Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05846/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05846-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and F.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties consented to proceed before a United States

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Magistrate Judge, and by a September 27, 2004 order, this action was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence

J. O’Neill for all further proceedings.

EHS, Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray will be referred to collectively as the “County defendants.” 2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROXANNE AYALA, et al., CASE NO. CV F 02-5846 LJO

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’

RECONSIDERATION MOTION

vs. (Doc. 158.)

KC ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, 

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

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In this malicious prosecution action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs Leroy Edwards, Kenneth

Edwards and Roxanne Ayala (collectively “plaintiffs”) seek reconsideration of summary judgment in

favor of defendants William O’Rullian (“Mr. O’Rullian”), a Kern County Environmental Health

Services Department (“EHS”) environmental specialist, and EHS environmental health technician Terry

Gray (“Mr. Gray”). This Court considered plaintiffs’ reconsideration motion on the record and without 2

oral argument, pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-730(h). For the reasons discussed below, this

Court DENIES plaintiffs’ reconsideration motion.

Case 1:02-cv-05846-NEW Document 168 Filed 05/08/06 Page 1 of 7
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Plaintiffs papers do not indicate that plaintiffs seek reconsideration of summary judgment for EHS and 3

against plaintiffs’ based on Monell liability.

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BACKGROUND

With its March 30, 2006 decision, this Court granted the County defendants summary judgment

on grounds that plaintiffs lacked evidence to support, and evidence negated, elements of plaintiffs’

malicious prosecution and Monell claims. This Court further granted Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray

summary judgment on grounds they are entitled to qualified immunity as to actions of which plaintiffs

complain. As to plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims against Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray, this Court

specifically determined that:

1. Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray did not initiate the underlying criminal action against

plaintiffs;

2. Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray did not deceive Kern County Deputy District Attorney Craig

A. Smith (“Mr. Smith”) to prosecute plaintiffs wrongfully;

3. The underlying criminal action was not terminated in plaintiffs’ favor for malicious

prosecution purposes; and

4. Based on collateral estoppel effects of the preliminary hearing determination in the

underlying criminal action, the absence of probable cause element is negated as to

plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims; and

5. The malice element is negated as to plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims in that Mr.

O’Rullian and Mr. Gray’s actions at issue arose in connection with their environmental

investigation and enforcement responsibilities, and the record lacks evidence of Mr.

O’Rullian or Mr. Gray’s wrongful motive or sinister purpose toward plaintiffs.

On April 10, 2006, plaintiffs filed and served their motion which this Court construes to seek

reconsideration of summary judgment for Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray. Plaintiffs argue that summary 3

judgment was inappropriate “because a [sic] triable issues of fact exists [sic], and because the court

incorrectly interpreted the facts and applied incorrect legal standards in relation to the issue of favorable

determination [sic] and probable cause, and incorrectly considered some of the facts.” Plaintiffs’ papers

review enumerated matters addressed by this Court in its summary judgment decision. This Court

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This Court rejects Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray’s argument that plaintiffs untimely filed their motion within 4

10 days as required by F.R.Civ.P. 59(b). Although this Court signed its summary judgment decision on March 28, 2006, this

Court’s clerk served and entered on the docket the decision and judgment on March 30, 2006. Time limits for plaintiffs’

motion ran from March 30, 2006, and their motion satisfied a 10-day filing limit in accordance with F.R.Civ.P. 6(a)’s time

calculation.

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discerns that plaintiffs seek specifically to readdress whether:

1. Mr. O’Rullian deceived Mr. Smith to prosecute plaintiffs;

2. Mr. O’Rullian improperlyinduced a third-partywitness to testify against plaintiffs Leroy

Edwards (“Leroy”) and Kenneth Edwards (“Kenneth”);

3. The underlying criminal action against Leroy and Kenneth was terminated favorably

toward them; and

4. Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray acted with malice toward plaintiffs.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs apparently seek reconsideration under F.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (“motion to alter or amend

judgment . . .”) or F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (“The court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or

proceeding . . . ). See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9 Cir. 1985). This Court construes th

plaintiffs’ motion as seeking reconsideration of summary judgment for Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray.4

Either the moving or opposing party may seek reconsideration of a summary judgment ruling.

Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 868, 110 S.Ct. 192 (1989). th

Reconsideration is appropriate when the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence,

committed clear error, or there is an intervening change in controlling law. School District No. 1J,

Multnomah County, Oregon v. A C and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9 Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. th

1236, 114 S.Ct. 2742 (1994). A motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment ruling is restricted:

Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors

of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Such motions cannot in any case

be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during

pendency of the summary judgment motion. . . . Nor should a motion for reconsideration

serve as the occasion to tender new legal theories for the first time.

Publisher’s Resource, Inc. v. Walker Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7 Cir. 1985) (quoting th

Keene Corp. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp. 656, 665-666 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d, 736

F.2d 388 (7 Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original)); see Novato Fire Protection Dist. v. United States, 181 th

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F.3d 1135, 1142, n. 6 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1129, 120 S.Ct. 2005 (2000). th

Reconsideration should not be used “to argue new facts or issues that inexcusably were not presented

to the court in the matter previously decided.” See Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239,

1240 (D. Del. 1990). Under this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(k), a party seeking reconsideration must

demonstrate “what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or

were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion” and “why the facts

or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.”

As discussed below, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate newly-discovered evidence, clear error or

intervening change in controlling law to warrant reconsideration.

Prosecutorial Deception

This Court agrees with Mr. O’Rullian that plaintiffs, in their opening papers, appear to insinuate

that Mr. O’Rullian deceived Mr. Smith to prosecute plaintiffs. Plaintiffs suggest that Mr. O’Rullian

supplied Mr. Smith information but did not inform Mr. Smith that hazardous waste was not an issue to

dissuade Mr. Smith to charge plaintiffs with violating California Health and Safety Code section 25189.5

(disposal, storage or transportation of hazardous waste without permits or at unauthorized points). In

their reply papers, plaintiffs claim their “theory” is that Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Gray “frustrated by the

ongoing inability to regulate, acted collectively, individually and in concert” with Mr. Smith and “there

was enough to take the matter to a jury.”

With its summary judgment decision, this Court noted the absence of evidence that Mr.

O’Rullian and Mr. Gray improperly exerted pressure on Mr. Smith, knowingly provided misinformation

to Mr. Smith, concealed exculpatory evidence, or engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct. Plaintiffs

offer nothing to demonstrate the slightest error in such conclusion or of a purported “conspiracy.” Mr.

O’Rullian points out that plaintiffs appear to misconstrue Mr. O’Rullian’s testimony at a September

2001 EHS administrative hearing and that such testimony is disconnected to plaintiffs’ claims at issue

here. Plaintiffs present nothing to warrant reconsideration as to their prosecutorial deception claims. 

Alleged Inducement Of Testimony

To recap, in the underlying criminal action, Leroy and Kenneth were prosecuted under count

three of the criminal complaint for violating California Penal Code section 182(a)(4) by conspiring

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unlawfully to defraud sisters Shirley Kinney (“Ms. Kinney”) and Irma Honeycutt (“Ms. Honeycutt”) to

pay money by false pretenses in connection with a January 21, 2001 septic pumping job at Ms. Kinney

and Ms. Honeycutt’s mobile home. In their reconsideration papers, plaintiffs quote portions of Ms.

Kinney’s deposition which this Court considered when ruling on summary judgment. The upshot of

plaintiffs’ contentions is that Mr. O’Rullian and Mr. Smith represented to Ms. Kinney and Ms.

Honeycutt that they would be repaid the $225 cost of Leroy and Kenneth’s septic pumping job if they

testified against Leroy and Kenneth.

Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors and may be pursued

against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto,

368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9 Cir. 2004); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126-1127 (9 th th

Cir. 2002). “The test is whether the defendant was actively instrumental in causing the prosecution.”

