Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00591/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00591-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NARCISO MORALES, )

) CIV. S-05-591 GEB KJM

Plaintiff, ) 

) ORDER

v. ) 

)

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH )

AUTHORITY; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; )

DELWIN BROWN; MARCEL BERRY; )

DANIEL TORRES; LINDA BRIDGES; )

STEVIE CHIU; ROBERT DUTRA; )

RODERICK HICKMAN; TIM MAHONEY; )

WALTER ALLEN III; STEVE STENOWSKI; )

STEVE CRUZ; and DOES 1 to 100, )

in their individual and official )

capacities, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff has moved to remand this action to the Superior

Court of California for the County of San Joaquin. Defendants State

of California, California Youth Authority, Roderick Hickman, Walter

Allen III, Steve Stenowski, and Steve Cruz (“Defendants”) oppose the

motion. 

“[A] defendant who removes an action from state court to

federal district court bears the burden . . . of establishing that

removal was proper.” United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298

F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2002). “[R]emoval statutes are strictly

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1 Plaintiff also asserts that “the removal was untimely because

it took place more than thirty days after the State of California first

received a copy of the Complaint.” (Pl.’s Remand Mot. at 2.) However,

because Defendants’ failure to adhere to the unanimity rule is

dispositive, that issue need not be reached.

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construed against removal.” Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592

F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979).

“Section 1446 requires all proper defendants to join or

consent to the removal notice.” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.),

Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999). “Where fewer than all the

defendants have joined in a removal action, the removing party has the

burden under section 1446(a) to explain affirmatively the absence of

any co-defendants in the notice for removal.” Id.

Plaintiff contends “removal was improper because all of the

served defendants did not join in the notice of removal . . . .”1

(Pl.’s Memo. Supp. Remand Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff notes that “[t]he

removal notice in this case was submitted on March 25, 2005, on behalf

of only four out of five defendants served up to that time.” (Id. at

4.)

Defendant Dutra was served with a copy of the summons and

complaint on March 24, 2005. (See Exh. A to Decl. of Bruce M.

Glassner.) Defendants State of California, California Youth

Authority, Allen, and Stenowski filed a removal notice on March 25,

2005. Since Defendant Dutra had been served with process at the time

of removal but did not join in the removal, and the removing

Defendants did not affirmatively explain Dutra’s absence, the removal

was defective. 

Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s contention [that Dutra

should have joined in the removal under the rule of unanimity] is

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2 Defendants also contend that the court should deny remand in

the interest of judicial economy since, inter alia, “[t]he related case

of Baker v. State of California remains in federal court, as removal of

that case has not been challenged.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 14.) The order

relating these cases has no bearing on Plaintiff’s remand motion.

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without merit as Defendant Dutra could later consent to the removal

and has in fact consented.”2 (Defs.’ Opp’n at 12.) Although

Defendant Dutra consented to removal on May 9, 2005, this late consent

did not cure the defective removal, since it was not manifested within

thirty days from the date upon which Dutra was served with the

complaint. See Hernandez v. Six Flags Magic Mountain, Inc., 688 F.

Supp. 560, 562 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (“[C]onsent must be manifested within

the thirty day period beginning from the date upon which the

non-petitioning defendant is served with the complaint.”); Prize

Frize, Inc., 167 F.3d at 1266 (stating that a party’s attempt “to

orally join at a court hearing weeks after the thirty-day period had

expired” did not cure the defective removal since “[t]he defects in

the removal notice were not cured within the thirty-day statutory

period permitted for joinder.”).

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s remand motion is

granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to remand this action to

the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San

Joaquin. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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