Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01299/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01299-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

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17 This action challenges the delayed adjudication of immigrant visa applications. The 

18 parties voluntarily dismissed four of the six plaintiffs after two of the noncitizen beneficiary 

19 plaintiffs received their visas. See First Stip. Dismissal, ECF No. 31 (dismissing plaintiffs Lailaa 

20 Iqbal and Qaiser Javed); Second Stip. Dismissal, ECF No. 36 (dismissing plaintiffs Obaid 

21 Rehman and Sabah Jabeen). The remaining plaintiffs are Muhammad Hassan and Irsa Jamil. 

22 Defendants move for summary judgment and have filed a request for judicial notice. Plaintiffs 

23 have separately moved to compel the full administrative record and to strike defendants’ request 

24 for judicial notice. The court denies the motion for summary judgment, grants in part the 

25 motion to strike and denies the motion to compel. The court first resolves the request for judicial 

26 notice and motion to strike. 

Lailaa Iqbal, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Antony J. Blinken, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-01299-KJM-CSK 

ORDER 

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1 I. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE

2 According to the parties, on January 29, 2024, after defendants moved for summary

3 judgment, a consular officer at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan interviewed Ms. Jamil. 

4 See Second Stip. & Order for Extension of Time, ECF No. 34. The officer refused Ms. Jamil’s 

5 visa application for administrative processing. Id. Defendants request the court take judicial 

6 notice of the following: “(1) that Plaintiff Jamil appeared for a consular interview and applied for 

7 an immigrant visa at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan on January 29, 2024, and (2) that, 

8 following the interview, a consular officer refused her visa application under § 221(g) for 

9 administrative processing, to conduct additional security screening.” Req. Judicial Notice at 2, 

ECF No. 41 (citing Linda Neilan Dus Decl. ¶¶ 7–8, ECF No. 41-1).1 10 The declaration they attach 

11 is signed by Ms. Dus, a U.S. Department of State attorney adviser employed in the Advisory 

12 Opinions Division, Office of Legal Affairs of the Visa Office, Bureau of Consular Affairs. See

13 Dus Decl. Ms. Dus is authorized to search the electronic Consular Consolidated Database for 

14 records of immigrant visas adjudicated at U.S. Embassies, and declares the database reflects the 

15 two facts noted above. Id. ¶¶ 1, 7–8. In that same request, defendants appear to improperly 

16 supplement their motion for summary judgment without leave of court by discussing how the two 

17 new developments affect the court’s analysis of the relevant factors in determining whether an 

18 agency action was unreasonably delayed. See Req. Judicial Notice at 2–7. 

19 Plaintiffs move to strike defendants’ request for judicial notice. Mot. Strike, ECF No. 42. 

20 They argue the fact Ms. Jamil attended an interview and was not yet issued a visa “is not news to 

21 the Court.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs also argue the fact is not relevant and Ms. Dus’s declaration in 

22 support of the request for judicial notice is extra-record evidence precluded by the Administrative 

23 Procedure Act (APA). See generally id. Defendants oppose the motion to strike, Opp’n Mot. 

24 Strike, ECF No. 45, and plaintiffs have replied, Reply Mot. Strike, ECF No. 46. 

25 /// 

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 When citing page numbers on filings, the court uses the pagination automatically 

generated by the CM/ECF system. 

Case 2:23-cv-01299-KJM-CSK Document 55 Filed 08/22/24 Page 2 of 22
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1 Neither party disputes Ms. Jamil appeared for an interview and the consular officer 

2 refused her visa application for administrative processing to conduct additional security 

3 screening. See Second Stip. & Order for Extension of Time; see also Mot. Strike at 3 & n.1. The 

4 court grants judicial notice of these two adjudicative facts because the facts are not subject to 

5 reasonable dispute and can “be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

6 cannot reasonably be questioned,” i.e., agency records. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see, e.g., 

7 Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of “the existence of” 

8 naturalization applications “because they are official agency records”); Sanchez-Patron v. 

9 Garland, No. 21-70950, 2022 WL 2072649, at *1 (9th Cir. June 9, 2022) (unpublished) (“We 

10 may take judicial notice of the agency’s own records, even when those records were not part of 

11 the administrative record in proceedings before the BIA.”). The court also takes judicial notice of 

the online U.S. Department of State visa status checker, see Visa Status Checker,2 12 that 

13 corresponds to Ms. Jamil’s visa case number, see Second Stip. & Order for Extension of Time at 

14 1, and confirms a consular officer has adjudicated and refused her visa application, see, e.g., 

15 Miguel v. Lynch, 631 F. App’x 476 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (similarly taking judicial notice 

16 of an online case status report) (citing Dent, 627 F.3d at 371)). The status checker provides the 

17 following notice: 

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 U.S. Department of State, Consular Electronic Application Center, Visa Status Check, 

https://ceac.state.gov/CEACStatTracker/Status.aspx?App=IV (last visited Aug. 8, 2024). 

