Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02019/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02019-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF 

COMMERCE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

XAVIER BECERRA, 

Defendant, 

and COUNCIL FOR EDUCATION AND 

RESEARCH ON TOXICS, 

Defendant-Intervenor. 

No. 2:19-CV-02019-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff California Chamber of Commerce brings this suit challenging California’s 

Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65) insofar as it requires certain 

California businesses to post warnings about the presence of acrylamide, a chemical the state has 

identified as a cancer risk. See Compl. ¶¶ 1–3, ECF No. 1; Becerra Mem. P. & A. (“Becerra 

MTD”), ECF Nos. 21, at 6. Plaintiff argues the enforcement of the statute with respect to 

acrylamide violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and requests declaratory and 

injunctive relief. Compl. at 20, 22–23. The parties stipulated to allow Council for Education and 

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Research on Toxics (CERT) to intervene as a party defendant, ECF No. 28, and the court 

approved the stipulation, ECF No. 29. 

Before the court are two motions to dismiss by defendant-intervenor CERT and 

defendant Becerra (collectively “Defendants”). CERT Mot. (“CERT MTD”), ECF No. 8; 

Becerra MTD. Becerra also filed a request for judicial notice in conjunction with his motion to 

dismiss. Req. for Judicial Not., ECF No. 22. Plaintiff has opposed both motions to dismiss. 

Opp’n to CERT MTD, ECF No. 31; Opp’n to Becerra MTD, ECF No. 30. Defendants replied.1 

CERT Reply, ECF No. 38; Becerra Reply, ECF No. 39. Given their overlapping subject matter 

and common objective, the court addresses both motions here, differentiating where necessary. 

I. DISCUSSION 

The gravamen of defendants’ motions to dismiss is that the court should dismiss 

this case in favor of ongoing state proceedings enforcing Proposition 65 with respect to 

acrylamide against certain members of the California Chamber of Commerce. See CERT MTD at 

11–13 (citing CERT v. Starbucks, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC435759); 

Becerra MTD at 6–7 (referring to “multiple pending enforcement proceedings in California state 

courts”). Specifically, defendant Becerra argues: (1) the court should abstain under the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), and Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 

(1942); and (2) the court should dismiss or stay the action under Colorado River Water 

Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). See generally Becerra MTD. CERT 

argues: (1) the court should dismiss the case because it is barred from granting the requested 

injunction under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283; (2) the court should abstain based on 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (3) the court should abstain based on the Younger abstention 

doctrine; and (4) the court should dismiss the complaint under Colorado River. See generally

CERT MTD. 

1

 After filing an oversized brief on reply, CERT filed an ex parte application to file a brief 

exceeding 10 pages. ECF No. 41. While it is counsel’s responsibility to carefully read and abide 

by the court’s standing orders, the complexity of the issues presented here warrants the extra 

pages and the court GRANTS the application retroactively. 

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The court addresses Brillhart abstention and the Anti-Injunction Act below and 

finds dismissal of plaintiff’s claims is warranted on these grounds without the need to reach 

defendants’ other arguments at this time. 

A. Declaratory Judgments Act & Brillhart Abstention2

Defendant Becerra argues the court should dismiss this case, because the 

Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, affords the court discretion to abstain from 

deciding a declaratory judgment action for the “purpose of enhancing ‘judicial economy and 

cooperative federalism.’” Becerra MTD at 14 (citing R.R. St. & Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 

966, 975 (9th Cir. 2011)). Because the Declaratory Judgments Act uses permissive language 

when granting courts jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions, “[a] district court may, in 

its discretion, decline to hear a declaratory judgment action when a related case is pending in state 

court,” Scotts Co. LLC v. Seeds, Inc., 688 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Wilton v. 

Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995)). See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (stating that federal courts 

“may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party” in a declaratory judgment 

action (emphasis added)); see also Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495 (holding federal courts “under no 

compulsion” to exercise jurisdiction over suits under Declaratory Judgments Act). 

1. Whether Plaintiff Pleads an “Independent Claim” 

“[T]his discretionary jurisdictional rule does not apply to ‘[c]laims that exist 

independent of the request for a declaration.’” Scotts Co. LLC, 688 F.3d at 1158–59 (quoting 

Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 1998)). Where a 

case involves a claim for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act in addition to a 

claim for monetary or injunctive relief, “[t]he appropriate inquiry . . . is to determine whether 

there are claims in the case that exist independent of any request for purely declaratory relief, that 

is, claims that would continue to exist if the request for a declaration simply dropped from the 

case.” Snodgrass, 147 F.3d at 1167. These “independent” claims are instead evaluated under the 

2 Brillhart abstention is also commonly referred to as Wilton/Brillhart abstention, 

referring to the complementary case, Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 283 (1995). See, 

e.g., R.R. St. & Co. Inc., 656 F.3d at 975. 

