Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05079/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

BARRY HOYT PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-5079

 

SHERIFF KEITH FERGUSON;

CAPT. HUNTER PETRAY;

LT. CARTER; DEPUTY BUTH;

AND DEPUTY LISENBEE DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Barry Hoyt brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He proceeds pro

se and in forma pauperis. Hoyt contends his constitutional rights were violated when Deputy

Buth and Deputy Lisenbee used excessive force against him while he was incarcerated at the

Benton County Detention Center.

On August 5, 2005, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14). By order

entered on October 5, 2005 (Doc. 17), Hoyt was directed to complete, sign, and return an

attached questionnaire that would serve as his response to the summary judgment motion. On

November 2, 2005, plaintiff's response to the court’s questionnaire (Doc. 18) was filed. The

summary judgment motion is currently before the undersigned for issuance of this report and

recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

Hoyt was arrested and booked into the Benton County Detention Center (BCDC) on

December 14, 2004, on charges of assault on a law enforcement officer, second degree sexual

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assault, and failure to appear. Plaintiff’s Response (hereinafter Resp.) at ¶ 1. He was provided

with, and signed, the Benton CountyDetainee Inmate Rights and Benton County Detainee Rules

forms. Id. at ¶ 2. He was incarcerated solely because of the pending criminal charges. Id. at ¶

3.

On March 30, 2005, Hoyt submitted an inmate request form to Lt. Carter. Resp. at ¶ 4.

He asked to be returned to general population. Id. He stated he would not get into trouble over

there. Id.

On April 4, 2005, Lt. Carter responded to Hoyt’s request. Resp. at ¶ 6. He stated that

Hoyt needed to obey the rules of the facility before he could be placed into population. Id.

On April 2, 2005, an inmate flooded E-pod. Resp. at ¶ 7. Deputy Barrett and Deputy

Buth were both in E-pod to supervise while the trustees cleaned up the pod. Id. at ¶ 8.

The cell Hoyt was assigned to, E-102, had some water in it from the flood. Resp. at ¶ 9.

Deputy Buth came to Hoyt’s cell and told him to go to the back of his cell so the trustees could

squeegee the small amount of water that was in his cell. Id. at ¶ 10. Hoyt asked if he could clean

his own cell and Buth replied no. Id. at ¶ 11.

Buth’s incident report provides as follows:

I asked Deputy Ledbetter to open [Hoyt’s] cell door. I told Inmate Hoyt several

times to go to the back of his cell Inmate Hoyt said “no”. I entered his cell and

told him to get on his knees. Inmate Hoyt would not go to his knees. I gave

Inmate Hoyt a common peroneal strike to his left thigh. Inmate Hoyt dropped to

one knee. I tried to place Inmate Hoyt on the floor but he resisted me. I told

Inmate Hoyt several times to stop resisting me. I asked Deputy Barrett to assist

me. Deputy Barrett and I placed Inmate Hoyt on the floor. Deputy Barrett placed

handcuffs on Hoyt. I escorted Hoyt to pod control. Deputy Greenlee placed

shackles on Inmate Hoyt and double locked them. I explained to Inmate Hoyt

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that I was locking him down for disobeying the order of a deputy. Deputies

Lisenbee and Greenlee escorted Inmate Hoyt to booking. 

Defendants’ Exhibit 5.

Deputy Barrett’s incident report provides as follows:

I was in E-102 helping Deputy Buth clean up where an inmate had flooded. As

trustees cleaned water from cells Deputy Buth ordered Inmate Hoyt to go to the

back of his cell and get on his knees and put his hands behind his back. Inmate

Hoyt did not comply with what Deputy Buth ordered him to do, Deputy Buth told

Inmate Hoyt again. He still did not comply. Deputy Buth and I placed Inmate

Hoyt on the floor. I placed him in handcuffs, and Deputy Buth escorted him out

of the pod.

Defts’ Ex. 4.

Hoyt agrees that Buth had Ledbetter open Hoyt’s cell door and that Buth then entered the

cell and ordered Hoyt to his knees. Resp. at ¶ 14 & ¶ 15. However, Hoyt maintains he complied

with Buth’s order. Resp. at ¶ 12 & ¶ 16. 

Hoyt denies that Buth used a common peronealstrike to Hoyt’s left thigh. Instead, Hoyt

states Buth came up behind Hoyt and grabbed him by the hair and started kicking and hitting

him. Resp. at ¶ 12 & ¶ 17. Hoyt denies that he resisted Buth. Id. at ¶ 18 & ¶ 19.

Hoyt maintains he was taken to the pod door where Buth and Lisenbee put Hoyt on the

floor and slammed his head on the floor. Resp. at ¶ 20. Hoyt indicates Lisenbee stomped on his

legs and Buth was hitting him. Id. After the incident was over, Hoyt states he was locked down

by Lt. Carter. Id. Hoyt disagrees that he was escorted to booking by Lisenbee and Greenlee.

Id. at ¶ 25. 

As a result of the incident, Hoyt was charged with a disciplinary violation for disobeying

the order of a deputy. Defts’ Ex. 6. He was found guilty and locked down for ten days and also

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Defendants submitted only the front side of the grievance dated April 2, 2005. There is an arrow indicating that the 1

grievance continued on the back of the form.

