Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00459/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00459-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SMILEY J. HARRIS,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-0459 PJH

v. ORDER DISMISSING SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

BUSINESS, TRANSPORTATION AND 

HOUSING AGENCY, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff Smiley J. Harris filed this action on January 23, 2007, and also filed a

request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a motion for preliminary

injunction. On April 2, 2007, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging nine causes of

action. 

On April 17, 2007, the court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e) for failure to state a claim, and denied the IFP request and the motion for

preliminary injunction. The dismissal was with leave to amend. In dismissing the

complaint, the court issued a 24-page order, providing a detailed explanation of the basis of

dismissal of each of the nine causes of action, and also providing comprehensive

instructions to plaintiff regarding the amended complaint. 

On May 15, 2007, plaintiff filed the second amended complaint (“SAC”). In the SAC,

which asserts twelve causes of action, plaintiff made modifications to some of the factual

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allegations; and complied with some, though not all, of the court’s instructions regarding

amending the complaint. 

BACKGROUND

The factual allegations in the second amended complaint are substantially similar to

those in the first amended complaint. The court detailed those allegations in the April 17,

2007, order, and does not repeat the entire factual background here. 

Briefly, plaintiff asserts that his “desire for Oneness with the One God” has “inspired”

him to “revoke and/or rescind all preexisting contracts with the United States Government,”

and also apparently with the State of California. He alleges that he notified Lake County

and the State of California in 2001 that he was surrendering his driver’s license and

revoking his birth certificate. In addition, he does not have a social security number (which

is required by the State of California in order to obtain a driver’s license), because he

believes social security numbers are a component of the “Mark of the Beast” (as described

in the Biblical Book of Revelation), and surrendered his to the United States government. 

Lacking a California driver’s license, plaintiff nonetheless continues to drive. Not

surprisingly, he has been repeatedly cited by peace officers and charged with violating

California Vehicle Code § 12500(a) (driving without a license). His vehicle or vehicles have

also been impounded. 

In the SAC, plaintiff alleges twelve causes of action – four for false arrest, three for

false imprisonment, two for malicious prosecution, two for false arrest and false

imprisonment, and one for double jeopardy. These causes of action arise from two

incidents, one occurring on February 23, 2005, and the other on June 14, 2005.

In the first incident, on February 23, 2005, plaintiff alleges that he was stopped and

arrested by a California Highway Patrol officer for violating California Health & Safety Code

§ 11358 (cultivation of marijuana); California Vehicle Code §§ 23222 (possession of less

than one ounce of marijuana), 22349(a) (driving over the speed limit), and 12500(a)

(operating a motor vehicle without a license). He asserts that he was held in the County

Jail for approximately 48 hours before being released. He claims that on April 11, 2005,

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 He does not allege that the speeding citation or the charges of marijuana possession

and cultivation were dismissed. 

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the charge of violation of Vehicle Code § 12500(a) was dismissed for failure to prosecute. 

SAC ¶¶ 49, 52.1

In the second incident, on June 14, 2005, plaintiff alleges that while appearing for a

hearing on two criminal matters pending against him in the Lake County Superior Court – a

charge for driving without a license on February 16, 2005, and another charge for driving

without a license on March 15, 2005 – he was stopped by Lake County Sheriff’s Officers

Chris Macedo and Pat McMahon, cited for a violation of Vehicle Code § 12500(a)

(operating a motor vehicle without a license), and detained in front of the courthouse for

approximately seven to twelve minutes. In addition, his vehicle was seized and towed

based on the Vehicle Code § 12500(a) violation. He claims that on October 28, 2005, the

charge of violation of Vehicle Code § 12500(a) was dismissed “in the interests of justice.” 

SAC ¶¶ 56, 58. 

In the first cause of action, plaintiff alleges false arrest in violation of his rights under

the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution, against the California Business, Transportation and Housing Agency (“BTH”);

Barry Sedlik (“Sedlik”), identified as an employee of and “Acting Secretary” of the BTH; the

California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”); and George Valverde (“Valverde”),

identified as an employee of and the Director of the DMV. 

Plaintiff alleges that each of these defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or

instruct its officers, agents and/or employees” to understand that statutes that employ the

term “person” do not apply to “the citizen.” He alleges further that these defendants

“implemented policy [sic], practices, and/or procedures,” which “caused, led to and/or

resulted in” plaintiff’s false arrest on February 23, 2005, in addition to the seizure of

plaintiff’s automobile. SAC ¶¶ 73-74. 

