Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01099/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01099-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Hilda Quinones,

Plaintiff(s),

 v.

Target Stores, et al.,

Defendant(s).

 /

NO. C 05-01099 JW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND

I. INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit arises out of an employment dispute between Plaintiff Hilda Quinones

("Plaintiff") and Defendant Target Corporation (aka Target Stores) ("Defendant"), Plaintiff's former

employer. Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit in Monterey County Superior Court. Defendant

removed. Presently before this Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. (See Plaintiff's Motion to

Remand, hereinafter Plaintiff's Motion, Docket Item No. 14.) This Court finds it appropriate, pursuant

to Civil L.R. 7-1(b), to take Plaintiff's Motion under submission, without oral argument, for a decision

based upon the papers filed by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS

Plaintiff's Motion.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant owns and operates a retail store in Salinas, California, which employs

approximately 150 employees. (Declaration of Natalie A. Beccia in Support of Defendant's

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Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion, hereinafter Beccia Decl., Docket Item No. 17, Ex. A ¶ 1.) Plaintiff

was an employee in that store. Originally, Plaintiff was hired in 1994 to work as a sales clerk. 

(Beccia Decl. Ex. A ¶ 2.) By 1998, Plaintiff had been promoted to a signing supervisor; in 1999,

Plaintiff was promoted to a sales supervisor. (Beccia Decl. Ex. A ¶ 2.) Plaintiff received favorable

performance reviews and regular pay increases. (Beccia Decl. Ex. A ¶ 2.)

During the course of her employment, Plaintiff sustained three injuries. First, on March 18,

1996, Plaintiff injured her back while stepping down a ladder. (Declaration of Alfred Lombardo,

hereinafter Lombardo Decl., Docket Item No. 14, Ex. 1; Beccia Decl. Ex. A ¶ 3.) Second, on March

11, 2000, Plaintiff slipped and fell and injured her "left lower extremity[] [and] upper extremity." 

(Lombardo Decl. Ex. 2; Beccia Decl. Ex. A ¶ 3.) Third, on April 21, 2003, Plaintiff was struck by a

falling box and injured her "[h]ead, neck and left shoulder." (Lombardo Decl. Ex. 3; Beccia Decl. Ex.

A ¶ 3.) On July 11, 2003, only a few months after Plaintiff sustained injuries to her head, neck, and

left shoulder, "defendants' human resources manager Robert Banuelos informed plaintiff that she could

no longer work for Target Stores because the defendants did not want supervisors with disabilities." 

(Beccia Decl. Ex. A ¶ 4.)

III. STANDARDS

A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. WILLIAM W.

SCHWARZER, A. WALLACE TASHIMA & JAMES M. WAGSTAFFE, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE

TRIAL § 2:1081 (2005). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The defendant seeking

removal of an action to federal court bears the burden of establishing grounds for federal jurisdiction. 

Id. § 2:609. Removal statutes are construed restrictively, so as to limit removal jurisdiction. Ethridge

v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he removal statute is strictly

construed against removal jurisdiction"). Doubts as to removability are resolved in favor of

remanding the case to state court. SCHWARZER ET AL., supra, § 2:606 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas

Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) and Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.

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1 See Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167 (1980).

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1992)). Civil actions arising under a state's workers' compensation laws are not removable. 28

U.S.C. § 1445(c).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Claim(s) Is/Are Unclear

Although the facts underlying Plaintiff's Complaint are clear, Plaintiff's precise claims for

relief are not clear. Unlike a typical complaint, which clearly enumerates a plaintiff's claims for relief

under separate headings, Plaintiff's Complaint here fails to clearly enumerate Plaintiff's claim(s) for

relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"). Instead,

Plaintiff's factual averments bleed into her prayer for relief. (See Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion, hereinafter Defendant's Opposition, Docket Item No. 15, at 1:16 ("The Complaint does not

specify individual causes of action").)

