Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02540/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02540-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JO ANN ZEPHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITAL; 

and KIMBERLY LAURENSON, M.D.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-02540 JAM EFB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT KFH’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (“Defendant KFH”) 

moves to dismiss Plaintiff Jo Ann Zepher’s (“Plaintiff”) First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #13). Plaintiff opposes 

Defendant’s motion (Doc. #22) and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 

#26). As noted in the Court’s May 11, 2015 minute order (Doc. 

#25), only those arguments contained in the first fifteen pages 

of Defendant KFH’s motion will be considered (thus Defendant 

KFH’s arguments in support of its motion to dismiss the fourth, 

fifth and sixth claims for relief have not been considered). For 

this reason, Defendant KFH’s motion with respect to these three 

claims is denied. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to 

dismiss the first, second, third and seventh claims for relief is 

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granted in part and denied in part.1

The Court also notes that in filing a seven page reply, 

Defendant KFH again failed to comply with the Court’s “Order re: 

Filing Requirements” (Doc. #6) which requires that replies be 

limited to five pages. As this filing exceeds the page limit by 

one page (not including the cover page, which is numbered but 

contains no text), Defendant’s law firm, Davis Wright Tremaine, 

LLP is sanctioned $50.00. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP is ordered 

to pay this amount to the Clerk of the Court within 14 days of 

this Order.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was hired to work “in the nutrition unit at the 

Kaiser Hospital on Morse Avenue in Sacramento, California, in 

1990.” FAC ¶ 11. Until 2008, Plaintiff received “good reviews” 

and “positive evaluations.” FAC ¶ 11. During all times relevant 

to the complaint, Plaintiff was supervised by either Defendant 

Harrison or Defendant Rosenberg. FAC ¶ 12. In 2008, Defendant 

KFH allegedly “put a policy into effect to cause its long time 

employees to retire or be terminated.” FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiff 

alleges that this policy was accomplished, in part, through 

“pretextual write ups,” which included:

• In March/April 2009, Defendant Harrison “gave plaintiff 

a note stating there were complaints regarding meal 

service times. Plaintiff and only she was instructed 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 20, 2015.

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to be on the floor at 7:30 am. Plaintiff replied that 

she would not accept the discriminatory note unless 

everyone else in the department was getting the same 

note. Plaintiff contends she was being harassed 

because she was singled out undeservedly for this 

requirement.” FAC ¶¶ 13, 23

• On April 23, 2009, Plaintiff “received a written memo 

stating Harrison wanted to meet with her and a Shop 

Steward to investigate some alleged irregularities. 

Plaintiff replied saying defendant Harrison had been 

harassing her for more than a year, and she did not 

want to meet with him. He labeled that as 

insubordination.” FAC ¶ 24.

• In July 2009, Plaintiff “received a warning for alleged 

insubordination from another incident.” FAC ¶ 24.

• On September 16, 2009, “during a meeting, Harrison 

kicked plaintiff on the leg. He said he did not mean 

it. When she was out sick the next day, because the 

meeting and the battery had been so stressful, Harrison 

called her at home and demanded a doctor’s note 

regarding her absence.” Similar proof was not required 

of other employees who called in sick. FAC ¶ 25.

• In October 2009, Defendant Harrison “complained 

plaintiff was five minutes late, but on the same day a 

male employee was 45 minutes late and drew no 

criticism. That male and other employees commonly came 

in late, without receiving negative comments.” 

FAC ¶ 26.

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• On October 27, 2009, Plaintiff received “her first poor 

evaluation,” which she considered to be in retaliation 

for a complaint she had filed with the Department of 

Fair Employment and Housing. FAC ¶ 26.

• Defendant Harrison “had called her into his office 10 

times to take up one issue or another, being 

hypercritical about minor matters.” FAC ¶ 27. He also 

“subjected plaintiff to angry outbursts.” FAC ¶ 27.

