Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02724/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02724-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN KENNISTON,

Petitioner,

v.

J. MCDONALD, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15cv2724 AJB (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE DENIAL 

OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Kevin Kenniston (“Petitioner” or “Kenniston”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction in case number 

SCS247814. (Pet. at 1, ECF No. 1 “Pet.”)1 The Court has reviewed the Petition, the 

Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer, the 

 

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those 

imprinted by the court’s electronic case filing system.

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Traverse, the lodgments, and all the supporting documents submitted by both parties. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

A. Mendez Counts

Mendez testified she was 20 years old when she and defendant met 

in 2007. Mendez was then living with her parents. When they met, 

defendant told Mendez he owned his own “transportation company” and 

worked for the “government,” although defendant told Mendez he was 

prohibited from giving her more specifics about his governmental work. 

About a month and a half after they met, Mendez and defendant became 

engaged. They married shortly thereafter and resided together in an 

apartment in Oceanside, California.

A few weeks later, Mendez became aware that the diamond in the 

wedding ring defendant had given her was fake. This caused Mendez to 

become suspicious of defendant because he previously had told her the 

diamond was real. Mendez confronted defendant about the diamond and 

about other things defendant had said, including that he owned his own 

home. Defendant initially insisted the diamond was real but subsequently 

admitted it was fake. When Mendez asked about the home defendant said 

he owned and asked to see it, defendant told Mendez he was selling it and 

did not have a key.

Just a few weeks after they began living together as a married 

couple, Mendez moved back to her parent’s home because she and 

defendant were arguing. Mendez subsequently moved back in with 

defendant. After she returned, defendant became physically abusive.

/ / /

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Mendez testified about an incident that occurred after they had 

argued. Defendant initially refused to let her leave their apartment or call 

her parents on her cell phone, which he disabled. Defendant next pushed 

Mendez up against the bedroom wall, put both of his hands around her 

neck and choked her for about 30 seconds. He also grabbed Mendez by 

the ankles a “couple of times” when she was on the bed and pulled her 

down to the floor.

Defendant then went to the kitchen, retrieved a “steak knife” and 

pointed it at Mendez. Mendez testified defendant then got on top of, and 

wrapped his legs around, her. Mendez asked defendant, “‘Are you going 

to kill me or what are you going to do?’” and “‘Really? Are you really 

going to do this?’” Mendez was afraid defendant would stab her.

Defendant responded, “‘You don’t think I will?’” Scared, Mendez tried 

to be “nice” to defendant so that he would let her go. Defendant, in 

response, stabbed the pillow twice, missing Mendez’s head by a “couple 

inches.”

After defendant got off of Mendez, she ran to a neighbor’s house 

and asked them to call police. While at the neighbors, she saw defendant 

outside letting the air out of her car tires. Mendez ran back to the 

apartment and tried to lock the door behind her. Defendant followed 

behind and pushed the door open.

When Mendez told defendant the police had been called, he said, 

“Let’s go.” Defendant then grabbed Mendez by the arm, walked her 

outside and forced her into his car. Mendez testified she was scared.

Defendant would not tell Mendez where they were going as he 

drove. Mendez repeatedly asked defendant to let her go. Finally, Mendez 

told defendant that if he let her go, she would not press charges against 

him. According to Mendez, defendant’s demeanor then changed and he 

allowed Mendez to use his cell phone.

Mendez’s sister met Mendez and defendant in a parking lot. 

Mendez’s sister then drove Mendez to their parents’ home, where Mendez 

took pictures of the bruises to her neck, arms and knees she received 

during the incident.

/ / /

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Mendez testified defendant called the following day to apologize 

and to ask her to come home. Mendez refused. A few weeks later, 

defendant went to Mendez’s parents’ house, again apologized and asked 

Mendez to come home with him. While there, defendant found Mendez’s 

cell phone and deleted the pictures she had taken of her bruises from the 

steak knife incident. Mendez was very upset when she discovered her 

pictures were gone.

About two weeks later, Mendez returned to defendant. Although 

Mendez was cautious when she moved back into their apartment, she 

believed defendant had changed because he was being “really nice and 

sweet.” However, when Mendez heard a voicemail on defendant’s phone 

from another woman, Mendez concluded defendant was cheating on her 

and asked for a divorce.

Mendez testified in early May 2007 defendant came to her parents’

home with divorce papers for her to sign. Mendez’s mother was home 

with Mendez at the time. After Mendez signed the papers, she went 

upstairs to get ready for work, believing defendant had left. While in the 

shower, defendant came into her bathroom, opened the shower curtain and 

struck Mendez in the face and chest while accusing her of cheating on 

him. Defendant then threw Mendez’s car keys at her, striking her on the 

arm.

When police arrived, they took pictures of Mendez’s face, which 

was red from the blows from defendant, and of her arm, which was 

scratched from the keys. The next day, Mendez sought to obtain a 

restraining order against defendant.

In support of the restraining order, Mendez described not only the 

shower incident but also an incident involving defendant that occurred in 

late April 2007. In the latter incident, Mendez had agreed to meet 

defendant at a fitness club after work. After exercising, Mendez stopped 

at a convenience store. When she came out of the store, defendant had 

used his car to block Mendez’s car from leaving. Defendant then started 

yelling, “Where were you?” When Mendez replied she had been inside 

the store the entire time, defendant accused her of lying and of using the 

payphone outside the store to call another man. Defendant then jumped 

onto the hood of Mendez’s car, stomped on the windshield and shattered 

the glass while Mendez was inside.

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A patrol officer testified he responded to a call in late April 2007 

about 12:30 a.m. involving a family disturbance at a convenience store. 

The officer spoke to Mendez. His report confirmed the events Mendez 

described in support of her restraining order. The officer also testified 

Mendez said she did not want to press charges against defendant.

Despite the temporary restraining order, defendant called Mendez 

several times, including the “whole week” before defendant’s scheduled 

court date resulting from the May 2007 shower incident. During one of 

those calls, defendant asked Mendez to go to court with him and testify 

that defendant had not hit her in the shower, as she had previously 

claimed. Mendez refused.

Mendez testified the restraining order did not stop defendant 

thereafter from continuing to contact her, including coming to her place of 

employment. Defendant complained to Mendez it was her fault he had to 

pay “fees” and take “anger management classes” as a result of the May 

2007 shower incident. [Footnote 3: The record shows that as a result of 

the May 2007 shower incident, defendant plead guilty to misdemeanor 

battery on a spouse, in violation of section 243, subdivision (e)(1).]

B. Jessica G. Counts

Jessica G. testified she met defendant in April 2010. In the 

beginning of their relationship, defendant told Jessica G. and Jessica G.’s 

then 11-year-old daughter, Kylie, he owned a funeral escort business and, 

as a result, was authorized to stop traffic to allow a funeral procession to 

proceed uninterrupted. He also told Jessica G. a “hand[ful] of times” over 

the course of their relationship that he was a sworn police officer and had 

taken a course through the California Highway Patrol that authorized him 

“to stop people and write tickets.”

Kylie testified defendant told her that he purchased a black and 

white car online and that he was allowed to pull people over like the 

highway patrol. Kylie also testified that defendant’s car had roofmounted lights, a siren and a loudspeaker; that defendant also had a police 

scanner inside, which he used to speak to other police officers; and that 

defendant told her he was then known as “the sergeant,” and it was not 

illegal to listen to and talk on the police scanner “if you are a cop.”

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Kylie testified defendant told her in the past he had ticketed people. 

Kylie saw defendant carry a gun when he wore his funeral escort uniform. 

Defendant told Kylie it was a “real gun.”

Kylie testified about various incidents when defendant would pull 

over other motorists while she was riding as a passenger in his car. In one 

instance, defendant used the lights on the top of his car to pull over a 

motorist driving a “blue car” near a shopping center because the motorist, 

according to Kylie, had either run a stoplight or was going too fast. 

Defendant talked to the motorist but did not write a ticket because the 

motorist apologized.

In another incident, defendant used his car’s flashing lights to pull 

over a yellow “sports car” for speeding on a freeway as he was driving 

Kylie to school. About five minutes later, defendant returned and told 

Kylie he did not ticket the motorist because he “left his ticket book at 

home. . . .” Kylie recounted another incident when defendant used his 

car’s flashing lights to pull over a motorist on the freeway. Kylie testified 

this incident also occurred in the morning when defendant was driving her 

to school.

Kylie also testified about an incident involving a homeless man. 

As they were driving on a freeway, defendant said to Kylie, “‘watch 

this.’” Defendant then slowed down and, over the loud speaker, told the 

homeless man, “‘get off of my freeway.’” Kylie testified the man 

appeared afraid and quickly attempted to gather up his belongings. 

Defendant then told the man he would buy him a pizza if he picked up 

trash on the freeway.

Kylie testified about another incident when defendant used his car’s 

flashing lights and siren to block a lane and divert traffic after they exited 

a freeway and saw a man out of his car looking in some bushes. 

Defendant pulled up to the man, who claimed to be looking for an item 

that had flown out of his car window. Defendant helped the man look for 

the item for about three minutes. When they could not find it, defendant 

demanded the man “get off the road.”

Kylie testified that defendant was wearing his funeral escort 

uniform in at least one of these incidents and that she was afraid when 

defendant stopped motorists because a motorist might get angry “and 

come and try to hurt him or me.” On one occasion, Kylie told defendant 

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he could not pull over people because he was not a “real cop.” Defendant 

responded he had the “same powers as a cop.”

Jessica G. testified that, shortly before she and defendant stopped 

dating, Kylie told her about an incident that occurred when defendant had 

been dropping Kylie off at school. As discussed in more detail post, 

defendant in this particular incident confronted a woman as she sat in her 

car parked in the school’s loading zone. Kylie then told Jessica G. about 

the other incidents of defendant pulling over motorists when Kylie was a 

passenger in defendant’s car. Jessica G. testified that she was “shocked” 

to learn her daughter had been in the car with defendant. Jessica G. 

confronted defendant and told him he was not allowed to pull people over.

In response, defendant said, “‘Yeah, I can.’”

Jessica G. testified the first incident of physical abuse by defendant 

occurred in June 2010 when defendant pushed her as he was taking away 

her cell phone. In another incident of abuse, Jessica G. testified defendant 

came to her home and wanted to talk. Because Jessica G. had just gotten 

off work, she got up to make herself a drink. Defendant did not want 

Jessica G. to drink so defendant “took the booze and . . . poured it out.” 

Jessica G. in response said, “Why d[id] you do that? It is my condo. You 

can’t just come over here and tell me what to do.” Defendant responded 

by hitting Jessica G. in the solar plexus, knocking the wind out of her.

In another incident of abuse, after they had argued, defendant 

restrained Jessica G. in her home while Kylie and Kylie’s friend were also 

at home. In this incident, defendant would not let Jessica G. go even 

though she was trying to get away from him.

Jessica G. testified about an incident that took place in early March 

2011 after she and defendant argued. In this incident, defendant put his 

hands around her neck, after forcing her into a corner, and lifted her off 

the ground. After defendant calmed down, he let Jessica G. go and said, 

“‘I am sorry. I am sorry. I didn’t mean to do that. Let’s just talk.’”

During the same general time frame as the March 2011 incident, 

defendant told Jessica G. he was contemplating leaving San Diego and 

taking a job as a “mercenary overseas.” Defendant told Jessica G. that the 

job was “somewhere in Africa”; that it was dangerous and there was a 

“high chance of [him] getting KIA or killed in action”; but that the money 

was good and it was a good opportunity for him.

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On or about March 16, 2011, Jessica G. invited defendant to stop 

by her home. At some point that evening, Jessica G. unexpectedly 

received a text from “Brad,” an individual she previously had met while 

playing online video games. Jessica G. opened the message, looked at it 

and then erased it. When Jessica G. refused to tell defendant who had 

texted her, defendant took Jessica G.’s phone and left. Defendant later 

called Jessica G. and told her he had “chucked it [i.e., the phone] off the 

side of the road.” The next day, while upstairs in her home, Jessica G. 

heard someone come through the front gate into her house and “plop” 

something on the counter. Jessica G. went downstairs and found the cell 

phone defendant had taken the night before.

On or about March 18, 2011, Jessica G. came home from work 

about 2:30 a.m. and found defendant waiting for her in his funeral escort 

car, which he had parked in front of her carport. Defendant told Jessica 

G. they needed to talk. Jessica G. reluctantly agreed. After Jessica G. 

told defendant she did not love him anymore, defendant said he had taken 

the mercenary job and was leaving the following day for Washington 

D.C., where he would pick up his “orders” and obtain his itinerary. 

Defendant returned the keys to Jessica G.’s home and left.

The following day, defendant sent Jessica G. various text messages, 

including one stating he was in the airplane and was about to take off and 

another of an aerial photo taken from inside an airplane. Defendant also 

called Jessica G. and left a message while on the airplane. Jessica G. 

testified in the message she could hear “airplane noise in the background.”

Defendant told Jessica G. he would call when he arrived at his hotel in 

Washington D.C.

On March 20, 2011, defendant sent Jessica G. a text message

saying he would consider coming back to San Diego so they could get 

married and have children. Jessica G. respond[ed] defendant was crazy. 

During the day, defendant sent myriad additional text messages to Jessica 

G., including one accusing Jessica G. of “video fucking” Brad, one telling 

Jessica G., “you love only yourself,” and another saying she drank too 

much.

The next day, defendant sent Jessica G. a text message apologizing 

for his behavior. He told Jessica G. that he would be leaving the 

following day to go overseas; that he would no longer be able to 

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communicate once he left; and that he would like her to call when she got 

off work.

Although Jessica G. got off work about 2:30 a.m., she spoke to 

defendant as she drove home. Once home, they hung up and Jessica G. 

began playing an online video game with Brad. As she was playing, 

defendant began to send Jessica G. text messages. When Jessica G. did 

not respond, defendant sent Jessica G. a message, “Say hi to Brad,” and 

moments thereafter, another message, “for me.” When Jessica G. still did 

not respond, Jessica G.’s landlines starting ringing even though it was 

after 3:00 a.m. and Kylie was sleeping. Defendant then left a message on 

Jessica G.’s answering machine that his employer was considering 

sending him back to San Diego.

A few minutes later, Jessica G. heard a “clicking” noise at the front 

door. Defendant suddenly came “storming” through her front door, 

silently approached Jessica G. and then went to her gaming console and 

turned it off. Believing defendant was in Washington D.C. and was 

leaving from there to go overseas, Jessica G. testified she was shocked to 

see defendant and asked him how he got inside her apartment. Defendant 

told Jessica G. he used his “special forces training” to pick her locks “with 

twigs.”

Defendant next started looking through the text messages on Jessica 

G.’s cell phone. When Jessica G. tried to take her phone back, defendant 

grabbed Jessica G. and applied pressure so that she was unable to move 

her arm. As defendant twisted Jessica G.’s arm, she lost her balance and 

fell to the floor. Defendant got on top of Jessica G. and used his weight 

and knees to pin her down as he continued looking through her phone 

messages. When Jessica G. said she was not doing anything wrong, 

defendant told Jessica G. to shut up and used the back of his hand to slap 

Jessica G., grazing her face.

Defendant next came across a text message where Brad had called 

Jessica G. “darling.” Defendant leaned forward, got within a few inches 

of Jessica G.’s face and said, “‘Do you know what the word betrayal 

means?’”

Jessica G.’s cell phone starting ringing. When Jessica G. did not 

pick up, Brad sent Jessica G. a text message saying he had called the 

police. Jessica G. remained curled in a ball on the floor as her phone rang 

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again. Despite defendant’s demands, Jessica G. refused to answer the 

phone and say everything was fine.

Shortly thereafter, defendant saw the police outside of Jessica G.’s 

home. He told Jessica G. he could go to jail unless she told them 

everything was okay between them. Jessica G. did not respond. 

Defendant then threatened to destroy Jessica G.’s business and job.

Jessica G. testified defendant tried to be “chummy” with the police 

when he opened the front door and said, “‘Hey, guys. How is it going?’” 

After speaking to Jessica G., however, the police arrested defendant. The 

officers later returned three keys to Jessica G. they had found on 

defendant, including a spare car key and two keys to her home. A few 

days later, Jessica G. obtained a restraining order against defendant after 

he was released on bail after being charged with assaulting Jessica G.

In mid-April 2011, with the temporary restraining order still in 

effect, defendant called Jessica G. and said he wanted to apologize. 

During their conversation, defendant acknowledged the restraining order 

prevented him from contacting Jessica G.

Jessica G. testified the following day she saw defendant in his car 

traveling in the opposite direction. In her rearview mirror, she saw 

defendant make a U-turn and follow her into a grocery store parking lot. 

Defendant stopped about 10 to 15 feet from where Jessica G. had parked. 

Defendant said he wanted to have coffee, “com[e] clean” and tell Jessica 

G. about his “real past.” Jessica G. responded, “‘You got to be fucking 

kidding me.’” Jessica G. called the police.

A police officer testified he and another officer went to defendant’s 

home later that evening, knocked on the door and saw a man in pajamas 

come downstairs and then go back upstairs. According to the officer, 

when the same man returned downstairs, he was wearing jeans and tennis 

shoes. The officers waited outside until they were let into the home by 

another of its occupants. The officer testified the back door of the home 

was open, and the man was gone. Jessica G. testified she was scared 

when police called her at work about 9:30 p.m. that night informing her 

that defendant had evaded arrest.

