Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00194/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00194-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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KAB

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Taheny,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-23-00194-PHX-JAT (ASB)

ORDER

Plaintiff John Taheny, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Tucson, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants

move for summary judgment. (Doc. 43.) Plaintiff was informed of his rights and 

obligations to respond pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en 

banc) (Doc. 44), and he did not file a response.

1

 

I. Background

On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated 

Eighth Amendment claims against: (1) Defendants Buenacosa and Joshua in their 

individual capacities (Count One), (2) Defendant Centurion (Count Two), and (3)

Defendant Shinn in his individual capacity and Defendant Thornell in his official capacity

1

In Response to an Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff indicated that he intends to 

prosecute this action. (Doc. 46.) Plaintiff offered no cause, however, for extending the 

deadline to file a response to the motion for summary judgment and did not explain why

he did not timely seek an extension of time to file a response. 

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(Count Three), and medical negligence claims against all Defendants (Count Four). (Doc. 

6.) 

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.

II. Legal Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 

movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 

those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 

produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 

1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 

to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 

Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 

favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 

it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 

citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 

all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 

materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

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III. Facts2

On July 29, 2021, Plaintiff fell while playing basketball and suffered pain and 

immobility of his left hand; he submitted a Health Needs Request (HNR) the same day. 

(Doc. 1 at 3.) On July 30, 2021, Plaintiff went to medical and saw Registered Nurse (RN)

Wilson for a left-hand injury with bruising and swelling. (Doc. 41 ¶ 5.) She instructed 

Plaintiff to submit a HNR for a nurse to evaluate his hand and prescribed ice three times 

per day and over-the-counter ibuprofen. (Id.; Doc. 1 at 3.) On July 31, 2021, Plaintiff was 

seen by RN Buenacosa in response to a HNR stating that his hand is hurt and swollen. 

(Doc. 41 ¶ 6.) RN Buenacosa observed that Plaintiff was not in acute distress, had swelling 

to his left first digit extending to base of second, third, and fourth digits, with bruising to 

the left first digit, tender to touch. (Doc. 41 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s color to his hand and capillary 

refills were within normal limits and his skin felt warm and dry to touch. (Id.) Plaintiff’s 

hand was wrapped in an ace bandage, and he was instructed to continue with medical ice 

and ibuprofen; he was informed that a provider would be notified “as soon as available on 

yard.” (Id.) RN Buenacosa told Plaintiff that he would order x-rays and that x-rays would 

be scheduled for August 4, 2021. (Doc. 1 at 3.) 

On August 8, 2021, Plaintiff saw RN Buenacosa in response to an August 7, 2021, 

HNR in which Plaintiff stated that he was still in pain from his hand injury, his hand is very 

weak and tingling, and he needs more ibuprofen and x-rays. (Doc. 41 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff 

complained of unresolved pain and swelling with limited movement to his left second 

finger. (Id.) It was observed that Plaintiff had swelling in the left second finger, some 

weakness in the handgrip due to pain and had limited movement, but he had no 

discoloration, and his capillary refill was within normal limits. (Id.) Plaintiff appeared 

2 Because Plaintiff did not file a response or controverting statement of facts, the 

Court will consider Defendants’ supported facts undisputed unless they are clearly 

controverted by Plaintiff’s first-hand allegations in the verified Complaint or other 

evidence on the record. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (Where the 

nonmovant is a pro se litigant, the Court must consider as evidence in opposition to 

summary judgment all the nonmovant’s contentions set forth in a verified complaint or 

motion.).

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alert and in no acute distress. (Id.) Plaintiff’s finger was placed in a buddy splint for his 

second digit, he was given more ibuprofen, and he was placed on the provider line. (Id.) 

On August 10, 2021, Plaintiff saw NP Joshua for unresolved pain and swelling of 

his left hand, with it affecting his third finger and difficulty flexing his hand. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

Plaintiff stated that the swelling was slowly improving. (Id.) NP Joshua noted that Plaintiff 

was alert and oriented, and in no acute distress, that there was mild swelling of the left 

hand, with no redness or drainage, strength was three out of five, and Plaintiff was unable 

to fully flex his second finger. (Id.) NP Joshua submitted a STAT request for x-rays, 

recommended warm compression, and to continue with non-steroidal anti-inflammatory 

drugs. (Id.) Plaintiff’s finger was wrapped to reduce swelling. (Id.) 

