Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02727/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02727-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas J. Redmond, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v.

Frank D. Shilosky, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 05-2727-PCT-SMM

ORDER

The following motions are pending before the Court: 

Defendants Frank Daniel Shilosky (“Shilosky”) and Lake Havasu City’s (collectively,

“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 40); Plaintiffs Thomas

Joseph and Linda Jean Redmond’s (“Plaintiffs”) Motion to Strike Defendants’ Statement of

Facts (Dkt. 47); Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Expert David Smith (Dkt. 56); and,

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ State of Facts in Support of their Response to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Numbers 30 and 34 (Dkt. 61).

The Court’s discussion of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendants’ Statement of Facts

will dispose of all of the motions pending above, except Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs’ Expert David Smith, which will be addressed separately.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Originally filed in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for the County of Mohave,

this action was removed to this Court on September 7, 2005. Defendants filed a Motion for

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability was accompanied by a Motion to Exceed Page 

 Limitations (Dkt. 39), which the Court will deny. 

2

Plaintiffs’ Response was accompanied by a Motion to for Leave to File Excess Pages in Response to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49), which the Court granted by Order dated March 29, 2007. (Dkt. 52)

- 2 -

Summary Judgment Re: Liability on January 31, 2007.1

 (Dkt. 40) In turn, Plaintiffs moved

to strike Defendants’ Statement of Facts in support of their motion for summary judgment

(Dkt. 47) and filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with a

corresponding Separate Statement of Facts in Support of their Response to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment.2

 (Dkt. 50) Defendants subsequently filed a Reply in Support

of their Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 58), a Supplemental Statement

of Facts in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 60), and a Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs’ Expert David Smith (Dkt. 56). Defendants would later file a Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs’ State of Facts in Support of Their Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment Numbers 30 and 34. (Dkt. 61) On May 16, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Leave to File Supplemental Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.

70) Finally, in response to Plaintiffs’ latest filing, Defendants filed a Surreply in Support of

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Strike Defendants’ Statement of Facts

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Defendants’ Statement of Facts in Support of

their Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contest the following statements of fact

found in Defendants’ Statement of Facts in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment

(“DSOF”): ## 1-9, 12-16, 23-26, 30-33, 35, 38-40.

A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764,

773 (9th Cir. 2002). Affidavits supporting a motion for summary judgment “shall be made

on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

A Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings is attached as Exhibit B to DSOF. (Dkt. 41)

- 3 -

shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). When relying on deposition testimony parties must

designate specific facts and their location in the record. Orr, 285 F.3d at 777. Evidence

supporting a motion for summary judgment that is not admissible in evidence must be

stricken upon objection. Beyenne v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

 Plaintiffs move to strike DSOF ## 1, 2, 4, 6, 24, 31 and 35 pursuant to Rule

56.1(a) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona (“LRCiv”), which requires each statement of fact to refer to a specific

admissible portion of the record where the fact finds support. LRCiv 56.1(a) provides:

Any party filing a motion for summary judgment shall file a statement, separate

from the motion and memorandum of law, setting forth each material fact on

which the party relies in support of the motion. Each material fact shall be set

forth in a separately numbered paragraph and shall refer to a specific admissible

portion of the record where the fact finds support (for example, affidavit,

deposition, discovery, response, etc.). A failure to submit a separate statement of

facts in this form may constitute grounds for denial of the motion. (Emphasis

added).

Notwithstanding this legitimate objection, there are strong indications that many of

Plaintiffs’ other objections are vexatious. For example, some of the statements of fact

which Plaintiffs seek to strike are supported by allegations contained in their own

Complaint, such as DSOF # 24: “Fire Marshal Shilosky was called to testify as to the

cause of the fire.” This statement refers to Shilosky’s testifying before the grand jury on

November 14, 2002,3

 a fact alleged in paragraphs 9-12 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Dkt. 1) 

Other portions of statements of fact that Plaintiffs challenge, such as their objection

DSOF # 31 on grounds that there is no evidence that Fire Marshal Shilosky gave a

deposition in civil proceedings “without objection,” are immaterial to the issues at hand. 

Finally, many of the initial objections raised in Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, save for their

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

objection to DSOF #39, lack detailed legal analyses or explanations as well as fail to cite

the applicable Federal Rules of Evidence on which they are based.

