Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04977/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04977-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA PEDRAZA and FRANCISCO

PEDRAZA, individually and on

behalf of their son MICHAEL

PEDRAZA,

Plaintiffs,

 v

ALAMEDA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

and THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, THE ALAMEDA BOARD OF

EDUCATION, ALAN NISHINO,

individually and as

Superintendent of the Alameda

Unified School District, ARDELLA

DAILEY, as superintendent of the

Alameda Unified School District,

DAVID WAX, individually and as

Special Education Director of the

Alameda Unified School District,

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION and JACK O’CONNELL, as

State Superintendent of Public

Instruction for the State of

California, 

Defendants. /

No C 05-04977 VRW 

ORDER

On February 23, 2006, plaintiffs Linda and Francisco

Pedraza, individually and on behalf of their son Michael Pedraza,

filed a first amended complaint (Doc #10) against various

defendants for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities in

Education Act (IDEA), 20 USC §§ 1400, et seq; the Rehabilitation

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Act of 1973, 20 USC § 794; 42 USC § 1983; and for breach of

contract. 

Defendants are the Alameda Unified School District

(AUSD); the AUSD Board of Education; Alan Nishino, individually and

as former AUSD Superintendent; Ardella Dailey, individually and as

current AUSD Superintendent; David Wax, individually and as former

AUSD Special Education Director; Theresa Anderberg, individually

and as current AUSD Special Education Director (local defendants);

the California Department of Education (CDE); and Jack O’Connell,

individually and as State Superintendent for Public Instruction

(state defendants).

Both local and state defendants have filed separate Rule

12 motions to dismiss all claims against them for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and, in the alternative, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc ##20, 29.

The court has heard oral arguments and reviewed memoranda

from both sides. For the reasons stated herein, defendants’

motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ first claim for violation of the

IDEA, third claim for violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

fifth claim for violation of § 1983 predicated upon a violation of

the due process clause of the 14th Amendment and sixth claim for

breach of contract are DENIED; defendants’ motions to dismiss

plaintiffs’ second and fourth causes of action for violation of 

§ 1983 are GRANTED. Local defendants’ motion to dismiss the

individual defendants in their official capacities and the AUSD

board is DENIED. Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim

for monetary damages under the IDEA and for punitive damages under

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are GRANTED. 

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I

Michael Pedraza was born on October 25, 1999 and later

diagnosed with autism. Doc #10, ¶ 5. Michael’s autism makes him

eligible for a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the

IDEA. Doc #10, ¶¶ 5, 19; 20 USC § 1401(3)(A). As a resident of

Alameda County, California, Michael is entitled to receive a FAPE

from the AUSD. Doc #10, ¶ 5. 

The IDEA requires a team comprised of the student’s

parents and AUSD employees (including teachers and administrators)

to meet and develop an individualized education program (IEP) for

each school year. 20 USC § 1414(d); see Cal Educ Code § 56340. An

IEP summarizes the special education and related services which

will make up the student’s FAPE. Id. 

In October 2002, plaintiffs participated in an IEP

meeting for the 2003-2004 school year (the only year at issue in

this proceeding) at which time the AUSD outlined its proposal for

Michael’s FAPE. Doc #10, ¶ 19. Plaintiffs disagreed with the

AUSD’s proposal and requested a second IEP meeting. Id. 

While it is unclear from the record whether a second IEP

meeting took place, plaintiffs retained counsel in July 2003 and

initiated a due process proceeding to resolve issues relating to

the AUSD’s offer of FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year. Doc #10,

¶¶ 19-20; see also Michael Pedraza v Alameda Unified Sch Dist,

SN03-01426. Before the hearing took place, plaintiffs and the AUSD

agreed to mediate and subsequently entered into a “compromise and

release agreement” purporting to resolve the issues raised in the

due process complaint. Doc #10, ¶ 21, Ex 2 at 5. 

