Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06191/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06191-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRIENDS OF YOSEMITE VALLEY, a )

non-profit corporation; and )

MARIPOSANS FOR )

ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE

) GROWTH, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

)

P. LYNN SCARLETT, in her official )

capacity as Acting Secretary of the )

Interior, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

___________________________________ )

CV F 00-6191 AWI DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER RE

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Docs. 271, 276]

In 1987, Congress designated the Merced River in Yosemite National Park as a

component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System. Pub. L. 101-49, 101 Stat. 879,

16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(62). Under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (“WSRA”) , 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1271 et seq, the National Park Service (“NPS”) was obligated to prepare a comprehensive

management plan (“CMP”) for the Merced River within three fiscal years of its designation

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under WSRA. 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d). It did not do so.

In February of 1999, Mariposans for Environmentally Responsible Growth and the

Sierra Club filed a lawsuit against NPS concerning a road widening project with the Merced

River corridor. Sierra Club v. Babbit, 60 F.Supp.2d 1202 (E.D. Cal. 1999). In that lawsuit,

the plaintiffs argued in part that the road project violated WSRA’s requirement that NPS

protect and enhance the values and free-flowing character of the Merced River. On July 12,

1999, this court enjoined part of the project and ordered NPS to complete a valid CMP

pursuant to WSRA by July 2000. NPS issued the Record of Decision adopting the 2000

Merced Wild and Scenic River Comprehensive Management Plan on August 9, 2000. 

In present action, Friends of Yosemite Valley and MERG (collectively “Plaintiffs”)

initially challenged the 2000 Merced Wild and Scenic River Comprehensive Management

Plan (“2000 MRP”) and Final Environmental Impact Statement (“2000 FEIS”), and the

August 9, 2000 Record of Decision (“2000 ROD”) implementing the 2000 MRP and the

2000 FEIS. Plaintiffs contended that Defendants had failed to prepare a valid CMP that

protects and enhances the natural values of the Merced River in Yosemite National Park in

compliance with WSRA and had also violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42

U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., (“NEPA”), and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et

seq., (“APA”). 

On March 22, 2002, this court issued its opinion generally upholding the 2000 MRP. 

See Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 194 F.Supp.2d 1066 (E.D.Cal. 2002), reversed in

part and remanded, 348 F.3d 789 (9 Cir. 2003). This court did find that Plaintiffs were th

entitled to declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on their third cause of action for

violation of the requirement pursuant to 16 U.S.C. Section 1274(a)(62)(A) to adopt

appropriate revisions to the Yosemite General Management Plan. Friends of Yosemite, 194

F.Supp.2d. at 1071.

Plaintiffs appealed portions of this court’s ruling and the United States Court of

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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered its opinion on October 27, 2003, reversing this court’s

opinion in part by finding that the 2000 MRP violated WSRA by: 1) insufficiently addressing

user capacities; and 2) improperly setting river area boundaries within the El Portal

administrative site. Friends of Yosemite, 348 F.3d at 803. The court further found that the

2000 MRP and its EIS contained sufficient data for a programmatic plan under WSRA and

NEPA, and that the NPS did not violate its duty to cooperate with water pollution agencies. 

The portion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion which is now particularly relevant provides as

follows:

A. User Capacities

The district court erred in determining that the CMP adequately "address[ed]

... user capacities" as required by § 1274(d)(1). The current CMP is deficient in its

approach to user capacities because its principal method for addressing user

capacities, the VERP framework, contains only sample standards and indicators. 

Thus, the CMP fails to yield any actual measure of user capacities, whether by setting

limits on the specific number of visitors, by monitoring and maintaining

environmental and experiential criteria under the VERP framework, or through some

other method.

The WSRA explicitly requires administering agencies to "prepare a[CMP] ... 

[that] shall address ... user capacities" within three full fiscal years of a WSRS

segment's designation. Id. § 1274(d)(1). However, § 1274(d)(1) does not define the

phrase "address ... user capacities." In the absence of a statutory definition of the

phrase, we look to the plain meaning of its terms. See Hells Canyon Alliance, 227

F.3d at 1177. "Address" means to "deal with or discuss." Random House Webster's

College Dictionary 16 (1991). "User" is defined as "a person or thing that [avails

oneself of something]," id. at 1468, and "capacity" is "the maximum number that can

be received or contained." Id. at 201. Thus, applied to this case, the plain meaning

of the phrase "address ... user capacities," is simply that the CMP must deal with or

discuss the maximum number of people that can be received at a WSRS. Based on

this plain meaning, we do not read § 1274(d)(1) to require that the administering

agency advance one particular approach to visitor capacity in all circumstances (e.g., a

head count of all entrants to Yosemite).

This interpretation of § 1274(d)(1) is buttressed by the interpretive guidelines

jointly published in 1982 by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the

Interior. These "Secretarial Guidelines" are crafted to facilitate greater consistency in

the agencies' interpretation of the WSRA. See National Wild and Scenic Rivers

System: Final Revised Guidelines for Eligibility, Classification and Management of

River Areas, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,454 (Sept. 7, 1982) (the "Secretarial Guidelines"). We

defer to the Secretarial Guidelines as an exercise of the administering agencies'

authority to resolve ambiguities in the statute they administer. See United States v.

Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001).

The Secretarial Guidelines interpret the WSRA to require the preparation of

river "[m]anagement plans [that] state ... the kinds and amounts of public use which

the river area can sustain without impact to the [ORVs]," and to mandate ongoing

studies to "determine the quantity and mixture of recreation and other public use

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which can be permitted without adverse impact on the resource values of the river

area." 47 Fed. Reg. at 39, 458-59. Although these references to setting limits on the

amount or quantity of public use clarify that the WSRA obliges the administering

agency to provide actual limits in its CMP, the Secretarial Guidelines do not specify

that this obligation can be satisfied only by capping the number of visitors. Thus, we

interpret § 1274(d)(1)'s instruction that a CMP must "address ... user capacities" to

require only that the CMP contain specific measurable limits on use. See also id. at

39,459 (explaining that § 1281(a) states "a nondegradation and enhancement policy

for all designated river areas, regardless of classification").

This does not mean that the NPS is precluded from using the VERP to fulfill

the user capacities requirement. However, the WSRA does require that the VERP be

implemented through the adoption of quantitative measures sufficient to ensure its

effectiveness as a current measure of user capacities. If the NPS is correct in

projecting that it will need five years fully to implement the VERP, it may be able to

comply with the user capacity mandate in the interim by implementing preliminary or

temporary limits of some kind.

Because the present version of the CMP fails to provide any concrete measure

of use, we conclude that it fails sufficiently to address user capacities. Indeed, we

note that the NPS’s proposed five-year timetable for the implementation of the VERP

framework would not satisfy § 1274(d)(1)’s three-full-fiscal-year timetable even if the

NPS were to have begun implementation of the VERP immediately upon Congress’

designation of the Merced. On remand, the NPS shall adopt specific limits on user

capacity consistent with both the WSRA and the instruction of the Secretarial

Guidelines that such limits describe an actual level of visitor use that will not

adversely impact the Merced’s ORVs.

B. WSRA Boundaries at El Portal

The NPS violated the WSRA by drawing the boundaries at the Merced's El

Portal administrative site too narrowly. The WSRA requires a CMP to delineate river

boundaries that "include an average of not more than 320 acres of land per mile

measured from the ordinary high water mark on both sides of the river." §16 U.S.C. 

1274(b). The CMP sets the river boundaries for the seventy-seven miles of the

Merced that do not flow through El Portal at a distance of one-quarter mile from the

ordinary high water mark on either side of the river. These boundaries are consistent

with the statutory acre-age maximum. However, for the approximately four miles

flowing through El Portal, the CMP sets the river boundaries to include only the

greater of the RPO or the one-hundred-year floodplain, plus adjacent wetlands and

meadows.

We have not yet decided a case involving WSRA river boundaries, but one of

our sister circuits has reasoned that the setting of boundaries is an "administrative act"

that falls within the agency's statutory duty to administer the river area "in such

manner as to protect and enhance the [ORVs] which caused it to be included in the

[WSRS]." Sokol v. Kennedy, 210 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir.2000) (remanding for

redetermination of boundaries consistent with §16 U.S.C. 1281(a)). Although Sokol

involved boundaries that were potentially overinclusive, because they were not drawn

on the basis of the statutorily-required "outstandingly remarkable values" criterion, we

agree with the Eighth Circuit's analytic approach. Accordingly, we conclude that the

boundaries at El Portal are deficient because they were not devised pursuant to §

1281(a)'s protection and enhancement mandate.

While the CMP associates specific ORVs with El Portal, the record does not

reflect the precise location of these ORVs or how, in drawing the boundaries, the NPS

sought to protect them. The CMP lists five categories of ORVs for El Portal, and

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provides the following descriptions: 

Geologic Processes/Conditions --This segment contains a transition from

igneous to metasedimentary rocks (metasedimentary rocks are among the oldest in the

Sierra Nevada). 

Recreation--This segment provides a range of river-related recreational

opportunities, in particular white-water rafting and kayaking (class III to V) and

fishing. 

Biological--This segment contains riverine habitats such as riparian

woodlands and associated federal and state special status species, including

Tompkin's sedge and Valley elderberry longhorn beetle and its critical habitat 

(elderberry shrub). Expanses of north-facing habitat allow unlimited access to the

riparian zone for wildlife species. 

Cultural--This segment contains some of the oldest archeological sites in the

Yosemite area, as well as many historic Indian villages and traditional gathering

places. River-related historic resources include structures related to early tourism and

industrial development. 

Hydrological Processes--This segment is characterized by continuous rapids. 

The El Portal segment also falls under the general "scientific" ORV identified by the

CMP for the river's main stem "because the river watershed is largely within

designated Wilderness in Yosemite National Park."

The record reflects that some of El Portal's ORVs are not protected by the

present boundaries and, indeed, that not all of El Portal's ORVs have been fully

located. For example, the CMP points out a significant deficiency with respect to El

Portal's cultural ORVs: 

A systematic inventory for ethnographic resources has not been undertaken for

El Portal.... [S]everal individuals and families have traditional ties to this area. 

Redbud, willow, sourberry, and other plant materials are known to be gathered

here. There are at least three known cemeteries, two of which were used in

historic times and are the burial places for ancestors of some local Indian

families. 

In addition, although the CMP notes that a "comprehensive evaluation of

cultural landscapes and historic structures at the El Portal Administrative Site, based

on National Register criteria, has been completed," it does not discuss whether such

landscapes and structures are located within the present boundaries or if their

protection and enhancement were considered when the boundaries were drawn. 

Indeed, the record reflects that NPS employees expressed concern about the effect of

the boundaries on cultural ORVs during the drafting stage of the CMP. For example,

one employee noted that "there are river-related archeological sites, considered part of

the cultural resource ORV in El Portal, that lie outside the 100-y[ea]r floodplain ...

that would be directly and adversely affected by administrative purposes (e.g.,

construction of employee housing at Hillside West)." Such omissions demonstrate

that the CMP's boundaries at El Portal could not possibly have been promulgated to

protect and enhance such ORVs.

