Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-04997/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-04997-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Estate of Cau Bich Tran, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

City of San Jose, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

NO. C 03-04997 JW 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO MAINTAIN TRIAL DATE

AND CERTIFYING DEFENDANTS’

APPEAL AS FRIVOLOUS

I. BACKGROUND

The full background of this case is articulated in the Court’s September 30, 2005 Order. (See

Docket Item No. 56, hereafter “Order.”) 

On July 13, 2003, two San Jose Police Officers went to the home of Ms. Cau Bich Tran in

response to a neighbor’s concern for the safety of her children. Shortly after they entered her home, they

found Ms. Tran in her kitchen holding a kitchen implement, which appeared to one of the police officers to

be a meat cleaver. Unbeknownst to the officers, Ms. Tran had been using the implement to try to open a

bedroom door, which she had accidentally locked. One of the police officers states that he believed that

she was using the implement to threaten the officers or members of her family. In a matter of seconds after

entering her home and in front of her family, he fatally shot her Ms. Tran. 

Case 5:03-cv-04997-JW Document 69 Filed 11/10/05 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Ms. Tran’s Estate, her two children and her parents filed this action against the City of San Jose

(“City”), Police Officer Chad Marshall (“Officer Marshall”), William Lansdowne (“Lansdowne”), Thomas

Wheatley (“Wheatley”), and Robert L. Davis (“Davis”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege that

Defendants violated their constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that based on the facts, Officer Marshall

had sufficient cause to use deadly force and is therefore immune form liability for the fatal shooting. On

September 20, 2005, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that

material facts upon which the motion was based are in dispute. Defendants immediately filed a Notice of

Interlocutory Appeal from the Court’s Order. Before the Court is a motion by the Plaintiffs to maintain the

trial date and certify Defendants’ appeal as frivolous.

II. DISCUSSION

The general rule is that a timely notice of an interlocutory appeal from a judgment which is

immediately appealable divests the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial over all but tangential

matters. Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104 (9th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d

842, 850 (9th Cir.) (cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984). Prior to 1992, this rule applied to appeals from a

denial of qualified immunity to a police officer in an action under Section 1983. This is based on the nature

of qualified immunity. It is an immunity from liability. An officer who is entitled to qualified immunity is

entitled to assert this as a prohibition from having to stand trial. If the immunity is asserted and in a motion

for summary judgment, it is established that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the defendant is

entitled to an immediate interlocutory appeal of a denial of summary judgment. The trial court is divested of

jurisdiction until the appeal is decided. Allowing an immediate interlocutory appeal before the officer is

placed on trial preserves the purpose of the immunity defense.

In 1992, however, the Ninth Circuit carved out an exception to this divestment of trial court

jurisdiction during an interlocutory appeal on denial of qualified immunity. If the trial court certifies that the

interlocutory appeal is "frivolous" or "forfeited,” the defendant may proceed with the interlocutory appeal,

however, the trial court retains dual jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. Chuman, 960 F.2d at 105 (9th

Cir. 1992). This has become known as a “Chuman certification.” The Supreme Court has since endorsed

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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this power as a means of protecting civil rights plaintiffs from abusive pre-trial assertions of qualified

immunity. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996). 

In this case, Plaintiffs have asked the Court to certify Defendants’ appeal as frivolous. The issue

becomes what is meant by "frivolous" under Chuman and whether or not this case fits within it. Chuman

does not define the term. This Court gives the term its ordinary meaning. An appeal is frivolous if it has no

legal basis or is interposed for an unlawful purpose, such as delay or the vex, annoy or harass. 

There is no claim that the interlocutory appeal in this case is being taken for an unlawful purpose.

An interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity which raises an issue of law is within

the jurisdiction of the appellate court and therefore meritorious. An appeal which raises an issue of fact

is outside the jurisdiction of the appellate court and is frivolous. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313

(1995); Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 905 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). If the material facts are

not in dispute and on the basis of those material facts, a reasonable police officer could reasonably

conclude that the use of deadly force is warranted, an appeal from a denial of summary judgment would not

be frivolous. Under these circumstances, the appeal would raise a question of law, namely whether Officer

Marshall is eligible for qualified immunity under the Plaintiffs’ version of the disputed facts. See Wilkins vs.

