Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02887/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02887-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UnitCld States C.outt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAR .. 2 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

RAYMOND SNELL, } 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; HONORABLE ) 

FEDERICO PENA, in his official ) 

capacity as Mayor of the City and ) 

County of Denver; J.D. MACFARLANE, in ) 

his official capacity as Manager of ) 

Safety for the City and County of ) 

Denver; CHIEF JOHN COOGAN, The Denver ) 

Police Department in is official ) 

capacity as Chief of the Denver Police ) 

Department; THE CIVIL SERVICE ) 

COMMISSION, of the City and County of ) 

Denver; LESLEY FRANKLIN; JANE WOODHOUSE;) 

LEO CONE; DEBRA WAGNER; ARTHUR LUCERO, ) 

in their official capacities as members ) 

of the Civil Service Commission, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 87-2887 

(D.C. No. 86-M-2378) 

(Dist. of Colo.) 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS, and BARRETT, Circuit 

Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-2887 Document: 01019965806 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 1 
App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. We affirm the 

d i strict court's grant of the City and County of Denver's motion 

for summary judgment. We agree with the district court's 

determination of the applicable statute of limitations for actions 

a rising under 31 U.S.C. § 6721 for substantially the same reasons 

s et forth in the court's Memorandum and Order of December 18, 

1987, a copy of which is attached hereto. We will, however, 

address one argument set forth in appellant Snell's brief. 

We find no merit in Snell's contention that this case should 

be analyzed under Occidental Life Insurance Co., v. Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission, 432 U.S. 355 (1977). That case 

i s distinguished from the case at bar because here the district 

c o urt found that the three-year limitation period was tolled 

during the 90-day pendancy of the federal administrative 

proceedings concerning Snell's complaint. Further, the Court in 

Occidental, id., stated that "[s]tate limitations periods will not 

be borrowed if their application would be inconsistent with the 

underlying policies of the federal statute." Id. at 367. There 

i s neither indication nor contention in this case that the threey ear period is inconsistent with the underlying policies of the 

Revenue Sharing Act. 

We AFFIRM. 

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Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 87-2887 Document: 01019965806 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 2 
. .. •. •~ .{ 

. .. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - .. FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO ~ \ (.l~OGt:tJJt A II: 33 

Civil Action No. 86-M-2378 

RAYMOND SNELL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

nIE CITY J\ND COUNTY OF DENVER, et al. , 

Defendants. 

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C R, t,A,._NSP CLERK 

J~W.t-:1 . 

MEMORANDUM OPINION J\ND ORDER -

MATSCH, Judge,. 

The plaintiff, Raymond Snell, a former Denver police officer, brought 

suit against the City and County of Denver, the Mayor, the Manager of Safety, 

the Police Chief, the Civil Service Commission and individual members of the 

commission. He alleges that racial harassment on the job caused nervousness 

and high blood pressure, which required him to take a leave of absence. A 

request for a short extension of this leave was granted. A second request, 

for an extended leave of absence, was denied and he was directed to return to 

work on May 15, 1981. While the plaintiff alleges that he did, in fact, 

report for duty'on that day, the police department issued him~ notice of 

constructive resignation for failure to report within five days of the 

expiration of his leave. 

on June 30, 1981, the plaintiff petitioned the Civil Service Commission 

for review of both the denial of his request for an extended leave of absence 

and the issuance of the notice of constructive resignation. After the 

plaintiff changed lawyers, and a related delay, the Commission dismissed both 

appeals on January 27, 1983. The appeal of the denial of the leave of absence 

A1TAaJMENr I 

Appellate Case: 87-2887 Document: 01019965806 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 3 
was dismissed on the motion of the City Attorney and the appeal of the 

constructive resignation was dismissed on the motion of the plaintiff's 

attorney. The plaintiff, now represented by yet another attorney, claims that 

his former attorney acted without his permission or knowledge in making that 

motion. 

Sometime in April of 1985 (the exact date has not been provided), the 

plaintiff filed a complaint against the City and County of Denver with the 

United States Department of Justice. This complaint was then transferred to 

the Office of Revenue Sharing in the Treasury Department. In response to this 

complaint, the Office of Revenue Sharing wrote the plaintiff on April 22, 1985 

to inform him that 31 u.s.c. S 6721 authorizes a private cause of action if 

the office has not issued a ruling on the complaint within 90 days. No such 

ruling was issued. 

The plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on November 17, 1986. At that 

time his claims against Denver, its agencies and officials were alleged 

violations of 42 u.s.c. S 1983. Not until June 26, 1987, when the plaintiff 

filed an amended complaint, were claims under 31 u.s.c. S 6721 asserted. The 

amended complaint was accepted for filing, but at the same time the claims 

against the plaintiff's former attorney (the one who moved for dismissal of 

the constructive resignation appeal), as well as those again~t the public 

defendants based on S 1983, were dismissed. Thus, the only active claims at 

present are those against the public defendants based on 31 u.s.c. S 6721. 

The defendants have moved for summary judgment on these claims, asserting 

that the relevant statute of limitations has run. The legal issues have been 

adequately briefed and oral argument would not assist the court in its 

determinations. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2887 Document: 01019965806 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 4 
The defendants assert that causes of action under 31 u.s.c. S 6721 are 

governed by a three year statute of limitations. They note that there is no 

explicitly provided federal limitations period, and thus argue that this court 

must look to Colorado law to determine the applicable limit. To this effect, 

the defendants cite Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 

(D. Colo. 1964). It is, indeed, the general rule that when there is no 

federal limitations period the state statute of limitations for the most 

analogous state cause of action should be adopted (so long as it is not 

inconsistent with federal law or policy). Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 

(1985). 

