Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01161/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01161-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THX, LTD.,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-01161-HSG 

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

On July 11, 2013, Plaintiff THX, Ltd. filed the currently operative first amended complaint

against Defendant Apple, Inc., alleging infringement of two patents entitled “Narrow Profile 

Speaker Configurations and Systems”: (1) United States Patent No. 7,433,483 (the “‘483 patent”) 

and (2) United States Patent No. 8,457,340 (the “‘340 patent”) (together, “patents-in-suit”). Dkt. 

No. 12. The parties seek construction of six terms found in the patents-in-suit. This order follows 

claim construction briefing, a technology tutorial, and a claim construction hearing.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the Court. See Markman v. 

Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). “The purpose of claim construction is to 

determine the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” O2 Micro Int’l 

Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Generally, claim terms should be given their ordinary and customary meaning — i.e., the 

meaning that the terms would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the 

invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). There are 

only two circumstances where a claim is not entitled to its plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a 

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patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows 

the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony 

Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

When construing claim terms, the Federal Circuit emphasizes the importance of intrinsic 

evidence such as the language of the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution 

history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-17. The claim language can “provide substantial guidance as 

to the meaning of particular claim terms,” both through the context in which the claim terms are 

used and by considering other claims in the same patent. Id. at 1314. The specification is likewise 

a crucial source of information. Although it is improper to read limitations from the specification 

into the claims, the specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. 

at 1315 (“[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, 

it is dispositive.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, 

Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[C]laims must be construed so as to be consistent 

with the specification.”).

Courts may also consider extrinsic evidence — technical dictionaries, learned treatises, 

expert and inventor testimony, and the like — to help construe the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 

1317–18. For example, dictionaries may reveal what the ordinary and customary meaning of a 

term would have been to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Frans 

Nooren Afdichtingssystemen B.V. v. Stopaq Amcorr Inc., 744 F.3d 715, 722 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (“Terms generally carry their ordinary and customary meaning in the relevant field at the 

relevant time, as shown by reliable sources such as dictionaries, but they always must be 

understood in the context of the whole document—in particular, the specification (along with the 

prosecution history, if pertinent).”). Extrinsic evidence is, however, “less significant than the 

intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 

F.3d at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Agreed Terms

The parties have agreed to the construction of the following terms:

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Claim Term Agreed Construction

“sound damping material”

(‘483 and ‘340 patents)

“material that absorbs sound waves in an 

audible frequency range”

“acoustically isolating”

(‘483 and ‘340 patents)

“drive unit’s forward radiation is 

isolated from its rearward radiation”

(‘483 patent)

“acoustically separating”

“drive unit’s forward radiation is acoustically 

separated from its rearward radiation”

“sound reflecting surface”

(‘483 and ‘340 patents)

“a non-resonant surface with low sound 

absorption, not made of sound damping 

material”1

See Dkt. Nos. 58 at 1, 84 at 15-16. In light of the parties’ agreement on the construction of these

terms, the Court adopts the parties’ constructions.

B. Disputed Terms

The patents-in-suit, entitled “Narrow Profile Speaker Configurations and Systems,” 

describe “[a] narrow profile speaker unit” comprised of “at least one speaker outputting sound 

towards an internal surface and through a duct with an output terminus, such as a slot, having a 

narrow dimension, effectively changing the cross-section of the speaker’s audio output wave.” 

‘483 patent at 1; ‘340 patent at 1. The purpose of the described inventions is, at least in part, 

“[h]igh-quality stereo reproduction” and the provision of “a uniform sound field” in 

“environments that have physical constraints, limits of size, [and/or] limits of speakers.” See Hr’g 

Tr. at 8:1-9; see also ‘483 patent at 1:20-3:37; ‘340 patent 1:26-3:46. Because the patents-in-suit 

are continuations, but for “some minor changes,” “the specification is identical” across the ‘483 

and ‘340 patents. See Hr’g Tr. at 7:8-12. 

The Court will address each of the six disputed terms in turn.

 

1

The parties stipulated to this construction on the record at the May 25, 2016, claim construction 

hearing. See Dkt. No. 122 (“Hr’g Tr.”) at 79:19-80-21.

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i. “straight path”

THX’s Construction Apple’s Construction

“a sound path along which the sound waves 

are turned and travel to an output slot, 

without curves, bends or angles”

“a sound duct, within which sound waves 

are turned and travel to an output, without

curves, bends, or angles”

“Straight path” appears in claims 1-3, 4-6, 8, 10-11, 16, 18-21, 24, 27-29, and 31-32 of the 

‘483 patent and claims 1-6 and 29-34 of the ‘340 patent. Claim 1 of the ‘483 patent and claim 1 of 

the ‘340 patent are representative of how the term is used in the claim language:

1. A narrow profile sound system, comprising:

a drive unit disposed on a mounting surface, said mounting surface 

forming a barrier acoustically isolating the drive unit’s forward 

radiation from its rearward radiation;

a sound reflecting surface facing the drive unit and substantially 

parallel with the mounting surface; and

sound damping material disposed between said sound reflecting 

surface and the mounting surface, the sound reflecting surface and 

the mounting surface defining a bottom and top of a narrow sound 

duct terminating in an elongate output slot, with the sound damping 

material forming the sides of the sound duct, whereby forward 

radiation from the drive unit is turned at a substantially right angle 

and channeled along a straight path towards the output slot . . .

‘483 patent, claim 1 (emphasis added).

1. A narrow profile sound system, comprising:

a drive unit disposed on a mounting surface, said mounting surface 

forming a barrier acoustically isolating the drive unit’s forward 

radiation from its rearward radiation;

a sound reflecting surface facing the drive unit; and 

a narrow sound duct terminating in an elongate output slot, the 

sound duct being defined by the sound reflective surface, the 

mounting surface, and an interior sidewall disposed between the 

sound reflecting surface and the mounting surface that follows a rear 

contoured edge of the drive unit opposite the sound duct, such that 

the sound duct provides a substantially straight path from the drive 

unit to the output slot...

‘340 patent, claim 1 (emphasis added).

THX asserts that “straight path” refers to the route that sound waves travel, while Apple 

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contends that “straight path” refers to the shape of the duct through which the sound waves travel. 

