Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01050/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01050-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 26:7403 Suit to Enforce Federal Tax Lien

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANTONIO B. SECAPURE, 

Defendants.

NO. C 07-1050 TEH 

ORDER

The United States moves for summary judgment in this matter, seeking to reduce to

judgment outstanding federal tax assessments against defendants Antonio B. Secapure and

Elsa M. Secapure, to set aside the transfer of their residence at 208 Starling Way in Hercules,

California to their son, Anthony M. Secapure III, and to foreclose federal tax liens on that

property. The Court heard argument on the motion on March 24, 2008. For the reasons set

out below, the Court is prepared to grant the motion, provided the government submits

evidence of the recorded tax liens it alleges in its Complaint. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from a Complaint filed by the United States against taxpayers

Antonio B. Secapure, Elsa M. Secapure, and their son Anthony M. Secapure III, the

California State Board of Equalization, and the Everhome Mortgage Company. The

Complaint seeks relief for unpaid taxes.

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 The Secapures were notified that the 1996 return had been added to the audit in March,

2000.

2

 Unless otherwise noted, further references to Exhibits are to Exhibits to the Moore

Declaration.

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 The government states (without support) that these were, respectively, a duplex and a

parking lot. MPA at 9.

2

In January, 1998, the IRS notified defendants Antonio B. and Elsa M. Secapure that

their 1994 and 1995 tax returns were being audited. In April, 1998, the Secapures filed their

(late) 1996 tax return, and that return was added to the audit.1

After the January, 1998 audit notice was sent to the Secapures, they started

encumbering their real property. On March 13, 1998, the executed a deed of trust for

$50,000 on a property in Hercules with their son, Anthony M. Secapure, as the beneficiary. 

Pl. Exh. 10. A week later, they executed two more deeds of trust in favor of their son, one

for $75,000 on a property in Richmond, Declaration of Thomas Moore In Support of Motion

for Summary Judgment Exh. 11,2

 and another for $60,000 on a property in “Herman’s

Addition.” Exh. 12.3

 Mr. Secapure testified in a different case that on March 24, 1998, Mr.

Secapure executed a deed of trust on the Starling Way residence for $69,000 in favor of his

mother-in-law, when he owed her only a little over a thousand dollars. 

On February 1, 2000, the Secapures transferred their Starling Way residence to their

son Anthony by Grant Deed. The transfer was a “gift,” and the Secapures admit that

Anthony paid no consideration for the transfer. The Secapures said they gave the property to

their son because they wanted him to have a place to live, but he had been living there since

1990.

The Secapures continued to live in the home (with their son) until 2004, and later

moved back into the house. Even though Anthony began claiming the property taxes and

mortgage interest as deductions on his taxes, the government submitted evidence that Mr.

and Mrs. Secapure paid the real property taxes, the mortgage payments, insurance and

utilities on the property until at least 2005. They continued to clean the yard, and paid to

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have the roof replaced. Mrs. Secapure testified at deposition that Anthony repaid them for

the mortgage payments and utilities, although “sometimes” the Secapure parents paid them. 

On various dates between 2000 and 2004, the government made assessments against

Mr. and Mrs Secapure for unpaid federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for the tax

years 1995, 1996, 2002 and 2003. Exhs. 14-17 (Certificates of Assessment, Payments and

Other Specified Matters). The Complaint alleges that in 2005, the government recorded tax

liens in Contra Costa County against Mr. and Mrs. Secapure, and against Anthony M.

Secapure III as their nominee.

The government now seeks summary judgment on this action to reduce the tax

assessments to judgment, set aside the conveyance of property to Anthony M. Secapure as

fraudulent, and to foreclose the tax liens. California’s State Board of Equalization, holder of

a state tax lien against defendants, filed a statement of non-opposition to the motion (and a

stipulation concerning priority of claims). Everhome Mortgage (owed only about $6,000)

also filed a stipulation setting out priority of claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The

court may not weigh the evidence and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id. at 255.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than

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 Certificates of Assessments and Payments are admissible pursuant to Rules 803(3) and

902(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Beary, 2007 WL 2712217 (N.D. Cal.

