Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_04-cv-00599/USCOURTS-alsd-2_04-cv-00599-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1Plaintiff originally filed a complaint on July 20, 2004, in

the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Alabama. (Doc. 1). In this original complaint, Plaintiff

named Thomas A P R Jones, Stephen Bullard, and Ms. Wilson as

Defendants. (Id.). However, the action was subsequently

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

HERBERT CORNELL, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 04-0599-CG-M

THOMAS AP R JONES, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

This action has been referred to the undersigned for

appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and

Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). It is recommended that this action be

dismissed with prejudice as frivolous, prior to service of

process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

I. Nature of Proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a section 1983 complaint naming as the

sole Defendant Thomas A P R Jones, identified by Plaintiff as

the Circuit Judge of Dallas County.1 (Doc. 7, Complaint). In

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transferred to this Court on the basis that Plaintiff is

incarcerated at William E. Donaldson Correctional Facility

which is within the jurisdiction of this Court. (Docs. 3, 4,

and 5). Upon receipt of Plaintiff’s action, this Court

ordered Plaintiff to file his section 1983 complaint on this

Court’s forms, along with a Motion to Proceed without

Prepayment of Fees. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff filed his new

complaint, which by this Court’s Order supersedes the previous

complaint, on October 12, 2004. (Doc. 7). Although in his

previous complaint, Plaintiff named two additional defendants,

the Court notes that Plaintiff has named only Defendant Jones

in this current, superseding complaint. (Doc. 7). 

2

this action, Plaintiff appears to claim that his

constitutional rights were violated in 1998, when he and his

trial counsel were unaware of Plaintiff’s prior felony

convictions, and thus unaware that Plaintiff would be

sentenced “under the Habitual Offender Law.” (Doc. 7 at 5). 

Plaintiff implies that he would have entered a guilty plea to

the charge of first degree rape, as opposed to proceeding to

trial on that charge, if he had been aware of his prior felony

convictions in the state of Georgia. (Id.). Plaintiff

further claims that his rights were violated because his

conviction of first degree rape was obtained through the use

of hearsay and false evidence. (Id.). For relief, Plaintiff

seeks monetary damages in the amount of five hundred thousand

dollars, along with an additional amount of one million

dollars for mental anguish. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff also

requests that this Court reverse Plaintiff’s conviction and

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2The predecessor to this section is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

Even though Congress made many substantive changes to §

1915(d) when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2)(B), the

frivolity and the failure to state a claim analysis contained

in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L.

Ed. 2d 338 (1989), was unaltered. See Bilal v. Driver, 251

F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.) , cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044, 122

S. Ct. 624, 151 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2001); Brown v. Bargery, 207

F.3d 863, 866 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000). However, dismissal under §

1915(e)(2)(B) is now mandatory. Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1348-49.

3

send the case back to state court for Plaintiff to receive a

new trial. (Id.). 

II. Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the

Court is reviewing Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).2 Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may be

dismissed as “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in

law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.

Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants

are immune from suit, id. at 327, 109 S. Ct. at 1833, the

claim seeks to enforce a right which clearly does not exist,

id., or there is an affirmative defense that would defeat the

claim, such as the statute of limitations, Clark v. Georgia

Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).

Case 2:04-cv-00599-CG-M Document 10 Filed 06/28/05 Page 3 of 11
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III. Discussion.

Plaintiff claims that he, along with his trial counsel

were unaware of Plaintiff’s own prior felony convictions, and

that this lack of knowledge in part contributed to their

decision to proceed to trial rather than enter into a plea

agreement regarding Plaintiff’s charge of first degree rape. 

(Doc. 7 at 5). Further, Plaintiff claims that his conviction

was obtained through the use of hearsay and false evidence. 

(Id.). The conviction which Plaintiff references is that of

life without the possibility of parole as the result of

Plaintiff entering a guilty plea on March 18, 1998, to the

charge of first degree rape. Notably, Plaintiff has indicated

that this conviction has not been reversed, expunged,

invalidated, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. (Id.). 

As Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive

damages, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims in this action are

precluded from review by the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). In Heck,

a prisoner filed a § 1983 damages action against the

prosecutors and investigator in his criminal case for their

actions which resulted in his conviction. The Supreme Court

analogized the plaintiff's claim to a common-law cause of

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action for malicious prosecution, which has as a required

element that the accused prove the termination of the prior

criminal proceeding in favor of the accused. 512 U.S. at 484,

114 S. Ct. at 2371. The Supreme Court opined:

We think the hoary principle that civil

tort actions are not appropriate vehicles

for challenging the validity of outstanding

criminal judgments applies to § 1983

damages actions that necessarily require

the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of

his conviction or confinement, just as it

had always applied to actions for malicious

prosecution (footnote omitted). 

We hold that, in order to recover damages

for allegedly unconstitutional conviction

or imprisonment, or for other harm caused

by actions whose unlawfulness would render

a conviction or sentence invalid, (footnote

omitted), a § 1983 plaintiff must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim

for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 

Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages

in a § 1983 suit, the district court must

consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence;

if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence

has already been invalidated. But if the

district court determines that the

plaintiff's action, even if successful,

will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

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outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff, the action should be allowed to

proceed (footnote omitted), in the absence

of some other bar to the suit (footnote

omitted).

Id. at 486-87, 114 S. Ct. at 2372-73. 

