Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02186/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-02186-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rosario Parra Hernandez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-02186-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Rosario Parra Hernandez has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 8.) In their answer, Respondents 

assert that the Amended Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides the statute of 

limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 18.) 

Alternatively, Respondents argue that federal habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims 

is procedurally barred. Petitioner has not filed a reply in support of his Amended Petition 

and the time to do so has passed. (See Doc. 11 at 6.) For the reasons below, the Court 

finds the Amended Petition untimely, recommends that it be dismissed, and does not 

consider Respondents’ alternative arguments. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentence 

On May 6, 1993, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court 

on the following charges: (1) two counts of aggravated assault (Counts One and Two); 

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(2) four counts of kidnapping (Counts Three, Four, Five, and Six); (3) aggravated assault 

(Count Seven); and (4) two counts of kidnapping (Counts Three and Nine). (Doc. 18, 

Ex. A.) The case proceeded to trial. (Doc. 18, Ex. B.) The trial court granted 

Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts Five and Six. (Doc. 18, 

Ex. WWW at 8.) On February 9, 1994, Petitioner was found guilty of the remaining 

counts.1

 (Doc. 18, Ex. C at 2-5; Ex. YYY at 10-12.) Petitioner filed a motion for a new 

trial, which the trial court denied. (Doc. 18, Exh. D, E, and ZZZ at 7.) 

 On March 23, 1994, the trial court found as aggravating circumstances that 

Petitioner had five prior felony convictions, he was a danger to the community, and he 

caused physical and emotional harm to the victims. (Doc. 18, Ex. AAAA at 12.) The 

trial court sentenced Petitioner as follows: (1) to the presumptive term of 7.5 years’ 

imprisonment on Count One; (2) to the presumptive term of 7.5 years’ imprisonment on 

Count Two, to be served consecutively to the sentence on Count One; (3) to the 

presumptive term of 10.5 years’ imprisonment on Count Three, to be served 

consecutively to the sentence on Count Two; (4) to the presumptive term of 10.5 years’ 

imprisonment on Count Four, to be served concurrently with the sentence on Count One; 

(5) to an aggravated term of 15 years’ imprisonment on Count Seven, to run 

consecutively to the sentence on Count Three; (6) to an aggravated term of twenty years’ 

imprisonment on Count Eight, to run consecutively to the sentence on Count Seven; and 

(7) to an aggravated term of twenty years’ imprisonment on Count Nine, to be served 

consecutively to the sentence on Count Eight. (Doc. 18, Ex. G and Ex. AAAA at 12-14.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 On March 31, 1994, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 18, Ex. I.) In his opening brief, Petitioner raised four claims: (1) the trial 

court abused its discretion by determining that the pre-trial identification procedure was 

not unduly suggestive and then refusing to give a Dessureault jury instruction; (2) the 

 

1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ opinion sets forth the evidence supporting Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 18, Ex. L.) 

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trial court erred when, after deliberations had begun, it gave the jury a definition of 

reasonable doubt in response to its request for a definition of that term; (3) the trial court 

erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts Eight and Nine; 

and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider an accomplice’s 

sentence a mitigating factor and by sentencing Petitioner to aggravated terms on Counts 

Eight and Nine. (Doc. 18, Ex. J.) On September 5, 1995, the appellate court denied 

Petitioner’s claims and affirmed his convictions and sentences. (Doc. 18, Ex. L.) 

 On October 5, 1995, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 18, Ex. M.) On January 18, 1996, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily 

denied review. (Doc. 18, Ex. O.) 

C. Post-Conviction Review 

 1. First Post-Conviction Proceeding

 On March 4, 1996, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 18, Ex. Q.) 

The trial court appointed counsel from the public defender’s office. (Doc. 18, Ex. R.) 

Counsel moved to withdraw because Petitioner wanted to assert that his trial counsel 

from the public defender’s office was ineffective, which created a conflict of interest. 

