Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00537/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00537-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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07cv0537

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLIE JOSEPH SILVA,

Petitioner,

v.

J. YATES, Warden, et al.,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 07-CV-0537-WQH (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. Introduction

On March 22, 2007, Leslie Joseph Silva (“Petitioner”), a

state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] On

May 24, 2007, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition

(hereinafter the “Petition”). [Doc. No. 4.] The Petition

challenges his San Diego Superior Court conviction in case number

SCD 175694 for ten counts consisting of three counts of forcible

rape, two counts of forcible sodomy, one count of forcible oral

copulation, two counts of residential burglary, and two counts of

misdemeanor indecent exposure. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

Transcript (“CT”), at 15-20, 293-95.) Petitioner contends: (1)

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the trial court erred in refusing to sever the counts, resulting

in a fundamentally unfair trial, and (2) trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective. (See Petition, Grounds One and Two

at 6-7.)

This Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

and all the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based

upon the documents and evidence presented in this case, and for

the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the Petition be

DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact

and presumes them to be correct. Petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506

U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact,

including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled

to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts as found by

the state appellate court are as follows:

Offenses Against Cynthia B. - Counts 1 through 4

[¶] On May 29, 2002, Cynthia B. fell asleep after forgetting

to close her garage door. She awoke at 2:30 a.m. in her bed

to find a man, later determined through DNA analysis to be

Silva, grabbing her wrists and pinning her down. While she

tried to fight and scream, Silva told her to “[s]hut the

fuck up or I’ll take you out.” Silva began to tie Cynthia’s

leg to the bed but stopped when she told him she would not

fight. He had her get on her hands and knees, applied

lubricant to her, raped and sodomized her, and then forced

her to orally copulate him. The room was dark and Cynthia

complied with Silva’s demand that she look away. Cynthia

told Silva not to harm her because she was an only child of

an 88-year-old mother; in response Silva told her not to

call her mother or the police or he would “take her out.” 

Silva tied Cynthia’s wrists behind her back and told her to

keep looking away; that he was going to clean himself. He

turned the light on, took a tissue from a drawer and went to

the bathroom. Cynthia eventually freed her wrists and

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called the police. Cynthia denied ever engaging in

consensual sex with Silva or inviting him over to her house.

[¶] Police responding to Cynthia’s call found a brown

bootlace and a cap from a lubricant bottle. A nurse who

conducted a physical exam of Cynthia after the incident

found injuries on her consistent with sexual assault as

Cynthia described.

Indecent Exposure - Counts 5 and 6

[¶] On three separate occasions in July and August 2002,

Diana Hatfield was walking in Silva’s neighborhood when she

passed his house and saw him either totally or partially

unclothed and masturbating in his front yard. During the

second incident, Silva was close enough to make eye contact

with Hatfield. Hatfield reported the incidents to police.

[¶] In October 2002, Bonnie Thompson, a postal carrier for

Silva’s neighborhood, was delivering mail to Silva’s

residence when she saw him through the open front door,

standing unclothed and masturbating in front of a mirror in

his living room. She saw him in the same condition a few

weeks later; this time Silva looked at her through the

reflection in his mirror. At her supervisor’s instruction,

Thompson would not deliver mail if Silva’s front door was

open. However, on two additional occasions Silva hid

himself in his front patio so that Thompson would not see

him until she entered to deliver the mail. On those

occasions, she found Silva seated in a chair with his pants

down and his penis exposed.

Offenses Against Amy L. - Counts 7 through 10

[¶] At 3:00 a.m. on April 3, 2003, Amy L. went to sleep in

her North Park apartment after going out with friends. She

had locked her windows and doors, but had lost her house

keys the night before. That morning she awoke to find a man

sitting on top of her back, threatening to kill her if she

didn’t cooperate or crack her neck if she were to scream. 

The man grabbed her hands behind her back and tied them with

what felt like tape. He also placed tape over her mouth. 

The man pulled down her pants and underwear, lifted her up

on her hands and knees, and raped and sodomized her. He sat

her on his lap and raped her again. Eventually Amy freed

her hands, removed the tape from her mouth and screamed. 

The man got very angry, slammed her head into the mattress

and told her, “I should fucking kill you right now.” He

then gagged her by putting something in her mouth, covered

her head, and got dressed. Amy never saw the man’s face,

but recalled his voice had a slight Hispanic accent.

[¶] Police later found red electrical tape and a used Bandaid in Amy’s apartment, neither of which belonged to Amy. 

Two or three days later Amy also found an unfamiliar

baseball cap on the floor of her bedroom, which she gave to

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police. Amy denied having ever seen Silva or having

consensual sex with the person who entered her bedroom that

morning. The nurse who examined Amy after the incident

found injuries consistent with Amy’s description of the

assault.

[¶] A criminalist who examined clothing and swabs taken from

Amy L. submitted cuttings from the Band-aid, a comforter,

cigarette butt, ball cap and one of a pair of stockings, as

well as swabs from Amy’s right hand and right and left

breast, for DNA analysis. A DNA profile taken from the

Band-aid matched the DNA profile taken from Silva in Cynthia

B.’s case. Another criminalist could not exclude Silva as

the contributor of the DNA on the ball cap found in Amy’s

room, but he concluded Silva was very likely the source of

the predominant DNA profile obtained from the Band-aid.

Defense Testimony

[¶] Silva testified at trial about his involvement with

Cynthia B. According to Silva, he had several telephone

conversations with Cynthia after leaving her a note asking

whether she would be interested in going out with him. He

testified they talked on the telephone about their Memorial

Day weekend plans on May 29, 2002, and again on May 30,

2002, during which [] she invited him over to her house to

meet. Later that evening, he entered her house and they had

consensual intercourse. Silva denied sodomizing her,

threatening her or using tape or ropes. He felt badly

afterwards because he was still married, and told Cynthia so

and that he could not have a relationship with her. Silva

testified Cynthia called him a couple more times afterwards

asking if he wanted to have a relationship, but he declined.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 2-5.)

III. Procedural Background

The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an

Information charging Petitioner with three counts of forcible

rape (counts 1, 7, 8) in violation of California Penal Code

(“Penal Code”) section 261(a)(2); two counts of forcible sodomy

(counts 2, 9) in violation of Penal Code section 286(c)(2); one

count forcible of oral copulation (count 3) in violation of Penal

Code section 288a(c)(2); two counts of residential burglary

(counts 4, 10) in violation of Penal Code section 459; and two

counts of misdemeanor indecent exposure (counts 5, 6) in

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1

 Volume 6 of Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s Transcript, begins with

consecutively numbered pages starting with page 546. However,

beginning with page 549, all pages within Volume 6 are hand-marked and

consecutively numbered 549/1 through 549/128. Volume 7 begins with

page 550 and contains consecutively numbered pages thereafter.

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violation of Penal Code section 314.1. (CT at 15-20.) The

Information alleged special allegations as to all felony counts. 

(CT at 15-16.) A jury found Petitioner guilty of all counts and

found true all special allegations. (CT at 270-86; Lodgment No.

2, Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”), at 534-40.)1 The trial court

sentenced Petitioner to a 25-years-to-life term on counts 1-4, a

25-years-to-life term on counts 7-10, plus a 32-year term. (CT

at 241-44.) Petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial, (CT at 214-

24), which the trial denied after holding a hearing. (RT 546-

66.) 

On April 4, 2005, Petitioner filed a direct appeal

challenging his conviction and sentence in the California Court

of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment

Nos. 3-5.) On January 12, 2006, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in an unpublished

opinion. (Lodgment No. 6.) On January 18, 2006, Petitioner

filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court,

(Lodgment No. 7), which the court denied without comment. 

(Lodgment No. 8.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for habeas corpus relief

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on March 22, 2007. 

[Doc. No. 1.] Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition on May

24, 2007. [Doc. No. 4.] Respondent filed an Answer on August 6,

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2

 Petitioner did not file a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer. 

Because Petitioner did not file a Traverse, the allegations of the

Answer “shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge

finds from the evidence that they are not true.” 28 U.S.C. § 2248.

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2007. [Doc. No. 8.]2

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 

///

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To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy

either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)

& (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Id. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74

(2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, this Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate

court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 

If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis

for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis,

223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76); accord Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state

court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving claims

presented on direct or collateral review. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent],” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary

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3

 If Petitioner testified in defense of the Cynthia B. counts, he

would be subject to cross-examination on the Amy L. counts. (RT at

19.) This would have been problematic for Petitioner. Petitioner

told trial counsel that he met Amy L. the night before she was raped

8 07cv0537

to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Denial of Severance

In his first claim, Petitioner contends that the trial court

committed reversible error by refusing to sever the Cynthia B.

counts from the Amy L. counts, rendering his trial fundamentally

unfair. (Petition, Ground One.) Petitioner contends that the

joinder of the Cynthia B. counts with the Amy L. counts

prejudiced his trial on the Cynthia B. counts, to which he had a

consensual-sex defense. (Id.) Respondent contends that the

evidence would have been cross-admissible in separate trials, and

thus Petitioner cannot show that he was actually prejudiced when

the trial court refused to sever the counts. (Answer at 8-9.)

Petitioner first raised this claim prior to trial in a

motion for severance of counts based on the theory that the

assaults and indecent exposure took place on separate occasions

and involved separate victims. (CT at 21-45; RT at 16-38.) 

Petitioner requested three (if not four) separate trials. (CT at

45; RT at 15.) After a lengthy hearing with extensive argument

from both the prosecution and defense, the trial court denied the

motion. (RT 16-38; CT at 259.) 

In denying the motion for severance of counts, the trial

court found that the statutory requirements for joinder were met

because the evidence in both the Cynthia B. and Amy L. counts was

cross-admissible. (RT at 37.) The trial court noted, however,

that there was a “substantial danger of undue prejudice” caused

by joinder of the claims in the case.3 (Id.) To alleviate that

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while she was in a drunken stupor. (RT at 549/88, 559.) Amy L. got

into Petitioner’s van to look for her car. (RT at 549/88, 559-60.) 

Amy L. testified at the preliminary hearing that the man driving her

told her he was going to rape her. (RT at 560.) Amy L. escaped,

leaving behind her keys to her apartment, her bag, and her

identification. (RT at 560, 576.) Amy L. immediately called 911 and

reported the attempted rape. (RT at 549/89-90.) If Petitioner was

questioned at trial regarding the Amy L. counts, he could be

prejudiced by either his refusal to respond or his evasive answers. 

(RT at 19-20.)

9 07cv0537

danger, the trial court exercised its “residual” power under

California Evidence Code section 352 and ruled that Petitioner

could testify in defense of the Cynthia B. charges without

subjecting himself to cross-examination on the Amy L. charges. 

(RT at 37-38.) In exercising this discretion, the trial court

asserted that it had sufficiently addressed the risk of undue

prejudice and the potential denial of the right to a fair trial. 

(RT at 38.)

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. (Lodgment

Nos. 3-5.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment

in an unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 6.) The California

Supreme Court denied a subsequent petition for review without

comment. (Lodgment Nos. 7-8.) Because the California Supreme

Court did not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” this Court

must look through to the reasoning of the underlying decision of

the California Court of Appeal. See Ylst, supra, 501 U.S. at

801-06. (Lodgment No. 6.)

Under clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law, improper

joinder of defendants violates the Constitution only when it

results in prejudice so great that it denies a defendant his

Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. United States v. Lane,

474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986) (emphasis added). However, the U.S.

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Supreme Court has not clearly addressed whether improper joinder

of counts implicates federal constitutional issues. Therefore,

because there is no clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law

pertaining to improper joinder of counts, Petitioner’s claim is

not subject to federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). Even if Petitioner had raised a claim for which

federal habeas relief was available, however, Petitioner’s claim

is without merit.

The Ninth Circuit has summarized the test for assessing when

consolidation of counts rises to the level of a due process

violation:

[T]he propriety of a consolidation rests within the

sound discretion of the state trial judge. The

simultaneous trial of more than one offense must

actually render petitioner’s state trial fundamentally

unfair and hence, violative of due process before

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 would be

appropriate.

Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

Additionally, even if the trial court’s denial of the motion for

severance violated Petitioner’s due process rights, habeas relief

would not be available in this Court unless the error had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 at 637

(1993); see also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996). 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, stating:

[¶] Silva contends the trial court prejudicially abused its

discretion by denying his motion to sever the charges

relating to Cynthia B. from the remaining indecent exposure

and Amy L. counts. Although he concedes joinder of the

offenses is admissible [sic] under section 954 because they

belong to the same assaultive class and that the court

permitted him to testify on the Cynthia B. counts without

being subject to cross-examination on the other counts, he

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nevertheless maintains the trial court’s refusal to separate

the counts resulted in a “grossly unfair trial” in violation

of the California Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Specifically, he argues the counts as to

Cynthia B. and Amy L. were mutually irrelevant to each other

and even if properly joined under section 954, the Amy L.

counts, to which he presented no defense due to asserted

ineffective assistance of counsel (a claim we reject below),

had a highly inflammatory “spillover” effect that tainted

his trial on the Cynthia B. counts to which he had a

defense. Silva also challenges the commonality of the rape

and sodomy offenses against Cynthia B. and Amy L., asserting

they do not establish either intent or identity sufficient

to permit cross-admissibility under section 1101,

subdivision (b).

. . .

[¶] Because, Silva concedes, the offenses were of the same

class, joinder of the counts under section 954 was

appropriate unless Silva could make “a clear showing of

potential prejudice” due to the consolidation of such

properly joined counts. (citation omitted.) Silva did not

meet this burden. “‘“The determination of prejudice is

necessarily dependent on the particular circumstances of

each individual case, but certain criteria have emerged to

provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to

sever trial.” (citation omitted.) Refusal to sever may be

an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence [of] the crimes

to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in

separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually

likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a

“weak” case has been joined with a “strong” case, or with

another “weak” case, so that the “spillover” effect of

aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the

outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of

the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them

turns the matter into a capital case.’” (citation omitted.)

