Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05641/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05641-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OMAR KAHLIFE KING, CASE NO. CV-F-04-5641 AWI DLB HC

Petitioner, 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

vs. MOTION TO STAY

SCOTT KERNAN, Warden, [Doc. 28]

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 29, 2004. On January

10, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw Ground Two from the petition. On February 9, 2005,

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. On March 22, 2005, the Court issued Findings

and Recommendations recommending that Petitioner’s request to withdraw the unexhausted claims

be granted, Respondent’s motion to dismiss be denied as moot, and Grounds Two and Four of the

petition be dismissed. The Findings and Recommendation was adopted in full on May 24, 2005. 

On January 9, 2006, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. On January 23, 2006,

Petitioner filed a traverse. 

Now pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion to stay the petition, filed December 26,

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28 AEDPA refers to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 1

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2006. Respondent filed an opposition on February 13, 2007.

DISCUSSION

Traditionally, a district court has had the discretion to stay a petition which it may validly

consider on the merits. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-988 (9th

Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that it is proper for a district court, in its discretion, to

hold a petition containing only exhausted claims in abeyance in order to permit the petitioner to

return to state court to exhaust his state remedies. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 ((th Cir.

2004); Ford v. Hubbard, 305 F.3d 875, 882-883 (9 Cir. 2002); James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, th

1126-1127 (9 Cir. 2002); Taylor, 134 F.3d 981. th

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (2005), the Supreme Court held that a

district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present his unexhausted

claims to the state court in the first instance and then to return to federal court for review of his

perfected petition. Nevertheless, stay and abeyance is available only in limited circumstances,

because the procedure frustrates AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner 1

to delay the resolution of federal proceedings and undermines AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal

habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior

to filing his federal petition. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court held that a stay and abeyance is “only

appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to

exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id. 

In Rhines, the Supreme Court noted that, while the procedure should be “available only in

limited circumstances,” it “likely would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a stay

and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his

unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged

in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

The Ninth Circuit has questioned, but not resolved, whether the standards set forth by the

United States Supreme Court in Rhines apply when the petitioner seeks to stay a fully exhausted

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petition. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9 Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit noted that Rhines th

held that the district court authorized stays of mixed petitions in limited circumstances. Id. at 660. 

The Ninth Circuit suggested that the “three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure approved in Taylor

and Kelly” might still be valid. Id.; see Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063; Taylor, 134 F.3d 981. This

implicates that the limitations set on the stay and abeyance in Rhines might not apply. See Jackson,

425 F.3d at 659; see e.g. Romero v. Runnels, No. CIV S-04-0459, 2006 WL 2460736 at *2 (E.D.

Cal. Aug. 23, 2006); Lugo v. Kirkland, No. C 05-0580, 2006 WL 449130 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22,

2006). The Court need not resolve the question whether Rhines applies to the instant stay because 

even if the minimal limitations of Taylor and Kelly apply, Petitioner is still not entitled to a stay. 

Here, the current petition pending before the Court contains only exhausted claims. 

Petitioner indicates that he wishes to exhaust a claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel. However, Petitioner fails to state any reasons or justification why Petitioner waited well

over two years from the filing of the petition to attempt to exhaust this additional claim or claims,

nor does Petitioner provide the Court with any basis to make a determination regarding the existence

of good cause for granting the stay. Petitioner has previously withdrawn an unexhausted claim and

stated his intention to proceed only with the exhausted claims raised in the initial petition. (See

Court Doc. 6.) Thus, if Petitioner wished to exhaust new or additional claims, he could and should

have sought leave to stay and exhaust at that time. Moreover, as mentioned above, Respondent has

already filed his response to which Petitioner has replied, both of which bear only upon the claims

included in the initial petition. Furthermore, as previously noted, Petitioner has not provided the

Court with any justification for attempting to raise or even exhaust this new claim. The instant

motion is the first mention of any new claims. These factual circumstances support a finding that

Petitioner is attempting to merely stall the process of federal review. See Taylor, 134 F.3d at 986

n.11. As such, the Court finds that a stay is not warranted under Rhines, Taylor or Kelly. Thus,

based on the lack of justification and substantial delay in raising the new claim(s), Petitioner’s

motion must be denied. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner’s interest in obtaining

federal review of the new claim(s) outweighs the competing interests in finality and speedy

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28 The Court will review the merits of Petitioner’s petition in due course. 

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resolution of federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-278. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion is

DENIED. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 15, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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