Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-03412/USCOURTS-ca2-13-03412-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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13‐3412

Warren v. Pataki

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2014

(Argued:  June 5, 2015 Decided: May 17, 2016)

Docket No. 13‐3412

1

2

3 ROBERT WARREN, CHARLES BROOKS,

4 Consolidated Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

5

6 ROBERT TROCCHIO, SYLVIA TORRES, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE

7 ESTATE OF JORGE BURGOS, JR., LOUIS MASSEI,

8 Consolidated Plaintiffs,

9

10 KENNETH BAILEY,

11 Plaintiff,

12

13 v.

14

15 GEORGE PATAKI, FORMER GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK STATE, SHARON

16 CARPINELLO, GLENN S. GOORD, EILEEN CONSILVIO, FORMER

17 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MANHATTAN PSYCHIATRIC CENTER AND KIRBY

18 FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC CENTER, ROBERT DENNISON, FORMER

19 CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE AND CHIEF

20 EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,

21 DALE ARTUS, FORMER SUPERINTENDENT OF CLINTON CORRECTIONAL

22 FACILITY,

23 Defendants‐Appellees,

24

25 JOHN DOE(S), # 3, SUPERINTENDENT OF WYOMING CORRECTIONAL

26 FACILITY, JOHN DOE(S), # 4, SUPERINTENDENT OF ATTICA

27 CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, JOHN DOE(S), # 5, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE

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1 DOWNSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, JOHN DOES, # 6 THROUGH 20,

2 MEDICAL PERSONNEL WHO EXAMINED AND EVALUATED PLAINTIFF

3 PURSUANT TO NEW YORK STATE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 9,

4 MICHAEL GIAMBRUNO, JAMES CONWAY, PAUL ANNETTS, EMILIA

5 RUTIGLIANO, PRABHAKAR GUMBULA, OLUSEGUN BELLO, ALLAN

6 WELLS, JONATHAN KAPLAN, MARY ANN ROSS, AYODEJI SOMEFUN,

7 MICHAL KUNZ, WILLIAM POWERS, LEO E. PAYANT, LAWRENCE

8 FARAGO, LUIS HERNANDEZ, SAMUEL LANGER, JEFFREY TEDFORD,

9 FORMER DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF SECURITY, CLINTON

10 CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, WILLIAM J. SACKETT, FACILITY SENIOR

11 PAROLE OFFICER, CLINTON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, JEAN LIU,

12 PSYCHIATRIST WHO EVALUATED PLAINTIFF FOR POSSIBLE CIVIL

13 COMMITMENT, ABADUL QAYYUM, CHARLES CHUNG,

Defendants.* 14

15

16

17    

18 Before: SACK, HALL, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

19 The plaintiffs were civilly committed to state psychiatric facilities pursuant

20 to the New York State Sexually Violent Predator Initiative promulgated by the

21 executive branch of the New York State government in 2005.  Challenging their

22 commitments by bringing suit in the United States District Court for the

23 Southern District of New York, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants, who

24 were allegedly involved in the creation and execution of the Initiative, violated

25 the plaintiffsʹ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.

                                                            

* We accept the partiesʹ representations, made in response to our inquiry of counsel,

that all named defendants were duly served with process in this litigation and thus are

properly identified as defendants.  The Clerk of Court is therefore respectfully directed

to amend the official caption as shown above.   

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1 Constitution, and state law.  The district court (Jed S. Rakoff, Judge) concluded,

2 on defendantsʹ motion for summary judgment, that the defendants were not

3 entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, a conclusion that we affirmed

4 on interlocutory appeal.  Many of the claims were thereafter dismissed by the

5 district court on judgments as a matter of law, while the remainder were tried to

6 a jury.  The jury found one defendant liable for procedural due‐process

7 violations, and awarded each plaintiff one dollar in nominal damages against

8 that defendant.  The appellants now challenge the district courtʹs (1) jury

9 instruction on personal involvement; (2) denial of judgment as a matter of law on

10 procedural due‐process liability; (3) denial of judgment as a matter of law on the

11 plaintiffsʹ entitlement to actual, compensatory damages; (4) entry of judgment for

12 the defendants on the plaintiffsʹ false‐imprisonment claims on the grounds that

13 these claims were duplicative; and (5) limitations on depositions, and several

14 other evidentiary decisions.  We affirm the judgment of the district court.   

15 AFFIRMED.

16 KAREN R. KING (Jesse S. Crew, Jayme J.

17 Herschkopf, and Ekta R. Dharia, on the

18 brief), Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &

19 Garrison LLP, New York, New York, for

20 Consolidated Plaintiffs‐Appellants.

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1 Ameer Benno, Benno & Associates P.C.,

2 New York, New York, (on the brief), for

3 Consolidated Plaintiffs‐Appellants.

4

5 CLAUDE S. PLATTON (Barbara D.

6 Underwood, Cecelia C. Chang, on the brief),

7 for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General

8 of the State of New York, New York, New

9 York, for Defendants‐Appellees Except George

10 Pataki.

11 ABBE DAVID LOWELL (Christopher D.

12 Man, on the brief), Chadbourne & Parke,

13 LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, for

14 Defendant‐Appellee George Pataki.

15                       

16 SACK, Circuit Judge:

17 In 2005, then‐New York State Governor George Pataki launched the

18 Sexually Violent Predator Initiative (the ʺSVP Initiativeʺ or the ʺInitiativeʺ),

19 which provided for the involuntary civil commitment at state psychiatric

20 facilities of some ʺsexually violent predatorsʺ (ʺSVPsʺ) nearing the date of their

21 release from incarceration or supervision.  The six plaintiffs in this case were

22 civilly committed to a psychiatric hospital in late 2005, during the first weeks the

23 Initiative was in effect.  In 2008, they filed this action against several individuals

24 who allegedly designed or implemented the Initiative, asserting claims under the

25 Fourth Amendment, the substantive and procedural components of the

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1 Fourteenth Amendmentʹs Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendmentʹs

2 Equal Protection Clause, and several provisions of New York state law.   

3 In Bailey v. Pataki, 708 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 2013), we affirmed on interlocutory

4 appeal the decision of the district court (Jed S. Rakoff, Judge) in Bailey v. Pataki,

5 722 F. Supp. 2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  There, the district court had concluded that

6 the defendants could not establish as a matter of law at the summary judgment

7 stage that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffsʹ procedural

8 due‐process claims.  In affirming, we concluded that if the material facts alleged

9 were proven, the Initiative would have violated the plaintiffsʹ clearly established

10 rights to procedural due process.  Bailey, 708 F.3d at 403‐04.

