Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02962/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02962-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SRI LOUISE COLES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C03-2961 TEH 

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

TO DISMISS

LOCAL 10, INTERNATIONAL

LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE

UNION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C03-2962 TEH

These matters came before the Court on Monday, March 7, 2005, on Defendants’

motions to dismiss. Although Defendants filed a separate motion in each of the above cases,

the cases concern the same April 7, 2003 antiwar demonstration at the Port of Oakland, as well

as the same allegations of use of force by Defendants. In addition, the primary issue – whether

Plaintiffs can state a claim for relief based on the Fourth Amendment – is common to both

motions. Thus, the Court finds it appropriate to address both motions in a single order. After

carefully considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the factual allegations in

Plaintiffs’ complaints, and relevant case law, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motions in both

cases for the reasons set forth below.

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United States District Court

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1Only a handful of plaintiffs were arrested. Defendants do not seek dismissal of the

Fourth Amendment claims based on allegedly excessive force used during these arrests.

2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are demonstrators, legal observers, videographers, journalists, and

dockworkers who, on April 7, 2003, gathered outside the gate entrances of two companies at

the Port of Oakland that had economic involvement in the war in Iraq. They allege that Oakland

police officers used excessive force at various times throughout that morning’s demonstration,

sometimes without any warning and at other times after giving orders to disperse that were

allegedly inaudible to most of the crowd. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants aimed and fired

projectiles, such as wooden dowels, “flexible batons” (bean bags), and sting ball grenades filled

with rubber pellets and tear gas, directly at Plaintiffs and, in some cases, from close range. 

Defendants also allegedly charged Plaintiffs with motorcycles and hit them with clubs. The

police allegedly never gave a clear order directing what Plaintiffs should do or where they

should go to avoid being shot at or otherwise subjected to force.

Plaintiffs allege that the police continued to shoot Plaintiffs with projectiles and charge

them with motorcycles even after they started to leave the protest area by walking up the only

avenue not blocked off by police. According to the allegations, the police herded Plaintiffs

from the port area to the West Oakland BART station – a path of more than a mile – and also

pursued a group of Plaintiffs who walked from the BART station to the Oakland federal

building, periodically hitting them with motorcycles and shooting projectiles at them.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs in both cases assert violations of their First,

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also

contend that Defendants violated various provisions of the California Constitution and other

California state laws. Defendants now move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims brought

by all plaintiffs who were not arrested in connection with the demonstration.1 Defendants also

move to dismiss the First Amendment claim asserted by the union plaintiffs in the Local 10

case.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a

plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). A court should not grant dismissal “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Moreover, dismissal should be with leave to amend

unless it is clear that amendment could not possibly cure the complaint’s deficiencies. 

Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).

In deciding whether a case should be dismissed, a court may generally only consider the

complaint and any attached exhibits that have been incorporated therein. Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court may consider a document

external to the complaint if the complaint “necessarily relies” on the document and no party

contests the document’s authenticity. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir.

1998). The court may also consider facts for which judicial notice is appropriate. Barron v.

Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, while the court must generally accept as

true the factual allegations of the complaint and construe those allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, the court need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters

properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266

F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). “Nor is the court

required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs in both cases assert that Defendants’ use of force violated the Fourth

Amendment. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims on grounds

that Plaintiffs’ excessive force claims must be analyzed under the substantive due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Fourth Amendment’s ban on

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28 2These motions do not concern the claims of those plaintiffs who were arrested.

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unreasonable searches and seizures. In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held that “all

claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force – deadly or not – in the course

of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due

process’ approach.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Where no search or

seizure is involved, however, the substantive due process framework applies. County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). Under this latter framework, use of force is

unconstitutional only if it “shocks the conscience.” Id. at 845-55. The parties here do not

dispute that Plaintiffs were not arrested or stopped for investigation, and Plaintiffs do not

allege that they were searched by Defendants.2 The key issue in deciding Defendants’ motions

is therefore whether Plaintiffs were subject to an “other ‘seizure’” triggering the Fourth

Amendment’s protections.

