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Nature of Suit Code: 0
Nature of Suit: other
Cause of Action: 

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* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. BAP

L.R. 8018-6(a).

FILED

U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

of the Tenth Circuit

April 26, 2005

Barbara A. Schermerhorn

Clerk NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

IN RE WILLIAM LEE MUSGROVE,

Debtor.

BAP No. EO-05-002

WILLIAM LEE MUSGROVE,

Appellant,

Bankr. No. 03-73331

 Chapter 13

v. ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

LINDA DAVIS, and WILLIAM MARK

BONNEY, Trustee,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma

Before McFEELEY, Chief Judge, NUGENT, and THURMAN, Bankruptcy

Judges.

THURMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

The parties did not request oral argument, and after examining the briefs

and appellate record, the Court has determined unanimously that oral argument

would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8012. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

The Chapter 13 debtor appeals an Order entered by the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma refusing to afford the

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 1 of 9
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debtor relief from an earlier Order entered by that court incorporating the terms of

a stipulation between the debtor and his former spouse, Linda Davis (Davis),

related to a divorce-related debt. The bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1977, the debtor and Davis married, and in April, 1978, their only child

was born. They divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce filed by an Oklahoma

court in 1982. The Decree of Divorce granted Davis custody of the child, and

required the debtor to pay Davis $100.00 per month as child support during the

child’s minority.

The debtor failed to pay Davis child support. Davis commenced an action

against the debtor in a Texas court, seeking to collect the child support debt

(Collection Action). On July 2, 2003, the Texas court entered a notation in the

Collection Action docket, awarding Davis child support arrears, pre-judgment and

post-judgment interest, and attorney’s fees and costs.

On August 25, 2003, prior to entry of a Judgment in the Collection Action,

the debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. In

October, 2003, Davis filed a “Motion for Cumulative Judgment of Child Support

Arrears,” in the bankruptcy case, asserting, in relevant part, a claim against the

debtor for child support arrearages (First Motion). The debtor objected to the

First Motion. Davis responded to the debtor’s Objections, and simultaneously

filed an amendment to the First Motion (Amended Motion). In the Amended

Motion, Davis asserted that in addition to prepetition child support arrearages, her

claim against the debtor included interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. The

debtor objected to the Amended Motion. 

The bankruptcy court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Amended

Motion. Davis and the debtor filed a Joint Motion to continue the scheduled

hearing, representing that they were attempting to determine if the matter could

be settled. The bankruptcy court granted the Joint Motion, and the hearing was

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 2 of 9
1 Order at 4, in Appellant’s Appendix at 17.

2 Stipulated Order at 1, in Appellant’s Appendix at 14.

3 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a).

4 The bankruptcy court entered an order dismissing the debtor’s Chapter 13 case on June 25, 2004, after the debtor failed to appear at a hearing on the 

confirmation of his contested Chapter 13 plan. Although the case was dismissed,

it was not closed. See 11 U.S.C. § 350(a)

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rescheduled. In the meantime, Davis filed a “Corrected and Supplemented

Amended Motion,” further increasing the amount of her claim against the debtor.

At the rescheduled hearing, appearances were made by counsel of record

for the debtor and Davis. Both counsel represented to the bankruptcy court that

the parties had reached an agreement regarding Davis’s claim against the debtor,

and Davis’s counsel submitted a proposed order setting forth the terms of the

agreement. The bankruptcy court did not execute the proposed order at the

hearing because it contained provisions allowing Davis fees in the event of

appeal, and it did not require the debtor to amend his Chapter 13 plan to

incorporate the stipulated claim. The proposed order was modified with the

bankruptcy court’s comments, and then it was filed with the court, after having

been “[a]pproved as to Form, Substance and Stipulated to”1

 by all counsel,

including debtor’s counsel (Stipulated Order). 

The bankruptcy court executed and entered the Stipulated Order on January

8, 2004. It provides, in relevant part, that Davis is allowed “a priority claim in

the amount of $55,825.72 as of August 25, 2003 consisting of $40,947.22 in child

support arrears (including accrued interest), $11,500.00 attorney fees . . . and

costs of $66.00.”2

The debtor did not file a notice of appeal from the Stipulated Order within

ten days of it being entered.3

 In June, 2004, the debtor’s case was dismissed.4

Subsequently, in October, 2004, the Texas court made the following minute entry

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 3 of 9
5 Debtor’s Motion for Dismissal, Exhibit A at 2, in Appellant’s Appendix at

32. 

