Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-05184/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-05184-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ARMANI SANCHEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-05184-VKD 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART CROSS-MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 30

Plaintiff Armani Sanchez appeals a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”)1denying his application for child’s insurance benefits under Title II of the 

Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423, et seq. The parties have filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment.

Mr. Sanchez contends that the Commissioner’s denial of benefits reflects multiple errors: 

(1) the Commissioner failed to provide Mr. Sanchez proper notice of the issues to be decided at 

the administrative hearing; (2) the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating the 

medical evidence; (3) the ALJ’s findings that Mr. Sanchez’s impairments do not meet or equal any 

listed impairments are not supported by substantial evidence; (4) the ALJ failed to provide clear 

and convincing reasons for discounting Mr. Sanchez’s credibility; (5) the ALJ’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) finding is not based on substantial evidence; (6) the ALJ’s 

determination that Mr. Sanchez is employable is not supported by substantial evidence; and (7) the 

ALJ failed to provide germane reasons for rejecting third party statements regarding Mr. 

1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Andrew M. Saul is substituted for his predecessor, Nancy A. 

Berryhill.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 1 of 32
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Sanchez’s functional capacity. The Commissioner contends that his decision is supported by 

substantial evidence and is free from legal error.

The matter was submitted without oral argument. Upon consideration of the moving and 

responding papers and the relevant evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, the Court 

grants in part and denies in part Mr. Sanchez’s motion for summary judgment and grants in part 

and denies in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.2

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Sanchez was born in 1991 and is 28 years old. He completed the 12th grade, but did 

not receive a high school diploma and has never worked. AR350, 251, 382. He participated in 

Civicorps, a job training program, but was asked to leave the program twice for behavioral issues 

in 2010 and 2011. AR 401.

On June 26, 2014, he applied for child’s insurance benefits under Title II of the Act, 

alleging disability due to mental impairments, including bipolar disorder and learning delays. 

AR 219. His application was denied initially and on review. An ALJ held a hearing and 

subsequently issued an unfavorable decision on September 21, 2017. AR 15-30. The ALJ found 

that as of April 1, 2000, the alleged onset date, Mr. Sanchez had not attained age 224and had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity. AR 17. The ALJ further found that prior to reaching age 

22, Mr. Sanchez had the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder and learning disability. 

Id. However, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Sanchez did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the impairments listed in the 

Commissioner’s regulations. AR 18. The ALJ then determined that Mr. Sanchez has the RFC to 

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with the sole non-exertional limitation that 

Mr. Sanchez can only occasionally respond appropriately to supervisors, coworkers and the 

2 All parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally 

adjudicated by a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73; Dkt. Nos. 7, 15.

3

“AR” refers to the certified administrative record lodged with the Court. Dkt. No. 21.

4 Child’s insurance benefits are available to the children of persons who are deceased or who are 

drawing Social Security disability or retirement benefits, subject to certain conditions including 

that the child became disabled before age 22. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d).

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 2 of 32
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

public. AR 21. The ALJ concluded that Mr. Sanchez can perform work that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy (namely as a hand packer, assembler, and machine feeder) and 

has not been disabled, as defined by the Act, at any time before he attained age 22. AR 30.

The Appeals Council denied Mr. Sanchez’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. 

AR 1-3. Mr. Sanchez then filed the present action seeking judicial review of the decision denying

his application for benefits.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review the Commissioner’s 

decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or if it is based upon the application of improper legal 

standards. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Moncada v. 

Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). In this context, the term “substantial evidence” means 

“more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance—it is such relevant evidence that a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; 

see also Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). When determining whether 

substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision, the Court examines the 

administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 

F.2d at 1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to 

support more than one rational interpretation, the Court must defer to the decision of the 

Commissioner. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Due Process

Mr. Sanchez argues that his right to due process was violated because he was not given 

proper notice of the issues to be decided at the administrative hearing. “The fundamental 

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.’” Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. 

Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). In the Social Security context, a notice of hearing before an 

ALJ must provide a claimant with certain information, including “[t]he specific issues to be 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 3 of 32
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

decided in [the claimant’s] case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.938.

Here, the ALJ sent Mr. Sanchez a notice of hearing that advised:

Issues I Will Consider

The hearing concerns your application of June 26, 2014, for a Period 

of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits under sections 216(i) 

and 223(a) of the Social Security Act (the Act). I will consider 

whether you are disabled under section 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act.

AR 178. The parties do not dispute that this notice refers to Mr. Sanchez’s June 26, 2014 

application for Title II child’s insurance benefits. However, Mr. Sanchez contends that the notice 

of hearing is insufficient because the record contains references to other benefits applications and 

proceedings, namely a continuing disability review (“CDR”),5the results of which he says are 

unclear. Mr. Sanchez points out that in September 2004, when he was 13 years old, he applied for 

disabled child Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. AR 100. The 

Social Security Administration (“SSA”) approved that application in January 2005, and Mr. 

Sanchez began receiving SSI benefits around March 2005. Id. While the record indicates that the 

SSA conducted a CDR concerning his Title XVI SSI benefits sometime in 2014 (AR 234), it is 

unclear what happened with respect to that process. Mr. Sanchez says that the second mention of 

a CDR is a note in the transmittal sheet regarding the initial denial of his June 26, 2014 Title II

application (the application presently at issue) which reads: “Conversion to CDB processed with 

CDR/Age 18 redetermination.”6 AR 86. There is no explanation in the record as to what this 

notation means, and the Commissioner offers none in his motion papers.7 Mr. Sanchez contends 

that the notation is especially confusing because he turned 18 in 2009—the same year he 

5 The Commissioner is statutorily required to periodically review whether claimants who have 

been granted disability benefits remain disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(i)(1); 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1594, 416.989.

6 Although it is unclear what this notation means, the Court assumes that the notation refers, in 

part, to the regulatory process in which the SSA must redetermine a claimant’s eligibility for SSI 

disability benefits if the claimant (1) is at least 18 years old; (2) became eligible for SSI disability 

benefits before age 18; and (3) was eligible for such benefits for the month before the claimant 

attained age 18. 20 C.F.R. § 416.987.

7 Nor did the Commissioner provide a Statement of the Administrative Record as ordered by the 

Court. Dkt. No. 16.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 4 of 32
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

previously applied for, and was denied, Title II benefits. AR 77, 247. Additionally, Mr. Sanchez

points out that the ALJ remarked at the administrative hearing that the present matter is “an appeal 

of a continuing disability review” (AR 42), but the ALJ’s decision makes no mention of any CDR.

Although neither side has cited any analogous authority, another court in this district 

addressed a similar issue in Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-cv-07164-JD, 2019 WL 

5102574 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019). In Williams, the SSA granted claimant Marshaun Williams 

SSI benefits for bipolar disorder in 2003 when he was 19 years old. Those benefits were later 

terminated during Mr. Williams’s period of incarceration. In a subsequent application for benefits, 

filed in 2014 when Mr. Williams was 30 years old, he expressly requested Title XVI SSI benefits, 

but his application seemingly also referred broadly to Title II child’s insurance benefits. Id. at *1. 

In denying his application, the SSA sent Mr. Williams a notice of disapproved claim that referred 

to both child’s insurance benefits and SSI benefits. Id. Mr. Willliams’s subsequent request for 

reconsideration seemed to limit his claim to SSI benefits; and, the SSA denied that request, this 

time referencing only the rules for SSI disability payments and omitting any reference to child’s 

insurance benefits. Nevertheless, in his request for an administrative hearing, Mr. Williams 

argued that the SSA’s reconsideration decision was at odds with the first notice of denial that 

seemed to be “based on [his] condition not being disabling before age 22.”8 Id. at *3. The ALJ 

nonetheless issued a notice of hearing advising that a hearing would be held regarding Mr. 

