Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01265/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01265-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Loretta Greer, )

)

 Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CV 04-1265 PHX JAT (VAM)

)

Attorney General, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 )

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Loretta Greer ("petitioner") filed a pro se Second Amended

Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner presents four

grounds for relief in the amended petition. (Doc. 65 at pp. 5-

22). By previous order, the Court dismissed Ground IV and

ordered respondents to file a response to the remaining claims

for relief. (Doc. 90). Respondents filed a response opposing the

granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 137). 

BACKGROUND

 In December, 1999, petitioner was convicted of two counts of

first degree murder and two counts of child abuse for killing her

two children, ages 5 and 4. (Doc. 137, Exhibit A at pp. 4-6). 

As a result of these convictions, petitioner was sentenced to two

consecutive life terms with no possibility of parole, as well as

two consecutive 17-year prison terms for the two felony child

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abuse convictions. (Id. at Exhibit B).

Plaintiff appealed raising the following issues:

Issue 1: Denial of Right to Testify

Issue 2: [Petitioner's] September 30, 1994 Statement

was Involuntary

Issue 3: A Response to a Jury Question was Fundamental

Error 

Issue 4: An inflammatory newspaper article the day of

trial that several jurors read portions of supported a

motion to strike the jury panel

(Doc. 137, Exhibit D at pp. 9-11).

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's

convictions and sentences on January 24, 2002. (Doc. 137 at

Exhibit E). Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme

Court, but raised only one issue, to wit:

She was denied her right to testify because she did not

make a knowing and intelligent waiver.

(Doc. 137, Exhibit F at p. 3). The Arizona Supreme Court denied

the petition for review without comment on June 25, 2002. (Id.

at Exhibit G). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court on October 9, 2002. (Id.

at Exhibit H). The Supreme Court denied the petition on December

2, 2002. (Id. at Exhibit I). 

On March 8, 2002, while her appeal was still pending before

the Arizona Supreme Court, petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. (Doc. 137 at

Exhibit J). On November 21, 2002, petitioner filed a postconviction relief petition raising the following claims:

1. When trial counsel violated the Rules of

Professional Conduct by telegraphing to the trial court

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that his client would perjure herself, consequently

functionally depriving her of the right to testify and

undermining her credibility for sentencing, the conduct

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

2. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under

Arizona law by disclosing a confidential communication

to the trial court.

3. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of

counsel by functionally waiving the client's right to

testify by informing the court she would perjure

herself.

4. As a matter of constitutional law, the trial court

denied [petitioner] a fundamental right by not

performing an on-the-record waiver of her right to

testify or making an inquiry into the trial court's

frustration of her right to testify.

5. Sentencing Greer to Life without Parole ("LWOP")

violates the principles of Apprendi and Ring, as well

as Due Process of Law.

(Doc. 137, Exhibit K at pp. 4-19).

On May 27, 2003, the trial court denied the post-conviction

petition. (Doc. 137, Exhibit L at p. 2). Petitioner was

subsequently granted five extensions of time to file a petition

for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals up through January 16,

2004. (Id. at Exhibit M). Petitioner filed nothing by this

deadline, however, on January 30, 2004, petitioner filed an

"Affadavit Supporting Petition for Review" in the trial court. 

(Id. at Exhibit N). On February 11, 2004, petitioner filed a

"Notice of Petition for Reivew" in the trial court, and on

February 26, 2004, a petition for review was also filed in the

trial court. (Id. at Exhibits P and O). The petition for review

was evidently forwarded to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

noted its filing on March 3, 2004, but nevertheless dismissed the

petition as untimely, noting that petitioner was required to file

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the petition for review no later than January 16, 2004. (Id. at

Exhibit Q). In dismissing the petition for review, the Court of

Appeals stated that "[w]hether petitioner was without fault for

the untimely filing is a question of fact. The trial court may,

'after being presented with proper evidence, allow a late filing'

if it finds that petitioner was not responsible for the untimely

filing." (Id. at Exhibit Q). The record does not indicate if

petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, although

petitioner states she sought review but review was denied. (Doc.

65 at p. 2). No documentation has been provided to support this

assertion.

On June 17, 2004, petitioner filed her first federal habeas

corpus petition. (Doc. 1). The Court dismissed the petition

with 30 days leave to amend because the petition failed to name a

custodian, failed to state claims in summary form, and failed to

allege exhaustion of state court remedies. (See Doc. 7 at pp. 1-

4). On February 11, 2005, the Court issued an order noting that

petitioner had failed to file a proper amended petition on the

court-approved form and again permitted her an additional 30 days

to file an amended petition. (See Doc. 44). 

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed an amended petition. 

(Doc. 46). However, on March 9, 2005, petitioner moved to strike

the amended petition. (Doc. 50). On April 12, 2005, petitioner

filed a second amended petition. Petitioner labeled this a 3rd

Amended Petition. (Doc. 65). On May 3, 2005, the Court ordered

service with respect to Grounds I, II and III of the second

amended petition but dismissed Ground IV. (See Doc. 90). On

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September 6, 2005, respondents filed a response contending that

all remainig claims in the second amended petition (Grounds IIII) should be denied because they are untimely. Alternatively,

respondents allege that the claims are procedurally defaulted. 

