Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01442/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01442-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Luis Cano-Mendoza, 

a.k.a. Leonel Cano-Mendoza 

Petitioner, 

v. 

United States of America 

Respondent. 

No. CV-13-01442-SRB (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Luis Cano-Mendoza (Petitioner) has filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram 

Nobis pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). (Doc. 1.) The United States 

(Respondent) has filed a response. (Doc. 7.) Petitioner has not filed a reply and the time 

to do so has passed. As set forth below, the Petition should be denied because Petitioner 

has not established the requirements for coram nobis relief. 

I. Petitioner’s Claims of Fundamental Error in the 1995 Criminal Matter. 

 Petitioner argues that this Court should find that fundamental error occurred in the 

1995 criminal matter before this Court, United States v. Leonel Cano-Mendoza, CR 95-

00032-MS, in which he pleaded guilty to entering the United States without inspection, a 

misdemeanor, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). (Doc. 1 at 10, Exs. C and D.)1

 

Petitioner asserts that he was convicted as Leonel Cano-Mendoza, which he states is his 

 

1

 Exhibits C and D to the Petition are the docket sheets for the complaint and the information filed against Petitioner in the 1995 criminal matter, United States v. Leonel 

Cano-Mendoza, 95-MJ-04024-SLV-1, and CR 95-00032-MS-MS-1. (Doc. 1, Exs. C and D.) Petitioner attached his exhibits to his Petition and did not file them as separate documents in CM/ECF. 

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brother’s name, and that he was prejudiced because if the matter had proceeded against 

him under his true name, Luis Cano-Mendoza, his status as a legal permanent resident 

(LPR) would have precluded the “illegal entry” charge. (Doc. 1 at 11.) Specifically, 

Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his attorney 

failed to investigate his true identity and determine his immigration status. (Id. at 8.) He 

also argues that the government violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by 

prosecuting him for illegal entry because it knew or should have known he had LPR 

status. (Id. at 10.) Therefore, Petitioner asserts that his 1995 conviction is invalid and 

should be “dismissed.” (Id. at 11.) 

 In response, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to coram nobis relief 

because he has not demonstrated good reason for the eighteen-year delay in challenging 

his conviction and sentence, other remedies exist, and Petitioner has not established 

fundamental error because he was properly convicted in the 1995 matter. (Doc. 7 at 4-5.) 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s assertion that he was an LPR in 1995 is immaterial 

because such status would not have precluded the charge for entering without inspection. 

(Doc. 7 at 5.) The Court considers these issues below in Section III, after discussing 

Petitioner’s underlying criminal conviction. 

II. Petitioner’s 1995 Misdemeanor Conviction under § 1325(a) 

On January 17, 1995, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)2

 agents 

arrested Petitioner after they observed him at the airport handing what appeared to be 

airline tickets to suspected illegal aliens. (Doc. 7, Ex. 1.) 3 Petitioner identified himself 

as “Leonel Cano-Mendoza” and provided the agents an Arizona identification card and 

 

2

 Prior to 2003, immigration offenses were handled by INS, but Congress abolished this agency and transferred most of its functions to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its subagency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE). See United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1041 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Homeland Security Act of 2002, §§ 441, 471; 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 291). 

3

 Exhibits 1 through 6 to the Government’s Response to the Petition for Error Coram Nobis (Doc. 7, Exs. 1-6) are located at dockets 7-1 through 7-6. Exhibit 1 is the complaint and affidavit filed in the 1995 criminal matter. 

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driver’s license with that name. (Doc. 7, Ex. 4 at 7.)4 Petitioner told the agents that he 

was an LPR, but they were unable to find any records indicating that Leonel CanoMendoza was a legal resident. (Id.) They determined that Petitioner was eligible for 

voluntary removal to Mexico, which he accepted, and he was removed on January 17, 

1995. (Doc. 7, Ex. 1 at 1, and Ex. 4 at 7.) 

