Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00277/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESLEY WATSON, Civil No. 13-cv-0277-WQH (DHB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

On February 4, 2013, Petitioner Wesley Watson (“Petitioner” or “Watson”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner seeks relief

from his July 28, 2010 conviction in San Diego County Superior Court, Case No.

SCN275145, following a jury trial in which Petitioner was found guilty of robbery,

burglary, assault, and battery. (Id. at 1-2.)1

 Petitioner raises two grounds for relief in his

Petition. First, the “[p]rosecutor committed misconduct by (1) eliciting testimony that

petitioner sold marijuana; (2) acting as a witness on behalf of the prosecution throughout

the trial; and (3) vouching for the case at closing argument.” (Id. at 6.) Second,

“Petitioner’s jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 335, an instruction which

impermissibly infringes on the reasonable-doubt standard.” (Id. at 7.) 

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted by the Court’s electronic case filing (“ECF”) system.

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Respondent filed an Answer on May 2, 2013, arguing (1) Petitioner’s prosecutorial

misconduct claims are procedurally defaulted; and (2) all of Petitioner’s claims fail on

the merits. (ECF No. 6.) Respondent also lodged the pertinent state court record. (ECF

No. 7.)

Petitioner did not file a traverse by his June 10, 2013 deadline. In light of

Petitioner’s status as a pro se prisoner, the Court sua sponte extended the traverse

deadline to August 9, 2013. (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner again failed to file a traverse by the

August 9, 2013 deadline, and the Court again sua sponte extended the traverse deadline

to October 4, 2013. (ECF No. 9.) At the time, the Court warned Petitioner that if he

“does not file a traverse on or before October 4, 2013, the Court must presume he has no

opposition to the Court deciding his Petition on the papers currently before it. At that

time [i.e., October 4, 2013], the Court will consider the matter fully briefed and submitted

on the papers and will thereafter issue a written Report and Recommendation.” (Id. at

2:3-6.) Notwithstanding the Court’s warning, to date, Petitioner has not filed a traverse.

After a thorough review of the parties’ pleadings, the record, and controlling law,

and for the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be

DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background 

The following facts are taken from the February 17, 2012 unpublished opinion of

the California Court of Appeal in People v. Watson, Case No. D058047. (Lodgment No.

6.) The Court presumes these factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1). See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“Factual

determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence

to the contrary.”). As the Court of Appeal stated:

A. Prosecution Case

Ruben Carvajal, the victim, had been involved in buying marijuana from, and selling marijuana to, Noah Bloom. In mid- and late-October

2009, Bloom obtained some marijuana from Jeffrey Vuytowecz and

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“fronted” it to Carvajal, meaning Carvajal did not immediately pay Bloom for the delivery. In turn, Bloom had not paid Vuytowecz for the marijuana. Carvajal owed Bloom $5000 to $6000.

Carvajal and Bloom arranged for Carvajal to bring marijuana from Los Angeles to San Diego on November 27, 2009, the day after Thanksgiving. The trial testimonies of Carvajal, Bloom, and Vuytowecz concerning the plan for this trip were hazy.2

 However, it was undisputed that Carvajal did bring marijuana with him when he drove to San Diego to meet with Bloom.

2 Carvajal testified he was bringing the marijuana to sell to Bloom, who might resell it to another buyer. Bloom testified Carvajal had concocted a plan to satisfy the debt he owed to Bloom by agreeing to sell him a quantity of high grade marijuana at a substantially reduced price. Vuytowecz said Bloom simply told Vuytowecz there was an opportunity to buy

high grade marijuana for a good price.

On November 27, 2009, Bloom’s friend use [sic] a false ID to rent a room at a Carlsbad motel, and Bloom gave his friend cash3

 to rent the room. 

Bloom expected to use the room for only half an hour (to conduct the drug

transaction), and planned to leave the room to his friend to use for the

remainder of the night. In the past, Bloom and Carvajal had conducted business at Bloom’s house, but they used the motel room for this transaction

because Bloom’s roommate did not like Carvajal.

3 Bloom testified Vuytowecz gave him cash to rent the room, but Vuytowecz denied he paid for the room.

Carvajal rendezvoused with Bloom at a 7-11 Store sometime after dark on the evening of November 27th.4

 After purchasing some beer, they went to the motel room. Carvajal brought one pound of the marijuana (along with the beer and his laptop and camera) into the motel room.

4 Bloom said he checked in after the sun had already set, and guessed it was around 7:00 p.m.

About 20 minutes after Carvajal and Bloom arrived at the motel, Vuytowecz and Watson arrived and knocked on the door. Bloom answered

and invited them inside. Carvajal sat on the bed while Bloom negotiated with Vuytowecz about the marijuana. Watson asked Carvajal if there was

more marijuana available, and Carvajal replied there was more in Los Angeles. Watson then attacked Carvajal, punching and choking him as he took Carvajal to the ground. Watson asked Vuytowecz for help, and

Vuytowecz joined the assault by kicking Carvajal. Bloom did not come to the aid of Carvajal. Carvajal lost consciousness and, when he awoke, all of

his belongings were gone, including the marijuana. He asked the front desk to call the police.

Both Bloom and Vuytowecz, who testified at trial, pleaded guilty to assault charges in connection with their roles in the assault on Carvajal. Bloom testified he had not planned to rob Carvajal and did not know that Vuytowecz and Watson planned to do so. However, Bloom testified that he

suspected something was amiss immediately after Vuytowecz and Watson entered the room because the marijuana was not high quality and

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Vuytowecz seemed noncommittal about buying it. While he and Watson were beating Carvajal, Vuytowecz told Bloom to leave and get into Vuytowecz’s car. Vuytowecz and Watson later emerged from the room carrying Carvajal’s belongings; Bloom denied he took any of them. Bloom testified that, after leaving the motel, the assailants stopped for gas and disposed of some of Carvajal’s belongings, then went to Bloom’s house. 

Vuytowecz and Watson left some clothing with Carvajal’s blood on it at Bloom’s house, and Bloom disposed of it the following day.

Vuytowecz’s version of the events differed in some respects from that of Bloom. He claimed Bloom did not owe him any money, but that Carvajal owed Bloom some money. Vuytowecz testified that, after he (accompanied by Watson) arrived at the motel and evaluated the marijuana, he realized it was not a high grade product and therefore tried to negotiate with Carvajal for a lower price. However, Bloom tried to justify the higher price and Carvajal was becoming upset. When the conversation turned “unfriendly,” Watson struck Carvajal with Vuytowecz joining in the attack. Vuytowecz testified it was Bloom who took all of Carvajal’s possessions.

Carvajal, as well as Vuytowecz and Bloom, identified Watson as the

person who initiated the assault on Carvajal. The prosecutor agreed Vuytowecz could ameliorate his sentence if he cooperated by testifying at Watson’s trial.

B. The Defense

Watson presented alibi evidence from Mr. and Mrs. Miller, with whom he was living with at the time of the assault.5

 They testified Watson had Thanksgiving dinner with them the night before the attack, and produced a photograph of the event in which Watson appeared. Watson did not have a shaved head in that photograph.6

 Mrs. Miller testified she

realized they had not celebrated Waton’s birthday, so she bought a cake and the Millers and Watson had dinner and cake the next night (the night of the attack), and Watson was sitting on the back porch when she went to bed

around 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. Mr. Miller testified Watson was at the house, in

Mr. Miller’s son’s room, when Mr. Miller went to bed around 9:30 that

night.

5 Watson also pointed out there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence collected from the motel room.

6 Carvajal’s original description of the assailants to the investigating officer was that the attackers had shaved heads

but, when later interviewed by the officer, Carvajal said one of the attackers had a shaved head and the other had acne.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 2-5.)

