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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 16-2431

_____________

NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP INC, Publishers of 

Northjersey.com as well as The Record and The Herald 

News; BLOOMBERG LP, The owner and operator of 

Bloomberg News; NBCUNIVERSAL MEDIA LLC, doing 

business as WNBC TV CHANNEL 4; THE NEW YORK 

TIMES COMPANY; NEW JERSEY ADVANCED MEDIA, 

Publishers of NJ.com; DOW JONES & COMPANY, INC., 

The publisher of the Wall Street Journal; THE 

ASSOCIATED PRESS; PUBLIC MEDIA NJ, INC, doing 

business as NJTV; NEW YORK PUBLIC RADIO;

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.; 

PHILADELPHIA MEDIA NETWORK, PBC; POLITICO 

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; WILLIAM E. BARONI, 

JR.; BRIDGET ANNE KELLY; THE PORT AUTHORITY 

OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

JOHN DOE, 

 Appellant 

_______________

Case: 16-2431 Document: 003112400389 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/07/2016
On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-267)

District Judge: Hon. Susan D. Wigenton

_______________

Argued

June 6, 2016

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.

(Filed )

_______________

Jenny R. Kramer [ARGUED]

Chadbourne & Parke

1301 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

 Counsel for Intervenor-Appellant, John Doe

Bruce S. Rosen [ARGUED]

McCusker Anselmi Rosen & Carvelli

210 Park Avenue – Ste. 301

Florham Park, NJ 07932

 Counsel for Appellees, North Jersey Media Group Inc.,

 Bloomberg LP, NBC Universal Media LLC, 

 DBA WNBC TV Ch 4, New York Times Co.,

 Dow Jones & Co. Inc., Associated Press, 

 Public Media NJ Inc., DBA NJTV, New York

 Public Radio, American Broadcasting Co. Inc.,

 Politico,and Philadelphia Media Network PBC

Case: 16-2431 Document: 003112400389 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/07/2016
Lee M. Cortes, Jr.

Mark E. Coyne

David W. Feder

Paul J. Fishman [ARGUED]

J. Fortier Imbert

Vikas Khanna

Office of United States Attorney

970 Broad Street – Rm. 700

Newark, NJ 07102

 Counsel for Appellee, United States of America

Michael A. Baldassare

Dillon H. Malar

Jennifer Mara

Badlassare & Mara

570 Broad St. – Ste. 900

Newark, NJ 07102

 Counsel for Defendant, William E. Baroni, Jr.

Michael D. Critchley

Critchley Kinum & Vazquez

75 Livingston Avenue – 3rd Fl.

Roseland, NJ 07068

 Counsel for Defendant, Bridget Anne Kelly

David R. Kromm

Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

4 World Trade Center

150 Greenwich St.

New York, NY 10007

 Counsel for Defendant, Port Authority 

 of New York and New Jersey

_______________

Case: 16-2431 Document: 003112400389 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/07/2016
OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

For five days in September 2013, lane closures on the 

George Washington Bridge caused extraordinary traffic jams

in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The closures were allegedly 

orchestrated as revenge against the Mayor of Fort Lee for his 

refusal to endorse New Jersey Governor Christopher J.

Christie in the Governor’s bid for reelection. Political and 

legal consequences of the supposed retaliation have been

extensively covered in local and national media, and, as if by

some public reflex, the scandal has acquired a name with a “-

gate” suffix, being widely known as “Bridgegate.”

This appeal concerns the efforts of a “John Doe” to 

avoid being publicly identified as an unindicted coconspirator in the criminal case that federal prosecutors have 

brought against certain New Jersey government officials 

involved in Bridgegate. A consortium of media groups took 

legal steps to force the disclosure of a letter, authored by one 

of the prosecutors, that purportedly identifies unindicted coconspirators, and the District Court ordered the letter to be 

disclosed. Doe intervened and sought to block public access 

to the letter. The Court denied his request and again ordered

that it be disclosed. Doe appealed, and we granted an

emergency motion for a stay and for expedited consideration 

of this appeal.

Although the appeal arises out of a matter of high

public interest, the issue presented is basic and undramatic. 

We must decide whether the letter is more akin to a bill of 

Case: 16-2431 Document: 003112400389 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/07/2016
particulars or to a discovery disclosure in a criminal case. 

That distinction is dispositive, because the former is subject 

to a recognized right of public access while the latter has 

historically been kept from public view. See United States v. 

Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985). Because we conclude 

that the letter in question is a part of the general discovery 

process, it is not subject to any First Amendment or common 

law right of public access, and we will vacate the District 

Court’s order insofar as it requires the letter to be publicly 

disclosed.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2015, a grand jury returned a nine-count 

indictment against William E. Baroni Jr. and Bridget Anne 

Kelly based on the Bridgegate political payback scheme. See 

United States v. Baroni, No. 15-cr-193 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 23, 

2015).1

 With the exception of Count 9, the indictment alleges 

that Baroni and Kelly committed their offenses with 

unidentified “others.” The only other individual identified by 

name in that indictment is David Wildstein, who has already 

pled guilty in a separate criminal case to two charges arising 

from Bridgegate. See United States v. Wildstein, No. 15-cr209 (D.N.J. filed May 1, 2015). Wildstein is awaiting 

sentencing. The charges against Baroni and Kelly are still 

pending.

