Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08076/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08076-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rhonda Lynn Shreves, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-11-8076-PCT (BSB)

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Rhonda Lynn Shreves (Plaintiff) has filed a Motion for Award of 

Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

(Doc. 26.) Defendant, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the 

government), opposes this motion. (Doc. 31.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

grants Plaintiff’s motion. 

I. Procedural History 

 On November 22, 2006, Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits under 

Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 401-434, alleging 

disability with an onset date of August 4, 2002. (Tr. 19.)1

 Plaintiff’s application was 

denied at the initial level of administrative review. After a hearing, on June 23, 2009, an 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits finding that 

she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 19-33.) The 

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when 

 

1

 Citations to “Tr.” are to the administrative record located at docket 12. 

Case 3:11-cv-08076-BSB Document 33 Filed 08/06/13 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March 16, 

2011. (Id. at 1-5.) 

 Plaintiff then brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review 

of the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1.) This Court reversed the decision and 

remanded the case for further consideration. (Doc. 24.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the 

pending motion requesting an award of $7,728.51 in attorney’s fees under the EAJA. 

(Doc. 27.) In the Reply in support of her motion, Plaintiff requests an additional $460.80 

in attorney’s fees for time expended preparing her Reply. (Doc. 32.) Plaintiff also 

requests that any attorney’s fees awarded be paid by a check sent directly to her 

attorney’s office. (Doc. 27.) The government argues that the motion should be denied 

because it was substantially justified in defending this matter. The government also 

argues, that unless Plaintiff agrees to waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, 

and there is no debt owed by Plaintiff under the Treasury Offset Program, any award of 

attorney’s fees should be paid directly to Plaintiff, not to her attorney. (Doc. 31.) 

II. Attorney’s Fees under the EAJA

 In any action brought by or against the United States, the EAJA provides that “a 

court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other 

expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially 

justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) 

(emphasis added); see also Thomas v. Peterson, 841 F.2d 332, 335 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(stating that the EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to the prevailing 

party unless the government establishes that its position was “substantially justified”). 

 “Substantially justified means justified in substance or in the main — that is, 

justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 

U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal citations omitted). A substantially justified position must 

have a reasonable basis both in law and fact. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 

(9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit applies a reasonableness standard in determining 

whether the government’s position was substantially justified for EAJA purposes. United 

Case 3:11-cv-08076-BSB Document 33 Filed 08/06/13 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

States v. Rubin, 97 F.3d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1996); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 

(9th Cir. 1995). The government bears the burden of establishing that its position was 

substantially justified. Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. “The ‘position of the United States’ 

includes both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action 

giving rise to the civil action.” Meier v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3802382, at *1 (9th Cir. Jul. 

23, 2013). The EAJA provides that, “‘[t]he position of the United States’ means, in 

addition to the posture taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure 

to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). 

 In the Social Security context, the Ninth Circuit treats the ALJ’s decision as the 

“action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” Meier, 2013 

WL 3802382, at *2. Thus, when applying the substantial justification test, the court 

determines “(1) whether the [ALJ] was substantially justified in taking [the] original 

action, and (2) whether the government was substantially justified in defending the 

validity of the action in court.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258; see also Meier, 2013 WL 

3802382, at *3 (“Applying the substantial justification test [in the Social Security 

context, the court] first consider[s] the underlying agency action, which . . . is the 

decision of the ALJ. [The court] then considers the government’s litigation position.”). 

III. Analysis

 A. Prevailing Party

 The Court must first determine whether Plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party 

under the EAJA. A plaintiff is a prevailing party if he or she succeeds on “any significant 

issue that achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the suit.” Penrod v. Apfel, 54 

F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 1999) (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland Indep. 

School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989)). A claimant who obtains a court order 

remanding a Social Security case to the Commissioner either for further proceedings or 

for an award of benefits is a prevailing party under the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 

U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993). Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a prevailing 

party because the Court remanded this matter to the ALJ for further consideration. See

Case 3:11-cv-08076-BSB Document 33 Filed 08/06/13 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257 (“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing 

party for purposes of the EAJA if the denial of benefits is reversed and remanded 

regardless of whether disability benefits are ultimately awarded.). 

