Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00056/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-00056-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAGHVENDRA SINGH, also known as 

Raj Singh, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-CV-0056-DMC-P

ORDER

 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 

initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 

Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 

portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 

complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

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entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 

concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 

of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 

1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 

overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 

to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 

required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Sacramento County; and (2) Scott 

Jones, the Sacramento County Sheriff. See ECF No. 1. In his one-page complaint, Plaintiff 

alleges as follows:

 On October 14, 2022, Raj Singh, AKA Raghvendra Singh 

(“Singh”) was released from Sacramento County Jail. But, Singh was not 

provided any medicines, medically needed help, Gate fees, housing, and 

other financial benefits resulting in Misuse and loss of health dramatically. 

Singh serve all his time. But, Singh was forced to serve probation for 3 

years. The laws require probation at the most 2 years of probation (see 

AB 1950) only if the accused is sentenced to probation. Defendants had 

and have duty to provide stated services but refused to provide such 

services. Defendants refused to send Singh to his home in Nevada. 

 Under the leadership of defendants, the County jails adopted stated 

grossly illegal and unconstitutional practices, customs, and policies which 

are contrary to the public policies also. So, please allow this action to 

restore the public trust and public faith also. Singh does not know the 

names of other defendants. 

ECF No. 1 (errors in original). 

 Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and 

costs, and other relief as deemed appropriate by the Court. See id. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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II. DISCUSSION

 As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted because he does not allege facts to link any of the named defendants, including 

Sacramento County, to a claimed constitutional violation. 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 

specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 

employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 

Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 

knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 

officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 

and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 

personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 

liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 

Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

/ / /

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 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, such as the Sacramento County 

Sheriff Scott Jones named in this action, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed 

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th 

Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory 

allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 

 Municipalities and other local government units, such as Defendant Sacramento 

County, are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties and municipal government officials are also 

“persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 

F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government unit, however, may not be held responsible 

for the acts of its employees or officials under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of 

County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the 

actions of the municipality, and not of the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert 

municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation 

complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality. See id. 

Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend consistent with the standards outlined 

above. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 

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complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 

Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 

Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 

with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 

service of this order.

Dated: August 15, 2023 

____________________________________ 

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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