Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00395/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00395-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stanley Wade Starr, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Antonio Baca, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 11-0395-TUC-JGZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Stanley Wade Starr’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of 

Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background of Starr’s 

and his co-defendant’s convictions as follows: 

 The charges against Starr and his codefendants arose from 

actions they took after K., an investor in real estate, purchased a house 

at a foreclosure sale through his limited liability company. Except for 

the value of the house, Starr does not challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the jury’s findings that he had conspired to steal the 

house from K. Indeed, Starr was convicted of knowingly recording in 

the Pima County recorder’s office three false documents pertaining to 

the property, one of which created a public appearance that a 

codefendant actually owned the house instead of K. 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to supporting the verdicts, 

see State v. George, 206 Ariz. 436, ¶ 3, 79 P.3d 1050, 1054 (App. 

2003), the evidence of the house’s value was as follows: K. purchased 

the house for $87500. He testified his goal as an investor was to buy 

the house “under market” value and resell it for a profit. He estimated 

at the time of purchase that, after making improvements, he would be 

able to resell it for $150,000 to $170,000. However, he did not make 

the anticipated improvements because a cloud on the title caused by 

Starr’s and his codefendants’ actions made him leery of investing any 

more funds in the house. Approximately two years later, he sold it for 

“around $115,000.” 

Ex. A, pp. 2-3. 1 A jury convicted Starr in absentia of three counts of filing false 

instruments, theft of more than $100,000.00 in real property, and conspiracy. Ex. A, 

pp. 1-2; Ex. N, p. 1. The trial court sentenced Starr to consecutive prison terms of 

four years on the conspiracy conviction and five years on the theft conviction, and to 

a concurrent term of one-year on the remaining counts. Ex. A, p. 2. 

 

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 9). 

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 Starr appealed his conviction, claiming that the prosecution did not prove the 

value of the property was over $100,000.00 and that the trial court’s jury instruction 

on value was insufficient. Ex. B, pp. 30-43. By Memorandum Opinion filed August 

21, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied Starr’s appeal on the merits. Ex. A. 

 On April 13, 2009, Starr filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme 

Court that included a request that the petition, despite Starr’s acknowledgment that it 

was untimely, be permitted by the court. Ex. D. By order dated April 20, 2009, the 

Court of Appeals granted Starr’s request and ordered that the Petition for Review be 

considered timely filed. Ex. C. In the Petition, Starr raised four claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct and alleged that his counsel was ineffective at trial and on 

appeal. Ex. D, pp. 6-12. He also claimed that he was subjected to double jeopardy, 

that his sentence was excessive and that the theft statute was improperly applied by 

the trial court. Id., pp. 12-14. On July 30, 2009, the Supreme Court denied review 

without comment. Ex. E. 

 On April 13, 2009, Starr initiated state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

proceedings by filing a notice and accompanying memorandum requesting he be 

permitted to file a “delayed” pleading, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel prevented him from filing a timely petition. Ex. F. In the PCR petition filed 

at the same time, Starr alleged he was entitled to relief due to ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the unconstitutional suppression of evidence by the State, violation of his 

double jeopardy rights, other unspecified constitutional violations, and due to the 

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existence of newly-discovered evidence. Ex. G. On April 29, 2009, the trial court 

summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. Ex. H. 

 Starr then petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals and challenged the trial 

court’s finding that the PCR petition was untimely. Ex. I, pp. 4-5. He also raised 

four claims of prosecutorial misconduct, two claims of misconduct by the trial judge, 

and alleged his counsel had provided ineffective assistance at both the trial and 

appellate levels. Id., pp. 6-7. The Court of Appeals found that Starr’s PCR petition 

was timely because it had vacated the mandate on his direct appeal. Ex. J. The Court 

of Appeals therefore remanded the petition to the trial court for further proceedings, 

but expressed no opinion on the merits of Starr’s claims. Id., p. 3. 

 On remand, Starr filed a new PCR petition asserting four claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct, three claims of misconduct by the trial judge, and again 

alleging his counsel had provided ineffective assistance at both the trial and appellate 

levels. Ex. K, pp. 5-6. Starr also asserted that he was subjected to selective 

prosecution, received an excessive sentence, was the victim of a misapplication of 

Arizona statutes, and was denied the right to trial by jury. Ex. K, pp. 19-22. The trial 

court found that Starr’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and for selective 

prosecution were precluded under Rule 32.2(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., because the claims 

were not raised on direct appeal. Ex. L, pp. 2-3. The court also found Starr’s claims 

of judicial misconduct precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(2), Ariz.R.Crim.P., because it 

had been raised in a previous collateral proceeding. Id., p. 3. Finally, the trial court 

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found that Starr had failed to present a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Id., pp. 3-4. 

