Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02458/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02458-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY M. McCARTHY 

Petitioner,

 vs.

MATTHEW C. KRAMER, Warden, 

Respondent. /

No. C 04-2458 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. The

matter is submitted.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of arson of an inhabited structure. 

Petitioner was also convicted of one count of presenting a false and fraudulent insurance

claim. The trial court sentenced petitioner to seventeen years in state prison. As grounds

for habeas relief petitioner asserts that: (1) his due process rights were violated by

admission of evidence of his threats to his wife and her lawyer; (2) his free speech and due

process rights were violated by admission of certain evidence of various books he

possessed; (3) his Confrontation Clause and due process rights were violated by admission

of certain evidence from petitioner’s former girlfriend and his nephew, and by the trial

court’s limits on his cross-examination of them; (4) his due process and jury trial rights were

violated by the trial court’s refusal to explicitly instruct the jury that in evaluating credibility it

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could consider whether a witness was testifying under a grant of immunity; (5) his due

process rights were violated by the trial court’s jury instruction defining “reasonable doubt;”

(6) his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s giving CALJIC 17.41.1, which

instructs the jurors to report if any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention not

to follow the law or to decide the case on any improper basis; (7) his trial counsel was

ineffective in specified ways; and (8) the above “errors” cumulatively denied petitioner a fair

trial. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are excerpted from the opinion

of the California Court of Appeal: 

Prosecution Case: Studio Fire/Insurance Fraud

In 1991, defendant assumed the ownership of the Karate Studio

(Studio) and purchased a commercial building in Mountain View to house the

school. Defendant obtained a mortgage on the building from Silicon Valley

Bank. In December 1993, defendant stopped making the mortgage payments

and the bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. Despite the foreclosure, the

bank agreed to let the school remain in the building for another year.

In the fall of 1994, defendant had a falling out with one of the

instructors and the instructor quit the Studio. Shortly thereafter, nearly

one-half of the remaining instructors left, taking their students with them. 

More than one person testified that the Studio was not profitable because the

mortgage payments were too high.

In the fall of 1994, defendant's nephew, Michael McCarthy, Jr.,

(Michael) worked at the Studio. At the time, he owed defendant $4,000 on a

vehicle defendant had purchased for him. In November 1994, defendant

started joking with Michael about burning down the Studio. What started as a

joke became more serious. Toward the end of November 1994, defendant

offered to forgive Michael's debt if Michael would burn down the Studio. . . . 

Michael was tempted by defendant's offer. Michael, a recovering

alcoholic/drug addict, discussed the offer with his Alcoholics Anonymous

sponsor. After talking with his sponsor, Michael decided to refuse defendant's

offer. However, he agreed to defendant's request that their conversations

regarding the offer remain confidential.

On December 24, 1994, defendant told the karate instructors at the

Studio to remove their belongings from the locker room so that it could be

cleaned. He also told Michael not to visit the Studio during the holiday break.

On January 1, 1995, instructors who attempted to work out at the Studio

discovered that the locks had been changed. At the end of December 1994,

defendant removed several items of personal property from the Studio and

placed them in storage.

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At about 1:00 a.m. on January 2, 1995, a passerby saw smoke coming

from the Studio and called 911. The fire, which was confined to the center of

the building, was extinguished. The firefighters determined that the blaze was

intentionally set. Arson investigators found three incendiary devices, only one

of which had detonated. An investigation ensued and defendant became a

suspect.

. . . . 

In November 1995 the police suspended the investigation of the Studio

fire because they were unable to confirm a suspect.

On April 15, 1996, defendant filed a sworn statement with the Hartford

Insurance Company (the Hartford), claiming losses of $171,980.42 as a result

of the Studio fire. As of August 1996, the Hartford had paid defendant $2,947

for the restoration of art and furniture, $10,200 for undisputed business income loss, and $20,658.50 for undisputed personal property loss. In

December 1996, the Hartford paid defendant $48,500 in settlement of the

remaining disputed claims arising out of the fire. The Hartford paid a total of $82,305.50 to defendant. At trial, there was testimony that defendant had

overvalued the items in his insurance claim and that some of the items, which

defendant claimed were destroyed, were later seen on his property.

