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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

_______ 

Argued March 7, 2008 Decided April 29, 2008 

No. 07-5196 

CHARLES E. LARSEN, REVEREND, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

UNITED STATES NAVY AND

DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES 

NAVY, 

APPELLEES

_______ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 02cv02005) 

_______ 

 Arthur A. Schulcz, Sr. argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellants. 

 Lewis Yelin, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Jeffrey S. 

Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, Marleigh D. Dover, Special Counsel, 

and Catherine Y. Hancock, Attorney. 

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 Before: RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

 Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment filed by Senior Circuit Judge WILLIAMS. 

 TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this case, three applicants to the 

Navy Chaplain Corps allege that the Navy maintained a 

religious quota system for choosing chaplains and that under 

this system the Navy illegally refused to hire them because 

they are non-liturgical Protestants. But because the Navy has 

long since eliminated the challenged policy, plaintiffs’ 

challenge is moot. 

I. 

 To become a Navy chaplain, a person applies to the 

Chaplain Accession and Recall Eligibility Board (CARE 

Board), which recommends to the Chief of Chaplains whether 

to hire the applicant. Plaintiffs Charles Larsen, Gregory 

McNear, and James Linzey applied to be Navy chaplains 

between 1987 and 2001, but the CARE Board recommended 

against hiring them and the Navy rejected all three. During 

that time, they allege, the Navy maintained quotas for how 

many chaplains it would hire from each of four “faith group 

categories.” As we explained in Chaplaincy of Full Gospel 

Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006): 

The Navy divides its chaplains into four 

categories according to common faith group 

characteristics: Catholic, liturgical Protestant, 

non-liturgical Protestant, and “special 

worship.” “Liturgical Protestant” refers to 

Protestant denominations that trace their 

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origins to the Reformation, retain an 

established liturgy in their worship services, 

and practice infant baptism; it includes 

Lutheran, Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, 

and Congregational faiths. “Nonliturgical 

Protestant” refers to Protestant denominations 

that do not have a formal liturgy or order in 

their worship services, that baptize only those 

who have reached the age of reason, and 

whose clergy generally do not wear religious 

vestments during services; it includes Baptist, 

Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Charismatic 

faiths. 

Id. at 294 (citations omitted). “‘Special worship’ refers to 

faith groups, both Christian and non-Christian, that have 

‘unique or special needs for their worship and religious 

practices’; it includes Jewish, Christian Science, Seventh-Day 

Adventist, Mormon, Buddhist, Hindu, Moslem, Jehovah’s 

Witness, and Unitarian faiths.” Id. at 295 n.3 (quoting Adair 

v. England, 183 F. Supp. 2d 31, 36 (D.D.C. 2002)). 

 Plaintiffs, all non-liturgical Protestants, allege that until 

2001 the Navy had a policy of hiring one-third liturgical 

Protestants, one-third non-liturgical Protestants, and one-third 

divided between Catholics and adherents of “special worship” 

faiths (heavily weighted towards Catholics). According to 

plaintiffs, this “Thirds Policy,” as they call it, discriminated 

against them because it underrepresented non-liturgical 

Protestants in the Chaplain Corps relative to their numbers in 

the Navy. The Navy admits that prior to 2001 it “maintained 

recruiting goals for each faith group category,” Appellees’ Br. 

10, but asserts that since then it has given no consideration to 

any applicant’s faith group in making hiring decisions. 

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Plaintiffs concede that the Navy “abandoned [its] Thirds 

Policy . . . in 2001.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 11. 

In 2002, plaintiffs filed suit against the Navy in U.S. 

District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the 

Thirds Policy violated the First Amendment, Fifth 

Amendment, and Religious Freedom Restoration Act 

(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. They sought declaratory 

and injunctive relief and an order declaring that if they were 

hired as Navy chaplains, they should receive “constructive 

credit” towards their pay and retirement benefits for the time 

they were improperly denied positions. 

 The district court construed plaintiffs’ claim for 

“constructive credit” as a request for money damages and 

found it barred by sovereign immunity. See Larsen v. Navy, 

346 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128-30 (D.D.C. 2004). It dismissed 

plaintiffs’ RFRA claim on a questionable theory advocated by 

neither party, holding that RFRA had no application to the 

facially discriminatory policy alleged here because the statute 

applies only to government actions that are “neutral and 

generally applicable.” Id. at 137. The district court later 

granted summary judgment for the Navy on plaintiffs’ 

remaining claims, finding them largely moot but otherwise 

unpersuasive. See Larsen v. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 

(D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiffs now appeal, challenging the district 

court’s RFRA, sovereign immunity, mootness, and First 

Amendment rulings. 

