Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07451/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07451-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE A. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORE-MARK INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-07451-JCS 

ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND FOR JUDGMENT ON 

THE PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. No. 28

I. INTRODUCTION

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Willie Brown brings two claims under the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act (“FCRA”) against his former employer, Defendant Core-Mark International, Inc. 

(“Core-Mark”). Core-Mark moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that Brown lacks standing under 

Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) on the 

basis that Core-Mark’s disclosure and Brown’s authorization for Core-Mark to obtain consumer 

reports satisfy the FCRA’s requirement of clarity. The Court held a hearing on May 3, 2019. For 

the reasons discussed below, Core-Mark’s motion is GRANTED IN PART, and Brown’s 

complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. If Brown can cure the deficiencies identified 

herein, he may file a second amended complaint no later than May 24, 2019.

1

II. BACKGROUND

Brown alleges that when he applied and was hired for a job with Core-Mark, he was 

confused by a disclosure form purporting to indicate that Core-Mark could obtain consumer 

reports related to Brown, and that he therefore “did not give valid authorization for [Core-Mark] to 

 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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procure a consumer report.” 1st Am. Compl. (“FAC,” dkt. 21) ¶¶ 3, 10, 17, 25, 26, 32. He alleges 

that Core-Mark nevertheless subsequently obtained such a report. Id. ¶¶ 17, 33. Seeking to 

represent a class of similarly situated employees and applicants, Brown brings claims under 15 

U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), for failure to provide proper disclosure that a consumer report may be 

obtained, FAC ¶¶ 52–62, and under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii), for failure to obtain proper 

authorization to obtain such a report, FAC ¶¶ 63–68. Brown contends that Core-Mark’s purported 

violations were willful and that he and the putative class are therefore entitled to statutory 

damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. FAC ¶¶ 59–60, 65–66.2

The disclosure form that Brown signed reads as follows:

DISCLOSURE REGARDING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

Employer (“the Company”) may obtain information about you from 

a third party consumer reporting agency for employment purposes. 

Thus, you may be the subject of a “consumer report” and/or an 

“investigative consumer report” which may include information 

about your character, general reputation, personal characteristics, 

and/or mode of living, and which can involve personal interviews 

with sources such as your neighbors, friends, or associates. These 

reports may contain information regarding your credit history, 

criminal history, social security verification, motor vehicle records 

(“driving records”), verification of your education or employment 

history, or other background checks. Credit history will only be 

requested where such information is substantially related to the duties 

and responsibilities of the position for which you are applying.

You have the right, upon written request made within a reasonable 

time, to request whether a consumer report has been run about you, 

and disclosure of the nature and scope of any investigative consumer 

report and to request a copy of your report. Please be advised that the 

nature and scope of the most common form of investigative consumer 

report is an employment history or verification. These searches will 

be conducted by USAFact, Inc., 6240 Box Springs Blvd Riverside, 

CA 92507, 800-547-0263, www.usafact.com. The scope of this 

disclosure is all-encompassing, however, allowing the Company 

to obtain from any outside organization all manner of consumer 

reports throughout the course of your employment to the extent 

permitted by law.

FAC Ex. 1 (final bold emphasis added). The last sentence, emphasized in bold above, is the focus 

of Brown’s complaint and the parties’ arguments on the present motion. Brown contends that it is 

 

2 Core-Mark’s present motion challenges whether Brown has alleged a violation, but does not 

address whether Brown sufficiently alleges willfulness.

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functionally identical to a disclosure held to be unclear in Gilberg v. California Check Cashing 

Stores, LLC, 913 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2019). FAC ¶ 7; Opp’n (dkt. 27) at 1, 7. As explained by 

Brown’s counsel at the hearing, this theory is based primarily on the disclosure’s use of the word 

“however.”