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However, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion to strike in part. “The district court has 

considerable latitude in managing the parties’ motion practice and enforcing local rules that place

parameters on briefing.” Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002). Neither 

the Local Rules nor this court’s standing order permits parties to file sur-replies or to supplement 

their motions without prior approval from the court. See, e.g., Hill v. England, No. 05-869, 

2005 WL 3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005). Here, however, defendants appear to 

circumvent these rules by going beyond requesting the taking of judicial notice and attempting to 

supplement their motion for summary judgment in the guise of a request for judicial notice. See

Req. Judicial Notice at 2–7. The appropriate procedure would have been to either move to 

supplement their motion in light of new developments in this case, or to withdraw their pending 

motion and file an amended motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the court exercises its 

inherent power to manage its docket and strikes Section II, “These Developments Change the 

TRAC Analysis. The Measurable Delay Now Only Stands Only at Less Than Two Months, 

Which Is Plainly Inadequate to Justify Judicial Intervention in Executive Branch Functions,” of 

defendants’ request for judicial notice. Req. Judicial Notice at 2–7; see Ready Transp., Inc. v. 

AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing district courts’ inherent power to 

17 control their dockets, including “power to strike items,” and collecting authority).

18 II. BACKROUND

19 A. Immigrant Visa Application Processing

20 As explained in a prior order, foreign nationals may petition for immigrant visas based on 

21 a familial relationship with a U.S. citizen. See Prior Order at 2, ECF No. 18 (citing 8 U.S.C. 

22 §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1201(a)(1)(A); 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.21, 42.42). The court incorporates its prior

23 discussion regarding immigration visa application processing by reference. In relevant parts, for

24 a family-based immigrant visa, a sponsoring U.S. citizen must first file the Form I-130, Petition

25 for Alien Relative, with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

26 8 U.S.C. § 1154; 9 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 504.2-2(A)(a)(1). Once the USCIS

27 approves the I-130, the beneficiary may begin the visa application process by submitting a

28 DS-260 Online Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration. See 9 FAM § 504.1-2.

Case 2:23-cv-01299-KJM-CSK Document 55 Filed 08/22/24 Page 4 of 22
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1 After the beneficiary completes the DS-260 and submits all the necessary forms and fees to the 

2 National Visa Center (NVC), the NVC determines whether an application is documentarily 

3 complete. Id. § 504.1-2(b)(2). 

4 Once the NVC determines an application is documentarily complete and the applicable 

5 consular officer completes all the “necessary clearance procedures,” the applicant is considered 

6 documentarily qualified. 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(h). This means the applicant is qualified “to apply 

7 formally for an immigrant visa[.]” Id. For an immigrant visa applicant, to “[m]ake or file an 

8 application for a visa means” in relevant part, “personally appearing before a consular officer and 

9 verifying by oath or affirmation the statements contained on . . . Form DS–260[.]” Id. § 40.1(l). 

10 During the interview, an applicant can formally apply for an immigrant visa by swearing to or 

11 affirming the contents of the DS-260 and signing it before a consular officer. 22 C.F.R. 

12 § 42.67(a). The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides “[a]ll immigrant visa

13 applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b). Once

14 an application is properly completed and executed before a consular officer, the officer must

15 either issue or refuse to issue a visa. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a).

16 B. Undisputed Facts

17 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff Muhammad Hassan 

18 filed an I-130 petition on behalf of his non-citizen beneficiary spouse, plaintiff Irsa Jamil. Austin 

19 Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 24-4. USCIS approved that petition on August 9, 2021. Id. The NVC then 

20 determined Ms. Jamil was documentarily qualified on May 24, 2022. Id. ¶ 11. 

21 On June 30, 2023, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants Antony J. Blinken, sued 

22 in his official capacity as the United States Secretary of State, Rena Bitter, sued in her official 

23 capacity as the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, Michael Solberg, sued in his 

official capacity as the Consul General for the United States Embassy in Islamabad,3 24 and Andrew 

25 Schofer, sued in his official capacity as the Deputy Chief of Mission for the United States 

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 Plaintiffs have substituted Pamela Bentley, in her official capacity as the Consul General 

or Consular Chief for the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, as a party defendant for the former Consul 

General or Consular Chief for the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and previously named defendant 

Michael Solberg in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). See ECF No. 25. 

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1 Embassy in Islamabad. Compl. ¶¶ 19–22. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ first, second and third 

2 claims, which challenged three State Department decisions, but denied defendants’ motion to 

3 dismiss as to claim four, which alleges unreasonable delay in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and 

4 claim five, which requests relief under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. See Prior Order. 

5 The court found the reasonableness inquiry was best resolved ultimately on a full factual record. 

6 Id. at 13. 

7 Defendants now move for summary judgment on claims four and five. Mot. Summ. J. 

8 (MSJ), ECF No. 24. In support, they have provided the following undisputed facts. 

9 In the 2018 and 2019 fiscal year, consular officers at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad 

10 adjudicated 13,974 and 12,896 immigrant visa applications, respectively. Grewe Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 

11 No. 24-3. However, consular officers adjudicated 7,332 immigration visa applications in the 

12 2020 fiscal year, and 8,183 immigrant visa applications in the 2021 fiscal year. Id. The number 

13 of visa applications adjudicated has steadily increased since then—consular officers adjudicated 

14 10,838 immigrant visa applications in the 2022 fiscal year and 16,227 immigrant visa applications 

15 in the 2023 fiscal year. Id. Nonetheless, the immigrant visa backlog has increased from 658 

16 documentarily complete immediate relative applications on March 1, 2020, to 12,097 on 

17 December 7, 2023. See Austin Decl. ¶ 3. 

18 The decrease in immigrant visa applications adjudicated in the 2020 and 2021 fiscal years 

19 was due in part to the COVID-19 pandemic. Grewe Decl. ¶ 3. For example, “[i]n March 2020, 

20 the Office of Management and Budget (‘OBM’) directed all federal agencies, including the 

21 Department [of State], to utilize the full scope of their legal authority to minimize face-to-face 

22 interactions due to the COVID-19 pandemic.” Bentley Decl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 24-2. In response, 

23 on March 20, 2020, the State Department “suspended all routine visa services” at all U.S. 

