Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01054/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01054-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Jareer A. Tabari, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 10-1054-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Respondent Jareer A. Tabari’s Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings (Doc. 43), Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 46), Motion to

Strike Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Plaintiff’s Response in

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. 67), and

Petitioner United States of America’s (“the Government”) Motion for Summary Judgment

and Alternative Motion for an Independent Medical Psychiatric Examination (Doc. 68). The

Court now rules on the motions. 

I. Background

A. Criminal and Immigration Proceedings

In the 1970’s, Tabari came to the United States from Israel. In 1990, Tabari became

a lawful permanent resident. On May 12, 1994, Tabari was convicted of Trespass in

California and sentenced to nine days in jail. On March 14, 2002, Tabari was convicted of

Disorderly Conduct, Soliciting Lewd Act in California and was sentenced to ten days in jail

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and three years of probation. On May 14, 2004, Tabari pleaded guilty to the felony offense

of Resisting an Executive Officer. He was sentenced to six months in jail and three years of

probation. Shortly after his release from jail, Tabari violated the terms of his parole and was

sentenced to two years in the California penal system.

On August 17, 2006, the California Superior Court found Tabari mentally incompetent

to stand trial and ordered him to undergo treatment. On December 7, 2007, following

treatment that included the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs, the Superior

Court found Tabari restored to competency. 

On November 17, 2008, the Department of Homeland security (“DHS”), 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), took custody of Tabari after his release

from California state prison. ICE transferred Tabari to the Florence Service Processing

Center in Florence, Arizona. ICE issued and served a Notice to Appear, alleging the 2004

criminal conviction as a ground for removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

On February 23, 2009, Tabari had an individual hearing before the immigration court.

The immigration judge ordered Tabari removed to Israel and denied Tabari’s applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under Article III of the

Convention Against Torture. Tabari reserved his right to appeal, but failed to file an appeal.

The immigration judge’s order therefore became administratively final.

B. Mental Health History

On September 5, 2008, Tabari was diagnosed with Psychotic Disorder NOS by a

California Mental Health Examination. Tabari’s medical file also contained diagnoses of

schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. On June 5, 2009, Tabari was admitted to Sonora

Behavioral Health Hospital for psychiatric evaluation. 

On August 14, 2009, after an expedited evaluation, Dr. Jack Potts opined that Tabari

suffers from schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder with moments of cooperation. On

March 17, 2010, after two brief examinations, Dr. Ronald Segal opined that Tabari was

gravely disabled and posed a risk of harm to other people due to his mental illness. On

August 1, 2010, after reviewing Tabari’s medical records, but not personally examining him,

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Dr. Tariq Ghafoor opined that Tabari most likely suffers from schizophrenia, paranoid type,

with schizoaffective disorder as secondary consideration with antisocial, narcissistic, and

histrionic personality traits. 

II. Respondent Tabari’s Motions 

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Motion to Strike

Tabari argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Government’s Petition

because the Government’s request to involuntarily medicate Tabari does not rely on a

specific provision of the Constitution or federal law. But Tabari’s arguments ignore the fact

that the United States of America, as Petitioner, commenced this case. 28 U.S.C. §1345

provides, “Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have

original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States,

or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.”

Tabari has not pointed to an Act of Congress that would divest this Court of its

jurisdiction over a case instituted by the United States. Tabari may believe that this Court

does not have the authority to do what the Government asks, but that does not mean that this

Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. The Court can resolve quickly Tabari’s Motion to

Dismiss. The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1345 because the

United States commenced this action. The Court therefore denies Tabari’s Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 46).

Tabari has filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 67) the separate Statement of Facts that the

Government filed along with its Response to the Motion to Dismiss. Tabari argues that

neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor this Court’s Local Rules provide for the

filing of a separate statement of facts in support of a response in opposition to a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Court notes that it can resolve factual issues when deciding a motion to dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction. Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).

The Court therefore cannot say categorically that a statement of facts in support of a response

to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is never appropriate. But the

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied Iqbal to Rule 12(c) motions. Cafasso

ex rel., - - F.3d - - , 2011 WL 1053366 at *11 n.4.

