Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-00942/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-00942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

MARGARET PETERSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

U.S. BANCORP EQUIPMENT FINANCE, 

INC., a corporation; and U.S. BANCORP, a 

corporation, 

 Defendants. 

Case No: C 10-0942 SBA 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

Docket 5 

Plaintiff Margaret Peterson (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant employment discrimination and 

wrongful termination action in state court against her former employer, U.S. Bancorp 

Equipment Finance, Inc. (“USBEF”) and its parent entity, U.S. Bancorp (“USB”) on December 

30, 2009. USBEF and USB (collectively, “Defendants”) removed the action to this Court on 

March 5, 2010, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The parties are 

presently before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to State a 

Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted, or in the Alternative for a More Definitive 

Statement Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). (Docket 5). Having read and considered the papers 

filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS the 

motion to dismiss for the reasons set forth below. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter 

suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b).1

 

I. BACKGROUND 

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, which are taken as true for 

purposes of the instant motion. Plaintiff is an African-American female over the age of fifty 

 1 In light of the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court does not 

reach Defendants’ alternative request for a more definite statement. 

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who worked for USBEF, and its predecessor, Oliver-Allan Technology, for over ten years. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 2, 7.) During the relevant time period, Plaintiff worked at USBEF’s principal 

office located in Larkspur, California. (Id. ¶ 6.) She does not allege the names of any her job 

titles, and only vaguely asserts that “she served in several different capacities and collections 

activities.” (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Plaintiff alleges that during her ten year tenure at USBEF she was subjected to 

discrimination and sexual harassment. Her Complaint states: 

During the course of her employment, plaintiff, who is an AfricanAmerican woman over 50, found herself subjected to various 

forms and instances of disparate treatment by her managers at 

USBEF, compared to male and younger, white female peers and 

colleagues. This included, among other things, limitations or 

denials or promotions and/or opportunities for advancement and 

compensation increases equal to that of similarly situated 

qualified employees outside her protected race, gender and age 

and/or diminution of “official” titles and authority, while subject 

to the same or increased work duties, assignments and 

responsibilities, such that plaintiff was required to work 

considerably longer and harder than peers and managers who were 

not members of her protected classes . 

(Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff also asserts that she “witnessed, experienced and/or 

became aware of various forms and instances of hostile, disparaging and/or offensive treatment 

regarding or directed toward woman at USBEF by its male managers and officials, and made 

complaints and/or objections regarding such behavior.” (Id.) The Complaint does not specify 

the nature or frequency of the allegedly improper “treatment.” 

Separate and apart from her claims of discrimination and harassment, Plaintiff avers that 

USBEF retaliated against her for a variety of reasons, including for complaining about 

discrimination and harassment. (Id. ¶ 42.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that: 

[S]he observed, experienced, and/or learned of various instances 

in which USBEF violated [financial and accounting 

compliance] . . . procedures, requirements and controls, which 

included, without limitation, improper booking and/or recognition 

of certain revenues. Plaintiff further observed, experienced, 

and/or learned of other improprieties or reported improprieties that 

affected both revenue and expense aspects of USBEF’s business, 

particularly compensation of certain sales employees, including 

the apparent manipulation and/or duplication of leasing 

transactions booked by sales employees on such transactions. 

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Plaintiff raised inquiries and objections to management officials or 

USBEF and/or USB as to such instances or practices. 

Within a short time of plaintiff’s aforesaid inquiries and 

objections, defendants terminated her employment at USBEF, . . . 

(Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff does not indicate when she was terminated nor does she specify when 

any of the alleged conduct underlying her claims occurred. 

The Complaint alleges seven state law causes of action, styled as follows: (1) Sex 

Discrimination – Disparate Treatment; Harassment; (2) Discrimination –Race and Ethnicity; 

(3) Discrimination – Age; (4) Failure to Prevent Discrimination; (5) Discrimination and 

Harassment – Cal. Constitution; (6) Retaliation; and (7) Wrongful Termination in Violation of 

Public Policy. With the exception of her fifth cause of action, all of Plaintiff’s claims appear to 

be predicated on the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Defendants 

now move to dismiss all causes of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

or alternatively, for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if the 

plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a 

cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The 

pleadings must “give the defendant fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take the wellpled allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). However, “the tenet 

that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to 

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949-50. “While legal conclusions can provide 

the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 1950. Those 

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facts must be sufficient to push the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Id.

at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). If the complaint is dismissed, plaintiff generally 

should be afforded leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint cannot be saved by 

amendment. See Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT

To state a claim of “work environment” sexual harassment under FEHA, a plaintiff 

must allege that: (1) she was “subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a . . . sexual nature; 

(2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work 

environment.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003).2

 “The 

plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct would have interfered with a reasonable 

employee’s work performance and would have seriously affected the psychological well-being 

of a reasonable employee and that she was actually offended.” Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula 

Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 608, 609-610 (1989). Conduct must be so extreme as to amount to 

a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 

860 (9th Cir. 1999). The work environment “must be both objectively and subjectively 

offensive, one that a reasonable [woman] would find hostile or abusive, and one that the 

[plaintiff] in fact did perceive to be so.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 

(1998). 

Plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment are insufficient to state a claim under FEHA. 

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she “witnessed, experienced and/or became aware of 

various forms and instances of hostile, disparaging and/or offensive treatment regarding or 

directed toward woman at USBEF by its male managers and officials, and made complaints 

and/or objections regarding such behavior.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) Without more, these allegations are 

too vague and conclusory to state a claim for sexual harassment. As an initial matter, Plaintiff 

 2 FEHA harassment claims are evaluated under the same standards as Title VII 

harassment claims. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys. 21 Cal.4th 121, 130 (1999). 

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does not specify the nature of the “hostile, disparaging and/or offensive treatment” that forms 

the basis of her claim. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even specify whether she personally 

experienced or witnessed such conduct or whether she simply heard by about it from some 

other source. There also are no facts alleged to establish that the alleged harassment was 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment. Plaintiff 

has offered little more than the type of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action” that the Supreme Court has held are insufficient to avoid dismissal. See Iqbal, 129 

S.Ct. at 1949. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s first cause of action for sexual 

harassment under FEHA, with leave to amend. 

B. RACE AND AGE DISCRIMINATION

FEHA prohibits discrimination in the workplace on account of the employee’s race or 

age. Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a). A plaintiff may prove unlawful discrimination by producing 

“direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than 

not motivated the employer.” Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Because direct evidence of discrimination is rare, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) developed tripartite burden shifting test to prove 

discrimination circumstantially. California has expressly adopted this test in evaluating race 

and age discrimination claims brought under FEHA. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc. 24 Cal.4th 317, 

354 (2000) (“California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the 

United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, 

based on a theory of disparate treatment.”). 

The McDonnell Douglas steps are as follows. First, Plaintiff must establish a prima 

facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was 

qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and 

(4) similarly-situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably. See, 

e.g., Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1105-1106 (9th Cir. 2008). Second, if a 

plaintiff establishes the prima facie case of discrimination, the burden “shifts to the defendant 

to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory conduct.” 

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Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, if the employer 

articulates a legitimate reason for its action, “the employee must then prove that the reason 

advanced by the employer constitutes a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Diaz v. Eagle 

Produce Ltd. Partnership, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). Regardless of who bears the 

burden of production, the employee always retains the ultimate burden of persuading the trier 

of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee. Texas Dep’t of 

Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1982). 

In the instant case, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a member of protected classes 

(i.e., race and ethnicity) and that she was qualified for her unspecified positions at USBEF. 

However, her allegations are deficient with respect to demonstrating that she was subject to an 

adverse employment action and that similarly-situated individuals outside her protected class 

were treated more favorably. Plaintiff merely alleges that she was “subjected to various forms 

and instances of disparate treatment by her managers at USBEF, compared to male and to 

younger, white female peers and colleagues.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) She vaguely alludes to “limitation 

or denials of promotions and/or opportunities for advancement and compensation increases 

equal to that of similarly qualified employees outside of her protected race, gender and age 

and/or the dimunition of ‘official’ titles and authority . . . .” (Id.) Like her cause of action for 

sexual harassment, Plaintiff has done little more that recite the elements of a discrimination 

claim without providing any factual support. 

At a minimum, Plaintiff must allege facts supporting her assertion that she was 

subjected to “limitation or denials of promotions and/or opportunities for advancement and 

compensation increases[.]” In particular, Plaintiff should identify the positions and 

“opportunities” that she purportedly sought but was denied by her employer and when such 

events occurred. In their present form, the allegations in support of Plaintiff’s causes of action 

for age and race discrimination fail to “give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93. Accordingly, the Court 

dismisses Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action for race and age discrimination, 

respectively, with leave to amend. 

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C. DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is presented a claim for “discrimination and/or 

harassment” in violation of Article I, Section 8, of the California Constitution, which states 

that: “A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, 

vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin.” Cal. 

Const. art. I, § 8. This claim merely incorporates by reference Plaintiff’s other allegations of 

“discrimination and/or harassment.” (See Compl. ¶ 37.) Thus, this claim is insufficiently pled 

for the same reasons as above. 

The Court notes that neither party discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Strother v. S.

Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir.1996), which held that “a claim brought 

directly under Article I, § 8 of the California Constitution may only be brought where a 

plaintiff has been denied entrance into a profession or particular employment or terminated 

from the same,” and applies neither to claims of “discrimination in the conditions of 

employment” nor “conduct affecting particular aspects of an individual’s job.” Id. at 871-73. 

As such, Strother appears to bar Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action insofar as it is predicated upon 

discrimination and/or harassment. However, since the parties neglected to address Strother, the 

Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend. Plaintiff should be aware that any pleading 

filed in this Court is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and as such, she may amend 

only to the extent that she has a good faith basis for doing so. 

D. FAILURE TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT

Under FEHA, it is unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps 

necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Cal.Gov. Code 

§ 12940(k). To state a claim for violation of section 12940(k), plaintiff must allege and prove 

the following: “1) plaintiff was subjected to discrimination, harassment or retaliation; 

2) defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment or 

retaliation; and 3) this failure caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm.” Lelaind 

v. City and County of San Francisco, 576 F. Supp.2d 1079, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2008). There can 

be no claim for failure to prevent discrimination or harassment under FEHA unless the plaintiff 

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first establishes a valid underlying, claim for discrimination or harassment. Trujillo v. N. Co. 