In response to Plaintiffs’ various objections, Defendants correctly observe that

Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Facts in Support of their Response to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (“PSOF”) fails to comply with LRCiv 56.1(b). Pursuant

to LRCiv 56.1(b): 

Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall file a statement,

separate from that party’s memorandum of law, setting forth: (1) for each

paragraph of the moving party’s separate statement of facts, a correspondingly

numbered paragraph indicating whether the party disputes the statement of fact set

forth in that paragraph and a reference to the specific admissible portion of the

record supporting that party’s position if the fact is disputed; and (2) any additional

facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact or otherwise preclude judgment

in favor of the moving party. Each additional fact shall be set forth in a separately

numbered paragraph and shall refer to a specific admissible portion of the record

where the fact finds support. Each numbered paragraph of the statement of facts

shall, unless otherwise ordered, be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for

summary judgment if not specifically controverted by a correspondingly numbered

paragraph in the opposing party’s statement of facts. (Emphasis added).

Specifically, PSOF does not provide correspondingly numbered paragraphs

indicating their position on each of Defendants’ Statement of Facts. This rule, which is

required under the Local Rules, is particularly important in cases such as the present one,

where the parties have voiced numerous objections to certain statements of fact and

obfuscated the record with an array supplemental filings. As such, the Court is left with

the unenviable task of thrashing through these entangled pleadings to search for the

material facts that are not in dispute. The Court declines. The burden of producing a

clear record is on the parties: “the district judge is not required to comb the record to find

some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.” Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest

Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, the Court will strike:

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 40), Defendants’ Motion

to Exceed Page Limitations (Dkt. 39), Defendants’ Statement of Facts in Support of

Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 41), Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendants’

Statement of Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 47),

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Facts in Support of their Response to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 48), Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 58), Defendants’ Controverting Statement of

Facts to Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Facts in Support of their Response to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 59), Defendants’ Supplemental

Statement of Facts in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 60), Defendants’

Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts in Support of their Response to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Numbers 30 and 34 (Dkt. 61), Plaintiffs’

Supplemental Statement of Facts (Dkt. 69), Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Response to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 78), the Surreply in Support of

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 79) and Defendants’

Controverting Statement of Facts to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Statement of Facts (Dkt.

80). 

Sorting through this patchwork of filings to properly analyze the pending motion

for summary judgment would amount to a waste of judicial resources. The Court will 

therefore grant the parties another opportunity to file their pleadings in accordance with

the terms of this Order, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules. This

approach will enable a more efficient consideration of the legal issues driving this

litigation.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Expert David Smith

Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Expert David Smith (“Smith”)

pursuant to Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 56)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require each party must disclose the identity

of its expert witnesses and provide an expert report for each expert witness. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(a)(2). Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B), 

.... The report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed

and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other information considered by the

witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or

support for the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all

publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other

cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within

the preceding four years. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 

Defendants argue that the preliminary report prepared by Smith is incomplete. 

According to Defendants, the report fails to set forth the basis and reasons for any specific

opinion rendered by Smith. Thus, in light of Smith’s allegedly incomplete report,

Defendants request that Smith be stricken as an expert in this case pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 

Smith’s report contains the following three opinions:

(1) [P]rofessional fire investigators are trained to document and to follow up upon

potential exculpatory evidence or statements. The failure to document or to follow up on

that information falls below the Standard of Care required of professional investigators

and the training given to professional investigators; 

(2) If a fire investigator, as a member of the International Association of Arson

Investigators, were to receive potential exculpatory information and failed to follow up on

that information, pass that information on to the proper parties, or ignore that information,

that investigator would be in violation of the Code of Ethics for the International

Association of Arson Investigators, particularly section X(10) “I will bear in mind always

that I am a truth-seeker not a case maker; that it is more important to protect the innocent

than to convict the guilty. 

(3) A cigarette as an ignition source in this opined fire scenario is less than a probability. 

(Dkt. 56, Ex. A)

Plaintiffs argue that the report complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B),

describing it as a “very succinct and focused expert opinion addressing squarely the three

issues alleged in the Complaint” as to Shilosky. (Dkt. 57 at 2) In the alternative, assuming

arguendo that the report does not fully satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), Plaintiffs argue

that the sanction Defendants seek is inappropriate. 

