Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03081/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-03081-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

C-04-03081 RMW

JAS

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 1/5/10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JEFFREY FIGUEROA,

Petitioner,

v.

CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT OF

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY JUVENILE

DIVISION,

Respondent.

No. C-04-03081 RMW

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

[Re Docket No. 1]

Petitioner Jeffrey Figueroa ("Jeffrey") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Petitioner claims he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because: (1) he was denied his Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation because the juvenile court improperly considered hearsay

evidence; (2) he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial; and (3) his convictions were not

supported by sufficient evidence, violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Respondent has filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition, and petitioner has filed a

traverse. Having reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the court concludes that petitioner is

not entitled to relief based on the claims presented and denies the petition.

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United States District Court

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

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JAS 2

I. BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2001, Nicholas T., a 14-year-old eighth grader at Walnut Creek

Intermediate School, was in line with other students waiting to obtain a locker at the school gym. 

Reporter's Transcript (Pet'r's Ex. 1) ("RT") at 14-15. As the boys waited, petitioner's brother,

Stephen Figueroa ("Stephen"), walked up and down the line, asking other boys whether they liked

the Oakland Raiders. RT 16. If a boy said no, Stephen would strike the boy on the forehead. Id. 

When Stephen got to Nicholas T. and asked him the same question, Nicholas T. said that he

did not like the Raiders and that the Raiders "sucked." RT 33. Stephen hit Nicholas T. on the

forehead and stomach and kicked his leg. RT 16. Nicholas T. called Stephen a "faggot." RT 33. 

Stephen walked away and started talking to his younger brother, Jeffrey. RT 28. Nicholas T. saw

the two brothers pointing at him as they talked. Id. Shortly thereafter, Stephen and Jeffrey returned

and stood next to Nicholas T. RT 58. Nicholas J., a classmate of Nicholas T.'s who was standing

near Nicholas T. at the time of the incident, saw Jeffrey fashion a tinfoil object with his hands. RT

68-70. Jeffrey then tapped Nicholas T. on the shoulder and said, "Hey, kid." RT 17. When

Nicholas T. turned to face him, Jeffrey spit the object out of his mouth and into Nicholas T.'s right

eye. RT 39, 59-60. The object lodged in Nicholas T.'s eye, and when Nicholas T. pulled it out, he

found a needle or a tack at the end of the tinfoil. RT 18-25. Nicholas T. cupped his injured eye with

his hand while Stephen and Jeffrey laughed; Jeffrey ordered Nicholas T. not to tell the teacher. RT

59-61. Both Stephen and Jeffrey seemed happy that Jeffrey had struck Nicholas T. in the eye, and

neither expressed any shock or disbelief that this had occurred. RT 63. 

Ignoring Jeffrey's warning, Nicholas T. sought the aid of a teacher who told him to go to a

bathroom and wash the eye out. RT 22. After school, Nicholas T.'s mother took him to a hospital

where he was treated by Dr. Robert Edelman. RT 215-16. Nicholas T. had received a penetrating

injury through the cornea, which caused the lens to split vertically. RT 216-20. Dr. Edelman

testified that in his 23 years of practicing ophthalmology, he had never seen an injury so severe

caused by paper or tin foil. RT 225. Dr. Edelman expressed doubt that a gum wrapper alone could

have caused such a deep injury, and he speculated that something more firm likely had been

wrapped inside of the wrapper. RT 229-32. Nicholas T. underwent two operations on his eye and

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1

 Stephen was charged in a separate petition with the same allegations as Jeffrey under a conspiracy

theory. RT 8. The juvenile court rejected the conspiracy theory, acquitting Stephen of these charges

but found him guilty of misdemeanor battery. RT 268-69. Stephen appealed to the Court of

Appeals, which consolidated his case with Jeffrey's appeal and affirmed the disposition of both in an

unpublished opinion. Only Jeffrey has brought this habeas action.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

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JAS 3

he testified that his vision continues to be blurry. RT 23. Nicholas T. also received a lens implant

which helps him see at a distance. RT 233. Nonetheless, his vision will be permanently impaired. 

Id.

Based on these facts, petitions were filed alleging that Jeffrey came within the jurisdiction of

the juvenile court because he had committed the following four offenses1: (1) battery causing serious

bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code §§ 242, 243(d); (2) assault with a deadly weapon, § 245(a)(1); (3)

assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, § 245(a)(1); and (4) mayhem, § 203. 

The petition against Jeffrey included an enhancement allegation that he had personally inflicted

great bodily injury. Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a). 

