Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00358/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00358-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

STEVEN MICHAEL FERNANDEZ, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES L. RYAN, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 08-358-TUC-FRZ (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Petitioner Steven Michael Fernandez, presently confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex-Tucson, has filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondents have filed an answer to the original petition (“Answer”)

with exhibits A through V attached. (Doc. No. 11.) A reply was filed by Petitioner with

Exhibit A attached. (Doc. No. 17.) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation.

For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plea Agreement

Petitioner was charged in Graham County Superior Court with one count each of:

administration of a narcotic drug, a class 2 felony; possession of a narcotic drug, a class 4

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felony; endangerment, a class 6 felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony;

and transfer of a narcotic drug, a class 2 felony, in CR2004-268 (“‘268"). (Answer, Ex. A)

On October 15, 2004, Petitioner was charged in CR2004-301 (“‘301") with one count each

of: attempt to obtain or procure the administration of a narcotic drug by fraud, deceit,

misrepresentation or subterfuge, a class 4 felony; attempted fraudulent schemes and artifices,

a class 4 felony; and three counts of forgery, class 4 felonies. (Id.) In both cases allegations

of four prior felony convictions and four possessory convictions, as well as the aggravating

factors of prior felony history and physical, emotional or financial harm caused to the victim

or if the victim died as a result of the conduct of defendant, the emotional and financial harm

caused to the victim’s immediate family were filed. (Id.)

On March 28, 2005, Petitioner pled guilty in ‘268 to Count 1, attempted

administration of a narcotic drug as a class 3 felony (amended), and Count 3, endangerment,

a class 6 felony. (Answer, Ex. C, Reporter’s Transcript (“R.T.”), 3/28/05, at 3-4, 19-20.) As

part of the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted a prior conviction for aggravated driving

under the influence. (Id. at 3, 16-19.) That same date, Petitioner pled guilty in ‘301 to Count

4, forgery, a class 4 felony. (Id. at 7, 21-22.) All other allegations, as well as another case,

CR 2004-307, were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. (Id., and Answer, Ex. A at 2.)

As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to give up the right to plead not guilty and

the right to a jury trial, as well as “the right to a jury determination of any factor [the court]

may use as an aggravator” beyond the presumptive term of 6.5 years, up to the cap of 10.5

years in ‘268. (Answer, Ex. C, R.T. 3/28/05 at 9.) The court stated that “we’re waiving

basically Blakely rights of a jury determination and empowering the judge to consider

aggravating factors.” (Id.) Counsel explained that he had “outlined that new change in the

law” to his client by letter, and confirmed, on the record, that Petitioner understood that

“there’s been a change in the law,” that Petitioner had “a right to have a jury determination

of aggravating factors ... proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at 9-10) Counsel explained

that if Petitioner accepted the plea agreement, he was “giving up that right and [the trial

court] will make that determination by a much lower standard of proof, what is called

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preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at 10.) Petitioner advised that he understood, and

agreed to give up that right. (Id.) Petitioner admitted the prior felony conviction of

aggravated DUI. (Id. at 16.) 

B. Sentencing

On May 19, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner in ‘268 to the slightly

aggravated term of 10.5 years imprisonment for attempted administration of a narcotic drug

and 1.5 years imprisonment for endangerment, each with a prior conviction, to run

concurrently. (Answer, Ex. D. R.T. 5/19/05 at 44-46.) The state produced certified copy of

Petitioner’s aggravated DUI conviction from 1991 in Pima County cause number CR 32171,

and his conviction for aggravated assault in 1993, also out of Pima County, at the time of

sentencing. (Id. at 21-22.) Petitioner did not object to the admission of these two priors for

sentencing purposes. (Id. at 22.) The state also produced a certified copy of Petitioner’s

conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, in Graham County cause number 2004-047.

