Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02200/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02200-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GORDON ARMSTRONG, BRYON

ARMSTRONG, and JENNIFER

PAYAN ARMSTRONG,

NO. CIV. S-06-2200 LKK/EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

MICHAEL SEXSON, AGENT CORRAL,

RITE-AID CORPORATION, and 

DOES 1-30,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs, Gordon, Bryon and Jennifer Armstrong, bring suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Michael Sexson

and Agent Michael John Corral violated their Fourth Amendment right

to be free from illegal search and seizure. Sexson and Corral are

sued in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs also

bring pendent state law claims against Sexson, Corral, the Rite-Aid

Corporation and Doe I (a Rite-Aid employee). Pending before the

court are three motions to dismiss filed by the three named

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Although the warrant is not attached to the complaint, the 1

court may take judicial notice of the warrant. “[E]ven if a

document is not attached to a complaint, it may be incorporated by

reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to

the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff's

claim.” U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). The

“district court may treat such a document as part of the complaint,

and thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. 

2

defendants. For the reasons discussed herein, the motions to

dismiss are granted in part and denied in part. 

I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiffs’ allegations stem from the search and seizure of

roughly 116 marijuana plants at plaintiffs’ residence in Manteca,

California. Plaintiffs claim they were growing marijuana for both

personal use and for cannabis clubs pursuant to the California

Compassionate Use Act. Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiffs concede that they did

not know precisely how much marijuana the crop would yield, or how

much a cannabis cooperative would use. Compl. ¶ 6.

 Plaintiffs maintain that in 2004, Officer Sexson obtained a

“defective search warrant” to search plaintiffs’ property. The

warrant was allegedly defective for several reasons. First, the

warrant was based on the allegedly illegal observations of Agent

Corral. Comlp. ¶ 8. The affidavit in support of the warrant

reflects that Corral saw plaintiff Jennifer Payne Armstrong

cultivating marijuana plants in a vineyard and that the marijuana

plants “were concealed under the vines of plants.” See Affidavit

in Support of Warrant, Ex. A to Berry Decl. Plaintiffs contend 1

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The court assumes, but does not know, that plaintiffs 2

meant to state “confidential informant”, not “confidential

warrant.” 

3

that the warrant failed to explain how Agent Corral “got to be in

a position to observe [plaintiff] ‘manicuring’ marijuana in a

vineyard at 30500 Garden Ave.” Id. Plaintiffs claim that “there is

no way that Agent Corral could have made such an observation

without trespassing on the subject premises.” Id.

Second, plaintiffs allege that the search warrant was

deficient because the “confidential warrant was not shown to be

reliable in the warrant itself. No history of reliability,

honesty, or basic knowledge were set forth in the warrant.” Compl.

¶ 9.2

Finally, plaintiffs aver that the warrant was based on stale

information. Defendant Sexson received the information regarding

the confidential informant on August 24, 2004, approximately 34

days prior to the warrant being signed and 43 days prior to the

execution of the warrant. 

When defendant Sexson, along with other law enforcement

officers, executed the search warrant on plaintiffs’ property, they

discovered 116 marijuana plants. Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs also

concede that there were an additional 28 plants in packaging in a

trailer and a “warning system that the defendants mistakenly

described as ‘booby traps.’” Id. Plaintiffs contend that they were

candid with the officers and informed the officers that they were

growing for themselves under the Compassionate Use Act and that

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

excess marijuana would be provided to cannabis clubs. Id. 

According to the complaint, plaintiffs were arrested and

charged with cultivation, possession with intent to sell and “booby

trap device.” Compl. ¶ 14. Charges were also brought against

Jennifer Payne Armstrong and Bryon Armstrong for possession of

methamphetamine. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Sexson also seized

property and “a large amount of money had to be paid as bail by

each plaintiff.” Compl. ¶ 15. The criminal charges against

plaintiffs were ultimately dismissed, “shortly after [plaintiffs’]

motion to suppress all evidence obtained by the warrant was granted

on October 24, 2005.” Compl. ¶ 15.

Plaintiffs bring two claims against Officer Sexson and Agent

Corral. The first claim is entitled “wrongful search and

seizure/false imprisonment/malicious prosecution.” The second

claim is entitled “taking/inverse condemnation – violation of

California Constitution, Article I, Section 19.” 

