Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_13-cv-00063/USCOURTS-akd-3_13-cv-00063-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTEGRATED CONCEPTS AND 

RESEARCH CORPORATION, a 

corporation; PHD ENGINEERS, INC., a 

corporation; CH2M HILL ALASKA, INC., a 

corporation; and GEOENGINEERS, INC., 

a corporation,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:13-cv-00063-SLG

AND RELATED THIRD PARTY CLAIMS

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE NEW CLAIMS IN EXPERT 

REPORT

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Strike New Claims in Expert Report at 

Docket 403 and Third-Party Defendant Terracon’s Joinder in that motion at Docket 404. 

The motion is fully briefed.1 Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to 

the Court’s decision.

In its expert report disclosed on July 21, 2016, the Municipality of Anchorage 

(“MOA”) asserted that the sheet piles should have been galvanized using a hot-dipped 

 1 See Docket 404 (Terracon’s Joinder in Docket 403); Docket 414 (Opp’n); Docket 423 (Reply of 

PND, ICRC, and GeoEngineers); Docket 424 (Reply of CH2M); Docket 426 (Reply of Terracon).

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coating, but instead a metalized spray coating was used.2 Defendants argue that this 

disclosure constitutes a new legal theory that comes too late that substantially prejudices 

them. They seek an order precluding Plaintiff from present evidence on or otherwise 

pursuing any new galvanization-related claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 37. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that it did provide sufficient notice of 

its galvanization theory earlier in the proceedings, and that in any event any delay was 

harmless or substantially justified.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) imposes an affirmative obligation on a litigant 

to supplement or correct its responses to interrogatories “in a timely manner if the party 

learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, 

and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the 

other parties during the discovery process or in writing.”3 The civil discovery rules are 

designed to make litigation “less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with 

the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”4 The Court must 

first decide whether Plaintiff breached its duty to supplement, and, if it has, what the 

appropriate remedy should be.

Here, a claim that the sheet piles were not properly galvanized would have been

responsive to several interrogatories that had been posed to MOA. MOA argues that it 

 2 See Docket 394-1 at 28 (“Our evaluation confirmed that . . . a spray applied metalized coating 

was used instead. . . . We . . . determined that the coating reduced the ultimate interlock capacity 

significantly compared to the capacity without the coating.”).

3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).

4 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 

U.S. 495 (1947)). 

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did not disclose a galvanization theory in these responses because it “was simply not in 

a position to identify the galvanization issue at that time.”5 The rules do not require MOA

to have disclosed an issue that it was unaware of, but they do require supplementation 

when the information becomes known. 

In July 2014, MOA served its answers to CH2M Hill Alaska, Inc.’s First 

Interrogatories.6 Among the requests CH2M made was for MOA to “[d]escribe with 

particularity every way in which MOA contends that VECO’s work on the Project fell below 

the applicable standard of care.”7 In its response, MOA did not identify galvanization or 

spray-on coating as an issue. 

In August 2014, MOA served its answers to PND’s First Interrogatories.8 Among 

the requests PND made was for MOA to describe and identify MOA’s “reasoning, 

including but not limited to all facts in support,” behind its contention that PND’s services 

were defective.9 In its response, MOA did not identify galvanization or spray-on coating

as an issue. Instead, the response referenced the findings in both the CH2M Hill 

Suitability Study and the August 2013 SGH report.10

 5 Docket 414 at 7-9.

6 See Docket 403-3.

7 Docket 403-3 at 2 (Interrogatory No. 3).

8 See Docket 403-4.

9 E.g., Docket 403-4 at 2 (Interrogatory No. 1).

10 Docket 403-4.

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In December 2015, MOA served its responses to Terracon’s First Set of 

Interrogatories.11 Terracon asked MOA to “identify all alleged breaches of the standard 

of care and all facts supporting each breach.”12 MOA again made no reference to 

galvanization or spray-on coating. Perhaps foreshadowing this issue, however, MOA’s 

response noted that it “anticipates that the response to this Interrogatory will be 

supplemented and/or amended as the result of expert analyses and opinions which are 

not yet subject to disclosure.”13

MOA does not assert that it supplemented its interrogatory responses, but it does 

maintain that the galvanization claim was otherwise made known to Defendants. MOA

contends that it disclosed the expert report by the deadline set by the Court, and that the 

notice in the report “complies with Federal Rule 26.”14 The Court acknowledges that MOA 

complied with the expert report disclosure deadline. But the federal rules also require 

timely supplementation of interrogatory responses. The disclosure of the galvanization 

