Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08051/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

)

 Plaintiff/Respondent, ) CR 05-1105 PCT JAT 

) CIV 08-8051 PCT JAT (MEA)

v. ) 

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Miguel Angel Mejia Vasquez, )

) 

Defendant/Movant. )

)

______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Mr. Miguel Angel Mejia Vasquez (“Movant”) is currently

confined at the United States prison at Ray Brook, New York,

pursuant to his conviction by the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona. On April 24, 2008, Movant filed a

pro se motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging his

conviction on one count of illegal reentry into the United

States. Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255 (“Response”) on July 11, 2008. Movant filed a reply to the

response on July 28, 2008. 

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Movant was apparently born in 1977 and entered the United

States with his parents at the age of six. 

2 The information provided by Movant indicates he had other state

court convictions for criminal damage in 1997 and trespass in 1995.

-2-

I Procedural History

Movant is a citizen of Mexico, who entered the United

States illegally as a minor child with his parents.1 In August

of 1997, Movant was convicted by an Arizona state court on one

count of possession of dangerous drugs. See Docket No. 120

(Movant’s memorandum of law in support of his section 2255

motion).2 Movant received a sentence of three years probation

pursuant to this conviction. Id. In March of 1998 Movant was

ordered removed from the United States. Id. In July of 1998

Movant’s probation regarding his state 1997 drug conviction was

revoked and Movant was sentenced to a term of two years

imprisonment pursuant to that conviction. Id. It appears

Movant was not removed from the United States pursuant to the

March order prior to the time that his supervised release was

revoked in his state criminal proceedings and he was again taken

into state custody in July. In February of 1999 the Arizona

Court of Appeals ordered that Movant be re-sentenced because

Movant could not be sentenced to a term of incarceration for

this offense. Id.

In 1999, pursuant to a guilty plea, Movant was

convicted by the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute methamphetamine. See United States v. Vasquez, et

al., 2:98 CR 000698 PHX JAT (Movant is defendant number 11), at

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Prior to being assigned to the Honorable James A. Teilborg the

1998 criminal case was assigned to the Honorable Roger Strand. 

4 Movant’s conviction for violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) &

846 made him removable and ineligible for relief from removal because

he was an alien who had committed an aggravated felony, i.e., a

federal drug trafficking crime. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)

& (2)(C)(i) (2005 & Supp. 2008).

5 Section 241(a)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) provides for

the reinstatement of removal orders against aliens who illegally

reenter the United States after having been removed or voluntarily

departed under an order of removal.

6 Additionally, in 2004 Movant’s father applied for an immigrant

visa for Movant, based on his own status as a United States citizen.

The application was granted in early 2008. Reply, Exh. at 4

(“Appendix 12”). However, the Notice of Action explicitly states that

Movant was not eligible to adjust his status and explicitly states

that the approval of the application did not function as a visa. Id.

-3-

Docket No. 153.3 Pursuant to this conviction, on February 9,

2000, Movant was sentenced to a term of 33 months imprisonment

followed by 60 months of supervised release, with credit for 448

days of pre-sentence incarceration. Id. at Docket No. 267. A

condition of the supervised release was that Movant not reenter

the United States without legal authorization. See Response,

Attach. at 137.4 On or about October 18, 2000, Movant was

released from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and began his

term of 60 months of supervised release. Id., Attach. at 137.

On May 10, 2000, Movant was ordered removed from the

United States to Mexico by an Immigration Judge pursuant to INA

section 241(a)(5), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).5 See

Response, Attach. at 111. Movant was deported from the United

States on or about October 21, 2000. Id., Attach. at 112.

Using an address in Lake Havasu City, Arizona, Movant

applied for a United States work visa on or about February 17,

2005. Reply, Exh. at 3 (“Appendix #11”).6 Movant was in the

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 Section 1326 provides that any alien who--

(1) has been ... deported, or removed or has departed the

United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or

removal is outstanding, and thereafter

(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in,

the United States, ...

shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than

2 years, or both.

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2005 & Supp. 2008). Subsection (b)(2) provides:

Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case

of any alien described in such subsection--

(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission

of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such

Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both...

