Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00195/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00195-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST MERRILL, et al., ) 

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

COUNTY OF MADERA, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

______________________________)

COUNTY OF MADERA, )

 )

 Counter-Claimant, )

 )

v. )

 )

ERNEST MERRILL, et al., )

 )

 Counter-Defendants.)

)

 )

1:05-cv-00195-AWI-SMS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

TO CONSOLIDATE ACTIONS AS MOOT

(DOC. 18)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

TO JOIN PARTIES, PERMIT A

SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING ALLEGING A

COUNTERCLAIM, IMPLEAD THIRD

PARTIES, AND FOR MANDATORY

JOINDER (DOCS. 18, 34)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART THE

PARTIES’ REQUESTS THAT THE COURT

TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF DOCUMENTS

FILED IN REMANDED ACTION NO.

1:05-CV-00559-AWI-SMS

I. Background

On September 9, 2005, Plaintiffs Ernest and Lila Merrill

filed their first amended complaint, in which they sued the

County of Madera, two employees thereof (Basch, a code

enforcement officer, and Meyers, who issues permits), and Gary

Gilbert, a member of the County Board of Supervisors, alleging

that the County and its agents gave inconsistent advice

regarding, and required when the law really did not require,

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permits to grade a road on their property which is the only

practical access to their property; denied a road permit in June

2002 and thereafter; wrongly cited Plaintiff for grading a road

without a permit; instigated a criminal prosecution in July 2002

for grading without a permit, which developed into a prosecution

for Fish and Game Code violations regarding which Plaintiff

Ernest Merrill is on probation; delayed a building permit in

August 2002; refused permits for a deck and barn; issued in

October 2003 and then revoked or failed to renew in March 2004

grading permits for the road; and thereby precipitated conflict

between Plaintiffs and third parties Schub and Gillette, who

purchased some of Plaintiffs’ property on which the road is

situated, who gave Plaintiffs an easement over the road, and who

are parties to a contract with Plaintiffs which requires

Plaintiffs to maintain and grade the road. 

The claims stated in the complaint against Defendant County,

which are constitutional claims over which there is federal

question jurisdiction, include denial of access to a public

building, denial of due process (failure of Defendant County to

provide reasons and a hearing as requested by Plaintiffs with

respect to the denials of their various requests for permits),

denial of equal protection (unequal treatment of Plaintiffs with

respect to permits, prosecution, bond requirements, and waiver

thereof), and impairment of the obligations of contract

(contracts between Plaintiffs and Schub and Gillette as well as

others). Plaintiffs seek $100,000,000.00 in damages for the loss

of the money that they spent on grading the road that has washed

our or will wash out because it cannot be completed, damage to

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and loss of the barn, loss of a contract for, or income from,

grazing cows on the land prevented by the absence of the

functioning barn, and loss of potential income or value of

subdividing their land.

Defendants answered the complaint on September 20, 2005,

denying the essential allegations of the complaint, and asserting

affirmative defenses of lack of standing (Plaintiffs’ no longer

own the property that is the subject of the action), lack of

ripeness and exhaustion of state remedies, absolute or qualified

immunity, and unclean hands.

Defendant County filed a counterclaim against Plaintiffs,

various business entities owned and/or operated by them, and

third parties also owning part of Plaintiffs’ ranches or property

situated adjacent thereto, and most recently amended

counterclaims on September 26, 2005, asserting claims alleged to

arise from the same events and occurrences and same case or

controversy (Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)), including nuisance and

violation of County codes (unlawful and substandard road grading

and building activities and subsequent unlawful sales of land to

third parties), public nuisance (damage to slopes and banks,

tributaries and streams, and trees from road grading and other

activities, affecting neighboring properties), violation of

subdivision regulations (lack of required parcel maps), and

declaratory relief (regarding the applicability of the County

codes, and whether the codes have been violated).

In a state court action that was removed to this Court

(Schub v. Merrill, 1:05-cv-00559), Schub and Gillette, the

purchasers and present owners of part of the land over which the

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1No evidentiary materials, such as declarations, have been submitted by either party in connection with the

present motion.

