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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1518

ANGEL HOUSTON,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

C.G. SECURITY SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12‐cv‐00328 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2016 — DECIDED APRIL 25, 2016

____________________

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of a lawsuit

brought by plaintiff‐appellee Angel Houston, who sustained

injuries from a fall during a New Year’s Eve party at a Hyatt

hotel in Indianapolis. Defendant‐appellant C.G. Security Ser‐

vices, Inc. (“C.G.”) provided security personnel for the party.

During litigation, Houston filed several motions for sanctions

against C.G. The district court referred the matter to a magis‐

Case: 15-1518 Document: 46 Filed: 04/25/2016 Pages: 8
2 No. 15‐1518

trate judge, who issued a report and recommendation regard‐

ing sanctions against C.G. for discovery violations. The dis‐

trict court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recom‐

mendation to impose sanctions.

C.G. appeals. Specifically, C.G. claims that the district

court abused its discretion by adopting the report and recom‐

mendation, as well as by awarding Houston’s counsel attor‐

ney’s fees. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion

and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

In March 2012, Houston sued Hyatt Corporation and the

Hyatt Regency Indianapolis (collectively, “Hyatt”) for breach

of contract, intentional misconduct, and negligence in connec‐

tion with injuries she sustained after falling at the downtown

Indianapolis Hyatt hotel during a hotel‐sponsored New

Year’s Eve party on December 31, 2010. Houston claimed that

Hyatt failed to provide a safe and secure environment for the

party and that this failure was the proximate cause of her in‐

juries as well as consequential damages arising out of those

injuries. Houston sought damages in excess of one million

dollars.

Several months later, Houston joined C.G. as a defendant

in an amended complaint based upon C.G.’s provision of se‐

curity personnel for the New Year’s Eve party. Discovery re‐

vealed that Hyatt had used C.G.’s security services for years.

Houston alleged that C.G. failed to provide adequate security

services and that this failure proximately caused her injuries

and damages.

On May 1, 2013, both Hyatt and C.G. moved for summary

judgment. A discovery conference was held several weeks

Case: 15-1518 Document: 46 Filed: 04/25/2016 Pages: 8
No. 15‐1518 3

later, on May 22. The district court granted Hyatt’s summary

judgment motion on February 3, 2014. However, it delayed

ruling on C.G.’s motion due to Houston’s filing of three mo‐

tions for sanctions against C.G. for various discovery matters.

The district court referred the matter of sanctions to a magis‐

trate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

The magistrate judge examined the three motions for sanc‐

tions and found that C.G. had engaged in a pattern of obstrep‐

erous discovery behavior by testifying falsely about its docu‐

ments and discovery efforts, failing timely to correct false rep‐

resentations regarding its discovery, falsifying documents,

and impeding the fair conduct of depositions. The magistrate

judge recommended that the district court impose monetary

sanctions against C.G. In particular, the magistrate judge ad‐

vised the district court to compel C.G. to pay Houston reason‐

able attorney’s fees for the work of her counsel in the conduct

of discovery after C.G. joined the litigation.

Following the magistrate judge’s issuance of the report

and sanctions recommendation, the district court granted

C.G.’s motion for summary judgment on March 14, 2014. The

district court declined to enter final judgment pending a de‐

termination as to the amount of sanctions to be levied against

C.G. C.G. subsequently objected to the magistrate judge’s re‐

port and recommendation.

The district court considered C.G.’s objection and con‐

ducted a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation. On September 16, 2014, the district court

overruled C.G.’s objection, adopted the report and recom‐

mendation, and ordered Houston’s counsel to file a petition

for fees. Houston’s counsel moved for $146,050.00 in attor‐

ney’s fees and $18,512.10 in costs.  

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4 No. 15‐1518

In February 2015, the district court granted in part Hou‐

ston’s motion for attorney’s fees. In so doing, the district court

considered various objections lodged by C.G. and excluded

more than 100 billed hours that appeared unrelated to discov‐

ery efforts. The district court ultimately ordered C.G. to pay

Houston $118,925.00 in attorney’s fees and $16,498.91 in costs,

for a total of $135,423.91.  

C.G. appeals the district court’s adoption of the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation regarding sanctions, as

well as its order awarding Houston attorney’s fees.

II. Discussion

A. Report and Recommendation Regarding Sanctions

On appeal, C.G. argues that the district court abused its

discretion by awarding sanctions. We may reverse the district

court’s determination of factual issues underlying the award

of sanctions only if its findings are clearly erroneous. Ordower

v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1574 (7th Cir. 1987). By contrast, we

review the decision to award sanctions for abuse of discretion.

