Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08063/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08063-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TOM BEAN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MCDOUGAL LITTELL, A DIVISION

OF HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY,

AND R.R. DONNELLEY & SONS

COMPANY, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-8063-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Doc. #

14). The Court has considered Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. # 1), Defendants’ Notice of

Supplemental Authority in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. # 18), Plaintiff’s

Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. # 21), and

Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. # 22). For the

following reasons, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant McDougal Littel, a division of Houghton Mifflin Company (“McDougal”),

is a textbook publisher. Defendant R.R. Donnelley and Sons Company (“R.R. Donnelley”)

is a printer of textbooks. Plaintiff Tom Bean (“Bean”) is a professional photographer who

created and owns a photograph entitled, “Ruins of Anasazi Granaries at Nankoweep above

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the Colorado River, Grand Canyon National Park” (“the photograph”). In 1998, Bean sold

McDougal limited licenses to copy and print 45,000 total copies of the photograph for use

in three of McDougal’s textbooks. 

In 2007, Bean brought suit against McDougal and R.R. Donnelley for copyright

infringement and against McDougal for fraud. Bean alleges that McDougal exceeded its

license to print 45,000 copies of the photograph and used the photograph in a new textbook

edition, without obtaining Bean’s authority or permission. Bean maintains that McDougal

intentionally made misrepresentations to him in order to obtain access to the photograph at

a lower cost. Bean further alleges that R.R. Donnelley printed the textbooks in excess of the

licensed amount, and therefore infringed upon his copyright as well. Bean claims that the

copyrights in the photograph were properly registered before Defendants’ alleged

infringement. McDougal and R.R. Donnelley filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on

October 1, 2007, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and,

in the alternative, that the fraud claim is preempted by the Copyright Act. 

II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can take one

of two forms. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979). It can be a “facial attack,” in which case “the challenger asserts that the allegations

contained in [the] complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.”

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Or it can be a “factual

attack,” in which case the challenger asserts that federal jurisdiction does not exist in fact.

Id. Defendants have limited their motion to a facial attack. (Doc. # 14 at 1-2, 5; Defs.’

Reply at 2.)

In resolving a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must accept the

allegations of the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). Such a jurisdictional attack

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Because Defendants limited their motion to a facial attack, the Court did not consider

the exhibits attached to Bean’s Reponse. (Doc. # 21.)

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will succeed “only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter

jurisdiction.” Denney v. DEA, 508 F. Supp. 2d 815, 824 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 

Here, Bean alleges federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338.

(Compl. ¶ 6.) Bean’s Complaint states that McDougal infringed upon his copyrights in the

photograph in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Bean also claims that R.R.

Donnelley violated his copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) by making unauthorized

reproductions of the copyrighted photograph. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Defendants, however, contend

that the copyrights in the photograph were not properly registered and that, as a result, this

Court does not have jurisdiction over Bean’s copyright infringement claims. (Doc. # 14 at

1-2.) 

It is true that in order for the Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over these

claims, the photograph must have been properly registered with the Copyright Office. 17

U.S.C. §§ 411(a), 412. However, whether the photograph was properly registered in fact is

beyond the limited inquiry that a facial attack permits. Bean alleges that “[t]he copyrights

in [the photograph] were registered before McDougal’s improper and unauthorized use.”

(Compl. ¶ 9.) Accepting the allegations of the Complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff, this allegation sufficiently alleges the jurisdictional

prerequisite of registration. Thus, Bean’s Complaint is sufficient on its face to invoke subject

matter jurisdiction.1

B. Preemption of the Fraud Claim

A court may dismiss a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for “failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted” but may not do so “unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him

to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Buckley v. Los

Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1992)). “The federal rules require only a ‘short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Gilligan v. Jamco

Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). “All that is

required are sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against

them.” McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted).

The Court must accept all material allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1998). Further, the Complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See id. “‘The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’” Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249

(quoting Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

McDougal asserts that Bean’s fraud claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)

because it is preempted by the Federal Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301. The cases cited by

both parties agree that section 301 establishes a two-part test for preemption. Grosso v.

Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). “Claims under state law are

preempted where: (1) the work at issue comes within the subject matter of copyright, and (2)

the state law rights are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of

copyright. Id. (internal quotations omitted). In this case, it is not in dispute that the

photograph comes within the subject matter of copyright. (Doc. # 14 at 9.) In order for

Bean’s claim to survive preemption under the second element of the test, his stated cause of

action must “protect rights which are qualitatively different from copyright rights.” ValenteKritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1989). The claim must have an “extra

element” which changes the nature of his action from a copyright claim. Id. 

Under Arizona law, “a fraud cause of action requires proof of misrepresentation,” an

element absent from a copyright infringement claim. Giddings v. Vision House Prod., Inc.,

No. CV 05-2963-PHX-MHM, 2007 WL 2274800, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 2007); see also

Arnold & Assocs., Inc. v. Misys Healthcare Sys., 275 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1027 (D. Ariz. 2003)

(stating that nine elements must be sufficiently pleaded by the plaintiff in Arizona to

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maintain an action for fraud: “(1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the

speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, (5) the speaker’s intent that it be

acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably calculated, (6) the hearer’s ignorance

of its falsity, (7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth, (8) the right to rely on it, and (9) a

consequent and proximate injury”). McDougal, however, argues that, despite the extra

element of misrepresentation, there is no “per se rule that fraud is never preempted [by the

Copyright Act].” (Defs.’ Reply at 6-7.) McDougal cites Giddings, a case from this district,

for support. 2007 WL 2274800. There, the court held that an alleged misrepresentation did

not constitute an extra element that distinguished the plaintiff’s fraud claim from her

copyright infringement claim. Id. at *3. 

Although the Court agrees that the element of misrepresentation is not enough, by

itself, to prevent a fraud claim from being preempted by the Copyright Act, the Court finds

that, under the facts of this case, the fraud claim is not preempted. In Valente-Kritzer, the

Ninth Circuit held that intentionally misrepresenting one’s intent to perform a contract at the

time the contract is formed is “not substantially equivalent to [the] claim for copyright

infringement.” 881 F.2d at 776. The court stated that this particular misrepresentation is a

sufficient extra element to distinguish a fraud claim from a copyright action. Id. 

Here, Bean specifically alleges that at the time of licensing McDougal falsely

represented that it sought to print only 45,000 copies of the photograph because McDougal

knew that “its actual use would greatly exceed that number.” (Compl. ¶ 12.) Bean’s

Complaint also states that McDougal did this in order to “obtain access to the photograph at

a lower cost than it would have paid.” (Id. ¶ 13.) In assuming these facts to be true and

reading them in a light most favorable to Bean, the Court concludes that, as in the case of

Valente-Kritzer, McDougal’s alleged misrepresentation during the dealing for the licenses

provides an extra element which distinguishes the nature of Bean’s fraud action from a

copyright claim. Therefore, Bean’s fraud claim is not preempted by the Copyright Act.

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 14) is DENIED.

DATED this 6th day of March, 2008.

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