Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00006/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

DANIEL ESPIE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:14cv6-MHT

) (WO) 

WASHINGTON NATIONAL )

INSURANCE COMPANY, a )

Corporation; and CAINE & )

WEINER COMPANY, LLC, a )

Corporation, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Daniel Espie brought this action against

defendants Washington National Insurance Company and

Caine & Weiner Company, LLC, asserting state-law claims

of breach of contract and fraud. Subject-matter

jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332

(diversity).

The case is now before this court on the defendants’

motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)

or transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), based on a

Case 2:14-cv-00006-MHT-SRW Document 27 Filed 06/27/14 Page 1 of 35
forum-selection clause. The court finds that the clause

applies to the claims in this case, but those motions

will nonetheless be denied. However, Washington National

raised an additional basis for dismissal, the doctrine of

forum non conveniens, in a footnote in its reply brief. 

The court will therefore treat the reply brief as a

separate motion to dismiss, and will give Caine & Weiner

an opportunity to join and Espie an opportunity to

respond.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss for

improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), the court

accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true “only ‘to the

extent they are uncontroverted by defendant[’s]

affidavits.’” Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean

Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas Indus., Inc., 896 F.2d

1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1990)). “Rule 12(b)(3) is a

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somewhat unique context of dismissal in which [courts]

consciously look beyond the mere allegations of a

complaint, and, although [courts] continue to favor the

plaintiff’s facts in the context of any actual

evidentiary dispute, [courts] do not view the allegations

of the complaint as the exclusive basis for decision.” 

Id.

In considering a defendant’s motion to transfer venue

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court has “broad

discretion in weighing the conflicting arguments as to

venue,” England v. ITT Thompson Industries, Inc., 856

F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988); it must engage in an

“individualized, case-by-case consideration of

convenience and fairness.” Stewart Organization, Inc. v.

Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also C.M.B. Foods, Inc. v. Corral of

Middle Georgia, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1286 (M.D. Ala.

2005) (Thompson, J.).

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II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Daniel Espie is an insurance agent. During

the relevant time period, he worked as a regional manager

for a company which, in turn, acted as an independent

marketing organization for defendant Washington National

Insurance Company.

Espie and Washington National entered into a “Sales

Representative Agreement.” See Affidavit of Christy

Wilson (Doc. No. 6-1) at 9-19.1

 That agreement authorized

Espie to sell Washington National insurance and set forth

the terms of that relationship. It also contained a

1. The documents submitted by the defendants in this

case indicate that “Conseco Marketing, L.L.C.,” rather

than Washington National, was the party that contracted 

with Espie. The relationship between Conseco and

Washington National is not obvious from the record in

this case. See Affidavit of Christy Wilson (Doc. No.

6-1) at 20 (mentioning Conseco and Washington National in

correspondence to Espie). However, from both sides’

filings it is clear that the relevant contracts

constitute agreements between Espie and Washington

National, and that there is no dispute on this point. 

See id. at 2 (attesting that attached document is “the

controlling contract between Washington National and

Plaintiff Daniel Espie”); Letter Dated July 31, 2013

(Doc. No. 1-1) (referencing agreement between Washington

National and Espie).

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forum-selection clause: “Each party agrees to the

exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Hamilton County,

Indiana, with respect to any claim or cause of action,

whether in law or in equity, including specific

performance, arising under or relating to this

agreement....” Id. at 16.

Espie and Washington National also entered into a

separate “Advance Compensation Agreement.” See id. at 5-

7; see also id. at 14-15 (Sales Representative Agreement

addressing advance compensation). The Advance

Compensation Agreement provided that, when Espie sold an

insurance policy to a customer, Washington National would

pay Espie’s commission in advance, before the company had

collected premiums from the customer. It also provided

that, should the insurance policies Espie had sold lapse

or be terminated before Washington National had recovered

the sum advanced to Espie, or should Washington

National's agreement with Espie be terminated, then Espie

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would owe Washington National the outstanding sum that

had been advanced to him.

