Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00281/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00281-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Genaro Lopez Maduena, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-281-PHX-FJM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1) Respondents filed a Limited Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Petitioner filed a Reply to the Limited Answer.

(Docs. 6-7) As explained below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends the Petition

be dismissed as untimely. 

I. Background

A. Trial and Sentencing

Petitioner challenges his criminal convictions in two separate Arizona cases. In Pinal

County Superior Court Case No. CR 2008-01452, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial

of two counts of Selling Dangerous Drugs and two counts of Selling, Transferring, or

Offering to Sell or Transfer Marijuana. (Doc. 6, Exh. A) Through a combination of

concurrent and consecutive prison terms, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total of 25

years in the Arizona Department of Corrections in this case. (Id.) 

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In Pinal County Superior Court Case No. CR 2008-01005, Petitioner was convicted

after a jury trial of Sale or Transportation of Methamphetamine, Possession of

Methamphetamine for Sale, and Possession for Sale of More Than Nine Grams of Cocaine.

(Doc. 6, Exh. C) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to three concurrent terms of ten years

in prison, commencing upon the completion of the 25-year sentence in the other State case.

(Id. at 2)

B. Direct Review

Petitioner sought direct review in both cases. In CR 2008-01452, Petitioner’s counsel

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Clark, 196

Ariz. 530, 2 P.3d 89 (Az. Ct. App. 1989), stating there were no arguable issues of law to

present and asking the Arizona Court of Appeals to review the record for fundamental error.

(Doc. 6, Exh. A at 2) Petitioner did not file a pro se supplemental brief. (Id.) The Court of

Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on March 16, 2010, in which it found no reversible

error and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at 3) When Petitioner failed

to seek further review, the Court of Appeals issued a Mandate on April 23, 2010. (Id., Exh.

B)

In CR 2008-01005, Petitioner presented a single issue on direct appeal: that his

conviction for Possessing Methamphetamine for Sale was “redundant” to his conviction for

Sale or Transportation of Methamphetamine, and that this double jeopardy violation

constituted fundamental error. (Id., Exh. C at 2) The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s

argument, found no error, and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id. at 5)

When Petitioner failed to seek further review, the Court of Appeals issued a Mandate on

January 5, 2011. (Id., Exh. D)

C. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

 On April 11, 2011, Petitioner initiated State post-conviction proceedings by filing a

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“Notice”) and, simultaneously, a Petition for PostConviction Relief in both cases. (Doc. 6, Exhs. E at 21-22; F) The attorney appointed by the

trial court to represent Petitioner in the post-conviction proceedings subsequently filed a

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 The docket reflects the Petition was actually filed on February 10, 2012. (Doc. 1)

The January 30, 2012 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the Petition, doc. 1 at 23, and

reflects the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date

it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149

n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003).

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notice, stating she had found no colorable claims to raise. (Id, Exh. E at 2) Although

Petitioner was granted additional time to file a pro se petition, he elected to rely on the

Petition he had previously filed with the Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Id.)

In an order entered on September 8, 2011, the trial court addressed the merits of

Petitioner’s post-conviction relief claims and denied relief. (Id., Exh. G) On October 11,

2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review. (Id., Exh. H) In a Memorandum Decision on

January 10, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. (Id., Exh.

E) The Court of Appeals determined that it need not address the merits of Petitioner’s claims

because his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was filed untimely. (Id. at 3) Based on the

untimely Notice, the Court of Appeals denied relief. (Id. at 4) Petitioner did not seek review

in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 1 at 5) 

D. Federal Habeas Petition

On January 30, 2012, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

District Court.1

 (Doc. 1) Petitioner alleges three grounds for relief in the Petition. First, he

alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments based on allegations that counsel failed to raise certain issues on appeal. (Id.

at 6-9) Second, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel in violation of the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments based on counsel’s alleged errors during the pretrial

stages and trials of the two cases. (Doc. 1 at 10-15) Third, Petitioner contends his convictions

were obtained as a result of prosecutorial misconduct in violation of the Fifth Amendment

Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. (Doc. 1 at 16-20) On April

27, 2012, Respondents filed their answer and on May 21, 2012, Petitioner filed his reply.

(Docs. 6-7)

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II. Discussion

Respondents argue the Petition should be dismissed because it was not filed within

the federal statute of limitations period for filing habeas petitions. Alternatively, Respondents

contend Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. Because the information presented

clearly establishes Petitioner’s habeas Petition was filed after the limitations period expired,

the Court finds the Petition is barred and recommends the Petition be denied on that basis.

The Court finds it unnecessary to address Respondents’ alternative argument.

