Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00308/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00308-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN O’QUINN,

No. 2:02-CV-00308-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RALEY’S et. al.,

Defendants.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff John O’Quinn (“Plaintiff”) brought this suit

against Defendant Raley’s (“Defendant”) claiming disparate

treatment employment discrimination under both Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t

Code §§ 12940, et seq. This case was tried by a jury on the

issue of liability from August 27 to August 30, 2007. On

August 31, 2007, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of

Plaintiff in the amount of $455,500. 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders these matters submitted on the briefs. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

The jury found specifically that Plaintiff’s race was the sole

reason for the Defendant’s decision not to promote Plaintiff and

that Plaintiff suffered injury, damage, loss or harm as a result

of Defendant’s decision not to promote Plaintiff.

The Court then ordered the jury and the parties to reconvene

on September 28, 2007 for the punitive damages phase of the

trial. In the interim, Defendant moved to vacate the second

phase of trial based on the Title VII cap on damages and on

grounds of state procedural law. The Court denied that motion to

vacate the finding that the Title VII cap does not apply to state

law claims and that the federal courts are not bound by

California’s procedural rules. On September 28, 2007, the jury

found that Defendant engaged in the conduct of not promoting

Plaintiff with malice, oppression, or fraud and assessed punitive

damages against Defendant in the amount of $950,000. Accordingly,

judgment was entered against Defendant in the amount of

$1,405,500.

Subsequently, Defendant brought this Motion for Judgment as

a Matter of Law and a Motion for New Trial. Although filed as 1

separate motions, the Court will resolve both by way of this

Order.

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3

STANDARDS

1. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

On a motion for judgment as a matter of law under

Rule 50(b), a court must determine whether the evidence

presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, leads to only one reasonable conclusion, and

that conclusion is contrary to the verdict rendered at trial. 

White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.38 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002); see

also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 255

(1986). When resolving a motion for judgment as a matter of law,

the court draws all reasonable inferences in light of the nonmoving party, but does not make credibility determinations, nor

does it weigh the evidence. Settlegood v. Portland Pub. Schools,

371 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). “The district

court may not reject the jury’s verdict simply because another

appears preferable.” McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d

1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149-50).

2. Motion for New Trial

The grant or denial of a motion for new trial is left to the

discretion of the trial court. Murphy v. City of Long Beach,

914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 59 provides for a new

trial “for any of the reasons for which new trials have

heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the

United States.” 

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4

In ruling on a motion for new trial, a court is bound by

historically recognized grounds. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc.,

481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Zhang v. Am. Gem

Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Ninth

Circuit has recognized grounds for granting a new trial where

“the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is

based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a

miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quoting Passantino v. Johnson &

Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15 (9th Cir.

2000)).

ANALYSIS

1. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Defendant moves for Judgment as a Matter of Law on two

grounds. Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to meet

his burden of proof as to the punitive damages claims and second

that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof as to his

racial discrimination claim.

A. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim for Punitive Damages

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not present clear and

convincing evidence to support a finding of malice, oppression or

fraud on the part of Defendant and that there was no evidence

that the employees who failed to promote Plaintiff were

Defendant’s officers, directors, or managing agents. 

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5

California Civil Code section 3294(a) allows for the

recovery of punitive damages if “it is proven by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of

oppression, fraud, or malice.” Malice is defined as including

“conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to

the plaintiff.” § 3294(c)(1). Oppression is defined as

“despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust

hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” 

§ 3294(c)(2). For a corporation to be liable for punitive

damages under section 3294, “an officer, director, or managing

agent” must have committed the act of oppression, fraud, or

malice, or must have had advance knowledge of such an act by an

employee and either authorized, ratified, or consciously

disregarded the act. § 3294(b).

Defendant’s moving papers focus solely on the evidence of

interview panel, where five managers selected four employees for

the customer service manager position and excluded eight other

employees, including Plaintiff. The evidence adduced at trial

established that Plaintiff worked for Defendant for several

decades, that Plaintiff was not promoted despite evidence of his

qualifications (including passing the manager’s exam), that only

white employees were promoted to the positions Plaintiff sought,

and that Defendant lacked any African-American store directors. 

Given the above, the jury’s conclusion that Defendant acted with

malice, fraud, or oppression is a reasonable conclusion and is

not contrary to the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from

the evidence. 

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6

Further, based on the evidence of Defendant’s conduct over the

several decades of Plaintiff’s employment, a jury could

reasonably infer and conclude that Defendant’s treatment of

Plaintiff was authorized or ratified by one or more of

Defendant’s officers and directors.

B. Plaintiff’s Race Discrimination Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie

case of racial discrimination and that Plaintiff failed to rebut

Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for deciding not

to promote Plaintiff.

Because of the similarity between state and federal

discrimination laws, California courts follow the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting test established by the U.S. Supreme

Court. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000). 

To establish a prima facie case for discrimination under FEHA and

Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) he was a member

of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he

sought or was performing competently in the position he held,

(3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as

termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and

(4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive." 

Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 355; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

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7

Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not establish a prima

facie case because he did not show that he was qualified for the

position. Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff is a member

of a protected class, or that he suffered an adverse employment

action. As to the other two elements, the evidence presented at

trial established that Plaintiff took and passed Defendant’s

manager’s exam, that Plaintiff worked for Defendant for many

years without promotion, and that a hiring panel of five white

managers promoted only white employees. Based on Plaintiff’s

passing the manager’s exam, the jury could have reasonably

concluded that Plaintiff was qualified for the position. From

the evidence establishing Plaintiff’s many years of service

without promotion, contrasted against the promotion of other

employees who were white, less tenured, and in some cases trained

by Plaintiff, the jury could reasonably find a discriminatory

motive in Defendant’s failure to promote Plaintiff. Therefore,

the verdict is not contrary to the only reasonable conclusion to

be drawn from the evidence.

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff did not rebut

Defendant’s offered non-discriminatory reason - namely, that

Plaintiff was not qualified. This argument is circular. One

element of Plaintiff’s prima facie case was that he was qualified

for the position. As set forth above, there was evidence from

which the jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff was

qualified for the position.

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8

Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial and viewed in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff does not require that the

only reasonable conclusion is contrary to the verdict rendered in

this case. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a

Matter of Law is DENIED.

2. Motion for New Trial

Defendant brings its Motion for New Trial on three grounds. 

First, Defendant argues that the Court incorrectly instructed the

jury as to emotional distress damages. Second, Defendant argues

that the compensatory damages are excessive. Third, Defendant

argues, based on the alleged excessive compensatory damages, that

the punitive damages are also excessive. The Court will address

each argument in turn.

A. Instructional Error

Erroneous or inadequate jury instructions can be the basis

for granting a new trial. Murphy, 914 F.3d at 187. Defendant

asserts two arguments in support of its motion for new trial

based on instructional error. First, Defendant argues that the

instruction given on emotional distress damages was inadequate

and plainly erroneous. Second, Defendant argues that the Court

erred in instructing the jury on emotional distress damages.

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9

A party may assign as error “an error in an instruction

actually given if that party made a proper objection.” Fed. R.

Civ. Proc. 51(d)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit strictly enforces

Rule 51 and does not recognize a plain error exception to a

party's failure to object to a jury instruction. Zhang v. Am.

Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore,

absent an objection to an instruction, a party is foreclosed from

arguing asserting error related to that instruction. Hammer,

932 F.2d at 848.

Here, Defendant concedes that it did not object to Jury

Instruction #12, the instruction on damages, including emotional

suffering. Defendant asserts that this Court should grant a new

trial because of the exceptional circumstances involving this

instruction, although Defendant is unable to reference any case

law providing for this type of exception to Rule 51. Defendant

asserts that the Court represented to the parties that the Court

would include the Ninth Circuit Model Rule 5.2 definition of

emotional pain and suffering damages. The instruction actually

given was not Model Rule 5.2, but rather an instruction submitted

by Plaintiff. Defendant and its counsel received a copy of the

instructions and were present in court as the instructions were

read aloud to the jury. Defendant failed to object to the

instruction at any point prior to the verdict. Having failed to

object, Defendant is now foreclosed from asserting instructional

error as a grounds for a new trial.

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10

B. Excessive Compensatory Damages

A jury’s findings as to damages must be upheld unless “the

amount is grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported

by the evidence, or based on speculation or guesswork.” Del Monte

Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1435

(9th Cir. 1996). Defendant argues that the compensatory damages

award is excessive because Plaintiff failed to present evidence

of emotional distress damages and therefore the $455,500 verdict

is clearly not supported by the evidence.

The Ninth Circuit does not require objective evidence of

emotional damages in order to sustain a jury’s award of damages

for emotional pain and suffering. A plaintiff’s testimony alone

can support an award of emotional damages. Passantino, 212 F.3d

at 513 (upholding emotional damages award where plaintiff

testified that she experienced substantial anxiety from lost

promotional opportunities and testimony was corroborated by

husband and sister); Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1040 (upholding emotional

damages award where plaintiff testified he was troubled and

letters to his suppliers regarding his termination hurt his

dignity and reputation).

Here, Plaintiff testified that working in management on the

day shift was his life-long dream. Plaintiff volunteered a twoweek vacation in order to learn bookkeeping to qualify for a

management position. Plaintiff took tests as requested by

Defendant and sat through several rounds of interviews. 

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11

Eventually Plaintiff stepped down from his position because he

felt he was not going to go anywhere and that his manager was not

keeping his promise. Considering Plaintiff’s testimony regarding

the more than 30-year period of his employment with Defendant, a

finding of compensatory damages in the amount of $455,500 is not

“grossly excessive or monstrous,” nor is it clear that the

damages are not supported by the evidence.

C. Excessive Punitive Damages

Defendant argues that if the Court finds that the

compensatory damages are excessive then the punitive damages are

grossly excessive in comparison. As set forth above, the

compensatory damages are not excessive. Therefore, the punitive

damages - at approximately a 2:1 ratio to compensatory damages -

are well within the single digit ratio required by State Farm

Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).

Accordingly, Defendant cannot establish that the verdict is

contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, nor does the Court

find that any miscarriage of justice occurred. Therefore,

Defendant’s Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

as a Matter of Law is DENIED. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial

is also DENIED. 

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Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Stay Execution of, or

Proceedings to Enforce, Judgment Pending Resolution of Post-Trial

Motions is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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