In support of its construction, THX argues that there is no reason to interpret “path” to 

mean “duct” when the meaning of “path” is relatively clear. Dkt. No. 74 (“THX Opening Br.”) at 

3. Further, THX contends that it would be illogical to equate “path” and “duct,” especially when 

the patent uses the words in the same clause. Id. at 3-4. For example, claim 1 of the ‘340 patent 

recites a speaker design in which “the sound duct provides a substantially straight path from the 

drive unit to the output slot.” ‘340 patent, 30:21-22 (emphasis added). Similarly, claim 29 recites 

turning sound waves such that they are “channeled through the sound duct in a linear path

directly towards the output slot.” Id. at 32:58-60. THX points to Figure 10A of the ‘340 patent,

where the word “path” is used to refer to the route that sound travels where there is no duct, as 

evidence supporting its interpretation. THX Opening Br. at 4.

The crux of Apple’s argument is that during inter partes review (“IPR”) of the patents-insuit, (1) the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) adopted Apple’s proposed construction as 

the broadest reasonable construction and (2) in distinguishing Sadaie as prior art, THX “clearly 

disavowed any construction of ‘straight path’ that would cover a sound duct having bends, curves, 

or angles.” Dkt. No. 84 (“Apple Br.”) at 4-8. According to Apple, because PTAB held that “the 

broadest reasonable interpretation of ‘straight path,’ in the context of the ‘340 patent claims 

consistent with the specification, is ‘a sound duct, within which sound waves are turned and travel 

to an output, without curves, bends, or angles,” Dkt. No. 84-8, Ex. 4 at 9, THX’s proposed 

construction is necessarily unreasonable. Apple Br. at 6. In addition, Apple argues that THX did 

not object to PTAB’s construction and made the following unequivocal disavowals that a “path” 

can be distinct from a “duct”:

 “Sadaie teaches that the sound path 42 should be asymmetric so that 

any acoustic mass moving down the slot will have different 

distances to travel and the length of the sound path cannot be 

determined [], and that an acoustic mass moving down the path will 

be broken up because of the different distances that sound in 

different parts of the path must travel. [Sadaie’s] asymmetric 

dimensions . . . mean that the path contains curves and bends, and 

does not follow a ‘straight path.’” Dkt. No. 84-5, Ex. 1 at 28-29 

(emphasis added).

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 “[A]ll of Sadaie’s embodiments include a sound path 42 that is significantly 

narrower than the sound source space 41, and often the sound path itself also 

undergoes further narrowing at its mid-section.” Id. at 29 (emphasis added).

 “In light of Sadaie’s teaching that the sound path should be asymmetric, this does 

not constitute disclosure of a ‘straight path.’” Id. (emphasis added).

 “Sadaie’s sound path incorporates features that are explicitly designed to 

preclude a straight path. First, Sadaie’s duct narrows substantially from the 

sound source space 41 where the driver is located to the sound path 42. . . . This 

narrowing can be seen in Sadaie’s figures, which show that the width of the sound 

path at its narrowest ranges from between 50 to 25% of the total width of the 

driver in the sound source space. This means that there is no straight path to the 

exit for most of the generated sound.” Dkt. No. 84-6, Ex. 2 at 32-33 (emphasis 

added).

See Apple Br. at 5.

The Court finds that (1) the claim language and specification of the patents-in-suit support 

THX’s construction and (2) THX did not unequivocally disavow its proposed construction during 

IPR proceedings.

The language of the ‘340 patent and figure 10A support ascribing distinct definitions to the 

terms “path” and “duct.” While not conclusive, “[t]here is an inference . . . that two different 

terms used in a patent have different meanings.” Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 

1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 

1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that “[i]f the terms ‘pusher assembly’ and ‘pusher bar’ described a 

single element, one would expect the claim to consistently refer to this element as either a ‘pusher 

bar’ or a ‘pusher assembly,’ but not both, especially not within the same clause.”). The ‘340 

patent not only uses both “path” and “duct,” but juxtaposes the terms within the same clause in

claim one. Consequently, the adoption of Apple’s proposed construction that equates “path” and 

“duct” would result in claim one repetitively instructing that “the sound duct provides a 

substantially straight duct from the drive unit to the output slot.” See ‘340, 30:21-22. Further, 

figure 10A of the patents-in-suit describes a sound “path” independent of any physical structure 

that could be considered a “duct,” and it is thus unlikely that the inventor intended to define a 

“straight path” as a “straight duct.” Based on the foregoing intrinsic evidence, the Court finds that 

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the inference that “path” and “duct” have different meanings is appropriate here.

The Court’s conclusion is not changed by the prosecution history of the patents-in-suit. 

“[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating 

how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the 

course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Phillips v. 

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “The patentee is held to what he declares 

during the prosecution of his patent,” Gillespie v. Dywidag Sys. Int’l, USA, 501 F.3d 1285, 1291 

(Fed. Cir. 2007), but where the disavowal of a claim scope is ambiguous, the doctrine of 

prosecution disclaimers does not apply. TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). Thus, for the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer to attach and “narrow[] the ordinary 

meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of surrender,” the patentee must have 

“unequivocally disavowed a certain meaning to obtain his patent.” Id. 

During the IPR proceedings, THX arguably used the terms “duct” and “path” 

interchangeably. See e.g., Dkt. No. 84-5, Ex. 1 at 29 (“[A]ll of Sadaie’s embodiments include a 

sound path 42 that is significantly narrower than the sound source space 41, and often the sound 

path itself also undergoes further narrowing at its mid-section.”) (emphasis added); id. (“In light 

of Sadaie’s teaching that the sound path should be asymmetric, this does not constitute 

disclosure of a ‘straight path.’”) (emphasis added); Dkt. No. 84-6, Ex. 2 at 32-33 (“Sadaie’s 

sound path incorporates features that are explicitly designed to preclude a straight path. First, 

Sadaie’s duct narrows substantially from the sound source space 41 where the driver is located to 

the sound path 42. . . . This narrowing can be seen in Sadaie’s figures, which show that the width 

of the sound path at its narrowest ranges from between 50 to 25% of the total width of the driver 

in the sound source space.) (emphasis added). However, while THX’s language may not have 

been as precise as it could have been, none of the above statements “unequivocally disavowed” its 

current distinction between “path” and “duct.” This is especially true when the distinction 

between “path” and “duct” was not presented to PTAB. See Dkt. No. 84-8. Because the Court 

finds no evidence that THX “unequivocally disavowed” its proposed construction, the doctrine of 

prosecution disclaimer does not apply. See TomTom, Inc., 790 F.3d at 1325.

