Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00403/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00403-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Delfina Moreno, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J Astrue, Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-2010-403-TUC-AWT (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff is a former packing line worker who alleges disability beginning 

December 31, 2003 due to disabling back and ankle pain. (Administrative Record “AR” 

42, 53).1

 She was 55 years old on the date of alleged disability and has a sixth grade 

education. Plaintiff applied for social security disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued an 

unfavorable decision on October 16, 2009. (AR 9). This decision became the 

Commissioner’s final decision when the Social Security Appeals Council denied review 

on June 17, 2010. (AR 3). 

 Plaintiff brings this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

(Doc. 1). The issues are briefed. (Docs. 17, 18, 19). Oral argument was not requested and 

this case is ready for adjudication. For the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends the Commissioner’s decision be reversed and this case remanded to the 

Commissioner for an award of benefits. 

 

1

 Plaintiff initially claimed disability onset date of June 1, 1998 but later amended 

that date. (AR 15, 53, 42). 

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I. Standard of Review

 The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of record, a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

decision denying benefits “should be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not 

supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 

(9th Cir.2008). In determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, 

the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by 

isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

II. Discussion 

 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. 

To establish disability, the claimant must show she has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, she has a severe impairment, and her impairment meets or equals a 

listed impairment or her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precludes her from 

performing past work. Where the claimant meets her burden, the Commissioner must 

show that the claimant is able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 

 Plaintiff has not worked since well-before her alleged onset date of December 31, 

2003. (AR 17). Plaintiff has severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the 

lumbar spine and right peroneal tendon tear. (AR 17). The ALJ found Plaintiff not 

disabled at step four of the evaluation process, concluding Plaintiff could perform past 

relevant work. 

Plaintiff alleged five errors in her appeal to this Court. (Doc. 17). Three of the 

errors focused on the ALJ’s analysis of the physicians’ opinions. The other two errors 

focused on whether the ALJ erred in including fast food cook and laundry worker in 

Plaintiff’s past relevant work. (Doc. 17). In response, the Commissioner conceded the 

ALJ erred in evaluating some of the physicians’ opinions and in finding Plaintiff had past 

relevant work as a fast food cook and laundry worker but argued the errors were 

harmless. (Doc. 18). Remaining at issue is whether Plaintiff can perform past relevant 

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work as a packing line worker as generally performed, not as actually performed. If she 

cannot perform that job, the second issue is whether the ALJ’s errors require a remand for 

further evaluation or whether given Plaintiff’s age, education, and limitations, she is 

disabled at step five under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. 

A. The ALJ erred in his analysis of the physicians’ opinions

 The ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of treating physician Dr. Freebourn and 

reviewing agency physician Dr. Kattapong. Plaintiff argues the ALJ omitted parts of 

these opinions that conflicted with his determination that Plaintiff had no restrictions in 

her ability to sit and stand. Plaintiff is correct. The ALJ also gave little weight to 

examining physician Dr. Thrasher. Plaintiff argues this decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence and she is correct. 

In determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ stated 

Plaintiff could: 

Perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b) except the claimant should avoid climbing ropes, ladders and 

scaffolds and should avoid unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. 

The claimant may only occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or 

crawl. The claimant has no restrictions on her ability to sit or stand. The 

claimant suffers from moderate pain in her neck, back, arms and shoulders, 

primarily on the right side of her body, but this pain is controlled by 

medication without significant adverse side effects. 

(AR 18) (emphasis added). This RFC fails to reflect the limitations identified by all three 

doctors in Plaintiff’s ability to sit and stand for prolonged periods of time. This is a 

critical error because the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work 

as a packing line worker as it is generally performed, requiring six or more hours of 

standing in a workday. (AR 400); see also DICOT 753.687-038, 1991 WL 680354. 

As Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Freebourn is “employed to cure and has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe [Plaintiff] as an individual.” McAllister v. 

Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.1989). His opinion regarding the severity and 

limiting effects of Plaintiff’s impairments is therefore entitled to “special weight,” and if 

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the ALJ chooses to disregard the opinion, he must “set forth specific, legitimate reasons 

for doing so, and this decision must itself be based on substantial evidence.” Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir.1988) (internal citation omitted). 

