Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00601/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00601-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARCUS D. NELSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-00601 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On March 21, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 11) on July 13, 2007. Petitioner

has not filed a reply to the answer and the time to do so has

expired. 

I Procedural History

In August of 2002 Petitioner was charged by an

indictment with five counts of sexual conduct with a minor and

three counts of molestation of a child, all eight counts

classified as class 2 felonies, and two counts of sexual abuse,

which were classified as class 3 felonies. See Answer, Exh. A.

The indictment alleged the acts occurred between June of 2000

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and March of 2001 and that the victim was a minor under the age

of fifteen years old. Id., Exh. A. Respondents aver Petitioner

faced a minimum sentence of 205 years incarceration if he was

convicted on all of the charges stated in the indictment. Id.

at 2 n.1 & Exh. C. 

At a settlement hearing conducted October 21, 2003,

Petitioner, his appointed defense counsel, and the prosecution

discussed a proffered plea agreement before a state trial judge.

Id., Exh. C. The judge informed Petitioner he faced a potential

life sentence if convicted on all or even some of the charges

alleged in the indictment. Id., Exh. C at 5. The trial court

stated “the best” Petitioner could expect if he accepted the

plea agreement was a sentence of 10 years imprisonment and the

“worst” he could expect if he signed the plea agreement was a

sentence of 24 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. C at 5. 

At the hearing the prosecution indicated Petitioner had

confessed to a state agency worker and to a doctor that he

committed the acts alleged in the indictment. Id., Exh. C at 5-

6. The prosecution averred these two individuals were prepared

to testify as to Petitioner’s confessions at trial. Id., Exh.

C at 5-6. The prosecution stated that forensic evidence also

supported the charges. Id., Exh. C at 5-6. Petitioner

indicated to the judge, however, that he was “flabbergasted” by

what he had read in the police report and initially stated that

he thought he could prove he was “totally innocent.” Id., Exh.

C at 7. Petitioner also stated “If I go to trial and lose, no

worse than if I sign the plea as far as I’m concerned.” Id. at

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9. 

Petitioner further stated at the hearing:

[I]t’s a crap-shoot. There’s no guaranty

(sic) I wouldn’t get 25 years. I would be 65

when I get out of jail... I would rather try

to fight this and try to exonerate myself

with the charges and face life in jail, than

plead guilty for something I didn’t do or

even....

Id., Exh. C at 9. 

However, in response to the judge’s question, “Is it

your contention you didn’t do any of it...?” Petitioner

responded: “I’m not denying or affirming anything Your Honor.”

Id., Exh. C at 9-10. Petitioner then stated he believed a

sentence of 10 years “work furlough” would be appropriate, but

agreed that was “not possible.” Id., Exh. C at 12. After

discussing the plea agreement with Petitioner and answering his

questions, the state court adjourned until later that day to

allow Petitioner to consider accepting the plea agreement or

going forward to trial on the charges against him. Id., Exh. C.

Later that same day, after conferring with his counsel,

Petitioner signed the proffered plea agreement. Id., Exh. B &

Exh. D. Petitioner averred to the court that he understood the

potential sentences involved if he pled guilty, including a

potential sentence of lifetime probation pursuant to a

conviction for attempted sexual conduct with a minor. Id., Exh.

D. The plea agreement and the court noted the maximum sentence

of 15 years imprisonment on the charge of attempted sexual

conduct with a minor and a maximum sentence of 24 years

imprisonment with regard to the charge of child molestation.

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Id., Exh. B & Exh. D. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one

count of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, a class 3

felony, and one count of child molestation, a class 2 felony.

Id., Exh. B & Exh. D. 

At that time, Petitioner’s counsel stated the factual

basis for Petitioner’s plea of guilty to both of those charges.

Id., Exh. D at 5. Counsel stated Petitioner had “attempted to

have oral sexual contact with his daughter, []. [Who], at that

point in time, was nine years old, or a child within the

definition of the statute.” Id., Exh. D at 6. After counsel

made this statement, Petitioner affirmed: “That’s correct.”

Id., Exh. D at 6. Counsel then stated that when Petitioner

committed the other act to which he was pleading guilty, the

victim “was 9 there also.” Id., Exh. D at 6. When asked by the

state court if everything his counsel had stated was correct,

Petitioner replied, “Yes, sir.” Id., Exh. D at 6.

