Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00454/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00454-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PROTECT LAKE PLEASANT, LLC, )

an Arizona limited liability )

company, et al., ) No. CIV 07-454 PHX RCB

)

Plaintiffs, ) O R D E R

)

vs. ) 

) 

ROBERT W. JOHNSON, in his )

official capacity as )

Commissioner, United States )

Bureau of Reclamation, et al.,)

)

Defendants. ) )

In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief,

Plaintiffs allege that the United States Bureau of Reclamation

("BOR"), by authorizing Maricopa County (the "County") to proceed

with the development and construction of the proposed Scorpion Bay

Marina & Yacht Club ("Scorpion Bay Marina") at Lake Pleasant

Regional Park ("LPRP"), violated, inter alia, the National

Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., and

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. Am. Compl. (doc. # 4)

¶¶ 57-117.

. . .

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Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for

preliminary injunction (doc. # 12) seeking to enjoin BOR from

issuing or implementing a Finding of No Significant Impact

("FONSI") that would authorize the County's construction of the

Marina until such time as BOR has complied with its obligations

under NEPA. BOR and Intervenor-Defendant Lake Pleasant Marina

Partners, LLC ("Marina Partners") oppose the motion. BOR's Resp.

(doc. # 25); MP's Resp. (doc. # 32). Plaintiffs filed their reply

memorandum (doc. # 34) on April 30, 2007. Also before the Court is

Marina Partners' motion in limine (doc. # 35), filed on May 4,

2007, seeking to exclude the extra-record testimony of Glen Haas,

Ph.D.. Plaintiffs filed a responsive memorandum (doc. # 36)

opposing Marina Partners’ motion on May 7, 2007, and the Court

heard oral argument on both motions on May 8, 2007. (doc. # 38). 

Having carefully reviewed the record and considered the arguments

raised, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Lake Pleasant was originally formed in the 1920s when the

Waddell Dam was built by a company that is now the Maricopa

Municipal Water Conservation District ("Water District"). In 1969,

the Water District and the County entered into an operating

agreement requiring the County to manage Lake Pleasant as a

regional park.

Under the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, Congress

authorized BOR to develop and build the Central Arizona Project. 

Pursuant to this authority, BOR proposed the construction of a new

dam in the 1980s. In 1984, BOR prepared a final environmental

impact statement ("EIS") for the CAP storage division which

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included the New Waddell Dam. Because water levels were to

increase significantly with the construction of the New Waddell

Dam, submerging the then existing public marina, the 1984 EIS

included a recreational development plan for the enlarged lake

resulting from the new dam.

Construction of the New Waddell Dam was commenced in 1985 and

completed in 1992. In 1990, BOR and Maricopa County entered into a

50-year Recreation Management Agreement ("RMA") under which the

County, through its Parks and Recreation Department, would manage

recreation in LPRP. Under the RMA, the County is authorized to

enter into third-party concession agreements for recreational

services and facilities subject to BOR approval. The County

subsequently developed a Master Recreational Plan ("MRP") based on

the conceptual plan described in the 1984 EIS. In 1997, BOR

prepared an environmental assessment ("EA") comparing the impacts

of the MRP with the impacts of the recreational plan discussed in

the 1984 EIS. The 1997 EA determined that a FONSI was appropriate

for the MRP. However, the 1997 EA stipulated that any proposed

concession and recreational development at LPRP was required to be

consistent with the overall recreational management plans and goals

for Lake Pleasant identified in Appendix C of the 1984 Final EIS,

and would be subject to BOR review for site-specific NEPA

compliance.

In 2005, the County issued a request for proposals ("RFP") for

development of the marina project on Lake Pleasant. The RFP

expressly precluded any party possessing any commercial interest

adjacent to or near the lake from bidding. Marina Partners

submitted the only bid for the project, and BOR subsequently

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approved the Proposed Use Management Agreement between Marina

Partners and the County. The County then entered into a final Use

Management Agreement with Marina Partners.

On March 1, 2006, BOR issued a notice of public scoping for

the proposed marina, and, on July 28, 2006, issued a draft EA for

public comment. After public comment, a revised draft EA was

released for further comment in October of 2006. Plaintiffs MauleFfinch and Pensus Group, LLC submitted comments on the draft EA.

On February 27, 2007, BOR issued the final EA and FONSI,

determining that the construction and operation of the proposed

Scorpion Bay Marina would not significantly impact the environment. 

Plaintiffs filed this action and motion for preliminary injunction

shortly thereafter.

II. JURISDICTION

Before proceeding to the merits of the pending motions, the

Court notes that it has jurisdiction to review BOR's administrative

decisions and to issue the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201-02.

The constitutional limitations on the Court's jurisdiction are

satisfied as well. In order to establish Article III standing, a

party must show the following:

(1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is

(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual

and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it

is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,

that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S.

167, 180-81 (2000) (internal quotation omitted). In addition to

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these constitutional requirements, standing to bring suit for

judicial review of federal agency action under the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq., requires a showing that the

interest to be vindicated is arguably within the "zone of

interests" to be protected or regulated by the statute in question. 

Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). 

