Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01951/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01951-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT D. STONER,

CDCR #K-40009,

Civil No. 11-1951 LAB (CAB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE, GARNISHING $350

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT [ECF No. 2]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[ECF No. 3]; and

(3) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING

TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO

 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

vs.

L.S. McEWEN; S. ANDERSON;

K. BALL; S. JARAL; J. HURTADO; 

K. HATFIELD; V. WALLS;

M. DELEON; M. BISHOP; SHAFT;

EVANS; J. FAWCETT; J. GONZALES, 

Defendants.

Scott D. Stoner (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2], along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel [ECF No. 3].

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I. 

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [ECF NO. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), further

requires that each prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP submit a “certified copy of [his] trust

fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Using these certified trust

account statements, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly

deposit, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is

greater, and collect that amount as the prisoner’s initial partial filing fee, unless he has no current

assets with which to pay. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4); Taylor, 281 F.3d

at 850. Thereafter, the institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent

payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account

exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit that complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1) [ECF No. 2] as well as a certified copy of his prison trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and Civil Local Rule 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account currently

indicates that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2],

and assesses no initial partial filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (court shall

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assess initial partial filing fee only “when funds exist”); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action . . . for the reason that the prisoner has

no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s

IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when

payment is ordered.”). However, Plaintiff is required to pay the full $350 filing fee mandated

by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) and 1915(b)(1), by subjecting any future funds credited to his prison

trust account to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [ECF No. 3]

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil

action. The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however,

unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept.

of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district

courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be

exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th

Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the

‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se

in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon,

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

II.

SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

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of,0 sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

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other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when he was being escorted

through an area that had “water all over the floor,” and as a result, Plaintiff “slipped and fell

landing on his buttock.” (Compl. at 4.) Defendant Hurtado “saw Plaintiff fall and ran over and

tried to pick Plaintiff up” which Plaintiff claims resulted in further injuries. (Id.) These claims,

as alleged, fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim. The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits

“cruel and unusual punishments,” imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane

conditions of confinement and to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993). However, every injury suffered by

an inmate does not necessarily translate into constitutional liability for prison officials. 

Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349

(1981) (noting that the U.S. Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons.”). 

Thus, to assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of

confinement a prisoner must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.

1994). Under the objective requirement, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that

“a prison official’s acts or omissions . . . result[ed] in the denial of the ‘minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).

This objective component is satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners

with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit

v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 534; Wright v. Rushen, 642

F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). The subjective requirement, relating to the defendant’s state

of mind, requires that the plaintiff allege facts sufficient to show “deliberate indifference.”

Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. “Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

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Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim because they do not

rise to the level of a serious safety hazard. See Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 939 (finding that prisoner’s

injury due to faulty oven door was not sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment cruel and

unusual punishment claim because Plaintiff did not plead any “exacerbating conditions” which

rendered him unable to “provide for [his] own safety,” i.e., that prison officials precluded him

from avoiding the faulty oven door or rendered him unable to perceive its defective condition);

see also Tunstall v. Rowe, 478 F. Supp. 87, 89 (N. D. Ill. 1979) (the existence of a greasy

staircase which caused a prisoner to slip and fall did not violate the Eighth Amendment). As

currently pleaded, the Court finds that Plaintiff alleges no facts which are sufficient to show that

the conditions of confinement were objectively and demonstrably unsafe, and further fails to

allege facts which show that any of the named Defendants were actually aware and consciously

disregarded the risk posed. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 36 (exposure to demonstrably unsafe

conditions may violate the Eighth Amendment if the inmate can show that the risk he faced was

“so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency”); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828-29

(deliberate indifference requires a showing that specific prison officials were “subjectively aware

of the risk”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims are

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

In addition, Plaintiff claims he was denied adequate medical care for several months

following his fall. Where an inmate’s claim is one of inadequate medical care, the inmate must

allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Such a claim has two elements:

“the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that

need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds

by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). A medical need is serious

“if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429

U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include “the presence of a medical condition

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that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” Id. at 1059-60. By establishing the

existence of a serious medical need, an inmate satisfies the objective requirement for proving

an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or

intentionally interfere with a prescribed course of medical treatment, or it may be shown by the

way in which prison medical officials provide necessary care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838

F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). Before it can be said that a inmate’s civil rights have been

abridged with regard to medical care, however, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, Plaintiff seeks to hold liable Defendants Bishop and Shaft, both of whom are

physicians who examined Plaintiff following his fall. (See Compl. at 5-6.) Plaintiff claims that

these Defendants “should have detected” his injuries but failed to do so. (Id.) These claims do

not rise to the level of “deliberate indifference,” instead Plaintiff frames these allegations as

negligence. As stated above, inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence,

does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 

 Thus, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claims as to Defendants

Bishop and Shaft are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff seek to sue Defendants based merely on their

supervisory positions, such allegations are insufficient to state a claim against these Defendants

because there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson,

9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order

to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual

Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See

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Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed to

support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendant McEwen.

Finally, it appears that Plaintiff may not have exhausted his administrative remedies as

to any of his Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claims as required by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e. Plaintiff has attached some administrative grievances to his Complaint but they only

pertain to his claims against the correctional officers whom he claims were responsible for his

fall. Plaintiff has not attached any administrative grievances relating to his claims of inadequate

medical care. The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that no § 1983 action “shall

be brought . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198 (9th Cir. 2002) holds that prisoners who are incarcerated at the time they file a civil action

which challenges the conditions of their confinement are required to exhaust “all administrative

remedies as are available” as a mandatory precondition to suit. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1198.

Section 1997e(a) “clearly contemplates exhaustion prior to the commencement of the action as

an indispensable requirement. Exhaustion subsequent to the filing of the suit will not suffice.”

Id. (quoting Medina-Claudio v. Rodriquez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2002)). 

However, because non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as set forth in 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense which defendant prison officials have the burden of raising

and proving, the Court is not dismissing Plaintiff’s action on these grounds at this time. See

Jones v. Bock, 594 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). The Court cautions Plaintiff, however, that this action

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may later be dismissed if he files an Amended Complaint that contains claims that were not

exhausted at the time of filing. 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED [ECF No. 3] without prejudice;

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED.

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave

from the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself

without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not

named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further

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leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved § 1983 form complaint to

Plaintiff.

DATED: November 14, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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