11 Following our decision, the district court held a jury trial on the plaintiffsʹ 

12 false‐imprisonment, procedural due‐process, substantive due‐process, and state

13 law claims against six defendants: former Governor George Pataki; former Office

14 of Mental Health Commissioner Sharon Carpinello; former Department of

15 Correctional Services Commissioner Glenn S. Goord; former Executive Director

16 of Manhattan Psychiatric Center Eileen Consilvio; former Superintendent of

17 Clinton Correctional Facility Dale Artus; and former Division of Parole head

18 Robert Dennison.  During the trial, the district court entered judgments as a

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1 matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 in the defendantsʹ 

2 favor on the false‐imprisonment claims, among others, deeming them

3 impermissibly duplicative of the procedural due‐process claims.  The court also

4 denied the plaintiffsʹ motions for judgment as a matter of law on their procedural

5 due‐process claims and their entitlement to actual, compensatory damages for

6 the alleged due‐process violations.  The jury ultimately rejected the plaintiffsʹ 

7 remaining substantive due‐process claims, found defendant Carpinello liable for

8 procedural due‐process violations, and awarded each plaintiff one dollar in

9 nominal damages against her.

10 Plaintiffs Robert Warren and Charles Brooks appeal, challenging the

11 district courtʹs (1) jury instruction on personal involvement; (2) denial of

12 judgment as a matter of law on procedural due‐process liability; (3) denial of

13 judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffsʹ entitlement to actual, compensatory

14 damages; (4) entry of judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffsʹ false‐

15 imprisonment claims on the grounds that these claims were duplicative; and (5)

16 limitations on depositions, and several other evidentiary decisions.  The plaintiffs

17 dispute neither the judgment against them on their substantive due‐process

18 claims nor the denial of their requests for punitive damages.

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1 For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the plaintiffsʹ arguments

2 lack merit.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

3 BACKGROUND

4 Factual Background

5 We set forth the factual background underlying this appeal in some detail

6 in our opinion affirming on interlocutory appeal the district courtʹs denial of

7 summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity.  

8 See Bailey, 708 F.3d at 393‐99.  We rehearse it here only insofar as we think it

9 necessary to an understanding of our resolution of this appeal.

10 The SVP Initiative

11 In October 2005, then‐New York State Governor George Pataki faced a

12 challenge:  He had tried and failed several times to persuade the State Assembly

13 to establish a program that would permit the civil commitment and confinement

14 of designated sex offenders in New York State.  Political pressure on the issue

15 was mounting in the wake of a widely publicized murder committed by a then‐

16 recently paroled sex offender.  Unwilling to wait any longer, as we described in

17 Bailey, id. at 394, the Governor directed New Yorkʹs Office of Mental Health

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Warren v. Pataki

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(ʺOMHʺ) and Department of Correctional Services (ʺDOCSʺ)1 1   to ʺpush the

2 envelope of the Stateʹs existing involuntary commitment law,ʺ id.  The result was

3 the SVP Initiative.  Its principal theme was that every ʺsexually violent predatorʺ 

4 in state prison should and would be evaluated for involuntary civil commitment

5 before being released from incarceration.

6 Sharon Carpinello, the Commissioner of the New York State Office of

7 Mental Health, with several others, developed an implementation plan for the

8 SVP Initiative.  She presented it to Governor Patakiʹs representatives in mid‐

9 September 2005.  The Initiative provided for a commitment process based on the

10 procedures set forth in New York Mental Hygiene Law (ʺMHLʺ) § 9.27 et seq.

11 (ʺArticle 9ʺ), instead of the more stringent criteria for commitment set forth in

Correction Law § 402, 12 2 which the SVP Initiativeʹs designers had also considered.  

                                                            

1 DOCS is now known as the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision,

and commonly referred to by the nearly identical acronym, ʺDOCCS.ʺ 

2 As we explained in Bailey:

Section 9.27 of the Mental Hygiene Law (ʺMHLʺ), codified in

Article 9 of the MHL and entitled ʺInvoluntary admission on

medical certification,ʺ  allows the director of a hospital to

accept any patient ʺalleged to be mentally ill and in need of

involuntary care and treatment upon the certificates of two

examining physicians.ʺ   MHL § 9.27(a).   The director must

also receive a sworn application explaining why the patient

needs mental health treatment.  Id.  After the patient arrives

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at the hospital, a member of the hospitalʹs psychiatric staff is

required to examine him and confirm that he should be

admitted.  MHL § 9.27(e).  The law requires that the nearest

relative of the patient, or any other person the patient has

designated, be given notice of the involuntary admission

within five days of admission.  MHL § 9.29(b).  Within sixty

days of admission, the patient or a friend or relative can

request a hearing on the involuntary admission, which is

required to be held within five days of receipt by the

hospital director of notice of the request.  MHL § 9.31(a).  If

no hearing has been held or court order issued, or if the

patient does not consent to the admission, the hospital

director is required to seek a court order within sixty days of

the patientʹs involuntary admission if the director wishes to

pursue the matter.  MHL § 9.33(a).

Correction Law § 402 is entitled ʺCommitment of mentally ill

inmates.ʺ    Under that law, if a staff physician at a prison

informs the prison superintendent that an inmate is mentally

ill, the superintendent asks a  ʺjudge of the county court or

justice of the supreme court in the countyʺ to appoint two

physicians to examine the inmate.  Correction Law § 402(1).  

If both physicians conclude that hospitalization is

appropriate, they must produce certificates to that effect.  Id.  

The superintendent is then required to apply to the court for

a commitment order, and personally serve notice on the

inmate and his or her closest relative or, if relatives are

unknown or not within the state,  ʺany known friend,ʺ five

days prior to the commitment.  Correction Law § 402(3).  The

Mental Hygiene Legal Services must then inform the inmate

(or, in appropriate cases, others concerned with the inmateʹs

welfare) of  ʺthe procedures for placement in a hospital and

of the inmateʹs right to have a hearing, to have judicial

review with a right to a jury trial, to be represented by

counsel and to seek an independent medical opinion.ʺ  Id.

The inmate is entitled to request a hearing before a judge

prior to any transfer to a psychiatric hospital.    Correction

Law § 402(5).  The procedural protections in section 402 may

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1 Under this process, before being released from prison, inmates who had been

2 deemed ʺsexually violent predatorsʺ would be evaluated by two OMH

3 psychiatrists, each of whom would render an opinion as to whether the inmate

4 should be involuntarily committed to a state psychiatric facility.  Before the

5 evaluation, DOCS would provide OMH with criminal history reports for each

6 inmate. OMH would use these reports to create editorialized descriptions of the

7 inmateʹs criminal history and an assessment of their likelihood of recidivism.  

8 They would then provide these materials to the OMH psychiatrists.  If the OMH

9 psychiatrists recommended civil commitment, the inmate would be transferred

10 to a psychiatric center and examined by a psychiatrist to confirm the diagnosis.  

11 Once admitted to the facility, the inmate would begin undergoing a specialized

12 course of treatment.

13 OMH officials informed Governor Patakiʹs office that they needed four to

14 six months to prepare for the implementation of the SVP Initiative, including

15 training the psychiatrists responsible for examining the inmates.  Governor

16 Pataki nonetheless ordered that the SVP Initiative begin forthwith.

                                                                                                                                                                                               

only be bypassed where admission to a hospital is sought on

an emergency basis.  Correction Law § 402(9).

708 F.3d at 394‐95.

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1 Thereafter, under Goordʹs direction, DOCS began identifying inmates to be

2 evaluated for civil commitment by OMH psychiatrists.  The pool of inmates was

3 drawn from those who had committed a violent offense as defined by New York

4 Penal Law § 70.02, and those who had committed a sex offense as defined by

5 Penal Law § 130, as well as from another list of inmates who had committed

6 felonies that had been, to some extent, sexually motivated.  Any inmate who

7 refused to appear for an evaluation was potentially subject to disciplinary action,

8 and refusal could have constituted a parole violation.

