Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03058/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 19, 2015*

Decided March 20, 2015

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐3058           Appeal from the

        United States District Court

MUFID ABDULQADER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant‐Appellee.

for the Southern District of Indiana,

Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:13‐cv‐0207‐WTL‐WGH

William T. Lawrence,

Judge.

O R D E R

Mufid Abdulqader, a federal prisoner, sued the United States under the Federal

Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that the Bureau of Prisons

negligently lost some of his legal papers, religious items, and other personal belongings

when he was transferred from USP Marion to FCI Terre Haute in May 2012. Before the

government had answered his complaint, Abdulqader served the United States with a

request for admission, see FED. R. CIV. P. 36, asking the government to admit that his

claim “is in fact a valid claim and this Plaintiff is unquestionably entitled to all of the

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐3058    Page 2

sums so claimed for therein.” The United States never responded. Instead, it moved to

dismiss the suit for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction because, the government argued,

the FTCA does not waive the government’s sovereign immunity for cases involving lost

or destroyed prisoner property. Abdulqader countered that the government had waived

its sovereign immunity by admitting—i.e., ignoring his request for admission—the

validity of his claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3). The district court agreed with the

government that Abdulqader’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity but clarified that

a dismissal on that ground is for failure to state a claim for relief, see FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(b)(6), not lack of jurisdiction, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

Abdulqader contests this ruling on appeal. But the district court correctly

concluded that although subject‐matter jurisdiction was secure, see Smoke Shop, LLC v.

United States, 761 F.3d 779, 782 n.1 (7th Cir. 2014); Williams v. Fleming, 597 F.3d 820,   

823–24 (7th Cir. 2010), Abdulqader’s claim is barred by sovereign immunity. In enacting

the FTCA, Congress waived the United States’ sovereign immunity for suits alleging

injury—including the loss of property—attributable to negligence on the part of federal

employees acting within the scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1),

2671–2680; Furry v. United States, 712 F.3d 988, 992 (7th Cir. 2013); On‐Site Screening,

Inc. v. United States, 687 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2012). But in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,

552 U.S. 214 (2008), the Supreme Court held that § 2680(c) excludes from this waiver

claims involving the negligent handling of detained property by law‐enforcement

officers, which includes prison guards. Id. at 216, 228; see Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S.

848, 854 (1984); Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d 629, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2008). Indeed, on

strikingly similar facts, the Court concluded in Ali that sovereign immunity blocked an

inmate’s suit alleging that the Bureau of Prisons lost personal property during a prison

transfer. 552 U.S. at 216–17, 227–28. Reinstating Abdulqader’s suit would run afoul of

Ali.   

Nevertheless, Abdulqader insists that the government waived its sovereign

immunity by not responding to his request for admission. Yet, a “waiver of sovereign

immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed,” United States v.

Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);

see Edwards v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 43 F.3d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1994), and any expression of

waiver will be strictly construed in the government’s favor, Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192

(1996); United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). The government’s

unresponsiveness to Abdulqader’s Rule 36 request does not meet this standard.

Anyway, Rule 36 does not encompass demands—like Abdulqader’s—for legal

conclusions. See FED R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1)(A) (limiting scope of admissions to “facts, the

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application of law to fact, or opinions about either”); United States v. Petroff‐Kline,

557 F.3d 285, 293 (6th Cir. 2009); 8B CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &

RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2255 & n.7, pp. 334–36 (3d ed.

2010).

AFFIRMED.

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