Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00987/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00987-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aida Esmeralda Campos, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Arizona Board of Regents, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-24-00987-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

At issue is Plaintiffs’ Motion to De-Designate Law Enforcement Bodycam Footage 

as Confidential (Doc. 59, Motion), to which non-party ASU Police Department (ASU PD) 

filed a Response (Doc. 62, Response) and Plaintiffs filed a Reply (Doc. 63, Reply). The 

Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion in part and denies it in 

part.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are a group of students who allege that various individuals and entities 

associated with Arizona State University (ASU) violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by illegally 

retaliating against Plaintiffs for their participation in a self-described anti-Israel protest that 

occurred on ASU’s campus earlier this year. In brief, on April 26, 2024, Plaintiffs attended 

a protest on ASU’s campus. Around 11:30 p.m., ASU PD intervened to disband the protest. 

The parties dispute the motive and manner of ASU PD’s dispersal of the protesters, 

including the reason for the dispersal, the extent to which the police used force, and the 

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extent to which the protesters refused to comply with the police’s orders. Some of the 

protesters were arrested. Shortly thereafter, ASU imposed a raft of disciplinary measures 

on some of these arrestees. Not all of the individuals present at the protest were arrested, 

and it is unclear whether all of the arrestees were subjected to disciplinary measures by 

ASU. Plaintiffs comprise only a subset of the arrestees subjected to disciplinary measures. 

Plaintiffs assert that both ASU PD’s law-enforcement actions and ASU’s subsequent 

disciplinary actions were invalid, pretextual, retaliatory, and in fact motivated by the 

anti-Israel tenor of Plaintiffs’ speech.

Plaintiffs initially brought suit against the Arizona Board of Regents and a number 

of unnamed “Doe” defendants. (See Doc. 1.) Soon thereafter, Plaintiffs amended their 

complaint to name three individual ASU administrators as defendants, but the complaint 

continued to assert the existence of multiple unknown Doe defendants. (See Doc. 23.) 

Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the Arizona Board of Regents as a defendant, (see

Doc. 28), and moved for leave to conduct limited early discovery to ascertain the identify 

of the unknown Doe defendants, (see Doc. 31). Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss. 

(See Doc. 32.) The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for limited early discovery, (see

Doc. 44), but Defendants’ motion to dismiss remains pending. The parties also requested 

that the Court enter a stipulated protective order governing discovery in this case. (See

Doc. 51.) The Court acquiesced to the parties’ joint request and entered a protective order 

permitting a producing party to designate as confidential any material that, inter alia, 

“relates or refers to current or former students enrolled at Arizona State University except 

Plaintiffs.” (See Doc. 52 at 2.) Discovery production properly designated as confidential 

may not be further disseminated to anyone, except to a narrow set of persons not relevant 

here. (See Doc. 52 at 5.) The stated purpose of the stipulated protective order is “to 

(a) facilitate document production and disclosure and (b) protect [the parties’] respective 

interests—and certain third parties’ interests—in their confidential information.” (See

Doc. 52 at 1.) In order to identify potential Doe defendants, Plaintiffs propounded 

discovery requests upon non-party ASU PD seeking bodycam footage from the protest, 

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and ASU PD produced the requested video. ASU PD designated the bodycam footage as 

confidential on the basis that it relates or refers to current or former ASU students other 

than Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert that the bodycam video is not properly confidential, and 

they have moved the Court to de-designate the video as such.

II. Legal Standard

The parties dispute the legal standard that governs a motion to de-designate

discovery material as confidential.

There exist two interrelated rights of access held by the public with respect to 

documents produced during discovery: (1) a right of access created by the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and (2) a right of access extant under federal common law. See 

Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002)

(describing the “common law right of access” as “a separate and independent basis” from 

that embodied by Rule 26(c)); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. District Court, 187 

F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to address whether the public holds a First 

Amendment right of access to discovery documents in light of the conclusion that the 

public holds both an FRCP right and a common-law right).

Under Rule 26(c), a district court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a 

party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” 

relating to discovery. Thus, even though “[i]t is well-established that the fruits of pretrial 

discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public,” a 

district court may “override this presumption where ‘good cause’ is shown.” San Jose 

Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1103. Ordinarily, “[f]or good cause to exist, the party seeking 

protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no 

protective order is granted.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210–11. If that showing is made, the 

district court must then “balance[] the public and private interests to decide whether a 

protective order is necessary.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a set of factors from the 

Third Circuit that are germane to the balancing of public and private interests. Id. (citing 

Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)).

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Much of the caselaw addressing protective orders assumes that the imposition of 

such an order occurs in an adversarial setting such that one party must make a showing of 

good cause over the other party’s opposition. In many cases, however, parties stipulate to 

entry of a protective order.

