Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04042/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4042

No. 07-1127

___________

Todd Sturgill, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. *

* Appeals from the United States

United Parcel Service, Inc., * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Defendant - Appellant. *

------------------------------------------------ *

National Council of the Churches of *

Christ in the USA, et al., *

*

Amici on Behalf of Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 27, 2007

Filed: January 15, 2008

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Todd Sturgill was a full-time package car driver for United Parcel Service

(UPS) at its Center in Springdale, Arkansas. UPS terminated Sturgill when he refused

to complete his route on December 17, 2004, because working past sundown on a

Friday would violate his beliefs as a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.

Sturgill commenced this action, claiming that UPS discriminated against him on

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-2-

account of his religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). After a lengthy trial, the jury found that UPS violated Title

VII by failing to reasonably accommodate Sturgill’s religious observance or practice.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The jury awarded Sturgill $103,722.25 in compensatory

and $207,444.50 in punitive damages. The district court denied UPS’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law (JAML) and awarded Sturgill reinstatement, front pay to

the date of reinstatement, an injunction requiring UPS “to accommodate [his] religious

observation of the Sabbath in the future,” and $134,838.37 in attorneys’ fees and

costs. UPS appeals, raising numerous issues. We conclude that the jury was

improperly instructed but the errors did not adversely affect its verdict. Accordingly,

we affirm the award of compensatory damages, reinstatement, front pay, attorneys’

fees, and costs. We reverse the award of punitive damages and the grant of overlybroad injunctive relief. 

I. Background

We summarize the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to Sturgill. At

the Springdale Center, UPS pre-loaded drivers’ vehicles with packages each weekday

morning. A driver’s shift normally ended when all pre-loaded packages were

delivered. Thus, the end of a driver’s work day depended on variables such as the

number of packages to be delivered, how many packages needed to be picked up, and

road conditions. UPS’s peak season extended from Thanksgiving to Christmas.

Drivers were often required to work long days during peak season, and their options

for discretionary time off were limited. Perquisites such as vacations and bidding

privileges depended on a driver’s seniority under the collective bargaining agreement

(CBA) between UPS and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 

In May 2004 Sturgill joined the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which forbids

working between sundown Friday and sundown Saturday. Realizing that his new

religion might interfere with work requirements later in the year, when the sun sets

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-3-

earlier in the day, Sturgill asked UPS to exempt him from work after sundown on

Fridays. He suggested as possible accommodations starting early on Fridays, working

Sundays through Thursdays, working longer shifts on Mondays through Thursdays

and shorter shifts on Fridays, using vacation time to cover a shorter Friday workday,

relief from making next-day air deliveries on Fridays, or no lunch breaks on Fridays.

Consistent with established UPS procedures, the Springdale Center’s manager, Scotty

Patton, forwarded Sturgill’s Request for Religious Accommodation to UPS’s District

Human Resources Manager. 

Sturgill’s Request was reviewed by district and regional Labor Relations and

Human Resources managers. UPS’s experienced District Labor Relations Manager,

Walter Dickson, testified that UPS denied the Request because Sturgill’s suggested

year-round accommodations were inconsistent either with UPS operations or with the

CBA. Dickson testified that he explored other options with the union’s business

agent, and they agreed that Sturgill could eliminate the religious conflict by

transferring to a UPS “combination job” that did not require work between sundown

Friday and sundown Saturday. However, no such jobs were then available at

Springdale, and any future combination job would be filled on the basis of seniority.

UPS denied the Request in writing, cryptically explaining that the requested

accommodations would have a “substantial impact [on] our operation” but also noting

the union’s position that Sturgill should be offered the chance to bid on other work

such as a combination job as it became available. Sturgill acknowledged knowing the

union’s position and testified that he planned to bid on an appropriate combination job

in the spring of 2005. Apparently, he would have been awarded that job based on

seniority had he not been fired after the December 17, 2004, incident. 