B. Procedural Background

1. Conviction

On July 28, 2010, a jury convicted Petitioner of robbery, burglary, assault by

means likely to produce great bodily injury, and battery with serious bodily injury, in

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violation of California Penal Code §§ 211, 243(d), 245(a)(1), and 459. (Lodgment No.

1 at 89-94.) Petitioner was sentenced to nine years in prison. (Id. at 117; Lodgment No.

2 at 803.) 

2. Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed his opening brief on direct appeal on February 23, 2011. 

(Lodgment No. 3.) Petitioner raised five arguments: (1) the prosecutor committed

prejudicial misconduct by eliciting testimony indicating that Petitioner sold marijuana;

(2) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by acting as a witness on behalf of

the prosecution throughout the trial; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct at closing

argument by vouching for the case, telling the jury that it should not think there was

anything wrong with the case, and referring to facts outside of evidence regarding the

absence of DNA and fingerprint evidence at the scene; (4) CALCRIM No. 335 misstates

the law and reduces the prosecution’s burden of proof, meriting reversal; and (5) since

Petitioner had the owner’s permission to enter the motel room, and the owner shared

Petitioner’s intent to rob Carvajal, Petitioner cannot be convicted of burglary. (Id. at iiiii, 52-98.)

On February 17, 2012, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed Petitioner’s judgment in all respects. (Lodgment No. 6 at 21.) As to Petitioner’s

three claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court of Appeal found that Petitioner had

forfeited these claims by failing to object or ask for a curative admonition. (Id. at 9, 11,

13-14.) The Court of Appeal also rejected the three prosecutorial misconduct claims on

the merits upon finding that there was no misconduct by the prosecutor. (Id. at 9-16.) 

The Court of Appeal also rejected Petitioner’s claims of instructional error and

insufficiency of evidence on the burglary charge. (Id. at 16-21.)

On March 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. (Lodgment No. 7.) Petitioner again raised the three prosecutorial misconduct

claims and the instructional error claim. (Id. at I-ii, 3.) On May 11, 2012, the California

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. (Lodgment No. 8.)

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3. Collateral Review

On December 7, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

San Diego County Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 9.) In the petition, Petitioner again

raised his three prosecutorial misconduct claims, the improper jury instruction claim as

to CALCRIM No. 335, an insufficiency of evidence claim on the burglary charge, and

a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id.) On December 28, 2012, the

Superior Court denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 10.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (“AEDPA”), controls review of this habeas action. See Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with

respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless that adjudication

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1)-(2). 

“Section 2254(d)(1)’s ‘clearly established’ phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as

opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant

state-court decision.’” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (quoting Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). “In other words, ‘clearly established Federal law’

under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme

Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id. at 71-72 (2003) (citing

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002)). Absent a Supreme

Court decision that “squarely addresses the issue” presented to the state court, Wright v.

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Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (per curiam), or establishes an applicable general

principle that “clearly extend[s]” to the case, id. at 123, a federal habeas court cannot

conclude that a state court’s adjudication of that issue was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d

742, 760 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 126). The state court decision

need not cite or even be aware of the controlling Supreme Court cases, “so long as neither

the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).

The “‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ clauses have independent

meaning.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05). A federal habeas

court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applied a rule

different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case

differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Id. at

694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). A federal habeas court “may grant relief under

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing

legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts

of the particular case.” Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08). Additionally, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision “be not only

erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003)

(per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003); Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (per curiam); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409); see also

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (“The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court

decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. . . . The state court’s application of

clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.” (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at

409-20, 412)); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Extraordinarily

deferential to the state courts, the ‘unreasonable application’ clause does not trigger

habeas relief unless the state court’s analysis was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” (quoting

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2003)). “This requires a showing of

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error greater than clear error.” Medina, 386 F.3d at 877 (citing Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068). 

“Ninth Circuit precedent may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining

whether a particular state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

law, and may also help determine what law is clearly established.” Fernandez v. Adams,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38662, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011) (citing Sims v. Rowland,

414 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005)). However, “circuit law may not be used to fill open

questions in the Supreme Court’s holdings for purposes of federal habeas analysis.” Id.

at *24 (citing Moses, 555 F.3d at 760). 

Federal habeas courts must defer to factual determinations made by the state

courts, to which a statutory presumption of correctness attaches, and the petitioner “shall

have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74

(2007) (“AEDPA . . . requires federal habeas courts to presume the correctness of state

courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and

convincing evidence.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1))).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the Court “looks

through” any unexplained decisions to “the last reasoned state court decision”2

 as the

basis for its analysis. Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Van

Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d

1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ylst v. Nunnumaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04

(1991)). “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim,

[federal habeas courts apply the presumption that] later unexplained orders upholding that

judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-

04. However, if the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

2

 Here, “the last reasoned state-court decision” was the California Court of

Appeal’s March 24, 2011 decision denying Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 12.)

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of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part by

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76.

Moreover, federal habeas courts reviewing state prisoner claims under § 2254

“must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial

under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth in” Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619 (1993). Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007); see also Baines v. Cambra,

204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000) (Ninth Circuit applies the Brecht harmless error

standard “uniformly in all federal habeas corpus cases under § 2254”). Thus, even if

constitutional error occurred, a federal habeas petitioner must still demonstrate prejudice,

that is, that the “error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.

750, 776 (1946)).

III. DISCUSSION

In Ground One of the Petition, Petitioner asserts a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct based on several theories. In Ground Two, Petitioner claims the jury

received an instruction that impermissibly infringes on the reasonable doubt standard. 

For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on either claim.

A. Ground One: Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner first contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by (1) improperly

eliciting testimony that Petitioner sold marijuana; (2) acting as a prosecution witness

throughout the trial by interjecting her own unsworn testimony into the trial, posing

leading questions, and referring to her conversations with witnesses; and (3) vouching

for the case during her closing argument by stating there was nothing wrong with the case

and by referring to DNA and fingerprint evidence outside the record. (ECF No. 1 at 6,

13, 27.)

Respondent contends Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are procedurally

defaulted based on the California Court of Appeal’s determination that “the claims of

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prosecutor misconduct [were] forfeited because trial defense counsel had failed to

interpose a contemporaneous objection.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 18:18-21.) “Respondent

affirmatively pleads that this state law procedural default is independent and adequate to

preclude federal review.” (Id. at 24-25 (citing Walker v. Martin, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct.

1120 (2011)).) Respondent alternatively contends Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct

claims fail on the merits because the state court’s determination that the prosecutor did

not commit misconduct was correct and it did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as

to make the resulting convictions a denial of due process.” (Id. at 19:4-22 (quoting

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)).)

The Court first addresses Respondent’s contention that the claims in Ground One

are procedurally defaulted. The Court then addresses the merits of each specific claim

of prosecutorial misconduct.

1. Procedural Default

a. Applicable Law

“In a federal habeas action brought by a state prisoner, federal courts ‘will not

review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests

on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support

the judgment.’” La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)); see also Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801 (citing

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-92 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-

88 (1977)) (“When a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits

of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.”). “For the

procedural default rule to apply, however, the application of the state procedural rule

must provide ‘an adequate and independent state law basis’ on which the state court can

deny relief.” Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Coleman,

501 U.S. at 729-30) (citing Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

If a petitioner procedurally defaults his federal claims in state court by operation of a state rule that is independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless

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the prisoner can demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or that failure to consider

the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 750); see also Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.

1996) [hereinafter Bean] (“The procedural default doctrine ‘bars federal habeas when a

state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed

to meet a state procedural requirement.’”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30). 

“The Ninth Circuit has held that because procedural default is an affirmative

defense, Respondent must first have ‘adequately pled the existence of an independent and

adequate state procedural ground.’” Roberts v. Uribe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34992, at

*8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) (quoting Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir.

2003)).

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden to

place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority

demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate burden is the state’s.

Accordingly, because it is the State who seeks dismissal based on the

procedural bar, it is the State who must bear the burden of demonstrating that the bar is applicable -- in this case that the state procedural rule has been

regularly and consistently applied in habeas actions.

