Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01237/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The petition is signed on May 27, 2011, but was marked as

received by the United States District Court on June 23, 2011.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rene Orivel Sanchez, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-01237 PHX NVW (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Therese Schroeder, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEAL V. WAKE:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus on or about May 27, 2011.1 Respondents

filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Answer”) (Doc. 9) on August 10, 2011. Petitioner filed a

reply to the answer to his petition on August 17, 2011. See

Doc. 10.

I Procedural History

Petitioner is serving a “flat time” sentence of seven

years imprisonment imposed in Maricopa County docket number CR

2006–006577. The sentence is being served concurrently with a

three and one-half year sentence imposed in Maricopa County

docket number CR 2004–133044. 

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -2-

On November 22, 2004, a Maricopa County grand jury

indicted Petitioner on one count of aggravated assault,

classified as a Class 3 dangerous felony, and one count of

assault, classified as a Class 1 misdemeanor. See Answer, Exh.

A. The indictment charged Petitioner had used a handgun in the

commission of the aggravated assault. See id., Exh. A. On

December 23, 2004, the state amended the indictment to allege

aggravating circumstances other than prior convictions, i.e.,

that the offenses implicated the infliction of serious physical

injury and that Petitioner had used a handgun in the commission

of the offenses. Id., Exh. B. 

On April 11, 2005, pursuant to a written plea

agreement, Petitioner agreed to enter a guilty plea to one count

of aggravated assault as a Class 3 domestic violence felony.

Id., Exh. C. In consideration for the guilty plea, the state

dropped the allegation of dangerousness and dismissed the second

count of the 2004 indictment. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement

noted the minimum, maximum, and presumptive sentences for this

offense and clearly averred that the state and Petitioner had

reached “NO AGREEMENTS” as to sentencing. Id., Exh. C.

On May 9, 2005, pursuant to Petitioner’s guilty plea,

the state trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and

placed Petitioner on probation for a term of five years pursuant

to his conviction for aggravated assault. Id., Exh. D. On

January 31, 2006, the state court continued Petitioner on

probation following resolution of allegations of a probation

violation. Id., Exh. F. 

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -3-

On October 20, 2006, following a finding of violation

of probation due to being found guilty on a new criminal charge,

the state court revoked Petitioner’s probation and sentenced

Petitioner to a three and one-half year term of incarceration in

CR 2004–133044. Id., Exh. H. The trial court credited

Petitioner with 382 days of pre-sentence incarceration and

ordered the sentence be served concurrently with a sentence

imposed in CR 2006–006577. Petitioner received notice of his

right of review after conviction. Id., Exh. I.

In a Maricopa County grand jury indictment in docket

number CR 2006–006577, with regard to crimes alleged to have

been committed on January 10, 2006, the state charged Petitioner

with one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale, a

Class 2 felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class 6

felony, and misconduct involving weapons, a Class 4 felony. See

id., Exh. J. The state amended the indictment to allege that

the offenses were committed while Petitioner was released from

confinement and aggravating circumstances other than prior

convictions and the existence of prior felony convictions. Id.,

Exh. K. 

On September 20, 2006, pursuant to a written plea

agreement, Petitioner entered a guilty plea in Maricopa County

docket number CR 2006–006577 to one count of possession of

methamphetamine for sale, a Class 2 felony. Id., Exh. L. The

state agreed to dismiss the charges of possession of drug

paraphernalia and misconduct involving weapons, the allegation

of a prior felony conviction, and the allegation that the crimes

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -4-

were committed while Petitioner was on release from custody.

Id., Exh. L. The plea agreement notes that the presumptive

sentence for the crime was “10.0 calendar years,” that the

minimum sentence was five “calendar years,” and that the maximum

sentence was 15 “calender years.” Id., Exh. L. The plea

agreement states that Petitioner would be sentenced “to the

Arizona Department of Corrections for a period of 7 yrs.” Id.,

Exh. L. 