5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10 ed. 2005) Torts, § 476, p. 702. Generally, the decision to file a th

criminal complaint is presumed to result from an independent determination by the prosecutor and thus

precludes liability for those who participated in the investigation or filed a report that resulted in

initiation of proceedings. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067; Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-268 (9 Cir. th

1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829, 103 S.Ct. 65 (1982). Nonetheless, the presumption of prosecutorial

independence does not bar a subsequent section 1983 claim “against state or local officials who

improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him, concealed

exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively

instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067; see Galbraith,

307 F.3d at 1126-1127. 

This Court carefully considered the evidence presented by plaintiffs. An interpretation of the

evidence in light most favorable to plaintiffs does not reveal wrongful or bad faith conduct that was

actively instrumental to initiate the criminal action against plaintiffs. The record is clear that for

malicious prosecution purposes, Mr. Smith initiated the criminal action, not Mr. O’Rullian despite his

comments to Ms. Kinney, Ms. Honeycutt or anyone else. Plaintiffs’ reworking of their prior arguments

raises no grounds to reconsider Mr. O’Rullian’s conduct or applicable law in that Mr. O’Rullian at most

indicated restitution was available to Ms. Kinney and Ms. Honeycutt.

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Moreover, plaintiffs’ assertions regarding the interaction among Mr. O’Rullian, Ms. Kinney and

Ms. Honeycutt do not raise factual issues for reconsideration of the absence of probable cause element

of plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims. In the underlying criminal action, the preliminary hearing

determination was unfavorable to Leroy and Kenneth to constitute prima facie evidence of probable

cause. See Awabdy, 368 F.3d 1067. Despite Mr. O’Rullian’s comment about restitution, plaintiffs failed

to rebut a prima facie probable cause finding by showing the underlying criminal action “was induced

by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.”

Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. In the absence of disputed facts, such as here, “the question whether there

was probable cause to institute the prior action is purely a legal question” and “the existence or absence

of probable cause has traditionally been viewed as a question of law to be determined by the court, rather

than a question of fact for the jury.” Sheldon Appel Company v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863, 868,

875, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 337, 342 (1989). There is an absence of evidence that Mr. O’Rullian’s conduct

influenced pursuit of count three of the criminal complaint against plaintiffs for violating California

Penal Code section 182(a)(4) (unlawful conspiracy to defraud and to obtain money by false pretenses).

Plaintiffs again fail to raise factual issues on the absence of probable cause element of their malicious

prosecution claims.

Favorable Termination

Plaintiffsseek to revisit the issue whether the underlying criminal action was terminated in their

favor. Plaintiffs argue that a “favorable termination occurred in this case because prosecutor Craig

Smith terminated his case when he was backed into a corner.” This Court fully explored the favorable

termination element in its summary judgment decision and dismissal of the subject criminal charges

against plaintiffs in furtherance of justice. This Court found that the record and reasonable inferences

therefrom indicate that the criminal charges at issue were not terminated in favor of plaintiffs for

malicious prosecution purposes. Plaintiffs offer nothing new to merit further exploration and rest on

arguments made to oppose summary judgment. Nonetheless, even assuming favorable termination for

plaintiffs, plaintiffs fail to address meaningfully the other malicious prosecution elements on which this

Court found evidence to negate or an absence of evidence to support. This Court’s summary judgment

decision thoroughly addressed plaintiffs’ failure to raise genuine issues of material fact as to Mr.

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O’Rullian and Mr. Gray’sinitiation of the criminal action and malice and the absence of probable cause

to pursue the criminal action.

Malice

Plaintiffs appear to argue there is evidence of malice in that Mr. O’Rullian offered to pay Ms.

Kinney for testimony and supplied information to Mr. Smith when Mr. O’Rullian knew hazardous waste

was not at issue and Mr. Smith prosecuted the underlying criminal action and civil proceedings against

plaintiffs. Plaintiffs present no factual support to overcome the evidence that Mr. O’Rullian lacked

malice toward plaintiffs and acted to pursue legitimate investigation and enforcement objectives.

Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to warrant reconsideration on the malice element of their malicious

prosecution claims.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In sum, plaintiffs’ papers are a scattered, shotgun approach raising several issues but offering

little, if any, substance or evidentiary support. Plaintiffs fail to satisfy reconsideration requirements,

including the specific mandates of this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(k). Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate

newly-discovered evidence, clear error or intervening change in controlling law to warrant

reconsideration of matters raised in their papers.

For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES plaintiffs’ reconsideration motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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