Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-05979/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-05979-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEMCAP LENDING I, LLC,

Plaintiff,

vs.

UNITY BANK MINNESOTA, ET AL.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 18-cv-05979-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

Re: Dkt. No. 63

Now before the Court is defendant Robert Hower’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees 

in the amount of $84,172.80 and costs in the amount of $630.56. (Dkt. No. 63 (“Motion”).) 

By way of background, on September 28, 2018, plaintiff GemCap Lending I, LLC filed 

this action against defendants Hower, Unity Bank Minnesota, and George Van Buren, alleging 

claims for breach of fiduciary duty as to Van Buren, fraud as to Hower and Unity Bank, and aiding 

and abetting to commit fraud as to all defendants. (Dkt. No. 1.) Thereafter, Hower filed a special 

motion to strike, known as an “anti-SLAPP motion,” seeking an order striking (1) paragraphs 41 

through 44 of the complaint, (2) plaintiff’s second claim for “fraud,” and (3) all references to 

Hower in support of plaintiff’s third claim for “aiding and abetting to commit fraud.” (Dkt. No. 

42.)

On May 20, 2019, the Court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the antiSLAPP motion. (Dkt. No. 62 (“Order”).) Specifically, the Court found that plaintiff’s claims 

against Hower arose out of conduct that fell into two categories: (1) statements Hower made 

during a Hawaii court proceeding, and (2) Hower’s conduct outside of that court proceeding. 

(Id. at 5, 7.) With respect to the first category, the Court held that Hower’s in-court statements 

constituted protected activity and that plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on its 

claims against Hower. (Id.) With respect to the second category, the Court held that Hower did 

not meet his burden of demonstrating that his out-of-court statements constituted a protected 

activity, and thus, these allegations were not entitled to anti-SLAPP protection. (Id. at 8.) The 

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Court noted, however, that this second category of allegations “d[id] not alter the crux of 

plaintiff’s claims against [] Hower, which concern his representations before the Hawaii court.” 

(Id. at 8, n.6.) Accordingly, the Court struck those allegations in the complaint related to Hower’s 

statements to the Hawaii court. (Id. at 14.) The Court further found that Hower was entitled to 

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in moving to strike the claims on which he prevailed. (Id.)

Having carefully considered the motion, pleadings, and the record in this action, and for 

the reasons set forth below, Hower’s motion is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

The Court awards $55,690.50 in fees and $630.56 in costs.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or 

her attorney’s fees and costs,” under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c). See

Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 (2001) (prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees upon 

granting motion absent narrow exception for certain claims enumerated in § 425.16(c)(2)). 

Reasonable fees include those incurred in connection with the attorney fee motion itself. See

Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1141; Blackburn v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., 11–CV–01298 JSW NC, 2012 

WL 1067632, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012).

The district court has broad discretion to determine a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees, 

and must provide “a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); see also Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(court should provide an explanation of the reasonable hours and hourly rate it uses to arrive at fee 

award). In the Ninth Circuit, reasonable attorneys’ fees are determined by first calculating the 

“lodestar.” Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). “The ‘lodestar’ is 

calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the 

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir.

1996). There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. Jordan,

815 F.2d at 1262.

With respect to the number of hours billed, fees must be awarded only for work reasonably 

related to the special motion to strike. Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 

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1320 (2008). Fees also are recoverable for the reasonable time spent seeking an award of statutory 

attorney’s fees. Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1131. In calculating a reasonable number of hours, the 

applicant must justify his or her claim by submitting detailed time records. See Van Gerwen v. 

Guar. Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court must review time records to 

determine whether the hours are adequately documented in a manner that can be properly billed 

directly to clients. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433–34. The Court may adjust these hours down if it 

believes the documentation to be inadequate. Id. at 433. The Court also must assess whether the 

hours claimed are vague, block-billed, excessive, and/or duplicative, or whether the hours in their 

entirety must be reduced because of limited success in the action. See Cotton v. City of Eureka, 

Cal., 889 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045.

The Court’s determination of reasonableness also considers the hourly rates claimed. 

