Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-03922/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-03922-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 California's Three Strikes law appears in California Penal Code § 667(b)-(i). The heart of

the Three Strikes law is § 667(e), which prescribes increased terms of imprisonment for defendants

who have previously been convicted of certain "violent" or "serious" felonies. Under subdivision

(e), a third strike defendant (with two or more prior felony convictions) receives an indeterminate

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH RAY CURTIS,

Petitioner,

v.

A. P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. __________________________________________

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No. C 02-3922 SBA (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's pro se petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 concerning his 2000 conviction in San Mateo

County Superior Court (hereinafter "Superior Court"). Warden A. P. Kane (hereinafter

"Respondent") opposes the petition. Petitioner filed a traverse. For the reasons discussed

below, the petition will be DENIED as to all claims.

BACKGROUND

I. Case History

On December 2, 1999, Petitioner was charged by information filed in Superior Court

with four counts of first-degree burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 460(a) -- Counts One, Two, Nine

and Ten), receiving stolen property (Cal. Penal Code § 496(a) -- Count Three), possession of

burglars' tools (Cal. Penal Code § 466 -- Count Four), failure to register as a sex offender (Cal.

Penal Code § 290(a)(1) -- Count Five), possession of ammunition by a felon (Cal. Penal Code 

§ 12316(b)(1) -- Count Six), and two counts of second-degree burglary (Cal. Penal Code

§ 460(b) -- Counts Seven and Eight). The information further alleged that he was ineligible for

probation (Cal. Penal Code § 1203(e)(4)). Under California's Three Strikes law,1

 Petitioner

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term of life imprisonment, which includes a minimum term. The minimum term for a third strike

defendant is the greatest of (i) "[t]hree times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each

current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions," (ii) twenty-five

years imprisonment in the state prison, or (iii) "[t]he term determined by the court pursuant to

Section 1170 for the underlying conviction," including any applicable enhancements. Cal. Penal

Code § 667(e)(2)(A). These provisions apply in addition to any other enhancement or punishment

provisions which may apply. Cal. Penal Code § 667(e).

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allegedly had suffered two prior strikes (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(a), 1170.12(c)(2)) and four

prior prison terms (Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b)).

Petitioner was arraigned on December 7, 1999, and he pleaded not guilty. He also 

denied the attendant enhancements. 

An amended information was filed on March 29, 2000 changing the allegations to three

prior strikes and two prior prison terms.

Petitioner's jury trial commenced on October 3, 2000. After the trial court denied his

motion to exclude his statements to the police, Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and

agreed to submit one first-degree burglary charge (Count Two) and two prior strike allegations

(a 1986 conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct and a 1990 conviction for burglary) to the

court. The remaining charges were dismissed, and the remaining allegations were stricken. 

On October 4, 2000, the trial court found Petitioner guilty of first-degree burglary, found

true the two prior strike allegations, and sentenced him to state prison for twenty-five years to

life pursuant to California's Three Strikes law. 

Petitioner raised two grounds for relief on direct appeal. Petitioner argued that his

admissions to police should have been excluded because they were elicited with false promises

of leniency and thus were involuntarily made, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He

also argued that admissions he made after he invoked his right to remain silent were elicited in

violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and should have been excluded. 

Petitioner's direct appeal was rejected by the California Court of Appeal on October 9, 2001. 

See Resp't Ex. F. The California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's petition for review on

December 19, 2001. See Resp't Ex. H.

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Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court

raising three additional grounds for relief. First, he argued that the trial court erroneously

increased Petitioner's sentence based on convictions imposed in 1986 and 1990, both of which

derived from plea agreements. Petitioner argued that enhancing his current sentence based on

those convictions amounted to a breach of the plea agreements that led to those convictions. 

Second, he argued that his sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison was grossly

disproportionate to the crime of burglary, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Third, he

argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his appellate attorney failed to

raise the Eighth Amendment claim on direct appeal. His state habeas petition was denied by the

Superior Court in a reasoned opinion on April 24, 2002. See Resp't Ex. I. The California Court

of Appeal summarily denied his habeas petition on May 15, 2002. See Resp't Ex. K. On July

17, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review without citation. See

Resp't Ex. M.

On August 15, 2002, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus

raising the aforementioned five claims from his direct appeal and state habeas petition.

Respondent filed his Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter "Answer ") on October 25, 2002 

(docket nos. 8, 9). Petitioner filed his Traverse on December 13, 2002 (docket no. 13). The

matter has been fully briefed and is now ready for review on the merits.

II. Facts

The following facts are drawn from the appellate opinion. 

 [Petitioner] was convicted of first[-]degree burglary on October 20, 1999,

of a residence at 2712 Westmoreland in unincorporated Redwood City. The

statement of facts taken from the preliminary hearing will therefore be limited to

the facts surrounding this offense.

