Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02230/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02230-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LON CARTER, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-2230 GEB GGH P

vs.

JAMES TILTON, et al., 

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and court records indicate that plaintiff has paid the $350.00 filing fee in full. 

Although plaintiff has paid the full filing fee and will not be assessed any further fee, the court

herein will permit plaintiff an opportunity to make the required showing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a), within thirty days, so that should plaintiff file an amended complaint (see below), also

within thirty days, setting forth colorable claims, and should he make the requisite showing to be

granted in forma pauperis status, the court would be able to direct the U.S. Marshal’s Office to

serve any such amended complaint rather than plaintiff being entirely responsible for service of

process. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). 

“The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235 (3d ed. 2004). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

Plaintiff names, in various locations, throughout his complaint, the following as

defendants: Correctional Officer (C/O) Meraz, Correctional (Corr.) Sergeant (Sgt.) E. Alfaro;

Corr. Sgt. D. Calhoun; Corr. Lieutenant (Lt.) D.A. Pina, C/O E.M. Wagner, acting as Avenal

State Prison Appeals Coordinator; Erica Weinstein; K.M. Powers; James Tilton, CDCR Director.

The gravamen of his complaint is that he was subjected to an excessive use of force, on October

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

25, 2006, by being handcuffed by defendant Meraz, after plaintiff refused to cooperate when

inmates in his dormitory were told to report to an interview/interrogation concerning a prior

battery on an inmate, which had occurred weeks before. Complaint, pp. 4, 10, 20-21. After

handcuffing plaintiff, defendant Meraz transported plaintiff to the program office, after which he

was transported the rest of the way by defendant Calhoun. Id. at 20. Plaintiff appears to conflate

what he maintains was a violation of a state regulation, pursuant to CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, §

3268.2, concerning use of restraints with allegations of a violation of the Eighth Amendment. In

any event, on the face of it, the allegations do not show that the use of restraints did violate the

state regulation he identifies, in that the regulation sets forth that “transporting a person between

locations” is a circumstance under which “[m]echanical means of physical restraint may be

used....” CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3268.2(a)(1). Plaintiff has made clear that he refused an order

and was thereafter transported to the program office after being cuffed. 

Plaintiff states that en route to the main program office he was questioned by

defendant Calhoun and once inside the “main supporting office” by defendant Pina and another 

officer, but plaintiff continued to refuse to cooperate. Complaint, p. 4. Plaintiff stated that he

remained handcuffed and was not released for about two hours. “Some time later plaintiff

noticed pain in his thumb.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff links no defendant to his allegations that his

requests to receive medical treatment for his thumb were unanswered, other than elsewhere

conclusorily stating, without providing any factual predicate, that “defendant Erica Weinstein

was cr[ue]l and unus[u]al and deliberate and indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical need of

treating plaintiff’s injured thumb.” Id. at 8. 

Plaintiff faults defendant Alfaro during his first level interview for failing to

document that plaintiff had a swollen thumb in his first level appeal response. Id. On second

level appeal, defendant Wagner “cancelled the appeal for claiming residual physical [e]ffects and

changing actions requested.” Id. However, thereafter non-defendant Appeals Coordinator S.T.

Smith later reinstated the appeal, stating that it had been cancelled in error. Id., at 6. Plaintiff

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

states that thereafter he was subjected to “reprisal from defendant Meraz,” but plaintiff fails to

state what form any such reprisal or retaliation took. Plaintiff claims that his refusal to cooperate

warranted a CDC-115 Rule Violation Report, rather than handcuffing. Complaint, p. 10. 

Plaintiff evidently did receive a CDC-128 B disciplinary chrono for refusing to comply with staff

orders, but not the more serious RVR he apparently believes would have been appropriate. Id. at

21. 

Plaintiff’s claims simply do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

Plaintiff does not make a colorable claim with regard to defendant Meraz, the one he believes

most culpable for an Eighth Amendment violation, that he was subjected to an ‘unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain’” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986)

[citations omitted]. “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical

force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is...whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 6-7,112 S. Ct. at 999). 

