Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00481/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00481-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Carlos R. Burnett,

Petitioner, No. 2:01:cv-00481-MDS

vs. ORDER

Ken Clark, Warden, 

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner Carlos R. Burnett, a state prisoner, has filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus with this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). For the reasons

discussed below, Burnett’s petition is DENIED.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In the early morning hours of July 24, 1996, three teenage boys named

Feolofan Lopa, Matthew Lene, and Jesse Tooto, started walking to Lene’s home in

North Sacramento after spending the evening at the home of Lene’s aunt. RT 37-

43, 73-75. Their journey home took them through the neighborhood of Del Paso

Heights. 

Del Paso Heights is a large neighborhood in North Sacramento, and Elm

Street is located within Del Paso Heights. RT 273. At the time of the events in this

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case, each of these geographical areas was associated with a specific street gang. 

The Del Paso Heights Bloods claimed the Del Paso Heights neighborhood as their

territory, and the Elm Street Bloods claimed Elm Street and the associated block as

their territory. RT 275. The Del Paso Heights and Elm Street Bloods were related

gangs, as they were both subsets of the larger Bloods gang. RT 273-75. 

The Bloods often engage in violent conflict with the Crips, a rival gang. RT

274-75. Both gangs have their own signs, hand signs, and graffiti to identify their

members. Id. They also distinguish themselves from one another by the colors they

wear—Crips typically wear blue, and Bloods tend to wear red. RT 273. 

On the morning of July 24, Lopa was wearing blue clothing. RT 76-77. The

record is not clear whether the three boys belonged to a gang. Lene testified that he

“grew up with a street gang” called the Sons of Samoa, RT 38-39, whose members

tended to wear blue, RT 39-40, but he declined to say whether the Sons of Samoa

associated themselves with the Crips or Bloods. RT 39. Lene also did not address

Lopa’s or Tooto’s involvement with the Sons of Samoa. RT 38. 

As the three boys walked together, two African-American males in a gray

pickup truck with a camper shell drove slowly past the boys, giving them “hard

looks.” RT 76-77. The driver shortly turned the truck around, parked, and exited

the vehicle with the passenger. RT 43-45, 77. The driver yelled, “What’s up,

Bloods?” RT 45, 77. The three boys did not respond to the driver’s taunt and

continued walking. RT 46, 77. 

After the two drivers initially passed the three boys and parked the car, Lene

was able to briefly look at them after the two men exited the truck. Lene saw that

the driver was a skinny African-American male with braided hair. RT 48-49. Lene

observed that the passenger was a tall, skinny African-American male with little or

no hair. RT 49-50. Tooto also got a look at the two men as they slowly drove past

the boys, giving them “hard looks.” He described the driver as an AfricanAmerican male who was “kind of chubby and stocky” with braided hair. RT 85-86. 

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He described the passenger as a tall, skinny African-American male who was bald

or had little hair. RT 87. 

Suddenly, the truck pulled up behind the boys. RT 50, 79. The passenger

shouted, “What’s up now, Blood,” and then began firing at the boys. RT 50-51, 55,

80-81. Lene was hit in his left thigh, RT 56-57, 81-82, and Lopa was shot in the

back, RT 58-59. Lopa died from the gunshot wound. RT 258-60. 

After the incident, Lene participated in a photo line-up at the police station. 

RT 60-62. Lene was shown ten photos in the photo line-up, and he pointed out two

that resembled the shooter, one of whom was Burnett. RT 59-64. Tooto also

participated in a photo lineup. RT 99-100. When Tooto was shown a group of ten

photographs, he eventually picked a photograph that he believed resembled the

passenger. The photograph he selected was not of Burnett. RT 90-92, 100-01.

After Lene identified Burnett as being the possible shooter, Sharon

McClatchy, a detective with the Sacramento City Police Department, interviewed

Burnett. RT 247-48, CT 1-48. In that interview, Burnett represented that on the

night of the shooting, he and his friend, Omar, drove a gray truck with a camper in

the Del Paso Heights neighborhood. CT 1-12. However, Burnett stated that they

drove to an apartment to check on Omar’s baby, who was sick, and that once they

checked on the baby, they returned home. Id. Burnett told Detective McClatchy

that he and Omar returned home between midnight and 1 a.m. and that they did not

go out again. CT 37-38. Shortly after the interview, Burnett was arrested and

charged with murder. RT 252.

