Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01814/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01814-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jorge Hernandez-Roque,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-01814-PHX-DJH (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Jorge Hernandez-Roque’s (“Petitioner”) Petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) (the “Petition”). 

Respondents have answered (Docs. 10, 16), and Petitioner has replied (Docs. 13, 17). 

The matter is deemed ripe for consideration. 

The Petition contains four grounds for relief that allege the ineffective assistance 

of Petitioner’s trial counsel. Respondents do not argue that the Petition is untimely or 

that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. The undersigned finds that all four 

grounds for relief are meritless. It is therefore recommended that the Court deny the 

Petition. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex in Yuma, 

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Arizona. After an August 2010 trial with co-defendant Juan Abundez Leyva (“Leyva”), a 

jury convicted Petitioner on two counts: (i) conspiracy to commit possession of marijuana 

for sale and (ii) possession of marijuana for sale having a weight that exceeds four 

pounds. (Doc. 1-1 at 9-10). Both counts are class two felonies under Arizona law. (Id.

at 9). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent prison terms of 15.75 years on

each count. (Id. at 11). The trial court also revoked Petitioner’s probation on his prior 

felony convictions. (Id.).

A. Facts Underlying Petitioner’s Convictions

The following is a summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions as 

recounted by the Arizona Court of Appeals in its July 2011 decision.1

 On June 17, 2009, 

police conducted surveillance on a house located on West Vista Avenue in Glendale, 

Arizona as part of a narcotics investigation. (Id. at 6). An officer observed a black 

Dodge truck (the “Dodge”) parked on the street in front of the house. (Id. at 7). A black 

Toyota Camry (the “Camry”) briefly stopped in front of the house, drove away, then 

returned approximately twenty minutes later and parked on the street in front of the 

house. (Id.). The driver of the Camry, Christopher Notice (“Notice”), entered the house. 

Several minutes later, Notice returned to the Camry and drove away. (Id.).

Shortly after the Camry left the premises, Petitioner exited the West Vista house, 

moved the Dodge onto the driveway, and went back inside the house. (Id.). Petitioner 

left the house a few minutes later carrying a large black plastic bag that contained “bulky 

material.” Petitioner placed the bag under a piece of drywall in the truck bed of the 

Dodge, then drove away in the Dodge. (Id.).

Officers began mobile surveillance on both the Dodge and Camry. (Id.). After

stopping at a gas station for approximately five minutes, the Dodge and Camry traveled 

to a golf course parking lot. (Id.). While Petitioner remained in the Dodge, Notice exited 

the Camry, grabbed the large black plastic bag from the Dodge’s truck bed, and placed 

1 A state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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the bag in the trunk of the Camry. (Id. at 7-8). The Dodge and Camry then exited the 

parking lot. (Id. at 8).

Officers stopped the Camry and smelled a strong marijuana odor coming from 

inside the vehicle. (Id.). A K-9 officer arrived with his drug-sniffing dog, which alerted 

to the large black plastic bag. (Id.). The bag contained over seven pounds of marijuana. 

(Id.). 

Other officers stopped the Dodge at approximately the same time the Camry was 

stopped. (Id.). The same K-9 officer who assisted in the stop of the Camry directed his 

dog to conduct a “free air sniff” around the Dodge. (Id. at 9). Although the dog alerted 

the officer that there were drugs in the vehicle, no drugs were found. (Id.). The K-9 

officer opined that the dog smelled marijuana that was previously inside the Dodge. 

(Id.). 

Officers later searched the West Vista house, and discovered marijuana of the 

same type found in the Camry’s trunk. (Id. at 8). 

B. Direct Appeal, Post-Conviction Relief, and Petition for Review

In its July 7, 2011 decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Id. at 5-15). Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme 

Court for review.

