Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01022/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01022-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Insurance Contract

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-1- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ILDEFONSO MORALES, ALICIA A.

RUIZ de MORALES and JUAN JAVIER

LOPEZ,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 06cv1022-B(BLM)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT LOPEZ’

MOTION REQUESTING REOPENING OF

DISCOVERY IN ORDER TO DEPOSE

THE MORALES DEFENDANTS’

PROPOSED TRIAL WITNESSES

[Doc. No. 126]

On June 9, 2008, Defendant Lopez filed a motion entitled

“Motion Requesting Reopening of Discovery in Order to Depose the

Morales Defendants’ Proposed Trial Witnesses.” Doc. No. 126 (“Lopez

Mot.”). The Morales Defendants filed a timely opposition on June

19, 2008. Doc. No. 128 (“Morales Opp’n”). Thereafter, the Court

took the matter under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule

7.1(d)(1). Doc. No. 129.

Having reviewed the briefing submitted, and for the reasons

set forth below, Defendant Lopez’ motion is DENIED.

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-2- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

BACKGROUND

This interpleader action was filed on May 10, 2006, in order

to determine the proper beneficiary of life insurance proceeds from

a policy on the life of Maria F. Lopez (“the decedent”). See Doc.

No. 1. The policy named the decedent’s spouse, Defendant Juan

Javier Lopez, as the sole beneficiary. Id. ¶ 7. However, before

Plaintiff New York Life Insurance Company became aware of the

decedent’s passing and any potential claims to the insurance

proceeds, Defendant Lopez was convicted by a Mexican court of

murdering his wife. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant Lopez remains incarcerated

in Mexico as a result of this conviction. Id.

In light of California Probate Code § 252, which prohibits a

killer from collecting the proceeds of a life insurance policy on

the life of his victim, Plaintiff believed that the decedent’s

parents, Ildefonso Morales and Alicia A. Ruiz de Morales, might

claim the insurance proceeds as the decedent’s surviving heirs. Id.

¶ 11. Given the Defendants’ conflicting claims to the policy

proceeds, Plaintiff filed this action and deposited proceeds

totaling $140,197.71 with the Court. Id. ¶ 12. On October 13,

2006, the district judge discharged Plaintiff from the case. Doc.

No. 23.

Defendant Lopez and the Morales Defendants pursued their

respective claims to the insurance proceeds. On November 17, 2006,

this Court issued a scheduling order setting June 18, 2007, as the

deadline for completing all discovery in the case. Doc. No. 28.

Prior to the close of discovery, the defendants filed cross-motions

for summary judgment. Doc. Nos. 26 & 44. On December 10, 2007, the

district judge denied both motions for summary judgment and

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-3- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

instructed the parties that the case would be set for a bench trial.

Doc. No. 89. In the same order, the district judge authorized

additional discovery, with deadlines to be set by this Court. Id.

For that reason, and based upon all of the defendants’

representations regarding how much additional time they would need

to conduct discovery, this Court set a new discovery cut-off date of

March 21, 2008. Doc. No. 92. 

In the motion presently before the Court, Defendant Lopez

asks the Court to reopen the discovery period that ended on March

21, 2008, and allow him to conduct three additional depositions.

Lopez Mot. at 1-2.

LEGAL STANDARD

Dates set in a scheduling order may be modified “for good

cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Doc.

No. 92 (scheduling order stating that dates may be modified for

“good cause”). The Rule 16 “good cause” standard focuses on the

“reasonable diligence” of the moving party. Noyes v. Kelly

Services, 488 F.3d 1163, 1174 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007); Coleman v. Quaker

Oats Company, 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000) (Rule 16(b)

scheduling order may be modified for “good cause” based primarily on

diligence of moving party). Diligence should not be confused with

carelessness, which offers no reason for a grant of relief. Johnson

v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992).

“If [the moving] party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.”

Id.

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-4- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

DISCUSSION

Defendant Lopez requests that the Court reopen discovery so

that he may depose Defendant Ildefonso Morales and non-parties

Claudia Yvette Morales and Jean Carlo Morales. Lopez Mot. at 1. He

argues that good cause for his request exists because the Morales

Defendants only recently disclosed these three trial witnesses in

the joint pretrial order. Id. at 1-2. Because he contends the

naming of these three individuals as trial witnesses runs contrary

to the Morales Defendants’ answers to Defendant Lopez’ written

discovery, Defendant Lopez submits that he was very surprised by

these late disclosures. Id. at 2. Prior to filing the instant

motion, Defendant Lopez’ counsel attempted to solicit these

witnesses’ addresses and intended testimony from opposing counsel on

an informal basis, but to no avail. Id. at 10-13.