Plaintiff submitted a HNR on August 13, 2021 asserting that this was his third HNR 

and still did not know what was going on with his hand. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff stated that he 

continued to experience swelling, difficulty moving his finger, and that an x-ray had not 

yet been taken. (Id.) On the same day, Plaintiff saw NP Joshua, at which time he also 

complained that the requested x-rays had not yet been taken. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff was 

instructed to wrap his band with ACE bandage and apply ice. (Id.) NP Joshua submitted 

a consultation request to send Plaintiff to the emergency room for swelling. (Id.) 

The same day, Plaintiff was taken to Yuma Regional Medical Center for a left-hand 

injury, extreme swelling and numbness. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with a closed 

displaced fracture of the second metacarpal bone, was placed in a volar splint, was 

prescribed Naproxen, and recommended to see Todd Runyan, an orthopedic specialist. 

(Id.) 

On August 14, 2021, NP Curd reviewed the after-visit summary report from the 

hospital and submitted a consultation request for an offsite visit to orthopedic specialist, 

Dr. Runyan. (Id. ¶ 18.) On August 16, 2021, Plaintiff saw Physician Assistant (PA) Sidi 

for a follow up after his emergency room visit. (Id. ¶ 19.) PA Sidi recommended an urgent 

consultation with an orthopedic specialist, continued use of ibuprofen, and that Plaintiff 

should return to clinic if he had any worsening pain, swelling, erythema, warmth, 

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numbness, and tingling. (Id.) 

On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff had a follow up visit with Dr. Runyan, and he 

recommended Plaintiff return for a subsequent follow up. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was 

evaluated and diagnosed with a left hand closed fracture, and his left lower arm and hand 

were placed in a soft cast. (Id.) Plaintiff was able to move his fingers with no signs of 

impeding circulation noted. (Id.) 

On August 19, 2021, onsite x-rays (taken on August 10, 2021) of Plaintiff’s hand 

that showed an age-indeterminate fracture of the neck of the second metacarpal with mild 

displacement of the distal fragment. (Id. ¶ 21.) On August 20, 2021, Plaintiff was notified 

of the results and informed he would be scheduled for a follow up. (Id.) On August 23, 

2021, per Dr. Runyan’s request, Nurse Practitioner (NP) Curd created a consultation 

request for an offsite visit for a follow with his office. (Id. ¶ 22.) 

On September 16, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a HNR, inquiring about the status of a 

follow up with a hand specialist, and was concerned that if the treatment plan set forth by 

the specialist was not followed, it would not go well for him. (Id.) Plaintiff was informed 

that the consultation was under review and, due to COVID, scheduling was still difficult. 

(Id.) 

On October 18, 2021, Dr. Runyan saw Plaintiff and he did not require any additional 

follow up appointments with his office. (Id. ¶ 24.) On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff 

submitted a HNR complaining that after the removal of his cast, he was experiencing 

nagging pain, continued swelling and stiffness, and asserted he was exercising his hand. 

(Id. ¶ 25.) The same day, RN Buenacosa saw Plaintiff and Plaintiff reported that he had 

been doing exercises to get back to normal and that over-the-counter ibuprofen was not 

addressing his pain. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff was alert and in no acute distress and his left hand 

color and capillary refill were within normal limits. (Id.) It was noted that the bilateral 

handgrips were strong, but that the left handgrip was weaker due to pain. (Id.) Plaintiff 

was informed that his complaints would be forwarded to a provider for review. (Id.) NP 

Joshua reviewed this record on November 22, 2021. (Doc. 41-1 at 64.) 

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On December 10, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a HNR requesting a follow up because 

he continued to experience pain, stiffness, lack of mobility and strength in his hand. (Id. ¶ 

27.) The next day, Plaintiff saw RN Buenacosa and Buenacosa continued ibuprofen and 

instructed Plaintiff to avoid strenuous activities. (Id. ¶ 28.) 

On December 22, 2021, Nursing Director Carli Myers placed an order for x-rays of 

Plaintiff’s left hand to compare to the August 2021 images; x-rays were taken on December 

29, 2021 and the results appeared to be within normal limits. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff was 

encouraged to submit a HNR if he continued to experience pain. (Id.) 

On February 3, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a HNR asking for the results of his x-rays 

and stated that he continues to experience pain, discomfort, and weakness in his hand. (Id. 

