Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-03577/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-03577-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Contract Dispute

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

ALABAMA AIRCRAFT 

INDUSTRIES, INC., ALABAMA 

AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC. - 

BIRMINGHAM, AND PEMCO 

AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING 

SERVICES, INC. 

) 

) 

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 Plaintiff, 

 CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 

v. 2:11-cv-03577-RDP 

 

THE BOEING COMPANY, 

BOEING AEROSPACE 

OPERATIONS, INC. AND BOEING 

AEROSPACE SUPPORT 

CENTER, 

 

 Defendant. 

 ) 

 ) 

THE BOEING COMPANY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Case No.: 2:16-mc-01216-RDP 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

TENNENBAUM CAPITAL 

PARTNERS, LLC 

) 

) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Before the Special Master are four (4) related motions, namely, (1) 

Boeing’s Motion to Compel the Production of Documents by Tennenbaum 

FILED

 2016 Dec-02 AM 11:58

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 1 of 33
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Capital Partners (“TCP”) (Doc. 1), (2) TCP’s Motion to Quash Boeing’s April 

7, 2016 Subpoena (Doc. 6), (3) TCP’s Motion to Strike Portions of the 

Declaration of J. Thomas Richie (Doc. 9), and (4) AAI’s Motion to Quash 

Boeing’s April 7, 2016 Subpoena (Doc. 3) (collectively, “the Motions” or “the 

TCP Subpoena Motions”), which were referred to the undersigned by 

Judge Proctor in an order dated August 16, 2016 (Doc. 40 at 1) in the 

matter of The Boeing Company v. Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC, 

Case No. 2:16-mc-01216-RDP.1 

Prior to the matter’s transfer to Judge Proctor, the Motions were 

extensively briefed in the Central District of California (see Docs. 3, 18, 28, 

32, 33, 35); at Judge Proctor’s behest (Doc. 40 at 2), the undersigned 

convened a telephone conference on August 23, 2016 to discuss with 

counsel for Boeing, TCP, and AAI whether such briefing was sufficient to 

allow the undersigned to properly resolve the Motions. Counsel for TCP 

requested the opportunity to submit additional briefing as to the issue of 

cost sharing, but the parties were otherwise satisfied with the state of their 

briefing; however, by order dated August 26, 2016 (Doc. 41), the 

undersigned solicited supplementing briefing from the parties on the topic 

 1 Judge Proctor’s August 16, 2016 Order (Doc. 40) also encompassed a fifth 

motion, TCP’s Motion for Sanctions and Cost Sharing (Doc. 8), but that motion has 

already been addressed separately in a Report and Recommendation filed by the 

undersigned on October 17, 2016 (Doc. 43). 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 2 of 33
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of privilege waiver, which the undersigned identified as a threshold issue in 

resolving the TCP Subpoena Motions after a review of the existing record. 

The parties responded on September 23, 2016 by submitting briefs and 

exhibits regarding privilege waiver, and, in turn, by order dated October 3, 

2016 (Doc. 42), the undersigned requested additional, waiver-related 

information from TCP. TCP provided the requested information on October 

10, 2016, and, as such, the Motions are now fully briefed, rendering them 

ripe for resolution. For the reasons explained below, it is the 

recommendation of the Special Master that the TCP Subpoena Motions be

GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, and DEEMED MOOT IN PART. 

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Underlying Subpoenas & Independent Production 

Agreement 

1. On February 18, 2015, Boeing served TCP with its first 

subpoena, issuing the document request out of the Southern District of 

California. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 3). 

2. Following TCP’s objections to the court of issuance, Boeing reissued the subpoena from the Central District of California, serving it on 

TCP on March 5, 2015. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Exs. 4 & 5). 

3. After extended negotiations over TCP’s responsive obligations 

under the second subpoena (see, e.g., Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 10), the 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 3 of 33
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parties entered into an independent production agreement in November 

2015, pursuant to which TCP agreed to turn over certain documents in lieu 

of complying with the subpoena. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 37). 

4. Ultimately, TCP produced more than twenty-three thousand 

(23,000) documents in connection with the agreement, turning over hard 

copy documents on November 30, 2015 and electronic documents on

December 22, 2015. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at ¶ 24). TCP also produced two 

privilege logs on January 19, 2016. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Exs. 1 & 2). 

B. Privilege Dispute, Third Subpoena, & TCP Subpoena 

Motions 

5. After receiving TCP’s privilege logs, Boeing informally 

challenged the privilege assertions made therein, exchanging numerous 

letters with TCP on the issue. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Exs. 12-15). The 

parties were unable to resolve their privilege disputes, and, accordingly, 

Boeing filed a Motion to Compel on February 11, 2016 in the Northern 

District of Alabama. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 40). 

6. Construing Boeing’s Motion to Compel as an attempt to enforce 

the underlying subpoena (rather than the operative production agreement) 

(Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 41), the Court applied Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(i) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“At any time, on notice to the 

commanded person, the serving party may move the court for the district 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 4 of 33
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where compliance is required for an order compelling production or 

inspection.”) (emphasis added), concluding that the Motion to Compel 

should have been filed in the Central District of California, as opposed to 

the Northern District of Alabama. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 41—“The 

subpoena was served in California on a California company and seeks 

documents maintained in California. Nothing in the discovery agreement 

alters Rule 45’s tautological application here.”). Accordingly, it dismissed 

Boeing’s Motion, but did so without prejudice, noting that “Boeing may file 

its Motion in the court issuing the subpoena (or another court which may 

have jurisdiction over TCP).” (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 41). 