In concluding that the river boundaries at El Portal were improperly drawn, we

do not, as the NPS fears, establish "a preference for ... includ[ing] the absolute

maximum number of acres on every part of the designated river," or place a "special

burden of justification on an agency if it chooses less than the absolute maximum

average." Instead, we hold that there is one burden of justification that generally

applies to an administering agency's determination of river boundaries: Boundaries

set within the WSRA's acreage requirement, regardless where such boundaries fall

within the statutory range, must be drawn so as to protect and enhance the ORVs

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causing that area to be included within the WSRS. See §16 U.S.C. 1281(a); Sokol,

210 F.3d at 879; 47 Fed. Reg. at 39,459. Because the NPS failed to apply this

standard, the CMP's present boundaries at El Portal were not determined in

accordance with law. Accordingly, on remand the NPS must redetermine the river

area boundaries at El Portal under the proper standard. See §5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).

Friends of Yosemite v. Norton, 348 F.3d at 796-799. The Ninth Circuit summarized its

holding as follows:

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we conclude that the CMP and its EIS contain

sufficient data for a programmatic plan under the WSRA and NEPA, and that the 

NPS did not violate its duty to cooperate with water pollution agencies as required by

§16 U.S.C. 1283(a). We further conclude that the CMP violates the WSRA by

insufficiently addressing user capacities and improperly setting river area boundaries

within El Portal. We remand for the district court to enter an appropriate order

requiring the NPS to remedy these deficiencies in the CMP in a timely manner. 

Inasmuch as the NPS was supposed to have completed a CMP for the Merced River

some twelve years ago, we would also expect that the NPS would implement, as soon

as is practicable, temporary or provisional measures designed to avoid environmental

degradation pending the completion of its task.

Id. at 803-04.

On remand, NPS advised this court and Plaintiffs that it planned to proceed with

several projects in the Yosemite Valley segment of the Merced River corridor in Yosemite

National Park, which were tiered to the 2000 MRP and the Yosemite Valley Plan. Plaintiffs

then moved for injunctive relief to prevent NPS from implementing those projects. On March

26, 2004, the court entered an order finding that the Ninth Circuit had not invalidated the

2000 MRP as a whole and denying Plaintiffs’ request for a broad injunction halting all

projects tiered to the 2000 MRP. 

Plaintiffs appealed. On April 20, 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued an order clarifying its

October 27, 2003 opinion and explaining that it had held the entire 2000 MRP to be invalid. 

It remanded the matter to this court for reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ motion in light of this

clarification. Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 366 F.3d 731 (9 Cir. 2004). th

On July 6, 2004, following a further round of briefing, this court vacated its March 26

order and directed NPS to comply with the Ninth Circuit’s April 20 order by “remedying in a

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timely manner the deficiencies found in the 2000 MRP, i.e., insufficient addressing of user

capacities and improper setting of river area boundaries within El Portal.” It also ordered

NPS to comply with NEPA by issuing a supplemental EIS. This court enjoined two projects:

the Curry Village Campgrounds Project and the East Yosemite Valley Utilities Improvement

Plan, pending completion of a new or revised CMP for the Merced River. With Defendants’

consent, the court enjoined NPS “from implementing projects and activities relating to

Yosemite Lodge Development, the Yosemite Village Parking and Transit Area

Improvements (Camp 6 Parking Lot), Curry Village Cabins, and the Camp Wawona

Redevelopment and Proposed Land Exchange” until completion of a new or revised CMP. 

The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief in other respects and allowed a

number of projects to proceed, including the El Portal Office Building Annex, Curry Village

Employee Dorms, the South Fork Bridge Replacement Project, tree stump removal, and data

collection efforts. Finally, the court reiterated the finding that NPS would be required to

provide specific references to the line or page numbers of the Park’s 1980 GMP, which

would be amended by the new or revised river plan. The court directed that the injunction

remain in place until “the NPS completes the new or revised CMP,” which this court ordered

the agency to complete within one year. 

NPS published a notice of intent to prepare an environmental impact statement on the

Revised Merced River Plan/SEIS in the Federal Register on July 27, 2004. A series of public

scoping meetings were held in mid-August in Oakland, Mariposa, Yosemite Valley, and El

Portal, California. In response to public comment, the public scoping period was extended by

two weeks and closed on September 10, 2004. The Draft Merced Wild and Scenic River

Revised Comprehensive Management Plan and Supplemental Environmental Impact

Statement was released for public review in January 2005. The Notice of Availability was

published in the Federal Register on January 14, 2005, and the official review period

continued through March 22, 2005. The Record of Decision for the Merced Wild and Scenic

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River Revised Comprehensive Management Plan was signed on July 25, 2005, adopting

Alternative 2 from the SEIS.

NPS issued a two-volume publication entitled, “Merced Wild and Scenic River

Revised Comprehensive Management Plan and Supplemental Environmental Impact

Statement” (“2005 Revised Plan”) in June 2005. With the completion of the 2005 Revised

Plan, the court ruled on October 27, 2005, that its July 6, 2004 injunction expired by its own

terms and was no longer in effect. 

On November 11, 2005, Plaintiffs lodged their First Supplemental Complaint,

alleging five causes of action against Defendants and challenging the 2005 Revised Plan

under WSRA, NEPA and the APA. On December 2, 2005, Defendants filed an Answer to

the Supplemental Complaint, and lodged the Administrative Record for the 2005 Revised

Plan. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the case now proceeds on cross motions for

summary judgment. Oral argument was presented on May 1, 2006.

LEGAL STANDARD

Absent a separately-created right of action, the review of final agency action is

governed by the Administrative Procedure Act under an “arbitrary or capricious” standard. 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Absent a showing of arbitrary action, a court must assume that an

agency has exercised its discretion appropriately. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412

(1976). Thus, the standard is “highly deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid and

affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its decision.” Independent

Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9 Cir. 2000)(internal quotations th

omitted.). An agency’s decision should be overturned if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, other otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);

Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbit, 58 F.3d 1392, 1401 (9 Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit th

has explained review of agency decisions as follows:

Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and the reviewing court

may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Marsh v. Oregon Natural

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Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)

(Marsh). We must determine whether the agency’s decision was made after

considering the relevant factors and whether the agency made a clear error of

judgment. Id. at 378, 109 S.Ct. at 1861. We may reverse the agency’s decision as

arbitrary or capricious only if the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it

to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an

explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the agency, or offered one that is

so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of

agency expertise. Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1521 (9th

Cir. 1995).

Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 900 (9 Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 th

S.Ct. 80 (1996). 

In the present case, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are not entitled to the

presumption discussed in Kleppe that NPS has exercised its discretion appropriately. 

Rather, Plaintiffs argue that because the Ninth Circuit found that NPS violated WSRA in

regard to user capacities and the El Portal boundaries, it has already been found to have acted

arbitrarily in this case, and it is not entitled to the presumption that it has exercised its

discretion appropriately. Plaintiffs also emphasize that courts have found that NPS violated

the law in regard to Yosemite National Park on at least three different occasions in the last

six years. See Sierra Club v. United States, 23 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1998)

(substantial likelihood NPS violated NEPA); Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F.Supp.2d 1202,

1263 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (NPS violated WSRA and NEPA); Friends of Yosemite, 348 F.3d at

797, 799, 803 (NPS violated WSRA). Plaintiffs conclude that under these circumstances,

NPS is not entitled to any presumption of compliance with the law in this instance. In

response, Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit’s finding that it had violated WSRA in two

respects was not based on the conclusion that it had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, but

rather on the court’s legal interpretation of WSRA. 

In ruling on this case, the Ninth Circuit repeated the well-known standard that an

agency’s decision will be set aside “only if it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 793,

quoting Hells Canyon Alliance v. United States Forest Serv., 227 F.3d 1170, 1176-77 (9th

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Cir. 2000). The court found that “[t]he current CMP is deficient in its approach to user

capacities because its principal method for addressing user capacities, the VERP framework,

contains only sample standards and indicators,” and that “[t]he NPS violated WSRA by

drawing the boundaries at the Merced’s El Portal administrative site too narrowly.” Friends

of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 796, 797. Nowhere in its opinion does the court make a

finding regarding the actual nature of the NPS decision, i.e., whether it was arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Because this

standard contains the catch-all “otherwise not in accordance with the law,” this court cannot

find that the Ninth Circuit necessarily determined that the NPS’s decision was arbitrary,

capricious or an abuse of discretion. Significantly, Plaintiffs have not provided the court with

any direct authority for the proposition that a reversal of an administrative agency’s decision

by the appeals court results in the application of a different standard of review when the same

issue comes before the district court on remand. Accordingly, this court concludes that the

regular APA standard for the review of agency decisions applies in this case.

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no

genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);

Poller v. Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755

F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1985); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d

1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) Summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

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showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted,

"so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of

summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); First Nat'l

Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los

Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1980).

The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors

Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477

U.S. 248-49; Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need

not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of

the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus,

the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order

to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); International Union of

Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

UNDISPUTED FACTS

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Both parties to this action have filed statements of undisputed facts, to which the

other party has responded. The court finds, however, that Defendants’ Response to

Plaintiffs’ Concise Statement of Facts fails to comply with the Local Rules for the Eastern

District. Local Rule 56-260 provides in part as follows:

(b) Opposition. Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary

adjudication shall reproduce the itemized facts in the Statement of Undisputed Facts

and admit those facts which are undisputed and deny those which are disputed,

including with each denial a citation to the particular portions of any pleadings,

affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission or other document relied upon

in support of that denial. 

In this case, Defendants have reproduced each of the 38 itemized facts in Plaintiffs’ Concise

Statement of Facts and have stated whether they dispute each fact. They fail, however, to

provide any citation to any portion of the administrative record relied upon in support of that

denial. This is particularly egregious as Defendants’ response to many of Plaintiffs’ facts is a

claim that the fact mischaracterises the administrative record. This court considered ordering

Defendants to file a response to Plaintiffs’ Concise Statement of Facts that would comply

with the Local Rules, but in an effort to expedite resolution of this case, will not to do so. 

Defendants are cautioned, however, that any future response to a statement of facts filed in

connection with a motion for summary judgment in this or any other case filed before the

undersigned must be in compliance with Local Rule 56-260(b).

The undisputed facts regarding the procedural history of this case are set forth above.

The facts regarding the contents of the administrative record are discussed below.

DISCUSSION

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants contend that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2005 Revised Plan. Previously, in response to Plaintiffs’

challenge to the 2000 MRP, Defendants raised two jurisdictional challenges: 1) Plaintiffs’

claims were not ripe for judicial review; and 2) Plaintiffs lacked standing. This court rejected

those challenges in its decision issued March 22, 2002. Friends of Yosemite Valley v.

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Norton, 194 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1074 - 1080. Defendants did not appeal this court’s ruling on

the jurisdictional issue and the Ninth Circuit did not address it.

