Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-02842/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-02842-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RODRIGO CAMILO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SEVERO C. OZUNA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.18-cv-02842-VKD 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 

APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 40

Plaintiffs Rodrigo Camilo, Alvaro Camilo, Ricardo Sanchez, and Jose Lopez bring this 

hybrid putative class action and collective class action for alleged wage and hour violations under 

various provisions of the California Labor Code and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 

(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Defendants are Severo C. Ozuna and the Don Vito Ozuna 

Food Corporation, a tortilla factory based in Morgan Hill, California.

Presently before the Court is plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the 

settlement of this action. The Court held a hearing on the motion on March 19, 2019. Following 

the hearing, and at the Court’s direction, plaintiffs filed supplemental briefing on the matter. 

Upon consideration of the moving papers, plaintiffs’ supplemental submissions, and the arguments 

of counsel, the Court conditionally certifies a Rule 23 class and FLSA collective class, but 

otherwise denies plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice to filing a renewed motion for preliminary 

approval of the settlement by June 17, 2019.

1

 

1

 All parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally 

adjudicated by a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

According to the complaint, defendants employed plaintiffs as non-exempt, hourly 

employees in the tortilla manufacturing and distribution industry. Plaintiffs allege that they

worked as production, packaging, and manufacturing laborers whose job duties included

preparing, stocking, stacking, lifting, and sorting products and ingredients, as well as filling orders 

and delivering, distributing, and transporting products. Dkt. No. 1. The record is unclear as to

exactly what positions plaintiffs held and what specific duties they performed, except that two of 

the named plaintiffs, Alvaro and Rodrigo Camilo, now state that their job responsibilities “were to 

simply make tortillas.” Dkt. No. 42 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 43 ¶ 4.

Plaintiffs claim that they regularly worked over eight hours in one day and more than 40 

hours in one week and that defendants failed to pay for all the time plaintiffs actually worked. In

their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they typically worked five to six days per week, for over 12 

hours per day, on shifts starting between 3:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. and lasting as long as 18 hours. 

Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 23-26. They further allege that they were not always provided legally mandated rest 

and meal breaks. Id. ¶¶ 26, 32. Additionally, defendants reportedly “shaved” work hours from 

plaintiffs’ paychecks on a regular basis, with the result that plaintiffs were not paid minimum 

wages and were not compensated for all the overtime hours they worked (or, if they were paid, 

plaintiffs claim that they were compensated for overtime work at the regular rate of pay). Id. 

¶¶ 27-31. Plaintiffs further claim that defendants provided paystubs that did not include their 

overtime hours and did not accurately reflect the hours they worked. Id. ¶ 33.

Plaintiffs filed this action for themselves and on behalf of a putative class, defined as 

follows:

All non-exempt hourly employees who are employed or have been 

employed by Defendants as production, packaging, and 

manufacturing laborers in the tortilla-manufacturing and distribution 

industry [in] California within four (4) years of the filing of this 

Complaint engaged in tortilla-manufacturing, packaging, and 

distribution labor through the date of final disposition of this action 

and who suffered the following:

a. Were not paid overtime wages;

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b. Were not paid for all hours worked;

c. Were not paid minimum wages for all hours worked;

d. Were not provided with proper paystubs;

e. Were not provided with all legally mandated rest breaks.

f. Were not provided with all legally mandated lunch breaks.

Id. ¶ 37. Additionally, plaintiffs sought to represent the following subclass:

All non-exempt hourly employees whose employment ended in 

California within four (4) years of the filing of this Complaint 

engaged in production, packaging, and manufacturing-related labor 

for the Defendants as non-exempt production, packaging, and 

manufacturing laborers through the date of final disposition of this 

action and who were not fully paid their wages within seventy-two 

hours of the end of their employment.

Id. ¶ 38. The complaint asserts seven claims for relief: (1) failure to pay overtime, FLSA, 29 

U.S.C. §§ 207, 216(b), 255(a); (2) failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, Cal. Labor Code 

§§ 510, 1194, 1197, 1771, 1774; (3) failure to pay wages due and waiting time penalties, Cal. 

Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203; (4) failure to provide accurate wage stubs, Cal. Labor Code § 226; 

(5) failure to provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof, Cal. Labor Code §§ 203, 226, 

226.7, 512, 1194, (6) failure to provide rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof, Cal. Labor 

Code §§ 203, 226, 226.7, 1194; and (7) restitution for unfair business practices, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 17200. Id. ¶¶ 49-94.

B. The Proposed Settlement: Plaintiffs’ Original Briefing

Prior to certification, the parties participated in a full-day private mediation with Hon. 

George Hernandez (Ret.) and reached a settlement as to plaintiffs’ claims and those of all “Class 

Members,” defined in the parties’ Joint Stipulation for Class Action Settlement and Release

(“Stipulated Settlement”) as follows:

All non-exempt hourly employees who are employed or have been 

employed by Defendants as all non-exempt hourly employees 

involved in the tortilla and chip manufacturing process who were 

employed by Defendants between May 14, 2014 and March 19, 

2019 who claim they were not paid all their overtime at the rate of 

1.5 times their regular rate of pay, and who claim did not receive 

their breaks.

Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 4. The Stipulated Settlement does not refer to a subclass of employees who were 

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not timely paid final wages upon termination.

As suggested by this definition of the class, plaintiffs represented in their original moving 

papers that the relevant period for both the putative Rule 23 class and the putative FLSA collective 

class spans the period May 14, 2014 to March 1, 2019. However, plaintiffs acknowledged that the 

FLSA portion of the Stipulated Settlement excludes the period from November 16, 2014 through

November 22, 2016 to account for the time during which the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) 

settled FLSA claims against the defendants. Dkt. No. 40 at ECF 11.