7. On April 7, 2016, Boeing served a third subpoena on TCP, 

issuing it from the Northern District of Alabama. (Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 

22). The third subpoena was much narrower than its two predecessors, 

seeking only those documents that appeared on TCP’s privilege logs (“the 

Disputed Documents”)2

 in an attempt to circumvent the jurisdictional issues 

 2 The Disputed Documents consist of emails/email attachments containing legal 

advice from counsel for AAI that three former TCP partners/officers—Michael 

Tennenbaum, Mark Holsdworth, and Steve Wilson (“the TCP-based Outside 

Directors”)—allegedly sent or received in their capacity as directors of AAI. (Doc. 3 at 

17-18 (AAI)—“TCP withheld from that production privileged or otherwise protected 

documents that were in its possession because the documents had been received or 

sent by three of its former managing partners/officers: Michael Tennenbaum, Steve 

Wilson, and Mark Holdsworth. These former TCP officers also served as members of 

AAI’s board of directors by virtue of a TCP-managed fund’s investment in AAI. Because 

these TCP/AAI officers engaged in privileged and other communications related to their 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 5 of 33
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that had previously plagued Boeing’s efforts (see supra at ¶ 6) to compel 

production of the Disputed Documents. (See April 7, 2016 Letter from 

Boeing to Special Master—Doc. 3, Richie Dec. at Ex. 24—“As you know, 

TCP produced documents and two large privilege logs under the subpoena 

Boeing issued. But when Boeing raised challenges to those privilege logs, 

TCP raised jurisdictional objections to Boeing’s subpoena. The objections 

relate solely to the court out of which the subpoena issued and is a wholely 

technical matter, but for expediency we are simply issuing a revised 

subpoena rather than continue to dispute this point.” (emphasis added); 

see also Doc. 3 at 12 (Boeing)—“To obviate TCP’s new counsel’s objection 

to Boeing’s subpoena, Boeing issued a subpoena from the Northern District 

of Alabama on April 7. It seeks only documents that were at issue under 

the prior subpoena, specifically the documents identified on TCP’s privilege 

log.” (internal citations omitted)). 

8. On June 24, 2016, Boeing filed two motions in the Central 

District of California, seeking to compel production of the Disputed 

Documents (Doc. 1) and/or transfer the enforcement proceedings to the 

Northern District of Alabama (Doc. 2). TCP concurrently filed a number of 

 

service on the AAI board while working at TCP, TCP has possession, custody, and 

control over privileged AAI communications and documents and thus has rightfully 

withheld them from their document production to Boeing.”). 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 6 of 33
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cross-motions—including a Motion to Quash (Doc. 6), a Motion to Strike 

(Doc. 9), and a Motion for Sanctions and Cost Sharing (Doc. 8)—and AAI 

also filed a Motion to Quash (Doc. 3). Per local practice in the Central 

District of California, Boeing, TCP, and AAI submitted their briefing and 

evidentiary materials to the Court in a Joint Stipulation (Doc. 3).3

 3 TCP’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 9)—which seeks to strike Paragraphs 9 and 12 of 

the declaration by Thomas Richie (counsel for Boeing) that was submitted with the Joint 

Stipulation (Doc. 3)—was not addressed in the parties’ joint briefing materials. Instead, 

the parties submitted separate briefs, namely TCP’s Initial Brief (Doc. 9-1), Boeing’s 

Response (Doc. 18), and TCP’s Reply (Doc. 28). In support of its Motion, TCP argued 

that Paragraph 9 (“Th[e] Special Master has ruled on numerous issues related to this 

motion, including . . .”) amounted to “improper legal argument” because it offered “Mr. 

Richie’s interpretation of various decisions by the Special Master” (Doc. 9-1 at 2). 

Likewise, in regard to Paragraph 12 (“TCP initially objected to [the first] subpoena 

because it issued out of the Southern District of California. Counsel for Boeing asked 

counsel for TCP to state out of which district TCP contended the subpoena should 

issue. The parties conferred regarding the matter and agreed that TCP’s counsel would 

accept service of a subpoena issued from the Central District of California.”), TCP 

argued that Richie lacked the personal knowledge necessary to support the paragraph’s 

factual assertions. (Doc. 9-1 at 3—“Paragraph 12 of the Richie Declaration describes 

the content of conversations between counsel for Boeing and counsel for TCP, but Mr. 

Richie does not state that he was a party to these conversations . . . Because Mr. Richie 

has neither laid the proper foundation showing that he participated in these 

conversations, nor provided any evidence that he was a party to these conversations, 

he lacks personal knowledge to allow him to competently testify as to the substance of 

these conversations and the Court should strike this paragraph.”). In opposition, Boeing 

argued that there was “nothing objectionable in the brief descriptions contained in 

Paragraph 9,” and further asserted that the paragraph was a non-issue because “those 

rulings speak for themselves” (Doc. 18 at 3); Boeing took much greater issue with 

TCP’s Paragraph 12 argument, asserting that Richie’s representation of Boeing 

provided him with sufficient personal knowledge (Doc. 18 at 4—“[T]he Richie 

Declaration in Paragraph 12 addresses the substance of the parties’ positions, not the 

particular words used in a particular conversation. By virtue of his representation of 

Boeing in this particular dispute, Mr. Richie has at all times had knowledge of TCP’s 

litigation positions, and that knowledge is sufficient to support Paragraph 12 of his 

declaration.”). 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 7 of 33
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9. Although many of the issues addressed by the parties in the 

Joint Stipulation are no longer relevant (e.g., those relating to Boeing’s 

Motion to Transfer or TCP’s Motion for Cost Sharing), a number remain 

central to the Motions considered here, namely (1) timeliness, and (2) 

privilege. Indeed, in attempting to quash Boeing’s third subpoena, TCP 

and AAI primarily argued that the subpoena was untimely, as it was issued 

by Boeing after the discovery deadline in the underlying case. (Doc. 3 at 15 

(TCP)—“With fact discovery closed in Alabama as of Februrary 29, 2016, 

and without a valid subpoena on which to move against TCP, on April 7, 

2016 Boeing issued a third subpoena expressly targeting documents 

appearing on the privilege log TCP voluntarily provided with its production. 

