Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03920/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03920-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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*

After examining the briefs and the record, we conclude that oral argument is not

necessary.  The appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 31, 2010*

Decided April 1, 2010

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3920

APRIL GRIFFIN and INEZ GRIFFIN,

           Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

MILWAUKEE COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 08 C 822

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Pro se plaintiffs April Griffin, her sister, and ostensibly their minor children, claim in

this civil‐rights action that the State of Wisconsin, the City of Milwaukee, and a multitude of

individual defendants interfered with Griffin’s custody of her infant son.  The district court

first notified the plaintiffs that their complaint does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a), and when they ignored two deadlines to amend it, the court dismissed the

action with prejudice.  The plaintiffs appeal.  

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐3920 Page 2

1

The Griffin sisters were not authorized to file the complaint or pursue this appeal on

the childrenʹs behalf without counsel.  See Elustra ex rel. Elustra v. Mineo, – F.3d –, 2010 WL

431669, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 9, 2010); Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th

Cir. 2001) (per curiam).  Accordingly, the minor children were not part of the underlying

action and are not parties to this appeal.

Like the district court, we have struggled to understand the plaintiffs’ 70‐page

complaint.  From the text we glean that April Griffin has a son with one of the defendants,

who was awarded custody by a state judge when Griffin commenced a paternity action.

But she refused to disclose the child’s location and was held in civil contempt, and her sister

was arrested after the father accused her of hiding the child.  Griffin eventually was

released from the civil contempt, but police officers then raided the apartment where she

was living, found the boy and took custody, and arrested Griffin for interference with child

custody.  She was in jail when this suit was filed.

The plaintiffs already had filed an amended complaint before the district judge got

his first look at the lawsuit.  The court screened the amended complaint and characterized it

as rambling and confusing with “a whole mess of unconnected legal conclusions sprinkled

with occasional facts.”  This prolixity, the court explained, made it “nearly impossible to

determine exactly what each defendant is alleged to have done to violate plaintiffs’ rights

and therefore to analyze whether there is any potential basis for liability for each

defendant.”  The court dismissed the complaint but gave the plaintiffs leave to amend and

instructed them to number the paragraphs and limit each to a “single set of circumstances.”

The plaintiffs were also told to “clearly set forth what each defendant is alleged to have

done” and to refrain from including “lengthy legal descriptions and conclusions.”  The

plaintiffs ignored this directive and instead sought reconsideration and asked the judge to

recuse himself.  The court declined to do either and extended the deadline for the plaintiffs

to file a second amended complaint.  They in turn filed an “objection” to the order and

repeated their demand for recusal.  After the second deadline had passed without a revised

complaint, the court dismissed the case with prejudice under Rule 8(a).

On appeal the Griffin sisters1 argue that the district court should not have ordered

them to amend their complaint because the defendants could have moved for a more

definite statement.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).  But we have explained that often it is simpler to

dismiss an unintelligible complaint with leave to file a new one so that a plaintiff’s

allegations are contained in only one document rather than two: the complaint and the more

definite statement.  Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001).  That is the

case here.  Where the operative complaint cannot stand on its own—itself a confusing

Case: 09-3920 Document: 10 Filed: 04/01/2010 Pages: 3
No. 09‐3920 Page 3

morass of legal theory and limited factual assertions—an addendum would only complicate

matters.

In addition, the plaintiffs contend that the district court did not have authority to

screen their complaint because they had paid the filing fee.  But district courts are permitted

to screen every complaint, regardless of a plaintiff’s fee status.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir.

1999).

Finally, the plaintiffs insist that it was error to dismiss their suit under Rule 8

because, in their view, the complaint “spell[s] out in detail how each defendant

participated” in violating their rights.  We review a dismissal under Rule 8 for abuse of

discretion.  See Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438‐39 (7th Cir. 2004); Davis, 269

F.3d at 820.  A district court normally cannot dismiss a complaint merely because it is

repetitious or includes irrelevant material.  United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed‐Martin Corp.,

328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).  But “[l]ength may make a complaint unintelligible, by

scattering and concealing in a morass of irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.”  Id.

A court is free to dismiss a complaint with prejudice when the plaintiffs have been given

opportunities to amend, but fail to do so.  See Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility

LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2007); Frederiksen, 384 F.3d at 439.

Here, the plaintiffs’ lengthy and disjointed complaint made it impossible for the

district court to identify the specific allegations against each defendant and therefore

impossible to determine whether there are potential claims against any of them.  We agree

with the district court that the complaint does not comply with Rule 8.  The complaint

includes some factual allegations, but they are not easily retrieved or assimilated; only after

18 pages of mostly broad legal assertions does the complaint mention the custody battle that

seems to be at the heart of the suit.  And even then it is unclear how each defendant is

supposed to have participated; some defendants listed in the caption are not even

mentioned in the body of the complaint.  The complaint is unintelligible, and it was not an

abuse of discretion for the district court to dismiss the case with prejudice after the plaintiffs

failed to cure the deficiencies.

The plaintiffs include several additional arguments in their brief, including a

contention that the district judge should have recused himself.  We have reviewed these

additional arguments and conclude that none has merit.

AFFIRMED.

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