Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02194/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02194-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

TERRY DARNELL DUNN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

AUQ i 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) 

THOMAS WHITE, Warden; CHARLIE ARNOLD, ) 

Major; T. BILL RANDALL; BRAD PAYAS, ) 

H.S.A.; LARRY MEACHUM, Director, D.A.C.,) 

Oklahoma; JIM BURKS, P.A., ) 

No. 88-2194 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-C-753-C) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Terry Darnell Dunn, prose. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General, and Sue Wycoff, Assistant 

Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before MCKAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* District 

Judge. 

*The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff appeals the district court's dismissal of his 

complaint filed pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983. Plaintiff alleged 

that prison officials assaulted him and threatened to place him in 

disciplinary segregation when he refused to submit to a blood test 

for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Plaintiff 

contended that by threatening him with disciplinary segregation, 

prison officials in effect forced him to submit to the blood test. 

Plaintiff argued that threatening him and testing his blood prior 

to a due process hearing violated his rights under the fourteenth 

amendment, and that his religious beliefs forbade his being tested 

for AIDS. 

The district court referred plaintiff's prose complaint to a 

United States magistrate, who recommended that the district court 

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for a 

deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. The magistrate 

reasoned that the prison could limit plaintiff's freedoms for 

legitimate penological purposes and that identifying AIDS carriers 

was such a purpose. 

In his objection 

'recommendation, plaintiff 

to the 

argued 

magistrate's report and 

that AIDS testing served no 

legitimate purpose, because after identifying carriers, the prison 

neither treated nor quarantined those prisoners. Plaintiff also 

2 

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contended that the Oklahoma statute requiring AIDS testing 

contained an exemption for prisoners with religious objections. 

Because it concluded that plaintiff's objections to the 

magistrate's report were untimely, the district court 

consider them. The district court adopted the 

recommendation and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. 

refused to 

magistrate's 

We affirm. 

"The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law which we 

review de novo." Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 

(10th Cir. 1986). In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint, 

"[a]ll well~pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory 

allegations, must be taken as true." Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 

810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984). In addition, we will take the 

allegations in plaintiff's objections to the magistrate's report 

as true. Although plaintiff's objections were filed in the 

district court beyond the ten-day limit, plaintiff mailed his 

objections from prison in a timely fashion. Cf. Houston v. Lack, 

108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988)(mailing date of prisoner's 

notice of appeal deemed filing date). On appeal, we will 

accordingly consider plaintiff's objections as allegations in 

support of his constitutional claims. 

"When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which 

the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against 

the plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is 

appropriate ••.. " Neitzke v. Williams, 109 s. Ct. 1827, 1833 

(1989). At the same time, however, "[a] constitutional claim 

under§ 1983 should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond 

doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 3 
his claim that would entitle him to relief." Meade v. Grubbs, 841 

F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988)(citation omitted). "Moreover, 

prose complaints, like the one involved here, are held 'to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" 

Id. (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 

L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 

S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). 

Plaintiff's factual allegations that he refused consent to a 

medical test on religious grounds, and was then forced to submit 

to the test, at least facially support claims under the first and 

fourth amendments, as incorporated into the fourteenth. In light 

of the liberal construction accorded pro se pleadings, we will 

analyze plaintiff's complaint under both amendments. See Haines, 

404 U.S. at 520, 92 s. Ct. at 596. We will also address 

plaintiff's argument that he was entitled to a due process hearing 

prior to the blood test and the threat of disciplinary 

segregation. 

I • FOURTH AMENDMENT 

No court has yet decided whether a nonconsensual AIDS test 

violates a prisoner's fight to be free from an unreasonable 

search. The Supreme Court, however, has addressed the fourth 

amendment rights of prisoners in other contexts. In Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), the 

Court held that prisoners had no legitimate expectation of privacy 

in their prison cells, and accordingly had no interest against 

even an unreasonable search of their cells. 

4 

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A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms 

is fundamentally incompatible with the close and 

continual surveillance of inmates and their cells 

required to ensure institutional security and internal 

order. We are satisfied that society would insist that 

the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to 

what must be considered the paramount interest in 

institutional security. We believe that it is accepted 

by our society that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and 

privacy are inherent incidents of confinement." 

Id. at 527-28, 104 s. Ct. at 3201 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. 520, 537, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1873, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). 

