Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02845/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02845-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH RICHARD SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. TAM BUI; et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-2845 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

INTRODUCTION

Joseph Richard Scott, formerly an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se civil

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint is now before the court for initial review

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

BACKGROUND

Scott's complaint alleged the following about medical care he received while in custody

at San Quentin State Prison: Scott received what he thought was a spider bite on May 19, 2005.

Although he made numerous requests for medical care and although his arm became very swollen,

he was not allowed to see a doctor until several days later. He was seen by Dr. Bui on May 24, and

Dr. Bui told a nurse to give him a shot of some kind of medicine. Scott did receive some

medicine, but a medical slip was discarded into the trash. Despite receiving shots for his arm

problem, the arm continued to cause him pain and continued to swell. On May 28, he was seen by
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Dr. Bui and another doctor; they sent him to an emergency room in a hospital in Novato. He was

treated at the hospital, where he remained for seven days. When his wound was drained at the

hospital, "a river of pus and poison flowed out." Complaint, p. 9. He received antibiotics and

further treatment in the hospital. He then was returned to San Quentin, where his medicine arrived

two days late and he was deprived of a scheduled dressing change by unidentified persons. He

alleged that he was "filing this suit due to serious malpractice/neglect by unprofessional and

irresponsible person[s] here at San Quentin." Id. He seeks money damages. In his complaint,

Scott alleged that he did not exhaust administrative remedies and was not required to do so

"because a criminal act was committed against me. So, no administrative process is required by

law ('medical malpractice')." Id. at 2.

After he filed his complaint, Scott sent a letter informing the court that he was to be

paroled on August 12, 2005.

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The complaint has two problems. The first problem with the complaint is that Scott did not

exhaust administrative remedies before filing the complaint. "No action shall be brought with
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Despite Scott's assertion otherwise, the requirement

that a prisoner exhaust his administrative remedies is not excused when an inmate complains of

criminal conduct or medical malpractice. Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is mandatory.

Porter v. Nussel, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5

(2001). Even when a prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money

damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id. at 741. The State of California provides its

prisoners and parolees the right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision, action,

condition or policy perceived by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." See Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this

system, a prisoner or parolee must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal

resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal

to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the California

Department of Corrections. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal.

1997). Scott's concession that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this

action permits the dismissal of this action. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.

2003) ("prisoner's concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, so long as no

exception to exhaustion applies"). The fact that Scott was paroled after the complaint was filed

does not excuse the exhaustion requirement because parolees, like prisoners, have administrative

remedies available to them. Section 3084.1(a) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations

provides for administrative appeals by "[a]ny prisoner or parolee." Because Scott has

administrative remedies available to him as a parolee, and affirmatively pled that he did not exhaust

the administrative remedies available to him, this action cannot be brought in federal court at this

time. The action must be dismissed without prejudice to Scott filing a new action after he exhausts

his administrative remedies. 

The second problem with the complaint is that Scott has not adequately plead a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute under which most prisoners proceed. A claim for
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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inadequate medical care in prison may be pursued under § 1983, but only where that care or lack

of care have violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In the

medical care context, a prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must allege both (1) a

serious medical need and (2) deliberate indifference to that need by prison officials. See

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992). A medical need is serious if the

failure to treat the inmate's condition could result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain." Id. at 1059 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).

A defendant acts with deliberate indifference when he both knows of and disregards a serious

medical need. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Scott's complaint specifically alleged that defendants were negligent and engaged in

malpractice in their care for his medical problem. However, negligence is not actionable under

§ 1983. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d

1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). If Scott wants to pursue his medical care claim in federal court, he

must (after exhausting administrative remedies) file a new complaint that alleges that each

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs if he believes that to be

true. This normally would be a pleading problem that could be cured by an amended complaint;

however, leave to amend will not be permitted because even if an amended complaint was filed,

the exhaustion problem discussed in the preceding paragraph would remain as a bar to this action.

If, instead of attempting to pursue a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, Scott wants

to pursue a negligence claim – which is considerably easier to prove – he should dismiss this

action and file an action in state court. Of course, he may need to comply with the California Tort

Claims Act and present his claims to the State Board of Control before he files an action in state

court, but that is something he needs to determine and this court will not determine for him. 

CONCLUSION

The complaint discloses on its face that it is premature because Scott did not exhaust

administrative remedies available to him before bringing this action. The complaint is
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISMISSED without leave to amend and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice to Scott

filing a new action for an Eighth Amendment violation after he exhausts his administrative

remedies and without prejudice to him filing an action in state court. The in forma pauperis

application is DENIED. (Docket # 2.) The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9,___, 2005 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH RICHARD SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. TAM BUI; et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-2845 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

INTRODUCTION

Joseph Richard Scott, formerly an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se civil

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint is now before the court for initial review

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

BACKGROUND

Scott's complaint alleged the following about medical care he received while in custody

at San Quentin State Prison: Scott received what he thought was a spider bite on May 19, 2005.

