Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-00489/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-00489-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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“On July 14, 1989, an Elmore County grand jury returned a four-count indictment against J.C. Woodall,

charging him with two counts of capital murder, under §§ 13A-5-40(a)(2) and (a)(7), Ala.Code 1975

(robbery-murder and murder-for- hire), in connection with the death of his mother, Clemer Woodall; and one

count each of the noncapital offenses of attempted murder, §§ 13A-6-2, 13A-4-2, Ala.Code 1975, and assault

in the first degree, § 13A-6-20, Ala.Code 1975, in connection with the shooting of his brother, Elmer

Woodall. The defendant was arrested in Kansas, and Alabama authorities sought his return in order to have

him stand trial. After protracted extradition challenges in the state and federal courts in Kansas, see Kennon

v. State, 248 Kan. 515, 809 P.2d 546 (1991); Kennon v. Hill, 44 F.3d 904 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 515 U.S.

1146, 115 S.Ct. 2586, 132 L.Ed.2d 835 (1995), J.C. Woodall was delivered to Alabama authorities. In

December 1995, after a trial in the Elmore County Circuit Court, he was convicted of capital murder on the

count based upon § 13A-5-40(a)(7) and was convicted of attempted murder.” Ex parte Woodall, 730 So.2d

652, 656-657 (Ala. 1998). The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded Woodall’s 1995 capital

murder conviction. Id. at 666. The conviction which Woodall now challenges occurred upon his re-trial for

the capital murder of his mother.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

J. C. WOODALL, #185587, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:03-CV-489-F

)

RALPH HOOKS, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by J. C. Woodall (“Woodall”), a state inmate, on May 5, 2003. In this petition,

Woodall challenges a conviction for capital murder imposed upon him by the Circuit Court

of Elmore County, Alabama on June 21, 2001.1

 The trial court sentenced Woodall to life

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imprisonment without parole for this conviction. 

Woodall filed a direct appeal of his 2001 capital murder conviction in which he

raised the following claims for relief: (i) the trial court erred when, over his objection, it

admitted the testimony of Freddie Glenn Pope [“Pope”] and John Kennon [“Kennon”]from

the 1995 transcript; and (ii) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a

conviction for capital murder. On April 19, 2002, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed Woodall’s capitalmurder conviction. SeeRespondents’ Exhibit D - Memorandum

Opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. The relevant portion of this decision

reads as follows:

 Both the State and the appellant’s defense counsel adopted the facts

contained in this Court’s first opinion following the appellant’s first trial.

Those facts are as follows [sic]:

“In this case the defendant, J.C. Woodall, hired Freddie Glenn Pope

to kill his brother Elmer ‘Stormy’ Woodall and his eighty-one year old

mother, Clemer E. Woodall. The gunman, Freddie Glenn Pope carried out

the contract by shooting to death Clemer Woodall and by attempting to kill

Elmer ‘Stormy’ Woodall, who survived gunshot wounds to the head.

“The evidence established that J.C. Woodall was engaged in a longterm dispute with other Woodall family members over certain real property

located in Elmore County, Alabama, near the city of Tallassee. The

defendant developed an anger or hatred for his youngest brother, Elmer

'Stormy' Woodall, due to Stormy's acquisition of the family property. 

 “The property dispute involved litigation which was ultimately settled

through J. C. Woodall's attorney, Robert Alton. During settlement efforts or

in conjunction with the ultimate settlement, Elmer 'Stormy' Woodall mailed

a sketch of the subject thirty-seven acre tract of land to his brother, J.C.

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Woodall, who lived in the state of Kansas. The sketch map was colored in a

distinguishable manner to identify the land in question. Elmer 'Stormy'

Woodall testified that the triggerman, Freddie Glenn Pope, had possession

of that map when Pope stopped by his residence located at Rt. 3, Box 231,

Tallassee, Alabama, inquiring about some gravel. Under the pretense of

desiring to purchase some gravel, Pope visited the would-be site of the

murders in order to locate the person he was to kill and make preparation for

the hit. 

 “Between March and April, 1989, J.C. Woodall requested long-time

acquaintance John Kennon to come to Alabama to take care of a problem that

he had with a certain person who had beaten him out of some land, and had

given him some problems which caused him to lose a lot of money. John

Kennon refused the request but assisted J.C. Woodall by locating Freddie

Glenn Pope. 

 “In April of 1989, John Kennon introduced J.C. Woodall to Freddie Glenn

Pope. J.C. Woodall sought the assistance of Freddie Glenn Pope to kill a man

in Alabama. Pope dealt with J.C. Woodall in a manner designed to hide the

fact that Pope intended to personally handle the contract killing.

