Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01812/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01812-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Wayne Murray, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-99-1812-PHX-DGC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE: PROCEDURAL STATUS

OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

Petitioner Robert Wayne Murray is a state prisoner, sentenced to death, who has

petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He alleges

that he was convicted and sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution. (Dkt. 1.)1

This order addresses procedural bar and other issues raised by Respondents’ answer to the

petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 12, 1992, Petitioner and his younger brother, Roger, were jointly tried and

convicted by a jury of one count of armed robbery and two counts of first degree murder.

The murders of Dean Morrison and Jacqueline Appelhans occurred in the course of an armed

robbery of their store, restaurant, and house in Grasshopper Junction, Arizona. Mohave

County Superior Court Judge James E. Chavez sentenced Petitioner and his brother to death

on each murder count and to a term of imprisonment for the armed robbery. The Arizona

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2

 Resolving whether a petitioner has fairly presented his claim to the state court is an

intrinsically federal issue to be determined by the federal court. Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d

247, 251 (8th Cir. 1995); Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1556 (10th Cir. 1994).

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Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of each brother in a joint opinion.

State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 906 P.2d 542 (1995). 

On January 21, 1997, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief (“PCR”) in

the trial court (“PCR court”). (Dkt. 38, ex. C.) The PCR court summarily rejected or found

precluded as waived most of Petitioner’s claims, but held an evidentiary hearing regarding

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). (Id., ex. D.) The PCR court denied

relief on that claim following the evidentiary hearing. (Id., ex. E.) The Arizona Supreme

Court summarily denied a petition for review. (Id., ex. F, G.) Petitioner thereafter

commenced these proceedings.

PRINCIPLES OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). The AEDPA

requires that a writ of habeas corpus not be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). To properly

exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to the state’s highest

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999).

 A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78

(1971).2

 Commenting on the importance of fair presentation, the United States Supreme

Court has stated:

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If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of

prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the

prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must

say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per curiam). 

Following Duncan, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a state prisoner

has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) federal claims in state court unless he

specifically indicated to that court that the claims were based on federal law. See, e.g., Lyons

v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669-70 (2000), as amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001)

(general reference to insufficiency of evidence, right to be tried by impartial jury and

ineffective assistance of counsel lacked the specificity and explicitness required to present

federal claim); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000) (broad reference

to “due process” insufficient to present federal claim); see also Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d

1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The mere similarity between a claim of state and federal error

is insufficient to establish exhaustion.”). A petitioner must make the federal basis of a claim

explicit by citing specific provisions of federal statutory or case law, even if the federal basis

of a claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), or by

citing state cases that explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v.

Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Such explicit fair presentation must

be made not only to the trial or post-conviction court, but also to the state’s highest court.

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). If a petitioner’s habeas claim includes new

factual allegations not presented to the state courts, the claim may be considered unexhausted

if the new facts “fundamentally alter” the legal claim presented and considered in state court.

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). 

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman,

501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed

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to present the claim in any forum and “the court to which the petitioner would be required

to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims

procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. This is often referred to as “technical”

exhaustion because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the

petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. See id. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who

has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for

exhaustion; there are no remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”); Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996).

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs when petitioners may

seek relief in post-conviction proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to their

convictions or sentences in state court. Rule 32.2 provides, in part:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule

based upon any ground: . . . .

(2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous

collateral proceeding;

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral

proceeding.

b. Exceptions. Rule 32.2(a) shall not apply to claims for relief based on

Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). When a claim under [these sub-sections]

is to be raised in a successive or untimely post-conviction relief proceeding,

the notice of post-conviction relief must set forth the substance of the specific

exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in the previous petition or

in a timely manner. If the specific exception and meritorious reasons do not

appear substantiating the claim and indicating why the claim was not stated in

the previous petition or in a timely manner, the notice shall be summarily

dismissed.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (West 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3),

petitioners may not be granted relief on any claim which was waived at trial, on appeal, or

in a previous PCR petition. Similarly, pursuant to Rule 32.4, petitioners must seek relief in

a timely manner. Only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through (h)

of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior petition

or was not presented in a timely manner will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2 be avoided.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) (3), 32.4(a). 

