Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00927/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00927-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

M.J., a minor, by and through

his parents, G.J. and J.J.,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

FRESNO COUNTY, DR. GARY D.

ZOMALT, in his official capacity

as the Director of the FRESNO

COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN

AND FAMILY SERVICES, and CLOVIS

UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-00927 OWW LJO

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

CLOVIS UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(DOC. 17)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a minor with special education needs, seeks a

declaratory judgment that Defendant Clovis Unified School

District (“CUSD”) breached a settlement agreement Plaintiff and

CUSD entered into in the course of a special education due

process proceeding, conducted pursuant to the Individuals with

Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et

seq. (Doc. 10, First Am. Compl., filed Aug. 30, 2005.) The

Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the Defendant,

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as a political subdivision of the State of California, is immune

from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment, (2) the

court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and (3) the Plaintiff

has failed to state a cause of action for declaratory relief. 

(Doc. 17, filed Sept. 27, 2005.) Plaintiff opposes. (Doc. 20,

filed Oct. 13, 2005.) 

II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

M.J. resides in the Clovis Unified School District (“CUSD”)

within Fresno County. In or around 1999, a CUSD psychologist

assessed M.J. as “autistic-like,” which qualified M.J. for

special education services under the IDEA and California special

education laws. (Doc. 10 at ¶¶ 9-11.) The First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) alleges a long series of failures on the part

of both CUSD and the Fresno County Department of Children and

Family Services (“the Department”), to which he was referred for

therapy, to provide M.J. with the help he needed to benefit from

his education, given his often severe behavior problems. (Doc.

10.) The FAC alleges that these failures violate both state and

federal law. (Id.) 

The FAC further alleges that M.J.’s parents pursued a due

process proceeding against both the Department and CUSD before

the California Special Education Hearing Office on January 27,

2005. Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with CUSD on

the first day of the hearing, and CUSD was dismissed as a

defendant. (Id. at ¶32.) The Hearing Officer subsequently ruled

against the Department, finding that it failed to comply with the

IDEA. Unsatisfied with the relief ordered by the Hearing

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Officer, Plaintiff, through his parents, sought review of the

decision in this court. Subsequently, in late December 2005,

Plaintiff reached a settlement with the Department, and the

Department, together with Fresno County and Dr. Zomalt, were

dismissed from this suit. (See Doc. 28, filed Dec. 20, 2005.) 

Count Five is the only claim that remains. It seeks a

declaratory judgment pursuant to Title 28, Section 2201, of the

United States Code, that CUSD has violated the terms of the

settlement agreement with Plaintiff. Plaintiff complains that

the agreement required CUSD to provide a range of services to

M.J. to address his disability, but that CUSD has not done

provided the agreed-upon services. (See Doc. 10 at ¶¶ 75-88.)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions

“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For a case to “arise under” federal

law, a plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint must establish either

(1) that federal law creates the cause of action or (2) that the

plaintiff's asserted right to relief depends on the resolution of

a substantial question of federal law. Peabody Coal Co. v.

Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for

S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)). It is Plaintiff’s burden to

establish the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In re Ford

Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The party

asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the

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case is properly in federal court.”). 

Here, Plaintiff’s only remaining claim seeks a declaration

that CUSD has breached their settlement agreement. Plaintiff

suggests that this claim arises under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415,

but Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiffs have not pled

a claim directly under the IDEA against CUSD. Rather, the

settlement agreement was formed during the course of a state

administrative hearing. 

An alternative basis for jurisdiction over the remaining

claim is the federal Declaratory Judgment Act. But, the federal

declaratory-judgment statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, does not provide

an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th

Cir 2005); see also 10B Fed. Prac. & Pro. §§ 2751 & n.6, 2766 &

n.2 (underlying claims and applicable law determine jurisdiction

in a declaratory relief action). Without jurisdiction over the

subject matter of Plaintiff’s contract claim, declaratory relief

is unavailable. 

CUSD argues that the underlying claim here is one for

enforcement of the terms of a settlement agreement, citing

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375,

377 (1994), which held that enforcement of a settlement agreement

“is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for

federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 382. There is no independent

basis for federal jurisdiction over the settlement agreement

between Plaintiff and CUSD.

Plaintiff argues, however, that even if the court lacks an

independent jurisdictional basis to grant the declaratory relief

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sought, the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining claim. (Doc. 20 at 5.) The FAC alleged that both

Fresno County and the Department violated federal statutes,

allegations over which the court would have had subject-matter

jurisdiction. However, those claims have been dismissed. A

district court may, in its discretion, decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all

remaining federal claims have been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3). It is appropriate to decline Supplemental

jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) when it serves objectives of

economy, convenience and fairness to the parties, and comity. 