Generally, fees must be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the forum 

district. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he fee applicant has the 

burden of producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to the affidavits of its counsel, that the 

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers 

of reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 73 

F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1263). A court may rely on its own 

experience to determine whether the hourly rates and the expended number of hours are 

reasonable. See Van Gerwen, 214 F.3d at 1045. Decisions by other courts regarding the 

reasonableness of the rate sought may also provide evidence to support a finding of 

reasonableness. See Children’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta, 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 782–83 (2002).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Attorneys’ Fees

The Court determines reasonable attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method,1 which 

requires the Court to determine the amount of the lodestar by multiplying (1) the number of hours 

 

1

 Neither party disputes that the lodestar method applies here.

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counsel reasonably expended on the motion by (2) a reasonable hourly rate. Jordan v. Multnomah 

County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court addresses each.

1. Number of Hours Expended

Hower requests fees for 192.1 hours of work, comprised of time spent (i) preparing 

briefing on the anti-SLAPP motion, (ii) preparing for and attending oral argument, (iii) preparing 

briefing on the motion for fees and costs; and (iv) preparing for and attending oral argument on the 

motion for fees and costs. The Court again considers each.

Briefing the Anti-SLAPP Motion: Hower asserts that his counsel spent a total of 73.3 

hours preparing the anti-SLAPP motion (52.8 hours by Mr. Jurdi, 14.2 hours by Mr. Swenson, and 

6.3 hours by Mr. Hoffman) and 40.2 hours preparing the reply (31.7 hours by Mr. Jurdi, 7 hours 

by Mr. Swenson, and 1.5 hours by Mr. Hoffman). (Motion at 13-15.) Plaintiff argues that the

number of hours billed by Hower’s counsel should be reduced substantially because Hower has 

not submitted sufficient evidence to substantiate his request. (Dkt. No. 66 (“Opp.”) at 3–4.)

Importantly, Hower has not offered any billing records in support of his request for fees

even though they could have been easily submitted and counsel knew in advance that fees were 

available for a successful motion. This Court routinely reviews detailed billings to ensure the 

efficiency of the tasks being performed. Instead, Hower has submitted declarations from his 

attorneys summarizing, in a manner akin to “block billing,” how counsel spent their time at 

various stages in the litigation. Although a party may prevail on a motion for attorneys’ fees 

without submitting billing records, the absence of any detailed evidence regarding time expended 

is significant. For example, although the Court can determine that Mr. Jurdi spent 31.7 hours 

working on the reply in support of the anti-SLAPP motion, some of which was spent researching 

four specific legal issues, the Court cannot determine how much of that time was spent doing each

of the many tasks involved with preparing the reply, such as researching each of four issues, 

drafting the reply, and drafting the objections to evidence. (See Dkt. No. 63-1 (“Jurdi Decl.”) ¶¶ 

9–10.) As a result, the Court “cannot with precision eliminate particular billing entries that are, in 

the Court’s determination . . . excessive.” Fallay v. San Francisco City & Cty., No. C 08-2261 

CRB, 2016 WL 879632, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) (“[S]ubmitting a one paragraph 

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‘summary of tasks’ is not advisable for a law firm that truly believes itself entitled to the full 

amount requested.”); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (fee applicant has burden of “documenting 

the appropriate hours expended” in the litigation and must “submit evidence supporting the hours 

worked”).

Courts may reduce the time for which fees are sought if block billing, or failing to itemize 

each task individually in the billing records, makes it impossible to evaluate the reasonableness of 

the time billed. Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). Counsel’s 

declarations raise the same impossibilities. Accordingly, the Court will apply a 15% reduction to 

the number of hours expended in connection with briefing on the anti-SLAPP motion. After this 

reduction, Hower reasonably is entitled to recover for 71.8 hours for Mr. Jurdi (44.9 for the 

motion and 26.9 for the reply), 18 hours for Mr. Swenson (12.1 for the motion at 5.9 for the reply), 

and 6.6 hours for Mr. Hoffman (5.3 hours for the motion at 1.3 hours for the reply).

Oral Argument on the Anti-SLAPP Motion: Hower seeks to recover for 7.7 hours 

expended preparing for oral argument (5.8 hours by Mr. Swenson and 1.9 hours by Mr. Hoffman) 

and 9.2 hours attending oral argument (Mr. Swenson only). Given the small increments of time 

expended and the limited nature of the tasks associated with preparing for and attending oral 

argument (see Dkt. No. 63-2 (“Swenson Decl.”) ¶¶ 9–10; Dkt. No. 63-3 (“Hoffman Decl.”) ¶ 8), 

the Court finds that counsel’s declarations describe in sufficient detail how counsel spent its time 

at this stage in the proceedings. Thus, no overall reduction in hours is warranted.

