Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01467/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01467-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ANDI MILLARD, 

NO. CIV. S-03-1468 WBS GGH

Plaintiff, 

RELATED CASE NOS.

v. CIV. S-03-1481 WBS/GGH

CIV. S-03-1482 WBS/GGH

LA BAER INN, et al.; CIV. S-03-1480 WBS/GGH

CARRIAGE HOUSE INN, et al.; CIV. S-03-1467 WBS/GGH

DRIFTWOOD LODGE, et al.;

THUNDERBIRD MOTEL, et al.; MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TRAVEL INN, et al., RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

OF ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS’ FEES,

LITIGATION EXPENSES & COSTS

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a) and

60(b), plaintiff moves for reconsideration of and relief from the

court’s April 7, 2005 order regarding attorneys’ fees, litigation

expenses and costs. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a disabled person who uses a wheelchair. 

On or about July 16, 2002, she took a road trip to South Lake

Tahoe only to discover that none of the defendant motels were

accessible to wheelchair users. She obtained Paul Rein as

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counsel, and after some preliminary investigations of the

exteriors of the motel sites, filed several complaints against

defendants on July 11, 2003. These complaints alleged violations

of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq., California Civil Code §§ 54.1 and 55, California

Health and Safety Code § 19953, and California Code of Civil

Procedure § 1021.5. 

Eventually, after some failed attempts at settlement,

the parties agreed to the terms of five separate consent decrees. 

They did not, however, agree on attorneys’ fees, expenses, or

costs. Plaintiff made an offer to defendant which was refused,

and subsequently plaintiff filed a motion requesting an award of

attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and costs totaling $205,120.

This court awarded a reduced amount of fees, expenses,

and costs after (1) lowering the hourly rate for Paul Rein and

Patricia Barbosa from $395 per hour and $375 per hour to $250 per

hour each, on the ground that the requested rates were consistent

with the prevailing rates for the San Francisco area, but the

prevailing market rate for the most experienced attorneys in the

Sacramento area is $250 per hour; (2) reducing plaintiff’s expert

Barry Atwood’s fees by $3,410 on the ground that plaintiff had

double billed these fees; and (3) removing two hours from the

total award of attorney Julie McLean on an unstated ground. 

Several other reductions relating to unreasonable amounts of time

were made that are not at issue in this motion. After the

reductions, the court awarded plaintiff a total of $113,591 in

attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs, the payment of which was to

be borne equally by the five defendants.

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1 Defendants cite nonbinding authority to make the

hypertechnical observation that the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure do not specifically recognize such a motion. (See

Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. For Reconsideration at 2)(citing

Hatfield v. Bd. of County Comrs. For Converse County, 52 F.3d

858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995)). However, the Ninth Circuit clearly

recognizes that motions so denominated may be brought under

either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See, e.g., Am. Ironworks &

Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th

Cir. 2001). 

3

Plaintiff filed this motion for reconsideration on

April 21, 2005 in Case No. 03-1467, but failed to file a notice

of motion or set a date for hearing in any of the five related

cases until June 10, 2005. Plaintiff now moves the court to

determine that it erred (1) in calculating plaintiff’s attorneys’

fees award by reducing Mr. Rein’s and Ms. Barbosa’s billing rates

to $250 per hour, (2) in reducing Mr. Atwoods’ expert witness

fees by 50%, and (3) in deducting two extra hours from Ms.

McLean’s time.

II. Discussion

A. Rule 60(b) Motion

Plaintiff makes two requests properly considered under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and Local Rule 78-230(k):

(1) the request to reconsider the reduction of Mr. Rein’s and Ms.

Barbosa’s billing rates; and (2) the request to reconsider the

50% reduction of Mr. Atwood’s expert witness fees.

A “motion for reconsideration” may properly be brought

under Rule 60(b) and Local Rule 78-230(k). Hinton v. NMI Pac.

