Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04032/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04032-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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The Court has construed this motion as Objections to the R&R.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Timothy Souliere, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Edwards, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-05-4032-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Petitioner Timothy Souliere (“Petitioner”) is currently incarcerated in the Arizona

State Prison Complex at Buckeye, Arizona. He filed an Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 29, 2005. On February 6, 2008, United

States Magistrate Judge Jay Irwin filed his Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)

concluding that Petitioner’s claim was time barred by the statute of limitations set in the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Petitioner has filed

a Motion for Supersedeas Rule 8(B)1

 (“Objections”) contesting this conclusion, and

requesting an evidentiary hearing. Because objections have been filed, the Court will review

the portions of the R&R to which there are objections de novo. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

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I. Procedural Background (adopted from R&R 2-5)

On January 8, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to 12 years in prison and a successive

term of lifetime probation. Having pled guilty, Petitioner waived his right to appeal. Around

January 2, 2003, Petitioner filed his first Notice for Post-Conviction Relief with the Maricopa

County Superior Court. Petitioner filed a motion to extend, which the court granted. The

Superior Court ordered Petitioner to file his petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) by

November 28, 2003. On November 13, 2003, Petitioner requested a 90 day extension which

the court never addressed. On January 7, 2004, the Superior Court dismissed the PCR

proceeding for failure to file a petition. On January 26, 2004, Petitioner filed for a Motion

to Reinstate which the Superior Court denied. Despite this, Petitioner still attempted to file

his PCR on April 30, 2004, however the court took no action on this. Petitioner then filed

a Motion to Compel on July 20, 2004, a Motion to Review on October 25, 2004, and a

Motion to Withdraw Plea on December 6, 2004. There is nothing in the record showing that

the Superior Court ever acted on any of these motions.

On July 20, 2004, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 with the Superior Court. Although Petitioner alleges that he filed the Petition

with the District Court of Arizona, there are no records of this being filed in the District

Court. On August 11, 2004, the Superior Court denied the petition.

On April 29, 2005, Petitioner filed a Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief which

the Superior Court denied as untimely on May 23, 2005. Petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration on June 2, 2005 which the Superior Court denied on June 27, 2005. He then

filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals on June 20, 2005 which was

stricken as improperly filed with the appellate court rather than the trial court on July 1,

2005. The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Review on March 16, 2006.

Petitioner filed his present Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 12, 2005

while his Petition for Review was still pending with the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Respondents filed their Answer on June 13, 2006, and Petitioner filed a Traverse on July 12,

2006. Petitioner also filed a Motion for Review containing an article on the right to counsel

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and copies of a Motion to Compel directed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Magistrate

Judge Irwin of the Arizona District Court granted the Motion to the extent of allowing the

exhibits to become part of the record. While this action was pending, Petitioner filed a

Certificate of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on December 27, 2006. This was

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on August 24, 2007.

On February 6, 2008, Magistrate Judge Irwin filed an R&R recommending that

Petitioner’s Petition be dismissed as untimely. Because the Magistrate considered the claims

to be time barred, the remaining arguments made by Respondents were not evaluated.

Petitioner filed a Motion objecting to this recommendation on February 25, 2008.

II. Statute of Limitations

A. Applicable Limitations Period

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Congress has

set a one year statute of limitations to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The year long statute of limitations begins to run on “the date on which the judgment

became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). It may also begin to run from the date on which a

constitutional right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court, so long as that right

has been “made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(C).

1. Conclusion of Direct Review

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that Arizona’s Rule 32 PCR proceedings are

considered “direct review” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, as noted in the R&R, this direct review was pending until

the Superior Court filed its denial of Petitioner’s Motion to Reinstate and Request for

Rehearing for Petitioner’s original PCR proceeding on March 16, 2004. (R&R at 6.)

Petitioner then had 30 days to file a petition for review. Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.9(c).

Because he did not, his direct review concluded on April 15, 2004.

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Although it is true that Petitioner filed additional motions in this original PCR

proceeding with the Superior Court, these filings were improper and therefore “did not delay

the finality of his conviction.” (R&R 6.) Petitioner also filed a second PCR, however this

was also improperly filed. A petitioner only has a right to subsequent PCR petitions if they

are filed “within thirty days after issuance of the final order or mandate of the appellate court

in the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. Rule

32.4(a). Since Petitioner did not appeal his first proceeding, and because he did not file the

second one until over a year after the first had been originally dismissed and rehearing

denied, the second PCR was not a proper form of direct review.

2. Newly Recognized Constitutional Right

Petitioner also asserts claims based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 297 (2004).