. . .

[¶] Here the trial court found the charges against Cynthia

B. and Amy L., as well as the indecent exposure charges,

would be cross-admissible under Evidence Code section 1108. 

Evidence Code section 1108 provides that where a defendant

is accused of a sexual offense in a criminal action,

“evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual

offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by [Evidence

Code] [s]ection 352.” (footnote omitted.) Rape, forcible

sodomy and forcible oral copulation under Penal Code

sections 261, subd. (a)(2), 286, subd. (c)(2), and indecent

exposure under Penal Code section 314 are “sexual offenses”

as defined in Evidence Code section 1108. (citation

omitted.) Evidence of Silva’s crimes against Amy L. was

therefore admissible on the other charges, unless it was

insufficiently probative or unduly prejudicial under

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Evidence Code section 352.

[¶] Undertaking that Evidence Code section 352 analysis, the

trial court determined the probative value of the evidence

of the Amy L. charges and the indecent exposure charges was

not outweighed by any probability of confusion or undue time

consumption, and it rejected any claim of prejudice. This

ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The charges with

respect to both Cynthia B. and Amy L. were almost identical

(Amy L. was the subject of an additional forced oral

copulation charge), and Silva’s actual conduct during the

offense was very similar. In both cases, he entered the

victims’ homes in the early morning hours while they slept;

he attempted to bind or actually bound them; he used threats

against each victim to deter their screams; and he placed

them in a similar position (on hands and knees) in which to

both rape and sodomize them. The fact the crimes against

Amy L. and Cynthia B. took place approximately one year

apart did not affect the probative value of the offenses. 

Cases decided under Evidence Code section 1108 have approved

the admission of much older evidence of prior sexual

offenses. (citation omitted.) Under the circumstances,

cross-admissibility of the evidence on the charges against

Silva sufficed to negate any prejudice, and eliminated the

need to analyze the other factors mentioned above.

[citation.]

[¶] Even assuming the trial court erred in its ruling on

cross-admissibility, the potential prejudice Silva asserts

would result from joinder “[does] not rise to the level of

demonstrating that the court’s denial of severance was an

abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted.) In particular,

we disagree with Silva’s argument that the Amy L. counts had

any inflammatory spillover effect due to the relative

strength and weakness of the cases. Both cases were

supported by compelling independent evidence consisting of

the victims’ own testimony and physical examinations, as

well as DNA evidence identifying Silva as the likely

contributor. There is absolutely no showing that the jury

in any way used evidence from one of the cases to bolster

the other. (citation omitted.) Under these facts, Silva in

our view cannot show a substantial danger of prejudice. The

court correctly addressed the motion for severance on the

record before it by Silva, and we find no abuse of

discretion in its ruling. (citation omitted.)

[¶] Nor has Silva shown that the trial court’s decision to

join the offenses, though correct when made, actually

resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due

process. (citation omitted.) Silva appears to argue that,

but for his counsel’s ineffective assistance, he would have

had an alibi defense to the Amy L. charges that would have

lessened the prejudice caused by joinder. We reject Silva’s

claim of ineffective assistance below. However the jury

disbelieved Silva’s defense to the Cynthia B. charges, and

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we see no reason why the jury would have believed any alibi

defense presented by him as to Amy L., particularly in view

of the DNA evidence linking him to the crimes. No gross

unfairness resulted from joinder to deprive him of a fair

trial or due process of law.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 5-11.)

(1) The state appellate court’s decision was not contrary to

or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law.

The state appellate court’s decision here is not “contrary

to” clearly established federal law because it neither “applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [United

States Supreme Court] cases” nor “confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme

Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the

Supreme Court’s] precedent.” Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 405-

06. The test applied by the state appellate court does not

“contradict” clearly established federal law because federal law

recognizes the need for consideration of substantially similar

factors as were identified by the state court. 

The test applied to analyze the potential prejudice from

joining counts by the state included factors such as: (1) lack of

cross-admissibility of evidence; (2) whether the nature of the

charges was unusually likely to inflame the jury; or (3) the

presence of any “spillover” effect of evidence from a strong

charge to a weak one which might affect the outcome. (Lodgment

No. 6 at 6, 8.) Similarly, the factors applied under federal law

when undertaking the same analysis include: (1) considering

whether the defendant would likely become embarrassed or

confounded in presenting separate defenses; (2) whether the jury

would likely use the evidence of one crime to infer a criminal

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disposition for commission the other crime; or (3) whether the

jury would likely fail to compartmentalize the crimes charged and

find guilt where, had the crimes been considered separately, it

would not so find. See Bean, supra, 163 F.3d at 1084-86; see

also Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 

Thus, the state law applied by the California Court of Appeal in

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in

joining the counts is compatible with the “fundamental fairness”

inquiry under federal law. 

Neither did the California Court of Appeal’s decision

involve an unreasonable application of federal law. In his

federal Petition, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s

decision to deny the motion for severance vis-a-vis the third

factor in the state court’s analysis and the second factor in the

federal court’s analysis, that is, whether a “spill-over” effect

occurred because the court did not sever the counts in

Petitioner’s trial. (See Petition, Ground One.) The thrust of

Petitioner’s argument is that the prosecution improperly combined

the evidence in the two cases because the evidence in the Amy L.

case was strong, while the evidence in the Cynthia B. case was

weak. Prosecuting the counts together, Petitioner contends, had

a “cumulative effect” on the jury, which used the evidence of the

sexual assault on Amy L. to infer a criminal predisposition for

commission of the crimes against Cynthia B. (Petition, Ground

One; see RT at 20, 25.) Therefore, Petitioner contends, the jury

believed that he raped Cynthia B. even though the sex was

consensual. Along the same lines, Petitioner contends that by

restricting Petitioner in defending against the Amy L. counts, to

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4

 Cynthia B. and Petitioner gave differing testimony as to their

“relationship” prior to the assault. Cynthia B. testified that around

February or March 2002, she found a note on her lawn that said, “I

think you’re a beautiful woman.” (RT at 89.) The note contained a

phone number. (RT at 90.) Cynthia B. was flattered by the note and

called the number. (RT at 93.) She had several conversations over

the phone with a person named “Lee.” (RT at 90, 104.) Cynthia B.

testified that she never met up with the person who she talked to on

the phone. (RT at 90.) During the rape investigation, Cynthia B.

told police about the note. (RT at 91.) Cynthia B. suspected Lee was

her assailant because of prior conversations they had. (RT at 106.) 

With the police listening in, Cynthia B. called the number again. (RT

at 91.) Cynthia B. asked the man where he lived and his last name. 

(RT at 94, 104.) The man told her his last name was Silva and that he

lived on Market Street. (RT at 109, 300, 309-10.) Cynthia B. also

learned the man’s name was Leslie, not “Lee.” (RT at 104.) 

