Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-05333/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-05333-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOYER GREAR and JOCELYN HARRIS,

individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

COMCAST CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania

Corporation,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 14-05333 JSW

ORDER GRANTING COMCAST

CORPORATION’S MOTION TO

COMPEL ARBITRATION AND

STAYING ACTION

Now before the Court for consideration is the motion to compel arbitration filed by

Defendant Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”). The Court has considered the parties’ papers,

relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it finds the motion suitable for

disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The Court VACATES the

hearing scheduled for March 13, 2015, GRANTS Comcast’s motion, and STAYS this action

pending completion of arbitration. 

BACKGROUND

On December 14, 2014, Plaintiffs, Toyer Grear (“Grear”) and Jocelyn Harris (“Harris”)

(collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed this putative class action against Comcast. Plaintiffs assert

claims for: (1) violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. section 1030; (2)

violations of the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, California Penal Code

section 502; and (3) violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business and

Case 4:14-cv-05333-JSW Document 35 Filed 03/03/15 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. 

Plaintiffs are Comcast customers who “access the Internet in their household via the

wireless router leased from Comcast as part of its Xfinity Wi-Fi Service.” (Compl. ¶ 10; see

also id. ¶¶ 42-46.) Harris signed the contract with Comcast. Although Grear did not sign the

contract, she pays the household utility bills, including the Comcast bill. (Id.) According to

Plaintiffs, Comcast has begun to lease wireless routers to its customers, including Plaintiffs, that

are equipped to provide its customers with a Wi-Fi signal for their homes. These new routers

also include an additional signal that can be accessed by the public. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 2,

15.) Each of Plaintiffs’ claims for relief are premised on the theory that Comcast did not obtain

their authorization to use their wireless router to broadcast these additional “hotspots” to the

public. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 28-41, 43.)

It is undisputed that the contract with Comcast includes a residential services agreement

(the “RSA”), which contains an arbitration provision (the “Arbitration Provision”). (Compl. ¶

31, Ex. A (RSA § 13).) Although Comcast permits its customers to opt-out of the Arbitration

Provision, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs have not opted out. (See, e.g., Declaration of Mary

Kane, ¶ 7.)

The terms of the RSA provide that the customer or Comcast “may elect to arbitrate [a]

Dispute in accordance with the terms of this Arbitration Provision rather than litigate the

Dispute in court.” (Id. § 13.a.) The term “dispute” means 

any dispute, claim or controversy between you and Comcast regarding any

aspect of your relationship with Comcast, whether based in contract,

statute, regulation, ordinance, tort . . . or any other legal or equitable

theory, and includes the validity, enforceability or scope of this Arbitration

Provision. “Dispute” is to be given the broadest possible meaning that will

be enforced.

 (Id. § 13.b.) 

The Arbitration Provision also contains a section entitled “Exclusions from Arbitration.”

(RSA, § 13.j (hereinafter “Section 13.j”). Section 13.j provides that “YOU AND COMCAST

AGREE THAT THE FOLLOWING WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION . . . (3)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ANY DISPUTE RELATED TO OR ARISING FROM ALLEGATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH

UNAUTHORIZED USE OR RECEIPT OF SERVICE.” (Id. (emphasis in original).)

The Court shall address additional facts as necessary in the remainder of this Order.

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), arbitration agreements “shall be valid,

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the

revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA represents the “liberal federal policy

favoring arbitration agreements” and “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues

should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury

Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Under the FAA, “once [the Court] is satisfied that an

agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored,” and the dispute falls within

the scope of that agreement, the Court must order arbitration. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &

Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967). 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Arbitration Provision is valid or that they would be

bound by its terms. They oppose Comcast’s motion on the basis that none of their claims fall

within the scope of the Arbitration Provision. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the plain language of

Section 13.j demonstrates that each of their claims are excluded from arbitration, because the

claims relate to unauthorized “use.” Comcast argues that each of Plaintiffs’ claims relate to

disputes over unauthorized use of their equipment, not service, and it contends the RSA clearly

distinguishes the term equipment from the term service. Thus, according to Comcast, Plaintiffs’

claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Provision and are not excluded by Section 13.j.

It is well established that courts generally decide “gateway” issues of arbitrability. 

However, because arbitration is a matter of contract, the “parties can agree to arbitrate

‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or

whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.” Rent-A-Center West., Inc. v. Jackson,

561 U.S. 63, 69 (2010). In such instances, the parties must “clearly and unmistakably” delegate

such issues to the arbitrator. Id., 561 U.S. at 69 n.1. In this case, as set forth above, the

Arbitration Provision provides that the term “Dispute” includes a dispute about “the scope of

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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this Arbitration Provision.” The parties put forth competing interpretations of the Arbitration

Provision, specifically Section 13.j, and, thus they dispute whether Plaintiffs’ claims fall within

its scope. Because the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated that issue to the arbitrator, the

Court does not resolve that issue.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Comcast’s motion to compel arbitration, and it

HEREBY STAYS this action pending completion of arbitration. The parties shall file joint

status reports every 120 days in which they advise the Court of the status of the arbitration

proceedings and when they expect that the stay may be lifted or the case may be dismissed. The

parties first joint status report shall be due 120 days from the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2015 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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