Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02089/USCOURTS-ca10-92-02089-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FILLO C 

UNITED STATES 

Unit.eel States Co~~ AppealCOURT OF APPEALS TeTlth C, 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAR 2 9 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

MERRILL BURROUS CHAMBERLAIN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; KEN SHULTZ, ) 

Mayor; SAM BACA, Chief of Police; ) 

J.G. GALLEGOS, Sgt . ; JOHN A. ) 

CARILLO, Officer; JOHN MESSIMER, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 92-2089 

(D. C. No . 89-CV-101) 

(D. N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Mr. Chamberlain, a prose litigator, appeals the dismissal of 

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 . 

Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 1 
Mr. Chamberlain was tried, convicted and sentenced on 

criminal charges arising out of the circumstances basically 

described by Mr. Chamberlain in his complaint, which the district 

court summarized as follows: 

On February 21, 1987, Albuquerque Police Department 

(APD) received a[] call from a woman who claimed that 

Plaintiff was physically assaulting her. The woman 

called APD from Plaintiff's home. Upon the arrival of 

Officers Messimer and Carrillo at the address, Plaintiff 

agreed to a search of his home. During the search, 

Carrillo received APD's confirmation that the emergency 

call did originate from Plaintiff's address. Carrillo 

also discovered evidence of the recent presence of a 

woman in a bedroom in the house. The officers requested 

to search again. Plaintiff declined to consent to a 

further search and requested the presence of his lawyer. Carrillo and Messimer permitted Plaintiff to go upstairs 

and use the telephone to call his lawyer but continued 

to search the house . At some point, Plaintiff retrieved 

a briefcase with a gun in it. Carrillo and Messimer 

permitted Plaintiff to go into the bathroom unescorted, 

to which he carried the briefcase with the hidden gun. 

When Plaintiff attempted to leave the bathroom, Carrillo 

blocked his exit and held a gun leveled at Plaintiff's 

chest . Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff engaged the 

officers in a gun battle in which Carrillo was shot to 

death. 

Mr. Chamberlain filed this prose action against the City of 

Albuquerque, its police department and various officers claiming 

the violation of his constitutional rights originating in the 

above described circurnstances. 1 Specifically, plaintiff contended 

that his Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendrnent2 rights were violated 

1 In order to give the reader 

Chamberlain complains, inter 

was not wearing a bullet-proof 

police conduct by naming a new 

the flavor of this complaint, Mr. 

alia, that one of the two officers 

vest and the City ratified the 

city park after the slain officer. 

2 Plaintiff does not appeal the dismissal of his Sixth Amendment 

claim. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 2 
during the incident. 

The district court, in a thorough and well written twentyfour-page Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on April 10, 1992, 

dismissed the complaint. We attach a copy of this Memorandum 

Opinion and Order hereto. On September 28, 1992, pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1) and (b) (6), plaintiff filed a motion for 

relief from judgment. The district court found on October 7, 1992 

that it was without jurisdiction to consider the motion since 

plaintiff had already appealed. 

It is difficult to either characterize or summarize Mr. 

Chamberlain's brief to this court accurately. The essence of the 

appeal is that the district court made erroneous factual findings 

"that contradict the substantive facts known to both officers." 

Additionally, Mr. Chamberlain petitioned for a writ of mandamus to 

compel consideration of his Rule 60(b) motion. 

Regarding dismissal, the district court liberally construed 

Mr. Chamberlain's pleadings and viewed them in the appropriate 

light: "' [A]ll well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from 

conclusory allegations, must be taken as true,' Swanson v. Bixler, 

750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984) . " The district court concluded 

Mr. Chamberlain could prove no set of facts in support of his 

claim that would entitle him to relief. We review the dismissal 

for failure to state a claim de nova. Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 

1563, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991). 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 3 
In regard to the excessive force claim, the officers' conduct 

even according to plaintiff's facts was objectively reasonable. 

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S . 386, 396 (1989 ) . Allegations such 

as "both officers agreed to allow me to enter my bathroom alone"; 

"one [officer] was not wearing a bullet-proof vest 11 ; "one 

[officer] left the room of the other five times"; "instead of 

leaving me alone in my bathroom the second time, he could have 

continued eye contact," do not constitute facts showing excessive 

force. We agree with the district court that any alleged seizure 

was justified by the legitimate interests of minimizing the risk 

of harm to the officers and other potential occupants, and the 

facilitation of the orderly completion of the search. See 

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981). Further, 

plaintiff has alleged no facts that would indicate an 

interrogation took place in violation of his Fifth Amendment 

rights. An interrogation requires the officers to make statements 

which would be "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 

response." Rhode Island v . Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301 (1990 ) . 

