Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01850/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346t Tort Claim

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARY JANE FISHER, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-1850-L-AGS 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [ECF No. 14] 

Pending before the Court is Defendant United States’ (“Defendant”) motion for 

summary judgment. ECF No. 14. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court decides 

the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. For the reasons stated 

below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

 This Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) case arises out of a February 12, 2015 

incident where Plaintiff Mary Jane Fisher (“Fisher”) was assaulted and battered by Brenda 

Olsen (“Olsen”), a former employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). At the 

time, Olsen was a Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor for Plaintiff, a military veteran, at 

Mira Costa College. Olsen started her career at the VA in 2002 and retired in June 2015 

amid pending termination. In the later years of her employment, Linda Raffigone 

supervised Olsen. Olsen was disciplined by her supervisors at the VA for at least three 

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separate incidents of misconduct (two written counselings on July 8, 2010, and May 21, 

2013 and a five-day suspension for fraudulently certifying VA Form 28-1905) prior to the 

February 12, 2015 incident. 

 On August 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Complaint under the FTCA alleging that the 

VA was negligent in the hiring, supervision, and retention of Olsen. Plaintiff also alleged 

that the VA’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injuries that she suffered 

due to Olsen assaulting her on February 12, 2015. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

 Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party 

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment 

as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute 

about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

 The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party 

can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential 

element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party 

failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23. “Disputes over 

irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. 

Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 “[T]he district court may limit its review to the documents submitted for the purpose 

of summary judgment and those parts of the record specifically referenced therein.” 

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Therefore, the court is not obligated “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of 

triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Richards v. 

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Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995). If the moving party fails to 

discharge this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not 

consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159–

60 (1970). 

 If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat 

summary judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts.” Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co., Ltd. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

586 (1986). Rather, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and by “the 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. 

Civ P. 56(e)). 

 When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from 

the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 

475 U.S. at 587. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing 

of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he 

[or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts a single contention in its motion: the discretionary function 

exception to the FTCA bars Plaintiff’s claim. The Court agrees with that contention. 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), an FTCA claim is waived when based on a discretionary 

function of an employee of the Government “whether or not the discretion involved [is] 

abused.” The FTCA’s discretionary function exception “marks the boundary between 

Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to 

protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.” 

Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). Courts enlist a two-pronged test to 

determine whether the discretionary function exception bars a particular claim. Alfrey c. 

United States, 276 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 2002). First, the court must define “whether the 

challenged conduct is discretionary, that is whether it ‘involv[es] an element of judgment 

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or choice.’” Id. (quoting Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998)) 

(alteration in original). “This element is not met ‘when a federal statute, regulation or 

policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.’” Id. (quoting 

Fang, 140 F.3d at 1241). Second, if the conduct proves discretionary, “the court “must 

determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function was designed 

to shield.” Id. (quoting Berkovitz, 486, U.S. at 536). “[O]nly governmental actions and 

decisions based on considerations of public policy” are protected by the discretionary 

function exception. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537. “It is not necessary for the government to 

prove a conscious decision based on a policy analysis.” Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 

810, 813 (9th Cir. 1993). “It is enough that the choice is one to which a policy analysis 

may apply.” Id. A court must dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the 

discretionary function exception applies to the claim. Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Research Found. 

Inc., 339 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Linda Raffigone exercised discretion in the supervision, discipline, and retention of 

Brenda Olsen. Raffigone’s disciplinary decisions in response to Olsen’s misconduct 

during Olsen’s tenure at the VA involved an element of judgment as she testified that the 

table of penalties within the Employee/Management Relations did not mandate certain 

outcomes but acted more as a guideline to possible penalties. See ECF No. 14-5. 

Moreover, it is undisputed that “[t]here are no federal statutes, regulations or policies that 

specifically prescribed a course of action to be followed by the VA with regard to the 

hiring, supervision or retention of Brenda Olsen.” ECF No. 18. Accordingly, the 

challenged conduct is discretionary. 

 In the Ninth Circuit, employment-related decisions by governmental agencies 

generally fall under the discretionary function exception. See Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 

1066, 1084 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that “the decision of whether and how to retain and 

supervise an employee [is] the type of discretionary judgment that the [discretionary 

function exception] was designed to protect]); Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001 

(9th Cir. 2000) (finding that negligent and reckless employment, supervision, and training 

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of United States personnel “falls squarely within the discretionary function exception”); 

Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the discretionary 

function exception applies to the negligent hiring, training, and supervision of an agent for 

the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]); Gager v. United States, 149 F.3d 918, 

921 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the discretionary function exception to training and 

supervision of Postal employees). Therefore, the VA’s decisions with regard to hiring, 

supervision, and retention of Olsen falls squarely within the discretionary function 

exception. 

 Since the discretionary function exception applies to the sole claim for relief here, 

the Court dismisses the entire claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close this case upon entry of this 

order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 4, 2019 

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