Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00453/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00453-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TAIT L. BELYEW, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR BROWN, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-453-MCE-EFB PS 

ORDER 

 Plaintiffs seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915.1 Their 

joint declaration makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) and (2). See ECF No. 2. 

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

 Determining that plaintiffs may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the required 

inquiry. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines the 

allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. As discussed 

below, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed. 

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 This case, in which plaintiffs are proceeding in propria persona, was referred to the 

undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

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 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it 

fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 

(1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of 

his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are 

true.” Id. (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable 

legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations 

of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), 

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the 

plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must satisfy 

the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) 

“requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

 Additionally, a federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and may adjudicate only 

those cases authorized by the Constitution and by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). For that reason, every federal court has an obligation to satisfy itself 

not only of its own jurisdiction. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). The basic federal 

jurisdiction statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332, confer “federal question” and “diversity” 

jurisdiction, respectively. Federal question jurisdiction requires a claim(s) arises under a federal 

law and that the complaint allege a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of 

the U. S. Constitution. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). To invoke the court’s diversity 

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jurisdiction, a plaintiff must specifically allege the diverse citizenship of all parties, and that the 

matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Bautista v. Pan American World 

Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987). A case presumably lies outside the jurisdiction 

of the federal courts and the party asserting the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of 

demonstrating otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may 

be raised at any time by either party or by the court. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer 

Products, Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Here, jurisdiction is not clear because the complaint is imprecise as to what causes of 

action are being asserted, and to the extent that one or more causes of action are suggested, it is 

unclear which claims are being asserted as to which defendants. 

 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that law enforcement agencies from El Dorado County, 

Placer County, Sacramento, Placerville, Lincoln and Rancho Cordova; the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation; the California Department of Justice; the California Department of Corrections; the 

United States Forest Service; the Social Security Administration; California state court judges; 

California prosecutors; California’s governor; the President of the United States; and Tsi-Akim 

Maidu Corporation committed various crimes against plaintiffs. ECF No. 1 at 3. The alleged 

crimes include body and property searches, destruction of property, harassment, stalking, threats 

of fabricating “criminal cases, with physical and mental harm,” “unconstitutional attempts to put 

Mr. Belyew into Slavery,” and robbery. Id. at 4. 

 Plaintiffs further allege that their right to due process was violated due to Judge 

Phimister’s deliberate indifference in processing their criminal cases and by Judge Wagoner 

“stealing Mr. Belyew’s vehicle and retaliating against Mrs. Belyew for Mr. Belyew reporting 

Judge WAGONER’s criminality for approximately ten years.” Id. at 5. The complaint also 

alleges that Ms. Belyew was sexually assaulted by an El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff, and that 

when plaintiffs attempted to report the assault to the FBI they were denied access to the FBI’s 

offices in Sacramento. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that a United States Forest Service officer cuffed 

Ms. Belyew against her will, searched her car, and stole her “hair-filled comb” for DNA 

evidence. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs further claim that government agencies in El Dorado County 

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“fabricated criminal cases” against Mr. Belyew, stole his vehicle, and tortured him. Id. at 9. 

Plaintiffs contend that the abuse from government agencies has been ongoing for approximately 

25 years, and that such conduct constitutes “Cruel punishment.” Id. at 9, 11. 

 Plaintiffs further allege that a Social Security Administration employee, identified only as 

Chriss, refused to give testimony regarding a government plot to harm and kidnap plaintiffs. Id. 

at 6. Plaintiffs claim that the refusal to testify violated the American with Disabilities Act 

(ADA). Id. at 7. Lastly, plaintiffs allege that President Obama ignored three different telegrams 

seeking help from officers that were hurting plaintiffs. Id. at 6. 

 The initial challenge with screening this complaint is identifying what specific claims and 

under what statutes plaintiffs are attempting to sue. Their pleading is captioned as a motion for 

injunctive relief and appointment of counsel, but it includes a prayer for relief and several loosely 

connected factual allegations against a number of government entities and employees and, 

liberally construed, suggests an attempt at filing a complaint. Construed as a civil complaint, the 

pleading nonetheless fails to satisfy the pleading requirements for stating a claim. It makes loose 

reference to the ADA, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 

the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but fails to allege facts demonstrating a plausible 

claim under any of those authorities. 

The reference to the Eighth Amendment in the context of allegations against state officials 

suggests an attempt to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To assert such a claim, plaintiffs 

must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). An individual defendant is 

not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in 

the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct 

and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 

1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). 

