Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01940/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01940-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1940 

JEANNE PACE and DAN PACE, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

TIMMERMANN’S RANCH AND SADDLE SHOP 

INC., et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Northern Division. 

No. 1:13-cv-00818 — James B. Zagel, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2014 — DECIDED AUGUST 4, 2015 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In 2011, Timmermann’s Ranch and 

Saddle Shop (“Timmermann’s”) brought an action against its 

former employee, Jeanne Pace, for conversion, breach of 

fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment. It alleged that 

Ms. Pace had stolen merchandise and money from the 

company. Ms. Pace filed her answer and a counterclaim in 

early 2011. 

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2 No. 14-1940 

In 2013, Ms. Pace and Dan Pace, her husband, filed a 

separate action against Timmermann’s and four of its 

employees, Dan Timmermann, Carol Timmermann, 

Dawn Manley, and Tammy Rigsby (collectively “the 

individual defendants”). They alleged that these defendants 

had conspired to facilitate Ms. Pace’s false arrest. Ms. Pace 

alleged that, as a result of their actions, she had suffered 

severe and extreme emotional distress. Mr. Pace claimed a 

loss of consortium. 

Ms. Pace filed a motion to consolidate these two actions. 

The court granted the motion with respect to discovery, but 

denied the motion with respect to trial and instructed 

Ms. Pace that she should request consolidation for trial after 

the close of discovery. In the midst of discovery, however, 

the district court dismissed Ms. Pace’s 2013 action after 

concluding that her claims were actually compulsory 

counterclaims that should have been filed with her answer 

to the company’s 2011 complaint. Ms. Pace appeals the 

dismissal of her 2013 action and the court’s denial of her 

motion to consolidate. 

We hold that Ms. Pace’s claims against parties other than 

Timmermann’s were not compulsory counterclaims because 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13 and 20, in combination, 

do not compel a litigant to join additional parties to bring 

what would otherwise be a compulsory counterclaim. We 

also hold that because Ms. Pace’s claim for abuse of process 

against Timmermann’s arose prior to the filing of her 

counterclaim, it was a mandatory counterclaim. We 

therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of 

the district court and remand the case for further 

proceedings. 

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No. 14-1940 3

I 

BACKGROUND 

A. 

The issues in this case present a somewhat complex 

procedural situation. For ease of reading, we first will set 

forth the substantive allegations of each party. Then, we will 

set forth the procedural history of this litigation in the 

district court. 

1. 

Timmermann’s boards, buys, and sells horses, as well as 

operates both a ranch and a “saddle shop,” in which it sells 

merchandise for owners and riders of horses. When this 

dispute arose, Carol and Dale Timmermann managed 

Timmermann’s. Dawn Manley and Tammy Rigsby were 

employees of Timmermann’s. 

In its 2011 complaint, Timmermann’s alleged that, while 

employed as a bookkeeper at Timmermann’s, Ms. Pace had 

embezzled funds and stolen merchandise. According to the 

complaint, beginning at an unknown time, Ms. Pace 

regularly began removing merchandise from Timmermann’s 

without paying; she would then sell those articles on eBay 

for her personal benefit. Timmermann’s further alleged that 

it discovered that Ms. Pace was selling items on eBay 

through a private sting operation. 

According to the complaint, in February 2011, a 

Timmermann’s employee discovered some of the company’s 

merchandise in Ms. Pace’s car. At this point, Timmermann’s 

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4 No. 14-1940 

fired Ms. Pace. Thereafter, during a review of its records, 

including the checking account maintained by Ms. Pace, 

Timmermann’s discovered that a check that Ms. Pace had 

represented as being payable to a hay vendor actually had 

been made payable to cash. Timmermann’s also discovered 

that, on at least eight occasions, Ms. Pace had utilized the 

company’s business credit card to make personal purchases. 

2. 

