Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04277/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOI NGO,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-04277-JCS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND AND VACATING 

NOVEMBER 22, 2019 HEARING AND 

INITIAL CASE MANAGEMENT 

CONFERENCE

Re: Dkt. No. 14

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Loi Ngo asserts state law claims, including claims of discrimination and 

harassment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), against his former 

employer, United Airlines (“United”), and two of his former supervisors, Mohammed Buksh and 

Yvonne Pierce. He filed this action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of 

Alameda and Defendants removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Although Defendants Buksh and Pierce are citizens of California – as is Ngo 

– Defendants contend there is diversity of citizenship because Buksh and Pierce were fraudulently 

joined in this action. Presently before the Court is Ngo’s Motion to Remand (“Motion”), in which 

he argues that this action should be remanded to state court on the basis that there is no federal 

subject matter jurisdiction because neither Pierce nor Buksh is a “sham defendant” and therefore 

there is no diversity jurisdiction. The Court finds that the Motion is suitable for determination 

without oral argument and therefore vacates the motion hearing set for November 22, 2019

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Because the Court finds that this case must be remanded to 

state court, the Initial Case Management Conference set for the same date is also vacated. 

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For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion.1

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT2

Ngo alleges that he was employed by United for nearly 29 years when he was fired on March 

2, 2018 during a medical leave of absence. FAC ¶ 16. Ngo worked on maintaining aircraft 

components at United’s San Francisco International Airport (“SFO”) maintenance base. Id. In recent 

years, he worked as a sheet metal technician, fabricating, repairing and overhauling sheet metal parts. 

Id. Defendant Buksh is currently a Senior Manager in the United’s Components Shop at SFO and 

was a skip-level supervisor of Ngo. FAC ¶ 12. Defendant Pierce is a supervisor working under 

Buksh; she was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. FAC ¶ 13. 

Ngo alleges in the FAC that Buksh and Pierce demonstrated hostility toward Ngo’s 

disability-related physical restrictions from the time he first transferred to their unit. In particular, 

Ngo alleges that when Pierce learned Ngo was being transferred to her unit, she made it clear she

did not want him because he had a 40-pound lifting restriction due to a prior industrial accident at 

United, telling Human Resources that she only wanted “100% workers.” FAC ¶ 41. Likewise,

Buksh allegedly tried to persuade Ngo to find a doctor who would be willing to support clearing 

the 40-pound lifting restriction from the file so that Ngo would appear to be 100% healed, even 

though Buksh knew that he was not. Id. 

Ngo alleges that after he was transferred to Pierce and Buksh’s unit he was injured twice –

once in April 2016, when he injured his thumb (“the thumb injury”) and next in May 2016, when 

 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c).

2 Defendants refer to the original complaint in this action as the “Operative Complaint” throughout 

their Opposition brief, citing the fact that the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was not served 

on them. As discussed below, the test for determining whether a defendant has been fraudulently 

joined for the purposes of federal jurisdiction is whether “there is a possibility that a state court 

would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants.” 

Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal 

quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, in determining whether remand is 

appropriate, the district court must consider not only the allegations in the operative complaint but 

also “whether a deficiency in the complaint can possibly be cured by granting the plaintiff leave to 

amend.” Id. at 550. Here, the allegations in Ngo’s FAC shed the most light on that question –

regardless of whether the original complaint or the FAC is the “operative complaint” – and 

therefore the Court looks to that pleading rather than the original complaint in determining 

whether remand is appropriate under Grancare.

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he injured his elbow (“the elbow injury”). FAC ¶¶ 17, 22. He alleges that after the thumb injury 

he was cleared to return to work with a 15-pound lifting restriction and instructions to reduce the 

use of his right upper body at work. FAC ¶ 17. According to Ngo, Pierce did not abide by these 

restrictions, forcing him to rely on his left arm and upper body to operate a sanding machine that 

required the use of two hands, even though she knew Ngo was right-handed and that he was in 

pain, and refusing to allow him to take adequate breaks to alleviate the physical strain. FAC ¶ 19. 

Ngo alleges that Buksh supported Pierce’s forcing him to “use the outdated sanding machine, 

while in pain, in defiance of his doctor-ordered work restrictions.” FAC ¶ 20. Ngo further alleges 

that the elbow injury was “due to the stress of relying on [the] left side of his body while working 

on the sanding machine.” FAC ¶ 22. 

