Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07196/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07196-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 740
Nature of Suit: Railway Labor Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 1999 Decided December 28, 1999

No. 98-7196

Air Line Pilots Association, International,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant

v.

Northwest Airlines, Inc.,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Consolidated with

98-7202

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01917)

John J. Gallagher argued the cause for appellant/crossappellee. With him on the briefs were Cathy Wassberg, Neal

D. Mollen, and Intra L. Germanis.

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Jerry Anker argued the cause for appellee/cross-appellant.

With him on the briefs were Elizabeth Ginsburg and James

K. Lobsenz.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: For more than 30 years Northwest Airlines has required newly hired pilot trainees to sign

individual employment contracts called "Conditions of Employment." In 1995 Northwest added several new provisions

to the Conditions, including a clause under which each trainee

agreed to binding arbitration of any claim he might have

against Northwest for discrimination in employment.

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which is the union

that represents Northwest pilots once they have completed

their training, filed suit claiming that the carrier violated the

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. s 151 et seq., by requiring

individual trainees to agree to the Conditions without first

having bargained with ALPA over them. The district court

granted partial summary judgment for each party; the court

enjoined Northwest, pending completion of the bargaining

and mediation process, from applying the Arbitration Clause

to pilots who have completed their training and are represented by ALPA, but refused to enjoin the use of any other of

the Conditions.

Northwest appeals, claiming that under Alexander v.

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the arbitration of

individual statutory claims is not a mandatory subject of

collective bargaining and that Northwest is therefore free to

bargain individually with its employees over the Arbitration

Clause. We agree and accordingly reverse the judgment of

the district court on this issue.

ALPA cross-appeals, claiming the district court should have

enjoined the use of other provisions that Northwest added to

the Conditions in 1995. Because, in light of subsequent

events, the cross-appeal does not present a live controversy,

we dismiss ALPA's claim without prejudice to its raising the

same claim in the future.

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I. Background

The relationship between Northwest and ALPA is governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. s 151 et

seq. Under RLA s 2 First, 45 U.S.C. s 152 First, the carrier

is required to "exert every reasonable effort to make and

maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and

working conditions." This statutory obligation to bargain

with the union in good faith is backed up by RLA s 2

Seventh, 45 U.S.C. s 152 Seventh, which provides that "[n]o

carrier ... shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working

conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or

in [s 6 of the RLA]." In other words, if the carrier is unable

to reach agreement with the union on changing a rate of pay,

rule, or working condition, then it must maintain the status

quo until it has satisfied the multi-step process of negotiation,

mediation, arbitration, and cooling-off required under RLA

s 6, 45 U.S.C. s 156. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R.

Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969)

(describing negotiation process under s 6 as "almost interminable"). If at the end of that process the parties have not

reached an agreement, then the employer may unilaterally

implement its proposal and the union may resort to economic

self-help to resist the change.

Matters that are "directly related to 'rates of pay, rules,

and working conditions'," and may therefore trigger the

obligations of RLA s 2 First and Seventh, are denominated

"mandatory subject[s] of collective bargaining," a phrase

courts have borrowed from case law arising under the National Labor Relations Act. Japan Air Lines Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 538 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1976). If a

carrier and a union have a dispute over a proposed change to

a mandatory subject of bargaining, then the union can get an

injunction prohibiting the carrier from unilaterally implementing the change before completing the lengthy negotiation

process set out in s 6. On the other hand, if the dispute is

over a non-mandatory subject, then the carrier may unilaterally implement the change unless limited by an existing

collective bargaining agreement (CBA).

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A. Northwest's Practice, 1966-97

ALPA has represented the pilots of Northwest Airlines in

collective bargaining for nearly 60 years. When a pilot first

begins his training with Northwest, he is not represented by

ALPA or by any other union. When the pilot completes his

training and enters into "revenue service" as a probationary

employee, however, he immediately becomes a member of the

bargaining unit represented by ALPA.