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. “If the state meets this burden, federal review of the claim is

foreclosed unless the petitioner can ‘demonstrate cause for the default and actual

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Roberts, 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34992, at *9 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750).

“A state ground is independent and adequate only if the last state court to which

the petitioner presented the claim ‘actually relied’ on a state rule that was sufficient to

justify the decision.” Carter, 385 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Valerio v. Dir. of Dep’t of

Prisons, 306 F.3d 742, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039,

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1049-50 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

b. Analysis

Here, the California Court of Appeal summarized California law with respect to

preserving issues for appeal. (Lodgment No. 6 at 7.) The Court of Appeal then held that

each of Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims were forfeited due to trial counsel’s

failure to object during trial. (Id. at 9 (“Watson neither objected nor asked for a curative

admonition, and therefore he has forfeited the claim of error.”), 11 (same), 13-14 (same).) 

In the Answer, Respondent affirmatively pled that Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct

claims are procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 6 at 2:9; ECF No. 6-1 at 18:18-19:2.) As

a result, the burden shifts to Petitioner to place the defense in issue by alleging specific

facts “that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to

authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule.” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

However, Petitioner has not filed a traverse or otherwise attempted to satisfy his burden. 

Moreover, it is well-established that California’s contemporaneous objection rule

is an independent and adequate state procedural bar. See Shendi v. Cate, 2014 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 588, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2014) (“It has been the law of the Ninth Circuit for

over thirty years that California’s contemporaneous objection rule is both independent

and, at least where a party has failed to make any objection at all, adequate to support

default.” (citing Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that

California’s contemporaneous objection rule “is consistently applied when a party has

failed to make any objection to the admission of evidence.”); Garrison v. McCarthy, 653

F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1981) (“California courts adhere to the contemporaneous

objection rule barring appellate review of alleged errors that are not raised at trial by

timely objection.”)); Robles v. Long, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129200, at *14 (S.D. Cal.

June 17, 2013) (“California’s contemporaneous objection rule is consistently applied,

independent of federal law, and adequate.”) (citing Fairbank v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243,

1256 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding federal habeas petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct

claim was procedurally barred after the California Supreme Court had applied the state’s

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contemporaneous objection rule on direct review)).

Finally, the Court notes Petitioner has made no attempt to demonstrate cause for

the procedural default and prejudice, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would

accompany this Court’s decision not to consider the procedurally defaulted claims. As

a result, Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims in Ground One are procedurally

defaulted. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ground One be DENIED as

procedurally defaulted, foreclosing federal habeas review on that theory.

Nevertheless, “in the habeas context, a procedural default . . . is not a jurisdictional

matter.” Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997). If the District Judge elects to reach the

merits of Petitioner’s defaulted prosecutorial misconduct claims despite his procedural

default of those claims, the Court RECOMMENDS, alternatively, that the claims be

DENIED on the merits, for the reasons set forth below.

2. Merits3

Even assuming arguendo Petitioner’s claims in Ground One are not procedurally

defaulted, the claims fail on their merits because Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the

California Court of Appeal’s decision on the merits of the claims “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-

(2).

/ / /

3

 Because the California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims both on procedural grounds and on the merits, its opinion is entitled to AEDPA deference. See Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 321 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[I]n referencing ‘adjudication on the merits,’ AEDPA draws no . . . distinction for alternative

rulings. Rather, it suggests that where a state court has considered the merits of the claim,

and its consideration provides an alternative and sufficient basis for the decision, such

consideration warrants deference.”); Stephens v. Branker, 570 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n alternative merits determination to a procedural bar ruling is entitled to AEDPA deference.”).

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a. Applicable Law

“A habeas petitioner can prevail on a claim for relief due to prosecutorial

misconduct only upon a showing first, the prosecutor’s alleged conduct was improper,

and second, the misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to render the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” McClintock v. Yates, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 33667, at

*33-34 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2008) (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181; Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). 

The occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct “does not automatically invalidate a

conviction.” Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “it is not

enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” 

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (citation omitted). Rather, “[t]he relevant question is whether

the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.’” Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643). 

“Moreover, the appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus

is ‘the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.’” Id.

(quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642). In other words, “[a] defendant’s due process rights

are violated if prosecutorial misconduct renders a trial ‘fundamentally unfair.’” Drayden

v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 183). 

Additionally, “[p]rosecutorial misconduct which rises to the level of a due process

violation may provide the grounds for granting a habeas petition only if that misconduct

is deemed prejudicial under [Brecht’s] ‘harmless error’ test.” Shaw v. Terhune, 380 F.3d

473, 478 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002);

Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 976-78 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Brecht requires that [courts]

independently evaluate whether an error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

“[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial

misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982); see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)

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(“The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth

Amendment.”) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)). “Determining

whether a due process violation occurred requires an examination of the entire

proceedings so the prosecutor’s conduct may be placed in its proper context.” Ward v.

Beard, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156589, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013) (citing Boyde

v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384-85 (1990)). 

b. Analysis

In Ground One of the Petition, Petitioner raises three separate claims of prosecutor

misconduct that, according to Petitioner, “each so infected the trial with unfairness as to

make the resulting convictions a denial of due process, but collectively they worked

synergistically to mar petitioner’s rights to a fair trial.” (ECF No. 1 at 48:14-16.)

First, the prosecutor elicited character evidence and criminal

propensity evidence, to wit, that petitioner previously sold marijuana, that she knew (as evidenced by her in limine motion to conditionally admit the evidence) was inadmissible under [California] Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). Second, the prosecutor improperly interjected her own unsworn testimony into the case and into the jury’s minds by posing leading

questions and referring to her own conversations with witnesses. Third, the

prosecutor unconstitutionally vouched for the case in closing argument by

stating there was nothing wrong with this case and asserting there was no DNA or fingerprints at the scene.

(Id. at 48:17-26.)

With respect to all three claims of prosecutor misconduct, Respondent contends: 

the state court reasonable [sic] determined that the behavior of the

prosecutor about which Watson complained was neither ‘undesirable’ nor

‘universally condemned.’ On the contrary, the prosecutor’s actions were proper. The question about Watson’s sale of marijuana was proper to establish his relationship with another witness. The prosecutor neither vouched nor became the equivalent of a witness in questioning witnesses about her interviews with them, because those questions were proper and necessary to correct or remind witnesses about their earlier statements. And

the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument were not vouching; instead, they were permissible statements about the evidence.

Since the prosecutor did nothing wrong, Watson’s trial was not so infected with unfairness. Accordingly, the state court reasonably rejected

Watson’s claims.

(ECF No. 6-1 at 19:12-22.)

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Here, none of Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct, whether viewed

together or separately, warrant habeas relief.

i. Improper Character Evidence

Petitioner argues in his first claim of prosecutorial misconduct that the prosecutor

committed misconduct by posing a series of questions to Vuytowecz which improperly

elicited testimony indicating Petitioner had previously sold marijuana, and that this “other

acts” evidence was inadmissible under California Evidence Code § 1101(a).4

 (ECF No.

1 at 50:14-16.) 

During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Vuytowecz, the following exchange

occurred:

[Prosecutor]: So your relationship with Mr. Watson is a social relationship?

[Vuytowecz]: Yeah.

[Prosecutor]: Yes?

[Vuytowecz]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: Do you also have a business relationship with Mr. Watson?

[Vuytowecz]: We’ve had one in the past, yes.

[Prosecutor]: What kind?

[Vuytowecz]: Just recreational drug habits.

[Prosecutor]: Did you ever sell dope together?

[Vuytowecz]: Yes.

[Prosecutor]: When you did, who sold to whom?

[Vuytowecz]: It kind of went both ways. There was no -- you know,

4

 California Evidence Code § 1101(a) generally provides that “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” Section 1101(b) provides certain exceptions to this general rule, including that character evidence is admissible “when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b).