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Therefore, in the present case, if there are claims which have not been raised

previously in state court, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has state remedies

currently available to him pursuant to Rule 32. If no remedies are currently available,

petitioner’s claims are “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501

U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. In addition, if there are claims that were fairly presented in state court

but found defaulted on state procedural grounds, such claims also will be found procedurally

defaulted in federal court so long as the state procedural bar was independent of federal law

and adequate to warrant preclusion of federal review. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262

(1989). A state procedural default is not independent if, for example, it depends upon an

antecedent federal constitutional ruling. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per

curiam). A state bar is not adequate unless it was firmly established and regularly followed

at the time of application by the state court. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, federal

courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits of

procedurally defaulted claims unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the failure

to properly exhaust in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation, or

shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s Amended Petition contains 47 claims. (Dkt. 20.) On October 16, 2000,

Petitioner withdrew Claims 6, 20, 21, 23-27, 38 and 41-46 and, pursuant to Court order, filed

a supplemental statement of exhaustion regarding the other claims. (Dkts. 30, 31.) On

January 25, 2001, he additionally withdrew Claims 8, 13-14, 16-19 and 28. (Dkt. 42.)

Therefore, the Court reviews the procedural status of the remaining claims, Claims 1-5, 7,

9-12, 15, 22, 29-37, 39, 40 and 47.

Fundamental Error Review

Petitioner asserts that aspects of his claims that were not fairly presented to the state

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courts were nevertheless exhausted by virtue of the supreme court’s fundamental error

review on direct appeal. The Court disagrees.

At the time of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court was charged by

statute with reviewing the record independently in all criminal cases for fundamental error.

See A.R.S. § 13-4035 (Repealed by Laws 1995, Ch. 198, § 1). The Ninth Circuit has

rejected the contention that this statutory fundamental error review itself exhausts claims that

were not fairly presented for purposes of federal habeas review. See Poland (Michael) v.

Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 1997) (Arizona’s process of fundamental error review

does not excuse a petitioner’s failure to present federal claims to the state’s highest court);

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting argument that

review for fundamental error by Arizona Supreme Court prevents procedural preclusion).

 In an attempt to avoid these holdings, Petitioner relies on Falcone v. Stewart, 120 F.3d

1082 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 947 (1998). In Falcone, the Ninth

Circuit noted in dicta that the Arizona Court of Appeals’s “fundamental error review almost

necessarily included consideration of the[] particular [constitutional] claims,” only because

such claims “were readily apparent from the record, and [the petitioner] had attempted to

raise them in an amended brief.” 120 F.3d at 1084 n.2. In this case, by contrast, Petitioner

did not alert the Arizona Supreme Court to the existence of the federal constitutional claims

at issue, nor does show that the claimed errors were readily apparent from the record.

Additionally, Falcone has little, if any, persuasive authority because the discussion of

Arizona’s fundamental error review is dicta and the entire opinion was vacated by the

Supreme Court. See 524 U.S. 947 (1998). Finally, since Falcone was decided, the Ninth

Circuit has reaffirmed the holdings of Poland and Martinez-Villareal that the Arizona

Supreme Court’s fundamental error review does not in itself exhaust un-presented claims for

purposes of federal habeas. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland

(Patrick) v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, the fundamental error review

conducted by the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to former A.R.S. § 13-4035 did not

exhaust any claim, or aspect thereof, that was not fairly presented by Petitioner. 

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Fifth Amendment Due Process Allegations

It is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment, that protects a person

against deprivations of due process by a state. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall

any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”);

Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment

prohibits the federal government from depriving persons of due process, while the Fourteenth

Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without due process by the several States.”).

Because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not provide a cognizable ground for

relief from Petitioner’s state court conviction, the allegations that the Fifth Amendment Due

Process Clause was violated will be dismissed as to all of his claims and will not be discussed

further.

Eighth Amendment Allegations

The right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, by definition, is a protection

related to the imposition or carrying out of a sentence. Eighth Amendment protections

therefore do not attach until a person is convicted and subject to punishment by the State.

See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 667, 671 n. 40 (1977) (Eighth Amendment

circumscribes only the type of punishment imposable on those convicted, punishment grossly

disproportionate to the crime, and what can be criminalized and punished); Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (Eighth Amendment has no application to pretrial detainees).