Finally, because plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a 

constitutional violation by a police officer, there can be no 

action against the officer's supervisors for failing to train or 

supervise the officer. Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's 

Dept., 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir. 1990) . 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 4 
Mr. Chamberlain's numerous other arguments do not warrant 

discussion . Mr . Chamberlain has failed to persuade us that he has 

stated a claim for which relief may be granted. 

Mr. Chamberlain's petition for writ of mandamus to direct the 

district court to consider his Rule 60(b) motion must also be 

denied . Technically, the district court was incorrect in its 

Order of October 7, 1992, when it stated it did not have 

jurisdiction to consider the Rule 60 (b ) motion. Actual ly, the 

district court lacks jurisdiction only to grant a Rule 60 {b ) 

motion once an appeal has been filed. Aldrich Enters. , Inc. v . 

United States, 938 F.2d 1134, 1143 (10th Cir. 1991). The court 

was free to consider the motion and then deny it on its merits, or 

it could notify us of its intention to grant the motion upon 

remand . Id. The issues raised by Mr . Chamberlain's Rule 60 {b ) 

motion, however, were addressed in the court's Memorandum and 

Order of April 10, 1992. In Plaintiff's Rule 60 (b) motion he 

requests leave to replace "Section C. Cause of Action," in the 

complaint with eight pages of reworded claims containing many 

conclusory allegations. A motion under Rule 60(b) must present a 

matter that is material and of such importance that it would 

likely alter the outcome. Id. Excluding the conclusory 

allegations, none of the actual facts brought forth in Mr. 

Chamberlain's motion state a claim for which relief may be 

granted. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 5 
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for 

substantially the same reasons set forth therein, and the writ of 

mandamus is DENIED. The mandate shall issue f orthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 6 
--. ' / / ' ..... J J 

_/ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

MERRILL BURROUS CHAMBERLAIN, 

Plaintiff, 

Fl LED 

AT ALBUQUERQUE 

APR ~ 0 1992 

ROBERT M. MARCH 

CLERK 

vs. No. CIV 89-0101 H/SGB 

ENTERED (HJ DOCKET 

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, et al., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

L-f- ./() {];i.. 

This matter comes before the court pursuant to Defendants' 

various motions to dismiss and George Carrillo's Suggestion of 

Death and accompanying motion to substitute parties. 

I. SUMMARY OF CASE 

This is a prose civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 

u.s.c § 1983. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. 

On February 21, 1987, Albuquerque Police Department (APD) 

received an call from a woman who claimed that Plaintiff was 

physically assaulting her. The woman called APD from Plaintiff's 

home. Upon the arrival of Officers Messimer and Carrillo at the 

address, Plaintiff agreed to a search of his. home. During the 

search, Carrillo received APD' s confirmati..,n that the emergency 

call did originate from Plaintiff's address. Carrillo also 

discovered evidence of the recent presence of a woman in a bedroom 

in the house. The officers requested to search again. Plaintiff 

declined to consent to a further search and requested the presence 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 7 
of his lawyer. Carrillo and Messimer permitted Plaintiff to go 

upstairs and use the telephone to call his lawyer but continued to 

search the house. At some point, Plaintiff retrieved a briefcase 

with a gun in it. Carrillo and Messimer_permitted Plaintiff to go 

the bathroom unescorted, to which he carried the briefcase with the 

hidden gun. When Plaintiff attempted to leave the bathroom, ➔ 

Carrillo blocked his exit and held a gun leveled at Plaintiff's 

chest. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff engaged the officers in a gun 

battle in which Carrillo was shot to death. 

Plaintiff claims violations of his rights under the Fourth, 

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments; all of which claims 

originate in the circumstances surrounding his arrest in his home. 

Plaintiff names as defendants the City of Albuquerque, former mayor 

Ken Schultz, Pol ice Chief Sam Baca, Police Sergeant John B. 

Gallegos, and unknown policy makers (collectively referenced in 

this opinion as "City defendants"), as well as Officers Carrillo 

and Messimer. 

Plaintiff alleges that Carrillo and Messimer, the officers at 

the scene of the arrest, and Defendant Gallegos, their immediate 

supervisor, violated his right to be free from unreasonable 

seizure. Plaintiff complains that City defendants violated his 

substantive due process rights by failing to adequately train or 

.:nipe·r~-:~.:: c. .... .c _ _;_11c. a.nd Messimer. Plaintiff alleges that Carrillo 

and Messimer violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 

Amendments when they continued to interrogate him and search his 

house after he had requested the presence of an attorney and 

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his subsequent behavior which culminated in the gun battle in which 

Carrillo lost his life. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the 

repeated search demonstrates the City defendants' inadequate 

training or supervision of Carrillo and .Messimer. 