On September 13, 2011, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(“PCR”). (Doc. 13 at 13). On May 30, 2012, Petitioner’s PCR counsel filed a PCR 

Notice and PCR Petition. (Doc. 10-1 at 22-25; Doc. 1-1 at 20). On September 12, 2012, 

the trial court denied the PCR Petition. (Doc. 1-1 at 76-77). Petitioner filed a Petition for 

Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 79-91). On January 7, 2014, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the PCR Petition. (Id. at 122-25). 

Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Supreme Court.

On August 15, 2014, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. 1). 

In accordance with the Court’s November 2014 Order (Doc. 7), Respondents answered 

the Petition. (Doc. 10). Respondents argued in their Limited Answer that the Petition 

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was filed after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. (Id. at 9-16). Respondents’ 

argument rested primarily on Petitioner’s PCR Notice filed on May 30, 2012. In a 

September 2015 Order (Doc. 15), the undersigned observed that the Limited Answer did 

not address the PCR Notice filed on September 13, 2011. The undersigned noted that in 

light of the September 13, 2011 PCR Notice, the Petition appears to be timely. (Id. at 3). 

The undersigned ordered Respondents to address the September 13, 2011 PCR Notice. 

(Id.). In their Supplemental Answer filed on October 16, 2015, Respondents concede that 

the Petition is timely and address the claims presented in the Petition on the merits. (Doc. 

16 at 5, 10-14). Petitioner has replied to Respondents’ Supplemental Answer. (Doc. 17).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Reviewing Habeas Claims on the Merits

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last 

reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or her claims either:

1. [R]esulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or

2. [R]esulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. 

As to the first entitlement to relief explained above, “clearly established federal 

law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time 

of the relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

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law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to the second entitlement to relief explained above, factual determinations by 

state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 

852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, 

a state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so 

long as “fair-minded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). 

B. Proving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984)

The “clearly established federal law” for an ineffective assistance of counsel 

(“IAC”) claim is the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner arguing an IAC claim must establish that his or her 

counsel’s performance was (i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential standard, and “[s]urmounting 

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). In the habeas context, 

the issue is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In assessing the performance factor of Strickland’s two-part test, judicial review 

“must be highly deferential” and the court must try not “to second-guess counsel’s 

assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 (internal quotation marks and 

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citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, counsel’s representation must fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness such that it was outside the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. A reviewing court considers

“whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was effective. Rogovich v. 

Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.

Although the performance factor is listed first in Strickland’s two-part test, a court 

may consider the prejudice factor first. In addition, a court need not consider both factors 

if the court determines that a petitioner has failed to meet one factor. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both 

deficiency and prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other).

III. DISCUSSION

Respondents concede that the Petition is timely. Respondents do not raise the 

affirmative defense of procedural default, thus waiving the issue. See Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2002). Although a court may sua sponte raise 

the issue of procedural default, the undersigned has found that in this case, the interests of 

judicial economy are best served by reviewing Petitioner’s claims on the merits rather 

than first analyzing possible procedural default issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An 

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the 

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); 

Lambrix v. Singletarv, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (holding that a district court may 

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address the merits without reaching procedural issues where the interests of judicial 

economy are best served by doing so); Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1232 (“Procedural bar issues 

are not infrequently more complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it 

may well make sense in some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the 

same.”). 

A. Ground One: Alleged IAC for Trial Counsel’s Failure to Interview 

Petitioner’s Co-Defendant

“[T]he duty to investigate and prepare a defense is not limitless.” Hamilton v. 

Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The duty 

“does not necessarily require that every conceivable witness be interviewed or that 

counsel . . . pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all conceivable hope withers.”

Id. In presenting an IAC claim based on counsel’s failure to call a witness, a petitioner 

must (i) identify the witness, United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 979 (1985); (ii) show that the witness was available and 

willing to testify, United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988); and (iii) show that the witness’ testimony would have been 

sufficient to create a reasonable probability that the jury would have had a reasonable 

doubt as to guilt, Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 

U.S. 1091 (1991). Further, IAC claims based on a duty to investigate and call relevant 

witnesses “must be considered in light of the strength of the government’s case.” Rios v. 

Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 808-13 (9th Cir. 2002).

As discussed, Petitioner was tried with co-defendant Leyva. Leyva was charged 

and convicted on two counts: (i) conspiracy to commit possession of marijuana for sale 

and (ii) possession of marijuana for sale. (Doc. 10-2 at 11, 240). Both counts resulted 

from the investigation of the West Vista house.

2

 During the August 2010 trial, Detective 

2 Officers observed Leyva arrive at the West Vista house in a green Ford pickup truck with an individual named Christopher Peters (“Peters”). (Doc. 10-2 at 89-90). 

Leyva and Peters entered the house and exited approximately fifteen minutes later. (Id. at 

91). Peters was carrying a black plastic bag and placed the bag in the pickup truck. (Id.). Peters entered the driver’s side of the truck, Leyva entered the passenger’s side, and 

Peters drove away. (Id.). Officers stopped the truck, and Leyva ran out the door. An 

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Cano testified that he interviewed Leyva after advising Leyva of his Miranda rights. (Id.

at 145-46). Detective Cano asked Leyva to explain his involvement at the West Vista 

house. (Id. at 146). Leyva told Detective Cano that a co-worker at the painting company 

for which Leyva works “was looking to buy about five to seven pounds of marijuana.” 

(Id.). Leyva “reached out to a friend named Jorge, who could provide pretty much five to 

seven pounds of marijuana. So [Leyva’s co-worker] and Leyva got together in a vehicle, 

and Jorge told them to go to the [West Vista house].” (Id.). The trial court asked 

Detective Cano if Leyva was referring to Petitioner when Leyva identified the individual 

named “Jorge.” (Id. at 151). Detective Cano stated “I don’t know.” (Id.).

Petitioner’s PCR counsel hired a private investigator, who interviewed Leyva on 

July 18, 2011 and September 15, 2011 at the prison where Leyva is serving his sentences. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 37-38). The investigator stated that:

[d]uring both interviews Leyva told me that Jorge Roque was 

not the ‘Jorge’ he was referring to in that interview. He said 

that Jorge Roque was not a participant in the incident that led 

to their arrest in Glendale. . . . After reviewing the transcript 

and watching the video of his interview [with Detective 

Cano], Leyva stated again, that he does not know who the 

person ‘Jorge’ is whom he was referring to in that statement 

to Glendale Police Department. Leyva stated numerous times 

that he was not referring to Jorge Roque in that interview. 

(Id. at 38).

In Ground One of the Petition, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to interview Leyva before trial. (Doc. 1 at 6). Petitioner asserts 

that Leyva would have informed Petitioner’s counsel that Petitioner is not the individual 

named “Jorge” whom Leyva called regarding the purchase of marijuana. Petitioner 

further asserts that “had counsel properly investigated the case, then the jury would not 

have been left to believe that Jorge Hernandez-Roque was ‘Jorge Luis Vasquez-Munoz’

who was actually the individual called about the drugs.”3

 (Id.).

officer caught up to Leyva and arrested him. (Id. at 97-99). 

3 Jorge Luis Vasquez-Munoz is another individual arrested and charged as a result of the investigation of the West Vista house. (Doc. 1-1 at 25, 51).

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The last reasoned state court decision reviewing the above claim is the January 7, 

2014 Arizona Court of Appeals’ ruling that affirmed the trial court’s denial of 

Petitioner’s PCR Petition. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s ruling that 

even if Leyva’s post-trial statements were credible, it is unlikely that he would have 

agreed to a pretrial interview with Petitioner’s counsel. (Doc. 1-1 at 124). For the 

following reasons, Petitioner’s claim in Ground One fails.