6 Dismissal Motion at 1, in Appellant’s Appendix at 30.

7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is made applicable in bankruptcy cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. 

8 See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992).

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in the Collection Action: “Court finds that money judgment granted in

bankruptcy court is res judicata.”5

On November 17, 2004, the debtor, now appearing pro se, filed a motion

seeking relief from the Stipulated Order (Rehearing Motion). The debtor

questioned the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to determine child support. In

addition, he stated that he did not understand how the Stipulated Order was

“created” and why it was not “dismissed when the Bankruptcy was dismissed.”6

Davis objected to the Rehearing Motion, and the debtor subsequently filed a

“Motion to Vacate,” which is not included in our record.

The bankruptcy court entered an Order denying the Rehearing Motion

(Rehearing Order), holding that the debtor failed to set forth sufficient grounds

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to set the Stipulated Order aside.7

This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

The debtor expressly states in his Notice of Appeal that he appeals the

Rehearing Order. In addition, although not specifically stated, the text of and the

attachments to the Notice of Appeal indicate the debtor’s intent to appeal the

Stipulated Order.8

 For the reasons stated, we do not have jurisdiction to review

the Stipulated Order, and the Rehearing Order is affirmed.

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 4 of 9
9 See, e.g., Dimeff v. Good (In re Good), 281 B.R. 689 (10th Cir. BAP 2002) (citing cases).

10 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a).

11 Id. 8002(b)(4) & 9024.

12 See, e.g., In re Geneva Steel Co., 260 B.R. 517, 520 (10th Cir. BAP 2001) (order resolving an objection to claim and setting priority of claim is a final order

under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)), aff’d, 281 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2002) (order subordinating claim is a final order).

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1. This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Stipulated Order

This Court has jurisdiction to review an order or judgment that is “final”

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) only if a notice of appeal is timely

filed.9

 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a) states that a “notice of

appeal shall be filed with the clerk within 10 days of the date of the entry of the

. . . order . . . appealed from.”10 A motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b), such as the Rehearing Motion in this case, tolls that ten day

period, but only “if the motion is filed no later than 10 days after the entry of

judgment.”11

The Stipulated Order, which sets forth the parties’ stipulation as to the

allowance, priority and amount of Davis’s claim against the debtor, was “final”

when it was entered by the bankruptcy court on January 8, 2004.12 Under

Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a), therefore, the debtor was required to file a notice of

appeal within ten days of January 8, 2004. The debtor did not do so. 

Furthermore, because the Rehearing Motion was filed almost eleven months after

the Stipulated Order was entered, the ten-day period was not tolled. Accordingly,

this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Stipulated Order.

2. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in entering the Rehearing Order

Unlike the Stipulated Order, we have jurisdiction to review the Rehearing

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 5 of 9
13 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a); see, e.g., Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999) (order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is a final order).

14 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)-(c); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(e).

15 11 U.S.C. § 349.

16 See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 292 B.R. 678, 685-86 (10th Cir. BAP 2003) (citing cases).

17 See, e.g., Good, 281 B.R. at 699 (citing Elsken v. Network Multi-Family

Sec. Corp., 49 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995); Van Skiver v. United States, 952

F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991)) (orders entered pursuant to Rule 60(b) are

reviewed for abuse of discretion).

18 Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

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Order. It is a final order from which the debtor filed a timely notice of appeal.13

The parties have consented to this Court’s jurisdiction because they have not

elected to have the appeal heard by the District Court for the Eastern District of

Oklahoma.14 Furthermore, this appeal of the Rehearing Order is not moot as a

result of dismissal of the debtor’s Chapter 13 case because the Stipulated

Order–the Order from which the debtor seeks relief–was not vacated when the

case was dismissed.15 Accordingly, if we were to hold that the bankruptcy court

erred in refusing to set the Stipulated Order aside (which we do not), we could

render effective relief.16 

The Rehearing Order was entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b). It is not argued, nor could it be, that the bankruptcy court erred

as a matter of law in applying Rule 60(b). The only issue, therefore, is whether

the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in refusing to afford the debtor relief

from the Stipulated Order.17 A trial court abuses its discretion only if “the

appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that [it] made a clear error of

judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”18

Applying this standard of review, we affirm the Rehearing Order. 

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 6 of 9
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

20 See, e.g., State Bank v. Gledhill (In re Gledhill), 76 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir. 1996); Good, 281 B.R. at 699.

