Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02395/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02395-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 U.S. Defendant

---

– 1 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA HALL,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION

[ECF No. 4]

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Maria Hall commenced this lawsuit against Defendant United States 

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).1 Plaintiff 

alleges that Navy commissary personnel employed by the Government negligently 

shelved jars of coconut oil at the Commissary at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar 

 

1 Although the caption of Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies “Ray Mabus, Secretary, 

Department of the Navy” as the defendant, the body of the Complaint identifies the defendant as 

the United States. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5, 7.) The Ninth Circuit has held “that even if an improper 

defendant is indicated in the caption, [the court] may consider a complaint to have named the proper 

defendant ‘if the allegations made in the body of the complaint make it plain that the party is 

intended as a defendant.’” Barsten v. Dep’t of Interior, 896 F.2d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1983)). The 

allegations in the body of Plaintiff’s Complaint make it clear that the United States is the intended 

defendant. Therefore, the Court will consider the Complaint to have named the United States as the 

proper defendant under the FTCA. See id.

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 12
– 2 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“Miramar Commissary”), causing Plaintiff to sustain a head injury while shopping. 

(Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) 

Presently before the Court is the Government’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.) The Government argues 

that dismissal is proper because the FTCA’s independent contractor exception 

provides the Government has not waived its sovereign immunity for Plaintiff’s

action. (Id.) Plaintiff opposes. (ECF No. 7.)

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted 

and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the 

reasons that follow, the Court denies the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Claim

Plaintiff Maria Hall is a resident of California and a civilian spouse of a retired 

veteran. (Compl. ¶ 8.) On September 22, 2014, while grocery shopping in the 

Miramar Commissary, Plaintiff attempted to procure a glass jar of solid coconut oil 

from the top of a shelf. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the jars of coconut oil were stacked three 

high. (Id.; see also Redcrow Decl. Ex. 1.) When Plaintiff tried to secure the topmost 

jar, a falling jar of coconut oil struck Plaintiff in the eye. (Compl. ¶¶ 8–9.) Balboa 

Naval Hospital diagnosed Plaintiff with hematoma to the right eye, post-concussion 

syndrome, cervical spasm, and headache. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) Plaintiff claims that her pain 

remains a problem, though physical therapy and pain management care have 

provided her some relief. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 15.) Further, she allegedly has been unable 

to return to her full employment as a hairdresser following the injury. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.)

On August 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a claim for her injuries and wage losses 

with the Department of the Navy and provided supporting medical documentation of 

her injuries and treatment. (Compl. ¶ 21.) In a letter dated March 24, 2016, the Navy 

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 12
– 3 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

rejected Plaintiff’s claim for injuries pursuant to the FTCA and instructed her to file 

her claim in federal district court. (Id. ¶ 22.) 

Plaintiff filed this suit on September 23, 2016, pursuant to the FTCA, alleging 

that “Commissary personnel employed by the [Government] were negligent in 

performance of their duties,” specifically in “stack[ing] the glass jars of solidified 

coconut oil three high, one atop another, on the uppermost shelf of the grocery aisle.” 

(Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff asserts the alleged negligence caused her to sustain injuries 

when “she attempted to secure the top-most jar . . . above her head.” (Id.)

B. Commissary Staffing Procedure

The Government and Plaintiff provide declarations and evidence regarding the 

staffing procedure and employee duties at the Miramar Commissary. The Defense 

Commissary Agency (“DeCA”) is responsible for operating commissaries on 

military bases, including the Miramar Commissary. (Prince Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5, ECF No. 

7.) DeCA contracts with independent contractors to run daily operations at the 

commissaries, “including shelf stocking, custodial and Receiving/Storage/Holding 

Area . . . services for commissaries.” (Id. ¶¶ 1, 6.)

On March 26, 2014, DeCA awarded Job Options, Inc., a contractor, contract 

number HDEC08-14-C-0016 to staff and operate the Miramar Commissary 

(“Commissary Contract”). (Prince Decl. ¶¶ 7–8, Ex. A.) The Commissary Contract 

allocates supervision and control of Job Options’s employees to Job Options. 

(Commissary Contract § 52.237-4501(b–c).)

Further, on September 11, 2014, the parties attached the Performance Work 

Statement for Shelf Stocking, Receiving/Storage/Holding Area and Custodial 

Operations at the Miramar Commissary (“PWS”) to the Commissary Contract. (See

PWS, Redcrow Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 7-3.) In part, the PWS specifies Job Options’s 

responsibilities related to shelf stocking (id. § 1.1.1), and allocates responsibility for 

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 12
– 4 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

shelving items such as glass jars of coconut oil to Job Options, (see id. §§ 4.3–

4.3.3.15.3; see also Prince Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. E). 