Although the Supreme Court has thus foreclosed any fourth 

amendment challenge to the search of a prison cell, this court has 

recognized a qualitative difference between property searches and 

searches of a prisoner's person. The prisoner's privacy interest 

in the integrity of his own person is still preserved under 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S. Ct. at 1884, in which the Supreme 

Court applied traditional fourth amendment analysis to 

constitutional challenge by prisoners to personal body searches. 

In Wolfish, the Supreme Court assumed that prison 

inmates retain some measure of Fourth Amendment rights. 

Id. We do not believe that the Supreme Court's decision 

InHudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 s. Ct. 3194, 82 

L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) in which the Court held that a 

prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 

prison cell, eviscerates the requirement set forth in 

Wolfish that personal body searches of inmates must be 

reasonable under the circumstances. See Hudson, 468 

U.S. at 555 n.31, 104 s. Ct. at 3216 n.3l(Stevens, J., 

dissenting). 

a 

Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437, 1439, n.** (10th Cir. 1986); accord 

Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986)(applying 

traditional fourth amendment analysis to a prisoner's claim that 

urinalysis to detect drugs violated his right to be free from 

unreasonable searches). 

5 

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The Supreme Court in Wolfish held that even assuming 

prisoners retained a privacy interest in their own persons, a 

post-visitation body cavity search nonetheless was not an 

unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. The Court 

emphasized that "preserving internal order and discipline are 

essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the 

retained constitutional rights of convicted prisoners." Wolfish, 

441 U.S. at 546, 99 S. Ct. at 1878 (footnote omitted). "Prison 

officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the 

safety of inmates and corrections personnel. Accordingly, 

we have held that even when an institutional restriction infringes 

a specific constitutional guarantee, ••• the practice must be 

evaluated in light of the central objective of prison 

administration, safeguarding institutional security." Id. at 547, 

99 s. Ct. at 1878 (citations omitted). Thus, on issues of 

''internal order and discipline" or "institutional security," 

courts should accord "wide-ranging deference'' to prison officials, • 

unless there is "substantial evidence in the record to indicate 

the officials have exaggerated their response." Id. at 547-48, 99 

s. Ct. at 1879 (citations and quotation omitted). 

Within this framework, the Supreme Court in Wolfish addressed 

the fourth amendment claim. 

In each case [the fourth amendment] requires a balancing 

of the need for the particular search against the 

invasion of personal rights that the search entails. 

Courts must consider the scope of the particular 

intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the 

justification for initiating it, and the place in which 

it is conducted. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 6 
Id. at 559, 99 S. Ct. at 1884 (citations omitted). 

Although no court has addressed whether mandatory testing for 

AIDS violates the fourth amendment rights of prisoners, the courts 

have addressed the issue of prison drug tests. Drug testing in 

prison implicates concerns similar to those at issue in the case 

at bar. In Spence, 807 F.2d at 755, the Eighth Circuit considered 

whether random urinalysis for the presence of drugs violated a 

prisoner's fourth amendment rights. Balancing the security 

interests of the prison against the prisoner's privacy interest, 

the court concluded that the plague of unauthorized narcotics in 

prison justified the intrusion on the prisoner's already 

diminished .privacy interest, so long as the testing was random. 

Id.; accord Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-20 

(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 

In contrast, in Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 

(D.C. Cir. 1987), the District of Columbia Circuit perceived a 

potential intrusion on the fourth amendment rights of pretrial 

detainees tested for drugs. Detainees were tested and treated for 

drug abuse as a condition of pretrial release. In approving the 

testing as a condition of release, the district court had assumed 

a nexus between drug usage and pretrial criminality or failure to 

appear. The district court had also assumed that arrestees were 

potential drug users. The District of Columbia Circuit questioned 

these assumptions, and accordingly remanded to the district court 

for further factual development. 

The facts in Spence are more analogous to the circumstances 

at bar. In Berry, drug testing was a condition of release of 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 7 
pretrial detainees, who would otherwise be at liberty to leave 

prison. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that a prison's 

internal security concerns are the same for pretrial detainees, 

see Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546 n.28, 99 s. Ct. at 1878 n.28, the 

plaintiffs in Berry would not otherwise be detained in prison were 

it not for their refusal to submit to a drug test. Thus, the 

prison's security concerns were not internal to the prison; 

rather, the authorities assumed th~t drug testing would prevent 

the release of prisoners who were a flight risk or a risk to 

society while they were awaiting trial. The court required a 

factual showing supporting the theory behind denying release to 

these particular detainees. 