 1 The indictment charged Baroni and Kelly with 

conspiracy to misapply and the misapplication of government 

property (Counts 1 and 2), conspiracy to commit and the 

commission of wire fraud (Counts 3 through 7), and 

conspiracy against and the deprivation of civil rights (Counts 

8 and 9). 

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Following their indictment, Baroni and Kelly filed 

omnibus motions for discovery of certain information.2

 They 

also filed motions for a bill of particulars,3 seeking the 

identity of the unindicted co-conspirators referenced as 

“others” in the indictment. Specifically, Kelly asked that the 

government be ordered to provide “the identities of any and 

all undisclosed or unindicted co-conspirators, aiders and 

abettors, and/or any other individuals involved in any and all 

alleged criminal activity.” (A-107.) Baroni likewise sought 

the identity “of all unindicted co-conspirators,” as well as 

“the names of the ‘others’ referred to in the Indictment.” (A115.)

The government opposed those requests. It argued that 

the motions for a bill of particulars should be denied because

voluminous discovery and the detailed indictment had already 

given the defendants more than enough information about the 

criminal charges to allow them to prepare a defense. In the 

government’s view, the defendants were “ask[ing] the United 

 2 Discovery in the Baroni and Kelly criminal matter is 

subject to a protective order. The protective order applies to 

“confidential discovery materials,” which includes (among 

other things) “information of a personal nature.” Order 

Granting Motion for Protective Order at 1, United States v. 

Baroni, No. 15-cr-193 (D.N.J. Jul. 7, 2015), ECF No. 22.

3 A “bill of particulars” is “[a] formal, detailed 

statement of the claims or charges brought by a plaintiff or a 

prosecutor, usu[ally] filed in response to the defendant’s 

request for a more specific complaint.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

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States to reveal much of its trial strategy and prematurely 

commit to specific evidentiary proofs.” (A-136.) 

Nevertheless, the government said that it would, “in a 

document to be filed under seal, identify any other individual 

about whom [it] has sufficient evidence to designate as 

having joined the conspiracy.” (A-141.)

On January 11, 2016, as promised, the government 

produced to the defendants the “Conspirator Letter,”

revealing the names of any individuals the government 

regarded as having joined the conspiracy. At the same time, 

while it did not make a formal motion to seal the Letter, the 

government sent a copy to the chambers of the judge 

presiding in the case and “ask[ed] the Court to permanently 

shield its disclosure from public view given the ‘sensitive 

nature’ of the information contained therein.” (A-148.)4

 The 

Letter was not, it seems, ever filed with the Clerk of the

District Court. The day after submission of the Conspirator 

Letter, Baroni objected to its being sealed and the manner in 

which the government had submitted it to the Court.

The government filed a response to Baroni’s objection.

In requesting that the Conspirator Letter be kept under seal, 

the government cited a set of Department of Justice 

instructions called the “U.S. Attorney’s Manual,” which 

directs prosecutors to “avoid unnecessary public references to 

wrongdoing by uncharged third-parties.” (A-150.) While it 

thus justified maintaining the Letter’s secrecy, the 

government at the same time recognized that the Court might

 4 This description is taken from a letter filed by 

Baroni’s attorney on January 12, 2016, objecting to the 

government’s request to the Court. 

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later be required to rule on a request for public disclosure.

“As is always the case,” the government said, “if Baroni, 

Kelly, or the [g]overnment articulates a sufficient reason for 

unsealing [the Letter] at any point in the prosecution, the 

Court then will address that issue.” (A-151.) The 

government summed up its position by saying, “[o]ur request 

that the Court maintain the [g]overnment’s letter and its 

contents under seal is consistent with departmental guidance, 

decisional law, and the common sense proposition that 

publicizing allegations of wrongdoing by uncharged third 

parties should be avoided.” (A-152.)

The District Court never issued an order directing the 

government to file a bill of particulars. After the Conspirator 

Letter was provided to the defense, a hearing was held to 

address any lingering issues from the omnibus motions. 

Baroni’s counsel indicated that his request for information 

about unindicted co-conspirators was “still alive, but because 

of other motions that are pending, [he could not] talk about it 

[at that time].” (A-166.) The Court noted that it did not need 

to rule on any motions “unless [the parties] ha[d] an issue 

going forward.” (A-165.) No further discussion was 

dedicated to the subject. Immediately after the hearing, the 

District Court issued an order granting additional relief on the 

defendants’ various motions, but it also ordered “that the 

remainder of [d]efendants’ Discovery Motions” – which 

included the motions for a bill of particulars – “are 

DISMISSED AS MOOT as per counsels’ representations 

and the discussion on the record.” (A-184 (original 

emphasis).)

Meanwhile, “[s]hortly after the [g]overnment 

represented that it would produce the Conspirator Letter to 

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the defendants, the media began reporting about” its 

existence. (Opening Br. at 10.) On January 13, 2016 – two 

days after the government gave the Letter to the defendants –

a consortium of news organizations (collectively, “the 

Media”)5 filed a motion to intervene in the criminal case and 

for access to the Letter.

6

 Among other things, the Media

sought “[t]he [g]overnment’s response to a Motion for a Bill 

of Particulars, including a list of unindicted co-conspirators 

emailed to the Court and Defense counsel on January 11, 

2016.” Notice of Motion to Intervene and for Other Relief at 

2, N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. United States, No. 16-cv-267 

(D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2016), ECF No. 1.

