Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02828/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02828-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLEON NEAL JONES,

CDCR #H-84601,

Civil No. 14cv2828 GPC (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) DIRECTING CLERK OF

COURT TO FILE COMPLAINT

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF Doc. No. 1) 

AND

(3) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

AND 1915A(b)

vs.

DR. AJMEL SANGHA, M.D.; 

K. WYATT, R.N.; DR. IRENE PULIDO,

M.D.,

Defendants.

Cleon Neal Jones (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison

located in Imperial, California, and proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Central District of California.

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing and administrative fees required by 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time he initiated the action; instead, he submitted a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 1).

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United States Chief District Judge George H. King determined that venue was

improper, and transferred the case to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint was “lodged” at the time he initiated this action, thisCourt

directs the Clerk of Court to file Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 1-1) as a separate

docket entry. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All partiesinstituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the

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entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted

leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless

of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor

v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the sixmonth period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution

having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of

the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after 1

May 1, 2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a),

(b); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May

1, 2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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$10, and forwards them to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows no monthly

deposits or balance and a current available balance of zero at the time he submitted it for

filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial

partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as

a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure

to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available.”). 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 1), and

assesses no initial partialfiling fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) will be collected and

forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) AND 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA also

obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damagesfrom

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

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Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000);see also

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while

a plaintiff’s allegations are taken astrue, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where

the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th

Cir. 1985)), it may not, in so doing, “supply essential elements of claims that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil

rights violations” are simply not “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

/ / / 

/ / /

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B. Inadequate Medical Care Claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his right to adequate medical care when

they scheduled him for a “routine evaluation of my problem” which he believes resulted

in a loss of his vision. (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he had to wait an additional

eleven days for an examination because Defendants failed to schedule an “emergency”

evaluation. (Id.)

As to his medical care claims, only “deliberate indifference to a serious illness or

injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105

(1976). First, Plaintiff must allege a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that

“failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

(9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The “existence of an

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment

ortreatment; the presence of a medical condition thatsignificantly affects an individual’s

daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” Id. at 1059-60.

Here, Plaintiff contends he suffers from permanent loss of vision in his right eye. 

See Compl. at 1. Thus, the Court will assume, for purposes of screening pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, that he had a serious medical need. See id. at 1059.

However, even assuming Plaintiff’s medical condition and/or pain wassufficiently

objectively serious to invoke Eighth Amendment protection, he must also include in his

pleading enough factual content to show that Defendants’ actions were “deliberately

indifferent” to his needs. Id. at 1060; see also Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2006). “This second prong–defendant’s response to the need was deliberately

indifferent–is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to [the]

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett,

439 F.3d at 1096. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” and claims of

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medical malpractice or negligence are insufficient to establish a constitutional

deprivation. Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he had a loss of vision in

his right eye on September 2, 2013. (See Compl. at 5.) He claims he “informed head

R.N. Nurse K. Wyatt who could not diagnose the problem.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims

Defendants were deliberately indifferent by ordering a routine examination eleven (11)

days later instead of prioritizing Plaintiff’s examination as an emergency. (Id.)

“Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when a prisoner can show that the

official he seeks to hold liable “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate

health and safety; the official must be both aware offacts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must also [have]

draw[n] the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Specifically,

Plaintiff must allege “factual content,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, which demonstrates “(a)

a purposeful act or failure to respond to [his] pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm

caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 ((9th Cir. 2012)

(citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective

recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow v. McDaniel, 681

F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d

at 1122. 

Here, while Plaintiff may not have agreed with Defendants decision to categorize

his medical issue as “routine,” his disagreement, without more does not provide

sufficient “factual content” to plausibly suggest that any of the named Defendants acted

with deliberate indifference. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not

akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it ask for more than the sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully,”). “A difference of opinion between a physician and the

prisoner–or between medical professionals–concerning what medical care is appropriate

does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th

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Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)); Wilhelm, 680

F.3d at 1122-23. Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the doctors

chosewasmedically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the defendants chose

this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d

at 988 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth

Amendment inadequate medical care claim against any of the named Defendants, and

that these claims must also be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and §

1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the Court having now provided

himwith “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also grant him an opportunity

to “effectively” amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).2

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of Court is directed to “file” Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is

currently “lodged” as docket entry 1-1, as a separate docket entry. 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF

Doc. Nos. 1) is GRANTED.

3. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the

$350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an

amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff concedes that he has not exhausted all 2

administrative remedies as are available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), see Jones v. Bock,

549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Plaintiff is hereby advised that “[t]he available remed[y] must be

‘exhausted’ before a complaint under § 1983 may be entertained.” McKinney v. Carey, 311

F.3d 1198, 1199 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 523 U.S. 731, 738 (2001) (emphasis added)). 

“Exhaustion subsequent to the filing of suit will not suffice.” Id. 

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payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

A. Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave fromthe date this Order is entered into the Court’s

docket in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of

pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to his original pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc.

v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended

pleading supersedes the original.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citation omitted) (“All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

alleged in an amended complaint are waived.”).

Should Plaintiff fail to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the

Court shall enter a final Order dismissing this civil action without prejudice based on

Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved civil rights form to

Plaintiff.

DATED: January 16, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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