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Relatedly, the Court is unpersuaded by the argument that it should adopt Apple’s proposed 

construction because it is consistent with PTAB’s broadest reasonable construction. See Apple Br. 

at 4-8. As an initial matter, Apple conceded at the claim construction hearing that the Court is not 

bound by PTAB’s construction. See Hr’g Tr. at 3:23-5:16; cf. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 

136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (recognizing that the “different evidentiary burdens” in IPR and 

district court proceedings “mean that the possibility of inconsistent results is inherent to Congress’

regulatory design”). In addition, even if the Court were to consider PTAB’s construction, the 

Court would ascribe limited persuasive authority to the PTAB decision because the dispute 

between “straight path” and “straight duct” was not presented. See Dkt. No. 84-8. Rather, PTAB 

considered whether Saidie discloses a “straight path,” finding that Apple had not adequately 

explained “how Sadaie discloses a substantially straight path in light of (1) Sadaie’s textual 

description of sound path 42 as having an asymmetrical or curved shape and (2) Sadaie’s figures 

illustrating paths that are asymmetrical or narrow . . . .” Id. at 15-16. Completely absent from 

PTAB’s opinion is any construction of “straight path” outside of the context of Saidie.

Thus, consistent with the intrinsic evidence, the Court construes “straight path” as “a sound 

path along which the sound waves are turned and travel to an output slot, without curves, bends or 

angles.”

ii. “narrow sound duct”

THX’s Construction Apple’s Construction

“a duct that is narrow in relation to the 

wavelength of the sound to be reproduced”

Plain and ordinary meaning; no

construction necessary.

Alternatively, “a sound duct that has a 

width that is greater than its height”

“Narrow sound duct” appears in claim 1 of the ‘483 patent and claims 1 and 29 of the ‘340 

patent. Claims 2-3 of the ‘483 patent and claims 2-6 and 30-34 of the ‘340 patent are dependent 

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on the independent claims. Claim 1 of the ‘340 patent is representative of how the term is used in 

the claim language:

1. A narrow profile sound system, comprising:

a drive unit disposed on a mounting surface, said mounting surface 

forming a barrier acoustically isolating the drive unit’s forward 

radiation from its rearward radiation;

a sound reflecting surface facing the drive unit; and 

a narrow sound duct terminating in an elongate output slot, the 

sound duct being defined by the sound reflective surface, the 

mounting surface, and an interior sidewall disposed between the 

sound reflecting surface and the mounting surface that follows a rear 

contoured edge of the drive unit opposite the sound duct, such that 

the sound duct provides a substantially straight path from the drive 

unit to the output slot . . .

‘340 patent, claim 1 (emphasis added).

THX contends that the term “narrow sound duct” must be construed in relation to the 

audible sounds to be reproduced, whereas Apple argues that the term should be ascribed its plain 

and ordinary meaning. Alternatively, Apple proposes that “narrow sound duct” be defined as any 

sound duct “that has a width that is greater than its height.”

In support of its argument, THX first asserts that in several dependent claims, it is clear 

that “narrow” describes the dimension perpendicular to the driver. THX Opening Br. at 7 (citing 

‘340 patent, claims 5, 16, 27, 33, 44). Those dependent claims recite “a sound duct . . . 

sufficiently narrow such that an interfering phase shift is avoided between direct and reflecting 

sound waves output by the drive unit.” ‘340 patent, claims 5, 16, 27, 33, 44. In order to be 

“sufficiently narrow such that an interfering phase shift is avoided,” THX argues that the distance 

between the speaker face and the sound reflecting surface must be small in view of the frequencies 

of sound to be reproduced. Id. According to THX, while the language above appears in 

dependent claims that further restrict the degree of narrowness, “narrow” should be construed 

consistently across all claims. Second, THX argues that its construction finds support in the 

patents’ goals of “conveying sound waves through the duct with high quality and minimal 

distortion.” Id. at 8. According to THX, in order to preserve sound quality, the duct must be 

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narrow in an absolute sense such that it is too short “for standing waves to form . . . and produce 

unwanted coloration of the frequency response.” Id. Finally, THX argues that using a short duct 

height to prevent resonances comports with the patents’ teachings to place sound damping 

material on the side and rear walls of the duct to prevent resonances. Id. at 9. THX asserts that 

the lack of sound damping material on the top or bottom of the duct implies that vertical 

resonances will not arise due to the narrow nature of the duct. Id.

Apple makes three main arguments in support of its “plain and ordinary meaning” 

construction: (1) dependent claims that further limit the invention to ducts “sufficiently narrow” 

to avoid an interfering phase shift do not impart special meaning to “narrow sound duct” itself; (2) 

THX’s construction would require the Court to interpret “narrow” differently here than in other 

claims such as “narrow profile sound system” (‘483 patent claim 1) and “wherein sound 

emanating from the sound output aperture is characterized by a wide horizontal dispersion angle 

and a narrow vertical dispersion angle as a result of the elongate shape of the sound output 

aperture” (‘483 patent claim 8); and (3) neither the intrinsic evidence nor knowledge of one skilled 

in the art provides a standard by which to judge whether a duct is “narrow” “in relation to” the 

wavelength of the sound because there is no single “wavelength of the sound” in any embodiment. 

Apple Br. at 9-10.

The Court holds that the specification of the patents-in-suit implies that THX’s 

construction of “narrow sound duct” is correct. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 

1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines 

terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.”). The specification discloses 

that the patents-in-suit are directed to “sound reproduction” in environments that may limit the 

“number, size, quality, characteristics, and arrangement of speakers.” ‘483 patent at 1:30-33. In 

line with this goal, the preferred embodiments describe a speaker in which “the sound reflecting 

surface is spaced at a distance from the front face of the speaker such that the duct or chamber 

defined by the surrounding sidewalls and backwall does not permit soundwaves of the primary 

acoustic output from the speaker to unfold significantly within the confines of the duct,” which 

causes the soundwaves emitted from the output slot “to have sound quality and dynamic range 

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comparable to the soundwaves initially emitted from the speaker itself.” ‘483 patent at 6:18-27. 

