Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00282/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00282-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Edward Finck,

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

 CV 18-00282-TUC-FRZ (JR)

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) 

(Doc. 1) filed by Petitioner Michael Edward Finck (“Finck”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. Also pending is Finck’s Request for Evidentiary Hearing and Motion for 

Production of Documents (Doc. 26). 

In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for 

the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the 

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Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation.1 As explained below, the 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of 

the record, grant the Petition. This Court will deny Finck’s Request for Evidentiary 

Hearing and Motion for Production of Documents.

I. Factual and Procedural Background2

Finck was convicted by a jury on November 8, 2013. (Respondent’s Limited 

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Limited Answer”), Ex. A, p. 3).

3 On 

January 28, 2013, he was sentenced to an aggravated term of 12-years incarceration. 

(Ex. B, p. 2). Because Finck committed the offense while on pretrial release on 

another matter, the judge imposed an additional two-year sentence that was to run 

consecutive to the 12-year sentence; he was given zero days credit for time served. 

(Ex. B). 

Finck appealed on January 29, 2013 and after additional briefing, the Court of 

Appeals, on September 2, 2014, affirmed the conviction. (Ex. J). Finck did not move 

for reconsideration of the decision nor did he petition for review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Ex. K).

 

1 This case was randomly reassigned to Magistrate Judge Rateau on March 15, 2019. 

(Doc. 23). 

2 The factual summary of the state court is accorded a presumption of correctness. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)).

3 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Limited Answer (Doc. 15).

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On January 15, 2015, pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, Finck mailed a Notice of 

Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Ex. L).

4 Counsel was appointed on February 11, 

2015. (Ex. M). After numerous continuances, Finck filed his Petition on February 22, 

2016. (Exs. N, O). Finding that Finck presented no material issue of fact or law 

entitling him to relief, the trial court dismissed the petition on July 1, 2016. (Ex. T, p.

6).

Finck filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals on 

August 30, 2016, and on November 23, 2016, the Court granted review but denied 

relief. (Exs. V, W). He then filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme 

Court on December 12, 2016. (Ex. X). Review was denied on April 18, 2017. (Ex. 

AA).

In the Petition now before the Court, which was mailed on June 1, 2018, Finck 

argues that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in two 

ways: (1) when the trial court permitted him to represent himself at trial without 

properly advising him about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and 

the potential penalties he was facing; and (2) when the court ruled on his Faretta

rights, the judge applied standard harmless error principles instead of treating the 

error as structural. (Doc. 1, pp. 6 and 13). 

 

4 Under the “mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition is constructively filed 

when it is given to prison authorities for mailing. See Hernandez v. Spearman, 764 

F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)).

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Respondents argue, inter alia, that Finck’s petition is untimely and in the event 

the Court disagrees, they request the opportunity to file a supplemental answer. (Doc. 

15). In reply, Petitioner raises for the first time the issue of “equitable tolling” and 

motions the Court for an evidentiary hearing and an order directed to Respondents to 

produce documents so he may prove the cause of his untimeliness. (Docs. 26, 32). 

Respondent argues that a hearing is unwarranted and attaches to their pleading all 

documents relevant to Finck’s newly raised argument of equitable tolling. (Doc. 27). 

In response to those records, Finck submits an unnotorized affidavit prepared 

by a Janet Walter who purportedly made efforts to help him obtain his legal file so he 

could file his petition in a timely fashion. (Doc. 33).

II. Discussion

A. Timeliness

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one-year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations period 

must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that:

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action;

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Here, Finck’s convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Court of 

Appeals on September 2, 2014. (Ex. J). He had 35 days to petition the Arizona 

Supreme Court for review, see Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.19; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 1.3, or until 

October 7, 2014. Because Finck did not seek review, his conviction became final on 

October 7, 2014. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (AEDPA’s limitation period is 

triggered on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”). Absent tolling, 

Finck’s AEDPA statute of limitations would have expired one year later, or on 

October 7, 2015. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). He mailed the present Petition on June 

1, 2018 (Doc. 1), 968 days too late. Thus, the Petition is untimely unless Finck

establishes that the limitation period should be tolled.

