Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01652/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01652-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD SCOTT KINDRED,

Plaintiff,

v.

AUDREY KING, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-01652-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 11)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 4.) His complaint 

(ECF No. 1) was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he was given leave to amend 

(ECF No. 8). His first amended complaint (ECF No. 11) is before the Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”), where the acts giving rise 

to his complaint occurred. He names the following 23 Defendants: (1) Audrey King, 

Executive Director, California Department of State Hospitals; (2) Brandon Price, Hospital 

Administrator; (3) Debra Brown, Assistant Hospital Administrator; (4) Remi Smith, 

Program Director; (5) Mathew Collins, Assistant Program Director; (6) Marisa Bigot, Unit 

Supervisor; (7) Samantha Perryman, Unit Supervisor; (8) Lilian Caylan, Psychiatrist; (9) 

Jeffrey Hasson, Psychologist; (10) Doug Veit, Social Worker; (11) Carolyn Knox, 

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Recreational Therapist; (12) Guadalupe McKenzie, Unit Supervisor; (13) Jeanette 

Riveria, Psych Tech; (14) Angela Padilla, Psych Tech; (15) Angel Felix, Psych Tech; 

(16) Cinthia Martinez, Psych Tech; (17) Paul Alkelougie, Psych Tech; (18) Jose Lopez, 

Unit Shift Lead; (19) Jorge Zavala, Psych Tech; (20) Tom Faina, Director of Central 

Program Services; (21) Lt. Bernard, Department of Protection Services Officer; (22) Sgt. 

Kenneth Bel, Department of Protection Services Officer; and (23) Daniel Wagoner, Sr. 

Patients’ Rights Advocate at the California Office of Patients’ Rights.

Plaintiff’s complaint is 48 pages long and difficult to follow. It alleges a series of 

discrete and unrelated acts carried out by a variety of individuals. It is not presented as a 

chronological narrative and appears to include every perceptibly adverse act Plaintiff has 

experienced in relation to his religious practice, spiritual items, and filing of grievances. 

The Court herein endeavors to construe Plaintiff’s complaint liberally and to summarize it 

succinctly without repeating the entirety of Plaintiff’s 48 page complaint. With that in 

mind, Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

A. Overview

Plaintiff is a “practicing Native American.” Since May 2014, Defendants have 

interfered with and denied Plaintiff’s right to practice his “way of life” in violation of the 

First Amendment, “Native American Civil Rights,” and the Joint Resolution of 1978.

Defendants also violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in a variety of ways.

B. Grievances

Defendant King denied and failed to properly address grievances Plaintiff filed 

regarding being unable to participate in Sunrise Ceremonies, Inipi Ceremonies, and 

Seasonal Ceremonies and regarding spiritual items that were not allowed in the hospital. 

In so doing, King ignored Plaintiff’s rights and failed to address unprofessional and 

discriminatory acts by employees under her supervision.

Defendant King failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s grievances. 

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Defendants Collins and Veit refused to give Plaintiff copies of responses to his 

SOC341 (Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse) complaints.

Defendant Wagoner refused to enforce time constraints on the processing of 

Plaintiff’s grievances and refused to provide Plaintiff “denial of rights” forms.

Defendant Hasson refused to file Elder/Dependent Abuse Reports in relation to 

the denial of Plaintiff’s rights.

Defendant Knox refused to provide Plaintiff a denial of rights form.

Defendant Veit refused to document incidents and file Elder/Dependent Abuse 

Reports. He followed up on one of Plaintiff’s Elder/Dependent Abuse complaints but did 

not give Plaintiff the response.

Defendant Faina refused to provide Plaintiff a denial of rights form.

Plaintiff filed an Elder/Dependent Abuse Claim against Defendant Bell. Defendant 

Bernard was assigned to investigate the claim. Bernard sided with Bell and ignored 

Plaintiff’s documentation. Bernard never gave Plaintiff a proper response to his claim

C. Native American Practices

In April 2014, Defendant Bigot contacted Defendant Smith regarding Plaintiff and 

other Native Americans using the small unit courtyard at 5:00 a.m. for Sunrise 

Ceremony. Defendant Smith made a program decision to disallow this practice on safety 

and security grounds, even though Christians were allowed to hold Sunrise Services in 

the main courtyard. Defendant Bigot enforced this decision.

