Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00387/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00387-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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1 The FDCPA defines a “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality

of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the

collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly,

debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Debt

collectors may include attorneys litigating cases on behalf of their clients. Heintz v. Jenkins,

514 U.S. 291, 297 (1995); Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir.

2010). See also, Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1994) (Where a

creditor who is a debt collector hires an attorney and that attorney violates the FDCPA, the

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Marvin Randall, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Nelson & Kennard; LVNV Funding,

L.L.C., 

Defendants. _________________________________

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No. CV-09-0387-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) action comes before the

Court on Plaintiff Marvin Randall’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, alleging a violation 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(2)’s lawsuit venue provision.

(Doc. 61) Defendant LVNV Funding, L.L.C., a Nevada limited liability collection agency,

and its California collection law firm, Defendant Nelson & Kennard, both debt collectors

within the meaning of the FDCPA,

1 cross moved for summary judgment on their affirmative

Case 2:09-cv-00387-LOA Document 74 Filed 09/20/10 Page 1 of 6
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creditor is vicariously liable for the attorney’s actions.”)

2

 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c), “[a] debt collector may not be held liable in any action

brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence

that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the

maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692

k(c). See also, Fox, 15 F.3d at 1514 (requiring “evidence supporting the existence of ‘reasonable preventive procedures’” in order to establish bona fide error defense); Oglesby v.

Rotche, 1993 WL 460841, at * 9 (N.D.Ill. 1993) (“In order to claim section 1692k(c)’s

defense, the debt collector must show bona fide error and mechanisms designed to prevent

[the filing in the incorrect venue] by a preponderance of the evidence.).

3

 Under § 1692k, Defendants may be liable to Plaintiff for “any actual damage

sustained,” “additional damages” of up to $1,000, and “the costs of the action, together with

a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)-(3). 

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defense of bona fide error2 alleged in their Answers, docs. 8-9 at 7, ¶¶ 31. 

After review of the parties’ briefings, the relevant legal authorities, and wellaware of the summary judgment standard, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment because there is no material factual dispute that Defendants filed their

debt collection suit against Plaintiff on an alleged Sears’ credit card debt in Riverside

County, California, a venue not authorized by § 1692i(a)(2). The Court will deny

Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment because it was untimely filed. (Doc. 68)

By separate order, the Court will set a final Rule 16 scheduling conference for the purpose,

inter alia, of setting a jury trial on Plaintiff’s damages3 and Defendants’ bona fide error

defense.

Plaintiff’s Reply, doc. 70 at 2, makes clear that he voluntarily abandons all

claims alleged in the Complaint except his single claim of § 1692i(a)(2)’s venue provision.

The parties do not dispute that Defendants filed their collection action in Riverside County,

California on October 10, 2008 where Plaintiff did not live when he entered into the Sears’

contract and where Plaintiff did not live when Defendants’ debt collection suit was filed.

Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”) at ¶¶ 3-9, 11, doc. 61-2 at p. 1-2; Defendants’

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4

 Plaintiff does not need to prove where he lived on October 10, 2008 as long as it is

undisputed that he did not live in Riverside County when Defendants’ suit was filed.

5

 Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff’s alleged debt to Sears falls within §

1692a(5)’s definition.

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Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) at ¶¶ 3, 20, 22, doc. 69 at p. 8.4

The FDCPA was enacted to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by

debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt

collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State

action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The

FDCPA does not protect every imaginable debt; instead, it is limited to consumer debts,

specifically, “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out

of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject

of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not

such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (emphasis added).5

The FDCPA is considered a strict liability statute, meaning that a consumer

need not show that the debt collector intentionally, fraudulently, or knowingly violated the

Act. Reichert v. National Credit Systems, Inc. 531 F.3d. 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur

court decided [Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.

2006)], which made clear that the FDCPA is a strict liability statute in that a plaintiff need

not prove an error was intentional.”); Hunt v. Check Recovery Sys., Inc., 478 F.Supp.2d

1157, 1169 (N.D.Cal. 2007) (“[D]ebt collectors generally are liable for violating the

FDCPA’s requirements without regard to intent, knowledge or willfulness.”) (citations

omitted). A single violation of any of the FDCPA’s provisions “is sufficient to establish civil

liability under the FDCPA.” United States v. Trans Cont’l Affiliates, 1997 WL 26297 at *3

(N.D.Cal. 1997) (quoting Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993)); § 1692k

(imposing civil liability on “any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this

subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person . . . .”) (emphases added). 

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6

 Section 1692i provides in relevant part:

(a) Venue

Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer

shall--

(1) * * * * *

(2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring such

action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity-- 

(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or

(B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the

action. 

7

 PSOF at ¶ 3, doc. 61-1 at 2.