Consequently, Pope led J.C. Woodall to believe that an unidentified third

party was to be paid for committing the murder when, in fact, Pope was the

true hiree who ultimately came to Alabama for the purpose of killing Elmer

'Stormy' Woodall and Clemer Woodall. The testimony of Pope was that J.C.

Woodall paid $3,500.00 to him for the commission of the murder and

attempted murder. 

 “On or about May 30, 1989, J.C. Woodall accompanied by his lady friend,

Ruby Fennigan, came to Alabama. On this date J.C. Woodall conveyed to his

mother, Clemer Woodall, a life estate in the thirty-seven acres of land. Elmer

'Stormy' Woodall testified that the conveyance surprised him because it was

not a part of the settlement agreement reached between the parties to the land

dispute. The conveyance of the life estate to Clemer Woodall was made after

the murder for hire contract was entered into between J.C. Woodall and

Freddie Glenn Pope. 

 “On June 24, 1989, Freddie Glenn Pope arrived in Alabama and on June

25, 1989, he checked into the Budgetel Inn in Montgomery, Alabama.

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Exhibits were introduced into evidence corroborating Pope's oral testimony

regarding his stay in the motel. Pope located the residence of the man he was

employed to kill. While scoping the ultimate crime scene, Pope noticed from

the appearances of things at the residence that another person was there. After

making this observation, Pope telephoned J.C. Woodall in an effort to

determine who was present at the residence in addition to the man he was

supposed to kill. The telephone company records were introduced

corroborating Pope's testimony and matching the telephone number of J.C.

Woodall for at least one of the calls Pope made to J.C. Pope was told by J.C.

Woodall that the person was probably the sister of the man Pope was

employed to kill. In another telephone conversation between Pope and J.C.

Woodall, when the subject of the continued presence of another person was

mentioned by Pope, J.C. told Pope that 'if she gets in the road she has got to

go.' Pope understood this to mean that whoever was present when the murder

took place would have to be killed so that there would be no witnesses. The

evidence establishes that J.C. Woodall knew that his mother lived with his

brother and, therefore, would likely be present when Freddie Glenn Pope

executed the contract for murder. The State argued to the jury that J.C.

Woodall deeded to his mother a life estate in the disputed property because he

knew she would be killed by Freddie Glenn Pope in accordance with the

contract to kill Elmer 'Stormy' Woodall. Pope was told by J.C. Woodall that

the man he was to kill lived alone. Accordingly, when Pope complained to

J.C. Woodall of another person's presence at the residence, he was instructed

to kill that person also as indicated above. 

 “On Monday, June 26, 1989 at approximately 3:30 p.m., Freddie Glenn

Pope arrived at Rt. 3, Box 231, Tallassee, Alabama for the purpose of

performing the contract killings. Pope shot Elmer 'Stormy' Woodall in the

head twice. Clemer Woodall was present and saw Pope shoot her youngest

son. Clemer began to cry out or scream and Pope then fatally shot her in the

head. Pope believed that both of his shooting victims were dead when he left

the scene of the crime. However, Elmer 'Stormy' Woodall survived the

shooting and provided the investigators valuable information about the killer.

This information included observation of a wheat symbol on Pope's car tag

and his possession of the sketch map of the property. Those tips, along with

clever investigative work by local law enforcement and the Alabama Bureau

of Investigation ultimately led to the identification and arrest of Freddie

Glenn Pope, John Kennon, and J.C. Woodall.

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Woodall v. State, 730 So.2d [627, 632-634 (Ala.Cr.App. 1997].

I.

 The appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence

that portion of the transcript of his first trial which contained the testimony

of two deceased State’s witnesses, Freddie Glenn Pope and John Kennon.

In support of his argument, he contends that the admission of the testimony

violates Rule 403 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence because the probative

value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact.

 Additionally, he argues that the former testimony should have been

excluded because it contained statements made by co-conspirators. Lastly,

he argues that the admission of the testimony violated his right to

confrontation of the witnesses against him. 

 In Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 125 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), this Court

reiterated the general rule regarding the introduction of former testimony as

follows:

 “Testimony of a witness, in a former trial or action, given

(1) under oath, (2) before a tribunal or officer having by law

the authority to take testimony and legally requiring an

opportunity for cross-examination, (3) under circumstances

affording the party against whom the witness was offered an

opportunity to test his credibility by cross-examination and 

(4) given in a litigation in which the issues and parties were

substantially the same as in the present cause, is receivable as

evidence in the present trial (5) when the personal attendance

of the witness to testify in the present trial is not feasible. . . .