A municipal entity or its departments (such as a county, a county jail, or a county 

employee acting in an official capacity) is liable under section 1983 only if a plaintiff shows that 

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his constitutional injury was caused by employees acting pursuant to the municipality’s policy or 

custom. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Monell v. New 

York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 

541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008). In addition, such local government entities may not be held 

vicariously liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under a theory 

of respondeat superior. See Board of Cty. Comm’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). That is, 

a plaintiff may not sue any defendant on the theory that the defendant is automatically liable for 

the alleged misconduct of subordinate officers. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). 

Plaintiffs’ allegations are too vague and conclusory to identify which defendant engaged 

in which specific acts that deprived plaintiffs of a federally protected right. Nor do the allegations 

identify as to each defendant what right was deprived and how the alleged acts would constitute a 

violation of that right. Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint 

must give fair notice of the claims asserted against each defendant and state the elements of the 

claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 

1984). Plaintiffs must at least some alleged conduct by each defendant which, if taken as true, 

would entitle plaintiffs to relief under section 1983. Because plaintiffs’ complaint fails to do so, 

any such claims must be dismissed. 

Plaintiffs pleading also names state judges and prosecutors as having violated plaintiffs’ 

rights. Judges and prosecutors are generally immune from suit. “Judges are absolutely immune 

from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts . . . A judge 

loses absolute immunity only when [the judge] acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or 

performs an act that is not judicial in nature.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (per curiam). State prosecutors are also entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for 

acts taken in their official capacity. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123–24 (1997); 

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269–70 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 

430–31 (1976). The California Superior Court is also immune from suit. See Will v. Michigan 

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 

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318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state superior court 

and its employees). 

Plaintiffs’ reference to the ADA also fails to state a claim. Title II of the ADA prohibits a 

public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of 

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In order to state a claim that a public program or service violated 

Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) 

he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, 

programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such 

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. McGary v. City of 

Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

691 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If a public entity denies an otherwise ‘qualified individual’ ‘meaningful 

access’ to its ‘services, programs, or activities’ ‘solely by reason of’ his or her disability, that 

individual may have an ADA claim against the public entity.”). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges no 

facts that satisfy those required elements. 2 

Further, “[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA . . . , a plaintiff must 

prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 

F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). The standard for intentional discrimination is deliberate 

indifference, which “requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is 

substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 1139. Again, plaintiffs’ 

allegations do not meet that requirement. 

Additionally, plaintiffs appear to be asserting ADA claims against individual defendants 

in their individual capacities. “In suits under Title II of the ADA . . . the proper defendant usually 

is an organization rather than a natural person . . . . Thus, as a rule, there is no personal liability 

under Title II.” Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-cv-06502-OWW-LJO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

 2

 Plaintiffs’ allegations about the Social Security employee identified only as Chriss are 

curious. They assert that “[t]he Belyew Family asked CHRISS to help put the sheriff in jail. 

CHRISS refused claiming she would get into trouble. This is a violation of the [ADA] that this 

government employee refused to report and testify of these crimes other government employees 

were executing, Criminal Case P14CRR0207.” ECF No. 1 at 7. 

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40517, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2005) (quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, a plaintiff 

cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in his individual capacity to 

vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA. Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2002). Thus, an ADA plaintiff may seek injunctive relief against an individual defendant only if 

the defendant is sued in his or her official capacity. Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 

1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 The court finds that plaintiffs’ claims are too vague and conclusory to state a cognizable 

claim for relief and must be dismissed. Plaintiffs will be granted leave to file an amended 

complaint alleges a cognizable legal theory against a proper defendant and with sufficient facts in 

support of that cognizable legal theory. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc) (district courts must afford pro se litigants an opportunity to amend to correct any 

deficiency in their complaints). Should plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, the 

amended complaint shall clearly set forth the claims and allegations against each defendant. Any 

amended complaint must cure the deficiencies identified above and also adhere to the following 

requirements: 

Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 

participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is 

legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). It must also contain a caption 

including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 

Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself 

without reference to any earlier filed complaint. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 

complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 

earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 

being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967)). 

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Finally, plaintiffs are cautioned that failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, or any court order may result in this action being dismissed. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiffs’ request to proceed in form pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, as provided herein. 

 3. Plaintiffs are granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an 

amended complaint. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case 

and be titled “First Amended Complaint.” Failure to timely file an amended complaint in 

accordance with this order will result in a recommendation this action be dismissed. 

DATED: July 13, 2015. 

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