In her 2013 complaint, Ms. Pace alleged that her conduct 

while working at Timmermann’s was consistent with its 

usual course of business. She stated that Timmermann’s had 

a practice of allowing employees to use cash to purchase 

merchandise at cost or, alternatively, by deducting the 

merchandise’s value from the employee’s pay. She maintains 

that she had purchased the company’s merchandise under 

that established practice. She also alleged that 

Carol Timmermann, her supervisor, knew that she had sold 

the company’s merchandise at flea markets and never had 

objected. 

Ms. Pace also maintained that she was instructed to write 

corporate checks out to cash and to note the payee in the 

check records. Pursuant to those instructions, Ms. Pace had 

written checks to cash and recorded the payee and purpose 

of the check in the check records. Ms. Pace further alleged 

that Carol Timmermann had instructed her to use Carol’s 

credit card, which was used as the corporate credit card, for 

personal purchases and to reimburse Carol, and not 

Timmermann’s, for those purchases. 

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No. 14-1940 5

According to Ms. Pace’s complaint, on February 14, 2011, 

Dale Timmermann called the Lake County, Illinois, Sheriff’s 

Office and accused Ms. Pace of stealing over $100,000 in 

merchandise from Timmermann’s. On February 14 and 15, 

Dale Timmermann took affirmative steps to convince the 

Sheriff’s Office to arrest Ms. Pace by stating that Ms. Pace 

had stolen approximately $100,000 in merchandise and that 

Ms. Pace had been changing inventory on the computer. 

Ms. Pace was taken into custody by the Lake County 

Sheriff’s Office on February 15, 2011, and released on 

February 16. 

Following her release from custody, the individual 

defendants continued to provide the Sherriff’s Office with 

information about Ms. Pace’s allegedly unlawful conduct. 

On March 13, 2012, the State’s Attorney brought charges 

against Ms. Pace premised on the information provided by 

the company’s employees. Ms. Pace was charged with theft, 

forgery, and unlawful use of a credit card. 

B. 

We turn now to the procedural history of this litigation in 

the district court, a history that produced the situation 

before us today. 

On March 3, 2011, Timmermann’s filed its civil complaint 

against Ms. Pace, alleging conversion, breach of fiduciary 

duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment. It sought to recover the 

value of the merchandise and money that Ms. Pace allegedly 

had stolen. Ms. Pace filed her answer and counterclaims on 

April 5, 2011. 

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6 No. 14-1940 

On February 1, 2013, Ms. Pace and Mr. Pace (collectively 

“the Paces”) filed a complaint against Timmermann’s and 

the individual defendants, alleging that they had conspired 

to facilitate Ms. Pace’s false arrest. Ms. Pace alleged that she 

had suffered severe and extreme emotional distress; Mr. 

Pace claimed a loss of consortium. Specifically, the Paces’ 

complaint included seven counts: “false arrest/false 

imprisonment/in concert liability” (Count I); “abuse of 

process” (Count II); “intentional infliction of emotional 

distress” (Count III); “conspiracy to commit abuse of process 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress” (Count IV); 

“in concert activity” (Count V); “aiding and abetting abuse 

of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress” 

(Count VI); and “loss of consortium” (Count VII).1

 Only four 

counts, Counts I–III and Count VII, listed Timmermann’s as 

a defendant. The remaining counts were directed at Dale 

and Carol Timmermann or the other individual defendants. 

On March 15, 2013, Ms. Pace filed a motion to consolidate 

the two cases. On April 2, 2013, the district court 

consolidated the cases for the purpose of discovery and 

pretrial practice. The court denied without prejudice the 

motion to consolidate the cases for trial; it stated that it 

would rule on a motion to consolidate for trial after 

discovery. 

On May 2, 2013, Timmermann’s and the individual 

defendants moved to dismiss Ms. Pace’s action under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 13(a). They 

contended that her allegations should have been filed as 

 

1 R.1 at 24, 26–30. 

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No. 14-1940 7

compulsory counterclaims in the 2011 action. Thereafter, Ms. 

Pace moved to amend her 2011 counterclaim and to 

consolidate the cases for trial. The district court set a briefing 

schedule for the company’s motion to dismiss and held Ms. 

Pace’s motion to consolidate in abeyance. 

