Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00413/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00413-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lynn M. Bleeker,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Mike Johanns, Secretary, United States

Department of Agriculture,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-0413-PCT-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 102)

regarding Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under Count V of her Complaint, which

the Court permitted Defendant to file (Dkt. 101, Order dated April 24, 2009). Plaintiff

responded to the motion (Dkt. 104). The parties did not request oral argument, and the Court

finds the pending motion for summary judgment suitable for decision without oral argument.

Having considered the parties’ memoranda and other submissions, the Court now issues this

Memorandum of Decision and Order granting Defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Defendant first filed a motion for summary judgment only addressing Plaintiff’s

retaliation claims (Dkt. 86), which the Court ruled upon on August 31, 2009 (Dkt. 106).

Although Plaintiff’s allegations for her retaliation claims do not directly pertain to her hostile

work environment claim, the Court summarizes them here as helpful background. For a

complete background of this case, see this Court’s Order dated August 31, 2009 (Id.).

Case 3:07-cv-00413-SMM Document 107 Filed 12/02/09 Page 1 of 13
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Plaintiff is a former employee of the United States Forest Service, an agency within

the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) (Dkt. 90, Pl.’s Statement of Facts

(“PSOF”) ¶ 1). As a seasonal employee, Plaintiff had non-consecutive term appointments

from 1980 until 2004 at various national forests, including the Coconino National Forest and

Prescott National Forest (Id. ¶¶ 2, 22). She enjoyed a good working relationship with the

Forest Service (Id. ¶ 3). In 1995 and 1996, she filed formal complaints of discrimination and

retaliation against the Forest Service. The parties resolved both complaints through

settlement (Id. ¶ 4).

In December 1999, Defendant selected Plaintiff as a Forestry Technician,

Compliance/Collection Officer, GS-0462-5, which was a term appointment not to exceed

four years (“Term I”) (Id. ¶ 6). At the time, Vickie Dyer was the Human Resources

Specialist for the Coconino National Forest (Id. ¶ 10). On March 30, 2000, Plaintiff

contacted an EEO Counselor and alleged discrimination based on reprisal by personnel,

particularly Ms. Dyer, in the Western Human Resources Office (Id. ¶ 7). The parties

informally resolved the dispute through a settlement agreement on January 19, 2001 (Id.).

The settlement agreement restricted Ms. Dyer from handling personnel actions involving

Plaintiff and required Plaintiff to avoid contact with Ms. Dyer for a three-year period (Id.).

On February 20, 2002, the Forest Service sought authority from the Office of

Personnel Management (“OPM”) to extend the term appointments to March 30, 2005 for 48

employees, including Plaintiff (Id. ¶ 12). However, the OPM denied extensions for fourteen

employees, including Plaintiff, who already had been extended in 1999 (Id. ¶ 17).

In October 2003, Defendant promoted Plaintiff to the position of Forestry Technician,

Compliance/Collection Officer, GS-0462-6, which was another term appointment (“Term

II”) (Id. ¶ 22). For this promotion, Plaintiff signed a document regarding her term limits (Id.

¶ 23). Plaintiff believed that Human Resources had placed a term limit restriction on her,

though, which it had not placed on other employees under the same circumstances (Id. ¶ 24).

On October 28, 2003, Plaintiff contacted OPM because of the alleged hostility between her,

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1

 In Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment, he mistakenly states that

Plaintiff brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act (Dkt. 102). Plaintiff brought suit under

Title VII (Compl. ¶ 1), though, which Defendant has correctly acknowledged on previous

occasions (Dkts. 86, 97).

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Ms. Dyer, and other personnel in the Western Human Resources Office (Id.). On January

15, 2004, Plaintiff’s Term II appointment ended.

In spring 2005, Plaintiff applied for a permanent position of Forestry Technician, GS0462-05, at the Prescott National Forest, Camp Verde, AZ (Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 42, 55).

Defendant ultimately selected Gregory Page for the position in August 2005 (Id. ¶ 44).

Plaintiff brought this claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) against Defendant (Id. ¶

1). Plaintiff claimed discrimination based on her sex and age and retaliation based on her

protected activities (Id.). She alleged five counts: (1) retaliation/wrongful termination, (2)

retaliation, (3) reprisal, (4) violation of ADEA, and (5) hostile work environment. After

Defendant first moved for summary judgment, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of

Plaintiff’s ADEA claim in Count IV (Dkts. 93, 95). At that time, only Plaintiff’s three

retaliation claims and hostile work environment claim under Title VII remained.1

Defendant first moved for summary judgment on only Plaintiff’s retaliation claims

(Dkt. 86). After Defendant replied to his motion, Plaintiff moved to strike the new

arguments raised in his reply, or in the alternative, for leave to file a surreply (Dkt. 98).