September 14, 2007), at *5, citing United States v. Lorsen Electric Co., 480 F.2d 554, 555-556 (2nd

Cir. 1973); United States v. Strebler, 313 F.2d 402, 403 (8th Cir. 1963).

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for the moving party. Id. at 322-23. However, on an issue for which its opponent will have

the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by “pointing out to the

District Court . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case.” Id. at 325. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then

“set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” to defeat the motion. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

DISCUSSION

I. Reducing Assessments to Judgment

The government first seeks to reduce four outstanding assessments against the

Secapures to judgment.

The government bears the burden of proof in an action to collect taxes. It can carry its

initial burden by introducing its assessment of taxes due;4

 a Certificate of Assessments and

Payments is presumptively correct evidence of a taxpayer’s liability, and is the proper means

of establishing that assessments were properly made and that notices and demand for

payment were sent. Koff v. United States, 3 F.3d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.

Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983). The burden then shifts to the defendant to

show that the assessment is incorrect; if the defendant can rebut the presumption by showing

it is “arbitrary or erroneous,” then the burden shifts back to the government to “establish the

correctness of the assessment by sufficient and competent evidence.” United States v.

Molitor, 337 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1964); Stonehill, 702 F.2d at 1294.

The government submitted Certificates of Assessments, Payments, and Other

Specified Matters for the tax years 1995, 1996, 2002, and 2003. Exhs. 14-17; Declaration of

Jerry Reed in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ¶¶ 2, 4 (setting out the Secapures’

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 The government also argues that Antonio B. Secapure’s 1995 tax liability is res judicata

because the United States Tax Court determined he was liable for the tax deficiencies and statutory

additions asserted against him by Decision dated March 30, 2004. Exh. 13. “[I]f a claim of liability

or non-liability relating to a particular tax year is litigated, a judgment on the merits is res judicata

as to any subsequent proceeding involving the same claim and the same tax year.” Commissioner of

Internal Revenue Service v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948),

quoted in United States v. Hoffman, 643 F.Supp. 346, 348 (E.D.Wis. 1986). Therefore, res judicata

is an additional ground for judgment in favor of the United States on the 1995 assessment.

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“total outstanding tax debts” including accrued interest and penalties, as of November 5,

2007). The amounts of the original tax liability and total amounts are as follows:

Tax Period Ending Balance Shown on

Certificate

Total Tax Debt as of

November 5, 2007

1995 (Antonio Secapure

only)

$48,356.65 $61,019.78

1996 $10,082.48 $19,796.50

2002 $3,946.07 $4,982.89

2003 $5,392.53 $6,564.35

Total: $67,777.73 $92,363.52

The Secapures’ opposition to the motion fails to address, and therefore fails to rebut,

the government’s prima facie case of tax liability. The United States has therefore

established the defendants’ tax liability.5

 

II. The Starling Way Property

The amount of a delinquent taxpayer’s liability is a lien in favor of the United States

upon all property belonging to the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6322; United States v.

McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 452-55 (1993)(lien arises upon assessment). When there has been

“a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, or to discharge any liability in respect thereof,” the

United States may bring an action to enforce the lien created by 26 U.S.C. § 6321, or to

subject any property held by the taxpayer to the payment of the tax. 26 U.S.C. § 7403(a). 

The United States seeks to foreclose tax liens on the Starling Way property based on

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the assessments above. It contends under a number of theories that Antonio and Elsa

Secapure are the true owners of the Starling Way property. As set out below, the Court

finds that the government has not proven that the Secapure’s transfer of the property to their

son was fraudulent under California law. However, the government has shown that Anthony

M. Secapure holds the property as their nominee, and that they are the true owners of the

property. 

