Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02451/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02451-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-2451 

RONALD SWEATT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 12 C 9579 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 6, 2015 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Appellant Ronald Sweatt is an African-American male who worked for Union Pacific Railroad 

Company (“Union Pacific”). Union Pacific hired him in 2006 

to perform manual labor jobs, and during his time there, he 

did just that. He served as a Laborer, Assistant Foreman, 

Trackwalker, Trackman, and Tie Inserter. After a few years 

on the job, Sweatt manifested pain in his shoulder and 

hands. The pain progressed to the point that Sweatt could no 

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longer do his job. So he sought a less strenuous position—

Security Officer—through Union Pacific’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program. Sweatt did not get the job. 

Sweatt subsequently filed suit against Union Pacific. For 

his physical injuries, he alleged violations of the Federal 

Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”). For the denial of the Security Officer position, he alleged violations of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1991 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), among other statutes.1 He bundled 

these claims into one action (with five counts) in the Northern District of Illinois. Discovery ensued, and Union Pacific 

eventually filed a motion for summary judgment on each of 

Sweatt’s claims. The district court granted Union Pacific’s 

motion in its entirety. For the reasons below, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Sweatt’s job as a railroad worker was hard work. No one 

disputes that. During his time at Union Pacific, he operated 

spike mauls, hydraulic tampers, and spiker guns. He swung 

sledgehammers, pulled spikes with claw bars, and assisted 

with welding. He also inserted—and removed—railroad 

ties. Unsurprisingly, this strenuous work caused Sweatt to 

develop pain in his shoulder and hands. Sweatt addressed 

his shoulder pain in his deposition. 

A. I started having a lot of pain during 2009, the 

year 2009, that year when I was up at Lake Street 

when we started doing a lot of tampering [sic]. 

 

1 Sweatt also brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2-

103, but those claims are not before us on appeal. 

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No. 14-2451 3

Q. What time of year was it? 

A. What time of year? 

Q. Uh-huh—yes. 

A. Oh, like in the summer. 

Q. Somewhere in June or July or August? 

A. It might have been—I know it was—it was 

warm. It might have been before then. 

Q. So it could have been before June? 

A. Yeah. 

Q. And when you would use the claw bars back 

probably before June of 2009, you would notice the 

pain in your shoulder? 

A. Yes. Because when I would—when I would use 

the—use the claw bar, it was just—it was unbearable, you know, I would, you know, try to—I called 

one of the guys, come over, you know, and give me 

a hand. 

Q. Did you seek medical attention at that time? 

A. See I—over the counter I was taking pain medication because I didn’t want—I didn’t really want 

no time off work. 

During that same timeframe, Sweatt began experiencing 

pain in his hands. He attributed the cause of the hand pain 

to repetitive use of hydraulic tools and other hand tools. On 

November 19, 2009, Sweatt saw a medical professional to 

address the hand pain. His provider for that healthcare visit, 

Nurse Practitioner Valentin, entered the following note into 

Sweatt’s medical record: “complaining of bilateral hand 

pain. The patient has had pain in his hands for quite a while 

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now. He might have carpal tunnel syndrome. He does repetitive motion at his job.” 

Eleven days later, on November 30, 2009, Sweatt met 

with Dr. Coates. According to Dr. Coates, Sweatt first complained of hand pain, which he attributed to his work at Union Pacific, in May of 2009. Sweatt was a Trackman at the 

time. Upon examination, Dr. Coates believed that Sweatt was 

unable to perform the job of Trackman. 

We pay particular attention to these dates. They are significant because Union Pacific contends that Sweatt’s FELA 

claims2 are barred by the statute of limitations. To recap: 

 May / June 2009–Sweatt notices hand pain. He also 

describes experiencing “unbearable” shoulder pain. 

Sweatt requests coworkers to help him use claw bars. 

 Nov. 19, 2009–Sweatt sees Nurse Practitioner Valentin 

for bilateral hand pain. 

 Nov. 30, 2009–Sweatt sees Dr. Coates. Dr. Coates says 

Sweatt is unfit to perform the duties of Trackman. 

 

2 Sweatt alleged nine theories of negligence against Union Pacific under 

the FELA. According to Sweatt, Union Pacific: (1) neglected to provide 

him with a reasonably safe place to work; (2) neglected to provide him 

with safe and proper tools; (3) neglected to provide him with the proper 

safety equipment; (4) neglected to inspect and maintain its equipment; 

(5) neglected to warn him about defective tools and equipment; (6) negligently created and permitted a dangerous and hazardous workplace 

condition; (7) neglected to adopt safe customs and practices; (8) neglected to adopt safe methods and procedures; and (9) committed other acts 

of negligence. These separate harms resulted, he alleged, in “permanent 

injuries to his shoulders, arms, hands and wrists and the bones, muscles, 

tissues, ligaments and internal parts thereof.” 

