Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01344/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01344-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KRISTINE MERRIFIELD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

MINER’S INN RESTAURANT & )

LOUNGE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:05-CV-1344-OWW-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT

JUDGMENT (DOC. 23)

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action over which this

Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

201 et seq. and 1331, based on Plaintiff’s alleging a claim under

the Fair Labor Standards Act; Plaintiff also alleges state tort

claims over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff has filed a motion for default judgment,

which has proceeded before a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72-302(c)(19).

BACKGROUND 

By motion filed on July 6, 2006, Plaintiff seeks judgment

against Defendants Miner’s Inn Restaurant & Lounge (Miner’s),

Parker Fausnight (Fausnight) and Shane Sweat (Sweat) for unpaid

overtime wages and penalties, compensatory and punitive damages

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for sexual harassment and unlawful termination, and attorney’s

fees and costs. The declarations of Costa Kerestenzis and

Kristine Merrifield were filed with the motion. At a hearing held

on September 1, 2006, Costa Kerestenzis of Beeson, Tayer &

Bodine, APC, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. There was no

appearance on behalf of Defendant. Supplemental points and

authorities and supplemental declarations of Kristine Merrifield,

Costa Kerestenzis, and Eric Rouen were served and filed on

September 15, 2006. A copy of Plaintiff’s initial declaration

that contained the second page was filed on September 19, 2006.

The matter was thus submitted to the Court for consideration and

the issuance of findings and a recommendation. 

ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standards

A court has the discretion to enter a default judgment

against one who is not an infant, incompetent, or member of the

armed services where the claim is for an amount that is not

certain on the face of the claim and where 1) the defendant has

been served with the claim; 2) the defendant’s default has been

entered for failure to appear; 3) if the defendant has appeared

in the action, the defendant has been served with written notice

of the application for judgment at least three days before the

hearing on the application; and 4) the court has undertaken any

necessary and proper investigation or hearing in order to enter

judgment or carry it into effect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Alan

Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th

Cir. 1988). Factors that may be considered by courts in

exercising discretion as to the entry of a default judgment

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include the nature and extent of the delay, Draper v. Coombs, 792

F.2d 915, 924-925 (9 Cir. 1986); the possibility of prejudice to th

the plaintiff, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th

Cir.1986); the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, id.; the

sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to support

judgment, Alan Neuman Productions, Inc., 862 F.2d at 1392; the

amount in controversy, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1471-1472;

the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, id.;

whether the default was due to excusable neglect, id.; and the

strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

that favors decisions on the merits, id.

 A default judgment generally bars the defaulting party from

disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, but the defaulting

party may argue that the facts as alleged do not state a claim.

Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392.

Thus, well pleaded factual allegations, except as to damages, are

taken as true; however, necessary facts not contained in the

pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not

established by default. Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of North America,

980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9 Cir. 1992); TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. th

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9 Cir. 1987). th

II. Status of the Parties, Service, Notice, and Entry of 

 Default

The first amended complaint alleges that Defendant Miner’s

is a business entity of unknown type operating a restaurant and

lounge in Mariposa, California, and an employer within the

meaning of the pertinent statutes. Defendant Fausnight was the

owner/operator of the inn and an employer and supervisor within

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the meaning of the pertinent statutes. Defendant Sweat was

employed as the general manager of the inn and was a supervisor.

(FAC p. 3.)

Plaintiff’s applications for the entry of default against

these defendants demonstrate that Plaintiff’s registered process

server served Defendant Miner’s on December 12, 2005, by leaving

copies of the relevant documents at Miner’s usual place of

business with an adult person apparently in charge, and then on

December 13, 2005, mailing copies to the address. Further,

Plaintiff served Fausnight, described as the owner/operator of

the inn in the complaint, by personal delivery. This was in

compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§§ 416.40(a) and 415.20.

Likewise, the request for entry of default against Defendant

Sweat demonstrates that a registered process server served

Defendant Sweat personally on February 23, 2006 in compliance

with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).