24 embassies and consulates, including immigrant visa interviews, and cancelled interviews already 

25 scheduled. Id. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad resumed limited scheduling of immediate relative 

26 visas in June 2020, and resumed all routine visa services in March 2021. Id. ¶ 13. 

27 The Consular Section at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad also “played a major role in 

28 assisting evacuees out of Afghanistan after the fall of Kabul in August 2021.” Id. ¶ 14. Between 

Case 2:23-cv-01299-KJM-CSK Document 55 Filed 08/22/24 Page 6 of 22
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1 August and October 2021, the embassy “processed thousands of U.S. citizens, U.S. lawful 

2 permanent residents, locally employed staff from U.S. Embassy Kabul, and other U.S. 

3 government-affiliated noncitizens for onward travel to the United States through various legal 

4 pathways, including hundreds of [immigrant visas] and Special Immigrant Visa (‘SIV’) 

5 applications for Afghan nationals.” Id. 

6 Since “the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic through 2023,” the U.S. Embassy in 

7 Islamabad has had several staff vacancies, including three vacant positions for U.S. direct-hire 

8 employees, who perform various duties including “case processing and adjudication” and “in 

9 person interviews.” Id. ¶¶ 16–17. Two temporary interpreter positions also are vacant. Id. ¶ 17. 

10 To assist the embassy, the State Department has assigned four additional consular officers on 

11 temporary details in Islamabad; however, those details “last, on average, thirty days.” Id. The 

12 staffing vacancies “are partially explained by the fact that Islamabad is considered a hardship and 

13 high-threat post,” many of the positions require adjudicators to know or learn Urdu or Dari, and 

14 the “pandemic resulted in a drastic drop in fee revenue for the [State] Department and visa 

15 services are primarily fee funded.” Id. ¶ 16. 

16 After defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, Ms. Jamil “appeared for a 

17 consular interview and applied for an immigrant visa at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan” 

18 on January 29, 2024. Dus Decl. ¶ 7; see also Second Stip. & Order for Extension of Time. A 

19 consular officer refused to issue a visa that same day “under Section 221(g) of the INA for 

20 required administrative processing to conduct additional security screening.” Dus Decl. ¶ 8. 

21 While Ms. Jamil was waiting for her scheduled interview to take place, the court granted 

22 plaintiffs two extensions of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. First Stip. & 

23 Order for Extension of Time, ECF No. 28; Second Stip. & Order for Extension of Time. 

24 Plaintiffs have now filed an opposition, Opp’n, ECF No. 43, and defendants have replied, Reply, 

25 ECF No. 47. The court held a hearing on the pending matters on May 17, 2024. Mins. Mot. 

26 Hr’g, ECF No. 52. Curtis Morrison appeared for plaintiffs. Id. Elliot Wong appeared for 

27 defendants. Id.

Case 2:23-cv-01299-KJM-CSK Document 55 Filed 08/22/24 Page 7 of 22
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1 III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

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“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must

dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when 

the controversy before it becomes moot. In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005). “A 

case is moot if the issues presented are no longer live and there fails to be a ‘case or controversy’ 

under Article III of the Constitution.” Id. (citing GTE Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 945 

(9th Cir. 1994)). “The basic question in determining mootness is whether there is a present 

controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.” Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 

849 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Geophysical Corp., 732 F.2d 693, 

698 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

As noted, Ms. Jamil appeared for an interview in the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and a 

consular officer refused her visa application for administrative processing to conduct additional 

security screening. See Second Stip. & Order for Extension of Time. The parties dispute whether 

the consular officer’s decision to refuse Ms. Jamil’s visa application renders plaintiffs’ claims 

moot. See Mot. Compel at 7, ECF No. 37; Req. Judicial Notice at 2 n.1; Opp’n at 28 n.20; Joint 

Status Report at 2, ECF No. 50. The parties, however, do not provide any analysis in their 

briefings regarding this issue. The court directed the parties to come prepared to discuss whether 

plaintiffs’ claims are moot at the May 17, 2024, hearing. See Min. Order, ECF No. 49. During 

hearing, the court confirmed neither party requested supplemental briefing on this issue. 

Courts have found immigration cases moot when a consular officer makes a final decision 

to grant or deny an applicant’s visa application. See, e.g., OC Modeling, LLC v. Michael Richard 

Pompeo, No. 20-1687, 2020 WL 7263278, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020) (collecting cases). 

However, many district courts have found “the ‘administrative processing’ designation 

insufficient to constitute a refusal.” Mohamed v. Pompeo, No. 19-01345, 2019 WL 4734927, at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2019).425 These courts have considered the contents of the refusal letters,

4 See, e.g., Rasoulzadeh v. Tillerson, No. 17-2399, 2018 WL 1426965, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

Mar. 22, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss complaint as moot because “there is a dispute of fact 

as to whether [the] visa application has been denied or whether it is still undergoing 

administrative processing”); Billoo v. Baran, No. 21-05401, 2022 WL 1841611, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 

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and other factors to find that although consular officials “nominally” refused the visa application, 

by determining the visa application required further administrative processing, the visa 

application remained under consideration and could not “fairly be described as a final 

determination.” Sharifi v. Blinken, No. 23-5112, 2024 WL 1798185, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 

2024). 