As early as 1966 Northwest unilaterally began to require

that each trainee pilot agree to the Conditions as part of his

contract of employment. The earliest known Conditions included provisions covering such matters as the trainee's pay,

permission to use his likeness in promotions, and the assignment of rights to anything he might invent. Although trainees are not represented by ALPA when they agree to the

Conditions, some of the Conditions either expressly or implicitly continue to apply for as long as the signatory remains

employed as a pilot with Northwest, that is, even after the

pilot becomes a member of the bargaining unit represented

by ALPA.

Over the course of three decades Northwest made numerous changes to the Conditions without consulting ALPA. In

1995 the airline added an Arbitration Clause requiring employees to submit to binding arbitration all claims against it

arising from the employment relationship. Of particular

relevance to this appeal, the Arbitration Clause specifically

requires binding arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims brought under "the Minnesota Human Rights

Acts, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or

any other state or federal law prohibiting employment discrimination" (citations omitted). Also in 1995, Northwest

unilaterally introduced other new Conditions: (1) setting the

pilot's monthly salary during the probationary period, when

he has completed his training and is represented by ALPA;

(2) requiring the pilot to submit to a medical examination if

Northwest has reason to believe he is no longer able to

perform his essential job functions; (3) acknowledging that

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Northwest may change various working conditions at its

option; and (4) acknowledging that failure to comply with

company rules is a ground for termination.

B. ALPA's Objection, 1997-Present

In 1997 Northwest notified ALPA that it was terminating a

probationary pilot and attached to the notice a copy of the

Conditions he had signed. ALPA, which claims that this was

the first it had learned of the Conditions, demanded that

Northwest cease requiring trainee pilots to agree to them and

that it inform each pilot who had signed Conditions that they

were null and void. When Northwest refused to do so, ALPA

filed suit in district court seeking injunctive and declaratory

relief on the ground that Northwest had violated the RLA by

unilaterally implementing the Conditions, which ALPA alleged are individual contracts concerning mandatory subjects

of bargaining, without first negotiating with the Union as

required by the RLA.

While the suit was pending before the district court, Northwest, in an attempt to respond to some of ALPA's concerns

regarding the 1995 Conditions, deleted three and revised one

of the provisions to which the Union objected. In presenting

the new version (the 1997 Conditions) to ALPA, Robert

Brodin, Northwest's vice president for labor relations, wrote:

Northwest has never interpreted or applied the Conditions of Employment to operate in derogation of the

collective bargaining agreement between Northwest and

ALPA. Northwest and ALPA both agree that in the

event of overlap or inconsistency, the collective bargaining agreement controls.

As to the Arbitration Clause in particular, however, Brodin

wrote that "Northwest continues to believe that it has the

right to insist on arbitration of non-contract claims as a

condition of employment for new hires." The only significant

change Northwest made to the Arbitration Clause was to

clarify that it does not apply to claims arising out of the CBA

between Northwest and ALPA.

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Both ALPA and Northwest moved for summary judgment

on the validity of the Conditions. The district court first

considered whether Northwest's use of Conditions originating

before 1995 violated the RLA. The court held that ALPA, by

its failure to object to the Conditions for some 30 years, had

arguably consented to them, which if true would make use of

the Conditions an implied term of the CBA between Northwest and ALPA. Because that dispute related solely to the

meaning of the CBA, the court held it could be resolved only

by binding arbitration pursuant to RLA ss 2 Sixth and 3

First, 45 U.S.C. ss 152 Sixth and 153 First.

The court concluded that ALPA had objected in a timely

fashion, however, to the Arbitration Clause introduced in

1995, and therefore had not acquiesced in Northwest's use of

that term. The district court then held that the Arbitration

Clause deals with a mandatory subject of bargaining. Because the Arbitration Clause would have worked a change

with respect to a mandatory subject and ALPA had neither

agreed to nor acquiesced in that change, the court enjoined

Northwest from applying the Arbitration Clause to any pilot

represented by ALPA.

