Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06059/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06059-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERONICA GARCIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

LOS BANOS UNIFIED SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:04-CV-6059-SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S AND

DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

(DOCS. 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78,

79)

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.

I. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine (Doc. 73)

Plaintiff filed motions in limine on February 12, 2007,

and Defendant filed opposition on February 20, 2007 (Doc. 89).

The matters were argued to the Court on March 5, 2007, with Rey

Hassan appearing for Plaintiff, and Robert Rosati for Defendant.

The matters were submitted to the Court for decision.

A. Motion No. 1: Defendant’s Investigation and Findings

Plaintiff objects to 1) evidence of Defendant’s findings or

determination that there was insufficient evidence of sexual

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harassment and retaliation; and 2) evidence of the investigation

conducted by Susan Kaplan, a paralegal employed by Defendant’s

law firm; and 3) “all testimony” of Kaplan (Mot p. 2).

1. Rule 403

a. Legal Standards

Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides that although relevant, evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.

A district court retains broad discretion to make the

determinations required by Rule 403. Obrey v. Johnson, 440 F.3d

691, 698 (9 Cir. 2005) (exclusion of other incidents of th

unequal/discriminatory treatment held erroneous where probative

of motive, bias, and/or pretext in a pattern and practice of

discrimination case). A district court’s weighing process

pursuant to Rule 403 should be stated on the record; when a court

fails to make an explicit finding of Rule 403 balancing on the

record, an appellate court reviews the evidentiary determination

de novo. United States v. Boulware, 384 F.3d 794, 805 n.6 (9th

Cir. 2004).

In determining whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403, a

court should consider whether the evidence presents a danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion, delay, waste of time, or unnecessary

accumulation of evidence. The court should consider the probative

value of the evidence and should evaluate the relative weight of

these factors as to the evidence in question as well as to

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actually available substitute evidence, stipulations, etc. If

there is alternative evidence with substantially the same or

greater probative value as the proffered evidence but with a

lower danger of unfair prejudice, exercise of a sound judicial

discretion would discount the value of the proffered item and

exclude the proffered evidence if its discounted probative value

were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk. Such

a weighing should be made in view of the availability of other

facts appropriate to the Rule 403 determination as well as with

an appreciation of the offering party’s need for “evidentiary

richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case....” Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-83 (9 Cir. 1997) th

(citing, inter alia, the Committee Notes to Rule 403).

Courts have considered various factors, such as the

importance of the evidence and the need for it in the context of

litigation, including both the extent to which the evidence tends

to establish the matter as to which it is offered and the extent

to which that matter is directly in issue, Mihailovich v.

Laatsch, 359 F.3d 892, 906-914 (7 Cir. 2004); United States v. th

Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1978); the length of the

chain of inferences necessary to establish the fact of

consequence, United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir.

1997); remoteness in time as affecting probative value, Tennison

v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., 244 F.3d 684, 690 (9 Cir. th

2001) (upholding the trial court’s exercise of discretion under

Rule 403 to exclude five-year-old incidents of harassment with

other parties that would have shown knowledge of the employer of

the harasser’s conduct but which carried a substantial danger of

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inefficient use of trial time in considering collateral events in

a “mini trial” and of focusing the jury’s assessment on remote

events); the availability of alternative means of proof, Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184-5 (1997); the presence

of any surprise, Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 798-99

(10 Cir. 1980); and the probable effectiveness or lack thereof th

of a limiting instruction, United States v. Boulware, 384 F.3d

794, 808 (9 Cir. 2004), or of redaction, Constantino v. David M. th

Herzog, M.D., P.C., 203 F.3d 164, 1765 (2d Cir. 2000).

If the probative value and danger of prejudice, confusion,

etc., are of relatively equal weight, the evidence should be

admitted. Blancha v. Raymark Industries, 972 F.2d 507, 516 (3d

Cir. 1992).

Undue prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision

on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an

emotional one, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180

(1997) (concerning character evidence used to show propensity to

commit an offense); it is evidence likely to inflame the passions

of the jury sufficiently to distract them from the issues, United

States v. Layton, 767 F.2d 549, 556 (9 Cir. 1985). th

In considering undue prejudice, courts have considered

whether or not cross-examination and/or cautionary instructions

may reduce the risk of prejudice. DeBiasio v. Illinois Central R.

R., 52 F.3d 678, 687 (7 Cir. 1995). th

Evidence may be more likely to confuse the issues or mislead

the jury where its admission would lead to litigation of

collateral issues and thereby create a side issue that might

distract the jury from the main issues. Blancha v. Raymark

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Industries, 972 F.2d 507, 516 (3d Cir. 1992).

If the probative value of evidence is minimal and thus is

substantially outweighed by the amount of time it will take to

establish the evidence, it may be excluded, such as when detailed

rebuttal testimony is necessary in order to show lack of

probative worth. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litigation, 611

F.Supp. 1223, 1255-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).

A court has discretion to exclude evidence that is

cumulative or repetitive of evidence already in the record.

United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 847 (9 Cir. 1996) th

(upholding exclusion of expert on eyewitness identifications

because its substance was covered in cross-examination and jury

instructions). Demonstrative evidence is generally not considered

cumulative of oral testimony on the same subject matter because

it illustrates it. Grimes v. Employers Mutual Liability Co. of

Wisconsin, 73 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D.AK 1977); but see Pursche v.

