Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03386/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03386-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR EMEONYE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. 

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No. 04-03386 SC

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND

DEFENDANT'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Victor Emeonye ("Plaintiff" or "Claimant") moves

for summary judgment on his action seeking review of the Social

Security Commissioner's final decision denying his claim for

Social Security disability benefits. Defendant Jo Anne Barnhart

("Defendant" or "Commissioner") has cross-motioned for summary

judgment. For the reasons set forth below, this Court hereby

DENIES both motions and REMANDS the matter for further

consideration. 

II. BACKGROUND

Claimant Victor Emeonye worked as a security guard from 1986

to 2002. Administrative Record ("AR") at 28. On June 4, 2002,

Claimant was stabbed multiple times and suffered injuries to the

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chest, neck, abdomen, and hand. AR at 143. He was taken to San

Francisco General Hospital, where he underwent open-heart surgery

to repair a "very complex laceration of the right ventricle" and

to remove a "large amount of clot" in the pericardium. AR at 149. 

Plaintiff's attending surgeons also performed a limited upper

abdominal exploration, but elected not to undertake a full

exploratory laparotomy because of the extensive adhesions already

present in Claimant's abdomen as a result of a 1997 shooting

incident. Id. Claimant remained in the hospital for eight days

and was released with a good prognosis. AR at 138. Claimant

alleges that he has been disabled since the date of the stabbing,

June 4, 2002.

Several months after his surgery, Claimant began experiencing

nausea, digestive problems, dizziness, watery eyes, headaches, and

discomfort in the upper abdomen. AR 215-17; 233-34. As a result

of these symptoms, Plaintiff visited the South of Market Medical

Center for medical attention and follow-up appointments in

October, November, and December 2002, and again in January,

February, and March 2003. Id at 213-17. 

On February 9, 2003, Plaintiff had a seizure and was treated

at San Francisco General Hospital. AR at 130-31. A CT scan taken

days later revealed a chronic subdural hematoma. AR at 124-25. A

subsequent CT scan taken May 6, 2003 confirmed this diagnosis and

also revealed a "left inferior temporal encephalomalacia." AR at

257. A third CT scan was performed on March 3, 2004, after

Claimant's December 10, 2003 hearing before the Administrative Law

Judge ("ALJ"), and revealed no significant changes in Claimant's

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physiological condition. AR at 17. 

Plaintiff experienced another seizure on April 28, 2004, for

which he was treated at Seton Medical Center. AR 19-20. Claimant

was instructed to see a physician for follow-up care, and was

discharged with a prescription for Dilantin anti-seizure

medication. AR at 19. On May 1, 2004, Claimant checked in to the

Emergency Department of the Saint Francis Medical Center, where he

received medical attention for hallucinations. AR at 21. 

Plaintiff asserts that his hallucinations were actually the result

of another seizure episode. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Sum. J. at 5. 

Claimant asserts that he is disabled and unable to return to

work because of chest pain, high blood pressure, gastroesophageal

reflux disease, nausea, and damage to his cerebral cortex, which

Plaintiff claims is responsible for his recurring headaches,

dizziness, and seizures. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Sum. J. at 4-5. 

After his claim for disability benefits was denied at the initial

and reconsideration stages, Claimant testified at a hearing before

an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on December 10, 2003. On

February 19, 2004, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim, a decision

that became final on August 10, 2004 when the Appeals Council

declined to review the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff filed a

complaint seeking review of the ALJ's decision with this Court on

August 18, 2004. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This court may set aside the decision of the ALJ if it is

based on an incorrect application of the law or is not supported

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by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial

evidence" is the relevant evidence which a reasonable person might

accept as adequate to support the ALJ's conclusion. Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). In order to be

"substantial," the evidence must amount to "more than a mere

scintilla," but need not rise to the level of a preponderance. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Where the

evidence could reasonably support either affirming or reversing

the ALJ's decision, this Court may not substitute its judgment for

the ALJ's decision. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Claimant argues that this Court should reverse the ALJ's

decision because the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of

Claimant's treating physician, Dr. Chaudary, who on two separate

occasions opined that Claimant was disabled. Pl.'s Mem. Supp.

Mot. Sum. J. at 5. The parties agree that in order to reject the

opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must provide specific and

legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in

the record. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Sum. J. at 5, citing Reddick at

725; Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Sum. J. at 3, citing Magallanes at

751. The parties disagree, however, on the question of whether

the record supports the ALJ's decision to reject the opinion of

Plaintiff's treating physician. 

In his decision, the ALJ declined to accord significant

weight to Dr. Chaudary's opinion because it was "not shown to be

corroborated by objective or other clinical evidence." AR at 29. 

