Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01555/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01555-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Marvin Sapiro and Gloria Sapiro, his wife,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Sunstone Hotel Investors, L.L.C.,

Sunstone Hotel Investors, L.P., 

Defendants. _________________________________

Gilbert Sudbeck and Lynn Sudbeck,

husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Sunstone Hotel Properties, Inc.; Sunstone

Hotels Investors, LLC; Sunstone Hotel

Investors, L.P.; SMP II Limited

Partnership; Jeffery Hammermeister, and

Jone Doe Hammermeister, husband and

wife; Diversified Engineering, Inc.; John

and Jane Doe I-X, husbands and wives;

Black Corporations, I-X; White

Partnerships, I-X,

Defendants.

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No. CV-03-1555-PHX-SRB

ORDER

No. CV-04-1535-PHX-JWS

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Marvin and Gloria Sapiro's Motion to

Consolidate Sapiro v. Sunstone, L.L.C., No. CV-03-1555-PHX-SRB and Sudbeck v. Sunstone

Case 2:03-cv-01555-SRB Document 168 Filed 04/04/06 Page 1 of 6
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Doc. 123 is a duplicate of Doc. 122 and was docketed in error.

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Hotel Properties, Inc., No. CV-04-1535-PHX-JWS (Doc. 122, 123)1

. The Court now rules

on the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Marvin Sapiro and Gilbert Sudbeck allege that they contracted Legionnaires' Disease

after staying at the Sheraton San Marcos Gold Resort ("resort") in Chandler, Arizona.

Sudbeck stayed at the resort from June 24-27, 2002, and Sapiro stayed at the resort from

February 6-11, 2003. Both were diagnosed with Legionnaires' Disease after they returned

to their respective homes in South Dakota and Florida. Sudbeck and Sapiro filed separate

lawsuits claiming in each that Defendants negligently maintained the resort, which allowed

the pathogen associated with Legionnaries' Disease to propagate and infect them during their

respective stays at the resort. 

Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to consolidate Sapiro v. Sunstone Hotel Investors,

L.L.C., and Sunstone Hotel Investors, L.P., CV-03-1555-PHX-SRB and Sudbeck v. Sunstone

Hotel Properties, Inc., CV-04-1535-PHX-JWS. Defendants oppose the motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides:

When actions involving a common question of law or fact are

pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of

any or all of the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all

the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders

concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid

unnecessary costs or delay. 

Rule 42 permits consolidation of separate actions presenting a common issue of law

or fact as a matter of convenience and economy in judicial administration. See, e.g., Devlin

v. Transp. Communications Int’l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 1999); Enter. Bank v.

Saettele, 21 F.3d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1994). However, the fact that a common question is

Case 2:03-cv-01555-SRB Document 168 Filed 04/04/06 Page 2 of 6
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present does not guarantee consolidation. In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 182 F.R.D. 441, 444

(D.N.J. 1998). The district court has broad discretion to decide whether consolidation is

desirable. See, e.g., Enter. Bank, 21 F.3d at 235; In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 182 F.R.D.

at 444. In determining whether consolidation is appropriate, a court "must balance the

interest of judicial convenience against the potential for delay, confusion and prejudice that

may result from such consolidation." Bank of Montreal v. Eagle Assoc., 117 F.R.D. 530, 532

(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354, 1362 (2d Cir. 1975)).

Factors such as differing trial dates or stages of discovery usually weigh against

consolidation. Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §

2383 (1995). Furthermore, "the trial judge should be most cautious not to abuse his judicial

discretion and to make sure that the rights of the parties are not prejudiced by the order of

consolidation under the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Dupont v. S. Pac.

Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1966). Conversely, "the risk of inconsistent adjudications

of common factual and legal issues" generally weighs in favor of consolidation. Malcolm

v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). However,

"[c]onsiderations of convenience and economy must yield to a paramount concern for a fair

and impartial trial." Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation

omitted). 