In December 2013, the district court granted the 

company’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that 

Ms. Pace’s separate claims were barred because they were 

compulsory counterclaims that should have been brought in 

the 2011 action because the claims arose out of the same 

transaction or occurrence. Noting that her 2013 complaint 

had indicated that the fear of being indicted caused her 

emotional distress, the court held that Ms. Pace’s claims 

were in existence when the 2011 action was filed; it therefore 

rejected Ms. Pace’s argument that her abuse-of-process claim 

was not in existence until she was charged. In the district 

court’s view, the absence of Mr. Pace and the individual 

defendants from the 2011 action did not preclude the court’s 

conclusion that Ms. Pace’s claims were compulsory 

counterclaims because Mr. Pace and the individual 

defendants could have been joined in the 2011 action under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20.2

 

II 

DISCUSSION 

 

2 Because the court granted the company’s motion to dismiss, the court 

denied Ms. Pace’s motion to consolidate without discussion. Ms. Pace 

filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal, which the court denied on April 10, 2014.

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8 No. 14-1940 

The Paces now appeal the dismissal of the 2013 action. 

They concede that Ms. Pace’s false arrest and emotional 

distress claims against Timmermann’s were compulsory 

counterclaims and therefore properly dismissed. They 

contend, however, that Ms. Pace’s claims against the 

individual defendants and Mr. Pace’s claims for loss of 

consortium were not compulsory counterclaims. They also 

submit that Ms. Pace’s abuse of process claim against 

Timmermann’s did not “exist” when the 2011 action was 

filed and therefore could not have been a compulsory 

counterclaim. 

“We review de novo [a] district court’s grant of a motion 

to dismiss.” Thulin v. Shopko Stores Operating Co., LLC, 771 

F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Transamerica Occidental 

Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 384, 389 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (“[W]e review de novo the District Court’s 

determination that [the] suit should have been pursued as a 

compulsory counterclaim in the [prior] action.”). 

A. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 governs compulsory 

counterclaims. Rule 13(a)(1) provides: 

In General. A pleading must state as a 

counterclaim any claim that—at the time of its 

service—the pleader has against an opposing 

party if the claim: 

(A) arises out of the transaction or 

occurrence that is the subject matter of 

the opposing party’s claim; and 

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No. 14-1940 9

(B) does not require adding another party 

over whom the court cannot acquire 

jurisdiction. 

The text of this subsection limits the definition of 

compulsory counterclaim to those claims that the pleader 

has against an opposing party; it does not provide for the 

joinder of parties. Instead, in a later subsection, it expressly 

incorporates the standards set out for the required joinder of 

parties under Rule 19 and the permissive joinder of parties 

under Rule 20. Specifically, subsection 13(h) provides: 

“Rules 19 and 20 govern the addition of a person as a party 

to a counterclaim or crossclaim.” 

Rule 19 requires that a party be joined if, “in that person’s 

absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among 

existing parties,” or if proceeding in the party’s absence may 

“impair or impede the person’s ability to protect [his] 

interest” or “leave an existing party subject to a substantial 

risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 

obligations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). In contrast, Rule 20 

allows for parties to be joined if “any right to relief is asserted 

against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with 

respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, 

or series of transactions or occurrences; and ... any question 

of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the 

action.”3

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 

 

3 Rule 20 also allows for the joinder of plaintiffs if “they assert any right 

to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising 

out of the same transaction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). 

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10 No. 14-1940 

The district court did not hold, and Timmermann’s does 

not contend, that the individual defendants named in 

Ms. Pace’s complaint were opposing parties under Rule 

13(a) in the 2011 action.4

 Nor does the company’s claim that 

the individual defendants were required parties under Rule 

19. Instead, Timmermann’s submits that, because the district 

court could have acquired jurisdiction over the individual 

defendants and could have joined them under Rule 20, it was 

appropriate to treat Ms. Pace’s claims as compulsory 

counterclaims. In essence, Timmermann’s combines the 

permissive joinder rule under Rule 20 with the compulsory 

counterclaim requirement in Rule 13 to create a rule for 

compulsory joinder. 