Williams’s application for SSI benefits. Id. at *2. Confusion repeatedly arose during the hearing 

because the ALJ focused on the time period between the filing of Mr. Williams’s application in 

2014 and the hearing in 2016, whereas Mr. Williams seemed to believe the relevant question was 

whether his condition was disabling before he reached age 22. Id. The ALJ issued an unfavorable 

decision, concluding that Mr. Williams was not disabled from the date his application was filed in 

2014.

8 As noted above, establishing disability before age 22 is important for eligibility for child’s 

insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d). However, when a claimant applies for SSI, the 

SSA generally considers the time period from the date of the claimant’s application to the date of 

the ALJ’s decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335 (stating that the earliest date an SSI claimant may 

receive benefits is the month following the month in which the SSI application was filed).

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 5 of 32
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

In considering whether Mr. Williams’s due process rights had been violated, the court 

noted that although Mr. Williams’s application for benefits and the SSA’s initial notice of 

disapproved claims indicated that both child’s insurance benefits and SSI benefits were at issue, “a 

remand would not necessarily be warranted” because Mr. Williams’s request for reconsideration

seemed to abandon his claim for child’s insurance benefits and instead focused solely on his claim 

for SSI. Id. at *3. Nevertheless, the court concluded that remand was required due to the apparent 

confusion over the relevant time period applicable to Mr. Williams’s claims, i.e., whether his 

condition was disabling before he reached age 22, or from the time he filed his 2014 application at 

age 30. Here, the court noted that although Mr. Williams’s application expressly requested SSI 

benefits, the SSA denied that application for the sole reason that it determined that his condition 

was not disabling before age 22. Thus, Mr. Williams “rightfully proceeded with the understanding 

that his SSI benefits too were denied because he had failed to show his condition was disabling 

before age 22,” and “[n]o subsequent communication from the SSA clearly communicated that 

there was a different time period at issue for his claim for SSI benefits.” Id. Additionally, because 

Mr. Williams expressly raised this issue in his request for hearing, and the ALJ failed to address it, 

the court concluded that Mr. Williams did not receive constitutionally sufficient notice of the 

issues to be decided, and that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record. Id. at *3-*4.

In the present matter, there are references to a CDR process, the results of which are not 

explained. The ALJ also did remark at the start of the administrative hearing that this case 

concerns an appeal of a CDR, although his written decision makes no mention of any CDR. 

Unlike Williams, however, the administrative record reveals no apparent confusion or objection by 

Mr. Sanchez about the issues to be addressed, or the relevant standards to be applied; and, other 

than to question what the references to a CDR process might mean, Mr. Sanchez identifies no 

palpable prejudice he has suffered as a result.

First, Mr. Sanchez’s June 2014 application for benefits clearly states that he is seeking 

child’s disability benefits. AR 219. Although that application also says that Mr. Sanchez planned 

to file an application for SSI benefits, it is unclear whether he did so, and Mr. Sanchez does not 

say whether he filed another such application.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 6 of 32
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Second, notwithstanding the unexplained notation in the SSA’s initial denial of Mr. 

Sanchez’s application for child’s insurance benefits (AR 86), there is no indication that he was 

confused about what benefits were being denied or why. As Mr. Sanchez points out, the 

transmittal sheet for the SSA’s denial of benefits contains the unexplained note: “CEF exclusion –

Conversion to CDB processed with CDR/Age 18 redetermination.” AR 86. The SSA’s notice of 

disapproved claim, however, states that Mr. Sanchez’s claim for child’s insurance benefits was 

denied because the agency determined that his “condition was not disabling before age 22.” 

AR 126. The notice contains no reference to any request for SSI benefits or to any CDR or Age 

18 redetermination.

Similarly, there is no indication at the reconsideration level of the administrative 

proceedings that Mr. Sanchez was confused about what benefits were being denied and why. 

Here, the record contains two different requests for reconsideration:

• The request for reconsideration cited by Mr. Sanchez refers to SSI benefits, is dated 

January 2, 2015, and bears the name and contact information of his mother, Kiva 

Brazington.

9 AR 131-34. The document says that Mr. Sanchez requests

reconsideration and a hearing regarding “disability cessation”; disagrees with the 

determination on his claim for SSI benefits; and notes that he has additional 

evidence and “wishes to appear at the disability hearing.” Id.

• The other request for reconsideration is also dated January 2, 2015, albeit the top of 

the document bears the date “January 27, 2015.” AR 135. This request for 

reconsideration contains the name and contact information for Maisha Savoy, who 

previously was Mr. Sanchez’s designated payee for his benefits. The request states 

that Mr. Sanchez disagreed with the determination on his claim for “child benefits 

because [he is] disabled and cannot work”; that Mr. Sanchez has no additional 

evidence to submit; and that he wants a “case review.” Id.

9

In the record, Mr. Sanchez’s mother is sometimes referred to as “Kiva Brazington Verduzco” 

and sometimes as “Kiva Brazington.” Because Mr. Sanchez refers to her simply as Kiva 

Brazington, the Court will do the same.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 7 of 32
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

As noted by Mr. Sanchez in papers he submitted during the administrative proceedings, an 

Age 18 redetermination hearing apparently was held in November 2015. AR 210; see also AR 

137-48. In a December 10, 2015 notice of reconsideration, which appears to be the only notice of 

reconsideration in the record, the SSA affirmed that its “first decision was correct” and that Mr. 

Sanchez’s “condition was not disabling before age 22.” AR 149-54. The notice further advised 

Mr. Sanchez of his right to request a hearing before an ALJ. Mr. Sanchez apparently did so on 

December 28, 2015. AR 155.

As discussed above, the March 8, 2017 notice of hearing states that the ALJ would address

Mr. Sanchez’s June 26, 2014 Title II application for child’s insurance benefits. AR 178. 

Notwithstanding the ALJ’s remark at the start of the hearing about “an appeal of a [CDR],” in 

advising Mr. Sanchez of the issues to be decided, the ALJ also stated:

Okay. Mr. Sanchez, the issue in this case is whether you are disabled. 

To be disabled under the [SSA], you must have an impairment that 

has lasted, or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 

12 months, or be expected to result in death. The impairment must 

be severe enough to prevent you from doing any kind of gainful 

activity since the date you said you could not work.

AR 46-47. While Mr. Sanchez correctly notes that the ALJ’s decision does not mention any CDR, 

there also is no indication that Mr. Sanchez believed that a CDR, or anything other than his June 

2014 Title II application for child’s insurance benefits, was at issue. For example, in his papers 

filed with this Court, Mr. Sanchez acknowledges that to determine whether a claimant is disabled, 

federal regulations require the application of a five-step sequential analysis, used by the ALJ in 

this matter. See Dkt. No. 25 at 10; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.10 Additionally, in his prehearing brief submitted to the ALJ by Mr. Sanchez’s attorney, Mr. Sanchez presented arguments 

about his June 2014 Title II claim for child’s benefits under the five-step sequential analysis used 

by the ALJ in reaching his decision. AR 368-73. Moreover, in his request for a review by the 

Appeals Council, Mr. Sanchez acknowledged that further development of the record was 

10 By contrast, and although neither side has said so, in a CDR process to determine whether a 

claimant continues to be disabled and entitled to benefits, the Commissioner apparently applies a 

different sequential analysis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594; 416.994.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 8 of 32
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

unnecessary and that there were no outstanding issues that needed to be resolved. AR 215.

On this record, the Court cannot conclude that the Commissioner failed to provide Mr. 

Sanchez with constitutionally sufficient notice of the issues to be decided at the administrative 

hearing. To the extent Mr. Sanchez may be contending that the Commissioner’s decision should 

have addressed matters beyond his Title II claim for child’s insurance benefits, he has not 

persuasively demonstrated that that is the case. The Court finds no error here.

