Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01786/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01786-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

1

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1786

___________

Michael Cagle, Jr., *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Larry Norris, Director, *

Arkansas Department of Correction, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: October 17, 2006

Filed: January 24, 2007 

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and BENTON Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Michael Cagle, Jr., was convicted in Arkansas state court of murder in the first

degree and sentenced to forty-years' imprisonment. He exhausted state court remedies

and petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court1

denied his petition. Cagle appeals asserting structural error in a jury instruction, and

violation of the right to present a defense by an improper exclusion of evidence. For

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-2-

each claim, he further alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. Having jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

Cagle was convicted of murder in the first degree for fatally shooting

Christopher Odom. Preceding the shooting, he and Odom were involved with the

same woman. On October 3, 1997, Cagle saw Odom at a tavern, approached him, and

asked him to step outside. Cagle testified that once outside, he asked Odom about

late-night phone calls to the woman's home. Odom became "real mad" and threw one

punch; Cagle threw one punch, and the two began wrestling in a standing position.

While wrestling, Cagle took a handgun from his belt and shot Odom twice in the

torso. Cagle admitted fatally wounding Odom but claimed Odom had him in a

headlock, causing him to begin to lose consciousness and believe that his life was in

danger. Thus, Cagle gave evidence that the shooting was in self-defense, or justified.

Immediately after the shooting and before police arrived, Cagle left the scene

in an automobile. After traveling a few blocks, the car was stopped by police. Cagle

fled on foot, hiding the handgun in a nearby alley, where police later found it. Cagle

ran home, changed clothes, and grabbed some clothing. He was then arrested. 

Pretrial, the state prosecutor moved to exclude evidence that Odom's autopsy

showed the presence of methamphetamine. Over Cagle's objection, the evidence was

excluded because the trial court found its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed

any probative value. As a proffer of evidence by Cagle during trial, but outside the

hearing of the jury, the chief medical examiner of Arkansas, who preformed Odom's

autopsy, testified that a sample of his heart blood showed meth at .24 micrograms per

milliliter. Although this evidence was excluded, during trial many eye witnesses

testified regarding Cagle's and Odom's behavior and acts before, during, and after the

shooting. 

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-3-

At the close of all evidence, the jury orally was instructed: "In this case, the

State of Arkansas must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense

charged. On the other hand, the defendant, Mr. Cagle, is not required to prove his

innocence." The trial court further instructed the jury using Arkansas Model Criminal

Instruction 2d 704:

Michael Cagle, Jr., asserts a defense to the charge of murder in the

first degree that he was defending himself. This is a defense only if:

first, Michael Cagle, Jr., reasonably believed that the victim was using

or was about to use unlawful physical force upon him. And, secondly,

Michael Cagle only used such force which he reasonably believed to be

necessary.

Michael Cagle would not have been justified in using physical

force upon another if, with the purpose of causing physical injury or

death to Chris Odom, Michael Cagle, Jr., provoked the use of unlawful

physical force, or, he was the initial aggressor.

However, if you find that Michael Cagle withdrew from the

encounter and effectively communicated that to the person his intent to

withdraw, then Michael Cagle, Jr., is no longer the initial aggressor when

the other person continued or threatened to continue the use of unlawful

physical force.

And finally, "physical force," involved was the product of combat

by agreement which is not authorized by law.

Michael Cagle, Jr., in asserting this defense is required only to

raise a reasonable doubt in your minds. Consequently, if you believe

that this defense has been shown to exist or if the evidence leaves you

with a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of murder in the first degree, then

you must find him not guilty.

The jury convicted Cagle of murder in the first degree. Continuing with the

same counsel, Cagle appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals claiming error in: (1)

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-4-

permitting prosecutorial comment on Cagle's right to remain silent; (2) allowing

spectators to wear buttons depicting Odom; and (3) excluding evidence of the meth

found during Odom's autopsy. The appellate court affirmed. Cagle v. State, 6 S.W.3d

801 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999).

