Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-04685/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-04685-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability as Unnecessary

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FIDEL MORALES MENDEZ

Petitioner, 

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 08-04685 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY AS

UNNECESSARY

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2007 decision of the California Board of

Parole Hearings (“Board”) finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. The Court ordered

respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an

answer, and petitioner filed a traverse.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May 1992, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder with the use of a

firearm and assault with a deadly weapon. Petitioner was sentenced to eighteen years-tolife. On August 29, 2007, petitioner was denied parole by the Board for a second time. 

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state superior court, which denied the petition in a

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reasoned opinion on January 15, 2008. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition in the

California Court of Appeal, which issued a summary denial on February 29, 2008. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which summarily

denied review on August 27, 2008. Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on October

9, 2008. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Commitment Offense

The following summary of facts is taken from the opinion of the California Court

of Appeal on direct appeal, filed on October 28, 1993, and read into the transcript of the

Board hearing:

 The evidence established that between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. on March 5, 1990,

Santa Maria police officers Larry Davis, common spelling, and Paul Flores,

F-L-O-R-E-S, arrived at the Santa Maria apartment of Salvador Garcia, GA-R-C-I-A, in response to a call regarding a disturbance. The officers found

Manuel Castro, C-A-S-T-R-O, who appeared ‘terrified.’ Castro had bruises

and welts and was bleeding from the head. In the apartment the officers

found Garcia lying on the floor, bleeding. Garcia subsequently died from

two gunshot wounds to the head. He had also suffered an injury to his arm

caused by ‘some very blunt object with a pretty rigid right angle to it.’ The

rifle used in the shooting was not found. 

 Based on statements Garcia made to a paramedic, Flores arrested Castro and

took him to a hospital for treatment of his wounds. Flores advised Castro of

his constitutional rights, which Castro waived. Castro told the officer that he

had been visiting Garcia when Jose Luis Mendez, Salvador Enriquez, E-NR-I-Q-U-E-Z, and [petitioner] entered. Enriquez attacked Castro while the

other two attacked Garcia. Castro stated that [petitioner] brought the rifle

and that Mendez picked it up when [petitioner] dropped it as he fought with

Garcia. Enriquez said they should shoot Castro also, but the other two

assailants had already left. Enriquez then struck Castro with a pipe. After

Enriquez left, Castro called for help and went out on the balcony, where the

officers found him. Flores, who spoke fluent Spanish, later assisted

Detective Craig Ross, common spelling, in obtaining a further statement

from Castro.

 Castro told Ross essentially the same facts he told Flores. He stated that

[petitioner] carried a .22 caliber rifle into the apartment and struck Garcia

with it. He did not state that [petitioner] was absent during the fight. On

March 6, 1990, Detective William Marquez, M-A-R-Q-U-E-Z, met with

Castro, who provided substantially the same facts. Castro told Marquez that

[petitioner] brought the rifle and struck Garcia with the butt of the gun.

[Petitioner] told Mendez to pick up the gun when it dropped, referring to

Jose Luis Mendez, and Jose Luis Mendez did so then shot Garcia. Castro

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testified at trial that he went to visit Garcia, who lived with Jose Mendez. 

Mendez, Enriquez, and [petitioner], who were related to each other, were at

the apartment. Castro claimed that after Enriquez began to fight with Castro,

[petitioner] began to fight with Garcia, [petitioner] left. Enriquez struck

Castro with a pipe and said they should kill Castro. Jose Mendez shot

Garcia. Castro claimed he did not recall seeing [petitioner] with a rifle or

seeing someone bring a rifle into the apartment. He assumed that the rifle

was already present.

 At an April 1990 preliminary hearing, he had testified that [petitioner] had

the gun when Castro first saw it, [petitioner] struck Garcia with the gun, then

dropped it, and Jose Mendez picked it up and shot Garcia. At trial Castro

acknowledged that his preliminary hearing testimony was true. Van Diaz,

D-I-A-Z, a district attorney’s investigator, spoke with Castro about his

preliminary hearing testimony, and Castro indicated that his testimony was

accurate. At trial Castro also claimed he could not remember if he told

Marquez that [petitioner] struck Garcia with the rifle and that Jose Mendez

and [petitioner] left the apartment quickly. He could also not remember if he

told Ross that [petitioner] struck Garcia with the rifle and that [petitioner]

dropped the gun. He also claimed not to remember telling Detective Mike

Miranda, M-I-R-A-N-D-A, after his preliminary hearing testimony in April

1990, that he was concerned about what Mendez family members might do

to him if he testified against [petitioner.] However, he testified that his

statements to Ross that Enriquez, Joe Mendez, and [petitioner] entered the

apartment without saying anything, with [petitioner] carrying a gun, and that

[petitioner] began to fight wit Garcia were true. His statements to Flores that

[petitioner] was carrying the rifle when he entered was also true. He further

testified that his statement to Marquez that [petitioner] dropped the rifle and

that Jose Mendez picked it up and shot Garcia was true, as well. He also

acknowledged he had told Marquez that he called the police and went

downstairs because he wanted to be sure the police and the ambulance could

find Garcia. 

