Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01314/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01314-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAYLE WINTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01314-GSA

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

Gayle Winter (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for disability insurance 

benefits pursuant to Title II and Title VII of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently 

before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted without oral argument to the 

Honorable Gary S. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.1 The Court finds the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court affirms the agency’s 

determination to deny benefits.

 

1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF Nos. 7, 9).

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II. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

On February 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits under 

Title II and supplemental security income under Title VII. AR 147-158. The application was 

denied initially on December 1, 2010, and upon reconsideration on May 6, 2011. AR 72-73; 77-

78. Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing on July 13, 2011. AR 95-96. The hearing was then 

conducted before Administrative Law Judge Philip E. Callis (the “ALJ”) on March 28, 2012. AR 

39-55. On April 25, 2012, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision determining that Plaintiff was 

not disabled. AR 23-33. On May 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed an appeal of this decision with the 

Appeals Council. AR 18-19. On June 26, 2013, the Appeals Council denied the appeal, 

rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1-7. This appeal 

followed.

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff was born on March 16, 1952, and was sixty years old on the date of the hearing. 

AR 45, 167. Plaintiff lives alone in a duplex. AR 47. She has a driver’s license and she drives to 

the bank monthly, to the doctor monthly, and to the grocery store every two weeks. AR 48, 50, 

220-21. 

She graduated high school and completed two years of college. AR 193. Plaintiff worked 

as a vice president of organizational development at a temporary service company from April 

1992 through May 1996. AR 194. Plaintiff then worked as a manager of a visitor center from 

September 1999 through February 2000, as a vice president of organizational development at a 

furniture store from September 2002 through May 2005, and as a general manager at another 

furniture store from September 2005 through February 2006. AR 46, 194. Subsequently, she

worked as a bookkeeper who posted checks at a property management business from January 

2007 through April 2007. AR 45, 194. She has not worked since that time. AR 192. 

In her applications for benefits, Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from bipolar disorder, 

depression, anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder, schizophrenia, posttraumatic stress disorder, 

tremors, hemolytic autoimmune anemia, low thyroid levels, and a sleep disorder,. AR 126, 92. 

 

2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

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Plaintiff testified that she is unable to work because she has trouble getting out of bed and she 

forgets what she is doing. AR 46. When Plaintiff tried to work in 2007, she had trouble getting 

to work because her emotional problems caused her to have trouble in the shower and getting 

dressed. AR 51. She testified that her condition worsened during the year prior to the hearing. 

AR 52.

When asked about her daily activities, Plaintiff stated that she watches television,

although she has trouble concentrating on the storyline; feeds the dog and puts it outside; makes 

meals for herself, such as TV dinners, sandwiches, and hardboiled eggs; and sometimes sleeps for

sixteen to twenty hours a day. AR 47-49, 219, 221. She is able to make her bed and do the 

dishes, but she only does minimal cleaning and laundry because of how long it takes her to do it. 

AR 49, 222. Plaintiff indicated that she does not have the energy to chat; she cannot remember 

conversations; and she cannot handle stress, crowded stores, and changes in her routine. AR 223, 

224. Plaintiff stated that she is not very good at concentrating and understanding and following 

directions. AR 223. She stated that spoken instructions would have to be written down. AR 223. 

However, she is able to get along “fine” with authority figures and she has never been fired or 

laid off because of problems getting along with other people. AR 224. 

B. Third Party Testimony

Plaintiff’s friend, Gary Grove, completed the third party function report on June 30, 2010. 

AR 255-262. He stated that Plaintiff cannot do simple tasks and that she spends her days sleeping 

and watching TV, but she has trouble following the storyline. AR 255, 259. Plaintiff’s ability to 

reason and comprehend has decreased and she cannot pay attention for long, which has affected 

her cooking. AR 257, 260. Plaintiff does laundry once a month, goes food shopping every two 

weeks, and visits her mother monthly. AR 257-59. 

C. Medical Evidence

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 283-530. The relevant sections 

of the reports are detailed below.

Treatment History

Medical notes in the record reveal that Plaintiff had a long history of bipolar disorder and 

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alcohol abuse. Plaintiff was seen in April 2006 by Paul McGrew, M.D., and she reported that she 

had not been to a doctor in more than four years. AR 284, 313. At that time, Plaintiff stated that 

she had been off her medications for several weeks and needed refills. AR 284, 313.

On August 31, 2007, Robert Chin, M.D., treated Plaintiff for complaints of depression. 

AR 312. Dr. Chin diagnosed bipolar affective disorder, moderate depression, and “unspecified” 

alcoholism and prescribed medications. AR 312. Dr. Chin noted that Plaintiff had appropriate 

judgment, mood, and affect, and normal memory. AR 312.

On November 14, 2007, Dr. Chin noted that Plaintiff had appropriate judgment, mood, 

and affect, but she also had pressured speech and verbosity and was in a manic phase. AR 309. 

