Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02005/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02005-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

Defendant’s request for oral argument is denied because the parties have thoroughly

briefed the law and evidence and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Mahon

v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ryan W. Buckman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MCI World Com, 

Defendant.

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No. CV-06-2005-PHX-DGC (JJM)

ORDER

Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. #99. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court will grant the motion.1

I. Background.

On May 24, 1999, Plaintiff Ryan W. Buckman began working for Defendant MCI

World Com as a telemarketing sales representative. See Dkt. #102 ¶4. Plaintiff was

terminated on July 12, 1999 for “job abandonment after he failed to report to work.” Id. 

Plaintiff rejoined Defendant’s company on February 19, 2003. Dkt. #100 ¶1. He was

diagnosed with Hepatitis C in June of 2003. Dkt. #100 ¶32. The parties agree that during

his second tour of duty with Defendant, Plaintiff received numerous warnings for attendance

and disciplinary problems. See, e.g., ¶¶13-14. The parties further agree that for medical

reasons Defendant changed Plaintiff’s work schedule and the sales team to which he

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Defendant appears to be under the impression that Plaintiff’s complaint includes a

claim that Defendant wrongfully failed to rehire him. See Dkt. #99. Even with a liberal

reading of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff asserts only two causes of

action, both of which relate to his August 23, 2004 termination, not his 2005 attempt to be

rehired by Defendant. See Dkt. #28 at 8 (alleging only that Defendant violated the FMLA

and the ADA “when they improperly fired me . . . in retaliation for” exercising his FMLA

rights and his disability status) (emphasis added). The FMLA requires employers to reinstate

an employee to his or her former position or an equivalent position following the employee’s

timely return from FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). But Plaintiff’s complaint does not

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belonged (see Dkt. #100 ¶¶8-10, 30), and granted Plaintiff’s requests for intermittent leave

under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (see id. ¶7). 

Plaintiff was on approved intermittent FMLA leave for two weeks from Monday,

April 5, through Friday, April 9, 2004, and from Monday, April 12, through Friday, April 16,

2004. See Dkt. #127-8 at 5. The following Monday, April 19, 2004, Plaintiff did not report

for work and his absence was recorded as “unexcused.” See Dkt. #102 ¶7. Plaintiff failed

to appear for work the next day and did not call to report that he would be absent. See id;

Dkt. #100 ¶22. 

On April 21, 2004, after meeting with Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s supervisor, senior

manager Jerry Ulibarri suspended Plaintiff effective immediately. Dkt. #105 ¶3. Ulibarri

terminated Plaintiff effective April 23, 2004. Id. at ¶4. 

 Plaintiff again applied for employment with Defendant in February of 2005.

Dkt. #100 ¶46. According to Defendant, Plaintiff was not rehired because he failed to

disclose prior criminal convictions. Id. 

Plaintiff has been incarcerated since May 17, 2005. Id. at ¶41. On August 25, 2005,

Plaintiff was indicted on three counts of first degree murder, three counts of armed robbery,

and one count of burglary in the first degree. Dkt. #106-2 Ex. 13. He currently is

incarcerated in Maricopa County Jail awaiting trial on these charges. See id.

Plaintiff filed an amended pro se complaint in which he alleges that he was terminated

in retaliation for exercising his rights under the FMLA and in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Dkt. #28.2

 The parties have fully briefed Defendant’s motion for

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allege as a basis for relief Defendant’s failure to reinstate him following his return from

approved leave on April 19, 2004. Accordingly, the Court will not address Defendant’s

arguments with respect to their refusal to rehire or reinstate Plaintiff.

3

The Court notes that documents submitted with Plaintiff’s statement of facts are

voluminous (some 800 pages), poorly cited, and without sequential page numbers or any

discernable order. Where a non-moving party’s papers are “extraordinarily difficult to use”

due to their size and unhelpful citations, a court is not required to scour those papers in

search of a genuine issue of material fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278-79 (9th Cir.

1996). As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the Court has undertaken significant

efforts to locate relevant documents cited in Plaintiff’s statement of facts.

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summary judgment. Dkt. ##99, 127, 134.3

 

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary

judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Summary judgment may be entered against a party who “fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986).

