Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01777/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01777-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

James Earl Williams,

Petitioner,

v.

Tim Perez, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15-cv-1777-CAB (JLB)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Cathy

Ann Bencivengo pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner James Earl Williams (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner who is proceeding 

pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State 

Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1, hereinafter “Pet.”.)

Petitioner challenges his September 27, 2013 San Diego County Superior Court 

conviction where a jury found him guilty of petty theft with three prior convictions, second 

degree burglary, and robbery. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner was sentenced to state prison for a term 

of four years four months. (Id. at 1.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth 

Appellate District, Division One. (ECF No. 10–9; 10–11.) On December 16, 2014, that 

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court filed an unpublished opinion unanimously affirming the judgment. (ECF No. 10–

12.) Petitioner’s ensuing petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court 

on February 25, 2015. (ECF No. 10–13; 10–14.) Petitioner did not file a petition for 

certiorari in the United Sates Supreme Court. (Pet. at 3.)

On August 12, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Pet. at 1.) For the following reasons, the 

Court finds that the state court adjudication of the claims raised in the Petition is not

contrary to, nor does it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED. 

II. UNDERLYING FACTS

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1992) 

(holding that findings of historical fact, which include inferences properly drawn from such 

facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The relevant facts as found by 

the California Court of Appeal are as follows:

A. January 2013[] Robbery at Marshalls (Count 4)

On January 5[,] Juan Ruiz was working as a loss 

prevention officer at the Marshalls in El Cajon. Using a 

surveillance camera, Ruiz watched Williams walk into the shoe 

department, select a pair of Adidas shoes, and then, after trying 

them on, put them into a shopping bag he had carried into the 

store. Ruiz testified the shopping bag had comic characters on it 

and appeared to be empty before Williams put the shoes in it. 

Armando Valdez, a loss prevention officer who worked 

with Ruiz that day, also watched Williams from the camera room 

of the store as Williams selected the Adidas, pulled the security 

sensors off of the shoes, and placed the shoes in the bag he was 

carrying. Valdez later went to the shoe department and found the 

Adidas box he had seen Williams replace on the shelf after he

removed the shoes. Only the security sensors were left in the box.

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Ruiz—who is six feet tall, weighs 340 pounds, and was 

dressed in plain clothes—went to the floor of the store and was 

behind Williams when Williams walked out of the store. Ruiz 

testified that he ran around in front of Williams as Williams ran 

outside the store without paying for the merchandise he was 

carrying. Ruiz identified himself as a Marshalls loss prevention 

officer and showed Williams his Marshalls identification card. 

Ruiz tried to prevent Williams from leaving by cutting in front 

of Williams and turning to face him. Ruiz testified that Williams 

ran into him with one hand up and “pushed [him] out of the way”

by putting his hand on Ruiz’s shoulder. 

Ruiz testified that when Williams pushed him out of the 

way, he (Ruiz) “disengage[d]” in accordance with Marshalls

policy requiring its personnel to stop apprehension attempts once 

a person places a hand on an employee. Williams ran through the 

parking lot carrying the merchandise he had taken. Ruiz then 

called the police.

B. February Petty Theft at Walmart (Count 1)

On February 24, in the men’s department of a Walmart 

store in La Mesa, Williams quickly selected a number of items 

of men’s clothing from the store displays without looking at their 

prices. A Walmart asset protection associate testified that this 

sort of “quick selection” indicates suspicious activity.

After taking the merchandise, Williams rode the store 

escalators to the automotive department on the second floor. He 

went down an aisle, pulled a reusable bag out of his pocket, and 

placed the merchandise inside the bag. Williams left the store 

with the merchandise without paying for it.

Near the exit, a Walmart asset protection associate 

approached Williams, identified herself as Walmart security, and 

asked him to return to the store. Williams did not comply with 

her request and fled through the parking lot with the merchandise 

he had taken.