• On November 10, 2009, Plaintiff was “suspended for one 

day based on another claim of insubordination.” 

FAC ¶ 27.

In January 2010, Plaintiff filed a written complaint with Human 

Resources. FAC ¶ 27. She alleges that the “harassment and 

retaliation continued throughout the remainder of her employ” 

with Defendant KFH. FAC ¶ 27.

Sometime between 2010 and 2013, Defendant Harrison was 

replaced by Defendant Rosenberg. FAC ¶ 30. By September 2013, 

the “scrutiny and unearned complaints about minor matters had 

become almost constant.” FAC ¶ 30. Plaintiff’s harassment 

included the following actions:

• “Plaintiff was asked impermissible non-job related 

personal questions.” FAC ¶ 30.

• Plaintiff was asked to “explain why she was standing 

where she was and not somewhere else; why she did or 

did not do something; and told to do a task one way and 

then told to do it another way by someone different.” 

FAC ¶ 31.

• Plaintiff was “interrupted at lunch, watched

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incessantly and her workplace conversations were 

monitored. Other employees were told not to talk to 

her when they came to the department. She was called 

into the office and told she was a negative person and 

that is why no one likes her.” FAC ¶ 31

• When other employees were off work, Plaintiff was 

“required to do their work in addition to her own,” 

despite the fact that “there was a roving replacement 

available.” FAC ¶ 31.

• Plaintiff was “required to have a doctor’s note when 

she called in sick even though her file showed she had 

a chronic illness.” FAC ¶ 31.

• Defendant Rosenberg “criticized her fingernails” and 

“took issue regarding how and when she washed her 

hands.” FAC ¶ 32.

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of this treatment, she was 

“constructively terminated on December 20, 2013, when she was 61 

years old and forced to retire or be fired.” FAC ¶ 20. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the repeated “false and 

pretextual” complaints “caused plaintiff to believe she would be 

fired (as she saw happening to other senior employees) if she did 

not accept the retirement package.” FAC ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges 

that the harassment was “based in whole or in part upon her age.” 

FAC ¶ 20. She also alleges that these actions had “racial 

overtones.” FAC ¶ 17.

Plaintiff further alleges that, in early 2013, Defendant 

Laurenson, a “Kaiser physician,” failed to “identify, follow up 

or diagnose the dark shadow in plaintiff’s lung as cancer.” FAC 

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¶ 44. Plaintiff alleges that this “failure to diagnose and treat

plaintiff timely was below the standard of care expected of 

physicians,” and resulted in the surgical removal of Plaintiff’s 

lung, which might have been avoided by an earlier diagnosis. FAC 

¶ 45.

On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed the FAC in this Court. 

The FAC includes the following causes of action: 

(1) “discrimination and constructive termination in violation of 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) by 

Kaiser”; (2) discrimination and retaliation by Frank Harrison”; 

(3) “discrimination and retaliation by Jeremy Rosenberg”; (4) 

“constructive termination in violation of public policy”; (5) 

“discrimination based upon race”; (6) “intentional/ negligent 

infliction of emotional distress”; and (7) “medical negligence.”

II. OPINION

A. First Cause of Action

Defendant KFH argues that that Plaintiff’s first cause of 

action for “discrimination and constructive termination in 

violation of ADEA by Kaiser” must be dismissed for the following 

reasons: (1) Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory; 

(2) Plaintiff has failed to identify KFH’s discriminatory 

conduct; and (3) Plaintiff has failed to properly plead 

constructive discharge. Mot. at 11-12. Plaintiff responds that, 

at this stage, “detailed factual allegations are not required.” 

Opp. at 2.

