Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01984/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01984-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice. (Doc. No. 44.) Plaintiff’s

motion is GRANTED.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NELSON C. BURNS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07-CV-1984-JLS (WMc)

ORDER: (1) ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION, AND

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. Nos. 32 & 42)

vs.

DECARR, CROOK, VISTA DETENTION

FACILITY, VISTA SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 32.)

Plaintiff has opposed this motion and Defendants have filed a reply. (Doc. Nos. 33 & 34.) Magistrate

Judge McCurine issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) to this Court advising that Defendants’

motion should be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. No. 42.) Both Plaintiff and Defendants

have objected to this conclusion and Defendants have replied to Plaintiff’s objections. (Doc. Nos. 43,

45, & 46.) Having considered all of the parties filings, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge

McCurine’s R&R and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.1

Case 3:07-cv-01984-JLS-WMC Document 47 Filed 03/02/10 Page 1 of 6
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The allegations in this matter were correctly set forth in the R&R and not objected to by either

party. (R&R at 2.) They are again noted here for the sake of clarity. 

Plaintiff was being held in custody at the Vista Detention Facility, when he sought medical

attention for lice or scapies. (Compl. at 3.) However, when the time arrived for Plaintiff to be taken

to the medical facilities, Defendant Yapette Crook, who was to escort Plaintiff, did not arrive. (Id.)

Plaintiff then contacted Defendant Crook via intercom. Defendant Crook allegedly told Plaintiff that

Plaintiff had been treated several days before, and that Defendant Crook was “not going to risk taking

any bugs home” to his family. (Id.) 

Shortly afterward, Plaintiff began to complain of chest pain but Defendant Crook again refused

to bring Plaintiff for medical attention, allegedly telling Plaintiff “that [he] better quit calling him.”

(Id.) Next, Plaintiff’s cell mate, Jeff Atkinson, called for medical help on Plaintiff’s behalf but

Defendant Crook “stated that plaintiff was faking it.” (Id.) When Mr. Atkinson persisted, Defendant

Crook said that he was on his way and that he was “going to fuck [Plaintiff] up.” (Id.) 

When Defendant Crook arrived, “[b]oth defendants proceeded to drag the [P]laintiff down the

module stairs roughfully (sic) so.” (Id. at 4.) According to Plaintiff, he was prevented from talking

to the nurse by Defendants’ threats resulting in him not receiving the necessary medical care. (Id.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on October 12, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) On March 7,

2008, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 12.) On December 3, 2008, the Court,

adopting Magistrate Judge McCurine’s R&R, denied the motion. (Doc. No. 19.) Defendants filed

their answer on December 8, 2008. (Doc. No. 20.) The present motion for summary judgment was

filed on July 16, 2009. (Doc. No. 32.) Magistrate Judge McCurine filed his R&R on January 29,

2010. (Doc. No. 42.)

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LEGAL STANDARD

I. Review of the Report and Recommendation

Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth the

duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge ’s report and recommendation. “The

district court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations

made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(c); see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614,

617 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). However, the Court has no

obligation to review a legal conclusions to which neither party objects. Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.

Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a court to grant summary judgment where (1) the

moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and (2) entitlement to

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The initial burden

of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls on the moving party. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. The movant can carry his burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party

“failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has

the burden of proof.” Id. at 322–23. 

Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the burden

shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing that a genuine issue of disputed fact remains.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary

judgment motion by “rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 256. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all inferences drawn from

the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

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 California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1(a) tolls the statute of limitations for actions

which accrue when a prisoner is incarcerated for up to two years.

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ANALYSIS

I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In their motion, Defendants make two arguments in favor of summary judgment. First, they

assert that Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling of the two-year limitations period. (Memo. ISO

Motion at 6–8.) However, Judge McCurine found that “Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling for the

period he was pursuing his alternative legal theories,” granting him an additional 243 days to file his

complaint. (R&R at 7.) As such, Judge McCurine recommended denying Defendants summary

judgment on this argument. (Id. at 8.) 

Defendants, objecting to this conclusion, argue that equitably tolling the limitations period

would be improper when the events justifying tolling occurred during a period of statutory disability

for incarceration. (Def.’s Objections at 3.) Of course, this objection runs smack into the law of the

case doctrine. 

