Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01591/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01591-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Xavier Sanchez,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Arizona Board of Regents, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-15-01591-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Arizona Board of Regents (“ABOR”), et al. 

(hereafter “Defendants”)s’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 12). Following a hearing on 

Thursday, November 5, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff Xavier Sanchez’s motion for a 

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, (Doc. 13), concluding that the 

Court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Younger v. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The following order memorializes the Court’s ruling, and 

addresses Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I.

Plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief arises out of a disciplinary 

proceeding brought against Plaintiff by Arizona State University (“ASU”). Based on the 

Court’s understanding of the facts, a complaint was lodged with the Dean of Students, 

alleging that Plaintiff—a college student currently enrolled at ASU—had violated “three 

provisions of the ABOR Student Code of Conduct.” (Doc. 1 at 1). These alleged 

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violations stemmed from two separate incidents that occurred on September 19, and 

September 25, 2014. (Id. at 19). According to Arizona Board of Regents (“ABOR”) 

policy, “[a] disciplinary investigation may be initiated by submitting a written referral to 

the Dean of Students.” (Doc. 12-1 at 2). ASU’s Dean of Students, acting in conjunction 

with the Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities (“OSRR”), investigated the 

allegations, and Plaintiff was “notified . . . by letter” of the investigation on October 6, 

2014. Following the investigation, the Dean of Students found, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that Plaintiff’s conduct had violated three provisions of the ABOR Student 

Code of Conduct. (Doc. 1 at 19).

On October 29, 2014, Plaintiff was notified by OSRR that he would be subject to a 

disciplinary sanction in the form of a finite suspension.1(Doc. 1 at 19). On November 30, 

2014, Plaintiff filed a “timely written request for a hearing” to review the Dean’s findings 

and recommended sanction, which automatically stayed implementation of the 

suspension “pending the outcome of the [review] hearing.” (Doc. 12-1 at 5; ABOR 

Policy 5-403 § 12). ABOR policy establishes that when a student is found to have 

violated the Student Code of Conduct and faces disciplinary sanction in the form of 

suspension, expulsion, or degree revocation, he is entitled to a review by the University 

Hearing Board (“UHB”). (Doc. 12-1 at 5). The UHB is described as an “advisory” body 

“to the Vice President for Student Affairs, who will make the final decision” with respect 

to whether a violation of the Student Code of Conduct occurred, whether the student

should be sanctioned, and to what degree. (Id.).

The UHB hearing contains many of the hallmark characteristics of a judicial 

proceeding. Students may obtain legal counsel. ASU has a representative arguing on the 

University’s behalf.2 ASU, the complainant, and the accused may all offer opening 

statements, present witnesses for questioning, and proffer evidence on their own behalf. 

 

1

The record is unclear as to whether the Dean of Students or OSRR recommended 

the disciplinary sanction.

2

If either the accused or the complainant is represented by legal counsel, then 

ASU’s “University Representative” may also be legal counsel. (Doc. 12-1 at 7).

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(Doc. 12-1 at 7-8). Defendants acknowledge that the UHB reviews the findings of the 

Dean of Students and OSRR de novo and “[b]ased solely on upon the information 

presented during the hearing” determines whether a violation of the Student Code of 

Conduct occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at 9). The UHB will then 

“formulate a recommendation [for] the Vice President of Student Affairs.” The 

investigation phase and finding made by the Dean of Students as well as the UHB 

“review hearing” are referred to as “recommendation[s].” (Id.). No finding or disciplinary 

sanction is final until the Vice President for Student Affairs renders a determination.

Plaintiff’s UHB hearing was initially set for April 3, 2015, (Doc. 1 at 9), but for a 

variety of reasons was continued to November 6, 2015. On August 17, 2015, Plaintiff 

filed suit in this Court, alleging that certain procedures ASU sought to impose on him at 

the UHB hearing were unconstitutional.