Though UPS denied Sturgill’s Request for accommodation, he never had to

work after sundown on any Friday before December 17. As the days shortened, when

a heavy load threatened to extend Sturgill’s Friday shift past sundown, his immediate

supervisor, Mike Hadaway, “split” his load, moving packages to other drivers to

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-4-

ensure that Sturgill could finish before sundown. Hadaway testified that this type of

informal relief was not guaranteed but, whenever possible, he made splits for many

drivers for a variety of reasons, for example, to attend a Little League game. The

CBA prohibited severely unbalanced workloads, and UPS required full-time drivers

to work a full day. Thus, when Sturgill was afforded a split that caused him to work

less than an eight-hour “plan day” on November 12, a divisional manager told Sturgill

he would be terminated if he failed to complete his deliveries again. However,

Sturgill continued to receive splits on Fridays after this November 12 incident. 

By mid-afternoon on Friday, December 17, Sturgill realized that he would not

be able to complete his route before sundown. He called Hadaway and asked for a

split. Hadaway could not find a driver to assist and told Sturgill to call Center

manager Patton. Patton warned Sturgill he would be fired if he did not deliver all of

his packages that day. Sturgill delivered packages until sundown, then returned about

thirty-five packages to the Springdale Center and left work. A UPS supervisor

completed the deliveries after dark. Terminated for abandoning his job, Sturgill filed

a grievance, claiming religious discrimination. A grievance panel of management and

union members denied the grievance. This lawsuit followed. 

Sturgill’s primary theory at trial was that UPS, with minimal cost and without

violating the CBA, could have reasonably accommodated his religious practice on

December 17 by splitting his load with other drivers. Sturgill presented evidence that

UPS routinely balanced loads when the vehicles were pre-loaded in the morning, and

that other Springdale drivers with less seniority worked fewer hours and were given

many fewer packages to deliver on December 17. There was also substantial trial

testimony concerning whether Springdale Center managers had available during the

peak season one or more other procedures that, with sufficient advance notice and

planning, would have avoided Sturgill’s religious conflict on December 17 without

violating the CBA or causing undue hardship to UPS’s operations. UPS and union

witnesses testified that all of these potential accommodations -- paid leave, vacation

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-5-

time, “personal holidays” or “option days,” and requests for relief from overtime --

would have violated the CBA or resulted in extensive overtime wages or in

fundamental changes to UPS’s business model. But the testimony by local Springdale

drivers and managers was confused and inconsistent on these issues. 

UPS also presented evidence tending to show that routinely granting Sturgill

Friday splits might require new drivers or more overtime, that drivers covering for

Sturgill might be less efficient delivering his route, and that allowing Sturgill a set end

time might result in other drivers filing grievances for being required to work

excessive overtime. Sturgill countered with evidence tending to show that, given the

enormous volume handled by Springdale drivers during peak season, relieving him

of overtime work on Fridays would only negligibly increase other drivers’ workloads

and might reduce UPS’s costs because the drivers that regularly covered Sturgill’s

route had less seniority and a lower hourly wage rate. 

The case was submitted on two alternative theories of Title VII liability, that

Sturgill was terminated because of his religion, and that the termination was caused

by a failure to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs. The jury found for UPS

on the first claim, but it found for Sturgill on the accommodation claim. We agree

with the district court there was ample evidence permitting a reasonable jury to find

that UPS could have accommodated Sturgill’s religious practice on December 17,

2004, without violating the CBA and without undue hardship to UPS operations.

Therefore, JAML was properly denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).