Petitioner’s birth name is Leslie, but he goes by “Lee.” (RT at 279.) 

Cynthia B. looked up Leslie Silva’s exact address in the phone book

and drove by his residence several times. (RT at 107.) Cynthia B.

wanted to see what her assailant looked like. (RT at 107.) The

police, after naming Leslie Silva as a suspect, interviewed him and

asked to take a mouth swab. (RT at 301.) The DNA obtained from the

crime scene matched the DNA from the mouth swab. (RT at 228.) 

Petitioner testified that he wrote a note to Cynthia B. telling

her she was pretty and asking her if she would like to go out with

him. (RT at 265.) Petitioner said they talked several times on the

phone about a month before the alleged rape and made plans to meet up. 

(RT at 266-67.) They never did. (RT at 267.) On the night of the

alleged rape, Petitioner testified that he called Cynthia B. and made

plans to get together. (RT at 267-68.) He went to her house and

after talking with her for about one to two minutes, they had

consensual sex. (RT at 269-70, 292.) Afterwards, Petitioner

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which he had an alleged alibi defense, his decision not to

testify led the jury to believe that he must be guilty of the Amy

L. counts. (Lodgment No. 3 at 26; RT 15-38.)

Under Ninth Circuit case law, joinder may be considered

unconstitutional under circumstances in which the prosecution

joins a strong evidentiary case with a weaker case, hoping that

the overlapping evidence will lead to a conviction in both. 

Bean, supra, 163 F.3d at 1083. Here, the District Attorney

initially rejected prosecuting Petitioner for the Cynthia B.

assault because Cynthia B.’s and Petitioner’s stories were too

divergent.4 (CT at 24, Motion for Severance of Counts.) At the

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testified that he felt bad about having sex with Cynthia B. because he

was still married and told Cynthia B. he did not want to have a

relationship with her. (RT at 272.) Petitioner contends Cynthia B.

called him several times afterwards asking if he would have a

relationship with her. (RT at 273, 286.) Petitioner told Cynthia B.

he would not. (RT at 273.) 

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time, it was difficult for the District Attorney to prove that

Cynthia B. did not have consensual sex with Petitioner because of

several conversations that took place between the parties before

the rape. (Id. at 24-25.) However, after the Amy L. assault, the

police were able to enter a DNA profile obtained from a Band-aid

left in her apartment into a local DNA database. (RT at 252.) 

In entering the profile, results came back that the same DNA

profile had been entered into the database on a previous

occasion, after the Cynthia B. assault. (RT at 252.) The DNA

profile matched Petitioner. (RT at 253.) 

Due to the similarity of the crimes, the matching DNA

profiles, the strong independent evidence, and the crossadmissibility of the evidence, the District Attorney was ready to

prosecute both cases, either jointly or separately. (RT at 3,

28.) If the court granted the motion for severance, the District

Attorney planned to prosecute the Amy L. charges first and the

Cynthia B. charges second. (RT at 3.) This was not a case in

which, if the court denied the motion for severance, the District

Attorney would not have prosecuted the “weaker” case. Rather,

both cases were supported by strong independent evidence.

In the Cynthia B. assault, Petitioner had seen the victim

before the assault from his nearby cousin’s house. (RT at 277,

312.) Cynthia B. testified that Petitioner entered Cynthia B.’s

house in the early morning. (RT at 74.) Petitioner told her

that if she screamed he would “take her out.” (RT at 75.) 

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Petitioner forced Cynthia B. to get on her knees with her face in

the pillow. (RT at 76-77.) Petitioner forced Cynthia B. to first

have vaginal intercourse with him. (Id.) Petitioner then forced

Cynthia B. to have anal intercourse with him. (RT at 77-78.) 

Lastly, Petitioner forced her to orally copulate him. (RT at

79.) Petitioner then tied the victim’s hands behind her back. 

(RT at 80.) They were tied in such a way that the victim could

eventually free herself. (RT at 103.) The entire episode lasted

roughly 25 minutes. (RT at 83.) DNA analysis of a spine swab

from Cynthia B.’s back revealed Petitioner’s DNA. (RT at 228.)

The facts in the Amy L. assault are strikingly similar to

the facts in the Cynthia B. assault. In the Amy L. assault,

Petitioner had seen Amy L. the night before the assault. (RT at

559-60.) Amy L. testified that Petitioner entered Amy L.’s house

in the early morning. (RT at 142-43.) Petitioner told her that

if she did not cooperate, he would kill her or crack her neck. 

(RT at 143.) Petitioner tied the victim’s hands behind her back. 

(Id.) They were tied in such a way that the victim could

eventually free herself. (RT at 150.) Petitioner placed Amy L.

on her knees. (RT at 145.) Petitioner forced Amy L. to first

have vaginal intercourse with him. (Id.) Petitioner then forced

her to have anal intercourse with him. (Id.) The entire episode

lasted roughly 20 minutes. (RT at 154.) DNA analysis of a Bandaid left in Amy L.’s house revealed Petitioner’s DNA. (CT at

227; RT at 560.)

Nurse Clair Nellie specializes in sexual assault crimes and

conducted rape examinations on both Cynthia B. and Amy L. (RT at

169, 171, 182.) During the examination of Cynthia B., Nellie

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5

 Despite Petitioner’s testimony that the sex was consensual,

Cynthia B.’s actions after the incident did not indicate consensual

sex. Cynthia B. immediately called 911 after the assault. (RT at 82,

359.) She underwent a two to three hour rape examination conducted at

4:15 a.m. (RT at 171-74, 359.) Moreover, Cynthia B. could not

recognize Petitioner at trial and could not identify her assailant. 

(RT at 88, 108.) The District Attorney argued that if Cynthia B. was

upset because Petitioner refused to have a relationship with her and

wanted to punish him by reporting a false rape, she would not have

undergone the invasive rape evaluation, nor would she have had

difficulty identifying him at trial. (RT at 388.)

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observed injuries consistent with both vaginal and anal sexual

assault. (RT at 176-78.) Additionally, Nellie took a swab of

Cynthia B.’s spine because Cynthia B. told her the assailant

licked her spine. (RT at 179.) Nellie also found red

indentations on Cynthia B.’s wrists consistent with Cynthia B.’s

story that the assailant tied her wrists and attempted to tie her

legs. (RT at 173-74.) Nellie’s testimony corroborated Cynthia

B.’s testimony, not Petitioner’s.5 (RT at 182.) 

Nellie also observed injuries consistent with sexual assault

on Amy L. (RT at 186.) During an anal examination, Nellie

observed redness and bruising in Amy L.’s anal canal. (RT at

187.) At the back of her anal canal, there were several

lacerations with active bleeding. (Id.) Nellie also observed an

injury to Amy L.’s lip, which was swollen and bruised, as well as

bruises on her legs and shins. (RT at 184.) Nellie’s testimony

corroborated Amy L.’s testimony that she was raped. (RT at 189.)