/ / /

/ / /

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C. March Burglary and Petty Theft at the Same Walmart

(Counts 2 & 3)

On March 1[,] at the same La Mesa Walmart, Williams 

selected pieces of both men’s and women’s clothing and placed 

them inside a shopping cart. He then moved to the stationery 

department, which is the department closest to the exit. There he 

placed the merchandise he had taken into two reusable bags he 

had brought with him to the store. He then placed the bags into 

the shopping cart and left the store without the bags or 

merchandise.

A few minutes later, Williams returned to the Walmart 

stationery department, grabbed the reusable bags containing the 

merchandise he had selected, and left the store with the 

merchandise without paying for it. La Mesa police arrested 

Williams a few minutes later outside the store.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254, subsection (a) provides the scope of review for 

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

[sic] behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court only on the ground that he is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Additionally, Petitioner’s habeas claims are subject to the provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997) (Federal courts reviewing any 

petition filed in federal court after the April 24, 1996 enactment of “AEDPA,” will apply 

its provisions). Under AEDPA, the standard of review for Petitioner’s habeas claims, is as 

follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

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merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Clearly established Federal law,” as understood in the context of § 2254(d)(1), 

consists of holdings of Supreme Court decisions. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 

(2000) (stating that the phrase “clearly established Federal law,” as determined by the 

United States Supreme Court, refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the 

Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision”). In order 

to grant habeas corpus relief, a federal habeas court must rule out whether it is possible that 

“fair-minded jurists” could disagree that the decision is inconsistent with clearly 

established federal law. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). To satisfy 

§ 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state 

court’s adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the facts, 

are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the federal habeas 

court “looks through” to the underlying appellate decision in applying AEDPA. Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801–06 (1991); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99–100

(holding that an unexplained denial of a claim by the California Supreme Court is an 

adjudication on the merits of the claim and is entitled to deference unless “there is reason 

to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely”). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises three claims in his Petition. First, he claims that there was 

insufficient evidence of force to sustain his robbery conviction. (Pet. at 6.) Second, he 

claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the force element of robbery. 

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(Id. at 7.) Third, he claims that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated 

because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. (Id. at 8.) Respondent contends 

that this Court should dismiss the Petition with prejudice and deny a certificate of 

appealability because Petitioner’s robbery conviction was supported by sufficient 

evidence, Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and Petitioner’s trial

counsel did not render ineffective assistance. (See Mem. of P. & A. Supp. Answer at 4–

15, ECF No. 9.)

A. Ground One

Petitioner first claims that there is insufficient evidence of force to support his 

conviction of robbery. (Pet. at 6.) The Court construes this argument as implicating 

§ 2254(d)(2).

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects a defendant from 

conviction “except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 

constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 569 U.S. 359, 364 (1970). 

When reviewing an insufficient evidence claim in habeas proceedings, a federal court must 

determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This 

standard is applied with specific reference to the applicable state law defining the elements 

of the crime at issue. Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

For a defendant to be convicted of robbery in California, he “must apply . . . force 

for the purpose of accomplishing the taking.” United States v. Flores-Mejia, 687 F.3d 

1213, 1215 (2012) (quoting People v. Anderson, 51 Cal. 4th 989, 995 (2011)). The amount 

of force required to sustain a robbery conviction is “some quantum amount of force in 

excess [of the amount of force] ‘necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of property.’” 

Id. at 995. Therefore, a “slight push” or “tap” against the victim would be enough force to

sustain a robbery conviction in California. People v. Garcia, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1246 

(1996). 

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Petitioner argues there is insufficient evidence of the force element to convict him 

of robbery. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the evidence at trial fails to show an 

intentional use of force. Instead, according to Petitioner, the evidence merely establishes

that his collision with Juan Ruiz, the Marshalls loss prevention officer, was unavoidable 

because Ruiz cut him off as both men were running from the store.1 (Pet. at 6.)

A federal court faced with a factual record “that supports conflicting inferences must 

presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact 

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. By doing so, the federal court will “preserve the factfinder’s role 

as the weigher of evidence.” Id. at 319. In a habeas proceeding, “a federal court may not 

overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply 

because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do 

so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Coleman v. Johnson, 

132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 3 (2011)).