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No. 14-2451 5

 Nov. 30, 2012–Sweatt files suit. 

Given this series of events, the district court agreed with Union Pacific. It ruled the claims time-barred by the applicable 

three-year statute of limitations, 45 U.S.C. § 56, and granted 

summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. 

That brings us to Sweatt’s age- and race-based discrimination claims. These claims flow from Sweatt’s rejection for 

the Security Officer position, a position he sought once he 

could no longer perform his manual-labor jobs. In January 

2011, Union Pacific gave Sweatt an opportunity to participate in the Vocational Rehabilitation Program (“VRP”). This 

program facilitates job placement for railroad workers who 

are no longer able to perform their existing jobs to due injury 

or illness. VRP Counselors try to place workers in their previous jobs, in different jobs within Union Pacific, or in positions outside Union Pacific. During their placement efforts, 

VRP Counselors help workers develop skills in interviewing 

and résumé drafting. 

Sweatt seized the opportunity. When he learned of an 

open Security Officer position in the greater Chicago area, he 

expressed interest and applied. Union Pacific scheduled him 

for an interview in Omaha, Nebraska, where its corporate 

headquarters are located. Before Sweatt left, VRP Counselor 

Elizabeth Watson gave him a document that alerted him to 

areas of interest that could be discussed during the interview. The document, “Information requested on Personal 

History form for background check,” requested information 

pertaining to arrests, traffic citations, military service, family, 

education, and references. Watson discussed the form with 

Sweatt and generally helped him to prepare for the interview. 

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Sweatt arrived in Omaha on March 16, 2011. Before he 

began his interviews, he completed a “Personal History 

Statement.” This document was different from the form Watson had given him. Under a heading entitled “ARRESTS,” 

the form asked if he had ever been convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony offense. It also asked if he had ever been 

on probation or parole, and if he had ever been under indictment or charges for a criminal offense. The form then 

provided an admonishment: “A conviction may not disqualify you, but a false statement will.” Sweatt answered “no” to 

each of the questions. 

Then he met with Candace Girard, Director of Disability 

Management. She informed him that Union Pacific favors a 

candidate with integrity and honesty because a Security Officer is charged with guarding multi-million dollar vehicles. 

After his meeting with Girard, Sweatt met with Bruce Finger, 

Director of Internal Placement, and Ken Eultgen, Director of 

Homeland Security. Finger used an “Interview Questioner’s 

Form,” the same form he always used when interviewing 

candidates for the Security Officer position. In accordance 

with that form, Finger asked Sweatt if he had ever been arrested or convicted of a misdemeanor or felony. Sweatt answered in the negative, and Finger recommended Sweatt for 

the position. 

Then Union Pacific ran a background check. Union Pacific first conducted an “eVerifile” criminal report, which it 

runs on all prospective employees. That report returned a 

clean record. The background check did not stop there, however. When someone applies for a position in the police deCase: 14-2451 Document: 26 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 20
No. 14-2451 7

partment,3 Union Pacific conducts a more thorough investigation. So Special Agent James Weller, Union Pacific (Northern Region), ran a “LEADS/NCIC” criminal check on Sweatt. 

LEADS/NCIC (Law Enforcement Agencies Data System / 

National Crime Information Center) is a computerized database that is maintained by the government. It facilitates 

background checks on all prospective employees in the 

Northern Region. Here, it indicated that Sweatt had been arrested in the Homewood-Flossmoor area of Illinois. The report disclosed a case number from the Flossmoor Police Department and a State ID number for the arrest. Agent Weller 

confirmed the arrest. 

He then contacted Sweatt’s former supervisor, Richard 

Johnson, who gave Sweatt a positive referral. Johnson stated 

that Sweatt earned an award for his hard work, never 

abused sick time, and never gave anyone a hard time. He 

recommended Sweatt for the job. After receiving a similar, 

positive referral from Sweatt’s former employer of fifteen 

years, Agent Weller conducted an in-person interview of 

Sweatt. 

