Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06052/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

ARCHIE L. TURNER, JR. PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL NO. 04-6052

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Archie Turner (hereinafter “plaintiff”), brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social

Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying his application for a period of disability

and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), under Title II, and supplemental security income benefits

(“SSI”), under Title XVI, of the Act.

Background:

The applications for DIB and SSI now before this court were filed on December 28, 2001,

alleging an onset date of June 15, 2001, due to a learning disability, back problems, epilepsy/seizure

disorder, arthritis, and high blood pressure. (Tr. 229, 234, 348-350). An administrative hearing was

held on June 26, 2003. (Tr. 39-58). Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel.

At the time of the supplemental administrative hearing, plaintiff was thirty-three years old

and possessed a high school education. (Tr. 42). However, the evidence indicates that plaintiff was

in special education courses throughout his high school tenure. (Tr. 42-43). Further, the record also

reveals that plaintiff is unable to read or write. (Tr. 43). As for past relevant work (“PRW”),

plaintiff has performed the positions of janitor and forklift operator. (Tr. 44). 

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On January 9, 2004, the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”), found that plaintiff

had severe impairments related to residuals from a healed compression fracture at the T-12 level,

hypertension, and borderline intellectual functioning. (Tr. 22). However, he concluded that

plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in

Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. After discrediting plaintiff’s subjective allegations, the

ALJ concluded that he maintained the residual functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”), to perform

a limited range of light work. (Tr. 23). He determined that plaintiff could only occasionally stoop

and crouch, could not do excessive bending, twisting, or turning, and required seizure precautions.

(Tr. 23). Further, due to his mental impairment, the ALJ found that plaintiff could only perform

work where the interpersonal contact is incidental to the work performed, the tasks performed are

learned by experience and require little judgment, and the supervision for non-routine tasks is

detailed. (Tr. 23). With the assistance of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was

capable of performing the position of housekeeping cleaner. (Tr. 56-57). 

The Appeals Council declined to review this decision. (Tr. 8-11). Subsequently, plaintiff

filed this action. (Doc. # 1). This case is before the undersigned by consent of the parties. The

plaintiff and Commissioner have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (Doc.

# 7, 8). 

Applicable Law:

This Court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

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2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the

Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists

in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have

decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words,

if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and

one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed.

Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year

and that prevent him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable bymedicallyacceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his

disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process

to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

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activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003). Only if the final

stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in

light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42

(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C .F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

Discussion:

Of particular concern to the undersigned is the ALJ’s failure to question the vocational expert

(“VE”), concerning plaintiff’s borderline intellectual functioning. The United States Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that borderline intellectual functioning represents a

significant nonexertional impairment that must be considered by a VE. See Foreman v. Callahan,

122 F.3d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1997). In the present case, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff suffered from

borderline intellectual functioning. However, in his hypothetical question to the VE, he merely

stated that plaintiff could perform work that involves only incidental interpersonal contact, tasks

learned by experience, limited judgement, and detailed supervision for non-routine tasks. (Tr. 56).

He failed to include plaintiff’s borderline intellectual functioning in this hypothetical. See Foreman

v. Callahan, 122 F.3d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that borderline intellectual functioning

indicates a significant nonexertional impairment that needs to be considered by a VE); see also Cox

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v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir.1998)(“If a hypothetical question does not include all of the

claimant's impairments, limitations, and restrictions, or it is otherwise inadequate, a VE's response

cannot constitute substantial evidence to support a conclusion of no disability.”). As such, we

believe that remand is necessary to allow the ALJ to re-examine plaintiff’s mental impairment and

question the VE accordingly.

In addition, we also note that the position of housekeeper, which the VE testified that plaintiff

could perform as that position is generally performed, requires the employee to be able to “[r]ead a

variety of novels, magazines, atlases, and encyclopedias,” as well as “[r]ead safety rules, instructions

in the use and maintenance of shop tools and equipment, and methods and procedures in mechanical

drawing and layout work.” See DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES § 321.137-010, at

www.westlaw.com. It also requires an ability to “[w]rite reports and essays with proper format,

punctuation, spelling, and grammar, using all parts of speech.” Id. 

Generally, when expert testimony conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupation Titles

(“DOT”), it is the DOT that controls. Smith v. Shalala, 46 F.3d 45, 47 (8th Cir. 1995); Montgomery

v. Chater, 69 F.3d 273, 276-77 (8th Cir. 1995). However, the DOT classifications may be rebutted

with VE testimony which shows that “particular jobs may be ones that a claimant can perform.”

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir.1995). 

In this case, the ALJincluded the fact that plaintiff was basically illiterate in his hypothetical

question to the VE. (Tr. 56). Although the VE testified that plaintiff could perform the position of

housekeeper, the DOT’s classification of this job indicates that plaintiff must be able to read and

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There is no evidence in the record to indicate when or why plaintiff’s benefits were 1

terminated. The ALJ merely notes that they were terminated.

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write. Further, with regard to the reading and writing requirements, the VE failed to testify that the

job traits of the position identified varied from the way the DOT described them. Montgomery, 69

F.3d at 277. As the VE’s task “is to determine whether jobs exist for someone with the claimant’s

precise disabilities,” he failed to accomplish that task in this case. Id. ; Jelinek v. Bowen, 870 F.2d

457, 459 (8th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the Commissioner may not rely on his testimony, and has

not met her burden of demonstrating that jobs exist in the economy which plaintiff is capable of

performing. 

The undersigned is also concerned with the ALJ’s failure to obtain a more recent

psychological evaluation of plaintiff. Records indicate that plaintiff was last evaluated in 1991, due

to a previous application for SSI. (Tr. 16). In 1993, he was reportedly awarded benefits due to his

limited intellectual functioning. However, said benefits were later terminated. Following the 1

termination of benefits, plaintiff returned to work, and worked until August 2001. (Tr. 16). While

the undersigned is well aware that a person’s IQ is presumed to remain stable over time in the

absence of any evidence of a change in a claimant’s intellectual functioning, S.S.R. 82-54 (2005),

1982 WL 31381 (S.S.A.), we believe that plaintiff’s return to work was sufficient to constitute a

possible change in his intellectual functioning. See, e.g., Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734-35 (8th

Cir. 2001); Sird v. Chater, 105 F.3d 401, 402 n. 4 (8th Cir.1997). As such, a more recent

psychological evaluation was warranted. Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ is directed to order a

psychological consultative examination.

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Conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence, and therefore, the denial of benefits to the plaintiff, should be reversed and this matter

should be remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

DATED this 22nd day of August 2005.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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