The April 7 subpoena is fatally defective, as it was issued more than a 

month after the Alabama court’s fact discovery cutoff.”; Doc. 3 at 17 (AAI)—

“Boeing’s Motion should be denied and the TCP Subpoena quashed for 

two reasons: (1) because Boeing improperly issued and served this 

subpoena more than one month after the close of fact discovery in the 

Alabama Lawsuit, in violation of the Scheduling Order in that case; and (2) 

because the untimely subpoena expressly seeks the production of AAI’s 

privileged or otherwise protected documents.”; Doc. 3 at 17, n.4 (AAI)—“[I]t 

is not necessary for the Court to reach the privilege issues because 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 8 of 33
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Boeing’s Motion to Compel is due to be denied and the untimely TCP 

Subpoena quashed because it was served after the Alabama Lawsuit’s 

discovery deadline.”). In addition to making a threshold timeliness 

argument, TCP and AAI also argued that Boeing’s subpoena improperly 

sought privileged documents. (See, e.g., supra at ¶ 7, n.2). Boeing, in turn, 

pushed back on TCP/AAI’s timeliness and privilege arguments, framing its 

third subpoena as a continuation of earlier, more timely discovery efforts 

and asserting that TCP’s possession of the Disputed Documents resulted 

in a waiver of their AAI-based privilege. (Doc. 3 at 11 (Boeing)—“Their 

latest effort is to claim that Boeing’s subpoena is untimely. They are 

wrong. This dispute began with a subpoena Boeing issued to TCP in 

March 2015, and every document at issue is responsive to that subpoena. 

The documents at issue were collected, reviewed, and logged by TCP at 

least by January 2016. Although the scheduling order in the Underlying 

Action closed most fact discovery on February 29, 2016, all parties are well 

aware that several pending items were left open to continue past that 

date.”; Doc. 3 at 24 (Boeing)—“[E]ven if the subpoenaed documents could 

have been privileged in AAI’s hands, there is no possible basis for them to 

retain privileged status when all of the documents were available to TCP 

employees and attorneys to review and were actually reviewed by TCP’s 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 9 of 33
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attorneys. TCP is a third party, and its possession and review of the 

subpoenaed documents breaks any possible privilege.”). 

10. After entertaining the parties’ motions at a hearing held on July 

21, 2016 (Doc. 38), the California Court entered an order dated August 2, 

2016 (attached hereto as Exhibit A),4

 which granted Boeing’s Motion to 

Transfer and denied TCP’s “Request for Cost Sharing” without prejudice. 

C. Supplemental Briefing 

11. Following the matter’s transfer, referral, and discussion by 

telephone conference (as described in the introductory paragraph above), 

the undersigned ordered the submission of supplemental briefing on the 

issue of privilege waiver, specifically requesting that the parties answer 

three waiver-centric questions: (1) What are the implications for purposes 

of waiver that result from the TCP-based Outside Directors’ use of TCP 

email addresses to send and receive the Disputed Documents?; (2) Did the 

TCP-based Outside Directors have access to AAI email addresses?; and 

(3) What measures were taken by the TCP-based Outside Directors and/or 

 4 The Court’s order appeared as Doc. 41 on the docket report of the Central 

District of California case, which was styled as 2:16-mc-00081-FMO-JPR. However, the 

order appears to have been lost in the case’s transfer, as it does not appear on the 

docket report of the instant case. Accordingly, for ease of reference, the order has been 

attached hereto as Exhibit A. 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 10 of 33
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TCP to protect the confidentiality of the Disputed Documents? (Doc. 41 at 

5). 

12. The parties complied with the undersigned’s briefing request on 

September 23, 2016. (See TCP’s Supplemental Brief (attached hereto as 

Exhibit B), AAI’s Supplemental Brief (attached hereto as Exhibit C), and 

Boeing’s Supplemental Brief (attached hereto as Exhibit D)). Expanding on 

its earlier position, Boeing argued that the Disputed Documents’ exposure 

to TCP’s email system resulted in broad waiver of both the attorney-client 

privilege and the work product doctrine. (Boeing’s Supplemental Brief at 

6—“It appears that neither Pemco nor its TCP-affiliated directors treated 

Pemco’s privilege with anything close to the necessary respect and caution 

. . . [T]he putative privilege holder (Pemco) permitted its allegedly privileged 

communications to be shared with third party TCP by allowing its directors 

(Messrs. Tennenbaum, Wilson, and Holdsworth) to conduct their Pemco 

business using their TCP e-mail address, and, significantly, those 

communications were either stored on TCP’s servers, or were otherwise 

found by TCP through a search of its documents. All were thus 

unquestionably in TCP’s possession, custody, and control and apparently 

available to anyone who could search TCP’s system, without restriction.”; 

Id. at 12—“Pemco waived [work product protection] when it voluntarily 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 11 of 33
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disclosed those documents to TCP, which was initially a potential 

adversary during the term of its loan to Pemco and later became an actual 

adversary at Pemco’s bankruptcy.”). In contrast, TCP/AAI argued that the 

Disputed Documents retained the protection of the attorney-client privilege 

and the work product doctrine, as TCP’s email system contained sufficient 

confidentiality mechanisms and there was no adversity between TCP and 

AAI. (See, e.g., AAI’s Supplemental Brief at 2—“These privileged emails 

sent over TCP’s email system were secure, protected, and maintained their 

confidential and privileged character when they were sent and received at 

TCP, when they were stored on TCP’s servers, and when they were

retrieved, reviewed, and logged in conjunction with TCP’s document 

production to Boeing . . . Further, . . . disclosure of work product-protected 

materials to a non-adversarial and friendly party such as TCP does not 

waive the work-product protection associated with the document.”). 