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more stringent Colorado River abstention doctrine, which the court does not reach at this point. 

Scotts Co. LLC, 688 F.3d at 1158–59 (citation omitted). As a general rule, a court should not 

decline to entertain a claim for declaratory relief when it is joined with independent claims, unless 

there is some other basis for abstention. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citation omitted).

Here, plaintiff requests declaratory relief as well as “preliminary and permanent 

injunctions prohibiting Defendant . . . from enforcing or threatening to enforce the Proposition 65 

warning requirement for cancer with respect to acrylamide in food products intended for human 

consumption.” Compl. at 22–23. Becerra argues, correctly, that this claim for injunctive relief is 

not a separate cause of action, but a remedy, and therefore could not survive independently if the 

declaratory relief claim were dropped from the case. Becerra Reply at 13 (citing Jensen v. Quality 

Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“A request for injunctive relief by 

itself does not state a cause of action.” (citation omitted)). 

Plaintiff’s complaint brings one “claim for relief” entitled “Violation of the First 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,” Compl. at 20, and cites the Declaratory Judgments Act in its 

prayer for relief, id. at 22 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201). Nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff invoke 

the federal statute providing a private cause of action for constitutional violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

but it does cite 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which authorizes attorneys’ fees in an action under, inter alia, 

§ 1983. Id. at 23. At hearing, however, counsel for plaintiff clarified plaintiff did not intend to 

bring a claim under § 1983 but could amend its claim to rely on the statute if given the chance to 

amend.3 As currently pled, however, plaintiff’s complaint does not bring any claims independent 

of its declaratory relief claim, and the court may decline to hear the declaratory relief claim in its 

discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 

2. Whether the Court Should Decline to Entertain Plaintiff’s Claims 

Though the Supreme Court has “not yet delineated “the outer boundaries of the socalled [Brillhart] doctrine,” the Ninth Circuit has generally “allowed district courts broad 

3

 Notably, without a § 1983 claim, the complaint does not provide a basis for awarding 

fees under § 1988. 

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discretion as long as it furthers the Declaratory Judgment Act’s purpose of enhancing ‘judicial 

economy and cooperative federalism,’” R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d at 975 

(quoting Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1224). Courts generally consider three factors when determining the 

propriety of entertaining a declaratory judgment action under Brillhart: (1) avoiding “needless 

determination of state law issues”; (2) discouraging “forum shopping”; and (3) avoiding 

“duplicative litigation.” Id. (quoting Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225). Here, because the primary legal 

question is one of federal law, the latter two factors are most relevant and support dismissal. 

First, given the timing of plaintiff’s filing, it appears plaintiff seeks to proceed in 

this federal action as a result of the unfavorable decision of the state court in CERT v. Starbucks. 

See Becerra MTD at 15. Brillhart’s policy rationale of discouraging forum-shopping applies in 

precisely this situation, “when a party files a suit in federal court in reaction to a pending state 

court suit on the same issues, seeking a declaration that would influence the outcome of the state 

litigation.” Hanover Ins. Co. v. Fremont Bank, 68 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 

(citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Robsac Industries, 947 F.2d 1367, 1371–73 (9th Cir. 1991), 

overruled on other grounds by Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1220. This is the kind of “reactive declaratory 

action” federal courts “should generally decline to entertain,” Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225. 

Second, plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim would likely be duplicative of claims in 

the roughly 38 ongoing state court proceedings involving acrylamide and Proposition 65 

referenced by defendant Becerra. Becerra MTD at 18 (citing Req. for Judicial Not., Ex. 1). As 

Becerra points out, many of the companies represented by Plaintiff are involved in these state 

suits, and many have asserted a First Amendment defense, the flip slide of the affirmative First 

Amendment claim presented here. Id. It is in the interest of judicial economy to avoid 

unnecessarily deciding questions that are being raised before the state courts. Polido v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 110 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he dispositive question is not 

whether the pending state proceeding is ‘parallel,’ but rather, whether there was a procedural 

vehicle available to the [defendant] in state court to resolve the issues raised in the action filed in 

federal court.”), overruled on other grounds by Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1227. 