Further, the declarations submitted in connection with the

requests for entry of default establish that Defendants all

failed to respond to the complaint by answer or otherwise. It

appears that the entry of default was proper.

The motion for default judgment was served on Defendants

Miner’s, Fausnight, and Sweat by mail on July 6, 2006. Thus, if

compliance were necessary, Plaintiff would be in compliance with

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), which requires that written notice of

an application for default judgment be served at least three days

prior to the hearing on the defaulting party.

The Court notes that no formal appearance was made by any

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Attorney Kerestenzis declares that Defendant Sweat once called after service on or about March 9, 2006 1

and inquired what he needed to do to respond to the complaint. Kerestenzis informed him that no legal advice could

be given but that the service documents instructed him to respond and where a response needed to be filed and

served. No further communications from Defendant Sweat were received.

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defendant.1

Further, the notice provided by the complaint was adequate

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d) and 54(c), which require that a

judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed

in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Plaintiff

expressly alleged in the complaint that Plaintiff sought unpaid

regular and overtime wages with interest, liquidated damages and

penalties as provided by law, compensatory and punitive or

exemplary damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. (Complt. at 14-

15.) 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d) and 54(c) require that a judgment by

default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount

that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Here, the precise

amount of damages sought was not stated in the complaint,

although it was stated in the motion for default judgment. It has

been held that where a type of damages is requested in the

complaint in an amount to be proved, but the amount is not

specified, recovery in excess of an amount stated is permitted.

Henry v. Sneiders, 490 F.2d 315, 317 n. 2 (9 Cir. 1974), th

cert. denied Sneiders v. Henry, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974). Here,

Defendants were given appropriate notice of the amount sought in

the papers seeking the default judgment, and Defendants were

served with these papers. Rule 54(c) has been satisfied. 

In a declaration, Costa Kerestenzis declares that none of

the Defendants is an infant, incompetent, or member of the armed

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28 Plaintiff alleged that she was a bar manager beginning in September 2004 until termination in December 2

2004. The harassment allegedly began on the second day of her employment. (Cmplt ¶ 1.)

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forces.

In summary, there is no defect with respect to notice,

status or interest of the parties, or presence of a member of the

armed forces, which would render entry of default judgment

inappropriate.

II. Legal Sufficiency of the Complaint

The Court notes that in the supplemental points and

authorities, Plaintiff states that Plaintiff is not seeking

judgment on the twelfth claim for relief, unfair business

practices. (Supp. Memo. p. 2.)

A. Sexual Harassment, FEHA

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was employed at the MINER'S

INN. (Complaint at ¶5.) At all relevant times, Defendant MINER'S 2

INN was a restaurant located in Mariposa, California, and an

employer within the meaning of California Fair Employment and

Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12926(d) and

12940G)(4)(A), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as the

business affected interstate commerce, 29 U.S.C. §§203, 207. (Id.

at ¶6.) At all relevant times, Defendant FAUSNIGHT was the

owner/operator of the MINER'S INN, and an employer and supervisor

within the meaning of FEHA, Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12926(r) and

12940(j)(4)(A). (Id. at ¶7.) At all relevant times, Defendant

SWEAT was employed as the general manager of the MINER'S INN, and

a supervisor within the meaning of FEHA, Cal. Govt. Code

§12940(j)(4)(A). (Id. at ¶8.)

Plaintiff began her employment with the MINER'S INN in

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September 2004. (Complaint at ¶9.) Plaintiff’s direct supervisor

was SWEAT, the general manager of the MINER'S INN. Plaintiff was

employed as a "bar manager," whose duties primarily dealt with

tending the bar. (Id.) During Plaintiffs employment at the

MINER'S INN, she was subjected to a pattern of sexual harassment

by SWEAT. This pattern included, but was not limited to:

