Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01132/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lydia Marquez et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

City of Phoenix et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 08-1132-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Taser International Inc.’s Motion for

Discovery Dispute Resolution Re Expert Fees (doc. #131), which Defendants Guliano,

City of Phoenix, and Joshua Roper have joined (doc. #133). 

I. Background

A. Plaintiffs’ Complaint

Plaintiffs are the family members of decedent Ronald Marquez. Plaintiffs allege

that on July 28, 2007, they summoned the Phoenix police in the hopes of diffusing a

family dispute. The family was concerned that Mr. Marquez’s daughter, Cynthia, was

trying to “save” her three-year-old daughter Destiny by ridding her of demons. When

Officers Roper and Guliano arrived at the house, the Marquez family directed them to a

back bedroom, where they apparently saw Mr. Marquez lying on a bed and holding his

granddaughter Destiny. Officers Roper and Guliano then allegedly proceeded to deploy

Officer Roper’s taser twenty-two times for a total of 123 seconds on or around Mr.

Marquez although he was clearly unarmed and carrying a young child. The officers then

Case 2:08-cv-01132-NVW Document 139 Filed 01/22/10 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

handcuffed Mr. Marquez. However, shortly thereafter Mr. Marquez experienced cardiac

distress and died. Mr. Marquez’s autopsy report revealed that the cause of death was

excited delirium from being subjected to the taser. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit

against the City of Phoenix, Officer Roper, Officer Guliano, asserting various state and

federal claims, and against Taser International Inc., the manufacturer of Officer Roper’s

taser, under a products liability theory. 

B. Discovery Dispute

This discovery dispute arose because Plaintiffs deposed six of Taser’s experts and

the expert for the City of Phoenix but refused to pay expert deposition fees. Plaintiffs

contend that they are indigent and need not pay the fees under the “manifest injustice”

exception to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). In the alternative, Plaintiffs request that the

Court reserve judgment on Defendants’ motion for fees until the case is finally resolved. 

II. Analysis

“A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose

opinions may be presented at trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A). “Unless manifest

injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery . . . pay the

expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(4)(C). There is no definition for “manifest injustice” in the rules. However, the

Advisory Committee Notes explain that the court “can protect, when necessary and

appropriate, the interests of an indigent party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C) advisory

committee’s note. 

“To apply the exception, the court must find that the plaintiff is ‘either indigent or

that requiring him to pay a deposition fee incurred in litigation that he voluntarily initiated

would create an undue hardship.’” Harris v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 235 F.R.D.

471, 473 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Edin v. The Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 188 F.R.D.

543, 547 (D. Ariz. 1999)). To determine whether undue hardship would result, the court

must “weigh the possible hardships imposed on the respective parties . . . [and] balance

Case 2:08-cv-01132-NVW Document 139 Filed 01/22/10 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

the need for doing justice on the merits between the parties . . . against the need for

maintaining orderly and efficient procedural arrangements.” Reed v. Binder, 165 F.R.D.

424, 427-28 (D.N.J. 1996). 

Plaintiffs should have notified the Court in advance that they could not pay for the

depositions of Defendants’ experts. The Court could have then fashioned appropriate

relief, if necessary, to protect Defendants from undue expense. See Harris, 235 F.R.D. at

474 (where plaintiff informed the court that he would suffer undue hardship if required to

pay for the deposition of defendant’s expert, court allowed limited three-hour deposition

of two of the defendant’s experts, but prevented plaintiff from deposing the defendant’s

three other experts because plaintiff had previously deposed one expert, had been given

reasonably detailed expert reports, and had his own experts covering many of the issues

to which defendant’s experts would testify). This does not necessarily prevent the Court

from granting relief. See Reed, 165 F.R.D. at 424 (shifting cost of deposition to

defendants although plaintiffs had already taken depositions because it would have been

manifestly unjust to require impoverished plaintiffs to pay). But the Court also does not

wish to encourage litigants to subject their opponent to significant expense, knowing full

well that they are unable to pay and depriving the Court of the opportunity to protect the

opponent, and to then claim that manifest injustice would result if ordered to reimburse

the opponent. 

Plaintiffs have vigorously prosecuted their case. Plaintiffs have taken twenty-one

depositions, including costly out-of-state and video depositions. Defendants provided

detailed expert reports to Plaintiffs, which may have obviated the need for some of those

depositions. Plaintiffs, however, never notified opposing counsel or the Court that they

would not be able to pay for taking those depositions. Plaintiffs have also hired their own

experts, whose fees are presumably being advanced by Plaintiffs’ attorney. Plaintiffs’

attorney explicitly agreed to pay for the deposition and for one-third of the travel costs of

one of the experts for Defendant City of Phoenix, and Plaintiffs’ attorney has remitted

Case 2:08-cv-01132-NVW Document 139 Filed 01/22/10 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

payment to at least one of the City of Phoenix’s experts. Plaintiffs’ attorney represented

to counsel for Taser that he expected to be able to pay the expert invoices for the

depositions he had taken by December 1, 2009. Now Plaintiffs’ attorney claims that

manifest injustice would result if his clients were required to pay for the experts he

decided to depose, without explaining why payment was made to some experts but not

others or why representations were made to opposing counsel that payment would be

forthcoming. 

In short, Plaintiffs, no doubt through the advancement of costs by their attorney,

have met the expense of the depositions Plaintiffs thought helpful to the preparation of

their case. The election to depose the Defendants’ experts is not different in character

from the election to pursue, and advance the costs of, other depositions for Plaintiffs’ trial

advantage. Rule 26(b)(4)(C) requires parties generally to bear the expense of deposing

opposing parties’ expert witnesses, and Plaintiffs obviously thought it to their benefit to

do so in this case. 

There is no manifest injustice in requiring Plaintiffs to pay Defendants’ expert fees

under these circumstances. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Discovery Dispute

Resolution re Expert Fees (doc. #131) is granted. 

DATED this 22nd day of January, 2010.

Case 2:08-cv-01132-NVW Document 139 Filed 01/22/10 Page 4 of 4