Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02523/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02523-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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“Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. “Tr.” refers to the administrative

transcript. A certified copy of the administrative transcript was provided to this Court by the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on May 29, 2012. (See Doc. 11.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Katherine Williams, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-2523-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

AND ORDER

Katherine G. Williams seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)

of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), which

denied her application for supplemental security income under the Social Security Act.

(Doc. 1.1) Williams asks the Court to vacate the Commissioner’s denial. (Doc. 14.) The

Commissioner filed her Opposition Brief (Doc. 19), and Williams filed her Reply (Doc. 20).

Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial

evidence and is not based on harmful legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be

affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Williams was born in 1965 and has a high school equivalency degree. (Tr. 41.) She

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trained and was employed as a certified nursing assistant. (Tr. 41-42.) Williams has a

significant history of methamphetamine drug abuse that lasted until 2007 or 2008. (Tr. 11;

403.) Williams’ application for supplemental social security income is based on alleged

impairments due to her diabetes, which began at the age of 18. (Tr. 42.) Williams primarily

complains of numbness and pain in her feet. (Id.)

On May 29, 2008, Williams applied for social security disability insurance benefits

and for supplemental social security income. (Tr. 9.) In both applications, Williams alleged

that she became disabled as of November 23, 2001 (otherwise referred to as “disability onset

date”). (Tr. 9.) On August 8, 2008, at the request of the State agency, Williams underwent

a consultative physical examination with Keith Cunningham, M.D, board certified in internal

medicine, who submitted his expert report. On August 21, 2008, Vivienne Kattapong, M.D.,

a non-examining state agency consultant also reviewed the evidence of record and submitted

her expert report. On August 22, 2008, Williams’ disability application was denied initially,

and upon reconsideration on January 9, 2009. (Tr. 61-62, 77-80.) Williams sought further

review before an ALJ. (Tr. 81-82.) On September 8, 2010, the ALJ held a hearing at which

Williams and vocational expert Mark J. Kelman appeared and testified. (Tr. 9.) At the

hearing, Williams amended her alleged disability onset date to June 5, 2008. (Id.) Due to

this amendment, Williams conceded that she was voluntarily dismissing her application for

disability insurance benefits. (Tr. 16; Doc. 14 at 2 n.1.) Counsel for Williams commented

that the new June 5, 2008 disability onset date would render testimony regarding her drug

abuse immaterial since Williams had ceased abusing drugs in April 2008. (Tr. 41.) The

remaining issue for the ALJ was Williams’ application for supplemental social security

income based on disability. (Tr. 9.) On September 22, 2010, the ALJ found that Williams

was not disabled. (Tr. 9-16.) This decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when

the Social Security Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-8.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Supplemental security income benefits are for the “needy disabled,” and the applicant

is not required to have worked to receive these benefits. See Whaley v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d

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871, 873 (9th Cir. 1981). The pertinent statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c, provides benefits for

qualified individuals who are aged, blind or disabled. Id. The purpose of the program is to

assure that the recipient’s income is maintained at a level viewed by Congress as the

minimum necessary for the subsistence of that individual. Id. In this case, Williams claims

benefits due to disability. 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s

decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). When reviewing a

Social Security appeal, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by

substantial evidence and she applied the correct legal standards. See Batson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030,

1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual determinations, acting

through the ALJ, this Court will affirm if there is substantial evidence supporting those

determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater,

94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less

than a preponderance. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir.

2003); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is

relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion based on the entire record. Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011; Morgan v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If the evidence can reasonably support

either affirming or reversing the Commissioner’s conclusion, the Court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v.

Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040; Edlund v.

Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s legal determinations are

reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable

statutes. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.

2000).

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Because regulations for disability determinations under Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act, governing Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security

Income benefits respectively, mirror each other, citations to regulations will be to Disability

Insurance Benefits regulations without citation to parallel Supplemental Security Income

benefits.

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COMMISSIONER’S DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

To qualify for Social Security disability benefits, Williams must show that she suffers

from a “medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that prevents her from

performing her prior work activities and any other substantial gainful employment that exists

in the national economy, and that the impairment “can be expected to result in death or [] has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). 

Social Security regulations prescribe a five-step evaluation process for an ALJ to

determine if a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1190, 1194; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.2 At step one, the ALJ determines if

the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then she is not

disabled. If not, the ALJ moves to step two to determine if the claimant has impairments or

combinations of impairments that significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability

to do basic work activities and are thus “severe” within the meaning of the regulation. See

id. § 404.1520(c). At the third step, the ALJ evaluates if the claimant’s impairment meets

or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment found in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of

Regulation No. 404. If yes, and the impairment meets the requirements for duration under

20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, the claimant is disabled. If the claimant fails to meet or equal the

criteria or fails the duration requirement, the ALJ’s analysis moves to step four. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Under step four, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the continued ability of the claimant to perform

physical or mental work activities despite her impairment or combination of impairments.

