Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01871/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01871-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDDIE YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. CURLISS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01871 JLT (PC)

ORDER TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER CONSTRUING PLAINTFF’S 

“OBJECTION” AS A MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING 

RECONSIDERATION

(Doc. 3)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

DIMISSING FOR FAILURE TO PAY 

FILING FEES

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. He is not eligible to proceed in forma pauperis, given that he has been determined 

to have filed at least three cases in the past that failed to state a claim and, indeed, has not filed a 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

On December 12, 2012, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay the filing fees (Doc. 2), but he 

has not. Instead, Plaintiff has objected to the order to pay and asserts that he is at risk of 

imminent harm. (Doc. 3) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the matter be 

dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fees.

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I. Background

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on November 16, 2011, Defendant Curliss subjected 

him to retaliation for submitting prison grievances. (Doc. 1 at 4) Plaintiff contends that this 

retaliation was in the form of having his property confiscated and destroyed. Id. Also, he asserts 

that on the same date, he suffered injuries as a result of Defendants’ use of excessive force and 

the use of pepper spray. Id. at 5. Plaintiff contends also he was denied medical care for these 

injuries and, as a result of the use of the pepper spray, he suffers from a “skin problem” that has 

not been adequately treated. Id. at 6. Likewise Plaintiff concludes he is in “imminent danger” of 

being denied medical care in the future for his skin condition. Id.

II. Plaintiff is not eligible to proceed in forma pauperis

A. Plaintiff has not demonstrated he is entitled to reconsideration

To the extent that by filing his “Objection,” Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 60(b), such relief is not warranted in this case. Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(6) allows the Court to relieve a party from an order for any reason that justifies 

relief. However, Rule 60(b)(6) “is to be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 

manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances . . .” exist. 

Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks and citation 

omitted). Accordingly, “reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 

circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law” and it “may not be used to 

raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been 

raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 

F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). See also Local 

Rule 230(j) (requiring the party seeking reconsideration to demonstrate, among other things, what 

new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist at the time of the 

prior motion).

Though Plaintiff has not filed a motion to proceed in formal pauperis, in his Objections, 

he argues he should be permitted to proceed without paying filing fees. The Court has concluded 

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already he is ineligible to so proceed. 

Indisputably, at least three of Plaintiff’s lawsuits have been dismissed as frivolous for 

failure to state a claim1and several others have been dismissed due to his failure to pay the filing 

fee after having been determined ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis.2 Thus, because Plaintiff 

has accumulated “three strikes” against him, he may only proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915 

only if he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he brought the action. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). The 

“imminent danger” exception to the three-strikes rule, requires the Court to examine the 

complaint to determine whether it demonstrates Plaintiff is at imminent danger of serious physical 

injury. Id. After a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court is convinced that he is not.

In his objections to the order requiring him to pay the filing fee, Plaintiff attempts to 

establish he is currently in imminent danger of serious physical harm. He asserts that on 

December 8, 2012, he was “viciously attacked with a baton by an unsupervised officer.” (Doc. 3 

at 2) He explains also that he feels that he is at risk of further attacks because the “Green Wall 

members . . . run rampant throughout the Department’s institutions . . .” Id. at 2. Notably, though 

his complaint addresses retaliation for filing prison grievances, in his objections, he attributes his

recent assault as a result of a gang of correctional officers running amok within the prison system. 

This is an important distinction because there is no indication—or reason to think--that this recent 

event has anything to do with the November 2011 retaliatory incident. 

It is plain that the reason the PLRA requires a showing of imminent danger is to ensure 

that only those cases which require litigation to protect the inmate from serious physical harm

may be allowed to proceed without the payment of fees. Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1053. The fact 

 

1

1) Young v. Briddle, et al., 3:98-cv-00714-SI at Doc. 5 (N.D. Cal June 5, 1998) (failure to state a claim); 

2) Young v. McCargar, et al., 2:00-cv-02393-GEB-DAD at Doc. 25, Doc. 33 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2002) (failure to 

state a claim); and 3) Young v. Bowen, et al., No. 2:01-cv-06368-DSF-MLG at Doc. 213 (C.D. Cal. July. 12, 2007) 

(failure to state a claim). Judicial notice may be taken of court records. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 

626, 635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981).

