Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06373/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06373-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY CRANDALL MINCEY, )

)

)

)

Petitioner, )

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vs. )

)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-6373 REC

(No. CR-F-97-5266 REC) 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE

OR CORRECT SENTENCE PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 AND

DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

FOR RESPONDENT 

On October 6, 2004, petitioner Terry Crandall Mincey timely

filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Based on the court’s initial review of petitioner’s motion,

the court concludes that petitioner has not demonstrated that he

is entitled to relief on any of the grounds asserted in the

motion. 

A. Grounds One, Three, Six and Eight Based on Blakely and

Booker.

A number of petitioner’s grounds for relief are based on

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1At the time petitioner filed this Section 2255 motion, the

United States Supreme Court had not issued Booker. However,

petitioner relied on the fact that the Supreme Court had granted

certiorari in Booker. 

2

Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) and

United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).

Thus, in Ground One,, relying on Blakely and Booker,

petitioner argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because

it was imposed under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 

Petitioner further contends that the base offense level and an

enhancement for role in the offense were improperly determined by

the court as opposed to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.1

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

Neither Booker nor Blakely have been made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review. See Cook v. United

States, 386 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004); Green v. United States,

2005 WL 237204 (2nd Cir. 2005); McReynolds v. United States, 2005

WL 237642 (7th Cir. 2005); In re Anderson, 2005 WL 123923 (11th

Cir. 2005).

In Grounds Three and Eight, petitioner asserts that he was

denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel when

appellate counsel failed to raise Blakely and Booker on direct

appeal, and “failed to appropriately raise the Blakely, Apprendi,

Booker, and Fanfan issues either on Petition for Rehearing in the

Ninth Circuit or on Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme

Court.” In Ground Six, petitioner contends that he was denied

the effective assistance of trial counsel when trial counsel

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2Rehearing en banc has been granted in Ameline at 401 F.3d

1007 (9th Cir. 2005).

3

“failed to raise the Blakely, Booker and Fanfan issues prior to

trial.” 

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme

Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond

a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. At the time of

petitioner’s conviction and sentencing, it was established law in

the Ninth Circuit that sentencing enhancements under the

Sentencing Guidelines were determined by the sentencing judge

under the preponderance of the evidence standard as long as the

sentence imposed did not exceed the statutory maximum. See

United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1026-1027

(9th Cir. 2000). Petitioner’s direct appeal to the Ninth Circuit

was filed in 2001. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on February 28, 2003. Blakely,

which involved state law, was not issued by the Supreme Court

until June 24, 2004. Although Blakely called the ruling in

Hernandez-Guardado into doubt, Blakely was not applied to initial

sentencings under the Sentencing Guidelines by the Ninth Circuit

until it issued United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir.

2004), on July 21, 2004.2 The Supreme Court’s decision in

Booker, applying Blakely to the Sentencing Guidelines, was not

decided by the Supreme Court until January 12, 2005. Petitioner

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was convicted on April 17, 2000. Petitioner’s appeal of his

conviction and sentence was filed in 2001. His conviction and

sentence were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on February 28, 2003. 

The petition for rehearing was filed in the Ninth Circuit on

April 3, 2003. The petition for writ of certiorari was filed in

the Supreme Court on August 5, 2003. As a matter of law, the

Blakely and Booker rulings cannot give rise to a viable claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel based on appellate counsel’s

failure to object to events that Blakely and Booker may have

rendered unconstitutional months later contrary to binding

precedent. See Aird v. United States, 339 F.Supp.2d 1305, 1313-

1314 (S.D.Ala. 2004). 

Therefore, to the extent that petitioner’s claims for relief

are based on Blakely and Booker, the claims are without merit and

are denied. 

B. Grounds Two, Four and Five.

Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel when his appellate counsel failed to raise

any sentencing and/or guideline issues on direct appeal. In so

asserting, petitioner refers to the claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel raised in Grounds Four and Five, infra.

The standards governing an assertion of ineffective

assistance of counsel are set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). As explained in United States v. QuinteroBarraza, 78 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 848 (1996):

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5

According to Strickland, there are two

components to an effectiveness inquiry, and

the petitioner bears the burden of

establishing both ... First, the

representation must fall ‘below an objective

standard of reasonableness.’ ... Courts

scrutinizing the reasonableness of an

attorney’s conduct must examine counsel’s

‘overall performance,’ both before and at

trial, and must be highly deferential to the

attorney’s judgments ... In fact, there

exists a ‘strong presumption that counsel

“rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.”’ ... In

short, defendant must surmount the

presumption that, ‘under the circumstances,

the challenged action “might be considered

sound trial strategy.”’ ... Thus, the proper

inquiry is ‘whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or

omissions were outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance.’ ....

