Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02513/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SABRINA MUHAMMAD, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v. 

REESE LAW GROUP, APC; and FORD 

MOTOR AND CREDIT COMPANY, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv2513-MMA (BGS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 

FORD MOTOR CREDIT 

COMPANY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 15]

Plaintiff Sabrina Muhammad (“Plaintiff”) brings two causes of action against 

Defendant Reese Law Group (“Reese”) and Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company, 

LLC1

 (“Ford,” collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), and California’s 

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code § 1788 et seq. 

(“Rosenthal Act”). See Complaint. On January 23, 2017, the Court granted Reese’s anti-

                                               

1

 Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC was erroneously sued as Ford Motor and Credit Company. 

See Doc. No. 10 at 2. 

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SLAPP motion, dismissing Plaintiff’s Rosenthal Act claims against Reese with prejudice. 

Doc. No. 31. Ford now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 15. Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to Ford’s motion, to which Ford replied. See Doc. Nos. 30, 34. The Court 

found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 36. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court GRANTS Ford’s motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff Sabrina Muhammad is an individual residing in Orange County, 

California. Reese is a law firm headquartered in San Diego, California, which conducts 

business in the state of California. Ford is headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan, and 

employs the services of Reese to collect alleged debts on its behalf. 

 On June 16, 1997, Plaintiff leased a Ford Explorer from the Theodore Robins Ford 

car dealership. The car dealership assigned the motor vehicle lease to Ford Credit. 

Plaintiff defaulted on the debt. In June 2000, Ford’s collection counsel, Reese, “filed suit 

against Plaintiff for the balance owed on the motor vehicle lease.” Doc. No. 15-1 at 3. 

On or about March 30, 2001, Ford secured a money judgment against Plaintiff in the 

Orange County Superior Court in the amount of $11,674.04. Defendants did not attempt 

to collect any money for approximately two years. On or about July 28, 2003, 

Defendants obtained a Writ of Execution directing the Orange County Sheriff’s Office to 

collect $14,346.64 from Plaintiff. 

On or about September 30, 2003, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office commenced 

garnishing Plaintiff’s wages pursuant to an Earnings Withholding Order. On or about 

July 17, 2009, Defendants applied for a renewal of the money judgment entered against 

                                               

2

 Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true 

all material allegations in the complaint and must also construe the complaint, and all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 

895 (9th Cir. 2002). All facts are taken from the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) unless otherwise noted. 

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Plaintiff. In its application, Defendants alleged Plaintiff owed $12,462.20. Defendants 

filed a “Memorandum of Costs After Judgment, Acknowledgment of Credit, and 

Declaration of Accrued Interest” with the Orange County Superior Court attesting to 

Plaintiff owing $768.16 in accrued interest. Complaint ¶ 27. 

On or about November 8, 2010, Plaintiff took a leave of absence from her 

employment with the Internal Revenue Service due to a medical condition. Plaintiff 

remained on non-pay status for approximately one year. On or about November 24, 

2010, Defendants ceased garnishing Plaintiff’s wages in Orange County. At this time, 

Plaintiff allegedly owed $3,284.00 on the money judgment. 

On or about June 3, 2011, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office returned an 

“Execution Return – Earnings Withholding Order” to Reese, and the Orange County 

Superior Court, deeming the money judgment against Plaintiff to be “partially satisfied.” 

Complaint ¶ 31. This document certified that the Sheriff’s Office collected a total of 

$13,015.24 from Plaintiff. Of that amount, $11,126.24 was allocated to the money 

judgment, and $1,889.00 was paid to the Sheriff’s Office for fees and expenses incurred. 

On or about November 9, 2011, Reese filed a “Memorandum of Costs After 

Judgment, Acknowledgement of Credit, and Declaration of Accrued Interest” with the 

Orange County Superior Court attesting to Plaintiff owing $1,070.48 of accrued interest, 

despite the fact that the money judgment had been deemed “partially satisfied.” 

Complaint ¶ 32. On or about June 22, 2012, Reese obtained a Writ of Execution 

directing the Orange County Sheriff to collect $13,007.82 from Plaintiff. 

