Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-03934/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-03934-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Request for Certificate of Appealability

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL W. LEWIS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 08-03934 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING

REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the decision of the Board of Parole

Hearings (the “Board”) finding him unsuitable for parole. The Court found that the

petition stated cognizable claims and ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition

should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition,

and Petitioner filed a traverse. Having reviewed the papers and the underlying record, the

Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the claims presented and

will deny the petition.

STATEMENT

On November 21, 1988, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of fifteen-years-to-life

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Request for Certificate of Appealability

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in state prison after pleading no contest to second degree murder in Los Angeles County

Superior Court. Petitioner challenges the Board’s decision denying him parole following

his most recent parole suitability hearing on October 1, 2007. (Pet., Ex. 1, p. 113-125.) 

Petitioner filed habeas petitions in the state superior court, state appellate court, and the

state supreme court, all of which were denied as of July 23, 2008. Petitioner filed the

instant federal petition on August 18, 2008.

 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court will entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated

on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413

(2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Request for Certificate of Appealability

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also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should

ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 409. In examining whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court’s method

as well as its result. Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). The

standard for “objectively unreasonable” is not “clear error” because “[t]hese two

standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of error fails to give proper deference to state

courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “results in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination

of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Where, as here, the highest state court to consider Petitioner’s claims issued a

summary opinion which does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal review

under § 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-

78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner’s claims is the opinion of the California Superior Court for the County of Los

Angeles. (Petition, Ex. 15.)

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner alleges that the Board’s decision to deny him parole was not based on at

least some evidence and thus violated his right to due process. The Ninth Circuit has

determined that a California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the

possibility of parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a

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right to due process in the parole suitability proceedings. See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306

F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987);

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)). See also

Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2007); Sass v. California Board of Prison

Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16

(9th Cir. 2003).

A parole board’s decision must be supported by “some evidence” to satisfy the

requirements of due process. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting “some evidence”

standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-

55 (1985)). The standard of “some evidence” is met if there was some evidence from

which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal may be deduced. See Hill, 472 U.S.

at 455. An examination of the entire record is not required, nor is an independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses nor weighing of the evidence. Id. The relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the Board. See id. Accordingly, “if the Board’s determination of parole

suitability is to satisfy due process there must be some evidence, with some indicia of

reliability, to support the decision.” Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904). 

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was

supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and

regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 505

F.3d at 850. Accordingly, in California, the court must look to California law to

determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and

then must review the record in order to determine whether the state court decision

constituted an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” principle. Id.

California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402(a) provides that “[t]he panel

shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless

of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied

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 The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the

commitment offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner;” (2) previous record of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual

offenses; (5) psychological factors such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems

related to the offense;” and (6) prison misconduct. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c). 

The circumstances tending to show suitability are: (1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social

history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense was committed as a result of stress

which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7)

age is such that it reduces the possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for future including

development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional activities that indicate ability to

function within the law. Cal. Code of Regs., tit., 15 § 2402(d).

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parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison.” Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a). The

regulations direct the Board to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” 

Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Further, the regulations enumerate various

circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole. Cal.

Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)-(d).1

It is now established under California law that the task of the Board and the

Governor is to determine whether the prisoner would be a danger to society if he or she

were paroled. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181 (2008). The constitutional “some

evidence” requirement therefore is that there be some evidence that the prisoner would be

such a danger, not that there be some evidence of one or more of the factors that the

regulations list as factors to be considered in deciding whether to grant parole. Id. at

1205-06. 

Most recently, the Ninth Circuit reheard en banc the panel decision in Hayward v.

Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th. Cir.

2008), which presented a state prisoner’s due process habeas challenge to the denial of

parole. The panel opinion concluded that the gravity of the commitment offense had no

predictive value regarding the petitioner’s suitability for parole and held that the

governor’s reversal of parole was not supported by some evidence and resulted in a due

process violation. 512 F.3d at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an en banc

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 Although Petitioner asserts that his minimum parole eligibility date was February

19, 1997, superior court records indicate a date of February 19, 1998. This Court

expresses no opinion on the accuracy of either date except to note that Petitioner’s

minimum parole eligibility date had passed prior to the date of this challenged 2007

parole eligibility hearing.