 Starr filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals wherein he 

again alleged claims of prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct and ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Ex. M, p.2. He also offered a “list of additional issues” that 

included claims alleging a claim that “new evidence” would have changed the 

outcome of the trial, that he was indicted based on a “false instrument,” that his 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims at trial and on appeal, that he was 

improperly tried in absentia without notification, that the prosecutor relied on “nonexistent crimes” to support the conspiracy charge, that the trial court erred in 

imposing consecutive sentences, that the trial court abused its discretion when 

determining whether “theft applies to real estate,” and that the Arizona law allowing 

him to be tried in absentia violated the United States Constitution. Ex. M, pp 2-3. 

 The Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s order denying the petition and 

further reiterated that Starr’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial 

misconduct, and judicial misconduct were precluded under rule 32.2(A) because they 

should have been raised on direct appeal or in his first PCR petition. Ex. N, pp. 2-3. 

As for Starr’s list of “additional issues,” the appeals court declined to address them 

“either because they were raised and addressed in the court’s ruling below, which we 

have adopted in this decision, or because they do not appear to have been raised 

below at all.” Id., pp. 3-4 (citation omitted). 

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 In the petition now before the Court, Starr raises five claims. In Ground One, 

he alleges the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for judgment of 

acquittal based on insufficient evidence. In Ground Two, he alleges that his counsel 

was ineffective for failing to tell him that the state had offered Starr a plea agreement. 

Ground Three alleges that a then-recent state-court decision clarifying the application 

of accomplice liability under state law would have induced him to take the plea had 

he been aware of it and understood it. In Ground Four, he alleges that the trial court 

did not properly define the crime of felony murder in the instructions given to the 

jury. Ground Five alleges that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the 

victim’s statements that he had been “jumped” by three men and had his car stolen 

because that statement was inadmissible hearsay and violated the Sixth Amendment’s 

confrontation clause. Petition, pp. 3-10. 

II. TIMELINESS 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

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States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Here, the record shows that the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on 

direct appeal on July 30, 2009. Ex. E. Starr had 90 days to petition the United States 

Supreme Court for review. Sup.Ct.R. 13. He did not do so. Thus, his convictions 

became final on direct review 90-days later. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 

(9th Cir. 1999) (conclusion of direct review occurs when the 90-day time period 

during which a defendant may file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court expires, regardless of whether the petitioner files such a petition). 

 However, the one-year limitation period did not begin to run immediately 

because Starr’s PCR petition was still pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Starr’s 

PCR petition remained pending at least until October 26, 2010, when the Arizona 

Court of Appeals denied relief. Ex. N. Because Starr filed the instant petition on 

July 2, 2011, well within a year of that date, it is timely. 

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III. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 

 Respondents contend that all Starr’s claims were not properly exhausted and 

are procedurally barred from habeas review. A state prisoner must exhaust the 

available state remedies before a federal court may consider the merits of his habeas 

corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 

1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state 

court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the 

proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 

668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

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F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

state court review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Arizona courts have been consistent 

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in the application of the state’s procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent 

procedural bar). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on 

either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because any attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the 

claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 1. Analysis of Claims

 a. Claims 1, 2 and 3

 Claim 1 asserts that Starr’s rights to free speech, to peaceably assemble, and to 

petition the government for redress of his grievances were violated when he was 

selectively prosecuted. Petition, p. 3. In Claim 2, Starr contends that his Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures was violated 

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when he was indicted without probable cause. Id., p. 4. Claim 3 asserts that Starr 

was subjected to double jeopardy when he was prosecuted criminally after the 

conclusion of a quiet title action involving the same property. Id. On direct appeal, 

Starr raised these claims, under the heading “prosecutorial misconduct,” for the first 

time in his petition to the Arizona Supreme Court. Ex. D. In his first PCR petition, 

the claims were raised for the first time in his petition for review by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. Ex. I. He then raised the claims, again under the heading of 

“prosecutorial misconduct,” in his second PCR petition. The trial court, in a decision 

adopted by the Court of Appeals, found the claims precluded under Rule 32.2(a), 

Ariz.R.Crim.P., because they were not raised properly on direct appeal. Exs. L, N. 