Prosecution Case: Danaher Fire

In the spring of 1996, defendant's wife, Kim McCarthy (Kim), decided

to file for divorce. Defendant was opposed to the divorce and tried to

dissuade Kim from hiring an attorney. About this time, defendant started a

romantic relationship with Robin Mann, a nurse who had just started law

school at Santa Clara University.

In July 1996, Kim retained James Danaher to represent her in the

divorce. Kim moved out of the couple's Portola Valley home. After Kim

moved out, Mann stayed with defendant every other week, when he did not

have custody of his children. According to Mann, defendant frustrated

Danaher's efforts to resolve the divorce by refusing to accept mail, turning off

his fax machine, and refusing to return telephone calls. Defendant viewed

Danaher as an obstacle to his efforts to obtain a favorable settlement of the

divorce action and told Mann that he really wanted to get rid of Danaher.

Defendant bragged to Mann that he had interviewed all of the divorce

attorneys in the area to create a conflict of interest so that Kim could not

obtain new counsel once Danaher was off the case.

In December 1996, defendant bought 30 books on incendiary devices,

timers, detonators, bypassing alarm systems, and other topics that he kept in

a box by his bed. According to Mann, defendant read the books all the time;

he bragged that he had read each one from cover to cover at least twice. 

One day, while discussing the divorce and Danaher, defendant told Mann that

"he could burn down his house or blow someone up." Defendant threatened

to "take care of" Danaher on two other occasions.

On two separate occasions in December 1997 and January 1998,

defendant attempted to run Kim's car off the road when he encountered her

near his home. On January 15, 1998, defendant told Danaher that he could

get rid of Danaher or Kim for $5,000. That same day, Danaher served

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defendant with a Notice of Unavailability, advising him that he would be out of

town on vacation from January 15, 1998, until February 1, 1998.

The Danahers had arranged for two young women to stay in the guest

quarters over their garage while they were away on vacation. The house

sitters' last night in the guest quarters was Thursday, January 29, 1998. One

of them returned Friday evening to feed the cat. Before she left, she checked

to make sure the doors to the house were locked and left the garage door

open two feet at the bottom so that the cat could enter, as instructed by the

Danahers. At various times on Friday, January 30, 1998 and Saturday,

January 31, 1998, two of Danaher's neighbors saw a distinctive red sports car

parked in Danaher's driveway. Both neighbors picked defendant's red

Mitsubishi out of a photo line-up.

Mann had invited defendant to dinner both Friday and Saturday nights,

January 30 and 31, 1998. Defendant was late both nights. He also spent

both nights at Mann's apartment, which was unusual. On Friday night,

defendant told Mann that he had been conducting "night maneuvers," which

he had described as doing "sneaky things."

At approximately 3:20 a.m. on February 1, 1998, the Danahers'

neighbors were awakened by noises and saw flames rising above the

Danahers' home. By the time firefighters arrived, the house was 85 to 90

percent engulfed in flames. The house was completely destroyed. At trial,

the parties' stipulated that the monetary loss from the fire exceeded $1

million. Arson investigators subsequently determined that the fire was started

by a timing device, which had been plugged into an electrical outlet in the

crawl space under the house. The timer was connected to an ignition device

by an extension cord. The ignition device, in turn, ignited a gas-soaked rag

sticking out of a gas can. The device used to start the Danaher fire was very

similar to the device that had been used to start the Studio fire. Because of

the similarities between the two devices, authorities reopened the

investigation into the Studio fire.

After the Danaher fire, Mann lied to police investigators about the times

that defendant arrived and left her apartment on the two days before the fire. 

In the weeks that followed the Danaher fire, defendant made several

statements to Mann that indicated that he was involved in the fire.

On February 27, 1998, Michael spoke with sheriff's deputies. He

denied any knowledge of either fire . . . . He did not tell them about

defendant's offer to forgive the debt if he burned down the Studio and told

investigators that defendant was not involved. Two days later, defendant

asked Michael whether he had set the Studio fire. Michael was shocked and

believed that defendant was going to frame him for the Studio fire. Michael

met with arson investigators on May 1, 1998. Once again, he denied knowing

anything about either fire and said that defendant was not involved. At trial,

he admitted that he lied to investigators on both occasions.

