Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02507/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02507-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

HERIBERTO LANDEROS-LOPEZ

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-2507-PHX-MHM (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On October 20, 2006, Heriberto Landeros-Lopez, (“Petitioner”), an inmate

confined under Department of Corrections custody in the Diamondback Correctional

Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by

a Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (Doc. No.

1.) Named as Respondent in the Petition is Dora B. Schriro. The Attorney General of

the State of Arizona is named as an additional Respondent. Respondents filed an

Answer (“Answer”) to the Petition on March 19, 2007, with exhibits A through KK

attached. (Doc No. 10.) No reply was filed.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order dismissing the Petition. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Prior Convictions and Sentences: 

1. Case Number CR 2002-006659

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On April 26, 2002, the State of Arizona (“State”) charged Petitioner in CR 2002-

006659 with possession or use of narcotic drugs, a class 4 felony (Count 1), and

possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony (Count 2). (Answer, Ex. A.) The

State alleged one prior felony conviction. (Answer, Ex. B.) 

On June 3, 2002, Petitioner entered a plea agreement to plead guilty to

possession of narcotic drugs, a class 4 felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the

allegation of a prior felony conviction and any allegation of probation at the time of

sentencing. (Id., Ex. D.) The trial court accepted the Petitioner’s plea on that same

date. (Id., Ex. E.) 

On August 27, 2002, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed

Petitioner on probation for a term of 3 years. (Id., Ex. F.) As a condition of his

probation, Petitioner was ordered to serve thirty (30) days in the county jail. (Id., at 2)

On September 17, 2002, the trial court determined that Petitioner had violated

the terms of his probation, based on a conviction in Cause Number CR 2002-011180,

and set a disposition hearing. (Id., Ex. G.) 

At the disposition hearing, on November 15, 2002, the trial court reinstated

Petitioner on intensive probation for 2 years and 11 months to date from November 15,

2002, including, as a condition of probation, 12 months “flat time” in the county jail,

with “0 days” presentence incarceration credit. (Id., Ex. H, at 2) 

2. Case Number CR 2002-011180

On June 26, 2002, Petitioner was charged with one count of the sale or

transportation of narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony. (Id., Ex. V.) The State alleged two

prior felony convictions, but these allegations were struck after a hearing. (Id., Ex. W,

X.) 

On September 17, 2002, Petitioner entered a guilty plea, without benefit of a plea

agreement, to one count of sale or transportation of narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony.

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(Id., Ex. Z.) The trial court accepted the Petitioner’s plea on that same date. (Id., Ex.

Z.) 

On November 15, 2002, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and

placed Petitioner on intensive probation for a term of 7 years, beginning that same date.

(Id., Ex. AA, at 2.) The trial court did not order any jail time as a condition of

probation. (Id., Ex. AA.)

On April 22, 2004, the trial court determined that Petitioner had violated the

terms of his probation, based on a conviction in Cause Number CR 2003-027230, and

set a disposition hearing. (Id., Ex. BB.) 

At the disposition hearing, on May 25, 2004, the trial court revoked probation,

and sentenced Petitioner to an exceptionally mitigated, 3-year term of imprisonment

which was to run consecutively to the sentence imposed in CR 2003-027230. (Id., Ex.

CC, at 2) The trial court gave Petitioner credit for 337 days of presentence

incarceration. (Id., Ex. CC at 2) 

On January 12, 2005, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Correct Sentence to Reflect

Credit for Time Served” in CR 2002-01180, arguing that the “1 year jail time” he

served in conjunction with his probation in CR 2002-006659 should count as

presentence incarceration credit in CR 2002-01180. (Id., Ex. DD.) The trial court

denied the motion on March 22, 2005. (Id., Ex. EE.) The trial court denied a second

motion to correct sentence (not included in this habeas record) on April 18, 2005. (Id,

Ex. FF.) 

3. Case Number CR 2003-027230

Petitioner was indicted on December 31, 2003, with one count of promoting

prison contraband, a class 2 felony. (Id., Ex. K.) The State alleged three prior felony

convictions. (Id., Ex. L.) 

On April 22, 2004, Petitioner entered a plea agreement to plead guilty to

promoting prison contraband, a class 2 felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the

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allegation of a prior felony conviction and any allegation of probation at the time of

sentencing. (Id., Ex. M.) The trial court accepted the Petitioner’s plea on that same

date. (Id., Ex. N.) 

