Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00499/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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Defendant Coughlin has filed a Joinder to this Notice and Motion.

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The Court will address the lodged judgment in a separate order.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

ROMA O. AMOR, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

STATE OF ARIZONA, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 06-499-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Plaintiff Roma A. Amor has filed a proposed Second Amended Complaint and a

proposed Third Amended Complaint. Pending before the Court are Amor’s Motion to Seal

Second Amended Complaint [Doc. # 124], Motion to Extend Page Limitations [Doc. # 125],

Motion for Clarification Sealed Service [Doc. # 127], Motion for Leave of Court to File

Third Amended Complaint [Doc. # 129], Motion for Temporary Seal of Third Amended

Complaint [Doc. # 131], Motion for Clarification and for Extension of Time to Serve

Amended Complaint [Doc. # 136], and Motion for Clarification & Stay [Doc. # 139].

Additionally, Defendant Dodds has filed a Notice of Non-Service and Motion to Extend

Deadlines [Doc. # 132]1

 and dismissed Defendant Plevell has lodged a proposed judgment

[Doc. # 138].2

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Amor has also filed a Motion to Extend Page Limitations as to the Second Amended

Complaint. This motion will be denied as moot.

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I. Procedural Background

On March 27, 2007, this Court issued an Order screening the Complaint filed by

Roma A. Amor (“Amor”). Amor was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the

Complaint was dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend. An additional Order

directing Amor to file an Amended Complaint was filed on December 28, 2007, as modified

on February 14, 2008. On June 16, 2008, Amor submitted a Second Amended Complaint

and, on July 7, 2008, Amor submitted a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”).

II. Screening Order

This Court is required to dismiss a case if the Court determines that the allegation of

poverty is untrue, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), or if the Court determines that the action "(i)

is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 §

1915(e)(2)(B). The Court found, in its December 2, 2007, Order that it is appropriate for the

Court to determine whether an Amended Complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

III. Motion for Leave of Court to File Third Amended Complaint

The Court having not yet screened Amor’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court

will accept Amor’s TAC and screen the TAC herein.3

IV. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)

Amor was previously advised that a complaint is to contain a "short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed.R.Civ.P. (8)(a)(2)

(emphasis added). A complaint must set forth a set of facts that serves to put defendants on

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The holding in Twombly explicitly abrogates the well established holding in Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that “a complaint should

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” While

a complaint need not plead “detailed factual allegations,” the factual allegations it does

include “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 127

S.Ct. at 1964-65. Indeed, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires a showing that a plaintiff is entitled

to relief “rather than a blanket assertion” of entitlement to relief. Id. at 1965 n. 3. The

complaint “must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates

a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right to action.” Id. at 1965. 

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notice as to the nature and basis of the claim(s). Failure to set forth claims in such a manner

places the onus on the court to decipher which, if any, facts support which claims, as well as

to determine whether Amor is entitled to the relief sought. Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick,

Inc., 508 F.Supp. 1303 (D.C.Va. 1981). 

Amor's TAC attempts to set forth facts in a shorter and plainer statement than

previously submitted, but again includes conclusory allegations. The commingling of facts

and claims have placed the onus on the Court to decipher which, if any, facts support which

claims. Such allegations do not provide fair notice to Defendants as to Amor's claims and

the grounds upon which they rest. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence

& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). 

However, pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

(1972). Nonetheless, the Court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory

legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643

F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A review of the TAC indicates that, for some claims, Amor

has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its facts.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).4

V. Count I – Wrongful Seizure/Removal

Amor asserts that Dr. Ronald A. Goodsite (“Goodsite”), all City Defendants, including

Tucson Police Department (“TPD”) Officer Jeffrey Baker (“Baker”) and TPD Officer Craig

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Amor’s claim under the First Amendment will be considered in section X.

Additionally, the Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction, not a substantive basis for a

civil rights claim. Rynn v. Jaffe, 457 F.Supp.2d 22 (D.D.C. 2006); Clynch v. Chapman, 285

F.Supp.2d 213 (D.Conn. 2003). The Court finds Amor has not stated a Ninth Amendment

claim upon which relief can be granted in Count I. 

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Amor appears to be alleging that the child had suffered an accidental injury on City

of Tucson playground equipment which resulted in the visit to the doctor.

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Wells (“Wells”), State of Arizona Department of Economic Security (“DES”), DCYF

Supervisor Lillian Downing (“Downing”), DES-DCYF Deputy Director Mary Lou Hanley

(“Hanley”), DCYF-CPS Agent Corie M. Adams (“Adams”), DCYF-CPS Agent Jill Pike

(“Pike”), and DCYF-CPS Agent Olivia R. Sifuentes (“Sifuentes”) violated her First, Fourth,

Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, her right to privacy under the Arizona Constitution,

Art. 2, § 8, and A.R.S. § 41-1401 by the wrongful seizure and removal of her child.5

 

Specifically, Amor asserts that, on September 15, 2005, Goodsite contacted DES/CPS

which resulted in the seizure of her child.6

 Amor asserts that Goodsite acted under the color

of law under mandatory reporter statutes. Later that evening, Sifuentes, at the direction of

Adams and Pike, appeared with Baker and Wells to seize Amor’s child. Amor alleges that

the seizure of the child was without notice of investigation, without investigating

circumstances, without consideration of less extreme measure, and with no finding of nonaccidental trauma and lacking imminent danger. Further, no temporary custody order had

been issued by the juvenile court.

Amor alleges that Baker did not report any suspicion of non-accidental trauma or

abuse to show probable cause or imminent danger to seize the child to avert an injury. Amor

asserts that while Sifuentes was advising Amor to contact Adams, advising Amor that the

child should be returned before the weekend, and Amor was engaging in her and the child’s

evening prayer, Baker ripped the child from her arms with callous deliberate indifference to

the child’s tender years and injuries (including stitches). 

Initially, the Court considers these claims against Goodsite. Amor is alleging that

Goodsite was a state actor. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct.

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2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). However, the Ninth Circuit has consistently determined that

private hospitals and doctors in § 1983 claims fail to come within the color of state law. See

Briley v. State of Cal., 564 F.2d 849, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (private hospitals not acting

under color of state law unless the state is significantly involved in the private party’s

activities); Watkins v. Mercy Med. Center, 520 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1975); see Polk

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319 n. 9, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)

(private attorneys do not act under color of state law). Other courts have similarly held.

Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir. 2002) (complying with mandatory reporting

statute does not justify finding defendant was a state actor); Preston v. New York, 223

F.Supp.2d 452, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (private actors do not become state actors simply by

complying with legal duty to report suspected child abuse). The Court finds Goodsite was

not a state actor and, therefore, the federal civil rights claims cannot be maintained against

him.

Similarly, Ariz.Const. Art. 2, § 8 “was not intended to give rise to a private cause of

action between private individuals[.]” Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 10 Ariz. 560, 563,

460 P.2d 666, 669 (1969), overruled on other grounds. The Court having found that

Goodsite is not a state actor, the Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim against Goodsite

under Ariz.Const. Art. 2, § 8. However, Arizona does recognize a cause of action between

private individuals for the tort of invasion of privacy. Id.; see also Martinez v. Green, 212

Ariz. 320, 131 P.3d 492 (App. 2006) (invasion of privacy is a tort claim). Nonetheless,

Amor has not alleged that Goodsite communicated any information “to the public at large,

or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one

of public knowledge.” Restatement 2d of Torts, § 652D, comment a.; see also Godbehere

v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781 (1989) (recognizing tort as set

forth in Restatement); Restatement 2d of Torts, § 652E (incorporating § 652D). The Court

finds Amor has failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy false light on which relief can

be granted against Goodsite. 

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As to Amor’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the

government actors, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

Government officials are required to obtain prior judicial authorization before

intruding on a parent's custody of her child unless they possess information at the time

of the seizure that establishes 'reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent

danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably

necessary to avert that specific injury.'" 

Mabe v. San Bernardino County Dept. of Public Social Services, 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th

Cir. 2001), citation omitted. The "same legal standard applies in evaluating Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children[.]" Wallis ex rel. Wallis v.

Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court finds Amor has stated a Fourth

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the removal of the child against

Baker, Wells, and Sifuentes. Furthermore, Amor has stated a claim for supervisor liability

against Adams and Pike. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 987, 988 (9th Cir. 2007), citation

omitted (supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates “if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to

act to prevent them”). 

As to Amor’s claims against the remaining government Defendants, Amor has not

alleged that those individuals personally participated in the constitutional deprivation, or that

they were aware of widespread abuses, and with deliberate indifference to the person's

constitutional rights, failed to take action to prevent further misconduct. See King v. Atiyeh,

814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987); see also, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Court finds

Amor has failed to state a Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the

removal of the child against the other government officials.

The Arizona Constitution does not provide less protection than does the Fourth

Amendment. See Petersen v. City of Mesa, 207 Ariz. 35, 37 n. 3, 83 P.3d 35, 37 n. 3 (2004),

citing Ariz.Const. Art. 2, § 8. The Court finds, therefore, that Amor has stated an Ariz.Const.

At. 2, § 8 claim against Baker, Wells, Sifuentes, Adams, and Pike.

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Amor also asserts a claim under A.R.S. § 41-1401. However, that statute establishes

a “civil rights division within the department of law which shall include the Arizona civil

rights advisory board.” The statute, itself, does not provide a basis for a cause of action. The

Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim based on A.R.S. § 41-1401.

