Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00468/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00468-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JEFF SLOAN,

NO. CIV. S-06-468 WBS GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS 

CHICO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

RICK ANDERSON, RICK REES,

ANTHONY WATTS, STEVE O’BRYAN,

SCOTT BROWN, and CHET

FRANCISCO,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through his first amended complaint (“FAC”), plaintiff

Jeff Sloan seeks reinstatement and money damages for an alleged

smear campaign that resulted in the loss of his position as a

public middle school principal. Defendants Chico Unified School

District (“CUSD”), Rick Anderson, Rick Rees, Anthony Watts, Steve

O’Bryan, and Scott Brown move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon

which this federal court can grant relief.

///

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

From 1990 until 2004, plaintiff served defendant CUSD

as a middle school principal. (FAC ¶ 6.) He “routinely received

outstanding performance evaluations” and was entrusted in 1999

with responsibility for opening a new campus. (Id.) However, on

March 9, 2004, without warning, plaintiff was informed that at a

closed trustees’ meeting on March 3rd, the Board had decided to

provide him with a preliminary administrative lay-off notice. 

(Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) Thereafter, plaintiff learned from members of the

public that this decision was motivated by suspicions that he had

misappropriated public funds. (Id. ¶ 10.)

On March 16, 2004, defendant Brown presented plaintiff

with a letter, and supporting materials, alleging that he had

misused district, school, and student body funds. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

The letter was placed in plaintiff’s personnel file and plaintiff

was given ten days to file a written response. (Id.)

When plaintiff did respond, the Human Resources (“HR”)

department replied with additional findings and documentation in

support of the misappropriation charges and again gave plaintiff

ten days to respond to this additional information. (Id. ¶ 14.) 

Soon thereafter, on April 23, 2004, HR made further allegations

against plaintiff, accusing him of having sexually explicit

photographs on the CUSD computer assigned to him. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

Plaintiff maintains that these allegedly false charges against

him were malicious, stigmatizing, and designed to compel him to

resign. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 20.) 

Because, according to plaintiff, defendants had already

notified the media and the public about the charges against him,

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plaintiff opted to have a public hearing on the charges on May 5,

2004. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17-18.) Despite evidence that “clearly

demonstrated that defendant Brown’s charges were false and

pretext,” the Board elected at that time to reassign plaintiff to

another position. (Id. ¶ 18.) On June 18, 2004, plaintiff was

informed that he would spend the 2004-05 school year as the

secondary assistant principal at a CUSD high school. (Id. ¶ 22.) 

The following year, he was removed from that position and

assigned to an elementary school teaching job. (Id. ¶ 23.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was essentially demoted in

retaliation for publicly defending himself against defendants’

charges, openly criticizing Brown, and exposing district

mismanagement. (Id. ¶ 21.) He further claims that defendants’

actions overall “resulted in substantial economic loss in the

form of reduced salary and benefits” and damaged his career. 

(Id. ¶ 23.) As a result, plaintiff believes that his ability to

pursue other employment opportunities has been severely impaired. 

(Id. ¶ 20.) He thus seeks “prospective injunctive relief”,

specifically reinstatement to his position as principal of Marsh

Junior High School, and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.

¶¶ 26-28 & p.10.) 

II. Discussion

Defendants initially moved to dismiss plaintiff’s

complaint, consisting of five causes of action, on March 31,

2006. Because defendants had not yet filed an answer, plaintiff

filed in response a first amended complaint as of right. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a) (“A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a

matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is

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When a plaintiff files an amended complaint as of right 1

pursuant to Rule 15(a), “[t]he amended complaint supersedes the

original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.” 

Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Such filings

typically moot all pending motions, however “the [c]ourt may

exercise its discretion to consider a motion to dismiss the

original complaint where the amended complaint fails to cure the

defects of the original complaint.” Fitzgerald v. State, No.

Civ. 96-2077, 1997 WL 579193, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 9, 1997); see

also Datastorm Techs., Inc. v. Excalibur Commc’ns, Inc., 888 F.

Supp. 112, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F.

Supp. 343, 347 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Here, because the amended

complaint largely preserved claims one and three, defendants’

objections are still relevant and require the court’s

consideration.