A. Fraudulent Conveyance To Anthony M. Secapure

The United States seeks to set aside the conveyance of the Starling Way property to

Anthony M. Secapure on the ground that the transfer was fraudulent. See Bresson v. C.I.R.,

213 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2000)(determining fraudulent conveyance under California law); 

U.S. v. Verduchi, 434 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2006)(court looks to state law to see if property

fraudulently transferred); Cal. Civil Code § 3439.07(a)(fraudulent conveyance can be set

aside). 

1. Fraudulent Conveyance Under Civil Code § 3439.04(a)(1) 

The Government has not carried its burden of showing that the transfer to Anthony

Secapure was a fraudulent transfer under Cal. Civil Code § 3439.04. 

Cal. Civil Code § 3439.04, part of California’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent

Transfer Act (“UFTA”), provides that

(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor,

whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the

obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation

 ...(1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.

The government must show actual intent to defraud by a preponderance of the evidence, In

re Beverly, 374 B.R. 221, 235 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts commonly rely on circumstantial

evidence of intent to defraud, Filip v. Bucurenciu, 129 Cal.App.4th 825, 834 (2005),

specifically on the “badges of fraud” now codified in Civil Code § 3439.04(b). The presence

of one or more of the “badges of fraud” does not create a presumption of fraud, but is

evidence from which an inference of actual fraudulent intent may be drawn. Wyzard v.

Goller, 23 Cal.App.4th 1983, 1191 (1994). “There is no minimum number of factors that

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must be present before the scales tip in favor of finding of actual intent to defraud. This list

of factors is meant to provide guidance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way or the

other.” Filip, 129 Cal.App.4th at 834.

While several of the badges of fraud are clearly present here, the United States has

failed to offer evidence sufficient to prove others. 

Civil Code § 3439(b)(1): Whether the Transfer or Obligation 

Was to an Insider

Mr. and Mrs. Secapure transferred the Starling Way property to their son, an insider.

Menick v. Goldy, 131 Cal.App.2d 542, 547 (1955)(parent and child have “confidential”

relationship; the “relationship of parent and child, when coupled with other suspicious

circumstances, may be sufficient to raise an inference of fraud in the conveyance”).

Civil Code § 3439(b)(2): Whether the Debtor Retained Possession or

Control of the Property Transferred After the Transfer 

The Secapures continued to live in the property for approximately four years after

they gave it to their son. Exh. 18 ¶¶ 74-78 (admissions). They also continued to pay

insurance, taxes, and, at least in part, the mortgage and utilities, and would come by and

clean the yard even after they moved out. Exh. 19 at 28 (Elsa Secapure deposition). 

Civil Code § 3439(b)(4): Whether Before the Transfer Was Made ... The

Debtor Had Been Sued or Threatened With Suit

The Secapures received notice that they were being audited on January 28, 1998. 

Exh. 2A. They executed a deed of trust to Anthony on the Starling Way property on March

13, 1998. They transferred the property to him in February, 2000. 

Civil Code § 3439(b)(5): Whether the Transfer Was of Substantially All the

Debtor's Assets

The government argues that “almost all of Mr. and Mrs. Secapure’s property had been

encumbered with deeds of trust with their son named as the beneficiary,” citing to the various

deeds. But nowhere does the government make any showing about the sum total of the

Secapure’s assets. Antonio Secapure disputes this point, claiming he owned a business, a

half-interest in a duplex, and lots in Richmond and Southern California. Antonio B.

Secapure Decl. ¶ 11. The government has completely failed to prove this “badge” of intent.

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Civil Code § 3439(b)(7): Whether the Debtor Removed or Concealed Assets

The government argues that the Secapures tried to “conceal the true extent” of their

assets by encumbering two other pieces of property with deeds of trust to Anthony, “making

it appear that the properties were encumbered when they owned them free and clear” from

any bona fide lien other than the mortgage. 

