Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01474/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01474-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRINA HILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOODFELLOW TOP GRADE,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-01474-HSG 

ORDER ON RENEWED MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Re: Dkt. No. 172

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). Dkt. No. 172 (“Mot.”). Having carefully considered 

the papers submitted and oral arguments, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendant’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Role at Goodfellow

Plaintiff Trina Hill started working for Defendant Goodfellow Top Grade Construction, 

LLC (“Goodfellow” or “Top Grade”) on May 9, 2017. Dkt. No. 154 (“Trial Tr. Vol. 1”) at 

124:16–17. Goodfellow was one of the subcontractors working for Clark Construction, the 

general contractor, to construct the Chase Center in San Francisco, California. See id. at 124:3–

125:7. Plaintiff is listed with her union as a “general laborer,” a role which entails flagging, 

shoveling, digging, and “a variety of tasks under labor.” Id. at 121:17–122:2; Tr. Ex. 4. She

primarily works at construction sites. Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 117:12–13. 

Around December 2013, Plaintiff’s left lung collapsed and had to be partially removed. 

Id. at 118:14–119:1. As a result of her lung condition, Plaintiff was not capable of performing 

“general labor physical work” anymore. Id. at 119:5–11. Therefore, though her official title was 

still “general laborer,” she was registered with her union for “flagging jobs only.” Id. at 116:1–4. 

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Flagging jobs involve directing traffic. Id. at 116:5–11. Plaintiff testified that she explained her 

lung condition to Leonard Garcia, her supervisor at Goodfellow, on June 28, 2017. Id. at 132:16–

24.

B. July 13, 2017 Incident with Phallic-Shaped Object and Michael Bounds

On the morning of July 13, 2017, Plaintiff and her colleague, Diana Monroe, discovered a 

phallic-shaped object at the gate where they worked. Id. at 139:15–140:1. The object was not 

there the night before when Plaintiff departed the worksite around 7:00 p.m. Dkt. No. 151 (“Trial 

Tr. Vol. 2”) at 271:5–272:4. The gate was not locked, and Plaintiff does not know who placed the 

object there. Id. at 272:8–274:1. 

Because Ms. Monroe and Plaintiff were the only women working at that gate, Plaintiff felt 

disrespected upon seeing that object. Id. at 141:16–21. She asked Michael Bounds, an employee 

of another subcontractor, if he placed the object there, and he responded by “lift[ing] up his shirt 

and pull[ing] his pants down and expos[ing]” himself indecently to Plaintiff. Id. at 141:22–142:6. 

Immediately after, Ms. Monroe reported the Mr. Bounds incident to Justin Porter, the “on-site, oncare health and safety provider.” Id. at 142:25–143:6. Mr. Porter told Plaintiff to “immediately 

go report it on the seventh floor to the general contractor, Clark Construction.” Id. Plaintiff

reported the incident to Steve Humphrey, head of safety at Clark Construction. Id. at 143:7–22. 

Mr. Humphrey called Goodfellow and according to Plaintiff, he “didn’t offer them a choice but to 

remove Mr. Bounds from the jobsite.” Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 145:16–146:4. As a result, Mr. Bounds 

was “immediately terminated.” Id. 

At the direction of Prentiss Jackson, another Clark Construction employee, Plaintiff 

submitted a statement describing the incident, which Mr. Jackson forwarded to Goodfellow on 

July 19, 2017. Id. at 144:2–21; Trial. Ex. 14. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Jackson removed the 

phallic-shaped object. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 274:17–18. 

C. Statewide Flaggers

Plaintiff testified that on September 5, 2017, Mr. Garcia informed her that Clark 

Construction “had made a decision to bring in eight non-African American flaggers to replace 

eight African American local hires.” Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 146:21–147:6. These flaggers were from 

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Statewide. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 174:22–175:24. In response to the “Statewide flaggers being 

brought in,” Plaintiff set up a meeting with Mr. Humphrey for the following day, September 6, 

2017, at 10:00 a.m. Id. at 175:24–176:5. At the meeting, Mr. Humphrey told Plaintiff that she 

“would be staying on for the whole duration of the job, flagging.” Id. at 178:15–21. After the 

meeting, Plaintiff ran into Justin Kim and Sean Lennan from Goodfellow and discussed her 

respiratory issues and the “type of problems I was having with my body.” Id. at 180:21–181:17.

