Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02221/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Petition to Quiet Title

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jay Boersma, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, a Wisconsin

corporation, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV10-2221-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice.” (Doc. 5.) The

Court will grant Defendant’s motion without prejudice.

I. Background & Procedural History

Plaintiff Jay Boersma owns a home in Fountain Hills, Arizona, which he financed

through Defendant M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank. In September 2009, Boersma (acting pro

se) filed suit against M&I in Maricopa County Superior Court, claiming that he “is in

anticipation of the beginning of foreclosure action as he is now 2 months behind on

payments.” (Doc. 1-2 ¶ 3.) Boersma, however, did not state whether he has received any

sort of notice of foreclosure.

Boersma alleged three causes of action: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation based on a

“show me the note” theory; (2) “predatory lending practices” under certain federal statutes;

Case 2:10-cv-02221-NVW Document 21 Filed 12/06/10 Page 1 of 3
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and (3) quiet title. M&I removed to this Court, asserting both federal question and diversity

jurisdiction. M&I has now moved to dismiss.

II. Analysis

To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing under Article III of the U.S.

Constitution. This means: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” that is

“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (2) the alleged wrongful conduct

must have reasonably caused the injury the plaintiff alleges; and (3) it must be likely, as

opposed to merely speculative, that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

Related to standing is the concept of “ripeness.” “A claim is not ripe for adjudication

if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not

occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Standing and ripeness are “intertwined” because, “if the contingent events do not

occur, the plaintiff likely will not have suffered an injury that is concrete and particularized

enough to establish the first element of standing.” Bova v. City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093,

1096 (9th Cir. 2009).

Boersma’s claims are not ripe. For all three causes of action, the injury he asserts is

the potential loss of his home through foreclosure. (Doc. 1-2 ¶ ¶ 15, 18, 22.) He expects

foreclosure because he is behind on payments. Boersma’s complaint, and Boersma’s

subsequent assertions to this Court, contain no other reason to believe that foreclosure is

imminent. Falling behind on house payments may lead to foreclosure, but it may also lead

elsewhere, such as loan modification. Accordingly, Boersma has not alleged an “actual or

imminent” injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The Court will therefore dismiss his claims as

unripe.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss With

Prejudice” (Doc. 5) is GRANTED without prejudice. The Clerk shall please close this case.

DATED this 6th day of December, 2010.

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