Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01148/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01148-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLINTON MORRIS REDDICK,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-1148 LEW DAD P

vs.

T. FELKER, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On June 22, 2007, the undersigned ordered a response to

the petition. On July 23, 2007, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that

petitioner has failed to exhaust available state remedies with respect to eight of the nine claims

set forth in the petition. On August 28, 2007, petitioner filed a timely opposition to the motion to

dismiss together with a proposed amended petition and motion for stay and abeyance. 

Respondent has not filed a reply. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered in the Sacramento County

Superior Court on October 3, 2003. (Docs. Lodged by Resp’t July 23, 2007, Doc. 1.) Following

a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of two counts of second degree robbery, assault with a

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firearm, and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. (Id., Doc. 1.) A number of

sentencing enhancement allegations were also found to be true by the jury. Petitioner was

sentenced to state prison for a term of eleven years. (Id.) On December 15, 2004, the California

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed petitioner’s conviction. (Id., Doc. 2.)

On March 2, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. (Id., Doc. 4.)

Petitioner filed three state post-conviction challenges to his judgment of

conviction. On March 8, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Sacramento County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 5.) On May 30, 2006, the Superior Court

denied the petition on the merits. (Id., Doc. 6.) On July 21, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. (Id.,

Doc. 7.) On August 3, 2006, the Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. (Id., Doc. 8.)

Finally, on September 5, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Id., Doc. 9.) On March 14, 2007, the California Supreme Court

denied that petition with citations to In re Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464 474 (1995), In re Swain, 34 Cal.

2d 300, 304 (1949) and In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947). (Id., Doc. 10.)

On June 14, 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition presenting, nine grounds for

relief. 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner has failed

to exhaust eight of the nine claims presented in his federal petition. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at

2.) Respondent argues that the exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is a prerequisite to

obtaining federal habeas relief. Respondent notes that petitioner has raised the following nine

claims in the instant petition: (1) trial counsel Higgins was ineffective for failing to call

petitioner’s previous trial attorney, Mr. Wiretz, to testify as a rebuttal witness; (2) because victim

Woo testified that the revolver shown to him by the prosecution was not the weapon used in the

robbery, the evidence against petitioner was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (3) because of

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the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel Higgins, the trial court erred by not allowing

petitioner to call Mr. Wiretz as a witness through Mardsen proceedings instead of by way of a

subpoena; (4) trial counsel Higgins was ineffective by failing to meet with petitioner before trial,

by not moving to suppress evidence, by not moving for dismissal once the victim testified that

the gun admitted into evidence at trial was not the same gun used in the robbery, offering false

testimony concerning petitioner’s prior convictions, and not challenging the prosecutor’s use of

false information concerning petitioner’s prior convictions; (5) the prosecutor committed

misconduct by coercing and/or coaching a witness; (6) the prosecutor knowingly used false

evidence to convict petitioner by offering the gun shown to the victim as evidence of petitioner’s

guilt even after the victim testified that the gun was not the one used in the robbery; (7) the

prosecutor used false information concerning petitioner’s prior convictions to convince the trial

judge to allow the prosecution to impeach him; (8) he received ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel due to counsel’s failure to raise all meritorious issues on appeal; and (9) there was

insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. (Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 3.)

Respondent points out that petitioner filed two petitions with the California

Supreme Court, a petition for review on direct appeal and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) Respondent argues that the only claim presented in the petition

for review was that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction of

assault with a deadly weapon. (Id.) Respondent contends that although the other eight claims set

out in the federal petition were alluded to by petitioner in his habeas petition filed with the

California Supreme Court, that petition was denied with a citation to In re Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464,

474 (1995) and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949). (Id. at 4.) Respondent argues that in

Duvall and Swain, the California Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to present their

claims with sufficient particularity and therefore their petitions were rejected as deficient. (Id.) 

Respondent contends that, similarly, in this case petitioner failed to present the eight claims to

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the California Supreme Court with sufficient particularity. (Id.) Accordingly, respondent

concludes that because petitioner has not fairly presented the eight claims to the California

Supreme Court and a state remedy remains available to him, the court should dismiss the instant

petition without prejudice after first providing petitioner a chance to amend his petition to delete

any unexhausted claims if he wishes to proceed at this time. (Id.)

PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION

In a brief opposition, petitioner acknowledges his failure to exhaust claims one

through eight of his federal petition. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Petitioner

has also filed a proposed amended petition containing his only exhausted claim along with a

motion for stay and abeyance. 

In his motion for stay and abeyance, petitioner contends that the Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged a district court’s discretion to hold a petition in abeyance. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay

& Abey. at 4.) Petitioner explains that, in fact, in Rhines v. Weber the United States Supreme

Court held that a district court abuses its discretion if it fails to stay a petition to allow a

petitioner acting in good faith to exhaust his potentially meritorious claims in state court. (Id. at

4-5.) Petitioner further contends that a district court may guard against “dilatory tactics” by

conditioning the stay on a speedy filing in state court followed by a prompt return to federal court

upon denial of the state petition by the state’s highest court. (Id. at 5.) 