-4-

custody of local authorities in Lake Havasu City, Arizona, on or

about August 20, 2005. Response, Attach. at 6. Movant was

retrieved from the Mohave County jail and taken into custody by

an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agent and

transported to Blythe, California. Id., Attach. at 5-6. Movant

was Mirandized in Spanish and then interviewed by an ICE agent.

Id., Attach. at 18-24. Movant told the agent he had most

recently entered the United States on or about August 15, 2005,

on foot, through the desert, accompanied by other immigrants.

Id., Attach. at 25. Movant further admitted he had not been

inspected by government officials when he reentered the United

States. Id., Attach. at 25. Movant also “readily” told the

ICE agent he had been previously removed from the United States.

Id., Attach. at 26.

On October 25, 2005, a grand jury indictment charged

Movant with one count of illegal reentry after deportation, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) as enhanced by subsection

(b)(2). See Reply, Exh. at 2.7 The indictment alleged that

Movant “entered and was found in” the United States after having

been previously removed from the United States and without

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-5-

having obtained the express consent of the Department of

Homeland Security to reenter. Id., Exh. at 2. On September 28,

2005, the government filed a charge that Movant had violated the

conditions of his release in his 1998 criminal matter. See

United States v. Vasquez, et al., 2:98 CR 000698 PHX JAT at

Docket No. 325.

Movant was appointed counsel and a jury trial was

conducted in May of 2006, which resulted in a conviction on the

charge stated in the 2005 indictment, i.e., illegal reentry

after deportation without authorization. Response, Attach. at

1-110. Movant’s counsel first argued to the Court that Movant

was entitled to an acquittal based on the “continual

surveillance” or “official restraint” doctrines. Id., Attach.

at 99-110. Movant testified at his trial and Movant testified

he thought he had permission to return to the United States.

Id., Attach. at 104. Movant testified he had not entered

through the desert but through a Border Patrol station at

Calexico on a date he did not recall. Id., Attach. at 107-08.

During Movant’s trial, defense counsel challenged the ICE

agents’ identification of Movant as being the person interviewed

on or about August 20, 2005, and asserted their Mirandizing and

questioning of Movant in Spanish was improper. Id., Attach. at

1-109.

At a sentencing hearing conducted October 10, 2006, the

Court noted that, based on Movant’s conviction for violation of

section 1326 as aggravated by subsection (b), and his prior

criminal conviction for a methamphetamine-trafficking crime, the

sentencing range for his conviction for violation of section

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 In 2005 Movant was convicted of disorderly conduct, charges

arising from an altercation with his brother. See Docket No. 121,

“Appendix 10."

-6-

1326 was 92 to 115 months. At the hearing Movant and his

counsel argued for a downward departure from the applicable

sentencing range. Movant told the Court he had reviewed the

presentence report and, after he was sentenced, Movant told the

Court he had only had two days to review the report. Id.,

Attach. at 130-31. 

Movant did not dispute the factual allegations in the

presentence report but objected to the characterization of

himself and his acts in the report. Id., Attach. at 114-33.

Movant told the Court he disliked his attorney and stated he had

“continually proclaimed [his] innocence.” Id., Attach. at 117.

Movant asserted his counsel had urged him to plead guilty and

that counsel was unwilling to listen to his explanations

regarding his “previous criminal acts.” Id., Attach. at 117.

Movant did not deny his prior convictions or removal as stated

in the presentence report but asserted that his previous

convictions were the result of “youth and to chemical usage” and

that he was not then violent or addicted to drugs. Id., Attach.

at 117-18.8 Movant alleged he had been “railroaded” with regard

to his previous removal. Id., Attach. at 119. Movant asserted

that statements in the presentence report were “accusations that

never went anywhere.” Id., Attach. at 118. Movant argued that

he did not deserve to be sentenced to a term of eight years

imprisonment based on “domestic disputes and driving

offenses...” Id., Attach at 119. 

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-7-

At the sentencing hearing, the government told the

Court Movant had been offered a “fast track” plea agreement

providing for a sentence of 46 to 57 months imprisonment and

that Movant had been offered another plea agreement providing

for a sentencing range of 51 to 63 months imprisonment. Id.,

Attach. at 123.