(Doc. 18, Ex. S.) The trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointed 

new counsel. (Doc. 18, Ex. U.) However, this attorney also had a conflict and the trial 

court again appointed new post-conviction counsel. (Doc. 18, Exs. V, W.) The trial 

court then granted several extensions of time for Petitioner to file a petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. 18, Exs. X, Y, Z.) On January 30, 1997, Petitioner, through 

counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging newly discovered evidence — 

that a witness at trial, Petitioner’s co-defendant, recanted his trial testimony. (Doc. 18, 

Ex. AA.) The trial court found that Petitioner had presented a colorable claim, and held 

an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 18, Exs. FF, GG.) On February 2, 1998, the trial court 

rejected Petitioner’s claim of newly discovered evidence and dismissed the petition for 

post-conviction relief. (Doc. 18, Ex. JJ.) The court noted that the witness who allegedly 

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recanted his trial testimony, Montes, was unavailable to be called as a witness at the 

evidentiary hearing because he had been deported. (Id.) At the evidentiary hearing, 

Petitioner presented his own testimony and that of a friend. (Id.) The court found that 

the testimony lacked credibility and, thus, concluded that Petitioner had not presented any 

credible evidence to support his claim that Montes recanted his trial testimony. (Id.) The 

trial court granted Petitioner an extension to March 27, 1998 to file a motion for 

rehearing or a petition for review. However, Petitioner filed neither. (Doc. 18, Ex. KK.) 

 2. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On July 25, 2001, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief arguing 

that newly discovered evidence, a diagnosis of Hepatitis C, entitled him to a sentence 

reduction. (Doc. 18, Ex. LL at 3.) Petitioner further argued that his sentence was illegal 

and that counsel was ineffective due to “possible conflict of interest issues.” (Doc. 18, 

Ex. LL at 3.) On August 22, 2001, the trial court dismissed the notice of post-conviction 

relief. (Doc. 18, Ex. MM.) On September 6, 2001, Petitioner filed a motion for 

reconsideration, but the trial court never ruled on it. (Doc. 18, Ex. NN.) Petitioner did 

not file a petition for review. 

 3. Petition for DNA Testing 

 On January 28, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for DNA testing. (Doc. 18, 

Ex. OO.) The trial court heard oral argument on the motion and, on June 30, 2004, the 

trial court granted Petitioner’s motion for DNA testing. (Doc. 18, Exs. RR, SS.) 

Following further briefing and court orders regarding the responsibility for conducting 

the DNA testing, no further action was taken. (Doc. 18, Ex. TT.) 

 4. Third Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On January 4, 2010, Petitioner filed a third notice and petition for post-conviction 

relief alleging trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, his consecutive sentences 

violated the rule against double jeopardy, and the trial court erred by failing to instruct 

the jury on lesser-included offenses. (Doc. 18, Ex. UU at 2.) On February 22, 2010, the 

trial court dismissed the post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 18, Ex. VV.) The court 

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concluded that Petitioner’s notice and petition were successive and that Petitioner did not 

raise any claims that could be asserted in a successive petition. (Id.) The court further 

found Petitioner’s claims precluded because they could have been raised either on direct 

appeal or in Petitioner’s first post-conviction proceeding. (Id.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 18, 

Exs. WW, XX.) On August 4, 2011, the appellate court denied review. (Doc. 18, 

Ex. YY.) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on 

February 23, 2012. (Doc. 18, Exs. ZZ, AAA.) 

 5. Fourth Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On May 7, 2012, Petitioner filed another notice of post-conviction relief asserting 

that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer pursuant to 

Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). (Doc. 18, Ex. BBB at 3.) Finding 

a “significantly colorable” claim, the trial court appointed counsel and ordered briefing. 

(Doc. 18, Ex. CCC at 1-2.) On December 21, 2012, the trial court dismissed the postconviction proceeding. (Doc. 19, Ex. HHH.) The court concluded that Petitioner had not 

presented a colorable or a non-precluded claim. (Id.) Petitioner moved for rehearing, 

which the court denied on January 17, 2013. (Doc. 19, Exs. III, JJJ.) 

 Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for review on February 18, 2013. 

(Doc. 18, Exs. KKK.) Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

convey a plea offer. (Id.) He also argued that there was a conflict of interest between 

trial counsel, George Gaziano, and post-conviction counsel for his first post-conviction 

proceeding, Robert Doyle, which affected post-conviction counsel’s judgment and 

resulted in his failure to raise claims based on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. (Id.) On 

June 9, 2014, the appellate court granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 18, Ex. NNN.) 

The appellate court found that Petitioner’s claim that there was a conflict between 

Gaziano and Doyle was untimely under Rule 32.4(a), and therefore, was precluded. (Id.

at 4.) The court further noted that the claim appeared to challenge Doyle’s representation 

of Petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding, but Petitioner, as a non-pleading defendant, 

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had no right to the effective assistance of counsel in a Rule 32 proceeding. (Id.) The 

court also determined that Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective during plea 

negotiations was precluded because Petitioner could have raised that claim in his first 

post-conviction proceeding. (Id. at 5.) The court explained that before the Supreme 

Court decided Frye, a defendant in Arizona had the right to effective assistance of 

counsel during plea negotiations. (Id.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the 

Arizona Supreme Court, and on December 30, 2014, that court summarily denied review. 

