Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01950/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01950-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RAMON ENRIQUEZ MENDEZ, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

STU SHERMAN, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:14-cv-1950-MCE-KJN (TEMP) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction 

entered against him on October 5, 2009, in the San Joaquin County Superior Court, on charges of 

first degree murder, attempted robbery, and active participation in a criminal street gang. He 

seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) the trial court violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him and his Fourteenth Amendment right to 

due process when it allowed the prosecution’s gang expert to testify on the basis of hearsay; (2) 

his sentence of life without parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment; (3) the evidence introduced at his trial is insufficient to support the robbery 

special circumstance and his conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang; (4) his 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (5) jury instruction error violated his right to due 

process. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned 

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recommends that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder 

(Pen.Code, § 187), attempted robbery (id. § 664/211), and active 

participation in a criminal street gang (id. § 186.22, subd. (a)). 

(Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.) 

The jury also found the murder was committed during the 

attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), both the murder and 

the attempted robbery were committed for the benefit of a criminal 

street gang (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and a 

principal in the offenses discharged a firearm causing great bodily 

injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)). 

On the murder conviction, defendant was sentenced to life without 

the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus consecutive terms of 25 years 

to life and 10 years for the firearm discharge and gang 

enhancements respectively. On the attempted robbery, defendant 

received a consecutive, one-third middle term of one year, plus 

enhancements of 25 years to life and 10 years for the firearm 

discharge and gang enhancements, to run concurrently to the terms 

on the murder charge. Finally, on the gang offense, defendant 

received a concurrent middle term of two years. 

Defendant appeals contending: (1) the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for mistrial after a prosecution gang expert presented 

improper testimony; (2) he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel when his attorney elicited testimony from a witness 

suggesting, incorrectly, that another witness had provided damaging 

testimony during the preliminary hearing; (3) there is insufficient 

evidence to support the robbery special circumstance; (4) there is 

insufficient evidence to support the gang charge and enhancements; 

(5) the jury was not properly instructed on the gang special 

circumstance; (6) the jury was not properly instructed on the 

firearm enhancement; (7) the LWOP sentence constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment; (8) the 10–year gang enhancements were 

improperly imposed in addition to the 25–to–life firearm 

enhancements; and (9) the court was required to stay the sentences 

on the attempted robbery and gang charges. 

We agree with defendant that the gang special circumstance 

findings on the murder and attempted robbery offenses must be 

reversed due to instructional error, the gang enhancements on those 

offenses must be stricken because they cannot be imposed in 

addition to the firearm use enhancements, and the separate 

punishments for the robbery and gang charges must be stayed 

pursuant to section 654. In all other respects, we affirm the 

judgment. 

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Facts and Proceedings 

On the afternoon of December 9, 2007, defendant, Jose Cardenas, 

Martha M., and Carina G., along with several others, attended a 

gathering at the home of Jose P. in Stockton. All of the attendees 

were members of the Surenos criminal street gang. Defendant and 

Cardenas were members of the Vickystown subset of the Surenos, 

while Martha and Carina were members of the Playboys subset. 

Cardenas, Martha M. and Carina G. arrived in a car driven by 

Carina, who parked in an alley behind Jose P.'s home. Defendant 

arrived separately. At some point during the afternoon, defendant 

and Cardenas stood among a group of men who were passing 

around a handgun. Defendant had the gun in his pocket or 

waistband either before or after it was passed around. 

Later in the afternoon, Cardenas, Martha and Carina got into 

Carina's car to leave and were waiting for defendant to join them. 

About that time, 19–year–old Francisco Montejo walked passed 

[sic] them down the alley talking on a cell phone. Cardenas made a 

comment to the effect that he liked the man's phone and should take 

it from him. A couple of minutes later, Cardenas asked to be let out 

of the car and walked to the back of it. Defendant joined him there 

and they talked for a couple of minutes. The two then walked up 

the alley in the direction of Montejo. 

Defendant and Cardenas approached Montejo and announced they 

were Surenos. Cardenas held Montejo at gunpoint, while defendant 

attempted to search him. However, before defendant could take 

anything, Cardenas shot Montejo in the chest. 

Defendant and Cardenas fled and shortly thereafter were picked up 

by Carina G. and left the area. Montejo later died from the bullet 

wound. 

Defendant and Cardenas were charged with murder, attempted 

robbery and active participation in a criminal street gang, along 

with various special circumstances and enhancements, as described 

above. They were tried together before separate juries. Defendant 

was convicted as charged and sentenced as previously indicated. 

People v. Mendez, No. C063386, 2013 WL 120935, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013), as 

modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 11, 2013). 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

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U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be 

persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that 

law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th 

Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle 

of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not 

announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 

S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

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writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

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presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but 

does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could 

have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to 

demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

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habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims 

 A. Testimony of Gang Expert

 In his first ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him and his Fourteenth Amendment right to 

due process when it allowed the prosecution gang expert to testify on the basis of hearsay that 

Montejo’s murder may have been committed for the benefit of the Sureno street gang. (ECF No. 

1 at 30.)1 Petitioner argues that the expert “disgorged testimonial hearsay to the jury,” in 

violation of the Confrontation Clause. (Id. at 34.) He also argues the expert’s testimony was so 

prejudicial as to render his trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of the Due Process Clause. 

(Id.) 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal described petitioner’s arguments and its ruling thereon, as 

follows: 

During cross-examination of the prosecution's gang expert, Officer 

James Ridenour, counsel for codefendant Cardenas asked how the 

offenses charged in this matter could have benefited the Surenos 

gang in light of the fact the defendants had not been wearing gang 

clothing, they did not flash gang signs, and no graffiti was produced 

proclaiming responsibility. Ridenour answered: “Since this crime 

has happened, all the way up Cinco de Mayo, or actually it was 

May 3rd of this year, when I have talked to Norteno gang members, 

especially on May 3rd, I actually stopped and talked to them on the 

alley off Charter, okay, this alley that enters off MLK is actually a 

spot I stopped and talked to this kid. We were just talking and I 

was asking him what was going on with his gang, what's going on 

with the fighting, has he been shot at lately, has he been - what's 

going on with him, the Nortenos, with the Nortenos and Surenos. 

We talked for a while, and I said—.” 

At that point, counsel for defendant objected on hearsay grounds, 

and counsel for Cardenas objected that the answer was not 

responsive to the question. The trial court overruled the objections. 

 

1

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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Ridenour continued: “We talked for a while, and he said the 

Surenos are starting to step it up. I asked him what he meant by 

that.” Counsel for Cardenas again objected, this time based on 

Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2d 177] 

(Crawford). The trial court again overruled the objection. 

Ridenour then completed his answer: “And he said they are starting 

to step it up and that they have been killing a lot of us lately. I said, 

what are you talking about, and he said they killed their own people 

here in the alley a couple of years ago. During that same year, they 

were driving around in a truck just shooting Nortenos like they 

were nothing, and then they were talking about the homicide that 

happened at AM/PM, when they stabbed and shot the guy at 

AM/PM. He said they're just stepping up. They're not playing no 

more with us, they're trying to make a move. That's one way. 

“I have also talked to citizens in that area, right after this homicide 

happened, a couple of months, and since then going through that 

area, asking them - I see people standing, mowing their yards and 

stuff like that, I just ask them what the neighborhood is like, they 

tell me they're tense, they're tense because of the shootings, they're 

tense because - and they say both Nortenos and Surenos, both 

Nortenos and Surenos seem like they are getting more violent, 

they're shooting people in the alley, they're shooting people in the 

streets.” 

At that point, counsel for defendant objected that the answer was 

not responsive and asked that it be stricken and to approach the 

bench. After an unreported bench conference, questioning moved 

on to other matters. 

At the next break, counsel for defendant moved for a mistrial. 

Counsel indicated that, while the answer may have been responsive 

to the question, defendant “shouldn't be saddled with bad 

questions” asked by a co-defendant's counsel. Cardenas's counsel 

again asserted the testimony violated Crawford. 

The trial court denied the motion. The court explained the question 

was legitimate and the answer was responsive, but “probably went 

too far.” The court indicated the answer did not suggest that either 

defendant was involved in the other crimes described by the officer 

but instead the reference was to Sureno crimes in general. 

Defendant contends admission of the foregoing testimony was so 

prejudicial as to render his trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of 

state and federal due process. He argues the trial court therefore 

erred in denying his motion for mistrial. Of course, implicit in this 

argument is that the trial court erred in overruling counsels' 

objections to the testimony in the first place. Defendant raises a 

number of separate arguments in this regard, including a claim that 

admission of the evidence violated his constitutional right of 

confrontation as recognized in Crawford. 

Inexplicably, the People respond only to this Crawford argument, 

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thereby apparently conceding the others. However, we do not 

accept that implicit concession and shall consider each argument in 

turn. 

Defendant first contends the court erroneously reasoned there was 

no prejudice from the foregoing testimony because it was not 

directed at him personally, but only at the Surenos gang generally. 

He points out: “The unidentified Norteno directly referred to the 

charged crimes (‘they killed their own people here in the alley a 

couple of years ago’). Similarly, the neighbors' statements that they 

were tense because of the ‘shootings' was solicited from those 

witnesses by Ridenour ‘right after the homicide happened.’” 

Defendant argues the unidentified Norteno stated “they killed” 

rather than “they accidentally shot” the victim, thereby going to 

“one of the most hotly disputed issues in the trial.” 