The government, consistent with its request that the 

Letter be maintained under seal, did not oppose the Media’s

intervention but did oppose any disclosure of the Conspirator 

Letter, arguing that “public disclosure of the information 

 5 Those organizations include: North Jersey Media 

Group Inc., publishers of Northjersey.com as well as The 

Record and The Herald News; Bloomberg L.P., the owner 

and operator of Bloomberg News; NBCUniversal Media, 

LLC d/b/a WNBC-TV Channel 4; The New York Times 

Company; New Jersey Advance Media, publishers of nj.com; 

Dow Jones & Company, Inc., the publisher of The Wall 

Street Journal; the Associated Press; Public Media NJ, Inc. 

d/b/a NJTV; New York Public Radio; American Broadcasting 

Companies, Inc.; Philadelphia Media network; PBC; and the 

website Politico.

6 The Media’s motion to intervene in the criminal case 

was then assigned a separate civil action number, under 

which the case has proceeded since that time. 

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contained in the [C]onspirator Letter is unwarranted at this 

phase of the prosecution.” (A-187.) It recognized that 

“evidence relating to even uncharged coconspirators may take 

on significance at a conspiracy trial.” (A-188.) For example, 

the identity of unindicted co-conspirators could become 

relevant at trial “if the [g]overnment moves for the admission 

of an out-of-court statement made in furtherance of the 

conspiracy by an unindicted coconspirator under Federal Rule 

of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).” (A-188.) But, absent the need for 

such a disclosure of unindicted co-conspirators, the 

government asserted that the Conspirator Letter “has no 

evidentiary value” (A-188), and that “Department of Justice 

policy directs federal prosecutors to avoid unnecessary public

references to wrongdoing by uncharged third parties.” (A189.) According to the government, the Letter was 

“communicated to [d]efendants only for purposes of trial 

preparation” and, unlike a formal bill of particulars, had “no 

adjudicatory significance at this point.” (A-193.) In

recognition of the rights of the unindicted co-conspirators 

themselves, the government emphasized that they are not 

charged and so “have no opportunity to challenge that 

potentially injurious designation in court.” (A-189.)

On May 10, 2016, the District Court granted the 

Media’s motion and ordered the disclosure of the Conspirator 

Letter. See N. Jersey Media Grp. v. United States, No. 16-cv267, 2016 WL 2660104 (D.N.J. May 10, 2016). It reasoned 

that the Letter was equivalent to a bill of particulars, to which 

a right of access has historically attached. Id. at *2. The 

Court then weighed the privacy interests of the unindicted coconspirators against the public interest in disclosure and 

concluded that the balance weighed in favor of disclosure. Id. 

at *3. As to the privacy interests, the Court emphasized that 

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“[t]he underlying events that gave rise to the Indictment have 

been extensively covered by the media, such that even 

persons tangentially involved have already been identified 

and exposed in the press.” Id. Also, said the Court, 

individuals “thus far identified” as being involved in 

Bridgegate have been public employees or appointed 

officials, so their privacy interests are significantly limited. 

Id. The Court ordered that the Conspirator Letter be 

disclosed by noon on May 13, 2016. 

Then John Doe intervened.7

 He says that, up to that

point, he had “relied on the [g]overnment and its obligation 

under the [U.S. Attorney’s Manual] to vindicate his 

constitutional and reputational rights against being publicly 

branded a criminal without a forum to contest those 

accusations.” (Opening Br. at 15.) But, after the May 10th 

order that the Letter be disclosed, he believed the government 

“was no longer adequately representing his rights, especially 

in light of its apparent intention not to appeal the court’s 

order.” (Id.) Doe thus filed his emergency motion to 

intervene, to proceed anonymously, and to stay the release of 

the Conspirator Letter. In his motion, he made the same 

arguments he makes now: that no right of access requires 

 7 Doe says that he “has not seen and does not have 

access to the Conspirator Letter.” (Opening Br. at 16 n.5.) 

The government has clarified that Doe’s name does, in fact, 

appear in the letter: “John Doe has standing for purposes of 

this appeal because the [g]overnment’s letter to defense 

counsel in the criminal case identifies him as an unindicted 

coconspirator.” (United States’s Second Letter re: Oral 

Argument, filed May 20, 2016, at 1.)

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disclosure of the Conspirator Letter, and that identifying him

as a co-conspirator would violate his due process rights.

The next day, May 13, 2016, the District Court granted 

Doe’s motion to intervene and his request to proceed 

anonymously, but denied his motion for a stay. See N. Jersey 

Media Grp., Inc. v. United States, No. 16-cv-267, 2016 WL 

2771805 (D.N.J. May 13, 2016). It concluded that he had not 

shown any likelihood of success on the merits of his request 

that the Conspirator Letter remain sealed. According to the 

Court, “the Conspirator Letter was submitted ... in response 

to [d]efendants’ motions for bills of particulars.” (A-34.) A 

copy was sent to the Court, but “[t]he document was never 

labeled a courtesy copy, nor has the [g]overnment included 

th[e] Court in other exchanges of mere discovery material.” 

(Id.) As a consequence, the District Court “deemed the 

Conspirator Letter a judicial record ... .” (Id.) As to Doe’s 

due process argument, the Court held that any due process 

interest was satisfied because Doe “ha[d] been heard by th[e] 

Court” in his request for nondisclosure. (Id.)

Doe promptly filed a notice of appeal from the May 10 

and May 13 orders. We granted his emergency motion for a 

stay of the District Court’s order pending appeal and for 

expedited consideration of his case.

