Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00524/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00524-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1158 Immigration &amp; Nationality Act, Section 208 (Asylum)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TUGCE VAROL,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID M. RADEL, Los Angeles Asylum 

Office, Director, U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv0524 GPC JLB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[Dkt. No. 4]

On July 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a form I-589 with the United States Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (USCIS) to apply for asylum and withholding of removal. 

(Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) More than three years later, Plaintiff is still waiting to schedule an 

asylum interview with USCIS and for ultimate adjudication of her asylum application. 

(Id.) She reports that the delays have produced great stress and anxiety and has prompted 

the filing of this action which requires the Court to determine whether it has the 

jurisdiction to entertain the case and, if so, whether the law provides Plaintiff a 

cognizable cause of action. While the Court appreciates the difficulties that Plaintiff has 

experienced in the course of awaiting a hearing, unfortunately, neither immigration law, 

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the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) nor the Constitution provide the sought-after

remedy. 

On March 19, 2019, Tugce Varol (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint for relief in the 

nature of mandamus to compel David M. Radel, Los Angeles Asylum Office, Director, 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security; and William P. Barr, U.S. Attorney General (collectively,

“Defendants”) to schedule an interview and adjudicate Plaintiff’s asylum application. 

(Dkt. No. 1.) On June 14, 2019, Defendants filed, in response, a motion to dismiss the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 

4.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a late response in opposition to the Government’s 

motion on July 4, 2019.

1

 (Dkt. No. 7.) On July 12, 2019, Defendants filed a reply to in 

support of their motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 8.) 

A hearing on motion was held on September 27, 2019. Having reviewed the 

moving papers and applicable law, considered the arguments of counsel, and for the 

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Background

On July 23, 2015, Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Turkey, came to the United 

States as a B-2 visitor. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 

authorized Plaintiff to remain in the country for a period of six months. (Id.) On July 11, 

2016, she filed a form I-589 with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS) to apply for asylum and withholding of removal. (Id.) On or about September 1, 

2016, Plaintiff provided her biometrics to the USCIS per agency direction. (Id.) Plaintiff 

is still waiting to schedule an asylum interview with the USCIS and for ultimate 

adjudication of her asylum application. (Id.) 

 

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s untimely response was unopposed by Defendants and ultimately 

accepted by the Court. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 10.) 

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Plaintiff has made multiple attempts to expedite her asylum interview without 

success. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims to have exhausted all available administrative 

remedies and asserts Defendants have failed to act in accordance with their duties under 

the law. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff believes Defendants have unreasonably delayed the 

adjudication of Plaintiff’s asylum application. (Id. at 9.) 

Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have been unable or unwilling to 

adjudicate her application for asylum and that the agency’s system for scheduling asylum 

applications for interviews is “arbitrary and capricious.” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 16, 20.) 

Consequently, Plaintiff seeks relief under the Mandamus Act for violations of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Administrative Procedures Act 

(“APA”). (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff also asserts a Due Process claim. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) 

Ultimately, Plaintiff seeks an order to compel the Defendants to schedule an interview 

and fully adjudicate Plaintiff’s asylum application. (Id. at 9.)

Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Plaintiff’s 

complaint lacks subject matter jurisdiction and cannot state a claim for relief. (Dkt. No. 

4.) 

Legal Standard

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may seek 

to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The federal court is one of 

limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 774 

(9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it confirms its 

own subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 

83, 95 (1998). Plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction, has the burden of 

establishing that jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 

U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

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A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Dismissal is warranted under Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal 

theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); See 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to 

dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law."). Alternatively, a complaint 

may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential 

facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give 

"detailed factual allegations," a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, "raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

545 (2007).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible 

when the factual allegations permit "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In other words, "the non-conclusory 

'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly 

suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 

for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the 

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 

2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal 

conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); W. 

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to 

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dismiss, a court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to 

the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity 

is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Lee v. Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, "leave to amend should be granted 'unless 

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.'" DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). In other words, where leave to amend would be futile, 

the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658.