Atlas Scraper and Engineering Co., 300 F.2d 467 489 (9 Cir. th

1961) (upholding exclusion of motion picture when testimony and

still pictures were admitted into evidence). 

b. Analysis regarding Investigation 

The fact that Defendants carried out an investigation, and

the nature and extent of that investigation, is part of a crucial

defense to Plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment

harassment by a supervisor, and also a defense to an apparently

separate claim that Defendants did not respond appropriately to

Plaintiff’s complaint regarding the alleged masturbation of May

30, 2003. Defendants will attempt to show that it undertook

prompt corrective action reasonably calculated to prevent and

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correct harassment, and Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take

advantage of the opportunities to avoid harm. See, Bator v. State

of Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9 Cir. 1994); Sarro v. City of th

Sacramento, 78 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1064-65 (E.D.Cal. 1999)

(recognizing this as a basis of Title VII liability). Plaintiff

alleged that the board was required by federal law to take

reasonable steps to prevent harassment and retaliation for

opposing unlawful sexual harassment by employees, and the

Defendant failed or refused to take appropriate action to remedy

it and prevent it. (FAC ¶¶ 7, 15, 18.)

It is also relevant to the question of whether or not

Defendant is liable for Heid’s conduct in that it reveals what

the employer knew of the misconduct and what it did to cure or

prevent it. 

Although Heid may not be personally liable for his own Title

VII violation, an employer is generally liable for hostile work

environment sexual harassment by a supervisor who has immediate

or successively higher authority over the employee in question.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).

However, a recognized defense is that the employer exercised

reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing

behavior, and the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage

of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided to avoid

the harm. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,

765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. at 807.

Thus, evidence of the investigation has high probative

value. The fact that Kaplan was or may have been biased due to a

connection between her employer’s office and the Defendant, or

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because she was being paid, or the inherent bias of the board’s

finding based on the fact that the decision makers were all inhouse, should not require exclusion; it is for the finder of fact

to determine the adequacy of the investigation. Further,

generally, a witness’s lack of credibility does not itself

constitute unfair prejudice; rather, it would be a basis for the

finder to evaluate the witness. See, Rainey v. Conerly, 973 F.2d

321, 325-26 (4 Cir l992) (error to exclude document thought to th

be unreliable; lack of credibility was not unfair prejudice per

se under Rule 403; the jury is to resolve the issue of

credibility). Although it might take up substantial time and

raise some collateral issues, that consideration does not

outweigh the probative value.

The Court notes that in a somewhat related motion in limine,

Defendant seeks to exclude Plaintiff’s consistent statements

during the investigation and therapy regarding the events that

Plaintiff claims constitute harassment/hostile work environment.

It would be unfair to permit Defendant to show how it proceeded

in investigating and to assert the reasonableness and adequacy of

its process without Plaintiff’s being able to show Plaintiff’s

input into the investigation and experience of the investigation;

indeed, it might be confusing to the trier not to have a full and

balanced story of the investigation because the trier would not

understand the basis for the parties’ actions and responses. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the probative value is

not substantially outweighed by prejudice or other negative

factors, and the motion to exclude all evidence of the

investigation IS DENIED.

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c. Analysis regarding Findings

Plaintiff argues that the finding of Defendant that there

was insufficient evidence of harassment and retaliation (both are

mentioned at p. 3, but only the former is argued at pp. 3-4 of

Plaintiff’s motion) should be excluded under Rule 403 because the

findings could poison the well of clear judgment, causing jurors

to be hesitant to overturn the findings of such a sophisticated

and august group.

Plaintiff relies on authority concerning agency findings. A

court in this circuit must introduce an agency’s finding of

probable cause. Beachy v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 191 F.3d

1010, 1015 (citing authorities). However, in ruling on an

objection to the admissibility of agency findings of insufficient

facts to continue an investigation (which is more analogous to

the present case, which involves an employer’s own investigation

that culminated in a finding of insufficient evidence of

harassment or retaliation), a court need not admit it per se, and

instead should conduct a balancing pursuant to Rule 403. The

document is not a preliminary probable cause finding, but rather

is like a final ruling by the agency, which carries a greater

risk of unfair prejudice because a jury might find it difficult

to evaluate evidence independently after being informed of the

investigating agency’s final results. Beachy v. Boise Cascade

Corporation, 191 F.3d p. 1015; see, Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons

Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488 (9 Cir. 1986) (EEOC letter of th

violation subject to discretionary admission). It has been held

appropriate to exclude the EEOC‘s conclusive finding of liability

under Title VII (and to have the parties stipulate to a statement

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of facts of the relevant incident and investigation where

liability was already established and the only issue was the

suffering of emotional distress as a result of the employer’s

failure to conduct an adequate investigation). Amantea-Cabrera,

279 F.3d 746, 749-50.) It has also been held that it was not

erroneous to admit evidence of an arbitrator’s decision (later

vacated by a court) of a racial discrimination violation as a

complete narrative of the events of the case where the jury

repeatedly was told that the award had been vacated, and thus any

prejudice was immediately and repeatedly miniminzed. Elsayed

Mukhtar v. California State University Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053,

1062 (9 Cir. 2002), amended 319 F.3d 1073 (2003). th

It is recognized that an employer’s duty to take corrective

action in response to a complaint of harassment has two parts:

temporary steps to deal with the situation while the employer

determines whether the complaint is justified; and permanent

remedial steps the employer takes once it has completed its

investigation. Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192. The

findings of the employer (there the USPS, which found that it

could not support a case of sexual harassment by a co-worker

against the alleged perpetrator) were admissible in Swenson v.

Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1193-95, including the findings of the inhouse investigation (at 1196) as well as the findings of the EEOC

ALJ to the effect that a violation of Title VII had occurred (at

1198). Although not raised as an issue in that case, the

evidentiary rulings make sense because of the need under the law

for the trier to determine the adequacy of the investigation

process and the actions taken in as a result thereof. The

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evidence of the employer’s conclusion or finding is part and

parcel of the investigation and other actions taken thereafter,

which have high probative value. Any prejudice would not be

unfair or undue because the Plaintiff is trying, after all, to

show not only that Heid sexually harassed her, but also that the

employer was aware of it and took ineffective or inadequate

actions, thereby violating Title VII. Any bias of the

investigators or the board which informally decided the issue may

be argued to the jury, as may any unfairness or inadequacy of the

investigation. As Plaintiff’s counsel admitted at hearing, the

finding, if based on an investigation found by the trier to be

unfair or inadequate, could conceivably could work in Plaintiff’s

favor on the third claim.

The Court concludes that the probative value of the findings

of the Defendant during the investigation is not outweighed by

the potential for prejudice under Rule 403.

The Court will consider giving a limiting instruction that

the evidence of the finding is admitted to show that the finding

was made, not that it was factually accurate or that the

harassment did not occur. The parties are directed to suggest to

the Court the terms of such an instruction.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude the

findings of the employer in the investigation under Rule 403 IS

DENIED.

d. Analysis regarding Kaplan’s Testimony

I. Rule 403

Plaintiff generally objects to all testimony of Kaplan (Mot.

p. 2), presumably testimony regarding the investigation, and

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presumably on the basis of Rule 403. This appears to be largely

duplicative of the motion to exclude testimony regarding the

investigation and findings. However, she is the person who

primarily conducted the investigation; she is the most

knowledgeable percipient witness of the steps undertaken, the

information gained, and the transmission of information to the

employer effected in connection with the investigation, and it

does not appear that there is any substitute for her in this

regard. Again, the probative value outweighs any of the competing

considerations.

Accordingly, the motion to exclude all of Kaplan’s testimony

pursuant to Rule 403 IS DENIED.

II. Expert Opinion

Plaintiff argues that Kaplan is not a qualified expert.

However, at hearing Defendant confirmed that although her

training and qualifications to perform the investigation will be

covered, Kaplan will not be offered as an expert, but rather only

as a percipient witness to the investigation and related

proceedings and events.

Accordingly, the motion to exclude Kaplan’s expert testimony

IS DENIED AS MOOT.

III. Hearsay

Plaintiff states that Kaplan has no personal knowledge of

material facts. Again, she has personal knowledge of the

investigation. With respect to much of the information gained in

the investigation (which witnesses said what when), it is

probable that Kaplan will testify as to statements made by

witnesses. The Court rejects any reliance by Plaintiff on the 

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hearsay prohibition (Plaintiff made no express hearsay objection,

but Defendant covered it in the opposition [p. 9-10]). It would

appear that Kaplan’s relating statements by witnesses would not

be for the purpose of showing the truth of the matters stated,

but rather for the purpose of showing that the statements were

made (i.e., were events in the investigation) or were heard, a

non-hearsay purpose, Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 852 (9 Cir. th

2004), United States v. Montana, 199 F.3d 947, 949 (7 Cir. th

1949), or to show communication to, or knowledge on the part of,

one to whom the information was transmitted, Ramirez-Rodriguez v.

Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 75-77

(1 Cir. 2005). This would bear on the reasonableness of the st

conduct of the employer once informed of the alleged misconduct

of Heid.

Evidence of statements sought to be introduced for the truth

of the matter asserted should be excluded. However, it appears

that Defendant’s purpose in attempting to introduce what was said

during the investigation is not to prove the truth of the matters

asserted, but rather to demonstrate its conduct and that it was a

reasonable response, to show its conduct towards Plaintiff, the

degree of responsiveness to Plaintiff’s complaint reflected in

the investigation, and its focus (i.e., on the conduct, or on

extraneous matters, such as Plaintiff’s own past). 

However, a limiting instruction is appropriate to inform the

jury that the evidence may not be considered for the truth of the

matter asserted, but only for the purpose of showing that the

statement was made. The parties ARE DIRECTED to propose the terms

of a limiting instruction to the Court.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude all of Kaplan’s

testimony as hearsay IS DENIED.

B. Testimony of Heid regarding Son’s Service in Iraq

Plaintiff seeks to exclude Heid’s testimony regarding his

son’s having been deployed to Iraq.

At the hearing on the motion, the parties agreed that Heid

will testify that he retired from LBUSD for personal reasons, to

be closer to his family, and thus moved to Texas with his wife

last year where his son lives. (Opp. p. 2.) In such

circumstances, the evidence of the son’s deployment would seem to

have only remote relevance and a significant risk of some appeal

to jurors’ passions, and thus should be excluded. 

However, if Plaintiff “implies, questions, asks, or argues”

that Heid left LBUSD for reasons other than personal reasons, and

thus litigates the reason for Heid’s retirement or attacks Heid’s

credibility concerning the retirement and move, then testimony

regarding Heid’s son having been deployed to Iraq last year will

be sufficiently relevant and probative to warrant admission

because it would not be significantly outweighed by a potential

for prejudice. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude any mention of

Heid’s son’s service in Iraq IS DENIED AS MOOT, subject to a

renewed objection if evidence introduced or argument raise a

material issue concerning Heid’s reason for leaving the district

or credibility related thereto.