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not one over the other.

(Lodgment No. 2 at 383:2-16.)

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim on the

merits, as well as Petitioner’s claim that the issue should be deemed preserved despite

trial counsel’s failure to object or ask for a curative admonition:

Watson argues the issue should be deemed preserved because an objection would have been futile (because an admonition would not have

cured the harm caused by the misconduct) or, alternatively, that he is entitled to relief because the failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We are not persuaded by Watson’s arguments

because both are premised on the assumption the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). However, “Evidence

Code section 1101, subdivision (b), permits the admission of other-crimes

evidence against a defendant ‘when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.’ Section 1101 prohibits the admission of other-crimes evidence for

the purpose of showing the defendant’s bad character or criminal

propensity. It also recognizes, however, that there are facts other than

criminal propensity to which other-crimes evidence may be relevant.

[Citation.] The categories listed in section 1101, subdivision (b), are example of facts that legitimately may be proved by other-crimes evidence, but . . . the list is not exclusive. [Citations.] As we have explained, the admissibility of other-crimes evidence depends upon the materiality of the

fact sought to be proved or disproved, the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or disprove the material fact, and the existence of any policy requiring exclusion of the evidence. [Citation.] In order to be material, the fact in dispute ‘may be either an ultimate fact in the proceeding or an intermediate fact “from which such ultimate fact[ ] may be . . . inferred.” ’ [(Quoting People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 315, fn. omitted.)]” (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 145-146.)

Here, the testimony was relevant to show the nature of the

relationship between Watson and Vuytowecz, and to corroborate Vuytowecz’s testimony that Watson accompanied Vuytowecz on a mission

to acquire marijuana. (See People v. Ellers (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 943, 953-954.) There was no misconduct in eliciting that evidence.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 9-10.)

Petitioner claims the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the evidence was

admissible to (1) show the nature of the relationship between him and Vuytowecz, and

(2) corroborate Vuytowecz’s testimony, is “irrelevant and unreasonable, and as a result

the judgment of the Court of Appeal is contrary to established Supreme Court precedent

and constitutes an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the record.” (ECF

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No. 1 at 52:8-11.)

First, Petitioner contends California Evidence Code § 1101(b) “says nothing about

permitting otherwise inadmissible evidence for the purpose of exposing ‘the nature of the

relationship’ between a defendant and someone else.” (Id. at 52:13-16.) Further,

Petitioner contends “there was no question about the relationship between Vuytowecz

and petitioner because their relationship was well established. [Citation.] It is highly

unlikely the prosecutor would have actually elicited this cumulative evidence for the

purpose of establishing an irrelevant, already-established issue.” (Id. at 52:20-23.)

Second, Petitioner contends the state court’s conclusion that the other-acts

evidence was admissible to corroborate Vuytowecz’s testimony that he and Petitioner

were on a mission to acquire marijuana “is tenuous at best. There is no indication in the

record that the prosecutor elicited the inadmissible evidence for this purpose. Further,

such corroboration would have been of infinitesimal importance in this case, because

whether or not petitioner was on a mission to acquire marijuana has no bearing on any

of the elements of the charged offenses.” (Id. at 52:26-53:3.)

Importantly, “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” 

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41

(1984); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1975) (per curiam)). Thus, even assuming

California Evidence Code § 1101(b) does not permit evidence of prior criminal acts to

establish the nature of the relationship between a defendant and another individual or to

corroborate a witness’s testimony, the trial court’s alleged violation of this state

evidentiary rule does not justify federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is

limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Rose, 423 U.S. at 21); Larson v. Palmateer,

515 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The correctness of the trial court’s evidentiary

ruling as a matter of state law is irrelevant to our review, because a federal court may

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entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus ‘only on the ground that [the

petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“[F]ailure to comply with the state’s rules of evidence is neither a necessary

nor a sufficient basis for granting habeas relief.”). 

“The admission of evidence does not provide a basis for habeas relief unless it

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.” Johnson v. Sublett,

63 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. 62). However, “[u]nder

AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of evidence that render a trial fundamentally

unfair may not permit the grant of federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly

established Federal law,’ as laid out by the Supreme Court.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568

F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Here, Petitioner cites to

no established Supreme Court precedent that is contradicted by the Court of Appeal’s

decision. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[t]he Supreme Court has

made very few rulings regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due process,”

and “it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial

evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. 

Absent such ‘clearly established Federal law,’ [federal courts] cannot conclude that the

state court’s ruling was an ‘unreasonable application.’” Id. at 1101 (citing Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)).

Finally, to the extent Petitioner’s claim is reviewable based on a potential denial

of due process, the claim lacks merit. “A habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden in

showing a due process violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404

F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). “The admission of evidence does not provide a basis

for habeas relief unless it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due

process.” Johnson, 63 F.3d at 930 (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. 62). “Evidence introduced

by the prosecution will often raise more than one inference, some permissible, some not;

we must rely on the jury to sort them out in light of the court’s instructions. Only if there

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are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission

violate due process.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920; see also Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d

1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hether or not the admission of evidence is contrary

to a state rule of evidence, a trial court’s ruling does not violate due process unless the

evidence is ‘of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’”) (quoting Kealohapauole

v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)), overruled on other grounds by Solis

v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 

Here, Petitioner cannot shown that admission of this evidence rendered his trial

“fundamentally unfair” and that the jury could draw no permissible inferences from the

evidence. “Both California and Federal rules of evidence allow evidence of prior

criminal activity to prove, inter alia, intent, common scheme or plan, knowledge, and

absence of mistake or accident.” Frausto v. Grounds, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51855, at

*24-25 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b); CAL. EVID. CODE §

1101(b)). The California Court of Appeal determined that evidence of Petitioner’s prior

marijuana sales “was relevant to show the nature of the relationship between Watson and

Vuytowecz, and to corroborate Vuytowecz’s testimony that Watson accompanied

Vuytowecz on a mission to acquire marijuana.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 10.) This Court

agrees with the Court of Appeal that there were permissible inferences the jury could

draw from the evidence of Petitioner’s prior marijuana sales. Thus, the prosecutor’s

conduct in eliciting this evidence does not amount to misconduct, let alone misconduct

that “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of

due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181.

Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that

the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Petitioner’s prior drug activity cannot be

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1); see also Van Patten, 552 U.S. at 126 (“Because our cases give no clear

answer to the question presented, let alone one in Van Patten’s favor, it cannot be said

that the state court unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law. Under the

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explicit terms of § 2254(d)(1), therefore, relief is unauthorized.”) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted; brackets in original); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881

(9th Cir. 2007) (“Where the Supreme Court has not addressed an issue in its holding, a

state court adjudication of the issue not addressed by the Supreme Court cannot be

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.”) (citing

Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 9 (2006) (per curiam)).

ii. Prosecutor Acting as a Witness

In Petitioner’s second claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner contends “[t]he

prosecutor improperly interjected her own unsworn testimony into the case and into the

jury’s minds and improperly acted as a witness by posing leading questions and referring

to her own conversations with witnesses,” and that “[t]he prosecutor acted essentially as

an investigator in the case, frequently using her own recollection of interviews that she

had with the witnesses to impeach them.” (ECF No. 1 at 53:11-16.) Petitioner contends

“[s]uch impeachment turns the prosecutor into a witness, because the only way that the

relevant witness could be entirely impeached would be to put a witness on the stand to

contradict them, and, in this case, that witness would be the prosecutor.” (Id. at 53:17-

21.) In light of numerous instances where the prosecutor asked witnesses to recall their

interviews with her5

, Petitioner claims:

The prosecutor’s conduct amounted to testifying on behalf of the prosecution, because the prosecutor’s constant questioning regarding what the witnesses told the prosecutor herself, and not, for example, an officer, pitted her credibility against the witnesses’ credibility. The misconduct was further exacerbated by the prosecutor’s comprehensive involvement in the investigation, and not only the prosecution, of petitioner’s case, and her

communication of this to the jury.