II. 

 We lack jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the district 

court’s substantive holdings because we find this entire case 

moot. “Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues 

presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome.” County of Los Angeles v. 

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Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. 

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). “Federal courts lack 

jurisdiction to decide moot cases because their constitutional 

authority extends only to actual cases or controversies.” Iron 

Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). 

This case is moot because in their complaint plaintiffs 

challenged only the legality of the Navy’s alleged Thirds 

Policy, but even they admit that the Thirds Policy ended in 

2001 and that the Navy now maintains no religious quotas. 

Plaintiffs nonetheless insist their claim remains live, but each 

of their three arguments fails. 

First, as plaintiffs correctly point out, a defendant’s 

voluntary cessation of a challenged practice moots a case only 

if the defendant shows that: (1) “‘there is no reasonable 

expectation . . .’ that the alleged violation will recur,” and (2) 

“interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably 

eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Davis, 440 

U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 

U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). Plaintiffs argue that the Navy flunked 

condition one because it failed to prove that it wouldn’t 

reinstitute the Thirds Policy and condition two because it still 

uses the CARE Board. As to the first condition, because 

plaintiffs never allege that the Navy is likely to or even 

considering reinstituting the Thirds Policy, there is “‘no 

reasonable expectation . . .’ that the alleged violation will 

recur.” Id. (quoting Grant, 345 U.S. at 633). Plaintiffs point 

out that the Navy still has authority to reinstitute the policy, 

but “the mere power to reenact a challenged [policy] is not a 

sufficient basis on which a court can conclude that a 

reasonable expectation of recurrence exists. Rather, there 

must be evidence indicating that the challenged [policy] likely 

will be reenacted.” Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of 

Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The record 

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here contains no such evidence. Plaintiffs insist that the 

Navy’s continued defense of the now abandoned Thirds 

Policy amounts to evidence that the Navy will reenact the 

policy. In support, it cites our statement in Doe v. Harris, 696 

F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1982), that “when a complaint identifies 

official conduct as wrongful and the legality of that conduct is 

vigorously asserted by the officers in question, the 

complainant may justifiably project repetition.” Id. at 113. 

But this case differs significantly from Harris. There, the 

defendant expressly said it would commit the same alleged 

violation again under certain circumstances, giving the 

plaintiffs solid “evidence indicating that the challenged 

[policy] likely [would] be reenacted.” Nat’l Black Police 

Ass’n, 108 F.3d at 349. Here, by contrast, the Navy has never 

said it will reenact the Thirds Policy, and plaintiffs have not 

even alleged as much. As to condition two, the Navy’s 

continued use of the CARE Board is irrelevant because the 

Board no longer applies any type of religious quota system. 

 

Second, as plaintiffs again accurately point out, a case is 

not moot if a court can provide an effective remedy. See

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13 

(1992). And according to plaintiffs, this court can provide a 

remedy, namely “a declaration that the Thirds Policy . . . was 

unconstitutional, their rejection unlawful, and that an 

injunction be granted preventing its reimplementation.” 

Appellants’ Opening Br. 37. But because the Navy already 

eliminated the Thirds Policy and plaintiffs never allege that 

the Navy will reinstitute it, any injunction or order declaring it 

illegal would accomplish nothing—amounting to exactly the 

type of advisory opinion Article III prohibits. Of course, if 

the district court’s sovereign immunity holding was incorrect, 

plaintiffs’ claim for “constructive credit” might defeat 

mootness, but because plaintiffs never argue this ground for 

avoiding mootness, we decline to consider it. See Carducci v. 

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Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[W]here counsel 

has made no attempt to address the issue, we will not remedy 

the defect . . . .”). Our concurring colleague is correct that in 

Lesesne ex rel. B.F. v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 828 

(D.C. Cir. 2006), we considered an argument against 

mootness that was only “implied” on appeal, but explicit in 

the complaint. Id. at 833. But here, plaintiffs never raised 

their constructive credit claim as a ground for avoiding 

mootness, not even implicitly. Moreover, the Lesesne court 

never said it was required to consider the argument the 

plaintiff inadequately raised. Thus, while Lesesne certainly 

means we may consider arguments a plaintiff fails to raise 

against mootness, we need not do so, especially where, as 

here, it might force us to resolve a constitutional question. 