The court in Berry distinguished between drug testing in a 

criminal context versus testing at the workplace. The court noted 

that the "criminal context obviously raises questions different 

from those raised in the employment context." Berry, 833 F.2d at 

1035 n.16. We agree with the D.C. Circuit that searches in a 

noncriminal context such as this one1 raise different 

constitutional concerns than those implicated in Berry. 2 In 

1 Although plaintiff in the case at bar is in prison, there is 

nothing to suggest that the prison's AIDS testing program has a 

punitive objective, or that those testing positive will be denied 

release from prison in the future. Such an allegation would raise 

constitutional issues not present here. 

2 In agreeing with the D.C. Circuit that searches with a criminal 

investigative purpose raise constitutional issues different than 

those raised by searches in a noncriminal context, we suggest 

neither approval nor disapproval of the court's ultimate rejection 

of drug testing of pretrial detainees. We have no occasion to 

address the validity of drug testing of pretrial detainees as a 

way to enforce conditions of release. See, ~' 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3142(c)(2)(I)(permitting judicial officer to condition release 

(Continued on next page) 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 8 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 179 

(5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 s. Ct. 1384, 

103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), however, the Fifth Circuit has gone 

further to suggest that drug testing in a noncriminal context is 

less likely to require judicial protection. In Von Raab, the 

court considered the constitutional implications of drug testing 

of customs employees applying for job transfers. "While the 

fourth amendment protects against invasions for civil as well as 

criminal investigatory purposes, the need for protection against 

governmental intrusion diminishes if the investigation is neither 

designed to enforce criminal laws nor likely to be used to bring. 

criminal charges against the person investigated." Id. (citing 

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5, 96 s. Ct. 3092, 

3097 n.5, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); accord Colorado v. Bertine, 479 

U.S. 367, 371-73, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); see 

also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720-25, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 

1500-01, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987)). 

To the extent that the Fifth Circuit has suggested that in 

noncriminal contexts, governmental intrusions on the fourth 

amendment rights of citizens are subject to a lower standard of 

judicial scrutiny, we disagree with the reasoning of that court. 

Supreme Court precedent does not require painting with such a 

broad brush. Indeed, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von 

(Continued from previous page) 

pending trial on refraining from illegal use of narcotic drugs). 

Indeed, we make no comment on mandatory drug testing, whe.ther in 

or out of prison. 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 9 
Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1393, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), the Supreme 

Court affirmed in part the Fifth Circuit's holding, but did not 

suggest that a lower standard of scrutiny should be applied to 

workplace searches. The Court emphasized the need in Von Raab for 

a separate standard for noncriminal fourth amendment challenges, 

noting that the probable cause standard was particularly unhelpful 

in analyzing the reasonableness of "routine administrative 

functions, especially where the Government seeks to prevent the 

development of hazardous conditions." Id. at 1391-92 (citations 

omitted). 

"compelling 

The Court nonetheless balanced the government's 

interest" against the potentially substantial 

"interference with individual freedom" resulting from mandatory 

urinalysis. Id. at 1393. 

Similarly, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' 

Association, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), the Supreme 

Court balanced the government's need against the worker's privacy 

interest. The Court decided a challenge by railway workers to the 

railway's blood and urine tests following certain train accidents. 

The Court first recognized the fourth amendment's application to 

this challenge. 

In light of our society's concern for the security of 

one's person, see,~, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 

88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968), it is 

obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating 

beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy 

that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 

The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain 

physiological data is a further invasion of the tested 

employee's privacy interests. 

Skinner, 109 s. Ct. at 1412 (citation omitted). 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 10 
At the same time, however, the Court recognized that there is 

a question whether the traditional warrant or probable cause 

standards are reasonable in a noncriminal 

government's interest could never be served 

suspicion were necessary before every search. 

context, where the 

if individualized 

Id. at 1412. "In 

limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by 

the search are minimal, and where an important governmental 

interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by 

may be 

at 1417. 

a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search 

reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion." Id. 

Officials are not required to justify searches within this 

"special needs" category under "the usual warrant and 

probable-cause requirements." Id. at 1414. 

Thus, in limited circumstances, the distinction between 

criminal and civil justifications for testing indeed may become 

dispositive, but not because the search is less intrusive on the 

citizen. Rather, the very nature of the government's need makes 

warrant and probable cause requirements unworkable, if not 

meaningless. See,~, Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371, 107 S. Ct. at 

741; O'Connor, 480. U.S. at 722-24, 107 s. Ct. at 1500-01. The 

individual's privacy interest, however, remains unchanged, 

regardless whether the government is pursuing civil or criminal 

objectives, and the courts must still inquire whether the 

government's need outweighs the individual's privacy interest. 