On May 25, 2004, the trial court sentenced Petitioner, in accordance with the

plea agreement, to a mitigated, 6-year term in CR 2003-027230, to be served

consecutive to CR 2002-011180. (Id., Ex. O, at 6.) The trial court recorded “0 days”

presentence incarceration credit. (Id.) 

B. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

1. Case Number CR 2002-006659

On September 2, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in CR

2002-006659, arguing a violation pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004). (Answer, Ex. I.) 

2. Case Number CR 2003-02730

On August 3, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in CR

2002-006659, arguing a violation pursuant to Blakely, 542 U.S. 296. (Answer, Ex. P.)

The trial court consolidated the Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings in CR

2002-006659 with his post-conviction proceedings in CR 2003-027230, and appointed

counsel to represent the Petitioner in his post-conviction proceedings. (Id., Ex. J.) 

On November 22, 2004, appointed counsel, having reviewed the files and

finding no colorable claim for relief, filed a “Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction

Review by Counsel; Request for 45-Day Extension of Time to Allow Defendant to File

Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Id., Ex. Q) 

On November 29, 2004, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request to permit the

filing of a pro per petition for post-conviction relief, and an extension of 45 days within

which to file. (Id., Ex. R.) 

On January 12, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in CR

2003-02730 only, arguing (1) the trial court erred by accepting the plea agreement even

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after the court considered that such plea agreement was unfair and harsh; (2) the trial

court erred by accepting a plea that was illegal since the defendant was ineffectively

represented and was forced to sign the plea under false pretenses; and, (3) the trial court

failed to proved the defendant at sentencing with a recommendation to the Board of

Clemency under A.R.S. § 13-603(L) after disclosing that the sentence was unfair and

harsh. (Answer, Ex. S, at 2-3.) The State filed a response on February 24, 2005. (Id.,

Ex. T.) On May 9, 2005, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition for postconviction relief, finding that Petitioner had failed to raise any colorable claims. (Id.,

Ex. U.) 

C. Appeal

On June 6, 2005, Petitioner sought review of the denial of his motion to correct

sentence, in CR 2002-011180, in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id., Ex. GG.) The

Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the matter as untimely filed, construing the

Petitioner’s request for sentence correction as a petition for post-conviction relief,

denied by the trial court on April 18, 2005. (Id., Ex. HH.) 

On July 20, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Id., Ex. II.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on

December 8, 2005. (Id., Ex. JJ.) 

D. Federal Habeas

Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the District Court on

October 20, 2006. (Doc. No. 1) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed

by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(“AEDPA”). 

B. Timeliness

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1 In the wake of Bowles v. Russell, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007), the

availability of equitable tolling is in question. This Court, however, need

not resolve the issue because even assuming equitable tolling remains

viable after Bowles, Petitioner does not satisfy the requirements for such

tolling.

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A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1).

The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state

convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, the statute of

limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA's limitations period may be

equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. 1

 Calderon

v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997), overruled, in

part, on other grounds by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.(Kelly) 163 F.3d 530, 540

(9th Cir.1998). Tolling is appropriate when "extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Id.; see also, Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.2002)(stating that "the threshold necessary to

trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.") (citations omitted); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.2003). "When

external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles

v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999). The extraordinary circumstances

requirement is a "high hurdle," see Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1289, and policy

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considerations counsel against equitable tolling. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807

(1980). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: "(1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161

L.Ed.2d 669 (2005). Petitioner must also establish a "causal connection" between the

extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. Bryant v. Arizona

Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.2007).

C. Analysis

The Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition filed in

this Court is untimely. Petitioner had until one year after his convictions and sentences

became final to file his federal petition. Petitioner asserts that he did not receive credit

for all the time he spent in jail before sentencing. See Petition at 6. Petitioner,

however, has previously asserted this argument only in regards to case number CR

2002-01180. See Petition and supporting documents (Doc. No. 1), see also Motion to

Correct Sentence to Reflect Credit for Time Served, (Doc. No. 10, Ex. DD.) Petitioner,

however, brings this Petition challenging both case numbers CR 2002-011180 and CR

2003-07230 (see Petition, at 1.) Petitioner’s arguments are factually and legally related

to both case numbers, however, and this Court will address the statute of limitations in

each case. 