(See Doc. 137).

DISCUSSION

Respondents assert that the claims raised in the Second

Amended Petition are barred by the statute of limitations. 

Alternatively, they argue that the claims have been procedurally

defaulted.

I. Statute of Limitations

A. Law Generally

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to the counting

provisions outlined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, the one-year limitations

period for all habeas petitioner's challenging convictions or

sentences finalized prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of

the AEDPA is April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

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right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations

period contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that

prior to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost

unfettered discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas

petition" and that "delays of more than a decade did not

necessarily bar a prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128

F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of

limitations "did not begin to run against any state prisoner

prior to the statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims

concerning state court judgments finalized prior to April 24,

1996, had to be filed by April 23, 1997,1 or they were barred by

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the statute of limitations absent a showing the circumstances

surrounding the filing of the petition fell into one of the

categories listed in § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." 

Id. at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on

time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v.

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

B. Application of Law to the Facts of the Case

The record reveals that petitioner's direct appeal concluded

on December 2, 2002, when the U.S. Supreme Court denied her

petition for writ of certiorari. (Doc. 137 at Exhibit I). 

However, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that "[t]he time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection." In this case, prior to the

conclusion of her direct appeal, petitioner filed a Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 in the

trial court. (See id. at Exhibit J); see also Isley v. Arizona

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Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir.

2004)(holding that in Arizona, a state post-conviction petition

is deemed "pending" for purposes of the tolling provision of 28

U.S.C. § 2254, when the notice is filed). As long as petitioner

had a "properly filed petition for post-conviction relief"

pending in state court, the 1-year limitations period was tolled.

The record indicates that the trial court denied the postconviction petition on May 27, 2003. (Doc. 137 at Exhibit L). 

Arizona R.Crim.P. 32.9(c) gives petitioner 30 days to seek review

of the denial in the Arizona Court of Appeals from the date of

the trial court's denial. In this case, petitioner sought and

received numerous extensions of time to seek review before the

Arizona Court of Appeals, up through January 16, 2004. (Doc. 137

at Exhibit M). It further appears that petitioner did not file a

proper petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals

within that time frame. Instead, petitioner filed a belated

petition for review that was dismissed on March 8, 2004, as

untimely. (Doc. 137 at Exhibit Q). The record does not provide

documentation of whether petitioner sought further review before

the Arizona Supreme Court. Petitioner states she did seek review

before that court but the Arizona Supreme Court denied the

petition. (Doc. 65 at p. 2).

Respondents contend that because petitioner's petition for

review before the Arizona Court of Appeals was deemed untimely

under Arizona procedural rules, the one year limitations period

began to run when the trial court issued its denial of Rule 32

relief on May 27, 2003. Thus, they argue the federal habeas

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petition (originally filed on June 17, 2004) is untimely. 

Respondents further contend that the original habeas

petition did not stop the running of the limitations period

because the petition was dismissed with leave to amend due to

procedural infirmities. (See Doc. 7). They argue the

limitations period actually ran until April 12, 2005, when

petitioner filed a second amended petition. They argue the

second amended petition does not relate back to the original

petition for tolling purposes. (See Doc. 137 at p. 7).

As a preliminary matter, with respect to respondents'

relation back argument, the Magistrate Judge believes that the

second amended petition does relate back. Respondents cite,

inter alia, Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999), to support their claim that the

second amended petition does not relate back to the original June

17, 2004 petition. However, in Henry, the court noted that when

the district court dismissed the original habeas petition, it

"did not expressly or impliedly retain jurisdiction of Henry's

original petition [and] .... there was no pending petition to

which Henry's new ... petition could relate back or amend." Id.

at 1241. In this case, the Court reserved dismissal of

proceedings and ordered petitioner to amend to correct

deficiencies in the original filing. (See Doc. 7). As a result,

the circumstances are substantially different than those

presented in Henry. For this reason, petitioner's second amended

petition does relate back and the operative date for filing the

federal petition remains June 17, 2004. Nevertheless, for the

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reasons stated below, the petition is still untimely.

Even conceding that petitioner's second amended petition

relates back to her original filing and, thus, the limitations

period stopped running on June 17, 2004, petitioner's claims are

still time-barred unless the limitations period was tolled

between May 27, 2003 (when the state trial court denied her Rule

32 petition), and June 17, 2004 (when she filed her original

federal habeas petition), a period of 386 days, 21 more than

permissible. As noted, to toll the limitations period during any

part of this period, petitioner must have a "properly filed"

petition for post-conviction relief pending in state court. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005),

the Supreme Court construed the term "properly filed petition" as

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) to require that the state

post-conviction petition be filed in a timely manner. 