13. Despite their conflicting conclusions, the parties’ briefs 

evidence agreement on a number of critical matters. First, the parties 

agree that the TCP-based Outside Directors’ use of TCP email addresses 

did not—without more—compromise the confidentiality of the Disputed 

Documents. (AAI’s Supplemental Brief at 7—“Assuming a communication 

is otherwise privileged, the use of the company’s email system does not 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 12 of 33
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without more, destroy the privilege.” (internal citations and quotations 

omitted); Boeing’s Supplemental Brief at 6, n.7 & 12, n.12—“To be sure, 

the allegedly privileged communications between Pemco and those

directors did not lose their privileged character merely because the 

directors happened to be TCP owners and officers and received emails at 

their TCP email addresses . . . To be clear, Boeing is not arguing that 

Pemco waived work protection merely by communicating with its directors 

on their TCP e-mail addresses.”). Second, the parties agree that the issue 

of confidentiality—and, thus, waiver—hinges on the question of whether 

AAI and the TCP-based Outside Directors sent, received, and stored the 

Disputed Documents on TCP’s email system with an objectively reasonable 

expectation of confidentiality. (AAI’s Supplemental Brief at 15—“Because 

the AAI Outside Directors had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality 

and privacy in their TCP emails . . . there has been on waiver of privilege 

here.” (emphasis added); Boeing’s Supplemental Brief at 10—“To escape 

waiver it would have to prove that Pemco and the directors had an 

objectively reasonable expectation that allegedly privileged 

communications sent or received from their TCP e-mail addresses would 

remain confidential from TCP despite being in TCP’s possession, custody, 

or control (either stored on its servers or otherwise).”). Finally, they agree 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 13 of 33
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that such a question is best evaluated using the four-factor, Asia Global 

balancing test: “(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal 

or other objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the 

employee’s computer or email, (3) do third parties have a right of access to 

the computer or emails, and (4) did the corporation notify the employee, or 

was the employee aware, of the use and monitoring policies?” In re Asia 

Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); (AAI’s 

Supplemental Brief at 8 & 9—“Asia Global is considered the seminal case 

on the waiver issue . . . applying these four [Asia Global] factors, which 

numerous courts have found instructive . . .”; Boeing’s Supplemental Brief 

at 10—“When assessing whether an employee has waived his or her own 

privilege by storing privileged communications on his or her employer’s 

server (a slightly different context than that at issue here), many district 

courts (including those in the Eleventh Circuit) use the following four-factor 

framework . . . The same framework, however, should also apply to the 

facts we have here.”) 

14. TCP’s supplemental submission included a number of 

declarations that spoke to its policies and practices regarding the use and 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 14 of 33
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monitoring of its email system (i.e., the subject of an Asia Global analysis),5

but the submission did not include the exact language of TCP’s use and 

 5 See, e.g., Declaration of Elizabeth Greenwood (TCP’s General Counsel) at ¶¶ 

11 (“Email accounts and computers at TCP are password protected, and TCP 

employees and management did not have general access to Mr. Tennenbaum, Mr. 

Wilson, and/or Mr. Holdsworth’s emails.”), 12 (“TCP’s compliance department monitors 

the emails on the tennenbaumcapital.com domain for the purposes of ensuring 

compliance with the securities laws. The compliance review . . . is not for review, 

recirculation, or dissemination of the contents of non-investment adviser activity-related 

emails.”), & 13 (“TCP’s information technology personnel had access to TCP email 

accounts for the limited purpose of network maintenance and other limited information 

technology purposes, [but] did not have permission or authority to review and monitor 

the content of Mr. Tennenbaum, Mr. Wilson, or Mr. Holdsworth’s emails.”); Declaration 

of Michael Tennenbaum at ¶¶ 11 (“As an owner of and partner in TCP, I was specifically 

aware of its very limited practices in monitoring my email for compliance purposes only 

and was also specifically aware that, as an owner and partner in TCP, I knew I was 

required to use my TCP email address to engage in communications, privileged or 

otherwise, related to my service on the Pemco board of directors.”), 13 (“While I was a 

partner of TCP, to my knowledge, the only person authorized to have access to my TCP 

email address emails was the compliance officer, Liz Greenwood, for the limited 

purpose of regulatory compliance. It is my understanding that, to comply with SECrelated audits of my emails, my emails would have been compiled into a batch by the 

TCP compliance officer, and then I would have reviewed that batch to remove any 

privileged emails from any internal or external review. These privileged emails would 

have been identified by me and segregated from any investment-related emails. 

Neither the SEC nor TCP’s compliance personnel would have had authorization to 

review the content of any privileged emails.”), 14 (“While it is my understanding that 

information technology personnel had access to my TCP email account for the limited 

purpose of network maintenance and other limited information technology purposes (as 

is necessary for the maintenance of any email system), they did not have permission or 

authority to view the content of my emails, particularly any Pemco-related emails.”), 15 

(“No one at TCP could access my TCP email account without my authorization . . . To 

the best of my knowledge, no other TCP personnel besides compliance or information 

technology staff to whom I gave authorization actually accessed my TCP email 

account.”), 16 (“To the best of my recollection I did not verbally inform any non-Pemco 

employees or non-Pemco directors of the privileged contents of any Pemco email that I 

understood to be privileged. In addition, I would not have taken any actions to waive 

the attorney-client privilege.”), & 17 (“At all times when I sent an email or received an 

email involving counsel and Pemco, via my TCP email address, I had a full expectation 

of confidentiality and privacy in the sending, receiving, and storage of that email such 

that I understood that a confidential communication that was protected by the attorneyclient privilege would remain privileged when sent, received, and/or stored by me on the 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 15 of 33
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monitoring policies, which, according to the relevant case law, is a crucial 

element of a comprehensive Asia Global analysis. As such, by order dated 

October 3, 2016, the undersigned requested that TCP submit “the exact, 

written language—if any—that makes up TCP’s use and monitoring 

policies.” (Doc. 42 at 3). TCP did so on October 10, 2016,6

 rendering the 

Motions fully briefed and primed for resolution. 

 

TCP email system . . . I understood that my emails related to my service on the Pemco 

board of directors that were sent, received, and stored on the TCP email system were 

private, confidential, protected from disclosure, and would remain so.”). 