Petitioner argues that holding these proceedings in abeyance will preserve his

federal habeas rights, which he has sought to assert diligently and in good faith. (Pet’r’s Mot. for

Stay & Abey. at 5.) Petitioner contends that his apparent failure to set forth a sufficient factual

predicate for the claims presented in his petition for review and petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed in the California Supreme Court was a result of not being trained in the law and not because

of any desire on his part to delay review of his claims. (Id.) Petitioner further contends that he

thought the facts he provided on his state form petition filed with the state Supreme Court would

be sufficient. (Id.) 

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Petitioner also asserts that the claims he wishes to present raise legitimate

questions of law related to whether he was deprived of his constitutional rights under the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay & Abey. at 5.) Specifically, petitioner notes

that his unexhausted claims relate to ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel,

prosecutorial misconduct and the insufficiency of the evidence presented at his trial. (Id. at 5.) 

Petitioner concludes that he meets the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rhines

and requests that this court grant his motion for stay and abeyance so that he can return to state

court to exhaust claims one through eight in his original petition.

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion of Available State Remedies

The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court's

consideration of claims sought to be presented in habeas corpus proceedings. See Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before

presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, both parties agree that petitioner failed to exhaust claims one through eight

in his original petition. The concession appears to be well-taken. See Harris v. Superior Court,

200 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1974) (“If a state court denies a petition for post conviction relief

on procedural grounds, the petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies.”); see also Kim v.

Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986); McQuown v. McCartney, 795 F.2d 807, 809

(9th Cir. 1986). Here, the California Supreme Court clearly denied petitioner’s habeas petition

on the procedural ground that he had not presented his claims with sufficient particularity. In this

regard, the California Supreme Court cited its decisions in In re Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474

(1995) (holding that a habeas petition must “state fully and with particularity the facts on which

relief is sought”) and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949) (holding that a petition for writ of

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In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Rhines, as recognized by the Ninth Circuit in 1

Jackson, the mixed petition filed in this case is subject to stay and abeyance and need not be

dismissed or replaced by an amended petition alleging only exhausted claims. Accordingly, the

proposed amended petition filed by petitioner shall be placed in the file and disregarded at this time.

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habeas corpus must “allege with particularity the facts upon which he would have a final

judgment overturned”). 

However, despite the conceded non-exhaustion of eight of the nine claims

presented to this court, recent developments in the law leads the court to the conclusion that the

motion to dismiss should not be granted at this time. 

II. Stay and Abeyance

The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the district court’s discretion to

stay a federal habeas proceeding to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims to the state

court where there is good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust all claims in state court

before filing a federal habeas petition. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005); see also

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000) (authorizing district courts to stay fully

exhausted federal petitions pending exhaustion of other claims); Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1998). Importantly for purposes of resolving the

pending motions, this discretion to issue a stay extends to mixed petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at

278 (where a petitioner has met the standard for the granting of stay and abeyance, “the district

court should stay, rather than dismiss, the mixed petition.”); Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 660

(9th Cir. 2005) (“Rhines concluded that a district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition to

allow a petitioner time to return to state court to present unexhausted claims.”). The Supreme 1

Court has cautioned, however, that “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited

circumstances,” and “district courts should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to

state court and back.” Id. at 277-78. The Supreme Court noted that district courts should not

grant a stay if the petitioner has engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay or if the

unexhausted claims are plainly meritless. Id. at 278.

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Here, it does not appear that the pro se petitioner seeks to stay these proceedings

for an improper purpose. Nor does it appear that petitioner has engaged in abusive litigation

tactics or intentional delay. For example, petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on March

8, 2006. Less than one month after the Superior Court denied that petition, petitioner filed his

second state habeas petition on July 21, 2006 with the California Court of Appeal. A little more

than one month after the state appellate court denied that petition, petitioner filed his third

petition with the California Supreme Court. Three months after the California Supreme Court

denied that petition, petitioner promptly filed the instant petition in federal court. Thus,

petitioner has been diligently pursuing his federal claims. 

Moreover, the undersigned does not find petitioner’s claims one through eight to

be plainly meritless. If petitioner obtains relief in state court, his federal petition may be

rendered moot, thereby serving the interests of judicial economy as well as the interests of

justice. Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance should be granted.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s August 28, 2007 motion to hold proceedings in abeyance be

granted;

2. Respondent’s July 23, 2007 motion to dismiss be denied without prejudice in

light of the granting of the requested stay and abeyance;

3. Petitioner be ordered to present all unexhausted claims to the California

Supreme Court in a further state habeas corpus petition to be filed within thirty days from the

date of this order;

4. This action be stayed and the Clerk of the Court be directed to administratively

close the case;

5. Petitioner be ordered to file and serve a status report in this case on the first

court day of each month; and

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6. Petitioner be ordered to file and serve a motion to lift the stay of this action

within thirty days after petitioner is served with the California Supreme Court’s order disposing

of the state exhaustion petition.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. A document containing objections

should be titled “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply

to objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain

circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 14, 2007.

DAD:9

redd1148.157

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