In the second cause of action, plaintiff asserts false arrest in violation of his rights

under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the

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 The court understands the references to “July 14, 2005" as referring to the incident

occurring on June 14, 2005, when plaintiff was stopped and cited for driving without a license,

as the SAC does not mention any events occurring on July 14, 2005. 

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U.S. Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlik; the DMV; Valverde; and Lake County, which he

describes as including the Lake County Board of Supervisors and Lake County Sheriff

Rodney Mitchell (“Mitchell”). 

Plaintiff alleges that each of these defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or

instruct its officers, agents and/or employees” to understand that statutes that employ the

term “person“ do not apply to “the citizen.” He alleges further that they “implemented policy

[sic], practices, and/or procedures,” which “caused, led to and/or resulted in” plaintiff’s false

arrest on July 14, 2005,2

 in addition to the seizure of plaintiff’s automobile. SAC ¶¶ 76-77. 

In the third cause of action, plaintiff alleges false arrest in violation of his rights under

the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution, against Sheriffs’ Deputies Pat McMahon (“McMahon”) and Chris Macedo

(“Macedo”). He alleges that McMahon and Macedo arrested him on July 14, 2005, without

probable cause, based solely on an alleged violation of Vehicle Code § 12500(a). SAC 

¶ 79.

In the fourth cause of action, plaintiff asserts false arrest in violation of his rights

under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlik; the DMV; Valverde; and Lake County (including

the Lake County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff Mitchell). 

Plaintiff claims that each of these defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or

instruct its officers, agents and/or employees” to understand the proper application of

Vehicle Code § 12801.5(e) (“a peace officer may not detain or arrest a person solely on the

belief that the person is an unlicensed driver”). He alleges further that they “implemented

policy [sic], practices, and/or procedures,” which “caused, led to and/or resulted in”

plaintiff’s false arrest on July 14, 2005, in addition to the seizure of plaintiff’s automobile. 

SAC ¶¶ 81-8

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 In the fifth cause of action, plaintiff alleges false imprisonment in violation of his

rights under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlik; the DMV; Valverde; and Lake County (including the

Lake County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff Mitchell). Plaintiff claims that each of these

defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or instruct its officers, agents and/or employees;”

and “implemented policies, practices, and/or procedures,” which “caused, led to and/or

resulted in” plaintiff’s imprisonment without probable cause from July 14, 2005 through to

October 28, 2005, based solely on an alleged violation of Vehicle Code § 12500(a). SAC 

¶ 84. 

In the sixth cause of action, plaintiff asserts false imprisonment in violation of his

rights under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the U.S. Constitution, against McMahon and Macedo. He claims that these defendants

falsely imprisoned him without probable cause on July 14, 2005, solely upon an alleged

violation of Vehicle Code § 12500(a). SAC ¶ 86.

In the seventh cause of action, plaintiff alleges false imprisonment in violation of his

rights under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlik; the DMV; and Valverde. He asserts that these

defendants “implemented policy [sic], practices, and/or procedures,” which “caused, led to

and/or resulted in” plaintiff’s false imprisonment without probable cause, from the period

February 23, 2005, through April 11, 2005. SAC ¶ 88. 

In the eighth cause of action, plaintiff asserts malicious prosecution in violation of his

rights under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlik; the DMV; Valverde; and

Lake County (including the Lake County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff Mitchell). He

claims that each of these defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or instruct its officers,

agents and/or employees” to understand the proper application of Vehicle Code 

§ 12801.5(e) (“a peace officer may not detain or arrest a person solely on the belief that the

person is an unlicensed driver”). Plaintiff alleges that this failure to train “caused, led to

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and/or resulted in” malicious prosecution without probable cause, in an effort to deprive him

of his constitutional rights, from July 14, 2005, through October 28, 2005. SAC ¶ 90.

In the ninth cause of action, plaintiff alleges malicious prosecution in violation of his

rights under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlk; the DMV; and Valverde. He claims that each of these

defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or instruct its officers, agents and/or employees”

to understand the proper application of Vehicle Code § 12801.5(e) (“a peace officer may

not detain or arrest a person solely on the belief that the person is an unlicensed driver”). 

Plaintiff alleges that this failure to train “caused, led to and/or resulted in” malicious

prosecution without probable cause, in an effort to deprive him of his constitutional rights,

from February 23, 2005, through April 11, 2005. SAC ¶ 92.