inappropriate comments made by SWEAT, such as "it's only two

inches long but I'll still make you happy"; details by SWEAT of

his sexual escapades with other women; descriptive comments made

by SWEAT regarding his pornography collection; sexual comments by

SWEAT directed towards Plaintiff and other women; SWEAT's

unlawful touching and grabbing of Plaintiffs hips, genital area,

breasts and buttocks, including pulling Plaintiff close during

conversations and pressing his crotch into her; sexual

propositions by SWEAT to Plaintiff, including invitations to

accompany him to his room (SWEAT lived at the MINER'S INN hotel)

during work hours; and inappropriate stares by SWEAT. (Complaint

at ¶10; Merrifield.) SWEAT's conduct created a hostile work

environment which was known by everyone at the MINER'S INN, as

SWEAT engaged in similar conduct with other female employees and

customers.(Complaint at ¶1.) Plaintiff specifically brought

SWEAT's conduct to the attention of FAUSNIGHT. However, nothing

was done to correct or stop SWEAT's inappropriate behavior.

Rather, SWEAT was left to do as he pleased. (Complaint at ¶1.)

During this time period SWEAT subjected other employees and

customers to similar harassment and propositions. This also was

brought to the attention of FAUSNIGHT. Again, nothing was done to

correct or stop SWEAT's pattern of inappropriate behavior.

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(Complaint at ¶12.) SWEAT's outrageous conduct culminated in his

termination of Plaintiff on Christmas Eve, December 24, 2004,

because she would not succumb to his propositions and harassment.

(Complaint at ¶13.)

After being terminated, Plaintiff looked for another job.

However, since Plaintiff lived in a small community in which the

service industry jobs were tied to a few people, such as

FAUSNIGHT, it was difficult to find another job and Plaintiff did

not secure employment until June 22, 2005. (Merrifield

Declaration at ¶8.)

These facts establish that under California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Defendant Sweat, Plaintiff’s

supervisor, engaged in harassment because of sex in violation of

Cal. Govt. Code § 12940(j). A supervisor is personally liable

under FEHA if he or she engages in harassing conduct or

retaliation. Page v.Superior Court, 31 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1212

(1995). Further, Miner’s and Fausnight, Plaintiff’s employers and

covered entities under Cal. Govt. Code §§ 12926(d) and 12940(j),

were responsible for an unlawful employment practice by failing

to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination

and harassment from occurring pursuant to § 12940(k), and they

were strictly liable for harassment caused by Sweat, the

supervisor, pursuant to § 12940(j). State Dept. of Health

Services v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1040-41 (2003). The

harassment was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the

conditions of employment and create an abusive working

environment. Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214

Cal.App.3d 590, 608 (1989). Further, Sweat terminated Plaintiff

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for resisting his sexual harassment in violation of § 12940(h)

and thereby resisting practices forbidden by FEHA.

B. Assault and Battery

The same facts are sufficient to state a claim for battery,

an invasion without consent of the interest in freedom from

intentional, unlawful, and harmful or offensive contact with the

person. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal.App.3d 369, 375 (1983). An

assault is also made out because the facts show intentional

conduct causing an apprehension of contact. See, 5 Witkin,

Summary of California Law § 381-83 (2005). Plaintiff alleged that

Sweat touched, groped, and fondled Plaintiff without her consent;

the conduct was wilful, malicious, and reckless and/or

accomplished with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights.

She further alleged that the other Defendants were vicariously

liable as Sweat’s employer. (Cmplt. ¶ 33-36.) Employers are

liable for the intentional torts of their employees committed

within the scope of the employment, such as battery and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lisa M. v. Henry

May Newhall Memorial Hospital, 12 Cal.4th 291, 297 (1995).

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The same facts are sufficient to state a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, consisting of

outrageous conduct by the defendant undertaken with the intention

to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing

emotional distress, severe emotional suffering, and actual and

proximate causation of the emotional distress. Molko v. Holy

Spirit, 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1120 (1988) (superseded by statute with

respect to an unrelated point). Plaintiff alleged that Sweat’s

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conduct was outrageous, done with intent to cause or with

reckless disregard of causing severe emotional distress, and that

it caused Plaintiff severe emotional distress. She further

alleged that the other defendants were vicariously liable as

Sweat’s employer. (Cmplt. ¶¶ 37-41.)