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lost his privileges. Id. Hoyt appealed the decision and it was affirmed by Carter on April 4,

2005. Id. Hoyt, however, contends he did nothing wrong. Resp. at ¶ 27.

On April 2, 2005, Hoyt submitted a grievance to Lt. Carter. Resp. at ¶ 29. He stated

Buth came to Hoyt’s cell and told him to go to the back of his cell. Id. Hoyt stated he complied.

Id. He stated he was then told to get on his knees in the water and he also did that. Id.

Hoyt stated Buth came up behind him, grabbed Hoyt’s hair, and started kicking and

hitting him. Resp. at ¶ 30(a). He stated he did nothing wrong and Buth had maliciously and

sadistically used force to harm him. Id. 

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On April 5, 2005, Captain Petray responded to Hoyt’s grievance. Resp. at ¶ 33. Petray

stated: “This is not what happened. You did not obey the deputies when they gave you orders.”

Id.

On April 3, 2005, Hoyt submitted a request for medical attention. Resp. at ¶ 33. He

stated he had been beaten up and his head, foot, ear and back were hurting. Id. Hoyt also

contends he submitted a request for medical treatment on April 2nd. Id. at ¶ 34.

As a result of the use of force on April 2nd, Hoyt maintains his lower back hurt him so

much he could not sleep at night, his leg hurt, and he had a headache. Resp. at ¶ 35. Hoyt

indicates he went to his doctor, Dr. Huskin, to get pain pills so he can sleep. Id.

Hoyt was seen by Dr. Mullins on April 4, 2005. Resp. at ¶ 36. Hoyt told Dr. Mullins that

he had been beaten up by deputies but did not give the doctor any details. Id. at ¶ 37.

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Hoyt had a small bruise on his third toe and complained of pain in his lower back. Resp.

at ¶ 38. Dr. Mullins noted Hoyt had a small bruise on his left third toe, the toe was not swollen,

and it did not appear to be fractured. Id. at ¶ 39.

When Dr. Mullins examined Hoyt’s back, his straight leg test was negative. Resp. at ¶

40. Dr. Mullins concluded Hoyt had questionable back pain and a small bruise on his toe. Id.

at ¶ 41. Dr. Mullins prescribed Ibuprofen twice a day for five days. Id. Hoyt received the

prescribed Ibuprofen. Id. at ¶ 42.

On April 6, 2005, Hoyt requested a copy of his rights as an inmate and he was provided

a copy. Resp. at ¶ 43. On April 7, 2005, Hoyt submitted a request that he be moved to cell 216.

Id. at ¶ 44. The request was denied. Id. 

On April 12, 2005, Hoyt submitted a medical request stating that he was still hurting from

when he had been beaten up by the deputies. Resp. at ¶ 45. He stated he needed to see the

doctor and needed something for pain. Id. In response, he was seen by the nurse and Dr.

Mullins. Id. at ¶ 46. Dr. Mullins prescribed Ibuprofen. Id. 

On April 14, 2005, Hoyt submitted a grievance in which he stated he wanted something

done about Deputy Buth and Deputy Lisenbee beating him up. Resp. at ¶ 48. He stated it did

happen and he had witnesses. Id. He indicated he had done nothing wrong and Buth had

maliciously and sadistically used force against him. Id. Captain Petray responded that he had

already answered this. Id.

Hoyt named Carter as a defendant solely because he handled the appeal of Hoyt’s

disciplinary charge. Resp. at ¶ 50. As a result of the disciplinary charge, Hoyt was locked down.

Id. 

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Hoyt has named Petray as a defendant solely because he responded to Hoyt’s grievances

regarding the alleged beating. Resp. at ¶ 51. Hoyt maintains Petray lied when he said nothing

happened. Id.

Hoyt named Sheriff Ferguson as a defendant solely because he is in charge of the BCDC.

Resp. at ¶ 52. Hoyt indicates Sheriff Ferguson would not do anything about the deputy who beat

Hoyt up. Id. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary

judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth

specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact

exists." National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

"A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary

judgment." Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 

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III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. Defendants

first contend their conduct was objectively reasonable. They argue a minimal level of force was

used and it was necessary given the plaintiff’s actions. They maintain plaintiff has absolutely

no proof to support his account of the events including any injuries that are consistent with his

allegations. Next, defendants contend the plaintiff has failed to allege any action on the part of

Sheriff Ferguson, Carter, or Petray that would constitute a constitutional violation. Finally,

defendants contend Hoyt suffered insufficient injuries to satisfy the physical injury requirement

of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). 

"In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by

identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of

force." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989).

"[T]he constitutional standard applied may vary depending upon whether the victim is an

arrestee, a pretrial detainee, or a convicted inmate of a penal institution." Andrews v. Neer, 253

F.3d 1052, 1060 (8th Cir. 2001). 

In this case, Hoyt was a pretrial detainee. In Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, the Eighth Circuit

court noted that:

[u]nlike convicted prisoners, the state has no right to punish [pretrial detainees].

