Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00848/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00848-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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1 06cv0848-L (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MUSTAFA SIRAT,

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary of

the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 06cv0848 L(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS [DOC. NO. 10]

Mustafa Sirat, a paroled state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 1]

on April 20, 2006. Petitioner does not distinctly allege separate

grounds for relief. (See Pet. 6-8.) Instead, Sirat submits a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities which argues that he is

entitled to habeas relief. (Pet. Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 1-27.)

In his Petition and Memorandum, Sirat appears to allege the

following seven grounds for relief, claiming that the trial court

erred: (1) The trial judge improperly increased his sentence

beyond the statutory maximum without specific fact-finding by the

jury as required by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); (2)

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he erroneously instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, which

infringed Petitioner’s right to a jury trial and deprived him of

due process because the instruction chilled the jury’s deliberative

process and compromised the independent and impartial decision of

jurors; (3) the evidentiary rulings amounted to an abuse of

discretion that violated Petitioner’s due process rights and his

right to a fair trial; (4) the trial judge made multiple errors in

ruling on the admissibility of evidence and in instructing the

jury, and their cumulative effect was prejudicial and violated his

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (5) the

trial judge erred in admitting prior act evidence to show Sirat’s

propensity to commit crimes, and the judge erred further in

instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.02, leading jurors to

believe that they could convict Petitioner on improper grounds; and

(6) the failure to strike evidence that the prosecutor did not

disclose to the defense violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment

compulsory process right and denied him a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense. (See Pet. Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 3-

27.) Lastly, Sirat claims that he was denied equal protection when

the California Supreme Court did not decide his case in accordance

with People v. Engelman, 28 Cal. 4th 436, 49 P.3d 209, 121 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 862 (2002), where the court concluded that CALJIC No.

17.41.1 should no longer be given in criminal trials. (Pet.

Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 4.) 

The Petition in this case was originally filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. On October 26, 2006, United States District Judge

M. James Lorenz issued an Order Construing the Petition as Brought

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [doc. no. 6] because Sirat is

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challenging his state court conviction. On December 11, 2006,

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction [doc.

no. 10] and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Motion [doc. no. 10]. Respondent argues that the Petition should

be dismissed because it is a second or successive habeas corpus

application filed without authorization from the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, and it is barred by the statute of limitations. 

(Resp’t’s Mem. 7-10.) Respondent also alleges that ground six of

the Petition fails to raise a federal question. (Id. at 11.) 

Petitioner did not file any opposition to Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss. On March 2, 2007, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause

[doc. no. 11] for Petitioner’s failure to oppose the Motion. Sirat

failed to respond, and the Order to Show Cause was returned to the

Court with the notation “paroled” [doc. no. 12]. 

This Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Motion 

and Memorandum in Support of the Motion, and the lodgments. For 

the reasons expressed below, the Court recommends that Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying this case are stated in the April 10,

2002, court of appeal opinion in People v. Sirat. (See Lodgment

No. 1, People v. Sirat, No. D036061, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.

10, 2002).) The Court presumes these factual determinations are

correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(e)(1) (West 2006).

In 1997, Sirat married Bahijah Ab Salam. (Id. at 2.) They

moved to the United States in 1998 and began living with

Petitioner’s family. (Id.) Because Sirat wanted to show his

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family that he was “macho,” Ab Salam was not allowed to have

friends, choose her own clothing or hairstyle, or leave the house

without Sirat’s permission. (Id.) Ab Salam was only permitted to

attend English classes and go to work. (Id.) 

Ab Salam became pregnant in 1998, and in December 1998, she

and Sirat got into an argument which resulted in Petitioner kicking

her in the abdomen between five and ten times. (Id.) Although Ab

Salam screamed, no one in Sirat’s family helped her. (Id.) The

next day, she suffered from vaginal bleeding and suspected she was

having a miscarriage. (Id.) Because she did not have health

insurance, she did not seek medical assistance. (Id.) The

bleeding increased over the next two days, and she also suffered

from dizziness. (Id. at 2-3.) Sirat took her to the Grossmont

Hospital emergency room where hospital staff asked her if she had

been physically abused. (Id. at 3.) Ab Salam feared Petitioner so

she said she did not know how she became injured. (Id.) Physician

Peter Colaprete examined Ab Salam at the emergency room and

determined that she was in the early stages of pregnancy and would

likely miscarry. (Id.) Dr. Colaprete referred her to OB/Gyn

Surinder Tayebi for follow-up treatment. (Id.) Based on Dr.