The foregoing arguments do not suggest any misuse of the 

indicated testimony. The question asked of Officer Ridenour was 

how the gang could benefit from the crime. The fact that people on 

the street were aware of the crime and that it was perpetrated by 

Surenos answered that question. The fact neighbors may have been 

tense following the crime is no surprise, since tension and anxiety is 

exactly what such gang crimes are intended to create. Officer 

Ridenour was essentially explaining how the crimes caused their 

intended result. There is no suggestion either defendant was tied to 

any of the other described crimes. 

Defendant also takes issue with the trial court's suggestion that he 

would not be prejudiced by the mention of other crimes committed 

by Surenos in general. He argues: “It is well established that 

improperly admitted gang evidence creates a substantial danger of 

undue prejudice precisely because it creates a risk that the jury will 

improperly infer that the defendant has a criminal disposition.” 

Defendant cites as support People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 

897 (Cardenas), where the Supreme Court found an abuse of 

discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in the admission of 

evidence that the defendant and several of his witnesses were 

members of the same criminal street gang. In that case, there were 

no gang charges; the evidence was admitted instead to show bias of 

the witnesses. The high court concluded such evidence was 

cumulative in light of other evidence showing the close relationship 

between the defendant and the witnesses. Hence, the minimal 

probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial 

effect. (Cardenas, at pp. 904–905.) 

Cardenas is clearly inapposite. The court there concluded the 

evidence was improperly admitted under Evidence Code section 

352 because its slight probative value was outweighed by its 

prejudicial effect. Defendant here did not raise an Evidence Code 

section 352 objection, so there was no occasion for the trial court to 

weigh probative value against prejudicial effect. Defendant did not 

initially object to the evidence as unduly prejudicial. He asserted it 

should be excluded because it was hearsay and not responsive. 

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Defendant's argument that “improperly admitted gang evidence 

creates a substantial danger of undue prejudice” merely begs the 

question of whether the evidence was improperly admitted. And 

while improperly admitted evidence could create a substantial 

danger of prejudice, so too could properly admitted evidence. 

“The rule is long established in California that experts may testify 

as to their opinions on relevant matters and, if questioned, may 

relate the information and sources on which they relied in forming 

those opinions. Such sources may include hearsay.” (People v. 

Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.) “Evidence Code 

section 801 permits an expert to testify to an opinion ‘[b]ased on 

matter . . . perceived by or personally known to the witness or made 

known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, 

that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in 

forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, 

unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as the 

basis of his opinion.’ (Evid.Code, § 801, subd. (b) . . . .)” (People 

v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 90 (Coleman), disapproved on 

other grounds in People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 824, fn. 

32.) 

The questioning by defense counsel went to the expert's opinion 

that the shooting of Montejo was for the benefit of the Surenos 

gang. Ridenour was asked an open-ended question about how the 

crime could have benefited the gang, thus inviting an open-ended 

answer. Ridenour explained how the public, and the Nortenos in 

particular, came to view the crime as part of an increase in violent 

criminal activity by the Surenos. The answer was responsive. 

Defendant argues evidence of other crimes committed by someone 

else, such as the AM/PM stabbing and shooting mentioned by 

Ridenour, is not admissible to prove defendant's guilt of the 

charged offenses. However, while that may be true as far as it goes, 

the evidence here was not admitted to prove defendant committed 

the offense but to prove that such offense was for the benefit of the 

gang. Defense counsel's questioning suggested no such connection 

existed and challenged the witness to explain otherwise. The 

witness did so by indicating word on the street was that the murder 

was part of a pattern of increased gang violence. 

Defendant next contends “an expert ‘may not under the guise of 

reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence,’” 

quoting from Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at page 92. According to 

defendant, “[i]n cases ‘where the risk of improper use of the 

hearsay outweighs its probative value as a basis for the expert 

opinion it may be necessary to exclude the evidence altogether.’” 

Defendant argues this is such a case, because the trial court placed 

no restriction on the jury's use of the evidence. Hence, the jury was 

not restricted to using the evidence only to test the basis of the 

expert's opinions. 

In Coleman, the high court cautioned: “California law gives the trial 

court discretion to weigh the probative value of inadmissible 

evidence relied upon by an expert witness as a partial basis for his 

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opinion against the risk that the jury might improperly consider it as 

independent proof of the facts recited therein.” (Coleman, supra, 38 

Cal.3d at p. 91.) The court continued: “[W]hile an expert may give 

reasons on direct examination for his opinions, including the 

matters he considered in forming them, he may not under the guise 

of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence. 

[Citation.] Ordinarily, the use of a limiting instruction that matters 

on which an expert based his opinion are admitted only to show the 

basis of the opinion and not for the truth of the matter cures any 

hearsay problem involved, but in aggravated situations, where 

hearsay evidence is recited in detail, a limiting instruction may not 

remedy the problem.” (Id. at p. 92.) Finally, the court stated: 

“[T]he trial court must exercise its discretion pursuant to Evidence 

Code section 352 in order to limit the evidence to its proper uses. 

The exercise of this discretion may require exclusion of portions of 

inadmissible hearsay which were not related to the expert opinion. 

[Citation.] Or it may be necessary to sever portions of the 

testimony in order to protect the rights of the defendant without 

totally destroying the value of the expert witness' testimony. 

[Citation.] In still other cases where the risk of improper use of the 

hearsay outweighs its probative value as a basis for the expert 

opinion it may be necessary to exclude the evidence altogether.” 

(Id. at pp. 92–93.) 

Defendant's argument that an expert may not present incompetent 

hearsay evidence under the guise of explaining the basis for his 

opinions again begs the question of whether this was incompetent 

hearsay evidence. Likewise as to defendant's further argument that 

an expert cannot base an opinion on unreliable hearsay. Defendant 

asserts “[s]tatements made to police by victims and witnesses are 

not considered trustworthy.” However, these are the very things 

gang experts are reasonably expected to rely upon. In this instance, 

for example, how else would Officer Ridenour have learned about 

the perception in the community regarding the charged crime. 

While the hearsay evidence may not have been admissible to prove 

a stabbing and shooting occurred at an AM/PM, it would 

nevertheless be admissible to show how the public viewed the 

charged crime in context, thereby supporting the expert's opinion 

that the crime was gang-related. Defendant points to nothing to 

suggest the indicated information was any more or less competent 

or reliable than other such evidence routinely relied upon by gang 

experts. 

Lastly, defendant contends introduction of the hearsay evidence 

violated his right of confrontation. “In all criminal prosecutions, 

the accused has a right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution, ‘to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him . . . .” (People v. Thomas, supra, 

130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1208.) “In Crawford, the Supreme Court 

held that out-of-court statements that are testimonial in nature are 

inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable and the accused has 

had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” (Ibid.) 

The People contend defendant has forfeited this argument by failing 

to object below on the basis of Crawford. However, because the 

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issue was raised by co-counsel, we conclude it is properly before 

us. 

The initial question in any Crawford analysis is whether the out-ofcourt statements were testimonial in nature. The United States 

Supreme Court did not provide a comprehensive definition in 

Crawford of what would be considered testimonial, but did provide 

the following examples: (1) “‘ex parte in-court testimony or its 

functional equivalent - that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 

examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to 

cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 

reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,’” and (2) “statements . 

. . made under circumstances which would lead an objective 

witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 

for use at a later trial.” (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 51–52 

[158 L.Ed.2d at p. 193].) 

There can be no reasonable dispute that the statements at issue here 

fall outside the examples mentioned by the United States Supreme 

Court. These were not custodial examinations of percipient 

witnesses to the crimes but merely general statements regarding the 

word on the street as to the effect of the crimes. There is nothing to 

suggest the individuals questioned by Officer Ridenour would 

reasonably have expected their comments to be used in court. 

Defendant cites United States v. Mejia (2d Cir. 2008) 545 F.3d 179, 

to support his contention that the statements at issue here were 

testimonial. However, Mejia is clearly inapposite, as it involved an 

expert who was also the investigating officer in the case and who 

recited to the jury information that was obtained from a gang 

member who had been interrogated while in police custody. (See 

id. at p. 199.) 

“‘Hearsay in support of expert opinion is simply not the sort of 

testimonial hearsay the use of which Crawford condemned.’ 

[Citations.] ‘The rule is long established in California that experts 

may testify as to their opinions on relevant matters and, if 

questioned, may relate the information and sources on which they 

relied in forming those opinions. Such sources may include 

hearsay. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] . . . [A]dmission of expert 

testimony based on hearsay will typically not offend confrontation 

clause protections because ‘an expert is subject to crossexamination about his or her opinions and additionally, the 

materials on which the expert bases his or her opinion are not 

elicited for the truth of their contents; they are examined to assess 

the weight of the expert's opinion.’” (People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 

Cal.App.4th 142, 153–154.) 

The question here is whether the trial court erred in denying 

defendant's motion for mistrial. “In reviewing rulings on motions 

for mistrial, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard. 

[Citation.] ‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of 

prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. 

[Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is 

by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with 

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considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1068.) 

Any prejudice to defendant was minimal, inasmuch as the expert 

recounted other Surenos crimes as the basis for his opinion that a 

primary purpose of the gang was committing crimes. 

Furthermore, contrary to defendant's assertions, this was not a close 

case. Defendant relies on his own self-serving statements to police 

that he tried to talk Cardenas out of the crime and only followed 

behind him as he approached the victim. But even accepting this as 

true, the fact remains that, after defendant was unable to talk 

Cardenas out of it, he accompanied Cardenas up the alley knowing 

full well Cardenas's intent. Other evidence also shows defendant 

readily participated in the crime thereafter. 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

defendant's motion for mistrial. 

Mendez, 2013 WL 120935, at *2-6. 