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Specifically, the AUSD agreed to provide clinical therapy

and speech programs and to reimburse plaintiffs for Michael’s preschool placement, the costs of a paraprofessional aide and for

occupational therapy services. Doc #10, Ex 2 at 1-3. The

agreement also provided that failure to perform any provision would

be considered a breach of the entire agreement whereby “the

breaching party shall forfeit all consideration promised or

received.” Doc #10, Ex 2 at 7. 

 The 2003-2004 school year commenced and soon thereafter,

the AUSD breached the agreement by failing to (1) provide “parent

reimbursement for services” and (2) “contract directly with service

providers” to “secure agreed upon related services” for Michael. 

Doc #10, ¶ 22. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint with the CDE

setting forth the AUSD’s alleged “failure to fulfill its

obligations under the settlement agreement and [the] IDEA.” Doc

#10, ¶ 24, Ex 3 at 2. On December 1, 2003, the CDE issued a report

finding the AUSD “in compliance regarding implementation of [the

July 2003] mediation agreement.” Doc #10, Ex 3 at 2. 

Plaintiffs requested reconsideration of the CDE’s

findings. Doc #10, ¶ 26, Ex 3 at 1, 6. The CDE granted their

request and on May 10, 2004 issued an amended report, this time

finding the AUSD “out of compliance.” Id. The CDE directed the

AUSD to arrange an IEP meeting to evaluate Michael’s program and

found that “if dispute resolution and/or mediation [did] not result

in a settlement agreement and appropriate program for [Michael],

the [AUSD] shall ensure FAPE by initiating due process prior to

7/15/04.” Doc #10, Ex 3 at 6. An IEP meeting took place, but no

agreement was reached regarding the 2003-2004 dispute, and the AUSD

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failed to initiate a due process proceeding as required by the

CDE’s mandate. Doc #10, ¶¶ 27-28. 

In November 2004, plaintiffs notified the CDE that the

AUSD remained out of compliance and requested a further

investigation. Doc #10, ¶ 28. In a letter (not addressed to

plaintiffs) dated February 8, 2005, the CDE stated: 

The file regarding the [Pedraza] case has

been carefully reviewed and completed. As

appropriate, all required corrective actions

have been received and duly noted. Therefore

this case is now closed. 

Doc #32, Ex A. 

In August 2005, plaintiffs initiated a second due process

hearing alleging, inter alia, that the AUSD denied Michael a FAPE

for the 2003-2004 school year by failing to abide by the settlement

agreement. Doc #10, ¶ 31. In September 2005, the Office of

Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed the 2003-2004 claim for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction stating: 

While petitioner has artfully drafted the due

process complaint to include a denial of FAPE

during the [2003-2004] school year covered by

the mediated settlement agreement and the CDE

investigation, the theory remains that [the

AUSD] has violated [the IDEA] by failing to

live up to [its] obligations under the

mediated settlement agreement. Violations of

mediated settlement agreements are clearly

within the purview of CDE. Petitioner has

recourse other than through OAH, including

filing suit in state or federal court, when a

state agency is not fulfilling its legal

obligations.

Doc #10, ¶ 32, Ex 1 at 2. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed their

original and first amended complaints with this court seeking

injunctive relief and damages for the alleged denial of FAPE for

the 2003-2004 school year. Doc ##1, 10.

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II

Plaintiffs’ FAC asserts six causes of action, all arising

out of defendants’ alleged breach of the IDEA. Doc #10. 

Plaintiffs seek damages pursuant to: (1) the IDEA, 20 USC §§ 1400

et seq; (2) 42 USC § 1983 for violation of the IDEA; (3) section

504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 20 USC § 794; (4) 42 USC §

1983 for violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (5) 42

USC § 1983 for violation of the due process clause of the 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (6) breach of

contract. Id. 

Plaintiffs assert the court has subject matter

jurisdiction over their first five claims pursuant to 28 USC §

1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over their sixth claim subject

to 20 USC § 1367. Doc #10, ¶¶ 1-2. Defendants argue that this

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs’ claims

arise out of the settlement agreement mediated under the IDEA and

that the IDEA did not provide a right of enforcement in federal

court for such agreements until 2005. Doc #23, 6:14-9:6; Doc #30,

5:22-8:8. 

