Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01052/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01052-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN GORTHY, et al., ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-05-1052 REC LJO

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AND

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE

A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN 30 DAYS.

(Doc. 38) 

On January 23, 2006, the Court heard Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss and for More Definite Statement (the “Motion”). Upon due

consideration of the written and oral arguments of the parties

and the record herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion in part and

DENIES it in part as set forth herein.

I. Factual Background

As alleged in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”),

the facts are as follows. Plaintiff Jacob Gorthy (“Jacob”), who

is now 16 years old, attended Clovis West High School (“Clovis

West”) where he played for the high school football team. Clovis

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The Defendants in this action are Russ Harding, Jim Hartigan, 1

[First Name Unknown] Powell, Trina Smith, Bill Crawford, Carlo

Prandini, Karen Sowby, and Rodney Michaels.

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West is part of Clovis Unified School District (“the District”). 

Plaintiff Susan Gorthy (“Ms. Gorthy) is Jacob’s mother.

On August 16, 2004, Jacob was 14 years old. Jacob reported

to football practice at approximately 4:30 p.m. The temperature

at that time was in excess of 95 degrees. Unbeknownst to Jacob,

the starting time for practice had been changed from 5:00 p.m. to

4:00 p.m. Consequently, he was late for practice. When he

arrived, he was instructed to perform “bear crawls.” This

required that he drop to his hands and crawl, using his toes and

hands for balance. Defendants instructed Jacob to perform the

drill on a stretch of asphalt, which had reached an extreme

temperature. Plaintiff attempted to explain his reasons for

being late. Defendant Assistant Football Coach Rodney Michaels

ordered Jacob to continue the bear crawls. Plaintiffs allege

that the Defendants each forced Jacob to continue the drill. 1

As he continued the drill, Jacob’s palms and fingertips

burned and he suffered blisters. Ultimately, Jacob was

instructed to cease the bear crawls. Afterward, Defendant Trina

Smith, the athletic trainer, placed gauze and athletic tape over

both hands. The coaching staff forced Jacob to complete

practice.

Following practice, Ms. Gorthy arrived to pick up her son. 

She immediately took him to the emergency room. Plaintiff was

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diagnosed with second- and third-degree burns as a result of the

bear crawls.

II. Procedural History

On August 17, 2005, Plaintiffs filed this action. On

October 7, 2005, the defendants named in that complaint filed a

motion to dismiss. On November 7, 2005, Plaintiffs filed an

opposition brief to the motion to dismiss, along with the FAC. 

On November 8, 2005, the Court denied the motion to dismiss as

moot due to the FAC. On November 23, 2005, Defendants, along

with the District, which was not a defendant in the FAC, filed

this Motion. On January 6, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their

opposition to the motion. On January 13, 2006, Defendants filed

a reply brief.

III. Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2

L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint

against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” N. Star Int’l v.

Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The Court need not, however, “accept legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

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reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

Court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979). 

Where the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be

granted, leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911

F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. The District and Clovis West 

Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Clovis West on

the grounds that it is not a separate entity subject to liability

or suit. Defendants also move to dismiss all claims against the

District on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Plaintiffs do not

contend that Clovis West or the District are proper parties. 

Rather, Plaintiffs contend that Clovis West and the District are

not defendants in this action. 3:8-11. 

The FAC lists Clovis West and the District under the heading

“PARTIES.” FAC at ¶ 4. Clovis West and the District are not

labeled as defendants, while the name of each of the Defendants

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Defendants also urge the Court to hold that the District 2

enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because the FAC does not

include any claims against the District, the Court need not decide

this issue.