Defendants claim that a significant new development has occurred since this court’s

March 22, 2002 ruling and the Ninth Circuit’s October 2003 ruling on appeal, which requires

this court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. This new development is the issuance of the opinion

in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 524 U.S. 55 (2004) (“SUWA”). SUWA

involved three claims, one of which was that the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) had

failed to meet its statutory mandate under the Federal Land Policy Management Act

(“FLPMA”), 43 U.S.C. Section 1782(c). The particular provision at issue directed the BLM

“not to impair the suitability” of potential wilderness areas. Id. at 2377. The plaintiffs in

SUWA alleged that off-highway vehicle use was damaging potential wilderness areas on

BLM lands in Utah, and they brought suit under APA Section 706(1), alleging a failure to

comply with FLPMA and seeking an order to compel the agency to fulfill its “nonimpairment

obligation.” Id. at 2378. The Tenth Circuit held that the FLPMA nonimpairment mandate

constituted a “mandatory, nondiscretionary duty” of the BLM that could be compelled under

Section 706(1) of the APA. Id. 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously reversed the decision of the

Tenth Circuit. The Court defined the issue in the case as whether “the authority of a federal

court under the . . . (APA) to ‘compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably

delayed,’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), extends to the review of the [BLM’s] stewardship of public

lands under certain statutory provisions and its own planning documents.” Id. at 57 -58. The

Court held that “a claim under Section 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that

an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Id. at 64. The

Court also explained the limits the APA places on judicial review as follows:

Where no other statute provides a private right of action, the "agency action"

complained of must be " final agency action." § 704 (emphasis added). "Agency

action" is defined in § 551(13) to include "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order,

license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act."

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(Emphasis added.) The APA provides relief for a failure to act in § 706(1): "The

reviewing court shall ... compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 

delayed." Sections 702, 704, and 706(1) all insist upon an "agency action," either as

the action complained of (in §§ 702 and 704) or as the action to be compelled (in §

706(1)). The definition of that term begins with a list of five categories of decisions

made or outcomes implemented by an agency--"agency rule, order, license, sanction

[or] relief." § 551(13). All of those categories involve circumscribed, discrete agency

actions, as their definitions make clear: "an agency statement of ... future effect

designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy" (rule); "a final

disposition ... in a matter other than rule making" (order); a "permit ... or other form

of permission" (license); a "prohibition ... or taking [of] other compulsory or

restrictive action" (sanction); or a "grant of money, assistance, license, authority," etc.,

or "recognition of a claim, right, immunity," etc., or "taking of other action on the

application or petition of, and beneficial to, a person" (relief). §§ 551(4), (6), (8), (10),

(11).

Id. at 61 -62. Based on these standards the Court held that the BLM’s alleged failure to act

was not remediable under the APA, because the plaintiffs alleged general deficiencies in

compliance which lacked the specificity requisite for agency action. Id. at 66 - 67.

An obvious distinction between the SUWA case and the case before this court is that

SUWA involved a claim that a federal agency had failed to act, while Plaintiffs in the

present case challenge, at least to some degree, an affirmative action by Defendants. 

Defendants claim, however, that SUWA’s holding is not limited to challenges to agency

actions unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld pursuant to Section 706(1) of the APA. 

Rather, they argue, the holding applies equally to a final agency action under the remaining

APA provisions, including Section 704 and Section 706(2)(A) - (D). The court agrees. See 

SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62 (“[s]ections 702, 704, and 706(a) all insist upon an ‘agency action,’

either as the action complained of (in §§ 702 and 704) or as the action to be compelled (in §

706(1)).”)

Applying SUWA to the present case, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs, by seeking

review of NPS’s general adoption of the 2005 Revised Plan, rather than challenging a

discrete final agency action taken pursuant to that plan, have filed the same type of

programmatic challenge to the overall management of the Merced River areas that the

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Supreme Court rejected in SUWA.. Central to Defendant’s argument is their claim that

Plaintiffs have not challenged any one of the five discrete “agency actions” listed in APA §

551(13). Defendants claim that to the contrary, Plaintiffs seek judicial intervention into the

type of broader-scale planning effort, which, under SUWA, is outside the permissible scope

of judicial review under the APA. 

Defendants also discuss a recent Ninth Circuit case which interprets SUWA. In

Center for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 1108 (9 Cir. 2005), the plaintiffs th

alleged that the United States Forest Service had violated WSRA by failing to consider

certain rivers as potential segments of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System while planning for

the use and development of water and related land resources in Arizona national forests. On

rehearing, the Ninth Circuit held that under SUWA ,the Forest Service’s failure to consider

the rivers when engaging in federal land planning was not a discrete agency action that would

permit review under the APA. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Veneman, 394 F.3d at 1113.

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Complaint similarly fails to

challenge a discrete final “agency action” under WSRA. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs

challenge the 2005 Revised Plan in the abstract, but that the 2005 Revised Plan does not

constitute a “rule, order, license, sanction, or relief,” as required for judicial review under the

APA. Defendants suggest that if and when NPS does take a reviewable final agency action

regarding a specific implementation project to which Plaintiffs object, they could attempt to

challenge that action under Sections 704 and 706(2)(A)-(D) of the APA, provided that the

action in question qualifies as one of the five categories of “agency action” defined in the

APA.

In response, Plaintiffs contend that they have standing to pursue this action and that

the court has subject matter jurisdiction. In support of standing, Plaintiffs assert that the

decisions made by NPS in the 2005 Revised Plan and ROD will cause them and their

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5 U.S.C. Section 706(2) provides in part:

1

“The reviewing court shall . . .

“(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action .. . found to be - - 

“(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”

16

members injuries that are within the zone of interests of WSRA and NEPA. See Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 - 61 (1992) (constitutional minimum of standing

contains three elements of injury in fact, casual connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of, and likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision).

Defendants clarify their position in their Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Summary Judgment and Reply Supporting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

explaining that they do not challenge Plaintiffs’ Article III standing. Rather, they state, the

reference to standing arose in the context of their discussion of Veneman, in which the Ninth

Circuit found that because the plaintiff failed to allege a discrete agency action that the Forest

Service had failed to take, the plaintiff had no standing under Section 706(1). Veneman, 394

F.3d at 1113. 

In regard to subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs first argue that Defendants are

wrong in claiming that the requirements of the APA implicate a court’s jurisdiction. It is

difficult to reconcile this argument with the decisions in SUWA (upholding trial court’s

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and Veneman (after finding Plaintiffs had no

standing, and “given the Supreme Court’s holding in SUWA,” affirming the trial court’s

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). The court therefore rejects this argument.

Plaintiffs next argue that if they must allege final agency action subject to review

under the APA to establish subject matter jurisdiction, they have done so, because they

challenge under Section 706(2)(A) of the APA the ROD adopting the Revised Plan and EIS 1

that underlies it. 

Plaintiffs correctly state that there is a right of judicial review of “agency actions”

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under Section 702 of the APA. As set forth above, one of the things that qualifies under

Section 551(13) as an agency action is a “rule.” A “rule,” in turn, is defined to include “the

whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect

designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . .” 5 U.S.C. Section

551(4). Plaintiffs argue that the ROD is a rule under the APA, because it interprets and

implements WSRA as applied particularly to the Merced River. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue,

the ROD is an “agency action” under the APA.

Plaintiffs further argue that the ROD is a “final” agency action subject to review

under Section 704 of the APA. Under Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997), final

agency action exists if: (1) the action marks the consummation of the agency’s

decisionmaking process, meaning it is not “merely tentative or interlocutory in nature;” or (2)

the action determines rights or obligations, and has legal consequences. Plaintiffs assert that

the ROD satisfies the first Spear criterion because it consummates NPS’s decisionmaking

related to its duty under WSRA and the Ninth Circuit’s order. They also assert that the EIS

upon which the ROD is based consummates NPS’s decisionmaking under NEPA to perform

its duties to publicly consider and evaluate the environmental consequences of its actions. 

Plaintiffs claim that the ROD also satisfies the second criterion in Spear, because it

determines rights and obligations and has legal consequences. For example, the ROD

addresses user capacities by determining the limits on the number of people who may use the

Merced River corridor in the next five years, and also addresses river boundaries and

management zoning in El Portal. Plaintiffs argue that the ROD has legal consequences, not

only because of these two decisions, but also because it immediately authorizes continuing

uses of the river corridor. 

In regard to SUWA, Plaintiffs contend that the present case is distinguishable because

SUWA involved the issue of whether a party could bring a “failure to act” claim challenging

an agency’s failure to comply with a broad statutory goal that did not require any particular

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discrete agency action. In contrast, argue Plaintiffs, they do not seek to compel NPS to

perform any tasks for the first time. Rather NPS has already acted, in part because WSRA

and the Ninth Circuit compelled it to do so, and Plaintiffs now seek review of the ROD that

purports to comply with those mandates. Plaintiffs argue that their challenges are thus to a

final agency action and are subject to review under section 706(2) of the APA. They also

argue that the agency duty at issue in SUWA to “avoid impairment” is not analogous to

NPS’s affirmative duty under WSRA to address user capacities, particularly as ordered by the

Ninth Circuit. They conclude that NPS’s decisions taken in an attempt to comply with

WSRA and the order of the Ninth Circuit are subject to judicial review as final agency

actions. 

In regard to Veneman, the Ninth Circuit case decided after SUWA, Plaintiffs argue

that this again involves a failure to act, which is dissimilar to the present case. Plaintiffs also

argue that in another case decided after SUWA, the Ninth Circuit held that it did have

jurisdiction over a forest plan adopted pursuant to the National Forest Management Act,

which they claim is analogous to a wild and scenic river management plan. In Natural

Resources Defense Council v. United States Forest Service, 421 F.3d 797, 804 (9 Cir. th

2005), Congress had placed a provision in an omnibus appropriations act stating that the

ROD for the 2003 SEIS for the 1997 Tongass Land Management Plan was not subject to

judicial review. The government argued that Congress had intended to insulate the entire

1997 plan from judicial scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and found that it

had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 to review the final decision and judgment of

the district court dismissing the plaintiff’s claims. The decision contains no reference to

SUWA or a lack of jurisdiction under the APA. 

Plaintiffs distinguish one final case. In Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871

(1990), the plaintiffs brought an action suing the Secretary of the Interior over what they

characterized as his “land withdrawal review program,” which concerned at least 1250

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actions across 11 western states and the classification of lands which might in the future

allow entry for activities such as mining. The Supreme Court held that the program in

question was “not an ‘agency action’ within the meaning of” the APA. Id. at 890. The

Court noted that the plaintiffs’ complaint “does not refer to a single BLM order or regulation,

or even to a completed universe of particular BLM orders and regulations.” Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that by contrast, they challenge a specific CMP and EIS that together

have immediate effects on a discrete wild and scenic river. They stress that in Lujan, the

Court explained that, “we intervene in the administration of the laws only when, and to the

extent that, a specific "final agency action" has an actual or immediately threatened effect.

Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S., at 164166, 87 S.Ct., at 1524-1526. Such an intervention may

ultimately have the effect of requiring a regulation, a series of regulations, or even a whole

‘program’ to be revised by the agency in order to avoid the unlawful result that the court

discerns.” 

In concluding, Plaintiffs note that the Ninth Circuit directed NPS to “adopt specific

limits on user capacity consistent with both the WSRA and the instruction of the Secretarial

Guidelines that such limits describe an actual level of use that will not adversely impact the

Merced’s ORVs.” Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 797. Plaintiffs claim that

Defendants’ argument that the 2005 Revised Plan is not a final agency action implies that it

does nothing to change the status quo. Plaintiffs argue that if this is true, NPS has not

complied with the Ninth Circuit’s directive.

