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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 12, 1999 Decided March 5, 1999

No. 98-7120

National Black Police Association, et al.,

Appellees

v.

District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, et al.,

Appellants

D.C. Statehood Party,

Appellees

Consolidated with

No. 98-7177

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv01476)

Edward Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were John

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M. Ferren, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel,

Deputy Corporation Counsel.

Thomas J. Judge argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Daniel J. Standish, Lisa A. Burns,

Arthur B. Spitzer and Lawrence H. Mirel.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: The District of Columbia appeals

an award of attorney's fees to the National Black Police

Association and associated plaintiffs (collectively the "NBPA")

who won an injunction against a D.C. citizen initiative capping

campaign contributions to candidates for D.C. Mayor, City

Council, and Board of Education. In the litigation resulting

in the fee award, the district court held that the contribution

limits improperly infringed on the free speech of candidates

and the free association rights of contributors in violation of

the First Amendment. The District argues that the victory

won by the plaintiffs was de minimis, and that the more than

$619,000 in fees awarded was so disproportionate to the value

of the victory, measured in campaign contributions, as to

amount to an abuse of discretion. We disagree. First

Amendment freedoms are neither so amenable to financial

measurement nor so easily discounted as the District would

have us believe. For the reasons stated below, we uphold the

district court's award of attorney's fees.

I. BACKGROUND

The history of this litigation is recounted in detail in our

prior opinion in this case, National Black Police Association

v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1997),

and we repeat here only so much as is needed to explain our

decision. The citizen initiative, the D.C. Campaign Contributions Limitation Initiative of 1992 ("Initiative 41") (codified at

D.C. Code s 1-1441), prohibited contributions of more than

$100 to any candidate for Mayor, D.C. Council Chairman, or

at-large Council member, and $50 for any ward council member or Board of Education candidate. It also prohibited any

contributor from giving more than $600 to all candidates in

any election. The overall cap did not apply to contributions

made to initiative, referendum or recall measures. D.C. Law

9-204, D.C. Code s 1-1441.1, amended by D.C. Law 11-144,

43 D.C. Reg. 2174 (1996). The initiative, popularly known as

Initiative 41, took effect March 17, 1993. In February 1994,

less than a year after Initiative 41 passed, Council Member

Jack Evans introduced a bill that would have reinstated the

campaign limits in place prior to Initiative 41. See Jonetta

Rose Barras, Campaign Limits Face Repeal, Wash. Times,

Mar. 11, 1994, at C6. The proponents of the initiative made it

clear that they would again go to the polls to reinstate the

contribution limits if the Council passed Evans's legislation.

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See Statement of Donna F. Edwards, Executive Director,

Center for a New Democracy, April 20, 1994, Appendix II at

10. The bill ultimately failed.

The appellees, five individual and four organizational plaintiffs, filed suit on July 6, 1994, challenging the campaign

finance contribution limits on First and Fifth Amendment

grounds, and as a violation of the Home Rule Charter,

seeking an injunction against the contribution limits. The

district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, and tried

the case over a five-day period in February 1996. Prior to

trial, Council Member Harold Brazil introduced another bill

designed to raise Initiative 41's limits. The Council vote

approving the bill came after the close of trial, but before the

district court issued its injunction.

On March 5, 1996, and again on April 2, 1996, the Council

voted in favor of the Brazil bill. On April 18, 1996, Mayor

Marion Barry signed the legislation repealing the citizen

initiative, and the thirty-day waiting period for congressional

review of city ordinances began to run. The District is

required to submit Council-enacted laws to Congress for a

thirty-day period that excludes Saturdays, Sundays, holidays,

and days when Congress is in recess or not in session; a law

will only take effect if Congress does not enact a joint

resolution of disapproval during the thirty-day period. D.C.

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Code s 1-233(c)(1) (Supp. 1998). The new campaign legislation increased Initiative 41's campaign ceilings so that the

limits became $2,000 for mayoral candidates, $1,500 for Council Chairman candidates, $1,000 for at-large Council member

candidates, $500 for ward Council member candidates and atlarge Board of Education candidates, and $200 for ward

Board of Education member candidates, and raised the total

cap on contributions in a given election to $8,500. D.C. Law

11-144, 43 D.C. Reg. 2174, 2174-75 (1996).