B. Evaluation of Medical Evidence11

The record contains the reports of three psychologists who each examined Mr. Sanchez: 

Cecilia M. Hardey, Ph.D., Maria Kerosky, Ph.D., and Faith Tanner, Psy.D. Additionally, two 

nonexamining state agency physicians, Dr. V. Meenakshi, M.D. and Dr. D. Lucila, M.D., provided 

reports based on their review of Mr. Sanchez’s records. Mr. Sanchez contends that the ALJ erred

by failing to weigh Dr. Hardey’s opinion, ignoring the opinions of Drs. Meenakshi and Lucila, 

rejecting Dr. Kerosky’s opinion, and ignoring some of Dr. Tanner’s findings. Additionally, Mr. 

Sanchez argues that the ALJ should have granted his request to have a medical expert testify at the 

administrative hearing.

1. Examining Psychologist Cecilia M. Hardey, Ph.D.

In September 2009, when Mr. Sanchez was about 18 and a half years old, Dr. Hardey 

conducted a psychological evaluation arranged by the state agency. AR 395-400. According to 

Dr. Hardey’s report, Mr. Sanchez’s scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III test placed 

him within the borderline range of intellectual functioning, with a full scale IQ of 74. She further 

noted that results on the Wechsler Memory Scale-III test indicated that Mr. Sanchez’s Immediate 

Auditory Memory was in the mildly impaired range. Dr. Hardey found that Mr. Sanchez’s score

on the Bender Visual-Motor Gestalt Test-II placed him in the borderline to mildly impaired range. 

11 The Commissioner’s rules and regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence were 

revised in March 2017. The Commissioner says that those new rules apply in the present matter 

because they were in effect at the time the ALJ issued his decision in September 2017. Dkt. No. 

30 at ECF 8 n.1. That assertion appears to be incorrect. The new regulation itself states that the 

new rules apply to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (“For 

claims filed . . . on or after March 27, 2017, the rules in this section apply. For claims filed before 

March 27, 2017, the rules in § 404.1527 apply.”). Because Mr. Sanchez’s claim was filed before 

March 27, 2017, the Court applies the rules then in effect under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 9 of 32
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

AR 397-98.

Based on her review of Mr. Sanchez’s records and her examination, Dr. Hardey concluded 

that he has “some deficits, particularly in the areas of Auditory Processing and Memory.” 

AR 398. With respect to Mr. Sanchez’s work-related abilities, Dr. Hardey found that he is mildly 

impaired in his ability to “Follow/remember simple visual instructions” and has a “Moderate to 

Severe” impairment in his ability to “Follow/remember complex/detailed auditory instructions.” 

AR 399. She otherwise found that Mr. Sanchez has mostly “Mild to Moderate” or “Moderate” 

levels of impairment in his work-related abilities. Id. Dr. Hardey opined that Mr. Sanchez “needs 

additional training and perhaps vocational courses including job readiness in order for him to be 

able to function in the world of work,” adding that “[h]e appears to be somewhat developmentally 

and emotionally delayed and would probably find difficulty functioning in an adult work 

situation.” AR 398.

There is no dispute that the ALJ considered Dr. Hardey’s report. Indeed, although he 

never referred to Dr. Hardey by name, the ALJ referenced her report by exhibit number (i.e., 

Exhibit 2F) at multiple places in his decision. For example, the ALJ noted Dr. Hardey’s test 

results; Mr. Sanchez’s activities of daily living as reported to Dr. Hardey; and Dr. Hardey’s 

general observations that while Mr. Sanchez appeared immature, he was cooperative during her 

examination and had adequate hygiene. See AR 18-21, 25-29. Nevertheless, Mr. Sanchez 

contends that the ALJ erred by failing to explicitly accept or reject Dr. Hardey’s opinion. The 

Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ did not state the specific weight he gave to Dr. 

Hardey’s report, but contends that it was not necessary for the ALJ to do so, or alternatively, that 

the ALJ’s failure to do so was harmless.

“Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, legitimate 

reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, he errs. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 

1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996)). Here, the 

Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not need to state the specific weight he gave to Dr. 

Hardey’s report because the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of examining psychologist Dr. 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 10 of 32
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Faith Tanner12 and “found [Dr. Hardey’s] report consistent with or exceeding Dr. Tanner’s 

findings . . ..” Dkt. No. 30 at ECF 12. The ALJ, however, made no such finding. What he said is 

that Dr. Tanner’s opinion is “consistent with [Mr. Sanchez’s] reported wide array of activities of 

daily living” as noted in Dr. Hardey’s report, and that Dr. Tanner’s opinion “explains his other low 

cognitive test scores” found by Dr. Hardey and others.

13

 AR 27. While the Commissioner 

suggests that the Court may infer that the ALJ found Dr. Hardey’s opinion to be consistent with 

Dr. Tanner’s opinion, the Court properly may do so only “if those inferences are there to be 

drawn.” Magallanes v. Brown, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989). Nothing in the ALJ’s decision 

indicates that that is what he did, and the Court “reviews only the reasons provided by the ALJ in 

the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the ALJ erred in failing to state 

what weight he gave to Dr. Hardey’s opinion.

The Commissioner nonetheless contends the error is harmless, primarily relying on Rogal 

v. Colvin, 590 Fed. App’x 667 (9th Cir. 2014). In Rogal, although the ALJ did not expressly state 

what weight she assigned to a physician’s opinion, the error was found harmless because the ALJ 

gave significant weight to the opinion of another physician who, in turn, relied upon the opinion of 

the first one. Id. at 670-71. Here, unlike Rogal, there is no indication that Dr. Tanner relied on 

Dr. Hardey’s report. Moreover, “[a]n error is harmless only if it is inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination, or if despite the legal error, the agency’s path may reasonably be 

discerned.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotations and citations 

omitted); see also Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(same). Mr. Sanchez notes, and the Commissioner does not deny, that Dr. Hardey’s report is the 

only psychological evaluation in the record that was performed before Mr. Sanchez turned 22. On 

this record the Court cannot conclude, as the Commissioner urges, that the error was 

12 Mr. Sanchez’s arguments concerning the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Tanner’s report are addressed

below.

13 As discussed below, the ALJ’s assertion that Dr. Tanner explained Mr. Sanchez’s “low 

cognitive test scores” is not an accurate reflection of Dr. Tanner’s opinion.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 11 of 32
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

inconsequential to the ultimate determination that Mr. Sanchez is not disabled.

Accordingly, the ALJ erred in failing to state what weight he gave to Dr. Hardey’s opinion, 

and the error is not harmless.

2. Nonexamining State Agency Consultants

Mr. Sanchez argues that the ALJ erred by failing to weigh, or to even mention, the 

opinions of the nonexamining State agency psychological consultants, Dr. V. Meenakshi, M.D. 

and Dr. D. Lucila, M.D. The Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ did not discuss these 

opinions, but maintains that any error is harmless.

In September 2014, Dr. Meenakshi issued a report finding that Mr. Sanchez has severe 

medically determinable affective and learning disorders. AR 80. While Dr. Meenakshi’s report 

notes that Mr. Sanchez has no social or adaptation limitations and was “Not significantly limited” 

in a number of areas, the report states that he has moderate limitations in his abilities to understand 

and remember detailed instructions; carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and 

concentration for extended periods; complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and perform at a consistent pace without an 

unreasonable number and length of rest periods. AR 82-83. Ultimately, Dr. Meenakshi concluded 

that Mr. Sanchez can work and is not disabled. AR 84.

In April 2015, Dr. Lucila reviewed Mr. Sanchez’s records and found that he has severe 

medically determinable impairments for intellectual disability and affective disorders. AR 93. 

The report further notes that Mr. Sanchez has no social interaction limitations. While Dr. Lucila 

found that he is “Not significantly limited” in a number of areas, the report states that Mr. Sanchez 

has moderate limitations in his abilities to understand and remember detailed instructions; carry 

out detailed instructions; maintain concentration and attention for extended periods; complete a 

normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; and 

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. AR 96. 

Additionally, Dr. Lucila noted some adaptation limitations, including moderate limitations in Mr. 