 A few days later, on January 20, 1995, Petitioner’s wife, Maria Cano-Mendoza, 

reported to INS agents that Petitioner had returned to Phoenix and resumed his alien 

smuggling activities. (Doc 7, Ex. at 2, Ex. 4 at 20-23.)5

 INS agents began surveillance 

and arrested Petitioner on January 31, 1995 after observing him transporting fifteen 

illegal aliens to the airport. (Doc. 7, Ex. 1 at 2-5; Ex. 4 at 16.) Petitioner told the agents 

that he entered the United States illegally on January 20, 1995, and he admitted that he 

was transporting illegal aliens. (Doc. 7, Ex. 1 at 5.) Petitioner identified himself to 

agents as Leonel Cano-Mendoza and stated “several times” that Luis Cano-Mendoza was 

his brother. (Doc. 7, Ex. 4 at 19.) Petitioner asserts that he was a LPR at the time of his 

January 20, 1995 entry into the United States and his January 31, 1995 arrest. (Doc. 1, 

Ex. B.)6

 

 On February 1, 1995, the government filed a complaint against Petitioner, 

identifying him as “Leonel Cano-Mendoza AKA Luis Manuel Cano-Mendoza,” and 

charging him with transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) and 

(C), a felony offense. (Doc. 7, Ex. 1.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to 

plead guilty to an information charging him with entering the United States without 

inspection, a misdemeanor, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), and the government 

agreed to dismiss the felony § 1324 charge. (Doc. 7, Ex. 2 at 1-2.) 

 

4

 Exhibit 4 is the transcript of the February 6, 1995 sentencing hearing. 

5

 Exhibit 2 is the plea agreement, which Petitioner signed on February 3, 1995. 

6

 Exhibit B is a photocopy of Petitioner’s Resident Alien card, which lists his 

name as Luis M. Cano-Mendoza. 

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 Petitioner signed his name on the plea agreement as Leonel Cano-Mendoza. (Id.) 

In the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted that he was not a citizen of the United States 

and that he had entered the United States without inspection on January 20, 1995. (Id.) 

At the change of plea hearing, Petitioner stated his name, under oath, as Leonel CanoMendoza. (Doc. 7, Ex. 3 at 8.)7

 He admitted that he had entered the United States 

“through a hole” and that he knew was entering the United States illegally. (Id. at 3-4.) 

At the sentencing hearing, he again admitted that he entered the United States illegally 

“through a tunnel which is the drainage that carries waste and everything.” (Doc. 7, Ex. 4 

at 26.) 

 At the sentencing hearing, the government presented extensive evidence through 

the testimony of an INS agent to establish that Petitioner’s true name was Luis CanoMendoza and that Leonel Cano-Mendoza was his brother’s name. (Id. at 5-23.) In his 

testimony, the agent described the name and identification cards that Petitioner provided 

when he was arrested, that another agent had reviewed Petitioner’s photograph and 

identified him as Luis Cano-Mendoza, and that Petitioner’s wife had identified him as 

Luis Cano-Mendoza and told agents that he was using his brother’s name. (Id. at 9-11, 

18-23.) At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the government argued “it’s clear 

that Mr. Cano-Mendoza has used the name Leonel and Luis. And it’s our contention that 

his real name is Luis.” (Id. at 24.) 

 Throughout the sentencing hearing, defense counsel maintained that his client was 

Leonel, not Luis. (Id. at 26-30.) He argued to the Court that “about this false name 

stuff[,] Leonel has come clean and said, I’m Leonel, this is my name. I have a brother 

named Luis.” (Id. at 28.) He further argued that Petitioner “claimed he was Leonel from 

the start, . . . he never claimed to be Luis.” (Id.) Finally, he argued that “whether or not a 

false name has been used, that’s something that’s not unusual when people cross over and 

try to remain in the country.” (Id. at 29.) 

 

7

 Exhibit 3 is the transcript of the February 3, 1995 change of plea hearing. 