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination in 

violation of the ADEA, “a plaintiff must allege in her complaint 

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that: (1) she was at least forty years old; (2) she was 

performing her job satisfactorily; (3) she was discharged; and 

(4) she was either replaced by a substantially younger employee

with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged under 

circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age 

discrimination.” Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 

1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal marks and citations 

omitted). A “voluntary” resignation or retirement may constitute 

a “constructive discharge” if the “working conditions 

deteriorate, as a result of discrimination, to the point that 

they become sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome 

the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable 

employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve 

his or her employer.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 

930 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal marks and citations omitted); see 

also, Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 

1987) (noting that constructive discharge has occurred where 

conditions are “so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify a 

reasonable employee's decision to resign”). For purposes of 

establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination, an 

inference of discrimination can be shown by alleging that “others 

not in [the] protected class were treated more favorably.” Diaz 

v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 

2008).

Here, Plaintiff alleged that she was 61 years old at the 

time of her constructive termination. FAC ¶ 20. She alleged 

that she was “an exemplary employee with good reviews prior to 

the commencement of the harassment” and that she “performed her

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jobs with skill and dedication.” She further alleged that she 

was constructively discharged due to Defendant KFH’s continued

harassment of her through “false and pretextual” disciplinary 

write-ups. As summarized above in the “Factual and Procedural 

Background” section, these pretextual complaints were continuous 

and pervasive, and, taking the allegations as true, their 

cumulative effect could “justify a reasonable employee’s 

decision” to retire. Watson, 823 F.2d at 361. Finally, 

Plaintiff alleges that she was singled out for this treatment, 

and that other, non-protected employees were not subject to the 

same pretextual complaints. See FAC ¶¶ 23, 25, 26. Thus, 

Plaintiff has adequately alleged all four elements of a prima 

facie case of age discrimination.

Contrary to Defendant KFH’s argument, Plaintiff’s 

allegations are not conclusory. As noted above, Plaintiff 

specifically alleges a number of incidents – primarily pretextual 

disciplinary write-ups – to support her age discrimination claim. 

Similarly, Defendant KFH’s argument that Plaintiff has not 

identified the nature of KFH’s discriminatory conduct fails. 

Mot. at 11. Plaintiff’s first cause of action is labeled 

“discrimination and constructive termination in violation of 

ADEA[.]” Although Plaintiff’s allegations may not be a model of 

clarity and precision, the allegations within the first cause of 

action are sufficiently clear to put Defendant KFH on notice of 

the nature of the age discrimination claim against it. Unlike 

her second and third causes of action (discussed below), 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action identifies supporting legal 

authority (the ADEA), the form of the claim (constructive 

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termination), and the defendant against whom the claim is brought 

(Defendant KFH). Finally, Defendant KFH’s argument that 

constructive discharge is “implausible” because Plaintiff worked 

at KFH for five years before retiring is unpersuasive. Mot. at 

13. As with any case of continuing conduct, the potential 

cumulative effect of ongoing harassment may explain why an 

employee did not immediately quit after the first discriminatory 

incident. For all of these reasons, Defendant KFH’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action is denied.

B. Second and Third Causes of Action

Defendant KFH argues that Plaintiff’s second and third 

causes of action for “racial discrimination and retaliation” must 

be dismissed because she has failed to plead a “short and plain 

statement” showing that she is entitled to relief. Mot. at 14 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Specifically, Defendant notes 

that “[t]he allegations in these claims for relief do not 

identify any legal basis for the claims, for example, Title VII, 

ADEA, FEHA, etc.” Plaintiff responds that she “believes it was 

clear she brings these claims under Federal Civil Rights law and 

the California Government Code Sections 12940, et seq.” Opp. at 

2.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 

provides that a pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement operates, in 

part, to ensure that a defendant has notice of the legal claims 

being brought against it, so that it may effectively defend 

itself.

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The allegations in Plaintiff’s second and third causes of 

action do not satisfy the “short and plain statement” requirement 

included in Rule 8. As argued by Defendant KFH, Plaintiff’s 

failure to identify the legal bases of her claims “makes a 

substantial difference” in the context of racial discrimination, 

where a variety of forms of racial discrimination are actionable. 