Sanchez’s ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting and to set realistic goals 

or make plans independently of others. AR 96-97. Ultimately, Dr. Lucila also concluded that Mr. 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 12 of 32
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Sanchez can work and is not disabled. AR 97-98.

As noted above, it is undisputed that the ALJ did not discuss the opinions of Drs. 

Meenakshi and Lucila. Mr. Sanchez notes, in particular, the moderate limitations identified in 

their respective reports. The Commissioner contends that any error in the failure to address these 

opinions is harmless, arguing that the reports and their findings are irrelevant to the ALJ’s findings 

and conclusions. Here, the Commissioner points out that Drs. Meenakshi and Lucila did not have 

before them the November 2016 report of Dr. Tanner, which the ALJ relied upon and assigned

great weight. AR 27. The Commissioner further argues that because Drs. Meenakshi and Lucila 

are nonexamining physicians, their opinions cannot constitute substantial evidence justifying the 

rejection of Dr. Tanner’s opinion.

The Commissioner’s regulations provide that, “[r]egardless of [their] source,” the SSA 

“will evaluate every medical opinion [it] receive[s]. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). While the 

Commissioner offers various reasons why the State agency physicians’ reports are irrelevant, and 

hence inconsequential, to the ALJ’s ultimate determination of nondisability, none of those reasons

were articulated by the ALJ. Although an agency will not be faulted “merely for explaining its 

decision with less than ideal clarity,” the agency must still “set forth the reasoning behind its 

decisions in a way that allows for meaningful review.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492

(quotations and citations omitted). Here, the ALJ did not mention Dr. Meenakshi’s or Dr. Lucila’s 

findings at all, and the Court cannot conclude with any confidence that the error was harmless. 

See id. (“A reviewing court may not make independent findings based on the evidence before the 

ALJ to conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless.”); Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (“In the circumstances of this case, where the ALJ did not even mention Dr. Betat’s 

opinion that Marsh’s chronic bursitis rendered her ‘pretty much nonfunctional,’ we cannot 

confidently conclude that the error was harmless.”) (citation omitted).

The ALJ erred in failing to address the opinions of Drs. Meenakshi and Lucila, and the

error was not harmless.

3. Examining Psychologist Maria Kerosky, Ph.D.

At the request of the State agency, psychologist Maria Kerosky, Ph.D. evaluated Mr. 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 13 of 32
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Sanchez and prepared a report dated March 25, 2015, when Mr. Sanchez was 23 years old. 

AR 464-470. During her examination, Dr. Kerosky administered several tests, including the 

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV and the Wechsler Memory Scale IV. Mr. Sanchez’s test 

results indicated a full scale IQ of 58, and Dr. Kerosky found that his scores demonstrate that he 

“functions intellectually in the extremely low range.” AR 467, 469. With respect to Mr. 

Sanchez’s emotional functioning, Dr. Kerosky observed that he “presented as a restless, 

distractible man” and that “[h]is frustration tolerance was low.” AR 469. Based on his clinical 

presentation and reported history, Dr. Kerosky stated that Mr. Sanchez appears to meet the DSMV criteria for a diagnosis of depressive disorder, with a need to rule out unspecified psychotic 

disorder. AR 468. She gave a “[g]uarded” prognosis and recommended comprehensive mental 

health services. AR 469. As for Mr. Sanchez’s ability to perform in the workplace, Dr. Kerosky 

found that he has mild to moderate difficulty maintaining adequate pace and persistence to 

perform simple repetitive tasks, and moderate impairment in his ability to interact appropriately 

with coworkers, supervisors, and the public on a regular basis. She further noted that Mr. Sanchez 

has moderate to marked difficulty following complex/detailed instructions; maintaining adequate 

sustained attention/concentration during routine workday; and adapting to changes in job routine. 

She found marked impairments in Mr. Sanchez’s ability to perform complex tasks; adapt to 

stressors in workplace setting; and complete normal workday/workweek without interruption 

related to psychiatric condition. AR 469-470.

The ALJ gave four reasons for assigning Dr. Kerosky’s opinion little weight: (1) “she was 

only able to examine [Mr. Sanchez] once and was not able to review the medical evidence at the 

hearing level”; (2) while Mr. Sanchez had “varied academic performance, IEP [individualized 

education program] participation, and behavioral problems a[t] Civicorps, . . . teachers still 

considered him bright and capable”; (3) “a Civicorp case counselor mentioned behavioral 

problems but did not mention intellectual difficulties”; and (4) “Dr. Tanner gave a thorough 

explanation for [Mr. Sanchez]’s low cognitive test scores, indicating his performance was more 

due to other mental illness and being used to others doing things for him rather than an intellectual 

disability.” AR 28.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 14 of 32
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Mr. Sanchez contends that the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons, 

supported by substantial evidence, to discredit Dr. Kerosky’s opinion. “As is the case with the 

opinion of a treating physician, the Commissioner must provide ‘clear and convincing’ reasons for 

rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). “And like the opinion of a treating doctor, the opinion of an examining 

doctor, even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 830-31 (citing Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (“If a treating 

or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject 

it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. This is 

so because, even when contradicted, a treating or examining physician’s opinion is still owed 

deference and will often be ‘entitled to the greatest weight . . . even if it does not meet the test for 

controlling weight.’”) (quoting Orn, 495 F.3d at 633)). Here, the parties seem to agree that Dr. 

Tanner’s assessment of Mr. Sanchez’s work abilities is less restrictive than that made by Dr. 

Kerosky and that the ALJ must provide specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial 

evidence, for giving Dr. Kerosky’s opinion little weight.

Mr. Sanchez correctly notes that the ALJ’s first reason for rejecting Dr. Kerosky’s 

opinion—i.e., that “she was only able to examine [Mr. Sanchez] once and was not able to review 

the medical evidence at the hearing level”—applies equally to all three of the psychologists who 

examined him. The Court agrees that this is not a legitimate reason to reject Dr. Kerosky’s 

opinion. In any event, the Commissioner does not address this argument and thus, appears to 

concede this point.

In discounting Dr. Kerosky’s opinion, the ALJ noted that “Dr. Tanner gave a thorough 

explanation for [Mr. Sanchez]’s low cognitive test scores, indicating that his performance was 

more due to other mental illness and being used to others doing things for him rather than an 

intellectual disability.” AR 28. In the relevant portion of her report, however, Dr. Tanner did not 

say that Mr. Sanchez’s low cognitive test scores were due to other mental illness, as opposed to an 

intellectual disability. Rather, she was explaining why she believed Mr. Sanchez’s adaptive and 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 15 of 32
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

academic test scores were lower than his cognitive test scores. AR 486. As for the ALJ’s 

remaining reasons for discounting Dr. Kerosky’s opinion, Mr. Sanchez argues that observations 

from his teachers in 2009 and from a Civicorps counselor in 2010 and 2011 are not dispositive of 

Dr. Kerosky’s findings regarding Mr. Sanchez’s psychological evaluation in 2015. While the 

Commissioner correctly notes that the ALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities

or conflicts in the evidence, even viewing the record as a whole, the Court finds that the ALJ did 

not provide sufficient specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Kerosky’s opinion.

4. Examining Psychologist Faith Tanner, Psy.D.

Dr. Tanner evaluated Mr. Sanchez in November 2016 when he was 25 years old. 

Although she did not conduct a psychiatric review, Dr. Tanner concurred with a prior diagnosis of 

bipolar disorder. Additionally, she found that Mr. Sanchez has mild intellectual disability, as well 

as deficits in several areas of adaptive functioning, and further opined that “he was likely 

functioning at this same level prior to the age of 18.” AR 485-486. The ALJ gave Dr. Tanner’s 

opinion great weight, noting her conclusion that “while he has deficits with money management 

and time telling, he only has a mild intellectual disability considering his varied cognitive test 

scores and presentation.” AR 27. Further noting Dr. Tanner’s recommendations for socialization 

opportunities such as an art group, treatment for his bipolar disorder, and supportive employment, 

the ALJ stated that Dr. Tanner’s assessment is consistent with Mr. Sanchez’s education records

and reported activities of daily living, and “further explains his other low cognitive test[] scores 

(Exs. 2F, 7F), but otherwise lack of documented observed mental abnormalities by treating 

medical providers (Exs. 4F , 12F).” AR 27.