/ / /

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Shortly after receiving that call from police, Kylie called Jessica G. 

and said, “‘Mommy, he is here,’” “‘He is outside.’” When Jessica G. 

asked who was outside, Kylie said she thought it was defendant. Kylie 

was crying and could barely talk. Kylie told her mother she heard 

knocking on the sliding glass door of their home and then heard the front 

door “jiggle.” Jessica G. told Kylie to hang up and call 911. The phone 

line then went dead.

Jessica G. testified she was afraid defendant would break into her 

home and take Kylie hostage. Jessica G. attempted to contact Kylie, but 

the phone line was busy. Jessica G. called 911. Police arrested defendant 

the following morning.

C. Impersonation/Child Endangerment Counts

The record shows defendant was charged in counts 7-10 and 12-22 

of impersonating an officer/child endangerment. [Footnote omitted.] The 

record shows Kylie was also riding in defendant’s car in connection with 

count 8, summarized below.

1. Counts 8 and 13-22

With respect to count 8, in early March 2011 Lisbeth Figueroa 

dropped off two of her children at school and then remained in a yellow 

unloading zone in her car while she talked on her phone. As she sat, she 

saw in the rearview mirror flashing lights behind her from what appeared 

to be a police car. She then heard someone say over a loudspeaker, 

“‘Please move your vehicle. This is not a parking zone.’” Figueroa 

noticed the lights were all yellow even though the car was black and white 

and looked like a police car.

The driver of the car, later identified as defendant (who was 

dropping Kylie off at school), again demanded that Figueroa move her 

car. When she did not move, the man pulled alongside and Figueroa 

noticed the words “funeral escort” written on the car door. The man told 

Figueroa the registration tag on her vehicle was expired and either she had 

to move her car or he would have it towed. The man also demanded 

Figueroa’s driver’s license and car registration.

/ / /

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Figueroa explained she had been unable to go to the DMV to renew 

her car’s registration. After Figueroa told the man she worked in security, 

the man’s demeanor changed. He introduced himself as “Kevin” and told 

Figueroa he had a friend who worked at the DMV who could help 

Figueroa. Figueroa later reported this incident to the school police 

officer.

Counts 13-22 charged defendant with impersonating an 

officer/child endangerment specifically relating to the incidents, 

summarized ante, when Kylie was riding as a passenger in defendant’s 

car.

2. Counts 9, 10 and 12

The record shows count 9 charged defendant with impersonating an 

officer on or about July 16 and 17, 2010 (victim Jessica G.). Defendant 

was charged in count 10 with impersonating an officer between June and 

August 2010 (victims Ivan Fernandez and Nichole Ballesteros). 

[Footnote 5: The record shows that while driving in June or July 2010, 

Fernandez accidently cut off whom he believed was a motorcycle officer. 

The “officer” made a U-turn, turned on a siren and pulled over Fernandez, 

who had just picked up Ballesteros. The “officer,” later identified as 

defendant, was wearing a uniform, helmet, badge and a belt typically 

worn by a sworn police officer. The “officer” made Fernandez get out of 

his car and sit on the curb. The “officer” subsequently let Fernandez go, 

but, before doing so, made him drive back to Ballesteros’s house to 

apologize to Ballesteros’s mother.] Count 12 charged defendant with 

impersonating an officer in early December 2008 (victim Candice 

Hodge).

(Lodgment No. 5 at 4-17.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 23, 2011, a grand jury charged Kenniston by indictment with 32 counts: 

kidnapping (count one) (Cal. Penal Code § 207(a)); false imprisonment for purpose to 

avoid arrest (count two) (Cal. Penal Code § 210.5); attempting to dissuade a witness from 

reporting a crime (count three) (Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1)); false imprisonment by 

violence or menace (count four) (Cal. Penal Code §§ 236 and 237(a)); battery of a current 

of former significant other (count five) (Cal. Penal Code § 243(e)(1)); petty theft with 

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three priors (count six) (Cal. Penal Code §§ 484 & 666(a)); child abuse (count 18) (Cal. 

Penal Code § 273a); stalking with court order in effect (count 23) (Cal. Penal Code § 

644.9(b)); 11 counts of impersonating an officer (counts 7-13, 15, 17, 20 and 22) (Cal. 

Penal Code § 146a(b)(1)(2)); five counts of cruelty to a child by endangering health 

(counts 14, 16, 19, 21, 32) (Cal. Penal Code § 273a(b)); four counts of violation of a 

protective order, domestic violence or elder abuse (counts 25, 27, 29, 31) (Cal. Penal 

Code § 166(c)(1)); and four counts of disobeying a court order (counts 25, 27, 29, 31) 

(Cal. Penal Code § 273.6(a)). (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 1-12.)

As to counts 7-13, 15, 17, 20 and 22, it was further alleged that during the 

commission of those offenses, Petitioner willfully impersonated a peace officer (Cal.

Penal Code § 538d). (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 3-8.) It was further alleged as to count 

23 that the offense was committed while Kenniston was released from custody on bail 

(Cal. Penal Code § 12022.1(b)). Finally, it was alleged that Petitioner suffered four 

prison priors (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667.5(b) & 668). (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 8-9.) 

The trial court dismissed counts 11, 24 and 25 prior to trial. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 

5 at 983; see also Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 28-29.) In addition, on October 30, 2012, the 

court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss count 12. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 

1030; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 13 at 1282-83.) 

Opening statements in Kenniston’s jury trial began on November 5, 2012. 

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 15 at 1371.) On November 28, 2012, the jury found Petitioner 

guilty on counts 1-6, 8, 10, 15, 16, and 18-29. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 1115-16; see 

also Lodgment No. 2, vol. 30 at 4885-91.) In addition, as to counts 8, 10, 15, 20 and 22, 

the jury found the Cal. Penal Code § 538d(c) allegations to be true. The jury further 

found that count 23 was committed while Petitioner was out of custody on bail (Cal. 

Penal Code § 12022.1(b)). (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 1115-16; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 30 

at 4887-91.) The jury found Petitioner not guilty on counts 7, 9, 13, 14, 17 and 30-32, 

and that the section 538d allegations with regard to counts 7, 9, 13 and 17 to be not true. 

(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 1115-16; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 30 at 4886-92.) Kenniston 

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waived his right to a bench trial on his priors, and admitted the alleged prison priors. 

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 30 at 4895-4900.) On May 3, 2013, the trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to 23 years and four months in prison.2 (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 1153; 

Lodgment No. 2, vol. 32 at 5515.)

On December 31, 2013, Kenniston, represented by appointed counsel, appealed the 

judgment to the California Court of Appeal arguing (1) his due process rights were 

violated when the trial court refused to sever the charges, (2) the trial court improperly 

denied Kenniston’s request to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel; (3) his 

due process rights were violated when the prosecutor made improper comments to the 

jury; and (4) his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when defense 

counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper comments. (See Lodgment No. 3.)

On September 2, 2014, Kenniston submitted a “Supplemental Brief” to the 

appellate court, on his own behalf. (ECF No. 8 at Ex. A, 22-53.) In it, Petitioner argued 

the prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence (grounds one and three), there was 

insufficient evidence to support counts 1, 15, 18-20 and 22 (grounds two, four and 

seven), the court erred in permitting expert testimony (ground five) and the prosecutor 

committed misconduct during closing argument (ground six). (See id. at 23.) In a letter 

dated September 8, 2014, the California Court of Appeal informed Petitioner that his pro 

se supplemental brief was being forwarded to his appellate counsel to determine what, if 

any, action should be taken. (Id., Ex. B at 56.) 

/ / /

 

2 The court sentenced Kenniston to eight years on count one. As to count two, the court 

imposed a term of one year and eight months, but stayed the sentence under California Penal 

Code section 654. On counts three, four and six, Petitioner was sentenced to eight months on 

each count. The court imposed a term of one year each for counts 8, 10, 15, 20 and 22. 

Petitioner received a 16 months on count 18, a one year sentence on count 23 and a two years 

for the section 12022.1(b) allegation. In addition, the court imposed one year each for the four 

prison priors. As to counts 5, 16, 21, 26 and 26, the court granted time served concurrent with 

count one and struck count 19. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 1150-52; Lodgment No. 2, vol. 32 at 

5512-15.)

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On September 19, 2014, the appellate court affirmed Kenniston’s conviction in an 

unpublished opinion. The court addressed only the claims raised in the brief submitted 

by Kenniston’s appellate counsel. (See Lodgment No. 5.)

On October 20, 2014, Kenniston submitted a “supplemental brief” to the California 

Supreme Court, to which he appears to have attached the supplemental brief he had 

attempted to submit to the Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment No. 6.) On October 27, 

2014, appellate counsel for Kenniston filed a petition for review, raising the same four 

claims as those presented to the appellate court. (Lodgment No. 7.) On December 10, 

2014, the California Supreme Court issued an order stating “The Petitions for review are 

denied.” (Lodgment No. 8.) 

Kenniston, proceeding pro se, filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus on December 4, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) In it, Petitioner raises ten claims. (See id.) 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay on January 4, 2015. (ECF. No. 8.) Respondent filed an 

Answer on February 11, 2016. (ECF No. 10.) Kenniston filed a Traverse on March 14, 

2016. On April 26, 2016 the Court denied Petitioner’s stay motion without prejudice to 

filing an amended Motion for Stay. (ECF No. 16.) On June 13, 2016, Kenniston filed an 

Amended Motion for Stay. (ECF No. 18.) Finally, on October 3, 2016, Petitioner filed a 

“Notice of Exhaustion.” (ECF No. 19.)

In his “Notice of Exhaustion,” Kenniston’s stated that while his federal petition has 

been pending before the Court, he has been seeking habeas review in the state courts. 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego Superior Court on 

December 7, 2015. (See Notice, ECF No. 19, Ex. A at 22.) In it, he raised 10 claims. 

(See id. at 23-30.) On February 19, 2016, the San Diego Superior Court denied his 

habeas petition in a reasoned decision. (See id.) Kenniston then filed a petition with the 

California Court of Appeal, raising the same 10 claims.3 (Id., Ex. B at 32-62.) The 

 

3 Kenniston submitted the document as a “Petition for Review” of the superior court’s decision. 

The appellate court, however, construed the petition as an original proceeding. (See Notice, 

ECF No. 19, Ex. C at 64.)

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appellate court denied the petition in a reasoned decision on April 26, 2016. (Id. at 64-

65.) Finally, Kenniston filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court on June 27, 2016, which was denied without comment or citation on 

September 14, 2016.

4

 (See id. at 5.) 

On February 3, 2017, this Court denied Kenniston’s motion for stay as moot. 

(ECF No. 20.)

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Kenniston’s Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 

(1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring 

only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

order to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an 

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably 

conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

/ / /

 

4 Although Petitioner did not submit a copy of the Supreme Court’s decision, a search of the 

court’s docket reveals that the petition was denied without comment or citation. (See

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist =0&doc_id= 

2147723&doc_no=S235484.)

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A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 

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8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

[Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

V. DISCUSSION

Kenniston raises ten claims in his Petition: (1) his due process rights were violated 

when the state failed to turn over information about a prosecution witness; (2) his due 

process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence to support his 

kidnapping conviction; (3) his due process rights were violated when the trial court 

permitted expert witness testimony and the prosecution failed to provide discovery

regarding the expert witness; (4) his due process rights were violated because there was 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction on counts 15 and 20; (5) his due process 

rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence to support the true findings 

on the allegations for impersonating a peace officer while committing a felony, pursuant 

to California Penal Code §§ 538d & 667.17 (counts 8, 10, 15, 20 and 22); (6) his due 

process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions on counts 18 and 19; (7) his due process rights were violated when the 

prosecution failed to provide exculpatory documents to the defense; (8) his due process 

rights were violated by the failure to sever the charges against him; (9) his right to 

counsel was violated when the trial court denied his request for a continuance in order to 

substitute retained counsel; and (10) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he 

received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsels. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-

1 at 1-100, ECF No. 1-2 at 1-97.)

A. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

In the Answer, Respondent argues claims one through four, six and seven are 

unexhausted because Petitioner failed to “fairly present” them to the California Supreme 

Court. (See P. & A. Supp. Answer, ECF No. 10-1 at 8-10.) Habeas petitioners who wish 

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to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state 

prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. 

Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California 

state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule 

on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 367, 

365 (1995). If the claim was not presented to the state’s highest court on direct appeal, 

state collateral remedies must be exhausted. Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1427 

(9th Cir. 1986). For a petitioner in California state custody, this generally means that the 

petitioner must have fairly presented his or her claims in a petition to the California 

Supreme Court. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (interpreting 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(c)); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying 

O’Sullivan to California); accord Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).

As noted above, Kenniston raised claims one through four, six and seven in a pro 

se “supplemental” brief submitted to the California Court of Appeal in conjunction with 

his direct appeal. (See ECF No. 8, Ex. A at 22-53.) The appellate court informed 

Kenniston by letter that the supplemental brief was being forwarded to his appointed

appellate attorney, who had already filed a brief on Kenniston’s behalf. (See id., Ex. A at 

23.) Petitioner’s pro se supplemental brief was not filed and the appellate court’s opinion 

affirming Kenniston’s conviction addressed only those claims raised in the brief filed by 

appellate counsel. (Id., see also Lodgment No. 5.) 

Kenniston then submitted a “supplemental brief” to the California Supreme Court, 

along with a petition for review filed by his appellate counsel. (See Lodgment Nos. 6 & 

7.) The supplemental brief was filed, but it appears the supporting exhibits were returned 

to Kenniston. The California Supreme Court ultimately issued an order stating “The 

Petitions for review are denied.” (Lodgment No. 8.) 

Respondent argues that despite Kenniston’s efforts to raise claims one through 

four, six and seven in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, 

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the supplemental brief raising the claims was never filed in the appellate court. Under 

California Rules of Court, the California Supreme Court will normally not consider 

issues that petitioner failed to timely raise in the appellate court. Cal. R. Ct. 8.516(b)(1). 

Therefore, Respondent argues, because the supplemental brief was not filed in the 

appellate court, the claims raised therein were not “fairly presented” to the California 

Supreme Court. As such the claims are unexhausted. (See P. & A. Supp. Answer, ECF 

No. 10-1 at 9-10.) 

After Respondent filed his Answer, however, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the 

proceedings so that he could return to state court and properly exhaust his state court 

remedies as to all claims.

5

 On October 3, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Exhaustion, 

which established that Petitioner had presented all claims to the California Supreme 

Court. (ECF No. 19.) On February 3, 2017, this Court concluded that Petitioner’s claims 

were exhausted and denied Petitioner’s motion for stay as moot. (ECF No. 20.) 

Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of all ten claims.

B. Brady Violations (Claims One and Seven) 

In grounds one and seven of the Petition, Kenniston argues his due process rights 

were violated when the prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence pursuant to 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 82 (1963). In ground one, he asserts the prosecutor failed to 

notify the defense regarding statements prosecution witness Esmeralda Mendez

purportedly made after the trial ended. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 5-9.) He also claims that 

 

5 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego Superior Court on 

December 7, 2015. (See Notice, ECF No. 19, Ex. A at 22.) In it, he raised the same 10 claims 

as those presented in his federal petition. (See id. at 23-30.) On February 19, 2016, the San 

Diego Superior Court denied his habeas petition in a reasoned decision. (See id.) Kenniston 

then filed a petition with the California Court of Appeal, raising the same 10 claims on April 7, 

2016. (Id., Ex. B at 32-62.) The appellate court denied the petition in a reasoned decision on 

April 26, 2016. (Id. at 64-65.) Finally, Kenniston filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the California Supreme Court on June 27, 2016, which was denied without comment or citation 

on September 14, 2016. (See http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/main

CaseScreen. cfm?dist =0&doc_id= 2147723&doc_no=S235484.)

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the prosecution knowingly relied on perjured testimony from Mendez. (Id. at 9.) In 

ground seven, Kenniston argues the prosecution failed to turn over evidence of an 

investigation of Petitioner conducted by Chula Vista Police to the defense. (Pet., ECF 

No. 1-2 at 33-37.)

As discussed above, Kenniston raised these claims in a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus to the California Supreme Court, which was denied without comment or citation. 

Thus, this Court “looks through” to the last reasoned decision to address these grounds, 

that of the California Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. In denying both 

claims, the appellate court stated:

Kenniston raises two claims that the prosecution failed to produce 

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. 

The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence to a criminal defendant 

when the evidence is both favorable to the defendant and material on either 

guilt or punishment. (In re Miranda (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 541, 575.) Evidence 

is material if there is a reasonable possibility that, had it been disclosed to 

the defense, the result of the trial would have been different. (Ibid.) “Such a 

probability exists when the undisclosed evidence reasonably could be taken 

to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in 

the verdict.” (Ibid.) 

Kenniston admits, however, that he does not know what information 

the prosecution allegedly did not disclose, but merely suspects the existence 

of such information. His claim is entirely speculative and Kenniston fails to 

demonstrate the materiality of the alleged undisclosed information. Thus, he 

does not establish a basis for relief.

(See Notice, ECF No. 19, Ex. C at 65.) 