In a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction, “the

court considers the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint (together

with documents attached to the complaint, judicially noticed facts

and any undisputed facts evidenced in the record) in the light most

favorable to plaintiff.” William W Schwarzer, A Wallace Tashima,

and James M Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 9:78

(Rutter Group, 2006). Because federal courts are those of limited

jurisdiction, it is presumed that the court lacks jurisdiction in a

particular case “unless the contrary affirmatively appears” in

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plaintiffs’ complaint. Kokkonen v Guardian Life Insurance Co of

America, 511 US 375, 377 (1994); Stock West, Inc v Confederated

Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F 2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir

1989) (citing California ex rel Younger v Andrus, 608 F 2d 1247,

1249 (9th Cir 1979)). 

Jurisdiction over several of plaintiffs’ claims is

contingent upon the court having jurisdiction over plaintiffs’

cause of action under the IDEA (claim #1). Accordingly, the court

will first address the issue whether plaintiffs have established

federal question jurisdiction over their IDEA claim. 

A

Plaintiffs assert that the court may exercise federal

question jurisdiction over their IDEA claim based on two theories:

(1) defendants violated the IDEA by failing to comply (or in the

case of state defendants, failing to enforce compliance) with the

settlement agreement; and (2) the AUSD’s failure to provide the

services and reimbursement agreed upon in the settlement agreement

resulted in a denial of FAPE, which constitutes a violation of the

IDEA. Doc #39, 10:4-12:7. While the court cannot exercise subject

matter jurisdiction based on breach of the settlement agreement, it

may do so based on the alleged violation of the IDEA. 

The current version of 20 USC § 1415(e), which took

effect on July 1, 2005, provides:

In the case that a resolution is reached to

resolve the complaint through the [IDEA’s]

mediation process, the parties shall execute

a legally binding agreement that sets forth

such resolution and that * * * is enforceable

in any State court of competent jurisdiction

or in a district court of the United States.

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20 USC § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii); Individuals with Disabilities

Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub L No 108-446. Plaintiffs

argue that, although they entered into the settlement agreement two

years before the effective date of the act, the applicable statute

is retroactive and thus federal question jurisdiction exists. See

Doc #58. In support of this contention, plaintiffs point to CT v

Vacaville Unified Sch Dist, Slip Copy, 2006 WL 2092613 (ED Cal

2006), in which the court found that an alleged breach of a May

2004 mediated settlement agreement conferred federal jurisdiction

under § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii). In CT, however, the parties failed to

raise and the court did not address the issue of retroactivity. 

Thus, even if CT were binding upon this court, it is not applicable

to the issue of retroactivity. Moreover, defendants argue, without

opposition, that nothing in the 2004 amendments “suggests that

courts may retroactively apply any of the amendments, let alone

specific subsections.” Doc #30, 6:21-23; Doc #23, 7:14-17. 

Because the parties mediated the agreement at issue two years prior

to the effective date of the above statute, the court does not have

jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. For these reasons, federal

jurisdiction cannot be predicated on breach of the 2003 agreement. 

Subject matter jurisdiction over the IDEA claim, therefore, rests

solely on plaintiffs’ second theory: that a breach of the agreement

constitutes a denial of FAPE and a violation of the IDEA. 

In the 2003 agreement, the parties “acknowledged that the

services the District agreed to provide constituted a FAPE for the

2003-2004 school year.” Doc #40, 10:13-14; Doc #10, Ex 2 at 5. 

Plaintiffs argue that when the AUSD failed to provide the services

outlined in the settlement agreement, it effectively denied Michael

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a FAPE for that school year. Doc #10, ¶¶ 22, 45. According to

plaintiffs, that denial of a FAPE constitutes a violation of the

IDEA itself, and because defendants violated the IDEA, federal

question jurisdiction exists. Id. 

Taking plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Michael was

indeed denied a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year, and failure to

provide a FAPE, in any form, constitutes a violation of the IDEA. 