The date of the Blakely decision could provide a new commencement date for the statute of

limitations, but only if this case was made retroactively applicable. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(C). Here, the Ninth Circuit has made it quite clear that Blakely is not

retroactively applicable to habeas cases. Cook v. U.S., 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004).

Thus, Blakely does not provide a new start date for the statute of limitations.

Petitioner argues that rulings of the United States Supreme Court should still be

binding on lower courts. While this is true, the Supreme Court did not rule that Blakely

would apply retroactively. Thus, the one year statute of limitations started on the date at

which Petitioner’s conviction became final: April 15, 2004.

B. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA states that the statute of limitations may be tolled while a “properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This tolling time includes all of the

stages of appeal in the process, so long as there is “proper use of state court procedures.”

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999).

Although Petitioner filed subsequent motions after his first PCR was dismissed, none

of these was a “proper use of state court procedures.” The proper procedure would have

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2

Although Petitioner claims that the Maricopa County Superior Court does not have

jurisdiction over habeas claims, it appears that Arizona has retained the writ of habeas corpus

in some contexts. See State v. Cowles, 82 P.3d 369 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2004). Thus, the

Arizona state courts have jurisdiction to decide habeas corpus cases on state grounds, and

therefore the Superior Court was within its jurisdiction to deny the petition.

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been to either file a new PCR by filing a notice with the court, or to appeal the decision to

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Since Petitioner did neither of these things, his further

motions related to his first PCR do not toll the statute of limitations under AEDPA.

Petitioner also filed a second PCR on April 29, 2005, however this was dismissed as

untimely. The Supreme Court has held that when a state post-conviction petition is untimely,

it is not “properly-filed” under § 2244(d)(2), and therefore does not toll the statute of

limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). Therefore, the second PCR

filed does not toll the statute of limitations either.

On July 20, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner

argues that he intended to file this petition with the District Court. Indeed, the petition is on

District Court forms, the mailing certificate says that it is to be sent to the District Court, and

Petitioner claims that the prison mailing logs reflect it being mailed to the District Court.

However, the petition ended up being filed with the Maricopa County Superior Court. The

Superior Court then summarily denied the petition. The order was filed on August 11, 2004,

and it did not give a reason for the denial. Thus, this Court can presume that this was a

“properly-filed” application for state relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).2

 Taking the date

at which the petition was delivered to prison officials for mailing as the filing date, see

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 577 (9th Cir. 2000), Petitioner is entitled to statutory

tolling from the period of May 16, 2004 until August 11, 2004. 

As discussed above , Petitioner’s statute of limitations began to run on April 15, 2004.

Thus, as of May 16, 2004, 31 days had expired. On August 11, 2004, Petitioner had 334

days remaining. Given the applicable statutory tolling, Petitioner’s statute of limitations

expired on July 11, 2005, thus time barring his current December 12, 2005 petition.

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C. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit has held that § 2244(d) allows for equitable tolling. Harris v.

Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2008). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations if he can show: “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented

timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (citing Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “Equitable tolling is typically granted when

litigants are unable to file timely petitions as a result of external circumstances beyond their

direct control.” Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055. “Equitable tolling is typically denied in cases

where a litigant’s own mistake clearly contributed to his predicament.” Id.

Here, Petitioner contends that four extraordinary circumstances exist that should

excuse his tardy filing: (1) he requested counsel and it was denied; (2) the prison law library

is deficient; (3) the Arizona state courts excessively prolonged the litigation process; and (4)

he intended to file his original habeas petition with the District Court and not the state court.

Each of these circumstances will be discussed in turn.

1. Denial of Counsel

Petitioner claims that he requested counsel from every court that he has filed with in

order to ensure that he was in compliance with all of the court rules and procedures.

(Objections at 2.) He argues that his lack of access to adequate legal representation hindered

his efforts to properly file what was needed for his claim. However, Petitioner’s lack of

familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do not toll the limitations period.

Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has held that

there is no right to legal assistance in seeking any type of post-conviction relief, and, as a

result, lack of legal assistance in seeking post-conviction relief cannot form the basis for

equitable tolling. Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007).

2. Prison Law Library

Petitioner also claims that the delay in obtaining materials from the prison law library

should form the basis for equitable tolling of his habeas claim. The Court notes that in some

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cases inadequate legal materials can be an “impediment” that justifies late filing, or can form

the basis of equitable tolling. See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc). However, the mere fact that Petitioner had to wait a bit longer than he

would prefer to receive legal materials does not in itself rise to the level of an impediment

that prevents compliance with the one year statute of limitations. Further, Petitioner alleges

no timeline or specific facts showing the length of the alleged delay, nor that he would have

been able to timely file his petition “but-for” the delay. See Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798,

800-01 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Petitioner “must show that the extraordinary

circumstances were the but-for and proximate cause of his untimeliness”).