If the petitioner satisfies the first prong,

he must then establish that there is ‘a

reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

would have been different ....

In Grounds Four and Five, petitioner contends that he

received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when

appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal that petitioner was

entitled “to the role adjustment under Section 3B1.1(c)” and to

raise on appeal that the Government’s contention that level 38

was the correct base offense level under Section 2D1.1(c)(1),

even though no illegal drugs were seized, was error.

Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the Sentencing

Guidelines in effect in 1998. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that appellate counsel was

ineffective in failing to raise on appeal the adjustment to

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3Petitioner implies that appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing to raise on appeal that the CLS chemicals would not have

yielded 51,000 pounds of methamphetamine. However, there is

nothing in the record and no facts or evidence are alleged in

petitioner’s motion substantiating that the CLS chemicals would not

have yielded 51,000 pounds of methamphetamine. Furthermore,

petitioner, who was representing himself at sentencing, did not

file objections concerning the quantity of methamphetamine that

could have been yielded by the CLS chemicals and did not present

any expert evidence concerning this issue. [P]etitioner asserts

that “[c]ompetent counsel, at sentencing, would have introduced

expert testimony, and a multitude of other evidence, challenging

the government’s contention (accepted by the Court while Mr. Mincey

represented himself, not being an attorney, and not being legally

competent, or educated, in any way, in connection with Guideline

6

petitioner’s base offense level pursuant to § 3B1.1(c). The

record in this action demonstrates that petitioner “was an

organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal

activity ....” Petitioner presents nothing in this motion

demonstrating to the contrary. Failure of appellate counsel to

raise a sentencing issue on appeal does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel where the action complained of

did not result in an incorrect sentence. See United States v.

Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470

U.S. 1058 (1985).

Petitioner’s contention that appellate counsel was

ineffective by failing to raise on appeal the calculation of the

offense level pursuant to § 2D1.1(c) when no drugs were seized is

without merit. Application Note 12 to § 2D1.1 provides “[w]here

there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect

the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the

quantity of controlled substance.”3

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matters), that the CLS chemicals would have yielded 51,000 pounds

of methamphetamine.” However, as discussed infra, petitioner

validly exercised his right to self-representation for postconviction proceedings and cannot now claim that appellate counsel

was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal that

petitioner did not raise at sentencing.

7

Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to relief on these

grounds.

C. Grounds Four, Five, Nine and Ten. 

In Ground Four, petitioner contends that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel “when the trial court denied his

motion for new appointed counsel on at least two occasions,

resulting in him improperly representing himself at his

sentencing and forfeiture hearings, and in the filing of posttrial motions and in filings for the sentencing hearing,

including objections to the presentence report.” In Ground Five,

petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance

of counsel ... when the trial court violated Faretta v.

California ... and allowed Mr. Mincey to represent himself at his

sentencing and forfeiture hearings.” 

In Grounds Nine and Ten, petitioner contends that he was

denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel when

appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal that the court

improperly denied petitioner’s motion for new counsel to

represent him for post-conviction proceedings and failed to raise

on appeal that the court improperly permitted petitioner to

represent himself during post-conviction proceedings.

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8

To the extent that petitioner claims that trial counsel was

ineffective in moving the court to appoint new counsel to

represent him, petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

The record in this action establishes that petitioner’s

trial counsel, Marshall Hodgkins, filed on petitioner’s behalf an

ex parte motion for new counsel on May 9, 2000. Petitioner sent

a letter to the court making the same request, which letter was

filed on May 10, 2000. The court conducted an in camera hearing

with respect to this motion on May 22, 2000 by Order filed under

seal on May 22, 2000. On November 9, 2000, the court received a

letter from Mr. Hodgkins expressing concern about his continued

representation of petitioner. According to the record in this

action, by Order filed on November 14, 2000, the court granted

Mr. Hodgkins’ request for a closed hearing concerning the

representation of petitioner, setting the matter for hearing on

November 20, 2000. The court conducted an in camera inquiry on

November 20, 2000 concerning petitioner’s renewed motion for

substitution of counsel. The court denied this second motion for

substitution of counsel by Order filed under seal on November 29,

2000. The court has reviewed the transcripts of the in camera

hearings and the Orders denying the two motions for substitution

of counsel. The court concludes that Mr. Hodgkins was not

constitutionally ineffective in presenting these two motions and

his position. Petitioner was allowed to address the court at

both hearings. As stated in detail in the two Orders denying the

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motions for substitution of counsel, the court concluded after

reviewing the record and the standards governing resolution of

such a request that petitioner was not entitled to new counsel. 

