Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06330/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06330-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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1 Erroneously sued as “Orange County Department of Child

Support.”

2 Erroneously sued as “Jan Staurl.”

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THURMAN DEE PAYNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ORANGE COUNTY DEPT. OF CHILD

SUPPORT, et al.,

Defendants.

1:04-cv-6330 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants County of Orange (“County”)1 and Jan Sturla

(“Sturla”)2 move under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4), (5), and (6) to

dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff pro se Thurman Dee Payne. 

Doc. 11, filed Jan. 13, 2005. They also move under Rule 12(f) to

strike Plaintiff’s demand against the County for punitive

damages. Doc. 10, filed Jan. 13, 2005. The County and Sturla

further move alternatively under Rule 12(b)(3) to dismiss for

improper venue, or to transfer this case to the Central District

of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). Doc.

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12, filed Jan. 13, 2005. Finally, and also in the alternative,

they move under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) for a more definitive

statement of the facts. Doc. 11.

Defendants Stockmen’s Bank (“Bank”), Farrel Holyoak

(“Holyoak”), and Leon Schlotterbeck (“Schlotterbeck”) move to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Rules 12(b)(4) and (5). Doc.

7, filed Nov. 22, 2004.

Defendant State of California Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”)

moves to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), (4), (5), and (6), Doc.

13, filed Feb. 16, 2005, or, in the alternative, for a more

definitive statement of the facts under Rule 12(e), id.

Plaintiff filed no opposition to any of the foregoing

motions. The motions were submitted on the papers without oral

argument. Doc. 9.

Because all Defendants may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6),

it is unnecessary to reach the numerous other motions brought by

the various Defendants, save for the County’s motions to strike

Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages and to transfer the case

to the Central District of California.

II. BACKGROUND

On June 28, 1982, the Superior Court of California for the

County of Orange apparently ordered Plaintiff to pay $575 in

overdue child support and $150 per month thereafter. Doc. 1,

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3 Three pages of the Complaint bear the unorthodox numbering

designation “5 of A,” “6 of A,” and “7 of A,” respectively. To

avoid confusion, these pages shall be referred to as 5A, 6A, and

7A, respectively.

3

Compl. at 5A, filed Sept. 29, 2004.3 On March 13, 1986, the

Orange County Municipal Court issued a warrant for Plaintiff’s

arrest on charges of failure to pay child support, and Plaintiff

was subsequently arrested. Id. During his appearance in Orange

County Municipal Court, Plaintiff claims that the judge dismissed

his case and “eliminated entirely” the child support obligations

imposed in 1982. Id. Plaintiff provides no court orders of

other certified record of action “dismissing” the child support

case, nor any information as to what transpired between 1986 and

2002 with respect to the aforementioned child support obligation

or any other such obligation. However, on March 29, 2002, FTB,

acting on behalf of the Orange County Department of Child Support

Services, issued a levy against Plaintiff’s funds held at the

Bank in the amount of $41,651.01. Id. at 5-6A. In response,

Plaintiff filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that

Defendants deprived him of his money without due process of the

law, thereby violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at

5. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth

Amendment rights when they seized his money “[w]ithout probable

cause upon a STALE warrant and a court order that had been

terminated and destroyed.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff does not identify or provide the “stale” warrant

or court order by which FTB seized his money. It can be inferred

from the Complaint that Plaintiff may be referring to the warrant

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4 Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the County, FTB, and

the Bank each pay him $350,000 in compensatory damages and

$700,000 in punitive damages. Plaintiff requests that Sturla,

unknown agents of FTB, Holyoak, and Schlotterbeck each pay him

$250,000 in compensatory damages.

5 Plaintiff’s caption to his complaint erroneously states

that he sues pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2201. He correctly cites 28

U.S.C. § 2201 at page 8 of his complaint.

4

for his arrest issued by Orange County Municipal Court in 1986. 