On October 20, 1999, around 10:00 a.m., Cecilia Alvarez was inside her

San Mateo County home when she heard a knock on the front screen door. She

looked through the peephole and heard someone walking to the side of the house

and then trying to open the side door. She called the police. While she was on

the phone with the police, she heard someone walking around outside, then a loud

noise, and saw a man in front of the kitchen window looking at her. The man

asked if the car in the driveway was for sale. She did not respond, but continued

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 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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talking to the police dispatcher on the phone and described the intruder.

San Mateo County Deputy Sheriff David Titus responded to the call from

the Alvarez residence and observed [Petitioner], who matched the description of

the suspect. Titus searched the backpack [Petitioner] was carrying and found

numerous items of jewelry, a screwdriver, camcorder, and some clothing. Inside

the camcorder bag was an extended warranty that had the Cerrillos' name and

address. The Cerrillos lived at 2712 Westmoreland.

Titus went to the Cerrillo residence around 11:00 a.m. and spoke with the

two Cerrillo children, who said they had been sleeping when the officers arrived. 

The parents came home and identified the jewelry, the backpack and the

camcorder. Titus looked around the house and found that the master bedroom

had been ransacked. Drawers had also been opened in the living room and front

bedroom. Titus found a Nike Swoosh shoe imprint in the dirt in two different

places in the backyard.

San Mateo County Sheriff's Detective Gregory Eatmon spoke with

[Petitioner] on October 20, 1999, and advised him of his Miranda2

 rights. 

[Petitioner] told Eatmon he had entered the Cerrillos' residence through a side

bathroom window. He observed two children sleeping in one bedroom, and

removed jewelry, a camcorder, and a backpack from the master bedroom. 

[Petitioner] chose the residence because he thought the occupants were Hispanic,

and assumed they were illegal [aliens] and would therefore store money inside

their residence.

People v. Curtis, No. A092781, slip op. at 2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2001) (Resp't Ex. F)

(footnote added).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter

"AEDPA"), a district court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court only if the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

"Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

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States" refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the [Supreme] Court's decisions as of

the time of the relevant state court decision." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412

(2000); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69

(9th Cir. 2001). Section 2254(d)(1) "restricts the source of clearly established law to the

[Supreme] Court's jurisprudence." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the [Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than the [Supreme] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413. "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a

federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 412-13. 

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant [s]tate court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.

at 411. The objectively unreasonable standard is not a clear error standard. See Andrade, 538

U.S. at 63 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's use of clear error standard in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212

F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)). After Andrade, "[t]he writ may not issue simply because, in our

determination, a [s]tate court's application of federal law was erroneous, clearly or otherwise." 

Id. at 75-76. While the 'objectively unreasonable' standard is not self-explanatory, at a

minimum "it denotes a greater degree of deference to the state courts than [the Ninth Circuit]

ha[s] previously afforded them." Id. at 75. 

A federal habeas court may also grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's

adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A district court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue

made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and

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convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption is not altered by the fact that

the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state trial court. See Sumner

v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); see also Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.

2001), amended by 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Where, as here, the California Supreme Court denies review of Petitioner's claim

without explanation, the Court looks to the last reasoned state court decision in conducting

habeas review. See Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001) (the district court "looks through" the unexplained

California Supreme Court decision to the last reasoned state court decision). In the instant case,

the California Court of Appeal rendered the last reasoned state court decision as to Petitioner's

claim of improper admission of his pretrial confession. The Superior Court was the only court

to issue a written decision analyzing Petitioner's claims raised in his state habeas petition. Both

the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily denied his habeas

petitions without issuing a reasoned decision. Therefore, the Court looks to the analysis of the

Superior Court in evaluating Petitioner's claims involving California's Three Strikes law, a

violation of the Eighth Amendment, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Lajoie

v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000).

Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue is structural error or

had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). 

Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims,

but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it

resulted in "actual" prejudice. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

II. Exhaustion

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

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highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S.

129, 133-34 (1987). It is undisputed that Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies as to the

claims raised in this proceeding.

III. Legal Claims

Petitioner raises five claims for relief under § 2254 which can be fairly classified into

four general categories for purposes of discussion and analysis: (A) improper admission of his

pretrial confession (Claims 1 and 2); (B) imposition of the three strikes sentence violated the

terms of his prior plea agreements (Claim 3); (C) his Eight Amendment claim that his sentence

of twenty-five years to life in prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Claim 4); and

(D) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise his Eighth Amendment claim

on direct appeal (Claim 5).

A. Improper Admission of Pretrial Confession

1. Background

Petitioner claims that his pretrial confession was inadmissible because it was coerced

and obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Petitioner specifically claims that his

admissions should have been excluded because they were obtained by false promises of

leniency and also because he invoked his right to remain silent. (Pet. at 5, Ex. A.) Therefore,

Petitioner alleges that the trial court's ruling to admit Petitioner's pretrial confession was

"prejudicial error." (Traverse at 4.)