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“Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally

lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary

job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is

often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are

required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a).

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See id. The ALJ also determines if the claimant’s RFC allows her to perform past relevant

work. See id. § 404.1520(f). If yes, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the analysis

proceeds to a fifth step where the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the

claimant is not disabled by presenting evidence that the claimant retains sufficient RFC to

adjust to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers either in the region where the

claimant lives or in several regions of the country. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(g). 

DISCUSSION

A. ALJ Rationale

The ALJ found that Williams had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

June 5, 2008, the amended disability onset date. (Tr. 11.) At step two, Williams had the

following “severe” impairments: type II diabetes mellitus, diabetic retinopathy, and

peripheral neuropathy. (Tr. 11.) Williams had the following RFC: sedentary work;3

 limited

to standing for 20 minutes at a time before needing to sit; limited to sitting for 30 minutes

at a time before needing to stand; requiring a sit/stand option in the workplace; and able to

walk a mile before needing to rest. (Tr. 12.) At step four, Williams was unable to perform

any of her past relevant work (Tr. 30), but at step five, there were jobs existing in significant

numbers in the national economy that Williams could perform. (Tr. 15.) The ALJ rejected

Williams’ subjective symptom testimony that she could not work. (Tr. 12-14.) The ALJ

credited the vocational expert’s testimony that there were jobs that Williams could perform.

(Tr. 15-16.) Therefore, Williams was not disabled from June 5, 2008, through the date of

decision. (Tr. 16.)

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B. Opinion Evidence

Williams argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh the reports submitted

by her treating doctor, Dr. Warren Tripp, who had been treating her since November 2008.

(Doc. 14 at 11-13.) On July 29, 2010, Dr. Tripp provided a medical source statement

evaluating Williams’ RFC. (Tr. 543-44.) Dr. Tripp indicated that Williams’ pain, fatigue,

and nausea severely limited her ability to sustain work. (Id.) He opined that in an eight-hour

work day, Williams can sit less than two hours, stand/walk less than two hours, and lift/carry

less than ten pounds. (Id.) Williams contends that Dr. Tripp’s opinion was entitled to

controlling weight, not the limited weight assigned by the ALJ. (Doc. 14 at 11-13.) 

The ALJ found conflicting medical opinion evidence in this case. (Tr. 11-16.) Based

on all the evidence, the ALJ determined that Williams could perform sedentary work with

limitations, standing for 20 minutes at a time before needing to sit, sitting for 30 minutes

before needing to stand, requiring a sit/stand option in the workplace, and able to walk a mile

before needing to rest. (Tr. 12.) The ALJ disagreed with Dr. Tripp’s RFC evaluation,

stating that Dr. Tripp’s opinion was not supported by “the great weight of the evidence of

record.” (Tr. 14.) The ALJ also noted that Dr. Tripp did not attempt to establish how long

Williams’ symptoms and associated limitations had been present or how long they would

continue. (Id.) 

Generally, the Commissioner gives more weight to opinions from treating doctors

since these doctors are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed,

longitudinal picture of a claimant’s medical impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). So

long as the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the

record, the opinion will be given controlling weight. Id.; see Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

830-31 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the opinion of an examining doctor, even if contradicted

by another doctor, can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons). 

In support of his finding that Williams’ RFC allowed her to work at a sedentary level,

with adjustments for a sit/stand option, the ALJ cited the August 21, 2008 expert report from

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Dr. Vivienne Kattapong, a non-examining state agency consultant. (Tr. 14.) Dr. Kattapong

evaluated Williams’ medical impairments and determined that she is not only able to sustain

work at the sedentary level, but also at the light exertional level. (Tr. 14, citing Tr. 416-23.)

Dr. Kattapong indicated that her RFC assessment was consistent with a previous expert

report made by an examining state agency consultant. (Tr. 422.)

The previous RFC assessment referenced by Dr. Kattapong was discussed by the

ALJ, as follows:

At the request of the State agency, the claimant underwent a consultative

physical examination on August 8, 2008. The examiner, Keith Cunningham,

M.D., who is board certified in internal medicine, found the claimant’s gait

to be normal. The claimant’s extremities showed no edema. She had normal

motor strength and range of motion. Dr. Cunningham diagnosed the claimant

with diabetes with peripheral neuropathy, a history of diabetic retinopathy and

right vitreous bleed, and methamphetamine abuse. In his functional

assessment, the doctor assigned to the claimant no exertional limitation, except

for a lifting/carrying restriction of 10 pounds frequently and 50 pounds

occasionally.

