Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02260/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02260-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT E. THOMPSON, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

J. HARTLEY, et al., 

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:10-cv-02260-LJO-MJS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO:

1) GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(ECF No. 30.)

2) DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME

(ECF No. 50.)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 & 4.) The action 

proceeds on an excessive force claim against Defendants Tercero and Campbell. (ECF 

No. 22.)

Before the Court is Defendant Tercero’s August 7, 2014 motion for summary 

judgment on exhaustion grounds. (ECF No. 30.) Defendant Campbell joined the 

motion. (ECF Nos. 37 & 39.) Plaintiff opposes the motion (ECF No. 33.), and 

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Defendants filed a joint reply. (ECF No. 41.) 

Also, before the Court is Plaintiff’s third motion for an extension of time to 

authenticate the exhibits attached to his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. (ECF No. 50.)

These matters are deemed submitted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Any party may move for summary judgment, and “[t]he [C]ourt shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Each party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be 

supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not 

limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) “showing that the 

materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that 

an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed R. Civ. 

P. 56(c)(1). 

“Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the 

movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other 

than for the moving party.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must point 

to "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).

In evaluating the evidence, “the [C]ourt does not make credibility determinations 

or weigh conflicting evidence,” and “it draws all inferences in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Id.

III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff complains in his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) that Defendants 

used excessive force against him on December 27, 2007, while he was a prisoner at 

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Avenal State Prison (“ASP”). (ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff alleges that while handcuffed 

behind his back, Defendants picked him up by the handcuffs and injured his shoulder. 

Defendants then escorted Plaintiff to the prison clinic where Defendant Tercero threw 

him to the floor and continued to hit and kick Plaintiff even though he was restrained 

and compliant. 

IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard -- Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) stipulates, “No action shall be brought 

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by 

a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Therefore, prisoners are required to exhaust all available administrative remedies prior 

to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). 

“The primary purpose of a [prisoner’s administrative] grievance is to alert the 

prison to a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.” 

Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). “A grievance need not include 

legal terminology or legal theories unless they are in some way needed to provide 

notice of the harm being grieved. A grievance also need not contain every fact 

necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal claim.” Id. Instead, the grievance 

must alert “‘the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought,’” id. at 

1120 (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)), and must give the 

prison an opportunity “to reach the merits of the issue.” Id. at 1119.

A motion for summary judgment is the proper means to raise a prisoner's failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 

2014). Defendants have the burden of proving Plaintiff failed to exhaust available 

administrative remedies. Id. A defendant's burden of establishing an inmate's failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies has been characterized by the Ninth Circuit as “very 

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low.” Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012). The “defendant need only 

show the existence of . . . [a grievance procedure] that the plaintiff did not use.” Id.

(citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778, n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)).

“If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows 

a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. If material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be 

denied, and the district court should decide “disputed factual questions relevant to 

exhaustion . . . in the same manner a judge rather than a jury decides disputed factual 

questions relevant to jurisdiction and venue.” Id. at 1170-71. 

B. Factual Background

The excessive force claim alleged in Plaintiff’s SAC occurred on December 27, 

2007, while he was a prisoner at ASP. Plaintiff resided at ASP until March 9, 2009, 

when he was transferred to Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”).

At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was required to submit an appeal within fifteen 

working days of the event or decision being appealed. Appeals were to go through the 

following processes: 1) informal resolution, 2) first formal level of appeal, 3) second 

level appeal by the institution head, and then 4) third level appeal by the Director of 

CDCR.

CDCR has no record of an excessive force appeal having been submitted by 

Plaintiff while he was housed at ASP.

Plaintiff asserts that from November 2007 to at least July 2008 he suffered from a 

psychotic state that prevented him from filing an administrative appeal. Additionally, 

Plaintiff attests to having feared retaliation by Defendants if he had filed a grievance 

against them in the period from the date of the incident to the date of his March 2009 

transfer from ASP to CSP. 