There is no cognizable claim that Petitioner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment were

violated as to claims relating solely to his conviction. Because the Eighth Amendment does

not provide a cognizable ground for relief regarding conviction-related claims, the allegations

that the Eighth Amendment was violated will be dismissed as to Claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10-12, 15,

30-37 and 39, and will not be discussed further.

The Court will also dismiss the Eighth Amendment aspects of Claims 29 and 40.

Petitioner did not raise an Eighth Amendment aspect with respect to these claims in state

court, which he tacitly concedes, and those aspects of these claims are now procedurally

barred. (Dkts. 38, ex. C at 113, ex. F at 13; 42 at 33, 37.) 

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3

 Similarly, Petitioner did not exhaust the Sixth Amendment aspects of Claims 7 and

10 in state court and that aspect of these claims will be dismissed as procedurally barred.

(Dkt. 42 at 19-20, 23-24.)

4

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issues with respect to these claims, and that the claims therefore were “properly before the

Court to be reviewed on the merits.” (Dkt. 42 at 19-20, 34-37.) 

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Fourteenth Amendment Allegations

In each claim, Petitioner alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to

equal protection and due process. Respondents concede that the equal protection aspect of

Claim 7 and the due process aspect of Claims 10 and 29 were exhausted in the state courts,

but otherwise dispute that the equal protection and due process aspects of Petitioner’s

remaining claims were properly exhausted. 

The record reflects, and Petitioner tacitly acknowledges, that with the exception of

Claim 7, none of the equal protection aspects of his remaining claims were exhausted in state

court. (See dkt. 38, ex. B at 39-42, C.) The equal protection aspects of all but Claim 7 are

now procedurally barred and will be dismissed. (Dkt. 38, ex. B at 39-42; see, e.g., dkt. 42

at 15, 16, 17, 18-19.)3

 Similarly, the record reflects, and Petitioner tacitly acknowledges, that

the due process aspects of Claims 5, 7, 30-37, 39 and 40 were not exhausted in state court.

(See dkt. 38, ex. B, C.)4

 Those aspects are now procedurally barred and will be dismissed.

Summary

Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment allegations will be dismissed as non-cognizable for all

of his claims. The Eighth Amendment aspect of Claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10-12, 15, 29-37, 39 and

40 will be dismissed as non-cognizable or procedurally barred. The due process aspect of

Claims 5, 7, 30-37, 39 and 40 and the equal protection aspects of Claims 1-5, 9-12, 15, 22,

29-37, 39 and 40 will be dismissed as procedurally barred. Because the parties agree that the

balance of Claims 5, 7, 10, 12, 29, 30-37, 39 and 40 have been exhausted, the merits of the

remaining portions of those claims will be addressed in a separate order. The Court next

reviews the individual procedural status of Claims 1-4, 9, 11, 15, 22 and 47. 

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5

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direct appeal (Case No. CR-92-0440-AP). Certified copies of trial and post-conviction

records, in addition to the original reporter’s transcripts, were provided to this Court by the

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II. Individual Claims

A. Claim 1

Claim 1 alleges that Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by the denial of his motion to change venue or to sequester the jury. Respondents

concede the Sixth Amendment portion of the claim is exhausted (dkt. 37 at 9), but argue that

Petitioner failed to present a substantive Fourteenth Amendment due process claim to the

state courts (dkt. 54 at 25). 

On direct appeal, Petitioner alleged that the trial court violated his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying his motion for change of venue, but he did not

fairly present allegations concerning a failure to sequester the jury. (Dkt. 38, ex. B at 20-22.)

The Court finds, however, that Respondents have expressly waived exhaustion of the

sequestration allegation by conceding that Petitioner properly exhausted the Sixth

Amendment portion Claim 1. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). Further, because Petitioner

expressly cited the Fourteenth Amendment in support of the claim in state court, the Court

will review both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment aspects of this claim on the merits.

 B. Claim 2

Claim 2 alleges that Petitioner was denied his right to have a fair and impartial grand

jury determine probable cause in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Respondents contend this claim is barred because Petitioner failed to properly challenge the

grand jury proceedings by filing a special action prior to trial and because the Arizona

Supreme Court found the claim “precluded” on that basis. Petitioner counters that he argued,

in his reply brief on direct appeal, that “the pretrial publicity and close connections of grand

jurors with members of law enforcement was so insidious as to render the entire proceedings,

including the grand jury indictment, a sham. The error in this case was fundamental.” (Dkt.