The Court is mindful that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is incarcerated. “Pro se

prison inmates, with limited access to legal materials, occupy a position significantly

different from that occupied by litigants represented by counsel.” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790

F.2d 1362, 1365 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Courts have a duty to liberally

construe the pleadings of pro se litigants, particularly those filed by pro se prisoners. See

Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). Pro se litigants are nonetheless bound

by “the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants,” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir.1987), including Rule 56’s requirement that a non-moving party “must present

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some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint” in order to survive

summary judgment. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1235 (9th Cir.1984) (citation and

internal quotes omitted).

III. FMLA Claim.

A. Legal Standard.

“Congress enacted the FMLA to allow workers flexibility in scheduling time off to

deal with family and medical problems and alleviate some of the tension created by the

competing demands of work and family in modern society.” Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck

Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated in

retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Dkt. #28. Under the FMLA, it is “unlawful for any

employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise any

right provided” by the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit has held that

“visiting negative consequences on an employee simply because he has used FMLA leave”

is not considered retaliation, but “[s]uch action is, instead, covered under § 2615(a)(1), the

provision governing ‘Interference [with the] exercise of rights.’” Bachelder v. America West

Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s

allegation as one of interference with his FMLA rights. See Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347

F.3d 1125, 1134 n.8 (9th Cir.2003) (applying the FMLA interference provision where the

plaintiff mistakenly alleged retaliation).

Defendant argues primarily that Plaintiff was terminated as a result of his failure to

abide by Defendant’s call-in procedures and specifically that his April 19, 2004 absence was

his “last straw.” Dkt. #99. Defendant contends that dismissal of Plaintiff’s FMLA cause of

action is appropriate in part because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that this legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Id. But the Ninth Circuit has rejected the notion that

the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

applies to an FMLA interference claim. See Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at 1136. To prevail on a claim

under § 2615(a)(1), Plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he

took FMLA-protected leave, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the

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4

 The McDonnell Douglas framework does apply in FMLA cases where an “employee

is punished for opposing unlawful practices by the employer.” See Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at 1136

(emphasis in original). Plaintiff makes no such claim in this case. 

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adverse actions were causally related to his FMLA leave. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124-

26.4 

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff took FMLA leave (see Dkt. #127-8 at 5) and

was subjected to an adverse employment action (see Dkt. #100 ¶24). The parties focus

instead on the third element – the existence of a causal link between Plaintiff’s leave and his

termination. To establish causation, a plaintiff “need only prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that [his] taking of FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the

decision to terminate [him].” Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124. “[R]equiring a showing that the

protected activity constituted a negative factor in an adverse employment decision is another

way of stating that there must be some causal connection between the FMLA right and the

employment decision.” Hambright v. Potter, No. 05-1302, 2007 WL 1101262, at *7 (D.

Ariz. Apr. 12, 2007). 

B. Plaintiff’s History of Attendance and Disciplinary Problems.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff had a history of disciplinary problems by the time of

his termination. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was warned (1) on April 3,

2003, for calling in sick when he had no accrued sick time; (2) on April 7, 2003, for

mimicking customers in sales calls; (3) on April 18, 2003, for calling in sick when he had no

accrued sick time; (4) on July 25, 2003, for calling in sick when he had no accrued sick time;

(5) on July 31, 2003, for not calling in prior to his shift to notify his supervisor that he would

be late; (6) on September 30, 2003, for assuring a customer that he was eligible for a service

that was not available to him; and (7) on January 6, 2004, for not reporting to work on

November 10 and 11, 2003, and January 2, 2004. Dkt. #100 ¶¶13-14. Plaintiff does not

dispute these assertions. Dkt. #127 ¶¶13-14.

Plaintiff also received a warning on January 7, 2004, for failing to call in before

missing his shift. Dkt. #100 ¶15. This warning notes the previous occurrences on

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November 10 and 11, 2003, and January 2, 2004, and states, “Per attendance guidelines that

[Plaintiff] received during his initial training, he must call at least 2 hours prior to shift.” Id.

Plaintiff does not deny that he received this warning or its language. Dkt. #127 ¶15. He

instead asserts that the warning was not warranted because he had been trained in February

of 2003 that he must call in only during the first hour of his shift, not before the shift, and had

never agreed to be bound by a policy requiring him to call in two hours before the shift. Id.

Plaintiff does not contend that the warning was given on the basis of his FMLA leave.