1. Evidence Regarding Mendez’s Testimony (Ground One)

Petitioner argues his due process rights were violated when, after trial, Mendez

contacted an employee of the District Attorney’s office and provided “additional 

information” which was not turned over to the defense. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 5-9.) He 

/ / /

/ / /

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further contends Mendez gave false testimony. He argues his due process rights were 

violated because the prosecution knowingly relied on perjured testimony from Mendez. 

(Id. at 9.) 

Some background on Mendez’s testimony is necessary first. Mendez was 

Kenniston’s former wife. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 18 at 1820.) She testified before the 

grand jury once and at trial on two occasions regarding her relationship with Kenniston 

and, in particular, an incident which occurred a few weeks after they married and moved 

in together. Mendez’s trial testimony regarding the incident provided the evidentiary

basis for counts one and two against Kenniston. (See generally Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 

1.)

On November 8, 2012, the day Mendez was scheduled to testify at Kenniston’s 

trial, an investigator in the District Attorney’s office picked Mendez up at her home and 

drove her to the courthouse. During the drive, Mendez told the investigator she did not 

want to testify. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 18 at 1731-32, 1747-48.) Mendez stated that she 

suffered from anxiety and panic attacks. She said she had forgiven Kenniston and did not 

want to relive the incident. She also told a district attorney investigator that if called to 

testify, she would “take the Fifth.” (Id. at 1757, 1761-62.) After arriving at the 

courthouse, Mendez was in the hallway with two employees from the District Attorney’s 

office, waiting to be called to testify, when she appeared to experience a panic attack. 

(Id. at 1730, 1780-81.) She asked the investigator to inform the court she wished to be 

excused from testifying for medical reasons. (Id. at 1731-32.) 

The court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether 

Mendez was medically competent to testify. (See id. at 1747-53, 1759-68.) The court 

also sought to determine what Mendez meant when she told investigators she would 

“plead the Fifth.” During the hearing, Mendez stated that she did not want to testify at 

trial because of her anxiety. (Id. at 1748-49.) She further stated that she did not want to 

“relive everything that happened” and that she forgave Kenniston. (Id. at 1750.) 

/ / /

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When asked by the prosecutor about her comment to the investigator that she 

would “plead the Fifth,” Mendez stated that she would do so because she did not want to 

testify, “not because she thought she had committed any sort of criminal offense.” (Id. at 

1765.) Although Mendez denied the existence of any self-incrimination issue, the court, 

in an abundance of caution, appointed counsel to represent Mendez regarding any 

potential Fifth Amendment issues. (Id. at 1785-86.) After meeting with Mendez, her 

appointed counsel reported to the court that he did not believe there was any Fifth 

Amendment issue and that it was simply matter of Mendez not wanting to testify. (Id. at 

1817-18.) He stated that Mendez had erroneously believed that “pleading the Fifth” 

simply meant she would not have testify and she was unaware that it applied specifically

to self-incriminating testimony. He stated that Mendez now understood that she had to 

testify and would comply. (Id.) Although Mendez’s attorney stated that she was 

“adamant” that she had not lied during her grand jury testimony or any prior proceedings, 

the prosecutor agreed to grant Mendez immunity in order to avoid any potential Fifth 

Amendment issues, in the event it came to light she had perjured herself at any time 

during the proceedings. (Id.) 

Shortly thereafter, Mendez took the stand to testify before the jury. It is clear from 

the record that she was anxious and hesitant during her testimony. She often had 

difficulty remembering specific details and her memory had to be refreshed with her 

grand jury testimony numerous times. Nonetheless, Mendez’s testimony was generally

consistent with her grand jury testimony. Specifically, she testified that in 2007, some 

weeks after moving in with Petitioner, the two had an argument at their apartment. She 

attempted to leave to go to her parents’ home but Kenniston blocked the door. (Id. at 

1854.) When she tried to push past Petitioner, he became violent. At one point, 

Kenniston pushed her against a wall and grabbed her around the neck with both hands, 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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choking her. (Id. at 1851-52, 1854, 1858.) At another point,6 Kenniston pulled her off 

the bed by her ankles. (Id. at 1860-61.) When Mendez tried to call her parents, Petitioner 

took her phone away. (Id. at 1862.) While she was on the bed, Kenniston went to the 

kitchen, got a knife and returned to the bedroom. He got on top of Mendez and pointed 

the knife at her. After threatening her with the knife, Kenniston stabbed the pillow twice, 

inches away from Mendez’s head. (Id. at 1865-67.) 

Ultimately, Mendez was able to free herself and flee the apartment. She went to 

her neighbors’ apartment and asked them to call the police. (Id. at 1870.) When she 

looked outside, she saw Kenniston in the parking lot letting the air out of her 

automobile’s tires. (Id. at 1873.) She tried to return to her apartment but before she 

could lock the door, Petitioner pushed his way in. (Id. at 1875-76.) She told Kenniston

the police had been called and he responded that they had to leave in order to avoid the 

police. (Id. at 1876.) She did not want to go; she wanted to stay and wait for the police 

to arrive. (Id. at 1877, 1879.) Kenniston grabbed her by the arm, led her to the parking 

lot and forced her into his car. (Id. at 1878.) Once in the car, Kenniston drove fast out of 

the parking lot. Mendez testified that she was scared and did not know where Petitioner 

was taking her. She asked Petitioner several times to let her go and told him that if he 

did, she would not press charges. (Id. at 1897-88.) Eventually Kenniston calmed down 

and finally let her use his phone to call her family. He ultimately dropped her off in a 

grocery store parking lot. Mendez’s sister picked her up and took her to her parents’

house. (Id. at 1890.) 

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mendez if she had been drinking on 

the day of the incident. She replied that she did not remember drinking that day. (Id. at 

1966-67.) At the end of re-direct, Mendez stated that she had been truthful in her 

testimony to the best of her abilities. (Id. at 2015.) 

 

6 During her trial testimony, Mendez had difficulty remembering the exact order of events that 

took place in the apartment. (Id. at 1860.)

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After her testimony on November 8 and 9, 2012, Mendez was re-called to testify 

on November 20, 2012, when a transcript of her grand jury testimony was admitted into 

evidence. (Id., vol. 26 at 3036.) She testified on November 20 that she had had a 

“flashback” after her initial trial testimony. During the flashback, she remembered that 

“the day [Kenniston] took me in his car, we were [both] drinking.” (Id. at 3036-37.) She 

reiterated, however, that she had not wanted to be taken from the apartment by 

Kenniston. (Id. at 3048.) 

After the trial concluded, but before sentencing, Mendez spoke to an investigator

for Petitioner’s defense counsel. (See Pet., Exs. B & C, ECF No. 1-2 at 103-07.) 

According to the investigator’s reports, Mendez told her she did not think Kenniston had 

kidnapped her. Mendez also reiterated that she had been drinking on the day of the

incident, contrary to her testimony before the grand jury and her first time testifying at 

trial. (See id. at 103.) Soon thereafter, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial 

based, in part, on this “additional and new evidence.” (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 930-

31.)

In a sworn affidavit obtained by defense counsel and filed in support of the motion, 

Mendez stated that after she testified for the final time on November 20, 2012, she spoke 

to an employee at the District Attorney’s office and provided “additional information” 

that she had forgotten during her original testimony. (Pet., Ex. A, ECF No. 1-2 at 101.) 

She also stated that she wanted leniency for Kenniston at sentencing because she had 

forgiven him. (Id.) 

In his federal Petition, Kenniston argues that his due process rights under Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) were violated because the prosecutor did not inform 

the defense that Mendez had provided “additional information” after her November 20, 

2012 testimony. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 11.) In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates 

due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of 

the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Although this 

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rule originally covered only exculpatory evidence, the Supreme Court has extended it to 

include impeachment evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).

In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show three things: (1) the 

evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the 

withheld evidence was either exculpatory or impeachment material, and (3) the evidence 

was material to the defense. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 678). Evidence is material under Brady only if there is a 

“‘reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 

(1995). A “reasonable probability” means a probability “sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; United States v. 

Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (the defendant must show that the 

government’s suppression of the evidence undermines confidence in the trial’s outcome).

Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor withheld information regarding a 

conversation between a District Attorney investigator and Mendez, Petitioner cannot 

establish a Brady violation because he has not shown the purported evidence was 

exculpatory or impeachment evidence, or that any such evidence was material. Mere 

supposition as to what a witness told prosecutors cannot support a Brady claim. 

Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.2d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 2012). As the California appellate 

court noted, Kenniston only speculates that the “additional information” Mendez 

purportedly provided to the prosecution would have been favorable to the defense. (See 

ECF No. 19, Ex. C at 65.) In her signed affidavit, Mendez states only that she “talked 

more about the incident and how Mr. Kenniston returned me” with an employee at the 

District Attorney’s office. (Pet., Ex. A, ECF No. 1-2, at 101.) No specifics are offered in 

Mendez’s affidavit regarding the nature of the “additional information.” As such, 

Petitioner has not established that the evidence was favorable, much less material, to the 

defense. See Runningeagle, 686 F.2d at 770; see also Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 

1037 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Brady claim as too speculative).

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Kenniston points to reports of a defense investigator regarding conversations she 

had with Mendez in February and March 2013, arguing they suggest Mendez provided 

favorable evidence to the prosecution. Specifically, during the March interview, Mendez 

reportedly told the defense investigator she had been drinking on the day of the incident, 

Kenniston did not want her to drive because she was drunk, and Mendez did not think 

Kenniston had kidnapped her. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-2, Ex. C at 107.) However, the

defense investigator reports are not sworn affidavits, and as such they were not admitted 

by the state trial court. See People v. Pic’l, 171 Cal. Rptr. 106, 137-38 (Cal. App. 1981) 

(holding a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be decided 

“solely upon affidavits” and a trial court is prohibited from hearing witness testimony at 

an evidentiary hearing); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1191(8).

Furthermore, Mendez herself failed to corroborate the statements in her own 

affidavit. She states only that she provided “additional information.” As discussed 

above, Mendez did not offer any specifics as to what that information included.

Moreover, there is nothing in the defense investigator’s reports concerning any new 

information relayed to the prosecutor, or the defense investigator, for that matter. Indeed, 

there is no mention of any post-trial communication between Mendez and anyone from 

the District Attorney’s office in either report. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-2, Exs. B & C at 103-

07.) 

Finally, to the extent there is any favorable information contained in the defense 

investigator’s reports, it is not inconsistent with evidence already presented to the jury. 

When she returned to testify the second time about her “flashback,” Mendez stated on 

cross-examination that she had been drinking on the day of the incident and Kenniston 

did not want her to drive, contrary to her previous grand jury and trial testimony.

7

 

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 26 at 3036-37.) Thus, even if this Court could consider the 

 

7 The jury also heard testimony that she did not want to go with Kenniston that day, and that she 

had begged Kenniston to let her out of the car. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 26 at 3049.) 

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reports, there is nothing contained in them to establish the prosecutor failed to turn over 

evidence. Moreover, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that any such evidence 

was material under Brady. Therefore, this Court concludes the state court’s denial of 

Petitioner’s Brady claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. 

Petitioner further argues in ground one that the prosecutor knowingly relied on 

“faulty and perjured testimony provided by Mendez to convict Petitioner.” (Pet., ECF

No. 1-1 at 10.) He claims the statements purportedly made by Mendez to the defense 

investigator provide “proof of perjury.” (Id. at 9.) 

“The knowing use of perjured testimony by a prosecutor generally requires that the 

conviction be set aside.” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). “The same result obtains when the 

State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” 

Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, the 

presentation of conflicting versions of events, without more, does not constitute knowing 

presentation of false evidence. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2002). To prevail on such claims, three things are required: (1) the testimony or evidence 

must be false, (2) the prosecution must have known or should have known it was false, 

and (3) the false testimony must be material. See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 

2003)). 

A witness testifying under oath commits perjury if she “gives false testimony 

concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than 

as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 

U.S. 87, 94 (1993). Not every discrepancy in testimony translates into perjury. Lambert 

v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 249 (3d Cir. 2004). The presentation of a conflicting version 

of events does not establish the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony. Falsity 

is not established merely by showing that the witness made an earlier inconsistent 

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statement, or that the witness’s testimony differs from that of another witness. See ZunoArce, 44 F.3d at 1423; see also Geston, 299 F.3d at 1135. “Discrepancies in testimony . .

.could as easily flow from errors in recollection as from lies.” Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d at 

1423. 

Here, there is nothing to suggest the prosecution had reason to believe Mendez 

perjured herself. As discussed above, when she returned to testify the second time at 

trial, on November 20, Mendez offered some information that was inconsistent with her 

grand jury and initial trial testimony. She stated that since testifying on November 8 and 

9, she had a flashback during which she remembered drinking on the day of the incident. 

Nonetheless, nothing in Mendez’s testimony supports the argument that the prosecutor 

knew her previous testimony was perjurous. Indeed, all of Mendez’s statements suggest 

the contrary. She testified that she only remembered drinking after her initial trial 

testimony. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 26 at 3036-37.) After trial, when Mendez spoke to 

defense investigator about her trial testimony, she repeatedly stated that her trial

testimony was true to her recollection when she gave it, and that she was not asked to 

exaggerate or lie at any time during the proceedings. (See Pet., Exs. B & C, ECF No. 1-2 

at 103, 107.) Furthermore, any inconsistencies in Mendez’s testimony were apparent on 

the stand, and where the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine her on those 

inconsistencies. Cf. Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735 744 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no 

prosecutorial duty under Napue to investigate alleged witness perjury to extent witness 

just changed her story on the stand since defense knew of it and her inconsistent stories 

were grounds for cross-examination); see also Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1563 (10th 

Cir. 1991) (“Contradictions and changes in a witness’s testimony alone do not constitute 

perjury and do not create an inference, let alone prove, that the prosecution knowingly 

presented perjured testimony.”)

It was for the jury to decide whether Mendez was a credible witnesses and how 

much of her testimony was to be believed. See, e.g., Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 

1358 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that it is province of jury to determine credibility of 

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witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven 

facts); Bruce, 376 F.3d at 957 (stating that a jury’s credibility determinations are entitled 

to near-total deference); see also Carothers v. Rhey, 594 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1975). 

Petitioner’s allegations regarding these allegedly “false” statements simply do not 

demonstrate a Napue violation because Kenniston has not shown that the evidence in 

question was false or that the prosecutor knew or reasonably should have known it was 

false. See Mancuso, 292 F.3d at 957 (rejecting Napue claim where there was no evidence 

prosecutor presented false testimony); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 959 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (rejecting claim that prosecution suppressed evidence that witness’ testimony 

was false because petitioner presented no evidence that prosecution knew it was false). 

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish a due process violation based on presentation 

of false evidence.

In sum, the state court’s denial of ground one was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 

529 U.S. at 407-08. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS the claim be DENIED.

2. Evidence of Investigation by Chula Vista Police (Claim Seven)

In ground seven, Petitioner argues his due process rights under Brady were

violated when the prosecution failed to turn over exculpatory documents referenced in a 

restraining order application filed by prosecution witness Jessica Green. (Pet., ECF No. 

1-2 at 33-37.) As noted above, the state appellate court rejected Kenniston’s Brady 

claim because Petitioner did not know what information the prosecution allegedly failed 

to disclose and thus his claim was “entirely speculative.” (See Notice, ECF No. 19, Ex. 

C at 65.) 

On March 24, 2011, two days after Kenniston broke into her home, Jessica Green 

applied for a temporary restraining order against him. (See Pet., Ex. U, ECF No. 1-4 at 

12-15.) In her affidavit in support of the restraining order, Green stated that she had 

been “notified that [Kenniston] has been under surveillance for a year” for police 

impersonation. (Id. at 14.) In his Petition, Kenniston argues Green’s statement in her 

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affidavit provides proof that there were police reports pertaining to an investigation by 

the Chula Vista Police Department that the prosecution failed to turn over to the defense. 

(Id., ECF No. 1-2 at 36-37.) 

Beyond the brief mention of the investigation in Green’s affidavit, Petitioner offers 

no proof that such reports exist. Indeed, Detective Deaner testified that the investigation 

into Kenniston’s impersonation as an officer began in February 2011, only a month prior 

to the filing of Greens’ restraining order application.

8

 (See Lodgment No. 2, vol. 26 at 

3052, 3064.) Even assuming there are reports related to a year-long investigation of 

Petitioner conducted by Chula Vista Police, he fails to establish any such reports

contained exculpatory or impeachment evidence. Moreover, Kenniston fails to show that 

any such evidence which would have been material to the defense. He merely speculates 

that a report may “arguably” contain information regarding surveillance which would 

have “cleared [him] of wrongdoing” on counts 15, 20 and 22, for which he was convicted 

of impersonating an officer and detaining another under California Penal Code section

146a(b)(1)(2). (Id. at 37-38.) As discussed above, mere supposition is insufficient to 

show that such reports contained information or evidence material to Petitioner’s defense. 

See Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 987 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no Brady violation 

where the petitioner failed to show that a report existed, or that if it did, it contained 

exculpatory evidence); see also Downs, 232 F.3d at 1037 (rejecting Brady claim as too 

speculative).

Therefore, the Court finds the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s that claim his due 

process rights were violated by a failure of the prosecutor to turn over police reports 

purportedly held by the Chula Vista Police Department, was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 

529 U.S. at 407-08. The Court RECOMMENDS ground seven be DENIED.

 

8 And it is clear from the testimony of Detective Deaner on cross-examination that defense 

counsel had a copy of his February 2011 report. (See Lodgment No. 2, vol. 26 at 3064.) 