During the latter half of 1998, defendant's relationship with Mann

soured. On different occasions, he threatened to report her to her law school

for ethical violations, to hire someone to rape her, and to "come after her" if

he ever went to jail. Mann finally told investigators that on the two nights

before the fire, defendant had arrived at her apartment much later than she

had previously claimed and that he had left much earlier each of the following

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mornings. She also changed her story about the vehicle that defendant was

driving on the dates in question. She had previously told them it was a Jeep.

She later told them it was the red Mitsubishi. . . . 

In March 1999, Michael was subpoenaed to testify at defendant's

preliminary hearing. Michael did not want to lie under oath and retained an

attorney. His attorney negotiated an agreement with the district attorney that

provided that Michael would be immune from prosecution for his previous

false statements to investigators. Michael then told investigators about

defendant's offer . . . and statements defendant made to Michael about the

Studio fire and the investigation. 

Defense Case

Defendant testified and denied setting either fire or making a false

insurance claim. He disputed Kim's and Danaher's accounts of events that

occurred during the divorce. Defendant vigorously attacked Mann's

credibility. He presented evidence of her "mental and emotional instability,

and of bizarre and threatening behavior in which she engaged during the

course of their stormy on-again, off-again relationship." He also attacked

Michael's credibility. He had an explanation for almost all of the evidence that

was introduced by the prosecution.

Ex. C (opinion of Court of Appeal) at 2-7. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

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Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Default

Respondent contends that issue one through four are procedurally defaulted. The

California Court of Appeal held that error had not been preserved as to these issues

because petitioner’s lawyer’s objections at trial did not include the constitutional grounds. 

Ex. C (opinion of Court of Appeal) at 15, 21, 28, 34. The Ninth Circuit has recognized and

applied the California contemporaneous objection rule in affirming denial of a federal

petition on grounds of procedural default where there was a complete failure to object at

trial. Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Paulino v. Castro, 371

F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957-58 (9th Cir.

1999). Respondent, therefore, is correct that these issues are procedurally defaulted, and

because petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice, see

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Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991), the first four issues are barred. The

court will, however, alternatively consider the claims on the merits. 

B. Admission of Evidence of Verbal Threats and Threatening Conduct

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s admission of evidence of verbal threats and

threatening conduct towards his wife and her attorney during the divorce proceedings

violated his due process rights. 

The trial court found certain statements relevant, and therefore admissible under

California Evidence Code section 1101. The California Court of Appeal, relying on state

law, upheld the trial court’s decision. Ex. C at 8-15. It also held that the state and federal

due process claims were waived because they were not raised in the trial court, and

because petitioner had not provided any authority that admission of wrongful acts can

violate due process. Id. at 15-16.

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a

denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a

necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. 

Id.; Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). While adherence to state

evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is

certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state standards are violated; conversely,

state procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance processes that do not comport

with fundamental fairness. Id. (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)). The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is

whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). Only if there

are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission

violate due process. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

As to whether the admission of evidence of petitioner’s verbal threats and

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threatening conduct was so arbitrary or prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair, as the state appellate court stated, the evidence was not offered to prove petitioner’s

disposition to commit such acts, but instead, to prove “motive, intent, and the willful and

malicious nature of the act.” The evidence was relevant to support an essential element of

the arson charge, i.e., malice; therefore, there was a permissible inference the jury could

draw from the evidence. See id. The evidence also portrayed petitioner’s motive and

intent for the crimes, another permissible inference. See id. Accordingly, petitioner has

failed to show he was denied a fair trial. 

In the alternative, any error in admitting this evidence was harmless under Brecht. 