42 at 15-16, quoting ROA 19 at 12.)5

 He asserts that the Arizona Supreme Court, in

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searching the record for fundamental error, necessarily considered Claim 2 on the merits.

(Id. at 16.)

 The Arizona Supreme Court addressed this claim in its opinion and unambiguously

found it precluded under state procedural law. It stated that “[t]o obtain review of a denial

of redetermination of probable cause, a defendant must seek relief before trial by special

action” and he “may not challenge matters relevant only to the grand jury proceedings by

appeal from conviction,” absent “an indictment that the state knew was partially based on

perjured, material testimony[.]” Murray, 184 Ariz. at 32, 906 P.2d at 565. It held that

because Petitioner did not claim that the indictment had been obtained using perjured

testimony, he was “precluded from challenging the grand jury’s finding of probable cause”

on appeal. Id. The basis for its preclusion ruling was adequate and independent; Arizona

law and rules have long required challenges to grand jury proceedings, including to the

impartiality of a grand jury, be brought by special action prior to trial. See Maretick v.

Jarrett, 204 Ariz. 194, 197, 62 P.3d 120, 123 (2003); Crimmins v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz.

39, 41, 668 P.2d 882, 884 (1983); State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570, 575, 627 P.2d 721, 726

(1981) (“We hold that defendant cannot, by appeal from a conviction, obtain review of

matters relevant only to the grand jury proceedings that had no effect on the subsequent

trial.”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.9. The claim is therefore procedurally barred.

Even if Claim 2 were not procedurally barred, it would fail on the merits. Because

a jury found Petitioner guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, the alleged

absence of probable cause before the grand jury, even if true, would be harmless error.

United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) (following conviction by a petit jury, “any

error in the grand jury proceeding . . . was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); People of

Territory of Guam v. Muna, 999 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1993) (“On appellate review of the

case after conviction, the Mechanik standard applies and, therefore, even if the prosecutor

erred as contended by the appellant, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does

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not justify dismissal of the indictment.”); see also United States v. Anderson, 61 F.3d 1290,

1297, n.5 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding no prejudice where counsel failed to challenge indictment

because of conviction); Thompson v. Kelly, No. 97-CV-258H, 1999 WL 166820 (W.D.N.Y.

Feb. 4, 1999) (same). This claim will be dismissed as procedurally barred and, in the

alternative, denied on the merits.

C. Claim 3

Claim 3 alleges that Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

to proceed pro per with advisory counsel and with access to a law library or legal resources

before and during trial. Respondents concede that the Sixth Amendment portion of this claim

is exhausted, but contend the Fourteenth Amendment portion is not. (Dkt. 37 at 11.) 

In his appellate brief, Petitioner alleged the factual basis of Claim 3, asserted that it

violated his Sixth Amendment rights and his Fifth Amendment due process rights. (Dkt. 38,

ex. B at 23-27.) Additionally, Petitioner cited State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 584-85, 863

P.2d 861, 876-77 (1993), which relied on Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). (Dkt. 44 at 17-18.) In Henry, the defendant argued

that “his right to self-representation was unduly infringed because jail officials did not permit

him an allotted 3 hours a day in the law library.” 176 Ariz. at 584, 863 P.2d at 876. The

Arizona Supreme Court stated that, “[w]hen a defendant in custody exercises th[e right of

self-representation pursuant to Faretta], the Fifth Amendment guarantee of access to the

courts requires that he or she be provided an adequate law library or assistance from someone

trained in the law.” Id. (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828). The supreme court went on to note

that library access was only one permissible means of affording the right to meaningful selfrepresentation and that “[d]ue process rights are violated only when a defendant is denied all

meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense.” Id. Although Petitioner and the state supreme

court referred to Fifth rather than Fourteenth Amendment due process, the court’s decision

clearly relied on federal law. 

The Court concludes that Petitioner’s citation to Henry was sufficient to fairly alert

the state court to his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Therefore, the Sixth and

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 “RT” refers to the state court reporter’s transcript. 