Dr. Chin switched Plaintiff’s medication to Zyprexa. AR 309. On November 21, 2007, Dr. Chin 

observed that Plaintiff’s speech was less pressured and noted appropriate judgment, mood, and 

affect and normal memory. AR 308. On December 14, 2007, Dr. Chin noted that Plaintiff’s 

judgment, mood, and affect were appropriate, she was oriented, and her memory was normal. AR 

307. 

In January 2008, Plaintiff reported less inactivity and “[s]till feel[ing] some depression” 

but “feel[ing] better” since stopping Zyprexa several days earlier. AR 306. Dr. Chin again noted 

appropriate judgment, mood, and affect and normal memory and wrote Plaintiff a new 

prescription for Celexa. AR 306.

At her March 2008 visit with Dr. Chin, Plaintiff stated that she was sleeping “okay” and 

not hypomanic. AR 305. Plaintiff acknowledged that when she was manic, she over-shopped. 

AR 305. Dr. Chin continued Plaintiff on Depakote. AR 305. In April 2008, Plaintiff’s diagnoses 

remained unchanged and Dr. Chin wrote Plaintiff a new prescription for Olanzapine-Fluoxetine. 

AR 304. In May 2008, Dr. Chin started Plaintiff on a “trial” of Topamax. AR 303. In June 

2008, Dr. Chin encouraged Plaintiff to increase Topamax as tolerated. AR 302. Dr. Chin again 

remarked that Plaintiff had appropriate judgment, mood, and affect and normal memory, and the 

diagnoses remained unchanged. AR 302. In August 2008, Plaintiff reported that she felt 

unmotivated and that she had stopped drinking alcohol one month earlier. AR 300. Dr. Chin 

noted that Plaintiff had a mildly depressed affect and prescribed Celexa for Plaintiff’s depression. 

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AR 300. In August 2009, Dr. Chin noted that Plaintiff’s judgment, mood, and affect were 

appropriate, she was oriented, and her memory was normal. AR 299. 

Medical Opinions

1. M.J. Hetnal, M.D., treating psychiatrist

Dr. Hetnal was Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist beginning in October 2008 and noted that 

she has had bipolar disorder since 1995. AR 286-289. In his October 9, 2008 evaluation, Dr. 

Hetnal noted that Plaintiff was alert, oriented, and cooperative. AR 288. Her speech was 

somewhat slow with a decrease in volume, but goal oriented. AR 288. Plaintiff’s mood was 

depressed and her affect was somewhat restricted. AR 288. Plaintiff’s cognitive functioning, 

recent memory, and remote memory appeared intact, but her attention and concentration were 

somewhat decreased. AR 288. Dr. Hetnal diagnosed bipolar disorder with current depressive 

disorder, ruled out anxiety and panic disorders, and stated that she had alcohol abuse in remission. 

(AR 288). Dr. Hetnal also noted financial stress and “disability from work” and assigned a Global 

Assessment Functioning (GAF) score of 50. AR 288. More specifically, Dr. Hetnal stated that 

Plaintiff had a history of bipolar disorder since 1995 and was “predominantly depressed for the 

last nine months.” AR 289. Dr. Hetnal made no changes to Plaintiff’s medications and noted that 

Plaintiff “remain[ed] disabled from work.” AR 289. 

During the October 9, 2008 evaluation, Plaintiff reported that she was hypomanic and 

energetic, but that she had been okay until her boss raped her in 1995 or 1996. AR 286. She 

admitted to “periods of times lasting for a few days at the time with excessive energy, money 

spending, impulsiveness and lack of sleep.” AR 286. During one of these periods, she claimed to 

have purchased six cars. AR 286. She reported “feeling increasingly depressed in the last nine 

months with increasing symptoms in the last three months.” AR 286. She told Dr. Hetnal that 

she was sad, unable to enjoy things, felt worthless, slept excessively, and had no energy or 

motivation. AR 286. She admitted to crying spells, being isolated, and having suicidal thoughts, 

but had no intent or plan to kill herself. AR 290. She reported tolerating medication well. AR 

287. She said she worried excessively, experienced one prior panic attack, and acknowledged

being “quite angry-verbally.” AR 287. She denied significant mood swings since 2003, and Dr. 

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Hetnal observed that she appeared “predominantly depressed.” AR 287. She admitted that 

Depakote helped with her mood swings, but said that she could not tolerate Seroquel, Wellbutrin, 

or Topamax. AR 287. Plaintiff also admitted to abusing alcohol, having 8 to 10 drinks per day 

and a history of blackouts, but asserted that she had been sober for the previous 6 months. AR 

287. 