II. The Jury Instruction Issue

 Title VII declares that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer

“to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a). The statute defines “religion” as including - 

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-6-

all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless

an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate

to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue

hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Sturgill alleges that UPS violated its duty to reasonably

accommodate his religious belief that he must abstain from work between sundown

Friday and sundown Saturday. It is undisputed that Sturgill timely notified UPS of

a conflict between a sincerely held religious belief and his work requirements. See

Jones v. TEK Indus., Inc., 319 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Overruling UPS’s timely objection, the district court instructed the jury that “an

accommodation is reasonable if it eliminates the conflict between Plaintiff’s religious

beliefs and Defendant’s work requirements and reasonably permits Plaintiff to

continue to be employed by Defendant” (emphasis added), but that Sturgill need not

receive the accommodation of his choice. On appeal, UPS argues that this instruction

was error requiring a new trial because, as a matter of law, an employer’s

accommodation is reasonable if it provides a religion-neutral way for the employee

to minimize a religious conflict. Sturgill and supporting amici counter that the court

committed no instructional error because, to be reasonable as a matter of law, an

employer’s accommodation must eliminate the conflict and “fully satisfy the religious

convictions of an employee.” We reject both contentions. What is reasonable

depends on the totality of the circumstances and therefore might, or might not, require

elimination of a particular, fact-specific conflict.

The word “minimize” urged by UPS entered this Title VII universe in the

Supreme Court’s first opinion resolving a religious accommodation issue, Trans

World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 78 (1977):

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
1

UPS correctly notes that we used the word “minimizing” in Mann v. Frank, 7

F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1993), and in Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339

(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973 (1993). But in Mann the plaintiff initially

turned down a voluntary program that would have eliminated the conflict, and in Cook

the district court found that additional accommodations outside the collective

bargaining agreement caused undue hardship. Thus, neither decision supports UPS’s

assertion that a collective bargaining agreement that “minimizes” a religious conflict

is always a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law. 

-7-

[A collective bargaining agreement’s] seniority system represents a

neutral way of minimizing the number of occasions when an employee

must work on a day that he would prefer to have off.

The Court in Hardison established important principles: that the Title VII duty to

reasonably accommodate religious beliefs does not require an employer “to take steps

inconsistent with the otherwise valid [collective bargaining] agreement,” nor does it

require the employer to discriminate against other employees by depriving them of

collectively bargained seniority rights in order to accommodate plaintiff’s observance

of the Saturday Sabbath. Id. at 79, 81. In this case, without objection, the district

court properly included these principles in its instructions to the jury. But Hardison

did not hold, more broadly, that an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate never

requires additional actions beyond, but not inconsistent with, its contractual

obligations under a collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, the Court in Hardison

discussed such additional actions but concluded on the facts of that case that they

would have imposed an undue hardship. Id. at 84-85.1

The word “eliminate” that Sturgill urges and the district court adopted appeared

in the Supreme Court’s only other opinion resolving a religious accommodation issue,

Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986). The Court concluded

that “requiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance” would be a

reasonable accommodation if applied in a religion-neutral manner because “[t]he

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
2

In Ansonia, the Court remanded for factual findings as to how the school

board’s unpaid leave policy had been applied because “unpaid leave is not a

reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except

religious ones.” 479 U.S. at 71 (emphasis in original).

-8-

provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between employment requirements

and religious practices.” Id. at 70. Again, the Court established an important

principle: that an accommodation is reasonable as a matter of law if it eliminates a

religious conflict; therefore, the employee has no right to insist upon a different

accommodation that he prefers.2

 But the Court in Ansonia did not hold, indeed did

not suggest, that an accommodation, to be reasonable as a matter of law, must

eliminate any religious conflict.

The Supreme Court explained in Ansonia that a rule mandating that employees

be given their preferred accommodations would be inconsistent with the intended

purpose of Title VII’s reasonable accommodation provision, to foster “bilateral

cooperation” in resolving an employee’s religion-work conflict. 479 U.S. at 69; see

Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (8th Cir. 1977). It would likewise

be inconsistent with this purpose to hold that an accommodation, to be reasonable,

must wholly eliminate the conflict between work and religious requirements in all

situations. Read in this context, it is clear that the Court’s reference to “eliminat[ing]

the conflict” was not intended to pronounce a rule that all employees -- absent undue

hardship -- must receive accommodations that eliminate any conflict between religion

and work. Our reading of Ansonia is confirmed by the dissenting opinion, which

argued that the employer should remain under an obligation to consider the

employee’s reasonable proposals “if the accommodation offered by the employer does

not completely resolve the employee’s conflict.” 479 U.S. at 72-73 (Marshall, J.,

dissenting). 

