Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00037/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00037-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OLAF PETER JUDA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

RAYMOND D. ANDREWS, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1: 05-CV-0037 AWI WMW HC

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

(Document #34) 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a federal prisoner who filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241. On March 28, 2007, the court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss and

dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus. In dismissing the petition, the court cited to Ivy

v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9 Cir. 2003), and found that relief pursuant to section 2241 th

was not available because Petitioner had not shown he was factually innocent and had never had

an “unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting this claim. 

On October 26, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner contends

the court should not have followed Ivy because a free standing claim of innocence implicates a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, and such an argument cannot be ignored regardless of

whether it could have been raised earlier. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the court may relieve a party from a

final judgment based on specific grounds, such as: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied

or discharged judgment; or (6) “extraordinary circumstances” which would justify relief. School

Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9 Cir. 1993). The Ninth th

Circuit has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being exclusive of the

preceding clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338

(9 Cir. 1986), quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9 Cir. 1981). th th

Accordingly, “the clause is reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. Clause 60(b)(6)

“applies only when the reason for granting relief is not covered by any of the other reasons set

forth in Rule 60.” Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9 Cir. 2007). Clause 60(b)(6) is to

th

be “‘used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice’ and ‘is to be utilized

only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action . . . .’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9 Cir. 1993)). th

DISCUSSION

The petition in this action contained two claims for relief. The first alleged that Petitioner

is innocent of the facts used to enhance his sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 

The second alleged that Petitioner is innocent of the crime of arson on the high seas. The

petition was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides the exclusive

procedure by which a federal prisoner may test the legality of his detention. Lorentsen v. Hood,

223 F.3d 950, 953 (9 Cir. 2000). “A federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under section th

2255 may not petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to section 2241.” United States v. Pirro,

104 F.3d 297, 299 (9 Cir. 1997). There is one exception to this general rule. Section 2255 th

provides that while a court normally cannot consider a habeas corpus petition authorized under

section 2255 unless it is brought in the sentencing court under section 2255, a petitioner can

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bring a petition under section 2241 if the remedy under section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective

to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

Petitioner contends that section 2241 is available to him because he is actually innocent. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that section 2241 is available under the "escape hatch" of section 

2255 “when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an

‘unobstructed procedural shot’ at presenting that claim. Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898

(9 Cir. 2006) (quoting Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060). The court previously found that section 2241 th

was not available to Petitioner because Petitioner had an unobstructed “procedural shot” at

presenting his innocence claims earlier. Petitioner’s argument in this motion for

reconsideration is that the court’s ruling, relying on Ivy and its progeny, is wrong because prior to

Ivy the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court found that actual innocence is all that is required.

Prior to the AEDPA, there was no statutory limit on how many federal habeas corpus

petitions a person could file. To stop repetitive petitions, courts employed the abuse of the writ

doctrine. An exception to the abuse of the writ doctrine was created for claims of actual

innocence. Pursuant to Ninth Circuit authority, a habeas petitioner's claims that would otherwise

be barred under abuse of writ doctrine can still be considered on the merits if the petitioner's

actual innocence claim implicated a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Carriger v. Stewart, 132

F.3d 463, 477 (9 Cir. 1997). Because only actual innocence is required under this exception th

and this exception does not also require a prior “unobstructed shot” at presenting the claim,

Petitioner believes that Ivy improperly added this second requirement. Petitioner argues that Ivy

is incorrect and the court is bound to the earlier Ninth Circuit authority and similar Supreme

Court law. The problem with Petitioner’s position is that Petitioner’s petition was not

dismissed under the doctrine of abuse of the writ. Rather, Petitioner’s petition was dismissed

because section 2241 is not available. The court did not find that Petitioner did not fall within

the actual innocence exception to abuse of the writ. The court dismissed the petition because the

court found Petitioner’s claims do not fall within the savings clause of section 2255. The Ninth

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Circuit in Ivy was not discussing an exception to abuse of the writ; The Ninth Circuit was

defining when a petition pursuant to section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. Thus, Ivy is not

inconsistent with prior law.

Petitioner’s reliance on Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9 Cir. 2004), is similarly

th

unavailing even though Leavitt was decided after Ivy. The issue in Leavitt was whether the

claim of state prisoner proceeding with a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was

barred because the state prisoner had failed to comply with state procedural rules in presenting

the claim to the state courts. If the petitioner had failed to comply with the state’s procedural

rules, the claim was procedurally defaulted. The Ninth Circuit in Leavitt discussed an exception

to procedural default that is available when the failure to consider a procedurally defaulted claim

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 838. Because the decision in Leavitt

concerned the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to procedurally defaulted claims and

not the escape hatch found in section 2255 to allow section 2241 petitions, Leavitt does not assist

Petitioner.

Finally, even if this court agreed with Petitioner that Ivy was wrongfully decided, the

court still could not give Petitioner the relief he seeks. This court, as a District Court, is bound

by Ninth Circuit precedent. Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 (9 Cir. 1987); United th

States v. Slocum, 486 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1118 (C.D. 2007). Thus, this court has no power to

refuse to follow Ivy. 

ORDER

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 20, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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