Even were we to deem this case a live controversy, there 

is another reason why we would decline to consider plaintiffs’ 

claim for constructive credit. Because plaintiffs’ claim relies 

on their first being hired as Navy chaplains—a vital condition 

that has yet to occur—it is unripe. See Devia v. Nuclear 

Regulatory Comm’n, 492 F.3d 421, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(“[I]f a plaintiff’s claim . . . depends on future events that may 

never come to pass, or that may not occur in the form 

forecasted, then the claim is unripe.” (quoting McInnisMisenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2003))). 

The concurrence is concerned that delaying resolution of this 

claim may force these plaintiffs to a difficult decision about 

whether to reapply. By reaching the merits, however, we 

would be deciding an issue that will not arise unless plaintiffs 

are hired as Navy chaplains—something that may never 

occur. The claim is thus unripe. 

Finally, plaintiffs argue that they challenge the Navy’s 

current hiring policy as well as its Thirds Policy. Plaintiffs’ 

complaint, however, focuses on the Thirds Policy. Of the 

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four relevant counts, three challenge “the Navy’s chaplain 

accession goals,” yet the complaint itself states that the Navy 

already “abandoned its policy of providing goals for specific 

faith group clusters.” Compl. 18, 21, 23. The final relevant 

count alleges that “[t]he Navy has established and maintained 

an unconstitutional religious quota system.” Id. at 22. Even 

on appeal, plaintiffs devote only two paragraphs of their sixtytwo-page opening brief to attacking the Navy’s current hiring 

policies, providing virtually no reasoning or citations. 

Appellants’ Opening Br. 50-51. We decline to revive this 

case by reading into plaintiffs’ complaint an argument not 

adequately presented. See Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 

F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Courts have long declined to 

render decisions on important questions of far-reaching 

significance which have not been argued by the party who 

might benefit therefrom.”). 

III. 

 For the reasons stated above, we remand this case to the 

district court with instructions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim as 

moot. 

So ordered. 

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 WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 

concurring in the judgment: While I otherwise join the 

majority opinion in full, I depart from it as to the plaintiffs’ 

request for “constructive credit.” I believe that this request, 

unlike the other equitable remedies the plaintiffs seek, could 

save their challenge to the now-abandoned “Thirds Policy” (see 

Maj. Op. at 3) from mootness. In the end, however, I concur in 

the court’s finding a lack of jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ challenge 

to that policy, as this remedy is itself barred by the government’s 

valid jurisdictional assertion of sovereign immunity. 

The plaintiffs accuse the Navy of having engaged in 

religious discrimination by refusing to hire them as chaplains. 

They declare that they are “able and ready” to apply for the 

chaplaincy again, and they seek an injunction ordering the 

Navy, should it hire them as chaplains in the future, to accord 

them “constructive credit” for the years they would have 

served but for its unlawful discrimination under the Thirds 

Policy. This additional seniority would entitle the plaintiffs to 

a higher salary and would make them eligible to receive an 

officer’s pension on retirement, a benefit they would 

otherwise lack because of the Navy’s retirement rules and 

pension prerequisites. 

No one disputes that the plaintiffs allege an injury in fact 

(the discriminatory refusal to hire). If the court can remedy that 

injury, their claim is not moot, and per Lesesne ex rel. B.F. v. 

District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 828, 832-33 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 

we may look past a plaintiff’s losing arguments to determine 

mootness from the complaint itself. In Lesesne, the plaintiff 

correctly identified a form of relief that would have forestalled 

mootness, but she failed to recognize that it had been properly 

requested in her complaint—instead contending unsuccessfully 

that it was implied in her demand for “any other relief the 

Court deems just.” Id. at 833. Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs 

correctly note that their complaint requests constructive credit; 

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they merely fail to cite this request as a specific defense to 

mootness. As in Lesesne, however, the fact that plaintiffs’ 

rebuttals to mootness are “without merit” does not prevent us 

from recognizing that “[their] complaint presented the District 

Court with a live controversy.” Id. at 832-33. The face of the 

complaint reveals a live claim: the plaintiffs asked for 

constructive credit and have not received it. The plaintiffs’ 

briefs pressed this remedy on appeal, and their failure to 

mention it as a defense to mootness hasn’t prejudiced the 

Navy—which acknowledged at oral argument that if 

constructive credit were not barred by sovereign immunity, the 

availability of that remedy would cure the mootness problem. 

