Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03991/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DELPHINO BALINTON, 

Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC ARNOLD,

Respondent. 

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No. C 14-3991 LHK (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should

not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer. Although given an opportunity, petitioner has

not filed a traverse. Having reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the court concludes

that petitioner is not entitled to relief, and DENIES the petition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 7, 2009, petitioner was charged with kidnapping to commit rape, sodomy, and

oral copulation (Count 1); forcible rape (Count 2); forcible oral copulation (Count 3); oral

copulation of a minor (Count 4); and assault with intent to commit sodomy (Count 5). On April

5, 2011, a jury convicted petitioner of Counts 2, 3, and 4. The jury also found corresponding

kidnapping enhancements true as to Counts 2 and 3. The jury further convicted petitioner of

simple assault as a lesser included offense of Count 5. The jury deadlocked on Count 1, and the

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trial court ultimately declared a mistrial on Count 1. The jury also found true a single serious

felony strike conviction. On May 20, 2011, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of 55

years to life.

On March 19, 2013, the California Court of Appeal affirmed. On June 12, 2013, the

California Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner filed the underlying federal habeas petition

on September 3, 2014.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Court of Appeal’s opinion in People v. Balinton,

No. A132571, 2013 WL 1122486 (Cal. App. March 19, 2013). 

In 2001, 16 year-old C.C. was walking on Sixth Street in San Francisco. At some point,

someone grabbed C.C. from behind and pulled her back into an alleyway. C.C. was unable to

get away. The attacker pulled C.C. into a large cardboard box where he sexually assaulted and

raped her. Some time after C.C. escaped from the attacker, she was taken to the hospital where

she was examined by a sexual assault nurse. Swabs were taken from C.C.’s mouth, vagina, and

anus. C.C. gave a description of her attacker as an African-American male, approximately 45

years old, 5 feet nine inches tall, and weighing around 220 pounds.

In 2008, a “cold hit” of DNA from sperm found and preserved on C.C.’s underpants

matched a reference sample of petitioner’s DNA. At the time, petitioner was incarcerated at San

Quentin State Prison. Petitioner admitted being in the area during the time C.C was attacked, but

denied having sex with anyone in the alleys south of Market Street, where the attack occurred. 

Petitioner stated that at the time of the attack, petitioner had a girlfriend and they would go to a

hotel to have sex. Petitioner did not recognize C.C. when the police showed him her picture. 

Petitioner denied that there was any chance his DNA could end up in evidence collected in

C.C.’s sexual assault case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

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petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme] Court on a question

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, the application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409.

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the United States Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Id. at 412. Clearly established federal law is defined as “the governing

legal principle or principles set forth by the [United States] Supreme Court.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s sole claim in his federal habeas petition is that the trial court’s instruction

regarding asportation for the kidnapping enhancements under Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(d)(2),

charged in connection with Counts 2 and 3, was erroneous. The court instructed the jury on the

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kidnapping enhancements as follows:

If you find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts Two and Three,

you must then decide whether, for each crime, the People have proved the

additional allegation that the defendant kidnapped [C.C.], increasing the risk of

harm to her. You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation

for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.

To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant took, held, or detained [C.C.] by the use of force or by

instilling reasonable fear;

2. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved [C.C.] or made her

move a substantial distance;

3. The movement of [C.C.] substantially increased the risk of harm to

her beyond that necessarily present in the crimes of rape and/or forced oral

copulation.

“Substantial distance” means more than a slight or trivial distance. The

movement must be more than merely incidental to the commission of rape

and/or forced oral copulation. In deciding whether the distance was substantial

and whether the movement substantially increased the risk of harm, you must

consider all the circumstances relating to the movement.

Balinton, 2013 WL 1122486, at *2-*3 (emphasis added). Petitioner argues that, with regard to

the emphasized portion, there should have been a comma inserted before and after the phrase “or

made her move,” to clearly communicate that the “substantial distance” was meant to modify

both “moved” and “made her move.” That is, without the commas, the instruction misstated the

elements of the kidnapping enhancement. Thus, argues petitioner, the jury could have found the

kidnapping enhancements true if it found that he moved C.C. without finding that he moved C.C.

a substantial distance.