The PWS also elaborates on the Commissary Contract’s definition of the 

relationship between the Government and Job Options, stating: “The Government 

will employ Quality Assurance Evaluators (“QAE”) to surveil and document 

Contractor performance.” (PWS § 1.1.2.) In addition, the PWS contemplates the 

presence of a Store Director—an “onsite supervisor . . . responsible for overall 

commissary operations”—who “act[s] as an authorized representative of the 

Government.” (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss a claim based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, “[a] federal court is presumed to lack 

jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., 

Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). “[T]he burden of 

establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 

U.S. at 377.

A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either 

facial or factual. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial 

attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to 

invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2004). Here, the court limits its review to the allegations in the complaint. 

Id.

In a factual attack, however, the challenger provides evidence that an alleged 

fact in the complaint is false, thereby resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 12
– 5 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

See Meyer, 373 F.3d at 1039. Therefore, in a factual attack, the allegations in the 

complaint are not presumed to be true, and “the district court is not restricted to the 

face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, 

to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. 

United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). “In response to a factual attack, [the 

non-moving party] must present ‘affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy 

[its] burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject matter 

jurisdiction.’” Edison v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Colwell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009)).

However, “because jurisdictional fact-finding by the court deprives litigants of the 

protections otherwise afforded by Rule 56,” the court’s ability to dismiss claims 

based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is limited. Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. 

Ernst Enter., Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, “[j]urisdictional 

dismissals in cases premised on federal-question jurisdiction are exceptional[.]” Id.

at 140.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Government’s Sovereign Immunity Is Abrogated If the 

Government Exercised Substantial Control and Supervision over 

Job Options’s Employees’ Daily Operations.

The Government makes a factual attack on the existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction and requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claim. Specifically, the 

Government argues that it retains sovereign immunity under the FTCA’s independent 

contractor exception and therefore cannot be held liable for Job Options’s employees’ 

allegedly negligent conduct. 

“It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save 

as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define 

that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 12
– 6 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1195 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). 

Accordingly, “[t]he waiver of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to federal-court 

jurisdiction.” Id.

The FTCA is a limited waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1346(b). The FTCA allows the United States to be sued in federal district 

court for certain “negligent or wrongful act[s] or omission[s]” perpetrated by “any 

employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his or her employment 

. . . in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” Id.

The FTCA “defines Government employees to include officers and employees of 

‘any federal agency’ but excludes ‘any contractor with the United States.’” United 

States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813–14 (1971) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671). 

Accordingly, “[t]he FTCA provides that the government cannot be held vicariously 

liable for the negligence of an employee of an independent contractor.” Yanez v. 

United States, 63 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671; Logue v. 

United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973)). “Courts are not free ‘to abrogate the 

[independent contractor] exemption’ for the negligent acts of contractors regardless 

of whether there is a good reason for so doing.” Autery v. United States, 424 F.3d 

944, 957 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration in the original) (quoting Hines v. United States, 

60 F.3d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Thus, the Government may only be sued for the actions of its contractor “if the 

contractor [wa]s acting as an agent of the government, i.e. ‘if the government ha[d] 

the authority “to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor” and 

supervise its “day-to-day operations.” ’ ” Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 

858 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Letnes v. United States, 820 F.2d 1517, 1518 (9th Cir. 

1987)). In this circuit, the Government’s mere ability to control is not determinative; 

rather, it is the Government’s degree of actual control over the contractor that 

determines whether the Government may be held liable for the contractor’s 

negligence under the FTCA. See Fekrat v. United States, No. CV 13-00594 MMM 

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 12
– 7 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(PJWx), 2013 WL 12130585, at *4 n.39 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) (summarizing 

Ninth Circuit case law requiring the Government to exercise actual control over 

contractors to be liable under the FTCA, rather than solely retaining the right to 

control contractors). Consequently, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff 

provides sufficient evidence showing that the Government actually controlled and 

supervised Job Options’s employees’ daily operations, such that the Government 

may be held liable for Job Options’s employees’ allegedly negligent shelving of 

coconut oil jars at the Miramar Commissary.

B. Jurisdictional Discovery Is Appropriate Because a More 

Satisfactory Showing of the Jurisdictional Facts Is Necessary to 

Determine the Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 

FTCA Claim.

Because the outcome of the Government’s motion to dismiss relies on the 

evidence presented by Plaintiff, the Court first addresses Plaintiff’s request to 

conduct jurisdictional discovery.2(Opp’n at 4:21–4:24.) Specifically, Plaintiff 

requests the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery by reviewing the QAEs’ 

inspection records related to the incident and investigating the alleged relationship 

 

2 As an alternative to her request for jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiff asserts that the Court 

retains subject matter jurisdiction over her action because she has a direct premises liability claim 

against the Government. (Opp’n at 6:9–8:22.) In the event that the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint 

does not establish jurisdiction, Plaintiff requests leave to file a First Amended Complaint that 

alleges this alternative theory. (Id. at 8:17–8:20.) Because the Court ultimately denies the 

Government’s motion and grants Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery on her original 

negligence claim, the Court does not address Plaintiff’s arguments regarding her premises liability 

theory. If Plaintiff wishes to amend her Complaint to allege facts supporting this theory, she must 

do so in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 12
– 8 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

between the Government and Job Options.