The United States has offered no authority to suggest that encumbering property with

liens is considered removing or concealing assets for fraudulent transfer purposes. The 1986

Comments to the statute concerning “removing and concealing” assets cite to cases that

involve physical concealment. (“Bentley v. Young, 210 F. 202 (S.D.N.Y.1914), aff'd, 223 F.

536 (2d Cir.1915) (debtor's removal of goods from store to conceal their whereabouts and to

sell them held to render sale fraudulent); Cioli v. Kenourgios, 59 Cal.App. 690, 211 P. 838

(1922) (debtor's sale of all assets and shipment of proceeds out of the country held to be

fraudulent notwithstanding adequacy of consideration)”). Accordingly, the government has

not shown this badge of fraudulent intent.

Civil Code § 3439(b)(8): Whether the Value of the Consideration Received

by the Debtor was Reasonably Equivalent to the Value of the Asset

Transferred or the Amount of the Obligation Incurred.

The Secapures received no consideration in exchange for transferring the Starling

Way property to their son. Mr. Secapure admitted that Anthony never paid money, property,

or assets worth over $10.00 for the property, and admitted that between 1995 and 2005,

Anthony never paid consideration for the transfer. Exh. 18 (admissions) ¶¶ 3, 51-59.

Civil Code § 3439(b)(9): Whether the Debtor was Insolvent or Became

Insolvent Shortly After the Transfer was Made or the Obligation Was

Incurred. The UFTA provides that “[a] debtor is insolvent if, at fair valuations, the sum of the

debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets.” Civil Code § 3439.02(a). Again, the

government failed to submit any evidence about the Secapures’ overall debts, assets, or net

worth before or after the transfer. Moreover, Antonio Secapure declared that the transfer did

not render the Secapures insolvent because Elsa Secapure was employed, he had a pension,

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 On the other hand, he also declared that he plans to either have his son refinance the house

or transfer it back to him so that he can pay his taxes, id. ¶ 13, which suggests that he may be

insolvent now.

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and he owned a business, a half-interest in a duplex, and lots in Richmond and Southern

California. Antonio B. Secapure Decl. ¶ 11.6

 

The UFTA also provides that “[a] debtor who is generally not paying his or her debts

as they become due is presumed to be insolvent.” Cal. Civil Code § 3439.02[c]. During

examination in a state court tax action in 2005, Antonio Secapure admitted that in 1998, he

had “creditors that he couldn’t pay.” Exh. 22 at 55. This, standing alone, is not enough to

establish that in 2000, when the house was transferred, the Secapures became insolvent. 

The government has failed to carry its burden of proof on this badge of fraud. 

Although the government claims that the Secapures have not proven they were solvent,

Reply at 7, the burden of proof is on the government, not the defendants.

Civil Code § 3439.04(b)(10): Whether the Transfer Occurred Shortly Before

or Shortly After a Substantial Debt was Incurred

The government argues that the Secapures transferred an interest in the Starling Way

house to their son just 44 days after they learned they were being audited, and that they

granted him the house during the midst of an audit. However, although the government

makes no argument and cites no authority as to when the Secapures “incurred” their tax debt,

it later argues that “the government becomes a creditor when the taxable period (year) ends.” 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

(“MPA”) at 11:22, citing Edelson v. Commisssioner, 829 F.2d 828, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The deed of trust or the grant deed were not made “shortly” before or after the 1995 and

1996 tax debt was incurred.

In sum, to be entitled to summary judgment, the government must show actual intent

to defraud by a preponderance of the evidence. It has not “affirmatively demonstrat[ed] that

no reasonable trier of fact could find” for the defendants. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. All

the government has shown is that the Secapures transferred their house to their son, for no

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consideration and retained control of it at a time they were being audited by the IRS. This is

not proof of a fraudulent transfer. 

2. Fraudulent Conveyance under Cal. Civil Code § 3439.04(a)(2)

The UTCA also provides that a transfer is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor

made the transfer:

(2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or

obligation, and the debtor ...:

(B) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or

she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due.

