Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00688/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00688-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs.

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LINDA IMEL,

NO. 2:10-CV-0688 FCD EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF EL DORADO,

Defendant.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant County of El

Dorado’s (the “County” or “defendant”) motion to dismiss

plaintiff Linda Imel’s (“Imel” or “plaintiff”) complaint pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6). Plaintiff

opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below,1

defendant’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Imel was employed by defendant County with its

Department of Child Support Services (“DCSS”). (Compl., filed

Mar. 22, 2010, ¶ 5.) She was hired by DCSS on or about March 11,

2000 and worked continuously for the County over the next 10

years. (Id. ¶ 6.) During the vast majority of that time, she

received exemplary performance reviews and appraisals from her

supervisors and consistently received merit raises. (Id.)

On or about September 17, 2008, management began to

criticize plaintiff’s appearance as “unprofessional.” (Id. ¶ 7.) 

Plaintiff was called into an individual meeting after management

had chastised all the employees about the perceived inadequacies

of their attire. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff was the only employee who

demanded her union shop steward accompany her in the meeting. 

(Id.) 

At the same time, management also found reasons to reprimand

plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 8.) Specifically, she was chastised for

failing to read an email and consequently, failing to attend a

workshop. Subsequently, on October 23, 2009, after plaintiff

committed a clerical oversight in failing to generate a

preliminary notice to a consumer, she was summarily terminated. 

There was no progressive discipline, and plaintiff contends that

her “Skelley” hearing was “a farcical kangaroo court.” Plaintiff

alleges that at the time of her termination she was nearing a

step-up in her benefits due to her seniority and years on the

job. 

Plaintiff contends that the proffered reasons for her

termination were pretext for (1) retaliating against her for

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2 Defendant moves to dismiss this claim on the basis tat

the court does not have federal jurisdiction over this claim. 

Plaintiff does not oppose the motion. Accordingly, defendant’s

motion to dismiss the second claim for relief is GRANTED.

3

asserting her rights; and (2) terminating “costlier older workers

and the costly retirements to which they were entitled, as well

as the costly health care they needed and had earned.” (Id. ¶¶

8-9.) Plaintiff further contends that after her termination, she

did not receive her earned wages or accrued benefits in a timely

fashion and did not receive any interest or penalties on the

delayed payments.

On March 22, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging

claims against the County for (1) violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623; (2)

unfair labor practice in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158;2 (3)

failure to pay wages when due in violation of California Labor

Code § 218.6; and (4) retaliation in violation of California

Labor Code § 1102.5.

STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal

court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what

the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations

omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on

liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define

disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious

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claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

322 (1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not

allege “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his

claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

Nevertheless, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual

allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1950 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 

Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can

prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have

violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council

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of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has

failed to “nudge [his or her] claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. 

Id. at 1952. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a

probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949. 

This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Id. at 1950. 

ANALYSIS

1. ADEA

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s first claim for

relief for discrimination in violation of the ADEA on the grounds

that plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a

claim. Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff fails to

allege her age or date of birth and that she insufficiently

alleges a connection between her age and an adverse employment

action.

The ADEA provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to

discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish a prima facie

claim of disparate treatment on the basis of age by demonstrating

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that she was “(1) at least forty years old; (2) performing [her]

job satisfactorily; (3) discharged; and (4) either replaced by

substantially younger employees with equal or inferior

qualifications or discharged under circumstances otherwise

‘giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.’” Diaz v.

Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th

Cir. 2000)). Further, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that age was

the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” Gross

v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 

While plaintiff does not specifically allege her age or date

of birth, she asserts that she is of an “advanced age” and that

she was nearing an increase in her benefits “due to her seniority

and years on the job.” (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10.) Plaintiff also

alleges that during the majority of her time on the job, she

consistently received positive performance reviews and appraisals

from her supervisors. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff further contends

that she was discharged because she the County sought to save

money by discharging older employees and thus, the reasons given

for her reprimands and subsequent discharge were pretextual. 

(Compl. ¶ 8.) 

Therefore, at this stage of the litigation, where

plaintiff’s allegations must be taken as true and reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, plaintiff has stated a plausible

claim for discrimination under the ADEA. 

2. California Labor Code § 1102.5

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for violation

of California Labor Code § 1102.5 on the basis that common law

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actions against public entities for wrongful termination or

retaliation are barred by California Government Code § 815(a). 