During that interview, Agent Weller asked Sweatt if he 

had ever been arrested. Sweatt again said “no.” Agent Weller 

asked him that question at least three times, and each time 

Sweatt gave him the same answer—“no.” Armed with the 

background report, Agent Weller decided to confront Sweatt 

 

3 According to Union Pacific’s website, the railroad police force dates to 

the mid-nineteenth century, “when the number of U.S. Marshals was 

insufficient to police America’s growing rail network.” See

https://www.up.com/aboutup/community/safety/special_agents/index.ht

m (last visited on July 24, 2015). 

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with the details of the arrest. He asked Sweatt if he had been 

arrested in Flossmoor, Illinois. Sweatt finally acknowledged 

that he had. He quickly called the incident a misunderstanding, noting that the judge tossed the case out of court. He also added that it was a domestic dispute, and that he remained friends with everyone involved. 

Agent Weller summarized the results of his background 

investigation and sent his final report to Jack Harris, Northern Division Captain. Upon review, Harris emailed Finger to 

memorialize his concerns about the inconsistencies in 

Sweatt’s responses to the arrest questions. Finger, who had 

previously recommended Sweatt, e-mailed Mark Kalinowski, Regional Director, asking for his opinion on the matter. 

Kalinowski responded with a negative endorsement on 

Sweatt’s candidacy. In his view, Sweatt did not deserve the 

Security Officer position due to his untruthfulness related to 

the prior arrest. Recall Girard’s notice: Union Pacific was 

looking for a person with integrity and honesty. 

Finger subsequently notified Sweatt in writing that he 

was disqualified for the Security Officer position. The form 

letter, dated March 31, 2011, stated that Sweatt’s “background investigation has disclosed information and circumstances that disqualify you as a candidate for Security Officer.” 

Sweat subsequently filed suit against Union Pacific, alleging, in part, age- and race-based discrimination. In support 

of his case, Sweatt offers nineteen comparators who have 

been offered the position of Security Officer since 2009. He 

argues that these comparators reveal a less-than-level playing field when it comes to competition for the Security Officer position. In his view, the case boils down to questions of 

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No. 14-2451 9

credibility, so his claims should have survived summary 

judgment. 

There is more. Sweatt links the district court’s judgment 

against him to its case management procedure (“CMP”) regarding summary judgment. He argues that Judge Sara L. 

Ellis exceeded her authority by promulgating a CMP that 

prevents parties from filing separate statements of fact.4 In 

Sweatt’s view, this rule is inconsistent with Local Rule 56.1 

and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83. We unfurl this novel 

argument below. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co., 751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate where the admissible evidence reveals no genuine issue of any material 

fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 

916, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). A fact is “material” if it is one identified by the law as affecting the outcome of the case. Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. We “construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 

965 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, Sweatt is the non-moving party. So 

we construe all facts and reasonable inferences in his favor. 

 

4 Under the CMP, the parties must file a “joint” statement of undisputed 

facts. 

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A. FELA Claims 

Our discussion begins with Sweatt’s FELA claims. The 

FELA affords redress to injured employees of railroad companies that are engaged in interstate commerce. 45 U.S.C. 

§ 51 et seq.; see also Conrail v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994) 

(“Cognizant of the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in the death or maiming of thousands of workers every year, Congress crafted a federal remedy that shifted part 

of the human overhead of doing business from employees to 

their employers.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). In crafting this remedy, Congress imposed a threeyear statute of limitations. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (“No action shall be 

maintained under this chapter unless commenced within 

three years from the day the cause of action accrued.”). 

In cases like this one, where the statute of limitations is at 

issue, the date of accrual is key. Accrual is defined in two 

parts: notice of injury and notice of cause. See Fries v. Chicago 

& Nw. Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[O]nce 

a plaintiff is in possession of the critical facts of both injury 

and governing cause of that injury the action accrues even 

though he may be unaware that a legal wrong has occurred.”) (citation omitted). Actual notice is not required for 

accrual. Tolston v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 102 F.3d 863, 866 

(7th Cir. 1996). After a condition manifests itself, the question 

becomes whether the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise 

of reasonable diligence, should have known of the cause of his 

injury. Id. 