3

(Id.) Plaintiff supports her request on 

grounds that she was “blindsided” when the Government introduced to her the 

existence of its relationship with Job Options the night before the Government filed 

its motion to dismiss. (Id.) Plaintiff claims—and the Government does not contest—

that she had no notice regarding the relationship between the Government and Job 

Options before the Government’s motion to dismiss. (See Redcrow Decl. ¶¶ 2–5; see 

generally Reply.)

“A district court is vested with broad discretion to permit or deny discovery.” 

Laub v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“Discovery may appropriately be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the 

question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the 

facts is necessary.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 

n.1 (9th Cir. 1977). However, a request for discovery is properly denied where it is 

“based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts.” 

Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, “[a]lthough 

a refusal to grant discovery to establish jurisdiction is [permissible] when ‘it is clear 

that further discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for 

jurisdiction,’ discovery should be granted when . . . the jurisdictional facts are 

contested or more facts are needed.’” Laub, 342 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Wells Fargo 

& Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977)).

“It is well-established that ‘[t]he burden is on the party seeking to conduct 

additional discovery to put forth sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought 

 

3 Though Plaintiff requests jurisdictional discovery to review inspection reports, the Court 

cautions that the presence of inspections alone fails to establish the Government’s actual control 

over Job Options’s employees such that the independent contractor exception is abrogated. See 

Letnes v. United States, 820 F.2d 1517, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that “[t]he [Supreme] Court 

has indicated that detailed regulations and inspections are no longer evidence of an employee 

relationship” (citing Orleans, 425 U.S. at 815; Logue, 412 U.S. at 529–30); see also Rodriguez v. 

United States ex rel. Nellis Air Force Base, No. 2:13-cv-00566-GMN-VCF, 2014 WL 5364111, 

*at 2 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2014) (finding commissary managers’ protocol of “[i]nspecting the premises 

and notifying the parties who are responsible for cleaning up a dangerous condition [wa]s not 

equivalent to substantial supervision over the day-to-day operations”). 

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 12
– 9 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exists.” Gager v. United States, 149 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Conkle 

v. Jeong, 73 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1995)). However, “[a] plaintiff who seeks 

jurisdictional discovery needn’t first make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction 

actually exists.” NuboNau, Inc. v. NB Labs, Ltd., No. 10-cv-2631-LAB-BGS, 2011 

WL 5237566, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011). “Such a showing is necessary to survive 

a motion to dismiss, and ‘[i]t would . . . be counter intuitive to require a plaintiff, 

prior to conducting discovery, to meet the same burden that would be required in 

order to defeat a motion to dismiss.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Orchid 

Biosciences, Inc. v. St. Louis Univ., 198 F.R.D. 670, 673 (S.D. Cal. 2001)). 

In Laub v. United States Department of the Interior, the Ninth Circuit found 

the district court improperly denied jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiffs 

supported their request with documents suggesting their claim was “arguable.” See

342 F.3d at 1092–93. There, the plaintiffs requested discovery after the 

Government’s reply brief “asserted for the first time” that its land and water 

acquisitions were independent of a government water management program and not 

subject to an injunction. See id. at 1083, 1092–93. The Ninth Circuit found that 

“public documents offered by [the] [p]laintiffs suggest[ed] that there [wa]s at least 

an arguable claim that the federal government play[ed] a significant enough role in 

the [water management] program” to render the Government’s actions subject to 

federal requirements. Id. at 1093. Though noting that the offered documents might 

“be insufficient in themselves to establish jurisdiction,” the court found that allowing 

discovery “would create a ‘reasonable probability’ that the outcome of the factual 

motion to dismiss would be different.” Id. Thus, the district court erred in denying 

jurisdictional discovery “[b]ecause additional discovery would be useful to establish 

federal subject matter jurisdiction, and because the extent of federal involvement in 

the challenged transactions [wa]s contested.” Id.

Here, jurisdictional discovery is appropriate because more facts regarding the 

Government’s actual control and supervision over Job Options’s employees are 

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 12
– 10 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

necessary to determine whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s negligence claim under the FTCA. The parties only provide evidence 

establishing a contractual relationship between Job Options and the Government. 

(See generally Commissary Contract; Prince Decl.; PWS; Redcrow Decl.) This 

evidence gives the Court insufficient insight into whether the Government actually 

controlled and supervised Job Options’s employees so as to render them de facto 

government employees on the date in question.