8

 This allegation of a violation of the FDCPA was alleged in the Complaint. (Doc. at

¶¶ 20, 21) Defendants’ Answers admitted the allegation in paragraph 20 of the Complaint,

viz. “On or about October 10, 2008, Defendant Nelson & Kennard filed suit against Plaintiff

on behalf of Defendant LVNV Funding LLC for the alleged debt in the Superior Court of

California, County of Riverside, case number RIC 510992.” (Docs. 8-9 at ¶¶ 20)

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Section 1692i(a)(2) of the FDCPA requires a lawsuit initiated to recover an

unpaid debt be brought “only in the judicial district or similar legal entity (A) in which such

consumer signed the contract sued upon; or (B) in which such consumer resides at the

commencement of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(2).

6

 “The FDCPA’s venue provision,

which plainly provides for ‘only’ two venues[,] . . . is wholly consistent with the purpose of

the FDCPA’s venue requirement: ‘to prevent debt collectors from bringing collection suits

in forums located at great distances from debtors’ residences.’” Harper v. Collection Bureau

of Walla Walla, Inc., 2007 WL 4287293, at * 8 (W.D.Wash. 2007) (quoting Dutton v.

Wolhar, 809 F.Supp. 1130, 1139 (D.Del. 1992)).

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated 1692i(a)(2) and damaged Plaintiff by

filing the debt collection lawsuit in Riverside County Superior Court, when Plaintiff did not

reside in Riverside County at the time the Sears’ credit card application was signed (May,

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) or at the time the lawsuit was commenced (October 10, 2008).8 Relying on Fox, 15

F.3d at 1514 and Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions, LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2007)

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9

 The FDCPA defines “communication” as “the conveying of information regarding

a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). But

see § 1692(g)(d) which provides that “[a] communication in the form of a formal pleading

in a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for purposes of subsection

(a) of this section.” This October 13, 2006 amendment in Pub.L. 109-351 reversed precedent

holding that pleadings may be an initial communication under the FDCPA. See, e.g., Thomas

v. Law Firm of Simpson & Cybak, 392 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 2004) (a summons and a

complaint that an attorney serves on a debtor is an initial communication with a consumer

and must comply with the notice requirements of § 1692(g)); Cisneros v. Neuheisel Law

Firm, P.C., 2008 WL 65608 (D.Ariz. 2008).

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on different FDCPA sections, Defendants claim that without service of the debt collection

lawsuit on Plaintiff, it was not a “communication”9

 within the meaning of the FDCPA. (Doc.

71 at 2-3) Therefore, Defendants argue, there can be no liability on Defendants pursuant to

§ 1692i(a)(2). Defendants acknowledge, however, they “are aware of no reported case

imposing liability under the FDCPA where no service of process occurred.” (Id. at 3)

Because the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, Reichert, 531 F.3d. at 1004, the Court

declines to address this untimely-raised issue until post-trial if Defendants are unsuccessful

on their bona fide error defense.

In the Court’s August 6, 2009 Rule 16 scheduling order, the Court ordered that

any motion for summary judgment must be filed on or before “Wednesday, June 30, 2010

[and] [a]ny cross-motion(s) for summary judgment may be filed on or before Friday, July

30, 2010; provided, however, such motion(s) is related solely to the specific issue(s) directly

raised in the initial dispositive motion(s).” (Doc. 30 at 4) (emphasis in original). While the

Court extended Defendants’ responsive memorandum deadline to August 2nd and then

August 11, 2010 because Defendants did not comply with the District Court’s Local Rules

(it was not filed in text-searchable .pdf format, docs. 62, 66) when they filed their crossmotion on August 2nd, the Court did not modify its scheduling order that any cross-motion

for summary judgment must be “related solely to the specific issue(s) directly raised in the

initial dispositive motion(s).” Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment raised only the 15

U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(2) claim of filing the collection lawsuit in the incorrect venue. (Doc. 61)

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Conversely, Plaintiff’s Motion did not raise the bona fide error defense. Thus, Defendants’

summary judgment motion should have been filed on or before June 30, 2010. Defendants’

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment was untimely filed on August 9, 2010 and will be

summarily denied. (Doc. 68)

There being no genuine dispute of material fact, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986),

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. 61, is

GRANTED. The Court finds that Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(2) by filing the

debt collection lawsuit against Plaintiff in the incorrect venue.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment, doc. 68, is summarily DENIED without prejudice as untimely filed.

Plaintiff having abandoned all claims except the 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(2) claim

against Defendants,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims alleged in the Complaint except

the Title 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a)(2) claim (lawsuit venue provision) are hereby DISMISSED

with prejudice.

DATED this 20th day of September, 2010.

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