(Id. at 57:16-21.) 

Based on these allegations, Petitioner claims “the prosecutor’s interjection of her

unsworn testimony violated petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

5

 The Court of Appeal summarized this alleged misconduct as follows: “During the examination of Carvajal, Bloom and Vuytowecz, the prosecutor asked some questions that were prefaced by phrases like ‘[d]o you recall in the interview with me and my investigator you said,’ ‘[d]o you remember talking to me in my office and saying,’ or ‘[d]o you recall telling me.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 10.)

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confrontation and due process.” (Id. at 56:11-12.)

In response, Respondent contends the prosecutor did not become “the equivalent

of a witness in questioning witnesses about her interviews with them, because those

questions were proper and necessary to correct or remind witnesses about their earlier

statements.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 19:16-19.)

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim on the

merits, as well as Petitioner’s claim that the issue should be deemed preserved despite

trial counsel’s failure to object or ask for a curative admonition:

Watson resurrects his twin claims that the issue should be deemed

preserved because an objection would have been futile (because an

admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct) or, alternatively, that he is entitled to relief because the failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We are not persuaded by Watson’s arguments because both arguments are premised on the assumption that posing leading questions to a witness is misconduct, insofar

as the leading questions imply some knowledge by the prosecutor of facts

outside of the record, and the questions amount to an interjection of those

facts in an unsworn fashion. However, in People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, the defendant argued the trial court committed reversible error

in allowing the prosecutor to ask leading questions of a witness and argued that “by using leading questions, the prosecutor essentially testified for

Zamora, who was not credible.” (Id. at p. 214.) The court, after noting that “leading questions are not always impermissible on direct examination” and

that a trial court has discretion to permit such questions (Ibid.), concluded that questions substantially indistinguishable from the questions asked in

this case were not improper. For example, in Collins, the prosecutor (referring the witness to a meeting between himself, the prosecutor and a detective several days before his trial testimony) asked, “ ‘Do you remember saying you had forgotten to tell us something because you were scared and now you want to tell us something else,’ ” “ ‘Do you remember telling us,’ ” “ ‘Did you tell us,’ ” and “ ‘Do you remember telling us.’ ” (Id. at p. 215.) Collins concluded such questions were permissible under the circumstances of that case.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 11-12.) 

Petitioner contends the Court of Appeal’s analysis “is unreasonable and contrary

to established Supreme Court precedent.” (ECF No. 1 at 58:14-15.) Petitioner first

claims the analysis “attempts to reduce the entirety of petitioner’s claim to a complaint

that the prosecutor improperly posed leading questions.” (Id. at 58:15-16.) Petitioner

asserts, however, that his “claim is not premised solely on the propriety of posing leading

questions,” but that such questions were prejudicial because they “did not simply guide

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witnesses with established truth, but acted to improperly insert the prosecutor’s version

of the facts into evidence to prove the truth of the prosecutor’s questions, not to elicit the

truth from the witness on the stand.” (Id. at 58:221-27.) Petitioner also claims the Court

of Appeal’s analysis “failed utterly to address the confrontation aspect of petitioner’s

claims. The federal constitution entitled petitioner to confront evidence against him; but

when this evidence is not presented in proper procedural format, that is, with a witness

on the stand under oath to tell the truth, petitioner cannot assert his right to

confrontation.” (Id. at 59:1-5.)6

 The Court finds that each contention is without merit.

A. Due Process

As noted above, prosecutorial misconduct only entitles a federal habeas petitioner

to relief if it is shown that the petitioner’s due process rights were violated because the

prosecutor’s misconduct rendered the trial “fundamentally unfair.” Darden, 477 U.S. at

181. Moreover, Darden requires courts to first address “whether the prosecutor’s

remarks were improper; if so, the next question is whether such conduct ‘infected the trial

with unfairness.’” Salazar v. Lewis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132196, at *22 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 15, 2013) (quoting Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005)). “A

prosecutorial misconduct claim is decided by ‘examining the entire proceedings to

determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as to

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 63 F.3d at

929).

6

 Petitioner also characterizes the prosecutor’s interjection of unsworn testimony as improper vouching. (See ECF No. 1 at 56-57.) However, this characterization does not strictly align with the concept of vouching as set forth in the case law. “Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal

assurances of the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276

(9th Cir. 1993). Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor used leading questions to insert her

own testimony into the record is not, strictly speaking, vouching. Indeed, Petitioner does not claim that the prosecutor’s questions were aimed at supporting the witnesses’

veracity. Rather, Petitioner claims the questions sought to introduce new evidence into the record, even if the evidence contradicted the witnesses’ testimony. Thus, this particular claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not properly viewed as a claim of

improper vouching. That being said, the Court does address Petitioner’s claim that the

prosecutor improperly vouched during closing arguments. See supra Part III.A.2.b.iii.

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“The first factor in determining whether misconduct amounted to a due process

violation is whether the trial court issued a curative instruction to the jury.” Id. (citing

United States v. De Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Simtob, 901

F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1558 (9th Cir.

1986)). “When a curative instruction is issued, a court presumes that the jury has

disregarded the improper remarks and that no due process violation occurred.” Id. at *23

(citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)).

Additional factors that bear on whether a prosecutor’s misconduct rises to a due

process violation include: (1) the weight of evidence of guilt, United States v. Young, 470

U.S. 1, 19-20 (1985); (2) whether the misconduct was isolated or part of an ongoing

pattern, Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987) (“courts will not reverse when

the prosecutorial comment is a single, isolated incident, does not stress an inference of

guilt from silence as a basis of conviction, and is followed by curative instructions.”)

(citations omitted); and (3) whether the misconduct relates to a critical part of the case,

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). See Salazar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

132196, at *23 (reviewing applicable factors).

Here, the Court concludes the prosecutor’s various leading questions to Carvajal,

Bloom, and Vuytowecz were not improper. As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that

“[t]he use of leading questions on direct examination is not always improper.” United

States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Turner v. Marshall, 63

F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In the discretion of the judge, some leading questions can

be proper and would only justify reversal if their use amounted to a denial of a fair trial.”)

(citing United States v. Castro-Romero, 964 F.2d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam);

Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1965)).

Petitioner identifies fourteen specific questions where “the prosecutor employed

her recollection of her interviews with” the witnesses. (ECF No. 1 at 54:6-19.) However,

the Court has carefully reviewed each of these questions and the trial testimony

surrounding these questions, and finds no misconduct. Indeed, aside from establishing

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the existence of the witnesses’ interviews with the prosecutor and a detective (Lodgment

No. 2 at 335, 491), the prosecutor’s reference to the interviews were primarily made for

purposes of refreshing the witnesses’ recollection. Specifically, the prosecutor sought to

refresh (a) Carvajal’s recollection about the details of a phone call he had with Bloom

prior to the incident at the motel (id. at 146); (b) Bloom’s recollection about the date the

incident occurred (id. at 178), the quantity of marijuana brought to the motel by Carvajal

(id. at 181), and Bloom’s agreement to plead guilty (id. at 335, 370); and (c) Vuytowecz’s

recollection about whether Carvajal threw any punches during the incident (id. at 430),

whether Petitioner held Carvajal in a choke hold (id. at 431), and Vuytowecz’s agreement

to plead guilty (id. at 451, 456-457). Such questions were permissible under both federal

and California evidence rules. See FED.R. EVID. 611(c) (“Leading questions should not

be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the

witness’ testimony.”) (emphasis added); Collins, 49 Cal. 4th at 214 (“Leading questions

are permitted on direct examination to the extent necessary to stimulate or revive [the

witness’s] recollection.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in

original). Moreover, the remaining questions highlighted by Petitioner simply referenced

the prosecutor’s interviews with the witnesses for purposes of directing the questions to

a new topic, i.e., whether the witnesses were shown a photo lineup (Lodgment No. 2 at

337, 462), or establishing the occurrence of a witness interview or the demeanor of the

prosecutor during the interview (id. at 371, 491). None of the questions suggested critical

testimony. Thus, the trial court’s allowance of the questions, even if in the face of

defense counsel’s failure to object, was inconsequential to the verdict. See Cooper v.