In May 2014, Defendant Bigot began harassing Plaintiff and directing other Unit 

Staff to do the same. She ordered Plaintiff to take down his dream catcher and other 

items hanging in his room based on the Fire Code. Plaintiff informed Bigot she was 

misquoting the relevant regulation, but she refused to acknowledge him. Plaintiff was 

moved from his single room to a dorm shared with three others.

On August 16, 2014 and August 30, 2014, Defendant Smith denied Plaintiff an 

escort to his Native American Ceremonies/Celebrations. This occurred even though, on 

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August 30, 2014, the Native American Spiritual Advisor requested Plaintiff be escorted to 

an Inipi Ceremony. Defendant Bigot also was “instrumental” in these decisions. When 

Plaintiff questioned Smith about the decision, she informed Plaintiff that his “HAS Level” 

was on hold and the facility was short of staff. She refused to discuss the matter further.

Defendant Collins intervened and directed the Shift Lead to provide Plaintiff an escort.

Once Defendant Bigot learned of Defendant Collins’ intervention, she retaliated

against Plaintiff by denying Plaintiff several sacred/spiritual items that had been 

approved by Defendant Bell. Plaintiff had to wait until a different Unit Supervisor was 

assigned to retrieve his items.

On September 5, 2014, Defendant Collins attended a unit meeting and spoke with 

Plaintiff regarding various problems. Collins agreed to speak with Bigot and to let her 

know that Plaintiff and other practicing Native Americans would be permitted to use the 

day room between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m.

On May 23, 2015, Plaintiff was informed that the Shift Lead, non-Defendant 

Aboloje, was not allowing anyone into the dayroom. Plaintiff requested that the room be 

opened for prayer in accordance with the approval from Defendant Collins. Aboloje 

stated that Collins dictated no one was to have access to the dayroom before 6:00 a.m. 

Plaintiff requested to contact Defendant Perryman but she refused to speak with Plaintiff. 

The next day, Plaintiff was told that there was a misunderstanding and that Collins would 

speak with him. However, neither Collins nor anyone else addressed the issue with 

Plaintiff that day.

D. August 29, 2014 Incident/Spiritual Rug

On August 29, 2014, Defendant Riveria entered Plaintiff’s room while Plaintiff was 

in a meditative state and partially undressed. Riveria told Plaintiff she wanted his “HAS 

Level”; Plaintiff threw it at her. Riveria told Defendant Alkelhougie that Plaintiff assaulted 

her and left the room laughing. Riveria filed a false police report against Plaintiff.

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Defendant Smith refused to discuss this incident with Plaintiff. Instead, Smith 

directed Defendant Bigot to bring 20-25 staff and officers to Plaintiff’s living area. Plaintiff 

was assaulted. Plaintiff’s spiritual rug was confiscated. Proper procedure and policies 

were not followed in handling Plaintiff’s items. Thereafter, Defendant Felix escorted 

Plaintiff to an exclusion room. When they neared the room, Plaintiff’s arms were 

restrained and Felix reached inside Plaintiff’s shirt and grabbed Plaintiff’s medicine bag, 

desecrating it. Plaintiff yelled for Felix to stop, but Felix told Plaintiff he could not have 

the bag in the room and that it needed to come off. Felix got Plaintiff a plastic bag to put 

the medicine bag in, but Plaintiff stated that doing so would be pointless because it was 

desecrated. Plaintiff had to wait for the Native American Spiritual Advisor to bless him a 

new medicine bag. Medicine bags are intended to last a lifetime and the contents of 

Plaintiff’s original bag cannot be replaced. 

Defendant Lopez also was involved in this incident. He used excessive force and 

failed to follow procedures for handling the morbidly obese or individuals with COPD, 

resulting in injury to Plaintiff.

Defendant Alkelhougie also was involved in this incident.