The moving party bears the burden of proof on a motion for consolidation. See, e.g.,

In Re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Consol. Parlodel

Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 444. Here, Plaintiffs argue that consolidation is appropriate because

"[b]oth actions arise out of the same circumstances: Mr. Sudbeck and Mr. Sapiro were guests

of the same hotel, within approximately eight months of each other, and both fell ill with

Legionnaires' Disease shortly following their stays." (Pls.' Mot. to Consol. at 2.) Plaintiffs

argue that the resources saved by consolidating these cases outweighs any confusion, delay,

expense, inconvenience or prejudicial effect caused by granting Plaintiffs' motion. The

Sudbecks support this motion to consolidate and argue that it is appropriate to consolidate

the two cases because Sudbeck and Sapiro "allege they sustained bodily injuries as a result

Case 2:03-cv-01555-SRB Document 168 Filed 04/04/06 Page 3 of 6
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of contracting Legionnaires['] Disease while guests at the hotel property in question." (Pls.'

Mot. to Consol. at 1; Shannon Aff. ¶ 3.) 

Defendants argue that consolidation would prejudice them because factual confusion

will occur. In particular, Defendants argue that "[c]onsolidation of these two isolated cases

would only permit the improper inference that because two people suffered a similar injury

at the same location, the property was negligent in its operations." (Defs.' Resp. in Opp'n to

Pls.' Mot. to Consolidate at 5.) The Court agrees that consolidation could lead to improper

inferences in this case. If Sudbeck and Sapiro had stayed at the hotel at the same time or

even within a few weeks of each other, then consolidation would be more appropriate. In

this case, however, the passage of eight months leaves too much time for the possibility that

separate, intervening events led to Sapiro and Sudbeck contracting Legionnaires' Disease.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants "make[] much of the eight months that separate the

onset of Messrs. Sapiro and Sudbeck's infections, as if this passage of time sufficed to

destroy all common questions of fact." (Pls.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Consolidate at 2.)

For support, Plaintiffs cite to a Second Circuit opinion that affirmed the consolidation of two

asbestos injury cases in which the plaintiffs were allegedly exposed to asbestos at the same

worksite but during different time periods; one plaintiff was exposed between 1942-1945 and

the other was exposed from 1946-1966. See Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1285. In Johnson, the

court permitted consolidation because the two cases shared numerous characteristics

including a "common worksite" and a "similar occupation to the extent that both workers

were exposed to asbestos in a bystander capacity (they worked in trades that did not involve

direct handling of asbestos products)." Id. Thus, each plaintiff was exposed to asbestos at

the same worksite over a period of at least three years, albeit at different time periods. 

In this case, Sudbeck was at Defendants' resort for three days in June 2002 and Sapiro

stayed at the resort during five days in February 2003. The only factual commonalities here

are that Sapiro and Sudbeck each stayed at the resort and, shortly after they returned to their

homes in Florida and South Dakota, were diagnosed with Legionnaires' Disease. The case

before this Court does not involve workers at the same worksite exposed to the same

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While consolidating these actions could prevent some duplication of efforts, these

savings would be minimal since most of the discovery has already been completed.

Furthermore, having one trial rather than two would not necessarily save judicial resources

in this case because the resulting joint trial could be longer, more complicated and potentially

more confusing to jurors. On balance, the resources saved by granting this consolidation do

not justify the resulting prejudice and potential for confusion.

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substance over a period of years. Thus, the Court chooses to exercise its discretion and deny

Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate.2

In addition, the concern about inconsistent verdicts is not significant here. This

situation is different from an airplane crash where all passengers suffered a harm at the same

time and through the same mechanism. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro.

Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 737 F. Supp. 391, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (consolidating all

pending cases arising out of the crash of Northwest Flight 255 on August 16, 1987). Because

Sudbeck's and Sapiro's stays at Defendants' resort occurred eight months apart, the Court

cannot say that each man was harmed in the same way. Unlike a single airplane crash in

which multiple passengers were injured at the same time, it is more difficult to determine

how someone contracted a disease. Therefore, it is not possible to say at this stage of

litigation that both Sapiro and Sudbeck contracted Legionnaires' Disease during their

separate stays at Defendants' resort. 

The concern about inconsistent verdicts is also alleviated by the fact that different

verdicts might be warranted. If Sapiro can only recover on the basis that Defendants had

knowledge of the dangerous condition, it is possible that Sapiro could prevail in his lawsuit

but not Sudbeck, if the hotel only learned of the dangerous condition in the time between

their two respective stays.

 Therefore, the Court denies the motion to consolidate because the judicial resources

potentially saved by consolidating the cases at this stage do not outweigh the prejudice and

confusion that could be created.

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IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate (Doc. 122, 123.) 

DATED this 4th day of April, 2006.

Case 2:03-cv-01555-SRB Document 168 Filed 04/04/06 Page 6 of 6