Petitioner was sentenced on February 13, 2004. Id.,

Exh. E. At his sentencing hearing, Petitioner indicated he had

signed the plea agreement because his counsel had informed him

there was 

no way he could win this case given the fact

that none of those situations were done, no

interviews, no true investigation was

done.... I feel that had I not signed a plea

and went on to trial, I would just have been

in as much trouble as I am now.

Id., Exh. E at 5. 

The sentencing court noted Petitioner’s claims

regarding dissatisfaction with counsel should be raised in an

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action for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. E at 7. The court

also noted Petitioner had previously stated his plea was

voluntary and that he was not coerced to enter a guilty plea.

Id., Exh. E at 7. Petitioner then indicated he did not wish to

withdraw from the plea agreement, but that he believed his

counsel had not done an adequate job of investigating mitigation

of his sentence. Id., Exh. E at 10. 

The prosecution asked the court to impose the maximum

sentence, noting the age of the victim, the number of times the

victim was assaulted, and the emotional damage to the victim,

averring there were no mitigating factors warranting a lesser

sentence. Id., Exh. E at 16. Petitioner’s counsel then argued

there were mitigating factors, i.e., that Petitioner had

accepted responsibility for his actions by calling the state’s

Child Protective Services and telling “CPS what happened.” Id.,

Exh. E at 17. Defense counsel also noted Petitioner’s military

service. Id., Exh. E at 18. 

At the sentencing hearing Petitioner addressed the

court and admitted he molested his daughter and that he “did it

for a period of time.” Id., Exh. E at 20. Petitioner then

stated: “Unfortunately I could have taken the steps to correct

that behavior sooner. That’s not my fault. I did seek

professional help.” Id., Exh. E at 20. 

The state sentencing court found facts allowing for the

imposition of an aggravated sentence, i.e., the victim’s age,

the nature of the crimes, and the “psychological emotional

impact on the victim.” Id., Exh. E at 25. The trial court also

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1 Arizona state law prohibits a “direct appeal” arising from

a conviction pursuant to a plea agreement. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13–4033(B) (“In noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a

judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement or

an admission to a probation violation.”). 

-6-

concluded there were no circumstances warranting any mitigation

of Petitioner’s sentence. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner was then

sentenced to an aggravated term of 24 years in prison for his

conviction for child molestation and to a term of lifetime

probation for his conviction for attempted sexual conduct with

a minor. Id., Exh. E. 

Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence by pleading guilty. Id., Exh. B.1

Petitioner filed a timely action for post-conviction relief in

the Arizona Superior Court on April 20, 2004. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner asserted his guilty plea was not intelligent or

voluntary, citing Rule 17.1(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 336

(1985). Id., Exh. G. Petitioner also argued his Sixth

Amendment rights were violated because his sentence was

aggravated based on facts found by a judge and not a jury,

citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531

(2004).

The Arizona Superior Court denied relief on the merits

of Petitioner’s claim regarding the nature of his guilty plea.

Id., Exh. H. However, the Superior Court granted relief on

Petitioner’s Blakely claim. Id., Exh. H. The Superior Court

concluded there was no error in aggravating Petitioner’s

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2

 See Arizona v. Pitre, 2006 WL 1686506, *3 (Ct. App.) and

Arizona v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 93, 107 P.3d 939 (Ct. App. 2005), rev’d

by 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2006).

3 In Henderson the Arizona Supreme Court held that alleged

Blakely errors were to be reviewed under the harmless-error or

fundamental-error standards of review. 

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sentence based on the age of the victim because it was an

element of the underlying offense to which Petitioner had pled

guilty. Id., Exh. H. Nonetheless, the Superior Court further

concluded that Blakely required a jury and not a judge find

every fact used to aggravate a sentence that was not admitted by

the defendant or implicit in a jury verdict. Id., Exh. H.

Accordingly, the Arizona Superior Court determined it had erred

by considering the other factors when imposing an aggravated

sentence. Id., Exh. H. In doing so, the Superior Court noted

the Arizona Court of Appeals’ conflicting decisions regarding

this exact issue in Arizona v. Martinez and Arizona v. Pitre.2

Id., Exh. H.