On November 1, 1996, an information was filed in Sacramento Superior

Court charging Burnett with violation of California Penal Code section 187 for first

degree murder and sections 664/187 for attempted murder. CAT 8-10. The

information also contained special allegations that Burnett personally used a firearm

in the commission of the charged offenses and that he intentionally killed the victim

by firing from a motor vehicle. Id. Burnet pleaded not guilty and denied the special

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allegations. CAT 133.

The jury trial commenced on March 31, 1997. CAT 112-13. On April 10,

1997, a jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts and found the special

allegations to be true. CAT 202-03. On May 8, 1997, the trial court sentenced

Burnett to state prison for life without possibility of parole on the murder count, and

to twelve years and four months for consecutive terms for the attempted murder

count and special allegations enhancements. CAT 236-37. On June 30, 1998, the

California Court of Appeal of the Third Appellate District affirmed Burnett’s

conviction. On September 23, 1998, the California Supreme Court denied Burnett’s

petition for review. 

On October 13, 1999, Burnett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Sacramento County Superior Court. On November 3, 1999, the state court denied

the petition. On November 29, 1999, Burnett filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. On

December 2, 1999, the California Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. 

On March 13, 2000, Burnett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Supreme Court. On June 28, 2000, the California Supreme Court

summarily denied the petition. 

On March 9, 2001, Burnett filed the present petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Burnett filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 16,

2008. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a district

court may grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence with respect to

a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if it (1) “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”;

or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

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the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 21 (2002) (per curiam).

“Clearly established federal law” consists of “the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its

decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A state court’s

decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at

a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13

(2000). A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly

established federal law where “the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court

may not issue a writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

Habeas relief is also available if the state court’s adjudication of a claim

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in” state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Factual

determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing

evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a

state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the

state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).” See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003). 

Generally, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1987), governs claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. For relief to be granted under Strickland, a

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petitioner must prove 1) that counsel’s “‘representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness’” and, 2) that “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.’” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688, 694). 

In assessing counsel’s performance, courts must defer to the reasonable

professional judgment of a trial counsel and presume that counsel’s conduct falls

within a “wide range” of “reasonable” professional representation. Id. at 702. “The

reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be evaluated from counsel’s

perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and

the standard of review is highly deferential.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.

365, 381 (1986); see also Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.

1995) (“[U]nder the rule of contemporary assessment, an attorney’s actions must be

examined according to what was known and reasonable at the time the attorney

made his choices.”). To meet his burden of showing prejudice, Burnett must

affirmatively “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S.

364, 372 (1993) (noting that the “prejudice” component “focuses on the question

whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or

the proceeding fundamentally unfair”). 

DISCUSSION

I. Claim One: The conviction must be reversed due to a violation of 

Burnett’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial 

counsel because counsel failed to withdraw despite an irreconcilable 

conflict.

Burnett argues that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel

because his attorney did not move to withdraw due to an irreconcilable conflict. 

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Specifically, Burnett contends that his trial counsel wanted more time to prepare for

trial, while Burnett refused to postpone the trial any longer. Burnett contends that

“[b]y staying in the case despite his [counsel’s] professional belief that he needed

more time to prepare the defense, trial counsel served as counsel in only the most

superficial sense.” 

Burnett is essentially arguing that his counsel proceeded to trial even though

he was unprepared. But the record reveals that Burnett’s counsel was

well-informed of his client’s case, that he ably argued his client’s defense, and that

he competently examined the witnesses. Further, Burnett has failed to point to any

specific examples demonstrating his counsel’s lack of preparation. It is Burnett’s

burden to overcome the “strong presumption” that his counsel “rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. To do so, Burnett needs to

identify the acts or omissions that allegedly rendered the representation objectively

unreasonable. Id. (observing that “[t]he availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry

into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would

encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges” as well as “dampen the

ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of

assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client”). Here,

Burnett’s mere conclusory allegation that trial counsel failed to investigate or

prepare is insufficient to show that his counsel’s representation was deficient. See

Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding the record

showed that the petitioner’s counsel was well informed of the facts and

circumstances of the case). 