 2. Analysis: Confrontation Clause 

 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal defendant the 

right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The ‘main and 

essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.’” Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections for California, 692 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986)). The Confrontation 

Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 

406 (1965). 

 In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held 

that the Confrontation Clause bars the state from introducing into evidence out-of-court 

statements which are “testimonial” in nature unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 

had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such statements are 

deemed reliable. The Crawford rule “has no application to” an “out-of-court nontestimonial 

statement.” Id. at 42, 51, 68. See also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007). 

Although the Supreme Court in Crawford declined to provide a comprehensive definition of the 

term “testimonial,” it did state that “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of 

interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. The 

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court also provided the following “formulations” of a “core class” of testimonial statements: (1) 

“ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent – that is, material such as affidavits, 

custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or 

similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;” 

(2) “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 

depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;” and (3) “statements that were made under 

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 

would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 51-52. 

 The Confrontation Clause “has no application to out-of-court statements that are not 

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228 

(2012). See also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (noting that the Confrontation Clause “does not 

bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 

asserted”). Thus, “[u]nder settled evidence law, an expert may express an opinion that is based 

on facts that the expert assumes, but does not know, to be true.” Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228. 

Since the decision in Crawford, numerous federal courts have held that the introduction of 

otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence in support of a gang expert witness’ testimony does not 

violate the Confrontation Clause. See e.g., United States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 243-44 (4th 

Cir. 2012); United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 275 (4th Cir. 2010); Alejandre v. Brazelton, No. 

C 11-4803 CRB (PR), 2013 WL 1729775, at **10 -11 (N.D. Cal. April 22, 2013) (expert 

witness’ testimony concerning the meaning of defendant’s tattoos based in part on hearsay 

statements from an undisclosed parolee did not violate Confrontation Clause); Lee v. Gipson, No. 

11-cv-2855 MCE KJN P, 2012 WL 5349506 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012 (concluding that Crawford 

does not undermine the established rule that experts can testify to their opinions on relevant 

matters and may relate the information and sources upon which they rely in forming those 

opinions)); Lopez v. Horel, Civ. No. 07-4169, 2011 WL 940054, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) 

(“Thus, Crawford does not undermine the established rule that experts can testify to their opinions 

on relevant matters and may relate the information and sources upon which they rely in forming 

those opinions”); Her v. Jacquez, No. 2:09-cv-612 JAM TJB, 2011 WL 1466868, at *33 (E.D. 

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Cal. Apr. 18, 2011) (gang expert’s testimony about specific gangs and their activities and 

membership, based on information imparted to him by others, did not violate Confrontation 

Clause because underlying information not offered for its truth but merely to support expert’s 

opinion); Walker v. Clark, No. CV 08-5587-CJC (JEM), 2010 WL 1643580, at *15 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 

Feb. 18, 2010) (citing cases); Lopez v. Jacquez, No. 1:09-CV1451 AWI JMD HC, 2010 WL 

2650695, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (“[T]he Court does not find that an objective application 

of Crawford would result in a finding that the gang expert’s reliance on hearsay testimony to 

explain his opinion that Petitioner was a member of the West Fresno Nortenos, and that the West 

Fresno Nortenos area criminal street gang, to be in violation of Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause 

rights”); Cason v. Hedgpeth, No. CV 08-4576 -JVS (RNB), 2009 WL 1096209, at *13-14 (C.D. 

Cal. Apr. 22, 2009) (hearsay evidence regarding the witness’s gang membership did not violate 

Crawford because it was admitted not for the truth of the matter asserted but to support 

detective’s opinion that witness was a gang member); Eddington v. Adams, No. CV F 06-1770 

DLB HC, 2008 WL 397290, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008) (gang expert’s reliance on gang 

member’s statement as part of basis for opinion did not violate Crawford)”); Ortiz v. Tilton, Civ. 

No. 06-1752-L (CAB), 2008 WL 2543440, at *16 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) (gang expert’s 

reliance on field investigation reports, defendants’ admissions as to gang member status, and 

other hearsay as basis for opinion did not violate Crawford because materials were not admitted 

for truth of the matter asserted and his reliance on them was subject to cross-examination); 

Nguyen v. Evans, No. C 06-04630 JSW, 2008 WL 1994902, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) (gang 

expert’s testimony regarding information he received from other gang members and victims, 

which he used as a basis for his opinion, did not violate Crawford); Thomas v. Chromes, No. ED 

CV 06-00787-JFW (VBK), 2008 WL 4597214, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2008) (gang expert’s 

reliance on gang members’ statements as basis for opinion that petitioner was a gang member did 

not violate Crawford). 

 This court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that the admission into evidence of 

Detective Ridenour’s testimony did not violate petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. 

As noted by the Court of Appeal, Ridenour’s testimony was not offered for the truth of the 

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information asserted, but as a foundation for his expert opinion that the murder of Montejo could 

have been committed for the benefit of the Sureno street gang even though there was no outward 

evidence that this was the case. Ridenour’s testimony was also offered in response to a direct 

question from counsel for petitioner’s co-defendant. As an expert, Detective Ridenour could 

properly base his opinion on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, of a kind that experts in 

the field regularly consult. Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2228. Thus his opinion could include interviews 

with neighborhood residents about their reactions and opinions with respect to violent acts 

committed by gangs. 

 Even if the statements relied on by Detective Ridenour in forming his opinion testimony 

could be considered testimonial in nature, their admission did not implicate petitioner’s right to 

confrontation. As explained by the court in United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 

2009): 

An expert witness’s reliance on evidence that Crawford would bar 

if offered directly only becomes a problem where the witness is 

used as little more than a conduit or transmitter for testimonial 

hearsay, rather than as a true expert whose considered opinion 

sheds light on some specialized factual situation. Allowing a 

witness simply to parrot “out-of-court testimonial statements of 

cooperating witnesses and confidential informants directly to the 

jury in the guise of expert opinion” would provide an end run 

around Crawford. United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 72 

(2d Cir. 2007). For this reason, an expert’s use of testimonial 

hearsay is a matter of degree. See Ross Andrew Oliver, Note, 

Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert Opinion: The 

Intersection of the Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of 

Evidence 703 After Crawford v. Washington, 55 Hastings L. J. 

1539, 1560 (2004) (describing a “continuum of situations” in which 

experts rely on testimonial hearsay). The question is whether the 

expert is, in essence, giving an independent judgment or merely 

acting as a transmitter for testimonial hearsay. As long as he is 

applying his training and experience to the sources before him and 

reaching an independent judgment, there will typically be no 

Crawford problem. The expert’s opinion will be an original 

product that can be tested through cross-examination. 

See also United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding no Confrontation 

Clause violation based on admission of an expert’s testimony because the expert did not simply 

convey statements by other declarants). 

 In this case, Detective Ridenour was not merely a conduit or transmitter of testimonial 

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hearsay. Rather, in response to a question asked by defense counsel he offered his expert opinion 

based on information he had gathered from his sources on the street. Although that information 

included a generalized description of specific crimes, Ridenour did not elaborate on those crimes 

or connect petitioner or his co-defendant with their commission. In addition, petitioner was given 

the opportunity to cross-examine Detective Ridenour about his opinions as well as the basis of his 

opinions, and the jury was able to judge Ridenour’s credibility in light of the sources he described 

in his testimony. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the state courts' conclusion that Detective Ridenour’s expert 

testimony did not violate petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause is not contrary to or 

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the state court record. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas relief with respect to this claim. 

 3. Analysis: Due Process 

 Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the trial court violated 

his right to due process in failing to grant his motion for mistrial based on the admission of 

Detective Ridenour’s testimony. As noted above, errors of state law, which would include errors 

in admitting evidence or in denying a motion for mistrial, do not warrant the granting of federal 

habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. The only issue before this court is whether the admission 

of Detective Ridenour’s testimony “rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due 

process.” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68). 

 “On habeas review, constitutional errors of the ‘trial type,’ . . ., warrant relief only if they 

‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Wood v. 

Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 

(1993)). See also Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (1991) (erroneous admission of 

evidence in a state trial denies a defendant due process only when the evidence “so fatally 

infect[s] the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair”). The Ninth Circuit has 

observed that: 

//// 

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The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the 

admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Although the 

Court has been clear that a writ should be issued when 

constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair 

(citation omitted), it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission 

of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due 

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. 

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, “under AEDPA, even 

clearly erroneous admissions of evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit 

the grant of federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as 

laid out by the Supreme Court.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. See also Greel v. Martel, No. 10-

16847, 472 Fed. Appx. 503, 504, 2012 WL 907215, *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (“There is 

likewise no clearly established federal law that admitting prejudicial evidence violates due 

process.”). 

 The admission into evidence of Detective Ridenour’s testimony was not so unduly 

prejudicial as to “necessarily” prevent a fair trial. He simply responded to a question asked by 

co-defendant’s counsel about how it was possible the Montejo murder was committed to benefit a 

street gang given the lack of any outward signs to that effect. Although he mentioned some 

specifics, he did not connect petitioner to any of the acts he described. Ridenour’s testimony in 

this regard did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. It is true that the trial judge 

stated that Detective Ridenour’s testimony went “too far.” However, he also stated that 

Ridenour’s answer was “responsive in the sense that he is trying to explain how the word gets 

around” and “I don’t think that [Ridenour] has done anything to prejudice your clients in the 

sense that he is talking about Surenos in general, not about your two particular clients, so I don’t 

think it’s grounds for a mistrial.” (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 2153.) The trial 

judge also stated, “I don’t think it’s going to do a bit of good to say forget the business about the 

other crimes that the Surenos commit because we all know they commit other crimes anyway, 

and so I think it’s just going to make it worse.” (Id. at 2159.) Read as a whole, the trial judge’s 

statements clarify that he did not believe Detective Ridenour’s testimony was unduly prejudicial. 

