Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_11-cv-04270/USCOURTS-alnd-4_11-cv-04270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

SANDRA TORRES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAROLYN COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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4:11-cv-4270-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, Sandra Torres (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, appeals from the

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for Survivor’s Insurance Benefits

(“SIB”). Plaintiff timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the

decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3).

On January 8, 2009, Plaintifffiled an application for widow’s insurance benefits

as a surviving divorced spouse of wage-earner/insured John Marchlowska (“the

insured”), who died on December 5, 2001 in New York. (Tr. at 10.) On her

FILED

 2014 Feb-27 PM 12:13

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:11-cv-04270-LSC Document 14 Filed 02/27/14 Page 1 of 11
application for SIB as a divorced widow of the insured, Plaintiff stated that she

married the insured in October 1962 and that the marriage ended by a Mexican

divorce in October 1963. (Tr. at 14.) She additionally stated that she remarried on

three separate occasions: first, to Robert DiPietro in February 1964, ending in divorce

in January 1966; second, to Frank Umbrecht in January 1971, ending in divorce in

January 1972; and finally, to Chris Korovessi in January 1973, ending in divorce in

January 1976. (Id.) Plaintiff further stated in her SIB application that the insured

remarried in January 1965, and that marriage ended in divorce in January 1986. (Id.)

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application on

the grounds that she had not been married to the insured for the minimum ten (10)

years required to qualify for SIB as a divorced widow. (Tr. at 21.) Plaintiff requested

reconsideration, arguing that the Mexican divorce from the insured was invalid under

New York law, and that she was therefore still the insured’s wife. (Tr. at 24.) The

SSA again denied her application on the alternative grounds that either 1) the divorce

was valid under New York law, or 2) that Plaintiff was estopped from challenging the

validity of the divorce because both she and the insured had remarried other people

in reliance on the divorce. (Tr. at 27-28.)

Plaintiff appealed the SSA’s decision to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).

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During the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff again argued that her divorce from the

insured was invalid, and that she was therefore still married to him. (Tr. at 42.)

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she was unsure about the marriage and divorce

dates that she had provided in her initial SIB application, and that she had estimated

the dates at the time of the application because she could not remember them. (Tr. at

52.) The ALJ ruled that Plaintiff was not validly married to the insured for the

requisite ten years required to qualify for benefits, and noted that even if her divorce

from the insured was invalid, she was estopped from denying its validity because she

had remarried. (Tr. at 11.) 

Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council was

denied, (tr. at 3), and this appeal followed. On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff proceeds

pro se, and has not filed a brief. Plaintiff has instead filed a letter detailing her

experiences with the SSA and reiterating her contention that she remains legally

married to the insured, and is thus due benefits, because the divorce procured in

Mexico is invalid. (Doc. 9 at 1.) 

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is

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substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d

1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the

Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See

Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts,

weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The

substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with

considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions

from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being

supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.

1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,

620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against

the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by

substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for

“despite this deferential standard [for reviewof claims] it is imperative that the Court

scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision

reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to

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apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v.Heckler, 748F.2d

629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984). 

III. Discussion

An individual may qualify for survivor’s insurance benefit payments if she is

either a widow (as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 416(c)) or a surviving divorced wife (as

defined in 42 U.S.C. § 416(d)) to an insured decedent. Plaintiff’s initial application

for benefits indicated her marriage to the insured began onOctober 6, 1962, and ended

by divorce on October 1, 1963. (Tr. at 14). Her initial application was treated as an

application for benefits as a divorced wife. (Tr. at 21). On appeal, Plaintiff contends

that her divorce from the insured was not valid, and therefore her claim is for benefits

as a widow to the insured and not as his surviving divorced wife. If Plaintiff is entitled

to benefits as the insured widow, she would also meet the requirements for benefits

as a surviving divorced wife. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(c); 42 U.S.C. § 416(d).

Accordingly, this Court continues to treat Plaintiff’s application as an application for

benefits as a surviving divorced wife. 

In holding that Plaintiff is not entitled to SIB because she was not validly

married to the insured for the requisite period often years, the ALJ applied the correct

legal standards, and substantial evidence in the record supports his decision. To

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qualify for widow’s insurance benefits as a surviving divorced spouse, an individual

must have been validly married to the wage-earner/insured for at least ten years before

the divorce became final. 20 C.F.R. § 404.336. The validity of the putative spouse’s

marriage is governed by the laws of the state where the insured was domiciled at time

of death. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(I); 20 C.F.R. § 404.345. Because the insured was

a resident of the State of New York at the time of his death, the law of New York

governs with respect to the duration of Plaintiff’s marriage to the insured.(Tr. at 55.)

In New York, a divorce decree is invalid and void if obtained in a foreign

country upon the ex parte petition of a spouse who is present but not domiciled in that

country where the defending party is not present and has not been served with

process. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 376 (N.Y. 1955) (holding that

plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction to restrain her husband from prosecuting a

Mexican divorce action because the divorce action was a “clear legal nullity” where

neither party was domiciled in Mexico). Plaintiff indicated in her application for

benefits that her divorce from the insured occurred in Mexico, and that she had been

told that the divorce was invalid, but she did not at that time provide any explanation

as to why the divorce would be invalid. (Tr. at 14-15.) In her request for a hearing by

an ALJ, Plaintiff explained that she had not appeared at the divorce proceeding in

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person nor through an attorney. (Tr. at 30.) Asuming these facts to be true, Plaintiff’s

divorce from the insured would be void under New York law because it was procured

upon the ex parte petition of the insured, who was domiciled in New York at the time.