Discussion

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Mandamus and APA claims for four

reasons. First, under Rule 12(b)(1), Defendants contend that subject matter jurisdiction is 

improper because 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) does not provide Plaintiff with substantive or 

procedural rights before this Court. Second, under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief through either the Mandamus Act or the APA 

because she fails to establish as a matter of law that the time period for processing her 

application is unreasonable under the present circumstances. Third, Defendants argue 

that Plaintiff’s claim regarding the agency’s allocation of resources presents a nonjusticiable political question. And finally, Defendants proffer that Plaintiff has failed to 

state a cognizable due process claim – and even if she had, it would fail. The Court will 

address these arguments in turn. 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants contend this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the INA 

provides no private right of action. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(7). Plaintiff’s primary theory of 

relief arises from an alleged violation of §§ 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii)-(iii) which, in the absence 

of exceptional circumstances, requires an initial interview on the asylum application 

within 45 days and a final administrative adjudication within 180 days after the filing of 

the application. However, Defendants point out that § 1158(d)(7) precludes a private 

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right of action and further states “[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to create 

any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party 

against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 

2.) Thus, Defendants submit that this Court lacks the required subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff counters that § 1158(d)(7) “merely points out that, given that asylum is 

discretionary in nature, no applicant can compel the granting of the benefit.” (Dkt. No. 7 

at 16). Plaintiff explains that an action to compel Defendants to process the application is 

substantively different than a demand for approval of the asylum application and is not 

precluded by statute. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff asserts the Court is within its discretion 

to hear the case and that her claims are not automatically precluded from judicial review. 

(Id.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants have violated § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) by failing to 

conduct an initial interview in over three years since her application has been pending. 

However, the INA provides that “[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to create 

any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party 

against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person. Id. §1158(d)(7). 

Repeatedly, courts in the Ninth Circuit that have addressed § 1158(d)(7) have declined to 

conclude that a private right of action exists. See Ms. L v. United States Immigration & 

Customs Enforcement, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (“absent any 

authority that a private right of action exists [under § 1158(d)(7)], the Court grants 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim”); Liuqing Zhu v. Cissna, 2019 WL 3064458 

(C.D. Cal. 2019) (finding that asylum applicants lack a private right of action to enforce 

the timing requirements of § 1158(d)(5)(A)); Ou v. Johnson, 2016 WL 7238850 (N.D. 

Cal. 2016) (“Under § 1158, there is no private right of action.”). 

However, the Court notes that unlike other subsections of the INA, § 1158(d)(7)

does not expressly preclude judicial review. Compare § 1158(a)(3) (“No court shall have 

jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).”); 

§ 1158(b)(2)(D) (“No judicial review.”), with § 1158(d)(7) (“No private right of action. 

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Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural right 

or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies 

or officers or any other person.”). Had Congress intended § 1158(d)(7) to be a 

jurisdiction-stripping provision, it would have adopted the express language found in § 

1158(a)(3) and § 1158(b)(2)(D). Here, such review is not expressly precluded by the 

statute and if there was any doubt as to Congressional intent, the well-established 

presumption favors judicial review. Kucana v. Holder 558 U.S. 233, 251 (2010) (“We 

have consistently applied that interpretive guide to legislation regarding immigration, and 

particularly to questions concerning the preservation of federal-court jurisdiction.”). 

While the statute here denies Plaintiff any private cause of action under the INA, the 

Court retains subject matter jurisdiction. See L.M. v. Johnson, 150 F. Supp. 3d 202, 210 

(E.D.N.Y.); see also Lajin v. Radel, No. 19cv52-MMA (BLM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

125118, at 6 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2019) (finding that the court possessed subject matter 

jurisdiction but that Plaintiff did not have a private right of action under INA). In other 

words, the Court finds that Plaintiff may raise her claim in this Court, but the INA 

provides her no relief. As a result, in order to proceed in this case, Plaintiff must identify 

a separate basis for relief. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

Having found that the INA provides no relief, the Court proceeds to determine

whether Plaintiff states a claim under the APA, the Mandamus Act, and the due process 

clause. 

1. Administrative Procedures Act

The APA requires an administrative agency to adjudicate matters presented to it 

within a “reasonable time.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). A reviewing court has discretion to 

“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 

706(1). An “‘agency action’ includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, 

license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 

551(13). A reviewing court can only compel an agency to act "if there is 'a specific, 

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unequivocal command' placed on the agency to take a 'discrete agency action,' and the 

agency has failed to take that action." Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Cent. Intelligence 

Agency, 811 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness 

Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-64 (2004)). “The agency action must be pursuant to a legal 

obligation ‘so clearly set forth that it could traditionally have been enforced through a 

writ of mandamus.’” Vietnam Veterans, 811 F.3d at 1075-76 (quoting Hells Canyon Pres. 

Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2010)).

Plaintiff asserts that waiting approximately three years for an interview and 

adjudication of her asylum application constitutes an unreasonable delay. (Dkt. No. 1 at 

9.) Defendants counter that the mere passage of time in processing an I-589 application

is insufficient to constitute unreasonable delay. 

