Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00891/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00891-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

CECIL VANN, )

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Plaintiff, )

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v. )

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R. RIMMER, et.al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 05-0891 OWW DLB P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s amended complaint filed

October 3, 2005. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend

may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 

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U.S. District Court

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). th

Plaintiff names as defendants R. Rimmer, Director of the California Department of

Corrections (“CDC”); Warden Scribner; Lieutenant Hill; and Officer Reacheck. Plaintiff alleges that

on April 23, 2003, he was participating in yard activities at Corcoran State Prison, where he was

incarcerated at the time, when he was attacked by another inmate. Plaintiff contends that when he

turned around to defend himself, he was shot in the ear by a wooden block fired by defendant

Reacheck. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Scribner and Hill failed to process his inmate appeals and

defendant Rimmer failed to protect him from the violation of his civil rights.

Excessive Force Claim

“Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause [of the Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is . . .

whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers,

475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and

unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at

7. “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

Not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at

9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s

chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,

1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (cert. denied sub nom. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a

sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 9-10.

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U.S. District Court

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Here, plainitff describes force applied in an effort to maintain or restore discipline. Even if

plaintiff was not the aggressor in th altercation, it does not appear that defendant Reacheck had any

way of knowing this. Even if defendant Reacheck’s conduct was negligent, negligent conduct, even

if it causes injury cannot serve as the basis for a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff does not contend that defendant Reacheck maliciously fired at him but rather fired during an

altercation with another inmate. While it is unfortunate that plainitff was injured, the allegations do

not rise to the level of malicious or sadistic conduct and are not sufficient to state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment.

Supervisorial Liability

Plaintiff also fails to state cognizable claims against the supervisory defendants Rimmer,

Scribner or Hill. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts that

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support

claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that these defendants personally participated in

the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

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them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at

646. He therefore fails to state claims under section 1983 against defendants Rimmer, Scribner or

Hill.

Moreover, the non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly implement an

administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. 

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991).

“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right

upon the inmates.” Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495 (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.

Ill. 1982)); see also Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise

to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316

(E.D. Mo. 1986). Specifically, failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation. 

Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. Thus, a prison official’s involvement and actions in reviewing prisoner’s

administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d

at 495. 

Leave to Amend

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The Court

will grant plaintiff an opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies of this complaint. Failure to cure

the deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action without leave to amend. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

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In addition, plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint,

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; 

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a complaint form; and

3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket

number assigned this case and must be labeled "Amended Complaint"; plaintiff must file an original

and two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with

this order will result in dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with

the court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 28, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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