Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01910/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01910-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELMER DWAYNE JAMES,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11cv1910-IEG(NLS)

Order Adopting Report and

Recommendation; Denying Motion to

Dismiss; Ordering Respondent to File

Answer

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation

Respondent.

Petitioner Elmer Dwayne James, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction for first degree

robbery and related charges in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SDC216879. 

Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the sole claim presented therein is unexhausted. 

On February 1, 2012, Magistrate Judge Nita Stormes filed a report and recommendation that the

Court deny the motion to dismiss. Respondent has filed an objection to the report and

recommendation.

The Court reviews de novo those portion of the report and recommendation to which

Respondent objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ("a judge of the court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to

which objection is made"); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)

(clarifying scope of district judge’s review of magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations). 

Upon review, for the reasons explained below, the Court adopts in full Magistrate Judge Stormes’

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report and recommendation, and DENIES the motion to dismiss. 

Background

Petitioner was found guilty of first degree robbery on May 5, 2009, and was sentenced to a

term of five years in state prison. [Lodgment No. 1, at pp. 129-30.] Petitioner filed a direct appeal,

arguing the trial court’s failure to grant immunity to a proposed defense witness, Diemekia Reed,

deprived him of his rights to compulsory process and due process. [Lodgment No. 3.] The

California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim, finding Petitioner forfeited such claim by

failing to request that the trial court grant immunity to Reed. Even assuming Petitioner did not

forfeit his claim, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court lack authority to grant Reed

immunity when the prosecutor declined to do so, and that the trial court did not err in any event

because Reed’s proffered testimony was not "clearly exculpatory." [Lodgment No. 6, pp. 8, 10-

12.] By order filed October 27, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for

review, raising the same single claim, without citation or comment. [Lodgment No. 8.]

In the current petition, Petitioner raises a single claim – that his attorney was

constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution and trial court’s decision not to

grant immunity to Reed, and for not raising the matter on appeal. Petitioner never presented this

Sixth Amendment claim to the California Supreme Court for consideration. Davis v. Silva, 511

F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2008) (in order to exhaust a claim prior to its presentation in a federal

habeas corpus petition, petitioner must fairly present both the legal and factual basis of the claim to

state’s highest court). Based thereon, Respondent moved to dismiss the petition for lack of

exhaustion. 

In recommending that the Court deny the motion, Magistrate Judge Stormes cited 

California’s rule barring untimely petitions for post-conviction relief. In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th

770, 805 (1998) (holding that a state habeas claim "that is substantially delayed" will not be

considered unless "the petitioner can demonstrate ‘good cause’ for the delay."). Because more

than two years have passed since Petitioner knew or should reasonably have known of the facts

and legal basis for his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Magistrate

Judge Stormes found California’s untimeliness rule would now bar Petitioner from seeking relief

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in state court on his newly asserted Sixth Amendment claim. [Doc. No. 8, pp. 3-4.]; Walker v.

Martin, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1125-31 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness rule is

"firmly established" and regularly followed so as to constitute an adequate and independent ground

barring federal habeas review of claims). Because Petitioner cannot now raise his claim in the

California courts, Magistrate Judge Stormes concluded the claim is technically exhausted. [Doc.

No. 8, p. 4.] Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 328 (9th Cir. 2011) ("if a claim is unexhausted but

state procedural rules would now bar consideration of the claim, it is technically exhausted but will

be deemed procedurally defaulted unless the petitioner can show cause and prejudice.")

Respondent objects that because Petitioner may seek to explain his delay or failure to

present his claim to the state courts, it is not clear that the California courts will rely on procedural

rules and decline to rule on the merits of the unexhausted claim. [Doc. No. 11.] Therefore,

Respondent argues the Court should treat the petition as wholly unexhausted and dismiss it based

thereon. 

Discussion

Contrary to Respondent’s argument, this Court need not dismiss the petition for lack of

exhaustion where to do so would be a waste of judicial resources. Although procedural default is

an affirmative defense which must generally be asserted by the state, "the district court retain

discretion to consider the issue sua sponte if the circumstances warrant." Vang v. Nevada, 329

F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003). In particular, the court may raise the issue sua sponte where

warranted by "principles of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency." Id.

Here, as Magitrate Judge Stormes found, California’s timeliness rules for the filing of

petitions for collateral review are firmly established and consistently applied. Walker, 131 S. Ct.

at 1128-29. Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim arose before or immediately after

his conviction in May of 2009, but he delayed more than two years before bringing such claim in

the current petition. He challenged the trial court’s failure to grant Reed immunity on direct

appeal, and could have raised counsel’s alleged error by petition by writ of habeas corpus within

the same time period. Under these circumstances, it appears Petitioner has no available state court

remedies remaining for his claim. He has, therefore, met the technical requirements of exhaustion

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of such claim. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621, n.5 (9th Cir. 2005); Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). Furthermore, the Court notes that if this petition is simply dismissed

based on lack of exhaustion, Petitioner would likely be barred by the one-year statute of

limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) from ever obtaining federal review of his claim.1

Conclusion

For the reasons explained herein, the Court concludes Petitioner has technically exhausted

his state remedies. Therefore, Respondent’s motion to dismiss based upon lack of exhaustion is

DENIED. Respondent is ordered to file an Answer addressing the merits of Petitioner’s claim by

April 17, 2012. Petitioner shall file a traverse on or before May 17, 2012.

The Court notes the address listed on the docket for Petitioner is different than the address

on the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Inmate Locator database. 

Therefore, in addition to sending this order to Petitioner at the address listed on the docket, the

Clerk is directed to send a copy also to Petitioner Elmer D. James, CDCR#V79852, at Sierra

Conservation Center, 5150 O’Byrnes Ferry Road, Jamestown, CA 95327.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 21, 2012

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

1

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on October 27, 2010.

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