Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08128/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08128-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jack Whiteside,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV-07-8128-PHX-MHM (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Jack Whiteside, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex,

Meadows Unit, in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred

to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1), Respondents’ Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 15) and Petitioner’s Reply to

Respondent’s Answer for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Reply”). (Doc. No. 19.) The Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition as untimely.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s state court convictions

On January 28, 1992, Petitioner was convicted by jury verdict in the Coconino County

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The State did not provide this Court with those portions of the state court record

documenting Petitioner’s conviction or sentence. Instead, the State cited to other portions of the

state court record summarizing the procedural history of this case. See Response at pg. 2. 

2

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), "a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct." 

2

Superior Court on one count of child molestation, a class 2 felony.1 (Petition, Ex. A.) This

conviction arose from an incident that occurred on July 3, 1991, in which Petitioner allegedly

molested a six-year old female in the back bedroom of her family trailer, where Petitioner

also resided.2

 (Id.) On March 30, 1992, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated

term of 30 years’ imprisonment. (Petition, Ex. B.) 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing that: (1) the conviction was not supported

by sufficient evidence; and (2) the trial court committed reversible error by admitting

evidence of prior bad acts involving child molestation. (Petition, Ex. A.) The Court of

Appeals concluded that Petitioner’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, but that

the prior bad acts evidence should not have been admitted by the trial court. (Id.) The Court

of Appeals reversed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Id.) The Arizona Supreme Court

denied the State’s petition for review. (Petition, Ex. C.) On October 6, 1993, the Arizona

Court of Appeals issued its Order and Mandate and returned the record to the Coconino

County Superior Court. (Id.)

On October 18, 1993, the State filed a “Motion to Set Trial and Order” based on the

Court of Appeals’ decision. (Petition, Ex. D.) The motion was granted and the matter was

set for trial. (Id.) Petitioner filed two motions to dismiss the proceedings: the first argued

that a second trial would violate double jeopardy because the prosecutor intentionally

introduced legally inadmissible evidence in the first trial; the second argued that Petitioner’s

speedy trial rights had been violated. (Answer, Exs. A & C.) Both motions were denied and

the case proceeded to trial. (Answer, Ex. C.) Petitioner was again convicted by jury on one

count of child molestation and on May 22, 1995, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated

term of 31 years’ imprisonment. (Answer, Ex. B.) 

Petitioner appealed his second conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Respondents were apparently unable to locate copies of the notice or petition from

Petitioner’s First Rule 32 Proceedings. The information related to this First 32 Petition stated

herein was obtained from other portions of the state court record, such as Petitioner’s Petition for

Review by the Arizona Supreme Court of the lower courts’ denial of his First Rule 32 Petition.

4

 Respondents’ Answer incorrectly states that review was denied on May 25, 2000. 

(Answer, pg. 8.)

5

 The filing dates of Petitioner’s pro se filings have been calculated based on the date the

documents are signed and delivered to prison authorities for mailing, pursuant to the mailbox

rule. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).

3

denied his motions to dismiss. (Answer, Ex. C.) On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals

affirmed his conviction and sentence. (Petition, Ex. E.) Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration, which was denied. (Answer, Ex. F.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied

review on December 6, 1996. (Answer, Ex. G.) 

B. Petitioner’s First Rule 32 Petition

Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to

Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“First Rule 32 Petition”) on February 20, 1997, asserting claims

for ineffective assistance of counsel.3

 (Petition, Ex. G; see also Answer, Ex. Q.) The

petition was supplemented on June 15, 1997. (Petition, Ex. G.) After filing a reply to the

Petition on August 16, 1997, Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to allow time to file a

supplemental reply, indicating that Petitioner had raised with counsel possible claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel which created a potential conflict for appellate

counsel. (Id.; see also Answer, Ex. H.) The trial court permitted Petitioner to file a

supplemental reply, which Petitioner filed on September 17, 1997. (Answer, Ex. Q.) The

trial court denied Petitioner’s First Rule 32 Petition on January 6, 1998. (Answer, Ex. I.) On

January 20, 1998, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals,

which was denied on July 9, 1999. (Answer, Exs. P & S.) Petitioner petitioned for review

by the Arizona Supreme Court; review was denied on May 23, 2000.4

 (Petition, Ex. G.) 

C. Petitioner’s First State Habeas Petition

Shortly after the trial court denied his First Rule 32 Petition, on January 22, 1998,5

Petitioner filed a pro se “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” in the Navajo County

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Superior Court (“First State Habeas Petition”). (Answer, Ex. J.) Petitioner amended his First

State Habeas Petition on February 2, 1998. (Id.) In his First State Habeas Petition, Petitioner

argued that the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed his original conviction but did not remand

it, and therefore the state trial court was without jurisdiction over Petitioner’s second trial and

conviction. (Id.) On April 8, 1998, the Navajo County Superior Court held a hearing on

Petitioner’s First State Habeas Petition and concluded that Petitioner was properly

incarcerated. (Answer, Ex. K.) Petitioner appealed; the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

on October 20, 1998. (Answer, Ex. O.) Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona

Supreme Court. 

D. Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Petition

On May 25, 2001, one year and two days after the Arizona Supreme Court denied

review of Petitioner’s First Rule 32 Petition, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition

– this time represented by counsel – in Pinal County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. T.) On

June 15, 2001, the trial court construed the second state habeas petition as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. and transferred the matter to the

Coconino County Superior Court (“Second Rule 32 Petition”). (Answer, Ex. Y.) Petitioner

moved for reconsideration of the Pinal County Superior Court’s June 15, 2001 order; that

motion was denied on July 23, 2001. (Answer, Ex. HH.) By then, the Coconino County

Superior Court had already dismissed Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Petition on July 5, 2001.

(Answer, Ex. GG.)

On or about August 3, 2001, Petitioner filed a “Notice of Ruling” in the Coconino

County Superior Court, stating that the Pinal County Superior Court had denied Petitioner’s

Motion for Reconsideration of its June 15, 2001 order and that Petitioner intended to file a

special action challenging that decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Ex. II.)

Petitioner argued that the Coconino County Superior Court was obligated to withdraw its

July 5, 2001 decision dismissing Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Petition until the Pinal County

proceedings were final. (Id.) On August 7, 2001, the Coconino County Superior Court issued

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

 On October 19, 2004, the trial court re-affirmed its July 5, 2001 decision. (Answer, Ex.

TT.)

5

an order withdrawing its July 5, 2001 decision.6 (Answer, Ex. JJ.)

Petitioner filed his special action; on October 23, 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals

issued an order stating that it declined to accept jurisdiction over the special action. (Answer,

Ex. NN.) On November 29, 2001, Petitioner filed another special action in the Arizona

Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. OO.) On February 14, 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court

declined to accept jurisdiction. (Petition, Ex. I.) 

E. Petitioner’s First Federal Habeas Petition

While he continued to pursue his various state court petitions, Petitioner also initiated

proceedings in federal court. On June 20, 2001, Petitioner filed a counseled Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“First Federal Habeas Petition”) in this Court. (Answer, Ex. AA.) On

or about June 25, 2001, Petitioner moved to stay his First Federal Habeas Petition on the

ground that his Second Rule 32 Petition was pending in the Pinal County Superior Court and

he had filed his First Federal Habeas Petition only to ensure that his statute of limitations did

not expire in federal court. (Answer, Ex. CC.) The motion for stay was denied on August

23, 2001. (Answer, Ex. DD.) 

On October 1, 2001, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss his First Federal Habeas

Petition in light of the state court proceedings pending in Pinal and Coconino County

Superior Courts regarding his Second Rule 32 Petition. (Answer, Ex. FF; see also Petition,

Ex. H.) The motion was granted and the First Rule 32 Proceedings were dismissed without

prejudice on October 11, 2001. (Petition, Ex. H.) 

F. Petitioner’s First Direct Special Action in the Arizona Supreme Court 

On September 2, 2002, Petitioner filed a pro se “Writ of Statutory Special Action and

Writ of Habeas Corpus” with the Arizona Supreme Court (“First Direct Special Action”).

(Petition, Ex. J.) On October 2, 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court dismissed the petition,

found that Petitioner had engaged in abuse of judicial process, and ordered the Clerk of the

Court not to accept any further noncompliant motions filed by Petitioner. (Id.) 

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

 As evidenced by the order of dismissal, which states “It is further ordered dismissed

defendant’s latest Petition for Rule 32 relief (filed as a petition for habeas corpus).”

6

G. Petitioner’s Third Rule 32 Petition

On August 14, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Pinal

County Superior Court (“Third Rule 32 Petition”). (Petition, Ex. K.) On November 4, 2004,

the Pinal County Superior Court construed the petition as a petition for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. and transferred the petition to Coconino County

Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. SS.) The Coconino County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s

Third Rule 32 Petition on December 17, 2004, finding that the issues raised in the Petition

had already been ruled on by the court in considering Petitioner’s “previous Rule 32

Petition.” (Petition, Ex. K.) 

H. Petitioner’s Second Direct Special Action

On November 7, 2005, Petitioner filed a second pro se “Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus” in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Petition, Ex. L.) In a letter dated November 17,

2005, and re-sent to Petitioner on November 25, 2005, the Arizona Supreme Court Clerk of

the Court rejected the attempted filing pursuant to the Supreme Court’s October 2, 2002

order. (Id.) 

I. Petitioner’s Fourth Rule 32 Petition

On February 23, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Pinal

County Superior Court (“Fourth Rule 32 Petition”). After various transfers between Pinal

County and Coconino County Superior Courts, the Coconino County Superior Court

eventually construed the petition as a petition for post-conviction relief brought pursuant to

Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P.7

 and dismissed it, finding that the claims had already been litigated

in previous petitions and were without merit. (Answer, Ex. II.) 

