Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01053/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01053-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

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* This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1 Although both parties continue to reference Jeanne Langnesser

as an additional Defendant, she was dismissed on July 28, 2006. (Order,

July 28, 2006 at 12.)

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

READY TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al.,)

) 2:06-cv-1053-GEB-KJM

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

AAR MANUFACTURING, INC.; AAR )

MOBILITY SYSTEMS; DEFENSE CONTRACT )

MANAGEMENT AGENCY; DEPARTMENT OF )

DEFENSE, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiffs move for leave to amend their Complaint to add an

additional paragraph clarifying their third claim against Defendants

AAR Manufacturing and AAR Mobility Systems (“AAR”).1 AAR opposes the

motion. Defendants Defense Contract Management Agency (“DCMA”) and

the Department of Defense (collectively, “Government”) move for

dismissal, or summary judgment, on Plaintiffs’ first claim, arguing,

inter alia, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently state a claim under

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28 2 All references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

2

the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). Plaintiffs oppose this

motion.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

 Plaintiffs are a group of businesses that have hauled

freight for the U.S. government since 1990. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 15.) AAR

makes and sells shipping containers to the military. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Under an agreement between AAR and DCMA, AAR selects the carriers who

transport the containers, and is required to select the “best value”

carrier pursuant to the guidelines established by the Surface

Deployment and Distribution Command. (Id. ¶ 16.) DCMA is responsible

for ensuring these guidelines are followed. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 29.)

Plaintiffs allege AAR selected higher priced carriers than

Plaintiffs to haul the freight even though Plaintiffs were available. 

(Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs further allege that many of these higher

priced carriers used to subcontract the work to Plaintiffs, but

Plaintiffs have not received any of this business for the past two

years because AAR has “blackballed” Plaintiffs. (Id.) 

I. Motion to Amend

Plaintiffs seek to amend their Complaint under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15(a) “to clarify the nature of damages that

Plaintiffs will seek at trial in regard to [their claim for

interference with prospective economic advantage],” arguing that

“[Rule] 15(a) provides that leave to file an amendment such as the one

at issue ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’”2 (Pls.’

Mot. at 2:6-7, 8:21-23.) AAR counters that Rule 16’s good cause

standard applies and Plaintiffs “[do] not come close to meeting the

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required good cause standard set forth in this Court’s [S]cheduling

[O]rder.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 7:8-10.) Plaintiffs rejoin “[t]he

Scheduling Order [cannot] impose a greater burden beyond those set

forth in Rule 15” because “local rules must be harmonized with the

national uniform rules.” (Pls.’ Reply at 18:19, 19:4-5.)

A Rule 16 Scheduling Order issued on August 16, 2006. 

(Order, Aug. 16, 2006.) This order contains a provision prescribing

“[n]o further service, joinder of parties or amendments to pleadings

is permitted, except with leave of Court, good cause having been

shown.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiffs filed their motion to amend the

Complaint on June 14, 2007. (Pls.’ Mot. at 1.)

Plaintiffs’ argument that the “good cause” standard

prescribed in the referenced provision of the Scheduling Order

impermissibly relies on a local rule lacks merit. The authority for

the provision is Rule 16, which provides that a pretrial Scheduling

Order “shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and

by leave of the district judge.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (emphasis added). 

Since Plaintiffs have not satisfied this standard, their motion is

denied.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Standard

“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

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necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

Therefore, “[t]he moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient

showing on an essential element of [their] case with respect to which

[they] ha[ve] the burden of proof.” Id.

B. Analysis

The Government seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ first

claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs allege in

this claim that DCMA failed to enforce AAR’s compliance with the “best

value” regulations. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 28-33.) The Government argues

the claim fails since Plaintiffs “[do] not cite any discrete action

that DCMA has failed to take regarding a specific shipping contract”

as required by the APA. (Gov.’s Mot. at 14:9-10.) Plaintiffs rejoin

this argument “is wholly without merit” because DCMA failed to ensure

AAR’s compliance with specific regulations requiring AAR to choose the

“low cost response carrier.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 14:26-28, 18:3-16.) 

The APA provides that “[t]he reviewing court shall compel

agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(a)(1). However, “a claim under [5 U.S.C.] § 706(1) can proceed

only where [Plaintiffs] assert[] that an agency failed to take a

discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S.

Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004). Alleging “[g]eneral

deficiencies in compliance” with the regulations is insufficient to

state a claim under the APA because this “lack[s] the specificity

requisite.” Id. at 66. 

Plaintiffs do not provide evidence of any specific failure

by the Government. Rather, the evidence Plaintiffs submit shows DCMA

took steps to require AAR to comply with the applicable regulations. 

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(Riley Decl., Ex. F at 1.) Plaintiffs bear the burden of presenting

evidence sufficient to establish each element of their claims against

the Government. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Since Plaintiffs have

failed to present any evidence of a specific failure by the

Government, the Government’s summary judgment motion is granted on

Plaintiffs’ first claim, which is the only claim against the

Government in this action. 

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their

Complaint is denied and the Government’s motion for summary judgment

is granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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