D. September 18, 2017 Incident with Maurice Haskell

Plaintiff was working with a co-worker named Maurice Haskell on September 18, 2017. 

Id. at 182:24–183:4. She and Mr. Haskell were both flagging at their respective gates when they 

simultaneously let their traffic go, almost causing a collision. Id. at 183:14–184:5. Plaintiff and 

Mr. Haskell started arguing, which escalated with Mr. Haskell calling her a gender-linked 

derogatory term (“b----”) and threatening Plaintiff and her family. Id. at 185:9–23. Plaintiff 

testified that she spoke to Mr. Garcia, who told Plaintiff to move to the “middle of the jobsite.” Id. 

at 185:24–15. Plaintiff expressed to Mr. Garcia her health concerns with moving to that location, 

given that the area had a lot of dust, and asked Mr. Garcia why he was not asking Mr. Haskell to 

move. Id. at 186:16– 187:19. Mr. Garcia responded, “Trina, that’s not your gate. Either you can 

get your things and move to the middle or you can leave the jobsite.” Id. at 187:20–22. Plaintiff 

gathered her things and proceeded to leave the jobsite. Id. at 188:1–5. 

After Plaintiff left the jobsite, Mr. Garcia started to investigate the altercation between 

Plaintiff and Mr. Haskell. Dkt. No. 159 (“Trial Tr. Vol. 3”) at 415:23–416:4. He called Mr. 

Lennan to assist in the investigation and they interviewed Mr. Haskell and other workers who 

witnessed the dispute. Id. at 416:5–16. As a result of Defendant’s investigation, approximately 

three days after the incident, Defendant gave Mr. Haskell a verbal “Coach to Correct,” informing

him that it was “wrong of him to be using inappropriate language on the jobsite directed at other 

employees, including the word ‘b----.’” Id. at 417:14–19, 488:11–21. 

E. Plaintiff’s Coach to Correct and One-Day Suspension

Plaintiff testified that after her incident with Mr. Haskell but before Plaintiff could leave 

the jobsite, a Goodfellow supervisor stopped her and told her not to leave, as there was going to be 

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a meeting. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 188:8–18. During the meeting, Mr. Lennan issued a written “Coach 

to Correct Notice” to Plaintiff and suspended her for a day. Id. at 189:6–11; Trial Ex. 125. 

Plaintiff was told that she was being suspended for a day because she was insubordinate and 

“harsh” with Mr. Garcia. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 189:6–123. 

After she received the Coach to Correct with the one-day suspension, Plaintiff sought an 

appointment with a doctor, because she was “overwhelmed with anxiety at this point. It was just 

one thing after the other with this company.” Id. at 194:3–12. The doctor’s note indicated that 

Plaintiff would be unable to work from “9/20/17 to 12/20/17.” Trial Ex. 111. Plaintiff went back 

to work against her doctor’s recommendation, because she needed to provide for herself and her 

family. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 197:21–24. Plaintiff testified that she disagreed with Defendant’s

characterization of her behavior and felt that the Coach to Correct and one-day suspension were a 

“retaliatory tactic,” and thus she did not return to work for Goodfellow. Id. at 195:22–196:24. 

Instead, she proceeded to work for other construction companies. Id. 

F. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant on March 6, 2018, alleging the following 

claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.: 

(1) discrimination on the basis of race; (2) discrimination on the basis of sex; (3) harassment on 

the basis of race; (4) harassment on the basis of sex; and (5) retaliation. Dkt. No. 1. The parties 

proceeded to trial, which started on September 10, 2019. At the close of Plaintiff’s case, 

Defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 153. The Court deferred 

ruling on the motion. 1 Following a six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant 

on the race discrimination, sex discrimination, and race harassment claims, but found in favor of 

Plaintiff on the sexual harassment and retaliation claims. Dkt. Nos. 162, 166. The jury awarded 

Plaintiff a total of $18,750 in compensatory damages ($11,250 for the sexual harassment claim 

and $7,500 for the retaliation claim). Dkt. No. 162. 

The Court entered final judgment on September 24, 2019. Dkt. No. 171. Defendant

1 Under Rule 50(b), the Court “submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s later deciding 

the legal questions raised by the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).

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timely filed its renewed motion for judgment as matter of law.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“[A] party must make a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law before a case is 

submitted to the jury. If the judge denies or defers ruling on the motion, and if the jury then 

returns a verdict against the moving party, the party may renew its motion under Rule 50(b).” 

Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In considering a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must uphold the jury’s 

verdict if “substantial evidence” supports the jury’s conclusion. Johnson v. Paradise Valley 

Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence is evidence 

adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion 

from the same evidence.” Id. The Court must “view all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of the nonmover, and disregard 

all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Castro v. Cnty. 

of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 662-63 (9th Cir. 2015). A court should only grant a Rule 50(b) 

motion if, after construing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the 

record “permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's 

verdict.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the sexual harassment 

and retaliation claims. The Court addresses each of the claims in turn.

A. Sexual Harassment

Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, including sexual harassment, in employment. Little 

v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2002). When evaluating a claim for 

sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment, the court must determine “two things: 

whether the plaintiff has established that he or she was subjected to a hostile work environment, 

and whether the employer is liable for the harassment that caused the environment.” Id. To 

establish that plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show that: 

(1) she or he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct was

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unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her

or his employment and create an abusive working environment. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 

875–76 (9th Cir. 1991). To be actionable, the Supreme Court has held that a “sexually 

objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a 

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 

787 (1998). “When assessing the objective portion of a plaintiff’s claim, [the court] assume[s] the 

perspective of the reasonable victim.” Id. (citation omitted). Hostility must be measured based on 

the totality of the circumstances. Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 

1995).

“When harassment by co-workers is at issue, the employer’s conduct is reviewed for 

negligence.” Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881). “An employer is liable for a co-worker’s sexual harassment only if, 

after the employer learns of the alleged conduct, he fails to take adequate remedial measures.” 

Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997). The remedial 

measures must be “reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 

928, 940 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted). The reasonableness of the remedial 

measures depends on their ability to: (1) “stop harassment by the person who engaged in the 

harassment;” and (2) “persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct.” Id. 

Remedial measures may include some form of disciplinary action “proportionate[ ] to the 

seriousness of the offense.” Id. at 940–41 (citation and quotations omitted and alterations in 

original). Even if the harassment independently ceases, inaction “constitutes a ratification of past 

harassment.” Id. at 941.

Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim rests on the incidents that Plaintiff testified occurred on 

July 13, 2017 (concerning the phallic-shaped object placed at the worksite and Mr. Bounds 

exposing his behind), and the incident with Mr. Haskell on September 18, 2017. Defendant argues 

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because “three alleged incidents over the course of 

Plaintiff’s four month employment are not sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Dkt. No. 174 

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(“Reply”) at 4.

2

 Further, Defendant argues it took appropriate remedial action in response to any 

alleged sexual misconduct. Mot. at 10–14.3 

i. Severe or Pervasive

To determine whether there was substantial evidence that the unwelcome conduct was 

severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile working environment, the Court considers the 

totality of the circumstances. See Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1527. The Supreme Court has listed 

“frequency, severity and level of interference with work performance among the factors 

particularly relevant to the inquiry.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). “‘[S]imple teasing,’ offhand 

comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory 

changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citations 

omitted). “The required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies 

inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 926.

Here, the unwelcome conduct amounted to three incidents that happened on July 13 and 

September 18, 2017, two of which involved different actors (one of whom was not an employee of 

Goodfellow, based on the evidence presented), and one of which involved an act by an unknown 

person. Further, Plaintiff presented no evidence connecting any of the events to each other. In 

2 Defendant raised this argument for the first time in its reply brief. Although arguments not 

raised by a party in its opening brief are ordinarily deemed waived, see Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 

1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999), the Court may consider new arguments raised in a reply brief “only if 

the adverse party is given an opportunity to respond.” Banga v. First USA, NA, 29 F. Supp. 3d 

1270, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citations omitted). At the Court’s direction, see Dkt. No. 172, 

Plaintiff filed her sur-reply addressing this specific argument, see Dkt. No. 181.

3 Defendant appears to suggest that sexual harassment claims based on a hostile environment are 

subject to a McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, with the plaintiff having to first 

establish a “prima facie” case before the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove it took 

appropriate remedial actions. But the Court does not find that the caselaw supports this burdenshifting approach. Instead, the plaintiff must first establish that the alleged misconduct created a 

hostile environment. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875. Then, depending on the circumstances, plaintiff 

must also show that there is a basis for holding the employer liable for the harassment, either 

under a theory of vicarious liability or negligence. Id. (“The relevant standards and burdens 

pertaining to employer liability vary with the circumstances. When harassment by co-workers is 

at issue, the employer’s conduct is reviewed for negligence. When harassment by a supervisor is 

at issue, an employer is vicariously liable, subject to a potential affirmative defense.” (citations 

omitted)). The Court does not read these cases to suggest that it is the employer’s burden to prove 

it took remedial actions, but rather Plaintiff’s burden to prove that the employer should be liable 

for the acts of its employees (in other words, why those remedial actions were not reasonable).