J. Pending Federal Proceedings

On November 30, 2007, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Second Federal Habeas Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.) The Second Federal Habeas

Petition contains four claims: (1) Petitioner’s second trial violated due process because the

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Arizona Court of Appeals never remanded after reversing his first conviction, (2) Petitioner

was denied effective assistance of trial counsel, (3) Petitioner was denied effective assistance

of appellate counsel, and (4) Petitioner’s second trial constituted structural error.

DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of the Petition

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a

one-year statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations

begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) the date

on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Of these possible starting dates, only the first is relevant to the present action.

Petitioner does not assert that State action impeded him from timely filing his Petition, nor

does Petitioner assert a new right recognized by the Supreme Court that grants retroactive

review or that newly-discovered evidence excuses his untimely filing.

Petitioner’s judgment became final on March 10, 1997, 90 days after Arizona

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the trial court’s dismissal of his

direct appeal on June 24, 1997. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding

that the period within which a petitioner could have sought direct review of his conviction

includes the ninety-day period within which petitioner could have filed a petition for a writ

of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court). Under ordinary circumstances, the one

year statute of limitations would have began to run on that date. However, on February 20,

1997, before the ninety-day period expired, Petitioner filed his First Rule 32 Petition. When

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

 To the extent that Petitioner intends to argue, at page 11 of his Petition, that he is

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because he relied on his attorney in the

filing of his First Federal Habeas Petition, that argument is without merit. See Lawrence v.

Florida, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (“attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to

warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the postconviction context where prisoners have no

constitutional right to counsel.”)

8

a properly filed state post-conviction relief request is pending, the proscribed one year statute

of limitations may be tolled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Since Petitioner properly filed his

First Rule 32 Petition, the one year statute of limitations was tolled until May 23, 2000, when

the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the lower courts’ denial of Petitioner’s First

Rule 32 Petition. The statutory period then ran for one year, from May 24, 2000 to May 24,

2001, when it expired. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001)

(calculating the 1-year period using the “anniversary method” of Rule 6(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.).

The filing of Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Petition does not affect this Court’s

conclusion that Petitioner’s statute of limitations is expired. First, it was not filed until May

25, 2001, one day after the statute of limitations had expired. See Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of

the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed). Second, it was filed

as a state habeas petition: a state habeas petition is not a “properly filed” application for postconviction review under Arizona law, and thus does not toll the limitations period. See Nino

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). The second state petition would not have a

tolling effect until it was designated as a Rule 32 petition, which did not occur until June 15,

2001. Id. For these same reasons, the various proceedings that Petitioner pursued in state

court after May 24, 2001 have no affect on this Court’s timeliness analysis.

Petitioner did not file the pending federal habeas petition until November 30, 2007,

over six years after the statute of limitations period expired. The petition is untimely. The

fact that Petitioner previously filed his First Federal Habeas Petition in this Court on June 20,

2001 does not change this conclusion. That Petition was also filed after the statute of

limitations had expired on May 24, 2001.8

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Petitioner presents one argument that appears to challenge when his judgment became

“final” for purposes of the statute of limitations. While it is difficult to understand the

argument – presented at page 11 of his Petition and further discussed in his Reply – it appears

to be Petitioner’s position that following the Arizona Court of Appeals’ October 6, 1993

order reversing Petitioner’s first conviction, the trial court should have issued an order

vacating Petitioner’s conviction and sentence and ordering his release. According to

Petitioner, because such an order was never issued (instead, the trial court construed the

Court of Appeals’ decision as a reversal with remand for a new trial and ordered a new trial)

the statute of limitations never began to run. This argument is without merit. First, 28

U.S.C. §2254 permits “application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (emphasis added).

Thus, Petitioner’s federal Petition must be limited to constitutional violations related to the

current sentence by which Petitioner is held in custody – in this case, his second trial and

second conviction. The statute of limitations, therefore, is calculated from the date that the

second judgment against Petitioner became final. Regardless of whether a constitutional

error occurred in relation to Petitioner’s first conviction and sentence, that conviction and

sentence was nullified by the Court of Appeals October 6, 1993 decision and Petitioner is not

in custody pursuant to that judgment. Furthermore, to the extent that Petitioner claims that

the trial court never, in response to the October 6, 1993 Court of Appeals decision, issued

an order that Petitioner could challenge, Petitioner is incorrect: the trial court issued an order

setting a second trial, and ultimately convicted Petitioner a second time. Petitioner had an

opportunity – and in fact availed himself of that opportunity – to challenge these state court

decisions. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the pending Petition is untimely.

Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period has

expired if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to

file a petition on time." Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Equitable tolling is appropriate only if extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time, and

is "unavailable in most cases." Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.

denied 527 U.S. 1003 (2002) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999)

and Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). Petitioner has not argued that he was unable to timely file the

pending petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV-07-8128-PHX-MHM

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 15th day of July, 2008.

Case 3:07-cv-08128-MHM Document 21 Filed 07/15/08 Page 10 of 10