Other courts, however, have found visa refusals moot claims alleging unreasonable delay 

and requests for mandamus relief, even if the visa application has been placed in administrative 

processing to conduct additional security screening. See Bamdad v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 

No. 23-757, 2024 WL 1462948, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2024).5 These courts rely on the 

language of the applicable federal regulations and sections of the INA to conclude claims become 

moot when a consular officer refuses a visa application. Id. 

“When a visa application has been properly completed and executed before a consular 

officer . . . , the consular officer must issue the visa, refuse the visa under INA 212(a) or 221(g) or 

other applicable law or, pursuant to an outstanding order under INA 243(d), discontinue granting 

15 the visa.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). “If a visa is refused, and the applicant within one year from the 

Mar. 18, 2022) (not moot because while application was labelled “refused,” application was still 

in administrative processing and consular officer requested more information); Gonzalez v. 

Baran, No. 21-05902, 2022 WL 1843148, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2022) (collecting authority); 

Taherian v. Blinken, No. 23-01927, 2024 WL 1652625, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2024) (same); 

Shahijani v. Laitinen, No. 23-03967, 2023 WL 6889774, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2023) (same); 

Nine Iraqi Allies Under Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful Serv. to the United States v. 

Kerry, 168 F. Supp. 3d 268, 285–89 (D.D.C. 2016) (considering specificities of refusal letter and 

website information regarding definition of “administrative processing”); Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of 

State, No. 19-610, 2020 WL 1703892, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2020) (collecting authority across the 

country); cf. Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 1997) (no refusal when letter did not 

comply with refusal procedure under 22 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)); Amerkhail v. Blinken, No. 22-00149, 

2022 WL 4093932, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2022) (not moot because plaintiff alleged defendants 

unreasonably delayed completing “administrative processing” step). 

5 See, e.g., Elhabash v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 09-5847, 2010 WL 1742116, at *3 

(D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2010) (case moot when Embassy refused visa); Ahmed v. Miller, No. 19-11138,

2020 WL 3250214, at *2, 7 (E.D. Mich. June 16, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Baaghil v. Miller, 

1 F.4th 427 (6th Cir. 2021) (claims moot when visa refused but file placed in administrative 

proceeding); Conley v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 24-10131, 2024 WL 1640074, at *4 (D. Mass. 

Apr. 16, 2024) (noting split and finding claim for unreasonable delay moot once consular officer 

refused visa application). 

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date of refusal adduces further evidence tending to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which 

the refusal was based, the case shall be reconsidered.” Id. § 42.81(e). Section 221(g) of the INA 

provides several grounds for non-issuance of visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). 

Here, the consular officer refused Ms. Jamil’s visa application under section 221(g) for 

administrative processing to conduct additional security screening. The INA and related 

regulations do not provide for this “administrative processing” designation, which has the effect 

of placing Ms. Jamil’s application in limbo—her visa application was neither granted nor refused 

in such a way that she now has an opportunity to request reconsideration of the refusal under 

22 C.F.R. § 42.81. Defendants confirmed at hearing that when a visa is refused for the purpose of

administrative processing, defendants are not waiting for the applicant to provide additional

evidence. Rather, the government is undergoing a security vetting process on its own without

additional input from the applicant.

According to a declaration by Carson Wu, the Acting Director of the Bureau of Consular 

Affairs’ Office of Screening, Analysis and Coordination (SAC), the SAC has the “primary 

responsibility for screening noncitizens who apply for U.S. visas for potential security-related 

grounds of visa ineligibility.” Second Wu Decl. ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 43-1. Although the defendants 

in a separate case filed the original declaration, defendants in this case do not challenge the 

court’s consideration of the declaration here. See Reply at 11. At hearing, defendants agreed the 

court could consider the declaration with respect to the question of mootness. Mr. Wu signed the 

declaration under penalty of perjury, see Second Wu Decl., and the court considers it to determine 

whether the case is now moot, see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 485

(9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he nonmoving party need not produce evidence ‘in a form that would be 

admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.’” (citation omitted)). 

According to Mr. Wu’s declaration, the SAC coordinates with several other bureaus 

within the State Department, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and other “U.S. 

government partners on matters involving national security, technology transfer, 

counterintelligence, human rights violations, and U.S. sanctions.” Id. ¶ 2. “After coordinating 

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Advisory Opinions (SAO) responses related to grounds of visa ineligibility and inadmissibility 

under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).” Id. “In any case where 

an officer uncovers facts that would require additional security vetting, the officer is required to 

submit an SAO to initiate additional security vetting.” Id. ¶ 18. “In any case in which a SAO is 

required, a consular officer must wait for a response, which will provide a recommendation on 

whether sufficient information exists to support a security-related ineligibility finding.” Id. ¶ 19. 

The timing and completion of SAO responses depend on a variety of factors including “extent of 

review and coordination required,” “amount of derogatory information,” “which other agencies 

have responsive information,” “timing of when each partner agency completes its review,” 

“emergent circumstances such as COVID,” “SAO request volume,” and “foreign policy 

priorities.” Id. ¶ 27. “Because of the complexity of this process, SAO requests can be neither

addressed nor resolved in a first-in-first-out basis.” Id. In general, however, in 75 percent of 

cases requiring additional security vetting, security vetting is concluded in approximately 120 

days. Id. 

