Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02389/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02389-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEVIN E. GILMORE, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a 

national bank; NDEX WEST, LLC, a 

Delaware limited liability 

company; and DOES 1-10, 

inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

________________________________/ 

No. C 14-2389 CW 

ORDER GRANTING 

WELLS FARGO’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(Docket No. 80) 

 

Plaintiff Kevin E. Gilmore asserts various mortgage-related 

claims against Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, NA and NDEX West, 

LLC.1 Wells Fargo moves for summary judgment. Docket No. 80. 

Plaintiff has opposed the motion in pro per and Wells Fargo has 

replied. The Court took the motion under submission on the 

papers. Having considered the arguments presented by the parties, 

the Court GRANTS Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

The following facts are undisputed unless noted. 

In 2007, Plaintiff inherited from his grandfather the 

property at issue, located at 955 Virginia Street, Berkeley, 

California. On June 21, 2007, he took out a loan secured by a 

 1 Based on the parties' stipulation, the Court ordered that 

NDEX West, LLC "shall be deemed a nominal party to this action" 

and "shall not be required to actively participate in further 

proceedings in the action." Docket No. 52 at 2. 

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promissory note in the principal sum of $375,000 to World Savings 

Bank, FSB. Through a series of mergers, the servicing of his loan 

was transferred to Wachovia Bank and then to Wells Fargo. 

In 2010, Plaintiff became delinquent on his loan. From 2011 

to 2013, he submitted a number of applications seeking loan 

modifications. Each one was denied, almost always due to 

insufficient documents. In October 2013, Plaintiff submitted a 

loan modification application. In November 2013, that application 

was denied due to his excessive financial obligations. 

In February 2014, Wells Fargo invited Plaintiff to attend a 

home preservation workshop to be held on March 12, 2014. On March 

11, 2014, Plaintiff spoke to Sarah Nuncio, a Wells Fargo employee 

who stated that the point of the phone call was to make sure 

Plaintiff could “go to the workshop and that [he could] walk away 

with a decision.” Bailey Decl., Ex. 15, Call Tr. 3:13-18. Ms. 

Nuncio informed Plaintiff that he needed to bring: (1) evidence of 

the sources of incomes that contributed to the household, 

including a Form 1099 (self-employment) for co-habitant Kathryn 

Stepanski; (2) Plaintiff’s and Ms. Stepanski’s profit and loss 

statements for the prior ninety days or twelve months; (3) at 

least two bank statements from both Plaintiff and Ms. Stepanski 

that matched the profit and loss statements; (4) a 2012 tax return 

for Ms. Stepanski, including all schedules; (5) a non-borrower 

occupancy form for Ms. Stepanski; and (6) a utility bill, bank 

statement or car insurance statement that showed Ms. Stepanski 

lived at the property. See id. at 11:12-38:6. Ms. Nuncio stated 

that, after the call, she would send Plaintiff "an email package." 

Id. at 26:16-24. 

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On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff attended the home preservation 

workshop and submitted documentation in support of a loan 

modification application to one of Wells Fargo’s representatives. 

The next day, on March 13, 2014, Wells Fargo filed a Notice of 

Trustee’s Sale on the property. Wells Fargo presents evidence 

that the application was incomplete, including internal logs 

reflecting missing documents. Plaintiff presents no evidence 

demonstrating that he in fact submitted these documents. 

Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on May 23, 2014. 

On July 29, 2014, this Court granted Plaintiff a preliminary 

injunction, preventing Wells Fargo from continuing foreclosure 

proceedings due to a likely violation of the dual-tracking 

provision of the Homeowners Bill of Rights (HBOR), California 

Civil Code section 2923.6. Wells Fargo appealed that ruling to 

the Ninth Circuit, which ordered mediation. As a result of the 

mediation, in September 2014, Plaintiff’s former counsel, on 

behalf of Plaintiff, submitted all the documentation required by 

Wells Fargo to comprise a completed loan modification application. 

Wells Fargo denied that application in October 2014. Plaintiff 

appealed, and Wells Fargo denied the appeal on November 10, 2014. 