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme Court in a petition for 

review, which was summarily denied. (Pet. at 2; ECF No. 10–13; ECF No. 10–14.) The 

California Court of Appeal, however, denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. (ECF No. 

10–12.) Because there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to this underlying appellate court decision and presumes that it provides 

the basis for the higher court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. 

The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s Ground One claim challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence as follows:

We are guided in our analysis by the decision in People v. 

Garcia, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at page 1246. In Garcia “[t]he 

 

1 The thrust of Petitioner’s Ground One claim is that the force at issue was unavoidable. However, 

Petitioner also incorrectly recites California law in his Petition that suggests he may believe that in order 

to be convicted of robbery, “force even if slight must be shown to induce fear in the victim.” (Pet. at 6.) 

The California Court of Appeal correctly held that the California Penal Code only requires the theft to 

be accomplished by either force or fear. See Cal. Penal Code § 211. It is not required for both elements 

to be proven. See id.

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evidence [showed that the] defendant approached the cashier 

while the register drawer was open and gave her a slight push, 

‘like a tap,’ on her shoulder with his shoulder. Fearful defendant 

might be armed, the cashier moved away. Defendant then 

reached into the open register, grabbed the money and escaped. 

The cashier was not injured.” (Ibid.) In concluding the “slight 

push” was sufficiently forcible to establish the force element of 

robbery, the Court of Appeal stated: “The defendant did not 

simply brush against the cashier as he grabbed for the money. He 

intentionally pushed against her to move her out of the way so he 

could reach into the register. . . . [P]ushing the cashier went 

beyond the ‘quantum force which [was] necessary’ to grab the 

money out of the cash register. We agree defendant appears to 

have been rather polite in his use of force, giving the cashier a 

mere ‘tap.’ Nevertheless, for purposes of the crime of robbery, 

the degree of force is immaterial.” (Ibid.)

Similarly here, substantial evidence supports Williams’s 

count 4 robbery conviction by establishing that Williams, like the 

defendant in Garcia, accomplished the theft by pushing the 

victim out of the way. Specifically, Ruiz testified that he 

identified himself to Williams as a Marshalls loss prevention 

officer and showed Williams his Marshalls identification card 

after Williams exited the store without paying for the 

merchandise he was carrying. Ruiz also testified that he tried to 

prevent Williams from leaving by running in front of him to cut 

him off and then turning around to face him. Ruiz further 

testified that Williams ran into him with one hand up, “pushed 

[him] out of the way” by putting his hand on Ruiz’s shoulder, 

and then ran away with the stolen merchandise. 

Ruiz’s foregoing testimony constitutes substantial 

evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that 

Williams, in accomplishing his theft of the Marshalls 

merchandise, pushed the loss prevention officer out of the way 

as Williams was running away from the store with the 

merchandise, and this forcible act was motivated by his intent to 

steal the merchandise. 

Williams contends, however, that the evidence is 

insufficient to support his robbery conviction because “it was not 

[he] who applied force, but [Ruiz] and the law of physics” that 

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applied force, and, thus, “the only physical contact was caused 

by an act over which [he (Williams)] had no control.” 

Williams’s attempt to characterize his physical contact 

with Ruiz outside the Marshalls store as an inadvertent and 

unintentional collision is unavailing. In applying the substantial 

evidence standard of review, as already discussed, we must view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment (People 

v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578), and we do not reweigh 

the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the 

credibility of witnesses (People v. Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 

1206; People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314). Here, Ruiz 

explicitly testified on direct examination that Williams “pushed 

me out of the way and ran to the parking lot.” (Italics added.) 

When questioned further by the prosecutor, Ruiz reiterated, “I 

ran in front of [Williams], and he . . . just pushed me out of the 

way.” (Italics added.) The prosecutor asked Ruiz to more 

specifically describe what Williams did, and Ruiz replied that 

Williams “used one hand to push me out of the way.” (Italics 

added.) Later, when defense counsel cross-examined Ruiz and 

characterized Williams’s physical contact with Ruiz as 

“run[ning] into you,” Ruiz disagreed and stated, “Actually[,] it 

was more of a push.”