The court agrees with Defendants that whether Plaintiffs rely on Section 706(1) or

706(2) is immaterial, because, as explained in SUWA, an agency action includes both action

and inaction. See 5 U.S.C. Section 551(13). The court also agrees with Defendants that

regardless of under what section a legal challenge is brought, it must concern final agency

action. However, the court must agree with Plaintiffs that the ROD adopting the 2005

Revised Plan is a final agency action. That is, the court finds that the ROD is an “agency

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statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement [and]

interpret. . . law or policy” as to the application of WSRA to the Merced River, and is

therefore a “rule” under Section 551(13). Thus, the ROD is an agency action. Further, the

court finds that the ROD marks the “consumation of the [NPS’] decisionmaking process”

under WSRA and the Ninth Circuit’s order and determines rights or obligations, and has

legal consequences in that it establishes limits on visitor capacity for the next five years and

addresses river boundaries and management zoning in El Portal. Thus, the 2005 ROD is a

final agency action subject to judicial review under the APA. 5 U.S.C. Section 702. 

Accordingly, the court finds that it continues to have subject matter jurisdiction over

this action. 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs filed four declarations and several exhibits in conjunction with their motion

for summary judgment. Defendants have moved to strike these declarations and their

supporting exhibits, contending that they lie outside the scope of the administrative record in

this case. Defendants qualify this contention somewhat, stating that they do not seek to strike

the portions of the declarations of Bart Brown and Greg Adair to the extent that they are

offered solely for the purpose of establishing standing. Because Defendants clarify in their

opposition and reply that they do not challenge Plaintiffs’ Article III standing, the court has

disregarded Mr. Brown’s declaration in its entirety and Mr. Adair’s declaration to the extent

it is offered to establish standing.

It is undisputed that the focal point for judicial review is the administrative record

before the agency at the time of the agency’s decision and “not some new record made

initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). There are,

however, exceptions to this general rule. In Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d

1432, 1436 (9 Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit explained: th

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However, certain circumstances may justify expanding review beyond the

record or permitting discovery. See, e.g., Public Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d

791, 793 (9th Cir.1982). The district court may inquire outside the administrative

record when necessary to explain the agency's action. Id. at 793-94. When such a

failure to explain agency action effectively frustrates judicial review, the court may

"obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional

explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary." Camp v.

Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1244, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). The court's

inquiry outside the record is limited to determining whether the agency has considered

all relevant factors or has explained its course of conduct or grounds of decision. 

Hintz, 800 F.2d at 829.

The district court may also inquire outside of the administrative record "when

it appears the agency has relied on documents or materials not included in the record."

Id. In addition, discovery may be permitted if supplementation of the record is

necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter involved in the agency

action. Id.

Defendants claim that the declarations and supporting exhibits at issue here do not fall

within one of these exceptions. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion, claiming that the

extra-record evidence does qualify for the exceptions.

Plaintiffs explain that they submit the declaration of Greg Adair and the

accompanying photographs for authority in addition to the administrative record concerning 

the adverse impacts and degradation to specific areas of the Park due to the 200 MRP. They

state that the declaration offers only what Defendants have already been alerted to through the

comments of Plaintiffs and others, as set forth in the administrative record. They stress that

the photographs provide a visual illustration of actual conditions in the Park. 

Plaintiffs submit the declaration of Bridget McGinniss Kerr to show that the SEIS

fails to give the decisionmaker or public an accurate portrayal of the existing resources and

their location in relation to what may occur during the zoning design. Plaintiffs claim that

Defendants have not revealed the relationship between zoning and cultural and biological

resources, and have therefore failed to provide necessary and relevant data. 

Finally, Plaintiffs present the declaration of Patrick Rhoan, offering him as an expert

competent to testify regarding Native American experiences and cultural resources relied

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upon in Yosemite Valley and along the Merced River corridor. Plaintiffs rely upon Mr.

Rhoan’s testimony to show the damage caused to traditional cultural resources by

development, and along with the testimony of Ms. Kerr, to show that NPS failed to consider

a reasonable alternative. They also argue that the testimony of Mr. Rhoan and Ms. Kerr

reveals the extent to which NPS in the SEIS has “swept problems or criticisms under the

rug.” National Audubon Soc., 46 F.3d at 1447.

The court has reviewed the extra-record evidence submitted by Plaintiffs and

concludes that this evidence is unnecessary for the court’s understanding of the issues

currently before it. Therefore, the court has disregarded this evidence for the purposes of the

issues resolved in the present opinion. However, this opinion does not address the injunctive

relief sought by Plaintiffs, and the court has not yet determined whether the evidence should

be considered by the court in resolving the issue of that relief. Accordingly, the court

declines to strike the evidence at this time.

New or Revised Plan

Plaintiffs contend that the 2005 Revised Plan fails to comply with the express

requirements of WSRA, as confirmed by the Ninth Circuit’s decision, to have one CMP for

the Merced River. Plaintiffs rely on the language from the Ninth Circuit’s April 20, 2004

order noting that it had previously “held that the entire Merced Wild and Scenic River

Comprehensive Management Plan (“CMP”) is invalid” and requiring the NPS to prepare “a

new or revised CMP.”

Plaintiffs present two related arguments. First, Plaintiffs argue that although NPS

captions the new document “Revised Comprehensive Management Plan,” it is not

comprehensive. Rather, by its own terms, the 2005 Revised Plan “is intended to supplement

and amend the Merced River Plan/FEIS that was completed in June 2000.” Revised Plan, I25. Plaintiffs complain that, “[t]he Park Service has merely issued supplemental volumes as

amendments to the invalid 2000 CMP, expecting this court and the public to probe some

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thousands of pages in six volumes of material, with cross-referencing and incorporation, to

try and glean what NPS claims is a comprehensive plan.” Plaintiffs further claim that the

2005 Revised Plan focuses on user capacity, river area boundaries, and revision of the 1980

General Management Plan, Revised Plan, I -6, and makes only cursory mention of such

elements as outstandingly remarkable values, management zones and river protection

overlay, referring the reader instead to the 2000 MRP. Revised Plan, I -13, I - 17 (“refer to

the Merced River Plan/FEIS for a more detailed description of the River Protection Overlay

and its specific prescriptions”); II - 16 (explaining that “[m]anagement zoning for the Merced

River corridor was “adopted by the 2000 Merced River Plan” and referring the reader to

pages 57 -101 of the summary document completed in February 2001); II -30 (“[a] detailed

discussion of the relationship between specific management zones and the river’s

Outstanding Remarkable Values can be found in the Merced River Plan (NPS 2001a)”). 

Plaintiffs conclude that because the 2005 Revised Plan relies on the 2000 MRP, it must be

rejected as “not in compliance with WSRA as interpreted by judicial orders in this case.” 

While Plaintiffs do not dispute NPS’s ability to use information and appropriate analyses

from the 2000 MRP in a new or revised plan, they argue that NPS is required to issue a single

CMP that contains all management decisions and environmental analyses.

Second, Plaintiffs contend that reliance on the 2000 MRP is improper not only

because the 2005 Revised Plan is therefore not comprehensive, but also because the 2000

MRP has been held to be invalid. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, while the ROD for the 2005

Revised Plan expressly states that it “will amend the existing 2000 Merced River Plan,” 

there is no “existing” 2000 Merced River Plan. Essentially, Plaintiffs argue that any

reference to, or reliance on, the 2000 MRP as a separate, free-standing entity apart from the

2005 Revised Plan is improper, because that plan has been held to be invalid by the Ninth

Circuit. 

In response, Defendants contend that the 2005 Revised Plan constitutes a properly

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approved revised CMP. They restate Plaintiffs’ argument as follows: “plaintiffs claim that it

was improper for the defendants to reincorporate management elements and data from the

2000 Plan into the Revised Plan.” Defendants then argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel disavowed

this position at the October 24, 2005 hearing and conclude that Plaintiffs therefore cannot

now claim that it was improper for NPS to reuse data and management elements from the

2000 Plan.

After review of the papers and after hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the

court finds that Defendants’ argument does not accurately reflect Plaintiffs’ position. 

Plaintiffs do not contend that it was improper for Defendants to reincorporate management

elements and data from the 2000 MRP into the 2005 Revised Plan. They do not contend that

the NPS must come upon with a new plan that reexamines all of the elements of WSRA,

without using any elements of the 2000 MRP. What Plaintiffs contend is that Defendants

may not rely on the 2000 MRP as a separate, existing plan in addition to the 2005 Revised

Plan. They argue that the 2005 Revised Plan must be wholly self-contained and that because

the 2000 MRP has been declared invalid, the 2005 Revised Plan cannot refer the reader to it

as an ongoing plan. Plaintiffs contend that NPS is required to issue a single CMP that

contains all management decisions and environmental analyses. 

The court and the parties find themselves at the present juncture because of the need

to interpret the Ninth Circuit’s opinion issued October 27, 2003, and the clarifying order

issued April 20, 2004. On remand from the appeal, this court stated in part as follows:

As explained above, the Ninth Circuit reversed this court’s March 22, 2002

opinion on two issues only, finding that the MRP violated WSRA by insufficiently

addressing user capacity and by improperly drawing the river boundaries within El

Portal. The Ninth Circuit otherwise upheld the MRP and EIS on the points on which

Plaintiffs challenged it. After reviewing Plaintiffs’ arguments in depth, this court

finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion invalidates

the existing MRP. Although not determinative, the court finds evidence to support

this finding in the express language of the Ninth Circuit that “[w]e remand for the

district court to enter an appropriate order requiring the NPS to remedy these

deficiencies in the CMP in a timely manner.” Friends of Yosemite, 348 F.3d at 803

[emphasis added.] Thus, the court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that the Ninth Circuit’s

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opinion requires this court to enjoin all pending projects which are dependent upon

the Valley Plan, which is in turn dependant upon the MRP.

Memorandum Opinion and Order Following Remand, 28.

On April 20, 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued an order stating as follows:

We write to clarify our Opinion of October 27, 2003, Friends of Yosemite Valley v.

Norton, 348 F.3d 789, 796-99 (9th Cir.2003). There we held that the entire Merced

Wild and Scenic River Comprehensive Management Plan (“CMP”) is invalid due to

two deficiencies: (1) a failure to adequately address user capacities; and (2) the

improper drawing of the Merced River's boundaries at El Portal. While we remanded

to “the district court to enter an appropriate order requiring the [National Park

Service] to remedy these deficiencies in the CMP in a timely manner,” id. at 803, we

did not “otherwise uphold the [CMP].” District Court's Memorandum Opinion and

Order Following Remand at 28. Rather, our Opinion merely stated that the additional

challenges to the CMP brought by Friends of Yosemite Valley and Mariposans for

Environmentally Responsible Growth (collectively, “Friends”) lacked merit. Pursuant

to our original Opinion, the National Park Service (“NPS”) must prepare a new or

revised CMP that adequately addresses user capacities and properly draws the river

boundaries at El Portal.

Because the district court based its denial of Friends' motion for injunctive relief on a

misconstruction of our Opinion, we remand this matter to it for reconsideration of

Friends' motion in light of this clarification of our prior holding. Pending the district

court's reconsideration of this matter, we grant a temporary stay of proceedings and an

injunction prohibiting NPS from implementing any and all projects developed in

reliance upon the invalid CMP.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 366 F.3d 731 (9 Cir. 2004). th

Thus, in its clarifying order, the Ninth Circuit stated that its opinion found the “entire”

2000 MRP was “invalid” due to the two deficiencies and that its opinion did not “otherwise

uphold the [CMP].” This court finds that Plaintiffs are correct in arguing that because the

Ninth Circuit found the 2000 MRP to be invalid, the 2005 Revised Plan cannot logically refer

to it and rely on it, as a separate, existing entity, to create a “new or revised” plan. 

