Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_12-cv-01689/USCOURTS-alnd-1_12-cv-01689-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

TERRANCE EUGENE TAYLOR, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 1:12-cv-01689-VEH-JEO

)

WARDEN JOHN T. RATHMAN, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Terrance Eugene Taylor filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking

immediate release from federal custody. (Doc. 1). He alleges that his federal sentence has been fully

served, and that he is being held illegally by the United States. (Id. at 6). The matter was referred

to a magistrate judge for preliminaryreview. On June 17, 2014, the magistrate judge entered a report

and recommendation finding that the application for a writ of habeas corpus was due to be denied. 

(Doc. 33). The petitioner filed objections to the findings and conclusion of the magistrate judge. 

(Doc. 34).

BACKGROUND

In the report and recommendation, the magistrate judge found as follows:

The petitioner was arrested on May 12, 2002, in Dekalb County, Georgia on

charges of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm during a crime. (Doc.

11-3 at ¶ 37; Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 6). The petitioner spent one day in custody ... and was

released. (Id.) On October 9, 2002, authorities from Dekalb County, Georgia

arrested the petitioner for murder ... and for violating his probation... (Doc. 11-3 at

¶ 28; Doc. 11-5; Doc. 11- 4 at ¶ 6).

On June 18, 2003, the petitioner was indicted on federal charges in the

Northern District of Georgia for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and

simple possession of cocaine. (Doc. 11-6; Doc. 11-7; Doc.11-4 at ¶ 7). Apparently

premised on the previous arrest in Dekalb County.

FILED

 2014 Aug-29 PM 03:01

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:12-cv-01689-VEH-JEO Document 37 Filed 08/29/14 Page 1 of 5
On June 24, 2003, the petitioner’s probation was revoked ... and he was

sentenced to 18 months in prison, with credit for time served since October 9, 2002

(“Dekalb County Sentence”). (Doc. 1-1 at 24 of 41; Doc.11-4 at ¶ 6; Doc. 17 at 5). 

Prosecutors from Dekalb County did not prosecute the murder charge.... (Doc. 11-4

at ¶ 6).

On June 27, 2003, the petitioner was “borrowed” pursuant to a federal writ

of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and arraigned on the federal charges. (Doc. 11-6;

Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 7).1

On September 18, 2003, Liberty County, Georgia issued a Special

Presentment Bench Warrant for Taylor’s arrest, charging him with murder and felony

murder.... (Doc.11-8; Doc.11-4 at ¶ 7). The warrant was lodged as a detainer with

the Dekalb County authorities on October 1, 2003. (Doc. 31-1 at 8 of 20 Attachment

A2)).

On April 8, 2004, the petitioner completed his 18-month Dekalb County

sentence. (Doc. 26-1 at ¶ 2 see also Doc. 26-1 at 5 of 11).

United States District Judge Jack T. Camp sentenced the petitioner in his

federal case to 57 months in prison on April 14, 2004 (“Federal Sentence”). (Doc.

1-1 at 28 of 41; Doc. 11-2; Doc 11-4 at ¶ 8). According to the judgment in that case,

the federal sentence is to run consecutive to the state sentence in the Dekalb County

case (no. 98-CR-2605). (Id.) The petitioner was returned to state custodyto continue

his state sentence with the federal judgment lodged as a detainer. (Doc. 11-6 at 2,

Section III; Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 8; Doc. 31-1 at 5 of 20 ). Judge Camp’s judgment was 2

silent regarding the pending charges in Liberty County, Georgia. (Doc. 11-2; Doc.

11-4 at ¶ 8).

 There is a dispute as to how long he was in federal custody at this time. Respondents 1

have submitted an affidavit indicating that he was returned to Georgia State custody the same day

(Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 7). However, the petitioner asserts that this is false. (Doc. 15 at ¶ 4). That does

not impact the present case in that the petitioner was “deemed” to be in state custody during the

entire time; thus, he received credit on his state sentences for the entire time he was in state

custody and for the entire time he was in federal custody.

 A letter from the United States Marshal for the Northern District of Georgia to the 2

United States Marshal in Savannah, Georgia (Southern District of Georgia) dated May 12, 2004,

notes that the petitioner “has been transferred to Liberty Co. S[heriff’s] O[ffice], Ga. for 2 counts

of felony murder. Please file a J&C detainer with their office.” (Doc. 31-1 at 5 of 20

(Attachment A1)).

2

Case 1:12-cv-01689-VEH-JEO Document 37 Filed 08/29/14 Page 2 of 5
On April 29, 2004, authorities in Dekalb County, Georgia released Taylor to

authorities in LibertyCounty, Georgia pursuant to the bench warrant, which acted as

a detainer. (Doc. 11-5; Doc. 11-9; Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 9; Doc. 31-1 at 8 of 20). On

February 8, 2005, Judge David L. Cavender sentenced the petitioner in the Superior

Court of Liberty County to a term of seven years in prison for aggravated assault ...

(“Liberty County Sentence”). (Doc 11-10, Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 9; Doc. 31-1 at 14 of 20

(Attachment A5). The petitioner was awarded credit for the time he spent in custody

between April 29, 2004, and February 7, 2005, on that sentence. (Doc. 11-9; Doc.