Further, Burnett has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by his counsel

proceeding to trial when he did. Burnett has not explained what new counsel would

have done for Burnett that his trial counsel was unable to do or did not do himself. 

Burnett’s conclusory allegations that new counsel might have been able to provide a

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more effective representation are insufficient to prove that counsel was ineffective. 

See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding the

petitioner’s allegation that his counsel improperly advised him was vague and

conclusory); see also Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 630-32 (9th Cir. 1997)

(rejecting petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim where he presented no evidence

concerning what counsel would have found had he interviewed a witness or

investigated further); Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding

there was no ineffective assistance of counsel where the petitioner failed to explain

“what compelling evidence additional interviews would have unearthed or to explain

how an investigation of aggravation evidence would have negated the evidence of

the multiple gunshot wounds”). A habeas petitioner “is expected to state facts that

point to a real possibility of constitutional error.” Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d

1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, Burnett has

failed to provide this court with sufficient detail about what his trial counsel did

wrong as a result of his lack of preparation, or what his substituted counsel would

have done better with more preparation, so as to enable the court to determine

whether Burnett’s first claim raises a “real possibility” of constitutional error and

warrants further habeas review. See Cox v. Del Papa, 542 F.3d 669, 681 (9th Cir.

2008) (“Without any specification of the mitigating evidence that counsel failed to

unearth, Cox’s [IAC] claim must fail.”); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.

1994) (“Conclusory allegations . . . [un]supported by a statement of specific facts do

not warrant habeas relief.”).

As a result, Burnett has failed to carry his burden under Strickland as to his

first claim.

II. Claim Two: The conviction must be reversed due to a violation of 

Burnett’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial 

counsel because counsel failed to have Burnett examined for his 

competency to stand trial.

Burnett argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his

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counsel failed to seek a competency hearing or request that Burnett undergo a

psychiatric evaluation. He asserts that his counsel should have done so after Burnett

informed him that he had experimented with PCP in the months prior to his case and

had consequently suffered paranoid schizophrenic symptoms. He also contends that

his counsel should have been alerted to his competency problems when Burnett

insisted on rushing to trial, contrary to his counsel’s desire to take more time to

prepare for trial. 

It is well established that the conviction of a legally incompetent defendant

violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cooper v.

Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996). In federal court, a defendant is competent to

stand trial if he has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against him.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389,

396 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In California, “[a] defendant is

mentally incompetent . . . [if] the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the

criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational

manner.” Cal. Pen. Code § 1367; see also Nguyen v. Garcia, 477 F.3d 716, 724

(9th Cir. 2007) (equating competency standard articulated in section 1367 with the

standard applied by the Supreme Court in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401

n.12 (1993)). California law “presume[s] that the defendant is mentally competent

unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally

incompetent.” Cal. Pen. Code § 1369(f). 

Burnett’s counsel had a duty to request a competency hearing if he harbored

“substantial doubt” about Burnett’s competency to stand trial. See, e.g., Boag v.

Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985) (“In a habeas proceeding, a petitioner

is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of competency to stand trial if he

presents sufficient facts to create a real and substantial doubt as to his competency,

even if those facts were not presented to the trial court.”); People v. Farnam, 47

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P.3d 988, 1056 (Cal. 2002) (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for failing

to raise competency issue where “nothing in the record raised a substantial doubt as

to competency”). A “substantial doubt” exists in this regard “when there is

substantial evidence of incompetence.” Deere v. Woodford, 339 F.3d 1084, 1086

(9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Burnett has the burden of

establishing his mental incompetence to stand trial. See McKinney v. United States,

487 F.2d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[W]hen the issue of the defendant’s

competency to stand trial is raised in a § 2255 motion, the burden is upon the

defendant to prove that he was not mentally competent to stand trial.”). Whether a

defendant is capable of understanding the proceedings and assisting counsel

depends on “evidence of the defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor in court,

and any prior medical opinions on competence to stand trial.” Drope v. Missouri,

420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975); see also Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 702 (9th

Cir. 2002).