The Arizona Superior Court granted the petition for

post-conviction relief on the Blakely claim and ordered

Petitioner be re-sentenced with regard to his conviction for

child molestation. Id., Exh. H. However, on June 21, 2005, the

Maricopa County Attorney filed an appeal of the Superior Court’s

decision granting relief on Petitioner’s Blakely claim. Id.,

Exh. I. 

The Arizona Supreme Court then issued its decisions in

Arizona v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d 601 (2005)3 and

Arizona v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005). In

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Martinez, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded the state’s

sentencing scheme allowed a judge to consider additional

aggravating circumstances, not found by a jury, if a single

aggravating factor was established in accordance with Blakely,

thereby “authorizing” a sentence in the aggravated range.

On March 21, 2006, citing Martinez, the Arizona Court

of Appeals concluded Petitioner was not prejudiced by the

judicial fact-finding regarding his sentence. Id., Exh. J. The

Court of Appeals noted Petitioner never contested the victim’s

age, and concluded no reasonable juror could have failed to find

the victim’s age as a matter of fact. Id., Exh. J. Therefore,

the appellate court concluded, the sentencing court could find

and consider additional aggravating factors without first

submitting them to a jury because the aggravated sentencing

range was applicable pursuant to the uncontested fact of the

victim’s age. Id., Exh. J. The Arizona Court of Appeals

vacated the Superior Court’s order granting post-conviction

relief and reinstated the term of imprisonment originally

imposed on Petitioner. Id., Exh. J. Petitioner did not seek

review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 4

& Exh. K.

In his petition for federal habeas relief Petitioner

alleges he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance

of counsel. Petitioner asserts his trial counsel did not give

him access to copies of the indictment, police reports, and the

victim’s statements. Petitioner argues that, if he had seen

this evidence, he would not have pled guilty. Petitioner

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further contends that, because he did not have all the

information necessary prior to entering his plea, his guilty

plea was not voluntary, knowing, nor intelligent. Petitioner

also argues that, because not all of the facts used to aggravate

his sentence were found by a jury, his Sixth Amendment rights

were violated. Petitioner contends the Arizona Court of

Appeal’s decision with regard to his sentence is contrary to,

and not a reasonable application of federal law, i.e., the

holding in Blakely. 

Respondents assert Petitioner procedurally defaulted

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his claim that

his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Answer at 5.

Respondents also contend that the Arizona Supreme Court’s

application of Blakely to Petitioner’s sentence was not contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

 II Analysis

Petitioner’s claims regarding his guilty plea

Petitioner asserts in his habeas petition that he faced

“the realistic possibility of a defenseless trial due to both

the lack of investigation of preparation by [his counsel] and

inability for Petitioner’s primary witnesses (his wife and other

children) to travel from the family’s new home in Virginia to

Arizona for the trial, Petitioner accepted the plea

agreement...” Docket No. 1. Petitioner claims his guilty pleas

were not knowing and voluntary because he was denied his right

to the effective representation of counsel. Respondents assert

this claim was not properly exhausted in the state courts.

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However, regardless of any failure to exhaust the claim, it may

be denied on the merits.

In his Rule 32 action, Petitioner asserted his guilty

plea was not intelligent or voluntary, citing Rule 17.1(b),

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 336 (1985). Answer, Exh. G. Petitioner

asserted his plea was unknowing because he was not aware of the

details alleged in the indictment, inter alia, because he was

not provided with the victim’s statements. Petitioner also

alleged that he was “coerced” into taking a plea because to go

to trial would have created hardship for his wife, who is the

victim’s mother, and one of his other children. Petitioner

additionally asserted that he did not want to go to trial

because he knew his defense counsel was unprepared for a trial.

Additionally, Petitioner averred he was “[t]hreatened with a

sentence of over 400 years and knowing that [his counsel] was

not ready for trial, Petitioner believed his only option was to

accept the plea. ...” 

The Arizona Superior Court denied this claim, stating:

The issues raised do not support a finding

that [Petitioner] did not understand the

nature or potential consequences of his plea

or that he was in any way coerced in a manner

to override his free will choice to take the

plea offered. His decision was undoubtedly

based on many factors, but in the end it was

his decision, and he chose to accept the

benefits offered in the agreement.