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Fourteenth Amendment aspects of this Claim will be reviewed on the merits in a subsequent

order.

D. Claim 4

Claim 4 alleges that the failure to sever Petitioner’s trial from that of his brother’s

violated Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Right to Counsel Clause and the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Dkt. 20 at 43.) Specifically, Petitioner

contends that severance was necessary because some evidence implicated only his brother

and a joint trial prevented him from presenting a defense implicating his brother. (Dkt. 20

at 40-42.) He also contends that their respective trial counsel were antagonistic to one

another and that his brother’s counsel acted as a “second prosecutor.” (Id. at 40-41, quoting

RT 6/2/92, vol. 2, at 42-44.)6

 Respondents argue this claim is procedurally barred. (Dkt.

37 at 11-12.) Petitioner counters that his citation to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123

(1968), in his opening appellate brief, was sufficient to fairly alert the state courts to the

federal claim presented here and that the supreme court reached the merits of this claim.

(Dkt. 42 at 18-19.) The Court disagrees. 

In state court, Petitioner argued that his right to present a defense by inculpating his

brother was impaired by the denial of severance, citing Bruton. (Dkt. 38, ex. B at 47-48.)

Because Petitioner did not allege that the denial of severance impaired his right to counsel,

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel portion of this claim was not fairly presented.

Moreover, Bruton concerned the admission at a joint trial of one defendant’s confession that

inculpated a second defendant, and was based on the Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause. 391 U.S. at 126. Claim 4 does not assert a Confrontation Clause violation. Finally,

Petitioner did not fairly present the claim that denial of severance violated his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process. Bruton did not concern that right and Petitioner neither

cited the Fourteenth Amendment nor any law addressing a federal due process right related

to severance or a joint trial.

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 The Court directed Petitioner to address cause and prejudice and fundamental

miscarriage of justice in his Traverse and Sur-reply as to any claim Respondents asserted to

be procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 4 at 4). Although Respondents asserted procedural bar as

to many of Petitioner’s claims, Petitioner did not assert that any defaults should be excused

based on cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. He instead asserted

that his “arguments concerning cause and prejudice, as well as fundamental miscarriage of

justice, will depend on how this Court rules on the procedural status of each of the claims.”

(Dkt. 42 at 13.) The Court disagrees. Petitioner was provided an opportunity to raise these

arguments to overcome any defaults and he chose not to do so. Similarly, Petitioner’s

request for evidentiary development regarding cause and prejudice and fundamental

miscarriage of justice is not warranted because he has not raised any such arguments.

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Nor did the Arizona Supreme Court reach the merits of Petitioner’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim. Rather, the court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion

under state law by denying severance, stating that “[n]either defendant made a statement,

testified at trial, or presented an antagonistic defense. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.

123, 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1621, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (confession by co-defendant).”

Murray, 184 Ariz. at 25, 906 P.2d at 558. The state court merely held that the denial of

severance did not violate the Confrontation Clause under Bruton. 

Because Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 now preclude

Petitioner from obtaining relief on this claim in state court, it is technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not asserted that cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice excuses any default found by the Court. Claim 4 is procedurally

barred.7

E. Claim 9

Claim 9 alleges that Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were

violated by the improper admission of expert testimony from Detective Dale Lent regarding

footprint comparisons. Respondents contend that Petitioner only exhausted this claim as a

violation of state law. (Dkt. 37 at 14.)

In his appellate briefs, Petitioner argued that the admission of Lent’s expert testimony

violated Petitioner’s “right to a fair trial” and Rule 702 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, and

contravened State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 633 P.2d 410 (1981). (Dkt. 42 at 22.) He now

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argues that Arizona’s 1977 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 702,

together with the allegation that the rule was violated, were sufficient to fairly present the

instant federal claim because the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to ensure that

“a defendant is afforded a trial that comports with the minimal requirements of due process.”

(Id.) He also argues that the citation to Jessen fairly alerted the state court to his federal

claim because Jessen relied on federal cases, McKee v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 623

(6th Cir. 1970), and Bridger v. Union Railway Co., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966),

regarding the qualification of expert witnesses. Finally, he argues that testimony from an

improperly qualified expert invades the province of the jury and that “[a]ny claim of trial

error alleging an improper invasion of the province of the jury necessarily involves the Sixth

Amendment and the Due Process Clause.” (Dkt. 42 at 22-23.) These arguments are

unpersuasive.