First, Petitioner has not presented any evidence that Leyva was willing to testify 

on Petitioner’s behalf. Nor does the record reflect a reason why Leyva would have been 

willing to waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. If Leyva testified as he told 

the private investigator that “[Petitioner] was not a participant in the incident that led to 

their arrest in Glendale,” Leyva would risk incriminating himself. Only a participant 

would be able to accurately identify other participants. Leyva had ample reason not to 

waive his right against self-incrimination. Because Petitioner has not shown that Leyva 

was willing to testify, Petitioner’s IAC claim in Ground One fails. See Harden, 846 F.2d 

at 1231-32.

Moreover, Leyva’s statements to the private investigator are contradictory. Leyva 

told the investigator that the individual named “Jorge” with whom he discussed the 

purchase of marijuana was not Petitioner. (Doc. 1-1 at 38). Yet Leyva also told the 

investigator that “he does not know who the person ‘Jorge’ is whom he was referring to 

in that statement to Glendale Police Department.” (Id.). Leyva’s inconsistent statements 

do not show a substantial likelihood that the jury would have acquitted Petitioner had 

Leyva testified on Petitioner’s behalf. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. Further, Detective 

Cano testified that he did not know whether Leyva was referring to Petitioner when he 

identified the name “Jorge.” (Doc. 1-1 at 151). The jury thus was aware that Petitioner 

may not be the individual whom Leyva referenced in the interview with Detective Cano. 

Finally, as recounted by the trial court:

The State’s case was largely circumstantial but quite strong. 

Defendant was seen acting in tandem with co-defendants, 

carrying a large bag later found to contain the marijuana in 

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question, and a dog alerted on the truck he was driving for the 

presence of marijuana. He received numerous calls on his 

phone from co-defendant Leyva after his arrest. Finally, he 

made several incriminating statements against his own 

interest. Even if there had been no reference to “Jorge” by 

detective Cano, the outcome would have clearly been the 

same.

(Id. at 77). Given the strength of the state’s case against Petitioner, Petitioner has not 

established a “substantial, not just conceivable” likelihood of a different result if the jury 

had heard the testimony of Leyva. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. 

For the above reasons, Petitioner cannot establish the prejudice prong of the 

Strickland test. The undersigned therefore does not find that the state court’s 

determination was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Strickland or 

was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Ground One. 

B. Ground Two: Alleged IAC for Trial Counsel’s Failure to Interview 

Detective Cano 

An officer testified that when Petitioner was arrested, Petitioner’s “phone kept 

going off. . . . Somebody kept calling him.” (Doc. 10-2 at 65). The officer testified that 

the telephone number that was “continually calling” Petitioner was the same number that 

Leyva provided on his information form when booked. (Id. at 66-67). In Ground Two, 

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 

interview Detective Cano “who held exculpatory evidence for Petitioner . . . .” (Doc. 1 

at 7). Petitioner asserts that Detective Cano would have informed Petitioner’s counsel 

that the number from which Leyva allegedly called Petitioner belonged to Christina 

Remedios (“Remedios”), a female acquaintance of Petitioner. (Id.). 

The last reasoned state court decision regarding the claim in Ground Two is the 

trial court’s September 12, 2012 decision denying the PCR Petition. The Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ January 7, 2014 decision substantially incorporates the trial court’s decision.

The Court therefore may review the trial court’s decision as part of the review of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 

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2014). 

The trial court’s decision noted that the phone number listed by Leyva when 

booked was the same phone number that appeared multiple times on Petitioner’s phone 

immediately after his arrest. (Doc. 1-1 at 77). Testimony that the telephone number was 

registered to Remedios would not have prevented a reasonable jury from concluding that 

Leyva used the telephone number to call Petitioner. Respondents correctly observe that a 

prudent individual would not use a telephone registered in his or her own name to arrange 

a drug transaction. Petitioner has failed to establish that there is a “substantial, not just 

conceivable” likelihood of a different result if the jury had heard testimony that the 

telephone number was registered to Remedios. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. In other 

words, Petitioner has failed to establish the prejudice prong of Strickland. 

The Arizona courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim presented in Ground Two was 

not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Strickland and was not an 

unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record. The 

undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Ground Two. 

