Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04170/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04170-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO MCWOODSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-04170-VC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Antonio McWoodson seeks review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of 

benefits. Among other things, McWoodson contends the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred 

in rejecting the opinion of one of McWoodson's treating physicians, Dr. Rachel Shorr, without 

providing specific and legitimate reasons for doing so.

In his written decision, the ALJ noted that Dr. Shorr (described in the ALJ's decision as "a 

physician at [Lifelong] West Berkeley") had treated McWoodson for neck, back, shoulder, and 

knee pain in February 2012, and that Dr. Shorr had opined that McWoodson "was incapable of 

low stress jobs and that his pain or other symptoms were severe enough to interfere with his 

attention and concentration frequently." AR 26. The ALJ further noted that, in Dr. Shorr's

opinion, McWoodson could "sit for five hours, stand for three hours, and walk for one hour in an 

eight hour workday," but that he "would miss more than four days of work per month due to his 

impairment." Id.

The ALJ did not expressly reject Dr. Shorr's opinion. In fact, the ALJ did not make any 

comments, positive or negative, about Dr. Shorr's opinion. But the ALJ's determination about

McWoodson's residual functional capacity did not include the restrictions Dr. Shorr described. In 

determining McWoodson's residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that McWoodson could 

"stand/walk for four hours . . . [and] sit for six hours of an eight hour workday." AR 24. By 

disregarding Dr. Shorr's opinion and making contrary findings, the ALJ effectively rejected that 

opinion.

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At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the Commissioner argued that the 

ALJ's opinion is sufficient under Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1989), because the 

ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of McWoodson's other doctors 

and it can be inferred from the ALJ's opinion that the same reasoning applies to Dr. Shorr's 

opinion. But even if the ALJ did provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions

of McWoodson's other doctors, the ALJ's failure to provide any explanation for rejecting Dr. 

Shorr's opinion requires that this case be remanded for a redetermination of McWoodson's 

eligibility for benefits.

It's true that in Magallanes the Ninth Circuit explained that an ALJ need not recite specific 

"magic words" in rendering a decision, and a reviewing court is entitled to draw inferences from 

that decision. Id. at 755. There, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "there was substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ's decision rejecting Dr. Fox's opinion as to the onset date of Magallanes's 

disability," despite the fact that the ALJ's opinion did not literally say, "I reject Dr. Fox's opinion 

about the onset date because . . . ." Id. But the Ninth Circuit noted that the ALJ had addressed in 

detail the reasons for rejecting another doctor's opinion about the disability onset date, and had

provided specific and legitimate reasons for crediting other physicians' opinions based on the very

same clinical findings that formed the basis for Dr. Fox's opinion. Id. In other words, while the 

ALJ might not have expressly addressed Dr. Fox's opinion about the disability onset date, it was 

clear from the ALJ's opinion that the ALJ had considered the conflicting clinical evidence and the 

other doctors' analysis of that evidence. And because the ALJ had provided a detailed explanation 

of his reasons for accepting one interpretation of that evidence and rejecting another, those reasons 

necessarily applied to Dr. Fox's opinion. 

Magallanes does not stand for the broader proposition asserted by the Commissioner, that 

the ALJ need not provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting every treating doctor's 

opinion so long as the ALJ provides such reasons for rejecting some other doctor's opinion. 

Following Magallanes, the Ninth Circuit has continued to emphasize that ALJs must provide 

specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion of any treating physician. See, e.g., Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631–35 (9th Cir. 2007). What's more, the Ninth Circuit has rejected 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

arguments like the one the Commissioner raises here, albeit in unpublished memorandum 

dispositions. See, e.g., Monteiro v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 130 F. App'x 93, 94 (9th Cir. 

2005); Cochrane v. Barnhart, 78 F. App'x 561, 562 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A]n ALJ need not 

recite 'here are my specific, legitimate reasons' in those terms, but an informed medical view 

cannot be rejected by mere implication. Reasons must be given.").

This case is not like Magallanes. The ALJ did provide reasons for rejecting the opinion of 

another physician, Dr. Rose Lewis – rejecting that opinion on the grounds that it "was too 

restrictive given the physical findings and appeared to be based mostly on subjective complaints." 

AR 27. But even if this was a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Lewis's opinion (a 

question that the Court does not reach), that opinion was based on a single examination in July 

2011, AR 418, whereas Dr. Shorr's medical source statement was based on her own clinical 

observations after treating McWoodson for almost an entire year. AR 385, 454–55. Therefore, 

the Court cannot infer from ALJ's explanation for rejecting Dr. Lewis's opinion that the ALJ 

rejected Dr. Shorr's opinion for the same reasons. 

The ALJ's failure to offer reasons for rejecting Dr. Shorr's opinion was legal error. See

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1286 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the Court remands this case 

to the agency for redetermination of McWoodson's eligibility for benefits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 16, 2015

______________________________________

 VINCE CHHABRIA

 United States District Judge

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