Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00160/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00160-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WILLIAM SILVERSTEIN, an individual

Plaintiff,

v.

EXPERIENCED INTERNET.COM,

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: C 05-0160 PVT

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

On April 5, 2005, the parties appeared before Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull for

hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss.1 Both parties have consented to Magistrate Judge

Jurisdiction. Based on the briefs and arguments presented,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion is GRANTED with leave to amend

the complaint. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no later than June 1, 2005. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff William Silverstein (“Plaintiff”) is the sole proprietor of an internet service

provider with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. Defendant Experienced

Case 5:05-cv-00160-PVT Document 15 Filed 05/12/05 Page 1 of 5
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2 Neither party submitted copies of any of the subject emails. At the hearing the

parties both indicated that the alleged emails advertised a product. However, neither side

identified the product or specified whether it is offered for sale by Experienced Internet or

SEXSEARCHCOM.COM. 

 

3 Plaintiff did not mention this website in either his Complaint, or his Opposition.

ORDER, page 2

Internet.com (“Defendant”) is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Miami,

Florida. Defendant Patricia Quesada (“Quesada”), a Miami resident, is its Director and

President. Defendant Sylvia Bedoya (“Bedoya”), also a Miami resident, is its Vice President. 

Plaintiff alleges that in March 2004, Defendants used Plaintiff’s servers to deliver

unsolicited electronic mail (“email”) advertisements containing sexually explicit content.2 He

further alleges that subject lines of these emails were not prefixed with the “SEXUALLYEXPLICIT” designation that is required by 16 C.F.R. Part 316 and 15 U.S.C. 7705(d)(1)(A). 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s electronic filters were unable to separate these emails from regular email. 

Some of these unsolicited emails were delivered, via Plaintiff’s servers, to a personal computer in

Santa Clara County, California. Plaintiff alleges that although he asked Defendants to

discontinue this practice, they continued to intermittently send such emails through his server. 

Plaintiff sued for Violation of the CAN-SPAM Act, and for Violation of California

Business & Professions Code § 17529.5. Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) - lack of personal jurisdiction, (3) -

improper venue, and (6) - failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff

opposed the motion and requested that the court take judicial notice of information on the

Internet indicating that Defendant Experienced Internet.com is the registrant of

SEXSEARCHCOM.COM.3 In addition to the jurisdictional challenge, Defendants argue that the

CAN-SPAM Act preempts the California spam statute. Defendants also argue that because

Plaintiff, and presumably his servers, are located in Los Angeles, any injury was sustained in Los

Angeles and the case should be transferred to that district. Finally, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff is unlikely to prove that Defendants actually engaged in the alleged conduct and

therefore Plaintiff should be required to post a bond. 

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ORDER, page 3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Where no applicable federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, federal courts apply the

law of the state in which the court sits. See Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d

1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993). The only federal cause of action in this case is brought under the

CAN-SPAM Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. sections 7701, et seq. Pursuant to Section 7706(g), a

provider of internet access service may bring a civil action for violations of CAN-SPAM “in any

district court of the United States with jurisdiction over the defendant.” Because the federal law

does not specify the court’s jurisdictional reach for these claims, state law governs.

California’s long-arm statute allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over

defendants to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

See CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 410.10 (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis

not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”); Core-Vent, 11 F.3d

at 1484. Thus, the court “need only determine whether personal jurisdiction in this case would

meet the requirements of due process.” See Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873

F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1989).

Due process requires that “in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if

he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such

that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Under the due

process analysis, a state may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant. See

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984). 

If a defendant's activities within the forum state are “continuous and systematic” or

“substantial,” the state has a sufficient relationship with the defendant to assert general

jurisdiction. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 447 (1952). If a

forum state cannot assert general jurisdiction over the defendant, it may still assert specific

jurisdiction based on the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum state in

relation to the cause of action. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Incs., 557 F.2d

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ORDER, page 4

1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).

The Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test to determine if specific jurisdiction is

appropriate: 

(1) the nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities

or consummate some transaction with the forum or residents

thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails

himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the

claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's

forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must

comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be

reasonable. 

Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9thCir. 1987).

Plaintiff claims this court has general jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants

engaged in “continuous and systematic” activity within California by systematically directing

commercial advertising at California residents. In the alternative, Plaintiff claims this court has

specific jurisdiction because Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of

California’s markets by directing misleading commercial emails at California residents, that

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant arise out of these activities, and that jurisdiction would be

reasonable because Defendant chose to send unsolicited emails and thus should reasonably have

foreseen that it might be haled into court in California. Plaintiff fails to make an adequate

showing under either standard.

When a trial court rules on an issue relying on declarations and discovery materials

without holding an evidentiary hearing, dismissal is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to make a

prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. American Telephone & Telegraph Company v.

Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether the

plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in

the complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’

affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

Here, Defendants dispute the jurisdictional facts and thus Plaintiff’s allegations are not

“uncontroverted.” Specifically, Defendants filed declarations denying that they sent the subject

emails. Defendants claim the emails were sent by a third party with whom Defendants are not

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4 By asking the court to take judicial notice of certain information on the Internet,

Plaintiff implies that Defendants are affiliated with the website SEXSEARCHCOM.COM. The

court declines to take judicial notice of the information on various websites purportedly showing

a relationship between Defendants and SEXSEARCHCOM.COM, because the reliability of

those websites has not been established. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dingle v. Bioport

Corporation, 270 F.Supp.2d 968, 972 (W.D. Mich. 2003) (declining to take judicial notice of

certain website information because it could not verify the accuracy or authenticity of the

information). Moreover, even if SEXSEARCHCOM.COM is controlled by Defendants, Plaintiff

has not shown that SEXSEARCHCOM.COM sent the emails in question. 

ORDER, page 5

affiliated. Even though disputes contained in parties’ affidavits must be resolved in a plaintiff’s

favor, here Plaintiff did not submit any affidavits or other competent evidence showing any link

between Defendants and the emails in question.4 For the purposes of this motion, Defendants’

undisputed declarations adequately rebutted Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants sent the subject

emails. Thus, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that Defendants have sufficient

minimum contacts with California to entitle this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over

Defendants.

At the hearing on this motion, Plaintiff objected to the Defendants’ declarations. The

court hereby overrules Plaintiff’s objection. Generally courts may consider declarations in ruling

on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems

Technology Assoc., Inc., 557 F2d. at 1289. And Plaintiff failed to articulate any violation of a

specific rule of evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

Dismissal is warranted because Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing that any

Defendant caused the subject emails to be sent to California. Absent such a showing, there is no

basis for finding Defendants had sufficient contacts with California on which to base personal

jurisdiction. Based on the policy of resolving matters on the merits rather than on technicalities,

leave to amend is warranted to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to make such a showing if he can

do so.

In light of the foregoing ruling, the court need not rule on the preemption, venue and bond

issues at this time. 

Dated: 5/12/05 /s/ Patricia V. Trumbull 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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