On August 2, 2010, Dr. Hetnal completed a mental disorder questionnaire form for 

Plaintiff intended to summarize Plaintiff’s limitations. AR 330-334. In several places on the 

form, however, Dr. Hetnal simply wrote “Review records please.” AR 330-334. Dr. Hetnal 

noted that Plaintiff had psychomotor retardation and was tearful and sad. AR 331. Plaintiff was 

lower in concentration and slow in responses. AR 331. Plaintiff had a depressed mood, restricted 

affect, decreased energy, guilt, and anhedonia. AR 332. Plaintiff was isolated, staying by herself, 

withdrawn, had poor attention, and was not involved in daily routines. AR 333. Plaintiff was 

unable to adapt to stress and had poor decision making skills. AR 333. Dr. Hetnal diagnosed 

Plaintiff with bipolar disorder depressed phase, anxiety disorder, and alcohol abuse in remission. 

AR 334. Dr. Hetnal determined that Plaintiff had a poor prognosis and remained disabled from 

work. AR 334. 

2. Stanislaus County Behavioral Health and Recovery Services

On July 14, 2010, Stanislaus County Behavioral Health and Recovery Services noted that 

Plaintiff’s stream of thought was clear, her mood and affect were depressed and sad, her judgment 

and insight were clear. AR 327. 

In January 2012, Plaintiff presented to Darlene Thompson, L.C.S.W., at Stanislaus County 

Health Services. AR 447. Plaintiff reported that she could no longer afford a private psychiatrist 

and that she was managing her hallucinations better with medication. AR 447. Ms. Thompson 

scheduled Plaintiff for treatment with Dr. Nadolny. AR 447. Subsequently, Plaintiff met with 

Dr. Nadolny and continued treatment with Dr. Hetnal. AR 443. In March 2012, Plaintiff 

reported that her symptoms were improving after medication adjustments, but she still 

experienced depression. AR 438. 

On March 12, 2012, Plaintiff presented to Stanislaus County Behavioral Health and 

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Recovery Services Senior Access Group. AR 510-14. Plaintiff was depressed, but oriented as to 

person, time, and place. AR 512. Plaintiff had a pleasant attitude, logical though flow, fair 

concentration, normal immediate memory.

3. Carol W. Fetterman, Ph.D., consultative examiner

On October 20, 2010, Dr. Fetterman completed a consultative examination of Plaintiff. 

AR 343-346. Dr. Fetterman noted that Plaintiff was friendly, cooperative, and interacted 

appropriately with the examiner and office staff. AR 343-344. Plaintiff was alert, fully oriented, 

had good intelligence, and a depressed mood and affect. AR 344. Plaintiff’s concentration and 

attention were good. AR 344. She was able to spell “world” forward and in reverse with no 

mistake and was able to do serial 3’s and able to repeat 9 digits forward and 6 in reverse. AR 

344. Plaintiff has an adequate memory and took one trial to learn 3 words and recalled 2 out of 3 

words after a brief delay and remembered the events of 9/11. AR 344. Plaintiff’s judgment and 

insight are intact. AR 344. When Plaintiff was asked what she would do if she were in Wal-Mart 

and a small child came up to her crying and saying she was lost, she stated that “[she] would go 

up to the cashier and have [them] page her mother.” AR 344. 

Dr. Fetterman determined that Plaintiff can perform simple and complex tasks. AR 345. 

Plaintiff has a good ability to accept instructions and to interact with coworkers and the public. 

AR 345. She has no noted social impairments. AR 345. However, Dr. Fetterman determined 

that Plaintiff has a poor ability to maintain regular attendance in the workplace, complete a 

normal workday or workweek without interruptions from a psychiatric condition, and handle 

normal work related stress from a competitive work environment. AR 345. 

4. Brian Ginsburg, M.D., reviewing physician

On September 28, 2010, Dr. Ginsburg, completed a physical residual capacity assessment 

and determined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry 50 pounds, frequently lift and/or 

carry 25 pounds, stand and/or walk for a total of about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit for a 

total of about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. AR 336-342. 

5. Daniel Malone, Ph.D., reviewing psychologist

On May 9, 2011, Dr. Malone, completed a case analysis review of Plaintiff’s mental 

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impairments. AR 426-27. Dr. Malone stated that he was “unable to agree or disagree with the 

DDS’s affirmation of the Initial level mental FRC/determination [#1] because [he] cannot reliably 

read Dr. Hetnal’s treatment records [#2], particularly the 2011 records following the alleged 

worsening of the claimant’s mental impairments in late 2010.” AR 427. Dr. Malone 

recommended “an updated mental disorder questionnaire from Dr. Hetnal (legible writing or 

typed) to account for any changes from his 8/2/10 opinion of the claimant’s functioning since the 

alleged worsening of her condition in late 2010.” AR 427. 