C. Ground Three: Alleged IAC Based on Trial Counsel’s “Individual and 

Cumulative Errors”

Petitioner argues in Ground Three that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

allegedly failing to investigate and present evidence to the jury that there were no drugs 

found in Petitioner’s truck the day he was arrested “deeming Petitioner actually innocent 

of the charges tried before the jury.” (Doc. 1 at 8). Petitioner also argues that his counsel 

was ineffective for failing to present evidence to the jury that Petitioner and Leyva did 

not know each other and met for the first time at trial. (Id.). Petitioner reasserts his 

argument that his counsel should have discovered and presented evidence that the 

telephone number listed by Leyva and found on Petitioner’s phone was registered to 

Remedios. (Id.). Petitioner contends that the “cummulative [sic] prejudice of all these 

factors not presented to the jury by defense counsel deems his performance deficient.” 

(Id.). 

Ground Three was raised in the PCR Petition. Citing to the same errors alleged 

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above, the PCR Petition argued that Petitioner was “prejudiced as a result of both Trial 

Counsel’s individual and cumulative errors during the pre-trial investigation and trial.” 

(Doc. 1-1 at 28-30, 36). Neither the trial court nor the Arizona Court of Appeals

explicitly addressed the claim in their decisions. “When a federal claim has been 

presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the 

state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or statelaw procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 

(2011). Although there may be an argument that Petitioner did not fairly present the 

claim in Ground Three to the Arizona Court of Appeals,4 Respondents have waived the 

procedural default defense. In the interest of judicial economy, the undersigned has

reviewed the IAC claim presented in Ground Three on the merits.5

In presenting Petitioner’s defense, Petitioner’s trial counsel focused on the lack of 

direct evidence showing that Petitioner is guilty. For example, Petitioner’s trial counsel 

highlighted to the jury (i) that there were no photographs taken to verify the testifying 

officers’ version of the events (Doc. 10-2 at 209) and (ii) the black bag containing 

marijuana that was found in the Camry was not tested for fingerprints (Id. at 211). 

Although Petitioner disagrees with trial counsel’s defense strategy, that 

disagreement does not constitute deficient performance on the part of Petitioner’s trial 

counsel. See Murray, 746 F.3d at 457 (a “defendant’s disagreement with trial counsel’s 

4 The Arizona Court of Appeals stated that “[t]o the extent [Petitioner] otherwise 

contends the trial court erred in rejecting his claims, he does not develop any meaningful 

arguments. Thus, he has waived any such arguments on review.” (Doc. 1-1 at 124-25). 

5 One of the claims presented in Petitioner’s PCR Petition argued that Petitioner is actually innocent of the crimes underlying his convictions. (Doc. 1-1 at 33-35). To the 

extent Ground Three presents a freestanding actual innocence claim, the claim is not 

cognizable in this federal habeas proceeding. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 

(1993) (“[A] claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a 

gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred 

constitutional claim considered on the merits.”); see also Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 

1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995); Jordan v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351,1356 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (“[O]ur precedent forbids granting habeas relief based on a claim of actual 

innocence . . . in non-capital cases.”); Wright v. Stegall, 247 F. App’x 709, 712 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Since the Supreme Court has declined to recognize a freestanding innocence 

claim in habeas corpus, outside the death-penalty context, this court finds that petitioner’s 

claim is not entitled to relief under available Supreme Court precedent.”).

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strategy does not constitute deficient performance on the part of trial counsel”). A court 

reviewing the performance of counsel must make “every effort . . . to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Bell v. 

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); Edwards v. 

Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (court cannot apply “fabled twentytwenty vision of hindsight” (internal quotation omitted)). Upon review of the record, the 

undersigned finds that the performance of Petitioner’s trial counsel was reasonable under 

prevailing professional norms. Clark, 769 F.3d at 725. 

