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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court ofAppeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 4, 2014 Decided May 13, 2014

No. 13-5119

COAL RIVER ENERGY, LLC,

APPELLANT

v.

SALLY JEWELL, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-01648)

Steven H. Becker argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Tara K. Hogan, Senior Trial Counsel, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief

were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeanne

E. Davidson, Director.

Before: KAVANAUGH and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge: Under the Surface

Mining Control and Reclamation Act, operators of coal mines

must pay a fee for each ton of coal they produce by mining. The

purpose of the fee is to fund the restoration of land damaged by

coal mining. A Department of the Interior regulation requires

mine operators to pay the reclamation fee when the coal is

ultimately sold or used, rather than immediately after the coal is

removed from the ground. Appellant, a coal mine operator, sued

the Secretary in district court, arguing that the regulation could

not be constitutionally applied to coal sold for export because

the Export Clause of the Constitution states that “No Tax or

Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any state.” U.S.

Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. The district court dismissed the case as

untimely. We affirm.

I.

In 1977, Congress enacted the Reclamation Act,

establishing a fee on all coal mined in the United States. The Act

set a fee of “28 cents per ton of coal produced by surface coal

mining and 12 cents per ton of coal produced by underground

mining.” 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a). Immediately after the coal is

removed from the ground it is impure, mixed with other rocks

and dirt. So if the coal were weighed at that moment, it would be

impossible to determine exactly how much mass is attributable

to coal and how much to other impurities. The Secretary of the

Interior, recognizing that problem, promulgated the following

rule:

(a) The operator shall pay a reclamation fee on each

ton of coal produced for sale, transfer, or use, including

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the products of in situ mining.

(b) The fee shall be determined by the weight and

value at the time of initial bona fide sale, transfer of

ownership, or use by the operator.

30 C.F.R. § 870.12 (emphasis added). Measuring the weight of

the coal at the time of sale increases accuracy, as most

impurities will likely have been removed. The total weight – and

total fee charged – should therefore be less.

A number of coal companies, nevertheless, challenged the

regulation – at least with respect to the sales of coal for export.

A direct tax on coal exported would violate the little-known

Export Clause of the Constitution, which provides that “No Tax

or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any state.” U.S.

Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. They sued in the Court of Federal

Claims, were initially successful, but lost on appeal in the

Federal Circuit. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. United States,

528 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied 131 S. Ct.

2990 (2011). The Federal Circuit, relying on the constitutional

avoidance canon, interpreted the statutory phrase “coal

produced” as referring to coal extracted, and therefore the

regulation should be interpreted as a fee imposed on extraction

but collected at a later date.

A few months later a newly established coal company, Coal

River – which did not participate in the Consolidation Coal

litigation – filed essentially the same suit, a challenge to the

regulation based on the Export Clause, in our district court,

seeking ultimately a D. C. Circuit conflict with the Federal

Circuit. Appellant relied on our opinion in Drummond Coal Co.

v. Hodel, 796 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1986), in which a coal

company challenged a different portion of the Secretary’s

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regulation, which clarified that impurities not removed at the

time of sale were included in the weight of the coal on which the

fee was imposed. Although we noted that the term “‘coal

produced’...could reasonably be interpreted to include the entire

process of extracting and selling coal...or it could refer solely to

the process of extraction,” and the government was resting on the

former interpretation, our key observation was that “nowhere

does the [Act] specify what elements comprise a taxable piece of

coal.” Id. at 505. In that case, although we sanctioned pursuant

to Chevron the Department’s interpretation that “coal produced”

was legitimately interpreted as the final step at sale or use, we

were not faced with the constitutional argument presented in

Consolidation Coal, which led the Federal Circuit to conclude

the constitutional avoidance canon trumped the Department’s

prior interpretation. Therefore, appellant’s argument that there is

a conflict between the two circuits is somewhat strained. 

But as will become apparent, any supposed conflict with the

Federal Circuit is not really relevant because we agree with the

district court that appellant’s challenge to the rule comes too late

to be entertained. Section 1276 of the Reclamation Act explicitly

provides – similar to a number of statutes – that all challenges to

regulations promulgated under the Act must be brought within

sixty days of a rule’s promulgation. 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1).

II.

Before considering the scope of limitations language of 

§ 1276, we need to deal with Coal River’s argument that § 1276

does not even apply to its suit, which relies on the Constitution

and the Administrative Procedure Act, because it is not one

challenging the regulation on its face. As we understand Coal

River’s contention, it is that § 1276 only covers “facial”

challenges to the regulation, whereas appellant’s claim – based

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as it is only on the regulation’s impact on sales for export, not all

sales or uses of coal – should be thought of as an as-applied

challenge. Although Coal River’s case is admittedly directed to

only certain transactions covered by the regulation, it is still a

challenge to the rule as it is written, and not simply as it might

later be interpreted or applied. As such, it is certainly a challenge

to an “action by the Secretary promulgating national rules or

regulations,” and therefore § 1276 applies.1

We turn now to the timeliness of the claim under the

Reclamation Act. To be sure, § 1276 provides a safety valve; a

challenge may be brought “after such date if the petition is based

solely on grounds arising after the sixtieth day.” Coal River

argues that, as a new coal company that was not in existence at

the time the regulation was promulgated, it can take advantage

of the safety valve provision. The government, without explicitly

conceding that such a circumstance falls within the regulation’s

exception, does not contest this interpretation. But it contends

that the district court was correct in determining that, at most,

Coal River had sixty days after the fee was first imposed on it.