Here, Sweatt was on notice of his injuries and the cause 

of his injuries as early as May or June 2009. Sweatt testified 

that he first observed his hand and shoulder pain in the 

summer months of 2009: “I started having [shoulder] pain 

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No. 14-2451 11

during 2009 ... like in the summer.” When asked if it was “in 

June or July or August,” he answered, “I know it was ... 

warm. It might have been before then.” Dr. Coates corroborated that testimony. He testified that Sweatt first noticed his 

hand pain in May of 2009. And Nurse Practitioner Valentin’s 

notes from Sweatt’s November 19, 2009, appointment states 

that he experienced “pain in his hands for quite a while 

now.” Clearly then, Sweatt’s injury manifested itself well before November 30, 2009—the critical three-year mark from 

his filing in district court. See Green v. CSX Transp., Inc., 414 

F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 2005) (“When the specific date of injury cannot be determined because an injury results from continual exposure to a harmful condition over a period of time, 

a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues when the injury manifests itself.”). 

Sweatt’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He 

first argues that “intermittent pain associated with a minor 

injury” is insufficient to trigger accrual of a claim under the 

FELA. We do not disagree with that proposition of law, see

Green, 414 F.3d at 764; we disagree with its applicability to 

this case. Sweatt’s own testimony belies the notion that he 

experienced “intermittent pain associated with a minor injury.” Indeed, he described his shoulder pain as “unbearable,” 

particularly when using the claw bar.5 He testified that he 

needed help from his coworkers to use that tool. And by 

November 30, 2009 (exactly three years before he filed this 

action), Dr. Coates opined that Sweatt could no longer per-

 

5 We are unsure why Sweatt questions the district court’s reliance on this 

fact. It is beyond dispute that he testified to enduring “unbearable” pain. 

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12 No. 14-2451 

form the work as a Trackman.6 To be sure, Sweatt testified 

that he did not miss work as a result of these injuries. But his 

effort in working in the face of injury does not forestall the 

date of accrual. 

Sweatt next argues that he was unaware that his malady 

was anything more than muscle soreness. This plea of ignorance is similar to the argument the appellant advanced in 

Fries. In that case, the appellant argued that the statute of 

limitations for his FELA claim was tolled until a doctor diagnosed him with the relevant injury. 909 F.2d at 1095. We 

rejected that argument, and held that a plaintiff cannot wait 

until he receives a medical diagnosis to begin pursuit of his 

claim. Id. We are not alone in this approach. In the cause-ofinjury context, the Fifth Circuit also rejects the use of a medical diagnosis as a starting point for the statute of limitations. 

See Emmons v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 

1983) (“[W]e think it sufficient for purposes of commencement of the limitations period that the plaintiff knew his 

complained of condition was work related, and that it is not 

additionally necessary that he have been formally so advised 

by a physician.”). 

Regarding cause of injury, Sweatt immediately linked his 

pain to his employment with Union Pacific. He testified that 

he first noticed the pain when he started doing a lot of tamping on the railroad tracks. He called his shoulder pain “unbearable,” particularly when he would use the claw bar—a 

tool specific to his job at Union Pacific. Nurse Practitioner 

 

6 Dr. Coates performed corrective surgery on Sweatt’s shoulder in March 

2010. 

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Valentin’s November 19, 2009, note corroborates the workrelated nature of the injury. She wrote that Sweatt “does repetitive motion at his job” (emphasis added). And Dr. Coates also 

testified that Sweatt associated the pain with his work. 

This connection is no leap of logic. After all, Sweatt had 

performed heavy-duty jobs at Union Pacific for a period of 

nearly three years. Like a machinist who, after years working 

in a loud, industrial room, develops hearing loss, Fries, 909 

F.2d at 1093–94, Sweatt knew or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that his injuries were 

caused by his work for Union Pacific. 

Based on our de novo review of the record, Sweatt’s FELA 

claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to 

accrue well before November 30, 2009. That puts them outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them timebarred by the statute of limitations. 

B. Race and Age Discrimination Claims 

Sweatt’s next issue concerns his prima facie cases of age 

and race discrimination. He brings these claims in light of 

Union Pacific’s failure to hire him as a Security Officer.7 Because Sweatt did not present direct evidence that he was discriminated against, the district court resorted to the burdenshifting method of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

 

7 Given the briefing in this case, it is unclear whether Sweatt’s race discrimination claim is brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-2, or the Civil Rights Acts of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Appellant’s 

Br. 36.) Sweatt’s complaint alleges a violation under § 1981, so our analysis proceeds under that statute. 

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14 No. 14-2451 

792, 802–05 (1973).8 Under this method, a plaintiff must 

show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for an open position; (3) despite 

his qualifications, he was rejected for the position; and (4) a 

similarly situated person outside his protected class was 

hired for the position instead, or the position remained open. 

Gore v. Ind. Univ., 416 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2005). We note 

that this familiar burden-shifting framework also applies to 

age discrimination claims under the ADEA. Krchnavy v. 