The text of the rules, however, do not permit such an 

arrangement. Timmermann’s relies on the text of Rule 

13(a)(1)(B), which provides that a claim is not a compulsory 

counterclaim if it “require[s] adding another party over 

whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

13(a)(1)(B). From this statement, Timmermann’s devises that, 

because the district court could have exercised jurisdiction 

over the individual defendants, the claims against them 

 

4 Even if Timmermann’s had argued that the individual defendants were 

opposing parties under Rule 13, we would be hesitant to reach that 

conclusion. See Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of 

Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 384, 391 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting courts have generally 

limited their interpretation of “opposing party” to three circumstances: 

“[w]here parties are functionally equivalent..., where an unnamed party 

controlled the litigation, or where...an unnamed party was the alter ego 

of the named party”). 

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No. 14-1940 11

must be brought as compulsory counterclaims.5

 Rule 13, 

however, does not require the joinder of parties. Its scope is 

limited to the filing of counterclaims. Although Rule 

13(a)(1)(B), like Rule 19, encourages that all claims be 

resolved in one action with all the interested parties before 

 

5 Timmermann’s also invites our attention to Assett Allocation & 

Management Co. v. Western Employers Insurance Co., 892 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 

1989). The propositions in that case on which Timmermann’s relies, 

however, are dicta. See id. at 571 (noting that, because we concluded that 

the district court’s “opinion [did] not establish that the district court had 

jurisdiction over Western,” “[w]e could stop”); see also id. at 575 

(Ripple, J., concurring). In any event, it is not clear that Asset Allocation

supports the company’s position. Our focus in that case was on the effect 

of the additional counterclaim defendants on the counterclaim. We held 

that the joinder of additional counterclaim defendants did not make the 

otherwise compulsory counterclaim permissive. See id. at 574 (majority 

opinion) (“Nor is it material that the counterclaim named additional 

parties, besides Asset’s three partners, as counterclaim defendants.”). We 

noted that “Rule 13(h) allowed [the additional counterclaim defendants] 

to be joined pursuant to Rule 20(a).” Id. Although our opinion does not 

state that the additional counterclaim defendants already had been 

joined in the action under Rule 20, it is clear that the court, and the 

parties, contemplated that they would be joined. See id. at 568, 574 

(noting that the counterclaim named the additional defendants). We 

went on to note that, in the event that the court did not have personal 

jurisdiction over one or more of the additional counterclaim defendants, 

the counterclaim would be “permissive as to that defendant.” Id. at 574. 

Although our opinion indicates that the counterclaims against the 

additional defendants were compulsory, see id.; accord 6 Charles Alan 

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1404 (3d ed. 2010) (“An 

additional party brought in under Rule 13(h) for the purpose of 

responding to a counterclaim also becomes an opposing party.”), we did 

not hold that a counterclaim would be compulsory against a defendant 

that was not a party to the litigation. 

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12 No. 14-1940 

the court,6

 Rule 13 fulfils this objective by allowing, not 

mandating, that a defendant bring counterclaims that 

require additional parties.7

 Whether a party must be joined in 

an action continues to be governed only by Rule 19. Rule 

13(a)(1)(B) does not transform Rule 20 into a mandatory 

joinder rule. 

The history of Rule 13 supports our conclusion that Rule 

13 does not provide for compulsory joinder. Prior to 1966, 

Rule 13(h) read: 

When the presence of parties other than 

those to the original action is required for the 

granting of complete relief in the 

determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, 

the court shall order them to be brought in as 

defendants as provided in these rules, if 

jurisdiction of them can be obtained and their 

joinder will not deprive the court of 

jurisdiction of the action. 

 

6 Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(B), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1); see also 3 

James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 13.16(2) (3d ed. 1997 & 

Supp. 2014) (acknowledging the parallels between Rule 13(a)(1)(B) and 

Rule 19). 