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The court’s interest in discouraging forum shopping and avoiding duplicative 

litigation weighs in favor of declining to entertain plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim. The court 

here so declines. 

B. The Anti-Injunction Act 

Additionally, as CERT argues, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prevents 

the court from granting plaintiff’s requested relief, because both the requested injunctive relief 

and the declaratory relief would have the effect of enjoining a state action. CERT MTD at 14. 

Therefore, the court must dismiss the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

The federal Anti-Injunction Act forbids a federal district court from “grant[ing] an 

injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except [1] as expressly authorized by Act of 

Congress, or [2] where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or [3] to protect or effectuate its 

judgments,” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Anti-Injunction Act “is an absolute prohibition against 

enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically 

defined exceptions.” Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286–87 

(1970)). The Act applies equally to prevent a declaratory judgment if it would have the same 

effect as an injunction. California v. Randtron, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 1999) 

(“[T]he Anti–Injunction Act applies to declaratory relief if it would have the same effect as an 

injunction” (citing Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 506 (5th Cir.1988)), 

aff’d sub nom. People of California v. Randtron, 268 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended 

and superseded on denial of reh’g sub nom. California v. Randtron, 284 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, the Act “does not preclude injunctions against a lawyer’s filing of prospective state 

court actions.” In re GTI Capital Holdings, LLC, 420 B.R. 1, 11 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting 

Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)). 

1. Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief 

There is no dispute that none of the three express exceptions to the Act’s 

prohibition against a federal court’s deciding a case applies here. See CERT MTD at 14; Opp’n 

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to CERT MTD at 12 (omitting any argument regarding exceptions to Act). Rather, plaintiff’s 

argument against dismissal is twofold: first, plaintiff argues the Anti-Injunction Act is not a 

jurisdictional statute, and does not set up a threshold bar against this court’s exercising 

jurisdiction at this stage. Opp’n to CERT MTD at 12. While the Act is in fact not a jurisdictional 

statute, see Prometheus Dev. Co. v. Everest Properties, 289 F. App’x 211, 212 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citing, inter alia, Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 278–79 (1924)), if the Anti-Injunction Act bars 

the court from granting plaintiff’s requested remedies, it nevertheless warrants a dismissal of the 

claims under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., David V. ex rel. Ohio Legal Rights Serv. v. Bd. of Trustees 

of Miami Twp., No. 1:05 CV 714, 2005 WL 3307346, at *5, 8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2005) (finding 

requested injunction would violate Anti-Injunction Act and dismissing injunction claim “for 

failure to state a claim”). Second, plaintiff argues the Act does not apply to their injunction 

request, because plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief from future enforcement actions. Opp’n to 

CERT MTD at 12; see Newby, 302 F.3d at 301 (injunction against prospective state actions not 

barred by Anti-Injunction Act) (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 n.2 (1965)). 

As currently pled, however, plaintiff’s request for an injunction is not merely 

prospective. See Compl. at 22–23 (requesting injunction to prohibit defendant and all those in 

privity defendant from “enforcing or threatening to enforce the Proposition 65 warning 

requirement . . . with respect to acrylamide in food products intended for human consumption.”). 

At hearing, plaintiff argued it need not amend its complaint to narrow the scope of the requested 

injunction, because counsel had stated on the record that plaintiff will not request retroactive 

injunctive relief, which plaintiff concedes would be barred under the Anti-Injunction Act. The 

court finds this statement insufficient to obviate the need for amendment. See Hafiz v. Aurora 

Loan Servs., No. C 09-1963 SI, 2009 WL 2029800, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2009) (granting 

motion to dismiss with leave to amend where plaintiff’s arguments in opposition rendered the 

scope of her request for injunctive relief unclear). For this additional reason, the court dismisses 

the First Amendment claim and corresponding request for injunctive relief, while granting 

plaintiff leave to amend. 

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2. Plaintiff’s Request for Declaratory Relief 

 “The Anti-Injunction Act also applies to declaratory judgments if those judgments 

have the same effect as an injunction.” Randtron, 284 F.3d at 975; see also Samuels, 401 U.S. at 

72 (“[O]rdinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and 

disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to 

avoid.”). As CERT suggests in its reply, plaintiff’s requested declaratory relief, if granted, would 

effectively enjoin the CERT v. Starbucks case, which has been litigated in state court since 2010, 

CERT MTD, Ex. B4, ECF No. 8-2, at 3, because it would decide the issue of the defendants’ 

affirmative defense for defendants, thereby undoing the state court’s decision issued in 2015, id. 

at 17, and preventing CERT’s enforcement action from moving forward. CERT Reply at 8 

(“Since CalChamber cannot enjoin CERT from enforcing Proposition 65 in the CERT v. 

