Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00070/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP, an Arizona 

limited liability partnership dba HBI 

International, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Juicy eJuice, a Canadian Business Entity; 

Vapour Limited, a Seychelles Business 

Entity; et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-00070-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are separate Motions to Dismiss from Defendants 

Nikki’s Vapor Bar, USA, Inc. (Doc. 55) and 1673030 Alberta, Inc. (Doc. 57). Also 

before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Responses to the 

Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. 81.) For the reason set forth below, the Motion for Leave is 

denied and the Motions to Dismiss are both denied.1

BACKGROUND 

 The Plaintiff, BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP (“BBK”), sells a variety of smoking 

related products on its website including the liquid used in electronic cigarettes to create 

vapor. BBK uses multiple trademarks, many of which incorporate the word “JUICY” as 

 

1

 The parties’ requests for oral argument are denied because the parties have 

thoroughly discussed the law and the evidence, and oral argument will not aid the Court’s 

decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Grp., Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 724, 

729 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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an element such as JUICY JAYS and JUICY DROPS. Some of these trademarks are 

registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). BBK alleges 

that Defendants have engaged in trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, and 

unfair competition. 

 Defendant Nikki’s Vapor Bar, USA, Inc. (“Nikki’s Vapor”) sells similar products 

under the name JUICY EJUICE on its website. Nikki’s Vapor is a Florida based 

company that is incorporated in Delaware. It has no physical storefront but its website is 

accessible from anywhere, including Arizona, and it allows customers to order and have 

products shipped to Arizona. Arizona is one of many options available to select in a dropdown menu that customers use to enter their mailing address. Nikki’s Vapor declares that 

“through its website, [it] has not sold any Juicy eJuice products in Arizona nor has 

Nikki’s shipped any Juicy eJuice products to Arizona.” (Doc. 56-1.) The website invites 

visitors to contact Nikki’s Vapor for franchising opportunities. The website also has a 

Terms and Conditions that govern the use of the site. 

 Defendant 1673030 Alberta, Inc., (“Alberta”) is a Canadian company. BBK 

alleges that Alberta sells electronic smoking devices using the word mark JUICY 

ESTICK and the e-liquids used in such devices. (Doc. 32 ¶¶ 95–96, 146.) BBK alleges 

that one of the places where Alberta sells its e-liquids and e-sticks is on the JUICY 

EJUICE website, JuicyeJuice.com. (Id. ¶¶ 101, 113.) Alberta points out that the website 

JuicyeJuice.com is not registered to Alberta (Doc. 71 at 2), but also acknowledges that it 

“conducts sales transactions through websites where customers from around the world 

can purchase its products.” (Doc. 57-1 at 2). Alberta admits that it has sold products to 

customers in Arizona, but states that in the past year those sales were “less than a third of 

one percent of its online sales.” (Id.) BBK had a copy of the Second Amended Complaint 

served or delivered to Alberta’s registered office in Canada. (Id.) 

 The online presence, marketing, and sales operations of Nikki’s Vapor and Alberta 

are interconnected. The website for Nikki’s Vapor, NikkisVaporBar.com, is actually 

registered to another defendant in this case, Vapour Ltd. (“Vapour”). (Doc. 55 at 2.) The 

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website JuicyeJuice.com, where Alberta’s products are sold, is also registered to Vapour. 

(Doc. 32 at 12.) When a customer signs up for emails on JuicyeJuice.com, the customer 

will receive promotional emails listing the name and address of Nikki’s Vapor. (Doc. 59-

1) Those emails originate from a third website, eStick.com, but they link customers back 

to the website for Nikki’s Vapor. When a customer purchases an Alberta product on 

JuicyeJuice.com, that customer then receives email confirmations and updates from the 

third website, eStick.com. (Doc. 66-1.) The charge on the order from JuicyeJuice.com is 

listed on the credit card statement as being from “NIKKI’S LIQUID” and the product 

ordered arrives from the Florida address of Nikki’s Vapor. (Id.) 

