Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01181/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 10cv01181 LAB(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHANIE L. GARDNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of the Social Security

Administration,

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 10cv01181 LAB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS [ECF NO. 8]

Stephanie L. Gardner applied for supplemental security income

on July 20, 2006. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1; see also Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #3 Ex. 1, at 4, ECF No. 8.) She also applied for

disability insurance benefits on July 28, 2006. (Id.) Her claims

were denied initially, and the denial was upheld by the Social

Security Administration after reconsideration. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #3 Ex. 1, at 4, ECF No. 8.) A hearing was held before

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Peter J. Valentino on December 4,

2008. (Id.) He issued a written decision on December 17, 2008,

finding that Gardner was not disabled. (Compl. 2-3, ECF No. 1;

Mot. Dismiss Attach. #2 Decl. Ford 3, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #3 Ex.

1, at 11-12.) The denial of benefits became final when the Appeals

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Council upheld the ALJ’s decision on April 6, 2009. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #2 Decl. Ford 3, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #3 Ex. 2.)

On June 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed this Complaint for Judicial

Review and Remedy on Administrative Decision Under the Social

Security Act against Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security, challenging the decision denying her disability insurance

benefits [ECF. No. 1]. On August 5, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion

to Dismiss, along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of the Motion, a declaration from Dennis V. Ford, and

Exhibits [ECF No. 8]. To date, Plaintiff has not filed an

opposition to the Motion. The Court found Defendant’s Motion

suitable for decision without oral argument, pursuant to Civil

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) [ECF No. 9]. 

Although Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) provides that failure

to oppose a motion may constitute consent to the granting of the

motion, this Court will evaluate the merits of Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2009, Stephanie Gardner sought judicial review of ALJ

Valentino’s December 17, 2008 decision in a different case that was

also before this Court. See Gardner v. Astrue, No. 09-cv-01608 BEN

(RBB) (S.D. Cal. filed July 24, 2009), ECF No. 1.

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Filed on July 24, 2009 

Gardner filed her first complaint against Michael J. Astrue on

July 24, 2009. Id. Plaintiff, then pro se and in forma pauperis,

sought judicial review of ALJ Valentino’s December 17, 2008 written

decision denying her disability insurance benefits. Id.; see

Gardner, No. 09-cv-01608 BEN (RBB) (order granting motion for leave

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to proceed in forma pauperis), ECF No. 3. In that action, Gardner

alleged that on June 18, 2009, the Appeals Council denied her

request for review. Gardner, No. 09-cv-01608 BEN (RBB) (complaint

at 3), ECF No. 1. On November 3, 2009, the defendant filed an

answer and the administrative record. Id. (answer and

administrative record), ECF Nos. 8, 9. On the same day, this Court

issued an order setting the deadline for filing pretrial motions. 

Id. (order setting deadline), ECF No. 10. 

On March 23, 2010, United States District Court Judge Roger T.

Benitez noted that pretrial motions had not been filed and found

the case ready for disposition. Id. (order setting schedule for

disposition), ECF No. 13. He referred the matter to this Court for

a report and recommendation. (Id.) On April 2, 2010, this Court

recommended that the case be dismissed for want of prosecution. 

Id. (report and recommendation), ECF No. 14. The report and

recommendation advised Gardner that she could file any objections

to the recommendations by April 23, 2010. Id. at 7. None were

filed, and on May 18, 2010, Judge Benitez adopted this Court’s

recommendation and dismissed the case without prejudice. Id. (slip

op.) ECF No. 15.

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint in This Case

On June 2, 2010, after Judge Benitez dismissed her first

complaint, Gardner filed a second complaint against the

Commissioner in a new case altogether [ECF No. 1]. Again, this

Court was randomly assigned to the case; a different district court

judge, Judge Larry A. Burns, was also assigned. Plaintiff’s

Complaint in this subsequent case is the subject of this Motion to

Dismiss. This Complaint is virtually identical to the July 24,

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2009 complaint. (Compare Compl. 1-3, ECF No. 1), with Gardner, No.

09-cv-01608 BEN (RBB) (complaint at 1-3), ECF No. 1. Plaintiff,

now represented by attorney Matty Sandoval, again seeks judicial

review of Commissioner Astrue’s determination that Gardner is not

entitled to disability insurance or supplemental security income

benefits. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff repeats her request

for a reversal of ALJ Valentino’s December 17, 2008 written

decision denying her application for benefits. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Alternatively, Gardner asks that her case be remanded for a new

administrative hearing. (Id.) Gardner again alleges, “By ‘Action

of Appeals Council on Request for Review’ dated June 18, 2009, the

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review.” (Id. at

3.) On June 3, 2010, Judge Burns referred the matter to this Court

for a Report and Recommendation. (Order Reference 1, ECF No. 3.) 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was filed approximately two months

later. (Mot. Dismiss 1-2, ECF No. 8.) 