9 The SVP Initiative was in effect only briefly.  In 2006, after several inmates

10 who were confined under the SVP Initiative sought habeas corpus relief in state

11 courts, the New York Court of Appeals held that the SVP Initiative should

12 proceed under Correction Law § 402 instead of MHL Article 9, and ordered that

13 each civilly committed individual remaining in OMH custody be provided an

14 immediate retention hearing.  State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 7 N.Y.3d 607, 614,

15 859 N.E.2d 508, 512, 825 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (2006). Then, in 2007, the New York

16 State Legislature ended the SVP Initiative by enacting a comprehensive statutory

17 scheme for the civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders nearing release from

18 incarceration or supervision.

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1 The Defendantsʹ Roles

2 Each of the defendants played a unique role in the design and

3 implementation of the SVP Initiative.

4 George Pataki was the Governor of New York State from 1995 to 2006.  He

5 authorized the SVP Initiative, made it the official policy of the State of New York,

6 and tasked DOCS and OMH with developing a detailed plan for its

7 implementation.

8 Sharon Carpinello was Commissioner of OMH at the time the SVP

9 Initiative was in place.  Her duties as Commissioner included establishing,

10 developing, and coordinating OMH programs and procedures.  She helped to

11 develop OMHʹs plan for implementing the SVP Initiative, reviewed the plan, and

12 approved it for submission to Governor Pataki.  After Governor Pataki approved

13 the plan, she ordered OMH to carry it out.  

14 Glenn Goord was the Commissioner of DOCS during the implementation

15 of the SVP Initiative.  He was involved in the process of planning the SVP

16 Initiative, and understood that it called for inmates to be committed without a

17 prior hearing.  Goord ordered DOCS to implement the SVP Initiative by selecting

18 for examination inmates due to be released and, depending on the result of the

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1 examination, arranging for their transportation to psychiatric hospitals for

2 commitment.   

3 Eileen Consilvio was Executive Director of Manhattan Psychiatric Center

4 (ʺMPCʺ) when the SVP Initiative was created.  She agreed to make the MPC

5 available to receive inmates designated for involuntary civil commitment under

6 the initiative.  Consilvio handled the logistics of Warrenʹs and Brooksʹs civil

7 commitment there.  

Dale Artus was Superintendent of the Clinton Correctional Facility3 8

9 (ʺClintonʺ), where Warren was imprisoned and to where he was returned after

10 he was civilly committed.  Warren allegedly filed complaints about his

11 confinement with Artus, who did not respond to them.   

12 At the time that the SVP Initiative became effective, Robert Dennison was

the highest‐ranking officer in the Division of Parole (ʺParoleʺ).4 13   Warren alleges

14 that when he was confined at Clinton, he wrote to Dennison complaining about

15 his reconfinement despite his having been granted parole.  It is not clear from the

                                                            

3 The Clinton Correctional Facility may be better known by the name of the town in

which it is located: Dannemora, New York.  See Village of Dannemora,

http://www.villageofdannemora.com (last visited May 16, 2016).

4 In 2011, the Division of Parole was merged with DOCS (which, as explained above, is

now known as DOCCS).

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1 record what if anything Dennison did to investigate or otherwise address the

2 situation.   

3 Plaintiffsʹ Confinement

4 Plaintiffs Robert Warren and Charles Brooks, both convicted sex offenders,

5 were involuntarily committed at the MPC and Kirby Psychiatric Center pursuant

6 to the SVP Initiative after they were scheduled to be released from prison.  Their

7 involuntary civil commitment was based entirely on the recommendations of

8 OMH psychiatrists.

9 Robert Warren was serving a sentence for multiple crimes, including

10 sexual abuse in the first degree, when he was approved for parole and scheduled

11 to be conditionally released from prison on September 27, 2005, under the

12 supervision of Parole.  The day before his scheduled release, and without prior

13 notice, two OMH psychiatrists evaluated Warren by conducting short

14 interviews, one of which was done remotely by video, and completing with

15 respect to each of them a so‐called Certification of Examining Physician to

16 Support an Application for Involuntary Admission form.  On that basis, they

17 determined that he required involuntary commitment in a psychiatric hospital.  

18 On the day of his scheduled release, he was transferred to a state psychiatric

19 institution instead.   

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1 Less than two months later, Warren was again examined by a psychiatrist,

2 but this time he was found not to require confinement.  On October 23, 2005, he

3 was discharged into the custody of Parole.  He was never in fact released on

4 parole, however, nor was he given a parole revocation hearing.  Instead, he was

5 returned to DOCS and housed at Clinton, where he remained until October 23,

2006—the latest possible expiration date for his original prison sentence.5 6

7 Charles Brooks had nearly completed serving his eight‐year prison term

8 for burglary and sexual abuse in the second degree when, on Friday, October 7,

9 2005, the last business day before his scheduled release, he was evaluated by two

10 OMH staff psychiatrists, who determined that he required involuntary

11 commitment in a psychiatric hospital.  Brooks was then sent to the MPC, where

12 he remained confined pursuant to Article 9 until May 2009, at which time he was

                                                            

5 Warren later challenged his reconfinement as part of a state habeas corpus petition.  

The county court that heard the petition deemed his reconfinement to be unlawful, but

found the appropriate remedy to be ʺmerely a judgment directing petitionerʹs re‐release

to parole supervision subject to appropriate conditions imposed b[y] parole authorities,

including special conditions which must be satisfied prior to the petitionerʹs re‐release,ʺ 

which in Warrenʹs case encompassed an approved‐residence special condition.  Warren

v. Artus, No. 06‐15, at 7‐8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Clinton Cty., July 5, 2006), reproduced at Joint

Appendix filed on this Appeal (ʺJ.A.ʺ) 1498‐99.  Warren was ultimately unable to obtain

Paroleʹs approval of a residence, and thus remained at Clinton until October 23, 2006.   

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1 committed under the statute that replaced the SVP Initiative, MHL §§ 10.06‐.17

(ʺArticle 10ʺ).6 2

3 Procedural History

4 Brooks, Warren, and several other similarly situated persons filed actions

5 in 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking

6 compensatory damages for their involuntary civil commitment under the SVP

7 Initiative.  The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fourth Amendment right

8 against false imprisonment, their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal

9 protection and substantive and procedural due process, and several rights under

10 state law.  The actions were designated as related and consolidated for trial.