(Tr. 12.) 

At issue is whether the ALJ properly discounted the opinion of Williams’ treating

doctor. The Court finds that the ALJ applied proper legal standards and, based on the entire

record, there is substantial evidence to support his conclusion discounting the opinion of Dr.

Tripp. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. The ALJ provided his specific and legitimate reason

for discounting Dr. Tripp’s opinion; it was inconsistent with the submitted evidence of

record. Dr. Tripp’s RFC assessment was inconsistent with the RFC assessment of both

agency doctors who believed that Williams could at least perform at a sedentary level with

a sit/stand option at work. (Tr. 12-14.) It is the ALJ who is responsible for determining

credibility and resolving conflicts in the medical testimony. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040.

The ALJ need not give controlling weight to an opinion that is inconsistent with the other

substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(c)(5). 

Based on Dr. Cunningham’s physical examination, Cunningham noted the lack of

swelling in Williams’ legs, that she had a normal gait, and concluded that she had no

exertional limitations. (Tr. 404, 12.) After reviewing the submitted evidence, Dr. Kattapong

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indicated that she believed Williams could walk, stand and sit for 6-hours during an 8-hour

workday. (Tr. 416-23.) Dr. Tripp’s July 2010 RFC concluded that Williams’ pain and

fatigue caused an inability for her to sustain work. (Tr. 543-44.) However, even Dr. Tripp

consistently noted that Williams’ diabetic pain was reasonably controlled with medication

with no side effects. (Tr. 494, 496, 502, 505, 507, 513, 517.) Here, substantial evidence

reasonably supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment regarding Williams’ ability to perform

sedentary work. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193.

C. Subjective Pain Testimony

The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to evaluate the credibility of a claimant’s

subjective testimony. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented

objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be

expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d

1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)

(en banc)). If the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, then

the ALJ “can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by

offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Carmickle v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that an ALJ may discount the claimant’s subjective

statements with clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence). An ALJ

may consider at least the following factors when weighing the claimant’s credibility:

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in claimant’s testimony or

between her testimony and her conduct, claimant’s daily activities, her work record, and

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the

symptoms of which claimant complains. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789,792 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

The ALJ summarized Williams’ symptom testimony as follows:

The claimant testified that she has been unable to work primarily due to

diabetes and its complications. She stated that her diabetes was first diagnosed

at the age of 18. She has pain and numbness in both feet caused by peripheral

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neuropathy. She also has a loss of vision in the right eye. The claimant

indicated that her vision is blurred and she gets headaches if she tries to read.

She also complained of loss of energy possibly due to hypertension. She

acknowledged her past substance abuse, but indicated that she last used

methamphetamines in 2007. The claimant testified that she could not stand for

more than 20 minutes at a time and could sit up to 30 minutes at a time, but

needed to elevate her feet to hip level to be most comfortable while sitting.

She estimated that she could not lift more than 10 pounds and needed to nap

approximately 2.5 hours out of each 8-hour workday because of pain. 

(Tr. 13.) The ALJ credited some of Williams’ testimony and included some physical

limitations that Williams testified to as part of his RFC assessment. The ALJ found that

Williams was able to perform the exertional requirements of sedentary work, but limited her

to a sit/stand option in the workplace. (Tr. 12.) She was limited to standing for 20 minutes

at a time before needing to sit and limited to sitting for 30 minutes before needing to stand.

However, the ALJ also found that some of Williams’ statements concerning the “intensity,

persistence and limiting effects” of her symptoms were not credible to the extent that they

were inconsistent with his RFC assessment. (Tr. 13.)

 For instance, the ALJ did not credit the extent of Williams’ vision impairment,

finding that it was not at listing level severity, and that she had done reasonably well

following her eye surgery. (Tr. 12-13.) An impairment that can reasonably be alleviated by

treatment cannot serve as a basis for a finding of disability. See Warre v. Comm. of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th

Cir. 1996). Here, at a February 2010 follow-up to surgery on her right eye in December

2009, Williams’ treating ophthalmologist, Dr. Park, reported that she was doing well, and

that her vision had improved to 20/70 in the right eye, and 20/40 in the left eye. (Tr. 479.)

Williams’ testimony is in contradiction with the medical record, which is a sufficient basis

for rejecting her subjective testimony. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161.

The ALJ also did not credit Williams’ testimony that pain and numbness in her feet

prevented her from working. (Tr. 13.) The ALJ found that Williams was able to ambulate

independently, that her motor strength was intact, that she had no swelling of her lower

extremities, and no indication of any negative side effects from her pain medication regimen.