 B. Underlying Agency Conduct 

 The parties disagree as to whether the ALJ’s decision in this case was substantially 

justified. The Order remanding this case for further proceedings was based on the 

Court’s conclusion that the ALJ erred at steps four and five of the sequential evaluation 

process. (Doc. 24 at 20-23.) Specifically, the Court found that the ALJ’s determination 

that Plaintiff retained the mental residual functional capacity to perform “unskilled work” 

was not a substitute for the ALJ’s obligation to assess Plaintiff’s degree of functional 

limitation resulting from her impairment and rendered the ALJ’s decision susceptible to 

“‘overlooking limitations or restrictions that would narrow the ranges and types of work 

an individual may be able to do.’” (Doc. 24 at 20 (citing Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 

1996 WL 374184, at *4 (Jul. 2, 1996).) 

 The Court further found that the ALJ erred by applying the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines (the grids) without sufficiently explaining their applicability despite record 

evidence suggesting that the grids may not encompass Plaintiff’s nonexertional 

limitations. (Doc. 24 at 23.) The Court concluded that because issues remained 

regarding Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and her ability to perform other work 

existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the matter must be remanded to 

the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. (Id. at 24.) 

 The government argues that implicit in the ALJ’s mental residual functional 

capacity finding was a finding that Plaintiff could perform all of the mental demands of 

unskilled work. (Doc. 31.) The government relies on Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211 

(9th Cir. 2005), among other cases, to argue that as long as the ALJ took into account 

Plaintiff’s limitations and discussed how evidence supported the residual function 

capacity assessment, the ALJ was not required to engage in a function-by-function 

analysis. As Plaintiff notes, the government essentially reiterates its arguments asserted 

Case 3:11-cv-08076-BSB Document 33 Filed 08/06/13 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

in its Opposition to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 21), but does not explain why the 

ALJ’s position was substantially justified. The Court has already rejected the 

government’s argument that “function-by-function assessments are not always necessary 

because findings about specific limitations can be implicit” (Doc. 24 at 20-21), because 

“Social Security Ruling 96-8p requires more than implicit findings” and “mere citation to 

the regulations does not fulfill the function-by-function and narrative requirements under 

SSR 96-8p.” (Id. at 21 (internal citations omitted).) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments would “cause mild limitations in her daily living activities, mild 

restrictions in social functions, and moderate restrictions in her concentration, 

persistence, or pace.” (Tr. 31.) The ALJ, however, did not consider how those 

restrictions would limit specific work-related functions. Thus, the ALJ did not satisfy his 

obligations under SSR 96-8p and the government has not met its burden of showing that 

ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity was substantially 

justified. 

 The government agrees that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled was 

based on the grids. (Doc. 31 at 6.) The government also acknowledges that the grids do 

not direct a finding of “disabled” or “not disabled” when a claimant suffers from 

nonexterional limitations that have a material effect on his work abilities. (Id. at 7.) 

Then, the government argues that Plaintiff’s nonexertional impairments did not rise to 

that level. The Court has already found that “[t]he ALJ erred by applying the grids 

without providing sufficient explanation of their applicability despite record evidence 

suggesting that the grids may not encompass Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations . . . .” 

(Doc. 24 at 23.) Again, the government does not explain why the ALJ’s step-five 

determination was substantially justified. Therefore, the Court finds that the 

government’s underlying action was not substantially justified in this case. 

C. Litigation Position

 Because the government’s underlying position was not substantially justified, the 

Court need not address whether the government’s litigation position was justified. Meier, 

Case 3:11-cv-08076-BSB Document 33 Filed 08/06/13 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2013 WL 3802382, at *4 (citing Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“The government’s position must be substantially justified at each stage of the 

proceedings.”)). Moreover, even if the Court considered the government’s position in 

this litigation, the Court would find that it was not substantially justified. See Sampson v. 

Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[i]t is difficult to imagine any 

circumstance in which the government’s decision to defend its actions in court would be 

substantially justified, but the underlying administrative decision would not.”). As 

Plaintiff points out, the government’s defense of the ALJ’s decision mainly restates its 

arguments that the Court previously rejected in its order remanding this matter for further 

proceedings. (Doc. 24.) In view of the errors in the ALJ’s analysis, the Court cannot 

find that the government was substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s decision in 

this case. Accordingly, the Court will award Plaintiff attorney’s fees under the EAJA. 

IV. Award of Attorney’s Fees

 Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,189.31. This amount is based 

on the following hourly rates and hours worked: (1) 2011, hourly rate $180.59 and 37.2 

hours; and (2) 2012, hourly rate $183.73 and 5.5 hours. (Doc. 28. Ex. 1.) The fee request 

also includes 2.5 hours at an hourly rate of $184.32 for time spent preparing Plaintiff’s 

reply in 2013. (Doc. 32.) The government does not oppose the amount of fees 

requested. 