Cal. Civil Code § 3439.04(a)(2). Again, the government has not shown anything about the

Secapures’ overall assets before or after the transfer, and therefore has not shown that they

transferred the property “when they knew they were about to incur/had already incurred

substantial tax debts, leaving them with insufficient assets to satisfy this tax debt.” MPA at

11:4-5 (emphasis added). 

3. Constructive Fraud Under Cal Civil Code § 3439.05

Cal. Civil Code § 3439.05 provides that:

A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose

claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor

made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent

value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that

time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.

The government becomes a creditor when the tax year ends. Edelson, 829 F.2d at

834. Therefore, the government’s claims as a creditor arose in 1995 and 1996, before the

transfer in 2000. As set out above, the Secapures made the transfer without receiving

reasonably equivalent value in exchange. 

The government argues that the Secapures “knew they were indebted to the United

States, and did not pay off their debt as it became due,” and were insolvent under Civil Code

§ 3439.02(c) because they “could not pay their debts.” MPA at 12:19-21. Yet the

government cites only to a hearing transcript in which Mr. Secapure testifies that in 1998, he

could not pay his bills. Although Mr. Secapure acknowledged at a deposition that he knew

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he owed the IRS money in 1997, Exh. 20 at 28, he also testified he had no idea at that time

how much money he owed. 

Without more, the government is not entitled to summary judgment on this theory.

B. Nominee Lien Theory

Nonetheless, the government has shown that Anthony Secapure was the “nominee” of

Mr. and Mrs. Secapure – that is, he held the title to the property for the benefit of his parents.

See Scoville v. United States, 250 F.3d 1198, 1202 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Black's Law

Dictionary (7th ed.1999). 

To satisfy legitimate tax debts, the government may impose a lien on property held by

an individual who is merely the nominee of the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6331; G.M.

Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1977) (holding that § 6321 allows the

government to impose a lien on property in the hands of a third party straw man and that 

§ 6331 permits a levy upon such property); United States v. Bell, 27 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1195

(E.D.Cal.1998) and cases cited therein (property of the alter ego of a taxpayer is subject to

the collection of the taxpayer's tax liability); United States v. Marsh, 114 F.Supp.2d 1036,

1043 (D. Hi. 2000)(same); Towe Antique Ford Found. v. I.R.S., 791 F.Supp. 1450, 1454

(D.Mont. 1992)(same).

“State law governs the determination of whether there exists an alter ego from whom

the government may satisfy the obligation of a taxpayer.” Wolfe v. United States, 806 F.2d

1410, 1411 n. 3 (9th Cir.1986). Courts throughout the Ninth Circuit rely on the following six

factors to determine nominee status:

1) Whether no consideration or inadequate consideration paid by the nominee;

2) Whether the property was placed in the name of the nominee in anticipation of

litigation or liabilities;

3) Whether a close relationship between the transferor and the nominee;

4) Whether the parties to the transfer failed to record the conveyance

5) Whether the transferor retained possession; and

6) Whether the transferor continues to enjoy the benefits of the transferred property.

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 In briefing the nominee theory, the government lists seven factors – without any citation

or support – omitting the factor that is not present in the Secapures’ case (failure to record the

conveyance) and adding two which are (state property taxes assessed in the name of the taxpayer,

other expenses of the property paid by taxpayer). MPA at 13:25-14:13. Although Plaintiff claimed

that these were the “traditional elements” of nominee theory at oral argument, the Court has been

unable to find any cases referring to property taxes or expenses relating to a nominee theory. The

government’s error in its own favor, made without bothering to cite any authority, is both suspect

and unprofessional.

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See, e.g., Sharp Management, LLC v. United States, 2007 WL 1367698, *3 (W.D.Wash. May

8, 2007), citing United States v. Bell, 27 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1195 (E.D.Cal.1998) and Colby B.

