Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01088/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01088-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRED KENNETH MACDONALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 11CV1088 BEN (KSC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO REOPEN CASE, 

VACATE DISMISSAL WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE, AND ENTER 

DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Following the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of his appeal, Plaintiff Fred Kenneth 

MacDonald moves this Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to reopen 

his case, vacate the dismissal without prejudice, and enter dismissal with prejudice. 

(Docket No. 100.) The Government has filed an Opposition and Plaintiff a Reply. 

(Docket Nos. 101, 102.)

Plaintiff requested voluntary dismissal of this case without prejudice in 2012. 

(Docket No. 83.) The Court granted the request.1 (Docket No. 86.) Plaintiff then filed 

an appeal. (Docket No. 88.) After briefing and oral argument, the Ninth Circuit dismissed 

 

1 This case was previously before the Hon. Irma E. Gonzalez. The case was assigned to the 

undersigned following the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s appeal. References to this Court’s 

decisions include Judge Gonzalez’s decisions in this case.

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the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. MacDonald v. United States, 578 Fed. Appx. 641 (9th 

Cir. 2014) [Docket No. 98].) A review of the history of this case and Plaintiff’s 

arguments, almost all of which directly conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s findings in 

dismissing his appeal, require denial of his motion. 

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

This action was filed on May 16, 2011 in state court. (Notice of Removal (Docket 

No. 1).) On May 18, 2011, the Government removed the case to this Court. (Id.) Plaintiff 

filed a First Amended Complaint on June 8, 2011 asserting claims for violations of the 

Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Non-Detention Act, and Federal Tort Claims Act. 

(Docket No. 4.) Plaintiff’s claims were based on his removal to Canada by the United

States and its employees and the year he remained there awaiting the ultimate decision 

that, as a Canadian-born Indian, he was not removable. (Id.)

The Court will not recite the entire procedural history of this case, but notes that

the Government and the Individual Defendants filed motions to dismiss challenging 

Plaintiff’s claims. As a result of those motions to dismiss, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 

Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). His NonDetention Act claim was dismissed with prejudice. His Federal Tort Claims Act claim 

was dismissed with prejudice as to the Individual Defendants and dismissed with leave to 

amend as to the Government. His Fifth Amendment claim was allowed to proceed. 

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of his Fourth 

Amendment claim under § 1252(g) while subsequent motions to dismiss the Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) were pending. (Docket No. 55.) He also filed a motion 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify the same issue for interlocutory appeal. (Docket No. 

64.) The Court denied both motions. (Docket No. 74.) 

After the Court ruled on the motions to dismiss, Plaintiff did not file a Third 

Amended Complaint or otherwise proceed with the case. He filed a “Request for 

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Voluntary Dismissal” in which he “request[ed] the Court dismiss this case without 

prejudice” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). (Docket No. 83) The Court 

ordered the Government to show cause in writing why the Court should not dismiss the 

case without prejudice pursuant to Plaintiff’s request. (Docket No. 84.) The 

Government’s response sought costs and fees as a condition of dismissal without 

prejudice, but offered to withdraw the request if Plaintiff sought dismissal with prejudice. 

(Docket No. 85.) The Court then granted Plaintiff’s motion and did not require Plaintiff 

to pay the Government’s costs and fees as a condition of dismissal. (Docket No. 86.) 

“Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal [was] GRANTED.” (Id.) “Plaintiff’s 

complaint [was] DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJDUICE, with each party to bear its own 

costs.” (Id.) 

After the case was dismissed without prejudice at Plaintiff’s request, he filed an ex 

parte motion seeking a final entry of judgment. (Docket No. 87.) This was the first time 

Plaintiff indicated any intention to seek appellate review other than his unsuccessful

motion for §1292(b) certification. However, in seeking a final entry of judgment, Plaintiff

refers to the Court’s order granting dismissal of the action without prejudice as 

“memorialize[ing] his decision to stand on the Second Amended Complaint rather than 

file a Third Amended Complaint.” (Id.) The next day, while that request was pending, 

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit. (Docket No. 89.) The Court 

denied the motion for entry of judgment and noted that “Plaintiff’s request for voluntary 

dismissal, filed on May 7, 2012, did not in any way indicate he intended to stand on the 

