Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01487/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01487-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 The Court notes that Petitioner also filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 26). Since the Second Amended Petition was filed without leave of

court, the Court will not consider said Petition. In any event, the record reveals that the

Second Amended Petition is essentially a copy of the Amended Petition and raises the same

grounds for relief.

2

 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 23 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Haider H. Abdulla,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CIV 15-01487-PHX-DJH (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Haider H. Abdulla, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex,

filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 15).1

 Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 23), but despite having the opportunity to do

so, Petitioner has not filed a reply.

BACKGROUND2

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:

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¶3 M.M. and A.M. were both killed on April 13, 2009. The two men were not

related, but they had been close friends for over 17 years. The day before his

death, A.M. spoke with his brother-in-law, [Petitioner]. The two did not have

a good relationship; A.M. felt that [Petitioner] was disrespectful of his family

and forbid him from coming to A.M.’s home. A.M. and his wife, [Petitioner]’s

sister, spoke about this decision and, on April 13, 2009, she called [Petitioner]

to tell him he was no longer welcome in her family’s home.

¶4 [Petitioner] was angry at this news; he called his sister back the same day

and threatened to kill her husband. He drove to A.M.’s house that afternoon

calling for A.M. to come out to face him. His sister told him to leave, and it

appeared that he did, however when A.M. walked out of the house to buy

cigarettes [Petitioner] pursued him. He fired multiple shots at A.M. and killed

him in the street in front of his house.

¶5 On the same day, M.M.’s body was found by Officer Barrett in the parking

lot of the Safeway located at 35th Avenue and Northern. When Officer Barrett

arrived at the scene, M.M.’s car was spinning in reverse and he was slumped

over the wheel; M.M. had been shot to death in his car.

¶6 After killing A.M., [Petitioner] drove to Tempe Town Lake and threw his

gun into the lake. He then returned to his home, put some clothes in a bag, took

$8,000 in cash, and began driving to Los Angeles, CA. Two days later,

[Petitioner] was arrested in Salinas, CA and extradited to Arizona where he

was arrested on April 24, 2009.

¶7 The firearms identification section of the Phoenix crime laboratory

compared shell casings and bullets from the two crime scenes, A.M.’s house

and the Safeway parking lot, and confirmed that the same gun was used at both

shootings. The investigation revealed that [Petitioner] knew both A.M. and

M.M. and that he had a motive to kill them.

(Exh. DD at 2-3, ¶¶ 3-7.)

On April 17, 2009, the Maricopa County grand jurors indicted Petitioner for two

counts of first-degree murder. (Exh. A.) Petitioner was initially represented by James Cleary

and Gary Shriver. (Exh. B.) Later, Jeremy Bogart and Chad Garner represented Petitioner.

(Exhs. D, F.) Mr. Bogart requested that Petitioner be examined pursuant to Rule 11 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Exh. D.) Pursuant to a stipulation, the trial court

determined Petitioner’s competency based on three written reports submitted by two experts.

(Exh. J at 2.) The trial court determined that Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (Id.)

In December 2010, Petitioner moved to substitute his counsel. (Exh. M.) The trial

court found an “irreconcilable conflict” existed between Petitioner and his defense counsel,

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and ordered that new attorneys be assigned. (Exh. N at 2.) Petitioner then retained Ulises A.

Ferragut, Jr., to represent him. (Exh. P.)

Four settlement conferences were held prior to trial, but Petitioner declined to take a

plea offer and instead opted to go to trial. (Exhs. BBB, CCC, DDD; Exh. EEE at 45-61.)

A jury trial was held, and the jury found Petitioner guilty of both counts of first-degree

murder. (Exh. OOO at 3-5.) The trial court subsequently imposed two consecutive life

sentences with the possibility of parole after 25 years. (Exh. T; Exh. PPP at 17.)

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal. (Exh. U.) Then, the trial

court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw from the case. (Exhs. V, W.) The Maricopa

County Public Defender’s office was appointed to represent Petitioner on appeal, and their

subsequent request to withdraw from the case was granted by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

(Exhs. X, Y.) Janelle A. McEachern was then appointed as Petitioner’s appellate counsel.

(Exh. Y.)

Appellate counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 451 P.2d 878 (Ariz. 1969), stating she had found “no arguable

question of law that is not frivolous.” (Exh. Z at 29.) The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted

the Anders brief and granted the request to allow Petitioner to file a pro per supplemental

brief. (Exhs. AA, BB.) Counsel also filed a letter that she had sent to Petitioner indicating

that she had given him all of the documents in the case, and informing him that he had until

September 3, 2013, to file a supplemental brief. (Exh. CC.) Petitioner did not file a

supplemental brief. (Exh. DD at 2,¶ 1.)

On April 24, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision,

affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Exh. DD.) Petitioner did not seek further

review. (Exh. EE.)

On May 30, 2014, Petitioner initiated a PCR proceeding by filing a notice of

post-conviction relief. (Exh. FF.) The trial court appointed Natalee Segal to represent

Petitioner. (Exh. HH.)

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After receiving an extension of time (Exh. JJ), PCR counsel filed a notice stating that

she had not found “an issue for a petition.” (Exh. KK.) The trial court granted PCR counsel’s

request for additional time for Petitioner to file a pro per PCR petition. (Exh. LL.)