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After observing Claimant testify and reviewing the evidence in the

record, the ALJ found that the evidence instead demonstrated that

Plaintiff had responded favorably to treatment for his injuries

and demonstrated "few objective abnormalities." AR at 29. The

ALJ therefore credited the assessments of two State Agency Medical

Consultants that reported "sufficient capacity for Medium Work,

while precluding exposure to hazardous conditions." Id. The

Commissioner urges this Court to affirm the ALJ's decision,

arguing that Dr. Chaudary's opinion was "conclusory, inadequately

supported by clinical findings and inconsistent with his own

treatment notes." Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Sum. J. at 7.

Significantly, both the ALJ and the Commissioner noted the lack of

further seizures as a factor that supported their conclusions that

the Plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant time period. 

AR at 29 ("[I]t is relevant that the claimant has reported only

two seizures during the past year..."); Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot.

Summ. J. at 6. 

District Courts retain the discretion to remand a case for

consideration of new evidence not originally presented to the ALJ,

provided that the evidence is material and that there is good

cause for the evidence not having been presented previously. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 90 (1991). 

Evidence is material if it bears "directly and substantially" on

the matter in dispute, see Burton v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 1415, 1417

(9th Cir. 1984), a standard that is satisfied where "there is a

reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed

the outcome of the Secretary's determination had it been before

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1

 This Court notes that the standard for materiality used by

District Courts in evaluating whether newly-discovered evidence

warrants remanding a case is different from the standard utilized

by the Appeals Council in determining whether to review the ALJ's

decision. Compare Booz (outlining the "reasonable possibility"

standard) with 20 C.F.R. 404.970 and 416.1470 (Appeals Council will

review the case if it finds that the ALJ's action, findings, or

conclusion "is contrary to the weight of the evidence currently of

record."). Therefore, the fact that the Appeals Council decided

not to review the ALJ's decision, even after considering Claimant's

evidence of recurring seizure activity, does not affect this

Court's evaluation of whether this same evidence is material under

§405(g). C.f. Ferrell v. Chater, No. C-96-1772, 1996 WL 637851

(N.D. Cal. 1996) (applying materiality standard from Booz in

evaluating evidence that was presented to the Appeals Council but

was not available at the time of the ALJ's decision).

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him." Booz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F.2d

1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1983).1 A claimant shows good cause for not

having produced the evidence by demonstrating that a practical

obstacle existed that prevented the evidence from being previously

discovered. See Burton, 724 F.2d at 1417-18. 

At the hearing, the ALJ directly considered Claimant's

assertion that his subdural hematoma and temporal encephalomalacia

were causing debilitating seizures and other symptoms. 

Ultimately, however, the ALJ remained unconvinced that the

symptoms allegedly caused by Plaintiff's head injuries were severe

enough to render Claimant disabled. In this respect, Claimant's

ability to perform his duties as a security guard free from

debilitating seizure activity and other symptoms was an issue that

was squarely before the ALJ. Consequently, resolution of this

issue, central to Plaintiff's claim, would benefit from

consideration of evidence regarding Plaintiff's more recent

seizure activity, in that such recurring seizures, if proven,

would support Plaintiff's claim that his head injuries were indeed

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severe, and were causing chronic headaches, dizziness, and other

potentially debilitating symptoms. See Burton, 724 F.2d at 1417-

18. 

 This case is therefore similar to Burton, where the Ninth

Circuit found that evidence gathered by the claimant after the

date of the hearing that related directly and substantially to an

issue that was before the ALJ met the materiality requirement of

section 405(g). Id at 1417. Although the new evidence in Burton

consisted of an additional psychiatric evaluation rather than

evidence documenting the recurrence of an allegedly debilitating

condition, this Court is not aware of any reason why that

distinction alone removes this case from the purview of the Ninth

Circuit's decision in Burton. Accordingly, this Court finds that

the evidence of recurring seizures bears directly and

substantially on an issue that was central to Plaintiff's claim,

and is therefore material within the meaning of section 405(g).

Claimant has also demonstrated good cause for his failure to

present this evidence to the ALJ, in that further seizure activity

did not occur until after the ALJ's decision had been issued. 

Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ should consider all evidence

bearing on the issue of Claimant's physical and mental fitness to

return to work during the relevant time period, including evidence

gathered since the December 10, 2003 hearing. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, this Court holds that the

newly-discovered evidence of recurring seizures is material, and

that Claimant has shown good cause for failing to present that

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evidence to the ALJ. Accordingly, this Court DENIES both motions

for summary judgment and REMANDS this matter for further

consideration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2005

 /s/ Samuel Conti 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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