In order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of an evidentiary error, a petitioner must show

that the error was one of constitutional dimension and that it was not harmless under

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). He would have to show that the error had "'a

substantial and injurious effect' on the verdict.'" Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). In addition to the challenged evidence, there

was other evidence offered to prove petitioner’s negative response to the divorce:

Kim testified that defendant reacted angrily when she first told him she

wanted a divorce. He did not want a divorce and did not want her to see an

attorney. He begged her not to serve him personally and asked that he be

allowed to pick up the petition at her attorney's office. A couple of days later,

he filed his own petition and had her personally served at home while he

watched from the bushes. Kim also testified that defendant pressured her

repeatedly to settle the case without an attorney and told her, in a threatening

tone that she had "better settle," and that "he wouldn't go to court." When

Kim confronted him about having books on incendiary devices, he reassured

her that he would not harm her or their children, but said there were some

attorneys he "would like to take care of."

Danaher testified that he had difficulty communicating with defendant from the

time defendant started representing himself in the summer of 1997 until the

time of the fire. Danaher testified about a settlement meeting with defendant

in September 1997. Defendant angrily accused Danaher of prolonging the

case to collect more fees. When Danaher suggested defendant could sue

him, defendant responded: “I won't sue you, I will take care of you.” In

January 1998, Danaher met with defendant again to discuss settlement. At

that time, Danaher served defendant with an order to show cause regarding

several items of property that were at issue in the divorce. Danaher also

placed a lis pendens on three properties defendant owned until it was

determined whether they were part of the marital community. Defendant

wanted to sell one of the properties and was not happy about the lis pendens. 

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During this meeting, defendant stated that he had considered suicide, but

there were people he wanted to take care of first.

Ex. C at 8-9. Given this extensive evidence, it cannot be said that there is a reasonable

probability that the admission of the statements had a substantial and injurious effect on the

verdict. 

In contending that his due process rights were violated by admission of this evidence

petitioner relies in part on Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980). In Hicks the Supreme

Court held that it violated due process for the trial court to give a jury instruction based on

an invalid state law mandatory sentence provision. Id. at 345. Without any significant

analysis, the Court concluded that the question was not merely one of state procedural law. 

Id. at 346. Unlike Hicks, where there was state law error, in this case the state courts have

determined that there was no state law violation, and that determination is binding on this

court. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629

(1988). As a result, Hicks is irrelevant. 

As noted above, this claim is procedurally defaulted. Alternatively, there was no

constitutional violation for the reasons discussed above. The state courts’ rejection of this

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established United

States Supreme Court authority.

C. Admission of Evidence that Petitioner Possessed Books About Incendiary

Devices and Divorce Tactics

Petitioner argues that his free speech and due process rights were violated by the

trial court’s admission of evidence that books on incendiary devices were found during the

search of his residence. 

The trial court admitted the titles of ten of the thirty books actually found and held

that the only admissible portions of the contents would those which “would correlate to the

evidence found at either fire ... but only those portions of the books,’ subject to further

hearing.” Ex. C at 16. Relying on state law, the appellate court held that the titles of the

books were relevant to the issues of the case, that the restricted use of the book titles and

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content as evidence was unlikely to “inflame the jury,” and that any possible error regarding

the admission of these titles was harmless given the existing testimony of Kim and

petitioner’s ex-girlfriend, Mann. Id. at 18-21.

The court has held above that this claim is procedurally defaulted, but in addition will

consider it on the merits. 

1. First Amendment 

It does not violate a defendant’s First Amendment rights to use his or her reading

material as evidence. United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc) (plurality opinion). As an alternative ground to the procedural bar, therefore, the

court concludes that petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated. 

2. Due Process

Petitioner contends that admission of the titles and contents of the books violated

due process. Only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the

evidence can its admission violate due process. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d at

920. 

The books provided independent corroboration of Kim’s and Mann’s testimony about

petitioner’s possession and reading of the books and his intent to use the knowledge he

gained from them to burn Danahar’s house down. Therefore, there was a permissible

inference for the jury to draw from this evidence. And, as discussed above, petitioner’s

reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma is misplaced because there was no state law violation. 

Furthermore, any error was harmless because admission of the titles of ten books

and the content of one of the books, where two witnesses had already testified to his

possession of such books, could not have had a substantial and injurious effect on the

verdict under Brecht. 

As an alternative ground to the procedural bar, the court concludes that petitioner’s

constitutional rights were not violated. 