11 During discovery, the plaintiffs filed notices of depositions for all of the

12 defendants named in the complaints.  The district court informed the plaintiffs

13 that they would be permitted to take the depositions of only four senior official

14 defendants of their choice, however, and that each deposition could not exceed

                                                            

6 Brooksʹs confinement under Article 10 was the subject of separate litigation

challenging Article 10ʹs validity, whether the state had jurisdiction over Brooks as a

consequence of his illegal commitment under Article 9, and the adequacy of Brooksʹs

legal representation.  The challenges were unsuccessful.  See Brooks v. State, 120 A.D.3d

1577, 993 N.Y.S.2d 409 (4th Depʹt 2014), leave to appeal denied, 25 N.Y.3d 901, 30 N.E.3d

164, 7 N.Y.S.3d 273 (2015); Brooks v. Sawyer, No. 9:11‐CV‐248 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013);

State v. C.B., 88 A.D.3d 599, 931 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Depʹt  2011), appeal dismissed and leave

to appeal denied, 18 N.Y.3d 905, 963 N.E.2d 790, 940 N.Y.S.2d 213 (2012).

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1 two hours.  The plaintiffs chose to, and did, take the depositions of Pataki,

2 Carpinello, Goord, and Consilvio.   

3 On March 31, 2010, the parties filed cross‐motions for summary judgment.  

4 The district court issued a ʺbottom lineʺ order granting the defendantsʹ motion in

5 part on statute of limitations grounds, but denying it on the issues of qualified

immunity and lack of personal involvement.7 6   The court also denied the

7 plaintiffsʹ motion in its entirety.  The district court later issued two opinions and

8 orders setting forth its reasoning for its summary judgment decisions, which we

9 affirmed on interlocutory appeal.  See Bailey v. Pataki, 708 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 2013).

10 Back in the district court, both sides then filed motions in limine in

11 preparation for trial.  Three of th0se motions are relevant to this appeal.  First, the

12 plaintiffs moved to preclude the defendants from arguing that the plaintiffs

13 suffered no injury because they would have been confined nonetheless had they

14 received a constitutionally sufficient pre‐deprivation hearing.  Second, the

15 plaintiffs moved to preclude evidence concerning their criminal histories, prison

16 disciplinary records, and OMH records, or, in the alternative, to bifurcate the

17 trial.  Third, the plaintiffs moved to require the defendants to bear the burden of

                                                            

7 Warrenʹs claim against defendant Paul Annetts was dismissed by the court for lack of

his personal involvement in the events at issue.

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1 disproving that plaintiffs had suffered compensable damages.  The district court

2 denied the first two of these motions, and granted the third.   

3 A jury trial was conducted between July 9 and July 31, 2013.  The parties

4 called twenty‐nine fact witnesses in all, but no expert witnesses.   

5 During the trial, the district court entered several judgments as a matter of

6 law in the defendantsʹ favor pursuant to Rule 50: for Artus and Dennison on all

7 claims, and for the other defendants on all state‐law claims except for negligence

8 claims against Carpinello and Consilvio.  The district court also entered

9 judgment for the defendants on the false‐imprisonment claims because it deemed

10 them duplicative of the plaintiffsʹ procedural due‐process claims.  The court

11 reasoned that the jury would need to find a procedural due‐process violation in

12 order to find that the false imprisonment was not otherwise ʺprivileged,ʺ and

13 that the damages recoverable under both causes of action were the same.  J.A.

14 1293 (Trial Transcript (ʺTr.ʺ) 2871:20‐2874:14).   

15 After the district court entered judgment for the defendants on the false‐

16 imprisonment claims, the plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law on

17 their procedural due‐process claims, and noted for the record their view that

18 judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 would also be appropriate on the

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1 false‐imprisonment claims, whose dismissal they contested.  The district court

2 denied the motion.

3 Before the case was submitted to the jury, the plaintiffs withdrew their

4 remaining negligence claims.  As a result, the principal disputed issues sent to

5 the jury were whether: (1) the plaintiffs had established violations of their

6 substantive due‐process rights; (2) each defendant proximately caused the

7 procedural due‐process violations at issue; and (3) the plaintiffs were entitled to

8 compensatory or punitive damages, and if so, in what amount or amounts.

9 On July 26, 2013, the district court held a charging conference during

10 which the parties discussed how to instruct the jury on the meaning of proximate

11 causation in the context of a procedural due‐process violation.  To establish a

12 section 1983 claim, ʺa plaintiff must establish a given defendantʹs personal

13 involvement in the claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his

14 individual capacity.ʺ  Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir.

15 2004).  To proximately cause a procedural due‐process violation, therefore, a

16 defendant must be personally involved in the violation.  A plaintiff may establish

17 such personal involvement by making any one of five showings (the ʺColon

18 factorsʺ):

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1 (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional

2 violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation

3 through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the

4 defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional

5 practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or

6 custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising

7 subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant

8 exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of [the plaintiffs] by

9 failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts

10 were occurring.

11

12 Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995).   

13 In preparation for the charging conference, the plaintiffs requested a jury

14 instruction on proximate causation that listed the five Colon factors and

15 explained that each would be sufficient to establish a defendantʹs personal

16 involvement.  During the conference, the court proposed an alternative

17 instruction that described the threshold for personal involvement more briefly,

18 with language that tracked only the third Colon factor.  The plaintiffs made no

19 objection to the courtʹs proposed instruction on the threshold requirement for

20 finding personal involvement.  See J.A. 1304 (Tr. 2915:21‐2916:8).   

21 The court subsequently delivered its proposed proximate causation

22 instruction, with one modification not relevant here, to the jury.  The court first

23 explained that each defendant could be held liable for violating a plaintiffʹs

24 procedural due‐process rights if he or she took steps that ʺproximately caused

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1 that plaintiff to be involuntarily committed under the sexually‐violent predator

2 initiative.ʺ  J.A. 1350 (Tr. 3100:02‐04).  The court then addressed the threshold for

3 personal involvement:

4 If a given defendant played a material role, directly or indirectly, in

5 creating or implementing, even in good faith, the aforementioned

6 aspects of the sexually‐violent predator initiative that were

7 constitutionally defective, and that foreseeably would be applied to

8 someone in a given plaintiff[ʹs] position, that would be sufficient to

9 establish that that defendant proximately caused the violation of

10 that plaintiff[ʹs] constitutional right to procedural due process.

11 J.A. 1350 (Tr. 3100:17‐24).

12 On the issue of damages, the district court gave the following instruction:

13 In addition to disputing plaintiffsʹ  proof of damages in various

14 respects, defendants also raise a special defense, namely, that even if

15 the given plaintiff you are considering had been given full due

16 process, he would still have been involuntarily committed, and so he

17 did not suffer any actual injury.  On this defense, it is the defendants

18 who bear the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of

19 the credible evidence.    If you find that, notwithstanding [] a

20 defendant[ʹs] liability on a given claim, the plaintiff who made that

21 claim did not suffer any injury, you should then award damages of

22 one dollar.  These are called ʺnominal damages.ʺ 

23 J.A. 1351 (Tr. 3102:20‐3103:05).

24 On July 31, 2013, the jury reached its verdict.  It rejected the plaintiffsʹ 

25 substantive due‐process claims and found Carpinello alone liable for procedural

26 due‐process violations.  It further found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to

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1 compensatory damages or punitive damages, and awarded nominal damages of

2 one dollar to each plaintiff.  

3 On August 8, 2013, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for judgment as a

4 matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), which the district court summarily denied.  

5 This appeal followed.

6 DISCUSSION

7 I. Standards of Review

8 A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

9 We review the district courtʹs decision to grant or deny a Rule 50 motion

10 for judgment as a matter of law de novo.  SEC v. Ginder, 752 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir.