In their Answer, all defendants except Carrillo move the court 

to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

George Carrillo, the personal representative of the estate of 

Defendant Carrillo, has moved the court for the substitution of the 

estate as party defendant. Carrillo has also moved to dismiss the 

claim against the estate on the ground that the claim is barred by 

the applicable statute of limitations. 

I have reviewed the complaint, Defendants' Answer and 

accompanying memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss 

(Defendants' motion), Carrillo's motion to substitute parties and 

to dismiss and supporting memorandum (Carrillo's motion), and 

Plaintiff's memoranda filed in opposition to the defendants' two 

motions. 

I have construed the prose plaintiff's pleadings liberally, 

holding him to a less stringent standard than that required of a 

party represented by legal counsel. See, e.g. , Gillihan v. 

Shillinger, 872 F . 2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1989). While applying the 

standard for consideriny a 12(b) (6) motion that "[a)ll well-pleaded 

facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken 

as true," Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984) 

(citation omitted), I have remained mindful that a constitutional 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 9 
claim brought by a prose plaintiff under Section 1983 should not 

be dismissed unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff 

could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would 

entitle him to relief. Dunn v.lfbite, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th 

Cir. 1989), (citations omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 

(1990). 

II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 

Because Count I is premised in the theory that the City 

defendants' failed to provide Carrillo and Messimer training 

adequate to avoid the Constitutional violations alleged in Count II 

of the Complaint, I will consider Count II first. 

A. Count II: Excessive Force 

Plaintiff claims that, by unnecessarily maintaining a threat 

of deadly force, Carrillo violated his right to be secure in his 

home and person against unreasonable seizure. As support, 

Plaintiff alleges that Carrillo prevented him from leaving his 

bathroom by pointing a gun at his chest despite his raised and 

empty hands; that Carrillo held the gun on Plaintiff because 

Plaintiff had been out of sight when he was permitted to use the 

bathroom; that Carrillo continued to threaten Plaintiff's life for 

a "considerable time;" and that Messimer did not come to 

Plaintiff's aid. 

1. Defendant Gallegos 

Plaintiff names Gallegos as a defendant in Count II of his 

complaint, and describes Gallegos as the immediate supervisor of 

Carrillo and Messimer. As Gallegos is also named as a defendant in 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 10 
count I, which specifically involves a claim for inadequat e 

supervision and training, I interpret his inclusion in Count II to 

be premised in something other than a claim for failure to train 

and supervise. That claim under Count I . will be considered below. 

Liability under section 1983 cannot rest upon a theory of 

respondeat superior. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 385 (1989). Absent personal participation, supervisory 

personnel are not liable for civil rights violations perpetrated by 

individual police officers unless the plaintiff demonstrates an 

"affirmative link" between the incident of police misconduct and 

the adoption of a plan or policy showing authorization or approval 

of the misconduct. See, e.g., D.T. by M.T. v. Independent School 

District No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1187 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, __ 

u.s. __ , 111 s.ct. 213 (1990) (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 u.s. 

362, 371 (1976)). Superior officers who have no affirmative link 

with Constitutionally-proscribed misconduct cannot be held liable 

under Section 1983. McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 695-96 

(10th Cir. 1979). To hold a superior liable for the acts of an 

inferior, the superior "must have participated or acquiesced in the 

constitutional deprivations." Meade v. Grul:>bs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 

(10th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). 

Barring evidence that Gallegos personally established or used 

an unconstitutional policy or custom, which has not been alleged, 

Plaintiff must aver facts sufficient to support a determination 

that Gallegos "breached a duty imposed by state or local law which 

caused the constitutional violation." Id. Plaintiff has not 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 11 
alleged such facts. Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged neither that 

Gallegos had any duty or authority to hire, train, supervise or 

discipline Carrillo and Messimer, (see, id., at 1528-29,) nor that 

any specific deficiencies in Gallegos's performance actually caused 

the purported constitutional injury in this case. See, e.g., Munz 

v. Ryan, 752 F.Supp. 1537, 1549 (D.Kan. 1990). The instant case 

differs dramatically from Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 

F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989}, .which Plaintiff cites in his response to 

the City defendants' motion to dismiss. In Cartagena, the court 

held a police superintendent liable for civil rights violations 

when the superintendent had personal knowledge of numerous 

complaints specifically against the officer in question, had taken 

no action, and had employed an inadequate disciplinary system 

permitting the officer to continue his improper practices. Id. at 

561-569. Plaintiff has alleged no fact which could support a 

conclusion that either Carrillo or Messimer had any history of 

violations or that Gallegos had in any way breached any duty or 

responsibility required of him by law. Cf., Meade v. Grubbs, 841 

F.2d at 1527-29. 