The Advance Compensation agreement explicitly

indicated Espie’s desire to “modify” the Sales

Representative Agreement “in order to permit [him] to

receive compensation in advance of premiums being

collected” by Washington National. Id. at 5. However,

it provided that, other than specific modifications it

made, “[a]ll the terms, conditions and definitions of the

[Sales Representative Agreement] ... shall remain in

force and effect...” Id. at 7. The unmodified terms

remaining in effect therefore included the forumselection clause. Because the Advance Compensation

Agreement modified some terms of the Sales Representative

Agreement, but reaffirmed all others including the forumselection clause, the court will treat the two as a

single contract for the purposes of this opinion. When

the court refers to the “Sales Representative Agreement”

in the remainder of this opinion, it is referring that

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agreement as modified by the Advance Compensation

Agreement.

Under this advance-compensation agreement, Espie came

to owe Washington National $ 29,019.04 in the form of

previously advanced commissions, referred to as

“charge-backs.” Complaint (Doc. No. 1) at ¶ 7. 

Washington National retained defendant Caine & Weiner

Company, LLC, to collect the debt owed by Espie.

Espie negotiated with Caine & Weiner, ultimately

reaching an agreement regarding the outstanding debt. 

Under that agreement, which was memorialized in a letter

Caine & Weiner sent to Espie dated July 31, 2013, Espie

would pay $ 10,250.00 immediately and $100 per month

thereafter until the debt was satisfied. See Letter

Dated July 31, 2013 (Doc. No. 1-1).

In exchange, Caine & Weiner represented that

Washington National would not report Espie’s debt to

VectorOne. See id.; Complaint (Doc. No. 1) at ¶ 11. 

VectorOne, or Vector, is a computer service which

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includes information about debts that insurance agents

owe to insurance companies. According to the complaint,

insurance companies rely on that information when

deciding whether to contract with particular agents. 

Caine & Weiner also represented that Espie’s debt would

not be made part of Espie’s credit report. See Letter

Dated July 31, 2013 (Doc. No. 1-1). The letter does not

include any forum-selection clause. 

Espie paid as he had agreed. However, he alleges,

the defendants breached the agreement by reporting his

debt to VectorOne as well as two consumer credit

reporting agencies. As a result, his contract with one

insurance company was cancelled, and the terms of his

contract with another company were adversely modified.

Espie then brought this suit, asserting six state-law

claims: one count of breach of contract, and five counts 

of various kinds of fraud. The basic assertions

underlying all six counts are the same: that the

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defendants promised not to report Espie’s debts, but did

so anyway.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the

forum-selection clause of the Sales Representative

Agreement requires that this case be heard in Indiana. 

After Espie amended his complaint, the defendants renewed

their motions on this same basis.2

III. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of the Forum-Selection Clause

The threshold issue is whether the forum-selection

clause applies to Espie’s claims at all. The clause

provides: “Each party agrees to the exclusive

jurisdiction of the courts of Hamilton County, Indiana,

with respect to any claim or cause of action, whether in

law or in equity, including specific performance, arising

2. Caine & Weiner, but not Washington National, also

moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It made no

substantial argument in support. That motion will be

denied.

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under or relating to this agreement...” Affidavit of

Christy Wilson (Doc. No. 6-1) at 16.

The defendants argue that Espie’s claims clearly

‘relate to’ the Sales Representative Agreement and

therefore fall within the scope of the forum-selection

clause. After all, the claims in this case all

essentially amount to the assertion that the defendants

failed to live up to their side of the agreement to

settle Espie’s debt, and it is clear that the debt itself

was incurred during the course of Espie’s work as an

insurance agent pursuant to the Sales Representative

Agreement. Espie, on the other hand, argues that the

defendants breached not the Sales Representative

Agreement but a different contract, namely the July 31,

2013, letter settling his outstanding debt. Because that

letter contract contains no forum-selection clause, he

argues that he is free to bring his case in this court.

If the court were to read the forum-selection clause

literally, then the defendants would be clearly correct. 