The appellate court summarized the facts underlying Petitioner's pretrial confession

claims as follows:

The police interviewed [Petitioner] on October 20, 1999, and again on

October 22, 1999. The October 20 interview was conducted by Detectives Greg

Eatmon and Ken Taylor of the San Mateo County Sheriff's Office and was

videotaped. The second interview, on October 22, was conducted by Detective

Eatmon and by Detective Dawn Jones of the California Highway Patrol and was

audiotaped [sic]. Transcriptions of the tapes were also admitted into evidence. 

[Petitioner] was already under arrest at the time of the first interview and

was advised of his Miranda rights. [Petitioner] was asked if he understood those

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rights and answered affirmatively. He was not, however, asked if he wished to

waive those rights, but he did continue talking. At the beginning of the first

interview, Detectives Eatmon and Taylor told [Petitioner] they were sex crimes

investigators; that they "[do not] do property crimes," only sex crimes. They

continued to make such comments, indicating that they were sex crimes

investigators and were trying to determine if [Petitioner] had committed any sex

crimes at the residences where [the] burglaries had occurred, and that they wanted

to eliminate him from being involved in sexual behavior in the house. The

detectives' references to sex crimes and wanting to determine whether [Petitioner]

was just there to take property were made before [Petitioner] admitted having

taken property from the Westmoreland residence. The detectives told [Petitioner]

they knew he was in the house on Westmoreland and they just wanted to know

why; they knew [Petitioner] was caught with property from the house. 

[Petitioner] then admitted entering the house and taking the property. 

Later in the interview the detectives exhorted [Petitioner] to tell them

about all of the burglaries he had committed because he might get a "package." 

They also indicated that they would forward a favorable report to the district

attorney who might put together a package deal. Additionally, the detectives told

[Petitioner] that if he "clear[ed] up the cases" for them, they would tell the district

attorney he had done so and would ask the district attorney to let the judge know,

"so the Judge knows what good [Petitioner has] done."

During the first interview, [Petitioner] made a number of comments that

he contends indicated he was invoking his right to remain silent. At one point he

said, "I'm through talking," but he then kept talking and complaining that he had

already told them what he had done that morning. [Petitioner] also made

statements, such as "[j]ust take me to the jailhouse," "write it up," and "well we

gonna keep on talkin'?" All the while, however, he continued talking to the

detectives.

Resp't Ex. F at 3-4.

2. Applicable Federal Law

Involuntary confessions are inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Blackburn

v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the

court must consider the effect that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the

defendant. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). "The test is whether,

considering the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical

or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne." 

United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Haynes v.

Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963)). Absent police misconduct causally related to the

confession, there is no basis for concluding that a confession was involuntary in violation of the

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Fourteenth Amendment. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).

Statements made in violation of a defendant's right to cut off questioning are

inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. "Once warnings have been given, the subsequent

procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior or during to

questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Miranda, 384 U.S.

at 473-74. Without the right to cut off questioning, the "setting of in-custody interrogation

operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege

has once been invoked." Id. at 474. Ultimately, the "admissibility of statements obtained after

the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his 'right

to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.'" Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104

(1975).

3. Analysis

In this case, the state courts made findings from the facts adduced at the pretrial hearing

on Petitioner's motion to exclude his confession and reasonably determined that Petitioner's

confession was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice. After a careful

review of the record and relevant cases, the Court is satisfied that the state courts' findings were

not "objectively unreasonable." Andrade, 538 U.S. at 63.

A federal court may grant the writ if it concludes that a state court's adjudication of the

claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A

district court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court

unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Section 2254(d)(2) applies to intrinsic review of a state court's fact-finding process, or

situations in which the petitioner challenges the state court's fact-findings based entirely on the

state court record, whereas section 2254(e)(1) applies to challenges based on extrinsic evidence,

or evidence presented for the first time in federal court. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992,

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 California Penal Code § 290, entitled "Registration of sex offenders," requires convicted

sex offenders to register with the chief of police of their city of residence.

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999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004). In Taylor, the Ninth Circuit established a two-part analysis under

sections 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). Id. First, federal courts must undertake an "intrinsic review" of

the state court's fact-finding process under the "unreasonable determination" clause of section

2254(d)(2). Id. at 1000. The intrinsic review requires federal courts to examine the state court's

fact-finding process, not its findings. Id. Once the state court's fact-finding process survives

this intrinsic review, the second part of the analysis begins by dressing the state court finding in

a presumption of correctness under section 2254(e)(1). Id. According to the AEDPA, this

presumption means that the state court's fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence

presented by the petitioner for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts

to clear and convincing proof that the state court finding is in error. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). "Significantly, the presumption of correctness and the clear-and-convincing

standard of proof only come into play once the state court's fact-findings survive any intrinsic

challenge; they do not apply to a challenge that is governed by the deference implicit in the

"unreasonable determination" standard of section 2254(d)(2)." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. The

relevant question under section 2254(d)(2) is if an appellate panel applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude whether or not a state court finding is

supported by the record. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

At the hearing on Petitioner's motion to exclude his statements, the trial court reviewed

the challenged transcripts and videotapes before making its finding that Petitioner's admissions

were voluntary.