On September 5, 2014, Defendant Collins attended a unit meeting and spoke with 

Plaintiff regarding problems with Defendant Bigot and the confiscation of Plaintiff’s 

prayer rug. Collins agreed to look into the matter of Plaintiff’s rug but suggested holding 

a WRPTM on the issue and including the Native American Spiritual advisor in the 

determination. Collins admitted to not knowing much about Plaintiff’s culture or beliefs.

Plaintiff later discussed the confiscation of his rug with Defendant Smith at a 

WRPTM. Smith advised Plaintiff that he would be given his rug back on the condition 

that it be used only four times a day to pray, and otherwise would be rolled up and put 

against the wall. Plaintiff challenged Smith’s ability to dictate his manner of prayer and 

use of the rug and threatened to file a grievance. Smith refused to discuss the matter 

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further other than to state that Plaintiff’s rug would be restored subject to the stated 

conditions.

E. Confiscation of Property

In November 2013, Plaintiff attempted to retrieve a prayer blanket (an approved 

item) from his property. Defendant Bell told his officers not to release the blanket. 

Plaintiff wrote a grievance and, as a result, eventually recovered his blanket.

In July, September, and November of 2014, Plaintiff received spiritual packages 

from Crazy Crow Trading Post, “a recognized vendor of Native American and Early 

American materials.” Several of his items were denied by Defendant Bell despite not 

being on the Statewide Property Contraband list. Several of the items in Plaintiff’s 

packages were on the “approved list” for Religious/Spiritual Items but nonetheless were 

denied. In July 2014, Plaintiff was denied medicines/herbs (on the ground no names

were on the packages), a turtle rattle kit, a roll of simulated sinew/string, elk antler (on 

the ground it was too large), and needles. In September 2014, Plaintiff was denied elk 

splits and hides, red and off-white cloth, simulated sinew, and needles. Plaintiff filed 

grievances and eventually was able to receive the red cloth, one of the herbs, and the 

elk splits/hides, but not the other items. As to the other items, Plaintiff was told they had 

to be sent back or destroyed. When Plaintiff went to send them back, he found that 

many of the items were missing. Defendant Bell told Plaintiff that Defendant Brown 

ordered that most of the items be destroyed. Bell did give Plaintiff his needles. Plaintiff 

filed a report with the Department of Protective Services.

At a WRPTM, Plaintiff raised with Smith issues concerning the items that he was 

denied that were not on the Statewide Property Contraband List. Smith advised Plaintiff 

that non-Defendant Ramos, the Native American Spiritual Advisor, would review the 

items and determine what Plaintiff could receive. However, property room officers 

thereafter refused to allow Ramos to remove any of the items, stating that Defendant 

Bell told them nothing was to be removed. Plaintiff raised this at a WRPTM but “they” 

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said there was nothing they could do. Plaintiff later spoke with Defendant Bell who 

agreed to release Plaintiff’s Elk Splits on the condition that Plaintiff’s Unit Supervisor pick 

them up. Defendant Bigot agreed to pick them up, but instead spoke to Defendant 

Smith, who refused to allow them. Defendant Smith later agreed to “work it out.” 

On January 15, 2015, Plaintiff’s items were to go to the Statewide Property 

Contraband Meeting, an “underground sub-review committee” chaired by Defendant 

Price, co-chaired by Defendant Brown, and of which Defendants Faina and Bell are 

members. Instead, Defendant Brown determined that, going forward, any 

religious/spiritual items on the approved list should be given to patients upon delivery of 

the package. However, Defendant Brown did not specifically address Plaintiff’s alreadydelivered items. Because the items were not specifically addressed, Defendant Bell 

refused to give them to Plaintiff.

F. Elk Hides/Art Class

Plaintiff alleges various due process violations in relation to his elk hides. Plaintiff 

requested a violation of rights form for his elk hides, but Smith refused to provide one. 