The Court further finds that the hours expended by counsel in connection with oral 

argument were reasonable, with one exception. Of the 9.2 hours Mr. Swenson spent attending oral 

argument, 6.3 hours were spent traveling to and from the hearing. (Swenson Decl. ¶ 10.) The 

Court notes that many clients will not pay for travel, including time spent sitting on a tarmac or in 

traffic, where the attorney is not performing work on behalf of the client. Additionally, many 

attorneys negotiate flat rates for travel or engage in other work during trial to minimize the cost to 

the client. Here, Hower does not provide any evidence indicating that Mr. Swenson performed 

work for his client during any portion of his travel or that an appropriate rate was negotiated for 

travel time. Absent such evidence, the Court will not assume that counsel is entitled to recover for 

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travel time.

Thus, Hower reasonably may recover for 10.6 hours related to oral argument, comprised of 

8.7 hours for Mr. Swenson and 1.9 hours for Mr. Hoffman.

Briefing on the Fees and Costs Motion: Prevailing parties on an anti-SLAPP motion are 

entitled to recover for hours reasonably expended seeking statutory attorneys’ fees. Ketchum, 24 

Cal. 4th at 1131. Here, Hower seeks to be compensated for a total of 47.1 hours spent preparing 

the instant motion (43.7 hours by Mr. Jurdi and 3.4 hours by Mr. Swenson) and 5 hours of 

anticipated time spent on the reply (3 hours by Mr. Jurdi and 2 hours by Mr. Swenson). (Motion 

at 16–17.)

With respect to time spent preparing the motion, the Court again observes that counsel’s 

declarations problematically lump together time spent, for example, meeting and conferring with 

opposing counsel, reviewing billing for all time keepers, research, and drafting the motion, into a 

single, indistinguishable block of time billed. (Jurdi Decl. ¶¶ 11-13.) In light of the deficiencies 

in the evidence, the Court will apply a 15% reduction to the number of hours attributed to 

preparing briefing on the instant motion. As to the anticipated time spent on the reply, because 

Hower’s counsel only estimated the hours they would spend on the reply, and never supplemented 

the record to substantiate the actual hours, the Court will not award compensation for the hours 

claimed for this task.

Accordingly, Hower reasonably is entitled to recover for 37.1 hours worked by Mr. Jurdi 

and 2.9 hours worked by Mr. Swenson in connection with this motion.

Oral Argument on the Fees and Costs Motion: Finally, Hower seeks to be compensated 

for 9.6 hours that he anticipated would be expended preparing for oral argument on the instant

motion. Because the Court vacated the hearing on the motion well in advance of its scheduled 

date, counsel is not entitled to recover fees in connection with oral argument.

2. Hourly Rates

Having determined the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel, the Court must 

next determine the reasonable hourly rates. Hower urges the Court to apply the hourly rates set 

forth in the Laffey Matrix, a fee schedule “prepared by the Civil Division of the United States 

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Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia [] to evaluate requests for attorney’s fees in civil 

cases in District of Columbia courts.” (Motion at 11–13.) In the alternative, Hower avers that the 

Court may apply the actual rates charged by Hower’s counsel. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff counters that 

there is no basis for applying the Laffey rates here. (Opp. at 5.) Further, plaintiff argues that the 

Court should, in its discretion, reduce counsel’s actual rates when calculating the lodestar. (Id. at 

6.) The Court considers each argument in turn.

In support of his argument that the Court should apply the Laffey rates, Hower cites to a 

single decision from a court in this district stating that “[i]n determining the prevailing rates in the 

community for similar work, the Court may . . . determine that application of the Laffey Matrix is 

warranted.” (Motion at 11, quoting Cuviello v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 2015 WL 154197, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 12, 2015).)

2

 The Ninth Circuit, however, has repeatedly cautioned that “just because the 

Laffey matrix has been accepted in the District of Columbia does not mean that it is a sound basis 

for determining rates elsewhere, let alone in a legal market 3,000 miles away.” Prison Legal News 

v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Pollinator Stewardship Council v. 