The district court did not address the question whether

other clauses ALPA claimed were newly included in the 1995

Conditions also violated the RLA. ALPA therefore moved to

amend the court's order so as to enjoin Northwest from

implementing those clauses but the district court denied the

motion because of ALPA's failure to comply with local court

rules.

II. Analysis

ALPA does not challenge the district court's determination

that Northwest's use of Conditions originating before 1995

must be resolved through binding arbitration. Therefore,

both Northwest's appeal and ALPA's cross-appeal concern

only the Union's request for an injunction against Northwest's use of particular provisions that ALPA maintains first

appeared in the 1995 Conditions.

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A. Northwest's Appeal: The Arbitration Clause

Is the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims a mandatory subject of bargaining? Northwest says not and claims

the district court erred in enjoining its use of the Arbitration

Clause, reasoning as follows. Under Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), a union cannot waive the right

of the employees it represents to bring a statutory discrimination claim in a judicial forum. Because ALPA cannot agree

to such a provision, it cannot be a mandatory subject of

bargaining. Therefore, Northwest is free to deal directly

with its employees over the arbitration of such claims.

For its part, ALPA urges that the arbitration of statutory

claims is a mandatory subject, and that we should therefore

affirm the district court's judgment, for three independent

but related reasons. First, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson

Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) "effectively supersedes"

Gardner-Denver. If, as ALPA reads Gilmer, a union may in

collective bargaining waive the employees' right to a judicial

forum for a statutory discrimination claim, then there is no

reason to doubt that the arbitration of statutory claims is a

mandatory subject of bargaining. Second, even if GardnerDenver is still good law, it has no effect upon whether

arbitration of statutory claims is a mandatory subject of

bargaining. In other words, as the district court held, Northwest must bargain with ALPA over the Arbitration Clause

regardless whether ALPA could lawfully agree to it because

it is directly related to "rates of pay, rules, or working

conditions." Third, even if waiver of the right to a judicial

forum is not a mandatory subject of bargaining because

ALPA cannot agree to such a waiver under Gardner-Denver,

the procedural rules for arbitration, as specified in the Arbitration Clause, are mandatory subjects of bargaining.

In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court considered whether an employee who had pursued arbitration of a racial

discrimination claim under a CBA was thereby precluded

from later asserting a Title VII claim based upon the same

facts. 415 U.S. at 46-55. The Supreme Court held that

"there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights

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under Title VII." Id. at 51. Because Title VII provides each

individual with the right to be free of invidious discrimination,

"the rights conferred can form no part of the collectivebargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat

the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII." Id.

Therefore, although the union could and did prospectively

waive the employee's right to sue upon (rather than arbitrate)

his claim of discrimination in violation of the CBA, the

employee's resort to arbitration of this claim did not preclude

him from suing upon his statutory claim of discrimination.

See id. at 51-52.

The Supreme Court also rejected the suggestion that a

court should dismiss a Title VII claim if the facts underlying

it had already been the subject of arbitration under a CBA

that prohibited, and provided a remedy for, the discrimination. According to the Court, arbitral processes were inferior

to judicial processes for protecting statutory rights, and the

Congress intended the federal courts to exercise final responsibility over Title VII claims. See id. at 56-59. The Court

was particularly concerned that a union, which ordinarily

controls the arbitration of an employee's claim, might, if

allowed, compromise the would-be Title VII plaintiff's statutory rights: "In arbitration, as in the collective-bargaining

process, the interests of the individual employee may be

subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the

bargaining unit." Id. at 58 n.19.