The proposed settlement is non-reversionary and contemplates a release of claims in return 

for a total payment of $375,000 into a common fund. From that fund, the parties will deduct 

$112,500 in attorneys’ fees, up to $10,000 in litigation expenses, no more than $15,000 for 

settlement administration costs, and service awards of $5,000 to each named plaintiff. The 

remaining sum, $217,500, referred to as the “Net Settlement Fund,” will then be available for

distribution to each “Participating Class Member” based on the number of weeks he or she 

worked, with 67% of the fund being allocated to Rule 23 class claims and 33% being allocated to 

those under the FLSA. Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 10, 34-37, 40, 42-43, 49.

Defendants agree to fund the settlement in two installments. The first payment of 

$200,000 is due by July 1, 2019, or 30 days after final approval of the settlement (assuming no 

objections are asserted and no appeal is filed), whichever is later. Id. ¶ 45. The second 

installment of $175,000 is due by May 1, 2020. Payments will be distributed by CPT Group, the 

agreed-upon claims administrator, after each installment is paid. Id. Payments to each 

Participating Class Member will be allocated as follows: 20% wages, 40% penalties, and 40% 

interest. Id. ¶ 49.

Any unclaimed funds remaining after the first distribution will be redistributed to 

Participating Class Members in the second payment. Id. ¶ 48. If any Participating Class Member 

fails to cash his or her second check within 180 days after those checks were mailed to their last 

known address, then the remainder will be redistributed, as a cy pres award, to the Katherine & 

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George Alexander Community Law Center.2 Id.

Notice of the proposed settlement will be sent to putative class and collective members,3in 

both English and Spanish. CPT Group will mail notice to each individual’s last known address. If 

any mail is returned as undeliverable, CPT Group will use skip trace methods to attempt to locate 

those members and provide them with notice. CPT Group will also send reminders to all members 

30 days after the initial notice was sent. Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 55, 58.

Plaintiffs assert that, as a result of this settlement, they will obtain for the class a little more 

than half of the amount of defendants’ potential total liability exposure, which they estimate is 

$488,000. Dkt. No. 40 at ECF 18. They contend that this represents a fair compromise of their 

claims. For example, they note that they “d[o] not have a strong claim for meal or rest period 

violations,” in view of records indicating that defendants permitted and accounted for breaks. Id. 

at ECF 17. However, other than stating that the $488,000 estimate is based on “records provided 

to [them] by Defendants,” and that plaintiffs’ calculations “assume[d] that every employee 

work[ed] 14 hours of overtime per pay period,” plaintiffs do not explain how they arrived at the 

$488,000 figure. Id.

Plaintiffs also originally asserted that there were a total of 68 putative class and collective 

members, with the group being divided about equally between current and former employees. 

Dkt. No. 40 at ECF 17; Dkt. No. 40-1 ¶ 25. Additionally, plaintiffs stated that most of the workers 

in question earned between $9 to $11 per hour. Dkt. No. 40 at ECF 17. Assuming that every 

eligible class/collective member participated in the settlement, and based on information that the 

putative class members worked a total of 4,780 workweeks,4plaintiffs originally estimated that 

 

2 Plaintiffs provided no information about the Katherine and George Alexander Law Center in 

their papers. However, at the motion hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel represented that the Law Center 

runs a worker’s rights clinic and provides services to the Spanish-speaking and immigrant 

community. Dkt. No. 47. Counsel for both sides confirmed that aside from performing some 

volunteer work in the past, they have no association with the Law Center. Id.

3 Although plaintiffs’ moving papers and the Stipulated Settlement sometimes refer to current and 

former “Class Member[s],” at the motion hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel clarified that plaintiffs 

actually meant to refer to current and former employees. Dkt. No. 47.

4 At the motion hearing, defendants stated that they provided plaintiffs with the actual number of 

workweeks each putative class member worked during the class period. Dkt. No. 47.

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each member would receive, on average, about $30 per week for every week that the employee

worked. Dkt. No. 40 at ECF 17; Dkt. No. 40-1 ¶ 25. Alleging that employees were paid at the 

regular rate of pay for overtime hours, plaintiffs further estimated that each class/collective 

member would be paid for “about six hours of overtime at $10.00 an hour, the overtime 

differential for the minimum wage of $10 per hour.” Dkt. No. 40 at ECF 17. Plaintiffs provided 

no specific information about how they calculated these estimates or what those calculations were 

based on, except that their counsel averred that he “performed all the calculations contained within 

the motion based upon the Plaintiff’s testimony and the documents provided to [him] by the 

Plaintiffs and Defendants.” Dkt. No. 40-1 ¶ 26. It is unclear what testimony plaintiffs refer to, 

since both sides stated that no depositions were taken in discovery. Dkt. No. 47. Plaintiffs also 

acknowledged that some employees who worked no overtime will receive money, and “some who 

worked more will receive less than they worked.” Dkt. No. 40 at ECF 17.

At the motion hearing, the Court raised several concerns about the proposed settlement, 

including the fact that the parties’ submitted Stipulated Settlement was unsigned;5the lack of 

explanation or evidence supporting plaintiffs’ estimated $488,000 potential value of the 

settlement; the lack of an explanation as to the designated allocation of the settlement as between 

the Rule 23 class claims and those of the FLSA collective class; issues regarding the clarity of the 

proposed notice to be sent to putative class/collective members; and plaintiffs’ claimed attorneys’ 

fees of approximately 30% of the settlement, which exceeds the 25% benchmark used in the Ninth 

Circuit. Dkt. Nos. 45, 47. The Court ordered supplemental briefing. Dkt. No. 46. Although both 

sides were given an opportunity to submit further briefing, the Court has received additional 

papers only from plaintiffs. Dkt. Nos. 48-51.

