Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02381/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02381-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 5/2/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

BF&W ASSOCIATES,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MOTOROLA, INC.,

 Defendant.

Case Number C 05-02381 JF

ORDER1 GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Docket No. 39]

I. BACKGROUND

On November 12, 2004, Plaintiff BF&W Associates (“BF&W”) filed its original

complaint against Defendants Motorola, Inc. (“Motorola”), Janiece Webb (“Webb”), Philippe

Kahn (“Kahn”), Eli Porat (“Porat”) Jens Hortsman (“Hortsman”), and Uecker & Associates, Inc.

(“Uecker & Associates”) in the Santa Clara Superior Court. BF&W alleged five claims: (1)

breach of contract, (2) account stated, (3) quantum meruit, (4) conversion, (5) breach of fiduciary

duty, and (6) unfair business practices. Motorola, Kahn, and Uecker & Associates filed

demurrers, which the state court sustained in part and overruled in part. BF&W settled with

Case 5:05-cv-02381-JF Document 59 Filed 05/02/06 Page 1 of 13
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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

Uecker & Associates and dismissed its claims against Porat.

On May 6, 2005, BF&W filed its First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in the Santa Clara

Superior Court, against Defendants Motorola, Webb, Kahn, and Hortsman. BF&W dismissed

Kahn and Hortsman, and Motorola and Webb removed the action to this Court. On June 16,

2005, Motorola and Webb moved to dismiss BF&W’s claims for quantum meruit and

misappropriation of trade secrets. On the same date, BF&W moved to strike all claims for

punitive damages from the FAC. On August 15, 2005, this Court issued an order (1) dismissing

the claim for quantum meruit on the ground that the underlying agreement was for services rather

than for goods, subjecting it to a two-year, rather than a four-year, statute of limitations; the

Court granted “leave to amend so that BF&W [could] attempt to allege facts bringing the claim

within the exception [for contracts for the sale of goods];” (2) dismissing the claim for

misappropriation on the ground that it was barred by the applicable three-year statute of

limitations, granting “leave to amend so that BF&W [could] attempt to allege facts

demonstrating accrual within the three-year limitations period;” and (3) granting the motion to

strike claims for punitive damages.

On September 13, 2005, BF&W filed its Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), naming

Motorola as the only Defendant. Motorola moved to dismiss the SAC as time-barred based on

the alleged accrual date of January 5, 2000. BF&W filed a notice of errata, stating that the date

of January 5, 2000 was a typographical error and that the correct accrual date is January 5, 2001. 

At a case management conference on October 14, 2005, BF&W agreed to submit an amended

complaint containing the January 5, 2001 date. On October 17, 2005, BF&W filed the operative

Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). BF&W alleges five claims: (1) breach of written contract,

(2) breach of implied-in-fact contract, (3) quantum valebant / quantum meruit, (4) breach of

fiduciary duty as an agent, and (5) breach of fiduciary duty as a controlling shareholder. BF&W

also alleges alter ego and successor liability, though it does not reallege claims for punitive

damages. Motorola now moves to dismiss all claims on the ground that they are barred by the

applicable statutes of limitations. Motorola argues that none of the current claims, except for the

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

claim for quantum meruit, relates back to claims raised in the original complaint. Motorola also

argues that the claim for quantum meruit, although it does relate back, is nevertheless barred by

the applicable statue of limitations.

BF&W alleges the following facts in the TAC. BF&W owns a building in San Jose,

California, which it leased to OpenGrid, Inc., formerly known as Ensemble Solutions, Inc.

(collectively, “OpenGrid”) on April 19, 2000. OpenGrid breached its lease with BF&W, and, on

November 22, 2002, BF&W obtained a judgment against OpenGrid in the amount of

$1,308,684.23. OpenGrid assigned to Uecker & Associates the claims that BF&W now brings. 

On November 12, 2004, BF&W filed the instant action as a beneficiary of this assignment and as

a judgment creditor of OpenGrid. Since the filing of the action, BF&W has received an

assignment of OpenGrid’s claims from Uecker & Associates.