///

D. Evidentiary Rulings Regarding the Testimony of Mann and McCarthy Jr. 

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Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his rights to due process and

confrontation in two instances: 1) refusing to permit defense cross-examination of Mann

with evidence of a prior misdemeanor charge, and 2) refusing to permit Michael to be

impeached with his prior inconsistent statements. Petitioner also argues that the trial court

violated his right to due process in two additional instances: 1) allowing Mann to explain her

telephone messages to petitioner and 2) allowing Michael to testify to his opinion about

petitioner’s reasons for suggesting that Michael stay away from the karate studio on the

weekend of the fire. 

1. Exclusion of Evidence 

a. Criminal Charges Against Robin Mann

The state appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of

criminal charges filed against Mann arising out of an allegedly false emergency call she

made. Ex. C at 22. Mann called 911, identified herself as Kim, and reported that petitioner

had left a message on her answering machine threatening to commit suicide. Id. She was

charged with making a false report of an emergency, but the charges were dropped. Id. 

The trial court found the evidence “very slightly relevant” to the issue of Mann’s credibility

but excluded the evidence because it would be too time consuming to try the misdemeanor

false report case within the arson case. Id. at 23.

As to the constitutional issue, the court of appeal concluded that it had not been

preserved, as discussed above, and alternatively held that if it was preserved, it was

without merit because petitioner was not completely prevented from impeaching the

witnesses. Id. at 28-29.

Exclusion of evidence may violate a defendant’s constitutional rights even if the

exclusion is proper under state evidentiary rules. Murdoch v. Castro, 365 F.3d 699, 702

(9th Cir. 2004). In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the Supreme Court held

that the defendant was denied a fair trial when the state's evidentiary rules prevented him

from calling other witnesses who would have testified that the first witness made

inculpatory statements on the night of the crime. Similarly, in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

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683, 690-91 (1986), the Court held that the defendant's right to have a fair opportunity to

present a defense, whether rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause or

in the Sixth Amendment's confrontation or compulsory process clauses, is violated by a trial

court's exclusion of competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession

when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence. See also Rock v.

Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56-62 (1987) (holding unconstitutional Arkansas per se rule

excluding all hypnotically enhanced testimony). The Ninth Circuit has summarized the rule

as "states may not impede a defendants's right to put on a defense by imposing

mechanistic (Chambers) or arbitrary (Rock) rules of evidence." LaGrand v. Stewart, 133

F.3d 1253, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998). The rule is clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) and a proper basis for federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Greene v.

Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002) 

The right to present a defense is not absolute, however. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484

U.S. 400, 410 (1988). The accused's compulsory process rights may be limited by

evidentiary rules, see Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1983) (no violation

of compulsory process to prohibit evidence of third party identity because evidence

collateral and state interest in evidentiary rule overriding), and by the state's legitimate

interest in efficient trials, see United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1985) (no

compulsory process clause violation when trial court denied motion for continuance to

permit defense witness to testify because defendant made neither timely request for

witness production nor "eleventh hour" request on expedited basis). Nor does the Due

Process Clause guarantee the right to introduce all relevant evidence to present a defense. 

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996). The exclusion of evidence does not violate

the Due Process Clause unless “‘it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’” Id. at 43

(quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).

///

The question, then, is whether the exclusion here was “mechanistic” or “arbitrary.” 

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See LaGrand, 133 F.3d at 1266 (summarizing Supreme Court cases). Here, excluding

evidence of Mann’s prior misdemeanor charge was not a result of rigid application of

mechanistic or arbitrary rules of admissibility. The trial court believed that there was a

factual issue as to whether the 911 report was, in fact, false. While Mann admitted to using

Kim’s name, she maintained that petitioner had called her threatening suicide. Petitioner,

on the other hand, denied leaving such a message. Because presentation of this evidence

would have required the jury to determine whether the charges against Mann were true or

false, the trial court excluded the evidence on the premise that its probative value was

outweighed by the probability that its admission would “necessitate undue consumption of

time.” See Cal. Evid. Code § 352. This was not a mechanistic or arbitrary application of

the rule in that it required the court to conduct a balancing test, which it did. Furthermore,

petitioner’s reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma is misplaced as there was no state law violation. 