The ALJ gave “great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Freebourn but then failed to 

address his differences with that opinion. (AR 20). According to the ALJ, Dr. 

Freebourn’s treatment notes showed that Plaintiff’s impairments should be treated 

conservatively, he did not recommend surgery for her and she experienced pain relief 

through injections and prescription medications. (AR 20). The ALJ’s characterization of 

Dr. Freebourn’s treatment notes is not entirely accurate and it discounts significant 

limitations identified by Dr. Freebourn as Plaintiff’s treating physician. 

To begin, Dr. Freebourn did refer Plaintiff to a surgeon for her ankle problems and 

Plaintiff did have surgery on her ankle. (AR 308). Many months post-surgery, Plaintiff 

was still having significant pain and swelling in her ankle. (AR 326, 325). The ALJ is 

correct that Dr. Freebourn prescribed medications and physical therapy for Plaintiff’s 

back pain but he consistently stated in his treatment notes that Plaintiff continued to be in 

pain and did not experience significant and consistent reduction in pain. (167, 168, 162-

165, 326). For example, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Freebourn that she had difficultly sitting 

on her right side and had to lean to left when she sitting down (AR 167); she was in 

severe and constant pain (AR 167); Dr. Freebourn observed Plaintiff appeared to be in a 

“moderate amount of distress” (AR 168); Dr. Freebourn found Plaintiff “frequently ha[d] 

to move positions due to pain” (AR 326). 

The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff had no limitation in standing and sitting is 

not supported by Dr. Freebourn’s treatment notes. The ALJ erred when he gave Dr. 

Freebourn’s opinion great weight but then failed to address why he ignored the ample 

evidence from Dr. Freebourn that Plaintiff had significant limitations and pain related to 

her back and ankle. Specifically, Dr. Freebourn’s treatment notes about Plaintiff’s 

inability to sit or stand for prolonged periods of time are in direct conflict with the ALJ’s 

RFC finding that Plaintiff had no restrictions for sitting and standing. 

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The ALJ’s interpretation of reviewing physician Dr. Kattapong’s assessment was 

similarly in error. The ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Kattapong but he then 

misstated that opinion. (AR 20). While Dr. Kattapong opined Plaintiff could do light 

work, it was only with restrictions not acknowledged by the ALJ. In reviewing Plaintiff’s 

record, Dr. Kattapong opined Plaintiff could only stand and sit for six hours in a 

workday. (AR 115). He also opined Plaintiff must periodically alternate sitting and 

standing to relieve pain or discomfort. (AR 115). He further explained “[t]his can be 

accommodated with normal breaks + lunch, together with brief stretches.” (AR 115). The 

ALJ, in giving great weight to Dr. Kattapong’s opinion, completely ignored these 

restrictions and determined Plaintiff could stand and sit without restrictions. (AR 18). 

The ALJ cannot “pick and choose from a medical opinion, using only those parts 

that are favorable to a finding of nondisability.” Craig v. Astrue, 269 Fed.Appx. 710, 712 

(9th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (citing Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th 

Cir.2004); Switzer v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 382, 385-86 (7th Cir.1984) (Secretary may not 

use only portions favorable to her decision and ignore other parts of the record). The ALJ 

erred in analyzing the opinion of Dr. Kattapong. 

The ALJ committed further error in evaluating the opinion of examining physician 

Dr. Thrasher. Like the opinions from Drs. Freebourn and Kattapong, the ALJ selected the 

parts of Dr. Thrasher’s opinion that were favorable to a denial of benefits and he ignored 

the parts not helpful to his own conclusions. The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Thrasher’s 

opinion about Plaintiff’s limitations to stand but cited Dr. Thrasher’s examination of 

Plaintiff and his subsequent Medical Source Statement about Plaintiff as support for his 

conclusion that Plaintiff could “perform work at the light exertional level with the 

requirements that the claimant sit during normal breaks and limit her use of her lower 

extremities in pushing and pulling foot controls.” (AR 20, 19). 