On April 19, 1996,1 the district court issued an injunction on

the grounds that the limitations unconstitutionally infringed

the free speech rights of candidates and the free association

rights of contributors. See National Black Police Ass'n v.

District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 924

F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996), judgment vacated, 108 F.3d 346

(1997). Fifty-two days later, on June 13, 1996, the new

legislation repealing the contribution limits became effective

after the thirty-day period for congressional review. The

District appealed, initially supporting the initiative as constitutional, then changing its position after the Brazil bill passed

and asked that the judgment be vacated as moot. We agreed

and the judgment in the case was vacated as moot because

the District of Columbia had passed the new ordinance. See

National Black Police Ass'n, 108 F.3d at 347-48.

On May 27, 1998, the district court issued an order awarding the NBPA $544,325.85 in attorney's fees and $41,327 in

costs for litigating the case, and on July 17, 1998, issued an

order awarding appellees $31,413.15 in attorney's fees and

$2,765.87 in costs for litigating the attorney's fees request.

The total of the two awards is $619,831.87. The court held

that the plaintiffs/appellees were the prevailing parties despite the eventual mootness of the case because there was an

enforceable judgment against the District during the thirty-

__________

1 The order enjoining enforcement of the campaign contribution

limitations in D.C. Code s 1-1441(a) & (b) (Supp. 1995) is datestamped as filed on April 18, and hand-lettered April 19th. The

district court docket shows the order as issued on April 19th.

Which of the two dates is correct is immaterial to our disposition.

day congressional review period, which expired June 13, 1996.

During that period, it held, the injunction changed the legal

relationship of the parties, and contributors were able to

make substantial contributions that otherwise would not have

been legal.

The District now appeals the award of attorney's fees on

the grounds that the appellees either were not a prevailing

party within the meaning of the statute, or in the alternative

that their victory was de minimis, and thus it was an abuse

of discretion to award the attorney's fees when the benefit to

the plaintiffs was so disproportionate to the fee award. Specifically, they argue that because the injunction was granted

against a repealed statute, and the judgment was ultimately

vacated, the fact that the appellants did achieve a victory

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limited to the congressional review period was insufficient to

support the award of more than $600,000 in attorney's fees.

Finally, they argue that the unfettered exercise of political

speech during a period when there were no campaign contribution limits is harmful, and thus weighs in favor of overturning the fee award. We consider these arguments in turn.

II. PREVAILING PARTY

42 U.S.C. s 1988(b) provides: "In any action or proceeding

to enforce a provision of section[ ] 1983 ... of this title ...

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,

other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as

part of the costs." The Supreme Court stated the basic test

for prevailing party status in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,

111-12 (1992).

[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff

must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his

claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought,

or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement. Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly

benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement.... In short, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual

relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the

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legal relationship between the parties by modifying the

defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the

plaintiff.

Id. (citations omitted).

The District argues that the plaintiffs are not entitled to

attorney's fees because their victories are "purely symbolic,"

technical and de minimis. Initiative 41 had already been

repealed when the injunction issued, and the injunction was

effective for only 52 days. The fact that a panel of this court

has already found the case moot on appeal, they argue,

proves that the District had already supplied any relief to

which the plaintiffs might be entitled. The District first

relies on Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988). In Rhodes,

two plaintiffs were complaining individually about their treatment in prison and seeking injunctive relief. Before the

court entered judgment, one plaintiff had died and the other

had been released from prison. Id. at 2. The court denied

any award of fees. Id. at 4. The District argues that Rhodes

establishes that a plaintiff is not a prevailing party where the

litigation becomes moot. But Rhodes is not controlling in the

present case. The judgment entered in Rhodes did not alter

the relationship between the parties, because no relationship

existed. Here, in contrast, the district court specifically

found when considering the fee award that its injunction had

a real effect on the parties' behavior. The new legislation

became effective only after the injunction issued, and during

the pendency of the District's appeal.

