Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01239/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

lJDJkd Slate! Cour1 of Appeals Tacb Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN ... 3 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Oerk 

In re: HOME & FAMILY, INC., 

Debtor. 

HOME & FAMILY, INC., 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

ENGLAND RESOURCES 

CORPORATION, HEATECH 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

Defendants - Appellees. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 95-1239 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 94-M-2870) 

Philip D. Geil of Geil, Jeffers & Waitkus, P.C., Boulder, Colorado for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Michael G. Martin of Baker & Hostetler, Denver, Colorado for Defendants - Appellees. 

Before HENRY, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

LUCERO, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-1239 Document: 01019276453 Date Filed: 06/03/1996 Page: 1 
We review this case to detennine whether the doctrine of "unique circumstances" 

saves Home & Family, Inc. (HFI) from the district court's dismissal of its bankruptcy 

appeal. The doctrine pennits an untimely appeal to go forward "where a party has 

performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing an 

appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been 

properly done." Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989). We agree 

with the district court that the doctrine does not apply here and affirm. 

I 

HFI sought a declaration from the bankruptcy court that it held rights in 

intellectual property claimed by appellees. On November 2, 1994 the bankruptcy court 

entered an order granting summary judgment against HFI. On November 14, HFI filed a 

"Motion for Additional Time to Reconsider Court's Order ofNovember 2, 1994." HFI 

asked the bankruptcy court to extend the time to file a motion to reconsider or a notice of 

appeal through December 1. A clerk's minute order was entered on November 16 

granting the motion. On that same day, the United States Trustee (not a party to this 

appeal) filed an objection to HFI's motion. The Trustee argued that motions to 

reconsider are properly characterized as motions to amend or alter judgment under Fed. 

R. Bankr. P. 9023, and that extensions of time to file such motions are prohibited by Fed 

R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(2). In support of these contentions, the Trustee cited In re Antell, 

155 B.R. 921 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992). 

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On December 1, 1994 HFI filed a "Motion to Reconsider and Amend Order 

Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment." HFI does not dispute the 

characterization of this motion as one filed under Fed R Bankr. P. 9023. On December 

6, the bankruptcy court vacated its order granting HFI additional time to file that motion, 

concluding that it had no authority to grant that extension in the first instance. Eight days 

later, HFI filed a Motion to Amend asking the bankruptcy court to grant it an additional 

ten days to file an appeal, on the basis of the doctrine of unique circumstances. On that 

same day, HFI filed a Notice of Appeal with the district court. The bankruptcy court 

denied the Motion to Amend. 

Although HFI's appeal was untimely, the district court noted that the "unique 

circumstances" exception might permit it to be heard. & Senjuro v. Murray, 943 F.2d 

36, 37 (lOth Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The court surveyed the case law, and concluded 

that this Circuit has applied the doctrine "somewhat inconsistently." Thus, the court 

turned for guidance to Pinion v. Dow Chemical. U.S.A, 928 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.), .em._ 

denied, 502 U.S. 968 (1991). In Pinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that attorneys are 

presumed to be familiar with the rules of the courts in which they practice, and therefore, 

represented parties may not invoke the "unique circumstances" exception to permit them 

to rely on an order that a lower court had no authority to enter. 928 F.2d at 1533 and 

n.11. The district court applied Pinion and held that HFI could not reasonably rely on the 

bankruptcy court's extension of time to file its Rule 9023 motion because that extension 

was specifically prohibited by the Rules. Further, the district court noted that the 

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trustee's objection put HFI on notice that the bankruptcy court had no authority to grant 

that extension. The district court found that unique circumstances were not present and 

dismissed the appeal. 

n 

We recognize that courts and counsel have faced difficulties trying to tune into one 

band the discordant signals emanating from our "unique circumstances" jurisprudence. 

Some background may prove helpful. The doctrine traces its origin to three Supreme 

Court cases. In the first, the Court reinstated an untimely appeal when the appellant 

reasonably relied on the district court's initial finding that an extension under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 73(a) was justified due to counsel's excusable neglect. Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. 

Cherry Meat Packers. Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217 (1962) (per curiam). 

The scope of the doctrine was expanded, over vigorous dissent, in two subsequent 

Supreme Court opinions. & Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203 (1964) (per curiam); 

Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per curiam). In 

W olfsohn, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of an appeal as untimely in a one 

sentence opinion citing Harris Truck Lines and Thompson. Four Justices dissented in an 

opinion written by a member of the Harris Truck Lines majority, arguing that Harris 

Truck Lines should be confined to its facts-- the situation where a party reasonably relies 

on the district court's finding of "excusable neglect" under Fed R. Civ. P. 73(a). 

Wolfsohn, 376 U.S. at 203 (Clark, J., dissenting). In the dissenters' view, Thompson and 

Wolfsohn represented an unwarranted extension of Harris Truck Lines because those 

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opinions gave district judges "de facto power to grant extensions of time, directly contra 

to the definite requirements" of Fed. R Civ. P. 6, 52 and 59. ld. at 204. See also 

Thompson, 375 U.S. at 389 (Clark, J., dissenting) (Harris Truck Lines is distinguishable 

because Fed. R Civ. P. 73(a) permits extensions of time). Since Wolfsow. the Supreme 

Court has not invoked the doctrine to permit an appeal to go forward, but neither has it 

repudiated the doctrine. ~ Ostemeck, 489 U.S. at 179. 