 

5 No one has voiced any objection to the Stipulated Settlement, and at the motion hearing, both 

sides confirmed that they agreed to all of its terms. Plaintiffs suggested that no one signed the 

document in anticipation that the Court might make changes to the settlement terms. As discussed 

below, however, in assessing the reasonableness of the settlement, the Court cannot delete, 

modify, or substitute provisions, and the settlement must stand or fall in its entirety. Staton v. 

Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 969 (9th Cir. 2003); Nen Thio v. Genji, LLC, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1333 

(N.D. Cal. 2014).

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C. The Proposed Settlement: Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing

Many of the proposed terms of the settlement, as described in plaintiffs’ original briefing 

and as summarized above, remain the same. In their supplemental briefing, however, plaintiffs 

now advise that they have reevaluated the claimed damages. Indeed, plaintiffs’ supplemental 

papers indicate that not only are their present calculations based on different assumptions and data 

than those underlying their original calculations, the size and composition of the proposed Rule 23 

and FLSA collective classes have also changed, as has the relevant class period for the FLSA 

class.

With respect to the claimed damages, plaintiffs explain that the estimates presented in their 

original brief were calculated on the assumption that defendants employed 25-35 employees in 

any given pay period, with a low employee turnover rate. Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 2. That assumption

apparently was based on numbers extrapolated solely from DOL records. Id. By contrast, 

plaintiffs now say their new estimates are based on DOL records, as well as defendants’ class list 

and payroll records. Id. According to plaintiffs, those records show that defendants employed 

approximately 30-35 employees per pay period, with a high employee turnover rate. Id.

Additionally, the size and composition of the putative Rule 23 class and FLSA collective 

class appear to have changed. As discussed, plaintiffs’ original submission suggested that the 

Rule 23 class and the FLSA collective class, taken together, comprised 68 total members, with the 

group being about equally divided between former and current employees. At oral argument, the 

parties suggested that the response to the proposed notice of settlement would be perhaps as high 

as 85-90%, in part because at least half of the putative class members were still working for 

defendants. By contrast, plaintiffs now say that the putative Rule 23 and FLSA collective classes

comprise a total of 128 members, with the vast majority (i.e., approximately 107 members) being 

former employees, and only 21 members being identified as current employees as of the March 

19, 2019 close of the class period. Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 2; Dkt. No. 51-1. Whereas the range of 

wages paid to the plaintiffs and the class/collective members previously was identified as $9 to 

$11 per hour, plaintiffs now say that, during the class period, defendants actually paid wages 

ranging from $8 to $14.50 per hour. Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 4.

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Further, it now appears that there are more differences between the putative Rule 23 and 

FLSA collective classes than plaintiffs originally represented. The parties’ Stipulated Settlement

does not distinguish between the putative Rule 23 class and the putative FLSA collective class, 

and indicates that the relevant period for both classes is the same, i.e., May 14, 2014 to March 29, 

2019. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 4. However, plaintiffs now acknowledge that due to different limitations 

periods applicable to their FLSA and California Labor Code claims,6the relevant period for the 

putative FLSA collective class is one year shorter than previously described, i.e., May 14, 2015 to 

March 19, 2019. Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 3. The carve-out period for the prior DOL settlement is now 

identified as November 22, 2014 to November 19, 2016, rather than November 16, 2014 to 

November 22, 2016. Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 3. Plaintiffs also clarify that the carve-out period 

accounts for the prior settlement paid to 35 FLSA collective members through the DOL 

proceedings. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 51-1. Additionally, while plaintiffs previously represented 

that there were a total of 4,780 workweeks during the class period for both classes, they now say 

that members of the putative Rule 23 class worked a total of 6,825.29 workweeks, and the relevant 

number of workweeks for the putative FLSA collective class is 3,918.86.7 Id.

Each plaintiff and putative class/collective member will still be paid according to the 

number of workweeks they worked (minus any workweeks for which they may have already been 

paid under the DOL settlement). But whereas the Stipulated Settlement provides that 67% of the 

 

6 Plaintiffs state that the statute of limitations for their FLSA claim is three years and that the 

limitations period for their California claims is four years. Although plaintiffs do not cite 

authority for the cited limitations periods, an FLSA claim has a standard two-year statute of 

limitations, but a three-year statute of limitations applies for willful violations. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 255(a). As for plaintiffs’ state law claims, a three-year limitations period applies, Cal. C.C.P. 

§ 338(a), but the Court assumes that plaintiffs seek recovery going back four years based on the 

four-year limitations period applicable to claims under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. See 

generally Zhang v. Aicem Group, LLC, No. 13-cv-01342-KAW, 2014 WL 12678026, at *9 (N.D. 

Cal., Jan. 28, 2014) (concluding that California’s unfair competition law, with a four-year 

limitations period, permitted the plaintiff to recover unpaid overtime compensation that was 

otherwise barred by the three-year limitations period applicable to his California Labor Code 

claims).

7 According to plaintiffs, members of the putative FLSA collective class worked a total of 

5,661.57 workweeks during the class period. However, for purposes of the present settlement, 

plaintiffs deducted workweeks to account for the DOL settlement paid to 35 of defendants’ 

employees for the period from November 22, 2014 to November 19, 2016. Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 3.

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available $217,500 Net Settlement Fund would be allocated to California claims and 33% would 

be reserved for the FLSA claims (with payments constituting 20% wages, 40% penalties, and 40% 

interest), plaintiffs now say that 40% of the $217,500 fund (i.e., $87,000) will be reserved for 

wages, with the remaining 60% (i.e., $130,500) to be paid as interest and penalties. Dkt. No. 51 at 

ECF 2. Of the 40% reserved for wages, the funds will now be allocated evenly between state and 

federal claims, with 20% of the fund being reserved for the California Labor Code claims and 20% 

being allocated to the FLSA claims. Id.