Taybei’s report and all other medical records, Dr. Colaprete

testified at trial that Ab Salam had in fact suffered a miscarriage

which could have been caused by kicks to her abdomen. (Id.) 

In June 1999, Sirat forcibly sodomized Ab Salam because he was

angry that she was still bleeding heavily from the miscarriage. 

(Id.) The sodomy went unreported because of Ab Salam’s fear of

Petitioner and her uneasiness in discussing the matter. (Id.) 

Shortly after this incident, Sirat took Ab Salam to a Planned

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Parenthood clinic to address the bleeding and to obtain

contraceptives. (Id.) While at the clinic, Planned Parenthood

staff inquired about bruises on Ab Salam’s body. (Id.) Because

she feared Sirat, Ab Salam denied any physical abuse and told the

staff she had hit a table. (Id.) 

On June 30, 1999, Ab Salam told Petitioner she wanted to move

out of his family’s house into a place of her own. (Id. at 3-4.) 

At the time, she was lying on her back on the bed. (Id. at 4.) 

Sirat climbed on top of her, placed his knees on her thigh and

torso, grabbed her neck, and hit her. (Id.) Although other family

members were home and Ab Salam screamed for help, no one came. 

(Id.) The next morning, Ab Salam felt very weak and could barely

talk. (Id.) She called Mary Perret, a woman she met through her

English classes, and told her, “If anything happens to me, please

call my parents in Morocco.” (Id.) Perret asked what was wrong,

but Ab Salam said, “I can’t tell you -- I can’t talk,” then hung

up. (Id.) Concerned for her well-being, Perret and her husband

went to Ab Salam’s house and took her to stay with them. (Id.) 

She was very thin, could barely walk, and had a number of old and

new bruises. (Id.) In a telephone conversation, Perret told

Petitioner that Ab Salam would be staying with her despite Sirat’s

insistence that he would take her home. (Id.) Perret also told

Sirat that Ab Salam was ill and might die, to which he responded,

“Better she should die than not be here at home with me.” (Id. at

4-5.) 

On July 2, 1999, Perret brought Ab Salam to a Planned

Parenthood clinic for a checkup. (Id. at 4.) Ab Salam finally

told the clinic staff about the physical abuse, the miscarriage,

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and the sodomy. (Id.) She also got a restraining order against

Petitioner. (Id. at 5.) In August 1999, however, Ab Salam decided

to cancel the restraining order. (Id.) Sirat had apologized to Ab

Salam, and thinking that things had changed, she went back to him

so they could start a new life. (Id.) They moved out of Sirat’s

family’s house and got an apartment together. (Id.) While at the

apartment, Sirat began behaving strangely. (Id.) He told Ab Salam

that he had nightmares in which he was strangling her, that people

were following him, and that he believed people on television and

radio were laughing at him and talking about him. (Id.) One time

Ab Salam could not find the kitchen knives, and Petitioner told her

he hid them in the bedroom because he was afraid he might

accidentally kill her. (Id. at 5-6.) He also became very jealous

of Ab Salam. (Id. at 5.) In November 1999, they decided to

separate; Ab Salam stayed in the apartment and Sirat moved back

into his family’s house. (Id.) Part of the separation agreement

was that Petitioner would not contact Ab Salam; nevertheless, he

called her thirty to forty times a day and came to the apartment

almost daily. (Id.) He also checked on her at work and threatened

to kill her if she left him permanently or if he caught her with

another man. (Id.) Sirat also threatened to commit suicide. 

(Id.) When Ab Salam said she would not feel guilty if he committed

suicide, he said he would first kill her, then himself. (Id.) 

On November 21, 1999, only a week after Petitioner moved out,

he left over fifty messages on Ab Salam’s answering machine and

went to the apartment approximately four times. (Id. at 6.) Ab

Salam told him to leave each time. (Id.) The last time he went to

the apartment, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., he knocked so long and

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so loudly that Ab Salam opened the door. (Id.) When she opened

the door, Sirat was convinced a man was with her because he smelled

cockroach spray and thought it was a man’s cologne. (Id.) 

