Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08026/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08026-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 1

Although the parties have requested oral argument, the Court concludes

that oral argument would not aid the decisional process.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brenda Ostler,

 Plaintiff,

vs.

Keith Sego, et al.,

 Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-15-08026-PCT-PGR 

 ORDER

 

 

Pending before the Court is Defendants Keith and Rita Sego’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc.35), wherein they seek judgment as to the entirety of the

plaintiff’s complaint, and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41),

wherein she seeks judgment as to Court IV of her complaint. Having considered the

parties’ memoranda, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s cross-motion should be

denied, and that the defendants’ motion should be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

56 because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the defendants

are entitled to entry of judgment as a matter of law.1

 

Case 3:15-cv-08026-PGR Document 48 Filed 08/09/16 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, the Court

references only those facts necessary to explain its decision.

3

The withdrawn claims are for negligence (Count I), strict liability

pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-1014(A)(2) [sic - § 11-1014.01(A)(2)] (Count II), and strict

liability pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-1012(D) (Count III).

- 2 -

Background2

This diversity-based removed action arises from an accident inside a fenced-in

dog run in a RV park in which the defendants’ dog ran into the plaintiff causing her

to fall and be injured. Notwithstanding the parties’ inexplicable failure to

authenticate their summary judgment-related exhibits, the Court considers the

following facts to be either undisputed or at least not controverted for purposes of the

summary judgment motions: the plaintiff and defendant Rita Sego and their

respective dogs were inside the “big dog” run at the RV park at the time the

defendants’ dog injured the plaintiff; the defendants’ dog was playing off-leash at the

time of the accident; the dog run is enclosed by a chain link fence and is between

75 and 100 feet long and is much longer than it is wide; the dog run has a dual gate

system in which entry is made into the fenced area through an initial gate and then

into the dog run itself through a second gate; and dogs cannot enter or leave the dog

run by themselves.

Although the plaintiff’s state court complaint contained four claims under

Arizona law, and the defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of them,

the plaintiff, in her response/cross-motion (Doc. 41, at 3), withdrew all but her fourth

claim, wherein she alleges a claim for strict liability pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-1020.3

Section 11-1020 provides that “[i]njury to any person or damage to any property by

a dog while at large shall be the full responsibility of the dog owner or person or

Case 3:15-cv-08026-PGR Document 48 Filed 08/09/16 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

- 3 -

persons responsible for the dog when such damages are inflicted.” A.R.S. § 11-

1001(2) defines “at large” for purposes of § 11-1020 as meaning “being neither

confined by an enclosure nor physically restrained by a leash.” 

Discussion

The parties agree that the only issue that the Court needs to decide in order

to resolve the summary judgment motions is whether the defendants’ dog was

“confined by an enclosure” at the time it injured the plaintiff. The Court concludes

as a matter of law that it was so confined.

The parties disagree as to what the phrase “confined by an enclosure” means.

Under Arizona law, the interpretation of a statute is a matter of law. Barry v. Alberty,

843 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ariz.App.1992). The Court’s goal in construing a statute is to

give effect to the intent of the state’s legislature, which requires that the Court apply

the usual or commonly understood meaning to each word or phrase in the statute

unless the legislature clearly intended a different meaning. Spirlong v. Browne, 336

P.3d 779, 782 (Ariz.App.2014); Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Construction

Co., 869 P.2d 500, 503 (Ariz.1994) (“[W]here the language [of a statute] is plain and

unambiguous, courts generally must follow the text as written. ... Accordingly, absent

a clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary, we are reluctant to construe the

words of a statute to mean something other than what they plainly state.”) To

determine the plain meaning of a term, courts refer to established and widely used

dictionaries. Western Corrections Group, Inc. v. Tierney, 96 P.3d 1070, 1074

(Ariz.App.2004). The defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that they cannot be

liable to the plaintiff pursuant to § 11-1020 because their dog was not “at large”

because it was “confined by an enclosure” at the time of the accident. The dog run

in which the defendants’ dog was playing at the time of the accident, being fully

Case 3:15-cv-08026-PGR Document 48 Filed 08/09/16 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

- 4 -

fenced-in with a dual gate opening, constitutes an enclosure under the ordinary

dictionary meaning of the word and the defendants’ dog, being unable to leave that

enclosure on its own, was confined within that enclosure at the time of the accident.

 Such an interpretation does not, as the plaintiff argues, violate the intent of

§11-1020 by ending responsible dog ownership at the gates off a dog park. The

plaintiff’s contention that the exceptions to § 11-1020 liability set forth by § 11-

1001(2) “require that the dog be limited, confined, and under the physical control of

the owner” is not supported by the plain language of § 11-1001(2). Being “confined

by an enclosure” and being “restrained by a leash” are two separate exceptions to

the “at large” requirement of § 11-1020. See Kaweske v. DeRosa, 2016 WL

3457898, at *3 (D.Ariz. June 24, 2016) (In an action by a plaintiff who was injured

by the defendants’ unleashed dog inside a fenced-in dog park, the court noted that

the sole issue on summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s claim for strict liability

pursuant to § 11-1020 was “the legal question of whether a dog without a leash in

a fenced-in dog park is ‘at large’ under the statute.” In granting summary judgment

to the defendants, the court concluded for purposes of § 11-1020 liability that “[a]

fenced-in area is an ‘enclosure’ in the ordinary sense of the word[,]” and that “the

dog park is entirely fenced-in such that the dogs are restrained from leaving the dog

park on their own accord, and therefore the dogs that play in the dog park are

‘confined by an enclosure.’ A.R.S. § 11-1001. As such, dogs are not ‘at large’ when

they are in the dog park, regardless of whether they are leashed.”) Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Keith and Rita Sego’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 35) is granted and that Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 41) is denied. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for the

/ / /

Case 3:15-cv-08026-PGR Document 48 Filed 08/09/16 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

- 5 -

defendants accordingly. 

DATED this 8th day of August, 2016.

Case 3:15-cv-08026-PGR Document 48 Filed 08/09/16 Page 5 of 5