"[T]he relevant statute . . . is the statute whose violation is the

gravamen of the complaint." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497

U.S. 871, 886 (1990). Thus, "a plaintiff claiming injury from

environmental damage," as in this case, "must use the area affected

by the challenged activity." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 565-66 (1992) (citations omitted).

This requirements are met with respect to individual

Plaintiffs David Maule-Ffinch and Michael Viscuis, as well Pensus

Group, LLC, all of whom have alleged their regular use of Lake

Pleasant for "wildlife viewing and education, photography, boating,

fishing, recreational, social and other water-related activities." 

See Am. Compl. (doc. # 4) ¶¶ 5-7. As such, their injuries are

neither conjectural nor hypothetical, and it is beyond reasonable

dispute that their alleged injuries, which are fairly traceable to

BOR's administrative actions, are likely to be redressed if the

Court were to issue a favorable decision. See Friends of the Earth,

Inc., 528 U.S. at 180-81.

Plaintiff Protect Lake Pleasant, LLC also has standing. An

association has standing to sue in a representational capacity for

its members "when [1] its members would otherwise have standing to

sue in their own right, [2] the interests at stake are germane to

the organization's purpose, and [3] neither the claim asserted nor

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the relief requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit." Id. at 181. Individual Plaintiffs

Maule-Ffinch and Viscuis are members of Protect Lake Pleasant, LLC,

and, as explained above, have standing to sue in their own right

based on their regular use of the lake. Moreover, the

environmental interests at stake in this litigation are germane to

the purpose of the organization, "an Arizona non-profit limited

liability company formed to protect the natural environment,

wildlife and resources at Lake Pleasant." See Am. Compl. (doc. #

4) ¶ 4. Finally, while the individual plaintiffs are participants

in this suit, their participation is not necessary for the claims

asserted or the relief sought. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528

U.S. at 181.

BOR raises two potential challenges to Plaintiffs’ standing. 

First, BOR hastens to point out that Plaintiffs Maule-Ffinch and

Pensus Group, LLC own and operate Pleasant Harbor Marina, which is

currently the only marina operating on the lake. BOR’s Resp. (doc.

# 25) at 2. BOR states that "[P]laintiffs [lawsuit] attempt[s] to

characterize primarily economic arguments as environmental

arguments." Id. Marina Partners raises similar concerns in its

response, albeit in more dramatic language. See MP’s Resp. (doc. #

32) at 2. BOR and Marina Partners seem to suggest that Plaintiffs’

economic interests are not within the zone of interests to be

protected or regulated by NEPA. However, as discussed above,

Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled environmental injury. Moreover,

Marina Partners should already be aware from the Court’s April 13,

2007 order granting its motion to intervene that economic interests

can be sufficient to confer standing in environmental litigation. 

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1

 Plaintiffs have asked for what they characterize as personal

attacks be stricken from the opposition briefs. Reply (doc. # 34) at

1 n.1. While the Court agrees that BOR and Marina Partners have not

illuminated any of the legal issues controlling this case by their

immaterial and excessive remarks, the Court will not strike the

offending matter as it appears only in their opposition briefs, and

not in any pleading to which Rule 12(f) would apply. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(f) ("[T]he court may order stricken from any pleading . .

. any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.")

(emphasis added). To the extent that the Court has the inherent

authority to strike inappropriate matter in briefs, it declines to do

so here. In the future, however, Marina Partners would do well not

to stretch its intervenor status and focus instead on the legal

issues as it had promised.

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See Order (doc. # 24) at 8 ("Marina Partners' economic interest in

the development and operation of the proposed Scorpion Bay Marina

qualifies as a legal interest within the zone of interests to be

regulated or protected by [NEPA].").1

Second, BOR states that "[p]ersons challenging an agency's

compliance with NEPA should participate in the process so the

agency has an opportunity to give their issues meaningful

consideration," and suggests that Plaintiffs have not done so here. 

BOR’s Resp. (doc. # 25) at 2. For this proposition, BOR relies on

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752

(2004). However, that case did not establish a rule so broad as

that for which it is cited by BOR; rather, the Supreme Court held

that the respondents, by failing to urge the agency to evaluate

specific alternatives during the comment period, could not

subsequently complain about the agency’s failure to consider those

alternatives in the EA. DOT, 541 U.S. at 764-65. The case did not

address any issues related to standing.

The statutory and constitutional bases for the Court's

jurisdiction being satisfied, the Court now turns to the merits of

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2

 Dr. Haas co-authored the Water Recreation Opportunity Spectrum

Users' Guidebook for BOR. See Admin. R., Vol. 12.

