Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07128/USCOURTS-caDC-09-07128-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 2010 Decided January 14, 2011

No. 09-7128

CAPITOL SPRINKLER INSPECTION, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

GUEST SERVICES, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-02115-CKK)

Theodore J. Segletes III argued the cause for appellant. 

With him on the briefs was Michael T. Hamilton.

Stephen A. Horvath argued the cause and filed the brief 

for appellee Guest Services, Inc.

Before: GINSBURG, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

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GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, 

Inc., the defendant in the district court, appeals the summary 

judgment entered for Guest Services, Inc. on Capitol’s thirdparty claims for negligence and breach of contract in 

connection with a burst pipe at a building managed by Guest. 

Guest argues we lack jurisdiction for want of a timely notice 

of appeal. We hold that we have jurisdiction of the appeal 

based upon Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) and 

affirm the district court in all respects. 

I. Background

Gallaudet University hired Guest to manage the 

conference center building on its campus in Washington, D.C. 

Guest in turn retained Capitol to service the fire sprinkler 

system in the conference center. One of Capitol’s contractual 

duties was “open[ing] condensation drains on drum drip 

connections and drain[ing] low points during fall and winter 

inspection.”

In January 2003 two of Capitol’s inspectors came to the 

conference center, where they were met by someone who 

escorted them around the building. The record does not 

reveal whether their escort was an employee of Guest. While 

on site, the inspectors drained water from all but one of the 

drum drips; that one was in a locked room for which the 

escort was not carrying a key card. Later that month, a pipe 

fitting froze, burst, and discharged water, which would not 

have happened if Capitol’s inspectors had drained the drum 

drip.

Gallaudet filed a claim for the resulting damage with its 

property insurer, St. Paul Mercury Insurance. St. Paul, as 

Gallaudet’s subrogee, then filed suit against Capitol for both 

negligence and breach of contract. Capitol in turn filed a 

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third-party complaint against Guest, seeking contribution or 

indemnity, again based upon both negligence and breach of 

contract.

All parties filed dispositive motions. St. Paul moved for 

partial summary judgment on its contract claim against 

Capitol, which cross-moved for summary judgment against 

St. Paul on both claims. Capitol and Guest filed crossmotions for summary judgment on the third-party claims. All 

the motions drew responses and replies except that Guest did 

not timely respond to Capitol’s motion for summary 

judgment. The district court denied Guest’s motion to file a 

late response but nonetheless deemed Capitol’s motion for 

summary judgment opposed because Guest, in the course of 

supporting its own motion, had briefed the relevant issues. 

The district court denied Capitol’s motion for summary 

judgment against Guest and its motion to strike Guest’s reply 

in support of its motion for summary judgment. Because St. 

Paul had argued that Capitol could not prevail without expert 

testimony to explain the applicable standard of care in tort and 

the contractual duty Guest owed to Capitol but “the parties 

[had] devote[d] only scant attention to” the subject, the court 

was “unwilling to rule on [that] dispositive issue”; instead the 

court held all other motions in abeyance pending 

supplemental briefing on the need for expert testimony. On 

June 15, 2009 the district court, having determined Capitol 

could not prove its claims or defenses without expert 

testimony to explain Guest’s duty, entered an order granting 

Guest’s and St. Paul’s motions respectively for summary and 

for partial summary judgment and stating “Guest Services is 

dismissed from further proceedings in this case.” St. Paul’s 

tort claim against Capitol, which had not been a subject of St. 

Paul’s dispositive motion, alone remained pending.

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Capitol then filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 54(b) asking the district court to certify an 

interlocutory appeal or, in the alternative, for reconsideration 

of its June 15 order granting summary judgment to Guest. 

The district court denied Capitol’s motion, holding an

immediate appeal would be inappropriate because the thirdparty claims overlapped with St. Paul’s claims against Capitol 

and rejecting Capitol’s arguments in the alternative for 

reconsideration.

On October 16 Capitol and St. Paul informed the court 

they had “settled all claims between them,” would “finalize a 

settlement agreement” within 30 days, and would thereafter 

file a joint stipulation of dismissal. Later that same day 

Capitol filed a notice of appeal with respect to its claims 

against Guest. Later still that day, the district court entered an 

order dismissing the case without prejudice based upon the 

impending settlement and stating the case would stand 

dismissed with prejudice as of October 26 unless counsel 

moved to extend the date or to reopen the case. On October 

23 St. Paul and Capitol filed their joint stipulation of 

dismissal. The order dismissing the case having become final 

on October 26, this appeal by Capitol proceeded without 

further action by the district court and without Capitol having 

filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Capitol challenges the district court’s order 

denying its and granting Guest’s motion for summary 

judgment, and the orders denying its motions (1) to 

supplement its expert disclosures, (2) to strike Guest’s reply, 

and (3) for reconsideration or for an appealable judgment 

under Rule 54(b). Guest defends each of those orders but first 

argues this court lacks appellate jurisdiction. We begin, of 

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course, with our jurisdiction. Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 

248, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

To vest this court with appellate jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, the appellant must file a timely notice of

appeal from a final, appealable judgment of the district court. 