1. Case Number CR 2003-07230

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in CR 2003-07230 were based upon a guilty

plea, and thus, under Arizona law, Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings were

“of-right.” See Rule 32.1, Az.R.Cr.P. Accordingly, AEDPA’s statute of limitations did

not begin to run until the conclusion of Petitioner’s Rule 32 “of-right” proceedings. See

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that “[b]ecause a

Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form of direct review, AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding

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and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for seeking such

proceeding or review.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(a)(A) (stating that a judgment

becomes final at the later of either the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review). Petitioner's conviction and sentence in CR 2003-

07230 became final on June 8, 2005, thirty (30) days after the trail court summarily

dismissed Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief, when Petitioner’s opportunity

to petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for review had expired. See Rule 32.9(c),

Ariz.R.Crim.P. (stating that defendant has 30 days after the filing of a decision to file

a petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals). Although direct review is not

normally complete until the time for filing a writ of certiorari to the United States

Supreme Court has expired, see Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999),

certiorari can only be sought following a decision or denial of discretionary review by

the state court of last resort, i.e. the Arizona Supreme Court. See SupCt.R.13.

Accordingly, Petitioner was required to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus within

1 year of the date his convictions became final, i.e., one year from June 8, 2005, absent

statutory tolling.

2. Case Number CR 2002-011180

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s conviction in CR 2002-01180 became final

on November 15, 2002, the date of the original conviction and sentence, and not the

date the trial court revoked probation and imposed sentence. This Court declines to

adopt this date, as it fails to take into consideration several factors. 

First, as Respondents concede, the Fifth Circuit in Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d

521 (5th Cir. 2005), which held that the one year statute of limitations began to run when

the original order imposing probation was issued, limited that holding to instances

where a petitioner challenges substantive issues relating to an original order of deferred

adjudication probation or straight probation. Petitioner, in this habeas, is not

challenging the original conviction and sentence of probation. Petitioner is challenging

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the sentence imposed at the time his probation was revoked. Petitioner would not, at

the time of his conviction, or even one year from that date, have been able to foresee

that the trial court might make a sentencing error at the time the court revoked his

probation and imposed a prison sentence on Petitioner. 

Second, under Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, any person

who admits a probation violation or whose probation was automatically violated based

upon a plea of guilty is also entitled to the right to file an “of-right” Rule 32 postconviction petition. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment in Petitioner’s probation revocation

proceedings became final when Petitioner’s time to seek review following the May 25,

2004 disposition hearing expired. Under Rule 32.4(a), Petitioner had ninety (90) days

to seek review of the trial court’s decision. Thus, the trial court’s decision in CR 2002-

011180 became final on August 23, 2004. Accordingly, Petitioner was required to file

his petition for writ of habeas corpus within 1 year of the date his sentence became

final, i.e., one year from August 23, 2004, absent statutory tolling.

 Even if the Court were to give Petitioner the benefit of every doubt and deem

that pursuant to section 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitations period did not commence until

after resolution of Petitioner’s motion to correct sentence, the instant Petition is still

untimely. 

In such a scenario, the statute of limitations would have begun running thirty

days after the trial court denied the motion a second time, on April 18, 2005, and

Petitioner failed to file a timely petition for review. In this case, Petitioner’s statute of

limitations under the AEDPA would have begun to run on May 18, 2005. 

D. Statutory Tolling

The only tolling events occurring after the limitations period started were the

filing of the petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals and the subsequent

petition for review and “especial action” to the Arizona Supreme Court. The AEDPA

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allows for tolling during the time "which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending...." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An application contemplated by section

2244(d)(2) is properly filed "when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with

the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example,

the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in

which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8

(2000) (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held that untimely

state post-conviction petitions are not “properly filed” under AEDPA, and do not toll

AEDPA's statute of limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

Thus, unless there is a basis for equitably tolling the limitations period,

Petitioner's habeas petition, filed on October 20, 2006, is untimely.

E. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner raises no grounds for equitable tolling in his petition, and did not file

a reply. Petitioner does not make a sufficient showing that these are “extraordinary

circumstances” that caused the untimely filing of his Petition. “A pro se petitioner’s

lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting

equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). The

Magistrate Judge does not reach the Petitioner's or Respondents’ alternate arguments

concerning procedural default or the merits of this case. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, dismiss this action in its entirety as untimely. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A

party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with

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a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the

following case number: CIV 06-2507-PHX-MHM.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 8th day of May, 2008.

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