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ provided sufficient reasons supported by the record 

for giving Dr. Tanner’s opinion great weight. Mr. Sanchez, however, does not contend that the 

ALJ was wrong to assign great weight to Dr. Tanner’s opinion. Rather, he argues that the ALJ 

failed to “fully credit” Dr. Tanner’s opinion by highlighting her conclusion that he has a mild 

intellectual disability, while overlooking other findings that Mr. Sanchez says are indicative of 

significant functional limitations. Dkt. No. 31 at ECF 6.

An ALJ may not cherry-pick portions of the medical record and selectively rely on those 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 16 of 32
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

that are consistent with his findings. See Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 

2001) (holding that an ALJ may not selectively rely on some entries and ignore others “that 

indicate[] continued, severe impairment”). Here, Mr. Sanchez argues that the ALJ ignored Dr. 

Tanner’s findings regarding his inability to read a clock, as well as her observation that Mr. 

Sanchez “did not try to add coins stating that he could not do so.” AR 483. To the contrary, in 

crediting Dr. Tanner’s opinion, the ALJ did note her conclusions that Mr. Sanchez has deficits in 

money management and time telling. AR 27. Moreover, elsewhere in his decision the ALJ 

acknowledged that Mr. Sanchez did not attempt some tasks during Dr. Tanner’s academic testing,

and correctly noted Dr. Tanner’s observation that “[Mr. Sanchez] seemed to know that he could 

not perform the tasks without significant effort and likely could have performed some of the tasks 

but did not do so since others do it for him.” AR 25, 481.

Mr. Sanchez nonetheless argues that the ALJ failed to consider other of Dr. Tanner’s 

findings based on her academic and adaptive testing, including that Mr. Sanchez did not know the 

sign for poison and is unable to talk about realistic goals; could not distinguish between 

exaggerated and truthful claims; could not follow verbal directions to nearby places; does not 

carry identification since he would lose it; is unable to use a map; is unable to write his complete 

address; does not follow a schedule; does not write notes or emails; does not use lists or 

reminders; does not do a good job when washing clothes or dishes, putting things away or keeping 

his room clean; does not dry clothes well, fold clothing or clear the table after eating; does not pay 

bills; does not take medication independently; does not follow rules when playing games; does not 

wait for his turn; has difficulty focusing for 15 minutes on an activity and working independently; 

does not avoid harmful situations; does not complete household routines in a reasonable amount of 

time; is easily discouraged; cannot control his anger; does not say please; and does not show 

respect for authority. Dkt. No. 25 at ECF 14-15; AR 483-85. Additionally, Mr. Sanchez says that 

the ALJ erred by failing to mention that Mr. Sanchez was accompanied by his girlfriend during

portions of Dr. Tanner’s examination and that Dr. Tanner noted that Mr. Sanchez “was likely 

functioning at this same level prior to the age of 18.” AR 485-86.

Although the ALJ did not expressly mention these specific findings, he did acknowledge 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 17 of 32
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

that Mr. Sanchez’s academic testing scores “were well below average and lower extreme in 

arithmetic,” and that his general adaptive composite score “was extremely low.” AR 25. 

Additionally, in this portion of his decision, the ALJ correctly noted that Dr. Tanner “only 

diagnosed [Mr. Sanchez] with a mild intellectual disability and reasoned that [Mr. Sanchez’s] 

adaptive and academic scores were lower than those obtained on other tests due to mental illness 

and his often having others doing things for him.” AR 25, 486. To the extent Mr. Sanchez 

disagrees that is a proper basis for discounting the severity of his adaptive and academic 

functioning, the ALJ’s observation is supported by Dr. Tanner’s report. The ALJ did not err by 

selectively relying on portions of Dr. Tanner’s report to the exclusion of others.

5. Mr. Sanchez’s Request for a Medical Expert

Mr. Sanchez requested that the ALJ call a medical expert to testify at the administrative 

hearing, noting that “[o]ne of [Mr. Sanchez’s] arguments at the hearing will be that his 

impairments meet or medically equal the requirements of Listing 12.05 and Listing 12.04.” 

AR 356. The ALJ did not call a medical expert to testify at the hearing, and Mr. Sanchez now 

contends that the ALJ erred in failing to receive such testimony. Mr. Sanchez’s arguments, 

however, are not tied to the issue of medical equivalence.14 Rather, Mr. Sanchez contends that, in 

view of the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical source statements discussed above, the ALJ 

improperly substituted his own judgment for those of the medical experts.

An ALJ’s decision regarding whether a medical expert is necessary is discretionary. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(iii) (an ALJ “may also ask for and consider opinions from medical 

experts on the nature and severity of your impairment(s) and on whether your impairment(s) 

equals the requirements of any impairment listed in appendix 1 to this subpart.”). An ALJ has a 

duty to fully and fairly develop the record, and “[a]mbiguous evidence, or the ALJ’s own finding 

that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty 

to ‘conduct an appropriate inquiry.’” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996)). While the Court concludes that 

14 Mr. Sanchez’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s medical equivalence findings are discussed 

below.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 18 of 32
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the ALJ did not properly evaluate all of the medical source statements of record, it also finds no

basis for Mr. Sanchez’s argument that the ALJ improperly substituted his own medical judgment 

for that of a medical expert. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in failing to call a medical expert to 

testify at the administrative hearing.

C. The ALJ’s Findings re Medical Equivalence

At step three of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that “[t]he severity of [Mr. 

Sanchez]’s mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not meet or medically 

equal the criteria of listings 12.04, 12.05, 12.08, and 12.11”

15 in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. AR 18. In making that finding, the ALJ considered whether Mr. Sanchez’s 

impairments satisfy the “paragraph B”16 criteria of each listed impairment. Mr. Sanchez contends 

that the ALJ ignored evidence indicating that his functional impairments are more limited than as 

found by the ALJ. He also argues that that ALJ erred by failing to consider the combined effects 

of his bipolar disorder and learning disability.

“An ALJ must evaluate the relevant evidence before concluding that a claimant’s 

impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “A boilerplate finding is insufficient to support a conclusion that a claimant’s 

impairment does not do so.” Id. “[I]n determining whether a claimant equals a listing under step 

three of the Secretary’s disability evaluation process, the ALJ must explain adequately his 

evaluation of alternative tests and the combined effects of the impairments.” Marcia v. Sullivan, 

900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, an ALJ does not err by failing to address 

whether the claimant’s combination of impairments medically equals a listing where the claimant 

15 The listings for mental disorders are arranged by categories. Listing 12.04 concerns depressive, 

bipolar and related disorders; listing 12.05 pertains to intellectual disorder; listing 12.08 addresses 

personality and impulse-control disorders; and listing 12.11 concerns neurodevelopmental 

disorders.

16 Listing 12.04 has three paragraphs, designated A, B, and C; a claimant’s mental disorder must 

satisfy the requirements of both paragraphs A and B or the requirements of paragraphs A and C. 

Listings 12.08 and 12.11 have two paragraphs, designated A and B, and a claimant’s mental 

disorder must satisfy the requirements of both paragraphs. Listing 12.05 has two paragraphs, 

designated A and B, which are unique to that listing; a claimant’s mental disorder must satisfy the 

requirements of either paragraph A or B. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00A.2. & A.3.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 19 of 32
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

offers no plausible theory as to how her impairments equal a listed impairment. Lewis, 236 F.3d

at 514.

