Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02092/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBIN A. HASSETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No. 10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Robin A. Hassett brought this action for judicial review of the Social Security

Commissioner’s (Commissioner) denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 16) and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19). 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry A.

Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons set forth below, this Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Defendant’s

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED.

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 Plaintiff later amended her onset date to July 25, 2007. AR at 65.

2 10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 2, 2007, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental

security income. Administrative Record (AR) at 223-29. Plaintiff alleged that she had been

unable to work due to her disabling condition since May 20, 20021

. Id. at 223, 227. The Social

Security Administration denied her claim initially (id. at 121-25) and on reconsideration (id. at

117-20, 133-37).

Plaintiff requested a hearing (id. at 139-40) and on July 2, 2009, an Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing, during which Plaintiff, a vocational expert, and a medical expert

testified (id. at 60-98). The medical expert explained that the record was somewhat deficient and

opined that it “might be a good idea to get a fresh psychiatric consultation from an outside

source.” Id. at 88-90. The medical expert specifically recommended that Dr. H. Douglas

Englehorn conduct the consultative examination. Id. at 90. The ALJ adopted this

recommendation and continued the hearing until Plaintiff could be examined by a consultative

psychiatrist. Id. at 92-94. The ALJ specifically requested that Dr. Engelhorn conduct the

examination. Id. at 92-93.

On August 3, 2009, Dr. Engelhorn examined Plaintiff. Id. at 660. He provided his findings

in a report dated August 5, 2009. Id. at 656-64. On December 15, 2009, the ALJ convened the

continued hearing and heard testimony from Plaintiff, a different medical expert, and a different

vocational expert. Id. at 33-59. In a decision dated March 4, 2009, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 21-32. 

The Appeals Counsel denied Plaintiff’s request for review on August 26, 2010, making the

ALJ’s decision the final determination of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-3. Plaintiff filed the instant

action on October 7, 2010. ECF No. 1. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to Social Security Administration regulations, the ALJ followed a five-step

sequential evaluation process for determining whether Plaintiff was disabled. AR at 22-23; see

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 Neither party objects to the ALJ’s determination about Plaintiff’s impairments. 

3 10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a) (describing five-step assessment). In so doing, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of

the cervical and lumbar spine; a bipolar II disorder; post traumatic stress disorder; a personality

disorder, mixed type; and a polysubstance addiction disorder, in remission.2 AR at 24. He

concluded that these impairments prevented Plaintiff from performing any of her past relevant

work. Id. at 30. The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity

to lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for no

more than six hours in an eight-hour workday; and sit for no more than six hours in an eight-hour

workday. Id. at 26. Additionally, he found that she was limited to occasional climbing, balancing,

stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. Id. In regard to mental function, the ALJ found

Plaintiff’s abilities to be limited to simple, repetitive tasks in a nonpublic setting. Id. 

In light of this residual functional capacity, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled

and that she would be able to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the regional and

national economy, including small product assembler, nut and bolt packer, and garment sorter.

Id. at 30-31.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act permits unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial

review of the Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review is

limited in that a denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence

and contains no legal error. Id.; Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193

(9th Cir. 2004).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.”

Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). It is “relevant evidence that,

considering the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006,

1011 (9th Cir. 2003). Where the evidence reasonably can be construed to support more than one

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4 10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Batson, 350 F.3d at 1193. This

includes deferring to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts.

See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509.

Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions,

the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in

weighing the evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. Section

405(g) permits a court to enter judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social

Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

DISCUSSION

In his report, the ALJ adopted the conclusions of Miriam Sherman, M.D., the non-examining

medical expert who opined during the second hearing on Plaintiff’s mental functioning. Based

upon her review of the medical records, Dr. Sherman stated that Plaintiff is capable of performing

simple, repetitive non-public tasks. AR at 27, 29. Using this assessment, the vocational expert

at the second hearing testified that Plaintiff could not perform any of her past relevant work, but

could perform work as a small products assembler, nut and bolt packer, or garment sorter. Id.

at 55-56. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 31. In reaching

this decision, the ALJ explicitly considered and evaluated the opinions of four doctors (Sherman,

Sabourin, Close and Glassman). Id. at 29. Despite the fact that the ALJ continued the first

hearing for the sole purpose of obtaining a new psychiatric examination and report, preferably

by Dr. Engelhorn, the ALJ did not mention Dr. Engelhorn, nor any of the opinions set forth in his

report. Id. 92-94. 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment regarding her mental capacity for work. Pl.’s

Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.’s Mem.) at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

explicitly adopted the conclusions of the non-examining medical expert, Dr. Sherman, and

implicitly rejected the conclusions of the examining medical expert, Dr. Engelhorn, without

articulating “specific and legitimate reasons” for doing so. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff explains that Dr.

Sherman’s conclusion that Plaintiff can perform simple, repetitive non-public tasks contradicts Dr.

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3

 Plaintiff acknowledges that the hypotheticals presented to the VE during the second hearing did not

accurately reflect the limitations opined by Dr. Engelhorn. Pl.’s Mem. at 3-4.

4

 The memorandum accompanying Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 19-1] is

identical to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 18]. Accordingly, the Court

will refer to both briefs simply as “Def.’s Mem.”

5

 Defendant cited the portion of the ALJ’s opinion where the ALJ noted the argument that Plaintiff had

“‘marked’ limitation in interacting appropriately with co-workers, supervisors and the public” and cited exhibit “B22F,

p. 4," which was Dr. Engelhorn’s assessment. Def.’s Mem. at 3 n.3.

5 10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

Engelhorn’s opinion that Plaintiff suffers moderate to marked limitations in her ability to interact

appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers. Id. at 3. Plaintiff supports her

argument with the VE’s testimony that the available jobs would be significantly reduced if Dr.

Engelhorn’s opinions were considered.3

 Id. at 3-4. 

In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ failed to address Dr.

Engelhorn’s medical opinion is “frivolous” because the ALJ directly referenced Dr. Engelhorn’s

assessment and his report. Def.’s Mem.4

 at 3 and n.35. Moreover, Defendant submits that the

ALJ properly considered the appropriate factors in according more weight to Dr. Sherman’s

opinion. Id. at 2 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (f)(2)(iii), 416.927(d)(2), (f)(2)(iii)). Finally,

Defendant notes that a close examination of Plaintiff’s treatment record validates the ALJ’s

determination. Id. at 4. 

When evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ must afford greater weight to the opinion of

an examining physician than to that of a nonexamining physician. Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995));

20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(1) (2010). “If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted by

another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons

that are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1216 (9th Cir. 2005)); Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010). “The

opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies

the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester, 81

F.3d at 831 (emphasis in original).

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 The ALJ repeatedly refers to Mary Jesko, Ph.D. as having provided expert vocational testimony at the

December 15, 2009 administrative hearing. See AR at 27, 30. This appears to be a typographical error, as the

transcript of that hearing reflects that John Kelcher was the testifying vocational expert. AR at 33. 

6 10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

Defendant does not dispute that the ALJ’s opinion does not mention Dr. Engelhorn.

Rather, Defendant argues in a footnote that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion

because he “discussed Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion, directly referencing his assessment that Plaintiff

had “‘marked’ limitation in interacting appropriately with co-workers, supervisors and the public”

(AR 27).” Def.’s Mem. at 3 n.1. The full paragraph on which Defendant relies states:

The Administrative Law Judge has considered counsel’s argument that that (sic) the

claimant has “marked” limitations in interacting appropriately with co-worker (sic), supervisors and the public (Exhibit B22F, p. 4). However, the objective medical

evidence does not support such a finding, as Dr. Sherman testified that the claimant

could work performing simple repetitive tasks in a nonpublic setting. Moreover, Dr.

Jesko6

 was able to identify jobs that the claimant would be able to perform.