Petitioner grabbed her arm and dragged her around the apartment

looking for a man, which hurt and bruised Ab Salam’s arm. (Id.) 

When Ab Salam said she was going to call the police, Sirat left. 

(Id.) She locked the door behind him, barricaded it shut with

chairs, and called the police. (Id.) When they arrived, they

found Petitioner outside the apartment; Ab Salam was inside the

apartment and visibly upset and fearful. (Id.) After multiple

requests by the police, Sirat finally left. (Id.) 

The next day, Ab Salam began the process of obtaining another

restraining order against Petitioner. (Id.) That night, Sirat was

waiting for Ab Salam when she arrived home. (Id.) He threatened

to kill her if she did not let him into the apartment. (Id. at 6-

7.) She ran inside, locked the door, barricaded it with chairs,

and called the police. (Id. at 7.) Officer Eliot Underhill

responded to the scene. (Id.) Ab Salam reported the death threat,

and Officer Underhill saw that she was crying, was visibly shaken,

and had a recent bruise. (Id.) Ab Salam explained how she

received the bruise from Petitioner the night before, and after she

finished making her report, Sirat was arrested. (Id.) During

Officer Underhill and Ab Salam’s discussion, a neighbor knocked on

the door; Ab Salam was so frightened that she urinated on herself. 

(Id.) 

Neighbors testified on behalf of the defense at trial, stating

that they never heard any fighting or screaming coming from Sirat

and Ab Salam’s apartment. (Id.) The couple’s friends testified

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they did not know of any marital troubles or abuse. (Id.) Ab

Salam only told them she wanted to move out of Sirat’s family’s

house so she and Petitioner could get their own place. (Id.) 

Family members with whom Sirat and Ab Salam lived testified

that they did not know of any incidents where Petitioner physically

abused Ab Salam. (Id.) In fact, Sirat’s mother stated that Ab

Salam attributed her vaginal bleeding to lifting a heavy closet

door. (Id.) Petitioner’s sister testified that Ab Salam’s

bleeding started after she moved a bed. (Id.) Sirat’s friend

claimed that Ab Salam attributed the miscarriage to running. (Id.

at 7-8.) Both Petitioner’s mother and sister believed that it was

Ab Salam who physically abused Sirat. (Id. at 8.) 

In rebuttal, police detective Daniel Willis testified that

Petitioner’s mother and sister told him that Sirat and Ab Salam got

into a loud argument on June 30, 1999. (Id.) Petitioner’s mother

saw both Sirat and Ab Salam in the bathroom; Petitioner was washing

blood off his face and Ab Salam was crying and vomiting. (Id.) 

Sirat told his mother that he hit Ab Salam after she scratched him. 

(Id.) Ab Salam told Petitioner’s mother that she scratched him

after he hit her. (Id.) Sirat’s mother also told detective Willis

that in her culture a husband can hit his wife if she does

something wrong. (Id.) After a while, however, she changed her

mind and said that a man should never hit his wife. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s sister also said that according to her culture and

religion a husband can hit his wife if she does not do what he

tells her to do or if she leaves without his permission. (Id.) 

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 1999, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial

in San Diego Superior Court of inflicting corporal injury on a

spouse, see Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a), assault by means of force

likely to produce great bodily injury, see Cal. Penal Code §

245(a)(1), making a terrorist threat, see Cal. Penal Code § 422,

stalking, see Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(a), and misdemeanor spousal

battery, see Cal. Penal Code § 243(e)(1). (Lodgment No. 3, Sirat

v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Report & Recommendation at 1

(S.D. Cal. June 10, 2003).) The jury also found that Petitioner

inflicted great bodily injury during commission of the corporal

injury on a spouse and the felony assault, see Cal. Penal Code §

12022.7(d). (Lodgment No. 1, People v. Sirat, No. D036061, slip

op. at 1.) He was sentenced to a total of eight years and four

months: three years for the assault, four years for the great

bodily injury enhancement, and two separate consecutive eight-month

terms for the terrorist threat and stalking convictions. (Id. at

1-2.) The court stayed the sentence for the corporal injury

conviction. (Id. at 2.) 

On April 10, 2002, the California Court of Appeal affirmed 

the judgment of the trial court. (Id. at 1.) On June 26, 2002,

the California Supreme Court denied Sirat’s petition for review. 