Defendant also contends that the claims should be dismissed for

failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”).

1. California Government Code § 815 

California Government Code § 815(a) provides that “[a]

public entity is not liable for an injury” except as otherwise

provided by statute. Section 815(a), therefore, “abolishes

common law tort liability for public entities.” Lloyd v. County

of Los Angeles, 172 Cal. App. 4th 320, 329 (2009). 

 However, in this case, plaintiff does not allege common law

torts against the County. Rather, plaintiff alleges claims under

California Labor Code § 1102.5, which provides that an employer

may not retaliate against an employee for exercising rights

provided by the statute. Defendant has failed to set forth any

law or argument that any government immunity provision bars

alleged statutory violations of the California Labor Code. See

Thornborough v. W. Placer Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-cv-2613,

2010 WL 2179917, at *15 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2010) (holding that §

815(a) did not bar claims against a district for an alleged

violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5); see also Chapin v.

Aguirre, No. 05CV1906 R(POR), 2007 WL 1660740, at *8 (S.D. Cal.

June 7, 2007) (holding that a similar governmental immunity

provision did not bar claims alleged under California Labor Code

§ 1102.5). Accordingly, defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s

statutory claim is barred by § 815(a) is without merit.

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2. California Tort Claims Act

In order to state a tort claim for money or damages against

a public entity, the CTCA requires the timely presentation of a

written claim in whole or in part within either six months or a

year after the accrual of the cause of action depending on the

nature of the tort. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. Under Government

Code § 945.4,

[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is

required to by presented in accordance with Chapter 1

(commencing with section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing

with section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a

written claim therefore has been presented to the

public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or

has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.

 Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4. Because all governmental tort liability

is based on statute, as opposed to common law tort doctrine, the

CTCA also applies to statutory claims for damages against a

public entity. See Shoemaker v. Myers, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1407,

1425-26 (1992) (holding that the claim presentation requirement

of the CTCA applies to a statutory whistleblower claim); Konig v.

State Bar of Cal., No. C04-2210, 2004 WL 2091990, at *7 (N.D.

Cal. Sept. 16, 2004) (holding that compliance with CTCA was

required for plaintiff’s claim under California Labor Code §

1102.5). 

The claim presentation requirement serves (1) to give the

public entity prompt notice of a claim in order to investigate

the strengths and weakness of the claim while the evidence is

fresh and witnesses are available; (2) to provide an opportunity

for “amicable adjustment, thereby avoiding expenditure of public

funds in needless litigation;” and (3) to inform the public

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entity of potential liability in preparing its budget. Spencer

v. Merced County Office of Educ., 59 Cal. App. 4th 1429, 1434-35

(1997). A “public entity” includes “the State, the Regents of

the University of California, a county, city, district, public

authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or

public corporation in the State.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 811.2. 

A plaintiff has the burden of pleading compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act in the complaint. Wood v. Riverside

General Hospital, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Moreover,

compliance with the CTCA is mandatory. City of San Jose v.

Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 4447, 454 (1974). Federal courts have

recognized these requirements. See Ortega v. O’Connor, 764 F.2d

701, 707 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1492

(1987) (failure to comply with claim-filing requirements imposed

by California Tort Claims Act bars pendent state claims). 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege compliance with the

CTCA. However, plaintiff attached a form to her opposition that

appears to be a government claim form submitted to the State of

California on April 5, 2010. (Ex. A to Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to

Dismiss, filed June 1, 2010.) From its face, this form was not

submitted to the public entity against whom plaintiff filed suit,

the County. Rather, it appears to be submitted to the State. As

such, plaintiff has failed to plead compliance with the CTCA. 

See Spencer, 59 Cal. App. 4th at 1433-34, 1440 (affirming

dismissal of claim where the plaintiff filed the government tort

claim with the wrong public entity).

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Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim

for violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5 is GRANTED with

leave to amend.

3. Failure to Pay Wages

Finally, defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for

failure to pay wages on the basis that the court should decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if

the federal claims are dismissed. Because plaintiff has

sufficiently pled a claim for violation of the ADEA, defendant’s

argument is without merit. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Plaintiff is granted fifteen (15) days from the date of this

order to file a first amended complaint in accordance with this

order. Defendant is granted thirty (30) days from the date of

service of plaintiffs’ first amended complaint to file a response

thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 28, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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