Trustees of Construction Industry and Laborers Health, et al. v.

Desert Valley Landscape & Maintenance, Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925

(9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Among other considerations,

“[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided.” Id.

Kokkonen provides guidance. There, Kokkonen filed suit in

state court against an insurance company for terminating his

general agency agreement. The defendant removed the case to

federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at

376. The case was resolved by a settlement agreement, but the

agreement did not provide that the district court retain

enforcement jurisdiction. Id. at 376. Later, the parties

disagreed over the scope of certain obligations created by the

settlement agreement. Kokkonen moved in the district court to

enforce the agreement’s terms. The Defendant objected on

jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court examined whether it

was appropriate for the district court to exercise ancillary

jurisdiction, a doctrine that “recognizes federal courts’

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jurisdiction over some matters (otherwise beyond their

competence) that are incidental to other matters properly before

them.” Generally ancillary jurisdiction is asserted “for two

separate, though sometimes related, purposes: (1) to permit

disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying

respects and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable

a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its

proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its

decrees.” Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted). Although the

judicially created doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is not

exactly parallel to the statutory factors to be considered in

deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the

Supreme Court’s reasoning is instructive. Applying the two

ancillary jurisdiction factors, the Court reasoned that “the

facts underlying [the] dismissed claim for breach of [the] agency

agreement and those underlying [the] claim for breach of the

settlement agreement have nothing to do with each other; it would

neither be necessary nor particularly efficient that they be

adjudicated together.” Id. at 380.

Plaintiff suggests that there are practical considerations

here that warrant departure from Kokkonen’s reasoning. 

Essentially, Plaintiff maintains that forcing his declaratory

judgment action back to state court would needlessly complicate

the course of the litigation:

If, as CUSD suggests, Plaintiff’s action may only be

maintained in state court, then Plaintiff will be

forced to file a state court action declaring CUSD’s

consideration under the Settlement Agreement forfeit[]. 

If Plaintiff is successful, then Plaintiff will be

forced to take two parallel routes[:] (1) to refile a

due process [state administrative] proceeding against

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CUSD in order to demonstrate that CUSD violated the

IDEA and to obtain an order requiring CUSD to provide

services since it refuses to do so in accordance with

the Settlement Agreement; and (2) to refile a

discrimination claim in this [c]ourt for the violations

of law by FRESNO COUNTY which CUSD is rightfully held

liable for under the IDEA and Section 504.

(Doc. 20 at 4.) 

Plaintiff’s argument has some practical merit. It might be

more efficient for the claim to enforce the settlement agreement

to remain in federal court if, at the end of the day, Plaintiff

has to return to federal court to ultimately adjudicate his

rights under the DEA. However, the IDEA’s statutory scheme is

set up to give the state administrative system the first chance

to correct any mistakes in administration of federally funded

programs for special needs students. See Hoeft v. Tucson Unified

School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992)(“Exhaustion of

the administrative process [in IDEA cases] allows for the

exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state and

local agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational

issues, furthers development of a complete factual record, and

promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first

opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs

for disabled children.”).

The settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and CUSD

dismissed CUSD as a defendant from the state due process

administrative hearing before that hearing was completed. As

Defendant correctly points out, even if the settlement agreement

is nullified, Plaintiff would not be eligible to directly return

to federal court. First, Plaintiff would be required to exhaust

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Plaintiff also suggests that he “will simply need to 1

amend his action in federal court in order to allege a

discrimination claim against CUSD for the violations of law by

Fresno county which CUSD is rightfully held liable for under the

IDEA and Section 504.” (Doc. 20 at 4.) But, Plaintiffs offer no

authority to support the proposition that any such claim would be

exempt from the exhaustion requirements. 

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his administrative remedies against CUSD. See id.; see also 20 1

U.S.C. § 1415(f). The existence of this exhaustion requirement

in connection with the “traditionally strong state and local

interest in education, as reflected in the statute's emphasis on

state and local responsibility,” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1302, counsel

against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s federal declaratory relief claim. 

 

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

As an alternative ground for dismissal, CUSD maintains that

the remaining claim in this case must be dismissed because it is

immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution. Plaintiff responds that the State of

California waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits under

IDEA because the State accepted federal funds for purposes of

special education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(“A State shall not be

immune under the 11th amendment to the Constitution of the United

States from suit in Federal court for a violation of this

chapter.”). However, Plaintiff has not named CUSD as a defendant

in an IDEA claim. The waiver set forth in § 1403(a) is

inapplicable. 

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C. Request for Leave to Amend to Allege a “Stay Put”

Claim.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint to assert a

Motion to Stay Put, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). 