Williams’s claim that it was Ruiz, not Williams, who 

applied the force during the collision is meritless because it is 

based not on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 

the judgment, but on an interpretation that essentially asks this 

court improperly to reweigh Ruiz’s testimony, give little weight 

to his testimony that Williams was running from the store with 

stolen merchandise after Ruiz identified himself as a loss 

prevention officer, and to disregard Ruiz’s explicit and repeated 

testimony showing that Williams did not just run into Ruiz, but 

rather he used one hand to push Ruiz out of the way. Ruiz’s 

testimony is substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could find that Williams used force to retain the merchandise he 

was carrying after the Marshalls loss prevention officer tried to 

stop him, and in doing so he was motivated by the intent to steal 

that merchandise. By failing to present all the relevant evidence 

on the issue of whether the force he used force [sic] in stealing 

the merchandise was sufficient to constitute robbery, and in 

failing to present the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

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People, Williams has failed to meet his burden of showing the 

evidence is insufficient to support his robbery conviction. (See

People v. Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.)

(ECF No. 10–12, at 8–10.)

This Court concludes that the California Court of Appeal reasonably determined that 

a rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of force to support the robbery 

conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Juan Ruiz’s 

testimony at trial was that Petitioner used intentional, and not accidental, force when he 

“pushed” Ruiz as he fled the store with stolen merchandise. (ECF No. 10–4, at 68–70, 78.) 

For example, when asked on cross-examination whether Williams’s “only contact” with 

Ruiz was running into him, Ruiz clarifies that, “Actually[,] it was more of a push.” (Id. at

78.)

Petitioner argues that Ruiz lied when he testified about Williams’s use of force. 

However, a reviewing court must not make credibility determinations, but rather must defer 

to the trier of fact’s express or implied resolution of any purported conflicts in evidence. 

See McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133–34 (2010). As the California Court of Appeal 

explained, Petitioner is improperly asking the Court to reweigh Ruiz’s testimony and 

completely disregard Ruiz’s repeated statements that Petitioner pushed Ruiz in the process 

of fleeing towards the parking lot. (ECF No. 10–12, at 10.) As such, Petitioner’s argument 

concerning the veracity of Ruiz’s testimony fails.

2

In sum, Petitioner has not established that “no rational trier of fact could have found 

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” on the force element of robbery, given the 

evidence and testimony presented. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. The state court adjudication 

of Ground One was not based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

 

2 The Court notes that even if the undisputed evidence showed that the contact between Petitioner and 

Ruiz was purely accidental (which it does not), it appears that even accidental force could be sufficient 

to convict someone of robbery under California law. See Anderson, 51 Cal. 4th at 996 (“It was robbery 

even if, as [Petitioner] claims, [Petitioner] did not intend to strike [the victim], but did so accidentally.”);

see also United States v. Flores-Mejia, 687 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2012) (analyzing Anderson). 

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evidence presented in the State court proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, the 

Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED as to Ground One. 

B. Ground Two

As Ground Two, Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was 

violated when the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the force element of robbery. 

(Pet. at 7.)

After both parties rested their cases at trial, Petitioner (through counsel) requested 

that the state superior court instruct the jury on his defense of accident as he argued it was 

relevant to the mental state required for the force element of robbery. Specifically, 

Petitioner proposed that the following instruction (CALCRIM 3404) should be used to 

address the mental state necessary to satisfy the force element: “The defendant is not guilty 

of robbery if he acted without the intent required for that crime[,] but acted instead 

accidentally. You may not find the defendant guilty of robbery unless you are convinced 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the required intent.” (ECF No. 10–4, at 97–

99.) Petitioner argued before the superior court that this instruction was appropriate 

because there must be an intent to push or use force in order to find the defendant guilty of 

robbery. (ECF No. 10–4, at 98.) The superior court denied his request, concluding that 

the evidence showed only intentional force, and thus, did not support the accident 

instruction. (ECF No. 10–4, at 99.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed, ruling that 

the accident instruction did not apply to the case, and that any error was harmless, in any 

event. (ECF No. 10–12 at, 13–15.)