VI. Count II – Excessive Force and Coercion

Amor alleges that all City Defendants, including Baker and Wells, DES, Adams, Pike,

and Sifuentes used excessive force and coercion. Specifically, she alleges that Sifuentes, at

the direction of Adams and Pike, unreasonably and using unnecessary psychological coercion

and force by appearing with Baker and Wells to seize the child without notice, investigation,

no finding of accidental trauma or imminent danger, and without consideration of less

extreme measures. Further, Amor alleges that Baker ripped the chid from her arms with

callous deliberate indifference to the child’s tender years and injuries (including stitches). 

“The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making [a seizure] to use only an

amount of force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them.”

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007). In determining whether

the use of force was reasonable, “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing government interests at stake” are to

be balanced. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443

(1989), internal quotation marks omitted. Relevant factors in this inquiry include “the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety

of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Id. 

Accepting the allegations contained in the TAC as true, Amor did not present an

immediate threat to the officers, Amor was not attempting to evade the removal of the child,

and Baker acted without concern for the child’s injuries. The Court finds Amor has stated

a Fourth Amendment claim against Baker for unreasonable force. However, the Court finds

Amor’s allegations of psychological coercion and force fail to state a claim against any other

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government actors. The Court finds Amor has failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim for

unreasonable force against any other government actor.

VII. Count III – Medical Malpractice

Amor alleges that Goodsite injured the child and then either he or his staff had

repeated conversations with CPS to arrange for the seizure of the child. Amor further alleges

that Goodsite did not timely provide her with a referral for an MRI for the child.

A medical malpractice claim requires an allegation that Goodsite owed a duty, there

was a breach of that duty, and damages related to the breach of the duty. Smethers v.

Campion, 210 Ariz. 167, 108 P.3d 946 (App. 2005); see also A.R.S. § 12-563. Here, Amor

alleges that when the child was receiving medical care from Goodsite, Goodsite cut the child.

The Court finds Amor has stated a medical malpractice claim for this injury on which relief

can be granted. Amor further alleges that Goodsite did not timely provide a referral for a test

for the child. Amor does not allege any damages (e.g., the results of the test indicated

treatment that could have been provided earlier) as to this claim. The Court finds Amor has

not stated a medical malpractice claim on which relief can be granted as to this allegation.

VIII. Count IV – False and Malicious Reporting

Amor alleges Goodsite and/or his employees had repeated conversations with CPS

to arrange for the seizure of the child. A.R.S.§ 13-3620.J. provides that a person who

furnishes a report as required by statute “is immune from any civil or criminal liability by

reason of that action unless the person acted with malice or unless the person has been

charged with or is suspected of abusing or neglecting the child or children in question.” In

this case, Amor alleges that Goodsite made a report and abused the child (i.e., unnecessarily

cutting the child). 

It is not clear if a civil action for false and malicious reporting is available in Arizona.

See e.g. Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 54 Cal.Rptr. 158 (1996) (Legislature has

declared person who makes false report of child abuse is liable for damages). The Arizona

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The Arizona Legislature has provided that a “person acting with malice who

knowingly and intentionally makes a false report . . .” is guilty of a misdemeanor. A.R.S. §

13-3620.01(A).

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The Court notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but

merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by

a person action under color of state law. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696,

699 (9th Cir. 1990). Additionally, as previously stated, A.R.S. § 41-1401 does not provide

Amor with a cause of action.

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Legislature has not provided that persons making false reports of child abuse are liable for

damages.7

 Moreover, the Court has not found any case that authorizes such an action.

However, A.R.S. § 13-3620(A) requires specified “person[s] who reasonably believes that

a minor is or has been the victim of physical injury, abuse, [or child] abuse . . . .” to report

the information to CPS or a peace officer. A person includes “[a]ny physician . . . who

develops the reasonable belief in the course of treating a patient.” A.R.S. § 13-3620(A)(1).

That reporting person “is immune from any civil or criminal liability by reason of that action

unless the person acted with malice or unless the person has been charged with or is

suspected of abusing or neglecting the child or children in question.” A.R.S. § 13-3620(J).

The Court notes that the statute does not make clear what constitutes an adequate

“suspicion.” The Arizona Legislature’s discussion of immunity implies that such an action

is viable in Arizona. The Court finds Amor has stated a claim against Goodsite.

IX. Count V – Substantive Due Process

Amor asserts that all City Defendants, all State Defendants, the County of Pima by

and through its Superior Courts, Officers, and Indigent Defense Services violated her

Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. Amor also asserts a violation of the

Arizona Constitution, Art. 2, § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and A.R.S. § 41-1401.8

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The Court notes that many of Amor’s allegations as to this claim are more

appropriately relevant to her claim of procedural due process violations.

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As previously stated, the "same legal standard applies in evaluating Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children[.]" Wallis ex rel. Wallis v.

Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2000). For the reasons set forth in the discussion

in section V of this Order, the Court finds Amor has stated a substantive due process claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Arizona Constitution based on the removal

of the child against Baker, Wells, Sifuentes, Adams, and Pike but finds that Amor has failed

to state a claim against the other government officials.9

X. Count VI - Deprivation of Familial Association

Amor asserts that all City Defendants, all State Defendants, the County of Pima by

and through its Superior Courts, Officers, and Indigent Defense Services deprived her of

familial association without due process of law in violation of the First, Ninth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Amor alleges that, on September 15, 2005, Sifuentes,

at the direction of Adams and Pike, appeared with Baker and Wells to seize Amor’s child.

Amor alleges that the seizure of the child was without notice of investigation, without

investigating circumstances, without consideration of less extreme measure, and with no

finding of non-accidental trauma and lacking imminent danger. Further, no temporary

custody order had been issued by the juvenile court.

Amor alleges that, on September 16, 2005, Adams and Pike informed her that the

child would not be returned as Amor was unable to protect him from Eric P. Dodds

(“Dodds”). Amor asserts that she did not live with Dodds, Dodds lived in Pennsylvania, and

that she presented to Adams and Pike a contract lodged in the Pima County Superior Court

to protect the child from Dodds. Amor asserts that Adams and Pike’s decision of imminent

danger was unsubstantiated and was a deceitful, malicious act to withhold Amor’s child.

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10Amor asserts that the deceit was, in part, to conceal the child abuse and neglect of

the Preschool.

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Amor also asserts that Adams and Pike encouraged and recommended the transfer of

this child over state lines to Dodds without proper procedure and interfering with the contract

lodged in the Superior Court. Additionally, Amor asserts this was done in violation of an

interstate compact and the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Amor asserts that Adams and Pike withheld her child in an undisclosed location for nearly

three months where he was neglected and abused, which constituted cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and her inalienable right

to care for and protect her child. Amor also asserts a dependency petition was not filed

within 72 hours and the child was not returned within 72 hours. Therefore, Amor asserts,

state law requirements of providing her with documentation to support a dependency petition

was not provided to her. Amor further asserts that she was not provided an opportunity to

cross-examine Adams and Pike. Amor asserts that, thereafter, she was twice not provided

notice of the Preliminary Protective Hearing (“PPH”). Amor also asserts that insufficient

evidence was presented to show there was probable cause to believe continued custody of

the child was clearly necessary pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-824(F), and, therefore, the child

should have been returned. A.R.S. § 8-825(C)(1). Amor asserts that the juvenile court

improperly considered hearsay of the Christ Church of United Methodist Preschool (“the

Preschool”) and Goodsite contained within a report that was deliberately concealed from her.

Amor asserts that statements made by the Preschool, Goodsite, Adams, and Pike were false

and misleading, intended to deceive or misrepresent and harass, and were known to be

untrue.10 Amor asserts that the report is unavailable to her and State Defendants and the

Pima County Superior Court employees did not properly store the records. Amor also asserts

that Adams, Pike and DCYF-CPS Agent Emmanuel Vergara (Vergara”) failed to provide

information to the juvenile court which would have refuted allegations against Amor.

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Amor also asserts that Adams, Pike, and Vergara did not provide her with notice for

Foster Care Review Board (“FCRB”) hearings. Further, Amor asserts that the case plan

given to her at the PPH recommended unsupervised visitation twice a day for one hour.

Adams opposed the unsupervised visits.

Amor asserts that DES, Adams, Pike, Vergara, Assistant Attorney General Laurie

Beaver San Angelo (“Beaver San Angelo”) and non-defendant Turner (“Turner”) through

the Pima County Courts conspired to apply the law in a discriminatory manner to provide

Dodds, Gerald C. Dodds (“G. Dodds”), Julia Dodds (“J. Dodds”), non-defendant Foley

(“Foley”) and others unsupervised visitation and out-of-state travel. Amor asserts this

violated her right to exercise parental authority as to who should receive visitation,

considering who might post a safety risk to the child.

Amor asserts that DES, by and through Beaver San Angelo, Turner, Adams, Pike,

Vergara, and Bailey, conspired with Dodds, by and through non-defendant Sanders

(“Sanders”), Foley, and John C. Gilmore (“Gilmore”), G. Dodds, State of Pennsylvania

agencies, County of York agencies to file an application under the Interstate Compact on the

Placement of Children (“ICPC”) to send the child over state lines. An expedited ICPC

application was requested by Dodds, through Sanders, Foley and Turner and granted by the

juvenile court judge. Amor did not receive notice of the order until over one month later in

November 2005, when the Superior Court contract was consolidated with the juvenile

proceeding – Amor asserts the child was not adjudicated dependent nor was there an open

case to consolidate. Amor argues that the ICPC Reg. 303 provides that the legal right to care

for the child must be established prior to the initiation an ICPC application and that those

rights cannot have been voluntarily terminated or diminished by order of a court. Amor

asserts that the Pima County Superior Court contract relinquished Dodds’ rights to plan or

care for the child – Amor asserts that the contract was approved. Amor asserts the safety

stipulations of the contract were partially the result of previous York County Children and

Youth proceedings because of domestic violence involving Dodds.