20 USC §§ 1400, et seq. Accordingly, the court may exercise

subject matter jurisdiction provided that plaintiffs have either

complied with the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement or demonstrated

that doing so would be futile. 20 USC § 1415(l); see also Robb v

Bethel Sch Dist 403, 308 F3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir 2002); Hoeft v

Tucson Unified Sch Dist, 967 F 2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir 1992). 

B

The IDEA requires that all of the administrative

procedures set forth in 20 USC § 1415 must be exhausted before

filing a civil action in federal court. 20 USC § 1415(l); see also

Hoeft, 967 F2d at 1302.

The IDEA’s administrative procedures, detailed in 20 USC

§ 1415, begin with the filing of a parental complaint. 20 USC 

§ 1415(b)(6). Upon receipt of a complaint, the local educational

agency is required to convene an IEP meeting to discuss the issues

and attempt resolution. 20 USC § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i). If the issues

are not resolved, parents may either agree to mediation or initiate

an impartial due process hearing. 20 USC §§ 1415(e), 1415(f)(1)(A)

and (f)(1)(B)(ii). If the parties agree to mediation, they must

enter into a settlement agreement, which as of July 1, 2005, is

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enforceable in federal court. 20 USC § 1415(e)(2)(F). If the

parties go forward with the due process hearing, the hearing

officer considers the evidence and determines whether the child in

question received a FAPE. 20 USC § 1415(f). If parents are still

aggrieved, they may “bring a civil action * * * in any State court

of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United

States, without regard to the amount in controversy.” 20 USC §

1415(i).

The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed whether the

IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is satisfied when parties enter into

a mediated settlement agreement. The First Circuit, however, has

addressed the issue of what constitutes exhaustion under the IDEA

and found that mediation is insufficient. Weber v Cranston School

Committee, 212 F 3d 41, 53 (1st Cir 2000); accord Tyler B v San

Antonio Elementary School District, 253 F Supp 2d 1111, 1118 (ND

Cal 2003); see also James R Cohen and Peter N Thompson, Disputing

Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation about Mediation, 11 Harv

Negot L Rev 43, 131 (2006). In the absence of Ninth Circuit

precedent, the court adopts the First Circuit’s interpretation of

the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement and finds that this requirement

is not satisfied when parties enter into a mediated settlement

agreement. Pursuant to both the IDEA and California state law,

there must be, at the very least, a state-level impartial due

process hearing before the aggrieved party can file a civil action

in federal court. See 20 USC § 1415(i)(2); Cal Educ Code § 56501. 

Here, the parties agreed to waive the due process hearing

and instead, utilized the IDEA’s mediation process. Doc #10, ¶ 21. 

While plaintiffs ultimately appealed to the CDE, they did so based

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on denial of FAPE under the 2003 mediated settlement agreement, not

based on the findings of a due process hearing officer. Doc #10,

Ex 3 at 2. Because plaintiffs agreed to mediation and did not

participate in a due process hearing, plaintiffs have not exhausted

their administrative remedies under the IDEA. 

Application of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement,

however, is not absolute. Hoeft, 967 F 2d at 1303. The Ninth

Circuit has recognized an exception “based both on general

exhaustion principles and on the legislative history of the IDEA”

and held that where resort to the administrative procedures set

forth in 20 USC § 1415 would be futile or would provide an

inadequate remedy, the exhaustion requirement is excused. Id. In

general, futility will be found when resort to further

administrative process would serve no useful purpose (i e, not

serve the policies behind the exhaustion requirement). Id; see

also Jacob A Stein, Glenn A Mitchell, and Basil J Mezines, 5-49

Administrative Law § 49.02 (Matthew Bender 2006). When resort to

further administrative remedies will not serve any useful purpose,

the doctrine of futility excuses the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement

and provides federal courts jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s

complaint for violation of the IDEA. Id. 

