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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 2007 Decided February 1, 2008 

No. 05-5320 

HERBERT BROWN, 

APPELLANT

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 04cv02195) 

Richard H. Frankel, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause for amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on 

the briefs were Steven H. Goldblatt, Director, and Michael 

Hass, Brendon DeMay, Christian D'Avignon-Aubut, and 

Damon Elder, Student Counsel. 

Herbert Brown, pro se, was on the brief for appellant. 

Mary L. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for appellees District of Columbia, et al. 

With her on the brief were Linda Singer, Attorney General, 

USCA Case #05-5320 Document #1096349 Filed: 02/01/2008 Page 1 of 14
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Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Edward E. Schwab, 

Deputy Solicitor General. 

Eileen Dennis Gilbride argued the cause for appellee 

Corrections Corporation of America. With her on the brief 

was Daniel P. Struck. 

Adele P. Kimmel was on the brief for amici curiae DC 

Prisoners' Project of the Washington Lawyers' Committee for 

Civil Rights and Urban Affairs in support of appellant. 

Arthur B. Spitzer and Deborah M. Golden entered 

appearances. 

Before: GARLAND and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Herbert Brown, a prisoner, 

claims that his custodians’ failure to provide adequate medical 

care amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment. He sued the District of Columbia 

(“District”) and the Corrections Corporation of America 

(“CCA”), along with former Attorney General John 

Ashcroft,1 three high-ranking District officials including the 

mayor, and several District and CCA employees in their 

individual capacities. 

 The district court dismissed Brown’s complaint against 

the District, CCA, and the District officials for failure to state 

 

1

 Because a panel of this court has summarily affirmed the district 

court’s dismissal of Brown’s claim against the former Attorney 

General, Brown v. District of Columbia, No. 05-5320 (D.C. Cir. 

May 23, 2006), we do not discuss Brown’s claims against Ashcroft. 

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a claim. We affirm these dismissals in all respects but two. 

We reverse the dismissal of Brown’s claim against the 

District for the violation of his rights while in the District’s 

prison in Lorton, Virginia. The district court also dismissed 

Brown’s complaint against the District employees and the 

CCA employees because Brown failed to serve them. We 

reverse this dismissal, too. Our reasons follow. 

I.

A. 

 Brown’s complaint alleges a spate of harms, which we 

must take as true when reviewing the dismissal of his claims.2

 

Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). From 1991 

through 1997, Brown was incarcerated in the District’s 

Occoquan Correctional Facility in Lorton, Virginia.3

 

Although Brown entered the prison in good health, over the 

next five years his health deteriorated. He experienced severe 

headaches, constipation, loss of appetite, yellowed eyes, and 

pains in his chest, stomach, lower back, and penis. Several 

medical personnel at the prison wrongly diagnosed Brown or 

ignored his requests for treatment. Because of these failures, 

Brown suffered an inflamed liver, jaundice, and a medley of 

other maladies. 

 Finally, a Dr. Rafford diagnosed Brown with gallstones 

and ordered his immediate transfer to D.C. General Hospital 

for treatment. For the next sixty days prison officials failed to 

 

2

 Brown filed pro se in district court. On appeal he submitted a pro 

se brief and also joined the brief of appointed amicus curiae. All 

quotations from Brown’s filings are reproduced verbatim. 

3

 The record is devoid of any information regarding the nature of 

Brown’s crime or the terms of his sentence, neither of which is 

relevant to our disposition of his appeal. 

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make the transfer while Brown continued to complain of 

intense pain. Not until Dr. Rafford saw Brown a second time, 

made the same diagnosis, and again ordered his immediate 

transfer did prison officials finally comply. At the hospital, 

Brown underwent surgery that removed eighteen gallstones 

blocking his urinary tract. After he returned to the Lorton 

prison, Brown continued to complain of similar symptoms. 

Over the next several months, the prison’s medical staff again 

refused to treat him or wrongly diagnosed his condition. In 

one instance, a medical assistant diagnosed food poisoning 

and ordered Brown’s transfer to a hospital, but prison officials 

again refused. 

 In 1997 the District transferred Brown to the Northeast 

Ohio Correctional Center, a private prison owned and 

operated by CCA in Youngstown, Ohio that houses inmates 

for the Federal Bureau of Prisons. There, Brown’s experience 

with inadequate medical care continued. In one instance, a 

Dr. Mazzi prescribed diabetes medication for Brown without 

ever examining him. After months of suffering from the 

medication’s ill effects, Brown learned that he did not have 

the disease. At both the Virginia and Ohio facilities, Brown 

filed numerous grievances informing prison officials and the 

District of his plight. 

