Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00676/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00676-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:0185 Labor: Suits by and against Labor Organizations

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN MAURER,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 

OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 

569, AFL-CIO; and SAN DIEGO 

ELECTRICAL JOINT 

APPRENTICESHIP AND TRAINING 

COMMITTEE,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-00676-GPC-JMA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

[ECF Nos. 21 & 22]

After being terminated from Defendant San Diego Electrical Joint Apprenticeship 

and Training Committee’s (“SDJATC” or “the Committee”) apprenticeship program, pro 

se Plaintiff Martin Maurer, a member of Defendant International Brotherhood of 

Electrical Workers Local 569, AFL-CIO (“IBEW”), brought this case against both 

organizations for breach of contract under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 

(“LMRA”) and for infringement of rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and 

Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). Before the Court are Defendants SDJATC’s and 

IBEW’s motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”). ECF Nos. 21 & 

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22. Both motions to dismiss have been fully briefed. On September 29, 2016, Plaintiff 

filed a response to SDJATC’s motion to dismiss and a response to IBEW’s motion to 

dismiss. ECF Nos. 25 & 26. On October 14, 2016, Defendants SDJATC and IBEW filed 

replies. ECF Nos. 27 & 28. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The IBEW Local 569 Inside Agreement is a collective bargaining agreement 

executed between the San Diego National Electrical Contractors Association (“NECA”) 

and the IBEW Local 569. FAC ¶ 35. The SDJATC is “a joint apprentice committee” 

created by NECA and IBEW under their collective bargaining agreement and pursuant to 

Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 3075(a) (governing the establishment of apprenticeship 

programs). Id. ¶ 13. On January 10, 2012, Maurer entered into an apprentice agreement 

with SDJATC. Id. ¶ 93. On March 1, 2012, Defendant IBEW, alleged by Plaintiff to be 

a labor organization within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)1, id. ¶ 9, admitted Maurer 

as a member of the organization, id. ¶ 94. 

On February 18, 2015, Plaintiff was dispatched to work as an electrician for Five 

Star Electric. Id. ¶ 97. On February 27, 2015, Five Star Electric fired Plaintiff by 

handing him a “Termination Notice.” Id. ¶ 98. No reason was given for the termination. 

Id. On or about March 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the IBEW office, 

challenging the lack of reasons for his termination. Id. ¶ 99. On March 30, 2015, 

Plaintiff received a letter from SDJATC stating that Plaintiff was “to show-cause” why 

SDJATC should not recommend to the Administrator of Apprenticeship (the 

“Administrator”) that Plaintiff’s apprenticeship agreement be canceled in light of his 

termination from Five Star Electric. Id. ¶ 101. Plaintiff received this letter one day prior 

to a hearing on the matter, which was held before the Committee on March 31, 2015. Id. 

On April 6, 2015, Plaintiff received a letter from SDJATC stating that it had made 

 

1 Defendant IBEW does not contest that it is a “labor organization” within the meaning of the statute. 

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a decision to apply to the Administrator to cancel Maurer’s apprenticeship agreement 

effective March 31, 2015. Id. ¶ 117. Sometime between March 31, 2015 and May 14, 

2015, IBEW changed Plaintiff’s union classification from “Apprentice Wireman” to 

“Unclassified.” Id. ¶ 121. On May 1, 2015, Maurer appealed the SDJATC’s March 31, 

2015 decision to the Administrator. Id. ¶ 126. On January 29, 2016, the Administrator 

decided that SDJATC had failed to demonstrate a good and sufficient reason for 

canceling Plaintiff’s apprenticeship agreement and reinstated Plaintiff to the 

apprenticeship program. Id. ¶¶ 130-35. Plaintiff resumed work on or about February 8, 

2016, when he began to work for K&F Electric, Inc. Id. ¶ 137.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants SDJATC and 

IBEW alleging the same six causes of action against each Defendant. ECF No. 1. 

Plaintiff brought the first, second, and third causes of action under Section 301 of the 

LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action under Section 

101(a)(5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). Id. ¶¶ 1-2. Both Defendants moved to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 

12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 4 & 7. On August 4, 2016, the Court granted Defendants’ motions 

to dismiss, in their entirety, without prejudice and with leave to amend. ECF No. 19. 