As an initial matter, Petitioner’s assertion in his appellate briefs that he was denied

a “fair trial” by virtue of the trial court’s erroneous admission of expert testimony was not

sufficient to alert the state courts to the federal constitutional claim he now raises. See Gray,

518 U.S. at 162-63. Similarly, Arizona’s adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence as state

evidentiary rules does not transform the purported misapplication of a state rule into an

alleged federal constitutional violation. In addition, neither Jessen nor the cases cited in it

involved violations of federal constitutional rights in connection with the admission or

exclusion of expert testimony. Jessen concerned the erroneous admission of expert testimony

under state law, 130 Ariz. at 7, 633 P.2d at 416, while Bridger and McKee involved whether

the admission or exclusion of expert testimony constituted “manifest error” under the federal

rules of evidence, Bridger, 355 F.2d at 387; McKee, 423 F.2d at 625. Thus, the citation to

Jessen was not sufficient to fairly alert the state court to Petitioner’s federal constitutional

claim. Lastly, although Petitioner alleged in state court that Lent was improperly qualified

as an expert, he did not allege that admission of Lent’s testimony invaded the province of the

jury, nor did he assert that his federal constitutional rights were thereby violated.

The Court finds that Petitioner did not fairly present the federal constitutional claim

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and that aspect of the claim will be dismissed as procedurally barred. (Dkts. 38, ex. B at 43-

45; 42 at 24.) 

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to the state courts. Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 now preclude Petitioner from obtaining relief

on his federal claim in state court and the claim therefore is technically exhausted but

procedurally defaulted. Because Petitioner has not argued or established that cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice excuse the default, this claim will be

dismissed as procedurally barred. 

F. Claim 11

 Claim 11 alleges the trial court improperly admitted gruesome photos of the victims

in violation of Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.8

 (See id. at 15.)

Respondents argue this claim was only presented and addressed as a violation of state

evidentiary law. (Dkt. 37 at 15.) 

Petitioner contends that he fairly presented the constitutional dimension of this claim

on direct appeal by citing State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 800 P.2d 1260 (1990), which

addressed whether the admission of gruesome photos violated the rules of evidence or “due

process.” (Dkt. 42 at 24.) In Amaya-Ruiz, the Arizona Supreme Court described the

appellant as having alleged that “his due process rights were violated by the admission of

gruesome photographs,” but did not indicate that the appellant raised a federal due process

claim. 166 Ariz. at 170-71, 800 P.2d at 1278-79. The supreme court specifically noted when

the appellant claimed a federal constitutional violation with respect to other issues in the

case, and nothing in the opinion suggests that the appellant raised federal due process

concerns with respect to the gruesome photos or that the supreme court considered that issue.

Id. at 160, 170, 174, 182-83, 800 P.2d at 1268, 1278, 1282, 1290-91. Petitioner’s citation to

Amaya-Ruiz’s discussion of gruesome photographs therefore was not sufficient to fairly alert

the supreme court to the federal constitutional claim he now presents. Indeed, the supreme

court’s resolution of the gruesome photos issue in Amaya-Ruiz appears to rely solely on state

evidentiary law. Id. at 171, 800 P.2d at 1279. Because Amaya-Ruiz did not “explicitly

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to the state courts, that aspect of the claim is unexhausted and will be dismissed as

procedurally barred. (Dkts. 38, ex. 45-46; 42 at 27.)

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apply” federal constitutional due process to its analysis of the gruesome photos issue, the

Court concludes that Petitioner’s citation to that case did not exhaust the federal

constitutional dimension of the instant claim. See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (joining other circuits in holding that “citation to a state case

analyzing a federal constitutional issue serves the same purpose as a citation to a federal case

analyzing such an issue.”) 

Because Petitioner is now precluded by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 from returning to

state court to obtain review of this claim, the claim is technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted. Petitioner has not argued that cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of

justice excuse the default. Federal review on the merits of the claim is procedurally barred

and this claim will be dismissed. 

