Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00803/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00803-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL M. SOARES,

CDCR #F-39579, Civil No. 13cv0803 BTM (WMc)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO STAY 

(ECF Doc. No. 11)

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

CONCESSION OF FAILURE TO

EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES PRIOR TO SUIT

PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

AND

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS AS MOOT

(ECF Doc. Nos. 10, 16)

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden; 

G. STRATTON, Assoc. Warden; 

M. FLYNN, Correctional Counselor; 

JAN HANSSON, Psychiatrist; 

EMMA PHAN, Psychologist,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility

(“RJD”) in San Diego, California, initiated this civil action by filing a letter addressed to the

Honorable Thelton E. Henderson in the Northern District of California on March 30, 2013 (ECF

Doc. No. 1). 

Because Plaintiff’s letter alleged that he had been involuntarily transferred without due

process from RJD to Atascadero State Hospital (“ASH”) based on false claims of mental illness,

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Judge Henderson found venue properly lay in the Southern District ofCalifornia, and transferred

the case here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 84(b), 1391(b) and 1406(a). See Order of Transfer (ECF

Doc. No. 4) at 1-2.

Once the case was transferred here, Plaintiffsought and was granted an extension of time

in which to file a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF Doc. Nos. 7, 8). On April

23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a formal Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF Doc. No. 9), a

Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 10), and a Motion to Stay the proceedings “until exhaustion 1

of administrative remed[ies].” See ECF Doc. No. 11 at 2. On July 14, 2013, Plaintiff also

submitted a “Motion for Order Requiring Response” in which he requested a Court order

compelling Defendants to “respond to [his] administrative [CDC] 602 appeal (Log #RJD HC

13047781) or in the alternative, allow [him] to proceed [with his] complaint under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See ECF Doc. No. 18 at 1. On July 23, 2013, however, Plaintiff submitted a letter to

the Court requesting withdrawal of his July 14, 2013 Motion because he had, on July 21, 2013

“received a [2d level] response to [his] administrative appeal and will be submitting this matter

to the third (and final) level in Sacramento.” See ECF Doc. No. 20.

I. SCREENING AND DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), “the court shall review, ... as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a

civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee

of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “On review, the court shall identify

cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1)

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). “Among

other reforms, the PLRA mandates early judicial screening ... and requires prisoners to exhaust

prison grievance procedures before filing suit.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007).

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), the Court has

reviewed his Complaint pursuant to § 1915A(a), as well as his Motions for Stay, and for an

 Plaintiff filed a second Motion to Proceed IFP on May 23, 2013 (ECF Doc. No. 16).

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Order Requiring Response, and all exhibits attached thereto, and finds it clear Plaintiff’s case

must be dismissed because he has conceded his failure to exhaust all available administrative

remedies prior to commencing this action. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (noting that “[a]

prisoner’s concession to non-exhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal.”)

The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The requirement is mandatory

and unequivocal. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute making exhaustion a

precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes exhaustion a precondition to

suit.” ). 

A prisoner who seeks to challenge the conditions of his confinement brings an action for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e “when the complaint is tendered to the district clerk.” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a prisoner must exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing any papers in federal court and is not entitled to a stay of

judicial proceedings in order to exhaust. Id. at 1051; McKinney, 311 F.3d 1198 (rejection 2

prisoner’s claim that the court should have entered a stay which would have provided an

opportunity for exhaustion, and concluding that “[e]xhaustion subsequent to the filing of suit

will not suffice.”). See also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2010)

(clarifying that the rule of Vaden and McKinney does not apply to new claims raised in a

supplemental pleading, permitted by the Court pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 15(d), which permits

the party to allege new claims arising after the date the initial pleadings were filed).

/ / /

Prior to amendment by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e authorized district courts to stay a state 2

prisoner’s § 1983 action “for a period of not to exceed 180 days” while he exhausted available “plain,

speedy, and effective administrative remedies.” § 1997e(a)(1). See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,

522-23 (2002). “Exhaustion ... was in large part discretionary; it could be ordered only if the State’s

prison grievance system met specified federal standards, and even then, only if, in the particular case,

the court believed the requirement “appropriate and in the interests of justice.” Id. at 523 (citing 42

U.S.C. §§ 1997e(a) and (b)).

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The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal

administratively “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its

staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or

her health, safety, or welfare.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust

available administrative remedies within this system prior to January 28, 2011, a prisoner had

to proceed through four levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, which required a prisoner to

submit a CDC 602 inmate appeal form(captioned “Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form”); (2) first level

formal written appeal; (3) second level written appeal to the institution head or designee; and (4)

third level written appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85–86 (2006); see also CAL.

CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1–3084.9. A final decision from the Director’s level of review

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satisfies the exhaustion requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d

1164, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2005); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.7(d)(3) (as amended

Dec. 13, 2010).