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the plaintiff must set forth in 

the complaint a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and giving “the defendant fair notice of what the 

. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint 

lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

In considering whether dismissal is suitable, the Court will take all well-pleaded 

factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

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al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court will also consider 

whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a 

motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from 

that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). 

In the event that the Court does grant a motion to dismiss, Rule 15 provides that 

leave to amend should be freely granted when justice so requires. Accordingly, when a 

court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, “leave to amend should be granted 

unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight 

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). Amendment, 

therefore, may be denied if it would be futile. See id.

DISCUSSION

A. First Amended Complaint

In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts five causes of action against both Defendant SDJATC 

and Defendant IBEW.2 Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges a violation of Section 301 

of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, for breach of contract. The second through fifth causes

/ / / / 

/ / / /

 

2 Although it is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint which causes of action he is asserting against which 

Defendant, Defendants’ motions to dismiss seek to dismiss all five causes of action. Accordingly, the 

Court addresses each cause of action as to each Defendant. 

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of action allege infringement of rights, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 4123, of Sections 

§ 411(a)(5)4, safeguards against improper disciplinary action, and 29 U.S.C. § 411(b)5, 

invalidity of Constitution and bylaws, of the LMRDA. 

In the first cause of action, Maurer alleges that Defendants breached the National 

Guidelines for Apprenticeship Standards (“National Guidelines”), or as Plaintiff refers to 

them, the “National Standards,” by accepting an apprentice evaluation form that did not 

contain a signature from a supervising journeyman. FAC ¶ 145. In the second, he 

alleges that Defendants infringed upon his rights under § 411(a)(5)(A) because SDJATC 

ordered Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be expelled from the apprenticeship 

program without first being served with specific written charges. Id. ¶ 149. In the third, 

he contends that Defendants infringed upon his rights under § 411(a)(5)(B) because 

SDJATC ordered Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be expelled with only one 

day written notice (i.e., not a reasonable time to prepare a defense). In the fourth, he 

avers that Defendants infringed upon his rights under § 411(a)(5)(C) because SDJATC 

expelled Plaintiff from the apprenticeship program without a full and fair hearing. Id. 

¶ 157. Finally, in the fifth cause of action, Maurer asserts that Section 3(b) of Article XII 

of IBEW’s bylaws, requiring the IBEW to accept SDJATC’s decision to expel an 

apprentice from the program, should be declared as having no “force or effect,” pursuant 

 

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“Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any 

violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief 

(including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be 

brought in the district court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or 

where the principal office of such labor organization is located.” 29 U.S.C. § 412. 

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“No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined 

except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has 

been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) 

afforded a full and fair hearing.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). The second through fourth causes of action 

allege violations of subsections (A) through (C), respectively. 

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“Any provision of the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization which is inconsistent with the 

provisions of this section shall be of no force or effect.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(b). 

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to 29 U.S.C. § 411(b), because the SDJATC has “not set forth a method” for enforcing 

safeguards against improper disciplinary action under § 411(a)(5). Id. ¶¶ 160-61. 

B. SDJATC’s Motion to Dismiss 

Defendant SDJATC’s primary argument is that the Court should dismiss all of 

Plaintiff’s causes of action because SDJATC is not a “labor organization” within the 

meaning of either the LMRA or LMRDA and, thus, cannot be the subject of suit under 

either statute. ECF No. 21-1 at 14. More precisely, SDJATC argues that Plaintiff has 

failed to adequately plead that SDJATC is a “labor organization” because Maurer does 

not set forth any facts in support of the conclusion. See ECF No. 21-1 at 11, 15. 