Mr. Sanchez argues in conclusory fashion that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the 

combined effects of his bipolar disorder and his intellectual disorder in determining that he did not 

meet or equal any listed impairment. The ALJ apparently considered statements and allegations in 

Mr. Sanchez’s testimony, third party statements, the examining psychologists’ respective reports, 

as well as Mr. Sanchez’s education, Civicorps, and medical treatment records concerning his 

intellectual, behavioral, and emotional issues. AR 18-19. To the extent Mr. Sanchez claims that 

the ALJ erred by failing to “discuss[] the specific effects of either [Mr. Sanchez]’s Bipolar 

disorder or learning disability” (Dkt. No. 25 at ECF 18-19), Mr. Sanchez does not further 

elaborate as to how or why that is so. Lewis, 236 F.3d at 514; see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005) (“An ALJ is not required to discuss the combined effects of a 

claimant’s impairments or compare them to any listing in an equivalency determination, unless the 

claimant presents evidence in an effort to establish equivalence.”).

Even so, for the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with Mr. Sanchez that the ALJ 

erred in his analysis of the paragraph B criteria for the relevant listings.

1. Listings 12.04, 12.08 and 12.11

For each of these listings, “paragraph B” sets out criteria used to evaluate how a mental 

disorder limits a claimant’s functioning in four areas: (1) understanding, remembering, or 

applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining 

pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, § 12.00E. To 

satisfy these criteria, a claimant’s “mental disorder must result in ‘extreme’ limitation of one, or 

‘marked’ limitation of two, of the four areas of mental functioning.” Id. § 12.00A.2.b. Here, the 

ALJ found that Mr. Sanchez has moderate limitations with respect to the second criterion

regarding interaction with others, and mild limitations for the remaining criteria. AR 18-19. Mr. 

Sanchez argues that the ALJ ignored evidence that he says demonstrates marked limitations in all 

four of the paragraph B criteria.

In some respects, the ALJ’s analysis is not as narrow as Mr. Sanchez contends. Indeed, the 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 20 of 32
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

ALJ’s decision indicates that he considered Mr. Sanchez’s testimony, third party statements, the 

examining psychologists’ respective reports, as well as Mr. Sanchez’s education, Civicorps, and 

medical treatment records. AR 19. For example, the ALJ noted Mr. Sanchez’s allegations that he 

has difficulty with anger, frustration, hitting himself, punching walls, and getting along with 

others. He also considered Civicorps records citing Mr. Sanchez’s behavioral problems getting 

along with others and with authority figures. The ALJ correctly observed that Mr. Sanchez’s 

education records indicated that inappropriate and immature behavior were “very rare 

occurrences,” and that Mr. Sanchez was usually well-behaved and an active participant in class. 

AR 19, 378-379. Additionally, while Mr. Sanchez points out that he used an expletive during Dr. 

Tanner’s evaluation, the ALJ also noted Dr. Tanner’s observations that Mr. Sanchez “showed 

respect for [her]” by apologizing for his language, and that his “demeanor was generally laid back 

and informal,” and that he was “loosely polite and respectful during assessment . . .” AR 19, 481. 

The ALJ further remarked that Mr. Sanchez’s “regular medical treatment records also do not 

document any observed mental abnormalities.” AR 19.

Nevertheless, Mr. Sanchez contends that in determining that he has only mild limitations in

several of the paragraph B criteria, the ALJ failed to consider specific functional limitations found 

by Drs. Tanner, Kerosky, Hardey, Meenakshi and Lucila. For example, Mr. Sanchez points out

that Drs. Hardey, Meenakshi and Lucila found that he is at least moderately impaired in his ability 

to concentrate, while Dr. Kerosky found that he has moderate to marked limitations in his ability 

to maintain adequate sustained attention/concentration during a routine workday. See AR 80, 94, 

399, 469. While Mr. Sanchez acknowledges that Dr. Tanner did not expressly say that he is 

“moderately” impaired, he nonetheless argues that her findings indicate more than mild limitation 

in the ability to concentrate. See e.g., AR 485 (noting that Mr. Sanchez “has difficulty focusing 

for 15 minutes on an activity and working independently.”). As discussed above, this order finds 

that the ALJ did not selectively rely on portions of Dr. Tanner’s opinion. Moreover, it ultimately 

is for the ALJ to assess and weigh the evidence. Nevertheless, because the ALJ did err in failing 

to evaluate all of the medical source statements, the Court cannot conclude that he properly

considered all of the relevant evidence in assessing whether Mr. Sanchez satisfies the paragraph B 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 21 of 32
22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

criteria. In that respect, the ALJ erred.

2. Listing 12.05

“Listing 12.05 is based on the three elements that characterize intellectual disorder: 

Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; significant deficits in current adaptive 

functioning; and the disorder manifested before age 22.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 

§ 12.00H.1. As noted above, listing 12.05 has two paragraphs, designated A and B, which only 

apply to intellectual disorder; and, a claimant need only satisfy the requirements of either 

paragraph A or B. Id. § 12.00A.2, A.3. Although Mr. Sanchez does not challenge the ALJ’s 

finding that he does not satisfy listing 12.05 paragraph A, he contends that the ALJ’s paragraph B 

analysis is flawed.

For listing 12.05 paragraph B, the SSA “identif[ies] significantly subaverage general 

intellectual functioning by an IQ score(s) on an individually administered standardized test of 

general intelligence that meets program requirements and has a mean of 100 and a standard 

deviation of 15.” Id. § 12.00H.2.a. Specifically, paragraph B has three requirements, all three of 

which must be satisfied:

B. Satisfied by 1, 2, and 3 (see 12.00H):

1. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning evidenced by a or 

b:

a. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 70 or below on an individually 

administered standardized test of general intelligence; or

b. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 71-75 accompanied by a verbal or 

performance IQ score (or comparable part score) of 70 or below on an 

individually administered standardized test of general intelligence; and

2. Significant deficits in adaptive functioning currently manifested by 

extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas 

of mental functioning:

a. Understand, remember, or apply information (see 12.00E1); or

b. Interact with others (see 12.00E2); or

c. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 12.00E3); or

d. Adapt or manage oneself (see 12.00E4); and

3. The evidence about your current intellectual and adaptive functioning and 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 22 of 32
23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

about the history of your disorder demonstrates or supports the conclusion 

that the disorder began prior to your attainment of age 22.

Id. § 12.05B.

In determining that Mr. Sanchez did not satisfy these requirements, the ALJ acknowledged

that testing by Dr. Hardey in September 2009 showed a full scale IQ of 74 and a verbal IQ of 69. 

AR 21. He also noted that Dr. Tanner’s November 2016 evaluation revealed a full scale IQ of 68, 

with generally lower academic and adaptive testing scores. Id. Nevertheless, in concluding that 

Mr. Sanchez does not meet the paragraph B criteria, the ALJ noted that Dr. Tanner diagnosed only 

mild intellectual disability, and also noted her explanation “that the reason for [Mr. Sanchez’s]

adaptive and academic scores being lower may be due to mental illness and his often having others 

do things for him.” Id. Mr. Sanchez acknowledges that “[m]ental illness and relying on others for 

managing oneself may indeed explain [Mr. Sanchez]’s lower adaptive and academic scores, as Dr. 

Tanner noted.” Dkt. No. 25 at ECF 18; AR 486. However, he contends that it was error for the 

ALJ to discount his IQ scores on that basis. The Court agrees.