Limagrain Genetics Corp., 294 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2002). 

In any event, if a plaintiff can establish this prima facie

case, then the defendant must present evidence demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring the 

plaintiff for the position. Norman-Nunnery v. Madison Area 

Tech. Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 432 (7th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff must 

then present evidence that the stated reason for not hiring 

was merely pretextual. Zaccagnini v. Chas. Levy Circulating 

Co., 338 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2003). Pretext is defined as “a 

dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error.” Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 326 (7th Cir. 

2002). 

Here, Sweatt cannot make out a prima facie case for either 

age- or race-based discrimination. Specifically, he fails to establish the final prong dealing with similarly situated indi-

 

8 Although the district court laid out the McDonell Douglas framework, it 

proceeded directly to analysis of pretext. Sweatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 

No. 12 C 9579, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76156, at *22-23 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 

2014). 

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No. 14-2451 15

viduals.9 Although similarly situated individuals “need not 

be identical in every conceivable way,” they “must be ‘directly comparable’ to the plaintiff ‘in all material respects[.]’” 

Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012). This 

record reveals no candidates for the Security Officer position—past or present—who were comparable to Sweatt in all 

material respects, and yet were treated more favorably than 

he was (i.e. hired). 

We begin our analysis with Sweatt’s race discrimination 

claim under § 1981. Union Pacific offered nineteen people 

jobs as Security Officers in the past five years. Sweatt uses 

these individuals as his comparators. Discovery revealed 

their racial makeup: fifteen were Caucasian, three were Hispanic, and one was African-American. Nine of these individuals hailed from the Northern Region where Sweatt 

sought his Chicago position. Of those individuals, one was 

outside Sweatt’s protected class and was untruthful on the 

topic of traffic citations in his paper application. He was 

hired. But importantly, that candidate immediately rectified 

the discrepancy in his paper application during his interview. Sweatt, by contrast, did not. During Sweatt’s interview, 

he denied being arrested, and he corrected himself only 

when confronted by Agent Weller with the specific details of 

the arrest. That makes Sweatt and this particular comparator 

qualitatively different. 

 

9 Union Pacific appears to concede that Sweatt was qualified for the position of Security Officer, which satisfies prong 2 of Sweatt’s prima facie

case. Although we doubt that an applicant who is not forthright in an 

interview is qualified for a position that depends on honesty and integrity, we accept Union Pacific’s concession for purposes of our analysis. 

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16 No. 14-2451 

The same story plays out when we consider individuals 

hired by Union Pacific for Security Officer outside the Northern Region. Three individuals from this pool also had prior 

arrests and/or charges brought against them. Unlike Sweatt, 

however, each of these individuals forthrightly admitted to 

their prior misdeeds during the interviews. Collectively, 

then, these comparators are not comparable to Sweatt in all 

material aspects. It’s not the initial lie; it’s the cover-up, the 

persistence in the lie. Sweatt, unlike each of his purported 

comparators, engaged in the latter activity. The comparators, 

therefore, are not directly comparable in all material respects, Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846, and Sweatt cannot establish 

his prima facie case for race discrimination. 

Sweatt’s alternative argument, that members outside his 

protected racial class were treated more favorably than he 

was because some of their summary reports do not state that 

they had background checks performed, is also unavailing. 

The fact that a summary report does not contain language 

indicating that a background check was performed does not 

mean that it was not performed. It simply means that the 

check, if one occurred, was not included in the report. And 

even if this argument somehow satisfied Sweatt’s prima facie

case, which it does not, Sweatt presents no evidence suggesting that Union Pacific’s reason for not hiring him—his dishonesty during the interview—is pretextual. EEOC v. Target 

Corp., 460 F.3d 946, 960 (7th Cir. 2006) (“To satisfy [pretext], a 

plaintiff must show that (a) the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason was dishonest; and (b) the employer’s true reason 

was based on discriminatory intent.”). 

Our § 1981 analysis applies with equal force to Sweatt’s 

ADEA claim. Sweatt was born on August 6, 1956, so on the 

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date of his interview, March 16, 2011, he was fifty-four. Under the ADEA, that means he was a member of a protected 

class, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall 

be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”), 

which covers prong 1 of his prima facie case. Union Pacific 

does not contest prongs 2 or 3. It does not have to. Because 

once again, the insurmountable hurdle for Sweatt is prong 4. 