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The Sales Representative Agreement provides for exclusive

Indiana jurisdiction for any claim “relating to this

agreement.” Affidavit of Christy Wilson (Doc. No. 6-1)

at 16. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

observed, in the broadest sense everything is ‘related’:

“[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest

stretch of its indeterminacy, it would have no limiting

purpose because really, universally, relations stop

nowhere.” Bailey v. ERG Enterprises, LP, 705 F.3d 1311,

1318 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Doe v. Princess Cruise

Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1218 (11th Cir. 2011))

(internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in

original). Thus, the term ‘related to’ in forumselection clauses (or in their cousins, arbitration

clauses) is not read literally.3

Instead, in the Eleventh Circuit, “A claim ‘relates

to’ a contract when ‘the dispute occurs as a fairly

3. In interpreting forum-selection clauses, the

Eleventh Circuit has relied heavily on cases interpreting

arbitration clauses. See Bailey, 705 F.3d at 1317-18. 

This court will do likewise.

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direct result of the performance of contractual duties.’” 

Id. at 1217 (quoting Telecom Italia, SpA v. Wholesale

Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109, 1116 (11th Cir. 2001)). In

other words, in place of its literal meaning, the phrase

‘related to’ as interpreted in the Eleventh Circuit

“marks a boundary indicating some direct relationship.”

Id. at 1317-18 (internal quotation marks omitted).

As such, the defendants’ argument, that the claims

here are obviously ‘related’ to the Sales Representative

Agreement in the literal sense, is unpersuasive. Indeed,

the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly rejected the

application of forum-selection and arbitration clauses

containing similar language despite a clear relationship

between the claim and the contract. In Int’l

Underwriters AG v. Triple I: Int’l Invs., Inc., for

example, the court was confronted with two contracts: one

of the contracts contained a clause requiring arbitration

for any dispute “in any way related to” that contract,

while the plaintiff alleged a breach of the other

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contract. 533 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008). The

court noted the “obvious relationship between the two

contracts” at issue in that case. Id. at 1349. 

Nonetheless, despite the clear relationship, the court

refused to find that allegation of breach of one contract

fell within the arbitration clause of other.

But Espie’s argument, that the fact that he is suing

under a different contract than the one which contains

the forum-selection clause means the clause does not

apply, is equally simplistic and unpersuasive.4

 For, in

other cases, the Eleventh Circuit has found that forumselection and arbitration clauses do apply even though

4. In his brief, Espie also appears to argue that the

July 31, 2013, letter created a contract not with

Washington National but with Caine & Weiner. To the

extent that he makes it, this argument fails because 

Caine & Weiner entered into the July 31 agreement on

behalf of Washington National. See Letter Dated July 31,

2013 (Doc. No. 1-1) (“Caine & Weiner, represents

Washington National Insurance, both fully and legally in

regards to this matter.”); Complaint (Doc. No. 1) at ¶ 8

(Washington National “hired or otherwise retained [Caine

& Weiner] to collect the amount of the allegedly owed

commission charge-backs from Plaintiff”); Affidavit of

Christy Wilson (Doc. No. 6-1) at 23-39 (collection-agency

contract).

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the cause of action at issue is based on something other

than the contract which contains the clause. In Slater

v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int’l, Inc., for example, the court

rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the forumselection clause, which applied to claims relating to her

employment contract, “should be read to encompass only

breach-of-contract claims directly relating to the

employment agreement,” and not the plaintiff’s statutory

claims. 634 F.3d 1326, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2011).5

 And in

Doe, the court found that the scope of the arbitration

clause, which also applied to any claims relating to the

plaintiff’s employment contract, was broad enough to

include her claims under federal statutory law, admiralty

law, and traditional maritime law, all of which relied on

her status as a seaman, but not broad enough to include

her common-law tort claims, which did not. 657 F.3d at

1219-21.

5. As discussed below, Slater has been abrogated in

part on other grounds by Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc.

v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct.

568, 577 (2013).

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The parties have cited no case directly addressing

the instant situation, in which the claims relate most

directly to a subsequent agreement settling a debt that

in turn arose under a prior contract containing a forumselection clause. Thus, on the question of whether

Espie’s claims fall within the scope of the forumselection clause, “The case law yields no clear answer.” 

