Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01760/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01760-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD KEVIN HENRY,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12-CV-1760-LAB-WMC

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

vs. PETITION

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent.

Edward Henry, a prisoner in state custody, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in this Court challenging a 2011 disciplinary finding that he possessed inmate-manufactured

alcohol. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(c) and (d), the petition

was referred to Magistrate Judge McCurine for a report and recommendation. Judge

McCurine issued his R&R and Henry filed objections to it. For the reasons given below, the

Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety. 

I. Legal Standard

In reviewing an R&R, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the

magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district court may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return

the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” In other words, “the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, 

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but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Because Henry is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally and

affords him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). That said, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure

that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

The actual standard for habeas relief is familiar and comes directly from the relevant

statute. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d):

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d).

II. Discussion

As the R&R outlines, Henry presents three claims for relief. The first is that prison

officials failed to present “some evidence” at his disciplinary hearing that he possessed

inmate-manufactured alcohol. The second is that the uncorroborated testimony of the prison

guard who found and disposed of the alcohol, Officer Sanchez, was constitutionally

inadequate to find him guilty of possessing the alcohol. The third is that Officer Sanchez

failed to test the alcohol as required by California Department of Corrections Regulations.

With respect to the first claim, prison disciplinary convictions must be supported by

“some evidence” in order to satisfy due process. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455

(1985). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. That evidence can even be

characterized as “meager” and still be constitutionally adequate. Id. at 457. Here, Officer

Sanchez stated that he found coffee jars filled with an orange pulpy liquid in a laundry bag

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under Henry’s bed, and that they had a strong odor of alcohol. That statement is certainly

“some evidence” that Henry possessed inmate-manufactured alcohol. Henry appears to

argue in his objection to the R&R that a fuller adjudication of the facts may have resulted in

a favorable finding, and that the liquid Officer Sanchez found could have been vinegar or old

fruit juice. That of course misunderstands the legal standard for a due process violation. 

The question isn’t what the facts may show, or can be argued to show; the question is simply

whether “some evidence” supports the finding. The Court of Appeal’s ruling was not contrary

to clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts.

Henry’s second claim likewise fails. There is no constitutional requirement that the

statement of Officer Sanchez be corroborated. It is enough that the statement is “some

evidence” supporting the finding that Henry possessed inmate-manufactured alcohol. For

the reasons the R&R gives, Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1987) isn’t helpful to

Henry. That case involved the uncorroborated hearsay statement of a confidential informant,

which isn’t comparable to the statement of Officer Sanchez, who actually performed the linen

sweep and recovered the liquid he believed to be alcohol.

The biggest problem with Henry’s third claim, as the R&R observes, is that federal

habeas relief isn’t available for errors of state law. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389

(9th Cir. 1996). Even taking Henry’s claim at face value, however, the Court struggles to

understand it. His objection to the R&R cites 15 Cal. Code Reg. § 3016(a), which merely

prohibits inmates from possessing controlled substances and alcohol. And then he cites

§ 3290, which says, among other things, that: (1) CDC can prescribe the methods for testing

for controlled substances or alcohol; (2) field tests may be performed on suspected

substances; and (3) urine samples may be taken from inmates. Nowhere in these

regulations is the requirement that an inmate can’t be found guilty of possessing alcohol

unless the liquid in question is actually tested and confirmed to be alcohol. Indeed, as the

R&R observes, alcohol doesn’t qualify as a controlled substance, so any regulation to the

/ /

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effect that controlled substances must be tested is inapplicable. See 15 Cal. Code Reg.

3290(e). 

III. Conclusion

The Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, and OVERRULES Henry’s objections to

it. The Court will also deny Henry a certificate of appealability. A COA is authorized “if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason

could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists

could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). The Court finds that this standard

for a COA hasn’t been met in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 13, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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