 “In order for former testimony to be admissible in present

litigation, proof must be made to the reasonable satisfaction of

the trial judge that the personal attendance of the witness at

court is not procurable or, if procurable, is ineffective, in

consequence of legally recognized causes, to procure his

testimony.The following cases of nonproduction of the witness

have been held sufficient: that the witness is dead; that the

witness is permanently or indefinitely absent from the state;

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that the witness cannot be found after diligent search; that the

witness is in military service in time of war; that the witness is

now ill and, in all probability, will never be able to testify

again; that the opponent has caused the witness to be absent;

that the witness is now insane; that the witness has become

disqualified by facts occurring subsequent to the former trial if,

but only if, the party now offering the former testimony is not

responsible for such disqualification and that the witness now

avails himself or herself of a privilege not to testify.” 

Id. 

 Because the testimony was highly probative, and it is legally permissible

to introduce evidence from a previous trial if the witnesses are deceased, and

because the appellant had been afforded his right to confront the witnesses

through sifting cross-examination at the previous trial, no error occurred in

the trial court’s allowing into evidence the former testimony.

 The appellant’s argument that the witnesses’ testimony should not have

been admitted because each involved statements made by co-conspirators,

was not presented to the trial court, and was, therefore, not preserved for

appellate review. See Parker v. State, 777 So. 2d 937 (Ala. Crim. App.

1999). Additionally, the appellant’s argument that he was denied his right

to confrontation of the witnesses against him was not presented to the trial

court and was, thus, not preserved for appellate review. Bowles v. State, 783

So. 2d 1077 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (A defendant is bound by the grounds

of objection stated at trial and may not expand those grounds on appeal.)

II.

 The appellant argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to

sustain his conviction for capital murder because there was insufficient

evidence to prove that he intended for the “hit man”, whom he hired to kill

his brother, to also kill his mother. He contends that he hired the “hit man”

only to kill his brother. 

 The Alabama Supreme Court discussed this issue in Ex parte Woodall,

730 So. 2d 652, 658[-659] (Ala. 1998):

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 “‘[T]he accomplice liability doctrine may be used to

convict a non-triggerman accomplice if, but only if, the

defendant was an accomplice in the intentional killing

as opposed to being an accomplice merely in the

underlying felony. Ritter v. State, 375 So.2d 270

(Ala.1979). An accomplice to the intentional killing is

one who aids and abets the killing by any assistance

rendered through 'acts or words of encouragement or

support or presence, actual or constructive, to render

assistance should it become necessary.’ Id. at 274.”

Ex parte Raines, 429 So.2d 1111, 1112 (Ala.1982). Thus, one

who hires another to commit a murder may be convicted of the

capitaloffense delineated by § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala.Code 1975,

under the doctrine of accomplice liability. See Haney v. State,

603 So.2d 368, 380 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), aff'd, 603 So.2d 412

(Ala.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 925, 113 S.Ct. 1297, 122

L.Ed.2d 687 (1993); see also § 13A-2-23, Ala.Code 1975. "The

accomplice ... is criminally responsible for acts which are the

direct, proximate, natural result of the conspiracy formed," but

"[he] is not responsible for any special act, not within the scope

of the common purpose, but grow[ing] out of the individual

malice of the perpetrator. 1 Wharton Crim.Law, § 397."

Keller v. State, 380 So.2d 926, 935 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert.

denied, 380 So.2d 938 (Ala.1980).

The capital offense of which this defendant was convicted, see

§ 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala.Code 1975, requires (1) proof of an

intentional murder and (2) proof that the murder was

committed for pecuniary gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for

hire. Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 24 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). We

agree with the defendant that his intent that Pope kill Elmer

Woodall pursuant to a contract could not supply the intent

necessary to convict the defendant for the capital murder-forhire of Clemer Woodall. Cf. Tomlin v. State, 591 So.2d 550

(Ala.Cr.App.1991) (holding that under the accomplice liability

doctrine, a nontriggerman accomplice may be convicted of

double murder, a capital offense under § 13A-5-40(a)(10),

Ala.Code 1975, only if he had the particularized intent that

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both victims be killed). Rather, in order to convict the

defendant of the capital offense charged, the State had to

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended

that Clemer Woodall be killed and that she was killed “for a

pecuniary or other valuable consideration or pursuant to a

contract or for hire.” Sockwell, supra.

“‘In determining the sufficiency of the evidence

to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must

accept as true all evidence introduced by the

State, accord the State all legitimate inferences

therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution. Faircloth v.

