Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01947/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01947-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD A. BRISTOW, for

himself and a class of 

others similarly situated,

NO. CIV. S-06-1947 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v.

LYCOMING ENGINES, a O R D E R

Division of Avco Corporation;

AVCO CORPORATION,

Defendants.

 /

The defendants manufacture aircraft engines and the plaintiff

class includes persons who owned an aircraft subject to a recall

of certain crankshafts in the defendants’ engines. The plaintiffs

allege defendants violated California’s Unfair Competition Law

(“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., and the California

Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et

seq.

There are four motions pending before the court. The

plaintiffs move for summary judgment and for approval of class

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The court described the plaintiff’s allegations in detail in 1

its April 10, 2007 and June 15, 2007 orders. The facts stated

herein are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 

2

notice. Defendants move for summary judgment or, in the

alternative, to decertify the class. The defendants move to exclude

plaintiff’s experts. The court resolves the motions on the papers

and after oral argument.

I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND1

Defendant Lycoming Engines, a division of defendant Avco

Corporation, manufactures aircraft engines. Beginning in 2000,

Lycoming experienced an increase in failures of engine crankshafts,

causing them to issue a series of service bulletins. Among these

was Service Bulletin 569 and 569A, issued on February 19, 2006 and

April 11, 2006, respectively, which imposed a “retirement,” or

recall, of the problematic crankshafts. Service Bulletin 569A

required the faulty crankshafts be replaced at the “first crankcase

separation or at the next [engine] overhaul,” but not later than

February 21, 2009.

On September 29, 2006, the Federal Aviation Administration

(“FAA”) issued an Airworthiness Directive (“AD”) designated AD

2006-20-09. It required that the faulty crankshafts be replaced but

permitted a compliance date of twelve years from the date the

crankshaft was installed or until the next engine overhaul. The FAA

estimated that no additional cost would be incurred by the

crankshaft replacement, as it could be performed at the time of a

routine engine overhaul or maintenance. Lycoming agreed to replace

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the crankshafts at their factory at no cost to the aircraft owners

if the replacement occurs during the twelve-year period; this

obligation is included in AD 2006-20-09.

The plaintiffs’ complaint was filed in this court in August

2006. The amended complaint alleges causes of action under

California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

et seq., and California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ.

Code § 1750 et seq.

In April 2007, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the

plaintiffs had standing because they had sufficiently alleged they

had suffered or will suffer harm as a result of the defendants’

allegedly unlawful conduct. The court explained,

Class members must elect one of three choices. First, they

can obey MSB 569A and replace their crankshafts at overhaul

for “free” before 2009 at Lycoming -- but bear the extra cost

of a Lycoming overhaul (as compared to overhauls performed by

other FAA authorized facilities), higher freight charges, and

longer downtime, FAC ¶¶ 18-21 -- or overhaul their engines at

a local/preferred FAA facility to the tune of $2,000 for

replacement parts. Second, class members can wait until after

2009 to replace their crankshafts at overhaul and pay $16,000

for parts. Third, class members can replace the crankshaft in

advance of overhaul and pay the cost to remove and reinstall

the engine. Under any choice, plaintiffs will assuredly

suffer harm. 

Order, April 7, 2007, at 13. The court granted the defendants’

motion to dismiss in part, holding that the plaintiffs’ allegations

against defendant Textron were inadequately pled. 

On September 11, 2007, the court certified the plaintiff class

to include “all persons or entities residing in California who: (1)

before February 21, 2006 purchased an aircraft that is or was

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As the court explained in its June 15, 2007 order, the class 2

includes those businesses which are not a part of the subclass.

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subject to Lycoming Mandatory Service Bulletin 569A; (2) either

currently own that aircraft or sold that aircraft on or after

February 21, 2006.” The court also certified a subclass under the

CLRA that includes “all persons residing in California who: (1)

before February 21, 2006 purchased an aircraft which is used

primarily for personal, family or household purposes that is or was

subject to Lycoming Mandatory Service Bulletin 569A; (2) either

currently own that aircraft or sold that aircraft on or after

February 21, 2006.”2

II. STANDARDS

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here

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the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A]

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at

323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts

in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material,

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in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First

Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954

(9th Cir. 1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local

No. 169, Ass’n of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347,

355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g

& Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv.,

809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to

'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's

note on 1963 amendments); see also Int’l Union of Bricklayers &

Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752

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F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

Rule 56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d

1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party

is to be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party,

see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); See also

Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121,

1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn

out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp.