(Id. at 23.) Additional certified copies of convictions occurring more than ten years prior in

Pima County Superior Court were admitted, over Petitioner’s objection, as “background

information.” (Id. at 24.) The trial court found Petitioner’s “felony history” and “the

emotional harm caused to the family of [his] victim” as aggravating factors. (Id. at 44.) 

C. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On July 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se Notice of Post-Conviction Relief pursuant

to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Answer, Ex. E.) Appointed counsel

informed the trial court that she was unable to raise any colorable claim and moved to

withdraw and allow Petitioner to file a pro se petition. (Answer, Ex. F.) Petitioner filed a

pro se petition for post-conviction relief on February 9, 2006, raising the following grounds

for relief:

(A) Petitioner’s sentence violated his due process rights guaranteed by the

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution because the trial

court failed to comply with the mandates of A.R.S. § 13-709(B) by

failing to credit Petitioner for his presentence incarceration; and 

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1 The trial court found Petitioner in error when he cited A.R.S. § 13-

709(C)(9) when the correct reference is A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(9). (Answer,

Ex. A.) 

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(B) Petitioner’s sentence violated his due process rights guaranteed by the

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution because the trial

court considered an improper aggravating factor of emotional harm

caused to the family of the victim to increase the penalty for the offense

in violation of A.R.S. § 13-709(C)(9)1

. 

((Ex. G, at 3, 6.) 

On May 16, 2006, the trial court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief

finding that there are no claims that present a material issue of fact or law that would entitle

Petitioner to a hearing or relief and that no purpose would be served by any further

proceedings. (Answer, Ex. A.) Specifically, the trial court: (1) found under Arizona law

that the trial court did not err in denying credit for time served in CR 2004-047 to be credited

against the new time ordered in cause numbers ‘268, and ‘301; and (2) rejected Petitioner’s

claim that his sentence was unconstitutionally aggravated, finding that while the finding that

there was significant harm to the victim’s family that resulted from the death of the victim

and that Petitioner’s acts were clearly causal links in the victim’s death were supported by

Petitioner’s statements and Petitioner’s plea to endangerment. (Id.) The trial court also

found that, “[s]tanding alone, the substantial aggravator of felony history would still result

in the slightly aggravated 10.5 years, even if the Court found that consideration of § 13-

702(c)(9) “harm to the victim’s family” was inappropriate. (Id.) 

D. Motion for Reconsideration And Motion For The Appointment Of Advisory

Counsel and Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a pro se motion for the appointment of advisory counsel. (Answer,

Ex. K.) The trial court received the motion on November 29, 2006, although Petitioner

signed and dated the motion May 25, 2006. (Id.) Petitioner requested advisory counsel to

assist him in filing his motion to amend his Rule 32 to include claims of ineffective

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 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

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assistance of counsel, abuse of discretion by the trial court, and breach of the plea agreement

by the state. (Id.)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and to amend pleadings. (Answer, Ex.

L.) The trial court received the motion on November 29, 2006, although the document again

reflected a signature and date of May 25, 2006. (Id. at 1,14.) Petitioner raised the following

arguments in his motion:

(A) “Access to the courts;” 

(B) “Court’s abuse of discretion” related to Officer Orr’s use of a polygraph

test, a discussion that occurred before the tape recording of the

Petitioner, and the classification of Count 1 as a class 3 felony instead

of a class 4 after the count was amended to “attempt” and the

imposition of an aggravated sentence which involved an issue “of

Blakely2

 character;” and

(C) “Ineffective assistance of counsel.”

(Id. at 8-12.) 

Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. M.) Again,

the trial court received the motion on November 29, 2006, although the document reflected

a signature and date of May 25, 2006. (Id.) Petitioner raised the following arguments in

his petition:

(A) Petitioner is denied access to adequately trained legal assistance, and access

to the tools required to adequately and effectively produce documents;

(B) Petitioner was sentenced in violation of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and notice requirements of the Sixth

Amendment because his plea agreement failed to put him on notice that

he would be facing anything other than the presumptive sentence of 6.5

years for the attempted administration of a narcotic drug; and

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3 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

4 Department of Corrections

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(C) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to slightly aggravated terms of

imprisonment in violation of both Apprendi3

 and Blakely. 