The fact that the case was moot by the time of the appeal

does not alter the fact that the injunction altered the legal

relationship between the parties when it was issued. The

order was not moot when issued, and did not become so for 52

days. Accordingly, the plaintiffs secured a real-world vindication of their First Amendment rights, even if, as it proved,

extraneous events would have given them the substantial

equivalent 52 days later.2

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2 We have no need to consider the merits of plaintiffs' First

Amendment claims ourselves. "[O]nce a court has already ruled

that the claims are actionable--not just colorable--civil rights

As we have long held, the subsequent mootness of a case

does not necessarily alter the plaintiffs' status as prevailing

parties. In Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (D.C.

Cir. 1986), the Rhodes Tavern was scheduled to be razed. A

group attempted to save the building as a historic building.

The group managed to get the issue on the ballot and was

granted a preliminary injunction until the election could be

held. Id. at 1106-08. Although the case was rendered moot

on appeal by the intervening election, we upheld the lower

court's subsequent holding that the plaintiffs were prevailing

parties for the purposes of s 1988(b) on the basis of their

success in obtaining the injunction, which was a major part of

the relief they were seeking. Id. at 1108-10.

The plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in the litigation at

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bar. The relief they ultimately won was specifically the relief

they requested. In Farrar, the Supreme Court stated that

"plaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in

litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties

sought in bringing the suit." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 109 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 453 (1983)). The

inquiry focuses on whether "at the time of the judgment or

settlement ... [the] actual relief on the merits ... materially

alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying

the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the

plaintiff." Id. at 111-12. In this case the district court

properly found that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties

because at the time judgment was entered, the injunction

altered the legal relationship between the parties.

The District next argues that a party may prevail and still

not be awarded attorney's fees, because in some instances "a

technical victory may be so insignificant ... as to be insufficient to support prevailing party status." Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792

__________

claims, the question of whether the party meets the statutory

requirement of having prevailed on the basis of 'civil rights' claims

has been unequivocally answered." Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1106,

1111 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

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(1989). This, it argues, is one of those cases. But for the

congressionally-mandated waiting period, the injunction

would have been moot before it was issued. The Texas State

Teachers Association decision, though cited by the District, in

fact supports the award of fees to the NBPA. In that case,

the fee petitioners had filed a complaint seeking to enjoin a

school district's prohibiting of communications between a

teachers' association and teachers during the school day and

also a regulation prohibiting access to facilities by employee

organizations without the approval of a school principal. Although the plaintiffs failed to obtain much of the relief sought,

they did succeed in establishing the invalidity of some of the

limitations on teacher-to-teacher communications. Id. at 785-

86. In reversing a circuit decision denying plaintiffs' right to

a fee award, the Supreme Court held that a judgment vindicating the First Amendment rights of plaintiffs and "material[ly] alter[ing]" a governmental policy limiting those First

Amendment rights was not one that could be characterized as

"purely technical or de minimis." Id. at 792. Just so here.

We therefore hold that the NBPA is entitled to its fee

award under the test laid out by the Supreme Court in Texas

State Teachers Association. Here, the plaintiffs received

exactly the relief they sought. The District's long-delayed

reaction in passing a new provision raising the campaign

spending limits, after the case closed in federal court, beat

the opinion by only 24 hours, and did not take effect until 52

days after the injunction issued. Moreover, as NBPA notes,

it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the new

legislation would pass congressional review, or more importantly, that the proponents of Initiative 41 would not reintroduce precisely the same limitations by referendum.

III. REASONABLENESS

Having decided that the NBPA was a prevailing party, we

proceed to the reasonableness inquiry. The question we

must answer is whether the district court abused its discretion in setting the amount of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.

s 1988. The District of Columbia argues that the district

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court did abuse its discretion in awarding $619,831.87 in fees,

when the candidates received only a total of $28,883 in

contributions during the period in which the injunction was in

effect. That amounts to $21.46 in fees for each dollar given.

The fees, the District argues, are so incommensurate with the

benefit actually achieved as to render the fee award unreasonable. It also argues that the time value of the money may

be a more appropriate measure of the victory, and that

measure makes their case more powerfully. The best case

the NBPA could make, given that the contributions flowed in

over time, was that the injunction was valued at $481.38, or

the time value of $28,883 at 10 percent for 60 days, a total of

$1,287.61 in attorney's fees for each dollar of the value of the

injunction.