U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 13-72346, 2017 WL 3096105, at *6 (9th Cir. June 27, 2017) (“The 

Laffey Matrix is not determinative of a reasonable hourly rate for San Francisco-based Loarie’s 

and Seattle-based Brimmer’s work on this Ninth Circuit petition for review.”).

Here, the Laffey rates are, on average, $63 higher than the actual rates charged by Mr. 

Swenson and Mr. Jurdi, and $59 lower than the actual rate charged by Mr. Hoffman.3 Hower 

argues that the higher rates are warranted “in light of [counsel’s] years of experience, their 

clientele, and their educational background.” (Motion at 12.) Counsel’s credentials, however,

presumably are reflected in the actual rates charged to Hower for work on the anti-SLAPP motion.

Hower further contends that the Laffey rates are reasonable because they are lower than 

rates that some courts in this district have applied on fee requests related to anti-SLAPP motions, 

 

2

 The Cuviello court ultimately declined to apply the Laffey rates. Cuviello, 2015 WL 

154197, at *2.

3

 Because Mr. Swenson and Mr. Jurdi cumulatively billed more hours than Mr. Hoffman, 

applying the Laffey rates would result in a higher overall fee award.

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citing to three such cases. (Motion at 12.) This argument fails to persuade. To determine a 

reasonable hourly rate, the Court must look to “the rate prevailing in the community for similar 

work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers, 796 

F.2d at 1210 (emphasis supplied). In other words, simply because two cases involve the same 

kind of motion, it does not follow that the attorneys who worked on said motions are entitled to 

the same hourly rate. Here, Hower does not even attempt to demonstrate that the cases he cites

involved comparable law firms or attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.4 At 

most, Hower notes that Mr. Jurdi’s Laffey rate is $38 lower than the rate approved for a senior 

associate at Mr. Jurdi’s former firm in connection with an anti-SLAPP motion. (Motion at 12, 

citing Cuviello, 2015 WL 154197, at *2.) Even assuming Mr. Jurdi had similar experience and 

credentials as his former colleague, however, this point of comparison alone does not persuade the 

Court that it would be reasonable to apply the Laffey rates.

The Court next considers whether to apply the actual rates charged by Hower’s attorneys. 

Hower submits that Mr. Hoffman currently charges $225 per hour and charged $205 per hour prior 

to April 2019; Mr. Jurdi currently charges $370 per hour and charged $340 per hour prior to 

December 2018; and Mr. Swenson charges $465 per hour. (Motion at 13.) The Court again notes 

that Hower submits limited evidence, namely, the three declarations from his own counsel, to 

demonstrate the reasonableness of these rates. The Court observes, however, that notwithstanding 

plaintiff’s contention that Hower has not provided any evidence regarding his counsel’s skill or 

sophistication (Opp. at 4.), Hower’s counsel appears to have substantial legal experience, and at 

times, to have billed at rates higher than those charged to Hower. (Swenson Decl. ¶¶ 3–5; Jurdi 

Decl. ¶¶ 3–5; Hoffman Decl. ¶¶ 3–5.) Based upon the Court’s understanding of market rates in 

Los Angeles for firms of similar size and reputation as counsel’s firm, the nature and complexity 

of the anti-SLAPP motion at issue, and comparable rates that the Court has previously approved, 

 

4

 The Court observes potentially relevant distinctions between the attorneys discussed in 

the cited cases and Hower’s counsel. For example, Open Source Sec., Inc. v. Perens, 2018 WL 

2763637 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2019) and Vargas v. Berkeley Unified School District, 2017 WL 

5991859 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017) both involved attorneys located in the Bay Area, whereas 

Hower’s attorneys are Los Angeles-based.

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the Court is satisfied that counsel’s actual rates are reasonable.5

Based upon the foregoing, the Court will award attorneys’ fees as follows:

Name Hours Rate Total

John Swenson 18 + 8.7 + 2.9 = 29.6 $465 $13,764.00

Jade Jurdi64.9 $340 $1,666.00

40 + 26.9 + 37.1 = 104 $370 $38,480.00

Zachary Hoffman76.6 $205 $1,353.00

1.9 $225 $427.50

TOTAL $55,690.508

 

5

 Plaintiff additionally argues that counsel’s rates be reduced because the “case presents no 

uniquely complex or sophisticated legal claims.” (Opp. at 6.) However, the complexity of the 

case (or lack thereof) is likely reflected in the rate that Hower negotiated with his chosen counsel. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the actual rates charged by Hower’s counsel are reasonable for 

purposes of calculating the lodestar amount.

