Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-02711/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-02711-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Fair Credit Reporting Act

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Case No. 16-cv-02711 NC

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL FARRELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOEING EMPLOYEES CREDIT 

UNION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02711 NC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS ON FARRELL’S IIED 

CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 56

In this unfair debt collection case, defendants Boeing Employees Credit Union and 

Moore Brewer & Wolfe move to dismiss plaintiff Daniel Farrell’s intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”) claim. Dkt. No. 56. Because the Court finds Farrell has not 

pled sufficient facts to support an IIED claim, even after the Court previously gave leave to 

amend, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss the IIED claim WITH 

PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case arises from a motor vehicle financing agreement Farrell allegedly failed to 

maintain. Dkt. No. 55 at 3 (Second Amended Complaint). Boeing’s complaint, filed on or 

about May 28, 2010, requested physical repossession of the motor vehicle or the remaining 

balance on the contract. Id. at 4-5. Moore, Boeing’s attorney, succeeded in obtaining a 

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default judgment against Farrell, who did not respond to the complaint, for both physical 

repossession of the motor vehicle at issue and the full amount on the contract. Id. at 3-4. 

The court issued a Writ of Execution (Money Judgment) and Possession of Personal 

Property. Id. at 5. 

Farrell’s car was repossessed on or about June 8, 2011. Id. Farrell alleges that on 

September 4, 2012, on behalf of Boeing, Moore “had the Court issue a Writ of Execution” 

for a money judgment, which resulted in the garnishment of his wages. Id. at 6. That 

garnishment allegedly went on until September 23, 2015, coming to a total of $26,027.51. 

Id. According to Farrell, and as relevant to this motion to dismiss, as a result of Boeing 

and Moore’s conduct, he “has suffered great physical, emotional and mental pain and 

anguish, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer the same for an indefinite time in the future, 

all to Plaintiff’s great detriment and loss.” Id. at 11. Farrell also alleges the actual future 

damages of “financial and dignitary harm arising from loss of property, loss of 

transportation, and the injury to credit rating and reputation,” that will go on for an 

indefinite period of time. Id. 

B. Procedural History

Farrell filed his complaint in Monterey County Superior Court on April 11, 2016.

Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Boeing and Moore removed the case to federal court on May 19, 2016. 

Id. Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. Nos. 10, 18.

Boeing and Moore subsequently filed two motions to dismiss portions of the complaint. 

Dkt. Nos. 14, 39. The Court granted in part and denied in part the first motion, and gave 

Farrell leave to amend his complaint. Dkt. No. 29 at 8. On the second motion to dismiss, 

defendants sought to dismiss the IIED claim, which the Court granted with leave to amend. 

Dkt. No. 44. Farrell filed the Second Amended Complaint on November 16, 2016. Dkt. 

No. 55. Defendants once again move to dismiss the IIED claim. Dkt. No. 56. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). On a 

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motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-

38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need 

not allege detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

If a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend should be granted unless the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

The issue presented in defendants’ motion is whether Farrell states a claim for IIED.

The elements of IIED are: “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to 

cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe 

emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.” 

Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California, 144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 229 (1983); 

Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (1979) (characterizing the first element 

as “extreme and outrageous conduct”). The conduct complained of must be “so extreme as 

to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Cervantez, 24 

Cal. 3d at 593; Newberry v. Pac. Racing Ass’n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 1988). Debt 

collection, by its nature, causes the debtor emotional distress; however, “[s]uch conduct is 

only outrageous if it goes beyond all reasonable bounds of decency.” Ross v. Creel 

Printing & Publ’g Co., 100 Cal. App. 4th 736, 745 (2002) (internal citations and 

quotations marks omitted). 

“An assertion of legal rights in pursuit of one’s own economic interests does not 

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qualify as ‘outrageous’ under this standard.” Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, 69 Cal. App. 4th 

1377, 1398 (1999). In Yu, like here, defendants garnished plaintiffs’ wages to obtain 

repayment of a debt. Yu, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 1383. Farrell’s objection here is to the 

purported illegality of the out-of-state wage garnishment.1 Dkt. No. 58 at 5-6. There are 

no allegations that defendants had any intent in garnishing Farrell’s wages other than debt 

collection, even if they knew the collection of the debt would cause emotional distress. In 

Yu, the court found that even though the defendants may have abused the legal process by 

filing their claim in an incorrect venue, summary judgment for defendants was appropriate 

as to the IIED claim. Compare Yu, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 1389-90, 1397-98, with Bowden v. 

Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 795 (1950) (IIED claim was stated where collection 

agent phoned plaintiff’s neighbor at 11:00 p.m. claiming to need to speak with plaintiff due 

to an emergency, but when plaintiff spoke to defendant as the neighbors listened, 

defendant told her to prepare for a shock, demanded payment, and threatened to take her to 

court).

Here, the Court finds the IIED claim analogous to the unsuccessful IIED claim in 

Yu. Farrell has been given leave to amend his IIED claim, and has not presented to the 

Court any analogous law or facts suggesting Boeing and Moore’s conduct rose to the level 

of “extreme and outrageous” conduct. Farrell’s case law is factually distinguishable. See 

McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 373 (1991) (where creditor had power over 

debtor, the debtor “was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because of her pending 

marital dissolution. [Creditor] was aware of [debtor’s] circumstances. The withholding by 

a retained attorney of legal services when sexual favors are not granted by a client and 

engaging in sexual harassment of the client constitutes acts of outrageous conduct”); 

Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 296-98 (1976) disapproved of on 

other grounds by Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721 (1982) (finding substantial 

 

1 Defendants argue that contrary to Farrell’s argument that he could not have his wages 

garnished out of state, the garnishment of his wage was legal under 5 U.S.C. § 5520a(a). 

Dkt. No. 61 at 3-4. The Court notes the merit of this argument, but does not rely upon it in 

holding that Farrell has not stated a claim for IIED.

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evidence of “outrageous” conduct where landlord made physical threats against tenant if 

she did not vacate property). These cases are easily distinguishable as containing far more 

“outrageous” conduct than is alleged here. 

 As a matter of law, therefore, Farrell has not asserted a claim for IIED. Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1127. Farrell has now failed “to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed,” and the Court finds amendment would be futile; the Court need not give Farrell

additional opportunities to cure. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the IIED claim. The dismissal is with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion, and DISMISSES Farrell’s IIED claim 

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2017 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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