The complaint contains no allegation of fact demonstrating an 

affirmative link between Gallegos, in his personal capacity, and 

the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff's sole allegation specifically iu reference to Gallegos 

is that he was the immediate supervisor of the officers who 

purportedly violated Plaintiff's rights. This conclusory 

allegation fails to state a claim for federal court relief. see, 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 12 
e.g., Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Construed as a suit against Gallegos in his official capacity, 

this action constitutes a claim against the City of Albuquerque. 

See, e.g., Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d a~ 1529. In this context, 

Plaintiff must allege that Gallegos was responsible for 

establishing the City's policy regarding the use of force in 

circumstances such as those giving rise to this lawsuit. Id. at 

153 o. Plaintiff has not alleged any such facts, and therefore 

fails to state a claim against Gallegos in his official capacity. 

The "broad reading" to which Plaintiff's pleadings are 

entitled does not relieve him "of the burden of alleging sufficient 

facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based." Ball v. 

Bellmen, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). I find no factual 

averment sufficient to establish that Gallegos is a proper 

defendant in a Section 1983 lawsuit premised on the allegations 

that Carrillo used excessive force in the arrest of Plaintiff. 

Gallegos will be dismissed as a defendant under Count II. 

2. Defendants Carrillo and Messimer 

Count II of the complaint alleges a claim of excessive force 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The threshold requirement of 

such a claim is the establishment of a "seizure." see, e.g., 

Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S . 593, 596 (1989). Plaintiff must 

allege that Defendants sought to restrain his liberty 'by means of 

physical force or show of authority. " Weimer v. Schraeder, 952 

F.2d 336, 340 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 1, 

19 n.16 (1968)). The question is whether Defendants intended the 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 13 
force or authority to terminate Plaintiff's freedom of movement and 

then succeeded in doing so. Browyer, 489 U.S. at 598-99. For 

purposes of Defendants' motion, I assume without deciding that 

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts tC? establish a "seizure" for 

purposes of articulating a claim under the Fourth Amendment. 

Only unreasonable seizures, however, are proscribed by the 

Fourth Amendment. See id., 489 U.S. at 599, 109 s . ct. at 1382~ 

Weimer, 952 F.2d at 340. A detention amounting to a Fourth 

Amendment "seizure" may still be Constitutionally permissible. 

See, e.g., Michigan v. summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (warrant to 

search home for contraband found to authorize limited detention of 

occupants). Even a warrantless entry of a home, justifiable 

because of the exigency of the circumstances, may provide police 

officers with a constitutionally permissible basis for a temporary 

seizure of the house's residents. Id. at 703 n. 17. Here, 

Plaintiff himself alleges that Carrillo and Messimer were summoned 

to Plaintiff's home by a woman who reported that Plaintiff was 

beating her. Plaintiff also acknowledges that the officers entered 

and searched his home lawfully, pursuant to his permission. 

Plaintiff states that during the search Carrillo found evidence of 

a woman's presence in the house. Plaintiff's own version of the 

facts support the conclusion that the officers' interest was in 

finding the missing woman who might be concealed and injured. se~ 

United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984) (4th 

amendment does not bar warrantless entry when officer has 

reasonable belief that a person is in need of aid). 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 14 
Plaintiff's allegations demonstrate that the alleged seizure 

in question -- that period of time in which Carrillo held a gun 

aimed at Plaintiff's chest -- lasted something under sixty seconds. 

Plaintiff alleges that the seizure occurred after Carrillo left the 

bathroom, stating, "It's not my house," and before the first gun 

shot. According to Plaintiff, he attempted to follow Carrillo from 

the bathroom but Carrillo prevented his exit by holding a gun aimed 

at his chest. Plaintiff himself acknowledges that a tape recording 

of the incident establishes that only sixty seconds transpired 

between Carrillo's statement before leaving the bathroom and the 

initial gunfire. Consequently, Plaintiff is complaining of a less 

than sixty second "seizure" prior to the gun battle in which 

Carrillo was shot to death. While even a brief seizure and patdown search is a "severe •.• intrusion upon cherished personal 

security," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 24-25, Carrillo's 

abbreviated seizure of Plaintiff was justified because 

circumstances required "necessarily swift action predicated upon 

[Carrillo's] on-the-spot observations," id. at 20, particularly 

when weighed against Carrillo's "need to protect [himself] and 

other prospective victims of violence . " Id. at 24. As Carrillo's 

and Messimer's entry and initial search were lawful, by virtue of 

Plaintiff's consent, the Fourth Amendment permits the limited 

seizure at issue. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21. 

