Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00279/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00279-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY WIMBERLY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFERY BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-0279 KJM KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, in this civil rights action 

originally filed in Sacramento County Superior Court on November 3, 2015 (Case No. 34-2015-

00186294). The case was removed to federal court on February 11, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) The 

notice of removal was filed by three of the seven named defendants, specifically, Beard, Harris, 

and Stainer, who paid the filing fee. On February 16, 2016, defendants Beard, Harris, and Stainer

filed a motion for screening and request for extension of time to respond to plaintiff’s complaint. 

(ECF No. 4.)

On February 24, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to state court,

1 which 

was filed by the clerk on February 29, 2016. (ECF No. 7.) On March 2, 2016, defendants

 

1 Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is afforded the benefit of the prison mailbox rule. See

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

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Brager, Malmendier, and Rackley joined in defendant Beard, Harris, and Stainer’s notice of 

removal, and consented to the jurisdiction of this court. (ECF No. 8.) On March 7, 2016, 

defendants filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion to remand. (ECF No. 9.) On March 11, 2016, 

plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ opposition. (ECF No. 10.) Currently pending before the 

court is plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court, and defendants’ motion for extension 

of time to respond to the complaint.

Legal Standards Governing Removal

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), removal is appropriate for “any civil action brought in a 

State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction . . . .” 

Removal statutes are strictly construed. See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 

1064 (9th Cir. 1979). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 

removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction falls on the party invoking removal.” Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 

of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citation omitted).

As a general rule, all defendants in the state court action must join in the petition for 

removal. United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Although there are certain exceptions to this rule of unanimity, “[w]here fewer than all the 

defendants have joined in a removal action, the removing party has the burden under section 

1446(a) to explain affirmatively the absence of any co-defendants in the notice for removal.” 

Prize Frize v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999), superseded by statute on 

other grounds as recognized in Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 

2006) (class action) (citations omitted); cf., Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193, 

n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that nominal, unknown, fraudulently joined, or improperly served 

defendants need not join in a petition for removal).

Here, plaintiff asserts that remand to state court is proper because (1) this court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, and (2) defendants’ removal to federal court 

was procedurally defective. (See ECF Nos. 7 & 10.)

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Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiff moves to remand on the ground that there is no federal jurisdiction over the case 

because his claims arise under state law. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) Defendants oppose the motion, 

arguing that plaintiff’s suit includes several separate and distinct claims for violations of the 

United States Constitution. (ECF No. 9 at 2.)

“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be 

removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 

(1987). A federal court has original jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence 

of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides 

that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s 

properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392 (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). “The rule makes plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal 

jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. In other words, a plaintiff may defeat 

removal by choosing not to plead any federal claims. Id. at 399. The existence of federal 

jurisdiction is determined by the complaint at the time of removal. Libhart, 592 F.2d at 1065.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants violated plaintiff’s rights, and prison policy,

by forcing plaintiff to use the United States mail to deliver his prison grievances to the third level 

appeals branch in Sacramento, California, thereby requiring plaintiff to personally incur the cost 

of postage when seeking to exhaust administrative remedies at the third level of review.

2

 See

ECF No. 1-1 at 7-15. Plaintiff, currently an inmate at Folsom State Prison, asserts that inmates at 

other institutions have been spared the cost of mailing their grievances to the third level appeals 

branch, and have instead been permitted to submit their grievances to the appeals coordinator at 

their respective institutions for processing to the third level of review. Id. at 11-12, 49-51.

 

2

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that prisoners exhaust “such administrative 

remedies as are available” before commencing a suit challenging prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a). In California, CDCR regulations require that a grievance be pursued through the third 

level of review before it is deemed “exhausted.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b) (“all appeals 

are subject to a third level of review, as described in section 3084.7, before administrative 

remedies are deemed exhausted”).

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Specifically, plaintiff contends that in In Re Brodheim, Case No. FCR219566 (Aug. 8, 

2005), the Solano County Superior Court issued an order requiring the appeals coordinator at 

California Medical Facility, and/or appeals coordinators throughout the state, to accept and 

process third level appeals (as opposed to requiring inmates to submit their grievances through 

United States mail).

3

 See ECF No. 1-1 at 10-12, 49. Plaintiff alleges that over the past ten years,

defendants have refused to comply with the Solano County Superior Court order, and continue to

require plaintiff to use the United States mail, and to personally incur the cost of postage, in order 

to submit his administrative grievances to the third level of review. See id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges 

that his grievances have been improperly denied, that he has been unable to exhaust his 

administrative remedies because he cannot afford the cost of postage, and that defendants have 

mislead plaintiff and other inmates regarding the need to submit grievances through the United 

States mail, when they should instead be able to submit grievances directly to the appeals 

coordinator for processing to the third level of review.

Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth nineteen causes of action, including a number of state law 

negligence and intentional tort claims. See ECF No. 1-1 at 23-56. Throughout the complaint, 

plaintiff repeatedly cites to the United States Constitution and alleges that defendants’ actions 

violated his constitutional rights. While plaintiff argues that all of his claims arise under state law 

because he is attempting to enforce compliance with the Solano County Superior Court order, see

ECF No. 7 at 2, the complaint also alleges that defendants’ failure to comply with the state court 

order violates plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitution, see ECF No. 1-1 at 42-56. 