Smith denied knowledge of the hides for several months until a Unit Meeting wherein 

Plaintiff explained the situation to the Clinical Administrator. Smith then admitting to 

having the hides but advised Plaintiff he could only work on them in his spiritual art class 

and could not remove them until they were completed. Thereafter, Plaintiff receive a 

letter from the California Office of Patients’ Rights stating that he had the right to pray 

wherever and whenever he wanted if his prayer was done respectfully and without 

disturbing others. Plaintiff apparently attempted to pray in his art class. However, Plaintiff 

later was removed from his art class for refusing to sign a contract that would keep him 

from praying, force him to take classes he was not interested in, force him to participate 

in treatment, and force him to admit to things that were not true. Smith directed the Unit 

Supervisor to confiscate the hides until Plaintiff signed the contract. Smith refused to 

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return the hides, even when told to do so by the Office of Patients’ Rights. Smith again 

refused to give Plaintiff a denial of rights form.

Defendants Knox and Veit failed to hold a WRPTM regarding Plaintiff’s removal 

from art class and the requirements for being allowed to return. 

Defendant Knox at one point had Plaintiff’s elk hides but did not tell Plaintiff. She 

was directed by Defendant Smith to put them back into Plaintiff’s property.

G. Room Searches and Handling of Spiritual Items

From May 2014 to December 2014, Defendant Bigot and her “underlings” failed to 

abide by the following policies applicable to the search of Native American patients’ 

rooms: having a spiritual advisor supervise the search, staff does not handle sacred 

items, and no women involved in the search during “their time of the month.” Defendant 

Alkelhougie participated in the searches.

In July and August 2014, Defendants Riveria, Padilla, and Martinez repeatedly 

searched Plaintiff’s sacred, spiritual items and disrespected Plaintiff’s desire that said 

items not be handled or confiscated.

From August 2014 to November 2014, Defendant Zavala allowed staff under his 

supervision to search Plaintiff’s living area.

Defendant Alkelhougie searched Plaintiff’s room on December 29, 2014. Plaintiff 

protested and was thrown against the wall. Plaintiff’s spiritual bat also was thrown 

against the wall. Alkelhougie and Defendant Smith held Plaintiff while someone else 

disrespected Plaintiff’s spiritual items.

On December 30, 2014, Defendant Perryman directed staff to search Plaintiff’s 

living area for possible contraband. Plaintiff requested a spiritual advisor but was 

refused. Plaintiff was threatened with restraint. Plaintiff grabbed his sacred hawk wing, 

showed it to Defendants Perryman, Alkelhougie, and others, and placed it on his bed. 

He was restrained while Alkelhougie searched under his bed and mattress. When 

Alkelhougie got up off the floor, he put his hands on the hawk wing and broke it. 

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Alkelhougie is too overweight to safely work at the institution. Plaintiff requested a denial 

of rights form and was denied. The following items were confiscated: Plaintiff’s birth 

certificate (sent to the trust office), a typewriter (thrown away), two small wooden 

handles, and Plaintiff’s bank deposit slip. Plaintiff was told the bank deposit slip went to 

the trust office. He filed a claim for it but never received a response.

Defendant Veit contacted the confiscating officer and Chief of Police on Plaintiff’s 

behalf but received no response. 

H. Other

Defendant Caylan participated in disallowing Plaintiff’s attendance at ceremonies, 

pulled his HAS Level, confiscated and denied his spiritual rug for two weeks, and signed 

orders to have Plaintiff placed in seclusion. 

Defendant Hasson participated in disallowing Plaintiff’s attendance at ceremonies, 

pulled his HAS Level, and confiscated and denied his spiritual rug for two weeks.

Defendant Knox participated in disallowing Plaintiff’s attendance at ceremonies, 

pulled his HAS Level, and confiscated and denied his spiritual rug for two weeks.

Defendant McKenzie participated in illegal searches of Plaintiff’s living area and 

placed a hold on Plaintiff’s HAS Level, and allowed her subordinates to do the same. 

Defendant Martinez participated in illegal searches of Plaintiff’s living area, held 

Plaintiff’s HAS Level, made false entries in Plaintiff’s hospital records, and possibly threw 

away a dream catcher Plaintiff made for Defendant McKenzie. Martinez refused to work 

in the same office as McKenzie if McKenzie was allowed to hang up a dream catcher 

from Plaintiff.