Plaintiff received another warning on February 20, 2004, for failing to return to work

after lunch on February 13, 2004. Dkt. #100 ¶16. Plaintiff does not dispute that he received

this warning, but instead argues that the warning was not warranted. Dkt. #127 ¶16. Plaintiff

asserts that he had medical permission to be absent and that Defendant afforded him FMLA

leave that day. He asserts that the person who issued the warning was not aware of these

facts. Id. He does not claim that the warning was issued because of his FMLA leave. Id.

Plaintiff received another warning on March 16, 2004, for submitting the same sale

twice to be counted toward his quota. Dkt. #100 ¶17. Defendant does not dispute that he

received the warning, but again claims it was unjustified. Dkt. #127 ¶16. Plaintiff does not

contend, however, that the warning was tied to his taking FMLA leave. Id.

On April 15, 2004, Plaintiff received what was labeled a “final warning” because he

changed a customer’s service immediately after telling the customer he would wait before

making the change. Dkt. #100 ¶18. Plaintiff does not dispute that he received the warning,

nor that it was labeled a “final warning,” but asserts that it was unjustified because he did not

make a promise to the customer and did not control the timing of her change. Dkt. #127 ¶18.

Plaintiff notes that this warning was placed in his file on a day while he was on FMLA leave,

but does not assert that it was issued or placed in his file because of the leave. Id. 

Several of these warnings specifically advised Plaintiff that he would face termination

if he had other infractions. For example, at least seven warnings stated that “[f]uture

occurrences may result in further corrective action up to and including termination.”

Dkt. #101 Ex. 2 at 2, 4, 6, 7; Ex. 3 at 1, 2. The January 6, 2004 warning for failure to report

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to work on three days stated that “[i]f employees do not meet the company’s expectations of

performance and/or conduct, corrective action, including discharge, may be taken.”

Dkt. #101, Ex. 2 at 5.

C. Plaintiff’s Attendance on April 19, 2004.

As noted above, Plaintiff received two weeks of pre-approved FMLA leave that ended

on Friday, April 16, 2004. See Dkt. #127-8 at 5. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was

scheduled to return to work on Monday, April 19, 2004. Dkt. #100 ¶20. The parties agree

that Plaintiff did not appear for work that day. See Dkt. #100 ¶¶20-21; Dkt. #127 ¶¶20-21.

Plaintiff called at 9:48 a.m. that morning to inform his supervisor that he would be absent.

Id. Plaintiff also failed to appear for work the next day, April 20, 2004. Dkt. #100 ¶22; #127

¶22. Plaintiff did not call to say he would be absent that day. Id.

Plaintiff admits that it was Jerry Ulibarri, the senior manager at Defendant’s facility,

who suspended Plaintiff on April 21 and terminated him on April 23. Dkt. #100 ¶24; #127

¶24. Significantly, Plaintiff also admits that Ulibarri did not know about Plaintiff’s illness

or his use of FMLA leave. See Dkt. #127 ¶23. Defendant has submitted an affidavit from

Ulibarri stating that Plaintiff was terminated because he failed to call in before his shifts on

April 19 and 20, failed to report to work on April 19, and had received many previous

warnings, including a final warning. Dkt. #105 ¶4. Plaintiff provides no evidence to dispute

these reasons. Dkt. #127 ¶25.

Plaintiff instead asserts that he was not required to work on April 19 or 20. Dkt. #127

¶20. Plaintiff fails, however, to submit admissible evidence in support of this assertion.

Plaintiff provides no affidavit or declaration to support his claim. He cites to portions of his

deposition, but does not attach the cited pages and they are not included in excerpts supplied

by Defendant. Plaintiff cites to a number of requests for admissions and interrogatory

answers, but only one of them addresses his obligation to attend work on April 19 and 20 –

Defendant’s admission that “Plaintiff claims to have submitted a doctor’s note purporting to

excuse Plaintiff for April 19 and 20 due to liver issues.” Dkt. #127-8 at 6-7. The doctor’s

note states that Plaintiff was under the doctor’s care on April 20. Dkt. #128-7 at 2. Although

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5

 Defendant’s reply specifically asks the Court to disregard over 800 pages of

allegedly inadmissible evidence submitted by Plaintiff, especially unauthenticated medical

records and opinions. See Dkt. #134 at 6-7. Given this objection and Plaintiff’s failure to

provide any basis for the note’s admissibility, the Court will disregard it. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e)(1) (evidence submitted in connection with summary judgment motion must be

“admissible in evidence”; documents must be “sworn or certified”).