 The management and ownership of Nikki’s Vapor and Alberta also overlap. Allan 

Mackintosh is the Chief Operating Officer of Nikki’s Vapor. (Doc. 56-1.) Trevor 

Westlake is a Director of Alberta. (Doc. 57-1.) Allan Mackintosh and Trevor Westlake 

are the only two voting shareholders for Alberta, each with a fifty-percent share. (Doc. 

69-1 at 18.) Mackintosh declares that Nikki’s Vapor is incorporated in Delaware and has 

a principle place of business in Florida, but he signed that declaration and had it notarized 

in Canada. (Doc. 56-1.) Westlake declares that Alberta is incorporated and has its 

principle place of business in Canada, most of its employees are “located” in Canada, and 

it has no offices in America, but he signed that declaration and had it notarized in Florida. 

(Doc. 57-1.) Nikki’s Vapor and Alberta are both represented by the same counsel in this 

lawsuit. That counsel filed a joint motion (Doc. 86) by both defendants and motions by 

Alberta (Docs. 57, 71) that repeatedly references and incorporates the motions by Nikki’s 

Vapor (Docs. 55, 70). 

 BBK filed a proof of service with this Court indicating that it served Alberta at its 

registered office in Canada on September 30, 2013. (Doc. 48.) Alberta acknowledges that 

it “was served with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint at its registered address in 

Alberta, Canada,” (Doc. 57-1) but contends that it did not accept service or that the 

service was insufficient (Doc. 71 at 5). BBK also submitted a declaration from the 

Canadian attorney who hired the process server. (Doc. 69-1 at 2–4.) In that declaration 

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the attorney describes the applicable rules governing service on Alberta and attests that 

the service was performed in compliance with those rules. (Id.) Alberta does not contest 

that issue, but instead argues that the relevant issue is whether the service complied with 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of 

Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (“Hague Convention”). (Doc. 71 at 4.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. Supplemental Responses and Discovery 

 BBK’s Motion for Leave to File and its requests for limited discovery on the issue 

of personal jurisdiction are denied. This Court earlier granted a stipulation by BBK and 

Nikki’s Vapor to allow BBK to file a supplemental response with respect to Nikki’s 

Vapor. (Docs. 63, 66, 68.) BBK now seeks leave to file a supplemental response 

concerning Alberta and a second supplemental response concerning Nikki’s Vapor. (Doc. 

81.) Nikki’s Vapor and Alberta filed a joint response opposing that request. (Doc. 86.) 

BBK’s request is denied because it has already had a full opportunity to brief its position. 

 In the Ninth Circuit, jurisdictional discovery should “ordinarily be granted where 

‘pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more 

satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.’” Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC 

Invest., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. 

Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977)). As explained below, discovery is 

unwarranted because facts establishing jurisdiction have been sufficiently plead. 

II. Service 

 Compliance with the Hague Convention is mandatory in cases involving service in 

a signatory country and it determines in part the validity of service. Brockmeyer v. May, 

383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). Alberta is a Canadian company and the Parties agree 

that Canada is a signatory to the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention “regularized 

and liberalized service of process in international civil suits.” Id. It did so principally by 

requiring each country to set up a Central Authority which must effectuate service when 

it is provided with documents that comply with its rules. Id. 

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 In addition to establishing a new and uniform system of service, the Hague 

Convention also “shall not interfere with” other enumerated types of service “[p]rovided 

the State of destination does not object.” Hague Convention, art. 10. Those other types of 

service include: 

b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other 

competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of 

judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, 

officials or other competent persons of the State of 

destination, 

c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial 

proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly 

through the judicial officers, officials or other competent 

persons of the State of destination. 

Id. Alberta states that, according to Canada’s declaration at signing, the “normal 

procedure” should be service by a sheriff and that only “on occasion” has Canada not 

objected to the other forms of service. (Doc. 71 at 3.) In fact, the declaration quoted is 

only describing what the “normal procedure” will be when the Central Authority is used 

to affect formal service and Canada does not actually declare a preference or a 

requirement for such formal service. Text of the Declarations of Canada, Hague 

Conference on Private International Law, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status 

.comment&csid=392&disp=resdn (last visited Apr. 10, 2014). 