State, 471 So.2d 485 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), aff'd,

471 So.2d 493 (Ala.1985).’ Powe v. State, 597

So.2d 721, 724 (Ala.1991). It is not the function

of this Court to decide whether the evidence is

believable beyond a reasonable doubt,

Pennington v. State, 421 So.2d 1361

(Ala.Cr.App.1982); rather, the function of this

Court is to determine whether there is legal

evidence from which a rational finder of fact

could have, by fair inference, found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Davis v. State , 598 So.2d 1054

(Ala.Cr.App.1992). Thus, ‘[t]he role of appellate

courts is not to say what the facts are. [Their

role] is to judge whether the evidence is legally

sufficient to allow submission of an issue for

decision [by] the jury.’ Ex parte Bankston, 358

So.2d 1040, 1042 (Ala.1978) (emphasis

original).

 “The evidence tended to show that the defendant hired Pope

expressly to kill the defendant's brother, Elmer Woodall. The

evidence further indicated that, although he told Pope that

Elmer Woodall lived alone, the defendant was aware that his

mother, Clemer Woodall, resided at the house with Elmer

Woodall. Pope testified that once he was in Alabama, but

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before committing the shootings, he telephoned the defendant

in Kansas and that the defendant told him that the other person

at the house was probably his sister from Florida and that ‘if

she gets in the road she has got to go." Pope said he understood

this to mean that whoever was present when the murder took

place would have to be killed so that there would be no *659

witnesses. The defendant argues that Pope's testimony on this

issue is not believable, but our function is only to assess

whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the

defendant's capital murder conviction, not to second-guess the

jury's assessment of the credibility of the testimony. We

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to

infer that the defendant hired Pope and intended that Pope, if

doing so was necessary to complete his primary task of killing

Elmer Woodall, should also kill Clemer Woodall or anyone

else present who might be a potential witness to the crime. The

defendant's claim on this ground is due to be denied.”

 Based on the aforementioned legal authority, the State presented sufficient

evidence tending to show that the appellant was criminally responsible for

the death of his mother.

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Respondents’ Exhibit D - Memorandum Opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

 at 1-9. 

Woodall filed an application for rehearing which the appellate court denied on May

10, 2002. However, he did not further appeal his capital murder conviction by petition for

writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals therefore issued the certificate of judgment on May 28, 2002. 

Woodall filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on May 5, 2003 in which he asserts the

following claims for relief:

1. The indictment is defective because it is vague and duplicitous.

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2. The State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction for capital murder under a theory of murder for hire

of Clemer Woodall, because evidence that Woodall intended

for the shooter to kill his mother was insufficient.

3. The trial court erred by overruling Woodalls’ objection to the

introduction of Pope’s and Kennon’s prior trial testimony (i)

the testimony is unduly prejudicial, (ii) these witnesses were

co-conspirators, and (iii) this admission denied Woodall his

constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. 

The respondents have asserted the following contentions:

1. Woddal’s claims for federal habeas relief are procedurally defaulted due to

his failure to present these claims to the state courts in compliance with the

state’s procedural rules. See Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th

Cir. 2002); Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1254 n. 9 (11th Cir.), cert

denied, 531 U.S. 1017 (2000); Collier v. Jones, 901 F.2d 770, 773 (11th Cir.

1990). 

2. Woodall’s attack on the constitutionality of the indictment is procedurally

barred from review since the petitioner never presented this claim to the state

courts during the trial or on direct appeal of the capital murder conviction

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imposed upon him in June of 2001. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

(1989); Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999). 

3. The claims concerning insufficient evidence and erroneous admission of

former trial testimony are procedurally defaulted because Woodall failed to

file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court from the

appellate court’s denial of his application for rehearing on May 28, 2002.

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1

(1999); Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140-1146 (11th Cir. 2001), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S.Ct. 1081, 151 L.Ed.2d 982 (2002). 

4. Woodall’s challenge to the admission of prior testimony based on the ground

that co-conspirators testified and his assertion that the testimony violates the

Confrontation Clause are procedurally barred from review because the last

state court to render judgment deemed these claims procedurally defaulted.

See Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations

omitted) (“Federal review of a petitioner’s claim is barred by the proceduraldefault doctrine if the last state court to review the claim states clearly and

expressly that its judgment rests on a procedural bar, and that bar provides

an adequate and independent state ground for denying relief.”). On direct

appeal of his capital murder conviction, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals determined that these claims were precluded from review due to

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Woodall’s failure to present them to the trial court during the 2001

proceedings. Respondents’ Exhibit D - Memorandum Opinion on Direct

Appeal at 6.

