Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00557/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00557-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 09cr04083 BTM

ORDER DENYING § 2255 MOTION

v.

RAMON ALBERTO RABAGO-FELIX,

Defendant-Movant.

On March 4, 2013, Defendant Ramon Alberto Rabago Felix (“Defendant”) filed a

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court DENIES the motion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 10, 2010, a jury found Defendant guilty of possessing with intent to distribute

5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

On September 20, 2010, judgment was entered. Defendant was sentenced to 120

months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and a five-year term of supervised release.

On September 21, 2010, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Defendant was represented by Anthony E. Colombo, Jr., Esq., during trial

as well as on appeal.

On July 20, 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s judgment in a Memorandum

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Disposition. On September 9, 2011, the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate issued.

On January 4, 2013, the Ninth Circuit received from Defendant a request for

information regarding Defendant’s appeal. The request was dated December 31, 2012.

II. DISCUSSION 

Defendant’s § 2255 motion has been filed beyond the one-year limitations period set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Defendant alleges that he is entitled to equitable tolling

because he never received notice from the Ninth Circuit or his attorney that his appeal was

unsuccessful. As discussed below, the Court is not convinced that Defendant has met his

burden of establishing that equitable tolling is warranted.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the one-year period of limitation began running from the date

on which the judgment of conviction became final. Defendant’s judgment became final on 1

October 18, 2011, 90 days after the filing of the Memorandum Disposition, when the time for

filing a petition for a writ of certiorari expired. United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2000); Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. Thus, the limitations period expired on October 18, 2012. 

Defendant filed his § 2255 motion on March 8, 2013. 

 Section 2255 provides: 1

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion

created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was

prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Defendant does not argue that subsection (f)(2), (f)(3), or (f)(4) apply

to his case.

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The statute of limitations contained in § 2255 is subject to equitable tolling. United

States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). Equitable tolling is available when

the movant shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way of timely filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable

diligence.” Holland v. Florida, __ U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Defendant argues that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because

neither the Ninth Circuit nor his lawyer informed him about the Memorandum Disposition

filed on July 20, 2011. Courts have rejected similar equitable tolling arguments where the

petitioner or movant has failed to show that he acted diligently in finding out the status of his

appeal or other proceeding. In LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2005), the one-year

limitations period for filing a federal habeas petition was tolled pending the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court’s consideration of LaCava’s petition for permission to appeal. However,

LaCava did not file his habeas petition until more than 15 months after the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court denied his petition for permission to appeal. LaCava argued that he had

not received notice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of his petition and that he

acted diligently once he finally received notice. Id. at 276. The Third Circuit held that

LaCava did not act with the requisite diligence because he waited twenty-one months from

the filing of his petition for permission to appeal to inquire with the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court about the status of his petition. Id. at 277. Before that time, he did nothing else to

ensure that his claims were proceeding properly. Id. at 276. See also Belalcazar-Vallealla

v. United States, 2010 WL 4735950 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2010) (rejecting movant’s argument

that he was entitled to equitable tolling due to lack of knowledge that his petition for writ of

certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court because movant waited more than two years

after the filing of his petition for writ of certiorari to request a status update on his petition and

movant did not allege that he ever contacted his attorney about the petition).

As in LaCava, it appears that Defendant acted passively and did not take reasonable

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steps to ensure that he was in compliance with filing deadlines. Defendant did not request

information from the Ninth Circuit regarding his appeal until more than two years after his

appeal had been filed. Furthermore, Defendant does not allege that he ever contacted his

attorney to find out what happened to his appeal. The Court concludes that Defendant has

not established that he acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing his claims. Therefore,

Defendant is not entitled to equitable tolling, and Defendant’s § 2255 motion is untimely.

Defendant’s motion is also denied on the merits because the arguments Defendant

raises are frivolous. Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his trial attorney did not inform him that he could receive a lower sentence by

pleading guilty, and his appellate attorney failed to raise this issue on appeal. However,

whether Defendant went to trial or not, he could not have received a sentence lower than the

120-month mandatory minimum unless he satisfied the safety-valve requirements of USSG

§ 5C1.2. Defendant did not provide information to the Government as required by

subsection (a)(5) of § 5C1.2. Defendant chose not to come in and debrief with the

Government. (Tr. of Sentencing Hearing, 611.) Therefore, there is no prejudice.

Defendant also argues that he qualified for a minor role adjustment. However, as

explained by the Court at sentencing, even if Defendant qualified for a minor role adjustment,

absent safety valve, the statutory mandatory minimum sentence would still be 120 months. 

(Tr. at 619.) The Court did, in fact, agree with defense counsel that Defendant was a minor

participant and accorded a minor role adjustment. (Tr. at 617.) Therefore, there was no

deficient performance.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion is DENIED. The Court denies

a Certificate of Appealability. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 17, 2013

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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