As a result of a present dispute with CUSD as to

Plaintiff’s appropriate placement, Plaintiff intends to

avail himself of the right to file a Motion to Stay Put

pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Section 1415(j)

provides for original jurisdiction over a proceeding

seeking a “stay put” order. Murphy v. Arlington Cent.

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir.

2002); Cole v. Metro Gov’t of Nashsville, 954 F. Supp.

1214 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).

Plaintiff’s request for a stay put order relates to his

declaratory relief action because the “stay put”

placement contained in the Settlement Agreement is

inappropriate given the contention that CUSD has

forfeited its benefits under the Settlement Agreement.

As a result, this Court has jurisdiction, either

through original or supplemental jurisdiction, over the

declaratory relief action in addition to the Motion to

Stay Put, for which the Court has original

jurisdiction.

(Doc. 20 at 2.) 

The stay put provision provides:

Except as provided in subsection (k)(4) of this

section, during the pendency of any proceedings

conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or

local educational agency and the parents otherwise

agree, the child shall remain in the then- current

educational placement of the child, or, if applying for

initial admission to a public school, shall, with the

consent of the parents, be placed in the public school

program until all such proceedings have been completed.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

//

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//

//

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The amendment of pleadings is governed by Federal 2

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which provides:

 A party may amend the party's pleading once as a

matter of course at any time before a responsive

pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which

no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has

not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may

so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is

served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's

pleading only by leave of court or by written consent

of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given

when justice so requires....

Leave to amend should be “freely given,” “[i]n the absence of any

apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to

cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 182 (1962)(emphasis added). 

10

CUSD suggests that it would be futile for Plaintiff to bring

a stay put claim. Specifically CUSD argues: 2

The cases that plaintiff cites [in support of bringing

a stay put claim] deal with jurisdiction over stand

alone, emergency requests for stay put during the

course of an administrative proceeding. Murphy v.

Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195,

199 (2d Cir. 2002); Cole v. Metropolitan Government of

Nashville, 954 F. Supp.1214 (M.D. Tenn. 1997). They do

not address the situation here, where the plaintiff has

filed an ordinary civil complaint seeking an

interpretation of a contract between the parties

independent of any administrative proceeding.

In the cases cited by plaintiff, limited jurisdiction

was conferred to hear a motion for stay put because (1)

the claim was brought directly to enforce an IDEA

right, and (2) exhaustion of administrative remedies

would be inadequate because the right being asserted

was to a determination of placement during the course

of the administrative proceeding itself. However, in

the Cole case upon which plaintiff relies, the court

made clear that a petition for stay put is only a

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 Notably, CUSD cites no Ninth Circuit authority in 3

support of this proposition.

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limited exception to the exhaustion doctrine, and that

substantive issues regarding whether a change in

placement had occurred and whether that denied the

student a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”)

needed to be resolved by the administrative tribunal in

the first instance. Cole, supra, 954 F. Supp. at 1221.

(Doc. 21 at 2-3.) CUSD also suggests that the entire rationale

underlying those cases that justify giving a district court

jurisdiction over stay put petitions prior to the exhaustion of

administrative remedies is inapplicable in California, where

“hearing officers routinely entertain motions for stay put during

the pendency of due process proceedings. See, e.g., Ocean View

Elem. Sch. Dist., SN 1593-00, November 3, 2000, 102 LRP 3252;

Tehachapi Unif. Sch. Dist., SN 04-00242, February 13, 2004, 41

IDELR 20, 104 LRP 13295 (Appendix of Foreign Authorities, Exs 1

and 2).” (Doc. 21 at 3.) CUSD further argues: 3

Moreover, the rationale is particularly thin in this

case where the plaintiff cannot expect to get a speedy

determination on stay put by filing his declaratory

relief action. The entire purpose for plaintiff’s

declaratory relief claim is to obtain a ruling on

whether the District has breached the agreement, such

that the agreement’s stay put provisions are no longer

binding on the parties. This determination will come at

the end of a trial or upon a dispositive motion. The

motion for stay put that plaintiff claims he will file

would only be filed, if at all, after the Court has

made a final determination on the merits of the

declaratory relief claim. Thus, it is logically

impossible for such a stay put motion to retroactively

confer jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s declaratory

relief claim.

(Doc. 21 at 3.)

//

//

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CUSD’s arguments regarding futility are persuasive. 

Nevertheless, it is impossible to determine in the abstract

whether any of these arguments will ultimately operate to bar

Plaintiff’s proposed stay put claim. In view of the liberal

policy favoring amendment and because unintended delay by the

court in issuing this ruling should not prejudice either party,

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, CUSD’s motion to dismiss is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amendment shall be filed with

twenty (20) days following the date of service of this decision.

SO ORDERED

DATED: September 15, 2006

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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