Both cases were supported by strong, independent, crossadmissible, evidence. (RT at 28.) Both Cynthia B. and Amy L.

testified at trial. (RT at 72-111, 140-66.) The cases were

markedly similar, adding to the strength of the testimony. 

Petitioner had seen both victims before the rape, he entered

their homes in the early morning, he tied or attempted to tie

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them up, he threatened to kill them, he placed them in similar

sexual positions, he had both vaginal and anal sex with them, and

the rapes lasted around 20-25 minutes. Additionally, the

investigation revealed Petitioner’s DNA at the crime scenes in

both cases and the testimony of nurse Clair Nellie corroborated

the victims’ testimony. (RT at 169-94.) Furthermore, the jury

had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses,

including Petitioner. (RT at 338-40.) Ultimately, the jury

found the testimony of the victims and the nurse more credible. 

Even if the evidence of the Cynthia B. and the Amy L.

assaults was not properly cross-admissible, the jury received

ample instruction on compartmentalizing the counts throughout

trial, thus reducing the effect of a “spillover.” When

instructing the jury before trial on the alleged crimes, the

trial court specifically told the jury that Petitioner was

charged with “a separate commission of the crime of rape on Amy.” 

(RT at 63 (emphasis added).) After both sides rested, the court

again admonished the jury they were to “reach a separate decision

concerning each of the separate charges and the accompanying

allegations.” (RT at 322 (emphasis added).) The court went on

to explain, 

Each of the counts alleges a separate and distinct crime. 

Separate and distinct in terms of its commission and the

alleged victim. The crimes may be the same, but each

alleges a separate victim. So you must consider each count

separately... So you’ll be asked to separately decide as to

each separate charge or allegation. 

(RT at 352 (emphasis added).) Using CALJIC 17.02, the trial

court instructed the jury as follows: 

Each Count charges a distinct crime. You must decide each

Count separately. The defendant may be found guilty or not

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guilty of any or all of the crimes charged. Your finding as

to each Count must be stated in a separate verdict.

(CT at 166 (emphasis added).) Petitioner has failed to present

any evidence that the jury was unable to follow these

instructions, and the record supports a finding that the jury was

able to decide each count separately.

Lastly, any contention by Petitioner that the court

restricted him in defending against the alleged assault on Amy

L., and that such a restriction led the jury to believe it was

more likely that he committed the assault on her, is meritless. 

The trial court allowed Petitioner to testify to the encounter

with Cynthia B. without being subjected to cross-examination on

the Amy L. counts. (RT at 328.) The trial court did not

restrict Petitioner in his defense against the Amy L. assault;

rather, he chose not to testify. Had Petitioner testified to his

alleged alibi for the crimes against Amy L., the 911 tape in

which Amy L. screamed hysterically about an attempted rape the

night before would most certainly have been admitted on crossexamination and been seriously detrimental to Petitioner’s

defense. (See Lodgment No. 6 at 16.) It appears that Petitioner

wanted a trial in which he could testify to his alleged alibi

regarding the Amy L. assault, without being subjected to crossexamination. This is a patently unrealistic and untenable

position. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 415 (1986)

(noting the necessity and importance of cross-examination for the

discovery of truth). 

Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury regarding

Petitioner’s election not to testify in response to the Amy L.

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charges. Using CALJIC 2.61, the trial court instructed the jury

as follows:

In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may

choose to rely on the state of the evidence and upon

failure, if any, of the People to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt every essential element of the charge against him. No

lack of testimony on defendant’s part will make up for a

failure of proof by the People so as to support a finding

against him on any such essential element.

(CT at 145; RT at 328, 343.) Thus, the court properly instructed

the jury regarding Petitioner’s decision to exercise his right

not to testify in defending against the Amy L. charges.

(2) The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented.

Because the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law, the

only remaining issue is whether the California Court of Appeal

made an unreasonable determination of the facts in denying

Petitioner’s motion for severance. Taking into account the

review of the record conducted in the prior section (with respect

to whether there was an unreasonable application of federal law),

the evidence presented supports the court’s decision. There is

no indication that the California Court of Appeal made an

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Ultimately, Petitioner failed to carry his burden of

demonstrating that the state court’s denial of his motion for

severance rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Petitioner

has failed to show that the state court’s adjudication of

Petitioner’s claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

Moreover, even assuming Petitioner could satisfy the

conditions of § 2254(d)(1) or (2) by demonstrating that the trial

court’s denial of the motion for severance violated due process,

the Court finds that any such error by the state court did not

have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, supra, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Accordingly, this claim should be denied.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his second claim, Petitioner contends that his trial

counsel, John Blakely, was constitutionally ineffective in five

respects: (1) Mr. Blakely failed to consult with Petitioner about

trial strategy; (2) he failed to disclose a taped conversation

with Cynthia B.; (3) he failed to hire an investigator; (4) he

failed to present Petitioner’s alibi defense to the Amy L.

charges (including failure to cross-examine Amy L. on drug usage

with Petitioner the night before the assault); and (5) he failed

to present character witnesses on Petitioner’s behalf. 

(Petition, Ground Two.) 

Under clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law, to

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must

show: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness” and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687, 688, 690, 692, 694 (1984) (emphasis added). 

Petitioner’s claim fails if he makes an insufficient showing on

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either one of these components. Id. at 687. Additionally, mere

conclusory allegations that are not supported by specific facts

do not merit habeas relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935 (1994); O’Bremski v.

Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (the petitioner must

state facts which point to a real possibility of constitutional

error). 

Additionally, a wide measure of deference must be given to

counsel’s tactical decisions. Indeed, Strickland notes that

“counsel’s tactical decisions are virtually unchallengeable.” 

Id. at 690; see also, Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th

Cir. 1999). A petitioner “must overcome the presumption that,

under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S.

at 689 (citations omitted). 

Petitioner first raised this claim on direct appeal before

the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment of

the state trial court in an unpublished written opinion. 

(Lodgment No. 6.) The California Supreme Court denied review

without comment. (Lodgment No. 8.) Thus, this Court must “look

through” to the decision of the California Court of Appeal as the

basis for its analysis. See Ylst, supra, 501 U.S. at 801-06. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, stating:

[¶] ... For Silva to make a meritorious claim of

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, he must

establish both: “‘(1) that counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, a determination more favorable to

defendant would have resulted.’” (citation omitted.)...

. . .

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[¶] In his new trial motion, Silva argued Blakely did not

maintain adequate communication with him; that Blakely only

contacted him once before the preliminary hearing, did not

visit him in jail to discuss the case, and, though Silva

gave him a list of potential alibi witnesses, Blakely never

told Silva he had contacted or spoken with those persons and

they were not called at trial. Silva also contended Blakely

neglected to hire a private investigator or utilize an inhouse investigator to contact and [obtain] statements from

his mother, Emily Silva, or wife, Cara Silva, who according

to Silva could account for his whereabouts on April 3, 2002. 