6. Paul McGrew, M.D.

On June 27, 2011, Dr. McGrew, examined Plaintiff for back pain that she said had started 

several years before. AR 431. Dr. McGrew observed that Plaintiff came within eight inches of 

touching her toes and noted tenderness in her lumbarsacral joints. AR 431. Dr. McGrew 

diagnosed lower back lumbago, but indicated that Plaintiff may have had sacroiliitis. AR 431. He 

recommended an x-ray evaluation in the future and prescribed Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen 5-

500 mg for pain. AR 431. On February 7, 2012, Dr. McGraw noted that Plaintiff had no spinal 

tenderness, misalignment, or subluxations. AR 435. Dr. McGraw diagnosed degeneration of the 

lumbar or lumbosacral discs and prescribed Hydrocodone-Acetaminophen 10-325 mg every six 

hours. AR 435. Plaintiff had a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of her lumbar spine, sacrum, 

and coccyx, which showed moderate right-sided hypertrophic facet arthropathy at L4-L4 and L5-

S1. (AR 6, 515). 

III. THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must establish that he or 

she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 

than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a 

disability only if:

. . . his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he 

is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, 

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful 

work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work 

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exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy 

exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Commissioner has established 

a sequential five-step process for evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)-(f), 416.920(a)-(f). The ALJ proceeds through the steps and stops upon reaching a 

dispositive finding that the claimant is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920 

(a)(4). The ALJ must consider objective medical evidence and opinion testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527, 404.1529, 416.913. 

Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine: (1) whether a claimant engaged in 

substantial gainful activity during the period of alleged disability; (2) whether the claimant had 

medically-determinable “severe” impairments;

3

(3) whether these impairments meet or are 

medically equivalent to one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1; (4) whether the claimant retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform his past relevant work;

4

and (5) whether the claimant had the ability to perform other 

jobs existing in significant numbers at the regional and national level. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 23-33. In particular, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 16, 2009, 

the amended alleged onset date. AR 25. At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s hemolytic 

autoimmune anemia, tremors, posttraumatic stress disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and 

schizophrenia were not medically determinable impairments. AR 26-27. He did, however, 

identify hypothyroidism, anxiety disorder, and bipolar disorder as medically determinable severe 

impairments. AR 25. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that the severity of Plaintiff’s 

 

3

“Severe” simply means that the impairment significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic 

work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c).

4 Residual functional capacity captures what a claimant “can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1545 and 416.945. “Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an 

intermediate step in which the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 

F.3d 1149, 1151 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2007).

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impairments did not meet or exceed any of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. AR 27. 

Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to 

perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except she is 

limited to no more than frequent interaction with supervisors, coworkers and the public. AR 28. 

Given these limitations, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as 

a bookkeeper. AR 33.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine 

whether: (1) it is supported by substantial evidence; and (2) it applies the correct legal standards. 

See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 

F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). It is “relevant evidence which, 

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one 

of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Id.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Evaluation of Medical Evidence

1. Treating Psychiatrist, Dr. Hetnal

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of her treating psychiatrist,

M.J. Hetnal, M.D. Defendant argues that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence 

because Dr. Hetnal assessed more extreme limitations than the other physicians. 

Cases in this circuit distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those 

who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining 

physicians). As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source 

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than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 

647 (9th Cir. 1987). However, a “treating physician’s opinion is not . . . necessarily conclusive as 

to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 

747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (“the ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s opinion which is ‘brief 

and conclusionary in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support [its] conclusion”). 

When the treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it can be rejected 

for “clear and convincing” reasons. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may reject it by

providing “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record for the 

rejection. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983).

Here, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence 

for discounting Dr. Hetnal’s opinion. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. Hetnal’s findings were 

inconsistent with the other medical evidence in the record. For example, the ALJ noted that Dr. 

Hetnal’s opinion was entitled to little weight because other clinicians have noted that Plaintiff’s 

mental status examinations have been largely normal. A lack of supporting clinical findings is a 

valid reason for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

Plaintiff asserts that a mental status examination “is not sufficiently sensitive to detect the 

‘cognitive compromise’ caused by Bipolar Disorder.” (ECF No. 17 at 18). In her reply, Plaintiff 

argues that “a mental status examination assesses an individual’s cognition and serves to rule out 

dementia.” (ECF No. 25 at 2). Plaintiff cites an online mini-quiz that presents a scenario and 

allows the viewer to “vote” on the correct answer for which screening tool may be used to 

diagnose the patient. See Mini-Quiz: Psychiatric Screening Tools,” Psychiatric Times,

http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/bipolar-disorder/mini-quiz-psychiatric-screeningtools#sthash.JsbEBIs1.dpuf (last visited on 8/17/2015). The website then provides an explanation 

for the correct answer that states, “The MMSE is not sufficiently sensitive to detect the cognitive 

compromise now recognized in bipolar disorder.” Id. The ALJ considers objective evidence, 

including abnormalities of behavior, mood, thought, memory, orientation, development, or 

perception. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1528(b), 1529, 416.928(b), 416.929(a). The Court finds that 

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Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ should not have relied on mental status examinations. 

Plaintiff also argues that the mental status examinations that have yielded normal findings 

do not reflect the complete picture because bipolar is episodic in nature. However, the Court has 

reviewed Plaintiff’s treatment notes which span several years and the results of mental status 

examinations that are in the record, and the Court finds that the results of the mental status 

examinations are relevant in evaluating Dr. Hetnal’s opinion. 