Plaintiffs also name the Rite Aid Corporation and Doe 1 as

defendants. The factual allegations regarding Rite Aid are scant.

Plaintiff Bryon Armstrong brought photographs to a Rite Aid in

Manteca for development. One or more of the photographs depicted

Jennifer Payne Armstrong manicuring marijuana plants. A loss

prevention officer at the Rite Aid provided these photographs to

the Manteca police on September 18, 2004. Compl. ¶ 11. 

Plaintiffs allege that the warrant was also stale because of “the

lack of information in the affidavit about the date of Bryon

Armstrong’s photographs that depicted Ms. Armstrong manicuring

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

marijuana plants.” Compl. ¶ 11.

Plaintiffs bring seven causes of action against Rite Aid and

Doe I: conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligence, nuisance, trespass, invasion of privacy and breach of

contract. 

II.

STANDARDS FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must be

accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The

court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). So

construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle

him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the

plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper for the court

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Plaintiffs seek leave to file an amended complaint to 3

bring the adverse condemnation claim against the Manteca Police

Department. 

6

to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she]

has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . .

laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

III.

ANALYSIS

Pending before the court are three motions to dismiss filed

by the three named defendants. In their opposition, plaintiffs

concede that the claims for adverse condemnation against Officer

Sexson and Agent Corral must be dismissed, but oppose the remaining

motions. Accordingly, the court dismisses the claims for adverse

condemnation. The court addresses each motion in turn. 3

A. Officer Sexson & Agent Corral’s Motions to Dismiss 

Both Sexson and Corral move to dismiss the claims for false

imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Corral also moves to

dismiss the claim for wrongful search and seizure.

1. False Imprisonment Claim

Plaintiffs fail to clarify whether their claim for false

imprisonment is brought under federal or state law. In their

opposition brief, plaintiffs simply state that “the Ninth Circuit

has held that under California law, false arrest is simply one way

of committing false imprisonment.” Opp’n at 5. Plaintiffs then

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2 provides: 4

Except as provided in Section 950.4, a cause of action

against a public employee or former public employee for

injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his

employment as a public employee is barred if an action

against the employing public entity for such injury is barred

under Part 3 (commencing with Section 900) of this division

or under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 945) of Part 4 of

this division. This section is applicable even though the

public entity is immune from liability for the injury.

7

go on to set forth the elements of a claim for false imprisonment

under California state law. 

Plaintiffs’ sole factual allegation regarding their claim for

false imprisonment is that they were wrongfully arrested based on

an invalid warrant. Given that plaintiffs already assert a claim

for wrongful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (thereby

asserting a claim under Section 1983), a claim for false

imprisonment also under the Fourth Amendment would be redundant.

Plaintiffs fail to set forth any allegations which would suggest

that they are bringing a claim which is separate and distinct from

the claim of wrongful seizure. For these reasons, the court will

construe the false imprisonment claims as claims pursuant to state

tort law.

To the extent that plaintiffs bring state tort claims against

Officer Sexson and Agent Corral, these claims must be dismissed.

It is well established that to sue a public employee under

California law, a plaintiff must first file a claim with the

employing public entity. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2. Section 4

950.2 of the California Government Code mandates that 

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The court notes that plaintiffs fail to address the 5

requirements of the California Tort Claims Act in their opposition

brief. 

8

“‘a cause of action against a public employee . . . for injury

resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his employment

as a public employee is barred’ unless a timely claim has been

filed against the employing public entity.” Fowler v. Howell, 42

Cal. App. 4th 1746, 1750 (1996). The California Legislature

“included in the Tort Claims Act what amounts to a requirement that

. . . one who sues a public employee on the basis of acts or

omissions in the scope of the defendant's employment [must] have

filed a claim against the public-entity employer pursuant to the

procedure for claims against public entities.” Briggs v. Lawrence,

230 Cal. App. 3d 605, 612-13 (1991) (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§

911.2, 945.4, 950.2, 950.6(a)). Indeed, failure to adequately

allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act when suing a public

employee requires dismissal. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming

dismissal of pendent state law claims against public employee where

plaintiff failed to allege compliance with the Tort Claims Act).