(Doc. 18, Ex. OOO.) 

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On October 29, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1.) Pursuant to the Court’s orders, on November 24, 2015, Petitioner filed 

the pending Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 8.) Petitioner raises the 

following claims: (1) post-conviction counsel was ineffective due to an alleged conflict of 

interest with trial counsel; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Petitioner 

of a plea offer; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that an 

identification witness was mistaken or made inconsistent statements; (4) trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court’s enhancement of Petitioner’s 

sentences on two of the kidnapping counts; (5) Petitioner is actually innocent based on 

third-party evidence and forensic testing that would identify a different perpetrator; 

(6) Petitioner’s sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it is disproportionate to 

his crime; (7) Petitioner’s consecutive sentences violate the constitutional prohibition 

against double jeopardy; (8) Petitioner was denied due process because the trial court did 

not give lesser-included-offense instructions for assault and unlawful imprisonment; and 

(9) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony from a police officer to 

support Petitioner’s alibi defense, and for failing to adequately investigate the case. 

(Doc. 8 at 7-20.) As discussed below, the Court concludes that the Amended Petition is 

untimely and should be dismissed on that basis. 

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II. Statute of Limitations 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court.2

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “Section 

2244(d)(1) ‘contain[s] multiple provisions relating to the events that trigger its running.’” 

Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 631, 646 (2010)) (alteration in original). “The triggering events are the dates on 

which: direct review becomes final, an unlawful state-created impediment to filing is 

removed, a new constitutional right is made retroactively available, or the factual 

predicate of the claim(s) presented could have been discovered with ‘due diligence.’” 

Lee, 653 F.3d at 933 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D)). The one-year statute of 

limitations begins running on the latest of these dates. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); 

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court first determines the 

starting date of the statute of limitations by applying § 2244(d)(1)(A), and then considers 

whether Petitioner’s claims implicate the triggering events in § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). 

A. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) 

 Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that the statute of limitations commences on “the 

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Petitioner sought direct review of his 

convictions and sentences in the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 18, Exs. I, L, O.) On January 18, 1996, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review. (Doc. 18, Ex. O.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s convictions became final ninety 

days later, on April 17, 1996, upon the expiration of the time for Petitioner to file a 

petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See Porter v. Ollison, 

620 F.3d 952, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[w]hen, on direct appeal, review is 

sought in the state’s highest court but no petition for certiorari to the United States 

Supreme Court is filed, direct review is considered to be final when the certiorari petition 

 

2

 For purposes of determining whether this § 2254 proceeding is timely, the Court liberally considers the Amended Petition filed on October 29, 2015, the date Petitioner 

filed the original Petition. 

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would have been due, which is 90 days after the decision of the state’s highest court.”); 

see also Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (the time for seeking direct 

review under § 2244(d)(1)(A) “includes the period within which a petitioner can file a 

petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the 

petitioner actually files such a petition”); see also Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (a petition for writ of 

certiorari to review a judgment entered by a state’s highest court must be filed in the 

United States Supreme Court with ninety days after entry of the judgment). 

 Respondents argue that the statute of limitations began running the next day. 

(Doc. 18 at 13.) However, that argument does not account for the grace period that 

applies to petitioners whose convictions became final before the AEDPA’s enactment on 

April 24, 1996.3

 State prisoners, like Petitioner, whose convictions became final prior to 

the AEDPA’s enactment, have a one-year grace period in which to file their habeas 

corpus petitions in federal court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 

2001). The grace period commenced on April 25, 1996 and expired one year later, on 

April 24, 1997 in the absence of statutory tolling. Id. at 1246 (holding that the AEDPA 

limitations period begins to run on the day after the triggering event pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year period is tolled during the time that a 

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 As previously stated the one-year grace period commenced on April 25, 1996, but 

it was immediately tolled by the post-conviction proceeding that Petitioner had 

 

3

 Respondents’ failure to recognize that the grace period applies in this case does not affect the remainder of their analysis of the statute of limitations issue. 

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commenced by filing a timely notice of post-conviction relief on March 4, 1996. 

(Doc. 18, Ex. Q.); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrs., 383 F.3d 

1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (in Arizona, statutory tolling begins when a Rule 32 notice 

of post-conviction relief is properly filed). The statute of limitations remained tolled 

while this post-conviction proceeding was pending in state court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The trial court denied relief and granted Petitioner until March 27, 

1998 to file a motion for rehearing or a petition for review in the appellate court. 

(Doc. 18, Exs. JJ and KK.) Petitioner did neither. 

