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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FIL L.i .i) United States Cot.tt OUppeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAR 1 2 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

KENNETH E . HALL, JR. , 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v . 

GARY MAYNARD , Director of Oklahoma 

Department of Corrections; JAMES 

SAFFLE, Warden O.S . P . ; BOBBY BOONE, 

Deputy Warden; DAN REYNOLDS, Warden 

M.A. C. C.; LAURA MAXWELL, Case Manager, 

M. A. C.C.; BILLY KEYS, Law Library 

Supervisor, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No . 91 - 7110 

) (D . C. No. CIV-91-124-S) 

) (E . D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and 

District Judge . 

CONWAY,** 

**Honorable John E. Conway, Distri ct Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Ci rcuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel . 10th Cir. R. 36.3 . 

Appellate Case: 91-7110 Document: 010110191091 Date Filed: 03/12/1993 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument . 

Plaintiff Kenneth E. Hall, Jr., appeals from a district court 

order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Plaintiff, a 

state prisoner, alleged that defendants confiscated his tobacco 

ties, which are of religious significance, without due process; 

cut his hair in violation of his religious beliefs without a 

hearing; and retaliated against him for filing a previous lawsuit. 

After ordering submission of a special (Martinez) report, the 

district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand 

for further proceedings. 

On remand from this court, the district court denied 

plaintiff's motion for recusal. We review denial of a motion to 

recuse for abuse of discretion, Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 

938 (10th Cir. 1987), and find no abuse in the decision. See 

United States v. Carroll, 567 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1977) (bias 

or prejudice not established merely because judge has ruled 

against parties taking similar position as movant in other cases) . 

Plaintiff argues that he was entitled to a default judgment 

because defendants did not file the Martinez report within the 

time ordered. Given the strong preference for disposing of 

litigation on the merits and the lack of any allegation of 

prejudice to plaintiff, the district court's failure to grant 

plaintiff a default judgment was not an abuse of discretion. See 

Gulley v .,·' Orr, 905 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1990) . 

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Plaintiff's next contention is that, because affidavits and 

exhibits outside of the pleadings were submitted to and considered 

by the district court, the court should have treated defendants' 

motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and should 

have denied the motion because disputed issues of fact exist. In 

evaluating a prose prisoner complaint, a Martinez report may be 

used to develop a record sufficient to determine whether there are 

any bases for the prisoner's claims. Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 

1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) . "Although a court may consider the 

Martinez report in dismissing a claim pursuant to § 1915(d), it 

cannot resolve material disputed factual issues by accepting the 

report's factual findings when they are in conflict with pleadings 

or affidavits." Id. (citations omitted). 

Defendants maintain that any factual disputes are immaterial 

because plaintiff failed to allege a violation of a legal 

interest. A complaint alleging violation of a legal interest that 

clearly does not exist, or that is based on an indisputably 

meritless legal theory, may be dismissed as frivolous under 

§ 1915(d) . Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). We 

review the district court's conclusion that the complaint was 

frivolous for abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 112 

S . Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992). 

In Count I plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his 

tobacco ties without due process. A prisoner may not be deprived 

of property by persons acting under color of state law without due 

process. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981), overruled 

on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams. 474 U.S . 327 (1986). An 

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unauthorized deprivation of property by a state employee is not a 

due process violation if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is 

available, however. Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 

F.2d 360, 362 (10th Cir. 1991). Due process is violated only if 

that postdeprivation procedure is unavailable, unresponsive, or 

inadequate. Id. 

Here, plaintiff had a postdeprivation remedy available and, 

in fact, pursued that remedy by filing a grievance over the 

incident . Defendant Saffle did not respond to the grievance 

because plaintiff submitted a copy rather than the original. 

Plaintiff refused to file the original, stating that he was 

required to provide the original grievance to the federal court. 

We conclude Count I is frivolous. A postdeprivation remedy was 

available if plaintiff followed the proper procedures. 

In Count II plaintiff alleges that, upon his arrival at the 

Oklahoma State Penitentiary (OSP) , defendants cut his hair without 

first deciding whether he was entitled to an exemption from the 

prison grooming requirement, and then ignored his request for an 

exemption when he did apply. Plaintiff later acknowledged that 

the request for an exemption was denied, but claimed that 

defendants ignored his appeal from the denial of the exemption . 

After conducting an investigation and holding a hearing, the 

prison denied plaintiff an exemption on the ground that "[t]here 

is not sufficient evidence to indicate the inmate is a sincere 

adherent to the religion, or his practice is inhibited by [the 

prison grooming code]." Facility Classification Committee Review, 

R. Vol. I, doc. 14, attach. G. 

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The Inmate Grooming Code provides that a new reception at the 

facility "shall receive a haircut ... unless he has an exemption 

for religious reasons .... If the exception has been granted 

at the sending facility ... it shall be honored at Oklahoma 

State Penitentiary." Inmate Grooming Code, par. 5, R. Vol . I, 

doc. 14, attach. E. Plaintiff does not dispute that he had not 

been granted an exemption prior to his arrival at OSP. Defendants 

claim there was no record that plaintiff applied for an exemption 

previously; plaintiff alleged that he had applied at the Mack 

Alford Correctional Center (MACC). Whether plaintiff had applied 

for an exemption at the MACC is irrelevant, however, because he 

would have been exempt from the haircut requirement only if he had 

already been granted an exemption. While the Code provides that 

an inmate is not required to comply with the grooming standards 

until the expiration of five working days from the date he 

receives the decision on the exemption or until disposition of his 

appeal, nothing in the Code permits an inmate to apply for an 

exemption and receive a decision on the application before having 

his hair cut. 

