Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04914/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04914-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN L. BRUMFIELD,

Petitioner,

v.

MATHEW CATE, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 09-4914 MHP (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

John Brumfield, a prisoner currently in custody at the Gabilan Conservation Camp,

filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Now before

the court for consideration is respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. 

Brumfield has opposed the motion. The court finds that the petition was not timely filed and

dismisses it.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Brumfield pled no contest to robbery and false

imprisonment in Santa Clara County Superior Court on March 29, 2005. On May 12, 2005,

he was sentenced to a nine-year prison term. Brumfield did not appeal.

About three years after he was sentenced, he filed the first of his six state habeas

petitions. His habeas petition in the Santa Clara County Superior Court was filed on July 2,

2008, and denied on July 23, 2008. His habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal

was filed on October 1, 2008, and denied on October 10, 2008. Brumfield then filed two

additional habeas petitions in the Santa Clara County Superior Court on December 26, 2008;

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the first was denied on January 5, 2009, and the second was denied on January 14, 2009. In

one of the December 26, 2008 habeas petitions, Brumfield notified the court that his abstract

of judgment incorrectly added a year to his robbery count and stayed a year of his

enhancements, causing no change to the total number of years. The court issued an order

correcting this clerical error on January 14, 2009. Next, Brumfield filed a second habeas

petition in the California Court of Appeal on February 6, 2009; it was denied on February 17,

2009. His habeas petition in the California Supreme Court was filed on April 3, 2009, and

denied on August 19, 2009.

Brumfield then filed this action. His federal petition was signed on October 5, 2009,

and was stamped “filed” on October 15, 2009. For purposes of the present motion, the court

assumes that Brumfield put the petition in the prison mail the day he signed it and uses that

as the filing date under the prisoner mailbox rule. See generally Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.

266, 276 (1988). 

DISCUSSION

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), petitions

filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within

one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion

of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an

application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases

on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Brumfield’s limitations period had the ordinary starting date, i.e., the date on which

his conviction became final after the time to seek direct review expired. Because Brumfield

did not appeal his conviction, his judgment became final on July 11, 2005, which was sixty

days after his sentencing. See Cal. Rule Court 8.308(a). The presumptive deadline for

Brumfield to file his federal petition therefore was July 11, 2006. 

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Brumfield contends that his judgment actually became final on a later date, i.e.,

January 7, 2009, when the state superior court amended the abstract of judgment to reflect his

sentence accurately. This amendment came about from his December 26, 2008 habeas

petition, when he alerted the court to the error. The correction of this clerical error was not

the result of any judicial evaluation or change in judgment, so it was not a new final

judgment. In California, a court has “the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its

records so as to make these records reflect the true facts.” In re Candelario, 3 Cal.3d 702,

705 (1970). The error in Brumfield’s case was a clerical one, as it was made in recording,

not rendering, the judgment. Id.; See also People v. Anderson, 117 Cal.3d 654 (1981)

(classifying the correction of an abstract of judgment to reflect the correct sentence as

correction of a clerical error). A court of general jurisdiction has power, even after final

judgment, and even during an appeal or habeas proceeding, to correct clerical errors. Ex

parte Roberts, 200 Cal.App.2d 97 (1962). Because the amendment in Brumfield’s case was a

correction of a clerical error, the correction was not and could not have been used to change

the effect of the original judgment, so it in no way created a new final judgment. Candelario,

3 Cal.3d at 705. Therefore, the correction of the abstract to reflect the true sentence was not

a new final judgment that would result in a later starting date for the limitations period.

Brumfield points to Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 686 (2009) to show that

the AEDPA time limit began anew upon this amendment, but this case does not apply. The

rule of Jimenez only applies to reset the AEDPA clock when a state court grants the

defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral review, but

before he has first petitioned for federal habeas. Id. These are not the facts of Brumfield’s

case. 

Brumfield’s one year limitations period started when the deadline to appeal expired,

rather than three years later when the abstract of judgment was corrected. Therefore,

Brumfield missed the deadline to file his habeas petition by about 40 months, so unless he is

entitled to tolling, his petition was very untimely. 

The one-year limitations period will be tolled for the "time during which a properly

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filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Brumfield’s first state

habeas petition was not filed until July 2008, which was long after the one-year limitations

period had ended. His state habeas in 2008-2009 had no tolling effect because the limitations

period had ended almost two years earlier. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823

(9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period

that has ended before the state petition was filed,” even if the state petition was timely filed).

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute

of limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler),

128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v.

United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Brumfield

neither contends, nor presents any facts that indicate, equitable tolling is warranted in this

case.

 Brumfield’s federal petition was filed about forty months after the one-year deadline

for filing a federal habeas petition to challenge the conviction. The petition is untimely.

CONCLUSION

Respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket # 8.) The petition is

dismissed because it was not filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations period. 

Petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file his opposition is GRANTED. (Docket #9.) 

The opposition brief is deemed to have been filed on time.

The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 4, 2010 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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