On or about November 30, 2015, more than five years after Defendants ceased 

garnishing Plaintiff’s wages, Reese filed an additional “Memorandum of Costs After 

Judgment, Acknowledgement of Credit, and Declaration of Accrued Interest” in the 

Orange County Superior Court, claiming Plaintiff owes $5,887.64 of accrued interest. 

On or about December 2, 2015, Reese obtained a Writ of Execution in San Diego 

County, directing the San Diego County Sheriff to collect a total of $17,024.98 from 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff has never resided or worked in San Diego County. The original 

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contract between Plaintiff and Ford was executed in Orange County. On or about 

January 6, 2016, the San Diego County Sheriff’s Office issued an Earnings Withholding 

Order to Plaintiff’s employer, stating Plaintiff owed $17,986.09 pursuant to the money 

judgment originally obtained against Plaintiff on or about March 30, 2001. On or about 

January 27, 2016, Plaintiff drove from Orange County to San Diego to file a “Claim for 

Exemption,” contesting the amount Defendants sought to garnish from her wages. In 

February 2016, the San Diego County Sheriff’s Office began garnishing Plaintiff’s 

wages. 

Plaintiff asserts that despite having no ties to San Diego County, Defendants 

“continue to garnish Plaintiff’s wages pursuant to the Earnings Withholding Order filed 

with the San Diego County Sheriff’s Office on or about January 6, 2016.” Complaint ¶ 

45. Plaintiff alleges she has taken time off of work to travel to San Diego County to 

“prevent Defendants from continuing to illegally garnish her wages.” Complaint ¶ 46. 

As a result, Plaintiff asserts she “has suffered emotional distress with manifestations 

including, but not limited to, loss of appetite, inability to sleep, marital discord, anxiety, 

and paranoia.” Complaint ¶ 47. On October 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant action 

against Defendants alleging violations of the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Request for Judicial Notice 

Generally, a court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and supplies the 

court with the requisite information. Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). “A judicially noticed fact 

must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known 

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready 

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67, 70 

(9th Cir. 1956)). While a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, it 

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may not take judicial notice of a fact that is subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). 

B. 12(b)(6) 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). The plausibility standard thus demands more than a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint “must 

contain allegations of underlying facts sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011). 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to 

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not 

look beyond the complaint for additional facts. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 

908 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents 

attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or 

matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment.” Id.; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001). “However, [courts] are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations 

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which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Steckman v. Hart 

Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 1998). Where dismissal is appropriate, a 

court should grant leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects 

in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). 

DISCUSSION

A. Ford’s Request for Judicial Notice 

 As an initial matter, Ford requests the Court take judicial notice of two documents 

in connection with its motion to dismiss. See Doc. Nos. 16-1, 35-1. The first document 

is a copy of the executed Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement entered into between Plaintiff 

and Ford on June 19, 1997. Doc. No. 16-1. The second document is a copy of this 

Court’s Order granting Defendant Reese Law Group’s anti-SLAPP motion. Doc. No. 35-

1. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendant’s request for judicial notice. 

 The Court finds the authenticity of the parties’ Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement is 

not subject to reasonable dispute, and GRANTS Ford’s request for judicial notice of this 

document. Additionally, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Ford’s request for judicial 

notice of this Court’s Order granting Reese’s anti-SLAPP motion, as the Court need not 

take judicial notice of previous Orders issued by the Court in this action. 

B. Ford’s Motion to Dismiss 

While Plaintiff refers to Reese and Ford as “Defendants” without specifying the 

individual acts of each party in her Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that Ford “employed 

the services of REESE LAW GROUP to collect an alleged debt from Plaintiff.” 

Complaint ¶ 13. Plaintiff’s Complaint clarifies that the terms “‘Defendant’ and 

‘Defendants’ refer to all defendants, named and unnamed, as Plaintiff alleges each to be 

jointly and severally liable for the conduct alleged herein.” Complaint ¶ 14. In her 

opposition, Plaintiff states, “Defendant Ford Motor Credit hired Reese Law Group to 

collect the debt, making Defendant Ford Motor Credit responsible for all the actions of 

their attorneys.” Doc. No. 30 at 1. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts Ford is “vicarious[ly] 

liable for [Reese’s] actions.” Id. at 3. As such, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

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together with her opposition to Ford’s motion to dismiss, as alleging that Ford is liable 

under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act based on a theory of vicarious liability. 