Case: 16-2431 Document: 003112400389 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/07/2016
II. DISCUSSION8

The Media has asserted a right of access to the 

Conspirator Letter under both the First Amendment to the 

United States Constitution and under common law. Doe and 

the government say that, on this record, there is no such 

right.

9

 8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331; we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.

9 The Media also make two “waiver” arguments, 

which warrant little comment. First, they claim that “Doe is 

barred from arguing for the first time on appeal that this 

matter is not governed by this Court’s decision in Smith” 

because he did not raise that argument below. (Media 

Answering Br. at 46.) In fact, Doe made that exact argument 

below. He first argued that “the Conspirator Letter is not a 

bill of particulars or any other judicial filing to which the 

public’s presumptive right of access attaches; rather, it is 

nothing more than a discovery letter that should have been 

sent to the criminal defendants without being filed.” (District 

Ct. Docket, No. 37-1 at 9 (original emphasis).) Directly after 

that sentence, Doe used a “compare” signal to cite Smith, a 

case described in greater detail herein. Doe emphasized that 

the district court in that case, unlike here, had “granted the 

criminal defendants motion for a bill of particulars” and the 

responsive document had been filed with the Clerk of that 

Court. (Id.) In both distinguishing Smith and arguing that the 

Conspirator Letter is a discovery response rather than a bill of 

particulars, Doe raised the precise issue we now address. 

Second, the Media argues that “the [g]overnment should be 

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A. The First Amendment Right of Access10

In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the 

Supreme Court held that the First Amendment guarantees the 

public, and thus the press, a right of access to criminal 

proceedings. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). That right of access can 

include documents involved in the proceedings. See Smith, 

776 F.2d at 1111-12. Assessing the right of access “requires 

 

estopped from adopting new arguments it failed to raise 

below.” (Media Sur-Reply Br. at 1.) Any such arguments –

even assuming that the government did not advance them 

below and that estoppel might apply – are properly before us 

anyway, since Doe has advanced them consistently 

throughout this litigation.

10 In general, decisions to seal documents related to 

judicial proceedings are subject to review for an abuse of 

discretion. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 

1071 (3d Cir. 1984). In the First Amendment context, 

however, a right of access claim is subject to “substantially 

broader review.” In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application 

for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 

1990). “This broader review includes independent 

consideration of the district court’s order and the factual 

findings inferred from the evidence before it.” Id. “In the 

First Amendment context ... the Supreme Court has 

recognized the duty of reviewing courts to engage in an 

independent factual review of the full record. Thus we have 

explained that when we address a right of access claim, our 

scope of review is substantially broader than that for abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1357 (3d 

Cir. 1994) (internal citation and footnote omitted).

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a two-prong evaluation of ‘whether the place and process 

have historically been open to the press’ and ‘whether public 

access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of 

the particular process in question.’” PG Pub. Co. v. Aichele, 

705 F.3d 91, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Press-Enterprise 

Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 8 

(1986)). The first part of that test – generally referred to as 

the “experience” prong – calls for, as the Court noted, a 

consideration of whether there has been a tradition of opening 

to the press the matter in question. United States v. Wecht, 

537 F.3d 222, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008). The second part –

called the “logic” prong – considers whether public access 

plays a positive role in the judicial process by, inter alia, 

“enhancing both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the 

appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the 

system.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where 

both prongs of the test are satisfied, a qualified First 

Amendment right of public access attaches.” Aichele, 705 

F.3d at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted). If that right 

attaches, it gives rise to a strong presumption of access, which

“may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on 

findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and 

is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enterprise, 

478 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).

As to the “experience” prong, the Media argue that the 

Conspirator Letter is akin to a bill of particulars to which the 

right of access would unquestionably attach. They are right 

that our precedent does grant public access to bills of 

particulars, see Smith, 776 F.2d at 1112 (“[A]ccess to bills of 

particulars is protected by the First Amendment.”), but the 

term “bill of particulars” does not cover each and every 

document that provides additional information about a 

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criminal charge. A bill of particulars is of a specific nature, 

and its status has legal consequences. As earlier noted, supra 

note 3, “[a] bill of particulars is a formal written statement by 

the prosecutor providing details of the charges against the 

defendant.” 1 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 130 (4th ed. 2016). 

It effectively narrows the government’s case at trial in the 

same way as the formal charging document: “there can be no 

variance between the notice given in a bill of particulars and 

the evidence at trial.” Smith, 776 F.2d at 1111; see also 

United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 819 (2d Cir. 1962) 

(“[T]he government is strictly limited to proving what it has 

set forth in [a bill of particulars].”). In many instances, a bill 

of particulars provides information that ought to have been in 

the indictment in the first place and so protects the defendant 

by “preclud[ing] double jeopardy,” shielding the defendant 

from a second trial for the same acts. United States v. GAF 

Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United 

States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 771 (3d Cir. 2005).

Doe and the government take the position that the 

Conspirator Letter is not a bill of particulars at all but is 

instead an item of pretrial discovery, to which the First 

Amendment right of access has not historically been applied. 

See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) 

(“[R]estraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, 

information are not a restriction on a traditionally public 

source of information.”). “With respect to experience, there 

is no tradition of access to criminal discovery. To the 

contrary, discovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a 

private process because the litigants and the courts assume 

that the sole purpose of discovery is to assist trial 

preparation.” United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st 

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United 

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States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1986) 

(“Historically, discovery materials were not available to the 

public or press.”).11

This difference of opinion over the character of the 

Conspirator Letter is no mere battle over labels. It is the issue 

that, at least on the constitutional point, decides this case. 