However, defendants’ objections to plaintiff’s

discussion of the Brown Act, Cal. Gov. Code §§ 54950-54963, in

the FAC are not still at issue, contrary to defendants’ arguments

in their reply. Defendants originally argued only that “to the

extent that [the Brown Act] paragraphs seek a remedy, they should

be stricken.” (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 10.) As evident from the

complaint and noted by plaintiff in his opposition, he is not

seeking a remedy for Brown Act violations. Thus there is no need

for the court to consider defendants’ motion to strike.

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served . . . .”); Shaver v. Operating Eng’rs Local 428 Pension

Trust Fund, 332 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] motion to

dismiss [is] not a responsive pleading within the meaning of Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a).”). These amendments significantly streamlined

plaintiff’s allegations, reduced his claims from five to two, and

added Chet Francisco as a defendant. Additionally, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(i), plaintiff also

noticed a voluntary dismissal of defendant CUSD on April 12,

2006. In light of these changes, several, but not all, of

defendants’ grounds for their motion to dismiss are moot and the

court need only consider defendants’ arguments relating to claims

one and three in the original complaint (now claims one and

two).1

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

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inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). The court

may not dismiss for failure to state a claim “unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added);

see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

Plaintiff’s first cause of action, in both his original

complaint and the FAC, alleges a violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process, actionable under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (FAC ¶¶ 25-26.) “The Fourteenth Amendment protects

against the deprivation of property or liberty without procedural

due process;” however, plaintiff clarified in his FAC that he is

asserting only a deprivation of liberty without due process. 

Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1547 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis

added). This change rendered moot many of the arguments made by

defendants in support of their motion to dismiss this claim, as

they primarily focused on the fact that in California, a public

school administrator apparently is without tenure rights and

consequently has no protected property interest in continued

employment in an administrative capacity. See Grant v. Adams, 69

Cal. App. 3d 127, 133 (1977).

Plaintiff’s liberty interest is distinct from his

property interest and “is implicated in the employment

termination context if the charge [on which his demotion or

dismissal is based] impairs a reputation for honesty or

morality.” Matthews v. Harney County, Or., Sch. Dist. No. 4, 819

F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Hayes v. Phoenix-Talent

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Sch. Dist. No. 4, 893 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that

“publicized charges of moral turpitude or dishonesty” implicate a

liberty interest because such circumstances are stigmatizing and

“might foreclose other employment opportunities”); Brady, 859

F.2d at 1553 (noting that “failure to prevail on a property claim

will not preclude a properly asserted liberty claim”). Plaintiff

is entitled to procedural due process protections if “(1) the

accuracy of the charge is contested; (2) there is some public

disclosure of the charge; and (3) the charge is made in

connection with termination of employment.” Matthews, 819 F.2d

at 891-92; see also Brady, 859 F.2d at 1553 (“[A] nontenured

government employee has a liberty interest and is entitled to a

name-clearing hearing ‘if the employer creates and disseminates a

false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection

with his termination.’” (quoting Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624,

628 (1977))). 

Here, the charges against plaintiff included

allegations that he misappropriated public funds and that he

maintained pornographic images on his employer’s computer. Both

accusations easily satisfy the requirement that “the charge

impair[] a reputation for honesty or morality.” Matthews, 819

F.2d at 891. Further, plaintiff disputed these charges in

writing and at a public hearing. (FAC ¶¶ 14, 17.) He also

alleges that defendant Brown “intentionally leaked the charges

against plaintiff to the media” before plaintiff himself was even

aware of the grounds for his removal. (Id. ¶ 13.) Thus,

plaintiff appears to have been entitled to some procedural

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In Grant v. Adams, a California appellate court held 2

that the plaintiff, a former school principal, failed to show

that he had been stigmatized severely enough to implicate his

liberty interest because he retained a position as a tenured

teacher. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 136. However, Grant is

distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case filed suit

based on his suspicions that the reason proffered for his

termination was inaccurate. In contrast, charges of financial

mismanagement and possession of pornography, which are at issue

in this case, actually impugn plaintiff’s reputation in the

community and, relatedly, his liberty interests. See Roth, 408

U.S. at 573 (observing that liberty interest are at stake when

the State makes a charge against an individual “that might

seriously damage his standing and associations in his

community”).