Although he made numerous requests for medical care and although his arm became very swollen,

he was not allowed to see a doctor until several days later. He was seen by Dr. Bui on May 24, and

Dr. Bui told a nurse to give him a shot of some kind of medicine. Scott did receive some

medicine, but a medical slip was discarded into the trash. Despite receiving shots for his arm

problem, the arm continued to cause him pain and continued to swell. On May 28, he was seen by
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Dr. Bui and another doctor; they sent him to an emergency room in a hospital in Novato. He was

treated at the hospital, where he remained for seven days. When his wound was drained at the

hospital, "a river of pus and poison flowed out." Complaint, p. 9. He received antibiotics and

further treatment in the hospital. He then was returned to San Quentin, where his medicine arrived

two days late and he was deprived of a scheduled dressing change by unidentified persons. He

alleged that he was "filing this suit due to serious malpractice/neglect by unprofessional and

irresponsible person[s] here at San Quentin." Id. He seeks money damages. In his complaint,

Scott alleged that he did not exhaust administrative remedies and was not required to do so

"because a criminal act was committed against me. So, no administrative process is required by

law ('medical malpractice')." Id. at 2.

After he filed his complaint, Scott sent a letter informing the court that he was to be

paroled on August 12, 2005.

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The complaint has two problems. The first problem with the complaint is that Scott did not

exhaust administrative remedies before filing the complaint. "No action shall be brought with
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3

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respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Despite Scott's assertion otherwise, the requirement

that a prisoner exhaust his administrative remedies is not excused when an inmate complains of

criminal conduct or medical malpractice. Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is mandatory.

Porter v. Nussel, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5

(2001). Even when a prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money

damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id. at 741. The State of California provides its

prisoners and parolees the right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision, action,

condition or policy perceived by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." See Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this

system, a prisoner or parolee must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal

resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal

to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the California

Department of Corrections. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal.

1997). Scott's concession that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this

action permits the dismissal of this action. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.

2003) ("prisoner's concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, so long as no

exception to exhaustion applies"). The fact that Scott was paroled after the complaint was filed

does not excuse the exhaustion requirement because parolees, like prisoners, have administrative

remedies available to them. Section 3084.1(a) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations

provides for administrative appeals by "[a]ny prisoner or parolee." Because Scott has

administrative remedies available to him as a parolee, and affirmatively pled that he did not exhaust

the administrative remedies available to him, this action cannot be brought in federal court at this

time. The action must be dismissed without prejudice to Scott filing a new action after he exhausts

his administrative remedies. 

The second problem with the complaint is that Scott has not adequately plead a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute under which most prisoners proceed. A claim for
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

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3

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5

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inadequate medical care in prison may be pursued under § 1983, but only where that care or lack

of care have violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In the

medical care context, a prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must allege both (1) a

serious medical need and (2) deliberate indifference to that need by prison officials. See

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992). A medical need is serious if the

failure to treat the inmate's condition could result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain." Id. at 1059 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).

A defendant acts with deliberate indifference when he both knows of and disregards a serious

medical need. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Scott's complaint specifically alleged that defendants were negligent and engaged in

malpractice in their care for his medical problem. However, negligence is not actionable under

§ 1983. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d

1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). If Scott wants to pursue his medical care claim in federal court, he

must (after exhausting administrative remedies) file a new complaint that alleges that each

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs if he believes that to be

true. This normally would be a pleading problem that could be cured by an amended complaint;

however, leave to amend will not be permitted because even if an amended complaint was filed,

the exhaustion problem discussed in the preceding paragraph would remain as a bar to this action.

If, instead of attempting to pursue a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, Scott wants

to pursue a negligence claim – which is considerably easier to prove – he should dismiss this

action and file an action in state court. Of course, he may need to comply with the California Tort

Claims Act and present his claims to the State Board of Control before he files an action in state

court, but that is something he needs to determine and this court will not determine for him. 

CONCLUSION

The complaint discloses on its face that it is premature because Scott did not exhaust

administrative remedies available to him before bringing this action. The complaint is
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISMISSED without leave to amend and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice to Scott

filing a new action for an Eighth Amendment violation after he exhausts his administrative

remedies and without prejudice to him filing an action in state court. The in forma pauperis

application is DENIED. (Docket # 2.) The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9,___, 2005 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge