Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01513/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01513-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON LOKERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. PFEIFFER,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01513-HBK (PC)

ORDER TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A

DISTRICT JUDGE

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS CASE1

(Doc. No. 13)

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Pending before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is Plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 13). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 

recommends the district court dismiss the Second Amended Complaint because it fails to state 

any cognizable federal claim and any further amendment would be futile.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

A plaintiff who commences an action while in prison is subject to the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen a complaint that seeks relief 

against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon any 

defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the court to identify any cognizable claims and 

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2023). 

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dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, 

construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 

2003). The Court’s review is limited to the complaint, exhibits attached, materials incorporated 

into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Petrie v.

Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). A court 

does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted 

deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Critical 

to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual basis. See 

Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint include “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not 

sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not 

required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required 

to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 

2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant 

is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 

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245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the court to advise a pro se litigant on how 

to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial 

decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 

n.13. Furthermore, the court in its discretion may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad 

faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

amendments previously allowed . . . .” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 

(9th Cir. 2010). 

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action by 

filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). On November 28, 2023, the 

undersigned screened Plaintiff’s original complaint and found that it failed to state any cognizable 

constitutional claim. (See Doc. No. 9). The Court advised Plaintiff of the pleading deficiencies 

and applicable law and afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint. (Id.). 

Plaintiff timely filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 10) (“FAC”). Prior to the Court 

screening the FAC, Plaintiff filed a motion to disregard his FAC and for the Court to accept his 

later filed amended complaint, a lodged Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 11, 12, 13). 

On January 16, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to disregard the First Amended 

Complaint and deemed the lodged Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 13, “SAC”) the 

operative complaint in this matter. (See Doc. No. 15).

The events in the SAC took place at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”). (See generally

id.). The SAC identifies C. Pfeiffer, the Warden of KVSP, as the sole Defendant in this action. 

(Id. at 2). The SAC alleges an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See

generally id.). The following facts are presumed to be true at this stage of the screening process.

Plaintiff is housed in the Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”) at KVSP. Under a rule 

specific to KVSP known as OP 1015, inmates who are housed in CTC are prohibited from having 

or buying personal food. (Id. at 3). Meanwhile, inmates in general population may buy personal 

food in four different ways—through canteen purchases, package purchases, via food sales 

offered by community restaurants, and through food provided by visitors during contact visits. 

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(Id.). Plaintiff inquired as to the reason for this restriction and staff advised him that the rule was 

implemented by Defendant Pfeiffer at the request of KVSP medical staff so that they could 

enforce dietary restrictions on CTC patients. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff asserts that the rule is 

overbroad because certain CTC inmates like him do not have dietary restrictions, contrary to Title 

15 of the California Code of Regulations, and argues the rule is discriminatory because it applies 

only to CTC inmates. (Id. at 4). Moreover, Plaintiff notes that no such restrictions have been in 

effect in other CDCR facilities where he has been incarcerated, including High Desert State 

Prison, Salinas Valley State Prison, and California Health Care Facility. (Id.). Plaintiff contends 

that the impact on prison staff of permitting personal food, at least through package delivery or 

contact visits, would be minimal. (Id.).

As relief, Plaintiff seeks “modification of OP 1015 to allow personal food in CTC,” a 

“directive by the Court that Warden provide the same access to personal food to CTC inmates as 

is available to inmates in the general population,” monetary damages, and court costs. (Id. at 5).

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Equal Protection Claim

“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 

laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all 

similarly situated people equally.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2013). There are two different ways in which a plaintiff may state an equal 

protection claim. A plaintiff’s first option is to allege “facts plausibly showing that the 

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership 

in a protected class[.]” Id. (quoting Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 

2005)). The second way a plaintiff may state a claim is “as a ‘class of one’ by alleging that [the]

plaintiff has ‘been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is 

no rational basis for the treatment[.]” Koboyashi v. McMulling, 2022 WL 3137958, at *23 (C.D. 

Cal. May 31, 2022) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). 

Because “the disabled do not constitute a suspect class” for equal protection purposes, a 

governmental policy that purposefully treats the disabled differently from the non-disabled need 

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only be “rationally related to legitimate legislative goals” to pass constitutional muster. Does 1–5 

v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).