None of Sweatt’s purported comparators made the same fatal mistake that Sweatt made during his interview—

persisting in a lie about criminal history. As a result, his 

comparators are not similar in all material respects, and 

Sweatt cannot make out his prima facie case for age discrimination. 

Before we address Sweatt’s argument regarding the district court’s CMP, we pause to make some final observations 

on the discrimination claims. We do not doubt Sweatt’s explanation that the Flossmoor arrest was a misunderstanding, 

that the judge tossed the case, and that Sweatt remained 

friends with all relevant parties. But these facts, which we 

accept as true, do not change the fact that Sweatt was not 

forthcoming about the incident during his interview. In the 

context of an interview for a position where honesty and integrity are paramount (Girard told him so), Sweatt’s lack of 

candor understandably served as the death knell for his candidacy. Sweatt offers no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the true reason behind the failure to hire was age or race discrimination. 

C. The District Court’s Summary Judgment Procedure 

 Sweatt argues that the district court’s CMP denies a nonmovant the ability to respond to the movant’s statement of 

facts. He further argues that the CMP prohibits a nonCase: 14-2451 Document: 26 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 20
18 No. 14-2451 

movant from submitting additional facts that he believes 

would defeat the motion. This, he contends, contravenes Local Rule 56.1. And in this case, he claims, it prejudiced him 

below. We disagree. 

Our analysis begins with the relevant portion of Judge Ellis’s CMP: 

Motions for summary judgment and responses 

must comply with Local Rules 56.1(a)(1)–(2) and 

56.1(b)(1)–(2), as well as the procedures outlined 

herein. Parties are directed to file a joint statement 

of undisputed material facts that the parties agree 

are not in dispute. The joint statement must include—for each undisputed fact—citations to admissible evidence. The joint statement of undisputed material facts shall be filed separately from the 

memoranda of law and shall include the line, paragraph, or page number where the supporting material may be found in the record. The parties may 

not file—and the court will not consider—

separate documents of undisputed facts. If the 

nonmoving party refuses to join in the statement, 

the moving party will nevertheless be permitted to 

file the motion, accompanied by a separate declaration of counsel explaining why a joint statement 

was not filed. Failure to stipulate to an undisputed 

fact without a reasonable basis for doing so may result in sanctions. 

Judge Sara L. Ellis, Case Management Procedures, available at

http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.7thcircuitbar.org/resource/res

mgr/2014_materials/Ellis.pdf (last visited July 24, 2015) (emphasis in original). 

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No. 14-2451 19

This CMP is concerned solely with a statement of undisputed material facts to which both parties agree. Nothing in this 

CMP prohibits one party from responding to another party’s 

version of the disputed facts. And nothing in this CMP prohibits a party from submitting additional facts, as the need 

may arise. The laudable goal of this CMP is to remove the 

chaff from the grain in a given case, thereby allowing the 

parties—and the court—to focus on the facts that are actually in dispute. 

Judge Ellis’s CMP does not disadvantage a party. If a party refuses to agree to a joint statement, that party can still 

proceed with its motion for summary judgment. It simply 

must include a statement explaining why the joint statement 

was not filed. We note that in this case, the district court allowed Sweatt to amend the joint statement by including five 

additional facts. That procedure inured to Sweatt’s benefit 

here. 

Further, by its own terms, the CMP conforms to the Local 

Rules of the Northern District of Illinois. The relevant Local 

Rule, 56.1, directs each party to file “a statement of material 

facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue ... .” N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1 (emphasis added). That rule 

aspires to the goal achieved by Judge Ellis’s CMP—agreeing 

that certain material facts are beyond dispute. In practice, 

however, there is a difference between contending that a fact 

is beyond dispute and agreeing that a fact is beyond disputed. Local Rule 56.1(3) focuses on the former. The Committee 

Comment acknowledges this fact. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1 cmt. 

(“The judges of this Court have observed that parties frequently include in their LR56.1 statements facts that are unnecessary to the motion and/or are disputed.”) (emphasis 

Case: 14-2451 Document: 26 Filed: 08/06/2015 Pages: 20
20 No. 14-2451 

added). Judge Ellis’s CMP, on the other hand, encourages the 

parties to work together to focus on the latter. We find no 

fault in that. And we certainly find no inconsistency between 

the CMP and Local Rule 56.1. 

Because we find Local Rule 56.1 wholly consistent with 

Judge Ellis’s CMP, we need not discuss Sweatt’s remaining 

argument concerning Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 (allowing a judge to “regulate practice in 

any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district court’s local 

rules”). It is without merit. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

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