 The court also notes that petitioner’s jurors were instructed that in evaluating the 

testimony of an expert witness, they should consider “the facts or information on which the expert 

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relied in reaching [their] opinion,” and “whether information on which the expert relied was true 

and accurate.” (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 1197.) The jurors were also instructed to 

“examine the reasons given for each opinion and the facts or other matters on which each witness 

relied.” (Id.) See also id. at 1240 (instructing the jury to consider “evidence of gang activity only 

for the limited purpose” of, among other things, considering “the facts and information relied on 

by an expert witness in reaching his or her opinion”). These jury instructions would have 

lessened any prejudicial impact of Ridenour’s testimony. As the United States Supreme Court 

observed in another case, petitioner’s trial “was not perfect, few are, but neither was it 

fundamentally unfair.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 183 (1986). In sum, Ridenour’s 

testimony was not so prejudicial that the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial gave rise to a due 

process violation. 

 As in the claim above, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the decision of the 

California Court of Appeal rejecting his due process claim was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of federal law. He has certainly failed to show that the state appellate court’s 

thoughtful and thorough opinion was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief. 

B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

 In his next ground for habeas relief, petitioner claims that his sentence of life without 

parole on his first degree murder conviction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 

1 at 40.) Petitioner argues that he was an “immature and uneducated 18-year old non-shooter 

who neither killed nor intended to kill, and who had no history of violence.” (Id.) He argues that, 

under these circumstances, his sentence is unduly harsh. 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends that, given his young age, disadvantaged 

family background and limited intelligence, coupled with his minor 

role in the attempted robbery and murder, the LWOP sentence 

imposed in this matter amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. 

Defendant points out he turned 18 only a few months before the 

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offenses, was one of 15 children born to a Mexican immigrant 

family, still lived with his parents, dropped out of school in the 

tenth grade, had been an agricultural field worker since the age of 

17, could not spell his own middle name or the name of his brother, 

jumped into the Vickystown Surenos at the age of 16, and had no 

adult convictions or history of violence. As to the offenses, 

defendant contends he was a reluctant participant and the only 

evidence to the contrary came from the questionable testimony of 

two possible accomplices. Defendant asserts he “specifically 

obtained Cardenas's assurance that the victim would not be hurt” 

and “reluctantly” participated in an attempted robbery “that went 

awry when the gun held by his codefendant accidentally went off.” 

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution “‘forbids 

only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the 

crime.’” (People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1135.) 

A punishment also may violate the California Constitution if “it is 

so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it 

shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human 

dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. omitted 

(Lynch).) In Lynch, the California Supreme Court suggested three 

areas of focus: (1) the nature of the offense and the offender; (2) a 

comparison with the punishment imposed for more serious crimes 

in the same jurisdiction; and (3) a comparison with the punishment 

imposed for the same offense in different jurisdictions. (Id. at pp. 

425–427.) Disproportionality need not be established in all three 

areas. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 487, fn. 38.) 

The United States Supreme Court has identified two classes of 

cases that violate the proportionality standard. “The first involves 

challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the 

circumstances in a particular case. The second comprises cases in 

which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain 

categorical restrictions . . . .” (Graham v. Florida (2010) _____ ___ 

U.S. ____ [176 L.Ed.2d 825, 836].) This second classification, in 

turn, “consists of two subsets, one considering the nature of the 

offense, the other considering the characteristics of the offender.” 

(Id. at p. ____ [176 L.Ed.2d at p. 836].) Under the first subset, the 

high court has barred capital punishment for non-homicide offenses 

committed by anyone. (Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) 554 U.S. 407, 

____ [171 L.Ed.2d 525, 534].) Under the second, the court has 

barred capital punishment for minors, even if they commit murder. 

(Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 578 [161 L.Ed.2d 1, 28].) 

Defendant clearly does not qualify under either of the categorical 

prohibitions. This case involves a murder, and defendant was not a 

minor at the time of the killing. Thus, defendant's claim is that the 

LWOP sentence is disproportional to the crime and/or the criminal. 

However, in this regard, defendant's claim is premised on a false 

and misleading narrative. 

Regarding the offender, defendant asserts both that he was barely 

18 at the time of the offenses and he had no adult convictions. Of 

course, since defendant had been an adult for only a few months, it 

is not surprising he had no adult convictions. Defendant would had 

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to have committed a crime and been convicted of it in a very short 

span of time. At any rate, defendant admitted to probation that he 

had stolen cars with other gang members, and the probation report 

indicates he had juvenile offenses that “are numerous or of 

increasing seriousness.” 

The fact that defendant was one of 15 children born of Mexican 

immigrants would not appear to provide any excuse for his actions. 

The probation report indicates defendant reported that all his family 

members are hard workers, his older siblings are married with 

children, and he was not a victim of abuse, neglect or molestation. 

Nor would the facts that defendant was employed as a field worker 

and lived with his parents have any bearing on his susceptibility to 

crime. And while defendant may have dropped out of school in the 

10th grade, this coincides with his having joined the gang at the age 

of 16 and suggests nothing more than that defendant voluntarily 

chose to pursue the gang lifestyle rather than an education. Finally, 

there is nothing in this record to suggest defendant's purported 

regular use of alcohol and drugs contributed to the offenses in this 

matter. 

More importantly, defendant's characterization of his involvement 

in these offenses is based exclusively on his own self-serving 

statements to police. Those statements came during an interview in 

which defendant repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to lie to 

the officers in an effort to downplay his culpability. Defendant 

revealed only as much as he thought the officers already knew. 

Other evidence showed defendant was fully aware that Cardenas 

was armed and voluntarily accompanied his fellow gang member in 

pursuit of the victim in order to commit a robbery. Defendant 

asserts the gun accidentally went off, but the fact remains the gun 

was intentionally utilized in the crime to effectuate the robbery. 

In light of the circumstances of the offenses and the offender, we 

cannot agree an LWOP sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment under either the state or federal Constitution. 

Mendez, 2013 WL 120935, at *18-20. 

 2. Applicable Law and Analysis

 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes “cruel and unusual 

punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The United States Supreme Court has held that the 

Eighth Amendment includes a “narrow proportionality principle” that applies to terms of 

imprisonment. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 

957, 996 (1991). See also Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006). However, the 

precise contours of this principle are unclear, and successful challenges in federal court to the 

proportionality of particular sentences are “exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 

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289-90 (1983). See also Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004). “The Eighth 

Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids 

only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 

1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm). 

 In assessing the compliance of a non-capital sentence with the proportionality principle, a 

reviewing court must consider “objective factors” to the extent possible. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290. 

Foremost among these factors are the severity of the penalty imposed and the gravity of the 

offense. “Comparisons among offenses can be made in light of, among other things, the harm 

caused or threatened to the victim or society, the culpability of the offender, and the absolute 

magnitude of the crime.” Taylor, 460 F.3d at 1098. 

 The following decisions of the United States Supreme Court illustrate these principles. In 

Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a firsttime offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961. In 

Lockyer v. Andrade, the Supreme Court held that it was not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law for the California Court of Appeal to affirm a “Three Strikes” 

sentence of two consecutive 25 year-to-life imprisonment terms for a petty theft with a prior 

conviction involving theft of $150.00 worth of videotapes. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. In Hutto v. 

Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), the Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s sentence of 40 years in 

prison after his conviction for possession of nine ounces of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. 

Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370. Finally, in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Supreme Court 

upheld a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a defendant’s third nonviolent felony: 

obtaining money by false pretenses. 

 Pursuant to the authorities cited above, the sentence imposed on petitioner, while 

extremely harsh, is not grossly disproportionate to his first degree murder conviction. Petitioner’s 

crime is more serious than the drug possession in Harmelin, the petty theft convictions before the 

court in Andrade, the conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses at issue in Rummel, 

and the conviction for possession of .036 grams of cocaine in Taylor, all of which involved the 

imposition of sentences which were upheld against an Eighth Amendment challenge. See also 

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Hutto, 454 U.S. at 372 (the United States Supreme Court “has never found a sentence for a term 

of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment.”). 

This is not a case where “a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence 

imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 1004-05. Because 

petitioner does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality, this court need not compare 

petitioner’s sentence to the sentences of other defendants in other jurisdictions. Harmelin, 501 

U.S. at 1005; United States v. Meiners, 485 F.3d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 2007) (“in the rare case in 

which a threshold comparison [of the crime committed and the sentence imposed] leads to an 

inference of gross disproportionality, we then compare the sentence at issue with sentences 

imposed for analogous crimes in the same and other jurisdictions.@). 

 Petitioner notes that his eighteenth birthday was less than 4 months before the murder was 

committed. (ECF No. 1 at 40.) It is true that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to 

life sentences for juveniles is different than that for adults. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 

487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a 

fifteen year-old defendant convicted of first degree murder); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 

(2005) (the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of defendants under the 

age of eighteen); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 

imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit 

homicide); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (a mandatory sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment). However, these cases do not dictate 

the result in this case because petitioner was not a juvenile at the time he committed his crimes. 

 Based on the authorities cited above, the decision of the California Court of Appeal 

rejecting petitioner’s argument that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of wellestablished federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief with 

respect to this claim. 

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C. Insufficient Evidence

 Petitioner raises two claims of insufficient evidence. After setting forth the applicable 

legal standards, the court addresses these claims in turn below. 