 Therefore, the post-conviction proceeding remained pending and statutorily tolled 

the limitations period until March 27, 1998. The limitations period began running on 

March 27, 1998 and expired one year later on Monday, March 29, 1999. See Hemmerle 

v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the petitioner’s notice of 

post-conviction relief tolled the AEDPA limitation period only up to the date that the trial 

court summarily dismissed the post-conviction action for petitioner’s failure to timely file 

a petition for review). 

 After the expiration of the limitations period, Petitioner filed several additional 

notices of post-conviction relief in state court. (Doc. 18, Exs. LL, UU, BBB, DDD.) 

Because the AEDPA statute of limitations had expired by the time Petitioner filed those 

notices, they could not toll the limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “section 2244(d) does not permit re-initiation of 

the limitations period that has ended before the statee petition was filed.”). 

 Therefore, the deadline for Petitioner to file a § 2254 petition was March 29, 1999. 

Petitioner did file his Amended Petition until October 29, 2015, more than sixteen years 

after the limitations period expired. Accordingly, the Amended Petition is untimely 

unless Petitioner establishes a later starting date for the statute of limitations, or that 

equitable tolling or an exception to the statute of limitations applies. 

 

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B. Alternative Starting Dates for the Limitations Period 

 Liberally construing the Amended Petition, Petitioner could argue that the statute 

of limitations commenced on a later date as determined by the application of 

§ 2244(d)(1)(C) or § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

 1. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) 

 Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the statute of limitations commences on “the 

date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer. (Doc. 8 at 8.) 

Petitioner cites Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. 

Frye, ___ U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), to support this claim. (Id.) Thus, Petitioner 

could argue that the statute of limitations did not begin running until these cases were 

decided. As discussed below, the Court concludes that § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply. 

 The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to counsel during “critical 

stages” of a criminal proceeding. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) 

(quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-228 (1967)). In 1963, the Supreme 

Court recognized that the negotiation of a plea deal is a “critical stage” in which criminal 

defendants are entitled to counsel, and the Court has consistently held that position. 

White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 

407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972). Lafler and Frye extend the claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel to certain situations in which a defendant does not accept a plea offer. 

 In Lafler, defense counsel’s inaccurate legal advice led to the defendant’s rejection 

of a plea offer that was more favorable than the sentence he received after a jury trial. 

Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1383. The Supreme Court applied the test of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and stated that an attorney is ineffective when “but 

for” counsel’s inaccurate legal advice there is a reasonable probability that the defendant 

“would have accepted the plea.” Id. at 1385. 

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 In Frye, defense counsel did not tell the defendant about plea offers from the 

prosecution and the offers lapsed. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. As a result, the defendant 

accepted a later plea offer that was less favorable. Id. at 1404-05. The Supreme Court 

applied the Strickland test and held that “defense counsel has the duty to communicate 

formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea” to the defendant, and when defense 

counsel allows “the offer to expire without advising the defendant or allowing him to 

consider it, defense counsel did not render the effective assistance the Constitution 

requires.” Id. at 1408. 

Lafler and Frye did not create a new constitutional right and, therefore, 

§ 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply and does not supply a later starting date for the statute of 

limitations. For the starting date in § 2244(d)(1)(C) to apply, the Supreme Court must 

recognize a new right and that right must be “made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). In both Lafler and Frye, the Supreme 

Court applied the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel to a new situation, 

but did not create a new constitutional right. See Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 

1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because the Court in Frye and Lafler repeatedly noted its 

application of an established rule to the underlying facts, these cases did not break new 

ground or impose a new obligation on the State or Federal Government.”). 

 2. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) 

 Under Section 2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations commences on “the date on 

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). In Ground Five, 

Petitioner asserts that he is actually innocent based, in part, on his contention that a 

witness at trial recanted his testimony in January 1997. (Doc. 8 at 12.) Thus, Petitioner 

could argue that the limitations period commenced sometime in January 1997 when he 

discovered the facts underlying his actual innocence claim. Petitioner does not identify a 

precise date in January. However, because he filed a petition for post-conviction relief 

based on this same alleged newly-discovered evidence on January 30, 1997, the Court 

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assumes that Petitioner discovered that evidence on January 30, 1997. (Doc. 18, 

Ex. AA.) Thus, if § 2244(d)(1)(D) supplies the starting date for the limitations period, it 

would have commenced on January 31, 1997. The Court does not need to resolve 

whether § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies because even if the limitations period commenced on 

this later date, the petition would still be untimely. 

