Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00070/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM L. COSBY, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CA 16-00070-KD-C

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., :

Respondents. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a self-styled petition 

for writ for order to show cause in this Court on February 22, 2016, putatively invoking 

this Court’s jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 1652. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees has 

been referred to the undersigned for appropriate relief in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(A) and General Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R) & (S). In reviewing the motion (Doc. 2), 

the Court is required to screen Crosby’s action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. As a result 

of the undersigned’s review of petitioner’s complaint, it is recommended that this action 

be dismissed, prior to service of process, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A, and, alternatively, as frivolous.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Crosby is no stranger to this Court, having previously filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, attacking his 2003 murder conviction and 

resulting 35-year sentence, see Crosby v. Cooke, CA 04-0023-KD-B, and several actions in 

accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see, e.g., Crosby v. State of Alabama, CA 03-0042-CG-L. In 

the instant self-styled petition for writ for order to show cause, Crosby explicitly eschews 

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§ 1983 (see Doc. 1, at 4 (“This is not a § 1983 or 1985[.]”)) and makes no mention of 28 

U.S.C. § 22541 (see id. at 1-7). Instead, Crosby contends that this Court may exercise 

federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

1343(a)(3); and, finally, jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 1652. (Id. at 

3.) 

Crosby’s “factual allegations” establish that, on or about December 21, 2015, he 

filed a petition in the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, putatively in accordance with 

Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to enjoin the Circuit Court of 

Mobile County and the Attorney General of the State of Alabama in some respect with 

respect to his underlying murder conviction. (See id. at 3 & 4.) According to Crosby, 

instead of “keeping” his Rule 57 briefs and ruling on same, the Clerk of the Alabama 

Court of Civil Appeals improperly transferred his case to the Alabama Supreme Court—

on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction (compare id. at 4 with Doc. 1, 

Appendix 1)—and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Alabama then, two days later, 

exceeded its authority/jurisdiction in striking his petition for injunctive relief as 

prematurely filed (compare Doc. 1, at 5 with Doc. 1, Appendix B, December 23, 2015 

ORDER).2 Crosby’s extremely confused and confusing “factual allegations” otherwise 

read, in relevant part, as follows:

 1 Though Crosby nowhere mentions 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the undersigned certainly 

understands why the Clerk’s Office would docket his complaint as one pursuant to § 2254 given 

that he titles his pleading “Petition for Writ for Order [to] Show Cause” (see Doc. 1, at 1) and 

makes mention of the case number attached to his murder conviction out of the Circuit Court of 

Mobile County, Alabama (id., at 2 (citation to CC-02-736.60)). 

2 The Clerk of the Alabama Supreme Court explained to Crosby, in no small detail, 

the reasons for her actions, in a letter dated December 23, 2015. (Doc. 1, Appendix B, December 

23, 2015 Letter to Crosby.) 

(Continued)

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(4) Just to ask the “State” civil appellate court for “Show Cause 

Order” of exercise of authority-of subject matter of Clerk[]s of State of 

Alabama courts of their actions. And Attorney General of State of Alabama 

legal question of Crosby rights of the declaratory, in regards of magnitude 

and nature of the State of Alabama’s exercise of authority and Crosby 

rights—to access the courts! This is not a § 1983 or 1985—yet claims not 

barred by Teague vs Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

(5) Because the State of Alabama place certain kinds of primary, 

private conduct beyond the power of the criminal law—making authority 

upon Crosby to proscribe as punishments, where federal laws were clearly 

established, where jurisdiction is power to declare the “law,” and the 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 57 was for that to see! See: Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 

506, 514 (1868). With respect to mere formalities does not relieve the State 

of Alabama of jurisdictional requirements!

(6) The declaratory judgment is not for an unspecified nature, it 

challenges Crosby rights as to the State of Alabama’s subject matter—based 

on the allegations to decide the claims against the State of Alabama, 

founded upon the federal constitution, acts of Congress, within the Civil 

Rule 57.

(7) Crosby has a substantial liberty in this cause, which provides for 

the right to demand a change in government policies, and to petition the 

 

We are in receipt of your request for “Injunctive Relief and Declaratory 

Judgment” originally filed in the Court of Civil Appeals on December 21, 2015. 