While courts generally make a finding of good cause before issuing a 

protective order, a court need not do so where (as here) the parties stipulate 

to such an order. When the protective order “was a stipulated order and no 

party has made a ‘good cause’ showing,” then “the burden of proof remains 

with the party seeking protection.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211 n.1. If a party 

takes steps to release documents subject to a stipulated order, the party 

opposing disclosure has the burden of establishing that there is good cause 

to continue the protection of the discovery material.

In re Roman Cath. Archbishop of Portland in Or. (Archbishop), 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). A district court considering continuation of a stipulated protective 

order applies the same two-step process as would a court contemplating the initial 

imposition of an adversarial protective order: namely, a determination of good cause 

followed by a balancing of the public and private interests. Id.

If there is no basis under the FRCP to preclude disclosure, then the analysis is at an 

end, and the discovery documents must be disclosed. Phillips 307 F.3d at 1212. However, 

if good cause to issue a protective order under Rule 26(c) does exist, then the district court 

must consider whether disclosure is nonetheless required under the longstanding right of 

access that obtains under federal common law. Id. “Not only can the public generally gain 

access to unprotected information produced during discovery, but it also has a federal 

common law right of access to all information filed with the court.” Id. The trigger for the 

common-law right of access is a nexus between a litigation-related court filing and the 

sought-after discovery. Once triggered, the common-law presumption of public access 

applies with differing degrees of force in different circumstances. When discovery 

documents are relevant to a dispositive motion, the party seeking to maintain secrecy of 

those documents “must meet the high threshold of showing that ‘compelling reasons’

support secrecy.” Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 

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2006). However, “[a] ‘good cause’ showing under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed 

records attached to non-dispositive motions.” Id. (emphasis added). Although the foregoing 

statement from Kamakana seems to imply that a party seeking to preserve an extant 

protective order must make a new showing of good cause upon the opposing party’s 

attempt to disclose the relevant documents, the Ninth Circuit has since clarified that the 

original determination of good cause suffices to maintain protection of information related 

to non-dispositive court filings. Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 429–30 (9th Cir. 2011). “In such 

a case, the burden is on the party seeking disclosure to ‘present sufficiently compelling 

reasons why the sealed discovery document should be released.’” Id. (quoting Phillips, 307 

F.3d at 1213). However, although there is no common-law presumption of public access 

applicable to a discovery document subject to a protective order predicated upon a finding 

of good cause and attached to a non-dispositive motion, the Ninth Circuit has “not yet ruled 

on whether discovery documents subject to a stipulated protective order and attached to a 

non-dispositive motion, as in this case, fall within this exception.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). It bears repeating this distinction between the different treatments given 

stipulated and non-stipulated protective orders under both the FRCP right of access and the 

common-law right of access, as the holding from Archbishop can easily be misunderstood.

To reiterate, when considering the continuance of a stipulated protective order under 

the principles of the right of access contained in Rule 26(c), a district court in this Circuit 

must place the burden of demonstrating good cause on the party opposing disclosure. Id.

at 424. In contrast, it remains an open question in this Circuit upon whose shoulders a 

district court should place the burden of proof when the court considers whether to continue 

a (non-dispositive) stipulated protective order under the principles of federal common law, 

but there is some indication that the burden would rest on the party seeking disclosure, as 

that is the party who bears the burden when the existing protective order was issued 

pursuant to a finding of good cause. Id. at 429–30.

Finally, where discovery materials are not pertinent to any litigation-related filing, 

the common-law presumption of access does not apply. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 

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467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (holding that “restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, 

information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information”); see also

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (explaining that the “compelling reasons” standard applies to 

dispositive motions and the “good cause” standard applies to non-dispositive motions, but 

declining to address what standard applies to discovery information unrelated to any 

motion).

In this case, Plaintiffs seek to publicly disclose materials obtained via early 

discovery that are (1) currently subject to a stipulated protective order and (2) are not 

germane to any litigation-related filing. Therefore, the applicable legal standard is as 

follows. Because the relevant protective order was a stipulated order, ASU PD bears the 

burden of showing that good cause exists under Rule 26(c) to maintain protection of the 

subject police bodycam footage. If ASU PD carries that burden, it prevails. The 

common-law right of access does not exist here, as the bodycam footage remains 

unassociated with any litigation-related filing. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the 

“compelling reasons” standard is inapposite here. (See Motion at 2.) Instead, the two-step 

“good cause” standard governs. And although Plaintiffs are incorrect that the party 

opposing disclosure bears the burden of proof in all instances, (see Motion at 2–3), 

Plaintiffs are correct that ASU PD bears the burden in this case.