4

road passes, sued the Merrills, Plaintiffs in this action,

stating the following claims: (1) Breach of Easement Agreement

(failure to comply with terms of a written easement by engaging

in unlawful, wrongful and dangerous grading of a road being built

on Plaintiffs’ property, improper use of the easement, and

leaving debris); (2) Specific Performance; (3) Preliminary and

Permanent Injunction; (4) Abatement of Nuisance (caused by the

aforementioned conduct and by failing to comply with governmental

regulations, which in turn caused the County of Madera to “red

tag” the property and thereby to prevent Plaintiffs from using

the roadway to serve their own property and from developing their

own property); (5) Trespass; (6) Declaratory Relief (regarding

the scope of the easement); (7) Termination of Easement (for use

exceeding its scope) ; (8) Negligence (breach of duty created by

regulations and law promulgated by Madera County, California

Department of Fish and Game, and other governmental agencies);

and (9) Fraud (misrepresentation by Defendants at the time of

purchase regarding Plaintiffs’ property being buildable, gated,

fenced, and secure). This action was remanded to state Court on

September 1, 2005. Schub and Gillette assert1 that they are

seeking an injunction in that action.

Plaintiffs assert that the conduct of Defendant County has

prevented it from complying with its duty to third parties Schub

and Gillette to maintain and grade the easement road. Plaintiffs

quote a letter sent to them in April 2004 in which third parties

Schub/Gillete stated that they were refused by Defendant County

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permits to grade and place a construction trailer on the Schub

property because of ongoing code violations (on what or whose

property it is not clear). Plaintiffs also assert that Schub and

Gillette have since decided not to let Plaintiffs use the

easement and have refused access to Plaintiffs’ contractors and

to anyone who seeks to use the easement which Plaintiffs claim

they have over the property now owned by Schub and Gillette.

(Motion filed May 25, 2005, at 3.)

II. The Instant Motions

On May 25, 2005, Plaintiffs filed notice of a motion to

consolidate this action with the action that has been remanded to

state court; this motion is thus moot and will be denied.

Concurrently Plaintiffs filed a motion to join third parties

Schub/Gillette in the present case, to allow a supplemental

pleading pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(e), 13(a), and 14 to

implead and allege a counterclaim against them in connection with

their refusal to permit anyone to use the easement which

Plaintiffs allege they own; they also seek to ensure that Schub

and Gillette, as third party plaintiffs (Mot. at 4) who have been

denied permits for their own development by the County are

indemnified against loss and do not suffer from issue preclusion

or claim preclusion. They assert that this will conserve judicial

resources.

Third parties Schub and Gillette filed opposition on June

27, 2005 (at a time at which they were plaintiffs in a suit

pending in this Court), in which they requested judicial notice

be taken of the papers filed in connection with the motion to

remand in 05-cv-00559 (the motion that was granted, and the case

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that is no longer pending in this Court). 

Third parties also objected that there was no admissible

evidence of the factual matters argued in Plaintiff’s motion, in

violation of Local Rule 78-230(b), which provides that the moving

party shall file affidavits, if appropriate. 

Finally, third parties noted that it is unclear in what

capacity they are to be joined--whether as plaintiffs or

defendants--and whether any such option makes sense. No complaint

in impleader has been filed or proposed, so it is impossible to

determine the exact nature of claims that Plaintiffs are

asserting against third party defendants.

Plaintiffs filed a supplement to its motion to join on

September 22, 2005, in which they sought mandatory joinder

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.

Third parties filed a supplemental opposition on October 11,

2005, continuing their objections to the lack of declarations or

admissible evidence supporting the factual allegations in the

motion, and contesting the propriety of mandatory joinder.

Defendant County has filed neither opposition nor notice of

non-opposition.

By separate order the Court has vacated the hearing of this

matter set for November 4, 2005, and has deemed the matter

submitted on the papers previously filed with the Court.

III. Analysis

 In shotgun fashion, Plaintiffs have referred to several

possible basis for joinder or filing pleadings. Plaintiffs have

failed to submit a proposed pleading setting forth the precise

claim or claims they wish to include in this action; thus, the

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basis of Plaintiffs’ motion is unclear. Nevertheless, to the

extent intelligible, the requests set forth by Plaintiffs will

analyzed.

A. Impleader pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 14

Plaintiffs here seek to ensure that Schub and Gillette, as

third party plaintiffs (Mot. at 4) are indemnified against loss

and do not suffer from issue preclusion or claim preclusion;

further, Plaintiffs seek to conserve judicial resources.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 provides:

At any time after the commencement of the action

a defending party, as a third party plaintiff, may

cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a

person not a party to the action who is or may be

liable to the third party plaintiff for all or part of the

plaintiff’s claim against the third party plaintiff.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(b) provides:

When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff,

the plaintiff may cause a third party to be brought in

under circumstances which under this rule would 

entitle a defendant to do so. 