G. Claim 15

Claim 15 alleges that insufficient evidence supported his convictions for felony

murder and armed robbery in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.9

Petitioner concedes that his “notice of joinder” in his state appellate brief that purported to

incorporate claims raised in his brother’s appeal was not adequate to satisfy the fair

presentation requirement. (Dkt. 42 at 26-27.) Petitioner maintains, however, that he fairly

presented the federal claim to the Arizona Supreme Court and that the court addressed the

claim on the merits. (Id.)

 At trial, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20 of

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was denied. Murray, 184 Ariz. at 31, 906

P.2d at 564. In his opening appellate brief, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in denying

his Rule 20 motion, citing two state cases. (Dkt. 38, ex. B at 45-46.) Neither of those cases

relied on federal constitutional law such that the state supreme court would have been alerted

to Petitioner’s federal claim. See State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 365-66, 728 P.2d 232,

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235-36 (1986); State v. Lopez, 158 Ariz. 258, 264, 762 P.2d 545, 551 (1988). 

Petitioner also claims that he fairly presented the claim in his reply brief. This

contention also fails. Even if the Court assumes that it would have been procedurally proper

to first raise such a claim in a reply brief, Petitioner did not articulate a federal basis for the

claim in his reply. (ROA 19 at 22-23.) Petitioner therefore did not fairly present Claim 15

in state court.

Petitioner alternatively argues that the Arizona Supreme Court resolved the federal

claim on the merits based on its citation of State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552, 633 P.2d 355,

361 (1981). The Arizona Supreme Court addressed Petitioner’s claim of acquittal based

solely on state law pursuant to Rule 20. See Murray, 184 Ariz. at 31, 906 P.2d at 564. The

court cited Tison solely for the proposition that under state law, “[w]hen a defendant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court views the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the conviction.” Id. (citing Tison, 129 Ariz. at 552, 633 P.2d

at 361). The supreme court did not address this claim as one based on federal due process.

Because Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4 now preclude

Petitioner from obtaining relief on this claim in state court, the claim is technically exhausted

but procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not argued that cause and prejudice or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice excuse the default. This claim will be dismissed. 

H. Claim 22

Claim 22 alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of the

three aggravating circumstances. (Dkt. 20 at 87-91.) Respondents contend that Petitioner

only challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the especially heinous, cruel and

depraved aggravating circumstance in state court, and that he did not present the claim as a

violation of federal constitutional law. (Dkt. 38 at 21.) Petitioner counters that although not

expressly raised on direct appeal, Claim 22 was exhausted by virtue of the Arizona Supreme

Court’s independent sentencing review. (Dkt. 42 at 29-30.)

The Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that it independently reviews each

capital case to determine whether the death sentence is appropriate. Murray, 184 Ariz. at 36,

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906 P.2d at 569. In State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 54, 659 P.2d 1, 13 (1983), the court stated

that the purpose of independent review is to assess the presence or absence of aggravating

and mitigating circumstances and the weight to give to each. See also State v. Blazak, 131

Ariz. 598, 604, 643 P.2d 694, 700 (1982). In conducting this review, the court reviews the

record regarding aggravation and mitigation findings, and then decides independently

whether the death sentence should be imposed. State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 493-94, 826

P.2d 783, 790-91 (1992). The court also determines “whether the sentence of death was

imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factors,” State v.

Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976), sentence overturned on other

grounds, Richmond v. Cardwell, 450 F. Supp. 519 (D. Ariz. 1978), and will address

sentencing-related issues even if not directly raised in the appeal. See, e.g., State v.

McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 581, 917 P.2d 1214, 1228 (1996) (sua sponte striking application

of (F)(2) aggravating factor); State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 605, 863 P.2d 881, 897 (1993)

(sua sponte finding defendant’s psychiatric condition sufficiently substantial to warrant

leniency). Arguably, the court’s review rests on both state and federal grounds. See Brewer,

170 Ariz. at 493, 826 P.2d at 790 (finding that statutory duty to review death sentences arises

from need to ensure compliance with constitutional safeguards imposed by the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments); State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 63, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (1981)

(discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420

(1980) and stating that independent review of death penalty is mandated by the U.S. Supreme

Court and necessary to ensure against arbitrary and capricious application). 

