Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02191/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAHMOUD ABDEL KHALEK,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06CV2191 JM (BLM)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS

SAN DIEGO TROLLEY, INC. AND

SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN

TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT

BOARD’S MOTION TO DISMISS

[Docket No. 16]

vs.

SAN DIEGO TROLLEY, INC., SAN DIEGO

METROPOLITAN TRANSIT

DEVELOPMENT BOARD, HERITAGE

SECURITY dba TRANSIT SYSTEMS

SECURITY, OFFICER ANDRE WATSON,

OFFICER TYRONE COLMENERO, and

Does 1-18,

Defendants.

This is a § 1983 action arising out of an altercation occurring on the San Diego Trolley

between Plaintiff and municipal officers. Pending before the court is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss the first and second causes of action, brought by defendants San Diego Trolley, Inc., and San

Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board (collectively the “Defendants”). Plaintiff opposes

the motion. The court deemed the matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to

Local Civil Rule 7.1.d.1. After considering the parties’ papers and the authorities cited therein, the

motion is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART for the following reasons. 

I. BACKGROUND

In his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), filed February 1, 2007, Plaintiff makes the

following allegations of fact. On May 17, 2005, Plaintiff was riding the trolley in San Diego. When

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1 Plaintiff alleges a total of six claims. Only the two federal claims are at issue here. The other

supplemental state claims are for battery, negligence, negligent hiring, training and supervision, and violation

of California Civil Code § 52.1. 

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the trolley stopped in the city of Chula Vista, two officers, Officer Andre Watson and Officer Tyrone

Colmenero, both named defendants in this action, arrived on scene and announced to passengers that

the trolley was out of order. When some of the passengers stood and began to exit, the officers told

these passengers to stay inside the trolley because it was not out of order for them. The officers then

made their way to Plaintiff, who was calmly sitting and waiting, and informed Plaintiff that the trolley

was out of order for him and directed Plaintiff to exit. Plaintiff attempted to exit the trolley, and a

physical altercation between the officers and Plaintiff ensued. One of the officers sprayed Plaintiff

with pepper spray. Plaintiff was thereafter handcuffed and put into a transit patrol vehicle. When

Plaintiff complained that the handcuffs were causing him pain and requested that they be loosened,

the officers refused and one of them put his hand on Plaintiff’s throat, causing further pain to Plaintiff.

Eventually, Chula Vista police officers arrived and removed Plaintiff from the transit patrol car, took

off his handcuffs, and ordered Plaintiff to appear in court. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with

battery on a peace officer and resisting arrest. The charges were dismissed on January 17, 2006. 

This action followed. The present motion attacks the sufficiency of the allegations with

respect to the following two claims.1

 First, Plaintiff alleges an excessive force claim arising under §

1983 and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. For this

claim, Plaintiff requests exemplary and punitive damages. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

further violated his constitutional rights by having “unlawful policies, customs and habits of improper

and inadequate hiring, training, retention, discipline and supervision of its security officers, including

the individual Defendants named herein, legally causing the constitutional deprivations, injuries and

damages alleged in the [excessive force claim].” Comp. ¶ 20. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss, the court treats the well-pleaded allegations as true and construes them

in favor of the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422-22 (1969). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion

is properly granted when the complaint is not based on cognizable legal theory or when the complaint

fails to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

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F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s claims shall not be dismissed “for failure to state a claim

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force Claim

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory. Monell

v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Additionally, municipalities enjoy absolute

immunity from punitive damages in § 1983 actions. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

247, 271 (1981). Plaintiff concedes both of these points. Oppo. at 2. Therefore, the first claim is

dismissed with prejudice as against Defendants. 

B. Unlawful Policies and Customs Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a § 1983 claim on an unlawful

policy and custom theory because the SAC makes only conclusory allegations that fail to “show a

clear link between the constitutional violation in question and the custom, policy or practice that

purportedly resulted in the violation”. Mot. at 6. To the extent Defendants argue that § 1983 claims

against municipalities are subject to heightened pleading standards above Rule 8(a)’s requirement of

a short and plain statement, they are incorrect. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence

and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff is not required to

plead detailed facts forming the basis of his claim, but must only “give the defendant fair notice of

what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47;

Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (citing Conley). The court agrees with Plaintiff that the complaint

satisfies the Rule 8(a) and Leatherman standards because it is clear from the face of the complaint that

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable under § 1983 on an unlawful policy or custom theory for any

injuries arising out of the trolley incident. Comp. ¶¶ 3, 20.

Defendants argue that the allegations here are deficient under Ivey v. Board of Regents of

Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). In Ivey, the plaintiff was a teacher who sued his

former employer under § 1983, alleging that his employer, a municipality, had a policy and custom

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of racially segregating employment, attendance, and instruction within its school system. The Ninth

Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting defendant municipalities’ motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Noting the rule that “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss”, the Ninth

Circuit found that plaintiff had not alleged any connection between the alleged deprivation of his

constitutional rights and the municipality’s participation in the alleged discriminatory practice. Id.

at 268. The general allegation that defendants had provided financial support to the schools was

insufficient to state a claim; the complaint must allege defendants’ specific actions, practices, or

policies in order to survive dismissal. Id.

Putting aside whether the holding in Ivey, a case decided in 1982, survives the Supreme

Court’s 1993 decision in Leatherman, Ivey is distinguishable. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

actually developed and implemented unlawful policies and customs, policies and customs that

allegedly resulted in Plaintiff being deprived of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures. Comp. ¶ 20. By contrast, the allegations in Ivey merely showed

that defendants funded other entities which were the actual policymakers and practitioners of the

complained-of policy or custom. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Therefore, the link between Defendants’

conduct and the alleged injury is not attenuated here as it was in Ivey, and thus that decision does not

control.

Defendants next argue, under City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989), that failure

to train may be sufficient to be actionable under § 1983 actions, but that Plaintiff must also allege that

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ rights. Therefore, Defendants conclude, without

this allegation Plaintiff has failed to state a Monell claim. City of Canton, however, does not support

Defendants’ argument. In that case, the Supreme Court addressed the plaintiff’s burden of proof on

the merits when seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for failure to train. The Court held

that a municipality is not liable unless it deliberately or consciously chose not to train its employees.

 Id. at 389. Here, Defendants are only attacking the sufficiency of the pleadings. It would be a

wasteful formality, not supported by the Federal Rules’ notice pleading standards, to require Plaintiff

to further amend his complaint to allege that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Cf.

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Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988)(“[A] claim of municipal

liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based

on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official

policy, custom, or practice.”) (quoting Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir.

1986)) (internal quotations omitted). 

For these reasons, the motion is denied with respect to the second claim alleging municipal

liability on the basis of unlawful policies, practices, or customs.

IV. CONCLUSION

The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth above. The first

claim for relief, Comp. ¶¶ 15-18, is dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 7, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

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