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Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES (No. 3:14-02946-LB) 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

San Francisco Division 

TRIREME MEDICAL, LLC,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANGIOSCORE, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 3:14-cv-02946-LB 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY’S FEES 

[Re: ECF No. 55] 

INTRODUCTION

This is a case for correction of patent inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256. (ECF No. 1 at 2, 

¶ 3.)1

 Plaintiff TriReme Medical, LLC’s claims involve the alleged inventive contributions that a 

third party, Dr. Chaim Lotan, made to an angioplasty balloon catheter that defendant AngioScore, 

Inc. manufactures. TriReme sued to add Dr. Lotan to the patents-in-suit, alleging that he licensed 

his rights to TriReme in 2014. 

In March 2015, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that Dr. Lotan assigned 

whatever rights he had in the subject patents to AngioScore in a 2003 consulting agreement and 

thus had no rights in those patents to license to TriReme in 2014. (3/17/15 Order, ECF No. 41.) 

TriReme thus had no actionable interest in those patents and no standing to pursue a § 256 claim 

 

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 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the tops of documents. 

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES (No. 3:14-02946-LB) 

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to correct inventorship on the patents. (Id.) 

AngioScore now has moved for its attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, saying that it is a 

prevailing party and characterizing this as an “exceptional” case meriting fee shifting. (Motion, 

ECF No. 55, at 5.) In support of that conclusion, it argues that TriReme’s claims were weak and 

failed on “‘a straightforward application of the Consulting Agreement.’” (Id., quoting 3/17/15 

Order at 7.) It suggests that TriReme filed the lawsuit tactically to leverage its position in another 

lawsuit pending in this district. 2 (Id.) It also faults TriReme for an inadequate pre-filing 

investigation that failed to uncover the 2003 consulting agreement and for persisting in its case 

even after it became aware of the consulting agreement. (Id. at 5-6.) 

In the exercise of its discretion, and applying the standard in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON 

Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), the court finds that the case is not “exceptional” 

and thus denies the motion for fees.3

STATEMENT

AngioScore owns three patents issued on a medical device: a balloon catheter used in 

angioplasty to remedy obstructions (such as plaques) in the peripheral vascular system. (ECF No. 

1 at 2, ¶ 7; see ECF No. 37 at 10, 13.)) AngioScore owns these patents by assignment and 

manufactures the angioplasty balloon catheter to which they relate. The device’s inventors include 

Dr. Eitan Konstantino (who founded AngioScore and later left to found TriReme) and Tanhum 

Feld. Dr. Chaim Lotan — who is not a party to this suit; and who is not listed as an inventor on the 

patents — is an Israeli cardiologist who claims to have contributed to early work on the catheter 

and so to have inventors’ rights in the subject patents. Dr. Lotan entered into two contracts 

 

2

 The parties have a separate patent-infringement case pending in this district. See AngioScore, 

Inc. v. TriReme Med., Inc., 4:12-cv-3393-YGR. 

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 TriReme also argues that AngioScore is not a prevailing party because the court dismissed the 

case for lack of standing and did not materially alter the parties’ relationship. (Opposition, ECF 

No. 61 at 13-14). AngioScore responds that the court’s order did materially alter the parties’ legal 

relationship because the court ruled that Dr. Lotan assigned any interest in the patents-in-suit to 

AngioScore and dismissed the case with prejudice. (Reply, ECF No. 64 at 6.) Because in the 

exercise of its discretion, the court finds that this is not an exceptional case meriting fee shifting, 

the court does not address the parties’ argument about whether AngioScore is a “prevailing party” 

under § 285. 

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relevant to the case. In 2003, he entered into a consulting agreement with AngioScore; under that 

agreement, Dr. Lotan assigned to AngioScore all his rights in inventions that he worked on, and 

which related to AngioScore’s business, during the contract’s term. (ECF No. 36-2 at 2-3.) In June 

2014, one day before TriReme filed this suit, Dr. Lotan granted TriReme an exclusive worldwide 

license to “exploit” his rights in those patents. (ECF No. 36-3 at 2-8.) In its answer, AngioScore 

identified the consulting agreement and said that because of it, Dr. Lotan had no patent rights to 

assign to TriReme. (Answer, ECF No. 21 at 6, ¶ 22.) 