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decision in Hayward.

Unless or until the en banc court overrules the holdings in Biggs, Sass, and Irons, it

remains the law in this circuit that California’s parole scheme creates a federally

protected liberty interest in parole and therefore a right to due process, which is satisfied

if some evidence supports the Board’s parole suitability decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-

29. These cases also hold that the Board may rely on immutable events, such as the

nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to find that the prisoner is

not currently suitable for parole. Id. at 1129. Biggs and Irons also suggest, however, that

over time, the commitment offense and pre-conviction behavior become less reliable

predictors of danger to society such that repeated denial of parole based solely on

immutable events, regardless of the extent of rehabilitation during incarceration, could

violate due process at some point after the prisoner serves the minimum term on his

sentence.2

 See Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. 

The Board’s decision denying parole in this case was based upon its review of the

nature of the commitment offense, Petitioner’s prior criminal history, and Petitioner’s

disciplinary reports during imprisonment. (Pet., Ex. 1, p. 113-117, 121.) The Board

observed that the commitment offense was carried out in “an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering and human life and the way that this crime way that this

crime was carried out and the manner that this was done.” (Id. at 114-115.) The Board

added that the motive for the crime was “inexplicable.” (Id. at 115.) The state superior

court summarized the facts of the crime in its order denying petitioner’s state habeas

petition: 

The record reflects that on February 15, 1988, the Petitioner

argued with Marcos Villegas and challenged him to a fight. Mr.

Villegas’ brother intervened and the Petitioner threatened to return with

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his “homeboys”. The Petitioner then told some gang members who he

associated with about the incident and asked them to assist him. They

gave him a sawed-off shotgun and told him that if he shot Mr. Villegas,

it would be considered his initiation into the gang. The Petitioner

returned to the area where he previously argued with Mr. Villegas and

saw him standing among a group of five or six people. The Petitioner

fired several shots toward the group, missing Mr. Villegas. However,

Shavonne Perry was shot in the back and killed. Additionally, Lavelle

Bullard and April Purcell each suffered non-fatal gunshot wounds.

(Pet., Ex. 15, p. 1.)

The Board first considered Petitioner’s criminal history. The Board relied on

Petitioner’s commitment offense and described it as a “cruel, cold-blooded killing that . . .

had multiple victims involved.” (Pet., Ex. 1, p. 113.) The Board stated further that the

crime was done in a “calculated manner” because Petitioner had returned three times to

the victims’ location, giving him time to back away had he chosen to do so, and that the

motive for the crime was trivial because the crime was committed in the hopes of being

accepted into a gang. (Id. at 114-115.) The Board observed that Petitioner had an

escalating pattern of criminal conduct, beginning with a juvenile arrest for carrying a

concealed weapon, and then an adult arrest for carrying a concealed weapon, which was

later dismissed, followed by the instant offense. (Id. at 116.) 

The Board then recited the Petitioner’s record of misconduct while incarcerated. 

Petitioner had received seven 128a counseling chronos, the last one in February 1994 for

being out of bounds, and seven 115 disciplinary reports, the last one in August 1999 for

refusing a direct order. (Id.) The Board mentioned that Petitioner’s most recent

psychological report was “somewhat” supportive and that Petitioner had submitted

documented evidence of parole plans. (Id. at 116-117.) 

The Board commended Petitioner for his many achievements: obtaining his GED,

two AA degrees, and almost completing a Bachelor’s degree; openly discussing his role

as a facilitator in the Alternatives to Violence program and his passion for it; and staying

involved in Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous since 1991 for his own

self-improvement even though he has no history of substance abuse. (Id. at 119-120.) 

The Board praised Petitioner for being “really an excellent prisoner, a superb prisoner.” 

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(Id. at 120.) The Board concluded by telling Petitioner that he must “get some more

distance with those disciplinaries,” even though Petitioner’s last disciplinary report

occurred in 1999. (Id. at 121.)

