Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00793/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00793-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR GARZA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

DARREL ADAMS, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:07-cv-00793-AWI-TAG HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

(Doc. 1) 

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

May 30, 2007. (Doc. 1). 

On January 9, 2008, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the petition should not be

dismissed for violation of the one-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 8). On February 1, 2008,

Petitioner filed his response, providing new and, in some cases, additional information regarding his

entitlement to both statutory and equitable tolling. After consider Petitioner’s response, the Court

finds that the petition is untimely and recommends that it be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

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not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.

2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-1042. The Court has

afforded Petitioner such an opportunity by permitting him to respond to the Order to Show Cause

with information that would rebut the Court’s preliminary conclusion that the petition was untimely.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled on other grounds

by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320. The instant petition was filed on May 30, 2007, and thus, it is

subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

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The Court has accessed the California court system’s electronic database in order to confirm or adjust the dates 1

Petitioner has listed in his response to the Order to Show Cause. The Court may take notice of facts that are capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b);

United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank.

Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd,

645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown

Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 1980). As such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the

court system’s records for filings in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, are subject to judicial notice.

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

Court on March 29, 2000. (Doc. 9, p. 4). Thus, direct review would conclude on June 28, 2000, 1

when the ninety day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot

v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year

from that date, or until June 28, 2001, absent applicable tolling, within which to file his federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As mentioned the petition in this case was filed on May 30, 2007, almost six years after the

one-year period expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to sufficient statutory or equitable tolling

to account for that entire period, the petition is untimely and must be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 2

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2. Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus relief is

non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal

denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may instead

file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); see also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 2

557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned

that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the

next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent

the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. However, the limitations period is

not tolled for the time such an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001).

Here, Petitioner alleges that, following conclusion of direct review of his conviction, he filed

his first state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on March 30, 2001, before the

expiration of the one-year period. At that point, 274 days of the one-year period had expired; i.e.,

Petitioner had 91 days remaining on his one-year limitation period. When the California Supreme

Court denied the petition on June 27, 2001, the period re-commenced and expired 91 days later on

September 27, 2001. 

Petitioner contends that he did not file his next state habeas petition until he filed a petition in

the Fresno County Superior Court on June 5, 2003, almost two years after the first petition was

denied by the California Supreme Court and over twenty months after the one-year period had

expired. 

A petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to

filing a state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000); see Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8th

Cir. 1999)(petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the

one-year limitations period). Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for any of the

petitions filed after September 27, 2001, when the one-year period expired. Hence, the petition is

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untimely and, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, it must be dismissed. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1997)). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be

appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In his response to the Order to Show Cause, Petitioner makes several implicit claims for

equitable tolling. Petitioner contends that he did not understand the legal procedures involved in

filing the instant petition, that he was frequently transferred from prison to prison, that these prisons

were subject to frequent lockdowns, and that he had only limited access to the prison law libraries. 

(Doc. 9, p. 2). 

Petitioner’s claim of ignorance of the law is insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See e.g.,

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner’s

illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but insufficient to establish cause); Fisher v.

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 1999); Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991). Moreover,

unpredictable lockdowns or library closures do not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting

equitable tolling in this case. For these reasons, this Court finds that the lockdowns and limited

library access do not warrant equitable tolling in this case. See United States v. Van Poyck, 980

F.Supp. 1108, 1111 (C.D.Cal.1997) (inability to secure copies of transcripts from court reporters and

lockdowns at prison lasting several days and allegedly eliminating access to law library were not

extraordinary circumstances and did not equitably toll one-year statute of limitations); Atkins v.

Harris, 1999 WL 13719, *2 (N.D.Cal. January 7, 1999) (“lockdowns, restricted library access and

transfers do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to equitably toll the [AEDPA]

statute of limitations. Prisoners familiar with the routine restrictions of prison life must take such

matters into account when calculating when to file a federal [habeas] petition.... Petitioner’s alleged

lack of legal sophistication also does not excuse the delay.”); Giraldes v. Ramirez-Palmer, 1998 WL

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775085, *2 (N. D.Cal. November 3, 1998) (holding that prison lockdowns do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling). 

Petitioner’s indigent status and limited legal knowledge is no different than the majority of

incarcerated prisoners attempting to file petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Such circumstances are

not extraordinary and do not justify equitable tolling. If limited resources and legal knowledge were

an excuse for not complying with the limitations period, the enactment of the AEDPA would have

been futile since most incarcerated prisoners have these same problems. Thus, the limitations period

will not be equitably tolled on those grounds. 

A petitioner who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse his lack

of diligence. See, Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723

(1984); see also, Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107. Thus, the Court must consider Petitioner’s diligence in

pursuing his claims. Here, as mentioned, Petitioner had a “gap” of almost two years between the

denial of his first state habeas petition and the filing of his second. While the Court is cognizant of 

the difficulties faced by a pro se inmate attempting to act as his own counsel while in prison, the

difficulties necessarily entailed therein are similar for all inmates and are not peculiar to Petitioner. 

Thus, they do not qualify to equitably toll the statute.

Finally, Petitioner’s claim of mental illness alone is insufficient to equitably toll the

limitations period. Although some courts have recognized mental illness as a basis for equitable

tolling of a federal statute of limitations, they have done so only where the mental “illness in fact

prevent[ed] the sufferer from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and

acting upon them.” Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir.1996); see also, Nunnally v.

MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Page, 1999 WL 1044829, at *1-2

(N.D.Ill. November 16, 1999); Decrosta v. Runyon, 1993 WL 117583, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. April 14,

1993); Speiser v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Services, 670 F.Supp. 380, 384

(D.D.C.1986); cf. Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 n. 2 (3d Cir.1970) (“Insanity does

not prevent a federal statute of limitations from running.”); Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 184 (2nd

Cir. 2000) (“The question of whether a person is sufficiently mentally disabled to justify tolling of a

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limitation period is ... highly case-specific.”). Even assuming the correctness of such an approach,

Petitioner has not made the requisite showing. 

Petitioner has alleged that he was “deeply under the control of strong medication that was

effecting [him] mentally and physically” at the time of his guilty plea for possession of cocaine. 

(Doc. 9, p. 9). Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner’s claim is true, it is merely probative of

Petitioner’s mental condition at the time of the entry of his plea in May1998; it does not establish

that, subsequent to the conclusion of his direct appeal in 2000, his mental condition or dependence

on drugs prevented him from timely filing his federal petition. Miller, 77 F.3d at 191. Indeed,

Petitioner has made no allegation, and has presented no evidence, regarding a mental disability

during the running of the one-year limitation period that would have prevented him from timely

filing his petition. Thus, equitable tolling of the statute of limitation is not warranted on this basis

either. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the habeas corpus petition (Doc. 1),

be DISMISSED for Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation

period.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C).

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to appeal the District Judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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