In the early 1980s the Supreme Court twice applied the

reasoning of Gardner-Denver beyond the context of Title

VII. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,

450 U.S. 728 (1981), employees had filed suit under the Fair

Labor Standards Act after having lost in arbitration on a

contractual claim arising from the same facts. The employer

argued that the employees' union had waived their right to

bring the FLSA claim in court, noting that the CBA required

employees to arbitrate "any controversy" and that the employees had in fact pursued this matter to arbitration. Id. at

736. The Court rejected this argument:

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[T]he FLSA rights petitioners seek to assert in this

action are independent of the collective bargaining process. They devolve on petitioners as individual workers,

not as members of a collective organization. They are

not waivable. Because Congress intended to give individual employees the right to bring their minimum-wage

claims under the FLSA in court, and because these

congressionally granted FLSA rights are best protected

in a judicial rather than in an arbitral forum, we hold

that petitioners' claim is not barred by the prior submission of their grievances to the contractual disputeresolution procedures.

Id. at 745. In McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S.

284 (1984), the Supreme Court rejected the employer's argument that an employee's s 1983 claim should be dismissed

because he had already pursued to arbitration under the CBA

a claim based upon the same facts. The Court premised its

holding upon two factors: the inadequacy of arbitration for

the enforcement of individual statutory rights, and the intention of the Congress that s 1983 be judicially enforced. See

id. at 289-90.

In light of the Court's broad pronouncement in GardnerDenver that "there can be no prospective waiver of an

employee's rights under Title VII," and the application of this

principle to other federal statutes in Barrentine and McDonald, many courts concluded that the reasoning of

Gardner-Denver applied to still other federal employment

statutes, see Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering

Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526 (11th Cir. 1997) (Americans with

Disabilities Act); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836

F.2d 1544, 1553 (10th Cir. 1988) (Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (ADEA)), and held that Gardner-Denver

precluded prospective waiver of the right to sue even by the

individual employee, see Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1990) (Title VII), vacated for

reconsideration, 500 U.S. 930 (1991), in light of Gilmer;

Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir.

1989) (Title VII); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221,

229 (3d Cir. 1989) (ADEA), disapproved in Gilmer, 500 U.S.

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20, 24 n.1 (1991); Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l,

Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988) (Title VII).

In 1991, however, the Court staked out a limit to the

principle announced in Gardner-Denver. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Court held

that a claim arising under the ADEA was validly made

subject to binding arbitration by an agreement between the

employer and the individual (non-union) employee--a result

in some tension with the broad pronouncement in GardnerDenver that "there can be no prospective waiver of an

employee's rights under Title VII." 415 U.S. at 51. The

Court began by noting that under the Federal Arbitration

Act (FAA) an agreement to arbitrate individual statutory

rights is enforceable unless the Congress intended to preclude waiver of access to a judicial forum for vindication of

that right. See id. at 26. The text and legislative history of

the ADEA reflect no such intent, and the Court rejected the

argument that waiver should be precluded because arbitration is an inferior mechanism for resolving individual statutory claims--an argument to which the Court had given some

weight in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald, see

id. at 34 n.5. The Court expressly distinguished those cases

as follows:

First, [they] did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent

judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory

claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to

resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory

actions. Second, because the arbitration in those cases

occurred in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement, the claimants there were represented by their

unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important

concern therefore was the tension between collective

representation and individual statutory rights, a concern

not applicable to the present case. Finally, those cases

were not decided under the FAA.... Therefore, those

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cases provide no basis for refusing to enforce Gilmer's

agreement to arbitrate his ADEA claim.

Id. at 35.

Thus, Gilmer establishes that an individual employee may

himself validly agree in advance to binding arbitration of a

statutory claim he may later have against his employer. See

Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1478 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (citing Gilmer for the "general rule [that] statutory

claims are fully subject to binding arbitration, at least outside

of the context of collective bargaining"). The Court in Gilmer did not, however, address the continuing vitality of the

statement in Gardner-Denver that "the rights conferred [by

Title VII] can form no part of the collective bargaining

process." 415 U.S. at 51; see also Wright v. Universal

Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 119 S. Ct. 391, 396 (1998)

(raising but not resolving the question "whether or not Gardner-Denver's seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver

of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer").