Defendants acknowledge that no court has ever applied the substantive due process

clause to an excessive force claim in an analogous case. To the contrary, several courts have

analyzed similar claims under the rubric of the Fourth Amendment. Most of these courts,

however, failed to engage in any inquiry regarding whether the Fourth Amendment was the

appropriate framework for analyzing plaintiffs’ claims. E.g., Russ v. Jordan, 1992 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 19484, No. C-92-1084 MHP, at *12-18 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1992) (applying the Fourth

Amendment reasonableness standard to a case involving a baton strike to a demonstration

observer whom officers had no intent to arrest, without first analyzing whether the plaintiff was

“seized”); see also Otero v. Wood, 316 F. Supp. 2d 612, 621 n.5 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (applying,

without explanation, Fourth Amendment analysis to plaintiff’s excessive force claim where

plaintiff alleged that police fired wooden batons at her as part of a crowd-dispersal technique

and where plaintiff’s complaint failed to clearly identify under which constitutional

amendment her excessive force claim arose); Secot v. City of Sterling Heights, 985 F. Supp.

715, 720-21 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (applying Fourth Amendment standard to excessive force

claim without analyzing whether the circumstances constituted a “seizure,” in case involving

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use of baton to move protesters); Lamb v. City of Decatur, 947 F. Supp. 1261, 1265-66 (C.D.

Ill. 1996) (same, in case involving use of pepper spray on protesters). Similarly, although the

Sixth Circuit has discussed the difference between the Fourth Amendment and due process

standards for excessive force claims, that court explicitly did not decide which framework

applied to a crowd-control situation because it found, on review of a summary judgment ruling,

no disputed material fact under either standard. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301,

305-06 (6th Cir. 2001).

It appears that only one court, a district court in the District of Oregon, has directly

decided the issue of whether a Fourth Amendment claim can arise from the police’s use of

force to move plaintiffs as part of the police’s crowd-control or crowd-dispersal tactics. 

Marbet v. City of Portland, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25685, No. CV 02-1448-HA (D. Or. Sept.

8, 2003). In that case, demonstrators protesting against President Bush were blocking the

entrance to a Bush fundraiser. After plaintiffs allegedly ignored orders to disperse, defendants

“applied pepper spray and moved the crowd with force. Later in the day, the police used

additional tactics to subdue the crowd, including firing rubber bullets at members of the

protest.” Id. at *2-3. Defendants argued that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because

there was no seizure, but the court concluded to the contrary:

The Amended Complaint alleges facts, which, if proved, would

establish that defendants intentionally restrained plaintiffs’

freedom of movement. Plaintiffs allege that defendants

intentionally applied pepper spray and shot rubber bullets at

plaintiffs who were engaged in lawful protest activities. 

Further, the protesters were physically moved back from their

peaceful positions, according to the Amended Complaint. In

their supporting memorandum, defendants appear to contend

that the Fourth Amendment is not offended by the intentional

use of force that physically injures a citizen and only reduces

his or her freedom of movement. If the citizen is able to walk

or hobble away, according to defendants, no Fourth

Amendment violation has occurred. However, as the Supreme

Court has held, “The word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning

of laying on of hands or application of physical force to

restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.” 

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 113 L. Ed. 2d

690, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).

Defendants admit that on August 22, 2002, the police

physically moved the protesters approximately 120 feet in

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order to create a larger entryway to the street. Defendants

used pepper spray and physical force to achieve this

movement. Clearly the effect of defendants’ actions was to

control plaintiffs’ movement. Additionally, certain plaintiffs

assert that they were physically prevented from leaving an area

cordoned off by the police. By physically moving certain

plaintiffs and circumscribing the area of movement of other

plaintiffs, defendants seized plaintiffs within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at *26-28.