4

However, similar to the plaintiffs’ presentation of public documents in Laub, 

Plaintiff’s presentation of the full PWS—though insufficient to establish jurisdiction 

on its own—suggests that the Government may have had some degree of actual 

supervision and control over Job Options’s employees. See PWS § 1.1.2 (providing 

an onsite supervisor who is a representative of the Government “is responsible for 

overall commissary operations”); see also Autery, 424 F.3d at 957 (“Contractual 

provisions directing detailed performance generally do not abrogate the contractor 

exception.”). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s evidence shows at least an arguable 

FTCA claim “for damages resulting from torts committed by [Miramar Commissary] 

personnel employed by [the Government],” as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

(Compl. ¶ 1.)

Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not yet had a meaningful 

opportunity to develop evidence related to this jurisdictional issue. At this point in 

the proceedings, Plaintiff has not had the right to conduct discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 16(c), 26(f). Further, the Government did not disclose its relationship with Job 

 

4 The Government provides the declaration of a DeCA Contracting Officer, who not only 

discusses the Commissary Contract, but also states that “[n]o federal employee provided substantial 

supervision over the physical performance and day-to-day operations of shelving groceries such as 

glass jars of coconut oil at the [Miramar] Commissary on September 22, 2014.” (Prince Decl. ¶ 

14.) The declaration adequately demonstrates that she has personal knowledge of DeCA’s contract 

procedures. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 5–7.) It does not, however, establish that the Contracting Officer has personal 

knowledge of the events that took place at the Miramar Commissary on the date in question. (See 

id. ¶¶ 1–14.) The Officer’s mere assertion that she does is inadequate. See, e.g., Boyd v. City of 

Oakland, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Thus, her statement regarding the incident 

on September 22, 2014, is inadmissible. See, e.g., id. at 1023–24.

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 12
– 11 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Options when it generated its incident report or when it denied Plaintiff’s 

administrative claim under the FTCA. (Redcrow Decl. ¶¶ 3–5.) Additionally, though 

the Court granted the parties’ joint motion for an extension of time to file an 

opposition and reply (ECF Nos. 5, 6), this extension only afforded Plaintiff additional 

days, rather than months, to conduct an informal inquiry. C.f. Sopcak v. N. Mountain 

Helicopter Serv., 52 F3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding ruling on jurisdiction 

without allowing additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion when the 

plaintiffs failed to conduct discovery in the five months between raising the 

jurisdictional issue and the dismissal); Berardinelli v. Castle & Cooke Inc., 587 F.2d 

37, 38 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding the plaintiff’s argument that he lacked the opportunity 

to develop jurisdictional evidence unconvincing when the plaintiff “made no effort 

to undertake discovery” in the seven months between filing the complaint and the 

hearing). 

Given that Plaintiff has not yet had a meaningful opportunity to conduct 

jurisdictional discovery and because Plaintiff’s evidence shows that more facts are 

needed regarding the Government’s actual control over Job Option’s employees, the 

Court finds that granting Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery is appropriate.

Thus, like other district courts reviewing motions to dismiss FTCA claims, the Court 

will deny without prejudice the Government’s motion to dismiss to allow Plaintiff to 

conduct limited jurisdictional discovery on whether the Government actually 

exercised substantial supervision and control over Job Options’s day-to-day 

operations and physical performance. See, e.g., Nino v. United States, No. 12-cv0469-WQH-BGS, 2015 WL 5032644, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015) (denying a

motion to dismiss an FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after 

“grant[ing] the parties ninety days of jurisdictional discovery in order to address 

factual issues relevant to jurisdiction in light of the foreign country exception to the 

FTCA”); Guerrero v. United States, No. CV-12-00370-TUC-RCC, 2012 WL 

12842348, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 2012) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss 

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 12
– 12 – 16cv2395

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

plaintiff’s FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to allow plaintiff 

“limited . . . discovery on [a] specific jurisdictional issue”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the 

Government’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

(ECF No. 4). The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery. 

Plaintiff shall have until October 23, 2017, to conduct discovery on the jurisdictional 

issues raised in the Government’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s discovery shall be 

limited to the existence and extent of the Government’s control over Job Options’s 

employees’ physical performance and supervision of their day-to-day operations and 

shall be “proportional to the needs of the case.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (listing

factors for determining proportionality). Any requests, joint motions, or disputes 

regarding the jurisdictional discovery will be submitted to the magistrate judge. 

Once Plaintiff has had the opportunity to conduct limited jurisdictional 

discovery, the United States may renew its motion to dismiss, which must be filed no 

later than November 6, 2017. If the United States declines to renew its motion, it 

shall file an answer by this same date. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4) (providing the 

court may set a different time for the filing of a responsive pleading after a Rule 12 

motion has been denied). 

Finally, the Court ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to substitute the United 

States for the Secretary of the Navy as Defendant on the docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 31, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-02395-BAS-RBB Document 9 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 12