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is prefaced with “The Defendant . . . .” FAC at ¶¶ 4-12. At

oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel stipulated that Clovis West

and the District were listed as parties in the FAC solely for

purposes of description. The Court finds that Clovis West and

the District are not defendants in the FAC. Because Clovis West

and the District are not defendants in the FAC, Defendants’

motion to dismiss is DENIED as to those parties.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants contend that the school district employees are

entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity “to the extent the action

is based upon official action.” Mot. at 12:22-23. Sovereign 2

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment creates a subject matter

jurisdictional hurdle for plaintiffs suing state governments in

federal court. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984)

(declaring that “the principle of sovereign immunity is a

constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power

established in Art. III”). Specifically, “the Eleventh Amendment

bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against

a state, ‘an arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its

agencies.” Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419,1422-23

(9th Cir. 1991)). In the Ninth Circuit, public school districts

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qualify as state agencies in the context of Eleventh Amendment

immunity. See, e.g., Belanger v. Madera Unified School Dist.,

963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir 1992). This immunity extends to employees

of school districts only where they are sued in their official

capacities. Mitchell v. L.A. Cmty. College Dist., 861 F.2d 198,

201 (9th Cir. 1988); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974).

Defendants claim that Plaintiff has sued school district

employees and “it is unclear as to whether they are sued solely

in their individual capacity or also official capacities.” Mot.

at 12:20-21. Plaintiffs state that the FAC specifies that the

Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. The FAC

specifies that each Defendant “is sued in his [or her] individual

capacity.” FAC at ¶¶ 5-12. Nowhere does the FAC indicate that

Defendants are sued in their official capacities. Accordingly,

Defendants are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from

Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Defendants argue in their reply brief that Plaintiffs cannot

plead around Eleventh Amendment immunity without bringing their

claims outside the scope of section 1983. Defendants contend

that state employees may not be sued in their individual

capacities under section 1983 because this would mean that they

were not acting under color of state law, as the statute

requires. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States

or other person within the jurisdiction

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thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured . . . ."

The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 permits a suit

against a government official in his or her personal capacity. 

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27, 112 S. Ct. 358, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301

(1991); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,

69, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 137 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1997) (“State officers

are subject to § 1983 liability for damages in their personal

capacities, however, even when the conduct in question relates to

their official duties.” (citing Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25-31)). In

Hafer, the defendant auditor general argued that she could not be

personally liable under section 1983 for actions she took

pursuant to her government duties. Id. at 27. The Supreme Court

rejected defendant’s argument and held that she could be

personally liable for her official actions “precisely because of

her authority as auditor general.” Id. at 27-28. Plaintiffs

succeed in bringing Defendants within the scope of section 1983

because they allege that Defendants acted under the color of law.

D. Violation of Fourth Amendment

Defendants urge the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first claim

for relief to the extent it seeks to recover for Fourth Amendment

violations because none of the allegations in the FAC establish

that Plaintiffs faced unreasonable search and seizure or

excessive force at the hands of any state official. The Fourth

Amendment applies in the school environment. Doe v. Haw. Dep’t

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of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the

Fourth Amendment governs a teacher’s seizure of a student. Id.;

see also Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079

(5th Cir. 1995); Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist., 68 F.3d 1010,

1012-15 (7th Cir. 1995)); Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882, 884-85

(10th Cir. 1989). A school official’s action that restrains a

student’s liberty is a seizure if a reasonable person in that

situation would not feel free to leave. Doe, 334 F.3d at 909

(holding that taping student to a tree for disciplinary purposes

constituted a seizure).

Viewing the allegations of the FAC in a light most favorable

to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ actions amount to a seizure of Jacob

Gorthy. Defendants’ allegedly “harshly ordered [Jacob] to

perform the bear crawls.” FAC at ¶ 20. Defendants also “forced

[Jacob] to continue with the drill” despite his protests

right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Id. Plaintiffs’

allegations establish that a reasonable person in Jacob’s

position might not feel free to leave the asphalt until he was

“instructed to cease the bear crawls.” Id. Plaintiffs have

successfully alleged that Defendants’ actions gave Jacob the

impression that he had no choice but to remain on the asphalt and

to continue the “bear crawl” drill. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for relief under the Fourth

Amendment is DENIED.

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The Supreme Court has held that allegations of excessive 3

force should be analyzed under a more specific constitutional

provision if one is available, rather than under generalized

notions of due process. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109

S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). This holding might prevent

Plaintiffs from recovering under the Due Process clause if they

prevail on their Fourth Amendment claims. The Ninth Circuit has

left open the possibility that a seizure-related excessive force

claim is cognizable under either the Fourth or Fourteenth

Amendment. P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1996).