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cryptic, the note could be read to suggest that Plaintiff had liver problems on April 19 as well

(although it says he was under the doctor’s care only on April 20). Plaintiff fails, however,

to provide any evidence that the note would be admissible at trial. Id. He does not attach a

declaration from the doctor or explain how the note was obtained, and he apparently never

asked Defendant to admit its authenticity or admissibility.5

 

Plaintiff also points to Defendant’s employee handbook, which states that an

employee on FLMA leave must provide a medical release from his or her physician when

returning to work. See Dkt. #128-10 at 5, 7. Plaintiff suggests that this provision excused

him from attending work on April 19 and 20 because he had not provided Defendant with

a medical release. But the provision does not say that employees are free to miss work until

they provide a release. The clear meaning of the policy is that employees must bring a

release when returning to work as scheduled, not that they have a free pass to miss work until

they elect to produce a release. Id.

In addition to the fact that Plaintiff has provided no admissible evidence to support

his assertion that he was not required to work on April 19 and 20, the existing evidence

suggests otherwise. For example, if Plaintiff had pre-approved FMLA leave on April 19 as

he claims, why did he call his supervisor at 9:48 a.m. that day (as he admits) to say he would

not appear for work? See Dkt. #100 ¶21; #127 ¶21. Plaintiff himself asserts that he was not

required to call in on pre-approved FMLA days. Dkt. #127-7 at 12. 

D. FMLA Conclusion.

The uncontroverted evidence shows that Plaintiff received at least 11 warnings in the

months before his termination, including warnings that specifically advised him of his

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6

 Plaintiff argues that he never agreed to be bound by a policy requiring him to call

in his absences before his shift started, and that he therefore was required to follow only the

February 2003 training that said he could call in during the first hour of his shift. But

Plaintiff cites no authority, legal or factual, for the proposition that he was obligated to

follow only those policies of his employer with which he agreed. And he does not dispute

that warnings he received before his termination specifically advised him of the obligation

to call in before his shift. See, e.g., Dkt. #101 Ex. 2 at 6; Dkt. #102 Ex. 7 at 3.

7

 The Court is aware of the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s return from FMLA

leave and his termination. Plaintiff does not urge this as a basis for proving causation. More

importantly, although “[t]emporal proximity between protected activity and an adverse

employment action can by itself constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation

in some cases,” Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir.2003), the Court finds

that no reasonable jury could find causation in this case given the uncontroverted evidence

recited above, even considering the timing of Plaintiff’s termination. 

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obligation to call in before his shift on days when he would miss work.6

 Plaintiff received

a “final warning” on April 15. He was scheduled to work on April 19 and 20, but called in

late on the 19th, did not call at all on the 20th, and failed to appear for work on both days.

Plaintiff was then terminated by a senior manager who Plaintiff admits did not know about

his health problems or his FMLA leave. 

Given these undisputed facts, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to come

forward with sufficient evidence of causation – that his FMLA leave was a negative factor

in his termination. As noted earlier, summary judgment may be entered against a party who

“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322. Moreover, the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Plaintiff has

presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor on the issue of

causation. The Court accordingly will enter summary judgment on Plaintiff’s FMLA claim.7

IV. ADA Claim.

The ADA forbids employers from discriminating against a qualified individual with

a disability, on the basis of the disability, “in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions, and

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privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employee alleging ADA

discrimination bears the burden of proving that he is “disabled” within the meaning of the

statute. See Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2007). “[A]n

individual is disabled if that individual (1) has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the individual’s major life activities; (2) has a record of

such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.” Coons v. Sec’y of

U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A. Is Plaintiff Disabled?

To qualify as disabled under the first definition of disability, a plaintiff must prove

(1) he has a physical or mental impairment, (2) the impairment limits a major life activity,

and (3) the limitation upon that activity is substantial. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.

Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194-95 (2002). Plaintiff asserts that he has chronic Hepatitis C and

that he has problems associated with mental illness and his neurological, cardiovascular,

reproductive, digestive, hemic, lymphatic, and immune systems. Dkt. #127 at 15. Whether

Plaintiff is actually disabled, however, depends not on a diagnosis of an impairment or the

type of symptoms, but on an individualized inquiry into whether Plaintiff has an impairment

that substantially limits a major life activity. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198 (“It is

insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test to merely

submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.”). 