In response, the Morales Defendants assert that Defendant

Lopez has known the identities of these individuals for a long time

because they were his in-laws. Morales Opp’n at 2. Ildefonso

Morales is the father of the decedent, Maria Lopez, and is a named

party in this case. Id. Claudia Yvette Morales Serrano and Jean

Carlo Morales are the sister and brother, respectively, of the

decedent. Id. Additionally, both Claudia Yvette Morales Serrano

and Jean Carlo Morales filed declarations in this case on February

9, 2007, as part of the Morales Defendants’ opposition to Defendant

Lopez’ motion for summary judgment. Id. at 2; Doc. Nos. 45-3 & 45-

4. In regard to why the Morales Defendants listed these individuals

as potential trial witnesses in the proposed pretrial order, the

Morales Defendants claim that they listed Ildefonso Morales because

attorney Sanchez, who is counsel for Defendant Lopez, refused to

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-5- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

admit that Mr. Morales was the decedent’s father. Morales Opp’n at

2. The brother and sister were listed in an abundance of caution as

impeachment witnesses in order to respond, if necessary, should

Defendant Lopez’ deposition transcript be admitted at trial. Id.

And, because they will testify only as impeachment witnesses, the

Morales Defendants contend that they had no duty to disclose these

witnesses, their addresses, or the contents of their testimony. Id.

at 3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A)). 

Since the beginning of this case, the fundamental issue has

been whether Defendant Lopez feloniously and intentionally killed

his wife and, therefore, should be barred from recovering the

proceeds of her life insurance policy. As Judge Brewster explained

in his order denying the Defendants’ cross-motions for summary

judgment, the California Probate Code’s “Slayer Statute” bars a

killer from collecting money from the victim’s estate. Doc. No. 89.

Specifically, the statute provides that: 

A named beneficiary of a ... life insurance policy ...

who feloniously and intentionally kills ... the person

upon whose life the policy is issued is not entitled

to any benefit under the ... policy ... and it becomes

payable as though the killer had predeceased the

decedent. 

Cal. Prob. Code § 252. In most cases, “[a] final judgment of

conviction of felonious and intentional killing is conclusive for

purposes of this [statute].” Cal. Prob. Code § 254(a). However, if

the conviction occurred in a foreign country, as it did in this

case, the Ninth Circuit has held that the conviction cannot be

considered conclusive evidence. See Haung Tang v. Aetna Life Ins.

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1 This case does discuss one exception that may render a foreign

conviction “conclusive” evidence, but Judge Brewster found that the Morales

Defendants had failed to provide sufficient evidence that this exception applies

in this case. Doc. No. 89 at 2 n.1. 

2 In this case, Judge Brewster will make that determination during a

bench trial.

-6- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

Co., 523 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1975)1. Where the foreign conviction

does not serve as conclusive evidence, “the court may determine by

a preponderance of evidence whether the killing was felonious and

intentional.”2 Cal. Prob. Code § 254(b). Thus, Defendant Lopez’

goal since the onset of litigation presumably has been to cast doubt

on the validity of the Mexican conviction and the evidence that

implicates him in the murder. 

This Court’s analysis of whether Defendant Lopez has

demonstrated good cause for reopening discovery at this extremely

late date, therefore, turns on when Defendant Lopez learned of the

three new proposed deponents and their potential knowledge of

anything that would cast doubt on the validity of the evidence or

the Mexican conviction and whether he pursued this discovery in a

reasonably diligent manner. See Noyes, 488 F.3d at 1174 n.6 (Rule

16(b)'s “good cause” standard focuses on the “reasonable diligence”

of the moving party); Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1294 (same). As an

initial matter, Defendant Lopez cannot plausibly claim that he was

unaware of the existence of these individuals because they were his

father-in-law, sister-in-law, and brother-in-law. While it appears

to be undisputed that the decedent’s father, sister and brother did

not witness the murder, it certainly is foreseeable that one or all

of them might have discoverable information relevant to Defendant

Lopez’ legal theory that the Mexican conviction was invalid. In

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3 Defendant Lopez attempts to support his claim that he was caught by

surprise by the Morales Defendants’ designation of these three trial witnesses

by pointing to the fact that on January 22, 2008, he served Mr. Morales with a

special interrogatory requesting that they “[p]lease identify all persons whom

you expect to call as witnesses to testify at trial, including the name, address

and telephone number of such witnesses.” See Doc. No. 130 at 14 (using Court

page numbering at top of page), Special Interrogatory No. 21. Defendant Lopez

also asked in the next special interrogatory “[f]or each witness that you expect

to testify at trial, state with specificity the anticipated testimony of each

witness.” Doc. No. 126-3 at 34 (using Court page numbering at top of page),

Special Interrogatory No. 22. In response to both special interrogatories, the

Mr. Morales responded: “Objection: This question is not reasonably calculated to

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and violates the attorney workproduct doctrine. Preparation for trial has not yet begun and is not a matter

-7- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

fact, Defendant Lopez alleged in pleadings filed as early as October

4, 2006, that Jean Carlo Morales was affiliated with the political

team of the Mexican judge who convicted Defendant Lopez and that he

used his influence with the judge to secure Defendant Lopez’

conviction. See Doc. No. 14-2 at 4. The decedent’s family members

also likely would have knowledge about the decedent’s associations

and activities - information that would be relevant in trying to

establish, for instance, that another individual had a motive to

kill Defendant Lopez’ wife. In other words, these potential

deponents’ identities and possible bases for having knowledge of

relevant facts were all known extremely early in the case, if not

prior to its filing.