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1871-72, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447

(1979). Their confinement conditions are analyzed under the due process clause

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Eighth Amendment's

"cruel and unusual punishment" standard which is used for convicted prisoners.

Id. The injuries detainees suffer must be necessarily incident to administrative

interests in safety, security and efficiency. As a pretrial detainee, Freeman's

excessive-force claim is properly analyzed under the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 & n. 10

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(1989) (due process clause protects pretrial detainee from force amounting to

punishment). 

Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989).

The courts generally analyze excessive force claims of pretrial detainees in the same way

as those of arrestees. Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1060 (8th Cir. 2001)("The evaluation of

excessive-force claims brought by pre-trial detainees, although grounded in the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Fourth Amendment, also relies on an objective

reasonableness standard."). The use of force must be necessary to some legitimate institutional

interest such as safety, security, or efficiency, and the force used must not be in excess of that

reasonably believed necessary to achieve those goals. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d at 1048. The

relevant inquiry being whether the officials behaved in a reasonable way in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them. See e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1996).

 Applying the applicable law to the facts of this case, the court concludes there are

genuine issues of fact exist as to whether Buth and Lisenbee used excessive force against Hoyt.

Hoyt, Buth and Barrett have given contradictory versions of what occurred during the alleged

use of force. Buth and Barrett maintain that Lisenbee wasn’t even involved in the use of physical

force against Hoyt. 

While one might expect to see medical evidence of bruising, beyond the one bruise on

Hoyt’s great toe, if the incident occurred as Hoyt described, there is evidence establishing he

sought, and received, medical care on at least two occasions after the incident. See Crumley v.

City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003)(“An ‘actual injury’ must be shown to

support an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.”)(citation omitted). At the

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summary judgment stage, we are not free to make credibility determinations and adopt one

version of facts over another. Instead, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. We therefore cannot say as a matter of law that only a reasonable amount of force

was used against Hoyt. 

Defendants next argue Hoyt’s claim fails because he had no physical injury within the

meaning of the physical injury requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Codified as 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(e), section 803(d) of the PLRA provides as follows: "No Federal civil action

may be brought by a prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental

or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." This

section was "intended to limit access to the federal courts for certain prisoner claims, namely

those for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical harm." Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo,

138 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D. Mass. 2001). 

The provisions of § 1997e(e) have consistently been applied to excessive force claims.

See e.g., Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997)(A bruised ear lasting three days

did not constitute physical injury for purposes of § 1997e(e)); Warren v. Westchester County Jail,

106 F. Supp. 2d 559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)(excessive force claim dismissed where inmate's

injuries were no more than de minimis and thus insufficient to satisfy § 1997e(e)). Here, Hoyt

contends that as a result of the use of force his back hurt him so much he could not sleep at night,

his leg hurt, and he had headaches. Resp. at ¶ 35. Hoyt was seen by Dr. Mullins twice and Hoyt

also indicates he went to his own doctor to get pain pills so he could sleep. Resp. at ¶ 35. We

believe Hoyt has shown sufficient physical injury to satisfy the provisions of § 1997e(e).

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However, no evidence has been presented to suggest a basis of liability for Carter, Petray,

or Sheriff Ferguson. Carter merely processed Hoyt’s appeal from the finding that he had violated

detention center rules. There is no indication the disciplinary procedure is unconstitutional or

that Hoyt was not given an opportunity to be heard on the issue. Instead, Hoyt merely disagrees

with the decision made by Carter and maintains he was negligent in the manner in which he

processed the appeal. Negligence is insufficient to establish a violation of § 1983. See e.g.,

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986)(holding that

negligence does not give rise to a § 1983 claim based on an alleged due process violation).

Similarly, with respect to Petray, Hoyt believes Petray did not handle, or investigate,

Hoyt’s grievances properly. This does not state a claim of constitutional dimension. See e.g.,

Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005)(Prisoner has no federally protected liberty

interest in having grievances resolved to his satisfaction. “[A]ny alleged due process violation

arising from the alleged failure to investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless.”).

Finally, with respect to Sheriff Ferguson there was no evidence suggesting that Buth or

Lisenbee acted under an official policy, a widespread custom, or practice of Benton County.

Radloff v. City of Oelwein, 380 F.3d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 2004). See also Board of County

Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626

(1997)(“[R]igorous standards of culpability and cause [for a § 1983 claim] must be applied to

ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.”). Nor is

there any evidence Sheriff Ferguson was involved in, or had notice of, or that a lack of

supervision or training was likely to result in, the alleged use of force against Hoyt. Wever v.

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Lincoln County, 388 F.3d 601, 606 (8th Cir. 2004)(plaintiff must demonstrate that the supervisor

was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized the offending acts). Sheriff Ferguson cannot

be held liable merely because the duties of his position include operating and overseeing the

detention facility. 

 IV. CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted in part

and denied in part. Specifically, I recommend that all claims against Sheriff Keith Ferguson,

Capt. Hunter Petray, and Lt. Carter be dismissed. Ifurtherrecommend that the motion be denied

as to Deputy Buth and Deputy Lisenbee.

The parties have ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which

to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 22nd day of November 2005.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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