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short, there was no evidence of a “sustained campaign of harassing conducted directed at 

Plaintiff.” See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 873–75; cf. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 873 (finding a sustained 

campaign of taunts where co-workers’ “habitually called [the plaintiff] sexually derogatory names, 

referred to him with the female gender, and taunted him for behaving like a woman”). Because 

this is not a case in which Plaintiff was subjected to a “sustained campaign” of harassment

directed at her, the Court must analyze whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable victim would find

these three disparate incidents to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of her 

employment and create an abusive environment. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that for a single incident to “support a hostile work environment 

claim, the incident must be extremely severe.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 926 (citing EEOC Policy 

Guide). The Court does not question that Ms. Hill subjectively believed that “these three distinct 

incidents in just three months” were humiliating and offensive to her. See Dkt. No. 181 (“SurReply”) at 1. But the Court does not find that these three disparate incidents were so objectively 

severe or pervasive as to create an abusive working environment and alter the terms of her 

employment when measured against the well-settled legal standard. While the Court does not 

condone Mr. Bounds’ or Mr. Haskell’s behavior, as a matter of law, these three isolated incidents 

did not rise to the level of severity the Ninth Circuit has found necessary to establish a hostile 

working environment. Compare Little, 301 F.3d at 967 (“Here, in contrast to the single instance 

of fondling in Brooks, Little was victimized by three violent rapes.”) with Westendorf v. W. Coast 

Contractors of Nevada, Inc., 712 F.3d 417, 419–22 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding as a matter of law in 

affirming grant of summary judgment that a co-worker’s “crude and offensive remarks,” which 

included directing profanity at the plaintiff, making offensive comments about breast sizes, 

tampons, and sexual activity, and telling plaintiff that she had to “clean the trailer while wearing a 

French maid’s costume (or maid’s uniform)” did not rise to the level required to find the “sexual 

harassment [ ] sufficiently severe or pervasive”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that even viewing the facts established at trial in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiff, the three isolated incidents were not severe and pervasive so as to 

support a finding that Defendant was liable for sexual harassment under relevant Ninth Circuit 

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caselaw. The totality of the record demonstrates that the record “permits only one reasonable 

conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” See Castro, 797 F.3d at 662–63.

B. Retaliation

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the 

employee has taken action to enforce rights protected under Title VII. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 

Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1986). To prove a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff 

must show: (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subsequently subjected to an 

adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the 

employer’s action. Dawson, 630 F.3d at 936 (citation omitted). “The causal link can be inferred 

from circumstantial evidence such as the employer’s knowledge of the protected activities and the 

proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“[O]nly non-trivial employment actions that would deter reasonable employees from complaining 

about Title VII violations will constitute actionable retaliation.” Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest 

Prod., 847 F.3d 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928). If a plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, then the burden shifts to the defendant to 

offer evidence “that the challenged action was taken for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.” 

Id. (citation omitted). If the defendant provides a legitimate explanation, the burden of production 

shifts back to plaintiff to show that the defendant’s explanation is pretextual. Id. (citation 

omitted).

“An employee engages in protected activity when she opposes an employment practice that 

either violates Title VII or that the employee reasonably believes violates that law.” Westendorf, 

712 F.3d at 422. Plaintiff alleges that she engaged in the following protected activities: 

(1) reporting the July 13, 2017 incident with the phallic-shaped object and Mr. Bounds; 

(2) complaining about Defendant replacing local African-American flaggers by Statewide; and 

(3) complaining about the September 18, 2017 incident with Mr. Haskell. According to Plaintiff, 

she suffered three adverse employment actions as a result of engaging in the protected activities: 

(1) on September 6, 2017, Mr. Garcia attempted to walk her to the bottom of the excavation site, 

known as “the hole,” despite knowing that she had concerns about doing dust control because of 

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her respiratory issues; (2) on September 18, 2017, Mr. Garcia directed Plaintiff to move towards 

the top of the hole or leave the jobsite; and (3) on September 18, 2017, Defendant issued her a 

Coach to Correct with a one-day suspension.4

 Defendant contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the retaliation 

claim because: (1) with the exception of reporting the July 13 incident, Plaintiff does not establish 

she engaged in protected activity; (2) Plaintiff cannot show causation; and (3) Plaintiff fails to 

present evidence that Defendant’s explanation for the adverse employment action was pretextual. 

