Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01057/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01057-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN WAINE-GOLSTON and ANDRE

CORBIN, individually and on behalf of other

members of the general public similarly

situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv1057-GPB(RBB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION AS TO

CALIFORNIA BASED

EMPLOYEES ONLY

[Dkt. No. 51.]

vs.

TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENTADVANCE/NEW HOUSE PARTNERSHIP,

a New York general partnership and DOES 1

through 10, inclusive,,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Kevin Waine-Golston and Andre Corbin’s motion for class

certification as to California based employees only. Defendant Time Warner EntertainmentAdvance/New House Partnership (“Time Warner”) filed an opposition. Plaintiffs filed a reply. The

motion is submitted on the papers without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After

a review of the briefs, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’

motion for class certification as to California based employees only. 

Procedural Background

This action was originally filed in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego

on April 1, 2009. On May 13, 2011, the case was removed to this Court pursuant to the Class Action

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Fairness Act of 2005. (Dkt. No. 1.) On June 10, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. (Dkt.

No. 6.) The first amended complaint alleges a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for

violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”); a class action for violation of the California

Labor Code; a class action for violation of California Business & Professions Code section 17200 et

seq.; and penalties pursuant to California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”). (Dkt.

No. 6, FAC ¶¶ 11-14.) 

On May 21, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class of California employees only. (Dkt.

No. 51.) On June 18, 2012, Defendant filed an opposition. (Dkt. No. 56.) On June 25, 2012,

Plaintiffs filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 59.) On May 18, 2012, three days prior to filing their motion for

class certification, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Dkt. No.

50.) On October, 9, 2012, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the first amended

complaint. (Dkt. No. 83.) Specifically, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to add new legal

theories and factual allegations regarding Defendant’s time rounding policy; Defendant’s failure to

include a “birthday bonus” and discounted television cable service in the regular rate of pay; and

Defendant’s failure to provide a second meal period after ten hours of work. (Id.) On October 12,

2012, the case was transferred to the undersigned judge. (Dkt. No. 84.) 

Background

Plaintiff Kevin Waine-Golston was employed at Time Warner from October 29, 2010 until

April 2012 as a technical support agent (“TSA”). (Dkt. No. 6, FAC ¶ 33; Dkt. No. 51-5, WaineGolston Decl. ¶ 3.) He states that he was subject to Time Warner’s standard and uniform policies and

practices as laid out in its employee handbook. (Dkt. No. 51-5, Waine-Golston Decl. ¶ 6.) He clocked

in and was paid through the Kronos timekeeping system. (Id.) 

Plaintiff Andre Corbin was employed at Time Warner from July 20, 2007 until June 15, 2012

as a technical support agent. (Dkt. No. 6, FAC ¶ 38; Dkt. No. 51-4, Corbin Decl. ¶ 3.) He states that

he was subject to Time Warner’s standard and uniform policies and practices as laid out in its

employee handbook. (Dkt. No. 51-4, Corbin Decl. ¶ 6.) He clocked in and was paid through the

Kronos timekeeping system. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to provide overtime compensation in violation of Labor

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Code section 510(a); failed to provide all wages due and owing in violation of Labor Code section

204(a); failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Labor Code section 226(a);

failed to maintain accurate time records in violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section

11110 et seq; and failed to comply with Labor Code section 203(a) with respect to Plaintiffs who were

discharged or who quit. The factual basis for these legal theories is that Plaintiffs and all other

nonexempt employees were required to arrive approximately fifteen minutes prior to the beginning

of their shifts so that they can log into their computers and have all necessary software programs

running prior to the start of their shifts. (Dkt. No. 6, FAC ¶ 75.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendant

does not pay its employees from the time they log into their computers until the time they log out of

their computers. (Id. ¶ 76.) Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant does not pay its employees

the time spent logging into the computers at the beginning of the day until the time they activate

Avaya/Kronos, Defendant’s time-keeping software, and the time spent deactivating Avaya/Kronos

until the time they log out of their computers. (Id. ¶ 76.) 

Discussion

Plaintiffs seek to certify: “[a]ll current and former nonexempt employees of TIME WARNER,

Inc. who were designated by TIME WARNER, Inc. as nonexempt, and worked at any time in the 1

State of California from April 7, 2007 through the date of trial.” 