This is a Court of limited jurisdiction and in order to obtain jurisdiction, you must 

provide this Court with a final order to address. In criminal matters, you must 

first appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A review of your available case history indicates you filed a Rule 32 

Petition in case CC-02-736.60 which was appealed to the Court of Criminal 

Appeals in case CR-08-1441. The Court of Criminal Appeals issued a final 

certificate of judgment in CR-08-1441 on September 25, 2009. Therefore, any 

attempt to appeal that judgment is time barred.

Your available case history also indicates you filed a second Rule 32 

Petition in case CC-02-736.61 which is still pending in the Mobile Circuit Court. 

Until a final ruling is entered on that petition, there is no order to appeal to this 

Court or to the Court of Criminal or Civil Appeals. As such, your filing is being 

stricken as premature and returned to you.

No further action can be taken at this time.

(Id.)

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government for a redress of grievances, in which is in Crosby Fed.Civ.R.P. 

57 is to find out determination that involves apply the substantive federal 

law and federal constitution to the federal substantive facts. But without 

Rule 12(b)(1) by the State of Alabama Civil Judge[]s, the “Clerks” of both 

Appeal-Civil and Supreme Courts[-]exceeded their jurisdiction: even if 

aware of the existence of Crosby postconviction filed in Circuit Court of 

Mobile. A supervisor court must act civil or criminal. . . .

(8) The procedural Civil Rule 57 declaratory judgment was 

intended to reach the facts of the particular case, filed in Circuit Court, 

postconviction. Where Crosby clearly has an interest on basis of 

fundamental miscarriage of justice, even if there is another adequate 

remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief, in which 

would terminate the controversy of Crosby rights, privilege of status in 

which such legal interest depend. 

(9) The record by the Clerks is devoid of any final judgment in 

which Crosby can appeal, or file a writ of certiorari. Clerks took matters 

into their own hands without facial subject matter jurisdiction. Violated 

Crosby of enumerated rights[,] see 9th Amend, U.S.C.[,] 1st Amend 

U.S.C.[,] Art IV § 2 U.S.C.[,] 14th Amend U.S.C.[,] due process of law of 

procedures, under color of law without authority.

(10) If “Nisi” was issued that would also have to be issued by a 

Judge of a Court which has jurisdiction, that subject matter jurisdiction, 

would have to be signed off by a judge! . . .

(Id. at 4-6.) Based on the foregoing “factual allegations,” Crosby requests that this Court 

issue a “Show Cause Order” to Alabama’s Attorney General and, more importantly, the 

Clerks of the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, who 

“devised [a] policy that cause[d] Crosby a federal constitutional violation[] to access the 

state court—civil—for declaratory judgment under Fed.Civ.R.Pro.57.” (Id. at 7; see also id. 

(citing to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs).) 

DISCUSSION

A. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a federal court is required to conduct an initial 

screening of a prisoner complaint against a governmental entity, employee, or officer to 

determine whether the action: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon 

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which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). A claim is frivolous when it 

“’lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 

(11th Cir. 2008), quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-1832, 

104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); see also Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding 

an action frivolous when the district court concludes that it has “little or no chance of 

success,” because, based on the face of the complaint, the legal theories are “indisputably 

meritless,” or the factual allegations are “clearly baseless,”—that is, the complaint “lacks 

an arguable basis either in law or in fact”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 893, 114 S.Ct. 254, 126 

L.Ed.2d 206 (1993) ; see Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.) (a case is frivolous 

when it appears the plaintiff has little or no chance of success), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044, 

122 S.Ct. 624, 151 L.Ed.2d 545 (2001); Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 

F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A lawsuit is frivolous if the ‘plaintiff's realistic chances of 

ultimate success are slight.’”) (quotation omitted)). A complaint fails to state a claim 

when it does not include enough factual matter—taken as true—to “’give the defendant 

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), quoting 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). To avoid dismissal for 

failure to state a claim, the allegations must show plausibility. Id. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged. . . . [This standard] asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 

868 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

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the speculative level” and must be a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to 

‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 

1965, 1966 (second brackets in original). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In determining whether a claim is stated, the factual allegations are 

accepted as true, except for conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of action’s 

elements. Id.; Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).