Mot. at 14–16. The Court addresses whether each activity was a protected activity and if so, 

whether there was sufficient evidence of a causal connection between any protected activity and

the adverse employment actions. 

i. Statewide Flaggers

The Court finds that there was insufficient evidence at trial to establish that Plaintiff 

engaged in a protected activity with respect to the Statewide flaggers. The evidence showed that 

Plaintiff set up a meeting with Mr. Humphrey from Clark on September 6 at 10:00 a.m. to discuss 

Statewide flaggers temporarily replacing Goodfellow flaggers. Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 175:24–176:5. 

Before that meeting, she talked to Mr. Garcia and reminded him “about her respiratory issues,”

“collapsed lung surgery,” and that she “was dispatched for flagging only.” Id. at 176:8–17. Mr. 

Garcia said he would discuss it with Mr. Lennan. Id. at 176:18–21. No evidence showed that she 

mentioned to Mr. Garcia any concern about Statewide flaggers being brought in based on a 

discriminatory motive.

At the meeting with Mr. Humphrey, Plaintiff recalls:

Mr. Humphrey assured me that I would be staying on for the whole 

duration of the job, flagging. That once Goodfellow Top Grade left, 

4 Defendant argues that ordering Plaintiff to perform work at the hole does not constitute an 

adverse employment action in the retaliation context. Reply at 14. But the Court finds that 

considering all the circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 

there was adequate evidence that Defendant knew about her respiratory condition and that 

Defendant materially altered the conditions of her employment by trying to put her in a less 

favorable assignment. Cf. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(“We note in addition that the transfer is just barely—if at all—characterizable as ‘adverse’

employment action: Steiner was not demoted, or put in a worse job, or given any additional 

responsibilities. In fact, at first she even claimed to enjoy the day shift.”). 

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I would be moved over up under Clark, which was the general 

contractor, and continue for the duration of the job. 

Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 178:15–21. After the meeting, Plaintiff ran into Mr. Kim and Mr. Lennan and 

had a discussion with them about the problems she was facing. Id. at 180:21–181:17. 

Specifically, Plaintiff testified that:

A: The discussion was based on me – well, they started off 

apologizing, Mr. Lennan saying that he didn’t know – he wasn’t 

aware of my respiratory issues. 

... He told me that nobody was trying to compromise my position or 

nor was my position going to be compromised because of anybody 

else because I explained – I said, you know, my – my job 

performance and my work performance should be based on 

whatever I do, not because of what somebody else’s actions was. 

We had a discussion. I told him that it was all overwhelming. That 

my job and my livelihood was being toyed with. It was just too 

much. ... I explained to him the type of problems I was having with 

my body and just let them know that, you know, it was too much. 

... Mr. Lennan told me to go home, get some rest, and to report back 

the next morning for work as usual.

Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 180:18–181:17. 

The trial record thus did not establish that Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity with 

respect to the Statewide flaggers. Critically, the protected activity on which the alleged retaliation 

is based must be activity prohibited by Title VII. But the evidence showed that the subject of 

Plaintiff’s discussion with Mr. Humphrey (who worked for Clark) was Plaintiff’s flagging role. 

There is no evidence that she discussed her concern that the decision to bring in Statewide was

racially motivated. And even assuming Plaintiff expressed concerns to Mr. Humphrey about nonAfrican-American flaggers replacing African-American flaggers, there is no evidence that she then 

articulated this concern to Goodfellow. Absent such evidence, it is not reasonable to infer, as 

Plaintiff urges, that she repeated any complaint to Mr. Lennan and Mr. Kim, especially when the 

evidence that did come in at trial shows that she discussed concerns only about her respiratory 

health with them. The record thus reflected a complaint about Plaintiff having to perform duties 

outside of flagging because of the new Statewide flaggers, not a complaint that the Statewide 

flaggers were replacing the Goodfellow flaggers for a discriminatory purpose. The required nexus 

to a potential Title VII violation was not present here, and Ms. Hill thus failed to make a prima 

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facie showing of protected activity for purposes of this retaliation claim. 

ii. July 13 Incident with Mr. Bounds and Phallic-Shaped Object

Defendant does not dispute that the July 13 complaint regarding Mr. Bounds and the 

phallic-shaped object was a protected activity, but argues that there was no evidence of a causal 

link between this incident and any adverse employment action. Mot. at 15. 

