Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01845/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01845-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jamonz Majerrious Ross, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Arizona, State of, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-01845-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Rule 59(e) 

(Doc. 54). The Court now rules on the motion. 

I. Background 

 This Court and the magistrate judge found the following facts, which do not 

appear to be disputed by Petitioner: 

[Petitioner] was pulled over for a traffic violation on December 23, 2009. 

The officer noticed a pill bottle sticking out of [Petitioner’s] pocket, and 

noticed that the name “Ross” was not on the bottle. The officer suspected 

the pills were Alprazolam, a controlled substance, but did not charge 

[Petitioner] until the substance contained in the pills could be verified by 

the lab. The officer impounded the pills and sent them to a crime lab. A 

forensic scientist testified that in fact, the pills were Alprazolam. 

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. . . . 

On September 25, 2010, a police officer was notified by a detective that 

[Petitioner] might be in the area and that there was a warrant for his arrest 

[for the crimes charged in CR 2010–007952]. After [Petitioner] was 

arrested and transported to county jail, “several items of drugs” consisting 

of pills, methamphetamine and marijuana were found on his person. He 

was booked under the original warrant because the drugs [seized on 

September 25, 2010,] had not yet been officially tested and identified, so he 

was released. However, a forensic scientist for the Phoenix Police 

Department testified [at Petitioner’s trial] that her analysis of items 

submitted for testing were the controlled substances alleged in the 

indictment. 

 On October 30, 2010, [Petitioner] was arrested based on the 

September 25, 2010 charges. When he was searched, another two baggies 

of methamphetamine and marijuana were found. 

(Doc. 50 at 1–2 (quoting Doc. 41, Exh. CC at 3–4)). 

 Petitioner was arraigned for his two charges on November 18, 2010 

and December 9, 2010. (Doc. 41, Exhs. C, E). The minute entries indicate 

that Petitioner was represented by counsel at the arraignments. (Id.). 

Petitioner makes several other factual assertions regarding the arraignments 

which, for the purposes of adjudicating this petition, the Court accepts as 

true. First, Petitioner asserts that he participated in the arraignments via 

closed-circuit television. Next, Petitioner asserts that the commissioner who 

conducted the arraignments entered a not guilty plea “for him” without 

holding a “discussion” as to the charges. Finally, Petitioner asserts that he 

has been denied access to the transcripts or recordings of his arraignments, 

which he claims would prove the inadequacy of his arraignments. 

 At both trials, Petitioner represented himself. Mid-trial, Petitioner 

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filed a special action in the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing, inter alia, 

that his arraignments were constitutionally defective. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals summarily dismissed the petition. The Arizona Supreme Court 

denied review. 

 Petitioner was ultimately convicted in both cases and took a timely 

appeal of his convictions and sentences, consolidating his two trials for 

purposes of the appeal. On appeal, Petitioner again argued that his 

arraignments were improper. After the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected 

his argument, Petitioner moved for reconsideration, requested an 

evidentiary hearing, and moved to supplement the record with the 

arraignment transcripts. The motion for reconsideration was denied, and 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was also 

denied. 

 Petitioner also sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Arizona 

Supreme Court while his direct appeal was pending. There, Petitioner 

repeated his arguments regarding the sufficiency of his arraignments, which 

the Arizona Supreme Court rejected. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, 

arguing that the minute entries, upon which the Court of Appeals had relied 

to conclude that Petitioner’s arraignments were constitutionally sound, 

were “lying” and that the recordings of the proceedings would prove his 

claims. Petitioner also asked for an evidentiary hearing. The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration and the request for an 

evidentiary hearing. 

 Petitioner then submitted his petition to this Court for a federal writ 

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The case was assigned to a 

magistrate judge, who recommended that the Court deny the petition. 

(Doc. 50 at 2–3). 

 This Court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied 

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Petitioner’s petition on April 8, 2015. (Doc. 50). On April 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a 

notice of appeal of the Court’s denial of the petition. (Doc. 52). 

 On May 4, 2015, Petitioner filed the present motion under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e), requesting this Court to amend or alter its order denying Petitioner’s 

petition. (Doc. 54). In support of his motion, Petitioner attached the transcripts to one of 

his arraignment proceedings, which he apparently acquired after he filed his original 

objections to the R&R. This evidence, Petitioner claims, proves that he was not 

represented by counsel at the arraignment, in violation of his constitutional rights. 

II. Jurisdiction 

 By filing a notice of appeal before filing his Rule 59 motion, Petitioner divested 

the Court of jurisdiction “over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Stein v. 