OpenGrid was a company that created wireless instant messaging technology that could

be adapted for use with cellular telephones. On or about October 7, 1999, OpenGrid entered into

a Series C Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (“Stock Purchase Agreement”) and a Warrant

Agreement with Motorola. Under the Stock Purchase Agreement, Motorola agreed to purchase

more than two million shares of Series C preferred stock in OpenGrid for a total purchase price

of $5,000,000. The parties also agreed “to obtain rights to use [OpenGrid’s] Technology in or

with Motorola’s wireless telecommunications products” and “to distribute by sublicense

[OpenGrid’s] Technology for use by third parties as incorporated into Motorola’s wireless

telecommunications products directly and indirectly through multiple tiers of distribution.” They

agreed also that “[u]pon receiving notice of any licensing opportunity, Motorola was required to

promptly inform OpenGrid in writing if it did not wish to license OpenGrid’s technology.” 

Under the Warrant Agreement, Motorola “agreed to exercise ‘commercially reasonable efforts’

to assist OpenGrid in finding customers for OpenGrid’s technology, with the goal of achieving

certain specified customer and revenue objectives.” One of the objectives to which Motorola

agreed was that Motorola would license and distribute OpenGrid’s technology “‘as part of a

Motorola product offering.’”

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under

a cognizable legal theory. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robertson v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). For purposes of a motion to

dismiss, all allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754 (9th Cir. 1994). A complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Id.

However, the Court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Id. at

754-55. Motions to dismiss generally are viewed with disfavor under this liberal standard and

are granted rarely. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997).

III. DISCUSSION

As alleged by BF&W, the alleged claims arose no earlier than January 5, 2001. BF&W

alleges that “on or about January 5, 2001, without any explanation or justification, Motorola

cancelled the Alien phone and cancelled the license of OpenGrid’s technology.” Additional

claims may have arisen subsequently: “Motorola subsequently refused, without any explanation

or justification, to distribute OpenGrid’s technology under a license with any of its products.” 

The only other dates identified in the TAC are the date of OpenGrid’s lease agreement with

BF&W, the dates on which the Stock Purchase Agreement and the Warrant Agreement were

entered into, and the dates of relevant legal action. Accordingly, in evaluating whether BF&W

has alleged the claims in the TAC within the relevant periods of limitation, the Court will use

January 5, 2001 as the date upon which the claims arose.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2) provides, in part, that “[a]n amendment of a

pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the claim or defense asserted

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). The Ninth Circuit

has held that relation back will be found “when the claim to be added will likely be proved by the

same kind of evidence offered in support of the original pleading.” In re Dominguez, 51 F.3d

1502, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). In analyzing whether new claims relate

back, a court must “consider whether the original and amended pleadings share a common core

of operative facts so that the adverse party has fair notice of the transaction, occurrence, or

conduct called into question.” Martell v. Trilogy Ltd., 872 F.2d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1989). When

“there is some doubt as to whether the cause is clearly barred, the rule should be liberally

construed, and especially is this so where the defendant is put to no disadvantage.” DeMalherbe

v. Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors, 449 F.Supp. 1335, 1353 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (internal

quotations omitted).

BF&W argues that a recent Supreme Court case, Mayle v. Felix, 125 S.Ct. 2562 (2005),

stands for the proposition that “an amendment based on facts not previously alleged may still

‘relate back.’” This mistates the holding of Mayle. The Supreme Court instead held that the

Ninth Circuit’s allowance of amendments to habeas corpus petitions “so long as the new claim

stems from the habeas petitioner’s trial, conviction, or sentence,” was too broad. Id. at 2570. 

Rather, an amended claim in a habeas petition relates back only if it shares a “common core of

operative facts” with the original claim. Id. at 2574. The Court distinguished Tiller v. Atlantic

Coast Line R. Co., 323 U.S. 574, 580-81(1945), in which the Court “held that the amendment

related back, and therefore avoided a statute of limitations bar, even though the amendment

invoked a legal theory not suggested by the original complaint and relied on facts not originally

asserted.” Mayle, 125 S.Ct. at 2572. The Court noted that the plaintiff in Tiller “based her

complaint on a single ‘occurrence,’ an accident resulting in her husband’s death.” Id. (emphasis

added). In contrast, the petitioner in Mayle “targeted separate episodes, the pretrial police

interrogation of witness Williams in his original petition, his own interrogation at a different time

and place in his amended petition.” Id.