Having reviewed the statements and listened to and watched the videotape of the

October 20 statement, it is very clear to me that these statements were not

coerced.

This discussion early on in the interview about his being a [Section] 290

registrant,3

 and the officers['] ploy or device in telling him that they were only

interested in sex crimes, and, suggesting that they were not at all interested in the

burglaries so long as he was able to tell them that there weren't any sex offenses

being contemplated there, obviously was a ploy.

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[Petitioner] makes it abundantly clear throughout the interview that he didn't fall

for it. 

He [sic] repeatedly throughout that interview, the officers would try to suggest to

him that they were only interested in sex offenses, and he would laugh and point

out to them that that was curious, if they were after sex offenders, how come they

kept asking him about burglaries. 

And in his soliloquy at the end, when he's alone in the interview room, he makes

it quite clear, as he has throughout the interview, that he knows what they are up

to.

It is, [sic] there's no basis I think to find here that his will was overborne by theirs. 

He recognized the tactic for what it was.

And, there is simply no basis to exclude his statements on that theory.

(RT of 10/2/2000 to 10/4/2000 at 24-25) (footnote added).

The trial court further found that Petitioner's statements were not obtained in violation of

Miranda because he did not invoke his right to remain silent:

The [sic], as to an invocation of his right to remain silent, that never occurs. 

He talks about the possibility of stopping talking a couple of times, but he

scarcely draws a breath before he goes right on talking.

What one doesn't see from the transcripts is how fast these questions and answers

are going back and forth.

At, [sic] for example, at page 39, which is one of the illustrations of this, it's page

79 of the People's number 3, when you listen to that part of the discussion on the

videotape, they are basically going back and forth a mile a minute. 

And, at one point he had an answer. [Petitioner] says, I'm through talking. The

officer starts, gets a couple of words into the next sentence, and [Petitioner]

interrupts the officer and says, quotes, or this is from my notes, so it's probably

not an exact quote, but he says, in effect, you can keep talking about the same old

thing I just told you.

The officer follows that up with a question about [Petitioner] going to the service

league. [Petitioner] answers that; and, they are off to the races.

He never stops talking. He never suggests that he is serious about being through

talking.

And, at least one other time, during this interview, he indicates he's getting close

to stopping talking. He says, I'm only going to say this one more time. 

Let's see if I can find that in my notes. 

. . . it was actually earlier than that in the interview. It was about page -- It was on

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page fifty of the interview, where, the example I was thinking of, where

[Petitioner] said that he was going to clam up in a few minutes because the

officers were asking him such stupid questions. 

And that they were going over the same material. But he didn't stop talking then

earlier. He went on and on. The whole tone of this interview is, gives one the

feeling that [Petitioner] didn't have any interests at all in terminating that

interrogation.

He was more than willing to keep talking to the officers. Indeed, once the officers

left him alone in the room he continued to talk for many minutes on the same

subjects, out loud, with apparently some awareness he was under surveillance. 

Because at one point, he was talking out loud to himself about the camera

following his every move. And, this is very obviously an individual who didn't

have any interest in stopping talking at all.

So that that theory does not work for [Petitioner].

So the motion to exclude the statements on those grounds is denied. 

(Id. at 25-27.)

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and specifically found that no

promises of leniency were made to Petitioner, and that Petitioner did not invoke his Miranda

right to cut off questioning before admitting his involvement in the burglary. 

Petitioner argues that the "trial court erred in determining that his admissions were 

voluntary and admissible." (Pet. at 31.) Petitioner stresses that "[o]utside of [his] confession,

the only evidence of [Petitioner's] commission of the Westmoreland Avenue burglary was

circumstantial." (Id. at 32.) He argues that "[his] admissions were not the result of an

"essentially free and unconstrained choice" by [Petitioner] to confess, but rather, were the result

of improper promises of leniency which motivated [Petitioner] to make the admissions." (Id. at

31.) Moreover, Petitioner argues that "in finding that [Petitioner] did not invoke his right to

remain silent, the trial court failed to consider the additional comments made by [Petitioner],

and his demeanor throughout the interview, which at the very least implied the invocation of

this right because [his demeanor was] reasonably inconsistent with a present willingness to

discuss the case freely and completely." (Id. at 36.) Thus, Petitioner claims that "[a]ny

statements made by [Petitioner] after he impliedly invoked his right to remain silent, which first

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occurred when he said, 'Just take me to jailhouse. . . ,' (CT 86:1-2), and certainly any statements

made by [Petitioner] after he expressly invoked his right to remain silent (CT 122:26, 123:6-10)

were involuntary and should have . . . been excluded from evidence." (Pet. at 40-41.) 

Respondent disagrees and argues that this Court should defer to the state courts' determination

that Petitioner's confession was voluntary and that he did not ask to have the interview

terminated by invoking his right to remain silent. (Answer at 5-10.) Because Petitioner is

challenging the state courts' determination based on the state court record, the Court will

conduct its analysis under Section 2254(d)(2) and undertake an "intrinsic" review of the state

courts' processes.