On October 20, 2006, pursuant to his conviction for

dangerous drugs for sale in CR 2006-006577, the trial court

imposed a sentence of seven years incarceration. Id., Exh. M.

The trial court credited Petitioner with 283 days of

pre-sentence incarceration and ordered the seven-year sentence

be served concurrently with the three and one-half year sentence

imposed in CR 2004–133044. Petitioner received notice of his

right of review after conviction. Id., Exh. N. 

More than two and a half years later, on August 4,

2009, Petitioner initiated an action for state post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

regarding his 2006 conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. O. In

his action for post-conviction relief Petitioner asserted that

on December 19, 2006, he received a time computation sheet

indicating he would receive good time credits and that, on May

11, 2009, he was notified that he was serving a sentence of

“flat time” or “calendar years.” Id., Exh. O. Petitioner

alleged that, prior to entering his guilty plea in the 2006 case

his attorney encouraged him to sign the plea agreement, telling

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The letter from counsel attached to Petitioner’s state

post-conviction pleadings also states that, pursuant to a new statute

applicable to crimes committed after January 1, 2006, Petitioner’s

conviction on any charge of possession of methamphetamine for sale

would result in a sentence which would not include eligibility for

early release. See Answer, Exh. O at Exh. C.

3 Rule 32.4(a) provides: “Any notice not timely filed may

only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h).”

Rule 32.1 provides, inter alia:

e. Newly discovered material acts probably exist

and such facts probably would have changed the

verdict or sentence. Newly discovered material

facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were

discovered after the trial. 

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in

securing the newly discovered material facts. 

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment,

unless the impeachment evidence substantially

undermines testimony which was of critical

significance at trial such that the evidence

probably would have changed the verdict or

sentence. 

-5-

Petitioner that he would not be sentenced to “flat time” but

would be “eligible for early release.” Id., Exh. O.2 

On November 20, 2009, the state court ruled that

Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings were untimely.

Id., Exh. P. The trial court concluded that Petitioner had not

established his Rule 32 action was timely because he had “newly

discovered evidence.” Id., Exh. P.3 The trial court determined

that Petitioner could have previously discovered the nature of

his sentence through due diligence. Id., Exh. P. Petitioner

filed a motion for rehearing of the trial court’s denial of

relief, which was subsequently denied by the state court. Id.,

Exh. Q & Exh. R. 

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -6-

On January 11, 2010, Petitioner sought review of the

trial court’s decision denying relief, which request was denied

by the Arizona Court of Appeals on May 5, 2011. Id., Exh. S &

Exh. T. On August 30, 2010, Petitioner filed a second notice of

post-conviction relief, and a declaration and a motion to modify

his sentence. Id., Exh. U & Exh. V. The state court ruled that

the proceedings were untimely. Id., Exh. V. 

Petitioner filed a request for clarification and a

motion for summary disposition. Id., Exh. Y & Exh. Z. On

January 21, 2011, the state court ruled that the Petitioner’s

most recent claims were untimely, precluded, and not colorable.

Id., Exh. AA. On January 20, 2011, Petitioner filed another

notice of post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. BB. On February 8,

2011, the state court denied the pleading as moot. Id., Exh.

CC.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts that

he agreed to sign the plea agreement in the 2006 case because

his lawyer assured him that he would not receive a “flat time”

sentence. Petitioner summarily contends that his Fourteenth and

Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Petitioner asks to have

his plea agreement vacated or that the Court order the state to

alter his sentence to allow Petitioner to be released prior to

the expiration of the entire term imposed.

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -7-

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549,

2555 (2010); Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir.

2011); Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th

Cir. 2005). The one-year statute of limitations begins to run

when the petitioner’s conviction becomes “final” pursuant to

state law, i.e., at the conclusion of the petitioner’s “of

right” appeal of his convictions and sentences. See Summers v.

Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 714-15 (9th Cir. 2007).

