Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01306/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01306-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN E. KING,

Plaintiff,

v.

AARON ASHLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-1306 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a request for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 

302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

By order filed June 11, 2014, plaintiff was cautioned that his civil rights complaint failed 

to state a cognizable civil rights claim because it did not appear that the individuals named as 

defendants acted under color of state law. While this order was being processed, plaintiff filed a 

motion that was entered on the court’s electronic docket on June 10, 2014. In his motion, 

plaintiff asks the court to disregard or discard his original complaint, and to file three separate 

complaints in its place. 

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However, plaintiff’s three proposed complaints raise allegations stemming from an

incident that occurred on May 30, 2013. Plaintiff claims he had not committed any crime, was 

not loitering, and was not a threat to anyone. Specifically, in his first proposed complaint, 

plaintiff alleges that defendants Christopher Peterson and Aaron Ashley were employed as 

security guards with Cal Force Security on May 30, 2013. Plaintiff claims that he first noticed 

these defendants at the A.M./P.M. Mini Market on the corner of Mack Road and Alta Valley, 

when they told him to leave the market. Plaintiff left the market, and went in to Food Source at 

6366 Mack Road for a bite to eat. As plaintiff exited Food Source, he noticed defendant Peterson 

driving slowly while defendant Ashley was bending down walking to the side of the vehicle. 

When they saw plaintiff, defendant Peterson quickly exited his car, and both defendants began to 

run towards plaintiff. Defendant Ashley pulled his baton out and tried to hit plaintiff; plaintiff 

used his bike to shield the blows. When he saw defendant Peterson running after him, plaintiff 

threw his bike down and started running. When plaintiff reached the McDonalds in the Valley 

Mack parking lot, defendant Peterson fired his Taser, hitting plaintiff in the back. In fear for his 

life, plaintiff ran across the street to the Hawaiian Barbecue where two police officers responded 

to plaintiff’s distressed state, and placed him in their patrol car to protect him from the security 

guards. The police officers told the security guards to come across the street. A police report was 

taken and plaintiff was released.1 Plaintiff sought medical care, and claims he sustained injuries 

to his lower back, shoulder, and right leg, and his blood pressure was dangerously elevated.

Plaintiff raises the same allegations in his second and third proposed complaints, but 

names the owners of Cal Force Security, and asks the court to find the address of the owner of 

Cal Force Security because plaintiff is incarcerated and has no access to a phone or computer.

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 It is unclear on what basis a police report issued, or who was cited. It appears that plaintiff was 

subsequently incarcerated, but it is also unclear whether there is a connection between the 

incarceration and the May 30, 2013 incident. Accordingly, the court cannot determine whether 

plaintiff’s excessive force claim may be impacted by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 

(1944) (a plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 suit for damages if success on the § 1983 claim 

would “necessarily imply” the invalidity of a related prior criminal conviction, such as by 

negating an element of the convicted offense.)

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First, plaintiff is advised that all allegations arising from the same course of conduct must 

be brought in one action. Plaintiff must name all relevant parties, and must include all alleged 

causes of action stemming from the May 30, 2013 incident, in one complaint. Thus, plaintiff’s 

request to file the three separate complaints arising from the same incident is denied.

Second, plaintiff’s proposed complaints suffer from the same defects noted in this court’s 

June 11, 2014 order. Although plaintiff now claims that the two security guards used excessive

force, plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that the named defendants, private security guards,

were acting under color of state law. 

To state a claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a constitutional 

right under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). An 

individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish that defendant’s 

personal involvement in some constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between the 

defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978); see 

also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (person deprives another of constitutional 

right if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an 

act which he is legally required to do that causes deprivation of which plaintiff complains) 

(citation omitted). Supervisory personnel generally are not liable for civil rights violations on any 

theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability in the absence of law imposing such liability. 

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991)2, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 

1074 (1992); Hansen, 885 F.2d at 645-46. A supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of a 

subordinate only “if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

“Generally, the acts of private security guards, hired by a store, do not constitute state 

action under § 1983.” Josey v. Filene's, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 9, 16 (D.Conn. 2002) (citing Harris 

v. Security Co. of 1370 Sixth Avenue, 1996 WL 556927, *2 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); Moher v. Stop & 

 

2

 Redman was abrogated in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

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Shop Cos., Inc., 580 F.Supp. 723 (D. Conn.1984)); Bishop v. Toys “R” Us-NY LLC, 414 

F.Supp.2d 385, 396-97 (S.D. N.Y. 2006). Private individuals and entities not affiliated with a 

state or municipal government generally do not act “under color of state law.” See Florer v.

Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We start with the 

presumption that conduct by private actors is not state action.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 

132 S. Ct. 1000 (2012); Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[P]rivate 

parties are not generally acting under color of state law.”), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992). 

While such private parties may a cause a deprivation of a constitutional right, they are not subject 

to Section 1983 liability unless (1) they acted under color of law, and (2) their conduct was 

properly attributable to the government. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156

(1978); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 134-36 (9th Cir. 1971) 

(violations of certain constitutional rights actionable under federal law only when accomplished 

by one who is clothed with authority of state and purporting to act thereunder) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 

(1982) (private corporation does not act under color of law unless its actions are fairly attributable 

to the government).

The actions of a private individual or entity may properly be attributed to the government 

for purposes of Section 1983 if at the time of an alleged constitutional violation (1) the private 

actor was performing a public function; (2) the private actor was engaged in joint activity with the 

government; (3) the private party acted under governmental compulsion or coercion; or (4) there 

was a sufficient nexus between the government and the private actor. Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 

1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing “at least four . . . tests” for determining whether private 

conduct amounts to state action) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has the burden 

to establish state action under one of the foregoing tests. Florer, 639 F.3d at 922 (citation 

omitted); see also Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1092 (“Satisfaction of any one test is sufficient to find state 

action, so long as no countervailing factor exists.”) (citation omitted).

Here, plaintiff sets forth no facts demonstrating that the private security guards acted 

under color of state law. 

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Third, in his second and third proposed complaints, plaintiff names the “owners of Cal 

Force Security,” a private company, as a defendant. Plaintiff alleges that the owners of Cal Force 

Security, based on negligent policy and procedure, hired armed security guards with incompetent 

and inadequate training, and are responsible for who they hire. 

However, even when a private entity, such as Cal Force Security, acts “under color of 

state law,” it cannot be held liable under Section 1983 unless the entity itself caused plaintiff's 

injuries -- i.e., the alleged wrongdoing was committed pursuant to “a policy, decision, or custom 

promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.” White v. Golden State Eye Center, 2009 WL 

817937, *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009) (citations omitted); see also Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1993) (“a corporation acting under color of state law will only be 

held liable under § 1983 for its own unconstitutional policies” -- i.e., “a policy, custom or action 

by those who represent [the private entity's] official policy that inflicts injury actionable under 

§ 1983”) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 

690, 694 (1978)).

Moreover, section 1983 liability against a private entity cannot be based solely on 

respondeat superior, i.e., vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of the entity’s employees.

White, 2009 WL 817937 at *3 (citations omitted); Warwick v. University of the Pacific, 2010 

WL 2680817, *8 n.11 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (citing cases), motion for relief from judgment 

denied, 2011 WL 5573939 (N.D. Cal. Nov.15, 2011). A private employer is liable only “when 

the employer is the driving force behind the constitutional violations alleged against its 

employees, who are operating as state actors.” Stanley v. Goodwin, 475 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1038 

(D. Haw. 2006), aff’d, 262 Fed. Appx. 786 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, plaintiff again fails to establish that the owners of Cal Force Security were acting 

under color of state law. Bald allegations regarding policies or instructions are insufficient. If 

plaintiff can allege facts meeting the above standards as to Cal Force Security, plaintiff must set 

forth such allegations within one amended complaint. 

Fourth, plaintiff appended the civil cover sheet, his application to proceed in forma 

pauperis, inmate trust account statement, the notice of lawsuit and request to waive summons, and 

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a proof of service3to each of his proposed complaints. Plaintiff is advised that he is not required 

to append such documents to his amended complaint. Plaintiff should file one amended 

complaint without attachments. 

Finally, in his motion, plaintiff also asks the court whether his proposed complaints were 

timely filed, and if they were not, to notify plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed that the court does not 

issue advisory opinions or provide legal advice.4

In light of the above, plaintiff’s motion to dismiss is partially granted. Plaintiff’s original 

complaint is dismissed, and plaintiff is granted leave to file one amended complaint, provided he 

can demonstrate that defendants acted under color of state law. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless 

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed 

deprivation. Id.; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation 

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. 

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original 

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

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 Once defendants are served with process and appear in the action, plaintiff is then required to 

provide a proof of service confirming he served defendants or their attorney of record with 

plaintiff’s filing.

4

 Plaintiff also asks the court to locate the owners’ names and addresses. Plaintiff is advised that 

the court does not investigate for any party. Despite plaintiff’s incarceration, he is responsible for 

diligently prosecuting his case.

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original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith. 

3. Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 4) is partially granted.

4. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

5. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of 

this action.

Dated: July 23, 2014

king1306.14

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN E. KING,

Plaintiff,

v.

AARON ASHLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-1306 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order 

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

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