In the tenth cause of action, plaintiff asserts false arrest/imprisonment in violation of

his rights under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlik; the DMV; Valverde; and

Lake County (including the Lake County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff Mitchell). He

alleges that each of these defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or instruct its officers,

agents and/or employees” to “understand, recognize and/or to accept the non-contractual

forms of identification carried by citizens.” Plaintiff claims that this failure to train “caused,

led to and/or resulted in” his false arrest and false imprisonment and the seizure of his

automobile pursuant to Vehicle Code § 12500(a) on February 23, 2005. SAC ¶ 94-95.

In the eleventh cause of action, plaintiff alleges false arrest/imprisonment in violation

of his rights under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlik; the DMV; Valverde; and

Lake County (including the Lake County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff Mitchell). He

asserts that each of these defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or instruct its officers,

agents and/or employees” to “understand, recognize and/or to accept the non-contractual

forms of identification carried by citizens.” Plaintiff claims that this failure to train “caused,

led to and/or resulted in” his false arrest and false imprisonment on July 14, 2005, on an

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 As a further basis for dismissing the BHT, the DMV, and Sedlik and Valverde in their

official capacities, the court notes that they are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and are therefore not subject to suit under § 1983. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,

25-26 (1991). 

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alleged violation of Vehicle Code § 12500(a). SAC ¶ 97-98.

In the twelfth cause of action, plaintiff asserts a claim double jeopardy, in violation of

his rights under the 1849 California Constitution and the Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, against the BTH; Sedlik; the DMV; and

Valverde. He asserts that each of these defendants failed to “train, supervise and/or

instruct its officers, agents and/or employees” as to “the proper recognition and/or

understanding of law” as applied to distinguish between “persons” and “citizens,” and as to

“the proper recognition, understanding and/or acceptance of . . . non-contractual

documents carried by citizens.” Plaintiff claims that this failure to train “caused, led to

and/or resulted in” his being placed in jeopardy on February 23, 2005, and again on July

14, 2005, for the same offense. SAC ¶¶ 100-101. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

When a complaint is filed in forma pauperis, it must be dismissed prior to service of

process if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages

from defendants who are immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Franklin v.

Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1984).

B. Analysis

1. Claims Against State Agencies and State Officials

In the April 17, 2007, order, the court dismissed all claims asserted against the BTH

and the DMV, on the ground that they are state agencies that are immune from suit in

federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. For related reasons,

the court dismissed all claims asserted against Barry Sedlik and George Valverde in their

official capacities. Because the dismissals were with prejudice, the court does not now

consider any of those claims.3 

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The court also dismissed the claims against Sedlik and Valverde in their individual

capacities with leave to amend. The order instructed plaintiff that any amended complaint

must allege facts showing that Sedlik and Valverde were personally involved in the alleged

deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In the SAC, plaintiff alleges no facts

concerning Sedlik and Valverde other than the conclusory assertions that they failed to

supervise or train unnamed subordinates or agents, and implemented unidentified policies

that resulted in the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

In pleading constitutional violations, a plaintiff need not show with great specificity

how each defendant contributed to the violation of his constitutional rights. Nevertheless,

“he must state the allegations generally so as to provide notice to the defendants and alert

the court as to what conduct violated clearly established law.” Preschooler II v. Clark

County Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007). A person deprives

another of a constitutional right under § 1983 only if he “does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts,” or fails to perform a legally required duty which

“causes the deprivation of which” the plaintiff complains. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628,

633 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, there are no allegations in the SAC tying Sedlik or Valverde to the events

plaintiff claims caused his injuries. He asserts that both Sedlik and Valverde are

responsible for supervising the employees of their respective agencies, but alleges no more

than that Sedlik’s and Valverde’s respective responsibilities within the agencies that employ

them somehow establish personal involvement. Such allegations are insufficient to state a

claim. Ouztz v. Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987). As the court noted in the

April 17, 2007, order, while a supervisor is liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 “if [he]

participated in or directed the [constitutional] violations, or knew of the violations and failed

to act to prevent them,” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation

omitted), there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, see Polk Co. v. Dodson,

454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). 

It is apparent that plaintiff is unable to allege any facts showing that Sedlik or

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 “‘Public employee’ means an employee of a public entity.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 811.4.

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Valverde were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations or that they knew

of the alleged violations and failed to stop them. Indeed, apart from the claims against

Sedlik and Valverde themselves, plaintiff does not allege any constitutional violation by any

employee of either the BHT or the DMV. Accordingly, the court finds that the claims

against Sedlik and Valverde in their individual capacities must also be dismissed with

prejudice. 