Even if the exclusion of the evidence did violate the Confrontation Clause or due

process, it was harmless under Brecht. The trial court’s ruling did not completely prevent

petitioner from presenting his defense that Mann should be disbelieved because she was

an unstable liar. During direct and cross-examination, Mann admitted she had repeatedly

lied to the police, RT 1300-21, had been handcuffed and placed in a patrol car during a

scuffle at petitioner’s doorstep, RT 1496-98, had attempted suicide, RT 1399, had assisted

petitioner in obtaining the addresses of his intended victim, RT 1380, and had engaged in

numerous other bad acts based on her unhealthy romantic attachment to petitioner. RT

1483-87. In light of this record, petitioner cannot successfully claim that the exclusion was

prejudicial. The exclusion of the evidence did not render the trial unfair, nor did it have a

substantial or injurious effect on the verdict. 

As discussed above, this claim is procedurally barred. Alternatively, there was no

constitutional violation and no prejudice. 

///

b. Michael McCarthy Jr.’s Prior Inconsistent Statement

The state appellate court concluded that it was a state law error to exclude Michael’s

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prior inconsistent statement, but found it to be a harmless error. Ex. C at 27-28. Evidence

that Michael had previously told officers that he did not think petitioner was the kind of

person who would start a fire was inconsistent with his testimony that petitioner had offered

to forgive a $4,000 debt if Michael burned down the Studio. Id. The state court held that

any error was harmless given that the prosecutor had Michael testify on direct examination

that he had lied to investigating officers. Id. This testimony is very similar to that which

petitioner would have brought in if petitioner’s counsel was permitted to ask his question. 

The essence of the prior inconsistent statement was already before the jury through direct

examination of Michael. 

The exclusion of the evidence did not render the trial unfair, nor did it have a

substantial and injurious effect on the verdict under Brecht. The prior inconsistent

statement was introduced during direct examination, giving petitioner the opportunity to

cross-examine Michael on the matter. Therefore, with the cross-examination and the

multiple admissions that Michael had lied to the police, it is not reasonably probable that a

result more favorable to petitioner would have been reached had petitioner inquired further

into this issue on cross.

Petitioner again relies on Hicks v. Oklahoma, but this time there was a state law

violation – sustaining the objection was error, the court of appeal held. However, 

erroneously sustaining an objection to testimony which did not differ much from evidence

already in the case is in no way comparable to the error in Hicks, where the court instructed

the jury, erroneously, that it was required to give the defendant a forty-year mandatory

sentence. See Hicks, 447 U.S. at 344-45. Even assuming for the sake of decision that

Hicks applies beyond the sensitive jury context, this claim does not rise to the level of a due

process violation. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 957-58 (1983) (mere errors of

state law are not the concern of this court, unless they rise for some other reason to the

level of a denial of rights protected by the United States Constitution). 

As discussed above, this claim is procedurally barred. Alternatively, there was no

constitutional violation and the exclusion was not prejudicial. 

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2. Admission of Evidence

a. Robin Mann’s Testimony About Petitioner’s Conduct

The state appellate court upheld the trial court’s admission of Mann’s testimony

regarding petitioner’s conduct with other women. Ex. C at 24-25. Mann had left a number

of angry and jealous voice-mail messages for petitioner, which petitioner introduced to

impeach Mann. Id. The trial court permitted Mann to explain one of the messages left for

petitioner. Id. Petitioner argued that it was a hearsay violation for Mann to testify that she

told petitioner he had “just made another enemy” because a mutual acquaintance told

Mann that petitioner was hitting on and annoying a number of the acquaintance’s female

friends. Id. The appellate court did not find the acquaintance’s statements to Mann to be a

hearsay violation because the statements were not admitted for truth of the matter

asserted, but to explain Mann’s use of the word “enemy” on her voice-mail message. Id. 

As stated above, the due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the

admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d at 1357; Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d at 990. Only if

there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its

admission violate due process. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d at 920. Petitioner

would have to show that the error had "'a substantial and injurious effect' on the verdict.'" 

Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d at 767 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 623).

In the instant case, petitioner had repeatedly questioned Mann about her voice mail

messages to him, RT 1328-42, and specifically asked Mann about messages concerning

her jealousy over his interactions with another woman during a party that both Mann and

petitioner attended. RT 1329-22, 1363, 1391-98, 1301, 1486-87. Petitioner suggested that

Mann’s jealousy had triggered her decision to speak with the authorities, as opposed to her

sense of moral obligation. RT 1309, 2991. Petitioner encouraged Mann to speak about the

reasons she had left specific messages about petitioner and his attentions to another

woman. RT 3004-06. Therefore, the purpose of the redirect examination pertaining to why

Mann used the word “enemy” in her message, a message that petitioner repeatedly

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referenced during cross examination, was to provide context for why Mann had left such a

message. RT 3029. Evidence that petitioner had been hitting on and annoying women did

not result in a fundamentally unfair trial. Even if error is found, however, no prejudice can

be shown in light of other testimony pointing to petitioner’s guilt, petitioner’s extensive

cross-examination of Mann regarding the taped messages, and his testimony that she was

a liar. Petitioner’s reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma is also misplaced as there is no state law

violation. 447 U.S. at 346.

As discussed above, this claim is procedurally barred. Alternatively, there was no

constitutional violation and the exclusion was not prejudicial. 

b. Michael McCarthy Jr.’s Testimony About Petitioner’s Statement

The trial court allowed Michael’s opinion testimony about the underlying meaning of

petitioner’s statement that Michael should not go to the Studio over the holidays. Ex. C at

25-27. When the prosecutor asked Michael if he asked petitioner why he should not go to

the Studio, Michael testified that he did not need an explanation because “it was implied

that the Karate Studio would be burning down, therefore it was not a good idea to be there

during the break.” Id. at 25-26. Although technically afoul of state evidentiary rules, the

appellate court found the error harmless. Id. at 26-27.

Michael’s statement explained his conduct at the time, namely, his failure to ask

petitioner why he should not go to the Studio during the break. Although a violation of state

law, the remainder of Michael’s testimony made clear that Michael’s opinion about why

petitioner told him to stay away was based solely on his own inferences and not on any

express statement by petitioner. This isolated statement, clearly labeled as the witness’s

inference, could not render the trial unfair. Finally, prejudice under Brecht cannot be shown

in light of petitioner’s extensive cross-examination of Michael, during which Michael

admitted to being a recovering alcoholic, being in debt to petitioner, and repeatedly lying to

and misleading the investigators after the studio fire. RT 2062-2097. And petitioner’s

reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma is also misplaced as there is no state law violation. Hicks,

447 U.S. at 346.

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As discussed above, this claim is procedurally barred. Alternatively, there was no

constitutional violation and the exclusion was not prejudicial. 

D. CALJIC No. 2.20

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by refusing to

modify CALJIC No. 2.20, the standard jury instruction listing factors that the jury is to

consider in assessing witness credibility, to include the phrase “whether the witness is

testifying under a grant of immunity.” The instruction did say that the jurors should consider

“anything that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the

testimony of the witness,” including the witness’s “bias, interest or other motive.” Ex. C at

29 n.7. The pattern instruction subsequently was modified to include the phrase petitioner

requested here. Id. at 33.

The state appellate court found that any state law error was harmless, given that the

jury was made well aware of the witness’s immunity through the prosecutor’s opening

statement, petitioner’s opening statement, the witness’s testimony, and petitioner’s closing

argument. Ex. C at 33-34. As to the constitutional claim, the court held that it was waived

because it was not raised as a basis for the objection, and that “even if the error had been

preserved, we do not see any violation of defendant’s due process rights.” Id. at 34.

A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110,

114 (9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that the defendant was deprived of

the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Whether a constitutional

violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the case and the overall

instructions given to the jury. Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The jury was told from the outset that Michael was testifying under a promise of

immunity. RT 144-45, 174-75. Michael testified about the immunity agreement in his direct

testimony. RT 2050-52 2054. He was extensively cross-examined about the immunity

agreement. RT 2095-96. Defense counsel argued that the immunity agreement

established Michael’s bias and motive to frame petitioner. RT 3890-97. The jury was

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clearly aware of the effect of the immunity agreement related to Michael’s testimony. 