Impleader is available to a plaintiff where a counterclaim has

been filed against the plaintiff and where the person or entity

to be joined is or may be liable to the plaintiff on account of

the counterclaim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 (a), (b); see Atchison,

Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071,

1074 (9th Cir. 1998). Impleader is designed to bring in a third

party who is or may be liable to the impleading party for all or

part of the plaintiff's (here counterclaimant County’s) claim

against the impleading party. The purpose of this rule is to

promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the necessity for the

defendant (here a plaintiff) to bring a separate action against a

third individual who may be secondarily or derivatively liable to

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2The Court may take judicial notice of court records. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso,

989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d,

645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court takes judicial notice of documents filed in action number 05-00559-AWISMS to the extent those matters are referred to in this order.

8

the defendant (here a plaintiff) for all or part of the original

claim against the impleading party. It is a matter within the

sound discretion of the Court. Southwest Administrators, Inc. v.

Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, there is no basis for a finding that Schub/Gillette

are liable to Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants for all or part of

the claim that the County has against Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants. The County has alleged that Plaintiffs violated codes

and regulations. Schub/Gillette are not named in the

counterclaim. It is possible that by refusing to allow Counterdefendants Merrills to use the easement, Schub/Gillette are

precluding the Merrills’ bringing the road into compliance (now,

as distinct from in the past), but there is no evidence (as

distinct from mere factual assertions and quotation of a what is

asserted to be a letter received from Schub/Gillette from the

Merrills) in support of such an assertion. However,

Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants Merrills are not arguing that;

rather, they are seeking to protect Schub/Gillette from

adjudications regarding those violations. 

 There is no evidentiary showing supporting a finding that

Schub/Gilette are purchasers who, as alleged in the first amended

counterclaim (at 5), in January 2005 purchased their property as

part of a fraudulent marketing scheme by the Merrills; further,

the complaint in action number 05-00559, of which this Court

takes judicial notice,2 indicates (at 3) that the date of the

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Schub/Merrill purchase of property from Plaintiffs was February

7, 2003, and not January 2005, the time referenced in the

counterclaim (at 5). There is no basis for secondary or

derivative liability on the part of Schub/Gillette to the County

for Plaintiffs’ conduct, which is the basis for impleader. See,

United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 452 (9th

Cir. 1983).

Finally, the moving parties have not submitted any pleading

that would permit the Court to ascertain definitely how

Schub/Gillette should participate in this action. 

Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to deny the

request to implead Schub/Merrill pursuant to Rule 14.

B. Mandatory Joinder pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)

Plaintiffs assert, in their motion filed when the

Schub/Gillette action was pending in this Court, that the facts

that give rise to the Schub/Gillete’s (now state) action against

them arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as that in

their action here (namely, the County’s mistreatment of

Plaintiffs), and thus mandatory joinder is appropriate; the

Defendant County, and not Plaintiffs in this action, are

responsible for the harm that third parties Schub/Merrill have

suffered and continue to be responsible for continuing harm

because Defendant County has refused, and conspired to refuse,

permits.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides:

(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall

state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of

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serving the pleading the pleader has against any

opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or

occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing

party's claim and does not require for its adjudication

the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot

acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state

the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced

the claim was the subject of another pending action, or

(2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by

attachment or other process by which the court did not

acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on

that claim, and the pleader is not stating any

counterclaim under this Rule 13.

Rule 13(a) by its terms applies only to claims that the pleader

has against “any opposing party.” Schub/Gillette are not opposing

parties in this action; although they were parties to the earlier

action in this Court, they were not so in any voluntary sense,

and that action has not been remanded to state court. 

Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ request to join

Schub/Gillette in this action by way of a counterclaim.

