Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00344/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00344-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Timothy Paul Olmos, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-2011-00344-PHX-GMS (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 This matter is before the Court on referral from the Honorable G. Murray Snow 

for a Report and Recommendation on the part of Claim Thirteen of the Petition for 

Habeas Corpus in which Petitioner asserts that the registration requirement of the federal 

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA or the Act) violates his First 

Amendment rights. (Doc. 78.) In accordance with the Court’s Order, the parties have 

filed supplemental briefing on this claim. (Docs. 79, 80, 85, 86.) As set forth below, the 

Court recommends that Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief asserted in Claim 

Thirteen be denied because his First Amendment challenge to SORNA is not cognizable 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

I. Background 

 Following a jury trial in February 2005, Petitioner was convicted in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court of one count of child molestation and one count of sexual abuse.1

 

(Doc. 40, Ex. A.) The trial court imposed a mitigated fifteen-year prison sentence, placed 

 

1

 Because the Court’s June 24, 2013 Order includes a detailed discussion of the 

underlying criminal proceedings and the procedural history of this matter (Doc. 78), the 

Court includes only a limited discussion of the underlying criminal matter. 

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Petitioner on lifetime probation, and, as a condition of that probation, required Petitioner 

to register as a sex offender “if required by law.” (Doc. 40, Exs. E, F.) In Claim Thirteen 

of his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner challenges the provision of his probation that 

requires him to register as a sex offender. Specifically, he contends that SORNA’s 

requirement that he register his online identifiers violates the First Amendment protection 

of anonymous online speech. (Doc. 80.) 

 In his supplemental memorandum, Petitioner argues the merits of his SORNA 

claim. (Doc. 80.) Respondents assert that the Court should dismiss this claim for lack of 

jurisdiction (Doc. 85 at 3-4), and alternatively argue that Petitioner’s claim fails on the 

merits because SORNA’s registration requirements do not violate the First Amendment. 

(Id. at 8-14.) In his reply, Petitioner argues that because the Court’s June 24, 2013 Order 

reviewed the Petition and directed further consideration of Petitioner’s “federal 

constitutional claim against SORNA’s requirement for online registration,” the Court has 

already determined that it has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s constitutional claim. 

(Doc. 86 at 2 (citing Doc. 78 at 34).) Petitioner also asserts that it is too late for 

Respondents to argue that Petitioner’s challenge to SORNA is not cognizable on § 2254 

review because they did not file a timely motion for reconsideration of the Court’s June 

24, 2013 Order.2

 (Doc. 86 at 1-2.) 

 In its June 24, 2013 Order, the Court found that Petitioner “was not required to 

exhaust in state court his federal constitutional claim against SORNA’s requirement for 

online registration.” (Doc. 78 at 34.) Therefore, the Court found that failure to exhaust 

this claim in state court did not preclude this Court’s consideration of the claim. (Id.) 

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Court did not determine that a federal constitutional 

challenge to SORNA’s online registration requirement was properly brought in a § 2254 

 

2

 Petitioner refers to the June 24, 2013 Order as a “screening order.” Although the Court ordinarily screens a § 2254 petition to ensure that the petitioner has named a proper respondent, is in custody in connection with the conviction and sentence being challenged, has not previously filed a habeas action concerning the same conviction and sentence, and has alleged at least one claim for a violation of his federal constitutional or 

statutory rights, the record reflects that did not occur in this case. (See Docs. 13, 24, 29, 

39.) 

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petition. The Court only found that Petitioner was not required to exhaust this claim in 

state court and therefore his claim was not procedurally barred.3

 (Id.) 

 Moreover, a federal court must consider its subject-matter jurisdiction at all stages 

of litigation. See Scholastic Entm’t, Inc. v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (quoting Cal. Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 280 (9th 

Cir.1974) (“It has long been held that a judge can dismiss sua sponte for lack of 

jurisdiction.”); see also Rule 12, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (stating that the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied to a § 2254 proceeding); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 

 Therefore, the Court first considers whether Petitioner’s claim that SORNA’s 

registration requirement violates the First Amendment is cognizable under § 2254. As 

discussed below, the Court finds that Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to SORNA’s 

online identifier registration requirement is not cognizable on § 2254 review and should 

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

II. SORNA’s Registration Requirement 

 Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child and Protection and Safety Act (the 

Walsh Act) in July 2006. Title I of the Walsh Act contains SORNA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 

– 16929, which was intended to create national standard for sex-offender registration 

programs. The stated purpose of SORNA is “to protect the public from sex offenders and 

offenders against children, and . . . respon[d] to vicious attacks by violent predators.” 

 

3

 The Court referred this matter for a Report and Recommendation considering “whether SORNA’s requirement that sex offenders register all online identifiers applies to state convictions and violates the First Amendment.” (Doc. 78 at 34.) In the order 

directing supplemental briefing, this Court directed the parties to “address[] [Petitioner’s] claim in Claim Thirteen of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that SORNA’s requirement that sex offenders register their online identifiers violates the First 

Amendment.” (Doc. 79.) The parties apparently assumed that SORNA applies to state convictions and did not address this issue in their supplemental briefing. By its terms, as set forth in section II, SORNA’s registration requirements apply to persons convicted of sex offenses under state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1)-(6); see also United States v. 

