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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United Stat~ Court of Appeals UNITED STATES STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

AMERICAN MOTORIST INSURANCE ) 

COMPANY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JON MANUEL, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

LANCE, INC., ) 

) 

Defendant ) 

FEB 2 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1634 

(D.C. No. Civ-87-1283-P) 

(W. D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before*~ALDOCK, MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District 

Judge. 

This case involves Oklahoma's uninsured motorist law. Okla. 

Stat. tit. 36, § 3636 (1981) provides that no policy insuring 

against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable John L. Kane, United States District Judge for the 

District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1634 Document: 01019962911 Date Filed: 02/02/1990 Page: 1 
injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be issued unless 

the policy includes uninsured motorist coverage. That statute 

also provides that the named insured shall have the right to 

reject in writing uninsured motorist coverage and such coverage 

need not be provided in a supplemental or renewal policy where 

there has been an earlier rejection in writing by the named 

insured. 

On November 22, 1986, Jon Manuel, while driving his 

motorcycle near Marlow, Oklahoma, was severely injured when he was 

struck by the driver of a motor vehicle who was either uninsured 

or underinsured. As a result of this accident, Manuel was 

rendered paraplegic. For the purposes of this proceeding the 

uninsured motorist was solely at fault. 

At the time of the accident, Manuel was employed by Lance, 

Inc., a national snack food manufacturer and distributor with 

headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina. Manuel was employed by 

Lance as a delivery route driver in Oklahoma. In connection with 

his employment by Lance, Manuel drove his own Ford van which he 

leased to Lance under an agreement whereby Lance agreed "to 

procure public liability and property damage insurance to cover 

both parties [i.e., Lance and Manuel] as to this particular 

vehicle with limits of $500,000 combined single limit for property 

damage and bodily injury. That agreement further provided 

that Manuel would use the leased vehicle in the course of his 

1 The lease agreement between Lance and Manuel did not mention 

uninsured motorist coverage. 

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employment with Lance, and "when it is not being so used ... 

[Manuel] shall have full possession of said vehicle and shall have 

the right to use it for his own purposes, including both business 

and pleasure." The agreement also provided that Lance would 

deduct $60 per year from Manuel's earnings to cover, in part, the 

premium for the policy secured by Lance. 

American Motorist Insurance Company, an Illinois corporation, 

issued a so-called ''fleet policy" to Lance, covering vehicles 

owned outright by Lance and the several thousand vehicles leased 

by Lance from its employees and used by Lance's employees in the 

course of their employment with Lance. Although there is some 

dispute in this matter, Lance had rejected in writing uninsured 

motorist insurance. 2 However, Manuel had himself made no such 

rejection. 

Based on these events, American Motorist's position is that 

Manuel was not a ''named insured" under the terms of the policy it 

issued Lance, and that Lance, the only named insured, had rejected 

2 Lance had rejected in writing uninsured motorist coverage 

contained in the policy issued it by American Motorist for the 

period August 1, 1985 to August 1, 1986. Lance had not rejected 

uninsured motorist coverage contained in the policy issued by 

American Motorist for the period August 1, 1986 to August 1, 1987, 

until January 1987, several months after Manuel's motorcycle accident. In this regard, American Motorist's position, as well as 

Lance's position, is that the rejection of uninsured motorist 

coverage in connection with the earlier policy carried over to the 

succeeding policy. Manuel's position is that Lance's rejection of 

uninsured motorist benefits in the 1985-1986 policy was ineffective, and, in any event, did not carry over to the 1986-1987 

policy, which counsel says was not just a renewal policy. Be that 

as it may, we need not here consider that particular matter since 

the district court in granting summary judgment assumed that 

American Motorist's policy with Lance at the time of Manuel's accident did include uninsured motorist coverage for the named 

insured. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1634 Document: 01019962911 Date Filed: 02/02/1990 Page: 3 
in writing uninsured motorist coverage. That is also the position 

of Lance. Manuel's position is that he was a named insured under 

the terms of the policy issued Lance by American Motorist, and 

that he was accordingly afforded uninsured motorist coverage when 

injured while driving his motorcycle since he had not rejected in 

writing uninsured motorist coverage. 

In this general setting, American Motorist brought a 

declaratory judgment action against Jon Manuel and Lance. 28 

U.S.C. § 2210. Jurisdiction was based on diversity. 28 u.s.c. § 

1332. Judy Manuel, wife of Jon, as his guardian filed an answer 

and also counterclaimed for herself and Jon against American 

Motorist and filed a crossclaim against Lance. American Motorist 

filed a motion for summary judgment against Jon Manuel, which the 

district court granted. Implicit in the granting of summary judgment was a dismissal of all counterclaims. Also, the district 

court granted Lance's motion for summary judgment on Manuel's 

crossclaims because the agreement between Lance and Manuel was 

clear that Lance intended to provide only public liability and 

property damage coverage. Manuel appeals. We affirm. 