(Lodgment No. 2, People v. Sirat, No. S106916, order at 1 (Cal.

June 26, 2002).) 

Sirat, acting pro se, filed his first federal petition for a

writ of habeas corpus on January 6, 2003. (Lodgment No. 4, Sirat

v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Order Adopting R. & R. at 1

(S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2003).) He claimed that the trial court erred

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by (1) admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence

without balancing the prejudice with the evidence’s probative

value; (2) instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.02, suggesting

that evidence of prior uncharged crimes may be sufficient to

convict; (3) failing to instruct the jury on the legal definition

of sodomy when the jury requested it; and (4) instructing the jury

with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, which confused the jury, deprived it of

its ability to decide the facts of the case, and stalled the jury

process. (Lodgment No. 3, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-

IEG(NLS), Report & Recommendation at 5.) Lastly, Petitioner argued

that the cumulative effect of the trial court errors violated his

right to due process and a fair trial. (Id.) The court rejected

all of Sirat’s claims, and the petition was denied on the merits on

October 23, 2003. (See Lodgment No. 4, Sirat v. Hernandez, No.

03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Order Adopting R. & R. at 2.) 

On November 6, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and a

motion for a certificate of appealability. (See Lodgment No. 5,

Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Order Den. Certificate

of Appealability at 1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2003).) The district

court denied Sirat’s motion on November 18, 2003, for failure to

make a substantial showing of the denial of any constitutional

rights. (Id. at 2.) On August 24, 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability

regarding whether Sirat’s federal substantive due process rights

were violated by (1) the application of California Evidence Code

section 1109 and (2) instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.02. 

(Lodgment No. 6, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03-57061, order at 1 (9th

Cir. Aug. 24, 2004).) The Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s

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case on May 19, 2005, for failure to perfect the appeal. (Lodgment

No. 7, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03-57061, order at 1 (9th Cir. May

19, 2005).) 

Sirat filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Supreme Court of California on January 4, 2006. (Lodgment No. 8,

In re Sirat, No. S140082 (Cal. Jan. 18, 2006).) The petition was

denied on January 18, 2006. (Id. at 1.) 

Petitioner then filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on April 20, 2006. (Pet. 1.) In the Petition, Sirat fails

to mention that this is not his first federal petition challenging

his 1999 conviction. (See Pet.) Petitioner claims seven grounds

for relief: (1) the trial judge improperly increased his sentence

beyond the statutory maximum without specific fact-finding by the

jury as required by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); (2)

the court erroneously instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1,

which infringed upon his right to a jury trial and deprived him of

due process because the instruction chilled the jury’s deliberative

process and compromised the independent and impartial decision of

jurors; (3) the evidentiary rulings constituted an abuse of

discretion that violated Sirat’s due process rights and his right

to a fair trial; (4) the trial judge’s many errors in ruling on the

admissibility of evidence and in instructing the jury had the

cumulative effect of causing prejudice and unfairness in violation

of Petitioner’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights; (5) the trial court erred in admitting prior act evidence

to show Sirat’s propensity to commit crimes and in instructing the

jury on CALJIC No. 2.50.02, leading them to believe that they could

convict Petitioner based on prior acts, which violated his rights

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to a fair trial and due process; and (6) the failure to strike

testimony about evidence which was not disclosed to the defense in

accordance with California Penal Code section 1054.1 violated

Sirat’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process right and denying him

adequate representation because he was not given a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense. (See Pet. Attach. Mem.

of P. & A. 2-27.) Lastly, Petitioner claims that his right to

equal protection was violated when the California Supreme Court did

not decide his case in the same manner as People v. Engelman, 28

Cal. 4th 436, 49 P.3d 209, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (2002), which held

that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 should no longer be given in criminal

trials. (Id. at 4.)

Only claims one, three, six and seven are presented to the

federal court for the first time in the pending Petition. (Compare

Pet’r’s Mem., with Lodgment No. 3, Sirat v. Hernandez, No.

03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Report & Recommendation at 5.) The other claims

(grounds two, four, and five) were previously raised in Sirat’s

federal habeas petition filed in 2003. (Compare Pet’r’s Mem., with

Lodgment No. 3, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Report &

Recommendation at 5.)