6 See January 1, 2006 Code of Ethics at 9 (“The Funds and the Advisors 

consider all information concerning their investment activities and the operations of 

those private companies in which it primarily invests to be confidential. Access Persons 

. . . may not communicate that information to others who do not need to know that 

information in the interests of the Funds’ business or are not permitted to receive such 

information under the Funds’ confidentiality agreements with the companies in which 

they invest or consider investing.”) & 10 (“The following are steps that can be taken to 

preserve the confidentiality of confidential information . . . (b) Access persons should not 

discuss confidential matters in elevators, hallways, restaurants, airplanes, taxis, or any 

place where they might be overheard. (c) Access persons should not leave sensitive 

memoranda on their desk or in other places where others can read them. Access 

person should not leave a computer terminal without exiting the file upon which they are 

working. (d) Access persons should not read confidential documents in public places or 

discard them where others can retrieve them. Access persons should not carry 

confidential documents in an exposed manner. (e) Access persons should not discuss 

confidential business information with spouses or other relatives or with friends. (f) 

Access persons should not permit clients or other visitors to a Fund or an Advisor to 

wander freely.”); March 2006 Employee Handbook at 23 (“The Company’s information 

systems, including but not limited to computers, voice mail, email and access to the 

Internet and World Wide Web, are provided by the Company for the use of the 

Company and are to be reviewed, monitored and used only in the pursuit of the 

Company’s business. As a result, certain date is readily available to numerous persons. 

If, during the course of your employment, you perform or transmit work on the 

Company’s computers or other technical resources, your work may be subject to the 

review of others. You may access only files or programs that you have permission to 

enter. Unauthorized review of files, dissemination of passwords, the creation or use of 

passwords not authorized by the Company, damage to systems, removal of files, 

removal of programs or improper use of information contained in any software or other 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 16 of 33
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II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

For the reasons outlined below, it is the undersigned’s legal 

conclusion that (1) the paragraphs targeted by TCP’s Motion to Strike are 

irrelevant to the resolution of the remaining TCP Subpoena Motions, (2) 

Boeing’s third subpoena (i.e., the subject of Boeing’s Motion to Compel, 

TCP’s Motion to Quash, and AAI’s Motion to Quash) constitutes a

permissible continuation of timely, pre-deadline discovery efforts, and (3) 

the Disputed Documents were exchanged by AAI and the TCP-based 

 

technical system or application may be grounds for disciplinary action, up to and 

including termination.”) & 24 (“Searches of the Company’s information systems may be 

conducted without advance notice in order to ensure that they are being used 

exclusively to facilitate transmittal of business-related information . . . As an employee of 

the Company, you are permitted to use the Company’s equipment for occasional, nonCompany-related purposes in accordance with Company policy. However, no personal 

right of privacy of an employee exists in any information contained within or transmitted 

by the Company’s computers or voice mail or e-mail systems. Information contained on 

the Company’s voicemail and e-mail systems are subject to review; Company 

management may override your voicemail, email, and computer passwords and review 

your messages or other data if deemed necessary in the best interests of the 

Company.”); January 2009 Information Security Policies and Standards at 1 (“All 

information created or used in support of Tennenbaum Capital Partners business is 

considered company information. Company information will be protected from 

accidental, malicious or unauthorized disclosure, misuse, modification, destruction, loss 

and/or damage. Protection of company information must span the lifetime of the 

information.”), 4 (“Controls must exist to ensure that users can only access data for 

which they are authorized.”), & 15 (“Tennenbaum Capital Partners reserves the right to 

access, audit, and disclose all active and/or archived messages sent over its e-mail 

systems . . . All e-mail messages are considered Tennenbaum Capital Partners 

company records and property of Tennenbaum Capital Partners . . . Tennenbaum 

Capital Partners reserves the right to access, audit, and disclose all active and/or 

archived messages sent over its e-mail systems . . . Tennenbaum Capital Partners 

reserves the right to review electronic mail communications of employees to determine 

whether any breach of security or violation of company policy has occurred. Any 

individual who wishes to review e-mail messages for suspected violations must have 

the approval of the Director of Human Resources or his/her designate.”). 

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Outside Directors with an objectively reasonable expectation of

confidentiality. 

A. TCP’s Motion to Strike

It seems relatively clear that TCP’s Motion to Strike was filed in an 

attempt to ensure that the California court was not influenced in its handling 

of the TCP Subpoena Motions by what TCP viewed as inaccuracies 

contained in the Declaration of Thomas Richie, i.e., Paragraph 9 (which 

characterized prior rulings by the undersigned that were potentially relevant 

to the central issues of timeliness and privilege) and Paragraph 12 (which 

recounted an exchange between counsel for TCP and Boeing that was 

potentially relevant to the issue of timeliness). However, given the Motions’ 

current posture, such considerations have become irrelevant: the 

undersigned is fully capable of determining whether his prior rulings are of 

any significance to the present Motions without referring to Paragraph 9, 

and the undersigned’s timeliness conclusion, which is detailed below, does 

not turn on the exchange described in Paragraph 12. Accordingly, TCP’s 

Motion to Strike should be deemed moot. 

B. Boeing’s Motion to Compel/TCP’s Motion to Quash/AAI’s 

Motion to Quash

Resolution of the remaining TCP Subpoena Motions is primarily 

informed by two issues: timeliness and privilege. Whether Boeing’s third 

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subpoena was timely is a threshold issue, which, if resolved in the 

negative, would remove the need to address the issue of privilege, which is 

the core question presented by the remaining TCP Subpoena Motions. 

However, given the conclusion below that Boeing’s third subpoena is a 

permissible extension of the parties’ unimpeachably timely production 

agreement, the undersigned must grapple with the privilege conundrum, 

which is not suited for a clean and immediate determination. 

