Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05795/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05795-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOREEN MACLELLAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 12-5795 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

Before the Court is plaintiff Doreen MacLellan’s (“MacLellan”) Motion for Leave of

Court, filed March 17, 2014, by which MacLellan seeks leave to file a motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants

County of Alameda, Marc Dinis, and Rafael Alvarez (collectively, “County defendants”)

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9. Having read and considered the motion, the Court rules

as follows.

A party seeking leave to file a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order

must show one of the following: (1) “[t]hat at the time of the motion for leave, a material

difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of

the interlocutory order,” and that such difference was unknown to the party despite “the

exercise of reasonable diligence”; (2) “[t]he emergence of new material facts or a change of

law occurring after the time of such order”; or (3) “[a] manifest failure by the Court to

Case 3:12-cv-05795-MMC Document 111 Filed 03/21/14 Page 1 of 2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court

before such interlocutory order.” (See Civil L.R. 7-9(b).)

By the instant motion, MacLellan makes no showing as to either of the first two

grounds for reconsideration. As to the third, the great majority of the arguments MacLellan

makes in her motion were made in her opposition as originally filed and were considered by

the Court. The sole argument raised now by MacLellan which was not considered by the

Court is that the County defendants acted unlawfully by not delivering her directly to a

“facility designated by the county.” See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150. Specifically,

MacLellan now contends that ValleyCare Medical Center (“VCMC”), the first facility to

which she was transported, is not a facility “designated by the county and approved by the

state,” but, rather, is an “outside facility.” (See Mot. for Leave at 2:26-3:4.) The Court did

not consider that argument because it was not raised in MacLellan’s opposition to summary

judgment; rather, MacLellan contended that said defendants acted unlawfully by not

personally transporting her to a medical facility. (See Opp’n at 19:20-20:18.) Although

some of MacLellan’s assertions in her opposition might, if read in light of the contention she

now makes, be read as encompassing the argument that her delivery to VCMC was itself

unlawful, in her opposition MacLellan made no assertion, let alone presented any evidence

to support a finding, that VCMC was not in fact a designated and approved facility. In the

absence of any showing that whatever facts on which such contention is now made were

not reasonably discoverable at the time of the hearing on County defendants motion,

MacLellan fails to make a sufficient showing under Civil Local Rule 7-9.

Accordingly, MacLellan’s Motion for Leave is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2014 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:12-cv-05795-MMC Document 111 Filed 03/21/14 Page 2 of 2