. . . . 

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1. Statutory Tolling

The one-year AEDPA limitations period is tolled for the “time during which a 

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

On January 15, 2015, Finck mailed his first Notice of PCR. (Ex. L). It was 

pending in State court until April 18, 2017, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review. (Doc. AA). Finck is entitled to toll the limitations period 824 days. Finck’s 

present Petition is untimely by 144 days (968 minus 824) unless he can establish that 

he is entitled to equitable tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling

“Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time’ and ‘the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.’” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 

919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations 

period “only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” 

Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). “The high threshold of 

extraordinary circumstances is necessary lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. 

The standard is “highly fact-dependent,” Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 

(9th Cir. 2000), and is “reserved for rare cases,” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 

1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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Finck did not argue equitable tolling in his initial Petition. (Doc. 1). It was 

only after Respondents filed their response (Doc. 15) that Finck made the argument

(Doc. 26). He now asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling for 197 days-- from 

July 26, 2017 to February 7, 2018. (Doc. 26, pp. 9-12). Those are the dates he asserts

he was in custody at the Pima County Jail on an unrelated criminal matter and unable 

to access his legal materials. (Doc. 26, pp. 9-12). 

In addition to raising that argument, Finck requests that the Court order 

Respondents to produce all documents related to his transportation from ADOC to 

the Pima County Jail. (Doc 26, pp. 11-15). Although parties in habeas cases, unlike 

those in ordinary civil cases, have no right to discovery, Campbell v. Blodgett, 982 

F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir.1993), Respondents nonetheless complied with Finck’s

document request and provided the documents related to his temporary transfer to the 

Pima County Jail. (Doc. 27, Exs. A-E). As such, the Court will deny Finck’s Motion 

for Production of Documents as moot. 

Finally, Finck requests that the Court set an evidentiary hearing so he may 

establish that prison officials separated him from his legal materials thereby 

preventing him from proving that he is entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. 26 at 12-

14). With the production of the documents showing Finck’s absence and transfer 

from ADOC, as well as the pleading submitted by Ms. Walters, the Court finds that 

there is sufficient evidence in the record to allow the Court to decide the issue of 

equitable tolling. The Court will deny Finck’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing. 

(Doc. 26). See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010) (A court is not 

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obligated to hold evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual record, where the 

record is amply developed); Blackledge v. Allison, 421 U.S. 63, 74-81 (1977) (An 

evidentiary hearing is not required or needed if a court has sufficient facts before it to 

fully and fairly rule on the merits of the disputed issue.) 

The documents submitted by Respondents confirm, as asserted by Finck, that 

he was in the custody of the Pima County Jail, and not ADOC, from July 26, 2017 

until at least February 1, 2018. (Doc. 27, Exhibits A-C). The Court will accept 

Finck’s assertion that he remained at Pima County Jail until February 7, 2018 and 

will further accept his assertion that he did not have access to his legal files during 

the 197 days he was at the Pima County Jail on an unrelated criminal matter. 

The question becomes did the lack of access to his file “make it impossible to 

file a petition on time” and was the lack of access to his legal file the “cause of his 

untimeliness.” See Laws, 351 F.3d at 922. To answer these questions in his favor, 

Finck must show that he was “pursuing his rights diligently” but in spite of his 

efforts, “some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely 

filing.” See Lakey, 633 F.3d at 786. 

Finck presents a declaration from Janet Walter to prove that he acted 

diligently. (Doc 33). According to Ms. Walter, Finck was transferred from ADOC to 

the Pima County jail in July of 2017. (Doc. 33, p. 2). Upon learning that he would 

remain at the Pima County jail for several weeks, Finck asked Ms. Walter to call the 

warden and request that several of his legal boxes be shipped to him. (Doc. 33, p. 2). 