Shoulder, 2013 WL 5303242, at *2 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that SORNA’s registration requirement requires all state and federal sex offenders to register in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, works, or goes to school). 

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42 U.S.C. § 16901. With this purpose in mind, Congress “establish[ed] a comprehensive 

national system for the registration of those offenders.” Id. 

 SORNA grants the Attorney General the “authority to specify the applicability of 

the [registration] requirements . . . to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of 

[SORNA].” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). In 2007, the Attorney General clarified that 

SORNA’s registration requirements apply to sex offenders (such as Petitioner) who were 

convicted before SORNA’s enactment. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (authorizing the 

Attorney General to specify the applicability of SORNA’s requirements to sex offenders 

convicted before SORNA’s effective date); 28 C.F.R. § 72.3. 

 SORNA defines a “sex offender” as “an individual who was convicted of a sex 

offense” and classifies all sex offenders into three different categories. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 16911(1)-(4). A “sex offense” is “a criminal offense that has an element involving a 

sexual act or sexual contact with another.” Id. at § 16911(5)(A)(i). And a “‘criminal 

offense’ means a State, local, tribal, foreign, or military offense . . . or other criminal 

offense.” Id. at § 16911(6). 

 Section 16915a of SORNA provides that “[t]he Attorney General, using the 

authority provided in [42 U.S.C. § 16914(a)(7)], shall require that each sex offender 

provide to the sex offender registry those Internet identifiers that the sex offender uses or 

will use of any type that the Attorney General determines to be appropriate under th[e] 

Act.”4

 This section also clarifies that “[t]hese records of Internet identifiers shall be 

subject to the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)), to the same extent as the other records in 

the National Sex Offender Registry.” 42 U.S.C. § 16915a(a). “Internet identifiers” are 

defined as “electronic mail addresses and other designations used for self-identification 

or routing in Internet communication or posting.” 42 U.S.C. § 16915a(e)(2). 

 In Claim Thirteen, Petitioner argues that SORNA’s requirement that sex offenders 

register Internet identifiers violates the First Amendment. 

 

4

 Section 16915a was enacted as part of the Keeping the Internet Devoid of 

Sexual Predators Act of 2008 (the KIDS Act). See 42 U.S.C. § 16915a historical and 

statutory notes. 

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III. Scope of Habeas Corpus Review 

 Under § 2254 “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on 

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Because the “in custody” requirement of section 

2254(a) is jurisdictional, the Court must consider it first. See Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d

976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010) (the appellate court may not consider the merits of a habeas 

corpus claim unless the district court had jurisdiction over it) (citing Williamson v. 

Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir.1998)). 

 As set forth above, § 2254(a) uses the term “in custody” twice. First, the statute 

states that a habeas petition must be filed “in behalf of a person in custody.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). Second, the statute states that a habeas petition can only be considered “on the 

ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has explained that, “[a]lthough the 

[courts] generally speak of the ‘in custody’ requirement, it can be seen literally that this 

statutory requirement has two distinct aspects.” Bailey, 599 F.3d at 978. 

 The first statutory use of “in custody” refers to “whether there is a sufficient 

liberty restraint to consider a person as being ‘in custody.’” Id. at 979. “However, the 

second use of ‘in custody’ in the statute requires literally that the person applying for the 

writ is contending that he is ‘in custody’ in violation of the Constitution or other federal 

laws.” Id. Here, Petitioner was in physical custody in state prison when he commenced 

his habeas petition challenging the SORNA portion of his sentence.5

 (Doc. 1.) However, 

because “physical custody alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction,” the Court must 

 

5

 Although Petitioner’s habeas petition included independent, custodial claims 

that the Court has already considered (Docs. 1, 78), “he may not bypass the habeas statute’s “in custody’ requirement.” Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 721 (7th Cir. 

2008). “In other words, a court does not have ‘pendent’ jurisdiction over non-cognizable habeas claims.” Id.; see also United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 402 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(stating that “cognizable [habeas] claims in a § 2255 motion do not run interference for 

non-cognizable claims.”). 

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determine whether the statute’s second “in custody” requirement is met. Bailey, 599 F.3d 

at 980. 

 “Section 2254(a)’s language permitting a habeas petition to be entertained ‘only 

on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 

treaties of the United States,’ explicitly requires a nexus between the petitioner’s claim 

and the unlawful nature of the custody.” Bailey, 599 F.3d at 980; see also Virsnieks, 521 

F.3d at 721 (stating that “the plain language of the statute . . . commands that courts 

entertain habeas petitions ‘only’ on the ground that a prisoner is ‘in custody,’ and, [links] 

a court’s ability to entertain a habeas petition to the particular relief sought[.]”). The 

Ninth Circuit has explained that, “[g]iving the crucial phrase within § 2254(a) its 

ordinary, natural meaning, . . . to sustain [a] habeas challenge, [a petitioner] must show 

that his custody itself, or its conditions, offends federal law.” Bailey, 599 F.3d at 980. 