theory on July 21, 2016 was not timely—it came three years into this case, just six weeks 

before the close of fact discovery and apparently at least several months after MOA began 

pursuing this new theory.15

 11 See Docket 403-5.

12 Docket 403-5 at 2.

13 Docket 403-5 at 6.

14 Docket 414 at 9.

15 In addition to the February and March 2016 dates associated with MOA’s experts’ tests, see, 

e.g., Docket 427-2 (Ex. B to Buchanan Decl.), the Court notes the April 2016 deposition questions 

by MOA’s counsel, see Docket 414 at 13-14 (an excerpt of the deposition attached to the filing 

does not match the excerpt in the filing itself). There, MOA asked several questions regarding 

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MOA asserts that it was not obligated to inform the other parties of its galvanization 

theory prior to the expert disclosure deadline because the issue had not been fully 

analyzed by its experts. But MOA should have disclosed the theory to Defendants even 

if had not yet been fully analyzed by its experts.16 Earlier disclosure would have permitted 

Defendants to obtain their own experts on galvanization and conduct their own testing of 

the materials before expert reports were due. The Court finds that MOA failed to timely 

supplement its discovery responses or otherwise inform Defendants of its new 

galvanization theory when MOA learned that in some material respect that its prior 

responses were incomplete or incorrect, as required by Rule 26(e).

MOA maintains that even if the Court finds the disclosure was untimely, no 

sanctions should be imposed because its belated disclosure was “substantially justified” 

or “harmless.”17 The parties agree that the four factors set out in Lanard Toys Ltd. V. 

Novelty, Inc.18 should guide the Court in determining whether a violation of a discovery 

 

the decision to use hot-dip galvanization rather than spray-on coating, indicating that MOA 

appeared to be aware of this new theory by April 2016 at the latest.

16 MOA also argues that its delay in presenting this theory was consistent with the approach of 

Terracon’s counsel, who evidently instructed Terracon’s 30(b)(6) witness not to testify about 

subjects that required the deponent’s expertise. This conduct by Terracon’s counsel was 

improper. See generally Civil Rule 30(c)(2) (“A person may instruct a deponent not to answer 

only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to

present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).”). As such, Terracon’s conduct does not justify MOA’s 

failure to promptly disclose its new claim. 

17 Docket 414 at 9.

18 375 Fed. App’x 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th 

Cir. 2003).

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deadline is justified or harmless.

19 These four factors are “(1) prejudice or surprise to the 

party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the 

prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness 

involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.”20 MOA advances two additional factors 

derived from the Fourth Circuit: (5) the importance of the evidence; and (6) the 

nondisclosing party’s explanation for its failure to disclose the evidence. “21

Some of MOA’s arguments are in tension with one another. For example, it argues 

that Defendants cannot claim surprise because MOA adequately flagged the issue in its 

interrogatory responses, but it also argues that it was substantially justified in withholding 

the information because it did not know earlier that galvanization was an issue. It argues 

that Defendants will not be prejudiced because they were notified of the theory with six 

weeks of fact discovery remaining, but also asserts that the issue is so technically 

complex that it required MOA several years and expert witnesses to discover it. 

Turning to the Lanard Toys factors, MOA argues that Defendants were not 

surprised because its interrogatory answers discussed interlocking mechanisms and 

incorporated by reference various external documents, most notably the 2013 CH2M Hill 

Suitability Study.22 MOA argues that the study provided adequate notice that 

galvanization would be at issue. But that study does not suggest that galvanization was 

 19 See Docket 414 at 10-17; Docket 403 at 17.

20 375 Fed. App’x at 713 (citing David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003).

21 See Docket 414,at 10 (citing S. States Rack and Furniture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 

F.3d 592, 596 (4th Cir. 2003)).

22 See Docket 403-1.

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at issue;23 nor, as explained above, do the interrogatory responses themselves. MOA

points to a brief line of deposition questioning by Terracon’s counsel in November 2015, 

but those questions—limited as they are—appear to be focused on budgetary and design

problems associated with galvanization, not design deviation or interlock strength.24 And 

MOA points to its own questioning in an April 2016 deposition. But those limited questions 

were not enough to alert Defendants that Plaintiff would be asserting that there was a 

variance from the design specification by the use of a spray-on coating instead of hot dip 

galvanization.