II. Defendant’s Numbered Motions in Limine 

Defendant filed six serially numbered motions in limine on

February 12, 2007 (Docs. 74 through 79, numbered 1 through 6,

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respectively), and Plaintiff filed opposition on February 20,

2007 (Docs. 82 through 87).

A. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 1:

 Harassment of Gomes by Heid (Doc. 74)

Pursuant to Fed. Rule Evid. 403, Defendant moves to exclude

1) any and all testimony, evidence, or argument regarding a

sexual harassment accusation by Margaret Gomes against Ray Heid,

and 2) all other testimony by Margaret Gomes, arguing that the

probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that the

evidence will confuse the issues or mislead the jury, or

necessitate undue delay and a waste of time.

Evidence of Heid’s alleged harassment of Gomes would not be

admissible to show prior acts as demonstrating Heid’s character

and supporting an inference therefrom that he was more likely to

act in conformity therewith at other times, such as with respect

to Plaintiff and her claim of harassment. Fed. Rule Evid. 404

(a). 

However, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be

admissible for other purposes, such as motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake, or accident. Rule 404(b). An employer’s conduct tending

to demonstrate hostility towards a certain group is both relevant

and admissible where the employer’s general hostility towards

that group is the true reason behind firing an employee who is a

member, and even a discriminatory attitude in general is relevant

to prove discrimination with respect to quid pro quo harassment

involving a term or condition of employment. Heyne v. Caruso, 69

F.3d 1475, 1479-82 (9 Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial court th

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erred in excluding evidence of the employer’s harassment of other

female employees because it significantly obstructed Plaintiff’s

attempt to prove motive in rebutting the employer’s proffered

reason for the allegedly discriminatory termination). Evidence of

an employer’s sexual harassment of female employees other than

the plaintiff and evidence of disparaging remarks about women in

general have been held relevant to a discriminatory discharge

claim based in part on hostility towards women. Heyne at 1480

(citing EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 897-98 (9 Cir. th

1994)). The probative value of the employer’s sexual harassment

of other female employees is especially high because of the

inherent difficulty of proving state of mind. Heyne at 1480. Any

prejudice resulting from such evidence is not unfair if the trier

believes that sexual harassment of other female employees made it

more likely that an employer viewed his female workers as sexual

objects and that, in turn, convinced the jury that an employer

was more likely to fire an employee in retaliation for refusal of

sexual advances (i.e., because of sex). In such a case, there is

a direct link between the issue before the jury (employer’s

motive in undertaking the action) and the factor on which the

jury’s decision is based (employer’s harassment of other

females).

Here, the reason for Heid’s negative performance evaluations

of Plaintiff (alleged to be retaliatory) and for his conduct that

could be inferred to reflect a hostile work environment (HWE) is

disputed, with Defendant asserting a valid business reason (poor

work performance), and Plaintiff asserting mistreatment because

of gender. That Heid mistreated Gomes, another female employee in

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the unit, by yelling at her and using bad language towards others

on at least one occasion that she felt was inappropriate, during

the 2001-2002 time frame, and evidence that warrants an inference

that it was because of sex, would be probative of the basis of

the harassment and of the performance evaluations. Although Gomes

stated that she sometimes saw Heid mistreat male employees in the

same way and thus was not sure her own mistreatment by him was

because of sex, it should be remembered that there is other

evidence that treatment of men was more joking or jovial, and

thus the trier should be the one to draw the inference regarding

true motive on each occasion. In addition to the facts that Gomes

and Garcia worked in the same office and that the two women’s

complaints overlapped in time somewhat, in both cases there were

claims of unwarrantedly negative performance evaluations after

complaints, very negative feedback and very hostile work

environment towards both women, and ultimate transfer of the

women after investigations occurred. Thus, there are significant

similarities with the two situations.

Defendant claims that significant time would be taken by the

testimony required to rebut the assertion that Gomes was sexually

harassed and to show that Gomes had a motive to lie, including

testimony from Elliott, Heid, Garcia, and Villalta, which should

take two to three days.

The motive is closely related to the harassment here, and

the probative value of the evidence is substantial; the probative

value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue time

and confusion, or by prejudice. Potential unfair prejudice may be

limited by an instruction that the jury is to consider Gomes’

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sexual harassment testimony only for the determination of the

employer’s motive or basis for conduct towards Plaintiff, or for

any other valid purpose offered by the parties, but not as to

whether or not any harassment actually occurred. Heyne, at p.

1481. The parties are directed to propose the terms of an

appropriate limiting instruction. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of

Margaret Gomes regarding alleged sexual harassment by her of Heid

IS DENIED.

B. Defendant’s in Limine Motion No. 2:

 Acts Not Constituting Sexual Harassment, Time-barred Acts

Defendant’s motion (Doc. 75-1) was opposed by Plaintiff

(Doc. 83).

1. Acts Not Constituting Sexual Harassment

Defendant argues that conduct not constituting sexual

harassment or conduct that is time-barred as a matter of law

should be excluded as irrelevant or pursuant to Rule 403.