7 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment 

(noting that “a party may state as a permissive counterclaim a claim that 

does grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as an opposing party’s claim even though one of the exceptions in Rule 13(a) means the 

claim is not a compulsory counterclaim”). The counterclaimant thus can 

elect to litigate its claim in a separate forum with all required parties or 

as a permissive counterclaim in one forum and as a separate claim in 

another forum. 

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No. 14-1940 13

As then written, Rule 13(h) was interpreted as an 

additional mandatory joinder rule, similar to Rule 19, which 

required that necessary parties be joined.8 To correct this use 

of Rule 13, subdivision (h) was amended in 1966 to provide: 

“Joinder of Additional Parties. Persons other than those 

made parties to the original action may be made parties to a 

counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with the 

provisions of Rules 19 and 20.” In the note accompanying 

the amendment, the committee noted that Rule 13(h) had 

previously failed to reference that Rule 20 allows for the 

permissive joinder of parties. The committee continued: 

The amendment of Rule 13(h) supplies the 

latter omission by expressly referring to Rule 

20, as amended, and also incorporates by direct 

reference the revised criteria and procedures of 

Rule 19, as amended. Hereafter, for the 

purpose of determining who must or may be 

joined as additional parties to a counterclaim 

or cross-claim, ... amended Rules 19 and 20 are 

to be applied in the usual fashion. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 advisory committee’s note to 1966 

amendment.9

 The committee note thus highlights the limited 

 

8 See, e.g., United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prods., Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 216–

17 (2d Cir. 1955) (noting that courts require joinder under Rule 13(h) of 

necessary or indispensable parties). 

9 See also 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1434 

(3d ed. 2010) (noting that “the Advisory Committee completely redrafted 

Rule 13(h) in 1966, making it clear that if a counterclaim or crossclaim 

has been properly asserted, then any person whose joinder in the 

original action would have been possible under Rule 20, which deals 

(continued...) 

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14 No. 14-1940 

nature of Rule 13, which operates only with regard to claims 

and does not mandate or otherwise influence the joinder of 

parties. The rule, supported by its accompanying note, 

directs litigants to the framework under Rules 19 and 20, 

respectively, if they wish to join parties. To hold that Rule 13 

compels the joinder of additional parties through the use of 

Rule 20 would read the term “opposing party” out of Rule 

13(a).10 

 

(...continued) 

with permissive joinder, may be added as a party to the counterclaim or 

crossclaim” (emphasis added)). 

10 Indeed, during the drafting of the amendments to Rule 13, the drafters 

considered the suggestion that more counterclaims be made mandatory 

and that “opposing party” be removed from Rule 18. See Benjamin 

Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (II), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 591, 597 (1968). The 

drafters replied that “[it] may come to that before long, but rulemakers 

must not march too far ahead of the parade.” Id. The drafters never have 

adopted such an expansive amendment. See also Elmo Hunter, One Year 

of Our Federal Rules, 5 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1940) (“There was some suggestion to the Advisory Committee that all counterclaims of whatever nature, whether arising out of the same transactions or not, be treated as 

compulsory. Since this would force a party to submit all his claims to a 

forum of his opponent’s choosing, often complicate pleadings, and force 

a party to choose while he may still be in doubt as to the existence of certain claims and the advisability of litigating them at that time, it was decided best to allow him to use his own judgment as to whether unrelated 

claims should be pleaded.”). 

We have recognized that Rule 18, which generally governs the joinder of claims, operates independently from Rule 20. See Intercon Research 

Assocs., Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d 53, 56–57 (7th Cir. 1982). In 

Intercon, we affirmed the district court’s decision “reject[ing] the plaintiff’s argument that if the requirements of Rule 18(b) are met with respect 

(continued...) 

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No. 14-1940 15

Requiring Ms. Pace to bring the claims against the 

individual defendants as a counterclaim in the initial action 

might well serve judicial economy, but the Federal Rules of 

 

(...continued) 

to joinder of a certain claim, then a fortiori joinder of the party against 

whom that claim is asserted is permissible under Rule 20(a).” Id. at 56. 