When considering a pro se litigant’s allegations, the court holds them to a more 

lenient standard than those of an attorney, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 

1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but it does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient 

pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Investments v. County of 

Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. 

Scott, 610 F.3d 791, 710 (11th Cir. 2010) (relying on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662 (2009)).

Furthermore, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court including 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863, 110 S.Ct. 180, 107 L.Ed.2d 135 (1989).

B. Denial of Access to the Courts. Despite Crosby’s insistence that this action 

is not a § 1983 action (Doc. 1, at 4 (“This is not a § 1983[.]”)), his position is belied by the 

characterization of his claim as a denial of access to the state courts of Alabama (id. at 7 

(alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when the clerks of court denied him 

access to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals for a decision regarding his request for 

declaratory judgment under Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)), a 

decidedly § 1983 claim, compare Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 817 & 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 

1493 & 1494, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) (Supreme Court’s recognition in suit filed by prisoners 

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that “[i]t is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a 

constitutional right of access to the courts.”) with Wells v. Attorney General, State of Florida, 

470 Fed.Appx. 754, 755 (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2012)3 (“A prisoner convicted and sentenced 

under state law may seek federal relief in two primary ways: (1) a petition for habeas 

corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,4 or (2) a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hutcherson v. Riley, 

468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006).” (footnote added)).5 Thus, the undersigned considers 

plaintiff’s denial of access to courts claim as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

 3 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be 

cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir.R. 36-2.

4 Crosby makes no mention of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in his complaint (see Doc. 1, at 1-7), 

and while the undersigned again understands why the Clerk’s Office docketed the complaint as 

a habeas petition (particularly given the manner in which Crosby titled the pleading), it is now 

clear to the undersigned that this action is not one pursuant to § 2254. This is not solely because 

of Crosby’s recognition in his complaint that presently pending in the Circuit Court of Mobile 

County, Alabama is his “second” Rule 32 petition (compare Doc. 1, at 5-6 with Doc. 1, Appendix B, 

December 23, 2015 Letter (“[Y]ou filed a second Rule 32 Petition in case CC-02-736.61 which is 

still pending in the Mobile Circuit Court.”)) but, as well, because Crosby undoubtedly recognizes 

that since he has previously filed a habeas corpus petition in this Court attacking his murder 

conviction and sentence, see Crosby v. Cooke, supra, “‘[b]efore a second or successive application 

[for a writ of habeas corpus] is filed in the district court, [he must] move in the appropriate court 

of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.’” Guenther v. 

Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 

1085, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L.Ed.2d 683 (2000). In other words, “the petitioner first must obtain an 

order from the court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider” a second or successive 

petition because “[w]ithout authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider [such] 

second or successive petition.” United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted); see also Tompkins v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 557 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir.) 

(“Section 2244(b)(3)(A) requires a district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction a second or 

successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has obtained an order 

authorizing the district court to consider it.”), cert. denied sub nom. Tompkins v. McNeil, 555 U.S. 

1161, 129 S.Ct. 1305, 173 L.Ed.2d 483 (2009). Here, of course, petitioner has not applied to the 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for permission to file a second federal habeas petition because

he recognizes that he must first await a ruling on his second Rule 32 petition pending before the 

Mobile County Circuit Court, and then exhaust his Rule 32 claims in the state courts of Alabama, 

before repairing to the federal courts for habeas relief in accordance with § 2254; thus, the 

present pleading has not been filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

5 To the extent Crosby would continue to insist that his claim is not one which falls 

within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the undersigned would simply recommend that this 

(Continued)

Case 1:16-cv-00070-KD-C Document 3 Filed 04/29/16 Page 7 of 12
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Court find it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider whatever claim Crosby purports to 

raise, given that it is clear that his complaint has not been filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. 

“[F]ederal courts are duty bound to consider their subject matter jurisdiction sua 

sponte[,]” Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019, 1035 n.38 (11th Cir. 2006), and must sua sponte 

dismiss a complaint upon determining that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, see Jackson v. 

Farmers Ins. Group/Fire Ins. Exchange, 391 Fed.Appx. 854, 856 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2010). 

