Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01585/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01585-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM CECIL THORNTON,

CDCR #V-64547,

Civil No. 10-1585 JLS (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE

DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

& 1915A(b)

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 27, 2010, Plaintiff, William Cecil Thornton, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution located in Tehachapi, California and

proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleged that

his constitutional rights were violated when he was housed at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in 2008. (See Compl. at 1.)

Plaintiff did not prepay the $350 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead

he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF.

No. 2], as well as a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 5]. On September 16, 2010,

the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment

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of Counsel and dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. See Sept. 16, 2010 Order at 7-8. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended

Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. Plaintiff

filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on November 5, 2010. In his FAC, Plaintiff no

longer named Matthew Cate, Richard Hernandez or George Neotti as Defendants. Thus, those

Defendants were dismissed from this action. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). 

The Court, once again, dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failing to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Feb. 23, 2011 Order at 6. Plaintiff was granted

leave to file to a Second Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading

identified in the Court’s Order. Id. On June 10, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”).

II.

SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A

A. Standard

As stated in the Court’s previous Orders, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte

dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Eighth Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Picatoste, a nurse at RJD, examined him on May 28, 2008

regarding his lower back issues. (See SAC at 3.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Picatoste

refused to allow him to be examined by a medical doctor and as a result he has “atrophy in my

left leg and nerve damage in my leg and back.” (Id.) 

 “The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon incarcerated individuals under

color of law constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)).

A violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials are deliberately indifferent

to a prisoner’s medical needs. Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

/ / /

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1

 Plaintiff has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Thornton v. Stainer, S.D. Cal. Civil

Case No. 11cv1266 LAB (BLM). A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both

within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at

issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248

(9th Cir. 1992). 

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To allege an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must “satisfy both the objective

and subjective components of a two-part test.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002) (citation omitted). First, he must allege that prison officials deprived him of the “minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, he must allege the prison

official “acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference ... only if [he is alleged to] know[] of

and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under this standard, the official must be alleged to “be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed],” and must also be alleged to

also have drawn that inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation

omitted). This “subjective approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude

actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. “Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059 (alteration and citation omitted).

Plaintiff claims that he had only one medical examination by Defendant Picatoste but her

actions in not allowing him to be seen by a medical doctor caused him to have nerve damage and

“atrophy” in his leg. (See SAC at 3.) Plaintiff claims that these actions caused a three year delay

in finding treatment for his condition. However, documents attached to his Second Amended

Complaint, along with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus1

 Plaintiff has filed, indicate that

Plaintiff was actually paroled and released from RJD on June 29, 2008. This is only one month

after the medical examination by Defendant Picatoste. Accordingly, it is simply not plausible

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that her alleged failure to allow Plaintiff to be seen by a medical doctor on May 28, 2008 caused

a three year delay in finding additional treatment. A “claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009). 

In addition, the facts as described by Plaintiff indicate a difference of opinion with regard

to his medical needs. However, mere “difference of medical opinion” between a prisoner and

his physicians concerning the appropriate course of treatment is “insufficient, as a matter of law,

to establish deliberate indifference.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

Instead, to allege deliberate indifference regarding choices between alternative courses of

treatment, a prisoner must allege that the chosen course of treatment “was medically

unacceptable under the circumstances,” and was chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive

risk to [the prisoner’s] health.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts

from which the Court could find that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs.

C. Fourteenth Amendment claim

Plaintiff also claims that the actions of Defendants caused his release date to be delayed

by several weeks. However, Plaintiff cannot bring these claims under § 1983. A prisoner

simply may not use a civil rights action to challenge the “fact or duration of his confinement.”

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). The prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus

relief instead. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489).

Thus, Plaintiff’s civil action “is barred (absent prior invalidation)–no matter the relief sought

(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of his suit (state conduct leading to conviction

or internal prison proceedings)–if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the

invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 82. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims relating to the

validity of his release date are dismissed without leave to amend in this action.

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III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 29] is DISMISSED with

prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A(b). Because Plaintiff has been provided two opportunities, but still

has failed to sufficiently state a claim, the Court finds further amendment would be futile. See

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is

not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since plaintiff has

not, and cannot, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed

without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.”) (citing Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d

904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

2) IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that an IFP appeal from this final order of

dismissal would not appear to be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th

Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be

frivolous).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 28, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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