1. Timeliness

As noted above (supra at ¶ 9), the parties devoted considerable 

space in their initial briefing to arguments regarding the timeliness of 

Boeing’s third subpoena, which was served after the February 29, 2016 

discovery deadline established by the Court in its Amended Scheduling 

Order (Doc. 157). Indeed, TCP and AAI framed the deadline as absolute 

(see, e.g., Doc. 3 at 15 & 17), while Boeing couched the deadline in much

less definite terms, arguing that the deadline was understood by all 

involved to permit the continued pursuit of outstanding discovery requests 

(see, e.g., Doc. 3 at 11). 

Given the Court’s demonstrated willingness to entertain pre-deadline 

discovery disputes that have spilled beyond February 29, 2016 (e.g., 

Boeing’s May 6, 2016 “Motion to Compel AAI’s Responses to Boeing’s 

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Interrogatory No. 1 and Requests for Admission Nos. 6, 14, 15, 16, and 

20”), the undersigned is inclined to adopt Boeing’s approach, and, when 

combined with the fact that Boeing’s third subpoena only seeks documents 

encompassed by the parties’ timely production agreement, such an 

approach leads to the conclusion that the subpoena is an acceptable 

outgrowth of the underlying agreement, warranting consideration on the 

merits, i.e., whether the documents requested by the subpoena are 

protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work 

product doctrine. 

2. Privilege

Given the Disputed Documents’ inclusion on the privilege logs 

produced by TCP (and, thus, TCP’s acknowledgment that they fall within 

the parameters of the parties’ production agreement), it appears that the 

only basis on which TCP can plausibly resist producing the Disputed 

Documents is by successfully defending their privileged status.7

 This is an 

arduous task, requiring TCP to justify its privilege assertions on a 

document-by-document basis, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 831 F.2d 225, 

 7 As highlighted above (supra at ¶ 7, n.2), the underlying privilege theory 

advanced by TCP is that the Disputed Documents contain legal advice from counsel for 

AAI that three former TCP partners/officers either sent or received in their capacity as 

directors of AAI. In other words, the alleged privilege belongs to AAI, but is being 

asserted by TCP on AAI’s behalf. 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 20 of 33
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227 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Blanket assertions of privilege before a district court 

are usually unacceptable . . . instead, [an attorney] must present himself 

with his records for questioning, and as to . . . each record elect to raise or 

not to raise the defense.”) (emphasis not added); however, in light of TCP’s 

possession of the Disputed Documents, the most pressing privilege issue is 

not whether TCP can demonstrate privilege on a document-by-document 

basis, but, rather, whether the attorney-client privilege has been waived as 

to all of the Disputed Documents, as TCP’s third-party status potentially 

frustrates the privilege’s requisite confidentiality. In re Grand Jury 

Proceedings 88-9, 899 F.2d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The attorneyclient privilege exists to protect confidential communications between client 

and lawyer made for the purpose of securing legal advice.”) (internal 

citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 

F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[A] client’s and his attorney’s

communications are not deemed confidential when made in the presence 

of a third party.”). 

i. Waiver 

As noted above (see supra at ¶ 13), the parties are in agreement that 

the issue of confidentiality—and, thus, waiver—hinges on the question of 

whether AAI and the TCP-based Outside Directors sent, received, and 

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stored the Disputed Documents on TCP’s email systems with an 

“objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality”: if the Disputed 

Documents were exchanged/stored with such an expectation, then no 

waiver occurred; if, however, they were not, then the attorney-client 

privilege was waived. 

The “objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality” inquiry 

focuses on the email monitoring policies and practices of the third party at 

issue (i.e., TCP), with such policies and practices being examined through

the four-factor, Asia Global balancing test. Asia Global, 322 B.R. at 257 (“In 

general, a court should consider four factors: (1) does the corporation 

maintain a policy banning personal or other objectionable use, (2) does the 

company monitor the use of the employee’s computer or e-mail, (3) do third 

parties have a right of access to the computer or e-mails, and (4) did the 

corporation notify the employee, or was the employee aware, of the use 

and monitoring policies.”). The Asia Global test is most commonly utilized 

in the context of personal email use, where the question is whether the 

confidentiality of an employee’s communications with his/her personal 

attorney have been compromised by their exposure to the employer’s IT 

system; however, the test has also been successfully adapted to situations 

that approximate the present one, providing the undersigned with some 

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guidance in his application of the Asia Global factors to the information 

submitted by TCP regarding its email monitoring policies and practices. 

See In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, 2013 WL 772668 at *6 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013) (“In most [Asia Global] situations, an employee 

spoke with her personal attorney over her employer’s email system. Here, 

in contrast, Campbell [the Chairman of Intuit, who also served as a highlevel consultant to Google] spoke with Google’s employees and Google’s 

counsel over Intuit’s email system . . . Although the facts differ from the 

typical scenario, the court considers the method for determining whether 

the communications remained confidential basically the same. To wit, did 

Campbell and Google have an objectively reasonable expectation of 

confidentiality in emails sent through Intuit’s system?”). Applying the Asia 

Global factors to the present case, the undersigned concludes as follows: 

a. Factor 1 

According to In re Information Management Services, Inc. Derivative 

Litigation (a 2013 Delaware state court decision that applied the Asia 

Global factors in a particularly ordered and well-reasoned manner), “[the 

first Asia Global] factor has been refined to focus on the nature and 

specificity of the employer’s policies regarding email use and monitoring. It 

has been held to weigh in favor of production when the employer has a 

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clear policy banning or restricting personal use, where the employer 

informs employees that they have no right of personal privacy in work email 

communications, or where the employer advises employees that the 

employer monitors or reserves the right to monitor work email 

communications . . . This factor has been held to weigh against production 

if the employer does not have a clear policy or practice regarding personal 

use and monitoring.” 81 A.3d 278, 287-88 (Court of Chancery of Delaware, 

Sept. 5, 2013). 