See,~, Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-74, 107 s. Ct. at 741-42 

(balancing strong governmental interest in automobile inventory 

against citizen's diminished expectation· of privacy 

11 

in an 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 11 
automobile); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725, 107 S. Ct. at 1500-02 

(balancing substantial governmental interest in operation of 

workplace against "not insubstantial" privacy interest of 

employees in their place of work). Thus, the level of judicial 

scrutiny does not diminish, but rather changes in kind. 

The government's interest in the operation of a prison 

presents '"special needs' beyond law enforcement that may justify 

dep~rtures from the usual warrant and probable-cause 

requirements." Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414 (citation omitted); 

see also Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391-92. Under the reasoning in 

Skinner and Von Raab, this court must therefore balance the 

intrusiveness of the blood test against the prison's need to 

administer the test. Although the two sides of the equation are 

the same as they are in the free world, plaintiff's incarceration 

changes the relative weight accorded each interest. "[W]hen a 

prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the 

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 

S. Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). "[T]here must be a 

'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the 

legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. Thus, 

a regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection 

between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to 

render the policy arbitrary or irrational." Id. at 89-90, 107 

S. Ct. at 2262. 3 

3 

the 

In determining the reasonableness of the prison regulation, 

Court went on in Turner to consider three additional factors. 

(Continued on next page) 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 12 
In or out of prison, plaintiff has only a limited privacy 

interest in not having his blood tested. In Schmerber v. 

California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), 

the Supreme Court held that a state could constitutionally 

"search" a drunken driving· suspect by testing his blood. "The 

intrusion perhaps implicated Schmerber's most personal and 

deep-rooted expectations of privacy, and the Court recognized that 

fourth amendment analysis thus required a discerning inquiry into 

the facts and circumstances to determine whether the intrusion was 

justifiable." Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 s. Ct. 1611, 

1616, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985). The Court concluded that the 

intrusion, while implicating "deep-rooted expectations· of 

(Continued from previous page) 

Under the Turner test, a court should also inquire whether the 

prisoner retains other avenues for exercising his constitutional 

right, whether accommodation of the asserted right would adversely 

affect the guards and other prisoners, and whether there is an 

absence of ready alternatives to the infringement of the right. 

Id. at 90, 107 s. Ct. at 2262. 

To date, the Court has not applied its new test to prison 

regulations affecting a prisoner's fourth amendment rights. The 

Turner test appears analytically to have only limited 

applicability to a prisoner's fourth amendment challenge. The 

fourth amendment protects even free world residents only against 

"unreasonable'' searches. Once a court has concluded that a prison 

search is not unreasonable, there is no infringement of a 

constitutional right, and thus the issue whether there ts a 

possibility of "accommodating" a prisoner's fourth amendment right 

by some other means would not arise. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 

374, 107 s. Ct. at 7_42 ("'The real question is not what "could 

have been achieved," but whether the Fourth Amendment requires 

such steps.'")(quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 

103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983)(emphasis in 

original)). Moreover, strict limitations on the fourth amendment 

rights of prisoners are always inherent in the fact of 

incarceration, Wolfish, 44l U.S. at 537, 99 S. Ct. at 1873, a 

truism not applicable to other constitutional rights. 

13 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 13 
privacy," was nonetheless minimal. "In noting that a blood test 

was 'a commonplace in these days of periodic physical 

examinations,' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S. Ct. at 1836, 

Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood tests do not 

constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's 

personal privacy and bodily integrity." Winston, 470 U.S. at 762, 

105 S. Ct. at 1617. "A crucial factor in analyzing the magnitude 

of the intrusion in Schmerber is the extent to which the procedure 

may threaten the safety or health of the individual. '[F]or most 

people [a blood test] involves virtually no risk, trauma, or 

pain.'" Winston, 470 U.S. at 761, 105 s. Ct. at 1617 (quoting 

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S. Ct. at 1836). 

Plaintiff's privacy expectation is at least as limited as the 

plaintiff's in Schmerber. Moreover, in concluding that prison 

drug testing passed constitutional muster in Spence, the Eighth 

Circuit relied on the fact that in prison, an individual's 

"expectation of privacy in his or her body is diminished." 

Spence, 807 F.2d at 755; see also Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1224. 

