Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00323/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00323-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARTA ANGELICA HURTADO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-0323 KJM KJN 

ORDER 

 Defendants County of Sacramento, Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, 

Sheriff Scott Jones, Deputy David Cuneo, Deputy Grant Haney, and Deputy Eric Duncan have 

filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. The court ordered it submitted without a hearing 

and now GRANTS the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff filed a complaint on January 30, 2014, alleging generally that defendants 

subjected her to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 

of the California Constitution. ECF No. 1. The court granted plaintiff’s request to proceed in 

forma pauperis on May 6, 2014. ECF No. 4. 

 On May 7, 2014, the court issued its standing order in this case. One provision of 

that order provides that before filing a motion, “counsel shall engage in a pre-filing meet and 

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confer to discuss thoroughly the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential 

resolution.” ECF No. 5-1 at 3. 

 Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on July 11, 2014, seeking, among other 

things, that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety as to the County, the Sheriff’s Department, 

and the Sheriff. ECF No. 7-1 at 5-6. 

 Plaintiff filed her opposition on July 25, 2014, but noted she did not oppose 

defendant’s request to dismiss the complaint against the County, the Sheriff’s Department and the 

Sheriff. ECF No. 9 at 10. Neither party has explained why this issue was not resolved during the 

required meet and confer. Nonetheless, these two defendants will be dismissed with prejudice. 

II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 

 On the evening of April 20, 2013, the Sacramento County Sheriff’s dispatch 

received a complaint of loud music coming from the vicinity of 8149 Dillard Road in Wilton. 

ECF No. 1 ¶ 17. Deputies Cueno, Haney and Duncan were dispatched to the area and entered the 

property around 10:30 p.m. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff was among the guests, there to celebrate her 

uncle’s eightieth birthday; her husband, Octavio Palmas, was the disc jockey for the occasion. 

Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. Palmas turned the music off at the deputies’ request. Id. ¶ 18. 

 The deputies left 8149 Dillard Road, but parked about three quarters of a mile 

away to clear the call. They claim to have received two additional noise complaints, but did not 

respond right away. Id. ¶ 19. When, after thirty minutes had passed, they could still hear the 

music, the deputies returned to 8149 Dillard Road. Id. ¶ 20. 

 At 11:40 p.m., the deputies entered the property over the objection of some of the 

party guests. Id. ¶ 22. According to police reports, as Deputy Duncan was talking to Palmas, 

some of the guests began to gather around him. Id. ¶ 24. Palmas said the deputies were 

trespassing and asked them to leave. Id. The deputies detained Palmas and Duncan placed him 

in the patrol car. Id. ¶¶ 25-26 . 

 Upset at seeing her husband detained, plaintiff approached Cuneo to ask what was 

happening. Id. ¶ 28. Cuneo put his hands on plaintiff’s breasts and shoved her, causing her to 

fall backwards onto the concrete and strike her head. Id. Plaintiff got to her feet and walked 

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toward the house, but Cuneo chased her and struck her with a couch before handcuffing her. Id. 

¶ 29. Neither plaintiff nor any of her family members had reacted with hostility toward the 

deputies. Id. ¶ 24. 

II. STANDARDS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS 

 Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A court may 

dismiss “based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged 

under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

 Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to survive a motion 

to dismiss this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something 

more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the 

interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the 

action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 

 In making this context-specific evaluation, this court must construe the complaint 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the factual allegations of the 

complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). This rule does not apply to “‘a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) quoted 

in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, nor to “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 

judicial notice” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint. 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2001). A court’s 

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consideration of documents attached to a complaint or incorporated by reference or matter of 

judicial notice will not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. United 

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003); Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 

1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); compare Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 

980 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that even though court may look beyond pleadings on motion to 

dismiss, generally court is limited to face of the complaint on 12(b)(6) motion). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

 Defendant Cuneo does not challenge the sufficiency of the pleading, but 

defendants Haney and Duncan argue the complaint shows they were not involved in the use of 

force against plaintiff. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7-1 at 5. They also argue there is no private 

right of action under Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution. Id. at 6. 

 A. Defendants Duncan and Haney 

 A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has two elements: (1) a violation of a federal 

constitutional or statutory right, (2) committed by a person acting under state law. Long v. Cnty. 

of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, the person acting under color of 

state law must have personally participated in the acts giving rise to the claim or “set in motion a 

series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to 

inflict the constitutional injury.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); McMillan v. Virga, No. 2:14–cv–1106 CKD P, 2014 

WL 2093572, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2014) (stating a plaintiff must show how each defendant 

participated in the deprivation of rights). A defendant is a personal participant in an alleged 

deprivation of rights “‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation . . . .’” 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743) (emphasis 

in original). 