The SSA “generally presume[s] that [a claimant’s] obtained IQ score(s) is an accurate 

reflection of [the claimant’s] general intellectual functioning, unless evidence in the record 

suggests otherwise.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00H.2.d. Such evidence includes 

“a statement from the test administrator indicating that [the claimant’s] obtained score is not an 

accurate reflection of [the claimant’s] general intellectual functioning, prior or internally 

inconsistent IQ scores, or information about [the claimant’s] daily functioning.” Id. Only those 

qualified to administer such tests, agency medical and psychological consultants, and other 

contracted medical and psychological experts “may conclude that [a claimant’s] obtained IQ 

score(s) is not an accurate reflection of [the claimant’s] general functioning,” and such a 

conclusion “must be well supported by appropriate clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques . . ..” Id. In the present case, Dr. Tanner did not say that Mr. Sanchez’s IQ score was

invalid or inaccurate due to other mental illness or because others do things for him. Accordingly, 

the ALJ erred in suggesting that Dr. Tanner’s comment is a proper basis for questioning the 

validity of those scores. Although the ALJ also remarked that one of Mr. Sanchez’s regular 

treatment notes mentions only mild developmental delay (AR 21, 494), even viewing the record as 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 23 of 32
24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

a whole, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial 

evidence.

Moreover, insofar as listing 12.05 paragraph B incorporates the same adaptive functioning

analysis applicable to listings 12.04, 12.08 and 12.11, for the reasons discussed above, the Court 

finds that the ALJ did not properly consider all of the relevant evidence in assessing whether Mr. 

Sanchez satisfies the criteria in listing 12.05 paragraph B.2.

D. The ALJ’s Credibility Findings

In finding that Mr. Sanchez is not disabled, the ALJ determined that while his “medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” Mr. 

Sanchez’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the 

reasons explained in this decision.” AR 26. 

Mr. Sanchez argues that the ALJ’s credibility analysis contradicts statements the ALJ 

made at the administrative hearing, telling Mr. Sanchez, “I think you have been very honest during 

this hearing, and I haven’t doubted anything you said.” AR 71. This argument is unpersuasive. 

In assessing the credibility of a claimant’s alleged symptoms and limitations, “[a]n ALJ is not 

‘required to believe every allegation of disabling pain’ or other non-exertional impairment.” Orn, 

495 F.3d at 635 (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Mr. Sanchez nonetheless contends that the ALJ’s analysis is vague and that he erred by 

failing to identify what specific testimony he found not credible. In evaluating the credibility of a 

claimant’s testimony regarding subjective symptoms, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). “First, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 1036 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The claimant is not required to show that his

impairment “could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged; 

[he] need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. 

(internal quotation omitted). “[O]nce the claimant produces objective medical evidence of an 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 24 of 32
25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based 

solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity . . . .” 

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted). Unless there is 

affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s 

testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing

reasons for doing so.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the 

ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 

complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834.

Because the ALJ did not find that Mr. Sanchez was malingering, he was required to 

provide clear and convincing reasons to justify his rejection of Mr. Sanchez’s testimony about his

symptoms. The Court concludes that the ALJ met this standard.

Citing Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2014), Mr. Sanchez 

argues that the ALJ erred by failing to specify the testimony he found not credible. To the extent 

Mr. Sanchez suggests that the ALJ was obliged to identify precisely what statements or testimony 

lack credibility, his reliance on Treichler is misplaced. In Treichler, the Ninth Circuit found 

insufficient an ALJ’s cursory, one-sentence finding that the claimant’s statements regarding the 

severity of his symptoms were “not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [ALJ’s 

RFC] assessment.” Id. at 1103. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a]n ALJ’s vague 

allegation that a claimant’s testimony is not consistent with the objective medical evidence, 

without any specific findings in support of that conclusion is insufficient for [judicial] review.” 

Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit further noted that an ALJ’s

“analysis need not be extensive,” although “the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for 

[courts] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by substantial 

evidence.” Id.

In the present matter, unlike Treichler, the ALJ provided far more than a mere boilerplate

statement that Mr. Sanchez’s testimony is not credible. The ALJ discussed the evidence and 

explained the inconsistencies in the record that he concluded discredits Mr. Sanchez’s allegations 

and testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms. “Factors that an ALJ may consider in 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 25 of 32
26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

weighing a claimant’s credibility include reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony 

or between testimony and conduct, daily activities, and unexplained, or inadequately explained, 

failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 636. Here, 

the ALJ noted that Mr. Sanchez reported engaging in “an array of daily activities, including 

attending to his personal care, doing household chores, watching television, playing video games 

and basketball, going to restaurants and the park, drawing, and sewing.” AR 22. The ALJ also 

acknowledged that Mr. Sanchez later testified that “he does no chores and his symptoms and 

resulting limitations allegedly make it difficult to prepare meals, sleep, manage money, [and] 

shop . . .” Id. The ALJ noted that even if “[Mr. Sanchez’s] daily activities are truly as limited as 

alleged, it is difficult to attribute that degree of limitation to [his] medical condition, as opposed to 

other reasons, in view of the relatively weak medical evidence and other factors discussed in this 

decision.” AR 27. The ALJ provided a detailed summary of Mr. Sanchez’s education and 

medical records, explaining why he found they did not fully corroborate the alleged severity of 

Mr. Sanchez’s impairments. AR 24-26. For example, while the ALJ acknowledged that Mr. 

Sanchez’s school records reflected issues with distraction, tardiness, and failure to complete class 

assignments and homework, the ALJ correctly noted that those records also reflect that incidents 

of immature and inappropriate behavior were “very rare,” and that Mr. Sanchez “understood he 

gets distracted easily and requires a quiet controlled environment” and “had little difficulty 

completing assignments independently in [his special education] classes.” AR 24, 378-79. The 

ALJ further noted that while Civicorps records also documented behavioral and tardiness issues, 

Mr. Sanchez’s Civicorps counselor remembered him “as a nice, enthusiastic person who simply 

was unable to control his behavior/impulses.” AR 24, 401, 475.

As for Mr. Sanchez’s medical records, Mr. Sanchez argues that the ALJ improperly faulted 

him for not seeking treatment. See Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1465 (“[I]t is a questionable practice to 

chastise one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking 

rehabilitation.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). While the ALJ did observe that Mr. 

Sanchez’s “[t]reatment notes are sparse,” showing only that he was prescribed medication for 

bipolar disorder in mid- and late 2016, the ALJ’s findings were not based solely on a lack of 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 26 of 32
27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

medical treatment. Rather, the ALJ noted that observations in those medical records, e.g., 

describing Mr. Sanchez as “calm and cooperative,” and indicating that he was able to 

communicate with and understand medical staff with no noted difficulties or mental abnormalities,

did not support the alleged disabling effect of his impairments. AR 24-25, 421, 426-27, 429, 434, 

437, 441, 443-44, 447, 451. While subjective testimony “cannot be rejected on the sole ground 

that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a 

relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins 

v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Court finds that the reasons provided by the ALJ for partially discrediting Mr. 

Sanchez’s statements and testimony are specific, clear, convincing, and are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. Because the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence, this Court may not engage in second-guessing. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959

(9th Cir. 2002). The Court therefore finds that the ALJ did not err in his assessment of Mr. 

Sanchez’s statements and testimony.

E. The ALJ’s RFC Determination And Step 5 Finding That Mr. Sanchez Can 

Work

The ALJ determined that, prior to attaining age 22, Mr. Sanchez had the RFC to perform a 

full range of work at all exertional levels, with the sole non-exertional limitation that he can only 

occasionally respond appropriately to supervisors, co-workers and the public. AR 21. Mr. 

Sanchez contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment fails to properly account for restrictions found 

in the medical source statements in the record. Relatedly, Mr. Sanchez argues that the ALJ’s 

finding that he can work, which was informed by his RFC assessment, is also not supported by

substantial evidence. Specifically, Mr. Sanchez contends that the ALJ posed hypotheticals to the 

vocational expert (“VE”) that did not reflect the medical evidence and failed to accurately state 

Mr. Sanchez’s level of education.

17

17 As noted above, the record indicates that Mr. Sanchez completed the 12th grade, but did not 

pass the California high school exit exam and did not receive a diploma. AR 50, 382. Mr. 

Sanchez contends that at the administrative hearing, the VE inaccurately stated that his record 

“shows 12th grade with special education . . ..” AR 64. Although the Commissioner attributes the 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 27 of 32
28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

In assessing a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider “all allegations of physical and 

mental limitations or restrictions,” as well as “limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an 

individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’” SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *5. 