Petitioner filed a pro per PCR petition. (Exh. MM.) In the response, the State

construed and listed Petitioner’s claims as:

1. “[A] general claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IAC) for failure to

investigate facts and present [Petitioner]’s defenses at trial; self-defense in Count 1

and mistaken identity/alibi in Count 2”;

2. “Statements to Arizona detectives in Salinas, CA were in violation of right to

counsel”;

3. “DNA samples were taken without a warrant”;

4. Additional IAC claims: “Failure to provide [Petitioner] with police reports and

pretrial orders prior to trial; Failure to provide adequate interpretation; Failure to

challenge the trial court for cause due to bias shown in pretrial rulings; and Failure to

challenge the jury panel due to the absence of people ‘of color or ethnic

background’”;

5. “Identification evidence for Count 2 was insufficient to prove guilt”;

6. “Det. Dalton gave perjured testimony regarding the interrogation and obtaining

[Petitioner]’s DNA sample”;

7. “Insufficient evidence to establish Count 2”;

8. “Prosecutorial misconduct for ‘creating false evidence’ by allegedly fabricating

phone records”;

9. “Killing A.M. was justified by self-defense”;

10. “[Petitioner] claimed innocence on Count 2 because he did not kill M.M.”;

11. Petitioner also generally asserted “‘I’m no spoke English or Right English Good

Please I Need Help and Lawyer?’”

(Exh. NN at 5-6; Exh. MM at 12-13, 15-16.) The State argued that several of the claims were

precluded, and also that the IAC claims were meritless. (Exh. NN at 6-9.)

The trial court found that multiple claims were precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a).

(Exh. QQ at 1-2.) The court also found that Petitioner’s claim regarding “the need for

translation services [was] not cognizable under Rule 32.1” because it did not “concern

conviction or sentence, but concern[ed] alleged post-trial denial of rights.” (Id. at 2.) The

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court further noted that it had “observed that [Petitioner] frequently attempted to answer

questions and arguments proffered in English during the pre-trial and trial proceedings before

the Interpreter had a chance to translate for him.” (Id.) Finally, regarding Petitioner’s IAC

claims, the trial court found the PCR petition failed to “state a colorable claim or to comply

with Rule 32.5,” stating, “Claims that are based on conclusory statements and speculation

lack any meaningful proof of a violation of either prong of Strickland.” (Id.) Thus, the trial

court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR petition. (Id.)

Petitioner thereafter filed a “Notice of [Completion] and Request for [Extension] of

Time to File a[n] Amendment for Petition for Review” in the trial court. (Exh. RR.) The trial

court denied the request. (Exh. SS.) Petitioner then filed an “Amendment to Petition for

Review” in the trial court. (Exh. TT.) It appears Petitioner was attempting to raise a

sentencing issue pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Id.) The trial court denied “said Petition.” (Exh. UU.)

On April 30, 2015, Petitioner then filed a document entitled, “Appellant Opening

Brief Meling.” (Exh. XX.) Although the caption is labeled for the Arizona Court of Appeals,

Petitioner filed it in the trial court. (Id.; Exh. QQQ.) Petitioner then filed the following

miscellaneous documents: (1) a general letter to trial judge; (2) “Motion for copy of

Defendant’s (rule 32) Petition Order”; and (3) “Notice of Given Copy File All Following

Motion, Rule 32, to the Judge Warren J. Granville.” (Exhs. YY-AAA.) According to the

record, there are no orders or rulings from the trial court on these documents, and to date,

nothing further has been filed. (Exh. QQQ.)

In his amended habeas petition, Petitioner presents four grounds for review:

Ground One: Petitioner alleges that his Miranda rights were violated when detectives

interrogated him without first reading him his Miranda rights, interrogated him

without an interpreter, and continued to interrogate him after he requested counsel.

Ground Two: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when his

court-appointed counsel failed to provide him with an interpreter and failed to provide

Petitioner with documents relevant to his case until two weeks before trial.

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Ground Three: Petitioner’s trial counsel performed deficiently when counsel

cross-examined the lead detective.

Ground Four: Petitioner alleges that, but for his counsel’s ineffective assistance and

the language barrier, he would have signed the plea agreement and would not have

agreed to go to trial.

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Grounds Two, Three, and Four are

procedurally defaulted, and Ground One fails on the merits. As such, Respondents request

that the Court deny and dismiss Petitioner’s habeas petition with prejudice.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

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fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process, is insufficient

to achieve fair presentation. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518

U.S. 152, 163 (1996)); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an

underlying federal legal theory.”). Similarly, a federal claim is not exhausted merely because

its factual basis was presented to the state courts on state law grounds – a “mere similarity

between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway,

223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted); see Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77.

Even when a claim’s federal basis is “self-evident,” or the claim would have been

decided on the same considerations under state or federal law, a petitioner must still present

the federal claim to the state courts explicitly, “either by citing federal law or the decisions

of federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted),

amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004)

(claim not fairly presented when state court “must read beyond a petition or a brief ... that

does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim” to discover implicit federal claim).

Additionally, under the independent state grounds principle, a federal habeas court

generally may not review a claim if the state court’s denial of relief rests upon an

independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the

rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court

could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run

around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-31. A petitioner who fails to follow a state’s procedural requirements for

presenting a valid claim deprives the state court of an opportunity to address the claim in

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 A state procedural default rule is “independent” if it does not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002).

4

 A state procedural default rule is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.”

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-53 (1982)).

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much the same manner as a petitioner who fails to exhaust his state remedies. Thus, in order

to prevent a petitioner from subverting the exhaustion requirement by failing to follow state

procedures, a claim not presented to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner is

deemed procedurally defaulted, and is generally barred from habeas relief. See Id. at 731-32.

Claims may be procedurally barred from federal habeas review based upon a variety

of factual circumstances. If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner

attempted to raise the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both

“independent”3

 and “adequate”4 – review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court

is barred. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law default

prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily

not be reviewed in federal court.”) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977)

and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)).