In granting American Motorist's motion for summary judgment, 

the district court assumed that the policy issued Lance by 

American Motorist in effect at the time of Manuel's accident 

contained uninsured motorist benefits which had not been rejected 

in writing. However, the district court went on to observe that 

in item 1 in Part I, which part was the declaration section of the 

policy issued Lance by American Motorist, Lance, and only Lance, 

was listed as the "Named Insured," i.e., it did not list as "Named 

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Appellate Case: 88-1634 Document: 01019962911 Date Filed: 02/02/1990 Page: 4 
Insured" employees of Lance, such as Manuel who had leased 

vehicles to Lance. The district court then noted that under Part 

4(d} of the policy anyone other than the named insured is covered 

by the policy only if he, or she, is a "permissive user of a 

covered vehicle." The district court then commented as 

"It's undisputed in this case that Manuel was 

injured while driving his motorcycle, an 

uncovered vehicle. Thus even assuming that 

the policy included uninsured motorist insurance, Manuel would have to be a named insured 

of the policy in order to recover." 

follows: 

On appeal, all agree that the crucial issue is whether the 

district court correctly held that Manuel is not a "Named 

Insured" under the policy of insurance issued Lance by American 

Motorist. If he is a "Named Insured," there remains the question 

of whether there was a valid rejection of uninsured motorist 

coverage. However, if Manuel is not a "Named Insured," both parties agree that under Part 4(d} there is no coverage. 

It is quite certain that under the declarations section of 

the policy Manuel is not a "Named Insured." Only Lance is listed 

as a named insured. Counsel argue that other provisions in the 

policy, or in certain endorsements, convert Manuel from an 

"insured" or "additional insured" into a "Named Insured." The 

district court rejected the argument, citing Stanton v. American 

Mutual Liability Insurance Company, 747 P.2d 945 (Okla. 1987) and 

Rogers v. Goad, 739 P.2d 519 (Okla. 1987). 3 We are not inclined 

3 In Stanton, a corporate employer obtained a fleet auto policy 

covering 379 vehicles, which provided, inter alia, uninsured 

motorist coverage. An employee while driving a company car collided with an uninsured motorist. The employee sought to "stack" 

the uninsured motorist coverage provided for the 378 other 

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Appellate Case: 88-1634 Document: 01019962911 Date Filed: 02/02/1990 Page: 5 
to disturb the resident federal judge's understanding of Oklahoma 

law and his application of such to the present facts. 

Counsel for Manuel suggests in his brief that a recent 

Oklahoma case filed after the district court's order changes the 

outcome in the present case. Moon v. Guarantee, Ins. Co., 764 

P.2d 1331 (Okla. 1988}. We believe that counsel overreads Moon. 

In Moon the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Oklahoma certified certain questions of law to the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court. In that setting the Oklahoma Supreme 

Court held that Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636 (1981} requires an 

insurance company which insures a fleet of rental vehicles to 

provide each individual lessee of a rental vehicle the opportunity to purchase or reject uninsured motorist coverage. In 

so holding, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that the car rental 

employee who leased a car to a customer, and in connection 

therewith "sold" insurance to the lessee, was an "agent" of the 

insurance company. We reject the suggestion that in the instant 

case Lance was an "agent" for American Motorist. 

Further, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Moon observed that the 

"car rental" scenario "is fundamentally distinguishable from 

cases involving a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage by a 

head of~ household" and is also "distinguishable from the cases 

dealing with permissive usage of a vehicle by employees of the 

vehicles covered by the policy. In rejecting the "stacking'' argument, the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed that the employee was 

not a "named insured" and was an insured "only because he is 

• a permissive user of a vehicle insured under a business fleet 

policy (emphasis added}." 

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• 

named insured. " [emphasis in original]. It is equally 

distinguishable from the instant case where an employee of the 

named insured is injured while driving a non-covered vehicle, 

i.e., his personally owned motorcycle. 

As supplemental authority, counsel also draws our attention 

to a very recent decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Plaster 

v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 1989 W.L. 

106737, 1989 Okla. Lexis 143. In that case, the Oklahoma Supreme 

Court held that where a policy of insurance lists more than one 

individual as a "named insured," a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage by one of the named insureds does not constitute a 

rejection by other named insureds, and that each of the persons 

listed as a named insured must execute a written rejection of 

such coverage. Such is not our case. In the instant case, there 

is only one named insured, Lance, and accordingly under Part 4(d) 

of the policy, Manuel is not afforded any coverage when driving 

his motorcycle. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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Entered for the Court 

Robert H. Mcwilliams 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-1634 Document: 01019962911 Date Filed: 02/02/1990 Page: 7