11-4 at ¶ 9).

The United States Marshal for the Northern District of Georgia lodged a

detainer with the Georgia Department of Corrections on June 16, 2005, regarding the

petitioner. (Doc. 31-1 at 10 of 20 (Attachment A3)). The Georgia Department of 3

Corrections acknowledged receipt of the detainer and the filing of the same against

the petitioner Taylor on June 21, 2005. (Id. at 12 of 20 (Attachment A4)).

Taylor completed his Liberty County sentence and was released by the State

of Georgia to the United States Marshals Service to begin serving his federal

sentence on April 21, 2011. (Doc.11-9; Doc. 11-11; Doc. 31-1 at 16, 18 & 20 of 20;

Doc. 31-1 at 18 of 20 (Attachment A7)). The Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) prepared a

sentence computation for Taylor based on his Federal Sentence of fifty-seven months

confinement. (Doc. 11-1 at 2; Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 10). The petitioner’s projected release

date is May 22, 2015. (Doc. 11-1 at 2).

On December 29, 2011, the Designation and Sentence Computation Center

(“DSCC”) with the BOP sent a letter to Judge Camp to determine if a retroactive

concurrent designation would be appropriate on the petitioner’s federal sentence. 

(Doc. 11-12; Doc 11-4 at ¶ 11). Judge Camp did not respond to the letter. (Doc. 11- 4

4 at ¶ 11). The BOP interpreted the lack of response as a negative answer. (Id.) The

DSCC conducted a review pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) and determined a nunc

pro tunc sentence would not be appropriate. (Doc. 11-13; Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 11).

(Doc. 33 at 1-5). Premised on these facts, the magistrate judge concluded that, at the time of his

 The United States Marshal for the Southern District of Georgia notified the United 3

States Marshal for the Northern District of Georgia on June 14, 2005, that the petitioner had been

transferred from Liberty County to the Georgia Department of Corrections to serve his sentence. 

He returned the original Judgment and Commitment regarding the petitioner [t]o the Georgia

Department of Corrections [so it] could be filed and maintained. (Doc. 31-1 at 6 of 20).

 United States District Judge Jack T. Camp retired on November 19, 2010. Biographical 4

Directory of Federal Judges: Jack Tarpley Camp, Jr., Federal Judicial Center (September 23,

2013), http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=360&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na.

3

Case 1:12-cv-01689-VEH-JEO Document 37 Filed 08/29/14 Page 3 of 5
sentencing on the federal charge, Taylor was in the primary custody of the Georgia authorities. He

further found that the petitioner properly served his Liberty County sentence before the federal

sentence, and that Taylor is not entitled to immediate release. (Id. at 5-10).

DISCUSSION

Taylor advances three objections. First, he argues that “the active detainer that belonged to

Liberty County, Georgia is nowhere found in the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] Act or

Legislative History for the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum...” (Doc. 34 at 2). 

As noted by the magistrate judge:

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IADA”) does not define “detainer.”

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359 (1978). However, the House and Senate

Judiciary Committee Reports do so, as merely “a notification filed with the

institution in which a person is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face

pending criminal charges in anotherjurisdiction.” United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d

1168, 1173 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1970, p.

4865)....

(Id. at 6, n.12). A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer and did not change

Taylor’s status as being in the custody of the State of Georgia at the time he was “borrowed” on the

writ. See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 358-61. Thus, the magistrate judge is correct in concluding that Taylor

remained in state custody. This objection is without merit.

Next, Taylor complains that the magistrate judgemisapplied 18 U.S.C. § 3585. His argument

is premised on the factual assertion that when he was sentenced by Judge Camp on April 14, 2004,

he was in federal custodywith the United States Marshal’s Service. (Doc. 34 at 3). The court agrees

that, on April 14, 2004, Taylor was in federal custody; however, that was temporary custody derived

from the use of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. As discussed above, he remained in the

primary custody of Georgia authorities. Accordingly, the Court finds that the magistrate judge

4

Case 1:12-cv-01689-VEH-JEO Document 37 Filed 08/29/14 Page 4 of 5
properly applied § 3585 to Taylor’s situation.

Lastly, Taylor argues that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) improperly considered the “no

response” from Judge Camp. When the BOP did not receive a response from Judge Camp, the

required review under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) was conducted. It was determined that nunc pro tunc

designation would not be appropriate. (Doc. 11-4 at ¶ 11; Doc. 11-13). Taylor’s conclusory

challenge to that determination is insufficient to warrant any relief.

CONCLUSION

The Court has considered the entire file in this action together with the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation (doc. 33) and the petitioner’s objections (doc. 34) and has reached an

independent conclusion that the Report and Recommendation is due to be adopted and approved. 

The court hereby adopts and approves the findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge as

the findings and conclusions of the court. In accord with the recommendation, this petition for writ

of habeas corpus is due to be denied and dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order will be

entered.

DONE this the 29th of August, 2014.

 

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

5

Case 1:12-cv-01689-VEH-JEO Document 37 Filed 08/29/14 Page 5 of 5