On October 20, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced pursuant

to his conviction for dangerous drugs for sale in CR 2006-

006577. Because Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal

of his convictions and sentences in his written plea agreement,

Petitioner’s ability to seek relief pursuant to state postconviction proceedings, i.e., Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, constituted Petitioner’s “of right” appeal. In

Arizona, post-conviction relief proceedings in a “Rule 32 of

right proceeding” must be commenced within 90 days after the

entry of judgment and sentence. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

Therefore, Petitioner’s state conviction became final and the

statute of limitations began to run on Petitioner’s federal

habeas action on or about January 18, 2007, when the time

expired for Petitioner to file a Rule 32 action regarding his

conviction and sentence in the 2006 case. See Summers, 481 F.3d

at 717. The one-year statute of limitations expired on or about

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -8-

January 19, 2008, unless it was tolled by a properly filed state

action for post-conviction relief. See, e.g. Thorson v. Palmer,

479 F.3d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2007); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1158,

1160 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner did not file any request for post-conviction

relief from January 18, 2007, through January 19, 2008.

Petitioner did not seek relief from his convictions and

sentences until August 4, 2009, when Petitioner filed a notice

of post-conviction relief. On November 20, 2009, the state

court ruled that post-conviction relief proceedings were

untimely. The action for post-conviction relief filed in 2009

could not re-start the statute of limitations on Petitioner’s

federal habeas petition which had expired in January of 2008.

See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003);

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003);

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing

their petition on time. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560-62;

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010). A

petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -9-

1011-14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 244 (2009). In

Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical rule” for

determining extraordinary circumstances, while endorsing a

flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon decisions made

in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at

1096-97.

Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual

innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653

F.3d 929, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews, 432 F.3d

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

at 1026; Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Petitioner does not assert he is actually innocent of

the crime of conviction. Petitioner contends he did not know

until May of 2009 that he had been sentenced to “flat time,” and

that, when agreeing to plead guilty, he relied on a 2006 letter

from his counsel stating counsel’s opinion that Petitioner would

not be sentenced to a “flat time” sentence. Petitioner notes

that, in 2011, his counsel admitted that he had “misrepresented”

the penalties faced by Petitioner if he pled guilty. The Court

notes counsel’s letter to Petitioner not only “admits” that

counsel erred with regard to stating that Petitioner would be

eligible for good time credit, but counsel also explains to

Petitioner that any remedy in now vacating the plea agreement

would involve the revocation of the plea agreement, at which

time Petitioner would be facing a minimum sentence of 9.25 years

of flat time if convicted at trial. 

Petitioner contends he is entitled to tolling of the

statute of limitations because, after realizing in 2009 that he

had been sentenced to “flat time,” he sought post-conviction

relief in the state courts. Although Petitioner’s allegations

do not establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations, his statements implicate a different

starting date of the statute of limitations.

The applicable statute states:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall

apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation

period shall run from the latest of--

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -11-

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such

review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (emphasis added).

Petitioner asserts that he did not know of the factual

predicate for his federal habeas claim, i.e., that his sentence

did not allow for the application of good time credits, until

2009. However, the applicable federal statute requires that, to

allow for a later starting date for the running of the statute

of limitations, the factual predicate for the habeas claim could

not have been discovered by the petitioner through the exercise

of due diligence. The objective standard in determining when

time begins to run under section 2241(d)(1)(D) is when the

prisoner knows, or through diligence could discover, the

important facts, rather than when the prisoner recognizes the

legal significance of the facts. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2003); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150,

1154-55 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2001); Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359

(7th Cir. 2000).

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -12-

Petitioner could have, through the exercise of due

diligence, learned that the sentence imposed was “flat time.”

The written plea agreement indicated that the minimum, maximum,

and presumptive sentences of imprisonment which could be imposed

for the crime was a term of “calendar years.” The 2006 letter

to Petitioner from his counsel correctly indicates that

Petitioner’s crime, committed very shortly after the law changed

on January 1, 2006, required imposition of a “calendar year”

sentence, notwithstanding the fact that the same letter

indicated the plea agreement would provide that Petitioner would

be eligible for good time credit. The computation provided to

Petitioner in December of 2006 itself notes that some sentences

are not eligible for the application of good-time credits.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the protections of

section 2241(d)(1)(D).