D. Unruh Civil Rights Act

The same facts are sufficient to state a claim for a

violation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51.9 and 52, the Unruh Civil

Rights Act. Section 51.9 provides that a person has a claim for

sexual harassment where there is a business or professional

relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; the defendant

makes sexual advances, solicitations, sexual requests, demands

for sexual compliance, or other sexual or hostile conduct based

on gender that is pervasive or severe; there is an inability by

the plaintiff easily to terminate the relationship; and the

plaintiff has suffered or will suffer economic loss or

disadvantage or personal injury, including emotional distress.

Plaintiff alleged that the conduct was wrongful, intentional, and

harmful contact constituting sexual harassment in violation of §

51.9; further, it was the proximate cause of damages and that the

conduct was wilful, malicious, and oppressive entitling Plaintiff

to exemplary or punitive damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52.

(Cmplt. ¶ 77-80.) Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b) attaches liability to

whoever denies the right provided for by § 51.9, or who aids,

incites, or conspires in the denial, for actual damages for each

offense as well as exemplary damages. See Winarto v. Toshiba

America Electronics Components, 274 F.3d 1276, 1290 n. 16 (9th

Cir. 2001). 

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E. Wrongful Termination 

The same facts state a claim for wrongful termination or

discharge in violation of public policy, consisting of

termination of employment undertaken pursuant to a contract of

employment in violation of a public policy that is fundamental,

beneficial for the public, and embodied in a statute,

constitutional provision, or administrative regulation. Turner v.

Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238, (1994) 1252; Green v. Ralee

Engineering Co., 19 Cal.4th 66, 74 (1998). Plaintiff alleged that

the termination for not succumbing to Sweat’s sexual propositions

was in violation of the public policy prohibiting sexual

harassment in the workplace; it was the direct and proximate

cause of injuries and damages to Plaintiff; and it was undertaken

with malice and oppression. (Cmplt. ¶¶42-45.)

F. Overtime Wages

Plaintiff alleged that beginning in September 2004 and

continuing through December 2004, Defendants Miner’s and

Fausnight failed to pay Plaintiff’s earned regular and overtime

wages, and failed to provide required meal and rest periods.

(Cmptl ¶ 1.) Plaintiff made $400.00 per week and regularly worked

over eight hours a day and fifty to sixty hours a week, but

Defendants failed to pay overtime wages. Plaintiff alleged that

pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code § 510 and California Industrial

Welfare Commission Wage Order number 5-2001, she was entitled to

overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times the

regular rate of pay for work over eight hours per day or over

forty hours per week; double the employee’s regular rate of pay

for work over twelve hours per day; and one and one-half times

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the regular rate for work performed on the seventh consecutive

day of work and double the regular rate for work performed in

excess of eight hours on any seventh consecutive day of work.

(Cmplt. ¶ 48.) Further, Plaintiff regularly suffered or was

permitted to work in excess of eight hours per day and forty

hours per week and on seven consecutive days, but Defendant

failed to pay Plaintiff appropriate overtime for such hours in

violation of the statute and wage order. (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff

also alleged that she was entitled to recover monetary damages

equal to the sum of her unpaid overtime wages plus interest

pursuant to Labor Code § 1194.

Labor Code § 510 provides that eight hours of labor

constitutes a day’s work; any work in excess of eight hours in

one workday and any work in excess of forty hours in any one

workweek and the first eight hours worked on the seventh day of

work in any one workweek shall be compensated at the rate of no

less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for an

employee. Further, any work in excess of eight hours on any

seventh day of a workweek should be compensated at the rate of no

less than twice the regular rate. Cal. Lab. Code § 510(a). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint adequately states a claim for

compensation of overtime wages under state law.

With respect to federal law, Plaintiff alleged that the Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA) mandated that employees receive

overtime compensation at one and one-half times the regular rate

of pay for work over forty hours per week. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C.

§ 207, Plaintiff is entitled to compensation at that rate.