As Plaintiffs’ counsel stated, there is nothing wrong with Defendants using parts

(even very large parts) from the 2000 MRP to create a whole new or revised plan. But that is

not what Defendants have done. Defendants have proceeded from the assumption that the

2000 MRP still exists. For example, the ROD for the 2005 Revised Plan states that it “will

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When asked at oral argument what volumes contained the entire Revised Comprehensive 2

Management Plan without reference to any other document, counsel for Defendants stated that

the entire 2005 Revised Plan could be found in the one-volume “Presentation Plan.” In response,

Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the court should not look at that document. She explained that

Plaintiffs challenge the July 2005 Record of Decision, which implemented the 2005 Revised

Plan. The Presentation Plan, however, was not prepared until December 2005, after the present

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amend the existing 2000 Merced River Plan to address the two deficiencies identified by the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.” ROD - 3. It also provides:

When teamed with the other plan elements, the revised User Capacity Management

Program and the revised El Portal boundary work synergistically. Because the newly

revised elements of the plan can and do function with the pre-existing elements in a

comprehensive manner, the remaining management elements as described in the 2000

Merced River Plan/FEIS have not been revisited in this plan.

ROD - 3. Perhaps most telling of all is the following statement from the Executive Summary 

to the Revised Plan set forth at AR 4837: 

In response to the Court’s direction, the National Park Service is preparing the

Merced Wild and Scenic River Revised Comprehensive Management Plan and

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter referred to as the Revised

Merced River Plan/SEIS). This revised plan will amend the existing Merced River

Plan to address the two deficiencies identified by the Court and to specify how it

amends the General Management Plan. This Revised Merced River Plan does not

replace the Merced River Plan adopted in 2000, but corrects the deficiencies in its

management elements.

This approach by NPS corresponds to how this court originally perceived the posture

of the case when it was remanded by Ninth Circuit. However, the Ninth Circuit’s order

clarifying its opinion explained that it held the 2000 MRP plan to be invalid. NPS was not

given the discretion to remedy the deficiencies in the 2000 MRP as it saw fit. It was given

specific directions by the Ninth Circuit in its Opinion and in its subsequent order clarifying

that opinion. This court finds that language from the Ninth Circuit indicates an intention that

a single document be produced, covering everything. This court further finds that NPS’s

approach, as set forth in the above-quoted language from the 2005 Revised Plan and ROD,

does not comply with the Ninth Circuit’s directions. 

2

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complaint was filed in this case. The Presentation Plan therefore did not go through the NEPA

process and was not presented to the public. Defense Counsel replied that Defendants felt that it

was important to include the Presentation Plan as part of the record, because it provides an

“undated summary reflecting what’s in the record of decision.” They stated that it is currently

being printed and copies will be mailed to the public. Because the Presentation Plan was not

presented for public review as the Revised Comprehensive Management Plan, this court cannot

view it as such. 

 The court notes that the Abstract of the Merced Wild and Scenic River Revised

Comprehensive Management Plan and Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, found as

the second page of the grey, two - volume set, begins, “[t]his document is the Final Merced Wild

and Scenic River Revised Comprehensive Management Plan and Supplemental Environmental

Impact Statement (Final Revised Merced River Plan/SEIS). It is that two-volume document the

court has referenced as the 2005 Revised Plan.

Because the court has found the entire 2005 Revised Plan to be invalid, it can be argued 3

that the other claims raised by the parties are moot. However, for the sake of the expedient

resolution of this case, the court will address the other major claims. The court declines to

address issues not covered by the two-volume 2005 Revised Plan, and covered only by the

invalid 2000 MRP.

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Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their

claim that NPS has violated WSRA by failing to adopt a single, self-contained

comprehensive management plan for the Merced River. The 2005 Revised Plan is therefore 3

invalid.

User Capacity

 As set forth above, the Ninth Circuit found that the 2000 MRP violated WSRA by

insufficiently addressing user capacities. In analyzing Section 1274(d)(10), the WSRA

section which requires the adoption of a comprehensive management plan or CMP, the Ninth

Circuit held:

we interpret § 1274(d)(1)’s instruction that a CMP must “address . . . user

capacities” to require only that the CMP contain specific measurable limits on use.

[Citations omitted.] 

This does not mean that the NPS is precluded from using the VERP to fulfill the user

capacities requirement. However, the WSRA does require that the VERP be

implemented through the adoption of quantitative measures sufficient to ensure its

effectiveness as a current measure of user capacities. 

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The VERP framework is described in detail in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. Friends of 4

Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 796 -97.

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Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 797.

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of

addressing user capacities, because the user capacity program in the 2005 Revised Plan meets

this requirement. They argue that the program relies on Visitor Experience and Resource

Protection (“VERP”) framework, but also relies on a number of other methods for addressing 4

user capacity, some of which set limits on the number of people allowed in the river corridor. 

They argue that these methods, taken together, “function as a suite of specific, measurable

limits” through which NPS will “regulate visitor use” to ensure the protection and

enhancement of the Merced River’s ORVs. Defendants group the methods employed to

address user capacity into the following six categories: limits on the number of people; limits

on facilities; limits on specific activities; limits based on environmental and experiential

conditions; and interim limits on facilities and specific activities. 

In regard to limits on people, Defendants explain that the Wilderness Trailhead Quota

System, which has been in place since the 1970s, assigns a daily quota of visitors for each

wilderness trailhead and thus allows the park to regulate and disperse visitor use in the

wilderness areas surrounding the river. See AR 6802. Defendants claim that this system has

enabled NPS to protect natural and cultural resources in the wilderness and to ensure a quality

wilderness experience for park visitors by maintaining low levels of visitor use. Defendants

assert that because approximately 63% of river corridor is composed of wilderness, the

Wilderness Trailhead Quota System imposes specific, measurable limits on over half of the

NPS-administered portion of the Merced River corridor. 

Defendants also explain that the Superintendent’s Compendium includes a number of

specific, measurable limits on visitor use. This includes limits on overnight group size, day

use group size, stock animals per group, stock travel areas, areas of non-motorized water craft

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use, and areas of fishing. Finally, Defendants explain that visitor use is limited by existing

facilities capacities, specifically that of the park’s two wastewater facilities.

Defendants next claim that two programs within the 2005 Revised Plan fall within

limits based on environmental and experiential conditions: the Wilderness Impact Monitoring

System and VERP. The Wilderness Impact Monitoring System (“WIMS”) was developed in

the 1970s for wilderness managers to scientifically monitor the effectiveness of the

Wilderness Trailhead Quotas. Under WIMS, park scientists conduct inventory and

monitoring studies to gather data on wilderness trail and campsite impacts. This data has been

used to evaluate whether changes are occurring to wilderness resources and to make

adjustments in the trailhead quotas needed to protect wilderness resources and the quality of

wilderness experience.

In referring to the Wilderness Trailhead Quota System, the Superintendent’s

Compendium, limitations based on facilities capacities and WIMS, Defendants do not dispute

that the VERP program is NPS’s primary user capacity management tool. See Revised Plan,

II - 11 (“Although the VERP framework was identified as the National Park Service’s primary

user capacity management tool in the 2000 Merced River Plan, the remaining steps in the

process had not been completed at the time of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ October

2003 decision. This Revised Merced River Plan/SEIS proposes a fully developed VERP

program for Yosemite National Park.”). The additional methods for addressing user capacity

discussed above predate the 2000 MRP and were relied upon by Defendants in support of that

plan. Despite their existence, the Ninth Circuit found that the defects in the VERP program

caused the 2000 MRP to be “deficient in its approach to user capacities.” Id. at 796. 

Accordingly, this court cannot find these additional methods persuasive as to whether the

2005 Revised Plan adequately addresses user capacities. As was the case before the Ninth

Circuit, the focus of this court’s inquiry into user capacity remains the VERP program.

Defendants claim that VERP program is a scientifically-based monitoring and

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How NPS reached the decision to implement the interim measures for a period of five 5

years is not meaningfully addressed in Defendants’ papers. When asked at oral argument why

this particular time period was selected, Defendants’ counsel stated that he couldn’t give a

definitive answer, but thought that it was chosen because it seemed like a reasonable period to

have time to collect the data, apply the standards, see if the standards are working, and make

needed adjustments. 

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management program that relies on specific, measurable limits. Defendants summarize the

VERP program as follows: “VERP addresses user capacity by adopting desired resource

conditions which are translated into quantitative and measurable indicators and standards. 

These indicators are then monitored to ensure that the established standards are being met. If

standards were to decline or fall below established levels, the park would take management

action to rectify the condition and return conditions to the established standard.”

Defendants state that because NPS recognized that the VERP program would take

“several field seasons” to become “fully operational” it has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s

recommendation to incorporate “preliminary or temporary limits of some kind” into the user

capacity program. Thus, although the 2005 Revised Plan states claims that it “implements a

fully developed VERP program,” 2005 Revised Plan, II - 11, NPS anticipates needing five

more years to “refine” the VERP. NPS has therefore adopted interim limits which apply in 5

each segment of the river, and act as caps on the levels and types of use in the river corridor. 

The 2005 Revised Plan provides that:

The interim limits will last for approximately five years, while the VERP indicators

and standards continue to be field tested and improved. The National Park Service

would evaluate the VERP program’s effectiveness in providing management with the

information need to manage visitor use in a manner that protects and enhances the

Outstandingly Remarkable Values. Based on this evaluation, park managers would

present a report to the public addressing whether the VERP program has provided the

required guidance on visitor use levels and whether facility limits should be continued,

modified or eliminated. If the VERP program is providing sufficient data on visitor

use to guide the protection of Outstandingly Remarkable Values, interim limits would

most likely be eliminated. If, however ,the VERP program is not providing sufficient

data, the National Park Service would continue interim limits until VERP is

functioning as intended. In this situation, interim limits would not be eliminated;

however, the National Park Service could consider revisions to the interim limits (e.g.,

adding new limits, revising limits). 

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2005 Revised Plan, III-20. 

The interim limits restrict the number of lodging rooms, day visitor parking spaces,

bus parking spaces, tour buses, employee bed spaces, and campsites. In particular, the

number of lodging rooms, day visitor parking places, and bus parking spaces are set at existing

levels. Campground spaces in Yosemite Valley are allowed to increase by 163 sites, which

Defendants assert is below the number of campsites that existed in Yosemite Valley before the

1997 flood. Buses are limited to 92 buses per day, which Defendants claim is consistent with

the number of buses that entered the Valley during the mid-1990s. Revised Plan, III - 20 -22.

Plaintiffs contend that the 2005 Revised Plan fails to adequately address user capacity,

and that they are entitled to judgment on this issue. Plaintiffs rely on language from the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion stating that NPS “shall adopt specific limits on user capacity consistent with

both the WSRA and the instruction of the Secretarial Guidelines that such limits describe an

actual level of use that will not adversely impact the Merced ORVs,” Friends, 348 F.3d at

797, claiming that Defendants did not comply with this order. 