Coal River argues that imposing a sixty-day limitation on an

after-arising claim is unauthorized by the statute. After all, it

claims – and this is quite true – the statute is conspicuously silent

on such a limitation. Conspicuous because the preceding clause

imposes just that limitation on the normal claim. Moreover, Coal

1

 Because Coal River’s challenge clearly falls within the terms of

the statute, we need not decide whether, for constitutional purposes,

it is properly regarded as a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge,

though we note that “the distinction between facial and as-applied

challenges is not . . .well defined.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election

Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010).

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River points out that a comparable administrative review

provision of the Clean Air Act explicitly states that challenges to

regulations based on subsequent “after-arising” claims must be

brought within sixty days. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).2 So

obviously Congress had in mind how to deal with a limitation on

after-arising claims, if it had wanted one.

Coal River’s argument is by no means insubstantial; it is

superficially troubling, but ultimately we reject it and agree with

the district court because Coal River’s interpretation would

essentially nullify the sixty-day limitation for challenges to rules

under § 1276 (or any similar statute). That is so because there

might be a number of new coal companies that could come into

existence over a period of time after the initial sixty-day period

passed. Under Coal River’s interpretation, if each such company

could challenge the regulations at any time, it would certainly

frustrate Congress’s objective that facial challenges to the

regulation be confined to a limited period (the coal industry

might take advantage of such a situation to fund new litigation,

perhaps for a smaller company). Moreover, as the government

notes, an absence of an explicit statute of limitations is “a void

which is commonplace in federal statutory law.” Bd. of Regents

of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).

It is standard practice for courts to “borrow” a statute of

limitations when one is not explicitly provided, and in this case,

the most obvious limitations period is the one in the previous

2

We have previously noted the different language used by the two

statutes, though we did not have occasion to definitively interpret the

Reclamation Act, as we do now. See Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass'n

v. E.P.A., 588 F.3d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

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clause.3

 Indeed, we discovered that two of our sister circuits have

sanctioned that approach construing analogous statutes.4

Coal River claims that, even if the sixty-day statute of

limitations applies, the statute is subject to equitable tolling

because it is not jurisdictional. We need not decide whether the

statute is jurisdictional, however, because Coal River has made

no effort whatsoever to explain why equitable tolling would be

appropriate in this case. The sixty-day limitation period, 

therefore, applies regardless of whether it is a jurisdictional bar.

Coal River alternatively contends that even if § 1276 would

be a bar, if standing alone, it is not alone. It is argued that Coal

River’s claim under the Constitution itself for equitable relief

and/or a cause of action under the APA provides alternative

routes to judicial review. Coal River relies on the presumption of

judicial review under APA (and the Constitution). To be sure,

such a presumption is powerful, but it applies in situations where

judicial review would be totally precluded, see Bowen v.

Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986),

or would be realistically inadequate. See Sackett v. E.P.A., 132

S. Ct. 1367, 1372 (2012). But where a federal claim is merely

3

 In its reply brief, Coal River argues that each payment of the tax

constitutes an after-arising ground. Although we note that such an

interpretation would eviscerate the sixty-day limitation for all

plaintiffs, arguments raised for the first time in reply briefs are

forfeited. Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C.

Cir. 2008).

4 HRI, Inc. v. E.P.A., 198 F.3d 1224, 1239 n.9 (10th Cir. 2000)

(construing 42 U.S.C. § 300j–7(a)); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.

U.S.E.P.A., 908 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1990) (construing 33 U.S.C.

§ 1369(b)(1))

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channeled to a single forum, the question is whether it is “fairly

discernible” that Congress intended that particular review

provision to be exclusive. Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 132 S. Ct.

2126, 2133 (2012). It seems quite apparent to us that Congress’s

fashioning of an explicit provision for judicial review of the

promulgation of regulations – and limiting the time to raise such

a challenge – meets the Elgin standard.

As we have held, however, a statute like § 1276 does not

preclude a challenge when the government actually applies its

regulation against a party; assuming, of course, that a party has

an available procedure, it can mount a substantive rather than a

“procedural” defense against the regulation. See Indep. Cmty.

Bankers of Am. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 195

F.3d 28, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Functional Music, Inc. v.

FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). A substantive defense

is one based on an argument that a regulation is not authorized

by a statute or the Constitution, as opposed to a claim under the

APA regarding the method used in promulgating the regulation,

such as that it was issued without adequate notice, or that the

government inadequately responded to comments. See JEM

Broad. Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 22 F.3d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1994).5

So Coal River could certainly raise its constitutional challenge

in the Court of Federal Claims after the fee is assessed. Indeed,

both parties agree that route is available to appellant, but Coal

River argues it is inadequate. And, as we noted, the presumption

of judicial review would defeat an exclusive mode if the

exclusive mode were quite inadequate. 

5

Appellant makes a rather silly argument based on a misreading

of Functional Music, Inc. that the statute of limitations in § 1276

should be interpreted as precluding only direct procedural challenges,

not substantive challenges.

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Coal River’s (rather half-hearted) reason for claiming that

the Court of Federal Claims is inadequate is that the court cannot

grant declaratory relief. But a determination of the Court of

Federal Claims, upheld by the Federal Circuit, that the regulation

was illegal as applied to sales for export would have all the force

needed to complete relief without the formality of a declaratory

order. Indeed, a suit for declaratory relief seems decidedly

inferior, since it would provide only prospective relief, whereas

a suit for damages can provide both prospective and retroactive

relief. Coal River’s real problem is that the route is closed, not by

structural impediments, but because the Federal Circuit has

already ruled against its position. Adequate review, however,

entitles one to a procedurally fair forum, not to favorable

substantive law.

* * *

We determine that § 1276 applies to Coal River’s claim and

that its suit was untimely. The judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

So ordered.

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