Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-06005/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-06005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AARON ELLIOTT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

J. CABALLERO, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 19-cv-06005-PJH 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed an original 

complaint (Docket No. 1) and then an amended complaint (Docket No. 8). The court has 

reviewed the amended complaint. 

DISCUSSION 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 

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is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

(citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 

to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 

Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

LEGAL CLAIMS 

Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty of several false disciplinary 

violations in retaliation for his protected conduct. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 

protects individuals against governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property without 

due process of law. Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause 

may arise from two sources: the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests 

are generally ones pertaining to liberty. Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the 

sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, 

whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 

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United States District Court 

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484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital), 

and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (involuntary administration of 

psychotropic drugs)). Deprivations that are less severe or more closely related to the 

expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a protected liberty 

interest, provided that the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See Sandin, 515 

U.S. at 477-87. An interest of “real substance” will generally be limited to freedom from 

restraint that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life” or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence.” Id. 

at 484, 487. The placement of an inmate in a highly restrictive housing setting may 

amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest of “real substance” within the meaning of 

Sandin. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005). 

When there is a deprivation of a liberty interest of real substance, the procedural 

protections to which the prisoner is entitled depend on whether the deprivation results 

from a disciplinary decision or an administrative decision. If it is a disciplinary decision, 

the procedural protections required are: written notice, time to prepare for the hearing, a 

written statement of decision, allowance of witnesses and documentary evidence when 

not unduly hazardous, and aid to the accused where the inmate is illiterate or the issues 

are complex. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-67 (1974). The Due Process 

Clause requires only that prisoners be afforded those procedures mandated by Wolff and 

its progeny; it does not require that prisons comply with their own, more generous 

procedures. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419–20 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on 

other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472. A prisoner's right to due process is 

violated “only if he [is] not provided with process sufficient to meet the Wolff standard.” 

Id. at 1420. 

There also must be some reliable evidence to support the disciplinary decision, 

see Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 

704-05 (9th Cir. 1987). “Ascertaining whether [the some evidence] standard is satisfied 

does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the 

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credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is 

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached” by 

the disciplinary hearing officer. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. This standard 

is considerably lower than that applicable in criminal trials. See id. at 456. 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action 

(4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under § 1983 for retaliation must allege that he 

was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action 

did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and 

discipline). The prisoner must show that the type of activity he was engaged in was 

constitutionally protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating 

factor for the alleged retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no 

legitimate penological interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(inferring retaliatory motive from circumstantial evidence). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Caballero made false allegations and fabricated 

evidence that resulted in disciplinary proceedings. He states that Caballero engaged in 

this conduct in retaliation for plaintiff refusing to be a snitch. Plaintiff alleges that 

defendant Ivey interviewed him for a disciplinary hearing and defendant Martinez was the 

hearing officer. The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more 

information. 

With respect to the retaliation claim, plaintiff must present more information that he 

was engaged in protected conduct. Plaintiff has cited no cases and the court has not 

found caselaw indicating that refusing to snitch is considered protected conduct for a 

retaliation claim. Plaintiff must also provide more information regarding the due process 

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claim. He has not described the punishment for the disciplinary proceedings and if he 

lost good time credits. Plaintiff must provide more information to support his allegation 

that there was an atypical and significant hardship. Even assuming that the charges 

against plaintiff were false, he may not be entitled to relief. A prisoner has no 

constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct 

which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. Babcock, 

870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due 

process in the disciplinary hearing, allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim 

under § 1983. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984). A false 

charge that results in discipline that does not amount to a deprivation of a protected 

liberty interest under Sandin, is not actionable under § 1983 if it does not implicate 

another constitutional right. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 

2002); see, e.g., id. at 654 (even if the charges that led to disciplinary confinement were 

false, no claim was stated because the disciplinary confinement imposed was too short to 

amount to an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin). 

With respect to defendants Ivey and Martinez, plaintiff has not presented sufficient 

allegations that these defendants were responsible for any constitutional deprivation. 

Simply because they were involved in a disciplinary hearing is insufficient to state a 

claim. He should provide more information regarding their involvement. 

CONCLUSION 

1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the 

standards set forth above. The second amended complaint must be filed no later than 

December 18, 2019, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this 

order and the words SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an 

amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it 

all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th 

Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. 

Failure to file an amended complaint may result in dismissal of this case. 

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2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed 

“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 18, 2019 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

Case 4:19-cv-06005-PJH Document 12 Filed 11/18/19 Page 6 of 6