III. Discussion

In order to establish the threshold showing of good cause for continued protection, 

ASU PD must demonstrate that “particularized harm will result from disclosure of 

information to the public.” Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424 (quoting Phillips, 307 F.3d 

at 1211). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated 

reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Beckman Indus., 

Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)).

In attempting to show good cause for continued protection, ASU PD’s primary 

argument is simply that the designated video falls within the express scope of the stipulated 

protective order. (See, e.g., Response at 2 (describing the ambit of the protective order as 

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“dispositive”); Response at 5 (“Plaintiffs now try to pull the rug out from under ASU PD 

for reasonably relying on the order to which Plaintiffs stipulated.”); Response at 5 (“The 

motion does not mention the protective order’s terms, but those terms are dispositive.”); 

Response at 5 (“Plaintiffs cannot simply disregard the protective order to which they 

stipulated and on which ASU PD reasonably relied.”).) This argument, although logical, 

conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent.1 As noted, where a confidentiality designation is 

predicated upon a stipulated protective order, the party seeking to uphold the designation 

bears the burden of demonstrating that particularized harm will result from disclosure. 

Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424. The producing party’s good-faith reliance on the stipulation 

is insufficient to carry that burden. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. DJO Glob., Inc., No. 3:19-

CV-00970-JLS-AHG, 2020 WL 7625124, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2020) (finding an 

argument in favor of protection unpersuasive where “Defendants made no effort to argue 

that good cause exists other than to note that the documents were designated as highly 

confidential under the stipulated protective order”); Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. AMN 

Healthcare, Inc., No. 17CV205-MMA (MDD), 2020 WL 1911502, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 

20, 2020) (“An agreement to treat information designated by a third party as confidential 

under a protective order is insufficient to justify sealing the information.”). Therefore, 

under this Circuit’s precedent, the fact that the bodycam footage falls within the express 

ambit of the stipulated protective order does not ipso facto merit continued protection. ASU 

PD must mount a particularized showing of good cause.

ASU PD’s second argument is that the bodycam footage portrays personally 

identifying information, including “dates of birth and addresses for non-party arrestees,” 

1 The only case cited by ASU PD in support of its assertion that the stipulated 

protective order is itself dispositive of the Rule 26(c) analysis is one from outside this 

Circuit. (See Response at 5 (citing Trooper 1 v. N.Y. State Police, No. 22-CV-893 (LDH) 

(TAM), 2024 WL 1349122, at *11–13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024)).) Moreover, that case 

does not stand for the proposition that the terms of a protective order are always dispositive. 

Rather, Trooper 1 holds that the terms of a protective order are an important factor where 

the party opposing disclosure has demonstrated reliance on those terms. WL 1349122, at 

*11–13. According to ASU PD, its reliance on Plaintiffs’ stipulation took the form of 

producing unredacted bodycam footage, rather than limiting or redacting the portions of 

the video that contain private information. (Response at 5.) Therefore, to the extent ASU 

PD’s reliance on the protective order weighs against disclosure, it does so on a targeted 

basis, not a blanket basis. The Court considers the possibility of redaction below.

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as well as the more generally embarrassing depiction of “non-party ASU students (and 

likely former students) as arrestees, witnesses, and bystanders.” (Response at 3.) “There is 

thus non-party arrestee [personally identifying information] in both verbal and written form 

throughout the body camera footage.” (Response at 6.)

The presence of non-party personally identifying information in the video evidence 

unquestionably constitutes good cause for protection, and Plaintiffs do not meaningfully 

argue otherwise. (See Reply at 5 (stating that “an order from the Court precluding public 

access to portions of the footage which include [personally identifying information] of 

non-parties would [] completely address this concern”).) Plaintiffs assert that the private 

information contained in the video is minimal and readily susceptible of redaction. (Motion 

at 4.) Plaintiffs’ position aligns with the law of this Circuit. See Archbishop, 661 F.3d 

at 425 (“But even when the factors in this two-part test weigh in favor of protecting the 

discovery material (i.e., where the court determines that disclosure of information may 

result in ‘particularized harm,’ and the private interest in protecting the discovery material 

outweighs the public interest in disclosure), a court must still consider whether redacting 

portions of the discovery material will nevertheless allow disclosure.”). Plaintiffs raised 

the possibility of a redactive cure in their Motion, (see Motion at 4), and ASU PD has not 

contested the possibility of such a remedy. Moreover, the Court can balance the equities 

by tasking Plaintiffs with the initial redaction such that ASU PD is burdened only with 

approving or contesting Plaintiffs’ excisions. Therefore, the Court concludes that the 

specific instances of personally identifying information in the bodycam footage do not 

constitute good cause to preserve the confidentiality designation in toto.