Id. In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we “keep in mind that

because the trial court alone has an intimate familiarity with

the relevant proceedings it is in a far superior position to pass

on an attorney’s conduct than a reviewing court.” Id. (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

C.G.’s initial contention is that the district court abused its

discretion by awarding sanctions because Houston failed to

comply with procedural prerequisites. C.G. relies in part on

Local Rule 7‐1(g)(1) of the U.S. District Court for the Southern

District of Indiana, which requires movant’s counsel to file a

motion showing that she made reasonable efforts to confer

with opposing counsel and resolve the issues raised in the

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No. 15‐1518 5

motion. S.D. Ind. L.R. 7‐1(g)(1). Relatedly, Local Rule 37‐1(a)

requires movant’s counsel to confer in good faith before in‐

volving the court in discovery disputes. S.D. Ind. L.R. 37‐1(a);

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) (requiring certification of such

efforts). C.G. argues that because Houston did not engage in

a discovery conference before her second motion for sanc‐

tions, the award of fees for issues raised in the second motion

was improper. According to C.G., the sole discovery confer‐

ence held on May 22, 2013—before the first motion for sanc‐

tions was filed—did not satisfy the court’s meet‐and‐confer

requirements with regard to Houston’s second and third mo‐

tions for sanctions. C.G. asserts that Houston should have

called for an additional discovery conference and provided

proper certification of efforts to confer with opposing counsel.  

The evidence in the record indicates that Houston’s coun‐

sel met the meet‐and‐confer requirements through participa‐

tion in the May 2013 discovery conference, as well as through

email exchanges and calls to opposing counsel. In the context

of what the magistrate judge referred to as C.G.’s “obstreper‐

ous” conduct and “improper gamesmanship,” we cannot ac‐

cept C.G.’s contention that one discovery conference was in‐

sufficient. The record shows that Houston’s counsel made

various attempts to confer with C.G.’s counsel but that C.G.

rebuffed these efforts. Because C.G. was largely responsible

for the lack of meeting, the district court did not abuse its dis‐

cretion in finding that Houston had complied with the proce‐

dural prerequisites.

C.G. further argues that it did not conduct discovery in

bad faith and that any mistake or inadvertence on its part was

nothing more than “bad record‐keeping” unworthy of sanc‐

tion. To be sure, we have declined to impose sanctions where

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there is no showing of bad faith or improper purpose. See, e.g.,

Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 388 F.3d 990, 1014

(7th Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, upon review, there is sufficient

evidence to support the district court’s finding that C.G. acted

in bad faith. For instance, before C.G. was joined as a defend‐

ant, Houston served on C.G. a non‐party documents sub‐

poena. C.G. never responded to this subpoena. Although

Houston did not seek relief for C.G.’s failure to comply with

the subpoena, service of the subpoena alerted C.G. to the need

to search for and secure documents related to its work for Hy‐

att at the New Year’s Eve party. Nevertheless, C.G.’s initial

search as part of its discovery obligations did not take place

until at least April 2013, roughly four months after C.G. was

added as a party. Furthermore, C.G. did not provide infor‐

mation sought by Houston regarding the security personnel

working for C.G. at the party in a timely manner, failed to

alert Houston that it could not provide reasonably definitive

information about the personnel, and then proceeded to con‐

tinually change its answers about the personnel. There is also

evidence of false or, at best, reckless and evasive testimony

offered by at least one of C.G’s witnesses, namely Charles

Guynn, C.G.’s owner and president. Such conduct does not

comport with C.G.’s claim that it did the best it could to pro‐

vide Houston with accurate, timely information in discovery.

C.G.’s argument that the sanction award was dispropor‐

tionate to the harm and the outcome of the underlying lawsuit

is also unavailing. The magistrate judge did not clearly err in

her factual findings related to C.G.’s misconduct in discovery,

nor did she err in concluding that C.G.’s meritorious defense

to Houston’s claim that C.G. failed to provide adequate secu‐

rity services did not excuse C.G.’s misconduct. Given the am‐

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No. 15‐1518 7

ple evidence of C.G.’s attempts to impede, delay, and frus‐

trate Houston’s discovery efforts, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions.

B. Attorney’s Fee Award

C.G. also challenges the nature of the sanction imposed by

the district court, namely the award of attorney’s fees. Under

the federal rules, Rule 37 sanctions may include an order to

pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in mak‐

ing the motion for sanctions, including attorney’s fees. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). We review the district court’s award of at‐

torney’s fees for abuse of discretion. See Marrocco v. Gen. Mo‐

tors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 225 (7th Cir. 1992).

C.G. contends that the district court abused its discretion

by awarding Houston’s counsel an unreasonable attorney’s

fee: $135,423.91 in fees and costs. According to C.G., the item‐

ized fee statement submitted by Houston’s counsel was “out‐

landish and replete with overbilling on unrelated tasks.” C.G.

also objects to alleged large blocks of time billed on tasks that

fall outside the scope of the court order.

Our case law provides that the “starting point in a district

court’s evaluation of a fee petition is a lodestar analysis; that

is, a computation of the reasonable hours expended multi‐

plied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Divane v. Krull Elec. Co.,

319 F.3d 307, 317–18 (7th Cir. 2003). In the case at hand, the

district court properly applied the lodestar analysis and of‐

fered a thorough explanation for why the costs, expenses, and

time claimed by Houston’s counsel were reasonable. At the

outset, the district court evaluated the itemized fee statement

and excluded entries requesting compensation for tasks it

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deemed unrelated to discovery. The district court also explic‐

itly addressed and rejected C.G.’s objections to thirteen spe‐

cific billing entries. Moreover, the district court properly con‐

sidered Houston’s counsel’s hourly rate of $250 per hour and

determined that it was reasonable based on counsel’s twenty‐

one years of litigation experience, as well as the fact that $250

per hour is counsel’s standard hourly rate. Thus, we cannot

conclude that the district court abused its discretion in calcu‐

lating and awarding attorney’s fees.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.

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