Plaintiffs contend that the user capacity program established by NPS in the 2005

Revised Plan violates WSRA and the Ninth Circuit’s order in four ways. First, Plaintiffs

contend that the interim facility limits merely allow the status quo to act as the Merced River’s

user capacity and those limits are not linked to protecting ORVs. Plaintiffs argue that NPS’s

interim facility limits based on current and planned facility capacity for the Park proceed from

the false assumption that the status quo has no impact on Merced River ORVs. They claim

that the 2005 Revised Plan does not provide any analysis of how actual visitor use, based on

maximum facility capacity, protects the ORVs for the Merced River. 

Second, Plaintiffs argue that NPS’ decisions violate WSRA and the Ninth Circuit’s

order because VERP, the main user capacity mechanism, does not state an actual specific and

measurable level of visitor use that will not adversely impact the Merced’s ORVs. Plaintiffs

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note that in its standards and indicators, the VERP program does provide standards by which

to measure for desired conditions. However, these are not quantitative measures of actual

visitor use.

Third, Plaintiffs argue that the VERP program’s standards and indicators do not

adequately address ORVs. That is, they claim that even if the VERP program’s indicators and

standards did state an actual level of visitor use, they are not adequately linked to scientific,

biological, hydrological and cultural ORVs, because they are based on the desired conditions

of management zoning. Plaintiffs claim that most of the VERP program’s indicators are tied

to social conditions and experiences and will not protect the river’s non-recreational ORVs. 

These indicators are set forth in Table II-5. Plaintiffs argue that these indicators are presented

without any real explanation of how they may prevent degradation or enhance specific

resources that make up the ORVs. 

Relatedly, Plaintiffs assert that management zoning is not linked to the location or

condition of ORVs. As Plaintiffs note, the VERP program has a tiered approach, which first

requires detailed mapping of sensitive resources, then management zoning based on those

maps, and finally indicators and standards based upon the management zoning. Management

zoning defines qualitative desired conditions for areas within the Merced River corridor and

dictates how heavily an area will be used or developed. Plaintiffs complain that the 2005

Revised Plan does not address zoning for any part of the Merced River corridor other than El

Portal, but instead relies on the zoning in the invalid 2000 MRP. Plaintiffs claim that this

zoning was not properly developed based on resource concerns and sensitive resources. 

Finally, in addition to claiming that the VERP program’s standards and indicators do not

adequately address ORVs, Plaintiffs claim that they do not protect ORVs. They argue that

many indicators do not have any baseline data to support developing quantitative standards,

noting in particular that the Chief of Yosemite’s Resources Management and Science has

indicated that the sole indicator and standard for cultural resources is not protective of that

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The uncertainty of this issue is demonstrated by Defense Counsel’s explanation at oral

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argument that, “VERP does not necessarily end at the end of five years. VERP may go on

considerably longer and certain parts of it may go on in the interminable future.”

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ORV. AR 7888. They argue that because most levels of impact to cultural resources are

unacceptable, the VERP program does not effectively address that ORV.

Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that even if the VERP program’s indicators and standards

were adequately linked to ORVs, they do not prevent adverse impacts. Instead, they allow for

monitoring, which provides information that adverse impacts have occurred and that some

management action may be taken. Plaintiffs further note correctly that in the 2005 Revised

Plan, NPS does not commit to take any particular management action once degradation has

occurred. They stress that even under the 2005 Revised Plan, the VERP program still has no

mechanism for setting an actual level of use that will prevent degradation. 

The Ninth Circuit held: “[o]n remand, the NPS shall adopt specific limits on user

capacity . . . that such limits describe an actual level of visitor use that will not adversely

impact the Merced’s ORVs.” Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 797. After examining

all of the parties’ arguments and the administrative record, this court finds that NPS has failed

to comply with this order. What NPS has done, some sixteen years after it was required to

create a comprehensive management plan for the Merced River, is to decide that for

approximately five years, it would like to experiment with implementing the VERP program

as its primary means of addressing user capacity. Remarkably, NPS makes no commitment to

the use of the VERP program after five years, stating that “whether VERP will become

permanent after five years is not known at this time.” Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’

Concise Statement of Facts, response to no. 15 at p. 5. Thus, in theoretically crafting a plan 6

for addressing user capacity, NPS has left itself the option of deciding in five years to

abandon its currently proposed method and proceed in an entirely different, as yet

unidentified, manner. Under this scenario, there is no indication when, if ever, NPS will

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This situation provides even less certainty than the 2000 MRP, in regard to which the 7

Ninth Circuit noted that, “the NPS’s proposed five-year timetable for the implementation of the

VERP framework would not satisfy § 1274(d)(1)’s three-full-fiscal-year timetable even if the

NPS were to have begun implementation of the VERP immediately upon Congress’ designation

of the Merced.” Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 797. 

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finally adopt a permanent primary method for addressing user capacity, a required component

for a comprehensive management plan under WSRA.7

NPS’ implementation of the interim limits within the VERP program was an express

attempt to comply with the order to adopt specific limits on user capacity by following the

Ninth Circuit’s suggestion regarding implementation of preliminary or temporary limits. 

These “limits,” however, are simply the current physical capacity of the facilities in Yosemite

Valley, resulting from the ebb and flow of facility availability over time. Further, the court

notes that NPS has acknowledged a significant error in the description of the interim facility

limits in the two-volume Revised Comprehensive Management Plan and Supplemental

Environmental Impact Statement. In the ROD, NPS explains:

[T]he National Park Service has also made a technical correction on page III-20 of the

Revised Merced River Plan/SEIS. In the fourth paragraph, the Revised Merced River

Plan/SEIS states, “The interim facility limits would restrict any changes to the current

facility footprint and would require the National Park Service to manage use

accordingly.” This statement is not correct. Interim facility limits do not constrain

park facilities to the current footprint.

ROD -9. Thus, contrary to the impression that was given by the Revised Merced River

Plan/SEIS that was presented for public review, under the interim limits, new construction

may occur outside of existing developed spaces.

Defendants assert that the Administrative Record demonstrates that most interim

facility limits are set below the facility levels that existed in 1980, before the river was

designated under WSRA. They argue that, if the status of the river’s ORV’s was sufficient for

eligibility in 1987 when Yosemite Valley had many more parking spaces, campsites, and

lodging room than it does now, Plaintiffs cannot argue that the currently lower facility levels

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are degrading ORVs. The court rejects this argument. Defendants have provided no authority

for the presumption that facility levels in existence at the time that the Merced River was

designated under the Wild and Scenic River Act are protective of the ORVs, or, as Plaintiffs

argue, that such levels are otherwise grandfathered in. Defendants have pointed to nothing in

WSRA which provides that maintaining facility levels that existed at the time a river is

designated under WSRA satisfies the user capacity component of the required comprehensive

management plan. The court finds, therefore, that the interim limits are defective for the

same reason that the Ninth Circuit found the 2000 MRP to be invalid: they do not describe an

actual level of visitor use that will not adversely impact the Merced’s ORVs. 

As Plaintiffs repeatedly and correctly argue, the VERP program in the 2005 Revised

Plan is reactive. Defendants consistently sidestep the fact that without a user capacity

program that states an actual level of visitor use that will not adversely impact ORVs, the

VERP program is a reactionary tool to try to stop degradation that has already occurred. The

requirement for specific measurable limits on use is to prevent degradation, not to respond

after it has happened. The court finds that the VERP program, the primary user capacity

program in the 2005 Revised Plan, does not contain such specific measurable limits on use,

and so is not oriented towards preventing degradation. 

What NPS has created in the VERP portion of the user capacity program in the 2005

Revised Plan is a tentative plan of uncertain duration which adopts temporary limits, which

will apply for an unknown length of time. Defendants provide no authority for the concept

that such an arrangement can constitute an approach to user capacity that is valid under

WSRA. 

For all of the above reasons, the court concludes that the VERP program in the 

2005 Revised Plan is inadequate to constitute the primary feature of a user capacity program

that must “describe an actual level of visitor use that will not adversely impact the Merced’s

ORVs.” This court finds, therefore, that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their

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claim that Defendants have abused their discretion by failing to adopt a user capacity program

in compliance with WSRA and the order of the Ninth Circuit. 

El Portal Boundaries

The Ninth Circuit found that [t]he NPS violated the WSRA by drawing the boundaries

at the Merced’s El Portal administrative site too narrowly.” Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348

F.3d at 797. The court defined the burden on NPS in regard to the designation of boundaries

under WSRA as follows: “Boundaries set within the WSRA’s acreage requirement, regardless

of where such boundaries fall within the statutory range, must be drawn so as to protect and

enhance the ORVs causing that area to be included within the WSRS.” Id. at 799.

In regard to the El Portal boundaries, Defendants explain that they have redrawn the

boundaries for the El Portal segment of the Merced River to one-quarter mile on each side of

the river, the maximum allowed by WSRA. Defendants claim that the expanded boundary

was based upon mapping of the ORVs, wetlands mapping, and vegetation mapping, and

cultural landscape evaluation.

In response, Plaintiffs contend that because of management zoning, the new El Portal

boundaries do not protect and enhance ORVs. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the

management zoning for the El Portal segment established in the 2005 Revised Plan is not

based on available scientific data about the location of the ORVs. 

A large portion of the El Portal segment is zoned as 2C or 3C, and Plaintiffs argue that

the very definition of these zones belies the contention that they will protect sensitive ORVs. 

Category 3C zoning is described as “Park Operations and Administration” and allows impacts

and development for those purposes. AR 18179; 2005 Revised Plan, II-29 (3C areas

“managed with high tolerance for resource impacts in localized areas”). 2C zoning is for day

use and “is intended to be applied to popular park destinations, where visitors could spend

significant periods of time enjoying park resources in a relatively accessible setting.” AR

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18097. Plaintiffs argue that there is no explanation, grounded in sound data or science, of how

the ORVs will be protected or enhanced within this scheme of zoning. 

In regard to biological ORVs, Plaintiffs claim that NPS has zoned as 3C many areas

within the river boundary which contain sensitive biological ORVs. These include sensitive

and rare plant species, and animal species. Plaintiffs also claim that there are at least two

wetlands that are zoned 3C in El Portal and argue that the possible loss or degradation of these

wetlands resulting from this zoning will contribute to the already considerable loss of

wetlands along the Merced River. Plaintiffs further claim that 3C zoning will adversely affect

oak woodland habitat and species which use that habitat. 

 Plaintiffs contend that cultural ORVs will be adversely affected by the management

zoning within the new El Portal boundaries. These are generally archeological sites related to

native Americans. They claim that the 2005 Revised Plan does not account for past

degradation to cultural ORVs in El Portal and fails to explain with supporting evidence how

they will be enhanced and protected from further degradation. Rather, they argue, most

cultural resources are zoned 3C, which will allow for more degradation. 

Finally, Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ claim that the hydrologic ORV is not affected

by management zoning or boundary decisions. Plaintiffs argue that the Merced River’s

natural hydrologic processes have been and will continue to be affected by NPS actions

directly allowed in the 2005 Revised Plan. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that a great deal of

riprap revetment currently restricts the free flow of the Merced River in the El Portal segment

and the 2005 Revised Plan allows still more, so as to protect new infrastructure. They assert

that riparian habitat and its associated ORV species are dependent on beneficial effects of

natural seasonal flooding. 