Moreover, the permissibility of a particular use of force is 

measured by the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" 

standard. see, e.g., CUlver v. Town of Torrington, Wyoming, 930 

9 

Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 15 
F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1991). Actual physical contact is not 

a necessary component of a claim for unreasonable force. Martin v. 

Board of county Commissioners, 909 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1990) 

(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S • . 386, 395 n.10 (1989)). 

Nonetheless, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the amount of force 

used was "sufficiently egregious to be of Constitutional 

dimensions." Id. at 407 (citing Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1335 

(10th Cir. 1981). A court must consider the extent of the injury 

inflicted by the use of force when evaluating a claim of 

unreasonable force. Id. 

Even assuming for purposes of this motion that Plaintiff was 

not yet resisting arrest at the time in question, his allegations 

of the force used, absent any allegation of injury, are not so 

unreasonable as to give rise to a claim under the Fourth Amendment. 

see Foster v. Metropolitan Airports comm'n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 

(8th Cir. 1990) . Plaintiff relies heavily on a decision of the 

Third Circuit (Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1981), 

cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982)) as authority for the 

proposition that Carrillo's mere holding a gun aimed at his chest 

can constitute excessive force. In Black the Court found that for 

an officer to brandish his revolver near the plaintiff's head with 

plaintiff's wife in the precise line of fire and then threaten to 

shoot shocked the conscience so as to rise to the level of 

constitutional violation. Id. at 188. Plaintiff alleges no facts 

that would support a finding of unconscionable behavior. 

The mere threat of force, while perhaps intimidating, is not 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 16 
excessive force. Navratil v. Parker, 726 F . Supp. 800, 803 (D.Colo. 

1989) . Even a "grossly excessive demonstration of manpower and 

firepower," with no actual use of force and no resulting injury or 

harm, is not actionable under Section 1983. Gumz v. Morrissette, 

772 F.2d 1395, 1401 (7th Cir. 1985) , cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 

(1986). In response to the City defendants' motion, Plaintiff 

claims that Carrillo's threatening behavior "precipitated 

[Plaintiff's) subsequent conduct and the gun battle in [his] master 

bedroom that caused [Carrillo's) tragic death and the subsequent 

trials." (Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion to 

Dismiss at 7 [Plaintiff's Response).) Plaintiff maintains that 

Carrillo's death and his own "instinctual reaction to survive 

caused by [Carrillo's) terrorizing threat" triggered great 

emotional trauma and suffering, as well as mental anguish . 

(Plaintiff's Response at 7.) Accepting these assertions as true, 

I conclude that they are insufficient, without more, to support a 

claim of excessive force. Merely stating that a seizure involved 

excessive force does not entitle even a prose plaintiff to the 

attention of a federal court, regardless of the requirement to 

liberally construe the complaint. Conclusory claims of a 

constitutional violation, unsupported by the facts alleged, must be 

dismissed. See, e.g., Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th 

Cir. 1986). 

Even if Plaintiff were to establish a claim against Carrillo 

for an unreasonable seizure, his allegations would be insufficient 

to state a claim against Messimer. Plaintiff cites Gutierrez11 

Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 17 
Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989) as authority 

for holding Messimer liable for failing to intervene, alleging that 

Messimer "stood idly by and failed to perform his duty to stop this 

unlawful seizure." (Plaintiff's Response at 2.) In Cartagena, 

squad members who had actively participated in the deprivation of 

civil rights were attempting to avoid liability by arguing that 

they had not fired the bullet that actually injured the individual. 

Id. at 560-61. The court found that all four officers who 

participated in the incident could be found liable because the 

injury was foreseeable and the fact "[t)hat only one bullet found 

its mark was fortuitous, not exculpatory." Id. at 561. Here, 

Plaintiff has alleged no fact that would reasonably support the 

inference that Messimer was an active participant in the alleged 

offensive conduct and so should have reasonably foreseen the 

outcome of his participation. 

The claim under Count II that Plaintiff suffered an 

unreasonable seizure at the hands of Carrillo and Messimer is 

dismissed. 

B. count I: Failure to Adequately Train or Supervise 

Plaintiff requests the court to infer a failure to adequately 

train or supervise Carrillo and Messimer from the allegation that 

they permitted him to enter his bathroom alone and to close the 

door. Plaintiff alleges that the risk or necessity of having to 

use deadly force in such circumstances should be obvious to 

adequately trained or supervised police officers. He contends that 

Carrill o's use of deadly force violated his right to due process 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 18 
and "provoked the subsequent gun battle." (Complaint at pt. 

