Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04976/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04976-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES NELSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; VECTOR

REHABILITATION; NEIL KELLEY, D.P.M;

MATTHEW FLUKE,

Defendants. 

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No. C-06-04976 SC

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James Nelson ("Plaintiff" or "Nelson") brought this

malpractice action against various doctors and employees of the

Open Door Community Health Centers ("Defendants" or the "Health

Center"). Because the Health Center is a federally-funded

institution, the case was certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2679(d)(2) and the United States was substituted as the party

defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). See Docket No. 3. 

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated

herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 

II. BACKGROUND

On April 25, 2006, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice

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action against Defendants in Humboldt County Superior Court. See

Compl., Docket No. 1. As a federal entity, the Health Center is

covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"). See Bergeron

Decl. ¶ 4. The named Defendants were employees of the Health

Center when Plaintiff claims to have received negligent treatment

so they are covered by the FTCA as well. See id. at ¶ 6. After

the Attorney General certified that the individual Defendants were

federal employees acting within the scope of their employment

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), the United States was

substituted as the named defendant, and the case was removed to

federal court. See Docket No. 1, 3.

On August 21, 2006, Defendants filed the present Motion to

Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Docket No. 5. 

They assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. See id. Specifically, Defendants note that Plaintiff

filed his administrative tort claim on July 6, two months after he

filed the Complaint. See Bergeron Decl. at ¶ 3. At present,

Plaintiff's claim has not been evaluated by the agency. See id;

Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff's negligence claims are governed by the Federal

Tort Claims Act, which contains specific procedural requirements:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the

United States for money damages for injury or loss of

property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent

or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government

while acting within the scope of his office or employment,

unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to

the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been

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finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified

or registered mail. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).

The Supreme Court has described the administrative exhaustion

prerequisites of the FTCA as a "clear statutory command." McNeil

v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) Plaintiff was required to exhaust

his administrative remedies before filing suit. The Ninth Circuit

has explained that "[t]he claim requirement of section 2675 is

jurisdictional in nature and may not be waived." Burns v. United

States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985). As stated by the

Supreme Court, "[t]he FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in

federal court until they have exhausted their administrative

remedies." McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. 

In this case, Plaintiff filed his administrative tort claim

on July 6, 2006, but the agency has yet to issue a decision. See

Bergeron Decl. at ¶ 3; Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 2. 

Moreover, the six month review period described in 28 U.S.C. §

2675(a) has not run. Under the FTCA, even if the agency does not

dispose of the claim, once the agency has reviewed the claim for

six months, Plaintiff has a right to sue. Presently, as a result

of Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, his

claim is not timely. Nelson argues that the Court should ignore

this requirement because he could amend the complaint as in

Campbell v. United States, 534 F.Supp. 762, 764 (D. Haw. 1982). 

In Campbell, the court allowed amendment because the six month

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review period had already run by the time the defendant filed its

motion to dismiss. Id. Contrary to Campbell, Plaintiff filed his

administrative claim in July of 2006 and fewer than six months

have passed between now and then. See Bergeron Decl. at ¶ 3. 

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot in good faith assert that he has

complied with the FTCA. 

Plaintiff's failure to adhere to the procedural requirements

of the FTCA is a significant oversight considering the importance

of exhaustion, which "protects administrative agency authority"

and "promotes efficiency." Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2385

(2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992). 

Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed as this Court does not acquire

subject matter jurisdiction until Plaintiff has exhausted his

administrative remedies. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113.

In his Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff

fails to make any convincing arguments as to why the Court should

waive the exhaustion requirement. Plaintiff cites Bowen v. City

of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 476 (1986) and Daly-Murphy v. Winston,

837 F.2d 348, 354 (9th Cir. 1987) in support of waiver. In Bowen, 

the Supreme Court granted waiver to two groups of Social Security

claimants: those who had failed to file suit within 60 days of

receiving an agency decision and those who had not yet received a

final decision from the Secretary. 476 U.S. at 479, 482. Nelson

fails to note that the class action plaintiffs in Bowen sought to

challenge an illegal internal agency policy; they were not

pursuing individual Social Security benefits claims. Id. at 469. 

In Daly-Murphy, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's

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decision to deny waiver because the plaintiff had failed to show

that the Veterans Administration hospital's procedures were

invalid or would cause irreparable injury. See 837 F.2d at 354. 

Nelson requests this Court to grant waiver, but similar to the

plaintiff in Daly-Murphy, Nelson is unable to explain how the

procedural requirements of the FTCA are invalid or will cause

harm. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to present valid grounds

for waiver. Though it may be inconvenient for Plaintiff to comply

with the statutory requirements of the FTCA, he must do so in

order to proceed with his malpractice claims in federal court. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 

Plaintiff's case is dismissed without prejudice. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2006 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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