Here, TCP’s policies make clear that any information that passes 

through its IT system—such as the Disputed Documents—is considered 

company property, and they likewise reserve an unfettered right of review 

for the company. See, e.g., January 2009 Information Security Policies and 

Standards at 1 (“All information created or used in support of Tennenbaum 

Capital Partners business is considered company information.”) & 15 (“All 

e-mail messages are considered Tennenbaum Capital Partners company 

records and property of Tennenbaum Capital Partners . . . Tennenbaum 

Capital Partners reserves the right to access, audit, and disclose all active 

and/or archived messages sent over its e-mail systems . . . Tennenbaum 

Capital Partners reserves the right to review electronic mail 

communications of employees to determine whether any breach of security 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 24 of 33
25 

or violation of company policy has occurred.”). However, TCP’s monitoring 

policies seem primarily concerned with rooting out improper personal use 

(see, e.g., March 2006 Employee Handbook at 24—“Searches of the 

Company’s information systems may be conducted without advance notice 

in order to ensure that they are being used exclusively to facilitate 

transmittal of business-related information . . . As an employee of the 

Company, you are permitted to use the Company’s equipment for 

occasional, non-Company-related purposes in accordance with Company 

policy. However, no personal right of privacy of an employee exists in any 

information contained within or transmitted by the Company’s computers or 

voice mail or e-mail systems.”), and, as such, they largely fail to 

encompass the class of business-related communications to which the 

Disputed Documents belong. Furthermore, the limited scope of TCP’s 

monitoring practices (i.e., only for purposes of securities compliance and IT 

maintenance) seems designed to protect the substantive confidentiality of 

communications by high-level employees. See, e.g., Declaration of 

Elizabeth Greenwood (TCP’s General Counsel) at ¶¶ 12 (“TCP’s 

compliance department monitors the emails on the tennenbaumcapital.com 

domain for the purposes of ensuring compliance with the securities laws. 

The compliance review . . . is not for review, recirculation, or dissemination 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 25 of 33
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of the contents of non-investment adviser activity-related emails.”) & 13 

(“TCP’s information technology personnel had access to TCP email 

accounts for the limited purpose of network maintenance and other limited 

information technology purposes, [but] did not have permission or authority 

to review and monitor the content of Mr. Tennenbaum, Mr. Wilson, or Mr. 

Holdsworth’s emails.”). Considering, then, that TCP’s policies do not 

explicitly ban the type of behavior that the TCP-based Outside Directors 

engaged in with respect to the Disputed Documents, nor seem to be 

designed to monitor communications that resemble the Disputed 

Documents, this factor weighs in favor of finding that the Disputed 

Documents were exchanged and stored with an objectively reasonable 

expectation of privacy. 

b. Factor 2 

The second Asia Global factor—which “has been refined to focus on 

the extent to which the employer adheres to or enforces its policies,” i.e., 

“the employer’s actual conduct with respect to monitoring”—likewise seems 

to favor a finding that the Disputed Documents were exchanged and stored 

with an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. In re Information 

Management, 81 A.3d at 289. Indeed, there is no evidence that TCP 

actually breached the confidentiality of the Disputed Documents (cf. 

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Declaration of Michael Tennenbaum at ¶ 15—“To the best of my 

knowledge, no other TCP personnel besides compliance or information 

technology staff to whom I gave authorization actually accessed my TCP 

email account.”), and, as highlighted in the previous section, it was TCP’s 

practice to avoid monitoring the substance of business-related 

communications like the Disputed Documents (supra at 25-26). 

Accordingly, this factor weighs against a finding of waiver. See, e.g., In re 

High-Tech, 2013 WL 772668 at *7 (“In its Code of Conduct, Intuit reserves 

the right to ‘inspect or monitor all company resources, assets and property 

at any time, without prior approval, knowledge or consent of employees to 

the extent allowed by law.’ Intuit explicitly states that ‘this includes 

monitoring and retrieving information that is stored or transmitted on Intuit’s 

electronic devices, computers and systems.’ . . . [However], [n]othing in the 

record before the court suggests that Intuit actually monitored its 

employees’ emails or Campbell’s emails in particular. The court finds the 

second factor thus weighs in favor of Google’s expectation of confidentiality 

in the emails.”). 

c. Factor 3 

The same cannot be said of the third Asia Global factor, which 

measures the third party’s “right of access to the computer or emails.” Asia 

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Global, 322 B.R. at 257. TCP’s policies clearly reserve its right to access 

any communications that are transmitted through the company’s IT system 

(see, e.g., January 2009 Information Security Policies and Standards at 

15—“Tennenbaum Capital Partners reserves the right to access, audit, and 

disclose all active and/or archived messages sent over its e-mail 

systems.”), and, accordingly, this factor favors a finding that the Disputed 

Documents were not exchanged with an objectively reasonable expectation 

of confidentiality. 

d. Factor 4 

Finally, the fourth Asia Global factor—which evaluates employee 

knowledge of employer policies—also favors a finding that the Disputed 

Documents were not exchanged with an objectively reasonable expectation 

of confidentiality. Although there is some uncertainty as to the extent of the 

TPC-based Outside Directors’ knowledge regarding TCP’s policies, their 

elevated positions within the company effectively impute constructive 

knowledge to them, rendering any sort of detailed inquiry into their actual 

knowledge irrelevant. In re Information Management, 81 A.3d at 291-92 (“If 

the employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the policy, then this 

factor favors production because any subjective expectation of privacy that 

the employee may have had is likely unreasonable.”) (emphasis added); In 

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re High-Tech, 2013 WL 772668 at *7 (“Because he was one of the highest 

level executives at Intuit at the time and because he admits familiarity with 

the policies, the court assumes that Campbell had at least constructive 

knowledge of the policies . . . This fourth factor thus weighs against a 

finding that Campbell had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in his 

emails.”). 