We recognized “that Rule 18(b), which deals with joinder of claims, acts 

independently of Rule 20(a) which pertains to joinder of parties.” Id. at 

57 (footnote omitted). “Thus, joinder of claims under Rule 18 becomes 

relevant only after the requirements of Rule 20 relating to joinder of parties has been met with respect to the party against whom the claim is 

sought to be asserted.” Id.; see also Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 1655 (3d ed. 2001) (“Rule 20 deals solely with 

joinder of parties and becomes relevant only when there is more than 

one party on one or both sides of the action. It is not concerned with 

joinder of claims, which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions 

involving multiple defendants Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 

18. Indeed, as is discussed more fully elsewhere, both of these rules were 

amended in 1966 to eliminate language that lower courts had interpreted 

as restricting the joinder of multiple claims against multiple defendants.”); 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 20.02(6)(a) 

(3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2007) (“Rule 18, governing joinder of claims, permits a claimant to assert all claims that it has against a defending party. 

The claims joinder rule does not require that the claims share a common 

question or that they be transactionally related. It is, in short, a rule of 

unlimited claim joinder. The permissive party joinder rule, on the other 

hand, governs party joinder, and, as we have seen, imposes requirements 

of transactional relatedness and commonality. These Rules operate independently, and party joinder is the antecedent inquiry. Once parties are 

properly joined under Rule 20, then Rule 18 permits any claimant to take 

advantage of its unlimited joinder provision. (emphasis in original) 

(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)). This distinction, between claims 

and parties, is implicit in subsection 13(h) and controls our interpretation 

of Rules 13 and 20. 

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16 No. 14-1940 

Civil Procedure do not require such a result.11 The Rules 

strike a delicate balance between (1) a plaintiff’s interest in 

structuring litigation, (2) a defendant’s “wish to avoid 

multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief,” (3) an outsider’s 

interest in joining the litigation, and (4) “the interest of the 

courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient 

settlement of controversies.” Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. 

Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109–11 (1968).12 The rules 

generally allow for a plaintiff to decide who to join in an 

action. See Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 

574 (5th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff’s interest in structuring 

litigation is overridden only when the prejudice to the 

defendant or an absent party is substantial and cannot be 

avoided. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see also Provident 

 

11 In Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), the Supreme Court rejected 

similar policy arguments. The petitioners contended that “[j]udicial 

resources will be needlessly consumed” if mandatory intervention was 

not imposed under Rules 24 and 19. Id. at 767. In rejecting this 

contention, the Court recognized that it was bound by the Federal Rules, 

which simply did not require that a party intervene or risk forfeiting 

their claim. See id. at 766–67. The Court explained that to accept the 

petitioners’ arguments “would require a rewriting rather than an 

interpretation of the relevant Rules.” Id. at 767. The Court went on to 

note “that the system of joinder presently contemplated by the Rules best 

serves the many interests involved in the run of litigated cases.” Id. at 

768. 

12 See also John W. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 

Mich. L. Rev. 327, 330 (1957) (stating that “[t]here are three classes of interests which may be served by requiring the presence of additional parties in an action: (1) the interest of the present defendant; (2) the interests 

of potential but absent plaintiffs and defendants; (3) the social interest in 

the orderly, expeditious administration of justice”). 

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No. 14-1940 17

Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co., 390 U.S. at 124–25. Otherwise, the 

threat of duplicative litigation generally is insufficient to 

override a plaintiff’s interest in this regard. 

Indeed, if Ms. Pace had brought her claim before 

Timmermann’s filed suit, she could have chosen to file 

separate actions against Timmermann’s and the individual 

defendants. See Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990) 

(per curiam) (noting that “[i]t has long been the rule that it is 

not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as 

defendants in a single lawsuit”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 

advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (stating that 

the rule “is not at variance with the settled authorities 

holding that a tortfeasor with the usual ‘joint-and-several’ 

liability is merely a permissive party to an action against 

another with like liability” and that the “[j]oinder of these 

tortfeasors continues to be regulated by Rule 20”).13 It makes 

 

13 We note that, in certain factual scenarios, an additional unnamed 

counterclaim defendant may be so closely related to the named 

counterclaim defendant that the unnamed party should be deemed an 

“opposing party” under Rule 13(a). See Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. 