Moreover, if a state court applies a procedural bar, but goes on to alternatively address

the merits of the federal claim, the claim is still barred from federal review. See Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989) (“[A] state court need not fear reaching the merits of

a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and independent

state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient

basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law. ...

In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing its interests in

finality, federalism, and comity.”) (citations omitted); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s application of a procedural rule is not undermined where, as

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here, the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.”) (citing Harris, 489 U.S.

at 264 n.10).

A procedural bar may also be applied to unexhausted claims where state procedural

rules make a return to state court futile. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (claims are barred

from habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now

find the claims procedurally barred”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim ‘applies only

when a state court has been presented with the federal claim,’ but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or ‘if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally

barred.’”) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 263 n.9).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either direct appeal

or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt to return to

state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of claims for

which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding

claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief), 32.4(a) (time bar),

32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). Arizona

courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further review of claims

that were not raised on direct appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction proceedings. See,

e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (determinations made under Arizona’s procedural default rule

are “independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly followed [“adequate”] in

several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.

856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (rejecting argument that Arizona

courts have not “strictly or regularly followed” Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 334-36, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996)

(waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in post-conviction proceedings).

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The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless

a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Pursuant to the “cause and

prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented him from

following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim. “A showing

of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor

external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government interference or reasonable

unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir.

2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ignorance of the State’s procedural rules

or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of legal training and a petitioner’s mental

condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a petitioner’s failure to fairly

present his claim. Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court has made clear

that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional violation has resulted

in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96.

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel

when his court-appointed counsel failed to provide him with an “adequate Kuwait court

appointed interpreter” and failed to provide him with documents relevant to his case until two

weeks before trial.

The record reflects that Petitioner presented both of these claims to the trial court in

his PCR proceeding, and the trial court denied the claims on the merits. (Exh. MM at 15;

Exh. NN at 5; Exh. QQ at 2.) Petitioner, however, failed to file a petition for review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Consequently, Ground Two was not properly exhausted as it was

not fully and fairly presented to state courts. Failure to fairly present Ground Two has

resulted in procedural default because Petitioner is now barred from returning to state courts.

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a), 32.9(c).

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In Ground Three, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently when

counsel cross-examined the lead detective. Under the same Ground, Petitioner alleges that

he tried to change judges because he believed the trial judge was “bias[ed],” his request for

a “diverse jury instruction” was denied, a witness provided a description of the suspect that

did not match Petitioner, Detective Dalton committed perjury and created false evidence,

there was not sufficient evidence to support his convictions, and the State created “false

evidence.”

Petitioner presented several of these miscellaneous sub-claims to the trial court in his

PCR petition. (Exh. MM at 15-16; Exh. NN at 5.) The trial court denied these claims on the

merits. (Exh. QQ at 2.) Petitioner, however, did not file a petition for review with the Arizona

Court of Appeals. To the extent these claims were presented to the trial court, Petitioner did

not properly exhaust them because he failed to fairly present the claims to the Arizona Court

of Appeals. And, to the extent that any of the sub-claims were not presented in the PCR

petition, Petitioner has not properly exhausted them because he has not fairly presented the

claims to any state court in a Rule 32 proceeding. (Exhs. MM, NN, QQ.) Failure to fairly

present any of the claims alleged in Ground Three has resulted in procedural default because

Petitioner is now barred from returning to state courts. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a),

32.9(c).

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that, but for his counsel’s ineffective assistance and

the language barrier, he would have signed the plea agreement and would not have agreed

to go to trial. Petitioner has not presented this claim to any state court. (Exhs. MM, NN, QQ.)

Failure to fairly present Ground Four has resulted in procedural default because Petitioner

is now barred from returning to state courts. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted Grounds Two

through Four. Although a procedural default may be overcome upon a showing of cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51,

Petitioner has not established that any exception to procedural default applies.

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Petitioner asserts that he has a “language barrier” and has been denied access to an

interpreter. However, an assertion of the inability to understand English does not alone

constitute cause without some explanation of an external, objective factor which prevented

a petitioner from properly raising his claims in state court. See, e.g., Bonilla v. Hurley, 370

F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[Petitioner]’s unfamiliarity with the English language is

insufficient to establish cause to excuse his procedural default because such alleged

unfamiliarity is not ‘external to [his] defense.’” (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

488 (1986))); Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1988) (determining

petitioner’s “pro se status and lack of familiarity with the American language and court

system to not constitute cause” to excuse procedural default). Moreover, Petitioner has failed

to present any evidence that he was denied assistance in preparing his state-court filings.

Petitioner’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to show “cause.”

Further, the Court notes that even though he had a translator for trial, throughout his

testimony he opted to testify in English without the assistance of the translator. (Exh. MMM

at 3, 31-93.) Thus, the trial court record belies Petitioner’s claims that he has no

understanding of the English language.

Additionally, although Petitioner seems to generally claim he is innocent, he has not

made credible claim of actual innocence to permit review of his procedurally defaulted

claims. A gateway claim of actual innocence requires “new reliable evidence – whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence – that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. “[A] petitioner does not

meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new

evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 329. “[T]he Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only

in the ‘extraordinary’ case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513

U.S. at 327). These claims open the gateway for review when a petitioner “presents evidence

of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of a trial unless

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the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Schlup,

513 U.S. at 316. Further, “‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal

insufficiency” of the evidence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1998).

