Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02513/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02513-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332pi Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MACHELLE CARDENAS, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., a Texas 

corporation; AMERICAN AIRLINES 

GROUP, INC., a publicly traded 

Delaware corporation; Tony LNU, an

individual; and DOES 1 through 100, ,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv2513-GPC(JLB)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Dkt. No. 20.]

Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss the prayer for punitive damages

asserted in the first amended complaint (“FAC”). (Dkt. No. 20.) Plaintiff filed an 

opposition and Defendant filed a reply. (Dkt. Nos. 24, 26.) Based on the reasoning 

below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

/ / / / 

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/ / / /

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Background

Plaintiff Machelle Cardenas (“Plaintiff” or “Cardenas”), a resident of Arizona, 

filed a complaint against Defendants American Airlines, Inc., (“AA”), American Airlines 

Group, Inc. and Tony Lnu (“Tony”) alleging causes of action under the Federal Aviation 

Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a)(1) for wrongful refusal to transport, breach of contract, 

negligence, assault and battery, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional 

distress for excluding her from a flight at the Dallas/Fort Worth airport and then 

cancelling future flight reservations and temporarily barring her from buying any tickets 

without justification. (Dkt. No. 18, FAC) 

On August 27, 2017, at around 6:25 p.m., Plaintiff was in a long line at an AA 

customer service desk located across from Gate A20 where her originally scheduled 

flight was to depart from Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport. (Id. ¶ 21.) She was flying from San 

Diego to Washington D.C. with a stopover in Dallas/Ft. Worth with her son. (Id. ¶ 34.) 

She was told by the AA ticketing agent on the phone that her departing flight was 

changed to Gate C33 but was told she had to continue to wait in line to arrange the rerouting of her luggage. (Id. ¶ 21.) There were about 30 people waiting in two lines at the 

customer service desk. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff asked AA agents at the desk whether there 

would be additional agents to assist due to the long lines and lack of progress. (Id.) She 

was told that additional help was on the way. (Id.) Subsequently, one of the AA’s 

ticketing agents left so only one remaining AA ticket agent was handling the lines. (Id. ¶ 

23.) The remaining ticketing agent was clearly overwhelmed and unable to assist 

everyone in time for the departing flight. (Id.) 

Many customers in line then began to leave the line and walk across to Gate A20 

where they were immediately assisted by three customer service representatives, 

including Tony Lnu, a AA security officer or customer service representative with 

“significant authority and judgment in corporate decision making such that his decisions 

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determine corporate policy.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff and the other customers began to feel 

uncomfortable as those customers at Gate A20 received immediate attention so Plaintiff 

asked another customer to hold her spot in line while she went to request assistance at 

Gate A20. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 26.) Plaintiff approached Tony by gently tapping him on his 

shoulder to get his attention and said, “Excuse me . . . .” (Id. ¶ 27.) Tony immediately

became agitated and started physically and verbally assaulting Plaintiff without 

justification in a public display of power, control and authority. (Id. ¶ 28.) He yelled at 

her, made false accusations against her, falsely claimed she had assaulted him and stated 

he would press charges against her. (Id.) He held her against her will under color of 

authority by demanding that she wait in place and ordered another AA employee to watch 

over her while he retrieved security to arrest her. (Id. ¶ 28.) Two female airport security 

agents arrived at Tony’s request and eventually told her she would not be arrested and 

that she needed to get to Concourse C to confirm her ticket and boarding pass. (Id. ¶ 31.) 

Upon arrival at Gate C33, AA informed her that her ticket had been canceled and her 

account was locked. (Id. ¶ 32.) An AA agent on the phone advised her to get another 

ticket which she tried but was not able to. (Id.) She was informed that all her 

reservations had been cancelled and she was barred from buying any tickets based on her 

interaction with Tony. (Id.) Plaintiff had been flying with her son and was separated 

from him based on AA’s conduct. (Id. ¶ 34.) Neither knew whether the other was safe 

and she was disoriented, scared and shocked. (Id.) 

She was forced to stay overnight and purchased a ticket with United Airlines that 

left the next morning at 9 a.m. (Id. ¶ 35.) However, at around 3 a.m., AA unlocked her 

online account and she purchased an earlier non-stop flight to Washington D.C. that left 

at 6 a.m. in order to expeditiously reunite her with her son. (Id.) 