Defendant SDJATC’s alternative arguments are as follows. In the event that the 

Court finds that the SDJATC is a “labor organization” within the meaning of the LMRA, 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has, nonetheless, failed to state a cause of action under the 

LMRA because: 1) Plaintiff alleges no damages in connection with his claim; 2) 

Plaintiff’s claims are moot because Maurer already prevailed on an administrative 

challenge of the termination of his apprenticeship; 3) SDJATC never incorporated the 

“National Standards”; and 4) Plaintiff has not stated a valid breach of contract claim even 

if, for the sake of argument, the SDJATC did incorporate the “National Standards.” See 

ECF No. 21-1 at 10-14. Similarly, in the event that the Court rejects Defendant’s 

argument that the SDJATC is not a “labor organization” under the LMRDA, SDJATC 

alternatively argues that Plaintiff’s claims must fail because Maurer did not 1) allege any 

damages in connection with his claims and because 2) his claims are moot in light of his 

successful administrative challenge. See ECF No. 21-1 at 14-17. Plaintiff also asks the 

Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages under the LMRDA. ECF No. 21-

1 at 6. 

Because the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to allege a 

“violation of contract” under the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), the Court will not address 

SDJATC’s argument that it is not a “labor organization” within the meaning of the 

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LMRA or any of its other arguments. The Court will, however, address all of SDJATC’s 

arguments against liability under the LMRDA in turn.

1. Plaintiff’s LMRA claim

The LMRA confers jurisdiction on district courts to hear disputes arising from 

“violation of contracts” between “an employer and a labor organization representing 

employees in an industry affecting commerce” or between “any such labor 

organizations.” 29 U.S.C.A § 185(a). Accordingly, jurisdiction under the LMRA is 

proper when the suit is for a “violation of contract” and when the suit involves a “labor 

organization” within the meaning of the statute. See Trs. of Operating Eng’rs Pension 

Trust v. Tab Contractors, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (D. Nev. 2002). 

The Supreme Court has made clear that the statute “contemplates suits by and against 

individual employees as well as between unions and employers” and includes suits to 

“vindicate ‘uniquely personal’ rights of employees such as wages, hours, overtime pay, 

and wrongful discharge.” Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 

(1976). 

a. Violation of Contract

Plaintiff’s LMRA claim arises from SDJATC’s alleged violation of the National 

Guidelines for Apprenticeship Standards for Electrical Joint Apprenticeship and Training 

Committees, or National Guidelines, which, Plaintiff argues, is a contract between 

Plaintiff and SDJATC. FAC ¶ 144. Plaintiff contends that SDJATC must follow the 

National Guidelines because the NECA-IBEW collective bargaining agreement mandates 

that local apprenticeship standards be “in conformance with” the National Guidelines. 

ECF No. 26-1 at 14. What Plaintiff’s argument fails to appreciate, however, is that the 

SDJATC cannot be held liable for violations of the National Guidelines unless those 

guidelines are a contract and unless SDJATC is a party to that contract. It is not enough, 

for example, to cite to a line in the collective bargaining agreement between NECA and 

IBEW as evidence that a binding contract exists between SDJATC, a separate legal 

organization, and Plaintiff. 

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As Defendant SDJATC points out, Plaintiff has not alleged that the Committee

adopted the National Guidelines. Maurer alleges that the International President of the 

IBEW, the CEO of NECA, and the Executive Director of the National Joint 

Apprenticeship and Training Committee, all adopted the National Guidelines; but none of 

those allegations are relevant to the question of whether SDJATC adopted the National 

Guidelines. See FAC ¶¶ 40-42. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to 

demonstrate that SDJATC is a party to the National Guidelines or that it adopted them. 

What is more, even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that SDJATC adopted the 

National Guidelines, that fact would not matter because the National Guidelines are not a 

contract. The foreword of the National Guidelines states that its purpose is:

to provide policy and guidance to local JATCs in properly developing 

Apprenticeship Standards for Industry approval and subsequent Registration 

Agency acceptance . . . Local Apprenticeship Standards developed from the 

NJATC’s [National Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee for the 

Electrical Industry] Guidelines for Apprenticeship Standards, must be properly 

registered, as per Industry policy, by each JATC that undertakes to carry out an 

apprentice training program. Local Apprenticeship Standards represent the 

JATC’s written plan delineating the terms and conditions for the recruitment, 

selection, employment, training, and supervision of apprentices as subscribed to by 

the JATC. Apprentice Standards must meet the requirements of the local 

Registration Agency. 

