Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00144/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00144-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE H. KNOX,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-CV-00144-AWI-DLB P

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE

AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON COGNIZABLE EXCESSIVE

FORCE CLAIMS WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

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506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004)(“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at Kern Valley State Prison, where

plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. Plaintiff names former California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation DirectorJeanne Woodford, Warden Galaza; Captain Soto; Lieutenants Reynoso

and Garza; Sergeants Popper and Alvarez; Officers Pear, Morales, Reese, Navarro, Crisanto,

Reynaga, Wanagitis, Pelayo, Negrete and Hernandez; Medical Technical Assistants Parks, Fhemas,

and Sweeny; and Appeals Coordinator Gricewich as defendants. Plaintiff alleges defendants violated

his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment as well as California law.

Plaintiff is seeking money damages and injunctive relief. Because plaintiff is no longer incarcerated

at the prison at which the events giving rise to his claims occurred, plaintiff’s claims for injunctive

relief are moot and this action shall be treated as one for damages only. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d

1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991).

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1. Eighth Amendment Claims

a. Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiff alleges that on August 9, 2005, defendants Soto, Reynoso, Popper and Galaza

ordered officers to spray plaintiff with pepper spray without justifiable reason. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants Pear, Morales, Reese, Navarro, Crisanto, Reynaga, Wanagitis, Pelayo, Negrete and

Hernandez obeyed the orders and excessively sprayed plaintiff with pepper spray and thereafter

assaulted him. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain orrestore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

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it.” Id. 

Under federal notice pleading standards, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state claims

for the use of excessive force against defendants Soto, Reynoso, Popper, Galaza, Pear, Morales,

Reese, Navarro, Crisanto, Reynaga, Wanagitis, Pelayo, Negrete and Hernandez . Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 2003); Galbraith v. County

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). 

b. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that after he was pepper sprayed, defendants Parks, Fhemas and Sweeny

failed to ensure that plaintiff was decontaminated as required by medical procedures. A prisoner’s

claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless

(1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’”

and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391

F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the

official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”

Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the

risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the

risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Further, “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a section 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337,

1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff “must show that the course of

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that

they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v.

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McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).

The allegation that defendants failed to follow proper procedure in decontaminating plaintiff

does not support a claim for relief under section 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment. No

allegations have been made which support a claim that defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

2. Supervisory Liability Claims

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards

are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Although plaintiff names former Director Woodford and Sergeant Alvarez as defendants,

plaintiff has not alleged any facts that give rise to a claim for relief under section 1983 against them.

 3. Rules Violation

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Garza charged him with a false rules violation which resulted

in plaintiff being retained in administrative segregation for 91 days.

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

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law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.”

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in remaining free from ad-seg. Sandin, 515

U.S.at 484; Myron, 476 F.3d at 718; May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). Because

there is no protected liberty interest at stake, the alleged false rules violation report which resulted

in plaintiff’s retention in administrative segregation is not actionable under federal law.

4. Inmate Appeals

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Gricewich failed to properly process his inmate appeals.

These allegations also fail to state a cognizable claim under federal law. “[A prison] grievance

procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.”

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8,

10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)) (emphasis added); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003)

(no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Actions

in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983

action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

The actions of defendants in reviewing and resolving plaintiff’s inmate appeals do not

support any claims for relief under section 1983. Plaintiff’s attempt to impose liability on defendants

based on their involvement in responding to his appeals fails as a matter of law. 

C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint states a claim against defendants Soto, Reynoso, Popper, Galaza, Pear,

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Morales, Reese, Navarro, Crisanto, Reynaga, Wanagitis, Pelayo, Negrete and Hernandez for use of

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, plaintiff’s complaint does not state

any other claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The court will provide

plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and wishes to proceed on his

excessive force claims and state law claims only, plaintiff may so notify the court in writing. The

court will then issue Findings and Recommendations recommending that the remaining claims and

defendants be dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff summons and USM-285 forms

to fill out and return to the court. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will direct the United

States Marshal to initiate service of process on defendants.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

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b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint

and wishes to proceed only on his excessive force and state law claims; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 4, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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