11 2014).

12 B. Jury Instructions

13 We review ʺa claim of error in jury instructions de novo, reversing only

14 where appellant can show that, viewing the charge as a whole, there was a

15 prejudicial error.ʺ  United States v. Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 657‐58 (2d Cir. 2001).  

16 ʺʹAn erroneous instruction requires a new trial unless the error is harmlessʹ . . .

17 [and a]n error is harmless only if the court is convinced that the error did not

18 influence the juryʹs verdict.ʺ  Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d

19 Cir. 2000) (quoting LNC Invs., Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A. N.J., 173 F.3d 454, 460

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1 (2d Cir. 1999)).  If an instruction improperly directs the jury on whether a party

2 has satisfied its burden of proof, ʺit is not harmless error because it goes directly

3 to the [merits of the] claim, and a new trial is warranted.ʺ  Id. (quoting LNC Invs.,

4 Inc., 173 F.3d at 462).

5 C. Discovery Rulings

6 ʺWe review a district courtʹs discovery rulings for abuse of discretion.ʺ  

7 Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp., 760 F.3d 198, 204 (2d Cir. 2014).  ʺA district court has

8 abused its discretion if it has (1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,

9 (2) made a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or (3) rendered a

10 decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.ʺ  Lynch

11 v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

12 omitted).   

13 D. Evidentiary Rulings

14 We review the district courtʹs evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  

15 Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 247 (2d Cir. 2003).  We ʺgive district court

16 judges wide latitude in determining whether evidence is admissible at trial.ʺ  

17 Meloff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation

18 marks omitted).  Even if we conclude that the district court abused its discretion,

19 however, ʺan erroneous evidentiary ruling warrants a new trial only when a

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1 substantial right of a party is affected, as when a juryʹs judgment would be

2 swayed in a material fashion by the error.ʺ  Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127,

3 155 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We ʺwill not grant a new

4 trial if we find that the improperly admitted evidence was ʹharmless—i.e., [that]

5 the evidence was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered

6 on the issue in question.ʹʺ  Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir.

7 2010) (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 127

8 (2d Cir. 1998)). ʺAn error is harmless if we ʹcan conclude with fair assurance that

9 the evidence did not substantially influence the jury.ʹʺ  Cameron, 598 F.3d at 61

10 (quoting United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1220 (2d Cir. 1992)).  In civil cases, the

11 burden falls on the appellant to show that the error was not harmless and that ʺit

12 is likely that in some material respect the factfinderʹs judgment was swayed by

13 the error.ʺ  Tesser v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 370 F.3d 314, 319

14 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

15 II. Jury Instructions on Personal Involvement

16 The plaintiffs now argue, for the first time, that the district court made a

17 prejudicial error in the portion of its proximate‐causation instruction that

18 described the standard for personal involvement.  The plaintiffs contend that the

19 instruction improperly took into account only the third of the five Colon factors,

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1 and that the district court improperly added the terms ʺmaterialʺ and

2 ʺforeseeablyʺ to the third Colon factor, thereby increasing the plaintiffsʹ burden of

3 proof.  Blue 33‐36.  The plaintiffs waived these arguments by failing to object to

4 the instruction at trial, and we accordingly affirm as to this issue.  See United

5 States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 778 (2d Cir.) (a ʺfailure to object at trialʺ to a jury

6 instruction ʺresult[s] in a waiver of any claim of error on appealʺ), cert. denied, 484

7 U.S. 832 (1987).  The plaintiffs had previously requested a substantially different

8 proximate‐causation charge as to their procedural due‐process claims, which

9 included all five Colon factors.  When the district court proposed its shorter

10 alternative, however, the plaintiffsʹ counsel made no mention of Colon or the

inclusion of the terms ʺmaterialʺ or ʺforeseeably.ʺ8 11   Instead, the plaintiffsʹ counsel

12 objected only to the omission of the words ʺwithout counselʺ from another

13 portion of the instruction.  After the district court agreed with this objection, the

14 plaintiffsʹ counsel stated, ʺ[a]nd thatʹs all we had for that one.ʺ  See J.A. 1304 (Tr.

15 2915:21‐2916:8).

                                                            

8  The plaintiffsʹ counselʹs failure to object to the inclusion of the terms ʺmaterialʺ and

ʺforeseeablyʺ in the proximate‐cause instruction was understandable, because the

proximate‐cause inquiry is focused on whether ʺthe causal connection between the

defendantʹs action and the plaintiffʹs injury is sufficiently direct,ʺ Gierlinger v. Gleason,

160 F.3d 858, 872 (2d Cir. 1998), and the district courtʹs use of those terms was therefore

apt.

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1 We ʺwill disregard the failure to object where there is plain error affecting

2 substantial rights that goes to the very essence of the case, or where the partyʹs

3 position has previously been made clear to the trial court and it was apparent

4 that further efforts to object would be unavailing.ʺ  Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d

5 552, 556‐57 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), rehʹg denied, 27 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1994).  

6 Neither condition is met here.  As to the former, a substantial right is not

7 implicated if there is no likelihood that the error or defect affected the outcome of

8 the case, see, e.g., Tesser, 370 F.3d at 319, and there is no evidence in the record

9 before us sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs could have demonstrated any

10 of the other four Colon factors.  As to the latter condition, when the plaintiffsʹ 

11 counsel requested an instruction as to all of the Colon categories early in the trial,

12 the district court judge responded that he ʺagree[d] . . . weʹre going to have to

13 spell this out in some detail in the final instructions.,ʺ  J.A. 706 (Tr. 542:07‐08).  

14 That hardly suggests that further objections would have been unavailing.

15 Accordingly, the plaintiffsʹ arguments as to the personal‐involvement instruction

16 have been waived.

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1 III. Judgment as a Matter of Law on the Plaintiffsʹ Procedural Due‐

2 Process Claims

3 The district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to

4 Dennison and Artus pursuant to Rule 50(a).  The district court also properly

5 denied the plaintiffsʹ renewed judgment as a matter of law against Consilvio,

6 Goord, and Pataki under Rule 50(b).

7 Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate ʺonly if [the court] can

8 conclude that, with credibility assessments made against the moving party and

9 all inferences drawn against the moving party, a reasonable juror would have

10 been compelled to accept the view of the moving party.ʺ  Zellner v. Summerlin,

11 494 F.3d 344, 370‐71 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis removed and internal quotation

12 marks omitted).  A Rule 50 motion may only be granted if ʺthere exists such a

13 complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the juryʹs findings

14 could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence

15 in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded

16 [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].ʺ  Ginder, 752 F.3d at 574

17 (brackets in original) (quoting Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663

18 F.3d 556, 567 (2d Cir. 2011)).

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1 The district court properly dismissed the action against Artus and

2 Dennison pursuant to their Rule 50(a) motion.  They were defendants only as to

3 Warrenʹs claim that he was improperly returned to prison rather than released

4 on parole after he was found not to require further civil commitment.  There was

5 no evidence that either defendant was responsible—either directly or

6 indirectly—for Warrenʹs continued imprisonment.  To be sure, Warren testified

7 that he wrote to them to lodge complaints about his reconfinement, but that

8 testimony was an insufficient basis for a reasonable juror to conclude that Artus

9 and Dennison knew of Warrenʹs plight, let alone had the ability or responsibility

10 to do something about it.