In response, Defendants make two arguments. First, they assert that the ORVs of

concern to Plaintiffs will be protected regardless of the type of management zone in which

they are found. 2005 Revised Plan, V-221 (“[t]he National Park Service would be required to

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 It provides as follows: 8

The Outstandingly Remarkable Values identified within the El Portal segment of the river

corridor include: scientific, geologic process/conditions, recreation, biological, cultural,

38

protect and enhance ORVs in this segment in accordance with the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act

in future planning efforts”). They explain that information will be gathered through the VERP

process and that no action will be taken without planning consistent with the management

elements and criteria development in the 2005 Revised Plan. The 2005 ROD provides in part

as follows:

It should be noted that not all of the areas within the river corridor that are zoned for

Park Operations and Administration (3C) would be developed to the maximum

capacity allowed under this zoning designation, and some open spaces would continue

to exist in this zone. Any proposed future development in 3 C zones would follow a

prudent planning process and would be consistent with the other management elements

and criteria adopted in the Merced River Plan, as amended, as well as the requirements

of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.

AR 6575, ROD at 8. 

Second, Defendants address the separate ORVs discussed by Plaintiffs, and argue that

they examined extensive information regarding each of these ORVs when developing the

management zones for the El Portal segment. Defendants provide numerous citations to

portions of the administrative record which provide information regarding ORVs. In

response, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ citations to the documents in the record are

unpersuasive, because Defendants provide no explanation of how those documents were used

or relied upon in developing the management zoning. 

As Plaintiffs note, the 2005 Revised Plan provides that, “[the relationship between the

revised zoning for the El Portal segment and Outstandingly Remarkable Values is provided in

Chapter III, Alternatives in this document.” Revised Plan, 11-30. Plaintiffs argue that

Chapter III does not provide any explanation of the relationship between the location of ORVs

and management zoning. Page III -26 does contain a discussion of the relationship between

ORVs in general and the management zoning. It does not, however, provide a discussion of 8

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hydrologic processes. The scientific Outstandingly Remarkable Values, though not

directly enhanced by the boundary and management zoning prescriptions under

Alternative 2, would be enhanced by information gained through the VERP program, as a

comprehensive monitoring program of indicators and standards is a component of this

alternative. As mentioned in Alternative 1, both the geologic process/conditions and the

hydrologic processes Outstandingly Remarkable Values are not sensitive to the boundary

and management zones prescriptions proposed in Alternative 2. The recreation

Outstandingly Remarkable Values within the El Portal segment are protected under

Alternative 2, as the location of these Outstandingly Remarkable Values are primarily

found within the River Protection Overlay and contains both Open Space (2A) and Day

Use (2C) Zoning. The extent of the biological Outstandingly Remarkable Values found

within a quarter-mile of the river corridor are protected under Alternative 2 through Open

Space (2A), Day Use (2C), and Park Operations and Administration (3C) zoning. 

Similarly, the extent of cultural Outstandingly Remarkable Values within a quarter-mile

of the river corridor are protected primarily through Open Space (2A) and Park

Operations and Administration (3C) zoning, and most notably through Day Use (2C)

zoning.

The proposed management zoning scheme fulfills the legislative intent of the Wild and

Scenic Rivers Act. A subsidiary consideration is the legislative intent for the El Portal

Administrative Site, which was transferred to the National Park Service to be used for

operational purposes and to allow for the relocation of many park administrative and

support facilities from Yosemite Valley to El Portal. Outstandingly Remarkable Values

would be protected and enhanced during site planning and development within all

management zones. Protection of the Outstandingly Remarkable Values would be further

evaluated and documented in the El Portal Concept Plan, which will be initiated

following completion of this Revised Merced River Plan/SEIS. The El Portal Concept

Plan would re-evaluate the development proposed in the Yosemite Valley Plan for El

Portal, in light of the revised river corridor boundary and management zoning in the El

Portal area.

39

how the location of particular ORVs influenced the management zoning imposed by the 2005

Revised Plan. 

The court agrees with Plaintiffs that there is little meaningful explanation in the 2005

Revised Plan as to how the management zoning in the El Portal segment of the River was

influenced by the location of particular ORVs. The court finds, however, this must be

considered in light of the fact that the 2005 Revised Plan expands the boundary at the El

Portal administrative site to the maximum allowed under WSRA. Thus, the boundary itself

encompasses, and therefore protects, as large an area as possible. Further, NPS has repeatedly

acknowledged its duty to protect ORVs regardless of the management zoning imposed. For

example, in discussing the environmental consequences of Alternative 2, the 2005 Revised

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Plan expressly states that, “[a]ll ORVs must be protected on a segment-wide basis regardless

of the zoning designation or whether the resources are in or outside of the river corridor

boundary.” 2005 Revised Plan, V -180. Further, as Defendants explain, the 2005 Revised

Plan is a programmatic plan which does not authorize any specific development. 2005

Revised Plan, I -7 - 9. Any actual development in the El Portal segment would occur only

after site-specific planning for individual projects, which would include the protection of

ORVs. 2005 Revised Plan, 1 -24; III - 26. Defendants have provided extensive citations to

the administrative record regarding information NPS has gathered regarding the ORVs in the

El Portal segment, which is clearly applicable to such future planning efforts. 

This court cannot accept the extremely broad principle that NPS’ duty to protect and

enhance the ORVs of the Merced River results in a prohibition against all development in

areas that contain biological, cultural or hydrologic ORVs. The same duty to protect and

enhance the ORVs exists regardless of the management zoning in which they fall, thus the

mere designation of an area as a particular zone does not impact ORVs. Such impact can only

occur through actual projects undertaken within the zone, which could not proceed without

NPS first complying with WSRA and NEPA. For these reasons, the court finds that NPS has

complied with the requirement that the boundaries be drawn so as to protect and enhance the

ORVs, and did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner in setting the boundaries for the El

Portal administrative site in the 2005 Revised Plan, based upon the management zoning

imposed. Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication on this issue. 

General Management Plan

Plaintiffs contend in their second cause of action that Defendants have violated WSRA

by failing to amend the General Management Plan for the Park to be consistent with a valid

CMP. See 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(62)(A) (“Such revisions to the general management plan for

the park shall assure that no development or use of park lands shall be undertaken that is

inconsistent with the designation of such river segments.”). This contention stems from

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Plaintiffs’ main contention that the 2005 Revised Plan is invalid.

Defendants contend that they have revised the 1980 General Management Plan to

insure its consistency with the substantive provisions of the Merced River Plan. They state

that they have also removed any uncertainty as to the relationship between the two plans,

because the ROD for the 2005 Revised Plan expressly states that in the event of a conflict

between the two plans, the Merced River Plan will control. 

Because the court has found Plaintiffs’ substantive claims regarding the 2005 Revised

Plan to be meritorious, it must also find that Defendants have not amended the General

Management Plan for the Park to be consistent with a valid CMP. Plaintiffs are entitled to

summary adjudication on this issue.

NEPA

NPS issued an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the 2000 Merced River

Plan, and this court upheld the EIS, rejecting all of Plaintiffs’ NEPA claims. The Ninth

Circuit affirmed this outcome on appeal. Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 800 - 801.

Pursuant to this court’s order on remand, NPS has prepared a supplemental EIS (“SEIS”) that

includes potential impacts of the decisions in the 2005 Revised Plan regarding user capacity

and the El Portal river boundary. Plaintiffs now claim that the SEIS violates NEPA for three

reasons: 1) there is no true “no action” alternative; 2) it lacks a required reasonable range of

alternatives; and 3) it does not use high quality and accurate scientific analysis in developing

or evaluating the impacts of the alternatives.

In regard to their first claim that there is no true “no action” alternative, Plaintiffs

contend that the no action alternative improperly relies on the invalid 2000 MRP. Plaintiffs

argue that in terms of management direction in place at the time NPS prepared the 2005

Revised Plan, the no action alternative should have included the 1980 GMP, but should not

have included either the 2000 Merced River Plan, which the Ninth Circuit held was illegal, or

the Yosemite Valley Plan, which they claim relied upon the 2000 MRP. Plaintiffs claim that

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the invalid 2000 MRP gave the green light to all of the development outlined in the Yosemite

Valley Plan, thereby illegally predetermining user capacity. Thus, Plaintiffs conclude, in order

to fairly and properly evaluate alternatives to user capacity, those pre-determinations cannot

act as the baseline.

Plaintiffs also argue that in assessing the baseline status of the ORVs for the no action

alternative, the 2005 Revised Plan should have taken into account all of the individual and

cumulative effects from projects NPS has conducted in the last five years. They claim that

NPS had a duty to bring forward relevant information about current Merced River conditions

and the status of the resources and ORVs. Although Defendants argue in response that the

Yosemite Valley Plan projects that have been implemented are part of the environmental

baseline for no action purposes, Plaintiffs claim that the no action alternative does not

collectively discuss the impacts of past, present and reasonably foreseeable future projects in

combination with the proposed action.

Defendants contend that in drafting the no action alternative, they relied on the

regulations implementing NEPA, which provide in part as follows regarding a situation where

an agency seeks to update a land management plan and where ongoing programs implemented

by the agency will continue:

in these cases, ‘no action’ is ‘no change’ from current management direction or level

of management intensity. To construct an alternative based on no management at all

would be a useless academic exercise. Therefore, the ‘no action’ alternative may be

thought of in terms of continuing with the present course of action until that action is

changed.

46 Fed.Reg. 18026 - 18027 (March 23, 1981). Defendants explain that the no action

alternative for the 2005 Revised Plan is based on the 1980 General Management Plan and

other existing park plans and guidelines, such as those for wilderness management, fire

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management, vegetation management, etc. They argue that the no action alternative also

includes “selected elements from” the 2000 MRP, including the River Protection Overlay,

Management Zoning outside El Portal, Outstandingly Remarkable Values, river classifications

and river boundaries outside El Portal, which Plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged in the

litigation over the 2000 MRP. Defendants claim that NPS properly considers these elements

to be valid tools to further the mandate of the WSRA, and that NPS properly included these

elements in the no action alternative.

Plaintiffs suggest a no action alternative which is “the status quo without a CMP in

place and without the Yosemite Valley Plan and its proposed developments.” Defendants

argue that this proposal is completely untenable and contrary to the CEQ regulations. They

claim that many Yosemite Valley Plan projects have been implemented, and it would be

impossible and contrary to NEPA to pretend that they are not part of the status quo.

In regard to the Yosemite Valley Plan, as Defendants note, this court previously

rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the 2000 MRP was improperly driven by that plan. However,

that is not Plaintiffs’ current argument. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the 2000 MRP approved 

projects in the Yosemite Valley Plan, which, when implemented, had the effect of

predetermining user capacity. Because the Ninth Circuit eventually held the 2000 MRP to be

invalid, Plaintiffs claim that it, combined with the Yosemite Valley Plan, illegally

predetermined user capacity. Plaintiffs cite as an example NPS’ current calculation of the no

action “baseline” for existing facilities such as parking places, based on the assumption that

the 2000 MRP is a valid baseline.