On December 11, 2006, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for

Lack of Jurisdiction [doc. no. 10] and a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion [doc. no. 10]. Respondent argues

that the Petition should be dismissed because it is a second or

successive habeas corpus application filed without authorization

from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and because the statute of

limitations has expired. (Resp’t’s Mem. 7-10.) Respondent also

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asserts that ground six fails to state a claim which raises a

federal question. (Id. at 11.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Sirat filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, it is

subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA) of 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006). AEDPA sets forth

the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Hernandez v. Ylst, 930

F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991).

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See

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28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006). Petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. See Reed

v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719;

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

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on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added). Section

2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court

decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for

example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” 

Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state

court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of,’ an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.” 

Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir.

1996); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997);

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

IV. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues the Petition should be dismissed on the

grounds that it is a second or successive habeas corpus

application, and it was filed after the expiration of AEDPA’s

statute of limitations. (Resp’t’s Mem. 7-10.) Additionally,

Respondent contends that ground six fails to raise a federal

question. (Id. at 11.)

A. Authorization for a Successive Petition

Respondent claims that the Petition should be dismissed

because Petitioner is barred from filing a second habeas petition

without an order from the Ninth Circuit authorizing that it be

filed. (Resp’t’s Mem. 7.) Respondent asserts that grounds two,

three, and five of the present Petition were presented in Sirat’s

prior federal petition and are therefore barred. Additionally, he

claims that Petitioner’s other grounds for relief cannot be raised

until he receives authorization from the Ninth Circuit. (Id.

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).) 

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In Sirat’s 2003 petition, he raised five claims: (1) The

trial court’s admission of evidence of prior acts of domestic

violence without balancing the prejudice violated his rights to a

fair trial and due process; (2) the trial judge erred in

instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.02 because it suggested

that evidence of prior uncharged crimes may have been sufficient to

convict Sirat; (3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on

the legal definition of sodomy, violating Sirat’s due process

rights; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury with

CALJIC No. 17.41.1 because it deprived the jury of its ability to

decide the facts of the case, may have confused the jury, and

stalled the jury process; and (5) cumulative error violated

Petitioner’s fair trial and due process rights. (Lodgment No. 3,

Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Report & Recommendation

at 5.) 

Claims one and two of Sirat’s 2003 petition are comparable to

the fifth claim in the present petition. Sirat alleges in claim

five that the trial judge erred in admitting prior act evidence to

show his propensity to commit crimes. (Pet. Attach. Mem. of P. &

A. 15-16, 20-24.) Petitioner further alleges that by instructing

the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.02, the trial court led the jury to

believe that it could convict Sirat based on evidence of prior

acts, which violated his fair trial and due process rights. (Id.

at 20, 26-27.) Claim four of Sirat’s 2003 petition is identical to

claim two of his present petition, in which he contends that the

trial judge erroneously instructed the jury with CALJIC No.

17.41.1, which infringed Petitioner’s right to a jury trial and

deprived him of due process because the instruction chilled the

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jury’s deliberative process and compromised the independent and

impartial decision of the jurors. (Id. at 8.) Additionally, claim

five in Sirat’s 2003 petition is the same claim of cumulative error

that Sirat makes in claim four of the present petition. (Id. at

12.)

A “second or successive” petition is one filed after a

previous petition raising the same claims that have been decided on

their merits or raising claims that could have been raised in a

previous petition. Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1273 (9th

Cir. 2001) (“Generally, a new petition is ‘second or successive’ if

it raises claims that were or could have been adjudicated on their

merits in an earlier petition.”). 

Section 2244(b)(1) directs that “[a] claim presented in a

second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254

that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(1) (West 2006). Also, a new claim presented in

a second or successive habeas must be dismissed unless (1) the

claim rests on a new rule of constitutional law that was previously

unavailable and which the Supreme Court has made retroactive to

cases on collateral review, or (2) the facts underlying the claim

could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of

due diligence, and the facts establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the

petitioner guilty of the underlying offense absent constitutional

error. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2006). “Before a

second or successive application permitted by this section is filed

in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate

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court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to

consider the application.” 28 U.S.C.A § 2244(b)(3)(A) (West 2006).