I am uncertain whether some unripeness in the request for 

constructive credit sweeps it out of the picture, leaving the 

attack on the Thirds Policy moot. It is true that the soughtafter injunction requiring an award of credit would have bite 

only if the plaintiffs should be appointed as chaplains, and that 

ripeness normally calls on us not to adjudicate claims that 

“depend[] on future events that may never come to pass.” Maj. 

Op. at 7 (quoting Devia v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 492 

F.3d 421, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). But the events underlying the 

plaintiffs’ substantive claim—i.e., their attack on the Thirds 

Policy—have already occurred: the Navy’s refusal to hire them 

suffices for liability (assuming, as we must, that the plaintiffs 

would win on the merits), and this refusal has had “its effects 

felt in a concrete way.” Devia, 492 F.3d at 424 (quoting Abbott 

Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)). Indeed, the 

plaintiffs’ claims are partially overripe; the Navy’s shelving of 

the Thirds Policy rendered direct judicial relief against it 

meaningless and to that extent mooted the claim. The only 

remaining question is whether a court must wait before 

addressing the substantive questions on which the surviving 

meaningful remedy (the constructive credit) depends. But 

ripeness is a property of claims, not of remedies. If the Thirds 

Policy were still alive and thus an injunction still useful against 

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it, a court reaching the merits would consider the constructive 

credit remedy as well. Perhaps the law of remedies would bar 

such relief as too speculative, but the court would address that 

as a merits issue rather than as a ripeness defense. 

Further, to say that the plaintiffs’ claims become ripe only 

once they are hired might put them in the sort of bind that 

Abbott Labs. considered an important argument for ripeness, 

see 387 U.S. at 152-54, as it would require them to give up 

their current jobs (and any associated pension guarantees) 

before they could establish their pension eligibility as 

chaplains. Resolving the claim now would enable them to 

choose in light of their legal rights. 

Even if we viewed the plaintiffs’ request for credit as 

their “claim” (which seems odd), the predicate event that may 

or may not “come to pass” is their appointment as chaplains. 

In assessing the likelihood of that event for ripeness purposes, 

we must assume arguendo the validity of their merits claim. 

Removal of the discriminatory policy, to be sure, by no means 

guarantees their appointment, but the plaintiffs offered some 

evidence that their prospects would have been good in a nondiscriminatory system, including evidence that, at least at the 

time of the applications, the Navy was falling short of its 

chaplain recruitment goals. Again, of course, the potential 

hardship to the plaintiffs may tilt the balance toward 

immediate adjudication. Devia, 492 F.3d at 427. 

Doubtful that ripeness is a bar, and noting that we may 

“choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a 

case on the merits,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 

U.S. 574, 585 (1999), I believe we can more confidently rely 

on the government’s sovereign immunity defense. 

The plaintiffs argue that their request for constructive 

credit falls within the Administrative Procedure Act’s waiver 

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of sovereign immunity for actions “seeking relief other than 

money damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. We need not determine 

whether, under Hubbard v. EPA, 982 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 

1992), such credit is a form of money damages in a strict 

sense, for Kidwell v. Dep’t of the Army and its progeny extend 

the government’s immunity to equitable relief which “in 

essence” represents a monetary recovery. 56 F.3d 279, 284 

(D.C. Cir. 1995). As a result, where the relief sought lacks 

“significant non-monetary value,” Tootle v. Sec’y of the Navy, 

446 F.3d 167, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2006), it will be treated as a 

form of money damages. 

A variety of non-financial benefits have been described as 

“considerable” in prior cases: the upgrading of a less-thanhonorable discharge in Kidwell, 56 F.3d at 286, early 

retirement for an ill service member in Tootle, 446 F.3d at 

175, and numerous benefits accruing to retired personnel in

Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

But here the plaintiffs give no indication of any non-financial 

consequences to the constructive credit they seek. Rather, 

they state that “[u]nder existing law, there may be no way to 

compensate Plaintiffs financially for the Navy’s illegal denial 

of a commission,” Pls.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pls.’ Opp. Defs.’ 

Mot. to Dismiss, Docket No. 9, at 16 (emphasis added), and 

that “[t]he relief requested focuses on overcoming the 

Plaintiffs’ burden and disqualification for a pension caused by 

Defendants’ illegal actions,” Larsen Br. 60 (emphasis added). 

Because the plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of proving that 

the government has unequivocally waived its immunity,” TriState Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 575 

(D.C. Cir. 2003), and their allegations fail to identify any nonmonetary benefits to their proposed remedy, I would hold that 

their request for constructive credit is barred by sovereign 

immunity. 

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