Consistent with THX’s construction, a “sound duct” that is “narrow in relation to the wavelength 

of the sound to be reproduced” prevents unfolding and reproduces high-quality sound as 

described. See Dkt. No. 75 (“Elliott Decl.”) ¶ 53. Similarly, the patents-in-suit repeatedly 

disclose the use of sound damping material on the side and rear walls, but not on the top and 

bottom of the duct, to prevent unwanted resonances. See e.g., ‘483 patent at 8:45-60, 10:60-65, 

20:59-64, 25:26-30; see also ‘483 patent at 8:17-28, 8:52-55, 23:11-21. The absence of sound 

damping material on the top and bottom of the duct is consistent with the ultimate goal of 

reproducing high quality sound if the duct is “sufficiently narrow that the vertically oriented 

higher order waves cannot propagate.” See Elliott Decl. ¶ 54. Accordingly, the Court finds that 

the goal disclosed by the specification requires that “narrow sound duct” be understood in the 

context of the soundwaves to be reproduced.

The Court is unpersuaded by Apple’s arguments to the contrary. First, although dependent 

claim 5 of the ‘340 patent recites “a sound duct sufficiently narrow such that an interfering phase 

shift is avoided,” a duct that avoids an interfering phase shift must be even narrower than a duct 

that is narrow in relation to the wavelength to be reproduced. See Hr’g. Tr. at 51:2-54:16. Thus, 

dependent claim 5 of the ‘340 patent is not duplicative of THX’s proposed construction. In 

addition, for the reasons articulated above, the specification makes clear that “narrow sound duct” 

must be construed in light of the goal of the patents-in-suit, even if it requires “narrow” to assume 

different meanings at different points in the claims. See Fin Control Sytems Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, 

Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he same terms appearing in different portions of 

the claims should be given the same meaning unless it is clear from the specification and 

prosecution history that the terms have different meanings at different portions of the claims.”).

Finally, the Court finds Apple’s proposed alternative construction of “narrow sound duct” 

as “a sound duct that has a width that is greater than its height” untenable. THX correctly points 

out that “Apple’s proposal would define a duct as narrow even if it is almost a perfect square with 

a minimally greater width than height.” THX Opening Br. at 11. The Court finds this 

construction of “narrow sound duct” unsupported and inconsistent with even the plain and 

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ordinary meaning of the term.

As such, the Court construes “narrow sound duct” as “a duct that is narrow in relation to 

the wavelength of the sound to be reproduced.”

iii. “sound damping material” terms

There are several “sound damping material” terms that the parties dispute: (1) “sound 

damping material [forming/forms] sides of the sound duct” (‘483 patent); (2) “sound damping 

material [forms/forming] an outer shape of the sound duct” (‘483 patent); (3) “sound damping 

material forms a back wall of the sound duct” (‘483 patent); (4) “said interior sidewall comprises 

sound damping material” (‘340 patent); (5) “said interior sidewall is comprised of sound damping 

material along the entire interior periphery of the sound duct” (‘340 patent).

THX’s Construction Apple’s Construction

Agreed meaning for “sound damping 

material,” i.e., “material that absorbs sound

waves in an audible frequency range.”

The remainder of these phrases should be 

construed according to their plain meaning.

The parties agree that the terms

require material that absorbs sound waves 

in an audio frequency range.

The terms also require that the material that 

absorbs sound waves in an audible 

frequency range is added to the walls of the

sound duct.

These “sound damping material” terms appear in claims 1, 18, 31, and 32 of the ‘483 

patent. Claims 2-3, 19-20, 24, and 27-29 of the ’483 patent are dependent of those claims. The 

terms also appear in claims 3, 4, and 31 of the ‘340 patent. Claims 5-6, 8, 10, 11, 16, and 32 of the 

‘340 patent are dependent of those claims. These phrases provide examples of the varying ways in 

which the patents-in-suit use the terms.

The parties agree that “sound damping material” means “material that absorbs sound 

waves in an audible frequency range.” Dkt. No. 58 (“Joint Claim Construction Statement”) at 1. 

However, THX asserts that the phrases following “sound damping material” — “forming/forms” 

or “comprising/is comprised of” — should be construed according to their plain meaning. THX 

Opening Br. at 11-12. In contrast, Apple contends that the phrases “forming/forms” or 

“comprising/is comprised of” require that the sound damping material be added to the walls of the 

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sound duct as opposed to the walls potentially being made of sound damping material. Apple Br. 

at 10-13.

THX argues that there is no evidence that “forming/forms” or “comprising/is comprised 

of” assumes a special meaning in the field of acoustics or in the patents-in-suit. THX Opening Br. 

at 11-12. Additionally, THX argues that “it is well settled that ‘comprises’ or ‘is comprised of’ 

means ‘including but not limited to’ and covers a structure containing whatever follows 

‘comprises/is comprised of,’ regardless of whether the structure has additional components.” Id.

at 12 (citing CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 

According to THX, the specification discloses the use of sound damping material alone to form 

the sides of the duct in several places. Id. at 12 (citing ‘483 patent at 20:55-57) (“[S]ound 

damping material 1912 is extended to the front 1932 of the speaker mounting structure 1901, 

thereby forming sound ducts 1959, 1960 associated with each of the two speakers 1914, 1915.”). 

Apple articulates four reasons why the patents’ use of “sound damping material” requires 

that the material be added to the walls of the sound ducts: (1) the specification repeatedly 

distinguishes between “sound damping material” and the duct walls; (2) THX argued during IPR 

proceedings that the ‘483 patent “teaches placing sound damping material on the side walls of the 

duct,” Dkt. 84011, Ex. 7 at 28; (3) the specification never discloses a wall made of sound damping 

material, and it would be unworkable to construct a duct using only sound damping material; and 

(4) THX’s specification citations all support Apple’s construction that requires sound damping 

material to be added to the duct walls. Apple Br. at 11-13.

The Court finds that the intrinsic evidence supports THX’s position, and thus holds that the 

“sound damping material” terms do not require construction. While the specification is “the single 

best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,” it is improper to read limitations from the 

specification into the claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315; see also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 

Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the Federal Circuit has “expressly 

rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent 

must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.”). 