(Id.) 

On December 7, 2006, the trial court summarily denied all three motions, finding that

they were “nothing more than a rehash of his previous Petition for Post Convection Relief.”

(Answer, Ex. O at 1.) The trial court also reviewed Petitioner’s complaints about the

investigation, his complaints about his arrest, and his concerns about the lack of access to

research facilities in the Department of Corrections and found “no error in the record” (Id.

at 2.) 

E. Second Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Petitioner filed a second motion for the appointment of counsel, dated May 25, 2006,

and received by the court on January 17, 2007. (Answer, Ex. Q.) 

The trial court held a hearing on the motion and issued a ruling on April 10, 2007.

(Answer, Ex. N.) The trial court found that, for purposes of considering the timeliness of the

motions, the time line started on May 16, 2006, when the trial court dismissed the first

petition for post-conviction relief. (Id. at 1.) The trial court stated that the “record remained

silent for six months with regards to an appeal, until the second petition was received on

November 29, 2006,” the same date that the court received a motion for appointment of

advisory counsel and motion for reconsideration, and to amend the pleadings. (Id. at 2.) The

court inquired of the Petitioner why he did not submit originals, and why they were signed

in May, 2006, when the court did not receive them until November. (Id. at 3.) The trial court

found that it had “no reason to believe that the defendant mailed these in May, when the

Court received them in November, it appears as though the documents may have backdated

six months.” (Id. at 3.) The trial court further found there was “ no reason to give credibility,

and say that the DOC4

 is at fault, and defendant is not at fault for missing the deadlines for

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the filing of a Rule 32.” (Id.) The trial court concluded that the most recent request for

advisory counsel, the motion for reconsideration, and the second petition for post-conviction

relief were untimely. The court ruled that Petitioner “did not appeal within the appropriate

time, nor did he file anything with the State.” (Id.) Petitioner “did not file either one of his

petitions on time, which precludes him from filing anything else, unless there was new

evidence the defendant was not aware of.” (Id.) The trial court denied the motion for

appointment of advisory counsel, motion for reconsideration, and second petition for postconviction relief. (Id. at 4.) 

F. Petition for Review

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, dated December 21, 2006, received by the court on

January 17, 2007. (Answer, Ex. P.) Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in refusing

to appoint him advisory counsel. (Id.) Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, dated June 13, 2007. (Ex. T.) Petitioner raised the following issues: 

(A) Prosecutorial misconduct;

(B) The trial court erred by: (1) allowing Detective Orr to testify about the

lie detector test; (2) not holding a hearing on the ineffective assistance

of counsel claim to make a record; (3) regarding statutes used at

sentencing time; (4) accepting the plea when there was no proof that

defendant had committed any crime; (5) removing appointed counsel

prior to a final decision by the court; and (6) using an unusable prior for

aggravated DUI; and 

(C) Ineffective assistance of counsel before, during and after the plea. 

(Answer, Ex. T at iii.) 

On October 31, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision

denying review. (Answer, Ex. U.) The court of appeals held that the motion for

reconsideration was untimely, citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(a) (motion for rehearing must be

filed “within fifteen days after the ruling of the court”). (Answer Ex. U at 2.) The court of

appeals further held that the petition for review, filed more than one year after the trial court

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ruled in May 2006, and six months after it ruled in December 2006, was untimely, and denied

review, citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c)) (petition for review must be filed “[w]ithin thirty days

after the final decision of the trial court on the petition for post-conviction relief or the

motion for rehearing”). (Answer, Ex. U at 3.) The court of appeals found that it did not

appear that the trial court granted Petitioner leave to file a delayed petition for review, nor

did Petitioner claim he was granted such leave. (Id.) Neither did Petitioner present the trial

court with any ground to justify his late filing. (Id.) The court of appeals further declined

to address issues raised in Petitioner’s two “objections” to the state’s response to the petition

for review, stating that, pursuant to Rule 32.9(c)(2), “a reply to a petition for review ‘shall

be limited to matters addressed in the response,’” and the second objection was untimely

(Answer, Ex. U at 4.) Petitioner’s petition for review of the Arizona Court of Appeals

decision was denied by the Arizona Supreme Court, without comment, on March 4, 2008.