 1. Applicable Legal Principles

 The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There is sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[T]he dispositive question under 

Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 318). Put another way, “a reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground 

of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos 

v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, *4 (2011). 

 In conducting federal habeas review of a claim of insufficient evidence, “all evidence 

must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 F.3d 

1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). “Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences 

to draw from the evidence presented at trial,” and it requires only that they draw “‘reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) 

( per curiam ) (citation omitted). “‘Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be 

sufficient to sustain a conviction.’” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.1995) (citation 

omitted). 

 “A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus faces a heavy burden when challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due process grounds.” 

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to grant relief, the federal habeas 

court must find that the decision of the state court rejecting an insufficiency of the evidence 

claim reflected an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the 

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case. Ngo, 651 F.3d at 1115; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 & n.13. Thus, when a federal habeas 

court assesses a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a state court conviction under AEDPA, 

“there is a double dose of deference that can rarely be surmounted.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 

957, 964 (9th Cir. 2011). The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in 

reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983. 

 2. Robbery Special Circumstance

 In his third ground for relief, petitioner claims that the evidence is insufficient to support 

the robbery special circumstance “because the evidence does not support a finding that 

[petitioner] acted either with the intent to kill or with reckless disregard for human life.” (ECF 

No. 1 at 48.) In a thorough and careful decision, the California Court of Appeal denied this 

claim, reasoning as follows: 

Under section 190.2, a defendant found guilty of first degree 

murder is subject to a penalty of death or life without the possibility 

of parole (LWOP) if one of various special circumstances is found 

true. One such special circumstance is where “[t]he murder was 

committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an 

accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the 

immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit” one or 

more of various enumerated felonies, including robbery. (§ 190.2, 

subd. (a)(17).) For the actual killer, intent to kill is not an element 

of the special circumstance charge. However, for an aider and 

abettor, the prosecution must prove the defendant either intended to 

kill (§ 190.2, subd. (c)) or was a major participant in the underlying 

felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life (§ 190.2, 

subd. (d)). 

Defendant contends there is no evidence either that he intended to 

kill the victim or that he acted with reckless indifference to the 

victim's life. Hence, he argues, the special circumstance finding 

cannot stand. According to defendant, there is insufficient evidence 

he knew before the actual shooting that Cardenas was likely to fire 

or was likely to harm anyone. Rather, defendant argues, “the 

evidence tended to show that both defendants were completely 

surprised when the gun went off, as they immediately ran away in a 

panic without taking the victim's property.” Furthermore, 

defendant first tried to talk Cardenas out of the crime and 

eventually went along only because Cardenas promised the victim 

would not be hurt. 

“‘“To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains 

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evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which 

a rationale trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”’ [Citations.] ‘“If the circumstances reasonably 

justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court 

that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a 

contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’ 

[Citations.] The standard of review is the same when the 

prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” 

(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104.) 

As commonly understood, the term “reckless indifference to human 

life” means “that the defendant was subjectively aware that his or 

her participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death.” 

(People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 577.) 

 In People v. Hodgson (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 566 (Hodgson), the 

Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to support a robbery 

special circumstance where the defendant held open the electric 

gate of an underground parking garage to facilitate the escape of his 

fellow gang member, Salazar, who robbed and shot to death a 

woman who had opened the gate to enter. (Hodgson, at p. 568.) 

While the defendant stood at the gate, Salazar approached the 

victim's car and shot out one of the windows. After the car rolled 

forward and into a pillar and a parked car, Salazar fired another 

bullet through the window and into the victim's head. (Id. at p. 

570.) 

The court concluded the defendant was a major participant in the 

crime, notwithstanding the fact he did not supply the murder 

weapon, was not himself armed, and did not take anything from the 

victim. (Hodgson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 579.) The court 

explained there were only two participants in the crime, rather than 

a “coterie of confederates,” and the defendant's actions were 

essential in assisting his fellow gang member's escape. (Id. at pp. 

579–580.) The court further concluded a rational trier of fact could 

have found sufficient evidence that the defendant acted with 

reckless indifference to human life. The court explained: “Even 

after the first shot it must have been apparent to appellant Ms. Nam 

had been severely injured and was likely unconscious. Her car 

rolled into the garage and collided with a pillar and another car. 

Appellant had to be aware use of a gun to effect the robbery 

presented a grave risk of death. However, instead of coming to the 

victim's aid after the first shot, he instead chose to assist Salazar in 

accomplishing the robbery by assuming his position at the garage 

gate and trying to keep it from closing until Salazar could escape 

from the garage with the loot.” (Id. at p. 580.) In People v. Smith 

(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 914, Taffolla stood outside the victim's 

motel room while Smith entered and beat her to death in the course 

of a robbery. The Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to 

support the finding that Taffolla acted with reckless indifference to 

human life for purposes of a robbery special circumstance finding. 

According to the court: “Even if Taffolla remained outside [the 

victim]'s room as a lookout, the jury could have found Taffolla 

gained a ‘subjective awareness of a grave risk to human life’ during 

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the many tumultuous minutes it would have taken for [the victim] 

to be stabbed and slashed 27 times, beaten repeatedly in the face 

with a steam iron, and had her head slammed through the wall. In 

addition, when Smith emerged from her room covered in enough 

blood to leave a trail from the motel to McFadden Street, Taffolla 

chose to flee rather than going to [the victim]'s aid or summoning 

help.” (Id. at p. 927.) 

In neither of the foregoing cases did the defendant participate in the 

actual killing except as a lookout. In the present matter, defendant's 

participation was more direct. He stood alongside Cardenas as they 

attempted to rob the victim. On the other hand, in the foregoing 

cases, the defendant had an opportunity to intervene to stop the 

killing while it was in progress but chose not to do so. In the 

present matter, there was only one shot, after which defendant and 

Cardenas immediately fled. 

Defendant relies on two out-of-state decisions: Jackson v. Florida 

(Fla.1991) 575 So.2d 181 (Jackson); and State v. Lacy (Ariz.1996) 

929 P.2d 1288 (Lacy). In Jackson, the evidence established that the 

defendant and his brother were at the scene of a murder and the 

defendant had previously expressed an intent to rob the victim. 

However, there were no eyewitnesses to the actual killing. The 

defendant was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death, 

but the Florida Supreme Court reversed the sentence. The court 

explained that, while the defendant was clearly a major participant 

in the underlying felony, there was insufficient evidence that he 

acted with a reckless disregard for human life. In particular, there 

was no evidence the defendant possessed or fired a weapon, harmed 

the victim, intended to harm the victim when he entered the store, 

or expected violence to erupt. (Jackson, at pp. 192–193.) There 

was also no evidence that the defendant had a chance to prevent the 

murder, since it happened quickly. (Id. at p. 193.) 

In Lacy, two women were found dead in an apartment. One woman 

had been shot three times and received a blunt force injury to her 

head and scratches on her arm. The other woman had been shot 

twice, once in the face and once in the back of the head. (Lacy, 

supra, 929 P.2d at pp. 1292–1293.) The defendant later gave a 

statement to police implicating himself and a man named 

Stubblefield in the killings. However, the defendant claimed 

Stubblefield alone had killed the women while the defendant tried 

to get him to depart. The defendant eventually grabbed a 

microwave and ran out the door of the apartment. Stubblefield later 

picked him up and took him home. The two men were tried 

separately and Stubblefield was acquitted. However, the defendant 

was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. (Id. at 

p. 1293.) 

The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the sentence, finding 

insufficient evidence that the defendant acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. The only evidence of what occurred 

inside the apartment was the defendant's statement to police. 

According to the court: “Here, other than what defendant described, 

there is little to establish his involvement in the deaths of these 

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young women. We know that, at a minimum, he stole a microwave 

after one of the murders and did nothing to prevent either victim's 

death. While this may demonstrate callousness and a shocking lack 

of moral fiber, it does not alone rise to the level of reckless 

indifference.” (Lacy, supra, 929 P.2d at p. 1300.) The court 

continued: “We do not suggest that defendant's tale must be 

accepted at face value. Without his statement, however, we are left 

with an almost complete void as to what occurred that night. His 

fingerprints were nowhere to be found, it is unclear whether he 

knew Stubblefield had a gun, and it is uncertain that he should have 

anticipated violence.” (Ibid.) 

Similar to the foregoing cases, there is no evidence here as to what 

occurred in the alley other than defendant's statements to the police 

and the testimony of Martha and Carina about what defendant and 

Cardenas said after they returned to the car. However, in the 

present matter, there is evidence that defendant conspired with 

Cardenas to rob the victim, defendant was either armed or knew 

Cardenas was armed with a handgun, and the two proceeded in the 

direction of the victim to carry out their plan. It is also clear that, 

after the shooting, defendant ran from the scene with Cardenas 

rather than render aid to the victim. 

In People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607 (Mora), Mora and 

Arredondo conspired to rob a drug dealer named Minard. Minard 

and a friend named Nale were at Minard's home at 1:30 a.m. 

watching television and smoking marijuana when Mora knocked on 

the door. Nale had previously introduced Mora to Minard for the 

purpose of buying drugs and admitted Mora into the home. 

Arredondo later knocked on the door, and Mora asked if his friend 

could come in and use the bathroom. However, when the door was 

opened, Arredondo pushed his way in pointing a high-powered 

rifle. Arredondo instructed Minard to “get his boxes of shit,” and, 

as Minard began to get up, Mora grabbed him. A tussle ensued 

during which Arredondo fired a shot into Minard's chest. Minard 

fell to his knees, Mora pushed him the rest of the way down, and 

Arredondo shot Minard in the back. Each gun wound was fatal. 