Woodford, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71870, at *57 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010) (“Leading

questions frequently are simply re-phrased to avoid the leading question problem. There

is no indication here that any of the information elicited was vital and hinged on the

prosecutor asking a leading question to obtain the testimony.”).

Further, even if the leading questions were improper, they did not infect the trial

with such unfairness that the resulting conviction amounts to a denial of due process. 

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First, the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that statements and questions of

attorneys are not evidence.7

 “Having been adequately instructed, the jury is presumed to

have ignored the prosecutor’s improper remarks.” Salazar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

132196, at *24-25 (citing Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66).

Second, the Court has reviewed the trial transcript in its entirety and finds there is

sufficient evidence weighing in support of Petitioner’s guilt. The Court recognizes that

the testimony of each of the three prosecution witnesses (Carvajal, Bloom, and

Vuytowecz) was not entirely consistent and, at various times, was not entirely truthful. 

However, the state court’s determination of facts is presumptively correct absent “clear

and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. The Court

concludes Petitioner has not provided a sufficient basis to disturb this presumption. 

Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s factual determinations are supported by the trial

testimony. Importantly, whatever inconsistencies might exist, Carvajal, Bloom, and

7

 For example, the trial court instructed at the outset of the trial as follows:

Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and their closing arguments the attorneys are obviously going to discuss the case with you. But their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not

evidence. Only the witnesses[’] answers are the evidence. The attorneys questions may be significant if they assist you in understanding the witnesses[’] answers. And you are not to assume that something is true just because an attorney asks a question that suggests that it’s true.

(Lodgment No. 2 (part 3 of 6) at 8.)

In addition, prior to closing arguments, the Court admonished the jury:

You must decide what the facts are in this case. You must use only the evidence that was presented in the courtroom. Evidence is the sworn

testimony of witnesses, any exhibits that were admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider as evidence.

. . . Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing arguments, the attorneys will discuss the case with

you, but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the witnesses answers are evidence. The attorneys questions may be significant only if they helped you to understand the witnesses answers. Do

no assume that something is true just because one of the attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true.

(Lodgment No. 2 at 693.) 

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Vuytowecz each identified Petitioner as the primary assailant. Thus, the evidence against

Petitioner is sufficient.

Third, although the prosecutor’s use of leading questions was not an isolated

incident, as detailed above, the questions were fairly limited in nature. The record fails

to reflect an extensive, ongoing pattern of improper questions. See United States v.

Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 609-13 (9th Cir. 2010) (prosecutor’s “improper statements were

relatively isolated incidents over the course of a ten day trial.”).

Fourth, as discussed above, the prosecutor’s leading questions, and the testimony

that they elicited, “did not relate to a critical part of the case . . . or form the sole basis of

[Petitioner’s] guilt.” Salazar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132196, at *26.

In sum, the Court concludes that, under the circumstances, the prosecutor’s leading

questions were not improper. Moreover, even if they were, the trial court appropriately

instructed the jury to disregard the questions and comments of counsel when assessing

the evidence. Finally, the other factors discussed above weigh against Petitioner’s

argument that the prosecutor’s leading questions violated his right to due process. 

Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of this argument on direct appeal

cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

B. Confrontation Clause

Petitioner also claims the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the prosecutor’s leading

questions “failed utterly to address the confrontation aspect of petitioner’s claims. The

federal constitution entitled petitioner to confront evidence against him; but when this

evidence is not presented in proper procedural format, that is, with a witness on the stand

under oath to tell the truth, petitioner cannot assert his right to confrontation.” (ECF No.

1 at 59:1-5.) This claim, too, lacks merit.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that, in criminal cases,

the accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S.CONST.

/ / /

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amend. VI.8 The “Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant with the right to

face those who testify against him and the right to conduct cross-examination.” 

Fernandez v. Adams, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38662, at *54 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011)

(citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)). “The right to confront a witness

serves the purposes of ensuring reliability by means of oath, exposing the witness to

cross-examination, and permitting the trier of fact to weigh the demeanor of the witness.” 

Id. at *54-55 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). “The central

concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a

criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary

proceeding before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990); see

also Salazar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132196, at *27 ( “The ultimate goal of the

Confrontation Clause is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than

a substantive guarantee.”) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)).

The Confrontation Clause “applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused--in other

words, those who ‘bear testimony.’” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted). Indeed,

“only testimonial statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause.” Giles v.

California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008). Moreover, “[o]nly testimonial out-of-court

statements raise Confrontation Clause concerns.” United States v. Sine, 493 F.3d 1021,

1035 n.11 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406,

419-20 (2007)). Although the Supreme Court has not comprehensively defined

“testimonial,” “[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior

testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police

interrogations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 

“Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis.” United

States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Allen, 425

F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005). A federal habeas court must determine whether the

8

 The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).

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allegedly inadmissible evidence “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir.

2002) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).

Here, the Confrontation Clause is not applicable. Whereas the Confrontation

Clause applies only to testimonial out-of-court statements, here, the prosecutor’s

questions were non-testimonial in-court statements. See Salazar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

132196, at *29 (“[T]he court instructed the jury that the statements of attorneys are not

evidence. . . . Therefore, the prosecution’s questions to [the witness] did not violate the

Confrontation Clause.”). Moreover, even if the Confrontation Clause applied, as

discussed above, the questions did not have “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict,” and, therefore, any violation would be harmless. 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

iii. Improper Closing Argument

In Petitioner’s third claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner contends “[t]he

prosecutor improperly vouched for the case in closing argument by stating that there was

nothing wrong with this case and asserting there was no DNA or fingerprints at the

scene.” (ECF No. 1 at 59:7-8.) Specifically, Petitioner takes issue with the following

remarks at the end of the prosecutor’s closing argument:

There is no issue here, ladies and gentlemen. Do not think because

we are here in trial there’s a problem with the case. Well, there’s liars. 

That’s never an easy thing to present to somebody but doesn’t take away

what the facts are. Wesley Watson has an absolute right to the jury trial, and he has had it.

And it wouldn’t matter if there was DNA or fingerprints. And there

was no DNA or fingerprints of Wesley Watson at that crime scene, but

neither were there any of Noah Bloom, Jeffrey Vuytowecz or Ruben Carvajal. And they all admitted to you they were there, so that doesn’t mean that Wesley Watson wasn’t there. I’m, asking you to convict Mr. Watson of all four counts and all of the attending allegations.

(Lodgment No. 2 at 742:12-25 (emphasis added); ECF No. 1 at 59:11-18.)

“Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness

through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that information not

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presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1276. 

There is “no bright-line rule about when vouching will result in reversal.” Id. at 1278. 

Rather, courts should consider a number of factors including:

the form of vouching; how much the vouching implies that the prosecutor

has extra-record knowledge of or the capacity to monitor the witness’s truthfulness; any inference that the court is monitoring the witness’s

veracity; the degree of personal opinion asserted; the timing of the vouching; the extent to which the witness’s credibility was attacked; the

specificity and timing of a curative instruction; the importance of the

witness’s testimony and the vouching to the case overall. 

Id. 

When analyzing this claim on direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal stated:

Watson, citing numerous cases holding a prosecutor commits misconduct by “vouching for the case” presented to the jury, argues use of the italicized words was misconduct for three reasons. First, Watson asserts

that because the prosecutor implied (when she said “there’s no problem here”) that she was privy to information the jury had not seen and knew

from that information Watson was guilty. Second, he asserts that the

prosecutor (when she said “[d]o not think because we are here in trial there’s

a problem with the case”) was adverting to her experience in trying criminal cases in which a defendant is clearly guilty (but nevertheless required trial) and that this was such a case. Third, he asserts the prosecutor (when she

said “there was no DNA or fingerprints of [Watson] at that crime scene, but neither were there any of [Carvajal, Bloom or Vuytowecz]”) was referring to evidence not introduced at trial, i.e. that the results of testing were negative for all parties allegedly involved in the assault.