 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint included five causes of 

action: (1) violation of the HBOR; (2) a request to void the 

Notice of Trustee’s Sale; (3) negligence; (4) negligent 

misrepresentation; and (5) fraud. Wells Fargo was granted 

judgment on the pleadings on the second, fourth and fifth causes 

of action. Wells Fargo now moves for summary judgment on the 

remaining causes of action for a violation of the HBOR and 

negligence. 

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LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and 

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the 

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is 

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no 

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as 

true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or 

other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 

815 F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 

F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment 

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the 

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which 

facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). 

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on 

an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of 

production by either of two methods: 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, 

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that 

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 

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essential element of its claim or defense to carry its 

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 

1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an 

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or 

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the 

absence of a material fact on such issues, or to support its 

motion with evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; 

see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); 

Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

the moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving 

party to produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or 

admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” 

Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an 

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it 

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210 

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the 

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific 

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id. 

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of 

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no 

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. 

Id. This is true even though the non-moving party bears the 

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107. 

// 

// 

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ANALYSIS 

I. First Cause of Action: Violation of the Homeowners Bill of 

 Rights, California Civil Code section 2923.6 

 Wells Fargo moves for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s 

HBOR cause of action. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

that Wells Fargo violated the HBOR’s dual-tracking prohibition, 

whereby a lender cannot simultaneously pursue foreclosure while 

also considering a borrower for a loan modification. Cal. Civ. 

Code § 2923.6. Wells Fargo makes four arguments for summary 

adjudication in its favor. First, it argues that, because the 

property at issue is not “owner-occupied,” the HBOR’s prohibition 

on dual-tracking does not apply. Second, it argues that Plaintiff 

cannot establish that he had a completed loan modification 

application pending at the time Wells Fargo pursued foreclosure. 

Third, it argues that it was under no obligation to continue to 

consider Plaintiff’s multiple loan modification applications 

because he did not establish a material change in his financial 

circumstances. Fourth, it argues that, even if it violated the 

HBOR, the only remedy available is an injunction until the 

violation is cured. Wells Fargo argues that the violation has 

been cured and, thus, Plaintiff’s claim is moot. 

A. “Owner-occupied” 

Wells Fargo argues that the HBOR only applies to “owneroccupied” properties, and that Plaintiff was not living on the 

property at the time of the alleged violation. 

California Civil Code section 2924.15(a) provides, 

Unless otherwise provided . . . Section[] . . . 2923.6 shall 

apply only to first lien mortgages or deeds of trust that are 

secured by owner-occupied residential real property 

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containing no more than four dwelling units. For these 

purposes, “owner-occupied” means that the property is the 

principal residence of the borrower and is security for a 

loan made for personal, family, or household purposes. 

Failure to establish owner-occupancy at the time of the alleged 

violation is fatal to an HBOR violation. See Patel v. U.S. Bank, 

N.A., 2013 WL 3770836 at *6 (N.D. Cal.)(“These requirements, 

however, only apply to property that is owner-occupied. The 

Patels do not allege that the Property is ‘owner-occupied,’ as 

defined by the statute. Their claim fails as a result”). 

Plaintiff admitted that, as of March 30, 2015, no one was 

living at the property. See Declaration of Robert Bailey (Bailey 

Decl.) Ex. 7, Depo. 37:21-38:4. When asked what was the last date 

anyone resided at the property, Plaintiff responded, “Due to the 

City’s ordinance . . . [n]o one’s occupied the property until the 

permit expired. I can’t tell you when exactly it expired[.]” Id. 

at 38:7-11. Plaintiff went on to explain that there are two 

buildings on the property, and while no one has lived in either 

building for at least two years, he had lived on the property in a 

camper parked in the driveway, or in a tent in the front and back 

yards. See id. at 44:7-45:12. However, he also admitted that he 

owned another home where his girlfriend and children live. See 

id. at 46:17-47:3. 

Plaintiff supports his contention that the property was 

owner-occupied with various documents showing that he was issued 

owner-builder permits and a homestead exemption for the 

properties. See Declaration of Kathryn Stepanski (Stepanski 

Decl.) Ex. H at 24-25; Declaration of Kevin Gilmore (Gilmore 

Decl.) Ex. I. However, as Wells Fargo points out, these documents 

are not evidence that Plaintiff lived at the home on March 13, 

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2014, and Plaintiff does not himself state that he lived on the 

property on that date. 

