Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08141/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08141-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

TEMPSREF 

 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

ASH 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony L. Rodrigues, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-8141-PCT-DGC (ESW) 

ORDER 

On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff Anthony L. Rodrigues, who is confined in the 

Arizona State Prison Complex-Kingman in Kingman, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis. In a November 17, 2014 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed 

and dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave 

Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the 

Order. 

 On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. In a March 

18, 2015 Order, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint because Plaintiff had 

failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended 

complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 15). The 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 1 of 9
TEMPSREF 

- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Court will order all Defendants to answer Count Two of the Second Amended Complaint, 

and will dismiss the remaining claims without prejudice. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 2 of 9
TEMPSREF 

- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Second Amended Complaint 

 In his two-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants: 

Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”); R. Scott 

Marquardt, President and CEO of Management Training Corporation; Tara R. Diaz, 

ADOC Contract Beds Bureau Director; and Pamela Rider, Warden at ASPC-Kingman’s 

Hualapai Unit. Plaintiff seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, and punitive 

damages. 

 Plaintiff’s counts are largely intertwined, and are each brought under the Fifth, 

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Americans with Disabilities Act “(ADA”). 

Plaintiff styles Count One as relating to his “state created liberty interest[s],” and, in 

brief, alleges the following: On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff was informed that he was 

being disciplined for two unexcused absences from a life skills class. As a result, 

Plaintiff claims that he lost “preferred housing, modification [of] custody and 

classification score, ability . . . to participate in subsidized volunteer education and 

program activities, [and] potential loss of earned and temporary release credits.” Plaintiff 

further alleges that these sanctions implicated “state created liberty interests” that could 

not be taken away without due process. Plaintiff claims, however, that he did not receive 

notice of the disciplinary violation or an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of 

the above-described sanctions. 

 Plaintiff styles Count Two as related to a request for “reasonable accommodation.” 

Put briefly, Plaintiff alleges that he has a documented cardiac condition — for which he 

is receiving treatment — that qualifies as a “disability” under the ADA. However, after 

the November 26, 2013 disciplinary sanctions were imposed, Plaintiff was, among other 

things, reassigned to a 2-man bunk near where inmates smoked. Plaintiff further alleges 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 3 of 9
TEMPSREF 

- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that the Defendants are all on notice that — despite ADOC policies and notices 

prohibiting indoor smoking — inmates often smoke near Plaintiff’s new bunk. As a 

result, Plaintiff has been hospitalized at least twice due to second hand smoke. Plaintiff 

further alleges that he has sought a “reasonable accommodation” — specifically, that he 

be reassigned to a new bunk away from the smoking — from Defendants since at least 

January 2, 2014, but that he was not moved to a new bunk — apparently away from the 

smoking — until June 2014. 

III. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 Although styled as related to “state created liberty interests,” Plaintiff’s principal 

allegation is that he did not receive the process he believed he was due prior to the 

imposition of sanctions. Plaintiff’s claim is, therefore, more properly styled as a violation 

of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, to the extent 

Plaintiff seeks relief under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, as well as under the ADA, 

his claim will be dismissed. 

 In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must first decide whether Plaintiff was 

entitled to any process, and if so, whether he was denied any constitutionally required 

procedural safeguard. Liberty interests which entitle an inmate to due process are 

“generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in 

such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 4 of 9
TEMPSREF 

- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 

(1995) (internal citations omitted). 

 To determine whether an inmate is entitled to the procedural protections afforded 

by the Due Process Clause, the Court must look to the particular restrictions imposed and 

ask whether they “‘present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state 

might conceivably create a liberty interest.’” Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). “Atypicality” requires not merely an 

empirical comparison, but turns on the importance of the right taken away from the 

prisoner. See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1997). To determine 

whether the sanctions are atypical and a significant hardship, courts look to prisoner’s 

conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the sanction will 

affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

 Plaintiff was not entitled to any due process procedural protections because he has 

failed to demonstrate that any of the sanctions imposed were “atypical and significant 

hardships.” Plaintiff alleges that he lost “preferred housing, modification [of] custody 

and classification score, ability . . . to participate in subsidized volunteer education and 

program activities, potential loss of earned and temporary release credits,” and that he 

was moved to a new bunk (from which he was subsequently reassigned to a new bunk 

approximately six months later). None of these sanctions, however, are atypical and 

significant hardships. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475-76, 487 (30 days’ disciplinary 

segregation is not atypical and significant); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3rd 

Cir. 2002) (seven months of disciplinary confinement “does not, on its own, violate a 

protected liberty interest”); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998) (two and onehalf years’ administrative segregation is not atypical and significant); Rizzo v. Dawson, 

778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (prison authorities may change a prisoner’s “place of 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 5 of 9
TEMPSREF 

- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

confinement even though the degree of confinement may be different and prison life may 

be more disagreeable in one institution than in another” without violating a prisoner’s due 

process rights); Lucero v. Russell, 741 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1984) (administrative transfer 

to maximum security without a hearing does not infringe on any protected liberty 

interest). 

 Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff complains that he lost any earned or temporary 

release credits, such a claim is foreclosed in a § 1983 suit because judgment in favor of 

Plaintiff regarding the denial of due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding would 

invalidate the deprivation of good time credits. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); 

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). “[A] state prisoner seeking injunctive relief 

against the denial or revocation of good-time credits must proceed in habeas corpus, and 

not under § 1983.” Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2002). Because 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his prison disciplinary proceeding has been reversed, 

expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ 

of habeas corpus, this claim is barred by Heck. 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any named Defendant in 

Count One. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged both an Eighth Amendment 

and an ADA claim against all Defendants in Count Two, and the Court will require an 

Answer to that Count. However, Count Two will be dismissed to the extent Plaintiff 

seeks relief under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, for the reasons set forth in part 

Part III, supra. 

V. Warnings

A. Release

 If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not 

been paid in full, Plaintiff must, within 30 days of his release, either (1) notify the Court 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 6 of 9
TEMPSREF 

- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that he intends to pay the unpaid balance of his filing fee within 120 days of his release or 

(2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may 

result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 If Plaintiff’s address changes, Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of 

address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff 

must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Count One is dismissed without prejudice. 

 (2) All Defendants must answer Count Two, as set forth above. 

 (3) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 15), this Order, and both summons and request for 

waiver forms for Defendants. 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 7 of 9
TEMPSREF 

- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 (4) Plaintiff must complete1 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (5) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Second Amended Complaint on a Defendant 

within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this 

Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 

 (6) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Second 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (7) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Second Amended 

Complaint, and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure; and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

 1

If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections, Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or 

employee works. Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central 

Office of the Arizona Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works 

there. 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 8 of 9
TEMPSREF 

- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Second Amended Complaint, or 

this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

ordered by the Court. 

 (8) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Second 

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 

Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

 (9) Defendants must answer the Second Amended Complaint or otherwise 

respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of 

Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (10) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (11) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 20th day of July, 2015. 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 16 Filed 07/21/15 Page 9 of 9