C(l)(A)(2).) In his response to the City defendants' motion, 

Plaintiff supplements his claim of failure to supervise and train 

with a claim of municipal policy of wro~gful hiring policies. He 

alleges that during the time that Carrillo became a police officer, 

the City failed to utilize a screening examination that would 

eliminate about 25 per cent of all police officer candidates as a 

result of propensity for violence. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a 

constitutional violation arising from the use of force during his 

arrest, I need not address his claims against the City defendants 

in their official capacity. Absent an underlying constitutional 

violation by a police officer, there can be no action against the 

municipality or the officer's supervisors for failing to train or 

supervise the officer. Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's 

Dept., 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing City of Los 

Angeles v. Beller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). 

Construing Plaintiff's complaint as alleging suit against the 

City defendants in their individual capacities, he still would fail 

to state a claim for failure to train or supervise. A supervisor 

or municipality may be held liable for a claim of excessive force 

"where there is essentially a complete failure to train, 11 or 

· .. raining that is so objectively unreasonable "that future 

misconduct is almost inevitable." Heade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 

1528 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff alleges publicity of claims of APD officer 

13 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 19 
misconduct to support an inference that the City was put on notice 

of prior misbehavior and the need for corrective action. Plaintiff 

fails, however, to allege any fact that would support a conclusion 

that the City was on notice that Carrillo and Messimer, or any 

other police officers, were inadequately trained on the matter of 

permitting an arrest subject to be alone. Neither does he allege 

evidence of prior problems with these particular officers. Cf., 

McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 697 (10th Cir. 1979) 

(reversing summary judgment where supervisors were on notice that 

police officer in question was party in two other law suits 

involving the deaths of prisoners and where publicity of police 

misconduct was widespread) . He further alleges that the City 

defendants "learned within hours, 11 (Complaint at pt. C(l) (A) (2) ,) 

of Carrillo's and Messimer's actions, and were then on notice of 

the deficiencies in training and supervision. The City defendants 

can only be held liable if they had prior knowledge indicating that 

"future misconduct" was virtually unavoidable, see Meade v. Grubbs, 

841 F.2d at 1528 (emphasis added), and where the manifest 

inadequacy of training is "so likely to result in the violation of 

constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the City can 

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the 

need." See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (emphasis 

added). The City's purported subsequent acquiescence in allegedly 

wrongful conduct cannot be used to infer, retroactively, a claim 

for insufficient training or supervision. 

Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts to identify a 

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deficiency in the training program that actually caused the 

ultimate injury. Cf., id. at 391. The ruling in Canton dictates 

that if Plaintiff successfully identified an express defect in the 

officers' training and then demonstrated that the specified 

training deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury, he 

must still offer facts to support a determination that the failure 

to train "reflects deliberate indifference to the rights" of the 

city's inhabitants. l:d~, 489 U.S. at 392. I conclude that 

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts that will support a 

conclusion that the City defendants, in their individual capacity, 

are liable for a failure to train or supervise that amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the rights of Albuquerque residents to 

be free from excessive force. 

As to Plaintiff's contentions with regard to the hiring and 

screening practices, he fails to allege any facts that would 

support a conclusion that Carrillo's act in permitting him to be 

alone in his bathroom would have been predicted by the examinations 

the City failed to administer. Neither does he allege that 

Carrillo's actions in any way demonstrated a propensity for 

violence that would have been identified if the City had used the 

screening mechanism Plaintiff propounds. Before a supervisor or a 

municipality may be held liable for the acts of a subordinate, the 

plaintiff must allege an ·'affirmative link" between the incident of 

police misconduct and the municipality's deliberate indifference to 

the need to prevent that misconduct. See, e.g., D.T. by H.T. v. 

Independent School District No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1187 (10th Cir.) 

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cert. denied, U.S. , 111 s.ct. 213 (1990) (quoting Rizzo v. -- --

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976)). Plaintiff has failed to make 

factual averments sufficient to demonstrate, if proved, such a 

link. Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I for failure to state 

a claim is granted. 

c. Count III: Improper Search and Questioning after Request for 

Counsel 

Plaintiff alleges that, although he initially consented to a 

search of his house; he later revoked his consent by demanding the 

presence of his attorney and requesting a warrant before further 

questioning and searching. He alleges that the officers continued 

to search, question, and hover over him although he again demanded 

his attorney and twice attempted to telephone him. According to 

Plaintiff, the officers violated his Sixth Amendment rights by 

ignoring his demands for the presence of his attorney. Plaintiff 

further argues that Carrillo and Messimer violated his Fifth 

Amendment rights by interviewing him and recording him "without 

Miranda," 1 (Complaint at pt. C(l) (C) (2),) and using the tape of the 

gun battle as evidence against him at trial. Plaintiff claims that 

Carrillo and Messimer denied him his right to be free from 

unreasonable searches of his home as guaranteed by the Fourth 

Amendment when they continued to search after he had revoked 

consent. Finally, Plaintiff contends that these offensive acts 

1

Plaintiff presumably references the prophylactic rights, 

including the right to have counsel present, established in Miranda 

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) which were designed to counteract 

the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation. 