In light of intervening Supreme Court opinions emphasizing the jurisdictional 

nature of filing deadlines,~ • .e.g.., Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 

56 (1982); Browder v. Director. Dep't of Corrections oflllinois, 434 U.S. 257 (1978), the 

trend among the circuits is toward restricting application of the "unique circumstances" 

doctrine. Several of our sister circuits hold that, because attorneys are presumed to be 

familiar with the Federal Rules, reliance on an order purporting to grant additional time 

pursuant to a rule that does not permit an extension is unreasonable. See, e.g., Pinion, 

928 F.2d at 1533 and n.ll; Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 1360, 1365-66 

(3d Cir. 1990). This Circuit was one of the first to adopt this approach. We found that 

an appellant's reliance on an order enlarging time to appeal was not reasonable because 

counsel are charged with knowledge that Fed R App. P. 4(a)(5) does not permit 

extensions of time in excess of ten days. Certain Underwriters at Llczyds of London v. 

Evans, 896 F.2d 1255, 1258 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

The problem is that Certain Underwriters seems to conflict with a prior Tenth 

Circuit opinion that permitted an appeal to go forward when the district court improperly 

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extended the time to file a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59( e). Stauber v. Kieser, 810 

F.2d 1, 1-2 (lOth Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Apparently, the Stauber panel found "unique 

circumstances" to be present without evaluating the reasonableness of appellants' 

reliance. ld. Stauber is not a mere aberration. It was cited in a post-Certain 

Underwriters case that permitted a bankruptcy creditor to proceed with an untimely 

complaint when a bankruptcy court improperly extended the time to file such complaints. 

Themy v. Yu (In re Themy), 6 F. 3d 688, 690 (lOth Cir. 1993). We held there the 

bankruptcy court's equitable power to rectify its own mistakes in the interest of justice 

permitted it to entertain the complaint. ld. at 689-90. In re Themy cited Stauber for the 

proposition that the jurisdictional nature of filing deadlines did not preclude the 

complaint from going forward. ld. at 690. See also Collard v. United States, 10 F.3d 

718, 721 (lOth Cir. 1993) (Holloway, Ch. J., dissenting) (Stauber was "emphatically 

reaffirmed" in In re Themy and allows an appeal to proceed when district court extended 

time to file Rule 59( e) motion). 

We recognize that it may become necessary for this Circuit to decide whether 

Stauber's implicit holding -- that parties represented by counsel may reasonably rely on 

an order entered in excess of a court's jurisdiction -- remains the law. Today is not the 

day. We are mindful of our duty to refrain from rendering opinions on '"abstract 

propositions, or to declare principles or rules oflaw which cannot affect the matter in 

issue"' in the case before us. Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 

U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). The United States 

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Trustee's objection to HFT s motion for additional time to file a Rule 9023 motion gave 

HFI a&twll notice that the bankruptcy court did not have the power to grant that 

extension. Therefore, we need not attempt to resolve the conflict between Stauber and 

Certain Underwriters on the question of constructive notice. 

Til 

HFI argues that it was reasonable for it to rely on the bankruptcy court's extension 

of time, and refers to unpublished opinions of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 

District of Colorado, granting extensions of time similar to the one granted in this case. 

Because HFI' s counsel was accustomed to the granting of such extensions, HFI contends 

that it was reasonable to rely on the bankruptcy court's order. We reject this argument. 

HFI misapprehends the issue when it asks whether an Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania bankruptcy opinion that precludes such extensions is binding on a 

bankruptcy court in Colorado, or this Court. Of course not. The determinative inquiry is 

whether HFI' s reliance on the bankruptcy court's extension was reasonable in the light of 

its awareness of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(2) as well as Antell. Antell's square holding 

that a bankruptcy court has no power to extend the time to file a motion for 

reconsideration, 155 B.R. at 925, clearly supports the reasoning advanced by the Trustee. 

The plain language of Rule 9006(b)(2), that "[t]he court may not enlarge the time for 

taking action" under Rule 9023, compels Antell's holding. HFT s attention was directed 

to Rule 9006(b )(2) and the Antell opinion two weeks before its time to file an appeal 

expired. At that point, it was on notice that the bankruptcy court's order of November 16 

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extended only the time to file a notice of appeal. HFI chose to file a Ru1e 9023 motion 

instead Under these circumstances, its reliance on the bankruptcy court's order was 

unreasonable. Equity does not require acceptance of a late filing here. 

We sympathize with counsel, whose experience led him to believe that his client 

was entitled to rely on the bankruptcy court's order. However, Supreme Court and Tenth 

Circuit law make it clear that, whatever the precise contours of the "unique 

circumstances" exception may be, it is a disfavored doctrine that is to be applied only in 

"carefully limited circumstances." Senjuro, 943 F.2d at 37. When a party is made aware 

that an order extending time was entered in excess of the court's jurisdiction, and there is 

still time to file a notice of appeal, it is unreasonable to continue relying on that order. 

~Certain Underwriters, 896 F.2d at 1258. Reasonable reliance being the mainstay of 

the "unique circumstances" doctrine, the doctrine has no application here. 

Our resolution of this issue makes consideration of appellant's other contentions 

unnecessary. The district court's dismissal of this appeal is AFFIRMED. 

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