3 On November 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion 

to enjoin ASU from carrying out the November 6 hearing. (Doc. 13). In the interest of 

efficiency and permitting both parties to turn their attention to the imminent UHB 

hearing, the Court ruled from the bench that it was precluded from exercising jurisdiction 

over the matter. The Court now sets forth the rationale in support of its ruling.

II.

Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss, (Doc. 12 at 6), that even if Plaintiff 

“presented a ripe controversy within this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” the Court 

must refrain from hearing the case under Younger, 410 U.S. 71, a doctrine of abstention 

that is now known colloquially as “Younger abstention.” The doctrine “is essentially a 

jurisdictional doctrine.” Canatella v. State of California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 

2005). While Younger “neither provides a basis for nor destroys federal jurisdiction, [it] 

 

3 Because the Court has concluded that it must refrain from exercising jurisdiction 

over the matter and must dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court declines to further 

elaborate on the underlying facts. For purposes of this Order, it is sufficient to state that 

Plaintiff has alleged that ASU’s student disciplinary proceedings violate the procedural 

due process protections enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution.

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does determine when the federal courts must ‘refrain from exercising jurisdiction,’” id. 

(quoting Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 981 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)), based on 

“principles of comity” and “strong federal policy against federal-court interference with 

pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Gilbertson, 381 

F.3d at 976 (quoting Middlesex County Ethics. Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 

U.S. 423, 431 (1982)). Nonetheless, the Court must be mindful that “although there are 

limited circumstances in which such abstention . . . is appropriate, those circumstances 

are ‘carefully defined’ and ‘remain the exception, not the rule.’” Green v. City of Tucson, 

255 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of 

New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When a Younger abstention inquiry pertains to a non-criminal state proceeding, 

the Court applies the three-part test set forth in Middlesex. Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 977

(citation omitted). The Court must determine: (1) whether “the type of state hearings at 

issue constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding”; (2) whether “the proceedings 

implicate important state interests”; and (3) whether there “is an adequate opportunity in 

the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Id. at 973 (citing Middlesex 

County Ethics. Comm., 457 U.S. at 432).

First, the Court must determine whether ASU’s disciplinary system constitutes an 

“ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Plaintiff asserts that it does not, arguing that “[t]here 

are no judges, marshals, subpoenas, formal discovery . . . or desperately thick, legal 

tomes brimming with statutes or procedural rules.” (Doc. 16 at 9). The Court disagrees.

In the interest of brevity, the Court will not compile an exhaustive list of the trial-like 

procedures that ASU’s disciplinary system incorporates, and will restrict its discussion to 

several prominent characteristics. When a student seeks review of an adverse finding by 

the Dean of Students, the student will appear before a five-member panel, and may be 

represented by legal counsel. (Doc. 12-1 at 5). ASU is represented by a “University 

Representative,” who may be an attorney under certain circumstances, (id. at 7) and the 

University has “the burden of showing that a violation of the Student Code of Conduct” 

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occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id.) Each party may offer an opening 

statement, call witnesses, introduce documents and exhibits into evidence, and generally 

cross-examine witnesses who are called to testify. The student is also subject to tangible 

harm in the form of disciplinary sanctions, up to expulsion from the University. In short, 

the UHB hearing—and overall student discipline procedure—possesses many of the 

hallmarks of a civil trial. Importantly, the Ninth Circuit has held that when these 

circumstances are present—where legal representation at a hearing is present and tangible 

sanctions may be imposed—the adjudicatory hearing is both “quasi-judicial” and “quasicriminal” and Younger applies. See Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 617-

18 (9th Cir. 2003). In the instant matter, such circumstances are present, and the UHB 

hearing constitutes an ongoing state judicial proceeding.

Progressing in the analysis, the Court has little difficulty finding that the 

“proceedings implicate important state interests.” Generally, the state’s interest in 

administering “quasi-criminal . . . proceedings without interference is . . . significant.” 