Additionally, “[t]he RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the 

evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and 

nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” Id. at *7.

Because this order finds that the ALJ did not properly assess the medical source 

statements, the Court cannot conclude that his RFC assessment is supported by substantial 

evidence. On remand, the ALJ must consider all of the medical source statements and, if 

necessary, revisit the degree to which the opinions in those statements should be credited. Upon 

further proceedings on remand and consideration of the record evidence, the RFC may change. 

Accordingly, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the propriety of specific questions posed to 

the vocational expert based on the ALJ’s flawed RFC.

F. Lay Witness Statements

Mr. Sanchez contends that the ALJ failed to provide germane reasons for rejecting several 

lay witness statements submitted by family and friends, including Ms. Brazington, Kimberlie 

Lowe, Lisa Fortune, Colleen S. Congress and Rain Johnson. AR 280, 292, 321, 323, 325.

In her January 27, 2015 statement, Ms. Brazington states that Mr. Sanchez behaves like a 

12-year old child; needs reminders for appointments and for personal care matters, such as 

bathing, shaving and washing his clothes; cannot manage money; has trouble staying on task for 

more than five minutes; is easily frustrated and has anger issues; and slaps himself or punches 

holes in walls. AR 292.

In her December 18, 2014 statement, Kimberlie Lowe, a special education teacher, states 

that she is Ms. Brazington’s work colleague and has known Mr. Sanchez for three years. AR 280. 

Ms. Lowe says that she had several occasions to interact with Mr. Sanchez and found him to be a 

“very pleasant young man.” Id. She says she learned about Mr. Sanchez’s alleged disability 

quoted statement to Mr. Sanchez’s counsel, review of the record confirms that it was a statement 

by the VE.

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 28 of 32
29

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

through Ms. Brazington, noting that he “struggles with academics, self-help skills, behavior 

problems, and attention deficits.” Id. Ms. Lowe further notes that Mr. Sanchez lacks basic 

academic skills, does not stay on task for more than a few minutes, needs help with daily living 

skills, and has behavioral issues including slapping himself, punching holes in walls and 

screaming at others. Id.

In her October 16, 2015 statement, Lisa Fortune states that she has known Mr. Sanchez 

since 1997 and says that he is like a nephew to her. AR 321. Ms. Fortune notes that she has 

observed Mr. Sanchez’s difficulties performing simple math and basic reading and writing skills, 

as well as problems focusing on a task for a short period of time. For example, Ms. Fortune notes 

that when Mr. Sanchez has done yard work for her, she had to “constantly remind him of what he 

was supposed to be doing” and that “[h]e cannot follow simple instructions unless they are 

repeated several times.” Id. Additionally, Ms. Fortune opines that Mr. Sanchez needs supervision 

regarding matters “such as washing dishes or his clothes,” and further notes that he “loses his 

temper very easily and then starts banging his head or punching holes in walls.” Id.

In her November 10, 2015 statement, Ms. Congress states that she is a vocational specialist 

at Spectrum Center, a school that serves students with disabilities, adding that she has been Ms. 

Brazington’s friend for several years and has known Mr. Sanchez for the same period. She states 

that Mr. Sanchez requires multiple verbal and physical prompts to complete simple tasks “such as 

sweeping, washing dishes, mopping floors, etc.”; struggles academically; and has anger 

management issues and reacts by punching whatever has frustrated him, head-butting walls, or 

behaving inappropriately with authority figures. AR 323. Ms. Congress opines that Mr. Sanchez 

“need[s] continued support in all functional areas in his life.” Id.

In his November 12, 2015 statement, Mr. Johnson, the director of Spectrum Center, states 

that he has worked with Ms. Brazington for over 10 years and has known Mr. Sanchez during that 

time. Mr. Johnson states that Mr. Sanchez has struggled to obtain and keep employment; has 

memory issues; cannot finish tasks he starts; and has anger and other emotional issues. In Mr. 

Johnson’s view, Mr. Sanchez “would be unable to hold a job that did not have direct support or 

belong in a supported employment program” and “would need extensive and repeated training and 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 29 of 32
30

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

supervision in a job.” AR 325.

“Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects the claimant’s

ability to work is competent evidence that the ALJ must take into account.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). However, an ALJ is not required to “discuss every witness’s 

testimony on a[n] individualized, witness-by-witness basis. Rather, if the ALJ gives germane 

reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the ALJ need only point to those reasons when 

rejecting similar testimony by a different witness.” Id.

Here, the ALJ stated that the lay witnesses’ statements “mirror that of [Mr. Sanchez] and 

are not entirely consistent with the record as a whole . . ..” and provided several reasons for giving 

those statements little weight. AR 23. First, the ALJ noted that Mr. Sanchez’s medical evidence 

“shows very little mental health treatment, but apparently ability to seek out and obtain treatment 

for non-mental health medical conditions, as further discussed below.” Id. Second, the ALJ stated 

that while Mr. Sanchez’s “[c]ognitive test scores have been low,” Dr. Tanner “reasoned that they 

were more due to other mental illness and him being used to others doing things for him than an 

intellectual disability.” Id. Third, the ALJ stated that Mr. Sanchez’s “[m]edical treatment records 

and consultative psychological examination reports also do not document observed behavioral 

abnormalities as extreme as described by [his] family and family friends.” Id.

Mr. Sanchez contends that the ALJ erred in stating that these lay witness statements 

“mirror” his own because the statements in question were made by different individuals who each 

describe their respective relationships with, and impressions of, Mr. Sanchez. All of the lay 

witness statements, however, are similar to Mr. Sanchez’s statements with respect to the nature 

and alleged effects of his impairments. Accordingly, to the extent Mr. Sanchez contends that the 

ALJ was required to discuss each witness’s testimony on an individual basis, the Court is 

unpersuaded.

With respect to the ALJ’s stated reasons for discounting the weight given to the witnesses’ 

statements, the Court agrees that the ALJ failed to provide a germane reason for rejecting these 

witness statements based on Dr. Tanner’s report. As in other places in his decision, the ALJ 

incorrectly attributes Dr. Tanner’s comment about Mr. Sanchez’s adaptive and academic testing

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 30 of 32
31

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

scores to his cognitive test scores. However, the Court has found that the ALJ provided sufficient 

reasons for rejecting Mr. Sanchez’s statements and testimony based at least in part on sparse 

mental health treatment and inconsistencies with the medical record. “In such a situation, the ALJ 

also gives germane reasons for rejecting other lay witness testimony where it is found to be similar 

to claimant’s.” Bennet v. Colvin, 202 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1130-31 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see also 

Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In light of our 

conclusion that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Valentine’s own 

subjective complaints, and because Ms. Valentine’s testimony was similar to such complaints, it 

follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting her testimony.”). The Court finds no 

error in the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to the statements by Ms. Brazington, Ms. Lowe, 

Ms. Fortune, Ms. Congress and Mr. Johnson.

IV. DISPOSITION

The Act permits courts to affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision “with or 

without remanding the case for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Treichler, 775 F.3d at 

1099-1100; Garrison, 759 F.3d 995at 1019. Because it is not clear from the record that the ALJ 

would be required to find Mr. Sanchez disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated, 

remand is appropriate. On remand, and based on applicable law and the guidance provided in this 

opinion, the ALJ must properly evaluate the medical source statements, which may in turn affect 

the ALJ’s analysis whether Mr. Sanchez’s meets or equals the relevant listings, Mr. Sanchez’s 

RFC, and whether Mr. Sanchez is able to work. It is not the Court’s intent to limit the scope of the 

remand.

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Sanchez’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part 

and denied in part, the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted in part and 

denied in part, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. The 

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 31 of 32
32

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2020

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:18-cv-05184-VKD Document 32 Filed 03/30/20 Page 32 of 32