Co., 292 F.3d at 390–91. For example, it may have been appropriate to 

characterize the individual defendants as opposing parties if the district 

court had found that they had been in privity with Timmermann’s. See 

id. at 393 (noting that “there is privity between IIC and the Texas 

plaintiffs because the Texas plaintiffs assigned IIC their rights with 

respect to this litigation”); see also Avemco Ins. Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 11 

F.3d 998, 1001 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a defendant’s insurer was an 

opposing party because “the insurer has controlled the defense in both 

actions[ and] there is little to commend allowing the insurer to sit idly by 

during the subsequent litigation, only to bring a separate action against 

the very same defendant at a later date”). But see Ponderosa Dev. Corp. v. 

Bjordahl, 787 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the chief 

(continued...) 

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18 No. 14-1940 

little sense to require Ms. Pace to join the individual 

defendants under Rule 20 in order to bring all of her claims 

in the same action when, if she initially had been the 

plaintiff, she would not have been required to join those 

same parties.14

 

(...continued) 

executive officers of savings and loan associations were not opposing 

parties under Rule 13(a) in an action in which the associations were 

plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants). We reiterate, however, that 

Timmermann’s does not suggest that the individual defendants were 

opposing parties under the rule, and the district court did not reach such 

a conclusion. 

Although a broader interpretation of “opposing party” under Rule 

13 might further the policy of judicial economy, such an interpretation 

interferes with a plaintiff’s ability to structure litigation in a manner of 

his choosing. See Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 (5th 

Cir. 1995) (“Generally, permissive joinder of plaintiffs under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 20 is at the option of the plaintiffs, assuming they 

meet the requirements set forth in Rule 20.”); Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 

F.2d 1487, 1499 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that the “joinder of defendants 

under rule 20 is a right belonging to plaintiffs” and that “a defendant can 

not use rule 20 to join a person as an additional defendant”); 4 James 

Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 20.02(2)(a)(i) (3d ed. 1997 & 

Supp. 2014) (“The defendant has no right to insist that the plaintiff join 

all persons who could be joined under the permissive party joinder 

rule.”); see also Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: 

Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative 

Unit, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 809, 826–27 (1989). Interpreting the term 

“opposing party” broadly would require that parties be added under 

Rule 20, effectively transforming the permissive joinder rule into one of 

compulsory joinder. As previously noted, Rule 13(h) was amended to 

correct and avoid such an interpretation. 

14 See James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 20.02(2)(b)(i) (3d 

ed. 1997 & Supp. 2013) (“On the other hand, a defendant who files a 

(continued...) 

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No. 14-1940 19

Timmermann’s recognizes that Rule 20 does not require a 

litigant to join additional parties.15 Therefore, because a party 

is not required to join additional parties under Rules 13 or 20, 

the district court erred by barring Ms. Pace’s claims against 

the individual defendants and Mr. Pace’s claims for failing 

to join them when she brought her counterclaim. 

 

 

(...continued) 

counterclaim or crossclaim in the pending case is treated as a plaintiff for 

purposes of permissive party joinder. The Rule puts defendant-claimants 

on the same footing as original plaintiffs in choosing party structure.” 

(footnotes omitted)).

15 One commentator has explained: 

In either event, [Rule 20] is a permissive rule. Although 

universal employment of the permissive party joinder 

rule, by joining all interested parties, would virtually 

eliminate duplicative litigation, the plaintiff is not 

required to join all potential litigants. Moreover, the 

defendant has no right to insist that the plaintiff join all 

persons who satisfy the permissive party joinder 

standard. This is why such parties are referred to as 

“proper” parties—they may be joined, but need not be. 

The fact that the plaintiff has the choice of whether (and 

to what extent) to use the permissive party joinder rule 

creates tension between a respect for plaintiff autonomy 

in structuring litigation and the systemic interest in 

judicial economy. While the permissive party joinder 

rule embraces plaintiff autonomy, other joinder 

provisions of the Rules may permit a defendant to 

override the plaintiff’s structuring of the litigation. 