Baffert, 332 F.3d at 618. And the quasi-criminal proceeding at issue is the disciplinary 

system established by ABOR, the governing body for Arizona’s public universities. It is 

clear that the state has a strong interest in establishing a fair, transparent, and just 

disciplinary system to administer a Student Code of Conduct that applies to many 

students every single day. Furthermore, here, Plaintiff has alleged that certain procedural 

elements of this important system are constitutionally infirm. It is also clear that the state 

has a keen interest in ensuring that ABOR and ASU administrative procedures comply 

with the federal constitution.

Finally, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has “an adequate opportunity 

in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 973. 

The proceeding Plaintiff seeks to enjoin—the UHB hearing—is the intermediate level of 

ASU’s disciplinary system. It is an “advisory” body, and the Vice President for Student 

Affairs makes the final determination as to whether a student violated ABOR’s Student 

Code of Conduct, and if the student should be sanctioned. (Doc. 12-1 at 5). ABOR policy 

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establishes that following the UHB hearing, a student may request a review of the case 

from the Vice President for Student Affairs which “is not an appeal,” but rather, “is an 

opportunity for the student to make the decision-maker aware of . . . illegalities in the 

proceedings . . . .” (Id. at 10). This includes whether UHB’s decision was “contrary to 

law,” ABOR Policy 5-403, § G (d), and Defendants concede that Plaintiff could raise his 

constitutional claims before the Vice President. Once the Vice President renders the final 

determination, he or she must “provide notice to the student and Complainant of the right 

to seek review pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-904.” ABOR Policy 5-403, § F. Defendants 

further concede that ASU’s adjudication of student discipline matters is subject to judicial 

review under the Arizona Administrative Review Act (“ARA”), A.R.S. § 12-901 et seq. 

(2012).4 Under the ARA, Plaintiff may challenge both the decision itself and the 

procedures utilized by ASU. While the standard of review for administrative actions is 

generally whether the decision is “supported by substantial evidence,” the reviewing 

court may not affirm a decision that is “contrary to law.” A.R.S. § 12-910 (E).

Defendants also concede that “contrary to law” includes any constitutional infirmity of 

ABOR’s and ASU’s procedures. Plaintiff is entitled to “an evidentiary hearing” at which 

he may present all “relevant and admissible exhibits and testimony” whether they were 

offered during the administrative hearing or not, and may lodge objections not preserved

below. A.R.S. §§ 12-910 (A), (B). The Court finds that the state proceedings in place 

provide sufficient opportunity for Plaintiff to raise constitutional challenges to ASU’s 

procedures.

Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that because Plaintiff is subject 

to a state judicial proceeding that implicates important state issues and gives Plaintiff 

adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges, Younger abstention mandates that 

the Court refrain from hearing this case. 

III.

 

4 Defendants conceded this point in both their brief and at oral argument.

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The Court must now determine whether the appropriate action is to stay the case 

or grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss. “When the Supreme Court has applied abstention 

principles to actions at law, it has only allowed stay orders, not orders dismissing the 

action entirely.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 981 (discussing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. 

Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719-20 (1996)). But when declaratory relief or “an injunction is 

sought and Younger applies, it makes sense to abstain, that is, to refrain from exercising 

jurisdiction, permanently by dismissing the federal action because the federal court is 

only being asked to stop the state proceeding.” Id. (emphasis in original). As Plaintiff’s 

claim seeks only injunctive relief and reasonable attorney’s fees, (Doc. 1 at 16), his 

“lawsuit does not involve a monetary claim.” (Id. at 2). Specifically, the complaint “seeks 

only a judicial declaration that Defendants, while acting under color of state law, have 

violated [U.S. CONST. amend. XIV].” (Id.). Succinctly, “there is nothing more for the 

federal court to do” and dismissal “is appropriate.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 981.5

IV.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court is precluded from exercising 

jurisdiction over the matter and Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be granted.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) is hereby 

GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment of dismissal without prejudice.

Dated this 10th day of November, 2015.

 

5 Consideration of Defendants’ alternative argument—that Plaintiff’s claim 

is not ripe—is therefore not necessary.

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