A. Legal Standards

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An application for post-conviction relief

remains “pending” for purposes of the tolling provision at § 2244(d)(2) until it has achieved

final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedure. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

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214, 219-220 (2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a

state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d

921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of postconviction relief is filed even though the petition may not be filed until later. Isley v. Arizona

Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that Isley’s

state petition was “pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and he was

entitled to tolling from the date when the Notice was filed. The district court erred in

dismissing his petition as untimely.”).

State post-conviction petitions rejected as untimely by the State court are not

“properly filed” under § 2244(d)(2), and do not toll the statute of limitations. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA

petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling

under § 2244(d)(2).”). “When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that

[is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

The AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner

must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way” and prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562

(quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Analysis

Here, in CR 2008-01452, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief and affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on March 16, 2010. (Doc. 6, Exh. A) Petitioner then

had thirty days to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a)

(petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court must be filed within 30 days after the

filing of the decision by the Court of Appeals). As a result of Petitioner’s failure to seek

review in the Arizona Supreme Court, his convictions became final upon the expiration of

the time to seek review, which was April 15, 2010. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069,

1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (direct appeal was final on the date the petitioner allowed his time to

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seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court to expire). Thus, the AEDPA statute of limitations

began to run the next day and expired one year later on April 15, 2011. Petitioner did not file

his federal habeas petition until January 30, 2012, more than nine months after the limitations

period expired.

Moreover, Petitioner’s Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, filed on April 11, 2011, did

not toll the limitations period. As determined by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner’s

Notice was untimely because it was not filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment

and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct

appeal, whichever is the later.” (Doc. 6, Exh. E at 3) (quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a)). The

Court of Appeals found Petitioner filed his Notice “more than eleven months” after the

mandate issued. (Doc. 6, Exh. E at 3) Because the Notice was untimely, it was not “properly

filed” under § 2244(d)(2) and, consequently, it did not toll the statute of limitations. See

Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. Thus, with respect to Petitioner’s convictions in CR 2008-01452, the

Court finds that the habeas petition was filed after the statute of limitations expired and is

untimely.

Similarly, in CR 2008-01005, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief and affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on September 3, 2010. (Doc. 6, Exh. C) Petitioner

then had thirty days to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P.

31.19(a). As a result of Petitioner’s failure to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court, his

convictions became final upon the expiration of the time to seek review, which was October

3, 2010. See Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1074. Thus, the AEDPA statute of limitations began

running the next day and expired one year later on October 3, 2011. Petitioner did not file

his federal habeas petition until January 30, 2012, nearly four months after the limitations

period expired.

As in the other State case, Petitioner’s Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, filed on April

11, 2011, did not toll the federal limitations period. As the Arizona Court of Appeals

determined, Petitioner’s Notice was untimely because it was not filed “within ninety days

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order

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and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” (Doc. 6, Exh. E at 3) (quoting

Ariz.R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). The Court of Appeals found that Petitioner filed his Notice “more

than ninety days” after the mandate issued. (Id., Exh. E at 3) Because the Notice was

untimely, it was not “properly filed” under § 2244(d)(2) and, consequently, it did not toll the

AEDPA statute of limitations. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. Thus, as to Petitioner’s convictions

in CR 2008-01005, the Court finds Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was filed after the

statute of limitations expired and is untimely.

Nothing raised by Petitioner in his Petition or Reply alters the Court’s analysis. In the

Petition’s section that provides an opportunity to explain why the statute of limitations does

not bar the Petition, Petitioner simply wrote, “Timely filed.” (Doc. 1 at 23) In his Reply,

Petitioner argues that, because the trial court accepted his untimely Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief, the Notice properly tolled the federal habeas limitations period. (Doc. 7 at 4) He

further argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals erred when it subsequently determined that

Petitioner’s Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was untimely. (Id. at 5) 

The Court finds Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. Any claim that the Arizona

Court of Appeals erred when it found his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief to be untimely,

should have been raised in a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, which

Petitioner failed to do. (Doc. 1 at 5) Because the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected

Petitioner’s Notice of Post-Conviction Relief as untimely, the Notice was not “properly

filed,” and Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2). See Pace, 544

U.S. at 417.

 Petitioner has not alleged in his habeas Petition or Reply that equitable tolling of the

limitations period should apply here. Based on its own review of the information presented

by Petitioner, the Court finds there is no basis to conclude that extraordinary circumstances

beyond Petitioner’s control prevented him from filing a timely petition. 

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Petitioner’s habeas Petition is barred by the

AEDPA statute of limitations.

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 1, be

DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists

of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

Dated this 29th day of April, 2013.

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