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the pending motions.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Marina Partners' Motion in Limine

Marina Partners has filed a motion in limine (doc. # 35)

seeking to preclude Plaintiffs from introducing the pre-recorded

video testimony or declaration of Glenn A. Haas, Ph.D.2 at the

preliminary injunction hearing. Marina Partners argues that such

extra-record evidence cannot be considered under the Administrative

Procedure Act, and that the foundation for such evidence is lacking

due to Dr. Haas' lack of familiarity with parts of the

administrative record. Mot. (doc. # 35) at 1-8. Plaintiffs

believe that Dr. Haas' testimony is necessary to help the Court

understand what is involved in a Water Recreation Opportunity

Spectrum study, see Mot. (doc. # 35), Ex. 1 at 2, and contend that

his testimony should be admitted under any of the four exceptions

to the general rule against extra-record evidence. Resp. (doc. #

36) at 1-8.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§

500 et seq., judicial review of an agency decision typically

focuses on the administrative record in existence at the time of

the decision and does not encompass any part of the record made

initially in the reviewing court. 5 U.S.C. § 706; Southwest Ctr.

for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450

(9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has allowed the consideration

of extra-record materials only in the following circumstances:

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(1) if necessary to determine whether the

agency has considered all relevant factors and

has explained its decision, (2) when the agency

has relied on documents not in the record, or

(3) when supplementing the record is necessary

to explain technical terms or complex subject

matter.

Id. (internal quotations omitted). Extra-record documents may also

be admitted when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith. 

Id. For this exception to apply, "normally there must be a strong

showing of bad faith or improper behavior before the court may

inquire into the thought processes of administrative

decisionmakers." Pub. Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 795

(9th Cir. 1982).

Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the first

exception does not apply. Much of the information provided by Dr.

Haas' testimony "can either be extracted from the record or is not

necessary to this court's review" of BOR's decision. See Southwest

Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1451. The information

necessary for the Court's review is set forth in the guidebook coauthored by Dr. Haas, which appears at volume 12 of the

administrative record. Moreover, the extra-record testimony

Plaintiffs seek to introduce was not relied upon by BOR in reaching

its decision. See id. at 1450. Likewise, the Court does not

perceive Dr. Haas' testimony as being particularly relevant to any

possible claim of bad faith by BOR. See id. However, the Court

does believe that some of Dr. Haas' testimony may be helpful in

explaining the technical terms and complex subject matter involved

in this case. See id. For these limited purposes, the Court does

not believe that Marina Partners has sufficiently demonstrated that

the testimony should not be considered for lack of foundation. 

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Therefore, Marina Partners' motion in limine (doc. # 35) will

be granted in part and denied in part. In reviewing Plaintiffs'

motion for preliminary injunction, the Court will consider Dr.

Haas' testimony for the limited purpose of explaining technical

terms and complex subject matter relating to the Water Recreation

Opportunity Spectrum, but not for any other purpose, including his

opinions regarding the NEPA planning process.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the

status quo among the parties pending a final decision on the merits

of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; Dep't of Parks & Recreation

v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Court may grant a preliminary injunction if the moving party

demonstrates (1) a probability of success on the merits and the

possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) that the lawsuit raises

serious questions and the balance of hardship tips sharply in the

movant's favor. Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113,

1120 (9th Cir. 2005). "These two formulations represent two points

on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm

increases as the probability of success decreases. They are not

separate tests but outer reaches of a single continuum." Id.

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

1. Probability of Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs principal contentions are that BOR violated NEPA by

failing to prepare an EIS for the proposed Scorpion Bay Marina, and

by failing to adequately consider the potential environmental

impact of the project before issuing a FONSI.

Under NEPA all federal agencies must prepare an EIS for all

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"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Procedurally, the

decision as to whether an EIS is required is made by evaluating the

collected data, analysis, and discussion in the agency's EA. See

40 C.F.R. §§ 6.105(d), 1508.9. If the EA establishes that a

proposed action will not have a significant effect on the

environment, the agency may issue a FONSI presenting convincing

reasons "why an action . . . will not have a significant effect on

the human environment and for which an environmental impact

statement therefore will not be prepared." Native Ecosystems

Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.3); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.

Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

"NEPA 'does not mandate particular results,' but 'simply

provides the necessary process' to ensure that federal agencies

take a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences of their

actions." Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1050

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens

Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)). The "hard look" requires an

agency to "undertake a thorough environmental analysis before

concluding that no significant environmental impact exists." 

Native Ecosystems Council, 428 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation

omitted). In determining whether an agency undertook the requisite

"hard look," courts apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of

review. Id. In making this factual inquiry, the court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Navajo Nation, 479

F.3d at 1050. Rather, the purpose of the court's narrow review is

to consider whether the agency's decision was based on a

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3

 The regulations set forth a number of additional factors

relevant to determining the intensity or severity of impact

contemplated by a proposed action:

(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and

adverse. A significant effect may exist even if

the Federal agency believes that on balance the

effect will be beneficial.

(2) The degree to which the proposed action

affects public health or safety.

(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area

such as proximity to historic or cultural

resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands,

wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical

areas.

(4) The degree to which the effects on the

quality of the human environment are likely to be

highly controversial.

(5) The degree to which the possible effects on

the human environment are highly uncertain or

involve unique or unknown risks.

. . .

(7) Whether the action is related to other

actions with individually insignificant but

cumulatively significant impacts. Significance

exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a

cumulatively significant impact on the

environment. Significance cannot be avoided by

terming an action temporary or by breaking it

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consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a

clear error of judgment. Id.; see also Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau

of Land Mgmt., 914 F.2d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1990).