Movant was sentenced to a term of 92 months

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for violation of section

1326(a) as enhanced by subsection (b). Id., Attach. at 126 &

134-36. The Court noted Movant’s propensity to re-offend,

including the fact that his very-mitigated sentence in the 1998

matter pursuant to his plea agreement had not deterred him from

again violating the laws of the United States. Id., Attach. at

127-28. The Court also revoked Movant’s supervised release in

his 1998 case and sentenced him to a term of seven months

imprisonment pursuant to the violation of supervised release, to

be served consecutively to his 92 month sentence. Id., Attach.

at 127-29 & 140. 

Movant took a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentences to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and was

appointed counsel to represent him in his direct appeal.

Movant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ninth

Circuit in a decision issued March 3, 2008. See United States

v. Mejia Vasquez, 3:05 CR 1105 PCT JAT, Docket No. 118. Movant

asserts that, in his direct appeal, he alleged he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel, and that the indictment was

defective and that the government violated the Brady doctrine by

failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. See

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-8-

Section 2255 Motion at 2.

In its decision denying Movant’s direct appeal, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Movant’s contention that

the District Court erroneously denied his motion for an

acquittal and also erred by revoking his supervised release.

See United States v. Mejia Vasquez, 3:05 CR 1105 PCT JAT, Docket

No. 118. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Movant’s contention

that the Court “made various errors in calculating his

sentence,” including adding criminal history points for a 1997

state criminal conviction for a first-time drug offense. Id.

The Ninth Circuit also stated Movant had argued his prior state

conviction for criminal damage should not have been used to

increase his criminal history. Id. Additionally, Movant argued

to the Ninth Circuit that the District Court erred by not

according Movant two levels of sentencing credit for his

“acceptance of responsibility.” Id.

In this section 2255 action Movant asserts he is

entitled to relief from his conviction and sentence because he

was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Movant also contends the government presented false and

misleading evidence to the grand jury, in violation of his right

to due process and a fair trial. Movant contends that the grand

jury should have been informed that a prior state conviction had

been vacated. Movant alleges the indictment was defective

because it did not list aggravating sentencing factors on the

indictment. Additionally, Movant asserts he is entitled to

habeas relief because the government failed to provide

exculpatory material to defense counsel, i.e., that Movant’s

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-9-

state court conviction had been vacated. 

II Discussion

“Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not

be allowed to do service for an appeal.” Bousley v. United

States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998).

Accordingly, section 2255 relief is precluded on any claim that

was raised and decided in the movant’s direct appeal. See,

e.g., United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir.

2000); United States v. Scrivner, 189 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir.

1999). Additionally, absent a showing of cause and prejudice,

a federal habeas petitioner procedurally defaults all claims

which are not raised in his direct appeal, other than claims

asserting the petitioner was deprived of the effective

assistance of counsel. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 167-68, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1594 (1982); United States v.

Ware, 416 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993). “[T]o obtain

collateral relief based on trial errors to which no

contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted defendant must

show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double procedural default,

and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he

complains.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68, 102 S. Ct. at 1594.

Movant asserts he raised his claims regarding an

alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland and the evidence

presented to the grand jury, in his direct appeal. If this were

so, relief on these claims would be precluded because they were

raised and decided in Movant’s direct appeal. See Hayes, 231

F.3d at 1139; Scrivner, 189 F.3d at 828.

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-10-

However, the opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals denying Movant’s direct appeal does not indicate that

Movant raised a Brady claim or a claim regarding the grand jury

proceedings in that court. To the extent any claim regarding

Brady or the grand jury process was not raised in Movant’s

direct appeal, such a claim has been procedurally defaulted.

Movant has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from, his

procedural default of these claims. Movant does not assert that

he is factually innocent of the crime of conviction, i.e., that

he did not reenter the United States without permission after

being previously deported, but instead argues that he is legally

innocent of the crimes as charged because, inter alia, his

sentence was predicated on a conviction he alleges was reversed

and because he had applied for permission to be in the United

States at the time he was “found in” the United States.

Therefore, to the extent any Brady or grand jury claim was not

presented in Movant’s direct appeal, section 2255 relief on the

claims is barred because Movant has not shown cause for his

procedural default of these claims or actual prejudice arising

from his default of these claims.

Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Claims of ineffective assistance of federal criminal

counsel are properly raised for the first time in a section 2255

action. See, e.g., United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 845

(9th Cir. 2003). To prevail on his claims, Movant must

establish both that his counsel’s performance was unreasonable

under the prevailing professional standards and the reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-11-

results of his criminal proceedings would have been different.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694-95, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 2068-69 (1984); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2001); United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th

Cir. 1996). Movant bears the burden of providing sufficient

evidence from which the Court can conclude his counsel was

ineffective. See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 878 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). To establish that counsel’s conduct

was unconstitutionally substandard, a section 2255 petitioner

must establish that no competent counsel would have acted as his

counsel acted, i.e., that his counsel’s acts were unreasonable.

United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2004);

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Movant must also establish that, but for counsel’s

error, the result of his trial would have been different. See

Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154. Because Movant must establish

prejudice arising from any error, counsel is per se not

ineffective if counsel “failed” to raise a meritless argument or

to pursue a meritless defense. See, e.g., Wilson v. Henry, 185

F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27

(9th Cir. 1994); Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 427-28 (9th

Cir. 1992); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th

Cir. 1982) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 Movant contends the indictment was defective because it alleged

a “prior drug conviction ... when the above Arizona conviction was

vacated by the Arizona State Court.” Section 2255 motion at 5. The

conviction was not reversed, the sentence imposed was reversed. See

Mejia v. Irwin, 195 Ariz. 270, 272, 987 P.2d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 1999)

(noting Movant’s plea agreement in that matter had resulted in the

dismissal of other charges, but that Movant stood convicted of

possession of dangerous drugs).

-12-

Movant contends his trial counsel was ineffective

because he failed to challenge the “defective” indictment.9

Movant also contends counsel was ineffective because he failed

to challenge the indictment on the basis that it did not include

“all enhancements” the government “planned to use...”, in

violation of Movant’s Fifth Amendment rights. Movant further

asserts counsel should have argued that Movant had not been

denied admission into the United States, but instead that Movant

had submitted an “application to reside in the United States” at

the time the indictment was issued. 

None of the acts ascribed to counsel can be deemed

unreasonable and, accordingly, counsel’s performance was not

deficient. The indictment, which alleged the elements of a

violation of section 1326 as aggravated by subsection (b),

satisfied the constitutional requirements for an indictment

alleging violation of this section. Almendarez-Torres v. United

States, 523 U.S. 224, 240, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1229 (1998) (holding

a subsection (b) aggravating factor need not be pled in the

indictment alleging violation of section 1326). Accordingly,

the indictment was not defective and counsel did not err by

failing to challenge the indictment. Nor has Movant established

that, had counsel challenged the indictment, the outcome of his

criminal proceedings would have been different.

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-13-

Additionally, counsel was not ineffective for arguing

that, at the time the indictment was issued in 2005, Movant’s

father, a United States citizen, had applied for a visa for

Movant as his adult child, nor was counsel ineffective for

“failing” to argue that Movant had applied for work visa prior

to the time that he entered the United States in 2005. Neither

application was “permission” from the Department of Homeland

Security to enter the United States or consent to Movant to

apply for lawful admission and, accordingly, counsel was not

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument nor can

Movant establish any prejudice thereby. See United States v.

Flores-Villar, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 3008975, at *6 (9th Cir.)

(holding violation of section 1326 is a general intent crime and

the defendant’s subjective belief that they had permission to

reenter was not a defense to the charge); Delgado v. Mukasey,

516 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2008). Movant’s subjective intent that

he believed he had received permission to reenter, which was

expressed to the jury, was not something the government was

required to prove nor was the jury required to find Movant not

guilty if it concluded he had applied for legal reentry prior to

the time he entered in August of 2005.

III Conclusion

Movant procedurally defaulted the claims stated in his

section 2255 petition except for his ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. Movant has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from, his procedural default of his claims.

Additionally, Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

must be denied because Movant has not established that his

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-14-

counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by

any alleged error of counsel.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Mejia Vasquez’

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-15-

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 8th day of August, 2008.

Case 3:08-cv-08051-JAT Document 4 Filed 08/11/08 Page 15 of 15