(Answer, Ex. V.) 

G. Federal Habeas Petition

On June 18, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition. In Ground One,

Petitioner alleges a violation of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments because the “sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum allowed by law” because it exceeds the presumptive 6.5-year

sentence. In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments because the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a “sentence

contrary to the legislative intent . . . enacted by [the] Arizona legislature.” In Ground Three,

Petitioner claims “to conform with sentencing under Arizona Legislature laws as it pertain

to Blak[e]ly and Apprendi violates the 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment[s] of the U.S. Const.,

especially when the method of using priors to conform with Blak[e]ly is contrary to Arizona

Legislative intent.” In Ground Four, Petitioner claims a violation of his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 1.) 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“AEDPA”).

B. Timeliness

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas corpus

within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review [.]” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). 

The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state

convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, the statute of limitations is

tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction relief. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). 

An application contemplated by section 2244(d)(2) is properly filed "when its delivery

and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These

usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery,

the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee." Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held that

untimely state post-conviction petitions are not “properly filed” under AEDPA, and do not

toll AEDPA's statute of limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA's limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States

Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled, in part, on other grounds

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly) 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). Tolling is

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appropriate when "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time." Id.; see also, Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067

(9th Cir. 2002)(stating that "the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.") (citations omitted); Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's

lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999). The

extraordinary circumstances requirement is a "high hurdle," see Calderon (Beeler), 128 F.3d

at 1289, and policy considerations counsel against equitable tolling. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,

447 U.S. 807 (1980). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two elements: "(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Petitioner must also

establish a "causal connection" between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007).

This Court rejects Respondents argument that equitable tolling of the Congressionally

mandated limitations period cannot survive in the face of Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 2360

(2007). Respondents argue that the United States Supreme Court opinion in Bowles,

established that the AEDPA limitations period is jurisdictional, and therefore equitable

tolling does not apply. This Court disagrees. Prior to Bowles, the Supreme Court assumed,

without deciding, that equitable tolling is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007). The Ninth Circuit continues to apply

equitable tolling to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations post-Bowles. Harris v. Carter, 515

F.3d 1051, 1054, n.3 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, this Court rejects Respondents arguments

and finds that Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. 

C. Analysis

The Magistrate Judge finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition filed in this

Court is untimely. Fernandez had until one year after his conviction and sentence became

final to file his federal petition. 

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1. Limitation Period Under § 2244(d)(1)(A)

Petitioner's conviction and sentence became final on June 15, 2006, thirty (30) days

after his petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the trial court on May 16, 2006,

when the time for filing a petition for review to the court of appeals expired See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007)(“Arizona’s Rule

32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)”); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.

2001)(Judgment becomes final either by the conclusion of direct review by the highest court,

including the United States Supreme Court, or by the expiration of the time to seek such

review); Ariz.R.Crim.P., Rule 32.9(a)(providing for the filing of a petition for postconviction review “[w]ithin thirty days after the final decision of the trial court on the

petition for post-conviction relief or the motion for rehearing”) . Accordingly, Petitioner was

required to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus within 1 year of the date his convictions

became final, i.e., June 15, 2007, absent statutory tolling.

2. Statutory Tolling

a. Second Petition, Motion to Reconsider, Motions for

Appointment of Counsel, and Petition for Review. 

Neither the second petition for post-conviction relief, the petition for review, or the

motion to reconsider or appoint advisory counsel could toll the limitations period in this case.