See id. at 5A. Regardless, Plaintiff impliedly asserts that FTB

seized his money in a collection action initiated by the County

to recover child support due since 1982. See id.

Plaintiff seeks a total of $2,050,000 in compensatory

damages and $2,100,000 in punitive damages from the various

defendants.4 Id. at 8. Plaintiff also requests a declaration

under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that each of the Defendants violated his

constitutional rights.5 Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

A district court should not grant a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In evaluating a complaint, the

court must “accept all factual allegations...as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” 

TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). However,

purely conclusory allegations need not be countenanced. See

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Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.

1981).

B. Special Considerations for Pro Se Litigants.

Courts have a “duty...to construe pro se pleadings

liberally.” Hamilton v. United States, 67 F.3d 761, 764 (9th

Cir. 1995) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)

(quotation omitted)). The pleadings of pro se litigants are

“held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10 (quotation omitted). 

However, “a liberal interpretation of a [pro se] complaint may

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir.

1992).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action “against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of

the United States.” Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana,

336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003). Although courts are

instructed to construe remedial statutes such as Section 1983

“liberally and beneficently,” id., (quoting Dennis v. Higgins,

498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991)), certain persons and other entities are

immune from Section 1983 liability.

1. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Against FTB.

“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official

capacities are ‘persons’ under Section 1983.” Will v. Mich.

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Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Furthermore,

Governmental entities that are considered “arms of the State” are

also immune from Section 1983 suits. Id. at 70. As California’s

primary tax collection agency, FTB is an “arm” of the State of

California and cannot be sued under Section 1983. See In re

Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111, 1115-1117 (9th Cir. 2000). The Section

1983 claims against FTB must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims Against The County and

Sturla.

Municipal governments (such as counties and cities) are

“persons” subject to suit for constitutional torts under Section

1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);

see also Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Municipal governments may be “sued directly under § 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief” for an alleged

deprivation which “implements or executes a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers...[or for] deprivations

visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a

custom has not received formal approval through the body’s

official decision making channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. 

Employees of such entities, acting in their official capacities,

may also be sued, although this “generally represent[s] only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent....” Id. at 690 n.55.

However, to state a claim against the County and Sturla,

Plaintiff must at least allege that the County’s efforts to

deprive him of his money were pursuant to some official or

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6 By contrast, for example, the Ninth Circuit has sustained

a § 1983 claim against a municipal police department where that

police department had authorized apprehension of “all concealed

suspects — resistant or nonresistant, armed or unarmed, violent

or nonviolent — by dogs trained to bite hard and to hold,” and

the plaintiff was actually mauled by such a police dog while

attempting to conceal himself from a police search. Chew v.

Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).

7

unofficial County policy. See id. at 690-91. Plaintiff’s

complaint contains no such allegation. While Plaintiff accuses

the County of initiating a proceeding against him without a valid

warrant or probable cause, see Doc. 1 at 5, and claims that

Sturla “allowed [the] proceeding to be initiated,” id., Plaintiff

does not allege that the County carried out this action as part

of a pattern, policy, or custom.6 The Section 1983 claims

against the County and Sturla must therefore also be DISMISSED.

3. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims Against The Bank,

Holyoak, and Schlotterbeck.

A proper defendant in a Section 1983 suit must have acted

under “color of law” while perpetrating the alleged

constitutional violation. See Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co.,

254 F.3d 772, 783 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, however, the Bank is a

private financial institution incorporated in Arizona, while

Holyoak and Schlotterbeck are private individuals. Private

individuals or other private entities cannot act under color of

state law for purposes of Section 1983 “unless they conspired or

acted jointly with state actors to deprive the plaintiffs of

their constitutional rights.” Id. at 783. To prove such a

conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that the state and private

actors reached “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate

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constitutional rights.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps

Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-1541 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff alleges that the Bank, Holyoak, and Schlotterbeck

“engag[ed] in prohibited conduct” with the County and FTB, Doc.