The possibility that non-parties shown in the bodycam footage may be embarrassed 

by their depiction “as arrestees, witnesses, and bystanders” presents a different and more 

general issue than that presented by discrete portrayals of personally identifying 

information. Plaintiffs cite caselaw establishing the proposition that there is “no objectively 

reasonable expectation of privacy that would preclude video surveillance of activities 

already visible to the public.” (See Motion at 4 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 328 

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F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2003)).) From that premise, Plaintiffs derive the argument that “the 

very legal principle which permits law enforcement to record public interactions precludes 

a finding that those persons recorded in a public location have privacy interests that need 

protection.” (Motion at 3–4.) The Court finds this reasoning persuasive, and ASU PD fails 

to rebut the argument in any event. Therefore, the Court concludes that the mere physical 

depiction of non-parties in a public setting does not weigh in favor of preserving the 

confidential status of the bodycam footage.

ASU PD’s final argument is that the confidentiality designation should be preserved 

because Plaintiffs seek to publicize the bodycam footage, rather than use it to identify Doe 

defendants. This argument fails for two reasons. First, ASU PD cannot satisfy its burden 

of justifying secrecy by simply shifting it onto Plaintiffs’ shoulders via a request that 

Plaintiffs defend their intended use of the information. After all, discovery documents are 

presumptively public under Rule 26(c), and this presumption applies to information 

discovered from non-parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (providing that the Court may issue 

an order protecting “[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought” (emphasis 

added)). Second, mere publication to the public is not an improper use of information that 

is presumptively accessible by the public. Were it otherwise, the presumption of public 

access would be illusory.

The Court notes that the requirements of Rule 26(c) do not exhaust the Court’s 

concerns with the issue before it. The Court is charged with the fair administration of this 

lawsuit, to include ultimately ensuring a fair trial before an impartial jury of peers, should 

the case so require. To that end, the Court will guard against the danger of pretrial publicity 

in the form of statements prohibited by ER 3.6 of the Arizona Rules of Professional 

Conduct. While Rule 26(c) permits conveyance of the bodycam footage adequately 

redacted, ER 3.6 nonetheless bars extrajudicial statements by counsel, either 

accompanying the video or separate from but referring to it, that counsel knows or 

reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 

adjudicative proceeding in the matter, including any future trial.

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IV. Conclusion

It is uncontested that there exists good cause under Rule 26(c) to prevent disclosure 

of discrete depictions of personally identifying information in ASU PD’s bodycam footage. 

Because Plaintiffs do not contest the propriety of preserving the secrecy of those portions 

of the video evidence displaying personally identifying information of non-parties, the 

Court need not conduct the second step of the Rule 26(c) analysis. The Court will sustain

the confidentiality of such information. However, the secrecy of that information can be 

maintained through targeted redaction. ASU PD has failed to establish the threshold 

showing that particularized harm would attend public disclosure of the remainder of the 

bodycam footage. Therefore, the Court will order the confidentiality designation thereof 

withdrawn.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ 

Motion to De-Designate Law Enforcement Bodycam Footage as Confidential (Doc. 59).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing Plaintiffs to prepare a redacted version of 

the relevant video evidence that removes all discrete depictions of non-party personally 

identifying information. Consistent with this Order, mere physical depiction of persons in 

a public setting does not constitute personally identifying information requiring redaction. 

Plaintiffs shall provide to ASU PD the redacted version of the relevant video evidence. 

ASU PD shall then have ten (10) days from the date of receipt within which to either 

approve the redacted video or request further redaction. Upon mutual approval, the parties 

shall jointly file a notice with the Court, at which point the Court will issue an Order 

de-designating the redacted video as confidential. Until such time, the confidentiality 

designation applies with full force, and no disclosures shall be made. In the event that 

a dispute arises as to the sufficiency of the redaction that cannot be resolved through sincere 

personal consultation, the parties shall jointly file (1) a brief written summary of the 

dispute, not to exceed three pages per side, with an explanation of the position taken by 

each side; (2) a joint written certification that counsel or the parties have attempted to 

resolve the matter through sincere personal consultation and sincere effort as required by 

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LRCiv 7.2(j) and have reached an impasse; and (3) a submission of the relevant video filed 

under seal for in camera review. Upon review of the filed written summary of the dispute, 

the Court may set a telephonic conference, order written briefing, or decide the dispute 

without conference or briefing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing Plaintiffs to file within five (5) days of 

the date of this Order a status update indicating a date by which limited early discovery 

shall be complete.

Dated this 20th day of December, 2024.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

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