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Court need not address the propriety of the separate statement of facts because the Court did

not review the facts while deciding the Motion to Dismiss. The Court therefore denies the

Motion to Strike as moot. 

B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is “functionally identical” to Rule 12(b)(6).

The same legal standard therefore applies to motions brought under either rule. Cafasso,

U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., - - F.3d - -, 2011 WL 1053366, *11 n.4 (9th Cir.

March 24, 2011); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.

1989)(“The principal difference between motions filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c)

is the time of filing. Because the motions are functionally identical, the same standard of

review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog.”).

The standard for deciding Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions has evolved since the

Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)

and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - - U.S. - -, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).1

 To survive a motion for failure to

state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires

a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that

the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires “more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The factual allegations

of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Id.

Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.

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Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could

satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also

‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure §1202, pp. 94, 95(3d ed. 2004)).

Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). A complaint that offers nothing more than naked assertions will not suffice. To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if

accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at

1949. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.

Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility requires more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that

are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the facts alleged in the

complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and must accept all

well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th

Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court may

dismiss a complaint for two reasons: 1) lack of a cognizable legal theory and 2) insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

2. Analysis and Conclusion

As set out above, the Court can grant a judgment on the pleadings for two reasons: 1)

lack of a cognizable legal theory and 2) insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory. Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699. Tabari’s arguments seem to urge the Court to grant the

Motion for the first reason, but could be directed toward the second reason as well.

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Tabari makes other arguments that are not appropriate for a Judgment on the

Pleadings in the pending case, e.g, the validity of Tabari’s continued detention. The Court

therefore will not address those arguments here.

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 Tabari argues the Court must dismiss the Government’s Petition because the

Government has not identified any statutory or regulatory scheme that gives ICE the

authority to forcibly medicate him.2

 ICE’s current “procedure” for involuntarily medicating

detainees is to seek court approval. ICE does not have a procedure at the administrative

level.

Tabari correctly notes that the cases addressing whether to involuntarily medicate

happen to have arisen in the context of reviewing set administrative or state procedures. But

that does not mean that the Government cannot petition this Court to authorize forced

medication in the absence of a specific administrative procedure if forced medication would

be in the best medical interests of the respondent and in the best interests of others under the

Government’s supervision. ICE’s policy of seeking court approval for forced medication

arguably might provide more due process to a detainee than an administrative-level policy

or procedure. 

The Court finds that it has the power to grant the relief requested by the Government

if the Government meets the applicable standard, which the Court sets forth below. Because

the Court cannot say that the Government could never prevail on the facts as alleged in the

Petition, the Court will deny Tabari’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 

III. Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion

by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” including depositions, affidavits,

interrogatory answers or other materials, or by “showing that materials cited do not establish

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

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admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Thus, summary judgment

is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be unable

to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by “com[ing]

forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)

(1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare assertions, standing alone, are

insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.

at 247–48. However, in the summary judgment context, the Court construes all disputed

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004).

B. Analysis and Conclusion

In ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court first must decide the proper

standard to apply for the involuntary medication of a detainee in an immigration facility. The

Court then must decide whether the Government has met that standard as a matter of law.

Individuals undisputedly have a significant, constitutionally protected liberty interest

in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. Washington v. Harper, 494

U.S. 210, 221 (1990). The “forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s

body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.” Id. at 228.

Nonetheless, forced medication may by appropriate under certain circumstances.

The parties do not cite any cases that specifically address when ICE can involuntarily

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medicate a detainee, and the Court did not find any such cases. The Government argues that

the standards established in Harper should apply. Tabari argues that the Harper standards

do not apply because he is not a state prisoner convicted of a crime.

In Harper, the Supreme Court addressed whether a Washington state prison policy

for forcibly medicating prisoners provided adequate due process. After balancing the state’s

interests in prisoner and staff safety against prisoners’ constitutional rights to liberty, the

Supreme Court determined that the Washington Special Offender Center’s policy comported

with constitutional requirements by affording sufficient due process. Id. at 224. The

Supreme Court held that due process permits involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs

for serious mental illness if an inmate is dangerous to himself or others and if the treatment

is in the inmate’s best medical interest. Id. at 227. 

