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Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 17, 2010 Decided February 11, 2011

No. 09-7133

PABLO FIGUEROA, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE

DEPARTMENT,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:07-cv-01992)

John V. Berry argued the cause for appellants. With him on

the briefs was Stephanie E. Hosea.

James C. McKay, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General,

Attorney General’s Office for the District of Columbia, argued

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Peter J.

Nickles, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and

Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General. Mary L. Wilson,

Assistant Attorney General, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Officers of the District of

Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) sued their

employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging

that MPD had failed to calculate their overtime based on

enhanced pay owed to detective sergeants under the District of

Columbia Code. The district court dismissed the officers’

claims as barred by the statute of limitations. Although we

agree that some of the officers’ claims are untimely, we do not

agree that all of their claims are barred. Because a new cause of

action accrues each time MPD issues a deficient paycheck,

claims based on paychecks falling within the limitations period

are timely.

I

The District of Columbia Code provides that “[e]ach officer

or member [of the MPD] who is promoted . . . to the rank of

detective sergeant shall receive, in addition to his scheduled rate

of basic compensation, $595 per annum . . . so long as he

remains in such assignment.” D.C. CODE § 5-543.02(c). On

December 12, 2003, three of the four plaintiffs in this case filed

a grievance through their union, alleging that they had fulfilled

the duties of detective sergeant but had not received the

additional $595 per year stipend. In a December 29, 2003 letter,

the Chief of Police denied the grievance, stating that the

Department had not utilized the position of detective sergeant

for more than two decades. 

In accordance with its collective bargaining agreement, the

officers’ union then sought a ruling on the issue from an

arbitrator. The arbitrator found that the D.C. Code provision

applied to the officers because they had performed the functions

of detective sergeant. He rejected MPD’s argument that the

USCA Case #09-7133 Document #1292775 Filed: 02/11/2011 Page 2 of 12
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grievance was untimely, concluding that the officers had not

previously “discovered” the D.C. Code provision, and,

moreover, that their claim was for “an on-going and continuing

violation.” Arbitrator’s Opinion at 6 (June 11, 2004)(J.A. 106). 

He then awarded the officers “the Status of Detective Sergeant”

and back pay of $595 per year. Id. at 8 (J.A. 108). On

September 30, 2005, the District of Columbia’s Public

Employee Relations Board (PERB) denied MPD’s request to set

aside the arbitrator’s award. PERB Decision at 2-4 (J.A. 96-98).

Following the PERB’s ruling, MPD took steps to

compensate retroactively those officers who had served as

detective sergeants. In 2007, it amended the personnel forms of

three of the plaintiffs to show that they had served and continued

to serve as detective sergeants, and it gave them lump sum

payments of $595 per year for every year they were assigned to

the position. The Department did not, however, recalculate the

officers’ overtime based on the $595 stipend. At the time this

lawsuit was filed, the fourth plaintiff had neither been

reclassified as a detective sergeant nor awarded back pay.

On November 5, 2007, the officers filed a complaint against

MPD in United States District Court, alleging violations of the

Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The

complaint alleged three violations: (1) willful failure to pay

minimum wages, in violation of § 206(b); (2) untimely payment

of wages, in violation of § 206(b); and (3) willful failure to pay

overtime, in violation of § 207(a). The officers also alleged that

the Department violated the detective sergeant provision of D.C.

Code § 5-543.02(c). The district court found the D.C. Code

claim barred by res judicata on the ground that the arbitration

proceeding constituted a final judgment on the merits, and it

found the FLSA claims barred by the statute of limitations. It

therefore entered summary judgment in favor of MPD. 

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Figueroa v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 658 F. Supp. 2d 148, 152,

154 (D.D.C. 2009). This appeal followed.

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Montgomery v. Chao, 546 F.3d 703, 706 (D.C. Cir.

2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a);

see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48

(1986). “We must view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in his

favor, and eschew making credibility determinations or

weighing the evidence.” Montgomery, 546 F.3d at 706. 