AR at 27. While Defendant is correct that the exhibit cited by the ALJ (Exhibit B22F) is Dr.

Engelhorn’s report, the ALJ’s statement does not provide the “specific and legitimate reasons that

are supported by substantial evidence” required to reject an examining doctor’s opinion. 

The ALJ does not discuss or reject Dr. Engelhorn’s opinions; he merely states that he has

considered and rejected “counsel’s argument.” Considering and rejecting “counsel’s argument”

is not the same as considering and rejecting an examining doctor’s findings, as the second result

requires “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” for doing

so. The ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Engelhorn’s findings is especially troubling since the ALJ

continued the administrative hearing to obtain a new and thorough psychiatric examination of

Plaintiff after determining there was insufficient evidence in the record to make a proper disability

determination and the ALJ specifically requested that Dr. Engelhorn perform the examination.

AR at 89-94. Because Dr. Engelhorn was the most recent examining doctor, specifically requested

by the ALJ, the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion, without mentioning Dr. Engelhorn or

any of his findings, conclusions, or opinions does not satisfy the ALJ’s burden of providing

“specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence,” for rejecting Dr. Engelhorn’s

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7

 Though Defendant does not dispute that the ALJ rejected Dr. Engelhorn’s assessment (see Def.’s Mem. at

3), the Court briefly addresses the issue of whether the opinions of Dr. Engelhorn and Dr. Sherman are contradictory

because it dictates which standard is to be applied. If an ALJ rejects an examining physician’s uncontradicted

assessment, he must offer clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for doing so. Ryan, 528

F.3d at 1198. If the opinion of the examining doctor is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the ALJ need only

provide specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting it. Id. Here, both Dr.

Engelhorn and Dr. Sherman agreed that Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive tasks. AR at 44-45, 664. However,

Dr. Sherman did not adopt Dr. Engelhorn’s view that Plaintiff had moderate to marked limitations in her ability to

interact appropriately with supervisors and co-workers. See AR at 658, 664. It appears, then, that the two opinions

are contradictory. Further, they are contradictory on a material point because the vocational expert’s testimony

suggests the additional limitation presented by Dr. Engelhorn would impact the ALJ’s disability determination—at least

in regard to what, if any, other work Plaintiff could perform. See AR at 51-58 (the vocational expert testified that a

claimant who could perform simple, repetitive tasks, but suffered a marked limitation in her ability to interact

appropriately with supervisors or co-workers, likely could not work as a small products assembler, nut and bolt packer,

or garment sorter). 

7 10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

opinion.7 See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198. 

The only reason the ALJ offered for rejecting “counsel’s argument,” which was based on

Dr. Engelhorn’s report, is that it conflicted with Dr. Sherman’s assessment of the medical

evidence. As explained above, the law is clear that “the nonexamining doctor’s opinion ‘with

nothing more’ [cannot] constitute substantial evidence,” let alone a sufficient basis for rejecting

the opinion of an examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831 (quoting Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d

502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990)). Furthermore, even if the Court ignores the reference to Dr.

Sherman, the ALJ’s bare assertion that the “the objective medical evidence does not support [Dr.

Engelhorn’s] finding” (AR at 27), also fails to achieve the level of specificity required in this Circuit.

“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and

explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22

(9th Cir. 1988). Here, the ALJ simply did not provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting

Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion.

Defendant cites to four factors that he argues justified the ALJ’s decision to credit a nonexamining physician’s opinion over that of an examining physician. Def.’s Mem. at 3-4 (citing 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (f)(2)(iii), 416.927(d)(2),(f)(2)(iii) as listing factors an ALJ should

consider in determining the degree of weight given to each medical opinion). However, the

factors cited by the Defendant were not provided by the ALJ as a basis for rejecting Dr.