Accordingly, plaintiffs say that they have now calculated payments in three categories: 

California wages, FLSA wages and California penalties. Plaintiffs’ counsel state that they 

calculated each category separately, and then added the sums together to arrive at an estimated

total settlement payment per employee:

• California wages: To calculate California wages owed under the settlement, 

plaintiffs’ counsel took 20% of the fund reserved for the state law claims (i.e., 

$43,500) and divided it by the number of California workweeks at issue (6825.29), 

with the result that California wages will be paid at $6.35 per workweek.8

• FLSA wages: To calculate the FLSA wages, plaintiffs’ counsel took 20% of the 

fund reserved for the FLSA claims (i.e., $43,500) and divided it by the relevant 

number of FLSA workweeks (i.e., 3918.86), with the result that FLSA wages will 

be paid at a rate of $11.10 per workweek.

• California penalties: Plaintiffs took the $130,5009reserved for California penalties

and interest and divided it by the 6825.29 workweeks at issue, with the result that 

California penalties will be paid at a rate of $19.05 per workweek.

10

Plaintiffs’ caveat is that these calculations are estimates and that the final amounts will be

 

8 According to the Court’s calculations, $43,500 divided by 6825.29 yields $6.37.

9 Although plaintiffs’ papers state that $135,000 is to be distributed as payment of penalties and 

interest (Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 2), that presumably is a typographical error, as 60% of $217,500 is 

$130,500.

10 According to the Court’s calculations, $130,500 divided by 6825.29 yields $19.12.

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calculated by the class administrator. Nevertheless, according to plaintiffs, class members who 

participate in both the Rule 23 and FLSA settlements will receive, on average, $36.49 per 

workweek. Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 4-5. Additionally, plaintiffs assert that the average total award per 

class member is $1,699.22, with a median of $873.32 and a standard deviation of $1,955.00. Id. at 

ECF 5. They anticipate that the largest payment one employee will receive is $8,326.04, and the 

smallest payment made to an employee will be $15.64. Id.

Defendants have not filed any response or objection to plaintiffs’ modified proposals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 23 Class Certification and FLSA Collective Class Certification

Court approval generally is required for the settlement of both Rule 23 class actions and 

FLSA collective actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified 

class—or a class proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily 

dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”); Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United 

States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that employees may settle or compromise 

FLSA claims for unpaid wages only under the supervision of the U.S. Secretary of Labor or with 

court approval).

Nevertheless, Rule 23 class actions and FLSA collective actions are fundamentally 

different proceedings. Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2018). 

In a Rule 23 class action, the members of a certified class are bound by the judgment unless they 

opt out of the suit. By contrast, in an FLSA collective action, only those claimants who

affirmatively opt-in by providing a written consent are bound by the results of the action. See id. 

at 1105. The procedures for certification and approval of settlement for Rule 23 class actions and 

FLSA collective actions therefore are significantly different. The Court now discusses each in 

turn.

B. Rule 23 Class Certification

The Ninth Circuit has declared that a strong judicial policy favors settlement of Rule 23 

class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). Where the 

parties reach a settlement before class certification, however, “courts must peruse the proposed 

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compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and the fairness of the settlement.” 

Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that class 

certification is appropriate under Rule 23. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350

(2011) (“A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with 

the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, 

common questions of law or fact, etc.”). Class certification under Rule 23 requires two steps. 

First, plaintiffs must satisfy the four prerequisites under Rule 23(a), namely numerosity, 

commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation. Id. at 349. Additionally, plaintiffs must 

also show that at least one of the bases for certification under Rule 23(b) is met. Amchem. Prods., 

Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). Here, plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3) 

and therefore must show that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 

over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(3).

1. Rule 23(a) Certification

For purposes of resolving the present motion for settlement, the Court finds that the Rule 

23(a) requirements are satisfied.

a. Numerosity

Under Rule 23(a), the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). While there is no fixed number that satisfies the 

numerosity requirement, “[a]s a general rule, classes of forty or more are considered sufficiently 

numerous.’” Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc., No. 15-cv-00600-HSG, 2016 WL 4073336, at *5 

(N.D. Cal., Aug. 1, 2016) (quoting Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 254 F.R.D. 610, 617 (C.D. 

Cal., 2008)); see also Millan v. Cascade Water Servs., Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593, 603 (E.D. Cal. 2015) 

(same). Here, the numerosity requirement is met. Whether this factor is evaluated under 

plaintiffs’ original or supplemental briefing, all indications are that there are well over 40 putative 

class members.

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b. Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a)(2). A question is common where “it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that 

determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of 

the claims in one stroke.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. However, “[w]hat matters to class certification 

. . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but rather the capacity of a 

classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” 

Id. (citation omitted). A single common question is sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). Id. at 359. 

Here, the commonality requirement is met because resolution of the class claims depends on 

common questions of law and fact about the class members’ employment with defendants. 

Although plaintiffs have not identified the particular positions and duties of the putative class 

members, plaintiffs contend that every class member was subject to the same alleged policies, i.e., 

“shaved” overtime hours, the payment of overtime work at the regular rate of pay, and the failure 

to provide meal and rest breaks. And plaintiffs’ counsel state that they investigated the claimed 

wage and hour violations, many of which they say are evidenced by defendants’ payroll and 

timecard records. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 42; Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 24; Dkt. No. 50 ¶ 5. See Tijero v. Aaron Bros., 

Inc., 301 F.R.D. 314, 321 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (concluding that the commonality requirement was 

satisfied where plaintiffs contended that all non-exempt employees were subject to the same wage 

and hour policies and practices).

c. Typicality

Rule 23(a) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of 

the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The purpose of the typicality 

requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the interests of the 

class,” and “the test is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action 

is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members 

have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 

508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotations and citations omitted). The typicality requirement is satisfied 

where representative claims “are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members; they 