On appeal, the officers challenge only one aspect of the

district court’s decision: its conclusion that their FLSA

overtime claims are time-barred. The overtime claims are based

on 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), which provides that “no employer shall

employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than

forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his

employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate of

not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he

is employed.” The officers charge that, in calculating their

overtime compensation, MPD failed to include within the

“regular rate” the $595 stipend for detective sergeants required

by D.C. Code § 5-543.02(c). Because the district court found

the officers’ complaint barred by the FLSA’s statute of

limitations, it did not address the merits of their argument. See

Figueroa, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 154-55.

The FLSA provides affected employees with a cause of

action to recover for violation of its overtime provision, see 29

U.S.C. § 216(b), and its statute of limitations provides that any

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action to collect unpaid overtime “shall be forever barred unless

commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued,

except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation

may be commenced within three years after the cause of action

accrued,” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). MPD maintains that the

appellants’ FLSA claims are time-barred because they accrued

more than three years before this lawsuit was filed -- the first

time the officers improperly failed to receive the compensation

of a detective sergeant, a position MPD eliminated more than

twenty years ago. The appellants counter that their claims did

not accrue that early because MPD misrepresented the existence

of the position and they did not know of their rights under the

D.C. Code. 

Whatever the validity of the plaintiffs’ contention regarding

their knowledge prior to December 12, 2003, it is clear that they

knew of their claims as of that date -- because on that date they

filed their grievance for non-payment under § 5-543.02(c). See

Figueroa, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 154-55 & n.9. Had the officers

filed their lawsuit within three years of December 12, 2003, they

might have been able to assert earlier claims. But they did not. 

Instead, they filed almost four years later, on November 5, 2007. 

As a consequence, they may not now recover for non-willful

violations that occurred more than two years or for willful

violations that occurred more than three years before they filed

their complaint. That is, they may not now recover for

violations that occurred before November 5, 2004.1

1

Because the parties have not addressed the question, we use

November 5 as the dividing line for purposes of discussion without

deciding whether the statutory phrase “within three years after the

cause of action accrued” might instead require selection of November

4 or 6. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (emphasis added). The precise date is

an issue to be decided on remand.

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The appellants contend that they are not barred from

asserting claims arising before November 5, 2004 because they

were unable to bring any claims until the PERB affirmed the

arbitrator’s decision. In their view, the PERB’s determination

that they had a right to the $595 yearly stipend was a “condition

precedent” to their FLSA suit. Appellants’ Br. 20. And because

the PERB did not make that determination until September

2005, they maintain that their November 2007 complaint was

timely as to all willful violations.

But as the district court held and the appellants conceded at

oral argument, there is nothing in the FLSA that requires a

claimant to obtain a favorable administrative decision before he

or she can sue in federal court. See Figueroa, 658 F. Supp. 2d

at 154, 155 n.9; Oral. Arg. Recording at 8:30-9:04. The Federal

Circuit’s decision in Cook v. United States, 855 F.2d 848 (Fed.

Cir. 1988), upon which the appellants rely by analogy, does not

assist them. In that case, an amendment to the FLSA made “the

right of firefighters to statutory overtime depend[] on a

condition precedent, the performance of . . . [a] study” by the

Secretary of Labor. Id. at 851. Accordingly, the court held that

the plaintiff firefighters’ cause of action did not accrue until that

condition was fulfilled. Id. The FLSA provision at issue here,

by contrast, contains no such precondition.2

 Hence, nothing

relieves the appellants of the bar against bringing claims that

arose before November 5, 2004.3

2

Indeed, Cook noted that the rule in the firefighters’ case was

“contrary to the usual rule, i.e., that a claim for unpaid overtime under

the FLSA accrues at the end of each pay period when it is not paid.” 

Cook, 855 F.2d at 851. 

3

On appeal, the officers argue that they are entitled to relief from

the statute of limitations based on the doctrines of equitable estoppel

and equitable tolling. As the officers acknowledge, they did not assert 

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This analysis does not, however, preclude the appellants

from bringing FLSA claims that arose after November 5, 2004. 

