Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00414/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00414-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE JAMES,

CDCR #AL-1830,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES MARSHALS 

SERVICE AGENTS, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM

1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1) 

AND

2) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS MOOT [ECF Doc. No. 9]

Kyle James (“Plaintiff”), currently housed at the California Men’s Colony located 

in San Luis Obispo, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff did not 

prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead he 

has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 9).

I. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

The Court may conduct a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s pleading because he was 

“incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 

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delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, 

pretrial release, or diversionary program” at the time he filed this action. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a), (c). 

Section 1915A, also enacted as part of PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of 

prisoner complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Coleman v. Tollefson, 

135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need 

not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 

2012)).

A. Previous action

As an initial matter, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff filed similar claims 

in an action filed in 2014. A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both 

within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation 

to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Here, Plaintiff filed nearly identical claims against the same Defendants in James v.

Unnamed Defendants, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-02936-WQH-JMA (“James 

I”). In the First Amended Complaint filed in James I, Plaintiff claimed that United States 

Deputy Marshals “maliciously” slandered him “by lying to everyone I’ve ever known and 

associated with that I am a violent child rapist capable of murder.” (James I, ECF No. 3, 

at 3.) Plaintiff also alleged that a prosecutor with the United States Attorney’s Office 

“maliciously turned over jurisdiction” of his criminal matter involving a robbery to the San 

Diego County District Attorney’s Office in order to give Plaintiff a “life sentence” instead 

of the ten to fifteen years he would have faced under federal criminal sentencing. (Id. at 

4.) 

In James I, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but simultaneously

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dismissed his amended complaint on the grounds that he had failed to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). 

(James I, ECF No. 4 at 7-8.) Specifically, to the extent that Plaintiff alleged actions on the 

part of the defendants that influenced his ongoing criminal proceedings, the Court found 

that his claims amounted to “an attack on the validity of his underlying criminal 

proceeding, and as such, are not addressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless he alleges and 

can ultimately show that conviction has already been invalidated.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s 

claims were dismissed for failing to state a claim “without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to 

file a new action if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction.” Id. at 5 (citing Edwards v. 

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997)). 

In addition, the Court found that Plaintiff’s claims, while brought pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, in fact arose under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (James I, ECF No. 4 at 5-6). The Court 

dismissed some of the named defendants because they were federal agencies and Bivens

does not authorize a suit against the government or its agencies for monetary relief. Id. at 

6 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994)).

Plaintiff was granted forty five (45) days to file an amended pleading in order to 

correct the deficiencies identified in the Court’s Order. Id. at 8. However, Plaintiff failed 

to do so and therefore, on April 22, 2015 the Court dismissed the entire action without 

prejudice for failing to comply with a Court Order and for the reasons set forth in the 

Court’s January 15, 2015 Order. (James I, ECF No. 8.) Judgment was entered the 

following day on April 23, 2015. (James I, ECF No. 9.)

B. Current litigation

Plaintiff filed this current action on February 24, 2017 (“James II”). (ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff purports to bring this action pursuant to “5 U.S.C. § 702, Federal Question 

Jurisdiction and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and F.T.C.A and Pendent Jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1367.” 

(Id. at 1.)

1. Factual allegations

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Plaintiff claims that he was on federal probation in 2013 when he “absconded Dec 

2013 - March 17, 2014 with an active Federal warrant giving the United States Marshals 

Service (“USMS”) jurisdiction” over him. Id. Plaintiff claims that in March of 2014, the 

USMS “worked with the San Diego Sheriff’s Dep’t as part of the Regional Fugitive Task 

Force.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that he was charged with crimes that were “unfounded 

and unsupported by evidence” and some of these charges were dismissed in September of 

2016 while Plaintiff was convicted of bank robbery. Id. Plaintiff alleges that five unnamed 

USMS Deputies, along with USMS Deputy Brown and USMS Deputy Laney “acted 

maliciously” and “slandered” Plaintiff in March of 2014. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims that they 

lied to his “friends, family, and associates” by claiming that Plaintiff had “raped a little 

girl.” (Id.) As a result of these actions, Plaintiff alleges he was the “target for serious harm 

and injury to the point of death.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that “due to the actions and 

misconduct of the ‘Marshals,’ people to this day think/believe that the lies the Marshals 

told are true putting the Plaintiff’s life at risk in the future.” (Id. at 7-8.)

2. Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

As the Court informed Plaintiff in the James I matter, because he is naming federal 

officials as Defendants, his claims of constitutional violations arise under Bivens rather 

than 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bivens established that “compensable injury to a constitutionally 

protected interest [by federal officials alleged to have acted under color of federal law] 

could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general federal question jurisdiction 

of the federal courts [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331].” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 

486 (1978); Western Center for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2000) (under Bivens, “federal courts have the inherent authority to award damages against 

federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional rights.”). 

