Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00243/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00243-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL ADAMS,

CDCR #F-92755, Civil No. 11cv0243 WQH (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b);

AND

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

COURT TO SERVE SUMMONS

UPON DEFENDANTS AND

GRANTING MOTION TO ALLOW

PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS

COMPLAINT

vs.

K. RASKE, et al.

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On February 4, 2011, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Ironwood State

Prison located in Blythe, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was denied access to

the courts when he was housed at Calipatria State Prison in 2009. Plaintiff also filed a Motion

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

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On March 30, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and dismissed

his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Mar. 30, 2011

Order at 5-6. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct

the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. Plaintiff was also cautioned that any

Defendants not named and claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint would be deemed

to have been waived. Id. (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff

then filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff no

longer names as Defendants, J. Chiang or B. Leonard. Thus, those Defendants are DISMISSED

from this action. Plaintiff has also filed a “Request asking this Court to serve summons upon

Defendants in this case, or if this Court finds that Petitioner fails to state a claim, that this Court

should grant Petitioner opportunity to yet again, amend his Civil Action herewith” [ECF No. 6].

Because the Court does determine that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint still contains

deficiencies of pleading, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to issue summons as to

Defendants but will GRANT Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”) amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 obligate

the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff,

who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated

delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial

release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any

prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous,

malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains

of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a

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right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. County of Los

Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

B. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff names former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Secretary of the CDCR

Matthew Cate, Warden Larry Small and Associate Warden T. Ochoa as Defendants in this

matter but fail to set forth sufficient factual allegations with regard to these Defendants in the

body of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold these

Defendants liable in their supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat superior

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993).

Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused

a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff

must allege personal acts by each individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection

to the constitutional violation at issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir.

1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally

construed to support an individualized constitutional claim against these Defendants.

C. Grievance procedure

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Hodges-Wilkins and Foston liable because he disagrees

with their handling of his administrative grievances. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that:

“[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the

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deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and

property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison

regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke due process

protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). To state a procedural due process

claim, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2)

a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland,

219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest in

an inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v.

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement

to a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate

claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance procedure”)); accord Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75

(4th Cir. 1994) (1995); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that prison official

deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison

grievances in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise from state law or prison

regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process protections are implicated only if

Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom in a manner not

expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff pleads nothing to suggest how

the allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate grievances amounted to a

restraint on his freedom not contemplated by his original sentence or how it resulted in an

“atypical” and “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84.

Thus, to the extent Plaintiff challenges the procedural adequacy of inmate grievance

procedures, his First Amended Complaint fails to state a due process claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1); Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446. 

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For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state

a constitutional claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, and thus, this action must be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-

27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants J. Chiang and B. Leonard are DISMISSED from this action. See

King, 814 F.2d at 567.

2. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45)

days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a Second Amended Complaint

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must

be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1.

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)

3. Plaintiff’s Motion to have the Court issue summons and serve Defendants is

DENIED. However, Plaintiff’s Motion for leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is

GRANTED [ECF No. 6].

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 25, 2011

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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