Starbucks case, it also cannot obtain a judgment in this case declaring CERT’s enforcement of 

Proposition 65 in the Starbucks case to violate the First Amendment.”); see also Monster 

Beverage Corp. v. Herrera, No. EDCV1300786VAPOPX, 2013 WL 12131740, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 

Dec. 16, 2013), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 344 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding declaratory relief barred by AntiInjunction Act where granting relief would “effectively bar all of the [defendant’s] claims in the 

pending state court action, and resolve it just as an injunction would”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

claim for declaratory relief is also dismissed without prejudice under the Anti-Injunction Act. 

In light of the above, the court need not consider the remaining arguments for 

abstention, including abstention under Colorado River Water. Defendants may renew any 

arguments the court does not reach here in any future motions to dismiss. 

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

In conjunction with his motion to dismiss, defendant Becerra also filed a request 

for judicial notice, which included, inter alia, (1) the dockets in the state court private 

4

 To the extent necessary, the court judicially notices the existence of the Superior Court’s 

decision in CERT v. Starbucks, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 435759, attached 

as Exhibit B to CERT’s motion to dismiss. See CERT MTD, Ex. B; Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. 

Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court 

filings and other matters of public record.”). 

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enforcement proceedings listed in Exhibit 1 to the request; (2) the consent judgments filed in state 

court proceedings brought by private Proposition 65 enforcers listed in Exhibit 2 to the request; 

(3) the dockets in the state court proceedings listed in Exhibit 3 to the request, in which the 

Attorney General has secured consent judgments; and (4) consent judgments filed in state court 

enforcement proceedings brought by the Attorney General, which are attached to the request as 

Exhibits 4 through 6. ECF No. 22. The request is not opposed. The court GRANTS the request 

for judicial notice as to the existence of these dockets and documents, because they are matters of 

official public record “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC, 442 F.3d at 746 n.6 

(“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.”).

The remainder of the request is for judicial notice of several administrative reports 

on acrylamide by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the California Office of Environmental 

Health Hazard Assessment, the Food and Drug Administration, the International Agency for Research 

on Cancer, and other similar agencies. See Req. for Judicial Not. at 3–4. Because these documents 

relate to the merits of plaintiff’s underlying claim and not to the issues addressed in the motions 

to dismiss, the court DENIES the request in this respect without prejudice. See CYBERsitter, 

LLC v. People’s Republic of China, 805 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to take 

judicial notice of fact irrelevant to instant motion). 

Becerra also filed a second request in conjunction with his Reply, in which he 

requested judicial notice of (1) a notice of motion and motion to stay filed on November 19, 2019, 

in Patten v. Safeway, Case No. 37-2019-00011824-CU-NP-CTL (Exhibit 1); and (2) a 

Proposition 65 notice letter against McDonald’s dated May 1, 2002, which was downloaded from 

the Attorney General’s website (Exhibit 2). ECF No. 40 at 2. This request is also unopposed. 

The court GRANTS the request as to the existence of both documents, but not as to the truth of 

the contents therein. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC, 442 F.3d at 746 n.6; United States v. 14.02 

Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cty., 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Judicial notice is 

appropriate for ‘records and reports of administrative bodies.’” (citation omitted)). 

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III. CONCLUSION 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED in part. Defendant Becerra’s first 

request for judicial notice, ECF No. 27, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant 

Becerra’s second request for judicial notice, ECF No. 40, is GRANTED. Plaintiff may file an 

amended complaint within 14 days of this order. 

Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion, ECF No. 26, is DENIED without 

prejudice, as it is based on the dismissed claims. See Chiu v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 

No. 2:11-CV-01400-ECR, 2012 WL 1902918, at *5 (D. Nev. May 25, 2012) (denying motion for 

preliminary injunction on the basis plaintiff’s related claims were subject to dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6)); Bonneau v. United States, No. 10-653-PK, 2010 WL 3419542, at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 30, 

2010) (dismissing motion for temporary restraining order on the basis it related to dismissed 

claims). 

This order resolves ECF Nos. 8, 20, 22, 26, 27, 32, 40 and 41. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 2, 2020. 

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