Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06479/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06479-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHANIEL ALLEN WOODYARD, CASE NO. CV-F-04-6479 OWW DLB HC

Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

vs. HABEAS CORPUS

DAVID L. RUNNELS, Warden, [Doc. 1]

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

On July 11, 2002, in the Stanislaus County Superior Court Petitioner was convicted by a jury

of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and battery with serious bodily

injury. (CT 111.) Petitioner was sentenced to sixteen years in state prison. 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth

Appellate District. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence.

Petitioner timely petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. The petition for review

was denied on January 14, 2004. 

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Prosecution

On December 28, 2001, Petitioner was visiting Joshua Hassen at his apartment in Modesto. 

Edward Sweeten testified that on December 28, 2001, when he arrived home after work, he observed

Joshua Hassen and Petitioner drinking alcohol, when Mr. Sweeten told Joshua that he kept screwing

up and he was going to make his life hell. (RT 38.) Petitioner told Joshua “You got to handle your

shit, you got to handle your shit.” (RT 38.) Joshua told Petitioner “Forget it, don’t worry about it.” 

(RT 38-39.) Later that evening, Petitioner and Joshua went to Mr. Sweeten’s apartment and told him

they needed to talk. (RT 39.) Sweeten stepped outside the apartment and told Joshua “I don’t think

we got shit to talk about, man.” (RT 41.) Before Sweeten could finish the sentence, Petitioner hit

him in the face with a closed fist causing him to fall to the ground. (RT 42, 115-116.) Petitioner

continued to punch Sweeten in the face with a closed fist, while Joshua kicked him. (RT 43, 115-

116, 141, 143.) A neighbor subsequently intervened, got Joshua off of Petitioner, and Sweeten was

able to immobilize Petitioner and detain him until the police arrived. (RT 46-47, 143-145.) Sweeten

was treated for a severe laceration of his upper lip from the base of his nose to his upper lip,

requiring suturing and a “three-layer repair,” and a broken front tooth. (RT 48-49.) 

Defense

Petitioner testified in his own defense. Petitioner testified that Sweeten had been attempting

to engage Joshua Hassen in a fight for several weeks prior to the incident. (RT 245.) Petitioner

stated that he and Joshua went to Sweeten’s apartment to talk to him and Sweeten said “Let’s go,

let’s do this” while maintaining a fighting stance (RT 246- 248.) Petitioner felt as though he was

about to be hit by Sweeten, so he punched him in the face in an attempt to defend himself. (RT 249-

250-252.) Petitioner continued to hit Sweeten in an attempt to get away from him. (RT 251.) After

hitting Sweeten three times, he was tackled by Petitioner’s neighbor. (RT 251.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

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the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as

guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Stanislaus County

Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499

(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97

F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s

approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations omitted). “Rather,

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that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Trial Court’s Refusal to Question Juror Regarding Observation of Petitioner in Physical

Restraints

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his due process right to a fair trial when it

refused to inquire if any of the jurors observed Petitioner in chains and shackles. 

A jury’s observation of a defendant in custody may under certain circumstances “create the

impression in the minds of the jury that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy” which can

unfairly prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial notwithstanding the validity of his custody status. 

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986). Because visible shackling during trial is so likely to

cause a defendant prejudice, it is permitted only when justified by an essential state interest specific

to each trial. Id. at 568-569. However, a jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in

physical restraints outside of the courtroom has not warranted habeas relief. Ghent v. Woodford,

279 F.3d 1121 (9 Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557, 560-561 (9 Cir. th th

1989); Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (9 Cir. 1985). In Ghent v. Woodford, 279 th

F.3d 1121, the district court found that the defendant was transported to and from the courtroom in

shackles and that on some of these occasions jurors observed defendant under such restraint. Id. at

1132. The jurors glimpsed Ghent as he walked in the hallway and stood at the doorway of the

courtroom to have his restraints removed. Id. Despite its agreement with these factual findings, the

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Ninth Circuit held that, “The jury’s ‘brief or inadvertent glimpse’ of a shackled defendant is not

inherently or presumptively prejudicial, nor has Ghent made a sufficient showing of actual

prejudice.” Id. at 1133. 

Petitioner was not shackled while court was in session during the duration of the four-day

trial. (RT 273.) Thus, the only observation of Petitioner in shackles was during transportation

outside of the courtroom. 

In the midst of the jury trial, one of the jurors may have inadvertently observed Petitioner in

shackles being transported to the courtroom. In response to the bailiff informing the trial judge that

one of the jurors may have observed Petitioner in shackles, the Court stated the following on the

record:

THE COURT: And that fact was disclosed to the attorneys, and both defense

attorneys have suggested it would be appropriate for me to inquire of that particular

juror whether or not the juror in fact saw them, or recognized they were in shackles - -

I don’t know how you would do that - - but to further inquire whether or not that fact

would in any way prejudice that juror. And the court has offered to admonish this

jury that the defendants are in custody is not a fact that the jury should give any

consideration in their deliberations, and it should in no way prejudice them against the

defendants. It happens to be a fact they’re in custody.