 Canada has not objected to the other types of service permitted under Article 10. 

See id. Alberta argues that those other forms of service have only been allowed “on 

occasion,” when in fact the declaration states that “[o]n accession, Canada has not 

declared to object to methods of service of Article 10, sub-paragraphs b) and c).” Id. The 

word “accession” is not a typographical error or in any way a synonym for “occasion.” 

Accession is defined as “the act by which one nation becomes party to an agreement 

already in force between other powers.” Accession - Definition, Merriam-Webster, 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accession (last visited Apr. 10, 2014). In 

other words, Canada did not object to the methods of service in Article 10 when it 

became a party to the Hague Convention. 

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 Article 10 permits direct service and BBK asserts that its method of direct service 

was in compliance with Canadian law. It corroborates that position by an affidavit from 

the Canadian lawyer who facilitated the service. Alberta only argues that service should 

have been through the Central Authority and does not argue that the service was 

otherwise impermissible under Canadian law. In this case, the service was adequate 

because it complied with Canadian law and was permissible under article 10 of the Hague 

Convention. 

 Defendant’s contention that the service is not permissible under the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure is premised on the argument that the service was not in fact compliant 

with the Hague Convention. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do allow service “by 

any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, 

such as those authorized by the Hague Convention.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). BBK’s 

service on Alberta complied with that requirement by complying with the Hague 

Convention. 

 The Motion to Dismiss will not be granted based on a failure of service because 

BBK’s service on Alberta was permissible under Canadian law, the Hague Convention, 

and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

III. Personal Jurisdiction 

 A. Law 

 In a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the “party seeking to invoke the 

court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Scott v. 

Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). When the Court is resolving a motion to 

dismiss without holding an evidentiary hearing, plaintiff “need make only a prima facie 

showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 

F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). “That is, the plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that if 

true would support jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. A plaintiff’s uncontroverted 

allegations from the complaint are taken as true and conflicts in affidavits are resolved in 

favor of the plaintiff. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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 “Where, as here, there is no applicable federal statute governing personal 

jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits.” 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). Because Arizona’s long-arm statute is co-extensive with 

federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under Arizona law and 

federal due process are the same. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Doe v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 

112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997). “The due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment requires that the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum 

state ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice.’” Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 

1988) (quoting Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287). 

 A court lacking general jurisdiction may nevertheless exercise specific jurisdiction 

over a party if: (1) the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privileges of 

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws, or purposely directs conduct at the forum that has effects in the forum; (2) the claim 

arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction 

comports with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it is reasonable. Bancroft & Masters, 

Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Cybersell, Inc. v. 

Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La 

Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006)). If Plaintiff 

succeeds in establishing the first two elements of this test, the burden shifts to Defendants 

to “‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

462, 476–78 (1985)). 

 1. Purposeful Direction 

 It has long been established, that to assert specific jurisdiction, there must be in 

each case “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 

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its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). More recently, however, the 

Supreme Court held that a court may also have specific jurisdiction over a defendant 

where the intended effects of the defendant’s non-forum conduct were purposely directed 

at and caused harm in the forum state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–90 (1984); see 

also Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that 

purposeful direction analysis is appropriate when “all of [the defendant’s] action 

identified by [the plaintiff] is action taking place outside the forum”); Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 

1195 (“[T]he decisions of this court have interpreted the holdings of Calder and Burger 

King as modifying the purposeful availment rubric to allow ‘the exercise of jurisdiction 

over a defendant whose only “contact” with the forum is the “purposeful direction” of a 

foreign act having effect in the forum state.’”) (quoting Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. 

Reimbursement Fund, 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986)); but see Cybersell, 130 F.3d 

at 420 (holding that the “effects” test did not “apply with the same force” in a trademark 

infringement and unfair competition action against a business entity in which the 

defendant’s contact with Arizona arose only from infringing use of the plaintiff’s 

trademarks on a passive website on the Internet). 

