Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-05744/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-05744-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN MURRAY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. 09-05744 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STRIKE

CLASS ACTION

ALLEGATIONS AND

DENYING

DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STAY

DISCOVERY

Plaintiff Martin Murray charges Defendants Sears, Roebuck and

Co. and Eletrolux Home Products, Inc. with violating California

consumer protection statutes in connection with certain Kenmore

laundry dryers. Defendants move to stay discovery pending a final

ruling issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit resolving Sears’ motion for a permanent injunction in

Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 10-2407 (Thorogood III). 

Defendants argue that, once the appeal is decided, Plaintiff will

be estopped from bringing the instant case as a class action. 

Whether this case will proceed as a class action impacts the manner

in which discovery progresses. In the alternative, Defendants move

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United States District Court

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1

The Court takes judicial notice of the filings and court

orders in the Thorogood cases. 

2

to strike the class allegations from Plaintiff’s complaint as

barred by collateral estoppel based on upon prior rulings by the

Seventh Circuit in Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742

(7th Cir. 2008) (Thorogood I) and Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 595 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2010) (Thorogood II). Plaintiff

opposes the motion and seeks to engage in class certification

discovery immediately. After having heard oral argument and read

all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court denies

Defendants’ motion to stay and grants Defendants’ motion to strike.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Murray filed the present case on November 9, 2009,

alleging causes of action under the California Consumer Legal

Remedies Act and the California Unfair Competition Law, unjust

enrichment and breach of contract based on allegations similar to

those raised in Thorogood.1 Plaintiff seeks to bring his claims as

a class action. 

The parties dispute the similarities between the instant case

and Thorogood. In Thorogood, the plaintiff sought certification of

a class of consumers from twenty-nine jurisdictions, including

California. The class consisted of individuals who had purchased

the same Kenmore brand clothes dryers at issue in the instant case. 

In both Thorogood and the instant case, the issue is whether these

dryers were marketed using deceptive trade practices which misled

consumers to believe that the dryers contained drums that were 100%

stainless steel. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The district court certified the class in Thorogood, but the

Seventh Circuit reversed. Thorogood filed a petition for rehearing

and rehearing en banc, which the court denied. He filed a petition

for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which

was also denied.

After the case was remanded to the district court, Sears

served Thorogood with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of

judgment. After Thorogood did not respond to the offer, Sears

moved to dismiss the case, arguing that once Thorogood rejected an

offer of judgment consisting of all the relief he could have

received had he prosecuted the case to judgment, the case became

moot and the court should dismiss it for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The court agreed and gave Thorogood two weeks to

accept Sears’ offer of judgment. If he did not, it would grant

Sears’ motion to dismiss. Thorogood filed a motion for

reconsideration asking the court to entertain a revised motion for

class certification based on allegedly newly discovered evidence

from other similarly situated people. The court denied Thorogood’s

request and dismissed the case. Thorogood then appealed the

district court’s dismissal and its denial of leave to file a

revised motion for class certification. The Seventh Circuit

affirmed the district court’s order and denied Thorogood’s petition

for rehearing and rehearing en banc. 

On March 15, 2010, Sears filed in the Northern District of

Illinois a motion for a permanent injunction which would have

enjoined members of the decertified Thorogood I class, including

Plaintiff Murray here, and their lawyers, from seeking

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certification of a class in any other court based on the same

allegations made in Thorogood I. This Court stayed proceedings in

this case pending a decision on the motion for a permanent

injunction. 

On May 18, the Northern District of Illinois denied Sears’

motion. The court noted that the All Writs Act can be used to

“‘effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders’ a court ‘has

previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction.’” Defendants’

Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), Exh. 9, 3:1-3 (quoting United

States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977)). It held

that the Thorogood decisions “concerned only a national class. The

Murray case concerns only a single state class. This Court need

not protect or effectuate its order with an injunction because its

order is not being challenged by the Murray litigation or any other

litigation.” RJN, Exh. 9, 3:22-4:1. The court also held that an

injunction was inappropriate because Sears had an adequate remedy

at law in that it could assert a collateral estoppel defense in the

Murray litigation. Sears appealed this decision to the Seventh

Circuit. 

I. Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may

strike from a pleading “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or

scandalous matter.” The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid

spending time and money litigating spurious issues. Fantasy, Inc.

v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), reversed on other

grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). A matter is immaterial if it has no

essential or important relationship to the claim for relief plead. 

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Id. A matter is impertinent if it does not pertain and is not

necessary to the issues in question in the case. Id. Under Rules

23(c)(1)(A) and 23(d)(1)(D), as well as pursuant to Rule 12(f),

this Court has authority to strike class allegations prior to

discovery if the complaint demonstrates that a class action cannot

be maintained. Tietsworth v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 2010 WL 1268093

(N.D. Cal.).