On July 14, 2010, during an emergency evaluation, Plaintiff was cooperative, had a clear 

stream of thought, intact impulse control, and intact judgment and insight. AR 327. On August 

7, 2009, January 23, 2008, December 14, 2007, and November 21, 2007, Dr. Chin noted that 

Plaintiff was oriented, had an appropriate mood and affect, had a normal memory, and had 

appropriate judgment. AR 299, 306-09, 311. On October 20, 2010, Dr. Fetterman noted that 

Plaintiff was cooperative, alert, fully oriented, had intact judgment and insight, no abnormal 

speech, and a depressed mood and affect. AR 344. Therefore, the mental status examinations in 

the record were inconsistent with Dr. Hetnal’s opinion. 

The ALJ also found that Dr. Hetnal’s opinion was inconsistent with his own treatment 

records. Inconsistencies between a doctor’s opinion and his own reports provide a specific and 

legitimate reason for rejecting even a treating doctor's opinion. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a discrepancy between a doctor's opinion and his other 

recorded observations and opinions provided a clear and convincing reason for not relying on that 

doctor's opinion). The ALJ noted that Dr. Hetnal fails to note significant objective abnormalities. 

Dr. Hetnal noted that Plaintiff was alert, oriented and cooperative, had intact cognitive 

functioning and recent and remote memory, had good insight and judgment, and denied having 

any hallucinations and suicidal thoughts. AR 288. Therefore, Dr. Hetnal’s treatment records do 

not support his conclusions that Plaintiff has psychomotor retardation, slowed responses, and 

reduced concentration. 

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Hetnal’s treatment notes are so illegible that the ALJ must not 

have been able to read them and that the ALJ should have contacted Dr. Hetnal. 20 C.F.R. 

416.912(e) provides direction for an ALJ to recontact a treating physician or psychologist. 

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However, in this case, the ALJ did not make a finding that the report was inadequate to make a 

determination regarding Plaintiff’s disability. The ALJ disagreed with Dr. Hetnal’s report, but did 

not find that it was inadequate to form a determination regarding disability. Moreover, the ALJ 

cited to numerous notes by Dr. Hetnal. AR 30. Dr. Hetnal’s treatment notes are Exhibits B13F 

and B23F within the administrative record. The ALJ cites to these exhibits in his analysis on 

multiple occasions. For example, the ALJ stated that B13F at 11-28, B23F at 1-2, 4, 6-7, 9, 11, 

13-14, 17-18, and 20-123 showed that Plaintiff had auditory and visual hallucinations in 

November 2010, but that this had largely resolved by December 2010. AR 30. The ALJ also 

stated that Dr. Hetnal noted in B13F at 11-3, 15, 19, and B2F at 1 and 13 that Plaintiff was 

improving or doing well. AR 30. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the ALJ could 

not read Dr. Hetnal’s treatments notes. 

In Plaintiff’s reply, she argues that the ALJ should have obtained a medical expert opinion 

as to the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments after May 2011. (ECF No. 25 at 3). 

Because the ALJ met his burden identifying conflicting evidence in the record and within Dr. 

Hetnal’s own report, the inconsistencies are clear and convincing reasons for discounting Dr. 

Hetnal’s opinions. Plaintiff has shown, at most, that the evidence before the ALJ could have been 

interpreted differently, which is insufficient to warrant reversal. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. 

Hetnal’s opinion.

2. Consultative Examiner, Dr. Fetterman

The ALJ generally must accord greater weight to the opinion of an examining physician 

than that of a non-examining physician. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995) (as 

amended). As is the case with the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must provide “clear 

and convincing” reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician. 

Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990). If the opinion of an examining physician is 

contradicted by another physician’s opinion, the ALJ must provide “specific, legitimate reasons” 

for discrediting the examining physician’s opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Specific, legitimate 

reasons for rejecting a physician's opinion may include its reliance on a claimant's discredited 

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subjective complaints, inconsistency with medical records, inconsistency with a claimant's 

testimony, and inconsistency with a claimant's daily activities. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 

1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). It is error to ignore an examining physician's medical opinion 

without providing reasons for doing so. An ALJ effectively rejects an opinion when he ignores it. 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1286 (9th Cir. 1996).

The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Fetterman’s opinion that Plaintiff had a poor ability to 

maintain regular attendance in the workplace, complete a normal workday/workweek without 

interruptions from psychiatric condition, and to handle normal work-related stress from a 

competitive work environment because this was inconsistent with the other evidence in the 

record. AR 32, 345. As stated above, Plaintiff’s mental status examinations have been largely 

normal. On July 14, 2010, during an emergency evaluation, Plaintiff was cooperative, had a clear 

stream of thought, intact impulse control, and intact judgment and insight. AR 327. On August 

7, 2009, January 23, 2008, December 14, 2007, and November 21, 2007, Dr. Chin noted that 

Plaintiff was oriented, had an appropriate mood and affect, had a normal memory, and had 

appropriate judgment. AR 299, 306-09, 311. Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Hetnal, noted 

that Plaintiff was alert, oriented and cooperative, had intact cognitive functioning and recent and 

remote memory, had good insight and judgment, and denied having any hallucinations and 

suicidal thoughts. AR 288. Therefore, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Fetterman’s opinion 

because it was inconsistent with the evidence in the record. 