Determining whether the Conspirator Letter is the sort of 

document that would historically have been available to the 

public, and thus would satisfy the “experience” prong of the 

First Amendment inquiry, turns on whether it is more 

properly thought of as discovery material or as a bill of 

particulars.

Our opinion in United States v. Smith is our only 

previous effort to grapple with a pretrial request for public 

disclosure of unindicted co-conspirator information at a 

similar stage in a criminal prosecution. 776 F.2d at 1112.

Although Smith ultimately concluded that the document at 

issue there should not be disclosed, it nonetheless held that 

both the First Amendment and common law rights of access 

apply to bills of particulars. Id. at 1112-13. The defendants 

in that case moved for a bill of particulars on various issues, 

including a request for the names of unindicted coconspirators. Id. at 1105. Unlike here, the district court in 

Smith actually granted the motion and ordered that the 

government provide a bill of particulars listing the names of

unindicted co-conspirators. See id. at 1105-06. Also unlike 

 11 See also United States v. Benzer, No. 2:13-cr-18, 

2015 WL 9200365, at *4 (D. Nev. Dec. 15, 2015) (collecting 

authorities concluding that there is “no traditional right of 

access to pretrial discovery”).

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here, the government formally “filed [that] list of names in 

response to th[e] order and the Clerk placed the document 

under seal.” Id. at 1106. Two newspapers then intervened 

and moved to unseal the list.

Under those circumstances, we considered the list to 

be a bill of particulars and we held that the First Amendment 

right of access applied. We first emphasized the importance 

of ensuring the public’s access to the charging documents in a 

criminal case:

Th[e] historic tradition of public access to the 

charging document in a criminal case reflects 

the importance of its role in the criminal trial 

process and the public’s interest in knowing its 

contents. It sets forth the charge or charges to 

be tried and ... thereby establishes the general 

parameters of the government’s case. 

Knowledge of the charge or charges is essential 

to an understanding of the trial, essential to an 

evaluation of the performance of counsel and 

the court, and, most importantly, essential to an 

appraisal of the fairness of the criminal process 

to the accused.

Id. at 1112. We then noted that, “[h]istorically and 

functionally, the bill of particulars is closely related to the 

indictment.” Id. at 1111. Bills of particulars are regarded as 

“supplements to the indictment rather than as pretrial 

discovery.” Id. “[I]mportantly, a bill of particulars, like the 

indictment, is designed to define and limit the government’s 

case. As with the indictment, there can be no variance 

between the notice given in a bill of particulars and the 

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evidence at trial.” Id. In short, a public right of access 

attaches to a bill of particulars because the bill serves the 

same purpose and has the same legal effect as a charging 

document, to which the right of access unquestionably 

attaches. The very function it serves – as a supplement to the 

indictment – is what suggests generally open access to it.

12

Here, for at least four reasons, the Conspirator Letter

does not share the attributes of a bill of particulars and so 

stands in contrast to the document in Smith. First, the 

government did not treat it as a bill of particulars. In the 

government’s words, it “conceptualized and treated the Letter 

as a vehicle for voluntarily delivering discovery to 

[d]efendants rather than as a formal bill of particulars that 

was ordered by the District Court. Indeed, the [g]overnment 

objected strongly to [d]efendants’ request for a bill of 

particulars in its opposition to [d]efendants’ discovery 

motions.” (USA Answering Br. at 13.) When the defendants 

moved for a bill of particulars, the government outlined – in 

great detail13 – why such a binding document is unnecessary

in this case.

 12 In the end, Smith determined that the list should 

remain sealed to protect the named persons’ reputation and 

privacy interests. 776 F.2d at 1113-15. We need not weigh 

the public and private interests at stake in this case, however, 

because – unlike in Smith – we conclude that there is no 

presumptive right of access to the document in question.

13 The government’s response to the motions for bills 

of particulars included a section entitled: “Defendants’ 

motions for bills of particulars should be denied.” (A-136.) 

In that section, the government argued extensively that a bill 

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We recognize that the government may have avoided 

this entire dispute by stating, when it gave the Letter, that 

doing so was a matter of discovery and not a response to the 

request for a bill of particulars. It did not do that.14 But, 

 

of particulars was not required, correctly citing the standards 

for determining whether a bill of particulars was necessary. It 

summarized its argument as follows:

The circumstances of this case obviate the 

professed need for additional clarity with

respect to the allegations in the Indictment. 

Count One of the Indictment is 26 pages long, 

and provides a wealth of detailed information 

about the nature of the charged conspiracy and

[d]efendants’ specific roles in carrying out its 

aims. Moreover, discovery in this case has been

extensive, and [d]efendants have had at their 

disposal for some time documentary evidence 

that will be used by the [g]overnment to prove 

its case. Indeed, one of [d]efendants’ complaints 

is that the [g]overnment has provided too much 

discovery.

(A-139.) It would require a painfully strained reading of that 

response to regard it as demonstrating the government’s 

acquiescence and agreement to provide the Defendants with 

the bill of particulars that they were seeking.

14 The government has conceded in its briefing that it 

“could have made clearer to the District Court that the 

[C]onspirator Letter was a discovery letter, not a bill of 

particulars,” and it reiterated that concession at oral argument. 