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars re-litigation

of issues when:

(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous

proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be

relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final

judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom

collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity

with a party at the first proceeding. 

Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th

Cir. 2006). However, “it is inappropriate to apply collateral

estoppel when its effect would be unfair.” Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass’n v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 873 F.2d 229, 234 (9th Cir.

1989).

Plaintiff disputes that the class certification issues

necessarily decided in the previous proceeding are identical to

those presently before the Court. The Court looks to four factors

to aid in “[d]etermining whether two issues are identical for

purposes of collateral estoppel: (1) is there a substantial overlap

between the evidence or argument to be advanced in the second

proceeding and that advanced in the first? (2) does the new

evidence or argument involve the application of the same rule of

law as that involved in the prior proceeding? (3) could pretrial

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preparation and discovery related to the matter presented in the

first action reasonably be expected to have embraced the matter

sought to be presented in the second? and (4) how closely related

are the claims involved in the two proceedings?” Resolution Trust

Corp. v. Keating, 186 F. 3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations

omitted).

In the present case, Plaintiff claims that he is “alleging [a]

sufficiently similar general set of operative facts as alleged” in

Thorogood. Comp. ¶ 50. In both cases, the claim is that Sears

misrepresents its dryers as containing a “stainless steel” drum,

when in fact the drum includes mild steel parts. The plaintiff in

the Thorogood case argued that certification in that case was

proper because, despite the fact that individuals from twenty-nine

different states would be included in the class, “all litigants are

governed by the same legal rules.” RJN, Ex. 1. 

The Seventh Circuit decertified the class because, 

not only do common issues of law or fact not predominate

over the issues particular to each purchase and purchaser of

a “stainless steel” Kenmore dryer, as Rule 23(b)(3) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires, but there are no

common issues of law or fact, so there would be no economies

from class action treatment.

Thorogood I, 547 F.3d at 747 (emphasis in original). The Seventh

Circuit summarized Thorogood’s allegation as follows:

The plaintiff claims to believe that when a dryer is labeled

or advertised as having a stainless steel drum, this

implies, without more, that the drum is 100 percent

stainless steel because otherwise it might rust and cause

rust stains in the clothes dried in the dryer. Do the other

500,000 members of the class believe this? Does anyone

believe this besides Mr. Thorogood? It is not as if Sears

advertised the dryers as eliminating a problem of rust

stains by having a stainless steel drum. There is no

suggestion of that. It is not as if rust stains were a

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common concern of owners of clothes dryers. There is no

suggestion of that either, and it certainly is not common

knowledge.

Id. (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit concluded that

the plaintiff’s concerns were “idiosyncratic” and that the

“evaluation of the class members’ claims will require individual

hearings.” Id. The Seventh Circuit also noted that, 

In granting class certification, the district judge said

that because “Sears marketed its dryers on a class wide

basis . . . reliance can be presumed.” Reliance on what? 

On stainless steel preventing rust stains on clothes? Since

rust stains on clothes do not appear to be one of the

hazards of clothes dryers, and since Sears did not advertise

its stainless steel dryers as preventing such stains, the

proposition that the other half million buyers, apart from

Thorogood, shared his understanding of Sears’s

representations and paid a premium to avoid rust stains is,

to put it mildly, implausible, and so would require

individual hearings to verify.

Id. at 748. In sum, the “deal breaker” against Thorogood’s class

allegations was “the absence of any reason to believe that there is

a single understanding of the significance of labeling or

advertising clothes dryers as containing a ‘stainless steel drum.’” 

Id.

Plaintiff primarily argues that collateral estoppel should not

apply because the Seventh Circuit rejected a multi-state class

whereas he seeks to certify a California-only class. Notably,

however, the Seventh Circuit did not decertify the class because of

variation in state law among the twenty-nine jurisdictions. In

fact, the Seventh Circuit did not even address the issue. As noted

above, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was “implausible” that

any other potential class members, including those in California,

shared Thorogood’s understanding of “Sears’s representations and

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paid a premium to avoid rust stains.” Id. at 747. 

The cases that Plaintiff relies on in which a court declined

to preclude single-state classes after nation-wide class

certification was rejected are inapposite. In those cases, the

courts examined the rationale for denial of nation-wide class

certification and determined that the rationale did not preclude

the certification of the state-wide class before them. They

concluded that the obstacles to class certification identified by

the earlier court were not present in the later case. See Salgado

v. Wells Fargo Fin., Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78699 (E.D. Cal.);

Szittai v. Wells Fargo Fin., Inc., 2008 WL 4647739 (N.D. Ohio);

Kirkland v. Wells Fargo Fin., Inc., 2008 WL 5381952 (N.D. GA). 

However, in the present case, Plaintiff relies on the same alleged

misrepresentations rejected by the Seventh Circuit and the

rationale of the Seventh Circuit is directly applicable. 