¶ 32.) Plaintiff was seen on the nurses’ line. (Id.) On February 4, 2022, Plaintiff saw RN 

Conley for complaints of continued hand pain, discomfort, and weakness. (Id. ¶ 33.) 

Plaintiff complained that he was not able to fully extend his left index finger and that his 

finger appeared shorter than his right and his hand grip was uneven as he could not close 

his left index finger; he was alerted that x-rays of the hand taken in December appeared 

normal, but the RN submitted a request so Plaintiff could see a provider and ibuprofen was 

continued. (Id.) 

Plaintiff saw NP Peeks on February 8, 2022, and he complained of continued lefthand pain and weakness in pointer finger. (Id. ¶ 34.) An evaluation was performed, and it 

was noted that Plaintiff had decreased strength in his left pointer finger. (Id.) A 

consultation request was made for a referral to onsite physical therapy. (Id.) Plaintiff 

began physical therapy on February 15, 2022, and attended seven sessions. (Id. ¶ 35.) 

On March 15, 2022, Plaintiff complained to PT Farley of left hand and wrist pain, 

with weakness, at which time PT Farley recommended Plaintiff use an ace bandage and 

gave him home exercises. (Id. ¶ 36.) On May 3, 2022, Plaintiff saw PT Farley for 

complaints for left wrist pain and secondary metacarpophalangeal (MCP) pain. (Id. ¶ 37.) 

PT Farley stated that Plaintiff would benefit from ice three times a day to address his left 

wrist pain. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff submitted a HNR on May 4, 2022, complaining of continued pain in his 

hand and wrist after participating in physical therapy. (Id. ¶ 38.) He complained that his 

hand was very weak and lacked strength and mobility. (Id.) Plaintiff was placed on the 

nurses’ line. (Id.) That same day, Plaintiff saw RN Amaral and requested a steroid 

injection. (Id. ¶ 39.) RN Amaral noted that Plaintiff’s left hand first knuckle appeared 

slightly depressed looking, with limited range of motion and pain complaints. (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserted that over-the-counter pain medications did not address his pain. (Id.) RN 

Amaral referred Plaintiff to the provider line for evaluation for a possible steroid injection. 

(Id.) 

On May 9, 2022, Plaintiff saw PA Sidi for left hand and wrist concerns that he has 

been experiencing for the last 2-3 months. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff was referred to physical 

therapy and scheduled for a follow-up. (Id.) On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff saw PT Farley, 

who noted that Plaintiff showed progress, however, if Plaintiff showed continued minimal 

progress, then Farley would recommend another x-ray or seeing a hand therapist. (Id. ¶ 

41.) 

On June 2, 2022, Plaintiff saw PA Sidi for a follow-up regarding his pointer finger 

on his left hand and the MCP joint and wrist discomfort and complained that the home 

exercises from physical therapy have done little to help him. (Id. ¶ 42.) Sidi noted that 

Plaintiff’s main concern is his ability to use his dexterity and performing his job after he is 

released from prison. (Id.) PA Sidi discussed risks of potential surgical intervention versus 

conservative management. (Id.) PA Sidi recommended consulting with physical therapy 

regarding the home exercises program. (Id.) 

IV. Discussion

Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff’s 

providers were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, Plaintiff 

has not shown that he was subject to a constitutional deprivation due to a policy, practice,

or custom of Centurion or Director Thornell, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is moot, 

and there is no evidence that Defendants violated any standard of care. 

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A. Eighth Amendment

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a prisoner must demonstrate 

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). There are two prongs 

to this analysis: an objective prong and a subjective prong. First, as to the objective prong, 

a prisoner must show a “serious medical need.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citations omitted). 

A “‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin 

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., 

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). 

Second, as to the subjective prong, a prisoner must show that the defendant’s 

response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. An official acts 

with deliberate indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To satisfy the knowledge 

component, the official must both “be aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Id. “Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when 

they deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 

F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), or when 

they fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

But the deliberate-indifference doctrine is limited; an inadvertent failure to provide 

adequate medical care or negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not 

support an Eighth Amendment claim. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citations omitted); see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (negligence does not rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation). Further, a mere difference in medical opinion does not 

establish deliberate indifference. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due 

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross 

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of Corrs., 

220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical 

malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). A mere delay in medical care, without 

more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See

Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The 

indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. Even if deliberate indifference is 

shown, to support an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must demonstrate harm 

caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

In this case, Plaintiff had a serious medical need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-

60 (a serious medical need exists if there is an injury “that a reasonable doctor or patient 

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment”). The Court must therefore 

determine whether there is evidence that each Defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

Plaintiff’s serious medical need. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(the inquiry into a defendant’s liability for deliberate indifference “must be individualized 

and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or 

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 

U.S. 362, 370-71, 375-77 (1976).