25

MOA also suggests that its Complaint provided Defendants with notice that the 

interlocking mechanisms would be at issue, and that this was sufficient notice that 

galvanization might be at issue. MOA’s Amended Complaint alleges that “the interlock 

integrity of the sheet piles in numerous instances were severely compromised” and that 

ICRC and PND had failed to “develop[] during the Project the necessary inspection 

protocol to verify interlock integrity.”26 It also alleges that some of the sections “have 

dramatic defects including . . . unzipped interlocks.”27 But each of these allegations is 

 23 MOA argues that “cathodic protection” and “interlock integrity” were sufficiently linked in the 

Suitability Study to suggest that galvanization was at issue. Docket 414 at 11-12. But in the 

Study, these concepts were discussed in the context of asserted defects in the design. The new 

theory advanced in the SGH July 2016 expert report is that the specified design was not followed 

at all. See Docket 394-1, at 28 (“Our evaluation confirmed that although PND’s design specified 

the sheet piling to be hot dip galvanized, this was not done and a spray applied metalized coating 

was used instead.”).

24 See Docket 414-2 at 5.

25 See Docket 414 at 13-14.

26 Docket 145 ¶ 188. 

27 Docket 145 ¶ 207.

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clarified and limited by MOA’s responses to various Defendants’ interrogatories, which 

focus on design work and over-driving the piles, not on galvanization. To the extent that 

these allegations in the Amended Complaint might suggest that a failure to use hot-dip 

galvanization was being alleged, MOA did not advance such a theory when directly asked 

in interrogatories what theories it was advancing. In sum, the Court finds that the 

prejudice and surprise to Defendants is considerable. 

MOA asserts that Defendants can cure any prejudice through rebuttal expert 

reports. But, as MOA points out, galvanization “is a highly technical issue requiring expert

testimony,”28 and not all experts are experts in either galvanization or its effects on 

interlock integrity. Because Defendants were not timely apprised that galvanization would 

be at issue, they evidently did not retain experts to opine on it. And it is likely that further 

fact discovery would be needed, as the subject was not meaningfully explored during the 

extensive fact depositions that have now concluded. For additional fact discovery to 

occur, for Defendants to find and retain new experts, for those experts to conduct the 

appropriate tests, and for those experts to write up their reports could take months, but 

rebuttal reports are now due on September 16, 2016. Defendants do not have a 

meaningful ability to cure the prejudice. 

The Court also finds there to be a high likelihood of disruption of the trial if the 

claim were to be permitted, as any cure would likely require an extension of discovery 

deadlines to allow Defendants to adequately address this issue. Moreover, Defendants 

have plausibly contended that the new claims could well require the joinder of new parties 

 28 Docket 414 at 8.

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that were directly involved with the galvanization,

29 which would make a disruption of the 

entire remaining pretrial schedule and trial date a near certainty.

The fourth Lanard factor asks whether bad faith or willfulness was involved in not 

timely disclosing the evidence. On this point, the Court does not find that MOA acted in 

bad faith.

30 

On the two additional factors, MOA contends that this evidence is important 

because it further supports its claims. But given the wide range of issues that have been 

litigated in this case over several years, MOA has not demonstrated that this new theory 

is essential to MOA’s case. Finally, the Court finds that MOA’s explanation for its delay 

is unpersuasive. MOA asserts that its own lack of expertise in technical matters caused 

the delay. But while a plaintiff need not have all of its evidence marshalled before filing 

its complaint, MOA should have disclosed its galvanization theory considerably sooner 

than it did.

On consideration of all of the above factors, and in particular the fact that the 

remaining pretrial deadlines and the trial date would very likely be disrupted, the Court

finds that the late disclosure of the galvanization theory is not substantially justified or 

harmless. 

 29 See, e.g., Docket 426 at 3-4; Docket 424 at 4. Third-Party Defendant Terracon also suggests 

that if the new theory is permitted it will necessarily involve Coffman Enterprises, Inc., setting up 

a conflict of interest that might require Terracon’s Alaska counsel to withdraw. See Docket 404

at 3-4.

30 See Yeti by Molly, Inc. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001).

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As to the appropriate remedy, Civil Rule 37(c)(1) provides that a party that fails to 

timely supplement its discovery responses as required by Rule 26(e) “is not allowed to 

use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial,

unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” For the reasons discussed 

above, MOA’s failure to timely supplement was not substantially justified or harmless. 

Accordingly, the Court will strike the newly disclosed theory from the expert’s report. In 

addition, the Court will preclude all parties from presenting any evidence relating to a 

claim that Defendants deviated from PND’s design by failing to use hot-dip galvanization 

where specified.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike at Docket 403 and 

Terracon’s Joinder at Docket 404 are GRANTED.

DATED this 12th day of September, 2016.

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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