Plaintiffs, also alternatively, seek certification of five separate sub-classes: 1) the

“compensation [rounding] policy” issue; 2) the “computer log-in and out” issue; 3) the “overtime rate

of pay” issue as to the “birthday bonus” and free/discounted television cable service; 4) the lack of a

“second meal period policy” issue; and 5) the “failure to pay wages to ex-employees” issue. 

Defendant objects to the certification of claims regarding rounding, regular rate of pay and

second meal period because they are not alleged in the operative first amended complaint. Plaintiffs

contend that their complaint alleges a failure to pay all wages due which would encompass these

claims. At the time when Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was fully briefed on June 25, 2012,

It appears that Plaintiffs have misnamed the Defendant in its class designation. Defendant is 1

Time-Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership, not Time Warner,Inc. asTime-Warner

Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership was substituted as the proper party on June 15, 2011. 

(Dkt. No. 7.) 

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the parties did not have the benefit of Judge Moskowitz’ order denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

amend the first amended complaint filed on October 9, 2012. In that order, Judge Moskowitz denied

Plaintiff’s motion to add allegations concerning the time rounding policy, failure to include a “birthday

bonus” and discounted television cable service in the regular rate of pay and Defendant’s failure to

provide a second meal period after ten hours of work. (Dkt. No. 83.) In coming to its conclusion, the

Court noted that the parties entered into a stipulation where “Plaintiffs contend that their First

Amended Complaint does not challenge Defendant’s practice of rounding time.” (Id. at 4 citing Dkt.

No. 43.)

Plaintiffs may not certify a class based on claims not asserted in the complaint. See Anderson

v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 554 F.3d 525, 528-29 (5th Cir. 2008) (trial court abused

discretion certifying class based on claims not alleged in complaint); Trinidad v. Victaulic Co. of Am.,

No. 85-1962, 1986 WL 276 *3 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 15, 1986) (denying certification of subclass based

on claims not alleged in complaint). 

Although the papers discuss all the issues Plaintiffs seek to certify, the Court only addresses

certification as it concerns the computer log-in and out policy and the failure to pay wages to exemployees as both are alleged in the first amended complaint. 

A. Legal Standard for Class Certification

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”) governs the certification of a class. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23. A plaintiff seeking class certification must affirmatively show the class meets the

requirements of Rule 23. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). To obtain

certification, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the class meets all four requirements of Rule

23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Ellis v.CostcoWholesale Corp., 657 F.3d

970 979-80 (9th Cir. 2011). If these prerequisites are met, the court must then decide whetherthe class

action is maintainable under Rule 23(b). The Court exercises discretion in granting or denying a

motion for class certification. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The party seeking to certify a class must demonstrate that it has met all four requirements of

Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst.,

Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2011). The moving partymust provide allegations and supporting

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facts to satisfy these requirements. Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th

Cir. 1977). 

The Court is required to perform a “rigorous analysis,” which may require it “to probe behind

the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. “‘[T]he

merits of the class members’ substantive claims are often highly relevant when determining whether

to certify a class. More importantly, it is not correct to say a district court may consider the merits to

the extent that they overlap with class certification issues; rather, a district court must consider the

merits if they overlap with Rule 23(a) requirements.” Ellis, 657 F.3d.at 981. Nonetheless, the district

court does not conduct a mini-trial to determine if the class “could actually prevail on the merits of

their claims.” Id. at 983 n.8; United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. &

Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citation omitted) (court may inquire into substance of case to apply the Rule 23 factors, however,

“[t]he court may not go so far . . . as to judge the validity of these claims.”). “[I]n determining whether

to certify the class, the district court is bound to take the substantive allegations of the complaint as

true” but “also is required to consider the nature and range of proof necessary to establish those

allegations.” In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d

1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1975)). 

1. Rule 23(a)(1) - Numerosity

To establish numerosity, a plaintiff must show that the represented class is “so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., 204

F.R.D. 440, 444 (N.D. Cal. 2001). However, “impracticable” does not mean impossible; it refers only

to the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine

Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1964). “Because no exact numerical cut-off exists, the

specific facts of each case must be examined to determine if impracticability exists.” Haley v.

Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,

330 (1980)). “As a general rule, classes of 20 are too small, classes of 20–40 may or may not be big

enough depending on the circumstances of each case, and classes of 40 or more are numerous enough.” 

Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258, 262 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (citation omitted). 

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Plaintiffs assert that there are about 2,000 members of the putative class in Count II and 1,800

ascertaining members in Count III. (Dkt. No. 6, FAC ¶¶ 22, 23.) Time Warner does not challenge the

numerosity requirement. Therefore, the Court concludes that it has been met. 