Defendant Zavala failed to provide Plaintiff escorts to the law library.

Defendant Faina approved the confiscation of Plaintiff’s spiritual rug and 

restrictions on Plaintiff. 

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I. Relief Sought

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. He also seeks the following 

injunctive relief: demotion of Defendant Bell, termination of Defendants Smith and King, 

various changes to grievance handling procedures, specific procedures for handling 

patient packages, compliance with all federal and state laws and regulations, and a 

requirement that all policies, procedures, special orders and administrative directives be 

properly promulgated. 

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint suffers from many of the same deficiencies as 

his original complaint. The Court will again advise Plaintiff of the legal standards 

applicable to his claims. Plaintiff will be given one final opportunity to amend his 

complaint to cure noted defects. If he chooses to amend, he must state facts to meet the 

elements and the legal standards set forth below. 

A. Improper Joinder of Unrelated Claims

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) allows a party to “join, as independent or 

alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” However, Rule 

20(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to sue multiple defendants in the same action only if “any right 

to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or 

arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 

occurrences,” and there is a “question of law or fact common to all defendants.” “Thus 

multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should 

not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against 

different defendants belong in different suits . . .” See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir.2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

Plaintiff attempts to bring several unrelated claims in this action. His allegations 

span from November 2013 to May 2015. They involve numerous unrelated incidents: 

room searches, WRPTM meetings, art classes, property seizures, interference with 

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grievances, inability to attend ceremonies, and at least one alleged use of force. The 

incidents also involve a disparate array of defendants. While at least some of Plaintiff’s 

claims regarding his Native American practices appear to arise out of the same 

transaction or occurrence, or to at least raise a common question of law or fact, these 

claims plainly do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as Plaintiff’s 

allegations that certain Defendants interfered with his ability to file administrative 

grievances or legal claims, his allegations regarding Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse, or 

his allegations regarding false police reports. Plaintiff may not bring all of these claims in 

a single action.

Plaintiff previously was advised of this defect in the Court’s initial screening order. 

Instead of limiting his amended pleading to those claims arising out of a single 

transaction or occurrence, Plaintiff added additional claims and Defendants. 

The Court will focus its analysis herein on what appear to be the primary, core 

claims regarding denial of a First Amendment right to freely practice religion and a

Fourteenth Amendment right to property related to that practice. If Plaintiff chooses to 

amend his complaint, he should focus his efforts on presenting cognizable allegations 

pertaining to these claims. A repeat attempt to include multiple disparate claims 

previously alleged may well prove fatal to Plaintiff’s case.

B. First Amendment Free Exercise

Plaintiff alleges a variety of Free Exercise violations against numerous 

Defendants. 

Civil detainees retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, including 

the right to freely practice their religion. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 347, 

348 (1987) (citations omitted); see also Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) 

(holding civilly detained persons must be afforded “more considerate treatment and 

conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed 

to punish”). In order to establish a cause of action under the Free Exercise Clause, 

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Plaintiff must show that a restriction substantially burdened the practice of his religion by 

preventing him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with 

his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008).

Additionally, Plaintiff must show that the restriction is not required to maintain 

institutional security and preserve internal order and discipline. See Pierce v. Cnty. of 

Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008). Restrictions on access to “religious 

opportunities” must be found reasonable in light of four factors: (1) whether there is a 

“valid, rational connection” between the regulation and a legitimate government interest 

put forward to justify it; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right”

that remain open to Plaintiff; (3) whether accommodation of the asserted constitutional 

right would have a significant impact on staff and other detainees; and (4) whether ready 

alternatives are absent (bearing on the reasonableness of the regulation). Turner v. 