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 BF&W cites California Commercial Code § 2725 for this proposition, while Motorola

cites California Code of Civil Procedure § 337.

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

BF&W also argues that its broad amendments should be allowed because it only recently

discovered the contracts that are the bases for the new allegations. It asserts that because it is a

judgment creditor, it did not have access previously to all of OpenGrid’s agreements. It contends

that because plaintiffs are generally not required to “plead facts which are peculiarly within the

control of defendants,” In re Network Equipment Tech., Inc., Litigation 762 F.Supp. 1359, 1366

(N.D. Cal. 1991), it may amend its complaint to include these new allegations. However, the

cases cited by BF&W to support this argument do not address the question of when new

allegations relate back to previous allegations for purposes of tolling a statute of limitations.

BF&W argues separately that all of the statutes of limitations in the present action should

be extended by one year, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 708.230(a): 

an action shall be commenced pursuant to this article before the expiration of the

later of the following times:

(1) The time when the judgment debtor may bring an action against the

third person concerning the property or debt.

(2) One year after creation of a lien on the property or debt pursuant to this

title if the lien is created at the time when the judgment debtor may bring an

action against the third person concerning the property or debt.

(emphasis added). However, the present action was not commenced pursuant to the Creditor’s

Suit Article of the California Code of Civil Procedure, § 708.210 et seq. BF&W has not 

invoked this statute in any pleading or motion paper prior to its opposition to the instant motion.

Moreover, although the statute expressly precludes the right to a jury trial, Cal. Civ. Code §

708.270, BF&W has demanded a jury trial here. Accordingly, the Court concludes that §

708.230 does not apply.

1. Breach of written contract and implied-in-fact contract

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for the claim for breach of

written contract is four years.2 However, they disagree about the applicable statute of limitations

for the claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract. Motorola contends that it is two years,

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 339, while BF&W contends that it is four years,

pursuant to California Commercial Code §§ 2725 and 1201(3). The Court need not resolve this

dispute here, because it concludes that neither the claim for breach of written contract nor for

breach of an implied-in-fact contract relates back. Even assuming that the statute of limitations

for each claim is four years, both are time-barred.

BF&W’s claim for breach of written contract alleges that Motorola breached the Stock

Purchase Agreement and the Warrant Agreement by cancelling “the Alien phone” and “the

license of OpenGrid’s technology,” and by subsequently refusing “to distribute OpenGrid’s

technology under a license with any of its products.” The “license and distribution of

OpenGrid’s technology” had been “the essence and predominant purpose of the agreements

between the parties.” After the alleged breach, “Motorola simply claimed Opengrid’s [sic]

technology as its own and distributed OpenGrid’s technology without a license and without

compensating OpenGrid.” BF&W’s claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract alleges that

“[u]nder the implied license agreement, Motorola was required to distribute OpenGrid’s

technology with Motorola’s products, to pay OpenGrid reasonable royalties thereon and to pay

the reasonable value for the custom development and installation of OpenGrid’s technology.”

Motorola argues that these claims do not relate back to the original complaint because the

original complaint does not refer to any alleged breach of the Stock Purchase Agreement, the

Warrant Agreement, or any implied licensing agreement. Instead, the original complaint

asserted a claim for breach of contract based on an alleged agreement that, as described therein,

was materially different from the contracts alleged in the TAC. The breach of contract claim in

the original complaint states in relevant part: “On or about May 20, 2000, Motorola agreed in

writing to pay OpenGrid a minimum of one million dollars ($1,000,000) for services relating to

the custom development, integration, testing, maintenance, support and hosting of OpenGrid’s

proprietary Intelligent Messaging Solution, an instant messaging technology which was to be

incorporated into Motorola cell phones under a license.” BF&W alleged that OpenGrid

performed all services required under this agreement, and, on November 15, 2001, delivered an

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

invoice to Motorola for $1,175,000. BF&W sought payment of this alleged unpaid invoice.

