Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00375/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00375-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE MORRIS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07-CV-0375 H (PCL)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2254 AFTER

RECONSIDERATION

vs.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

Respondent.

Petitioner Lawrence Morris (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 26, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) He challenges a September

13, 2005 Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) decision denying his parole. Respondent filed

an Answer on July 16, 2007. (Doc. No. 14.) On August 21, 2007, Petitioner filed a traverse.

(Doc. No. 16.) The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation on October 5,

2007, recommending that the Court deny the petition and deny Petitioner’s motion for

discovery. (Doc. No. 18.) Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendations on

November 9, 2007. (Doc. No. 19.) Respondent did not file a reply to Petitioner’s objections.

On January 30, 2008, the Court issued an order adopting the Report and

Recommendation, denying the petition and denying the motion for discovery. (Doc. No. 20.)

On September 13, 2008, Petitioner submitted a notice of additional authorities. (Doc. No. 23.)

On October 7, 2008, the Court issued an order stating that the Court had considered

Petitioner’s additional authorities. (Doc. No. 21.) On October 31, 2008, Petitioner submitted

Case 3:07-cv-00375-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 11/05/08 Page 1 of 8
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a document that the Court construes as a motion for reconsideration based on those additional

authorities. The Court granted the motion for reconsideration and vacated the January 30,

2008 order.

After careful reconsideration, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation,

DENIES the petition, and DENIES the motion for discovery. The Court also DENIES a

Certificate of Appealability.

Background

The California Court of Appeal described the facts as follows:

After a night of drinking, Morris and a codefendant drove to the apartment of the

victim, Lee Hill, for the purpose of getting Hill intoxicated, driving him to the

desert and killing him. Although Morris and Hill were close friends, Morris was

angry with Hill about financial issues and Hill’s attempt to rape Morris’s wife.

Hill agreed to accompany Morris and the codefendant. When they were in an

isolated area, Morris approached Hill from behind and cut his throat with a

knife. After Hill fell to the ground, the codefendant cut off Hill’s genitals and

stabbed him in the back of the skull. Morris and the codefendant took Hill’s

identification and left him there where his decomposed remains were later

discovered by some campers.

(Lodgment 6 at 1-2.)

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder with a deadly weapon in violation of

California Penal Code §§ 187, 189, and 12022(b). (Lodgment 1.) On or about April 26, 1988,

the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 26 years to life in prison, with the possibility of parole.

(Lodgment 1.)

On September 13, 2005, the Board held Petitioner’s initial parole consideration hearing.

(Doc. No. 1) Petitioner contends that the Board’s Presiding Commissioner (“Commissioner”)

made statements during the hearing that demonstrated that the Board had predetermined the

hearing’s outcome. (Doc. No. 1-2.) During the hearing, the Board considered numerous

parole suitability factors, including Petitioner’s social history, his past and present mental state,

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his criminal history, his commitment offense, his behavior before, during and after the crime,

and his attitudes towards the crime. In particular, the Board considered Petitioner’s six rule

violations while institutionalized, his resistance to substance abuse assistance, his cruel and

calculated commitment offense, his trivial motive in committing the offense, his non-violent

history prior to the commitment offense, and his recent psychiatric report. (Lodgment 2 at

59-64.) The Board denied Petitioner’s parole based on these factors. (Id. at 59:4-10.)

On April 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the state

court, appealing the Board’s ruling. (Lodgment 3.) The Superior Court of San Diego County

denied his request on June 16, 2006. (Lodgment 4.) On September 6, 2006, the California

Court of Appeal also denied the petition. (Lodgment 6.) On December 13, 2006, the

California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (Lodgment 8.) Petitioner filed his

petition to this Court on February 27, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.)

Standards of Review

A. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects

to any portion of the report, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id. The Court reviews de novo the

magistrate judge’s conclusions of law. Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d

452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Scope of Review for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petitions

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus petitions:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

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Moreover, this action is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as

amended by the AEDPA:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The reviewing court may find a state court’s decision “contrary to” clearly established

United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) precedent: (1) “if the state court applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or (2) “if the state

court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision may involve an

“unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. Alternatively, the reviewing court

may find an “unreasonable application” “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal

principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.

Analysis

In his petition, Petitioner makes two contentions. First, Petitioner asserts that an inmate

has a liberty interest in release on parole. Second, Petitioner alleges that the Board violated

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his due process rights because it had predetermined his parole hearing’s outcome. In response,

Respondent contends that the state courts’ resolution of Petitioner’s claims were neither

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

A. Liberty Interest in a Parole Hearing

Petitioner argues that an inmate has a federally protected liberty interest in release on

parole. If a state’s statutory parole scheme uses mandatory language, it may create a

presumption that the Board will grant parole release when or unless it makes certain designated

findings. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12

(1979). In such a case, an inmate has a legitimate expectation in parole that the state cannot

deny without affording adequate procedural due process protections. Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-81 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16.

California’s parole scheme uses mandatory language that is largely parallel to the

schemes found in Allen and Greenholtz. Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). See also In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 661 (2002) (“prisoners possess a protected liberty interest in

connection with parole decisions rendered by the Board”). Petitioner therefore has a federally

protected liberty interest in release from parole.