Answer, Exh. H.

A state court’s factual finding that a plea was

voluntary and knowing is entitled to a presumption of

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correctness by a federal habeas court. See Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 982 (9th Cir. 2004); Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92

F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Factual findings of a state

court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by a

federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented

with clear and convincing evidence. See Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Anderson v. Terhune,

467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d

922, 926 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The state court’s factual findings

are entitled to a presumption of correctness unless the

petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing

evidence.”). 

Additionally, Petitioner’s contemporaneous statements

regarding his understanding of the plea agreement carry

substantial weight in determining if his entry of a guilty plea

was knowing and voluntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.

63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in

open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics

is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the

face of the record are wholly incredible”); United States v.

Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991) (reaching this holding

in a section 2255 case); Restucci v. Spencer, 249 F. Supp. 2d

33, 45 (D. Mass. 2003) (collecting cases so holding). Because

Petitioner stated at the time of his guilty plea that the plea

was knowing and voluntary, the Court concludes that, as a matter

of fact, the plea was voluntary and made intelligently. See

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Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context

of cases wherein the defendant did not go to trial are governed

by the doctrine of Strickland v. Washington. See, e.g., Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Fields v.

Attorney General, 956 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1992). The

Strickland standard requires a defendant to “show that his

counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient

performance prejudiced him.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d

1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984). When a defendant

challenges a conviction resulting from a plea agreement the

“prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is modified; the

defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty to

the charges against him, but instead would have insisted on

going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.

Accord Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297; Craker v. McCotter, 805 F.2d

538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986). 

Additionally, to succeed on a claim that his counsel

was constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.

Ct. at 369; Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th

Cir. 1990). A lawyer’s advice to plead guilty in the face of

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strong inculpatory evidence does not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel. See United States v. Cassidy, 428 F.2d

383, 384 (9th Cir. 1970); Schone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 790

(8th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Dugger, 928 F.2d 1020, 1028 (11th Cir.

1991); Hogan v. Ward, 998 F. Supp. 290, 294 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).

[A] defendant has the right to make a

reasonably informed decision whether to

accept a plea offer. In McMann v.

Richardson, the seminal decision on

ineffectiveness of counsel in plea

situations, the Court described the question

as not whether “counsel’s advice [was] right

or wrong, but ... whether that advice was

within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann, 397

U.S. at 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441. Thus, for [the

petitioner] to establish a claim of

ineffective assistance, he “must demonstrate

gross error on the part of counsel....” Id.

at 772, 90 S. Ct. 1441. The Third Circuit

has interpreted this standard as requiring a

defendant to demonstrate that the advice he

received was so incorrect and so insufficient

that it undermined his ability to make an

intelligent decision about whether to accept

the plea offer. 

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Petitioner offers no evidence he did not understand or

agree to the plea agreement. Certainly any competent attorney

would have advised Petitioner to accept the plea agreement

rather than face a likely term of life imprisonment if convicted

of even some of the charges stated in the indictment and given

the amount of incriminatory evidence against Petitioner and the

number and type of charges alleged. Petitioner did not deny

that his separate admissions to other individuals regarding his

actions would be admissible at trial. Despite Petitioner’s

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protestations to the contrary, Petitioner has not established

that, absent his counsel’s advice, he would have rejected the

plea agreement and continued to trial, facing a minimum term of

at least 200 years in prison if convicted of charges to which he

had confessed. The plea agreement negotiated by Petitioner’s

counsel resulted in a prison sentence greatly diminished from

that faced by Petitioner if he went to trial on all of the

charges against him. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on the claim that his guilty plea was not knowing or

voluntary or that he was not provided the effective assistance

of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Petitioner has not

established that his counsel’s performance was deficient, nor

has Petitioner established that, absent his counsel’s advice to

accept the plea agreement, he would have proceeded to trial.

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment sentencing claim

A state prisoner is not entitled to habeas relief on a

claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless he

demonstrates the state court’s adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2007). See also Price v.

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638, 123 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 (2003). 

