Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00820/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00820-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EMIL LAWRENCE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00820-MEJ 

DISCOVERY ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 71

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Emil Lawrence (“Plaintiff”) initially represented himself when he filed this 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 case in San Francisco Superior Court related to his arrest and transport to a police 

station on January 2, 2012. After the case was removed to this Court in 2014 and discovery closed 

in February 2015, the Court appointed volunteer attorneys Fred Fields, David Anderson, and 

Martin White of Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass LLP as counsel for Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 55. With 

the aid of counsel, Plaintiff now seeks to reopen discovery to: (1) depose three officers—Christa 

Peters, Joshua Enea, and Daniel Bonnel—allegedly responsible for his arrest and transport to the 

police station; and (2) compel Defendant City and County of San Francisco (the “City”) to 

produce (a) all records from the City’s Office of Citizen Complaints (“OCC”) and Internal Affairs 

Division (“IAD”) related to complaints against these officers for excessive force or dishonesty, 

and (b) all documents in these officers’ personnel files regarding their mental and physical 

condition for duty. Jt. Ltr., Dkt. No. 71. Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal 

authority, and the record in this case, the Court issues the following order.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in this matter in San Francisco Superior Court on 

November 8, 2012, alleging “intentional multiple torts” against San Francisco police officers 

related to his arrest in January 2012. Not. of Rem., Ex. A, Dkt. No. 1-1. On July 22, 2013, he 

filed a First Amended Complaint which included a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and on that 

basis the City removed the case to this Court on February 24, 2014. Id. The following factual 

allegations are taken from Mr. Lawrence’s First Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff alleges that, in December 2011, while having lunch at a Panda Express restaurant, 

he noticed “a black notebook, possibly with a calculator or unknown brand of reader like Kindle, 

or a Droid, PC, Apple, or some other kind of electronic device, across from me at the table.” Id. at 

17. Plaintiff picked up the device and left the restaurant. Id. On January 2, 2012, Plaintiff

returned to the Panda Express for lunch, at which point two San Francisco police officers 

approached him and asked, “Did you take a computer from this store?” Id. at 18. At the same 

time, a woman yelled from the sidewalk, “That is the thief, that is him, get him, my computer, he 

is on the video stealing it.” Id. The officers handcuffed Plaintiff, pushed him into a police 

vehicle, and forced him to sit on his previously-broken wrists. Id. The officers transported 

Plaintiff to the Northern Police Station on Fillmore Street and dragged him out of the vehicle, 

dropping him on his back while still handcuffed. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was shackled for two 

hours at the police station, with the handcuffs causing his hands to go while. Id. Plaintiff was 

released after signing two citations. Id. at 19. As a result of his arrest, Plaintiff alleges multiple 

claims, including violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false imprisonment, false arrest, negligence, and 

various California statutory claims.

On May 22, 2014, the Court issued a Case Management Order, establishing a discovery 

cut-off of February 10, 2015. Dkt. No. 19. As noted above, before July 31, 2015, Plaintiff 

represented himself pro se. During that time, he propounded requests for production that sought, 

among other things, his arresting and transporting officers’ discipline and fitness for duty records. 

After the City objected to these records requests, Plaintiff filed several motions outlining their 

discovery disputes. Dkt. Nos. 23, 33, 39, 41, & 42. The Court denied his motions without 

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prejudice, directing the parties to meet and confer and submit joint letters per the Court’s 

Discovery Standing Order. Dkt. Nos. 24, 32, 40, & 44. Plaintiff was deposed, but he never 

noticed or took the officers’ depositions. Jt. Ltr. at 1. 

On October 20, 2015, after appointment of his present counsel, Plaintiff moved to reopen 

discovery to: “(1) seek unredacted versions of documents Defendant already produced, arguing 

they were not properly redacted in the first place; (2) seek documents he contends Defendant 

improperly withheld from production; and (3) allow him to take the deposition of three witnesses: 

officers Bonnel, Peters, and Enea.” Order re: Discovery Deadline, Dkt. No. 67 (citing Pl.’s Mot. 

to Change Time, Dkt. No. 66). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice and ordered 

as follows: “Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds good cause may exist to reopen 

discovery, as it will benefit both the parties’ settlement negotiations and, if negotiations are 

unsuccessful, resolution of this case on the merits.” Id. The Court ordered the parties to meet and 

confer in person to explore reopening discovery on mutually beneficial grounds. Id.