When determining whether an agency’s delay is reasonable, Courts apply the 

“TRAC factors.” The TRAC factors include:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a 'rule of 

reason'; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of 

the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, 

that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays 

that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less 

tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should 

consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a 

higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the 

nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay; and (6) the court 

need not 'find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to 

hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Telecomm. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

The TRAC factors applied here favor the Defendants. The first and second factors 

require the Court to review the USCIS policy regarding asylum review scheduling. The 

Defendants have explained at length the policy and historical reasons that have driven the 

changes to the application processing system which now operates as a Last-In-First-Out 

(“LIFO”) system. (Dkt. No. 4.) TRAC factor one requires a “rule of reason” for the 

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application system and the Defendants have convincingly asserted that LIFO is “a 

sensible administrative response to the problem of increased frivolous, fraudulent, or 

meritless asylum filings that increase the overall caseload and extend wait periods for all 

applicants.” (Dkt. No. 4 at 18). 

With respect to the second factor, the Court concludes that Congress has provided 

a clear timetable for the processing of asylum applications. 8 U.S.C. §§

1158(d)(5)(A)(ii)-(iii). While the statutory guidelines provide a clear expectation that the 

initial interview should commence within 45 days – with a final adjudication to be 

completed within 180 days – the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A) clarifies that 

the timing requirements are not mandatory. Thus, the timetable, while clear, does not 

outweigh the rule of reason which supports the USCIS policies which have caused the 

challenged delays. The first factor favors the Defendants and the second factor is neutral. 

The third, fifth, and sixth factors favor the Defendants. Plaintiff asserts concerns 

that delays in adjudicating asylum claims could render even the strongest claims stale and 

remote. (Dkt. No. 7 at 20.) Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that she is forced to reside 

without permanent status which is problematic for securing specialized employment, 

educational opportunities, home purchasing, car purchasing, and other activities. (Id.) 

Further, the delay in processing Plaintiff’s application has had a psychological impact. 

(Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) However, the Court notes Plaintiff continues to reside in the United

States pending the processing of her application and is authorized to work pursuant to 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2). Although the Court recognizes the difficulty in waiting for the 

asylum interview and the processing of Plaintiff’s application, the risk to human health 

and welfare, the potential prejudice of the delay, and the lack of any impropriety behind 

the delay all favor denial of relief.

Furthermore, Plaintiff concedes that the fourth factor, competing priority, favors 

the Defendants. (Dkt. No. 7 at 20.) Plaintiff recognizes that advancing her asylum 

application for interview and adjudication may negatively affect other applicants in a 

similar position. (Id.) Other courts have noted the importance of competing priority in 

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resolving TRAC factor analysis ordering that even if all other TRAC factors favored relief, 

it was sufficient to deny relief based on the fourth factor alone. Mashpee Wampanoag 

Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (2003); In re Barr Laboratories, 

Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (1991). Here, granting relief to the Plaintiff simply moves her to 

the front of the line at the expense of all other applicants who may not have filed an 

application for mandamus relief. Therefore, this factor, and the overall TRAC analysis, 

weighs against granting relief.

Defendants observe that findings of unreasonable delay in the adjudication of

immigration applications have been confined to I-485 applications: Bayene v. Napolitano, 

No. C 12-01149 WHA, 2012 WL 2911838 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 13, 2012); Kahn v. Johnson, 

65 F.Supp.3d 918 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Islam v. Heinauer, 32 F.Supp.3d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 

2014). (Dkt. No. 4 at 12.) These I-485 cases are distinguishable and have no bearing on 

applying the TRAC factors to a case concerning an I-589 application. In Khan and Islam, 

the courts focused primarily on TRAC factor one, concerning the rule of reason, and the 

government’s failure to provide sufficient justification for the delay in adjudicating I-485 

applications. See Islam, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1072; Khan, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 930. There, the

government claimed that the delay was justified by a potential change in policy that may

affect the outcome of the I-485 applications at issue, but the courts found that a potential

change that may happen at some uncertain date was not a strong enough rule of reason on 

which to base an extended delay. Meanwhile, in Beyene, the court did not actually find 

unreasonable delay, noting that the case presented a “close call,” but noted that the 

petitioner, who had been waiting for five years, could bring a new action in a year, at 

which time the court may issue a different outcome. Beyene, No. C 12-01149 WHA, 

2012 WL 2911838, at *9. In contrast, the rule of reason offered in the instant case – i.e., 

the LIFO system – has been enacted to prevent fraud and abuse of the asylum system. 