Id. ¶ 44 (emphasis added). This language belies the very notion that the National 

Guidelines are a contract. As the forward unequivocally states, the National Guidelines 

are meant to “provide policy and guidance” to local JATCs as they prepare to promulgate 

local standards for apprenticeship programs. Nothing in this foreword, or in any of the 

other sections cited by Plaintiff, indicates that the National Guidelines are a binding 

contract. In fact, the forward itself explains that it is the “local standards” that represent 

the “written plan delineating the terms and conditions . . . subscribed to by the JATC,” 

not the National Guidelines. 

The SDJATC adopted local standards in conformity with the National Guidelines 

on November 19, 2007. Id. ¶ 47. Those standards, in turn, were approved by and 

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registered with the National Apprenticeship and Training Committee and the U.S. 

Department of Labor. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s complaint does it allege that 

the local standards adopted by the SDJATC contain a provision requiring journeymen 

working with an apprentice to discuss evaluation forms and sign them before submittal to 

the SDJATC. See FAC ¶ 144. Moreover, as stated above, the National Guidelines are 

not a binding contract. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim for breach 

of contract under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) because he has failed to plead a “violation of 

contract.” 

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant SDJATC’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Because the National Guidelines are not a binding 

contract, Plaintiff has failed to state a valid cause of action and this failure cannot be 

cured. See DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first cause of action is 

dismissed with prejudice as to both Defendants. 

2. Plaintiff’s LMRDA claims

a. Whether SDJATC is a “labor organization” 

The LMRDA defines a “labor organization” as follows:

‘Labor organization’ means a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting 

commerce and includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee 

representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which 

employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of 

dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, 

hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general 

committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate 

to a national or international labor organization, other than a State or local central 

body.

29 U.S.C. § 402(i). Defendant SDJATC’s contends that Plaintiff’s LMRDA claims 

should be dismissed because Plaintiff offers only “bare conclusions” in support of his 

position that SDJATC is a “labor organization.” ECF No. 21-1 at 5, 15. This contention, 

however, underestimates the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint. In the FAC, Maurer 

offers the SDJATC’s local standards as support for his argument that Defendant is a 

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“labor organization” within the meaning of the LMRDA. See ECF No. 26-1 at 12-13. A 

sampling of the standards reproduced in Plaintiff’s allegations are as follows: 

The SDJATC shall take action and dispose of all apprenticeship matters 

before the action is reported to, or acted upon by, the sponsoring 

organizations. 

The SDJATC shall have full authority and responsibility to review and shall 

seek to resolve all issues and/or disputes pertaining to all apprenticeship 

matters.

The SDJATC has full authority to supervise the enforcement of these 

Standards. Its decision will be final and binding on the employer, the local 

union and the apprentice, unless otherwise noted below. 

For issues regarding wages, hours, working conditions, and other issues 

covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, apprentices may seek 

resolution through the applicable Grievance and Arbitration Articles of the 

collective bargaining agreement after first bringing documented evidence to 

the SDJATC. 

The decision(s) of such joint committee shall be accepted by the Local 

Union. Its decision will be final and binding on the employer, the local 

union and the apprentice . . . 

FAC ¶¶ 65-68 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff has presented factual 

allegations to support his contention that the SDJATC is a “labor organization.” For 

example, because SDJATC has the power to adjudicate disputes about working 

conditions, see id. ¶ 67 (stating that employees must bring grievances about “wages, 

hours, working conditions, and other issues” to the SDJATC prior to bringing such 

grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement) and because its decision is 

binding on the employer, see id. (stating that the SDJATC’s decision “will be final and 

binding on the employer, the local union and the apprentice”), it is plausible that the 

SDJATC exists, at least in part, for the purpose of dealing with employers. 

This conclusion is, moreover, not precluded by any law presented to the Court. As 

the Court noted in its August 4, 2016 Order, “none of the authorities cited by [SD]JATC 

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clearly establish that apprenticeship committees are not labor organizations as a matter of 

law.” See ECF No. 19 at 8. Similarly, here, Defendant has failed to present the court 

with any legal authority demonstrating that joint apprenticeship training committees are 

not “labor organizations” under the LMRDA. Thus, because Maurer has amended his 

complaint to allege factual allegations establishing that SDJATC is a “labor organization” 

under the LMRDA, and because Defendant has failed to persuasively demonstrate that 

those allegations are insufficient as a matter of law, the Court will not grant Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss on this ground.

