Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06496/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06496-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL SHOTWELL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

MIKE EVANS, )

)

Respondent. ) 

 )

1:04-CV-6496 LJO JMD HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION IN PART

ORDER REFERRING CASE TO

MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR EXPANSION

OF THE RECORD

Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Magistrate Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 27, 2009 in order to

determine whether Petitioner’s counsel’s investigation of Petitioner’s competency to stand trial and

potential mental defenses was constitutionally adequate. Petitioner filed a post-evidentiary hearing

brief on July 17, 2009. (Doc. 64). Respondent filed its post-evidentiary hearing brief on September

3, 2009. (Doc. 67).

After reviewing the record and the transcript of the April 27 evidentiary hearing, the

Magistrate Judge issued a Findings and Recommendation (“Recommendation”) recommending that

the petition be denied with prejudice. (Doc. 68). Petitioner filed objections to the Recommendation

on March 24, 2010. (Doc. 69).

Discussion

Petitioner advances two related but distinct claims concerning his counsel’s investigation into

Petitioner’s mental health. First, Petitioner contends that his counsel’s investigation into Petitioner’s

competency to stand trial was deficient because counsel failed to have Petitioner evaluated by a

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mental health professional prior to trial. Second, Petitioner contends that his counsel’s investigation

into potential mental defenses was constitutionally inadequate. In order to establish entitlement to

relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Petitioner must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s

alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering

the circumstances. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Petitioner must also

demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result ... would have been different." Id. at 694. 

I. Counsel’s Investigation into Petitioner’s Competency

Due process prohibits states from trying a person who is mentally incompetent. E.g. Drope v.

Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must demonstrate

an ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational

as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d

1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003). Defense counsel’s failure to request a competency evaluation may

violate the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel provided there are sufficient indicia of

incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt the defendant’s competency. 

E.g. Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 438 (3rd Cir. 2007).

The Magistrate Judge held that Petitioner’s trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation

into Petitioner’s competency to stand trial in light of prevailing legal norms in California during

Petitioner’s trial in 2002. As the Magistrate Judge noted, 

Pursuant to prevailing legal norms in place at the time of Petitioner’s trial in 2002,

counsel had a duty to request a competency hearing if he harbored “substantial doubt”

about Petitioner’s competency to stand trial. See People v. Farnam, 28 Cal.4th 107,

187 (Cal. 2002) (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

competency issue where “nothing in the record raised a substantial doubt as to

competency”); People v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1108 (Cal. 1994) (“[b]ecause the

record does not demonstrate a substantial doubt as to defendant's competency, we

reject defendant's related claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to request a

competency hearing” ); see also Davis, 384 F.3d at 646-47 (rejecting ineffective

assistance claim where record did not demonstrate “substantial evidence” of

incompetence). The Ninth Circuit has explained that, “[a]lthough no particular facts

signal a defendant's incompetence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant's

demeanor before the trial judge, irrational behavior of the defendant, and available

medical evaluations of the defendant's competence to stand trial.” Williams v.

Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 702 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 

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(Recommendation at 15). Petitioner does not object to the legal standard expressed in the

Recommendation. Instead, Petitioner contends that 

In light of Petitioner’s extensive mental health background, including an evaluation

from Kern Regional Center and the receipt of social security disability payments from

the age of eight, hospitalization at age eight or nine for “hearing voices and seeing

things,” numerous calls to law enforcement by Petitioner’s parents because of his

uncontrollable behavior as a [sic] adolescent, a commitment to Napa State Hospital

for incompetency to stand trial, and bizarre behavior–yelling and screaming at cars,

shouting crazy things, acting spaced out and with a blank stare, and saying that he

wanted to die–shortly before the crime, it was incumbent upon trial counsel to have a

competency evaluation.

(Objections at 6). Petitioner fails to acknowledge, however, that other facts known to Petitioner’s

counsel at the time of trial weighed heavily against the proposition that Petitioner was not competent

to stand trial. Petitioner’s selective use of the record is unavailing, as the reasonableness of

counsel’s decision to forego a competency hearing must be considered in light of all the information

known by counsel.