The Court must first determine whether the United

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States Supreme Court has “clearly established” the law on the

legal issue raised by the habeas petitioner. See Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2003). If the

Supreme Court has not clearly established a rule of law

providing a basis for habeas relief, the petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief. Mitchell v. Esparaza, 540 U.S. 12,

14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000) (explaining that “clearly

established federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) “refers to the

holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision.”). When more

than one state court has adjudicated a claim, the Court must

analyze the last reasoned decision by a state court to determine

if the state’s denial of relief on the claim was clearly

contrary to federal law. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085,

1091-92 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2041

(2006).

The Arizona courts have determined that, after a

criminal sentence within the “aggravated range” is authorized by

means of a jury decision, a guilty plea, or the existence of a

prior felony, the facts “legally essential to punishment” have

been found and other aggravating factors, not found by a jury or

admitted in a guilty plea, may then be considered by the court

in fixing a sentence within the aggravated range. See Answer,

Exh. J; Martinez, 210 Ariz. at 585, 115 P.2d at 625. This

determination is not contrary to nor an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law regarding the Sixth

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Amendment.

 The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury-trial

proscribes the imposition of a sentence above the statutory

maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not

found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. See United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In Blakely,

the United States Supreme Court clarified the rule stated in

Apprendi: 

[T]he “statutory maximum” for Apprendi

purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may

impose solely on the basis of the facts

reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by

the defendant .... In other words, the

relevant “statutory maximum” is not the

maximum sentence a judge may impose after

finding additional facts, but the maximum he

may impose without any additional findings.”

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (emphasis in

original). The rule established by Blakely is, therefore, that

before a trial court can impose a sentence above the presumptive

statutory term, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt or

the defendant must admit all facts “legally essential to the

punishment.” Id., 542 U.S. at 313, 124 S. Ct. at 2543.

In Petitioner’s case, an aggravated sentence was

authorized solely by the fact of the age of the victim, a fact

admitted by Petitioner in the colloquy supporting his guilty

plea. Petitioner points to no authority concluding that the

trial court’s consideration of other aggravating factors when

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The Supreme Court has not considered the

situation in this case-where the trial judge

imposed a sentence above the statutory maximum

based upon one fact that was either

Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt, and

additional facts that were neither found by a

jury nor otherwise complied with Blakely.

Accordingly, this Court cannot find that the

state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment/ Blakely claim is either contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly establishes federal law, as determined by

the United States Supreme Court at the time of

the state court’s decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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choosing the actual sentence within the aggravated sentencing

range violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision denying Petitioner’s Blakely

claim was neither contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law. Additionally, in unpublished opinions, the

judges of the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona have affirmed the Arizona courts’ application of the

Blakely decision. See Van Norman v. Schriro, 2007 WL 2325969,

at *10; Estrada v. Schriro, 2007 WL 2237626, at *6; Beals v.

Bartos, 2007 WL 2220467, at *8-13;4 Nino v. Flannigan, 2007 WL

1412493 at *4; Garcia v. Schriro, 2006 WL 3292473, at *3; Jones

v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1794765, at *2-*3 (concluding the “rule” of

Blakely was satisfied once petitioner admitted a single

aggravating factor).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also affirmed

the Arizona state courts’ interpretation of Blakely. In Stokes

v. Schriro, the Ninth Circuit stated: 

[T]he Arizona state courts’ interpretation of

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these [sentencing] provisions does not

contradict clearly established federal law...

A statutory maximum need not be defined by

every one of the facts found at trial, so

long as the defendant is not exposed to a

greater punishment than that authorized

solely by those facts ...

465 F.3d 397, 402-03 (2006) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

III Conclusion

Petitioner presents no evidence other than his

unsupported self-serving statements that his guilty plea was not

knowing or voluntary. Additionally, there is no evidence

Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel

advised Petitioner to accept a guilty plea in the face of a

virtual life sentence when there was an abundance of admissible,

inculpatory evidence in support of the charges alleged in the

indictment. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief on his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing or

voluntary or that his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance

resulted in his acceptance of a guilty plea when he otherwise

would have chosen to go to trial. 

The Supreme Court has never held that the Sixth

Amendment prohibits the imposition of an increased sentence

where at least one Blakely-exempt factor expands the potential

sentence into the “aggravated” range. Accordingly, the Arizona

Court of Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s Blakely challenge to

his aggravated sentence was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

established by the holdings of the Supreme Court.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Nelson’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 31st day of August, 2007.

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