Telecom Italia, 248 F.3d at 1114. The cases do, however,

provide guidance. Several factors which the Eleventh

Circuit has emphasized in prior cases all point to the

conclusion that the claims in this case are encompassed

in the forum-selection clause.

One critical factor to consider is “whether the tort

or breach in question was an immediate, foreseeable

result of the performance of contractual duties.” Id. at

1116. In this case, it was foreseeable at the time Espie

signed the Sales Representative Agreement that he might,

as a result of advance payments made to him under the

contract, end up owing money to Washington National. It

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was also foreseeable that he might reach some settlement

with regard to that debt, and that Washington National

might breach that settlement. The foreseeability of the

instant situation suggests that these claims do ‘relate

to’ the original contract, as that term has been

interpreted in the Eleventh Circuit.

This conclusion is bolstered by examination of

another factor that the Eleventh Circuit has considered

important: the extent to which the claim is ‘independent’

of the contract. When the claim in a case would be

viable even if the contract containing the clause had

never existed, the court has indicated that independence

is an important factor suggesting that the claim does not

‘relate to’ the contract. See, e.g., Telecom Italia, 248

F.3d at 1116 (alleged tortious interference could have

taken place “even if TMI had no contractual relationship

with WTC”); Doe, 657 F.3d at 1219 (“The cruise line could

have engaged in that tortious conduct even in the absence

of any contractual or employment relationship with

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Doe.”); Triple I, 533 F.3d at 1347 (“Triple I’s claims

could have arisen even in the absence of any escrow

agreement.”).

Similarly, when a claim would be viable even if all

parties had performed satisfactorily under the contract,

that suggests the claim does not ‘relate to’ the

contract. See, e.g., Bailey, 705 F.3d at 1318 (“the

Buyers would still be able to bring their ... fraud

claims even if Ginn-LA had performed all of its

obligations under the ... contracts”); Doe, 657, F.3d at

1219-20 (“The parties could each have fulfilled all of

their duties under the crew agreement and Doe could have

perfectly performed her services for the cruise line, and

the parties still be embroiled in the dispute alleged in

Doe’s common law claims...”); Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc.

v. Johannesburg Consol. Investments, 553 F.3d 1351,

1368-69 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The parties could have

‘performed the arbitrable contract perfectly, fulfilling

all expectations under that contract,’ and still be

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embroiled in this dispute.”) (quoting Gregory v. ElectroMechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 385 (11th Cir. 1996)).

Thus, it is clear that the fact that a claim could

exist in the absence of the contract (or in the absence

of failure to perform under the contract) is important to

the determination of whether the claim ‘relates to’ the

contract. However, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the

argument that “a but-for relationship” between the

contract and the claims necessarily means “the claims

‘relate to’ the contract.” Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v.

Byers, 701 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Triple I, 533 F.3d at 1347). In other words, the fact

that a claim would not exist but for the contract (or but

for failure to perform under the contract) does not

establish that the claim ‘relates to’ the contract. 

Nonetheless, it is clear from the court’s analysis in

the above-cited cases that a but-for relationship is

relevant. In each of those cases, the fact that the

claim would be viable even without any contractual

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relationship at all (or without any failure to perform

fully under the contract) was critical to the court’s

finding that the claim did not ‘relate to’ the contract. 

If the lack of a but-for relationship is a critical

consideration, then the existence of a but-for

relationship also bears on the analysis, suggesting that

the claim does ‘relate to’ the contract.

In this case, there is a clear but-for relationship. 

If there had been no contract, there would be no debt. 

If there were no debt, there would be no promise to

refrain from reporting the debt (and, indeed, there would

be nothing to report). Similarly, if all parties had

performed fully under the original contract, then there

would remain no outstanding debt to be settled with a

later agreement. In other words, but for the Sales

Representative Agreement, and but for the failure to

fully perform under the Sales Representative Agreement, 

there would be no claims in this case. This is another

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factor that weighs in favor of finding the clause

applicable to these claims.