6

 

b. Whether Plaintiff’s claim inadequately pleads damages 

Defendant SDJATC next argues that Plaintiff’s second through fifth causes of 

actions are also deficient because they do not allege what damages Maurer actually 

sustained “as a result of the purported infringements of rights” under the LMRDA. 

Defendant is, however, incorrect in making this assertion. Plaintiff has indicated what 

harm resulted from Defendant’s breach and he has plead damages with enough specificity 

to comply with notice pleading standards. 

Here, Maurer indicates that SDJATC infringed upon the rights guaranteed to him 

under the LMRDA by terminating him from the apprenticeship program without the 

benefit of the safeguards enumerated at 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). According to the FAC, 

SDJATC cancelled Maurer’s apprenticeship agreement on March 31, 2015 with only one 

day’s notice and without providing him with written charges. FAC ¶¶ 101, 102, 117. 

The Committee gave no reason for their determination and did not indicate what, if any, 

 

6 Defendant’s remark that Plaintiff’s facts, instead, “suggest” that the SDJATC is not a labor 

organization is similarly unpersuasive. See ECF No. 21-1 at 11. That Plaintiff acknowledges that the 

SDJATC was “jointly sponsored” by the parties to a collective bargaining agreement (i.e., the NECA 

and IBEW) does not rule out the possibility that the SDJATC, too, is a labor organization. See id., ECF 

No. 21-1 at 12 (“In other words, the SDJATC is sponsored in part by a labor organization. It is not itself 

a labor organization. And the FAC alleges no facts from which the Court could plausibly infer 

otherwise.”) Thus, Defendant neither “suggests” nor demonstrates anything relevant by pointing out 

that the SDJATC was established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. 

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evidence they relied upon in reaching their conclusion. Id. ¶ 118. The FAC goes on to 

describe the harm that resulted from these alleged infringements. For example, because 

Maurer’s apprenticeship was cancelled, he became “ineligible to use . . . Reserve 

Account hours or to make Direct Payment to maintain [medical] coverage for the month 

of June 2015,” id. ¶ 120, and his union classification changed from “Apprentice 

Wireman” to “Unclassified,” id. ¶ 121. He was also ineligible to work as an apprentice 

from March 2015 until February 2016, at which time the Administrator reinstated him 

into the apprentice program. See id. ¶¶ 130, 134, 137. Accordingly, the harms that 

resulted from SDJATC’s decision to terminate his apprenticeship are evident from the 

face of the complaint. 

The damages that Plaintiff seeks are also evident from the face of the complaint. 

In his prayer for relief, Maurer asks for 1) punitive damages; 2) compensatory damages; 

3) special damages relating to loss of employment, delayed pay increases, and out-ofpocket expenses; 4) prejudgment interest at the legal rate; 5) costs of suit incurred herein; 

and 6) declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 42-43. None of these requests are 

precluded by the language of the LMRDA, which provides that persons whose rights 

have been infringed “may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for 

such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. § 412. Thus, given 

Plaintiff’s pro se status and the fact that Defendant does not rebut or respond to Plaintiff’s 

allegations of damages, the Court concludes that notice pleading has been satisfied as to 

damages. See Ottolini v. Bank of America, 2011 WL 8583133, *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 

2011) (finding that pro se plaintiff had adequately plead damages by noting how he was 

harmed by Defendant’s conduct). 

c. Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages

Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages under the 

LMRDA because he has not adequately articulated facts to support a “plausible claim 

that the SDJATC acted with malice or evil intent toward Plaintiff.” ECF No. 21-1 at 17. 

Yet as Defendant notes, federal pleading standards only require a claimant to plead 

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malice and intent generally. See Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Thus, Maurer need only state a “plausible” claim for punitive damages in order to survive 

the motion to dismiss. See id. 