All of the petitions and motions were held to be untimely, rendering them not “properly

filed” for tolling purposes under § 2244(d)(2). Untimely pleadings summarily dismissed by

the state courts are not "properly filed" and do not result in statutory tolling of the 1-year

statute of limitations. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (holding that "[b]ecause the state court

rejected petitioner's PCR petition as untimely, it was not 'properly filed,' and he was not

entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)"); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 4

(2007)(“[w]hether a time limit is jurisdictional, an affirmative defense, or something in

between, it is a ‘condition to filing,”)(citation omitted). 

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Petitioner was required to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus within the 1-year

period of limitations, excluding time where the statute of limitations was properly tolled. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). Petitioner did not file his federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus within the 1-year statute of limitations. Unless there is a basis for equitably

tolling the limitations period, Petitioner's habeas petition, filed on June 18, 2008, is untimely.

This Court must recommend denial of Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus as

untimely filed. 

3. Newly Discovered Constitutional Right Or Factual Predicate

Respondents assert that Grounds One and Three of the Petition stem from the United

States’ Supreme Court decision in Apprendi and Blakely, but that Petitioner cannot avoid the

statue of limitation bar with respect to these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).

Section 2244(d)(1)(C)) renews the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations from “the date

on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, fi

the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)). Respondents argue that although

Blakely recognized a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has

not made the rule retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. The Court need not

decide if Blakely should be retroactively applied, however, because, at the time Blakely was

decided, Petitioner had not yet been convicted or sentenced as reflected in the discussion of

the holding in Blakely at the time Petitioner entered his guilty plea. Thus, for purposes of

Petitioner’s collateral proceedings, Blakely is not a “new constitutional rule.” 

Neither does the Petition demonstrate any new factual predicate underlying his claims

that would allow for an alternative statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

4. Equitable tolling

“A pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006). Petitioner asserts, in response to Respondents’ contention that his Petition is

untimely, that “Petitioner was not advised by post-conviction relief counsel [...] that he had

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[to] file a petition for review which counsel was obligated to advise Petitioner of his next step

in the Rule 32 proceeding.” (Doc. No. 17, Reply at 8.) Neither a failure to perfect an appeal

nor counsel’s negligence in calculating the limitations period for a habeas petition constitutes

an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. Randle v. Crawford, 578 F.3d

1177, 1186 (9th Cir. 2009)(citing Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002),

citing Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001)). As in Randle, the alleged negligence

of counsel in this case has little to no bearing on the ability of a petitioner to file a timely

federal habeas petition. 578 U.S. at 1186. 

Petitioner has also asserted in his state court pleadings, although not directly in

response to Respondents’ equitable tolling argument, that he lacked access to “a law library

or people trained in law.” (Answer, Ex. K at 2, Ex. L at 8, Ex. Q at 2.) The Ninth Circuit

has indicated that a petitioner's inability to access information about the statute of limitations

deadline may warrant equitable tolling. See Whalem/Hunt, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th

Cir.2000) (en banc) (remanding case to district court for development of facts concerning

whether AEDPA materials were unavailable in the prison law library and the legal

significance of such a finding). The record as submitted in this case, however, does not

demonstrate that Petitioner's ability to access the relevant limitations provisions of the

AEDPA or other necessary legal material was eliminated, rather, Petitioner seems to be

asserting that he was not capable of researching an issue about polygraph evidence, or to

have a speedy way to get copies made. (See Ex. K at 2.) Petitioner does not allege that he

did not have access to the provisions of the AEDPA, or that he was denied such material after

requesting it. Petitioner has not, at this time, sufficiently alleged that, due to circumstances

beyond his control it was impossible to file a petition on time. Accordingly, this Court finds

no cause for equitably tolling the limitations period in this case. 

 IV. RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, dismiss this action in its entirety as untimely. 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number:

CIV 08-0358-TUC-FRZ.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir)(2003).

DATED this 26th day of October, 2009.

Case 4:08-cv-00358-FRZ Document 20 Filed 10/26/09 Page 14 of 14