On the whole, then, the factors are relatively balanced, largely split 

between those favoring waiver and those favoring confidentiality. That 

being said, given the lack of evidence that TCP actually monitored the 

Disputed Documents, as well as the uniquely intertwined nature of the 

relationship between TCP and AAI, the undersigned concludes that the 

Disputed Documents were exchanged and stored with an objectively 

reasonable expectation of confidentiality, and, as such, no waiver of the 

attorney-client privilege occurred.8

 8 Boeing has also argued that TCP’s possession of the Disputed Documents 

waived any potential work product protection (despite the work product doctrine’s less 

pronounced emphasis on confidentiality), because TCP was an adversary of AAI. 

Boeing’s Supplemental Brief at 12 (“[AAI] waived [work product protection] when it 

voluntarily disclosed [the Disputed Documents] to TCP, which was initially a potential 

adversary during the term of its loan to [AAI] and later became an actual adversary at 

[AAI]’s bankruptcy.”); see, e.g., Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. Stone & Webster 

Engineering Corp., 125 F.R.D. 578, 587 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Generally, the work product 

protection is waived when documents are voluntarily shared with an adversary or . . . 

when protected materials are disclosed in a manner which substantially increases the 

opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the information. However, sharing work 

product material with a friendly party does not waive the work product protection as it 

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ii. Supplemental Privilege Log 

However, the undersigned’s conclusion that no waiver occurred does 

not definitively resolve the overarching production question in TCP/AAI’s 

favor. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the attorney-client privilege and the work 

product doctrine can only be applied on a document-by-document basis, 

supra at 20-21, and, accordingly, TCP/AAI should be required to submit a 

supplemental privilege log that includes more specific assertions of the 

attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine if they wish to 

continue to withhold the Disputed Documents on such a basis. 

 

applies to an adverse third party.”) (internal citations omitted). At first glance, Boeing’s 

argument is compelling; indeed, there was enough tension between TCP and AAI that 

Steve Wilson (i.e., one of the three TCP-based Outside Directors) resigned from AAI’s 

Board prior to its bankruptcy filing, citing a conflict of interest between his obligations to 

TCP and AAI. (Boeing’s Supplement Privilege Brief at 7—“Mr. Wilson resigned from 

Pemco’s Board before the bankruptcy due to a “conflict of interest” between Pemco and 

TCP’s Special Value Bond Fund.”). However, the argument ultimately fails, as it is 

based on an improper use of the term “adversary”: in the work product context, 

“adversary” is not some general designation, but, instead, is context-specific, referring 

to someone who is on the other side of the same litigation that is being anticipated by 

the work product. See Hope For Families & Community Service, Inc. v. Warren, 2009 

WL 1066525 at *8 (M.D. Ala. April 21, 2009) (“The work-product doctrine ‘protects from 

disclosure materials prepared by an attorney acting for his client in anticipation of 

litigation.’”) (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979)); 

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Richard L. Marcus, 8 Federal Practice & 

Procedure § 2024 (2d ed. 1994) (“[T]he purpose of the work product rule is not to 

protect the evidence from disclosure to the outside world but rather to protect it only 

from the knowledge of opposing counsel and his client.”) (emphasis added and internal 

citations omitted). As such, except in those instances where the work product doctrine 

is being applied to Disputed Documents that anticipate litigation between TCP and AAI, 

Boeing’s argument is unavailing. 

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III. RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons outlined above, the undersigned recommends to the 

Court that the TCP Subpoena Motions be GRANTED IN PART, DENIED 

IN PART, and DEEMED MOOT IN PART as follows: 

 TCP’s Motion to Strike should be deemed MOOT. 

 Boeing’s Motion to Compel should be DENIED to the extent 

that it seeks immediate production of the Disputed Documents; 

however, Boeing’s Motion to Compel should be GRANTED to 

the extent that the undersigned recognizes Boeing’s entitlement

to any Disputed Documents not protected by the attorney-client 

privilege and/or the work product doctrine. Likewise, TCP’s 

Motion to Quash and AAI’s Motion to Quash should be DENIED

to the extent that they seek the wholesale rejection of Boeing’s 

entitlement to the production of the Disputed Documents; 

however, TCP’s Motion to Quash and AAI’s Motion to Quash 

should be GRANTED to the extent that they seek to establish 

that Boeing may be prevented from obtaining some or all of the 

Disputed Documents because such documents are potentially 

protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work 

product doctrine. In order to facilitate a final resolution of the 

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 31 of 33
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parties’ struggle over the Disputed Documents, TCP/AAI should 

be required to produce a supplemental privilege log on or 

before December 23, 2016 that details the application of the 

attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine on a

document-by-document basis; any assertion of the work 

product doctrine, in particular, should be accompanied by an 

identification of the specific litigation that was anticipated in 

creating the document at issue. If Boeing still wishes to 

challenge any of the renewed assertions, it may do so by filing

specific, document-by-document challenges on or before 

January 13, 2016. For those challenges aimed at an assertion 

of the work product doctrine, Boeing should detail (1) why the 

work product doctrine is inapplicable, or (2) why Boeing has a 

substantial need for the documents at issue and why Boeing 

cannot obtain the information contained in the documents at 

issue by other means without undue hardship. After reviewing 

Boeing’s challenges, the undersigned will conduct an in camera 

review of the Disputed Documents, if necessary.

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 301 Filed 12/02/16 Page 32 of 33
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Respectfully Submitted, 

s/ David J. Middlebrooks 

David J. Middlebrooks ASB- 8553-D58D 

OF COUNSEL: 

LEHR MIDDLEBROOKS VREELAND & THOMPSON, P.C. 

P.O. Box 11945 

Birmingham, Alabama 35202-1945 

(205) 326-3002 

Fax: (205) 326-3008 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on December 2, 2016, I electronically filed the 

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will 

send notification of such filing to the following: 

Counsel for Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc., Alabama Aircraft

Industries, Inc. – Birmingham, and Pemco Aircraft Engineering Services, 

Inc. 

Counsel for The Boeing Company, Boeing Aerospace Operations, 

Inc. and Boeing Aerospace Support Center 

Counsel for Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC 

s/ David J. Middlebrooks 

OF COUNSEL 

537541 

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