Utilizing new counsel, Cagle pursued post-conviction relief in the state trial

court under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. Cagle claimed: (1) ineffective

assistance of counsel in failing to object to jury instruction; (2) ineffective assistance

of counsel in failing to adequately argue in favor of admitting the meth evidence; (3)

ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately argue against improper efforts

to influence the jury, specifically spectators wearing buttons depicting Odom; (4)

structural error in submission of an incorrect jury instruction; and (5) violation of the

right to present a defense, specifically exclusion of the meth evidence. At the postconviction relief hearing, Cagle called two witnesses, his trial counsel and a professor

of pharmacology. Trial counsel testified regarding decisions made at trial, and the

professor of pharmacology, accepted as an expert, testified in a proffer of evidence

about meth intoxication. The trial court denied post-conviction relief. The Arkansas

Supreme Court affirmed, finding the three assertions of ineffective assistance of

counsel did not satisfy Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). Regarding the

claims of structural error and right to present a defense, the court found them

inappropriate for post-conviction relief because they were not raised on direct appeal.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Cagle petitioned for habeas corpus in the district

court, and his petition was denied. On appeal, he asserts the following claims:

Submission of the jury instruction on justification caused structural error and counsel

was ineffective in failing to object to it. Next, exclusion of the meth autopsy evidence

denied Cagle the right to present a defense, and counsel was ineffective in failing to

present evidence of the effects of meth intoxication.

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-5-

II.

On appeal of a denial of habeas corpus, this court reviews the district court's

findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Lyons v. Luebbers,

403 F.3d 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2005); Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th

Cir. 1991) (ineffective assistance of counsel claims reviewed de novo). If an issue is

adjudicated on the merits in state court, a court shall not grant habeas relief unless the

state court proceeding

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "A state court's decision is contrary to ... clearly established law

if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court]

cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

[Supreme Court] decision ... and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Mitchell

v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

Cagle asserts ineffective assistance in counsel's failures to object to the

justification jury instruction and to adequately argue for admission of meth evidence.

"An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that

counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense."

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-6-

that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders

the result unreliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Cagle, therefore, must "first

establish that counsel's representation was constitutionally deficient, which requires

a showing that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness." Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 2006). If

objectively unreasonable performance is established, Cagle then must "show that the

deficient performance prejudiced his defense. This requires proving that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's ineffectiveness, the result would have

been more favorable to [Cagle]. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 and

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (internal citations omitted). Specifically, it must be

determined "whether there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not

have been found guilty if counsel's performance had not been ineffective." Lyons,

403 F.3d at 594. 

Cagle asserts ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the jury

instruction regarding the justification of self-defense. At trial, without objection by

either party, the jury was instructed pursuant to Arkansas Model Criminal Instruction

2d (AMCI 2d) 704, Justification – Use of Physical Force in Defense of Person. Cagle

contends that AMCI 2d 705, Justification – Use of Deadly Physical Force in Defense

of Person, should have been given. In order to warrant habeas relief, Cagle must show

counsel's failure to object was unreasonably deficient and that such deficiency

prejudiced Cagle's defense creating a reasonable probability of acquittal absent

counsel's ineffective performance. Lyons, 403 F.3d 594.

The Use of Deadly Physical Force instruction, AMCI 705, was based upon

Arkansas Code § 5-2-607, which stated:

(a) A person is justified in using deadly physical force upon another

person if he reasonably believes that the other persons is:

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-7-

(1) Committing or about to commit a felony involving force or

violence;

(2) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force; ....

(b) A person may not use deadly physical force in self-defense if he

knows that he can avoid the necessity of using that force with complete

safety:

(1) by retreating, except that a person is not required to retreat if

he is in his dwelling and was not the original aggressor ....

Under Arkansas law, the self-defense justification "is not an affirmative defense

which must be pled, but becomes a defense when any evidence tending to support its

existence is offered to support it. It does not matter whether the evidence of selfdefense comes from the defense's case or the prosecution's case." Anderson v. State,

108 S.W.3d 592, 604 (Ark. 2003) quoting Doles v. State, 631 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Ark.

1982). Further, "justification, such as self-defense, is considered an element of the

offense, and once raised, must be disproved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable

doubt." Id. at 605. 

In the present case, the jury instruction given, AMCI 2d 704, required Cagle to

show that he reasonably believed Odom was using or was about to use physical force

upon him. The deadly force instruction, AMCI 2d 705, presently promoted by Cagle,

would have required him to show a higher standard. Cagle would have been required

to show he reasonably believed Odom was using or about to use deadly physical force

or that he reasonably believed Odom was committing or about to commit a felony

involving force or violence. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607(a)(1)&(2). Additionally,

AMCI 2d 705 contains a duty to retreat, which is not a requirement of AMCI 2d 704.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607(b)(1). Further, while AMCI 2d 705 specifically authorizes

deadly force, AMCI 2d 704 does not prohibit the use of deadly force, authorizing

Cagle to use any force he reasonably believed necessary. 