City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2003.) The appeal would also be meritorious if it is made

on the ground that the denial of qualified immunity was based on factual disputes over matters which were

not material, so long as the undisputed material facts would justify granting immunity. Id. at 951.

If on the other hand, the trial judge rules that there is a genuine dispute over material facts and on

that basis denies qualified immunity, an interlocutory appeal is frivolous if it is made on the ground that the

evidence upon which the trial judge relied in finding a genuine dispute is insufficient to raise a genuine issue

of fact. The interlocutory appeal on this latter ground raises a purely factual issue over which the appellate

court has no jurisdiction.

Applying this standard, the Court finds that Defendants’ appeal is frivolous. In its September 30

Order, the Court denied qualified immunity because it found that there was a genuine dispute over what

took place between the time the police officers arrived at the Ms. Tran’s apartment and the fatal shot. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants’ appeal necessarily challenges the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Court relied in

finding a genuine dispute and therefore, raises a purely factual issue.

In their opposition to the motion to certify the appeal as frivolous, the Defendants attempt to place

themselves in a position of prosecuting a meritorious appeal by contending that they accept the Plaintiffs’

version of the facts. Defendants contend, therefore, that because, under the Plaintiffs’ version of the facts

they are entitled to qualified immunity, the appeal raises a question of law and is meritorious. However, the

appeal is taken from the Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In support of that

motion, the Defendants did not accept Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, but tendered their own version about

what took place during the relevant time period. It was the difference between these versions over material

matters which led the Court to deny summary judgment. 

Moreover, the contention that the Defendants accept Plaintiffs’ version of the facts is disingenuous. 

Their factual recitations contain significant differences from the version of the events according to the

witnesses tendered by the Plaintiffs, including one of the police officers.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that there

were genuine factual disputes. At most, all that can be said at present is that Plaintiffs dispute Officer

Marshall’s version. At the point of ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court did not accept

any version of the events. It only identified what it regards as a legitimate dispute over those facts. For that

reason, no appeal can be based on the "Plaintiffs’ version."

Ultimately, however, in this motion Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ version of the facts are

“completely meaningless” because the issue is how the circumstances would have been perceived by the

officer. (Opp’n at 8.) It is correct that the question is what a reasonable police officer would do under the

circumstances shown by the evidence. However, since there is a dispute over those circumstances, the

Court ruled that an assessment of reasonableness could not be made at this time. In maintaining their own

version of the facts, Defendants are essentially challenging the Court’s conclusion that issues of fact exist. It

appears then, that Defendants are challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by this Court to

reach its conclusion. In this way, Defendants’ appeal is frivolous because it is beyond the jurisdiction of the

Ninth Circuit during an interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Accordingly, the Court exercises its authority to certify Defendants’ appeal as frivolous and to

proceed with trial. The Constitutional rights in dispute have been clearly established. The evidence in the

record, viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, establishes at the very least that genuine issues of

material fact remain as to whether those clearly established rights have in fact been violated. Under the

“dual jurisdiction” theory, the parties’ interests are best served by this certification; Officer Marshall is freed

to proceed with his appeal, while the Plaintiffs will not be unreasonably delayed in their pursuit of a remedy

for the alleged violations of their constitutional rights.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court believes there is sufficient evidence in the record to create the factual disputes identified

by the Court and finds that those disputes are material to the question of qualified immunity. The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Maintain Trial Date and therefore, certifies Defendants’ appeal as frivolous.

Dated: November 10, 2005 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Andrew C. Schwartz schwartz@cmslaw.com

Clifford S. Greenberg cao.main@ci.sj.ca.us

Felicita Vu Ngo felicita_vu_ngo@yahoo.com

Karen L. Snell ksnell@clarencedyer.com

Michael R. Groves CAO.Main@ci.sj.ca.us

Office of the Clerk

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

P.O. Box 193939

San Francisco, CA 94110-3939

Dated: November 10, 2005 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: /s/ JW Chambers 

Ronald L. Davis

Courtroom Deputy

Case 5:03-cv-04997-JW Document 69 Filed 11/10/05 Page 6 of 6