Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00201/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00201-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ELAINE STEVENSON,

NO. CIV. S 03-0201 MCE PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, CRAIG

HILL, JOHN McGINNESS and DOES

1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

BACKGROUND

In bringing this motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to impose

monetary sanctions against defense counsel Nancy Sheehan on the

basis of Ms. Sheehan’s alleged misconduct in punitive damages

portion of this trial. She alleges that misconduct caused a

mistrial and requests a total of $2,285.15 in expenses (costs for

trial transcripts and travel expenses) associated with having to

bring the instant motion.

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff bases her motion on five main grounds. First, she

claims that Sheehan improperly alluded to the fact that Defendant

Hill might be responsible for paying the judgment in this case. 

Secondly, she argues that Sheehan’s questioning of Hill, with

respect to how media accounts of this case affected him, was

wholly improper. Third, Price contends that Sheehan should not

have elicited testimony from Hill as to how it was embarrassing

for him to have to produce the details of his financial

circumstances during the punitive damages aspect of the trial. 

Fourth, Price argues that any reference, by Hill, to how the

verdict in the case in chief had already affected him (and

effectuated punishment) should not have occurred. Finally,

Price asserts that any reference to Hill’s family should not have

been permitted since such reference served no purpose other than

to openly solicit sympathy for Hill. 

None of these claims have merit. Hill’s personal

responsibility for paying any judgment must necessarily be the

baseline approach and assumption to be applied by the jury. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Ninth Circuit’s decision

in Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513 (9 Cir. 1994) does not th

indicate otherwise. Larez simply holds that evidence of

insurance or other indemnification should not be permitted to

reach the jury due to concerns that a resulting verdict could be

skewed if, for example, the jury knew that someone else would be

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paying the verdict. Id. at 1518, 1520. Larez does not stand for

the proposition, as advanced by Plaintiff, that the defendant’s

own ability to pay cannot be advanced in the punitive damages

portion of a trial.

While Plaintiff’s papers quote the Rutter Group’s Practice

Guide on Federal Civil Trials & Evidence (at § 14:266) as stating

that “reference to the wealth or poverty of either party or

reflection of financial disparity is improper argument”,

Plaintiff neglects to say that the same Practice Guide goes on to

state that “[t]he rule is otherwise where a party’s financial

condition is at issue– e.g., where punitive damages are sought.” 

Id. at § 14:271.

Any reference to Hill’s financial condition during the

compensatory aspect of the trial, where the focus must

necessarily be on making the Plaintiff whole without regard to a

defendant’s ability to pay, would have been improper. Here,

however, the only reference to Hill’s finances in fact occurred

during the punitive damages portion of the trial, where his net

worth was directly relevant in formulating an appropriate

punishment. Making that determination on anything other than an

assumption by the jury that Hill would have to pay the judgment

makes no sense. Hence any reference to Hill having to pay any

judgment is proper argument and not sanctionable conduct.

The second, third and fourth arguments identified by

Plaintiff as constituting misconduct on attorney Sheehan’s part

all pertain to testimony elicited from Defendant Hill as to the

effect these proceedings have already had on him and on his

family. It is axiomatic that punitive damages serve a dual

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purpose of both deterrence and retribution. State Farm Mutual

Ins. Co., v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). In determining

the amount of such damages that will adequately punish and deter

a defendant, the jury should not be precluded from hearing

evidence and/or argument bearing on the degree to which the

defendant has already been punished though non-financial means. 

To that end, Ms. Sheehan had Defendant Hill testify as to his

discomfort at being the source of newspaper/media attention

through the course of the case, the punishment already meted out

in the form of the initial verdict alone, and his embarrassment

at having to publicly divulge every detail of his personal

finances. Ms. Sheehan then argued that those factors should be

taken into account in determining any additional punitive damages

that the jury deemed necessary to adequately deter and punish

Defendant Hill. That is also perfectly acceptable argument and

not behavior for which Ms. Sheehan should be sanctioned.

The unquestioned fact that it would have been impermissible

to introduce newspaper articles about the case into evidence,

since they constitute hearsay, does not mean that Defendant Hill

could not testify concerning the effect that media coverage had

on him in general. The substance of the articles was not

disclosed and they were mentioned only with respect to their

effect on Defendant Hill, not for the truth of what they

asserted. Consequently there is no hearsay issue.

Plaintiff’s final argument (that Hill should not have

testified about his family circumstances) is equally unavailing. 

The fact that Defendant Hill had three young children (who were

triplets), for example, was relevant to his financial obligations

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In making this Motion, Plaintiff has requested that the 1

Court take judicial notice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence

201, of four different items. Judicial notice as to portions of

the Reporter’s Transcript in this matter, as well as proffered

jury instructions, is unopposed and accordingly granted. The

defense, however, has opposed judicial notice of the Declaration

of Susan A. Taylor. While that Declaration has undisputedly been

lodged with the court, that does not mean that its contents are

subject to judicial notice as not reasonably subject to dispute

under Rule 201(b). In fact, examination of the Taylor

Declaration shows that it is replete with references to the

manner in which the jury deliberated in this matter, and

consequently must be disregarded and stricken in its entirety

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which prohibits a

verdict from being impeached on such evidence. Consequently

judicial notice is denied as to the Taylor Declaration. 

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and hence to any calculation of an appropriate punitive damage

award. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Monetary

Sanctions against defense counsel Nancy Sheehan is DENIED in its

entirety.1

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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