C. Permissive Joinder pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20

In their Supplement filed on September 22, 2005, Plaintiffs

argued that in this action against Madera, they seek damages for

the County’s impairment of their contract with third parties

Schub and Gillette based on Defendant’s unconstitutional actions

preventing maintenance of the easement. Plaintiffs argue that

Schub/Gillette should be joined permissively as Plaintiffs in

this action under Rule 20, to be liberally construed pursuant to

League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558

F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977), because third parties have been

harmed by the County in a way nearly identical to the way in

which Plaintiffs have been harmed by the County. However,

Plaintiffs acknowledge that these third parties have indicated

they are not interested in permissive joinder.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) provides:

 (a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one

action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief

jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of

or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

series of transactions or occurrences and if any

question of law or fact common to all these persons

will arise in the action. All persons (and any vessel,

cargo or other property subject to admiralty process in

rem) may be joined in one action as defendants if there

is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative, any right to relief in respect of or

arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

series of transactions or occurrences and if any

question of law or fact common to all defendants will

arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not

be interested in obtaining or defending against all the

relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more

of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights

to relief, and against one or more defendants according

to their respective liabilities.

Rule 20(a) by its terms refers to permissive joinder; Plaintiffs

cite no authority permitting the Court to order or mandate

“permissive” joinder. It is undisputed that Schub/Gillette do not

desire to join in this action.

Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ request to

order joinder pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).

D. Mandatory Joinder pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) provides:

a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who

is subject to service of process and whose joinder will

not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the

action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief

cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)

the person claims an interest relating to the subject

of the action and is so situated that the disposition

of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a

practical matter impair or impede the person's ability

to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the

persons already parties subject to a substantial risk

of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise

inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed

interest. If the person has not been so joined, the

court shall order that the person be made a party. If

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the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do

so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper

case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party

objects to venue and joinder of that party would render

the venue of the action improper, that party shall be

dismissed from the action.

By way of brief factual summary, from the pleadings filed in

action number 05-00559-AWI-SMS, in state court the third parties

are suing Plaintiffs for breach of their contractual duty to

maintain the easement and grade the road by engaging in unlawful,

wrongful and dangerous grading of the road, as well as abatement

of nuisance based in part on failing to comply with governmental

regulations, which in turn caused the County of Madera to “red

tag” the property and thereby to prevent Plaintiffs from using

the roadway to serve their own property and from developing their

own property); third parties also allege negligent failure to

perform a duty created by regulations and law promulgated by

Madera County, California Department of Fish and Game, and other

governmental agencies.

In this Court, Plaintiffs are suing the government for

wrongfully delaying and failing to grant permits to grade the

road (and perform other work on his property), citing him for

grading without a permit, prosecuting him for continuing to grade

without a permit and thereby interfering with Plaintiffs’ duty to

the third parties (Schub/Gillette, purchasers of the parcel

abutting the road over which Plaintiffs retain an easement to use

the road to access the remainder of his ranch) pursuant to a

contractual obligation to maintain the road by grading and

maintaining it, and further impairing Plaintiffs’ business

relationship with Schub/Gillette, who have in fact sued

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 No evidence is submitted in support of this factual assertion.

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Plaintiffs. Because of Defendants’ wrongful conduct and the

resulting inability to grade the road, run-off into streams has

occurred, and Merrills were wrongfully and selectively cited for

conditions on the property.

The County has now countersued, alleging in part that

Plaintiffs engaged in development and road construction

activities without permits and without compliance with pertinent

codes and workmanlike standards, causing environmental damage,

and that Plaintiffs further sold in a fraudulent manner parcels

to other persons (not third parties here) who have thereby

assisted with, or are responsible for, the noncomplying

activities on the land. The relief requested by the

counterclaiming County includes a determination that Plaintiffs

violated the Madera County Codes, engaged in nuisances, and a

declaration of the applicability of the County’s grading and

building regulations.

In this regard, Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial

notice of the counterclaim and assert that there has been

sufficient identification of the Doe counterdefendants such that

the Schub/Gillete third parties are in fact identified,

particularly because parcel number 050-102-006, the parcel owned

by Schub/Gillette3, was alleged to be part of Plaintiffs’ Dream

Catcher Ranch and to have been sold; further, because the

purchasers are alleged to have aided and assisted the nuisance on

all parts of the ranch, their conduct is in issue, and Plaintiff

contends that Plaintiffs cannot obtain complete relief unless

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Schub and Gillette are joined. Plaintiffs assert this is the

parcel that Schub/Gillette own. However, as previously noted, the

complaint in previous action 05-00559 reveals that Schub/Gillette

purchased their parcel well in advance of the January 2005 period

specified in Plaintiffs’ complaint in this action.