1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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In the plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs 3

stated that they sought injunctive relief and monetary damages

“including but not limited to compensatory, incidental,

consequential, and punitive damages.” Therefore, although the

plaintiffs now no longer seek damages to represent the alleged

diminution in value of their aircraft, this does not constitute an

amendment of the complaint, and does not unfairly prejudice the

defendants. See Eagle v. American Telephone & Telegraph, Co., 769

F.2d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 1985)(Rule 16 amendment improper to permit

the addition of a new damages theory, where the plaintiff had

proposed the theory in his summary judgment motion). The relief

that the plaintiffs seek is permitted by law, as both the UCL and

CLRA permit an award of restitution damages and issuance of an

injunction for successful plaintiffs. Cal. Civ. Code §

1780(a)(recovery for restitution damages under CLRA); Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 17203 (same, under UCL); Cal. Civ. Code §

1780(a)(2)(injunctive relief under CLRA); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17203 (same, under UCL); see also Cal. Civ. Code §

1780(a)(1)(CLRA permits recovery for “actual damages” suffered by

plaintiff); id. § 1780(a)(5)(court permitted to award any relief

it “deems proper,” under CLRA).

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or Decertification

The defendants move for summary judgment or, alternatively,

class decertification on the grounds that the plaintiffs cannot

meet their burden of proving that the crankshafts at issue

caused a diminution in the value of the plaintiffs’ aircrafts.

The plaintiffs in their opposition concede that they are no

longer seeking damages for diminution in aircrafts’ value, but

that they seek recovery for restitution and other damages. The 3

defendants argue that there are no other damages to which the

plaintiffs have shown they are entitled. They contend that the

plaintiffs are either not entitled to certain damages they seek

or that they are unable to prove these damages. The court

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The plaintiffs also claim that the court could simply order 4

injunctive relief, requiring the defendants to pay all costs

associated with the faulty crankshafts. This approach has two main

flaws. First, it does not address the issue of whether the

plaintiffs have shown they in fact suffered harm, which is

necessary for recovery under both the UCL and CLRA. Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 17204; Cal Civ. Code § 1780. Second, the class was

certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). If

injunctive relief is the remedy now sought, it is inconsistent with

that Rule’s opt-out right. 

9

considers each of the alleged damages in turn.4

1. Cost of Replacing the Crankshaft

The plaintiffs present evidence that the defendants will

provide replacement crankshafts for $2000 until February 21,

2009. Declaration of Erica Craven In Support of Plaintiffs’

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or, In the

Alternative, to Decertify the Class (“Craven Decl.”) ¶ 5, Ex. D

(FAA Airworthiness Directive, at 6). After that, the replacement

part will cost approximately $16,000. Id. The defendants counter

that, if an aircraft owner receives an engine overhaul at the

Lycoming factory within twelve years, the defective crankshaft

will be replaced at no cost. Whether an engine overhaul is

recommended or required within twelve years varies depending on

whether the aircraft is for private use or not. Declaration of

Richard Moffett In Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment or, In the Alternative, to Decertify the Class

(“Moffett Decl.”) ¶ 13. 

2. Additional Costs if the Crankshaft Replacement Does

Not Occur at the Lycoming Factory

If an aircraft owner has the crankshaft replaced at a place

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other than the factory, the plaintiffs contend that the owner

will be required to pay for the replacement part ($2000 or

$16,000, depending on when the replacement occurs), labor costs,

removal and installation costs, and time for loss of use of the

aircraft. The defendants argue that all costs except the cost of

the replacement part are not “damages,” as they would have been

incurred by the aircraft owners during the routine overhaul of

the engine. If the aircraft owner has the crankshaft replaced in

advance of routine maintenance, the defendants assert that it

would be improper to impose this cost on the defendants. The

court agrees. 

The FAA Airworthiness Directive concluded that the

defective crankshafts “must” be replaced “at the earliest of

maintenance involving crankcase separation, the time-in-service

specified by Lycoming Engines . . . for engine overhaul, or

twelve years from the time the crankshaft first entered

service.” Moffett Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 3. Lycoming recommends engine

overhaul occur at least every two thousand miles, or twelve

years. Declaration of Ronald Mangon In Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (“Mangon Decl. (Motion to Dismiss)”) ¶ 6, Ex.

A at 1. Accordingly, the defective crankshaft would not need to

be replaced, per the FAA’s Airworthiness Directive, any earlier

than an overhaul would regularly occur. It follows that if an

aircraft owner replaces the crankshaft sooner than the FAA

requires, this is not a damage a jury could reasonably conclude

was caused by Lycoming’s actions. 

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In sum, if the crankshaft replacement occurs at a location

other than the Lycoming factory, the only damages to which a

plaintiff would arguably be subjected are the costs of the

replacement part. The question of whether such costs may be

pursued in a class suit will be discussed later. I first turn

to the alternative repair process.