Brown also attaches to his complaint two other documents that he signed: an “Application 

for Employment” authorizing Core-Mark “to make any investigation of [his] personal history and 

financial and credit records through any investigative or credit agencies or bureaus of [its] choice” 

and releasing Core-Mark from liability for such investigations, FAC Ex. 2; and an 

“Acknowledgment and Authorization for Background Check” acknowledging receipt of the 

disclosure reproduced above, certifying that Brown read and understood the disclosure, and 

authorizing Core-Mark to obtain consumer reports, FAC Ex. 3.

Core-Mark moves for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) on the basis that the 

disclosure is clear on its face. Mot. (dkt. 28) at 7–12. Core-Mark distinguishes Gilberg on the 

basis that the sentence at issue in that case was grammatically incorrect, while the sentence at 

issue here—otherwise substantially identical—corrects that error by using a comma instead of a 

semicolon. Id. at 11. Core-Mark also moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that Brown lacks Article III standing to bring a claim because CoreMark’s disclosure form did not violate the FCRA. Id. at 12–17. Finally, Core-Mark briefly 

moves in the alternative to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), based on the 

same arguments. Id. at 17. Brown argues that the case should go forward because the disclosure 

form did not meaningfully differ from the form at issue in Gilberg, and because he should be 

allowed to present evidence as to how a reasonable person would understand its language. See 

generally Opp’n. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

1. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court must 

dismiss an action if it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

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12(b)(1). “Subject matter jurisdiction can never be forfeited or waived and federal courts have a 

continuing independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”

Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975 n.12 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish the existence of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

A party challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may bring a 

facial challenge or a factual challenge. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In 

evaluating a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court accepts the factual allegations 

in the complaint as true. See Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001). Where a 

defendant brings a factual challenge, on the other hand, “a court may look beyond the complaint to 

matters of public record without having to convert the motion into one for summary judgment.” 

White, 227 F.3d at 1242 (citation omitted). Once the moving party has made a factual challenge 

by offering affidavits or other evidence to dispute the allegations in the complaint, the party 

opposing the motion must “present affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden 

of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.” Colwell v. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. Clair v. City of Chico, 

880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)).

2. Brown’s Allegations Satisfy Article III Standing

In order for an action to satisfy Article III’s requirement of a “case or controversy,” a 

plaintiff must establish standing by showing “(1) an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the 

challenged conduct and (3) has some likelihood of redressability.” Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 

673 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 

At the pleading stage, “[g]eneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s 

conduct may suffice, as we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that 

are necessary to support the claim.’” Id. at 907 (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 

871, 889 (1990)) (second alteration in original). If a plaintiff lacks standing under Article III, 

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federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s claims. See Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 

559–61.

The dispute here relates to the “injury in fact” requirement, which the Supreme Court has 

described as the “‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s three elements.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 

S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998))

(alteration in original). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered 

‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 

560).

In Spokeo, the Court emphasized that concreteness and particularization are separate 

requirements. “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and 

individual way.’” Id. (quoting Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). Even where this 

requirement is met, however, the injury-in-fact requirement will not be satisfied unless the injury 

is also concrete. Id. “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.” Id. 

(citing Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009)). An injury may be “concrete” even if it is 

intangible, and “in determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both history 

and the judgment of Congress play important roles.” Id. at 1549. With respect to history, “it is 

instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that 

has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” 

Id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775–77 (2000)). 

The judgment of Congress is also “instructive and important” because “Congress is well 

positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements.” Id. Thus, 

“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a 

case or controversy where none existed before.” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., 

concurring)). Nonetheless, “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not 

mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute 

grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that 

right.” Id. at 1549. Thus, while a procedural violation “can be sufficient in some circumstances to 

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constitute injury in fact,” for example, where there is a “risk of real harm,” a “bare procedural 

violation, divorced from any concrete harm” does not “satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of 

Article III.” Id. (emphasis added).

In Syed v. M-I, LLC, the Ninth Circuit applied the test for standing set forth in Spokeo to a 

claim under the FCRA. Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 499–500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. 

