Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06155/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06155-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

TRUDY L. WRIGHT PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-6155

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Trudy L. Wright, appealed to this Court from the denial of her application(s)

for disability benefits, by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (hereinafter

"Commissioner") (Doc. #1). On March 13, 2006, the undersigned remanded this matter to the

Commissioner for further consideration (Doc. # 12 & 13). 

Plaintiff's attorney, Shannon Muse Carroll, filed a Plaintiff’s Application and Affidavit

for Attorney's Fees under the EAJA (the Equal Access to Justice Act, hereinafter the "EAJA"),

on April 4, 2006 (Doc. #14 & 15). The Commissioner filed her response on April 7, 2006

(Doc. #16). The Court finds this matter is now ready for consideration. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that the Court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The Commissioner has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits

was substantially justified. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner fails to oppose the

award of a reasonable attorney's fee under the EAJA, the hourly rate for which compensation is

sought, or the number of hours for which compensation is sought. The Court construes the lack

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of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the government's decision to

deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing

Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the

benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the

contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and, the amount involved. Allen

v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

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487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe

firsthand counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v.

Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359,

361 (8th Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request,

even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d

456, 459 (8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties

requires an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award

accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are

reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under

the EAJA at $150.00 per hour, for the 19.00 hours of attorney time, which she asserts was

devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this Court (Doc. #14 & 15). Plaintiff’s counsel

submits that she is entitled to an EAJA fee rate of $150.00 per hour, which represents the

statutory fee of $125.00 and an additional $25.00 per hour based upon an increased cost of

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living. 

Plaintiff’s counsel attached a summary of the March 2006 Consumer Price Index as an

attachment to her Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. #14, Exhibit 2), and thus, has presented

sufficient evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, her argument for increased

attorney fees, based on a cost of living increase, has merit. 

We further conclude that awarding an enhanced fee in the amount of $148.00 per hour

would not only allow a cost of living increase, but would also promote consistency in the EAJA

awards in the judicial districts of Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th

Cir.1990). Thus, upon consideration of the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly

rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $148.00 per hour. 

Further, we note that the defendant has failed to object to the number of hours for which

counsel seeks a fee award. Nonetheless, as always, we have carefully reviewed the time records

submitted in plaintiff’s counsel’s Declaration (Doc. #14, attachment 2 pp. 1-3). 

Counsels seeks compensation for 0.75 hours on October 28, 2004 (review unfavorable

decision from Appeals Council, pull file and review, dictate letter to Plaintiff (Doc. #14,

attachment #2 p. 1). However, plaintiff’s district court case was not filed until December 27,

2004 (Doc. #1). Plaintiff’s counsel did not begin work on preparation of the complaint until

December 17, 2004 (Doc. #14, attachment #2 p.2). Thus, we find that counsel is not entitled to

compensation for this time, as it was not performed in representation of the plaintiff in the

district court. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir.1984); see also, Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993); Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989) (An attorney is entitled

to EAJA fees for services rendered at the district court level). Accordingly, the 0.75 hours,

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alleged for services not performed before the District Court, must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel. 

A thorough review of the declaration reveals that all other time sought by counsel is

both fair and reasonable. Therefore, total deductions from compensable time sought equal 0.75

hours. Thus, we find that plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to compensation for 18.25 hours spent in

the representation of this plaintiff before the district court at the rate of $148.00 per hour, for a

total attorney's fee award of $2,701.00 under the EAJA.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into

account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §406, in order to

prevent double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of May, 2006.

/s/Bobby E. Shepherd 

Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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