 “A purposeful direction analysis, [rather than a purposeful availment analysis], is 

most often used in suits sounding in tort.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 

606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). A 

purposeful direction analysis applies to this case because the underlying action, 

trademark infringement, sounds in tort. See Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 

F.3d 700, 720 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Courts evaluate purposeful direction using the Calder “effects test.” See Brayton 

Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1128. Under the “effects test,” the defendant must allegedly have: 

“(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing 

harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Dole Food Co., 

Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). All three elements of the test must be 

satisfied. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805. “A finding of ‘express aiming’ . . . does not 

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mean ‘that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum states always gives rise to 

specific jurisdiction,’” Dole, 303 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087); see 

also Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418 (“Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of 

commerce, may be felt nationwide—or even worldwide—but, without more, it is not an 

act purposefully directed toward the forum state.”) (quotation omitted). 

 The “intentional” requirement is not a high bar, requiring only “an intent to 

perform an actual, physical act in the real world.” See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. 

 The express aiming requirement is another way of saying that there must be 

“something more” than a foreseeability of an effect in the forum state. Brayton Purcell, 

606 F.3d at 1129. A passive website alone cannot confer personal jurisdiction, but 

“operating even a passive website in conjunction with ‘something more’—conduct 

directly targeting the forum—is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting 

Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Ninth 

Circuit has made it clear that any intentional conduct must be “targeted at a plaintiff 

whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state.” Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 

1087; see also Goldberg v. Cameron, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 

(holding that defendants who willfully infringed a plaintiff’s copyright and who acted 

with the intent to produce movies for worldwide distribution, including in the forum 

state, sufficiently satisfied the purposeful direction requirement); Panavision Intern., L.P. 

v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a defendant who “engaged 

in a scheme to register Panavision’s trademarks as his domain names for the purpose of 

extorting money from Panavision” was enough “to demonstrate that the defendant 

directed his activity toward the forum state”). 

 The Ninth Circuit has noted that “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be 

constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of 

commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419 

(quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 

1997)). In Cybersell, the court went on to note that “the essentially passive nature of [the 

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defendant’s] activity in posting a home page on the World Wide Web that allegedly used 

the service mark of [the plaintiff] does not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the 

benefits and protections of Arizona,” id. at 418–19. In making its ruling, the court 

specifically noted that the defendant did nothing to encourage Arizona residents to visit 

the website, did not conduct business in Arizona, entered no contracts with Arizona 

residents, earned no income from Arizona, received no telephone calls from Arizona, and 

did not maintain an 800 telephone number. Id. at 419. The court indicated that there must 

be “something more” to “indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) 

directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state.” Id. at 418. 

 The third prong of the Calder effects test is foreseeable harm, which is satisfied 

when the defendant “caused harm that it knew was likely to be suffered in the forum.” 

Brayton Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1131. The forum state does not have to be the principle 

place of injury because this element can still be satisfied when the “‘the bulk of the harm’ 

occurs outside the forum.” Id. 

 2. The Claim Arises Out of the Forum-Related Activities 

 After the plaintiff establishes purposeful direction under the three steps of the 

Calder effect test, the second requirement for personal jurisdiction is that the claim must 

arise out of the forum-related activities. This is a “but for” test that determines whether 

defendant’s forum-related conduct caused the injury to plaintiff. Rio Properties, 284 F.3d 

at 1021. 

 3. The Exercise of Jurisdiction is Reasonable 

 Finally, jurisdiction must be reasonable, by “comport[ing] with traditional notions 

of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. Courts determine reasonableness by balancing 

the following factors, none of which is individually dispositive: 

(1) the extent of a defendant’s purposeful interjection; (2) the 

burden on the defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the 

extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s 

state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; 

(5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; 

(6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in 

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convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an 

alternative forum. 

Id.

 In analyzing personal jurisdiction generally, and the reasonableness inquiry in 

particular, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “litigation against an alien defendant requires 

a higher jurisdictional barrier than litigation against a citizen from a sister state.” Rano v. 

Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 B. Application 

 1. Nikki’s Vapor 

 Here, BBK has the initial burden to show that Nikki’s Vapor purposefully directed 

its conduct at Arizona. BBK alleges that Nikki’s Vapor operates an interactive website 

which advertises and makes sales of products that infringe on BBK’s trademark and trade 

dress. In these sales and promotional activities, Nikki’s Vapor is directly competing with 

BBK both in Arizona and throughout the country. BBK experiences this injury to its sales 

and this infringement of its copyright in its home state of Arizona. In addition to the harm 

experienced in Arizona as a result of this nationwide infringement by Nikki’s Vapor, 

BBK has also shown how the Nikki’s Vapor has individually targeted its conduct toward 

Arizona. BBK states that it has received promotional emails in Arizona from Nikki’s 

Vapor advertising the sale of the allegedly infringing products. In its supplemental 

motion, BBK showed how Nikki’s Vapor participated in a sale of the products on 

JuicyeJuice.com. Specifically, Nikki’s Vapor charged BBK’s credit card for the sale and 

shipped the products from its address in Florida to BBK in Arizona. 

 Turning to the elements of the Calder effect test, the conduct of Nikki’s Vapor is 

intentional because it runs the websites, sends the advertising emails, and participates in 

the billing and shipment. Under the second element, those actions must be expressly 

aimed at Arizona and the case law shows that a passive website cannot support personal 

jurisdiction. However, Nikki’s Vapor does not have a merely passive website with only 

information, but rather uses interactive websites to collect customer information and send 

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advertising emails and to sell allegedly infringing products in a market in which Plaintiff 

is its competitor. It also invites orders on the website with its name and at least 

participates in the sales made on another website. Nikki’s Vapor is actively reaching out 

to and making sales through the internet, and that conduct is expressly aimed at Arizona 

because BBK is an Arizona company that experiences the negative impact on its sales 

and intellectual property here in Arizona. Furthermore, BBK has shown that Nikki’s 

Vapor is doing business with a customer that Nikki’s Vapor knows is in Arizona. All of 

this conduct meets the requirement of “something more,” or express aiming at Arizona. 

Under the third Calder element, Nikki’s Vapor knew that it was selling and advertising 

the contested products in Arizona. It also knew that any harm from its infringing 

activities would be felt by BBK in Arizona because that is where BBK is located. 

 Nikki’s Vapor argues that it does not have sufficient contacts. In fact, in its Motion 

to Dismiss Nikki’s Vapor originally asserted that it “has not sold any Juicy eJuice product 

in Arizona” and that it “has no contacts with Arizona.” (Doc. 55 at 3, 5.) Nikki’s Vapor’s 

reply is more carefully worded. It does not deny that the emails or shipped products came 

from it. Instead it argues that the email advertisements to plaintiffs in Arizona and the 

shipment of Juicy eJuice products to Arizona should not be considered by this Court for 

several reasons. 

 First, Nikki’s Vapor argues that these contacts are somehow invalid because BBK 

initiated them with the intent of establishing jurisdiction. As just addressed, all of the 

infringing sales and marketing direct harm at BBK’s home in Arizona. In regards to the 

Arizona sales, Nikki’s Vapor cites no authority for its position that they should be invalid 

because BBK requested them. This is not a case of Nikki’s Vapor being inadvertently 

drawn into a market where it never intended to sell its product. Nikki’s Vapor is involved 

in a worldwide outreach to market and sell its products both by itself and through 

franchises. It chooses to send marketing emails to target individuals who indicate an 

interest in its products even when the customer is in Arizona. It charges customers who 

buy products and ships products to them even when the customer is in Arizona. BBK has 

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made a prima facie showing that Nikki’s Vapor is involved in nationwide sales that harm 

BBK and that Nikki’s Vapor advertised and sold products to at least one customer that 

Nikki’s Vapor knew was located in Arizona. 