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C. Insufficient Evidence (Claims Two, Four, Five and Six)

In claims two, four, five and six, Kenniston argues his due process rights were 

violated when he was convicted on certain counts based on insufficient evidence. 

Specifically, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for (1) 

kidnapping (ground two) (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 21-59); (2) two counts of impersonation 

of a public officer and detaining another (ground four) (id. at 91-100; ECF No. 1-2 at 1-

10); (3) five true findings regarding wearing or exhibiting a badge or insignia while 

impersonating a public officer and detaining another (ground five) (id., ECF No. 1-2 at 

10-29); and (4) one count of child abuse likely to cause great bodily harm or death and 

one count of child cruelty (ground six) (id. at 30-32). 

1. State Court Decision and Standard of Review

This Court looks through to the last reasoned decision to address these claims –

that of the California Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. In denying 

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, the appellate court denied all four insufficiency of 

evidence claims on procedural grounds, stating: 

Kenniston also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

his convictions. “[C]laims of the insufficiency of evidence to support a 

conviction are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (In re Reno

(2012) 55 Cal. 4th 428, 505.) . . . Although Kenniston asserts that exceptions 

to these procedural bars should apply to his petition, he does not establish a 

valid basis for such an exception.

(Notice, ECF No. 19, Ex. C at 64-65.) 

Respondent argues the claims are procedurally defaulted and thus barred from 

federal habeas review. (Resp’t Answer, ECF No. 10-1 at 11.) However, because the 

Court finds that it is easier to dispose of the claims on the merits, the Court will not 

address the procedural bar invoked by Respondent.9 See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 

 

9 The Court notes that Respondent has not alleged the state law barring insufficiency of evidence 

claims from being asserted on habeas corpus is independent and adequate. See Bennett v. 

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the initial burden to be met in 

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518, 524-25 (1997); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that 

federal courts “are empowered to, and in some cases should, reach the merits of habeas 

petitions if they are, on their face and without regard to any facts that could be developed 

below, clearly not meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar.”); see also Smith v. 

Stewart, 407 Fed. Appx. 237, 237-38 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We need not address the state’s 

procedural default and exhaustion arguments because [the] petition is clearly without 

merit.”) Because the Court of Appeal rejected Kenniston’s sufficiency of evidence

claims on procedural grounds, this court will review them de novo. See Stanley v. 

Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011); Reynoso v. Guirbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109

(9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003).

2. Clearly Established Law

The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause is violated “if it is found 

that upon the evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof 

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); see 

also Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Cavazos v. Smith, 

565 U.S. 1, 6 (2011) (per curiam ). The Court must engage in a thorough review of the 

state court record and view the evidence in the “light most favorable to the prosecution 

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from this evidence.” Juan H., 408 F.3d 

at 1275 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

Furthermore, “[c]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence 

may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358 (quoting United 

States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir.) amended on denial of reh’g, 798 F.2d 

1250 (9th Cir. 1986)). A petitioner faces a “heavy burden” when seeking habeas relief by 

challenging the sufficiency of evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due 

process grounds. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275. A petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim 

 

determining the adequacy of a state procedural bar is Respondent’s and as such the state must 

“adequately ple[a]d the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an 

affirmative defense”). 

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must be examined “with reference to the elements of the criminal offense as set forth by 

state law.” Id. 

3. Conviction on Count One – Kidnapping (Claim Two) 

In ground two, Kenniston argues there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for kidnapping Mendez. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 21.) Under California law, to 

establish the crime of kidnapping, the prosecution must prove, “(1) a person was 

unlawfully moved by the use of physical force or fear; (2) the movement was without the 

person’s consent; and (3) the movement of the person was for a substantial distance.” 

People v. Jones, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 362 (Cal. App. 2003) (citing Cal. Penal Code § 

207(a)).10 

As to the first element, physical compulsion is not required. People v. Majors, 33 

Cal. 4th 321, 326 (Cal. 2004). When the victim “reasonably feels compelled under the 

circumstances to comply with the defendant’s orders under fear of harm or injury from 

the defendant, the asportation is forcible.” People v. Alvarez, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468 (Cal. 

App. 2016) (citing Majors, 33 Cal. 4th at 327).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is 

sufficient evidence to establish that Kenniston used force or fear to get Mendez to leave 

the apartment and get into his car without her consent. Mendez testified that Kenniston 

had choked her (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 18 at 1852, 1858), yanked her off the bed by her 

ankles (id. at 1860-61), and threatened her with a knife, ultimately stabbing a pillow 

inches away from her face (id. at 1864-67). She managed to free herself and went to a 

neighbors’ apartment. (Id. at 1851, 1867.) She asked her neighbor to call the police. (Id.

at 1870.) When she looked outside, she saw Kenniston letting air out of her car’s tires. 

(Id. at 1870, 1874.) She ran back to her apartment and before she could close and lock 

 

10 Section 207(a) states: “Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, 

steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into 

another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of 

kidnapping.” Cal. Penal Code § 207(a).

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the door, Kenniston pushed his way back in. (Id. at 1874-76.) Mendez told Petitioner the 

police were on the way. (Id. at 1875.) He grabbed her with both hands, led her to his car

and put her in the passenger seat. (Id. at 1876-77, 1880, 1883.) Mendez testified that she 

did not want to go with him and she did not want to get into his car. (Id. at 1879.) She 

wanted to wait for the police. (Id.) She stated that she was afraid of Kenniston. (Id. at 

1886.) Once in the car, she told him if he let her go she would not press charges. (Id. at 

1887.) Eventually, Kenniston calmed down somewhat and took her to a parking lot 

where Mendez’s sister picked her up. (Id.)

Mendez’s testimony regarding Kenniston’s physical assaults leading up to forcing 

her into his car against her will are sufficient to establish that he used both physical force 

and fear to get Mendez into his car. Furthermore, she testified that she did not want to 

leave the apartment with him and did not want to get into his car. As such, there was 

sufficient evidence that he took her away from the apartment without her consent. 

Majors, 33 Cal. 4th at 327. In sum, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, there is more than enough evidence to support Kenniston’s kidnapping

conviction.

In his Petition, Kenniston goes to great lengths to point to inconsistencies in 

Mendez’s testimony, her difficulty remembering certain specifics, and the fact that she 

admitted to being very anxious when testifying. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 2-58.) He 

argues there was no evidence presented that law enforcement was dispatched to the 

apartment following a 911 call. (Id. at 51.) He also notes that Mendez returned to testify 

a second time, during which she stated she remembered that she had been drinking on the 

day of the incident. He contends this testimony makes it “clear that there was not a

kidnapping but rather Mendez was intoxicated.” (Id. at 52.) 

All of this evidence was before the jury. Mendez admitted she was extremely 

anxious testifying and it was clear she had difficulty, at times, recalling specific details of 

certain events. It was for the jury to evaluate and determine whether Mendez’s testimony 

was credible. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358 (stating that a reviewing court “must respect 

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the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary 

conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury 

resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict.”); see also Wright v. West, 

505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992). On habeas review this Court must assume the jury resolved 

credibility disputes in favor of the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

After independently reviewing the state court record and considering the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact 

could have found that the essential elements of kidnapping (count one) were proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 319. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS 

ground two of the Petition be DENIED.

4. Convictions on Counts 15 and 20 (Claim Four)

In ground four, Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions for impersonation of a public officer and detaining another (Cal. Penal Code 

§146a) as to counts 15 and 20. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 91-100; ECF No. 1-2 at 1-9.) 

At trial, the jury was instructed that in order to convict Kenniston on counts 15 and 

20 (among others) the prosecution must prove that:

1. The defendant falsely represented himself to be a public officer 

with the specific intent of inducing another person to believe that he was a 

public officer; and

2. When the defendant falsely represented himself to be a public 

officer, he did any of the following:

(1) Arrested, detained or threatened to arrest or detain any 

person, or

(2) Otherwise intimidated any person.

(See Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 843.) The court further instructed the jury: “A person is 

detained if under the same or similar circumstances a reasonable person would feel he or 

she was not free to leave. A person can detain someone without using force.” (Id.)

/ / /

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Jessica Green’s daughter, Kylie, was 11 years old when her mother started dating 

Kenniston. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 22 at 1585.) Kylie testified that Kenniston told her 

and her mom that he was a funeral escort. (Id. at 2588.) Petitioner also told Kylie he was 

allowed to pull people over, and it was kind of the same thing as highway patrol. (Id. at 

2591.) His car looked like a police car. (Id. at 2589.) Kylie testified that Kenniston had 

a police scanner in his car and he told her he could talk to other policemen through the 

radio. He said his nickname was “the sergeant.” (Id., vol. 23 at 2621, 2623.) Kylie 

asked Petitioner if it was illegal to be listening to a police scanner and he replied, “Not if 

you’re a cop.” (Id. at 2624.) He told Kylie he was “like a cop.” (Id.) 

Kylie testified about several occasions when she was a passenger in Petitioner’s 

funeral escort car and he pulled people over. (See id. at 2595, 5897-98, 2604-06, 2614-

15, 2616-20.) With regard to count 15, Kylie testified that she was riding in the funeral 

escort car with Petitioner. They were driving near a shopping center when a blue car 

either ran a stoplight or was going too fast. Kenniston turned on his car’s flashing lights 

and pulled the driver over. Kylie testified that Petitioner got out of his car and went to 

talk to the driver. (Id. at 2602.) When Kenniston came back, Kylie asked him why he 

had not ticketed the driver. Petitioner replied he decided not to give a ticket because the 

driver realized what he did was wrong and had apologized. (Id. at 2597-98, 2601.) 

As to count 20, Kylie testified that Kenniston had been driving her to school. They 

were on the 805 freeway when she saw a yellow sports car. Petitioner said the car was 

“going 90 on the freeway.” (Id. at 2604.) Kenniston turned on his car’s overhead 

flashing lights and pulled over the yellow car. (Id. at 2605.) He told Kylie to stay in the 

car and he would be back soon. Kenniston approached the yellow car and returned after 

about five minutes. (Id. at 2606.) When Kenniston returned to his car, Kylie asked him 

why he did not give the driver a ticket. He told her he had left his ticket book at home 

and he didn’t want her to be late for school while waiting for a police officer to bring him 

a ticket book. (Id. at 2606-07.) Kenniston told Kylie the driver of the yellow car was a 

man in his 50s. (Id. at 2607.) 

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In addition to Kylie’s testimony regarding these two specific instances, evidence 

was presented showing that Kenniston had told others he had the power to pull people 

over (id., vol. 15 at 1397, vol. 20 at 2236-37) and other witnesses testified that his car 

looked like a law enforcement vehicle, complete with overhead light bar, sirens and dash 

lights. (See id., vol. 15 at 1401, 1559, 1562; vol. 16 at 1442-43, 1452-53, 1465; vol. 26 at 

3060-63.) Additional witnesses testified about other instances, similar to those described 

by Kylie, when Kenniston had pulled vehicles over. (Id., vol. 16 at 1560, 1620-21, 1638;

vol. 17 at 1702; vol. 22 at 2237-38.) 

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was more 

than sufficient evidence to support Kenniston’s convictions on counts 15 and 20. Kylie’s 

testimony established that in both cases, Kenniston used his car’s overhead flashing lights 

to get drivers to pull over. His car looked similar to a law enforcement vehicle. A 

reasonable juror could infer from this that Kenniston intended to induce both drivers to 

believe he was a law enforcement officer, in order to pull them over and detain them. 

Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support counts 15 and 20. 

Kenniston appears to argue that Kylie’s testimony was insufficient to establish that 

the drivers “believed” he was a law enforcement officer. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 7-8.) As 

noted above, the mere fact the drivers pulled over after Petitioner followed them with his 

vehicle’s overhead lights flashing, is sufficient for the jury to infer that they only stopped

because they believed he was a law enforcement officer. Moreover, section 146a 

requires only that Petitioner acted with “specific intent of inducing” the drivers to believe 

he was an officer. Cal. Penal Code § 146a. Given the other evidence of Petitioner 

pulling over vehicles and allowing the passengers to believe he was a police officer, there 

is more than sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Petitioner further argues that Kylie’s testimony was improper under the Federal 

Rules of Evidence 701. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 97-100.) First, the Federal Rules of 

Evidence are irrelevant to evidence presented at his trial in California state court. 

Moreover, Rule 701 pertains to opinion testimony of layperson. Specifically, it provides 

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that a nonexpert witness’s testimony “in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 

those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the 

witness, [and] (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the 

determination of a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Even if the Federal Rules of 

Evidence were applicable, Kylie’s testimony would not be excluded. She did not testify 

as to her opinion about what Kenniston’s intent was or what the drivers believed. She 

merely testified as to what she observed. The jury was left to infer from those facts 

whether Petitioner had specific intent to make the drivers believe he was a law 

enforcement officer when he pulled them over. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358.

Kenniston also argues that the inferences drawn from Kylie’s testimony were 

improper under California Evidence Code section 600, which states:

a) A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be 

made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in 

the action. A presumption is not evidence.

(b) An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and 

reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise 

established in the action.

Cal. Evid. Code § 600. As discussed above, a reasonable juror could properly 

deduce from Kylie’s testimony that Kenniston intended to impersonate an officer 

when he stopped the drivers.

Finally, Petitioner argues that because the drivers did not testify, there is no way to 

establish that they believed he was a law enforcement officer. (Pet., ECF No 1-2 at 7.) 

Again, Kenniston misunderstands the statute. It requires specific intent of “inducing 

another person to believe” the person was an officer – not that the person actually believe 

it. See Cal. Penal Code § 146a. Nonetheless, even if it were a requirement, the fact that 

the drivers both pulled over after Kenniston turned on his car’s overhead flashing lights is 

sufficient for a jury to infer the drivers did think he was an officer, with the power to 

detain them. 

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In conclusion, and for the foregoing reasons, viewing the entire record as a whole 

in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable juror could find that Kenniston was 

guilty of impersonating an officer as to counts 15 and 20, beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS ground four be 

DENIED.

5. California Penal Code §§ 5538d & 667.17 Allegations (Claim Five)

Petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence to support a true finding that he 

impersonated an officer during the commission of a felony, as to counts 8, 10, 15, 20 and 

22, pursuant to California Penal Code sections 538d, 667.17. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 10-

29.)

California Penal Code section 667.17 provides that “Any person who violates the 

provisions of Section 538d [impersonating a police officer] during the commission of a 

felony shall receive an additional one-year term of imprisonment to be imposed 

consecutive to the term imposed for the felony, in lieu of the penalty that would have 

been imposed under Section 538d.”11 In turn, section 538d, provides in pertinent part:

[A]ny person who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses, or who willfully 

makes, sells, loans, gives, or transfers to another, any badge, insignia, 

emblem, device, or any label, certificate, card, or writing, which falsely 

purports to be authorized for the use of one who by law is given the 

authority of a peace officer, or which so resembles the authorized badge, 

insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a peace officer 

as would deceive an ordinary reasonable person into believing that it is 

authorized for the use of one who by law is given the authority of a peace 

officer.

Cal. Penal Code § 538d(c). 

/ / /

/ / /

 

11 Convictions under California Penal Code section 538d are typically misdemeanors. See Cal. 

Penal Code § 538d(a).

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There is sufficient evidence to support the true findings on the section 538d 

allegations as to all claims. First, with regard to count eight, Lizbeth Figueroa testified 

that on March 11, 2011, she dropped her children off at Chula Vista Elementary School. 

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 16 at 1555-58.) She parked in the loading zone while she talked 

on the phone. She then saw what she believed was a police car pull up behind her with 

its lights on. She heard someone say over a speaker, “Please move your vehicle. This is 

not a parking zone.” The car pulled next to Figueroa and the man, later identified as 

Kenniston, told Figueroa she needed to move her car or he would tow it. (Id. at 1558-

59.) Figueroa noticed the words “Funeral Escort” on the side of the door. (Id. at 1562-

64.) Kenniston told Figueroa that her tags were expired and asked to see her license and 

registration. He then got on his radio and said it was going to be an “1185,” which 

Figueroa understood from her job as a security agent at a hospital to mean he was going 

to tow her. (Id. at 1564-66.) They both got out of their cars and she handed Petitioner, 

who was wearing a badge, her license and registration. (Id. at 1567.) She told Kenniston 

she had not had time to get to the DMV. After Figueroa told Petitioner she worked in 

security, his demeanor changed. Petitioner then introduced himself as “Kevin” and told 

her he had a friend at the DMV if she needed to go without waiting in line. (Id. at 1568.)

As for count ten, 16 year-old Ivan Fernandez testified that in June or July 2010, he 

picked up his friend Nichole Ballesteros. (Id. at 1603-06.) When Fernandez made a turn, 

he cut off a motorcycle with a “police officer” on it and almost got in an accident. 

Fernandez kept driving. The “officer” on the motorcycle made a U-turn, turned on his 

siren and pulled Fernandez over. (Id. at 1608-10, 1620.) The “officer,” later identified as 

Kenniston, asked Fernandez to get out of his car and sit on the curb. Fernandez testified 

that Petitioner was wearing a uniform, helmet, badge and the type of belt worn by police 

officers. (Id. at 1629.) Fernandez believed he was a police officer. (Id.) Petitioner gave 

Fernandez the option of having his car towed or apologizing to Ballestros’ mother. (Id. at 

1626.) Fernandez went to Ballesteros’ house and knocked on the door. Kenniston 

/ / /

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followed. Ballesteros’ mother testified that Petitioner was “dressed as a cop” identified 

himself as “Officer Kenniston.” (Id., vol. 17 at 1670.)