We agree with the Eighth Circuit that plaintiff's privacy 

expectation in his body is further reduced by his incarceration, a 

fact recognized by the Supreme Court in Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537, 

99 S. Ct. at 1873. 

On the other side of the equation, the prison's stated 

justification in district court for the intrusion was the need to 

control the spread of AIDS. In its brief in support of its motion 

to dismiss, the state asked the district court to take judicial 

notice that 

14 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 14 
[t]he topic of AIDS and its methods of transmission have 

been constantly publicized in the last few years. All 

authorities have agreed that the disease is capable of 

being transmitted through sexual intercourse, is 

infectious, and is dangerous to the public health •••• 

Therefore, the Defendants have a statutory duty to 

test individuals incarcerated at Conner Correctional 

Center for AIDS. 

The prison's interest in responding to the threat of AIDS, or 

any contagious disease occurring in prison, is obviously strong. 

Indeed, in Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1988), the 

Eighth Circuit suggested that in limited circumstances, a prison's 

failure to protect prisoners from fellow inmates carrying AIDS may 

violate the eighth amendment. See also Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. 

Supp. 1177, 1194, 1195 n.22 (D. Conn. 1980)(failure to screen 

prisoners for communicable disease violates constitutional rights 

of other prisoners), aff'd in part, modified in part on other 

grounds, and remanded, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981). In limited 

circumstances, the state's interest in public health may even 

justify a similar intrusion on free world residents. See Prince 

v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442, 88 

L.Ed. 645 (1944)(dicta suggesting that mandatory immunization of 

children is constitutional); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 

11, 31, 38, 25 S. Ct. 358, 363, 366, 49 L.Ed. 643 

(1905)(compulsory vaccination is constitutional); cf. Compagnie 

Francaise De Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of 

Health, 186 U.S. 380, 391, 22 s. Ct. 811, 816, 46 L.Ed. 1209 

(1902)(use of quarantine power is constitutional absent conflict 

with Congressional enactment preempting state's authority). For 

example, in·Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1382 (10th Cir. 

15 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 15 
1973), this court, noting the existence of a "virtual epidemic'' of 

venereal disease in Denver, upheld a municipality's power to 

require testing for the disease for prostitutes, even if they are 

not at that time under arrest. The court relied primarily on a 

legitimate general suspicion of contagion in prostitutes, rather 

than on any individualized suspicion of the plaintiff. Id. 

Although the plaintiff in Reynolds had also once tested positive 

for venereal disease, this court considered this fact only as a 

secondary factor supporting the legitimate objectives of the test. 

Id. at 1382. Thus, in the area of public health, this court has 

suggested that testing of all those within a suspicious class 

sometimes may be justified. 

The goal of controlling the spread of venereal disease may 

justify coerced medical testing in limited circumstances. In 

accord with this view, the district court concluded that the 

prevention of the spread of AIDS in prison would justify the 

intrusion of a blood test. We agree that the district court could 

take judicial notice of the seriousness and the potential for 

transmissibility of the disease AIDS. Moreover, although a review 

of the record does not reveal whether there is currently a 

widespread AIDS infection among the prisoners, an attempt to 

ascertain the extent of the problem is certainly a legitimate 

penological purpose. The prison cannot determine the amount of 

infection without testing. Thus, even assuming that the spread of 

AIDS in prison is not any greater than its spread in the general 

population, this fact would not substantially weaken the prison's 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 16 
strong interest in determining who in the population currently 

carries AIDS. 

For similar reasons, the lack of any indication in the record 

that AIDS is communicable among prisoners who do nothing but live 

together does not diminish the prison's interest in testing. The 

United States government has stated that everyday contact does not 

create a risk of infection. Glick, 855 F.2d at 539 n.l. For this 

reason, the Eighth Circuit has rejected the argument that even 

without specific allegations supporting a personal risk of 

contagion, a prison's failure to test for AIDS and segregate 

infected prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. 

at 539. The eighth amendment, however, defines only the minimum 

treatment of prisoners; regardless whether the prison has a 

constitutional obligation to do so, it has an interest in making 

an extra effort to protect prisoners from a fatal disease. 

Moreover, the prison, as caretaker, has an interest in diagnosing 

and providing adequate health care to those already infected with 

AIDS. 

In light of the seriousness of the disease and its 

transmissibility, we conclude that the prison has a substantial 

interest in pursuing a program to treat those infected with the 

disease and in taking steps to prevent further transmission. We 

further conclude that the prison's substantial interest outweighs 

plaintiff's expectation of privacy. 