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that a

claim is more likely to be ‘related to’ a contract when

that contract is “the central document in the parties’

relationship.” Triple I, 533 F.3d at 1347. In Triple I,

there were two contracts: one which established the terms

of $ 10.4 million deal to issue bonds, and a second which

arranged for the first payment to be made via an escrow

agent. The escrow contract included an arbitration

clause, but the main bond contract did not. The claim

was for breach of the bond contract. The Eleventh

Circuit found that this claim did not ‘relate to’ the

escrow contract, and noted that “To hold otherwise would

be to let the tail wag the dog.” Id. at 1346. It

distinguished Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 400

F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part on

other grounds as recognized in Lawson v. Life of the S.

Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 1166, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011), because

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in Blinco the arbitration clause had been part of “the

central document in the parties’ relationship.” Triple

I, 533 F.3d at 1347.

In this case, “the central document in the parties’

relationship,” id., is the Sales Representative

Agreement. Like the escrow contract at issue in Triple

I, the subsequent agreement memorialized in the July 31,

2013, letter is an addendum to that relationship. 

However, unlike Triple I, in this case the forumselection clause is found in the central document, not

the addendum. As such, a finding that Espie’s claims

‘relate to’ the Sales Representative Agreement will not

result in the ‘tail wagging the dog’.

In sum, then, the court finds that the claims at

issue in this case do fall within the scope of the forumselection clause. Furthermore, because that clause

provides for “exclusive jurisdiction” in another forum,

Affidavit of Christy Wilson (Doc. No. 6-1) at 16, the

court finds that the clause is mandatory rather than

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permissive. Global Satellite Commc’n Co. v. Starmill

U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A

mandatory clause ... ‘dictates an exclusive forum for

litigation under the contract.’”) (quoting Snapper, Inc.

v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1262 n.24 (11th Cir. 1999)). 

B. Enforcement Procedure

Given that the clause applies to these claims, the

court must determine the proper procedural means to

enforce it. The defendants seek dismissal pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) or, in the alternative, transfer

to the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis

Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In its reply

brief, Washington National also seeks dismissal under the

doctrine of forum non conveniens.

i. Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(3)

There is Eleventh Circuit authority that a court may

grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) for

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improper venue in order to enforce a valid forumselection clause. See Slater, 634 F.3d at 1332-33;

Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285,

1290 (11th Cir. 1998). However, the Supreme Court has

recently rejected this approach, clarifying that such a

motion may be granted only if “venue is ‘wrong’ or

‘improper’” under the relevant statute, generally 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b). Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v.

U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568,

577 (2013). “Whether the parties entered into a contract

containing a forum-selection clause has no bearing” on

the analysis under § 1391(b), and so “venue is proper so

long as the requirements of § 1391(b) are met,

irrespective of any forum-selection clause.” Id. at 577-

8. The defendants have made no argument in this case

that venue is improper under § 1391(b), and the court

concludes venue is proper based on Espie’s residence. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Therefore, the motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) will be denied.

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ii. Motion to Transfer

In Atlantic Marine the Supreme Court went on to

address the proper methods for enforcing forum-selection

clauses. The Court found that such clauses may be

properly enforced by a transfer to another federal

district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and the

defendants in this case have moved for a transfer to the

Southern District of Indiana based on that provision. 

Section 1404(a) provides that, “For the convenience of

parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a

district court may transfer any civil action to any other

district or division where it might have been brought or

to any district or division to which all parties have

consented.” In Atlantic Marine, the Court indicated a

strong preference for such transfer when there is a valid

forum-selection clause. 134 S.Ct. at 581.

However, the forum-selection clause in this case does

not provide a basis for transfer to Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division, or to any other federal

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district court. The forum-selection clause calls for

“the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Hamilton

County, Indiana.” See Affidavit of Christy Wilson (Doc.

No. 6-1) at 16. In interpreting a similar clause, the

Eleventh Circuit found that, because it did not specify

the state courts of a particular county, a suit in either

the state or federal courts located in that county would

satisfy the clause. Global Satellite Commc'n Co. v.

Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004)

(“a suit either in the Seventeenth Judicial District of

Florida, or in the Fort Lauderdale Division of the

Southern District of Florida, both of which are located

in Broward County, would satisfy the venue requirement”). 

Hamilton County does fall within jurisdiction of the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. See

http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/content/indianapolis. But

the federal court itself is located in Indianapolis,

which is in Marion County. Id.; http://www.indy.gov/. 

The Eleventh Circuit has held in an unpublished opinion

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that suit in a district court which has jurisdiction

over, but is not itself located in, the county specified

in a forum-selection clause does not comply with the

clause:

“Under our clearly applicable reasoning

in Global Satellite, because the only

court situated in Suwannee County,

Florida is the Circuit Court for the

Third Judicial Circuit, the ... forum

selection clause did in fact designate

that court as the particular forum in

which the parties must bring suit. By

the same token, removal of the action to

the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville

Division, located outside of Suwannee

County, Florida, would not satisfy the

venue requirement.”

Cornett v. Carrithers, 465 F. App’x 841, 843 (11th Cir.

2012); see also Millennium Med. Mgmt., LLC v. Ling Li,

2012 WL 1940112 at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (Presnell, J.)

(following Cornett).

The court finds the reasoning of Cornett persuasive

and will follow it.6

 Because there is no federal court

6. The wording of the clauses in these cases varies

somewhat. In Global Satellite, the contract required

(continued...)

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located in Hamilton County, a transfer to the Southern

District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division (or any other

federal court) would not comply with the forum-selection

clause in this case. Therefore, the defendants’ motions

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) will also be denied.

iii. Motion to Dismiss - Forum Non Conveniens

Thus, it is clear that the forum-selection clause

designates a state court located in Hamilton County,

Indiana. The Supreme Court, in Atlantic Marine,

addressed this situation as well: “the appropriate way to

enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state ...

forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.” 

134 S.Ct. at 580. The Court noted that “Section 1404(a)

6(...continued)

venue to be “‘in Broward County.’” 378 F.3d at 1272. In

Cornett, the contract provided that “‘the venue shall be

Suwannee County.’” 465 F. App’x at 843. In this case,

the clause calls for venue in the “courts of Hamilton

County, Indiana.” See Affidavit of Christy Wilson (Doc.

No. 6-1) at 16. This court does not discern any

significance from the difference in wording that might

undermine the applicability of Cornett.

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is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non

conveniens for the subset of cases in which the

transferee forum is within the federal court system” and

indicated that, for cases to which § 1404(a) does not

apply, “the residual doctrine of forum non conveniens has

continuing application in federal courts.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In this case, Washington National has moved for

dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 

“To obtain dismissal for forum non conveniens, ‘[t]he

moving party must demonstrate that (1) an adequate

alternative forum is available, (2) the public and

private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the

plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum

without undue inconvenience or prejudice.’” GDG

Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1028

(11th Cir. 2014)(quoting Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251

F.3d 1305, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2001)).

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As the Eleventh Circuit recently observed, Atlantic

Marine made it clear that “an enforceable forum-selection

clause carries near-determinative weight in this

analysis.” GDG Acquisitions, 749 F.3d at 1028. While

Atlantic Marine’s discussion focused principally on

motions to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the

Supreme Court noted that the analysis would be the same

for a motion to dismiss under forum non conveniens. 134

S.Ct. at 580 (“courts should evaluate a forum-selection

clause pointing to a nonfederal forum in the same way

that they evaluate a forum-selection clause pointing to

a federal forum”). Thus, the Supreme Court’s

observations in Atlantic Marine regarding motions to

transfer apply with equal force to the forum non

conveniens analysis.

In discussing motions to transfer, the Supreme Court

stated that, “When the parties have agreed to a valid

forum-selection clause, a district court should

ordinarily transfer the case to the forum specified in

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that clause.” 134 S.Ct. at 581. “Only under

extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience

of the parties should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.” 