Cagle asserts that AMCI 2d 705, in contrast to the AMCI 2d 704 instruction

given, would provide a self-defense justification even if he were the initial aggressor.

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-8-

Although the deadly force statute mentions an original aggressor only in the context

of retreat, "obviously the provocation restriction on the defense of justification applies

equally to the use of 'physical force' and 'deadly physical force.'" Jones v. State, 615

S.W.2d 388, 390 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (applying previous codification of deadly force

statute that makes no mention of initial aggressor). "One who claims self-defense

must show not only that the person killed was the aggressor, but that the accused used

all reasonable means within his power and consistent with his safety to avoid the

killing." Ricketts v. State, 729 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Ark. 1987) (same). See also Craig

v. State, 14 S.W.3d 893, 900 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) ("A person is justified in using

deadly physical force ... only if he reasonably believes the other person was ... about

to use unlawful deadly physical force and he was not the original aggressor.").

Consequently, Cagle was afforded a lesser standard to show self-defense as

justification for Odom's death, and a AMCI 2d 705 instruction would not have

relieved him of his initial aggressor burden. Even if counsel's failure to object to the

submitted jury instruction fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Cagle's

defense was not prejudiced by the submission of the justification defense on use of

physical force. Thus, Cagle does not meet his burden under Strickland. Additionally,

this issue was fully adjudicated on the merits by the Arkansas courts, resulting in

determinations that are not contrary to clearly established federal law and not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

Therefore, as to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to object to the

jury instruction, it does not mandate habeas relief, and the district court did not err in

denying relief on this ground.

Cagle further contends ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately

argue for admission of the meth evidence. Cagle asserts that reasonably competent

counsel would have presented expert testimony regarding meth intoxication to the trial

court and that this evidence would have bolstered Cagle's testimony that Odom

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-9-

became "real mad," threw a punch, and put Cagle in a headlock, making Cagle fear

for his life. 

 "Reasonable performance of counsel includes an adequate investigation of facts,

consideration of viable theories, and development of evidence to support those

theories." Lyons, 403 F.3d at 594. "Judicial review of counsel's performance is

highly deferential, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within

a wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Abdi v. Hatch, 450 F.3d 334,

337 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 590 (2006), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689. Although trial counsel did not present expert testimony to try to persuade the

trial court to admit the autopsy evidence of meth usage, this decision neither fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness nor prejudiced Cagle's defense. See

McCann v. Armontrout, 973 F.2d 655, 660-61 (8th Cir. 1992) (counsel's failure to

call drug expert did not prejudice the defense when defendant testified to his

recollection and police officer testified to defendant's behavior). Cagle did not testify

that he suspected or was afraid Odom was under the influence of meth or any other

drug. See Halfacre v. State, 639 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Ark. 1982) (in determining

whether self-defense is reasonable, the relevant issue is whether the defendant was

aware of the victim's characteristics because it is relevant to the defendant's state of

mind and the reasonableness of his fear of the victim). Further, during trial, multiple

witnesses testified regarding Odom's behavior before, during, and after the shooting;

none testified that Odom's behavior appeared unusual, aggressive, or drug-induced.

Therefore, Cagle fails to show that counsel's performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness or that any deficiency in performance prejudiced the

defense. The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the meth evidence

was fully adjudicated on the merits by the Arkansas state courts. Their determinations

are not contrary to clearly established federal law and not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Consequently, as to the

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the meth evidence, the judgment

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-10-

of the district court is affirmed and habeas relief is not appropriate regarding this issue.

B.

Regarding Cagle's claims of structural error in submission of jury instruction

and violation of the right to present a defense, the Arkansas Supreme Court found

these issues inappropriate for post-conviction relief because they were not raised on

direct appeal. The district court found that the supreme court's refusal strongly

suggested that these claims were procedurally defaulted. The district court, however,

in caution, addressed the issues. On appeal, Cagle contends that the government

cannot assert procedural default as a bar to habeas review, as the government has done

in appellee's brief. All federal circuit courts of appeal have "held that, in appropriate

circumstances, courts, on their own initiative, may raise a petitioner's procedural

default." Day v. McDonough, __U.S.__, 126 S. Ct. 1675, 1682 (2006); see King v.