ALPA suggests that Gilmer "effectively supersedes"

Gardner-Denver and permits a union to waive the employees'

right to a judicial forum for statutory claims. The Fourth

Circuit and some district courts agree, see Austin v. OwensBrockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir.

1996); see, e.g., Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 959

F. Supp. 569, 573-74 (D. Conn. 1997), prematurely we think.

Whatever the Supreme Court said--or, more precisely,

refrained from saying--in Wright, we do not understand the

Court in Gilmer to have overruled Gardner-Denver. Rather,

the Court expressly distinguished that case, which strongly

implies that it remains the law within its field of application.

We therefore leave to the Court itself the prerogative of

overruling its own precedent (if it will); we apply the law as it

stands. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).

We see a clear rule of law emerging from Gardner-Denver

and Gilmer: Unless the Congress has precluded his doing so,

an individual may prospectively waive his own statutory right

to a judicial forum, but his union may not prospectively waive

that right for him. All of the circuits to have considered the

meaning of Gardner-Denver after Gilmer, other than the

Fourth, are in accord with this view. See Albertson's, Inc. v.

United Food & Com. Workers Union, 157 F.3d 758, 761-62

(9th Cir. 1998); Penny v. United Parcel Service, 128 F.3d

408, 413-14 (6th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster

Engineering Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526 (11th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 365 (7th Cir. 1997); cf.

Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1453 (10th Cir.

1997) (individual represented by union need not exhaust

remedies under CBA before filing statutory claim in court);

Varner v. National Super Market, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213

(8th Cir. 1996) (same); Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 117-18 (2d

Cir. 1995) (same); see also Cole v. Burns Int'l Security

Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("It is plain

that the Supreme Court saw a critical distinction in the

situations raised by Gardner-Denver and Gilmer: GardnerUSCA Case #98-7196 Document #486327 Filed: 12/28/1999 Page 11 of 17
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Denver involved arbitration in the context of collective bargaining .... Gilmer, on the other hand, raised an individual

employee claim outside the collective bargaining context").

Thus, even after Gilmer, Gardner-Denver stands as a

firewall between individual statutory rights the Congress

intended can be bargained away by the union, see, e.g.,

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 706-07 &

n.11 (1983) (union may waive officers' statutory right to be

free of discrimination, such as enhanced discipline, based

upon union activity), and those that remain exclusively within

the individual's control. Absent congressional intent to the

contrary, a union may not use the employees' individual

statutory right to a judicial forum as a bargaining chip to be

exchanged for some benefit to the group; the statutory right

"can form no part of the collective bargaining process."

Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51. Applying this rule to the

facts of the present case, ALPA could not lawfully agree to

the Arbitration Clause because it would effect a waiver of the

employees' right to a judicial forum for the vindication of

their statutory claims of discrimination in employment.

ALPA argues, however, that even if Gardner-Denver precludes it from waiving employees' right of access to a judicial

forum for a statutory claim, the arbitration of an

employment-related claim--whatever the legal basis for the

claim--remains a mandatory subject of bargaining. The

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district court agreed, holding that the Arbitration Clause is a

mandatory subject of bargaining "regardless of whether

[ALPA] can itself enter into arbitration agreements on behalf

of its members" because the Clause "governs rules or conditions of the pilots' employment with Northwest." In effect,

the district court held that an employer has to bargain over a

proposal concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions

that the union is not authorized to accept and the employer

could not enforce.

We cannot agree. The "essence of collective bargaining is

a notion of mutuality, that if a subject is brought up each side

has at least the authority both to offer and to concede."