Petitioner’s instant motion provides no new arguments or facts

from which it may be inferred that trial counsel was ineffective

in presenting and arguing the two motions for substitution of

counsel and provides nothing from which the court may infer that

it would have ruled differently than it did.

Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel “when the trial court violated Faretta v.

California ... and allowed Mr. Mincey to represent himself at his

sentencing and forfeiture hearings” also is without merit. 

The record in this action establishes that, following oral

argument on the motions for new trial conducted on February 1,

2001, petitioner, through Mr. Hodgkins, requested a closed

session. At that closed session, petitioner made a request to

represent himself. The court took the matter under submission,

requesting that petitioner and Mr. Hodgkins discuss this request,

and placed the request on calendar in in camera session on

February 2, 2001. At the February 2, 2001 hearing, Mr. Hodgkins

advised the court that he had discussed the matter with

petitioner and that it was still petitioner’s request to

represent himself. A defendant has a constitutional right to

represent herself in a criminal trial. Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806 (1975). However, because a defendant who wishes to

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represent himself gives up many benefits associated with the

right to counsel, the decision to represent himself must be

knowing, intelligent and voluntary. In addition, the request for

self-representation must be unequivocal. Jackson v. Ylst, 921

F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1990). Before waiving right to counsel,

the defendant must be made aware of the nature of the charges and

the possible penalties, as well as the dangers and disadvantages

of self-representation in a complex area where experience and

professional training are most helpful. Before granting a

defendant's request to serve as his own counsel, the court must

discuss with defendant, in open court, the factors set forth

above in determining whether the waiver of right to counsel and

the decision to represent himself was knowing, intelligent and

voluntary. United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir.

1982). The court conducted this inquiry with petitioner in

closed session on February 2, 2001 and concluded that

petitioner’s request to represent himself was knowing, voluntary

and unequivocal and therefore granted petitioner’s request. 

(Doc. 588). The court concludes that there is nothing Mr.

Hodgkins could have added to this inquiry and that, therefore,

petitioner has not established ineffective assistance of counsel

on this ground.

As noted, in Grounds Nine and Ten, petitioner contends he

was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel when

appellate counsel failed to raise on appeal that the court

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improperly denied petitioner’s motion for new counsel to

represent him for post-conviction proceedings and failed to raise

on appeal that the court improperly permitted petitioner to

represent himself during post-conviction proceedings.

Although it may be arguable that appellate counsel’s failure

to raise the two denials of the motions for substitution of

counsel on appeal satisfies the first prong of the Strickland

standard, the court concludes that petitioner has not established

that he was prejudiced by this failure, i.e., that petitioner’s

conviction or sentence would have been reversed by the Ninth

Circuit on appeal on this ground. The court considered the

grounds asserted in support of both motions and considered the

factors required by law in resolving motions for substitution of

counsel in denying both motions. The Ninth Circuit reviews the

denial of motions for substitution of counsel for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973,

976 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 898 (2000). Petitioner

has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for

appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue on appeal, the

Ninth Circuit would have found that this court’s denial of the

two motions for substitution of counsel were an abuse of

discretion.

With regard to petitioner’s claim that he was denied the

effective assistance of appellate counsel because of appellate

counsel’s failure to argue that the court improperly granted

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petitioner’s request for self-representation in post-conviction

proceedings, it may be arguable that this failure satisfies the

first prong of the Strickland standard. However, petitioner has

not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for the

failure of appellate counsel to raise this issue on appeal, the

Ninth Circuit would have reversed petitioner’s conviction and

sentence. The court has reviewed the transcript of the Faretta

inquiry conducted on February 2, 2001 and concludes that it

complied with the legal requirements set forth above in

determining that petitioner’s request to represent himself in

further post-conviction proceedings was knowing, intelligent and

voluntary. 