2. Rule 23(a)(2) - Commonality

Plaintiffs argue that the common legal questions arewhetherTime Warner’s failure to consider

its computer records when calculating its employees “time worked” violated California Labor sections

204(a), 510(a) and/or 1194; and whether Time Warner’s failure to provide “back wages” to exemployees violate California Labor Code section 203. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not

established commonalityas therewas no requirement or practice that employeesloaded programs prior

to clocking in. 

Under the Rule, Plaintiffs must show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the

class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class

members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. “That common contention .

. . must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination

of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one

stroke.” Id. “‘What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’ . . . but,

rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution

of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the

generation of common answers.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 

California Labor Code section 510(a) provides:

(a) Eight hours of labor constitutes a day’s work. Any work in excess of eight hours

in one workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek and the first

eight hours worked on the seventh day of work in any one workweek shall be

compensated at the rate of no less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay

for an employee.

Cal. Labor Code § 510(a)

California Labor Code section 204(a) provides:

(a) All wages, other than those mentioned in Section 201, 201.3, 202, 204.1, or 204.2,

earned by any person in any employment are due and payable twice during each

calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular paydays.

Labor performed between the 1st and 15th days, inclusive, of any calendar month shall

be paid for between the 16th and the 26th day of the month during which the labor was

performed, and labor performed between the 16th and the last day, inclusive, of any

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calendar month, shall be paid for between the 1st and 10th day of the following month.

Cal. Labor Code § 204(a). 

California Labor Code section 1194 states:

(a) Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving

less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the

employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount

of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon,

reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Cal. Labor Code § 1194(a).

California Labor Code section 203 provides:

(a) If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance

with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is

discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from

the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is

commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.

Cal. Labor Code § 203.

According to Time Warner’s Employee Handbook, “time worked” is defined as the time

recorded on the Kronos system. (Dkt. No. 51-7, Ps’ Notice of Lodgment (“NOL”), Ex. B, Chandler

Depo. at 33:5-34:5.) The Kronos timekeeping system tracks hours worked by its hourly, non-exempt

employees. (Dkt. No. 56-5, Testa Decl. ¶ 3.) The Kronos records are titled “Time Detail Reports.” 

(Dkt. No. 51-7, Ps’ Notice of Lodgment (“NOL”), Ex. B, Chandler Depo. at 33:5-34:5.) As to the

Avaya system, the “employee uses the Avaya system, which records the time in Kronos.” (Id. at

34:21-22.) Time Warner requires that employees must record actual times in and out at the beginning

of the workday, when leaving and returning from lunch, and at the end of the workday. (Id. at 41:19-

22.) 

As to the computer log-in and out issue, Plaintiffs present the following two facts. WaineGolston states that he corresponded with his supervisor Kevin Nester where Nester instructed him to

load his “ACR” program before clocking in. (Dkt. No. 51-5, Waine-Golston Decl. ¶ 8.; see also Dkt 2

No. 51-7, Ps’ NOL, Ex. O.) Another document, dated August 4, 2011, reveals that Waine-Golston

Plaintiffs do not explain what the ACR program is but the Court assumes it is a software

2

program used by the TSAs to perform their duties. 

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accessed the “Unified System” at 6:45 p.m.; however, he did not log back into the Kronos/Avaya

3

system until 6:48 p.m. causing a loss of 3 minutes of compensation. (Dkt. No. 51-6, Ps’ NOL, Ex. P.) 

Plaintiff does not provide any documents to show that Corbin or any other putative class members

clocked in after they loaded their programs. 

In opposition, Defendant contends there is no commonalitybecause the putative classmembers

have different job duties, routines and methods of recording their time. Plaintiffs’ testimony and

records also show that there is no commonality. In addition, Defendant states it did not require

employees to arrive early to load programs. Lastly, the message exchange between Waine-Golston

and Kevin Nester, a fellow employee , occurred one month after the lawsuit was filed and does not 4

demonstrate a requirement that non-exempt employees are required to load programs prior to clocking

in.

Prior to May 2010, all hourly, non-exempt employees in California, except the employees

working in the field, clocked in and out via a wall clock, merely by swiping their badge on the way in

and out of the call center. (Dkt. No. 56-5, Testa Decl. ¶ 4.) Corbin testified that he used the wall clock

system. (Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx, Ex. B, Corbin Depo at 63:19-64:6.) Employees in the field used

Tele-Time to record their start and stop times by using their cellular telephones to call in and record

their times. (Dkt. No. 56-5, Testa Decl. ¶ 5.) 

In 2010, Time Warner phased out the use of wall clocks and implemented the Kronos system. 

(Id. ¶ 6.) By June 26, 2010, all hourly, non-exempt employees who did not work in a call center or

in the field were to use their Kronos icon on their desktops to clock in and out. (Id. ¶ 7.) By May 4,

2010, all hourly, non-exempt employees in the call centers whose duties required them to service

customers over the phone, used Kronos Connect, which integrated the Kronos timekeeping system

with the Avaya soft-phone system that call center employees use to handle customer phone calls. (Id.

¶ 9.) When the call center employee logs into Avaya, the employee is automatically clocked into

Plaintiffs do not explain what the “UNIFIED SYSTEM” is and how it correlates with 3

Kronos/Avaya; however, the Court extrapolates from Defendant’s papers that UNIFIED is a software

program utilized by the TSAs to perform their duties.

Waine-Golston testified that Nester was not a supervisor. (Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx., Ex. A, 4

Waine-Golston Dep. at 109:7-17.) 

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Kronos. (Id.) The field employees continued to use Tele-Time to clock in and out. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

Defendant provides a declaration stating that most employees lock their computers at the end

of the shift instead of logging off. (Dkt. No. 56-7, D’s Appx., White Decl. ¶ 14.) To log in to Avaya,

the technical support agents (“TSA”) typically 1) unlock their computers by pressing “control-altdelete” and enter their system login ID and password; 2) click the Avaya “Log In” icon; and 3) click

the “log in” button. (Dkt. No. 56-7, D’s Appx, White Decl. ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx., Ex. A,

Waine-Golston Depo. at 231:14-17.) This process takes less than 30 seconds. (Dkt. No. 56-7, D’s

Appx., White Decl. ¶ 14.) If the employee logged off their computer at the end of his or her shift, it

would take about two minutes or less to log in and clock in through Avaya. (Id. ¶ 15.) Waine-Golston

testified it takes “less than a minute” to unlock the computer and clock-in, while Corbin stated that the

process took “a minute, two minutes top.” (Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx., Ex. A, Waine-Golston Depo.

at 195:12-14; Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx, Ex. B, Corbin Depo. at 108:21-109:3.) 

Moreover, both Plaintiffs testified that they loaded programs after they clocked in. Corbin

testified numerous times that he loaded the programs after he clocked in. (Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx,

Ex. B, Corbin Depo. at 69:8-16; 71:7-10; 85:24-86:7; 95:9-18.) Waine-Golston testified that he would

load up the other programs after clocked in. (Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx., Ex. A, Waine-Golston Depo.

at 222:14-223:16.) 

Defendant providesrecordsshowing the timeswhenWaine-Golston loaded a software program

called AAD and UNIFIED during July 21, 2011 to October 14, 2011 and compared it to the Kronos

Time Detail Reports for the same time period. (Dkt. No. 56-1, Kabat Decl. ¶ 2.) The records reveal

that Waine-Golston routinely clocked in before loading the ADD and UNIFIED programs. (Id.) The

records showed one instance when Waine-Golston loaded AAD before he clocked in on July 26, 2011

and it was loaded one minute before clocking in. (Id.) In addition, as to the UNIFIED program, there

were two instances on August 11 and 15, 2011 when he loaded UNIFIED before clocking in and it

took one or two minutes before he clocked into Kronos. (Id., Ex. H.) 

As to Corbin, the time period from July 7, 2010 to June 15, 2011 showed that he clocked into

Kronos before loading the AAD software every day except one instance on March 19, 2011 where he

logged into AAD one minute before clocking into Kronos. (Id. ¶ 3.) 

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Defendant’s attendance policy states, “[e]mployees are expected to report to work properly

as scheduled and to be at their workstations on time. (Dkt. No. 56-4, Chandler Decl. ¶ 4.; Dkt. No.

56-10, D’s Appx, Ex. L.) Moreover, Plaintiffs confirm that there was no written policy requiring

employees to arrive early. (Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx, Ex. B, Corbin Depo. at 79:4-14; 92:5-7; Dkt.

No. 56-9, D’s Appx, Ex. A, Golston Depo. at 163:21-164:8.) There was also a written policy of >>>>

The Employee Timecard Approval Procedure states that the method, either by telephone,

personal computer, etc. of accessing Kronos varies depending upon the department and employee

location. (Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx., Ex. C.) Moreover, Waine-Golston stated that in order to load

up the other programs, one had to start Avaya because that was the only way an employee logged in. 