In some cases, specific factual allegations can necessitate an evidentiary hearing to

determine if available legal materials were insufficient and when Petitioner’s access to said

materials was denied. “A habeas petitioner . . . should receive an evidentiary hearing when

he makes ‘a good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’ Laws

v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d

964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Allen, 255 F.3d at 800-01. Petitioner makes no allegations,

which, if true, would entitle him to relief. He does not allege that materials were denied,

merely that he did not receive them as quickly as he may have desired. Accordingly, this

Court finds no evidentiary hearing is necessary in this case.

3. Delay in State Courts

Petitioner states that the Arizona Courts delayed in responding to his second PCR

petition. However, as discussed above, this petition was improperly filed. Thus, the fact

Petitioner waited to file his present petition until after he had received a response to an

improperly filed PCR with the State was not an external circumstance beyond his control.

He had control over the filing of the petition, and over its incorrect filing. Had the PCR been

properly filed, then it would have been a form of state review that would have statutorily

tolled the limitations period. However, this is not true of an improper filing, as noted above.

Here the mistake was Petitioner’s, and he is not entitled to equitable tolling where it is clear

that his mistake contributed to his predicament. Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055. Again,

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3

Petitioner also argues that he should get the benefit of the “mailbox rule,” and thus

his initial habeas petition should be considered “filed” with the District Court from the time

that he delivered it to the prison official for mailing. (Objections at 4.) However, Petitioner

already has the benefit of the mailbox rule as discussed above. His petition was considered

filed with the Superior Court from the date of mailing, and this time period was taken into

account when statutorily tolling his limitations period. This is because the petition was

actually filed with the Superior Court, and not with the District Court. This reflects the

purpose of the mailbox rule, which was implemented because prisoners lack control over the

delays between the receipt of the notice and its filing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,

273-74 (1988). “The question is one of timing, not destination.” Id. at 73. The purpose is

not to mitigate clerical errors. Therefore, Petitioner cannot benefit from the mailbox rule

with the District Court to receive an earlier filing date when the petition was never actually

filed with the District Court.

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Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law does not equitably toll the limitations period.

Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

4. First Habeas Petition

Finally, Petitioner claims that he intended to file his original petition for writ of habeas

corpus with the District Court, and not with the state court. Indeed, Petitioner used District

Court forms for the petition, and the appended mailing certificate shows that he wanted it

sent to the District Court. However, no record of this petition exists in the District Court, and

the record suggests that it was only filed with Maricopa County Superior Court. This is the

only logical conclusion as to what happened, since the Superior Court, via a Minute Entry

denied the petition.3

Petitioner claims that “someone in-properly [sic] sent federal forms to AZ Superior,”

(Objections at 4.) thus implying that it was someone other than he who made the mistake.

As unlikely as it is that someone other than Petitioner made the mistake of filing the papers

in the wrong court, even assuming arguendo that this occurred, this circumstance would not

warrant equitable tolling for the five month period that this case is untimely.

In order to be entitled to equitable tolling, the Petitioner must show that the

circumstances standing in his way were the proximate cause of his untimeliness. Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Stillman v. LaMargue, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203

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(9th Cir. 2003)). Here, Petitioner already has statutory tolling for the time that the petition

was pending in the state court until the time that he was notified of the court’s ruling. At the

point that he received the ruling from the Maricopa County Superior Court, he should have

realized that the petition was filed in the incorrect court. At that point he could then have

timely filed the petition in the District Court. In fact, from the denial of the petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the Superior Court, Petitioner still had approximately eleven months

during which he could have timely filed in federal court. Thus, the improper filing was not

the proximate cause of his delay.

III. Conclusion

Thus, the Court concludes that the R&R properly found Petitioner’s claim to be barred

by the statute of limitations. Because Petitioner alleges no facts beyond the record which,

if true, would entitle him to further toll the statute of limitations, an evidentiary hearing is not

required. See Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998); see also discussion

above p. 7 ln. 15-23.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Court ACCEPTS the Report and

Recommendation (Doc. # 52); and OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections thereto (Doc. #53)

(hereby denying the Motion for Supersedeas Rule 8(B), which the Court has construed as

Petitioner’s Objections to the R&R);

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. #5) be DENIED, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 21st day of July, 2008.

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