Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00209/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00209-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINA DRENIK,

Plaintiff,

v.

GORDON OHANESIAN and VERA

OHANESIAN, 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 05-209 DFL DAD

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND

ORDER

Plaintiff Regina Drenik claims that defendants Gordon and

Vera Ohanesian violated the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 3601, et seq. (“FHA”) and the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12900, et seq. (“FEHA”) by

“steering” her away from renting one of their second-floor

apartments because she has a young child. She seeks declaratory

and injunctive relief, actual and punitive damages, and

attorneys’ fees and costs. Defendants move for summary judgment. 

For the reasons stated below, the court: (1) denies defendants’

motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s “steering” claim;

and (2) grants partial summary judgment as to any claim of

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intentional discrimination or disparate impact. 

I.

The facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to

plaintiff, are as follows. In June 2004, Regina Drenik sought to

rent an apartment from defendants Vera and Gordon Ohanesian. 

(Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 4, 6.) Drenik

intended to live in the apartment with her then boyfriend Jason,

and their 13-month-old son. (Id.)

The Ohanesian’s property has both first and second-floor

apartments. (Id. ¶ 7.) Some of the second-floor apartments have

balconies. (Id. ¶ 8.) The complex has a pool on the ground

level. (Id. ¶ 9.) When Drenik came to view a second-floor

apartment in the complex, Gordon Ohanesian told her that he was

concerned that the balcony and the stairs leading up to the

upstairs apartment posed safety hazards to her young son. (Pl.’s

Statement of Disputed Facts (“SDF”) ¶ 5.) He also advised Drenik

that the pool posed a potential danger to children. (SUF ¶ 11.)

Gordon then said that he would have to consult with his wife if

plaintiff was interested in the upstairs apartment. (SDF ¶ 7.) 

He also said that a downstairs unit might be more suitable. (Id.

¶ 9.) He told plaintiff that a lower-level apartment would be

available sometime in late June and that she should wait for the

vacancy. (Id. ¶ 11.) Gordon gave Drenik an application, but,

given the context of their conversation, she believed that it was

for the unavailable downstairs unit. (Id. ¶ 12.) She never

filled out the application or paid the $12 credit check fee

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because she and Jason felt it would be a waste of time and money. 

(Id. ¶ 13.) They were primarily interested in the upstairs unit

because they worried that burglars would have access to their

windows in the downstairs unit. (Drenik Dep. at 77:10-23.) 

Also, the upstairs unit had a better view of William Land Park. 

(Id.) Nevertheless, Drenik left her phone number with Gordon,

who allegedly agreed to contact her when the downstairs unit

became available. (SDF ¶ 14.) Gordon never contacted her. 

(Id. ¶ 15.) 

Around July 4, 2004, Drenik drove by the Ohanesian’s

property and saw that the “For Rent” sign was still posted. (Id.

¶ 16.) She then called the Ohanesians to see if the sign

referred to a downstairs or an upstairs unit. (Id. ¶ 17.) Vera

returned Drenik’s call the next day and told her that the lower

unit had been rented, but that there was an apartment available

on the second floor. (Id. ¶ 18.) Vera then asked Drenik who

would be living in the apartment, and Drenik responded that she,

her husband, and her son would reside there. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.) 

Vera told Drenik that she did not like the idea of renting to a

family with young children upstairs. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.) 

A few days later, Drenik visited the Human Rights and Fair

Housing Commission of Sacramento. (Id. ¶ 23.) The Commission

used two testers to inquire by phone about renting at defendants’

property. (Id. ¶ 25.) Both testers spoke with Gordon on July

15, 2004. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

The first tester, Rosalind Robbins (“Robbins”), mentioned to

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Gordon that she had an 18-month-old child. (Id. ¶ 27.) 

According to Robbins, Gordon “immediately began to show

reluctancy.” (Robbins Dep. at 42:14-20.) His tone of voice

changed, and he started talking about his concerns with having a

young child in a second-level apartment because of the balcony. 

(Id. at 42:18-43:4.) He also said that he needed to check with

his insurance company before he could give her an application. 

(Id. at 46:5-7, 53:20-21.) Robbins responded by saying that she

was not concerned with this issue. (Id. at 43:28-44:2.) Gordon

told her, “[t]hings can happen quickly. You might not think it’s

a problem, but safety is a problem. . . . [I]f you’re not

concerned about the safety . . . I’m concerned about my

liabilities.” (SDF ¶¶ 31, 32.) Robbins ended the conversation

by saying that she would drive by the apartment, and she would

contact him if she was interested in it. (Robbins Dep. at 46:12-

13.) Because Gordon did not tell her not to call, she felt that

he would have been receptive to “hearing back from her.” (Id. at

46:14-18.) 

Both testers completed a “Debriefer Assessment Form.” 