Transit Dist., 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 288-89 (1998). Since Plaintiff’s discrimination and 

harassment claims are infirm, so too is her fourth cause of action for failure to prevent 

discrimination and harassment. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 

E. RETALIATION

To state a prima facie case for retaliation, plaintiff must establish: (1) that she was 

engaged in protected activity; (2) that defendant took an adverse employment action; and (3) a 

causal connection existed between plaintiff’s protected activity and defendant’s adverse 

employment action. Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1034-35 (9th 

Cir. 2006). An employee’s formal or informal complaints to a supervisor regarding unlawful 

discrimination constitute “protected activity,” and adverse actions taken against the employee 

after such complaints may constitute retaliation. See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson 

Consumer Prod., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is deficiently pled. First, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient 

facts to establish that she engaged in protected activity. The Complaint simply alleges that she 

“engaged in one or more protected activities, including reporting and/or objecting to an 

appropriate manager regarding acts of discriminatory conduct and disparate treatment directed 

against her or toward other employees of defendants . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 42.) No facts are alleged 

which, if accepted as true, would be sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff engaged in 

protected activity. Plaintiff’s vague allegations of “reporting and/or objecting” to 

“discriminatory conduct and disparate treatment” fail to provide Defendants with fair notice of 

the basis of her retaliation claim. Likewise, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to 

demonstrate the requisite causal nexus between her purported complaints of discrimination and 

her termination.3

 Given the conclusory nature of the allegations supporting Plaintiff’s sixth 

 3 Plaintiff identifies the adverse employment action as “actions set forth herein, 

including, without limitation, termination of plaintiff’s employment.” (Compl. ¶ 43.) 

Termination of employment obviously is an adverse employment action. Nevertheless, to the 

extent that Plaintiff is attempting to claim that she suffered any other adverse employment 

action aside from termination, she must clearly identify such harm in her amended complaint. 

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cause of action for retaliation, the Court dismisses this claim with leave to amend. 

F. WRONGFUL TERMINATION

Plaintiff’s seventh and final cause of action is for wrongful termination in violation of 

public policy. California law allows a discharged employee to “maintain a tort action and 

recover damages traditionally available in such actions” when an employer’s discharge of that 

employee “violates fundamental principles of public policy.” Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield 

Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 170 (1980). To state a Tameny claim, the public policy “must be: 

(1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it 

‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; 

(3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.” 

Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.4th 880, 894 (1997). 

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated public policy by terminating 

her employment for reasons that are proscribed under FEHA. (Compl. ¶ 49.) A violation of 

FEHA may support a Tameny claim. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1143, 

1159-60 (1998). However, if an underlying FEHA claim fails, “any claim for wrongful 

discharge in violation of the public policy embodied in those claims fails.” Her v. Career Sys.

Devel. Corp., 2009 WL 4928395, at *9 (E.D. Cal., Dec. 14, 2009). Thus, to the extent 

Plaintiff’s tort claim for wrongful termination relies on violations of FEHA, such claim fails to 

state a claim for the reasons articulated above. 

Plaintiff also alleges that she was wrongfully terminated for making “reports of and/or 

objections to improper actions of defendants to deny or avoid payment of earned compensation 

to employee,” and “suspected improper and unlawful business practices regarding booking, 

revenue recognition, representations, and other aspects of lease transactions with defendants’ 

customers.” (Compl. ¶ 49.) As a general matter, terminating an employee for complaining 

about illegal practices may be actionable under Tameny, provided that the employee made such 

complaints to management. Rivera v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 331 F.3d 1074, 1079 

(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that to state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy, plaintiff must establish that “he disclosed the illegal practices of its employees to . . . 

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management”). Here, Plaintiff avers that she “raised inquiries and objections to management 

officials of USBEF and/or USB” (Compl. ¶ 9), but fails to present any facts regarding the 

content of those “inquiries and objections” or the circumstances surrounding those alleged 

communications. Nor has Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a nexus between 

those communications and her termination. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s cause 

of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, with leave to amend. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date this Order is filed 

to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies discussed above. Plaintiff is 

warned that the failure to file a First Amended Complaint within the specified time period will 

result in the dismissal of this action, with prejudice. 

2. The hearing on the motion scheduled for July 21, 2010 is VACATED. 

3. The Case Management Conference currently scheduled for July 21, 2010 is 

CONTINUED to September 29, 2010 at 3:30 p.m. The parties shall meet and confer prior to 

the conference and shall prepare a joint Case Management Conference Statement which shall 

be filed no later than ten (10) days prior to the Case Management Conference that complies 

with the Standing Order for All Judges of the Northern District of California and the Standing 

Order of this Court. Plaintiff shall be responsible for filing the statement as well as for 

arranging the conference call. All parties shall be on the line and shall call (510) 637-3559 at 

the above indicated date and time. 

4. This Order terminates Docket 5. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 14, 2010 _______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

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