It is evident from a reading of section 6721 that it provides a unique 

. and narrow remedy for discrimination in certain circumstances. This section 

creates a private cause of action against any unit of state or local 

government (or an employee thereof) for any act prohibited by the revenue 

sharing laws, 31 u.s.c. S 6701 et seq. Section 6716(a), in turn, provides 

that: 

No person in the united States shall be excluded 

from participating in, be denied the benefits of, 

or be subject to discrimination under, a program 

or activity of a State Government or unit of 

general local government because of race, color, 

national origin, or sex when the government receives a payment under this chapter (31 u.s.c. 

S 6701 et seq.). ' 

31 u.s.c. S 6716(a). Thus, the revenue sharing laws prohibit discrimination, 

but only in the administration of a program run by an agency of state or local 

government receiving federal revenue sharing funds. It is obvious that these 

provisions are designed not as a broad remedy for discrimination, but as a 

means of insuring that no program funded in whole or in part by the revenue 

sharing laws will be applied in a discriminatory manner •. Although section 

6721 does provide for a private cause of action, it is clear that it is not 

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Appellate Case: 87-2887 Document: 01019965806 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 5 
intended primarily as a means of vindicating individual rights, but rather as 

a means of preventing program wide discrimination. 

The plaintiff has not cited any cause of action which exists under 

Colorado law that can be described as analogous to this federal statutory 

scheme. While the revenue sharing laws prohibit discrimination, they do so in 

only a narrow range of circumstances and the remedies for such discrimination 

are limited. 

Since no other state law cause of action is analogous to that asserted by 

this plaintiff, the "residuary" statute of limitations, C.R.S. S 

13-80-108( 1 )(b) ( 1985 version), is the most appropriate provision. Cf. McKay 

v. Hanunock, 731 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying S 13-80-108(l)(b) 

where "no one Colorado limitations statute is applicable" to an action 

asserted under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983). Section 13-80-108(l)(b), when it was in 

effect prior to 1986, provided a limit of _ three years on all causes of action 

in Colorado "for which no other period of limitation is provtded for by law." 

C.R.S. S 13-80-108(1)(b). 

In opposing this motion the plaintiff merely asserts that section 

13-80-108(l)(b) should not be applicable. He does not offer any alternative 

limitations period, and appears to argue that there should be no time 

limitation on this cause of action. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), 

requires the adoption of the ioost analogous state law limitations period when 

the federal statute in question does not explicitly provide its own period. 

McKay, moreover, indicates that when no single Colorado limitations period 

applies to a given cause of action the residuary period provided by section 

13-80-108(1)(b) will govern. 

Since •sec;tion 13-80-108(l)(b) limits the pl_aintiff's cause of action it 

must be determined whether this suit was filed within three years of accrual. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2887 Document: 01019965806 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 6 
Although the plaintiff was denied an extended leave of absence on May 21, 1981 

and was sent his notice of constructive resignation on June 10, 1981, he did 

not exhaust his administrative remedies concerning these matters until his I 

petitions for review were dismissed on January 27, 1983. Thus, the 

plaintiff's cause of action accrued on January 27, 1983. This gave the 

plaintiff until January 27, 1986 to file suit under section 6721. 

The original complaint was not filed until November 17, 1986, and the 

amended complaint, first asserting the claims under 31 u.s.c. S 6721, was not 

filed until June 26, 1987. Even if the section 6721 claims were allowed to 

relate back to the time of the filing of the original complaint, they would 

still fail to meet the deadline imposed by C.R.S. S 13-80-108(1)(b) by nearly 

ten months. 

In further response to the defendant's argument that the three year 

limitations period of section 13-80-108(1)(b) should apply, the plaintiff 

asserts that he timely filed an administrative complaint with the Department 

of Justice. Such a complaint is required by section 6721 as a prerequisite to 

bringing suit. It does appear that the plaintiff took this required first 

step in pursuing his section 6721 claim in April 1985, within the three year 

limitations period. 

This filing, however, only tolled the limitations period during the 

pendency of the federal administrative proceedings concerning the plaintiff's 

complaint. By the explicit terms of section 6721, if the government agency 

with which the complaint was filed has not issued a decision within 90 days, 

the complainant's federal administrative remedies are deemed exhausted. Since 

no such decision was issued in this case, the plaintiff's administrative 

remedies were exhausted no later than 90 days after April 22, 1985 (the date 

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Appellate Case: 87-2887 Document: 01019965806 Date Filed: 03/02/1990 Page: 7 
l, • 

. . 

of the letter from the Office of Revenue Sharing to the plaintiff, informing 

him of their receipt of his complaint and explaining his rights under section 

6721). 

At this point the limitations period on the plaintiff's claims began to 

run again. At best, then, the plaintiff was given an additional 90 days 

beyond three years from January 27, 1983 in which to file suit under section 

6721. Since he did not file even his original section 1983 claim until 

November 17, 1986, he missed the deadline by at least six moths. 

The plaintiff's additional arguments concerning equitable tolling of the 

limitations period are not persuasive. The plaintiff argues that the . l~mitations period should be tolled because he was unaware that his attorney 

had moved to dismiss his claim. This merely alleges a wrong committed by the 

plaintiff's former attorney. The mishandling of a case by an attorney is not 

grounds for application of the doct~ine of equitable tolling. Bolling v. City 

& County of Denver, Colo., 790 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Upon the foregoing, it is 

ORDERED, that the defendants' rotion for summary judgment is granted and 

this civil action is dismissed with prejudice. 

Dated: cu~ J( 

I~ ITi:2 / I 

BY THE COURT: 

~u?~ 

Richard P. Matsch, Judge 

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