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant did not properly address Plaintiff’s retaliation claim as to her

nonselection in 2005. Additionally, Defendant did not address Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim until his reply, to which Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to respond.

The Court granted in part Plaintiff’s motion by allowing Plaintiff to file a surreply regarding

only her retaliation claim for her nonselection in 2005. In addition, the Court permitted the

parties to file an additional motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim (Dkt. 101). Defendant then filed an additional motion for summary

judgment regarding Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim on May 23, 2009 (Dkt. 102).

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On August 31, 2009, the Court granted in part Defendant’s first motion for summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims regarding the expiration of her term

appointments under Counts I and III of her Complaint (Dkt. 106). The Court denied in part

Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim regarding her nonselection in

2005 under Count II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law

determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the

evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Id. at 322; see Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994).

The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof

at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment need not

produce evidence “in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary

judgment.” Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant “may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is

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a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53

F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim

under Count V of her Complaint (Dkt. 102). Defendant contends summary judgment is

warranted for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff did not raise a hostile work environment claim in her

administrative claim so that she has not exhausted her administrative remedies and (2)

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim of hostile work environment because she did

not experience sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct. Thus, Defendant contends he is

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Although Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not raise a hostile work environment

claim in her administrative claims, he concedes that Plaintiff filed an Administrative

Complaint, USDA Case No. 040243, listing reprisal, sex (female), and hostile environment

as bases of discrimination when the USDA failed to extend her term position (Dkt. 102,

Def.’s Second Statement of Facts ¶ 1). However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff provided

no specific information regarding acts that could be interpreted as hostile; thus, the USDA

could not conduct an appropriate and meaningful investigation. Instead, Plaintiff’s only

allegations in support of her hostile work environment claim related to work performance,

managerial decisions, or human resource decisions. Therefore, the USDA only deemed the

reprisal issue appropriate for investigation at the administrative level (Dkt. 102 at 4:10-24).

Plaintiff counters that Defendant admits in both his motion and Answer to the Complaint that

Plaintiff met all administrative prerequisites related to her claims (See id.; Dkt. 9, Answer

¶¶ 10-13). Rather than addressing whether Plaintiff meaningfully exhausted her

administrative remedies, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim.

///

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2

 In Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Second Statement of Facts, she contends that

her Complaint need not provide a list of allegations allowing the Court to find a basis for the

case to go forward, but rather her Complaint need only provide notice to Defendant (Dkt.

105, ¶ 10). Regardless of whether that argument has any merit, this case is at the summary

judgment stage where, as noted, the party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon

the mere allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

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I. Hostile Work Environment

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim of hostile work

environment because she did not experience sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct.

Plaintiff responds that the record contains Defendant’s numerous acts of hostility, and the

totality of the circumstances establishes a prima facie case of hostile work environment (Dkt.

104 at 11:7-12). Moreover, Plaintiff claims that Human Resources, and not her managers or

co-workers, caused the harassment leading to a hostile work environment (Id. at 9:1-2).

In Plaintiff’s Second Statement of Facts (“PSSOF”), she identifies the following

“hostile acts” by Defendant against her (Dkt. 105, PSSOF ¶¶ 2-10 through 2-14), as listed

in her Complaint: (1) Plaintiff was fully qualified for the GS-6 Term position that she

applied for on July 17, 2003, but the Western Human Resource Office failed to place her

name on the selection consideration list (Compl. ¶¶ 32-33); (2) the Western Human Resource

Office refused to convert Plaintiff’s Term II appointment to a new four-year appointment (Id.

¶¶ 34-36); (3) during the period of October 2003 through January 15, 2004, the Western

Human Resource Office repeatedly denied the requests of Plaintiff’s supervisors to

implement the OPM-approved extension (Id. ¶ 37); (4) the Western Human Resource Office

repeatedly granted extensions to similarly situated male employees and converted them to

new term appointments while denying Plaintiff the same (Id. ¶ 38); and (5) on January 15,

2004, Plaintiff’s Term II appointment ended (Id. ¶ 40).2

“An employer is liable under Title VII for conduct giving rise to a hostile environment

where the employee proves (1) that [she] was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a

harassing nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was

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sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create

an abusive working environment.” Kortan v. Calif. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1109-1110

(9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); Manatt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.

2003). “To determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile, we look to the totality

of the circumstances, including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Ray v.

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). Moreover, “[t]o prevail on a hostile work environment . . . claim, the

plaintiff must show that her work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile;

that is, she must show that she perceived her work environment to be hostile, and that a

reasonable person in her position would perceive it to be so.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev.

Trans. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); Fuller v. City of

Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a work environment “must

both subjectively and objectively be perceived as abusive”).