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11The Court notes that the Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction, not a

substantive basis for a civil rights claim. Rynn v. Jaffe, 457 F.Supp.2d 22 (D.D.C. 2006);

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Amor asserts DES granted permission for the child to travel anywhere in the United

Stated prior to any hearing and prior to any notice to Amor. Amor further alleges that Beaver

San Angelo encouraged Judge Rubin to dismiss any and all safety precautions for the child

by dismissing the Dodds case plan including domestic violence, anger management,

parenting, divorce, and custody classes. By intentionally interfering with the contractual

safety stipulations, Amor asserts officials in Arizona and Pennsylvania did not ensure the

safety of the child and caused a state created danger, neglected fiduciary duties, and violated

the ICPC. Amor asserts that out-of-state travel began before any dependency hearing and

without a completed ICPC. Amor asserts that Beaver San Angelo urged Judge Rubin to

release the child out-of-state despite the ICPC process not being completed. Further, there

was no final custody order until October 2006, nine months after the child was forced to

travel out-of-state – Amor asserts she was not provided an opportunity to be heard on the

final order. 

Amor also asserts that DES, Adams, Pike, Vergara, Beaver San Angelo and Turner,

through the Pima County Courts, conspired to apply the law in a discriminatory manner to

provide Dodds, G. Dodds, J. Dodds, Foley and others unsupervised access by encouraging

them to file for unsupervised overnight visits and out-of-state travel. 

As the Court previously advised Amor, a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in the "companionship and society of their children". Kelson v. City of Springfield,

767 F.2d 651, 653-654 (9th Cir. 1985). Governmental interference with that interest may

give rise to a section 1983 action due to the well established holding that "[t]he integrity of

the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth

Amendment." Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations

omitted).11 “[T]he First Amendment protects those relationships, including family

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relationships, that presuppose 'deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few

other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts,

experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life.'" Board of Dir.

v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.

609, 619-20 (1984). The standard applied under the Fourteenth Amendment applies to a

claim under the First Amendment. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685-86 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Amor’s procedural due process claim as to the familial liberty interest is to be

considered “by balancing tests, where differing interests can give rise to many differing

procedural requirements." Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006). The

seminal balancing test is outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Per

Mathews, the Court is to look to: (i) the private interest that will be affected by the official

action, (ii) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used,

(iii) the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and, (iv) the

Government's interest, including the economic and administrative burden the additional or

substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id at 335. To allege a procedural due

process claim, Amor must allege that there is a liberty interest protected by the Constitution,

there has been a deprivation of the interest by the government, and a lack of process.

Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993).

In this case, Amor does not appear to be alleging that the procedures set forth in the

ICPC or Arizona statutes do not provide adequate due process. Rather, Amor seems to be

alleging that Arizona and Pennsylvania officials did not comply with those provisions. The

Court finds Amor has stated a claim against Adams, Pike, and Vergara.

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12Coughlin and Rohr were appointed as counsel for Amor in the juvenile court

proceedings and Gilmore represented Dodds in the juvenile court proceedings.

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 Amor seeks to impose liability for constitutional torts on private persons Kasey

Coughlin (“Coughlin”), Jacqueline Rohr (“Rohr”), and Gilmore.12 The conduct of these

individuals cannot be said to be fairly treated as that of the State itself and their conduct was

not that of traditional state actors. See also Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465

(9th Cir. 2003) (even if employed by government agency, if attorney is engaged in traditional

lawyer role, lawyer is not state actor for § 1983 purposes). Moreover, the Pima County

Superior Court, Indigent Defense Services, and Beaver San Angelo are entitled to absolute

immunity. See e.g. Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (clerks of court

had absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they

performed tasks that were an integral part of the judicial process); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 431 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (concluding that not only

prosecutor’s role in allegedly suborning perjury but also prosecutor’s “deliberate withholding

of exculpatory information” were shielded by absolute immunity).

Amor also asserts that private persons Dodds, G. Dodds, and J. Dodds deprived her

of familial association without procedural due process. A private actor may be deemed to

have engaged in state action for purposes of § 1983 under certain circumstances. Villegas

v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2008). Similarly, a private

entity can, in certain circumstances be subject to liability under § 1983. Sutton v. Providence

St. Joseph Medical Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme

Court created a two step analysis for determining whether a private actor engaged in state

action sufficient to establish liability for a constitutional tort. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The court must consider “whether the

claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source

in state authority.” Id., 457 U.S. at 939. The court must also consider “whether, under the

facts of this case, . . . [the] private parties, may be appropriately characterized as ‘state

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actors.’” Id. Subsequently, the Court found that the inquiry whether there was state action

is a general one: “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus

between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly

treated as that of the State itself.’” Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School

Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001), citation

omitted. Some of the factors to consider in determining whether there is a “close nexus” are

(1) the organization is mostly comprised of state institutions; (2) state officials dominate

decision making of the organization; (3) the organization’s funds are largely generated by

the state institutions; and (4) the organization is acting in lieu of a traditional state actor. Id.,

531 U.S. at 295-99. 

Amor has alleged that Dodds and G. Dodds took actions to obtain visitations and outof-state travel at the behest of state officials. However, Amor has not alleged any facts to

support allegations that state officials dominated the decision making of Dodds or G. Dodds

or that state officials provided any funds to support Dodds or G. Dodds’ legal actions.

Further, pursuing a custody order is not an action that is traditionally considered a state

action. The Court finds that Amor has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against

Dodds, G. Dodds, and J. Dodds as state actors. 

XI. County VII – Legal Malpractice and Misrepresentation

Amor asserts a claim of legal malpractice against attorneys Coughlin and Rohr. The

Court previously advised Amor that to state a claim for legal malpractice, Amor must allege

"(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship which imposes a duty on the attorney to

exercise that degree of skill, care, and knowledge commonly exercised by members of the

profession, (2) breach of that duty, (3) that such negligence was a proximate cause of

resulting injury, and (4) the fact and the extent of the injury." Philips v. Clancy, 152 Ariz.

415, 418, 733 P.2d 300, 303 (Ariz.App. 1986). In effect, Amor is alleging that appointed

counsel did not adequately pursue her interests both procedurally and substantively and, as

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a result, she lost custody of her child. The Court finds Amor has stated a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

Amor also asserts that Gilmore is liable for misrepresentation and fraud. However,

a cause of action against an opposing attorney for statements made during litigation is strictly

limited to actions alleging malicious prosecution, also known as wrongful institution of civil

proceedings. Linder v. Brwon & Herrick, 189 Ariz. 398, 943 P.2d 758, 766 (1977)

(dismissing claims of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress against opposing

counsel for failure to state a claim); see also Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 195 Ariz. 358, 988

P.2d 143 (App. 1999) (immunity for actions in representing client does not extent to

intentional torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process). The Court finds Amor has

failed to state a claim of misrepresentation or fraud upon which relief can be granted against

Gilmore. 

XII. Count VIII – Unequal Treatment, Retaliation, and Conspiracy

Amor asserts that all State Defendants, all City Defendants, the County of Pima by

and through its Superior Courts, Officers, and Indigent Defense Services, and Rohr deprived

her of equal protection under the ADA, retaliated against her, and conspired against her.

Amor alleges that Sifuentes called for police assistance at the time of removal because of

Amor having mental issues. Amor further alleges that Adams and Pike provided false

information to Dodds and Gilmore that Amor had failed to comply with a Pennsylvania order

to complete a psychological evaluation to assist in determining whether she could safely care

for the child. Amor also alleges that DES, Adams, Pike, Vergara, and Beaver San Angelo

disobeyed a court order by failing to provide Amor with an evaluation and therapy (e.g., after

submitting for testing, Amor was told in October 2005 by Adams that there were no concerns

and no further evaluation or therapy was needed).

Amor also alleges that, from November 2005 through February 2006, she spoke out

about the interference with her right to parent the child and the endangerment of the child as

a result of the state action. Amor alleges that officials and others retaliated against her.

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13Amor does not specify that this occurred in 2005, but in the context of Amor’s

allegations, it appears to have occurred in 2005.

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Specifically, Amor asserts that Adams, Vergara, Rohr, and Coughlin responded to her

concerns with sneers, sarcasm, and threats of losing her child permanently. Amor further

alleges that, on November 11, 2005,13 Rohr threatened to have a guardian ad litem appointed

if Amor did not sign full custody over to Dodds. Amor also asserts that, from October 2005

through February 2006, officials and others subjected her to harassment, stalking, and

vandalism, including a blade in a tire which nearly caused her to miss a scheduled visit.

“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment subjects the federal government

to constitutional limitations that are the equivalent of those imposed on the states by the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Consejo De Desarrollo Economico

De Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1170 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2007). “The Equal

Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be

treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct.

3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). “‘To state a claim . . . for a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause . . . a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The Equal Protection Clause also forbids unequal enforcement

of valid laws where such unequal enforcement is the product of improper motive. Yick Wo

v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); see also United States v.

Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Church of Scientology of California v. C.I.R., 823

F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the “[m]ere unequal enforcement of laws, without

more, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,

456 (1962). 

Considering Amor’s allegations, including the claims of false information and

disobeying court orders, the Court finds Amor has stated a claim for a violation of the Equal

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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against Adams, Pike, and Vergara. The

Court notes that Beaver San Angelo is entitled to absolute immunity. See e.g. Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34. 

