Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00393/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00393-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO WOOTEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

GRIPP, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-0393-LJO-DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed on March 12, 2007. 

B. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

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short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may

dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff

will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . .

.’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin.,

122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982)).

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at High Desert State Prison, where

plaintiff was housed at the time. Plaintiff names Officers Gripp, Wheeler and Williams and

Warden Wright as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants excluded him from participating in a vocational assignment due to a mental disability

and depression in violation of his constitutional rights. 

1. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges defendants violated his right to due process. The Civil Rights Act under

which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal

Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the

Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” 

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law,

the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the

nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests

created by state law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716,

718 (9th Cir. 2007). Although plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his due process rights

by interfering with his access to his vocational assignment, plaintiff does not have a protected

liberty interest in his vocational assignment. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Moody v. Daggett, 429

U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1985). Because

plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in his vocational assignment, plaintiff may not

pursue a claim for relief based on denial of due process arising from defendants’ interference

with his access to his assignment. 

2. American with Disabilities Act

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants’ actions in excluding him from a work assignment

violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Title II of the ADA “prohibit[s]

discrimination on the basis of disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.

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2002). Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,

or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §

12132. Title II of the ADA applies to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of

Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d

1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996). “To

establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a qualified

individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3)

such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 

“To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA . . . , a plaintiff must prove intentional

discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard for intentional discrimination is

deliberate indifference. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).

“‘Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in programs of a public entity or

discrimination by any such entity.’” Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005

WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684,

691 (D. Haw. 2000)). “The ADA defines ‘public entity’ in relevant part as ‘any State or local

government’ or ‘any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a

State or States or local government.’” Roundtree, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (citing 42 U.S.C. §

12131(1)(A)-(B)). Public entity, “‘as it is defined within the statute, does not include

individuals.’” Id. (quoting Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8thCir.

1999)). 

Based on the above, individual liability is precluded under Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, and plaintiff may not pursue his ADA claim against the individual defendants

named in the complaint. 

 C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cognizable due process ADA claim. The court will

provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

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In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local

Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any

prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the

original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint,

as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there

is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Further, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel such as the warden for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must

allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black,

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

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2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must file

an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order;

and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 22, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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