The factfinding processes used by the state courts to determine that Petitioner's

admissions were properly admitted into evidence were reasonable. The trial court conducted an

evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's motion to exclude his statements. The appellate court

affirmed the trial court's ruling in a reasoned decision. The Court concludes that Petitioner had

a full, fair and complete opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim to the state

courts, of which he took full advantage. Therefore, the Court finds that the state courts'

factfinding processes were intrinsically reasonable.

Upon finding that the state courts' factfinding processes survive an intrinsic review, the

Court now turns to the state courts' findings of fact, which are "dressed in a presumption of

correctness." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. These findings of fact are presumed correct unless

Petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1); Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Rupe v. Wood, 93

F.3d 1434, 1444 (9th Cir. 1996) (deferring to state appellate court's finding that challenged

statement did not constitute threat or promise). 

Petitioner disagrees with the state courts' findings and argues that the underlying facts

can be interpreted differently. He claims that "[t]he transcripts of the videotape of the police

interview, and the videotape itself, do not support the trial court's conclusion that [Petitioner]

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 Petitioner has attached a copy of his petition for review to the California Supreme Court to 

his federal petition, which includes a "motion to augment the record so as to include the videotapes

of the first interview." (Pet. at 22 n.3.) The Court will construe Petitioner as making the same

motion to augment in his federal habeas petition. The trial court had the benefit of reviewing the

transcripts and videotapes from both interviews, which were presented to the court and marked as

exhibits during the hearing on the motion to exclude statements. Resp't Ex. A at 41-42 (CJIS record

of 10/02/2000 proceedings in San Mateo County Superior Court). Petitioner is not asking to

augment the record with new evidence with which to rebut the trial court's decision, which is

presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Therefore, the Court DENIES Petitioner's

motion to augment the record.

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was aware of Detectives Eatmon and Taylor's 'ploy.'"4

 (Pet. at 22.) However, Petitioner's

arguments do not show that the state courts' findings are objectively unreasonable. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); cf. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409 (federal court making "unreasonable

application" inquiry under § 2254(d)(1) should ask whether the state court's application of

clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable"). The state courts' findings are

amply supported by the record. 

After an independent review of the record, the Court is satisfied that the state courts'

findings are at least reasonable and therefore binding in these proceedings. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2); cf. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002) (in context of § 2254(d)(1), noting that

even if federal court believed that there was jury coercion, "it is at least reasonable to conclude

that there was not, which means that the state court's determination to that effect must stand"). 

Furthermore, the state courts' findings -- that no improper promises of leniency produced

Petitioner's confession -- is a reasonable application of pertinent federal law under § 2254(d)(1).

 See United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 872

(1991) (Police generally may offer to tell the prosecutor about the defendant's cooperation and

suggest that cooperation may increase the likelihood of a more lenient sentence.); Guerrero, 847

F.2d at 1366 (interrogating agent's promise to inform prosecutor about suspect's cooperation

does not render subsequent statement involuntary, even when accompanied by promise to

recommend leniency or by speculation that cooperation will have a positive effect); AmayaRuiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir. 1997) (encouraging suspect to tell truth not

coercive conduct that would render a subsequently obtained statement involuntary); cf. United

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States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (reciting potential penalties or

sentences, including potential penalties for lying to interviewer, not coercive conduct that would

render a subsequently obtained statement involuntary). Similarly, the state courts'

determination -- that there was no violation of Petitioner's Miranda right to cut off questioning

because Petitioner did not invoke his right before admitting his involvement in the burglary -- is

also a reasonable application of federal law. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46

(1983) (authorities may continue interrogation if suspect himself voluntarily initiates further

communication). 

Importantly, the state courts' ultimate determination that Petitioner's will was not

overborne was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent

as set forth in Schneckloth and its progeny. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). After reasonably

rejecting Petitioner's claims of promises of leniency, and of a violation of his Miranda right to

cut off questioning, the state courts found that the totality of the circumstances persuaded it that

Petitioner's confession was not coerced. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to exclude

his statements based on the court's finding that Petitioner "did not fall for" the officers' "ploy" of

telling him that they were only interested in determining if Petitioner had committed any sex

offenses. (RT of 10/2/2000 to 10/4/2000 at 24-25.) The appellate court specifically noted that

"[t]he record of [Petitioner's] statement shows he knew the detectives were interested in

property crimes and that he had been caught red-handed with goods taken from the burglary to

which he then admitted." Resp't Ex. F at 7. The state courts' determination that Petitioner's

confession was not coerced must stand. Accord Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th

Cir. 2003) (holding that state court's determination that interrogation was non-coercive, where

suspect was interrogated over five-hour period in six-foot by eight-foot room without water or

toilet [but never requested water or use of a toilet], was objectively reasonable application of

Schneckloth). As noted earlier, even if the Court agreed with Petitioner that there was coercion,

it is at least reasonable to conclude, based on the record, that there was none. Consequently, the

state courts' determination to that effect must stand. See Early, 537 U.S. at 10.

