Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01185/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01185-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OLIVER HILL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID

TRANSIT DISTRICT and DOES 1 through

100, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-01185 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO

FEDERAL CLAIMS AND

REMANDING REMAINING

STATE CLAIM

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination case, plaintiff alleges that he suffered racial

harassment, hostile-work environment and retaliation by his co-workers at defendant Bay Area

Rapid Transit District (“BART”). Defendant moves for summary judgment. This order finds

that plaintiff cannot sustain his claims under either 42 U.S.C. 1981 or 1983 because he fails to

make a prima facie showing that he suffered a constitutional tort sufficient to impose municipal

liability. Defendant’s motion as to plaintiff’s federal claims is therefore GRANTED. The Court

declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction of plaintiff’s remaining state-law claim under

California Government Code Section 12940(k) and therefore REMANDS that claim to state

court.

Case 3:05-cv-01185-WHA Document 51 Filed 01/17/06 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

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STATEMENT

THE ALLEGED HOSTILE-WORK ENVIRONMENT AND RETALIATION.

Plaintiff, an African-American male who is 48, began working for BART as a transitvehicle mechanic in January 1999 (Hill Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7). After eight months in BART’s Daly City

shop, plaintiff transferred to the Richmond shop in order to be closer to home (id. at ¶ 7). 

Plaintiff alleges that several of his Caucasian co-workers harassed him at the Richmond shop, in

particular Christopher Van Fossen (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 9). Van Fossen purportedly

physically intimidated plaintiff and threw objects such as steel bolts at him (Hill Decl. ¶ 8). 

According to plaintiff, the conduct of Van Fossen was condoned by Tamar Allen, the Richmond

shop manager at the time (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 10). Allen is also Caucasian (ibid.). On

December 4, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint with BART's Office of Civil Rights, including a

log of the alleged harassment recorded by Hill (Moore Decl. Exh. 2). Sharon Moore, principal

administrative analyst in BART’s OCR, opened an administrative file for the complaint (id. at

¶¶ 1, 5). 

The following day, plaintiff alleges that Van Fossen hit him in the back of his hard hat

(Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 15). Plaintiff maintains that the slap caused a cervical injury (ibid.). 

Plaintiff first reported the incident to BART police six days later, who in turn reported the slap

to a shop supervisors (Lee Decl. Exh. 3). Upon learning of the incident, Allen conducted an

investigation of the slapping incident by interviewing plaintiff, Van Fossen and others present

in the break room (Allen Decl. ¶ 3). On December 20, 2000, Allen concluded that the slap did

not occur and disciplined plaintiff with a fifteen-day suspension for filing a false complaint

(id. at ¶ 8, Exh. 2). According to BART, Allen was unaware at the time that she was listed as a

perpetrator of harassment in plaintiff’s OCR complaint (id. at ¶ 9). 

Meanwhile, Moore reviewed plaintiff’s broader allegations of harassment by his coworkers and Allen (Moore Decl. ¶¶ 5–11). Moore apparently did not meet with Van Fossen,

the other alleged harassers or Allen (ibid.). Instead, Moore determined the complaint was

merely speculation deriving from plaintiff’s paranoia (id. at ¶ 7). Moore shared her concerns

with other employee services personnel at BART including Barbara George who agreed that

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plaintiff possibly posed a threat of violence (id. ¶¶ 7–8). On January 9, 2001, Allen, after

learning from George of the purported threat, ordered plaintiff to report to psychiatrist Dr.

Frank Ranuska for a “fitness for duty” evaluation (Allen Decl. Exh 3). Plaintiff was advised

that he was on paid administrative leave pending Ranuska’s evaluation (ibid.).

In February 2001, Ranuska issued a report that plaintiff was fit to return for work, but

only if he could be separated from the allegedly harassing co-workers (Lee Decl. Exh. 7). 

George subsequently asked that Ranuska reevaluate plaintiff (id. Exh. 8). In May 2001,

Ranuska issued a second report, again concluding that plaintiff was fit to return to work with

the limited restriction that he not work under Allen’s chain of command (ibid.).