6

 Mr. Jurdi submits that approximately 11% of the hours he spent preparing the antiSLAPP motion were billed at his pre-December 2018 rate, whereas all other hours for which fees 

are sought were billed at his post-December 2018 rate. (Jurdi Decl. ¶ 15.) Accordingly, 4.9 hours 

expended by Mr. Jurdi on the motion will be calculated at the previous year’s rate, and 40 hours 

will be expended at the current rate.

7

 Mr. Hoffman submits that all of the hours he spent on briefing related to the anti-SLAPP 

motion were billed at his pre-April 2019 rate, whereas time spent preparing for oral argument was 

billed at his post-April 2019 rate. (Hoffman Decl. ¶ 10.)

8

 Hower asserts that the total amount in fees he seeks, $84,172.80, is reasonable “when 

compared to other monetary awards on anti-SLAPP motions in the Northern District.” (Motion at 

23, citing cases.) This argument is unpersuasive, as each of the cases Hower cites for this 

proposition are distinguishable from the case at hand. In Wynn v. Chanos, No. 14-CV-04329-

WHO, 2015 WL 3832561, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2015), the fees motion incorporated 

substantial time spent on discovery, which has not occurred here. Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. 

David Lerner Assocs., Inc., No. 12-CV-04634-SI, 2015 WL 4932248, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 

2015) is distinguishable because, among other reasons, the anti-SLAPP motion at issue there was

more complicated, involving “roughly a dozen defamatory statements, three causes of action, and 

complex issues of law.” Xu v. Yamanaka, No. 13-CV-3240 YGR, 2014 WL 3840105, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) is likewise distinguishable for several reasons, including, for example, that 

market rates for firms comparable to the firm in Xu are higher than the fees reasonably charged by 

Hower’s counsel. Moreover, “[d]efining what is reasonable by reference to other cases would 

violate the principle that each fee application under [the anti-SLAPP statute] must be assessed on 

its own merits . . . taking into account what is reasonable under the circumstances.” Graham-Sult 

v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724, 752 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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B. Costs

Hower seeks $630.56 in costs incurred for travel ($44.74 for ground transportation; 

$359.96 for airfare) and electronic research ($225.86). (Motion at 18, 22.) Plaintiff offers no 

specific opposition to the request for costs. The Court therefore awards $630.56 in reasonable 

costs related to litigation of the anti-SLAPP motion. See Xu v. Yamanaka, No. 13-cv-3240 YGR, 

2014 WL 3840105, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) (awarding costs for transportation and 

electronic research).9

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff shall pay Hower a total of $55,690.50 as attorneys’ fees

and $630.56 as reimbursable costs.10

This Order terminates Docket Number 63.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

9

 Plaintiff avers that Hower is not entitled to recover for all fees and costs incurred in 

connection with the anti-SLAPP motion because Hower’s motion was granted in part. (Opp. at 6-

7.) Hower counters that he prevailed entirely on the anti-SLAPP motion, with the Court 

“str[iking] all of the claims alleged by [plaintiff] against [] Mr. Hower.” (Motion at 7.) Plaintiff’s 

argument fails to persuade. Although the Court struck only those allegations regarding Hower’s 

in-court statements, the allegations regarding Hower’s out-of-court conduct were inextricably 

intertwined with the stricken allegations. Thus, it would be impracticable for the Court to 

disaggregate the time spent and costs incurred litigating these two types of allegations.

10

 In its opposition, plaintiff argues that Hower “did not enter the meet and confer process 

in good faith.” (Opp. at 7.) Plaintiff’s argument is belied by the email correspondence between 

counsel for the parties, submitted by Hower, which shows that the parties exchanged multiple 

emails regarding their positions as to the instant motion. (Swenson Decl., Ex. A.) Further, in a 

May 30, 2019 email, plaintiff’s counsel communicated that Hower’s counsel’s correspondence 

“satisf[ied] the requirements of Local Rule 54-5(b)(1) and the court’s order that the parties meet 

and confer[.]” (Id.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties’ meet and confer obligations 

were met.

August 15, 2019

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