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993); Backlund v. Barnhart,

778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985); Local Rule 78-230(k).1

“Rule 60(b)(1) . . . grants district courts discretion to relieve

a party from a judgment or order for reason of ‘mistake,

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inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,’ provided that the

party moves for such relief not more than a year after the

judgment was offered,” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 24

F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 2001)(emphasis added), and so long as

“the motion [is] made within a reasonable time.” See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(stating that “[t]he motion shall be made within a

reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than

one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or

taken.”). Rule 60(b)(6) further authorizes the court to award

relief “for any other reason justifying relief from the operation

of [a] judgment” not listed elsewhere in the rule, so long as

such a motion is brought within a reasonable time. 

Rule 60(b) is meant to serve “the overriding judicial

goal of deciding cases correctly, on the balance of their factual

and legal merits, [while balancing] the interest of [] litigants

and the courts in the finality of judgments.” Knoebber, 24 F.3d

at 695(citing Pena v. Seguros La Comerical, 770 F.2d 811, 814

(9th Cir. 1985)). “Although the application of Rule 60(b) is

committed to the discretion of the district courts, . . . [the

Ninth Circuit] has admonished that, as a general matter, Rule

60(b) is ‘remedial in nature and . . . must be liberally

applied.’” Id., at 695-96(citing Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461,

463 (9th Cir. 1984)(per curiam)). However, “this does not mean,

of course, that the moving party is absolved from the burden of

demonstrating that, in a particular case, the interest in

deciding the case on the merits should prevail over the very

important interest in the finality of judgments.” Id. at 696. 

i. Timeliness

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Defendants challenge plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration as untimely, arguing that, because the motion

constitutes a direct attack on the underlying order, plaintiff

was required to bring the motion under Rule 59(e) instead of Rule

60(b), and that the time for bringing a Rule 59(e) motion had

already passed when plaintiff filed this motion. The Rule 59(e)

argument is easily dismissed, though the issue of timeliness is

more complicated. 

First, Rule 60(b) clearly authorizes a litigant to make

a direct attack on a judgment or order before the court which

rendered it. See Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir.

1985)(noting res judicata did not preclude litigant from making

direct attack under Rule 60(b)); see also Crawford v. Honig, 1992

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13677 *24(“. . . motions seeking to vacate or

modify a judgment under Rule 60 are more commonly brought as a

direct attack on the judgment in the original action. . . .”);

Bestway Prods., Inc. v. Best Trading Co., 151 B.R. 530, 541 (E.D.

Cal. Bankr. 1993)(“A Rule 60(b)(4) motion can either be made by

way of direct attack in the original case in which the order in

question was entered. . . .”). The cases defendants cite to the

contrary hold no differently. See United States v. 47 West 644

Route 38, Maple Park, Ill., 190 F.3d 781, 783 n.1 (7th Cir.

1999)(noting that motion to reconsider substance of summary

judgment would have been construed under Rule 60(b) if it had

been filed later); United States v. Real Property & Residence

Located at Route 1, Box 111 Firetower Road, Seemmes, Mobile

County, Ala, 920 F.2d 788, 791-92 (11th Cir. 1991)(finding that

district court properly construed direct attack on merits of

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2 Rule 6(a) mandates that the court exclude intermediate

Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays when computing a period of

time less than 11 days. Rule 59(e) sets a 10-day filing deadline

starting from the entry of judgment.

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order forbidding taxation of costs as Rule 60(b) motion). Thus,

the fact that plaintiff’s motion directly attacks an underlying

order does not put the motion outside the realm of Rule 60(b). 

Second, even if the court determined that plaintiff’s 

“motion for reconsideration” was filed after the deadline for

bringing such a motion under Rule 59(e) had expired, the court

would not be required to deny the motion as untimely. Rather,

the court would be compelled to treat the motion as a Rule 60(b)

motion for relief from a judgment or order. See Am. Ironworks &

Erectors, 248 F.3d at 898-99(“‘[A] motion for reconsideration’ is

treated as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure [] 59(e) if it is filed within ten days

of entry of judgment. Otherwise, it is treated as a Rule 60(b)

motion for relief from a judgment or order.”)(internal citation

omitted). 