2

See also Young v. Riley, et al., 2:02-cv-02297-LKK -DAD at Doc. 53, Doc. 58 (three strike dismissal 

March 29, 2005); Young v. Holguin, et al., 1:06-cv-00770-LJO-DLB at Doc. 18, Doc. 25 (three strike dismissal April 

14, 2008); Young v. Parks, et al., 2:09-cv-00336-GEB-GGH at Doc. 15, Doc. 19 (three strike dismissal April 7, 

2011).

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that Plaintiff has been the subject of an act of force more than a year after the events set forth in 

the complaint and a month after he filed is complaint, is insufficient. In this Court’s experience, 

violence—whether at the hands of other inmates or by prison staff--is a real, albeit unacceptable

consequence of incarceration but one which is faced by every prisoner. Despite the absolute 

despicability of this fact, without a connection to his litigation it does not demonstrate that 

Plaintiff was at “imminent danger of serious physical injury” for the purposes of the PLRA at the 

time he filed the litigation. If this was sufficient, a primary purpose of the PLRA—to prevent 

frivolous litigation--could never be met. Thus, the Court holds that the imminent danger showing 

required by the PLRA, must be tied to the litigation rather than merely being a risk suffered by 

inmates generally. Because this new, unrelated event does not demonstrate that Plaintiff was in 

imminent danger when he initiated this litigation, he has not demonstrated that the lawsuit must

be permitted to proceed without the prepayment of fees. Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 

Objections, as construed as a motion for reconsideration.

III. Plaintiff has failed to pay the filing fees as ordered by the Court

“District courts have inherent power to control their dockets,” and in exercising that 

power, a court may impose sanctions including dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing 

Authority of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action with 

prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action or failure to obey a court order, or 

failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9 th Cir. 2995) 

(dismissal for failure to comply with local rules); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th 

Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring amendment of complaint); 

Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply 

with a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for 

failure to prosecute and to comply with local rules).

In determining whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, failure to obey a court 

order, or failure to comply with the Local Rules, the Court must consider several factors, 

including: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 

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disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Henderson, 

779 F.2d at 1423-24; see also Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61; Thomspon, 782 F.2d at 831.

In the case at hand, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the 

Court’s interest in managing the docket weigh in favor of dismissal. The risk of prejudice to the 

defendants also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a presumption of injury arises from the 

occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecution of an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 

F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The Court will not, and cannot, hold the case in abeyance given 

Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee and will not allow it to proceed absent the payment of fees. 

Further, the factors in favor of dismissal outweigh the policy favoring disposition of cases on 

their merits. 

In its December 12, 2012 order, the Court warned Plaintiff that if he failed to comply with 

the order, the Court would recommend his entire matter be dismissed. (Doc. 2). Thus, Plaintiff 

had adequate warning that dismissal would result from his noncompliance with the Court’s order, 

and this satisfies the requirement that the Court consider less drastic measures than dismissal of 

the action. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. Moreover, no lesser sanction 

is feasible given the Court’s inability to communicate with Plaintiff.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff’s “Objections” (Doc. 3) as construed as a motion for reconsideration is 

DENIED;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to assign this matter to a District Judge.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

Because Plaintiff has accumulated “three strikes” under § 1915(g) and was not in 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he brought this action, Plaintiff is barred 

from proceeding in forma pauperis in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Because Plaintiff has 

failed to pay the filing fee as ordered, the Court recommends this matter be DIMISSED without 

prejudice.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

14 days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the 

Objections shall be served and filed within 7 days after the filing of the objections on CM/ECF. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right 

to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2013 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

9j7khijed

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