Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01184/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01184-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anita Pitroff,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Yavapai County Board of Supervisors,

Chip Davis and Lorna Street, 

 

 Defendants. 

 

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No. CV-06-1184-PCT-MHM

 

ORDER

The Yavapai County Board of Supervisors, Chip Davis, and Lorna Street (“the 

Defendants”) have moved to dismiss all of the claims against them in the Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint. (Dkt. #29, 28). After considering the Motion and related briefing, and

having found oral argument unnecessary, the Court issues the following Order.

I. Background and Procedural Posture

The Plaintiff filed the instant suit on April 28, 2006. The Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint asserted that she had been constructively discharged from her position as an

attorney in the Office of the Yavapai County Public Defender. She alleged that the

Defendants created an unbearable work environment in retaliation for her participation in

certain activities while working as a paralegal for the Public Defender. The Amended

Complaint asserted that as a paralegal, the Plaintiff helped in raising racial profiling defenses

in criminal cases, assisted the Department of Justice in an investigation of the Yavapai

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County jails, and assisted attorneys in her office with the preparation of Writs of Habeas

Corpus on behalf of jail inmates. 

The Amended Complaint asserted violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, violations of substantive and procedural due process,

and equal protection violations due to alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of age,

sex and disability, all pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, the Plaintiff brought a claim

for violation of A.R.S. § 38-532, Arizona’s whistle-blower protection act. 

The Defendants moved to dismiss all claims in the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on

November 17, 2006. (Dkt. #21). On August 2, 2007, this Court dismissed all of the claims

against the Defendants, but expressly granted the Plaintiff leave to amend her claims for

deprivation of property and liberty interest in her continued employment, her 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim against the Yavapai County Board of Supervisors, her sex discrimination claim,

and her A.R.S. § 38-532 “whistle-blower” claim. (Dkt. #27).

The Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint against the Defendants on August

23, 2007. (Dkt. #28). The Second Amended Complaint asserted claims for violation of the

Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Substantive Due Process, as well as

for sex, age and disability discrimination. The Second Amended Complaint also asserted

claims for violation of her property and liberty interests in continued employment, and

reasserted the Plaintiff’s whistle-blower claim under Arizona law. (Id.)

The Defendants have again moved to dismiss these claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. #29). 

II. Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will not be granted unless it appears beyond a 

doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove a set of facts to support the claim that would entitle the

plaintiff to relief. Morely v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). When determining

if a plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim in her complaint, all allegations of material fact

are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Whyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir.

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1998). When deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court will only

consider facts and evidence presented originally in the complaint. See North Star Int’l v.

Arizona Corp. Cmm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1983). 

III. Analysis

A. Fourth and Fifth Amendment, Substantive Due Process, Sex and Age Discrimination

Claims

The Plaintiff notes in her Response that her claims under the Fourth and Fifth 

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, her Substantive Due Process Claim, as well as her sex

and age discrimination claims were erroneously included in the Second Amended Complaint.

(Dkt. #34). These claims are accordingly dismissed.

B. Disability Discrimination Claim

This Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim without granting

the Plaintiff leave to amend. (Dkt. #27). The Plaintiff nevertheless appears to reassert this

claim in the Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. #28). This claim is dismissed with

prejudice. 

C. State Law Claims, Including A.R.S. § 38-531

The Defendants make two arguments in favor of dismissal of the Plaintiff’s state law

claims, particularly her claim for violation of Arizona’s whistle-blower protection statute.

1. Failure to State Necessary Facts to Support the Elements of a Whistle-Blower

Claim 

The Defendants argue that, in order to qualify for relief under A.R.S. § 38-531, the

Plaintiff must show that she made (1) a written disclosure; (2) to a public body; (3) alleging

a good-faith belief in a violation of law, mismanagement, gross waste of monies or abuse of

authority; (4) that resulted in a prohibited reprisal on the employee or former employee who

made the disclosure. Here, the Defendants assert, the Plaintiff’s participation in drafting

Habeas petitions and racial profiling motions cannot satisfy the written disclosure

requirement of the statute. Because the Plaintiff was a paralegal at the time these petitions

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Although the Court does not find that the email supports the Plaintiff’s claims —

rather, it seems to be a communication discussing alleged retaliation against her for previous

submissions made by the Public Defender’s office — that point is irrelevant at this stage of

the proceedings. 

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were filed, they would have been submitted by (and at the direction of) attorneys in the

Public Defender’s office. This level of involvement by a plaintiff has been held not to satisfy

the written disclosure requirement. 

The Defendants acknowledge, however, that the Plaintiff alleges that she

independently submitted a written disclosure. They argue, though, that “there are no facts

demonstrating the nature of the disclosure, what was stated, who it was sent to, or when.”