The evidence in support of counts 15 and 20 is discussed above in section V(C)(4) 

of this Report and Recommendation. In short, Kylie testified that Kenniston stopped two 

cars, using the flashing lights of his funeral escort car. (Id., vol. 22 at 2597-02, 2604-07.)

Finally, with regard to count 22, Kylie testified that Kenniston was driving her in 

his funeral escort vehicle to pick up a friend for a sleepover. (Id. at 2614.) They saw a 

homeless man near a freeway exit ramp. (Id.) Kennston said to Kylie, “Watch this,” and 

then got on his loud speaker and told the homeless man, “get off my freeway.” Kylie 

testified the man seemed scared and quickly gathered up his belongings. Petitioner then 

told the man he would buy him a pizza if he picked up trash on the freeway. (Id. at 2614-

15.) 

In addition to the testimony of Figueroa, Fernandez, Ballesteros and Kylie, 

additional evidence was presented that showed Petitioner’s funeral escort vehicle looked 

like a police car, with flashing red, amber and white lights on the top, as well as flashing 

blue lights in the grill and in the dash area. (Id., vol. 16 at 1530-31, 1537; vol. 20 at 

2203-05; vol. 26 at 3061-63.) Based on all the evidence presented and viewing it in the 

light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient evidence that Kenniston’s vehicle, 

uniform and badge “so resembled an authorized” badge, uniform and/or vehicle as to 

make a reasonable person believe they were authorized for use by a law enforcement 

officer. See Cal. Penal Code § 538d; Cf. e.g., People v. Diaz, 2005 WL 941402 (Cal. 

App. 2005) (unpublished) (stating that an ordinary reasonable person could be deceived 

by similarities in a badge, including the shape, the color, symbol, without making a 

detailed comparison of smaller, less visible words and symbols).

Kenniston further argues in claim five that the prosecutor engaged in selective and 

vindictive prosecution, in violation of his due process rights. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at

/ / /

/ / /

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13-25.) The decision whether to prosecute and what charges to bring generally rests 

entirely in the prosecutor’s discretion. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 

(1996); see also United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762, (1997) (holding courts 

generally have no place interfering with a prosecutor’s discretion regarding whom to 

prosecute, what charges to file, and whether to engage in plea negotiations); United 

States v. Duran, 41 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1994) (“If the prosecutor has probable cause 

to believe a defendant committed a crime, the decision of whether to prosecute and the 

charges to be filed rests with the prosecutor.”) Yet, while a prosecutor’s discretion is 

broad, it is not without limits. The decision to prosecute may not be based upon an 

unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, including the 

exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.

The Ninth Circuit has noted there is “little substantive difference” between 

selective prosecution and vindictive prosecution. United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 

502 (9th Cir. 1981). Vindictive prosecution arises when the government increases the 

severity of alleged charges in an attempt to punish a defendant for exercising a protected 

statutory or constitutional right. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). To 

establish actual prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant must show, through objective 

evidence, that the prosecutor acted with genuine animus toward the defendant for 

exercising a specific right, and that the defendant would not have been prosecuted “but 

for” that animus. Id. at 380 n. 12; United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 

(9th Cir. 1982).

Selective prosecution arises when a “petitioner alleges he is being initially 

prosecuted for having exercised a constitutional right.” Wilson, 639 F.2d at 502. To

establish selective prosecution, a petitioner must show “(1) that similarly situated persons 

have not been prosecuted and (2) that he was selected for prosecution on the basis of an 

impermissible ground such as race, religion or the exercise of constitutional rights.” 

United States v. DeTar, 832 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1987). 

/ / /

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Here, Kenniston claims that the prosecutor’s decision to charge him with the 

California Penal Code section 538d counts was motivated by a desire to punish him for 

exercising is First Amendment right to advertise his funeral escort business. (See Pet., 

ECF No. 1-2 at 16-17.) This argument is entirely speculative. Kenniston offers no 

evidence that the prosecutor sought to punish Petitioner for advertising his business. As 

such, the claim is without merit. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(stating that conclusory allegations do not warrant habeas relief).

Kenniston further argues that the prosecutor was improperly motivated to charge 

him under section 538d because of an uncharged allegation he may have pulled over the 

wife of a deputy district attorney. (Id. at 22-25.) Enrique Camarena briefly handled 

Petitioner’s case in the very early stages. (See Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 15-16.) After 

learning that his wife may have been pulled over by Petitioner in 2010, Camarena 

notified his supervisors and the case was assigned to another prosecutor, William La 

Fond, who was from another division of the District Attorney’s Office. (See Lodgment 

No. 1, vol. 1 at 11-14.) An “ethical wall” was established to avoid any conflicts. (See 

id.) No charges related to the stop of Camarena’s wife were ever brought.12 The trial 

court found there was no basis for recusing the District Attorney’s Office from 

prosecuting the case. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 14-15.) And that there was no 

evidence of “any desire to treat Mr. Kenniston differently or unfairly.” (Id. at 16-17.)

Petitioner again fails to show that the prosecutor acted with animus toward him. 

As discussed above, there was substantial evidence that Petitioner had impersonated a 

police officer on numerous occasions, using his funeral escort vehicle which looked 

strikingly similar to a police car, to induce people to pull over. Given the strength of the 

evidence against Petitioner in contrast to Camarena’s very brief involvement in the case, 

Petitioner has not established the any “genuine animus” on the part of Deputy District 

 

12 Mrs. Camarena never positively identified Kenniston as the person who pulled her over. (See

Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 15.)

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Attorney La Fond. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo there was some animus, 

Kenniston fails to establish it had anything to do with his exercise of his First 

Amendment rights. Thus, Petitioner’s vindictive prosecution claim is meritless.

Petitioner’s selective prosecution claim is similarly without merit. Petitioner 

argues other funeral escort services used similar logos, badges and patches and had not 

been similarly prosecuted. Yet he does not establish that the prosecutor in his case was 

motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253, 

1258 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Mere selectivity in prosecution . . . creates no constitutional 

problem. The impermissible selection must be shown to be based on an unjustifiable

standard[.]”) Petitioner has made no showing that the government focused its 

investigation on him because of any purported First Amendment activities.

In light of the evidence against him, neither the initial prosecution of Petitioner nor 

the severity of the charges suggest any improper motivation on the prosecution’s behalf, 

and therefore his claims of vindictive and selective prosecution claims are without merit. 

Moreover, viewing the entire record as a whole in the light most favorable to the verdict, 

a reasonable juror could find that Kenniston was guilty of California Penal Code section

538d as to counts 8, 10, 15, 20 and 22, beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. 

at 319. The Court RECOMMENDS claim five be DENIED. 

6. Convictions on Counts 18 and 19 (Claim Six)

In ground six, Kenniston argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 

child abuse (count 18) (Cal. Penal Code § 273a(a)) and cruelty to a child by endangering 

health (count 19) (Cal. Penal Code § 273a(b)). (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 30-32.)

Under California Penal Code section 273a(a), the prosecution must prove:

(1) The defendant, while having care or custody of a child, willfully 

caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation where the child’s 

person or health was endangered; and

/ / /

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(2) The defendant caused or permitted the child to be endangered 

under the circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or 

death; and 

(3) The defendant was criminally negligent when he caused or 

permitted the child to be endangered.

(See CALCRIM No. 821; Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 846; see also Cal. Penal Code § 

273a(a).)

California Penal Code section 273a(b) requires proof that:

(1) The defendant willfully caused or permitted a child to suffer 

unjustifiable mental suffering; or

(2) The defendant, while having care or custody of a child, willfully 

caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation where the child’s 

person or health was endangered.

(CALCRIM No. 823; Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 845; see also Cal. Penal Code § 

273a(b).) As the trial court instructed the jury, misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a(b)), is a 

lesser-included offense of felony child abuse (§ 273a(a)). (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 

860-61; see also People v. Lofink, 206 Cal. App. 3d 161, 168-69 (Cal. App. 1988).)

Kylie provided the bulk of the evidence against Petitioner as to counts 17 through 

19. She testified that she was riding in the funeral escort car with Kenniston. They were 

getting off an “off-ramp” near a 7-Eleven and the Telegraph Canyon Shopping Center 

and there was a man out of his car window, looking around in the bushes on the side of 

the road. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 2 at 1618.) Kenniston turned on his car’s siren and 

lights. There was not enough room to pull off the road so Petitioner stopped in the left 

exit ramp lane, blocking one lane of traffic. Petitioner, still in his car, asked the man 

what he was doing and the man responded that he was a college student and he was 

looking for his college parking pass, which had blown out his car window. (Id. at 2618-

19.) Kenniston got out of his car and helped the man look for the parking pass. After 

about three minutes, Petitioner said the parking pass was not there and told the student to 

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get off the road. (Id. at 2619.) The student thanked Kenniston, got in his car, and left. 

(Id. at 2620.)

The jury acquitted Kenniston of count 17 -- impersonating a public officer and 

detaining another, in violation of California Penal Code section 146a. Petitioner argues 

that because the jury found him not guilty on that count, he must necessarily be not guilty 

of the coinciding child abuse and child endangerment counts (counts 18 and 19). He 

claims the verdicts are inconsistent. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 30-31.) 

First, there is nothing inconsistent about the jury’s verdicts. It is possible to find 

that Kenniston was not guilty of count 17 because, according to Kylie’s testimony, 

Petitioner did not pull over the driver but rather came upon him, already stopped. Thus, 

the jury may have found there was insufficient evidence to conclude Petitioner had 

“detained” the driver while impersonating an officer. (See Cal. Penal Code § 146a.) This 

conclusion is not inconsistent with the guilty verdicts on counts 18 and 19. In order to 

find Petitioner guilty on both counts, the jury need only find that Kenniston, by stopping 

on the freeway ramp and blocking traffic with Kylie in his car, he had wilfully 

endangered her with criminal negligence, in a manner that could result in great bodily 

harm or death. (See Cal. Penal Code § 273a(a).)13 Therefore, given Kylie’s testimony, 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence 

to support the jury’s verdicts on counts 18 and 19. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

Furthermore, the Court notes that even if the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent, 

Kenniston would not be entitled to relief. Sufficiency of the evidence on one count is 

“independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on another count was 

insufficient.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984). The Supreme Court has 

“has made it clear that inconsistent verdicts may stand when one of those verdicts is a 

conviction and the other an acquittal.” Ferrizz v. Giurbino, 432 F.3d 990, 992-93 (9th 

 

13 Although the jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts 18 and 19, the trial court struck count 

19, the lesser-included offense, at sentencing. (See Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 1152.)

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Cir. 2005) (citing Powell, 469 U.S. at 65). As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[t]he 

underlying rationale of these cases is that the acquittal on one count may be explained as 

an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded in its view of the 

evidence.” Ferrizz, 432 F.3d at 993.

Thus, based on the foregoing, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the verdict, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to show there was insufficient evidence 

to support the jury’s findings as to counts 18 and 19. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS claim six be DENIED. 

D. Testimony of Expert Witness Mitch Kojima (Ground Three)

In ground three, Kenniston argues that his due process rights were violated when 

the trial court permitted the testimony of an expert witness. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 85-89.) 

He also contends the prosecution failed to comply with discovery rules, in violation of his 

due process rights. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 77-80.) 

The last reasoned state court decision to address this issue is that of the California 

Court of Appeal. In denying Petitioner’s habeas petition, the court concluded that this 

claim was procedurally barred because “habeas corpus is not an available remedy to 

review the rulings of the trial court with respect to the admission or exclusion of 

evidence. (In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal. 2d 709, 723.)” (Notice, ECF No. 19, Ex. C at 

65.) 

Respondent argues the claim is procedurally defaulted under In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 

2d 756, 759 (1953) because it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. 

(Resp’t Answer, ECF No. 10-1 at 10.) However, because the Court finds that it is easier 

to dispose of the claims on the merits, the Court will not address the procedural

bar invoked by Respondent.14 See Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 524-25; Franklin, 290 F.3d at

 

14 The Court notes that Respondent did not assert that the procedural bar ultimately imposed by 

the state court is independent and adequate. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586 (holding that the 

initial burden to be met in determining the adequacy of a state procedural bar is Respondent’s 

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1232 (noting that federal courts “are empowered to, and in some cases should, reach the 

merits of habeas petitions if they are, on their face and without regard to any facts that 

could be developed below, clearly not meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar.”); 

see also Smith, 407 Fed. Appx. at 237-38 (9th Cir. 2011). Because the court of appeal

rejected Kenniston’s claim regarding expert testimony on procedural grounds, this court 

will review the claim de novo. See Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109.

Kenniston argues that the trial court improperly allowed the expert testimony of 

Mitch Kojima, an investigator for the California Department of Consumer Affairs, 

Bureau Security Investigate Services (BSIS). (See Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 59-90.) The 

BSIS regulates private security companies, locksmiths, private investigators and security 

alarm companies. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 20 at 2191-92.) Kojima testified about how 

private security officers dress, including badges and patches, must differ from the dress 

of a law enforcement officer. (Id. at 2193-95.) Kojima also testified regarding the 

manner in which private security vehicles must differ in appearance from official police 

cars. For instance, Kojima testified that only amber lights are permitted on security 

vehicles and, if Kenniston’s escort car were submitted to him as a private security 

vehicle, Kojima would conclude it to be in violation of the law because its red lights and

markings did not clearly indicate it was not a law enforcement vehicle. Kojima testified 

that it was his opinion that a vehicle such as Kenniston’s could be confused with a police 

car. (Id. at 2203-04.) He further testified that Petitioner’s badge, patches and uniform 

would be in violation of state laws if it were used by a private security person because of 

their similarity to Highway Patrol uniforms. (Id. at 2205, 2209.) Kojima admitted, 

however, that California law permitted vehicles to have the markings on Petitioner’s car 

if it is being utilized in a funeral procession. Kojima further admitted that the BSIS does 

not regulate funeral escort vehicles. (Id. at 2212-13.) 

 

and as such the state must “adequately ple[a]d the existence of an independent and adequate 

state procedural ground as an affirmative defense”). 

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Petitioner alleges that Kojima’s testimony should not have been admitted because 

his duties at the BSIS did not include regulation of funeral escorts. Therefore, Kenniston 

argues, Kojima’s opinion regarding Petitioner’s vehicles and uniform was irrelevant and

unduly prejudicial. (See Pet., ECF No. 101 at 84-86.) Furthermore, Petitioner argues 

Kojima’s testimony was contrary to California Evidence Code sections 720 and 801.15

First, to the extent Kenniston asserts the trial court’s admission of the challenged 

testimony was in violation of California rules of evidence, his claim is not cognizable on 

 

15 California Evidence Code section 720 states: 

(a) A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the 

subject to which his testimony relates. Against the objection of a party, such 

special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education must be shown before 

the witness may testify as an expert.

(b) A witness’ special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may be 

shown by any otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony.

Cal. Evid. Code § 720.

California Evidence Code section 801 states:

If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is 

limited to such an opinion as is:

(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common 

experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; 

and

(b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally 

known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, 

whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be 

relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to 

which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law 

from using such matter as a basis for his opinion.

Cal. Evid. Code § 801.

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habeas review and must be denied. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) 

(finding issues regarding state law are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review 

and it is not the province of the federal habeas court to re-examine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions); Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir.

2000). 

“Evidence erroneously admitted warrants habeas relief only when it results in the 

denial of a fundamentally fair trial in violation of the right to due process.” Briceno v. 

Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68). Failure 

to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for 

granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 

1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). The 

due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was 

arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Walters, 45 F.3d 

at 1357. Only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the 

evidence can its admission violate due process. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Here, there 

were permissible inferences a jury could draw from Kojima’s testimony. For instance, 

the jury could properly infer that Kenniston’s uniform, badge and vehicle were of the 

type that could be confused with those used by law enforcement personnel.

Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner argues the admission of Kojima’s testimony 

was irrelevant and prejudicial, he is not entitled to habeas relief. The Supreme Court 

“has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial 

evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” 

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that trial court’s 

admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally unfair” under Ninth 

Circuit precedent but not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established United States Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)); see also Zapien v. 

Martel, 805 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that because there is no United 

States Supreme Court case establishing the fundamental unfairness of admitting multiple 

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hearsay testimony, Holley bars any such claim on federal habeas review). Absent such 

“clearly established Federal law,” the Court cannot conclude that the state court’s ruling 

was an “unreasonable application” thereof. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 

(2006) (“Given the lack of holdings from this Court. . .it cannot be said that the state 

court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.”’)

Even assuming Kojima’s expert testimony was improperly admitted in violation of 

due process, Petitioner is not entitled to relief because the error did not have “‘a 

substantial and injurious effect’ on the verdict.” Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n. 7 

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). Here, the trial 

court specifically instructed the jury on how to evaluate the expert opinion testimony by 

providing CALCRIM No. 332, which states:

Witnesses were allowed to testify as an expert and to give opinions. 

