Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01438/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01438-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 81989 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT 

GARY L. BOEHM, JAMES L. DANIEL, ) 

GEROLD R. FIRESTONE, THOMAS J. ) 

HAGGERTY, DONALD L. JONES, ) 

JIMMY R. LEWIS, ROBERT N. MADRIGAL, ) 

and JESS J. THOMPSON, ) 

v. 

Plaintiffs-Appellants 

and Cross-Appellees, 

KANSAS CITY POWER AND LIGHT 

COMPANY and W.H. MILLER, 

Def endants-Appellees 

and Cross-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Nos. 87-1438 

& 87-1462 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 84-2070-S) 

Michael A. Preston (Gregory J. Pappas with him on the brief), of 

McDonald, Preston & Louk, Chartered, Overland Park, Kansas, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Stanley E. Craven (David L. Wing with him on the brief), of 

Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Kansas City, Missouri, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 1 
This case involves a dispute about overtime pay under the 

Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-19. 1 The principal 

issue is whether plaintiffs should be paid overtime compensation 

by their employer for the time that they spend "on call." We 

conclude that plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime compensation 

for that time. 

Plaintiffs are power-company linemen who claim that they 

should be paid overtime compensation 24 hours a day (in excess of 

their base 40 hours per week) because the defendant power company 

requires them to be available on a stand-by basis to work during 

storms and other emergencies. It is undisputed that part of the 

job of being a power-company linemen is the obligation to work 

overtime when storms and other emergencies occur so that power can 

be restored as quickly as possible. In the past, whenever a storm 

or other emergency occurred, the company simply would telephone 

some or all of its linemen and request that they report for 

overtime work. Prior to the events leading to the dispute here, 

1 The Act provides, in pertinent part: 

Except as otherwise provided in this section, 

no employer shall employ any of his employees 

who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or 

in the production of goods for commerce, or is 

employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce 

or in the production of goods for commerce, 

for a workweek longer than forty hours unless 

such employee receives compensation for his 

employment in excess of the hours above 

specified at a rate not less than one and onehalf times the regular rate at which he is 

employed. 

29 u.s.c. § 207(a)(l). 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 2 
the company had no trouble in obtaining sufficient volunteers for 

those "call-outs." 

In 1982, the company and the plaintiffs' union were 

negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. As 

negotiations continued, the union instituted an overtime boycott. 

When the company required an emergency call-out, the linemen 

generally were "not home" or had left their telephones off the 

hook. Because of the boycott, the company was forced to cover all 

emergencies with non-union supervisory personnel. 

On September 19, 1983, in order to counter the boycott, the 

company instituted a formal call-out policy. The policy basically 

required linemen to be reachable and to accept call-outs 

approximately one-third of the time that they were called, or face 

progressive discipline. 

The policy worked like this. The company required each 

lineman to "report for work an average of at least once for each 

three counted call-outs made" to the lineman. (R. 1, Exh. B.} 

The company did not count more than one call-out per calendar day, 

no matter how many attempts were made to reach the employee during 

that day. Call-outs were not counted on days when the employee 

was excused from overtime work, such as days of vacation, 

restricted duty, jury duty, or when deaths in the family had 

occurred. Call-outs were not counted if the employee was ill or 

injured. Only one call-out was counted during a weekend and 

adjacent holidays (until the employee had accumulated ten counted 

call-outs}. The policy provided for progressive discipline for 

linemen whose responses fell below the required average. The 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 3 
discipline consisted of step one, a written warning; step two, a 

three-day suspension and final written warning; and step three, 

discharge. An employee in any of the progressive disciplinary 

steps could revert back one step if the employee maintained a 

satisfactory record for the longer of ten counted calls or one 

year. Any employee who believed he had extenuating circumstances 

for missing a call-out could pursue an internal grievance 

procedure. 

The company based ·the one-third response standard on the 

average response rate during the pre-boycott years. On February 

22, 1984, the company amended the policy to provide that the 

linemen at any time could leave an alternative telephone number 

where they might be reached if they were not at their usual 

telephone number. 

Approximately 200 linemen filed suit, alleging basically that 

the September 19, 1983 policy caused them to be "employed • 

twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days a week" and 

entitled them to overtime pay for that entire period (beyond their 

base 40 hours per week). (Second Amended Complaint, R. 45 at 7.) 2 

The parties agreed to litigate the claims of eight of the 200 

plaintiffs as a "test case." 

At the outset, the district court denied the company's motion 

for summary judgment. The district court held that although the 

policy on its face was not "so restrictive that it can be said 

2 In the alternative, plaintiffs sought "overtime compensation · ••• [for] the time actually spent at home waiting to be engaged 

by the overtime callout policy," although it is unclear how that 

time would be calculated. (Pretrial Order, R. 41 at 4.) 

-4-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 4 
that plaintiffs cannot use their off-duty time primarily for their 

own purposes," plaintiffs had the right to show that the policy as 

implemented caused them to spend time primarily for their 

employer's benefit. (Oct. 11, 1985 Order at 5-6.) 