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need not be substantially identical.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 957 (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). Here, plaintiffs’ claims meet the typicality requirement because plaintiffs, like every 

other class member, worked for defendants as non-exempt hourly employees and claim that they 

were subject to the same alleged unlawful wage and hour practices. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 42; Dkt. No. 41 

¶24; Dkt. No. 42 ¶¶ 8-13; Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 8-13; Dkt. No. 50 ¶ 5. See, e.g., Tijero, 301 F.R.D. at 

322 (concluding that the typicality requirement was met where the plaintiffs sought to represent all 

non-exempt employees that were not properly compensated due to the defendant’s policies and 

practices).

d. Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In assessing this factor, the Court addresses two 

legal issues, i.e., whether the named plaintiffs and their counsel (1) have any conflicts of interest 

with other class members, and (2) will prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class. 

Staton, 327 F.3d at 957. The record does not indicate the presence of any conflicts of interest. No 

issues have been raised with respect to plaintiffs’ counsel’s competence, and they each aver that 

they have been practicing attorneys for nearly 30 years, with considerable experience litigating 

employment and wage-and-hour matters. Dkt. No. 40-1 ¶¶ 3, 11-14, 16-19; Dkt. No. 50 ¶¶ 1, 10. 

Counsel state that, to promote economic efficiency in litigating this matter, most discovery was 

conducted informally and the parties agreed to forego depositions. Nevertheless, plaintiffs’ 

counsel say that they thoroughly investigated the facts and claims through interviews and the 

exchange of information and documents, including timecard records that purportedly evidence 

many of the alleged wage and hour violations. All four plaintiffs also reportedly participated in 

the investigation and mediation of this matter. Dkt. No. 50 ¶¶ 5-8. The Court finds that the 

adequacy requirement is met.

2. Rule 23(b)(3) Certification

Plaintiffs seek to certify the proposed class under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that “the 

questions of law or fact common to class member predominate over any questions affecting only 

individual members” and “that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 

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efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Based on its own review of the 

record the Court concludes that the predominance and superiority requirements are met.

The “predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to 

warrant adjudication by representation,” and “asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, 

issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, 

individual issues.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “When one or more of the central issues in the action are 

common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under 

Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as 

damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class members.” Id. (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). In the present case, plaintiffs have satisfied the predominance 

factor because the issues in dispute concern defendants’ allegedly unlawful wage and hour 

policies, which generally apply to all class members. The record suggests that the only individual 

question is the amount of damages to which each putative class member is entitled. However, 

individualized damages alone do not defeat Rule 23(b)(3) certification. Id; Leyva v. Medline 

Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013).

In determining whether “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 

efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” courts consider four nonexclusive factors: (1) the class 

members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; 

(2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 

against the class; (3) the desirability of concentrating the litigation of the controversy in the 

particular forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in managing a class action. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs have met the superiority requirement. Whether evaluated using the 

numbers provided in plaintiffs’ original or supplemental briefing, the record presented indicates 

that the damages at issue likely are not great enough for individual putative class members to want 

to litigate separate actions against the defendants. Additionally, the parties confirmed at the 

motion hearing that they are unaware of any other litigation already commenced by or against the 

class. Dkt. No. 47. Handling the 128 individual cases in a single class action is a more efficient 

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use of the Court’s and parties’ resources and the most economical way to resolve common 

questions about defendants’ alleged wage and hour practices with respect to overtime pay and rest 

and meal breaks. Further, the present forum is appropriate, and there are no obvious difficulties in 

managing this as a class action.

In sum, for purposes of settlement, provisional certification of a Rule 23 class is 

appropriate.

C. Class Representatives and Class Counsel

Because plaintiffs meet the Rule 23(a) requirements, the Court provisionally appoints 

Rodrigo Camilo, Alvaro Camilo, Ricardo G. Sanchez and Jose Manuel Lopez as class 

representatives.

Additionally, when a court certifies a class, it must also appoint class counsel. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 23(c)(1)(B). In appointing class counsel, the Court considers:

(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating 

potential claims in the action;

(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex 

litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;

(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and

(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). Here, plaintiffs’ counsel have investigated and litigated this action 

and have submitted declarations describing their expertise in representing plaintiffs in class action 

suits, especially in the area of wage and hour violations. Dkt. Nos. 40-1, 50. Nothing in the 

record suggests that counsel have not and will not continue to vigorously litigate this action. 

Accordingly, the Court provisionally appoints James Dal Bon of the Law Offices of James Dal 

Bon and Victoria Booke of Booke & Ajlouny as class counsel for settlement purposes only.

D. FLSA Conditional Certification

The FLSA permits an employee to bring a “collective action” on behalf of other “similarly 

situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Although the FLSA does not define “similarly 

situated,” the Ninth Circuit has held that the statute requires “that party plaintiffs must be alike 

with regard to some material aspect of their litigation. That is, the FLSA requires similarity of the 

kind that allows . . . plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the 

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pooling of resources.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1114 (internal quotations and citation omitted). “If 

the party plaintiffs’ factual or legal similarities are material to the resolution of their case, 

dissimilarities in other respects should not defeat collective treatment.” Id.

“The limited statutory requirements of a collective action are independent of, and unrelated 

to, the requirements for class action under Rule 23, and, by omitting most of the requirements in 

Rule 23 for class certification, necessarily impose a lesser burden.” Id. at 1112 (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). Certification of an FLSA collective action generally proceeds in 

two stages. First, at or around the pleading stage, the plaintiff may move for preliminary 

certification. Second, after the close of discovery, the employer may move for decertification. Id.

at 1109-10. Only the first stage is relevant here, as defendants do not oppose plaintiffs’ request for 

conditional certification of the FLSA collective action or the settlement of those claims.