(Tr. 13.) Social Security regulations require that an ALJ consider objective medical

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evidence when determining a claimant’s credibility. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4). When

examined by Dr. Cunningham in August 2008, although Williams had decreased sensation

to pinprick and touch from the mid-tibias distally, she had normal gait, motor strength, and

range of motion. (Tr. 404); see Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain

testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.”). Further,

although Williams testified that she had level “7” pain on average (Tr. 49), Dr. Tripp

consistently reported that her diabetic pain was reasonably controlled with medication,

without side effects. (Tr. 494, 496, 502, 505, 507, 513, 517.) The ALJ thus found that

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity and persistence of her pain was inconsistent with

the medical record. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating

that an ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility including

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid). 

Based on the ALJ’s discussion of the record evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ

provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting Williams’ subjective pain

testimony to the extent that it conflicted with the ALJ’s RFC assessment.

D. Vocational Expert Testimony

Finally, Williams argues that the ALJ failed to identify and present all of her physical

limitations to the vocational expert prior to the vocational expert testifying about whether

Williams could perform any jobs in the local and national economy. (Doc. 14 at 17-20.)

At the hearing, in questioning the vocational expert, the ALJ set forth Williams’ RFC

and her limitations as follows:

Q: I’m going to ask you a question of an individual same age, education, and

job experience as the claimant’s with the following limitations: The individual

would need to have a job with a sit/stand option where the individual’s only

able to stand for 20 minutes at a time before the individual would have to sit

down, and the individual would be limited to sitting for 30 minutes at a time

before the individual would have to stand up, and the individual would be

limited to lifting 10 pounds, and the individual is able to walk up to one mile

at a time. Are there any jobs with a sit/stand option that are available to such

an individual?

(Tr. 55.) Williams contends that the limitations the ALJ presented to the vocational expert

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did not include her vision-related limitations or a strict limitation only to sedentary unskilled

work. (Doc. 14 at 17-20.)

The Court has already discussed the ALJ’s finding regarding the medical treatment

Williams received regarding her vision. Williams underwent surgery on her right eye in

December 2009, and at a February 2010 follow-up, Williams’ treating ophthalmologist Dr.

Park reported that she was doing well and that her vision had improved to 20/70 in the right

eye, and 20/40 in the left eye. (Tr. 12, 479.) Based on this treatment record the ALJ did not

include a vision limitation in his RFC assessment. The Court finds that there is substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ’s non-inclusion of a vision limitation in his RFC assessment.

See Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011.

Regarding the ALJ’s alleged lack of presentation to the vocational expert that

Williams’ was limited to sedentary unskilled work, the Court finds that the ALJ’s

presentation to the vocational expert reasonably and adequately set forth the exertion level

for jobs that Williams would be qualified to perform. The ALJ’s limitation of the sit/stand

option with its accompanying time limitations made Williams’ exertion level clear to the

vocational expert. 

In response to the ALJ’s presentation of Williams’ RFC, the vocational expert

testified that there would be jobs in the local and national economies that Williams could

perform. The vocational expert testified to the following jobs: 

The first would be that of a telemarketing representative. There would be no

typing requirements for that. In terms of numbers, there would be at least

2,000 statewide, and in excess of 100,000 nationally. Headsets are readily

available, so if one wants to sit or stand, they can. They are tethered by the

headset, so they literally can’t walk away. In terms of the DOT number on

that, it’s 299.357-014. Second one would be that of an office helper, for which

there would be approximately 1,000 jobs statewide, and approximately 60,000

on the national basis, and the DOT number on that one would be 239.567-010,

and the last one would be that of a parking lot cashier, fuel island courtesy

booth, those types of environments as opposed to the retail cashier where one

is standing for extended periods. The DOT number’s 211.462-010, and in

terms of numbers it would be at least 800 statewide, and in excess of 100,000

plus on a national basis.

(Tr. 55-56.) Based on this testimony, the ALJ found that Williams could perform jobs in the

local and national economy. (Tr. 15-16.) The Court finds that there is substantial evidence

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supporting the ALJ’s finding that Williams is not disabled because she retains sufficient RFC

to adjust to perform the jobs testified to by the vocational expert that exist in significant

numbers both in the local and national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(g). 

CONCLUSION

After a thorough review of the record, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct

legal standards in his evaluation. The ALJ’s decision demonstrates that he carefully

considered Williams’ application and the supporting evidence. The ALJ identified

substantial evidence supporting each of his findings. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision denying Williams’

application for supplemental security income benefits is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment in favor of Defendant

and terminate this action.

DATED this 26th day of April, 2013.

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