With respect to the threshold decision of whether a proposed

federal action will so significantly affect the quality of the

human environment as to require an EIS, the implementing

regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality

identify two broad factors: "context and intensity."3 40 C.F.R. §

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down into small component parts.

. . .

. . .

(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of

Federal, State, or local law or requirements

imposed for the protection of the environment.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b).

4

 In a footnote to the introduction to their motion, Plaintiffs

allege that BOR also failed to comply with the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. Mot. (doc. # 12) at 2 n.2. However,

Plaintiffs’ motion does not argue for the issuance of a preliminary

injunction based on any alleged Clean Air Act violations. See id. at

7-20. Rather, Plaintiffs explicitly state that for purposes of their

motion for preliminary injunction they would "focus on BOR’s most

glaring failures," and that the air quality issues and other alleged

NEPA violations would be addressed at the summary judgment stage.

See id. at 2-3, n.2, 7 n.4.

Plaintiffs elaborate on the air quality issues in their reply

memorandum, apparently to rebut a passing reference in Marina

Partners’ response regarding BOR’s findings on air quality. See

Resp. (doc. # 32) at 15 ("[T]he impact on air quality will not exceed

de minimis thresholds."); Reply (doc. # 34) at 12. However, contrary

to earlier representations regarding the scope of their motion,

Plaintiffs also argue for the first time in their reply memorandum

that a preliminary injunction should issue on the basis of the

alleged Clean Air Act violations. See Reply (doc. # 34) at 12-15. 

Because Plaintiffs originally decided to focus their arguments

on BOR’s alleged NEPA violations to the exclusion of other issues

reserved for summary judgment, the Court will limit its analysis

accordingly. Therefore, this decision addresses only those NEPA

violations on which Plaintiffs’ motion is actually based. Cf.

Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that

where a party introduces new evidence in its reply brief, the

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1508.27.

Plaintiffs contend that BOR violated NEPA by (1) failing to

conduct a study of Lake Pleasant's carrying capacity, Mot. (doc. #

12) at 8-14, (2) overestimating the lake’s usable surface area and

underestimating daily watercraft counts, id. at 14-17, and (3) not

adequately considering alternatives to the Marina. Id. at 17-19.4

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district court should not consider the new evidence without giving

the non-movant an opportunity to respond); Corson & Gruman Co. v.

NLRB, 283 U.S. App. D.C. 239, 899 F.2d 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(requiring moving party to raise all arguments in its opening brief

to prevent "sandbagging" of opposing party).

5

 BOR's guidelines define carrying capacity as "the ability of

a resource to accommodate a user population at a reasonable threshold

without the user population negatively affecting the resource

sustainability . . . ." Mot. (doc. # 12), Ex. 3 at IV-13 n.1.

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i. Carrying Capacity

Plaintiffs' chief argument is that BOR violated NEPA by

issuing a FONSI without first conducting a carrying capacity5

 study

to inform its decision with respect to the potential impacts of the

proposed Scorpion Bay Marina. Mot. (doc. # 12) at 8-10.

Prior to the construction of New Waddell Dam, which

substantially increased the water level and surface area of Lake

Pleasant, BOR prepared an EIS in 1984 to evaluate a proposed

recreation plan. Admin. R., Vol. 7 ("1984 EIS"). In addition to

reviewing the results expected to flow from the proposed plan, the

1984 EIS set forth mitigation measures to ameliorate the

anticipated environmental consequences of recreational development. 

Id. at 253-86. To ensure that those mitigation measures would be

fulfilled, BOR's RMA contract with the County required, inter alia,

that "any concessionaire and subsequent development w[ould be] be

subject to compliance with procedural requirements of [NEPA] with

the condition that the proposed facility [would be] consistent with

the overall recreation management plans and goals for New Waddell

Reservoir identified in Appendix C of the [1984 EIS]." Admin. R.,

Vol. 6 ("1997 EA") at 40-41; accord Admin. R., Vol. 1 ("RMA") at

16. The Water Control Study and Appendix C used to develop those

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6

 It is difficult to locate page 12 of the Water Control Study,

because the copy of the study provided in the administrative record

appears to have been inadvertently merged with over twenty-three

pages of a separate unidentified document. See Admin. R., Vol. 9

("Water Control Study") at 10-11 (twenty-three pages of unidentified

document separating pages 10 and 11 of the Water Control Study).

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recreation and management plans established Lake Pleasant's average

carrying capacity at 546 boats subject to variation based on the

seasonal drawdown of water during the peak season. See Admin. R.,

Vol. 8 ("Appendix C") at 80; accord Admin. R., Vol. 9 ("Water

Control Study") at 12.6

On the one hand, Plaintiffs contend that a new marina cannot

be approved because the lake’s carrying capacity may already be

exceeded, Mot. (doc. # 12) at 9, and, on the other hand, argue that

BOR’s decision to issue the FONSI for the proposed marina was

arbitrary and capricious on account of its failure to conduct a new

carrying capacity study for Lake Pleasant. Both arguments fail.

a. Carrying Capacity Has Not Clearly Been Exceeded

Prior to this litigation, Plaintiff Pensus Group, LLC had

expressed concern during the public comment stage for the 2007 EA

as to whether the lake has the carrying capacity to accommodate the

proposed marina. Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at H-74-76. 