The Court has reviewed the Complaint and Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss and attachments. For the reasons set forth below, the

district court should GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula –-

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).

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A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there

“is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

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1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994)) (stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept as

true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions

of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside

of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. “When a plaintiff

has attached various exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may

be considered in determining whether dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” 

Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628

F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). When a defendant attaches

extrinsic evidence to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, however, the court must convert the motion to one for

summary judgment so that the plaintiff has a chance to respond. 

Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d

Cir. 1991). 

Nonetheless, courts may consider “documents whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

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but which are not physically attached to the pleading . . . .” 

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on

other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119,

1123-24 (9th Cir. 2002); see Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W.,

Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, courts may

consider any documents on which the complaint relies and whose

authenticity is not suspect, even if they are attached to the

defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac

Elecs. Secs. Litig.), 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996); Fecht

v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); Cortec

Industries, Inc., 949 F.2d at 47-48. Courts may consider documents

that are crucial to the plaintiff’s claims but are not explicitly

incorporated in the complaint. Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac Elecs.

Secs. Litig.), 70 F.3d at 1080 n.1; see United States v. Ritchie,

342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). These rules prevent plaintiffs

from surviving Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss legally deficient

claims by intentionally omitting from their complaints references

to documents on which they rely. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 

These Rule 12(b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss.

III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant argues that Gardner’s Complaint is untimely. (Mot.

Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 8). Specifically,

Astrue alleges the Complaint should be dismissed because it was

filed more than ten months after the sixty-day time limit provided

for in the Social Security Act and related regulations. (Id. at 3-

5.) The Commissioner also claims that there are no extraordinary

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circumstances that would justify the application of equitable

tolling to this case. (Id. at 5-6.) 

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Limitations Period

Almost four months have passed since Defendant’s Motion was

filed; still, Gardner has not filed an Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss her Complaint.

Defendant argues that Gardner’s Complaint fails to state a

claim because it was filed late. (Id. at 3-4). “The

Commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity is a condition of this

lawsuit. Congress and the Commissioner have set the terms of that

waiver to include only those claims filed within sixty days after

the presumptive receipt of notice by Plaintiff of the

Commissioner’s final decision ‘or within such further time as the

Commissioner may allow.’” (Id. at 4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

(h) (West Supp. 2010); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901, 416.1401, 422.210(c)

(2010)).) The Defendant contends that the Complaint must be

dismissed because it was filed after the sixty-day time period. 

(Id. at 5.) Moreover, “Plaintiff’s June 2010 complaint appears to

be an attempt to readjudicate a matter that has already been

decided by this Court.” (Id. (citing Cato v. United States, 70

F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990)).) 

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s administrative decisions

is governed by the Social Security Act. Section 205(g) of the Act

provides as follows:

Any individual, after any final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to

which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such

decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days

after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or

within such further time as the Commissioner of Social

Security may allow.

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42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). A claimant is presumed to have received

notice of the final administrative decision within five days of the

date on the notice, unless he or she can prove otherwise. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.901, 416.1401. 

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff timely filed her

prior lawsuit on July 24, 2009, which was dismissed for want of

prosecution on May 18, 2010. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

4 (citing id. Attach. #3 Ex. 7), ECF No. 8.) In contrast, the

Commissioner argues that “Plaintiff filed her current complaint -– 

with the benefit of an attorney –- on June 2, 2010, more than 10

months past the time provided in the statutory and regulatory

framework.” (Id.) Astrue contends that the 2010 Complaint is

untimely because if the April 6, 2009 Appeals Council denial letter

constituted the final administrative decision, Plaintiff had until

June 10, 2009, to commence a civil action. (Id.) Alternatively,

if the June 18, 2009 Appeals Council letter was the final decision,

Gardner had until August 24, 2009, to file a civil action. (Id.) 