I think that the attorneys declined that offer and so here we are. I’m going to

allow them to make whatever record they want to make with regard to that. 

Unfortunately, the configuration of this courthouse is not such that we have a method

of getting people from the jail to the courtroom, at least to this courtroom,

unobserved. So those sorts of things happen.

MR. MURY: Your Honor, the only thing I would add is I don’t have such a

concern of questioning the juror as to what he saw, or if he was able to see. I think

we could probably get enough information from the bailiff.

Did he come face-to-face? Did he look at the chains? Did he have any facial

reaction?

My request would have been a little modified from the other and that would

have been to find that information out from the bailiff, and if it was sufficient that it

was clear to her he did notice, to admonish that individual juror, as opposed to

picking that juror out and making some kind of big deal to him. I do request the court

not make the instruction of all the jurors - - or give instruction to all the jurors. I

don’t see any benefit to making any bigger deal than it was in that respect. My

request has gone to that point of finding out from the bailiff during that whether any

reaction that he noticed be made clear to us, “Yeah, he saw it and realized what was

going on.”

THE COURT: Well, okay. I guess the record should disclose that we have

this - - the courtroom is quite a distance from the holding area where the defendants

are housed. And they come in through a tunnel from the jail to an area between

departments ten and 12, and this is done at the other end of the hallway from that, and

there is no way to get here except by down the hallway. And there has never been my

policy to sequester jurors in any particular area or to order them to hold themselves

out of view or to do anything of that sort, or to seat them in the jury box without the

presence of everybody, and then have the bailiff go and get them, and have them to

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suddenly appear in the courtroom, that has never been my practice.

Further, I think the record should disclose there have been no extraordinary

measures taken with regard to security in this courtroom because we have two

defendants, we have - - most of the time we’ve had two bailiffs. Sometimes one

bailiff. Most of the time two bailiffs. And that the defendants are not shackled, as far

as I know.

They are not shackled, are they?

MR. FOLEY: No.

MR. MURY: No.

THE COURT: No leg restraints?

MR. MURY: That’s correct.

MR. FOLEY: That’s correct. 

THE COURT: No handcuffs?

MR. MURY: That’s correct.

MR. FOLEY: That’s correct.

THE COURT: Sitting at counsel table freely to converse with their attorneys,

as far as I know.

MR. MURY: Yes.

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

THE COURT: The only untoward occurrence is when the bailiff was bringing

him down. I can tell you the bailiffs do everything they can to try to bring them down

at a time when they are not likely to be seen by jurors, but sometimes it happens. In

this case, one juror happened to see them.

[THE BAILIFF]: May I clarify that?

THE COURT: Sure, bailiff, go ahead.

[THE BAILIFF]: The hallway was clear and when we walked down the

hallway, the juror came out of the bathroom.

THE COURT: Did the juror make any remarks?

[THE BAILIFF]: He was behind us, so I don’t know.

THE COURT: The juror was behind you as you proceeded down the hallway?

[THE BAILIFF]: Yes.

THE COURT: You came in the side door?

[THE BAILIFF]: Yes.

MR. FOLEY: If I may, this was in the afternoon after the lunch recess?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FOLEY: That juror would have presumably seen the defendants at

counsel table, made notation or would recall what in fact the individuals were

wearing, so even the fact that they couldn’t have seen them from the front would not

preclude the juror from being able to identify my client.

It was my request that we do inquire of the particular juror - - [w]hich I

believe was juror number four?

[THE BAILIFF]: Yes.

MR. FOLEY: If I may, this was in the afternoon after the lunch recess?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FOLEY: That juror would have presumably seen the defendants at

counsel table, made notation or would recall what in fact the individuals were

wearing, so even the fact that they couldn’t have seen them from the front would not

preclude the juror from being able to identify my client.

It was my request that we do inquire of the particular juror - - [w]hich I

believe was juror number four?

[THE BAILIFF]: Yes.

MR. FOLEY: Whether or not they noticed and/or recognized my client and if,

in fact, they did, inquire as to whether or not that created any problem for them in

terms of prejudice. Whether or not they had shared that information with any of the

other jurors and then appropriately admonish that juror or have them leave the jury

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and put the alternate on.

In light of the court’s unwillingness to do that, I would for the record ask the

court to declare a mistrial.

THE COURT: Any comment by anyone else?

I’m ready to rule

Mr. Houston.

MR. HOUSTON: The only thing the People would add, according to bailiff, if

I may ask your bailiff a question or two in regards to what, if anything, the jurors saw.

Did you see the juror make eye contact or look down the hallway towards

where you and the defendants were?

[THE BAILIFF]: I didn’t see that.