Here, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege compliance with

California tort claim procedures and thus, the claims for false

imprisonment against Sexson and Corral must be dismissed. 

5

2. Malicious Prosecution

To the extent that plaintiffs are attempting to bring a state

cause of action for malicious prosecution, it must be dismissed for

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

the reasons discussed above, namely, failure to allege compliance

with the California Tort Claims Act.

Plaintiffs may, however, state a cause of action for malicious

prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well established

that in “order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious

prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must show that the defendants prosecuted

[him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so

for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another

specific constitutional right.’” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368

F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004), citing Freeman v. City of Santa

Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Poppell v. City

of San Diego, 149 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that

“malicious prosecution with the intent to deprive a person of equal

protection of the law or otherwise to subject a person to a denial

of constitutional rights is cognizable under § 1983.”)

“[m]alicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against

prosecutors but may be brought . . . against other persons who have

wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at

1062.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs allege that Sexson and Corral

“advised, assisted, ratified and/or directed the initiation and

continuation of prosecution . . . withheld exculpatory information

from the prosecutor, had no probable cause to justify any advocacy

for taking action that would result in prosecution, and acted with

malice.” Compl. ¶ 17. 

In support of this claim, plaintiffs allege that Sexson’s

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 A mere allegation of a defective warrant is likely to be 6

insufficient to support a claim for malicious prosecution. As

noted above, however, plaintiffs allege more.

10

affidavit in support of the search warrant was defective and thus,

the subsequent search of plaintiffs’ property and plaintiffs’

arrest violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.6

Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the information from Agent

Corral was obtained illegally, that no information was provided

about the confidential informant, and that the affidavit was based

on stale information, such as the photographs. See Compl. ¶¶ 8,

9, 10. Although Agent Corral did not sign the affidavit in support

of the warrant, he did provide information to Officer Sexson and

thus could also be liable for malicious prosecution. See Awabdy,

368 F.3d at 1066.

While plaintiffs’ complaint certainly lacks detail, the court

may not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim.

See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Here, it

is certainly possible that plaintiffs could prove facts to support

their claim. Namely, plaintiffs could, on a motion for summary

judgment or a trial, present evidence that Agent Corral obtained

information illegally and that Officer Sexson filed a defective

affidavit in support of a search warrant and that both acted with

malice and with the intent to deprive plaintiffs’ of their Fourth

Amendment rights. The complaint alleges as much and that is all

that is required to survive a motion to dismiss. For these

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

reasons, Sexson and Corral’s motions to dismiss with respect to

plaintiffs’ claim for malicious prosecution must be denied. 

3. Agent Corral’s Motion to Dismiss the Wrongful Search and

Seizure Claim

Agent Corral also moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for

wrongful search and seizure. In his five page motion to dismiss,

Corral makes two general arguments, both of which are unavailing.

First, Corral construes the wrongful search and seizure claim as

a state law claim and argues that plaintiffs have failed to

comply with the California Tort Claims Act. See Corral Mot. to

Dismiss at 3. While Corral is correct that plaintiffs’ state law

claims must be dismissed for failure to comply with the

California Tort Claims Act, plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful search

and seizure is clearly a claim under federal law, specifically,

Section 1983. Plaintiffs allege that while acting under the

color of state law, Corral violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment

right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures. This is

a claim under federal law. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632

-633 (9th Cir. 1988) (setting forth the requirements for Section

1983 liability). Accordingly, there is no requirement that

plaintiffs comply with the California Tort Claims Act.

Corral also argues that he did not trespass when he observed

Jennifer Armstrong manicuring marijuana plants. In Corral’s

reply brief he states: “It is undisputed that CORRAL’S

observations of criminal activity occurring on the plaintiffs’

property were made during a lawful aerial over flight . . . At

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

no time did CORRAL enter The Property.” Corral Reply Br. at 2.

Corral goes on to explain that aerial observations are legal.

While it may be true that Corral did nothing illegal, the court

is adjudicating a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary

judgment. On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.

319, 322 (1972). The complaint alleges that Corral trespassed.

Compl. ¶ 8. Moreover, the warrant is silent as to how Corral

viewed the marijuana plants. Accordingly, the court cannot and

will not resolve a factual dispute as to where Corral was located

when he observed Ms. Armstrong and the marijuana plants.