Although the government in these circumstances is not 

required to demonstrate individualized suspicion, it still must 

demonstrate that the search is a "'sufficiently productive 

17 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 17 
mechanism to justify [its] intrusion upon Fourth Amendment 

interests.'" Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395 (quoting Delaware v. 

Prouse, 440 u. S. 648, 658-59, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1398-99, 59 L •. Ed. 2d 

660 (1979)). That is, although we have now decided that the 

prison's interest in treating and preventing the spread of AIDS 

outweighs the prisoner's privacy interest, this court must still 

inquire whether the method chosen to effect the prison's interest 

is a "productive mechanism." See,~, Glover v. Eastern Neb. 

Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 

1989)(holding that there was an insufficient nexus between testing 

social workers for AIDS and preventing the spread of AIDS in the 

disabled population to justify coerced testing). The remaining 

question therefore is, does AIDS testing by the prison in fact 

serve the goal of appropriately responding to the presence of AIDS 

in the inmate population? 

In district court, plaintiff responded to all the 

justifications proffered by the prison by alleging that the prison 

does not quarantine or treat infected prisoners. Thus, for 

purposes of reviewing the district court's dismissal of 

plaintiff's complaint, we must assume that the prison does not 

currently use the information it gathers either to treat or to 

control the spread of AIDS. Meade, 841 F.2d at 1526. 

The alleged lack of a current medical response to the problem 

does not mandate this court's forbidding prison officials from 

continuing to collect information on the spread of AIDS within 

prison walls. The prison will ultimately bear responsibility for 

decisions on segregation and treatment, and certainly it is 

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Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 18 
reasonable to attempt to avoid making such decisions in a vacuum. 4 

At the very least, "the logical connection between the regulation 

and the asserted goal" of treating and preventing the spread of 

AIDS is not ''so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or 

irrational." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 s. Ct. at 2262. 5 

Finally, in Wolfish, the Supreme Court explained that in 

balancing the prison's need against plaintiff's interest, 

"[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the 

manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating 

it, and the place in which it is conducted." Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 

559, 99 s. Ct. at 1884 (citations omitted). Similarly, in 

Winston, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the 

nonintrusiveness of the manner of blood testing, as well as the 

commonplace nature of the test itself, in the Court's previous 

approval of the blood testing in Schmerber. "[A]ll reasonable 

medical precautions were taken and no unusual or untested 

4 Plaintiff did not directly challenge the prison's program of 

AIDS treatment, or the alleged lack thereof, nor its alleged 

failure to segregate prisoners carrying AIDS. The complex 

constitutional issues arising from such allegations are therefore 

not currently before us. 

5 Indeed, in Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989), 

decided this term, the Supreme Court held there was a sufficient 

connection between prison security and censorship of prisoners' 

reading material to justify a federal prison regulation permitting 

the warden, within general guidelines, to censor entire 

publications rather than the individual objectionable articles 

contained within those publications. The prison justified its 

imprecise censorship by citing the administrative difficulties in 

deleting only objectionable articles. Certainly the connection 

between and the prison's legitimate penological interest in the 

health and security of the inmate population and mandatory testing 

for AIDS is as strong as the connection between the legitimate 

goals of security and efficiency and the extensive censorship of 

reading material approved in Thornburgh. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 19 
procedures were employed in Schmerber; the procedure was performed 

1 by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted 

medical practice.' Winston, 470 U.S. at 76~, 105 s. Ct. at 1617 

(citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S. Ct. at 1836); see also 

Berry, 833 F.2d at 1036 (explaining that "the [d)istrict [c)ourt 

must determine whether the testing program is 'no more degrading 

than is reasonably necessary.'") (quotation omitted). 

In the complaint before us, plaintiff did not allege that the 

manner or place of the test was unreasonable. Although we must 

liberally construe plaintiff's factual allegations, Haines, 404 

U.S. at 520, 92 S. Ct. at 596, we will not supply additional 

facts, nor will we construct a legal theory for plaintiff that 

assumes facts that have not been pleaded. See Neitzke, 109 S. Ct. 

at 1834 n.9. Thus, the sole issue before this court is whether 

nonconsensual testing for AIDS, without more, violates the fourth 

amendment rights of prisoners. We hold that it does not. 