From his position he had ample opportunity to see leg irons and the belly

chains. If he looked at us, he could have seen the belly chains and the leg irons.

MR. HOUSTON: You don’t know if he looked at all?

[THE BAILIFF]: I don’t know if he looked.

MR. HOUSTON: You didn’t hear any comments?

[THE BAILIFF]: He said nothing.

MR. MURY: For the record, I guess I will join that motion.

The only other thing, you came in the side door. We are talking about five

feet or so from the bathroom to the side doors?

[THE BAILIFF]: I think it is a little further than that. A little further, I would

say ten feet.

MR. MURY: You are talking about the bathroom at the end of the hallway

connected to this courtroom and ten feet from the bathroom door into the door in the

hallway?

[THE BAILIFF]: Yes. 

MR. FOLEY: Could I also inform the court, my client has shared with me he

made eye contact with the juror?

For the court’s information.

THE COURT: To do anything further, including to even interview that juror,

would be to cause an undue amount of attention to that - - to the circumstances of him

being brought to the courtroom, and I’m not going to do that. I think that alone might

tend to not only cause the juror to spend more time thinking about it, but it might

cause the other jurors to want to know what was it that he just talked to the judge and

lawyers in private about. That would get out also. I would be glad to admonish the

jury that the custodial status of these two defendants is not something they should

take into account or pay any attention to or discuss or let it enter into their

deliberations. I’ll be glad to advise them to that fact.

If your position is correct, I would have to make any order to my bailiffs to the

effect, from now on they may not under any circumstances ever bring a defendant to

my courtroom when it is such a condition that the jurors might see them. That would

be an order and I’m not quite prepared to do that. I’m not going to create a situation

in this courthouse that every time that event might occur you have to have a sudden

interrogation of jurors.

Maybe I should inquire of all 12 of them: “They’ve been brought up and down

in chains and belly chains, have any of you seen that?” 

How do you know that somebody else didn’t see them at some other time

through one of the windows or around the corner or whatever? And we are five days

into this. I think that maybe the inquiry would be necessary - - I was taking the

extraordinary measures and then I would probably sui sponte advise the jury, if I had

12, with the bailiff, in my courtroom, lined against the wall with their hands on their

pistols or something, or Tasers out, or something of that sort, I would have to do

something. At this point I’m not going to make a point of it to the jury unless you so

request.

Since you haven’t, I won’t.

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 Because the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, this Court "looks through" that decision

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and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned

opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991) (establishing, on

habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter

without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9 Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last th

reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

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And your motion for mistrial is denied.

MR. MURY: Can I ask that question now?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MURY: As to the instruction to the jury, would the court indicate or do it

separately or as part of the overall instruction at the end of the case?

THE COURT: I will do anything you want.

MR. MURY: Would the court reserve on that issue and let me look into that a

little bit, whether I want the court to instruct? I would only want it to be done as part

of the overall instructions. My concern is making this a bigger deal than it is.

THE COURT: Stick it in somewhere in the middle of the instructions. I will

go that far for you.

MR. FOLEY: If we are going to do it?

THE COURT: I’ll let you draw up the instruction, if necessary. In fact, I insist upon that.

(RT 270-277.)

 In rejecting Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the record failed

to establish that the juror actually observed Petitioner in shackles outside the courtroom and that

even if Petitioner had established that the juror observed the shackles, the error was harmless.2

(Opinion, at 2-3.)

First, the state courts’ determination that the record failed to establish that the juror outside

the courtroom actually saw Petitioner in shackles, is not an unreasonable determination of the facts

of the instant record. Further, Petitioner has failed to rebut the state court’s factual finding by clear

and convincing evidence. However, even assuming Petitioner’s allegation is true that one of the

jurors observed Petitioner outside the courtroom in shackles, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

corpus relief. There is no presumptive prejudice if members of the jury observe a defendant in

shackles in the corridor being transported to and from court. Ghent v. Woodord, 279 F.3d at 1133;

Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d 145, 148 (9 Cir. 1992), amended 997 F.2d 669 (9 Cir. 1993); see also th th

Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (9 Cir. 1985). Petitioner has failed to make an th

affirmative showing of prejudice. Petitioner’s allegation presents nothing more than a single jurors

brief and inadvertent observation of Petitioner in shackles outside the courtroom. Further, as stated

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by the Court of Appeal, the trial court offered to rectify any resulting prejudice by offering to

admonish the jury that the fact that Petitioner was in custody was not a fact that the jury should give

any consideration in their deliberations, and it should in no way prejudice them against the

Petitioner. Although defense counsel declined as he preferred that the trial court actually question

the juror, the trial court’s offered rectification was reasonable under the circumstances. (See RT

301-302.) Petitioner simply has not shown that a single jurors inadvertent observation of him in

shackles outside the courtroom “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). The state courts’ determination of this

issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), (2). 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. Judgment be entered in favor of Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 27, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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