Here, Petitioner no longer argues that the trial court should have given the jury the 

accident instruction (CALCRIM 3404). Instead, he argues in Ground Two that the superior 

court should have sua sponte modified the accident instruction so as to advise the jury that 

for a defendant to satisfy the force element of the crime of robbery, “the defendant and not 

somebody else [must have] exerted the force.” (Pet. at 7.) Petitioner made this argument 

for the first time in his Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 10–

13, at 17–23.) The California Supreme Court issued a silent denial of this instructional 

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error claim as it summarily denied the petition for review. (ECF No. 10–14 (“The petition 

for review is denied.”).)

1. Procedural Default

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Ground Two is procedurally defaulted. In 

making this argument, Respondent relies on the California Supreme Court’s silent denial 

of Petitioner’s instructional error claim on direct appeal from the California Court of 

Appeal. Respondent is asking the Court to read the California Supreme Court’s silent 

denial of Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal as implicitly applying a procedural bar. The 

Court declines to do so.

Procedural default in state court bars federal review only when the state court clearly 

and expressly sets forth its reliance on that ground. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62 

(1989). Here, because the California Supreme Court issued a silent denial, it did not 

expressly rely on procedural default. (See ECF No. 10–14.) Furthermore, established 

precedent in the Ninth Circuit dictates that a court’s decision on the issue of procedural 

default is to be informed by furthering “the interests of comity, federalism, and judicial 

efficiency.” Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, where

deciding the merits of a claim proves to be less complicated and less time-consuming than 

adjudicating the issue of procedural default, a court may exercise discretion in its 

management of the case to reject the claims on their merits and forgo an analysis of cause 

and prejudice. Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court chooses 

to exercise such discretion here and address Ground Two on its merits.

2. Merits Analysis

The Court rejects Petitioner’s claim under Ground Two on its merits. Clearly 

established federal law provides that in order for Petitioner to establish a violation of his 

federal due process rights by the failure to give a jury instruction, Petitioner must 

demonstrate that the instruction should have been given, and that its omission “so infected 

the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 

U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). A state 

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court’s “failure to correctly instruct the jury on a defense may deprive the defendant of his 

due process right to present a defense.” Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.

2002). “A defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the jury on his theory of defense 

provided it is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence.” United States 

v. Fejes, 232 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the failure to give an instruction is in 

issue, the petitioner’s burden of demonstrating a due process violation is “especially 

heavy.” Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 155. “An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely 

to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Id.

Moreover, even if the trial court’s failure to give the instruction violated due process, 

habeas relief would still not be available unless the error had a “substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 637 (1993). When the state court has found any error to be harmless, the Court may 

not grant relief for the error “unless the harmlessness determination itself was 

unreasonable.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 119 (2007) (emphasis in original)).

To assess the merits of Ground Two, the Court turns to the jury instructions given at 

trial by the San Diego Superior Court. At trial, the jury was properly instructed on the 

elements of the crime of robbery as follows:

Now, ladies and gentlemen, in Count 4, the defendant is 

charged with the crime of robbery. Every person who takes 

personal property owned by someone else against the will and 

from the immediate possession of the owner, accompanied by 

means of force or fear and with the specific intent permanently 

to deprive the owner of the property, is guilty of the crime of 

robbery. The taking element of robbery is comprised of, A, the 

gaining of possession of property by the perpetrator, and B, the 

asportation of that property. Asportation continues so long as the 

property’s being carried away by the perpetrator to a place of 

temporary safety.

Immediate presence means an area within the owner’s 

reach, observation or control, so that he could, if not prevented 

by fear, recover possession of the subject property. 