To state a claim under Bivens, Plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color 

of federal law deprived him of his constitutional rights. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 

1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, the Ninth Circuit considers “[a]ctions under § 1983 and 

those under Bivens [as] identical save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by 

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a federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254, 254 n.2 (2006) (a suit brought pursuant to Bivens is 

the “federal analogue” to § 1983).

3. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff claims that his “life is at risk in the future” due to the fact that the USMS 

Deputies have labeled him a child molester. (ECF No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff refers to this claim 

as a “deliberate indifference to safety claim” and thus, the Court will construe this claim as 

arising under the Eighth Amendment as Plaintiff is currently incarcerated. Plaintiff also 

purports to bring an Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment” claim based on 

the “malicious and sadistic actions of the U.S. Marshals in 2014 March lying telling my 

entire community that I was a child rapist.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff alleges that the statements 

by the Defendants “amounted to cruel and unusual punishment” and were “such a severe 

threat” that Plaintiff “ended up in prison for 38 years to life for 2 bank Robberies.” Id. 

Plaintiff contends that the threat created by Defendants’ statements “pushed [him] into 

robbing a bank because I felt I had no other option and that I had to . . . survive the ‘wildfire’ 

the Marshals spread.” Id.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment of a person 

convicted of a crime. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing U.S. 

Const. amend. VIII). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (citations omitted). 

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety and well-being of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–

33 (1994); Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. To state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect 

claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that (1) he faced conditions 

posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or safety, and (2) the individual 

prison officials he seeks to hold liable were “deliberately indifferent” to those risks. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). To 

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demonstrate deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show that the defendant both knew of 

and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to his health and safety. Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837. Thus, Plaintiff must allege “the official [was] both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and 

[that] he . . . also dr[e]w that inference.” Id.

There are no facts from which the Court could conclude that Defendants acted with 

“deliberate indifference” to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegations are 

broad, vague, and fail to identify how any inmate he is currently incarcerated with is aware 

of the comments allegedly made by Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff claims defamation and 

injuries to his reputation with his friends, family, and community, which is not a federally 

protected right. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 785, 708-712 (1976) (a defamatory 

publication, however seriously it may have harmed someone’s reputation, did not deprive 

him of any liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause). Further, 

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that the alleged statements by Defendants 

made prior to Plaintiff’s conviction for robbery and current incarceration constitute cruel 

and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. For these reasons, the 

Court finds Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims must be dismissed for failing to state a 

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

4. FTCA claims

Plaintiff also purports to bring claims under the FTCA alleging defamation, slander, 

negligence and intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress. (ECF No. 1 at 9-12). 

The FTCA provides a remedy “for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death 

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal employee. 28 U.S.C. § 

2672. However, the FTCA provides that the exclusive remedy for torts committed by 

federal employees is a suit against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). While 

Plaintiff did name the United States as a Defendant, he also named the United States 

Marshal Service, which is an agency of the federal government. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 4.) The 

sole permissible Defendant in a claim under the FTCA is the United States and thus, the 

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Court DISMISSES any FTCA claims against the United States Marshals Service and 

individual defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2679(a); Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749 

F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984). 

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to pursue claims of defamation and slander against 

the United States under the FTCA, these claims must be dismissed. The FTCA does not 

waive sovereign immunity as to claims arising out of “libel, slander, misrepresentation, 

deceit and interference with contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction to hear these claims and thus, these claims are DISMISSED without 

leave to amend as amendment would be futile.

Plaintiff also brings a negligence and an intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(“IIED”) claim arising from the same set of facts he attributes to his defamation and slander 

causes of action. (ECF No. 1 at 9-12). “In determining whether a claim ‘arises out of’ one 

of the enumerated torts, we look beyond a plaintiff’s classification of the cause of action 

to examine whether the conduct upon which the claim is based constitutes one of the torts 

listed in § 2680(h).” Sabow v. U.S., 93 F.3d 1445, 1456 (9th Cir. 1996). 

As to Plaintiff’s IIED claim, he alleges that Defendants lied “to the entire community 

convincing people I was a child rapist.” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) As for Plaintiff’s negligence 

claim, he claims that Defendants told “lies” that he had “allegedly raped a little girl” and 

they “convince[ed] the public that I was a ‘child rapist.’” Id. at 11. These facts upon which 

these claims are based arise from the same set of facts that Plaintiff seeks to pursue in his 

defamation and slander claims which are barred under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s negligence and IIED claims arise from the alleged 

defamation and slander claims, these claims are also barred by § 2680(h). Thomas-Lazear 

v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 851 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Thus, the Court DISMISSES all of Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the FTCA 

for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

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(1) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days 

leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all 

the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by 

itself without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not 

re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR

15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 

1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 

F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are 

not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 

1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

(2) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No. 9) as moot and 

without prejudice to be re-opened if Plaintiff files an amended pleading.

Dated: August 8, 2017

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