Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00872/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00872-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

JESSIE J. MILLER,

Plaintiff;

vs.

BOB KING, President of

INTERNATIONAL UNION

UNITED AUTOMOBILE,

AEROSPACE, AND

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT

WORKERS OF AMERICA

Defendant.

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7:14-cv-00872-LSC

Memorandum of Opinion

Plaintiff Jessie J. Miller (“Miller”) brought this action pro se in an effort to

recover benefits owed under a strike settlement agreement. Miller argues that United

Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural ImplementWorkers ofAmerica (“UAW”)

failed to adequately represent Miller in his efforts to obtain pension benefits pursuant

to the agreement. Miller also seeks to recover unidentified additional benefits, as well 1

While Miller named UAW President Bob King as the sole defendant in this action, the 1 

complaint makes clear that Miller intended to sue UAW directly. Miller’s complaint states that

“Defendant failed to represent Plaintiff . . . as promised to its members,” and that “Defendant

settled a lawsuit that resulted in the biggest settlement ever for UAW.” Furthermore, individual

union officials cannot be held liable for breach of a union’s duty of fair representation. See, e.g.,

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FILED

 2015 Feb-17 PM 03:32

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:14-cv-00872-LSC Document 20 Filed 02/17/15 Page 1 of 18
as funds that were “misappropriated” by UAW. Before this Court is UAW’s motion

for summary judgment. (Doc. 15.) UAW asserts that federal labor law preempts

Miller’s claim for “unfair representation,” and that the claim is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations. The issues have been fully briefed and are ripe for

review. For the reasons discussed below, UAW’s motion for summary judgment is

due to be granted.

I. Background

In November 1979, Miller was hired as a maintenance and production worker

at the Elastic Stop Nut Division (“ESND”) plant in Union, New Jersey. The plant

was operated by Amerace Corporation (“Amerace”) and manufactured specialized

metal fastening devices. 

While employed at the ENSD plant, Miller was a member of UAW Local 726,

the exclusive bargaining agent for all workers at the ESND plant. In 1985, Harvard

Industries (“Harvard”) purchased the ESND plant from Amerace and attempted to

operate the plant on a non-union basis. This prompted UAW workers, including

Miller, to go on strike on April 14, 1985. UAW proceeded to file a complaint with the

National Labor Relations Board, arguing that Harvard violated the National Labor

Morris v. Local 819, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 169 F.3d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that individual

union officers are “immune from unfair representation claims”).

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Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., when it refused to negotiate with

UAW representatives. In March 1991, UAW and Harvard reached a settlement 2

agreement that ended both the six-year-long strike at the ESND plant and the related

litigation. The settlement agreement required Harvard to provide enhanced pension

benefits to certain ESND workers. 

In 1988, Miller became disabled due to a back condition and began receiving

social security benefits. Miller therefore did not return to work at the ESND plant

once the strike ended in 1991. In December 1992 and January 1993, Miller received

letters from Harvard informing him of the new pension benefits available to ESND

plant employees as a result of the settlement. Miller called Harvard upon receipt of

one of these letters and had a telephone conversation with a Harvard representative

who informed Miller that he would potentially be eligible for benefits once he reached

age 55.

In 2002, Harvard declared bankruptcy, and the ESND pension plan was taken

over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”). In 2009, Miller 3

turned 55 years old and sought his pension. He contacted former UAW officials, who

For a more detailed history of the strike and ensuing litigation, see Elastic Stop Nut Div. of 2 

Harvard Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

PBGC is a federal corporationcreated under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

3 

of 1974. PBGC commonly acts as a guarantor for underfunded pension plans.

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informed Miller that he should apply with PBGC for a pension. However, PBGC told

Miller that he was not included on the list of individuals entitled to a pension. Miller

contacted the UAW research department in June 2012, and was provided a copy of

the settlement agreement between Harvard and UAW. Miller filed this action in state

court in on April 4, 2014. The action was removed to this Court on May 9, 2014.