According to defendant, finding plaintiff a position fitting this limitation was difficult

(Allen Decl. ¶ 13). By May 2001, Allen had been promoted to group manager, giving her

responsibility for the transit-vehicle mechanics at all four mechanic shops (ibid.). Thus all

transit-vehicle mechanics would be under Allen’s chain of command (ibid.). Ranuska,

therefore, agreed to modify the restriction contained in his revaluation report, so that plaintiff

could work as long as he did not report directly to Allen (id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiff returned to work

at the Concord shop on October 12, 2002 (id. at ¶ 16). In June 2003, plaintiff transferred to the

Richmond shop (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 38). According to plaintiff, this transfer back to the

shop where Van Fossen worked was against his will (ibid.; Hill Decl. ¶ 40). During his

deposition, however, plaintiff admitted that he put in a bid to return to the Richmond shop (Hill

Depo. 186:14-20). 

In any event, upon his return to Richmond, plaintiff contends that the harassment

resumed (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 39). According to plaintiff, Van Fossen closely followed

plaintiff throughout the shop and physically intimidated him (id. at ¶¶ 39, 42). Allen allegedly

was a witness to the stalking but did nothing (id. at ¶¶ 40, 42). In particular, plaintiff contends

that on July 14, 2003, Van Fossen walked closely by plaintiff and said “we don’t want you here,

nigger” (id. at ¶ 41). On July 24, 2003, in the break room Van Fossen allegedly kicked plaintiff

in the leg with Van Fossen’s steel-toe boot causing a bruise (id. at ¶ 42). Plaintiff initially

reported the kicking incident to union representatives (ibid.). Several months later, plaintiff

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reported the racial slur and the kick to BART police (ibid.). Allen’s successor Sean Steele

investigated plaintiff’s complaints, apparently by taking a statement from plaintiff, Van Fossen

and potential witnesses (Steele Depo. 54:1–57:10). Steele found plaintiff’s complaints baseless

and issued a written reprimand for filing a false charge (ibid.). Plaintiff further contends that

during his second stint in Richmond, BART management singled him out for special scrutiny

(Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 48). 

Additionally, plaintiff contends that BART rubber stamped a counterclaim for

harassment brought by Van Fossen (id. at ¶ 51). According to plaintiff, the extent of Van

Fossen’s counter-complaint was that plaintiff said “excuse me” in a sarcastic tone (id. at ¶ 43). 

Plaintiff complains that he was unable to obtain a copy of the allegations filed against him at the

time (id. at ¶ 44). 

In January 2004, plaintiff transferred back to the Concord shop where plaintiff continues

to work (Allen Decl. ¶ 74).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On January 12, 2004, plaintiff filed complaints for discrimination and retaliation with

the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission. The DFEH issued a right-to-sue letter on the same day

and the EEOC issued such a letter on May 25, 2004. 

Plaintiff filed suit in California Superior Court for the County of Alameda on August 24,

2004, against BART, Allen and Van Fossen. In that complaint, plaintiff alleged several claims

under California Government Code Section 12940, as well as intentional infliction of emotional

distress, assault and battery. Following a partial demurrer, plaintiff filed an amended complaint

on February 25, 2005, in state court, which no longer listed Van Fossen or Allen as defendants,

only included a claim for failure to prevent discrimination under Section 12940 and added a

claim for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against BART. BART removed the

case to this Court on March 23, 2005 asserting federal-question jurisdiction. Plaintiff

subsequently filed the operative second amended complaint on July 8, 2005, adding a claim for

deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1981 against BART. 

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Discovery has closed. Defendant moved for summary judgment on December 8, 2005. 

After full briefing and hearing, this order now issues. 

ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Summary judgment shall be rendered if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). Summary

judgment is not granted if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine” — that is, if the

evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The evidence, and all reasonable

inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” T.W.

Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630–31 (9th Cir. 1987).

The moving party “has both the initial burden of production and ultimate burden of

persuasion on a motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz

Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “Credibility determinations, weighing

evidence, and drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a

judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for directed verdict; evidence

of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

On a motion by the party without the burden of proof at trial, the party may carry its

initial burden by either of two methods. “The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or, after suitable discovery, the moving party

may show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of

its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at

1106. Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the

pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and

admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). Summary

judgment for a defendant is appropriate when plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to

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establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which party will bear

the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322.

2. PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW.

 As a threshold matter, to obtain relief against a municipality under Sections 1981 or 

1983, a plaintiff must prove that he has suffered a constitutional tort. “[T]he municipality itself

must cause the constitutional deprivation . . . a city may not be held vicariously liable for the

unconstitutional acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat superior.” Gillette v.