Ct. 447 (2017). The plaintiff in that case, Sarmad Syed, alleged that his employer violated the 

FCRA by including a liability waiver in the same form as the disclosure and authorization for the 

employer to procure consumer reports. Id. at 497–98. He also alleged “that he ‘discovered [his 

employer’s] violation(s) within the last two years when he obtained and reviewed his personnel 

file from [the employer] and discovered that [the employer] had procured and/or caused to be 

procured a “consumer report” regarding him for employment purposes based on the illegal 

disclosure and authorization form.’” Id. at 499 (quoting Syed’s complaint). The Ninth Circuit 

held Syed alleged “more than a ‘bare procedural violation’” because the “disclosure requirement 

at issue, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i), creates a right to information by requiring prospective 

employers to inform job applicants that they intend to procure their consumer reports,” and the 

“authorization requirement, § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii), creates a right to privacy by enabling applicants 

to withhold permission to obtain the report from the prospective employer, and a concrete injury 

when applicants are deprived of their ability to meaningfully authorize the credit check.” Id. at 

499. The Ninth Circuit also held that the allegation quoted above regarding Syed’s “discover[y]”

of the alleged violation was “sufficient to infer that Syed was deprived of [those rights] because it 

indicates that Syed was not aware that he was signing a waiver authorizing the credit check when 

he signed it,” and that the court could “fairly infer that Syed was confused by the inclusion of the 

liability waiver with the disclosure and would not have signed it had it contained a sufficiently 

clear disclosure, as required in the statute.” Id. at 499–500. 

There is no indication that the complaint in Syed included any more specific allegation of 

concrete or particularized injury than Brown’s allegation here that he “was confused by [CoreMark’s] standard disclosure form and did not understand that [Core-Mark] would be requesting a 

‘consumer report’ as defined in the FCRA,” and that Core-Mark in fact “secured a consumer 

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report.” See Compl. ¶ 17; see also id. ¶ 32 (alleging that Brown “did not give valid authorization 

for [Core-Mark] to procure a consumer report”).3 Core-Mark does not argue that Brown’s 

allegation of the effects he experienced—confusion regarding the nature of the disclosure and a 

consumer report obtained without valid authorization—is distinguishable from the allegations in 

Syed.

Instead, Core-Mark contends that “Syed is inapplicable here because the Disclosure form at 

issue in this case is clear,” and “[i]t is only when a disclosure form does not comply with the 

FCRA’s ‘clear and conspicuous’ requirements that the right to privacy may be infringed, in which 

case a ‘concrete injury’ and Article III standing would exist.” Reply at 9; see Mot. at 12–17. 

Whether Core-Mark’s disclosure was “clear” within the meaning of the FCRA is the core issue in 

dispute for the merits of Brown’s claims. As the Supreme Court has stated, “standing in no way 

depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal.” Warth v. 

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)); see also Flast, 

392 U.S. at 99 (“The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get 

his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.”). Under 

Syed, a plaintiff who is confused by a disclosure form, does not understand that he is authorizing 

his employer to obtain a consumer report, and nevertheless has such a report procured suffers a 

concrete injury to the plaintiff’s rights to information and privacy sufficient to establish Article III 

standing. The allegations here meet that standard. Brown therefore has standing to bring his 

claims, and the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider them. 

Lee v. Hertz Corporation, the only case that Core-Mark cites dismissing an FCRA claim 

for lack of standing, predated Syed and is distinguishable from the facts at hand. See Lee, No. 15-

cv-04562-BLF, 2016 WL 7034060 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2016). There, the plaintiffs did “not allege 

that the disclosures they received prevented them from understanding that they were authorizing 

 

3 Based on the complaint’s citation of Gilberg and Brown’s arguments on the present motion, the 

Court infers that Brown is alleging he was confused by the use of “however” in the language of 

the disclosure. Although, as discussed below, the Court holds as a matter of law that the use of 

“however” does not render the disclosure unclear, Brown’s allegation that he was confused by it is 

nevertheless taken as true, and is sufficient to establish standing for him to present such an 

argument.