As to Amor’s claim of retaliation, Amor’s heading indicates Amor is attempting to

state a claim of retaliation based on her disabled status; however, the language in the body

of the TAC indicates that she is attempting to state a claim of retaliation for exercising her

First Amendment rights. The Court will review the First Amendment retaliation claim. The

First Amendment prohibits government officials from "abridging the freedom of speech . .

. or the right to the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. Const. Amend. I. "[T]he First

Amendment reflects a 'profound national commitment' to the principle that debate on public

issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . and [the Supreme Court] ha[s]

consistently commented on the central importance of protecting speech on public issues."

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1162, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988). Contentbased restrictions on speech in public forums are prohibited unless the restrictions are the

least restrictive method of furthering a compelling government interest. Cinevision Corp.

v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 571 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The First Amendment prohibits government officials from "abridging the freedom of

speech . . . or the right to the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. Const. amend. I. "[T]he

First Amendment reflects a 'profound national commitment' to the principle that debate on

public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . and [the Supreme Court] ha[s]

consistently commented on the central importance of protecting speech on public issues."

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1162, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988). Contentbased restrictions on speech in public forums are prohibited unless the restrictions are the

least restrictive method of furthering a compelling government interest. Cinevision Corp.

v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 571 (9th Cir. 1984).

To state a claim that a government official violated his First Amendment rights, a

plaintiff must allege that defendants deterred or chilled her "'political speech and such

deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor in [Defendant's] conduct.'" Menotti v. City

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of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462,

1460 (9th Cir. 1994). To state a claim, a plaintiff need not allege that her speech was chilled:

"In making their First Amendment claim, the plaintiffs were obligated to prove only that the

officials' actions would have chilled or silenced 'a person of ordinary firmness from future

First Amendment activities,' not that their speech and petitioning were 'actually inhibited or

suppressed,'" White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Mendocino

Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). 

As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “it is clearly established federal and state law that

protests or assemblies cannot be dispersed on the ground that they are unlawful unless they

are violent or . . . pose a clear and present danger of imminent violence . . . or they are

violating some other law in the process. Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir.

1997). Moreover, “[t]he generally accepted way of dealing with the unlawful conduct that

may be intertwined with First Amendment activity is to punish it after it occurs, rather than

to prevent the First Amendment activity from occurring in order to obviate the possible

unlawful conduct.” Id. 

In a non-employment context, to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a

plaintiff must allege she was engaged in constitutionally protected activity, defendants'

conduct caused her to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from

continuing to engage in that activity, and that defendants’ conduct was substantially

motivated against plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. See e.g. Worrell

v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2000). Amor’s conclusory allegations that

Defendants’ conduct was in retaliation for her exercise of free speech is simply not supported

by her allegations. The child was removed from her home in September 2005. See TAC, ¶¶

75-77. Further, Amor alleges that, on September 16, 2005, she met with Adams and Pike.

Id., at ¶ 92. Adams and Pike informed her that the child would not be returned. Amor has

alleged that Adams and Pike used an erroneous and unconstitutionally vague standard to

withhold her child and that, “[i]mmediately thereafter,” Adams and Pike encouraged and

recommended the transfer of the child over state lines to Dodds. Id., at, ¶ 99-100. Yet, Amor

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does not allege that she spoke out about the interference with her right to parent the child and

the endangerment of the child as a result of the state action until November 2005. Amor has

not set forth any basis to support an allegation that Defendants were substantially motivated

against Amor’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.

Amor also alleges that all State Defendants, all City Defendants, the County of Pima

by and through its Superior Courts, Officers, and Indigent Defense Services, and Rohr

conspired against her. To state a 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy claim to interfere with civil

rights, “a plaintiff must allege []: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purposes of depriving, either

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or

of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in the furtherance of this

conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of

any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d

1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th

Cir. 2000). An essential requirement for a § 1985(3) claim is that there must be some racial

or other class-based “invidious discriminatory animus” for the conspiracy. Bray v.

Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268-69, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34

(1993), quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338

(1971).

In Breckenridge, the Supreme Court “not only precluded economic or commercial

classifications, but suggested that most political classifications are not covered [by § 1985(3)]

either.” 2 State and Local Government Civil Rights Liability § 2:3; see also Sever, 978 F.2d

1529, 1536-38 (9th Cir. 1992) (“individuals who wish to petition the government” are not

protected class). Amor has alleged that there is a class-based invidious discriminatory

animus (persons perceived as disabled) for the conspiracy sufficient to state a claim. The

Court finds Amor has stated a claim for conspiracy against Adams, Pike, and Vergara. The

Court notes that Beaver San Angelo is entitled to absolute immunity. See e.g. Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34. The Court further notes that Baker and Wells responded

to a request to assist and Amor has not alleged any facts to support an allegation that they

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acted with the purpose of denying a person equal privileges and immunities. Additionally,

Rohr cannot be said to be fairly treated as that of the State itself and her conduct was not that

of a traditional state actor. See also Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465 (9th

Cir. 2003) (even if employed by government agency, if attorney is engaged in traditional

lawyer role, lawyer is not state actor for § 1983 purposes). 

XIII. County IX – Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Care; Duty of Care

Amor asserts that all City Defendants, the State of Arizona, DES, Hanley, Downing,

Adams, Pike, Vergara, Sifuentes, Beaver San Angelo, Goodsite, Pennsylvania Defendants,

York County Defendants, the County of Pima by and through its Superior Courts, Officers,

and Doe Defendants breached a fiduciary duty and duty of care.

The Court of Appeals of Arizona has stated:

Constructive fraud is “a breach of legal or equitable duty which, without regard to

moral guilt or intent of the person charged, the law declares fraudulent because the

breach tends to deceive others, violates public or private confidences, or injures public

interests.” Lasley v. Helms, 179 Ariz. 589, 591, 880 P.2d 1135, 1137 (App. 1994).

While it does not require a showing of intent to deceive or dishonesty of purpose, it

does require a fiduciary or confidential relationship. Id. at 592, 880 P.2d at 1138.

Most importantly for our purposes, the breach of duty by the person in the

confidential or fiduciary relationship must induce justifiable reliance by the other to

his detriment. 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2001); Assilzadeh v. Cal. Fed.

Bank, 82 Cal.App.4th 399, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 176, 187 (2000).

Dawson v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 108, 163 P.3d 1034, 1058 (App. 2007). “A fiduciary

relationship has been described as ‘something approximating business agency, professional

relationship, or family tie impelling or inducing the trusting party to relax the care and

vigilance he would ordinarily exercise.’” Taeger v. Catholic Family and Community

Services, 196 Ariz. 285, 290, 995 P.2d 721, 726 (App. 1999), citing In re McDonnell’s

Estate, 65 Ariz. 248, 253-53, 179 P.2d 238, 241 (1947), quoting 37 C.J.S. Fraud, § 2(2), pp.

213-14). 

In Taeger, the court set forth definitions of a confidential relationship:

The McDonnell court defined a confidential relationship as follows:

* * * a confidential relation * * * is a relation of parties in which one is bound

to act for the benefit of the other and can take no advantage to himself from his

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acts relating to the interest of the other * * * it is denied that * * * mere

confidence or implicit faith in another’s honesty and integrity is sufficient to

constitute a fiduciary or confidential relationship. So too, mere friendly

relations are insufficient for this purpose.

Id. at 253, 179 P.2d at 241(quoting 37 C.J.S. Fraud, § 2(2), pp. 213-14). The Arizona

Supreme Court further elaborated on confidential and fiduciary relationships in

Condos v. Felder, 92 Ariz. 366, 377 P.2d 305 (1962):

There is no uniform practice among the courts in their use of the phrases

“fiduciary relation” and “confidential relation.” In many cases, however, the

latter phrase * * * [does] not [fall] into any well-defined category of the law.

The relations of trustee and cestui, executor or administrator and creditors,

next of kin or legatees, guardian and ward, principal and agent, attorney and

client, corporate director and corporation, and the like are easily thrown into

distinct subdivisions of the law. The have distinctive names. The term

“fiduciary” might well be reserved for such relations.

But there are other cases where there is just as great intimacy, disclosure of

secrets, intrusting of power, and superiority of position in the case of the

representative, but where the law has no special designation for the position

of the parties. It cannot be called trust or executorship, and yet it is so similar

in its creation and operation that it should have like results. 

Id. at 371, 377 P.2d 308 (quoting 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Pt. 1, § 482 (1946).

In re Guardianship of Chandos, 18 Ariz.App. 583, 585, 504 P.2d 524, 526 (1972)

(quoting 15A C.J.S. Confidential, p. 352), offered another definition of confidential

relationship as one arising

by reason of kinship between the parties, or professional, business, or social

relations that would reasonably lead an ordinarily prudent person in the

management of his business affairs to repose that degree of confidence in

another which largely results in the substitution of that other’s will for his in

the material matters involved in the transaction; or where the parties occupy

relations, whether legal, natural, or conventional in their origin, in which

confidence is naturally inspired, or, in fact, reasonably exists.

Whether a confidential relationship exists is a question of fact. Rhoads v. Harvey

Publications, Inc., 145 Ariz. 142, 148, 700 P.2d 840, 846 (App. 1984). However,

‘[w]hen the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict, the trial court has a duty to

decide the issue [as a matter of law].” Id. (citations omitted).

Taeger, 196 Ariz. at 290. 

A patient has a fiduciary relationship with his or her doctor. See e.g., Gonzales v.