Although plaintiff does not cite the federal civil rights statute,4he brings several causes of action 

based on the United States Constitution. Specifically, in Claims 15-19, plaintiff alleges that 

 

3

Plaintiff appears to rely on a Prison Legal News article summarizing the Solano County 

Superior Court’s decision in In Re Brodheim. See ECF No. 1-1 at 79. The article indicates that 

the superior court ordered California Medical Facility to comply with “the unambiguous language 

of section 3084.2(e), requiring the appeals coordinator to accept and process all formal level 

appeals, including the third level.” Id. The author concludes: “Since CDC must treat all 

prisoners equally, the practical effect of the order is to apply statewide.” Id.

4

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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defendants, acting under color of state law, violated plaintiff’s Due Process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and right of 

access to the courts under the First Amendment. See ECF No. 1-1 at 42-56. A federal court has 

subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Plaintiff could have limited his claims to state laws, rules, and regulations in order to 

avoid federal jurisdiction, see Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399, but did not choose to do so. Instead, in 

addition to his state law claims, plaintiff specifically alleged violations of his rights under the 

First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and set them out as separate 

and distinct claims for relief. See ECF No. 1-1 at 42-56. Thus, it is clear that this action satisfies 

the requirement for original federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, while 

plaintiff’s state law claims may be considered pursuant to the court’s exercise of supplemental 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This case therefore meets the threshold criteria for removal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Procedural Defects in Notice of Removal

Plaintiff asserts that defendants’ notice of removal is defective in that not all served 

defendants consented to removal. (ECF Nos. 7 & 10.) Defendants argue that remand to state 

court is unwarranted because the procedural defect has been cured. (ECF No. 9 at 1-2.)

When there is more than one defendant in the action, all defendants who have been 

“properly . . . served in the action” must unanimously agree to join in or consent to the removal.

Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956-957 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1193 

n.1 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986); 

United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 2002). This is 

commonly referred to as the unanimity requirement. Lewis v. City of Fresno, 627 F. Supp. 2d 

1179, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Failure to comply with the unanimity requirement renders the 

removal procedurally defective. See Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1193 n.1. However, if the unanimity 

requirement is not met when the notice of removal is filed, the district court may allow the 

removing defendants to cure the defect by obtaining joinder of all defendants prior to the entry of 

judgment. Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956–57.

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Plaintiff’s complaint names seven defendants: Beard, Harris, Stainer, Grannis, 

Malmendier, Brager, and Rackley. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) The notice of removal was filed by 

defendants Beard, Harris, and Stainer on February 11, 2016. The removal notice states that 

defendants Beard, Harris, and Stainer were served on January 27, 2016, and that as of February 

11, 2016, Beard, Harris, and Stainer were the only defendants who had been served. (ECF No. 1 

at 2.) However, plaintiff subsequently provided evidence that defendants Malmendier, Brager, 

and Rackley had also been served on January 27, 2016. (See ECF No. 10 at 4-12.)

Because Malmendier, Brager, and Rackley were served on January, 27, 2016, and did not 

join in the notice of removal filed on February 11, 2016, the notice of removal did not satisfy the 

unanimity requirement. However, defendants Malmendier, Brager, and Rackley joined the notice 

of removal on March 2, 2016. (ECF No. 8.) While plaintiff is correct that Malmendier, Brager, 

and Rackley’s consent to removal was untimely in that it was not obtained within thirty days of 

service of the complaint, the district court may allow the removing defendants to cure such a

defect by obtaining joinder of all defendants prior to the entry of judgment. See Destfino, 630 

F.3d at 956–57. Accordingly, because defendant Malmendier, Brager, and Rackley’s March 2, 

2016 joinder cured the procedural defect, and no judgment has been entered in the instant case, 

the court finds that defendants’ untimely consent does not warrant remand to state court. See

Soliman v. Philip Morris Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 970-971 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] procedural defect 

existing at the time of removal but cured prior to entry of judgment does not warrant reversal and 

remand of the matter to state court.”) (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).

The court also notes that defendant Grannis has not consented to removal. (See ECF No. 

1.) While the general rule is that all defendants in a state action must join in the petition for 

removal, this rule applies only to defendants properly joined and served in the action. See

Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1193, n.1 (citing Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n., 731 F.2d 1423, 

1429 (9th Cir. 1984)) (a party not served need not be joined in a petition for removal). It does not 

appear from the record before the court that defendant Grannis has been served in the instant case. 

Because participation by unserved defendants is not required, id., defendant Grannis’ failure to 

consent to removal does not warrant remand to state court.

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Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Defendants’ motion for screening and extension of time (ECF No. 4) is granted. The 

court will screen the complaint in a separate order. Defendants will be granted thirty (30) days 

from the date of service of the court’s screening order to file an answer or otherwise respond to 

the complaint.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that:

Plaintiff’s motion for remand (ECF No. 7) be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 26, 2016

/wimb2079.remand.fr

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