Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01513/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01513-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Charles Anthony McDonald,

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV10-01513-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

Charles Anthony McDonald petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 3. On October 24, 2011, Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. 

Anderson issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) that the petition be denied. 

Doc. 16. Petitioner has filed an objection to the R&R. Doc. 22. For the reasons that 

follow, the Court will accept the R&R and deny the petition. 

I. Background. 

 On January 29, 2004, Petitioner Charles Anthony McDonald was indicted in 

Maricopa County Superior Court for burglary in the second degree and possession of 

burglary tools. CR2004-006704. The State amended the indictment to allege 23 prior 

felony convictions, commission of the offenses while released from confinement, and 

aggravating circumstances other than the prior convictions. Doc. 12-1, at 4, 5, 13 (Resp. 

Ex. A, at 14, 15, 44). Following a mistrial on December 8, 2004, a second trial 

commenced on December 9, 2004. Petitioner was convicted, and on March 2, 2005, the 

trial court sentenced him to an aggravated 20-year term of imprisonment on the seconddegree burglary conviction and an aggravated concurrent 4.5-year term on the possession 

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for burglary tools conviction. Doc. 12-1, at 51 (Resp. Ex. B, at 126). The Arizona Court 

of Appeals upheld Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Doc. 12-1, 

at 95 (Resp. Ex. E). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of 

Appeals denied. Doc. 12-1, at 107, 119 (Resp. Ex. F, G). The Arizona Supreme Court 

denied the petition for review. Doc. 12-1, at 122, 135 (Resp. Ex. H, I). 

 Following an evidentiary hearing on the issue of counsel’s alleged failure to 

adequately advise Petitioner of the strengths and weaknesses associated with a plea offer 

(Doc. 12-1, at 54), the trial court denied a petition for post-conviction relief. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review. Doc. 12-3, 

at 53, 72, 74, 89 (Resp. Ex. O, P, Q, R). 

 In July 2010, Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 3. Petitioner raised eight grounds for relief. 

The Court dismissed Ground Eight for failure to state a federal habeas claim and ordered 

Respondents to answer Grounds One through Seven. Doc. 4, at 3. Respondents filed an 

answer (Doc. 12) and Petitioner filed a reply (Docs. 13, 14). Judge Anderson issued an 

R&R recommending that the petition be denied and that a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner 

had not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Doc. 16, at 42. 

Petitioner has filed an objection on Grounds One, Four, Five, and Seven. Doc. 22. 

II. Standard of Review. 

A party may file specific written objections to the R&R’s proposed findings and 

recommendations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court must 

undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are 

made. See id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

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Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the Court may not grant habeas relief unless it concludes that 

the state’s adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

III. Discussion.

A. Right to Self-Representation. 

Petitioner argues in Ground One that he was denied the right to represent himself 

at trial in violation of his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Doc. 3, at 7. Petitioner has an “independent constitutional right” to 

represent himself at trial. Feretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 806 (1975). A defendant 

must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo the right to counsel by being made “aware of 

the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 

‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open.’” Id. at 835 

(citations omitted). A defendant’s request for self-representation must also be 

unequivocal, timely, and not for purposes of delay. Id.; United States v. Erskine, 

355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has set forth three factors to 

determine whether a request for self-representation is unequivocal: the timing of the 

request, the manner in which the request was made, and whether the defendant repeatedly 

made the request. Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 On June 30, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion to proceed in propria persona. 

Doc. 12-1, at 8 (Resp. Ex. A, at 35). His trial had been continued twice to July 20, 2004. 