BF&W argues that all of the claims in the original and amended complaints relate to the

“ultimate wrongful act,” which was “Motorola’s misappropriation of OpenGrid’s technology.” It

contends that Motorola had notice of “the facts giving rise to the Stock Purchase Agreement and

Warrant Agreement because Plaintiff alleged that Motorola’s strategy was to acquire OpenGrid’s

technology as part of an investment.” However, the original complaint alleges only that

Motorola agreed to a services contract with OpenGrid. While the original complaint does

include allegations that Motorola invested in OpenGrid, there is no suggestion, express or

implied, that this investment was done as part of a licensing agreement. While the original

complaint refers to a license in the context of alleging that the Intelligent Messaging Solution

was “an instant messaging technology with was to be incorporated into Motorola cell phones

under a license,” this allegation offered only by way of description. There is no allegation in the

original complaint that there was any breach of or problem with this alleged license. 

Accordingly, the original complaint did not put Motorola on notice of the breach of written

contract and breach of implied-in-fact contract claims alleged in the TAC, and nor are these

claims based on the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set

forth in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).

BF&W compares the instant situation to that in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Nevada Power

Co., 950 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1991). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that “Union Pacific's

reference to only Tariff 6034 in its original complaint does not foreclose its subsequent request

for recovery of reparations made under Tariff 6020.” Id. at 1432. However, that court went on

to explain:

Union Pacific's claim under Tariff 6020 arose as a direct result of the facts surrounding

its claim under Tariff 6034. When Union Pacific cancelled Tariff 6034 after ordered to do

so by the ICC, Tariff 6020 automatically became effective, and Union Pacific began

charging rates which later resulted in more reparation payments paid by Union Pacific.

Nevada Power had “fair notice” of the disputed transaction. 

Id (emphasis added). Accordingly, because BF&W’s new contract allegations do not arise as a

direct result of the facts alleged in the original complaint and Motorola did not have fair notice of

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3

 Quantum valebant refers to claims for property, see, e.g., Lake v. Wyatt Earp

Enterprises, Inc., 26 Cal.Rptr. 683, 686 (Ct. App. 1962), while quantum meruit “refers to the

well-established principle that ‘the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under

circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered.’” Huskinson & Brown, LLP v.

Wolf, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 696 (2004) (quoting Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal.2d 334, 342 (1938)). 

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

these new allegations, Union Pacific does not provide support for BF&W’s position. 

Additionally, while “[i]n close cases, the prejudice to the defendant from allowing the claim to

relate back may be dispositive,” DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors,

449 F. Supp. 1335, 1353 (D.C. Cal. 1978), this Court need not evaluate the prejudice to the

defendant because it concludes that the new allegations clearly were not pled in the original

complaint.

The terms of the Stock Purchase Agreement, which is referenced in the TAC and may be

considered by the Court, see, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 970

(9th Cir. 1999), further convince the Court that Motorola was not on notice of the allegations that

it breached a licensing agreement. While the TAC alleges that the Stock Purchase Agreement

obligated Motorola to obtain certain licensing rights to OpenGrid’s technology, the agreement

itself instead obligates OpenGrid to “offer Motorola the opportunity to obtain rights.” FAC, Ex.

A, p. 13. Accordingly, it is unreasonable to conclude that Motorola would have been on notice

of allegations that are related to a contract that was not referenced in the original complaint and

do not conform with the terms of the contract.

While it does not appear that BF&W can allege any additional facts that would alter the

foregoing analysis, the Court notes that these particular claims are asserted for the first time in

the TAC. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claims for breach of contract and breach of

implied-in-fact contract with leave to amend.

3. Quantum valebant / Quantum meruit3

As stated in the original complaint, the quantum meruit claim was “for services relating

to the custom development, integration, testing, maintenance, support and hosting of OpenGrid’s

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

proprietary Intelligent Messaging Solution, an instant messaging technology which was to be

incorporated into Motorola cell phones under a license.” In its August 15, 2005, this Court

dismissed the claim for quantum meruit on the ground that the underlying agreement was for

services rather than for goods, subjecting it to a two-year, rather than a four-year, statute of

limitations. The Court granted “leave to amend so that BF&W may attempt to allege facts

bringing the claim within the exception [for contracts for the sale of goods].”