Here, Petitioner seems to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. However, alleging

that the evidence is unreliable or insufficient to support a conviction does not prove actual

innocence. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24. Petitioner’s bare claims of innocence without

any new reliable evidence fall short of meeting the “demanding” actual innocence standard.

See House, 547 U.S. at 538.

Lastly, although “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral

proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective

assistance at trial,” Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), Petitioner

fails to allege cause pursuant to Martinez. In any event, the Court finds that any allegation

that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel provides cause for Petitioner’s failure

to properly exhaust his IAC claims necessarily fails.

To establish cause under Martinez, a petitioner must demonstrate that post-conviction

counsel’s failure to raise the defaulted claim was itself ineffective under the standards of

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and that the

underlying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was “substantial.” See Martinez, 132

S.Ct. at 1318. A “substantial” claim “has some merit.” Id. Like the standard for issuing a

certificate of appealability, to establish a “substantial” claim, a petitioner must demonstrate

that “reasonable jurists could debate whether ... the petition should have been resolved in a

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations

omitted). In other words, a claim is “‘insubstantial’ if it does not have any merit or is wholly

without factual support.” Id. Determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

is substantial requires a district court to examine the claim under the standards of Strickland.

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To establish a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. See id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id.

at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that

counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. See

id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

Review of counsel’s performance is extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be

considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. See id. at 691-92. To show

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. The

court need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an insufficient

showing on one. See id. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, ... that course should be

followed”).

As to Ground Two, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate substantial claims.

Specifically, regarding Petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to provide him with an

“adequate Kuwait court appointed interpreter,” the record reflects that counsel requested an

“Arabic/Iraqui speaking interpreter” who was appointed to assist Petitioner. (Exh. B; Exh.

C at 2.) Counsel later moved for a “permanent assignment of interpreter,” requesting a

specific interpreter, Mr. Mansoon, because Mr. Mansoon was from Iraq and he spoke “the

same dialect of Arabic” as Petitioner. (Exh. E.) The trial court granted this request. (Exh. F

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at 2; Exh. G at 2.) At a subsequent hearing, the court appointed “the Court Interpretation and

Translation Services with the correct Arabic dialect.” (Exh. H at 2.)

The transcripts and minute entries reflect that an interpreter was present at each

settlement conference, pretrial hearings, and at trial. (Exhs. C, F-H, J, N, R, T, BBB-PPP.)

A review of the transcripts shows that Petitioner had an understanding of the proceedings,

and his responses to the court’s questions showed he understood what was being said (either

through the interpreter or his understanding of the English language). (Exh. BBB-PPP.) Prior

to trial, the court addressed Petitioner, stating, “[I]f at any time during the trial you don’t

understand the interpretation that you have been given, please don’t hesitate to tell the

interpreter and we will stop and repeat whatever needs to be repeated. Do you understand

that, sir?” (Exh. EEE at 43-44.) Petitioner said, “Yes, sir.” (Id. at 44.) Further, Petitioner has

not argued how he was prejudiced from his attorney’s alleged failure to secure an “adequate”

interpreter. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Regarding Petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to provide him with documents

relevant to his case until two weeks before trial, even assuming trial counsel did not provide

Petitioner relevant case materials until two weeks prior to trial, Petitioner has not shown, or

even alleged, how this prejudiced him. See id.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not established substantial claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel and has not overcome the procedural bar to his claims asserted in Ground Two.

In Ground Three, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently when

counsel cross-examined the lead detective. He then asserts multiple miscellaneous sub-claims

under the same Ground. Petitioner makes general and conclusory allegations, including, the

trial judge was biased and a detective created “false evidence,” yet Petitioner fails to explain

how counsel acted deficiently in each instance, or explain how he was prejudiced as a result.

Such broad and conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of

counsel. See, e.g., Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding

petitioner’s “cursory and vague [ineffective assistance of counsel claim] cannot support

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 The records reflects that Petitioner was represented by different defense counsel at

various settlement conferences. (Exhs. BBB, CCC, DDD; Exh. EEE at 45-61.) All agreed

that Petitioner should plead guilty. (Id.)

6

 On the date of the conference, defense counsel filed a “Settlement Conference

Memorandum.” (Exh. K.) It noted the plea offer was “based upon the deviation request

submitted by defense counsel” and it was the offer defense counsel “requested based on the

facts, the mitigation [], and [Petitioner]’s criminal history.” (Id. at 2.) The memorandum set

forth mitigation information and the facts of the crimes. (Id. at 2-3.) It also noted that

Petitioner “had difficulty accepting his current predicament and the possible consequences

that come from a guilty verdict.” (Id. at 3.)

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habeas relief.”); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding “conclusory

suggestions that [petitioner’s] trial and state appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance

fall far short of stating a valid claim of constitutional violation”). Therefore, Petitioner has

not established substantial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and has not overcome

the procedural bar to his claims asserted in Ground Three.

Finally, in Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that “but for his counsel’s ineffective

assistance and the language barrier, he would have signed the plea agreement and would not

have agreed to go to trial.” Petitioner fails to establish a substantial claim.

The record demonstrates that defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court

strongly urged Petitioner to plead guilty, but Petitioner refused to accept a plea offer and

maintained his innocence.5

 Four settlement conferences were held. At the first settlement

conference on December 13, 2010, Petitioner was assisted by an interpreter.6

 (Exh. BBB at

3.) The court, prosecutor, and defense counsel went through the evidence in the case, and

defense counsel set forth some of his investigation, including that he could not substantiate

an alibi defense for the murder of M.M. and that the retained ballistics expert agreed with the

State expert’s findings. (Id. at 7-9, 11-14, 16-17, 20-24.) The trial court explained to

Petitioner that, if he was found guilty of both charges, he faced either a 25-years-to-life or

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natural life sentence for each murder charge. (Id. at 10-11, 17.) The plea offer stipulated to

a 32-year prison sentence. (Id. at 25.)