Specifically, the Court stated "[w]e fail to see how timeliness

is any less a 'filing' requirement than the mechanical rules that

are enforceable by clerks, if such rules exist." Pace, 125 S.Ct.

at 1812. Nor did the Court find the existence of possible

exceptions to a state's timeliness requirements for postconviction petitions important. Specifically, the Court stated

that "a petition filed after a time limit, and which does not fit

within any exceptions to the time limit, is no more 'properly

filed' than a petition filed after a time limit that permits no

exception." Id. at 1811-12. The Court went on to hold:

... it must be the case that a petition that cannot

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even be initiated or considered due to the failure to

include a timely claim is not 'properly filed.

[Citations omitted.]

 For these reasons, we hold that time limits, no

matter their form, are "filing" conditions. Because

the state court rejected petitioner's PCRA petition as

untimely, it was not "properly filed," and he is not

entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).

Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period for

any time her proceedings were pending in state court after May

27, 2003, when the trial court denied the petition. As noted,

the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review in

March, 2004, on the basis that it was untimely. In doing so, the

Court noted that although petitioner was granted several

extensions of time to file a petition for review, she

nevertheless failed to file a petition within the extended time

allotted. (See Doc. 137 at Exhibit Q). The propriety of the

Arizona Court of Appeals' holding, construing state legal

requirements for filing petitions for review, is not subject to

review by a federal habeas court. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67 (1991).

Having determined that the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected

petitioner's petition for review as untimely, the petition for

review was not "properly filed" for purposes of tolling the

limitations period "and [s]he is not entitled to statutory

tolling under § 2244(d)(2)" for any time her petition for review

was pending before the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Pace, 125

S.Ct. at 1814. Because no timely petition was pending in state

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2

Arizona law affords a post-conviction relief petitioner 30

days to file a timely petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals following the trial court's denial of Rule 32 relief. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). However, this 30-day period does not

automatically extend the period for tolling the limitations period

if petitioner fails to file for review in a timely manner.

Although 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) expressly provides that the

limitations period does not begin to run until "the judgment

bec[omes] final by the conclusion of direct appeal or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review; ..." (emphasis

added), this language is confined to determining when the

limitations period begins to run upon conclusion of direct review

and is not repeated with respect to proceedings for collateral

relief and their ability to toll the statute of limitations under

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Section 2244(d)(2) provides only that the

period of time during which a properly filed petition for postconviction relief is pending tolls the limitations period. Case

law in this circuit and in at least one other circuit has held that

a post-conviction proceeding is "pending" during the interval

between the denial of post-conviction relief in one court and

review at the next level only if such review is sought in a timely

manner. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999),

cert.denied, 529 U.S. 1104 (2000); see also Melancon v. Kaylo, 259

F.3d 401, 405-06 (5th Cir. 2001). Since petitioner did not seek

review of the trial court's denial of Rule 32 relief in a timely

manner, she is not entitled to tolling of the limitations period

after the trial court issued its order denying relief.

12

court after the trial court denied relief on May 27, 2003, the

limitations period began to run from that date.2

 Thus, even

petitioner's original filing for habeas relief on June 17, 2004,

is untimely. Unless petitioner can establish entitlement to

statutory or equitable tolling, her claims are time-barred.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) - (D) lists various scenarios

which delay the running of the limitations period beyond the

entry of judgment (state-created impediments, new constitutional

right created, new factual predicate). None of these exceptions

appear applicable in this case and petitioner has made no

colorable or coherent argument that any of these exceptions might

be applicable in this case.

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With respect to equitable tolling, petitioner must show

"'extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.'" Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, "'[w]hen external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling may be

appropriate.'" Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir.

2002). However, equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases

and "the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

the AEDPA] is very high, lest the exception swallow the rule.'" 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 1003 (2002). Thus, it must be "external forces, rather

than a petitioner's lack of diligence, [which] account for the

failure to file a timely claim, ..." Lott, 304 F.3d at 922. 

Review of the facts present in this case reveal petitioner

has not established, or even coherently alleged, a colorable case

for equitable tolling. Petitioner has offered no plausible or

convincing explanation for not filing a timely petition for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals within the generous period

of time allowed her by the trial court. The court must conclude

that it was her lack of diligence in this regard and not an

external factor which resulted in the untimely petition for

review. As a result, petitioner has not established an

entitlement to equitable tolling and her claims for relief are

barred by the statute of limitations.

Because the Magistrate Judge believes petitioner's claims

are barred by the statute of limitations, it is not necessary to

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address respondents' alternative argument that the claims were

not properly exhausted in state court and, as a result, are

procedurally barred from consideration on federal habeas review.

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied on the basis that all claims

raised are barred by the statute of limitations.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Any notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of

the district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have

ten (10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation to file specific written objections with the

Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which

to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file

objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

will result in a waiver of de novo review of the factual findings

and may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation

by the district court without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

DATED this 8th day of November, 2005.

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