(Mora, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.) Mora later gave a 

statement to police claiming that he never intended that anybody 

die. (Id. at p. 612.) 

The Court of Appeal concluded there was sufficient evidence to 

support a finding that Mora acted with reckless disregard for human 

life. Even assuming Mora did not intend that the victim be killed, 

he “admitted planning to go to a drug dealer's home at night to rob 

him by having Arredondo enter with a rifle which fired three-inch 

bullets. [Mora] had to be aware of the risk of resistance to such an 

armed invasion of the home and the extreme likelihood death could 

result. [Citation.] According to [Mora]'s own statement he did not 

know whether Minard was dead or alive. He did not attempt to aid 

the victim but instead carried through with the original plan to steal 

the victim's drugs. [Mora] personally carried away the loot, left the 

victim there to die, and threatened the remaining victim Nale.” 

(Mora, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 617.) 

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In the present matter, the jury was not required to accept 

defendant's self-serving description of the offenses at face value. 

Defendant first denied even being present at Jose P.'s house. After 

being told the police knew he was there, defendant admitted being 

present, but claimed Cardenas wanted him to go along but he 

refused, Cardenas went alone, and defendant heard a gunshot. 

However, when told that bank surveillance cameras showed him 

with Cardenas in the alley, defendant admitted he went along but 

claimed he first tried to talk Cardenas out of it. He also claimed he 

did not know Cardenas was armed. Defendant then said he ran 

away after the shooting only because Cardenas ran and that 

Cardenas claimed when he got to the car that the gunshot had been 

accidental. It is clear from the foregoing that defendant revealed to 

police only as much as he was required to reveal based on what the 

officers claimed they already knew. 

Both Martha M. and Carina G. testified that Cardenas expressed an 

intent to steal the victim's cell phone and, a couple minutes later, 

engaged in a discussion with defendant at the rear of Carina's car. 

The two then departed up the alley in the direction of the victim. 

Shortly thereafter, the shooting occurred and both defendants fled 

the scene, leaving the victim lying in the alley. Martha testified she 

saw the two men running and, when they got in the car, they were 

laughing. Carina testified she told the police that defendant said he 

told Cardenas just to scare the victim and defendant was going to 

search the victim when he heard the gunshot. There was also 

testimony that defendant had been seen earlier in a group of men 

with Cardenas passing around a handgun. 

As in Mora, the two perpetrators planned to rob the victim at 

gunpoint. Also as in Mora, defendant was actively assisting his 

armed confederate in the attempted robbery when the latter shot the 

victim. Further as in Mora, both perpetrators fled the scene without 

rendering assistance following the allegedly unintended shooting. 

The only difference here, which also distinguishes this matter from 

Hodgson, is that the victim was not shot twice and, hence, 

defendant did not have as great an opportunity to intervene and stop 

the killing. However, we do not find this distinction to be 

significant under the circumstances. When defendant accompanied 

his confederate up that ally to assist in a robbery, he knew Cardenas 

was armed and had to be aware of the risk of resistance to such a 

crime and the extreme likelihood death could result. This is 

sufficient to support the finding that he acted with reckless 

disregard for human life. 

Mendez, 2013 WL 120935, at *8-11. 

 After reviewing the state court record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, and 

for the reasons expressed by the California Court of Appeal, this court concludes that there was 

sufficient evidence introduced at petitioner’s trial to support the robbery special circumstance. 

The court reaches this conclusion even though there was evidence which supports petitioner’s 

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argument that he did not act with intent to kill or with reckless disregard for human life. The 

question in this federal habeas action is not whether there was evidence from which the jury could 

have found for the petitioner on this issue. Rather, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, 

petitioner must demonstrate that the state courts’ denial of relief was an objectively unreasonable 

application of the decisions in Jackson and Winship to the facts of this case. Specifically, he must 

show that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the robbery special 

circumstance allegation beyond a reasonable doubt and that no rational trier of fact could have 

agreed with the jury’s decision on this issue. Petitioner has failed to make this showing, or to 

overcome the “double dose” of deference due to the state court’s findings of fact and its analysis 

of this claim. Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim of insufficient 

evidence. 

 3. Active Gang Participation

 In his fifth ground for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang. He argues 

that Detective Ridenour’s testimony was insufficient to demonstrate that at the time of the 

charged offenses the primary activities of the Surenos street gang included the commission of 

predicate offenses listed in Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(e). (ECF No. 1 at 59-71.) 

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, largely on state law grounds. The court 

reasoned as follows: 

Defendant contends his conviction for active participation in a 

criminal street gang must be reversed because the prosecution failed 

to prove the Surenos are a criminal street gang within the meaning 

of section 186.22. 

Section 186.22, subdivision (a), reads: “Any person who actively 

participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its 

members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 

activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any 

felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be 

punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to 

exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 

months, or two or three years.” 

A criminal street gang is defined in section 186.22 as “any ongoing 

organization, association, or group of three or more persons, 

whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities 

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the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in 

paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, or (31) to (33), inclusive, of 

subdivision (e), having a common name or common identifying 

sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively 

engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” 

(§ 186.22, subd. (f).) 

A “pattern of criminal gang activity” requires “the commission of, 

attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, 

sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more of the 

following offenses, provided at least one of these offenses occurred 

after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those offenses 

occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the offenses 

were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons: 

[33 offenses identified].” (§ 186.22, subd. (e).) 

Defendant does not contest that the Surenos are an “ongoing 

organization, association, or group of three or more persons” (§ 

186.22, subd. (f)) or that he is a member of the Vickystown subset 

of the Surenos. He contends there is insufficient evidence that a 

primary activity of the Surenos is the commission of one or more of 

the crimes enumerated in section 186.22, subdivision (e). 

Defendant acknowledges that Officer Ridenour, the prosecution's 

gang expert, testified a primary activity of the “gang” is the 

commission of “[h]omicide, carjacking, robbery, drug sales, 

burglary, stolen autos, possession of handguns, felon in possession 

of weapons, [and] burglary,” which are all listed crimes. However, 

he argues Ridenour never clarified whether the “gang” to which he 

was referring was the Surenos in general or one of its subsets. 

The People respond that the context of Officer Ridenour's 

testimony makes if [sic] “perfectly clear” he was referring to the 

Surenos in general. However, as support, the People cite nothing 

more than the testimony indicated above. They provide no 

“context” for that testimony. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the 

entire trial transcript and note that, in earlier testimony, Ridenour 

was discussing the two primary Hispanic gangs, the Surenos and 

the Nortenos, and not any particular subsets. Ridenour made no 

attempt to distinguish crimes committed by a particular subset from 

those committed by other Surenos. Thus, there is no reason to 

believe he was referring to any subset of the Surenos. 

Defendant next contends Officer Ridenour was never asked for the 

basis of his opinion that a primary activity of the Surenos was 

commission of the enumerated offenses. Defendant argues an 

expert opinion alone does not constitute substantial evidence but 

must be backed by sufficient facts. 

The People fail to respond to this argument. Instead, they refer to 

Ridenour's testimony identifying the various offenses constituting 

the gang's primary activities and assert those offenses qualify under 

section 186.22, subdivision (e). However, that point is not 

contested. Next, the People cite Martha M.'s testimony that the 

criminal activity of the Playboy Surenos, to which she belonged, 

was “pretty crazy,” in that “[e]verybody was going to jail for doing 

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stupid things.” Without more details, this testimony obviously had 

no probative value as to the primary activities of the Surenos. 

Finally, the People point out that defendant was an admitted 

member of the Vickystown Surenos and “there is little doubt that 

the Stockton Vickystown [S]urenos were a criminal street gang 

within the definition of the Penal Code.” This argument merely 

begs the question.” 

The phrase ‘primary activities,’ as used in the gang statute, implies 

that the commission of one or more of the statutorily enumerated 

crimes is one of the group's ‘chief’ or ‘principal’ occupations. (See 

Webster's Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1942) p. 1963 [defining 

‘primary’].) That definition would necessarily exclude the 

occasional commission of those crimes by the group's members.” 

(People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 323.) “Sufficient 

proof of the gang's primary activities might consist of evidence that 

the group's members consistently and repeatedly have committed 

criminal activity listed in the gang statute. Also sufficient might be 

expert testimony . . . .” (Id. at p. 324.) 

In In re Nathaniel C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, the Court of 

Appeal found the evidence insufficient to prove a primary activity 

of the gang at issue - the Family - was committing crimes 

enumerated in section 186.22. The gang expert in that case testified 

that a primary activity of the Family was to commit crimes, and 

enumerated the crimes he had in mind. However, only one of those 

crimes qualified for the gang enhancement. According to the court: 

“[T]he evidence is insufficient to show a primary activity of the 

Family is commission of one or more of the eight specified 

offenses, as required by section 186.22, subdivision (f). This is not 

to say that the evidence failed to show that criminal conduct is a 

primary activity of the Family. But the statute's focus is much 

narrower than general criminal conduct; evidence must establish 

that a primary activity of the gang is one or more of the listed 

offenses.” (Id. at p. 1004, fn. omitted.) The court went on to 

explain the gang expert admitted the Family was based in an area of 

the state other than the expert's jurisdiction. Thus, the expert's 

opinion about primary activities “did not relate specifically to the 

Family and its activities.” (Id. at p. 1005.) 