1, Compl. at 3-4, by agreeing to release Plaintiff’s money held

in an account at the Bank without ensuring that FTB’s levy was

based on a valid claim by the County, id. at 7. However, mere

acquiescence in a lawful government investigation does not

constitute participation in a conspiracy with the state to

violate civil rights. Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir.

1983). Plaintiff does not allege that the Bank, Holyoak, or

Schlotterbeck did more than comply with FTB’s levy, nor has

Plaintiff asserted that they had any reason to know that the levy

was based upon an allegedly “STALE warrant and a court order that

had been terminated and destroyed.” See Doc. 1 at 5 (emphasis in

original). In short, Plaintiff has stated no cognizable Section

1983 claim against the Bank, Holyoak, or Schlotterbeck.

B. Declaratory Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

Section 2201 provides that a party seeking declaratory

relief must state an otherwise valid claim:

In a case of actual controversy within its

jurisdiction...any court of the United States, upon

filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the

rights and other legal relations of any party seeking

such declaration....

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has stated no

valid claims and is therefore not entitled to declaratory relief

against any Defendant.

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C. Punitive Damages.

“Upon motion made by a party before responding to a

pleading,” Rule 12(f) grants district courts the authority to

strike “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(f). The County, in its first

filing pursuant to this action, moved to strike Plaintiff’s

request for punitive damages against it. Doc. 10, filed Jan. 13,

2005; see also Doc. 1, Compl. at 8. Municipalities (public

entities such as counties) are immune from punitive damages

sought under Section 1983. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,

Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). The County’s motion to strike

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is therefore GRANTED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

D. Leave to Amend.

A district court shall grant leave to amend “when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave need not be

granted if it would be futile, cause undue delay, is sought in

bad faith, or would prejudice the opposing party. Forsyth v.

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997).

In regard to FTB, leave to amend would be futile. FTB is an

arm of the State of California and is immune from suit under 

Section 1983.

With respect to the County, Sturla, the Bank, Holyoak, and

Schlotterbeck, Plaintiff is granted an opportunity to amend his

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complaint to set forth valid claims under federal law in

accordance with this decision.

E. Venue.

As a civil action arising under the laws of the United

States, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over a

Section 1983 suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, Section 1983

plaintiffs may not sue in any particular federal district court

that most pleases them. Venue must be appropriate. When all

defendants to a suit do not reside in the same state, “a judicial

district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claim occurred” is the appropriate venue. 28

U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(b). Here, not all Defendants reside in the

same state: some reside in Arizona (i.e., the Bank, Holyoak, and

Schlotterbeck) and the remaining California defendants (the

County and Sturla) reside in Orange County, CA. Therefore, the

district court looks for a place where “a substantial part” of

the events leading to this case occurred. Orange County is where

Plaintiff was ordered to pay child support, where he was arrested

for failing to pay support, and where the actions leading to the

levy on his money took place. The Central District of California

(the district covering Orange County) appears to be the most

appropriate venue.

A district court may transfer a case to another district

court if venue is improper where the suit has been filed. 28

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U.S.C. § 1406(a). This case is therefore TRANSFERRED TO THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF

CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN DIVISION, AT SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein:

1. The case is DISMISSED FOR IMPROPER VENUE and TRANSFERRED TO

THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN DIVISION, AT

SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA.

1. FTB’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 13) is GRANTED; the claims

against FTB are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and FTB is

DISMISSED AS A DEFENDANT;

2. The County and Sturla’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) and to

strike Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages (Doc. 10) are

GRANTED; the punitive damages claims against the County are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; the Section 1983 and Section 2201

claims against the County and Sturla are DISMISSED WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND;

3. The Bank, Holyoak, and Schlotterbeck’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. 7) is GRANTED; the claims against these defendants are

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

4. Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint within TWENTY

(20) days following service of this order.

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SO ORDERED.

DATED: July _7__, 2005.

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

_____________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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