Palo Verde Mental Health Services, 162 Ariz. 387, 783 P.2d 833 (App. 1989). As the parent

with custodial authority of the child at the time of treatment by Goodsite, the Court finds, for

purposes of this Order, Amor had a fiduciary relationship with Goodsite. The Court finds

Amor has stated a claim against Goodsite for a breach of fiduciary duty. 

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In some situations, a social worker may have a fiduciary relationship with a client.

See e.g., Taeger, 196 Ariz. at 292, 995 P.2d at 728 (adoption agency social workers have

fiduciary relationship with client); Hector M. v. Commissioner of Social Services, 102

Misc.2d 676, 425 N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y.Fam.Ct. 1980) (social worker in context of surrender

agreement does not have a per se fiduciary relationship with client); Horak v. Biris, 130

Ill.App.3d 140, 85 Ill.Dec. 599, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1985) (where social worker

counseled husband and wife while having affair with wife, violation of trust constituted a

breach of a fiduciary relationship).

The Court has not found any Arizona authority supporting an assertion that any named

Defendant, other than Goodsite, had a fiduciary relationship with Amor. See e.g,, Purday

v. Fleming, 655 N.W.2d 424 (S.D. 2002) (state social workers did not have fiduciary

relationship with mother – mother knew information given to social workers would not be

kept confidential and social workers’ primary relationship was with the state); Karen L. v.

State Dept. of Health and Social Services, 953 P.2d 871, 874-75 (Ala. 1998) (state social

workers did not have fiduciary relationship with a mother and no duty of care). Indeed, “[n]o

confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between a public official in a transaction in his

or her individual capacity and another, although there is a fiduciary relationship between the

official and the government unit he or she serves.” 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 34

(2008). The Court finds Amor has failed to state any facts that would support a fiduciary

relationship and, therefore, she has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted

against any named Defendants except Goodsite. 

However, a claim for failure to exercise professional judgment in the placement and

monitoring of a child in state foster care is viable. Weatherford v. State, 203, Ariz. 313, 54

P.3d 342 (App. 2002), vacated in part on other grounds; see also Weatherford ex rel.

Michael L. v. State, 206 Ariz. 526, 531, 81 P.3d 320, 322 (2003). Nonetheless, Amor has not

initiated this action as guardian ad litem for the child. Furthermore, she has not alleged any

facts establishing that she has the “right to litigate as [the child’s] next friend.” Elk Grove

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Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2311, 159 L.Ed.2d 98

(2004). The Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

As to Amor’s claim of state-created danger, the Court previously advised Amor that

the Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether such a claim is viable. Other courts, however,

have evaluated such claim under a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard.

See e.g., Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3rd Cir. 2000) Lintz v. Skipski, 25 F.3d 304 (9th Cir.

1994). In addition to advising Amor that allegations of harm while the child was in the

custody were needed to state a claim, see e.g., Philadelphia Police and Fire Ass’n for

Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156 (3rd Cir. 1989) (no

liability while child was in father’s care), the Court also advised Amor that she had failed to

allege any basis for her to bring the claim, rather than the child. Amor has alleged that

Arizona establishes civil remedies for heinous acts referring to A.R.S. § 12-511 and

recognizes the tort of loss of consortium. However, the statute refers to circumstances where

a defendant has been charged by a criminal complaint or indictment and when the statute of

limitations accrue. Indeed, it defines a civil cause of action to include a civil claim that a

victim “could have brought.” A.R.S. § 12-511 does not state that it provides an independent

source for a cause of action. Further, a state-created danger claim is based on the Fourteenth

Amendment, not state law. The Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim for state-created

danger on which relief can be granted. 

XIV. Count X – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Loss of Consortium

Amor asserts that all Defendants have intentionally inflicted emotional distress and

mental aguish. She further asserts a claim of loss of consortium against all defendants. The

Court will discuss the claims against Dodds separately in section XVIII.

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege

(1) the conduct of defendant was “extreme” and “outrageous,” (2) defendant intended to

cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that such conduct would

result from his conduct, and (3) severe emotional distress did occur as a result of defendant’s

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conduct. Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller, 210 Ariz. 513, 517, 115 P.3d 107, 111 (2005);

Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons Local No. 395

Pension Trust Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 38 P.3d 12 (2002) (discussing difference between

negligent and intentional torts). The acts must be "'so outrageous in character and so extreme

in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious

and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Mintz v. Bell Atlantic Systems Leasing

International, Inc., 183 Ariz. 550, 554, 905 P.3d 559, 563 (App. 1995), quotation omitted.

Further, the defendant must either intend to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard

the near certainty that such distress will result from his conduct. Ford v. Revlon, 153 Ariz.

38, 43, 734 P.2d 580 (1987). 

It is not clear if, in Arizona, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

based on the removal of a child and/or custody proceedings would adequately state extreme

and outrageous conduct, such that would be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in

a civilized society. Indeed, any actions to remove a child will cause distress. See Karen L.,

953 P.2d at 876 (where parent has right to counsel in removal proceedings, not foreseeable

that emotional distress will result; any litigation to remove child will cause some distress;

that “does not mean that the distress should be actionable”); see also LaBelle v. St. Lawrence

County, 85 A.D.2d 759, 445 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y.A.D. 1981) (as a matter of policy,

intentional infliction of emotional harm could not arise from police and social worker

participating in removal of unattended children); Dalmer v. State, 174 Vt. 157, 811 A.2d

1214 (2002) (violation of time requirements for court proceedings or return of child under

Juvenile Procedures Act did not, alone, constitute outrageous conduct); Spurrell v. Bloch, 40

Wash.App. 854, 863 701 P.2d 529, 536 (1985) (sleepless night, tears, loss of appetite, and

anxiety is not “distress above that level which is a fact of life”). However, where a parent

moved the child out of the country in violations of a custody order, a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress was permitted against the grandparents for assisting the

parents. See Pankratz v. Willis, 155 Ariz. 8, 744 P.2d 1182 (App. 1987). 

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14In Arizona, loss of consortium is a derivative claim and requires an underlying cause

of action. See e.g., Lohmeier v. Hammer, 214 Ariz. 57, 148 P.3d 101 (App. 2006).

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Amor has alleged that she was in a state of anguish and shock on September 29, 2005,

when she went to the juvenile court. Amor further asserts that her son suffered extreme

emotional and mental trauma while in temporary state custody. Additionally, Amor asserts

that she was in extreme distress for her child as he suffered trauma and injury in state

custody. The Court finds Amor has failed to allege severe emotional distress did occur as

a result of Defendants’ conduct. Rather, Amor has made conclusory allegations that fail “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65. The

Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

As to Amor’s claim of loss of consortium, the Supreme Court of Arizona has defined

a loss of consortium “as a loss of capacity to exchange love, affection, society,

companionship, comfort, care and moral support.” Pierce v. Cases Adobes Baptist Church,

162 Ariz. 269, 272, 782 P.2d 1162, 1165 (1989).14 The Court held that a parent:

may maintain a cause of action for loss of their child’s consortium when the child

suffers a severe, permanent, and disabling injury that substantially interferes with the

child’s capacity to interact with his parents in a normally gratifying way. . . Whether

a significant interference with the normal relationship between parent and child has

been met is a question of law for the judge to determine. Once the judge finds that

the child’s injuries are sufficiently severe to warrant a cause of action for loss of

consortium, the trier of fact determines the question of recovery or the amount

recoverable based on the degree of that interference.

Id. However, the Court has not found any Arizona authority for a loss of consortium claim

that is not based on the death or injury of the child. See also 7 Cause of Action 2d 319

(2008) (plaintiff must show that “the defendant is legally responsible for the injury or death

of the plaintiff’s child”). The Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim for loss of

consortium upon which relief can be granted.

XV. Count XI – Fraud and Common Law Deceit to Deny Equal Protection

Amor asserts that the Preschool, all State Defendants, Dodds, Gilmore, and Rohr have

committed fraud and common law deceit to deny equal protection and access to postCase 4:06-cv-00499-CKJ Document 143 Filed 02/27/09 Page 27 of 47
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15Included in the allegations referred to for this claim are Amor’s allegations regarding

the garnishment of child support from her federal social security benefits. Those allegations

are addressed separately in section XIX.

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judgment proceedings.15 Amor alleges that Adams and Pike presented a verified affidavit,

containing false allegations, that caused non-defendant Turner and the judge to proceed to

prosecute. Amor asserts that the allegations were based on a report that allegedly contained

the third-party hearsay of the Preschool and Goodsite. Amor asserts that Adams and Pike,

with deliberate and reckless disregard for Amor’s civil rights and fundamental liberties,

misrepresented other Defendants’ statements and records to obstruct justice, abuse process,

and maliciously prosecute Amor on false and fraudulent allegations.

Amor further alleges that the contract lodged with the Superior Court prohibited

Dodds or any member of his family to have any unsupervised visitation and that Dodds had

relinquished any legal rights to plan or care for the child. Amor alleges that Beaver San

Angelo encouraged the juvenile court to dismiss the Dodds’ case plan, i.e., contract, and that

DES and Pima County Court officers permitted Dodds to provide his own criminal clearance.

Amor also alleges that Beaver San Angelo urged the juvenile court to release the child outof-state without the ICPC process being completed. Amor also alleges that Rohr refused to

submit Amor’s motions and evidence to the juvenile court.

Amor also alleges that Dodds used the child to gain control of the minor’s assets, gain

control of expected inheritances, intercept Amor’s federal social security benefits, gain tax

advantages, and breached the domestic partnership agreement.