The earlier incidents tend to show the nature and extent of

any sexually discriminatory or sexually harassing conduct that in

totality make up the allegedly hostile work environment, a matter

that is central to Plaintiff’s case. There does not appear to be

a danger of undue prejudice; it is up to the trier of fact to

determine the nature and extent of the allegedly hostile work

environment by looking at the events in their totality.

a. Yelling Incident of October 8, 2002

Defendant moves to exclude evidence of the yelling incident

of October 8, 2002, on the ground that it does not constitute

sexual harassment as a matter of law because Garcia admitted that

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she had not perceived this incident or previous yelling as sexual

harassment; it was not until the “wipe your ass” comment that she

considered her treatment to be sexual harassment.

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony reflects that she

complained to Elliot about the October 2002 behavior of Heid

regarding a document that she did not immediately bring to him,

including yelling her name, screaming at her, putting his fists

up in the air and then closing them as he approached her, and

causing her to believe that he was going to hit her; instead,

after she raised her voice to him and said that although she owed

him respect, he also owed her respect, Heid hit himself against

the wall and then said, “Whoa, I blew it.” Plaintiff continued to

be afraid that he was going to return and hit her, even after he

apologized; the gist of the injury was that she felt physically

threatened. She did not consider that incident or the times that

he had previously yelled at her to be sexual harassment.

The Court previously addressed this issue on the motion for

summary judgment in response to Defendant’s request that all

allegations of sexual harassment be determined in its favor

except the masturbation allegations of May 2002 and January 2004. 

It is discrimination because of sex that is actionable; the

critical issue is whether or not members of one sex are exposed

to disadvantageous terms of conditions of employment to which

members of the other sex are not exposed. Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). With respect to

HWE, the issue is whether the conduct in question is sufficiently

severe or pervasive such that a reasonable person in the

Plaintiff’s position would find the environment hostile or

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abusive in light of the context of all surrounding circumstances.

Id. pp. 81-82. Title VII bars not only conduct that would

seriously affect a reasonable person’s psychological well-being,

but also conduct that would reasonably be perceived, and is

perceived, as hostile or abusive. Harris v. Forklift Systems,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). If the victim does not subjectively

perceive the environment to be abusive, then the conduct has not

actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and

there can be no Title VII violation. Id. Factors to be considered

include the frequency of the conduct, the severity of it, whether

it is merely offensive or is physically threatening or

humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance; the effect on the employee’s

psychological well being is relevant to determining whether the

Plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. Id. p. 23.

Here, Plaintiff is asserting a pattern of actions that

together constituted a hostile work environment. Plaintiff

considered the conduct of Heid physically threatening and thus

necessarily humiliating and/or demeaning. Thus, there is evidence

that regardless of Plaintiff’s characterization of the perceived

motive of the treatment at the time, Plaintiff nevertheless

considered it to be humiliating and demeaning and thus abusive.

It remains one act in a series of acts that in their totality may

be determined by the trier to be a hostile work environment.

Cross-examination can ensure that the trier learns that at the

time, Plaintiff did not consider the previous yelling or even

that particular yelling to be based on her sex. Instructions to

the jury will ensure that the jury understands that the only

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actionable harassment is that which is both subjectively and

objectively perceived to be because of sex.

 In summary, the Court concludes that the trier should be

able to consider it along with the remainder of the treatment

Heid gave to Plaintiff, in order to determine the extent of any

harassing conduct and HWE. Plaintiff’s belief that the time as to

the reason for the conduct is one factor among others;

Plaintiff’s ultimate understanding and the reasonableness of it

should be assessed in light of all the circumstances.

A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that physically

threatening conduct was part and parcel of a practice of

harassment directed to Plaintiff because of her sex. Steiner v.

Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9 Cir. 1994) th

(derogatory terms that were not merely offensive but were also

humiliating could constitute harassment on the basis of sex in

context); Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027,

1037 (9 Cir. 2005) (despite a victim’s acknowledgment that she th

had a friendly working relationship and even laughed at some

jokes, the victim’s later determination that she no longer

appreciated the rude jokes could be considered in light of her

ultimately having complained about the course of conduct). 

Further, the yelling/frightening incident is admissible to

show the basis for Plaintiff’s first complaint to Elliott and to

show the extent of the employer’s knowledge of Heid’s conduct,

which in turn could tend to support inferences regarding the

motive or intent of the employer in doing what it did.

b. Wiping Incident 

Defendant also seeks to exclude evidence of the November

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2002 “wipe yourself” comment because it does not meet the

objective criteria for sexual harassment.

Plaintiff testified that with respect to a mistake she had

made on a document, Heid made fun of her for not correcting one

of two mistakes and asked if she wiped herself after she went to

the restroom. She called Elliott about it. She considered it to

be sexual harassment. She also testified that she never again

felt physically threatened and that Heid did not use bad language

around her.

The comment involved direct reference to private functions

in coarse language and in a humiliating manner that a reasonable

trier could find was abusive and based on sex, in light of the

totality of the circumstances of the work environment. It is for

the trier of fact to evaluate the totality of the circumstances

to determine the severity and reason for the harassment.

Therefore, Defendant’s motion to exclude the “wiping”

incident IS DENIED.

2. Time-barred Acts

Defendant further argues that these acts should be timebarred because they are “stand-alone” incidents, unrelated to any

other conduct or interaction and thus not part of a course of

conduct that could in totality be considered a hostile work

environment. However, in the ruling on the motion for summary

judgment, the Court noted that although Plaintiff’s EEOC

complaint was filed in February 24, 2004, the theory of the

violation involves a hostile work environment claim which is

composed of a series of acts which collectively constitute one

employment practice; as long as an act contributing to the claim

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occurs within the filing period, some component acts of the HWE

claim may fall outside the statutory period and yet may be

considered as part of the entire time period of the hostile work

environment for the purpose of determining liability. (Order pp.

