Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01330/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01330-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WIEGELE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-01330-JM(POR)

ORDER DENYING OBJECTIONS

TO DISCOVERY ORDER;

LIFTING STAY OF DISCOVERY

vs.

FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM,

Defendant.

Defendant FedEx Ground Package System (“Fedex”) objects to Magistrate Judge Porter’s

December 12, 2006 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Issuing Limited Protective

Order (“Discovery Order”). Plaintiff opposes the Objections. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), this

matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court

denies the Objections to the Discovery Order. The court also lifts the stay of discovery entered on

December 28, 2006.

BACKGROUND

On June 26, 2006 Fedex removed this state wage and hour law case to federal court pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§1332(d)(2) and 1441(a)-(c), based upon diversity jurisdiction and that the amount in

controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interests and costs. Plaintiff, an employee of Fedex,

generally alleges that he was paid a salary for his duties while working as a “Sort Manager,” “Service

Manager,” “Pick Up and Delivery Sort Manager,” and “Outbound Sort Manager.” (Compl. ¶7).

Plaintiff generally alleges that he and similarly situated former and current Fedex employees

performed non-exempt work in excess of the maximum regular rate set by the Industrial Welfare

Case 3:06-cv-01330-AJB-POR Document 33 Filed 02/08/07 Page 1 of 6
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Commission. Contrary to California law, Plaintiff alleges that Fedex failed to pay Plaintiff and all

similarly situated individuals overtime compensation and rest and meal compensation (Compl. ¶7-8,

15-17, 22-28). No class has yet to be certified.

At issue here are two interrogatories propounded by Plaintiff. Special Interrogatory No. 1

requests the names, last known home addresses, home telephone numbers, and email addresses of

formerly-employed Pickup and Delivery Managers, Service Managers, Sort Managers, Pre-Load Sort

Managers, and related positions. Special Interrogatory No. 2 requests the same information but with

regard to currently employed individuals in the same positions. Magistrate Judge Porter ordered

Fedex to provide the “names, last known home addresses and home telephone numbers, and email

addresses of formerly and currently-employed” similarly situated individuals. (Discovery Order at

p.3:17-10). In addition, Judge Porter entered a protective order to limit disclosure of the discovery

to Plaintiff’s counsel, their investigators and experts, and not to any individual plaintiff. 

In the Objections, Fedex argues that (1) the Discovery Order circumvents the privacy rights

of putative class members and (2) requiring production of the e-mail addresses of Fedex employees

will result in a disruption to Fedex’s business and operations.

THE OBJECTIONS

Legal Standards

This court may set aside or modify a Magistrate Judge’s discovery order only if found to be

“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed.R.Civl.P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A); Bhan v. NME

Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1414 (9th Cir. 1991). While findings of fact are reviewed under the

clearly erroneous standard of review, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See United States v.

McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1984). Each objection is discussed in turn.

The Privacy Issue

The thrust of Fedex’s argument is that disclosure of putative class members’ names and

addresses is constitutionally protected from compelled disclosure. Fedex also contends that the

Discovery Order should have required that any contact with putative class members be initiated

through a neutral third party. The court rejects these Objections.

/ / / 

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1 The court notes that the identified employees are likely percipient witnesses to Plaintiff’s wage and

hour claims. Not only will any contact by Plaintiff’s counsel be minimally intrusive, but it will also inform

similarly situated individuals about Plaintiff’s alleged wage and hour claims and alert them that they may have

a significant wage and hour claim .

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When the constitutional right of privacy is involved, “the party seeking discovery must

demonstrate a compelling need for discovery, and that compelling need must be so strong as to

outweigh the privacy right when these two competing interests are carefully balanced.” Lantz v.

Superior Court, 28 Cal.App. 4th 1839, 1853-54 (1994). Compelled discovery within the realm of the

right of privacy “cannot be justified solely on the ground that it may lead to relevant information.”

Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 844, 856 (1978). “Even when discovery of private information is

found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there

must then be a ‘careful balancing’ of the ‘compelling public need’ for discovery against the

‘fundamental right of privacy.’” Lantz, 28 Cal.App.4th at 1854 (citations omitted). 

Here, the Magistrate Judge properly balanced Plaintiff’s need and due process right to conduct

discovery on class action issues, see Bartold v. Glendale Federal Bank, 81 Cal.App.3d 867, 873 (2000)

(due process requires an opportunity to conduct discovery on class action issues prior to class

certification proceedings, and discovery of putative plaintiffs’ names and addresses should be

provided before the class is certified, not after), against the putative plaintiffs’ right to privacy. In

analyzing the issue, the Magistrate Judge was persuaded by the reasoning in a similar wage and hour

dispute. In Jimenez v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, Case No. 04cv11107 JVS(RCx), 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 66510 (January 11, 2006) the court held: 

“Wage and hour disputes (and others in the same general class) routinely proceed as

class actions.” Prince v. CLS Transportation, Inc., 118 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1328, 13

Cal.Rptr. 3d 725 (2004). “[A]s a general rule, before class certification has taken

place, all parties are entitled to ‘equal access to persons who potentially have an

interest in or relevant knowledge of the subject of the action, but who are not yet

parties.” Koo v. Rubio’s Restaurants, Inc. 109 Cal.App.4th 719 (2003).

