Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02976/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02976-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN HAGAN,

CDCR #AX-5810,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SCOTT MICHAEL BLUMAN; 

CHARLES CHILDERS; SCOTTY 

ELECTRIC CO.; KATHY BURGESS,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[Doc. No. 2]; AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

Kevin Hagan (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 1 at 1. 

/ / / 

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
2

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the 

time of filing; instead he has filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement 

which the Court has liberally construed as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2).

I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 9
3

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his prison trust account statement 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. See Doc. No. 2 at 4-7; 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This statement shows that Plaintiff had an available amount 

of $0.01 at the time of filing. Therefore, the Court assesses no initial partial filing fee 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by 

which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of 

a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds 

available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and directs the 

Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or 

his designee, to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

A. Standard of Review

If a prisoner’s complaint “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 

employee of a governmental entity,” the Court “shall review” the pleading “as soon as 

practicable after docketing,” and “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, 

if [it] . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2014). As noted below, Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional right to be 

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 9
4

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

free from “cruel and unusual punishment,” see Compl. at 3, but he seeks redress from 

private citizens, attorneys and his former employer, none of whom are alleged to be 

governmental actors. Id. at 2. Therefore, § 1915A(a)’s screening provisions do not apply. 

See Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Section 1915A mandates 

early review ... for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks relief from a governmental 

entity...”) (quoting § 1915A(a)); see also Thompson v. Hicks, 213 Fed. Appx. 939, 2007 

WL 106785 at *3 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that because a private defendant was not a 

“governmental entity” as described in § 1915A, prisoner’s complaint as to that defendant 

was not subject to dismissal under § 1915A).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, however, his Complaint is still subject to a 

sua sponte review, and mandatory dismissal, if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant 

immune from such relief,” regardless of whether he seeks redress from a “governmental 

entity.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 

(2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or 

appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 

complaint that fails to state a claim.”).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 9
5

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls 

short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims to have been injured with a “life-time permanent injury” when he 

was working as an electrician for “Scotty Electric” in 2002. Compl. at 3. Plaintiff 

brought a worker’s compensation civil lawsuit against his former employer claiming, in 

part, “debilitating mental & physical injuries” which have “placed him in a wheelchair 

for the remainder of his life.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that the litigation remained pending 

for more than ten (10) years during which time he was “mentally & physically 

incompetent” and unable to understand any of the settlement negotiations. (Id.) As a 

result, Plaintiff claims his attorneys, the attorneys representing his former employer, and 

the attorneys representing the State Compensation Insurance Fund all took advantage of 

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 9
6

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

him. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that they “coerced” him into taking a settlement 

that fell far below the amount needed to take care of his medical needs for the remainder

of his life. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $2,000,000 and 

punitive damages in the amount of $500,000 from each Defendant. (Id. at 7.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and 

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 

789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

While Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free 

from “cruel and unusual punishment,” Defendants Bluman, Childers, Scott Electric Co., 

and Burgess are not alleged to be “person[s] acting under color of state law.” See West; 

487 U.S. at 48; Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir.

1999) (The party charged with a constitutional deprivation under § 1983 must be a person 

who may fairly be said to be a governmental actor) (citation and quotations omitted). 

The Constitution protects individual rights only from government action and not 

from private action; it is only when the government is responsible for the specific conduct 

of which the plaintiff complains that individual constitutional rights are implicated. 

Single Moms, Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 746-47 (9th Cir. 2003). Generally, 

private parties do not act under color of state law. See Price v. Hawai’i, 939 F.2d 702, 

707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). Section “1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no 

matter how discriminatory or wrong.” Sutton, 193 F.3d at 835 (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. 

Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 

see also Ouzts v. Md. Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir.1974) (a purely private 

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 9
7

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

actor may be liable for his misconduct in state court, but his conduct is not actionable 

under Section 1983, regardless of how egregious).

In order for private conduct to constitute governmental action, “something more” 

must be alleged. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (“Action 

by a private party pursuant to [§ 1983], without something more, [i]s not sufficient to 

justify a characterization of that party as a ‘state actor.’”). Courts have used four different 

factors or tests to identify what constitutes “something more”: (1) public function, (2) 

joint action, (3) governmental compulsion or coercion, and (4) governmental nexus. See 

id.; Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1997); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. 

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995); Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. 

Improvement and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that any of the 

private parties or organizations he has named as Defendants performed any public 

function traditionally reserved to the state, acted as willful participants in joint action 

with government agents, was compelled or coerced, or had any connection whatsoever 

with the state, when they allegedly deprived Plaintiff of a larger monetary settlement. See 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.

For all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1130. 

D. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his pleading to state a claim unless 

it is absolutely clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect”). 

Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix the pleading deficiencies 

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 9
8

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

discussed in this Order, if he can. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to file an Amended Complaint 

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned, 

however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by 

itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim not realleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 9
9

3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2017

HON. LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:16-cv-02976-LAB-JLB Document 3 Filed 02/28/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 9