Id.; see also id. (“‘a valid forum-selection clause

[should be] given controlling weight in all but the most

exceptional cases’”) (quoting Stewart Organization, Inc.

v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (alteration in original)). In particular,

where the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection

clause, courts are instructed to give no weight to the

plaintiff’s choice of forum and to ignore the parties’

private interests. Id. at 581-2. Furthermore, “the

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that transfer

to the forum for which the parties bargained is

unwarranted.” Id. at 581.

Applying these lessons to a motion under the doctrine

of forum non conveniens, the Eleventh Circuit found that

“A binding forum-selection clause requires the court to

find that the forum non conveniens private factors

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entirely favor the selected forum.” GDG Acquisitions,

749 F.3d at 1029. Therefore, if the court finds that a

forum-selection clause applies to the claims at issue (as

this court already has done in this case), “the district

court must find that the forum non conveniens private

factors unequivocally support the selected forum.” Id. 

“The forum non conveniens analysis should then proceed,

with the understanding that ‘[i]n all but the most

unusual cases ... the interest of justice is served by

holding parties to their bargain.’” Id. (quoting

Atlantic Marine, 134 S.Ct. at 583) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

However, these considerations principally bear on the

second prong of the Eleventh Circuit’s forum non

conveniens analysis: “(2) the public and private factors

weigh in favor of dismissal.” GDG Acquisitions, 749 F.3d

at 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted). In GDG

Acquisitions, the Eleventh Circuit was clear that, after

the court finds that the private factors support the

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agreed-upon forum, the “analysis should then proceed” to

the rest of the forum non conveniens test. Id. at 1029. 

But, in this case, Washington National has offered no

argument or evidence regarding the first and third prongs

of the forum non conveniens analysis: “(1) an adequate

alternative forum is available ... and (3) the plaintiff

can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum without

undue ... prejudice.” Id. at 1028. Indeed, far from

establishing that the Hamilton County, Indiana, state

courts offer an adequate alternative and that Espie can,

in fact, reinstate his case there, the defendants in this

case have not even mentioned those courts (indicating

instead a preference for the Indiana federal district

court).

Ordinarily, while the “burden of demonstrating that

an appropriate alternative forum exists is not a heavy

one,” it does lie squarely “with the party seeking

dismissal.” Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food

Co., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2001)

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(Gold, J.). But, as noted above, in Atlantic Marine the

Court specified that, when the parties have entered into

a valid forum-selection clause, “the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for

which the parties bargained is unwarranted.” 134 S.Ct.

at 581. In so doing, it specifically rejected the

district court’s finding in that case that the defendant

bore the burden of showing that transfer would be

appropriate. Id. at 583. Applying this to the forum non

conveniens context, this court holds that, because the

existence of a valid forum-selection clause governing

these claims has been established, the burden now shifts

to Espie to establish that dismissal is not warranted. 

Washington National raised the issue of forum non

conveniens for the first time in a footnote in its reply

brief. Espie, therefore, has not yet had an opportunity

to respond. As such, the court will treat the reply

brief as a separate motion to dismiss, will allow Caine

& Weiner an opportunity to join in the motion, and will

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allow Espie an opportunity to respond. However, Espie

bears the burden of establishing that, given the

applicability of the forum-selection clause, dismissal is

not warranted.

***

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Defendant Caine & Weiner, LLC’s motion to dismiss

or transfer venue (Doc. No. 22) is denied.

(2) Defendant Washington National Insurance Company’s

motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) or

to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Doc. No. 20)

is denied.

(3) Defendant Washington National’s reply brief (Doc.

No. 26) is treated as a separate motion to dismiss based

on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

(4) Defendant Washington National’s motion to dismiss

based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens (Doc. No.

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26) is set for submission, without oral argument, on July

31, 2014.

(5) Defendant Caine & Weiner shall have until July 3,

2014, to join in defendant Washington National’s motion

to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens

(Doc. No. 26) if it desires to do so.

(6) Plaintiff Daniel Espie shall have until July 17,

2014, to file a response.

(7) The defendants shall have until July 31, 2014, to

file a reply.

DONE, this the 27th day of June, 2014.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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