21 See, e.g., Thomas v. Colorado Trust Deed Funds, Inc., 366 F.2d 136, 139

(10th Cir. 1966) (party sought to set order aside under Rule 60(b) where attorney

allegedly compromised claim without client’s consent).

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Rule 60(b) states that:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a

party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could

not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule

59(b); (3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an

adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been

satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it

is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer

equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment.19

Relief under Rule 60(b) is afforded only in exceptional circumstances.20 

The bankruptcy court refused to set aside the Stipulated Order based on its

conclusion that the debtor failed establish any grounds for relief under Rule

60(b). We agree. None of the grounds for setting aside a final order stated in

Rule 60(b) was established by the debtor below and, therefore, the Rehearing

Order is affirmed.

The debtor’s primary argument on appeal is that the bankruptcy court erred

in refusing to vacate the Stipulated Order because the debtor did not authorize his

attorney to enter into the agreement set forth therein. Assuming that lack of

authority to settle Davis’s claim is a basis on which to set the Stipulated Order

aside under Rule 60(b),21 the bankruptcy court did not err in denying the

Rehearing Motion because the debtor did not present any evidence that his

attorney acted without his consent. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

has stated:

The law is settled that an attorney of record may not compromise,

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 7 of 9
22 Id. (citations omitted); accord Hayes v. Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d

892, 893 (10th Cir. 1975) (attorney does not have authority to settle absent client

consent, and any presumption of authority is “rebutted easily” by the party

questioning it), quoted in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Oaklawn Apts., 959 F.2d

170, 175 (10th Cir. 1992); see Yahola Sand & Gravel Co. v. Marx, 358 P.2d 366,

372 (Okla. 1960) (an attorney has no power to compromise a claim without

express consent, but the client ratifies his attorney’s acts “if he does not disavow

it the first moment he receives knowledge that his attorney has transcended his

authority.”) (quoting Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 87 A.2d 192, 193 (Pa. 1952)).

23 Appellant’s Brief at 17.

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settle, or consent to a final disposition of his client’s case without

express authority. However, this general principle must be

considered in connection with the rule that an attorney of record is

presumed to have authority to compromise and settle litigation of his

client, and a judgment entered upon an agreement by the attorney of

record will be set aside only upon affirmative proof by the party

seeking to vacate the judgment that the attorney had no right to

consent to its entry.22

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not err in presuming that the debtor’s

attorney, who was undisputably the debtor’s counsel of record at all times relative

to the Stipulated Order, had authority from the debtor to settle Davis’s claim, and

absent evidence rebutting the presumption of authority, it did not err in refusing

to set the Stipulation Order aside. 

In conjunction with his argument that his attorney lacked authority to settle

Davis’s claim, the debtor asserts that he has a malpractice claim against the

attorney. We do not address that allegation because it is not properly before us. 

Any malpractice claim that the debtor believes he has against the attorney must be

pursued by commencing an action against the attorney in an appropriate forum.

The debtor also states that Davis’s attorneys “have fabricated evidence to

deceive the bankruptcy court” in order to obtain funds from the Chapter 13

trustee.23 While fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an adverse party are

grounds to set an order aside under Rule 60(b)(3), the bankruptcy court did not

err in refusing to apply it in this case because the debtor did not present any

evidence supporting his allegations to the bankruptcy court. Furthermore, the

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 8 of 9
24 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b) & 507; 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1), (2)(A)-(B) & 1334(b); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019.

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debtor does not claim that the Stipulated Order was procured by the misconduct

of Davis’s attorneys; but, rather that they are now engaging in some type of

misconduct to obtain funds from the trustee. Such allegations are not grounds for

setting the Stipulated Order aside under Rule 60(b). 

Additionally, the debtor challenges the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to

enter the Stipulated Order. While an order entered by a court lacking subject

matter jurisdiction over a matter may be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4) as “void,”

the debtor’s arguments are without merit because the bankruptcy court had

jurisdiction to enter the Stipulated Order.24

Finally, the debtor states that the rate of interest on Davis’s claim allowed

in the Stipulated Order is not appropriate as a matter of law. We cannot address

this argument because it is an attack of the Stipulated Order, which is now final

and not subject to appeal. 

III. CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court’s Rehearing Order is AFFIRMED.

BAP Appeal No. 05-2 Docket No. 24 Filed: 04/26/2005 Page: 9 of 9