Each of THX’s citations to the specification is, at a minimum, consistent with sound 

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damping material forming or comprising a structure independent of a duct wall. See e.g., ‘483 

patent at 10:60-65 (“sound-damping material such as compressed foam surrounds the rear 

contours of the speaker . . . so as to define the sound duct”), 20:59-64 (“two sides of the sound 

duct being defined by the edge of the sound-damping material”), 21:35-39 (“the sound damping

material is tapered towards the front of the speaker mounting structure, thereby forming sound 

ducts”), 22:17-21 (“Rigid side panels, or alternatively struts or other rigid members along the 

sidewall regions and/or, if desired, within the sound-damping material, may optionally be 

provided for mechanical support.”). For example, the specification’s description of sound 

damping material “forming sound ducts” implies that the damping material itself can serve 

independently as one or more sound duct walls. See id. at 21:35-39. Apple’s argument that 

nothing in the specification explicitly discloses a wall made of sound-damping material would 

require the Court to limit the patents-in-suit to the described embodiments in a manner not 

permitted by Federal Circuit precedent. See Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906. Moreover, THX’s 

representations during IPR proceedings that the ‘483 patent “teaches placing sound damping 

materials on the side walls of the duct” do not amount to an “unambiguous disavowal” of a duct 

whose walls are formed solely by sound damping material. See TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d 

1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This is especially true when the distinction between “forming” and 

“adding” was not at issue in the IPR proceedings. See Dkt. No. 88 (“THX Reply Br.”) at 7. 

Thus, consistent with the intrinsic evidence, the Court holds that the phrases 

“forming/forms” or “comprising/is comprised of” do not require construction and should be 

ascribed their plain and ordinary meaning.

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iv. “groundplane audio speaker system”

THX’s Construction Apple’s Construction

“audio speaker system with a drive unit 

that can be configured to face a

groundplane, that is, a flat reflecting 

surface narrowly separated from the origin 

of a direct sound wave”

Plaintiff offers a construction of this 

language because Defendant identified it as

requiring construction. The language is 

drawn from the preamble of the claims. 

Plaintiff does not believe that it is a 

limitation affecting the scope of the patent 

claim or that devices must be demonstrated 

to be “groundplane audio speaker systems”

in order to infringe a claim.

“audio speaker system in which the drive 

unit is configured to face a groundplane”

“Groundplane audio speaker system” appears in claims 4, 18, 21, and 31 of the ‘483 patent 

and all claims dependent upon those claims. Claim 4 of the ‘483 patent is representative of the 

way in which this term is used:

4. A narrow-profile groundplane audio speaker system, comprising,

a speaker housing;

a first drive unit disposed within said speaker housing, said first 

drive unit mounted on a baffle whereby the drive unit’s forward 

radiation is isolated from its rearward radiation; and

one or more support members separating said first drive unit from a 

first sound reflective surface facing said first drive unit; 

wherein the baffle and the first sound reflecting surface define a 

sound duct terminating in a first sound output aperture proximate an 

outer edge of said first drive unit;

whereby forward radiation from said first drive unit is substantially 

unimpeded in the direction of the first sound reflecting surface, and 

is turned at a substantially right angle and travels along a straight 

path to exit the first sound output aperture; and

wherein said first sound output aperture is sufficiently narrow such 

that an interfering phase shift is avoided between the direct and 

reflecting sound waves output from said first drive unit.

‘483 Patent, claim 4 (emphasis added).

The parties dispute three issues with respect to “groundplane audio speaker system”: (1) 

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whether the presence of “groundplane audio speaker system” in the preamble is limiting; (2) if it is 

limiting, whether the speaker must be configured to face a groundplane or optionally can be 

configured to face the groundplane; and (3) whether the “reflecting surface” can be the 

“groundplane.” See Apple Br. at 16.

a. Whether “Groundplane” is Limiting

THX argues that “groundplane” is not limiting because (i) “the preamble does not recite 

structure essential to the claims” and (ii) the patent owner did not rely on the preamble to 

distinguish prior art. THX Opening Br. at 17-18. THX asserts that independent claims 21 and 31 

of the ‘483 patent recite being configured to face a flat surface, and thus treating “groundplane” in 

the preamble as limiting would be redundant. Id. at 18. Similarly, THX argues that it would be 

illogical to treat “groundplane” as limiting when the ‘483 patent’s independent claims (e.g., claim 

4) do not recite the speaker system being configured to face a flat surface but contain dependent 

claims that impose such a limitation (e.g., claim 11). Id. Finally, THX contends that it did not 

rely on “groundplane” to differentiate prior art during IPR proceedings, but instead used the term 

as shorthand to refer to other features explicit in the claim body. Id.

Apple argues that each of the ‘483 patent’s independent claims recites either a “narrow 

profile sound system” (claim 1) or a “narrow-profile groundplane audio speaker system” (claims 

4, 18, 21, 31), and thus, “groundplane” is limiting because it recites an essential structure and is 

necessary to give meaning to the claims. Apple Br. at 16. According to Apple, but for the 

limitation of “groundplane” in claim 18 of the ‘483 patent, the speaker is identical to the “narrow 

profile speaker” recited in claim 1 of the ‘483 patent. Additionally, Apple asserts that during IPR 

proceedings, THX (1) attempted to add the application of the claims to “a novel groundplane 

speaker system” and (2) relied upon “groundplane” as an essential distinguishing structure from 

the Phillips speaker. Id. at 17-18.

“Whether to treat a preamble term as a claim limitation is determined on the facts of each 

case in light of the claim as a whole and the invention described in the patent.” Am. Med. Sys., 

Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). In general, “the preamble does not limit the claims” unless “it recites essential structure 

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or steps or if it is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Id. A preamble is not 

limiting “when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the 

preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention.” Catalina Mktg. 

Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A preamble that is 

“reasonably susceptible to being construed to be merely duplicative of the limitations in the body 

of the claim (and was not clearly added to overcome a rejection)” is not a separate limitation 

because “in general, the purpose of a claim preamble is to give context for what is being described 

in the body of the claim.” Symantec Corp. v. Computer Associates Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 

1288-89 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, “clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to 

distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation 

because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.” 

Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808.

The Court finds that during IPR proceedings, THX explicitly relied on “groundplane” to 

distinguish the Phillips ‘170 patent, and thus “groundplane” is a limiting term. See Gillespie, 501 

F.3d at 1291 (“The patentee is held to what he declares during the prosecution of his patent.”). 