B. Alternative basis for denying relief

Assuming that Petitioner can overcome the barrier of

the statute of limitations and any argument that his claims are

procedurally defaulted, the Court may deny habeas relief because

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of his claim

that he has been denied his right to due process of law and the

effective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner summarily alleges his counsel was

ineffective for advising him that Petitioner would receive a

sentence where he would eligible for early release based on good

time credits and that he would not have accepted the plea

agreement if he was aware that he would be sentenced to “flat

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -13-

time.” The 2011 letter from counsel to Petitioner attached to

Petitioner’s reply to the answer to his habeas petition avers

that counsel erred in so advising Petitioner because the law had

recently changed and the law in effect at the time of

Petitioner’s crimes provided that only a “flat time” sentence

could be imposed. See Doc. 10, Attach. Counsel indicates he

does not remember if the trial court or anyone else informed

Petitioner prior to sentencing in 2006 that any sentence imposed

would be “flat time.” Counsel notes that, if the plea agreement

were vacated at this time, Petitioner would again stand charged

of crimes which would result in a mandatory flat sentence.

Counsel’s alleged error in advising Petitioner with

regard to a “flat time” sentence does not state a claim for

relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. The

federal courts have generally concluded that an assertion that

counsel misrepresented the potential sentence faced by the

defendant in the context of a plea agreement does not generally

comprise ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the

defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. See Weaver v. Palmateer,

455 F.3d 958, 968, 455 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2006). Compare Womack

v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007), with Iaea v.

Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding “gross

misrepresentation” of sentencing exposure may constitute

ineffective assistance). “To establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on alleged erroneous advice

regarding a guilty plea, a petitioner must demonstrate more than

a ‘mere inaccurate prediction.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer,

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -14-

378 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting Iaea, 800 F.2d at

864-5. Defense counsel’s alleged erroneous predictions as to

the likely sentence following a guilty plea “are deficient only

if they constitute ‘gross mischaracterization of the likely

outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with ... erroneous advice

on the probable effects of going to trial.’” Id., quoting

United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Additionally, although counsel can be deemed

ineffective for failing to provide proper advice during the plea

process, to be entitled to habeas relief Petitioner must come

forth with objective evidence to show that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have accepted the plea offer and would have

insisted on going to trial. See Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d

832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991); Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068

(7th Cir.1991). Conclusory, after-the-fact statements that

Petitioner would not have pled guilty do not meet this

requirement. See Diaz, 930 F.2d at 835. 

Neither has Petitioner stated a claim that his right to

due process of law was violated by the imposition of a “flat

time” sentence or the plea process. To establish this type of

violation Petitioner must establish that the state court’s

imposition of a flat time sentence violated Arizona law and that

the alleged violation was sufficiently egregious to deny him due

process. See Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1179-80 (10th Cir.

1999). “Moreover, the deprivation occasioned by the state’s

failure to follow its own law must be ‘arbitrary in the

constitutional sense’; that is, it must shock the judicial

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -15-

conscience.” Id. at 1180, citing Collins v. City of Harker

Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 129-130, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1070-71

(1992); Brooks v. Zimmerman, 712 F. Supp. 496, 498 (W.D. Pa.

1989) (“To receive review of what otherwise amounts to nothing

more than an error of state law, a petitioner must argue ‘not

that it is wrong, but that it is so wrong, so surprising, that

the error violates principles of due process”).

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s federal habeas action is not timely and

Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to statutory

or equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Petitioner

has also failed to articulate a cognizable claim that he was

deprived of his federal constitutional rights because he

allegedly understood at the time he pled guilty that he would be

eligible for early release based on good conduct and that, in

reality, he was subject to a mandatory “flat time” sentence.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Sanchez’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -16-

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 19th day of October, 2011.

Case 2:11-cv-01237-NVW Document 12 Filed 10/20/11 Page 16 of 16