Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00012/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Westfield Insurance Company, an Ohio 

Company, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Double AA Builders, Ltd., an Arizona 

corporation. 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00012-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 

12(b)(1), (3), (6), and (7). (Doc. 9.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the 

Motion.1

BACKGROUND2

 This declaratory action arises from an insurance coverage dispute. Defendant 

Double AA is a licensed general contractor and Plaintiff Westfield is its insurer. (Doc. 1 ¶ 

7.) In 2007, Double AA contracted with Harkins Theatres (“Harkins”) to construct a 

theatre complex in North Phoenix (the “Theatre”). (Id.) As the general contractor, Double 

 

1

 The Parties’ requests for oral argument are denied because they have had an adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence, and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 

724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). 

2

 The Court takes as true the allegations contained in Westfield’s Complaint at this stage of the litigation. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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AA contracted with Anchor Roofing Systems, Inc. (“Anchor”) to construct the Built-Up 

Roofing (the “BUR”) and with GAF Materials Corporation (“GAF”) to provide certain 

roofing materials for the Theatre. (Id.) 

 On April 16, 2008. (Id. ¶ 8.) Anchor warrantied the BUR and agreed to repair or 

replace any defective work within a period of two years. (Id.) After the Theatre’s 

completion, the roof developed cracks and leaks, resulting in some interior water damage 

to the Theatre. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 19.) Anchor and/or GAF made several repairs to the cracks in 

the BUR, but that did not resolve the issue. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

 Harkins, Double AA, and GAF investigated these continuing problems. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

Meanwhile, Harkins retained a roof consultant from WRECORP to determine the cause 

of the roof deterioration. (Id. ¶ 12.) The consultant’s August 16, 2012 report identified 

specific reasons why the roof installation by Anchor and GAF was not proper and 

concluded that a combination of factors caused the roof system to fail. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) The 

presence of moisture prior to and during the roof installation was the strongest factor in 

the deterioration. (Id. ¶ 14.) GAF reviewed and agreed with the conclusions contained in 

the report. (Id. ¶ 15.) Level 4 Studio, the architectural firm that designed the Theatre, sent 

correspondence to Double AA stating that the cracks exhibited a systematic roof failure 

and that Harkins demanded a full replacement of the roof. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

 Double AA proceeded with the roof replacement and incurred costs of 

approximately $400,000. (Id. ¶ 17.) To remedy the problem, Double AA removed the 

BUR to allow moisture to dry out and then re-installed it. (Id. ¶ 18.) After the 

replacement, Double AA submitted an insurance claim to Westfield. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

 Westfield had issued an insurance policy to Double AA (the “Policy”) which 

provided coverage beginning on August 2, 2006, and was renewed for one-year periods 

through August 1, 2012. (Id. ¶ 20.) The Policy covers “property damage” if it is caused 

by an “occurrence.” (Id. at 5, §§ 1(a), (b).) “Property damage” is defined as “[p]hysical 

injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property . . . or [l]oss 

of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.” (Id. at 9, § 17.) An 

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“occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 

substantially the same general harmful conditions.” (Id. at 8, § 13.) But the Policy does 

not cover “‘[p]roperty damage’ to ‘your work’ arising out of it or any part of it and 

included in the ‘products-completed operations hazard.’” (Id. at 7, § 2(l).) The exclusion 

does not apply “if the damaged work out of which the damage arises was performed on 

your behalf by a subcontractor.” (Id.) 

 Upon receiving the insurance claim, Westfield informed Double AA that the 

Policy does not provide coverage for the cost of repairing the defective roof but would 

provide coverage to the extent that Double AA was liable for resulting interior water 

damage. (Id. ¶ 22.) Westfield denies any obligation to indemnify Double AA because the 

existence of the defective roof and the cost of repairing it does not constitute an 

“occurrence” or “property damage” as defined in the Policy and because such 

expenditures are excluded from coverage. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Double AA disputes 

Westfield’s coverage position and has demanded that Westfield reimburse it for the costs 

incurred to replace the roof. (Id. ¶ 23.) 

 On January 3, 2013, Westfield filed this action pursuant to the Federal Declaratory 

Judgment Act (“FDJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, for a judicial declaration that it has no 

obligation to defend or indemnify Double AA in connection with any claims for the 

repair or replacement of the defective roof. (Doc. 1.) On February 19, 2013, Double AA 

filed an action in Maricopa County Superior Court with claims against Westfield for 

breach of contract and a declaratory judgment relating to the policy coverage issue. (Doc. 

9-1 at 13.) In that pending state action, Double AA also brings claims against Anchor for 

breach of contract, negligence, and indemnity for failing to properly install the BUR and 

against Anchor’s insurer, Preferred, for breach of contract and a declaratory judgment for 

damages caused by the roof failure. (Id.) On the same day, Double AA filed this motion 

to dismiss the Complaint and requested the Court to decline jurisdiction in this matter. 