The court cannot glean from the record or from the reasons provided by

Burnett why his trial counsel would have harbored substantial doubt as to Burnett’s

competency to stand trial. There is no indication in the record that counsel on either

side, or the trial judge, ever expressed a doubt as to Burnett’s competency to stand

trial. See Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We deem

significant the fact that the trial judge, government counsel, and Hernandez’s own

attorney did not perceive a reasonable cause to believe Hernandez was

incompetent.”); United States v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating

that a defense counsel’s silence on the petitioner’s competency is “some evidence”

that the petitioner showed no signs of incompetence at that time).

The reasons Burnett has provided are either unpersuasive or uncorroborated. 

The fact that Burnett, who was 19-years old at the time, might differ with his

counsel as to the timing of the trial is hardly surprising. And there is no evidence

that Burnett’s alleged drug experimentation a few months prior to his case, of which

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there is likewise no evidence, would affect his ability to stand trial months later. 

Burnett does not claim that he was taking any drugs or medications during the

course of the trial. Even if he was taking medications or drugs around the time of

the trial, Burnett would still need to produce evidence, not conclusory assertions, of

how those medications or drugs affected his competency at trial, which Burnett has

not done here beyond a bare allegation that he was suffering from “paranoid

schizophrenic symptoms” at some unspecified time. See Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796

F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure to present evidence of medication

petitioner was taking or “how [the medication] might have affected his competence

at trial” failed to raise a bona fide doubt as to the petitioner’s competency to stand

trial); United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Even if true,

the bare allegation that he has seen a psychiatrist and taken psychotropic

medication, without more, would not suffice to establish reasonable grounds to

believe that Williams might be so mentally compromised as to be unable to

understand trial proceedings or to assist in his own defense.”). Otherwise, Burnett

has not provided the court with declarations or affidavits from a physician

discussing his medical history or any medical records, which might substantiate that

there should have been some indication that Burnett was unable to understand the

nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist his counsel in the conduct of a

defense in a rational manner. Cf., Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 665 (9th

Cir. 1972) (defendant had “an extensive history of mental illness,” which included

repeated hospitalization for psychiatric disorders, suicide attempts, and

hallucinations). Nor has Burnett presented the court with any evidence of his

exhibiting erratic or irrational behavior during the course of the trial. Cf., Tillery v.

Eyman, 492 F.2d 1056, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant screamed throughout

the nights from his jail cell, laughed at the jury, made gestures at the bailiff, disrobed

in the courtroom, and butted his head through a glass window). Burnett’s claim is

especially tenuous in light of his own acknowledgment that his conversations with

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his counsel during the court proceedings did not indicate that Burnett had any

psychological problems. Lodgement No. 9 at 14. 

Accordingly, Burnett has failed to show that his trial counsel’s failure to

request a competency examination or hearing “‘fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688). As a result, Burnett has failed to carry his burden under

Strickland as to his second claim.

III. Ground Three: The conviction must be reversed due to a 

violation of Burnett’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to investigate 

any mental health defenses. 

Burnett argues that his “trial counsel had actual and constructive knowledge

that Mr. Burnett may have had mental health problems.” This notice came in the

form of Burnett informing his counsel that he was suffering from “paranoid

schizophrenic symptoms at the time of the shooting” and Burnett “rejecting

counsel’s professional advice to waive [the] Speedy Trial Act time so that counsel

could prepare a defense.” As a result, Burnett contends his counsel had a duty to

investigate and pursue a mental health defense. 

A defense attorney has a general duty to make reasonable investigations or to

make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. The duty of reasonable investigation extends to the

issue of mental health. See Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 800-801 (9th Cir. 2006)

(discussing counsel’s obligation to investigate mental health for purposes of

ascertaining viability of mental defenses at trial); Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d

1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Trial counsel has a duty to investigate a defendant’s

mental state if there is evidence to suggest that the defendant is impaired.”). 