UAW argues that removal jurisdiction is proper because Miller’s claims are

preempted by § 9(a) of the NLRA and § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations

Act (“LMRA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

Since filing this action, Miller has started receiving pension benefits, as he states

in his response to UAW’s motion for summary judgment that “[s]tarting the pension

has been resolved due to documents submitted by the Plaintiff.” See Doc. 18, at 3.

However, Miller still argues that he is entitled to unspecified additional benefits under

the settlement agreement. According to Miller, an employee in the UAW research

department told him of a “well-protected employee handbook” distributed to all

members of the Local 726 once the strike ended. This handbook supposedly lists

additional benefits resulting from the settlement agreement. The handbook is not

before this Court. UAW has continuously stated that it is not in possession of the

handbook and, to UAW’s knowledge, the handbook does not exist. Finally, Miller

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argues that UAW has “misappropriated” settlement funds. Miller does not identify

specific funds, nor does he state how these funds were misappropriated.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the

outcome ofthe suit under the governing law.”Anderson v.Liberty Lobby,Inc., 477U.S.

242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986);see alsoAvenue CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am.,

NA, 723 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013). There is a “genuine dispute” as to a

material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. The trial judge

should not weigh the evidence but must simply determine whether there are any

genuine issues that should be resolved at trial. Id. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511.

Inconsidering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must givedeference

to the non-moving party by “considering all of the evidence and the inferences it may

yield in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender

Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d

1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)). However, “unsubstantiated assertions alone are not

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enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833

F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). In making a motion for summary judgment, “the

moving party has the burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. Although the trial courts must use caution when

granting motionsforsummary judgment, “[s]ummary judgmentprocedure is properly

regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the

Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v.Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548,

2555 (1986).

III. Discussion

A. Sources of Preemption

Miller alleges that UAW failed to adequately represent him in efforts to obtain

benefits owed under a settlement plan. UAW cites two potential sources of

preemption for this claim: (1) the federal duty of fair representation, implied under

sections 8(b) and 9(a) of the NLRA; and (2) section 301(a) of the LMRA, which

confers federal jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of collective

bargaining agreements. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)–159(a); 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

Section 9(a) of the NLRA grants unions the exclusive authority to bargain on behalf

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of all employees in a unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (stating that “[r]epresentatives

designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by a majority of the

employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive

representatives of all the employees . . . for the purposes of collective bargaining”).

Because unions are the exclusive representatives ofthe employees in a unit, the NLRA

imposes a “statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility

or discrimination to any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and

honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967);

see also id. at 182 (explaining that federal law imposes a duty of fair representation on

unions in an effort to “prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped

of traditional forms of redress” due to the fact those individuals are unable to bargain

separately from the union). 

Because federal law so thoroughly defines a union’s rights and duties when

representing its members, any state law attempting to regulate union conduct within

the concern of the federal duty of fair representation is considered preempted. See id.

at 177 (stating that a claim against a union for unfair representation was based on a

violation “of a duty grounded in federal statutes [i.e., the NLRA] and . . . federal law

therefore governs the cause of action”); see also Condon v. Local 2994, United

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Steelworkersof Am.,AFL-CIO, CLC, 683 F.2d 590, 594–95 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating that

the rights and duties of a union when representing its members is an area of law “‘so

dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must

be deemed governed by federal law’ . . . . Congress has occupied the field and closed

it to regulation’” (quoting Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 261 (1964))).4

UAW also argues that Miller’s claim implicates § 301 of the LMRA.

Specifically, UAW argues that § 301 has preemptive effect because Miller seeks

enforcement of a “contract” within the meaning of § 301. Section 301(a) of the

LMRA states that:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor

organization representing employees in an industry affecting

commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States

having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in

controversy or with regard to the citizenship of the parties.”