Defendant filed this motion in Case No. 03-1467 on

April 21, 2005, just 10 court days after the court’s April 7,

2005 order, as calculated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 6(a).2 However, plaintiff neglected to file the motion

in any of the other four related cases, to set the motion for

hearing, or to file a notice of motion in any of the cases until

June 10, 2005, over two months after the challenged order issued,

and well after the Rule 59(e) deadline had passed. Defendants

therefore contend that the instant motion was not actually filed

until June 10, 2005. With respect to at least four of the five

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cases, defendants are correct. Therefore, the court construes

the motion as a Rule 60(b) motion. For simplicity’s sake, the

court also construes the earliest “filed” motion as made pursuant

to Rule 60(b), so as to resolve all the cases toghether. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1(requiring that federal rules of civil procedure

be “construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action.”). 

Because the court construes plaintiff’s motion as

brought pursuant to Rule 60(b), defendants’ timeliness objection

must be addressed according to Rule 60(b) standards. A motion is

timely filed under Rule 60(b) if it is filed within one year

after the challenged judgment was offered and within a reasonable

time. Knoebber, 24 F.3d at 695; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “What

constitutes [a] ‘reasonable time’ depends upon the facts of each

case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the

reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn

earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other

parties.” Asford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir.

1981). There is no dispute that plaintiff’s motion was filed 

within the one-year time limit imposed by Rule 60(b). The only

question remaining, therefore, is whether the motion was filed

within “a reasonable time.” 

Given the particular circumstances in this case, the

court finds the answer to be in the affirmative. Even assuming

that the motion was not filed in any of the five cases until June

10, 2005, just over two months is not an unreasonable time for

plaintiff to have delayed filing the motion. Rule 60(b) itself

enshrines a one-year time bar for such motions. Were such motions

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to be generally brought earlier, one would think the rule would

reflect as much. 

Further, the Ashford factors do not dictate a contrary

result. The time for appealing the court’s April 7, 2005 order

has passed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(notice of appeal must

generally be filed within 30 days of judgment). Therefore, the

interest in finality must be given considerable weight. Ashford,

657 F.2d at 1055. However, there is no significant prejudice to

defendants here. The only prejudice defendants claim is that

consideration of the motion will be costly and subject them to

appeal of the underlying order after the time for appeal has

passed. The cost of responding to the motion is no greater than

if the motion had been filed earlier. Moreover, the cost should

be relatively minimal, especially considering that defendants

have waived oral argument. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot For

Reconsideration at 2). Further defendants’ fear of appeal is

unfounded. “[A]n appeal from a denial of a rule 60(b) motion

brings up only the denial of the motion for review, not the

merits of the underlying judgment.” Negrete v. Bleau, 183 B.R.

195, 197 (9th Cir. Bankr. 1995)(citing In re Martinelli, 96

Bankr. 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 1988)). Therefore, defendants will

not be prejudiced by a surprise appeal of the judgment underlying

the motion. 

Plaintiff could have filed the instant motion earlier,

as evidenced by the fact that the memorandum of points and

authorities she submitted in support of the motion filed on June

10, 2005 is, with the exception of their hearing dates and times,

identical to that filed in support of the motion filed on April

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21, 2005 in Case No. 03-1467. (Compare April 21, 2005 Mem. of P.

& A. with June 10, 2005 Mem. of P. & A.). In fact, plaintiff did

not even change the date on the signature page of her June 10,

2005 points and authorities, which still reads April 21, 2005. 

(See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. For Reconsideration at 18). 

Nevertheless, plaintiff explains in her reply that she delayed

filing the motion until June 10, 2005 because she mistakenly

believed that she only needed to file a motion in the lead case

and that the court would set a hearing date for her. When she

realized that it fell to her to set the hearing date and to file

the motion in all the related cases, she “re-filed” the same

motion on June 10, 2005. (See Pl.’s Reply Mem. of P. & A. in

Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. For Reconsideration at 4). Plaintiff should

have been more familiar with the filing procedures or called the

court for clarification. However, absent significant prejudice

to defendants, plaintiff’s explanation is sufficient to warrant

her two-month delay. Therefore, the motion is timely.

 ii. Merits

a. Propriety of the Motion

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s motion is improper

because the arguments plaintiff makes in this motion are no

different from those plaintiff made in arguing the underlying fee

motion and because a Rule 60(b) motion should not be used as a

substitute for a timely appeal. This reasoning is flawed. 