Petitioner maintained that he killed A.M. in self-defense and denied killing M.M. (Id.

at 4-7, 15, 18, 26.) The trial court explained that the evidence against Petitioner was

“overwhelming” and his attorney were “trying to tell [him] as clearly as they can that they

don’t have a defense to present from [Petitioner] for a trial.” (Id. at 9.) The trial court further

told Petitioner that his attorneys had “investigated every possibility” and had “done the very

best to find something to present for [Petitioner] at trial and, to be honest, there just isn’t

anything.” (Id. at 14.) The trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor urged Petitioner

to plead guilty. (Id. at 9, 14, 17-18, 20-25.) Petitioner wanted additional time to think about

the offer, but made several statements that he would not “make it” 32 years in prison, he

wanted “a wife” and “children,” and that he was not sure he would be “alive after 32 years.”

(Id. at 19, 22-23, 29.)

At the next settlement conference on December 16, 2010, Petitioner was again

assisted by an interpreter. (Exh. CCC at 4.) The court addressed Petitioner and said, “Now,

sir, I’ve heard you speak a little bit of English, but I just want to make sure that to understand

all of the subtleties, you feel more comfortable with the aid of an interpreter; is that correct?”

(Id.) Petitioner said, “Yes.” (Id.) A different judge presided over this settlement conference,

and he explained again the possible sentences Petitioner could receive, and said that, based

on the facts, it was “very unlikely [Petitioner] would receive anything less than natural life.”

(Id. at 5-6.) The plea offer was for Petitioner to plead guilty to two counts of second-degree

murder, and agree to two 16-year flat-time, consecutive sentences, for a total of 32 years. (Id.

at 6.) The court noted this was “a very unusual and lenient plea” and Petitioner would likely

be released around age 70. (Id. at 6-7.) Again, the court and parties went through the

evidence, the fact that Petitioner did not have a strong defense and there was no evidence

supporting his self-defense claim for the killing of A.M. or his alibi defense for the killing

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of M.M., and strongly urged Petitioner to plead guilty. (Id. at 7, 9-33.) Petitioner again

maintained his innocence, and rejected the plea offer. (Id. at 9-34.)

Another settlement conference was held on May 19, 2011. (Exh. DDD.) Petitioner

was assisted by an interpreter. (Id. at 2.) The trial court went over the charges and the

possible sentences – that Petitioner was facing up to two consecutive natural life sentences.

(Id. at 3-4.) The parties and trial court went through the evidence. (Id. at 4-6.) The prosecutor

said if Petitioner was interested in pleading guilty, she would try to get the original offer of

two 16-year sentences, for a total of 32 years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 6.) The court said the

prosecutor should see if she could get the same offer. (Id.) The parties then set a trial date.

The record fails to indicate if Petitioner was interested in pursuing a plea offer. (Id. at 6-8.)

Finally, at the final pretrial conference on January 19, 2012, a final settlement

conference was held. (Exh. EEE at 45-61.) Again, Petitioner had the assistance of an

interpreter. (Id. at 3.) The purpose of the conference was to see if Petitioner wanted to make

a plea offer for the State to consider. (Id. at 46.) The court explained to Petitioner his right

to a jury trial, and again explained the potential penalty he faced if he was found guilty of

both first-degree murders, or of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. (Id. at

46-47.) The court answered Petitioner’s questions about the jury system, and then Petitioner

had an off-the-record discussion with his attorney. (Id. at 47-50.)

After the off-the-record discussion, defense counsel noted that they discussed that the

jury does not decide the sentence, and Petitioner did not agree with that. (Id. at 50-51.)

Defense counsel suggested that they propose a settlement offer of “25 years flat in the

Department of Corrections to resolve both of these counts.” (Id. at 51.) Counsel said, “I had

suggested that that was something [Petitioner] very much should consider under the

circumstances. He’s indicating that he does not want to do that. He’s indicating he wants to

proceed to trial; is that true?” (Id.) Petitioner said, “Yes.” (Id.) The court advised Petitioner

that he faced consecutive natural-life sentences if he was found guilty at trial. (Id. at 51-52.)

Petitioner confirmed he understood. (Id. at 52.) Petitioner later said, “The problem is, I am

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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innocent. This is why I can’t take a plea.” (Id. at 54.) The trial court further discussed the jury

system and self-defense with Petitioner, and defense counsel then asked Petitioner, “You still

want to proceed to trial?” (Id. at 54-60.) Petitioner said, “Yes, sir.” (Id. at 60.)

Thus, the record establishes that Petitioner knew the potential outcome of going to

trial and being found guilty, that his attorneys repeatedly tried to get him to accept a plea

offer, and that Petitioner maintained his innocence and refused to accept any plea. Other than

Petitioner’s conclusory statements, he cannot show that his trial counsel performed

deficiently. Moreover, Petitioner cannot show prejudice because he has not shown that he

would have taken the guilty plea absent any theoretical deficient performance by defense

counsel.

Petitioner has not established a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

and has not overcome the procedural bar to his claim asserted in Ground Four.

B. Merits

Pursuant to the AEDPA7

, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). “When applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last

reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson, 360 F.3d at 1055.

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

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decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his Miranda rights were violated when

detectives interrogated him without first reading him his Miranda rights, interrogated him

without an interpreter, and continued to interrogate him after he requested counsel.