Wood, 127 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1997).1

 However, Rule 62.1 permits the Court to 

treat Petitioner’s Rule 59 motion as a request for an indicative ruling: 

(a) If a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to 

grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court 

may: 

 (1) defer considering the motion; 

 (2) deny the motion; or 

 

1

 The Court recognizes that some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have concluded that the filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the district court of 

jurisdiction over the post-trial motions listed in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A). E.g., Yousefian v. City of Glendale, No. CV 11-03579 DMG MANX, 2013 

WL 948743, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013) (“Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (‘Appellate Rule’) 4(a)(4) (A) allows the Court to retain jurisdiction over certain postjudgment motions, including a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion.”); Grandinetti v. 

Sakai, No. CIV. 14-00060 DKW, 2014 WL 1049420, at *1 (D. Haw. Mar. 14, 2014) 

(same); see also Transmittal Note to the 1993 Amendment to Fed. R. App. P. 4 (“A notice [of appeal] filed before the filing of one of the specified motions [in Rule 4(a)(4)(A)] . . .is, in effect, suspended until the motion is disposed of, whereupon, the previously filed notice effectively places jurisdiction in the court of appeals.”). The Court disagrees with the reasoning of those cases because it finds nothing in the text of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) relating to the district court’s jurisdiction. Instead, that Rule speaks only to the extension of time to file an appeal by filing one of the listed motions. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) (“If a party timely files in the district court any of the following motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the time 

to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion . . . .”). 

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 (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals 

 remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a); see also Braun-Salinas v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 2015 WL 

128040, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2015) (applying Rule 62.1 to a motion for reconsideration 

filed after a notice of appeal). For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion 

under Rule 62.1(a)(2). 

III. Legal Standard 

“Rule 59(e) amendments are appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with 

newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was 

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Dixon v. 

Wallowa County, 336 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, “[a] Rule 59 motion should not be granted ‘unless the district court is presented 

with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening 

change in the controlling law.’” McQuillion v. Duncan, 343 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 

2003) (quoting McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). 

The Court ordinarily will deny a motion for reconsideration absent a showing of manifest 

error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to the 

Court’s attention earlier with reasonable diligence. L.R.Civ.P. 7.2(g). No motion for 

reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument made by the movant in support 

of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order for which the party seeks 

reconsideration. Id. Repeating arguments in a motion to reconsider may be grounds for 

denying the motion. Id. Therefore, the Court does not address the arguments Petitioner 

repeats from his objections to the R&R and only addresses the new argument and 

evidence raised by Petitioner’s Rule 59 motion. Specifically, the Court addresses the 

arraignment transcripts Petitioner has produced. 

IV. Discussion 

 Petitioner’s argument centers on an arraignment transcript that he claims his 

family was able to obtain, which indicates that Petitioner was acting “pro se” at one of his 

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arraignment hearings. Petitioner views this as evidence that the arraignment minute 

entries, upon which the state court relied, “were falsafyied [sic] to purport that Petitioners 

was represented by counsel.” Accordingly, Petitioner argues that his petition should be 

granted because his right to counsel was violated at the arraignment stage. 

 The Court is unpersuaded. First, and foremost, Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily waived counsel before his arraignment by signing a waiver document. 

(Doc. 41-1 at 2). Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81, 124 S. Ct. 1379, 1383, 158 L. Ed. 2d 

209 (2004) (“Waiver of the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal 

process generally, must be a ‘knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of 

the relevant circumstances.’ (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 2 

Petitioner does not deny this. Thus, even if counsel was not present at that arraignment, 

Petitioner’s rights were not violated. See id. at 87–88, 94 (noting that “the Constitution 

‘does not force a lawyer upon a defendant’” and that “States are free to adopt by statute, 

rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful” 

(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942))). 

 Second, Petitioner’s explanation for the discrepancy between his proffered 

transcripts and the minute entries—that the state court falsified the minute entries—is not 

plausible. The more likely explanation is that advisory counsel was appointed for the 

arraignment, as it was for the trial. This explains why the transcripts Petitioner submitted 

indicate that Petitioner acted “pro se,” while the minute entries noted the presence of 

counsel; both were true. 

 In short, Petitioner has failed to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that the 

state court erred in its determination that Petitioner was represented by counsel at his 

 

2

 Notably, the Ninth Circuit has held that a criminal defendant who pleads not guilty need not be shown to have waived with the same level of knowledge and intelligence as a defendant who pleads guilty. See Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040, 

1044 (9th Cir. 1969) (“The informational items recited as essential to an intelligent waiver relate to such a plea and serve to assure that a defendant understands the 

consequences of confessing guilt and that he knows enough of the law to be able intelligently to reach the conclusion that he is guilty under the law. Such colloquy has no place in a case where guilt is denied and an offer of counsel is rejected.”). 

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arraignment.3 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Even if he were not represented by counsel, Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 

V. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Rule 

59(e) (Doc. 54) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 19th day of May, 2015. 

 

3

 The Court finds that no evidentiary hearing is necessary to reach this conclusion. 

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