The state superior court made the following observations:

The Court finds that there is some evidence to support the

Board’s findings that the Petitioner’s commitment offense killed or

injured multiple victims; that it was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner; and that his motive was very trivial in relation to the

offense. [Citation omitted.] The Petitioner shot at Mr. Villegas, who was

among a crowd of people. Although he did not hit his intended target,

he did kill one victim and seriously injured two others. The Petitioner

sought the help of gang members who he associated with, agreed to

shoot Mr. Villegas as an initiation rite, armed himself with a sawed-off

shotgun and returned to the area where he had argued with Mr. Villegas

for the purpose of shooting him. These actions were deliberate, planned

and calculated and the Petitioner randomly fired into a crowd of

unarmed people who posed no threat to him in an execution-style

manner. His motive for shooting at the crowd was that he wanted to be

initiated into the gang that his friends were in. This was a very trivial

motive for killing one person and causing serious bodily injury to two

others.

The Board also considered the Petitioner’s non-violent prior

offenses; his gang association and its relationship to his offense; as well

as the seven 115 disciplines that he received prior to 1999, two of which

were for violent conduct. While these factors, alone, may not justify a

finding of unsuitability, the Board may properly consider them as

relevant to a determination of whether the Petitioner is suitable for

parole and they do weigh against his suitability. [Citation omitted.]

(Pet., Ex. 15, p. 1-2.)

Petitioner claims that the Board violated his due process rights in relying on his

unchanging commitment offense and prior 115 disciplinary reports, even in the face of his

extensive record of rehabilitation. Although Respondent points out that there is no

Supreme Court precedent prohibiting a parole board from relying on the unchanging facts

of a prisoner’s crime, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that where the prisoner has served

the minimum sentence and demonstrated “substantial evidence” of rehabilitation, reliance

on unchanging facts could violate due process. Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. 

There are a number of factors to be considered in assessing whether the Board’s

decision was supported by “some evidence” that petitioner would present an unreasonable

danger to the public if released. For almost a decade prior to Petitioner’s 2007 parole

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suitability hearing, Petitioner’s conduct while incarcerated was impeccable. Petitioner

made great strides in his attempts to improve himself while incarcerated, as shown by his

many accomplishments and the Board’s laudatory comments. On the other hand, the

gravity of Petitioner’s underlying offense can be considered in requiring a period of

longer incarceration. See Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Here, as the Board noted, the

commitment offense was carried out in an especially cruel manner: there were multiple

victims; Petitioner’s actions were dispassionate and calculated; and Petitioner’s motive

was very trivial in relation to the offense. See Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1). 

Even though Petitioner had been incarcerated beyond his minimum term, there was

some evidence before the Board indicating that Petitioner would continue to pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released. While the Board relied mainly upon

Petitioner’s underlying commitment offense, the issue for this Court is whether the state

courts’ rejection of petitioner’s due process claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). It

is true that Petitioner’s crime was committed approximately nineteen years prior to the

2007 parole suitability hearing, and that Petitioner was approximately nine years beyond

his minimum term at the time of the hearing. As expressed in Biggs, after passage of

enough time such a factor ceases to amount to “some evidence” on its own. While it was

perhaps a close question as to whether enough time had passed in this case given the cruel

and calculated circumstances surrounding the murder, when the additional layer of

deference in the “unreasonable application” standard is added, the question of whether the

Board’s decision was supported by “some evidence” is not a close call. Indeed, when the

constitutionality of the underlying decision is a close question, it is almost a foregone

conclusion that it was reasonable for the state courts to hold that it was not

unconstitutional. Accordingly, the state courts’ rejection of the this claim was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court

authority.

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CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing §

2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). However, the Ninth

Circuit has made clear that a state prisoner challenging the Board of Prison Terms’

administrative decision to deny a request for parole need not obtain a certificate of

appealability. See Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232. Accordingly, any request for a COA is

DENIED as unnecessary. The clerk shall forward to the court of appeals the case file

with this order. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to

show any violation of his federal constitutional rights in the underlying state criminal

proceedings. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus and COA are DENIED. 

The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

3/17/10

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL W. LEWIS,

Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. /

Case Number: CV08-03934 JF 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Samuel W. Lewis E05524

Correctional Training Facility

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Diana Munz, Deputy Clerk

3/18/10

3/18/10

Case 5:08-cv-03934-JF Document 8 Filed 03/18/10 Page 11 of 12
Samuel W. Lewis E05524

Correctional Training Facility

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

CV08-03934 JF 

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