D. Ground Eleven.

Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel when trial counsel “failed to

adequately point out and argue to the court and the jury that the

evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain a

conviction on each of the charges on which he was tried, and on

the forfeiture count.”

Petitioner has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of

counsel. Mr. Hodgkins argued to the court and to the jury that

the evidence was insufficient to convict petitioner of the

charges on which he was indicted. On appeal the Ninth Circuit

ruled that the evidence was sufficient to sustain petitioner’s

convictions and the forfeiture. Petitioner’s conclusory

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assertion that Mr. Hodgkins’ arguments regarding the sufficiency

of the evidence were not “adequate” does not suffice to establish

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 At the time of the evidentiary hearing regarding the

forfeiture count, which was tried to the court by stipulation of

the parties, petitioner was representing himself. Therefore,

petitioner cannot assert ineffective assistance of counsel on

this ground.

E. Ground Twelve.

Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of appellate counsel because appellate counsel “failed

to adequately point out and argue to the Ninth Circuit that the

evidence adduced at trial was insufficient, as a matter of law,

to sustain a conviction of each of the charges on which he was

tried, and on the forfeiture count.” 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. Appellate counsel

raised the sufficiency of the evidence as a ground for appeal. 

The Ninth Circuit ruled on appeal that the evidence was

sufficient to sustain petitioner’s convictions. Petitioner’s

conclusory assertion that counsel’s arguments were not “adequate”

does not suffice to establish ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel.

F. Ground Thirteen.

Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel when Mr. Hodgkins “failed to

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adequately investigate the case ....” 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. A

conclusory assertion that counsel failed to “adequately

investigate” does not suffice to establish ineffective assistance

of counsel.

Petitioner further contends that Mr. Hodgkins

failed to present evidence that government

official(s) clearly and affirmatively misled

Mr. Mincey into believing that his actions

were lawful, thereby supporting his defense

of entrapment by estoppel. This was in spite

of the fact that Mr. Mincey repeatedly and

clearly outlined for his trial counsel, in

detail, exactly what had to be done and shown

in order to make out a good entrapment by

estoppel defense.

However, the court ruled during the trial and in denying

petitioner’s motion for new trial that petitioner was not

entitled to the defense of entrapment by estoppel because no

evidence was presented that any federal official or agent so

authorized by the federal government expressly advised petitioner

that the conduct with which he was eventually charged was legal

or did not constitute a violation of the law, citing United

States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 892 (2000); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d

1379, 1385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1000 (1995); United

States v. Brabner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1024-1027 (9th Cir. 1991). The

court’s decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. 

Petitioner describes no evidence that would have allowed the

defense of entrapment by estoppel under these standards to be

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presented to the jury. Consequently, petitioner has not

established ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

G. Ground Fourteen.

Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel when Mr. Hodgkins “advised him to

testify when his trial counsel knew or should have known that the

government’s evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to

sustain a conviction on each of the counts on which he was

tried.”

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

Following the conclusion of the Government’s case in chief, the

defendants made motions for judgment of acquittal pursuant to

Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which motions were

denied by the court. The post-conviction motions for judgment of

acquittal and motions for new trial were denied by the court. As

noted supra, appellate counsel unsuccessfully argued on appeal

that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain petitioner’s

convictions. 

Consequently, petitioner’s assertion that calling petitioner

as a witness in his own defense constituted ineffective

assistance of counsel because Mr. Hodgkins knew that the evidence

was insufficient is without merit.

H. Ground Fifteen.

Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel when trial counsel failed to object

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at trial to the constructive amendment of the Indictment. 

Petitioner contends that counsel’s failure to do resulted in

plain error review by the Ninth Circuit on appeal but that de

novo review would have resulted in petitioner’s convictions being

reversed.

Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief on

this ground. 

A constructive amendment occurs if there is a change in the

terms of the indictment, whether literal or in effect. United

States v. Dipentino, 242 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001). A

variance occurs when the proof introduced at trial differs

materially from the facts alleged in the indictment. Jones v.

Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000). As was the case on

direct appeal, petitioner points to no facts showing that the

terms of the indictment were altered by the evidence introduced

at trial. 

Consequently, petitioner has not demonstrated that Mr.

Hodgkins was ineffective in failing to object to alleged

constructive amendment of the indictment and petitioner’s claim

for relief on this ground is denied.

