Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01488/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01488-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 47:227 Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY OLIVER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LYFT, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 19-01488 WHA

ORDER RE MOTIONS TO TRANSFER,

STAY, AND BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL,

AND ORDER VACATING HEARING 

INTRODUCTION

In this putative TCPA class action, defendant moves to transfer venue to the Southern

District of Georgia. Plaintiff moves to stay the action. Plaintiff’s counsel moves to be relieved

as counsel. For the reasons stated below, the motion to transfer is GRANTED, the motion to stay

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the motion to be relieved as counsel is GRANTED.

The hearing is VACATED.

STATEMENT

This action is one of several lawsuits brought by plaintiff Anthony Oliver against

defendant Lyft, Inc., a corporation based in this district (Dkt. No. 12, Exhs. D–E). Notably, this

district recently transferred two of plaintiff’s lawsuits against defendant to the Southern District

of Georgia (ibid.). Plaintiff dismissed one of these actions upon transfer, and the other is

pending (Dkt. No. 12, Exh. M). Plaintiff returns to this district with the instant case, alleging

that Lyft, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, sent

unauthorized text messages to his phone and the phones of other Lyft users (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 4).

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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* The Southern District of Georgia has imposed pre-filing conditions on plaintiff, including a postcontempt bond (Dkt. No. 12, Exh. C). The Central District of California has also declared plaintiff a

vexatious litigant (id., Exh. A).

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While residing in Chatham County, Georgia, plaintiff worked as a Lyft driver until

October 2018 (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 15). As a Lyft driver, plaintiff received texts regarding “local Lyft

sponsored events and other messages promoting Lyft’s mobile application” (ibid.). After his

termination, plaintiff continued to receive promotional texts from Lyft, despite allegedly

revoking consent to receive communications from defendant (Dkt. No. 19-2 at 2). As such,

plaintiff contends that the texts sent after October 2018 violate the TCPA. He subsequently

filed suit in this district.*

Plaintiff is currently being held in the Chatham County Jail without bond or a pending

court date (Dkt. No. 19-2 at 1).

Defendant moves to transfer venue to the Southern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a) (Dkt. No. 12). Plaintiff moves to stay the action for five months, pending the

resolution of a criminal proceeding against him (Dkt. No. 14 at 4). Plaintiff’s counsel moves to

be relieved as counsel (Dkt. No. 17). This order follows full briefing. Pursuant to Civil Local

Rule 7-1(b), this order finds the pending motions suitable for submission without oral argument

and hereby VACATES the hearing scheduled for June 6.

ANALYSIS

1. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE.

A court may take judicial notice of any fact “not subject to reasonable dispute because

it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned.” FRE 201(b)(2). 

Here, Lyft filed two separate requests for judicial notice. The requests for judicial

notice are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

A. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN MOTION TO TRANSFER.

In the motion to transfer, Lyft includes twenty-one exhibits to be judicially noticed

(Dkt. No. 12, Exhs. A–U). 

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For the Northern District of California

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Exhibit A is an order from the Central District of California that declares plaintiff a

vexatious litigant. Exhibit C is an order from the Southern District of Georgia imposing

pre-filing conditions on plaintiff. Exhibits D and E are orders from this district that transfer

other actions between plaintiff and defendant to the Southern District of Georgia. Exhibit M is

plaintiff’s notice of dismissal of one such action against Lyft. Exhibit U depicts caseload

statistics in this district and the Southern District of Georgia. The request for judicial notice as

to Exhibits A, C, D, E, M, and U is GRANTED. 

Exhibits B and F pertain to various orders and motions from actions that plaintiff filed

in the past. Exhibit G depicts that plaintiff was booked by the Chatham County Jail. 

Exhibits H–L, Exhibit N, and Exhibits Q–T pertain to more orders and motions from this

district and the Southern District of Geogia in actions in which both plaintiff and defendant are

parties. Exhibit O is a duplicate of Exhibit E. Exhibit P is a copy of Lyft’s Terms of Service. 