Dr. Thrasher examined Plaintiff in September 2007. (AR 122). Plaintiff 

complained to Dr. Thrasher of aggravated back pain when sitting or standing for 

prolonged periods of time. (AR 122). After performing an exam including a range of 

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motion test and reviewing x-rays, Dr. Thrasher opined Plaintiff had limitations that would 

impair her for twelve continuous months. (AR 122-126, 130, 131, 127). He further 

opined that she would have restrictions requiring her to stand or walk at least two hours a 

workday but no more than four hours. (AR 127). The ALJ discounted this standing 

limitation as not supported “by the objective findings in the record which shows that the 

claimant’s impairments are mild in nature and by the claimant’s” [sic]. (AR 20). 

The ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Thrasher’s opinion was in error. Dr. Thrasher’s 

opinion is consistent with both Drs. Freebourn and Kattapong who both identified 

Plaintiff’s constant back and ankle pain that required alternating between sitting and 

standing and limitations in an ability to sit or stand for prolonged periods of time. It is 

also consistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. As an example, reports 

from employees at the Social Security Administration office showed Plaintiff was 

struggling with pain. In December 2006, Plaintiff was observed having “a really hard 

time sitting in the chair” and she “had to stand up several time [sic] to releave [sic] 

pressure on her body. She walked with a limp. Seemed to be in constant pain!” (AR 110). 

In April 2007, an SSA employee observed that Plaintiff did not sit down during her face 

to face interview because her back was hurting. (AR 81). 

The ALJ’s approach of “picking” and “choosing” the parts of the physicians’ 

opinions that supported his conclusions was in error. The ALJ failed to provide legally 

sufficient reasons for discounting the parts of the physicians’ opinions that were 

inconsistent with his RFC findings. This was not harmless error. See Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.2008) (“the court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision 

for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was 

inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” (quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). The ALJ’s error in discounting portions of these physicians’ opinions 

was critical to determining Plaintiff’s accurate RFC. All three physicians identified 

standing and/or sitting limitations that directly impact Plaintiff’s ability to do light and/or 

sedentary work. 

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B. Past Relevant Work at Step Four

 At step four of the evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff had three prior jobs 

that qualified as past relevant work that she would still be able to perform. (AR 20). 

Plaintiff alleges, and the Commissioner essentially agreed, that the ALJ erred in 

determining Plaintiff had past relevant work as a fast food cook and a laundry worker. 

(Doc. 17, pp. 18, 10-11; Doc. 18, p. 12). The Magistrate Judge agrees. Plaintiff’s work as 

a fast food cook was performed more than fifteen years prior to her date last insured or 

the date of adjudication; this work did not fall within the definition of past relevant work. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(1), 404.1565(a). Also, Plaintiff did not perform her work as a 

laundry worker at the substantial gainful activity level, earning less than $500 per month 

in that job. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574a; (AR 51). The ALJ erred in finding either of these 

two jobs qualified as past relevant work. 

III. Remedy

 Having decided to vacate the Commissioner’s decision, the Court has the 

discretion to remand the case for further development of the record or for an award 

benefits. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir.1998). In Smolen v. Chater,

the Ninth Circuit held that evidence should be credited and an action remanded for an 

immediate award of benefits when the following three factors are satisfied: (1) the ALJ 

has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, (2) there are no 

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, 

and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant 

disabled were such evidence credited. 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir.1996); see Varney v. 

Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir.1988) ( Varney II ) (“In 

cases where there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper 

disability determination can be made, and where it is clear from the administrative record 

that the ALJ would be required to award benefits if the claimant's excess pain testimony 

were credited, we will not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings 

regarding that testimony.”); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir.1989) 

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(same); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir.1989) (“In a recent case in which 

the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting the opinion of the 

claimant's treating physician, we accepted the physician's uncontradicted testimony as 

true and awarded benefits.”) (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir.1988)); 

Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir.1989) (extending Varney II's “credit as 

true” rule to a case with outstanding issues where the claimant already had experienced a 

long delay and a treating doctor supported the claimant's testimony). 