In sum, Defendants find no support for their position in any of the cases that have

previously addressed the use of force in the crowd-control or crowd-dispersal context. The

district court in Marbet explicitly held to the contrary, finding that the police’s use of force in

that case constituted a seizure and that the Fourth Amendment therefore governed the

plaintiffs’ excessive force claims. The court reached that conclusion even though only some

plaintiffs alleged that they were held in a confined area and even though it appears that the

police intended to “move[] the protesters . . . to create a larger entryway to the street,”id. at

*27, rather than to arrest them. In addition, several other district courts, including one in this

district, have applied a Fourth Amendment analysis to excessive force claims arising in crowdcontrol or crowd-dispersal situations, albeit without explicitly finding that the facts at issue

constituted a seizure.

Moreover, this Court independently finds Defendants’ position – that Plaintiffs’ factual

allegations do not, as a matter of law, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure – to be

unsupported by controlling precedent. In Brower v. County of Inyo, the Supreme Court

explained that “[v]iolation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of

physical control.” Brower, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). The Court continued:

Thus, if a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake and

pins a passerby against a wall, it is likely that a tort has

occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And

the situation would not change if the passerby happened, by

lucky chance, to be a serial murderer for whom there was an

outstanding arrest warrant – even if, at the time he was thus

pinned, he was in the process of running away from two

pursuing constables. It is clear, in other words, that a Fourth

Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a

governmentally caused termination of an individual’s freedom

of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever

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there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired

termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the

fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental

termination of freedom of movement through means

intentionally applied.

Id. at 596-97. This last scenario is exactly the case here. The complaints allege that

Defendants intentionally applied force – in the form of wooden bullets, bean bags, grenades,

batons, and motorcycle hits – to stop Plaintiffs’ freedom of movement, essentially funneling

Plaintiffs down a mile-long path from the port to the BART station, and that Plaintiffs

submitted to Defendants’ authority by following the only route left open to them by the police.

The cases at issue are therefore different from cases where a person’s freedom of

movement is terminated, but not by “means intentionally applied.” Compare, e.g., Lewis, 523

U.S. at 843-44 (no seizure when person died when police car ran into motorcycle after highspeed chase because the police only intended to stop the person by flashing lights and

continuing pursuit, not by crashing into him); Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154,

1157 (10th Cir. 2000) (no seizure when innocent hostages are accidentally shot by police

because police only intended to stop the suspects driving the van and the van itself, and they did

not intend to stop the hostages). They also differ from cases where no physical force was used

and the person in question did not submit to the police’s show of authority by non-physical

means. Compare California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625-29 (1991) (holding that an

“arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion

of authority,” and finding no seizure before Hodari was tackled because, prior to that point, no

force was used and Hodari failed to submit to police authority).

The situation in Fuller v. Vines, in which the court found no seizure where the police

pointed a gun at an individual but never indicated that the person was not free to leave, is also

distinguishable. Fuller, 36 F.3d 65, 68 (9th Cir. 1994). Unlike the plaintiff in that case,

whose only restriction was that he could not attack the police officers, Plaintiffs here were

forced to move in a single direction. Thus, these cases are essentially the opposite of Fuller;

Defendants left Plaintiffs with only a single option, whereas the police in Fuller merely

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3Gause v. City of Philadelphia is distinguishable for the same reason. In Gause, the

police told the plaintiff to leave the scene, but the plaintiff’s freedom of movement was not

otherwise restricted. Gause, No. 00-1052, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17428, at *5-7 (E.D. Pa.

Sept. 27, 2001). The court found no seizure under these circumstances because “a reasonable

person in Plaintiff’s position would have reasonably understood that she was free to leave.” Id.

at *6.

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foreclosed one option and left all other options open.3 In other words, the police in Fuller did

not terminate the plaintiff’s freedom of movement, which is a prerequisite to finding that a

seizure occurred. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97 . Here, by contrast, Defendants took control of

Plaintiffs’ movement by leaving only one path open to Plaintiffs and forcing Plaintiffs to move

down that path. A reasonable person in Plaintiffs’ position would have believed that he or she

was “not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about their business.” United States v.

Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (discussing standard for

determining when a person’s liberty is restrained and explaining that a seizure occurs whenever

a law enforcement officer uses coercion, physical force, or other show of authority to restrain

a person’s liberty). 

Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, a person may be seized without becoming

completely immobile or being forced to remain in one location. As noted, the Supreme Court

in Brower required only that a person’s freedom of movement be terminated, not that the

person’s movement be terminated. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97; see also Marbet, 2003 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 25685, at *27 (rejecting defendants’ argument that no Fourth Amendment seizure

occurs where a citizen is physically injured by the intentional use of force but is still “able to

walk or hobble away”). The dispositive question is one of control: Did the police control the

plaintiff’s movement through the use of force intentionally applied for that purpose? See

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1991) (key issue in determining whether a seizure

has occurred is the “coercive effect of the encounter” with police); Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624

(at common law, “seizure” connoted “bringing [an object] within physical control”); Brower,

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4Thus, Schaefer v. Goch, a case cited by Defendants, does not support Defendants’

argument. In Schaefer, the Seventh Circuit found no seizure because the police never gained

control of the individual’s movement. Schaefer, 153 F.3d 793, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1998)

(decedent was not seized because she could have chosen to move despite police presence and

the police were in no position to stop another individual from taking control of the decedent’s

movement, which is what ultimately occurred).

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489 U.S. at 596-97 (termination of freedom of movement must be caused by means

intentionally applied).4

Defendants also erroneously assert that a seizure occurs only when the use of force is

accompanied by the intent to arrest. Notably, Defendants cite no case that held that intent to

arrest is required for a seizure nor, relatedly, any case where the court held that there was no

seizure because the police did not intend to arrest the plaintiff. Defendants argue that “where

there is a use of force without the intent to arrest, and the subject is free to leave, as in Fuller,

Schaefer and Gause, there is no seizure.” Local 10 Mot. at 9. However, these cases do not

depend on the intent to arrest; instead, as discussed above, the courts’ findings of no seizure

were based on the police’s failure to control the movement of the person in question or on the

conclusion that a reasonable person in the individual’s position would have felt free to ignore

the police and go about his or her business. 

Beyond that, the Ninth Circuit has held that intent to arrest is not required to find a

seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1989). The

court rejected the defendant’s argument that a seizure requires intent to arrest and instead held

that use of deadly force constituted a seizure, whether that use of force was “for the purpose of

effectuating an arrest or other stop, or for the purpose of self-defense.” Id. The court’s

emphasis in determining whether a seizure occurred was on the “acquisition of physical control

by a law enforcement official,” and the court identified three elements for a Fourth

Amendment seizure: “(1) governmental (2) termination of freedom of movement (3) through

means intentionally applied.” Id. (citing Brower). The court declined to add a fourth element

– intent to arrest – that the defendant in that case, like Defendants here, suggested was

required. 

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Defendants also cite the following sentence from Hodari D. to support their position: 

“We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter, to stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond

its words and beyond the meaning of arrest, as respondent urges.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627. 

However, Defendants read this statement too broadly. In Hodari D., the Court was not

concerned with whether officers must intend to arrest a citizen before the Fourth Amendment

protects that citizen’s rights. Instead, the Court was concerned with extending Fourth

Amendment protections to all assertions of police authority, regardless of whether force was

used or whether the person submitted to that authority. Hodari D. stands only for the

proposition that a seizure does not occur when police do not use physical force and instead

attempt to restrain the liberty of a citizen by a show of authority, but the police’s target fails to

submit to that show of authority. To the extent that the Court intended anything more by the

statement relied on by Defendants, it is dicta and therefore not binding on this Court. Intent to

arrest was clearly present in Hodari D., and the Court therefore did not need to decide whether

a seizure requires intent to arrest.