///

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G. Earned Wages

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Miner’s and Fausnight did

not issue Plaintiff her final check until January 5, 2005,

thirteen days after her termination, and the check did not fully

compensate Plaintiff for the last two-week period of work. (FAC ¶

17.) Plaintiff alleged that Defendants failed to pay her earned

wages in the issuance of her final check in violation of

California Industrial Welfare Commission Order No. 5-2001 (8 Cal.

Code. Regs. § 11050), as authorized by Cal. Lab. Code §§ 517 and

1173. (Id. ¶¶ 56-61.)

Cal. Lab. Code § 201 provides that if an employer discharges

an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge

are due and payable immediately. Plaintiff has established her

entitlement to earned wages omitted from her final check.

H. Omitted Rest Periods

Plaintiff alleged that Plaintiff was regularly suffered or

permitted to work without being provided a rest period as

mandated by Cal. Labor Code § 226.7, which states that no

employer shall require any employee to work during any meal or

rest period mandated by an applicable order of the California

Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC), and that if an employer

fails to provide an employee a meal or rest period, the employer

shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the regular

rate of compensation for each work day that the period was not

provided. (FAC ¶¶62-67.) Plaintiff further alleged that IWC Order

5-2001 mandated that Defendants provide Plaintiff with a tenminute rest period every four hours or major fraction thereof

worked. (Id. ¶ 64.)

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In her motion, Plaintiff also points to Cal. Lab. Code 512,

which requires, depending on the hours worked, a meal period of

not less than thirty minutes or two such meal periods.

Plaintiff has alleged facts showing that she is entitled to

monetary damages equal in amount to one hour of pay for each work

day that a rest period was not provided.

III. Appropriateness of Default Judgment

Here, it does not appear that there is any risk of mistake

or excusable neglect on the part of anyone with a potential

interest in the subject matter of the instant action. Further,

there is no apparent likelihood of a dispute as to a material

fact essential to the Plaintiff’s case. No just cause for delay

appears. It is apparent from the declarations submitted to the

Court that none of the defendants is an infant, incompetent, or

member of the armed services. There does not appear to be any

reason why the general policy in favor of a decision on the

merits would warrant refusing to enter the requested default

judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown its

entitlement to a default judgment.

IV. Recovery

A. FEHA

Under FEHA, a plaintiff may recover all relief generally

available in noncontract actions, including all damages

proximately caused by the hostile working environment and

unlawful termination, as well as punitive damages. Commodore Home

Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.3d 211, 221 (1982);

Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542, 547 (9th

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Cir. 1991).

1) Loss of Earnings

Plaintiff claims $15,625.00 against all defendants, jointly

and severally, to compensate her for loss of earnings until she

secured another job. Plaintiff’s declaration establishes that she

was out of work from December 24, 2004, through June 22, 2005, or

twenty-five weeks. (Decl. p. 3.) Plaintiff declares that she was

working fifty-five hours per week (Decl. p. 2), and thus she was

entitled to fifteen hours of overtime per week in addition to her

usual weekly gross wage of $400.00. Fifteen hours of overtime at

$15.00 per hour (time and one-half) equals $225.00, which, when

added to $400.00 yields a weekly wage of $625.00. That sum

multiplied by 25 weeks results in a sum of $15,625.00.

Further, in her supplemental declaration, Plaintiff states

that she earned $150.00 per week in tips, or a total of

$3,750.00.

Plaintiff has established damages in the form of lost

earnings in the amount of $19,375.00.

2. Emotional Distress

Plaintiff also claims entitlement to damages for emotional

distress and mental anguish. Emotional distress damages may be

awarded under FEHA as part of compensatory damages. Wilson v.

Safeway Stores, 52 Cal.App.4th 267, 273 (1997). Reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs are also awarded to the prevailing

party. Cal. Govt. Code 12965(b).