See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 

(1988) (timely notice of appeal is “mandatory and 

jurisdictional”); St. Marks Place Hous. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Hous. & Urban Dev., 610 F.3d 75, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (final 

judgment required). The district court ordinarily enters a final 

judgment only after it has disposed of all claims against all 

parties. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58; Cambridge Holdings Grp., 

Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 1356, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). The district court may, however, exercise its 

discretion to “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 

more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.” FED. R. CIV. P.

54(b).

In the present case, it is undisputed Capitol’s only notice 

of appeal was filed prematurely, that is, before the district 

court had entered a final, appealable judgment. When Capitol 

filed the notice of appeal on October 16, the district court had 

granted summary judgment in favor of Guest on Capitol’s 

third-party claims — the only claims Capitol sought to appeal 

— but had neither disposed of all St. Paul’s claims nor 

entered a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). 

Indeed, the court had expressly denied Capitol’s motion for a 

Rule 54(b) judgment. St. Paul and Capitol had notified the 

court earlier that day of their agreement to settle the 

remaining claims, but their letter informed the court they 

would file a stipulation of dismissal in the future, making it 

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clear the proceedings in the district court were still ongoing as 

of October 16.

A premature notice of appeal “filed after the court 

announces a decision or order [] but before the entry of 

judgment or order” can be saved by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(2), which provides such a notice is to be 

“treated as filed on the date of and after the entry” of a 

judgment or order. Still, the Supreme Court has held “Rule 

4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to 

operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only 

when a district court announces a decision that would be 

appealable if immediately followed by the entry of 

judgment,” because in such a situation a litigant could 

reasonably believe the order was appealable. FirsTier Mortg. 

Co. v. Investors Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991). In 

FirsTier, Rule 4(a)(2) rescued a notice of appeal filed after 

the district court had “announced from the bench” a ruling 

that addressed all the claims before it. Id. at 270. “Had the 

judge set forth the judgment immediately following the bench 

ruling, and had the clerk entered the judgment on the docket,” 

there could be “no question that the bench ruling would have 

been ‘final’ under § 1291.” Id. at 277. 

In Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc.,

this court held Rule 4(a)(2) applies to a ruling disposing of

fewer than all parties or all claims no differently than to a 

ruling disposing of an entire case. 412 F.3d 156, 161–62

(2005) (Roberts, J.). That is, if the appellant files a notice of 

appeal after the district court has issued, orally or in writing, 

an order that would be appealable if followed by a partial 

final judgment issued pursuant to Rule 54(b), then the notice 

ripens when a final judgment is later entered. The court 

reached this issue in Outlaw because the plaintiff filed a 

notice of appeal after the district court had entered summary 

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judgment for two of the three defendants. Id. at 158–59. In 

these circumstances, we acknowledged that, because the 

court’s order did not dispose of all claims against all parties,

“[s]imple entry of judgment would not have had the same 

effect” as in FirsTier but we saw no reason the rule in that 

case should not extend to a case in which entry of a Rule 

54(b) judgment would have made an order appealable. Id. at 

161–62. When the district court later enters a final judgment, 

regardless whether “the hypothetical judgment considered in 

applying [the FirsTier test is] the same type as the one 

actually entered,” the notice of appeal is saved by Rule 

4(a)(2). Id. at 162.

In this case, Capitol would have been able to appeal if the 

district court had entered a Rule 54(b) judgment after it 

granted summary judgment for Guest, and it is undisputed the 

district court did eventually enter a final judgment disposing 

of the entire case. The relevant question here is whether 

anything that happened before Capitol filed its notice of 

appeal warrants a different result than in Outlaw.

Guest first argues Rule 4(a)(2) does not apply because it 

applies only to decisions that have been “announced from the 

bench” whereas here, unlike in Outlaw, all decisions were

written. That factual difference is of no moment, however; 

indeed, the relevant ruling in Outlaw was a written order 

granting summary judgment as to fewer than all parties. See

id. at 159.