First, plaintiff is not simply repeating the same

arguments made in the underlying fees motion. Rather, plaintiff

contends (1) that the court unfairly “surprised” her by ignoring

the evidence she submitted to justify her counsels’ rates and by

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“apparently taking judicial notice of an Eastern District

prevailing fee rate without [giving] notice to the parties”

(Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. For Reconsideration at 3); and (2)

that the court mistakenly concluded that plaintiff had double

billed Mr. Atwood’s expert witness fees because plaintiff

inadvertently submitted the bills in duplicate. The court need

not reach the merits of these arguments to determine

preliminarily that they are not repetitive. Rather, these

arguments center on the court’s decision to reduce Mr. Rein’s and

Ms. Barbosa’s fee rates for reasons not raised during briefing or

at oral argument and on the court’s decision to reduce Mr.

Atwood’s expert witness fees for an erroneous reason that

plaintiff did not anticipate the court to consider. Thus, these

issues are properly raised in this motion.

Second, plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion is not a backdoor

substitute for an appeal. The cases defendants cite in this

regard are inapposite. Bell v. Eastman Kodak Company dealt with

a plaintiff who “tried to use Rule 60(b) to appeal a final

judgment entered by one magistrate judge to another magistrate

judge, rather than to the court of appeals.” 214 F.3d 798, 800

(7th Cir. 2000). Snell v. Cleveland, Inc. involved a district

court judge who sua sponte vacated another court’s judgment in a

closed action for lack of jurisdiction. 316 F.3d 822, 824-26

(9th Cir. 2002). No such situation is presented here. Nor is

this a case where plaintiff is simply trying to revisit the same

issues already ruled on in an underlying order. See Negrete v.

Bleau, 183 B.R. 195, 197 (9th Cir. Bankr. 1995)(equating motions

for reconsideration which revisit same issues with improper

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substitute for appeal). Therefore, plaintiff’s motion will not

be denied on the ground that it is an improper appeal.

b. The Court Did Not Err in Concluding that $250

Per Hour is a Reasonable Rate for Mr. Rein’s

and Ms. Barbosa’s Legal Services

Plaintiff makes several arguments challenging the

hourly rate at which the court allowed plaintiff to recover for

Mr. Rein’s and Ms. Barbosa’s legal services. None of them are

unpersuasive.

First, plaintiff argues that the court was bound to

accept her assertion that the “reasonable rates” for Mr. Rein’s

and Ms. Barbosa’s services were respectively $395 and $375 per

hour because similar rates had been awarded in another district,

the rates were supported by the declaration of a Sacramento

attorney, and because defendants failed to challenge the rates. 

The cases cited by plaintiff do not support this position. In

fact, the cases demonstrate that the dispositive factor in

setting a reasonable rate to calculate an attorneys’ fees award

is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community,

not simply what the fee applicant thinks the rate should be. 

Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir.

1992)(“Reasonable fees . . . are calculated according to the

prevailing market rates in the relevant legal

community.”)(emphasis added); accord Davis v. City & County of

San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1546 (9th Cir. 1992). Even the

cases plaintiff cites stating that plaintiff’s uncontroverted

evidence must be presumed to be reasonable involve situations

where plaintiff produced credible evidence of the prevailing

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market rate. Gates, 987 F.2d at 1405(“plaintiffs adequately

documented that their expertise in complex prison litigation

required application of San Francisco rates [in Sacramento]”);

Davis, 976 F.2d at 1547(“appellees produced numerous affidavits

declaring that the fees sought by appellee’s counsel . . . were

well within the bounds of the “prevailing market rates”)(emphasis

added); Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1105 (D.C.

Cir. 1995)(“[P]laintiffs submitted a good deal of evidence

establishing the prevailing market rates. . . .”)(emphasis

added); United States Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896

F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990)(fee applicant supplied affidavits

of the plaintiff’s attorney and other attorneys regarding

prevailing fees in the community). 

