Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02194/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02194-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Willie Louis Watkins,

Petitioner,

v.

R.E. Binkele,

Respondent.

Case No.: 18-cv-2194-AJB-RBM

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, (Doc. No. 12);

(2) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS, (Doc. No. 9);

and 

(3) DISMISSING PETITIONER’S 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(Doc. No. 1)

Before the Court is Petitioner’s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In the Report 

and Recommendation (“R&R”) the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing

Petitioner’s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus finding it was time-barred and his 

claims were procedurally defaulted. Agreeing with the R&R, the Court ADOPTS the 

R&R, GRANTS Respondent’s dismissal motion, and DISMISSES Petitioner’s writ of 

habeas corpus. 

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Willie Louis Watkins filed his Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 challenging his underlying state court conviction on seven grounds. (Doc. No. 1 at 

1, 12–18.) Respondent moved to dismiss Petitioner’s petition, arguing it is barred by the 

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statutes of limitations and that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. No. 9.) 

The factual details of Petitioner’s case are detailed in the R&R, (Doc. No. 12 at 2–4), and 

will only be referenced as necessary herein. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate’s judge’s R&R are set 

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court 

must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–

18 (9th Cir. 1989). As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court 

may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion 

on the applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); 

Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such 

circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that failure to file objections only relieves the 

trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must 

still be reviewed de novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

III. DISCUSSION

The R&R found that “absent any applicable tolling, Petitioner had until October 

12, 2011, to file his federal habeas petition.” (Doc. No. 12 at 6.) Here, Petitioner did not 

file his Petition until September 16, 2018, nearly seven years after the statute of limitations 

had run. (Id.) The R&R then went on to discuss whether Petitioner was entitled to the 

tolling of the statute, such that his Petition could survive. (Id. at 6–9.) The R&R first found 

that Petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling. (Id. at 6–7.) A federal habeas petition 

may be statutorily tolled when “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending. . . .” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The R&R found that Petitioner could not avail himself of statutory 

tolling because he did not file his state court habeas petition until April 2, 2015—three and 

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a half years after the statute had run. (Doc. No. 12 at 6.) Petitioner filed a second state court 

habeas petition in 2017, but the R&R found it met the same fate as the first. (Id. at 7.) 

The Court next discussed whether Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling. (Id.) 

Equitable tolling is allowed when the Petitioner can establish: “(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 554 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The R&R found Petitioner “fail[ed] 

to carry his burden of showing diligence in pursuing his rights or extraordinary 

circumstances that prevented him from timely filing his petition.” (Doc. No. 12 at 8.) The 

Magistrate Judge also stated that “Petitioner also fail[ed] to demonstrate that extraordinary 

circumstances beyond his control prevented him from timely filing the instant petition.” 

(Id.) Accordingly, the R&R concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling 

of his claims and that “[h]is petition is untimely.” (Id. at 9.) 

Finally, the R&R discussed whether Petitioner’s claims were procedurally defaulted. 

(Id. at 9–13.) This doctrine bars federal habeas review “when a state court declines to 

address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner has failed to meet a state procedural 

requirement.” Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(internal quotations omitted). Ultimately, the R&R reasoned that because Petitioner was 

unable to show actual innocence or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred, his 

claims were procedurally defaulted. (Doc. No. 12 at 9–13.) The R&R concluded by 

recommending this Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss and dismissing 

Petitioner’s petition with prejudice as untimely. (Id. at 14.)

In Petitioner’s objection, he makes two brief arguments. (Doc. No. 13.) First, he 

argues that under new authority, People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157 (2019), 

“restitution is recognized and considered to be separate and additional punishment for a 

crime.” (Id. at 1.) Thus, he contends “Double Jeopardy applies when there is both 

restitution and prison term for the same offense. . . .” (Id.) Second, Petitioner asserts his 

prison term was “unauthorized due to failure to impose a term of parole, which is a lawful 

requirement of a prison sentence.” (Id. at 2.) 

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However, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to properly object to the R&R’s 

conclusions regarding the untimeliness of his claims or the fact the R&R found his claims 

were procedurally defaulted. Even if the Court wanted to get into the merits of his claims, 

the Court does not have jurisdiction over claims not properly before it. Thus, the Court has 

no choice but to OVERRULE Petitioner’s objections and agree with the R&R.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate 

of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 330 (2003) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that 

“reasonable jurists could debate whether [] the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could not debate the 

Court’s conclusion to dismiss with prejudice Petitioner’s claims and therefore DECLINES

to issue a certificate of appealability.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds the R&R was well-reasoned, thorough, 

and contains no clear error. Thus, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, (Doc. No. 

12), GRANTS Respondent’s dismissal motion, (Doc. No. 9), and DISMISSES

Petitioner’s federal petition for habeas corpus, (Doc. No. 1). The Court Clerk is 

DIRECTED to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2019

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