And finally, while none of the courts found that the length of the delay alone was 

sufficient to find unreasonable delay, it is nevertheless worth noting that the Plaintiff here 

has faced a delay of three years, and the plaintiffs in Beyene, Khan, and Islam faced 

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delays of at least five years. See Islam, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1071-72 (“[C]ourts have 

generally found delays of four years or less not to be unreasonable. By contrast, many 

courts applying the TRAC factors have declined to find that delays exceeding six years 

are reasonable.”) (citations omitted). 

2. Mandamus Act

Mandamus is a remedy governed by equitable considerations and is only granted in 

the exercise of sound discretion. Whitehouse v. Ill. C. R. Co., 349 U.S. 366, 373 (1955).

The Mandamus Act allows a district court to “compel an officer or employee of the 

United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. 

1361. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is available to compel a federal 

official to perform a duty only if: (1) the individual's claim is clear and certain; (2) the 

official's duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from 

doubt, and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 

1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)). Even if 

the test is met, the district court still retains the discretion to deny relief. Johnson v. 

Reilly, 349 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, Plaintiff’s claim is not clear and certain. Section 1158(d)(7) of the INA 

makes clear that no provision of § 1158 is subject to a private right of action against the 

government. Ivantchouk v. United States AG, 417 F. App'x 918, 921 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Because Plaintiff is not afforded a private right of action against Defendants, she has 

failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. As such, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiff’s claim therefore fails the first prong of the Mandamus Act and she is not 

entitled to relief. 

3. Due Process

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ changes to the administrative process of 

adjudicating pending asylum applications violates her due process rights. (Dkt. No. 1 at 

8.) Regardless of citizenship, the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects 

everyone within the territory of the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693

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(2001). They must be afforded the opportunity to “be heard at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.” Mathew v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations 

omitted). “Parties claiming denial of due process in immigration cases must, in order to 

prevail, ‘allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the challenged process.’” 

Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2nd Cir. 2008) (quoting Lattab v. 

Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20 (1st Cir. 2004)). 

Here, the Plaintiff has not suffered a cognizable deprivation of rights because the 

plain language of § 1158(d)(7) expressly disclaims any substantive or procedural rights 

under the statute. See Vang v. Gonzales, 237 F. App'x 24, 31 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Furthermore, “the government's delay in scheduling or conducting immigration 

proceedings does not violate due process.” Id.; see also Mudric v. AG of the United 

States, 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006) (“federal immigration laws do not vest in aliens a 

constitutional right to have their immigration matters adjudicated in the most expeditious 

manner possible.”). 

Another court in this district has already rejected a due process challenge to a delay 

in adjudicating an asylum proceeding. See Lajin, 2019 WL 3388363 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 

2019). There, the court relied on a Sixth Circuit decision where the court considered the 

argument that the government’s 14-year delay in completing the plaintiffs’ asylum 

proceedings deprived them of due process. Vang v. Gonzales, 237 F. App’x 24 (6th Cir. 

2007). Specifically, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on the 45-day 

timeframe set out in § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii), noting that the section plainly clarified that there 

be no substantive or procedural right or benefit. Id. In Lajin, the court likewise found 

that a three-and-a-half year delay did not constitute a deprivation of due process. 2019 

WL 3388363 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2019). And finally, the Court notes that other courts 

have found that even longer delays than what Plaintiff has experienced in the 

immigration context did not violate a plaintiff’s due process rights. 

Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to depart from established precedent here 

and finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a due process violation. 

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4. Political Question

To the extent Plaintiff raises a political question, “judicial deference to the 

Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context.” Ins v. AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999). Here, Plaintiff argues that, inter alia, the asylum 

application process is flawed, lacks reason, is understaffed, and underfunded. (Dkt. No. 

1, 7.) However, it is the sole prerogative of Congress to allocate funds and set funding 

priorities. See Siwen Zhang v. Cissna, No. CV 18-9696-MWF (JCx), 2019 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 130884, at 13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2019). Moreover, in light of its rulings on the 

first three arguments, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the political question 

argument in further detail. See also Lajin, 2019 WL 3388363 (“The Court declines to 

analyze the political question argument in light of its rulings on the first four 

arguments.”) 

CONCLUSION

Although parties are typically allowed to amend their pleadings, such leniency 

does not extent to cases in which any amendment would be an exercise in futility. See 

Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Lajin, 

2019 WL 3388363 (S. D. Cal. July 29, 2019) (dismissing with prejudice a complaint 

based on similar causes of action and delay in asylum application processing). Based on 

the reasoning above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff could not feasibly amend her 

complaint to assert a plausible claim for relief. 

The Court GRANTS Defendants motion to dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s 

Complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is instructed 

to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 22, 2019

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