Second Amended Complaint, and seek entry of judgment based upon the Court’s orders 

dismissing certain claims with prejudice and other claims without prejudice.” (Docket 

No. 92.) The Court also noted that Plaintiff failed to cite any authority giving the Court 

jurisdiction to enter judgment after having dismissed the case under Rule 41(a)(2) at 

Plaintiff’s request. (Id.) The Ninth Circuit confirmed this in its order. MacDonald, 578 

Fed. Appx. at 643 (“At that point, having already dismissed the case without prejudice, 

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the district court could no longer consider whether to issue a final appealable judgment, 

and did not.”). 

Following briefing and oral argument, the Ninth Circuit found it lacked appellate 

jurisdiction. Id. at 644. Plaintiff sought and was denied panel rehearing and the mandate 

issued. (Docket No. 97-98.)

II. Ninth Circuit Decision

The Ninth Circuit reached a number of important conclusions in dismissing 

Plaintiff’s appeal. The court found Plaintiff sought voluntary dismissal of his entire case, 

not just his remaining claims. MacDonald, 578 Fed. Appx. at 642. And, in seeking 

dismissal of the entire case, “he did not make clear to the district court that he planned to 

appeal any portion of the case.” Id. at 643. On the contrary, “his request to dismiss the 

entire case communicated that he did not intend to proceed with any of his claims.” Id. 

The court specifically found that “the district court’s decision to allow the voluntary 

dismissal ‘did not imply its intent to grant . . . a final appealable judgment,’ similar to the 

grant of a Rule 54(b) motion.” Id. (quoting Am. States Ins. Co., Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 

881, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2003) and distinguishing James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 

1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002)). The first time Plaintiff expressed any intention to stand on 

the SAC for purposes of an appeal was after the case was voluntarily dismissed without 

prejudice. Id. And significantly, the Ninth Circuit specifically found that Plaintiff’s 

“actions provide evidence that he sought to circumvent the district court’s gatekeeping 

roles under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and § 1292(b) and thereby to 

manufacture appellate jurisdiction improperly.” Id. at 642-43. The court also found there 

was “no clear, consistent intent that the voluntary dismissal be with prejudice.” Id. at 

643. On the contrary, the court found Plaintiff’s conduct “after the dismissal confirms 

that he had not at the time of its entry intended the dismissal to be with prejudice.” Id. at 

643. 

///

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves to reopen this case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).

2

 

Rule 60(b)(6) provides that “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or 

its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 

reasons: . . . (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” The Court finds that Plaintiff is not 

entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for a number of reasons. 

“Judgments are not often set aside under Rule 60(b)(6).” Latshaw v. Trainer 

Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he Rule ‘is used sparingly as 

an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Rule “applies only in 

extraordinary circumstances where petitioner’s allegations set up an extraordinary 

situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as mere neglect on his part.” United 

States ex rel. Familian Nw., Inc. v. RG&B Contractors, Inc., 21 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 

1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s motion must be denied for at least there reasons. First, he is not entitled 

to an equitable remedy given his attempt to circumvent this Court’s authority. Second, 

he has not identified any extraordinary circumstances that justify relief. Third, the relief 

he seeks is unavailable under Rule 60(b)(6).

 

2 Plaintiff specifically concedes that “relief under Rule 60(b)(1) is foreclosed pursuant to the one-year 

time limit stated in Rule 60(c)(1) . . . ” in seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6). (Motion 16.) Plaintiff 

seems to hedge on this point in Reply, an untenable approach given the prior concession in the Motion. 

(Reply 5-6.) He argues the Court could find his mistake did not actually occur until the Ninth Circuit 

found it was a mistake in its decision because he thought the law the Ninth Circuit distinguished 

allowed him to appeal. In essence, it was not a mistake until the Ninth Circuit told him he was wrong 

even though the court applied existing law. To accept this proposition, the Court would have to 

conclude that a party is not subject to existing case law until the Ninth Circuit applies it to that party’s 

particular case. This makes no sense. Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff would not be entitled 

to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. & Annuity Co. v. Llewellyn, 139 F.3d 664, 666 

(9th Cir. 1997) (finding “neither ignorance nor carelessness on the part of the litigant or his attorney 

provide grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)” and “attorney error is insufficient grounds for relief 

under both Rule 60(b)(1) and (6).”).