To state a claim for fraud, Amor must allege “(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3)

its materiality; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the

speaker’s intent that it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably contemplated;

(6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth; (8) the right to

rely on it; (9) his consequent and proximate injury.” Enyart v. Transamerica Ins.Co., 195

Ariz. 71, 77, 985 P.2d 556, 562 (App. 1998). The only allegation that Amor relied upon a

material representation was that Dodds breached the domestic partnership agreement.

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However, Amor has not alleged or stated any facts that, at the time of the making of the

agreement, that the contents were false . . . . i.e., Amor has not alleged that Dodds knew of

any falsity. Furthermore, Amor has not alleged any other Defendant told her a material

falsity upon which Amor relied, The Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim of fraud

upon which relief can be granted.

While some states recognize a separate tort action for deceit, see e.g., MFA Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Keller, 274 Ark. 281, 623 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1981), it appears that Arizona does not

recognize, separate from the torts of fraud or misrepresentation, the tort of deceit. Rather,

the Arizona cases that discuss “deceit”involve the tort of fraud or misrepresentation of fact.

See e.g., Rhoads v. Harvey Publications, Inc., 131 Ariz. 267, 640 P.2d 198 (App. 1981)

(misrepresentation as to a matter of law will not ordinarily support an action for fraud or

deceit); Johnson v. Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., 129 Ariz. 393, 631 P.2 548 (App. 1981)

(in discussing fraud count, court refers to allegations of deceit); Brunell Leasing Corp. v.

Wilkins, 11 Ariz.App. 165, 462 P.2d 858 (1969) (refers to plaintiff’s action in fraud and

deceit); Thomas v. Newcomb, 26 Ariz. 47, 221 P. 226 (1923) (in appropriate circumstances,

plaintiff may sue for tort of fraud and deceit); see also QC Const. Products, LLC v. Cohill’s

Bldg., 423 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1016 n. 6 (D.Ariz. 2006) (referring to “fraud and deceit” as a

tort claim); Coleman v. Watts, 87 F.Supp.2d 944, 951 (D.Ariz. 1998) (liability in deceit for

pecuniary loss caused by justifiable reliance upon misrepresentation). The Court finds,

therefore, that Amor has failed to state a claim for common law deceit upon which relief can

be granted.

XVI. Count XII – False Malicious Reporting and Fraud

Amor asserts the Preschool committed false malicious reporting and fraud. Amor

alleges that the child received a head injury and a cut on his forehead while at the Preschool

on September 17, 2004. Amor further alleges that, approximately two to three weeks later,

the child suffered another head injury and bruises on his forehead. Amor alleges that Kathy

Lester (“Lester”) refused to provide a report regarding this incident. Amor also alleges that,

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in or around June 2005, she questioned the Preschool personnel about a black and blue mark,

which resembled a hand print, on the child’s thigh. The Preschool employees denied

knowledge of the source and refused to provide a report regarding this incident. Amor assert

that this injury was later included as a false allegation against her by DES, Adams, and Pike.

Amor further alleges that, in the summer of 2005, the Preschool told Amor that an irritation

to child’s inner mouth cheek had happened while the child was playing; Amor asserts that

DES, Adams, and Pike falsely alleged she was the cause of this injury.

Amor asserts that during July through September 2005, the child exhibited

increasingly fearful behavior (e.g., refusing to get out of the vehicle) regarding the Preschool.

Amor advised the Preschool that she would be removing the child from their care at the end

of September. Amor requested his records, but Lester and Janice Redding (“Redding”)

refused to provide them. The child was removed from her home before Amor removed the

child from the Preschool.

As previously stated, it is not clear if an action for false malicious reporting is

available in Arizona. However, for purposes of this Order, the Court finds such a claim is

available. However, Amor has not alleged who from the Preschool made any alleged false

reports. The Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim for false reporting against Lester

or Redding. Nonetheless, Amor has alleged that injuries suffered by the child at the

Preschool were later alleged against her. Amor further alleges that the false or misleading

statements were known to be untrue and were made to conceal the child abuse and neglect

by Preschool Defendants. Further, employer liability may be available in Arizona. See

generally Miller v. Mason-McDuffie Co. of Southern California, 153 Ariz. 58, 739 P.2d 806

(1987). The Court finds Amor has stated a claim of false reporting against the Preschool.

As to Amor’s claim of fraud against the Preschool, the Court has previously set out

the required allegations of a fraud claim. See Bryant, 195 Ariz. at 77, 985 P.2d at 562

(plaintiff must alleged a representation, its falsity, its materiality, the speaker’s knowledge

of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, the speaker’s intent that it be acted upon by the

recipient in the manner reasonably contemplated, the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity, the

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hearer’s reliance on its truth, the right to rely on it, his consequent and proximate injury).

Amor has not alleged that the hearers (presumably DES, Adams, and/or Pike) suffered an

injury. The Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim for fraud against the Preschool upon

which relief can be granted.

XVII. Count XIII - Negligent Hiring Training, and Supervision

Amor alleges that the State of Arizona, DES, Hanley, DCYF, Downing, the County

of Pima, the City of Tucson and its City Council, and TPD are liable for negligent hiring,

training and supervision. Amor has also listed the County of York in and of the State of

Pennsylvania as a Defendant.

In order to impose liability on the government entities and/or supervisors, Amor must

alleged that the government entities and/or the supervisors “implement[ed] a policy so

deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving

force of the constitutional violation.'” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446

(9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 972 (1992) (quotations omitted); see also Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he

"knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them."). 

However, Amor has not alleged the existence of any policy that was expressly

sanctioned, enacted, or authorized by the government entities or named supervisors that led

to an alleged injury. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89

L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968 (9th Cir.

2002). Amor’s allegations of the “standard procedure” in the juvenile courts,

unconstitutional polices or customs in the superior and juvenile courts, and the common

practice of TPD are conclusory and fail “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65. Moreover, Amor has not alleged that any alleged

constitutional violation is the result of inadequate training such that deliberate indifference

is shown. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412

(1989) (inadequacy must be so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the

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16The Court notes that “‘[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and

wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United

States.” Elk Grove Unified School Dist., 542 U.S. at 12, 124 S.Ct. at 2309, citation omitted.

Indeed, the federal courts are divested “of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody

decrees.” Id.

17This Order does not address possible venue and statute of limitations defenses.

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policymaker can reasonably be said to be indifferent to the need). Indeed, mere allegations

based solely on a plaintiff's own experience are insufficient to establish liability of a

supervisor. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Liability for improper

custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon

practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a

traditional method of carrying out policy."); City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-

24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). 

The Court finds dismissal of the State of Arizona, DES, Hanley, DCYF, Downing, the

County of Pima, the City of Tucson and its City Council, the City of Tucson Police

Department, and the County of York in and of the State of Pennsylvania as a Defendant is

appropriate. Further, the Court finds Amor has failed to set forth any claims of supervisory

liability, other than those as set out in sections V and IX against Adams and Pike.

XVIII. Count XIV – Torts

Amor alleges various state torts against Dodds. Amor alleges ongoing acts of

domestic violence, interstate stalking, threats of kidnapping, threats of physical and other

harms, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful receipt and use of monies,

interruption of social security direct benefit to cause irreparable financial and legal harm,

unhonored Domestic Partnership Agreement, intentional breach of contract, intentional

familial interference, fraud, and loss of consortium.16 The Court notes that, for some of the

allegations against Dodds, Amor has not alleged the dates or locations.17

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A. Domestic Violence and Threats

Amor does not specify which tort(s) she is attempting to allege in her claims of

domestic violence. As to Amor’s claims of harassment and stalking, the Court considers that

while “it is conceivable that a court could create a separate civil action for stalking by

extending the common law, courts have been reluctant to do so. The tort of harassment or

stalking has been a statutory creation, either by specific enactment of a civil action or by

inference from the criminal statute.” 32 Causes of Action 2d 487. Moreover, the

“recognition of a tort of stalking is generally a state matter.” Id. Arizona has not enacted a

statute creating a civil cause of action for stalking. Compare Cal.Civ.Code § 1708.7;

Mich.Stat.Ann. § 600.2954; Wyo.Stat.Ann. §§ 6-2-506(a) and (b); Or.Rev.Stat. § 30.866;

Tex.Civ.Code §§ 85.001 to 85.006; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-2.1; Va. Code Ann. § 18.01-42.3.

Moreover, no Arizona case has recognized a civil cause of action for stalking. Compare

Stockdale v. Baba, 153 OhioApp.3d 712, 795 N.E.d2d 727 (10th Dist. 2003 (Ohio appellate

court affirmed verdict for common law tort of stalking); Alison C. v. Westcott, 343 Ill.App.3d

648, 798 N.E.2d 813 (2nd Dist. 2003) (Domestic Violence Act provides a civil remedy for

stalking under certain circumstances). Indeed, some courts have rejected claims that a

criminal stalking statute implies a civil cause of action. See Troncalli v. Jones, 237 Ga.App.

10, 514 S.E.2d 478 (1999); Sullivan v. Borough of Hellertown, 2003 WL 21664848 (E.D.Pa.

2003). 

Arizona makes the harassment of another person a misdemeanor, A.R.S. § 13-2921.

That statute includes a cross reference to A.R.S. § 12-511, which discusses when the statute

of limitations for civil actions accrue and refers to civil claims that a victim “could have

brought.” However, “cross references are supplied for the purpose of convenient reference

and do not constitute part of the law.” A.R.S. § 1-212. A.R.S. § 12-511 does not state that

it provides a source for a civil cause of action. The Court finds there is no basis to conclude

that Arizona would recognize a tort for harassment or stalking.

