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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐2365

JOSEPH S. MCGREAL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

THE VILLAGE OF ORLAND PARK, TIMOTHY MCCARTHY, PATRICK

DUGGAN, and JAMES BIANCHI,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 5135 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2017

____________________

Before MANION, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. On June 28, 2010, Joseph McGreal

was fired from his position as a police officer with the Or‐

land Park Police Department. Thereafter, he sued the Village

of Orland Park and three members of the police depart‐

ment—Chief of Police Timothy McCarthy, Lieutenant Patrick

Duggan, and Lieutenant James Bianchi—claiming that the

defendants violated his First Amendment rights by firing

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2 No. 16‐2365

him in retaliation for his exercise of protected speech at a

community board meeting. He also brought a state‐law in‐

tentional‐infliction‐of‐emotional‐distress claim. The defend‐

ants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the dis‐

trict court granted.  

This appeal ultimately comes down to evidence, or per‐

haps more appropriately, a lack of it. Because McGreal has

offered no admissible evidence showing that he is entitled to

relief, the district court properly dismissed his claims.  

I. BACKGROUND

McGreal began working as a police officer in the Village

of Orland Park on January 10, 2005. Early in his career,

McGreal performed competently: he received positive re‐

views on his performance evaluations and was nominated

for various commendations and other honors. But conflict

between McGreal and the police department arose in 2009,

which culminated in McGreal’s firing on June 28, 2010.

McGreal alleges that he was fired because of his exercise

of protected speech at a village board meeting held on No‐

vember 2, 2009. The village had called that meeting to dis‐

cuss options to address an anticipated budgetary shortfall.

One of the cost‐saving options that the village proposed in‐

volved laying off as many as seven full‐time police officers.

McGreal, who had been elected secretary of the local police

union in 2008, contends that he attended the meeting on be‐

half of the union. There, he allegedly presented three alter‐

native solutions, none of which required the laying off of

any full‐time officers: (1) eliminating certain newly‐created,

non‐essential positions; (2) eliminating the take‐home squad‐

car program for certain lieutenant positions; and (3) creating

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No. 16‐2365 3

a new longevity‐benefit program that would allow eligible

officers to take early retirement. McGreal contends that those

solutions, which protected lower‐level police officers at the

expense of their superiors, drew the ire of the defendants.

According to McGreal, the defendants then retaliated against

him because of his speech by accusing, interrogating, and

ultimately firing him under the pretext of unsubstantiated

violations of department policy.  

The defendants, on the other hand, deny knowing that

McGreal engaged in any protected speech or even attended

the November 2 board meeting. Instead, they argue that

McGreal was legitimately fired because of a series of inci‐

dents that occurred in late 2009 and early 2010, none of

which involved any protected speech.

The first incident occurred on October 27, 2009. That

evening, McGreal conducted a traffic stop of a man named

Charles Robson, which McGreal’s in‐squad video camera

recorded. Because McGreal turned his microphone off short‐

ly after placing Robson in handcuffs, the police department

questioned whether the stop had been performed properly.

The defendants also allege that McGreal initially refused to

write a report for the stop and even lied under oath about

what occurred during the stop. The department conducted

an investigation of the stop and its aftermath on November

23, 2009.  

The defendants next contend that McGreal committed

several acts of misconduct shortly after the November 2

board meeting. These included two unauthorized, unneces‐

sary, and dangerous high‐speed chases. The defendants also

point to McGreal’s behavior at an awards banquet on No‐

vember 24, 2009, during which McGreal allegedly ostracized

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a fellow officer who had been honored as the Officer of the

Year. The defendants further allege that McGreal continued

this inappropriate behavior during his shift that same even‐

ing after the banquet.

Because of these and other incidents, the department in‐

terrogated McGreal on January 21, 2010. Specifically, they

questioned McGreal under oath about his actions during the

Robson traffic stop, the awards ceremony, and his shift im‐

mediately following the awards ceremony. The defendants

allege that McGreal lied during the interrogation about each

of those incidents. Afterward, the defendants contend that

McGreal committed several additional acts of misconduct,

including one instance of reckless driving while off duty.

On March 5, 2010, the department placed McGreal on

paid administrative leave. McGreal’s misconduct continued

after this date. The written order placing McGreal on leave

included a no‐contact clause, which ordered McGreal “to

have no contact or discussion of any kind with any member

of this department, citizen or complainant regarding these

investigations.” (R. 215‐23 at 1.) According to the defendants,

McGreal violated the no‐contact clause on at least two occa‐

sions. The department interrogated McGreal again on March

24, 2010. There, the defendants allege that McGreal again

lied under oath, claiming that he never contacted anyone in

the department about his case. The department ordered him

to provide his phone records to verify his testimony, but

McGreal refused, claiming that he was not an authorized us‐

er on his telephone account and could not obtain the records.

The department then obtained the records by subpoena,

which revealed that McGreal had in fact contacted at least

two officers. The records also showed that, on the same day

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No. 16‐2365 5

the department had asked him to provide his phone records,

McGreal had removed his name as an authorized user on the

account in an apparent effort to obstruct the department’s

investigation.  