In the sworn Declaration Plaintiff proffers in support of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges

his due process rights were violated in November 2012 when he was “brought before a Vitek

committee for consideration of a transfer to a mental hospital,” but was not provided “prior

written notice,” “any written disclosure ... as to the evidence or reasons why [he] was being

considered for transfer,” or an “independent or qualified person to act in [his] best interest at

th[e] hearing.” (ECF Doc. No. 9 at 5.) 

In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-96 (1980), the Supreme Court held that an

involuntary transfer of a state prisoner to a state mental hospital implicated his liberty interests

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sufficient to require certain

procedural safeguards prior to transfer. Id. 

They include: 

... written notice to the prisoner that a transfer to a mental hospital

is being considered; [] a hearing, sufficiently after the notice to

Effective January 28, 2011, the informal resolution level was eliminated. See CAL. CODE

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REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.7 (as amended Dec. 13, 2010).

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permit the prisoner to prepare, at which disclosure to the prisoner

is made of the evidence being relied upon for the transfer and at

which an opportunity to be heard in person and to present

documentary evidence is given; ... [a]n opportunity at the hearing to

present testimony of witnesses by the defense and to confront and

cross-examine witnesses called by the state, except upon a finding,

not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting such

presentation, confrontation, or cross-examination; ...“[a]n

independent decision-maker; and ... [a] written statement by the

factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for

transferring the inmate.

Id. at 494-95.4

At the same time, however, when asked on his form Complaint whether “the last level

to which [he] appealed [his administrative remedies] [was] the highest level of appeal available,”

(Compl. at 2), Plaintiff has checked the “No” box, explaining that “Defendants have not

answered any of [his] appeals or requests in this matter,” and referring the Court to his sworn

Declaration and his own Exhibit D. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff’s Exhibit D is comprised of what

appear to be several separate CDCR Form 602 grievances and responses, each identified with

“Tracking/Log #RJD HC 13047781,” and dated at various times ranging from January 11, 2013

through March 29, 2013. In his Declaration, Plaintiff admits to have initiated the administrative

Pursuant to Vitek, CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3369.1(a) provides that California inmates 4

“considered for placement in a Department of Mental Health hospital pursuant to Penal Code section

2684 shall be informed of their rights to a hearing on the placement and to waive such a hearing.” Id.

Unless inmates waive the hearing, or require emergency psychiatric hospitalization, they are provided:

(1) A written notice of the placement hearing at least 72 hours

prior to the hearing.

(2) An independent and qualified staff member to assist the inmate

with their preparation for the hearing. Any costs or expenses

incurred related to independent assistance obtained by the inmate

on their own shall be the sole responsibility of the inmate.

(3) An opportunity to present documentary evidence and the oral

or written testimony of witnesses, and to refute evidence and crossexamine witnesses unless the hearing officer indicates a good cause

for prohibiting such evidence or witnesses.

(4) A hearing officer who shall be the institution head or a

designee, which shall be a correctional administrator, physician,

psychiatrist, or psychologist who is not involved with treating the

inmate.

(5) A copy of the written decision within 72 hours after the

hearing, which shall include the reason for the decision and the

evidence, relied upon in making the decision.

CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3369.1(a) (1)-(5).

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appeal process “without response,” and asks the Court to “Order the Defendants to answer

Appeal Log. No. RJD HC 13047781.” See Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Claim (Compl. at 9).

In his Motion to Stay, Plaintiff also refers to the sworn Declaration attached to his

Complaint, as well as his Exhibit D, and claims that while he “had filed three administrative

appeals,” prison officials had “screen[ed] [them] out.” See Pl.’s Mot. (ECF Doc. No. 11) at 1-2. 

Plaintiff requests a stay, however, because on April 8, 2013, he received a “First Level HC

Appeal” Notice as to Appeal Log # RJD HC 13047781, which indicated that his appeal had, in

fact, been “assigned to the Health Care Appeals Office for [a] response,” which was due byMay

6, 2013. Id. In his later letter to the Court, filed on July 25, 2013, Plaintiff makes clear that as

ofJuly 21, 2013, he had since received a Second Level Response to Log No. RJD HC 13047781,

and “will be submitting this matter to the Third (and final) level in Sacramento.” (ECF Doc. No.

20 at 1.)

Based on these submissions and Plaintiff’s own sworn allegations, the Court finds that

he has conceded his failure to exhaust all administrative remedies as available pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) prior to initiating this suit. See Vaden, 499 F.3d at 1051; Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1120. The “exhaustion requirement does not allow a prisoner to file a complaint addressing

non-exhausted claims, even if the prisoner exhausts his administrative remedies while his case

is pending.” Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004 (citing McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Staymust be denied and this action must be dismissed

without prejudice to Plaintiff re-filing a new and separate civil action after he has fully complied

with 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(a)’s exhaustion mandate. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (a dismissal for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies is without prejudice).

II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay (ECF Doc. No. 11) is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice based on his conceded failure

to exhaust administrative remedies prior to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a);

/ / /

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3. Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. Nos. 10, 16) are DENIED as moot;

and

4. The Clerk ofCourt shall enter a final dismissal ofthis action without prejudice and

close the case.

DATED: September 12, 2013

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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