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006); Mauro 

v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Furthermore, to satisfy 

substantive due process requirements with respect to detainees, the restriction or 

regulation cannot be intended to serve a punitive interest. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 

535 (1979).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff is advised that the Free Exercise clause protects 

Plaintiff’s ability to freely practice his religion. However, Plaintiff does not expressly state 

that Defendants interfered with his religious practice. Instead, Plaintiff states that 

Defendants interfered with his “way of life.” Plaintiff’s “way of life” is not protected by the 

First Amendment. In order to state a Free Exercise claim, Plaintiff must allege that 

Defendants’ conduct substantially burdened “the practice of his religion.” Shakur, 514 

F.3d at 884-85 (emphasis added). For the purposes of this screening order, the Court 

will liberally construe the complaint and assume that Plaintiff’s allegations refer to his 

religion. However, if Plaintiff chooses to amend, he should address this requirement 

directly. 

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Plaintiff’s allegations list numerous wrongs he suffered in relation to his spiritual 

practice. He does not state whether or how such wrongs substantially burdened the 

practice of his religion. This failure is fatal to Plaintiff’s claims. Absent such allegation, he 

fails to state a claim. If he chooses to amend, he must specifically allege how his ability 

to practice his religion was substantially burdened.

The Court notes that, in many instances, the wrongs Plaintiff complains of were 

quickly remedied. For example, although one defendant initially refused to provide 

Plaintiff an escort to a ceremony, another defendant eventually did provide an escort. 

Thus, it appears that Plaintiff was able to participate in the ceremony and his religious 

practice was not, in fact, burdened in this instance. Absent further facts to indicate a 

substantial burden on the practice of his religion, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding wrongs 

that promptly were remedied fail to state a claim.

Lastly, the Court notes that, in several instances, Defendants justified restrictions

on Plaintiff’s conduct on safety and security grounds. Restrictions that are required to 

maintain institutional security and preserve internal order are justified under the First 

Amendment. See Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff must allege that the proffered justifications were, in fact, not necessary. 

C. Due Process – Property Seizure

Plaintiff appears to allege that his Due Process rights were violated when his 

spiritual packages were denied.

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff from being deprived of property without 

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). While the deprivation 

of property pursuant to an established government procedure is actionable under the 

Due Process Clause, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984) (citing Logan v. 

Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1982)),1neither negligent nor 

 

1

An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or 

statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 

832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.1987). 

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unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a governmental employee 

“constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” 

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

Plaintiff’s property claims appear to fall into four categories: (1) property that 

eventually was turned over to him, (2) property that was turned over to him, but with 

conditions regarding its use, (3) property that was denied him, and (4) property that was 

destroyed.

Plaintiff does not state a due process claim with regard to property that eventually 

was turned over to him, regardless of whether staff placed conditions on its use. Plaintiff 

filed grievances regarding these items or otherwise presented his concerns through 

procedural channels, and eventually received the property. He ultimately was not 

deprived of this property, let alone deprived of it without due process. Plaintiff may be 

able to state a Free Exercise claim regarding delays or restrictions relating to this 

property, but to do so he must meet the legal standards described above for a Free 

Exercise claim. 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim with regard to property that was destroyed. Plaintiff 

states that, when the property was confiscated, he filed a grievance. Through the 

grievance process, Plaintiff was advised that the property must be returned to its sender 

or destroyed, presumably because it was determined to be contraband. It therefore 

appears that Plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the deprivation 

of this property. He has not alleged facts to suggest that he was denied proper 

procedural protections. Furthermore, to the extent the items may have been mistakenly 

destroyed, such destruction fails to state a claim. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (negligent 

deprivation of property does not state a claim, so long as post-deprivation remedy is 

available); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (post-deprivation 

remedy available under California law).

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Although not entirely clear from the complaint, it appears that some of Plaintiff’s 

property may have been withheld from Plaintiff without due process. Plaintiff explains 

that some, unspecified property was scheduled to be considered before the Statewide 

Property Contraband Meeting. Such meeting, had it been held, might have afforded 

Plaintiff the requisite procedural protections. However, Plaintiff states that the meeting 

was never held and, as such, no official determination was made with respect to this 

property. Thereafter, Defendant Bell refused to give Plaintiff the property. However, it is 

not entirely clear whether Plaintiff was entirely deprived of this property or whether he 

was temporarily denied the property by Defendant Bell. Based on this lack of clarity, the 

Court cannot conclude that this allegation states a claim. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, 

he should specify which property was denied him and by whom, whether and how he 

sought to obtain it following the cancellation of the Meeting, and any grievances or 

hearings conducted in relation to this property.