 Assuming that § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies the limitations period commenced on 

January 31, 1997. However, it was immediately tolled by the post-conviction proceeding 

that Petitioner had commenced on March 4, 1996 and that was still pending. (Doc. 18, 

Ex. Q.) See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The trial court denied post-conviction relief on 

February 2, 1998 and granted Petitioner an extension of time until March 27, 1998 to file 

a motion for rehearing or a petition for review in the appellate court. (Doc. 18, Exs. JJ 

and KK.) Petitioner did neither. Therefore, the post-conviction proceeding remained 

pending, and statutorily tolled the limitations period until March 27, 1998. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

 The limitations period began running on March 27, 1998 and expired one year 

later on Monday, March 29, 1999. See Hemmerle 495 F.3d at 1074-75. After the 

expiration of the limitations period, Petitioner filed several additional notices of postconviction relief in state court. (Doc. 18, Exs. LL, UU, BBB, DDD.) Because the 

AEDPA statute of limitations had expired by the time Petitioner filed those notices, they 

did not toll the limitations period. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823. Therefore, the 

deadline for Petitioner to file a § 2254 petition was March 29, 1999. Petitioner did file 

his petition until October 29, 2015. Therefore, it is untimely. 

 Whether the limitations period commenced on the date determined by 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) or (d)(1)(D), the deadline for Petitioner to file a § 2254 petition was 

March 29, 1999. Petitioner did file his petition until October 29, 2015, more than sixteen 

years after the limitations period expired. Accordingly, this habeas corpus proceeding is 

untimely unless Petitioner establishes that equitable tolling or an exception to the statute 

of limitations applies. 

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 C. Equitable Tolling or Exception to the Limitations Period

 Because Petitioner filed his Amended Petition after the statute of limitations 

expired as to all of his claims, it is not subject to federal habeas corpus review unless 

Petitioner establishes a basis for equitably tolling or avoiding the limitations period. 

 1. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply 

the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 Petitioner does not argue that equitable tolling applies. (Doc. 8.) Additionally, the 

record does not reveal any extraordinary circumstance that prevented Petitioner from 

filing a timely federal habeas corpus petition. Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law 

and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll 

the limitations period. See Ballesteros v. Schriro, 2007 WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 

26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during 

the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances). 

 2. Actual Innocence Exception 

Liberally construing the Amended Petition, to avoid the statute of limitations, 

Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent because third-party evidence and forensic 

testing would reveal an alternate perpetrator. (Doc. 8 at 12.) As set forth below, 

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Petitioner has not established a claim of actual innocence that constitutes an equitable 

exception to the one-year statute of limitations. 

 In McQuiggin v. Perkins, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924, (2013), the United States 

Supreme Court recognized an exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations for a claim 

of actual innocence. The Court adopted the actual innocence gateway previously 

recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995), for excusing the bar to 

federal habeas corpus review of procedurally defaulted claims. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 

1928 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 937-38.) The rule announced in McQuiggin does not 

provide for an extension of the time statutorily prescribed, but instead is an equitable 

exception to § 2244(d)(1). McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931. Actual innocence, if proven, 

merely allows a federal court to address the merits of a petitioner’s otherwise time-barred 

constitutional claims; the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether “a freestanding 

claim of actual innocence” provides a separate basis for granting habeas relief. Id. 

 To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show that it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Schlup requires a petitioner ‘to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that 

was not presented at trial.’” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). “‘To be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based 

on reliable evidence not presented at trial,” Calderon v Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 

(1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324), although “the habeas court’s analysis is not 

limited to such evidence.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006). “Schlup pointed out 

three types of evidence that would pass the threshold of reliability: exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts and critical physical evidence.” Lee, 653 F.3d 

at 945 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-28). Actual innocence 

claims may not rest upon evidence that was available but not presented at trial. See 

Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 340 (3rd Cir. 2004) (“The only evidence that 

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Hubbard asserts is ‘new’ is what he terms as ‘his own sworn testimony. . . . . A 

defendant’s own late-proffered testimony is not ‘new’ because it was available at trial.”). 

 Here, Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent, but he has not presented any 

evidence “show[ing] that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. Therefore, 

Petitioner has not met the Schlup standard and this exception does not apply. 

III. Conclusion 

 Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and his Amended Petition 

after the AEDPA limitations period had expired as to all of his claims. Therefore, this 

proceeding is untimely. As set forth above, Petitioner has not established a basis to avoid 

the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Amended Petition should be denied as 

untimely and the Court does not consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying 

habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 18 at 16-24.) 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 8) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

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Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 8th day of July, 2016. 

 

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