Preliminary certification “refers to the dissemination of notice to putative collective 

members, conditioned on a preliminary determination that the collective as defined in the 

complaint satisfies the ‘similarly situated’ requirement of section 216(b).” Id. at 1109 (citation 

omitted). At this stage, “the district court’s analysis is typically focused on a review of the 

pleadings but may sometimes be supplemented by declarations or limited other evidence.” Id. 

“The level of consideration is ‘lenient’—sometimes articulated as requiring ‘substantial 

allegations,’ sometimes as turning on a ‘reasonable basis,’ but in any event loosely akin to a 

plausibility standard, commensurate with the stage of the proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted). 

“A grant of preliminary certification results in the dissemination of a court-approved notice to the 

putative collective action members, advising them that they must affirmatively opt in to participate 

in the litigation.” Id. “A denial of preliminary certification precludes dissemination of any such 

notice.” Id.

Here, plaintiffs claim that based on their own experience, as well as the investigation of 

their counsel, the FLSA collective members are similarly situated because that group consists of 

all non-exempt hourly employees who were uniformly subject to the same alleged unlawful wage 

and hour practices and policies, namely, the failure to pay overtime and to provide required meal 

and rest breaks. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 42; Dkt. No. 41 ¶24; Dkt. No. 42 ¶¶ 8-13; Dkt. No. 43 ¶¶ 8-13; Dkt. 

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No. 50 ¶ 5. Plaintiffs have made a plausible showing that there are “similar issue[s] of law or fact 

material to the disposition of their FLSA claims.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1117. The Court 

therefore grants their request for conditional certification of the FLSA collective action.

E. Preliminary Settlement Approval

As discussed, Rule 23(e) requires court approval of the settlement of a class action. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(e). The approval process proceeds in two steps. Lusby v. Gamestop, Inc., 297 

F.R.D. 400, 412 (N.D. Cal. 2013). First, the Court conducts a preliminary fairness evaluation. If 

the Court preliminarily approves the settlement, then notice to the class is disseminated and the 

Court sets a final hearing for approval of the settlement. Id. Ultimately, a settlement should only 

be approved if it is “fair, reasonable and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). In determining 

whether a proposed settlement meets this standard, the Court does not have “the ability to delete, 

modify, or substitute certain provisions,” and “[t]he settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.’” 

Staton, 327 F.3d at 969 (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Courts may preliminarily approve a Rule 23 class action settlement and direct notice to the 

class if the proposed settlement (1) appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive 

negotiations; (2) does not grant improper preferential treatment to class representatives or other 

segments of the class; (3) falls within the range of possible approval; and (4) has no obvious 

deficiencies. In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see 

also Nen Thio v. Genji, LLC, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1333 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The Court’s evaluation 

of a settlement reached prior to class certification “requires a higher standard of fairness and a 

more probing inquiry than may normally be required under Rule 23(e).” Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 

697 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, courts “must 

be particularly vigilant not only for explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs that class 

counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that of certain class members to infect 

the negotiations.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Such signs include (1) class counsel’s receipt of a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, 

(2) a “clear sailing” agreement “providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees separate and apart 

from class funds, which carries the potential of enabling a defendant to pay class counsel 

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excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the 

class”; and (3) an arrangement whereby fees that are not awarded are reverted to the defendants, 

rather than added to the class fund. Id.

As discussed above, court approval is also required for settlements of private collective 

actions under the FLSA. Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d at 1353. In scrutinizing the 

settlement for fairness, the court must determine whether the settlement “is a fair and reasonable 

resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.” Id. at 1355. If the settlement is a 

reasonable compromise of issues in dispute, the court “may approve the settlement in order to 

promote the policy of encouraging settlement of litigation.” Id. at 1354.

In the present case, the fact that the parties reached a settlement after the parties conducted 

an investigation, exchanged discovery of the facts of this case, and participated in a full day of 

mediation facilitated by a retired judge weighs in favor of granting preliminary settlement 

approval. See Noroma v. Home Point Fin. Corp., No. 17-cv-07205-HSG, 2019 WL 1589980, at 

*7 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 12, 2019) (“An initial presumption of fairness is usually involved if the 

settlement is recommended by class counsel after arm’s-length bargaining.”) (citation omitted); 

Nen Thio, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1334 (concluding that a settlement appeared to be the product of 

serious, informed and non-collusive negotiations where the settlement was reached after a 

thorough investigation of the facts and settlement negotiations occurred with the assistance of a 

mediator). Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed below, there are several issues that preclude the 

preliminary approval of the parties’ settlement at this time.

1. Allocation of Settlement Payments

There are substantial and unexplained inconsistencies between the terms of the parties’ 

Stipulated Settlement and the settlement terms for which the parties now appear to seek approval. 

The most obvious differences concern the allocation of the settlement funds and of the payments 

to be made. As discussed, the parties’ Stipulated Settlement contemplates that (1) 67% of the 

$217,500 settlement fund would be allocated to the California state claims, with the remaining 

33% reserved for the FLSA claims and (2) individual payments would comprise 20% wages, 40% 

penalties, and 40% interest. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 49. As described in plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing,

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however, the $217,500 fund will now be allocated equally between the California claims and the 

FLSA claims (with 20% of the fund, or $43,500, being reserved to each set of claims) and the 

remaining 60% (i.e., $130,500) to be paid as interest and penalties. Dkt. No. 51 at ECF 2. 

Although plaintiffs seemed to suggest that the Court could make changes to the parties’ Stipulated 

Settlement, as noted, the Court does not have the ability to do so. Staton, 327 F.3d at 969; Nen 

Thio, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1333.