Plaintiff alleges in her supplemental declaration that she

suffered anxiety and distress because of Sweat’s outrageous

sexual harassment, assault, and battery; when she acquired

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medical insurance in October 2005, she visited her doctor about

the anxiety and distress and has taken prescribed medications

since December 2005. (Supp. Decl. p. 2.) Plaintiff seeks

$100,000.00 for her distress based on research by Plaintiff’s

counsel into jury awards in similar cases. (Supp. Decl. of

Keretenzis ¶ 9.) The Court concludes that an award of $100,000.00

is appropriate.

3. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages.

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to punitive damages

under the California common law of torts, FEHA, and the Unruh

Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3294, 52, Commodore v. Home

Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.3d 211, 221 (1982).

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants engaged in outrageous conduct

in the nature of sexual harassment and battery and tolerance

thereof; Defendant has engaged in wilful and repeated disregard

of her rights. Plaintiff alleged that the conduct of Sweat, as

well as Fausnight’s failure to stop or prevent such conduct

despite knowledge thereof, was severe and pervasive and caused

severe emotional distress, mental anguish, fear, shock, and

humiliation.

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 provides for damages for the sake of

example and by way of punishing the defendant in an action for

breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is

proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has

been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.

Punitive damages are designed to serve the purposes of

deterrence and retribution. The Due Process Clause prohibits the

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imposition or arbitrary or grossly excessive punitive damages;

factors to consider in determining the amount of punitive damages

include to consider three guideposts: 1) the degree of

reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; 2) the disparity

between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff

and the punitive damages award (multipliers of a single digit

generally should not be exceeded); and 3) the difference between

the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties

authorized or imposed in comparable cases. State Farm v.

Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 425 (2003).

Malice is present where there is a motive and willingness to

vex, harass, annoy, or injure. Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal.2d

632, 647 (1948). It may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal.3d 43, 66 (1974), such

as conduct undertaken in reckless disregard of injurious

consequences, Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, 251 Cal.App.2d 689,

713, 719 (1967) (confirming that a defendant’s wilful,

intentional, wrongful conduct done in reckless disregard of

injuries consequences is sufficient from which to infer malice).

Here, the conduct alleged by Plaintiff is sufficient to support a

finding of malice that would support an award of punitive

damages. Given the outrageousness of the conduct and the factual

showing that the conduct was undertaken with conscious disregard

for Plaintiff’s rights and with malice, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff should be awarded punitive damages against Defendants

Fausnight and Miner’s in the amount of $50,000.00, and against

the individual Defendant Sweat in the amount of $25,000.00. 

////

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B. Tort Damages for Battery, Intentional

 Infliction of Emotional Distress

In the supplemental memorandum, Plaintiff states that the

claims for relief are cumulative and do not provide any separate

and distinct remedy form the other with exception of the Unruh

Civil Rights Act claims pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b)(1),

which states that the person who denies a protected right is

liable for actual damages as well as an amount to be determined

for exemplary damages). Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to the same

damages under California noncontractual or tort law.

C. Unruh Civil Rights Act

Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b) provides that anyone who denies a

right provided by § 51.9 is liable for actual damages, exemplary

damages, and attorney’s fees as may be determined by the Court.

Again, on this claim Plaintiff has demonstrated that she is

entitled to actual and exemplary damages as indicated in the

preceding analysis.

D. Overtime Wages

Labor Code § 1194 provides that notwithstanding any

agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less

than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation is

entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance with

interest, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Plaintiff alleged that she made $400.00 per week, or an hourly

wage of $10.00. She computed one and one-half times her regular

rate of pay to be $15.00 per hour, at fifteen hours a week, for

the fifteen weeks for which Plaintiff was employed. (Mot. p. 8 n.

4.) The total of overtime wages established due from Defendants

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Miner’s and Fausnight pursuant to the California Labor Code is

$3,375.00.

Likewise, 29 U.S.C. § 207 provides for compensation for work

over forty hours a week at one and one-half times the regular

rate of pay. In addition, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), an

employee may recover from an employer who violates § 207 the

unpaid minimum or overtime compensation, an additional equal

amount as liquidated damages, and costs and a reasonable

attorney’s fee. 