 Attorney’s fees and expenses under the EAJA must be reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2412(d)(2)(A). Counsel for the prevailing party has an ethical duty to make a good 

faith effort to exclude “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours from 

counsel’s fee petition. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). The district court 

has discretion to determine a reasonable fee award. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b); Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571 (1988). 

 The EAJA limits attorney’s fees to $125.00 per hour “unless the court determines 

that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of 

qualified attorneys for the proceeding involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. 

Case 3:11-cv-08076-BSB Document 33 Filed 08/06/13 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

§ 2412(2)(d)(A). The Supreme Court has suggested that an increase based on the cost of 

living is “next to automatic.” Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1035 n.9 (11th Cir. 

1992) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 571 (1988)). The cost of living adjustment is 

determined by multiplying the base EAJA rate ($125.00) by the current Consumer Price 

Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and then dividing the product by the CPI-U in 

the month that the cap was imposed ($155.70). See Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 863 F.2d 1458, 1463) (9th Cir. 

1988)). Plaintiff has calculated the attorney’s fees award based on hourly rates that are 

slightly less than or equal to the statutory maximum hourly rate under the EAJA. See

‘Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act,” available at 

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last visited Aug. 6, 

2013).2 Additionally, the Court finds that counsel expended a reasonable number of 

hours on this matter. Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff the requested amount of 

attorney’s fees, $8,189.31. 

 Plaintiff requests that the Court order that “any check be sent to Plaintiff’s 

counsel’s office.” (Doc. 27.) The government argues that any award of attorney’s fees 

should be made payable to Plaintiff, not her attorney. (Doc. 31.) In Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 

U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010), the Supreme Court held that EAJA fees are payable to 

the prevailing party, not his attorney. Although Plaintiff recognizes Ratliff’s holding, she 

states that the fee agreement with counsel provides that any EAJA fees are assigned to 

Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff states that, “while any EAJA fees are payable to Plaintiff, it 

is respectfully submitted this Court should order any check sent to Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

office.” (Doc. 27.) Plaintiff does not request that the check be made payable to her 

attorney. 

 As previously stated, the Court in Ratliff held that EAJA fees are payable the 

prevailing party, not his attorney. 130 S. Ct. at 2525. In so holding, the Court noted the 

 

2

 The applicable statutory maximum hourly rates under the EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, are as follows: first half of 2013 - $186.55; 2012 - $184.32; 

and 2011 - $180.59. 

Case 3:11-cv-08076-BSB Document 33 Filed 08/06/13 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“practical reality that attorneys are the beneficiaries and, almost always, the ultimate 

recipients of the fees that the statute awards to the ‘prevailing part[ies]’” because of 

“nonstatutory (contractual and other assignment-based) rights that typically confer upon 

the attorney the entitlement to payment of the fees award the statute confers on the 

prevailing litigant.” Id. at 2529 (quoting Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86 (1990)). 

The Court further noted that such “arrangements would be unnecessary if . . . statutory 

fees language like that in . . . EAJA provide[d] attorneys with a statutory right to direct 

payment of awards.” Id. Thus, although Ratliff clarifies that EAJA awards of attorney’s 

fees are payable directly to the prevailing party, it does not preclude the contractual 

assignment of the fee award to Plaintiff’s attorney.3

 In view of Ratliff, the Court declines 

to order direct payment to Plaintiff’s attorney. However, the Court will direct the 

government to mail the attorney’s fee award, made payable to Plaintiff, to the office of 

Plaintiff’s attorney. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 26) is GRANTED and that Plaintiff is awarded 

$8,189.31 in attorney’s fees to be mailed (payable to Plaintiff) to Plaintiff’s counsel, 

Mark Caldwell, Caldwell & Ober, PLLC, 1940 East Camelback Road, Suite 150, 

Phoenix, Arizona 85016. 

 Dated this 6th day of August, 2013. 

 

3

 See Brown v. Astrue, 271 Fed. Appx. 741, 744 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the 

private contractual arrangement between [Plaintiff] and his counsel [is] a collateral matter 

that the [Court] need not address when considering the EAJA fees motion.”). 

Case 3:11-cv-08076-BSB Document 33 Filed 08/06/13 Page 8 of 8