You must consider the opinions, but you are not required to accept them as 

true or correct. The meaning and importance of any opinion are for you to 

decide. In evaluating the believability of an expert witness, follow the 

instructions about the believability of witnesses generally. In addition, 

consider the expert’s knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, 

the reasons the expert gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on 

which the expert relied in reaching that opinion. You must decide whether 

information on which the expert relied was true and accurate. You may 

disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or 

unsupported by the evidence.

An expert witness may be asked a hypothetical question. A 

hypothetical question asks the witness to assume certain facts are true and to 

give an opinion based on the assumed facts. It is up to you to decide 

whether an assumed fact has been proved. If you conclude that an assumed 

fact is not true, consider the effect of the expert’s reliance on that fact in 

evaluating the expert’s opinion.

(Lodgment No. 2, vol. 4 at 822.) As such, the jury was free to consider the fact that 

Kojima’s job at the BSIS did not specifically include regulation of funeral escort vehicles 

or uniforms. Furthermore, the jury had plenty of opportunity to evaluate whether the 

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Kenniston’s escort vehicle, his uniform and badge were such that a reasonable person 

might believe they were that of a law enforcement officer, even without Kojima’s opinion 

on the matter. Several witnesses, including Figueroa, Fernandez, Nichole Ballesteros and 

Amparo Ballesteros, testified that they mistook Kenniston’s vehicle for a police car (see

Lodgment No. 2, vol. 16 at 1558-59) and that Kenniston’s uniform looked like that of a 

police officer. (Id. at 1530-31, 1537, 1629, 1638-39; vol. 17 at 1670; vol. 20 at 2203-05;

vol. 26 a 3061-63.) The jury also saw several photographs of Kenniston’s vehicle and 

uniform. (See e.g., id., vol. 26 at 3056-63.) Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner 

cannot show that any purported error had a substantial injurious effect on the verdict. See 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.

Finally, Petitioner argues the defense failed to provide notice of Kojima’s 

testimony 30 days prior to trial, as required under California Penal Code section 1054.7. 

(Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 86.) As discussed above, because federal habeas corpus relief may 

be granted only for a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, the claim 

is not cognizable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68, (holding that 

federal habeas corpus relief is not available to remedy alleged errors of state law); see 

also Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919 (federal courts sitting in habeas corpus do not review 

question of state evidence law).

In sum, Petitioner has not shown his due process rights were violated by the 

admission of expert testimony from Mitch Kojima. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Even assuming such a violation, Kenniston would not be entitled to relief because 

he has not shown any error had a substantial injurious effect. See Brecht, 507 U.S. 

at 638. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS claim three be DENIED. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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E. Severance (Ground Eight)

In ground eight, Kenniston argues his due process rights were violated by the trial 

court’s failure to sever the charges. Specifically, he contends his due process rights were 

violated when the trial court denied his request that counts one and two (Mendez counts) 

be severed from counts 3-6, 23, 26-32 (Green counts), and that both these cases also be 

severed from counts 7-10 and 13-22 (impersonation and child endangerment counts). 

(See Pet., ECF No. 38-48.)

Kenniston raised this claim in his petition for review to the California Supreme 

Court and it was denied without comment. (See Lodgment Nos. 6 & 7.) Thus, this Court 

“looks through” to the last reasoned decision to address this claim, that of the California 

Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The appellate court denied the claim, 

stating:

A. Trial Court Ruling Denying Severance

In denying defendant’s pretrial motion to sever, the trial court ruled in 

part as follows:

“Here what we have are what the defense term three 

separate cases. Case number one concerns Counts 1 and 2 

where the alleged victim is Esmeralda Mendez, events from 

2007 allege kidnapping and false imprisonment as counsel has 

termed it domestic violence.

“Case two is Counts 3 through 6, 23, and 26 through 32 

where the alleged victim is Jessica G. as well as Kylie G., the 

daughter of Jessica. Alleged disobeying of restraining orders 

and cruelty of a child, events in 2011. Similarly, domestic 

violence related allegations.

“Count 3 -- or case three concerns Counts 7 through 10 

and 13 through 22, alleged impersonating of an officer with 

multiple alleged victims, events from 2010 and 2011.

“Looking at the types of cases, as I have indicated, case 

number one as well as case number two appear to have the 

same class of crimes insofar as both are domestic violence 

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related offenses, alleged DV and alleged DV violation of 

restraining order. Thus, the same class of crimes. [¶] . . . [¶]

“Cases one and two also appear to have cross admissible 

evidence under Evidence Code Section 1109, Subdivision 

(a)(1). There is, contrary to the defense position, it would not 

be simply a two-witness case as against Esmeralda, he said/she 

said. But because of 1109, there would be cross admissibility 

of evidence concerning Jessica G. and other alleged victims of 

domestic violence such that it would not be a two-witness case.

“So in terms of judicial economy, if there were a 

severance, it would be presenting all that 1109 evidence twice, 

once for case number one, once for case number two. So 

judicial economy is not served in that way.

“Also, the Court understands that Evidence Code Section 

352 is ultimately an additional consideration when evaluating 

1109 evidence, and I will defer that until a further discussion 

momentarily.

“Looking at what we have here between cases one and 

two is four-year gap between 2007 and 2011. That does not 

appear to be too great of a distance, given that both are of the 

same class of domestic violence conflict and both appear to be 

of the same amount of alleged violence, this does not appear to 

be a situation where . . . one case is grossly violent and the 

other comparatively benign. The level of alleged violence in 

both appears to be on par.

“Now, balancing the prejudice versus the probative value 

under [Evidence Code section] 352, the Court has examined the 

prejudice versus the probative value and finds that it would be 

more probative than prejudicial. And, again, I will go through 

some additional factors momentarily.

“Looking at cases two and three, while false 

impersonation is not the same class, they do appear to be 

connected in their commission insofar as Kylie G. was present, 

as I believe counsel indicated, in five out of the eight alleged 

instances of impersonating an officer, the same Kylie G. that is 

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connected with case two. The percipient witness to quite a few 

of these events.

“So, it’s the first prong of Penal Code Section 954 

connected together in their commission that would attach 

counts two -- both cases two and case three.

“But looking at the [Evidence Code section] 352 

considerations, some of the factors that the Court has examined 

include the fact that are [sic] some of the charges more likely to 

inflame the jury than the other[s]. Looking at them on the 

balance, the Court answers that no, it does not appear that some 

are more prejudicial or inflammatory, that -- that it would 

prejudice the alleged weaker case.

“Secondly, are the People attempting to join a weak case 

with a stronger case to bolster the weak case? The defense has 

indicated that case number one is the stronger case. Looking at 

this as a two-witness, he said/she said, but as the Court 

indicated, because of [Evidence Code section] 1109, it would 

not be a he said/she said two witness, there would be multiple 

people testifying as to 1109 evidence. So it would be much 

more than that. So it does not appear to be attaching a strong 

case to bolster a weak case.

“Third, is this a situation where one of the charges is a 

capital offense [?] The answer to that is no.

“So balancing the prejudice and the probative value, it 

does not appear under [Evidence Code section] 352 that the 

Court should separate and sever cases one, two, or three from 

being tried together.

“And, finally, is this a situation where there would be a 

gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due process[?] 

[Citation.] It does not appear to be such a situation. [¶] 

Therefore, based on all of these reasons, the motion will be 

denied.”

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B. Guiding Principles

Section 954 provides in part: “An accusatory pleading may charge 

two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or . .

. of the same class of crimes or offenses. . . . [P]rovided, that the court in 

which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, 

may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in 

the accusatory pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more 

groups and each of said groups tried separately.”

“For purposes of joinder, offenses are deemed to have been 

‘connected together in their commission’ where there was a common 

element of substantial importance in their commission, even though the 

offenses charged did not relate to the same transaction and were committed 

at different times and places and against different victims. [Citations.] 

Similarly, within the meaning of section 954, offenses are ‘of the same 

class’ if they possess common characteristics or attributes.” (Aydelott v. 

Superior Court (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 718, 722; see People v. Lucky (1988) 

45 Cal.3d 259, 276.)

The law prefers consolidation or joinder of charged offenses in the 

interests of judicial economy (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 

1205, 1220), and the language of section 954 shows legislative intent for a 

“very broad test for joinder” (id. at p. 1217). Indeed, the joinder of related 

charges, “‘whether in a single accusatory pleading or by consolidation of 

several accusatory pleadings, ordinarily avoids needless harassment of the 

defendant and the waste of public funds which may result if the same 

general facts were to be tried in two or more separate trials [citation], and in 

several respects separate trials would result in the same factual issues being 

presented in both trials.’” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 409; see 

Alcala v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1220 [noting that “because 

consolidation or joinder of charged offenses ordinarily promotes efficiency, 

that is the course of action preferred by the law”].)

C. Analysis

1. Severance of Mendez Counts and Jessica G. Counts

Defendant admits both the Mendez counts and the Jessica G. counts 

involved domestic violence. This concession alone shows their joinder was 

proper. However, even without the concession, we have little difficulty 

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concluding the trial court properly exercised its discretion (see People v. 

Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 27-28) in refusing to sever the Mendez counts 

and the Jessica G. counts because the record contains ample evidence 

supporting the finding that both the Mendez counts and the Jessica G. counts 

were of the “same class of crimes or offenses” under section 954. That is, 

both the Mendez counts and the Jessica G. counts involved domestic 

violence, the subsequent violation of a domestic violence restraining order 

and false imprisonment of a domestic violence victim. Because both the 

Mendez counts and the Jessica G. counts possessed common characteristics 

and attributes, their joinder was proper. (See Alcala v. Superior Court, 

supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1220; Aydelott v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 722.)

Once criminal charges are properly joined, as in the instant case, the 

“‘burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a 

substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately 

tried.’” (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 773.) To meet this burden, 

a defendant must show the ruling fell “‘“outside the bounds of reason.”’”

(Id. at p. 774.)

“In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion under 

section 954 in declining to sever properly joined charges, ‘we consider the 

record before the trial court when it made its ruling’” and focus on “‘certain 

criteria [that] have emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and 

reviewing a motion to sever trial.’” (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 

774.)

“First, we consider the cross-admissibility of the evidence in 

hypothetical separate trials. [Citation.] If the evidence underlying the 

charges in question would be cross-admissible, that factor alone is normally 

sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court's 

refusal to sever properly joined charges.” (People v. Soper, supra, 45 

Cal.4th at pp. 774-775.)

Here, defendant wisely has conceded that the Mendez counts and the 

Jessica G. counts were cross-admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 

1109, subdivision (a)(1), which provides (with exceptions not relevant here): 

“[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense 

involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of 

other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the 

evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”

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He nonetheless contends he made a “clear showing of potential 

prejudice” (People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 172) to warrant 

severance because: (1) the counts and facts surrounding Mendez allegedly 

were far more serious than those surrounding Jessica G., thus causing the 

jury to become inflamed against defendant; and (2) the evidence related to 

both sets of counts allegedly was relatively weak, and, thus, the cases were 

brought together for their collective strength.

Regarding defendant’s first contention, we disagree the Mendez 

counts were more serious, much less “far more serious” as he posits, than the 

Jessica G. counts such that joinder was likely to inflame the jury against 

him. The evidence in the record shows in both the Mendez counts and the 

Jessica G. counts defendant repeatedly physically abused the victims, 

including pushing them against the wall, choking them and striking them 

after he had become angry. The record also shows neither Mendez nor 

Jessica G. sustained serious injury from the abuse, a fact which further 

supports a finding there was no prejudice, much less a “clear showing of 

potential prejudice” (see People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 172) 

absent joinder.

We also reject defendant’s contention he established the requisite 

prejudice because the evidence related to both the Mendez counts and the 

Jessica G. counts was relatively weak, and, thus, the cases were brought 

together for their collective strength. [footnote omitted] As already noted, 

both Mendez and Jessica G. were victims of domestic violence by 

defendant; both were set to testify and did testify about defendant’s multiple 

acts of domestic violence against them that possessed common 

characteristics; and both escaped serious injury as a result of the acts of 

violence by defendant. As such, we reject this contention.

“In any event, as between any two charges, it always is possible to 

point to individual aspects of one case and argue that one is stronger than the 

other. A mere imbalance in the evidence, however, will not indicate a risk 

of prejudicial ‘spillover effect,’ militating against the benefits of joinder and 

warranting severance of properly joined charges. [Citation.] Furthermore, 

the benefits of joinder are not outweighed -- and severance is not required --

merely because properly joined charges might make it more difficult for a 

defendant to avoid conviction compared with his or her chances were the 

charges to be separately tried. [Citation.]” (People v. Soper, supra, 45 

Cal.4th at p. 781.)

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Because defendant has been unable to establish the requisite “clear 

showing of potential prejudice” required to sever properly joined charges 

(see People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 172) and because the benefits 

of joinder clearly outweighed any alleged potential prejudice to him (see 

People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783), we have little difficulty 

concluding on this record that the court properly exercised its discretion in 

denying defendant’s motion to sever the Mendez counts and the Jessica G. 

counts.

2. Severance of Mendez/Jessica G. Counts and Impersonation/Child 

Endangerment Counts

Defendant also contends the court abused its discretion and thus erred 

when it refused to sever the Mendez counts and the Jessica G. counts 

(sometimes hereafter domestic violence counts), on the one hand, from the 

impersonation/child endangerment counts, on the other hand.

The record shows that throughout their approximate 10-month 

relationship, defendant repeatedly represented to Jessica G. and her daughter 

Kylie that he possessed the power and authority of a sworn police officer. It 

was this same power and authority defendant exercised when he repeatedly 

stopped and/or detained others as charged in the impersonation counts, 

including in count 8 when defendant, in front of Kylie, detained Figueroa at 

Kylie’s school. Because of the overlap of witnesses in the Jessica G. counts 

and the impersonation/child endangerment counts and because in those 

counts defendant’s abuse of authority was at issue, we conclude the court 

properly exercised its discretion when it found these counts were properly 

joined for purposes of section 954.

Having concluded joinder was proper, as noted ante, the burden 

shifted to defendant to “‘clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of 

prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.’” (See People v. 

Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 172.) Defendant has not met this burden.

Here, the evidence regarding defendant’s repeated representations to 

Jessica G. and Kylie that he had the same power and authority as a police 

officer, even when separately confronted by Jessica G. and Kylie on this 

very issue, was clearly admissible in the impersonation counts. Moreover, 

evidence that defendant was restraining and detaining others and holding 

himself out to be something that he was not (i.e., a police officer) was also 

admissible in connection with the Jessica G. counts, where defendant also 

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held himself out to Jessica G. to be something that he was not (i.e., a police 

officer and a mercenary on his way overseas to participate in a dangerous 

mission that could result in him being “KIA”).

In addition, the record shows Jessica G.’s daughter Kylie was a 

passenger in defendant’s car in several instances when defendant pulled over 

motorists or otherwise exercised his alleged authority as a sworn police 

officer. What’s more, Kylie was involved in and/or witnessed various 

incidents relevant to the Jessica G. counts including, by way of example 

only, the incident involving Figueroa in count 8, and the incident when 

Kylie believed defendant came to their home while her mother was at work 

and, in violation of a restraining order, knocked on the back door and 

“jiggled” the front door.

Defendant nonetheless contends he made the requisite clear showing 

of potential prejudice to warrant severance of the domestic violence counts 

from the impersonation/child endangerment counts because “[w]ithout the 

evidence related to Ms. Mendez and Ms. [G.], [defendant] would appear as 

an overzealous citizen who broke the law.” However, as a result of the 

evidence from the domestic violence counts, defendant contends he 

allegedly was viewed as someone “sinister, controlling and power hungry,” 

which thus inflamed the jury against him.

However, even absent evidence from the domestic violence counts, 

there is ample evidence in the record to show defendant was -- using his own 

words -- “sinister, controlling and power hungry” in connection with the 

impersonation counts, thus defusing his contention the jury was inflamed 

against him as a result of joinder of the domestic violence counts.

By way of example only, defendant did not appear to be merely an 

“overzealous citizen who broke the law” in connection with count 22. In 

this incident, he told Kylie to “‘watch this.’” He then slowed down his car 

while driving on a freeway and, over the loudspeaker, told a homeless man 

to “‘get off of my freeway.’” Defendant scared the homeless man, which 

appears in part to have been his motivation, and then offered to buy the man 

a pizza if he picked up trash along the freeway. This incident and others

/ / /

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(i.e., count 8 involving Figueroa or count 10 involving Fernandez and 

Ballesteros) support a finding the jury was not unduly inflamed against 

defendant, as he contends, because the domestic violence counts were joined 

with the impersonation/child endangerment counts.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 17-26.)

The state court’s decision was not contrary to, or unreasonable application of,

clearly-established federal law. First, no clear Supreme Court precedent exists, to date, 

that establishes a constitutional violation for a misjoinder of claims. See Runningeagle, 

686 F.3d at 776-77 (finding that existing Supreme Court cases did not establish clearly 

established law when misjoinder rises to a level of a constitutional violation) (citation 

omitted); see also, e.g., Martinez v. Yates, 585 F. App’x 460, 460 (9th Cir. 2014) ( “There 

is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent dictating when a trial in state court 

must be severed.”); Collins v. Uribe, 564 F. App’x 343, 343 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The 

Supreme Court has never held that a trial court’s failure to provide separate trials on 

different charges implicates a defendant’s right to due process.”); Grajeda v. Scribner, 

541 F. App’x 776, 778 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has not held that a state or 

federal trial court’s denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violation the Constitution.”) 

