Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02322/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARMANE SMITH 

Plaintiff,

v.

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, 

INC.

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv2322 JAH (AGS)

ORDER:

1. GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[Doc. No. 2]; 

2. DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT 

COUNSEL [Doc. No. 3];

3. DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [Doc. 

No. 1]

INTRODUCTION

On October 9, 2018, Charmane Smith (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a 

complaint seeking damages against Midland Credit Management, Inc. (“Defendant”) for 

violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) codified as 15 U.S.C. § 

1692-1692p. Civil filing fees, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), were not paid at the 

time of filing. Instead, a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) was filed, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 2. Plaintiff also filed a motion to appoint 

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counsel. Doc. No. 3. After a careful review of the pleadings, exhibits and motions and for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court (1) GRANTS the motion for leave to proceed IFP,

[Doc. No. 2]; (2) DENIES the motion to appoint counsel [Doc No. 3], and (3) DISMISSES

the Complaint, [Doc. No. 1], without prejudice, and with leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts grant leave to proceed IFP when 

plaintiffs submit an affidavit, including a statement of all of their assets, showing the 

inability to pay the statutory filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

In support of Plaintiff’s motion, she has submitted an application to proceed in 

district court without paying fees or costs. See Doc. No 2. The application indicates that 

Plaintiff is currently unemployed and has earned no job-related income during the past 

twelve months. Doc. No. 2 at 1-3. Plaintiff receives no income from real property, 

investments, retirement accounts, gifts, or alimony. Id. at 1. Her sole source of income is 

social security disability benefits in the amount of $750.00. Id. at 2. She receives an 

additional $150.00 in public assistance for food and groceries. Id. Her average monthly 

expenses total $934.00, exceeding her total monthly income. Id. at 4-5. She indicates no 

other assets of value. Id. at 2-5. Based on these representations, the Court finds Plaintiff is 

 

1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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unable to pay the statutory filing fee. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion 

for leave to proceed IFP.

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

A. Standard of Review

When a plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the

Complaint is subject to sua sponte review, and mandatory dismissal, if it is “frivolous, 

malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary 

relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman 

v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that... (B) the action or appeal... 

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (section 1915(e) not only permits, but requires, a district 

court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.). “The standard 

for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th 

Cir. 2012).

Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint 

lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 

534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) 

authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). 

Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory 

yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a 

plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” he must plead sufficient facts that, if 

true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). If a court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, the 

court should grant leave to amend unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

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be cured by the allegation of other facts. See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th 

Cir. 1995).

B. Insufficiency of the Complaint

To state a FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish: (1) the 

plaintiff has been the object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt; (2) 

Defendant qualifies as a “debt collector”; (3) Plaintiff is a “consumer”; and (4) Defendant 

violated at least one subsection of the FDCPA (§§ 1692b through 1692j, inclusive). Pratap 

v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The term “debt” 

is defined as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out 

of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject 

of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes ...” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692a(5); see also Bloom v. I.C. Sys. Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1068–69 (9th Cir.1992) 

(explaining that the FDCPA applies to debts incurred for personal rather than commercial 

reasons). The term “debt collector” is defined as “any person ... in any business the 

principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or 

attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due 

another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

Here, the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under 15 

U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. Although Plaintiff lists specific actions taken by Defendant, the 

Compliant does not allege facts that: (1) the debt in question arises out of a transaction 

entered into for personal family, or household purposes, (2) Defendant’s principal purpose 

is the collection of debt, or (3) that Defendant is either collecting such debt on behalf of 

another or collecting its own debt under a different name or alias. Equally as important, 

Plaintiff fails to specify which subsection of the FDCPA, set forth under 15 U.S.C. §§ 

1692b through 1692j, Defendant violated. For these reasons, the Complaint must be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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III. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 

Plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel [Doc No. 3]. In doing so, she expresses 

that she lives out of state and has limited financial resources. She notes that Defendant is 

a large corporation and that she requires professional legal assistance to resolve this 

ongoing dispute.

The motion was brought pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of section 1915, which 

provides that a court “may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to 

employ counsel.” 28 U.S.C § 1915 (e)(1). However, the authority of a court to appoint 

counsel is discretionary and there exists no statutory or constitutional right for an indigent 

to have counsel appointed in a civil case. Willbourn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 

(9th Cir.1986).

Counsel may be appointed under [1915(e)(1)] only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ 

which requires an evaluation of both: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits, and 

(2) the ability of petitioner to articulate [her] claims pro se in light of the complexity 

of the legal issues involved. Neither factor is dispositive and both must be viewed 

together. (Citations omitted) 

Collier v. Pickett, No. C-94-20065-RMW, 1995 WL 274186, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 1995) 

(citing Willbourn, 789 F.2d at 1331). Even assuming Plaintiff’s limited financial resources

and inability to articulate her claims, the Court finds appointment of counsel in the instant 

action unwarranted. In light of this Court’s determination that Plaintiff has failed to state 

a claim for relief, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success

on the merits of her case and therefore Plaintiffs motion to appoint counsel is DENIED. 

Should Plaintiff file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies stated herein, she may 

also request the Court reconsider her motion to appoint counsel. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. Plainitff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a),

[Doc. No. 2] is GRANTED; 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. No. 3] is DENIED;

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3. The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and

4. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave, from the filing date of 

this Order, to file an amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of the 

pleading described herein. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that should she

choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself, comply 

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rules 8(a) and that any 

claim not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; 

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims 

dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 

pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 30, 2019

 

_________________________________

HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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