The first, seventh, ninth, and twelfth causes of action are dismissed in their entirety,

with prejudice, and the claims asserted against the BTH, the DMV, Sedlik, and Valverde in

the second, fourth, fifth, eighth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action are also dismissed

with prejudice and may not be re-alleged in any future amended complaint. 

2. Claims Against Lake County Board of Supervisors

All claims asserted against Lake County are alleged against the County “including

but not limited to” the Lake County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff Mitchell. The SAC

does not specifically identify the five members of the Board of Supervisors as defendants. 

The SAC does, however, allege that the Board of Supervisors includes Ed Robey, Jeff

Smith, Gary Lewis, Anthony Farrington, and Rob Brown, and that they are being sued “in

their individual and official capacities pursuant to Government Code § 811.4.”4

 

The court interprets this as an indication that plaintiff intends to name the five

individual supervisors as defendants. Under California law, a county board of supervisors

has a statutory duty to supervise the conduct of all county officers, including county

sheriffs. Dibb v. County of San Diego, 8 Cal. 4th 1200, 1210 (1994). Although a board of

supervisors is prohibited from interfering with the sheriff’s “independent and constitutional

and statutorily designated investigative . . . functions,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 25303, the board

“nonetheless maintains a substantial interest in the performance of the sheriff’s

department, including the conduct of its officers when investigating a crime.” Brewster v.

Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803, 810 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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 Even if he had, any claims against the CHP or CHP officers acting in their official

capacity would be subject to dismissal, for the reasons stated above with regard to the other

California defendants.

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The court notes that the SAC does not plead any facts showing that the individual

members of the board of supervisors failed to supervise the sheriff. However, unlike the

claims asserted against state officials Sedlik and Valverde, where the SAC does not plead

even a tenuous connection between those defendants and the arresting officers, the claims

against the individual supervisors do allege that they supervised the “officers” (presumably,

Sheriff Mitchell and Officers McMahon and Macedo), and that the Supervisors were

responsible for certain unidentified policies, practices or procedures that resulted in the

alleged unlawful arrest on June 14, 2005. Accordingly, the court finds that the SAC states

a claim against the members of the Lake County Board of Supervisors. 3.

Constitutional Claims

a. False arrest

Plaintiff alleges claims of false arrest in connection with both the February 23, 2005,

incident and the June 14, 2005, incident. In the factual background, plaintiff alleges that on

February 23, 2005, he was stopped and arrested by officers of the California Highway

Patrol (“CHP”). SAC ¶ 49. In the first and tenth causes of action, he alleges false arrest on

February 23, 2005. SAC ¶¶ 74, 95. However, he does not name the CHP or any CHP

officers as defendants.5

 Accordingly, the first and tenth causes of action fail to state a

claim for false arrest. 

Plaintiff also alleges, in the second, third, fourth, and eleventh causes of action, that

he was falsely arrested or arrested without probable cause on July 14, 2005. SAC ¶¶ 77,

82, 84, 98. The second, fourth, and eleventh causes of action are asserted against Lake

County, the Supervisors, and Sheriff Mitchell, and the third cause of action is asserted

against McMahon and Macedo. 

The primary difference between the false arrest claims in the second, fourth, and

eleventh causes of action is that plaintiff alleges a different claim of “failure to train” in each. 

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In the second cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendants failed to instruct their officers

that statutes that employ the term “person” do not apply to “the citizen.” In the fourth cause

of action, plaintiff asserts that defendants failed to instruct their officers that under Vehicle

Code § 12801.5(e), a peace officer may not detain or arrest a person solely on the belief

that the person is an unlicensed driver. In the eleventh cause of action, plaintiff alleges that

defendants failed to instruct their officers to recognize or accept the “non-contractual forms

of identification carried by citizens.” 

Because the court finds the “failure to train” allegations in the second and eleventh

causes of action to be frivolous on their face, and because the false arrest claims in those

causes of action are otherwise duplicative of the claim in the fourth cause of action, the

court finds that the duplicative false arrest claims must be dismissed. 

As for the false arrest claim in the fourth cause of action, the court finds for purposes

of this analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), that the third cause of action (against McMahon

and Macedo) and the fourth cause of action (against Lake County, the Supervisors, and

Sheriff Mitchell) do state a claim of arrest without probable cause. A claim of unlawful

arrest is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition

against unreasonable search and seizure if the allegation is that the arrest was made

without probable cause or other justification. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-59 (1967).

Plaintiff should note, however, that the law is clear that a police officer may conduct

an investigatory traffic stop if the officer has a “reasonable suspicion” that a particular

person “has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” United States v.

Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1318 (2007) (citing

United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000). A traffic violation alone

is sufficient to establish “reasonable suspicion.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810

(1996) (decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when police have probable cause to

believe that a traffic violation has occurred). This is true regardless of whether the violation

was merely pretextual, the stop departed from the regular practice of a particular police

jurisdiction, or the violation was common and insignificant. Choudhry, 461 F.3d at 1102

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(citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-12, 814-15, 818-19). Thus, while the court finds that the

claim of false arrest in the SAC is sufficient, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), to

state a claim, that conclusion will have no bearing on whether plaintiff will be able to

establish the merits of this claim. 

The third and fourth causes of action also allege a violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights. There is no substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal arrest or prosecution except upon probable

cause. Relief for such a claim is available only under the Fourth Amendment. See Albright

v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268-75 (1994). To the extent that plaintiff intends to allege a claim

of deprivation of property without due process, in connection with the impoundment of his

vehicle on June 14, 2005, such a claim should be pleaded in a separate cause of action in

any amended complaint.

Accordingly, the false arrest claims in the first, second, tenth, and eleventh causes

of action are dismissed with prejudice 

b. False imprisonment

In the seventh and tenth causes of action, plaintiff alleges false imprisonment in

connection with the February 23, 2005, incident. He asserts that he was held for 48 hours

in the County Jail following his arrest for cultivation of marijuana, possession of marijuana,

driving over the speed limit, and driving without a license. A claim for false imprisonment

does not ordinarily state an independent claim under § 1983 absent a cognizable claim for

wrongful arrest. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-45 (1979). As plaintiff has not

stated a claim for false arrest in connection with the February 23, 2005, incident, he may

not maintain an independent claim for false imprisonment. 

In the fifth, sixth, and eleventh causes of action, plaintiff alleges false imprisonment

in connection with the June 14, 2005, incident. Under the facts as pleaded, however,

plaintiff was stopped by Officers McMahon and Macedo for driving without a license, and

was detained for approximately seven to twelve minutes. As plaintiff was not taken into

custody, any claim of false imprisonment in these causes of action would be redundant of

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 Moreover, plaintiff cannot state a state tort claim of false imprisonment, as he admits

he did not file a timely claim under the California Tort Claims Act. See Briggs v. Lawrence, 230

Cal. App. 3d 605, 612-13 (1991) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.2, 945.4, 950.2, 950.6(a)). 

7

 Plaintiff also asserts a claim of malicious prosecution in the ninth cause of action,

against the state defendants. However, as indicated above, that claim is dismissed with

prejudice.

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the false arrest claim. The SAC pleads no facts showing that the claim of false

imprisonment is distinct and separate from the claim of arrest without probable cause.6

Accordingly, the false imprisonment claims in the fifth, sixth, seventh, tenth and

eleventh causes of action are dismissed with prejudice. 

c. Malicious prosecution

In the eighth cause of action, plaintiff alleges a claim of malicious prosecution

against Lake County, the Supervisors, and Sheriff Mitchell.7

 Plaintiff asserts that

defendants failed to train, supervise, or instruct their employees as to the proper application

of Vehicle Code § 12801.5(e), with the result that plaintiff was prosecuted without probable

cause in connection with the July 14, 2005, incident. 

To prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that

defendants prosecuted him with malice and without probable cause, and for the purpose of

denying him equal protection or another specific constitutional right. Awabady v. City of

Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation omitted). “Malicious

prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be brought, as

here, against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.” Id.; see

also Ramirez v. County of Los Angeles, 397 F.Supp. 2d 1208, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

The court finds that the SAC adequately states a claim for malicious prosecution in

connection with the June 14, 2005, incident. The court notes, however, that in the event

that plaintiff does not prevail on his false arrest claim, the claim for malicious prosecution

will also fail.

d. Ninth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges violations of the Ninth Amendment in the first, second, tenth,

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eleventh, and twelfth causes of action. The Ninth Amendment provides that “the

enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or

disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. amend. ix. 

The Ninth Amendment “has never been recognized as independently securing any

constitutional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil rights claim.” Strandberg v. City of

Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1986); see also San Diego County Gun Rights

Committee v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1996) (collecting authorities rejecting the

Ninth Amendment as independently securing constitutional rights). Instead, a civil rights

claim must be based on a specific constitutional guarantee. Strandberg, 791 F.2d at 749

(collecting United States Supreme Court authorities).