In assessing whether a prison policy that impacts a fundamental right is in fact reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests, the Supreme Court has identified four relevant factors 

courts should consider: (1) whether there is “a valid, rational connection between the prison 

regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it,” (2) “whether there 

are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates,” (3) “the impact 

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on 

the allocation of prison resources generally,” and (4) the presence or “absence of ready 

alternatives.” Id. at 89–90 (internal quotation marks omitted)

Here, liberally construed, the SAC alleges that OP 1015 discriminates against inmates 

housed in the CTC by revoking canteen or personal food privileges that are provided to general 

population inmates. The FAC fails to state an Equal Protection claim, however, because OP 1015

does not impact a fundamental right protected by the constitution, does not discriminate against a 

suspect class, and is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective. 

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the rule on the basis that he is a member of a protected 

class, that challenge fails. As noted above, because “the disabled do not constitute a suspect 

class” for equal protection purposes, a governmental policy that purposefully treats the disabled 

differently from the non-disabled need only be “rationally related to legitimate legislative goals” 

to pass constitutional muster. Does 1–5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 

City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).

Nor does the regulation burden a fundamental right. Prisoners have no constitutional right 

to access personal food, only to be provided food that sustains them in good health. See McElyea 

v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir.1987) (Holding that “[i]nmates . . . have the right to be 

provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their 

religion”); see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The Eighth 

Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need 

not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing”) citing Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 659–60 (6th 

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Cir. 1977). Because OP 1015 does not burden any fundamental right, it need only be rationally 

related to a legitimate government objective. See, e.g., LaFaele v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F. App’x 

862, 863 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying equal protection challenge to prison ban on tobacco use 

because plaintiff had not shown that tobacco use is a fundamental right, and plaintiff’s complaint 

indicated that the rule was rationally related to legitimate government objectives.)

The SAC acknowledges Defendant Pfeiffer enacted the regulation at the behest of medical 

staff to ensure the dietary restrictions that protect the health and wellbeing of patients in CTC are 

followed. Such a regulation clearly advances a legitimate penological objective. See, e.g., 

Winston v. Gipson, 2023 WL 2588174, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2023) (finding prison 

regulation prohibiting most use of tobacco products by inmates serves legitimate penological 

objective because “allowing inmates to use tobacco products caused significant health problems 

for them, which increased the health care cost for CDCR to treat inmates suffering various 

conditions due to prolonged smoking and other use of tobacco products”). Ensuring that sick or 

injured inmates or those with chronic conditions adhere to their prescribed diets further the 

legitimate goal of protecting those inmates’ wellbeing, which also reduces health care costs for 

CDCR to treat them. Because the SAC lacks any allegation that KVSP fails to provide an 

adequate diet, and because OP 1015 further the legitimate penological objective of advancing the 

health and wellbeing of CTC inmates, the rule survives constitutional scrutiny.

To the extent the SAC alleges a claim because OP 1015 conflicts with CDCR regulations

governing inmate access to commissary and other sources of personal food, such a claim fails. 

There is no federal constitutional liberty interest in compliance with state prison regulations. 

Solomon v. Felker, 2013 WL 5375538, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s allegation 

that the defendants failed to adhere to the prison’s own institutional policies and procedures does 

not, by itself” give rise to a constitutional violation); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82, 

(1995) (recognizing prison regulations are “primarily designed to guide correctional officials in 

the administration of a prison” and are “not designed to confer rights on inmates”); Hovater v. 

Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A] failure to adhere to administrative 

regulations does not equate to a constitutional violation.”); see also Armstrong v. Warden of USP 

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Atwater, 2011 WL 2553266, at *8 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2011) (citing same). Thus, Plaintiff does 

not have a cognizable claim based on Defendant Pfeiffer’s alleged failure to comply with CDCR 

regulations.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the above, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state any cognizable 

claim. The SAC suffers from many of the same pleading deficiencies that the undersigned 

identified and explained to Plaintiff in screening his original Complaint. In particular, it fails to 

allege that the challenged KVSP regulation was not rationally related to a legitimate penological 

objective. Despite being provided with guidance and the appropriate legal standards, Plaintiff 

was unable to cure the deficiencies identified above. A plaintiff’s repeated failure to cure a 

complaint’s deficiencies constitutes “a strong indication that the [plaintiff has] no additional facts 

to plead.” Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the undersigned recommends that the district court 

dismiss the SAC without further leave to amend. McKinney v. Baca, 250 F. App’x 781 (9th Cir. 

2007) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1992)) (noting discretion to deny 

leave to amend is particularly broad where court has afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities 

to amend his complaint).

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED:

The Clerk of Court randomly assign this case to a district judge for consideration of these 

Findings and Recommendation.

It is further RECOMMENDED:

The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 13) be dismissed under § 1915A for failure to 

state a claim and this case be dismissed.

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The assigned District Judge 

will review these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). A party’s 

failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Dated: March 15, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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