Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02136/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02136-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Public Accomodations)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James E. Pruitt, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa Integrated Health System; and

Maricopa County,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-08-2136-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

Maricopa Integrated Health System (“MIHS”) and Maricopa County (the “County”). (Dkt.

# 36.) As set forth below, the Court grants the Motion.

DISCUSSION

The Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (the “Local

Rules”) provide that a party’s failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment may, in

the Court’s discretion, “be deemed a consent” to the Court’s granting of judgment in favor

of the movant. See LRCiv. 7.2(i). Before granting the motion pursuant to 7.2(i), however, a

district court generally must warn the plaintiff of “the consequence of his failure to respond

to the [opposing party’s] summary judgment motion.” See Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651,

652–53 (9th Cir.1994). Additionally, a district court abuses its discretion if it “grant[s] a

motion for summary judgment where the movant’s papers are insufficient to support that

Case 2:08-cv-02136-GMS Document 40 Filed 04/15/10 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

motion or on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact.” Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983

F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). 

Upon examination of Defendants’ Motion, and in the absence of any Response, the

Court grants summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. To begin, Mr. Pruitt is in violation of

Local Rule 7.2(i). Though Defendants filed their Motion for Summary judgment on February

26, 2010, Mr. Pruitt, through his attorney Rosemary Stathakis Cook, has not filed a timely

Response, nor has he sought extensions of time to do so. Accordingly, on April 6, 2010, the

Court ordered Mr. Pruitt to file a responsive memorandum and warned him that failure to do

so could be deemed a consent to the granting of judgment in Defendants’ favor. (Dkt. # 39.)

Mr. Pruitt, however, still has not filed any Response. See Brydges, 18 F.3d at 652–53. 

The Court further finds that Defendants’ moving papers are sufficient to support

summary judgment as those papers demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material

fact. See Henry, 983 F.2d at 950. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Pruitt claims that he was

discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the

Arizona Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act

(“OSHA”). (See Dkt. # 1, Ex. 1.) Specifically, Mr. Pruitt alleges that Defendants

discriminated against him on the basis of an alleged disability when he was terminated from

his position at MIHS . (Id.) Mr. Pruitt also claims that he was discriminated against under the

ADA when Defendants transferred him to a new department and denied his request for a

reasonable accommodation. (Id.) Finally, Mr. Pruitt alleges that he was retaliated against for

informing the local Occupation, Safety and Health Office of unsafe working conditions at

MIHS. (Id.) Defendants, however, present undisputed evidence to refute Mr. Pruitt’s claims.

See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c) (providing that summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”).

First, Mr. Pruitt’s ADA claims fail as a matter of law. While Mr. Pruitt contends in

his Amended Compliant that he was discriminated against when MIHS terminated him, the

undisputed evidence provides that he is still employed by MIHS. (See Dkt. # 38 at ¶ 27.)

Case 2:08-cv-02136-GMS Document 40 Filed 04/15/10 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

With respect to Mr. Pruitt’s claim that MIHS discriminated against him by transferring him

to another department, the evidence provides that Mr. Pruitt explicitly consented to that

transfer. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Defendants also present evidence that they provided Mr. Pruitt a

reasonable accommodation under the ADA; when Mr. Pruitt informed MIHS that a disability

prevented him from preforming work that involved certain chemicals, the undisputed record

provides that Defendants found a similar position for Mr. Pruitt that allowed him to work

without exposure to potentially dangerous chemicals. (Id. at ¶ 24, 27.) 

Next, Mr. Pruitt’s AEPA claim fails. While Mr. Pruitt claims that he was terminated

in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501, the undisputed record provides that he was not

terminated, but that he continues to work for MIHS. (See Dkt. # 38 at ¶ 27.) Hence, there are

no genuine issues of fact with respect to Mr. Pruitt’s AEPA claim. 

Defendants also present undisputed evidence that Mr. Pruitt was not retaliated against

under OSHA for informing the local office of the Occupation, Safety, and Health

Administration of allegedly unsafe working conditions at MIHS. While Mr. Pruitt alleges in

his Amended Complaint that he was transferred to a different position because he told the

Administration that MIHS was using unsafe chemicals, the record provides that the transfer

took place six months before Mr. Pruitt complained to the Administration. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Since

the transfer took place several months before Mr. Pruitt engaged in a protected activity, the

transfer cannot serve as the basis for his retaliation claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. # 36) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to TERMINATE this

matter and enter judgment in Defendants’ favor. 

DATED this 15th day of April, 2010.

Case 2:08-cv-02136-GMS Document 40 Filed 04/15/10 Page 3 of 3