Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00586/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00586-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PERCY STOCKTON, )

)

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

T. BILLINGS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:10-cv-00586-JLT HC 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS

CONTAINING UNEXHAUSTED CLAIMS 

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO FILE A

RESPONSE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The instant petition, which concerns a disciplinary hearing held on October 10, 2009, was

filed on April 5, 2010. (Doc. 1). In the petition, Petitioner alleges a single ground for relief as

follows: (1) a prison counselor, T. Billings, repeatedly rejected Petitioner’s appeal from a

disciplinary rules violation finding that resulted, inter alia, in the loss of thirty days’ credits. 

(Doc. 1, pp. 3; 19). On April 16, 2010, Petitioner filed his written consent to the jurisdiction of

the United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (Doc. 4). 

A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that some or all of Petitioner’s

claims may be unexhausted. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a

petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook,

260 F.3d 1039 (9 Cir.2001). th

B. Exhaustion.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d

1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971);

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest

state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis);

Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

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In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of

state remedies requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state

courts in order to give the State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights” (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged

violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that

the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say

so, not only in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his

federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982,

987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court

has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either

by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is

“self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be

decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution

of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th

Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact

that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of

federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In this case, Petitioner does not indicate that he has ever presented his claim to the

California Supreme Court. Instead, he states, “I have other pending suits, both civil and habeas

corpus.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). However, Petitioner does not identify the courts in which those cases

were filed, the dates on which they were filed, or the issues raised in those cases. Certainly,

Petitioner does not allege that he has presented his claim of wrongful rejection of his disciplinary

appeal to the State’s highest court. Accordingly, at this juncture, it appears that the petition

contains only unexhausted claims.

The Court must dismiss a petition that contains unexhausted claims, even if it also

contains exhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

265 (1997).

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Petitioner will be ordered to show cause why the Petition should not be dismissed for

failing to exhaust state court remedies. Should it be the case that the claims were exhausted,

Petitioner should make clear when and in what court the claims were raised. If possible,

Petitioner should present to the Court documentary evidence that the claims were indeed

presented to the California Supreme Court.1

If the Petition contains unexhausted claims, Petitioner may, at his option, withdraw the

unexhausted claims and go forward with the exhausted claims. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d

568, 574 (9th Cir.2000) (“habeas litigants must have opportunity to amend their mixed petitions

by striking unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering dismissal”). 

Petitioner may also move to withdraw the entire Petition and return to federal court only

when he has finally exhausted his state court remedies. Petitioner should bear in mind, however,

that there exists a one year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas corpus petitions. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Ford, 305 F.3d at 885-885. In most cases, the one year period starts to run

on the date the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct review. See id. Although the

limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in state

court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time an application is pending in federal

court. Duncan v. Walker, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

Finally, Petitioner can do nothing, and thereby risk dismissal of the entire Petition should

the Court later find that the Petition contained unexhausted claims. 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of

service of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for failing to

exhaust state court remedies. 

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in an order 

A copy of the California Supreme Court’s denial alone is insufficient to demonstrate exhaustion. The

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proper documentation to provide would be a copy of the Petition filed in the California Supreme Court that includes

the claim now presented and a file stamp showing that it was indeed filed in that Court.

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that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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