E. Earned Wages

Plaintiff seeks $320.00 in unpaid earned wages for

Defendant’s wage and hour violations. (Mot. pp. 2, 8.) Plaintiff

establishes in her declarations that she was paid $400.00 for one

week’s wages when she received her final check, issued January 5,

2005, whereas, she had worked nine days, or seventy-two hours;

she was not paid for thirty-two regular hours and twenty overtime

hours. Thus, she would be entitled to an additional four days’

pay, or $320.00 ($80.00 x 4 = $320.00). 

F. Late Paycheck

Plaintiff also seeks $1,040.00 for Defendants’ failure to

issue Plaintiff’s paycheck in a timely manner. (Mot. pp. 2, 12.)

Plaintiff is entitled to this penalty pursuant to Labor Code §

203, which provides:

If an employer willfully fails to pay, without 

abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections

201, 201.5, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee

who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the

employee shall continue as a penalty from the due

date thereof at the same rate until paid or until

an action therefor is commenced, but the wages shall

not continue for more than 30 days.

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Plaintiff established that in violation of § 201, her final

paycheck was not issued to her until January 5, 2005, thirteen

days after her termination. (FAC ¶ 17; Decl. ¶ 7.) Thus,

Plaintiff is entitled to $1,040.00 (13 x $80.00 = $1,040.00) from

Defendants Miner’s and Fausnight. 

G. Rest Periods

Cal. Labor Code § 226.7(b) provides:

If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period

or rest period in accordance with an applicable order of

the Industrial Welfare Commission, the employer shall

pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the

employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day

that the meal or rest period is not provided.

Plaintiff seeks one hour of pay for each day Plaintiff was not

allowed to take her breaks; Plaintiff declares that she was never

allowed to take breaks, and that she worked from September 13,

2004, through December 24, 2004, or fifteen weeks. (Supp. Decl. ¶

2.) Plaintiff calculates this amount as $10 per day five days a

week, for fifteen weeks ($10.00 x 5 [days per week]= $50.00 per

week x 15 [weeks] = $750.00). 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment

against Defendants Miner’s and Fausnight for penalties for

failing to provide breaks in the amount of $750.00.

H. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff has alleged violations of statute that warrant an

award of reasonable attorney’s fees. Cal. Gov. Code § 12965(b)

(permitting the Court to award to the prevailing party a

reasonable attorney’s fee and costs); Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b)

(providing that whoever denies a right provided by § 51.9 is

liable for actual damages and, in addition, attorney’s fees as

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may be determined by the Court); and Cal. Lab. Code § 1194

(permitting recovery by an employee reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs of suit).

It is the burden of the party seeking an award of fees to

submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed,

and when the documentation of hours is inadequate, a court may

reduce an award accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

433, 437. A party requesting a fee award has the burden of

presenting detailed records of the time spent, so that the judge

can make a fair evaluation of the amount of fees warranted. The

records should be comparable to those that a private attorney

would present to a client to substantiate a fee. Evers v. Custer

County, 745 F.2d 1196, 1205 (9 Cir. 1984), citing Hensley v. th

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424. The minimum required for satisfaction of

this burden is to list hours and identify the general subject

matter of the time expenditures. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214

F.3d 1115, 1121 (9 Cir. 2000). Fee awards will be set aside th

where summaries make it very difficult to ascertain whether the

time devoted to particular tasks was reasonable and whether there

was improper overlapping of hours. Intel Corp. v. Terabyte

Intern., Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 623 (9 Cir. 1993). th

Here, Plaintiff claimed before the hearing on this motion

39.5 hours of attorney time. Billing documents confirm 39.5 hours

of time spent by attorneys Kerestenzis and Rabinowitz. The

billing rate is $300.00 per hour, which by counsel’s declaration

is established to be a reasonable rate prevailing in the

community for comparable contingency work. The Court notes the

relative thoroughness with which counsel for Plaintiff covered

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the law pertinent to the motion.