Applying a turnover rate of 2 to BOR’s estimated daily watercraft

count of 1,660 for peak weekends, i.e., dividing 1,660 by 2 to

arrive at a boats-at-one-time figure of 830, and relying on the

1984 Water Control Study’s estimated average carrying capacity of

546 boats, Plaintiffs suggest that the lake is already over

capacity, and therefore cannot accommodate another marina. Mot.

(doc. # 12) at 9, 15. This reasoning is flawed for two reasons.

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First, Plaintiffs assume that the turnover rate of 2 that was

used in Appendix C to the 1984 EIS is accurate and binding on BOR,

see id. at 15, even though the 2007 EA neither uses that formula

nor suggests the existence of any other way to reliably calculate

the number of boats present on the lake at any one time. See

Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at 33-34. Instead, the EA

explains that the number of boats present on the lake at any moment

would be less than the total daily watercraft count depending on

the length of time associated with different types of boats and

boating activities. Id. Although a similar rationale was used to

explain the turnover rate formula on which Plaintiffs rely, the

Court cannot say that BOR acted in an arbitrary and capricious

manner simply by failing to use that or any other formula to give

its findings the appearance of mathematical certainty.

Second, BOR makes clear in the EA that the 546 boat figure on

which Plaintiffs rely was never intended to be "an absolute cap" so

much as it was intended to be "a planning and management tool." 

See Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at H-99-100. Moreover, in

Appendix C of the 1984 EIS, BOR similarly stated:

Management of the lake and operation of the

boating facilities must insure that the number

of boats on the lake does not exceed its

capacity. The lake capacity that has been

presented here is an average; it should be

remembered that the lake can safely accommodate

more boats early in the recreation season and

fewer boats as autumn approaches and the

combined CAP-MCMWCD drawdown becomes greater.

Admin. R., Vol. 8 ("Appendix C") at 80 (emphasis added); accord

Admin. R., Vol. 9 ("Water Control Study") at 12. In other words,

by the terms of the management plans developed around the 1984 EIS,

it is clear that the concept of carrying capacity allowed for more

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flexibility than Plaintiffs would imply. More importantly, in

light of that flexibility, it is not clear that carrying capacity

has already been exceeded. Finally, Plaintiffs argument weighs

peak weekend daily watercraft counts against an average carrying

capacity figure; however, applying the turnover rate of 2 to the

daily average watercraft count of 645, see Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007

Final EA") at 32, would lead to a boats-at-one-time figure of 323. 

In other words, using average figures on boths sides of the

equation, Plaintiffs’ rationale suggests that current usage is

still below the average carrying capacity of 546 boats established

in 1984. This hardly conveys the impression of arbitrary or

capricious decision-making by BOR.

Ultimately, by the terms of the EA, the issue of carrying

capacity will be addressed in the future, as it is currently, by

the County’s management of the lake. In sum, Plaintiffs have not

demonstrated any reason to believe that the lake’s carrying

capacity has already been exceeded so as to render BOR’s decision

arbitrary and capricious.

b. BOR Was Not Obligated to Conduct a Carrying Capacity Study

Plaintiffs make much the fact that a table in the 2007 EA

comparing major recreational reservoirs in Maricopa County reflects

Lake Pleasant's maximum watercraft capacity as "N/A," and the fact

that BOR only estimated average daily watercraft counts but did not

quantify the lake’s usage in terms of boats-at-one-time. See

Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at 30-33. Plaintiffs believe

that, because BOR did not conduct a carrying capacity study for the

lake prior to the issuance of the EA, or obtain a boats-at-one-time

figure, it did not take a "hard look" at the environmental

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consequences of the proposed marina, and therefore acted in

arbitrary and capricious manner.

At the outset, the Court notes that the final EA for the

proposed Scorpion Bay Marina is tiered to the 1984 EIS, which

analyzes the issue of Lake Pleasant’s carrying capacity. (doc. #

38). NEPA’s implementing regulations define "tiering" as follows:

The coverage of general matters in broader

environmental impact statements (such as

national program or policy statements) with

subsequent narrower statements or environmental

analyses (such as regional or basinwide program

statements or ultimately site-specific

statements) incorporating by reference the

general discussions and concentrating solely on

the issues specific to the statement

subsequently prepared.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.28; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20. An examination

of Appendix C to the 1984 EIS reveals carrying capacity to be a

flexible concept intended to assist the County in its management of

the lake. See Admin. R., Vol. 8 ("Appendix C") at 80. Although

the size and scope of the proposed Scorpion Bay Marina is larger

than the recreational plans contemplated by the 1984 EIS and 1997

EA, the 2007 EA explains that those changes are best understood in

the context of the extraordinary population growth in Maricopa

County and the attendant increase in demand for water-based

recreational opportunities. See Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final

EA") at 3-4. To that end, the EA recognizes that the County’s

management oversight, with the benefit of additional marina

facilities, would provide the best avenue to mitigate the

cumulative effects of the anticipated increase in watercraft using

the lake. Id. at 39. Accordingly, the EA calls for the County to

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7

 Although the 1984 Water Control Study utilized the methodology

of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to estimate the lake’s average

carrying capacity, the proposed Water Recreation Opportunity Spectrum

study is one of a number of tools available to assist in the

development and implementation of a recreational management plan.

See Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at H-99.

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initiate a Water Recreation Opportunity Spectrum7 study "within one

year of commencement of the marina's operation" to "establish a

numeric range for the purpose of identifying trigger points for

actions and resources." Id. at 38, H-105. Once the County

"determines it is appropriate," those actions would be "implemented

to provide for a safe and enjoyable experience for the water users,

while protecting sensitive natural resources." Id. The EA

further provides that "[a] letter agreement between the County and

[BOR] would be executed to ensure this study and subsequent

management strategies are developed and implemented in a timely

manner, as appropriate." Id. at 38.

Plaintiffs accuse BOR of "circular logic" for concluding that

the marina facilities would alleviate the feeling of overcrowding

by giving the County more resources to carry out its management

responsibilities. Mot. (doc. # 12) at 16-17. According to

Plaintiffs, "if [Scorpion Bay Marina] causes boating use to exceed

the safe carrying capacity of [Lake Pleasant], then the [] project

is not needed." Id. at 8. These arguments make the unwarranted

assumption that the County will shirk the management

responsibilities assigned to it years ago in the RMA contract with

BOR, and fail to maintain safe conditions on the lake. See Admin.

R., Vol. 1 ("RMA") at 002, 005, 006, 014. However, it was

undisputed at oral argument that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s

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8

 According to the EA, and as the parties acknowledged at the

hearing, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office patrols the lake for

security purposes. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that

the Maricopa County Sheriff is an independent, separately elected

County officer.

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Office patrols the lake for security reasons. (doc. # 38); see

also Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at 41. Plaintiffs suggest

that the County’s pecuniary interest in concession income from the

new marina will be a disincentive to its maintenance of safe

boating conditions,8 but the EA makes clear that concession income

will actually help fund the County’s operations at LPRP. See id.

at 44. BOR's decisions and reasoning do not strike the Court as

arbitrary or capricious, and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any

reason to believe that the County will not maintain safe conditions

at the lake if a new marina is built.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that BOR should have conducted

a carrying capacity study and determined the relevant information

prior to approving the proposed plan, rather than simply rely on

the County's management responsibility and obligation to conduct

studies in the future. Mot. (doc. # 12) at 8-9. Plaintiffs rely

principally on National Parks & Conservation Association v.

Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001), in which the court reviewed

the National Park Service's failure to issue an EIS for a proposal

to increase cruise-ship traffic in Alaska's Glacier Bay National

Park and Preserve. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's

decision to uphold the Park Service's FONSI, because the Park

Service had proposed to conduct the relevant studies after, not

before, the implementation of the proposed action. Nat'l Parks &

Conservation Ass'n, 241 F.3d at 725-26. Among the impacts not

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adequately investigated in the EA was the proposal's effect on the

habitat of Glacier Bay's endangered species such as the humpback

whale. See id. at 732. Although the Park Service's EA

acknowledged the certainty of these adverse effects, it described

their intensity as "unknown," and instead proposed a post hoc

monitoring program as a means of obtaining the necessary

information and implementing mitigation measures after the fact. 

Id. at 732-36. The Ninth Circuit rejected this approach as

"ha[ving] the process exactly backwards," noting that "[t]he point

[of NEPA] is . . . that the 'hard look' must be taken before, not

after, the environmentally threatening actions are put into

effect." Id. at 733.

Plaintiffs contend that BOR, like Park Services, by not

conducting a carrying capacity study before issuing its FONSI,

failed to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of

the proposed Scorpion Bay Marina. The Court disagrees. National

Parks is distinguishable from the present case in two important

important respects-- most notably that the context of the action

involved in the present case is significantly different from the

context involved in National Parks.

Plaintiffs claim that NEPA does not contemplate a “sliding

scale” approach that varies by context. See Reply (doc. # 34) at

9. Whatever label Plaintiffs would ascribe to its approach, the

Council on Environmental Quality clearly advises federal agencies,

in assessing the significance of environmental consequences, to

consider the "context" of the proposed action and the "intensity"

of its anticipated results. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27.

[T]he significance of an action must be

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9

 Bald eagle nesting in an area of LPRP was addressed in the

1984 EIS and more recently in the 2007 EA, see Admin. R., Vol. 3

("2007 Final EA") at 58, and Plaintiffs have claimed that BOR did not

take a "hard look" at the impact of the proposed marina on the bald

eagles or other endangered species populations in the park.

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analyzed in several contexts such as society as

a whole (human, national), the affected region,

the affected interests, and the locality.

Significance varies with the setting of the

proposed action. For instance, in the case of

a site-specific action, significance would

usually depend upon the effects in the locale

rather than in the world as a whole. Both

short- and long-term effects are relevant.