Silva claimed they were never interviewed and points out

they were not called as witnesses at trial. At the hearing

on his new trial motion, Silva also testified Blakely did

not do any investigation into another possible witness,

Jennifer Carter, who according to Silva had seen Cynthia B.

driving by Silva’s house on numerous occasions.

[¶] In his brief on appeal, Silva sets out all the testimony

at the hearing on his new trial motion (his own testimony,

that of his mother, wife, and Blakely’s testimony) and he

cites authority for general propositions relating to

ineffective assistance claims, but he does not develop

meaningful legal arguments as to why Blakely was assertedly

deficient in his communications with Silva about trial

strategy and the case in general, or apply any of the

decisional authority to the present circumstances. Silva’s

main argument is that Blakely was derelict in not

investigating and presenting Silva’s alibi defense to the

charges against Amy L., namely, that Silva was at home on

the morning in question putting out a fire. Indeed Silva’s

sole argument as to prejudice is that Blakely’s rejection

“out of hand” of the potential alibi defense as to the Amy

L. charges requires per se reversal and also reversal under

the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967)

386 U.S. 18; he maintains had that defense been presented to

the jury he stood a reasonable chance of obtaining a more

favorable verdict.

[¶] The court’s ruling on the new trial motion, however,

expressly turned on its credibility assessments of Silva,

his mother and wife on the one hand, and Blakely on the

other, to resolve, as Silva’s counsel put it, “diametrically

opposed positions.” At the hearing on Silva’s new trial

motion, Blakely testified that he and Silva discussed the

potential for using his mother and wife as alibi witnesses

well before trial. Further, Blakely testified he spoke with

Emily Silva more than once about her proposed alibi

testimony. She told him she was asleep in the house and

awakened at some point because there was a fire in the

kitchen, but she had no idea where Silva was. She was

unable to tell Blakely how she became aware the kitchen fire

occurred on the same day as Amy L.’s alleged rape. 

According to Blakely, he interviewed Cara Silva five to six

times in face-to-face meetings; he found Cara Silva to be a

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worthless witness and told Silva so; among other things Cara

Silva was homeless, severely addicted to methamphetamine,

and in his view was obviously fabricating much of what she

said. Blakely believed no rational person would put her on

the stand as a witness. As for the merits of the alibi

defense, Blakely decided based on the distance between the

homes that a reasonable jury could conclude Silva could have

been in both places, that is, travel from Amy L.’s apartment

to his residence in time to put out the fire.

[¶] Presenting an alibi defense in the Amy L. case also

proved tactically troubling to Blakely. Blakely testified

that Silva told him he had not been at Amy L.’s house on the

morning in question. However, Silva said he met her the

night before when she was in a drunken stupor, that she got

in his vehicle to look for her car, and they stopped and did

a line of methamphetamine. Blakely was in possession of a

911 tape from that evening of Amy L., screaming and

hysterical, calling about an attempted rape. Blakely told

Silva that his testimony on the Amy L. alibi defense would

expose the 911 tape and subject Silva to certain conviction

for her rape the next morning. Blakely’s legal strategy was

to move to sever the charges, which he discussed with Silva.

[¶] With respect to character witnesses, Blakely testified

he discussed the importance of having such witnesses with

Silva during his first meeting with him and also in a

conversation on the phone; according to Blakely he asked

Silva to think about finding witnesses to attest to his

truthfulness and have them contact Blakely a week or so

before trial. Blakely also told Silva that such witnesses

would be subject to cross-examination, and a decision would

have to be made at some point as to whether the value of

their testimony might be outweighed by any undue prejudice

that might become involved in cross-examination. Blakely

testified that Silva never gave him a list or phone call to

identify any of his potential character witnesses, and

ultimately he and Silva made a joint decision not to call

character witnesses in the 48 hours preceding his trial. 

Although they talked about Silva’s mother as a potential

character witness, Blakely told Silva he believed her

presence in the courtroom would be a benefit and Silva

decided he would rather have his mother sit in the courtroom

during the trial than be waiting outside as an excluded

witness. Under the circumstances, Blakely felt no need to

hire a private investigator to undertake any further

investigation into the case.

[¶] “Whether to call certain witnesses is...a matter of

trial tactics, unless the decision results from unreasonable

failure to investigate.” (citation omitted.) In order to

establish ineffective assistance based on an alleged failure

to investigate, a defendant “must show at the outset that

‘counsel knew or should have known’ further investigation

might turn up materially favorable evidence.” (citation

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omitted.) As for the failure to investigate a defense, the

defendant “must prove that counsel failed to make particular

investigation and that the omissions resulted in the denial

of or inadequate presentation of a potentially meritorious

defense.” (citation omitted.)

[¶] Silva has not made the requisite showing here. In

particular, he does not explain in any meaningful way how

Silva’s alibi defense as to Amy L., in view of all the other

evidence and the alibi’s potentially damaging impact, had

the potential of prevailing. His reliance on People v. Shaw

(1984) 35 Cal.3d 535 and People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d

142 do[es] not assist him. In those cases, counsel did not

interview numerous alibi witnesses or consult with critical

experts, conduct which deprived counsel of a basis to make

informed tactical and strategic trial decisions. (citation

omitted.) To the contrary here, Blakely’s testimony at the

hearing on Silva’s new trial motion, which the trial court

expressly accepted over Silva and the other witnesses,

demonstrates that Blakely’s decision not to call either

Emily Silva or Cara Silva as witnesses or present an alibi

defense was informed; it was made after interviewing those

individuals and discussing strategy with Silva, and it was

therefore a reasonable tactical decision within the scope of

competent representation. Under this record, Blakely

undertook an adequate investigation, which defeats Silva’s

claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance.

[¶] Even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient in all

of the respects Silva claims, the jury still would have

heard the strongest evidence of his guilt as to the Amy L.

charges. That is, the jury would have learned that DNA

matching Silva’s profile taken from the Cynthia B. case was

present in the Band-aid found in Amy L.’s room after the

assault. It is within the context of this strong

circumstantial evidence demonstrating Silva committed the

offenses against Amy L. that we consider whether he could

establish prejudice, assuming counsel was deficient in all

of the respects he alleges.

[¶] Under the circumstances, taking into account not only

the DNA evidence, but the strength of both Cynthia B. and

Amy L.’s testimony and the corroborating testimony of the

nurse as to their injuries, we conclude it is not reasonably

probable Silva would have received a more favorable result

if his counsel had presented the additional defense

witnesses and dubious (and potentially damaging) alibi

defense that Silva asserts should have been advanced. 

Whether we consider the alleged deficiencies individually or

cummulatively, Silva has not demonstrated resulting

prejudice. He has not carried his burden on appeal to show

he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 12, 14-19.) 

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(1) The state court’s decision was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law.

The state appellate court’s opinion was not “contrary to”

clearly established federal law because it neither “applie[d] a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [United

States Supreme Court] cases” nor “confront[ed] a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the

Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrive[d] at a result different

from [the Supreme Court’s] precedent.” Williams, supra, 529 U.S.

at 405-06. The rule applied by the state appellate court in

determining whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective was

the exact standard adopted in federal law. (See Lodgment No. 6

at 12.)

