Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04005/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04005-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE CHANG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROCKRIDGE MANOR CONDOMINIUM, et

al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-4005 EMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR RECUSAL

(Docket No. 211)

Plaintiff Christine Chang has filed a motion for recusal. She purports to make

this filing not only on her own behalf but also on the behalf of her son, Eric Sun. Because Ms.

Chang has never been appointed guardian ad litem for Mr. Sun, see Docket No. 170 (order), and

because, even if she had been, she would need representation by counsel which has not been

obtained, Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “a parent or

guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer”), the motion

as to Mr. Sun is DENIED without prejudice. As for the motion as to Ms. Chang, the Court, having

considered the papers filed and accompanying submissions, as well as all other evidence of record,

hereby DENIES the motion for the reasons discussed below.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A judgment in this case was entered on July 3, 2008. See Docket No. 182 (judgment). On

July 30, 2008, Ms. Chang appealed. See Docket No. 183 (notice of appeal). More than a year later,

on August 31, 2009, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of this Court. See Docket No. 191

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(order). In March 2010, Ms. Chang petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See Docket

No. 196 (letter from Supreme Court). Subsequently, in June 2010, Ms. Chang filed with this Court a

motion to set aside the judgment. See Docket No. 197 (motion). In the motion, Ms. Chang argued

that the judgment should be set aside based on evidence she discovered in September 2008 (i.e., a

few months after the judgment was rendered) that the undersigned was affiliated with the University

of California, Berkeley, one of the defendants in the case. This Court denied the motion to set aside

the judgment on August 3, 2010, noting, inter alia, that, under Ninth Circuit law, minimal alumni

contacts are not a basis for a judge to recuse himself or herself. See Docket No. 209 (order). Three

days after the decision issued, Ms. Chang filed the currently pending motion for recusal.

II. DISCUSSION

Ms. Chang has moved for a recusal of the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. 

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, arguably, Ms. Chang’s motion is untimely. Ms. Chang

claims to have discovered the undersigned’s affiliation with the University in September 2008. See

Docket No. 197 (Mot. at 6). However, Ms. Chang did not move for a recusal of the undersigned

until almost two years later – notably, after the Ninth Circuit rejected her appeal and after this Court

denied her motion to set aside the judgment. Cf. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d

1280, 1295 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting proposition that “a party having information that raises a

possible ground for disqualification can wait until after an unfavorable judgment before bringing the

information to the court's attention”; adding that “a recusal motion must be made in a timely

fashion” – i.e., “‘should be filed with reasonable promptness after the ground for such a motion is

ascertained’”).

However, even if her motion were timely filed, Ms. Chang would fare no better. With

respect to her request for recusal pursuant to § 455, this Court has already explained to Ms. Chang

that, under Ninth Circuit case law, § 455 does not require recusal for minimal alumni contacts. See

United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman, 145 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998). Minimal alumni

contacts include receiving a degree from the defendant school, making small yearly financial

contributions to an alumni organization of the defendant school, presenting education programs at

the defendant school, serving as an unpaid professor at the defendant school, and offering unpaid

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internships to students of the defendant school. See id. (citing cases); see also Lunde v. Helms, 29

F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that “making alumni contributions or participating in

university educational programs, without more, is [not] a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's

impartiality”). Ms. Chang’s reliance on Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 664 F.2d

10 (1st Cir. 1981), is unavailing. Brody is a First Circuit case and therefore is not binding precedent. 

In contrast, Hochman is a Ninth Circuit case and therefore is binding precedent.

As for Ms. Chang’s request for recusal pursuant to § 144, Ms. Chang’s contention that the

decision must be made by another judge is not entirely correct. Section 144 provides as follows:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files

a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter

is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in

favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein,

but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 144. As the Court has previously explained to Ms. Chang, the language of the statute

establishes that “‘[t]he simple filing of an affidavit does not automatically disqualify a judge.’ Only

if a timely and sufficient affidavit is filed must a presiding judge proceed no further and the case be

reassigned to another judge.” Docket No. 154 (Order at 1) (quoting United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d

851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978)

(noting that “[o]nly after the legal sufficiency of the affidavit is determined does it become the duty

of the judge to ‘proceed no further’ in the case”).

As noted above, the Court assumes for purposes of this motion that the request for recusal

was timely filed. But that still leaves open the question of the legal sufficiency of Ms. Chang’s

affidavit.

[T]o be legally sufficient, the affidavit must meet three requirements. 

It must state facts which if true fairly support the allegation that bias or

prejudice stemming from (1) an extrajudicial source (2) may prevent a

fair decision on the merits. The focus is not only on the source of the

facts and their distorting effect on a decision on the merits . . . but also

on (3) the substantiality of the support given by these facts to the

allegation of bias . . . .

Id. at 739-40. The problem for Ms. Chang is that, as discussed above, the alumni contacts to which

she points, see Mot., Exs. I-J, L-R (indicating that judicial externships are available with the

undersigned and that students from the University law school have been hired as externs, that the

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undersigned has made in certain years contributions between $500-1,000, that the undersigned had a

speech that was published in a University law review, that the undersigned made a presentation at an

event celebrating the naming of the Center for Social Justice at the University law school), are

nothing but minimal under Ninth Circuit law and therefore her affidavit is not legally sufficient such

that her request for recusal must be given to another judge.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Chang’s motion for recusal is DENIED.

This order disposes of Docket No. 211.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2010

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTINE CHANG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROCKRIDGE MANOR CONDOMINIUM, et

al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-4005 EMC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the U.S. District Court, Northern

District of California. On the below date, I served a true and correct copy of the attached, by placing

said copy/copies in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the person(s) listed below, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail; or by placing said copy/copies into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Office of the Clerk.

Christine Chang

341 Tideway Drive #214

Alameda, CA 94501

ALL OTHER COUNSEL SERVED VIA

ELECTRONIC FILING

Dated: August 11, 2010 RICHARD W. WIEKING, CLERK

By: /s/ Leni Doyle 

Leni Doyle

Deputy Clerk

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