A more promising distinction between this case and 

Outlaw might be that here the district court had denied 

Capitol’s Rule 54(b) motion and request to certify an 

interlocutory appeal against Guest, arguably indicating 

thereby that the possibility of an appealable judgment was

foreclosed. The difference is not significant, however; the 

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analysis in Outlaw turned upon whether a “hypothetical” 

judgment under Rule 54(b) would have rendered the case 

appealable, id. at 162 (“[t]he analysis was hypothetical in 

FirsTier itself”). We did not consider whether there was “no 

just reason for delay” or whether the district court would have 

abused its discretion by entering a Rule 54(b) judgment, as we 

would have done were we reviewing an actual rather than a 

hypothetical judgment. See, e.g., Brooks v. Dist. Hosp. 

Partners, L.P., 606 F.3d 800, 806–07 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Bldg. 

Indus. Ass’n v. Babbitt, 161 F.3d 740, 743–45 (D.C. Cir. 

1998). A Rule 54(b) judgment was no less hypothetically 

possible in this case once the district court had entered its 

order granting summary judgment.

At oral argument Guest argued the reference to a 

litigant’s reasonable expectations in FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 

276–77, suggests Capitol should not have the benefit of Rule 

4(a)(2) because, having made and lost a Rule 54(b) motion, it 

was not reasonable to believe the partial summary judgment 

order was appealable. In Outlaw we understood the rather

“imprecise guide” of reasonableness not as a stand-alone test 

but rather as informing the more concrete aspects of the 

Supreme Court’s analysis in FirsTier. See 412 F.3d at 161–

62. Rather than deciding whether the plaintiff “reasonably 

but mistakenly” thought the summary judgment order was a 

final judgment, this court focused upon the Supreme Court’s 

statement that Rule 4(a)(2) rescues a notice of appeal taken 

from a decision that “‘would be appealable if immediately 

followed by the entry of judgment.’” Id. at 161 (quoting 

FirstTier, 498 U.S. at 276). As we recognized, this objective 

understanding of Rule 4(a)(2) is more appropriate to a 

jurisdictional analysis than would be a flexible standard 

focusing upon reasonableness. See id. Applying this 

objective test, Capitol’s notice of appeal was timely under 

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Rule 4(a)(2) and we have jurisdiction to consider its appeal, to 

which we now turn.

B. Capitol’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The district court denied Capitol’s motion for summary

judgment because it found there were

genuine issues of material fact as to whether 

Capitol Sprinkler was escorted by a Guest 

Services employee ..., whether and to what 

extent Guest Services operated as an agent of 

Gallaudet, and whether and to what extent [the 

relevant standard of the National Fire 

Protection Association was] incorporated into

the Inspection Agreement between Capitol 

Sprinkler and Guest Services.

St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, 

Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 152, 178–79 (2008).

Capitol argues the court should have granted its motion 

for summary judgment because Guest did not oppose the 

motion, as required by Local Civil Rule 7(h) and by the 

district court’s scheduling order. As Guest correctly points 

out, however, Rule 7(h) provides the district court “may 

assume” facts not denied in an opposition have been admitted, 

thus leaving the matter to the district court’s discretion, and 

“this court has long recognized that the district court does not 

abuse its discretion by declining to invoke the requirements of 

the local rule in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 

Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 

(addressing predecessor rule). The district court’s scheduling 

order did not limit this discretion because, being interlocutory, 

the district court retained the power to revise the order at any 

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time prior to appeal. See Langevine v. District of Columbia, 

106 F.3d 1018, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In the present case, in 

which Guest had filed a cross-motion addressing the same 

issues that would have been addressed in a response to 

Capitol’s motion, we hold the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by declining to grant Capitol’s summary judgment 

motion for want of an opposition thereto.

Capitol also argues the district court erred by denying the 

summary judgment motion on its merits, a decision we review 

de novo. McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, 

LLP, 611 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is 

appropriate if, viewing all evidence “in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[ing] all 

reasonable inferences in its favor,” Venetian Casino Resort, 

L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2008), “there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(a).

As to the merits, Capitol’s first but cursory argument is 

that the district court erred by weighing the evidence. This 

argument is beside the point because our review is de novo. 

See Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(“because we review the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s decision de novo, 

we conduct an independent evaluation of the record”). 

Capitol also fails to establish it is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law because Guest was responsible for the acts 

and omissions of the escort. One of Capitol’s inspectors 

testified in his deposition the escort was “assigned” to provide 

access to certain rooms but did not say by whom he was 

assigned. There was an affidavit before the district court from 

Capitol’s other inspector conclusorily stating the escort was 

“an agent of Guest Services, Inc.” Even assuming — as did 

the district court, see 573 F. Supp. 2d at 161 — this is 

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evidence upon which a jury reasonably could find the escort 

worked for Guest, summary judgment for Capitol is 

inappropriate because, as Guest notes, the testimony falls 

short of establishing the escort’s employment status as a 

matter of law, such that a jury could not find otherwise.