(USA Answering Br. at 6 n.2.) We wholeheartedly agree. In 

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despite that failing, more than is present on this record is 

needed to persuade us that the Conspirator Letter was actually 

(and unbeknownst to the government) a bill of particulars,

when the prosecutors believed and stated that they were 

agreeing only to share a limited set of information, the sort of 

“informal correspondence” that is regularly “communicat[ed] 

between the parties” to a criminal case in fulfillment of 

discovery obligations. (A-186.) The government was willing 

to give the Conspirator Letter to the defendants to assist them 

in trial preparation, but it was not bargaining for the 

constraints that would be triggered by the filing of a bill of 

particulars.15 Of course, the government cannot avoid the 

 

fact, it muddied the waters by citing a portion of the U.S. 

Attorney’s Manual that said, “[w]ith respect to bills of 

particulars that identify unindicted co-conspirators, 

prosecutors generally should seek leave to file such 

documents under seal.” (A-192-93.) While we disagree with 

the District Court’s conclusion about the status of the 

Conspirator Letter, the government certainly should have 

been more explicit at the time of the disclosure that it was 

providing the letter as discovery material only and that it did 

not intend the letter to function as a bill of particulars.

15 There are legitimate reasons why the defendants 

would want to know whom the government considered 

unindicted co-conspirators to be, even if the information did 

not serve the function of a bill of particulars. For example, 

during a trial, the government could potentially try to admit 

into evidence any co-conspirator statements under the hearsay 

exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). The 

defendants would therefore be well-served to know whose 

statements might be used against them. Similarly, each 

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legal consequences associated with a bill of particulars 

merely by calling the document something else, but its

understanding of the character of its own filing is significant. 

Here, that understanding was that the Conspirator Letter was 

nothing more than discovery material.

The second reason for concluding that the Letter is no 

bill of particulars is that, prior to the Media’s motion for 

access, the District Court did not treat it as such. The Court 

did not characterize the Conspirator Letter as a bill of 

particulars at the time it was turned over, and never ordered 

the government to file a bill of particulars, as occurred in 

Smith.

16

 

participant in a conspiracy is liable for the actions of coconspirators when such actions are undertaken in furtherance 

of the goals of the conspiracy. See Pinkerton v. United 

States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946). As a consequence, if the 

defendants know whom the government regards as a coconspirator, they also know whose conduct might potentially 

be attributed to them.

16 The Media cite a handful of cases in their brief in 

which the government has provided bills of particulars 

without court order. See, e.g., United States v. Cont’l Grp., 

Inc., 456 F. Supp. 704, 707 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (referring to a 

“Voluntary Bill of Particulars”). We agree with the Media’s 

contention that a bill of particulars can be provided without 

court order. Even Doe acknowledges that the government 

can “conced[e] a motion for a bill of particulars and fil[e] that 

bill.” (Doe Reply Br. at 10.) But that only happens with the 

government’s agreement to voluntarily provide a formal bill, 

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The third reason is that the defendants also did not 

behave as though they believed the Conspirator Letter served 

as a bill of particulars. One would have expected them to 

insist on the filing of the Conspirator Letter, if it were to be 

treated as a bill of particulars, yet the Conspirator Letter was 

never filed with the Clerk.17 It was emailed directly to the 

District Court judge because of the government’s 

understandable desire “to protect the sensitive information 

contained in the [C]onspirator Letter by asking the District 

Court to seal it.” (USA Answering Br. at 15.)

Fourth and finally, the Conspirator Letter simply does 

not serve the purpose of a bill of particulars. That purpose is 

 

which we would expect would be signaled by styling the 

document as such.

17 According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

7(f), “[t]he court may direct the government to file a bill of 

particulars.” In Smith, we noted that Rule 7(f)’s reference to 

the government’s need to “file” a bill of particulars weighed 

in favor of treating it as a supplement to the indictment rather 

than pretrial discovery, since Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 16 provides that discovery need only be disclosed 

directly to the defendant in a criminal case. 776 F.2d at 1111.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49(d) states that 

filings in criminal actions are governed by Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 5(d)(2), which states: “A paper is filed by 

delivering it: (A) to the clerk; or (B) to a judge who agrees to 

accept it for filing, and who must then note the filing date on 

the paper and promptly send it to the clerk.” Neither 

happened here.

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to fill in the holes in an indictment when “the indictment itself 

is too vague and indefinite ... to inform the defendant of the 

nature of the charges brought against him.” United States v. 

Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). The rules of criminal 

procedure require an indictment to be concise. Id. The need 

for concision, though, does not excuse the omission of

information necessary to inform defendants of the charges 

against them and to safeguard their rights against double 

jeopardy. A bill of particulars can fix such flaws. The 

indictment in this case, however, did not require that kind of 

repair. On the contrary, the indictment is quite specific, 

running thirty-six pages and setting out the alleged role of 

each defendant with specificity. It gives the defendants more 

than enough information to make them aware of the crimes 

with which they are charged and allows them to prepare a 

defense. The Media rightly agreed at oral argument that the 

indictment against Baroni and Kelly is detailed. And that 

level of detail is the very thing that prevents any credible 

claim that the defendants needed a bill of particulars.