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 The parties were addressing Petitioner’s identity in the context of sentencing to 

determine if he was the person who was arrested on August 26, 1994 for transporting 

illegal aliens. (Id. at 10-11, 28.) This information was significant because the parties had 

agreed that the government could argue that the Court should consider any past arrests in 

determining the appropriate sentence. (Doc. 7, Ex. 3 at 5-6.) 

 The Court sentenced Petitioner to ninety days’ incarceration and dismissed the 

original complaint. (Doc. 7, Ex. 4 at 32.) Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or 

sentence to the Ninth Circuit and did not file a motion to vacate or set aside his sentence 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

 On May 5, 1995, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico. 

(Doc. 1, Ex. E.)8

 The order of removal listed Petitioner’s name as Leonel CanoMendoza, but it listed Petitioner’s A-file number. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Petitioner asserts that, a 

few months after his removal, his family told him that his LPR card had been renewed 

and therefore he believed that INS had resolved his immigration status. (Doc. 1 at 3-4, 

Ex. F at ¶10.)9

 Petitioner further asserts that he used his renewed LPR card to enter the 

United States with inspection in 1996 and that he traveled between the United States and 

Mexico. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.) 

 On January 11, 2013, DHS reinstated Petitioner’s May 5, 1995 order of 

deportation (Doc. 1, Ex. G),10 and Petitioner obtained an administrative stay of removal. 

(Doc. 1 at Ex. H.)11 Petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings and the IJ 

denied the motion. (Doc. 7, Ex. 5.)12 Petitioner appealed the IJ’s denial of his motion to 

reopen to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); the BIA dismissed his appeal. 

 

8

 Exhibit E is the IJ’s May 5, 1995 removal order. 

9

 Exhibit F is Petitioner’s Declaration in Support of Coram Nobis. 

10 Exhibit G is the Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order. 

11 Exhibit H is Petitioner’s Application for Stay of Removal. 

12 Exhibit 5 is the IJ’s May 1, 2013 Order denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen the 1995 deportation proceedings. 

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(Doc. 7, Ex. 6.)13 On July 12, 2013, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Error 

Coram Nobis. (Doc. 1.) 

III. The Writ of Error Coram Nobis 

 “The writ of error coram nobis affords a remedy to attack a conviction when the 

petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer in custody.” Estate of McKinney v. 

United States, 71 F.3d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1995). “The writ provides a remedy for those 

suffering from the ‘lingering collateral consequences of an unconstitutional or unlawful 

conviction based on errors of fact’ and ‘egregious legal errors.’” United States v. 

Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 

1496, 1498-99, n.2 (9th Cir. 1985)). The writ of error coram nobis allows a court to 

vacate its judgment when an error of “the most fundamental character” has occurred that 

causes the “proceeding itself [to be] rendered ‘invalid.’” McKinney, 71 F.3d at 781 

(citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Supreme 

Court and Ninth Circuit have “long made clear that the writ of error coram nobis is a 

highly unusual remedy, available only to correct grave injustices in a narrow range of 

cases where no more conventional remedy is applicable.” United States v. Riedl, 

496 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 

511 (1954). 

 In the Ninth Circuit, a petitioner seeking coram nobis relief must establish that: 

“(1) a more usual remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the 

conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences exist from the conviction to satisfy the case 

or controversy requirement of Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental 

character.” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 604. Because these requirements are conjunctive, a 

petitioner must establish all of these requirements, and failure to satisfy any one 

requirement is fatal to the petition. See Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

 

13 Exhibit 6 is the BIA’s October 8, 2013 Order dismissing Petitioner’s appeal from the IJ’s decision. 

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A. Availability of a More Usual Remedy 

Petitioner is no longer in custody for the illegal entry conviction and so he is 

ineligible for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1012 

(9th Cir. 2005) (finding that petitioner demonstrated that a more usual remedy was 

unavailable because he was not in custody and, thus, was ineligible for relief under 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2255), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356 (2010). Petitioner has not addressed whether any other remedy may be 

available, such as an appeal of the BIA’s decision. 