1. Thornell

Defendant Thornell was substituted in his official capacity only to provide any 

prospective injunctive relief. Plaintiff, however, was released from ADC custody on 

December 27, 2024. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot, and 

Defendant Thornell must be dismissed from this action. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 

1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Once an inmate is removed from the environment in which 

he is subjected to the challenged policy or practice, absent a claim for damages, he no 

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longer has a legally cognizable interest in a judicial decision on the merits of his claim.”) 

(quoting Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012)).

2. Joshua

Defendants assert that Joshua was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious 

medical needs. Defendant Joshua saw Plaintiff on two occasions, and on the first occasion, 

submitted an urgent request for x-rays, wrapped Plaintiff finger, recommended warm 

compression and to continue with anti-inflammatory drugs. On the second occasion, 

Joshua wrapped Plaintiff’s hand and sent him to the hospital. 

The evidence before the Court does not show that Joshua was deliberately 

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serous medical needs. The evidence shows that Joshua treated 

Plaintiff and ordered urgent x-rays during their first encounter, and when Plaintiff returned 

to her, she immediately referred Plaintiff to the hospital. Nothing in these actions suggests 

that Joshua deliberately disregarded a serious risk to Plaintiff health. Accordingly, 

summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant Joshua.

3. Buenacosa

Defendant Buenacosa argues that he was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s 

serious medical needs, but rather evaluated and treated Plaintiff conservatively and referred 

Plaintiff to a the “provider’s line” each time Plaintiff saw Buenacosa on the nurse’s line. 

Indeed, the evidence before the Court shows that Buenacosa was responsive to Plaintiff’s 

complaints and Buenacosa put Plaintiff on the provider’s line for further evaluation each 

time Buenacosa saw Plaintiff. Accordingly, on this record, there is no evidence that 

Buenacosa was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and summary 

judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant Buenacosa. 

4. Centurion and Shinn

To prevail on a claim against Centurion, as a private entity serving a traditional 

public function, Plaintiff must meet the test articulated in Monell v. Department of Social 

Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Monell to private entities acting under color 

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of state law). Likewise, to prevail on a claim against Shinn based on a policy, practice, or 

custom claim, Plaintiff must show that an official policy or custom caused the 

constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 

To make this showing, he must demonstrate that (1) he was deprived of a 

constitutional right; (2) Centurion and/or Shinn had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or 

custom amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the 

policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San 

Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Further, if the policy or custom in question is an unwritten one, the plaintiff must show that 

it is so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” 

practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Liability for 

improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be 

founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct 

has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 

918 (9th Cir. 1996). 

As discussed above, Plaintiff has not shown that he was deprived of his Eighth 

Amendment rights, and thus cannot show that such deprivation is attributable to a policy, 

practice or custom of Centurion or Shinn Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted 

in favor of Centurion and Shinn. 

B. Negligence 

Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

negligence claim because Plaintiff has not produced any evidence or expert testimony of 

the standard of care or that Defendants breached the standard of care.

“‘Medical malpractice action’ or ‘cause of action for medical malpractice’ means 

an action for injury or death against a licensed health care provider . . .” Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 12-561. 

Both of the following shall be necessary elements of 

proof that injury resulted from the failure of a health care 

provider to follow the accepted standard of care:

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1. The health care provider failed to exercise that degree 

of care, skill and learning expected of a reasonable, prudent 

health care provider in the profession or class to which he 

belongs within the state acting in the same or similar 

circumstances.

2. Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-563. Unless medical malpractice is grossly apparent, the standard of 

care must be established by expert medical testimony. Rasor v. Northwest Hosp., 403 P.3d 

572 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017); Peacock v. Samaritan Health Svc., 765 P.2d 525 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1988). 

Here, Plaintiff has not shown that medical malpractice is “grossly apparent” and 

Plaintiff has not designated any experts to support his medical malpractice claim against 

Defendants. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants as to 

the medical malpractice claim. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43) is granted, and the 

action is terminated with prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this 6th day of January, 2025.

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