B. Due Process of Parole Hearing

Petitioner challenges the due process of his parole hearing on the grounds that the Board

had predetermined his parole hearing’s outcome. Addressing the Petitioner’s allegations, the

California Court of Appeal held that “[t]he Board’s references to subsequent parole hearings

were made in the context of the possibility that parole would be denied, not that it was a

foregone conclusion.” (Lodgment 6.) The Court of Appeal held that the Board did not violate

the Petitioner’s due process rights. (Id.) 

By statute, when determining parole suitability, the Board “shall normally set a parole

release date,” Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(a), “unless it determines that the gravity of the current

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense

or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual.” Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(b). An inmate is unsuitable for parole

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if the panel determines that the inmate will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if

released from prison. 15 C.C.R. §§ 2281(a), 2402(a). The Board shall consider all relevant and

reliable information available to it, including the inmate’s social history, past and present

mental state, criminal history, commitment offenses, behavior before, during and after the

crime, attitudes towards the crime, and any other information that bears on the inmate’s

suitability for release. 15 C.C.R. §§ 2281(b), 2402(b).

A parole release determination is not subject to all the due process protections of an

adversarial proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987);

see also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (explaining that due process is flexible and calls for such

procedural protections as the particular situation demands). The Board must give the inmate

advance written notice of a hearing, Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399, the Board must afford the inmate

an opportunity to be heard, Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16, if the inmate is denied parole, the

Board must tell the inmate why he falls short of qualifying for parole, Id., and the Board must

rely on some evidence having some indicia of reliability. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

455 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987). Petitioner contends that while

some evidence supports the Board’s conclusion, the Board’s decision is “reversible per se as

it was clearly ‘predetermined.’” (Doc. No. 1-2.)

Petitioner argues that the Board predetermined his parole hearing’s outcome in violation

of state and federal due process. (Doc. No. 1-2.) See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644

(1997) (recognizing a due process claim based on allegations that a prison disciplinary hearing

officer was biased and would suppress evidence of innocence); O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d

418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that an inmate is entitled to have a Board consider his release

date without bias or prejudice); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th at 677 (holding that a parole

decision “must reflect an individualized consideration of the specified criteria and cannot be

arbitrary and capricious”).

Petitioner’s evidence falls short of what clearly established federal law requires to

establish that the Board had predetermined his parole hearing’s outcome. A petitioner may

demonstrate that a board had predetermined a hearing’s outcome with substantiated evidence

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beyond mere speculation. For example, in Balisok, the trier of fact “concealed exculpatory

witness statements and refused to ask specified questions of requested witnesses which

prevented respondent from introducing extant exculpatory material and ‘intentionally denied’

him the right to present evidence in his defense.” Balisok, 520 U.S. at 644 (inner citation

omitted). In O’Bremski, the petitioner pointed to a letter from a board member stating, “[a]s

a Board, we are doing everything we legally can to defer parole,” to show the Board’s bias.

O’Bremski, 915 U.S. at 422. In Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982), the Supreme

Court noted that hearing officers are presumed unbiased. See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.

35, 47 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941). The court noted that “[t]his

presumption can be rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason

for disqualification.” Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,

578-79 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).

The Board offered a detailed rationale for denying Petitioner’s parole based on the

particularized facts of his case. The Board properly considered Petitioner’s social history, his

past and present mental state, his criminal history, his commitment offense, his behavior

before, during and after the crime, and his attitudes towards the crime. 15 C.C.R. § 2402(c).

In particular, the Board considered Petitioner’s six rule violations while institutionalized, his

resistance to substance abuse assistance, his cruel and calculated commitment offense, his

trivial motive in committing the offense, his nonviolent history prior to the commitment

offense, and his recent psychiatric report. (Lodgment 2 at 59-64.)

The Commissioner’s statements, taken in the totality of the proceeding, do not

sufficiently evidence that the Board had predetermined the hearing’s outcome. The

“[C]ommissioner’s []failure to preface three of his comments in fifty-eight pages worth of

dialogue with ‘in the event that your parole is denied’ does not impugn the integrity of the

proceedings.” (Doc. No. 18.) Clearly established federal law does not permit a due process

violation finding on the basis of such speculative evidence.

In his September 13, 2008 notice of additional authorities, Petitioner requested that the

Court consider two California state cases in ruling on his petition. The Court granted

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Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration based on these authorities and has carefully reviewed

the cases. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Cal. 2008) holds that “when a court reviews a

decision of the [Parole] Board or the Governor, the relevant inquiry is whether some evidence

supports the decision of the Board of the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current threat

to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain

factual findings.” Id. at 1212. In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241 (Cal. 2008) applies the same

standard. In this case, the Court’s decision to deny the petition was not merely based on the

existence of evidence confirming the Board’s factual findings. Rather, consistent with

Lawrence and Shaputis, the Court analyzes the Board’s decision itself and concludes that there

is adequate evidence supporting that decision.

The state courts’ resolution of Petitioner’s claims did not result “in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).

As to Petitioner’s discovery request, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge

acted within his discretion to deny Petitioner’s motion for discovery. The Court concludes that

the Judge did not abuse his discretion and his decision was legally correct.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation, DENIES the

petition, and DENIES the motion for discovery. The Court also DENIES a Certificate of

Appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 5, 2008

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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