After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the Contra Costa County Superior Court ("Superior

Court") convicted Jeffrey of the battery charge and the mayhem charge. The Superior Court also

sustained the enhancement allegation of great bodily injury. At a dispositional hearing on June 6,

2002, the Superior Court declared Jeffrey to be a ward of the court and placed him on probation

under supervision of the California Youth Authority. Jeffrey appealed to the California Court of

Appeal, which affirmed all findings of the Superior Court on May 29, 2003, and then petitioned for

review in the California Supreme Court. That petition was summarily denied on August 20, 2003. 

Jeffrey filed a state habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court on August 3, 2004

which was denied on June 22, 2005. He filed his current petition with this court on July 29, 2004. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a district court may not grant a petition

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

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challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in

state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner's claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson,

217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). The AEDPA requires a district court to presume correct any

determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Even if a constitutional error

has occurred, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error had a "substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782,

795-96 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). In other words, a habeas

petitioner must show that the error resulted in "actual prejudice." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

B. Analysis of Legal Claims

1. Hearsay Testimony

Petitioner first contends that the juvenile court impermissibly relied on hearsay testimony 

contained in his disciplinary records. Petitioner claims that the juvenile court judge erred both in

admitting the disciplinary records as evidence, but also by misleading petitioner into thinking that

the judge would consider the disciplinary records only to extent they tended to support or detract

from the credibility of an expert’s opinion and that he would not consider their contents for their

truth. Petitioner alleges that these transgressions amount to a violation of his Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause right to be "confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. Amend.

VI.

Petitioner's contention that the trial judge erred in considering the contents of petitioner's

disciplinary record for their truth has some merit if, in fact, he did so. However, it is not clear that

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

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JAS 5

he did. Further, petitioner did not specifically object to the admission of the disciplinary records and

made only an objection to the reading of one specific passage. Most importantly, the court is not

persuaded that petitioner was prejudiced by the admission of the records.

Jeffrey's disciplinary records were first referenced in the direct testimony of Dr. Robert

Goyer, an expert witness called by the defense. Dr. Goyer, a school psychiatrist for the Walnut

Creek School District, reviewed and used the disciplinary records to assist him in coming to his

expert opinion on petitioner's mental and behavioral characteristics. RT 173:19-174:1; 176:9-13.

Therefore, the People were entitled to cross-examine Dr. Goyer about his consideration of the

contents of the disciplinary records in evaluating the weight to be given his opinion. See FRE 703.

However, the examination of an expert about facts upon which he relied or did not rely in

formulating his opinion does not make otherwise inadmissible facts admissible for their truth. Id.

Nevertheless, it does not appear that petitioner objected to the admissibility of his

disciplinary records. Petitioner did not object at trial on hearsay grounds when the disciplinary

records were marked as an exhibit nor during initial questions concerning their contents. RT

205:15-210:17. The first hearsay objection was made when June Krug, one of the vice-principals in

the Walnut Creek Intermediate School, after being asked on redirect examination about a particular

entry concerning an incident in which Jeffrey allegedly struck another boy, responded that "the

prinicpal said that the witnesses that she interviewed there did not support his [Jeffrey's] story." The

objection appears to have been made as to Ms. Krug's relation of what the principal had said as

opposed to being an objection as to the admissibility of the disciplinary records as a whole. Id. at

211:19-22. When the disciplinary records were actually received, no objection was made. Id. at

267:9-16.

Petitioner argues that the trial court misled the petitioner as to how the disciplinary reports

would be used and that explains the lack of objection other than that which was made. When

petitioner did object as set forth above, the trial court overruled the objection on the ground that the

information sought was relevant to the basis of Dr. Goyer's opinion. The trial court did not suggest

that it was admitting the evidence for the truth of the statement that Jeffrey struck another boy or the

truth of what the witnesses said.

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

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JAS 6

If petitioner's objection is treated as an objection to the admission of the disciplinary records

as a whole, the court's ruling was that the reports were admissible to the extent that they shed light

on Dr. Goyer's opinion but not as substantive evidence of the truth of the factual allegations reported

in the records. However, at the close of the jurisdictional hearing in orally giving his decision on

guilt, the trial court cited Jeffrey's prior disciplinary record as supporting his finding that Jeffrey

knew the difference between right and wrong and knew that there was a liklihood that his projectile

would strike someone. Id. at 324:3-326:20. This suggests that the trial judge may have considered

the contents of the disciplinary records for more than weighing the credibility of Dr. Goyer's

opinion.