B. 

 In December 2004 Brown filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, which creates a cause of action against state and local 

officials for violations of federal rights. The statute reads: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 

State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

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subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 

the party injured. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brown claimed that the District, CCA, and 

several individuals denied him adequate medical care in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. The individual 

defendants4

 he sought to hold personally liable include three 

District officials (Odie Washington, Director of the D.C. 

Department of Corrections; Elwood York, Director of 

External Confinement in the D.C. Department of Corrections; 

and Anthony Williams, former mayor of the District of 

Columbia); six doctors at the Lorton prison (Taylor, Marzban, 

K. R. Sorem, Ferry, Park, and Easted); and nine employees5 at 

CCA’s Ohio prison (Mazzi, Willis Gibson, A. Warfield, R. 

Adams, M. Perryman, A. Sims, J. Bass, B. Goodrich, and J. 

Cerimele). He served the District and defendants Williams, 

Washington, and York, but failed to serve the remaining 

individuals. Although CCA accepted service, it never 

appeared in district court. The District, along with defendants 

Williams, Washington, and York, filed a motion to dismiss. 

 On August 1, 2005 the district court dismissed Brown’s 

action in its entirety. Brown v. District of Columbia, No. 04-

2195 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2005). The court concluded that 

Brown failed to state a claim against either the District or 

CCA because his treatment at the hands of various prison 

doctors did not violate the Eighth Amendment: “Although 

 

4

 We use the defendants’ names as Brown used them in his 

complaint. 

5

 CCA disputes whether these individuals are employees, but we 

need not reach this issue. 

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there may have been delays in rendering treatment, 

displeasure as to the quality of treatment, or disagreement 

about the course of treatment, the plaintiff’s complaint makes 

clear that indeed he received treatment. Negligence does not 

rise to the level of deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s 

serious medical needs.” Id. at *5. The court also reasoned 

that even if Brown had stated an Eighth Amendment 

violation, he failed to make allegations which, if true, would 

hold the District liable. His claim against the District, at best, 

was based on a theory of respondeat superior, insufficient 

under well-established precedent. Id. at *6-7. In addition, the 

court dismissed the claims against defendants Williams, 

Washington, and York because Brown failed to allege that 

these public officials were personally involved in the 

decisions adversely affecting Brown’s rights. Id. at *7. 

Finally, the court dismissed sua sponte the claims against the 

CCA and District employees because Brown did not serve 

them. Id. at *4. 

 Brown appeals the decision in all respects. The district 

court exercised jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. Our review is de novo. Browning v. Clinton, 292 

F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (dismissal for failure to state a 

claim); Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of 

Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (dismissal for 

lack of personal jurisdiction). “[W]hen ruling on a 

defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all 

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” 

Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200. Moreover, “[a] document filed 

pro se is to be liberally construed . . . and a pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

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II. 

Brown argues that the district court erred in dismissing 

his claims against the District for alleged failures of medical 

care. We agree. 

A. 

 A municipality is a “person” subject to suit under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, although its liability is limited. Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To 

determine whether a plaintiff can hold a municipality liable 

under § 1983, we must answer two questions. “First, the 

court must determine whether the complaint states a claim for 

a predicate constitutional violation. Second, if so, then the 

court must determine whether the complaint states a claim 

that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the 

violation.” Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 

1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker 

Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992)). 

 Brown’s complaint alleges a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual 

punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Supreme 

Court has placed within the ambit of this prohibition 

“punishments . . . which involve the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 

(1976). When a prisoner claims that his custodian has 

violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide 

adequate medical care, he “must allege acts or omissions 

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. One example of such 

“deliberate indifference” is a prison doctor or official who 

“intentionally den[ies] or delay[s] access to medical care or 

intentionally interfere[s] with the treatment once prescribed.” 

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Id. at 105. A claim of negligence is insufficient. Id. at 105-

06. 

 The court must next determine whether the plaintiff has 

alleged facts sufficient to hold the municipality liable. Under 

Monell, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 

for an injury inflicted by its employees or agents. Instead, it 

is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . 

inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is 

responsible under § 1983.” 436 U.S. at 694. We have found 

a number of ways a municipality can adopt a policy or custom 

that might create liability, see Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306; 

Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 

2004), only one of which is relevant to Brown’s allegations: 

“the failure of the government to respond to a need . . . in 

such a manner as to show ‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk 

that not addressing the need will result in constitutional 

violations.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306 (quoting City of Canton 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). As Baker explains, 

“deliberate indifference is determined by analyzing whether 

the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of 

constitutional violations.” Id. at 1307. 

 

B. 