On April 21, 2010, the department presented McGreal

with a “summarized list of reasons for contemplated disci‐

plinary action,” which charged McGreal with a total of six‐

teen acts of misconduct. (R. 215‐24 at 2.) After meeting with

McGreal, Chief McCarthy filed a statement of charges with

the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. (R. 220‐20.)

McGreal was then fired on June 28, 2010.

McGreal contested his termination through arbitration.

After meeting with the parties seventeen times over a four‐

teen‐month period, the arbitrator sustained McGreal’s ter‐

mination on November 14, 2012. McGreal unsuccessfully

appealed the arbitrator’s decision in the Appellate Court of

Illinois. McGreal v. Village of Orland Park, No. 1‐14‐1412, 2015

WL 256529 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 20, 2015); McGreal v. Ill. Labor

Relations Bd. State Panel, No. 1‐13‐3634, 2014 WL 7176785 (Ill.

App. Ct. Dec. 16, 2014).  

On June 27, 2012, McGreal filed this lawsuit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants in the Northern District

of Illinois. In his complaint, McGreal alleged various consti‐

tutional and state‐law claims surrounding his termination

including: (1) a violation of due process under the Four‐

teenth Amendment, (2) retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment, (3) a Monell claim against the Village of Orland

Park and the police department, (4) tortious interference

with advantageous business relations, and (5) intentional in‐

fliction of emotional distress. He further alleged that the vil‐

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lage was liable under respondeat superior and indemnifica‐

tion theories.  

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the dis‐

trict court granted in part and denied in part on August 2,

2013. In particular, the district court dismissed all claims

against the individual defendants in their official capacities,

limited McGreal’s § 1983 claims to alleged violations that oc‐

curred on or after June 28, 2010, and dismissed certain

claims that were related to the arbitration hearing or that

should have been filed with the Illinois Labor Relations

Board. The defendants then filed a motion for summary

judgment, which the district court granted in its entirety on

April 15, 2016. The district court denied McGreal’s motion

for reconsideration on May 24, 2016. This appeal followed.  

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment, construing all facts and reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party. Tapley v. Chambers, 840 F.3d

370, 376 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is proper when

“the admissible evidence shows that there is no genuine is‐

sue as to any material fact and that the moving party is enti‐

tled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Hanover

Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co., 751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2014)).  

On appeal, McGreal contests only the district court’s

dismissal of his First Amendment and intentional‐infliction‐

of‐emotional‐distress claims. Our review is thus limited to

those claims. See e.g., United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044,

1059 (7th Cir. 2014) (treating as waived arguments that an

appellant did not raise in his opening brief). We begin with

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No. 16‐2365 7

his First Amendment claim and then turn to his intentional‐

infliction‐of‐emotional‐distress claim.  

A. First Amendment Retaliation

McGreal first argues that the defendants violated his First

Amendment rights by firing him in retaliation for his speech

at the November 2 board meeting. To prevail on this claim,

McGreal must show that “(1) he engaged in activity protect‐

ed by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation

that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the fu‐

ture; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a mo‐

tivating factor in the defendants’ decision to take the retalia‐

tory action.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)).

The defendants dispute only the third element—in short,

causation—arguing that McGreal’s termination had nothing

to do with his speech.  

At summary judgment in First Amendment retaliation

cases, the burden of proof for causation is divided and shifts

between the parties. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965

(7th Cir. 2012). First, the plaintiff must produce evidence that

his speech was “at least a motivating factor—or, in philo‐

sophical terms, a ‘sufficient condition’—of the employer’s

decision to take retaliatory action against him.” Id. (quoting

Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 979–80 (7th Cir. 2011)). If the

plaintiff makes this initial showing, the burden then “shifts

to the employer to rebut the causal inference.” Id. The em‐

ployer can meet its burden by offering an alternative expla‐

nation for the firing, showing that its decision to terminate

the plaintiff “would have been made in the absence of the

protected speech.” Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 252 (7th

Cir. 2012). If the employer successfully rebuts the causal in‐

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ference, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “demon‐

strate that the [employer’s] proffered reason was pretextual

and that the real reason was retaliatory animus.” Id.

Here, McGreal fails at both steps one and three in this

burden‐shifting analysis. First, he has provided no admissi‐

ble evidence that his speech was a motivating factor of the

defendants’ decision to fire him. Second, even if he had

made that initial showing and shifted the burden back to the

defendants, McGreal has provided no admissible evidence

that the defendants’ alternative explanations for his firing

were pretextual. See Swearnigen‐El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dept., 602 F.3d 852, 861–63 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing both

steps).

1. McGreal’s Speech as a Motivating Factor

To show that his firing was motivated by his protected

speech, McGreal must first demonstrate that the defendants

knew of the protected speech. “Allegedly protected speech

cannot be proven to motivate retaliation, if there is no evi‐

dence that the defendants knew of the protected speech.”

Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 999–1000 (7th Cir. 1999) (cita‐

tion omitted). McGreal argues that the defendants retaliated

against him because of his speech at the November 2 board

meeting. To survive summary judgment, he thus has to pro‐

vide admissible evidence that the defendants were aware of

that speech before they initiated disciplinary proceedings.