309 N.Y. at 376.

However, where a person enters into a second marriage, there is a presumption

in favor of the second marriage over a preceding marriage. Fishman v. Fishman, 368

N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (App. Div. 1975). This presumption is rebuttable, but the burden

of proof is upon the party asserting the continuing validity of the first marriage. Id.

Moreover, this presumption is said to be among the strongest in New York law. 45

N.Y. Jur. 2d Domestic Relations § 72; Shepard v. Shepard, 47 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Sup. Ct.

1944) aff’d 47 N.Y.S.2d 624 (App. Div. 1944). Plaintiff bore the burden of

overcoming this strong presumption, but presented no evidence, other than her own

(often inconsistent) testimony, that her divorce from the insured was invalid. 

For example, in her application, Plaintiff reported that she married the wage

earner on October 6, 1962, and the marriage ended in divorce on October 1, 1963. (Tr.

at 14.) Plaintiff also reported that she then married another individual onFebruary 13,

1964, and that marriage ended in divorce in 1966. (Tr. at 14.) She also reported she

married a third time to a different individual in 1971, with that marriage ending by

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divorce in 1972, and she married a fourth time in 1973, with that marriage ending by

divorce in 1976. (Tr. at 14.) Plaintiff ultimately affirmed that all the information she

provided in her application was true. (Tr. at 15.) Plaintiff also testified under oath

that she married another individual in 1968. (Tr. at 52, 54.) Plaintiff also testified that

her second marriage ended in either 1971 or 1972, and she married a third individual

“right afterwards.” (Tr. at 54.) Plaintiff, who was represented at her hearing, did not

at any point indicate that either her second or third marriage was invalid due to any

procedural deficiency with the marriage licenses she obtained for either marriage. 

Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence or relevant legal authority to support her most

recent assertions in her complaint regarding the validity of her divorce from the wage

earner in 1963 or the timing and validity of her second, third, and fourth marriages. 

(Doc. 1, at 1-2.) In fact, Plaintiff admitted she obtained a New Jersey marriage license

in 1968 with another individual. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Although Plaintiff asserted the

individual she married in 1968 was “in parole and not allowed to marry,” (doc. 1, at

2), Plaintiff failed to cite any evidence or authority showing the individual she married

in 1968 was actually legally precluded from entering into that marriage or that New

Jersey issued the marriage license in conflict with its own rules. 

The ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s own statements that she affirmed to be true in

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determining that she was not validly married to the insured for ten years. Plaintiff has

not subsequently presented any evidence to support her uncorroborated allegations

that her second marriage (or her third or fourth marriages) was legally deficient. This

Court may not re-weigh the evidence, try the case de novo, or substitute its own

judgment for that of the Commissioner, even if it finds that the evidence

preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. See Martin v.Sullivan, 894 F.2d

1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Baker o/b/o Baker v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 319, 321 (11th Cir.

1989). The Commissioner’sfactual findings are conclusive ifsupported by substantial

evidence. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529; Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir.

1987). 

Moreover, the ALJ correctly stated the law when he noted that Plaintiff would

be estopped from challenging the validity of her divorce, even if he she had proven it

to be invalid, because she had remarried in reliance on the divorce. (Tr. at 11.) A party

may be estopped from challenging the validity of a foreign divorce decree if the party

remarries in reliance on the decree’s validity. Carbulon v. Carbulon, 293 N.Y. 375,

377-78 (N.Y. 1940) (holding that the plaintiff “could not . . . assert that the marriage

relation . . . remained unaffected by the foreign decree and at the same time assert that

she had the legal capacity to marry another”); Capalbo v.Capalbo, 549 N.Y.S.2d 794,

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795 (N.Y. App. Div 1990) (holding that a husband who relied on a Mexican divorce

decree by remarrying was estopped from challenging the validity of the decree more

than 20 years later). The principles supporting application of estoppel are more

strongly present where a party challenges the validity of a divorce for the purpose of

asserting some collateral rights incident to the marital status, rather than for the

purpose of establishing marital status. Packer v. Packer, 179 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (App.

Div. 1958) (noting that although a mail-order divorce from a foreign country lacks

“sufficient vitality to create an estoppel . . . in an action to establish marital status . .

. it may suffice to preclude the spouse from asserting a private claim or demand arising

out of the marriage”). Here, Plaintiff herself stated that she had remarried within ten

years of her marriage to the insured, in either 1964 or 1968. (Tr. at 14, 52, 54.) The

ALJ correctly noted in his opinion that, whether she had remarried in 1964 or in 1968,

the second marriage would have been within ten years of her first marriage. (Tr. at

11.) Moreover, Plaintiff made her reliance on the divorce clear, stating that she “took

it for granted” that she was divorced from the insured. (Tr. at 46-47.) Therefore, on

the basis of Plaintiff’s own statements, and in the absence of any contrary

documentary evidence, the ALJ had substantial evidence to conclude that Plaintiff had

remarried, in reliance on the divorce, within ten years of her marriage to the insured.

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On this basis, the ALJ correctly noted that Plaintiff would be estopped from attacking

the validity of the divorce for the purpose of acquiring widow’s insurance benefits as

the surviving divorced spouse of the insured.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Plaintiff’s

arguments, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence and is in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.

Done this 27th day of February 2014.

 

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

[160704]

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