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has stated that § 301 preempts both (1) claims

alleging a direct violation of a duty imposed as a result of a “contract” under § 301;

and (2) claims that do not allege a breach of contract, but still require a court to

interpret the meaning of a specific provision in a collective bargaining agreement. See

This is not to suggest that there are no circumstances in which an employee may bring a

4 

state law claim against a union for refusing to adequately protect the employee’s interests. For

example, a union may be accused of violating duties that are derived solely from state law and touch

only peripherally on the concerns of the NLRA. See generally Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and

Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).

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United Steelworkers of Am., ALF-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 368 (1990)

(stating that “state-law cause[s] of action for violation of collective bargaining

agreements [are] entirely displaced by federal law under § 301” (citing Avco Corp. v.

Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968))); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220

(1985) (stating that § 301 preempts a plaintiff’s state-law claims whenever “resolution

of [the] state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an

agreement made [between employer and union] in a labor contract”).

B. The Nature of Miller’s Claim

Miller alleges in his complaint that UAW “failed to represent Plaintiff [in his

efforts to obtain benefits under the settlement agreement], assuring fair and just

treatment as promised to it[s] members in the UAW Constitution.” UAW urges the

Court to characterize Miller’s allegation as a “hybrid” § 301/duty of fair

representation (“DFR”) claim, arguing that Miller’s claim alleges a breach of the

NLRA-imposed duty of fair representation and seeks enforcement of a collective

bargaining agreement (i.e., the strike settlement) under § 301 of the LMRA. A

§ 301/DFR claim combines what was formerly two separate causes of action: breach

of a collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the LMRA and breach of the duty

of fair representation under the NLRA. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S.

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319, 328 (1989) (citing Del Costello v.Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983)).

The hybrid cause of action was developed to provide employees a method to vindicate

their rights pursuant to a union-brokered contract should the union fail to fairly

represent them during the collectively bargained-for grievance process. See Samples

v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881, 885 (11th Cir. 1985). Consequently, most

hybrid claims involve a plaintiff-employee suing both his employer and his union—the

employer is sued for breach of a § 301 “contract,” while the union is sued for breach

of the duty of fair representation during the grievance process. See id. at 886–87.

Regardless of whether the plaintiff sues both employer and union or chooses to sue

only one party, he must prove that the employer breached a “contract” under § 301

of the LMRA and that the union breached its duty of fair representation in handling

the grievance process. See id. at 886 (stating that a plaintiff must “show both that the

employer has breached the collective bargaining agreement and that the union has

breached its duty of fair representation in handling the ensuing grievance

proceeding”(citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185–86)). 

This Court agrees with UAW’s characterization of Miller’s “unfair

representation” claim as a hybrid § 301/DFR claim. First, Miller invokes the NLRAimposed duty of fair representation when asserting that UAW failed to provide him

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“fair and just treatment” in his efforts to obtain benefits from PBGC. While Miller

apparently considers the union constitution as the source of UAW’s obligation to

provide “fair and just” representation to Miller, courts have routinely refused to

recognize a separate action based on language found in a union’s constitution

whenever doing so would merely “repackage” the NLRA-imposed duty of fair

representation. See Erkins v.United Steelworkersof Am.,AFL-CIO-CLC, 723F.2d 837,

840 (11th Cir. 1984) (refusing to recognize a claim based on a duty of fair

representation implied from a union constitution, and stating that “the six-month

limitations period in § 10(b) [of the NLRA] would be rendered meaningless [if] fair

representation claims could be brought under state statute of limitations for contract

suits”); see also Brenner v. Local 514, Lewis v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers,

Warehousemen, and Helpers of Am., Local Union No. 771, 826 F.2d 1310, 1315 (3d Cir.

1987) (refusing to accept the appellant’s argument that his action for unfair

representation sounded in the union constitution when it implicated the same interests

as the NLRA’s duty of fair representation).