Since October 20, 2015, the parties’ counsel have since met and conferred—through three 

in-person meetings, over a dozen telephone conferences, and dozens of exchanged e-mails—

resolving some discovery issues raised in the Motion, but not others. Jt. Ltr. at 1. Plaintiff now

seeks (1) depositions of Officers Peters, Enea, and Bonnel, and (2) production of (a) all OCC and 

IAD documents related to complaints against these officers for excessive force or dishonesty, and 

(b) all documents in these officers’ personnel files regarding their mental and physical condition 

for duty. Id. On May 6, 2016, the City produced what its counsel has represented comprises all 

known complaints alleging excessive force investigated by OCC and/or IAD against the officers in 

the five years prior to the alleged incident. Id. However, the City continues to object and refuses 

to produce many requested documents as well as to produce the officers for deposition. Id. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 requires the trial court to enter pretrial scheduling 

orders which set dates for the completion of discovery, hearings on non-dispositive and dispositive 

motions, trial, and other matters. Rule 16(b)(4) provides the “scheduling order may be modified 

only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). When a party seeks 

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to continue the dates set by the court, it must first show ‘good cause’ for modification of the order 

under Rule 16(b). Zivkovic v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).

The good cause inquiry primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking amendment. 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). A party demonstrates 

good cause by establishing that, even with the exercise of due diligence, he or she was unable to 

meet the scheduling deadlines. Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1087; Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. Where the 

moving party has not been diligent, the inquiry ends and the motion should be denied. Zivkovic, 

302 F.3d at 1087; Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the 

party opposing modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the 

inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.”).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues his efforts satisfy Rule 16’s good cause standard because “his unsuccessful 

attempts as a pro se litigant to navigate the local rules and this Court’s Standing Order on 

Discovery do not take away from his good faith, diligent efforts to complete discovery before the 

deadline.” Jt. Ltr. at 2. He notes the Court appointed counsel after the discovery cutoff, and 

“counsel quickly moved the court to reopen merits discovery for a pro se litigant after assessing 

the discovery already taken in the case; and, if the City faces any prejudice, it is limited and 

substantially outweighed by Lawrence’s need to take sufficient discovery to adequately prepare 

for trial (and to participate in settlement efforts).” Id. He further argues the information he seeks 

is relevant because the deposition testimony of the arresting officers (Peters and Enea) and the 

transporting officer (Bonnel) bears upon his § 1983 claims involving those very officers. Id. 

Finally, he contends records related to any OCC complaints or IAD investigations against these 

three officers for excessive force or dishonesty, and documents in these officers’ personnel files 

regarding their mental and physical condition for duty are relevant for the same reason. Id. at 3. 

The City argues good cause does not exist to reopen discovery because Plaintiff had the 

opportunity to take discovery during the nine months discovery was open, and he exercised his 

right to take discovery by propounding 49 requests for production of documents and seven 

interrogatories. Id. at 4. The City maintains it “has expended considerable resources in 

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responding to Plaintiff’s discovery, for example by producing over 300 pages of documents[,]” but 

he “never attempted to take a single deposition prior to the close of discovery. Over the course of 

two settlement conferences and several lengthy meet and confer sessions, Plaintiff never expressed 

a desire to take any of the officers’ depositions.” Id. The City further argues it has produced all 

relevant discovery that are not privileged. Id. Specifically, based on Plaintiff’s allegation of 

excessive force, the City produced all complaints alleging excessive force investigated by OCC

and/or IAD against the subject officers in the five years prior to the alleged incident. Id. at 5. It 

maintains Plaintiff’s new request for “every complaint ever filed against the individual officers 

during the entirety of their careers” is unreasonable because he fails to make a showing of how 

such information is relevant, “and because such a position is on its face designed to harass and 

burden the City with unnecessary discovery.” Id. The City contends the officers have a protected 

interest in the information contained in these files, and the City has an interest in maintaining the 

confidentiality of this information, because the files contain highly sensitive, personal information,

including financial information. Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s requests for evaluations of the 

officers’ mental and physical condition for duty, the City argues Plaintiff has shown no 

compelling reason to violate the protection to which medical and mental health records are 

entitled. Id. 

Having reviewed the parties’ positions, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s request to 

reopen discovery is supported by the requisite showing of good cause. There is no indication that 

Plaintiff—who until recently has been acting pro se—has been dilatory in conducting discovery. 

To the contrary, the record shows he has made numerous attempts, albeit largely unsuccessfully, 

to obtain discovery from the City prior to the appointment of counsel. See Dkt. Nos. 23, 33, 39, 

41, & 42. In many circumstances, a pro se litigant’s good faith unsuccessful efforts to obtain 

discovery meet the standard of “good cause.” See, e.g., Henderson v. Peterson, 2011 WL 441206, 

at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011) (finding good cause after counsel’s appointment where “Plaintiff’s 

pro se status” demonstrated “that he was unable to gain access to evidence and information that he 

might otherwise have obtained had he been represented by counsel”); Woodard v. City of Menlo 

Park, 2012 WL 2119278, at * (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) (reopening discovery after appointment 

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of pro bono counsel). The Court also finds that modifying the deadlines in this case will not cause 

the City to suffer undue prejudice or impact the orderly and efficient resolution of this case 

because the Court vacated all pending deadlines at the time it appointed counsel. Dkt. No. 56. As 

such, reopening discovery for the limited purpose requested by Plaintiff will not delay the trial. 

Further, while the Court recognizes the City will incur increased litigation costs as a result of 

granting Plaintiff’s request, “any prejudice suffered by Defendant in this regard is substantially 

outweighed by Plaintiffs need to engage in discovery to adequately prepare for trial.” Woodard, 

2012 WL 2119278, at *2. 

However, the Court must also consider whether the requested discovery is relevant. As to 

Plaintiff’s request to take the three officers’ depositions, such discovery is clearly relevant as they 

are his arresting and transport officers. As to their disciplinary records, courts regularly grant

plaintiffs in excessive force cases leave to obtain the defendant officers’ disciplinary files. See,

e.g., Nehad v. Browder, 2016 WL 2745411, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2016); Henderson, 2011 WL 

441206, at *2; Zackery v. Stockton Police Dep’t, 2007 WL 1655634, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 

2007) (noting that in excessive force cases, the officers’ “personnel file information has been 

found to be quite relevant because they may reveal the defendant officers’ credibility, motive and 

patterns of behavior.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 615 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Records 

of complaints against defendant officers relating to their use of excessive force has been found to 

be relevant to a plaintiff’s civil rights claim.”). Further, Plaintiff has narrowed the scope of his 

request to complaints against these officers for excessive force or dishonesty, which is tailored to 

the claims in this case. Cf. Nehad, 2016 WL 2745411, at *2 (finding plaintiffs’ request for “any 

complaints” made against the defendant officer overbroad in scope and requiring plaintiffs to 

narrow their request “to any complaints made against [the officer] that are similar to the complaint 

made in this case”). Although the City argues it should not have to produce complaints against the 

officers “during the entirety of their careers,” see Jt. Ltr. at 5, it does not articulate why 

information about the officers’ earlier years on the force would not provide insight into their

background, and it does not adequately justify why a limitation would be warranted. Accordingly, 

this objection is overruled. See Nehad, 2016 WL 2745411, at *2 (“Even though Browder is a 

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twenty-eight year veteran of the force and thus his personnel records may be extensive, 

Defendants do not articulate why information about his earlier years on the force would not 

provide insight into his background.”). 

Finally, regarding Plaintiff’s request for the officers’ medical records, the Court finds this 

request overbroad in scope. As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not articulate why these officers’ 

medical records are relevant to his claims, other than a generalized statement that they are relevant 

to his excessive force claim. Jt. Ltr. at 2. Although courts do permit discovery of such records, 

their specific relevance must first be established. See Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219 F.R.D. 164, 

166-67 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (ordering an officer’s medical records produced in a civil rights case

where the records were directly relevant because the plaintiff claimed the officer shot him because 

his poor physical condition prevented him from chasing the plaintiff on foot); Nehad, 2016 WL 

2745411, at *2 (finding plaintiffs’ generalized request for medical records overbroad because they 

did not contend the officer had any psychological or medical issues that contributed to his 

behavior, but permitting discovery of the records narrowed to one year preceding the incident 

based on plaintiff’s allegation that the officer was not tested for drugs or alcohol the night of the 

shooting or thereafter). Thus, balancing Plaintiff’s stated interests in the officers’ medical and 

psychological records against the officers’ right to privacy in such information, the Court 

concludes these requests must be narrowed in scope. Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 618 (concluding that 

“only those mental or psychological records which concern the incident at issue, prior episodes of 

violence, or the officers’ propensity for violence of the type alleged in the complaint are 

relevant.”). Discovery is therefore appropriate only as to the incident at issue and prior episodes 

of violence, or the officers’ propensity for violence of the type alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint. Id.

The City also argues the officers’ medical records are subject to protection under the 

official information privilege. Jt. Ltr. at 4. Federal law regarding privilege applies to federal 

question cases. Fed. R. Evid. 501; Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official information. Kerr v. 

U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 426 U.S. 394 (1976). 

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Official information protected by this qualified privilege includes government personnel files.

Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1990). The official information 

privilege is subject to the competing interests of the requesting party and is “subject to disclosure 

especially where protective measures are taken.” Kerr, 511 F.2d at 198. Courts embrace “a 

balancing approach that is moderately pre-weighted in favor of disclosure.” Kelly v. San Jose, 

114 F.R.D. 653, 661 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (emphasis in original) (ordering disclosure of law 

enforcement documents subject to a protective order to a plaintiff in a § 1983 action). 

The party asserting the official information privilege must invoke it by name and make a 

substantial threshold showing of privilege. Id. at 669. To make such a showing, a “party must 

submit, at the time it files and serves its response to the discovery request, a declaration or 

affidavit, under oath or subject to the penalty of perjury, from the head of the department which 

has control over the matter.” Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 300 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (citing 

Kerr, 511 F.2d at 198). The affidavit must include:

(1) an affirmation that the agency generated or collected the material 

in issue and has in fact maintained its confidentiality,

(2) a statement that the official has personally reviewed the material 

in question,

(3) a specific identification of the governmental or privacy interests 

that would be threatened by disclosure of the material to plaintiff 

and/or his lawyer,

(4) a description of how disclosure subject to a carefully crafted 

protective order would create a substantial risk of harm to 

significant governmental or privacy interests,

(5) and a projection of how much harm would be done to the 

threatened interests if the disclosure were made.

Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 670. A “general assertion” that a law enforcement organization’s internal 

investigatory system “‘would be harmed by disclosure of the documents is insufficient’ to meet 

the threshold test for invoking the official information privilege.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 614 

(quoting Chism v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 159 F.R.D. 531, 534-35 (C.D. Cal. 1994)). A “general 

claim of harm to the ‘public interest’ is also insufficient to overcome the burden placed on the 

party seeking to shield material from disclosure.” Id. (citing Miller, 141 F.R.D. at 300-01; Kelly, 

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114 F.R.D. at 672). The party resisting discovery “must specifically describe how disclosure of 

the requested documents in that particular case . . . would be harmful.” Id. (emphasis in original) 

(citing Miller, 141 F.R.D. at 300-01).

Here, the City states it “fulfilled the ‘substantial threshold showing’ requirement in this 

case by submitting a declaration by Lt. Christopher Woon.” Jt. Ltr. at 5. However, the parties did 

not submit the declaration with their joint letter, and it is therefore not clear what governmental or 

privacy interests Lt. Woon stated would be threatened by disclosure of the material to Plaintiff. 

Regardless, having engaged in the requisite balancing approach to determine what level of 

protection should be afforded, the Court finds the City asserts only general assertions of harm, yet 

fails to demonstrate why disclosing the information sought under a carefully crafted protective 

order to protect the confidentiality of the information would harm a significant governmental 

interest. The Court recognizes the officers’ privacy concerns in the information maintained in 

these files, and those privacy rights are not inconsequential. However, on balance, such interests 

do not outweigh Plaintiff’s need to discover important information about his claims. Moreover, 

the City’s arguments regarding privacy can be addressed by an appropriate protective order, and 

by redacting the officers’ sensitive personal and financial information to protect against potential 

threats to safety. Nehad, 2016 WL 2745411, at *4. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, and subject to an appropriate protective order, the Court hereby GRANTS 

Plaintiff’s request to reopen discovery for the limited purposes stated herein. The Court further 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to compel discovery as follows:

1) Plaintiff may take the depositions of Officers Peters, Enea, and Bonnel;

2) The City shall produce all OCC and/or IAD documents related to complaints against 

these officers for excessive force or dishonesty; and 

3) The City shall produce all documents in these officers’ personnel files regarding their 

mental and physical condition for duty, but only as to (a) the incident at issue and prior 

episodes of violence, or (b) the officers’ propensity for violence of the type alleged in 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. The City shall redact the officers’ sensitive 

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personal and financial information, and the parties shall meet and confer to determine 

whether any changes need to be made to the protective order already in place (Dkt No. 

62).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 14, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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