Upon review of the § 2254 petition, the answer of the respondents, Woodall’s

response to the answer, and the undisputed record of the state court proceedings, the court

concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required and that the petition is due to be denied

in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in

United States District Courts. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Default In General

This court may reach the merits of Woodall’s procedurally defaulted claims only if

the petitioner shows (1) cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice arising out of

the violation of federal law, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), or (2) a resulting

fundamental miscarriage of justice if the federal court does not consider the merits of the

claims. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320 (1995). 

In his response to the answer of the respondents, Woodall asserts that “application

of the applicable procedural default is patently unfair[,]” the deficient indictment claim

should not be considered defaulted because he raised this claim within the sufficiency claim

on appeal of his 1995 conviction and the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed this claim

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2Woodall relies on Tucker v. Dept. of Corrections, 301 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2002) as the basis for this

argument. However, Tucker is not applicable to the instant habeas petition because its holding is explicitly

limited to Boerckel’s applicability “to § 2254 petitioners seeking review of Florida convictions” and only

“answer[s] a small part of that question.” Tucker, 301 F.3d at 1281. Specifically, Tucker addresses whether

the Boerckel rule applies to a federal habeas petition challenging a Florida conviction where the petitioner’s

ability to proceed on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court was permitted only because “the district court of

appeal certified a question ‘to be of great importance’ . . .” Id. at 1283. 

 

3Notwithstanding its inapplicability to this case, the court notes that Woodall’s “plain error” argument is

without merit. “[T]he mere existence of a ‘plain error’ rule does not preclude a finding of procedural default;

moreover, the assertion by an Alabama court that it did not find any errors upon its independent review of

the record does not constitute a ruling on the merits of claims not raised in that court or in any court below.

Unless there is some indication that the state court was aware of this issue, we cannot say that the court

rejected the merits of petitioner's constitutional claim. A contrary rule would encourage the ‘sandbagging’

of state courts criticized in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). See

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2647, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (possibility of ‘sandbagging

exists on appeal ‘since appellate counsel might well conclude that the best strategy is to select a few

promising claims for airing on appeal, while reserving others for federal habeas review should the appeal be

unsuccessful.’” Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).

13

“pursuant to the plain error Rule”, and Boerckel does not bar federal review of his claims.2

Petitioner’s August 18, 2003 Response - Court Doc. No. 8 at 3-4. 

The “patently unfair” argument set forth by Woodall fails to circumvent application

of the procedural default bar because it satisfies neither of the exceptions to the bar.

Moreover, Woodall’s appeal of the 1995 capital murder conviction did not preserve for

review issues arising during his 2001 trial; rather, claims related to the 2001 trial and

conviction must have been raised during this trial and/or on direct appeal therefrom in order

for Woodall to have presented these claims to the state courts.3

 

Finally, contrary to Woodall’s argument, Boerckel is applicable to his case. Smith

v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1140 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S.Ct. 1081

(2002) (“[T]here is no doubt that Alabama’s discretionary direct review procedures bring

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Alabama prisoner habeas petitions within the scope of the Boerckel rule.”). 

The court has thoroughly reviewed the response submitted by Woodall. The court

concludes that he has failed to demonstrate cause for his failure to present his federal

habeas claims to the state courts either at trial and/or on appeal of the 2001 conviction in

compliance with applicable procedural rules, and he has failed to demonstrate the existence

of actual prejudice arising from infringement of federal law. Nevertheless, the court may

still reach the merits of his defaulted claims to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

B. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

The miscarriage of justice standard is directly linked to innocence. Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). Innocence is not an independent claim; rather, it is the

“gateway” through which a petitioner must pass before a court may consider constitutional

claims which are defaulted. Id. at 315. This exception applies when a petitioner

establishes that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); Schlup v. Delo,

supra. 

“To establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must demonstrate that . . . ‘it

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.’ Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).” Bousley

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “It is important to note in this regard that

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‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. See Sawyer v.

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).” Id. at

623-624. 

Schlup observes that

a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the

conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. . . . To be

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence

– whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was

not presented at trial.

513 U.S. at 324.

Woodall has failed to make the requisite showing of actual innocence. He has

presented no evidence nor suggested that any exists which could satisfy the standard set 

forth in Schlup. Consequently, Woodall’s procedurally defaulted claims are foreclosed

from federal habeas review.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the

petition for habeas corpus relief filed by J. C. Woodall be denied and that this case be

dismissed with prejudice. It is further 

ORDERED that on or before August 10, 2005 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

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Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 26th day of July, 2005.

/s/ Vanzetta Penn McPherson

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-00489-MEF-VPM Document 10 Filed 07/26/05 Page 16 of 16