In addition, Dr. Fetterman’s clinical findings did not support her opinion. 

Dr. Fetterman found that Plaintiff was alert and fully oriented and exhibited good concentration 

and attention, adequate memory, intact judgment and insight, intact thought process, and 

unremarkable thought content. AR 344. Plaintiff was able to spell “world” forward and in 

reverse with no mistakes. AR 344. She was able to do serial 3’s and was able to repeat 9 digits 

forward and 6 in reverse. AR 344. She gave an appropriate response when asked what she would 

do if she was in a store and a child was lost. AR 344. Therefore, Dr. Fetterman’s clinical 

findings do not support the limitations that she found for Plaintiff. Accordingly, the ALJ 

provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Dr. Fetterman’s opinion.

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B. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 

testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing evidence for finding 

her testimony not credible. (Doc. 17). Defendant counters that the ALJ properly determined that 

Plaintiff was not credible because he provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, for his credibility determination. (Doc. 21). A review of the 

record reveals the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility.

When evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective complaints 

of pain and other symptoms, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ must first determine if “the claimant has presented 

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to 

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). This does not require the claimant to 

show that his impairment could be expected to cause the severity of the symptoms that are 

alleged, but only that it reasonably could have caused some degree of symptoms. Smolen, 80 

F.3d at 1282. 

If the first test is met and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the 

claimant's testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms by offering “clear and convincing 

reasons” for the adverse credibility finding. Carmickle v. Comm’r of Social Security, 533 F.3d 

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ must specifically make findings that support this conclusion 

and the findings must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ 

rejected the claimant's testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit the 

claimant's testimony. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal punctuation 

and citations omitted). 

Factors that may be considered in assessing a claimant's subjective pain and symptom 

testimony include the claimant's daily activities; the location, duration, intensity and frequency of 

the pain or symptoms; factors that cause or aggravate the symptoms; the type, dosage, 

effectiveness or side effects of any medication; other measures or treatment used for relief; 

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functional restrictions; and other relevant factors. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040; Thomas, 278 

F.3d at 958. In assessing the claimant's credibility, the ALJ may also consider “(1) ordinary 

techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent 

statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 

candid; [and] (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment. . . .” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1284). Other factors the ALJ may consider include a claimant’s work record and testimony from 

physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which 

he complains. See Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments that could be expected to cause 

some of the alleged symptoms. AR 29. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the 

extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” AR 29. 

This finding satisfied step one of the credibility analysis. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281-82. 

Because the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff was malingering, she was required to provide 

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony. Brown–Hunter, ––– F.3d ––––. 

2015 WL 4620123 at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2015); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283–84; Lester, 81 F.3d at 

834. 

The reasons that the ALJ cites for finding Plaintiff not credible are specific, clear, and 

convincing. First, the ALJ found that there was little objective evidence to support Plaintiff’s 

statement that she cannot work because of symptoms associated with her mental impairments, 

including difficulty performing daily tasks, mood fluctuations, and episodes of anger. AR 30. 

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist since October 2008 “has observed 

abnormalities in her mental status on only a few occasions since the date she alleges she became 

disabled and these have been limited to slight disturbances in mood and affect” and more often 

noted “that she is improving or doing well.” AR 30. The ALJ reviewed that medical evidence 

and reasonably determined that it did not fully support Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and 

limitations. This was a valid reason to reject Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. See

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Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain testimony cannot 

be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the 

medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its 

disabling effects.”).

Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not credible because there is evidence implying 

that she is not entirely compliant with her medications. AR 30. It is true that an “unexplained, or 

inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment” can 

constitute an appropriate reason to disbelieve a Plaintiff. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 

(9th Cir. 1991). However, an ALJ cannot discredit a plaintiff for failing to seek psychiatric 

treatment when the failure is due to the plaintiff’s mental impairment. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. 

Here, Plaintiff has bipolar disorder which may have contributed to Plaintiff’s failure to follow 

treatment recommendations. 

Similarly, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s symptoms are exacerbated when she does not take 

her medications. AR 30. When considering symptoms of mental disorders, “[r]eports of 

‘improvement’ in the context of mental health issues must be interpreted with an understanding of 

the patient’s overall well-being and nature of [his] symptoms.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 

1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Mental health treatment notes must be “interpreted with an awareness that 

improved functioning while being treated and while limiting environmental stressors does not 

always mean the claimant can function effectively in the workplace.” Id. Further, exercising 

caution in inferring from treatment notes that a claimant is able to work is “especially appropriate 

when no doctor or other medical expert has opined, on the basis of a full review of all relevant 

records, that a mental health patient is capable of working or is prepared to return to work.” Id.