In February 1986, the district court held a trial, which 

resulted in a hung jury. At the end of the trial, the district 

court granted the company's motion for a partial directed verdict 

concerning claims arising after February 22, 1984, the date when 

the company instituted the alternate telephone number policy. The 

district court held that the company could not be liable for any 

overtime compensation after that date. In light of that ruling, 

the district court granted a full directed verdict against one of 

the plaintiffs, Boehm, because all of his alleged damages occurred 

after February 22, 1984. 

In November 1986, the district court held a second trial. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the company on the claims 

of five of the eight test plaintiffs (plaintiffs Daniel, Haggerty, 

Jones, Lewis, and Thompson). The jury returned a verdict in favor 

of the two remaining plaintiffs, Firestone and Madrigal, for 

$3,789 and $4,443 respectively. The district court granted 

remittitur as to plaintiff Madrigal because the jury's award 

exceeded the amount of lost overtime pay shown by him at trial. 

The district court entered judgment accordingly. 

Plaintiffs appeal from the partial directed verdict against 

them in the first trial and from the jury verdict against some of 

them in the second trial. Plaintiffs also assert that the 

district court erred in ruling upon various motions in limine 

-5-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 5 
filed by both sides. Defendants (the company and one of its 

officers) cross-appeal.from the jury verdict in favor of 

plaintiffs Firestone and Madrigal. Defendants assert that (1) the 

district court erred by not granting them a directed verdict as to 

all plaintiffs after the first trial, and (2) the district court 

erred by not granting them judgment notwithstanding the verdict as 

to plaintiffs Firestone and Madrigal after the second trial. The 

district court certified its judgment concerning the claims of the 

eight test plaintiffs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

Discussion 

In our view, this case is controlled by Norton v. Worthen Van 

Service, Inc., 839 F.2d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 1988), in which we 

concluded that the employees there "should not be compensated for 

being on call" when they are free to leave their employer's 

premises and to pursue personal activities. The plaintiffs in 

Norton were van drivers who, during certain times, were required 

to be "near enough to the employer's premises to be able to 

respond to [telephone] calls within fifteen to twenty minutes." 

Id. Under the employer's policy in Norton, "[i]f a driver fails 

to promptly respond to a dispatcher's call, he is disciplined by 

the company. A driver may be fired if he is disciplined three 

times." Id. 

Like the plaintiffs here, the plaintiffs in Norton filed suit 

for back pay and overtime compensation for the time that they 

spent on call. The gist of the complaint in Norton was 

essentially identical to the one here -- that the employees were 

-6-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 6 
entitled to compensation because the company's on-call policy 

prevented them from using their off-duty time as they wished. 3 

We concluded in Norton that the drivers' on-call time was not 

so restrictive as to amount to working time. We emphasized that 

the drivers were free to leave the employer's premises and that 

they had the "opportunity to pursue personal business between 

assignments, even if being on call does limit their activity." 

839 F.2d at 655. We also pointed out that a "simple paging 

device, which the drivers are free to purchase and to use, would 

3 Indeed, the arguments of the Norton plaintiffs were nearly 

identical to those made by the plaintiffs in this case. In their 

brief on appeal, the Norton plaintiffs complained that the 

employer's policy effectively tied them to their homes and 

telephones: 

There are a host of personal, private pursuits 

that cannot be accomplished due to the strict 

mandate that on-call drivers be available at a 

moment's notice to respond to a call. For 

example, a driver who is waiting on call is 

effectively precluded from holding another 

job. • • • He is unable to take his children 

to the park to play, or to work on his car for 

fear he may not hear the phone, or to work on 

his car and otherwise be [able] to drive it 

anywhere •• 

839 F.2d at 654 n.l. The plaintiffs here make essentially the 

same arguments in their brief on appeal: 

(P]laintiffs ••• were not allowed sufficient 

time for their own personal use; they were not 

able to secure other employment during the 

time they were not working during their 

regular hours; they were tied down to their 

residences and homes; and further, a portion 

of the time spent waiting at home by their 

telephone for calls from defendants • • • has 

been predominantly for the defendants' 

benefit. 

Pl. Br. at 3-4. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 7 
have allayed the necessity of remaining by a phone." Id. at 655-

56. 

Norton's analysis comports with the Supreme Court's statement 

that the test for whether an employee's time constitutes working 

time is whether the "time is spent predominantly for the 

employer's benefit or for the employee's." Armour & Co. v. 

Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944). That test requires 

consideration of the agreement between the parties, the nature and 

extent of the restrictions, the relationship between the services 

rendered and the on-call time, and all surrounding circumstances. 

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944). 

In order to find error in the district court's denial of 

defendants' motion for a directed verdict, we must find that the 

"evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable 

inferences supporting the party [opposing the motion]; we must 

construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the 

nonmoving party." Zimmerman v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 

848 F.2d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 1988). Under that standard, we 

conclude that, although plaintiffs spent some time at home that 

they otherwise would not have spent because-of the company's oncall policy, defendant's call-out policy as written and as applied 

was not so restrictive that a jury reasonably could conclude that 

the time was spent predominantly for the employer's benefit. 