Ms. Walter called Warden Moody and made the request but was told that ADOC 

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policy prohibited inmates from taking any property with them when they are 

transferred to a jail or hospital. (Doc. 33, p. 2). Ms. Walter then contacted Finck’s 

attorney and explained the situation, but the attorney said he could do nothing about 

it. (Doc. 33 at 2-3). Finally, Ms. Walter contacted the Pima County Superior Court 

and explained the situation to the judge’s assistant. (Doc. 33 at 3). After conferring 

with the judge, the assistant called Ms. Walter and informed her that the judge would 

not interfere with ADOC policy because Finck’s stay at the jail was only temporary. 

(Doc. 33 at 3). Even if Finck potentially could have done more, 5the Court finds that 

Finck’s efforts to obtain his file by using Ms. Walter as an intermediary establish that

he was pursuing his rights diligently.

The finding that Finck was diligent does not end the inquiry. The denial of 

access to legal files supports equitable tolling only when the files are necessary to 

prepare the petition. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049; Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998; see 

also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (deprivation of access to 

legal files for 82 days because of two temporary transfers would “satisfy the 

extraordinary circumstances requirement” “if borne out by further factfinding” on 

remand), abrogation in part on other grounds recognized by Fue v. Biter, 842 F.3d 

650, 656-57 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Finck has sufficiently shown that the lack of 

access to his legal files prevented him from filing his Petition on time. 

 

5 The Court accepts Respondent’s proffer that Finck never filed a motion requesting a 

transfer of his legal file from ADOC to the Pima County jail. (Doc. 27 at 3). 

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In his reply, Finck argues that by not having his file, he was unable to prepare 

an accurate, effective, and meaningful petition; he was unable to include procedural 

and narrative case history; he was unable to utilize citations to the record to pinpoint 

the facts relevant to the issues on appeal; he was unable to set forth clear and 

understandable contentions and supporting arguments relevant to the issues on 

appeal; and he was unable to refer to significant evidence that supported his 

contentions. (Doc. 26 at 10). Finck was not necessarily required to do any of those 

things. The standard language in a petition states throughout, “[a]ttach, if available a 

copy of any brief filed on your behalf and a copy of the decisions by the court.” 

(Doc. 1, pp. 3-5). And when referring to grounds for relief, the petition directs a 

petitioner to cite “[s]upporting FACTS (Do not argue or cite law. Just state the 

specific facts that support your claim.)” (Doc. 1 at 6). Nevertheless, the quality of 

Finck’s filings reflect that he used his state court case materials to prepare more 

complete pleadings that were helpful to the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that

the record supports a finding that Finck is entitled to equitable tolling. See, e.g., Miles 

v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999) (equitable tolling applied where pro se 

prisoner, who timely requested that prison officials draw on his trust account and 

prepare a check for his filing fee, missed the filing deadline because prison officials 

delayed the request); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 

2005) (equitable tolling warranted where the petitioner was repeatedly denied access 

to requested legal materials while confined in protective administrative segregation 

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due to mental health problems for eleven months and therefore, had no access to the 

law library during that time.)

Without equitable tolling, Finck’s Petition is untimely by 144 days. However, 

that untimeliness is eliminated through equitable tolling of the limitations period for 

the 197 days he was without his legal files. The Court will recommend that his 

petition be found timely.

B. Exhaustion

A state prisoner must exhaust his available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). “[A] petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts to give them a “fair opportunity to act” upon the claims. 

See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). “To exhaust one’s state court 

remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or 

collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then present his 

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claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 

(9th Cir. 1999).

Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

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an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th 

Cir. 2005). 

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on either direct 

appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because any 

attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the claims fit 

into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be consistently 

and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, either their 

specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to preclude a 

return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent review of 

the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 

860 (2002); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 

1996) (waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a petitioner 

must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to 

comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 

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(2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference or 

reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

rules or lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id.