The dividing line between a bill of particulars and 

pretrial discovery may not always be clear, but it is in this 

instance. Despite the Media’s protestations, the mere fact that 

the Conspirator Letter includes information that could also 

have been included in a bill of particulars does not turn it into 

one. Nor does the existence of a motion for a bill of 

particulars mean that all information flowing from the 

government must be treated as a response to the motion. The 

legal significance of a bill of particulars – supplementing and 

narrowing the charging document, and thus affecting the 

government’s case at trial – is not something to be lightly

created by implication. As in Smith, there may be instances

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in which an indictment charging a conspiracy is so overbroad 

or vaguely drafted that a bill of particulars identifying 

unindicted co-conspirators is required to allow the defendant 

to prepare a defense. Considering the detail of this 

indictment, however, that is not a problem here. 

In sum, the Conspirator Letter is not a bill of 

particulars because the government did not regard it as one, 

the Court did not order one, the defendants did not behave as 

though they had received one, and the Letter itself did not 

serve the purpose of one. The “experience” prong of the First 

Amendment inquiry thus weighs against applying a 

presumptive right of access to the Conspirator Letter.

That conclusion suffices to end the First Amendment 

analysis, but, in the alternative, we note that the second, or 

“logic,” prong of the analysis – whether public access plays a 

meaningfully positive role in the functioning of the particular 

process in question – also weighs in Doe’s favor. The lack of 

adjudicatory significance of the Letter is manifest in two 

ways. First, as just discussed, it is not needed to address any 

shortcomings in the indictment and so to avoid unfairness in 

the criminal proceedings. Second, the document – at least at 

this stage of the proceedings – has no evidentiary 

significance. The government rightly acknowledges that 

there may come a point when the information in the Letter 

becomes important, but it is speculative to say it ever will, 

and a chance of significance is not the same as significance.

“Information wants to be free” is, in some quarters, a 

popular slogan, but there are dangers to the administration of 

justice in too freely granting access to information of the sort 

at issue here. “For one, the purpose of the discovery rules –

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to ... avoid unnecessary surprise and to level the playing field 

– might be undermined.” United States v. Smith, 985 F. 

Supp. 2d 506, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). “And, because the 

discovery rules are reciprocal, there is the risk that unfettered 

public access could jeopardize a defendant’s trial strategy.” 

Id.

Moreover, were we to apply a right of access in this 

case, it could stunt future efforts by prosecutors to resolve 

pretrial discovery disputes and motions practice without 

having to involve the district courts. The prosecution chose 

to satisfy Baroni and Kelly’s request to know whom the 

government considered to be co-conspirators. See supra note 

15. It did so voluntarily, without court order. To now impose 

a legal obligation on the government to comport its proof at 

trial with its voluntary submission could well chill similar 

efforts by the government in the future to moot pretrial 

motions through voluntary disclosure. That result would be 

much to the detriment of future defendants, who would 

probably receive less information in discovery than they 

currently do and would require judicial resolution of more 

discovery disputes. The government emphasized those risks 

at oral argument, and we agree they are real. We therefore

conclude that logic weighs against a First Amendment right 

of access to pretrial discovery materials like the Conspirator 

Letter.

That leaves for consideration only the Media’s claim 

of a common law right of access to the Letter.

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B. The Common Law Right of Access18

“We have previously recognized a right of access to 

judicial proceedings and judicial records, and this right of 

access is beyond dispute.” Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 

23 F.3d 772, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 

589 (1978) (recognizing that, in the context of criminal 

proceedings, the press has a historically-based, common law 

right of access to judicial records and documents). That right 

is rooted in common law and predates the Constitution. Bank 

of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 

800 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1986). It is, however, narrower 

than the First Amendment right we have just discussed, being 

focused on the specific question of “whether [the document at 

issue] is considered to be a ‘judicial record.’” In re Cendant 

Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001). And the answer to 

that question “depends on whether [the] document has been 

filed with the court, or otherwise somehow incorporated or 

integrated into a district court’s adjudicatory proceedings.” 

Id. A document may also be considered a “judicial record” 

absent formal filing, in limited circumstances, “if a court 

interprets or enforces the terms of that document, or requires 

that it be submitted to the court under seal.” Id.

In Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, 

Inc., we noted that “[n]umerous other courts have ...

recognized the principle that the filing of a document gives 

 18 “We review decisions relating to the common law 

right of access generally for abuse of discretion, though our 

review of the legal principles applied is plenary.” Wecht, 484 

F.3d at 208.

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rise to a presumptive right of public access.” 998 F.2d 157, 

161-62 (3d Cir. 1993). The act of filing, in fact, seems to be 

the most significant consideration, as is evident in situations 

in which we have previously granted the right of access. For 

example, we have done so with papers filed in connection 

with a motion for summary judgment, Republic of Philippines 

v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660-62 (3d Cir. 

1991), transcripts of civil trials and exhibits admitted at trials, 

Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678-80 (3d Cir. 1988),

and transcripts of a hearing for a preliminary injunction, 

Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 

1984).