Kemna, 266 F.3d 816, 821-22 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (where government fails to

raise issue of procedural default to panel, but argues default to court en banc, the court

has the discretion to consider issue of procedural default sua sponte). In this case, this

court will consider the issue of procedural bar.

 

As the last state court addressing Cagle's claims, the Arkansas Supreme Court

ruled: 

Under Arkansas law, there are only three circumstances in which an

issue that could have been raised on direct appeal may be raised for the

first time in a post-conviction petition: (1) when a trial is had with less

than 12 jurors; (2) when a defendant is convicted in a court that does not

have jurisdiction; and (3) when a conviction is the result of a violation

of constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The giving of the

instruction does not fall into one of these categories. Attacking the

conviction in this manner is not appropriate in a Rule 37 [post-conviction

relief] proceeding.

Cagle v. State, No. CR 01-723, 2002WL 31628432 at *3 (Ark. Nov. 21, 2002).

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-11-

 Further, concerning Cagle's claim of violation of the right to present a defense

due to the exclusion of autopsy evidence of meth, the court held:

Appellant goes on to argue that the failure to have this testimony

admitted was a structural error because appellant was denied the "right

to present a defense." However, this scenario does not fit into any of the

three categories deemed appropriate to be raised for the first time in a

Rule 37 proceeding. 

Cagle, 2002WL 31628432 at *4.

The Arkansas Supreme Court, therefore, declined to reach the merits of two of

Cagle's constitutional claims in the post-conviction proceeding because it found the

claims procedurally barred under Arkansas law. SeeColeman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729-30 (1991) (federal habeas action is barred when state court declined to

address prisoner's claims because prisoner failed to meet state procedural

requirement). Cagle contends the claims are not defaulted because he presented them

in post-conviction proceedings. This contention fails because, when presented, they

were procedurally barred under independent and adequate state law grounds. See

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) (explicit state court reliance upon procedural bar

as an independent basis for its disposition of case precludes habeas review); see also

Peeler v. State, No. CR97-1571, 1999WL459566 at *3 (Ark. July 1, 1999) ("It is well

settled that claims of trial error, even those of constitutional dimensions, are not

cognizable under Rule 37 unless the alleged error is sufficient to render the judgement

of conviction absolutely void."). 

"Out of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of justice,

a federal court will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim in a

petition for habeas corpus absent a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the

default." Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004). This court "is prohibited from

reviewing an issue the state court has resolved on an adequate and independent state

ground, including procedural default." Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1036 (8th

Cir. 2006). "This rule is nearly absolute, barring procedurally-defaulted petitions

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-12-

unless a habeas petitioner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice

as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or show actual innocence." Reagan

v. Norris, 279 F.3d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 2002), citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750;

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27

(1995); see Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

("miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal

innocence"); Abdullah v. Groose, 75 F.3d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc). "The

cause and prejudice requirement shows due regard for States' finality and comity

interests while ensuring that fundamental fairness remains the central concern of the

writ of habeas corpus." Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393. 

To obtain review of a defaulted constitutional claim, "the existence of cause for

procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the

State's procedural rule." Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Additionally, "the question of

cause for procedural default does not turn on whether counsel erred or the kind of

error counsel may have made. So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose

performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in

Strickland ...." Id. If a prisoner fails to demonstrate cause, the court need not address

prejudice. Mathenia v. Delo, 99 F.3d 1476, 1481 (8th Cir. 1996). On appeal, Cagle

points to no external factor impeding compliance with Arkansas procedural law and

demonstrates no cause for the procedural default. See Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107,

119-25 (1982) (state law procedural bar concerning objection to self-defense

instruction during trial does not constitute cause necessary to obtain habeas review).

Additionally, Cagle neither claims nor demonstrates miscarriage of justice

through actual innocence. "Without any new evidence of innocence, even the

existence of a concededly meritorious constitutional violation is not in itself sufficient

to establish a miscarriage of justice that would allow a habeas court to reach the merits

of a barred claim." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 135 (victims of

a fundamental miscarriage of justice generally meet the cause-and-prejudice standard);

Embrey, 131 F.3d at 741 ("in non-capital cases the concept of actual innocence is easy

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840
-13-

to grasp, because it simply means the person didn't commit the crime"). In this case,

there is no evidence of miscarriage of justice, or actual innocence, as required for

habeas review.

This court affirms the district court on other grounds because Cagle has not

demonstrated cause and prejudice or miscarriage of justice through actual innocence.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1786 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/24/2007 Entry ID: 3270840