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Hertz to procure a background report.” Id. at *5. Brown alleges here that he “was confused by the 

standard disclosure form and did not understand that [Core-Mark] would be requesting a 

‘consumer report’ as defined in the FCRA.” FAC ¶ 17. On the issue of standing, this case is 

therefore analogous to Syed, not Lee. Core-Mark’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is 

DENIED.

B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Under Rule 12(c)

1. Legal Standard

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move for judgment 

on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(c). “Analysis under Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) 

because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken 

as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).4 Generally, a plaintiff’s burden at the 

pleading stage is relatively light. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a] 

pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In ruling on a motion 

under Rule 12(c), the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view 

them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 

(9th Cir. 2009). 

Dismissal at the pleading stage may be based on a lack of a cognizable legal theory or on 

the absence of facts that would support a valid theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations 

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 

 

4

In the final substantive paragraph of both its motion and its reply, Core-Mark argues briefly that 

it is also entitled to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because the standards under Rule 12(b)(6) and 

Rule 12(c) are functionally identical. Mot. at 17; Reply at 10. That argument is frivolous: a 

motion under Rule 12(b)(6) must be brought before the defendant files an answer, see Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b) (text following subpart (b)(7)), and Core-Mark answered Brown’s complaint before it 

filed its present motion, albeit by only three minutes, see Answer (dkt. 27). Because the standards 

are the same, however, the distinction between Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6) is not material to the 

outcome.

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor 

Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 

‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). Rather, the claim must be “‘plausible on its face,’” meaning that the plaintiff must plead 

sufficient factual allegations to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

2. Brown Has Not Stated a Cognizable Claim

The FCRA prohibits an employer from obtaining a consumer report unless:

(i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the 

consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be 

procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a 

consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and

(ii) the consumer [i.e., the employee or job applicant] has authorized 

in writing (which authorization may be made on the document 

referred to in clause (i) ) the procurement of the report by [the 

employer].

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(2)(A). Core-Mark argues that the Court should determine as a matter of law 

from the face of the disclosure Brown signed that it is “clear and conspicuous,” and that Brown’s 

authorization for Core-Mark to obtain reports was therefore valid. Brown contends that the 

disclosure was not “clear.” 

In evaluating whether a disclosure is “clear and conspicuous,” courts “‘draw upon the 

wealth of [Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)] and [Truth in Lending Act (TILA)] case law’” 

addressing those terms. Gilberg v. Cal. Check Cashing Stores, LLC, 913 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting Cole v. U.S. Capital, 389 F.3d 719, 730 (7th Cir. 2004)). The Ninth Circuit 

“adopt[s] [its] ‘clear and conspicuous’ analysis from Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195 

(9th Cir. 2010), a TILA disclosure case.” Id. In Gilberg, the Ninth Circuit assumed without 

deciding “that clarity and conspicuousness under FCRA present questions of law rather than fact” 

where no party argued to the contrary. Id. at 1177. As neither party here argues that clarity is a 

question of fact, the Court assumes for the purpose of this order that it is a question of law. 

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Even where “clarity and conspicuousness is a question of law, . . . empirical evidence is 

helpful in determining what a reasonable consumer will understand and readily notice.” Rubio, 

613 F.3d at 1200. In Rubio, the Ninth Circuit relied on “evidence on how a reasonable consumer 

will understand the term ‘fixed rate’ . . . available from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 

the very agency tasked with implementing TILA.” Id. Because that evidence showed that 

“reasonable consumers [could] interpret [the] ambiguous disclosure [at issue] in more than one 

way,” the Rubio court reversed dismissal of plaintiff’s TILA claim. Id. at 1202. Although the 

Ninth Circuit declined to remand for further factual development, its decision not to do so was 

based the rule that “TILA is liberally construed in favor of the consumer and strictly enforced 

against the creditor,” and thus that “any misleading ambiguity—any disclosure that a reasonable 

person could read to mean something that is not accurate—should be resolved in favor of the 

consumer.’” Id. The court did not suggest, as it certainly could have in that context, that factual 

development would never be appropriate on the issue of whether a disclosure is sufficiently clear. 