“Because [there is] no clear answer to the question presented, . . . ‘it cannot be said that a 

state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.’” Wright v. Van Patten, 

552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (quoting Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77).

In any event, even assuming there is clearly established federal law permitting him 

to exert a due process right, the state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, 

nor an unreasonable application of, that law. Although the Supreme Court has never 

directly addressed the question, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “‘[f]ederal habeas is 

available for improper consolidation only if the simultaneous trial ‘actually render[ed the] 

state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process.’” Park v. California, 

202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 

1503 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant’s burden to establish a due process violation in this 

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regard requires that he demonstrate that actual, and not just potential, prejudice resulted 

as the events unfolded during the trial. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 94-95 

(1954); see also Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (2000). The Ninth Circuit has 

recognized a “particularly great” risk of prejudice whenever joinder; (1) “allows evidence 

of other crimes to be introduced in a trial where the evidence would otherwise be 

inadmissible,” or (2) results in “joinder of a strong evidentiary case with a weaker one.” 

Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772. Finally, in order to obtain habeas relief, the impermissible 

joinder must have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict. Id. (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623.)

Here, as the state court noted, the charges related to Mendez and Green were very 

similar in that they both concerned incidents of domestic violence. Moreover, under 

California state law, prior acts of domestic violence may be admitted to show propensity 

to commit acts of domestic violence, so long as the probative value outweighs the 

prejudicial effect. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1109(a)(1).16 Thus, as the state court found, 

evidence as to both the Mendez and Green counts was cross-admissible and therefore the 

risk of prejudice from joinder was minimal. Even assuming evidence of the domestic 

violence counts was not cross-admissible as to the impersonation counts, a violation 

based on the lack of cross-admissibility of evidence, alone, does not warrant habeas 

relief. See Park, 202 F.3d at 1149-50. 

Furthermore, this was not a case where the evidence of one case was substantially 

weaker than the other. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(concluding that denial of motion to sever trial of capital and noncapital charges based on 

separate incidents not a violation of due process because evidence was cross-admissible, 

the weight of evidence with respect to each incident was roughly equal, the evidence as to 

 

16 Section 1109(a)(1) provides that: “[I]n a criminal action in which the [petitioner] is accused of 

an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the [petitioner]’s commission of other 

domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible 

pursuant to Section 352.”

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each incident was distinct, and the jury was properly instructed). The strength of both 

domestic violence cases similarly relied primarily on the testimony of the victim. 

Moreover, the counts related to impersonation of an officer rested often rested on the 

testimony of a single eyewitness. 

Finally, the jury acquitted Petitioner of several counts related to Green (including 

violation of a protective order) and the impersonation of an officer counts and child abuse 

counts. (See Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 1115-16.) Thus, the record in this case does not 

support a conclusion that the joinder, even assuming it was improper, had a substantial 

and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. See Park, 202 F.3d at 1149-50 

(finding joinder generally does not result in prejudice if the jury did not convict on all 

counts because it presumably was able to compartmentalize the evidence); see also 

Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772. Accordingly, given the strength of the cases, the crossadmissibilty of evidence and the lack of prejudice, Kenniston has failed to establish the 

joinder of the cases violated his due process rights. See Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 776-

77; see also Park, 202 F.3d at 1149. 

Therefore, the Court concludes the state court’s denial of his severance claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The Court RECOMMENDS claim 

eight be DENIED.

F. Denial of Continuance and Substitution of Counsel (Ground Nine)

In claim nine, Kenniston argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 

violated when the trial court denied his request to substitute retained counsel for 

appointed counsel. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 49-69.) Specifically, on the eve of trial, 

Petitioner sought to have a newly retained counsel substituted for his public defender. 

The trial court denied the request because the retained counsel required a continuance of

at least 45 days to prepare. Kenniston argues the denial of the continuance effectively 

denied him his right to counsel of his choice. (See id. at 49, 68-69.)

/ / /

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Kenniston raised this claim in his petition for review to the California Supreme 

Court and it was denied without comment. (See Lodgment Nos. 6 & 7.) Thus, this Court 

“looks through” to the last reasoned decision to address this claim, that of the California 

Court of Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. In denying the claim, the appellate court 

stated: 

Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion when, 

after seven earlier continuances, it denied his request on the date trial was to 

begin to substitute in new counsel who was unfamiliar with defendant's case.

A. Additional Background

The record shows defendant was indicted by the grand jury in midMay 2011. In late June 2011, public defender Jesus Romero was appointed 

to represent defendant. On October 12, 2011, the day trial was set to begin, 

defendant sought and obtained a trial continuance to March 5, 2012. 

Thereafter, trial was continued to March 12, 2012.

On March 8, 2012, the court granted defendant’s request to represent 

himself after it denied his request for new counsel pursuant to People v. 

Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Trial was then set for June 20, 2012. 

However, on May 24, 2012, the record shows the court continued 

defendant’s trial to September 10, 2012. In so doing, the court found that 

there was nothing “specific about contact with people or potential witnesses 

that would cause [the court] to believe that [defendant] need[ed] a 

continuance” and that, when the court previously granted defendant’s 

request to represent himself, it informed him to be ready for trial. The 

record shows the court nonetheless granted defendant’s request for a 

continuance, noting it would be the last.

The record shows defendant on August 7, 2012 requested 

reappointment of a public defender. The court granted that request, 

reappointed Romero to represent defendant and subsequently granted 

defendant’s request to continue the trial to October 22, 2012.

On October 22, 2012, attorney Mark Edelman specially appeared on 

behalf of defendant, requesting he be substituted in as defendant’s new 

counsel. Edelman explained to the court that on October 18, 2012, he had 

viewed an ad on the internet posted by defendant’s friend seeking an 

attorney to handle defendant’s trial. Edelman noted he had been 

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misinformed that defendant was then representing himself and that there had 

been no prior continuances in the case, when in fact defendant’s trial had 

been continued at least seven times.

If appointed, Edelman estimated he could be ready to start trial the 

last week of November 2012. However, after learning the number of 

proposed witnesses the People intended to call, Edelman revised that 

estimate during the hearing and said he “maybe” would be ready to start trial 

in the middle of December.

In denying defendant’s motion to substitute in new counsel, the trial 

court looked at the history of the case and found that if Edelman was 

appointed, there would be a “great disruption or delay” [footnote omitted] as 

a result of “new counsel coming up to speed,” as Edelman “would not be 

ready until possibly mid December” (italics added) given the complexity of 

the case; and that, unlike Edelman, Romero and the People were prepared to 

start trial that day.

In addition, the court noted that defendant’s refusal to cooperate with 

Romero or make a good faith effort to resolve any potential disagreements 

with him was not a basis to substitute in Edelman as defendant’s counsel. In 

this regard, Romero noted at the hearing that defendant was choosing not to 

communicate with him; that defendant had asked him to do things that were 

“illegal in nature”; and that defendant surmised Romero was “complicit” 

with the district attorney’s office and was “working against him.” Romero

also indicated that in the past few weeks he had received sporadic phone 

calls from lawyers responding to the internet ad placed by defendant’s 

friend.

The record further shows that after the trial court refused to substitute 

Edelman as defendant’s counsel, at defendant’s request it conducted a 

People v. Marsden hearing and ultimately refused to remove Romero as 

defendant’s counsel and appoint new counsel. [footnote omitted]

B. Guiding Principles

A defendant “who does not require appointed counsel” has the right 

under the Sixth Amendment “to choose who will represent him [or her].” 

(United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 144.) That right, 

however, is “not absolute” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 311) 

and “can be forced to yield if the court determines the appointment at issue 

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will result ‘in a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable 

under the circumstances of the particular case.’ [Citations.] A trial court has 

‘wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of 

fairness [citation] and against the demands of its calendar [citation]. The 

court has, moreover, an “independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials 

are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal 

proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.” [Citation.]’ (United 

States v. Gonzalez-Lopez [, supra,] 548 U.S. [at p.] 152.)” (People v. 

Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 872.) A “‘disruption of the orderly 

processes of justice’” may result from a defendant’s untimely request to 

discharge counsel. (See People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983.)

C. Analysis

Here, the record shows that when Edelman specially appeared on 

October 22 after first seeing the internet ad on October 18, 2012, he had 

virtually no information concerning defendant’s case, which, as suggested 

by our discussion ante concerning severance, involved multiple counts and 

multiple witnesses spanning the course of years. During the course of the 

October 22, 2012 hearing, the record shows Edelman already had revised his 

forecast of when he possibly could be ready to start trial, stating initially he 

could be ready at the end of November 2012 but then subsequently revising 

that estimate to mid-December, “maybe.”

In addition, as Edelman himself recognized, he had been given 

improper information prior to the hearing, inasmuch as the record shows the 

trial already had been continued at least seven times, even after the court 

warned there would be no further continuances. What’s more, the record 

also shows defendant already had been afforded previous opportunities to 

change representation, including close to or on the eve of trial (with 

accompanying delays in the start of trial).

Under these circumstances, we conclude the court properly exercised 

its discretion when it found defendant’s eleventh-hour request to substitute 

in new counsel would have adverse effects on the orderly administration of 

justice, as it would have prompted yet another delay of trial of at least close 

to two months -- and likely much longer, given the complexity of the case 

and given Edelman had virtually no familiarity with the case when he was 

making (and already revising during the same hearing) his estimate of when 

he could be ready. (See People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 311 

[concluding the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the 

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defendant’s motion to relieve counsel during an evidentiary hearing on the 

defendant’s new trial motion because new counsel not only would have to 

become familiar with the specific issues raised in such motion but also 

would have had to study the “entire lengthy trial record, resulting in 

significant delays”]; see also People v. Keshishian (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 

425, 429 [concluding the trial court properly rejected the defendant's attempt 

to discharge counsel and delay the start of trial when that request was made 

on the date trial was set to begin].)

(Lodgment No. 5 at 28-32.)

It is clearly established under the Sixth Amendment that criminal defendants who 

have the means to hire their own attorneys generally have a right to such private counsel 

of their choice. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (holding 

that the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendant right to be represented by qualified 

attorney whom defendant can afford to hire); see also Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 

U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (stating that “a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to 

secure counsel of his own choice”). However, the right to retained counsel of choice is 

not absolute and, “if in the sound discretion of the court, the attempted exercise of choice 

is deemed dilatory or otherwise subversive of orderly criminal process, the judge may 

compel a defendant to proceed with designated counsel.” Lofton v. Procunier, 487 F.2d 

434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1465 

(9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the right to counsel of choice “must give way where its 

vindication would create a serious risk of undermining public confidence in the integrity 

of our legal system”). 

In general, “[t]rial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling 

trials.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 (1983). In that regard, “broad discretion 

must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary 

‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates the 

right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 

(1964)). “There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so 

arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances 

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present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time 

the request is denied.” Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589-90 (citations omitted); see also Houston v. 

Schomig, 533 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008); Miller v. Blackletter, 525 F.3d 890, 896-

98 (9th Cir. 2008). 

When a requested continuance arguably implicates a defendant’s Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, the court must evaluate the effect of its decision on this 

fundamental right. United States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (en 

banc). The Ninth Circuit has identified three factors courts should consider when 

deciding whether to permit substitution of retained counsel: (1) whether the defendant 

had already retained new counsel at the time the request for substitution of attorney is 

made; (2) whether current counsel was sufficiently prepared and competent to proceed to 

trial; and (3) the timing of the defendant’s request for a change of counsel or a 

continuance. Miller, 525 F.3d at 896-98.

Here, as the state court noted, on October 22, 2012, the day trial was set to begin, 

attorney Mark Edelman made a special appearance and asked to substitute in as 

Petitioner’s counsel. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 1022, Lodgment No. 2, vol. 8 at 600.) 

Edelman indicated that he had seen a Craigslist ad seeking an attorney for Kenniston on 

October 18, 2016 – four days before the trial date. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 8 at 599.) 

Initially, Edelman estimated he could be prepared for trial by the end of November, but 

after learning more about the complexity of the case, he revised that estimate, stating that 

he could be ready by the “middle of December, maybe.” (Id. at 608.) Romero, 

Petitioner’s appointed counsel, and the prosecutor both indicated that they were prepared 

to proceed to trial that day, as planned. (See id. at 613.) 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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At the time the request for substitution for counsel was made, the trial date had 

already been continued at least six times.17 It had been over a year since the original 

October 12, 2011 trial date. And as noted above, the request for substitution came on the 

day of trial and Edleman was not prepared to go forward. By granting the substitution

and continuance, the trial would have again been delayed, this time for well over a 

month, at minimum. Based on the timing of the request, the number of times the trial had 

already been delayed, and the additional delay granting the substitution request would 

cause, the trial court’s denial of the continuance was not unreasonable. See Morris, 461 

U.S. at 11-12; see also Houston, 533 F.3d at 1079 (holding that the trial court acted 

within its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion four days before trial to substitute 

retained counsel on the sole basis that defendant thought that trial counsel was 

unprepared); Miller, 525 F.3d at 896-98 (habeas petitioner’s right to counsel was not 

violated when he moved for a continuance on the eve of trial, had not yet retained 

counsel, and appointed counsel was ready to proceed). 

Based on the foregoing, the state court’s denial of claim nine was neither contrary 

to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

/ / /

 

17 Kenniston was indicted on May 23, 2011. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 1 at 1.) He was 

originally represented by retained counsel. (Id., vol. 5 at 975-76.) On June 24, 2011, however,

Deputy Public Defender Jesus Romero was appointed. (Id. at 984.) Trial was first set for 

October 12, 2011. That date was continued to March 5, 2012, and then continued again to 

March 12, 2012. (See id. at 979, 984, 986.) On March 8, 2012, four days before trial was set to 

begin, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request to represent himself. (Id. at 988, see also 

Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 at 87-88, 93, 100-01.) The trial date was then continued to June 20, 

2012. On April 3, 2012, the court denied Kenniston’s request for appointment of advisory 

counsel. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 993, Lodgment No. 2, vol. 2 at 119-23.) The trial was 

continued again to September 9, 2012. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 4 at 170.) In granting the 

continuance, the trial judge told Kenniston it would be the “last continuance.” (Id. at 172.) On 

August 7, 2012, Kenniston decided he no longer wished to represent himself. The court 

reappointed Deputy Public Defender Romero to represent him. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 5 at 

1011.) The trial was continued again to October 22, 2012. (Id. at 1014.) 

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Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS claim nine be 

DENIED.

G. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsels (Ground Ten)

In ground 10, Kenniston argues that both trial counsel and appellate counsel were 

ineffective, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 69-99.) 

This Court looks through to the last reasoned state court decision to address these claims. 

See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. In its opinion denying Kenniston’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, California Court of Appeal rejected both claims, stating:

Finally, Kenniston contends this [sic] trial and appellate counsel were 

ineffective for failing to raise the issues that Kenniston presents in his writ 

petition. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must 

demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice under an objective 

standard of reasonable probability of an adverse effect on the outcome. 

(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 718.) For the same reasons 

discussed above, his claims do not have merit and Kenniston does not 

establish a prima facie case for relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

(See Notice, ECF No. 19, Ex. C at 65.)18

1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Kenniston argues he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when 

defense counsel failed to adequately object to the prosecution’s references to the grand 

jury proceedings, in contravention of the trial court’s in limine ruling. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 

at 70-75.) Further, Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a 

new trial based on the prosecution’s purported failure to turn over exculpatory evidence 

concerning Mendez. (Id. at 76-80.) Finally, he contends trial counsel failed to 

/ / /

 

18 Kenniston also raised one of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel sub-claims on direct 

appeal. That court’s opinion is discussed below in section V(G)(1)(a) of this Report and

Recommendation.

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adequately object when jurors reported overhearing two witnesses talking outside the 

courtroom. (Id. at 80-81.)

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. Kenniston must also show he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by a showing 

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also Fretwell v. 

Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). Further, Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny 

of counsel’s performance . . . be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There 

is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Id. at 686-87. The Court need not address both the deficiency 

prong and the prejudice prong if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either 

one. Id. at 697.

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was 

denied a fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

a. Failure to Object to Prosecutorial Misconduct

Kenniston argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object each time the 

prosecutor improperly referred to prior grand jury proceedings. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 70-

75.) 

Some background is necessary first. Prior to jury voir dire, defense counsel asked 

that there be no mention of the “indictment” or “grand jury” proceedings. (Lodgment 

No. 2, vol. 9 at 746.) The prosecutor responded, “I have no problem with the concept of 

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not mentioning the grand jury. I think it should be referred to as ‘prior court 

proceeding.’” (Id. at 746-47.) The court agreed and the verdict forms were changed to 

remove the word “indictment” and substitute “charging document.” (Id. at 747-50.) The 

court stated, “And that way we don’t even mention indictment. We don’t mention grand 

jury. And I think that would be preferable.” (Id. at 750-51.)

On November 6, the second day of testimony, during redirect of prosecution 

witness Casey Taoian, the prosecutor asked: “Did you speak to a detective from the 

Chula Vista Police Department in approximately April of 2011, one month prior to the 

grand jury?” (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 16 at 1429.) Defense counsel objected and 

requested a side bar. The prosecution moved to strike the statement and the court did so. 