In Ground One of the Petition, Finck asserts that his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and counsel were violated by the trial 

court permitting him to represent himself at trial without “advising him of the 

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and the potential penalties he was 

facing.” Petition (Doc. 1), pp. 6-6F. Respondents recognize that he properly 

exhausted his Sixth Amendment claim in his direct appeal. Limited Answer (Doc. 

15), p. 10. However, they contend that Finck only made a “passing reference to due 

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process with respect to this claim” which was insufficient to constitute fair 

presentation of that part of the claim.

Examination of Finck’s Opening Supplemental Brief on direct appeal supports 

the Respondents’ contention. In that brief, after his introductory invocation of due 

process, Finck parenthetically mentions due process just one more time and never 

develops any federal due process argument. See Ex. F, pp. 2-16. The argument he 

does present is focused on his Sixth Amendment rights and on the trial court’s 

alleged shortcomings in applying the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. As noted 

above, however, to be “fairly presented,” Finck’s due process claim needed to be 

supported by federal authority. See Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. Because it was not, it is 

not exhausted. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998 n.3. Because Arizona’s waiver and 

preclusion rules are strictly applied in postconviction proceedings, any attempt by 

Finck to return to state court to exhaust this claim would be futile. Mata, 916 P.2d at 

1050-52. Without an available remedy in the state court for the claim, it is technically 

exhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

731-32 (1991). Finck does not claim actual innocence or cause and prejudice with 

respect to his due process claim. As such, the merits of the claim need not be 

addressed. 

In Ground Two, Finck asserts that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to due process and counsel were violated by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ erroneous application of “harmless error principles instead of treating the 

error as structural.” Petition (Doc. 1), pp. 7-7D. Respondents contend that Finck did 

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not raise this claim before the state court of appeals because “he only asserted 

generally that the denial of the right to counsel at trial is “prejudicial per se.” Limited 

Answer (Doc. 15), pp. 10-11. Respondents’ argument overlooks Finck’s assertion in 

his appeal brief that “[t]he trial court’s failure to meet the requirements for a valid 

Faretta waiver invoking the 6th Amendment right to self-representation constitutes 

per-se prejudicial error, and the harmless error standard is inapplicable.” Ex. F, p. 19 

(citing United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2004)). Thus, Finck did raise 

the issue before the Arizona Court of Appeals and it is undoubtedly exhausted.

Because the issues raised in Ground Two of the Petition are embedded in the 

determination of Ground One, the Court treats the two claims as one and addresses 

their merits collectively. 

C. Merits

1. AEDPA Standards

Under the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect 

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362 (2000). A state court’s decision can be “contrary to” federal law either (1) if 

it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts “materially indistinguishable” from those in a 

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controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court’s judgment. See Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 

1101 (9th Cir. 2002). A state court’s decision can be an unreasonable application of 

federal law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies 

it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or 

fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).

In conducting an analysis under AEDPA, the federal habeas court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision. See Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th 

Cir. 2014). Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the 

District Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes 

that the unexplained decision relies on the same reasoning. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 

U.S. 63, 73-74 (1991). Where no state court decision provides a basis for the 

decision, the district court must undertake an independent review of the record and 

determine whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable. See 

Castellanos, 766 F.3d at 1145; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 

(2011). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when 

resolving an issue presented on direct or collateral review. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 

3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court 

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decision contradicts [Supreme Court] precedent,” the state court decision will not be 

contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

2. Finck’s Sixth Amendment Claim

a. Supreme Court Precedent

The Sixth Amendment provides a criminal defendant the right to effective 

assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. A defendant faced with a choice 

between retaining his current court-appointed counsel and proceeding pro se is 

entitled to elect the latter option, because “the Sixth Amendment right to the 

assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a correlative right to dispense with a 

lawyer’s help.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “While the right to counsel attaches unless affirmatively 

waived, the right to self-representation does not attach until asserted.” Sandoval v. 

Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2001). A request for self-representation 

under Faretta must be clear and unequivocal. See Robinson v. Kramer, 588 F.3d 

1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 

2007); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-36). “Because a defendant who exercises the right to 

self-representation foregoes the benefits of exercising the right to counsel, ‘the 

accused must “knowingly and intelligently” forego those relinquished benefits.’” 

United States v. Gerritsen, 571 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Faretta, 422 

U.S. at 835). 

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b. State Court Decision

On direct appeal, Finck claimed that his waiver of the right to counsel was not 

knowing and intelligent. Ex. I. Addressing this argument, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals summarized the relevant background and denied the claim:

In this case, Finck was initially indicted on one count of 

possession of a firearm by a prohibited possessor in February 2011 and 

was appointed counsel. Thereafter, he filed a motion to represent 

himself, and the trial court held a hearing on that motion. In accordance 

with Rule 6.1(c), Ariz. R.Crim. P., Finck filed a document indicating he 

was making a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” waiver of his right 

to counsel, and the court allowed Finck to represent himself. The court 

also appointed advisory counsel, who also represented Finck in other, 

separate matters. The state later sought a new indictment, and a second 

“initial appearance and arraignment” was held on March 26, 2012.

At that arraignment the trial court asked Finck if he had received 

“a copy of the new indictment,” entered a not guilty plea, and affirmed 

the trial date. Finck indicated he had received a copy of the indictment 

and proceeded to discuss witness interviews with the court. As the state 

concedes, the court did not specifically inform Finck of the new 

charges against him or advise him of his right to counsel.

The court’s failure to properly advise Finck was error, but it 

does not justify reversal in this case. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27; cf. 

State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 324, 878 P.2d 1352, 1362 (1994) (“not 

reversible error to fail to warn of every possible strategic 

consideration” in self-representation); Miranda v. State, 42 Ariz. 358, 

363, 26 P.2d 241, 242 (1933) (failure to read complaint to defendant 

nonreversible, technical error when no prejudice resulted because 

complaint had been read previously and defendant was represented by 

counsel). As detailed above, the record before us demonstrates that 

Finck made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to 

counsel and decided to represent himself.

Finck argues that because the circumstances of the case changed 

substantially after the new indictment issued, the trial court should have 

made a new inquiry relating to his self-representation at that point. 

And, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), he maintains 

his waiver of his right to counsel was no longer knowing, intelligent, 

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and voluntary under the new circumstances of the case. But a majority 

of the federal circuit courts have concluded, and we agree, that 

although specific findings relating to the waiver of the right to counsel 

are preferable, Faretta requires only a “nonformalistic approach to 

determining sufficiency of the waiver from the record as a whole.” 

United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 1987).

In this case, as outlined above, Finck clearly and expressly had 

waived his right to counsel in a detailed writing. When the court 

reappointed counsel in January 2012, Finck again clarified that he 

wanted to represent himself. Furthermore, the additional charges filed 

against Finck were not different from the charge originally filed; rather 

they were additional counts of the same charge of prohibited 

possession, relating to guns which had all been seized on the same 

occasion and were the only guns at issue in the case. And Finck makes 

no claim that either the nature of the weapons-misconduct charge or the 

consequences related to a single conviction for that charge were not 

properly explained to him at his original arraignment. Nor did he 

indicate any uncertainty as to the charges at the second arraignment, 

stating he had received the new indictment and wished to proceed to 

interviewing witnesses.

Additionally, as the state points out, this is not Finck’s first 

criminal proceeding and he has represented himself in other 

proceedings. At the hearing on his motion to represent himself in this 

proceeding, Finck informed the court he has “a diploma in paralegal 

studies” and had represented himself “all the way up to the [Ninth 

C]ircuit in one criminal appeal” and in some civil matters. In view of 

Finck’s experience, his statements on the record regarding his desire to 

represent himself, and the nature of the charges, we cannot say that 

Finck was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to properly advise him 

pursuant to Rule 4.2 or that the court abused its discretion in 

concluding Finck had validly waived his right to counsel. See United 

States v. Lopez–Osuna, 242 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (in 

assessing validity of waiver, “the focus should be on what the 

defendant understood, rather than on what the court said or 

understood”).