 The Supreme Court has construed § 2254(a)’s “in custody” requirement and 

concluded that “its purpose is to permit petitions only when the remedy sought is capable 

of alleviating severe restraints on individual liberty.” Bailey, 599 F.3d at 980 (citing 

Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)). Habeas corpus is an 

“extraordinary remedy.” Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351. Its use “has been limited to cases of 

special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on 

liberty are neither severe nor immediate.” Id. Habeas corpus claims that do not “call into 

question the lawfulness of the conviction or confinement,” or challenge the fact or 

duration of the petitioner’s custody, or “seek immediate or speedier release,” are not 

cognizable under § 2254. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-83 (1994); see also

Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (“habeas proceedings are the proper 

mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or duration” of confinement) (citing 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that “habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action 

proper, where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the 

prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that 

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petitioner’s challenge to the constitutionality of a disciplinary proceeding was properly 

brought under § 1983 when it did not affect the length of his sentence). A civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper vehicle for a state prisoner to challenge 

the conditions of his confinement. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42 

(1991) (internal citations omitted) (stating that § 1983 action is the proper remedy for a 

state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, 

but not to the fact or length of his custody); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (stating that 

“[e]very person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”). 

 Here, Petitioner’s First Amendment challenge to SORNA’s online registration 

requirement lacks any nexus to his custody, as required by the text of § 2254(a). 

Although Petitioner’s convictions and custodial sentence have restrained his liberty, the 

requirement that Petitioner comply with SORNA’s online registration requirement does 

not directly implicate his liberty. See Bailey, 599 F.3d at 981 (concluding that restitution 

order lacked a nexus to petitioner’s custody); see also Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 523 

(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that, despite the fact that the petitioner was incarcerated at the 

time of his petition, his challenge to the constitutionality of Ohio’s sexual predator 

statute’s registration requirement was not cognizable on habeas corpus review). 

Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to SORNA’s online registration requirement does 

not challenge the legality or duration of his conviction, or his confinement in the Arizona 

Department of Corrections. See United States v. Shannon, 2013 WL 141779, at *4 (6th 

Cir. Jan. 14, 2103) (noting that SORNA “does not impose an ‘affirmative disability or 

restraint” on those required to register because it does not physically restrain[]” them or 

“directly restrict their mobility, employment, or how they spend their time”); see also 

Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 718 (noting that “courts have rejected uniformly the argument that 

a challenge to a sentence of registration under a [state] sexual offender statute is 

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cognizable in habeas” because such registration is not a significant restraint on the 

petitioner’s “physical sense of liberty” and listing cases). 

 Petitioner challenges a condition of his probation based on a federal statute, 

arguing that it violates his First Amendment right to free speech. Even if Petitioner 

succeeded on his constitutional challenge to SORNA’s online registration requirement, it 

would not invalidate his convictions or shorten his prison sentence. See Umbarger v. 

Michigan, 2013 WL 444024, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2013) (“SORNA is more 

analogous to a collateral consequence of conviction than a severe restraint on liberty like 

parole”); see also Bailey, 599 F.3d at 981 (challenge to restitution order was not 

cognizable on § 2254 review because, even if successful, petitioner would still have to 

serve his custodial sentence in the same manner). 

 Thus, Petitioner’s First Amendment challenge to SORNA’s online registration 

requirement asserted in Claim Thirteen is not properly brought in a § 2254 petition and it 

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 722 (holding that 

petitioner’s constitutional challenge brought under § 2254 to the non-custodial 

component of his sentence, that the petitioner register as a sex offender, did not create a 

cognizable claim). Petitioner can pursue this claim in a § 1983 action. See Kruger v.

Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that challenge to retroactive 

application of state law requiring DNA sample from certain inmates convicted of sex 

offenses was not properly brought in a habeas corpus proceeding under § 2254 and that 

such claim was properly brought as a § 1983 action); Holloway v. Giles, 2013 WL 

2067471, at *2 n.3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 22, 2013) (noting that petitioner should bring 

challenge to the constitutionality of the sex offender registration requirements in a § 1983 

action). 

IV. Conclusion 

 Because § 2254 does not confer jurisdiction over a habeas corpus claim raising a 

First Amendment challenge to SORNA’s online registration requirements, the Court 

recommends the dismissal of that claim and does not reach its merits. See Bailey, 599 

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F.3d at 984 n.7 (declining to reach or decide the merits of habeas corpus petition because 

there was no habeas corpus jurisdiction). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s First Amendment challenge to 

SORNA’s online registration requirement asserted in Claim Thirteen of the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED for lack 

of jurisdiction. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the procedural 

ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. Rule 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

 / / 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 22nd day of October, 2013. 

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