A. Verbal or Physical Conduct of a Harassing Nature

In this case, Plaintiff cannot establish the first and third elements of a prima facie

claim for hostile work environment. As for the first element, Plaintiff did not experience

verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature as she simply experienced employment

decisions. Because the Western Human Resources Office merely carried out personnel

actions, it did not subject Plaintiff to intimidation, ridicule, or insult. See Harris, 510 U.S.

at 21 (holding that Title VII is violated “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . .”). In fact, Western Human Resources

barely had any verbal communication with Plaintiff, and they did not have any physical

contact with her. Plaintiff focuses on the incident involving Ms. Dyer from Human

Resources in 2000, but the parties resolved this incident by a 2001 settlement agreement

prohibiting Ms. Dyer and Plaintiff from communicating with each other for three years.

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3

 See generally Dkt. 106, Order dated August 31, 2009. For a discussion of Plaintiff’s

allegations specifically regarding the Western Human Resources Office’s hostility toward

her in the retaliation context, see id. at 12:6-22, 15:19-16:12.

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After that time, Plaintiff does not allege that she had frequent verbal or physical contact with

Human Resources. The Western Human Resources Office typically sent her written notices

of employment decisions by letter, or Plaintiff learned about the decisions through her

supervisors (See, e.g., PSSOF ¶¶ 2-25 through 2-28). Even if Plaintiff had some verbal or

physical contact with Human Resources, she does not allege conduct of a harassing nature.

Thus, she simply was not targeted with harassing verbal or physical conduct.

Although Plaintiff takes issue with the employment decisions, her allegations are more

properly the subject of a retaliation claim. Plaintiff brought three retaliation claims regarding

those employment actions, which the Court has already ruled upon.3

 Even if Western Human

Resources did not qualify Plaintiff for the July 2003 position, she actually received a

promotion on October 3, 2003 when Defendant selected her for the Term II position because

she increased a grade level from 5 to 6 (See PSOF ¶¶ 6, 22). Moreover, the Court previously

found that Western Human Resources and the USDA did not make the decisions about

Plaintiff’s term appointment extensions, but rather OPM made the decisions. Furthermore,

Plaintiff’s allegation that the Western Human Resource Office repeatedly granted extensions

to similarly situated male employees and converted them to new term appointments while

denying Plaintiff the same may be grounds for a disparate treatment claim based on sex

discrimination, but Plaintiff did not bring such a claim (See Compl. ¶¶ 46-75). See

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d

748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006). Finally, the Court previously found that Plaintiff’s Term II position

expired in January 2004 by its own terms, which did not constitute retaliation. Even if

Plaintiff’s allegations are true, Western Human Resources plainly did not subject her to

verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature. For this reason alone, Plaintiff cannot

establish a prima facie claim of hostile work environment and summary judgment is proper.

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B. Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive Conduct Altering the Conditions of

Employment and Creating an Abusive Working Environment

With regards to the third element, the Western Human Resources Office’s conduct

was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. As noted, to establish a hostile work environment

under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that a defendant’s conduct was “so ‘severe or

pervasive’ as to ‘alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working

environment.’” Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). “Not every insult or harassing

comment will constitute a hostile work environment,” but repeated derogatory or humiliating

statements can constitute one. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245 (contrasting a single incident with

conduct that constituted sufficiently “severe or pervasive” harassment). Plaintiff has only

alleged that Human Resources had infrequent contact with her regarding occasional

employment decisions. When contrasted with what the Ninth Circuit has found to be

sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct, this minimal contact clearly does not constitute such

conduct. See Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1110-11 (finding that while a supervisor’s references to

a female employee as a “castrating bitch,” “madonna,” or “regina” in plaintiff’s presence and

name-calling of plaintiff as “Medea” were offensive, his conduct was not severe or pervasive

enough to unreasonably interfere with plaintiff’s employment); Gregory v. Widnall, 153 F.3d

1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a hostile work environment claim based on a “[a]

single drawing of a monkey on a memo circulated by senior NCO’s, accompanied by the

verbal explanation that it was intended to remind officers not to ‘get the monkey off their

back’ by passing their responsibilities to others”); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504,

1515 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by, Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d

951 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment when a supervisor

“repeatedly engaged in vulgarities, made sexual remarks, and requested sexual favors” while

another supervisor “frequently witnessed, laughed at, or herself made these types of

comments”); Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding

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that a plaintiff’s allegations that her supervisor regularly made sexual remarks to her

throughout her employment and snidely laughed at her complaints to him raised a genuine

issue of material fact). Because Plaintiff does not allege sufficiently severe or pervasive

conduct, the Court can grant summary judgment in Defendant’s favor for this reason.

Furthermore, Western Human Resources’s conduct was not so severe or pervasive as

to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environment.

“Conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of

employment.” Montero, 192 F.3d at 860 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

775, 788 (1998)). Plaintiff claims that Western Human Resources, and not her managers or

co-workers, caused the harassment leading to a hostile work environment (Dkt. 104 at 9:1-2).