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 Petitioner is also precluded from federal habeas relief because it does not appear that the

admission of his confession, even if coerced or obtained in violation of Miranda, had a "'substantial

and injurious effect or influence'" on the trial court finding him guilty of the burglary. Pope v.

Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). Petitioner was caught

with stolen property in the same area as the burglary and within a short period of time after its

removal from the victims' residence. He also possessed a stolen screwdriver, which police

determined was the same tool the burglary suspect used to gain entry. Furthermore, Petitioner was

identified as the suspect attempting to gain entry into another home in that area. Therefore, even if

the trial court erred in admitting his pretrial confession, such an error was harmless in light of the

overwhelming physical evidence tying Petitioner to the burglary for which he was convicted.

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Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim of improper

admission of his pretrial confession.5

B. Sentence Under California's Three Strikes Law Violated Prior Plea

Agreements

1. Background

Petitioner argues that the imposition of an enhanced sentence for his current conviction

under California's Three Strikes law violated the terms of his prior plea agreements. (Pet. at 5,

Ex. B.) He specifically argues that "[t]he district attorney's 'attack' to strike out [Petitioner]

pursuant to [Section] 1170.12 is in direct violation of [his] previous plea bargain agreement[s]." 

(Id.) Therefore, based on the alleged violation of the prior plea agreements, Petitioner claims

that his current conviction and sentence are invalid.

In arguing that his current sentence is invalid, Petitioner seems to be (1) challenging the

validity of his prior expired convictions, which were used as enhancements, and (2) claiming

that the use of his prior convictions to enhance his current sentence is a violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause.

A petitioner challenging in habeas the validity of an expired conviction which he

maintains is being used as a predicate or enhancement to his current confinement or sentence

satisfies the custody requirement, even if he is no longer in custody for the prior conviction. 

Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401-02 (2001). However, the

Supreme Court has determined that the expired conviction itself cannot be challenged in an

attack upon the later sentence it was used to enhance. See Coss, 532 U.S. at 403-04 (prior

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conviction cannot be challenged in a § 2254 petition); Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374,

382-83 (2001) (same). With respect to state convictions, the Supreme Court stated:

[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own

right because the [petitioner] failed to pursue those remedies while they were

available (or because the [petitioner] did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may

be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a

criminal sentence, the [petitioner] generally may not challenge the enhanced

sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction

was unconstitutionally obtained.

Coss, 532 U.S. at 403-04 (citation omitted). The only exception to this rule is for a claim that

the prior conviction was unconstitutional because there was a failure to appoint counsel in

violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372

U.S. 335 (1963). See Coss, 532 U.S. at 404; Daniels, 532 U.S. at 382. Such a claim is not

raised here, thus, Petitioner's prior expired convictions cannot be challenged. Therefore, the

Court will focus on Petitioner's claim of a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

In rejecting his claim, the Superior Court also construed Petitioner's claim as a violation

of the Double Jeopardy Clause, stating:

Petitioner claims that the plea agreements which gave rise to his prior

convictions were violated by the sentence he received in his current matter. 

Petitioner appears to specifically claim that the Prosecution violated the terms of

those agreements and Penal Code § 1192.5 when it charged him with those prior

convictions in the present case in order to increase his potential sentence. 

Petitioner contends that the alleged violation of the prior plea agreements makes

his conviction and sentence in the instant case invalid as well.

Petitioner's argument is without merit. It has been held that the "Three

Strikes" law does not operate retroactively, and that it does not violate double

jeopardy. (See People v. Sipe (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 468, and People v. White

Eagle (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1511 [criticized on other grounds in People v.

Milton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 365].) Therefore, it was not a violation of the

previous plea agreements to use the prior convictions obtained in those

agreements to enhance the Petitioner's sentence in a case involving new and

separate offenses.

In addition, since it was not a violation of the previous plea agreements to

sentence Petitioner under the "Three Strikes" law (Penal Code § 1170.12), his

conviction and sentence in the present case were also valid. Consequently, he is

not entitled to relief on this ground. 

Resp't Ex. I at 2.

2. Applicable Federal Law

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The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall

"be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb". U.S. Const. amend.

V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), its protections were held applicable to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The guarantee against double jeopardy protects

against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction, and (2)

multiple punishments for the same offense. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96

(1995); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395

U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Staatz v. Dupnik, 789 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 1986).