Viewing plaintiffs allegations in the light most

favorable to them, their prior attempts at administrative

resolution provide a near perfect example of futility. After the

AUSD’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement, plaintiffs filed

a complaint directly with the CDE. Doc #10, ¶ 24. The CDE

ultimately found the AUSD out of compliance, yet did nothing to

enforce the AUSD’s obligations under the agreement. Doc #10, ¶26;

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Doc #32, Ex A. Plaintiffs cannot file another complaint with the

CDE since it has already deemed the case “closed” and, under 20 USC

§ 1415, decisions rendered by a state educational agency are final.

Once the CDE deemed the case closed, plaintiffs sought a

due process hearing claiming that the AUSD denied Michael a FAPE,

but the OAH refused to adjudicate plaintiffs’ allegations. Doc

#10, ¶¶ 31,32; Doc #10, Ex 1 at 2. Despite plaintiffs’ allegation

of denial of a FAPE, and not merely a breach of the 2003 agreement,

the OAH dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

finding that “[v]iolations of mediated settlement agreements are

clearly within the purview of CDE.” Doc #10, Ex 1 at 2. 

Plaintiffs cannot seek reconsideration of the OAH’s denial of

jurisdiction because issues decided by the OAH are considered final

under Cal Educ Code § 56505(h). Moreover, it would be futile to

send plaintiffs back to the CDE since the department has already

issued a final decision and refused to take any action to enforce

the AUSD’s compliance with the IDEA. 

In Hoeft, the Ninth Circuit discussed the policy behind

the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement: 

The policies underlying the IDEA’s

administrative procedures reflect both

general principles of administrative law and

the educational philosophy of the IDEA. The

exhaustion doctrine embodies the notion that

agencies, not the courts, ought to have

primary responsibility for the programs that

Congress has charged them to administer. 

The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement also

recognizes the traditionally strong state and

local interest in education, as reflected in

the statute’s emphasis on state and local

responsibility. * * * Exhaustion of the

administrative process allows for the

exercise of discretion and educational

expertise by state and local agencies,

affords full exploration of technical

educational issues, furthers development of a

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complete factual record, and promotes

judicial efficiency by giving these agencies

the first opportunity to correct shortcomings

in their educational programs for disabled

children. 

967 F2d at 1303 (internal citations and quotations omitted). These

policies cannot be furthered when state administrative agencies

refuse to take action. The state agencies’ refusals in this case

are flagrant: the CDE refused to enforce compliance even after

finding the district in breach. And the OAH refused to accept

jurisdiction despite allegations that AUSD denied FAPE to Michael

Pedraza. 

Requiring plaintiffs to seek additional administrative

hearings would not serve the policies behind the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement. While a complete factual record would greatly

facilitate this court’s review, further administrative proceedings

would not likely produce a meaningful basis for that review.

Because plaintiff has pled a denial of FAPE in violation

of the IDEA and because further exhaustion of the administrative

remedies set forth in 20 USC § 1415 would be futile, the court has

federal question jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ IDEA claim pursuant

to 28 USC § 1331. Accordingly, defendants motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ first cause of action is DENIED.

III

Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action are all, in some

way, predicated upon plaintiffs’ first claim — that defendants

violated the “intent and purpose of the IDEA” when they denied

Michael a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year. See Doc #10 at ¶¶

43-48. Because the court has concluded that it possesses subject

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matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ IDEA claim, it may also

exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining claims (Doc #10,

¶¶ 49-79) pursuant to 28 USC §§ 1331 and 1367. 

The court may exercise federal question jurisdiction over

claims two (violation of 42 USC § 1983 for violation of IDEA, 20

USC §§ 1400, et seq), three (violation of § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 20 USC § 794), four (violation of 42

USC § 1983 for violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) and

five (violation of 42 USC § 1983 for violation of the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution) because each claim arises under “the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States.” 20 USC § 1331; see also

Doc #10 at ¶¶ 49-74. Additionally, the court may exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action

for breach of contract (Doc #10, ¶¶ 75-79) because this claim is so

related to defendants’ alleged violation of the IDEA that it forms

part of the same case or controversy. 28 USC § 1367. 