Claims two, four, and five of the present Petition are

essentially identical to claims one, two, four and five of Sirat’s

2003 petition. (Compare Pet. Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 3-27, with

Lodgment No. 3, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Report &

Recommendation at 5.) Accordingly, a petition making these claims

is a “second or successive” petition and cannot be filed unless it

fits within the exceptions provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)-(3).

Ground two of the present petition alleges that instructing

the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 deprived Sirat of due process

because it chilled jury deliberation, stalled the jury process,

deprived the jury of the ability to decide the facts of the case,

and may have confused the jury. (Pet. Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 4,

8-9.) This claim was raised in Sirat’s 2003 petition, and it was

rejected by Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes, who concluded that

the instruction “did not infect the entire trial such that

Petitioner’s due process rights were violated.” (Lodgment No. 3,

Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Report & Recommendation

at 13.) 

In ground four of the present Petition, Sirat alleges

cumulative error. (Pet. Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 12.) This claim

was also rejected in 2003, when Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes

found no trial error and, therefore, no cumulative error. Lodgment

No. 3, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Report &

Recommendation at 13.)

Ground five claims that the trial judge erred in admitting

prior act evidence to show Petitioner’s propensity to commit crimes

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and in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.02, which led

jurors to believe they could convict based on evidence of prior

uncharged crimes. (Pet. Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 15-16, 20-24, 26-

27.) Judge Stormes previously concluded that the trial court’s

evidentiary ruling and its use of CALJIC No. 2.50.02 did not infect

the entire trial and violate Petitioner’s due process rights. 

(Lodgment No. 3, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-IEG(NLS), Report

& Recommendation at 9, 11.)

United States District Court Judge Irma E. Gonzalez adopted

Judge Stormes’s recommendations and denied Sirat’s 2003 habeas

petition. (Lodgment No. 4, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-

IEG(NLS), Order Adopting R. & R. at 2.) As a result, Petitioner is

now barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) from presenting claims two,

four and five in a second or successive habeas application.

The following claims remain in the pending Petition: (1) The

trial judge improperly increased Sirat’s sentence in violation of

Blakely (ground one); (2) evidentiary rulings were an abuse of

discretion (ground three); (3) the failure to strike evidence

amounted to a denial of compulsory process (ground six); and (4)

Sirat was denied equal protection because the holding in People v.

Engelman, 28 Cal. 4th 436, 49 P.3d 209, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, was

not applied to his case (ground seven). These claims were not

alleged in Petitioner’s prior application, but they are

nevertheless barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

A claim not presented in a prior petition cannot be raised in

a second or successive petition unless the petitioner shows that

the claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law . . . that

was previously unavailable” or that the claim relies on facts not

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previously discoverable. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). Only

under these circumstances may a petitioner file a second or

successive habeas corpus application. However, “[b]efore a second

or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the

district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court

of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider

the application.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (b)(3)(A).

Sirat failed to seek or obtain the necessary authorization. 

Indeed, his Petition is missing the section of the standard habeas

form asking whether he received permission from the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals to file a second petition. Without permission

from the Ninth Circuit and a showing that either (a) the four new

claims are based on a newly-available constitutional rule, or (b)

the facts on which the claims are based establish Petitioner’s

innocence and were previously undiscoverable, Sirat is not

authorized to file a second habeas corpus petition. Accordingly,

the district court should GRANT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the

Petition as successive.

B. Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that Sirat’s Petition is time-barred under

AEDPA’s one-year period of limitations. (Resp’t’s Mem. 9-10.) The

relevant part of the statute states:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –-

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

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United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. 

 (2) The time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d) (West 2006).

The California Supreme Court denied Sirat’s petition for

review on June 26, 2002. (Lodgment No. 2, People v. Sirat, No.

S106916, order at 1.) The judgment became final on September 24,

2002, when Petitioner’s ninety-day period in which to file a

petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court expired. 

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999).

Under § 2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations on Sirat’s

federal petition began to run the next day, September 25, 2002. 

See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001)

(explaining the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)

to the calculation of the limitations period under AEDPA). Absent

statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2), or equitable tolling,

September 24, 2003 was the last day on which Petitioner could file

a timely federal habeas petition. Id.