 At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not dispute that he was “almost

cured” of his Hepatitis C as of April 20, 2004. Dkt. #100 ¶35; #127 ¶35. Plaintiff

nonetheless argues that he was disabled. He contends, for example, that his “food does not

digest the same as normal people[.]” Dkt. #127 at 15. But the ADA requires Plaintiff “to

prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of [his] own

experience . . . is substantial,” not information on his condition relative to others.

Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999). Plaintiff states that he vomits,

has fevers, and is fatigued. Dkt. #127 at 15. An ADA plaintiff’s limitations must, however,

be tied to a major life activity. See Toyota Motor Mfg, 534 U.S. at 194-95. Aside from

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eating, Plaintiff does not tie these limitations to a major life activity. See id. Nor does

Plaintiff direct the Court to evidence that these limitations significantly impaired the major

life activity of eating. For example, there is no evidence that he suffered these limitations

in the long-term. See id. at 198 (“[t]he impairment’s impact must . . . be permanent or long

term.”).

Plaintiff also notes that he takes Interferon for his Hepatitis C, which leads to side

effects for which he was hospitalized and prescribed medicine. Dkt. #127 at 16. He also

claims to receive other treatment for his symptoms. Id. at 18. But Plaintiff does not

demonstrate that the side effects of the medication impair a major life activity. See Toyota

Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198. Moreover, he does not explain whether he experiences a

substantially limiting impairment after taking his medications or receiving his treatment. See

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“if a person is taking measures

to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures –

both positive and negative – must be taken into account when judging whether that person

is ‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the [ADA].”). 

Plaintiff contends that he was substantially limited in his ability to reproduce for a

period of twelve months. Dkt. #127 at 16. Reproduction is a major life activity. See

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998). At the same time, however, Plaintiff states

that he “sometimes” has a “normal sex life” and a “few months” following his termination

he had a “pretty normal” sex life. Dkt. #106-3 at 156:19-21, 157:5-11. Plaintiff has not

submitted evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he is substantially

limited in the major life activity of reproduction. 

With respect to having a record of a disability, Plaintiff states that he has “medical

records of an impairment” (Dkt. #127 at 14), but he does not point the Court to records of an

impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. The evidence furnished by Plaintiff,

if admissible, could support a finding that he has had difficulties and restrictions, but they

do not rise to the level of a substantial limitation of a major life activity. See Coons, 383

F.3d at 886 (“Although the doctor states that Coons suffers from various physical and mental

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impairments, and that Coons received treatment for some of those impairments, there is no

allegation that any of the treated impairments substantially limited any major life activity.”).

Nor has Plaintiff submitted evidence to show that the records are admissible.

With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that he was “regarded” as disabled, Plaintiff cites

emails transmitted by one of Defendant’s human resources employees with “ADA

Accommodation” in the subject line. See Dkt. #128-5 at 7. The informal mention of the

“ADA” or an “Accommodation” is insufficient evidence that Defendant regarded Plaintiff

as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. See E.E.O.C. v.

United Parcel Service, Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Casual references to

‘disability’ . . . do not support a finding that the company regarded [an employee] as

disabled.”). The emails suggest that Defendant was attempting to accommodate Plaintiff, but

efforts to accommodate an employee do not show that the employer regards the employee

as disabled. See Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employee’s restrictions, it is not thereby

conceding that . . . it regards the employee as disabled.”), clarified in other respects by, 292

F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Considering these arguments, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to present

admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he is disabled within

the meaning of the ADA.

 B. Causation.

Even if Plaintiff could prove that he has an ADA disability, he could recover for an

ADA violation only by presenting evidence that he was terminated because of the disability.

See Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To state a prima

facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that he is a qualified individual with a

disability who suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.”). As noted

in the earlier discussion of Plaintiff’s FMLA claim, Plaintiff has failed to create a triable

issue of fact as to whether he was fired because of health issues. Among other significant

facts, Plaintiff admits that the senior manager who fired him did not know about his illness

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 Defendant asks the Court to issue two rulings with respect to damages: that

Plaintiff’s lost wages and benefits are “cut off” as a matter of law by Plaintiff’s current

incarceration and criminal charges, as well as by Defendant’s discovery of Plaintiff’s prior

criminal convictions, and that Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite intent necessary for

punitive damages. Dkt. #99. Because the Court concludes that Defendant is entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s FMLA and ADA claims, it need not resolve these issues.