Id. at 467. 

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demonstrate the City defendants' failure to adequately train or 

supervise Carrillo and Messimer. 

1. Fourth Amendment claim 

Plaintiff complains that Carrillo'$ and Messimer's continued 

search of his residence after he had revoked his consent violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches. 

A Fourth Amendment violation occurs when police engage in a 

warrantless, non-consensual search and no exception to the warrant 

requirement applies. see, e.g., Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516, 

1522-23 (10th Cir. 1987), reh1 g en bane granted on other grounds, 

and judgment, but not opinion, vacated, 853 F.2d 805 (1988), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989). One exception to the warrant 

requirement is the existence of exigent circumstances which justify 

immediate police action. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 797 

F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1986). For example, "'[t]he need to 

protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification 

of what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or 

emergency.'" Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) 

(quoting Wayne v. united States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir. 

1963)). The compelling need for official action with no time to 

secure a warrant can justify departures from the warrant 

requirement. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) 

(burning building presents exigency of sufficient proportions to 

render warrantless entry reasonable). 

In his own complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Carrillo and 

Messimer responded to a telephone call which reported that he was 

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beating a woman, and that while at the scene Carrillo received 

confirmation that the telephone call had come from Plaintiff's 

home. Plaintiff also acknowledges that he initially consented to 

a search in which Carrillo found evidence that a woman had been in 

the house. When the initial entry into a home is legitimate, a 

warrantless search may be justified by the exigencies inherent in 

the need to search for an injured person. United States v. 

Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 961-62 (10th Cir. 1987). "The Fourth 

Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless 

entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person 

within is in need of immediate aid." United states v. Riccio, 726 

F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984). Once inside legally, here with 

Plaintiff's consent, "the potential for danger justified a standard 

of less than probable cause for conducting a limited protective 

sweep." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n. 1 (1990). 

In his response, Plaintiff argues that the 

circumstances disappeared once the officers made the 

exigent 

initial 

search. I am not persuaded. Plaintiff acknowledges that a woman 

in his home called for police assistance, claiming that she was 

being beaten. Carrillo's and Messimer's reliance on this anonymous 

tip, while perhaps insufficient standing alone to provide probable 

cause for a warrantless search, is a particularly appropriate 

consideration in situations of possible domestic violence. see 

Hopkins v. city of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 529 n. 11 (9th cir. 

1991). Here the officers' decision to search the house a second 

time, according to Plaintiff's own allegations of fact, was 

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supported by confirmation from APO that the emergency call 

originated from Plaintiff's residence, as well as the evidence that 

a woman had recently been in the bedroom of the house . 

Carrillo and Messimer were inarguably proceeding on more than 

"an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" Maryland 

v. Buie, 494 U.S. at 332 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27). 

Moreover, the search was manifestly not motivated by an intent to 

arrest and seize evidence~ See United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d at 

840. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege such an intent and further 

fails to allege that the officers found any evidence in the second 

search. Rather, Plaintiff contends that the tape recording of his 

subsequent behavior during the gun battle was evidence procured 

from an unlawful search. I find that the facts alleged by 

Plaintiff establish the reasonableness of the officers' suspicion 

that an injured person was hidden in the house. I further find 

that the existence of exigent circumstances justified the repeated 

search. Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to 

the Fourth Amendment claim alleged in Count III. 

2. Fifth Amendment claim 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under the Fifth 

Amendment for failure to state a claim. 

offer Plaintiff's own allegation that 

As support, Defendants 

Carrillo and Messimer 

permitted him to leave their presence and to be alone in his 

bathroom. Plaintiff fails to address Defendants' argument in his 

response. 

When an accused in custody expresses the desire to deal with 

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the police only through an attorney, no further interrogation is 

permissible until counsel has been made available, barring a valid 

waiver of the earlier request for the assistance of counsel . 

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). In such 

circumstances, an accused's request for an attorney is an 

invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled 

self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 472 

(1966) . 

The rules of Edwards and Miranda only apply to the use of 

self-incriminating statements elicited in "an interrogation 

environment . .. created for no purpose other than to subjugate 

the individual to the will of [the] examiner." Id. , at 457. Cf., 

United states v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1990) (postconviction presentence interview not the type of inherently 

coercive situation and interrogation for which the Miranda rule was 

designed). A criminal defendant's right to counsel under Miranda 

is triggered only by a suspect invoking that right during custodial 

interrogat ion. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 , 300-301 

(1980); United States v. Abreu, 730 F. Supp. 1018 , 1029 (D.Colo . 