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial arguing that the prosecution’s reference to the 

grand jury had contaminated the jury. (Id. at 1430.) The prosecutor argued it was an 

inadvertent slip of the tongue and apologized. (Id.) He noted further that there was 

“nothing prejudicial about the fact that a grand jury, at some point, heard testimony.” (Id.

at 1431.) The court agreed it was unintentional and denied the motion for mistrial. The 

defense chose not have the judge admonish the jury so as to avoid highlighting the 

reference. (Id. at 1432) 

The next day, during direct examination of different witness Michael Benavidez, 

the prosecution again mentioned the grand jury proceedings:

[Prosecutor]: I would like again, seeing the same page of your grand 

jury testimony 944, lines 23 through 28, see if reviewing that paragraph of 

your prior testimony, if that might help you remember what he saw. Does 

that help you?

(Id., vol. 17 at 1694.) Defense counsel did not object and the court did not sua sponte 

strike the reference. (See id.)

The following day, November 8, 2012, the prosecution again mentioned the grand 

jury during while attempting to refresh Mendez’s recollection with her prior testimony:

/ / /

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[Prosecutor]: All right. Now did you testify before the grand jury?

[Defense]: Objection, Your Honor.

The Court: Sustained.

[Prosecutor]: Move to impeach, Your Honor. Discuss sidebar.

(Id., vol. 18 at 1844.)

During side bar, it was apparent the prosecutor initially thought defense counsel’s

objection had to do with his attempt to refresh Mendez’s recollection. (Id. at 1845.) 

After defense moved for a mistrial, the prosecutor apologized and stated that the grand 

jury reference was an accident. He suggested the court give a curative instruction. (Id.) 

The court admonished the prosecutor that he must be “very aware of what you are 

saying.” (Id. at 1845.) The court then denied defense counsel’s motion for mistrial. The 

defense did not want a curative instruction. In denying the motion for mistrial, the court 

reminded the prosecutor that “slips of the tongue cannot be occurring. The more they add 

up, the more we get to a situation where there may have to be more sanctions.” (Id. at 

1846.) The court went on to state, “I am again admonishing you if this happens again, I 

am not sure what my ruling will be at that time. So it is very serious that you pay close 

attention.” (Id. at 1847-48.) 

Finally, on November 9, 2012, the prosecution again referred to the grand jury 

when asking Mendez whether she had been encouraged to tell that truth at trial, even if 

she had previously lied to the grand jury. The prosecutor stated:

Prosecutor: Okay. So you understand you came into the courtroom 

before the jury here in order to testify after talking to your attorney, that you 

were in a position that you could admit to lying before the grand jury or 

admit to lying?

(Id., vol. 19 at 2015.) Defense counsel objected on the grounds the question was 

compound and the court sustained the objection. (Id.) The defense did not object to the 

reference to the grand jury. (Id.)

/ / / 

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Unlike Petitioner’s other ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained in

claim ten of the federal Petition, Kenniston raised this issue on direct appeal. He argued 

that the prosecutor had committed prejudicial misconduct when he referenced the grand 

jury proceedings and that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to two of 

the prosecutor’s grand jury references. The appellate court found no errors, stating in 

relevant part:

It is misconduct for a prosecutor to violate a court ruling by eliciting 

or attempting to elicit inadmissible evidence. (People v. Silva (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 345, 373.) Nonetheless, a defendant’s conviction will not be 

reversed for prosecutorial misconduct unless it is reasonably probable that a 

result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the 

alleged misconduct. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1133; see 

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

We review the court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial based on alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Ayala (2000) 

23 Cal.4th 225, 283.) “A motion for mistrial is directed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court. We have explained that ‘[a] mistrial should be 

granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by 

admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is 

incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court 

is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 985-986.)

We conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it 

refused to grant a mistrial based on the alleged prosecutorial misconduct in 

this case. The trial court found, as borne out by the record, that the grand 

jury references (when an objection was lodged) were inadvertent and 

unintentional, a finding that is amply supported by the evidence in the 

record. Indeed, the record shows the grand jury references by the prosecutor 

occurred in passing and ostensibly unknowingly when he was attempting to 

refresh various witnesses’ recollection of their prior testimony before the 

grand jury.

In addition, although the court -- at the request of the defense -- ruled 

in limine there should be no reference to an “indictment” or the “grand 

jury,” as demonstrated by the record the court also asked the defense to 

provide legal authority to support that ruling. In our own review of the 

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voluminous record, it appears no such authority was ever provided. In any 

event, we were unable to locate independently any authority that referencing 

the grand jury under circumstances such as here, where a defendant has been 

charged by indictment, deprives a defendant of the right to a fair trial.

We thus conclude the court properly exercised its discretion in 

denying defendant’s request for a mistrial, after it offered to give what we 

conclude was a simple curative instruction, because there was no 

prosecutorial misconduct in this case. [citations omitted]

Moreover, even assuming there was misconduct, we conclude it was 

not prejudicial. As shown by the record, on two occasions neither the court 

nor the parties even caught the prosecutor’s passing reference to “grand 

jury,” which, as noted, was harmless and, in our view, merely an inadvertent 

“slip of the tongue.” (See People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 568 [noting 

a “defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must further establish a 

reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable 

fashion”].)

That the jury found defendant not guilty of eight counts also supports 

the finding the jury gave little or no weight to the fact defendant had been 

indicted by a grand jury. This finding is also supported by the trial court’s 

clear jury instructions that it was up to the jury and the jury “alone to decide 

what happened, based only on the evidence that has been presented”; that 

“[n]othing the attorneys say is evidence”; and that, if the court sustained an 

objection, it was to ignore the question. For this separate and independent 

reason, we conclude defendant cannot show he was prejudiced by the four 

grand jury references even assuming those references involved prosecutorial 

misconduct.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 35-38.) In a footnote, the appellate court also concluded that 

there was no ineffective assistance of counsel, stating: 

In light of our conclusion there was no prosecutorial misconduct in 

this case, we also reject defendant’s contention he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel by his counsel’s failure to object to two of the four 

grand jury references by the prosecutor. (See People v. Hernandez (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 1040, 1052-1053 [noting to establish ineffective assistance, a 

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defendant must show: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) it is 

reasonably probable that the verdict would have been more favorable absent

counsel’s error]; see also People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616 [noting 

absent a sound legal basis for objection, counsel’s failure to object to the 

admission of evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel].)

(Lodgment No. 5 at 37, fn. 9.)

The state court’s denial of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was 

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. 

Given the state court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s isolated references to the 

grand jury did not amount to misconduct, defense counsel’s failure to object to two 

of the references was not unreasonable. See Strickland 466 U.S. at 688; see also 

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (concluding that federal courts on 

habeas are bound by state court’s interpretation of state law). Moreover, Petitioner 

has not shown he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to object to the two 

unchallenged grand jury references. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest the 

jury interpreted the references in an objectionable manner. Given the benign 

nature of the references, combined with the fact that they occurred over the course 

of a nearly three week trial, during which over two dozen witnesses testified 

regarding 32 counts, there is no reasonable probability that had defense counsel 

objected, the outcome would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim. 

b. Failure to Request New Trial Based on Brady Violation

Petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a new trial 

based on the prosecution’s purported failure to turn over exculpatory evidence 

concerning Mendez’s post-trial statements. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2. at 76-80.) He argues, as 

he does in claim one, that the prosecutor failed to disclose that Mendez had discussed

“additional information” with a District Attorney investigator after the trial had ended. 

(See id.) 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that failure to file a motion will not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel unless the trial court would have granted the motion. 

Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). As discussed above, in order to 

establish a Brady violation, a petitioner must show (1) the evidence must have been 

suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the withheld evidence 

must be either exculpatory or impeachment material, and (3) the evidence must be 

material to the defense. Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052-53 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 678). 

For the reasons discussed above in section V(B)(1) of this Report and Recommendation, 

trial counsel was not unreasonable for failing to raise a Brady claim. Nothing in the 

record shows that evidence was withheld by the prosecutor. And even assuming 

arguendo that evidence was withheld, Petitioner has not established a “reasonable 

probability” “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Bagley, 

473 U.S. at 682; United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Therefore, any motion for a new trial based on a Brady violation would have been 

denied. And as such, Petition has failed to establish that defense counsel’s failure to file 

the motion was unreasonable, or that any such failure was prejudicial. See Wilson, 185 

F.3d at 990; see also James, 24 F.3d at 27 (“Cousel’s failure to make a futile motion does 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”) The state court’s denial of the claim 

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

c. Failure to Object to Communication Between Witnesses

Finally, Kenniston argues trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to 

adequately object when an alternate juror reported overhearing two witnesses talking 

outside the courtroom. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 8.)

On November 8, 2011, the fourth day of testimony, Alternate Juror No. 1

approached the bailiff and asked if it was proper for a witness in the case to be speaking 

about the case with anyone else. (Lodgment No. 2, vol. 18 at 1735.) The attorneys 

agreed to bring the alternate juror into the courtroom, outside the presence of the other 

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jurors, in order to get more information. Alternate Juror No. 1 informed the court that he 

was sitting outside the courtroom when he saw one witness, ATF Agent Laurence Briggs, 

speaking to another witness, Michael Benavidez. (Id. at 1736.) The alternate juror was 

not close enough to hear their conversation but he overheard the name “Kenniston” 

mentioned twice. (Id. at 1737.) The alternate juror then moved away. He admitted he

was not wearing his juror badge at the time because he had forgotten it that day. (Id. at 

1739.) There were no other jurors in the area at the time. (Id. at 1738.) However, 

Alternate Juror No. 1 told the court he had mentioned the incident to Alternate Juror No. 

3. (Id. at 1744.) Alternate Juror No. 1 assured the court he could continue to be fair and 

impartial and follow the court’s instruction to base his decision only on the evidence 

presented at trial. (Id. at 1741-42.)

The trial court then brought in Alternate Juror No. 3. She stated that Alternate 

Juror No. 1 had told her he saw two witnesses talking and overhead them mention 

Kenniston’s name. He told her he assumed they were talking about the case. (Id. at 

1745.) He said he did not hear what they were saying, other than the name. She assured 

the trial court that she could set the information aside and judge the case based only on 

the evidence presented at trial. (Id.) The court also instructed Alterenate Juror No. 3 not 

to mention the situation to anyone. (Id. at 1746.) The prosecutor and defense counsel 

were given the opportunity to question both Alternate Juror No. 1 and No. 3. (Id. at 

1738-41, 1746.) After the court and attorneys finished questioning the alternates, they 

moved on to other matters. Defense counsel made no objections, nor did the prosecutor. 

(See id. at 1746.)

Kenniston argues defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request that the two 

witnesses be brought to court to “see what degree of misconduct (witness tampering) was 

perpetrated by ATF Agent Briggs in influencing Mr. Benavidez’s testimony.” (Pet., ECF 

No. 1-2 at 81.) Beyond Petitioner’s conclusory allegations, however, there is nothing to 

suggest there was “witness tampering.” Kenniston has no information as to the content 

of the conversation and as such his allegations that there was evidence of “witness 

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tampering” are entirely speculative. Petitioner has therefore failed to establish that 

defense counsel’s failure to object or continue to investigate the matter was unreasonable 

or prejudicial. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that mere 

conclusions of violations of federal rights in a federal habeas petition without specifics do 

not state a basis for habeas relief). Accordingly, the state court’s denial of the claim was 

not unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-89. 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Lastly, Kenniston argues appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the 

following claims on appeal: (1) failure to object to an untimely filing by Respondent on 

appeal; (2) failure to raise a Brady claim regarding Mendez’s purported statements; (3) 

failure to raise Brady claim regarding Jessica Green’s brother; and (4) failure to review 

the full record. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 81-90.)

It is clearly established that “[t]he proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that 

appellate counsel was ineffective . . . is that enunciated in Strickland.” Smith v. Robbins, 

528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986)). A 

petitioner must first show that his appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Specifically, a petitioner must 

show that counsel “unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a 

merits brief raising them.” Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. He must then show he was prejudiced 

by counsel’s errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To establish prejudice, Kenniston must 

demonstrate that she would have prevailed on appeal absent counsel’s errors. Smith, 528 

U.S. at 285. 

The Ninth Circuit has observed that:

[Strickland’s] two prongs partially overlap when evaluating the 

performance of appellate counsel. In many instances, appellate counsel will 

fail to raise an issue because she foresees little or no likelihood of success on 

that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as 

one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. . . . Appellate counsel 

will therefore frequently remain above an objective standard of competence 

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(prong one) and have caused her client no prejudice (prong two) for the 

same reason - because she declined to raise a weak issue.

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). An indigent defendant “does not 

have a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points 

requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to 

present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Counsel “must be 

allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the ability of counsel to 

present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation would be 

“seriously undermined.” Id.; see also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n. 4 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (counsel not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, 

and is not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) Indeed, appealing every arguable 

issue would do disservice to a client because it would draw an appellate judge’s attention 

away from stronger issues and reduce appellate counsel’s credibility before the appellate 

court. Id. at 1428.

a. Failure to Object to Untimely Filing by Respondent

First, Kenniston argues appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to object to an 

untimely brief submitted by Respondent on appeal. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 82-85.) In 

support of his claim, Petitioner attaches a letter written by appellate counsel in response 

to Petitioner’s concern regarding Respondent’s untimely brief. In it, appellate counsel

stated that “while [Respondent’s] brief was technically one day late,” it was likely due to 

an inadvertent calendaring mistake. Appellate counsel informed Petitioner that “[u]nder 

these circumstances the Court of Appeal is not going to strike the brief based on a 

technicality, and I will not be filing a motion with the court.” (See Pet., ECF No. 1-4, Ex. 

X-4 at 27.) As noted above, there can be no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

when counsel elects to forgo raising an issue he or she reasonably believes to be weak. 

Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. Here, appellate counsel considered the matter and determined 

any motion to strike would be denied by the appellate court. As such appellate counsel’s 

performance was reasonable. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285; see also Jones, 463 U.S. at 751. 

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Moreover, because Petitioner has offered nothing other than his own speculation that, had 

appellate counsel filed such a motion, it would have been granted, Kenniston has not 

established prejudice. See id. Accordingly, Kenniston is not entitled to relief as to this 

claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

2. Failure to Raise Brady Claim as to Mendez

Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the Brady 

claim with regard to the purported evidence that Mendez gave “additional information” to 

the District Attorney’s Office after the trial. As discussed in section V(B)(1) of this 

Report and Recommendation, even assuming the prosecutor failed to turn over evidence, 

there is nothing to suggest that the information Mendez allegedly provided was 

exculpatory or impeachment evidence or that it was material. Because the Brady claim 

lacked merit, Petitioner has not shown that appellate counsel’s decision not to raise it on 

appeal was unreasonable, nor has Petitioner’s established that had appellate counsel 

raised the issue, he would have prevailed on appeal. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. 

Therefore the state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 

529 U.S. at 412-13. 

3. Failure to Raise Claim Jessica Green’s Brother-In-Law

Next, Petitioner argues appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a claim 

related to Jessica Green’s brother. Specifically, Petitioner wrote appellate counsel a letter 

in which he stated that Green’s brother-in-law “works in the appellate office location in 

San Diego.” (Pet., ECF No. 1-4, Ex. X-13 at 59.) He suggests that this could be 

detrimental to his appeal because he “could have access to both documents and 

personnel” that might have influence over his case. (See id.) In response to Petitioner’s 

letter, appellate counsel stated that he had never encountered such a situation before, and

he would “discuss the matter with an attorney at Appellate Defenders, Inc. to see whether 

they have any insight into such a situation.” (Id., Ex. X-14 at 62.) 

/ / /

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Petitioner’s claim is conclusory and speculative and does not warrant habeas relief. 

See Jones, 66 F.3d 199, 205. Appellate counsel’s failure to raise any issue related to 

Petitioner’s vague, unsubstantiated claim that Green’s brother-in-law might have access 

to documents on appeal, was neither unreasonable, nor prejudicial. See Miller, 882 F.2d 

at 1434. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of the claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 

529 U.S. at 412-13. 

4. Failure to Review the Full Record 

Lastly, Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to review the 

complete record. (Pet., ECF No. 1-2 at 88-90.) Petitioner contends that because the 

grand jury transcript was admitted as evidence, appellate counsel had a duty to review it. 

(Id. at 89.) In a letter to Petitioner, appellate counsel noted that he would not be 

reviewing the grand jury transcripts unless he determined there was a specific need to do 

so because a grand jury proceeding is not an “appealable proceeding.” (Id., ECF No. 1-4, 

Ex. X-15 at 65.) Petitioner’s claim is again based on speculative and conclusory 

allegations. See Jones, 66 F.3d 199, 205. As appellate counsel noted, under California 

law, issues regarding the grand jury proceedings are not appealable absent a showing the 

trial was fundamentally unfair. See People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 529 (1980). 

As such, it was not unreasonable for appellate counsel to forgo their review. See Miller, 

882 F.3d at 1434. Furthermore, Petitioner fails to establish that, even assuming appellate 

counsel should have reviewed the transcripts, the failure to do so resulted in prejudice. 

Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. Kenniston does not specify what claim appellate counsel could 

have raised (but did not) had he reviewed the grand jury transcripts. Therefore, 

Kenniston is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

In sum, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

and appellate counsel claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The 

Court therefore RECOMMENDS claim ten be DENIED.

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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Anthony J. Battaglia under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving 

and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be 

entered DENYING the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than March 3, 2017. 

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than March 17, 2017. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 10, 2017

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