As noted above, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, 

Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts showing there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Plaintiff 

fails to do so. While the Court must draw any reasonable 

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, it is undisputed that no one was 

living in the home on the date of the alleged violation, even if 

Plaintiff was sleeping on the property. In fact, Plaintiff 

admitted that no one had lived in the home for at least two years 

prior to March 30, 2015. While Plaintiff claims to live on the 

property in a camper or in a tent, it would be an unreasonable 

inference that the camper or tent served as his primary residence 

when his girlfriend and children live in another home that is 

owned by Plaintiff. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to present “evidence 

from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor,” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 257, to rebut Wells Fargo’s contention that the home 

is not owner-occupied, Wells Fargo is entitled to summary 

adjudication on this cause of action. 

B. Completed loan modification application 

Even if Plaintiff’s HBOR cause of action did not fail because 

the property was not owner-occupied, Wells Fargo argues that 

Plaintiff did not have a complete loan modification pending on 

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March 13, 2014 that would have precluded it from commencing 

foreclosure proceedings.2

California Civil Code subsections 2923.6(c) and (h) provide, 

(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first 

lien loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s 

mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer . . . shall not record 

a notice of default or notice of sale, or conduct a trustee’s 

sale, while the complete first lien loan modification 

application is pending . . . (h) For purposes of this 

section, an application shall be deemed “complete” when a 

borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all 

documents required by the mortgage servicer within the 

reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer. 

 Plaintiff appears to challenge Wells Fargo’s documentation 

requirements, stating that it is not the servicer that should 

determine what documents are required for a loan modification 

application, but rather that “congressional legislation determines 

what is required for a federally funded homeowner assistance 

program.” Pl.’s Opp., Docket No. 84 at 7. Plaintiff cites only a 

petition for writ of certiorari to support his assertion, which 

directly conflicts with the plain language of section 2923.6(h). 

Thus, Plaintiff was required to comply with the documentation 

request in order for his application to be considered complete. 

 Plaintiff provides no evidence that he provided the required 

documentation Ms. Nuncio described. Rather than provide such 

evidence, he alleges that Wells Fargo did not establish that his 

modification application was incomplete until the next day. Thus, 

he concludes, the Notice of Sale that was recorded on March 13, 

 2 In earlier stages of this litigation Plaintiff alleged that 

he had completed applications to Wells Fargo prior to March 13, 

2014. 

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2014 violated the HBOR because Wells Fargo cannot establish that 

he did not have a complete application at that time. 

 Plaintiff’s argument is unconvincing. Plaintiff points to 

Wells Fargo’s March 2014 internal log of activity on his account 

as evidence that his loan application was complete on March 12, 

2014. He states that “Wells Fargo only deemed [his] loan 

[modification application] incomplete because [Wells Fargo] had 

yet to request non-borrower Kathryn Stepanski’s credit score and 

for [Wells Fargo] to conduct an appraisal.” Id. at 8. However, 

Plaintiff ignores the multiple line items in the same log which 

show that, on March 12, 2014, Wells Fargo tagged his account as 

having “MISSING INCOME DOCUMENTATION.” Declaration of Cynthia Sue 

Turner (Turner Decl.) Ex. 15. In addition, as Wells Fargo points 

out, Plaintiff relies on the phrase “CBR non borrower” to conclude 

that Wells Fargo was missing credit report information from Ms. 

Stepanski, information that was its responsibility to acquire. 

Plaintiff provides no factual support for this assertion. 