“In a given case, a federal district court must have at least one of three types of 

subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) 

federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” 

Cotton v. Burgess, 188 Fed.Appx. 964, 965 (11th Cir. Jul. 12, 2006), quoting Baltin v. Alaron Trading 

Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).

In this case, Crosby insists that this Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 & 1652. (See Doc. 1, at 

3.) However, § 1652 has no import with respect to this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see id. 

(“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or 

Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 

actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”), and the All Writs Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 1651(a) “does not create any substantive federal jurisdiction; ‘rather, it empowers a 

federal court—in a case in which it is already exercising subject matter jurisdiction—to enter 

such orders as are necessary to aid it in the exercise of such jurisdiction.’” Morales v. Florida Dept. 

of Corrections, 346 Fed.Appx. 539, 540 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2009) (quoting In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080, 

1083 (11th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied sub nom. Morales v. McNeil, 562 U.S. 866, 131 S.Ct. 156, 178 

L.Ed.2d 94 (2010). Accordingly, this Court must look to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) to see if 

it can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Supreme Court, of course, long ago recognized that § 1343(a)(3) (“The district courts 

shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any 

person . . . [t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of 

the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all 

persons within the jurisdiction of the United States[.]”) “is the jurisdictional counterpart of” § 

1983. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 615, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1915, 60 

L.Ed.2d 508 (1979). Thus, given Crosby’s apparent insistence that this is not a § 1983 action, § 

1343(a)(3) would provide no jurisdictional basis for this action. Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

specifically provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. However, “’[i]f 

jurisdiction is based on the existence of a federal question, the jurisdictional allegation should 

state that the action arises under a particular statute or provision of the Constitution and the 

body of the complaint must state facts showing that the case does in fact arise under federal 

law.’” Hines v. Reed, 170 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1203 (S.D. Ala. 2001), quoting Kirkland Masonry, Inc. v. 

Commissioner Internal Revenue, 614 F.2d 532, 533 (5th Cir. 1980) (other citations omitted). Here, 

Crosby’s jurisdictional allegation does not identify the particular statute or provision of the 

Constitution under which his case arises (see Doc. 1, at 3) and, therefore, any continued insistence 

(Continued)

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“In order to state a claim that his right of access to the courts was violated, a 

plaintiff must first state an actual injury.” Bryant v. Ruvin, 477 Fed.Appx. 605, 606-607 

(11th Cir. May 18, 2012), citing Cunningham v. District Attorney’s Office for Escambia 

County, 592 F.3d 1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010).

To state an actual injury, the plaintiff must allege that he had a cause of 

action that he could not vindicate because of the defendants’ actions, and 

he must describe that underlying cause of action in his complaint. The 

allegations about the underlying cause of action must be specific enough 

to give fair notice to the defendants and must be described well enough to 

apply the nonfrivolous test and to show that the arguable nature of the 

underlying claim is more than hope.

Bryant, supra, 477 Fed.Appx. at 607 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The alleged underlying cause of action for Crosby’s access to the courts claim is 

not his second Rule 32 petition challenging the validity of his 2003 murder conviction, 

inasmuch as—by his own admission—that action remains pending in the Circuit Court 

of Mobile County, Alabama (Doc. 1, at 5-7)

6

; instead, the underlying cause of action is 

 

by Crosby that this is not a § 1983 action would foreclose subject matter jurisdiction in this Court, 

compare Wells, supra, 470 Fed.Appx. at 755 (recognizing that one of the primary ways a prisoner 

convicted and sentenced under state law may seek relief is by filing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983) with Hines, supra, 170 F.Supp.2d at 1204 (recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a 

basis for a federal district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction and that “[i]n order to state 

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: ‘(1) . . . the conduct complained of was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) . . . this conduct deprived a person 

of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’” 

(citation omitted)) and Cooks v. Cox, 2008 WL 5245774, *4 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2008) (“This Court 

derives its authority to decide Plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 federal claims from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 

which provides that district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions ‘arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’” (citation omitted)). 

6 This fact alone refutes Crosby’s suggestion that the Clerks of the Alabama Court 

of Civil Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court have violated his right of access to the courts. 