IV

Having addressed jurisdiction, it is now proper to

address defendants’ alternative theory of dismissal. Pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted for claims one, two

and four. Doc #23, 6:14-9:6, 14:21-19:3; Doc #30, 12:20-13:10. 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted “only where there

is either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 

Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before

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Trial, Chapter 9:187 (Rutter Group, 2006); Balistreri v Pacifica

Police Department, 901 F2d 696, 699 (9th Cir 1990). “In resolving

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must (1) construe the complaint

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all wellpleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether

plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would

merit relief.” Id; Cahill v Liberty Mutual Ins Co, 80 F3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir 1996). 

Local and state defendants argue that plaintiffs’ first

(violation of IDEA) and fourth (violation of section 1983

predicated upon section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) causes of

action are deficient. Doc #23, 6:14-9:6, 18:7-19:3; Doc #30,

12:20-13:10. In addition, local defendants argue that plaintiffs’

second cause of action (violation of section 1983 predicated upon

the IDEA) fails to state a claim. Doc #23, 14:21-17:10. 

A

Plaintiffs first claim for relief under the IDEA is not

deficient. Under Rule 12(b)(6), all material facts pled in

plaintiffs complaint are taken as true. As discussed above,

plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleges defendants’ breach of

the IDEA. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

first cause of action (Doc #10, ¶¶43-48) is DENIED. 

B

Local defendants argue that both of plaintiffs’ § 1983

causes of action fail to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Doc #23, 14:21-19:3. State

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defendants join in the motion as to claim number four – plaintiffs’

§ 1983 action predicated upon § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Doc

#30, 12:20-13:10. Although § 1983 allows individuals to enforce

rights conferred by federal laws, “[a]n alleged violation of

federal law may not be vindicated under § 1983 * * * where * * *

Congress has foreclosed citizen enforcement in the enactment

itself, either explicitly, or implicitly by imbuing it with its own

comprehensive remedial scheme.” Vinson v Thomas, 288 F3d 1145,

1155 (9th Cir 2002).

Defendants point out, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act contains a comprehensive

enforcement scheme that “foreclose[s] resort to the more general

enforcement provisions of section 1983.” Id at 156 (internal

quotations omitted); Doc #23, 18:7-19:3; Doc #30, 12:20-13:10. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action for relief under §

1983 predicated on a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Plaintiffs’, however, do argue that § 1983 actions can be

predicated upon violations of the IDEA. Doc #39, 16:1-19:9. 

Defendants contend that the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v

Robinson, 468 US 992 (1984), specifically classifies the IDEA as a

federal statute with a comprehensive enforcement scheme, thus

precluding § 1983 liability. Doc #23, 15:7-14. 

Plaintiffs’ argument is based on Congress’ 1986 amendment

to the IDEA, 20 USC § 1415 the current version of which states, in

pertinent part: 

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to

restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and

remedies available under the Constitution,

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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[42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.], title V of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791

et seq.], or other Federal laws protecting

the rights of children with disabilities,

except that before the filing of a civil

action under such laws seeking relief that is

also available under this subchapter, the

procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of

this section shall be exhausted to the same

extent as would be required had the action

been brought under this subchapter.

20 USC § 1415(l). Plaintiffs argue that, with this amendment,

Congress specifically authorized § 1983 actions predicated on the

IDEA. Doc #39 at 16-19. This court, however, is not persuaded by

plaintiffs’ argument. 

As defendants point out, “section 1983 is not among the

statutes specifically named by Congress in § 1415(l) [nor] is it a

statute ‘protecting the rights of children with disabilities.’” 

Alex G v Bd of Trustees, 332 F Supp 2d 1315, 1317 (ED Cal 2004). 

Furthermore, although the Ninth Circuit has not specifically

addressed whether § 1983 liability for violations of the IDEA is

precluded, several sister circuits have found that the IDEA’s

comprehensive enforcement scheme, even in light of § 1415(l),

precludes § 1983 liability predicated upon the IDEA. Padilla v

School Dist No 1, 233 F3d 1268, 1272-74 (10th Cir 2000); Sellers by

Sellers v School Bd, 141 F3d 524, 529-30 (4th Cir 1998); DiazFonseca v Puerto Rico, 451 F3d 13, 28-29 (1st Cir 2006).