 Respondent asserts that Petitioner has an alternative remedy available because he 

could appeal the BIA’s decision denying his petition to reopen his immigration case. 

(Doc. 7 at 4.) However, Respondent has not demonstrated that such an appeal is a viable 

option for Petitioner to achieve the specific relief that he requests in the pending petition 

─ an order vacating his 1995 conviction for illegal entry. (Doc. 1 at 11.) In addition, in 

denying Petitioner’s attempts to reopen his removal proceedings, the BIA and the IJ 

noted that Petitioner’s 1995 conviction in this Court “would have to be set aside before 

he could claim that he is not subject to deportation.” (Doc. 7, Ex. 6 at 2; Ex. 5 at 2.) 

Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner does not have an alternative remedy 

available for the relief that he seeks and, therefore, he has established the first 

requirement for coram nobis relief. 

B. Failure to Attack Conviction Earlier 

Petitioner must also show that there is a valid reason why he did not challenge his 

1995 conviction earlier. There is no statute of limitations on filing a petition for writ of 

error coram nobis. Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, 

courts require “coram nobis petitioners to provide valid or sound reasons explaining why 

they did not attack their sentences or convictions earlier.” Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1012; see

United States v. Njai, 312 Fed. App’x 953, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that “[t]he law 

does not require a petitioner to challenge his conviction at the earliest opportunity, 

however, it does require that he have a legitimate reason for not doing so.”). 

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 “Few courts have expounded on what constitutes a ‘valid’ or ‘sound’ reason, but 

the writ has been denied when a petitioner provides no explanation or appears to be 

abusing the writ and when the respondent demonstrates prejudice as a result of the 

delay.” United States v. Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, *2 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (citing 

Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1013). “In making a determination of prejudice, the effect of the delay 

on both the government’s ability to respond to the petition and the government’s ability 

to mount a retrial are relevant.”14 Id. at 48. 

 Petitioner asserts that he did not know that he needed to collaterally attack his 

“erroneous 1995 illegal entry conviction” because the INS renewed his LPR card after his 

deportation and so he reasonably believed that his “immigration problem had been 

resolved by the INS, and the courts, and that he had retained his status as a Lawful 

Permanent Resident.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) He claims that he did not realize that he needed to 

attack his 1995 conviction until his order of deportation was reinstated in January 2013. 

(Id.) 

 Petitioner, however, does not state when he was actually removed from the United 

States. He asserts only that he was removed and then “a few months after my removal 

from the U.S. my family informed me that my LRP card had been renewed by the INS.” 

(Doc. 1, Ex. F at ¶ 10.) In contrast, the Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order 

states that the IJ ordered Petitioner’s removal on May 5, 1995, and he was removed on 

July 28, 1997. (Doc. 1, Ex. G.) It also states that he illegally entered the United States a 

few days after his removal, on August 1, 1997. (Id.) These dates are inconsistent with 

Petitioner’s assertion that he entered the United States, with inspection, after his removal 

and using his renewed LPR card in 1996. (Doc. 1, Ex. F at ¶ 11.) 

 Petitioner’s assertion that he received a renewed LPR card after he was removed 

from the United States is also inconsistent with the reasons stated for seeking a stay on 

 

14 Respondent does not argue prejudice as a result of Petitioner’s delay in attacking his 1995 conviction, but the Court notes the inherent difficulty and likely prejudice to the government by any attempt to retry this matter after a delay of more than eighteen years. 

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his 2013 Application for a Stay of Deportation or Removal. (Doc. 1, Ex. H.) That 

documents states that Petitioner “was ordered deported on May 5, 1995 in El Paso, 

Texas. [He] used his brother’s name, Leonel Mendoza Cano, during the course of the 

proceedings, and he did not affirmatively disclose his LPR status. [He] subsequently reentered the United States several times using his [LPR] card, which was reissued while he 

was in proceedings.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Therefore, the Court rejects Petitioner’s 

assertion that he believed that INS had resolved his immigration issues because he had 

received a renewed LPR card. 