A prisoner's right to exercise his religion is not absolute. 

Rather, the First Amendment requires that an inmate be accorded a 

reasonable opportunity to pursue his religion. Mosier v. Maynard, 

937 F.2d 1521, 1525 (10th Cir. 1991). "However, what constitutes 

a reasonable opportunity must be evaluated with 

legitimate penological objectives of the prison 

reference 

" Id. 

to 

An 

infringement of a constitutional right is valid in prison if it is 

"reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives." Id. 

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The four factors to consider in making the reasonableness inquiry 

are 1) whether a valid, rational connection exists between the 

prison policy and the legitimate governmental interest advanced as 

justification; 2) whether alternative means of exercising the 

constitutional right remain open to prisoners; 3) what impact 

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on 

guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources 

generally; and 4 ) whether alternatives exist that would 

accommodate the prisoner's rights at little cost to valid prison 

interests. Turner v. Safley. 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). We have 

held that the reasonableness of a procedure for obtaining a 

religious exemption from a prison grooming policy should be 

evaluated under Turner. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1527. 

The legitimate governmental interests offered as 

justification for the grooming code are safety, security, 

identification, and hygiene. Plaintiff alleged no facts 

indicating that under Turner, the grooming code procedures are not 

reasonably related to these legitimate penological interests. 

Rather, he apparently claims an absolute right to apply for an 

exemption before his hair is cut. He has alleged violation of a 

legal interest that does not exist. 

Plaintiff also maintains that the failure of prison officials 

to rule on his appeal from the exemption decision violated his 

constitutional rights. There is no due process right to an appeal 

if a full and fair trial on the merits has been provided. Lindsey 

v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 77 (1972). Plaintiff has not alleged that 

the hearing on his application for an exemption was not full and 

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fair. 1 We conclude that Count II was properly dismissed as 

frivolous. 

In Count III plaintiff alleges that he mailed his complaint 

in Hall v . Bellmen on January 22, 1990, that he informed defendant 

Maxwell of this fact on January 23, 1990, at a disciplinary 

hearing, and that Maxwell found him guilty, then telephoned 

defendant Reynolds and informed him of the lawsuit. One-half hour 

later plaintiff was placed in the disciplinary unit where all 

legal assistance was refused by the law library supervisor, then 

he was transferred to OSP on January 26, 1990. He was placed in 

the disciplinary unit two weeks later where he was not allowed to 

shower, legal mail was refused to be mailed by the mail room 

supervisor, and his religious exemption application was ignored. 

He filed grievances over these incidents with defendant Saffle 

that have been ignored. Defendant Keys, the law library 

supervisor, has denied him legal services and assistance on many 

occasions. These acts are part of a conspiracy to seek 

retaliation and retribution against plaintiff for filing Hall v. 

Bellmen. 

The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to show 

prison officials denied him adequate, effective, and meaningful 

access to the law library, as required by Bounds v , Smith, 430 

U.S. 817, 829 (1977); that the claims regarding denial of showers 

1 Even if prison regulations provide a right to appeal the 

denial of an exemption to the grooming requirement, which would be 

more procedural rights than the U.S. Constitution would require, a 

state's failure to abide by regulations relating only to procedure 

is not a federal due process issue. Riccio v. County of Fairfax. 

Va . , 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990). 

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and mailing privileges were vague, general assertions wholly 

unsupported by existing facts; and that there was evidence to 

support the finding of guilt in connection with the disciplinary 

charge. 

Prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for 

exercising their constitutional right of access to the courts. 

Smith v . Maschner, 899 F. 2d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990) . Thus, 

although a prisoner may not, for example, have a constitutional 

right to remain in a particular institution or to a particular job 

assignment, prison officials may not transfer him or deny him a 

job assignment in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally 

protected activity. See Williams v. Meese, 926 F . 2d 994, 998 

(10th Cir. 1991); Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F . 2d 560, 561 - 62 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

In Frazier, a prisoner filed a complaint alleging that he was 

transferred in retaliation for First Amendment activity. The 

district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 

§ 1915(d) on the ground that the government has discretion to 

transfer prisoners for any or no reasons. Id. at 561. We 

concluded that, while the prisoner had no constitutional right not 

to be transferred, he did have a constitutional right not to be 

transferred in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment 

rights. Id. at 561- 62 . Because the prisoner might have been able 

to prove that his transfer was the result of retaliation, we 

concluded that the claim was not frivolous, and we reversed and 

remanded for further consideration. Id . at 562 . 

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We reach the same conclusion here with respect to Count III. 

It may be true that the law library access provided to plaintiff 

was constitutionally adequate, or that his disciplinary proceeding 

comported with due process requirements. However, plaintiff may 

be able to prove that the denial of additional access to the law 

library or the discipline and transfer were imposed in retaliation 

for filing the prior lawsuit. We therefore reverse and remand the 

dismissal of these portions of Count III for further consideration 

in light of Frazier. Because plaintiff failed to allege that any 

of the named defendants were responsible for the denial of showers 

or free postage, we uphold dismissal of these claims. 

Plaintiff failed to identify any additional facts he could 

allege to establish his claims in Counts I and II. We conclude 

the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the 

complaint without leave to amend. ~ Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1734. 

We reject plaintiff's remaining contentions as meritless. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in 

part, and REMANDED for further proceedings. 

issue forthwith. 

The mandate shall 

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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