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or his use of FMLA leave. See Dkt. #127 ¶23. Plaintiff therefore cannot show that he was

terminated because of an ADA disability. Summary judgment is warranted on this ground

as well.8

V. Plaintiff’s Motions.

Almost one month after Defendant had filed its reply in support of summary

judgment, Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his response with the bare declaration that

“all of the evidence and information” in his response is “true and correct to the best of my

knowledge.” Dkt. #143. This attempt is too late and too broad. 

Following the filing of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court entered

an order that instructed Plaintiff on how to respond to the motion. Dkt. #111. The order

advised Plaintiff that he must comply with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

which in turn notes that parties opposing summary judgment “must – by affidavits or as

otherwise provided in this rule – set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The Court further advised Plaintiff that he “must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as

provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict facts shown in the Defendants’ declarations and

documents and show there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Dkt. #111 at 3. The

order then warned: “If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary

judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you.” Id. 

Plaintiff was then afforded sufficient time to comply with the Rule 56 and the Court’s

order. In addition to the time allotted for briefing summary judgment motions, the Court

granted Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file his response. Dkt. #117. Plaintiff’s

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response was due on January 12, 2008. Id. Defendant asks the Court to grant its motion for

summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff failed to file a timely reply, noting that the

reply was not delivered for filing until January 16, 2008, after the date set by the Court. Dkt.

#134 at 6 n.1. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will not grant Defendant’s

motion on this basis. The Court does note, however, that Plaintiff had sufficient time to

comply with Rule 56 and the Court’s order directing him to submit admissible evidence. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s current request is to treat his entire response to Defendant’s

motion – some 59 pages of written material and more than 800 pages of exhibits – as a single

sworn declaration. Dkt. #143. Such a declaration would clearly be improper under Rule

56(e), which requires affidavits “made on personal knowledge, set[ting] out facts that would

be admissible in evidence, and show[ing] that the affiant is competent to testify on the

matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Much of the material submitted in Plaintiff’s response

could not be known by him personally. For example, Plaintiff cannot authenticate the

numerous medical documents he has submitted, nor render them admissible, merely by

asserting that “they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.” Dkt. #143. Plaintiff’s

response also contains statements allegedly made by others, assertions about what others

thought, or assertions about why others took particular actions – matters on which Plaintiff

clearly lacks personal knowledge or, at least, for which he provides no foundation. The

Ninth Circuit has held that “[c]onclusory affidavits and affidavits that do not affirmatively

show personal knowledge of ‘specific facts’ are insufficient [to withstand summary

judgment].” Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d 1310, 1321 (9th Cir. 1981),

vacated on other grounds, Bureau of Economic Analysis v. Long, 454 U.S. 934 (1981); see

also Agricultural Mgt. Dev. Inc. v. National City Bank, No. 1:02-CV-11, 2003 WL 21919184

at *5 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (blanket assertions of personal knowledge are insufficient under Rule

56(e)) (collecting cases). 

The Court recognizes the challenges confronted by pro se parties, but the Court

specifically advised Plaintiff of the need to submit a timely response based on admissible

evidence. Dkt. #111. Defendant has now relied on Plaintiff’s response in crafting its reply

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and submitting final arguments. Plaintiff’s request to transform all he has submitted into a

single declaration is untimely, sweeps too broadly, and does not comply with the requirement

of Rule 56. Plaintiff’s motion will therefore be denied. 

Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of Magistrate Judge Marshall’s order

denying Plaintiff’s request to file a supplemental response to Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. Dkt. ##140, 145. The motion for reconsideration contains some ten

pages of additional arguments and attaches 167 pages of documents, mostly cases and other

legal materials. Dkt. #145. This attempted supplementation is untimely. The Court will not

reverse Judge Marshall’s decision. 

Plaintiff has filed yet another motion asking the Court to declare that his responses to

a defense discovery request are timely. Dkt. #146. Plaintiff does not attach the responses

or provide other evidence to support his assertion that they were not delivered due to a jail

error. In any event, because the Court has not relied on the lack of responses in this ruling,

the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion as moot. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #99) is granted.

2. Plaintiff’s other motions (Dkt. ##143, 145, 146) are denied.

3. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 4th day of April, 2008.

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