Further, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the jury heard evidence that no drugs 

were found in the Dodge. On both direct and cross-examination, the K-9 officer testified 

that no drugs were found in the Dodge. (Id. at 117, 127). Petitioner’s assertion that his 

counsel should have presented evidence that Petitioner and Leyva “actually met for the 

first time at trial and never knew each other prior to that date . . . .” is also meritless. 

(Doc. 1 at 8). Presentation of such evidence would have required Leyva and/or Petitioner 

to testify. Petitioner has not shown that Leyva was willing to testify on Petitioner’s 

behalf. Nor has Petitioner shown that Petitioner was willing, but was denied the 

opportunity, to waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and testify at trial. 

In addition, as explained in the preceding section, there is not a substantial 

likelihood that the jury would have acquitted Petitioner if it had heard testimony that the 

telephone number connecting Leyva and Petitioner was registered to Remedios. 

Finally, to reiterate, the state’s case against Petitioner was strong. Officers 

testified that they saw Petitioner place a large bag in the bed of a Dodge truck, drive away 

in the truck, then stop in a parking lot and allow an individual to take the bag out of the 

truck and place it in a different vehicle’s trunk. Officers later determined that the bag 

contained marijuana of the same type found in the West Vista house from which 

Petitioner exited with the large bag. A K-9 officer’s drug-sniffing dog made “residual 

alerts” indicating that drugs had been in the Dodge. (Doc. 10-2 at 117). Petitioner’s 

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claim in Ground Three does not satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.

Petitioner has failed to show that the Arizona courts’ rejection of the claim 

presented in Ground Three was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

Strickland or was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the 

record. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Ground Three.

D. Ground Four: Alleged IAC for Trial Counsel’s Failure to File a Motion to 

Sever Petitioner’s Trial from Leyva’s Trial

In his fourth ground for relief, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to file a motion to sever Petitioner’s trial from Leyva’s trial. (Doc. 

1 at 9). Petitioner asserts that he and Leyva had antagonistic defenses. The trial court 

rejected this claim because a motion to sever likely would not have succeeded. (Doc. 1-1 

at 77).

Under Arizona law, a defendant is entitled to severance based on antagonistic 

defenses only if he or she can demonstrate that his defense and the defense of his codefendant are mutually exclusive. “[D]efenses are mutually exclusive within the 

meaning of this rule if the jury, in order to believe the core of the evidence offered on 

behalf of one defendant, must disbelieve the core of the evidence offered on behalf of the 

co-defendant.” See State v. Cruz, 672 P.2d 470, 474 (Ariz. 1983). 

Petitioner and Leyva were arrested in conjunction with two separate incidents

involving two separate bags of marijuana and two separate third parties (i.e. Notice and 

Peters). Officers did not see Petitioner and Leyva interact with one another. Both 

Petitioner and Leyva denied possessing marijuana and conspiring to commit possession 

of marijuana for sale. Petitioner and Leyva’s claims of innocence did not require the jury 

to disbelieve the core of evidence offered on behalf of either defendant. Therefore, the 

trial court likely would have denied a motion to sever. The failure of Petitioner’s trial 

counsel to file a futile motion to sever does not constitute constitutionally deficient 

performance. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (an omitted action 

must be shown to be meritorious to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim);

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Counsel’s failure to make a futile motion 

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does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 

1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (failure to take futile action can never be deficient performance); 

Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985) (the “[f]ailure to raise a meritless 

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance”); Hernandez v. Harrington, 720

F.Supp.2d 1161, 1171–72 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (trial counsel held not to be ineffective for 

failing to make a motion to sever when it was “highly unlikely” that the motion would 

have been granted). 

As Petitioner cannot establish the performance prong of the Strickland test, the 

IAC claim in Ground Four fails. Ground Four therefore should be dismissed because 

Petitioner has failed to show that the Arizona courts’ rejection of the claim was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Strickland or was an unreasonable 

determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny and 

dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) with prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his claims for relief.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

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Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 27th day of May, 2016. 

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