In this case, plaintiff presents two types of evidence,

neither of which credibly demonstrates the prevailing market

rates in the relevant legal community. First, plaintiff

submitted several prior fee awards from the Northern District of

California. However, “the relevant legal community for

determining attorneys’ fees awards . . . is the forum in which

the district court sits,” and “[a]n attorney’s prior fee award is

not sufficient to support a requested rate for an award . . .

without other evidence showing that the requested rates are

prevailing in the community.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496,

500-02 (9th Cir. 1997)(emphasis added); see also Maldonado v.

Lehman, 811 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1987)(affirming district

court that refused to calculate attorneys’ fees using customary

billing rate, instead looking to prevailing market rate in city

where district court sat).

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Second, plaintiff submitted the declaration of John M.

Poswall, an attorney who represents plaintiffs in personal injury

cases in the Sacramento area. Mr. Poswall is well known to this

court. He does not profess to practice disability rights

litigation; nor does his declaration establish the prevailing

market rate in this community. Mr. Poswall admits his practice

is “almost exclusively [a] contingent fee practice,” and “is

rarely dependent upon an award of attorneys’ fees by a court.” 

(Poswall Decl. ¶ 6). He further states that he has only “. . .

charged an hourly fee for his services . . . from time to time,”

ranging from $400 to $425 per hour. (Id.). He then states that

“an award of $400 per hour for a person of Mr. Rein’s experience

and specialization is reasonable in this community,” and that he

would request that amount himself. (Id.)(emphasis added). 

The court does not question that Mr. Poswall has been

able to charge and collect hourly fees of $400 to $425 on some

limited occasions. He is a highly skilled and experienced

personal injury attorney. Almost astronomical sums of money can

sometimes ride on the skills of the particular lawyer handling a

large personal injury case. Disability rights cases are not

quite the same, however. Notably, he does not speak to the value

of Ms. Barbosa’s services. But even with regard to Mr. Rein’s

services, the declaration of an attorney who has only “from time

to time charged an hourly fee” for representing plaintiffs in

personal injury cases does not constitute sufficient evidence of

the prevailing market rate for attorneys representing plaintiffs

in disability rights cases in this district, especially where the

court is aware that the prevailing market rate is significantly

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lower.

Plaintiff questions the court’s taking judicial notice

of the hourly rates in this district. (See Pl.’s Mot. For

Reconsideration at 10-11). However, courts have broad discretion

in awarding attorneys’ fees, Gates, 987 F.2d at 1405, and can

take judicial notice of the prevailing rate of fees in the

relevant legal community where the evidence of the prevailing

market rate submitted to the court is inadequate. Wirtz v. Kan.

Farm Bureau Servs., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200 (D. Kan.

2005); Bishop Museum v. Lopez, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2962 *7 (D.

Haw. Feb. 28, 1996). Here, the evidence presented by plaintiff

was inadequate. Fee awards in the Northern district, which are

unsurprisingly higher, have no bearing on the prevailing market

rate in this district. Nor does a lone declaration from an

attorney who generally charges a contingency fee persuade this

court that roughly $400 per hour is the prevailing rate for legal

services in this area.

Plaintiff would, in effect, have the court accept the

proposition that if a fee applicant can find a single attorney

practicing in this district who will state in a declaration that

he charges a certain amount per hour and that it would be

reasonable for the applicant’s counsel to charge the same, then

the court would be bound to accept that amount as the prevailing

market rate in this district unless the opposing party produced

controverting evidence. Whether the number be $400 or $1,000 per

hour would be irrelevant. This result is untenable. The court

is familiar with the prevailing market rate in this district and

“has a great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness

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of attorneys’ fees.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1398. It need not

surrender that discretion to a fee applicant who produces

unpersuasive evidence regarding the prevailing market rate for

legal services, regardless of whether opposing counsel challenges

the rates claimed.

Next plaintiff argues that the court neglected to make

individualized determinations of what constituted a reasonable

fee for Mr. Rein’s and Ms. Barbosa’s legal services by failing to

take into account counsel’s experience. This is simply untrue. 