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E. Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for a

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the FAC does not

allege that Defendants discriminated against Jacob Gorthy based

on his membership in a protected class. It appears that

Defendants presume that Plaintiffs seek to recover under only the

Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48

L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976). It does not appear that Plaintiffs have

attempted to allege an Equal Protection clause violation, at all.

Rather, Plaintiffs’ claim appears to derive from the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which “prohibits any

state deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672, 97 S.

Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977). This provision gives

individuals the right to be free from “state-imposed violations

of bodily integrity.” Plumeau v. School Dist. # 40, 130 F.3d

432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). Excessive physical abuse by school

employees violates this right. Id. (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at

674).3

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In any event, at this stage, Plaintiffs are allowed to plead

mutually exclusive theories. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“Relief in the

alternative . . . may be demanded.”). 

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Plaintiffs allege that wrongful acts of defendants inflicted

“severe and serious injury to his person.” FAC at ¶ 28. 

Consequently, he has succeeded in alleging Defendants harmed his

“liberty interest in avoiding corporal punishment.” See

Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 675. Defendants do not contend that

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for violation of Jacob’s

rights under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims is

DENIED.

F. Second Cause of Action for Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action

fails because the Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel

and unusual punishment apply only to prisoners, not to citizens

in general. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment

is inapplicable to corporal punishment that public school

teachers or administrators impose. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.

651, 671, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977); see also Gary

H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The eighth

amendment applies to ‘convicted prisoners.’”); Jones v. Johnson,

781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (pretrial detainee’s treatment

was not properly evaluated under the Eighth Amendment because he

had not been convicted). The Court held that though “evolving

standards of decency” determine whether punishments are “cruel

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California Government Code section 815 states, in relevant 4

part, the following:

Except as otherwise provided by statute:

(a) A public entity is not liable for an

injury, whether such injury arises out of an

act or omission of the public entity or a

public employee or any other person.

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and unusual,” the limitation of the Eighth Amendment’s scope to

criminal punishments is inflexible. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 668 n.

36.

Jacob Gorthy was not a convicted criminal when Defendants

allegedly cruelly and unusually punished him. The Eighth

Amendment does not proscribe Defendants’ alleged conduct. 

Plaintiffs do not come forward with any other basis supporting

their Second Cause of Action. The Court finds that the absence

of a legal basis for this theory will make any attempts to amend

this claim futile. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of

Action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

G. The State Causes of Action

Defendants claim that the state causes of action fail

because Plaintiffs have not set forth any statutory basis for

them. Defendants point out that California Government Code

section 815(a) abolished common law liability for any “public 4

entity.” Under Government Code section 811.2, “‘Public entity’

includes the State, the Regents of the University of California,

a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and

any other political subdivision or public corporation in the

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State.” 

Plaintiffs’ FAC does not contain claims against any public

entities, only individuals in their individual capacities. See

FAC at ¶¶ 5-12. Defendants do not contend that Plaintiffs lack a

common law basis for the state claims. Accordingly, Government

Code section 815(a) does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims. 

H. Ms. Gorthy’s Cause of Action for IIED

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Ms. Gorthy cannot recover

for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) because

she did not contemporaneously observe Jacob Gorthy’s injury. In

support, Defendants cite Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644,

646-647 (1989), which dealt only with the tort of negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Defendants also cite Steven F.

v. Anaheim Union High School Dist., 112 Cal. App. 4th 904, 917

(2003), which dealt with the liability of the school district for

its negligence with respect to acts of a teacher. Neither of

these cases has any bearing on Ms. Gorthy’s claim for IIED.

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

requires: 

“‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the

defendant with the intention of causing, or

reckless disregard of the probability of

causing, emotional distress; (2) the

plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (3) actual and

proximate causation of the emotional distress

by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. . . .’

Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme

as to exceed all bounds of that usually

tolerated in a civilized community.” The

defendant must have engaged in “conduct

intended to inflict injury or engaged in with

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the realization that injury will result.”