 Defendant attached the Declaration of Dennis V. Ford as well

as the following copies of documents as exhibits to the Motion to

Dismiss: (1) ALJ Valentino’s December 17, 2008 written decision

denying Gardner benefits; (2) the Appeals Council’s April 6, 2009

denial of Plaintiff’s request for review; (3) the Appeals Council’s

June 18, 2009 denial of her request for reopening; (4) Gardner’s

July 24, 2009 complaint; (5) this Court’s recommendation to

district court Judge Benitez that he dismiss the July 24, 2009

complaint for want of prosecution; (6) Plaintiff’s June 2, 1010

Complaint in this case; and (7) the civil docket printout for case

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number 3:09-cv-01608-BEN (RBB). (Id. Attach. #2 Decl. Ford; id.

Attach. #3 Exs. 1-7.) 

Although Plaintiff did not attach any exhibits to her

Complaint, it explicitly references the December 17, 2008 decision

denying her benefits, and the Appeals Council’s June 18, 2009

denial of her request for review. (Compl. 2-3.) Because Gardner

is seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision denying her

benefits and the Appeals Council’s denial of her request for

review, documents relating to these decisions are essential to this

Complaint. See Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac Elecs. Secs. Litig.),

89 F.3d at 1405 n.4; Fecht, 70 F.3d at 1080 n.1. This Court will

therefore consider these decisions that are attached to Defendant’s

Motion as exhibit numbers one, two, and three, when ruling on the

Motion to Dismiss. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908; (see Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #3 Exs. 1-3, ECF No. 8.) 

The Court will also consider the remaining exhibits attached

to Defendant’s Motion, exhibit numbers four, five, six, and seven,

when ruling on the Motion. Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d

1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010); (see Mot. Dismiss Attach. #3 Exs. 4-7,

ECF No. 8.) All of Defendant’s exhibits are documents from either

this Court or the Office of Disability Adjudication, and their

authenticity is not questioned. See Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d at

1080 n.1 (noting that courts may consider documents on which

plaintiff’s complaint relies, so long as their authenticity is not

contested.) 

Here, the administrative hearing occurred on December 4, 2008,

and ALJ Valentino issued a written decision on December 17, 2008. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #2 Decl. Ford 3, ECF No. 8; id. Attach. #3

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Ex. 1.) The decision became final on April 6, 2009, when the

Appeals Council sent Gardner notice of its decision denying her

request for review of the ALJ’s adverse decision and advising her

that she could seek judicial review within sixty days. (Id.

Attach. #2 Decl. Ford 3; id. Attach. #3 Ex. 2.) Instead, on June

1, 2009, Gardner completed a Request For Review of Hearing

Decision/Order form, where she stated she is in constant pain, has

more problems with her foot, and will be having another surgery. 

(Id. Attach. #3 Ex. 3, at 3.) Also, she claimed she is receiving

treatment for her wrist but it is not helping. (Id.) On June 18,

2009, the Appeals Council informed Gardner that it denied her

request to reopen and found no reason to change the administrative

decision. (Id.) It stated that the “Appeals Council’s decision is

the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in your

case.” (Id.)

The June 18, 2009 refusal to reopen and reconsider is not a

“final decision” within the meaning of section 405(g) and cannot

cure an untimely appeal filed more than sixty days after the denial

of benefits. See Banta v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 343, 344 (9th Cir.

1991) (“[T]he Appeals Council is entitled to make a threshold

inquiry into additional evidence submitted in order to resolve the

reopening issue without actually reopening the decision or

rendering a new final decision.”) (citing Triplett v. Heckler, 767

F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1104 (1986) (per

curiam); Friddle v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1983) (per

curiam); Biron v. Harris, 668 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1982) (per

curiam)). Accordingly, the April 6, 2009 Notice of Appeals Council

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have been August 24, 2009.

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Action is the date of the final administrative decision denying

Plaintiff benefits. See id. 

Gardner was required to file her civil suit by June 10, 2009,

sixty-five days after the date of the notice. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

405(g) (providing that a claimant must file her complaint in

district court within sixty days of receipt of the final

administrative decision); 20 C.F.R. § 404.901 (stating that a

claimant is presumed to have received the decision within five days

of the date of the notice); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1401. Because

Plaintiff did not file suit until June 2, 2010, nearly one year

later, her Complaint is untimely. (See Compl. 1.) 

Even if the Court assumes the Appeals Council’s June 18, 2009

refusal to reopen constituted the final administrative decision,

Gardner would have had until August 23, 2009, to file suit.1

 But

see Banta, 925 F.2d at 344 (explaining that an Appeals Council’s

denial of a claimant’s request to reopen does not constitute a

final decision). Gardner did not file this Complaint until June 2,

2010, more than nine months past this deadline. Her Complaint is

untimely.