CALJIC No. 2.20 provided that the jurors were “the sole judges of the believability of

a witness and the weight to be given the testimony of each witness,” and that the jurors

“may consider anything that has a tendency to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the

testimony of the witness, including but not limited to . . . [t]he existence or nonexistence of

bias, interest, or other motive.” RT 3657. Due process does not require the trial court to

instruct on the defendant’s precise theory of the case where other instructions adequately

cover that theory. Duckett, 67 F.3d at 743-46. CALJIC No. 2.20 sufficiently encompassed

the substance of petitioner’s theory that Michael had a reason to testify falsely by calling on

the jurors to consider Michael’s “bias, interest, or other motive” in assessing his

truthfulness. In short, the trial court’s refusal to give the altered instruction did not render

the trial fundamentally unfair, and thus did not violate due process. And as before,

petitioner’s reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma is misplaced as there was no state law violation. 

Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346.

As discussed above, this claim is procedurally barred by petitioner’s failure to assert

it in the trial court. Alternatively, there was no constitutional violation.

E. CALJIC No. 2.90

Petitioner argues that the standard definition of reasonable doubt in CALJIC No.

2.90 (Rev. 1994) failed to adequately guide the jury regarding the degree of certainty

necessary for a finding of guilt, resulting in a due process violation. Relying on California

precedent, the state appellate court upheld the 1994 revision of CALJIC No. 2.90 as

satisfying federal due process concerns. 

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the

Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them

to do so as a matter of course. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994). So long as

the trial court instructs the jury on the necessity that defendant's guilt be proven beyond a

reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be

used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. See id. The 1994 version of

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CALJIC 2.90 was upheld in Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1999).

(use of term "abiding conviction" in defining reasonable doubt is constitutionally sound). It

thus is clear that giving the instruction did not violate due process.

F. CALJIC No. 17.41.1

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by giving

CALJIC No. 17.41.1 and that such an instruction inhibits jury deliberation and invades jury

privacy. CALJIC No. 17.41.1 provides: 

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their

deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these instructions.

Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses

an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on [penalty or

punishment, or] any [other] improper basis, it is the obligation of the other

jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that there is no “clearly established United States

Supreme Court precedent” which establishes that an anti-nullification instruction such as

CALJIC No. 17.41.1 violates a constitutional right. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-56

(9th Cir. 2004). The court therefore held that a California appellate court’s rejection of a

challenge to 17.41.1 could not be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court authority. Id. at 956. 

The state appellate court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. 

G. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by

failing to raise the federal constitutional grounds for several of his claims, as discussed

above. Because this claim was exhausted by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in the Supreme Court of California and that court denied it without comment, there is no

state court discussion of it.

///

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner

must satisfy a two-prong test. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was

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deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing

professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Judicial

scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See id. at 689. Second, Petitioner must establish that he was

prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Id. at 694. 

This court has concluded above as to each of the unpreserved issues that there was

no constitutional violation; as a consequence, it would have been futile for counsel to have

argued constitutional grounds. Counsel was not ineffective in failing to do so. See Rupe v.

Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9t Cir. 1996) (“the failure to take a futile action can never be

deficient performance”); Juan v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (trial counsel

cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise meritless objections). For the same reason,

counsel’s failure to raise the constitutional grounds was not prejudicial.

The state appellate court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. 

H. Cumulative Error

Petitioner claims that the foregoing errors considered cumulatively warrant relief. 

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant

reversal, the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much

that his conviction must be overturned. Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir.

2003). But where there is no constitutional error, nothing can accumulate to the level of a

constitutional violation. Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Fuller v.

Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d at 1445. That is, less-thanconstitutional errors cannot be cumulated into constitutional error; cumulation applies to

prejudice, not to whether there was error. Because there are was no constitutional error

here, there is nothing to cumulate. This claim is without merit. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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