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To prove that the defendant is guilty of robbery, the people 

must prove five things. No. 1, the defendant took the personal 

property of any value that was not his own, and No. 2, the 

property was taken from the owner’s immediate presence; No. 3, 

the owner did not consent to the taking of the property; No. 4, 

the defendant used force against the owner to take and/or retain 

possession of the property, and No. 5, when the defendant used 

force to take and/or retain the property, he intended to deprive 

the owner of it permanently. 

A person does not have to actually hold or touch 

something to possess it. It is enough if the person has control over 

it or the right to control it either personally or through another 

person. A store or business employee who is on duty has 

possession of the property of that store or business. The 

defendant’s intent to steal, that is, to deprive the owner of the 

property permanently, must have been formed before or during 

the time he used force. If the defendant did not form this required 

intent until after using force, then he did not commit robbery. 

Where [property] is originally taken by the defendant without the 

use of force, and thereafter while retaining possession of the 

property the defendant uses force to prevent the owner from 

recovering the property, or to facilitate an[] escape with the 

property, then the crime of robbery is committed provided that 

the foregoing elements, 1 through 5, have all been proven beyond 

any reasonable doubt.

(ECF No. 10–4, at 112–14.)

Having performed an independent review of both the record and silent denial of the 

California Supreme Court, the Court concludes that Ground Two fails under § 2254(a) 

because there was no instructional error amounting to a denial of Petitioner’s constitutional 

rights.3 The jury was properly instructed on the elements of robbery. And, Petitioner has 

not carried his “especially heavy” burden of demonstrating that the state court erred when 

 

3 For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the Court assumes, but does not hold, that 

Petitioner’s proposed modification(s) to the jury instructions for robbery would also be a correct 

statement of California law.

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it held Petitioner was not entitled to a jury instruction on his defense that his use of force 

was accidental. See Kibbe, 431 U.S. at 155. At trial, the superior court held that the 

defendant could argue his accidental force defense to the jury. However, the court held 

that this defense would not be supported by the requested jury instruction because the 

evidence at trial showed Petitioner’s use of force to be intentional, not accidental. (ECF 

No. 10–4, at 99 (“The evidence in this case is that . . . . it was a push, which suggests 

intention – intentional.”).)

Here, Petitioner argues that the following jury instruction would have cured the 

constitutional defect in the jury instructions given at trial for the crime of robbery:

To satisfy the force element in the crime of robbery the law requires that the

defendant exert some quantum of force in excess of that necessary to 

accomplish the mere seizing of the property. If you find that someone other 

than the defendant exerted physical force that caused contact between the 

victim and defendant you must find the force element has not been proven.

(Pet. at 7; ECF No. 10–13, at 19.) However, Petitioner has not shown that his defense that 

somebody else exerted the force has “some foundation in the evidence” presented at trial. 

See Fejes, 232 F.3d at 702 (“A defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the jury on 

his theory of defense provided it is supported by law and has some foundation in the 

evidence.”).

Indeed, there was substantial evidence at trial that Petitioner used intentional force 

against the Marshalls loss prevention officer when fleeing the store with stolen 

merchandise. Particularly, Ruiz testified repeatedly that Petitioner pushed him as 

Petitioner ran from the store carrying the stolen sneakers. (Id. at 68–70, 78.) In contrast, 

Petitioner did not present testimony or other evidence to support his contention that he “had 

no choice but to collide with [Ruiz]” because the security guard “suddenly cut in front of 

him as he ran full stride.” (ECF No. 10–9, at 28.) Without any evidence to support the 

requested instruction, Petitioner is unable to meet his high burden to demonstrate that the 

failure to give the proposed modified accident instruction “so infected the entire trial that 

the resulting conviction violates due process.” See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Thus, Petitioner 

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fails to meet his high burden to show that the omission of the proposed modified jury 

instruction violated his due process rights. 

The Court concludes that there was no instructional error with respect to the jury 

instructions that caused Petitioner to be held in custody in violation of his constitutional 

rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).4 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS habeas relief 

be DENIED as to Ground Two.

C. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that all four of his convictions should be reversed 

because his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena and 

present two witnesses. (Pet. at 8.) Petitioner asserts that the two witnesses, Officer Reilly 

of the El Cajon Police Department and Loss Prevention Officer Michael Perez of Walmart,

were “crucial to the defense” because their “testimony would have raised reasonable

doubt” about the testimony of other witnesses. (Id.) Thus, Petitioner argues that by failing 

to call these witnesses, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance, which violated his 

constitutional right to due process. (Id.)

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United 

States Supreme Court set forth a two prong test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of 

counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show 

that counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

 

4 Because there was no constitutional error, the Court need not address whether the error alleged in 

Ground Two was harmless. However, the Court notes that the California Court of Appeal made a 

harmlessness determination in the context of a similar instructional error argument raised by Petitioner 

on direct appeal. (ECF No. 10–12, at 11–16.) Petitioner’s argument before the Court of Appeal was 

that the trial court “prejudicially erred in denying his request for an instruction under CALCRIM No. 

3404 on the defense of accident.” (Id.) The Court of Appeal held that even if it were to assume the trial 

court erred, the assumed error was harmless under any standard of prejudice because there was no 

evidence to support Petitioner’s theory that his collision with Ruiz was accidental. (Id. at 11, 16.) 

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the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. “[A] court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption 

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 

strategy.’” Id. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 

deferential.”). Thus, “[a] tactical decision by counsel with which the defendant disagrees 

cannot form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People of Territory 

of Guam v. Santos, 741 F.2d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

690; Reynolds v. Smith, 124 F.3d 212 (9th Cir. 1997).

Second, a petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense. Id. at 694. “With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the proper standard 

requires the defendant to ‘show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Daire v. 

Lattimore, 818 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

However, courts need not address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong 

because the Strickland test is conjunctive: if a petitioner fails to make a sufficient showing 

of either prong, his claim fails. Id. at 697.

In Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), the Supreme Court emphasized the 

application of Strickland to ineffective assistance of counsel claims and its relationship to 

§ 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review. Id. When analyzing an argument under

Strickland in the context of § 2254(d), “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s 

application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable[,]” which is a different question 

from “asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” 

Id. at 785.

Petitioner raised Ground Three to the California Supreme Court in a petition for 

review, which was summarily denied. (Pet. at 2; ECF No. 10–13; ECF No. 10–14.) The 

California Court of Appeal, however, denied Ground Three on the merits in a reasoned 

opinion. (ECF No. 10–12.) The Court looks through the silent denial of Ground Three by 

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the California Supreme Court and applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to the underlying appellate 

court opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. 

In its analysis of the Supreme Court’s holding in Strickland, the California Court of 

Appeal stated: 

Applying a highly deferential standard of scrutiny and 

indulging a strong presumption that the conduct of Williams’s 

trial counsel fell within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance, as we must (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689), we

reject Williams’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

because the decisions made by his trial counsel not to call Officer 

Reilly and Perez as defense witnesses were reasonable tactical 

decisions that this court will not second-guess. (See People v. 

Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 520.)

Specifically, defense counsel’s decision not to call Officer 

Reilly was a sound trial tactic because, as she explained to the 

court at the Marsden hearing, Officer Reilly’s testimony would 

have “highlight[ed]” the testimony of Marshalls[] loss 

prevention officer, Ruiz, that Williams pushed Ruiz out of the 

way as Williams fled the scene with the stolen merchandise.

Defense counsel’s decision not to call Perez, who was one 

of Walmart’s loss prevention officers, also was a sound trial 

tactic because, as defense counsel explained to the court, two 

witnesses had already positively identified Williams as the 

perpetrator of the March 2013 theft committed at the Walmart 

store. Also, the reporter’s transcript of Perez’s testimony at the 

preliminary hearing in this matter shows that, had he testified at

trial, he could have offered further inculpatory evidence against 

Williams because his preliminary hearing testimony confirmed 

key aspects of the crime. For example, Perez testified at the 

preliminary hearing that Williams placed merchandise in a 

reusable bag he had brought with him, he first left the bag in the 

greeting card department, he went outside the store for a few 

minutes, and then he returned to the store and grabbed the bag.