Furthermore, Miller’s claim inevitably requires interpretation of a “contract”

within the meaning of § 301, since Miller’s claim of unfair representation is directly

tied to his employer’s alleged breach of the strike settlement agreement. See Retail

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Clerks Ass’n Local Unions Nos. 128 and 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 541, 548

(1962) (stating that “[w]e need not decide whether or not this strike settlement is

‘collective bargaining agreement’ to hold, as we do, that it is a ‘contract’for purposes

of § 301"). 

In making the determination that Miller’s “unfair representation” claim

constitutes a hybrid § 301/DFR claim, the Court notes that some ofthe characteristics

typical of a hybrid action are not presentin this case. For example, Miller has not sued

his employer and was not forced to submit his claim for benefits to a collectively

bargained-for grievance process. Still, no matter how Miller’s claim is

characterized—whether as a straight-forward DFR claim or as a hybrid § 301/DFR

claim—it sounds in federal labor law and is therefore due to be preempted.

C. Applying § 10(b)’s Six-Month Limitations Period

Miller’s “unfair representation” claim is based at least in part on the NLRA’s

duty of fair representation; therefore the claim is due to be preempted and the sixmonth limitations period found in § 10(b) of the NLRA is to be applied. See 29 U.S.C.

5

While the Court characterizes Miller’s claim as a hybrid § 301/DFR claim, the Court need 5 

only find that the NLRA’s duty of fair representation is implicated in order to decide this case, since

characterizing Miller’s claim as either a hybrid § 301/DFR claim or a straight-forward DFR claim

triggers preemption and subjects Miller’s claimto the NLRA’s six-month limitations period. SeeDel

Costello, 462 U.S. at 151 (adopting for hybrid claims the six-month limitations period found in § 10(b)

of the NLRA).

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§ 160(b) (enacting a six-month limitations period for claims alleging unfair labor

practices under the NLRA, including claims for breach of the duty of fair

representation). The six-month limitations period found in § 10(b) of the NLRA

begins to runwhen the plaintiff, through the exercise ofreasonable diligence, “was or

should have been aware of the acts constituting the alleged violation.” See Proudfoot

v. Seafarer’s Int’l Union, 779 F.2d 1558, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Benson v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 716 F.2d 862, 864 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that the § 10(b) limitations

period begins to run “when plaintiffs either were or should have been aware of the

injury itself, not . . . when plaintiffs became aware of one of the injury’s many

manifestations” (citing NLRB v. Auto Warehousers, Inc., 571 F.2d 860, 864–65 (5th

Cir. 1978))). For hybrid § 301/DFR claims, the six-month limitations period begins

following either the alleged breach of the union-brokered contract or the violation of

the duty of fair representation, whichever occurs later. See Coppage v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 281 F.3d 1200, 1205 (11th Cir. 2002).

Here, the undisputed facts show that, by no later than June 2012, Miller knew

of the acts serving as the basis of his claim. In 2009, Miller first discovered that he was

being denied benefits under the settlement agreement. Miller stated in his deposition

that, upon learning this information, he felt that UAW failed to represent him

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properly. See Doc. 17, at 17 (“That’s when I realized [UAW] had failed to represent

me, and not only that, [UAW has] failed me in every way.”). In June 2012, Miller

requested and received a copy of the settlement agreement from UAW’s research

department. According to Miller, an individual in UAW’s research department

informed Miller at that time that, per a directive from UAW’s legal team, no one in

the research department was to communicate with Miller any further, and were

instead to refer him to PBGC. See id. Even viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Miller, he should have been aware by June 2012 that the settlement

agreement had been breached and that UAW would assist him no further in his efforts

to enforce it. This would cause the NLRA’s six-month limitations period to run by

December 2012. Yet Miller waited until April 9, 2014 to file this action—almost

fourteen months after the NLRA’s statute of limitations had acted to bar his claim.