McGreal has not met his burden: none of the “many doc‐

uments” he references actually show that the defendants

were aware of his speech. (Appellant’s Br. at 29.) The first

few documents McGreal cites—a memorandum written by

the village manager to “All Village Employees” (R. 220‐15 at

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No. 16‐2365 9

24) and an email from the union president to the union’s

members (R. 220‐15 at 25)—were actually created weeks be‐

fore the November 2 meeting and thus could not have pro‐

vided the defendants with knowledge of who attended the

meeting or what the meeting’s attendees discussed. Other

documents McGreal references—a letter from the village

manager to the union president (R. 220‐17 at 20) and an

email from the union president to the village manager (R.

220‐16 at 14)—do not address the November 2 meeting at all.  

The deposition testimony that McGreal cites also doesn’t

show that the defendants knew of McGreal’s speech. Alt‐

hough Chief McCarthy admitted during his deposition that

he was aware that McGreal had met with the mayor and

other board members on October 26, McCarthy did not testi‐

fy that he knew McGreal attended or engaged in protected

speech at the November 2 meeting. (R. 220‐9 at 26.) Because

McGreal has provided no evidence that the defendants knew

of his speech, he has failed to show that his speech was a

motivating factor of the defendants’ decision to fire him.

Stagman, 176 F.3d at 999–1000.  

2. The Defendants’ Alternative Explanations

Had McGreal made the initial showing that the defend‐

ants were aware of his protected speech and that his speech

was a motivating factor in his firing, the burden would have

shifted to the defendants to provide a legitimate and non‐

retaliatory explanation for the firing. But because the de‐

fendants provided several alternative explanations for

McGreal’s firing—that he (1) lied under oath during several

formal interrogations, (2) committed numerous acts of in‐

subordination, and (3) engaged in reckless conduct while on

duty—the burden would have again shifted back to McGreal

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to show that these explanations were pretextual. See Thayer,

705 F.3d at 252. To show pretext and to survive summary

judgment, McGreal must “produce evidence upon which a

rational finder of fact could infer that the defendant[s’] prof‐

fered reason[s] [are] lie[s].” Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371,

379 (7th Cir. 2011).  

Again, McGreal has failed to meet his burden: he has of‐

fered no admissible evidence to show that the defendants’

nonretaliatory explanations for his firing were anything but

true. Although he does cite a few documents to bolster his

pretext argument, none of these are sufficient to withstand

summary judgment. For instance, he cites his own unsigned

affidavit (R. 220‐14), his Second Amended Complaint (R. 89

at ¶ 14), his statement of undisputed material facts (R. 220‐2

at ¶¶ 39, 41), and a spreadsheet that he created based largely

on his own experiences (R. 220‐21 at 45–47). He also tries to

bolster his argument with irrelevant citations to portions of

the record that have nothing to do with his firing. In short,

the documents he references are not admissible evidence

showing that the defendants’ explanations are pretextual.  

McGreal also largely relies on the suspicious timing of

events to show pretext. But as we have repeatedly held, sus‐

picious “timing alone does not create a genuine issue as to

pretext if the plaintiff is unable to prove, through other cir‐

cumstantial evidence, that he was terminated for a reason

other than that proffered by the employer.” Pugh v. City of

Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 2001). “The reason is obvi‐

ous: ‘[s]uspicious timing may be just that—suspicious—and

a suspicion is not enough to get past a motion for summary

judgment.’” Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966 (quoting Loudermilk v.

Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011)). Because

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No. 16‐2365 11

McGreal has cited no evidence apart from suspicious timing

that the defendants’ alternative explanations are untrue, he

has failed to meet his burden. The district court thus did not

err in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judg‐

ment as to McGreal’s First Amendment retaliation claim.  

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

McGreal next argues that the defendants’ conduct

amounted to an intentional infliction of emotional distress.

To prevail on this claim under Illinois law, McGreal must

show that (1) the defendants engaged in “extreme and out‐

rageous” conduct; (2) the defendants “either intended that

[their] conduct would inflict severe emotional distress, or

knew there was a high probability that [their] conduct

would cause severe emotional distress”; and (3) the defend‐

ants’ “conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress.” Zo‐

retic v. Darge, 832 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Doe v.

Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 506 (Ill. 1994)).  

McGreal has offered absolutely no evidence that the de‐

fendants’ conduct was extreme or outrageous or that their

conduct caused him severe emotional distress. To the contra‐

ry, in his own brief, McGreal admits that the “severity” of his

emotional distress was “probably of the garden variety.”

(Appellant’s Br. at 53.) “The law intervenes only where the

distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could

be expected to endure it.” McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806,

809 (Ill. 1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46,

cmt. j (1965)). Garden‐variety emotional distress is insuffi‐

cient to meet that standard. The district court did not err in

granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as

to McGreal’s intentional‐infliction‐of‐emotional‐distress

claim.

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12 No. 16‐2365

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is AFFIRMED.  

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