On January 6, 2003, Sirat filed his first federal habeas

petition in this Court, which was denied on the merits on October

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23, 2003. (Lodgment No. 3, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03cv0027-

IEG(NLS), Order Adopting R. & R. at 2.) Appellate review of the

petition was completed on May 19, 2005, when the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s case for failure to perfect

the appeal. (Lodgment No. 7, Sirat v. Hernandez, No. 03-57061,

order at 1.) AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not tolled during

the pendency of federal habeas proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533

U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). As a result, the time between the filing

of Sirat’s first federal petition and its dismissal cannot extend

the limitations period beyond September 24, 2003. Id.

Under AEDPA, there are alternate dates from which the

limitations period may be calculated. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(BD). The limitations period may begin to run when a state-created

impediment is removed, when a newly recognized constitutional right

is recognized or made retroactive, or on the date the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered with due

diligence. Id. Sirat has not asserted that any of these

circumstances apply to his case, nor has he set forth in his

Petition any facts sufficient to warrant calculating the

limitations period from a different date. (See Pet. Attach. Mem.)

1. Statutory Tolling Does Not Save Sirat’s Petition.

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is tolled during the

pendency of any collateral attacks properly filed in state court

challenging a habeas petitioner’s state conviction. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244(d)(2). Sirat filed his first state habeas petition on January

4, 2006, almost two years and six months after the statute of

limitations to file his federal petition had already run. Because

his state petition was filed after the expiration of the AEDPA

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limitations period, Petitioner’s state court habeas proceedings

cannot toll the statute of limitations. Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). From this sequence of events, Sirat’s

Petition appears to be time-barred.

2. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply.

In some cases, a Petitioner may be able to toll the

limitations period by demonstrating a basis for equitable tolling. 

To justify equitable tolling, Sirat must establish extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control that made it impossible for him to

file his Petition on time. Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199,

1202 (9th Cir. 2003); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107(9th Cir.

1999). The failure to file a timely petition must be the result of

external forces, not the result of the petitioner’s lack of

diligence. Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107. Sirat has the burden to

establish that extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant

equitable tolling. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1218 n.3

(9th Cir. 1999)). 

Petitioner has not alleged that equitable tolling should apply

to his case, and he has not provided any evidence to support the

application of equitable tolling. Without extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control, there is no basis for equitable

tolling. Thus, the district court should also GRANT Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss the Petition as untimely.

C. Failure to State a Claim Which Raises a Federal Question

Ground six of Sirat’s Petition states that the prosecution’s

failure to provide the defense with Officer Underhill’s

supplemental report, which discusses the fact that Ab Salam

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urinated on herself, violated California Penal Code section 1054.1,

and therefore the testimony should have been stricken. (Pet.

Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 24-26.) Respondent argues that this claim

does not properly state a federal question under the Constitution

and should be dismissed. (Resp’t’s Mem. 11.)

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006). A petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez,

930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d at 885; Mannhalt v.

Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

Respondent is correct that a trial court’s failure to strike

evidence that was not produced in accordance with California Penal

Code section 1054.1 does not present a federal question. 

Respondent, however, has misstated Petitioner’s claim. Sirat

claims that because the evidence was not disclosed to his attorney,

counsel was unable to prepare a proper defense. (Pet. Attach. Mem.

of P. & A. 24-25.) He argues that the trial court’s failure to

strike the testimony amounted to a denial of adequate

representation and a fair trial, and it contravened Petitioner’s

Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. (Id. at 25.) Sirat’s

claim is that the trial court committed constitutional error and

the state appellate court’s rejection of this claim is “contrary to

. . . clearly established Federal law . . . .” 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(d)(1) (West 2006). This claim is cognizable in federal habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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Ground Six of the Petition for failure to state a claim should be

DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Respondent’s Motion to 

Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a successive

petition, which is also barred by the statute of limitations,

should be GRANTED.

At the end of the memorandum in support of his habeas

petition, Sirat makes an off-the-cuff request for appointed

counsel. (Pet. Attach. Mem. of P. & A. 27.) This is made without

any supporting authority or rationale. A habeas petitioner is not

entitled to the automatic appointment of counsel. McCleskey v.

Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191,

1196 (9th Cir. 1986). Petitioner’s request for appointed counsel

is, therefore, DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before August 17, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 3,

2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

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district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th

Cir. 1991).

Dated: July 13, 2007 _____________________________ 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Lorenz

All parties of record

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