Mot. at 14. For example, a plaintiff may sue for adverse action 

discrimination, in which case she must establish that she 

suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination or a 

demotion. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 

(9th Cir. 2004). Alternatively, a plaintiff may sue for racial 

harassment or a hostile work environment, in which case the 

absence of a discrete adverse employment action is not fatal to 

her claim, but she must establish that the harassment was 

“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 

victim’s employment[.]” McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 

1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, a plaintiff may sue 

for retaliation, which requires a protected act, an adverse 

employment action, and a causal link between the two. Id. at 

1124. Plaintiff’s failure to identify which form or forms of 

discrimination she suffered – and failure to specifically allege 

the elements of each particular form of discrimination –

complicates Defendant KFH’s task in answering the allegations, 

and makes it nearly impossible for the Court to evaluate the 

sufficiency of her allegations.

Plaintiff has also failed to clearly identify which 

defendant she seeks to hold liable in these causes of action. 

Although the second claim is for “discrimination and retaliation 

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by Frank Harrison” and the third claim is for “discrimination and 

retaliation by Jeremy Rosenberg,” it is unclear whether she is 

suing Defendant KFH for the conduct of Harrison and Rosenberg, 

or, rather, is suing Harrison and Rosenberg as individuals. This 

is an important distinction, and shapes the direction the case 

may take. See Chinea-Varela v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 4 F. 

App'x 404, 405 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that individual defendants 

cannot be sued for discrimination or retaliation under Title 

VII). Plaintiff’s failure to identify “which claims are asserted 

against which defendants” runs afoul of Rule 8. McNeil v. Home 

Budget Loans, 2010 WL 1999580, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2010).

 For all of these reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action is granted with 

leave to amend. (As Defendant KFH’s Rule 8 argument is 

dispositive on these claims, the Court does not reach Defendant 

KFH’s other arguments regarding these claims.) 

C. Seventh Cause of Action

Defendant KFH argues that the seventh cause of action for 

medical negligence must be dismissed because the Court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. Mot. at 10. 

Specifically, Defendant argues that the claim against Defendant 

Laurenson “does not arise out of the same facts, events or 

transactions as the employment related claims.” Mot. at 10. 

Plaintiff notes that “she is not opposed to moving the medical 

malpractice claim to the State Court.” Opp. at 1. Of course, 

given the procedural posture of this motion to dismiss, a 

dismissal would not “mov[e] the medical malpractice claim to the 

State Court,” but, rather, would remove it from the present 

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lawsuit.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that, “in any civil action of 

which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 

or controversy under Article III of the United States 

Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In other words, a Court may 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim, 

provided that it forms “part of the same case or controversy” as 

the federal law claims. Id.

As noted by Defendant KFH – and as Plaintiff appears to 

concede – the medical negligence claim against Defendant 

Laurenson arises from an entirely separate set of facts than 

Plaintiff’s employment-based claims. The sole connecting fact –

which Defendant disputes but must be accepted as true at this 

stage in the litigation – is that Defendant KFH employed 

Defendant Laurenson. FAC ¶ 44. Even so, the connection between 

Plaintiff’s employment-based claims and her medical negligence 

claim is far too attenuated to support the exercise of 

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). As 

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is not “part of the same case 

or controversy” as Plaintiff’s federal law claims, Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 

granted. See U.S. ex rel. Giles v. Sardie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 

1121 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that “dismissal of a complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice and the 

plaintiff may still seek relief in another forum”) (emphasis in 

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original).

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss is DENIED with regard to Plaintiff’s first, fourth, fifth 

and sixth causes of action, GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND with 

regard to Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action, and 

GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with regard to Plaintiff’s seventh 

cause of action. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended 

complaint, she must do so within 20 days of this order. 

Defendants’ responsive pleading must be filed within 20 days 

thereafter. If Plaintiff chooses not to file an amended 

complaint, the case will proceed consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2015

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