Next, Capitol argues that, unlike the district court, we

should consider Guest’s conduct before and on the day the 

pipe burst, “not the least of which was [its] failure to timely 

terminate water flow.” Notwithstanding its use of the phrase 

“the least,” Capitol identifies no other conduct the court 

should have considered. As Guest argues, the alacrity with 

which it staunched the flow of water is relevant only to the 

measure of damages, which is not at issue in this appeal. 

Finally, Capitol’s argument that it could have proven its 

case using St. Paul’s expert or its own so-called “hybrid” factcum-expert witnesses, is off the mark because, again as Guest

notes, the testimony of those witnesses would not bear upon 

the relationship between Guest and the escort. Therefore we 

affirm the order of the district court denying Capitol’s motion

for summary judgment.

C. Guest’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Capitol next challenges the order granting summary 

judgment for Guest. The district court granted that motion 

because Capitol had failed to present the expert testimony

required under District of Columbia law to prevail upon its 

claims, which sound in tort and contract. St. Paul Mercury 

Ins. Co. v. Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 

1, 2 (2009). Our review is de novo. McFadden, 611 F.3d at 

3.

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First, Capitol argues summary judgment was 

inappropriate because the district court had concluded there 

were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the escort 

worked for Guest, whether Guest was Gallaudet’s agent, and 

whether the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 

standards were incorporated into the contract between Guest

and Capitol. Guest responds that, although disputed, none of 

these three issues is material because Capitol’s failure to 

disclose, pursuant to Rule 26, expert testimony concerning the 

standard of care or contractual duty independently dooms its 

claims respectively for negligence and for breach of contract. 

Both claims are premised upon applying the NFPA standard 

for building owners’ dealings with inspectors. Under that 

standard, a building owner must “provide ready accessibility 

to components of water-based fire protection systems that 

require inspection, testing, or maintenance.”

As the district court noted, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 11–12, 

Capitol did not disclose any expert testimony concerning the 

meaning of “ready accessibility,” served only a cursory 

disclosure that did not address the standard of care and did not 

designate any of its “hybrid” witnesses to offer expert 

testimony. Capitol’s argument it could have relied upon St. 

Paul’s expert witness is also unpersuasive because, as Guest

notes, his report does not address the meaning of “ready 

accessibility.”

Capitol’s fallback argument is that expert testimony was 

not required in any event: “If the court had provided guidance 

on the statute’s interpretation, a jury could have come to a 

conclusion regarding whether Guest provided Capitol with 

‘ready accessibility,’” all the more so because the disputed 

issue — whether the drum drip was readily accessible if the 

inspectors had to wait five to ten minutes to gain access — is 

factually straightforward. The controlling case law is less 

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forgiving than Capitol assumes; in the District of Columbia an 

expert witness is required to establish the standard of care or 

the contractual duty, see Sherman v. Adoption Ctr. of 

Washington, Inc., 741 A.2d 1031, 1036 n.11 (D.C. 1999) 

(same analysis for both), when “the subject in question is so 

distinctly related to some science, profession or occupation as 

to be beyond the ken of the average layperson,” Briggs v.

Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 845 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the last cited 

case the court held expert testimony was required in order to 

establish the standard for “adequate” lighting of a temporary 

walkway in a construction area of a Metrorail station and to 

establish when it was safe to replace plywood barriers around 

the construction area with chain-link fencing. Id. at 846. As

there noted, District of Columbia cases call for expert 

testimony concerning the maintenance of leaning trees, the 

application of hair relaxer, and even the tightness of hand

cuffs. Id. at 845–86 (collecting cases). Capitol relies upon 

McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 580 (D.C. 

1996), because the court there observed that “guidance from 

the court” might, in a negligence per se case, provide an 

alternative to expert testimony “to assist the jury’s 

understanding.” The case stands, however, for the more 

narrow proposition that in some circumstances, as where a 

statute uses terms familiar to a lay person, the district court’s 

jury instructions may provide sufficient guidance.

In the light of these precedents, Capitol clearly was 

required to present expert testimony on what it means to have 

“ready accessibility” to a drum drip. Although accessibility 

of a drum drip is not a complex technical issue and might 

appear to be within a jury’s understanding, id. at 845, the 

specific requirements of a set of rules for fire protection, like 

the specific requirements for safely lighting a subway station, 

are not a matter of common knowledge. Because Capitol did 

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not offer expert testimony to explain the NFPA standard, 

summary judgment for Guest was appropriate.