Even if Plaintiff’s noncompliance with medications and improvement of symptoms with 

medications were not specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s 

testimony, any error was harmless, because the ALJ gave other specific, clear, and convincing 

reasons for finding Plaintiff incredible.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statement that she sleeps for most of the day is inconsistent 

with her own statements and the evidence in the record. AR 31. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff 

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does a variety of activities around the house and attends regular medical appointments and that no 

doctors have indicated that she appears particularly fatigued or drowsy, which suggests that her 

fatigue is not as severe as she alleges. AR 31. These inconsistent statements are a proper basis to 

reject a claimant's credibility. See Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security, 554 F.3d 1212, 1227 

(9th Cir.2008) (“In reaching a credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies 

between the claimant's testimony and his or her conduct, daily activities, ... among other 

factors.”); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (An ALJ may rely on ordinary techniques of credibility 

evaluation such as prior inconsistent statements, and other testimony by the claimant that appears 

less than candid.); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (An ALJ may consider a claimant's inconsistent 

statements).

In sum, the ALJ’s credibility findings were thoroughly explained and supported. 

Credibility determinations “are the province of the ALJ,” and where the ALJ makes specific 

findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation of excess pain which is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, this Court does not second-guess that decision. Fair v. Bowen, 

885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989). By considering Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements and the lack 

of objective medical evidence, the ALJ set forth clear and convincing reasons for discounting the 

credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Although evidence supporting an ALJ’s 

conclusions might also permit an interpretation more favorable to the claimant, if the ALJ’s 

interpretation of evidence was rational, as it was here, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision 

where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 

680-81. Accordingly, the ALJ’s credibility determination was proper. 

C. The ALJ provided reasons germane to Gary Grove for rejecting his testimony

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s rejection of a third party statement by Gary Grove, the 

Plaintiff’s friend. Lay witness testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence 

which the Commissioner must take into account. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 

1993). The ALJ may reject such testimony if he does so expressly by providing “reasons that are 

germane to each witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. An ALJ can disregard a third party statement, 

for example, that “conflicts with medical evidence.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 

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2001). Similarly, lay witness testimony can be discounted if there is substantial evidence of

“[b]ias and financial motive.” Perkins v. Colvin, 45 F.Supp.3d 1137 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citing 

Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006). To reject lay testimony, “the ALJ need 

not cite to the specific record as long as ‘arguably germane reasons’ for dismissing the testimony 

are noted.” Caldwell v. Astrue, 804 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1104 (D. Or. 2011).

Mr. Grove’s statements mirrored Plaintiff’s testimony, and the ALJ rejected Mr. Grove’s 

statements for the same reasons that he rejected Plaintiff’s statements. AR 31. An ALJ need not 

reconsider each witness individually; “[i]f the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony 

by one witness, the ALJ need only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a 

different witness.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (citing Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 

F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009).

As discussed above, the ALJ discredited the Plaintiff’s testimony because it conflicted 

with the objective medical evidence in the record. An ALJ may reject lay opinion evidence 

where it is inconsistent with the medical evidence of record. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218 

(holding that inconsistency with medical evidence is a germane reason for discrediting lay 

witness testimony); Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511 (“One reason for which an ALJ may discount lay 

testimony is that it conflicts with medical evidence.”).

Mr. Grove stated that Plaintiff’s ability to reason and comprehend was greatly diminished. 

However, multiple mental status examinations indicated that Plaintiff had appropriate and intact 

judgment, intact insight, and intact thought process and clear stream of thought. AR 288, 299, 

306-309, 311, 327, 344. Mr. Grove’s statements did not support Plaintiff’s testimony about her 

daily activities. Plaintiff testified that she could prepare simple meals, care for her dog, drive, 

shop for groceries, and go to the bank. AR 47-50. 

Accordingly, the ALJ properly relied upon the fact that Plaintiff’s activities did not 

support Mr. Grove’s statements and the inconsistencies between Mr. Grove’s statements and the 

medical records to reject Mr. Grove’s lay witness testimony which suggested greater limitations 

than what the ALJ determined for the RFC. 

/ / / 

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D. Plaintiff’s Back Impairment

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have considered her back impairment at step two. 

Plaintiff also alleges that the Appeals Council failed to consider her new and material evidence.

After the ALJ issued his decision, but before the Appeals Council considered the decision, 

Plaintiff submitted a March 6, 2012 MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine which showed moderate 

right-sided hypertrophic facet arthropathy. AR 515. 

The Court has considered the MRI of Plaintiff’s back in conjunction with the rest of the 

record in reviewing the ALJ’s decision. It is important to note that Plaintiff did not allege a back 

impairment in her applications. AR 192, 229. Plaintiff did not mention a back impairment or any 

kind of physical impairment at the hearing before the ALJ. AR 41-55. Also, Plaintiff told Dr. 