According to Ngo, Pierce and Buksh knew that United had a newer sanding machine that 

was designed to prevent injuries like the one he sustained but refused to allow him to use it. FAC 

¶ 23. Similarly, although there was “plenty of work available that Ngo could do” in the sheet metal 

maintenance operation that would not have violated his doctor-ordered physical restrictions, “Buksh 

and Pierce intentionally refused to shift Ngo to work that would have accommodated his physical 

restrictions.” FAC ¶ 21.

After the elbow injury, Ngo was “examined by doctors arranged by United and was 

ordered to undergo physical therapy.” FAC ¶ 25. According to Ngo, Buksh and Pierce made it 

difficult for him to go to physical therapy, denying him time off to go to the clinic where United 

had arranged for him to receive physical therapy and consistently giving him the “run-around” 

with respect to getting approvals, with each of them telling Ngo he needed to obtain approval from 

the other. FAC ¶3 27, 32. Because of Pierce and Buksh’s overt hostility to his requests for 

scheduling accommodations, Ngo alleges, he was able to go to physical therapy only once. FAC ¶ 

33. In contrast, “[o]ther workers (not East Asian or not immigrants) who needed time off or 

scheduling accommodations for medical reasons were given permission to go to their medical 

appointments” and physical therapy. FAC ¶ 31. 

Ngo further alleges that Pierce treated him worse than other workers in response to his 

request for time off for family medical reasons, referring to his son as “your retarded son” when he 

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requested to “take a little time off to care for his disabled son.” FAC ¶¶ 29-30. 

Ngo also alleges that Buksh and Pierce repeatedly asked him about the details of his 

medical conditions, even though all they were entitled to know were the post-injury work 

restrictions that had been approved by United. FAC ¶ 34. According to Ngo, Buksh once pressed 

Ngo to give him a copy of a medical form he was not entitled to see, and on another occasion 

searched his tool box for medical reports. FAC ¶¶ 35-36.

Ngo alleges that as a result of the hostile work environment created by Buksh and Pierce 

he developed depression and anxiety and was forced to take an unpaid medical leave of absence. 

FAC ¶ 40. He attempted to return to work on May 9, 2017, reporting to work with a doctor’s note 

clearing him to return to work with the same physical restrictions as when he had return to work in 

May 2016, but Buksh and Pierce sent him home saying they needed to get approval from 

headquarters. FAC ¶¶ 45-46. According to Ngo, [t]heir conduct was a striking departure from 

normal practices and betrayed an animosity targeted at Ngo.” FAC ¶ 46. Ngo was forced to 

continue his medical leave as a result of this rejection. FAC ¶ 47. He was once again cleared to 

return to work in August 2017. FAC ¶ 48. He contacted United Medical department at United 

Headquarters and was instructed to return report to work on August 10, 2017; he was told that if 

any questions arose local management should call United Medical. Id. 

According to Ngo, problems did arise: when he returned to work on August 10, 2017 

Pierce and another manager told him he “could not be there.” FAC ¶ 50. When Ngo told the 

managers that he was cleared to return to work and that they should call United Medical, Pierce 

and the other manager refused to do so, instead attempting to confiscate Ngo’s employee badge, to 

Ngo’s “shock and embarrassment.” FAC ¶ 51. At that point another manager intervened and told 

Pierce that Ngo was still an employee of United so long as he was on medical leave and that she 

could not confiscate the badge. Id. Ngo was “humiliated and traumatized” by this experience. Id. 

He alleges that he has “seen numerous employees go on medical leave and never has he seen or 

heard of anyone getting rejected in similar fashion when they attempted to report back to work.” 

FAC ¶ 52. After this second attempt to return to work he extended his medical leave again. FAC 

¶ 54.

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United consistently approved Ngo’s requests for medical leave. Id. He understood that it 

approved the requests based on doctors’ notes from Kaiser. FAC ¶ 55. United also received 

medical reports about Ngo’s physical and mental conditions in 2017 because Ngo had filed for 

Workers’ Compensation. Id. Nonetheless, on August 23, 2017, August 28, 2017 and September 

13, 2017, Buksh sent Ngo letters “accusing Ngo of failing to return to work” and “ordered him to 

report to SFO on short notice for investigation into why he failed to return to work and factfinding into the basis for his absence from work.” FAC ¶ 57. Ngo alleges that Buksh “falsely 

claimed that Ngo did not report back to work, did not communicate with United, and did not 

inform United of his need for additional time off.” Id. In addition, Buksh threatened Ngo with 

disciplinary action and falsely claimed that Ngo’s absences since August 10, 2017 had been 

unauthorized. Id. 