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton

Belt R.R. Co., 385 F.2d 581, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1967). It follows

that a proposal to trade that which is not one's to give cannot

be a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Brotherhood of

R.R. Trainmen, 385 F.2d at 603-04 (proposal to bargain over

effects of job terminations, normally a mandatory subject,

held non-mandatory because union "could not bargain away

any part of the rights that accrued to employees under the

[arbitral] Award"); Southern Pacific Co. v. Switchmen's Union, 356 F.2d 332, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1966) (proposal to redefine

certain work as within particular craft held non-mandatory

because railroad could not lawfully agree to it: "These then

are not such disputes as can be resolved by capitulation of the

railroad and thus are not the proper subject [for bargaining

under RLA] section 6"). Because Gardner-Denver precludes

ALPA from agreeing to binding arbitration of individual

statutory claims, we conclude that the Arbitration Clause is

not a mandatory subject of bargaining.*

ALPA argues next that the district court properly enjoined

Northwest's implementation of the Arbitration Clause even if

the waiver of employees' right to a judicial forum for statuto-

__________

* Although Gardner-Denver suggests that the arbitration of individual statutory claims is an impermissible subject of bargaining,

we need not decide today whether it is an impermissible or a

permissible subject; the only issue presented is whether it is a

mandatory subject. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 385

F.2d at 604 n.52.

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ry claims is not a mandatory subject, because ALPA can still

lawfully bargain over the procedures to be used in arbitration.

The Union claims these procedures are a mandatory subject

of bargaining because the remedy awarded to a successful

complainant in the arbitration of a discrimination claim could

affect the "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" of all

employees, for example by restructuring their seniority

rights.

We fail to see how a remedy imposed by an arbitrator in a

proceeding involving only the employer and an individual

employee could have any adverse effect upon the working

conditions of the employees in the bargaining unit. Although

an arbitral award could indeed subject the employer to an

obligation inconsistent with the CBA, that is not the Union's

problem but the employer's: the employer simply cannot

make any unilateral change respecting a mandatory subject

of bargaining without first negotiating with the Union as

required under the RLA, and a private arbitration between

the employer and an individual employee does not alter this

rule of law.

In any event, as we read Gardner-Denver and Gilmer,

ALPA can have no role in negotiating obligatory procedural

rules for arbitration of individual statutory claims. Read

together, those cases establish that only the individual can

determine in what forum he will vindicate his statutory rights,

and this choice should not be burdened by the majoritarian

concerns that motivate a union. If a union has a mandatory

role in negotiating the terms that will apply to arbitration,

then it could also contrive to discourage the exercise of the

employee's right to choose a forum.

We conclude that the Arbitration Clause is not a mandatory

subject of bargaining under the RLA. Therefore, Northwest

is not required by RLA s 2, 45 U.S.C. 152, to negotiate with

ALPA over it. Instead, Northwest may, as it did, propose

the Arbitration Clause directly to each individual employee.

While it has long been clear that "members [of a bargaining

unit] cannot bargain individually on behalf of themselves as to

matters which are properly the subject of collective bargaining," Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192

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(1944), it is just as well-established that an employee represented by a union may bargain directly with his employer

over a non-mandatory subject of collective bargaining as long

as the proposed individual contract "is not inconsistent with a

collective agreement" or somehow implicated in an unfair

labor practice, J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339

(1944).

Here, the Arbitration Clause applies only to the statutory

rights of individuals and is not inconsistent with the CBA;

nor is Northwest using its direct dealings with the employees

either to change anyone's obligations under the CBA or to

avoid dealing with the union on a mandatory subject of

bargaining. Under these circumstances, the RLA is no bar

to Northwest's contracting individually with its employees.

B. ALPA's Cross-Appeal: Other Clauses New in 1995

ALPA claims the district court erred in failing to enjoin

Northwest from unilaterally implementing provisions other

than the Arbitration Clause that the carrier added to the 1995

Conditions and that concern mandatory subjects of bargaining. Northwest counters that ALPA's cross-appeal does not

present a ripe controversy in light of the airline's adoption of

the scaled-down 1997 Conditions and its subsequent representations concerning their application. For the reasons stated

below, we agree with Northwest and dismiss ALPA's crossappeal for want of a ripe controversy.