Ex. J; State v. Finck, No 2 CA-CR 2013-0039, 2014WL4347771 (Ariz. App. Sept. 2,

2014).

. . . . 

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c. Discussion

The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that Finck knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his right to counsel. On habeas review under the AEDPA, the 

Court must determine whether the state court decision is “contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13

(2000); see also Erskine, 355 F.3d at 1166 (ultimate validity of a Faretta waiver 

involves a mixed question of law and fact).

There is no dispute about the validity of Finck’s initial waiver of counsel. As 

such, the Court must consider whether that waiver was nullified by subsequent 

events. The court of appeal determined that Finck's initial Faretta waiver remained 

valid throughout the course of pretrial proceedings even after two more prohibited 

possessor counts were added in March 2012. An analytically similar factual scenario 

was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in the habeas context in Arrendondo v. Neven, 

763 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2014). In that case, Defendant Arrendondo was charged with 

possession of a stolen vehicle and possession of stolen property. Id. at 1125. 

Dissatisfied with the quality of representation from the public defender, Arrendondo 

waived his right to counsel and elected to represent himself. Id. at 1126-27. He was 

subsequently convicted at trial on both counts and days later the state filed habitual 

criminal allegations exposing Arrendondo to sentences of life in prison on each of the 

two counts. Id. at 1128. The trial court sentenced Arrendondo to two concurrent life 

sentences, with the possibility of parole after ten years. Id. The Nevada Supreme 

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Court found Arrendondo’s waiver of counsel valid and affirmed his convictions, 

stating that, “’Although the [trial] court indicated that Arrendondo would face a 

maximum of twenty years if convicted, rather than life, the otherwise extensive 

canvass of Arrendondo demonstrated that he understood the dangers and 

disadvantages of self-representation.” Id. 

Arrendondo sought federal habeas relief arguing, inter alia, that his waiver of 

counsel was invalid. Id. at 1129. The district court found that Arrendondo’s waiver 

was knowing and intelligent and therefore concluded that the Nevada Supreme 

Court’s decision “’was not contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent.’” Id.

Arrendondo appealed to the Ninth Circuit and that court examined the interplay 

between Faretta and Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). After noting that “[n]o 

clearly established Supreme Court case requires trial courts to apprise defendant in 

any particular form of the risks of proceeding to trial pro se,” Arrendondo, 763 F.3d 

at 1130, the court explained: 

Faretta itself did not specifically address the defendant's 

awareness of his possible punishments. But Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 124 

S.Ct. 1379, did. That case explained that a defendant, before waiving 

his right to counsel for the purpose of entering a guilty plea, must be 

aware “of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be 

counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable 

punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” Id. at 81, 124 

S.Ct. 1379 (emphasis added); see also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 

708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) (plurality opinion) (stating 

that a valid waiver of counsel for the purpose of entering a guilty plea 

requires “an apprehension of ... the range of allowable punishments,” 

among other matters).[footnote 2 omitted]

The requirement recounted in Tovar complements the requisites 

for a valid waiver of the right to counsel described in Faretta. [footnote 

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3 omitted] As the common law of torts long ago recognized, the 

rational calculation of risk requires multiplying the magnitude of a 

threatened loss by the probability of its occurrence. See United States v. 

Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Tovar supplies 

the first of these terms; Faretta, the second. By requiring awareness of 

the range of possible penalties, Tovar ensures that defendants 

understand the magnitude of the loss they face. Faretta, meanwhile, 

emphasizes awareness of “the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation ”—that is, the specific, tactical liabilities of going to 

trial without trained counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 

(emphasis added). That knowledge relates to the probability that a 

defendant will be convicted, not the consequences of conviction. In 

short, the requirements of Faretta and Tovar enrich one another. Taken 

together, they outline the minimum necessary knowledge for a 

defendant to calculate knowingly and intelligently the risk of 

proceeding to trial pro se.