According to Ngo, on September 1, 2017 he sent a request for reasonable accommodation 

signed by his doctor to United Medical asking to return to work on September 20, 2017 on a parttime schedule, returning to a full-time schedule by October 2, 2017. FAC ¶ 59. Ngo alleges that 

United did not respond to this request, but on September 6, 2017 Pleasanton police officers

knocked at his door and informed Ngo that his employer had sent them to “check on him.” FAC ¶ 

61. Ngo was “upset and distressed that his employer would send the police to his house, and his 

distress was heightened by seeing that the police officers’ visit frightened his children.” Id. Ngo 

alleges that Buksh called the Pleasanton police to request a welfare check even though no one 

from United had attempted to reach his spouse, who is the emergency contact in his personnel file, 

and Buksh knew that Ngo was on medical leave. FAC ¶ 62. He alleges that his supervisors and 

the Human Resources Department at SFO also knew that he was in regular contact with United 

Medical at headquarters with respect to his medical leave and return-to-work date and that 

threatening disciplinary action and sending the police to his house was merely harassment. FAC ¶ 

63.

On September 22, 2017 Ngo sent another request for medical accommodation, again 

signed by his doctor, because he had not gotten a response to the first letter. FAC ¶ 66. “Out of 

concern that United would continue to ignore [Ngo’s] request to return to work, his doctor also 

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stated that in the event United did not respond to the request, Ngo should be considered 

temporarily unable to return to work, for medical reasons.” Id. On the same day, Ngo called 

United Medical to verbally follow up on his request to return to work and was told United would 

follow up. Id. According to Ngo, though, United never responded to his request. Instead, on 

October 4, 2017 United Medical sent him two “vague boilerplate” letters asserting that his absence 

from work from September 20, 2017 onward was “not sufficiently supported” and requesting 

further information about ongoing treatment. FAC ¶68-69. The letters did not explain why the 

September 20, 2017 doctors’ note was found insufficient and did not address Ngo’s requests to 

return to work or the fact that he had been trying to return to work, requesting only a temporary 

part-time schedule as an accommodation. FAC ¶ 69. 

Ngo alleges that he continued to attempt to return to work, sending a letter to United 

Medical on October 13, 2017 asking what he needed to return to work and recounting that when 

he attempted to return to work on August 10, 2017 Piece and another supervisor had rejected him 

and refused to contact United Medical. FAC ¶ 71. He received no response to that letter. FAC ¶ 

72. He experienced anxiety and depression as a result of United’s treatment of him and continued 

to send doctors’ notes informing United of his need to extent his medical leave. FAC ¶¶ 73, 77. 

In the meantime, United sent Ngo a letter stating that he was required to appear for a 

medical evaluation on December 5, 2017 and also stating that Ngo had agreed to this specific 

appointment in a telephone conversation even though Ngo had not arranged for any medical 

evaluation through United Medical. FAC ¶ 74. Ngo did not go because he was confused as to why 

he had to undergo a medical evaluation from United and why the letter claimed he had agreed to 

the evaluation. FAC ¶ 75. 

On March 2, 2018, Ngo received a letter from Buksh informing him that he had been 

terminated on the basis that he “failed to medically support [his] absence and make contact with 

[his] Supervisor and/or Manager, over a period of several months.” FAC ¶ 79. The termination 

letter further stated that Ngo’s absence was unauthorized since September 20, 2017 and therefore, 

that he had been terminated under Article 10, Section C of the collective bargaining agreement 

between United and Ngo’s union. Id. Ngo alleges that the reason given for his termination was 

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pretext as “his managers had been determined to block Ngo’s return to work and had a 

longstanding desire to fire him due to bias against Ngo’s actual or perceived disability, medical 

condition, his race, ethnicity, national origin and/or ancestry, and his opposition to their attempted 

invasion of privacy.” FAC ¶ 81. 

On the basis of these allegations, Ngo asserts the following claims in his FAC: 1) 

discrimination based on physical disability, mental disability and medical condition under FEHA, 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a), asserted against United only; 2) harassment based on physical 

disability, mental disability and medical condition under the Fair Employment and Housing Act 

(“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a), asserted against United, Buksh and Pierce; 3) 

employment discrimination based on national origin, ancestry and race under FEHA, Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 12949(a), asserted against United only; 4) failure to provide reasonable accommodation 

under Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m), asserted against United only; 5) failure to engage in 

interactive process under Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n), asserted against United only; 6) wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy under Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n), asserted against 