The Court of Appeal in In re Alexander L. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 

605 likewise found insufficient evidence that a primary activity of 

the gang in question was committing one or more of the enumerated 

crimes. In that case, the gang expert provided the following 

testimony on the issue of primary activities: “‘I know they've 

committed quite a few assaults with a deadly weapon, several 

assaults. I know they've been involved in murders. [¶] I know 

they've been involved with auto thefts, auto/vehicle burglaries, 

felony graffiti, narcotic violations.’” (Id. at p. 611.) However, 

there was no testimony regarding the basis of the expert's 

knowledge. (Id. at pp. 611–612.) On cross-examination, the expert 

acknowledged the vast majority of cases with which he was 

familiar involved graffiti. (Id. at p. 612.) 

In In re Leland D. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 251, the gang expert 

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testified the primary purpose of the gang in question was engaging 

in criminal activity and further indicated the gang engaged in 

narcotics sales, vehicle thefts and assaults. (Id. at pp. 255, 259.) 

The court concluded this was insufficient to establish a pattern of 

criminal activity. (Id. at p. 258.) There was no evidence of any 

specific crime committed by the gang other than a single drug 

offense committed by the minor. (Ibid.) Furthermore, the sources 

of the expert's opinion “appear to have been hearsay statements 

from unidentified gang members and information pertaining to 

arrests of purported gang members all made without a definite 

timeframe being established.” (Id. at p. 259.) 

The present matter is readily distinguishable from the foregoing 

cases. Officer Ridenour testified one of the primary activities of the 

Surenos is the commission of crimes listed in section 186.22, 

subdivision (e). In particular, he identified homicides, carjacking, 

robberies, drug sales, burglaries, stolen vehicles, possession of 

firearms, and being felons in possession of firearms. As the basis 

for his opinion, Ridenour indicated he participated in the 

investigation of over 500 Sureno gang crimes and has personally 

arrested 200 to 500 gang members. Ridenour testified that, in order 

to keep current on gang activities, he contacts gang members on 

nearly a daily basis, both in and out of custody, talks to family 

members and girlfriends, talks to other police officers who handle 

gang matters, belongs to several associations that deal with gang 

activities, and receives e-mails and updates throughout the week 

about Hispanic gangs. 

Defendant argues Officer Ridenour's opinion alone is insufficient to 

establish the elements of the gang charge without the facts on which 

that opinion is based. Apparently, defendant is not satisfied with 

Ridenour's explanation that he has investigated over 500 Sureno 

gang crimes and talks with gang members, family and friends, and 

other officers about gang activities constantly. Defendant would 

presumably have Ridenour provide specific details on each of those 

500 plus crimes and all of his various discussions. 

In People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605 (Gardeley), the 

prosecution's gang expert testified that, “based on investigations of 

hundreds of gang-related offenses, conversations with defendants 

and other Family Crip members, as well as information from fellow 

officers and various law enforcement agencies, it was his opinion 

that the Family Crip gang's primary purpose was to sell narcotics, 

but that the gang also engaged in witness intimidation and other 

acts of violence to further its drug-dealing activities.” (Id. at p. 

612.) No further details were provided. The Supreme Court found 

the foregoing to be sufficient evidence to support a finding that a 

primary activity of the gang in question was the commission of 

enumerated crimes. (Id. at p. 620.) 

As in Gardeley, the gang expert here was not required to provide 

details about all the matters he used to form his opinions about the 

gang's primary activities. Defendant was free to test the basis of 

Ridenour's information on cross-examination as the codefendant 

did regarding Ridenour's opinion that the instant crime benefited 

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the gang. 

Defendant next contends there is no way to determine from 

Ridenour's testimony whether he was relying on gang offenses that 

occurred before or after the charged offenses. Defendant argues: 

“Both logic and fundamental principles of due process would 

preclude the imposition of punishment for gang-related conduct 

based on proof that an organization to which the defendant 

belonged became a criminal street gang after the commission of the 

crime of which he was convicted.” The People once again fail to 

respond to this argument. 

To support his argument, defendant cites Ridenour's testimony 

regarding specific crimes committed by Surenos and points out that 

Ridenour failed to indicate when most of them occurred. However, 

this argument goes to a different element of the gang charge -

whether the gang engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. 

Defendant does not raise any challenge on appeal to that element. 

Even without the testimony regarding specific, undated crimes 

committed by gang members, Ridenour's opinion about the primary 

activities of the gang, based on his investigation of over 500 Sureno 

gang crimes and his discussions with gang members, family and 

friends, and other officers about gang activities, was sufficient to 

support the primary activities finding without any further specifics. 

(See Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 620.) 

Mendez, 2013 WL 120935, at *11-14. 

 After a review of the record, this court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas relief on this claim of insufficient evidence. Based on the evidence introduced at 

petitioner’s trial, it was not unreasonable for the state courts to determine that a rational trier of 

fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was an active participant in a 

criminal street gang. The testimony of Detective Ridenour was sufficient to demonstrate that, at 

the time of petitioner’s crimes, the primary activities of the gang with which petitioner was 

affiliated were crimes listed in Cal. Penal Code § 186.22 (e). The decision of the California 

courts rejecting petitioner’s claim in this regard is not contrary to or an unreasonable application 

of the decisions in Jackson and In re Winship to the facts of this case. This court cannot conclude 

that “no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury” on this issue. Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 

4. See also Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2062 (quoting Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. at 4). Accordingly, 

petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

///// 

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D. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

 In his next ground for relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance “when he elicited testimony from Detective Rodriguez falsely suggesting that Martha 

M. told police or testified that [petitioner] had said something about going through the victim’s 

pockets.” (ECF No. 1 at 52.) Petitioner argues that Rodriguez’s testimony provided support for 

the prosecution’s argument that petitioner had actively assisted Cardenas in committing the 

robbery, and was therefore prejudicial. (Id. at 55.) 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

reasoning as follows: 

During her trial testimony, Martha M. testified that, when defendant 

and Cardenas returned to Carina's car after the shooting, they were 

laughing. She also acknowledged telling the police that, when 

defendant and Cardenas got into the car, they were a little jumpy as 

if they were in shock. She further testified nobody said anything in 

the car about anyone being shot and claimed not to remember 

telling police otherwise. She did not testify that defendant said 

anything about going through the victim's pockets before the 

shooting. 

During the defense case, counsel for defendant questioned 

Detective Rodriguez about his interview of Martha M. and Carina 

G. Rodriguez testified that both Carina and Martha told him that 

when Cardenas got back in the car he said he thought he shot 

someone. He further testified that they confirmed this in their 

preliminary hearing testimony. Rodriguez indicated Martha did not 

say anything to him about hearing defendant say he went through 

the victim's pockets before the shot. Counsel then continued along 

this line: 

“BY [counsel for defendant]: Q. You had a discussion with Martha 

[M.] in December, correct? 

“A. Correct. 

“Q. You heard her say in court that my client, [defendant], told her 

that he went through the victim's pockets, correct? 

“A. Yes. 

“Q. When you interviewed her in December, did she tell you the 

same thing? 

“A. No. 

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“Q. What did she tell you? 

“A. That she had no knowledge if [defendant] had gone through the 

pockets. 

“Q. She told you that she never heard anything in that car about 

[defendant] bragging about going through the guy's pockets, 

correct? 

“A. Correct.” 

Defendant contends counsel's question to Detective Rodriguez 

about hearing Martha M. say in court she heard defendant say he 

went through the victim's pockets, which elicited a positive 

response, amounted to ineffective assistance, inasmuch as Martha 

did not so testify, either at trial or in the preliminary hearing. He 

argues there could have been no possible tactical reason for 

eliciting this incorrect testimony, which was then used by the 

prosecution in closing arguments. 

The People respond that, while it is true Martha M. did not testify 

defendant said he went through the victim's pockets, she did testify 

that defendant was going to search the victim when he heard the 

shot. Thus, the People argue, “the fact that [defendant's] counsel 

attempted to discredit [Martha's] testimony that was slightly 

different from what she actually testified to was of no 

consequence.” 

The problem with the People's argument is that it was not Martha 

M., but Carina G., who testified that defendant was about to search 

the victim's pockets when the shot occurred. Martha M. did not 

testify about anything defendant said in the car. Nevertheless, as 

we shall explain, we find no ineffective assistance in connection 

with the indicated testimony. 

Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, a criminal 

defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel. (See Strickland 

v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684–685 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 

691–692]; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 422.) This right 

“entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to 

effective assistance.” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 

215.) 

“To establish entitlement to relief for ineffective assistance of 

counsel the burden is on the defendant to show (1) trial counsel 

failed to act in the manner to be expected of reasonably competent 

attorneys acting as diligent advocates and (2) it is reasonably 

probable that a more favorable determination would have resulted 

in the absence of counsel's failings.” (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 

Cal.3d 262, 288.) 

If the record does not show why counsel acted in the manner 

challenged, we must affirm the judgment unless there simply could 

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be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's conduct. (People v. 

Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389.) 

In this instance, one might readily surmise trial counsel was simply 

confused as to who had testified about defendant saying he was 

about to go through the victim's pockets. Counsel was asking 

Detective Rodriguez about statements made by both Martha M. and 

Carina G., including their respective testimony. Rodriguez too 

apparently confused the two women. An honest mistake does not 

necessarily amount to ineffective assistance. A criminal defendant 

is entitled to effective assistance, not perfect assistance. (United 

States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 656–658 [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 

666–667]; People v. Wallin (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479, 484–485; 

People v. Hartridge (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 659, 666–667.) The 

question is whether counsel's conduct met the standard of a 

reasonably competent attorney. 

