Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01810/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01810-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Linda Theresa Bradley, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 11-1810-PHX-NVW (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Linda Theresa Bradley filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 15,

2011, and an amended petition on November 28, 2011, challenging her convictions in

Maricopa County Superior Court for burglary and a probation violation, and the trial court’s

imposition of prison terms totaling 8 years. She raises four claims in her amended petition:

(1) violations of her rights to due process and a fair trial by the use of vindictive prosecution

practices; (2) the ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (3) trial court errors regarding prior

convictions and the consideration of the evidence; and (4) a breach of the plea agreement in

the consideration of prior convictions. Respondents contend that Bradley’s amended petition

was untimely filed, and alternatively that her claims are procedurally defaulted. For the

reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Bradley’s amended petition be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

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BACKGROUND

On April 7, 2008, following Bradley’s entry of a guilty plea in two separate criminal

causes, one alleging second-degree burglary and the other a probation violation, the trial

court sentenced Bradley to an aggravated seven-year prison term for the burglary, to be

served consecutively to the one-year term imposed for the probation violation (Doc. 13, Exh

P-Q). Over a year later, on April 28, 2009, Bradley filed a pro se habeas petition in state

court arguing that the trial court’s act of sentencing her to an aggravated term violated her

sixth amendment right to a trial by jury. The trial court construed it as a petition for postconviction relief, and on November 4, 2009, the trial court denied the post-conviction relief

on the grounds that it was untimely filed because over 90 days had passed from the April 7

sentencing. The trial court also ruled that Bradley’s claim lacked merit (Doc. 6-1).

Bradley’s motion for reconsideration was denied on October 11, 2010 (Doc. 13, Exh CC,

DD). After Bradley failed at three attempts to file a proper petition for review, the court of

appeals dismissed the matter on November 16, 2010, and the supreme court denied review

on March 31, 2011 (Id., Exh EE, FF). Bradley filed her federal petition on September 12,

2011, and an amended petition on November 25, 2011 (Docs. 1, 6).

DISCUSSION

A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is required

to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during the time in which a

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

If a defendant pleads guilty, the first post-conviction proceeding is considered a form of

direct review within the meaning of section 2244(d)(1)(A), thus delaying the start of the oneyear limitations period until after the 90-day period during which a defendant could have

petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari following the Arizona

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Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for review. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716-17

(9th Cir. 2007).

Bradley’s conviction became final on July 7, 2008. This is the date 90 days after

sentencing when the time expired for filing a notice of post-conviction relief. Therefore,

Bradley was required to file her federal petition by July 7, 2009, and her petition, filed over

2 years after the conclusion of the period of limitations, is untimely, absent any tolling of

this period. The filing of a post-conviction petition within the period of limitations does not

toll the period unless the pleading is “properly filed” within the meaning of section

2244(d)(2). The trial court ruled that Bradley’s state habeas petition was untimely because

it was not filed within 90 days of the date of sentencing, as required by Rule 32.4(a) of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore it was not properly filed. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005). As a result, statutory tolling cannot apply to any

portion of the entire 2-year period, beginning on April 28, 2009, when Bradley filed the

petition, until June 29, 2011, when the 90-day period ended during which Bradley could have

petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review of the trial court’s March 31, 2011

ruling. Id. “When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of

the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id., 544 U.S. at 414. In this case, the state court’s

rejection of Bradley’s petition as untimely means that it “must be treated as improperly filed,

or as though it never existed,” such that “for purposes of section 2244(d), the pendency of

that petition did not toll the limitations period.” Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th

Cir. 2011).

In addition, Bradley has not demonstrated that she is entitled to equitable tolling. She

has not established that she had been “pursuing her rights diligently,” and that “some

extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. , 130 S.Ct.

2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19 and n. 8). She makes a conclusory

statement in her motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of her post-conviction

petition that her failure to timely file the petition “was without fault on the defendant’s part.”

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She gives no explanation as to why it was not her fault, except an allegation that from April

23, 2008 until July 1, 2008, she was housed 23 hours a day in the mandatory intake process

at ASPC/Perryville, with no access to “necessary items to begin [the] appeal process.”

Assuming what Bradley says is true, that may explain a three-month delay in filing the

petition, but it does not explain why she took no action during the following seven months

by failing to file anything in the State court. In other words, she has not demonstrated that

any alleged lack of access prevented her from filing a timely notice, once that lack of access

had ended. She also alleges in this motion that she was not provided “sufficient timely, or

adequate notification of all related hearings.” A review of the record indicates that there

were no hearings of which Bradley would have needed notification in order to timely file her

petition. She also includes in her amended petition a letter to the trial court in which she

seeks to explain the untimely filing of her motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order

denying her post-conviction relief. The letter, however, does not give any explanation about

the untimely filing of her initial post-conviction petition. Bradley also argues that she was

unaware of the 90-day limitation on filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief until she read

the trial court’s order ruling her petition untimely. The record belies Bradley’s argument.

The Maricopa County Superior Court docket indicates that in 2007 and 2008, in two separate

criminal cases, Bradley signed a document entitled “Notice of Rights of Review After

Conviction and Procedure,” which explained in detail her right to post-conviction relief, with

the 90-day deadline indicated in bold print. The Court agrees with Respondents that absent

an explanation from Bradley as to why (1) she filed her post-conviction petition in an

untimely manner; (2) she filed her motion for reconsideration in an untimely manner; and (3)

she failed to file a substantially compliant petition for review in the court of appeals, she is

not entitled to equitable tolling.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized an actual innocence exception to the limitations bar.

Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011). To the extent that Bradley is somehow

claiming actual innocence, the Court finds the claim is without merit and does not justify

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equitable tolling. First, Bradley does not argue that the plea agreement she entered into was

in any way executed involuntarily or unknowingly on her part. In addition, she cites

repeatedly to the police report, which is not new evidence, and which includes eyewitness

and police identification of her at the scene of the burglary, as somehow supporting her claim

of actual innocence. Bradley has cited no authority and the Court is unaware of any that

would support extending the actual innocence exception to the facts of this case.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Linda Theresa Bradley’s Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 6).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 25th day of October, 2012.

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