United only; 7) invasion of privacy, asserted against United and Buksh; 8) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”), asserted against United, Buksh and Pierce; 9) negligent supervision 

and training, asserted against United; 10) California Private Attorney General (“PAGA”) 

violations under California Labor Code § 2698 et seq., asserted against United; 11) failure to 

provide records pertaining to employment under California Labor Code § 226, asserted against 

United; and 12) failure to provide personnel files under California Labor Code § 1198.5, asserted 

against United.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Governing Fraudulent Joinder

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if the action could have been 

filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A plaintiff may move to remand the case to the 

state court from which it was removed if the district court lacks jurisdiction or if there is a defect 

in the removal procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), based on diversity, requires complete diversity of citizenship and an amount 

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in controversy in excess of $75,000. “Complete diversity” means that “each plaintiff must be of a 

different citizenship from each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower ex rel. Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 

548 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)). However, where a 

non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently joined, diversity jurisdiction may still exist where the 

plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as the “sham defendant.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 

F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).

“There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: ‘(1) actual fraud in the pleading of 

jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the nondiverse party in state court.’” Id. (quoting Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th 

Cir. 2009)). “Fraudulent joinder is established the second way if a defendant shows that an 

‘individual joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory.’” Id. (internal brackets omitted) 

(quoting Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d at 1318). “But ‘if there is a possibility that a state 

court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, 

the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.’” Id. 

(emphasis in original) (quoting Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046).

“A defendant invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder 

bears a ‘heavy burden’ since there is a ‘general presumption against finding fraudulent joinder.’” 

Id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046). “Fraudulent joinder must be 

proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Hamilton Materials Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 

F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d 

Cir. 1998)). The Ninth Circuit has upheld findings of fraudulent joinder in cases “where a 

defendant presents extraordinarily strong evidence or arguments that a plaintiff could not possibly 

prevail on her claims against the allegedly fraudulently joined defendant.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 

548. On the other hand, courts refuse to find fraudulent joiner “where a defendant raises a defense 

that requires a searching inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff’s case, even if that defense, if 

successful, would prove fatal.” Id. at 548–49 (citing Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046). Additionally, “[i]f 

a defendant cannot withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the fraudulent inquiry does not end there.” 

Id. at 550. “For example, the district court must consider . . . whether a deficiency in the 

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complaint can possibly be cured by granting the plaintiff leave to amend.” Id. A court may find 

fraudulent joinder only if the claim against the non-diverse defendant is “wholly insubstantial and 

frivolous.” Id. at 549.

B. Whether Ngo’s FEHA Harassment Claims Against Buksh and Pierce are

Wholly Insubstantial and Frivolous

Ngo asserts claims for harassment under FEHA against Buksh and Pierce. As both 

Defendants are citizens of California, Ngo must demonstrate only that there is a possibility that a 

state court would find that one of these claims is adequately alleged. Ngo easily meets that 

standard. Because Ngo’s FEHA claims against Buksh and Pierce are not wholly insubstantial and 

frivolous the Court need not address the IIED claims that Ngo asserts against his supervisors.

Under FEHA, a supervisor may be held individually liable for workplace harassment, 

while only an employer may be held liable for discriminatory employment actions. Roby v. 

McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 707 (2009), modified, (Feb. 10, 2010). “[D]iscrimination refers 

to bias in the exercise of official actions on behalf of the employer, and harassment refers to bias 

that is expressed or communicated through interpersonal relations in the workplace.” Id. 

Harassment does not include “[c]ommonly necessary personnel management actions,” such as 

reassignment, disciplinary warnings, and termination. Id. at 707–08 (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). These personnel management actions can, however, be evidence of harassment 

because “some official employment actions done in furtherance of a supervisor’s managerial role 

can also have a secondary effect of communicating a hostile message.” Id. at 709. 

Thus, in Roby, the California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal 

that a pattern of supervisorial conduct could not give rise to a claim of harassment under FEHA, 

finding instead that while “some actions that [Roby’s supervisor] took with respect to Roby [were]

best characterized as official employment actions rather than hostile social interactions in the 

workplace, . . . they may have contributed to the hostile message that [her supervisor] was 

expressing to Roby in other, more explicit ways.” Id. These actions included the supervisor’s 

“shunning of Roby during staff meetings,” “belittling of Roby’s job” and “reprimands of Roby in 

front of Roby's coworkers.” Id. 

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Further, the California legislature has made clear that even “[a] single incident of harassing 

conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment 

if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or 

created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” Cal. Gov’t Code section 

12923(b) (effective January 1, 2019). Moreover, FEHA provides that “[h]arassment cases are 

rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.” Cal. Gov’t Code section 12923(d). 

