Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03541/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03541-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3541

___________

Emma Jean Jones, Individually and *

all other similarly situated female *

employees, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

The Boeing Company; McDonnell *

Douglas Corporation, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Defendants-Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: August 5, 2004

Filed: August 26, 2004 

___________

Before MELLOY, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Emma Jean Jones appeals, pro se, the district court’s1

 adverse grant of

summary judgment on her sex discrimination claims against her former employers,

The Boeing Company and McDonnell Douglas Corporation (together “ Defendants”).

Jones claims that she received fewer opportunities to work overtime than similarly

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Jones also brought a claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), which

was dismissed by the district court on August 5, 2003. Jones mentions this claim in

her main brief and reply brief, but does not argue that the district court’s dismissal of

this claim was erroneous. The Defendants therefore argue that Jones has waived the

issue. It is difficult to tell whether Jones meant to raise the issue or not. Even

assuming she did, however, the district court’s dismissal of the claim was not

erroneous, because Jones did not allege that she was paid at a lower rate than

similarly situated men, as the statute requires. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 

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situated male employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 213.010 et seq.

2

 On appeal, Jones argues that: 1) she established a prima facie

case of sex discrimination and showed Defendants’ alleged non-discriminatory reason

was merely a pretext for discrimination; 2) at the very least, there was a genuine issue

of material fact that precluded summary judgment; 3) she was entitled to an

evidentiary inference due to Defendants’ spoliation of evidence; 4) the district court

erred in denying her motion to compel memoranda relating to Defendants’ destruction

of documents; and 5) the district court erred in ordering her to pay Defendants’ costs.

After careful review, see Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 982 (8th

Cir. 2004) (standard of review), we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Jones claimed that she was denied access to overtime work on the basis

of her gender. However, the uncontroverted evidence established that she and other

female employees were among the top earners in overtime pay in her department for

the relevant time period. Jones did not submit any evidence to support her claim that

males were regularly offered opportunities to work overtime before females. She

therefore failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. See McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

240 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2001) (listing elements of a prima facie case). Moreover,

even if Jones had established a prima facie case, she offered no evidence to show that

Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation of their overtime distribution

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Because we find that the destruction of the asking sheets did not prejudice

Jones, we also find that the district court’s denial of Jones’s motion to compel

production of Defendants’ internal memoranda regarding the preservation of these

asking sheets in a related case was not an abuse of discretion. At most, these

memoranda would have shown that Defendants violated their own self-imposed stay

against destroying documents. Jones does not explain, however, how such

memoranda would have demonstrated sex discrimination or helped her overcome

Defendants’ summary judgment motion. 

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procedures was merely a pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 804. Thus, there was no genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary

judgment.

The district court also did not err in refusing to give Plaintiff an evidentiary

inference on the basis of Defendants’ destruction of some “asking sheets,” which

Jones claims would have demonstrated that Defendants offered overtime to men

before they offered it to women. An adverse inference instruction is warranted only

when there is “a finding of intentional destruction indicating a desire to suppress the

truth” and prejudice to the plaintiff. Stevenson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 354 F.3d

739, 746-48 (8th Cir. 2004). Here, Jones submitted no evidence to suggest that

Defendants intentionally destroyed the asking sheets. Furthermore, Jones herself

submitted into evidence copies of many of the disputed asking sheets. Contrary to

Jones’s claim, these sheets did not demonstrate that Defendants offered overtime to

men before they offered it to women. Thus, Jones was not prejudiced by Defendants’

destruction of the asking sheets.3

Finally, we find no error in the district court’s imposition of Defendants’ costs

on Jones. Jones is correct to point out that the district court inaccurately stated that

she had not paid costs in either of her two previous suits against Defendants, when

in fact she had paid costs in one of those suits. Despite this inaccuracy, we

nonetheless find that the district court’s award of costs was warranted, given that

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Defendants prevailed on summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1); E.E.O.C.

v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 338 (8th Cir. 1986) (explaining that under Rule

54(d) costs are to be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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