Plaintiff also establishes that an additional 16.5 hours of

attorney time was expended to prepare for and drive to and from

the hearing, attend the hearing, and prepare supplemental

filings. (Supp. Decl. Kerestenzis ¶ 4.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has shown entitlement to attorney’s

fees for 56 hours at $300.00 per hour, or $16,800.00.

Plaintiff also seeks 7.8 hours of clerk time (reduced from

42 hours) for time spent by a law clerk who was a law school

graduate and is presently licensed to practice. Plaintiff

establishes by the declaration of Kerestenzis that time expended

by such a law clerk is customarily billed to clients at the rate

of $110.00 per hour or more. A comparison of the law clerk’s

transactional record (an exhibit to the Declaration of Eric D.

Rouen) with that of the attorneys reveals that the reduction of

clerk’s hours to 7.8 to avoid duplications was reasonable.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees for

7.8 hours of law clerk time at $110.00 per hour, or $858.00.

Plaintiff has thus shown entitlement to reasonable

attorney’s fees of $17,658.00. 

I. Costs

Plaintiff seeks costs, including a filing fee of $250.00,

service fees of $390.00, investigator fees of $428.45, overnight

mail charges of $58.62, and $73.00 for in-house photocopies at

$.10 per copy. Plaintiff may apply for costs pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(d) and Local Rule 54-292(b).

IV. Form of Judgment

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against her employer,

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Defendants Miner’s and Fausnight, for overtime wages (seventh and

eighth claims for relief), regular wages (ninth claim for

relief), rest period penalties (tenth claim for relief), and

thirteen days’ pay for untimely payment of wages (eleventh claim

for relief).

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against her employer,

Defendants Miner’s and Fausnight, as well as from her supervisor,

Defendant Sweat, relief for sexual harassment and wrongful

termination based on her first claim (sexual harassment under

FEHA) second claim (failure to prevent harassment under FEHA),

third claim (assault), fourth claim (battery), fifth claim

(intentional infliction of emotional distress), sixth claim

(wrongful or tortious discharge against public policy), and

thirteenth claim (sexual harassment under the Unruh Civil Rights

Act).

Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment against the

Defendants jointly and severally.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that

1) Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment BE GRANTED, and

2) Judgment BE ENTERED for Plaintiff against Defendants as

follows:

a. Against Defendants MINER'S INN and PARKER FAUSNIGHT, 

jointly and severally, in the amount of $3,375.00 to compensate

Plaintiff for unpaid earned overtime wages;

b. Against Defendants MINER'S INN and PARKER FAUSNIGHT,

jointly and severally, in the amount of $320.00 to compensate

Plaintiff for unpaid earned regular wages;

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c. Against Defendants MINER'S INN and PARKER FAUSNIGHT,

jointly and severally, in the amount of $740.00 for the

Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiff statutorily required

breaks;

d. Against Defendants MINER'S INN and PARKER FAUSNIGHT,

jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,040.00 as a penalty

for Defendants' failure to issue Plaintiff her final check in a

timely manner;

e. Against Defendants MINER'S INN, PARKER FAUSNIGHT,

and SHANE SWEAT, jointly and severally, in the amount of

$19,375.00 to compensate Plaintiff for her lost earnings caused

by the unlawful harassment and termination;

f. Against Defendants MINER'S INN, PARKER FAUSNIGHT,

and SHANE SWEAT, jointly and severally, in the amount of

$100,000.00 to compensate Plaintiff for her emotional distress

damages caused by the unlawful harassment and termination;

g. Against Defendant MINER'S INN in the amount of

$50,000.00 for punitive damages to punish and deter said

Defendant for the unlawful harassment and termination;

h. Against Defendant PARKER FAUSNIGHT in the amount of

$50,000.00 for punitive damages to punish and deter said

Defendant for the unlawful harassment and termination;

i. Against Defendant SHANE SWEAT in the amount of

$25,000.00 for punitive damages to punish and deter said

Defendant for the unlawful harassment and termination; and

j. Against all three Defendants in the amount of

$17,658.00 for attorney's fees.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

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States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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