Although the consular officer nominally refused Ms. Jamil’s application, it appears the 

consular officer is waiting for the SAC to complete the additional security vetting. In fact, the 

Foreign Affairs Manual designates cases like Ms. Jamil’s “Quasi-Refusal Cases” as opposed to 

regular “Refusal Cases.” Compare 9 FAM § 504.11-3(B) (“Quasi-Refusal Cases,” which include 

circumstances that do not constitute a “formal refusal”), with id. § 504.11-3(A) (“Refusal Cases”). 

The Foreign Affairs Manual provides in cases requiring an advisory opinion (AO), “[u]nder no 

circumstances should a decision on the question of eligibility be made before the Department’s 

AO is received.” Id. § 504.11-3(B)(2)(a).6 

Moreover, the court lacks information needed to confirm whether the refusal of 

Ms. Jamil’s application complies with 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(b) (“Procedure in refusing immigrant 

visas.”). Neither party provided the court with a copy of a refusal letter or form provided to 

26 Ms. Jamil when her application was refused for administrative processing. See, e.g., Patel, 

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referenced in Mr. Wu’s declaration—both refer to an “advisory opinion.” 

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134 F.3d at 932 (refusal letter did not comply with the regulations and was not a “final 

decision”). Here, it appears defendants are holding Ms. Jamil’s visa application “in abeyance.” 

See id. Therefore, the court joins with the courts that have found the refusal of a visa application 

for administrative processing does not constitute a final decision. Because there has been no 

5 final adjudication of Ms. Jamil’s visa application, plaintiffs’ claims are not moot. 

6 IV. MOTION TO COMPEL ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

7 Plaintiffs move to compel the full administrative record. Mot. Compel. Defendants

8 oppose, Mot. Compel Opp’n, ECF No. 39, and plaintiffs have not filed a reply. The court denies 

9 the motion because plaintiffs are not challenging a final agency action. 

10 Plaintiffs’ motion “reflects confusion between lawsuits that challenge the propriety of a 

11 final agency action, and suits that are brought to compel an agency to act in the first instance.” 

12 Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs’ sole 

13 remaining claims allege unreasonable delay of an agency action, that is, defendants have 

14 unreasonably delayed adjudicating Ms. Jamil’s visa application. See generally Prior Order 

15 (dismissing plaintiffs’ first, second and third claims but denying defendants’ motion to dismiss as 

16 to claims four (unreasonable delay in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)) and five (relief under the 

17 Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361)). 

18 Plaintiffs’ remaining claims do not challenge a final agency action; rather they argue 

19 agency action has been unreasonably delayed. Therefore, “review is not limited to the record as it 

20 existed at any single point in time, because there is no final agency action to demarcate the limits 

21 of the record.” Friends of the Clearwater, 222 F.3d at 560. 

22 V. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

23 A. Legal Standard

24 A court may grant summary judgment if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

25 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 

26 “threshold inquiry” is whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved 

27 only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” 

28 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary 

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1 judgment, the court draws all inferences and views all evidence in the light most favorable to the 

2 nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 

3 (1986). 

4 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of production. See 

5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 

6 Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If, as in this case, the moving party does not have the 

7 ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it must carry its initial burden of production at summary 

8 judgment in one of two ways: “either produce evidence negating an essential element of the 

9 nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough 

10 evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 

11 210 F.3d at 1102. “If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving 

12 party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate 

13 burden of persuasion at trial.” Id. at 1102–03. If, however, the moving party does carry its initial 

14 burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claims and 

15 “establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585. 

16 B. Discussion

17 Under the APA, the reviewing court must “compel agency action . . . unreasonably 

18 delayed[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). However, “[a] court can compel agency action under this section 

19 only if there is a specific, unequivocal command placed on the agency to take a discrete agency 

20 action, and the agency has failed to take that action.” Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Cent. Intel. 

21 Agency, 811 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal marks and citation omitted). Similarly, the 

22 Mandamus Act “provides district courts with mandamus power ‘to compel an officer or employee 

23 of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.’” Indep. Min. 

24 Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1361). “Although the 

25 exact interplay between these two statutory schemes has not been thoroughly examined by the 

26 courts, the Supreme Court has construed a claim seeking mandamus under the [Mandamus Act] 

27 ‘in essence,’ as one for relief under § 706 of the APA.” Id. (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. 

28 Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986)). “Because the relief sought is essentially the 

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1 same, in the form of mandamus,” the court analyzes plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief under the 

2 APA. Id. 

3 In its prior order, the court found defendants have a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate 

4 Ms. Jamil’s immigrant visa petition within a reasonable time. See Prior Order at 11–12. The 

5 court declines to revisit that conclusion. 

6 The court now considers whether defendants have shown they are entitled to judgment as 

7 a matter of law with regards to plaintiffs’ unreasonable delay claim. In determining whether an 

8 agency action was unreasonably delayed, the courts consider the six “TRAC factors.” In re Nat. 

9 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 956 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2020). 

10 The factors are: 

11 (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a

12 rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other

13 indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed

14 in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for

15 this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere

16 of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and

17 welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of

18 expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or

19 competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the

20 nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the

21 court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude

22 in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

23 Id. at 1138–39 (quoting Telecommc’ns Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. F.C.C., 750 F.2d 70, 79–80 (D.C. 

24 Cir. 1984)). In considering these factors, the court views the summary judgment record in the 

25 light most favorable to plaintiffs and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor. See

26 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88. 