D. Rulings Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion

As noted before, Capitol also challenges the orders of the 

district court denying its motions (1) to supplement expert 

disclosure, (2) to strike a reply, and (3) for judgment under 

Rule 54(b) or for reconsideration. We review all three rulings 

for abuse of discretion. See Washburn v. Lavoie, 437 F.3d 84, 

94 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discovery deadlines); Jackson v. 

Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 

145, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (motion to strike); Flynn v. Dick 

Corp., 481 F.3d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (motion for 

reconsideration).

1. Motion to Supplement Expert Disclosure

Capitol argues the district court erred by denying its

motion to file a supplement to its expert disclosures after the 

deadline for filing had passed and discovery had closed. The 

court denied the motion because it concluded Capitol had not 

shown “good cause” for its tardiness, as required by Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. 

v. Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc., Civ. A. No. 05-2115, 

2007 WL 1589495, at *5–9 (June 1, 2007). Capitol argues 

there was good cause for an extension because Guest did not 

promptly make available for deposition certain witnesses who 

would have provided facts essential to the report by Capitol’s 

expert. 

As Guest suggests, “[t]he good cause standard requires

the ‘party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot

reasonably be met despite [its] diligence.’” S&W Enters., LLC 

v. SouthTrust Bank, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003) 

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(quoting 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1522.1 (2d ed. 1990)). Capitol’s 

actions in this case do not bespeak diligence or any sense of 

urgency at all in preparing its expert’s report, which was only 

a single page in length. Capitol noticed the depositions at 

issue for October 16, 2006 — the same day the report was due 

— meaning, as the district court concluded, the report “could 

not practically have incorporated any information from” the 

depositions. Civ. A. No. 05-2115, 2007 WL 1589495, at *7. 

Even after the depositions were cancelled and the district 

court extended the expert disclosure deadline by a month, 

Capitol did not again notice the depositions or file a 

supplement to its report during that period. Indeed, Capitol 

never again noticed the depositions and attempted to 

supplement its report only after the close of discovery. 

Because Capitol did not show “good cause,” the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying Capitol’s motion for 

an extension of time.

2. Motion to Strike Guest’s Reply

Capitol next argues the district court erred by denying its 

motion to strike the reply Guest filed in support of its motion 

for summary judgment; the motion to strike was based upon 

Guest’s supposedly late introduction of arguments and facts. 

The district court rejected this argument and denied the 

motion to strike because the reply brief and an attached 

affidavit did no more than bolster Guest’s opening

arguments.*

 * We note also the allegedly new facts and arguments to which 

Capitol points were raised in direct reply to Capitol’s submission of 

what the district court later determined was a “sham affidavit.” 

 Accordingly, we hold the district court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying the motion. Cf. 

Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib., 

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647 F.2d 200, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“motions to strike, as a 

general rule, are disfavored”). 

3. Motion for Interlocutory Appeal or Reconsideration

Finally, Capitol argues the district court erred by denying

its motion for a Rule 54(b) judgment, which would have 

enabled Capitol to appeal at once the order granting summary 

judgment to Guest, or in the alternative, for reconsideration of 

the same order. The interlocutory appeal issue is now moot

because a final judgment has been entered and the case has 

been presented to this court on appeal. Thus, Capitol has 

already obtained the relief it sought, that is, the right to appeal 

the order. See I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund Benefit Plan A v. 

Cooper Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 21, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 

(interlocutory order merges into final judgment and is 

reviewable upon appeal from final judgment).

The district court addressed Capitol’s request for 

reconsideration pursuant to Rule 54(b), which not only 

authorizes the court to enter a partial final judgment but also

recognizes its inherent power to reconsider an interlocutory 

order “as justice requires.” See Greene v. Union Mut. Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 764 F.2d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, 

J.) (“the district judge is in the best position to assess whether 

or not ‘justice requires’ [reconsideration]”).

The district court understandably determined justice did 

not require reconsidering its order, for Capitol raised no

arguments for reconsideration the court had not already 

rejected on the merits except its argument that the court had 

improperly weighed testimony. Similarly, on appeal, Capitol 

merely repeats its arguments concerning summary judgment. 

These arguments are without merit for reasons already stated; 

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a fortiori, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Capitol’s motion for reconsideration.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this court has appellate 

jurisdiction of the instant matter pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2), and 

the judgment of the district court is in all respects

Affirmed.

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