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The Ninth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff “sought to circumvent the district court’s 

gatekeeping roles under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and §1292(b) and thereby 

to manufacture appellate jurisdiction improperly.”3 There is ample support for this 

conclusion in the record and this Court agrees with the conclusion. Having failed in his

endeavor to circumvent the Court’s authority, Plaintiff wants to try again through Rule 

60(b)(6). Relief under Rule 60(b) is equitable. Latshaw, 452 F.3d at 1103. The Court 

will not reward a party with equitable relief for attempting to, however unsuccessfully,

circumvent the Court’s authority. 

Even if the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion and accepted Plaintiff’s 

characterization of the proceedings — that he simply did not know how to obtain an 

appealable final judgment — Plaintiff has not identified any extraordinary circumstances 

that justify relief. Rather, at best, he was careless and acted without diligence. His 

conduct before this Court “communicated that he did not intend to proceed with any of 

his claims,” MacDonald, 578 Fed. Appx. at 643, when he claims his true intention was to

only dismiss his remaining claims and stand on his SAC for purposes of appeal.

4

 At a 

bare minimum, Plaintiff had an obligation to tell the Court what he was trying to do and 

allow the Court “to exercise its discretion as to whether to grant the functional equivalent 

of a partial judgment under Rule 54(b).” Id. at 643. Instead, he filed a motion lacking 

 

3 Plaintiff characterizes this conclusion by the Ninth Circuit as “not tenable.” (Motion 10 n.9.) 

Assuming this Court could disregard the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, Plaintiff fails to provide a basis to 

do so. Plaintiff quotes this Court’s finding that “[t]he Court never found Plaintiff’s claims to be 

frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith.” But the Court made that finding as a basis for denying the 

Government’s request for fees and costs in granting Plaintiff’s request for voluntary dismissal. This 

decision was issued before Plaintiff surprised the Court with a request for a final entry of judgment. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on this language, preceding the conduct the Ninth Circuit was addressing, is at best 

misplaced and at worst an attempt to mislead the Court. 

4 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion in his Motion, he did not “file[] a motion for voluntary dismissal of 

the remaining claims on May 7, 2012.” (Motion 8.) As the Ninth Circuit found, “he did not dismiss 

only the ‘remaining claim’ that survived the district court’s orders; instead he explicitly sought 

dismissal of his entire case.” MacDonald, 578 Fed. Appx. at 642.

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any indication he was attempting to obtain a final judgment for appeal, sought dismissal 

without prejudice, and unsuccessfully tried to appeal. These are not extraordinary 

circumstances. Giving Plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, this can “fairly or logically be 

classified as mere neglect on his part,” rather than extraordinary circumstances. RG&B 

Contractors, Inc., 21 F.3d 956 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also 

Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Neglect or lack of 

diligence is not to be remedied through Rule 60(b)(6).”). 

This is sufficient to deny Rule 60(b)(6) relief, however, Plaintiff is also not entitled

to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for another reason. Plaintiff cannot obtain relief through 

Rule 60(b)(6) on a basis covered by Rule 60(b)(1). “These provisions are mutually 

exclusive, and thus a party who failed to take timely action due to excusable neglect [, 

under Rule 60(b)(1),] may not seek relief more than a year after the judgment by resorting 

to subsection (6).” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Bruswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 

393 (1993). If the Court accepts Plaintiff’s claim that this was just “an issue of 

vocabulary,” that he just failed to procedurally obtain a final appealable judgment, then 

he is claiming a mistake — a basis for seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1).5 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. The case remains closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2015

 

5

If the distinctions between dismissal without prejudice and with prejudice eluded Plaintiff when he 

filed his request for voluntary dismissal, the Government’s request for dismissal with prejudice as 

opposed to without prejudice, albeit for a different reason, should have prompted Plaintiff to consider 

that these words might have some significance. 

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