Thus, for example, in Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the court found that the plaintiff’s 

supervisor was not fraudulently joined where the plaintiff asserted a FEHA harassment claim 

against him based almost entirely on “commonly-necessary personnel-management actions – e.g., 

determining job or project assignments, provision of support, and meeting attendance decisions” 

but where the plaintiff also alleged that the supervisor had made an offensive comment to the 

plaintiff (“I have good news for you. You’re gonna want to suck my dick”). No. CV 19-5586-

GW-PLAX, 2019 WL 3942963, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2019). The court rejected the 

defendants’ arguments that the plaintiff could not rely on supervisorial actions to support his 

FEHA claim and that the claim failed because he had alleged only a single comment that could be 

considered harassing, reasoning as follows:

[W]hat Defendants fail to recognize is that even one instance of 

harassment can be sufficient. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12923(b). 

Moreover, personnel management actions can still constitute 

harassment to the extent the actions send a harassing message. See 

Martinez v. Michaels, No. CV 15-02104 MMM (Ex), 2015 WL 

4337059, at *2, 7 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015) (holding that the plaintiff's 

managers’ alleged failure to investigate matters involving employee 

racism directed at the plaintiff could support a finding that some of 

the managers’ actions were not strictly personnel management 

decisions). As such, based on the alleged “suck” comment, and the 

fact that such claims are rarely determined as a matter of law, 

Defendants have not satisfied their burden of establishing that [the 

supervisor] is a fraudulent defendant.

Id.

Here, Ngo has alleged that his supervisors engaged in a pattern of hostile conduct. To be 

sure, many of their actions were official actions that are within the scope of their supervisorial 

role, such as determining whether he would be allowed schedule accommodations to attend 

physical therapy, determining whether Ngo had provided the paperwork necessary to return to 

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work or even whether he would be permitted to keep his badge. Nonetheless, the alleged pattern 

of treating Ngo less favorably than other employees based on national origin3and physical and 

mental disability or medical condition with respect to these supervisorial decisions could still 

constitute harassment – especially when considered in combination with other allegations 

regarding conduct outside the scope of a supervisor’s responsibilities, such as asking the police go 

to Ngo’s house to perform a welfare check even though they knew he was on medical leave and 

without attempting to reach his emergency contact before doing so, and referring to his son as 

“retarded.”4 Because there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a 

cause of action for harassment under FEHA against both Buksh and Pierce, the Court concludes 

that neither defendant was fraudulently joined.

 

3 The Court notes that the harassment claim asserted against Pierce and Buksh in the FAC refers 

only to harassment based on physical disability, mental disability and medical condition. See 

FAC ¶¶ 99-103. Elsewhere in the FAC, however, Ngo alleges that his supervisors “had been 

determined to block Ngo’s return to work and had a longstanding desire to fire him due to . . . his 

race, . . . ethnicity, [and] national origin.” FAC ¶ 81. Ngo also alleges that he was treated less 

favorably with respect to workplace accommodations related to medical conditions than other 

employees who were not of East Asian heritage. FAC ¶¶ 31, 38. As the Court must consider not 

only the claims that have been alleged but also whether the complaint can be amended to assert 

claims that might survive in state court, the Court considers Ngo’s allegations of harassment based 

on race, ethnicity and national origin in determining whether he has been fraudulently joined. 

4 Defendant Pierce has submitted a declaration denying that she made this statement. This 

declaration establishes nothing but that there is a dispute of fact as to Ngo’s allegation. Under 

Grancare the existence of factual disputes as to a defendant’s conduct is not sufficient to 

demonstrate that that defendant has been fraudulently joined.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Motion and orders that this case be 

REMANDED to the Superior Court for the County of Alameda.5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2019

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

 

5 The Court notes that Ngo has not requested that the Court award attorneys’ fees in connection 

with the remand. See Motion at 2 n. 2 (reserving the right to move for attorneys’ fees after the 

Court decides the Motion); Reply at 14 (“Plaintiff did not move for fees and reserves the right to 

do so”). Therefore, the Court need not address whether Defendants’ removal of this action to 

federal court was objectively unreasonable. Because the Court does not award fees incurred in 

connection with Defendants’ removal in this Order, it is not appealable. K.V. Mart Co. v. United 

Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 324, 173 F.3d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“Although the remand order itself is not reviewable, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs for improper removal is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”) (citation 

omitted).

Case 3:19-cv-04277-JCS Document 29 Filed 11/15/19 Page 12 of 12