Plaintiffs did not clearly explain how or why the parties originally agreed to allocate 67% 

of the Net Settlement Fund to the California state claims and 33% to the FLSA claims. Nor have 

they explained why they have now changed those allocations or how those proposed modifications 

are fair. Additionally, plaintiffs’ supplemental calculations indicate, without explanation, that the 

$130,500 reserved for the payment of penalties and interest is really only being allocated to the 

payment of penalties. 

2. Treatment of Rule 23 class members and FLSA collective class 

members

The Stipulated Settlement seems to assume that all individuals covered by the settlement 

are members of both the Rule 23 class and the FLSA collective class, and also appears to 

contemplate payment only to those individuals who are, in fact, members of both classes. The 

record presented, however, suggests that the two classes are not one and the same and that the 

FLSA collective class is smaller than the Rule 23 class. In other words, the Stipulated Settlement 

does not appear to account for members of the Rule 23 class who are not also members of the 

FLSA collective class.

For example, the Stipulated Settlement seems to require Class Members to submit a claim 

form in order to receive any payment, even though Rule 23 class members are not obliged to 

submit a claim form to participate in the settlement. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 61. Adding to the confusion 

are the Stipulated Settlement’s definitions of the terms “Settlement Class Members” and 

“Participating Class Member.” The term “Settlement Class Members” seems to be defined as all 

Rule 23 class members who either do not opt out or who timely rescind a request to opt out of the 

settlement. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 16 (defining “Settlement Class Members” as “all persons, as defined 

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herein, who do not submit a Request for Exclusion from the Settlement, or who submit a Request 

for Exclusion but rescind it in a timely manner.”).11 The term “Participating Class Member” 

appears to refer to FLSA collective members who are also “Settlement Class Members.” Id. ¶ 11 

(defining “Participating Class Member[s]” as “Settlement Class Members who file a valid and 

timely Claim Form with the Claims Administrator to register their claim for recovery from the Net 

Settlement Amount pursuant to Section B, below.”). The Stipulated Settlement seems to 

contemplate that only “Participating Class Members” will be paid a settlement. See id. ¶ 43-44, 

46, 48-49, 54, (providing for distribution and payment of the Net Settlement Fund among 

“Participating Class Members”). Indeed, the Stipulated Settlement indicates that any Class 

Member who does not timely opt out of the Rule 23 settlement will automatically be deemed a 

“Settlement Class Member” who is not entitled to recover from the “Net Settlement Amount.” 

See, e.g. id. ¶ 67. Additionally, “Net Settlement Amount” is a term that appears to be used 

synonymously with “Net Settlement Fund,” but which is nevertheless not clearly defined in the 

Stipulated Settlement. Id. ¶¶ 11, 47, 67, 77. Other portions of the Stipulated Settlement appear to 

be internally inconsistent in that they seem to use the term “Settlement Class Members” to refer

more generically to members of both the Rule 23 class and the FLSA collective class. Id. ¶¶ 78-

79.

3. Carve-Out Period for FLSA Claims

Plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing clarifies that the FLSA settlement excludes any claims 

during the period November 22, 2014 to November 19, 2016 to account for payments made to 35 

individuals as part of the DOL proceeding. Plaintiffs’ supplemental spreadsheet, however,

indicates that there are other individuals who apparently did not receive a DOL settlement and 

whose FLSA claims fall entirely within the two-year carved out period. See Dkt. No. 51-1, 

Employee Nos. 3, 11, 13, 19, 21, 22, 32, 34, 36, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, 64, 75-78, 90-94, 112, 119.12

 

11 “Request for Exclusion” is not a term that is defined in the Stipulated Settlement.

12 There may be additional affected individuals, although that is not entirely clear since it appears 

that the start and end dates of employment may not have been correctly inserted in plaintiffs’ 

spreadsheet. See Dkt. No. 51-1, Employee Nos. 59, 68-69, 82, 84, 95.

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Plaintiffs do not explain how or why it may be fair to entirely exclude such claims from the 

settlement.

Further clarification of the dates of the FLSA carve-out period also may be necessary. 

Defendants previously advised the Court that resolution of the DOL audit encompassed “payment 

of overtime wages to 35 employees who worked during the period . . . November 16, 2014 to 

November 15, 2016.” Dkt. No. 37 at 2. Defendants explained that the payments “covered the 

period from [the] week ending November 22, 2014 to [the] week ending November 19, 2016.” 

Id.. It is not clear whether plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing refers to the “week ending” date or to 

the date that begins the work period covered.

4. Scope of the Release

The parties’ Stipulated Settlement provides that the agreed-upon release of liability 

encompasses the following: “all claims and/or causes of action alleged” in the present action “as 

well as any and all claims, demands, rights, liabilities and/or cause of action of any nature and 

description whatsoever, known or unknown, in law or in equity, asserted by Plaintiffs on behalf of 

any Settlement Class Member relating to any compensation allegedly due or earned as a result of 

their employment with Defendants” and “any other related claims and/or penalties of any nature 

whatsoever.” Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 18.

This release provision appears to be both too narrow and too broad. Insofar as the release 

is limited to “Settlement Class Member[s],” and for the reasons discussed above, the release may 

not to cover all individuals covered by the settlement. At the same time, a plain reading of the 

release terms suggests that class members are giving up not only claims alleged or asserted in the 

present action, but also “any other related claims and/or penalties of any nature whatsoever.” Dkt. 

No. 41 ¶ 18. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] settlement agreement may preclude a party from 

bringing a related claim in the future even though the claim was not presented and might not have 

been presentable in the class action, but only where the released claim is based on the identical 

factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action.” Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 

598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the release language is not 

so limited and suggests that class members are more broadly releasing claims that are not based on 

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the identical factual predicate as the present action. Courts have held that “such overbreadth in a 

proposed release is an obvious deficiency that warrants denying preliminary approval.” Mata v. 

