Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04961/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04961-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOHERTY, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF ALAMEDA and CITY OF

ALAMEDA HOUSING AND BUILDING

CODE HEARING AND APPEALS BOARD,

Defendants. /

No. 09-4961-EDL

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF

ORDER TO DISMISS CLAIM TWO OF

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

 On March 30, 2010, this Court issued an Order dismissing the second claim of Plaintiff’s

second amended complaint (“SAC”) with prejudice. The claim was dismissed because, despite

multiple pleading efforts, Plaintiff’s SAC failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for violation

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it did not allege that anyone with final policymaking authority, or the

existence of any alleged practice or custom, caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

On April 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order to Dismiss Claim Two of the

Second Amended Complaint. The motion was purportedly brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e), Local Rule 72, and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e) relates to the timing of motions to alter or amend a judgment, and no judgment has

been rendered in this matter so the rule is inapplicable. Local Rule 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

relate to review of a magistrate judge’s decision when pretrial or other matters have been referred to

the magistrate judge by an assigned district court judge. These review procedures are inapplicable

to this case because the parties here have expressly consented to having a magistrate judge preside

over all proceedings through judgment, and appeal is directly to the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(c)(3); Dkt. Nos. 3, 12. Instead, Local Rule 7-9(a) applies and requires Plaintiff to seek leave of

Case 3:09-cv-04961-EDL Document 42 Filed 04/14/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Court to file a motion for reconsideration on any ground set forth in Local Rule 7-9(b). See Local

Rule 7-9(a) (“No party may notice a motion for reconsideration without first obtaining leave of

Court to file the motion.”) Plaintiff did not seek leave of Court to file his motion for

reconsideration, and for this reason alone the motion may be denied as procedurally improper.

However, even if the Court were to construe Plaintiff’s motion as one for leave to file a motion

for reconsideration, Local Rule 7-9(b) requires that a motion for leave to file a motion for

reconsideration specifically show: 

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law

exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory

order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the

exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not

know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or (2) The emergence

of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order; or

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal

arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order. 

 Plaintiff’s motion fails to make this showing. He does not claim that there has been a subsequent

change in fact or law, or a failure by the Court to consider facts or arguments previously presented. 

Instead, Plaintiff’s motion repeats arguments made in his initial motion and requests that the Court

“revisit the issue,” which is expressly prohibited by the local rules and can subject him to sanctions. 

See Local Rule 7-9(c) (“No motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration may repeat any oral

or written argument . . . Any party who violates this restriction shall be subject to appropriate

sanctions.”). 

 Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 allows the Court to correct mistakes arising

from an “oversight or omission,” and allows parties to move for relief from an order based on,

among other things, “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Plaintiff’s counsel

claims that he was “mistaken” in failing to name a final policymaker in the SAC (such as the

Alameda City Council and various individuals he now claims should be substituted for Doe

defendants) instead of the City of Alameda generally. See Motion at 12; Declaration of Lee Grant

(“Grant Decl.”) at ¶ 2, 4. However, an attorney’s failure to name known defendants, based on an

erroneous view of the law as permitting naming a municipality generally to encompass all

policymakers and policymaking groups therein, is not the type of mistake for which relief under

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Rule 60 is granted. See e.g., Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc. 452 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.

2006) (“Rule 60(b)(1) is not intended to remedy the effects of a litigation decision that a party later

comes to regret through subsequently-gained knowledge that corrects the erroneous legal advice of

counsel. For purposes of subsection (b)(1), parties should be bound by and accountable for the

deliberate actions of themselves and their chosen counsel. This includes not only an innocent, albeit

careless or negligent, attorney mistake, but also intentional attorney misconduct.”) (citing cases).

Further, not only does the SAC fail to allege any action by a final policymaking authority; it also

fails to allege any connection between an action by a final policymaking authority (named or

unnamed) and any constitutional violation. In other words, even if the SAC alleges that Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were somehow violated, the SAC does not claim that any alleged violation was

done or ratified by a final policymaker to justify municipal liability under Monell. Plaintiff has been

given multiple opportunities to appropriately plead his § 1983 claim to cure these deficiencies, and

repeated failure to do so cannot be considered an excusable mistake. 

Plaintiff also bases his motion for reconsideration on his counsel’s “surprise” at Defendants’

position that the Alameda City Council is a final policymaker for the city of Alameda. Motion at 12;

Grant Decl. at ¶¶ 5. However, Defendants asserted this position in their moving papers, reply and

during oral argument, and this type of “surprise” is not a basis for reconsideration under Rule 60. 

Plaintiff also takes issue with the Court’s analysis of the applicability of one of Plaintiff’s case

citations. See Motion at 14. However, Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s legal analysis is not

an appropriate basis for a motion for reconsideration.

Finally, Plaintiff’s motion makes new allegations (based on facts that occurred long before he

filed the SAC) and arguments that do not appear in the SAC or his opposition to the motion to

dismiss, and therefore are not a reason for the Court to reconsider its prior decision. See Motion at

15-19. For example, Plaintiff’s motion extensively discusses events that occurred at a June 2007

city council meeting that were not mentioned in any of Plaintiff’s prior pleadings and are outside of

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Plaintiff has also filed a Request for Judicial Notice to which he attaches various documents

relating to this city council meeting. Because these new allegations dating back more than two years

prior to the date the claim was filed are beyond the statute of limitations and may not be considered in

connection with Plaintiff’s claim or motion for reconsideration, the Court declines to take judicial notice

of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. The Court has considered Exhibit 1, which is a declaration by Plaintiff’s counsel

for which judicial notice is unnecessary.

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the statute of limitations for this claim.1 Therefore, these new allegations are improper and could

have no bearing on the Court’s decision, even if the Court were to consider them.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Dated: April 14, 2010

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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