However, where the decision not to investigate further is taken because of

reasonable tactical evaluations, the attorney’s performance is not constitutionally

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deficient. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1998). For example,

in Bean v. Calderon, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to pursue a diminished capacity defense. 163 F.3d 1073, 1082

(9th Cir. 1998). The court noted that in light of the defendant’s own assertion of

where he was at the time of the crime, his defense counsel had made a reasonable

strategic choice to present an alibi defense. Id. Most importantly, the pursuit of a

diminished capacity defense would have conflicted with the alibi defense. Id. Thus,

“[o]nce [the defense counsel] reasonably chose that theory, largely on the basis of

[his client’s] own representations, his duty to investigate the directly conflicting

diminished capacity defense was at an end.” Id.; see also Williams v. Woodford,

384 F.3d 567, 611-12 (9th Cir. 2004) (where counsel reasonably selected an alibi

defense as the primary defense theory, counsel no longer had a duty to investigate a

“conflicting” mental state defense); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1411 (9th

Cir. 1998) (“Counsel did not have a duty to pursue every possible line of defense

where she reasonably did not believe [her client’s] interests would be advanced.”).

In this case, Burnett asserted an actual innocence defense. Burnett turned

himself in to the police and insisted that he had nothing to do with the murder. 

Lodgement No. 9 at 1-2, 18. Therefore, his counsel’s presentation of a mental

defense would have conflicted with his primary defense that he was innocent. 

Further, this is not a case where counsel’s failure to investigate led to the

presentation of a defense that was “incredibly lame.” Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d

835, 838-40 (9th Cir. 1997). Burnett had an alibi of where he was the night of the

crime. The prosecution did not have a confession from Burnett nor did it have

eyewitness accounts of Burnett committing the murder. All the evidence against

Burnett was circumstantial. Thus, Burnett’s counsel had reasonable grounds to

believe, especially in light of Burnett’s assertions that he was innocent, that he could

prevail in creating some reasonable doubt in the jury about whether Burnett was the

actual shooter. See Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (counsel

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 The admission of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is subject to 1

harmless error analysis. United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir. 2009);

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (holding that a constitutional error

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did not have duty to pursue every possible line of defense where she reasonably did

not believe the petitioner’s interests would be advanced). Under Strickland, the

relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have pursued, but rather whether

the choices made by defense counsel were reasonable. 466 U.S. at 690. The

evidence shows that Burnett’s counsel’s investigation and decision to forego a

mental defense was reasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)

(“The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy

judged with the benefit of hindsight.”); Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456-57

(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that if a court can conceive of reasonable tactical purpose

for counsel’s action or inaction, the court need not determine actual explanation).

As a result, Burnett has failed to carry his burden under Strickland as to his

third claim.

IV. Ground Four: The conviction must be reversed due to a 

violation of Burnett’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to move for 

suppression of the videotape of Burnett’s interrogation.

Burnett argues that his counsel erred by not moving to suppress the

videotaped statements made by Burnett, on the ground that it was in violation of

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme

Court held that to protect an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights, police must

advise a suspect of the right to an attorney and to remain silent before they can

subject that person to custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 

Nonetheless, even if there was a Miranda violation, Burnett must still affirmatively

prove prejudice under Strickland, showing “there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” 466 U.S. at 694. 1

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is harmless unless the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict”). Nonetheless, in a claim for ineffective assistance

of counsel, a court need not conduct a harmless error review under Brecht because

“‘[t]he Strickland error analysis is complete in itself; there is no place for an

additional harmless-error review.’” Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

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In this case, even assuming that the police somehow violated Burnett’s

Miranda rights during his taped interrogation, Burnett cannot show ineffective

assistance of counsel. Burnett turned himself into the police, at which time he was

interrogated by Detective McClatchy. During the interview, Burnett denied being

involved with the shooting. Burnett provided the detective with a alibi for what he

was doing around the same time the crime occurred. Thus, the interview did not

contain any incriminating statements that would have effected or influenced the

jury’s verdict. Burnett has acknowledged that the prosecution represented in open

court that it had no confession from Burnett and that it did not have Burnett’s

fingerprints. Lodgement No. 9 at 5. In short, Burnett has not demonstrated that the

admission of the taped statements would have resulted in prejudice. Therefore, trial

counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress

lacking in merit. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“[T]rial counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless

objection.”); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he failure to

take a futile action can never be deficient performance.”). Further, given that the

suppression motion would have been futile, there is no reasonable probability that,

had the motion been brought, the result of the proceeding would have different. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. 

