“extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. To warrant injunctive relief, irreparable 

injury must be more than merely possible. See Midgett v. Tri-Cty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of 

Or., 254 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2001). Rather, the plaintiff must show “that he faces a 

real or immediate threat” that he will suffer irreparable harm. Id. Plaintiffs seeking a 

preliminary injunction carry a particularly “heavy burden” of proving their entitlement to 

it. Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Munaf, 553 

U.S. at 689 (“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy.’”).

/ / /

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs filed their ex parte Motion for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction on May

2, 2018. In the Requested Relief section, Plaintiffs request the Court to enjoin Defendants 

U.S. Bank and Bank of America from advancing any collection or attempts to take

possession of Plaintiffs’ real property. (TRO MTN 9.)1In support of their TRO 

application, Plaintiffs assert that new facts have come to light supporting a violation of the 

California Rosenthal Act and California Civil Code § 1788 et seq. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs 

detail a long factual and procedural history between them and Defendants beginning as 

early as April 2009. (See id. ¶¶ 1–6.) The parties have been engaged in contentious 

litigation including the present action, a bankruptcy action, (id. ¶ 7), and three state court 

unlawful detainer actions, (id. ¶¶ 11–12), the third of which Plaintiffs removed to this 

Court, (id. ¶ 12).

Defendant U.S. Bank filed a response and generally advances two arguments. First, 

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to follow Civil Local Rule 83.3(g), which requires 

a party requesting an ex parte TRO to show by affidavit that it provided notice of the date 

and time of hearing or show why the moving party was unable to do so. (Opp’n 4.) 

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Local Rules. Second, Defendant contends that 

Plaintiffs fail to identify any irreparable injury, other than the pending unlawful detainer 

action, warranting TRO relief. (Id. at 4–6.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that U.S. Bank was the party who submitted the 

Opposition brief, but it was Bank of America who “has taken all the action against []our 

property.” (Reply 6.) Further, Bank of America has not opposed Plaintiffs’ TRO motion 

and Plaintiffs appear to suggest that this fact supports granting injunctive relief. (See id. at 

6–7.) Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant U.S. Bank has failed to address the pertinent 

facts that Plaintiffs raise in their TRO motion. (Id. at 6.)

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

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The Court begins with the Winter factors. 555 U.S. at 20 (“A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”). Plaintiffs fail to 

discuss the relevant Winter factors in support of their TRO motion. Plaintiffs mention the 

factors in their Reply, but rather than applying Winter to their case Plaintiffs simply

conclude that the factors are met. (Reply 8.) First, Plaintiffs do not explain how they have 

a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits. In their motion, Plaintiffs 

discuss “new and different facts” they have recently uncovered. (TRO MTN 1.) These 

facts arise from alleged fraud in connection with the notary public who notarized the 

“Trustees Deed Upon Sale.” (TRO MTN ¶ 13.) Yet, Plaintiffs do not explain how the 

alleged forgery creates a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits of a 

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim. 

Even assuming the new facts to be true and assuming the new facts established a 

claim, Plaintiffs face an additional hurdle in showing a likelihood of success on the merits.

On February 26, 2018, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint 

because Plaintiffs’ Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and declaratory relief 

claims were barred by claim preclusion. (ECF No. 56, at 15.) The Court dismissed 

Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice to allow them the opportunity to amend their operative 

complaint and cure the deficiencies outlined by the Court.2 Plaintiffs make no attempt to 

explain how they are likely to succeed on the merits given the Court’s claim preclusion 

finding. 

Second, Plaintiffs do not explain how they are likely to suffer a “real or immediate 

threat” of irreparable harm. Midgett, 254 F.3d at 850. A TRO applicant must demonstrate 

that in the absence of a TRO “the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a 

 

2 Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss are currently pending before 

the Court. (See ECF Nos. 57, 58.) 

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decision on the merits can be rendered.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (quoting 11A Wright & 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.1, at 139 (2d ed. 1995)). Plaintiffs’ TRO 

motion reveals that Defendants seek to enforce their rights against Plaintiffs through a state 

court unlawful detainer action. (TRO MTN ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiffs previously filed a TRO 

motion seeking to enjoin Defendants from prosecuting the unlawful detainer actions, which 

this Court denied pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. (ECF No. 51.) 

Other than the unlawful detainer action, Plaintiffs do not demonstrate any current action, 

activity, or threat made by Defendants against Plaintiffs that will likely cause irreparable 

harm. Even if the Court were to accept as true every single fact outlined in Plaintiffs’ TRO 

motion, those facts detail past abuses for which the appropriate relief lies in a decision on 

the merits, not a TRO. Thus, Plaintiffs have not identified an irreparable harm necessitating 

a TRO.

Third, Plaintiffs do not address how the balance of equities tip in their favor or how 

an injunction is in the public interest. A TRO is an “extraordinary remedy.” Winter, 555 

U.S. at 20. On balance, the Court finds that the Winter factors do not favor a grant of 

injunctive relief.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion for 

TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, (ECF No. 60).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 14, 2018

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