Corral’s factual contention that he was conducting a fly-over

when he observed Ms. Armstrong cultivating marijuana plants can

and should be raised on a motion for summary judgment or at

trial. For these reasons, Corral’s motion to dismiss the claim

for wrongful search and seizure must be denied. 

B. Rite Aid’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiffs assert seven causes of action against Rite-Aid

and Doe I: conversion, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, negligence, nuisance, trespass, invasion of privacy,

and breach of contract. 

As a general matter, the complaint contains almost no

factual allegations about Rite Aid. It simply alleges that a

Rite Aid employee (“Doe I”) provided to the police photos of Ms.

Armstrong manicuring marijuana plants. Compl. ¶ 11. The

affidavit in support of the warrant provides limited additional

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

detail. The affidavit states that the photo department of the

Rite Aid located at 1245 West Yosemite Ave in Manteca had

developed “some film that had pictures of a white female

manicuring marijuana plants . . . the envelope for the

photographs had the name Armstrong with an address of 30500

Gordon Ave.” See Warrant, Berry Decl., Ex. A. 

Before addressing each of plaintiffs’ seven causes of

action, the court must address the main argument raised in

plaintiffs’ opposition brief. In response to Rite Aid’s motion

to dismiss, plaintiffs argue that the photos of Ms. Armstrong

cultivating marijuana “had no criminal relevance whatsoever, any

more than a photo of Ms. Armstrong holding a Valium pill.” Pls.’

Opp’n at 9. “Given that the possession of marijuana and

cultivation of cannabis is completely legal in the state of

California for care givers and for patients, it was reckless for

Doe I to assume that the conduct [depicted in the photos]

constituted probable cause of any crime whatsoever.” Id. at 14.

This argument is unavailing.

Plaintiffs misstate the protections of California’s

Compassionate Use Act (“Act”). While the Act does provide that

marijuana may be legally grown for limited medical purposes, see

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(d), the act does not provide

complete immunity from arrest. In People v. Mower, the

California Supreme Court explained: 

Even when law enforcement officers believe that a person

who "possesses or cultivates marijuana" is a "patient"

or "primary caregiver" acting on the "recommendation or

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

approval of a physician," they may . . . have reason to

believe that that person does not possess or cultivate

the substance for the personal medical purposes of the

patient. Thus, we conclude that section 11362.5(d) does

not grant any immunity from arrest. 

People v. Mower, 28 Cal.4th 457,469 (2002). Although the Act

does not provide for complete immunity from arrest, the Mower

court concluded that the Act does provide limited immunity from

prosecution and that a criminal defendant could raise the Act as

a defense at trial, or as the basis for a motion to set aside an

indictment or information prior to trial. Id. at 470. In short,

the Act provides for an affirmative defense to prosecution, not

to arrest. 

As applied to the case at bar, plaintiffs claim that the

photographs only depicted legal activity, namely growing medical

marijuana. Therefore, the Rite Aid employee acted unreasonably

in providing the photographs to the police. In light of Mower,

this argument is without foundation. If there is no immunity

from arrest, it cannot be the case that plaintiffs have immunity

from Rite Aid turning over photos of marijuana to the police.

In other words, the court cannot hold a Rite Aid employee to a

higher standard than police officers. The photographs depicted

marijuana plants. While it may be that plaintiffs had sufficient

prescriptions for all the plants (a fact that plaintiffs

themselves do not allege), at the time the Rite Aid employee saw

the photographs he only saw marijuana plants and it was

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

It is also worth noting that cultivating large quantities 7

of marijuana is illegal under federal law, see 21 U.S.C. § 841

(b)(1)(B) and there is no medical marijuana exception. See Gonzales

v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). Therefore, under federal law,

the photos most certainly depicted illegal conduct. Although

plaintiffs were not arrested or prosecuted under federal law, the

Rite Aid employee certainly had no way of knowing this. In his

eyes, the photographs depicted activity that could constitute a

crime. Because the parties have not addressed the issue, the court

does not consider whether a claim for a violation of federal law

may be brought where the conduct violated federal law but state law

provides an affirmative defense to a state law violation.