As an initial matter, independent claims 21 and 31 of the ‘483 patent describe a speaker 

housing “adapted to rest stably on a flat surface such that said drive unit faces towards the flat 

surface.” See e.g., ‘483 patent at 32:17-19, 32:60-62. Accordingly, the preamble’s recitation of a 

“groundplane audio speaker system” is entirely duplicative of the independent claims, counseling 

against finding that the preamble is a limitation. See Catalina, 289 F.3d at 809 (stating that a 

preamble is not limiting “when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such 

that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed 

invention”). 

However, during IPR proceedings, THX explicitly argued that “[u]nlike the invention of 

claim 4, Phillips ’170 is not directed to a groundplane speaker at all, but rather to a wall-mounted 

speaker with substantially different intended sound attributes.” See Dkt. No. 74-4 at 15. Thus, 

according to THX, Phillips “does not face a groundplane, but rather faces away from the wall on 

which the speaker is mounted, and therefore would not have the same benefits as a groundplane 

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speaker.” Id. Although THX asserts that “groundplane” was being used as “shorthand to refer to 

other features explicit in the claim body,” see THX Opening Br. at 18, the applicant then 

continued to list the features explicit in the claim body as additional bases for distinguishing 

Phillips. See Dkt. No. 74-4 at 15-16 (“Also, the location of the drive unit 7 in Phillips ‘170 is in 

the center for large ‘sound diffusion receptacle area 22’ . . . . In addition, the wall-mounted 

speaker in Phillips ‘170 includes a ‘bass resonance chambers 21 . . . .”) (emphasis added). For 

these reasons, the Court holds that THX must be held to its representations during IPR 

proceedings and construes “groundplane audio speaker system” as a limiting term. See Gillespie, 

501 F.3d at 1291.

b. Whether the Speaker Must Be Configured to Face a Groundplane

Next, the parties dispute whether the audio speaker system taught by the ‘483 patent must 

be configured to face a groundplane or optionally can be configured to face a groundplane. THX 

argues that the intrinsic evidence teaches that the speaker is “capable of being placed on the 

reflecting surface” but “in no way requires” the speaker to be placed on such a surface. Hr’g Tr. at 

91:11-19. Apple argues that THX expressly disclaimed any speaker that is not configured to face 

a groundplane when it distinguished the Phillips speaker during IPR proceedings. Id. at 95:1-9.

The Court finds that the intrinsic evidence supports a construction in which the speaker 

must be capable of facing a groundplane, but need not be configured to face a groundplane in all 

instances. The patent’s specification explicitly teaches that the groundplane speaker can be 

oriented to face directions other than at the applicable groundplane. See ‘483 patent at 14:53-56 

(“[T]he speaker unit may also be oriented in a different direction; for example, it may be oriented 

upwards with the speaker housing suitably shaped to provide a stable base surface.”). Given this 

unequivocal description of a preferred embodiment facing a direction other than towards the 

groundplane, the intrinsic evidence counsels against requiring the speaker to be configured to face

a groundplane. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“Usually, [the specification] is dispositive.”).

The Court also holds that THX did not clearly and unambiguously disclaim speakers that 

do not face a groundplane during IPR proceedings. See TomTom, Inc., 790 F.3d at 1325 (holding 

that for the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer to apply, the patentee must have “unequivocally 

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disavowed a certain meaning to obtain his patent”). During IPR, THX distinguished Phillips ‘170

on the basis that it is a “wall-mounted speaker with substantially different intended sound 

attributes.” Dkt. No. 74-4 at 15. Thus, THX argued that Phillips was distinguishable both because 

it does not face a groundplane and because it possesses “substantially different intended sound 

attributes.” Id. The Court finds that nothing about THX’s representation qualifies as an 

unequivocal disavowal of a speaker unit that possesses the same attributes as the groundplane 

speaker taught by the ‘483 patent, but is not configured to face a groundplane.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the “groundplane audio speaker system” must be capable 

of facing a groundplane, but optionally can be configured to face in a different direction.

c. Whether the “Reflecting Surface” Can Be the “Groundplane”

Finally, the parties appear to dispute whether the “groundplane” may be the interior 

“reflecting surface” that immediately faces the drive unit. See ‘483 patent at 30:31-33. Apple 

contends that the “groundplane” and the internal “reflecting surface” immediately facing the drive 

unit must be distinct, see Apple Br. at 19-10, whereas THX appears to argue that one surface can 

serve as both the “groundplane” and the “reflecting surface,” see Hr’g Tr. at 102:5-104:19.

The Court holds that the intrinsic evidence mandates that the “groundplane” and the 

internal “reflecting surface” immediately facing the drive unit be construed as two distinct 

surfaces. As Apple argues, the asserted independent claims of the ‘483 patent recite a “sound 

reflecting surface,” regardless of whether the referenced unit is labeled a “narrow profile” or a 

“narrow-profile groundplane” speaker system. See Apple Br. at 19. For example, independent 

claim one, which is not described as a “groundplane” unit, teaches “a sound reflecting surface 

facing the drive unit and substantially parallel with the mounting surface.” See ‘483 patent at 

29:66-67. Independent claim 21, which in contrast describes a groundplane system, similarly 

teaches “a substantially flat sound reflecting surface facing said drive unit,” but separately

describes a flat surface on which the entire unit rests. See id. at 32:5-9, 32:17-19. It would be 

illogical to conclude that the internal “sound reflecting surface” that is present in both nongroundplane and groundplane speakers alike somehow distinguishes the groundplane speaker unit. 

Rather, the distinction is the additional, external sound reflecting surface that the unit may rest 

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upon. The Court’s conclusion is further supported by the specification, which makes clear that a 

unit “may be referred to as a ground plane speaker unit” because “it may be particularly 

advantageous for, e.g., improving the sound quality of loudspeakers intended to be placed on a 

table, desk or similar reflecting surface that is relatively large compared to the wavelength of the 

radiated sound.” See id. at 13:21-25. This reference in the specification clarifies that there is a 

relatively larger external reflecting surface — the groundplane — which is distinct from the sound 

reflecting surface internal to the speaker unit.

As such, the Court concludes that the intrinsic evidence supports a finding that the 

“groundplane” and the internal “sound reflecting surface” immediately facing the drive unit are 

distinct.

