Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01769/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01769-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tracy Dean Miller, 

Petitioner, 

 -vsDora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

CV 05–1769–PHX–NVW (CRP) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254 filed by Petitioner Tracy Deean Miller. (“Petition,” Docket 

#1). Petitioner is being held at the Arizona Department of Corrections based on 

convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court for child molestation and sexual conduct 

with a minor. 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Charles R. Pyle for a report and recommendation. The Magistrate 

Judge recommends the District Judge, after independent review of the record, enter an 

order denying counts one through thirteen of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus as moot due to the untimeliness of the petition. 

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I. INTRODUCTION

 The Petitioner raised thirteen grounds for relief all which must be denied because 

the petition was not raised in a timely manner under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The AEDPA gives petitioner a 

one-year deadline from the date his case became final. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner’s case became final on October 27, 2000. 

Petitioner filed his habeas claim on June 22, 2005, over 4 years late. This report will 

review how the AEDPA’s one-year deadline ran in this case, and why equitable tolling is 

inapplicable. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On January 29, 1993, a jury found Petitioner guilty of 4 counts of child 

molestation and 7 counts of sexual misconduct with a minor. (Respondent’s Answer, 

hereinafter Answer, Exhibit A, R.O.A., Item I). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 

153 years. (Id. Item 89). 

 On March 16, 1993, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief to the 

Maricopa County Superior Court and, at the same time, filed an appeal with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Id. Items 128, 142-44). On November 23, 1994, the trial court 

dismissed Petitioner’s Petition for post-conviction relief by finding that Petitioner’s 

counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. (Id. Item 146). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentence and denied review of the trial 

court’s denial of post-conviction relief. (Id. Item 156). Petitioner sought review of his 

appeal in Arizona State Supreme Court. (Id. Item 149). On April 2, 1996, the Arizona 

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Supreme Court denied review. (Id. Item 157). 

 On September 6, 1996, Petitioner petitioned for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Answer, Exhibit B, Item 530). On March 16, 1998, the U.S. District Court denied 

Petitioner’s Petition because he did not satisfy the requirement to exhaust his state 

remedies. (Id. at Item 30) (citing Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 

1981) (per curium) (holding dismissal is proper where Petitioner has failed to exhaust his 

state court remedies), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982). The Arizona Court of Appeals 

then reopened Petitioner’s appeal and Petitioner filed a supplemental brief. (Answer, 

Exhibit A, R.O.A., Item 166; Answer Exhibit C.). On January 21, 1999, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals addressed Petitioner’s five claims, found no reversible error, and 

affirmed Petitioner’s sentences and convictions. (Id. at Item 186, at 3-10). On July 30, 

1999, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review.1

 (Answer Exhibit D). 

 On July 8, 2003, the Petitioner filed his second petition for post conviction relief. 

On July 25, 2003, the state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s second petition for raising 

claims that “were or should have been raised in the direct appeal or in the first Rule 32 

proceeding.” (Answer, Exhibit A, R.O.A. Items 190 and 194). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals denied review on January 8, 2005. (Answer, Exhibit E). On June 13, 2005 

Petitioner filed this petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

 

________________________ 

1

 Order and Mandate was filed by the Arizona Court of Appeals on August 24, 1999. 

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III. DISCUSSION

The writ of habeas corpus is available to “a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The District 

Court’s standard of review reads: 

An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A. Timeliness

 Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition must be denied because it was filed 

over four years late. In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Act created a one-year statute of limitations for all cases that 

would become final after April 24, 1996. For all the cases that would have become final 

before that date, the statute of limitations would be up, April 24, 1997, one year from the 

date of enactment. 

A judgment becomes final after “the date on which the judgment became final by 

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

review July 30, 1999. (Answer, Exhibit D). Petitioner then had 90 days to seek review 

in the U.S. Supreme Court. SUP. CT. R. 13. Once the 90-day time limitation had run the 

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Arizona Supreme Court’s decision became final and the one-year deadline began 

running. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Therefore, absent any statutory or equitable 

tolling, the statute of limitations for Petitioner’s habeas claim expired on October 27, 

2000. 

B. Statutory Tolling

“The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.” 28 

U.S.C.A § 2244(d)(2). Time tolled must be equivalent to the “entire period in 

which a petitioner is appropriately pursuing and exhausting his state remedies.” 

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). Statutory tolling occurs 

during the time a petitioner is making proper use of state court procedures. See 

King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curium). 

 To determine whether petitioner was making proper use of state court 

procedures the petitioner must pass a two-part test. Id. First, the petitioner must 

demonstrate that his “subsequent petitions are limited to an elaboration of the facts 

relating to the claims in the first petition.” Id. If not, then the time between the 

petitioner’s petitions is not tolled. Id.; see also Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 

814 (9th Cir. 2002). If the claims raised in the first round of collateral review are 

complete when the courts ruling becomes final the petitioner is not entitled to 

tolling. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). If petitioner 

passes this first test then the petitioner’s petition must have been denied on the 

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merits. If it is denied on the merits, the gap is tolled. King, 340 F.3d at 823. If 

the petitioner’s petition was deemed untimely, the gap is not tolled. Id. 

Petitioner also fails to find an exception under Nino. The facts in Nino deal 

with equitable tolling when a petitioner is appropriately appealing denials of his 

petition for post conviction relief. 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. Petitioner’s second 

petition for post-conviction relief, filed July 8, 2003, was not related to his first 

petition. The state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s second petition for raising 

claims that “were or should have been raised in the direct appeal or in the first 

Rule 32 proceeding.” (Answer, Exhibit A, R.O.A. Item 194). Assuming that 

Petitioner is entitled to file more than one Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,2

Petitioner cannot restart the AEDPA’s statute of limitations by filing actions in 

state court after the AEDPA’s statute of limitations had already expired. See Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). Therefore, Petitioner fails the first test 

and the time in between Petitioners two petitions for post-conviction relief is not 

tolled. 