Petitioner’s trial counsel, Michael Lukehart, testified at length during the April 27, 2009

evidentiary hearing regarding his procedure for assessing competency and his pre-trial impressions

of Petitioner. The Recommendation summarized Lukehart’s testimony as follows:

At the evidentiary hearing on April 27, 2009, Lukehart recounted his procedure for

assessing a client’s mental health. (Ev. Hearing Trans. at 19). Lukehart testified that

the first step he took when he received a new client was to read the files available at

the public defender’s office, including any files for previous cases that the public

defender had handled for the client. (Id. at 19). Lukehart would then speak with

other attorneys in the public defender’s office who had interacted with the client. (Id.

at 20). Lukehart recalled that he reviewed Petitioner’s file concerning an unrelated

conviction for which Petitioner was being sentenced the day after the arraignment on

Lukehart’s case. (Id. at 20, 22). Lukehart remembered speaking with two attorneys

in the public defender’s office, Kelly Fowler and John Ulman, who had conducted

preliminary interviews with Petitioner prior to Lukehart’s initial meeting with

Petitioner. (Id. at 27, 45). Lukehart stated that nothing in his discussions with Ms.

Folwer “raised an issue in regards to [Petitioner’s] mental health.” (Id. at 28). In fact,

Ms. Folwer, the attorney initially assigned to Petitioner’s case, described Petitioner as

“fairly articulate and savvy on the law.” (Doc. 56 at 2). Lukehart testified that Mr.

Ulman did not raise any issues about Petitioner’s mental health. (Ev. Hearing Trans.

at 28, 45). Lukehart also spoke with two investigators, Patty Buckley and Grinnel

Griffin, who interacted with Petitioner prior to trial. (Id. at 21, 44). Neither Ms.

Buckley nor Ms. Griffin raised any concerns about Petitioner’s competency. (Id. at

45).

Lukehart testified that it was his practice to employ a mental status evaluation

“checklist” during his initial meeting with a client. (Id. at 20). Lukehart’s checklist

included an assessment of the client’s reactions to Lukehart’s questioning and

“whether the client seem[ed] to know what’s going on.” (Id.). Lukehart would also

ask the client whether they had past mental health commitments and whether the

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client was ever placed in “special ed.” (Id.). Had Lukehart harbored any “real

concerns” about the Petitioner’s mental health after the initial interview, he would

have retained a mental health professional pursuant to his custom and practice. (Id. at

21). Lukehart met with Petitioner several times after the initial interview. During

their meetings, Petitioner actively participated with counsel in preparing in his

defense. Petitioner gave Lukehart the names of potential alibi witnesses and was

adamant that he would testify at trial. (Id. at 33-34). At one meeting, Petitioner asked

Lukehart for a copy of the transcript of Petitioner’s preliminary examination. (Id. at

36). 

Lukehart testified that he reviewed several different sets of medical records pertaining

to Petitioner’s physical and mental health. Lukehart subpoenaed Petitioner’s records

from Kern Medical Center prior to trial; in fact, before receiving the subpoenaed

records, Lukehart physically went to Kern Medical Center and reviewed records

concerning a gunshot wound in Petitioner’s leg in 2000 and a drug-induced psychotic

episode in 1999. (Id. at 37-39). In addition to reviewing the medical documents from

Kern Medical Center, Lukehart also reviewed records from Napa State Hosptial

relating to Petitioner’s commitment after he was found not competent to stand trial in

early 1999. (Id. at 40). Lukehart recalled that the Napa State Hospital records

indicated that Petitioner had become competent to stand trial after approximately five

months of observation and treatment. (Id.). Lukehart testified that the records

produced at the evidentiary hearing did not include all of the records he reviewed

concerning Petitioner’s mental health. (Id. at 39). In addition to the conclusory

documents produced at the evidentiary hearing, Lukehart recalled reviewing “various

and sundry examination reports...and progress reports” prepared by psychologists,

psychiatrists, social workers, and other reports appended to the documents produced

at the evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 40).

(Recommendation at 12-14). 

There is no per se rule requiring an attorney to request a competency hearing in every

instance where a defendant has exhibited signs of mental illness. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.

162, 180 (1975) (“There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the

need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which

a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.”); see also United States v. Miller,

531 F.3d 340, 349-50 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that although a defendant may show signs of paranoia

or other mental illness, such an illness would not necessarily render the defendant incompetent to

stand trial). “Not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial;

rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges.” 