To prove causation, the plaintiff must show that “her protected conduct was a but-for 

cause—but not necessarily the only cause—of her [adverse employment action]. Westendorf, 712 

F.3d at 422 (citation omitted). “Causation sufficient to establish the third element of the prima 

facie case may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge that 

the plaintiff engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action 

and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th 

Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit has held that in some cases, “causation can be inferred from timing 

alone where an adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected activity.” Villiarimo 

v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to support an inference of 

retaliatory motive, “the [adverse action] must have occurred ‘fairly soon after the employee’s 

protected expression.’” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). While there is no per se rule as to 

what constitutes “fairly soon,” the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “a nearly 18-month lapse 

between protected activity and an adverse employment action is simply too long, by itself, to give 

rise to an inference of causation.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff failed to show a causal link between her July 13 protected activity and Mr. 

Garcia’s actions in attempting to place her close to the “hole” on September 6 and September 18. 

Nothing in the testimony or the exhibits suggested that Mr. Garcia had knowledge that Plaintiff 

complained about the phallic-shaped object and Mr. Bounds. There was no evidence that Mr. 

Jackson forwarded Plaintiff’s statement to Mr. Garcia, or emailed his own summary of events to 

Mr. Garcia. Trial Ex. 14; Trial Ex. 118. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence that a 

retaliatory motive contributed to Mr. Garcia’s actions on September 6 and 18. 

However, with respect to the September 18 Coach to Correct with one-day suspension, 

based on the totality of the record, a reasonable jury could have determined that Plaintiff’s July 13 

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complaint led to the imposition of the Coach to Correct with one-day suspension. Mr. Lennan, 

who issued and signed the Coach to Correct, was aware of Plaintiff’s July 13 complaint. Trial Ex. 

118; Trial Ex. 125; Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 471:17–472:9. And while the Court acknowledges that the 

temporal gap of almost two months could weigh against a finding of causation, it cannot say that 

as a matter of law this timing negated the possibility of causation. In some cases, a three-month 

time difference has been found not to defeat the possibility of a causal link between the protected 

activity and adverse employment action. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376; see also Miller v. Fairchild 

Indus., Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 505 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that discharges 42 and 59 days after the 

protected activity were sufficient to infer causation). Based on the evidence that Mr. Lennan knew 

about the July 13 complaint and was the supervisor who issued the Coach to Correct, as well as

the evidence that the Coach to Correct came approximately two months after the protected 

activity, a reasonable jury could have inferred a retaliatory motive (even though other inferences 

also would have been consistent with the evidence). 

Defendant also contends that it had a legitimate business reason for issuing Plaintiff a 

Coach to Correct and one-day suspension, and that Plaintiff failed to present any evidence of 

pretext. Mot. at 16. The Ninth Circuit has held that “evidence of pretext can take many forms,” 

including “the manner in which the plaintiff was treated by [her] employer during [her 

employment],” the “timing of the [adverse employment action],” and the “disparity in 

punishment” between the plaintiff and those who did not engage in the protected activity. See 

Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 695. Mr. Lennan testified that he issued the Coach to Correct because 

Plaintiff was insubordinate, as she walked away from Mr. Garcia and abandoned her post. Trial 

Tr. Vol. 3 at 464:2–11. But Plaintiff presented evidence that before she complained about sexual 

harassment, she did not have any trouble with her supervisors, and they praised her for her 

flagging work. Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 123:2–11; see Westendorf, 712 F.3d at 423 (finding that 

plaintiff’s “prima facie case and related inferences might well support a finding of pretext, 

especially since she had no record of insubordination until she complained about sexual 

harassment”). Further, Plaintiff received a one-day suspension, whereas Mr. Haskell received a 

verbal warning. See Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 189:6–24. 

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The Court recognizes that the circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive presented at 

trial was not particularly strong, and that the jury could have drawn other conclusions from that 

evidence. But given the substantial deference the Court must afford the verdict, it finds that 

Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that the reason 

for her Coach to Correct was pretextual, meaning that judgment as a matter of law is not warranted 

on this ground.

iii. September 18 Incident with Mr. Haskell

With respect to the September 18 incident, Defendant argues that there is no evidence 

establishing that Plaintiff actually told Mr. Garcia that Mr. Haskell called her the gender-linked 

profane term before walking her down the hole. The Court agrees. Plaintiff testified that she 

reported the collision incident to Mr. Garcia:

Q: Ms. Hill, without saying what Maurice Haskell said at that time, 

was there a safety incident that you observed with Maurice Haskell 

that day?