 Applying the Monell analysis, we conclude that Brown’s 

allegations state a claim that the District violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights at the Lorton prison. Although the task of 

discerning what constitutes a “serious medical need” under 

Estelle may prove vexing at the margins, Brown’s claim gives 

us no pause. His jeremiad reaches a climax in recounting his 

experience with gallstones. The intense and often relentless 

pain that accompanies this condition, and the complications 

that can follow, easily push Brown’s claim into the category 

of serious medical needs. See, e.g., Toombs v. Bell, 798 F.2d 

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297, 298 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that alleged gallstones 

constituted a serious medical need). In fact, the government 

concedes this point. Brief for the District of Columbia at 13 

(“Brown’s allegation . . . is adequate to state a serious medical 

need”). 

 Furthermore, Brown claims that prison officials 

demonstrated “deliberate indifference” to his condition. 

Although Dr. Rafford diagnosed Brown with gallstones and 

“ordered [him] to be immediately transfered to the D.C. 

General Hospital for treatment,” Compl. ¶ 17, he “was never 

transfered . . . and continued to report to the infirmary with 

complaints of Pain and stomach sickness for an additional 

(60) sixty days,” id. ¶ 21. Brown also alleges that “the 

defendants subjected [him] to an Unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain out of delibrate indifference . . . to his 

serious medical needs.” Id. ¶ 38. The government’s attempt 

to style Brown’s claim as mere griping about the quality or 

course of treatment misstates the gravamen of the allegation. 

After Dr. Rafford notified prison officials of Brown’s need for 

immediate hospitalization, they failed to transfer him for sixty 

days while he continued to suffer from gallstones. Presented 

with these claims, we do not hesitate to conclude that Brown 

alleges an Eighth Amendment violation. 

 Brown also avers facts sufficient to hold the District 

liable under Monell because he alleges that the District failed 

to act even though it “knew or should have known of the risk 

of constitutional violations.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1307. 

Brown claims that he filed numerous grievances, Compl. 

¶¶ 36, 42, and that “the District of Columbia sat idly by while 

the plaintiffs serious medical needs were ignored after 

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plaintiff had informed them of his medical needs,” id. ¶ 38.6

 

As this court interpreted Monell in Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306, 

these allegations are sufficient to state a claim that a custom 

or policy of the municipality caused the underlying 

constitutional violation. 

 Brown should have the chance to prove the case he has 

sufficiently pled. We therefore reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of Brown’s claim against the District for the alleged 

Eighth Amendment violations that occurred while he was 

incarcerated at the Lorton facility.7

 We also affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of Brown’s claim that the District is liable 

for the alleged harms committed by CCA because, as we 

explain in Section IV, his claim against CCA is barred by res 

judicata. 

 

6

 Aside from his general claim that “all grievances [have] been 

exhausted,” Compl. ¶ 42, Brown does not expressly state that he 

informed District officials of his condition during the sixty days 

after Dr. Rafford first ordered his transfer to the hospital and before 

prison officials complied with the order. However, construing the 

plaintiff’s complaint liberally as we are required to do on a motion 

to dismiss and mindful of the Court’s instruction to hold a pro se 

complaint to “less stringent standards,” Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 

2200, we conclude that Brown pleads sufficient knowledge by the 

District as required by Baker. 326 F.3d at 1307. 

7

 The complaint alleges several instances in which the District 

failed to provide Brown medical care at the Lorton facility, which 

Brown may or may not have intended as separate claims. The 

district court did not identify distinct claims and neither do we. On 

remand the court may consider whether Brown raises one or more 

claims separate from the gallstones claim and then determine in 

each instance whether Brown states a claim for relief. 

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III. 

 Brown also claims that Washington, York, and former 

Mayor Williams are personally liable for the Eighth 

Amendment violations that occurred from 1995-1997 while 

he was at the Lorton facility and before he was transfered 

sometime in 1997 to the CCA facility in Youngstown, Ohio. 

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of these claims. 

 We take judicial notice of the fact that Williams did not 

begin his first term of office as mayor until 1999 and 

Washington received his appointment as Director of the D.C. 

Department of Corrections that same year, see Res. 13-138, 

Dir. of the Dep’t of Corr. Odie Washington Confirmation 

Resolution of 1999, 46 D.C. Reg. 5517 (June 8, 1999), and 

accordingly affirm dismissal of the claims against them. See 

FED. R. EVID. 201. Brown also fails to state a claim against 

York. Under the theory of supervisory liability that Brown 

asserts, the plaintiff must allege that the official “was 

responsible for supervising the wrongdoer.” Haynesworth v. 

Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Brown only 

avers, however, that York supervised the care of prisoners 

“housed in contract facilities.” Compl. ¶ 4. The prison in 

Lorton, Virginia was not a contract facility and therefore we 

affirm dismissal of the claim against York. 

IV. 

 Brown also argues on appeal that the district court erred 

when it dismissed his claim against CCA for alleged 

violations that occurred while he was a prisoner at the 

Northeast Ohio Correctional Facility. These allegations 

resemble those he makes against the District for failure to 

provide medical care. We affirm the district court’s dismissal 

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of this claim, although we do so on the ground of res judicata, 

an argument CCA makes for the first time on appeal. 

 CCA argues that Brown is attempting to re-litigate an 

issue on appeal already decided by a federal court in Brown v. 

CCA, No. 03-822 (N.D. Ohio 2003). Before we address 

CCA’s argument, we must first decide whether CCA, which 

did not appear before the district court in this matter even 

though it was properly served, can raise the affirmative 

defense of res judicata for the first time on appeal. Typically 

a defendant must plead the defense in the answer to the 

complaint. Poulin v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 

1987). But in Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals, 127 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1997), this court said that 

because res judicata protects not only the interests of a 

particular party but the interests of the court, we may consider 

it for the first time on appeal where the defendant has not 

forfeited the defense, the relevant facts are uncontroverted, 

and a failure to consider it would only cause delay. Id. at 77. 

 These factors are all present here. In Stanton, the 

defendant retained the right to argue res judicata because the 

district court ruled on a dispositive motion before the 

defendant had answered the complaint, leaving him free to 

assert the defense on remand. Id. Likewise, CCA has not 

forfeited the right to raise the defense here. Although CCA 

risked entry of a default judgment on account of its absence, it 

did not thereby forfeit the right to answer Brown’s complaint 

and raise the defense if the district court’s dismissal in its 

favor was later reversed. Moreover, the relevant facts are 

uncontroverted. Neither Brown nor the appointed amicus 

curiae identifies any factual disputes that arise in connection 

with Brown’s earlier lawsuit. Finally, not to consider the 

defense now would only engender delay because CCA would 

be free to raise it on remand. 

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 Therefore, we properly consider the res judicata defense 

for the first time on appeal and hold that it bars Brown’s 

claims against CCA. In the previous case, Brown brought the 

identical claim against CCA that he brings now: Dr. Mazzi 

prescribed diabetic medication for Brown when in fact Brown 

did not have diabetes. Brown v. CCA, No. 03-822, at *1 

(N.D. Ohio 2003). The court dismissed that case because the 

governing statute of limitations barred the action. Id. at *2. 

Brown does not dispute that res judicata would bar his claim 

against CCA for the actions of Dr. Mazzi. But Brown argues 

that he has raised a separate claim against CCA that its 

medical staff acted with deliberate indifference in failing to 

diagnose his hepatitis while he was incarcerated at the CCA 

facility. We find no such claim. Nowhere in his complaint or 

other pleadings does Brown allege that medical personnel 

working at CCA, other than Dr. Mazzi, refused to diagnose 

him or otherwise showed deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical need. Brown’s claim against CCA for the conduct of 

Dr. Mazzi is barred by res judicata and Brown otherwise fails 

to state a claim for relief against CCA. 

V. 

Finally, Brown contends that the district court erred in 

dismissing for lack of proper service his claims against the six 

District and nine CCA employees, all of whom Brown sued in 

their individual capacities. We agree. 

 Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

requires the court to give the plaintiff notice prior to dismissal 

for lack of service: 

If service of the summons and complaint is not 

made upon a defendant within 120 days after 

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the filing of the complaint, the court, upon 

motion or on its own initiative after notice to 

the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without 

prejudice as to that defendant or direct that 

service be effected within a specific time; 

provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause 

for the failure, the court shall extend the time 

for service for an appropriate period. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (emphasis added). Interpreting a 

predecessor of Rule 4(m), this court held that a district court 

errs when it dismisses a suit for failure to effect service and 

the plaintiff is “neither actually nor constructively on notice 

as to the impending sua sponte dismissal.” Smith-Bey v. 

Cripe, 852 F.2d 592, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This rule is 

especially important to a plaintiff who is pro se and 

incarcerated because of his limited ability to ensure proper 

service. Id. at 594. The record, however, gives no indication 

that Brown received the requisite notice. 

VI. 

 We affirm the dismissal of the claims against CCA, the 

District for alleged violations committed by CCA, and the 

high-ranking District officials. We reverse the dismissal of 

the claims against the District for alleged violations at the 

Lorton facility and the dismissal of the claims against the nine 

CCA and six District employees for failure to serve, and 

remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

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