Id. Unlike Glacier Bay, Lake Pleasant is not a UNESCO designated

international biosphere.9 See BOR's Resp. (doc. # 25) at 11-12;

MP's Resp. (doc. # 32) at 13-15; Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n,

241 F.3d at 725. It is a manmade lake that, since its creation by

the New Waddell Dam, has been considered as a site for Countymanaged water-based recreational plans such as those reflected in

the 2007 EA, 1997 EA, and 1984 EIS. In this context, the Court

cannot say that BOR did not adequately consider the environmental

consequences of the proposed Marina simply because a new carrying

capacity was not conducted.

Second, in National Parks, the reason the court indicated that

it was so critical for the studies to be carried out by the agency

prior to taking action was that the EA did not provide sufficient

information about the action's anticipated effects on the humpback

whale habitat in the bay. Id. at 733-36. That uncertainty should

have been considered as a factor in assessing both the intensity of

the environmental impact of the proposed action, see 40 C.F.R. §

1508.27(b)(5), as well as the efficacy of the Park Service's

proposed mitigation measure of post-action monitoring. Nat'l Parks

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& Conservation Ass'n, 241 F.3d at 733-36. In the present case,

Plaintiffs have not claimed that any uncertainty surrounding the

issue of the lake's carrying capacity would affect sensitive

biological resources; rather, it is a matter primarily related to

safety and overcrowding. In view of the County's existing

contractual responsibilities for management at LPRP under the

Recreation Management Agreement, see Admin. R., Vol. 1 ("RMA") at

002, 005, 006, 014, and BOR's commitment to obtain a letter

agreement from the County to ensure that studies and management

strategies "are developed and implemented in a timely manner," see

Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at 38, the EA has demonstrated

reasonably developed mitigation measures that would render the

environmental impact of the new marina so minor as to not warrant

an EIS or a carrying capacity study prior to the issuance of the

FONSI. See Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n, 241 F.3d at 733-36.

Ultimately, BOR determined that, due to the growing population

in northwestern Maricopa County and increasing demand for waterbased recreation, overcrowding at Lake Pleasant could occur with or

without the addition of a new marina, and decided that a more

effective method of dealing with overcrowding would be through

proper management rather than limiting recreational development. 

Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("FONSI") at 4. Although a new carrying capacity

study has not been performed, the EA provides sufficient

information regarding the number of public boat ramps, park

visitors, and daily watercraft counts, as well as an estimate of

the expected increase in daily watercraft counts that would be

attributable to the new marina at full build-out. As such, the

Court is satisfied that BOR took the necessary "hard look" at the

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environmental consequences of the proposed Scorpion Bay Marina, and

did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner by issuing the

FONSI without first conducting an updated carrying capacity study. 

There is no requirement under NEPA that an agency must carry out

every conceivable study before action may be taken, see Jicarilla

Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1973); cf.

Brady v. FERC, 416 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.)

(finding that FERC's authorization of a marina expansion in spite

of carrying capacity concerns was not arbitrary or capricious,

because "the concept of 'carrying capacity' does not present the

sort of bright-line limit that would mandate a particular

finding"), and therefore BOR's decision is not arbitrary or

capricious.

ii. Overestimation of Surface Area; Underestimation of 

 Daily Watercraft Counts

In Plaintiffs’ view, the carrying capacity problem is further

exacerbated by BOR’s alleged overestimation of the usable surface

area of the lake and underestimation of daily watercraft counts. 

Mot. (doc. # 12) at 14-17. Plaintiffs argue that the EA's

estimates of the lake's low and peak usable surface area do not

account for unusable acreage occasioned by irregular shorelines and

shallow water/"no wake" zones. Id. at 14-15. Plaintiffs also

complain that the EA inadequately explains BOR's decision to ignore

evidence in the administrative record that, on the weekend of July

4, 2006, over 3,000 boats were on the lake. Id. at 15. 

The Court does not share Plaintiffs' concern that BOR has been

arbitrary or capricious in its consideration of these issues. 

Although lacking in mathematical certitude, the EA does acknowledge

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that "[t]he area open to watercraft use is somewhat less [than

estimated], adjusting for unusable boating areas (e.g., shallow

areas, small coves, etc.)." Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at

31. Similar observations were also made in the discussion of

carrying capacity in Appendix C to the 1984 EIS. BOR stated there

that "[t]he actual capacity of Lake Pleasant would be somewhat

lower than ha[d] been calculated as adjustments for unusable

boating areas of the lake ha[d] not been made (e.g. small coves too

narrow to navigate and areas of extremely shallow water). See

Admin. R., Vol. 8 ("Appendix C") at 80. The Court is satisfied

that BOR has given these issues adequate consideration as similarly

stated in the EA. Even if it were physically possible to do so,

the Court does not believe that BOR is obligated to obtain more

precise measurements for the lake's usable surface area to avoid

the appearance of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.

With regard to daily boat counts, the EA estimates watercraft

counts at a daily average and peak season daily average of 645 and

1,660 respectively. Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at 32. 

Plaintiffs claim that the latter figure should be much higher,

relying on an email from a person claiming to have received

information from a Maricopa County Sheriff officer that "on the

[Saturday] during the fourth of july [sic] weekend, it would be

safe to say over 3,000 (watercraft) on [sic] the lake." See Admin.