In 1997 Northwest dropped three of the clauses in the 1995

Conditions about which ALPA now complains. ALPA asserts

that its challenge to these three clauses remains ripe because

"Northwest has done nothing ... to alter or revoke the 1995

[Conditions] that have been signed by 1050 Northwest pilots,

and that still remain in effect." At oral argument before this

court, however, Northwest deliberately and unequivocally

represented that the 1997 Conditions supersede any previous

Conditions, and that the three clauses deleted in 1997 will not

be enforced against persons who signed the 1995 (or prior)

Conditions.

Although we are aware that "voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not ... make the case moot," a claim

for injunctive relief still requires "some cognizable danger of

recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility

which serves to keep the case alive." United States v. W.T.

Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953); see also Community

for Creative Non-Violence v. Hess, 745 F.2d 697, 700-01

(D.C. Cir. 1984). ALPA's only response to this requirement

is to say that at some time in the future Northwest might not

honor its representation to the court. That is insufficient to

render ALPA's requests for injunctive relief ripe at this time.

If in the future Northwest were to enforce one of the clauses

against a signatory employee, or were to indicate its "firm

intention" to do so, Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1481

(D.C. Cir. 1984), then the Union would have a ripe claim for

injunctive relief; at present, however, "the parties have no

live dispute ... and whether one will arise in the future is

conjectural," Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).

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ALPA's only other concern is with the amended version of

the Rules of Conduct clause in the 1997 Conditions. ALPA

objected to the Rules of Conduct clause in the 1995 Conditions because it stated that failure to comply with the company's rules and regulations "shall be grounds for [ ] termination," but termination is governed by the CBA. In 1997,

therefore, Northwest amended the Rules of Conduct provision to provide that Northwest's authority to discipline an

employee represented by the Union is "subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the applicable [CBA]."

This revision, coupled with Northwest's firm representation

that it will enforce the Rules of Conduct provision only to the

extent allowed by the 1997 Conditions, would seem to render

ALPA's claim for injunctive relief unripe.

At oral argument, however, ALPA suggested that the

revised Rules of Conduct clause still presents a ripe controversy insofar as it provides that "the Company, in its sole

discretion, may amend [its] rules, regulations, or policies from

time to time." If Northwest ever "in its sole discretion"

changed a rule, regulation, or policy concerning a mandatory

subject of bargaining, then it would violate its obligation

under the RLA to negotiate such changes with the Union. In

response to concern over this part of the Rules of Conduct

clause, Northwest represented to the court that, "as to manUSCA Case #98-7196 Document #486327 Filed: 12/28/1999 Page 16 of 17
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datory subjects of bargaining, [Northwest] cannot and will

not make unilateral changes. Because the union has a legitimate interest." By this representation Northwest acknowledges that the phrase "in its sole discretion" is implicitly

qualified by the laws of the United States, just as if the

Condition said "provided, however, that Northwest may not

make a change concerning a mandatory subject of bargaining

without first negotiating with ALPA as required by the

RLA."

In light of Northwest's representation, we fail to discern

any present controversy over the Rules of Conduct clause.

The parties agree that the clause does not affect Northwest's

obligations under the RLA to negotiate with ALPA. Northwest has not invoked the clause to make any unilateral

change concerning a mandatory subject of bargaining, and it

unequivocally states that it will not do so in the future.

ALPA's claim reduces to the fear that sometime in the future

Northwest may renege upon this representation to the court.

That possibility is speculative at best, and in our view utterly

implausible. But should it ever come to pass, then the doors

of the courthouse will be open wide to ALPA.

III. Conclusion

Northwest did not violate the RLA by implementing the

Arbitration Clause without first negotiating with ALPA. In

No. 98-7196, therefore, we vacate the injunction the district

court entered against Northwest. In No. 98-7202, ALPA's

cross-appeal, we do not find a ripe case or controversy at this

time; accordingly, we dismiss that case without prejudice to

ALPA's raising the same claim in the future.

It is so ordered.

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