Many prior cases are inconsistent with the contention that, absent undue

hardship, an employer has a Title VII duty to eliminate every employee’s religious

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-9-

conflict. In Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341 (8th Cir.

1995), we rejected the claim that the employer was unreasonable as a matter of law

in requiring an employee to cover up a graphic, religiously-motivated anti-abortion

button at work. Without discussing undue hardship, we observed that requiring the

employer to instruct co-workers they must tolerate the plaintiff’s offensive button “is

antithetical to the concept of reasonable accommodation.” In Shelton v. University

of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 223 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2000), the court

affirmed dismissal of the claim of a nurse who objected to participating in any medical

procedure that would terminate a pregnancy, despite the nurse’s contention that the

accommodation offered -- transfer to a newborn intensive care unit -- might not have

eliminated the religious conflict. And in Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services,

Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001), when a counselor

refused to offer advice about homosexual and non-marital sexual relationships

because these relationships offended her religion, the court concluded that it was a

reasonable accommodation as a matter of law when the employer offered to help the

employee apply for other positions “where the likelihood of encountering further

conflicts with her religious beliefs would be reduced” (emphasis added). See also

EEOC v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 914 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The Supreme Court

has never held that the question of ‘reasonable accommodation’ focuses upon the

number of conflicts or even upon the proportion of a single conflict eliminated by the

employer’s offer of accommodation.”) (emphasis added).

Similar analysis has been applied to many claims that an employer failed to

reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious desire not to work on the Sabbath.

In Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F.2d 141, 145 (5th Cir. 1982), a decision

cited favorably in Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69, the court affirmed judgment for an

employer, concluding it was reasonable to require the employee to arrange swaps with

other employees to avoid working on the Sabbath and to fire the employee for

refusing to work after failing to arrange a swap. In Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595

F.2d 441, 444-45 (8th Cir. 1979), a truck driver joined the Worldwide Church of God

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-10-

but continued to work some Sabbath days. When the employer’s demands increased,

the driver insisted he would only work on the Sabbath in an emergency, “resorted to

using his ingenuity to avoid working on the Sabbath,” and was terminated after

refusing to accept work many Sabbath days. We affirmed the district court’s

judgment in favor of the employer. 

Likewise, in Cook, 981 F.2d at 337-39, a Seventh Day Adventist ended a layoff by accepting a new position. Lacking seniority, he was placed on a shift requiring

Friday night work, denied a shift change, and eventually terminated for multiple

unexcused absences. We affirmed a judgment in favor of the employer and the union,

concluding that the seniority system for bidding on more favorable shifts, combined

with a first-come-first-serve procedure for requesting Fridays off in advance, was a

significant accommodation and any further accommodation would be either

impractical, too costly, or contrary to the collective bargaining agreement. And in

Mann, 7 F.3d at 1367-69, we affirmed a judgment rejecting the religious

accommodation claim of a Seventh Day Adventist because, while the employer did

not completely eliminate the conflict between her work and her religious desire not

to work on Friday nights and Saturdays, the employer’s seniority system and the

voluntary nature of its overtime procedure were significant accommodations that

justified suspending the employee when she disobeyed instructions to work a Friday

night-Saturday morning shift.

In light of these precedents and the Supreme Court’s analysis in Ansonia and

Hardison, we decline to follow the few decisions in other circuits declaring that a

“reasonable” accommodation must eliminate any religion-work conflict. Cosme v.

Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2002), and Wright v.Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217

(7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1121 (1994), affirmed judgments for

employers, so the declarations accompanied by a bare citation to Ansonia reflect little

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
3

Indeed, the Seventh Circuit subsequently rejected a claim by a Baptist police

officer that reasonable accommodation required a complete exemption from working

at gambling casinos. “Whether or not a paramilitary organization could accommodate

task-specific conscientious objection . . . the demand would not be reasonable -- and

[Title VII] calls only for reasonable accommodations. . . . Selective objection to some

of the employer’s goals raises problems on the ‘reasonableness’ branch as well as the

‘undue hardship’ branch.” Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir.

2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 989 (2004).

-11-

analysis.3

 In EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1077 (1989), the Ninth Circuit simply cited its

own pre-Ansonia decisions for this proposition without analyzing the impact of

Ansonia. The Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1988), likewise relied solely on pre-Ansonia

decisions. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred in instructing the

jury that a reasonable accommodation must eliminate the religious conflict, an

instruction that improperly took that issue from the jury. To be sure, there may be

many situations in which the only reasonable accommodation is to eliminate the

religious conflict altogether. But in close cases, that is a question for the jury because

it turns on fact-intensive issues such as work demands, the strength and nature of the

employee’s religious conviction, the terms of an applicable CBA, and the contractual

rights and workplace attitudes of co-workers. Bilateral cooperation under Title VII

requires employers to make serious efforts to accommodate a conflict between work

demands and an employee’s sincere religious beliefs. But it also requires

accommodation by the employee, and a reasonable jury may find in many

circumstances that the employee must either compromise a religious observance or

practice, or accept a less desirable job or less favorable working conditions.

That brings us to the equally critical question of whether the faulty instruction

was reversible error. The elimination issue was potentially important, for the aboveAppellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
4

Thus, UPS failed to prove that further accommodation would have caused

undue hardship as a matter of law. To meet its burden of proof on this issue, an

employer must establish that the hardship is “real rather than speculative . . . merely

conceivable, or hypothetical.” Undue hardship “cannot be proved by assumptions nor

by opinions based on hypothetical facts.” Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 655

(8th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996). 

-12-

cited cases demonstrate that it may well have been reasonable for UPS’s district and

regional managers to conclude, with the union’s concurrence, (i) that the

accommodations proposed by Sturgill were costly or inconsistent with the CBA and

therefore (ii) all that could be offered Sturgill was the prospect of bidding on a less

desirable, but conflict-eliminating combination job in 2005. But these decisionmakers did not consult local Springdale Center managers to determine whether there

were additional procedures, formal or informal, that could be employed to help

Sturgill avoid Friday work conflicts in the interim. As a result, all Center manager

Patton learned was, “Request denied,” which he construed as a mandate to give

Sturgill no accommodation and to fire him when he could not complete his December

17 assignment before sundown. Supervisor Hadaway informally accommodated

Sturgill every Friday before December 17, but this reflected Hadaway’s efforts to

accommodate diverse driver preferences, not Sturgill’s religion. Indeed, Hadaway

testified that, if so instructed in advance, he could have accommodated Sturgill on

December 17, apparently without violating the CBA.4

 This evidence of a specific,

one-time failure to accommodate resulting in the severe sanction of termination

justified the jury’s verdict, without regard to whether UPS had a broader Title VII

duty to completely and permanently eliminate the religious conflict. In these

circumstances, we conclude that the instruction error neither misled the jury nor had

a probable effect on the verdict. See Bass v. Flying J, Inc., 500 F.3d 736, 739 (8th

Cir. 2007) (standard of review).

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
5

Title VII provides that an employer commits an unfair employment practice

if it fails to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion, which is a negligence

standard of liability. However, an employee-plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement, back

pay, other injunctive relief, and monetary damages only if the employer “has

intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g), incorporated by reference in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). Here, without objection,

the district court failed to instruct the jury that these remedies are limited to intentional

violations of what is otherwise a negligence tort. Because prior religious

accommodation cases have not discussed the issue, there was no plain error.

However, failure to give this limiting instruction in the future will be reversible error.

