Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00717/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00717-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LISA BECK, NO. CIV. S-07-0717 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

FEDEX GROUND, a business

entity form unknown; SANDRA

WILLIAMS, in her official and/or

agency capacity, and not her 

individual capacity; DOES 1 

through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Lisa Beck brings this action alleging state

and federal causes of action stemming from conduct by her

employer and her manager while she was in defendant FedEx Ground

Package System Inc.’s (“FedEx”) employ. Defendant Sandra

Williams now moves to dismiss seven of the ten claims against

her.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff was an employee of defendant FedEx. (Compl.

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The complaint is unclear as to when she contacted 1

Crawford and Company, except to state that it was somewhere

between September 22, 2004, and February 21, 2005. (Compl. ¶

11.)

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¶ 11.) On May 24, 2004, plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury

when she was rear-ended while driving between the Stockton and

Sacramento FedEx terminals. (Id.) After experiencing

significant pain, plaintiff visited a doctor, who informed her

that she had soft tissue damage and recommended she visit a

chiropractor. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to work for several

months, visiting the chiropractor three times a week. (Id.)

The pain finally became too much for plaintiff, at

which point she ceased working. (Id.) On February 21, 2005,

plaintiff visited Dr. Perry, who performed tests and wrote a

medical note with proposed “work modifications” for plaintiff

through March 15, 2005. (Id.) Plaintiff presented the medical

note to the Human Resources Manager at FedEx, defendant Sandra

Williams, seeking modified duty in her position at FedEx. (Id.) 

Williams denied plaintiff’s request for modified duty, explaining

that it was not offered by FedEx. (Id.) Williams suggested that

plaintiff seek workers compensation from FedEx’s worker’s

compensation company, Crawford and Company (“Crawford”). (Id.) 

Plaintiff contacted Crawford, and began receiving

temporary disability benefits pursuant to the Family and Medical

Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (Id.) Plaintiff 1

continued to receive treatment from Dr. Perry three times a week,

and Dr. Perry continued to recommend modified duty based on

plaintiff’s disability, providing notes to that effect on March

15, 2005, April 7, 2005, and May 6, 2005. (Id.) Williams

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Although not specifically stated in the complaint, it 2

appears that plaintiff was in fact terminated on or about May 23,

2005, at least to the extent that she no longer received medical

benefits or a salary.

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continued to refuse plaintiff’s requests for modified duty. 

(Id.)

On May 18, 2005, Williams notified plaintiff that her

benefits under the FMLA had expired, and that she had one week to

find a job she was capable of performing within FedEx or else she

would be terminated. (Id.) At some point later (during the week

of August 8, 2005) Williams met with plaintiff and informed her

that a position was available as a Recruiter in San Jose,

California. (Id.) Because plaintiff found the position in San 2

Jose to be an unreasonable alternative, Williams said that

perhaps “layoff” was the only option, and that she would approve

unemployment benefits for plaintiff. (Id.) Accordingly, on

August 15, 2005, plaintiff began receiving unemployment benefits. 

(Id.) 

Several months later, in October, 2005, plaintiff

contacted Vanguard (FedEx’s 401(k) provider) and attempted to

transfer her FedEx 401(k) retirement fund into an Individual

Retirement Account (“IRA”). (Id.) Plaintiff was told, however,

that she was still listed as an active FedEx employee “on leave,”

and thus she was not able to do so. (Id.) On April 13, 2007,

plaintiff filed a complaint against FedEx and Williams, alleging:

(1) wrongful termination due to physical disability in violation

of California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”),

Government Code §§ 12900 et seq.; (2) unlawful harassment due to

physical disability (FEHA); (3) unlawful discrimination due to

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physical disability (FEHA); (4) unlawful denial of accomodation

to employee with physical disability (FEHA); (5) unlawful denial

of leave rights to employee with physical disability (FEHA); (6)

violation of FMLA and the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”);

(7) retaliation (FEHA); (8) wrongful termination in violation of

public policy (Tameny claim); (9) negligence; and (10) violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§

12101, et seq. Williams now moves to dismiss claims one, three,

four, five, eight, nine, and ten.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). To

survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to plead “only

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the pleader fails to

state a claim supportable by a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988).

B. FEHA - Claims One, Three, Four and Five

Williams moves to dismiss claims one, three, four, and

five (all brought under FEHA) on the grounds that non-harassment

claims under FEHA may only be brought against employers, not

individuals. In Reno v. Baird, the California Supreme Court held

unequivocally that for non-harassment claims under FEHA,

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Individual liability under FEHA for harassment claims 3

is not precluded as a matter of law. See, generally, Reno, 18

Cal. 4th at 660 (“Some of the FEHA provisions, such as those

involving harassment, do, indeed, apply to individual persons as

well as employers.” (citing Gov’t Code. § 12940(h)(1))). 

Williams, however, does not seek to dismiss plaintiff’s second

claim, for harassment.

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“individuals who do not themselves qualify as employers may not

be sued under the FEHA for alleged discriminatory acts.” 18 Cal.

4th 640, 663 (1998); see also Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46

Cal. App. 4th 55, 72 (1996)(“It is inconceivable that the

Legislature simultaneously intended to subject individual

nonemployers to the burdens of litigating such claims. To so

construe the statute would be incongruous and would upset the

balance struck by the Legislature.” (quotations omitted)).3

In response, plaintiff concedes that if she “were suing

Sandra Williams in her individual capacity” then the claims must

fail, but argues that she is suing Williams solely in “her

official and/or agency capacity, as allowed by caselaw.” (Opp’n

to Mot. to Dismiss 1.) The concept of “official and/or agency

capacity” makes no sense whatsoever in the context of this case. 