Plaintiff also argues that the legal issues in Thorogood and

the instant case are not identical because California law allows

for a presumption of reliance to enable certification of class

claims based on alleged material misrepresentations. He argues

that “Plaintiff Thorogood never asserted on behalf of the putative

class members California’s objective examination of whether the

misrepresentation was material or the ‘reasonable consumer’

standard of reliance.” Opposition at 17 (emphasis in original). 

However, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Thorogood’s

understanding of Sears’ stainless steel representation, was “almost

certainly unreasonable.” Thorogood II, 595 F.3d at 753. In the

instant case, Plaintiff proffers the same understanding of Sears’

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stainless steel representation as the plaintiff did in Thorogood.

In sum, the Court finds that Defendants satisfied the identity

requirement of the collateral estoppel doctrine. 

B. Final Judgment on the Merits

“To be ‘final’ for collateral estoppel purposes, a decision

need not possess ‘finality’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A

‘final judgment’ for purposes of collateral estoppel can be any

prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined

to be ‘sufficiently firm’ to be accorded conclusive effect.” Luben

Industries, Inc. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.

1983) (citing Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605

F.2d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 1979); Restatement (Second) of Judgments

§ 13 (1982)). Luben relies on comment g to § 13 of the

Restatement, which discusses factors that are relevant to the

determination of “firmness”:

[P]reclusion should be refused if the decision was avowedly

tentative. On the other hand, that the parties were fully

heard, that the court supported its decision with a reasoned

opinion, that the decision was subject to appeal or was in

fact reviewed on appeal, are factors supporting the

conclusion that the decision is final for purpose of

preclusion.

Id. Here, Thorogood extensively litigated the class certification

issue in the district court in the Northern District of Illinois,

in the Seventh Circuit on appeal and on a petition for rehearing

and in the U.S. Supreme Court on a petition for writ of certiorari. 

Thorogood pursued every available avenue to litigate class

certification and the courts gave the issue thorough consideration. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the issue is “sufficiently firm”

to be accorded conclusive effect.

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C. Party Against Whom Collateral Estoppel Is Asserted 

Plaintiff claims that collateral estoppel does not apply in

this case because he was not “fully represented in the Thorogood

matter.” Opposition at 23. He argues that he had “no proprietary

interest in or control of the Thorogood case” and that he was “not

a named plaintiff, a class representative, a witness or a deponent

in the Thorogood case. Id. at 24. These arguments are not

persuasive.

In a class action, “a person not named as a party may be bound

by a judgment on the merits of the action, if she was adequately

represented by a party who actively participated in the

litigation.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2167 (2008). 

That Plaintiff was not a named plaintiff, class representative,

witness or deponent in the Thorogood is not significant because

such is the case with virtually every member in every class action.

Here, the issue is whether Plaintiff was adequately represented in

the Thorogood case, and the Court finds that he was. The district

court in the Northern District of Illinois found that Thorogood and

his lawyers furnished adequate representation to the other members

of the putative class. That decision was not challenged on appeal

and is not seriously contested now. Further, it is important to

note that Plaintiff is represented by the same lead counsel who

represented the class of which he was a member in Thorogood. This

makes Plaintiff’s conduct appear to be an example of “deliberate

maneuvering to avoid the effects of” Thorogood. Tice v. Am.

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2The fact that Electrolux was not a party in Thorogood does

not preclude giving collateral estoppel effect to a determination

necessarily made in that case, if Thorogood had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate on the issue determined. See, e.g., Miller

Brewing, 605 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1979). As noted above, the

Court finds that he did. Moreover, Plaintiff does not raise this

argument in his brief.

11

Airlines, 162 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 1998).2

 

In sum, although rejection of a multi-state class does not

ipso facto foreclose all single-state class actions, the analysis

in the Seventh Circuit’s decision and the similarities between the

factual allegations and legal theories in that case and this case,

require the application of collateral estoppel. Accordingly, the

Court strikes Plaintiff’s class action allegations as barred by

collateral estoppel. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion

to strike. Docket No. 96. Within seven days from the date of this

Order, Plaintiff may file an amended class action complaint which

includes allegations sufficiently different from the Thorogood

complaint so as to avoid the application of collateral estoppel. 

Defendants shall notice any motion to strike those class

allegations for a hearing on September 7, 2010, the same date as

the next case management conference. 

Defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending a final ruling

issued by the Seventh Circuit resolving Sears’ motion for a

permanent injunction in Thorogood III is denied as moot. Because

the Court has concluded that Plaintiff cannot proceed on his class

allegations, the Court need not wait for a decision by the Seventh

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Circuit. However, in the interest of judicial economy, if

Plaintiff files an amended complaint and Defendants again move to

strike class allegations, the discovery stay will remain in effect

until this Court issues a ruling on Defendants’ motion to strike. 

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the stay on

discovery will be lifted and Plaintiff may commence discovery on

his individual claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 07/21/10 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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