Plaintiff’s complaint states that “[a]t all material times, Defendants acted with 

malice or with conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.” FAC ¶ 142. Such a conclusory 

assertion is enough to survive federal pleading standards. See Alejandro v. ST Micro 

Electronics, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 898, 917-18 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (concluding that plaintiff 

satisfied federal pleading standard by reciting a short and plain prayer for punitive 

damages); see also Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 F.R.D. 405, 406 (C.D. 

Cal. 2005) (dismissing defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages 

was insufficient because it made “bare conclusory allegations of oppression, fraud or 

malice” because conclusory pleading is sufficient); Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 106 F. 

Supp. 2d 1016, 1018-19 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (concluding that Plaintiff did not need to plead 

evidentiary facts to support contention that defendant had the mental state required to 

impose punitive damages). For this reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately 

pled punitive damages to survive the motion to dismiss. 

d. Whether Plaintiff’s claim is moot 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s claims under the LMRDA are moot because 

they have already “been rectified by his reinstatement to the apprenticeship program by 

the Department of the Industrial Relations.” ECF No. 21-1 at 15. Yet as Plaintiff notes

in his opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, “the relief Plaintiff sought through the 

administrative procedure was reinstatement of his apprenticeship [ ] while the relief 

Plaintiff seeks from the Court is damages and prejudgment interest.” ECF No. 26-1 at 15 

(citations omitted). Indeed, as noted above, Plaintiff’s current suit is for compensatory 

damages, special damages resulting from loss of employment, costs of suit, among others 

forms of relief. Accordingly, Plaintiffs current suit is not moot as Plaintiff may, for 

example, still demonstrate that he suffered damages between the time he was terminated 

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from the apprenticeship program up until the time he was reinstated. As such, the Court 

is not persuaded that the doctrine of justiciability warrants dismissal of Plaintiff’s FAC. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES SDJATC’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s second through fifth causes of action. 

C. IBEW’s Motion to Dismiss 

Defendant IBEW seeks to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 22- 1 at 3, 

n.1. IBEW contends that Plaintiff’s remaining four causes of action must fail because 1) 

Plaintiff has not adequately plead that SDJATC is the agent of IBEW; 2) the LMRDA 

does not regulate decisions by apprenticeship trust funds like the SDJATC; and 3) 

Maurer’s removal from the apprenticeship program does not constitute internal union 

discipline subject to 29 U.S.C. § 411(a), (b) of the LMRDA. ECF No. 22-1 at 5. 

1. Whether SDJATC is a “labor organization” under the LMRDA

Defendant IBEW’s second and third arguments rely on the assumption that 

SDJATC is not a “labor organization” within the meaning of the LMRDA. See ECF No. 

22-1 at 6 (“Because the JATC is not a labor organization, any decisions it makes to 

impose discipline on apprentices qua apprentices does not constitute internal union 

discipline governed by Section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA . . .”) (emphasis in original). 

Defendant, however, relies on no legal authority in making this argument. Given that the 

Court already concluded, above, that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual allegations to 

plead that SDJATC is a “labor organization” within the meaning of the LMRDA, and 

because Defendant IBEW cites to no legal authority to the contrary, the Court rejects 

Defendant’s second and third arguments. 

2. Whether Plaintiff pleads an agency relationship between SDJATC and IBEW

Common law agency principles apply to the LMRDA. Aguirre v. Automotive 

Teamsters, 633 F.2d 168, 172 (9th Cir. 1980). A principal may be held liable for the acts 

of its agent acting “within the general scope of their authority or through ratification by 

approval of their conduct with knowledge of the possibility of illegality.” Bender v. 

Wholesale & Retail Food Distrib., Teamsters Local 63, 951 F.2d 358, 1991 WL 276452, 

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*2 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 1991). An agent acts with actual authority when it “reasonably 

believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations, that the principal wishes the 

agent so to act.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01. A principal ratifies an act when 

it “affirm[s] [ ] a prior act done by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by 

an agent acting with actual authority.” Id. § 4.01. 

In his response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that the facts 

alleged in the FAC support two legal theories of agency: actual authority and ratification. 