 Subsequent line items on the internal log indicate that Wells 

Fargo never considered the application to be complete. On March 

13, 2014 at 5:45 p.m., the log stated: "Loan moving to Incomplete 

Documents." Id. On March 24, 2014 at 5:46 p.m., the log 

indicates that Plaintiff had not provided proof of occupancy for 

Ms. Stepanski, and that the profit and loss statement he provided 

for himself reflected only seventy-one days, instead of the ninety 

days that was required. Id. He claims that he “provided a 90 day 

profit and loss statement at [the workshop] and a Wells Fargo 

representative requested changes to that statement, which were 

made and approved at the workshop.” Pl.’s Opp at 8. His evidence 

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is a copy of the statement he provided to Wells Fargo, which 

includes hand-written corrections on a document purporting to 

contain income information for January 1, 2014 through March 31, 

2014. Gilmore Decl. Ex. K. However, Plaintiff signed and dated 

the form on March 12, 2014, the date of the workshop. Id. This 

document cannot reflect ninety days of profits and losses ending 

on March 31, 2014 because Plaintiff executed the document nearly 

three weeks early. Similarly, nothing in the document suggests 

that March 12 is the end of a different ninety-day period; such a 

period would have begun in December 2013, not on January 1, 2014, 

as the document indicates. See id. Thus, Plaintiff has not 

provided any evidence that, on March 12, 2014, he submitted all of 

the documents required by Wells Fargo for a complete loan 

modification application. 

 As noted above, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, 

Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts showing there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. He fails to 

do so. Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to present “evidence 

from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor” to rebut 

Wells Fargo’s evidence that he did not have a complete loan 

modification application pending at the time it recorded the 

notice of sale, Wells Fargo is entitled to summary adjudication on 

this cause of action for this reason as well.

 C. Material changes in financial circumstances 

 Next, Wells Fargo argues that even if Plaintiff had submitted 

a complete loan modification application at the March 12, 2014 

workshop, it was under no obligation to consider it because 

Plaintiff did not submit documentation of a material change in his 

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financial circumstances since Wells Fargo denied his loan 

modification application in November 2013. 

 California Civil Code section 2923.6(g) provides, 

In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting 

multiple applications for first lien loan modifications for 

the purpose of delay, the mortgage servicer shall not be 

obligated to evaluate applications from borrowers who have 

already been evaluated or afforded a fair opportunity to be 

evaluated for a first lien loan modification . . . unless 

there has been a material change in the borrower’s financial 

circumstances since the date of the borrower’s previous 

application and that change is documented by the borrower and 

submitted to the mortgage servicer. 

Plaintiff claims that he demonstrated a material change in 

his financial circumstances by including Ms. Stepanski as a nonborrower occupant who contributed income to the household. He 

also claims that he provided a “6 month Profit & Loss submitted in 

October 2013 . . . [and] that document included a one time, 

uncharacteristic influx of funds into [his] sole proprietorship.” 

Pl.’s Opp. at 8. 

Plaintiff’s claims are unsubstantiated. As discussed above, 

while Plaintiff provides copies of documents signed by Ms. 

Stepanski allowing Wells Fargo to obtain copies of her credit and 

tax information, Plaintiff never provided documentation to confirm 

that Ms. Stepanski resided at the property. Indeed, in the 

documents Ms. Stepanski signed, she listed her address as 1646 

Fifth Street, Berkeley, California, not the Virginia Street 

address. See Stepanski Decl. Ex. B. Furthermore, Plaintiff does 

not include in his opposition any bank statements or financial 

information for Ms. Stepanski to show that she had any income to 

contribute. In addition, he fails to provide the six-month profit 

and loss statement that he claims showed an increase in his 

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business profits. Indeed, Wells Fargo provides a copy of 

Plaintiff’s bank statements that show a decrease in his revenue 

for the first quarter of 2014 as compared to the last quarter of 

2013. See Bailey Decl. Ex. 10. 

As noted above, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, 

Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts showing there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. He fails to 

do so. Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to present “evidence 

from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor” to rebut 

Wells Fargo’s contention that Plaintiff did not experience a 

material change in financial circumstances that was documented and 

disclosed to Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo is entitled to summary 

adjudication on this cause of action for this reason as well. 

D. Claim is moot 

Wells Fargo argues that even if Plaintiff’s HBOR cause of 

action did not fail for the reasons discussed above, the claim 

fails because it has conducted a subsequent review of Plaintiff’s 

loan modification eligibility, thereby curing the alleged 

violation. In addition, it claims that the Notice of Trustee’s 

Sale recorded on March 13, 2014 is no longer valid, so the claim 

is moot for that reason as well. 