1. FDCPA 

“Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1968 in response to ‘abundant evidence of the 

use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors 

[which] contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the 

loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.’” Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney 

Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)). 

Plaintiff alleges various violations of the FDCPA. Specifically, Plaintiff claims 

Defendants engaged “in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass[,] oppress, 

or abuse Plaintiff” in violation of Section 1692d; used “false, deceptive, or misleading 

representations or means in connection with collection of an alleged debt from Plaintiff” 

in violation of Section 1692e; used “false representations and deceptive practices” in 

collecting the alleged debt in violation of Section 1692e(10); used “unfair or 

unconscionable means against Plaintiff in connection with an attempt to collect a debt” in 

violation of Section 1692f; and brought a legal action against Plaintiff in an improper 

venue in violation of Section 1692i(a)(2). Complaint ¶ 52(a)-(e). 

Ford contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the FDCPA because as a 

threshold issue, Ford is not a “debt collector” as defined by the statute. See Doc. No. 15-

1 at 4. In opposition, Plaintiff does not address Ford’s argument that it is not a debt 

collector. Instead, Plaintiff claims Ford is vicariously liable for employing Reese to 

collect a debt on its behalf. See Doc. No. 30 at 2-3. 

“To be held liable for violation of the FDCPA, a defendant must—as a threshold 

requirement—fall within the Act’s definition of ‘debt collector.’” Izenberg v. ETS Servs., 

LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2008). The FDCPA defines the term “debt 

collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the 

mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or 

who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 

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asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). The Ninth 

Circuit has held that debt collectors can be vicariously liable under the FDCPA for the 

conduct of their attorneys in collecting debts on their behalf. See Fox v. Citicorp, 15 F.3d 

1507, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994). “General principles of agency form the basis of vicarious 

liability under the FDCPA.” Breidenbach v. Experian, 2013 WL 1010565, at *3 (S.D. 

Cal. Mar. 13, 2013). In order to be liable for the actions of another, “the ‘principal’ must 

exercise control over the conduct or activities of the ‘agent.’” Clark v. Capital Credit & 

Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006). However, various circuit 

courts have held that “because the FDCPA only imposes liability on debt collectors, 

vicarious liability may only be imposed if both the principal and the agent are debt 

collector[s] as defined by the FDCPA.” Breidenbach, 2013 WL 1010565, at *3 

(emphasis added); see Police v. Nat’l Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 404 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(concluding that a company may be held vicariously liable for acts of its agent because 

the company and agent were debt collectors); Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 76 

F.3d 103, 108 (6th Cir. 1996) (declining to impose vicarious liability on non-debt 

collectors); Fox, 15 F.3d at 1513 (imposing vicarious liability on company for acts of its 

attorney where company was also a debt collector); Oei v. N. Star Capital Acquisitions, 

LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (stating “[v]icarious liability under the 

[FDCPA] has similarly been restricted to principals who themselves are statutory ‘debt 

collectors.’”); but see Huy Thanh Vo v. Nelson & Kennard, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1090 

(E.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting Oei and Police and holding that non-debt collector creditors 

can be vicariously liable for their attorneys’ actions under the FDCPA). 

 Here, the Court is persuaded by the weight of authority restricting FDCPA liability 

to entities that fit the statutory definition of “debt collector” as set forth in § 1692a(6). 

Plaintiff does not allege that Ford is itself a debt collector as defined by the statute. 

Rather, Plaintiff concedes that she is alleged to “formally owe a debt to Ford Motor 

Credit Company.” Complaint ¶ 19. Further, Plaintiff claims “Ford Motor Credit 

Company secured a money judgment against Plaintiff.” Complaint ¶ 20. Thus, Plaintiff 

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acknowledges Ford took action to collect its own debt—not the debt “of another” as 

required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). As such, Plaintiff fails to state a FDCPA claim against 

Ford on a theory of vicarious liability. Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot allege that 

Ford is a “debt collector” as defined under the FDCPA, the Court GRANTS Ford’s 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims against Ford with prejudice.