First, Plaintiff contends that the “entanglement” between IBEW and SDJATC tends to 

demonstrate that SDJATC acted with IBEW’s actual authority. Allegations tending to 

show that “entanglement” include: that 1) IBEW created the SDJATC and is a party to 

the Committee; 2) IBEW can terminate the SDJATC at any time; 3) SDJATC shares 

facilities with the IBEW; 4) three IBEW officers are SDJATC committee members; and 

5) SDJATC’s secretary is also IBEW’s business manager. ECF No. 25-1 at 19. Second, 

Plaintiff avers that IBEW’s “ratification” of SDJATC’s decision to cancel Maurer’s 

apprenticeship agreement also demonstrates an agency relationship. To support this 

agency theory, Plaintiff alleges: 1) that IBEW changed Plaintiff’s union’s classification 

from “apprentice wireman” to “unclassified” after SDJATC removed Maurer, making 

him ineligible for work; 2) that the IBEW officers responsible for enforcing the IBEW 

bylaws did not stop the SDJATC disciplinary hearing even though the SDJATC had 

violated the National Guidelines7; and finally 3) that the IBEW officers voted to 

terminate Plaintiff from the apprenticeship program in order to “maintain friendly 

relations with Five-Star Electric.” ECF No. 25-1 at 22. 

IBEW describes Plaintiff’s complaint as being nothing more than “boilerplate 

agency allegations” and the “quintessential threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action” rejected by the Supreme Court in Iqbal. See ECF No. 22-2 at 5 (citations 

 

7 As stated previously, this line of argument is unavailing because the National Guidelines are not a 

contract and because they were not adopted by SDJATC. 

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omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009)). Defendant’s 

oversimplification of Plaintiff’s allegations is unpersuasive. This is not a case where the 

plaintiff has relied on legal conclusions of agency cast as factual allegations to plead an 

agency relationship. See In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 911 (C.D. Cal. 

2011). Rather, and contrary to what Defendant suggests, Plaintiff has pointed to a 

number of facts that support his claim that SDJATC was the agent of IBEW. 

Defendants other arguments also do not persuade the Court that Plaintiff has failed 

to adequately allege agency. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegation that the 

Committee members “chose to maintain friendly relations with Five-Star Electric” does 

not make it “plausible” that the Committee members sought to remove Maurer from the 

apprenticeship program for the sake of “ingratiating the IBEW-appointed Trustees to the 

employers.” Id. at 3. In making this argument, however, Defendant belies his own point 

as it does seem reasonable, given the facts Plaintiff has alleged, that the Committee 

members sought to remove Maurer in order to maintain good relations with Five-Star 

Electric. Defendant’s reliance on the NLRB’s decision in IBEW Local 429 is similarly 

unconvincing. 357 NLRB No. 34 (2011). That case, Defendant argues, stands for the 

proposition that a trustee of a joint apprenticeship program is not acting for the 

appointing union, and that the union is not liable for the actions of the apprenticeship 

training committees, unless contrary evidence shows otherwise. ECF No. 28 at 2-3 

(citing IBEW Local 429, 357 NLRB at 334). In IBEW Local 429, the Board attributed a 

JATC’s conduct to the union based upon the finding that the JATC’s actions were 

directed by union officials and that the JATC’s committee members had acted to advance 

the interests of the union. Id. at 333. Thus, Defendant argues, because Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that the SDJATC members acted with intent to advance the IBEW’s 

interests, Maurer’s agency theory is insufficient. Id. Reliance on the Board’s decision in 

IBEW Local 429 is, however, misplaced insofar as it addresses what is needed in order to 

prove that an agency relationship exists rather than what is needed in order to plead that 

an agency relationship exists. Although there is certainly reason to doubt that Plaintiff 

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can prove that an agency relationship exists between the two organizations, that fact is 

not enough to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. 

Finally, Defendant IBEW argues that Plaintiff has asserted nothing more than 

conclusory allegations in pleading an agency relationship between IBEW and SDJATC. 

That statement is incorrect. Plaintiff has asserted a number of factual allegations in 

support of an agency relationship, and Defendant has failed to persuasively undermine 

any of those allegations. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant IBEW’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s second through fifth causes of action. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action, be GRANTED.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim under the LMRA is hereby DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

2. Defendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED as to Plaintiff’s second through 

fifth causes of action, brought under the LMRDA. 

Dated: November 7, 2016

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