Doc. 12-1, at 20, 22 (Resp. Ex. B, at 28, 31). On July 9, 2004, the trial court heard oral 

argument on Petitioner’s motion. Doc. 12-1, at 23 (Resp. Ex. B, at 33). At the hearing, 

Petitioner informed the court that he lacked confidence in trial counsel, wanted the 

assistance of advisory counsel, and needed an additional 90 to 180 days to prepare for 

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trial. Doc. 12-3, at 95-97 (Resp. Ex. S, at 5-7). The trial court informed Petitioner that 

his simultaneous request to proceed in propria persona and for an extension of time 

weighed against granting Petitioner’s request to represent himself. Doc. 12-3, at 97 

(Resp. Ex. S, at 7). The court also informed Petitioner that he would have to submit his 

request for a continuance to the continuance panel. Id. Petitioner stated that he would 

not be ready to proceed on July 20, 2004 by himself. Doc. 12-3, at 99 (Resp. Ex. S, at 9). 

Petitioner agreed to the trial court’s proposal of substituting counsel. Doc. 12-3, at 101 

(Resp. Ex. S, at 11). The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion without prejudice, 

withdrew the Office of the Public Defender from further representation of Petitioner, and 

appointed the Office of the Legal Defender. Doc. 12-3, at 105-06 (Resp. Ex. S, at 15-16). 

The court emphasized that Petitioner retained the right to represent himself and could 

“decide to try and exercise that [right] at a later time.” Doc. 12-3, at 105 (Resp. Ex. S, at 

15). 

 Judge Anderson concluded that Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s 

decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law, nor that it was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Doc. 16, at 12. In reaching this 

conclusion, Judge Anderson noted that the trial court had advised Petitioner of the 

responsibilities and disadvantages of self-representation during the Faretta hearing. 

Doc. 16, at 12. Petitioner agreed to the trial court’s proposal for substitute counsel. Id. 

Petitioner did not renew his request to represent himself, even though the trial court had 

advised him that he could do so at any time. Id. 

 Petitioner argues that the state court’s decision was unreasonable for two reasons: 

(1) the state court did not grant Petitioner’s request for a continuance, and (2) Petitioner’s 

request to proceed in propria persona was timely and unequivocal. Neither of these 

arguments is persuasive. Petitioner claims that “[t]he state trial court tacitly forced an 

unconstitutional dilemma on Petitioner” to choose between his right to conduct his own 

self-defense and going forward with trial unprepared in just eleven days. Doc. 22, at 5. 

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He argues that the state court should have granted a continuance of the trial pursuant to 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.5(b) to allow him to conduct basic discovery. Doc. 22, at 7. 

Rule 8.5(b) reads: “A continuance of any trial date shall be granted only upon a showing 

that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the interests of 

justice.” Petitioner does not make a showing of extraordinary circumstances, but merely 

states that his request for a continuance was “reasonable” because he had informed the 

trial court that he had not seen a copy of the police reports or received basic discovery. 

Doc. 22, at 7. Petitioner argues that the trial court was unwilling to grant a continuance 

despite having already continued the trial date twice “with much less fanfare and on 

much less notice from Petitioner’s counsel.” Doc. 22, at 8. At the time of these 

proceedings, trial judges in Maricopa County Superior Court did not rule on requests for 

continuances in cases assigned for trial. Doc. 12, at 12, n.3. The trial court informed 

Petitioner that such requests must be submitted to the continuance panel. Id. 

 Petitioner argues that his request to waive counsel was made at least twenty days 

prior to the start of trial on July 20, 2004, and that the Judge Anderson “incorrectly 

concluded that ‘Petitioner’s request to represent himself was not unequivocal when he 

simultaneously requested advisory counsel, a continuance of the trial date, and conceded 

that he was not prepared to proceed on the trial date.’” Doc. 22, at 9 (quoting Doc. 16, 

at 12:23-26). Judge Anderson determined that Petitioner’s request to represent himself 

was not unequivocal because it was conditioned on a continuance and appointment of 

advisory counsel. Doc. 16, at 12. Moreover, Petitioner subsequently agreed to a 

substitution of new counsel, and there is no evidence in the record that Petitioner renewed 

his request to represent himself, despite being informed that he could do so. See Stenson, 

504 F.3d at 882. The Court accepts Judge Anderson’s conclusion that Petitioner’s right 

to self-representation was not violated. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 

In Grounds Four, Five, and Seven, Petitioner argues that he was denied effective 

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assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to advocate on Petitioner’s behalf at 

sentencing, failure to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation, and failure to properly 

advise Petitioner regarding the merits of a plea offer. Petitioner objects to Judge 

Anderson’s conclusion that these claims lack merit. Doc. 22. 