These exhibits are not necessary for resolving the motion to transfer venue, so the request for

judicial notice as to Exhibits B, F, G–L, N, O–P, and Q–T is DENIED AS MOOT. 

B. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN REPLY.

In the reply to the motion to transfer, Lyft includes five exhibits to be judicially noticed

(Dkt. No. 23-2, Exhs. A–E). 

Exhibit A is an order written by the Southern District of Georgia regarding a separate

action between plaintiff and defendant. Exhibit B depicts the federal delineations of the judicial

districts in California. Exhibits C, D, and E are various briefs filed by plaintiff in other cases

involving Lyft in the Southern District of Georgia and in this district. These documents are not

necessary for resolving the motion to transfer, so the request for judicial notice as to Exhibits

A–E is DENIED AS MOOT. 

2. LYFT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE.

An action may be transferred to another district “[f]or the convenience of parties and

witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any other district or division where it might have been

brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Venue is proper in a judicial district where “a substantial part

of the events . . . giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). If the proposed

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venue is proper, the court may consider this non-exhaustive list of factors in determining

whether a motion to transfer venue under Section 1404(a) should be granted:

(1) plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) convenience of the parties,

(3) convenience of the witnesses, (4) ease of access to the

evidence, (5) familiarity of each forum with the applicable law,

(6) feasibility of consolidation with other claims, (7) any local

interest in the controversy, and (8) the relative court congestion in

each forum.

Martin v. Glob. Tel*Link Corp., 2015 WL 2124379, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2015)

(Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers). Whether transfer is appropriate is a decision well within the

discretion of the district court. Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007). 

A. Venue Would Have Been Proper in Georgia.

This order finds that venue would have been proper in the Southern District of Georgia

because this is where plaintiff executed Lyft’s Terms of Service and allegedly received the

unauthorized texts. 

At least two times during these proceedings, plaintiff presents inconsistent statements

pertaining to the location where he received the texts (Dkt. Nos. 1 ¶¶ 7, 9; 19-2 at 2, 4). In his

complaint, plaintiff states that the “acts giving rise to the claims alleged herein were committed

in Georgia” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 7). Two paragraphs later, however, plaintiff contradicts himself,

stating that he received the allegedly unauthorized texts in this district (id. at ¶ 9). Plaintiff

contradicts himself yet again in a self-serving declaration, attached to his opposition. In this

declaration, plaintiff states that he exclusively received the unauthorized texts while he was on

vacation in Los Angeles (Dkt. No. 19-2 at 2). This order finds it unnecessary to decide which

of plaintiff’s three equally conflicting statements is true. It is sufficient that plaintiff, in his own

complaint, states that the “acts giving rise to the claims alleged herein were committed in

Georgia” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 7).

 Defendant submits that plaintiff resides in Chatham County, within the Southern District

of Georgia (Dkt. No. 12 at 3). Plaintiff similarly alleges that he is a “citizen of Georgia” (Dkt.

No. 1 ¶ 10). On these assertions, it is highly likely that plaintiff started working for Lyft and

executed Lyft’s Terms of Service while in Chatham County (where he is currently incarcerated). 

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Thus, this order finds that plaintiff consented to receive communications from defendant in the

Southern District of Georgia (Dkt. No. 12, Exh. E at 4). 

Plaintiff contends that because the texts emanated from Lyft’s headquarters in San

Francisco, venue is proper in this district. This argument is unconvincing — more substantial

events giving rise to this action occurred in Georgia, where the contested texts were apparently

received (see Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 7) and where plaintiff initially consented to receiving the promotional

texts.

In light of the foregoing, this order finds that venue is proper in the Southern District of

Georgia.

B. Relevant Convenience Factors Favors Transfer.

(1) Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum.

Ordinarily, a plaintiff’s choice of forum weighs heavily against a defendant seeking to

transfer under Section 1404(a). When the chosen forum is not the plaintiff’s home forum,

however, “the presumption in the plaintiff’s favor ‘applies with less force,’ for the assumption

that the chosen forum is appropriate is in such cases ‘less reasonable.’” Sinochem Int’l Co. v.