3. Costs if the Crankshaft Replacement Occurs At the

Lycoming Factory

Although the defendants will pay for the cost of the

replacement part if an aircraft owner has the replacement

performed at the Lycoming factory, the plaintiffs contend that

this option necessarily includes costs to the aircraft owner,

which he is entitled to recover. 

a. Cost of Overhaul at Lycoming Compared to Other

Repair Stations

First, the plaintiffs argue that Lycoming charges more for

their factory overhauls than other mechanics charge, so a class

member who chose to have the overhaul performed by Lycoming in

order to receive free replacement parts would suffer damages

nonetheless. The plaintiffs base this assertion in part on the

testimony of Ronald Mangon, in the form of his declarations in

support of the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and in

opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants

object to the plaintiffs’ reliance on these declarations, as

they contain opinions not subsequently included in Mr. Mangon’s

expert report. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). This objection

appears to be not well taken, as Mr. Mangon’s statements

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The defendants raise this objection in their reply brief. 5

Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, In

the Alternative, To Certify the Class, at 5 n. 5. While raising new

issues in a reply brief is ordinarily improper, Nevada v. Watkins,

914 F.2d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir. 1990), obviously that does not apply

to issues raised by evidence tendered for the first time in the

opposition brief. 

The plaintiffs also have presented two invoices, one

6

accompanied by a declaration by one of the representative class

members, of the cost of a crankshaft replacement at non-Lycoming

shops. Plaintiffs’ Statement of Disputed Facts ¶ 8. Leaving aside

the question of whether one of the invoices is admissible, see

Craven. Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. L, these invoices only are offered to

establish the cost of crankshaft replacement in advance of an

engine overhaul. As explained supra, this does not serve to

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regarding the cost of engine overhauls were not made pursuant to

his status as an expert, but rather as a percipient witness

conveying information he obtained on overhaul costs.

These statements are inadmissable, however, as hearsay. In 5

the declarations on which the plaintiffs rely, Mr. Mangon

described what airplane engine repair stations informed him

would be the costs of engine overhauls and crankshaft

replacements. Declaration of Ronald Mangon in Support of Class

Certification ¶ 10; Mangon Decl. (Motion to Dismiss) ¶¶ 8-9.

Clearly, these are out-of-court statements offered for the truth

of what they assert and, as such, inadmissable hearsay. Fed. R.

Evid. 801. The plaintiffs have not shown that any applicable

hearsay exception applies.

Aside from the declaration of Mr. Mangon, the plaintiffs

present no additional evidence that a regularly-scheduled

overhaul is more expensive at the Lycoming factory than if

performed by another mechanic.6

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establish that the plaintiffs suffered damages from the defendants’

allegedly illegal acts.

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence in the form of “expert

analyses and formulas . . . to determine the average or regional

costs of replacement,” as they indicated they would in their motion

for class certification. See Plaintiffs’ Motion In Support of Class

Certification, at 20.

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b. Cost for Removal and Installation of the Engine

and Shipping Costs

The plaintiffs argue that aircraft owners who have the

crankshafts replaced at the Lycoming factory will incur a charge

for removal and installation of the engine. To substantiate this

argument, the plaintiffs produce two documents that purport to

be admissions by Lycoming of this cost. See Craven Decl. ¶¶ 8-9,

Ex. G, H. Assuming these documents are properly authenticated at

trial, see Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d

1110, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2006), they are admissible and serve as

grounds for this aspect of the plaintiffs’ claim for damages.

The plaintiffs also present evidence in the form of Mr.

Mangon’s declaration that shipping costs to the Lycoming factory

are approximately $800-$1,000. Mangon Decl. (Motion to Dismiss)

¶ 2. Assuming the proper foundation for this opinion is

developed at trial, Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1122, it is

admissible and may substantiate this claim for damages. 

c. Loss of Use

Third, the plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to

damages for the loss of use of their aircraft while it is

repaired at the Lycoming factory. The plaintiffs observe that

with prior Service Bulletins, Lycoming had paid for these costs

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and that “plaintiffs in this case should receive the same

treatment.” Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment or, In the Alternative, to Decertify the Class, at 8.

The plaintiffs state that at trial they “may submit a summary

exhibit that averages the loss of use payments that Lycoming

paid to Californians per plane under” those service bulletins.

Craven Decl. ¶ 15. 

This does not suffice to show that the plaintiffs would

actually suffer loss of use damages as a result of the

defendants’ conduct. As explained above, the FAA has determined

that the crankshafts at issue need not be replaced earlier than

when routine engine maintenance would occur. The plaintiffs have

not shown that they would experience a loss of use of their

aircraft beyond that which they would experience in any event

due to routine maintenance. The evidence regarding Lycoming’s

past practices on other service bulletins does not resolve this

question.