 Defendants Duncan and Haney point out that the complaint does not connect them 

with Cuneo’s alleged uses of force against plaintiff, but in fact suggests Duncan was not in the 

area because he had taken Palmas to the patrol car. ECF No. 7-1 at 5. 

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 Plaintiff argues Duncan and Haney unlawfully entered the property, unlawfully 

arrested Palmas and then stood by as Cuneo shoved her to the ground and hit her. ECF No. 9 at 

7. 

 Defendants counter that the entry onto the property and the arrest of Palmas did 

not violate plaintiff’s rights and that, even assuming the court can consider the allegations in 

opposition, the claim that the defendants “stood by” is not sufficient. ECF No. 10 at 2. 

 First, the allegations about Haney’s and Duncan’s unlawful entry onto the property 

and arrest of Palmas cannot be a part of plaintiff’s claim for the violation of her Fourth 

Amendment rights. See Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159, 1170 n.5 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (“‘Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional 

rights, may not be vicariously asserted.’” (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 

(1969)). 

 Second, the court cannot consider plaintiff’s somewhat expanded description of 

Haney’s and Duncan’s roles in evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint. Schneider v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the propriety of a Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, 

such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis in original). 

As the complaint does not describe Duncan’s or Haney’s personal participation in Cuneo’s use of 

force, the motion to dismiss in this respect is well taken. 

 Even though the complaint fails to state a claim as to defendants Duncan and 

Haney, plaintiff will be given leave to amend, if she is able to do so consonant with Rule 11 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 B. Right of Action under the California Constitution 

 Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution provides in part: “The right of 

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures 

and searches may not be violated . . . .” 

 Defendants argue that Section 13 does not create a private right of action. See, 

e.g., McLain v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C 12–3225 MEJ, 2014 WL 465595, at *14 

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(N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014) (stating no California case has found a private right of action under this 

section); Buzayan v. City of Davis Police Dept., No. 2:06-cv-01576-MCE-DAD, 2007 WL 

2288334, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim under Art. I, § 13). 

Plaintiff cites to Millender v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 05-2298 DDP (RZx), 2007 WL 

7589200, at *40 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2007), reversed on other grounds, Messerschmidt v. 

Millender, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011), and Camarillo v. City of Maywood, No. CV 07-3469 ODW 

(SHx), 2008 WL 4056994, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2008), which have recognized such a claim. 

None of these cases cited by either party are binding on this court. 

 In Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California, the California Supreme 

Court established a framework for deciding whether a constitutional provision gives rise to a 

private right to damages. 29 Cal.4th 300 (2002). In the first step, a court must determine whether 

there is evidence suggesting an intention to authorize or withhold a damages remedy, including 

the language and history of the constitutional provision and any pertinent common law. Id. at 

317. If the court finds no affirmative intent regarding a damages remedy, the court must then 

“undertake the ‘constitutional tort’ analysis adopted by Bivens [v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotic 

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)] . . . .” Id. Factors relevant to this inquiry include “whether an 

adequate remedy exists, the extent to which a constitutional tort action would change established 

tort law, and the nature and significance of the constitutional provision.” Id. If those factors 

“militate against recognizing the constitutional tort,” the inquiry ends. Id. If they favor 

recognizing the tort, however, the court must examine “any special factors counseling hesitation 

 . . . including deference to legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse policy consequences, 

considerations of government fiscal policy, practical issues of proof, and the competence of 

courts to assess particular types of damages.” Id. 

 Neither party has undertaken the Katzberg analysis, relying instead on cases that 

do not control this court’s resolution of the issue. Plaintiff does not even attempt to address the 

nuanced inquiries Katzberg requires and the court declines to undertake the inquiry on her behalf. 

See Adams v. Kraft, No. 5:10-CV-00602 LHK, 2011 WL 3240598, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 

2011) (declining to determine whether a damages remedy is available under Article I, § 2 because 

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of inadequate briefing on the Katzberg factors; collecting cases which did the same). The motion 

to dismiss this claim is granted without prejudice. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is granted as follows: 

 1. Defendants Sacramento County, Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, and 

Sheriff Scott Jones are dismissed with prejudice; 

 2. Defendants Duncan and Haney are dismissed without prejudice, and plaintiff is 

given leave to amend the claim as to them; 

 3. Plaintiff’s claim for a violation of Article I, Section 13 of the California 

Constitution is dismissed without prejudice; plaintiff is given leave to amend this claim if she is 

able; and 

 4. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is due within twenty-one days of the date of this 

order. 

DATED: August 19, 2014. 

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