The California Court of Appeal considered and rejected petitioner’s claim as follows:

Appellant’s contention that the instruction on the “movement” element of

section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2), prejudicially misled the jury does not

withstand scrutiny. To begin with, we cannot divine from a cold record whether

the trial court read the instruction in a way that corrected the grammatical

imprecision of the written instruction, that is, did the court pause between the

term “moved [C.C.]” and the term “or made her move”? Such a pause would

have signaled that there was a comma between the two elements as appellant

asserts there must be. We presume the court properly performs its judicial

duties, including knowing and applying the correct statutory law, and properly

presenting the instructions to the jury. (See Evid. Code, § 664.)

Moreover, the instructions as a whole conveyed that the substantial distance

applied whether the assailant moved the victim or made her move. The

instruction explained that the People must prove that the movement of C.C.

substantially increased the risk of harm and “the movement must be more than

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merely incidental to the commission” of the offense. Further, the jury was

advised to “consider all the circumstances relating to the movement” in deciding

whether the distance was substantial. (Italics added.) There is no logic to the

argument that the jury would conclude that the substantial distance element

applied only when making the victim move as opposed to actually moving the

victim. We presume that jurors are intelligent persons, capable of correlating

and understanding jury instructions. (People v. Brock (2006) 143 Cal. App. 4th

1266, 1277.) A reasonable juror would not interpret the instruction as appellant

suggests, namely that because there is no comma between the two forms of

movement, the substantial distance component does not apply if the perpetrator

actually moved the victim. Such an interpretation is nonsensical.

Additionally, the arguments of counsel assisted in eliminating any potential

ambiguity. The prosecutor’s closing argument made it clear that the

“substantial distance” factor applied to moving the victim, not just making the

victim move: “The defendant . . . took the person by force – I think it is real

clear that that happened in this case. [¶] Moved the person a substantial

distance, beyond merely incidental to the commission of these crimes.” (Italics

added.)

Defense counsel in turn underscored that the substantial distance factor

pertained to appellant’s act of moving C.C. to the alley: “[W]e have to think that

the reason the assailant dragged [C.C.] into the alley was for one purpose and

that’s sexual assault. So I would suggest the element to focus on is element No.

3 . . . : ‘Using that force or fear the defendant moved the other person or made

the other person move,’ . . . – this is the reason I bring this jury instruction up. 

Made the other person move a substantial distance. [¶] Now distance –

substantial distance is actually defined. . . . [¶] And I will tell you that I agree. 

Forty to fifty feet is a substantial distance for anyone to go anywhere. But

remember when [C.C.] moved away from her estimation of how far it was in

terms of number of feet and visualized the distance while she was on the

witness stand? You remember that distance . . . shrunk to the distance between

where she was seated in the witness chair and the end of [the prosecutor’s]

table? [¶] Is that in fact a substantial distance? Are you convinced of that

beyond a reasonable doubt?”

The prosecutor in rebuttal continued to present the evidence as showing that

appellant moved the victim a substantial distance: “[Defense counsel] indicated

. . . there wasn’t a substantial movement in the case. . . . We weren’t there. We

weren’t [C.C.]. It is a pretty substantial distance for her. Took her out of public

view. Took her out of any hope for being helped. Put Mr. Balinton in a

position where no one would interfere with what he was doing. [¶] Not too

dissimilar to walking down the sidewalk, the door open, pull you in, close the

door. You could be in another world, folks. No help is coming. You are

completely out of view. You are at the mercy of who dragged you there. 

Substantial distance for a sixteen-year old girl, absolutely.”

Appellant argues that the instruction on the substantive kidnapping charge and

the section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2), instruction both suffered the same

grammatical error, but in the substantive kidnapping charge, element 4 clarified

that any movement of the victim had to be for a distance more than incidental to

the commission of the sex crime. From this appellant concludes: “Since a

properly instructed jury dealing with the same issue was unable to agree

whether the movement was for a substantial distance, there is at least a

reasonable chance the true finding on [the section] 667.61 [, subdivision] (d)(2)

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charge was based on the legally invalid theory that appellant moved [C.C.].”

Appellant’s contention is not accurate. Some background is in order. The jury

submitted a note asking the court to identify and clarify the phrase, “‘merely

incidental to the commission of rape or oral copulation or sodomy’” with

respect to the substantive kidnapping count. The court responded: “‘This is a

question of fact for you to decide. You must consider the totality of

circumstances in making this decision.’” Later, the jury asked: “‘What happens

if we cannot reach a unanimous decision on a greater charge, [section] 209

[kidnapping for rape or other sex offenses], specifically on point No. 4?’” The

court noted that item 4 states: “‘The other person was moved or made to move a

distance beyond . . . that merely incidental to the commission of rape or oral

copulation or sodomy.’” The court queried whether the jury was hopelessly

deadlocked on that count; it was not, and thus deliberations continued, but

ultimately the jury did deadlock and a mistrial was declared as to the

substantive kidnapping charge.