But we have also held that the filing of a document 

does not, on its own, bring that document within the common 

law right of access. In Leucadia, we said that “there is a 

presumptive right to public access to all material filed in 

connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, whether these 

motions are case dispositive or not, but no such right as to 

discovery motions and their supporting documents.” 998 

F.2d at 165 (emphasis added). That case thus recognized the 

longstanding limitation on the public’s access to discovery 

materials and so limited the common law right of access, even 

when discovery motions and their supporting documents are

filed with the court. A contrary ruling, we noted, “would 

make raw discovery, ordinarily inaccessible to the public, 

accessible merely because it had to be included in motions 

precipitated by inadequate discovery responses or overly 

aggressive discovery demands. This would be a holding based 

more on expediency than principle.” Id. at 164. Inclusion in 

a judicial filing, therefore, does not necessarily bring filed

discovery materials within the scope of the common law right 

of access. See Wecht, 484 F.3d at 209 (“[D]ocuments filed 

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with the court are generally subject to the common law right 

of access, unless attached to a discovery motion.”).

Here, it seems, the Conspirator Letter was not filed 

with the Clerk’s Office but was emailed directly to the 

District Court judge to ensure that the defendants would feel 

some threat of adverse consequences from the Court if the 

Letter were leaked to the press.

19 The government contends 

that “[t]he mere act of submitting a document to the court as 

part of a request to seal that same document should not 

convert the document into a judicial record to which a 

presumptive right of access attaches.” (USA Answering Br. 

at 15.) By the government’s lights, “[i]t would be beyond 

ironic if an act taken to safeguard certain information from 

premature public disclosure inadvertently triggered the 

public’s right to access that information.” (Id. at 16.)

Even accepting, for the moment, the notion that 

emailing a document directly to a judge, without filing it with 

the Clerk, can be regarded as a formal “filing,” that step was 

not sufficient to bring the Letter within the common law right 

of access. For the reasons we have described at length, the 

Conspirator Letter is properly categorized as pretrial 

discovery and thus falls under our holding in Leucadia: 

discovery materials that are part of judicial filings are

generally not “judicial records” and do not fall within the 

common law right of access. The fact of filing is one point to 

 19 We question the government’s decision to email the 

Conspirator Letter directly to the judge in lieu of a formal 

filing. We do not gainsay the concern that motivated that 

decision, but permission should have been sought from the 

District Court first.

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consider but it cannot be the sole basis for applying the right 

of access.

The test is more functional than that. “[T]he issue of 

whether a document is a judicial record should turn on the use 

the court has made of it rather than on whether it has found its 

way into the clerk’s file.” Pansy, 23 F.3d at 783. To be 

considered a judicial record, to which the common law right 

of access properly attaches, “the item filed must be relevant to 

the performance of the judicial function and useful in the 

judicial process in order for it to be designated a judicial 

document.” United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d 

Cir. 1995). In light of its present lack of adjudicatory 

significance, the Conspirator Letter plays no part in the 

judicial function or process. The Letter was intended as an 

aid to the defense, not as an aid to the judge in rendering a 

decision or for some other judicial purpose. “The court was 

merely the passive repository of the letter and needed to do 

nothing with it” at the time it was submitted. (USA 

Answering Br. at 15.) The only reason for sending it to the 

judge was to ensure that it would be protected from public 

disclosure. We agree with the government that it would be a 

sad irony if that step – done for the purpose of protecting the 

document from disclosure – somehow meant that the letter 

was now unavoidably in the public realm. We therefore hold 

that the Conspirator Letter is not a judicial record to which 

the common law right of access attaches.20

 20 Doe also raises a due process challenge to the 

disclosure of the Conspirator Letter, but we do not need to 

consider Doe’s due process rights to resolve the instant 

appeal. See New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of 

Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 301 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have 

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III. CONCLUSION

Public access to judicial documents and court 

proceedings is a respected tradition and important legal 

principle, but it has bounds. “[D]iscovery traditionally has 

been conducted by the parties in private and has not been 

publically available.” Wecht, 484 F.3d at 208. That is so 

even in a case affected by heightened public interest. The 

time may come, perhaps at trial, when the information in the 

Conspirator Letter ought to be made public, but that time is 

not here yet. Because neither the First Amendment right of 

access nor the common law right of access applies to the 

Conspirator Letter, we will vacate the District Court’s order 

insofar as it requires disclosure of the Letter.

21

 

an obligation not to decide constitutional questions unless 

necessary.”). We thus decline to address that argument. We 

also will not address the Media’s argument about the 

timeliness of Doe’s motion to intervene. The Media contend 

that Doe “had every chance” to intervene earlier, “but instead 

sat on his hands” (Media Answering Br. at 14), so his “late 

application is barred” (id. at 43). The utterly undeveloped 

character of the Media’s protestations about the timeliness of 

intervention means that the argument is waived. John Wyeth 

& Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 

(3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J.) (“[A]rguments raised in passing ... 

are considered waived.”).

21 Doe also appealed from the District Court’s order, 

dated May 13, 2016, denying his request for a stay pending 

appeal of its order requiring the release of the Conspirator 

Letter. We will dismiss Doe’s appeal of that order as moot, 

both because we have previously granted Doe’s request for a 

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stay pending appeal and because, by vacating the District 

Court’s underlying order that Doe had sought to stay, there is 

now no pending prospect that the Conspirator Letter will be 

released.

In a motion for reconsideration dated May 17, 2016, 

the Media sought release of the Conspirator Letter with Doe’s 

name redacted. Having concluded that the entire Conspirator 

Letter is not subject to any public right of access, we discern 

no basis for the Media’s request for its partial disclosure. As 

we have explained, the Media has no right of access to 

pretrial discovery, which includes the entirety of the 

Conspirator Letter. Accordingly, we will deny the Media’s 

motion for reconsideration insofar as it requests a redacted 

version of the Conspirator Letter.

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