Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00620/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00620-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID E. EDWARDS, No. CIV S-08-0620-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

CSP SOLANO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the

undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order

(Doc. 43). In his motion, Plaintiff seeks an order preventing defendants from transferring him to

another prison during the pendency of this action.

 The legal principles applicable to requests for injunctive relief, such as a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, are well established. To prevail, the

moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of

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irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in

the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir.

1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The

two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal point being the degree of

irreparable injury shown. See Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. Under any formulation of the

test, however, the moving party must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury. See id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm,

the court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. See id. The loss of

money, or an injury whose measure of damages can be calculated in terms of money, will not be

considered irreparable. See id. at 1334-35. 

The standard for a temporary restraining order is essentially the same. The

purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a more

complete hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a temporary

restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the hearing on

a preliminary injunction. It is apparent however, that requests for temporary restraining orders

are governed by the same general standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 

See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist,

J.); Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir.

1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting); Century Time Ltd. v. Interchron Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 366, 368

(S.D.N.Y. 1990). In many cases the emphasis of the court is directed to irreparable harm and the

balance of hardships because the merits of a controversy are often difficult to ascertain and

adjudicate on short notice.

As outlined above, to obtain injunctive relief plaintiff must demonstrate a

significant threat of irreparable injury. In this case, Plaintiff has not made such a showing. 

Specifically, Plaintiff does not state how his transfer to another prison will cause him any injury. 

Plaintiff will still be able to litigate this action regardless of where he is incarcerated. Plaintiff

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states such a transfer will interfere with his access to witnesses. However, Plaintiff does not

explain how a transfer will eliminate all ability to communicate with his witnesses. 

Undoubtably, not being housed at the same facility will make such communication more

difficult, but the court sees no reason why it will be impossible. There are many cases pending in

the court where the witnesses are housed at a separate facility than the plaintiff, and there is no

issue regarding communication. Moreover, prisoners do not have a liberty interest in avoiding

being transferred to another prison. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983). 

Finally, Plaintiff claims he believes the transfer is in retaliation for bringing this

action. While prisoners generally may not be transferred in retaliation for exercising their First

Amendment rights, see Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995), Plaintiff has not yet

been transferred. He states he was brought in for his annual committee meeting, and his points

were reduced by the committee in an attempt to transfer him. He does not state there is an

immediate transfer order in place. And, even if Plaintiff is later transferred for a retaliatory

purpose, there would still be no irreparable injury because such a transfer could give rise to a

separate civil rights action for damages. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for temporary

restraining order (Doc. 43) is denied.

DATED: March 17, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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