The Court finds that Smith’s report fails to meet the disclosure requirements of

Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Smith’s report does not sufficiently indicate the testimony he is

expected to present during direct examination and it completely omits any explanation for

how he arrived at his conclusions. The first and second opinions, which fail to discuss

any specific information relating to the present case, are problematic due to their

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

vagueness. However, it is the third opinion that the Court finds to be the most egregious

violation of Rule 26. Smith’s third opinion merely states that a cigarette as an ignition

source for the fire “is less than a probability”; yet, he fails to provide any reasons

supporting or explaining this opinion. In actuality, these “opinions” are nothing more

than unsupported conclusions. As such, the report is deficient as a matter of law.

Rule 37(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:

(1) A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by

Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule

26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a

hearing, or on a motion any witness or information that is not so disclosed. In addition to

or in lieu of this sanction, the court, on motion and after an opportunity to be heard, may

impose other appropriate sanctions. In addition to requiring payment of reasonable

expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, these sanctions may include

any of the actions authorized under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), (B), and (C) and may include

informing the jury of the failure to make the disclosure. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 

Rather than offering a substantial justification for the failure to comply with Rule

26, Plaintiffs contend that there has been no prejudice to Defendants. Plaintiffs argue that

the Defendants “unaccounted for delay” in bringing their motion to strike should result in

its being denied. The Court disagrees. Smith’s opinions were relied upon by Plaintiffs in

their Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 50 at

5), which was filed on March 21, 2007. After stipulating to an extension of time for

Defendants to file a reply to Plaintiffs’ response, Defendants promptly moved to strike

Smith’s report on April 24, 2007. Thus, the Court does not find Defendants unreasonably

delayed in filing the motion to strike. Moreover, in light of Plaintiffs’ reliance on the

report in their Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability, the

Court finds that Defendants were prejudiced because they were unable to effectively

analyze Smith’s opinions. Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion under Rule

37(c) to preclude Plaintiffs from using the opinions of Smith to support or object to any

dispositive motions. In addition, if Plaintiffs plan to present the expert testimony of

Smith at trial, then the Court will require Plaintiffs to provide Defendants with a complete

expert report as to any opinion testimony to be offered by Smith by October 12, 2007. A

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

failure to furnish such a report to Defendants within the deadline prescribed by the Court

shall result in Smith being precluded from testifying at trial. Furthermore, the Court will

require Plaintiffs’ counsel, without contribution or reimbursement by Plaintiffs, to

reimburse Defendants for all reasonable and actual costs associated with preparing the

motion to strike and its reply. Moreover, should Plaintiffs choose to present Smith as a

witness at trial, Plaintiffs’ counsel shall be required to reimburse Defendants for all

expenses associated with taking Smith’s deposition. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, in light of the reasons set forth above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED STRIKING the following documents from the record:

• Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 40),

• Defendants’ Motion to Exceed Page Limitations (Dkt. 39), 

• Defendants’ Statement of Facts in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment

(Dkt.41),

• Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendants’ Statement of Facts in Support of Their

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 47),

• Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Facts in Support of their Response to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 48), 

• Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability

(Dkt.58),

• Defendants’ Controverting Statement of Facts to Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of

Facts in Support of their Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. 59),

• Defendants’ Supplemental Statement of Facts in Support of Motions for Summary

Judgment (Dkt. 60), 

• Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts in Support of their

Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Numbers 30 and 34

(Dkt.61), 

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

• Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Statement of Facts (Dkt. 69),

• Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. 78),

• Surreply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability

(Dkt.79); and,

• Defendants’ Controverting Statement of Facts to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Statement

of Facts (Dkt. 80).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that parties shall have until October 12, 2007, to file

any dispositive motions in this matter. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’

Expert David Smith. (Dkt. 56) If they so desire, Plaintiffs shall have through September 28,

2007, to re-submit Smith’s expert report in conformity with the Rules.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED precluding Plaintiffs from using the opinions of Smith

to support or respond to any dispositive motions until a complete report is filed. A failure

to furnish such a report to Defendants within the deadline prescribed by the Court shall result

in Smith being precluded from testifying at all in this action. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c), Plaintiffs’

counsel, without contribution or reimbursement by Plaintiffs, shall reimburse Defendants for

all reasonable and actual costs incurred preparing the motion to strike and its reply.

Moreover, should Defendants choose to depose Smith, Plaintiffs’ counsel shall be required

to reimburse Defendants for all expenses associated with taking Smith’s deposition. 

DATED this 21st day of August, 2007.

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 83 Filed 08/22/07 Page 9 of 9