When determining whether the force was excessive, we look to the “extent of the

injury..., the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson v. McMillian, supra, at 7, 112 S. Ct. at 999. 

Plaintiff simply does not make an excessive force claim where he alleges that, after refusing to

obey orders, he was handcuffed and transported to a program office to undergo questioning

and/or receive some form of verbal or written disciplinary action when, after the handcuffs are

removed, he later at some undefined time discovers he has a sore or swollen thumb. Nor does

such a claim arise simply from his being handcuffed for two hours while being questioned. 

Although at one point plaintiff alleges that he was tightly restrained by the handcuffs, plaintiff

neither claims that he was in any pain while restrained, that the restraint was too tight, nor that he

informed defendants of any discomfort while he was placed in the handcuffs. Complaint, p. 34. 

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

This claim will be dismissed but plaintiff will be granted leave to amend. 

Nor does plaintiff make a colorable allegation of inadequate medical care for not

having been treated for a sore thumb. In order to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth

Amendment based on inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976). To prevail, plaintiff must show both that

his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable

state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); McKinney v.

Anderson, 959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1992) (on remand). The requisite state of mind for a medical

claim is “deliberate indifference.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998

(1992). In this case, plaintiff wholly fails to meet the threshold of having suffered from a serious

medical condition by simply stating that he had a sore thumb. Plaintiff does contend that his

thumb became infected or that his injury developed into anything approaching a serious medical

condition. Plaintiff’s claims of Eighth Amendment violations will be dismissed, but plaintiff

will be granted leave to amend within thirty days.

As to his claims for a violation to due process in the processing of his inmate

appeals, plaintiff is informed that prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a

specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003),

citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Even the non-existence of, or the

failure of prison officials to properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the

prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1988). See also, Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932

F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991). Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (“[A prison]

grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the

inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural

protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment”). Specifically, a failure to process a

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 “[W]e recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 1

which are protected by the Due Process Clause. See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.

369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). But these interests will be generally limited to

freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as

to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, see, e.g., Vitek v. Jones,

445 U.S. 480, 493, 100 S.Ct.1254, 1263-1264 (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington, 494

U.S. 210, 221- 222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036-1037 (involuntary administration of psychotropic

drugs), nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, supra. 

6

grievance does not state a constitutional violation. Buckley, supra. State regulations give rise to

a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution only if those

regulations pertain to “freedom from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Plaintiff’s due process claims against the defendants will be 1

dismissed but plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

As to plaintiff’s claims against defendants simply in their supervisory capacity, to

the extent he even sets them forth, these claims will also be dismissed. The Civil Rights Act

under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 2

7

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). 

As to plaintiff’s claim of retaliation, plaintiff must set forth what conduct

constitutes such a claim. In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead facts which

suggest that retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or

“motivating” factor behind the defendant’s conduct. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874

F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff must also plead facts which suggest an absence of

legitimate correctional goals for the conduct he contends was retaliatory. Pratt at 806 (citing

Rizzo at 532). Verbal harassment alone is insufficient to state a claim. See Oltarzewski v.

Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). However, even threats of bodily injury are

insufficient to state a claim, because a mere naked threat is not the equivalent of doing the act

itself. See Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Mere conclusions of hypothetical

retaliation will not suffice, a prisoner must “allege specific facts showing retaliation because of

the exercise of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (n. 1)

(10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s undeveloped claim of retaliation will be dismissed but plaintiff will

be granted leave to amend.

Plaintiff’s claims of a Miranda violation by the manner in which he was

2

questioned about the incident about which he refused to talk is simply inapposite in the context

of this civil rights action and will be dismissed. 

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff has paid the filing fee in full and will be assessed no further filing fee;

however, plaintiff is granted leave, within thirty days, to make the requisite showing, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), to proceed in forma pauperis, as set forth above;

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff an Application to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis By a Prisoner.

\\\\\

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

3. The complaint is dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file

an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of service of this order. Failure to file an

amended complaint will result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed.

DATED: 04/03/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

cart2230.b

Case 2:07-cv-02230-LDG Document 5 Filed 04/03/08 Page 9 of 9