 Because the state courts expressly applied Rule 32.2(a) to these claims, and 

because the rule is consistently applied, these claims are not subject to review by the 

federal court in a habeas proceeding. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801; Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860 (holding that Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural 

bar). Additionally, the rules in Arizona prevent a petitioner from returning to state 

court to exhaust his claims except in a narrow range of circumstances. See 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or 

in prior post-conviction relief petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for 

review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). None of those 

circumstances are present in this case and, as such, unless Starr can establish cause 

and prejudice, the claims are procedurally barred from review by this Court. Stewart, 

536 U.S. at 860; Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931-32; Mata, 916 P.2d at 1050-52. 

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 b. Claim 4

 In Claim 4, Starr asserts that the prosecutor violated his Sixth Amendment 

rights to “a speedy public trial for criminal offenses, a fair trial, fair legal counsel, 

witnesses on his behalf, and constitutionally, judicially, and legally correct 

indictment.” Petition, p. 4. Although there is some overlap between this claim and 

others, no Sixth Amendment claim containing these allegations appears in any of 

Starr’s state court pleadings. As such, this claim has not been “fairly presented” in 

the state courts and is barred from federal habeas review. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78; 

Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. Additionally, as Respondents note, to the extent this claim can 

be construed as being based on prosecutorial misconduct, it is barred for the same 

reasons that apply to Claims 1, 2 and 3. 

 c. Claim 5 

Claim 5 alleges that Starr, by being sentenced to consecutive terms of 

imprisonment, was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. Petition, p. 5. Although he did contend in the state courts that it 

was error for the trial court to impose consecutive sentences, Exs. I, p. 14; M, p. 13, 

no mention was made of either the Eighth Amendment or its prohibition against cruel 

and unusual punishment. As such, this claim was not “fairly presented” to the state 

courts. 

 d. Claim 6 

Here, Starr reasserts his claims of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct as a 

violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. 

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Petition, p. 5. Although he did contend in some of his state court pleadings that he 

was subjected to prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, Exs. D, p. 6, 9; I, pp. 6; Ex. I, 

pp. 7-14; Ex. K, pp. 7-14, no mention was made in any of these arguments of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, due process or equal protection. As such, this claim was not 

“fairly presented” to the state courts. Additionally, because this claim is based on 

judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, it is barred for the same reasons that apply to 

Claims 1, 2 and 3. 

 e. Claim 7 

This claim, which Starr has enumerated as “5.2” in the petition, alleges six 

instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and one instance of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel. Specifically, he alleges that his trial counsel (1) did 

not object to the consecutive sentence imposed by the trial court; (2) did not question 

the indictment of “false instruments” even though the prosecutor repeatedly called 

them “false documents,” (3) never objected to the admission of misleading evidence; 

(4) never questioned the conspiracy and criminal syndicate charges based on a single 

act; (5) never objected to the trial court’s refusal to give a specific intent instruction 

in relation to the conspiracy charge; and (6) never called any witnesses on Starr’s 

behalf. Petition, p. 6. Starr also alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on appeal. Id. 

 Although his PCR petition can be read as including his other claims of 

ineffective assistance, Starr did not raise the claim that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call witnesses. Ex. K. Additionally, the ineffective assistance claims he 

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did allege in his trial court petition were not included in his petition for review of his 

PCR petition filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Ex. M. In fact, the only 

reference to ineffective assistance of counsel in his Court of Appeal brief is offered in 

support of Starr’s claim that he could show “cause and prejudice” in relation to his 

ineffective assistance claims. Significantly, however, he does not identify any 

specific claim of ineffective assistance in the appellate brief. See Ex. M, pp. 7-8. As 

such, the state appellate court did not have an opportunity to address the merits of 

any of the ineffective assistance claims he has raised in the instant petition. Thus, 

none of the claims are exhausted. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (“[E]xcept in habeas 

petitions in life-sentence or capital cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are 

exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has 

ruled on them.”) 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 Because each of Starr’s claims was either barred from review under Rule 32 

or would be precluded by that rule if he attempted to return to the state court, see 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or 

in prior post-conviction relief petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for 

review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision), they are 

procedurally defaulted and not subject to review unless Starr can demonstrate cause 

for his noncompliance with the state’s procedural rules and resulting prejudice, or 

establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of review. See 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a petitioner must point 

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to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with 

the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004). “[C]ause 

is an external impediment such as government interference or reasonable 

unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 

(9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 In his Reply, Starr argues that he had no money to hire competent counsel, no 

law books to research his case, and did not “know what the lawyers should have 

known.” Reply, p. 2. It is settled that ignorance of the state’s procedural rules or 

lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a petitioner’s 

failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 

F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2012). Additionally, Starr has not explained how the lack of library access 

impacted his case. His pro se pleadings are replete with legal citation to statutory 

and case law, both state and federal. Prisoners do not have an abstract “freestanding 

right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). 

Rather, they are obligated to show that they suffered actual injury as a result of 

alleged prison library shortcomings. Id. Based on Starr’s submissions to this Court 

and the state courts, he has not shown that he lacked the necessary tools to present his 

claims. 

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 Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id. Starr has not argued or established that his 

conviction constituted a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Starr’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without 

first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 11-0395-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 23rd day of August, 2013. 

Case 4:11-cv-00395-JGZ Document 13 Filed 08/23/13 Page 17 of 17