(Doc. 9.) 

/ / / 

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DISCUSSION 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

 The FDJA states that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction [with 

noted exceptions] . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other 

legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further 

relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The FDJA “created an opportunity, 

rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants.” Wilton v. Seven 

Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “The 

Declaratory Judgment Act was an authorization, not a command. It gave the federal 

courts competence to make a declaration of rights; it did not impose a duty to do so.” 

Amer. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hungerford, 53 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other 

grounds by Gov’t. Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(stating that “the Declaratory Judgment Act is ‘deliberately cast in terms of permissive, 

rather than mandatory, authority’”) (internal citation omitted). 

 When determining whether to abstain from an FDJA action, the Ninth Circuit 

considers the factors set out by the Supreme Court in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance 

Company of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942). “The district court [1] should avoid needless 

determination of state law issues; [2] it should discourage litigants from filing declaratory 

actions as a means of forum shopping; and [3] it should avoid duplicative litigation.” 

Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“The 

Brillhart factors remain the philosophical touchstone for the district court.”) (internal 

citation omitted). The Brillhart court explained that “[o]rdinarily it would be 

uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory 

judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, 

not governed by federal law, between the same parties” and that “[g]ratuitous 

interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation 

should be avoided.” 316 U.S. at 495. 

 The Brillhart factors are not exhaustive, and courts should also consider: (1) 

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whether the declaratory action will settle all aspects of the controversy; (2) whether the 

action will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; (3) whether the 

action is being sought merely for the purposes of procedural fencing or to obtain a “res 

judicata” advantage; (4) whether the use of the action will result in entanglement between 

the federal and state court systems; (5) the convenience to the parties; and (6) the 

availability and relative convenience of other remedies. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5. 

II. ABSTENTION FACTORS 

 A. Needless Determination of State Law Issues 

 Westfield brings this declaratory action to resolve one issue: whether Double AA 

is entitled to reimbursement from Westfield under its general liability policy for the 

expense that Double AA incurred in repairing the defective roof. Insurance coverage and 

contract interpretation are fundamentally questions of state law and “federal courts 

should decline to assert jurisdiction in insurance coverage and other declaratory relief 

actions presenting only issues of state law during the pendency of parallel proceedings in 

state court unless there are circumstances present to warrant an exception to that rule.” 

Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Karussos, 65 F.3d 796, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1995) overruled 

in part on other grounds by Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1227 (internal citation omitted). The Ninth 

Circuit has emphasized the general rule that insurance coverage actions belong in state 

rather than federal court and “the traditional rule that ‘states ha[ve] a free hand in 

regulating the dealings between insurers and their policyholders.’” Karussos, 65 F.3d at 

799 (citing SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969)). 

 If it proceeds with this action, the Court will be required to determine issues of 

state law when interpreting the policy, any ambiguity therein, and whether Double AA’s 

claims are covered. That determination is needless in light of the proceeding in the state 

court forum in which these issues can and will be resolved. 

 Westfield contends that although the coverage dispute is governed by state law, 

the Court need not address unsettled state law issues because coverage for the correction 

of defective workmanship has already been determined by Arizona state courts. That may 

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be true, however, the question before the Court is not whether it could adjudicate the 

insurance coverage issue, but whether such adjudication would be “needless” because 

that issue could be adjudicated in the pending state court proceeding. Westfield does not 

dispute the state action would dispose of all issues raised by it in the present declaratory 

suit. State court is the preferred forum for resolving issues of insurance coverage. See 

Karussos, 65 F.3d 796, 798-799. Thus, this factor weighs against exercising the Court’s 

jurisdiction to hear this case. 

 B. Forum Shopping 

 “[F]ederal courts should generally decline to entertain reactive declaratory 

actions.” Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225. In Continental Casualty. Co. v. Robsac Industries, an 

insurer filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court “during the pendency of a 

non-removable state court action presenting the same issues of state law.” The court held 

that the insurer did so merely to obtain “a tactical advantage from litigating in a federal 

forum” and that the “defensive or reactive” nature of the insurer’s action warranted 

dismissal. 947 F.2d 1367, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by 

Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1220. 

 Double AA argues that although Westfield could have filed the current action in 

state court, it “rushed to file this action within days after meeting with Double AA to 

discuss coverage.” (Doc. 9 at 7.) Westfield contends that the timing of its Complaint is 

not indicative of forum shopping because the Parties had been communicating for months 

about the coverage issue and it became clear that declaratory relief was required. 