Strickland provides the standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims: the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. To 

establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

 1. Sentencing. 

Plaintiff argues in Ground Four that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

present mitigating evidence at sentencing and in failing to object to certain statements 

made by the prosecutor, specifically a message from the victims’ son. Doc. 3, at 15. 

The Ninth Circuit ruled that Strickland does not delineate clearly established federal law 

for noncapital sentencing proceedings, thus precluding habeas relief for claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel at this sentencing. See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 

397 F.3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (“We need not consider 

the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which may involve informal proceedings 

and standardless discretion in the sentence, and hence may require a different approach to 

the definition of constitutionally effective assistance.”). “Where the Supreme Court has 

not addressed an issue in its holding, a state court adjudication of the issue not addressed 

by the Supreme Court cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established law.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, 

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the Court will accept Judge Anderson’s recommendation on Ground Four. 

 2. Pretrial Investigation. 

Plaintiff argues in Ground Five that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation. Doc. 3, at 19. Plaintiff objects that Judge 

Anderson misconstrued his claim as one “questioning the ‘soundness’ of his counsel’s 

representation,” when Petitioner’s claim in fact was “trial counsel’s failure to conduct an 

investigation in the first place . . . .” Doc. 22, at 15. Strickland acknowledges counsel’s 

duty to “make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 

particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. “In any 

ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 

counsel’s judgments.” Id. 

 Petitioner contends that Judge Anderson erred in his finding that the state court did 

not make an unreasonable determination of the facts because the state court failed to 

make any factual findings at all. Doc. 22, at 13. This is not the case. Petitioner’s 

defense strategy was that of mere presence and actual innocence. Doc. 22, at 15. The 

evidence presented at trial indicated that Petitioner was found in the victims’ home when 

police arrived and that he struggled when arrested. Doc. 12-4, at 48-49 (Resp. Ex. U, at 

34-35). At the time of arrest, Petitioner did not claim (as he later did) that he was merely 

present in the house because he was looking for a man named Danny Miller. Id. Police 

officers found a Leatherman’s tool on Petitioner’s person. A light bulb had been removed 

from the motion sensor over the back door, there were pry marks on the back window, 

there was a gym bag containing a purse and a jewelry box on the ground outside the patio 

door, and a flashlight lay near the door to the master bedroom. Doc. 12-4, at 40-42, 50-

51 (Resp. Ex. U, at 25-27, 35-36). Police did not find anyone else in the backyard, alley, 

or house. Doc. 12-4, at 40-41 (Resp. Ex. U, at 25-26). 

 Petitioner presented his theory of defense at trial, claiming that Danny Miller died 

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before trial and therefore was unavailable to testify. Doc. 12-4, at 5. Based on this 

evidence, counsel’s strategic decision not to investigate the whereabouts of Danny Miller 

was not ineffective assistance. Defense counsel testified on post-conviction review that 

Petitioner’s “story was simply beyond belief.” Doc. 12-3, at 29 (Resp. Ex. N, at 28). 

 Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the 

discrepancies between the description of the intruder given by the victims’ son to the 911 

operator and Petitioner’s appearance. Doc. 3, at 20. The record indicates, however, that 

such discrepancies can be explained by the son’s brief opportunity to observe the intruder 

in the dark. Doc. 12-5, at 144-146 (Resp. Ex. W, at 143-145). Petitioner also argues that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate latent fingerprints. Doc. 3, at 22. The 

fingerprints that police were able to recover from the file cabinets at the crime scene were 

exculpatory because they were not Petitioner’s. Doc. 12-4, at 63-64 (Resp. Ex. U, at 47-

48); Doc. 12-6, at 22 (Resp. Ex. U, at 20). Petitioner has not shown, however, that 

additional investigation of latent fingerprints would benefit his defense, or that he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate latent fingerprints when the evidence 

presented at trial was exculpatory. Doc. 16, at 29. 

 Based on these facts, the Court cannot conclude that counsel’s performance fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Nor can 

the Court conclude that different actions by trial counsel likely would have resulted in a 

different outcome at trial. Id. The Court will adopt Judge Anderson’s recommendation 

on Ground Five. 

 3. Plea Offer.

 In Ground Seven, Plaintiff argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

properly advise him of a plea offer and failing to adequately inform him of the risks of 

going to trial and his sentencing exposure. Doc. 3, at 33. The Supreme Court has held 

that Strickland’s two-part test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

applies in the context of plea bargaining. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 

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 Petitioner objects that “the record is barren of any indication that his trial counsel 

fully, effectively and competently communicated the 10-13 year plea offer discussed for 

the first time with Petitioner as well as the trial court on December 8, 2004, during a 

colloquy with the court following a mistrial in this case.” Doc. 22, at 17. The state court 

conducted a post-conviction evidentiary hearing on this claim. Doc. 12-2, at 7. Trial 

counsel testified that Petitioner rejected the 10-13 year plea offer after informing counsel 

that he had given a free-talk in a murder case that the State could not prove without his 

testimony and that he thought the State would extend a better offer. Doc. 12-3, at 29, 38 

(Resp. Ex. N, at 28, 37). Petitioner asked his counsel about the difference between the 

first plea offer of 7 years imprisonment and the second plea offer of 10-13 years 

imprisonment. Doc. 12-3, at 37-38 (Resp. Ex. N, at 36-37). Plaintiff’s counsel also 

testified that he had informed Petitioner about the potential impact of his 20-plus prior 

felony convictions on the sentencing range. Doc. 12-3, at 28 (Resp. Ex. N, at 27). Based 

on this testimony, the state court found that Petitioner had not met his burden of 

establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. Doc. 12-3, at 48-49 (Resp. Ex. N., at 47-

48). 

 The Court must defer to the state court’s factual findings and presume they are 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The state court record establishes that Petitioner was 

aware of the plea offers and that he rejected them because he thought the sentences were 

too long and believed he would be acquitted. Doc. 16, at 38. Petitioner has not met his 

burden of establishing that the state court’s finding was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts or was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. The Court will adopt Judge Anderson’s recommendation on 

Ground Seven. 

 C. Evidentiary Hearing, COA, and Appeal In Forma Pauperis. 

Petitioner asks this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the claims raised in 

his objection to Judge Anderson’s R&R. Doc. 22, at 22. In habeas proceedings, an 

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evidentiary hearing is required when the petitioner’s allegations, if proven, would 

establish the right to relief. Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998). “[A]n 

evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state 

court record.” Id. (emphasis in original). Petitioner’s objections can be resolved by 

looking to the state court record in this case. The Court will therefore deny Petitioner’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing. The R&R also recommended denying a COA and 

leave to appeal in forma pauperis because “Petitioner has not made a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right.” Doc. 16, at 42. Petitioner has failed to establish 

that a COA and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are warranted, and the Court therefore 

adopts these recommendations. The Court also concludes that Petitioner has been 

sufficiently able to set forth his arguments, and that appointment of counsel is not 

warranted. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. The factual findings and conclusions in Judge Anderson’s R&R (Doc. 16) 

are accepted. 

 2. Charles Anthony McDonald’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 3) is 

denied. 

 3. A certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied as stated above. 

 Dated this 13th day of December, 2011. 

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