In its April 7, 2005 order, the court did not ignore counsel’s

experience in handling these cases. Instead, the court noted

that it had “consistently limited compensation rates to $250 per

hour for even the most experienced attorneys. . . . because these

rates generally prevail in the Sacramento area, where this court

sits.” (April 7, 2005 Order at 18). The court further stated

that the case underlying the fee award was “of no different type

or complexity from those which this court has routinely refused

to award more than $250 per hour,” and that “[o]ther cases of

this nature are regularly handled by this court and do not

require the assistance of lawyers from outside the area.” (Id.). 

This procedure was not irregular. The court considered 

awards given to attorneys with comparable experience - it was not

required to search out awards given to attorneys with identical

experience. See Davis, 976 F.2d at 1545(attorneys’ fees rates to

be established by reference to fees that private attorneys of

comparable ability and reputation charge). Allowing plaintiff to

collect $250 per hour for Mr. Rein’s and Ms. Barbosa’s services

in no way impugns their reputations or skills. Plaintiff seems

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to believe that simply because Mr. Rein has had 35 years of

experience, any awards given to attorneys of lesser experience

are completely irrelevant. This is not the case. The court has

the experience and discretion sufficient to make a fair

comparison and did so.

Plaintiff contends that it was somehow inconsistent for

the court to reduce some of the hours expended by Mr. Rein on the

grounds that Mr. Rein’s experience was such that he could handle

a settlement conference on his own while, at the same time,

limiting Mr. Rein’s fee rate to $250. (See Pl.’s Mot. For

Reconsideration at 8-9). However, the court has already noted

that this rate is awarded to “even the most experienced

attorneys” in this district. (See April 7, 2005 Order at 18). 

Therefore, there is no inconsistency.

Plaintiff further argues that the $250 per hour rate

routinely awarded in this district is “outdated,” having remained

unchanged for seven years. (See Pl.’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of

Mot. For Reconsideration at 2, 6)(citing Loskot v. Pine St. Sch.,

CIV. S-00-2405 DFL JFM *5 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2002)(noting

plaintiffs’s argument that courts in this district had been

awarding $250 per hour since 1998 and finding the amount to still

be a reasonable fee). The prevailing market rate for legal

services in this district arises from a combination of economic

factors beyond this court’s control. Property values, wages, the

cost of living, and attorney overhead are generally lower in this

district than in the Northern District of California. Therefore,

it is not surprising that attorneys here generally charge their

clients less than do their counterparts do in the San Francisco

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Bay Area. It is not the court’s responsibility to set the

prevailing market rate; the court is only obligated to award fees

based on the prevailing market rate. See Gates, 987 F.2d at

1405.

Finally, plaintiff suggests that if the court continues

to limit attorneys’ fees to $250 per hour, attorneys will cease

to bring disability rights cases in Sacramento. So far, however,

the fact that most experienced attorneys in these sorts of

matters charge $250 per hour has certainly not caused a dearth in

representation of the disabled, nor a mass exodus of attorneys

refusing to take cases in this district. The court is

unpersuaded that attorneys need to receive a $400 hourly rate to

convince them to bring disability rights cases in this district.

c. Mr. Atwood’s Expert Witness Fees 

Plaintiff correctly notes an error in the court’s

decision regarding Mr. Atwood’s expert witness fees. Mr.

Atwood’s fees appeared to have been double billed, since two

bills were inadvertently included in the exhibits of bills. (See

Paul Rein Decl. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. For Attorneys’ Fees,

Expenses, & Costs (“Paul Rein Decl.”) Ex. 8 (Billing Records));

(Steve Rein Decl. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. For Reconsideration

(“Steve Rein Decl.”) ¶ 3)(acknowledging inadvertently submitted

double copies). Defendants noted the apparent double billing in

their opposition to plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees motion, without

any response from plaintiff. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. For

Award of Attorneys’ Fees at 32). However, on further review, the

court determines that total billings were only listed once in the

expense and cost itemization. (See Paul Rein Decl. ¶¶ 21, 61). 

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3 Not content to be left out of plaintiff’s orgy of

argumentation regarding this matter, defendants request that the

court reopen the entire issue of attorneys’ fees and then apply a

negative lodestar of the sort that was applied in a recent case

in another district. See Doran v. Corte Madera Inn, 360 F. Supp.