Given the Court’s conclusions above, the Court construes “groundplane audio speaker 

system” as “audio speaker system with a drive unit that can be configured to face a groundplane, 

that is, a flat reflecting surface that is distinct from the internal reflecting surface immediately 

facing the drive unit.”

v. “substantially” / “substantial”2

THX’s Construction Apple’s Construction

Plain meaning Indefinite

Some variation of “substantial” or “substantially” appears in claims 1-6, 8, 10-11, 16, 18-

21, 24, 27-29, and 31-32 of the ‘483 patent.3 Variations also appear in claims 1-6 and 29-34 of the 

‘340 patent. Claim 1 of the ‘483 patent is illustrative of how the terms are used:

1. A narrow profile sound system, comprising:

a drive unit disposed on a mounting surface, said mounting surface 

 

2 Apple proposes the following “complete” terms: “substantially flat”; “substantially following a 

curved contour”; “substantially level”; “substantially parallel”; “substantially right angle”; 

“substantially straight path”; “substantially unimpeded.”

3 Although THX treats “sound output is increased without substantial loss in smoothness or 

evenness of response over audio frequency ranges” separately, the Court includes the term in its 

analysis of the other “substantially” terms.

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forming a barrier acoustically isolating the drive unit’s forward 

radiation from its rearward radiation;

a sound reflecting surface facing the drive unit and substantially 

parallel with the mounting surface; and

sound damping material disposed between said sound reflecting 

surface and the mounting surface, the sound reflecting surface and 

the mounting surface defining a bottom and top of a narrow sound 

duct terminating in an elongate output slot, with the sound damping 

material forming the sides of the sound duct, whereby forward 

radiation from the drive unit is turned at a substantially right angle

and channeled along a straight path towards the output slot . . .

‘483 Patent, claim 1 (emphasis added).

THX asserts that “substantially” can be ascribed its plain meaning, whereas Apple argues 

that the term is indefinite.

In support of its indefiniteness argument, Apple asserts that the intrinsic evidence provides 

no objective boundaries for defining the “substantially” terms and fails to teach how to measure 

such claims. See Apple Br. at 20-23. THX opposes, contending that “the patent specification 

provides a standard by which a person of ordinary skill can assess the scope of the limitation 

modified by ‘substantial’ or ‘substantially.’” See THX Opening Br. at 21.

In order to survive an indefiniteness challenge, a patent’s claims “viewed in light of the 

specification and prosecution history” must “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the 

invention with reasonable certainty.” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 

1378 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 569 (2015). “The definiteness requirement, so 

understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable.” Id. 

Definiteness is assessed from the perspective of someone skilled in the art at the time the patent 

was filed. Id. A defense of invalidity due to indefiniteness must be proven by clear and 

convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). If intrinsic 

evidence provides “a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill 

in the art to determine the scope of the claims, the claims are not indefinite” even though they use 

a descriptor such as “substantially” “without reference to a precise numerical measurement.” See 

Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

The Court holds that Apple has not established by clear and convincing evidence that each 

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of the “substantially” terms is indefinite. Dr. Elliott, on behalf of THX, has provided a contextspecific analysis of each of the “substantially” terms to highlight the portions of the specification 

that inform a person of ordinary skill in the art regarding the scope of the invention with 

reasonable certainty. See Elliott Decl. ¶¶ 73-98. In response, Dr. Kyriakakis, on behalf of Apple, 

does not dispute that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to ascertain general 

guidelines for the “substantially” terms from the specification’s design goals and examples. See 

generally Dkt. No. 84-1 (“Kyriakakis Decl.”) ¶¶ 93-104. Rather, for each of the “substantially” 

terms, Dr. Kyriakakis maintains that the term is indefinite for failure to explicitly define variations 

that fall within the claim language. See generally id.

For example, in reference to a “substantially flat sound reflecting surface,” Dr. Elliott 

describes how the specification discloses design goals, pictures, and exemplars of “substantially 

flat” surfaces. See Elliott Decl. ¶¶ 74-78. He highlights portions of the specification that 

explicitly identify the ability “to influence the directivity of the sound waves toward the output 

slot or aperture and/or to reduce [sic] potentially interference” as an important design goal. See id. 

(citing ‘483 patent at 3:32-36, 8:17-27, 20:29-33, 20:45-58, 22:64-23:3). From the examples and 

the stated design goal, Dr. Elliott asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would

understand that the sound reflecting surface should be substantially flat because surfaces that are 

uneven will tend to scatter sound waves and promote, rather than limit, sound interference . . . .” 

Id. ¶ 75. In other words, any design which deviates sufficiently from a completely flat surface 

such that it begins to promote sound interference will fall outside of the claim language. Rather 

than dispute this rationale, Dr. Kyriakakis asserts that the patents-in-suit “do not identify what 

variation from ‘flat’ or ‘parallel’ would still achieve the purported design goals, while deviating 

from the configuration shown in the patent figures.” See Kyriakakis Decl. ¶ 98. However, the 

Federal Circuit does not require the identification of precise variations that fall within the claim 

language, holding that “reference to a precise numerical measurement” is unnecessary. See Enzo, 

599 F.3d at 1335. Rather, some gray area may remain so long as a person of ordinary skill in the 

art can define the scope of the claims with reasonable certainty. See Nautilus, 783 F.3d at 1378.

Dr. Kyriakakis’s expert report continues this pattern of requiring specific examples 

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defining the outer limits of the claim language for each of the “substantially” terms despite the 

Federal Circuit’s guidance that such precision is unnecessary. See Enzo, 599 F.3d at 1335. For 

this reason, the Court finds that Apple has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a 

person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to determine the scope of the “substantially” 

terms from the general guidelines and examples disclosed by the intrinsic evidence. Accordingly, 

the Court holds that the “substantially” terms are not indefinite and should be ascribed their plain 

and ordinary meaning. See id. (finding that “not interfering substantially” is not indefinite when 

the intrinsic evidence “provides a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a person of 

ordinary skill in the art to determine the scope of the claims”).

vi. “proximate”

THX’s Construction Apple’s Construction

Plain meaning Indefinite

“Proximate” appears in claims 4 and 31 of the ‘483 patent. Claims 5-6, 8, 10, 11, 16, and 

32 are dependent on those claims. Claim 4 of the ‘483 patent is representative of how the term is 

used:

4. A narrow-profile groundplane audio speaker system, comprising,

a speaker housing;

a first drive unit disposed within said speaker housing, said first 

drive unit mounted on a baffle whereby the drive unit’s forward 

radiation is isolated from its rearward radiation; and

one or more support members separating said first drive unit from a 

first sound reflective surface facing said first drive unit; 

wherein the baffle and the first sound reflecting surface define a 

sound duct terminating in a first sound output aperture proximate

an outer edge of said first drive unit;

whereby forward radiation from said first drive unit is substantially 

unimpeded in the direction of the first sound reflecting surface, and 

is turned at a substantially right angle and travels along a straight 

path to exit the first sound output aperture; and

wherein said first sound output aperture is sufficiently narrow such 

that an interfering phase shift is avoided between the direct and 

reflecting sound waves output from said first drive unit.