The District also disputes the appellees' suggestion that the

injunction had a greater value because it came at a critical

time in the election race. The District argues that the record

shows that the bulk of the contributions during the injunction

period went to established candidates, not to neophytes who

truly needed "seed money." Three incumbent candidates

received $21,395 of the $25,098 contributed. The remaining

money also went to incumbents. The injunction had no nonmonetary value, because the initiative had already been repealed.

Both the premises and logic of these arguments are wrongheaded. That the vindicated First Amendment rights of the

contributors yielded only a relatively small amount of money

in no way reflects the value of those rights to those who

exercise them. In Texas State Teachers Association, the

Supreme Court did not ask how many teachers took advantage of their First Amendment rights by communicating with

their co-workers, nor did the Court seek to evaluate the

volume or effectiveness of the speech. The First Amendment

rights of the exercisers were intrinsically valuable, and those

who vindicated them were entitled to fees without any attempt at quantification. We know of no hierarchy of First

Amendment values that would make the rights of the contributors here any less intrinsic than those of the teachers in the

Supreme Court case. Likewise, the fact that the contributors

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chose to exercise their First Amendment rights in favor of

established incumbent candidates rather than the neophytes

now favored by the appellants makes them no less valuable.

Had the plaintiffs sought to enjoin an ordinance prohibiting

public gatherings, the vindication of the rights of those who

wish to gather would as well have supported counsel fees,

whether the meeting was of seven adherents of a particular

political viewpoint or seventy times seven.

Further, the "time value" argument is without merit. That

the contributors, as events unfolded, could have made the

contributions after the amendment of the campaign limits is

immaterial to the value of the contribution when made. Also,

as a matter of hard reality, the plaintiffs could not have

known at the time they incurred their legal fees that events

would unfold as they did.

Finally, the District makes the remarkable argument that

"there was danger that harm to the public interests from the

injunction outweighed any benefit to the appellees," because

without the regulation contributors might abuse their rights.

The District actually argues that "even the most fervent

advocate of First Amendment rights would have to recognize

the danger that a period of unregulated campaign contributions, preceding the known contribution limits of the new law

could lead to abuse." We need say little about this argument.

Granted, it is frightening that a government in the United

States would advance the position that the vindication of First

Amendment rights is dangerous because its citizens, unfettered, might abuse those rights. Granted further, we doubt

that even the most lukewarm advocate of First Amendment

rights, let alone the most fervent, could agree with the

District's proposition. Nonetheless, we need discuss it but

little because the District, unsurprisingly, offers no authority

for the proposition that such a danger can affect the entitlement or calculus of counsel fees under 42 U.S.C. s 1988.

As to the length of the injunction, Grano shows that an

injunction of limited duration is sufficient to support an award

of attorney's fees, even where the case has become moot in

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the interim. See Grano, 783 F.2d at 1108-09. There we

noted that

[w]hile it is obvious that a party who succeeds in obtaining a favorable final judgment following a full trial on the

merits and exhaustion of all appeals is a prevailing party,

it is also clear that a party may be considered to have

prevailed even when the legal action stops short of final

appellate, or even initial, judgment due to a settlement or

intervening mootness.

Id. at 1108. Other circuits have reached the same conclusion.

See, e.g., Dahlem v. Board of Educ. of Denver Pub. Schs., 901

F.2d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1990); Bishop v. Committee on

Prof'l Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n, 686

F.2d 1278, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Alioto, 625

F.2d 845, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1980); Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d

118, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1980).

The Supreme Court in Farrar held that a plaintiff's degree

of success is part of the reasonableness calculation when

determining attorney's fees under Section 1988. Having

carefully considered the District of Columbia's arguments, we

hold that the award of fees in this case was reasonable given

the plaintiffs' success on the merits.

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that the district court properly found the plaintiffs

to be the prevailing parties in this case. The subsequent

mootness of the case does not alter the fact that they were

successful in their attempt to enjoin as unconstitutional the

campaign spending limits created by Initiative 41. We also

hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, and that it fully

explained the award in the memorandum opinion accompanying that award. For the foregoing reasons, the attorney's

fees award is affirmed.

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