On April 15, 2009, Phoenix Police Detectives Paul Dalton and April Lopez went to

Salinas, California to interview Petitioner. (Exh. O at 2.) The interview was audio and video

recorded, and transcribed. (Exhs. Q, SSS.) At the beginning of the interview, Detective

Dalton asked if Petitioner was “sick” and Petitioner said he has “diabetes” and takes

medication. (Exh. Q at 1.) Detective Dalton asked Petitioner if he understood English, and

Petitioner said, “Not that very well.” (Id.) Detective Dalton asked, “If I talk slow enough will

you understand?” (Id.) Petitioner said, “Yeah.” (Id.) Detective Dalton asked Petitioner some

preliminary background questions, such as the spelling of his name and date of birth, and

Petitioner answered him appropriately in English. (Id.) Then, the following occurred:

Q. [Detective Dalton]: Sir, you’re in custody here in Selena, California [sic]

and we’re from Phoenix PD. And we need to talk to you about some, some

things that happened in the last couple of days. Okay? But before I do that I

need to read you something, okay? Can you understand me?

A. [Petitioner]: Yeah.

Q. [Detective Dalton]: Okay. You have the right to remain silent. Anything

you say can be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to the

presence of an attorney to assist you prior to questioning and be with you

during questioning if you so desire. If you cannot afford an attorney you have

the right to have an attorney appointed for you prior to questioning. Do you

understand these rights?

A. [Petitioner]: Yeah.

(Id. at 2.)

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Petitioner then asked, “Can I have an attorney.” (Id.) Detective Dalton said, “You sure

can. All right. It makes this trip really short. So I can’t talk to you right now, okay? Is that

what you want? You want an attorney[?]” (Id.) Petitioner clarified, “You can talk to me,

yeah.” (Id.) Detective Dalton told Petitioner that he requested an attorney and they could not

talk to him. (Id.) A similar exchange went back and forth and Petitioner kept saying things

such as, “I’m gonna tell you right now,” and “let me tell you the story first.” (Id. at 3.) The

detectives clarified that he had the right to the attorney and stated that he had invoked that

right. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner then said, “I, I want a lawyer, cause I no understand what

happened.” (Id. at 4.) Detective Dalton said, “What, what I’m gonna do is you want a lawyer

and I’m not going to question you, okay?” (Id.) Petitioner confirmed he “understood that.”

(Id.)

Detective Dalton told Petitioner: “Okay. So we’re done right done. What we’re gonna

do is we’re gonna book you into jail for the killings of two people.” (Id.) Petitioner said,

“No,” and Detective Dalton said, “In Phoenix.” (Id.) Then, Petitioner began to explain his

version of what happened. (Id. at 4-5.) He said his sister’s husband came at him with a knife

and he shot him, and then he went to Tempe and dropped the gun and washed himself. (Id.

at 5.) Petitioner started to cry and Detective Dalton asked if he was “gonna be okay” and if

he needed any water. (Id.) Petitioner continued with his explanation of what happened. (Id.

at 5-8.)

Then, at one point, one of the detectives appeared to ask the name of the victim,

referring to M.M., and Petitioner asked, “What happened for him?” (Id. at 8.) Detective

Lopez said, “He was killed.” (Id. at 9.) Petitioner asked, “Who killed him?” and Detective

Dalton said, “You did.” (Id.) Petitioner denied killing M.M., and asked the detectives several

questions. (Id. at 9-10.) He said, “I have witness with me the, the doctor and two nurse[s].”

(Id. at 10.) Detective Dalton said, “I can’t ask any questions of you sir because you asked for

an attorney,” and Detective Lopez said something similar. (Id.) Detective Lopez said, “If you

decide that you want to talk to use without an attorney, we can talk about it. But if you say,

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no, I want an attorney, we cannot talk about it.” (Id.) Petitioner said, “Please give me

attorney, because I’m not understand.” (Id.)

Detective Dalton informed Petitioner he was “being charged with two murders.” (Id.)

Petitioner began to talk and ask more questions, and Detective Dalton stopped him and then

said he was concerned about Petitioner’s health. (Id. at 10-11.) Detective Dalton advised

Petitioner to let them know at the jail if he needed medication, and Petitioner said he felt

“tired” and kept insisting he did not kill M.M. (Id. at 11.) The detectives left the room. (Id.

at 12.)

Petitioner’s attorney filed a pretrial motion to suppress Petitioner’s statements,

arguing: (1) “[Petitioner]’s initial request for counsel during the interrogation was very clear,

so he should not have been subject to further interrogation without counsel, rendering any

statements he made inadmissible at trial,” and (2) “[Petitioner]’s further response to

interrogation is inadmissible at trial because [Petitioner] never made a valid waiver of his

right to counsel subsequent to his initial invocation of that right.” (Exh. L.) The State

responded, arguing that Petitioner either reinitiated the conversation with police or made

“spontaneous statements” after he initially invoked his right to counsel. (Exh. O.) The State

argued that Petitioner was not subject to interrogation after he invoked his right to counsel.

(Id. at 6-7.) A DVD containing an audio and video recording of Petitioner’s interview and

a transcript of the interview were submitted to the trial court, and the trial court reviewed

these items. (Exh. O at 2; Exh. EEE at 3-4, 15, 18; Exhs. Q, SSS.)