27 1. TRAC Factor One: Rule of Reason

28 Although not determinative, the first factor, “rule of reason,” is the most important factor. 

29 In re A Cmty. Voice, 878 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2017). Courts examine the length of delay and 

30 reason for the delay to determine “whether there is any rhyme or reason for the Government’s 

31 delay—in other words, whether the agency’s response time . . . is governed by an identifiable 

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1 rationale.” Poursohi v. Blinken, No. 21-01960, 2021 WL 5331446, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 

2 2021) (internal marks and citation omitted). 

3 The undisputed facts show there is a set of identifiable rationales for the delay in this case. 

4 Mr. Hassan filed an I-130 petition on behalf of his non-citizen beneficiary spouse, Ms. Jamil. 

5 Austin Decl. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs argue Mr. Hassan filed that petition on March 3, 2020. Opp’n at 

24.7 6 USCIS then approved Mr. Hassan’s I-130 petition on August 9, 2021. Austin Decl. ¶ 10. 

7 The NVC then determined Ms. Jamil was documentarily qualified on May 24, 2022. Id. ¶ 11. 

8 However, on March 20, 2020, the State Department suspended all routine visa services 

9 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Bentley Decl. ¶ 11. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad did 

10 not resume limited scheduling of immediate relative visas until June 2020, and did not fully 

11 resume all routine visa services until March 2021. Id. ¶ 13. 

12 In August 2021, the Taliban took over Kabul, Afghanistan, and the Consular Section at 

13 the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad “played a major role in assisting evacuees out of Afghanistan[.]” 

14 Id. ¶ 14. Between August and October 2021, the embassy “processed thousands of U.S. citizens, 

15 U.S. lawful permanent residents, locally employed staff from U.S. Embassy Kabul, and other 

16 U.S. government-affiliated noncitizens for onward travel to the United States through various 

17 legal pathways, including hundreds of [immigrant visas] and Special Immigrant Visa (‘SIV’) 

18 applications for Afghan nationals.” Id. 

19 Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic to 2023, the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad has 

20 struggled with several staff vacancies, including three vacant positions for U.S. direct-hire 

21 employees, who perform various duties including “case processing and adjudication” and “in 

22 person interviews.” Id. ¶¶ 16–17. As noted above, the staffing vacancies “are partially explained 

23 by the fact that Islamabad is considered a hardship and high-threat post,” many of the positions 

24 require adjudicators to know or learn Urdu or Dari, and the “pandemic resulted in a drastic drop 

25 in fee revenue for the [State] Department and visa services are primarily fee funded.” Id. ¶ 16. 

7

 Although plaintiffs provide no evidence to substantiate this argument, defendants do not 

challenge this statement and the court has no reason to doubt it. 

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The COVID-19 pandemic, Taliban takeover and staffing vacancies have resulted in 

significant backlogs and delays. See Austin Decl. ¶ 3. In addition to these factors, Ms. Jamil’s

application is undergoing administrative processing for additional security screening. Dus Decl. 

¶ 8; see also Second Stip. & Order for Extension of Time. The undisputed facts show an 

identifiable set of rationales for the delay in this case. 

In addition, the length of delay does not itself indicate unreasonable delay. As a 

preliminary matter, the court rejects plaintiffs’ suggestion that defendants have delayed 

adjudicating Ms. Jamil’s visa since March 3, 2020. See Opp’n at 24. March 3, 2020, was when 

Mr. Hassan filed an I-130 petition, and not when Ms. Jamil submitted her DS-260 immigrant visa 

application. See id. at 15; Austin Decl. ¶¶ 10–12. The USCIS has already approved the I-130 

petition, which is separate from the DS-260 application. See, e.g., Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 

3d 59, 67 (D.D.C. 2022) (claims against Department of Homeland Security and USCIS officials 

moot because they had already approved the plaintiff’s I-130 petition and forwarded it to NVC, 

thus their role in processing the visa application was complete and it was for the Department of 

State to schedule a consular interview and consular officer to issue or refuse the visa). At the 

earliest, defendants have delayed adjudicating Ms. Jamil’s application since May 24, 2022, the 

date the NVC determined Ms. Jamil was documentarily qualified, or at the latest, January 29, 

2024, the date the consular officer in the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad interviewed and refused her 

visa application. Defendants argue the length of delay is measured from the last government 

action, January 29, 2024. See Reply at 7 (citing Khushnood v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Serv., No. 21-02166, 2022 WL 407152, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2022)). Plaintiff argues the delay 

should be measured from May 24, 2022, or even earlier, March 3, 2020. See Opp’n at 24. 

The court does not resolve here whether the delay should be measured from the date the 

NVC determined Ms. Jamil was documentarily qualified or the date the consular officer refused 

her application for further administrative processing. Although the consular officer submitted 

her application for further administrative processing on January 29, 2024, this does not change 

27 the fact Ms. Jamil’s application has been pending since May 24, 2022. 

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1 In any case, in the immigration context, district courts have generally found delays of less 

2 than four years are not unreasonable. See, e.g., Islam v. Heinauer, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1071 

3 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (collecting cases and noting courts in that district “have generally found delays 

4 of four years or less not to be unreasonable”); Poursohi, 2021 WL 5331446, at *5 (collecting 

5 cases and noting delay of two years “does not typically require judicial intervention”); but cf. 

6 Feng v. Beers, No. 13-02396, 2014 WL 1028371, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014) (declining to 

7 decide whether delay of 16 months is unreasonable on a motion to dismiss and motion for 

8 summary judgment). 