Jimenez, 2006 LEXIS 66510 at *5. Here, the Magistrate Judge determined that putative class

members possess relevant discoverable information concerning issues dealing with Plaintiff’s wage

and hour claims, as well as class certification issues.1 Further, the privacy interests at stake in the

names, addresses, and phone numbers must be distinguished from those more intimate privacy

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interests such as compelled disclosure of medical records and personal histories. Moreover, the

Magistrate Judge imposed a protective order to assure that the information provided to Plaintiff is

protected from disclosure. The discovery, concerning approximately 250 to 500 current or former

Fedex employees, is to be produced to Plaintiff’s counsel only, can only be used in this litigation, and

provides that any disclosure to the court must be redacted to preserve the identities of the putative

plaintiffs. (Discovery Order at p.3:22-4:3). Under these circumstances, the Discovery Order is not

clearly erroneous as the potential privacy interests of putative class members are adequately balanced

to protect Plaintiff’s ability to prosecute this action.

Fedex contends that Experian Information Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 138 Cal.App.4th

122 (2006) and Best Buy Stores L.P. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.App.4th 778 (2006) provide

persuasive authority to support its claim that a neutral third party should be appointed to contact

putative class members. This argument is not persuasive. In Experian, the defendant Experian and

the plaintiff voluntarily entered into a stipulated protective order whereby Experian would provide the

identifies of all putative class members in order to permit plaintiff to “conduct discovery . . . regarding

class certification.” Experian, 138 Cal.App.4th at 126. After denial of the motion for class

certification on the ground that individual issues predominated, plaintiff requested relief from the

protective order in order to contact once putative class members to inform them “that they might have

claims subject to running statutes of limitations and requesting each recipient’s consent to be

contacted by [plaintiff’s] counsel to determine whether he or she has evidence relating to the issue of

[Plaintiff’s] damages.” Id. at 127. The trial court then balanced the need for the discovery against the

individual’s right to privacy. The court initially denied the request but then plaintiff’s counsel

suggested that contact be made by letter through a neutral third party. The trial court then approved

the modified proposed letter notice. Experian then petitioned for a writ of mandate, raising two issues

pertinent here: (1) whether, after denial of class certification, there is any legal basis permitting letter

notification of former putative class members of potential claims and (2) whether that portion of the

letter notification dealing with discovery adequately protected the recipients’ privacy rights. 

On the issue of permitting contact with any putative class member, the appellate court reversed

the trial court holding that “there is no legal basis supporting court-approved notifications of possible

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rights to putative class members after a motion for class certification has been denied.” Experian. 138

Cal.App.4th at 131. On the issue of discovery, the court noted that the requested discovery on the

punitive damages issue was relevant and a proper subject for discovery. However, in balancing the

need for disclosure against the recipient’s privacy rights, the appellate court required greater

protections of the recipient’s privacy rights and identified six specific items to be either included or

deleted from the letter notice. Notably, the Experian court did not establish a black letter rule

requiring that such disclosures can only be made through a neutral third party.

In Best Buy, the plaintiff, an attorney, sought to bring a class action with himself acting as both

class representative and class counsel. Plaintiff alleged that Best Buy charged an alleged illegal

restocking fee for returned merchandise. When informed by the trial court that plaintiff could not

serve as both class representative and class counsel, he sought leave of court to have notice sent to

putative class members “to seek a new class representative.” 137 Cal.App.4th at 775. The trial court

approved the request and required notice be provided by a neutral third party. Defendant Best Buy

then petitioned for a writ of mandate, seeking review of five issues, only one relevant here: whether

the order and letter notice adequately protected the recipients’ privacy rights. The appellate court

denied the writ on all issues raised, but required that the letter notice provide greater privacy

protections for the recipients. Among other things, the letter notice was required to state that the

notice could be ignored and that the identify of the recipient would not be disclosed to plaintiff unless

the recipient provided written consent. 

The court notes that both Experian and Best Buy applied the same general legal standard

applied by the Magistrate Judge here, that is, a balancing of the compelled need for discovery and the

recipient’s privacy rights. See Lantz, 28 Cal.App. 4th at 1853-54. Experian and Best Buy are

distinguishable from the case at bar in the nature of the claims asserted, the rights to be vindicated,

and the procedural posture of the cases. Significantly, Experian and Best Buy do not stand for the

proposition that contact of putative class members may only occur through a neutral third party. As

noted in Koo v. Rubio’s Restaurants, Inc., 109 Cal.App.4th 719, 736 (2003), 

[B]efore class certification has taken place, all parties are entitled to “equal access to

persons who potentially have an interest in or relevant knowledge of the subject of the

action, but who are not yet parties.” (Atari, Inc. v. superior Court, supra, 166

Cal.App.3d at p. 869.) Moreover cases have stressed “the importance of permitting

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named plaintiffs to communicate with persons for whose benefit their action was

ostensibly filed.” (Citations omitted).

Finally, the court notes that the Discovery Order includes a protective order to limit the

disclosure of any confidential information thereby further protecting the privacy rights of putative

class members. Further, any contact by Plaintiff’s counsel with putative class members must be

reasonable and comply with California Rules of Professional Conduct. 

In sum, the Discovery Order is narrowly tailored to balance Plaintiff’s right to conduct

discovery with the privacy interests of putative class members. Under these circumstances, the court

rejects Fedex’s Objections and lifts the stay of discovery imposed by this court.

The e-mail Issue

Fedex argues that it should not be compelled to provide the e-mail addresses of the 250 to 500

Fedex employees at issue because, among other things, increased e-mail traffic could threaten or

cripple the company’s e-mail system. (Stormfels Decl. ¶¶2-4). Further, Fedex argues that the e-mails

will likely be opened by the recipients during business hours and potentially threaten its time sensitive

delivery business. (Stormfels Decl. ¶5).

The court notes that this argument was not specifically raised before Magistrate Judge Porter.

Consequently, there is no record to review. Under these circumstances, the court declines to review

this claim. Should it desire to do so, Fedex may bring this argument before Magistrate Judge Porter.

In sum, the court denies the Objections and lifts the stay of discovery.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 8, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

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