(Defs.’ SUF Ex. I.) On the form, the testers indicated that

there was evidence of unequal treatment with regard to

availability because the landlord “offered[,] then refused to

rent to tester w/child.” (Id.) The testers also indicated that

the landlord treated them differently because he was “reluctant

to continue relationship w/ tester who had kid. Told tester w/

child he had to ‘consult insurance’ prior to renting.” (Id.) 

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However, in the “Overall Assessment” portion of the form, the

testers provided contradictory responses, in that they circled

“Yes” next to both “clearly no evidence of discrimination and/or

steering” and “substantial grounds for concluding that there was

discrimination or steering.” (Id.) 

The Ohanesians rented the original upstairs unit, which

Drenik had viewed, to a family with a child in junior high

school. (SDF ¶ 39.) The record does not reflect whether the

testers inquired about a different unit, and, if so, who

ultimately rented that unit. 

II.

Title 42 U.S.C. section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to “refuse

to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to

refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make

unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . .

familial status.” “Steering” is an example of “mak[ing]

unavailable” in violation of § [3604](a). Fair Housing Congress

v. Weber, 993 F.Supp. 1286, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also

Llanos v. Coehlo, 24 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1057 (E.D. Cal. 1998). 

“Steering” is “not an outright refusal to rent to a person within

a class of people protected by the statute; rather it consists of

efforts to deprive a protected homeseeker of housing

opportunities in certain locations.” Id. (citing HUD v.

Edelstein, Fair Housing-Fair Lending ¶ 25,018, pp. 25,236, 25,239

(1991)). At least in the context of this motion, defendants do

not dispute that a landlord may not “steer” families with young

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 “A landlord cannot justify steering families with 1

children away from housing by groundlessly claiming that the

housing would be unsafe for resident children. As a general

rule, safety judgments are for informed parents to make, not

landlords.” Weber, 993 F.Supp. at 1293. At oral argument, all

counsel agreed that steering may occur even if the landlord’s

safety fears are not groundless. According to plaintiff’s

counsel, a landlord has immunity under state and federal law for

any claim that arises out of an injury to a resident child where

the property is otherwise in compliance with applicable codes. 

 Using different words, FEHA employs much the same 2

standard as the FHA. It proscribes housing discrimination on the

basis of familial status and prohibits “the owner of any housing

accommodation” from making or causing to be made “any written or

oral inquiry concerning the . . . familial status . . . of any

person seeking to purchase, rent or lease any housing

accommodation.” Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12955(a), (b). Therefore,

while the analysis below addresses plaintiff’s claims under the

FHA, it also applies to her claim under FEHA. 

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children away from housing even if the housing could be dangerous

to children. Proof of illegal steering does not require evidence 1

of discriminatory intent. Weber, 993 F. Supp. at 1293 (citing

Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995)). The test is

whether the ordinary listener would understand that the owner is

communicating a preference. Id. (citing United States v. Hunter,

459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972); Ragin v. New York Times Co.,

923 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Llanos, 24

F.Supp.2d at 1057 (citing Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999.). 

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When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to

plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Ohanesians

communicated to Drenik that they preferred not to rent secondfloor balcony apartments to families with small children. 

Defendants do not dispute that Gordon told Drenik that: (1) he

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would have to consult with his wife if Drenik was interested in

the upstairs apartment; and (2) a downstairs unit might be more

suitable. (Response to Pl.’s SDF ¶¶ 7, 9.) Also, Drenik asserts

that Vera told her that she did not like the idea of renting to a

family with young children upstairs. (SDF ¶¶ 21, 22.) 

A reasonable jury could conclude that these statements in

context constituted “steering” of families with small children

away from upper-level apartments. See Weber, 993 F.Supp. at

1293. Plaintiff’s failure to file an application and submit the

$12 credit check fee does not necessarily suggest otherwise. A

jury could conclude that it shows that Drenik was indeed

“steered” away from renting. 

In response, defendants argue that plaintiffs do not allege

“steering” with any specificity in their pleadings. (Reply at

5.) However, the complaint alleges that “[d]efendants made

statements and continue to make statements with respect to the

rental of the Subject Property that discriminates based on

familial status . . . in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(c) and

(d).” (Compl. ¶¶ 27, 28.) While the word “steering” does not

appear, this allegation is sufficient to state a steering claim. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 

Defendants also argue that the court should grant partial

summary judgment as to the discrimination theories that Drenik

concedes she is not advancing, including: (1) intentional

discrimination; and (2) disparate impact. Because Drenik

concedes that she is not pursuing these theories of liability,

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the court grants partial summary judgment as to these issues.

III.

For the reasons stated above, the court: (1) denies

defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s

“steering” claim; and (2) grants partial summary judgment as to

any claim of intentional discrimination or disparate impact. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2006

 /s/ David F. Levi 

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge 

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