4. Plaintiffs’ Possible Award of Damages

In sum, the plaintiffs have adduced evidence that: (1) some

plaintiffs may pay the cost of the replacement crankshaft (if

the replacement is not performed at the Lycoming factory), and

(2) if some plaintiffs have their engines repaired by Lycoming,

they will incur costs for shipping, removal and installation.

Therefore, despite defendants’ argument otherwise, the

plaintiffs have adduced admissible evidence to show that at

least some of the class members were harmed by defendants’

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Plaintiffs cite Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., 23 Cal. 4th 7

116 (2000), as support for this approach. Kraus is distinguishable,

however, because there the defendants were ordered only to disgorge

ill-gotten security deposits from tenants. The calculation of the

recovery was straightforward and wholly within the knowledge of the

defendants. Id. Here, the plaintiffs seek damages whose value the

defendants would have no reason to know (i.e., the cost of

crankshaft replacement by mechanics other than the Lycoming factory

and shipping costs).

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conduct. Summary judgment is thus inappropriate on this ground.

The plaintiffs’ plan to show class-wide damages at trial,

however, raises serious question. In their trial plan, on which

the court relied in granting class certification, the plaintiffs

stated that its damages under the UCL and CLRA would be proven

based on “an aggregate amount by a formula.” Plaintiffs’

Proposed Notice and Trial Plan, at 3. The plaintiffs have not

directed the court to any evidence, expert or otherwise,

indicating how the damage award would be calculated or what

“formula” would be employed. The plaintiffs encourage the court

to shift the burden to the defendants to make the showing of

individualized damages, but can cite no precedent warranting

such a scheme nor was it proposed in the plaintiffs’ trial

plan. The plaintiffs cannot shirk their evidentiary duty 7

simply on the grounds that it is burdensome to meet. 

Moreover, the plaintiff's plan would not appear to show

class-wide damages. For instance, to show that an overhaul at

Lycoming would result in shipping costs, the plaintiffs only

have evidence in the form of Mr. Mangon’s vague estimate that

this amount would be between $800-$1000. Mangon Decl. (Motion to

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Similarly, even if the evidence of comparative cost of 8

overhauls at Lycoming and non-Lycoming shops is admitted, see

Mangon Decl. (Motion to Dismiss) ¶¶ 8-9 Ex. D-E, the plaintiffs

present no evidence or give any indication of how these costs are

borne by the class in its entirety.

Moreover, both the pieces of evidence on which the plaintiffs

rely, Mangon Decl. (Motion to Dismiss) ¶¶ 8-9 Ex. D-E, describe the

costs of engine overhauls at a shop in Oklahoma and in Florida,

respectively. Plaintiffs’ evidence of shipping cost damages,

however, appears to presume that the class members would have had

the overhauls performed in California; they do not address the

question of what damages for shipping costs would be available to

those plaintiffs who would send their engines out of state for

their overhauls regardless of the defendants’ conduct.

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Dismiss) ¶ 2. Common sense suggests, however, that the shipping

cost in fact differs depending on from what location the engine

is sent. The plaintiffs have not presented evidence of what the

individual damages in the form of shipping costs would be and

then how this should be aggregated to reflect class-wide

damages.8

Finally, the plaintiffs have not presented evidence to show

that the class is not overinclusive. Specifically, the

plaintiffs have not shown that they have evidence that aircraft

owners who send their engines to the Lycoming factory for

overhaul would not have had Lycoming perform the routine engine

maintenance anyhow. For this group of individuals, the

plaintiffs have no evidence of damages. If a proposed class

member has not in fact suffered damages, class certification is

improper under the UCL and CLRA. See Caro v. Proctor & Gamble,

Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 644, 669 (1993); Wilens v. TD Waterhouse

Group, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 746, 756 (2003); see also Abuan

v. General Electric, Co., 3 F.3d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir.

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1993)(summary judgment proper where plaintiffs had not shown

individual causation and damages for the members of the

plaintiff class). 

For these reasons, the court no longer can find that class

certification on the issue of damages is appropriate. Simply,

the evidence appears to show that damages will be individualized

across the class and the plaintiffs have not offered a

compelling mechanism or formula for aggregating the damages. By

virtue thereof, the plaintiff class and subclass must be

decertified.

By virtue thereof, it appears to the court that the

remaining issues are moot. If the plaintiffs wish to pursue

relief for the named plaintiffs only, they should so indicate

within 15 days and the court will then take up the remaining

issues.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the court ORDERS as follows:

1. The defendants’ motion to decertify the class is

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 28, 2008.

Case 2:06-cv-01947-LKK -GGH Document 211 Filed 03/28/08 Page 17 of 17