Insofar as it appears plain that Defendant Lopez knew of

these witnesses and their potential as sources of discoverable

information, he could have noticed their depositions at any time.

The fact that he chose not to do so within the initial or

supplemental discovery periods shows a lack of reasonable

diligence.3 In fact, Defendant Lopez has not provided any evidence

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within responding party’s knowledge.” Doc. No. 130 at 14; Doc. No. 126-3 at 34.

While it initially seems compelling, Defendant Lopez’ argument obscures the

relevant analysis. By January 22, 2008, Defendant Lopez already knew of the

existence of the three proposed deponents and their relationship to the decedent.

If Defendant Lopez wanted to know if they had any relevant and discoverable

evidence, he could have noticed their depositions at any time during the

discovery period. His failure to do so does not warrant reopening discovery now.

Mr. Morales also did not mislead Defendant Lopez because he did not indicate that

he would not call himself or his daughter or son as witnesses at trial.

Furthermore, if Defendant Lopez was unsatisfied with Mr. Morales’ February 19,

2007 responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 21 and 22, he could have filed a

motion to compel supplemental responses within the time period set by this Court

for doing so. See Doc. No. 92 at 2. He did not. Thus, the Court finds that

Defendant Lopez’ failure to pursue either path during the discovery periods

dramatically undercuts his surprise and reasonable diligence arguments.

4 In his December 10, 2007 “Status Report,” counsel for Defendant Lopez

stated that “[a]dditional [d]iscovery anticipated may be the deposition of the

Morales Defendants.” Doc. No. 90 at 2. Thus, counsel cannot now argue six

months later that it is a complete surprise that Mr. Morales might have

discoverable information.

-8- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

indicating that he ever formally noticed the depositions of any of

these witnesses. And, even assuming arguendo that he only learned

for the first time about the decedent’s sister when she filed her

declaration on February 9, 2007, he still would have had over four

months to notice her deposition before the original June 18, 2007

discovery cut-off date. Furthermore, Judge Brewster afforded

Defendant Lopez a second opportunity to conduct these three

depositions when he reopened discovery following his denial of the

summary judgment motions. At that time, this Court expressly asked

Defendant Lopez what additional discovery was necessary and how long

he needed to conduct the discovery.4 Counsel told this Court that

he wanted two months to conduct the remaining discovery. In an

abundance of caution, this Court extended the time period by an

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-9- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

additional month and provided Defendants with a three-month

supplemental discovery period. Doc. No. 92. Thus, the Court finds

that Defendant Lopez had ample notice of these witnesses and more

than enough time in which to depose them and has not demonstrated

good cause for his failure to do so.

Additionally, the Morales Defendants’ alleged failure to

disclose these witnesses earlier or to provide their contact

information and anticipated testimony does not provide the requisite

good cause for modifying the scheduling order. The decedent’s

sister and brother were listed in the Morales Defendants’ proposed

pretrial order as impeachment witnesses and the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure expressly exempt from both the initial and pretrial

disclosure requirements witnesses to be used solely for impeachment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) & (3)(A). Thus, the Morales

Defendants had no duty to disclose these individuals and the fact

that they are listed in the Morales Defendants’ proposed pretrial

order has no bearing on the instant motion. 

As for Ildefonso Morales, neither party attached a copy of

the Morales Defendants’ initial disclosures to their pleadings, so

this Court cannot confirm whether or not he was disclosed in the

initial disclosures. But, even if he was not, Defendant Lopez did

not timely move to compel or seek other relief once he learned of

the Morales Defendants’ alleged omission and he may not seek such

relief now. Furthermore, “[i]nitial disclosures under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 26(a)... are designed to facilitate the parties’

understanding of the case early on and to inform the appropriate

scope of discovery.” Neothermia Corp. v. Rubicor Med., Inc., 345 F.

Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Given that the purpose of

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-10- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

initial disclosures is to make other parties aware of potential

sources of discoverable information and the general nature of that

information, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i), it hardly can be said

that Defendant Lopez suffered any prejudice as a result of the

Morales Defendants’ alleged failure to disclose Mr. Morales. Mr.

Morales was Defendant Lopez’ father-in-law and both the Complaint

and the Morales Defendants’ Answer identify Mr. Morales as the

decedent’s father and a resident of San Diego. As such, Defendant

Lopez was aware even before initial disclosures were due of Mr.

Morales’ existence and his relationship to the case. Moreover, as

noted above, counsel for Defendant Lopez anticipated deposing Mr.

Morales as early as December 10, 2007 and yet failed to do so. See

Doc. No. 90 at 2. His decision not to depose Mr. Morales during the

discovery period does not justify reopening discovery now. Johnson,

975 F.2d at 609.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant

Lopez has not pursued discovery in a reasonably diligent manner and

has failed to demonstrate good cause for this Court to modify its

scheduling order and reopen discovery. Defendant Lopez’ motion,

therefore, is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 1, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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-11- 06cv1022-B (BLM) 

COPY TO:

HONORABLE RUDI M. BREWSTER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL AND PARTIES

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