Plaintiff submitted an appeal form on April 19, 2009. It complains that his inability 

to receive proper medication put him “in a state of insanity from December 07 to July 

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08.” (ECF No. 33 at 50). Plaintiff further complained of being “accused of grabbing 

correctional officer (Tacero) while [he] was in this state of mental disorder, dysfunction,” 

and that he suffered “from a ‘torn rotator cuff.’ Right Shoulder”. (ECF No. 33 at 51.) On 

April 22, 2009, Plaintiff received a response that his appeal was being screened out as 

a duplicate to a CDC 1824 medical appeal submitted on the same date.

On October 4, 2009, Plaintiff submitted another appeal form complaining of the 

same issues as his April 19, 2009 appeal. Plaintiff received a response that his appeal 

was being returned due to a time constraint violation.

C. Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

CDCR has no record of Plaintiff submitting an excessive force appeal within fifteen days 

of the alleged incident. They also claim that Plaintiff’s allegation in his SAC that he 

submitted an inmate appeal that was dismissed twice for untimeliness is effectively a 

concession of his failure to exhaust. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has not met 

his burden of demonstrating that administrative remedies were not available to him. 

Plaintiff’s claim of being in a psychotic state is unsupported by anything other than his 

inadmissible medical opinion and exhibits and his self-serving testimony. Likewise, 

even if fear of retaliation was a grounds for failing to exhaust, Plaintiff’s generalized 

allegation does not support such a claim. Finally, even if the Court accepts Plaintiff’s 

reasons for failing to appeal prior to March 9, 2009, his April 2009 appeal was still

untimely and fails to address his claims of excessive force against Defendants.

Plaintiff argues that he was prevented from filing an administrative appeal within 

fifteen days of December 27, 2007 because he was in a psychotic state until July 2008 

and feared for his safety until March 9, 2009 when he transferred to CSP. He contends 

that his April 19, 2009 appeal is the relevant appeal of his SAC claims and that it was 

not his fault that it was not processed through all three levels of review and denied as 

duplicative and untimely. 

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D. Analysis

Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that there was an available 

administrative process and that Plaintiff failed to exhaust it. 

Plaintiff concedes that there was an administrative grievance process in place at 

the time of the incident, but alleges that he was excused from complying with it until 

April 19, 2009. (ECF No. 33 at 11-12, 16-17). Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff 

had valid excuses for not filing his appeal prior to March 9, 2009, he has not met his 

burden of demonstrating the procedure was unavailable to him from March 9, 2009 until 

April 19, 2009 when he filed a grievance. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (the prisoner 

bears the burden “to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his 

particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies 

effectively unavailable to him”). Plaintiff concedes that he was required to submit an 

appeal within fifteen days. (ECF No. 33 at 16.). Yet, he offers no justification for his 

failure to do so even though he was no longer in a psychotic state or in fear of retaliation 

for filing a grievance.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s April 19, 2009 grievance fails to alert “‘the prison to the 

nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.’” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120 (quoting 

Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)). The grievance fails to mention 

Defendant Campbell’s name or any alleged actions by him. While the grievance 

discusses the December 27, 2007 incident of Defendant Tercero grabbing Plaintiff, it 

does not allege Defendant Tercero was too rough or used an excessive amount of force 

against Plaintiff or any other wrongdoing on the behalf of Defendant Tercero. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED.

V. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

Defendants argue in their reply that Plaintiff did not properly authenticate the 

progress notes and medical exhibits attached to his opposition in support of his 

allegation that he was suffering from a psychotic state. Plaintiff requests a third 

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extension of time to authenticate his exhibits. (ECF No. 50.) In light of the Court’s 

finding that even if Plaintiff’s mental state rendered the administrative grievance process 

unavailable to him until July 2008, he still failed to timely file an appeal and exhaust his 

administrative remedies, the authentication of Plaintiff’s documents will not alter the 

Court’s recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to authenticate said documents is 

DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of proving Plaintiff failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies. Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 30.) be 

GRANTED. Given the Court’s findings and recommendation, Plaintiff’s third motion for 

an extension of time is DENIED. (ECF No. 50.)

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States 

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and 

Recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a 

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served 

and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 

v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 23, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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