United States ex rel. Foster v. De Robertis, 741 F.2d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation ommitted). 

Prevailing legal norms in California in 2002 established that an attorney need not request a

competency hearing unless she harbored “substantial doubt” about her client’s competency to stand. 

See People v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1112 (Cal. 1994) (“because the record does not

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demonstrate a substantial doubt as to defendant's competency, we reject defendant's related claims

that his counsel was ineffective in failing to request a competency hearing”). 

 The record reveals that Lukehart conducted an investigation that was sufficient to dispel any

doubts he had concerning Petitioner’s competency to stand trial. Lukehart spoke with other

attorneys and support staff at the public defender’s office who had worked with Petitioner in the

past, completed a mental health evaluation checklist during his initial meeting with Petitioner, and

reviewed Petitioner’s medical records, including records pertaining to Petitioner’s commitment to

Napa State Hospital in connection with an earlier restoration of competency for trial. The

information gathered during his preliminary investigation of Petitioner’s mental health did not give

Lukehart reason to doubt Petitioner’s competency to stand trial, and Petitioner’s interaction with

Lukehart before and during his trial reinforced Lukehart’s assessment. Petitioner actively

participated in his defense by requesting the transcript of his preliminary hearing, asserting an alibi

defense, providing counsel with the names of potential witnesses, and testifying at trial. Such

conduct belies the notion that Petitioner did not have “a reasonable degree of rational understanding

and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Drope, 420 U.S. at

171. The results of Lukehart’s preliminary investigation into Petitioner’s mental health and

Petitioner’s active participation in his own defense provided sufficient basis for Lukehart to make a

reasonable professional judgement not to obtain a competency evaluation. Based on the facts known

to him at the time of trial, Lukehart had sufficient indicia of Petitioner’s competence to conclude that

there was no “substantial doubt” as to Petitioner’s ability to comprehend the proceedings and to

assist in his own defense. Because Lukehart had sufficient information to make a reasonable

professional judgment that no competency evaluation was needed, no further investigation of

Petitioner’s competency was required. See Rodrigues, 8 Cal.4th at 1112 (rejecting ineffective

assistance claim where record did not indicate counsel should have harbored substantial doubt as to

client’s competency);1 see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (decisions based on a less-thanPetitioner attempts to distinguish the Rodrigues and the other California authorities discussed in the Recommendation on

1

the basis that, in each of the cases cited by the Magistrate Judge, the defendant received a competency evaluation by at least

one mental health professional prior to trial. (Objections at 6). Although it may be true that the defendants received

competency evaluations in each of the cases cited in the Recommendation, the fact remains that the cases cited by the

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complete investigation are reasonable to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support

the limitations counsel placed on the investigation). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to carry his

burden of rebutting the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689.

Petitioner’s competency claim fails for an alternative reason as well: Petitioner cannot

establish that he was prejudiced by Lukehart’s failure to request a competency hearing.2 The record

demonstrates that there is no reasonable probability that, had Lukehart requested a competency

hearing, Petitioner would have been found to be actually incompetent to stand trial. Petitioner’s

active role in his defense and his interactions with counsel constitute significant evidence that

Petitioner was competent to stand trial. See, e .g., Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 608 (9th Cir.

2002) (fact that defendant provided witnesses in support of his alibi defense and discussed case

rationally with counsel evinced competency); Balfour v. Haws, 892 F.2d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 1989)

(defendant’s request to use law library and other pretrial participation evinced competency). 

Petitioner’s coherent testimony during trial also constitutes evidence that Petitioner was competent

to stand trial. E.g. Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 885 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “cogent trial

testimony reflects a sufficient ability to understand the proceedings and to assist in ...defense” ). 

Further, because Lukehart was in the best position to evaluate Petitioner’s ability to understand the

proceeding and assist in his own defense, the fact that Lukehart did not harbor doubt about

Petitioner’s competency is persuasive evidence that Petitioner was in fact competent. E.g. Balfour,

892 F.2d at 561; Williams, 384 F.3d at 606-608 (“the fact that defense counsel considered the

Magistrate Judge establish that whether the attorney had a basis to harbor “substantial doubt” as to her client’s competency

is the critical question in determining whether a decision to forego a competency evaluation was reasonable, not whether

counsel’s decision was based on a mental health evaluation .