 (Transcript at 13-18.)

 B. Parole Suitability Hearing

On August 29, 2007, petitioner appeared with counsel before the Board for his

second parole suitability hearing. The Board first reviewed petitioner’s pre-commitment

record and family life, noting that petitioner was born in Mexico, has seven siblings, and

came to the United States from Mexico in 1981. (Id. at 19.) While petitioner denied

having a drug or alcohol problem, he admitted that he began drinking alcohol when he

was around 20 years old and would sometimes have between 6 and 12 beers at once. 

(Id.) Petitioner has an INS hold to return to Mexico whenever he is released. (Id. at 20-

21.) Petitioner’s immediate family all reside in the United States. (Id.) While

incarcerated, petitioner had received no 115s and only one 128 in 1993 for destruction of

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state property. (Id. at 22.) Petitioner’s main activity while in prison has been to focus on

education and the documents showed that petitioner had progressed tremendously. (Id.

at 22-23.) Petitioner also had been attending Alcoholics Anonymous consistently since

2003. (Id. at 23.) Petitioner’s psychological evaluation concluded that he presented a

low risk of future violence. (Id. at 32.) Petitioner disagreed, however, with the

psychologist’s assessment of a previously recorded incident of mental instability. (Id. at

29-32.) The Board heard several letters of support on petitioner’s behalf, and petitioner

discussed his parole plans as well. (Id. at 35-38.) The Board heard closing statements

from counsel for petitioner in favor of parole. (Id. at 42-46.) The Board then took a

recess before rendering its decision finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. (Id. at 48-

53.)

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge to a state parole

eligibility decision, the applicable standard is contained in the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895,

901 (9th Cir. 2002). Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief unless

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court’s

factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the merits issued a summary

opinion which does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under

section 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v. Cambra,

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204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to

address the merits of petitioner’s claim is the opinion of the Santa Barbara Superior

Court.

B. Analysis of Legal Claims

Petitioner claims that (1) he was denied due process because the Board’s decision

finding him unsuitable for parole relied solely on the commitment offense and was not

supported by “some evidence” that he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society or a threat to public safety if released from prison and (2) the Board’s decision

violated his right to equal protection. Respondent argues that California inmates do not

have a federally protected liberty interest in parole release. 

1. Some Evidence

The Ninth Circuit has held that California prisoners have a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in release on parole, and therefore they cannot be denied a

parole date without adequate procedural protections necessary to satisfy due process. 

See Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has clearly

established that a parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the

board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the record,” or is “otherwise

arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006)

(adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). The “some evidence” standard identified in Hill is

clearly established federal law in the parole context for AEDPA purposes. Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128-29. Additionally, the evidence underlying the board’s decision must have

some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, if the Board’s determination

of parole suitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some

indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th

Cir. 2005); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904.

Recently, the Ninth Circuit reheard en banc the panel decision in Hayward v.

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Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir.

2008), which presented a state prisoner’s due process habeas challenge to the denial of

parole. The panel had concluded that the gravity of the commitment offense had no

predictive value regarding the petitioner’s suitability for parole and held that because the

Governor’s reversal of parole was not supported by some evidence, it resulted in a due

process violation. 512 F.3d at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an en banc

decision in Hayward. Unless or until the en banc court rules otherwise, the holdings in

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, and Irons are still the law in

this circuit.

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was

supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and

regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 505

F.3d at 850. Accordingly, in California, the court must look to California law to

determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and

then must review the record in order to determine whether the state court decision

constituted an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” principle. Id.

California law provides that a parole date is to be granted unless it is determined “that

the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public

safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

The California Code of Regulations sets out the factors showing suitability or

unsuitability for parole that the Board is required to consider. See 15 Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15 § 2402(b). These include “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available,” such as:

. . . the circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present mental

state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment

offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and

present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control,

including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

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results in finding of unsuitability.

Id.

Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include the nature of the

commitment offense and whether “[t]he prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Id. at § 2402(c). This includes consideration of

whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner,”

whether the victim was “abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense,”

whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrated an exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering,” and whether “[t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id. Other circumstances tending

to show unsuitability for parole are a previous record of violence, an unstable social

history, previous sadistic sexual offenses, a history of severe mental health problems

related to the offense, and serious misconduct in prison or jail. Id.

Conversely, circumstances tending to support a finding of suitability for parole

include: no juvenile record; a stable social history; signs of remorse; that the crime was

committed as a result of significant stress in the prisoner’s life; a lack of criminal history;

a reduced possibility of recidivism due to the prisoner’s present age; that the prisoner has

made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use

upon release; and that the prisoner’s institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability

to function within the law upon release. See id. at § 2402(d).