2d 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2005). They further request that they be

allowed to pay any award plaintiff receives on an installment

plan. However, the arguments defendants make for reducing

plaintiff’s award and plaintiff’s request to pay on installment,

were already made and rejected when defendants argued the

underlying attorneys’ fees motion. Defendants’ attempt to

relitigate these issues is thus inappropriate. See, e.g.,

Shamrock Farms Co. v. Shamrock Foods Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

3029 *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1997)(“motions to reconsider are not

vehicles permitting the unsuccessful party to ‘rehash’ arguments

previously presented”)(citation omitted). Therefore, these

requests are denied. 

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This resulted in the court unnecessarily deducting $3,410 in

expert fees from plaintiff’s award. These fees will therefore be

awarded to plaintiff. 

d. Fees Incurred at Oral Argument

Plaintiff also requests that she be awarded an

additional amount of attorneys’ fees for the time her counsel

expended at oral argument on the underlying motion. However,

plaintiff never raised this issue at oral argument or while the

underlying motion for attorneys’ fees was pending. Nor was it

the court’s burden to raise the issue sua sponte. The time for

this request has thus passed. See Novato Fire Protections Dist.

v. United States, 181 F.3d 1135, 1142 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999)(“A

district court has discretion to refuse to hear arguments that

are raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration.”). 

Therefore, the request is denied.3 

B. Rule 60(a) Motion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) authorizes the

court to correct “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments [or] orders .

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. . and errors therein arising from oversight or omission. . . at

any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party. . .

.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). The rule grants a district court

“very wide latitude” to correct a judgment to make it reflect the

court’s “actual intentions.” Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574,

1577 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff argues that the court erroneously deducted

two (2) hours of Ms. McLean’s time by mathematical error. 

Defendants suggest that this unexplained deduction was made

pursuant to the court’s discretion. (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s

Mot. For Redconsideration at 5). After reviewing the April 7,

2005 order, the court acknowledges that there is no basis for the

deduction in the April 7, 2005 order. The deduction was in fact

a typographical or mathematical error. Therefore, the court will

award plaintiff an additional $450 worth of Ms. McLean’s

attorneys’ fees that were erroneously deducted in the prior

order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). 

III. Conclusion

As per the court’s April 7, 2005 order, only 1/5 of

plaintiff’s award will be attributed to each defendant to ensure

that each defendant pays only its proportionate burden of

plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs. (See April 7,

2005 Order at 21). In accordance with the changes made to the

court’s April 7, 2005 pursuant to this order, attorneys’ fees,

litigation expenses, and costs are awarded in the following

amounts: 

Mr. Rein: ((274.3 hours -36 -13.3 - 2 -10.8)

 = 212.2 hours 

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 212.2 hours x $250 = $ 53,050

Ms. Barbosa: (( 96.7 hours -5 -.9 -7 -18.3)

 = 65.5 hours

 65.5 hours x $250 = $ 16,375

Ms. McLean: ((149 hours -20 -5.2 -14.1) 

 = 109.7 hours

 109.7 hours x $225 = $ 24,682.50

Mr. Holmes: ( 41.1 hours - 6.2)

 = 34.9 hours

 34.9 hours x $ 75 = $ 2,617.50

Expenses/

Costs: ($22,161 - $1,435) = $ 20,726

TOTAL: = $117,451

Each Defendant Pays: 1/5 x $117,451 = $ 23,490.20

 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the

court’s April 7, 2005 order regarding attorneys’ fees, litigation

expenses, and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART;

(2) the reasonable rate for Mr. Rein’s and Ms.

Barbosa’s attorneys’ fees shall remain at $250 per hour;

(3) plaintiff be, and the same hereby is, awarded

$3,410 dollars for Barry Atwood’s expert witness fees and another

$450 dollars for two hours of Ms. McLean’s time that were

deducted by typographical error, bringing the total award of

attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs in this

litigation to $117,451, of which each defendant shall pay

$23,490.20, 1/5 of the total award; and 

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(4) plaintiffs’ request to recover fees incurred at

oral argument be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: August 16, 2005

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