Moreover, this Court would simply note that it is not in the business of telling state courts what 

their internal rules and procedures mean and how they should be applied particularly where, as 

here, the Clerk of the Alabama Supreme Court explained to Crosby in plain language that 

Alabama’s high court only acts on the basis of an appeal of an order or judgment entered by a 

lower court and since no such order or judgment existed his pleading was stricken as premature.

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his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 petition for “Injunctive Relief and Declaratory 

Judgment” initially filed in the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals on December 21, 2015 

(compare Doc. 1, at 3-7 with Doc. 1, Appendix B, December 23, 2015 Letter). As was the 

case in Bryant, supra, here Crosby’s complaint and the exhibits attached thereto do not 

explain the basis for this Fed.R.Civ.P. 57 petition “in a way that gives fair notice to the 

defendants in this case or that allows” this Court “to determine whether that claim was 

frivolous.” 477 Fed.Appx. at 607. That Crosby has shown no actual injury is clear 

because none of the defendants took any action which forecloses Crosby’s ability to file 

a request for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment at the appropriate time, cf. Hall 

v. Secretary for the Dep’t of Corrections, 304 Fed.Appx. 848, 850 (11th Cir. Dec. 24, 2008) 

(“In order to show actual injury, a plaintiff must show ‘deterrence, such as denial or 

dismissal of a direct appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights case that results from actions 

of [] officials.’” (emphasis supplied; citation omitted)), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1261, 129 

S.Ct. 2440, 174 L.Ed.2d 233 (2009); instead, the Clerk of the Alabama Supreme Court 

merely struck Crosby’s pleading as prematurely filed.7 Crosby’s inability to show an 

actual injury means that this Court must dismiss his complaint, in accordance with § 

 7 Moreover, the undersigned would even dare to go further and opine that the 

arguable nature of the underlying claim is nothing more than hope given that “the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure do not create independently enforceable rights upon which [a plaintiff] may 

sue.” State Police for Automatic Retirement Ass’n v. Difava, 164 F.Supp.2d 141, 156 (D. Mass. 2001), 

judgment aff’d, 317 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Wells Fargo v. Cyrus, 2010 WL 3294320, *5 (N.D. 

Ga. Jul. 15, 2012) (collecting cases and determining that “[a]s a rule of federal procedure, 

FED.R.CIV.P. 60 does not provide any substantive rights. It is merely a procedural rule, so 

Plaintiff’s lawsuit could not arise under Rule 60.”), report & recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 

3294314 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2010). 

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1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim for violation of his right to access to the courts. 

See id.8

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss this 

action, prior to service, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

and, alternatively, as frivolous in accordance with this same statutory subsection. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D.ALA. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, 

“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based 

 8 Alternatively, the undersigned would note that Crosby’s sole request that this 

Court enter a show cause order to the defendants respecting the “policy that cause Crosby a 

federal constitutional violation, to access the state court-civil-for declaratory judgment under 

Fed.Civ.R.Pro.57[]” (Doc. 1, at 7) amounts to a request that this Court issue a writ of mandamus 

directing the defendants—and, by extension, Alabama’s appellate courts—to immediately 

entertain his petition for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment. See Schmidt v. Florida First

District Court of Appeal, 2014 WL 7428856, * 4 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2014), aff’d, 2016 WL 360748 (11th 

Cir. Jan. 29, 2016). And because this Court lacks jurisdiction to compel action from the Clerks of 

the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, as Crosby requests, see 

Lawrence v. Miami-Dade County State Attorney Office, 272 Fed.Appx. 781, 781 (11th Cir. Apr. 2, 

2008) (“Because the only relief Lawrence sought was a writ of mandamus compelling action 

from state officials, not federal officials, the district court lack jurisdiction to grant relief and did 

not err in dismissing the petition.”), Crosby’s complaint must be dismissed as frivolous, see Bailey 

v. Silberman, 226 Fed.Appx. 922, 924 (11th Cir. Apr. 2, 2007) (finding Bailey’s complaint properly 

dismissed as frivolous where district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested—a 

writ of mandamus directing a state court and its judicial officers in the performance of their 

duties). 

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on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence 

of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if 

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection 

must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not 

specific.

DONE this the 29th day of April, 2016.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00070-KD-C Document 3 Filed 04/29/16 Page 12 of 12