(Dkt. #29). In response, the Plaintiff attaches an email that she independently sent to the

Department of Justice.1

 (Dkt. #34). 

The Court declines to convert the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for

Summary Judgment by considering documents and evidence outside of the pleadings. See

San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998) (“When a

district court ‘looks beyond the pleadings in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,

the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.’”) (citation

omitted). The Court simply notes that the Plaintiff’s allegation that she made an independent

written disclosure is sufficient to survive a Motion to Dismiss under the liberal pleading

standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

2. Failure to Comply with Arizona’s Notice of Claim Statute

The Defendants next argue that the Plaintiff failed to comply with A.R.S. § 12-

821.01(A), Arizona’s Notice of Claim Statute. That statute requires persons who have statelaw claims against a public entity or employee to “file claims with the person or persons

authorized to accept service for the public entity . . . one hundred eighty days after the cause

of action accrues.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). The claim must “contain facts sufficient to

permit the public entity or public employee to understand the basis upon which liability is

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The Court notes, however, that it is troubled by the Plaintiff’s failure to address the

purported deficiencies with the Notice of Claim, other than to assert — without citation to

authority — that the Notice of Claim requirement does not apply to the whistle-blower

statute. 

The Court also directs the parties’ attention to a recently decided and potentially

relevant case on the subject from the Arizona Court of Appeals: Backus v. State, P.3d 

 , 2008 WL 2764601 (Ariz. App. July 17, 2008). 

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claimed. The claim shall also contain a specific amount for which the claim can be settled

and the facts supporting that amount.” Id. 

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiff’s Notice of Claim was deficient in several

respects, and that the recent Arizona case of Deer Valley v. Houser therefore mandates the

dismissal of all state law claims. 214 Ariz. 293 (2007). 

The Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint references the Notice of Claim that she

submitted prior to filing suit, which allows the Court to consider it without converting the

Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment. San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of

Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the actual Notice of Claim does

not appear to be part of the record in this case. The only information the Court has regarding

the Notice of Claim and its alleged deficiencies comes from the Defendants’ arguments in

the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court cannot be sure on the record before it that the

Plaintiff is unable to present facts to overcome the alleged deficiencies.2

 As such, dismissal

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate. 

D. Due Process

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has not properly established any property or

liberty interest in continued employment, and that the Court must therefore dismiss her

claims for violation of due process. 

1. Property Interest 

When the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s property interest claim, the Plaintiff was 

granted leave to amend her complaint in order to allege “facts that would suggest an implied

contract or other occupational security.” (Dkt. #27). In response to the Order, the Plaintiff

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The elements include: 1) that stigmatizing charges were made in connection with a

discharge; 2) that the charges were made public; 3) that the employee requested a nameclearing hearing; and 4) the employer refused the request for a hearing. (Dkt. #29). 

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alleged that her boss had promised to promote her to “attorney journey” upon passing the

Bar, as well as promising her “continued employment.” (Dkt. #28). The Defendants argue

that these allegations are “too vague to sustain an actual property interest cause of action.”

(Dkt #29). 

The Court agrees that these allegations would be insufficient to sustain the claim if

this were at the summary judgment stage. On a Motion to Dismiss, however, these claims

satisfy the liberal pleading standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Accordingly, the Motion

to dismiss is denied. 

2. Liberty Interest

The Defendants also assert that the Plaintiff has failed to state a liberty interest claim.

The Court’s previous Order permitted the Plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege facts

showing that “she lost employment opportunities due to a published defamatory statement.”

(Dkt. #27). The Plaintiff responded by asserting that she experienced discipline and publicly

published statements regarding her competence, resulting in “further employment setbacks.”

(Dkt. #28). 

The Court notes that these barest of assertions would not allow the Plaintiff to survive

summary judgment. Taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to her, however,

these allegations are sufficient to survive a Motion to Dismiss. Whyler Summit Partnership

v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998).

The Defendants argue further that the Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support

several of the required elements for a § 1983 claim based on violation of a liberty interest.3

The cases cited by the Defendants, however, are from the Tenth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.

The Defendants fail to inform the Court whether the law is the same in the Ninth Circuit, or

if this authority is merely persuasive. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the liberty

interest claim on these grounds. 

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IV. Conclusion

The Court dismisses the Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment,

Substantive Due Process, and the claims for Sex, Age and Disability Discrimination. The

Plaintiff is entitled to proceed with her whistle-blower claim, as well as her property and

liberty interest claims under the Due Process Clause. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part the Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. (Dkt. #29).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting this matter for a Rule 16 Scheduling

Conference. Separate order to follow.

DATED this 7th day of August, 2008.

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