1. Plaintiff's "Claim" Under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act

On the one hand, it seems, Plaintiff attempts to state a claim under California's Fair

Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). (See Beccia Decl. Ex. A ¶ 8 ("As a result of defendants'

unlawful discrimination in violation of California Government Code Section 12900 et seq. [i.e.,

FEHA], . . . plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer for an indefinite time in the future, a loss

of earnings"); Beccia Decl. Ex. A at 3:21-27 ("WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against

defendants for: . . . Attorney's fees pursuant to Government Code Section 12900 [i.e., FEHA], et

seq.").) 

2. Plaintiff's Tameny "Claim"

However, as Defendant points out, it also appears as though Plaintiff attempts to state, what

California courts call, a Tameny claim1 for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 

(See Defendant's Opposition at 5:17-8:8.) 

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3. Plaintiff's "Claim" Under CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a

However, Plaintiff purports to state a claim under CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a, which prohibits

employers from discriminating against employees who pursue their rights under California's workers'

compensation laws. (See Plaintiff's Motion at 6:11-12 ("Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant's

conduct violated . . . California Labor Code § 132a").) Defendant disputes that Plaintiff states such a

claim. (See Defendant's Opposition at 3:4-4:13.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to "allege facts

to suggest that she was discriminated against or terminated because she sought worker's compensation

benefits." (Defendant's Opposition at 3:28-4:1.) 

4. It Is Unclear as to What Claims, Exactly, Plaintiff Is Asserting, But Plaintiff

Potentially Asserts a Claim Under CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a

Frankly, Plaintiff's poor, open-ended pleading makes it difficult for this Court to discern what

claims, exactly, she is asserting. Plaintiff may be asserting any one (or any combination) of the claims

discussed above. (See, supra, Parts IV.A.1-IV.A.3.) Perhaps Plaintiff is asserting claims not hitherto

discussed. At the very least, Plaintiff's Complaint potentially asserts a claim under CAL. LAB. CODE §

132a. In fact, Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's Complaint explicitly references § 132a: "The defendants'

adverse actions against the plaintiff also violated a fundamental public policy of the State of

California embodied in California Labor Code § 132a which prohibits employers from taking adverse

action against an employee because she sustained a work injury or filed a workers' compensation

claim." (Beccia Decl. Ex. A ¶ 5.) 

B. A Claim Under CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a Is Not Removable

Courts have held that a claim brought under CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a is one that "arises under"

the workmen's compensation laws of California. See Fucci v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., No. C-00-3721

PJH, 2001 WL 182377, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2001) (J. Hamilton) ("Accordingly, based on the

statutory language, the interpretation of the California Supreme Court, and the reasoning of the federal

circuits that have addressed the issue, the court finds that Labor Code § 132a is a law 'arising under'

the workers' compensation laws of the State of California"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), civil

actions "arising under" the workmen's compensation laws of a state may not be removed. 28 U.S.C. §

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1445(c) ("A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such

State may not be removed to any district court of the United States"). In fact, some courts have held

that § 1445(c)'s proscription against removal is so strong that claims "arising under" a state's

workmen's compensation laws are nonremovable--even as pendent claims to a claim that is otherwise

within a federal court's original jurisdiction. See Hummel v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi

Bishop Estate, 749 F. Supp. 1021, 1029 (D. Haw. 1990).

Given that removal statutes are construed restrictively, that all doubts as to removability must

be resolved in favor of remand, that claims arising under states' workmen's compensation laws are

nonremovable, that Plaintiff's claim(s) is/are opaque, and that Plaintiff potentially states a claim under

CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (which arguably "arises under" California's workmen's compensation laws),

this Court grants Plaintiff's Motion. If, through an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper,

Defendant later learns that this lawsuit is in fact removable, it may file a notice of removal pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1446. At this point, however, this Court simply cannot tell what claim(s) Plaintiff is/are

asserting.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

Dated: May 17, 2005

05cv1099mtr

/s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Alfred Lombardo allombardo@rolmlaw.com

Natalie A. Beccia nbeccia@cdflaborlaw.com

Dated: May 17, 2005 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:/s/JWchambers 

Ronald L. Davis

Courtroom Deputy

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