Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07098/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JACK BOLAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FI LED 

Uoiced States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

ruG 14 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 89-7098 

DAVE WILLIAMS, Adair County 

Deputy District Attorney, 

RUSSELL NEFF, Ex-Sheriff of 

Stilwell, Oklahoma, 

R.L. OSEGUEDA, KATHY POLASKI, 

Arizona Sheriff Officers. 

Defendants-Appellees. 

(E.D. Okla. No. 89-155-C) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff filed this action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 in the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

on March 28, 1989. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that 

defendants, who are Arizona and Oklahoma police officers, violated 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-7098 Document: 010110040847 Date Filed: 08/14/1990 Page: 1 
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his constitutional rights by conducting a warrantless search and 

arresting him in Stilwell, Oklahoma on March 19, 1986. See R. 

Doc. 3. By order entered August 23, 1989, the district court 

dismissed plaintiff's action, ruling that it was barred by 

Oklahoma's two-year statute of limitations. See R. Doc. 15. 

Plaintiff filed a "Motion For Reconsideration" in which he 

asserted that "Oklahoma law tolls the statute of limitations, and 

indeed for any disability recognized by law." R. Doc. 16. By 

attached affidavit, plaintiff averred that he had "been 

continuously imprisoned out of the State of Oklahoma since 28 

March 1987." R. Doc. 17. The district court denied the motion to 

reconsider, see R. Doc. 20, the plaintiff appealed, see R. Doc. 

21, and the district court denied plaintiff leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis under 28 u.s.c. S 1915(a). We grant appellant's 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the Oklahoma statute of 

limitations was tolled because: (1) he suffered a legal 

disability by virtue of his imprisonment; (2) he mistakenly filed 

his complaint with the United States Commission on Civil rights; 

and (3) his action did not accrue until March 1989, when he 

obtained access to a law library. 

Because 42 u.s.c. S 1983 does not contain a limitations 

period, the statute of limitations of the state in which 

plaintiff's cause of action arose, Oklahoma, controls. See Krug 

v. Imbridino, 896 F.2d, 395, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1990). The Supreme 

Court has held that in S 1983 actions the controlling state's 

statute of limitations for personal injury actions is to be 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-7098 Document: 010110040847 Date Filed: 08/14/1990 Page: 2 
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applied. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). 

Applying Wilson, this court has determined that under Oklahoma law 

the statute of limitations for personal injury actions applicable 

in§ 1983 suits is the two-year limitation of Okla. Stat. Ann . 

tit. 12, § 95(3) (1971). See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 

1523-24 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff argues that Oklahoma law recognizes a legal 

disability for imprisonment which tolls the statute of 

limitations. The Oklahoma disability statute does not expressly 

recognize the disability of imprisonment. See Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 12 S 96 (1987). The statute simply provides that the statute 

of limitations shall be tolled for a person "under any legal 

disability." Id. Plaintiff does not cite, and our research has 

not disclosed, any case recognizing a disability for imprisonment 

under Oklahoma law. The single court which has confronted the 

question held that imprisonment is not a disability in Oklahoma. 

See Battle v. Lawson, 352 F. Supp. 156, 158 (W.D. Okla. 1972). 

This court has only recognized imprisonment as a disability 

when it was specifically enumerated by statute. See~, Brown 

v. Bigger, 622 F.2d 1025, 1026 (10th Cir. 1980) (Kansas statute 

stated that running is tolled by imprisonment); Tabor v. 

Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 528 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 

U.S. 971 (1956) (Michigan statute expressly recognized 

imprisonment as disability); ~ also Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 

F . 2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1981) ("appellant's status as a prisoner 

may toll the statutory limitation period under the relevant state 

statute") (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 89-7098 Document: 010110040847 Date Filed: 08/14/1990 Page: 3 
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Imprisonment, if not an exception in the statute, cannot 

affect the running of limitations; but under some 

statutes this exception has been made so as to toll the 

running of limitations, or the action may be brought 

within a specified period after the disability of 

imprisonment ceases. 

54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions§ 241 (1948). Therefore, because 

Oklahoma's disability statute does not expressly recognize a 

disability for imprisonment, we hold that the district court 

correctly denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. 1 

Reading appellant's brief with the leniency to which he is 

due as a prose litigant, it appears his next argument is that the 

limitations period was tolled because he filed his complaint with 

the United States Commission on Civil Rights on May 18, 1987, well 

within the Oklahoma two-year limitations period. See Appellant's 

Br. at 2. We reject this argument. Because there is no 

requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies 

before bringing suit under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, the limitations 

period was not tolled by his pursuit of such remedies. See 

Hansbury v. Regents of University of the California, 596 F.2d 944, 

949-50 n. 17 (10th Cir. 1979) (no requirement to exhaust Title VII 

remedies before bringing discrimination action under§ 1983, thus 

statute of limitations period not tolled), overruled on other 

grounds, Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd 

471 U.S. 261 (1985). 

1 Although appellant recognizes that his action is controlled 

by the Oklahoma statute of limitations, see Appellant's Br. at 2, 

Reply Br. at 2, he nonetheless urges us to adopt the Arizona 

disability provisions. See id. Although Arizona does 

specifically provide by statute that imprisonment is a disability 

tolling the limitations period, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 12-502 

(1989), appellant's claim is governed by Oklahoma law because that 

is the state in which it arose. Cf. Krug, 896 F.2d at 396-97. 

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Finally, relying on Williams v. Borden Inc., 637 F.2d 731, . '-

733-34 (10th Cir. 1980), appellant argues that the limitations 

period was tolled until March 1989, when he first had access to a 

legal library and realized he had a cause of action. This 

argument is a meritless recharacterization of appellant's 

assertion that Oklahoma recognizes imprisonment as a disability. 

Williams simply held that, under certain circumstances, ignorance 

of the facts giving rise to a cause of action may toll the 

Oklahoma statute of limitations. Id. Nothing in Williams 

suggests that ignorance of the law is an excuse in Oklahoma. 2 

Accordingly, the August 23, 1989, order of the district court 

dismissing appellant's action as time-barred and the November 30, 

1989, order denying appellant's motion to reconsider are AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

2 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

Appellant's reliance on Lavelle v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1131 

(5th Cir. 1980), is also misplaced. Lavelle held that the statute 

of limitations for a§ 1983 action began to run at the point when 

the plaintiff became aware of "the critic~! facts that he has been 

hurt and who has inflicted the injury." Id. (quotations omitted). 

The court in Lavelle specifically rejected the argument that the 

limitation period did not commence to run until the plaintiff 

gained "an awareness of the causal connection between the 

defendants' acts and the injury, and of the applicable legal 

standard. " Id. 

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