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992)(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of

N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). The same principle applies to Section 1981. See Fed’n of

African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 1996)(“[I]t is

highly implausible that Congress silently intended to impose respondeat superior liability on

state actors for the violation of § 1981 rights, a change which would create an enormous new

burden on government defendants”). A plaintiff may establish municipal liability in one of

three ways: 

First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee committed the

alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental

policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the

‘standard operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity. 

Second, the plaintiff may establish that the individual who

committed the constitutional tort was an official with final

policy-making authority and that the challenged action itself thus

constituted an act of official governmental policy. Whether a

particular official has final policy-making authority is a question

of state law. Third, the plaintiff may prove that an official with

final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate’s

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.

Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346–47 (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff does not dispute that BART is a municipality for purposes of Sections 1981 and

1983. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he discrimination, harassment and retaliation campaign against

Hill was pursuant to longstanding practice and custom which constituted standard operating

procedure” (Oppo. 24). To prevail on a theory of custom or usage, plaintiff must prove “the

existence of a widespread practice that . . . is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a

‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1349 (internal citation omitted). 

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Plaintiff does not meet this burden. Despite a full opportunity for discovery, plaintiff

makes only conclusory statements about the pervasiveness of such harassment. Plaintiff alludes

to only one specific example of similar harassment. Plaintiff reports that another AfricanAmerican employee at BART “explained to me” that his Caucasian co-worker kicked him and

that management did not discipline the alleged kicker (Hill Decl. ¶ 60). This hearsay allegation

is flawed, most notably due to plaintiff’s failure to submit a first-hand declaration from the

purported victim. In any event, this single anecdote fails to create a prima facie showing of a

“permanent and well settled” practice with “the force of law.” 

Alternatively, plaintiff suggests that an official with policy-making authority ratified the

harassment and retaliation. Here, California law governs whether a particular official has

policy-making authority. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346–47. With respect to the transit districts in

California, “[t]he board of directors . . . shall determine all questions of district policy.” Cal.

Pub. Utils. Code 28762. “[A] federal court would not be justified in assuming that municipal

policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to put it.” 

Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1350. 

Plaintiff argues that the conduct was ratified by “BART’s Office of Civil Rights,

BART’s Office of the General Counsel (representing the BART Board of Directors), and at

least one member of the BART Board of Directors” (Oppo. 25). Again, defendant sufficiently

demonstrates the absence of proof that the board of directors took any affirmative action with

respect to the purported racial harassment. To demonstrate ratification, plaintiff must show that

the board made “a deliberate choice from among various alternatives to follow a particular

course of action.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1348. Plaintiff presents no such evidence. Indeed,

plaintiff does not even argue that the whole board ever became involved. Plaintiff’s federal

claims therefore fail.

3. THE COURT DECLINES TO RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER STATE LAW CLAIM

At the hearing, counsel all agreed that the only federal claim is asserted against BART. 

No federal claims have been asserted against any individual defendants.

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A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim

if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). 

“When federal claims are dismissed before trial, the question whether pendent state claims

should still be entertained is within the discretion of the district court.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe,

Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)(citation omitted). While

the exercise of discretion may not be taken lightly, our circuit has deemed that “in the usual

case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will

point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Acri v.

Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir 1997)(internal citation omitted). 

So too here. Having determined that plaintiff’s Section 1981 and Section 1983 claims

cannot go forward, plaintiff’s only remaining claim is for failure to prevent discrimination

under California Government Code Section 12940(k). Nothing about this claim suggests the

Court should exercise its discretion counter to the usual case. Indeed, the California Superior

Court for the County of Alameda has spent at least an equal amount of time with the remaining

legal issues, having already considered BART’s demurrer. Moreover, it is possible that unique

questions regarding Section 12940(k) may arise, such as what constitutes an adequate

investigation and whether the continuing-violation doctrine applies. Such issues are better

resolved by the California courts. This order thus finds that remand of plaintiff’s Section

12940(k) claim is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary

judgment as to plaintiff’s federal claims. The Court REMANDS plaintiff’s remaining claim

under Section 12940(k) for adjudication in the California Superior Court for the County of

Alameda. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

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