15

reasonable for him to question the legality of the plants.7

There is simply no provision of the Compassionate Use Act

which protects plaintiffs from the actions taken by Rite Aid in

this case and accordingly, there is no legal basis to claim that

the photographs only depicted legal conduct. With this argument

disposed of, the court addresses plaintiffs’ seven causes of

action against Rite Aid. 

1. Conversion

Plaintiffs allege that Doe I “knew or should have known that

his actions would cause the plaintiff’s property to be removed

by law enforcement. Hence, RITE-AID Corporation and DOE I are

liable for conversion.” Compl. ¶ 23.

Conversion is defined as the wrongful exercise of dominion

over the personal property of another. Gruber v. Pacific States

Sav. & Loan Co., 13 Cal.2d 144, 148 (1939). The elements of a

conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to

possession of the property; (2) the defendant's conversion by a

wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.

Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1066 (1998).

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

Plaintiffs’ allegation merely states that Doe I should have

known his actions would cause “plaintiffs’ property to be removed

by law enforcement.” This statement, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim for conversion. First, plaintiffs

fail to assert what property right they have in photographs which

are delivered to a pharmacy for development. Second, plaintiffs

do not allege how Rite Aid’s act of giving the photographs to the

police constituted conversion by wrongful act or disposition of

property rights. 

Although the court is bound to give plaintiffs the benefit

of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint, it is not proper for the court to

assume that "the [plaintiffs] can prove facts which [they have]

not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws

in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). According, plaintiffs’

claim for conversion must be dismissed. 

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he actions of the RITE-AID

Corporation and DOE I, as described, constitute the tort of

intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Compl. ¶ 25.

 The elements of a prima facie case of intentional

infliction of emotional distress in California are: (1) extreme

and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous

conduct. Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593

(1979). For “[c]onduct to be outrageous [it] must be so extreme

as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized

community.” Id.

Plaintiffs have not alleged that Rite Aid took any actions

so extreme and outrageous so as to exceed all bounds of that

usually tolerated in a civilized community. Plaintiffs have also

not alleged the casual connection between Rite Aid’s action and

plaintiffs’ injury. For these reasons, the claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed. 

3. Negligence

Plaintiffs allege that “the actions of the RITE-AID

Corporation and DOE I, as described, constitute the tort of

negligence”. Compl. ¶ 27. The elements of a cause of action for

negligence are: (1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach

of such legal duty; and (3) the breach as the proximate or legal

cause of the resulting injury. Ladd v. County of San Mateo, 12

Cal. 4th 913, 917 (1996). 

Plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of a duty on the

part of Rite Aid or how Rite Aid breached that duty or how Rite

Aid’s actions caused plaintiffs’ injury. Simply stating that

Rite Aid acted negligently is insufficient. Accordingly,

plaintiffs’ claim for negligence must be dismissed.

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

4. Nuisance

Plaintiffs allege that “the actions of the RITE-AID

Corporation and DOE I, as described, constitute the tort of

private nuisance.” Compl. ¶ 29. Nuisance liability arises from

a violation of a duty to another that interferes with the free

use and enjoyment of his or her property. Cutujian v. Benedict

Hills Estates Assn., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1389 (1996). The

essence of a private nuisance is its interference with the use

and enjoyment of land. Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,

22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 124 (1971). To establish a cause of action

for private nuisance, plaintiffs’ must allege that defendants’

substantially and unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs’

interest in the use and enjoyment of their land. San Diego Gas

& Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.4th 893, 938 (1996).

The actions allegedly taken by Rite Aid, namely, providing

the Manteca Police Department with one or more photographs, would

not, if true, constitute a claim for private nuisance.

Plaintiffs fail to explain how Rite Aid’s actions substantially

and unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs’ interest in the use

of their land. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim for nuisance must

be dismissed. 

5. Trespass

Plaintiffs allege that the actions of Rite Aid and Doe I

“constitute the tort of trespass.” Compl. ¶ 31. It is well

established that the “essence of the cause of action for trespass

is an ‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of another.” Miller v.

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

19

National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1480(2 Dist.

1986). 

While plaintiffs allege that police officers entered their

land, they do not allege Rite Aid or Doe I entered their land.

Moreover, plaintiffs do not allege that Rite Aid committed

trespass by causing a third party to enter their land. Even when

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the

complaint simply fails to state a cause of action for trespass.