At any rate, in light of Carina's testimony about defendant 

preparing to go through the victim's pockets before the shooting, 

any error in attributing that testimony to Martha was clearly 

harmless. And whether defendant said he went through the victim's 

pockets or was about to do so is of no moment. Either way, it 

demonstrates defendant was an active participant in the attempted 

robbery. 

Defendant argues he was prejudiced because the prosecutor relied 

on the erroneous testimony during argument to the jury. However, 

the prosecution's argument could as easily have been a reference to 

Carina's testimony rather than Martha's. Because defendant has 

failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the erroneous testimony, 

his ineffective assistance claim is rejected. 

Mendez, 2013 WL 120935, at *6-8. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

that set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that (2) the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is 

constitutionally deficient if his or her representation “fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness” such that it was outside “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 562 at 

104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

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 Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792. 

 “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations 

omitted). Thus, in federal habeas proceedings involving “claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, . . . AEDPA review must be “‘“doubly deferential”’” in order to afford “both the state 

court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Daniel, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 

(2015) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013)). As the Ninth Circuit has 

recently acknowledged, “[t]he question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 

2015) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105). See also Griffin v. Harrington, 727 F.3d 940, 945 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (“The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland 

standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense counsel’s performance 

fell below Strickland’s standard.”) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101). 

 3. Analysis 

 As set forth above, the California Court of Appeal concluded that even if trial counsel was 

deficient in eliciting from Detective Rodriguez that Martha M. stated petitioner went through the 

victim’s pockets, petitioner had failed to show prejudice. This court agrees. Carina G. testified 

that after petitioner got in the car he told her that he was “going to search” the victim when he 

heard the gunshot. (RT at 1320-22.) The fact that petitioner’s trial counsel asked Detective 

Rodriguez about substantially the same testimony, but mistakenly attributed it to Martha M. 

instead of to Carina G., could not have had a significant impact on the verdict. Put another way, 

there is no reasonable probability the result of the proceedings would have been different if trial 

counsel had correctly attributed the testimony about searching the victim, or searching his 

pockets, to Carina G. Because petitioner has failed to show prejudice, he is not entitled to relief 

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on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

E. Jury Instruction Error 

 In his final claim for relief, petitioner argues that the trial court violated his right to due 

process in mis-instructing the jury on the elements of the vicarious gun use enhancements. (ECF 

No. 1 at 72.) 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal described petitioner’s arguments, and its ruling thereon, as 

follows: 

Section 12022.53 provides for an enhancement in the event a 

designated offense, including murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (a)(1)), is 

committed with the use of a firearm. If the defendant personally 

used a firearm in the commission of the offense, the enhancement is 

10 years. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) If the defendant personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm, the enhancement is 20 years. (§ 

12022.53, subd. (c).) If the defendant personally and intentionally 

discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury or death, the 

enhancement is an indeterminate term of 25 years to life. (§ 

12022.53, subd. (d).) Finally, if the offense was committed for the 

benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 

186.22, subdivision (b), any principal in the offense is subject to the 

same enhancement as the person who used or discharged the 

firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (e).) 

The trial court instructed the jury on the gun use enhancement 

pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1402 as follows: “[I]f you find the 

defendant guilty of either of the crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2, 

murder or attempted robbery, and you find that the defendant 

committed those crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 

association with a criminal street gang with the intent to promote, 

further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, you 

must then also decide whether, for each crime, the People have 

proved the additional allegation that one of the principals in the 

crime personally used or personally and intentionally discharged a 

firearm during the commission of that crime, which caused Mr. 

Montejo's death. You must decide whether the People have proved 

this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each 

crime. 

“To prove this allegation, the People have to prove that: 

“1. Someone who was a principal in the crime personally used or 

discharged a firearm during the commission or attempted 

commission of the robbery; and 

“2. That person intended to discharge the firearm; and 

“3. That person's act caused the death of another person who was 

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not an accomplice to the crime. 

“A person is a principal in a crime if he directly commits or 

attempts to commit the crime, or if he aids and abets someone else 

who committed the crime or attempted to commit the crime. 

“A principal personally uses a firearm if he intentionally does any 

of the following:

“1. Displays the firearm in a menacing manner; 

“2. Hits somebody with it; or 

“3. Fires the firearm.

“An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural and probable 

consequence of the act and the death would not have happened 

without it. A natural and probable consequence is one that a 

reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing 

unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural 

and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the 

evidence.” (Italics added.) 

Defendant contends that, by virtue of the italicized portions of the 

foregoing instruction, the jury was free to find this firearm 

enhancement true based on a finding merely that Cardenas “used” 

the firearm by displaying it in a menacing manner. Defendant 

asserts that, on the evidence presented, the jury could have 

determined the discharge of the firearm was accidental, whereas the 

enhancement requires an intentional discharge. The jury could 

have concluded Cardenas displayed the firearm to the victim in a 

menacing manner, i.e., used it, in an attempt to get the victim to 

give up his property. However, such menacing display would be 

insufficient to support a life term under section 12022.53, 

subdivisions (d) and (e). 

The People contend the instruction was correct because it required 

the jury to find Cardenas intentionally discharged the firearm. 

However, in making this argument, the People completely ignore 

the italicized portions of the instruction, which clearly gave the jury 

a choice between finding an intentional discharge of the firearm or 

a use of it, where such use was defined to include displaying in a 

menacing manner. 

In the original CALCRIM version of the instruction, the first 

italicized portion above reads: “[1.] Someone who was a principal 

in the crime personally (used/discharged) a firearm during the 

commission [or attempted commission] of the 

_____________<insert appropriate crime listed in Penal Code 

section 12022.53(a) (./;)” (CALCRIM No. 1402.) The Bench 

Note to the instruction states: “In this instruction, the court must 

select the appropriate options based on whether the prosecution 

alleges that the principal used the firearm, intentionally discharged 

the firearm, and/or intentionally discharged the firearm causing 

great bodily injury or death.” (Bench Note to CALCRIM No. 1402, 

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p. 1169.) The note also directs that the second italicized portion of 

the instruction given by the court, which concerns “use” of the 

firearm, should be given “only if the prosecution specifically 

alleges that the principal ‘personally used’ the firearm.” (Ibid.) It 

further instructs not to give that portion “if the prosecution alleges 

intentional discharge or intentional discharge causing great bodily 

injury or death.” (Ibid. ) 

The information here charged that, in the commission of the crimes, 

“a principal intentionally and personally discharged a firearm” and 

“proximately caused great bodily injury . . . or death . . . .” The 

verdict forms were likewise limited to discharge of the firearm. 

Thus, under the use notes, the trial court should not have included 

in the instruction the language relating to use of a firearm. 

However, the instructional error was harmless in this instance. The 

evidence here showed it was the discharge of the firearm into the 

victim's chest that caused his death. In addition to instructing the 

jury that it must find a principal either used or discharged a firearm, 

the jury was told it must find a principal “intended to discharge the 

firearm” and the principal's “act caused the death of another person 

who was not an accomplice to the crime.” Thus, in order to find the 

charge true, the jury had to conclude both that a principal intended 

to discharge the firearm and that such act, i.e., the discharge, caused 

the death of the victim. An intentional use of the firearm by 

displaying it in a menacing manner did not cause the death of the 

victim. In order to find the charge true, it would not be enough for 

the jury to conclude a principal displayed the firearm in a menacing 

manner and it went off accidentally. The jury was also required to 

find the principal intended to discharge the firearm. 

“It is well established in California that the correctness of jury 

instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, 

not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a 

particular instruction.” (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 

538–539.) Absent a contrary indication in the record, we assume 

the jury followed the instructions as given by the court. (People v. 

Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 253.) 

Mendez, 2013 WL 120935, at *16-18. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional claim. 

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 

1983). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely 

‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process 

right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). 

The appropriate inquiry “is whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the 

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resulting conviction violates due process.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) 

(quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). 

 “[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be 

viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Id. (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378 

(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Instructions that contain errors of state law may not 

form the basis for federal habeas relief.” Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993). “If the 

charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ‘reasonable likelihood that the 

jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Dixon v. 

Williams, 750 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc 

(June 11, 2014) (citations omitted). 

 Petitioner is entitled to relief on this jury instruction claim only if he can show prejudice. 

Dixon, 750 F.3d at 1034. Prejudice is shown for purposes of habeas relief if the trial error had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). A reviewing court may grant habeas relief only if it is 

“‘in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error.’” Id. (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 

432, 437 (1995)). 

 3. Analysis

 As set forth above, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the jury instruction error 

that occurred in this case was harmless because the jury instructions as a whole would not allow 

the jury to convict petitioner of the sentence enhancement for personal use of a firearm unless the 

firearm was actually discharged and caused the victim’s death. This court agrees. As the 

California Court of Appeal explained, even if some of the language of the instruction was 

ambiguous, the instructions as a whole clarified the requirements for a true finding on the 

sentence enhancement. 

 This court rejects petitioner’s argument that “the jury based its true finding on the 

vicarious firearm enhancement on a finding that Cardenas had intentionally displayed the weapon 

in a menacing manner, and it had accidentally discharged; rather than on a finding that he 

intentionally fired the gun.” (ECF No. 1 at 77.) The jury instruction required that in order to 

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find the sentence enhancement true, the jurors had to find that a principal “intended to discharge 

the firearm.” This language would preclude a true finding if the jury found the weapon was 

discharged accidentally. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the California Court of Appeal that the jury 

instruction error was harmless is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this jury instruction 

claim. 

IV. Conclusion 

 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas 

corpus be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

Dated: May 11, 2016 

Dmou8(2);Mendez1950.hc (du) 

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