BF&W’s original claim for quantum meruit alleged in relevant part: “As a direct, legal

and proximate result of Motorola’s failure to pay for the services, OpenGrid was entitled to the

reasonable value of the services provided in the amount of $1,175,000.” In the TAC’s claim for

“quantum valebant / quantum meruit,” BF&W alleges that “[t]he custom development and

installation of OpenGrid’s technology”—the services alleged in the original complaint—“were

incidental to the license and distribution [of] OpenGrid’s technology.” It alleges further that

“[t]he license and distribution of OpenGrid’s technology to Motorola’s customer’s constituted

the essence and predominant purpose of the transactions between the parties.”

To the extent that the new claim alleges a breach of contract for services in the amount of

$1,175,000, it relates back to the claim alleged in the original complaint. However, as stated in

this Court’s Order of August 15, 2005, this claim relates to services and is subject to a two-year

statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Code § 339. To the extent that the new claim alleges that the

services contract was incidental to the licensing and distribution claims, it does not relate back to

the original claim. As discussed above, the new allegations of licensing and distribution

agreements do not relate to the original complaint. The parties dispute whether the applicable

statute of limitations for a claim for quantum valebant (goods) is two or four years. Having

concluded that the new allegations do not relate back to the original complaint, the Court need

not reach this question. Even assuming a four-year statute of limitations, the claim is barred. 

Again, it does not appear that BF&W can allege any additional facts that would alter the

Court’s analysis. In this case, however, BF&W has had several opportunities to plead an

adequate claim. Accordingly, the claim for quantum valebant / quantum meruit will be

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

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(JFLC1)

dismissed without leave to amend.

5. Breach of fiduciary duty as an agent and as a controlling shareholder

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for the claims for breach of

fiduciary duty as an agent and as a controlling shareholder is four years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

343. Motorola argues that these claims do not relate back to the claim in the original complaint

for breach of fiduciary duty. In the original complaint, BF&W alleged that all Defendants – at

that time, including Motorola, Webb, Kahn, Porat, Hortsman, and Uecker & Associates –

“breached their fiduciary duties as the officers, directors and majority shareholders of OpenGrid

by permitting, facilitating and orchestrating the intentional transfer and diversion of OpenGrid’s

instant messaging technology, know-how, development and related services to Motorola for

inadequate consideration.” 

In its TAC, BF&W alleges a claim for breach of fiduciary duty as an agent based on a

relationship between BF&W that was not alleged previously: “Under the terms of the Warrant

Agreement, Motorola agreed to act as OpenGrid’s agent for the purpose of finding customers for

OpneGrid’s technology and products, and agreed to refer these customers to OpenGrid.” 

BF&W’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty as a controlling shareholder also relies on allegations

of a relationship that was not previously alleged, that of a controlling shareholder. However, in

its original complaint, BF&W did allege that Motorola violated California Business &

Professions Code section 17200, et. seq, “as a result of [Motorola’s] improper domination and

control of OpenGrid.”

Because BF&W’s original allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty and the claims in the

TAC of breach of fiduciary duty as an agent and as a controlling shareholder both are based on

the underlying allegation that BF&W engaged in self-dealing, the Court concludes that these

claims do relate back. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss either claim.

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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss

will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth above. 

DATED: May 2, 2006

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-02381-JF Document 59 Filed 05/02/06 Page 12 of 13
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Case No. C 05-02381 JF

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTOROLA’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Andrew L.Y. Chang achang@shb.com, rdarmstadt@shb.com, shicks@shb.com,

mreyes@shb.com, lgildea@shb.com, cmartinez@shb.com,

scastillo@shb.com

Peter W. Gumaer pgumaer@prattattorneys.com, rtrazo@prattattorneys.com

Michael C. Osborne mosborne@shb.com, dcampos@shb.com, shicks@shb.com,

mreyes@shb.com, hstockwell@shb.com

Case 5:05-cv-02381-JF Document 59 Filed 05/02/06 Page 13 of 13