3

 

2. Rosenthal Act 

Plaintiff further alleges Defendants violated Sections 1788.15(a) and 1788.15(b) of 

the Rosenthal Act. Complaint ¶ 64(a)-(b). Section 1788.15(a) provides in full, “[n]o 

debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect a consumer debt by means of judicial 

proceedings when the debt collector knows that service of process, where essential to 

jurisdiction over the debtor or his property, has not been legally effected.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1788.15(a). Section 1788.15(b) provides: 

No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect a consumer debt, other 

than one reduced to judgment, by means of judicial proceedings in a county 

other than the county in which the debtor has incurred the consumer debt or 

the county in which the debtor resides at the time such proceedings are 

instituted, or resided at the time the debt was incurred. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.15(b) (emphasis added). 

In its motion to dismiss, filed December 13, 2016, Ford asserts Plaintiff cannot 

state a claim under the Rosenthal Act because (a) a vehicle lease is not a “consumer 

credit transaction” as defined under the Rosenthal Act; and (b) the Rosenthal Act does 

not impute the “litigation activity” of Ford’s attorneys to Ford Motor Credit Company. 

See Doc. No. 15-1 at 6-8. Plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss on 

                                               

3

 As such, the Court similarly DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1788.17 of the 

Rosenthal Act, which incorporates various provisions of the FDCPA, against Ford with prejudice. 

“The Rosenthal Act requires compliance with the FDCPA and a debt collector that violates the FDCPA 

also violates the Rosenthal Act.” Gold, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1078; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. 

Because Plaintiff cannot allege that Ford is liable under the FDCPA, Plaintiff similarly cannot allege 

Ford is liable under Section 1788.17. Thus, the Court proceeds by analyzing Plaintiff’s additional 

theories of liability under the Rosenthal Act. 

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January 22, 2017. Doc. No. 30. The following day, the Court issued its Order granting 

Reese’s anti-SLAPP motion. Doc. No. 31. Ford filed its reply brief on January 30, 2017, 

arguing that because the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Rosenthal Act claims against Reese 

with prejudice, Ford cannot be held vicariously liable for claims that no longer exist.4

 

See Doc. No. 34 at 3. 

Here, the Court agrees that because Plaintiff does not allege any basis of liability 

against Ford that is separate and apart from that of Reese, Plaintiff’s Rosenthal Act 

claims against Ford fail for the same reason they fail against Reese. See Doc. No. 31 at 9 

(“Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support [her 1788.15(a)] allegation. Such a 

conclusory statement, without more, is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability 

of prevailing on her Section 1788.15(a) claim.”); Doc. No. 31 at 9 (“Because Ford 

secured a money judgment, Section 1788.15(b) does not apply to the case at bar. Thus, 

Plaintiff fails to establish a probability of prevailing on her claim under section 

1788.15(b).”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Ford’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

remaining Rosenthal Act claims against Ford with prejudice.

5

 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

 / / / 

/ / / 

                                               

4

 While a party ordinarily may not submit new evidence in a reply brief, the Court’s Order 

granting Reese’s anti-SLAPP motion cannot be considered “new evidence.” The Court’s Order, issued 

after Ford filed the instant motion, altered the landscape of this litigation. Accordingly, the Court must 

address Ford’s liability, if any, in light of the Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Rosenthal Act claims against 

Reese with prejudice. 

5

 Because the Court grants Ford’s motion to dismiss on this ground, the Court need not consider 

Ford’s additional arguments in support of its motion to dismiss. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Ford’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FDCPA and Rosenthal Act claims 

against Ford with prejudice.

6

 The Clerk of Court is instructed to terminate Ford from 

this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 27, 2017

 _____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

United States District Judge 

                                               

6

 Dismissal is with prejudice because any amendment to cure the deficiencies addressed herein 

would be futile. See AE v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a district 

court abuses its discretion by denying leave to amend unless amendment would be futile or the plaintiff 

has failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies despite repeated opportunities.”). 

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