Found. v. United States, 1997 WL 1046002, *20 (D.Or. Oct. 22, 1997); Towe Antique Ford

Foundation v. Internal Revenue Service 791 F.Supp. 1450, 1454 (D. Mont.1992); see also

Holman v. United States, 505 F.3d 1060, 1065 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) quoting Spotts v. United

States, 429 F.3d 248, 253 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005).7

These factors show that Anthony M. Secapure is his parents’ nominee. Anthony paid

no consideration for the property. There was a close relationship. The Secapures retained

possession of the property and continued to enjoy its benefits for many years. There is no

direct evidence that the property was placed in Anthony’s name in anticipation of tax

liability, but the timing is suspect. Although the transfer was recorded, that is the only factor

not weighing in the government’s favor. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met

its burden on summary judgment of showing that Anthony M. Secapure is the nominee of

Antonio B and Elsa M. Secapure.

III. Foreclosure of Federal Tax Liens

After the district court adjudicates the merits of the United States’ claim to the

property, it may decree a sale of the property and order distribution of the proceeds from that

sale. 26 U.S.C. § 7403(c); United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 US 713, 719-20

(1985); 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a)(allowing Court to set the terms and conditions of the sale of real

property). Although the Court is not required to foreclose tax liens, the Supreme Court has

noted that “the limited discretion accorded by § 7403 should be exercised rigorously and

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sparingly, keeping in mind the Government’s paramount interest in prompt and certain

collection of delinquent taxes.” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 711. 

The United States asks the Court to order that it has valid federal tax liens in the

amounts listed in Section I above, as of November 5, 2007, plus penalties and interest

accruing thereafter, against all property and rights of Antonio and Elsa Secapure, including

the Starling Way property. It also asks the Court to foreclose its tax liens, and order

sale of the Starling Way property to satisfy Defendants’ tax liabilities. 

The Court is prepared to do so. However, the government has not submitted evidence

that the liens themselves have been recorded. According to the Complaint, the IRS filed with

the Contra Costa County Recorder a Notice of Federal Tax Lien relative to each of the

assessments made for the 1995, 1996, 2002, and 2003 tax years against Antonio B. Secapure,

Elsa M. Secapure, and Anthony M. Secapure as their nominee. Complaint ¶¶ 11, 26, 30. At

the hearing on this motion, the Court asked whether the United States was required to make a

factual showing that the liens were recorded, and counsel for the United States represented

that the government had done so with Exhibits 14-17. However, those Exhibits are merely

Certificates of Assessment, and do not show that the government recorded liens.

The Court notes that this failure is consistent with the government’s sloppy and

incomplete briefing throughout. The government should not assume that the Court will rule

in its favor, either because of the nature of the suit or the opposition (or lack thereof) it faces. 

The government bears the burden on summary judgment. When it seeks a remedy as serious

as forced sale of a taxpayer’s residence, it must scrupulously make its case.

The Court will grant the motion and authorize sale of the subject property pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2001(a), on the terms requested by the government, provided the United States

submits the relevant Notices of Federal Tax Liens (or explains to the Court’s satisfaction 

why evidence that the tax liens were recorded is unnecessary). The United States shall

submit the notices, together with a Proposed Order consistent with this Order, within ten 

calendar days of the date of this Order. The trial date now set for April 1, 2008 is vacated.

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The Order to Show Cause why Defendants’ counsel, Charles E. Smith, should not be

sanctioned is hereby vacated. There is no justification for Mr. Smith’s continuing failure to

conform to this Court’s Local Rules, General Orders, and Standing Orders by failing to

register for electronic filing. Compliance with those rules, including those governing

registration for and use of electronic filing, is not optional. Although sanctions are fully

warranted, the Court, in its discretion, will not impose monetary sanctions. Mr. Smith is

hereby on notice of federal court electronic filing rules, and is directed to read General Order

45 in its entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2008 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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