 Respondent argues that Petitioner has not established a valid reason for waiting 

eighteen years to attack his 1995 conviction. (Doc. 7 at 4.) Respondent suggests that 

Petitioner did not attack his 1995 conviction earlier because he believed that conviction, 

which was in his brother’s name, would not affect his immigration status. (Id.) The 

Court agrees. The record of the 1995 criminal matter in this Court establishes that 

Petitioner repeatedly asserted, in writing and under oath, that he was Leonel CanoMendoza. (Doc. 7, Ex. 2, Ex. 3 at 8.) In Petitioner’s presence, and without any effort by 

Petitioner to clarify his identity, Petitioner’s defense counsel argued that he was Leonel 

Cano-Mendoza. (Doc. 7, Ex. 4 at 26-30.) Additionally, Petitioner does not explain for 

why he did not clarify his identity during the 1995 removal proceedings.15 

 Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner did not earlier challenge his 1995 

conviction because he believed the conviction, under his brother’s name, would not affect 

his immigration status. Petitioner decided to attack his conviction only after DHS 

 

15 In denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen his deportation proceedings, the IJ noted that Petitioner “stood silent before two legal bodies” [the district court in the 1995 criminal matter and the IJ in the 1995 removal proceedings] and did not clarify his identity or his LPR status. (Doc. 7, Ex. 5 at 2.) The BIA reports that Petitioner explained that he did not clarify his identity before the district court or the IJ because he was afraid 

he would lose his LPR status and be charged with using a false name. (Doc. 7, Ex. 6 at 1.) This is inconsistent with the explanation Petitioner now offers this Court that he 

believed his immigration issues were resolved. 

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reopened removal proceedings.16 See Matus-Leva, 287 F.3d at 760 (petitioner must 

establish all of the requirements for coram nobis relief.) Petitioner has not established a 

valid reason for not seeking relief earlier and, therefore, his petition fails. Nonetheless, 

the Court will address the remaining requirements for coram nobis relief. 

C. Adverse Consequences 

Petitioner must also demonstrate that, as a result of his conviction, he has 

experienced adverse consequences that are sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy 

requirement of Article III. Petitioner is subject to deportation because of his 1995 

conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Therefore, he has established the adverse 

consequences requirement for coram nobis relief. See Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1014 (“It is 

undisputed that the possibility of deportation is an ‘adverse consequence’ of [petitioner]’s 

conviction sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement.”); see also

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (“because he faced deportation, 

[petitioner] suffers actual consequences from his conviction.”) 

D. Fundamental Error 

 Finally, to be entitled to coram nobis relief, Petitioner must establish that a 

fundamental error occurred. See Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 604. He asserts fundamental 

error because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied due process 

under the Fifth Amendment. 

 1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Supreme Court 

articulated a two-part test to determine whether a defendant received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. First, counsel’s performance must be deficient. Id. This requires a 

petitioner to demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious so as to not function “as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The relevant question 

 

16 Similarly, the BIA concluded that Petitioner had failed to explain why he waited until 2013 to request reopening of his deportation proceedings. (Doc. 7, Ex. 6 at 2.) 

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under this prong is whether counsel’s performance was “reasonable[ ] under prevailing 

professional norms.” Id. at 688. 

 Second, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. This requires a petitioner to show that counsel’s 

errors were so egregious that they deprived him of a “fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable.” Id. at 687. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not 

warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on 

the judgment.” Id. at 691. Accordingly, a petitioner must establish, “that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish both parts of the Strickland test; if a 

petitioner fails to satisfy one part of the test, his claim fails. 