According, the claim for trespass must be dismissed

6. Invasion of Privacy

Plaintiffs claim that “the actions of Defendants Rite-Aid

Corporation and Doe I, as described, invaded the privacy of the

plaintiffs in violation of the California Constitution, Article

I, Section 1. The plaintiffs’ reasonable expectation of privacy

was violated by the actions of these defendants.” Compl. ¶ 33.

In California, the invasion of an individual's right of

privacy is an actionable tort. Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 823-824 (9th Cir. 1974). Article I,

section 1 of the California Constitution creates a right of

action against private as well as government entities. Hill v.

National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 20 (1994).

A plaintiff alleging an invasion of privacy must establish each

of the following: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2)

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3)

conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.

Id. at 39-40.

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

Plaintiffs fail to allege that they have a legally protected

privacy interest or a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

photographs. Indeed, just the opposite appears true. Plaintiffs

lost any privacy expectation when they delivered the film for

processing to Rite Aid, a third party. See e.g., United States

v. Taylor, 515 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D. Maine 1981) (finding

criminal defendants failed to show a reasonable expectation of

privacy in film, which depicted apparent criminal activity

[smuggling marijuana], delivered to commercial establishment for

development) aff'd, 683 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459

U.S. 945 (1982); Deemer v. Com., 920 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1996)(holding

that criminal defendant had no expectation of privacy with

respect to film he delivered to commercial entity to be developed

into photographs). In Deemer, the Kentucy Supreme Court was

faced with a similar factual situation and determined that: 

The rolls of film here were delivered to commercial

entities whose responsibility was to visually examine the

prints in the development process. Appellant knew or

should have known this. In disseminating the photographs to

commercial entities appellant had no reasonable expectation

of privacy.

Deemer, 920 at 48. Although the Deemer case is not binding, the

holding is legally sound and applies with equal force to the case

at hand. Plaintiffs knew or should have known that in delivering

the photographs to Rite Aid, they forgo any reasonable

expectation of privacy. For these reasons, plaintiffs’ invasion

of privacy claim must be dismissed. 

////

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

7. Breach of Contract 

Plaintiffs final cause of action is for breach of contract.

Plaintiffs allege that Rite Aid entered into a contract with

plaintiff Bryon Armstrong when he brought his film to Rite Aid

for development. According to the complaint, the contract

“ensured the privacy of the purchaser, and that such privacy

would not be breached without good reason and reasonable actions

by Rite-Aid and its employees.” Compl. ¶ 35. 

To establish a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must

demonstrate the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's

performance or excuse for nonperformance, the defendant's breach,

and damage to the plaintiff. Amelco Electric v. City of Thousand

Oaks, 27 Cal.4th 228, 243 (2002). 

Although plaintiffs allege the existence of a contract, the

complaint lacks any factual allegations to support this cause of

action. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a pleading must

“contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief, and... a demand for

judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Here, there is no allegation as to how, if at all, Rite Aid

breached a contract with plaintiffs.

Moreover, even if there was a contract, it would be

unenforceable as a matter of public policy. “[A]ll bargains

tending to stifle criminal prosecution, whether by suppressing

investigation of crime or by deterring citizens from their public

duty of assisting in the detection or punishment of crime, are

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

22

void as against public policy.” Williston on Contracts § 15:8.

See also Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850

(10th Cir. 1972) (holding that public policy would be offended

by enforcement of certain nondisclosure provisions in contract

where nondisclosure would likely permit a crime to be committed

without detection).

For these reasons, the breach of contract claim must be

dismissed. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

1. Defendant Rite Aid’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with

prejudice.

2. Defendant Sexson’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with

respect to the claims for adverse condemnation and

false imprisonment and DENIED with respect to the

claim for malicious prosecution.

3. Defendant Corral’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with

respect to the claims for adverse condemnation and

false imprisonment and DENIED with respect to the

claims for malicious prosecution and wrongful search

and seizure. 

4. Plaintiffs are given thirty days from the date of this

order to file an amended complaint against Corral,

////

////

////

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

23

 Sexson and the Manteca Police Department. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 24, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-02200-LKK -EFB Document 30 Filed 04/25/07 Page 23 of 23