3. Analysis

The Superior Court's rejection of this claim was not an unreasonable application of

federal law. Both the Supreme Court as well as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have found

that the use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions does not

violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967)

(upholding use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions even if in a

sense defendant must relitigate in sentencing proceeding conduct for which he was already

tried). Any such challenge is wholly without merit. See Jackson v. Nelson, 435 F.2d 553, 553

(9th Cir. 1971) (dismissing contentions of equal protection, bill of attainder, double jeopardy

and ex post facto against recidivist statute as meritless). Therefore, the Superior Court's denial

of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Additionally, in his Traverse, Petitioner alleges that the unconstitutional application of

California's Three Strikes law to his pre-1994 prior offenses violates the Ex Post Facto clause

and the Due Process clause. (Traverse at 22.) A traverse is not the proper pleading to raise

additional grounds for relief, therefore, issues raised for the first time in a traverse should not be

considered. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1994). Furthermore,

the only claim in his state habeas petition involves the alleged violation of his prior plea

agreements which was construed to be a Double Jeopardy claim, therefore, Petitioner has not

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exhausted his other claims in state court. Ignoring the procedural deficiencies of his claims, the

Court will still address the merits of these claims.

According to the Supreme Court, recidivist statutes do not increase the penalty imposed

for an earlier conviction, rather, they constitute a stiffened penalty for the current crime. Witte

v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995). The Ninth Circuit has directly held that the

recidivist statutes, like California's Three Strikes law, do not violate the Ex Post Facto clause. 

United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Weaver v. Graham, 450

U.S. 24, 30 (1981). In Kaluna, the Ninth Circuit noted that so long as California's Three Strikes

law was on the books at the time of the current offense, then there was no Ex Post Facto

problem. 192 F.3d at 1199. Kaluna is dispositive -- Petitioner's current offense occurred in

1999 and the Three Strikes law was enacted in 1994. Therefore, Petitioner's claim of an ex post

facto violation is meritless. Furthermore, Petitioner's claim of a due process violation equally

lacks merit. The Supreme Court has upheld the using of pre-1994 convictions in California and

has not found a due process problem. See e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27-31 (2003)

(upholding the use of convictions in 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1993 in imposing California's Three

Strikes law); see also Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72-77 (same, upholding use of convictions in 1982,

1988, 1990, and 1991). While these cases did not specifically address the due process clause

and California's Three Strikes law, they are factually similar because those cases also used pre1994 convictions, and the courts did not find a due process problem. Thus, there has been no

indication that using such prior convictions violates due process. Therefore, the Court finds that

Petitioner's claims that the use of his prior convictions violates both the due process and ex post

facto clauses of the Constitution to be meritless.

Accordingly, Petitioner's claim for habeas relief -- based on his allegation that his

current conviction and sentence are invalid due to the application of California's Three Strikes

law -- is denied.

//

C. Current Sentence Constitutes Cruel And Unusual Punishment

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 In analyzing this claim the Court must turn to clearly established federal law during the

time of the relevant state court decision, which is the California Supreme Court's summary denial of

the petition for review on July 17, 2002. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The Court "looks through"

the unexplained California Supreme Court decision to the last reasoned state court decision -- the

Superior Court's opinion, which was also issued in 2002. Shackleford, 234 F.3d at 1079. At that

time, no majority opinion emerged in Harmelin on the question of proportionality, and so Justice

Kennedy's view -- the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly

disproportionate to the crime -- was considered the holding of the Court. See United States v.

Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1992). This Court notes that since 2002, the Supreme Court

has clarified its decision in Harmelin and confirmed that Justice Kennedy's proportionality principle

is clearly established law. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 (applying the Harmelin standard); United

States v. Carr, 56 F.3d 38, 39 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141,

1146-47 (9th Cir. 1998) (after Harmelin Eighth Amendment forbids "at most" only sentences that

are "grossly disproportionate").

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1. Background

Petitioner's conviction for first-degree burglary and the finding that he had suffered two

prior strikes under California's Three Strikes law subjected him to a sentence of twenty-five

years to life in prison. Petitioner claims that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Pet. at 5, Ex. B.)

2. Applicable Federal Law

A criminal sentence that is significantly disproportionate to the crime for which the

defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,

303 (1983) (sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent

felony violates Eighth Amendment). "[O]utside the context of capital punishment, successful

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will be exceedingly rare." Id. at 289-90

(citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). The Eighth Amendment

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment "does not require strict proportionality between

crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate'

to the crime." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at

288, 303) (Kennedy, J., concurring).6

 Under this proportionality principle, the threshold

determination for the court is whether a petitioner's sentence is one of the rare cases in which a

comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross

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disproportionality. Bland, 961 F.2d at 129 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005). Only if such

an inference arises does the court proceed to compare a petitioner's sentence with sentences in

the same and other jurisdictions. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05; Bland, 961 F.2d at 129.

The threshold for an "inference of gross disproportionality" is quite high. See, e.g.,

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole for first

offense of possession of 672 grams of cocaine did not raise inference of gross

disproportionality). In addition, a court may take into account the State's interest not only in

punishing the offense of conviction, but also its interest "'in dealing in a harsher manner with

those who [are] repeat[] criminal[s].'" Bland, 961 F.2d at 129 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445

U.S. 263, 276 (1980)).