Manpower, Inc., No. 14-cv-03787-LHK, 2016 WL 7406989, at *9 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 22, 2016) 

(citing cases).

5. Defendants’ Estimated Exposure

In their original briefing, plaintiffs asserted that if this case were to proceed to trial, then 

defendants’ total estimated exposure would be $488,000. They provided only highly generalized 

information as to how they calculated that figure, stating that it was based on “records provided to 

[them] by Defendants,” and that plaintiffs’ calculations “assume[d] that every employee work[ed] 

14 hours of overtime per pay period.” Dkt. No. 40 at ECF 18. When probed by the Court at oral 

argument about the basis for the $488,000 estimate, plaintiffs’ counsel stated only that he took the 

largest estimate of overtime hours per week and then calculated the total wage loss using an Excel

spreadsheet. Dkt. No. 47.

In their supplemental briefing, plaintiffs offer no new estimate of defendants’ total 

potential exposure, and the Court cannot reliably discern from the record presented whether 

plaintiffs’ $488,000 is reasonable—and, thus, whether the proposed settlement falls within the 

range of possible approval. See Nen Thio, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1335 (stating that in evaluating 

whether a proposed settlement falls within the range of possible approval, “courts primarily 

consider plaintiff’s expected recovery balanced against the value of the settlement offer.”). This is 

particularly true where plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing includes an apparent significant 

reevaluation of the claimed damages.

6. Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Administrative Expenses

In plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing, one of plaintiffs’ attorneys, Victoria Booke, avers that 

she spent nearly 100 hours working on this matter. Dkt. No. 50 ¶ 10. She states, on information 

and belief, that her co-counsel, James Dal Bon, worked approximately the same number of hours. 

Id. Because both attorneys worked at a rate of $500 per hour, Ms. Booke states that the time they 

spent litigating this matter (plus anticipated additional 30 hours going forward) is “fairly close” to 

the 30% of the settlement counsel request in fees. Id. ¶ 11.

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Although the Court need not resolve the issue of fees at this preliminary stage (particularly 

when there are other issues that preclude the approval of settlement at this time), the Court has 

some concern regarding plaintiffs’ request for one-third of the settlement, in light of the fact that 

the benchmark is 25%. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 942. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel should bear this in mind if or when they present a fees motion for final 

approval.

Additionally, in the event the full amount of fees or litigation costs is not awarded or the 

sum reserved for administrative costs is not depleted, the parties’ Stipulated Settlement does not 

address what should be done with the excess sums.

7. Service Awards

As discussed, each named plaintiff intends to seek a service award of $5,000. While 

service awards are permissible, they must also be reasonable. Staton, 327 F.3d at 977. Courts 

must evaluate such awards individually, using “relevant factors includ[ing] the actions the plaintiff 

has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from 

those actions, . . . the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation . . . 

and reasonabl[e] fear[s of] workplace retaliation.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

Here, each named plaintiff will seek an award that is approximately three times the average 

$1,699.22 payment they say class/collective members may expect to receive. That might not be an 

unreasonable ratio, and plaintiffs’ counsel has now provided additional information about the 

plaintiffs’ efforts in this case. See Dkt. No. 50. However, in view of plaintiffs’ assertion that the 

settlement represents a little more than half of defendants’ total potential exposure, and given the 

range of payments plaintiffs now say that class/collective members will receive (i.e., the lowest 

payment being $15.64 and the highest being $8,326.04), the Court finds that if or when plaintiffs 

formally apply for service awards, the Court would benefit from additional discussion of the 

justification and evidence supporting their request.

8. Other Issues re the Stipulated Settlement

The Stipulated Settlement refers to “Participating OT Class Members,” “Hourly Wage 

Dispute Class,” and “Hourly Wage Dispute Class Members,” which are terms that are not defined 

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in the stipulation. Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 42, 49.

Additionally, the Stipulated Settlement initially refers to “Individual Settlement Amount” 

as the “gross amount of money to which each Settlement Class Member[] may be entitled,” but 

then goes on to refer to “Individual Settlement Amount” as the amount to be paid to a 

“Participating Class Member.” Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 9, 46, 49. For the reasons discussed above, these 

provisions are ambiguous inasmuch as the Stipulated Settlement seems to distinguish between 

“Settlement Class Members” and “Participating Class Members” and the payments to be made to 

each group.

9. Revised Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement (“Notice”)

The Notice (Dkt. No. 48) suggests that all individuals covered by the settlement will 

receive a payment for the FLSA claims, so long as they timely submit a claim form. For the 

reasons discussed above, however, that language is misleading. Plaintiffs’ supplemental filings 

indicate that some individuals may not receive any payment for their FLSA claims, either because 

their claims fall entirely within the FLSA carve-out period or because they already received 

payment for their FLSA claims through the DOL. The revised Notice may also be confusing in 

that regard, since there is nothing in the Stipulated Settlement or the Notice that advises class 

members of the two-year carve-out period.

Section 9 of the Notice does not account for changes to the applicable class periods for the 

Rule 23 class and the FLSA collective class.

Section 13 of the Notice should read “Do I have to have a lawyer in this case?”

The Notice occasionally refers to Mr. Ozuna as “Servero Ozuna” instead of “Severo 

Ozuna.”

If plaintiffs file an amended motion, they should take care that the Notice is consistent with 

the settlement proposed for approval and that the Notice clearly explains the relief the settlement 

provides.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court conditionally certifies a Rule 23 class and FLSA 

collective class, but otherwise denies plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. 

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The denial is without prejudice to plaintiffs to file an amended motion for preliminary approval 

(along with an amended Stipulated Settlement and proposed Notice) by June 17, 2019 that cures 

the deficiencies outlined in this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2019

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

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