Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00037/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Peter Massinga, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-037-TUC-JGZ (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On January 13, 2012, Petitioner Peter Massinga, who is confined in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex-Douglas in Douglas, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner contends that his 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were violated when a 

state statute regarding the burden of proof for proving a self-defense justification was 

improperly applied at his trial. In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that he was deprived 

of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at the trial and 

appellate stages of his criminal case. 

 The District Court screened the Petition and directed Respondents to file an 

Answer. (Doc. 6) Respondents filed an Answer on May 1, 2012, arguing that Ground 

One, a non-ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, was procedurally defaulted, and 

addressed Ground Two, an IAC claim, on the merits. (Doc. 15) 

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 On December 3, 2012, Petitioner moved the Court to voluntarily dismiss the 

action without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, to allow 

Petitioner to raise a new claim in the state courts, or alternatively place this action on 

inactive status while Petitioner pursues state relief. (Doc. 22) Petitioner asserts that he has 

recently obtained transcripts demonstrating juror misconduct, and argues he should be 

allowed to return to the state courts to raise a new IAC claim against trial counsel for 

failing to discover or raise the juror misconduct claim (Doc. 22, at 2-6) and also faults 

trial counsel for failing to provide him with transcripts documenting the alleged juror 

misconduct. (Id.) Petitioner asserts that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Martinez 

v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), will excuse the procedural default in these habeas 

proceedings for failing to raise the claim earlier. Alternatively, Petitioner moves to place 

the case on inactive status. 

Respondents oppose the motion, arguing that Martinez does not apply to 

Petitioner’s case, that any IAC claim will be untimely by the time Petitioner would be 

able to return to this Court, and Petitioner’s request is in essence a request to amend the 

habeas and add a new IAC claim sometime in the future, which would be prohibited by 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

Petitioner acknowledges in his Reply (Doc. 24) that he cannot amend his federal 

habeas petition to add the new claim because the claim he wishes to pursue is 

unexhausted, and, as Petitioner concedes, he must return to state court first to raise this 

claim. For the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiffs’ 

motion to dismiss be denied without prejudice and Defendant’s motion to place the case 

on inactive status be denied. 

Motion to Dismiss 

Petitioner requests dismissal of the present action, pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41. While there is no legal impediment to dismissal of Petitioner’s 

habeas, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion be denied because dismissal of 

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the petition, without prejudice, would effectively result in a dismissal with prejudice 

because the limitations period will expire during the time Petitioner returns to state court 

to exhaust his new claim. See Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230 (2004)(acknowledging 

that dismissal of exhausted claims in a petition could result in the loss of those claims 

because the limitations period could expire during the time a petitioner returns to state 

court to exhaust other unexhausted claims). Under Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 

(2001), the filing of a petition for federal habeas corpus relief does not toll AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations. Id. at 172. 

Motion to Stay 

Petitioner requests in the alternative that the Court place the Petition on inactive 

status. In limited circumstances, a federal district court has the discretion to stay a mixed 

habeas petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims to allow the petitioner to 

present his unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance, and then return to 

federal court for review of his perfected petition. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 

Because the petition before this Court is not a mixed petition, the Rhines analysis is 

inapplicable to Petitioner’s motion to stay. 

Stay of a fully exhausted petition is analyzed under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 

(9th Cir. 2003) overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 

2007). Though this case is not entirely similar to Kelly, Petitioner’s motion most clearly 

tracks the three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure outlined in Kelly, and the undersigned 

thus recommends that the District Court analyze the motion under that rubric. Under the 

Kelly three-step procedure (1) a petitioner amends his petition to delete any unexhausted 

claims; (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, 

allowing the petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted 

claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his petition and re-attaches the newlyexhausted claims to the original petition. King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-71). The Rhines and Kelly approaches are distinct 

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because “Rhines applies to stays of mixed petitions, whereas the three-step procedure 

applies to stays of fully exhausted petitions.” King, 564 F.3d at 1140. Additionally, unlike 

a stay predicated on Rhines, a Kelly stay “does nothing to protect a petitioner's 

unexhausted claims from untimeliness in the interim.” King, 564 F.3d at 1141. In King, 

the Ninth Circuit held that the three-step procedure outlined in Kelly “remains available 

after the Supreme Court's decision in Rhines,” id., “because it does not leave a mixed 

petition pending, does not sanction any exception to [the exhaustion requirement] and so 

does not present the same dangers of abuse,” Id. at 1140. They observed that the 

pendency of the federal petition did not toll the statute of limitations, meaning 

subsequently added (or re-added) claims had some likelihood of being untimely, and thus 

the Kelly procedures were unlikely to be abused. Id. at 1141. 

Nonetheless, the Magistrate Judge recommends denial of Petitioner’s motion to 

stay. The propriety of the stay-and-abeyance procedure under Kelly turns not on a 

showing of good cause for failure to exhaust state court remedies, rather a petitioner 

invokes Kelly’s three-step procedure subject to the requirement that the amendment of 

any newly exhausted claims relate back into the petition to satisfy the requirements set 

forth by the Supreme Court in Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005). A timely filed 

petition for writ of habeas corpus does not preserve claims that are not included in the 

timely petition and which are presented for the first time after the expiration of the statute 

of limitations. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657–664 (claims not presented in original, timely 

habeas petition, but only after the one-year limitations period expires, are untimely and 

not cognizable on habeas corpus review). Additionally, a timely filed habeas corpus 

petition does not toll the statute of limitations with respect to claims not included in that 

petition. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 172. 

Though Petitioner argues that he had good cause for failing to raise the 

unexhausted claim in earlier proceedings, Petitioner makes no argument that his claim 

“relates back” to the original petition under Mayle, supra. Though not entirely evident 

from Petitoner’s reply, Petitioner seems to be arguing that once he exhausts the new IAC 

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claim in state court the new IAC claim would be timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), 

because the limitations period would have begun on “the date on which the factual 

predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.” Id. (Doc. 24, at 2)(citing Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164 

(9th Cir. 2010)(when a habeas petitioner challenges an administrative decision affecting 

the “fact or duration of his confinement,” AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations runs 

from when the “factual predicate” of the habeas claims “could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” § 2244(d)(1)(D)) Presumably this is a date 

sometime in November, 2012 as Petitioner obtained, “contemporaneous with the filing” 

of Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the transcripts which formed the basis to allow 

Petitioner to litigate this issue for relief. (Doc. 22, at 2.) At this time, however, the 

Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the date on which the factual 

predicate of the claim or claims could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge cannot recommend that the District Court 

exercise its discretion to stay the petition in order to allow Petitioner to return to state 

court because Petitioner has not demonstrated that the new claims would relate back to 

the original petition, or would otherwise be considered timely upon Petitioner’s return to 

federal court. 

Recommendation 

In conclusion, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court 

DENY Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss without prejudice (Doc. 22). 

The Magistrate Judge FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY 

Defendant’s motion for inactive status (Doc. 22). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed R. Civ.P. 72(b). 

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If objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). 

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 12-

0037-TUC-JGZ. 

 Dated this 25th day of January, 2013. 

 

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