The court agrees with Defendants that it would be contrary to NEPA to pretend that the

various projects which have already been implemented under the Yosemite Valley Plan are

not now part of the status quo. However, the court also agrees with Plaintiffs that because the

Ninth Circuit held the 2000 MRP to be illegal, NPS cannot properly include elements from

that plan in the no action alternative as the status quo. The issue is not, as Defendants argue,

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whether Plaintiffs challenged those elements before the Ninth Circuit. The issue is that at the

time NPS was creating the no action alternative for the 2005 Revised Plan, the Ninth Circuit

had explicitly held the entire 2000 MRP to be invalid, and no comprehensive management

plan for the Merced River existed. The elements from the 2000 MRP which NPS includes as

the status quo had to be implemented, if at all, in the 2005 Revised Plan. It was thus improper 

for NPS to refer to those elements as part of the status quo at the time the no action alternative

was presented to the public. A no action alternative in an EIS is meaningless if it assumes the

existence of the very plan being proposed.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the SEIS violates NEPA in that it does not

include a valid no action alternative.

As their second claim of how the SEIS violates NEPA, Plaintiffs contend that the 2005

Revised Plan is unreasonably narrow, and fails to provide meaningful options in terms of a

permanent user capacity, or even an interim capacity. Every alternative in the 2005 Revised

Plan uses VERP to address user capacity, with the interim limit set for five years during the

time VERP is being finalized. Plaintiffs argue that the fact that every alternative has an

“interim capacity limit” is further evidence that VERP was the only alternative considered. 

Plaintiffs argue that because all action alternatives result in the exact same user capacity after

five years, the Park Service has violated its duty to consider alternative courses of action

pursuant to NEPA. Plaintiffs suggest as an example that had NPS considered an alternative

that used a quota system in the Merced River corridor, similar to the quota system used in

wilderness areas, NPS would not have needed an interim capacity limit, because a permanent

capacity limit would been established in this plan. 

In regard to the interim limits, Plaintiffs argue that they are almost identical in all the

alternatives. Plaintiffs assert that there is no evidence in the record that any of the interim

limits are linked to protecting the Merced River ORVs.

Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ claim that the Revised Plan and SEIS failed to evaluate

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a reasonable range of alternatives. Defendants acknowledge that each of the three action

alternatives shared similarities, such as the VERP framework and the Wilderness Trailhead

Quota System, but argue that they vary in other ways. 

This court has previously described the NEPA process in its March 2002 opinion.

Friends of Yosemite Valley, 194 F.Supp.2d at 1116-17:

The alternative section is “the heart of the environmental impact statement,”40 C.F.R.

§ 1502.14; hence, “[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an

environmental impact statement inadequate.” Citizens for a Better Henderson v.

Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.1985). While the practicalities of the requirement

are difficult to define, NEPA provides that all agencies of the Federal Government

shall, to the fullest extent possible, “[s]tudy, develop, and describe appropriate

alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves

unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.” 42 U.S.C. §

4332(2)(E). Whether a particular EIS has met this demand can best be determined by

its purpose, which is to “ensure[ ] that federal agencies have sufficiently detailed

information to decide whether to proceed with an action in light of potential

environmental consequences, and [to] provide[ ] the public with information on the

environmental impact of a proposed action and encourage[ ] public participation in the

development of that information.” Kunzman, 817 F.2d at 492; see also Citizens for a

Better Henderson, 768 F.2d at 1056.

As a result, an agency must look at every reasonable alternative, with the range

dictated by the ‘nature and scope of the proposed action,’ Block, 690 F.2d at 761, and

“sufficient to permit a reasoned choice.” Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional

Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir.1987), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Robertson

v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351

(1989).

In City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 123 F.3d 1142,

1145 (9th Cir.1997) the court further explained as follows:

An Environmental Impact Statement must discuss “reasonable alternatives” to

the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii); Alaska Wilderness

Recreation v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 729 (9th Cir.1995); see 40 C.F.R. §

1502.14 (consideration of alternatives “is the heart of the environmental impact

statement.”). The “rule of reason” guides both the choice of alternatives as well

as the extent to which the Environmental Impact Statement must discuss each

alternative. Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195

(D.C.Cir.1991) (quoting State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 475

(D.C.Cir.1978)). The Environmental Impact Statement need not consider an

infinite range of alternatives, only reasonable or feasible ones. 40 C.F.R. §

1502.14(a)-(c). [FN10]

FN10. Title 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) requires that an Environmental Impact

Statement:

Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for

alternatives which were eliminated from the detailed study, briefly discuss the

reasons for their having been eliminated.

Project alternatives derive from an Environmental Impact Statement's “Purpose

and Need” section, which briefly defines “the underlying purpose and need to

which the agency is responding in proposing the alternatives including the

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proposed action.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13. The stated goal of a project necessarily

dictates the range of “reasonable” alternatives and an agency cannot define its

objectives in unreasonably narrow terms. See Citizens Against Burlington, 938

F.2d at 196.

The court’s review of the administrative record reveals that all of the action

alternatives utilize VERP to address user capacity. Alternative 2, the preferred alternative

eventually adopted, has interim limits restricting the number of lodging rooms, day visitor

parking spaces, bus parking spaces, tour buses, employee bed spaces, and campsites. As

Plaintiffs note, however, these are no different than the limits identified for the no action

alternative and Alternative 3. It also appears that Alternative 4's limits are based on existing

capacities, and therefore would be the same as for Alternative 2. Thus, these numerical limits

are essentially the same for all the alternatives.

Additional annual visitation limits are also imposed by Alternatives 3 and 4. 

Alternative 3 imposes an annual visitation limit of 5.32 million visitors, and each river

segment has its own daily visitor cap. Alternative 4 has an annual visitation limit of 3.27

million visitors, and also has management zone caps. Although referred to by the NPS as

“caps,” these annual visitor limits could be altered if it is deemed appropriate by the NPS. 

Final Revised Merced Plan/SEIS, III - 31; IV-43. Thus, as Plaintiffs argue, there is nothing

permanent about these plans. Alternative 4's annual numeric limit reduces visitor use by 3.4

percent from the 2004 level of 3.27 million people per year. The basis for this limit is the

number of people visiting the Merced River corridor in 1987, the year the river was designated

under WSRA. As stated above, however, there is no presumption that levels at that time were

protective of the ORVs.

In light of these facts and the court’s conclusion, explained above, that the VERP

program in the 2005 Revised Plan is inadequate to constitute the primary feature of a user

capacity program as required by WSRA, this court must conclude that a EIS in which all

alternatives are based on VERP program presents an inadequate range of alternatives under

NEPA.

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Plaintiffs’ third NEPA claim relates to the adequacy of the scientific information and

data that supports the 2005 Revised Plan and SEIS. They claim that the decisions and

environmental analyses in the 2005 Revised Plan and SEIS are not based on either highquality information or accurate scientific analysis about the location and condition of ORVs. 

They further claim that the 2005 Revised Plan fails to provide analysis of how the goal of

protecting ORVs is achieved in light of the ongoing and foreseeable impacts to ORVs.

In response, Defendants claim that the premise for this claim is based on cases that

address project-level EIS’s, not programmatic EIS’s such as the 2005 Revised Plan. They

argue that the Ninth Circuit previously rejected this argument, and held as follows: 

Applying the principles of the WSRA and NEPA, we conclude that the NPS did not

abuse its discretion in preparing the CMP as a programmatic document, and that the

CMP's EIS contains sufficiently specific data and information for such a purpose. We

agree with the NPS that it must "prepare appropriate environmental review ( [pursuant

to the] National Environmental Policy Act, National Historic Preservation Act, and

other relevant legislation) for ... future actions" guided by the CMP, and anticipate that

such review will include, where appropriate, data-gathering and analysis of systemwide impacts.

Friends of Yosemite Valley, 348 F.3d at 801. Defendants claim that as was true with the 2000

Merced River Plan, the 2005 Revised Plan is a programmatic document that, by itself, makes

no commitment of any specific resources. They assert that no project-level decisions have

been made in the 2005 Revised Plan, and that before specific projects are pursued, they will be

evaluated for compliance with the 2005 Revised Plan and many will have to undergo sitespecific NEPA evaluation. Furthermore, Defendants assert, the information used in the 2005

Revised Plan and SEIS greatly exceeds the minimum statutory requirements of NEPA and

WSRA.

In response, Plaintiffs repeat their claim that under the Ninth Circuit’s order, this plan

must set limits on use. Friends of Yosemite, 348 F.3d at 797, 799. They argue that the 2005

Revised Plan and ROD expressly allow for visitor use in the Merced River corridor, and, that

allowing use is a commitment of resources. Plaintiffs also note that Defendants, in relying on

the language quoted above, omit the earlier language from the same opinion in which the

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Ninth Circuit states, “With the exception of the user capacities and river boundaries discussed

above, the CMP was prepared with sufficiently specific data and information to satisfy 

§ 1281(a)'s goal of protecting and enhancing ORVs.” Friends of Yosemite, 348 F.3d at 799

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs stress that the 2005 Revised Plan’s decision to allow existing

uses to continue will not be reevaluated in a subsequent environmental analysis. 

This court has already addressed the user capacity program of the 2005 Revised Plan,

finding it to be invalid. Any further discussion regarding the sufficiency of the data

supporting that program is moot. Similarly, this court has already addressed the El Portal

boundaries, finding the designation to be valid. As stated above, the court declines to address

any claims relating to issues not included within the 2005 Revised Plan and covered only by

the invalid 2000 MRP. Accordingly, the court declines to address the sufficiency of the

scientific information supporting the management zoning outside of the El Portal segment. 

Neither party is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

Administrative Procedures Act

In their first supplemental complaint, Plaintiffs allege as their fifth cause of action

various violations of the Administrative Procedure Act. These alleged violations are simply

reiterations of Plaintiffs’ other causes of action, restating the allegations regarding WSRA and

NEPA violations as APA violations. As discussed above, the APA sets forth the standard of

review regarding final agency actions, providing that the reviewing court shall hold unlawful

and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

ORDER

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Defendants’ request that the court dismiss this case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is DENIED;

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2) Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ four declarations and their supporting exhibits

is DENIED;

3) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is partially GRANTED as to their first cause

of action for violation of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act based on the finding that

NPS failed to adopt a single, self-contained comprehensive management plan for the

Merced River;

4) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is partially GRANTED as to their first cause

of action for violation of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act based on the finding that

NPS failed to adopt a valid user capacity program for the Merced River;

5) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is partially DENIED and Defendants’ motion

is partially GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for violation of the Wild

and Scenic Rivers Act based on the finding that NPS did not abuse its discretion or

otherwise violate WSRA in establishing the boundaries for the El Portal segment;

6) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to their second cause of

action for violation of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act for failure to amend the General

Management Plan to be consistent with a valid CMP; 

7) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is partially GRANTED as to their third cause

of action for violation of the National Environmental Policy Act based on the finding

that the SEIS violates NEPA in that it does not include a valid no action alternative;

8) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is partially GRANTED as to their third cause

of action for violation of the National Environmental Policy Act based on the finding

that the SEIS violates NEPA in that it does not contain an adequate range of

alternatives;

9) Both parties’ motions for summary judgment are DENIED as to the fourth cause of

action for violation of the National Environmental Policy Act based on failure of NPS

to base its decisions on high quality scientific information and data;

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10) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to their fifth cause of action

alleging that Defendants have violated the APA by acted illegally and in violation of

WSRA and NEPA in adopting the 2005 Revised Plan;

11) A hearing on Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief will be set by separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:00-cv-06191-AWI-DLB Document 307 Filed 07/19/06 Page 50 of 50