9 The undisputed facts of record show defendants’ response time—whether it be over two 

10 years or seven months—is governed by a set of identifiable rationales in light of the backlog and 

11 delays caused in part by the effects of the global pandemic, resource allocation in the Embassy in 

12 Islamabad to assist with ramifications of the Taliban takeover, continuing staffing vacancies, and 

13 the additional time needed to conduct additional security screening. See, e.g., Kapoor v. Blinken, 

14 No. 21-01961, 2022 WL 181217, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2022) (delays due to COVID 

15 reasonable and collecting cases); Infracost Inc. v. Blinkon, No. 23-2226, 2024 WL 1914368, at *8 

16 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2024) (cause of delay does not appear to lack reason where defendants needed 

17 additional information because of the sensitive nature of visa determination and other factors). 

18 On this record, this factor weighs in favor of defendants. 

19 2. TRAC Factor Two: Timetable

20 For the second TRAC factor, the court considers whether “Congress has provided a 

21 timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the 

22 enabling statute[.]” In re Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 956 F.3d at 1138. Congress has not 

23 provided a timetable for processing immigration visa applications. Cf. 8 U.S.C. 

24 § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) (another provision of the INA requiring interviews to “commence not later

25 than 45 days after the date an application is filed” for asylum cases). Rather, “Congress has given

26 the State Department and other agencies wide discretion in the area of immigration processing.”

27 Milligan v. Pompeo, 502 F. Supp. 3d 302, 318 (D.D.C. 2020) (internal marks and citation

28 omitted).

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Plaintiffs point to two sources to argue Congress did provide a timetable. First, plaintiffs 

point to 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b), which provides “[i]t is the sense of Congress that the processing of

an immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days after the initial 

filing of the application[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b). However, it is unclear how § 1571 is relevant in 

this case given the provision is directed to the USCIS regarding the processing of immigration 

benefit applications, and not to consular officials regarding the processing of immigrant visa 

applications. See, e.g., El Centro Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blinken, No. 21-00361, 2021 WL 3141205, 

at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) (“[T]he plain text of § 1571 indicates that it applies to the 

processing of immigrant benefit applications by USCIS, not consular officials at the State 

Department.”); Borzouei v. Bitter, No. 22-872, 2022 WL 17682659, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 

2022), appeal dismissed, No. 23-55121, 2023 WL 9546520 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2023) (same). 

Moreover, as plaintiffs note, this language is “merely precatory,” and does not impose a 

mandatory timetable. See Opp’n at 25; see, e.g., Eljalabi v. Blinken, No. 21-1730, 

2022 WL 2752613, at *5 (D.D.C. July 14, 2022). 

Second, plaintiffs point to 9 FAM 504.7-2(b), which provides the State Department 

“expects all IV units to strive to meet the 30[] day requirement[]” of the policy set forth in

Section 237 of Public Law 106-113. Section 237(a) states “[i]t shall be the policy of the 

Department of State to process immigrant visa applications of immediate relatives of United

States . . . within 30 days of the receipt of all necessary documents from the applicant and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service.” Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. 

No. 106-113, § 237, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999). Rather than being a mandatory timetable imposed 

by Congress, the 30-day timeline is a non-binding policy the Department of State strives to meet.

See, e.g., Kapoor, 2022 WL 181217, at *7; Pourshakouri v. Pompeo, No. 20-00402, 

2021 WL 3552199, at *9 n.11 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2021) (finding 9 FAM § 504.7-2 “insufficient to 

displace the significant discretion that Congress provided to the federal agencies tasked with 

processing immigration applicants and vetting them to protect the national security”).

Although there is no mandated timeline, the court notes “a non-binding deadline may still 

28 be an indication of the speed with which Congress expects the agency to proceed.” Ramirez v. 

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1 Blinken, 594 F. Supp. 3d 76, 94 (D.D.C. 2022) (emphasis in original) (internal marks and 

2 citations omitted). Thus, while the 30-day timeline may be a non-mandatory, aspirational goal, a 

3 delay of at least seven times Congress’s stated goal runs counter to Congressional expectations. 

4 Cf. e.g., Keller Wurtz v. U. S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 20-2163, 2020 WL 4673949, at 

5 *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2020) (“USCIS is correct that this timeline is not mandatory, but it

6 nevertheless weighs in favor of finding the delay here—approximately four times Congress’s

7 stated goal—to be unreasonable.”); Islam, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1073 (“While the language of

8 

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15 

§ 1571(b) [policy of completing certain immigration applications within 180 days] is not

mandatory, it nonetheless suffices to tip the second TRAC factor i[n] [plaintiff’s] favor.”).

However, because Congress has not yet imposed a mandatory timeline for adjudicating

Ms. Jamil’s application and the delay otherwise comports with the rule of reason, the second

factor is neutral based on this record. See, e.g., Poursohi, 2021 WL 5331446, at *9 (“[T]he

absence of a mandatory timetable for adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Application combined with the

fact that the delay comports with the rule of reason, the second TRAC factor also weighs in

Defendant’s favor or is at least neutral.”).

16 3. TRAC Factors Three and Five: Nature of Interests

17 

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26 

“The third and fifth factors overlap, requiring the court to consider whether human health 

and welfare are at stake, and the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay.” 

