Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05801/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05801-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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States District C

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICIA A. YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-05801 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In this section 1983 action plaintiff challenges San Mateo’s adoption of an ordinance

regulating bed and breakfast establishments. The Court previously dismissed some of the

claims, but denied defendant’s motion to dismiss as to others. Now pending before the Court

is defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims.

Factual Background

In 1999, plaintiff purchased residential property at 1201 West Selby Lane, Redwood

City, California (“the property”), located outside the Coastal Zone in the unincorporated

section of defendant San Mateo County (“defendant”). The property is in an area designated

as “R-1” (residential single-family homes) under local zoning ordinances. On or about

August 24, 2000, plaintiff applied for a building permit for construction of a bed and

breakfast. In so doing, plaintiff claims to have relied on defendant’s pamphlets and

ordinances which stated that for locations outside the Coastal Zone, no use permit or license 

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is required to construct a bed and breakfast, and that so long as an R-1 single family home

retains the appearance of a single family dwelling and satisfies parking requirements, an

owner may rent five or fewer rooms short term in their own home and provide meals for

guests. 

From March 7, 2002, to November 5, 2002, plaintiff was issued her demolition,

building, and sewer permits. 

On December 11, 2003, plaintiff was asked to appear at a San Mateo County Planning

Department meeting to discuss neighbor concerns about plaintiff’s bed and breakfast, which

was expected to open within two to four weeks. At the meeting, defendant presented

plaintiff with a proposed “Urgency Interim Ordinance” that in application modified the

existing zoning laws and impacted only plaintiff’s property. Defendant’s findings in relation

to the ordinance declared that as a result of analysis of 1201 West Selby Lane, the potential

threat to neighborhood character by bed and breakfasts warranted modification of county

zoning restrictions. 

On December 16, 2003, the San Mateo County Board of Supervisors voted to adopt

the Urgency Interim Ordinance, which in effect placed additional restrictions on plaintiff’s

ability to operate her bed and breakfast. The Ordinance’s “Findings and Declarations” note

that Section 6400 of the San Mateo County Zoning Regulations authorizes certain specified

“accessory uses” in a residential district, and in 1989 the San Mateo County Planning

Director adopted a policy that recognized that a bed and breakfast operation of five or fewer

rooms was an authorized accessory use. Ordinance No. 4200 at 1. The Findings further note

that plaintiff was advertising her proposed bed and breakfast as serving the “business and

leisure traveler,” and as indicating the availability of a “conference room,” and the ability to

host “small meetings” and “seminars.” Id. at 2. The Ordinance recites that this advertising

concerned the Board that the operation of plaintiff’s bed and breakfast would not be

consistent with the residential character of the neighborhood. Id. 

In light of these findings, the Ordinance provides that the “providing of table board in

a dwelling in which any room is rented at any time for a period of less than 30 consecutive

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days (commonly known as a bed and breakfast inn)” is a permitted incidental use of a

dwelling in a residential area, provided the bed and breakfast complies with certain

restrictions. For example, “[t]he maximum number of registered guests . . . on any given

evening shall not exceed 1.5 times the number of guest rooms . . . “ and the “maximum

number of guest motor vehicles parked on site . . . shall be limited to the number of off street

or driveway parking spaces provided.” The Ordinance also provides:

There shall be no hosting of meetings, conferences or social events, whether on

a commercial or non-commercial basis, involving on-site participants who are

not registered guests . . . . Similar events for registered guests shall be

conducted indoors only between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Monday

through Saturday.

A December 2003 memorandum to the Board of Supervisors from the San Mateo County

Director of Environmental Services explains that the purpose of the “meetings and

conferences” restriction is to “limit activities that go beyond the traditional purpose of bed

and breakfast inns: overnight accommodations.”

On December 23, 2003, plaintiff filed this Section 1983 action making eight claims

challenging the adoption of the Ordinance on First Amendment and substantive due process

grounds.

The next month the Board of Supervisors adopted a new ordinance to supercede the

emergency ordinance. The new ordinance includes the same restrictions with a few

exceptions. Notably, the restriction on meetings, conferences or social events expressly does

not apply to persons who reside at the bed and breakfast as their residence: “These

limitations do not apply to personal social events or meetings engaged in by person

occupying the dwelling as a single family residence.” Ordinance No. 4204 at 5.