A hearing was held on the motion, and Petitioner’s attorney additionally stated that

the police should have provided an “Arabic” interpreter. (Exh. EEE at 6-10.) Counsel argued

that Petitioner did not understand his Miranda rights, and there was no “knowing and

voluntary waiver of Miranda.” (Id. at 10.) The prosecutor argued that the totality of the video

showed Petitioner understood Detective Dalton, highlighting that Petitioner gave appropriate

responses to Detective Dalton’s questions. (Id. at 11-12.) The prosecutor also argued that the

fact Detective Dalton told Petitioner he was going to be arrested for two counts of murder

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was simply a fact and did not render the subsequent statements by Petitioner involuntary or

in violation of Miranda. (Id. at 12-13.) The prosecutor stated that the detective advised

Petitioner what was going to happen next and then Petitioner made spontaneous statements

without prompting by the detectives. (Id. at 13-15.)

The trial court ruled:

I have reviewed the tape and I quickly reviewed the transcript. It coincides

with my notes and frankly I wish I had it when I reviewed the tape the first

time. I do believe it is accurate because it has – doesn’t have the time stamp

information that I had, but it seems to have the same – it seems to be an

accurate transcription of what I heard on the tape.

And so the Court does agree that from the very beginning, [Petitioner] stated

that his ability to understand English was not very good. And that the entire

interview or entire conversation was in English. Detective Dalton did read the

Miranda rights. [Petitioner] made an unequivocal request for a lawyer. He then

made – began to make a spontaneous statement. Again, [Petitioner] stated, in

this Court’s opinion, unequivocally he wanted a lawyer.

Detective Dalton informed [Petitioner] of the intention to book him. The Court

observed that – the Court’s view is that Detective Dalton was in the process of

gathering – there was something in his hand he was gathering to get up. And

at that point, [Petitioner] made a very lengthy statement.

The Court does not find that the informing of [Petitioner] of the State’s

intention or the police officer’s intention to arrest is intended as an

interrogation question and, therefore, the statement made was spontaneous.

On the Miranda issue of whether it was improper to read the rights in English

rather than Arabic, the Court finds that because all of [Petitioner]’s statement

was in English and while sometimes using not native syntax it was always in

English, always using the appropriate terms at the appropriate places, the Court

finds that he – there’s a basis to believe he had a basic understanding of his

Miranda rights. So the Court finds no violation of Miranda.

On the separate issue of voluntariness, taking the totality that the defendant did

say he was tired, Detective Dalton on two or three different places asked if he

wanted water or anything. The Court finds that the statement itself was not a

result of [Petitioner]’s will being overcome by a law enforcement’s use of

violence, coercion, threats, or by any implied promise. So, therefore, the Court

finds that the statement was voluntary.

(Id. at 15-17.) The court denied Petitioner’s motion to suppress. (Id. at 17.) The parties then

discussed whether the Miranda warnings and invocation would be presented to the jury. (Id.

at 17-19.) The court noted that it believed the “spontaneous statement” began on “page 4, line

13” of the transcript, and its initial ruling was the State could present only that statement in

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its case-in-chief, finding Petitioner’s assertion of his constitutional rights at the interview was

precluded under Arizona Rule of Evidence 403. (Id. at 19.) But, Petitioner had the option of

presenting the beginning of the interview, if he chose to do so. (Id.)

The State did not introduce Petitioner’s statements in its case-in-chief, but rather only

used the statements to impeach Petitioner’s trial testimony. (Exh. MMM at 50-79.)

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal (Exh. U), and his appellate counsel filed an Anders

brief, finding “no arguable question of law that is not frivolous” to raise on direct appeal, and

requested that the court review the case for fundamental error. (Exh. Z at 29.) Petitioner was

given the option of filing a supplemental brief, but did not do so. (Exh. BB; Exh. DD at 2,

¶ 1.) In the memorandum decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted it had searched the

record for “reversible error” and found “no reversible error.” (Exh. DD at 2, ¶ 2.) The court

stated “[w]ith respect to [Petitioner]’s motion to suppress, the court’s factual findings

supported its conclusion that [Petitioner]’s statements were voluntary and he reinitiated the

conversation with police after requesting a lawyer.” (Id. at 4, ¶ 12.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals in its general review for fundamental error affirmed

the trial court’s rulings on the suppression motion, deferring entirely to its factual findings.

(Exh. DD at 3-4, ¶¶ 8, 12.)

Initially, with regard to Petitioner’s claim that his rights were violated when detectives

interrogated him without first reading him his Miranda rights, the Court finds that the state

court properly found that Petitioner received Miranda warnings. The transcript of the

interview reflects that Detective Dalton informed Petitioner of his Miranda rights. (Exh. Q

at 2.)

Next, Petitioner argues that he was improperly interrogated without the assistance of

an interpreter. As set forth above, the trial court concluded that although Petitioner expressed

that “his ability to understand English was not very good,” Petitioner spoke in English to the

detectives, and although he sometimes he did not use “native syntax,” he always used “the

appropriate terms at the appropriate places.” (Exh. EEE at 15-17.) The trial court concluded

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that Petitioner understood his Miranda rights, even though the rights were read in English.

(Id. at 17.) The Court finds that the transcript of Petitioner’s interview supports the court’s

conclusions. (Exh. Q.)

Finally, Petitioner contends that the detectives violated Miranda by continuing to

interrogate him after he requested an attorney. When a person makes an unequivocal request

for counsel during a custodial interrogation, he “is not subject to further interrogation by the

authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates

further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona,

451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). “[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person

is subject to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis,

446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to

express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than

those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301. In Miranda, the

Supreme Court stated that “[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth

Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.” 384 U.S. at 478.

“‘Miranda does not protect an accused from a spontaneous admission made under

circumstances not induced by the investigating officers or during a conversation not initiated

by the officers.’” Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States

v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1032 (4th Cir. 1985)).