 This case is distinguishable from the “reactive” action in Robsac in which the state 

action was pending when the insurer filed the federal declaratory action. Further, 

Westfield rightly asserts that the mere act of invoking federal jurisdiction when it is 

proper does not evince forum shopping. See First State Ins. Co. v. Callan Associates, 

Inc., 113 F.3d 161, 162 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Although occasionally stigmatized as ‘forum 

shopping,’ the desire for a federal forum is assured by the constitutional provision for 

diversity jurisdiction and the congressional statute implementing Article III.”) Yet 

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jurisdiction for actions brought pursuant to the FDJA is discretionary and the Court must 

decide whether it is proper to exercise such jurisdiction in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); 

Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288. 

 Westfield contends that it is Double AA that is forum shopping since it filed the 

state action after Westfield filed this action and joined a non-diverse defendant, Anchor, 

so that the state action would not be removable to federal court. Westfield claims that the 

tort claims against Anchor, the subcontractor, are not related to the insurance claims 

against Westfield and Double AA does not have a current dispute with Anchor. As is true 

for Westfield’s action, the timing of Double AA’s state action is not dispositive as to 

forum shopping. See Allstate Indem. Co., Inc. v. Reidel, CV 10-8158-PHX-DGC, 2011 

WL 744891 at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2011); Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 

F.3d 800, 802–04 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that in Wilton, 515 U.S. at 279–80 “the Court 

suggested that the order of filing is legally insignificant when it ruled in favor of a state 

action filed several weeks after a federal action.”). Further, joinder of Anchor in the state 

action is not necessarily “defensive maneuvering” since the tort and insurance claims are 

based on the same underlying facts regarding the defective roof and subsequent repair. It 

is telling that six weeks after Westfield filed this declaratory action in federal court, 

Double AA filed a similar action in state court and moved to dismiss this Complaint on 

the same day. It can be stated that both parties have engaged in some “procedural 

fencing” to get to their preferred forum. Thus, this factor is neutral in the determination. 

 C. Duplicative Litigation 

In cases where there is a parallel state proceeding involving the same issues and 

parties pending at the time the federal declaratory action is filed, there is a presumption 

that the entire suit should be heard in state court.” Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 (citing 

Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1991)). Westfield’s 

federal action, however, was filed before the state action. There is “no presumption that 

the declaratory action should be heard in state court.” Keown v. Tudor Ins. Co., 621 F. 

Supp. 2d 1025, 1038 (D. Haw. 2008) (citing Huth, 298 F.3d at 803–04). This case “will 

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be disposed of in its entirety either in state or federal court.” Huth, 298 F.3d at 803. 

Therefore, this factor is also neutral in the determination.

 D. Other Factors 

 The other factors outlined in Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5, do not meaningfully 

impact the jurisdictional analysis here. Double AA contends that this action will not settle 

all aspects of the controversy. The factual issues of the BUR failure’s cause, whether it 

was the workmanship of Double AA or its subcontractor, and the necessity of 

preventative repairs will be determined in the state action. Westfield states that the only 

dispute between the Parties is about policy coverage for costs incurred from repairing the 

roof. It is possible that the Court may address the cause of the roof failure in order to 

resolve the coverage dispute, and thus settle all aspects of this controversy. But such a 

determination is better made in the state action where there are concomitant tort and 

insurance claims against the subcontractor and its insurer. If the Court retains jurisdiction 

there is a risk of “piecemeal” litigation. 

 This declaratory action will not clarify the legal relations at issue more than the 

state action with a well-developed factual record. A similar state remedy for declaratory 

relief is available to Westfield. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 12-1831. In fact, Double AA requests 

declaratory relief against Westfield on the very same issue in the state action. 

 Because the parallel actions involve overlapping issues and parties, there is a 

possibility of inconsistent factual and legal determinations. This could lead to 

“entanglement” between the two systems. As for convenience to the parties, the cause of 

the roof failure and cost to repair it are pivotal factual issues in this case. Determining 

those issues would necessitate discovery from the parties involved in constructing the 

Theatre, including the subcontractor, architect, and property owner. Further, the 

subcontractor’s insurer may have an interest in being involved in such determination. 

These non-diverse parties have been or may be joined in the state action. Westfield 

argues that this Court is a convenient forum because Westfield is from another state and 

does not want to be dragged into an action involving unrelated claims against other 

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parties. The Court does not find that the other claims are wholly unrelated. 

 It was Westfield’s prerogative to file this action in federal court; however, the 

exercise of jurisdiction is discretionary in this matter. As the Court has not expended 

significant resources on this action, it is prudent to decline jurisdiction and allow the state 

action to proceed. 

CONCLUSION 

 The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over this declaratory action. This 

insurance coverage dispute governed by state law is properly adjudicated in the parallel 

state court proceeding where Westfield may pursue a similar state remedy.

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9), 

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (3), (6) and (7) is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to 

terminate this action and enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 12th day of August, 2013. 

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