Poursohi, 2021 WL 5331446, at *9. Defendants do not challenge plaintiffs’ allegations that they 

have suffered significant emotional, psychological and financial hardships as a result of the 

prolonged and indefinite family separation caused by defendants’ delay. See MSJ at 17–18; Reply 

at 13. The INA “was intended to keep families together.” Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 

401 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005), and the goals of the INA undoubtably are hindered by the

indefinite family separation here. It is reasonable to infer plaintiffs have suffered significant harm

due to the prolonged separation and uncertainty regarding the status of Ms. Jamil’s application.

Because it is defendants’ initial burden to show no material facts are in dispute, see Celotex Corp., 

27 477 U.S. at 325, and they have not submitted any evidence regarding factors three and

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1 five, the court draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor to conclude these factors weigh 

2 in favor of plaintiffs based on the record before the court. 

3 4. TRAC Factor Four: Effect of Expediting Delayed Action

4 For the fourth factor, the court considers “the effect of expediting delayed action on 

5 agency activities of a higher or competing priority[.]” In re Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 956 F.3d 

6 at 1141 (citation omitted). “[W]here an agency’s progress on one individual’s application would 

7 necessarily negatively impact another application, courts have held that plaintiffs’ recourse is 

8 with Congress, not the courts.” Liu v. Denayer, No. 16-653, 2022 WL 17370527, at *5 (C.D. 

9 Cal. July 18, 2022). 

10 Plaintiffs request the court compel defendants to “process Plaintiffs’ immigrant visa 

11 applications [and] issue visas to eligible Beneficiary Plaintiffs[.]” Compl. at 33 (Prayer for 

12 Relief). Defendants argue the relief plaintiffs seek would essentially allow plaintiffs to reorder 

13 the queue and allow Ms. Jamil’s application to be placed ahead of other applicants who have 

14 similarly been waiting for a similar or longer period of time. MSJ at 13–14. The granting of 

15 plaintiffs’ request would require the court to “upend the State Department’s discretionary 

16 balancing of competing demands and its allocation of limited consular resources.” Id. at 16. 

17 Plaintiffs argue there is no queue now that Ms. Jamil’s application is going through additional 

18 security vetting. See Opp’n at 27 (citing Second Carson Wu Decl. ¶ 27). 

19 The court agrees its authority cannot be deployed as a tool to “cut in line” or reorder 

20 agency priorities in plaintiffs’ favor at the expense of other similarly situated applicants. See, 

21 e.g., Ferdowski v. Blinken, No. 23-01123, 2024 WL 685912, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2024)

22 (“Where, as here, Plaintiffs suffer general physical, financial, and emotional stresses, courts

23 consider the government’s competing priorities and the fact that pushing Plaintiffs’ application to

24 the front of the line would delay the applications of others, who also have human welfare and

25 interests at stake.” (citation and marks omitted)). At the same time, however, the lack of consular

26 resources and “[d]efendants’ failure to fulfill their statutory duty to other applicants ha[ve] no

27 bearing on whether they have fulfilled their statutory duty to [p]laintiffs.” Liang v. Att’y Gen. of

28 U.S., No. 07-2349, 2007 WL 3225441, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2007).

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1 Here, the parties agree SAO responses cannot be completed on a first-in, first-out basis. 

2 See Opp’n at 27; Reply at 12. Accordingly, there is no evidence adjudicating Ms. Jamil’s 

3 application will place her ahead of other similarly situated applicants who have been waiting the 

4 same amount or longer time. Moreover, defendants have not provided any evidence of the “line” 

5 plaintiffs are supposedly cutting. Apart from citing several cases, defendants have not produced 

6 evidence of what their competing or higher priorities are. They also have not produced evidence 

7 of the effect timely adjudicating Ms. Jamil’s application will have on those priorities. The court 

8 understands defendants have an important role in making sure visa applicants do not pose 

9 national security risks and are working with limited consular resources. However, these factors 

10 do not excuse defendants from their duty to adjudicate plaintiffs’ immigrant visa petitions within 

11 a reasonable time. The record before the court shows this factor weighs in favor of plaintiffs. 

12 5. TRAC Factor Six: Impropriety

13 Plaintiffs do not allege or argue impropriety or bad faith. See generally Opp’n. Based on 

14 this record, this factor weighs in favor of defendants. 

15 VI. CONCLUSION

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Having considered all the factors in light of the record before it, the court cannot conclude

defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Without more information, the court cannot 

determine whether the time defendants are taking to conduct the additional security screening and 

complete adjudicating Ms. Jamil’s visa application is reasonable considering her unique 

circumstances. Defendants have provided no estimate of the additional time they need to

complete adjudicating the application. The court is concerned the “administrative processing” 

designation is a convenient bureaucratic label allowing defendants to place visa applicants like 

Ms. Jamil in limbo, where their visas are neither refused nor granted, but without any clear 

explanation as to when the administrative processing or additional security screening will be 

completed. Based on this record, the court cannot find the delay in this case is not unreasonable 

as a matter of law. Cf. e.g., Feng, 2014 WL 1028371, at *5 (denying summary judgment and 

27 noting “[i]t remains possible that USCIS has been dragging its feet, intentionally or not.”). 

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1 Accordingly, the court denies defendants’ motion for summary judgment. As noted, the 

2 court grants in part plaintiffs’ motion to strike and denies plaintiffs’ motion to compel. 

3 A Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Conference is hereby set for September 26, 2024 at 2:30 

4 p.m. in Courtroom 3 (KJM) before the undersigned, with the filing of a joint status report due

5 fourteen (14) days prior.

6 This order resolves ECF Nos. 24, 37 and 42. 

7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

8 DATED: August 21, 2024. 

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