Retrospective competency determinations are disfavored, as the passage of time and difficulties inherent in evaluating a

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defendant's competence from a written record reduce the likelihood of an accurate retrospective determination. Williams,

306 F.3d at 707. Retrospective competency evaluations are only permissible when it is possible to make an accurate

retrospective evaluation. Id. An accurate retrospective evaluation may be possible, for example, when contemporaneous

medical reports exist. Id. Here, there are no contemporaneous mental health records for Petitioner. The closest thing to

contemporaneous records concerning Petitioner’s competency in 2002 are the Napa State Hospital records, which indicate

that Petitioner was competent to stand trial in an unrelated matter approximately two years prior to his trial for the instant

offense. (Objections at 6).

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defendant competent to stand trial was significant evidence that the defendant was competent”)

(citation omitted); United States v. Benton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that trial

counsel’s opinion should receive “significant weight”); see also Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282,

1288 (11th Cir. 1996) (“because legal competency is primarily a function of defendant's role in

assisting counsel in conducting the defense, the defendant's attorney is in the best position to

determine whether the defendant's competency is suspect.”). Similarly, the fact that the trial court

did not invoke its duty to examine Petitioner’s competence is also evidence that Petitioner was in

fact competent. See Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We deem significant the 3

fact that the trial judge, government counsel, and [the defendant's] own attorney did not perceive a

reasonable cause to believe [the defendant] was incompetent.”). The current record establishes that

the probability Petitioner would have been found incompetent had Lukehart requested a competency

hearing is extremely minimal. Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

alleged unprofessional errors, the result of Petitioner’s proceeding would have been more favorable.

II. Counsel’s Investigation into Potential Mental Defenses

In order to provide constitutionally adequate representation to a criminal defendant who may

suffer from a mental defect, counsel must conduct a reasonable investigation into potential mental

defenses. See, e.g., Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 800-801 (9th Cir. 2006). Counsel’s investigation

must be sufficient to permit informed decisions about how best to represent the client. Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Magistrate Judge assumed arguendo that Lukehart’s investigation into potential mental

defenses was deficient but held that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he cannot establish that

he was prejudiced by Lukehart’s deficient investigation. (Recommendation at 19-20). As the

Magistrate Judge noted, whether Petitioner was prejudiced depends on whether a mental defense

could have benefitted Petitioner by negating the intent element necessary to sustain his conspiracy

 California Penal Code section 1368(a) requires trial court judges to raise any doubts about a defendant’s competency sua

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sponte. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1368 (a) (Deering’s 2002).

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and attempted murder convictions under the theory of “diminished actuality.” (Id.).4

Petitioner alleges that he suffered prejudice because, had counsel advanced a mental defense,

Petitioner “would likely have been convicted of something less than attempted first degree murder

and conspiracy to commit premeditated murder.” (Objections at 14). Petitioner contends that “he

may have been guilty of assault, or second-degree murder, but not first-degree murder or conspiracy

with the intent to murder.” (Objections at 11-12). Petitioner’s contention that he could have been

convicted of assault or second degree murder is based on Petitioner’s speculation that “suffering

from mild mental retardation and mood disturbances, [he] could have wildly and chaotically fired a

weapon without having premeditated a course of action.” (Objections at 13-14). As the Magistrate

Judge noted, in light of the evidence presented at trial and relevant California law, it is unlikely that

Petitioner can establish prejudice as a result of his counsel’s performance. Nevertheless, because

Petitioner has not been afforded an opportunity to present evidence regarding whether he was

prejudiced by counsel’s performance, this action is referred to the Magistrate Judge for the limited

purpose of expanding the record pursuant to Rule 7 of the Rule Governing Section 2254 Cases. The

Magistrate Judge shall receive evidence only on the narrow issue of whether Petitioner was

prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to assert the defense of diminished actuality. 

Order

1) The Court ADOPTS IN PART the Findings and Recommendation denying Petitioner’s

claims for relief. The Court reserves judgment on Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim with respect to counsel’s investigation of the diminished actuality defense

pending expansion of the record; and 

2) The case is HEREBY REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for the purpose of expanding

the record regarding whether Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s performance.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

Petitioner concedes that there is no reasonable probability that an insanity defense would have prevailed. (Objections at

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9).

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b9ed48UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

U.S. District Court

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