Plaintiffs admit that the relief they seek in the federal

action is not structured to have a negative impact on the third

parties’ interests, and that if Plaintiffs obtain judgment in

their favor here, it will not negatively impact third parties and

will in fact benefit them because it would permit Plaintiffs to

maintain the easement; further, a judgment in favor of Madera

will not affect any right of the third parties. Plaintiffs

assert, however, that third parties’ interests will be “more

protected” in federal court than in state court as they would

still look to Plaintiffs for relief, but the County of Madera

would be available for indemnification in this action. Plaintiffs

thus appear to admit that Schub/Gillette’s ability to protect any

interest they have relating to the subject of the action will

not, as a practical matter, be impaired or impeded.

 However, Plaintiffs argue that considering the possibility

of a state court judgment in favor of Schub/Gillette, Plaintiffs

could be subjected to “multiple judgments that could go different

ways.” (Supplement at 3.)

Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) provides that absent parties must be

joined where a judgment rendered in their absence would leave any

of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of

incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations

by reason of the absent parties’ claimed interest.

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Plaintiffs argue that they could be subject to multiple,

inconsistent judgments if the state court rules in favor of the

third parties. "Inconsistent obligations" within the terms of

Rule 19 are not, however, the same as inconsistent adjudications

or results. Delgado v. Plaza Las Americas, 139 F.3d 1, 3 (1st

Cir. 1998); see 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal

Practice ¶ 19.03 (3d ed.2005). Inconsistent obligations occur

when a party is unable to comply with one court's order without

breaching another court's order concerning the same incident.

See, 4 Moore's at ¶ 19.03. Inconsistent adjudications or results,

by contrast, occur when a defendant successfully defends a claim

in one forum, yet loses on another claim arising from the same

incident in another forum. Id. Even inconsistent judgments

regarding the validity of an obligation are not within the

meaning of the rule. Although such a scenario would produce

inconsistent judgments or results, it would not impose

inconsistent "obligations" because the party subject to the

judgments would be subject to only one judgment obligation.

Because Rule 19(a)(2) speaks in terms of inconsistent

"obligations" and not inconsistent "results," clause (a)(2) of

Rule 19 does not apply to these circumstances. Natl. Union Fire

Ins. Co. v. Mass. Mutual Wholesale Electric Co. 117 F.R.D. 321,

322-23 (D. Mass. 1987). Further, where two suits arising from the

same incident involve different causes of action, defendants are

not faced with the potential for double liability because

separate suits have different consequences and different measures

of damages. 139 F.3d at 3. 

Here, with respect to the issues in the federal case of

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 The Court notes that to the extent that there might be an inconsistency, Plaintiffs have not suggested that

they are unable to protect themselves by either bringing the County into the state action, or by seeking a stay of one

of the actions.

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whether or not the Madera codes were applicable or were violated

(raised in both the first amended complaint and the

counterclaim), the federal action could result in a finding that

the codes applied and that Plaintiffs violated them, and

Plaintiff could be ordered to abate the nuisances and pay fines

and costs. It is possible that in the state court action, it

could be determined that Plaintiffs here (Merrills, the

defendants in state court) had not violated the codes. However,

even though there might be inconsistent results, Plaintiffs would

be subject to only one judgment and would not be put in the

position of not being able to comply with inconsistent

judgments.4 With respect to affording complete relief among

the parties already joined, Eldredge v.Carpenters 46 N. Cal.

Counties Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee, 662 F.2d

534, 537 (9th Cir. 1981), there is no risk of inconsistent

declaratory judgments such that any relief that could be granted

in this case would be rendered inadequate absent joinder. This

is because the declaratory judgment sought by Schub/Gillette in

the state action goes only to the scope of the easement, not to

whether or not codes applied or were violated.

The Court concludes that in light of the above analysis, and

given the uncertainty of Plaintiffs’ motion, Plaintiffs’ motion

will be denied in its entirety.

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate this action with case

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number 05-00559-AWI-SMS IS DENIED as moot; and

2) Plaintiffs’ motion to join third parties Schub and

Gillette in the present case, allow a supplemental pleading

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(e) and 13(a), implead Schub and

Gillette pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 14, allege a counterclaim

against third parties, and for mandatory joinder of third parties

IS DENIED without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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