In the absence of Ninth Circuit precedent, this court

adopts the Tenth, Fourth and First Circuits’ interpretation and

finds that the IDEA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme precludes

relief under section 1983. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ second claim

for relief is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

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V

Local defendants move to dismiss each of plaintiffs’

claims against the individual defendants in their official

capacities arguing that it is duplicative and unnecessary because

“[a] suit against a government official in her ‘official capacity’

is, in practice, the same as a suit against the public entity for

which the officer is an agent.” Doc #23, 17:14-15. Local

defendants proffer a similar argument for plaintiffs’ claims

against the AUSD board urging that a “finding of liability against

the [b]oard is simply a redundant finding of liability against the

[d]istrict.” Doc #23, 17:26-27. 

These arguments are misplaced. It is well settled that

an injured party may obtain prospective injunctive relief against

individual defendants in their official capacities. Ex parte

Young, 209 US 123, 159-60 (1908); Natural Resources Defense Council

v California DOT, 96 F3d 420, 422 (9th Cir 1996). While it may be

inappropriate for individuals to be held liable for damages for

acts carried out in their official capacity, plaintiffs may still

seek prospective injunctive relief from the individual defendants

in their official capacities, and it would be inappropriate to

dismiss them as defendants. 

With respect to the AUSD board, it is not clear whether

the defendants seek to have all causes of action, or only

plaintiffs’ third and fourth causes of action, against the board

dismissed. In any event, the defendants have not sufficiently

articulated the relationship between the board and the AUSD for

this court to say with certainty that the board itself should be

dismissed. Because defendants’ only argument is that the parties

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are “duplicative,” the court concludes that defendants can suffer

no prejudice from keeping the board as a named defendant, and the

court declines to dismiss the board. 

Accordingly, local defendants’ motion to dismiss the

individual defendants and the board on the grounds that plaintiffs’

claims are duplicative and unnecessary is DENIED. 

VI

Defendants concede that, under the IDEA, plaintiffs could

obtain compensatory education, injunctive relief, attorney’s fees

and costs and reimbursement for expenses related to Michael’s

education. Doc #23, 19:25-20:3; Doc #30, 13:15-18. Defendants

argue, however, that beyond the above enumerated “equitable”

relief, plaintiffs cannot recover “monetary damages” under the

IDEA, i e, compensatory awards for emotional and physical harm, and

punitive awards. Doc #23, 20:15-18; Doc #30, 13:18-21. Defendants

further assert that plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages

under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Doc #23, 20:25-8; Doc #30,

14:24-15:1. 

Despite disagreement among the circuits, this court is

persuaded that, in the Ninth Circuit, monetary damages are not

available as a remedy under the IDEA. Primarily, plaintiffs argue

that the line of Ninth Circuit cases holding that monetary damages

are not available under the IDEA rests on the erroneous presumption

that a statute conferring such a remedy must be accompanied by

explicit congressional intent to do so. See Mountain View-Los

Altos Union High Sch Dist v Sharron BH, 709 F2d 28, 30 (9th Cir

1983). The Ninth Circuit’s rationale, according to plaintiffs, is

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erroneous in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Franklin v

Gwinnett County Pub Sch Dist, that “absent clear direction to the

contrary by Congress,” there is a presumption of availability of

all appropriate remedies. 503 US 60, 73 (1992) (finding a right to

monetary damages under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

(20 USC §§ 1681-88)). Plaintiffs accordingly assert that 20 USC §

1415(i)(2)(c)(iii), which states that a district court may “grant

such relief as the court determines appropriate” in an IDEA case,

must be construed broadly in favor of the availability of monetary

damages. Doc #39, 21:3-6. Plaintiffs’ argument goes too far. 