C. Equitable Tolling

This Court reads Petitioner’s response to the State’s answer for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus to claim exceptions to the one-year filing deadline based on 

equitable tolling. The 9th Circuit holds that the statute of limitations can be tolled 

________________________ 

2

 Petitioner’s second petition was denied because the claims raised “either were or 

should have been raised in the direct appeal or in the first Rule 32 proceeding.” (Answer, Exhibit A, R.O.A. Item 194). 

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if “the plaintiffs were prevented from asserting their claims by some kind of 

wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant” or “extraordinary circumstances 

beyond plaintiffs’ control made it impossible to file the claims on time.” AlvarezMachain v. U.S., 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996). Jefferson v. Budge, decided 

by the 9th Circuit is of particular relevance to Petitioner’s claim. 

A district court errs by dismissing a petition without first offering petitioner 

the choice of exhausting unexhausted claims by returning to state court or 

abandoning those claims and pursuing the remaining exhausted claims in federal 

court. Petitioner is then entitled to equitable tolling “from the date a mixed 

petition was dismissed until the date a new federal habeas petitions is filed, 

assuming ordinary diligence.” Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Although the district court, which dismissed Petitioner’s original habeas 

claim did not offer the Petitioner the right to pursue his remaining exhausted 

claims in federal court, Petitioner was not diligent in his second petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus. Therefore, the exception laid out in Jefferson will not help 

Petitioner’s claim. 

Petitioner’s mixed petition was dismissed on March 15, 1998, for failure to 

exhaust his state court remedies. (Answer, Exhibit B, Item 30). Thereafter, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals reopened Petitioner’s appeal, and allowed him to file a 

supplemental brief. (Answer, Exhibit A, R.O.A., Item 166; Answer, Exhibit C.). 

On January 21, 1999, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review on July 

30, 1999. (Answer, Exhibit D). Provided that all filings were timely up to this 

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date, Petitioner did not file his second petition for post conviction relief until July 

8, 2003, nearly five years after the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of review. 

Petitioner then did not file this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus until June 22, 

2005, seven years after petitioner’s mixed petition was dismissed and nearly six 

years after Petitioner’s first petition for post conviction relief, including his 

supplemental brief which included his previously unexhausted claims, was 

dismissed. Therefore, barring any extraordinary circumstances, Petitioner’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus does not fall under the equitable tolling 

exception. 

D. Extraordinary Circumstances 

Extraordinary circumstances that might toll the one-year filing deadline set 

forth by the AEDPA must be “beyond a prisoner’s control” and make it 

“impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. 128 F.3d 1283, 

1288 (9th Cir. 1997). A petitioner may make a claim of equitable tolling if he has 

pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstances stood in 

his way. See e.g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 

Due diligence is witnessed where an inmate makes complaints about his or her 

ability to do research. See Roy v. Lampert, --- F.3d ---, 2006 WL 2708608, *5 - *6 

(9th Cir. 2006) (due diligence demonstrated (1) where inmate, found guilty on two 

counts of first-degree sodomy in Oregon, made complaint to the State of Oregon 

Governor’s Advocate for Public Safety and the Corrections Ombudsman that 

Arizona’s facility did not have sufficient legal resources or (2) where it is evident 

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that inmate had been to the prison law library and knew that they contained no 

books discussing the AEDPA). Further, it is important that Petitioner provide 

specificity “regarding the alleged lack of access and the steps he took to diligently 

pursue his federal claims.” Id. at *6 (citing Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 

(10th Cir. 1998)). 

In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an inmate does not have an 

“abstract free-standing right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). Inmates only have some right to assistance so as to 

present a “non-frivolous” claim. In order to make a claim that an inmate’s 

constitutional right to access the courts has been violated, the prisoner must 

establish that his claim has been “frustrated or was being impeded” by the prison. 

Id. at 353. 

 According to the Arizona Department of Corrections Department Manual 

an inmate’s “legal access to the courts system relies on five specific groups of 

individuals. . .” including designated staff, paralegals, legal access monitors, ADC 

attorneys, and inmates. AZ DEP’T CORR. R. 902.03. Further, “[a]rrangements 

shall be made for inmates who have limited access to the Unit Library to meet 

with paralegals, to review legal resource materials, or to obtain forms or 

photocopies.” AZ DEP’T CORR. R. 902.08. 

Petitioner states that he falls under the “extraordinary circumstances” 

exception to the AEDPA’s one year filing deadline because “once the law library 

closed, the Petitioner was barred from private research, thus, unilaterally removing 

Petitioner’s choice of personal safety or his Right to prosecute his appeal. But 

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once sex offender units were established, the Petitioner actively sought assistance 

with his case and any appellate issues from this author.” (Petitioner’s Response, 

hereinafter Response, Pg. 3). However, petitioner does not provide the court with 

any specifics on how the Arizona Department of Corrections impeded Petitioner’s 

ability to do legal research. Nor does Petitioner make any showing that his safety 

would have been compromised by speaking to paralegals who are provided to 

Department of Correction inmates. 

Petitioner’s Petition was filed over four years late. Petitioner cannot restart 

the AEDPA’s statue of limitations by filing actions in state court after the 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations has expired and Petitioner provides no specific 

examples of how the prison has impeded his ability to timely file his Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reason, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order denying the 

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written 

objections within 10 days ob being served with a copy of this report and 

recommendation. If objections are not filed on time, the party’s right to de novo

review may be waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). If objections are 

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filed, the parties should direct them to the District Court by using the following 

case number: CV 05-1769-PHX-NVW 

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties. 

 Dated this 1st day of November, 2006. 

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