Engelhorn’s opinion; they were only listed as reasons for crediting Dr. Sherman’s opinion. AR at

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8

 The ALJ had the option of sending Plaintiff’s complete medical history to Dr. Engelhorn but chose to only

send him a portion of one report. AR at 92-93 (concurring with the medical expert’s statement that “the others might

just be confusing”). However, the ALJ instructed Dr. Engelhorn (or the examining doctor) to conduct a “psychiatric

consultative exam ... to include a history, mental status exam (i.e. Folstein/MMS) and a PTSD evaluation” (id. at 93).

Moreover, Dr. Engelhorn’s report indicates that he did obtain a medical, employment, and social history from Plaintiff.

Id. at 660-64.

9

 Dr. Sherman testified that Dr. Engelhorn is a respected doctor and that she “relied heavily on his report.”

AR at 46. Dr. Sherman did not explain why she disagreed with Dr. Engelhorn’s conclusion that Plaintiff had moderate

to marked limitations in her ability to interact appropriately with supervisor’s and co-workers. Id. at 46-51.

8 10cv2092-LAB (BLM)

27-29. As such, the listed reasons cannot satisfy the ALJ’s obligation to provide specific and

legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Likewise, the

regulations cited by Defendant list factors that may justify increasing or decreasing the weight

given to a particular opinion; they do not specify criteria that justify crediting a non-examining

physician’s opinion over that of an examining physician. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927.

Nevertheless, the Court will address the four factors.

The ALJ states that he credited Dr. Sherman’s opinion because (1) Dr. Sherman’s opinion

was consistent with Plaintiff’s medical record as a whole, (2) Dr. Sherman based her opinion on

a full review of Plaintiff’s medical record, (3) Dr. Sherman was familiar with the applicable Social

Security Regulations for evaluating disability, and (4) Dr. Sherman was a board certified

psychiatrist. Id. (citing AR at 27-29). With regard to the first factor, the ALJ does not state that

Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion was not consistent with Plaintiff’s medical records, nor does he explain

the extent of such an inconsistency. With regard to the second and third factors, the ALJ does

not indicate that Dr. Engelhorn did not consider all of Plaintiff’s medical history8

, nor does he state

which portion of Plaintiff’s medical records contradicts or undermines Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion, nor

that Dr. Engelhorn is unfamiliar with the applicable Social Security Regulations.9 In fact, given

that Dr. Engelhorn personally examined Plaintiff, it is likely that he was sufficiently aware of her

medical history and had additional insights as a result of his personal examination. Moreover, the

ALJ explicitly requested that Dr. Engelhorn perform the examination and it is unlikely the ALJ

would have done so if the ALJ thought Dr. Engelhorn was unfamiliar with the applicable

regulations. Finally, with regard to the fourth factor, Dr. Engelhorn also is a board certified

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psychiatrist. See AR at 664. Thus, the ALJ’s proffered reasons for accepting Dr. Sherman’s

finding do not constitute sufficient specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Engelhorn’s

opinion that Plaintiff suffered moderate to marked limitations in her ability to interact

appropriately with co-workers and supervisors. 

The Court finds that the ALJ erred as a matter of law and, therefore, RECOMMENDS that

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED and Defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment be DENIED. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the ALJ committed legal error in failing to

provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion. “Where the

Commissioner fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion of a treating or

examining physician,” the Court is directed to “credit that opinion ‘as a matter of law.’” Lester,

81 F.3d at 834 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Court,

therefore, credits as a matter of law Dr. Engelhorn’s opinion that Plaintiff is moderately to

markedly limited in her ability to interact appropriately with co-workers and supervisors.

However, even when this evidence is credited, the administrative record contains no vocational

evidence indicating whether Plaintiff still could perform alternate occupations. The hypothetical

Plaintiff’s administrative counsel posed to the vocational expert assumed only marked limitations.

See AR at 57-58. For this reason, the Court RECOMMENDS that the case be REMANDED for

consideration of whether Plaintiff’s impairments prevent her from making an adjustment to any

other work. See 20 CFR § 404.1520(g).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report and Recommendation

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than June 30, 2011. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than July 21, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: June 9, 2011

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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