34-35.) 

Here, there were a series of similar acts and general

conduct by the same supervisor towards the same employee; they

were relatively frequent throughout the period from 2002 through

January 2004. This is not a case of discrete, unrelated acts;

rather, it is to be evaluated by the trier as a hostile work

environment claim in its totality. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude earlier or timebarred acts IS DENIED.

C. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 3: Emotional

 Distress from Defense Counsel’s Taking a

 Deposition and Raising the Issue of Fraud

 regarding Bereavement Leave (Doc. 76)

Defendant moves to exclude pursuant to Rules 401 and 403 all

evidence and argument concerning defense counsel’s having caused

Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress by taking her deposition

and by raising the issue of bereavement leave fraud.

The evidence carries an undue tendency to inflame the jury

or to suggest an improper, emotional basis for decision, as well

as to distract and confuse the jury. Further, it would invite the

introduction of evidence that would unnecessarily consume time.

To the extent that the evidence would bear on continuation of the

damage claim, it is remote to the action of Heid and the action

or inaction of the school district. It does not appear that a

limiting instruction would cure the problems caused by

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introduction of the evidence.

Further, it was not established that Plaintiff appropriately

and timely disclosed this basis for her claim of damage; there is

no showing of any substantial justification or harmlessness.

Thus, the evidence is subject to exclusion pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude evidence and

argument concerning defense counsel’s having caused Plaintiff to

suffer emotional distress by taking her deposition and by raising

the issue of bereavement leave fraud IS GRANTED. 

D. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 4:

 Harassment/Discrimination Occurring after January 

 2, 2004 (Doc. 77)

Defendant moves to exclude evidence and argument regarding

allegations by Plaintiff of sexual harassment and/or

discrimination allegedly occurring after January 2, 2004, on the

grounds of irrelevance, Rule 403, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 for

failure to disclose any such allegations or conduct in

interrogatory answers.

Reference to the discovery materials submitted by Defendant

shows that there was no mention of any specific incidents or

conduct after January 2, 2004, in Plaintiff’s discovery

responding to questions regarding the facts upon which she based

the allegations of the first amended complaint. However, there

were references to unspecified (i.e., no time or place or other

details) constant cussing, and in connection with damages (Doc.

77-2 p. 16), Plaintiff alleged that her damages included ongoing

anxiety caused by the failure of the district to believe that she

was not telling the truth and its refusal to come to grips with

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Heid’s behavior; she claimed ongoing emotional distress since she

had been portrayed as not believable. The Court is cited to no

evidence that Plaintiff ever made any claims as to any particular

conduct after the pertinent date in her complaint, her

deposition, or in interrogatories. In the first amended

complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the most recent manifestation

of the conduct constituting the course of sexually hostile work

environment occurred on May 30, 2003; thereafter, the Defendant

failed or refused to take appropriate action to remedy the

effects of the discriminatory treatment, and it denied that the

conduct amounted to sexual harassment. (FAC pp. 4-5.)

Plaintiff points to the fact that it was well after the

January 2, 2004 incident that Plaintiff was transferred. The

district’s conduct in response to the January 2, 2004 incident is

within the scope of the third claim regarding unreasonable

response after formal complaint; thus, the completion of the

official action on Plaintiff’s complaints that are the subject of

this action should be permitted. 

Otherwise, acts following the date of January 2, 2004, are

beyond the scope of the complaint and the discovery. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) provides that a party who without

substantial justification fails to disclose information required

by Rule 26(a) [initial disclosures of, inter alia, a copy of, or

description by category and location of, all documents in the

possession of the party that the disclosing party may use to

support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment] or

26(e)(1) [imposing a duty to update initial disclosures or

responses to requests for discovery upon court order or upon

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learning of a material inaccuracy or deficit under circumstances

that the information has not otherwise been made known to the

other parties during the discovery process or in writing], or to

amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2)

[imposing a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an

interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission

if the party learns of a material inaccuracy or deficit and the

information has not otherwise been made known to the other

parties during the discovery process or in writing], is not,

unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at

a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness of information

not so disclosed. Additional or alternative appropriate sanctions

may be imposed upon motion and after a hearing.

The burden of establishing that something is harmless is on

the party who failed to make the required disclosure. Burton v.

R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 203 F.R.D. 636, 639-40. Relief may be

warranted where there is a lack of substantial justification for

the delay in disclosure, accompanied by a showing of prejudice,

which can consist of unfair surprise such that the party is not

able adequately to oppose a motion or otherwise prepare a case.

See Pfingston v. Ronan Engr. Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1005 (9 Cir. th

2002).

Plaintiff responds that unspecified evidence of ongoing

harassment and discrimination against Plaintiff would show a

pattern of misconduct constituting a HWE and callous disregard of

harm caused by Heid’s sexual harassment of Garcia. However, Heid

is no longer employed by the district, and it is assumed that

once Plaintiff was transferred, Heid was no longer her direct

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supervisor. Plaintiff’s discovery refers generally to the effect

on Plaintiff of the perceived violations, as distinct from

continuing affirmative conduct of the district. Defendant could

suffer surprise if specific, affirmative conduct other than

simply standing by the earlier determination is contemplated. No

justification for not giving greater notice is stated.

