Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00586/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00586-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CANDACE SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

WEST COAST HOTEL 

MANAGEMENT, LLC, MESA 

UNDERWRITERS, SPECIALITY 

INSURANCE, SELECTIVE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, SULEYKA 

HASSAN, BRADY WOLFOLK and 

MINH TRAN,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00586-JLT-HBK

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DISMISS ACTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE, FAILURE 

TO OBEY COURT ORDER AND 

PROSECUTE

1

(Doc. No. 3)

14-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Candace Smith is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action. For the reasons set 

forth below, the undersigned recommends the District Court dismiss this action for Plaintiff’s 

failure to pay the filing fee, comply with a court order, and prosecute this case.

BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for A Civil Case accompanied by a motion 

to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 1, 2). On May 17, 2024, the Court denied 

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP without prejudice because it lacked sufficient information to 

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2022).

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determine whether she was indigent. (Doc. No. 3 at 1-2). The Court ordered Smith to complete 

the long form IFP application or pay the $405.00 filing fee for this action within twenty-one (21) 

days. (Id.). The Court advised Plaintiff that if she “fails to comply with this order, this action

shall be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee and failure to comply with a court order as a 

sanction under Local Rule 110.” (Id. at 3 ¶ 4). 

As of the date of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff has neither filed a long 

form IFP application nor paid the required $405.00 filing fee and the time to do so has expired. 

(See docket). 

APPLICABLE LAW 

A. Plaintiff is Required to Pay the Filing Fee

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a $405 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a).2 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if she 

is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 

F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The Court previously advised Plaintiff that for this case to proceed further, she must either 

file a long form IFP application permitting the Court to assess whether she is indigent or pay the 

$405 filing fee. (See Doc. Nos. 3). Plaintiff’s long form IFP or the $405 filing fee was due no 

later than June 10, 2024. Because Plaintiff has failed to do either by the deadline, the 

undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s case be dismissed without prejudice. See Escobedo v. 

Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1228 (finding that a district court “will be free to dismiss the 

complaint” if the filing fee is not paid or application to proceed in forma pauperis is not granted); 

see also In re Perroton, 958 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of pro se litigant’s

claim for failure to pay required filing fees). 

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, ¶ 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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B. Failure to Prosecute

In the alternative, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily 

dismiss an action when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules 

or with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 

F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Local Rules, corresponding with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with . . .

any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions 

. . . within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent 

power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including 

dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th 

Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey 

a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 

(9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone 

v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with 

a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure 

to prosecute and to comply with local rules).

In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 

1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).

The undersigned considers each of the above-stated factors and concludes dismissal is 

warranted in this case. The Court’s May 17, 2024 directed Plaintiff to either pay the $405.00 

filing fee or file a long form IFP application. Plaintiff long form IFP or $405.00 filing fee was 

due no later than June 10, 2024. Ten days have elapsed since the Court’s deadline and Plaintiff 

has failed to comply. (See docket).

As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of litigation is deemed to be in the public 

interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 

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1999). Turning to the second factor, the Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 

overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and due to the delay in 

filling judicial vacancies, which was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operates under a 

declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing Judicial 

Emergency in the Eastern District of California. The Court’s time is better spent on its other 

matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. Because the Court 

cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating her case. Thus, the Court finds 

that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 

Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’

memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 

factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor, risk of prejudice 

to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 

occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 

524 (9th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this 

action, weighing in favor of dismissal for a risk of prejudice to defendants. 

Finally, the fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors 

disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, 

“this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward 

disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is the case 

here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on multiple failures 

by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at

644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary dismissal with prejudice of 

habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court order and noting “the weight of 

the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the docket, and those in the best 

position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”). 

Moreover, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result 

in dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

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1262; Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s May 17, 2024 

Order directing Plaintiff to file a long form IFP application or pay the filing fee expressly warned 

Plaintiff that her failure to timely comply with the Court’s respective orders would result in 

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. (See Doc. No. 3 at 3 ¶ 4). Thus, Plaintiff had 

adequate warning that dismissal could result from her noncompliance. And the instant dismissal 

is a dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, 

thereby addressing the fifth factor. 

After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, in the alternative, the 

undersigned recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and Local Rule 

110.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

This action be DISMISSED, all motions be terminated as MOOT, and this case be 

CLOSED.

NOTICE

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

of the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff’s failure to file objections within the specified time 

may result in waiver of her rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: June 21, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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