To state a claim for assault, Amor must allege that Dodds acted with intent “to cause

a harmful or offensive contact with [Amor] or an imminent apprehension of such a contact

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[and Amor was] thereby put in such apprehension.” Restatement 2nd Torts § 21. However,

where there is no apparent ability to carry through on the alleged threat, dismissal is

appropriate. Venerias v. Johnson, 127 Ariz. 496, 622 P.2d 55 (App. 1980), overruled on

other grounds. Amor alleges that Dodds, over a period of five to six years committed

continuous acts of domestic violence against Amor and her child (e.g., threatened to use

connections to have Amor appear mentally unstable, physical harm, separate Amor from the

child). Amor also alleges that from 2003 through 2005 Dodds harassed and threatened her

(e.g., kidnapping, financial and legal ruin, interception of social security benefits, physical

harm). The Court finds these vague allegations (e.g., no date or location) fail to set forth a

set of facts that serves to put Dodds on notice as to the nature and basis of the claims. 

 Amor alleges that, in March 2003, Dodds punched the wall, screamed obscenities,

and threatened Amor and the child with physical harm. The Court finds Amor has stated a

claim for assault against Dodds on which relief can be granted. 

Amor further alleges that during March and April of 2004, Dodds threatened to drop

a bomb on Amor during a telephone conversation. Thereafter, Amor and the child were the

subject of stalking and surveillance – Amor caught private investigator Stanley Moose with

a camera outside her window in Oro Valley. Amor appears to be implying that Dodds’

brother arranged for the surveillance. The Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim for

which relief can be granted against Dodds.

Amor asserts that during the period of May through August of 2005, the stalking

increased and was of a more alarming nature and during the period of June or July of 2005,

Dodds issued serious threats against Amor and the child. The Court finds these allegations

are conclusory and fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Amor alleges that around the third week of July 2005, she received a letter from

Dodds that threatened “social workers, judges, and lawyers.” TAC at ¶ 266. Amor appears

to be alleging that the Dodds would use social workers, judges, and lawyers to harm her. The

Court finds this allegation is vague and Amor has failed to state a claim on which relief can

be granted.

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B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

As previously stated, to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,

a plaintiff must allege (1) the conduct of defendant was “extreme” and “outrageous,” (2)

defendant intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty

that such conduct would result from his conduct, and (3) severe emotional distress did occur

as a result of defendant’s conduct. Citizen Publishing Co., 210 Ariz. at 517, 115 P.3d at

111. To the extent Amor is alleging an intentional infliction of emotional distress based on

Dodds’ actions in obtaining custody of the child, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes a

district court from reviewing state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413, 415, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1316, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1527, 161 L.Ed.2d 454

(2005). This Court’s jurisdiction to hear the alleged cause of action depends on whether

Amor’s claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s ruling in a state court

action.” Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior Court, 12 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994), citation

omitted. This Court lack subject matter jurisdiction if the relief requested requires “‘a mere

revision of the errors and irregularities, or of the legality and correctness’ of the state court

judgment, not the ‘investigation of a new case arising upon new facts.’” MacKay v. Pfeil, 827

F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1987).

To the extent that Amor is alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress based

on Dodds’ conduct in the state court proceedings, it appears that Amor is requesting this

Court to review the legality of the state court rulings. This requires a review of the state

court’s decision, and a potential revision of the state court’s order. Amor’s claim is

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s ruling and this Court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over this claim. The Court finds dismissal of this claim is appropriate. 

The Court also considers this claim based on the alleged domestic violence,

harassment, and stalking. Amor has alleged that she was in a state of anguish and shock on

September 29, 2005, when she went to the juvenile court. Additionally, Amor asserts that

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she was in extreme distress for her child as he suffered trauma and injury in state custody.

The Court finds Amor has failed to allege severe emotional distress occured as a result of

Defendants’ conduct. Amor’s conclusory allegations fail “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65. The Court finds Amor has failed to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

C. Unlawful Receipt and Use of Monies

This allegations appears to be based on Amor’s claims that Dodds received gifts for

the child in excess of gift tax limits, Dodds claimed the child on tax returns, and/or Dodds

received money from Blue Cross/Blue Shield. The Court cannot ascertain on what basis

Amor is claiming a tort action against Dodds. The Court finds Amor has failed to state a

claim on which relief can be granted.

D. Interruption of Social Security Direct Benefit

Again, it is not clear what tort Amor is attempting to allege by asserting that Dodds

caused the interruption of her social security benefits. However, the Rooker-Feldman

Doctrine precludes a district court from reviewing state court judgments. This Court’s

jurisdiction to hear the alleged cause of action depends on whether Amor’s claim is

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s ruling in a state court action.” Dubinka, 12

F.3d at 221. Amor requests this Court to review the legality of the interruption of funds from

her federal benefits for child support. This requires a review of the state court’s decision, and

a potential revision of the state court’s order that directs child support be withheld from

Amor’s federal benefits. Amor’s claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s

ruling and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. The Court

finds dismissal of this claim is appropriate. 

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E. Unhonored Domestic Partnership Agreement and Intentional Breach of Contract

To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege an agreement, the right

to seek relief, and a breach by a defendant. Commercial Cornice & Millwork, Inc. v. Camel

Construction Services Corp., 154 Ariz. 34, 739 P.2d 1351 (App. 1987). However, the

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes a district court from reviewing state court judgments.

Amor requests this Court to review the legality of a change in the custody decisions for the

child. This requires a review of the state court’s decision, and a potential revision of the state

court’s order. Amor’s breach of contract claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state

court’s ruling and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. The

Court finds dismissal of this claim is appropriate. 

F. Intentional Familial Interference

While Arizona has recognized an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

where grandparents were alleged to have assisted the “child stealing by a divorced parent[,]”

Pankratz v. Willis, 155 Ariz. at 15, 744 P.2d at 1189, the Court has not found any Arizona

authority that supports a claim for familial interference based upon a change in a custody

order. Moreover, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes a district court from reviewing

state court judgments. Amor requests this Court to review the legality of a change in the

custody decisions for the child. This requires a review of the state court’s decision, and a

potential revision of the state court’s order. Amor’s familial interference claim is

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s ruling and this Court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over this claim. The Court finds dismissal of this claim is appropriate. 

G. Fraud

It is not clear on what basis Amor alleges a claim of fraud against Dodds. To the

extent that Amor is seeking to state a claim based on the breached domestic partnership

agreement, as previously stated in section XV, the Court finds Amor has not stated a claim

on which relief can be granted. 

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H. Loss of Consortium

As previously stated the Court has not found any Arizona authority for a loss of

consortium claim that is not based on the death or injury of the child. See 7 Cause of Action

2d 319 (2008). Additionally, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes a district court from

reviewing state court judgments. Amor requests this Court to review the legality of a change

in the custody decisions of the child. This requires a review of the state court’s decision, and

a potential revision of the state court’s order. Amor’s loss of consortium claim is

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s ruling and this Court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over this claim. The Court finds Amor has failed to state a claim for loss

of consortium upon which relief can be granted.

XIX. Count XV – Wrongful Takings of Federal Social Security Benefit

Amor alleged that the State of Arizona through DES and the Office of the Attorney

General, Pima County by and through the Superior Court and Indigent Defense Counsel,

Dodds, Gilmore, and Rohr have wrongfully taken her federal social security benefits in

violation of the takings clause and committed fraud. Amor alleges that her federal disability

benefits have been garnished for child support without any notice or hearing.

The Fifth Amendment “prevents governments from taking property without just

compensation” while the Fourteenth Amendment “prevents states from taking property

without due process of law.” Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 817 (9th Cir. 1998),

concurring. However, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes a district court from

reviewing state court judgments. This Court’s jurisdiction to hear the alleged constitutional

challenge depends on whether Amor’s constitutional claim is “inextricably intertwined” with

the state court’s ruling in a state court action.” Dubinka v. Judges of the Superior Court, 12

F.3d at 221. Amor requests this Court to review the legality of the removal of funds from

her federal benefits for child support. This requires a review of the state court’s decision, and

a potential revision of the state court’s order that directs child support be withheld from

Amor’s federal benefits. Amor’s takings claim is “inextricably intertwined” with the state

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court’s ruling and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. The

Court finds dismissal of this claim is appropriate. 

XX. Claims Against Licensed Professionals

The Court has found that Amor has stated claims against licensed professionals

Goodsite, Coughlin, and Rohr. However, the Arizona Legislature has stated:

If a claim against a licensed professional is asserted in a civil action, the claimant or

the claimant’s attorney shall certify in a written statement that is filed and served with

the claim whether or not expert opinion testimony is necessary to prove the licensed

professional’s standard of care or liability for the claim.

A.R.S. § 12-2602(A). Amor has not included such a statement with the TAC. Amor will be

directed to file such a statement within ten (10) days of this Order and serve a copy of the

statement with the TAC.

XXI. Claims For Which An Answer Will be Required

Liberally construed, the Court has found that Amor’s TAC has stated the following

claims:

Count I: U.S. Const. Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const. Fourteenth Amendment,

Ariz. Const. Art. 2, § 8 (wrongful seizure/removal) claims against

Baker, Wells, Sifuentes, Adams, and Pike.

Count II: U.S. Const. Fourth Amendment (excessive force) claim against Baker.

Count III: Medical Malpractice claim against Goodsite.

Count IV: False Reporting claim against Goodsite.

Count V: U.S. Const. Fourteenth Amendment, Ariz. Const. Art. 2, § 4

(substantive due process) claims against Baker, Wells, Sifuentes,

Adams, and Pike.

Count VI: U.S. Const. First Amendment and U.S. Const. Fourteenth Amendment

(familial association) claims against Adams, Pike, and Vergara. 