In its order dismissing the case, the court held that Dr. Lotan assigned all his rights in the 

subject patents to AngioScore in the 2003 consulting agreement and had no rights in the patents to 

license to TriReme in 2014. (3/17/15 Order, ECF No. 41.) Because it had no actionable interest in 

the patents, TriReme had no standing to pursue a § 256 claim to correct inventorship in the 

patents. (Id.) 

AngioScore says that in a call on September 2, 2014, it offered an early disclosure of the 

consulting agreement to TriReme, and TriReme refused the proposal. (Armenio Decl., ECF No. 

55-1, ¶ 17.) AngioScore produced the consulting agreement in its first document production on 

December 17, 2014. (Id. ¶ 19.) It deposed Dr. Lotan on January 12, 2015 and moved to dismiss on 

January 29, 2015. It incurred $603,252 in fees in the case. (Id., Ex. A.) Its fees since it identified 

the consulting agreement on September 2, 2014 are $496,734, and its fees since it produced the 

consulting agreement on December 17, 2014 are $313,730. (Id.) 

AngioScore proposed, and this court ordered, phasing to focus on the consulting agreement. 

(ECF No. 27 at 8; ECF No. 29.) Still, AngioScore said, it had to spend a lot to respond to 

TriReme’s discovery requests, even though the consulting agreement was dispositive. (Motion, 

ECF No. 55 at 9-10, describing 35 requests for production, the collection and review of 1,500 

documents, and answering questions about its production.) It also points to TriReme’s initial 

representations about whether it controlled Dr. Lotan — who in the license agreement agreed to 

provide reasonable assistance to TriReme in connection with any litigation involving the “Lotan 

IP rights” — before TriReme ultimately produced Dr. Lotan for a deposition and also disclosed 

documents. (Id.) 

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ANALYSIS 

 The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285, provides: “The court in exceptional circumstances may 

award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” “[A]n ‘exceptional’ case is simply one 

that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position 

(considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in 

which the case was litigated.” Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. “[A] district court may award fees in the 

rare case in which a party’s unreasonable conduct — while not necessarily independently 

sanctionable — is nonetheless so ‘exceptional’ as to justify an award of fees.” Id. at 1757. “[A] 

case presenting either subjective bad faith or exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set 

itself aside from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award.” Id. 

“District courts may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of 

their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id.; see Highmark v. Allcare Health 

Mgt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (an appellate court reviews a district court’s § 235 

determination for abuse of discretion). “As in the comparable context of the Copyright Act, 

‘[t]here is no precise rule or formula for these determinations, but instead equitable discretion 

should be exercised ‘in light of the considerations we have identified.’’’ Octane, 134 S. Ct at 1756 

(quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)). The Octane Court further noted that 

in Fogerty, it had “explained that in determining whether to award fees under a similar provision 

in the Copyright Act, district courts could consider a ‘nonexclusive’ list of ‘factors,’ including 

‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components 

of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation 

and deterrence.’” Id. at 1756 n.6. Proof of entitlement to fees must be established by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1757. 

This is not the “exceptional” case justifying an award of fees under the fees statute. It is true, 

as AngioScore points out, that the court grounded its dismissal on the express terms of the 2003 

consulting agreement. But TriReme’s arguments were not frivolous or objectively unreasonable. 

See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 n.6. The court reaches this conclusion based on its careful 

consideration of the legal and factual arguments that both parties raised during the proceedings on 

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the motion to dismiss. 

AngioScore also argues that at least after TriReme knew of the consulting agreement, it should 

have dropped the lawsuit. Again, the court’s view is that TriReme’s legal and factual arguments 

— grounded in the consulting agreement itself —were not frivolous or objectively unreasonable. 

AngioScore characterizes TriReme’s pre-litigation failure to identify the consulting agreement as 

ineffective, but again, that does not change the court’s conclusion that pursuit of the litigation was 

not objectively unreasonable or frivolous. 

In sum, after considering the totality of the circumstances and the entire context of this case, 

the court exercises its discretion and concludes that this is not an exceptional case that justifies an 

award of fees under § 285 to AngioScore. See Octane, 134 S. Ct at 1757. 

CONCLUSION

The court denies the motion for fees. This disposes of ECF No. 55. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 28, 2015 ______________________________________ 

LAUREL BEELER 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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