All of the cases cited by plaintiff were brought against a public

official working for a local, state, or federal government,

whereas in this case Williams is a private individual working for

a private company. 

A suit against an public officer in his or her official

capacity is used to compel that officer to take some official

action. The concept is inapplicable to suits against private

parties in a case such as this where the entity is also

susceptible to suit. In this instance, FedEx can be, and is,

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properly named in the complaint. If supervisors or fellow

employees could be sued for damages on non-harassment claims

simply by adding the words “in their official and/or agency

capacity” after their names in the caption, it would eviscerate

the holding of Reno v. Baird, supra. 

Even if suing a private individual in her official

capacity were possible, it would be unnecessarily repetitive in

this case. Any relief available against Williams is already

available against FedEx--naming Williams in the complaint is

purely duplicative. See DeRay v. Larson, 283 F. Supp. 2d 706,

709-710 (D. Conn. 2003) (“While such official capacity suits are

necessary when the defendants are government officers and their

state or federal employer has sovereign immunity, a plaintiff who

sues a private entity does not contend with a sovereign immunity

bar to suit, and thus does not need an official capacity suit to

circumvent that immunity. As a result, it is unnecessary to

allow a claim against a defendant in his or her official capacity

when the entity of which he is an official is capable of being

sued directly.”); see also Groom v. Safeway, Inc., 973 F. Supp.

987, 992 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (“It would seem clear that Safeway, as

a private employer, has no ‘official’-capacity . . . .”).

Accordingly, claims one, three, four and five will be dismissed

against defendant Williams.

C. Wrongful Termination - Claim Eight

Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action against Williams

alleges wrongful termination in violation of public policy

pursuant to Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167

(1980). However, in California it is well established that,

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“[a]s a matter of law, only an employer can be liable for the

tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” 

Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Med. Group, 84 Cal. App. 4th

32, 53 (2000); see also Jacobs v. Universal Development Corp., 53

Cal. App. 4th 692, 704 (1997); Phillips v. Gemini Moving

Specialists, 63 Cal. App. 4th 563, 575 (1998). Plaintiff does

not argue that Williams is an “employer.” Plaintiff provides no

support for maintaining this claim, except to again argue that

the suit is brought against Williams solely in her “official

capacity.” For the reasons discussed above, this argument does

not have merit. Accordingly, plaintiff’s eighth claim will be

dismissed as against defendant Williams.

D. Negligence - Claim Nine

Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action seeks to hold

Williams liable under the common law tort of negligence, based

specifically on her supposed failure to provide a work

environment free of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. 

Defendant argues that this claim must be dismissed as a matter of

law because “except where a statutory exception applies, an

employee or former employee cannot sue other employees based on

their conduct relating to personnel actions.” Sheppard v.

Freeman, 67 Cal. App. 4th 339, 342 (1998). However, under

California law, there is a distinct and relevant difference

between “personnel actions” and “harassment.” See Reno, 18 Cal.

4th 646 (“Making a personnel decision is conduct of a type

fundamentally different from the type of conduct that constitutes

harassment.”). The Sheppard court itself noted that “a cause of

action for sexual harassment is governed by statute (see Gov.

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Indeed, this is plaintiff’s second cause of action, 4

which Williams does not seek to dismiss.

It is not even clear that the rule set out in Sheppard 5

is the law of California. The California Supreme Court has yet

to rule on the issue, and “where the state’s highest court has

not decided an issue, the task of the federal courts is to

predict how the state high court would resolve it.” Dimidowich

v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986);

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465

(1967). Several district courts that have addressed this

particular issue have declined to follow the per se rule of

Sheppard. See Graw v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth.,

52 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Scott v. Solano County

Health and Soc. Servs. Dep’t, 459 F. Supp. 2d 959 (E.D. Cal.

2006).

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Code, § 12940) and we do not purport to limit it.” Sheppard, 67

Cal. App. 4th at 346 n.6 (citation omitted). 

In this case, plaintiff alleges that Williams harassed

plaintiff due to her physical disability, pursuant to the same

statutory section noted above in Sheppard. Thus, because 4

plaintiff’s allegations of negligence against Williams include

allegations of harassment, (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 68), plaintiff’s ninth

cause of action is not precluded as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, William’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ninth cause

of action will be denied.5

E. ADA - Claim Ten

The Ninth Circuit has held that “individual defendants

cannot be held personally liable for violations of the ADA.” 

Walsh v. Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources, 471 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.

2006) (citing and adopting the logic of Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l

Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[I]ndividual defendants

cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII . . . .”)). 

Plaintiff does not dispute the clear Ninth Circuit law, but again

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merely argues that the claim is valid because Williams is solely

being sued in her “official capacity.” As discussed previously,

the court finds this argument unpersuasive. See Coddington v.

Adelphi Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 211, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The

court further holds that it is not necessary to allow plaintiff

to pursue his claims against [i]ndividual Defendants in their

‘official’ capacities. Official capacity lawsuits are

appropriate in cases involving the naming of government

officials. Where, as here, there is a private entity to name,

there is no reason to allow a plaintiff to proceed against an

individual in his ‘official capacity.’”). Accordingly,

plaintiff’s tenth cause of action against Williams will be

dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Sandra Williams’

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first, third, fourth, fifth,

eighth, and tenth causes of action be, and the same hereby is,

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Sandra Williams’

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ninth cause of action be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: July 9, 2007

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