“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, a court is ordinarily precluded from reexamining an

issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court, in the same case.” United States v. Bad

Marriage, 439 F.3d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Minidoka Irrigation Dist. v. Dep’t of Interior,

406 F.3d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 2005)). This Court’s Order dated December 3, 2008 held that “§ 352.12

does not exclude the possibility of a court equitably tolling the statute of limitations for reasons other

than the simple fact of incarceration.” ((Doc. No. 19 at 5.) It further held that a “‘tolled interval, no

mater when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus extending the deadline

for suit by the entire length of time during which the tolling event previously occurred.’” (Doc. No.

19 at 7 (quoting Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 73 P.3d 517, 523 (Cal. 2003)) (emphasis added).) The clear

import of that decision was that it is not improper as a matter of law to find an entitlement to equitable

tolling during the period of disability created by section 352.1.

There are three exceptions to the law of the case doctrine: “(1) the decision is clearly erroneous

and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes

reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.”

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 The Complaint, the R&R, and this Order’s caption refer to Defendant Dacar as Defendant

Decarr. (See Compl. at 1; R&R at 8.) This Order will refer to him by his actual name rather than the

name listed on the pleadings.

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Old Person v. Brown, 312 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). None of these

exceptions apply in this case. Therefore, this Court will not reexamine its prior legal determination.

Thus, the only proper basis for challenging the Report and Recommendation would be its

factual findings regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to tolling. (See R&R at 7–8.) However, Defendants

do not challenge either the factual findings regarding Plaintiff’s administrative complaints or the

conclusion that those facts satisfy the conditions required for equitable tolling. Therefore, the Court

ADOPTS the R&R with respect to the question of whether Plaintiff’s complaint was timely and

DENIES this aspect of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT DACAR3

Defendants’ second argument in favor of summary judgment is limited solely to Defendant

Christopher Dacar. (Memo. ISO Motion at 8–9.) They claim that Dacar cannot be liable under the

Eighth Amendment because Plaintiff “admits Defendant Dacar never touched him during the incident

for which he claims injury and did nothing more than tell Burns to “shut up.” (Id. at 9.) Judge

McCurine agreed, finding that “there is no genuine issue of material fact left in dispute with respect

to Defendant [Dacar] causing Plaintiff physical harm through the use of excessive force.” (R&R at

9.) Therefore, the R&R recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dacar. (Id.)

Plaintiff objected to this conclusion. He argues that he “is not arguing excessive force against

me,” but instead “that Officer Dacar . . . violated [his] rights under the 8th Eighth (sic) Amendment

to be free from harm.” (Pl.’s Objections at 2.) This argument is both incorrect and off point.

First, Plaintiff has asserted an excessive force claim against Defendant Dacar. The Complaint

specifically alleges that Defendant Dacar used “excessive force violative of the 8th Const[itutional]

Amend[ment].” (Compl. at 2.) To the extent his objections claim otherwise, they are incorrect.

Second, the R&R does not address any Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims that

Plaintiff’s complaint might raise, only an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. (See R&R at 8–9;

see also Robins v. Centinela State Prison, 19 Fed. App’x. 549, 551 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished)

(treating separately the plaintiff’s claims of excessive force from his claims for failure to protect).)

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And, since, unlike a failure to protect claim, an excessive force claim requires the actual use of

“force,” partial summary judgment must be granted in favor of Defendant Dacar on this single claim.

See generally Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). Because, as Plaintiff has

admitted, Defendant Dacar never “put his hands on” Plaintiff. (Memo. ISO Motion, Ex. B at 23.) 

Therefore, as recommended by Magistrate Judge McCurine, on this question Defendants’

motion is GRANTED. However, the Court notes that summary judgment here is limited solely to the

allegation that Defendant Dacar used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and does

not affect any asserted claims that Dacar violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate McCurine’s Report and

Recommendation. Further, both Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ objections to the R&R are

OVERRULED. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Defendant Dacar’s

liability for violating the Eighth Amendment by using excessive force. The remainder of Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 2, 2010

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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