 Second, Nikki’s Vapor argues that these activities came from websites that do not 

bear its name or are not registered to it. This point is immaterial. Neither JuicyeJuice.com 

nor NikkisVaporBar.com is registered to Nikki’s Vapor. However, it is plausible from the 

facts alleged that Nikki’s operates NikkisVaporBar.com. After BBK visited 

JuicyeJuice.com, Nikki’s Vapor allegedly sent BBK multiple promotional emails, and 

later billed and shipped the products ordered during a sale. The websites are both 

registered to a third defendant, but that does not mean that Nikki’s Vapor Bar is not 

responsible for the business that it conducts and the contacts that it makes using those 

websites. Nikki’s Vapor’s conduct is relevant even if it is not the registered owner of the 

website or does not have its name included in the website address. 

 BBK has made a prima facie showing that the Nikki’s Vapor’s conduct satisfies 

the purposeful direction prong for specific jurisdiction by passing the Calder effects test. 

Under the second prong, BBK has also shown that its claims of trademark and trade dress 

infringement arise out of that conduct. There would be no injury to BBK but for Nikki’s 

Vapor advertising and selling products bearing an allegedly infringing mark. 

 The burden shifts to Nikki’s Vapor to establish why the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over it would nonetheless be unreasonable. The seven factors do not support 

a conclusion that jurisdiction would be unreasonable in this case. First, Nikki’s Vapor 

argues that it made no interjection into Arizona, but the Court has found that BBK made 

a prima facie showing otherwise. Second, Nikki’s Vapor has not demonstrated anything 

that would make the typical burden of defending an out-of-state lawsuit exceptional in 

this case. Third and Fourth, it does not raise an issue about conflict of sovereignties or 

Arizona’s interest in the case. The fifth element of efficient judicial resolution of the 

controversy and the sixth element of convenient and effective relief both favor Arizona. 

BBK is suing several entities with ties to various states and countries. It should not have 

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to file separate cases in each of those locations if this Court can exercise jurisdiction over 

all defendants and resolve the matter entirely in one action. Seventh, there is no suitable 

alternative forum. Nikki’s Vapor suggests Delaware or Florida where it has citizenship, 

but that does not resolve the issue that the other defendants may not have citizenship or 

ties to those states. 

 BBK has met its prima facie burden of showing that Nikki’s purposefully aimed 

its conduct at Arizona and that BBK’s claims arise out of that forum-related conduct. 

Nikki’s has not shown that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. The Court 

will not grant Nikki’s Vapor’s Motion to Dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. 

 2. Alberta 

 Alberta repeats many of the same arguments for a lack of personal jurisdiction and 

explicitly references the arguments and law found in the Motion to Dismiss and Reply of 

Nikki’s Vapor. Although Alberta is in a somewhat different position than Nikki’s Vapor, 

the Court also has personal jurisdiction over Alberta. 

 One of the differences is that Alberta concedes that it makes sales to Arizona. It 

states that these sales make up only a third of one percent of its total sales. However, 

Arizona is one of fifty states, and the United States is one of hundreds of countries in the 

world. It is unremarkable that Arizona would make up a small percentage of Alberta’s 

worldwide sales. Alberta chose not to inform the Court about how many sales it makes to 

Arizona but admits to having “customers in Arizona.” (Doc. 57-1.) The fact that Alberta 

has sales throughout the world, or more sales in other states or countries, does not affect 

the analysis here of whether Alberta has sufficient minimum contacts in order to support 

jurisdiction in Arizona. 

 BBK alleges in its complaint that Alberta sells smoking products including an ecigarette and e-juice that are labeled with a “Juicy” mark. Alberta entirely avoids the 

issue of what products it sells or where it sells them. BBK alleges that Alberta sells its 

products through the website JuicyeJuice.com. Like Nikki’s Vapor, Alberta points out 

that the website is registered to another defendant. As explained above, not being the 

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registered owner of the website does not preclude personal jurisdiction for actions taken 

through the website. Alberta repeatedly states in its Reply that BBK has not proven 

anything alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, but Alberta does not actually deny 

or contradict the allegations of that complaint. BBK only has the burden to make a prima 

facie showing. BBK’s allegations from its complaint will be taken as true because they 

are not contradicted by Alberta. 