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protections prior to his removal from his principal position.2

However, questions remain as to the form of the process

required. In general, plaintiff is entitled to “an opportunity

to refute the charge” and clear his name. Bd. of Regents v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 & n.12 (1972). More specifically, this

opportunity must be one that allows plaintiff to be heard “at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Brady, 859 F.2d at

1554 (holding that the opportunity was not meaningful when the

evidence suggested that the employer had already made up her mind

before hearing out the terminated employee and the employer

failed to provide the employee with sufficient time to prepare

his presentation). The actual procedures required must be

determined on a case-by-case basis through an analysis that

“balances 1) the private interest that will be affected, 2) the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the

procedures used, and 3) the additional cost and administrative

burdens that additional procedures would entail.” Id. (citing

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). 

Plaintiff’s own pleadings reveal that, both before and

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Defendants do not argue that plaintiff has failed to 3

state a § 1983 claim for violation of his First Amendment rights. 

They only contend that the relief sought cannot be awarded by the

court against the named defendants. 

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during an open hearing on May 5, 2004, he and others were

permitted to present the Board with evidence of his innocence. 

(FAC ¶ 18.) Nevertheless, he also claims that he “was not given

an opportunity to be heard regarding the actual reasons for his

removal.” (Id. ¶ 20.) From this, at this early stage in the

proceedings and in the absence of any evidence, the court must

infer that although plaintiff was given an opportunity to present

his case, the opportunity, for whatever reason, was not

meaningful. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Ortez v.

Washington County, “[w]hile further discovery may reveal that,

when considered in their totality, the procedures available to

him did provide him with ample opportunity to be heard and

confront the evidence against him, his complaint sets forth

allegations that, if proven, would entitle him to relief.” 88

F.3d 804, 810 (9th Cir. 1996). Dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1983

claim based on alleged due process violations is therefore not

warranted.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action, which was claim

three in his original complaint, alleges a violation of his First

Amendment right to speak freely without fear of retaliation by

his employer, also actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (FAC ¶¶

27-28.) Defendants challenge this claim, as well as plaintiff’s

due process claim, based on the remedy sought: injunctive relief 3

in the form of reinstatement which, although carried out by

individual state actors subject to this lawsuit, will in fact

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Defendants attempt to distinguish Lawrence Livermore by 4

arguing that because relief cannot be realized through the acts

of one Board member and rather must be achieved by the Board

acting as a whole, the relief sought is “necessarily . . .

against the School District itself.” (Defs.’ Reply 3.) They

argue that awarding such relief “would violate the Eleventh

Amendment and is impermissible.” (Id.) However, the Eleventh

Amendment does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief

against state officers acting in their official capacities, even

if such suits are, at their core, suits against the state itself. 

Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power

Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1159 n.10 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that

Ex parte Young “created an oft-recognized legal fiction that

injunctive relief against state officials acting in their

official capacity does not run against the State”). 

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impact the public treasury and interfere with the public

administration. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to

Dismiss 5 (“If the individual Defendants are ordered by the Court

to reinstate Plaintiff as Principal of Marsh Junior High, then

Defendant School District [a state entity in California] becomes

obligated to pay his higher salary and is obligated to retain him

in that position.”).)

Although the Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits

against the state and its agents in their official capacity, “a

suit for prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow, but

well-established, exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Doe

v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.

1997); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).4

Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has held that “job reinstatement

constitutes prospective injunctive relief” because it “compel[s]

the state official to cease her actions in violation of federal

law and to comply with constitutional requirements.” Lawrence

Livermore, 131 F.3d at 841 (quoting Elliott v. Hinds, 786 F.2d

298, 302 (7th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, despite the salary that

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This is true even though “the remedy mandated by the 5

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘an opportunity

to refute the charge’” and not reinstatement. The Ninth Circuit

has recognized relief might not be limited to provision of the

appropriate process when due process claims are intertwined with

another substantive right. Brady, 859 F.2d at 1552; see also

Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977). Consequently, because

plaintiff has alleged that his demotion violated his Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process and First Amendment Free Speech rights, he

has sufficiently alleged a claim for reinstatement. 

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must be paid upon reinstatement, the Ninth Circuit has also noted

that this draw on state funds is not equivalent to an

impermissible award of damages because the salary paid will be

for work actually performed, not to compensate the plaintiff for

lost wages. Id. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519

U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“[W]hen the action is in essence one for

the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real,

substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its

sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are

nominal defendants.” (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury

of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945))). Consequently, plaintiff’s

claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Board is

cognizable.5

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: May 4, 2006

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