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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 1, 2015*

Decided June 2, 2015

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐3574

ERIN EILER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CITY OF PANA,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 14‐3063

Colin S. Bruce,

Judge.

O R D E R

Erin Eiler appeals the dismissal of her employment‐discrimination complaint

against the City of Pana, Illinois, which failed to hire her as a water‐plant operator. We

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Eiler alleges in her complaint that the City discriminated against her when,

despite her qualifications, it rejected her application for a water‐plant job. With her

application Eiler had submitted a certificate showing that she had been honorably

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐3574    Page 2

discharged from the military several years earlier because of an unspecified disability.

After receiving right‐to‐sue letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, Eiler, proceeding pro se, sued the City using the five‐page form complaint

provided by the Central District of Illinois for employment‐discrimination claims. Eiler

checked several boxes on the form to assert that, among other things, the City did not

hire her because of her race, age, sex, and disability. She further alleges that her degree

in chemistry qualifies her for the position but that the City, after seeing her

military‐discharge certificate, did not interview or hire her based on her disability.

The district court granted the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). The court first determined that Eiler failed to exhaust

administrative remedies with regard to her claims of age and race discrimination by not

raising them before the EEOC or the Illinois Department of Human Rights (and in any

event, the court said, her pleadings regarding these claims are deficient). As for her

claims of sex discrimination, the court concluded that she neither elaborates on the

nature of the discrimination nor alleges that she received unequal pay for equal work.

Finally, the court determined that Eiler fails to allege “sufficient facts to establish the

requirements necessary for a finding of disability discrimination.”

On appeal Eiler generally contests the district court’s conclusion that she fails to

state any claims for relief. But the district court correctly determined that, because she

did not file administrative charges of either age or race discrimination, she did not

exhaust those claims for purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

to 2000e‐17. See Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1099–1101 (7th Cir. 2013). The

district court also properly dismissed Eiler’s sex discrimination claims under Title VII

and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)—claims upon which she does not elaborate

beyond checking certain boxes on the form complaint concerning types of

discrimination. Without any supporting allegations, her checking of such boxes is

nothing more than a legal conclusion, which we need not accept as true. See Lodholtz v.

York Risk Servs. Grp., Inc., 778 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2015).

The district court erred, however, in dismissing Eiler’s claim of disability

discrimination under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

She properly states an ADA claim by alleging that she is disabled (an allegation

supported by her record of military discharge because of a disability), that she is

qualified (by virtue of her chemistry degree) to perform the essential job functions

either with or without reasonable accommodation, and that she suffered an adverse

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employment action (by not being hired) because of her disability. See Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 1172

(7th Cir. 2013). The district court was wrong to state that she needs to “establish” this

claim at the pleading stage; support of Eiler’s allegations comes later, in response to a

motion for summary judgment or at trial. See Armstrong v. Daily, No. 13‐3424, 2015 WL

2182942, at *2 (7th Cir. May 11, 2015); Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th

Cir. 2014).

Accordingly, the judgment is VACATED with regard to Eiler’s claim of disability

discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the case is REMANDED

for further proceedings consistent with this decision. In all other respects the judgment

is AFFIRMED.

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