I. Ground Sixteen.

Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel when counsel “failed to object to the

admission of the Chemical Handler’s Manual, or the testimony and

exhibits that reflected certain laws and regulations concerning

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the nature and scope of his company’s (CLS’s) obligations as a

chemical retailer.” Petitioner asserts that, because of these

failures to object, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the admission of

this evidence under the plain error standard of review but that

“[o]rdinary review ... after proper objection, would have

resulted in a finding of non-harmless error, and a reversal of

[petitioner’s] convictions.”

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

Petitioner does not allege a basis for objecting to the admission

of any of this evidence, much less that any such objections would

have been sustained. Therefore, petitioner has not demonstrated

ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

J. Ground Seventeen. 

Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance

“when his trial counsel failed to object to each and every

instance of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, thereby

resulting in the Ninth Circuit not granting the appropriate

standard of review, which would have resulted in a reversal.”

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. Petitioner’s motion

describes no instances of alleged judicial or prosecutorial

misconduct. 

Furthermore, this court rejected petitioner’s claims of

judicial misconduct in the “Order Denying Defendant Terry

Crandall Mincey’s Motion for New Trial, Judgment of Acquittal,

and Arrest of Judgment” filed on March 8, 2001 as did the Ninth

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Circuit on direct appeal. Failure of trial counsel to move for a

mistrial for alleged judicial misconduct does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel where the actions complained of

did not constitute judicial misconduct. See United States v.

Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470

U.S. 1058 (1985).

The court also rejected petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial

misconduct in the “Order Denying Defendant Terry Crandall

Mincey’s Motion for New Trial, Judgment of Acquittal, and Arrest

of Judgment” filed on March 8, 2001. As noted, failure of trial

counsel to move for a mistrial for alleged prosecutorial

misconduct does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel

where the actions complained of did not constitute prosecutorial

misconduct. Schaflander, supra. Furthermore, on direct appeal,

the Ninth Circuit ruled in pertinent part with respect to

petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct at trial:

Where Mincey objected to the prosecutor’s

alleged misconduct, we review for harmless

error ... On the other hand, where Mincey did

not object, we review for plain error ...

Reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct is

appropriate only if it appears more probable

than not that prosecutorial misconduct

materially affected the fairness of the trial

... Mincey fails to cite to any parts of the

record, or any other facts, that would show

prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, under either

standard of review, there is no basis for us

to conclude that Mincey’s conclusory

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct

materially affected the fairness of the

trial.

Therefore, petitioner’s claims that a contemporaneous objection

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would have resulted in a different standard of review and a

reversal of his conviction is not substantiated.

K. Ground Eighteen

Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance

“when trial counsel failed to raise prosecutorial misconduct in

the grand jury prior to his trial.” Petitioner asserts that this

“omission resulted in the Ninth Circuit failing to review this

issue.”

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

Petitioner’s motion presents no facts from which it may be

inferred that any prosecutorial misconduct occurred before the

grand jury, that this court would have dismissed the indictment

because of such prosecutorial misconduct if a motion to dismiss

the indictment based on this ground had been made, or that the

Ninth Circuit would have reversed his conviction on the ground of

prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury if trial counsel

had made such a motion and this court denied it.

L. Ground Nineteen.

Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel “when the Court improperly seized his assets at the

time of his arrest, thereby depriving him of the ability to

fairly defend himself.” 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

Petitioner’s defense attorney joined in co-defendant Lewis’s

opposition to the Government’s Request for a Preliminary

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Injunction, wherein the Government sought to restrain the

financial assets of the defendants. One of the arguments made by

co-defendant Lewis was that she needed the assets to pay

attorneys’ fees. The Request for Preliminary Injunction was

argued on March 23, 1998 and granted by Order filed on April 3,

1998. The implication in petitioner’s motion that counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the seizure of petitioner’s

assets on the ground that petitioner needed them to retain

counsel of his choice is without merit. See United States v.

Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989)(rejecting argument that

pretrial seizure of assets interferes with a criminal defendant’s

Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to

counsel); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S.

617, 632-633 (1989)(rejecting argument that general seizure of

assets interferes with a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment

right to retain counsel). The court so ruled in the April 3,

1998 Order. Failure to raise a meritless argument or to make a

meritless motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. See Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985).

M. Ground Twenty.

Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance

because his “conviction was obtained by statements improperly and

unconstitutionally obtained from him, and his trial counsel was

ineffective in not preventing the use of these statements.”