Although the scope of its independent sentencing review is limited, the Court finds

that a claim alleging unconstitutional application of enumerated aggravating factors falls

within the narrow class of claims implicitly rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court when it

affirmed Petitioner’s sentence. See Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1993)

(holding that, because the Idaho Supreme Court was statutorily required to review the

petitioner’s capital sentence to determine if it was infected by “passion, prejudice, or any

other arbitrary factor,” that court must have implicitly ruled on the constitutionality of the

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trial judge’s application of the “continuing threat” factor to the petitioner). In the Arizona

Supreme Court’s written opinion, it noted its obligation to determine if each aggravating

factor had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and reviewed each of the three factors and

the supporting evidence. Murray, 184 Ariz. at 36-37, 906 P.2d at 569-70. The supreme

court’s actual review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating factors

exhausted Claim 22. See Sandstrom v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir. 1984)

(“[t]here is no better evidence of exhaustion than a state court’s actual consideration of the

relevant constitutional issue”). Accordingly, Claim 22 will be addressed on the merits.

I. Claim 47

Claim 47 alleges that Petitioner will be incompetent to be executed under the Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Dkt. 20 at 195-97.) Petitioner recognizes, and

Respondents agree, that this claim is not yet ripe for federal review. (Dkt. 37 at 27.)

Pursuant to Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 U.S.

637 (1998), a claim of incompetency for execution “must be raised in a first habeas petition,

whereupon it also must be dismissed as premature due to the automatic stay that issues when

a first petition is filed.” If again presented to the district court once the claim becomes ripe

for review, it shall not be treated as a second or successive petition. See id. at 643-44.

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Claim 47 without prejudice as premature.

CONCLUSION

The Fifth Amendment Due Process aspects of Petitioner’s remaining claims will be

dismissed as non-cognizable. The Eighth Amendment aspect of Claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10-12, 15,

30-37 and 39 will be dismissed as non-cognizable. The Eighth Amendment aspects of

Claims 29 and 40 will be dismissed as procedurally barred. The Fourteenth Amendment

Equal Protection aspects of Claims 1-5, 9-12, 15, 22, 29-37 and 40 and the Due Process

aspects of Claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 29, 30-37, 39 and 40 will be dismissed as procedurally

barred. In addition, the Sixth Amendment aspects of Claims 2, 4, 7, 9-11, and 15 will be

dismissed as procedurally barred. Claim 47 will be dismissed without prejudice as

premature. Claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 29, 30-37, 39 and 40 will be reviewed on the merits

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in a subsequent order to the extent described herein. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Fifth Amendment aspect of ALL of Petitioner’s claims and

the Eighth Amendment aspects of Claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10-12, 15, 30-37 and 39 shall be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as non-cognizable.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following shall be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as procedurally barred: (a) the Eighth Amendment aspects of Claims 29 and

40; (b) the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection aspects of Claims 1-5, 9-12, 15, 22, 29-

37 and 40; (c) the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process aspects of Claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 29,

30-37, 39 and 40; and (d) the Sixth Amendment aspects of Claims 2, 4, 7, 9-11, and 15.10

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim 47 shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE as premature. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 22, 29, 30-37, 39 and

40 shall be reviewed on the merits, to the extent stated herein, in a subsequent order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than forty-five (45) days following entry

of this order, Petitioner shall file a Memorandum regarding the merits only of the properly

exhausted claims identified in the “Conclusion” section of this order. The Merits

Memorandum shall specifically identify and apply appropriate AEDPA standards of review

to each claim for relief and shall not simply restate facts and argument contained in the

amended petition. Petitioner shall also identify in the Merits Memorandum (1) each claim

for which further evidentiary development is sought, (2) the facts or evidence sought to be

discovered, expanded or presented at an evidentiary hearing, (3) why such evidence was not

developed in state court, and (4) why the failure to develop the claim in state court was not

the result of lack of diligence, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than forty-five (45) days following the

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filing of Petitioner’s Memorandum, Respondents shall file a Response Re: Merits.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than twenty (20) days following the

filing of Respondents’ Response, Petitioner may file a Reply.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(g), Petitioner or

Respondents file a Motion for Reconsideration of this order, such motion shall be filed within

fifteen (15) days of the filing of this order. The filing and disposition of such motion does

not toll the time for the filing of the merits briefs scheduled under this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a copy of this order

to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007-3329.

DATED this 13th day of April, 2006.

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