Neither did the California Court of Appeal’s decision

involve an unreasonable application of federal law. In deciding

whether Petitioner made a sufficient showing that counsel’s

representation was deficient and that prejudice had resulted, the

California Court of Appeal noted that Petitioner did not show (1)

how counsel’s actions were deficient or (2) why the outcome of

the trial would have been different had counsel not been derelict

in the five ways Petitioner contends. (See Lodgment No. 6 at 14,

18; See Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 688, 690, 692, 694.) The

California Court of Appeal’s decision was not an unreasonable

application of Strickland if Petitioner made an insufficient

showing on either one of these two prongs. Strickland, supra,

466 U.S. at 687. Moreover, mere conclusory allegations,

unsupported by specific facts, cannot amount to a sufficient

showing. James, supra, 24 F.3d at 26.

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In his Petition, Petitioner merely states “[c]ounsel failed

to discuss any case strategy or case proceeding with the

defendant; failed to disclose a tape prosecution had of telephone

conversation with victim Cynthia B.; never hired any

investigators to investigate witnesses or charges;

never...presented alibi witnesses to Amy L. charges; and never

called character witnesses.” (Petition, Ground Two.) Petitioner

does not even attempt to develop any meaningful arguments to

support these contentions and fails to show why these alleged

deficiencies amounted to a violation of his constitutional

rights. (See id.) Petitioner’s conclusory allegations that

counsel was ineffective, without specific facts supporting these

contentions, are insufficient to merit habeas relief. Id.

Respondent correctly notes that Petitioner has failed to show

counsel’s performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted. 

(Answer at 16.) Petitioner has made an insufficient showing on

both prongs of the Strickland analysis regarding each of his

contentions; thus, Petitioner fails to show that the California

Court of Appeal’s decision was an unreasonable application of the

standard set forth in Strickland. 

(2) The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented.

Because the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law, the

only remaining issue is whether the California Court of Appeal

made an unreasonable determination of the facts in denying

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

///

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6 As discussed above, the trial court ruled that Petitioner would

be entitled to testify in defense of the Cynthia B. charges without

subjecting himself to cross-examination on the Amy L. charges. (RT at

37-38.)

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(a) failure to consult Petitioner regarding trial strategy

First, Petitioner contends that Mr. Blakely was

constitutionally ineffective because he failed to consult with

Petitioner regarding trial strategy. (Petition, Ground Two.) 

For purposes of this analysis, the Court assumes that Petitioner

specifically contends that Mr. Blakely should have consulted him

regarding alibi witnesses, should have consulted him about the

significance of the motion for severance and should have

encouraged him to testify in defense of the Amy L. charges. (See

Lodgment No. 3 at 33; RT at 549/62-65.) 

Mr. Blakely testified during the hearing on Petitioner’s

motion for new trial that he interviewed the potential alibi

witnesses suggested by Petitioner and talked with him extensively

about the potential drawbacks involved. (RT at 549/89, 549/96-

99; CT at 227.) Ultimately, Mr. Blakely determined that it was

against Petitioner’s best interests to present them. (RT at

549/99.) Mr. Blakely also testified that he discussed the

significance of the motion for severance at length with

Petitioner and that Petitioner was “very, very happy” with the

result.6

 (RT at 549/91-92, 549/122.) 

Because Petitioner’s and Mr. Blakely’s testimony was

diametrically opposed, the issue of whether Mr. Blakely

completely failed to discuss trial strategy with Petitioner

turned on a credibility assessment of the two. (RT at 555;

Lodgment No. 6 at 15.) In denying Petitioner’s motion for new

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trial, the trial court noted, “I am persuaded by [counsel’s]

testimony... Your client [Petitioner] is not a credible witness. 

He was a terrible witness at trial. He was not a good witness

here, either.” (RT at 564-65; Lodgment No. 6 at 15.) This Court

will not second-guess the trial court’s credibility determination

because the trial court was in a better position to make

credibility assessments of the witnesses. Ornelas v. United

States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (noting that an appellate court

never has the benefit of the trial court’s familiarity with the

details of the case, nor the benefit of hearing live testimony). 

Thus, the record supports a finding that counsel sufficiently

discussed trial strategy and the significance of the motion for

severance with Petitioner. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner had set forth specific facts

showing that counsel’s performance was deficient, based on the

strong circumstantial evidence in the case, it would have been

virtually impossible for Petitioner to show that the outcome of

the trial would have been different. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S.

at 668, 688, 690, 692, 694. Petitioner ignores the fact that

circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a

conviction, and the jury was so instructed. (CT at 131; CALJIC

2.00.) Circumstantial evidence, including Petitioner’s DNA

obtained from each crime scene, as well as the strong testimony

of both Cynthia B. and Amy L., independently supported a finding

of guilt. (RT at 228, 560,72-111, 140-66.) Thus, the record

supports a finding that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Mr.

Blakely’s performance, and the claim should be denied.

///

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(b) failure to disclose taped conversation

Petitioner contends that Mr. Blakely was constitutionally

ineffective because he failed to disclose to Petitioner a taped

telephone conversation between Petitioner and Cynthia B. which

took place after Cynthia B.’s rape. (Petition, Ground Two.) The

District Attorney questioned Petitioner about the tape during

trial. (See RT at 299-301; see also Lodgment No. 3 at 33.) 

The problem with Petitioner’s contention, however, is that

neither the tape nor Petitioner’s responses to the prosecutor’s

questions were damaging to Petitioner’s defense. On the tape,

Petitioner and Cynthia B. engage in a friendly conversation. 

Petitioner even tells Cynthia B. his last name and where he

lives. (RT at 379.) Mr. Blakely was able to use the tape to

Petitioner’s benefit. In his closing argument, Mr. Blakely

argued, “Does this sound at all like the voice of a woman who

thinks that this man may be the person who [raped her]?” (Id.) 

Mr. Blakely argued that giving personal information to Cynthia B.

did not make sense if Petitioner had just committed violent,

forcible rape on her. (Id.) Thus, the record supports a finding

that counsel was not deficient in failing to disclose the tape. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner had set forth specific facts

showing that counsel’s performance was deficient, given the

strong circumstantial evidence supporting Petitioner’s guilt (as

discussed above), there is no reasonable likelihood that had Mr.

Blakely disclosed the tape, Petitioner would have been acquitted

of any crimes charged. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688, 690,

692, 694. Thus, the record supports a finding that Petitioner

was not prejudiced by Mr. Blakely’s performance, and the claim

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7

 The specific reasons why this decision was made are discussed

in subsection (e) below.

32 07cv0537

should be denied.

(c) failure to hire an investigator

Petitioner next contends that Mr. Blakely was

constitutionally ineffective because he failed to hire an

investigator to conduct a formal investigation into alibi and

character witnesses. (Petition, Ground Two.) 

