Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00359/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00359-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DARRELL SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. MOSS, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0359 KJN P 

ORDER

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). 

 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing 

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will 

direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 

and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly 

payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 

Case 2:15-cv-00359-KJN Document 4 Filed 02/24/15 Page 1 of 6
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These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2). 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 

However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 

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quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 

 Named as defendants are S. Moss and G. Matteson. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied 

due process during prison disciplinary proceedings. In particular, plaintiff alleges that the rules 

violation report was not served within the time frame set forth in the regulations. Attached as an 

exhibit to the complaint is a copy of the rules violation report. The report states that on October 

29, 2013, Correctional Officer Johnson found a bindle in plaintiff’s front right jacket. (ECF 1 at 

20.) The bindle was later determined to contain marijuana. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff was charged 

with possession of a controlled substance for distribution. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff was found guilty 

and assessed 180 days loss of behavioral credits, 10 days loss of “ASU” yard, 30 days loss of all 

packages and special privileges, one year loss of visits, etc. (Id. at 22.) As relief, plaintiff 

requests that his disciplinary conviction be overturned, visits be restored and that he receive 

compensation. 

 In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), an Indiana state prisoner brought a civil 

rights action under § 1983 for damages. Claiming that state and county officials violated his 

constitutional rights, he sought damages for improprieties in the investigation leading to his 

arrest, for the destruction of evidence, and for conduct during his trial (“illegal and unlawful voice 

identification procedure”). Convicted on voluntary manslaughter charges, and serving a fifteen 

year term, plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief or release from custody. The United States 

Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the complaint and held that: 

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, 

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has 

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance 

of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages 

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not 

been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983. 

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Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. 

In Heck, the Supreme Court expressly held that a cause of action for damages under § 

1983 concerning a criminal conviction or sentence cannot exist unless the conviction or sentence 

has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. Id. 

 In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court held that Heck applies to 

challenges to prison disciplinary hearings when the nature of the challenge to the procedures 

could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment. 

 Plaintiff’s claims challenge the validity of his prison disciplinary conviction. It does not 

appear that this disciplinary conviction has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. For that 

reason, plaintiff’s claim for money damages is barred by Heck. To the extent plaintiff seeks to 

simply overturn the disciplinary conviction, he must file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. While it does not appear that plaintiff can cure these pleading defects, in an 

abundance of caution plaintiff is granted leave to amend. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each 

named defendant is involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is 

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Id.; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. 

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original 

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

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original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. 

 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith. 

 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

 4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court: 

 a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and 

 b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of 

this action. 

Dated: February 24, 2015 

Sm359.14 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DARRELL SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. MOSS, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0359 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

 Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order 

filed______________. 

 _____________ Amended Complaint 

DATED: 

 ________________________________ 

 Plaintiff 

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