Miller asserts that the Court should toll § 10(b)’s limitations period because he

became entangled in UAW’s “dead end process.” Miller cites unreturned phone

calls, unanswered letters, and overtures of settlement that never materialized. Miller

offers no evidence in support of these allegations. However, even if he did offer such

evidence, it would be insufficient to delay the start of the statute of limitations. See

Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers, 903 F.2d 253, 262–63 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to toll

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§ 10(b)’s limitations period based on defendant’s pre-suit settlement overtures when

plaintiff presented no evidence that he relied on employer’s statements).

D. Miller Fails to Offer Evidence Creating a Genuine Issue of Material

Fact

1. Miller’s “Unfair Representation” Claim

Furthermore, even if the six-month limitations period found in § 10(b) of the

NLRA did not bar Miller’s unfair representation claim, Miller has failed to create a

genuine dispute of material fact concerning UAW’s breach of the duty of fair

representation. Put simply, Miller fails to offer any evidence suggesting that UAW

acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. It is undisputed that UAW was not in charge of

distributing settlement funds, and that UAW never impeded Miller from pursuing

relief directly from PBGC. In fact, both UAW and Miller agree that, in 2009, UAW

officials told Miller that UAW had no access to the settlementfunds, and that Miller’s

sole recourse concerning settlement benefits was with PBGC. See Doc. 17, at 26–27.

Furthermore, nothing has ever prevented Miller from suing PBGC or Harvard

directly. Thus, this case differs significantly from most § 301/DFR cases, in which the

plaintiff is forced to rely on the union as his exclusive agent in efforts to enforce

collective bargaining agreements.

In addition, a requirement of a hybrid § 301/DFR claim is that the plaintiff

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show the breach of a “contract” within the scope of § 301. Miller is now receiving

pension benefits, and apparently has abandoned that claim as a result. See Doc. 18, at

3 (“Starting the pension has been resolved due to documents submitted by the

Plaintiff.”). While Miller still seeks additional benefits under the settlement

agreement, he has not identified these benefits, much less offered any evidence

showing that he is entitled to receive them. Instead, Miller asserts that there was an

employee handbook distributed to ESND workers at the end ofthe strike, and that this

handbook details additional benefits. Miller argues that UAW has failed to produce

this handbook despite repeated requests, and now asks that the Court require UAW

to produce it. However, UAW has represented to this Court multiple times that it is

not in possession of this employee handbook and, to UAW’s knowledge, such a

handbook does not exist. Furthermore, UAW has submitted the entire UAW-Harvard

strike settlement agreement as evidence, and the document does not mention any

benefits beyond the pension that Miller is already receiving. See Doc. 17, at 28. 

Miller has failed to provide evidence suggesting that he is entitled to additional

benefits, and thus has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to one of the

requirements of his claim. Put simply, UAW cannot be found to have breached its

duty of fair representation for failing to advocate for the award of benefits that do not

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exist.

2. Miller’s Claim for “Misappropriated” Funds

Summary judgment is also due to be granted against Miller’s claim seeking the

return of“misappropriated” settlement funds. Miller never identifies in his complaint

or his response what conduct serves as the basis for this claim. He offers no evidence

that UAW spent funds in an improper way, and has failed to dispute UAW’s factual

assertion that UAW does not have access to any of the funds resulting from the

settlement. See Doc. 16, at 12.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (stating that “[i]f a

party . . . fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule

56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed” for the purposes of summary

judgment). Reviewing Miler’s deposition, it seems that this claim stems solely from

Miller’s dissatisfaction with the amount of attorneys’ feesthat UAW lawyers received

following resolution of the NLRB litigation in 1991. However, Miller offers no

evidence that the attorneys’ fees were calculated incorrectly or were otherwise

awarded inappropriately.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, UAW’s motion for summary judgment(Doc. 15)

is due to be GRANTED. 

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A separate Order will be entered.

Done this 17 day of February 2015.

 

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

177822

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