(Dkt. No. 56-9, D’s Appx., Ex. A, Waine-Golston Depo. at 222:14-223:9-16.) 

Defendant also further provides the declarations of twenty-one currently employed putative

class members each stating that there was no policy requiring them to load programs prior to clocking

in or to otherwise work off the clock. (Dkt. 56-6, D’s Appx. of Declarations of Putative Class

Members, Exs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.) Supervisors also

confirm that they either advised employees to clock in prior to performing any work or that there was

a policy that required employees to log in to programs prior to clocking in, and that there was no

requirement or expectation that employees arrive early. (Id., Exs. 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, 28.) 

Based on these facts, Plaintiffs have not established commonality among the putative class

members as to the computer log-in and out policy. They have not shown there was a uniform stated

policy or a practice that employees were required to arrive fifteen minutes early to log in to their

programs and have all necessary software programs running prior to the start of their shift. Nonexempt employees have different jobs and different methods of keeping their time. Moreover, prior

to 2010, the use of a computer log-in and out of the Kronos was not even applicable during the

relevant time period Plaintiffs seek to certify. Plaintiffs only provide one example of Waine-Golston

logging into a program prior to clocking in. Furthermore, Plaintiffs testified that they clocked in prior

to loading programs. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the putative class members have

suffered the same injury. Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to show a common core of facts or a

shared legal issue that affects all class members with respect to this claim. 

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In addition, Plaintiffs seek class certification as to Time Warner’s failure to provide wages to

ex-employees stating that based on Defendant’s records, there are at least 750 ex-employees during

this time period. Plaintiffs state they are ex-employees and did not receive any “back wages” from

Time Warner. (Dkt. No. 51-5, Waine-Golston Decl. ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 51-4, Corbin Decl. ¶ 9.) Besides

Plaintiffs’ declarations, they have not provided any evidence that there was a uniform policy or

practice of Time Warner to not pay back wages to the 750 ex-employees. Despite the fact that

Defendant has failed to address this issue , the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to 5

demonstrate commonality on this issue. 

Based on our conclusion as to the commonality question, it is not necessary to determine

whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality and adequate requirements of Rule 23(a). See Dukes,

131 S. Ct. at 2551 n. 5 (“In light of our disposition of the commonality question, however, it is

unnecessary to resolve whether respondents have satisfied the typicality and adequate-representation

requirements of Rule 23(a).”)

3. Rule 23(b) 

Because the Court find that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are not met, we need not reach the

question of whether the proposed class satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b). See Zinser v. Accufix

Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186, amended, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that under

Rule 23, the plaintiff must show that all four of the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and then at

least one requirement of Rule 23(b)); see Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp, 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.

1998) (Rule 23(a) is the threshold analysis for determining whether class certification is appropriate). 

B. Evidentiary Objections

In their reply, Plaintiffs filed objections to documents submitted byDefendant in its opposition

to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (Dkt. No. 59-4, -5, -6, -7, -8.) Without leave of Court

Defendant filed a response to Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections. (Dkt. No. 64-68.) 

Since a motion to certify a class is a preliminary procedure, courts do not require strict

adherence to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Eisen v.

Defendant states that it did not independently analyze this issue since it claims that the failure 5

to pay wages issue is derivative of the computer log-in and out claim. 

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Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (The class certification procedure “is not

accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil trials.”). At the class

certification stage, “the court makes no findings of fact and announces no ultimate conclusions on

Plaintiffs’ claims.” Alonzo v. Maximus, Inc., 275 F.R.D. 513, 519 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Mazza

v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 254 F.R.D. 610, 616 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Therefore, the Court may consider

inadmissible evidence at the class certification stage. Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Prods, Inc., 268

F.R.D. 330, 337 n. 3 (N.D. Cal. 2010). “The court need not address the ultimate admissibility of the

parties’ proffered exhibits, documents and testimony at this stage, and may consider them where

necessary for resolution of the [Motion for Class Certification].” Alonzo, 275 F.R.D. at 519. 

Here, Plaintiffs present evidentiary objections to evidence submitted by Defendant in support

of its opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. At this stage of preliminary proceedings,

the Court need not require strict adherence to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at

178. Accordingly, the Court overrules Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, theCourt DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification as to California

based employees only.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 18, 2012

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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