Here, Petitioner invoked his Miranda rights and asked for an attorney. (Exh. Q at 2.)

Detective Dalton informed Petitioner that the interview was ceasing and that he was not

“going to question” Petitioner. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner confirmed that he “understood that.” (Id.)

Then, Detective Dalton said, “Okay. So we’re done right done. What we’re gonna do is

we’re gonna book you into jail for the killings of two people.” (Id.) As the trial court stated,

the video of the interview then shows that Detective Dalton had gathered up his belongings

and appeared to be getting ready to leave the interview room. (Exh. EEE.) Without any

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question posed by the detectives, Petitioner began to explain what happened with regard to

A.M. (Exh. Q at 4-8.) The detectives did not pose any questions to Petitioner, except to ask

whether he was “gonna be okay,” whether he needed any water, and whether he needed

insulin. (Id.) Petitioner posed several questions to the detectives, but the detectives did not

appear to question Petitioner directly and told him several times that he had requested an

attorney and they could not question him. (Exh. Q at 8-11.)

Thus, the record supports the trial court’s conclusions that Petitioner reinitiated

contact with police, he was not subject to any further interrogation, and he made spontaneous

statements.

In any event, the record reflects that the State used Petitioner’s statements on crossexamination to impeach his trial testimony. (Exh. MMM at 50-79.) Voluntary statements

obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible to impeach a defendant’s trial testimony. See

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985); United States v. Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1126

(9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] defendant’s voluntary statements – even if obtained in violation of

Miranda – are admissible as impeachment evidence.”).

Regardless, the Court finds that Petitioner suffered no actual prejudice as the evidence

presented against him was overwhelming. It was uncontested at trial that Petitioner killed

A.M., and Petitioner’s self-defense claim was controverted by the State’s evidence. Multiple

eyewitnesses saw Petitioner shoot at A.M., and then when A.M. was laying on the ground,

saw him shoot A.M. several more times. (Exh. HHH at 44-53, 62-69, 81-91.) Although

Petitioner claimed A.M. had a knife, no knife was recovered by the body and eyewitnesses

did not see A.M. holding anything in his hands. (Exh. HHH at 42, 50, 67, 86; Exh. KKK at

46-47.)

A.M.’s wife testified that Petitioner had called her and said he had killed M.M. and

was going to kill her husband. (Exh. JJJ at 24-26, 39.) A.M.’s son testified that, shortly

before Petitioner killed A.M., Petitioner had left a voicemail on A.M.’s cellphone, stating if

he saw A.M., he would “kill him and he will empty a gun in his ass.” (Exh. III at 108.) After

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the murder, A.M.’s son called Petitioner’s cell phone twice, and Petitioner answered the

second call. (Id. at 113-14.) A.M.’s son asked Petitioner, “why” and Petitioner said, “[J]ust

to teach your father a lesson.” (Id. at 114.) Petitioner’s cell phone records verified that two

calls were made from A.M.’s son cell phone to Petitioner’s cell phone after the shooting.

(Exh. LLL at 70.) Petitioner fled Arizona, and was later arrested in California; he had over

$7,000 in cash when he was arrested. (Exh. KKK at 99-102.)

With regard to M.M., Petitioner’s alibi defense did not cover the established

time-frame of M.M.’s murder. According to the record, Petitioner went to a doctor’s office

and checked out at 3:39 p.m., and left the office by 3:50 p.m. (Exh. LLL at 145-59.). M.M.

was shot around 4:37 p.m., and the doctor’s office was near the location of the shooting.

(Exh. LLL at 8, 160; Exh. MMM at 75-76.) Phone records established that Petitioner called

M.M. three times in the hour before M.M. was shot, including one call just 6 minutes before

the 911 calls were made regarding the shooting. (Exh. LLL at 7-8.) Eyewitnesses from a

nearby apartment complex could not identify Petitioner, but several of them saw the shooter

get into a vehicle that matched the description of Petitioner’s vehicle. (Exh. GGG at 65-66,

72-74; Exh. KKK at 97.) During a search of Petitioner’s vehicle, police found a lottery ticket

that had M.M.’s number written on the back, and the number “35.” (Exh. KKK at 99.) M.M.

was shot in the parking lot of a Safeway located at 35th Avenue and Northern. (Exh. GGG

at 106.)

Physical evidence also linked the two murders. The State’s firearm expert concluded

that cartridge casings recovered at both scenes were fired from the same gun, and also

concluded that bullet and bullet fragments recovered by police from both murders were also

fired from the same gun. (Exh. GGG at 126-37, 161-63; Exh. HHH at 22-23; Exh. KKK at

11-46; Exh. LLL at 89-103, 108.) The expert opined that the gun used in both murders was

likely “a Beretta style firearm.” (Exh. LLL at 108.) During a search of Petitioner’s apartment,

police found an empty gun case for a Beretta handgun, and a box of 9-millimeter

ammunition, which was missing 40 rounds. (Exh. KKK at 91-95.) Police later found a receipt

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from a pawn shop for “a pistol, Berreta and HSM 9 millimeter HP” in Petitioner’s vehicle.

(Id. at 98.) During his testimony, Petitioner admitted he owned a 9-millimeter Beretta, he

shot A.M. with it, and he threw it in Tempe Town Lake after killing A.M. (Exh. MMM at

11-12, 30-34, 37-39.)

In light of the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt and the minimal use of his statements at

trial, any error in admitting his statements was harmless.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court’s

decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record

before the Court.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Grounds Two, Three, and Four are procedurally defaulted,

and Ground One fails on the merits, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 15) be DENIED and

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and because the dismissal of the

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

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Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 9th day of September, 2016.

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