 1. Subsequent review 

California Civil Code section 2924.12 provides, in relevant 

part, 

(a)(1) If a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a 

borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin 

a material violation of Section . . . 2923.6. (2) Any 

injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall 

be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage 

servicer . . . has corrected and remedied the violation or 

violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief. 

An enjoined entity may move to dissolve an injunction based 

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on a showing that the material violation has been corrected 

and remedied. . . . (c) A mortgage servicer . . . shall not 

be liable for any violation that it has corrected and 

remedied prior to the recordation of a trustee’s deed upon 

sale[.] 

In its July 29, 2014 order, the Court found that Plaintiff 

had satisfied the factors identified in Winter v. Natural Res. 

Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008), for a preliminary 

injunction against Wells Fargo. See Docket No. 44 at 14. In that 

order, the Court stated that it appeared that Plaintiff had never 

been provided a final rejection of his completed loan modification 

application, and that there were “serious questions going to 

whether [Plaintiff] completed his loan modification application.” 

Id. at 12. Thus, the Court reasoned that, because one of the 

goals of the HBOR was to allow borrowers to receive “a meaningful 

and clear review of their loan modification applications,” an 

injunction should issue. Id. at 15. 

 Wells Fargo now provides evidence that Plaintiff has 

received a review of an application it deems to be complete. It 

provides copies of emails sent between Plaintiff’s former counsel, 

David Pivtorak, and Wells Fargo’s counsel, Robert Bailey, in 

September, October and November 2014. See Bailey Decl. Ex. 1-4. 

On September 11, 2014, Mr. Pivtorak emailed “the completed 

application,” with the documents requested, to Mr. Bailey. On 

September 23, 2014, Mr. Bailey requested additional documents, 

which Mr. Pivtorak provided on September 25 and September 29, 

2014. On October 17, 2014, Mr. Bailey forwarded an email from 

Wells Fargo to Mr. Pivtorak with copies of the letters denying 

Plaintiff’s loan modification application. On November 3, 2014, 

Mr. Pivtorak emailed documents to Mr. Bailey purporting to appeal 

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Wells Fargo’s denial of Plaintiff’s loan modification application. 

On November 17, 2014, Mr. Bailey forwarded to Mr. Pivtorak a copy 

of Wells Fargo’s denial of Plaintiff’s appeal. 

Plaintiff argues that he was not aware that the information 

sent by Mr. Pivtorak to Mr. Bailey was for the purpose of 

reviewing a loan modification application. Instead, he claims, he 

believed the documents he provided to Mr. Pivtorak were simply to 

inform Wells Fargo of his financial circumstances. Nonetheless, 

Plaintiff does not contest that he has received a loan 

modification application review and a denial of that application. 

Thus, Wells Fargo has demonstrated that, even if a violation did 

occur, any material violation has been corrected and remedied. 

See Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.12(a)(2). Plaintiff does not allege 

that a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded. Wells Fargo 

cannot be held liable for “any violation that it has corrected and 

remedied prior to the recordation of a trustee’s deed upon sale.” 

Id. § 2924.12(c). 

Because Plaintiff fails to present “evidence from which a 

jury might return a verdict in his favor” to rebut Wells Fargo’s 

contention that any HBOR violation has been remedied and, thus, is 

moot, Wells Fargo is entitled to summary adjudication on this 

cause of action for this reason as well. 

 2. No pending notice of trustee’s sale 

Wells Fargo argues a second ground for mootness of 

Plaintiff's HBOR claim in that the notice of trustee’s sale in 

this case is no longer in effect, because it was recorded more 

than one year ago and no foreclosure is scheduled. Without a 

recorded notice of sale, the HBOR does not apply. 

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California Civil Code section 2924g(c)(2) provides, “In the 

event that the sale proceedings are postponed for a period or 

periods totaling more than 365 days, the scheduling of any further 

sale proceedings shall be preceded by giving a new notice of 

sale[.]” Thus, the notice of sale recorded on March 13, 2014 was 

ineffective as of March 13, 2015. Plaintiff does not contest this 

fact, or allege that a new notice of trustee’s sale has been 

recorded. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to present “evidence 

from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor” to rebut 

Wells Fargo’s contention that notice of trustee’s sale is 

ineffective and a new notice has not been recorded, Wells Fargo is 

entitled to summary adjudication on this cause of action for this 

reason as well. 