In making its determination in this case, the Board analyzed numerous factors

weighing for and against suitability for parole. The Board began by reviewing the

commitment offense and determined that the offense was against multiple victims and

was particularly cruel and callous with an inexplicable motive. (Tr. at 48-49.) The

Board reviewed the factual scenario, reiterating that petitioner and his co-defendants

entered into the victims’ residence and attacked them while the victims were unarmed. 

(Id.) Although petitioner denied having an alcohol problem, the Board was concerned

that he was in denial based upon his responses during the hearing as well as a previous

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record of two alcohol-related offenses. (Id. at 49-50.) The Board commended petitioner

on his remaining free of disciplinary reports and encouraged him to not only memorize

the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous but also to develop and understand the

steps. (Id. at 50.) The Board also recommended more self-help groups, as well as

therapy to address his anger and impulse control issues, although the Board questioned

petitioner’s motivation and receptiveness to therapy. (Id.) The Board concluded that the

factors tending to show suitability were outweighed by factors showing unsuitability and

denied parole. 

The superior court rejected petitioner’s habeas petition, finding that it failed to

state a claim. (Resp. Ex. 2.) The court nevertheless reviewed the Board’s decision and

found that there was some evidence supporting the decision to find petitioner unsuitable

for parole at this time. (Id. at 2.) Specifically, the court noted that the Board properly

determined that petitioner’s crime met the “some evidence” standard, and that

petitioner’s 2007 psychological report concluding that he was at a “low moderate” risk

of violence was conditioned on continued abstinence from alcohol. (Id.) The court

linked that report to the Board’s assessment that petitioner has not progressed

meaningfully as it relates to his rehabilitation. (Id.)

This court also concludes that the Board reasonably found that the circumstances

of the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and callous manner and against multiple

victims. The victims were unarmed and the motive for the attack was not readily

apparent. These facts alone amount to “some evidence” that petitioner would present an

unreasonable threat to the public if released, but there was additional evidence in the

record supporting the Board’s parole denial as well. The record of the 2007 parole

hearing demonstrates at least “some evidence” that petitioner would pose a risk of harm

to society if released and that parole should be denied. See Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232–33

(facts of the offense and psychiatric reports about the would-be parolee sufficient to

support denial). 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner’s due process claim was neither contrary

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to nor an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” requirement of due process. 

Moreover, this was only petitioner’s second parole hearing and at that time, petitioner

had only served approximately fifteen years of his eighteen years to life sentence. Based

on this record, petitioner cannot demonstrate a due process violation at this time. Cf.

Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Ninth Circuit has

upheld denial of parole based solely on commitment offense and/or pre-commitment

conduct where prisoners have not yet served minimum number of years required by their

sentence); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 912 (same). Therefore, the state court’s rejection of

petitioner’s due process claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the

“some evidence” standard. 

2. Equal Protection

Petitioner also claims that the Board violated his equal protection rights under a

“class of one” theory. He argues that he was treated differently from Mikael Schiold, a

foreign national, who was transferred to the custody of the government of Sweden to

serve a fixed term under a settlement agreement in a habeas action. Petitioner alleges

that Schiold received a specific release date when his term was set without him first

having been found suitable under § 3041(b). Petitioner also alleges that Schiold, the

foreign national, “is being treated distinctly different than ‘all’ U.S. Citizens, and,

foreign nationals that have not caused legal actions to enter into ‘settlement agreements’,

in California serving a sentence of life with the possibility of parole.” Petitioner further

alleges he is being treated differently than the foreign national who settled his habeas

action because he cannot be transferred to another country. 

These allegations do not state a claim for relief for an equal protection violation.

Petitioner has not alleged that all indeterminately sentenced foreign nationals are

receiving fixed terms, but only that one inmate with an indeterminate sentence who filed

a habeas action reached a settlement that allowed his transfer to his home country to

serve a fixed term. The petition and exhibits thereto plainly show that petitioner is not

similarly situated to the other inmate he claims has received more favorable treatment:

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the most obvious difference is that the other inmate had prevailed on his petition for writ

of habeas corpus in state superior court and the inmate was transferred to Sweden

pursuant to a settlement agreement as a compromise of that habeas action. Casting the

argument as a “class of one” equal protection claim does not help petitioner because the

case he cited adheres to the requirement that the plaintiff be “intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).

The equal protection claim is dismissed.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing §

2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). However, the Ninth

Circuit has made clear that a state prisoner challenging the Board of Prison Terms’

administrative decision to deny a request for parole need not obtain a certificate of

appealability. See Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232. Accordingly, any request for a COA is

DENIED as unnecessary. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED on the merits and a COA is DENIED as unnecessary. 

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

March 25, 2010 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FIDEL MENDEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. /

Case Number: CV08-04685 JW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Fidel Morales Mendez H-35192

CTF - Correctional Training Facility -Soledad

P. O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk

3/26/2010 3/26/2010 /s/

Case 5:08-cv-04685-JW Document 6 Filed 03/26/10 Page 11 of 12
Fidel Morales Mendez H-35192

CTF - Correctional Training Facility -Soledad

P. O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960

CV08-04685 JW 

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