Conduct on the part of the employer occurring after the

transfer in January 2004, when Plaintiff presumably no longer

worked for Heid, would appear to be very remote from the events

concerning whether Heid’s conduct was harassment. It might bear

on damages, but only in the context of those damages’ continuing,

as distinct from additional acts being committed causing further

damage.

At hearing counsel for the parties agreed that the only

evidence of post-January 2, 2004 conduct intended to be

introduced had been included in the deposition; thus, it was

unclear exactly what evidence Defendant was targeting by the

motion. The parties further appeared to be in agreement that

Plaintiff’s experience of distress and other damages was relevant

and admissible.

The Court concludes that evidence of Defendant’s conduct

that is unrelated to the Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s

complaint concerning the January 2, 2004 incident, and occurring

after that date, is remote from the events of Heid’s alleged

harassment, but it presents a significant danger of misleading

and confusing the jury, and it would surprise Defendant. These

factors outweigh its probative value. There is no justification

or harmlessness shown by the proponent of the evidence.

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Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of

Defendant’s conduct after January 2, 2004, excepting evidence

concerning Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s complaints made

before and on that date, and further excepting conduct that is

mentioned in Plaintiff’s deposition, IS GRANTED.

E. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 5: Subsequent

 Consistent Statements of Plaintiff (Doc. 78)

Defendant moves to exclude evidence of Plaintiff’s

subsequent consistent statements regarding the alleged harassment

made after her reports of the October 2002 and November 7, 2002

events, her note regarding the May 2003 masturbation incident,

and her report to union personnel (John Puentes and Rod Gaulman)

regarding the same incident. The basis of the motion is that

consistent statements made subsequent to these are hearsay

excluded by Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). These subsequent statements

include Plaintiff’s statement at the Mejia hearing on September

11, 2003; her interview and written statements to Kaplan and

Villalta in September and October 2003; her statements to the

board on November 20, 2003; her statement to the EEOC on December

30, 2003; statements to Juri on various dates in 2005, and to

Morewitz in May 2005.

Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) provides in pertinent part:

(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement

is not hearsay if--

(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant

testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to

cross-examination concerning the statement, and the

statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's

testimony, and was given under oath subject to the

penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other

proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with

the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an

express or implied charge against the declarant of

recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,

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or (C) one of identification of a person made after

perceiving the person....

The legal standard was summarized in United States v. Bao,

189 F.3d 860, 864 (9 Cir. 1999): th

An out-of-court statement is not hearsay if the

declarant testifies at the trial and is subject to

cross-examination concerning the statement, and the

statement is “consistent with the declarant's testimony

and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge

against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper

influence or motive.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B); see

United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th

Cir.1996). “Prior consistent statements may not be

admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to

bolster the witness merely because she has been

discredited.... The Rule speaks of a party rebutting an

alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the

story told.” Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150,

157-58, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995). In Tome,

the Supreme Court “added a ‘temporal’ requirement,

holding that prior consistent statements made after the

date of the alleged motivation to lie are

inadmissible.” Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1377; see Tome,

513 U.S. at 167, 115 S.Ct. 696. Therefore, the party

offering the statement must establish four elements

under Rule 801(d)(1)(B): “(1) the declarant must

testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination;

(2) there must be an express or implied charge of recent

fabrication or improper influence or motive of the

declarant's testimony; (3) the proponent must offer

a prior consistent statement that is consistent with

the declarant's challenged in-court testimony; and,

(4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior

to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose.” 

Collicott, 92 F.3d at 979.

United States v. Bao, 189 F. 3d at 864.

However, the parties agree that such evidence is admissible

if not admitted for the purpose of proving the truth of the

matter asserted but rather to prove relevant knowledge,

motivation, or state of mind; that the words were spoken or the

at was done, Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); to show the existence of a

fact rather than its truth, Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338

F.3d 1125, 1130 n.4 (10 Cir. 2003) (internet data admissible to th

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show that the data existed on the internet); or to explain the

course of a series of events, United States v. Eberhart, 467 F.3d

659, 663 (7 Cir. 2006) (testimony regarding recorded th

conversations admissible to explain the course of investigation),

or otherwise to provide context, United States v. Macari, 453

F.3d 926, 941-42 (7 Cir. 2006), cert. den. Brenkus v. United th

States, 127 S.Ct. 688 (2006) (statement regarding an individual’s

involvement in the grand jury was offered for a nonhearsay

purpose to provide context to the hearer’s instructions to the

speaker that were given in response to the statement).

Here, the trier will hear evidence of the course of

Plaintiff’s complaints and the series of events constituting the

investigation into the complaints and the Defendant’s response

thereto. The need to provide context and to explain the course of

the conduct of the parties will mean that vital links in the

sequence of events must not be kept from the jury. The Court

anticipates that most of the statements will be offered for

nonhearsay purposes. The potential for prejudice may be cured by

limiting instructions to the jury explaining that the statements

are to be considered only to provide context and to explain the

course of events, and not for the purpose of determining the

truth of the very matters asserted in the consistent statements.

The potential for duplication of evidence may be remedied by

limiting the detail provided as to the content of the statements.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude subsequent

consistent statements of Plaintiff as hearsay IS DENIED subject

to Defendant’s raising the issue again as the witnesses and facts

require in the course of the trial.