11 The district court also correctly declined to hold as a matter of law that

12 Consilvio, Goord, and Pataki were liable for violating the plaintiffsʹ procedural

13 due‐process rights.  The evidence does not compel a finding that these

14 defendants proximately caused the procedural due‐process violations allegedly

15 suffered by the plaintiffs.  The evidence at trial established that Consilvio—who

16 was the Executive Director of the MPC in 2005—was aware that the plaintiffs

17 were being committed under Article 9, but only handled the logistics for civil

18 confinement at the facility.  She was not otherwise involved in planning or

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1 carrying out the SVP Initiative.  A reasonable juror would not have been

2 compelled to conclude, based on this evidence, that Consilvio proximately

3 caused any of the alleged violations of the plaintiffsʹ constitutional rights, given

4 her mere logistical role in one of the intermediate steps of the civil commitment

5 process.

6 The evidence at trial with respect to Goord established that while he was

7 involved in the implementation of the SVP Initiative—by overseeing the sharing

8 of information between DOCS and OMH about soon‐to‐be‐released inmates and

9 assisting with the transportation of inmates to psychiatric facilities—he played

10 only a minor role in designing it.  Although Goord participated in several

11 planning meetings, this evidence, standing alone, was not so powerful that it

12 would compel a reasonable juror to conclude that Goord proximately caused the

13 relevant harm: the plaintiffsʹ confinement without notice or a pre‐deprivation

14 hearing.

15 Finally, a reasonable juror would not have been compelled to conclude

16 that Pataki played a material role in creating, coordinating, or implementing the

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specific aspects of the SVP Initiative that were constitutionally defective.9 1   Pataki

2 testified that he ʺdirected [his] team to work with OMH and to work with

3 [DOCS] to put in place the program,ʺ J.A. 1071 (Tr. 1988:02‐03), and that he ʺgave

4 a green light to go forward with the program,ʺ J.A. 1070 (Tr. 1987:04‐05).  But

5 with respect to the degree of his knowledge and involvement, he testified:

6 Before there was a court decision, I did not understand any of the

7 specifics of the initiative other than that there were three medical

8 professionals who had to evaluate and conclude that the inmates

9 were mentally ill and posed an imminent threat to themselves or

10 others, and that they were entitled to a hearing.    Beyond that, I

11 didn’t know any of the other details.  I didn’t know what section of

12 law was being used; I didn’t know even what article of law was

13 being used.  That was left to the professionals to determine.

14 J.A. 1073 (Tr. 1999:11‐20).  He testified further that he ʺdidn’t know whether the

15 hearing was before or after the commitment.ʺ  J.A. 1073‐74 (Tr. 1999:25‐2000:03).

16 Pataki had admitted earlier in the course of the litigation that he ordered

17 DOCS and OMH to use the MHL § 9.27 standard for evaluating individuals

18 under the SVP Initiative and to follow the procedures laid out in Article 9.  The

19 district court cautioned the jury, however, that none of these admissions

                                                            

9 In Bailey, we explained that the SVP Initiativeʹs use of the procedures set forth in

Article 9 did not provide for adequate due process protections, because ʺabsent exigent

circumstances . . . it was unconstitutional to civilly commit inmates to a psychiatric

facility prior to any notice or adversarial hearing.ʺ  708 F.3d at 408.

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1 ʺnecessarily mean[t] that he personally ordered that.ʺ  J.A. 1087‐88 (Tr. 2055:22‐

2 2056:01).  In light of this evidence, and accepting Patakiʹs testimony as credible, a

3 reasonable juror would not have been compelled to conclude that Pataki played

4 a material role in creating, coordinating, or implementing the defective aspects of

5 the SVP Initiative.

6 In sum, the district court did not err in granting the defendantsʹ Rule 50(a)

7 motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Artus and Dennison or in denying

8 the plaintiffsʹ Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law against

9 Consilvio, Goord, and Pataki.

10 IV. Actual Damages                

11 The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in denying them judgment

12 as a matter of law as to whether the defendantsʹ alleged due‐process violations

13 caused the plaintiffsʹ injuries, and therefore whether they were entitled to actual

14 damages instead of only nominal damages.  The defendants counter that the

15 district court improperly shifted the burden of proof on this issue to them.  We

16 conclude that the district court did not err in denying judgment as a matter of

17 law to the plaintiffs on the causation question and submitting it to the jury.  

18 Because the defendants shouldered the burden of proof on this issue, we need

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1 not reach their arguments as to whether the district courtʹs decision to shift this

2 burden to them was permissible.  

3 It is well‐settled that ʺ[a]bsent a showing of causation [of the plaintiffsʹ 

4 injuries by the defendantsʹ unconstitutional acts] and actual injury, a plaintiff is

5 entitled only to nominal damages.ʺ  Miner, 999 F.2d at 660 (citing Carey v. Piphus,

6 435 U.S. 247, 263, 266‐67 (1978); Patterson, 905 F.2d at 568).  At trial, the

defendants asserted what the parties term a ʺno harm, no foulʺ defense 7 10—they

8 argued, in essence, that even if the plaintiffs had been provided constitutionally

9 adequate pre‐confinement process they would nonetheless have been committed.  

10 The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in denying them judgment as a

11 matter of law on this issue, and that because the defendants did not call any

12 expert witnesses to opine on what might have happened in a hypothetical pre‐

13 deprivation hearing in 2005, the defendants could not satisfy their burden of

14 proof.  The plaintiffs further assert that the jury would have to engage in

                                                            

10 We reject the plaintiffsʹ argument that the defendants waived their ʺno harm, no

foulʺ defense because they failed to plead it as an affirmative defense.  Causation is a

requirement for establishing a viable section 1983 procedural due‐process claim, not an

affirmative defense that must be raised in the pleadings.  And in any event, the

defendantsʹ failure to plead this defense was excusable because it was not clear at the

outset that they would bear the initial burden on this issue, as the district court correctly

recognized.  See J.A. 555‐56 (Tr. 60:22‐61:03).

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1 impermissible speculation in order to resolve this question.  We disagree.  There

2 was sufficient evidence before the jury to support a finding that Warren and

3 Brooks would have been committed even if they had received due process, and

4 therefore that the defendants had carried their burden on this issue.

5 The plaintiffs were constitutionally entitled only to ʺnotice and an

6 adversarial hearing prior to civil commitment.ʺ  Bailey, 708 F.3d at 405.  Principles

7 of due process did not require the defendants to provide the plaintiffs with a

8 hearing conducted pursuant to Correction Law § 402, nor were they

9 constitutionally entitled to call a physician, psychiatrist, or expert witnesses

10 favorable to them, no matter that their ability to call such witnesses might have

11 rendered the proceedings fairer.  Thus, in establishing their ʺno harm, no foulʺ 

12 defense, the defendants were not required to present evidence—either through

13 expert testimony or otherwise—establishing that the plaintiffs would have been

14 confined under Correction Law § 402 or under Article 10, or that the plaintiffs

15 would have been committed in the face of testimony by favorable witnesses.  