 Petitioner argues that his counsel failed to properly investigate his identity and 

immigration status and that, because of this deficient performance, counsel failed to 

discover that the government “had knowledge of petitioner’s true immigration status, as 

an LPR, and his true identity.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Petitioner’s argument is refuted by the 

record of the 1995 criminal matter in this Court. The record establishes that the 

government was aware of Petitioner’s identity and argued to the Court that Petitioner was 

Luis Cano-Mendoza, not Leonel Cano-Mendoza. (Doc. 7, Ex. 4 at 24.) Thus, there was 

no reason for defense counsel to conduct additional investigation of Petitioner’s identity 

and immigration status in an effort to show that the government was aware of Petitioner’s 

identity. Indeed, in an effort to minimize Petitioner’s criminal history and obtain a more 

favorable sentence, defense counsel argued, without any clarification from Petitioner, that 

Petitioner was Leonel Cano-Mendoza. (Id. at 26-30.) Counsel’s performance was not 

deficient and Petitioner’s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

fails, but the Court nonetheless addresses Petitioner’s claim of prejudice. 

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 Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance 

because he asserts that if counsel had discovered his true identity and LPR status, he 

would not have been convicted. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Petitioner’s argument fails because even 

if he was an LPR in 1995, and that information had been presented to the Court, that 

status would have been immaterial to the charge that he entered the United States without 

inspection, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Under § 1325(a), it is a crime for any alien 

to “enter[] or attempt[] to enter the United States at any time or place other than as 

designated by immigration officers . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Petitioner admitted that he 

was an alien and entered the United States through a “hole” or “drainage pipe,” without 

inspection. (Doc. 7, Ex. 2; Ex. 3 at 3-4, Ex. 4 at 26.) Thus, Petitioner admitted to the 

elements of the offense. 

 As an LPR, Petitioner was an alien and he was required to enter the United States 

at a place designated by immigration officials. 17 See United States v. Figueroa-Corrales, 

1988 WL 35757, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 1988) (8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) “applies to 

permanent resident aliens as well as illegal aliens”) (citing Gunaydin v. U.S. I.N.S., 

742 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1984)); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 946-48 (7th Cir. 

1993) (a permanent resident is deportable for entering the United States without 

inspection). Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction under § 1325(a) was proper because he 

entered the United States at a place other than as designated by immigration officers. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that, but for counsel’s failure to investigate 

his true identity and ascertain his LPR status, there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of his 1995 prosecution would have been different. Therefore, he has not 

established a fundamental error entitling him to coram nobis relief. United States v. 

 

17 Title 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) defines alien as “any person not a citizen or national 

of the United States.” There is no dispute that Petitioner is not a United States citizen or 

national. (Doc. 1 at 2.) See Koyomejian v. Mukasey, 268 Fed. App’x 613, 614-15 (9th Cir. 2008) (petitioner was not a “national of the United States” within the meaning of § 1101(a)(3) because he had not completed the naturalization process); Hernandez v. 

Ashcroft, 114 Fed. App’x 183, 188 (6th Cir. 2004) (“permanent resident alien status (through marriage or otherwise) does not establish United States citizenship or nationality”). 

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Ramirez-Davilla, 46 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying coram nobis relief to petitioner, 

an LPR, who entered the United States by climbing through a hole in a fence and later 

pled guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1)). 

 2. Due Process 

 Petitioner also argues that he was denied due process under the Fifth Amendment 

because the government prosecuted him for illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1), 

even though it knew, or had reason to know, he had LPR status. (Doc. 1 at 10.) As set 

forth above, because § 1325(a)(1) applies to permanent resident aliens as well as illegal 

aliens, Petitioner’s prosecution under that statute did not violate his due process rights. 

See Figueroa-Corrales, 1988 WL 35757, at *1-2. Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish 

fundamental error in the 1995 criminal matter in this Court. 

IV. Conclusion

Petitioner has not established that he entitled to coram nobis relief. Specifically, 

he has not established a valid reason for the delay in attacking his conviction and has not 

established that his conviction was invalid. Therefore, the Petition should be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis

(Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, should not be filed until the district court enters its judgment. The parties 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation to file 

specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6(a), 6(b), 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

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Recommendation may result in the acceptance by the district court without further 

review. See United States v. ReynaBTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure 

to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be 

considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 26th day of March, 2014. 

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