However, even if the trial judge considered the disciplinary records for substantive evidence

of prior misconduct by Jeffrey, the court is not persuaded that the error was prejudicial. The trial

judge stated that the convictions were "based on all the facts and circumstances of the case." Id.

Indeed, in light of the record before the trial judge, there was ample evidence to convict on the

battery and mayhem charges without considering the truth of the contents of petitioner's disciplinary

record. The trial judge found that petitioner prepared and spat a sharp, pointy object at point-blank

range toward Nicholas T. The object was launched with enough force to penetrate two inches deep

into Nicholas T.'s eye. Petitioner had made projectiles in the past. Petitioner, at 12 years of age,

certainly was at an age where he must have realized that he could hit someone in a crowded area

with a projectile. The evidence, even without considering petitioner's disciplinary record, clearly

supports the conclusion that petitioner understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. Petitioner has

not shown that any erroneous consideration of the disciplinary records was other than harmless

error.

2. Jury Trial

Petitioner's second argument is that his juvenile proceeding, conducted without a jury, denied

him his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 

The Supreme Court has ruled that due process in juvenile delinquency proceedings does not

mandate a jury trial for juvenile defendants. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 

Petitioner concedes this point but argues that McKeiver's holding is based on outdated assumptions

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

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JAS 7

about the juvenile delinquency process that have been refuted in the years since. Specifically,

petitioner argues that juvenile proceedings now resemble adult criminal proceedings in that they

often involve punitive consequences and are more adversarial. Given this modern reality, petitioner

asks the court to extend the right of jury trial to him, as if he were an adult criminal defendant.

Whatever the merits of petitioner's argument, Ninth Circuit law is squarely in accord with

McKeiver in holding that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for a juvenile. See United

States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Juvenile, 228 F.3d

987, 990 (9th Cir. 2000). The court is not prepared to depart from years of well-established

precedent here; therefore, the court finds that petitioner was not entitled to a jury trial at his juvenile

proceeding, and no attendant constitutional rights were violated.

3. California Penal Code § 26 Presumption

Petitioner's final argument is that the prosecution did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut

the presumption under California Penal Code Section 26 that petitioner, a minor under the age of 14,

did not understand the wrongfulness of his conduct. Respondent contends that in the totality of

circumstances surrounding the offenses, there was ample evidence to establish that petitioner knew

what he was doing was wrong. The court agrees with respondent.

California Penal Code Section 26 reads in relevant part: "All persons are capable of

committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: One--Children under the age of

14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they

knew its wrongfulness . . ." The prosecution must come forward with "clear and convincing

evidence" to rebut this presumption. In re Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th 229, 238-39 (1994). "Attendant

circumstances of the crime, such as its preparation, the particular method of its commission, and its

concealment" are probative factors to assist the court in determining whether the prosecution has

rebutted the presumption. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 900 (1978). Furthermore, a court can infer

that the older a child gets, the more likely the child will appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts. In

re Marven C., 33 Cal. App. 4th 482, 487 (1995). 

In this case, the record shows that petitioner committed a premeditated battery against

Nicholas T. After his brother pointed Nicholas T. out from the crowd of boys, petitioner walked

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

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JAS 8

over to Nicholas T., fashioned a pointy object, stuck it in his mouth, tapped Nicholas T.'s shoulder to

get his attention, and then spat the object directly into Nicholas T.'s face. This course of events

clearly and convincingly shows that petitioner targeted Nicholas T. After Nicholas T. grabbed his

eye in pain, petitioner tried to escape responsibility, telling Nicholas T. not to go to a teacher. 

Petitioner knew what he did was wrong, and he sought to avoid the consequences of his actions. 

The court can also infer from petitioner's age at the time of the incident – 12 years and 8 months –

and his prior and current preparation of objects similar to the one he spat in Nicholas T.'s eye he

knew the wrongfulness of his actions. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in finding that petitioner

understood the wrongfulness of his actions.

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently been

amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. §

2254 (effective December 1, 2009). For the reasons set out in the discussion above, petitioner has

not shown "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of

the denial of a constitutional right [or] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Accordingly, a COA is denied..

IV. ORDER 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied and a certificate of

appealability will not be issued..

DATED: 1/4/10

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY—No.

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Petitioner:

Randy Philip Montesano rmontesano@hotmail.com 

Counsel for Respondent:

Christopher Joseph Wei christopher.wei@doj.ca.gov 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 1/5/10 CCL

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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