Watson argues these statements constituted misconduct because they implied the prosecutor had information the jury did not, and the information convinced her Watson was guilty. However, Watson neither objected nor asked for a curative admonition regarding these comments in the

prosecutor’s closing argument, and therefore he has forfeited any claim of

error as to the form of the questions.

. . .

We are unpersuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks as adverting to unadmitted evidence of which the prosecutor was aware, or that she was

inviting the jury to defer to her expertise in evaluating criminal matters. For example, the prosecutor’s statement that “[t]here is no issue here, ladies and

gentlemen[,] [do] not think because we are here in trial there’s a problem with the case. . . [Watson] has an absolute right to a jury trial, and he has had it,” could reasonably be understood to be a comment on the evidence

that, while Bloom and Vuytowecz had pleaded guilty, Watson differed only because he elected to require the prosecution to prove its case against him. Reading the comment in the least damaging fashion, this statement was an

argument on the evidence, i.e. that the jury should not infer this difference alone meant there were issues or problems with the case against Watson.

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Similarly, the prosecutor’s statement that “there was no DNA or

fingerprints of [Watson] at the crime scene, but neither were there any of [Carvajal, Bloom or Vuytowecz] [a]nd they all admitted to you they were there, so that doesn’t mean [Watson] wasn’t there,” read in the least

damaging fashion, could also reasonably be understood to be a comment on the evidence instead of a suggestion that there was unadmitted evidence of

which the prosecutor was aware. When the defense cross-examined

Detective Williams, it elicited testimony that neither Watson’s fingerprints nor his DNA was found in the hotel room. On redirect, the prosecutor asked Detective Williams to confirm police also had not found fingerprints or

DNA in the hotel room from Carvajal, Bloom or Vuytowecz because the

room was not processed to collect fingerprints or DNA. Thus, the comments were based on the evidence and argued no adverse inference should be drawn from the absence of physical evidence linking Watson to

the crime scene because the same absence of physical evidence pertained to people who admitted they were at the crime scene. Thus, reading the comment in the least damaging fashion, this statement was an argument on the evidence rather than an implication of the prosecutor’s knowledge of unadmitted evidence.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 13-16.)

Petitioner argues the Court of Appeal’s analysis was flawed for several reasons. 

First, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion as to the first set of comments “is an unreasonable

determination of the facts and runs contrary to federal law because the prosecutor’s

comment renders costly petitioner’s assertion of his constitutional right to a trial by jury. 

That is, even accepting that the Court’s interpretation of the prosecutor’s statement is the

one the jury applied, there is no legitimate value in arguing Watson is guilty because he

asserted his right to a jury trial, which is exactly what the prosecutor’s statement reduces

to.” (ECF No. 1 at 61:3-10.) However, Petitioner fails to cite to any Supreme Court

precedent establishing that the prosecutor’s argument in this regard was improper. 

Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s analysis was not an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. Indeed, the Court of Appeal reasonably found

a “legitimate value” in the prosecutor’s remarks regarding the evidence that Bloom and

Vuytowecz had pleaded guilty, namely, that the jury should not infer that Petitioner’s

decision to proceed to trial “meant there were issues or problems with the case against”

Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 6 at 15.) The Court of Appeal’s decision in this regard was

not unreasonable. 

/ / /

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Second, Petitioner claims “the State Court took no cognizance of petitioner’s

argument that the prosecutor improperly asserted her prosecutorial experience when she

argued that there was no issue with this case. The State Court failed to analyze the issue,

and petitioner still maintains that there can be no reasonable understanding of the

prosecutor’s statement that does not redound ultimately to her professional experience.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 61:11-15.) Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, however, the Court of Appeal

did analyze this issue. Indeed, the Court of Appeal expressly stated that it was

“unpersuaded there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of

the complained-of remarks as adverting to unadmitted evidence of which the prosecutor

was aware, or that she was inviting the jury to defer to her expertise in evaluating

criminal matters.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 15.) Thus, Petitioner’s claim that the state court

ignored his argument is unsupported by the record. Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s

decision was reasonable, and Petitioner has failed to identify any Supreme Court

precedent of which the state court’s decision contradicted or unreasonably applied.

Third, Petitioner claims the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the comments regarding

DNA and fingerprint evidence “conflated the police department’s never having conducted

testing with the prosecutor’s affirmative assertion that neither Carvajal, nor Bloom, nor

Vuytowecz left DNA or fingerprints at the scene. In truth, no one knows whether these

men left DNA or fingerprints at the scene because no DNA or fingerprint testing was

conducted.” (ECF No. 1 at 61:23-27.) Petitioner further contends “the ineluctable

conclusion that the jury must draw is that the prosecutor was aware that there was no

DNA or fingerprints at the scene of the crime, but this simply was not established based

on the evidence presented at trial.” (Id. at 61:27-62:3.) This Court agrees with Petitioner

that the absence of DNA and fingerprint evidence due to the police department’s decision

not to process the crime scene for such evidence does not mean that no DNA or

fingerprint evidence was present. Thus, the prosecutor’s statement that “there was no

DNA or fingerprints of Wesley Watson at that crime scene, but neither were there any of

Noah Bloom, Jeffrey Vuytowecz or Ruben Carvajal” went beyond the evidence presented

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at trial. Thus, it was improper for the prosecutor to argue, as the Court of Appeal

summarized, that “no adverse inference should be drawn from the absence of physical

evidence linking Watson to the crime scene because the same absence of physical

evidence pertained to people who admitted they were at the crime scene.” (Lodgment

No. 6 at 15-16.) 

However, “[i]mproper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s

constitutional rights.” Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing

Darden, 477 U.S. at 181; Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

“Even if a prosecutor’s argument is egregiously improper, a federal court cannot issue

a writ of habeas corpus to state authorities unless ‘the prosecutor’s comments so infected

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” 

Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at

181). Determining whether a due process violation occurred requires an examination of

the entire proceedings so the prosecutor’s argument may be placed in proper context. 

Boyde, 494 U.S. at 384-85; Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66. “In determining whether a

comment rendered a trial constitutionally unfair, factors [a federal habeas court] may

consider are whether the comment misstated the evidence, whether the judge admonished

the jury to disregard the comment, whether the comment was invited by defense counsel

in its summation, [and] whether defense counsel had an adequate opportunity to rebut the

comment, the prominence of the comment in the context of the entire trial and the weight

of the evidence.” Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 912-13 (2010) (citing Darden, 477 U.S.

at 182).

Here, the Court concludes that the prosecutor’s improper remark regarding the

absence of DNA and fingerprint evidence, although it improperly misstated the evidence,

it did not so infect the trial with unfairness such that Petitioner’s due process rights were

violated. Importantly, as discussed above, the Court admonished the jury that the

attorney’s comments and arguments were not evidence. See infra note 7. This factor is

important given that the testimony provided by the investigating detective made it clear

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that the reason no DNA or fingerprint evidence was found was because the crime scene

had not been tested for it. Thus, the jury is presumed to have disregarded the improper

comment by the prosecutor during her closing argument. Salazar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

132196, at *24-25. Next, immediately following the prosecutor’s remark, defense

counsel began his own closing argument during which he had an opportunity to rebut the

prosecutor’s comment, although defense counsel failed to do so. (Lodgment No. 2 at

743-770.) Next, although the prosecutor’s comment occurred at the very close of her

closing argument, the comment about DNA and fingerprint evidence was isolated and did

not constitute a recurring or prominent theme in the prosecution’s case. Finally, as

discussed above, in light of the numerous inconsistencies and fabrications found in the

testimony of Carvajal, Bloom, and Vuytowecz, the weight of the evidence against

Petitioner is not overwhelming. Nevertheless, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to

conclude that Petitioner committed the charged offenses.

iv. Cumulative Effect of Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

As discussed above, the Court concludes that each claim of prosecutorial

misconduct is insufficient to support habeas relief. However, habeas relief can be

available where several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, each insufficient by itself

to support relief, can, when viewed together, amount to a due process violation. Indeed,

“although no single trial error examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant

reversal, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may still prejudice a defendant.”