-13-

II. Compensatory Damages, Reinstatement, and Injunctive Relief

Relying on our decision in Voeltz v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 406 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir.

2005), UPS argues that the district court erred in awarding compensatory damages,

reinstatement, limited front pay, and injunctive relief because the jury found, in

rejecting Sturgill’s discriminatory discharge claim, that his religion was not a

motivating factor in UPS’s discharge decision. The district court rejected this

contention, concluding that the jury properly awarded discharge-related damages for

UPS’s failure to reasonably accommodate Sturgill’s religion because, “had defendant

accommodated plaintiff’s observance of the Sabbath [on December 17], he . . . would

not have been terminated for job abandonment.” We agree. 

The district court properly instructed the jury that intentional religious

discrimination and the failure to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion are

distinct Title VII claims. See Voeltz, 406 F.3d at 1051; Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330

F.3d 931, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2003). General tort law principles of causation apply in

determining the damages and other relief that may be recovered for an intentional5

violation of an employer’s Title VII duty to accommodate an employee’s religion.

See Shick v. Ill. Dept. of Human Servs., 307 F.3d 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, the

question is whether the injury resulting from Sturgill’s termination for not completing

his route on December 17 was proximately caused by UPS’s failure to accommodate

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
6

In our view, UPS’s reliance on Voeltz, an ADA failure-to-accommodate case,

is misplaced because in Voeltz the jury found that the employer would not have

recalled the plaintiff had he not been disabled, so his injury was not caused by the

employer’s failure to accommodate his disability. 406 F.3d at 1049, 51. Here, by

contrast, there was overwhelming evidence that UPS considered Sturgill a good

employee and only discharged him because of the December 17 incident.

-14-

his sincerely held and properly communicated religious belief. This precise question

was addressed by a district court in this circuit in Vetter v. Farmland Industries, Inc.,

901 F. Supp. 1446, 1459 (N.D. Iowa 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 120 F.3d 749,

751-52 (8th Cir. 1997):

What is important to the court’s conclusion . . . is that Farmland’s failure

to accommodate occurred before any “insubordination” . . . and, indeed,

was the “but for” cause of “insubordination” by Vetter . . . . To put it

another way, if Farmland had reasonably accommodated Vetter’s

religious beliefs, his asserted “insubordination” would never have

occurred. . . . The court cannot envision a construction of Title VII that

permits an employer . . . to be relieved of the burden of damages to the

employee for the employer’s refusal to accommodate, because the

employee subsequently chooses to follow the dictates of the employee’s

religion rather than those of the employer.

We agree with Judge Bennett’s analysis of this issue and accordingly uphold the

district court’s award of reinstatement with front pay and compensatory damages.6

However, we vacate the grant of an injunction requiring UPS “to accommodate

plaintiff’s religious observation of the Sabbath in the future.” This command to obey

the law “was overbroad under general equitable principles.” Jake's Ltd. v. City of

Coates, 356 F.3d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 2004). In addition, given the conflicting evidence

and the court’s instruction errors, it is not at all clear what accommodations will be

reasonable in the future. Such a debatable issue should not be the subject of contempt

proceedings. 

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-15-

III. Punitive Damages

UPS next argues that the district court erred in denying its post-verdict motion

for judgment as a matter of law on Sturgill’s claim for punitive damages We agree.

Punitive damages may be awarded for an intentional Title VII violation if the

employer acted “with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected

rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C, § 1981a(b)(1). The requisite showing

of malice or reckless indifference requires proof that the employer “at least

discriminate[d] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law.”

Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999). Thus, punitive damages are

inappropriate if the employer was unaware of the federal prohibition, or if the

plaintiff’s underlying theory of discrimination was novel or poorly recognized, or if

the employer reasonably believed that its discrimination satisfied a bona fide

occupational defense. Id. at 537. Moreover, even if particular agents exhibited malice

or reckless indifference, the employer may avoid vicarious punitive damages liability

by showing that it made good faith efforts to comply with Title VII. Id. at 545-46.

Given these stringent standards, plaintiffs face a “formidable burden” when seeking

punitive damages for employment discrimination. Canny v. Dr. Pepper/ Seven-Up

Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). 

In this case, UPS demonstrated that it followed a nationwide, multi-step

protocol for considering employee requests for religious accommodations. No UPS

employee was shown to have acted with malice or reckless indifference to Sturgill’s

accommodation request. The district and regional managers concluded, after

consulting a union representative, that Sturgill’s suggested accommodations would

violate the CBA or disrupt UPS operations. Accordingly, they denied his request and

suggested he use his seniority to bid on a combination job when available. The

Supreme Court in Hardison recognized that these are bona fide defenses to religious

accommodation claims. 432 U.S. at 79-81, 84. At the local level, Center manager

Patton helped Sturgill submit his formal Request and then abided by the answer --

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-16-

Request denied -- while supervisor Hadaway successfully accommodated Sturgill

informally until the ill-fated December 17 incident. The jury reasonably found that

the lack of communication between the local managers and the Title VII decisionmakers resulted in a failure to reasonably accommodate Sturgill’s religion on

December 17, but this is nothing more than violation of a Title VII negligence

standard. The incident was followed by a harsh and precipitous discharge for job

abandonment, which looks more like an intentional tort. But given the pressures and

significance of the UPS peak season, and the prior warnings to Sturgill, his discharge

did not establish either individual or corporate malice or reckless indifference to

UPS’s Title VII obligations. Compare Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 828,

837 (8th Cir. 2001) (punitive damages inappropriate when employer acted to protect

itself against employee absences). The award of punitive damages is reversed.

IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Over UPS’s objection, the district court awarded Sturgill $120,258.74 in

attorney’s fees and $14,579.63 in costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). UPS asserts that

the fees must be reduced and certain costs were non-compensable. “We review de

novo the legal issues related to the award of attorney’s fees and costs and review for

abuse of discretion the actual award of attorney’s fees and costs.” Thompson v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 472 F.3d 515, 516 (8th Cir. 2006).

UPS argues that the attorney’s fees must be discounted for Sturgill’s limited

success because the jury rejected his claim of intentional religious discrimination.

This contention is without merit. In determining the reasonable attorney’s fee to

award a Title VII prevailing party, the court should consider whether the plaintiff

failed to prevail on claims that are unrelated to his successful claims, and whether the

plaintiff “achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a

satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434

(1983). Here, Sturgill’s accommodation and religious discrimination claims were

inextricably related -- they alleged alternative unlawful discharge theories. When the

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860
-17-

facts and legal theories overlap in this fashion, and when the prevailing party pursued

alternative legal theories in good faith, rejection of one theory “is not a sufficient

reason for reducing a fee. The result is what matters.” Id. at 435. Nor does our

decision that the award of punitive damages must be reversed and the injunction

vacated require a reconsideration of the fee award, given the substantial relief that

Sturgill received and the amount awarded. See Allen v. Tobacco Superstore, Inc., 475

F.3d 931, 943-44 (8th Cir. 2007).

Finally, UPS argues the district court erred in including attorney travel and

private process server expenses in its award of costs because these are not recoverable

costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482

U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (absent statutory authorization, federal court may only award

costs enumerated in § 1920). Title VII grants discretion to award the prevailing party

“a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The

district court rejected UPS’s contention because other circuits have construed

§ 2000e-5(k) as allowing the award of “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred

by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee paying client.” Mota v. Univ. of

Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 529 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted);

accord LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998). We

conclude that this rule is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989), as construed in W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.

Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1991). UPS does not argue that the expenses in question

are not normally charged to fee-paying clients. Accordingly, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in awarding these costs. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and

the case is remanded for entry of an appropriate amended judgment. 

______________________________ 

Appellate Case: 06-4042 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/15/2008 Entry ID: 3391860