Plaintiffs were free to leave the company's premises and did so. 

Plaintiffs were free to use their off-duty time as they wished, 

provided that they could be contacted and report for work onethird of the time that they were called. See, ~; Dumas v. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 8 
King, 157 F.2d 463, 466 (8th Cir. 1946) (engineer at ice house 

need not be paid overtime for on-call time); Super-Cold Southwest 

Co. v. McBride, 124 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1941) (refrigerator 

serviceman need not be paid overtime for on-call time). 4 

The district court properly granted a directed verdict for 

claims arising after February 22, 1984, and the court should have 

granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict as to the claims 

of all plaintiffs at the end of the first trial because, even 

without the alternate telephone number policy, the defendants' oncall policy was not so restrictive as to entitle plaintiffs to 

overtime compensation.s In reaching that result, we are not 

4 See also Boll v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 

365--P:- Supp. 637, 647 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (bank examiners who must 

stay within a reasonable distance of the bank during non-working 

hours are not so restricted that they cannot use the time for 

their own use), aff'd, 497 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1974); Labor 

Department Interpetive Bulletin No. 13, 29 C.F.R. § 785.17 ("An 

employee who is not required to remain on the employer's premises 

but is merely required to leave word at his home or with company 

officials where he may be reached is not working while on call"). 

The cases cited by plaintiffs are inapposite. In Campbell v. 

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 70 F. Supp. 996, 997 (W.D. Pa. 

1947), the employees were required to remain at the employer's 

plant during their on-call time. In Aeromotive Metal Products, 

Inc. v. Wirtz, 312 F.2d 728, 729 (9th Cir. 1963), the employees' 

off-duty time was so limited in duration that, as a practical 

matter, the employees could not engage in meaningful personal 

activities during that time. No restrictions such as those are 

present here. 

5 The defendants specifically requested a directed verdict on 

that ground at the end of the first trial: 

Beyond guess, speculation and conjecture, 

there is no evidence, or no substantial 

evidence, demonstrating that the defendants' 

implementation of the overtime call-out policy· 

caused plaintiffs to spend time away from the 

Company premises predominantly for the benefit 

of the defendants. The jury cannot reasonably 

[footnote continued ••. ] 

-9-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 9 
persuaded that the district court erred in any of its motion in 

limine rulings.6 

Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment against plaintiff Boehm 

because the district court properly directed a verdict concerning 

claims arising after February 22, 1984. we also AFFIRM the 

judgment against plaintiffs Daniel, Haggerty, Jones, Lewis, and 

Thompson, but for a different reason than the district court's. 

We affirm the judgment against those five plaintiffs because the 

[ •.• footnote continued] 

find from the evidence that defendants are 

liable to plaintiffs for violations of the 

overtime provisions of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act, 29 u.s.c. § 207. 

Motion For Directed Verdict, R. 77 at 1. 

6 The district court properly granted defendants' motion in 

limine regarding plaintiffs' desire to introduce evidence 

concerning various lineman safety concerns. Under the facts of 

this case, those concerns were not relevant to the issue of 

whether plaintiffs were entitled to overtime compensation. 

Further, in light of our affirmance of the directed verdict 

concerning claims arising after February 22, 1984 and our decision 

that a full directed verdict against plaintiffs should have been 

entered after the first trial, the district court properly granted 

defendants' motion in limine in the second trial regarding events 

after February 22, 1984. Finally, the district court properly 

denied plaintiffs' motion in limine concerning evidence of 

plaintiffs' overtime boycott because the evidence was relevant to 

the issue of plaintiffs' credibility. In any event, none of the 

district court's rulings on the motions in limine is material to 

the ultimate result in this case because, regardless of those 

evidentiary rulings, we are convinced that the restrictions placed 

on plaintiffs' off-duty time were not so cumbersome as to cause 

the time to be spent predominantly for the employer's benefit. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; 28 u.s.c. § 2111; Asbill v. Housing 

Authority of the Choctaw Nation of Okla., 726 F.2d 1499, 1504 

(10th Cir. 1984) ("litmus test for reversal is whether the 

appellant was ••• unjustly prejudiced"). 

In light of. our disposition, we need not address defendants' 

contention that plaintiffs failed to present adequate proof 

linking their alleged extra work to.any particular 40 hour work 

week. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 10 
district court should have directed a verdict against them after 

the first trial. We REVERSE the judgment in favor of plaintiffs 

Firestone and Madrigal because the district court should have 

directed a verdict against them after the first trial. We REMAND 

the case to the district court for entry of judgment against 

plaintiffs Firestone and Madrigal and for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion concerning the claims of the 

approximately 200 remaining plaintiffs. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 87-1438 Document: 01019740028 Date Filed: 02/28/1989 Page: 11