Fetterman that she did not have physical limitations because of her medical problems. AR 344. 

Plaintiff did not complain of a back impairment and did not present evidence to show that a back 

impairment affected her ability to work. Therefore, it was not error for the ALJ to not discuss a 

back impairment for Plaintiff at step two. 

Federal courts “do not have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Appeals Council 

denying a request for review of an ALJ’s decision, because the Appeals Council decision is a 

non-final agency action.” Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 

2012). Once a party submits new and material evidence that relates to the period on or before the 

ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, however, “that evidence becomes part of the 

administrative record, which the district court must consider when reviewing the Commissioner’s 

final decision for substantial evidence.” Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1163. In evaluating the ALJ’s 

decision, the Court considers the evidence Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council. As 

explained by the Brewes court, however, the Court cannot remand based solely on the actions of 

the Appeals Council, nor can it hold that it was error for the Appeals Council not to comment on 

the new evidence. Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1162-1163. Plaintiff must show that there is a 

“reasonable possibility” that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the 

administrative hearing. See Booz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 

(9th Cir. 1983). 

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Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work. Dr. Ginsburg, a 

state agency physician, found that Plaintiff could still perform medium work. AR 335-39. 

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that her back impairment created additional limitations

beyond the finding that she could perform medium work. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that 

there was a reasonable probability that her lumbar spine MRI would have changed the outcome of 

her hearing, and the Court will not remand on this issue. 

E. The ALJ’s Development of the Record

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record with respect to the 

psychiatric testimony in the record because Dr. Hetnal’s notes were illegible and the ALJ rejected 

the other psychiatric opinions in the record. Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ should have 

developed the record with respect to the Plaintiff’s back impairment. 

An ALJ has a duty to “fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s 

interests are considered.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). This duty 

is triggered when there is “[a]mbiguous evidence” or on “the ALJ’s own finding that the record is 

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Id. Once the duty is triggered, the 

ALJ must “conduct an appropriate inquiry,” which can include “subpoenaing the claimant’s 

physicians, submitting questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping 

the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” Id.

However, an ALJ “does not have to exhaust every possible line of inquiry in an attempt to 

pursue every potential line of questioning.” Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 

1997) (“The standard is one of reasonable good judgment”). Indeed, an ALJ is only required to 

conduct further inquiries with a treating or consulting physician “if the medical records presented 

to him do not give sufficient medical evidence to determine whether the claimant is disabled.” 

Johnson v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 316, 319-20 (8th Cir. 2010). The duty to develop the record is 

typically triggered where, for example, a claimant’s medical records are incomplete or there is an 

“issue sought to be developed which, on its face, must be substantial.” Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 

F.3d 1067, 1071 (10th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record because Dr. Hetnal’s notes 

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are largely illegible. As discussed above, the ALJ did not indicate that he could not read Dr. 

Hetnal’s treatment notes. In fact, the ALJ summarized several of Dr. Hetnal’s treating records in 

his decision. AR 30-31. Therefore, there was no evidence in the record that the ALJ could not 

read Dr. Hetnal’s notes, and the ALJ did not have the duty to develop the record on this issue. 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should have developed the record because the ALJ rejected 

all of the psychiatric opinions in the record. The ALJ must avoid substituting his own opinion for 

that of the treating physician without relying on medical evidence or authority in the record. See

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). However, here, the ALJ did not substitute his own opinion. The ALJ 

found that the evidence supported a portion of Dr. Bilik’s opinion and gave that portion of the 

opinion some weight. The ALJ agreed with Dr. Bilik’s assessment that Plaintiff can “understand, 

remember and carry out simple and detailed instructions over the course of a normal workweek, 

adapt, and interact appropriately with others.” AR 31. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was more 

limited than Dr. Bilik’s assessment in terms of Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others. AR 32. 

The ALJ agreed with Dr. Fetterman’s opinion that Plaintiff can do complex tasks. The ALJ’s 

RFC was also consistent with Dr. Fetterman’s assessment that Plaintiff “has a good ability to 

interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public, and can perform work activities on a 

consistent basis without special or additional instruction.” AR 28, 32. For the reasons stated 

above, the ALJ properly provided reasons for rejecting Dr. Hetnal’s opinion and portions of Dr. 

Fetterman’s opinion and properly calculated Plaintiff’s RFC. Therefore, the ALJ did not 

improperly substitute his own opinions for the psychiatric opinions in the record. 

Lastly, the ALJ did not need to develop the record further in regards to Plaintiff’s back 

impairment. As stated above, Plaintiff did not allege a back impairment in her applications, 

during her consultative examination, or during the administrative hearing. AR 41-55, 192, 229, 

344. Although there was evidence in the record of Plaintiff having back pain, Plaintiff did not 

present any evidence to the ALJ or complain to any of her doctors that a back impairment 

affected her ability to work. Therefore, the ALJ did not have a duty to develop the record further.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

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evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn 

W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff, Gayle Gwen Winter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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