In sum, a motion challenging the admissibility of Burnett’s statements to

police on Miranda grounds would have been futile. Accordingly, counsel was not

ineffective in failing to make such a challenge, and Burnett has failed to carry his

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burden under Strickland as to his fourth claim.

V. Ground Five: The conviction must be reversed due to a 

violation of Burnett’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to challenge admission 

of testimony regarding the results of a photo line-up.

Burnett argues that his counsel “inexplicably failed to move to suppress

evidence regarding the surviving victims’ pre-trial identification of Mr. Burnett in a

photo lineup despite excellent grounds to attack the identification.” Burnett’s claim

refers to the photo lineups the police conducted for Matthew Lene and Jesse Tooto

following the shooting. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of

identification procedures that are “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to

irreparable mistaken identification.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967),

overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326 (1987). In a

habeas action, a federal court applies a two-step analysis to evaluate a petitioner’s

challenge to pretrial and subsequent in-court identifications. United States v.

Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 1985). First, the court must determine whether

the pretrial identification procedure was “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise

to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United

States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983,

992-93 (9th Cir. 1998). “An identification procedure is suggestive when it

emphasize[s] the focus upon a single individual thereby increasing the likelihood of

misidentification.” Id. at 992 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in

original); see e.g., United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 493 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The

repeated showing of the picture of an individual, for example, reinforces the image

of the photograph in the mind of the viewer.”). 

Second, even if the pretrial identification procedure was impermissibly

suggestive, the court must decide whether, under the totality of the circumstances,

the identification was nonetheless reliable. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114

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(1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1972). The factors to be

considered in determining reliability are: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the

criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the

accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty

demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between

the crime and the confrontation. Id. at 199-200.

Here, Burnett focuses his challenge exclusively on the reliability of the photo

lineups, arguing they were unreliable in light of Tooto’s and Lene’s inability to

properly view the shooter and the lack of certainty they demonstrated at the lineups. 

However, if no unnecessarily suggestive procedures were used, a court need not

determine reliability, and admission of the identification does not violate due

process. Bagley, 772 F.2d at 492 (“If we find that a challenged procedure is not

impermissibly suggestive, our inquiry into the due process claim ends.”); United

States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 651 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that because the

petitioner made no showing that the government’s identification procedures were

unduly suggestive, the petitioner’s Biggers challenge failed).

Burnett has not explained how the lineup itself was improperly suggestive.

Cf., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 108-09 (1977) (holding that exhibiting a

single photograph for identification purposes is impermissibly suggestive); Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 195 (1972) (finding a show-up was suggestive when

detectives called a rape victim to the police station months after the crime, walked

the defendant past the victim, and directed the defendant to tell the victim “shut up

or I’ll kill you”); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969) (holding that

identification procedures were inherently suggestive where police first arranged a

lineup in which “petitioner stood out from the other two men by the contrast of his

height and by the fact that he was wearing a leather jacket similar to that worn by

the robber”). “Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the

likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned

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for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.” 

Neil, 409 U.S. at 197. But in this case, Burnett has only impugned the victims’

ability to identify him, rather than identifying what aspect of the photo lineups

enhanced the likelihood of misidentification, thereby violating Burnett’s right to due

process. 

Because Burnett has failed to demonstrate that the photo lineups were unduly

suggestive, he cannot show that the admission of the identification violated due

process, and the court need not address the reliability of the identification

procedure. See Bagley, 772 F.2d at 492. Further, Burnett’s inability to show that

there would have been any merit to his counsel’s motion to suppress precludes him

from prevailing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Knowles v.

Mirzayance, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (counsel not “required to

pursue every claim or defense, regardless of success”); id. at 1422 (“The law does

not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense”); Rupe, 93 F.3d at

1445. Even if Burnett had demonstrated the lineups were unconstitutionally

suggestive, Burnett has not demonstrated that the outcome of this case would have

been different had the photo lineups been suppressed.

As a result, Burnett has failed to carry his burden under Strickland as to his

fifth claim.

CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the record, the court concludes Burnett has not shown it

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of established federal law, for the

state court to deny Burnett relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Accordingly, Burnett is not entitled to habeas relief.

It is hereby ORDERED that Burnett’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close the case.

DATED: April 7, 2010

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/s/ Milan D. Smith, Jr. 

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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