In short, the Court concludes that the definition established by the Supreme Court

in Brower continues to govern what is considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 

Under Brower, a seizure occurs “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of

movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. Thus, a seizure

does not require intent to arrest but, instead, requires only intent to terminate an individual’s

freedom of movement by the means through which freedom of movement is actually

terminated. Viewing the factual allegations in these cases in a light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that this test is satisfied here. Defendants allegedly did far

more than simply order Plaintiffs to disperse from the scene or attempt to control the crowd

gathered at the scene of the demonstrations. To the contrary, Defendants allegedly left

Plaintiffs with only one available path by which to leave the scene and applied physical force to

ensure that Plaintiffs followed that path. Defendants’ use of force against Plaintiffs allegedly

continued even after Plaintiffs left the protest area. The Court therefore concludes that, under

the facts as alleged, Defendants terminated Plaintiffs’ freedom of movement through means

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5As the parties observed at oral argument, application of the Fourth Amendment is a

fact-specific inquiry. Thus, the Court need not and does not decide whether all efforts to

disperse or control a crowd would constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. For example, the

factual allegations in the cases at hand are distinguishable from hypothetical allegations of a

police officer telling a person to get out of the street and onto the sidewalk or of the police

closing a city block to pedestrian traffic but allowing traffic to flow freely outside of the

closed area. In the latter cases, whether the police terminated freedom of movement would be

less clear than it is based on the allegations at issue here.

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intentionally applied, and that, as result, Plaintiffs may invoke the protections of the Fourth

Amendment.5 The Court’s decision is the same result reached by the only other district court

to have explicitly decided the issue, and it is also in accord with the several other courts that

have implicitly decided that the Fourth Amendment applies to the use of force in crowdcontrol or crowd-dispersal situations. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Court

DENIES Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims.

II. First Amendment Claim of the Union Plaintiffs

Defendants also move to dismiss the union plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim from the

Local 10 case. These plaintiffs, Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse

Union (“ILWU”) and its officers and members, allege that they were “standing by” at the port

during the protests because they were awaiting an arbitrator’s decision as to whether they

should enter the facilities “in the face of the public anti-war demonstration as well as the mass

police presence.” Local 10 Third Am. Complaint (“TAC”) ¶ 34. These plaintiffs allege that,

prior to the day of the demonstration, Defendants gathered intelligence about the union’s

antiwar activities, including an antiwar internal newsletter from the union and e-mail messages

to a union group listserv concerning union support for antiwar protest activities. Id. ¶ 30. 

They further allege that Defendants “deliberately singled out and aimed their weapons and

otherwise directed force at and engaged in the other conduct described herein against plaintiff

LOCAL 10 and its officers and members because of hostility, animus and discrimination

against the ILWU as an organization and against members and officers affiliated with the

ILWU.” Id. ¶ 48. 

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Based on the above allegations, the union plaintiffs clearly allege that they were

targeted by the police because of their union membership and the police’s animus and hostility

towards the union. If this is true, as the Court must assume it to be for purposes of deciding

this motion to dismiss, then Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for relief under the First

Amendment. Freedom of association “includes membership in unions.” Greminger v.

Seaborne, 584 F.2d 275, 278 (8th Cir. 1978). As Defendants’ counsel conceded at oral

argument, Plaintiffs’ freedom of association would therefore have been violated if police

targeted the union plaintiffs out of hostility towards the union. Consequently, the Court

DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the union plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.

CONCLUSION

In sum, for the reasons discussed above, and with good cause appearing, the Court

hereby DENIES Defendants’ motions to dismiss in their entirety. Plaintiffs in both cases have

sufficiently stated a claim for relief for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and the

union plaintiffs have also sufficiently stated a First Amendment claim.

The next scheduled appearance for the parties in these cases is the January 9, 2006

pretrial conference. If the parties believe that a case management conference would be useful

prior to that date, they should meet and confer and call this Court’s courtroom deputy with

potential dates on which all counsel are available.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 04/27/05 /s/ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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