First, although the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly

addressed Franklin’s effect on the denial of monetary damages under

the IDEA, since that decision, the court has reaffirmed that

monetary damages are not available. See Robb v Bethel Sch Dist

403, 308 F3d 1047 (9th Cir 2002); Witte v Clark County Sch Dist,

197 F3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir 1999). 

Second, the Supreme Court clarified Franklin in Gebser v

Lago Vista Indep Sch Dist, holding that the general presumption of

available remedies “‘yields where necessary to carry out the intent

of Congress or to avoid frustrating the purposes of the statute

involved.’” 524 US 274, 285 (1998) (citing Guardians Assn v Civ

Serv Comm of New York City, 463 US 582, 595 (1983). The Supreme

Court has specifically addressed the purpose of the IDEA in light

of the statute’s authorization for courts to order all “appropriate

relief.” In School Comm of the Town of Burlington v Dept of Educ

Mass, 471 US 359, 368-69 (1985), the Supreme Court specifically

interpreted the meaning of “appropriate relief” under the IDEA’s

preceding statute finding that relief must be appropriate in light

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of the purpose of the act, which is to provide disabled students

with a free appropriate public education. Thus, the Court found

that parents can be reimbursed for educational services a school

district illegally refuses to provide, but noted that such

reimbursements are not considered “damages.” Id at 370. 

Plaintiffs have not explained how monetary damages unrelated to

Michael’s education would serve to provide him with a “free

appropriate public education.” Furthermore, compensatory and

punitive damages would frustrate the limited purposes of the act by

essentially converting it into a tort claim against educational

agencies. 

Accordingly, this court is persuaded by other circuits,

which hold that the complicated administrative scheme created by

the IDEA demonstrates that Congress did not intend to provide

federal court claimants with all available remedies. See Sellers

by Sellers v Sch Bd, 141 F3d 524, 527 n3 (4th Cir 1998); DiazFonseca v Puerto Rico, 451 F3d 13, 28-29 (1st Cir 2006); Polera v

Bd of Educ, 288 F3d 478, 486 (2d Cir 2002). Indeed, it would make

little sense to provide a comprehensive administrative scheme for

the limited purpose of ensuring a “free appropriate public

education,” only to permit virtually unlimited liability on review

in the district court. Thus, plaintiffs’ claims for monetary

damages under their IDEA cause of action (claim #1) are DISMISSED. 

Plaintiffs, however, may still obtain reimbursement for educational

expenses, compensatory education, injunctive relief and attorneys

fees and costs under their IDEA claim. 

Defendants also urge the court to dismiss plaintiffs’

claims for punitive damages sought under the Rehabilitation Act

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since “parties cannot collect punitive damages based on violations

of [s]ection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Doc #23, 20:25-8; Doc

#30, 14:24-15:1; Barnes v Gorsman, 536 US 181, 189-190 (2002). 

Plaintiffs do not dispute this. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ prayer

for punitive damages under the Rehabilitation Act is DISMISSED. 

VII

For the above stated reasons, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims

predicated on a violation of the IDEA (claim #2) and on a violation

of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (claim #4) are DISMISSED

with prejudice. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ first, third,

fifth, and sixth causes of action are DENIED. 

Local defendants’ motion to dismiss individuals acting in

their official capacities and the AUSD board is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory and punitive damages

under the IDEA is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ claim for

punitive damages under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is

also DISMISSED with prejudice.

The court is in receipt of plaintiffs’ March 12, 2007

letter concerning: confusion over a July 25, 2006 minute order

directing plaintiffs to amend their complaint by September 2006 

(Doc #57); confusion over the status of mediation; and access to

the case file.

The order directing plaintiffs to amend their complaint

can be disregarded. The court’s recollection is that, at the July

2006 case management conference, the parties discussed the

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possibility of amending the complaint depending on the outcome of

the motions to dismiss. In light of the above ruling on these

motions, the court finds that amending the complaint is 

unnecessary. 

The parties shall appear for a case management conference

on May 8, 2007, at 9:00 am.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

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