3. Analysis

The Superior Court rejected Petitioner's claim that his twenty-five years to life sentence

for first-degree burglary and for being a repeat offender with at least two prior strikes was

constitutionally disproportionate, stating:

It has been determined that a sentence is cruel or unusual punishment if it

"is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the

conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." (People v.

Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502.) In assessing whether a punishment is

cruel or unusual a court should "(1) consider 'the nature of the offense and the

offender,' (2) compare the punishment to other punishments imposed by the same

jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and (3) compare the punishment to other

punishments imposed by other jurisdictions for the same offense." (Id. at 1510.)

Focusing on all of these factors, Petitioner has failed to show that his

sentence of 25 years to life is disproportionate to the crimes for which he was

sentenced. Petitioner was sentenced for a residential burglary (Penal Code 

§ 460(a)) and this sentence was then enhanced due to his prior convictions for

forcible lewd conduct (Penal Code § 288(b) and another residential burglary.

(Penal Code § 460(a)).

When compared with other cases and other statutes, it is clear that

Petitioner's sentence was an appropriate one for a repeat offender. (See Martinez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1502 and People v. Goodwin (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1084.) 

In light of all this, this Court cannot conclude Petitioner's sentence was cruel

and/or unusual punishment. 

Resp't Ex. I at 3. 

Petitioner argues that he "received a life term predicated upon an offense in which no

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 See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29-30 (upholding sentence of twenty-five years to life for

recidivist convicted most recently of grand theft); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1996)

(sentence of life without parole for fifteen-year-old murderer does not raise inference of gross

disproportionality); Carr, 56 F.3d at 39 (sentence of twenty-two years upon conviction for sale of

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victim was injured nor threatened with injury and which involved little or no pecuniary

damage." (Traverse at 41.) Petitioner further argues that his sentence, as compared to that for

more "violent felonies resulting in serious injury and is some cases [in] death," is

disproportionate. (Id.) However, as the Superior Court noted, Petitioner's sentence of twentyfive years to life under California's Three Strikes law punishes not only his current offenses, but

also his recidivism. See Resp't Ex. I at 3 (citing People v. Martinez, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1502

(1999)).

When viewed in light of his criminal history and current felony offense, the Court finds

that Petitioner's case is not that "rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime

committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality." 

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. Furthermore, the Superior Court reasonably applied the gross

disproportionality standard in rejecting Petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim. The court

considered the current offense of a residential burglary and Petitioner's strike convictions which

included a lewd and lascivious conviction and another residential burglary. The court

determined the record supported the finding that "[w]hen compared with other cases and other

statutes, it is clear that Petitioner's sentence was an appropriate one for a repeat offender." 

Resp't Ex. I at 3. The court reasonably concluded the sentence was not unconstitutionally

disproportionate in light of his current offense and criminal history. See id. Therefore, the

Superior Court's rejection of Petitioner's claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); see, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85 (upholding life sentence of recidivist

convicted of fraudulent use of credit card for $80, passing forged check for $28.36 and

obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (upholding sentence of life

without possibility of parole for first offense of possession of 672 grams of cocaine).7

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66.92 grams of cocaine base with enhancement under Federal Sentencing Guidelines' career

offender provision for two previous convictions for minor drug sales was not grossly

disproportionate).

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 Although the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is guaranteed to state criminal

defendants by the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see

Lucey, 469 U.S. at 392, the Sixth Amendment does not address a defendant's rights on appeal; the

right to effective state appellate counsel is derived purely from the Fourteenth Amendment's due

process guarantee, see id.

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Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the writ on his Eighth Amendment claim.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

1. Background

Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his

attorney did not raise his Eighth Amendment claim on direct appeal. (Pet. at 5, Ex. B.)

2. Applicable Federal Law

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant

the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.

387, 391-405 (1985).8 Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed

according to the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Miller v.

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th

Cir. 1986). A state criminal defendant therefore must show that counsel's advice fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 &

n.9 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Birtle, 792 F.2d at 849).

It is important to note that appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise

every nonfrivolous issue requested by defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54

(1983); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434

n.10. The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of

effective appellate advocacy. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 (footnote and citations omitted). 

Appellate counsel therefore will frequently remain above an objective standard of competence

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and have caused his client no prejudice for the same reason -- because he declined to raise a

weak issue. See id.

3. Analysis

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim fails with the predicate

claim. There is no merit to Petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim that his sentence amounted to

cruel and unusual punishment. Appellate counsel thus did not engage in deficient performance

by failing to argue that the sentence violated the California constitutional right to be free of

cruel or unusual punishment, because that argument also would have been futile as shown by

the Superior Court's rejection of it. Neither the federal nor state constitutional claims would

have succeeded, so there was no deficient performance in failing to make those arguments. 

There also was no prejudice resulting from the failure to make the futile argument. The

Superior Court's rejection of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED as to all

claims. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent, terminate all

pending motions, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 30, 2005 _______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

Case 4:02-cv-03922-SBA Document 18 Filed 09/30/05 Page 24 of 24