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Defendant American Airlines, Inc. moves to dismiss the punitive damages claim in 

the FAC for Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently allege that Tony was a managing agent of 

AA. Plaintiff opposes. 

Discussion

A. Legal Standard on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under 

Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or 

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep=t., 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required only to set 

forth a Ashort and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”

and “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded factual 

allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion 

to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, 

must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.@ Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion, the Court accepts as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draws all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The court evaluates lack of statutory standing under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Maya v. 

Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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B. Punitive Damages

The FAC seeks punitive damages on the fourth cause of action for assault and 

battery, fifth cause of action for false imprisonment and sixth cause of action for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. No. 1, FAC at 17.

1

) 

Defendant argues despite another opportunity to allege punitive damages against it 

as a corporate defendant, the FAC fails to assert that Tony is an officer, director or 

managing agent of Defendant. Plaintiff argues she has asserted sufficient facts to assert 

that Tony is a managing agent of AA.

A plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages where she can show by “clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294.2 When the defendant is a corporation, the evidence must 

demonstrate that an officer, director or managing agent of Defendant, with advance 

knowledge of the employee’s unfitness, committed, consciously disregarded, authorized or 

ratified an act of malice, oppression or fraud. Id.

 

1 Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination. 

2 Section 3294 provides, 

(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in 

addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing 

the defendant.

(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an 

employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee 

and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or 

ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, 

fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, 

authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, 

director, or managing agent of the corporation.

Cal. Civil Code § 3294.

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Here, the FAC alleges that AA is a corporate defendant. (Dkt. No. 18, FAC ¶ 2.) In

assessing whether an employee is an officer, director, or managing agent for purposes of 

section 3294, the California Supreme Court has taken a more narrow view of the term 

“managing agent” and held managing agents include “only those corporate employees who 

exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking 

so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.” White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 

Cal. 4th 563, 566-67 (1999). A “managing agent” is one with substantial authority over 

[corporate policy].” Cruz v. HomeBase, 83 Cal. App. 160, 167-68 (2000) (section 3294 

“avoids punishing the corporation for malice of low-level employees which does not reflect 

the corporate ‘state of mind’ or the intentions of corporate leaders.”). 

While section 3294 substantively applies California law and requires a narrow 

definition of managing agent, on a motion to dismiss, the Court must apply Rule 8’s liberal

federal pleading standard and Plaintiff need only assert a “short and plain statement” that 

Tony is a managing agent.3 See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 F.R.D. 405, 

406 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that “[w]hile California law governs Plaintiff's substantive 

claim for punitive damages under California Civil Code § 3294, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure govern the punitive damages claim procedurally with respect to the adequacy of 

pleadings.”); see also Taheny v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CIV. S–10–2123–LKK, 2011 

WL 1466944, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011) (“Although Section 3294 provides the 

governing substantive law for punitive damages, California's heightened pleading standard 

irreconcilably conflicts with Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—the 

provisions governing the adequacy of pleadings in federal court.”) (quoting Clark v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2000)). 

 

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In the Court’s prior order on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court noted that the only allegation 

concerning Tony’s role at AA was as a security officer or customer service representative and not a 

supervisory one. (Dkt. No. 16 at 8-9.) In contrast, the FAC alleges additional facts, if taken as true, 

raises a plausible claim that Tony is a managing agent of AA. 

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The FAC alleges that Tony is employed by AA in the capacity of a “corporate and 

managerial security officer authorized by AA with significant responsibility affecting AA’s 

policy toward security, customer interactions and internet accounts of customers.” (Dkt. 

No. 18, FAC ¶ 3.) It also claims Tony is a AA security officer or customer service 

representative with “significant authority and judgment in corporate decision making such 

that his decisions determine corporate policy.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Furthermore, the FAC claims 

that Tony is a supervisor and manager of AA at the Dallas/Ft. Worth national hub and has 

corporate authority over all or most other AA employees at Dallas/Ft. Worth. (Id. ¶ 30.) 

Specifically, he has corporate control over internet customer accounts, in the areas of

customer relations, security and ticketing. (Id.) These allegations satisfy the liberal 

pleading standard under Rule 8 and the Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated a claim for 

punitive damages against AA, a corporate defendant. 

Conclusion

Based on the reasoning above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

The hearing set for June 28, 2018 shall be vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 18, 2018

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