Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00723/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00723-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY DIBBERN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-00723-CDB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY 

AND DAMAGES PORTIONS OF TRIAL

(Doc. 71)

Introduction

Plaintiff Jeffrey Dibbern asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against 

Defendants City of Bakersfield, Anthony Kidwell, Nghia Duong, and Fabian Salazar, based on 

Defendants’ alleged actions in connection with a law enforcement encounter between Plaintiff and 

Defendants and others on December 30, 2021, in Bakersfield, as alleged in the operative First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 50). In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (1) 42 

U.S.C § 1983 - Violation of the Fourth Amendment - Excessive Force; (2) 42 U.S.C § 1983 -

Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment - Denial of Medical Care; (3) 42 U.S.C § 1983 - Conspiracy 

to Violate Civil Rights; (4) Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1; (5) Battery/Assault; (6) 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (7) Negligence.

Case 1:22-cv-00723-CDB Document 79 Filed 08/22/24 Page 1 of 5
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Trial of the action is scheduled to commence on September 16, 2024. Pending before the 

Court is Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate trial into two phases (damages and liability), filed on August 

13, 2024 (Doc. 71), for which Defendants filed an opposition (Doc. 78).

Plaintiff’s Motion to Bifurcate Trial

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “[f]or convenience, to 

avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more 

separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” The determination of 

whether to bifurcate a trial is a matter within the Court’s discretion. See Hangarter v. Provident Life 

& Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004). “In exercising this discretion, the court 

should consider ‘potential prejudice to the parties, potential confusion to the jury, and the relative 

convenience and economy which would result’ from bifurcation.” Stevenson v. Holland, 504 F. 

Supp.3d 1107, 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). 

“Absent some experience demonstrating the worth of bifurcation, ‘separation of issues for trial is not 

to be routinely ordered.’” Id. (quoting Hamm v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 

(E.D. Cal. 1995)) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 42(b) advisory committee notes). “The party who moves to 

bifurcate a trial has the burden of proving that the bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid 

inconvenience or prejudice to the parties.” A.G.1. v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-cv-1914-JLT-SAB, 

2023 WL 3752008, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2023) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

B. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff argues that trying the issues of liability before damages serves “the interest of 

promoting judicial economy” and avoiding prejudice. (Doc. 71 at 3, 4). Plaintiff argues, “[s]ince the 

evidence of compensatory and punitive damages usually overlaps substantially, ‘the normal procedure 

is to try compensatory and punitive damage claims together with appropriate instructions to make 

clear to the jury the difference in the clear and convincing evidence required for the award of punitive 

damages.’” Id. at 4 (quoting Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1021). Plaintiff further argues bifurcation would 

“allow the jury to focus on the reasonableness of the force used by Defendant officers, rather than 

determine liability and damages through jumbled testimony from several law enforcement officers 

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offering liability evidence at the same as hearing testimony numerous doctors on complex injuries and 

various medical procedures.” Id. at 4-5.

In opposition, Defendants principally argue that bifurcation is unwarranted given that Plaintiff 

will be required to introduce damages-related evidence during a liability phase of trial to establish the 

damages elements of Plaintiff’s claims – in particular, his state law causes of action for negligence and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 78 at 5-7). Defendants separately argue that 

Plaintiff fails to carry his burden under Rule 42(a) to establish that bifurcation would promote judicial 

efficiency. Id. at 7. Finally, while Defendants seemingly acknowledge that proceeding without 

bifurcating liability and damages will result in some prejudice to Plaintiff (id. at 7), Defendants

propose that any possible prejudice can be ameliorated with appropriate jury instructions restricting 

the jury’s consideration of the evidence for limited purposes. Id. at 9.

C. Discussion

In Stevenson, a former prisoner brought excessive force and failure to intervene claims against 

correctional officers he accused of physically abusing him. 504 F. Supp.3d at 113-14. Defendants 

sought to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of trial to minimize prejudice and avoid the “risk 

of the jury making its liability determination based on Stevenson’s damages evidence.” 504 F. 

Supp.3d at 1126. The court noted the likelihood “that separate trials for liability and damages would 

involve presentation of much of the same evidence.” Id. at 1127. The Court further noted that, given

“the liability evidence and damages evidence are entwined, bifurcating trial would raise additional 

line-drawing questions as to what evidence is relevant and admissible at the separate mini-trials.” Id.

In A.G.1 v. City of Fresno, an estate brought excessive force and related state law causes of 

action against a police officer who shot and killed the decedent during a foot chase. 2021 WL 

4502949, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2021). Only Plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action survived 

summary judgment. Id. In advance of trial, Plaintiffs moved to bifurcate the liability and damages 

phases on the grounds that some issues relevant to damages – “including the decedent’s criminal 

history” and autopsy results showing methamphetamine and THC in decedent’s system – would be 

“extremely prejudicial if they are brought out during the liability phase of this action.” 2023 WL 

3752008, at *6. The Court declined to bifurcate the trial, noting that numerous contested issues were 

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relevant to both liability and damages – for instance, that decedent was under the influence of 

methamphetamine and on parole at the time of the incident – and that, while some prejudice may 

result from declining to bifurcate, Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that any prejudice would 

outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence. Id. at *7.

The Court finds this case and the arguments advanced by Plaintiff in support of bifurcation are 

similar to the same issues addressed by the courts in Stevenson and A.G.1. First, Plaintiff’s argument

that “the evidence relevant to the Defendant Officers’ liability is sufficiently separate from the 

evidence that is relevant to damages” and that “[t]he only witnesses whose testimony would be 

relevant in both phases is Plaintiff and Defendant” (Doc. 71 at 4) is incorrect. In order to establish 

Defendants’ liability on his negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, Plaintiff 

will be required to introduce evidence of damages during any bifurcated liability phase. This 

inevitably would require testimony from medical practitioners and Plaintiff’s expert noticed to testify 

concerning Plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder during both phases of a bifurcated trial. See 

Stevenson, 504 F. Supp.3d at 1127. Relatedly, in their joint pretrial statement, the parties seemingly 

agree that evidence of the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries is relevant to Defendants’ liability on Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claims. See (Doc. 62 at 14-15) (quoting Ninth Circuit Jury Instruction 9.25, “Excessive 

Force,” directing the jury to consider “the extent of the plaintiff’s injury”).

Second, Plaintiff has noticed more than 200 exhibits consisting of body worn and vehicle dash 

camera video excerpts which invariably depict evidence relevant to both liability and damages issues. 

Thus, there inevitably will be an overlap of substantial amounts of evidence that would be introduced 

during both phases of a bifurcated trial. E.g., Rubalcava v. City of San Jose, No. 20-cv-04191-BLF, 

2024 WL 2031641, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2024) (declining to bifurcate liability and damages 

phases where the same witnesses would be required to testify during both phases; “[t]hus, bifurcation 

would not serve judicial economy, and would needlessly prolong the trial unless the jury were to find 

Defendants not liable”).

Finally, the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the prejudice that may result 

from introduction of certain unfavorable evidence during a liability phase of trial and which Plaintiff 

seeks to restrict to a separate damages phase. (Doc. 71 at 5-6). However, as the party bearing the 

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burden “of proving that the bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid inconvenience or 

prejudice to the parties” (A.G.1, 2023 WL 3752008, at *6), Plaintiff has failed to explain why any 

potential prejudice could not be addressed through appropriate limiting instruction. See Dunivin, 2024 

WL 3468785, at *4.

Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate (Doc. 71).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2024 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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