Plaintiff has not filed within the time limit required by the

Social Security Act. Without more, the Complaint should be

DISMISSED. 

B. Equitable Tolling

Defendant contends that equitable tolling of the statutory

deadline does not apply to this case. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 8.) Although Plaintiff’s first timely

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complaint was dismissed without prejudice, she may not “simply file

another complaint based on the exact same decision that was

previously at issue as though this were a fresh matter.” (Id. at

6.) Defendant asserts, “There are no extraordinary circumstances

present here that would justify allowing Plaintiff to proceed on a

complaint filed more than 10 months beyond the statutory time

frame.” (Id.) 

For claims arising under the Social Security Act, Congress

generally intended for section 405(g) to “‘compress the time for

judicial review.’” Matlock v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir.

1990) (quoting Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628, 630 (9th Cir.

1980)). The sixty-day filing requirement provided for in section

405(g) is treated as a statute of limitations period and is subject

to equitable tolling. Muller v. Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-00363 GSA, 2010

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60784, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2010) (citing

Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986); Banta,925 F.2d

at 346; Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1987); see

28 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).) “[T]he power to determine when finality has

occurred ordinarily rests with the Secretary . . . . But cases may

arise where a claimant’s interest in having a particular issue

resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency’s

judgment is inappropriate.” Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330

(1976); Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480; Banta, 925 F.2d at 345-46. In these

instances, courts may apply equitable tolling and to the sixty-day

requirement. See Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1277; Banta, 925 F.2d at 345-

46 (finding no evidence of waiver and that equitable tolling is

inappropriate); see Muller, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60784, at *2. 

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A court may grant a motion to dismiss based on the running of

the statute of limitations period only if the assertions of the

complaint, read liberally, would not allow the plaintiff to prove

that the statute was tolled. Cashman v. Astrue, No. 07-00560 ACKBMK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49707, at *6 (D. Haw. June 27, 2008). 

“The tolling of the limitations period contained in § 405(g) is ‘not

infrequently appropriate’ because it was designed by Congress to be

‘unusually protective’ of claimants.” Id. at **7-8 (citing New York

v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1990); Bowen, 476 U.S. at

480). Even so, equitable tolling does not apply to “a garden

variety claim of excusable neglect.” Id. at *7.

Courts may toll the statute of limitations only if tolling is

justified by “‘traditional equitable tolling principles.’” Hess v.

Astrue, No. CV-08-00131-FRZ-JCG, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109624, at *6

(D. Ariz. Dec. 11, 2008) (quoting Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349,

1355 (11th Cir. 2007). “A court should dismiss an action that was

not filed within the sixty (60) day period set forth by 42 U.S.C.A.

405(g) unless the ‘litigant can show that “he has been pursuing his

rights diligently” and that “some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way.”’” Id. at *7 (quoting Torres v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 276,

279 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (finding extraordinary

circumstances where claimant was pursuing his claim but filed a

defective pleading or was tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into

letting the deadline pass). A claimant’s failure to exercise due

diligence because of his or her own neglect does not constitute

extraordinary circumstances. Hess, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109624, at

*7 (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96); see also Jackson, 506 F.3d at

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1356 (finding no extraordinary circumstance where claimant argued

her limited legal experience prevented her from timely filing a

civil action).

Here, nothing in the record suggests that equitable tolling is

appropriate. Gardner has not offered any explanation for her

failure to file her 2010 Complaint within the sixty-day filing

period. See Hess, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109624, at *7; 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 405(g). She did not object to the recommendation that her

separate 2009 suit be dismissed. Nor had she sought any extensions

of time in which to file the current suit. (See Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #2 Decl. Ford 3, ECF No. 8.) In fact, Plaintiff did not

even oppose this Motion to Dismiss. There is no basis to apply

equitable tolling should apply to Gardner’s untimely Complaint. 

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

 The Court recommends that this case be dismissed with prejudice

for failure to state a claim. This Report and Recommendation will

be submitted to the United States District Court Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties on or before December 22, 2010. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

Failure to file an objection within the specified time may waive the

right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

//

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\SOCSEC\GARDNER1181\R&R re Mot. Dismissv3.wpd 16 10cv01181 LAB(RBB)

Any reply to a party’s “Objections to Report and Recommendation” may

be filed by January 12, 2011.

Dated: December 1, 2010 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Burns

 All Parties of Record

Case 3:10-cv-01181-LAB-RBB Document 10 Filed 12/01/10 Page 16 of 16