During the hearing of the motion for new trial, Petitioner

testified that he gave Mr. Blakely the names, addresses and

telephone numbers of potential character witnesses. (RT at

549/60.) Mr. Blakely testified that he attempted to contact or

did contact each character witness. (RT at 549/111, 549/106.) 

He further testified that he talked with Petitioner about the

potential character witnesses, but that they jointly decided not

to call them to testify.7 (RT at 549/94-95.) Additionally, Mr.

Blakely personally interviewed both of Petitioner’s potential

alibi witnesses and assessed their helpfulness to Petitioner’s

case. (CT at 227, 231; RT at 549/109, 549/112.) Because

Petitioner agreed not to call any character witnesses, and

because there were only two potential alibi witnesses, counsel

did not see the need to hire an investigator. (RT at 549/108.) 

Thus, the record supports a finding that counsel’s decision not

to hire a private investigator was reasonable. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner had set forth specific facts

showing that counsel’s performance was deficient, given the

strong circumstantial evidence supporting Petitioner’s guilt (as

discussed above), there is no reasonable likelihood that had Mr.

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Blakely hired a private investigator, Petitioner would have been

acquitted of any crimes charged. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at

688, 690, 692, 694. Thus, the record supports a finding that

Petitioner was not prejudiced by Mr. Blakely’s performance, and

the claim should be denied. 

(d) failure to present an alibi defense

Petitioner next contends that Mr. Blakely was

constitutionally ineffective because he failed to call potential

alibi witnesses and did not cross-examine Amy L. regarding drug

usage with Petitioner the night before the assault. (Petition,

Ground Two.) 

Petitioner gave Mr. Blakely the names of two alibi

witnesses: Emily Silva, his mother, and Cara Silva, his wife. (CT

at 227.) During the hearing on Petitioner’s motion for new

trial, Emily Silva testified that Petitioner was putting out a

kitchen fire during the early morning hours when Amy L. was

raped. (RT at 549/4-5, 549/6.) However, Emily Silva could only

account for roughly a half hour of Petitioner’s whereabouts (from

4:30 a.m. to 5:00 a.m). (RT at 549/11.) Petitioner could have

raped Amy L. before or after the fire. (Id.) Cara Silva

testified that she and Petitioner were doing drugs, among other

things, at the time of the Amy L. rape. (RT at 549/118.) 

Counsel determined that Cara Silva was a useless witness because

she was homeless and severely addicted to methamphetamine. (RT

at 549/98-99.) Even more fundamentally, it was clear to counsel

that Cara Silva was lying. (RT at 549/99.) 

Presenting the alibi defense and cross-examining Amy L.

about using drugs with Petitioner the night before the assault

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also was tactically troubling for Mr. Blakely. Petitioner told

Mr. Blakely that he met Amy L. the night before the rape while

she was in a drunken stupor. (RT at 549/88, 559.) Amy L. got

into Petitioner’s van to look for her car. (RT at 549/88, 559-

60.) Amy L. testified that the man driving her around told her

he was going to rape her. (RT at 560.) This was supported by a

recording of a 911 call in which Amy L. is crying hysterically,

reporting an attempted rape. (RT at 549/89-90.) Amy L. escaped,

leaving behind her keys to her apartment, her identification, and

her address in Petitioner’s van. (RT at 560, 576.) Had Mr.

Blakely presented the alibi defense or cross-examined Amy L.

regarding the prior night’s events, all of this evidence would

have come in and would have substantially supported the

prosecution’s case against Petitioner. (RT at 549/89.) 

Additionally, because Petitioner’s mother’s house and Amy L.’s

apartment were mere blocks from each other, it was possible that

Petitioner had committed the rape, and then gone home immediately

and set fire to the house to make it appear as if he had never

left. (RT at 549/126-27, 549/65.) Thus, the record supports a

finding that counsel’s decision not to call alibi witnesses was

tactically reasonable. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 690. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner had set forth specific facts

showing that counsel’s performance was deficient, given the

strong circumstantial evidence supporting Petitioner’s guilt (as

discussed above), there is no reasonable likelihood that had Mr.

Blakely presented the alibi defense, Petitioner would have been

acquitted of any crimes charged. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at

688, 690, 692, 694. As the California Court of Appeal noted,

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counsel’s tactical decisions not to call witnesses who were

useless or potentially damaging to Petitioner’s case was not

objectively unreasonable. (Lodgment No. 6 at 18.) Such

“tactical decisions are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland,

supra, 466 U.S. at 690. Thus, the record supports a finding that

Petitioner was not prejudiced by Mr. Blakely’s performance, and

the claim should be denied.

(e) failure to present defense character witnesses

Lastly, Petitioner contends that Mr. Blakely was

constitutionally ineffective because he failed to present

character witnesses who would have made a difference in the

trial’s outcome. (Petition, Ground Two.) 

During an initial interview, Mr. Blakely instructed

Petitioner to think of anyone who would be able to testify to

Petitioner’s character for truthfulness. (RT at 549/93.) 

Petitioner gave counsel several names of potential character

witnesses. (RT at 549/60.) Mr. Blakely chose not to interview

potential character witness Karina Vaught because Cara Silva

provided him with the name, and counsel believed it was a

mistake. (RT at 549/111.) He tried to call another potential

character witness, Jennifer Carter, but the number was

disconnected. (RT at 549/106.) Mr. Blakely spoke with the

remaining two potential character witnesses, Cara Silva and Emily

Silva. (RT at 549/109, 549/112.) Mr. Blakely felt that the

only witness worth calling was Emily Silva. (RT at 549/95.) 

However, because Emily Silva was Petitioner’s mother, it would be

in Petitioner’s best interest to have her present in the

courtroom, rather than waiting outside as an excluded witness. 

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(Id.) After discussing that the other character witnesses would

be subject to risky cross-examination (given their backgrounds),

counsel and Petitioner decided it was not in Petitioner’s best

interests to call them. (RT at 549/94-95.) Thus, the record

reflects that Mr. Blakely and Petitioner decided together that

calling any of the character witnesses would be tactically unwise

and this Court will not second-guess counsel’s tactical

decisions. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 690.

Moreover, even if Petitioner had set forth specific facts

showing that counsel’s performance was deficient, given the

strong circumstantial evidence supporting Petitioner’s guilt (as

discussed above), there is no reasonable likelihood that had Mr.

Blakely presented the character witnesses, Petitioner would have

been acquitted of any crimes charged. Strickland, supra, 466

U.S. at 688, 690, 692, 694. Thus, the record supports a finding

that Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance, and

the claim should be denied.

After a thorough and independent review of the record, this

Court finds the California Court of Appeal’s denial of

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, nor was the decision based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

Petitioner failed to make any showing whatsoever that he received

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. The record

supports a finding that counsel’s performance was reasonable and

that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Mr. Blakely’s performance. 

Thus, the claim should be denied. 

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V. Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned magistrate judge finds that Petitioner has not shown

that he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable

legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and

that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

William Q. Hayes, United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that not later than April 30, 2008, any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed not later than May 14, 2008. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 28, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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