Christensen v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991) (internal

citations omitted). Even if an action is intentional and

outrageous, it is not actionable unless it is directed at the

plaintiff or occurs in the presence of the plaintiff and the

defendant is aware that the plaintiff is present. Id.

Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Gorthy came to the practice

location only after practice finished to pick up her son. When

she arrived, Jacob had already suffered his injuries. FAC at

¶ 24. Plaintiffs do not allege that Ms. Gorthy was present while

Defendants forced Jacob to perform the bear crawls. At oral

argument, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants intended to inflict

emotional distress on Ms. Gorthy. They also claimed at oral

argument that Ms. Gorthy was present while Defendants tortiously

failed to render adequate medical treatment. Defendants’ latter

contention implies that the inadequate treatment of Jacob rose to

the level of extreme and outrageous conduct that can support a

claim for IIED. 

In any event, the FAC does not allege facts supporting the

contentions Plaintiffs made at oral argument. Without alleging

Ms. Gorthy’s presence and Defendants’ knowledge thereof, or that

Defendants directed their conduct at her, Ms. Gorthy cannot state

a claim for IIED. Accordingly, the Third Cause of Action for

IIED is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Ms. Gorthy in her

individual capacity. 

Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel are reminded that they

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are subject to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Rule 11(b)(3) provides that by presenting a signed pleading to

the court the pleader represents that the factual contentions

therein “have evidentiary support” or “are likely to have

evidentiary support” after reasonable discovery. Failure to

comply with Rule 11 may result in sanctions, which may include

dismissal of this action and the imposition of monetary

sanctions.

IV. Motion for a More Definite Statement

A. Legal Standard

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

for a motion for a more definite statement if a pleading “is so

vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to

frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Motions

for a more definite statement are disfavored, but are within the

Court’s discretion and may sometimes be appropriate. Osborne v.

County of Riverside, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

“[P]roper pleading under Rule 8 requires a pleading to contain

allegations of each element of the claim. If it does not, and if

the deficiency is not so material that the pleading should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a more definite statement is

appropriate.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.36[1] (Matthew

Bender 3d ed.). 

B. Discussion

Defendants claim the Court should require Plaintiffs to

amend the FAC to address “several ambiguities.” Mot. at 18:4. 

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Defendants claim that “there is no indication in any of the

causes of action as to whether they are brought by one or both

plaintiffs.” Mot. at 18:6-7. In the FAC, each cause of action

is described as “brought by SUSAN GORTHY, as Guardian Ad Litem

for Minor Plaintiff, JACOB GORTHY” (FAC at ¶¶ 26, 55, 63), or as

“brought by SUSAN GORTHY, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem

for Minor Plaintiff, JACOB GORTHY” (FAC at ¶ 45 (emphasis

added)). These descriptions clearly describe whether Ms. Gorthy

is suing individually or only on behalf of Jacob Gorthy.

Defendants also contend that “there is no indication as to

whether any of the particular causes of action are asserted

against one or all of the defendants . . . .” Mot. at 18:9-10. 

Each cause of action in the FAC provides that it is “brought

. . . against all defendants.” FAC at ¶¶ 26, 34, 45, 55, 63. No

ambiguity exists as to which Defendants face which causes of

action. 

Defendants also claim that “[i]t is also unclear if the

individual defendants are sued in their individual capacities or

official capacities, as the first amended complaint references

both.” Mot. at 18:10-12. As discussed above, the FAC clearly

states that each defendant is sued only in his or her “individual

capacity.” FAC at ¶¶ 5-12. 

Defendants also point out that “it is unclear as to whether

the District is still a party hereto.” Mot. at 18:13-14. As

discussed above, the District is included in the “PARTIES”

section but is not labeled “Defendant” as all of the Defendants

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are. See FAC at ¶¶ 4-12. No ambiguity exists as to whether the

FAC contains claims against the District.

Therefore, Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement

is DENIED.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Cruel and Unusual

Punishment is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to

Ms. Gorthy in her individual capacity.

3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to the

remainder of Plaintiffs’ FAC.

4. Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite statement is DENIED.

5. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30

days of the issuance of this order. Failure to comply will

result in dismissal of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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