Since Varney was decided, the overwhelming authority in this Circuit makes clear 

that the “credit as true” doctrine is mandatory. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 

(9th Cir.1995); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir.1996); Reddick v. Chater,

157 F.3d 715, 729 (9th Cir.1998); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.2000); 

Moore v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 278 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir.2002); McCartey v. Massanari,

298 F.3d 1072, 1076–77 (9th Cir.2002); Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th 

Cir.2004); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593–95 (9th Cir.2004); Orn v. Astrue, 495 

F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir.2007); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1041 (9th Cir.2007).

In this case, the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the 

physicians’ opinions about Plaintiff’s limitations in standing and sitting and the need to 

alternate between those positions. Treating physician Dr. Freebourn noted Plaintiff 

“frequently ha[d] to move positions due to pain” (AR 326). Reviewing physician Dr. 

Kattapong opined Plaintiff was limited to a maximum of six hours sitting or standing in a 

workday and that Plaintiff would need to alternate between sitting and standing using 

“normal breaks + lunch, together with brief stretches.” (AR 115). Examining physician 

Dr. Thrasher limited Plaintiff to standing a maximum of four hours in a workday. (AR 

127). While the physicians do not necessarily agree on the maximum time Plaintiff can 

spend standing and/or sitting, they are all consistent in finding Plaintiff has significant 

restrictions. 

Plaintiff’s only past relevant work was that of a packing line worker. As she 

actually performed it, she stood for eight hours a day. (AR 400). Crediting as true the 

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opinions of all three physicians, Plaintiff could not perform that work with her standing 

and sitting limitations and the need to alternate between standing and sitting. Given all 

the evidence from the record, it is also evident Plaintiff could not perform the job of 

packing line worker as it is generally performed, requiring standing for six hours a day. 

Even Dr. Kattapong, who opined Plaintiff could stand for a maximum of six hours in a 

workday, also found that Plaintiff would need to have additional breaks to alternate 

between sitting and standing. 

“[M]ost jobs have ongoing work processes which demand that a worker be in a 

certain place or posture for at least a certain length of time to accomplish a certain task. 

Unskilled types of jobs are particularly structured so that a person cannot ordinarily sit or 

stand at will.” SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, *4. Working as a packer in a factory line is 

not a job that enables Plaintiff to alternate between sitting and standing and to stand 

fewer than six hours. When the physicians’ opinions are credited as true, Plaintiff could 

not perform this job. 

 Plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work and she is unable, at step five of 

the evaluation process, to perform other jobs in the national economy. Plaintiff was 55 

years old on her amended alleged onset date of disability. (AR 354). Under the 

guidelines, she is a person of “advanced age”, which “significantly affects [her] ability to 

adjust to other work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e). A person of advanced age that is limited 

to sedentary or light work, is found unable to adjust to other work unless that person has 

skills that can transfer to other skilled or semiskilled work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(4). 

The vocational expert testified that Plaintiff’s past relevant work was unskilled. 

(AR 396). Plaintiff has a sixth grade education. (AR 359). As stated in the MedicalVocational Guidelines: 

For individuals of advanced age who can no longer perform vocationally 

relevant past work and who have a history of unskilled work experience, or 

who have only skills that are not readily transferable to a significant range 

of semi-skilled or skilled work that is within the individual's functional 

capacity, or who have no work experience, the limitations in vocational 

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adaptability represented by functional restriction to light work warrant a 

finding of disabled. Ordinarily, even a high school education or more which 

was completed in the remote past will have little positive impact on 

effecting a vocational adjustment unless relevant work experience reflects 

use of such education. 

20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 202.00(c). Under the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines, Plaintiff is of advanced age with limited education and prior unskilled 

worked; she is disabled. 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rule 202.01, Table No.2. 

There are no outstanding issues that need to be resolved. When crediting as true the 

opinions of the physicians and considering the record as a whole, it is clear the ALJ 

would be required to find the claimant disabled. 

IV. Recommendation 

The Magistrate Judge recommends the decision of the Commissioner be reversed 

and this case be remanded for an immediate award of benefits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) and the Rules of this Court, the parties may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen days of being served a copy of this report and recommendation. The 

parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case 

number: cv-10-403-AWT. 

 Dated this 11th day of February, 2013. 

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