D. Improper Handling of Grievances

Plaintiff alleges several Defendants improperly handled his administrative 

grievances. Specifically, Defendant King failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s grievances; 

Defendants Collins, Veit, Hasson, and Knox refused to give Plaintiff copies of responses

to his SOC341 (Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse) complaints; Defendants Bernard and Veit 

did not respond to Plaintiff’s complaints; Defendant Wagoner refused to enforce time 

constraints on the processing of Plaintiff’s grievances; and Defendants Knox, Faina and 

Wagoner (and, perhaps, other individuals) refused to provide Plaintiff “denial of rights” 

forms. These allegations do not state a claim under section 1983. 

1. No Due Process Right to Grievance Process

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty 

without the procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. 

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). However, Plaintiff has no stand-alone due process 

rights related to the administrative grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 

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860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Failing to 

properly process a grievance or denying a grievance does not constitute a due process 

violation. See, e.g., Wright v. Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 

445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied 

or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a cognizable claim under the First 

Amendment); Williams v. Cate, No. 1;09-cv-00468-OWW-YNP PC, 2009 WL 3789597, 

at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in the 

vindication of his administrative claims.”).

2. Insufficient Facts to State Access to Courts Claim

To the extent the failure to properly process grievances may have interfered with 

Plaintiff’s ability to pursue legal remedies, Plaintiff may be able to state an access to 

courts claim. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or 

hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or 

from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). 

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). A plaintiff must show that he 

suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out of court. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-

51 (1996). An “actual injury” is one that hinders the plaintiff’s ability to pursue a legal 

claim. Id. at 351.

Plaintiff has not here alleged that his ability to pursue a legal claim has been 

hindered. He fails to state an access to courts claim.

3. Insufficient Facts to Allege Contribution to Violations

Plaintiff also attempts to allege constitutional violations by those who reviewed his 

grievances. Specifically, he alleges that Defendant King failed to properly address his 

grievances, ignored Plaintiff’s rights and did not address unconstitutional conduct by her 

subordinates. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Bernard ignored Plaintiff’s 

documentation and sided with Defendant Bell on one of Plaintiff’s complaints. 

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Generally, denying an administrative appeal does not cause or contribute to the 

underlying violation. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2014); George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). However, administrators cannot willfully turn a 

blind eye to constitutional violations being committed by subordinates, Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006), and there may be limited circumstances in which 

those involved in reviewing an administrative appeal can be held liable under section 

1983. That circumstance has not been presented here. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Defendants King and Bernard failed to 

properly address his complaints or agree with his contentions is insufficient to support a 

plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. As an initial 

matter, Plaintiff has not shown that a constitutional violation occurred with respect to any 

of the issues grieved. Additionally, Plaintiff has provided insufficient detail regarding the 

information presented to Defendants through the grievance process to show that they 

willfully turned a blind eye to any constitutional violations. 

E. Equal Protection

Plaintiff alleges he was denied the right to perform Sunrise Prayer Ceremonies in 

the small courtyard even though other religions were allowed to do so in the main 

courtyard. In this regard, Plaintiff may intend to allege an Equal Protection claim. 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 

(1985). An equal protection claim may be established by showing that the defendant 

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's membership in a 

protected class, Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Lazy Y 

Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of 

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Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008). To allege a religious discrimination claim, 

Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that prison officials intentionally discriminated 

against him on the basis of his religion by failing to provide him a reasonable opportunity 

to pursue his faith compared to other similarly situated religious groups. Cruz v. Beto, 

405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972) (per curiam).

Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants intentionally discriminated 

against him on the basis of his religion or that he was not provided a reasonable 

opportunity to pursue his faith compared to other similarly situated religious groups. 

Although Plaintiff alleges that he was prevented from engaging in Sunrise Prayer 

Ceremonies in a similar manner to other groups, he has not stated whether he was 

provided other reasonable opportunities to conduct such ceremonies or otherwise 

pursue his faith.

F. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of 

respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable 

if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 

(9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has not alleged any unconstitutional conduct on the part of Defendant 

Collins. Indeed, it appears that Collins was responsible for resolving many of Plaintiff’s 

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issues with other staff. The Court cannot ascertain any basis for liability on the part of 

Collins.

The only allegation against Defendant Price is that he participated in an

“underground sub-review committee” for contraband property. However, Plaintiff states 

that his confiscated property ultimately was not reviewed by this committee. Thus, 

Plaintiff fails to explain how this Defendant may have participated in the violation of his 

rights.

G. False Police Report

Plaintiff already was advised that his allegation that Defendant Rivera filed a false 

police report against him is insufficient to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit has recognized 

“a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal 

charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the 

government.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001); see also

Costanich v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(relying on Devereaux to hold that a state investigator “who deliberately mischaracterizes 

witness statements in her investigative report also commits a constitutional violation”).

To state such a claim, Plaintiff must point to evidence that supports at least one of the 

following two propositions: “(1) Defendants continued their investigation of [Plaintiff] 

despite the fact that they knew or should have known that he was innocent; or (2) 

Defendants used investigative techniques that were so coercive and abusive that they 

knew or should have known that those techniques would yield false information.” 

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. He has not done so. Plaintiff was advised of this defect 

but nonetheless has not alleged such facts, nor has he alleged whether he was 

subjected to criminal charges.

H. Excessive Force

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff from the use of excessive force that 

amounts to punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th 

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Cir. 2002) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10). In resolving claims of excessive force 

brought by detainees, the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard 

applies. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); Andrews v. Neer, 253 

F.3d 1052, 1061-62 (9th Cir.2001). In applying this standard, “a court must also account 

for the legitimate interests that stem from the government's need to manage the facility 

in which the individual is detained, appropriately deferring to policies and practices that 

in the judgment of [staff] are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to 

maintain institutional security. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979)).

“Considerations such as the following may bear on the reasonableness or 

unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the need for the use of 

force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by 

the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at 

issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was 

actively resisting.” Id.

Plaintiff states that excessive force was used against him during the August 29, 

2014 search of his room, and that he was injured. However, he provides no greater 

details regarding this incident. Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that excessive force was 

used against him is insufficient to state a claim. This is particularly true where, as Plaintiff 

admits, the incident was precipitated by Plaintiff throwing something at staff. 

I. Native American Civil Rights

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his “Native American Civil Rights.” 

To the extent Plaintiff intends to allege a violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304, his allegations fail to state a claim. The Act provides relief from

tribal action that violates certain specified civil rights. Here, Plaintiff raises no allegations 

of tribal action. And, in any event, the only federal cause of action available to enforce 

the Indian Civil Rights Act is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 25 U.S.C. 

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§ 1303, a remedy not implicated in this action. Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community of 

Ft. Belknap Reservation, 642 F.2d 276, 278-79 (9th Cir.1981).

J. Joint Resolution of 1978

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct violates the Joint Resolution of 1978. 

Presumably, this is a reference to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (“AIRFA”), 

enacted by a joint resolution of Congress in 1978. “The AIRFA is a joint resolution of

Congress that establishes the ‘policy of the United States to protect and preserve for 

American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise [their] 

traditional religions . . . , including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession 

of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.’” 

Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1996).

The Supreme Court has held that the AIRFA is simply a policy statement that is 

judicially unenforceable. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 

439, 455 (1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the AIRFA.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The first amended complaint does not state a cognizable claim for relief. The 

Court will provide Plaintiff with one final opportunity to file an amended complaint that 

cures the noted deficiencies. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If 

Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Plaintiff should focus his attention on curing the deficiencies described in this screening 

order.

Plaintiff further is advised that he may not change the nature of this suit by adding 

new, unrelated claims in his second amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007). Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, 

Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012), and must be “complete in 

itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint (ECF No. 11) is DISMISSED for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights amended complaint 

form and a copy of his first amended complaint filed June 18, 2015, 

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a 

first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal, 

this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a court 

order and failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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