Plaintiff subsequently amended her complaint. Her First Amended Complaint

included a claim for relief alleging that the restriction on the hosting of meetings,

conferences or social events was “void for vagueness,” as well as a claim for equitable

estoppel and declaratory relief, among other claims. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. By Memorandum and

Order dated July 19, 2004, the Court granted defendants’ motion in part. Thereafter the

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County passed a new ordinance which prohibits the operation of new bed and breakfasts in

non-coastal residential areas of San Mateo County, but exempted existing bed and breakfasts,

that is, plaintiff’s bed and breakfast. Ordinance No. 4225. Plaintiff’s bed and breakfast,

however, is still subject to Ordinance No. 4204, including the “meetings and conferences”

prohibitions.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). The SAC makes

two substantive claims: (1) a facial First Amendment challenge on the ground that the

restriction on the hosting of meetings, conferences, and social events is inherently vague, and

(2) a claim that defendant is barred by equitable estoppel from enforcing the bed and

breakfast restrictions against her. Defendant moves for summary judgment on the remaining

claims. Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment on the First Amendment claim.

Summary Judgment Standard

A principle purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A

party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial (usually the defendant) has the initial burden of producing evidence negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102

(9th Cir. 2000). Where the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of

proof at trial (usually the plaintiff), it has the initial burden of producing evidence which

would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See C.A.R.

Transp. Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Darden, 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the non-moving party has no

obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. If, on the other hand,

the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then the non-moving party

may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead

must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for

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trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine issue of fact is one that

could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it could

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

Discussion

A. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff contends that the Ordinance’s restrictions on the hosting of “meetings,

conferences, and social events” involving participants who are not registered guests of the

bed and breakfast, and the time limitation on such events for registered guests, violate her

First Amendment rights as well as those of her guests. The parties cross-move for summary

judgment on this facial “void for vagueness” claim. 

 “An ordinance is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide people of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits or if it

authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Gospel Missions

of America, 419 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Nunez v. San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To avoid

unconstitutional vagueness, an ordinance must (1) define the offense with sufficient

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited; and (2) establish

standards to permit police to enforce the law in a non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner”).

 “The need for definiteness is greater when the ordinance imposes criminal penalties on

individual behavior or implicates constitutionally protected rights than when it regulates the

economic behavior of business.” Nunez, 114 F.3d at 940. This greater need for definiteness

is present in this case because a violation of the Ordinance can result in criminal sanctions,

namely, three months incarceration and/or a $300 per day fine. “However, perfect clarity and

precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive

activity. As a result, uncertainty at a statute’s margins will not warrant facial invalidation if

its is clear what the statute proscribes in the vast majority of its intended applications.” 

Gospel Missions of America, 419 F.3d at 1047 (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has cautioned, “[f]acial invalidation is, manifestly, strong

medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” Cal

Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

The Court previously denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the First Amendment

claim. Defendant argued that the Ordinance is not vague because any reasonable person

would understand what is prohibited by the statute. It based its argument solely on the

dictionary definitions of the terms challenged by plaintiff; namely, “meetings,”

“conferences,” and “social events.” The Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss,

reasoning that the dictionary definitions proffered by defendant are as vague as the terms

used in the Ordinance. The Court explained:

For example, the Ordinance prohibits hosting any meetings, conferences or

social events involving registered guests on Sundays. The Ordinance is vague

as to whether it therefore prohibits the bed and breakfast from serving breakfast

in the dining room, an event which might qualify as a “social event” or

“meeting.” As another example, the Ordinance also prohibits any outdoor

meetings, conferences or social events. Again, the Ordinance is vague as to

whether it would therefore prevent the establishment from serving wine and

cheese outside in the afternoon. 

July 19, 2004 Memorandum and Order at 6. Accordingly, defendant had not met its burden

of proving that plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law.

On its summary judgment motion defendant does not rely on dictionary definitions;

instead, it makes a different argument. It contends that the terms “meetings,” “conferences”

and “social events” as used in the Ordinance are sufficiently clear when viewed in the

context of the entire regulatory scheme, including the legislative purpose behind the

Ordinance. See Gospel Missions of America, 419 F.3d at 1048 (holding that other provisions

of an ordinance may provide guidance on terms that appear vague); City of Los Altos v.

Barnes, 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202 (1992) (holding that in interpreting zoning ordinances,

courts should refer to, among other things, legislative history or purpose). 

In Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 9 Cal.4th 1069 (1995), for example, the plaintiffs

challenged an ordinance which prohibited camping and storage of personal property in public

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places. The plaintiffs claimed that the terms “camp,” “camp paraphernalia,” and “store” in

the ordinance were unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1106. The appellate court agreed and the

California Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that the court of appeal had erred because it

had “isolated particular terms rather than considering them in context.” Id. The Court

concluded that the terms at issue are not unconstitutionally vague “when the purpose clause

of the ordinance is considered and the terms are read in that context as they should be.” Id. 

The same reasoning applies here. First, in order to put this discussion in context, the

Court notes that since the ruling on the motion to dismiss, defendant has adopted Ordinance

No. 4225 prohibiting all new bed and breakfasts in residential/non-coastal areas of San

Mateo County; thus, the provisions plaintiff challenges apply only to plaintiff’s bed and

breakfast. 

The Ordinance does not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights when the

restriction on meetings, conferences and social events is considered in light of the history and

purpose of the statute. The purpose of the statute is to prohibit the bed and breakfast from

hosting conferences, meetings and social events that include persons that are not guests of

the inn; in other words, it is to limit the bed and breakfast to providing room and table board,

the traditional services of a bed and breakfast. The Ordinance expressly states that these

restrictions do not apply to the persons who reside at the bed and breakfast as their residence. 

There is nothing vague about this exception: if plaintiff lives at the bed and breakfast she can

host and participate in events at her home just as anyone else in the neighborhood can do.

Plaintiff contends that she is precluded from inviting her family to her bed and

breakfast. The Court does not understand how plaintiff reads such a restriction into the

Ordinance. The Ordinance says that its meetings/conferences/social events restriction does

not apply to persons who occupy the bed and breakfast as their residence. As one cannot

engage in a “meeting” or “social event” by oneself, the Ordinance must mean that plaintiff

can host personal parties and family events. Common sense dictates that no public official

would read this Ordinance as prohibiting plaintiff from hosting her family at Christmas.

//

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The Ordinance also does not violate the First Amendment rights of plaintiff’s guests. 

The Court agrees with defendant that when the Ordinance is considered it context, it is not

unconstitutionally vague as to whether it would prohibit registered guests from gathering for

breakfast on Sunday, or from being served wine and cheese in the back yard. Such events

are part of the traditional services of a bed and breakfast. Moreover, defendant states in its

papers that such events are allowed. As the Ordinance applies only to plaintiff, she cannot

now claim to not know whether such events are permitted. 

Plaintiff does not identify any situations (other than those identified by the Court in its

ruling on the motion to dismiss and addressed in the paragraph above) in which there is

possible vagueness as to what plaintiff’s registered guests may do. In any event, “speculation

about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before [the Court] will not support a

facial attack on a statute when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its intended

applications.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the Ordinance does not specifically define the

terms “social events,” “conferences,” and “meetings.” The law does not require a municipal

ordinance to include definitions. The question is whether those terms, as used in Ordinance

4202, are sufficiently clear that a person of ordinary intelligence would know what is

prohibited. 

The meaning of the Ordinance is sufficiently clear. Plaintiff may not rent out her bed

and breakfast for weddings, parties, meetings, or conferences if those events will involve

participants who are not registered guests of the inn. She may host weddings, conferences,

meetings, and similar social events that are limited to registered guests, but such events must

occur indoors and must be limited to certain times. There are no restrictions on plaintiff’s

ability to provide traditional bed and breakfast services, such as providing meals to registered

guests. And there are no restrictions on plaintiff’s ability to use her home for personal social

events the same as any other homeowner in her neighborhood may do.

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Accordingly, the Court must grant defendant summary judgment on plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim and her claim for declaratory relief (which seeks a judgment that the

Ordinance violates the First Amendment), and deny plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary

judgment.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff does not contend that defendant cannot constitutionally limit her ability to

host meetings, conferences or social events involving non-registered guests; nor does she

contend that it cannot limit the time, place and manner in which she hosts such events for

registered guests. She also does not argue that her First Amendment claim turns on genuine

disputes of fact. Rather, her constitutional challenge is limited to whether one provision of

Ordinance 4204, namely, the restriction on the hosting of meetings, conferences, and social

events, is subject to a facial First Amendment challenge because it is too vague.

There is a “strong presumption that legislative enactments ‘must be upheld unless

their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears.” Walker v. Superior

Court, 47 Cal.3d 112,143 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As plaintiff

has not demonstrated that the Ordinance is “clearly, positively, and unmistakenly”

unconstitutional, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment claims

must be granted.

In the interests of comity, the Court dismisses the remaining state law equitable

estoppel claim without prejudice to plaintiff pursuing the claim in the state courts.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 16, 2005

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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