Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01897/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01897-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

First Service Networks, Inc.,

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

First Service Maintenance Group, Inc., 

Defendant.

No. CV11-1897-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging trademark infringement, unfair 

competition, unjust enrichment, and anticybersquatting. Doc. 1. Defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) 

and 12(b)(3), or, in the alternative, to transfer the suit to the Southern District of New 

York. Doc. 15. The motion is fully briefed.1

 Docs. 22, 23. For the reasons that follow, 

the Court will grant Plaintiff’s request for limited discovery.2

I. Background.

 Plaintiff provides maintenance and repair services to property owners and began 

using the mark FIRST SERVICE NETWORKS in April 2001. Doc. 1 at 2-3. Plaintiff 

provides services to U.S. and international customers who have business locations in all 

50 states. Id. at 3. Plaintiff owns U.S. trademark registrations for FIRST SERVICE 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied because the issues are fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Partidge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

2

 Plaintiff’s motion to file a sur-reply (Doc. 24) is granted. The Court has 

considered it in deciding this motion. 

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NETWORKS and FIRST SERVICE NETWORK & DESIGN. Id. 

 Defendant is also a maintenance and repair provider and began offering services 

sometime around January 2009. Id. Defendant’s website and marketing material use the 

words “First Service,” “1st Service,” “1st Service Maintenance,” and “First Services 

Maintenance Inc.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant trades on the goodwill of 

Plaintiff’s mark and has obtained profitability they otherwise would not have. Id.

II. Analysis.

 Defendant argues that Arizona does not have personal jurisdiction over it. A 

federal court has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when (1) the 

applicable state rule or statute permits service of process on the defendant, and (2) the 

assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. Chan v. Society 

Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1994). Arizona’s long-arm statute 

permits personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 

4.2(a). A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 

Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). Indeed, a plaintiff is 

obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant. Cummings v. W. Trial Lawyers Assoc., 133 F. Supp.2d 

1144, 1151 (D. Ariz. 2001). 

 A. General Jurisdiction. 

 The Court may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant if its activities in the 

forum state are substantial or continuous and systematic, even if the plaintiff’s claims are 

unrelated to those activities. Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 

784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 

Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). Other than allegations about Defendant’s website, 

Plaintiff does not argue or otherwise provide the Court with any evidence that establishes 

general jurisdiction over Defendant. There is no evidence that Defendant engages in 

business transactions with any residents or businesses in Arizona. Defendant’s website 

merely provides details about Defendant and its services, where it can provide the 

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services, and contact information. Merely maintaining a website that Arizona residents 

may access is not enough to satisfy general jurisdiction requirements. Hillman Group, 

Inc. v. Hy-Ko Products Co., No. CV 07-2446-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 3583253 at *3 (D. 

Ariz. Aug. 13, 2008); see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 

1124 (W. D. Pa. 1997) (distinguishing between “passive” websites that merely provide 

information and “active” websites though which commercial activity occurs). 

B. Specific Jurisdiction. 

 The Ninth Circuit employs a three-prong test to determine whether a party has 

sufficient minimum contacts for specific jurisdiction to exist: “(1) [t]he non-resident 

defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with 

the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails 

himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or 

relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction 

must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). The 

plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test. Sher v. Johnson, 

911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these prongs, 

personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state. If the plaintiff succeeds in 

satisfying the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant to “present a compelling 

case” that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985). Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first prong. 

 The first prong is satisfied by either purposeful availment (most often used in suits 

sounding in contract) or purposeful direction (most often used in suits sounding in tort). 

Id. The underlying federal claims here are based on trademark infringement, which 

sounds in tort.3

 GN Trade, Inc. v. Siemens, No. Civ. S-11-0994 LKK/KJN, 2011 WL 

 

3

 Plaintiff’s proof of personal jurisdiction also fails under the purposeful availment standard. To satisfy this standard, Defendant “must do some act or consummate some 

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4591080 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 

1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating trademark infringement and unfair competition case is 

“akin” to a tort case). To satisfy purposeful direction, Plaintiff must establish that 

(1) Defendant committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, 

(3) causing harm that Defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. 

Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Plaintiff argues that this Court has personal jurisdiction because Defendant’s 

website asserts that Defendant does business in the lower forty-eight states. But merely 

maintaining a passive website does not constitute purposeful direction sufficient to 

support specific jurisdiction.4

 Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 

606 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is beyond dispute in this circuit that maintenance 

of a passive website alone cannot satisfy the express aiming prong.”) (citing Holland Am. 

Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007); Pebble Beach Co. v. 

Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006)). But cf. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l 

Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[O]perating even a passive website in 

conjunction with ‘something more’ – conduct directly targeting the forum – is sufficient 

to confer personal jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).

 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has a west coast office and is scheduled to be an 

exhibitor at a Las Vegas conference. Doc. 22 at 5. Doing business on the west coast or 

in Nevada does not, however, constitute purposeful direction at Arizona. 

Plaintiff also “believes” that Defendant currently has contractors or subcontractors 

 transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections.” Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff has not identified any act or transaction of Defendant that is connected with 

Arizona. Plaintiff relies solely on Defendant’s passive website and a belief that Defendant has contractors in Arizona. This is not sufficient to establish purposeful availment. 

4

 Plaintiff asserts that if Defendant does not in fact do business in Arizona, then it 

will be liable for false advertising as well as trademark infringement. Even if this were 

true, Defendant could be held liable only in a jurisdiction where it is subject to personal jurisdiction. False statements of purposeful direction do not necessarily constitute purposeful direction. 

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providing services in Arizona. Defendant denies that it has conducted any activity in or 

derives any revenue from Arizona, and the affidavit of Andrea Fish, Defendant’s 

president and COO, states under penalty of perjury that Defendant has never contracted 

to offer services in Arizona. Doc. 16 ¶ 23. Services provided by Defendant outside of 

Arizona, of course, are not “aimed at” Arizona for purposes of specific jurisdiction. See 

GN Trade, 2011 WL 4591080 at *4 (selling products in Colorado did not constitute 

express aiming sufficient to support jurisdiction for a trademark action in California). 

 The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant purposefully 

has directed its activities at Arizona. Given this failure of proof, the Court need not 

address the other requirements of specific jurisdiction. 

C. Leave for Jurisdictional Discovery.

 Plaintiff asks the Court to grant 90 days of limited discovery to establish 

jurisdictional facts. The Court will grant this request, but for a shorter period. Plaintiff 

may have until June 29, 2012, to conduct discovery on personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff 

may propound up to 10 requests for production of documents and 10 interrogatories (each 

including subparts), and may take up to three depositions of no more than four hours 

each. Defendant shall file a supplement to its motion to dismiss by July 6, 2012. 

Plaintiff shall file a response by July 18, 2012. No reply will be permitted, and the 

supplements will be limited to 10 pages each. The Court will enter a final ruling on the 

motion to dismiss after considering the supplement and response. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to file a sur-reply (Doc. 24) is granted. 

 Dated this 24th day of April, 2012. 

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