Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02541/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02541-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 09cv2541

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIE LYNN SPENCER, Civil No. 09cv2541-BEN (CAB)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 13]

v.

JAVIER CAVAZOS, Acting Warden,

Defendant.

Petitioner Julie Lynn Spencer, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“SAP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 7.] This matter comes

before the Court on consideration of Respondent Cavazos’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition [Doc. No. 13.]

Petitioner has not filed an opposition to the motion. Having considered the motion and relevant legal

authority, this Court finds that the grounds Respondent raises in his Motion to Dismiss do not warrant

dismissal, and accordingly RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, first degree robbery, attempted

arson, elder abuse with great bodily injury, caretaker theft from an elder, false imprisonment of a dependent

elder, and two counts of forgery on March 22, 2007 in San Diego County Superior Court. [Doc. No. 7, at

1-2;] (Lodgment 9 at 2.) Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison, plus two years. [Id.]

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Case

No. D051183. (Lodgment 6.) On July 31, 2008, the state appellate court affirmed the judgment. (Lodgment

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Although the Original Petition was not docketed until November 9, 2009, the Petitioner signed

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the Petition on October 28, 2009, indicating she provided the Original Petition to correctional officers

for filing on that date, and the Court thus considers the Original Petition to have been filed as of that

date. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

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9.) Petitioner sought review by the California Supreme Court, Case No. S166003. (Lodgment 10). The

petition was denied on October 28, 2008. (Lodgment 11.) 

In addition to the direct appeal, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego

County Superior Court, Case No. EHC570, on March 27, 2007. (Lodgment 2). It was denied on April 18,

2007. (Lodgment 3). On April 18, 2007, Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the San Diego County

Superior Court, Case No EHC589. (Lodgment 4). That petition was denied on June 15, 2007. (Lodgment

5). While the Petitioner states that she filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court

of Appeal [Doc. No. 7, at 3-4,] she provides no case number, and the appellate docket does not reflect that

any such petition was filed. Petitioner states that her attorney tried to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus with the California Supreme Court in September of 2009, but her attorney stated that the Supreme

Court did not accept her type of case. [Doc. No. 7, at 4-5.]

Petitioner filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Original Petition”) on October 28,

2009. [Doc. No. 1.] On November 16, 2009, the Court issued a notice to Petitioner regarding a possible 1

failure to exhaust state court remedies, and advising her of the one year statute of limitations. [Doc. No. 2.]

On November 19, 2009, the Court dismissed the Original Petition without prejudice for failure to pay the

filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and for failure to name a proper Respondent. [Doc.

No. 3.] The dismissal order permitted Petitioner to file an amended petition no later than January 19, 2010.

[Id.] Petitioner signed her First Amended Petition (“FAP”) on January 7, 2010. [Doc. No. 4.] Due to

clerical error on the part of the Court, the FAP was not reviewed until January 3, 2011, at which point the

Court dismissed the FAP without prejudice, again for failure to pay the filing fee or a motion to proceed in

forma pauperis. [Doc. No. 6.] The Court expressly permitted Petitioner to file an amended petition no later

than March 8, 2011. [Id. at 5.] Petitioner signed the instant SAP, along with a Motion for Leave to Proceed

in forma pauperis, and handed the documents to a correctional officer for mailing to the court on January

20, 2011.[Doc. Nos. 7 & 8.]

Respondent filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on April 8, 2011. [Doc. No. 13.] Petitioner’s

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opposition to the motion was due on May 2, 2011 [see Doc. No. 10,] but Petitioner has not filed an

opposition.

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that the SAP should be dismissed because it is barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a one-year period of limitation applies to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus filed “by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” The limitation period

runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

In this instance, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on October 28,

2008. (Lodgment 11.) The period of “direct review”pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the

ninety-day period within which a petitioner can seek a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, regardless of whether the petitioner actually seeks such review. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d

1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner, therefore, had until January 26, 2010 (ninety days past the

California Supreme Court’s denial of the petition plus one year) to file her federal habeas petition.

Respondent does not dispute that the Original Petition [Doc. No. 1] and the FAP [Doc. No. 4], were

filed within the statutory period. Respondent claims, however that the SAP, signed by Petitioner on January

20, 2011 [Doc. No.7] should be barred as untimely filed. [Doc. No. 13-2 at 8.]

Although the statute of limitations is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending, Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001), if Petitioner can show “‘(1) that [s]he has been pursuing [her] rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way,’” she is entitled to equitable

tolling of the AEDPA one-year limitations period. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562

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In light of the Court’s finding that equitable tolling applies, Respondent’s arguments as to 2

whether or not the SAP relates back to previously-filed petitions are not addressed here as they are moot. 

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(2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). See also Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9thCir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States

Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998) (AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations is subject

to equitable tolling).“When external forces, ratherthan a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure

to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding equitable tolling appropriate where prison authorities did not timely

follow petitioner’s instructions to mail the petition for filing).

Here, the Court expressly authorized Petitioner to file her Second Amended Petition by March 8,

2011. [Doc. No. 6 at 5.] Petitioner signed the SAP less than three weeks following the Court’s order – well

within the time allotted by the Court for her petition to be filed. [Doc. No. 7]. Petitioner likewise timely filed

her FAP pursuant to the Court’s order dismissing the Original Petition. [Doc. Nos. 3 and 4, respectively.] Due

to clerical error on the part of the Court, the Court did not consider petitioner’s timely-filed FAP until nearly

a year after filing. [Doc. No. 6 at 1.] Such a clerical error was beyond Petitioner’s control. See Miles, 187

F.3d at 1107. The Court finds Petitioner was diligent in pursuing her claims as she met all filing deadlines

set by the Court, and therefore finds that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate here.

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Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on statute of

limitations grounds be DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss the

habeas corpus petition, based on the grounds of statute of limitations, be DENIED. The Court FURTHER

RECOMMENDS that Respondent be ordered to file an answer to the Petition and to lodge all documents

relating to the case. This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to

the United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 12, 2011 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 11, 2011

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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