This Court understands that portion of the decision as indicating both: (1) that a court may, in 

appropriate circumstances, reach a determination based on the language of a disclosure in itself; 

and (2) that in other circumstances, factual development may be appropriate. 

The relevant portion of the FCRA disclosure at issue in Gilberg, which the Ninth Circuit 

held to be unclear, read as follows: 

The scope of this notice and authorization is all-encompassing; 

however, allowing CheckSmart Financial, LLC to obtain from any 

outside organization all manner of consumer reports and investigative 

consumer reports now and, if you are hired, throughout the course of 

your employment to the extent permitted by law.

Gilberg, 913 F.3d at 1177. Core-Mark’s disclosure here includes similar language:

The scope of this disclosure is all-encompassing, however, allowing 

the Company to obtain from any outside organization all manner of 

consumer reports throughout the course of your employment to the 

extent permitted by law.

FAC Ex. 1

The Ninth Circuit focused on the semicolon before the word “however”:

The beginning of this sentence does not explain how the authorization 

is all-encompassing and how that would affect an applicant’s rights. 

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The second half of the sentence, following the semicolon, lacks a 

subject and is incomplete. It suggests that there may be some limits 

on the all-encompassing nature of the authorization, but it does not 

identify what those limits might be.

Gilberg, 913 F.3d at 1177. The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment for the defendant, and held instead that “the disclosure form contains language 

that a reasonable person would not understand. Id. 

Here, Core-Mark’s disclosure includes a comma instead of the semicolon in Gilberg, 

which resolves the grammatical error in that case. The latter portion of the sentence, rather than 

being a defective independent clause with no subject, is a participial phrase explaining how the 

scope is all-encompassing: it is not limited to the examples that Core-Mark provided of the most 

common reports obtained, but may instead encompass “all manner of consumer reports throughout 

the course of your employment to the extent permitted by law.” See FAC Ex. 1. In this context, 

the word “however” no longer suggests some limit to the “all-encompassing” authorization, but 

instead is more naturally read as highlighting the contrast between the limited examples of the 

most common reports as compared to the larger scope of authorized reports. While replacing a 

semicolon with a comma may be a minor change from a typographical standpoint, the semicolon 

was the primary reason for the Ninth Circuit’s objection to the clarity of the sentence, and is not an 

issue in this case. Gilberg therefore does not require the conclusion that Core-Mark’s disclosure 

was not “clear.”

When asked at the hearing how the word “however” could induce confusion as it is used in 

Core-Mark’s disclosure, Brown’s attorney’s answer was not persuasive, and mere reference to 

Gilberg does not explain how the disclosure here could be unclear when the grammatical error 

identified in that case has been resolved. The similarity to Gilberg is the only basis for a lack of 

clarity identified in Brown’s complaint, and Brown’s claims are therefore DISMISSED for failure 

to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

It is conceivable, however, that the disclosure could be unclear for other reasons. If Brown 

believes that some other aspect of the disclosure was not “clear” within the meaning of the FCRA,

he may amend his complaint to present such a theory. In order to have standing to pursue a claim 

based on a different reason the disclosure was unclear, Brown must have actually been confused 

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by the purported lack of clarity underlying his claim and must so allege, and any such amendment 

must, of course, have a sufficient basis in fact to comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Core-Mark’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is 

DENIED, but its motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED on the basis that Brown has 

not plausibly alleged that Core-Mark’s disclosure was “unclear” merely on account of its 

similarity to the disclosure in Gilberg. Brown’s claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend. If 

Brown was in fact confused by some other aspect of the disclosure and can amend his complaint 

to cure the deficiencies identified above, he may file an amended complaint no later than May 24, 

2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 10, 2019

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

Case 3:18-cv-07451-JCS Document 36 Filed 05/10/19 Page 12 of 12