As sound tactical reasons supported defense counsel’s 

decisions not to call Officer Reilly and Perez as witnesses, we 

conclude Williams has failed to meet his threshold burden of

demonstrating that his counsel’s performance was below an 

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objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms. Accordingly, we need not address 

Williams’s related contention that he suffered prejudice as a 

result of the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and, thus, 

we affirm the judgment.

(ECF No. 10–12, at 16–20.) Thus, the California Court of Appeal held that Petitioner failed 

to meet his threshold burden of demonstrating that his counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness under professional norms. And, because the 

Strickland test is conjunctive, the Court of Appeal refrained from assessing whether 

Petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.

Here, the Court concludes that the California Court of Appeal reasonably applied 

the Strickland standard in concluding Petitioner failed to demonstrate defense counsel 

provided ineffective assistance. Petitioner claims that his defense counsel should have 

called Officer Reilly as a defense witness because Officer Reilly would have testified that 

the encounter between Petitioner and Ruiz took place in the parking lot, not the sidewalk 

before the parking lot. (See Mem. P. and A. Supp. Pet. at 30, ECF No. 10–9.) Petitioner

further assumes that such testimony “would have been damaging to the credibility of Juan 

Ruiz,” because Ruiz testified that the encounter took place on the sidewalk before the 

parking lot, not in the parking where Petitioner alleges that the encounter actually took 

place. (Id.) However, Petitioner concedes that Officer Reilly also “would have simply 

restated Juan Ruiz’s version of the encounter” – that Petitioner pushed Ruiz, which is what 

his trial counsel sought to avoid. (See id. at 32.)

The Court of Appeal reasonably determined that Petitioner’s arguments amount to 

dissatisfaction with his counsel’s sound trial strategy, which cannot form a basis for an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Santos, 741 F.2d 

at 1169. As the California Court of Appeal noted, “defense counsel’s decision not to call 

Officer Reilly was a sound trial tactic [because] . . . Officer Reilly’s testimony would have 

‘highlight[ed]’” Ruiz’s testimony that Petitioner pushed Ruiz out of the way as Petitioner

fled the scene with stolen merchandise. (ECF No. 10–12, at 19.) The Court of Appeal 

reasonably determined that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s decision not

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to call Officer Reilly fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms.

Similarly, the Court of Appeal reasonably determined that Petitioner also failed to 

establish that defense counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in 

deciding not to call Michael Perez as a witness. As the Court of Appeal reasoned, “defense 

counsel’s decision not to call Perez, who was one of Walmart’s loss prevention officers, 

also was a sound trial tactic because . . . two witnesses had already positively identified 

Petitioner as the perpetrator of the March 2013 theft committed at the Walmart store.” 

(ECF No. 10–12, at 19.) Although Petitioner contends that Perez could not identify him 

as the perpetrator despite being “shoulder to shoulder” with him at times, Petitioner fails 

to show that trial counsel’s decision not to call Perez was unreasonable. The Court of 

Appeal noted that Perez had observed the perpetrator bring a reusable bag into Walmart, 

leave the bag in the greeting card department, go outside for a few minutes, then return to 

the store to grab the bag. (Id. at 19–20.) Because Perez could offer this further inculpatory 

evidence against Petitioner, the Court of Appeal found his trial counsel’s decision not to 

call Perez as a witness a “sound trial tactic.” (Id. at 19.) The Court concludes that the 

California Court of Appeal had sufficient evidence to find that Petitioner’s trial counsel 

made a sound tactical decision to not call Perez as a witness.

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that Petitioner failed to show that 

his counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland was reasonable and easily

withstands habeas review. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas 

claim was not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of any United States Supreme 

Court decision under § 2254(d)(1), nor was the decision an “unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented” under § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS habeas relief be DENIED as to Ground Three.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and 

(2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED THAT any party to this action may file written objections with 

the District Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than July 22, 2016. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the District Court and served on all parties no later than August 5, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise 

those objections on appeal of the District Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 1, 2016

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