Tovar’s statement concerning the defendant’s knowledge of 

possible punishments is clearly established Supreme Court law, and 

was at the time of the Court's decision on the merits. Tovar stated: “We 

hold. . . . [that t]he constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial 

court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of 

his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of 

allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” 

Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81, 124 S.Ct. 1379 (emphases added). An express 

holding is clearly established Supreme Court law for purposes of 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See, e.g., White v. Woodall, –––U.S. ––––, 134 

S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014). Moreover, the defendant’s 

understanding of his potential punishment was included in Tovar’s 

reasoning; the opinion affirmatively highlighted the fact that the 

defendant “has never claimed that he did not fully understand . . . the 

range of punishment for the crime. . . .” 541 U.S. at 92, 124 S.Ct. 1379.

Tovar, unlike this case, concerned an uncounseled guilty plea, not a 

defendant who represented himself at trial. But Tovar addressed the 

relationship between waiver at the plea phase and waiver at trial, 

stating that at the plea stage, “a less searching or formal colloquy” is 

needed to gauge the defendant’s knowledge than is necessary with 

regard to waiver of trial counsel. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89, 124 S.Ct. 1379 

(emphasis added) (citing Patterson [v. Illinois], 487 U.S. [285] at 299, 

108 S.Ct. 2389 [1988]). This difference is “not because pretrial 

proceedings are ‘less important’ than trial, but because, at that stage, 

‘the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less 

substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.’” 

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Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90, 124 S.Ct. 1379 (emphasis added) (quoting 

Patterson, 487 U.S. at 299, 108 S.Ct. 2389).

The risk calculation involved in determining whether to 

represent oneself at trial differs from that at the plea stage with regard 

to the number of tactical dangers of proceeding without counsel—that 

is, the probability that proceeding without counsel will affect the 

outcome. But there is no difference at all in the two circumstances with 

regard to the other component of risk calculation—namely, knowledge 

of the magnitude of the risk faced. And, given the Court’s express 

declaration that the requirements for a guilty plea waiver of counsel are 

less rigorous than those applicable to a trial waiver, excising any of 

Tovar’s requirements in the trial context would be an unreasonable 

interpretation of clearly established Supreme Court law.

Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1131-32.

In Finck’s case, the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly identified Faretta as 

the Supreme Court precedent governing Finck’s waiver claim, but it did not identify 

or examine Tovar’s impact on Faretta’s requirements. Instead, the appeals court 

cited to United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1987), to emphasize that 

“Faretta requires only a ‘nonformalistic approach to determining sufficiency of the 

waiver from the record as a whole.’” Ex. J, p. 4 (citing McDowell, 814 F.2d at 249).

If not for Arrendondo, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Faretta would 

qualify as “reasonable.” As noted by another district in our circuit, no other circuit 

has extended Tovar to reach a conclusion like that reached by the Ninth Circuit in 

Arrendondo. See Pierce v. Sherman, No. 15-CV-05568-LHK-PR, 2017WL600099,

at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2017) (citing Spates v. Clarke, No. 13-6358, 547 Fed. 

Appx. 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (specifically limiting Tovar’s

requirements to the context of a guilty plea) (unpublished memorandum disposition); 

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Page v. Burger, 406 F.3d 489, 494-95 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing a waiver of 

counsel to be valid if defendant is “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of 

self-representation” at the time of the waiver, and specifying that with regard to a 

guilty plea, the constitution requires the defendant be made aware of the nature of 

charges, the right to be counseled regarding plea, and the range of allowable 

punishments)). Moreover, although he concurred with the result in Arrendondo, 

Judge Fernandez noted that “the conclusion that any Tovar requirement must apply in 

the trial context . . . is especially unnecessary and problematic.” Arredondo, 763 F.3d 

at 1141. 