4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 20.02(1)(b) (3d ed. 

1997 & Supp. 2014) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 

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20 No. 14-1940 

B. 

We turn now to whether the district court appropriately 

characterized Ms. Pace’s claim against Timmermann’s for 

abuse of process as a compulsory counterclaim. Ms. Pace 

submits that her abuse of process claim did not exist until 

there was “process” in the form of an information or 

indictment. She contends that the facts alleged in the 2013 

complaint that occurred before she was charged only 

demonstrated one element of the claim, the defendants’ 

mens rea. “In order to be a compulsory counterclaim, Rule 

13(a) requires that a claim ... exist at the time of pleading....” 

Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 

1990). Thus, “a party need not assert...a compulsory 

counterclaim if it has not matured when the party serves his 

answer.” Id. at 712. 

Under Illinois law, “[t]he only elements necessary to 

plead a cause of action for abuse of process are: (1) the 

existence of an ulterior purpose or motive and (2) some act 

in the use of legal process not proper in the regular 

prosecution of the proceedings.” Kumar v. Bornstein, 820 

N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (emphasis in original). 

Although neither an indictment nor an arrest is a necessary 

element to bring an abuse of process claim under Illinois 

law, a plaintiff is required to plead some improper use of 

legal process. See id. To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff 

must plead facts that “show that the process was used to 

accomplish some result that is beyond the purview of the 

process.” Id. In most circumstances, this requirement is met 

through an arrest or physical seizure of property. See id. 

(noting that “the relevant case law generally views an actual 

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No. 14-1940 21

arrest or seizure of property as a sufficient fact to state a 

claim of abuse of process” (emphasis in original)). 

Ms. Pace was arrested on February 15, 2011. The 

company’s 2011 complaint was filed on March 3, 2011, and 

Ms. Pace filed her answer and counterclaim on April 5, 2011. 

Consequently, the only fact not in Ms. Pace’s possession at 

the time she filed her answer was the March 13, 2012 

information. Illinois courts are clear, however, that an arrest 

is sufficient to bring an abuse of process claim. See id. Ms. 

Pace’s abuse of process claim therefore matured when she 

was arrested, which occurred before she filed her responsive 

pleading. Her failure to raise the abuse of process claim as a 

counterclaim along with her answer therefore contravenes 

Rule 13. 

Indeed, in alleging an abuse of process, Ms. Pace 

primarily relies on her 2011 arrest, and not on the fact that 

she was charged. The complaint alleges that the defendants 

intentionally injured and caused injury to Ms. Pace by giving 

“false information to law enforcement and explicitly or 

implicitly urg[ing] the arrest and/or the indictment of 

[Ms. Pace].”16 The complaint makes it clear that Ms. Pace 

could have brought her claim following her 2011 arrest, and 

thus, her abuse of process claim matured at that time. 

Because we conclude that the district court erred in 

dismissing both Ms. Pace’s claims against the individual 

defendants and Mr. Pace’s claims, we need not address the 

party’s arguments about Ms. Pace’s motion to consolidate. 

 

16 R.1 at 25. 

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22 No. 14-1940 

The district court will have the opportunity to consider the 

motion to consolidate on remand. 

Conclusion 

We conclude that the district court erred in dismissing 

the Paces’ 2013 complaint in its entirety. Because neither Rule 

13 nor Rule 20 provide for compulsory joinder, Ms. Pace’s 

claims against the individual defendants and Mr. Pace’s 

claims for loss of consortium were not compulsory 

counterclaims. Ms. Pace’s abuse of process claim against 

Timmermann’s was in existence when Ms. Pace filed her 

2011 answer and counterclaim, and therefore the district 

court was correct to bar her subsequent abuse of process 

claim against Timmermann’s. The judgment of the district 

court is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part and 

the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. Ms. Pace may recover her costs in this appeal. 

 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND 

REMANDED IN PART 

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