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‘483 Patent, claim 4 (emphasis added).

Apple contends that “proximate” is indefinite, whereas THX asserts that “proximate” can 

be given its plain and ordinary meaning.

In support of its indefiniteness argument, Apple asserts that the ‘483 patent’s only use of 

“proximate” is in independent claims 4 and 31 themselves, and thus there is no indication of how 

one of ordinary skill in the art would measure proximity. Apple Br. at 23-24. Further, Apple 

argues that THX’s plain meaning construction of “proximate” as “very near or close” contradicts 

Dr. Elliott’s plain meaning definition as “near or close,” thus underscoring the indefiniteness of 

the term. Id. at 24-25. 

To explain the use of “proximate” in claim 4, THX points to the portion of the 

specification that describes placing the speaker “as near to the output slot as possible” if the 

speaker handles “significant high frequency signal components.” See ‘483 patent at 24:25-27. 

THX asserts that this language would inform a person of ordinary skill in the art to assess 

proximity in relation to the wavelength of the higher frequencies to be produced by the speaker 

system. THX Opening Br. at 25. With respect to claim 31, THX contends that “lengthwise 

proximate” is meant to minimize the phase differences with respect to direct and reflected waves. 

THX Reply Br. at 15. Finally, THX argues that Apple’s expert, Dr. Vipperman, ascribed the 

ordinary meaning of “close” to “proximate” during IPR proceedings. THX Opening Br. at 25.

The Court holds that Apple has not established by clear and convincing evidence the ‘483 

patent’s use of “proximate” is indefinite. The term’s plain and ordinary meaning governs, and no 

construction is necessary. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (“[T]he words of a claim are generally 

given their ordinary and customary meaning.”).

a. Independent Claim 4

The ‘483 patent’s specification provides sufficient guidance regarding its use of

“proximate” in claim 4 such that one of ordinary skill in the art would be reasonably certain about

the scope of the invention. For example, the ‘483 patent includes several examples of speakers 

close, or “proximate,” to the sound output aperture. See e.g., ‘483 patent, Figures 1, 2B, 3A-3C, 

19A. The specification provides further insight into the definition of “proximate” by teaching that 

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the “size and shape of the sound ducts” and sound damping material may need to be manipulated 

to avoid standing waves within the sound duct “in order to yield the optimal sound quality for a 

given type of speakers.” Id. at 23:7-21. Specifically, if the speaker “is a tweeter or else handles 

significant high frequency signal components, it is generally desirable to place the speaker as near 

to the output slot as possible.” Id. at 24:24-27. In the context of the ‘483 patent’s goal of turning 

sound while maintaining “sound quality and dynamic range comparable to the soundwaves 

initially emitted from the speaker itself,” ‘483 patent at 6:18-27, the above guidance plausibly 

instructs one of ordinary skill in the art that proximity should be assessed in “comparison with the 

wavelengths to be reproduced and the width of the speaker and duct.” See Elliott Decl. ¶ 67.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Apple has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the 

‘483 patent’s use of “proximate” in claim 4 is indefinite. See Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 

564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). 

b. Independent Claim 31

The ‘483 patent also adequately provides one of ordinary skill in the art reasonable 

certainty regarding the scope of “proximate” as used in claim 31. The specification teaches that 

“the radiating apertures defined by ducts are preferably close enough to the sound reflecting 

surface that an interfering phase shift between the direct and reflecting soundwaves is not 

induced.” ‘483 patent at 14:41-44. According to the specification, placing the output apertures 

“close enough” to the sound reflecting surface avoids “comb filtering” or “a roughness or 

coloration to the perceived sound quality.” See id. at 14:20-26. Independent claim 31’s explicit 

goal of increasing sound output “without substantial loss in smoothness or evenness of response

over audio frequency range,” see id. at 33:8-11, makes clear that the goal of placing the sound 

output aperture “lengthwise proximate the flat surface” is the avoidance of comb filtering as 

described by the specification. Accordingly, the Court finds that the specification provides one 

skilled in the art reasonable certainty regarding how to place the sound output aperture 

“lengthwise proximate the flat surface” to avoid an interfering phase shift and thus achieve the 

goals of claim 31. Apple has thus failed to prove that the use of “proximate” in claim 31 is 

indefinite by clear and convincing evidence. See Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 

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95 (2011). 

The Court finds that Apple has failed to prove that “proximate” is indefinite as used in the 

‘483 patent, and that the term should be ascribed its plain and ordinary meaning. See Phillips, 

415 F.3d at 1312 (“[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary 

meaning.”).

III. CONCLUSION

The Court construes the disputed terms as follows:

Term Patent(s) Construction

“straight path” ‘483 and ’340 patents “a sound path along which the

sound waves are turned and

travel to an output slot, 

without curves, bends or 

angles”

“narrow sound duct” ‘483 and ’340 patents “a duct that is narrow in

relation to the wavelength of

the sound to be reproduced”

“sound damping material” terms ‘483 and ’340 patents “sound damping material” 

means “material that absorbs 

sound waves in an audible 

frequency range”; 

the remainder of the phrases 

do not require construction 

and should be ascribed their 

plain and ordinary meaning 

“groundplane audio speaker system” ‘483 patent “audio speaker system with a 

drive unit that can be 

configured to face a 

groundplane, that is, a flat 

reflecting surface that is 

distinct from the internal 

reflecting surface immediately 

facing the drive unit”

“substantially” / “substantial” ‘483 and ’340 patents No construction necessary; the 

terms shall be ascribed their 

plain and ordinary meaning

“proximate” ‘483 patent No construction necessary; the 

term shall be ascribed its plain 

and ordinary meaning

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The Court sets a case management conference for November 29, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. The 

parties are directed to meet and confer and file a joint case management statement by November 

22, 2016. In particular, the parties should discuss whether they agree on a proposed case schedule.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 4, 2016

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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