Accordingly, the claims of Ninth Amendment violations do not state a claim, and

must be dismissed with prejudice.

e. Tenth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges violations of the Tenth Amendment in the first, second, tenth,

eleventh, and twelfth causes of action. The Tenth Amendment, which states that the

“powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the

States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,” U.S. Const., amend. x,

was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power. New York

v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992). The Amendment confirms that the power of

the federal government is subject to limits. Id. at 157. 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not give rise to a cause of action under the Tenth

Amendment because the United States is not a party to this action. Accordingly, claims of

Tenth Amendment violations must be dismissed with prejudice. 

f. Double jeopardy claim

In the twelfth cause of action, plaintiff alleges that he was placed twice in jeopardy

for the same offence, which he claims violated his rights under the Fourth, Ninth, Tenth,

and Fourteenth Amendments. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states

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through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the

same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. v; see Benton

v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the

imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Hudson v. United States,

522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); see also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959)

(“The basis of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy is that a person

shall not be harassed by successive trials; that an accused shall not have to marshal the

resources and energies necessary for his defense more than once for the same alleged

criminal acts.”) 

Here, plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that he was placed twice in jeopardy for

the same offense. Rather, the facts alleged show that he was cited on two separate

occasions, each time for operating a motor vehicle without a license. Plaintiff cannot state

a claim of double jeopardy under the facts alleged. The dismissal of the double jeopardy

claim in the twelfth cause of action is with prejudice. 

g. Claims under the California Constitution

Plaintiff asserts violations of the 1849 California Constitution, in each of his twelve

causes of action. The California Constitution of 1849 is no longer in effect, as the current

Constitution was adopted in 1879. See Wheeler v. Thomas F. White & Co., Inc., 1998 WL

239266 at *5 (C.D. Cal., March 19, 1988); see also 7 Witkin, Summary of California Law,

Constitutional Law, § 67 (10th ed., 2006). Thus, plaintiff cannot state a claim under the

1849 California Constitution, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the court finds that the second amended complaint

must be DISMISSED. The dismissal is with LEAVE TO AMEND, with the following

limitations.

1. All claims against the BHT, the DMV, Barry Sedlik, and George Valverde are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Any amended complaint must delete all references to

these defendants.

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8

 This appears to be a reference to the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1783, which ended

the hostilities between Great Britain and the United States, known in the United States as the

Revolutionary War. See Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and

his Brittanic Majesty, Sept. 3, 1793, 1783 WL 47 (U.S. Treaty), 8 Stat. 80, Great Britain. 

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2. All claims asserting violations of the 1849 version of the California

Constitution are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Any amended complaint must delete all

references to the 1849 version of the California Constitution.

3. All claims asserting violations of plaintiff’s rights under the Ninth and Tenth

Amendments, and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Any amended complaint must

delete all references to alleged violations of plaintiffs’ rights under the Ninth and Tenth

Amendments or the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

4. All factual allegations describing traffic stops, citations, vehicle impoundment,

arrests, imprisonment, or court hearings relating to incidents that occurred prior to January

23, 2005, cannot form the basis of a claim in this action, because any such claim would be

time-barred for the reasons stated in the April 17, 2007, order. Thus, all such allegations

must be deleted from any amended complaint.

5. All allegations regarding defendants’ failure to understand, recognize, or

accept the legal distinction between “persons” and “citizens” or the law relating to “citizens”

(first, second, and twelfth causes of action); regarding defendants’ failure to understand,

recognize, or accept the “non-contractual forms of identification carried by citizens” (tenth

and eleventh causes of action); and regarding violations of plaintiff’s rights under the “1783

Treaty of Peace”8

 are STRICKEN as frivolous on their face and may not be re-alleged in

any amended complaint.

6. No later than July 2, 2007, plaintiff shall file a third amended complaint, which

may allege only Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest and/or false imprisonment, and/or

claims of malicious prosecution, or Fourteenth Amendment claims of seizure of property

without due process, in connection with the incident on June 14, 2005, against

Lake County, the Supervisors, Sheriff Mitchell, and Sheriff’s Deputies McMahon and

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Macedo. No other claims or defendants may be added unless plaintiff first obtains leave of

court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 

7. If the court finds, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), that the third amended

complaint states a claim and is not frivolous, the court will re-visit plaintiff’s application to

proceed IFP. 

8. The motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED, as stated in the April 17,

2007, order, because this court has no jurisdiction to order any state or local official to

refrain from future legal arrests and/or prosecutions. Moreover, plaintiff has not established

any valid legal basis for the motion. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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