Malay Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,

454 U.S. 235, 255–256 (1981)). 

As a resident of Chatham County, plaintiff’s home forum is the Southern District of

Georgia. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, his choice of forum is not accorded the same

deference that it typically receives (Dkt. No. 19 at 2). Though defendant is based in this district,

plaintiff worked for Lyft, executed Lyft’s Terms of Service, and received the allegedly unlawful

texts in Chatham County. This case belongs in Georgia.

(2) Convenience of the Parties.

Plaintiff is currently being held without bond at the Chatham County Jail, absent a court

date (Dkt. No. 19-2 at 1). Denying defendant’s motion to transfer from this district wholly

deprives plaintiff of the ability to participate in all aspects of the proceedings and as a potential

witness. Transferring the case obviates some of these issues. The transfer is convenient for

defendant as well. Defendant is embroiled in another matter with plaintiff in the Southern

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District of Georgia and has since obtained counsel in Georgia (Dkt. No. 12 at 7). Because

transfer to the Southern District of Georgia is more convenient for both parties, this factor

strongly weighs in favor of transfer. 

(3) Convenience of Witnesses. 

At this point, neither party has identified any witnesses that they wish to call upon. 

Plaintiff declares that there are no witnesses in the Southern District of Georgia but fails to states

where any witnesses reside (Dkt. No. 19-2 at 3). Plaintiff, however, is presumably a witness and

is currently incarcerated in Georgia. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. 

(4) Ease of Access to the Evidence.

As with the issue of witnesses, it remains unclear what evidence will be brought forth by

either party. Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that the bulk of his evidence is in his phone, which is

presumably in Georgia, in an evidence locker at the jail. Meanwhile, defendant asserts that any

evidence they have is electronic and can be easily transmitted to Georgia. Because the phone

contains important evidence and is not easily accessible to this district, this factor weighs in

favor of transfer.

(5) Forum’s Familiarity With the Applicable Law.

TCPA is a federal statute. Both this district and the Southern District of Georgia are

equally familiar with the law. Neither venue is more convenient on this basis. This factor is thus

neutral.

(6) Feasibility of Consolidation With Other Claims.

Neither party identifies any actions in either district that would be consolidated with this

claim. Accordingly, this factor is not weighed when considering defendant’s motion to transfer.

(7) Local Interest in the Controversy.

Plaintiff is a resident of Georgia. As a resident of Georgia, this order presumes that he

received the texts in Georgia. In addition, plaintiff executed Lyft’s Terms of Service, effectively

consenting to communications from Lyft while in Georgia. Accordingly, Georgia has a local

interest in resolution of this matter. Although California also has an interest in defendant’s

business practices, given the unusual circumstances under which this controversy arises, Georgia

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ultimately has a greater interest in resolution of this claim. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of

transfer.

(8) Judicial Efficiency.

The Southern District of Georgia has a significantly smaller caseload, allowing the

parties to move through the judicial process more quickly (Dkt. No. 12, Exh. U). This will likely

result in more cost efficient litigation and a more timely decision, quickening the administration

of justice to both parties. In addition, there is one other pending case between plaintiff and

defendant in the Southern District of Georgia. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

For the foregoing reasons, this order finds that transfer to the Southern District of

Georgia is proper. 

3. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STAY.

In light of this order granting defendant’s motion to transfer, plaintiff’s motion to stay is

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renewal before the transferee court. This accords the court in

the Southern District of Georgia the ability to make this determination. 

4. MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL.

Because the motion to transfer is granted, counsel for plaintiff’s motion to be relieved as

counsel is also GRANTED. Plaintiff’s counsel is not licensed to practice in Georgia (Dkt.

No. 19-2 at 3). In addition, neither plaintiff nor defendant oppose the motion (Dkt. Nos. 17-2

¶ 6; 21 at 2).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to be relieved as plaintiff’s counsel is GRANTED. 

The motion to stay is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The motion to transfer is GRANTED. 

The Clerk shall Transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Southern District

of Georgia and CLOSE THE FILE. The hearing scheduled for June 6 is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2019. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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