E. Conclusion 

For all the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to 

identify any disputed issues of material fact preventing summary 

adjudication of his HBOR cause of action. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Wells Fargo’s motion for summary adjudication on this 

claim. 

II. Third Cause of Action: Negligence 

 Wells Fargo moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s 

negligence claim. 

 “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a 

legal duty to use reasonable care, (2) breach of that duty, and 

(3) proximate cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff’s 

injury.” Mendoza v. City of L.A., 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1339 

(1998) (citation omitted). 

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 A. Duty of Care 

 “The threshold element of a cause of action for negligence is 

the existence of a duty to use due care.” Paz v. State of Cal., 

22 Cal. 4th 550, 559 (2000) (citing Artiglio v. Corning Inc., 18 

Cal. 4th 604, 614 (1998)). On December 16, 2014, the Court denied 

Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim. See 

Docket No. 56 at 21. Based on the factors identified in Biakanja 

v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650 (1958), and adopted in Nymark v. 

Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 23 Cal. App. 3d 1089 (1991), the 

Court was persuaded that Plaintiff had adequately plead 

the allegation that Wells Fargo owed him a duty to process 

his loan modification with reasonable care. The loan 

modification application process was intended to affect 

Plaintiff. It was foreseeable that harm would occur to 

Plaintiff if his loan modification materials and application 

were not properly routed. Wells Fargo knew, with certainty, 

that if Plaintiff’s application was not properly handled, he 

would not receive a modification and, thus, would lose his 

home. Furthermore, recent national and state legislation 

proscribing dual-tracking and requiring standard foreclosure 

procedures confirms that policy considerations weigh toward 

ensuring that loan modification applications are processed 

with care prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings. 

Although Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support imputing 

any moral blame to Wells Fargo, the other factors weigh 

heavily toward finding that Plaintiff has adequately alleged 

that Wells Fargo owed him a duty of care in processing his 

loan modification application. 

Id. 

 In the current motion, Wells Fargo argues that the Court 

should not have applied the Biakanja factors because those factors 

only apply when a bank and a borrower are not in privity of 

contract at the time of the alleged conduct. Mot. Summ. J. at 15. 

 The Court declines to revisit this issue. As explained 

below, regardless of whether Wells Fargo had a duty of care, it is 

entitled to summary adjudication on the negligence claim. 

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 B. Breach, Damages and Causation 

 Wells Fargo argues that, even if it owed Plaintiff a duty of 

care in processing his loan modification applications, Plaintiff 

has not presented evidence of the other elements of a negligence 

claim: (1) breach; (2) causation; and (3) damages. Specifically, 

Wells Fargo argues that, although the Court found that Plaintiff 

had adequately plead a breach of the duty of care in processing 

his application, Plaintiff does not have any evidence to support 

his allegations. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations with regard to breach are the same 

allegations he uses to support his HBOR cause of action. 

Plaintiff alleges that, on March 12, 2014, he provided all of the 

documentation required for a complete loan modification 

application that Wells Fargo “mishandled.” Pl.’s Opp. at 19. As 

discussed above, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence of this 

mishandling, because he has not established that he submitted a 

complete loan modification application on March 12, 2014, that was 

pending at the time the notice of sale was recorded. He also does 

not provide any evidence that he was given inaccurate information 

as to what documents were required. 

 Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to present “evidence 

from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor” to 

establish a breach of the duty to process his completed 

application with reasonable care, Wells Fargo is entitled to 

summary adjudication on the negligence cause of action. Because 

Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of a breach of duty, the 

Court need not reach the issues of causation or damages. 

// 

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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Wells Fargo’s motion for 

summary adjudication on the HBOR and negligence causes of action 

(Docket No. 80) is GRANTED. All claims have now been adjudicated. 

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for Defendants 

and close the file. The parties will bear their own costs. The 

Clerk will mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 13, 2015 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

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