A: Yes. Because there was no communication between myself and 

Mr. Haskell, I left my traffic go. He let his traffic go, and there was 

almost a collision. 

...

Q: Ms. Hill, did you report this incident to someone?

A: Yes, I did. ... I told Mr. Garcia. 

...

Q: And what – what did you tell Mr. Garcia at that time? ... Without 

going into what Mr. Haskell had said to you, what did you tell him, 

Mr. Garcia, at that time?

A: I told him that Mr. Haskell was being childish and immature and 

wasn’t communicating with me and that there was almost a 

collision.

Q: What was Mr. Garcia’s response to that?

A: His response, that was – that part of the conversation I was trying 

keep out the rest – was a part of when I had to call after the things 

that was said [sic], so I don’t know how I’m supposed to bring that 

in.

Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 183:14–184:24. Plaintiff then testified about the altercation between herself and 

Mr. Haskell, and that Mr. Haskell said the following to her:

‘B----, you go in the hole,’ and then he went on to threaten myself 

and my family and told me I could call my N----, I could call my 

nephew, I could call whoever, and I said, ‘I’m going to call your 

immediate’ -- ‘ I’m going to call your immediate foreman.’ 

Id. at 185:19–186:2. When she spoke to Mr. Garcia, Mr. Garcia “said that he would be coming 

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over to the gate where we were at.” Id. at 186:1–4. Once Mr. Garcia arrived at the gate, “[h]e told 

me to gather my things and move to the middle of the jobsite,” towards the “top of the black hole.” 

Id. at 186:5–11. 

While there is ample evidence that Plaintiff told Mr. Garcia about her altercation with Mr. 

Haskell, there is no evidence that she specifically told Mr. Garcia that Mr. Haskell called her a “b-

---,” which is the claimed protected activity, before Mr. Garcia told Plaintiff to go to the middle of 

the jobsite. During oral argument, when pressed to point to what in the trial record established 

that Plaintiff reported this specific complaint to Mr. Garcia, Plaintiff’s counsel could not do so. 

Instead, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Plaintiff initially did not testify that she reported Mr. 

Haskell’s use of the offensive epithet to Mr. Garcia because that would necessarily have required

her to testify as to what Mr. Haskell said and Plaintiff was afraid that would be hearsay. But to 

adopt this attorney argument would be to simply presume the truth of the proposition to be proved: 

that Plaintiff reported the “b----” comment and would have so testified at trial but for her 

purported fear of providing hearsay testimony.

While there was insufficient evidence of a causal link between Mr. Garcia’s action and 

Plaintiff’s reporting of the offensive epithet, the same cannot be said for the September 18 Coach 

to Correct. Mr. Lennan testified that he had Plaintiff file a witness statement, which he sent to 

Human Resources “immediately after the incident.” Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 458:23–460:10, 483:13–

484:4. The witness statement reports that Mr. Haskell had called Ms. Hill the derogatory term, 

Trial Ex. 122, and Mr. Lennan, on the same day, issued her a Coach to Correct, Trial Ex. 125 and 

Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 471:17–472:9. Given that the Coach to Correct “follow[ed] on the heels of 

protected activity,” there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find the required 

causal link between the Coach to Correct and Plaintiff’s reporting of the epithet. See Villiarimo, 

281 F.3d at 1065. And for the same reasons discussed above, a reasonable jury could find that

Defendant’s proffered reason for the Coach to Correct was pretextual. 

* * *

The standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is high, and 

the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict. The totality 

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of the record demonstrates that the jury need not “have relied only on speculation to reach its 

verdict” with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. See Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah Cnty., 556 

F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this deferential standard, judgment as a matter of law thus is

not warranted as to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim, because a reasonable jury could find that the 

September 18, 2017 Coach to Correct was in retaliation for her July 13 and September 18 

complaints.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law with

respect to the sexual harassment claim, but DENIES the motion with respect to the retaliation 

claim. The Court DIRECTS the parties to file by February 19, 2020 a joint proposed revised

form of judgment consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/11/2020

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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