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.

Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d

1117, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Although no single alleged error may warrant habeas corpus

relief, the cumulative effect of errors may deprive a petitioner of the due process right to

a fair trial.” However, where “there is no single constitutional error in [a] case, there is

nothing to accumulate to a level of a constitutional violation.” Mancuso, 292 F.3d at 957

(citing Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999). Such is the case here, and

Petitioner’s argument that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct

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amounts to a constitutional violation fails.

v. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, even assuming Petitioner’s Ground One

prosecutorial misconduct claims are not procedurally defaulted, it cannot be said that the

California Court of Appeal’s denial of these claims “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” or that it “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ground One of the Petition be

DENIED.

B. Ground Two: Jury Instruction

In Ground Two of the Petition, Petitioner contends that a jury instruction,

CALCRIM No. 335, unconstitutionally reduces the prosecution’s burden of proving each

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM

No. 335, which states:

If the crimes charged in Counts 1 through 4 were committed, then Noah Bloom and Jeffrey Vuytowecz were accomplices to those crimes.

You may not convict the defendant of the crimes charged in Counts 1 through 4 based on the testimony of an accomplice alone. You may use the testimony of an accomplice to convict the defendant only if:

1. The accomplice’s testimony is supported by other evidence that

you believe;

2. That supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s

testimony;

AND

3. That supporting evidence tends to connect the defendant to the

commission of the crimes.

Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, and it does not need to support every fact about which the witness

testified.[] On the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence

merely shows that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its

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commission. The supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant

to the commission of the crime. 

The evidence needed to support the testimony of one accomplice cannot be provided by the testimony of another accomplice.

Any testimony of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not, however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that testimony the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the other evidence.

(Lodgment No. 1 at 55.)

Petitioner claims “[t]his instruction is incorrect because it is meant to convey to the

jury that it must view accomplice testimony with caution, but has the opposite effect of

reducing the burden of proof by creating a permissive presumption that communicates

that the jury can convict so long as there is accomplice testimony and at least some

‘slight’ corroborating evidence.” (ECF No. 1 at 69:26-70:2.) Petitioner further argues

the instruction essentially “undercuts the constitutionally required reasonable doubt

standard by implying that the jury can substitute this equation for reasonable doubt. The

instruction given here, that only slight corroborating evidence was necessary to establish

guilt, violated petitioner’s right to due process of law because it diluted the prosecution’s

burden of proof.” (Id. at 70:3-7.)

In addressing Petitioner’s claim of instructional error on direct appeal, the

California Court of Appeal stated:

Watson claims CALCRIM No. 335, as given by the court, unconstitutionally lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof by requiring far less proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, under the

federal Constitution, there is no requirement of any corroboration before an

accomplice’s testimony may provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt (see,

e.g., U.S. v. Necochea (9th Cir. 1993) 986 F.2d 1273, 1282), much less that such corroboration must achieve a level of persuasiveness satisfying the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Instead, the requirement under section 1111 that “[a] conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated” is a matter of state law that does not

implicate a federal constitutional right. (See, e.g., In re R.C. (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 887, 892-893; Barco v. Tilton (C.D. Cal. 2010) 694 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1136.)

Although federal due process mandates that the elements of the offenses be shown beyond a reasonable doubt (see, e.g., Sullivan v.

Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 277-278), the corroboration statutorily imposed by section 1111 does not require that proof. Instead, the court in

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People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 966, after holding that “[d]efendant’s characterization of the accomplice corroboration requirement

as an element of the crime subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt

[citations] is unsupported and unpersuasive,” concluded the state law

principles governing accomplice evidence (including permitting the

corroborating evidence to be satisfied by “slight” evidence) did not offend due process protections provided by the federal Constitution.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 17-18.)

Petitioner’s argument that CALCRIM No. 335, as instructed in this case, violates 

his due process rights by reducing the state’s burden of proof was recently rejected by a

sister district court in California. In Chatman v. Martel, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4750,

at *16-17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013), the court rejected a state prisoner’s federal habeas

claim that was premised on the same argument presented here by Petitioner:

The Supreme Court has held, “The Fourteenth Amendment does not

forbid a state court to construe and apply its laws with respect to the evidence of an accomplice.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227, 62

S. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941). Due process does not prohibit the use of

uncorroborated accomplice testimony. See United States v. Augenblick, 393

U.S. 348, 352, 89 S. Ct. 528, 21 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1969) (explaining “the use of accomplice testimony is not catalogued with constitutional restrictions”

of procedural due process); Darden v. United States, 405 F.2d 1054, 1056

(9th Cir.1969) (“it is well established that a conviction in federal court may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice”); Harrington v. Nix, 983 F.2d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 1993) (“state laws requiring corroboration do not implicate constitutional concerns that can be addressed

on habeas review”); Odle v. Calderon, 884 F.Supp. 1404, 1418 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“corroboration of accomplice testimony is not a federal

constitutional requirement”). Given that uncorroborated testimony from an accomplice is permissible under the Constitution, testimony corroborated

by “slight” evidence is also permissible, and does not violate Petitioner’s

right to due process. Consequently, Petitioner fails to demonstrate the

decision of the state court was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

(Emphasis added).

Importantly, “[s]tate laws requiring corroboration do not implicate constitutional

concerns that can be addressed on habeas review.” Harrington v. Nix, 983 F.2d 872, 874

(8th Cir. 1993); see also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (“[I]n

federal practice there is no rule preventing conviction on uncorroborated testimony of

accomplices, as there are in many jurisdictions, and the most comfort a defendant can

expect is that the court can be induced to follow the ‘better practice’ and caution the jury

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against ‘too much reliance upon the testimony of accomplices.’”) (quoting Caminetti v.

United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917)); Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir.

2000).

This Court agrees with the reasoning of the court in Chatman. Because the

Constitution does not require any corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony,

California’s requirement that an accomplice’s testimony need only be “slight” does not

offend due process. As Respondent correctly argues, Petitioner is essentially seeking “to

raise the state-law requirement for corroboration of accomplice testimony to that of an

element of the crime, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But federal due process

was not offended by the state’s corroboration requirement.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 21:18-21.)9

Thus, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim of instructional error on direct

appeal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor was the decision “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ground Two of the Petition be

DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge William Q. Hayes under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the

9

 Petitioner’s reliance on various cases from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits are

unavailing. (See ECF No. 1 at 75:22-76:20.) Indeed, those cases addressed whether a

“slight evidence” jury instruction is proper in conspiracy cases. “The essential elements of conspiracy, which have been stated repeatedly in the decisions of [the Ninth Circuit], are ‘an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective coupled with one or more overt acts

in furtherance of the illegal purpose and the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense.’” United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 321 (9th Cir. 1977); United

States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d

109, 115 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 242 (9th Cir. 1979). While more than “slight evidence” is required to establish the agreement element of a conspiracy charge, as discussed herein, federal law does not require any evidence

corroborating an accomplice’s testimony. Thus, Petitioner’s reliance on conspiracy cases is misplaced.

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United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing

reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s habeas Petition be DENIED in its

entirety as he is not in custody in violation of any federal right. IT IS FURTHER

RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation and (2) directing that judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than May 1, 2014, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than May 15, 2014. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 1, 2014

DAVID H. BARTICK

United States Magistrate Judge

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