We relate this sequence to illustrate that the jury was not confused, and

apparently did not deadlock, on the issue of the scope of the substantial distance

component of section 209, subdivision (b) – that is, did the component pertain

to both forms of movement or just one? That point was covered in item three of

the instruction, namely: “Using that force of fear, the defendant moved the other

person or made the other person move a substantial distance.” No question was

asked about item three.

Moreover, that the jury hung on the substantive kidnapping charge does not

suggest that it was confused. “An inconsistency may show no more than jury

lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the validity of a

verdict.” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 610, 656.) Inconsistent verdicts

most likely result from compromise in the jury room, or the extension of mercy

or leniency to the defendant. (People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1651,

1656.) Section 954 could not be clearer: “An acquittal of one or more counts

shall not be deemed an acquittal of any other count.”

In sum, for all these reasons there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would

have misconstrued or misapplied the instruction in the impermissible manner

appellant suggests.

Appellant also urges that the omission of a comma did more than render the

instruction ambiguous – it misstated an element of the charge, and thus the

resulting instruction violated his due process rights. As we explained above, no

reasonable juror would understand the instruction as removing the substantial

movement element in circumstances where appellant actually moved the victim

as opposed to making her move. There was no due process violation here.

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that

the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The instruction may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the

trial record. See id. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of

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the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady,

456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).

In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, as petitioner argues here, the inquiry is not how

reasonable jurors could or would have understood the instruction as a whole; rather, the court

must inquire whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 & n.4. In order to

show a due process violation, the defendant must show both ambiguity and a “reasonable

likelihood” that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violates the Constitution, such as

relieving the state of its burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-191 (2009) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner’s interpretation of the instruction was reasonable. 

Reading the instruction as a whole, the state court’s conclusion was reasonable that the

challenged instruction properly conveyed the message that the “substantial distance” element

applied with respect to whether petitioner moved C.C. or made C.C. move. Even assuming that

the instruction was ambiguous, it is reasonable to conclude that the arguments of counsel

clarified any potential ambiguity by emphasizing that the “substantial distance” element applied

to both the movement of C.C. as well as any act to make her move. Viewing the record and the

totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged instruction, the court concludes that

there was not a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violated

the Constitution.

Alternatively, assuming that the instruction was ambiguous and erroneous, petitioner has

not demonstrated that such error resulted in a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s

verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). The evidence clearly supported a

finding that petitioner moved C.C. a substantial distance. To determine whether the “substantial

distance” element is satisfied, “a trier of fact may consider not only the actual distance the victim

is moved, but also such factors as whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that

which existed prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased both

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the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker’s enhanced

opportunity to commit additional crimes.” People v. Arias, 193 Cal. App. 4th 1428, 1435-36

(2011). In California, “relatively short distances have been found not to be incidental where the

movement results in a substantial change in the context of the environment.” People v. Diaz, 78

Cal. App. 4th 243, 247 (2000) (citing cases). Moreover, “a rape involves solely an attack on the

person and does not necessarily require movement to complete the crime.” Id. at 248 (quoting

People v. Salazar, Cal. App. 4th 341, 347 (1995)). 

Here, the record demonstrates that C.C. testified she was dragged from the street back

into an alleyway and into a large cardboard box with openings cut out and pieces of cloth

hanging over the openings. C.C. initially testified that petitioner dragged her 40-50 feet, but

later testified that the distance was similar to that between the witness stand and the prosecutor’s

table. Despite the actual distance that C.C. was moved, the evidence shows that the movement

increased C.C.’s risk of harm, decreased the likelihood that she would be detected, and increased

the danger inherent in her foreseeable attempts to escape. See Arias, 193 Cal. App. 4th at 1435-

36. Thus, even assuming that the instruction was ambiguous as to whether the jury had to find

that petitioner moved C.C. a substantial distance, the evidence was more than sufficient to satisfy

that element.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district

court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its

ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Petitioner has

not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim

of the denial of a constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Accordingly, a COA is DENIED. 

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The clerk is instructed to enter judgment in favor of respondent, terminate all pending

motions, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: __________________ _________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

11/17/2015

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