16 Rather, the defendants needed only to have presented some evidence sufficient to

17 enable a jury to conclude that the plaintiffs would have been civilly committed

18 following an adversarial proceeding on notice.

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1 This the defendants did.  As the district court correctly noted, the trial

2 itself replicated the presentation of proof at a constitutionally adequate pre‐

3 commitment hearing, allowing the jury to evaluate what the strength of the

4 Stateʹs evidence at such a hearing would have been.  J.A. 1301 (Tr. 2905:19‐22).  

5 Further, as the plaintiffs acknowledge, Pls.ʹ Br. at 45, the examining OMH

6 psychiatrists testified regarding information that they were given in 2005 and

7 conclusions that they drew based on that information, which is presumably what

8 an examining OMH psychiatrist would have testified to at a properly convened

9 and conducted pre‐commitment hearing.  The cross‐examination by the

10 plaintiffsʹ counsel of the examining OMH psychiatrists—which the district court

11 described as ʺpiercing,ʺ J.A. 1301 (Tr. 2903:07‐08)—permitted the jury to see

12 ʺwhat would [have] happen[ed] if the plaintiff[s] had had counselʺ at a pre‐

13 commitment hearing in 2005.  J.A. 1300 (Tr. 2899:01‐05).  The jury was well aware

14 that the psychiatrists were employed by OMH, and it was free to take that fact

15 into account in assessing damages.  Even though the jury did not have before it

16 the testimony of any court‐appointed or plaintiff‐retained psychiatrist, it could

17 nevertheless infer from the state psychiatristsʹ testimony what other psychiatrists

18 might have recommended.

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1 Permitting the defendants to establish their defense based on such

2 evidence might, of course, have placed the plaintiffs at a decided disadvantage in

3 light of the fact that the defendants effectively deprived the plaintiffs of evidence

4 that would have been relevant to establishing causation: a contemporaneous pre‐

5 deprivation psychiatric evaluation by an independent party.  But once the

6 defendants carried their burden, the plaintiffs had an obligation to rebut it.  The

7 plaintiffsʹ challenge in mounting a rebuttal, while perhaps difficult, was not

8 necessarily impossible to overcome.  For instance, they might have presented

expert testimony on the variability of medical opinions, 9 11 or testimony based on a

10 contemporary medical examination that cast doubt on the 2005 evaluations of the

11 OMH doctors.  They did not pursue either possibility, or use any alternative

12 approach.

13 In light of the evidence at trial, then, a juror would not have been

14 compelled to accept the plaintiffsʹ view that the defendants had failed to carry

15 their burden on their ʺno harm, no foulʺ defense.  The district court therefore did

                                                            

11 As the Supreme Court has recognized, ʺ[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric

diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations.ʺ  Addington v.

Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979).  We have also acknowledged that ʺsome psychiatrists

tend to favor institutionalization more often than others who tend to favor release.ʺ  

Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1992).

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1 not err in denying the plaintiffs judgment as a matter of law on this issue and

2 submitting it to the jury.

3 V. Judgment as a Matter of Law on the False‐Imprisonment Claims

4 We conclude that the district court did not err in granting judgment as a

5 matter of law for the defendants on the false imprisonment claims on the basis

6 that these claims duplicated the plaintiffsʹ procedural due‐process claims.  The

7 district court reasoned that the false‐imprisonment and procedural due‐process

8 claims were duplicative on the grounds that, first, the jury would need to find a

9 procedural due‐process violation in order to conclude that the false

10 imprisonment was not otherwise ʺprivileged,ʺ and second, the damages for both

11 claims were necessarily the same.  See J.A. 1293 (Tr. 2871:20‐2874:14).  As to the

12 first basis for the courtʹs decision, the fact that two claims share a common

13 element of proof does not necessarily render them duplicative, and because the

14 plaintiffsʹ procedural due‐process claims were submitted to the jury, the first

15 ground was, standing on its own, insufficient to support the entry of judgment as

16 a matter of law for the defendants on the false‐imprisonment claims.  Perhaps it

17 is usually the better practice to allow all liability claims to go to the jury, with

18 careful instructions not to award duplicative damages.  But the district court was

19 correct here that the plaintiffs could not have obtained any additional damages if

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1 their false imprisonment claims had been submitted to the jury, and therefore no

2 new trial is warranted.

3 ʺRights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum.  Their

4 purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests, and their

5 contours are shaped by the interests they protect.ʺ  Carey, 435 U.S. at 254.  

6 Damages awards in section 1983 suits therefore ʺmust be considered with

7 reference to the nature of the interests protected by the particular constitutional

8 right in question,ʺ and accordingly, ʺthe elements and prerequisites for recovery

9 of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one

10 constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused

11 by the deprivation of another.ʺ  Id. at 264‐65.  Thus, the compensatory damages

12 calculation for different constitutional violations turns on the nature of the

13 injuries suffered even though the amount of compensatory damages awarded is

14 in any event limited to the actual injuries suffered by the plaintiff.

15 In the procedural due‐process context, actual damages are based on the

16 compensation for injuries that resulted from the plaintiffʹs receipt of deficient

17 process.  See Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 135‐36 (2d Cir. 2014) (en

18 banc).  To calculate such damages, courts must determine whether a different

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1 outcome would have been obtained had adequate procedural protections been

2 given.  If the outcome would not have been different, the plaintiff is

3 presumptively entitled to no more than nominal damages.  See id.; see also Carey,

4 435 U.S. at 262‐63.  If, however, a plaintiff can show that he suffered mental and

5 emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself (as

6 opposed to the mental and emotional distress caused by, for instance, the

7 incarceration that would have occurred absent the due‐process violation), he is

8 entitled to recover actual damages only to that extent.  See Carey, 435 U.S. at 263

9 (distinguishing between distress attributable to ʺthe justified deprivationʺ and

10 that caused by ʺdeficiencies in procedureʺ).

11 In the false‐imprisonment context, ʺupon pleading and proving merely the

12 unlawful interference with his liberty, the plaintiff is entitled to ʹgeneralʹ 

13 damages for [proved injuries arising from] loss of time and humiliation or

14 mental suffering.ʺ  Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 125 (2d Cir. 2004)

(some internal quotation marks omitted).12 15

                                                            

12      The compensatory damages that may be awarded for false imprisonment

fall into two categories: general damages and special damages.   General

damage is a harm of a sort inseparable from the unlawful restraint. . . .

Items of special damage commonly include physical discomfort, shock, or

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1 Although at first blush these categories of damages appear to be different,

2 in this case, all of the damages that the plaintiffs could have sought from a false

3 imprisonment claim were also available on the plaintiffsʹ procedural due process

4 claim, and were rejected by the jury.  The defendants were able to prove to the

5 juryʹs satisfaction that the plaintiffs would have been confined even if they had

6 been given a pre‐confinement hearing.  That barred any award of compensatory

7 damages for the plaintiffsʹ loss of time outside confinement, under both a

8 procedural‐due‐process and a false‐imprisonment theory.   