1990), aff 1 d, 935 F . 2d 1130 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied, 112 U. S. 271 

(1991). More to the point, the Miranda warnings are required only 

when an individual is in custody and subject to an interrogation. 

See , e.g., United states v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368 , 379 (10th Cir. 

1985). 

The threshold concern is whether Plaintiff was in custody. 

Roberts v. united states, 445 U.S. 552, 560-61 (1980). An 

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Appellate Case: 92-2089 Document: 010110198784 Date Filed: 03/29/1993 Page: 26 
individual, for Miranda purposes, is in custody when subject to 

"formal arrest or restraint in freedom of movement of the degree 

associated with a formal arrest." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 

420, 430 (1984) (citations omitted). The second element necessary 

to trigger the Miranda requirements is an interrogation 

environment. The term "interrogation" refers to words or actions 

that the police "should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response." United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d at 379 

(citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). An onthe-scene inquiry to find out what has happened and whether a crime 

has occurred is not an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. 

See, e.g., United states v. Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (10th 

Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). "The need for answers in a 

situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need" for 

Miranda warnings aimed at protecting the Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination. United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 

952, 961 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 

649, 657 ( 1984) (recognizing public safety exception to Miranda 

rule)) . 

Plaintiff's allegation, taken as true, that the officers 

continued searching and hovering over him simply does not rise to 

the level of an allegation of custodial interrogation. While he 

may have felt threatened sufficiently to transform an otherwise 

consensual interchange into a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment 

protections, (see Part II (A) (2), supra,) his allegations of fact do 

not justify a conclusion that he had been subject to a full-blown 

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arrest necessitating the Miranda warnings prior to the gun battle. 

See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 517 n. 2 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 

dissenting). Furthermore, accepting Plaintiff's version of the 

facts, I find it unreasonable to conclude that Carrillo should have 

considered his interchange with the plaintiff to be an 

interrogation when that conclusion must be premised in a decision 

that Carrillo should have viewed his drawn gun as "reasonably 

likely to elicit" the "incriminating response" of Plaintiff pulling 

a gun and engaging in a shoot-out. see United states v. Gay, 774 

F.2d at 379 (citations omitted). As to the taping of the gun 

battle, a person is not entitled to counsel while he is committing 

a crime. See, e.g., Noland v. United States, 380 F.2d 1016, 1017 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 945 (1967). 

Applying the objective, reasonable person standard, see 

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984), to the facts alleged 

by Plaintiff, I find that he was not in custody at the time of the 

interchange and the taping. I further find that Carrillo's actions 

were not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and 

so were not an interrogation; I likewise judge these facts by an 

objective standard. See United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d at 379 n. 

22. As he was not subject to a custodial interrogation, I find 

that Carrillo and Messimer did not violate his rights by their 

purported failure to apprise him of his rights under Miranda, by 

their continued interaction after he requested access to his 

attorney, or by their taping of his remarks or behavior. 

Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with r espect to the Fifth 

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Amendment claim alleged in Count III. 

3. sixth Amendment claim 

Defendants move the court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under 

the Sixth Amendment, essentially reite~ating their argument that 

Plaintiff was not in custody at the time in question. Plaintiff 

does not address the challenge to his Sixth Amendment claim in his 

response to Defendants' motion. 

The Sixth Amendment· right to the assistance of counsel in 

criminal prosecutions does not attach until a prosecution is 

commenced with "the initiation of adversary judicial criminal 

proceedings," for example, by way of indictment or preliminary 

hearing. see, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-88 

(1984) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972)). 

Accepting Plaintiff's recitation of facts as true, he had not even 

been arrested at the time of the incident in question. Because 

Plaintiff had not been arrested when the recorded interaction 

occurred, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated. 

See, e.g., Abreu, 730 F. Supp. at 1029. I find that, as he was 

neither accused as yet of any crime nor the subject of criminal 

prosecution, Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment rights had not attached at 

the time he indicated his desire to contact counsel. Defendants' 

motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the Sixth Amendment 

claim in Count III. 

4. Failure to train or supervise 

Because Plaintiff has failed to state claims for 

constitutional violations in Count III, the City defendants cannot 

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constitutional violations in Count III, the City defendants cannot 

be found liable in their official capacity for any alleged failure 

to train or supervise in the areas of conduct challenged in Count 

III. Neither has Plaintiff stated a cl_aim against them in their 

individual capacities. See discussion in Part II(B), supra. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim cognizable under Section 

1983 for the violation of his civil rights. His complaint will be 

dismissed on all counts. Because of the dispositive nature of this 

ruling, I do not address Carillo' s pending motions for substitution 

of parties and for dismissal. 

WHEREFORE 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with 

prejudice, in its entirety. 

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