R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at H-26; Mot. (doc. # 12) at 15. As

Marina Partners points out, BOR is not obliged to rely on a secondhand account of an unknown source's estimate. See Resp. (doc. #

32) at 12. More importantly, the EA not only acknowledges the

unique nature of the peak demand experienced on the fourth of July

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weekend, but explains the difficulty of obtaining exact daily

watercraft counts due to the County's monthly reporting cycle. See

Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at H-30. Quite simply, there

is no basis to find that BOR's determination of average daily

watercraft counts was arbitrary or capricious.

iii. Consideration of Alternatives

Plaintiffs also argue that BOR did not give meaningful

consideration to alternatives to the proposed marina. Mot. (doc. #

12) at 17-20. Meaningful consideration of alternatives is part of

the required analysis under NEPA. Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel,

852 F.2d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). 

Plaintiffs complain that BOR's consideration of the "no action"

alternative was not meaningful, because BOR did not analyze current

waiting times by visitors or whether those times are acceptable to

the lake's visitors. Mot. (doc. # 12) at 17-18. Plaintiffs also

contend that BOR should have considered an alternative proposed by

Plaintiffs Pensus Group, LLC and David Maule-Ffinch, which involved

a build-out of wet slips and dry storage space at Pleasant Harbor

Marina. Id. at 18. Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that the only

other alternative considered by BOR-- a marina adding 196 fewer

boats and deemed to have essentially the same environmental impact

as the proposed marina-- does not constitute a meaningful

alternative. Id. at 18 (citing Muckelshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 1999)).

With regard to alternative marina plans, BOR argues that it

was not obligated to consider unfeasible alternatives, and notes

that "[t]he County and its concessionaire ha[d] determined a marina

with capacity less than what [wa]s proposed under [the alternative

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considered in the EA] would not be economically viable." BOR’s

Resp. (doc. # 25) at 10 (citing Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at

1189); Admin. R., Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at 17. In response,

Plaintiffs argue that BOR has impermissibly identified the project

objectives in unreasonably narrow terms by deferring to the County

and concessionaire's determination of economic feasability, and

argue that BOR's resulting consideration of a nearly identical

marina plan with the essentially same environmental impact as the

proposed marina is inadequate. Mot. (doc. # 12) at 18-19 (citing

Citizens against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (9th

Cir. 1997)).

The Court finds that the EA sufficiently considers the "no

action" alternative. Although the EA does not set forth exact

figures for the waiting times at the public boat ramps or poll

results regarding visitors' satisfaction with the waiting times,

the EA's conclusions regarding increased waiting times under the

"no action" option are reasonable in light of the increased

visitation numbers that have been documented. See Admin. R., Vol.

3 ("2007 Final EA") at 8. Plaintiffs may feel that BOR gave the

"no action" option a shorter discussion than others, but the mere

fact that an alternative is given brief treatment does not

necessarily indicate that it was not evaluated seriously. See

Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d 1181.

Moreover, while BOR did not consider the alternatives proposed

by Plaintiffs during the public review and comment period--

specifically, the expansion of Pleasant Harbor Marina-- it is

apparent that BOR did not find those options feasible in light of

the EA's statement of purpose and need for the marina. Plaintiffs

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argue that BOR unreasonably eliminated other alternatives from

further consideration by relying on the County's statement of need

and economic viability. However, the Court sees nothing arbitrary

and capricious in BOR's doing so, as the EA makes clear that the

proposed marina and associated revenue stream is necessary to

assist the County in its management of the park. See Admin. R.,

Vol. 3 ("2007 Final EA") at 35-38. Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated at this stage any reasonable

probability of success on the merits of their claim that BOR did

not adequately consider alternatives to the proposed marina.

2. Possibility of Irreparable Harm

 Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' suggestion to the contrary, "there

is no presumption of irreparable harm in procedural violations of

environmental statutes." See Save Our Sonoran, Inc., 408 F.3d at

1124-25; Mot. (doc. # 12) at 6. Plaintiffs argue that in the

presence of strong NEPA claims, more liberal standards would favor

the issuance of an injunction. Mot. (doc. # 6) at 6. However, for

the reasons explained in Part III.B.1, supra, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any reasonable probability of

success on any of the NEPA claims raised in their motion, or

established a sufficient likelihood of environmental injury that

can be traced to the procedural violations alleged in their motion. 

See Save Our Sonoran, Inc., 408 F.3d at 1125. Because Plaintiffs

have not made a strong showing of the probability of success on the

merits of their NEPA claims, or the possibility of irreparable harm

that would result in the absence of a preliminary injunction, the

motion (doc. # 12) will be denied. Therefore,

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IT IS ORDERED that Intervenor-Defendant Lake Pleasant Marina

Partners, LLC's motion in limine (doc. # 35) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. In reviewing Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary

injunction, the Court considers Dr. Haas' testimony for the limited

purpose of explaining technical terms and complex subject matter

relating to the Water Recreation Opportunity Spectrum, but not for

any other purpose, including his opinions regarding the NEPA

planning process.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary

injunction (doc. # 12) is DENIED.

DATED this 18th day of May, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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