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F. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 6:

 Other Bad Acts of Heid

Defendant seeks to exclude several classes of prior bad acts

as irrelevant and pursuant to Rule 403.

1. Evidence before Employment at LBUSD

There is evidence from Heid’s deposition that he argued with

a supervisor while employed by a previous school district (before

2000), that the supervisor resigned, and that Heid was asked to

attend an anger management class.

There is no evidence that the district knew of this during

the pertinent time during which Heid worked for them; it thus

does not appear to relate to the claim of inadequate response.

If the evidence were offered to show intent or motive, in

determining whether a prior wrong or act is admissible under Rule

404(b) to prove a matter such as motive, intent, knowledge,

absence of mistake, etc., a court will admit the evidence if 1)

it tends to prove a material point, 2) the prior act is not too

remote in time, 3) the evidence is sufficient to support a

finding that the defendant committed the other act, and 4) (where

knowledge and intent are at issue), the act is similar to the

offense charged. United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th

Cir. 2005) (criminal case). The Court’s balancing under Rule 403

to determine the admissibility of bad acts evidence must appear

on the record. Blind-Doan v. Sanders, 291 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Here, the incident is remote and is not similar to the

incidents in the present case, which involve Heid’s conduct with

a subordinate female employee and often involve phenomena in

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addition to anger. It appears that any probative value is

substantially outweighed by prejudice. The evidence carries a

strong potential to inflame the jury and distract them. See,

Tennison v. Circus Circus Entriprises, Inc., 244 F.3d 684 (2001)

(upholding exclusion of co-workers’ testimony of claimed

harassment by the offending actor at a time five years earlier

when more recent evidence regarding other coworkers was

available). 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of

Heid’s pre-employment argument with a supervisor and anger

management follow-up IS GRANTED.

2. Abusive Acts of Heid to Men other than Mejia

Defendant argues that evidence of allegations or questions

regarding allegedly rude, vulgar, unprofessional, or abusive acts

by Heid towards men (except for the Andy Mejia incident which

Defendant admits is “inextricably interrelated to the facts of

this case” (Mot. p. 1)) should be excluded because it could not

prove or tend to prove that Heid sexually harassed Garcia. 

The evidence includes 1) Heid’s being upset and swearing at

a vendor around Christmas 2001 when a parked school bus

spontaneously caught fire; 2) evidence that Heid swore or yelled

at vendors at various occasions; and 3) evidence that Heid yelled

at, swore at or in front of, or yelled at, male subordinates,

peers, and /or supervisors on various occasions.

The incident of swearing at a vendor when a parked school

bus caught fire is not similar to the incidents involving

Plaintiff and Heid, and it is remote. It is of lesser probative

value and is arguably substantially outweighed by the danger of

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undue prejudice and distracting the jury from the material

elements of the case. Likewise, incidents of yelling or swearing

at vendors, as distinct from employees, are dissimilar and may

not be particularly probative, unless they are offered to show

knowledge.

Accordingly, with the exception of the yelling incident

involving Margaret Gomes, Defendant’s motion to exclude evidence

of Heid’s abusive acts towards vendors IS GRANTED. 

Evidence that Heid yelled at or abused male employees is not

irrelevant. There is no showing of the particulars of these

incidents, but the Court understands this evidence to be evidence

that in the pertinent time period Heid yelled at subordinate male

employees at the workplace. It is possible that Heid harassed

employees of both sexes, and yet the nature and quality of his

harassment of female employees was different, and thus a contrast

between harassment of females and harassment of males might tend

to show harassment and harassment because of sex. See, Oncale v.

Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (noting

in a case of same-sex harassment, that comparative evidence about

how alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in mixed-sex

workplace could be offered); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.,

25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (9 Cir. 1994) (noting that abuse of both th

sexes of workers by the employer does not nullify that fact that

a reasonable female worker might still be offended by the

conduct, and further noting that the nature of abuse of females

could differ qualitatively from that of men). 

 A limiting instruction could prevent the jury from using

the evidence to make inappropriate inferences of propensity.

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Counsel are invited to suggest the text of a limiting instruction

or instructions.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude Heid’s abusive

conduct towards male employees IS DENIED.

3. Swearing, Yelling, Rudeness towards Women

Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of Heid’s yelling to

women other than Gomes or Plaintiff when the behavior was not

considered or characterized as sexual harassment. 

As Plaintiff argues, whether or not misbehavior was

characterized by employees or the employer as sexual harassment

is not determinative; rather, the question is whether the

evidence tends to prove a material element of Plaintiff’s case,

or is relevant and within the scope of proper impeachment and

impeachment rebuttal evidence.

The circumstances of yelling in front of other women are not

set forth, but the Court understands that it is evidence of

Heid’s yelling at female employees at the workplace during the

pertinent period of time to show the basis of the harassment.

See, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80

(1998); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64

(9 Cir. 1994). It may also be relevant to prove knowledge on the th

part of Defendant and may be probative of Plaintiff’s subjective

understanding of her own treatment, or of a reasonable person’s

assessment of the situation, with respect to the issue of whether

harassment was because of sex. The evidence would be of

significant probative value in that it would permit the trier to

evaluate the facts relating to a harassment determination in

light of the totality of the circumstances at the workplace at

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the pertinent time. Again, a limiting instruction could limit any

potential for prejudice faced by Defendant; counsel are invited

to suggest the terms of such an instruction.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of

abusive behavior towards other female employees IS DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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