As noted, Plaintiff had minimal and infrequent contact with Western Human Resources.

Because Plaintiff did not work directly under or with the Western Human Resources Office,

that office could not have created an abusive working environment for her. Rather, her

managers and co-workers created her working environment. Plaintiff alleges that her

“managers were all working on her behalf to have her remain in her position” (Id. at 9:7-8).

Plaintiff further alleges that Tom Carney, her immediate supervisor prior to the expiration

of her term appointment, hired her based on her work ability and “described her as one of the

best employees he had hired” (Dkt. 104, Ex. 48, Davis Aff. at 2). Moreover, other

supervisors tried to extend Plaintiff’s term or select her for a new one (Dkt. 104 at 7:9-25).

As Plaintiff concedes that her managers and co-workers, who she worked with nearly

everyday, did not cause any harassment (Id. at 9:1-2), her claim that the Western Human

Resources Office created an abusive working environment is specious. Even if Ms. Dyer and

Human Resources harbored antagonism against Plaintiff, as she previously alleged (Dkt. 90

at 4-5), this alleged antagonism did not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiff’s work

performance. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court does not find

Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. See Ray, 217

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F.3d at 1245. For this reason, Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim also fails as a

matter of law.

Finally, Plaintiff cannot show that her work environment was both subjectively and

objectively hostile. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate “that she perceived her work environment

to be hostile, and that a reasonable person in her position would perceive it to be so.” See

Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1034; see also Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1527. She did not perceive

her work environment to be hostile because, by her own admission, she related well to her

managers and co-workers (Dkt. 104 at 7:1-20). Although Plaintiff claims that she became

“completely frustrated” by the Western Human Resource Office’s actions (Id. at 8:1), her

mere frustration does not demonstrate that she perceived her work environment to be

“hostile,” as contemplated by the law. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245-46 (finding a plaintiff’s

allegations, among many, that his supervisors regularly yelled at him during staff meetings,

called him a “liar,” “troublemaker,” and “rabble rouser,” told him to “shut up,” and made it

difficult for him to complete his tasks constituted work difficulties that “rose to such a level

that [plaintiff] took stress leave from his job”); see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229

F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that plaintiff established the subjective portion of a

hostile work environment claim because an incident with a co-worker pervaded plaintiff’s

work environment so much that she required psychological help and was unable to

successfully return to job). Importantly, moreover, a reasonable person in her position would

not perceive her work environment to be hostile. See Brooks, 229 F.3d at 924-27 (finding

that although plaintiff had established the subjective portion, her apprehension was not

objectively reasonable as a reasonable woman in her position would not believe the harassing

behavior had permanently altered a term or condition of her employment). In conclusion,

Plaintiff has misconceived the basis for a hostile work environment claim under the law.

“Harassment is actionable only if it is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Ray, 217 F.3d

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at 1245 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). Clearly, Plaintiff’s allegations do not come near

this threshold, and summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.

C. Hostile Work Environment as a Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff brought a hostile work environment claim under Count V of her Complaint,

which was separate from her three retaliation claims. However, in addition to her allegations

of harassment in Count V, Plaintiff states that “[a]s a consequence of the retaliation, Plaintiff

has suffered damages . . .” (Compl. ¶ 75). Plaintiff also argues in her response to

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment that the Western Human Resources Office’s

conduct was based on her protected activity (Dkt. 104 at 2:23-3:22, 13:12-16). Although

unusual in the retaliation context, the Ninth Circuit has held that a hostile work environment

may be the basis for a retaliation claim under Title VII. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244-45. When

a hostile work environment is alleged as a retaliation claim, though, a plaintiff must still

show harassment that is “‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Hardage v. CBS Broad.,

Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245 and Harris, 510

U.S. at 21). For the reasons already discussed, Plaintiff cannot show sufficiently severe or

pervasive conduct that altered the conditions of her employment and created an abusive

working environment. Thus, a hostile work environment alleged as a retaliation claim also

fails as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

Summary judgment is proper as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under

Count V of her Complaint. Despite the taking of substantial discovery, Plaintiff fails to set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Brinson, 53 F.3d at

1049. Plaintiff fails to provide the evidence to support her allegations, let alone allege

sufficient facts to support a hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff’s claim fails as a

matter of law because Plaintiff cannot show harassment that is sufficiently severe or

pervasive to be a hostile work environment. For the same reasons, even if Plaintiff’s hostile

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work environment allegation was construed as a retaliation claim, it would still fail as a

matter of law. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to

Count V of Plaintiff’s Complaint. As such, only Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint regarding

her nonselection in 2005 remains.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt.102) regarding Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under Count V of

her Complaint is GRANTED.

DATED this 2nd day of December, 2009.

Case 3:07-cv-00413-SMM Document 107 Filed 12/02/09 Page 13 of 13