 Alberta’s conduct qualifies as purposeful direction under the Calder effects test. 

Its sales of products allegedly infringing on an Arizona trademark are intentional under 

the first element. As to the second element, Alberta admits that it is involved in internet 

sales and that some of those sales are with customers in Arizona. As noted, the Court 

must accept as true the allegation in BBK’s complaint that Alberta is selling its products 

through the JuicyeJuice.com website. Alberta argues that BBK attributed this conduct to 

Nikki’s Vapor, but that does not mean that Alberta cannot be involved as well. The facts 

indicate that Alberta and Nikki’s Vapor are closely tied. Alberta’s declaration was 

notarized in Florida, the state where Nikki’s Vapor is located and from where the 

shipment was sent. Alberta is half owned by Allan Mackintosh, the Chief Operating 

Officer of Nikki’s Vapor. All of the websites are registered to another defendant. In the 

Second Amended Complaint, BBK alleges that all of the Defendants “are related to each 

other, are the alter egos of each other, are the agents of each other, or otherwise acted in 

concert with a common purpose sufficient enough to make each liable for the acts of the 

other.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) Without making any specific findings regarding the exact status of 

these various Defendants, the Court finds that BBK has made a prima facie showing that 

both Alberta and Nikki’s Vapor participated in the advertising emails and the sale to 

Arizona. This is in addition to the unspecified customers in Arizona that Alberta 

concedes to having. For all of these reasons, the second element of express aiming is 

sufficiently established. Under the third element of the Calder effects test, Alberta also 

knew that some of the harm from this conduct would be felt in Arizona because that is 

where BBK is located. 

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 After consideration of purposeful direction, the rest of the analysis also supports 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Alberta. The second prong, “but for” test, is 

satisfied because the injuries again arise out of the forum related contacts. Under the third 

prong, Alberta fails to show why personal jurisdiction cannot reasonably be exercised in 

Arizona. Although the Court is more mindful that the burdens on foreign defendants are 

sometimes unique, they are not particularly strong in this case. Representatives from 

Alberta will not be forced to travel any further than those from Nikki’s Vapor. As the 

Court has noted, they already share the same counsel and some of the same ownership or 

leadership with Nikki’s Vapor. Although another suit may have been filed in Canada, this 

Court does not have the power to transfer this case there or consolidate both cases. As 

noted above, Defendants fail to identify another venue with a similar interest in the 

matter where all defendants would be subject to jurisdiction. Finally, the trademarks at 

issue in this case are registered with the USPTO, making courts in the United States the 

most reasonable, if not the only, place to seek their enforcement. 

IV. Venue 

 Nikki’s Vapor makes a brief argument for dismissal based on improper venue that 

Alberta also incorporates into its motion. Their legal argument is that it is plaintiff’s 

burden to establish venue and that dismissal for improper venue is appropriate where 

“plaintiff’s chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court.” Piper 

Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981). Defendants failed to include the rest of 

the sentence with the remaining requirement from Piper Aircraft. That case actually 

approves of dismissal where there is both a heavy burden “and where the plaintiff is 

unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice.” Id. The Court 

goes on to explain that “dismissal may be warranted where a plaintiff chooses a particular 

forum, not because it is convenient, but solely in order to harass the defendant or take 

advantage of favorable law.” Id. n.15. 

 As described in the reasonableness analysis above, this case does not create an 

unusual or heavy burden on either Defendant. Further, Defendants have not argued that 

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BBK has no reasons of convenience for bringing this suit in Arizona, BBK’s home state. 

It makes no argument that this was done to harass or take advantage of favorable law. 

Their motions will not be granted because Defendants have not shown how Piper 

Aircraft supports dismissal in this case. 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File 

supplemental responses (Doc. 81) is DENIED.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Nikki’s Vapor Bar’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 55) is DENIED.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Alberta’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

57) is DENIED.

 Dated this 29th day of April, 2014. 

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