In dismissing the officers’ complaint outright, the district court

implicitly concluded that they have no such claims. The officers

disagree, arguing that “[e]ach time Appellants received a

paycheck without proper overtime compensation, a new cause

of action accrued under the FLSA.” Appellants’ Br. 22. Thus,

claims arising from paydays after November 5, 2004 are not

barred.

MPD contends that the officers forfeited any such claims by

failing to assert them in the district court. We disagree. 

Because the officers sought unpaid overtime for their entire

tenure as detective sergeants, their claims necessarily included

a request for unpaid overtime during the three years before their

suit was filed. The complaint charged that MPD was “required

to pay individual plaintiffs time-and-one-half compensation for

all overtime hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week

depending on their individual periods of time worked as

detective sergeant,” Compl. ¶ 61 (emphasis added), and their

affidavits alleged that they served as detective sergeants well

into the statute of limitations period, see J.A. 143, 147, 158, 162. 

Indeed, the officers sought damages in “a sum equivalent to and

in addition to their compensation which was not paid . . . for the

several years preceding this suit until the conclusion of the

current action as required by statute.” Compl. ¶ 68 (emphasis

added). And their opposition to summary judgment argued that

“[w]ages are ‘unpaid’ when they are not paid on the ordinary

those doctrines in the district court. Oral Arg. Recording at 11:59-

12:11. Ordinarily, we do not consider arguments raised for the first

time on appeal, and appellants present no extraordinary circumstances

to explain their failure to raise these arguments in district court. See

District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084-85

(D.C. Cir. 1984).

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payday,” Opp’n to Summary Judgment Mot. at 23, citing Biggs

v. Wilson, which recognized that “FLSA claims are continuing

claims and a separate cause of action ‘accrues’ every payday

that overtime is not paid,” 1 F.3d 1537, 1540 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citing Beebe v. United States, 640 F.2d 1283, 1293 (Ct. Cl.

1981)). We therefore reject MPD’s contention that the officers

forfeited this argument.

MPD also disputes the officers’ “each paycheck” argument

on the merits, contending that their cause of action could have

arisen no later than December 29, 2003, when the Chief of

Police denied their grievance and declared that the position of

detective sergeant did not exist. Appellee’s Br. 27. MPD insists

that, although the Chief’s declaration may have affected future

paychecks, such effects do not give rise to new causes of action.

It is true that in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

the Supreme Court held that, when the only act of intentional

discrimination in a Title VII case takes place outside the statute

of limitations, the fact that the act has adverse effects on

subsequent paychecks does not mean that a new violation occurs

with each new paycheck. 550 U.S. 618, 624-25, 628 (2007).4

A suit charging disparate treatment under Title VII, the Court

4

After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ledbetter,

Congress amended Title VII as follows: “For purposes of this section,

an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to

discrimination in compensation in violation of this subchapter, when

a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted,

when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation

decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by

application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other

practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation

is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other

practice.” See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-

2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)).

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said, is timely only if the intentionally discriminatory conduct

occurred within the limitations period. Id. at 628.5

 But the

Ledbetter Court did not disagree that -- unlike for some

violations of Title VII -- “it is ‘well established that the statute

of limitations for violations of the . . . overtime provisions of the

[FLSA] runs anew with each paycheck.’” 550 U.S. at 641

(quoting Pet. Br. at 35). And that is certainly an accurate

description of the caselaw. See, e.g., Knight v. City of

Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 581 (11th Cir. 1994); Biggs, 1 F.3d at

1540; Cook, 855 F.2d at 851; Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821

F.2d 261, 271 (5th Cir. 1987); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.

v. Keen, 157 F.2d 310, 316 (8th Cir. 1946); Beebe, 640 F.2d at

1293; see also THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT §18.VI.B.6, at

1210-12 (Ellen C. Kearns ed., 1990) (“[A] new separate cause

of action accrues . . . on the payday for each workweek in which

the employee has worked and has not been paid . . . overtime

compensation.”). 

As the Ledbetter Court explained, the distinction between

a Title VII disparate-treatment claim and an FLSA overtime

claim is “the fact that an FLSA . . . claim does not require proof

of specific intent to discriminate.” 550 U.S. at 641; cf. Lewis v.

Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2199-200 (2010) (distinguishing

between Title VII disparate-treatment and disparate-impact

claims on the same ground). Rather, “an employee has carried

out his burden [in an FLSA action] if he proves that he has in

fact performed work for which he was improperly

5

See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 624 (indicating that the petitioner’s

complaint would have been timely if the employer had “acted with

actual discriminatory intent . . . when [it] issued her checks during the

[limitations] period”); see also Lewis v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191,

2199 (2010) (explaining that Ledbetter “establish[es] only that a Title

VII plaintiff must show a ‘present violation’ within the limitations

period”). 

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compensated.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S.

680, 687 (1946).6

 Each of those elements, performance and

improper compensation, recurs with each pay period.7 

Accordingly, although the officers refer to their “each

paycheck” theory as one involving “continuing claims,” that

term “is something of a misnomer.” Knight, 19 F.3d at 582. In

fact, the gravamen of this theory is not that there has been one

continuing violation of the FLSA, but rather that there have been

“a series of repeated violations of an identical nature.” Id. And

“[b]ecause each violation gives rise to a new cause of action,

each failure to pay overtime begins a new statute of limitations

period as to that particular event.” Id.; see id. at 581 (rejecting

city’s argument that, because it adopted its personnel

classification system more than three years before the plaintiffs

brought suit, they had forever lost the right to challenge the

failure to include overtime payments in their paychecks). The

underpayment is not the “effect” of a prior violation; it is the

violation itself.

6

See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (providing that “no employer shall

employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty

hours unless such employee receives compensation for his

employment . . . at a rate not less than one and one-half times the

regular rate at which he is employed”); id. § 216(b) (providing that

“[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of . . . section 207

. . . shall be liable to the employee or employees affected,” and further

providing that such employees may bring “[a]n action to recover the

liability prescribed . . . in any Federal or State court of competent

jurisdiction”).

7

Cf. Biggs, 1 F.3d at 1539 (holding that the time when the

minimum wage provision of the FLSA is “violated, or, put another

way, when minimum wages become ‘unpaid,’” is “when they are not

paid at the time work has been done, the minimum wage is due, and

wages are ordinarily paid -- on payday”).

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Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993),

cited by MPD, is not to the contrary. In that case, the plaintiff

firefighters alleged that the city had violated the FLSA’s

overtime provision by refusing to pay them for “sleep time.” Id.

at 1427. Under the Labor Department’s FLSA regulations, a

municipality may exclude sleep time “‘if there is an expressed

or implied agreement between the employer and the

employees’” to that effect. Id. at 1428 (quoting 29 C.F.R.

§ 553.222(c)) (emphasis added). In Alldread, there was such an

agreement, but the plaintiffs claimed that the city had unlawfully

coerced them into signing it. Id. at 1429. Because the “alleged

act of coercion [was] the event giving rise to appellants’

complaint and [was] patently a single violation of the FLSA,”

and because that act took place outside the statute of limitations,

the court found the plaintiffs’ suit time-barred. Id. at 1432. 

Here, by contrast, the Chief’s 2003 declaration that the

position of detective sergeant no longer existed is not what gives

rise to the officers’ FLSA claims. If the officers have

meritorious claims, it is because they worked more than forty

hours in particular weeks, and because MPD failed to take the

$595 stipend into account when it paid them overtime for those

weeks. Thus, their complaint is based not on “a single violation

[of the FLSA] that occurred outside the statute of limitations,”

Alldread, 988 F.2d at 1430 (internal quotation marks omitted),

but on repeated violations, some of which fall within the

limitations period.

In sum, the appellants may recover if their paychecks failed

to include properly calculated overtime compensation during the

two or three years before they filed their complaint -- depending

upon which limitations provision is applicable. As the district

court did not determine the merits of the officers’ claims, or

which limitations period applies, we remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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III

For the forgoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

entry of summary judgment against the appellants with respect

to overtime claims accruing after November 5, 2004. See supra

note 1. With respect to the appellants’ other claims, the

judgment is affirmed.

Reversed in part and remanded.

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