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

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Petitioner asserts no facts from which it may be inferred that

any incriminating statements to law enforcement made by

petitioner were obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause

or Miranda v. Arizona.

N. Ground Twenty-One.

Petitioner contends that his conviction was obtained “by the

unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the

defendant evidence favorable to him in connection with his

defense of entrapment by estoppel and insufficiency of the

evidence.”

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

A Brady violation occurs when the government suppresses

material evidence, including impeachment evidence, favorable to

the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio

v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-155 (1972). Such evidence is

material if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of

the trial would have been different if the evidence had been

disclosed. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). A

reasonable probability is established when the failure to

disclose evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case

in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the

verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). 

Petitioner does not describe the allegedly favorable

evidence suppressed by the Government. Therefore, he has not

shown that a Brady violation has occurred or that he is entitled

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to relief because of a Brady violation.

O. Grounds Twenty-Two, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Four.

Petitioner contends that his conviction and sentence were in

violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause “inasmuch as his sentence

represented double punishment for the same offense for which he

had already been punished by criminal forfeiture and the illegal

seizure of his assets at the time of his arrest.” Petitioner

further contends that he was denied the effective assistance of

trial and appellate counsel when counsel failed to raise this

double jeopardy claim. 

Petitioner’s claims are without merit. Petitioner’s assets

were seized and preliminarily restrained pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §

853. The Superseding Indictment and the Second Superseding

Indictment alleged counts for criminal forfeiture. 

Petitioner’s assets were not forfeited to the United States until

after petitioner’s conviction and as part of his criminal

sentence. Therefore, petitioner’s assets were forfeited pursuant

to the criminal forfeiture statute during the same proceeding as

his criminal conviction. It is well-settled that Congress may

impose multiple punishments for the same conduct without

violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, so long as it clearly

expresses its intent to do so. Such is the case here. There was

no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Westine v.

United States, 1996 WL 456031 (6th Cir. 1996). Consequently,

neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel were ineffective in

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4Petitioner contends that the expert witness “was further

undermined, humiliated and made ineffective by the trial court’s

shouting at him and interference in his testimony.” However, this

court rejected petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to a new

trial because of judicial misconduct arising from these

allegations. On appeal the Ninth Circuit rejected petitioner’s

argument that the court committed judicial misconduct based on

these allegations. 

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failing to raise this claim. 

P. Ground Twenty-Five.

Petitioner contends he was denied the effective assistance

of trial counsel

when the critical defense forensic expert in

the field of chemistry was hired on a short

time line, was incompetent to testify, and

was hearing impaired. Mr. Mincey’s trial

counsel had ample time to retain and prepare

one of the many forensic experts in this

field so that Mr. Mincey would have had an

effective defense. 

Petitioner presents no facts from which it may be inferred

the forensic expert was incompetent to testify or that his

preparation as a defense witness was impaired because he was

retained on a “short time line.” That the expert witness was

hearing impaired has no bearing on his competence as an expert.4

Therefore, petitioner has not established ineffective

assistance of counsel on this ground.

Q. Ground Twenty-Six.

Petitioner contends he was denied effective assistance

because trial counsel

failed to prepare and investigate the case

and failed to be prepared for the

government’s introduction of critical

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evidence, including California statutes,

misinformation in connection with these

statutes, and an IRS form 8300. By the time

this evidence was introduced (improperly) by

the prosecution, no appropriate objections

had been made, no motions in limine or to bar

the evidence had appropriately been filed,

and no defense planning or strategy to meet

or counter this evidence had occurred or been

developed.

The Ninth Circuit ruled on appeal that the admission of

these documents was not error. Consequently, petitioner has not

demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective because of his

failure to object to the admission of the described evidence.

R. Ground Twenty-Seven.

Petitioner contends he was denied effective assistance when

trial counsel

failed to make the appropriate evidentiary

objections, failed to make the appropriate

arguments, failed to file the appropriate

motions in limine, and failed to prepare and

hire the appropriate forensic experts which

would have resulted in legal objections to

the admissibility of the testimony of

industry experts and a partially redacted

newspaper article being sustained by either

the district court or the Ninth Circuit.

To the extent that this ground for relief repeats the claims

of ineffective assistance set forth in Grounds Twenty-Five and

Twenty-Six, these claims are without merit. See discussion

supra.

Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing

to object to the admissibility of the testimony of industry

experts also is without merit. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that

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the admission of this evidence was proper. 

Petitioner’s has not demonstrated that counsel was

ineffective because different arguments would have resulted in

the exclusion from evidence of the partially redacted newspaper

article is without merit. Petitioner does not describe what

additional arguments could have been made which would have

resulted in the exclusion of this evidence. Furthermore, the

Ninth Circuit has ruled that the admission of this evidence was

proper.

S. Ground Twenty-Eight.

Petitioner contends that “[t]he products of CLS were not

covered by or illegally distributed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(1)

[sic], as a matter of law; convictions of attempt and aiding and

abetting and criminal forfeiture and money laundering and

conspiracy, all predicated on violations CLS’s violations [sic]

of Section 841(d)(1)[sic] were likewise flawed.” Petitioner

contends he was denied the effective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel when they failed to raise this issue.

Petitioner’s contention is unsupported by any facts or legal

analysis. The Second Superseding Indictment charged petitioner

with, among other violations, several counts of aiding and

abetting the attempted possession of hydriodic acid, a listed

chemical, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe that the

hydriodic acid would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(d)(2). Because hydriodic

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acid is a listed chemical, petitioner’s claim that he was denied

the effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to raise

this argument fails.

T. Ground Twenty-Nine.

Petitioner contends he was denied effective assistance when

trial counsel

failed, in spite of repeated instructions and

detailed information provided by Mr. Mincey,

to introduce and/or develop evidence,

including witness and expert witness

testimony, and the obtaining and preparation

of exhibits, on theory of the defense, lack

of knowledge, CLS’s compliance with

California and Federal regulation and

statute, and other evidence concerning the

basis for the lack of knowledge of wrongdoing

by Mr. Mincey or CLS. This resulted in the

defense’s theory of defense instruction being

denied. Further, the theory of defense on

knowledge and reliance on officials,

regulations, and statutes, was not

appropriately argued to the jury or the

court.

Petitioner’s conclusory assertion does not entitle him to

relief. Petitioner does not describe the evidence or testimony

upon which he bases this claim and makes no specific showing that

this evidence would have been relevant and admissible to

petitioner’s defense of lack of intent to violate the law and

reliance on officials. Petitioner’s contention that Mr. Hodgkins

did not “appropriately” argue the defense case to the jury does

not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the

Strickland standard.

U. Ground Thirty.

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Petitioner asserts he was denied effective assistance “when

his trial counsel failed to argue and/or file appropriate motions

for judgment of acquittal both during and after trial, as

provided in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29.” 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. Mr.

Hodgkins made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal at the

close of the Government’s case-in-chief. In addition, Mr.

Hodgkins filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and new trial

arguing that there was “little, if any indication that the

required elements of the offenses charged in the Indictment were

met” and that “there is a lack of evidence of the required mental

elements for all counts.” In addition, Mr. Hodgkins joined the

motion for judgment of acquittal filed by co-defendant Betty Lou

Lewis with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to support

Count 23. A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence. The Ninth Circuit ruled on direct

appeal that the evidence was sufficient to support petitioner’s

convictions. Petitioner’s conclusory assertion that the motions

for judgment of acquittal made by Mr. Hodgkins were not

“appropriate” does not suffice to establish that he was denied

the effective assistance of counsel in the making and arguing of

the motions for judgment of acquittal. 

Therefore, this ground for relief is denied. 

V. Grounds Thirty-One and Thirty-Two.

Petitioner contends he was denied the effective assistance

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of trial and appellate counsel when counsel failed to raise that

the United States had conducted an unconstitutional search of

CLS’s business premises on November 4, 1997.

Petitioner’s claim is without merit to the extent that it is

based on the alleged failure of trial counsel to raise this

issue. On November 17, 1998, co-defendant Richard Simonsen filed

a motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a

search warrant on November 4, 1997 at 801 98th Avenue, Oakland,

California, the business premises of CLS. This motion was joined

by petitioner on November 30, 1998. The motion to suppress was

denied by Order filed on January 8, 1999.

Petitioner’s claim is without merit with respect to

appellate counsel as well. Petitioner makes no showing that the

court’s denial of the motion to suppress was in error.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Petitioner Terry Crandall Mincey’s Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is denied.

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for

respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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