Notwithstanding Judge Fernandez’s warnings and the lack of support from 

other circuits, the Court’s decision here is governed by the holding in Arrendondo.

The Court recognizes that circuit court decisions do not constitute “clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” and a state court 

decision may not be overturned on habeas review because it conflicts with Ninth 

Circuit-based law. See Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct 2148, 2155 (2012); Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Additionally, circuit precedent may not 

be used to “refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into 

a specific legal rule that [the Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall v. 

Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013). Nevertheless, circuit decisions may be 

relevant as persuasive authority to determine whether a state court holding is an 

“unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent or to assess what law is 

“clearly established.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2003).

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In a passage equally applicable here, the Central District of California 

explained: 

Here, the Ninth Circuit in Arrendondo expressly stated that the failure 

to extend Tovar’s requirement that a criminal defendant be aware of the 

range of possible punishments when the waiver of the right to counsel 

is invoked in the trial context is an unreasonable interpretation of 

clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law. This court is bound by the 

law of the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Day v. Apoliona, 496 F.3d 1027, 

1031 (9th Cir. 2007) (district courts are bound by circuit authority 

unless there is clearly irreconcilable intervening Supreme Court 

authority); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 

1981) (“District courts are bound by the law of their own circuit.”). 

Pierce, 2017WL600099, at *7; see also Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (9th 

Cir. 2012 (district courts are bound by circuit authority unless there is an intervening, 

irreconcilable Supreme Court decision). 

It is undisputed that the trial court did not inform Finck of the increased 

possible punishment he faced after the two additional charges were added. Because

the Court is bound by Ninth Circuit’s Arrendondo decision, the trial court’s failure to 

provide the required information violated clearly-established Supreme Court 

precedent. As such, this Court finds that the Arizona Court of Appeal’s decision 

denying Finck’s Faretta claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

d. Remedy

The failure to meet the requirements for a valid Faretta waiver constitutes per 

se prejudicial error, and the harmless error standard is inapplicable. See McKaskle v. 

Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8 (1984) (“Since the right of self-representation is a 

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right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome 

unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ 

analysis.”); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 734-35 (9th Cir. 2008) (Arizona court’s 

application of harmless error rule to Faretta violation was contrary to U.S. Supreme 

Court holding that such error is structural); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 

75, 88 (1988); United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Accordingly, the determination that a Faretta error occurred here requires the grant 

of habeas relief.

Because Finck does not dispute that his initial waiver was valid, the 

appropriate remedy is to conditionally grant the writ and order that Finck’s judgment 

of conviction be vacated only if the State fails to either dismiss the two counts added 

to the indictment in March 2012 after the Faretta-compliant waiver of counsel and 

resentence Finck based on the original charges, or initiate proceeding to retry Finck 

within a reasonable time. See Jensen v. Hernandez, 864 F.Supp.2d 869, 902-03 (E.D. 

Cal. 2012); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Conceptually, 

any habeas remedy should put the defendant back in the position he would have been 

in if the Sixth Amendment violation never occurred.”) (citation and internal quotes 

omitted). Because the added charges involved the same weapons and conduct as the 

original charge, it may be unnecessary to retry Finck. See Jensen v. Hernandez, 572

. . . . 

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F.App’x 540 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming trial court’s decision to order resentencing in

light of Sixth Amendment violation where retrial was unnecessary to neutralize any 

taint resulting from the violation).

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge DENIES Finck’s Motion for 

Production of Documents as moot and DENIES his Motion for Evidentiary Hearing 

as unwarranted. (Doc. 26.) 

The Magistrate Judge further RECOMMENDS that the District Court, after 

its independent review, CONDITIONALLY GRANT Finck’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment.

However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this

action should be designated case number: CV 18-00282-TUC-FRZ. Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge

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may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. 

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Dated this 14th day of January, 2020.

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