Count VII: Legal Malpractice claims against Coughlin and Rohr.

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18The Court notes that a defendant’s request for a dismissal is “not foreclosed by the

issuance of a sua sponte screening providing that the [plaintiff] has stated a claim[.]” Teahan

v. Wilhelm, 481 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1119 (S.D.Cal. 2007).

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Count VIII: U.S. Const. Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection) claim against

Adams, Pike, and Vergara; 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Conspiracy claim

against Adams, Pike and Vergara.

Count IX: Breach of Fiduciary Care claim against Goodsite.

Count XII: False Reporting claim against the Preschool.

Count XIII: Supervisory Liability claims against Adams and Pike as set forth in

Counts I and V.

Count XIV: Assault and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claims against

Dodds.

The Court will require these Defendants to answer the allegations in the respective counts.18

XXII. Pending Motions and Service of Third Amended Complaint

Amor has requested that the Second and Third Amended Complaints be sealed.

However, “the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public

records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner

Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). Courts are

to weigh “the interests advanced by te parties in light of the public interest and the duty of

the courts.” Id. at 598. The Ninth Circuit has determined that, in determining whether the

public right of access should be restricted, a strong presumption in favor of public access

exists. Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, the Ninth

Circuit has stated that, in making a decision, a district court should consider all relevant

factors, including:

the public interest in understanding the judicial process and whether disclosure of the

material could result in improper use of the material for scandalous or libelous

purposes or infringement under trade secrets . . . After taking all relevant factors into

consideration, the district court must base its decision on a compelling reason and

articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.

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Id., quoting EEOC v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1990).

Amor’s Motions to Seal request the Court to only permit the Second Amended

Complaint and the TAC to be unsealed, because of sensitive, safety, and privacy issues

therein, if the Court accepts the documents. The Court having determined that Amor has

stated claims upon which relief can be granted, the Court finds it is not appropriate to seal

the documents. 

Amor also requests clarification regarding the service of documents and additional

time to complete service. The Court having accepted some of Amor’s claims, Amor will

now be directed to effectuate service upon Defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. However,

every pleading subsequent to an original complaint may be served by electronic means.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 5. Because Amor is not registered as an ECF user, service must be completed

by non-electronic means. L.R.Civ. 5.5(h). However, the parties and counsel are advised that

submission of a document to the office of the Clerk of the Court by Amor, subsequent entry

into ECF by the Clerk of the Court, and transmission of the Notice of Electronic Filing to a

Registered User’s e-mail address constitutes services of the hyperlinked document. Id. In

other words, if a Defendant is represented by counsel, and is, therefore, a registered ECF

User, service by Amor of any document subsequent to the Third Amended Complaint may

be completed by the entry into the ECF system by the Clerk of the Court. However, hard

copies of documents requested to be filed under seal must be provided to all other

parties/counsel in hard copy format (unless the Court has granted permission for a filing ex

parte).

The Court notes that Amor was previously granted in forma pauperis status. Further,

Amor previously inquired of service by the U.S. Marshal’s Office. Where an in forma

pauperis plaintiff seeks assistance of service, the Court may direct the United States

Marshal’s Office to effectuate service. See generally Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754 (9th

Cir. 1991). The Court finds it appropriate to direct the United States Marshal’s Office to

serve the summons and TAC upon Defendants. Amor will be directed to complete and return

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a service packet to the Clerk of Court within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order for the

United States Marshal to provide service of process of the Third Amended Complaint.

Amor also seeks a temporary stay in order to address state domestic relations issues

relating to the interception of social security benefits. Amor asserts that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not apply to preclude her claims in this litigation and, therefore, a stay is

appropriate because resolution of the state issues would result in judicial convenience and

efficiency. However, the Court has determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does

preclude some claims contained within the TAC. Resolution of those issues, therefore, will

not affect this pending matter. Additionally, Amor asserts that a stay is needed to avoid

juggling the legal issues in both the state matter and this matter. The Court does not find this

an adequate basis to stay this matter. Further, the Court’s granting Amor leave to amend and

the Court’s screening of Amor’s pleadings has delayed this matter and the Court does not

find it appropriate to grant the stay, thereby incurring additional delay.

Dodds’ Motion to Extend Deadlines will be denied as moot.

XXIII. Notice to Amor

Amor should again take notice that if she fails to timely comply with every provision

of this Order, this action will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. See Ferdik

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992) (District Court may

dismiss action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals requires the Court to provide pro se prisoners with

notice of the requirements of Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has

required notice be provided when a motion to dismiss has been filed. See Wyatt v. Terhune,

315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003). Although the Ninth Circuit has not stated that similar notices

must be provided to other pro se plaintiffs, the Court will provide Amor with these notices.

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ACCORDINGLY, the Court NOTIFIES Amor as follows:

a. When a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), motion for judgment

on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), or motion for summary judgment pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is filed (e.g., on the on the grounds that you failed to state a claim or that

there is no material issue of factual dispute), the motion will, if granted, result in the

dismissal of your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion to dismiss or for

summary judgment, and that motion is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn

testimony) and/or documents, you may not simply rely on what your complaint says.

Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answer to interrogatories,

or documents, that contradict the facts shown in the defendant's declarations and documents

and show that you have in fact exhausted your claims. If you do not submit your own

evidence in opposition, the motion to dismiss, if appropriate, may be granted and the case

dismissed.

1. The declarations or other sworn testimony setting out your specific facts

must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be

admissible as evidence, and must affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to

testify regarding the matters in the declaration or other sworn testimony.

2. If the Court determines that any of the declarations or other sworn

testimony are made in bad faith, the Court may order the party employing the bad

faith to pay the other party for costs associated with controverting that testimony,

including the other party's attorney's fees.

3. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition to the motion, the

moving party's evidence might be taken as truth and those claims addressed in the

motion will be DISMISSED without a trial. IF THAT OCCURS, THERE WILL

BE NO TRIAL ON THOSE CLAIMS.

b. YOU SHALL FILE ANY RESPONSE TO A MOTION TO DISMISS,

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM THE DATE THE MOTION IS

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19L.R.Civ. 12.1 and 56.1 provide for these time limits when a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a motion for summary judgment is filed. The Court

finds it appropriate to also impose these time limits for a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and a motion for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).

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FILED.19 If you do not respond to the motion, your failure to respond can be viewed as you

agreeing to the Court granting the Motion. See L.R.Civ. 7.2(i). IF THAT OCCURS,

THOSE CLAIMS ADDRESSED IN THE MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILL BE DISMISSED AND THERE WILL BE NO TRIAL ON THOSE CLAIMS.

Any reply shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date the response is filed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Amor’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Third Amended Complaint [Doc.

# 129] is GRANTED.

2. Amor’s Motion to Seal Second Amended Complaint [Doc. # 124] is DENIED.

3. Amor’s Motion for Temporary Seal of Third Amended Complaint [Doc. # 131]

is DENIED.

4. Amor’s Motion to Extend Page Limitations [Doc. # 125] is DENIED as

MOOT.

5. Amor’s Motion for Clarification Sealed Service [Doc. # 127] is GRANTED.

6. Amor’s Motion for Clarification and for Extension of Time to Serve Amended

Complaint [Doc. # 136] is GRANTED.

7. Amor’s Motion for Clarification & Stay [Doc. # 139] is GRANTED IN PART

AND DENIED IN PART.

8. Amor shall file a statement in compliance with A.R.S. § 12-2602(A) within ten

(10) days of this Order. Failure to comply with A.R.S. § 12-2602(A) within ten (10) days

of this Order will result in dismissal of the claims against the licensed professionals.

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9. Defendant Dodds’ Motion to Extend Deadlines, joined by Coughlin [Doc. #

132] is DENIED AS MOOT.

10. Defendants State of Arizona, State of Arizona Department of Economic

Security, Beaver San Angelo, Downing, Hanley, Count of Pima by and through its Superior

Courts and its Officers and Employees and its Indigent Defense Counsel, City of Tucson and

its City Council by and through its Tucson Police Department, Redding, Lester, County of

York in and of the State of Pennsylvania, Gilmore, G. Dodds, and J. Dodds are DISMISSED

from this action.

11. Defendants Baker, Wells, Sifuentes, Adams, and Pike must answer Counts I

and V, Defendant Baker must answer Count II, Defendant Goodsite must answer Counts III,

IV, and IX, Defendant Adams, Pike, and Vergara must answer Counts VI and VIII,

Defendants Coughlin and Rohr must answer Count VII, Defendant Preschool must answer

Count XII, Defendants Adams and Pike must answer Count XIII, and Defendant Dodds must

answer Count XIV. 

12. The Clerk of Court must send Amor a service packet including the Third

Amended Complaint, this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendants Baker, Wells, Sifuentes, Adams, Pike, Vergara, Baker, Goodsite, Coughlin,

Rohr, the Preschool, and Dodds.

13. Amor must complete and return the service packet, with the addition of the

A.R.S. § 12-2602(A) written statement, to the Clerk of Court within 20 days of the date of

filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide service of process if Amor

fails to comply with this Order.

14. A Defendant may be dismissed from this action, pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if Amor does not either obtain a waiver of service of the

summons or complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120

days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever

is later. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).

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15. The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

a copy of the A.R.S. § 12-2602(A) statement, and a copy of this Order for future use.

16. The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service

of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of

service form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal

for photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order

and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served

Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

17. A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint

must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not Amor.

18. Defendants must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

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19. Any answer or responsive pleading must state the specific Defendant by name

on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, responsive pleading, or other

motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is

filed.

DATED this 27th day of February, 2009.

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