II. FIRST AMENDMENT 

In district court, plaintiff alleged that he refused to 

consent to a test for AIDS on "religious grounds." He argued that 

Oklahoma statutes provide a religious exemption from testing. The 

statutory exemption upon which plaintiff relies, however, may not 

apply to prisoners. See Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-516.1. 6 In any 

6 Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-514 clearly applies only to the 

testing and treatment of eye infections in newborns. In contrast, 

Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-516.1 grants a religious exemption from 

the application of the ''provisions of this act," which may refer 

only to the specific section concerning testing of pregnant women, 

or may refer to the entire Public Health Code. Under the latter 

construction, the prior exemption for newborns would be 

superfluous. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 20 
those "who, 

and depend[ 

event, the exemption is for 

belief, in good faith select[ 

or prayer for the treatment 

§ 1-516.1. Plaintiff's vague 

or cure 

allegation 

because of religious 

upon spiritual means 

of disease." Id. at 

that he declined AIDS 

testing on generic "religious grounds" does not implicate this 

exemption. 

Similarly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim that the 

prison deprived him of freedom of religion. The Supreme Court has 

recognized that prisoners retain the right to religious freedom, 

although prisons may place restrictions on the overt exercise of 

the right for legitimate penological reasons. See O'Lone v. 

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 s. Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 

(1987); see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 

1081-82, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). Plaintiff's conclusory 

allegations, however, do not require us to reach the issue whether 

the prison's interest in testing for AIDS overrides plaintiff's 

interest in expressing his religious beliefs by declining to be 

tested. Plaintiff did not accompany his allegation with any 

details about his religious faith, nor did he allege what tenet of 

his faith required that he refuse the test. 

A "philosophical and personal" choice "does not rise to the 

demands of the Religion Clauses." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 

205, 216, 92 s. Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). 11 [T]o have 

the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted 

in religious belief •... [T]he very concept of ordered liberty 

precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on 

matters of conduct in which societf as a whole has important 

21 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 21 
interests." Id. at 215-16, 92 S. Ct. at 1533. Although plaintiff 

in the case at bar continuously has asserted religious objections 

to AIDS testing, at no tim~ has he gone any further than merely 

reciting the word "religion." The mere assertion of generic 

religious objections is not sufficient to invoke first amendment 

protections. 

In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 109 

s. Ct. 1514, 1516 (1989), the Supreme Court decided this term that 

a person need not belong to an "established religious sect or 

church," or claim that his action resulted from a "tenet, belief 

or teaching of an established religious body" to seek the 

protection of the first amendment's freedom of religion clause. 

In Frazee, however, an employee turned down Sunday employment 

because, "as a Christian, he could not work on the 'Lord's day.'" 

Id. at 1515. The sincerity and religious nature of Mr. Frazee's 

beliefs were not at issue. Rather, the Court decided only the 

narrow issue whether adherence to the beliefs of an organized 

group or sect was the only ''religion" entitled to recognition 

under the first amendment. Id. at 1517. In contrast to Mr. 

Frazee, plaintiff has not provided any details about either his 

religious faith or how it forbids his being tested for AIDS. By 

relying entirely on the word "religious" rather than on any 

specific belief, whether as part of a personal faith or as a tenet 

of an organized group or sect, plaintiff has supported his first 

amendment claim with only a conclusory allegation of religious 

exemption. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 22 
Plaintiff's vague assertion that he refused AIDS testing on 

generic "religious grounds" thus will not sustain a claim that he 

was entitled to any first amendment protection against testing. 

Although plaintiff's basis for declining to be tested may indeed 

be religious, and therefore entitled to first amendment 

protection, this essential allegation cannot be derived from the 

facts as pleaded. "Constitutional rights allegedly invaded, 

warranting an award of damages, must be specifically identified. 

Conclusory allegations will not suffice." Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 

1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 198l)(citing Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664 

(10th Cir. 1979, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086, 100 S. Ct. 1045, 62 

L.Ed.2d 772 (1980)). Without more specific allegations, 

plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim that the prison 

violated his right to religious freedom. 

III. DUE PROCESS 

Plaintiff also alleged in his complaint that he was entitled 

to a due process hearing before the prison threatened him with 

disciplinary segregation because of his refusal to submit to an 

AIDS test. The Supreme Court has recognized that in some 

circumstances, a hearing may be required prior to placing a 

prisoner in disciplinary segregation. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 

U.S. 539, 94 s. Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Hewitt v. Helms, 

459 U.S. 460, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Here, 

however, plaintiff alleged only that he was threatened with prison 

discipline. We see no merit in plaintiff's·argument that he was 

entitled to a due process hearing prior to being threatened with 

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Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 23 
segregation or prior to being tested for AIDS. The mere threat of 

segregation, without more, does not in~ringe on a prisoner's 

protected liberty interest. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. 

Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1989)(explaining manners by which 

state or prison may create liberty interest in prisoner). 

Moreover, since we have approved AIDS testing as a general matter, 

an individualized due process hearing would not assist plaintiff, 

since there are no factual or legal disputes to resolve. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. On appeal, plaintiff 

seeks a copy of a prison report on his case which he believes was 

filed in district court. No such report appears in the record on 

appeal or on the district court's docket sheet. The motion is 

accordingly DENIED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

24 

Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 24 
No. 88-2194 - TERRY DARNELL DUNN v. THOMAS WHITE, Warden, et al. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

This case was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. 

Civ. P. That fact is the analytical key to this case. It alone 

dictates my dissent. 

Plaintiff has alleged that there is no treatment or segregation for persons testing positive for AIDS in the prison where he 

is held. While under prevailing cases the prison would have to 

make only a small showing to justify AIDS testing, they must show 

some penological interest--not just curiosity or statistics 

gathering--to justify overcoming the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment 

interest in the integrity of his body. Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 

1437 (10th Cir. 1986). No matter how serious a disease, unwilling 

prisoners may not be made mere guinea pigs for its study. The 

state must show some penal interest. 

The effect of the majority opinion is far too sweeping. It 

in effect suggests that because of the known seriousness of AIDS, 

the prison need not even show its claimed interest. The prison 

has not even replied. I believe the unavoidable mandate of Levoy 

is that in the face of an allegation that the prison does not 

treat or segregate AIDS victims, responsive evidence or other 

showing of some penal interest is required. If treatment or segregation is in fact part of the prison program this testing 

clearly can survive a section 1983 claim. The majority cites 

language in the recent Supreme Court case, Turner v. Safley, 482 

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Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 25 
U.S. 78 (1987), which indicates that as long as there is even a 

remote connection between the policy at issue and the asserted 

. goal, the policy is not arbitrary or irrational and is therefore 

sustainable. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that whether a 

regulation was reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-

* ests was determined by analyzing various relevant factors. Here 

we only decide whether this prose petitioner has stated a claim 

upon which relief can be granted under 12(b)(6). 

Treating this prose pleading with the perspective mandated 

by the Supreme Court, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), and 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), I believe plaintiff 

has made a sufficient allegation of a protected religious interest 

in not being tested to survive a Rule 12(b) dismlssal. Plaintiff 

alleged that he declined on "religious grounds". He further cited 

to an Oklahoma statute which specifies some grounds for exemption 

from traditional medical treatment. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, 

* In determining reasonableness, relevant factors include (a) 

whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation and a legitimate and neutral governmental interest put forward to justify it, which connection cannot be so remote as to 

render the regulation arbitrary or irrational; (b) whether there 

are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional 

right that remain open to inmates, which alternatives, if they 

exist, will require a measure of judicial deference to the corrections officials' expertise; (c) whether and the extent to which 

accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison 

staff, on inmates' liberty, and on the allocation of limited 

prison resources, which impact, if substantial, will require particular deference to corrections officials; and (d) whether the 

regulation represents an "exaggerated response" to prison 

concerns, the existence of a ready alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis costs to valid penological interests being evidence of unreasonableness. 482 U.S. at 

84-91. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2194 Document: 01019830622 Date Filed: 08/01/1989 Page: 26 
§ 1-516.1 (1984). This is sufficient to state a claim even if the 

statute itself ultimately may not apply to him. His citation to 

the statute makes sufficiently clear his grounds, especially in 

light of the great expansion of the coverage of the First Amendment in Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 57 U.S.L.W. 

4397, Sup. Ct. II 87-1945 decided March 29, 1989. The Supreme 

Court in Frazee made clear that "we reject the notion that to 

claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be 

responding to the commands of a particular religious organization." 57 U.S.L.W. at 4399. While, under Frazee, a plaintiff 

must show he or she holds a "sincere religious belief," that 

determination is a question of fact. It is inherent in a free 

exercise claim that one is contending that one has a sincere 

religious belief and that the challenged conduct violates it. It 

is not necessary to attach a copy of one's sacred texts to one's 

pleading. I believe this prose complaint states a cause of' 

action for violation of the First Amendment which, of course, 

could be rebutted by an appropriate state interest. 

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