This decision thus requires a plaintiff in a § 1983

action who is attempting "to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm

caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction

or sentence invalid," to make a showing that his conviction,

sentence, or other criminal judgment was reversed, expunged,

declared invalid by an appropriate state tribunal, or called

into question in a federal court's issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus. Id. at 486-87, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. If a

plaintiff fails to make this showing, then no cause of action

under § 1983 exists. Id. at 489, 114 S. Ct. 2373. If, in a §

1983 action, a plaintiff contends that a favorable ruling on

his claims would not invalidate his conviction, sentence,

confinement, or other criminal judgment, the burden is on the

plaintiff to prove this contention in order for his claims to

proceed. Id. at 487, 114 S. Ct. at 2374. 

In the present action, Plaintiff has not shown that his

conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared

invalid by an appropriate state tribunal, or called into

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3Regarding Plaintiff’s request that his case be sent “back”

for a new trial, it has been held that “habeas corpus is the

exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact

or duration of his confinement and seeks an immediate or

speedier release...” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481, 114

S. Ct. 2364, 2369, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994)(citing Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439

(1973). Plaintiff has filed a section 1983 complaint, as

opposed to a habeas corpus, and is thus not entitled to his

requested relief. 

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question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus. Accordingly, any damages claims that would invalidate

Plaintiff’s convictions or sentences if the Court were to rule

favorably upon them would be precluded by the Heck decision

because Plaintiff has failed to establish that his convictions

or sentences have been invalidated in a manner prescribed by

Heck, supra. As a result, Plaintiff’s damages claims should

be dismissed as frivolous.3 

However, even if Plaintiff were to show that these claims

are beyond the scope of Heck because they would not invalidate

his conviction or sentence if the Court were to rule favorably

upon them, these claims would nonetheless be barred by the

two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in

Alabama. As noted previously, Plaintiff claims that his

constitutional rights were violated in March of 1998, when he

was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 

(Doc. 7 at 7). The Court finds that while Plaintiff knew

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4As noted previously, Plaintiff originally filed this action

on July 20, 2004, in the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Alabama, and the action was subsequently

transferred to this Court. (Docs. 1, 3, 4, and 5). Plaintiff

filed a new complaint as directed by this Court on October 12,

2004. (Doc. 7). The differences in the dates are not

important, however, as both dates are considerably well beyond

the time allowed for filing section 1983 claims. 

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about his civil rights claim against Defendant in March of

1998, when Plaintiff alleges the violation occurred, he waited

until July 20, 2004, to file this § 1983 action.4 (Doc. 1).

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action in Alabama

is two years. Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1106, 1108

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917, 113 S. Ct. 326, 121

L. Ed. 2d 246 (1992); Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l). The statute of

limitations

“‘does not begin to run until the facts

which would support a cause of action are

apparent or should be apparent to a person

with a reasonably prudent regard for his

rights.’” Calhoun v. Alabama Alcoholic

Beverage Control Board, 705 F.2d 422, 425

(11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Reeb v. Economic

Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924,

930 (5th Cir. 1975)). Thus Section 1983

actions do not accrue until the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know that he has

been injured. Calhoun, 705 F.2d at 424;

Rubin, 621 F.2d at 116; Lavellee, 611 F.2d

at 1131. Nor will a Section 1983 action

accrue until the plaintiff is aware or

should have been aware who has inflicted

the injury. Lavellee, 611 F.2d at 1131

(quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S.

111, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L. Ed. 2d 259

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(1979)).

Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987). 

In the present action, Plaintiff knew of the facts

supporting his claim in March 1998, when the alleged

unconstitutional action occurred. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff

filed the present action on or about July 20, 2004,

significantly more than two years from when his claim accrued

against Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff’s pleadings do not

show a reason why the two-year statute of limitations should

not be applied to bar his claims. Akins v. United States, 204

F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2000) (“‘Equitable tolling is

appropriate when a movant untimely files because of

extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control

and unavoidable even with diligence.’”) (quoting Sandvik v.

United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999)), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 971, 121 S. Ct. 410, 148 L. Ed. 2d 316

(2000); Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479-80 (11th

Cir. 1993) (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans’ Affairs,

498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S. Ct. 453, 45-58, 112 L. Ed. 2d 435

(1990)) (equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is

to be used sparingly and does not extend to garden variety

claims of excusable neglect). Therefore, any claims that

might be considered beyond the purview of Heck would be barred

Case 2:04-cv-00599-CG-M Document 10 Filed 06/28/05 Page 9 of 11
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by the two-year statute of limitations and are subject to

dismissal as frivolous.

IV. Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that

this action be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous, prior to

service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

The attached sheet contains important information

regarding objections to the Report and Recommendation. Should

Plaintiff wish to make objections to this Report and

Recommendation, this is Plaintiff’s opportunity to show the

Court why his claims are not barred by the decision in Heck v.

Humphrey, supra, and/or are not barred by the two-year statute

of limitations for §1983 claims. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d

1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003). 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk

of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by

the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will

bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the

magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677

F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for

challenging the findings and recommendations of the magistrate

judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1,

1997), which provides that:

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A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter

excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a

“Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with a

copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is

established by order. The statement of objection shall

specify those portions of the recommendation to which

objection is made and the basis for the objection. The

objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different

disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy

of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or

referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of

the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to

a Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment

can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 28th day of June, 2005.

 

 s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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