9 It is possible that other claims for compensatory damages remained viable.  

10 For example, the plaintiffs alleged injuries related to the humiliation and mental

11 suffering caused by the unlawfulness of their confinement.  J.A. 205‐08.  But, if

12 actually proven, those injuries would have been similarly available under a

13 procedural due process theory, as Carey makes clear.  See Carey, 435 U.S. at 264

14 (recognizing that ʺmental and emotional distress caused by the denial of

15 procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983,ʺ even when proper

16 procedures would have had the same result).  The jury, by awarding no such

                                                                                                                                                                                               

injury to health, loss of employment, and injury to the plaintiffʹs

reputation or credit, and must be specifically pleaded and proven.

Kerman, 374 F.3d at 125 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).  

The plaintiffs here did not seek special damages.

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1 damages, necessarily concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any such

2 injury.  Remanding this case to the district court to allow the plaintiffs to pursue

3 such damages on a false imprisonment claim would be, in effect, an invitation to

4 retry questions already presented to, and rejected by, a jury.

5 Because the jury found that the plaintiffs suffered no compensable injury

6 that could be linked to their false imprisonment claim, no new trial on their false

7 imprisonment claim is necessary.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the

8 district court on this claim.

9 VI. Discovery and Evidentiary Issues

10 Lastly, the plaintiffs challenge the district courtʹs decision to limit the

11 plaintiffs to four two‐hour depositions of the defendants; its decision to permit

12 the defendants to make several statements to the jury that the plaintiffs

13 characterize as inflammatory, irrelevant, and cumulatively prejudicial; and its

14 admission of evidence regarding Brooksʹs Article 10 hearing in 2009.  We reject

15 all three arguments.

16 A. Limitation on Depositions

17 ʺA district court has wide latitude to determine the scope of discovery, and

18 we ordinarily defer to the discretion of district courts regarding discovery

19 matters.ʺ  In re ʺAgent Orangeʺ Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir. 2008)

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1 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Isaacson v.

2 Dow Chem. Co., 555 U.S. 1218 (2009), and Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 555 U.S.

3 1218 (2009).  We see no reason to second‐guess the district courtʹs decision to

4 limit the plaintiffs to four depositions of no longer than two hours each of the

5 key players involved in the SVP Initiative.  Because of the number of defendants,

6 the number of people involved in the case, and the breadth of its subject matter,

7 the district courtʹs eagerness to keep the discovery process on a tight leash is

8 easily understood.  Moreover, as the district court pointed out, the plaintiffsʹ 

9 inability to depose certain witnesses before trial was mitigated by the plaintiffsʹ 

10 counselʹs ability to request permission to depose witnesses during the trial—

11 which requests the district court granted as to other witnesses—or to question

12 them outside the presence of the jury.  J.A. 1170 (Tr. 2385:13‐20).  We therefore

13 decline to disturb the judgment on this basis.

14 B. Inflammatory Statements

15 In their opening statements, defense counsel referred to the plaintiffsʹ 

16 ʺserious sex offenses like rape and sexual abuse of children,ʺ J.A. 577 (Tr. 28:20‐

17 21), ʺunspeakable crimes,ʺ J.A. 583 (Tr. 49:20), and ʺsickening backgrounds,ʺ J.A.

18 583 (Tr. 51:09‐10), as well as the ʺcrimes you cannot even imagineʺ committed by

19 ʺpeople like the plaintiffs,ʺ J.A. 583 (Tr. 49:09).  Similarly, in their summation,

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1 defense counsel graphically described the plaintiffsʹ sex offenses; described the

2 plaintiffs as among ʺthe worst criminals in society,ʺ J.A. 1345 (Tr. 3078:21‐22); and

3 implored the jury to remember that the ʺsix or more victims of these plaintiffs,

4 they are not just numbers; they are mothers, wives, and daughters,ʺ J.A. 1347 (Tr.

5 3086:02‐03).  Defense counsel also made several statements to which the plaintiffs

6 objected as inaccurate, including that Warrenʹs ʺplea was based on his having

7 been charged [with] raping his 8‐year‐old stepdaughter.ʺ  J.A. 580 (Tr. 39:09‐10).  

8 The plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion in permitting

9 defense counsel to dwell on and so characterize the plaintiffsʹ sex offenses, which

10 the plaintiffs argue was both irrelevant and cumulatively prejudicial.   

11 While we are troubled by the specter of a jury deciding this case on the

12 basis of revulsion against the plaintiffsʹ crimes rather than strictly on the

13 evidence of the alleged deprivation of their constitutional rights, we must

14 nonetheless affirm.  First and most important, the plaintiffs did not object to

15 these comments at the time of opening or closing statements.  The plaintiffsʹ 

16 arguments in this regard were therefore waived.  Cf. United States v. Terry, 702

17 F.2d 299, 317 (2d Cir.) (defendant waived claims based on statement in

18 summation by failure to contemporaneously object), cert. denied sub nom.

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1 Guippone v. United States, 464 U.S. 992 (1983), and Williams v. United States, 461

2 U.S. 931 (1983).  Second, as to closing statements, both plaintiffs had earlier

3 opened the door to information about their past through their counselʹs broad

questioning of them on direct examination.13 4    

5 C. Admission of Evidence of Brooksʹs Article 10 Hearing

6 We also reject the plaintiffsʹ argument that the district court abused its

7 discretion in admitting evidence regarding Brooksʹs Article 10 hearing in 2009.  

8 The fact that Brooks was civilly committed following that hearing is probative of

9 whether he would have been committed in 2005.  Indeed, the evidence at

10 Brooksʹs Article 10 hearing overlapped substantially with the evidence reviewed

11 by the examining OMH psychiatrists in 2005.  The outcome of Brooksʹs Article 10

                                                            

13    For example, as the district court recognized:

THE COURT:    The door was clearly opened to virtually

anything in his past that you have a good‐faith basis for

asking him.    I am once again surprised that after I spent

many minutes yesterday going through all this, that plaintiff

then chose to elicit broad statements from Mr. Brooks that

opens, it seems to me, opens the door to anything in his past.  

The one thing that was not opened is the fact that he is

presently incarcerated and being held on a burglary charge.  

Clearly that is just a charge.

J.A. 859 (Tr. 1146:09‐17).

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1 hearing was thus probative as to what the results of a 2005 hearing that complied

2 with the Constitutionʹs due‐process requirements would likely have been.

3 Moreover, the district court issued a cautionary instruction to ʺclue [the

4 jury] in as to why Article 10 may, in [the juryʹs] discretion, be relevant.ʺ  J.A. 869

5 (Tr. 1186:16‐18).  The district court explained that Article 10 employs different

6 substantive standards; that information may have been available in 2009 that was

7 not available in 2005; and that the plaintiffs contended that it was ʺtoo

8 speculative to assume that because someone was confined several years later

9 under Article 10, that they would have been confined if given due process under

10 Article 9.ʺ  J.A. 868‐69 (Tr. 1185:12‐1186:14).  Inasmuch as the jury was thus fully

11 equipped to assess the import of the Article 10 hearing on Brooksʹs claim for

12 damages, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this

13 evidence.

14 CONCLUSION

15 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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