At least one Circuit Court has applied the Harper standards in a civil setting. In

Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506 (10th Cir. 1998), the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals reviewed the §1983 claims of a civilly committed man who objected to the state

hospital’s involuntary treatment of him with psychotropic drugs. The Court of Appeals noted

that while an individual has a constitutional right to be free from involuntary medication,

state institutions also have an interest in preventing individuals from harming themselves or

others residing or working in the institution. Id. at 510. 

The Jurasek court found that although the case before it differed from Harper because

the plaintiff was a civilly committed patient and not a prison inmate, the Harper standards

nonetheless should control. Id. at 511 (“We conclude the standards established in Harper

for involuntarily medicating prisoners strike the appropriate balance.”). The court held that

the Due Process Clause allows a state hospital to forcibly drug a mentally ill patient who is

incompetent to make his own medical decisions if the patient is dangerous to himself or

others and the treatment is in the patient’s medical interests. Id. 

The Court finds that the Harper standards should apply here as well, even though

Tabari is a civil detainee, not an inmate. Although the immigration detention facility is not

a state prison, it has the same concerns for the safety of its detainees and employees as a

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prison. The Court finds that the Harper standards strike the right balance between the

facility’s interests and Tabari’s liberty interests. 

The Court finds the circumstances of Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) less

analogous and therefore will not apply the standards set out in that case. In Sell, the Supreme

Court analyzed the proper standards for involuntarily medicating mentally ill pretrial

detainees in order to restore them to competency for trial. The goals of the Government in

this case are more similar to the prison’s goals in Harper than the goal of rendering someone

competent to stand trial. 

The Sell court itself pointed out that courts need not consider the Sell standards if

involuntary medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as reasons relating to an

individual’s dangerousness to himself or others or the individual’s health risks. Id. at 181-82

(citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 225-26). “There are often strong reasons for a court to determine

whether forced administration of drugs can be justified on these alternative grounds before

turning to the trial competence question.” Id. at 182.

The Court therefore holds that the Harper standards apply here. The Government can

prevail on its Petition to involuntarily medicate Tabari with antipsychotic drugs if it

establishes that: 1) Tabari suffers from a serious mental illness; 2) Tabari is a danger to

himself or others; and 3) treatment is in his medical interest. The Court, however, will depart

from Harper in one respect. Because the Court, not medical professionals, will be making

the determination regarding forced medication, the Government must offer clear and

convincing proof of each of the three elements. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 235 (rejecting clear

and convincing burden because medical personnel were making the judgment required by

the regulations at issue); U.S. v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010)(joining all

other circuits in requiring clear and convincing proof for Sell hearings and stating

“[A]lthough the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the clear and convincing standard

was required for Harper hearings conducted by medical professionals, the more error-prone

analysis involved in a Sell hearing conducted by judicial officers, calls for a more stringent

burden of proof.”)(internal citations omitted). 

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The Court now turns to deciding whether the Government has met those standards

with clear and convincing proof as a matter of law or whether the Court should deny the

Motion and hold a hearing on the Petition. This case presents an unusual situation because

Respondent’s counsel have not received cooperation from Tabari, who, at times, has refused

even to speak with his counsel. 

Tabari’s lack of cooperation has made it difficult for counsel to oppose the Motion for

Summary Judgment. Counsel for Tabari also points out that the Government has not

presented any “fresh” medical opinions regarding Tabari’s current mental status and

dangerousness to himself and others. On the other hand, the Court acknowledges the validity

of the Government’s arguments regarding opposing counsel’s failure to obtain expert

opinions and other controverting evidence. Nonetheless, given the importance of the liberty

interests at stake, the Court finds a hearing is warranted. The Court therefore will deny the

Motion for Summary Judgment, but does not hold that the Government could never prevail

at the summary judgment stage in a forced medication proceeding for an immigration

detainee. 

IV. Alternative Motion for Independent Psychiatric Exam 

As an alternative to granting its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Government asks

the Court to order an independent psychiatric examination. Although discovery has closed,

the Court finds that an independent examination could help the Court to assess Tabari’s

current mental condition. The Court therefore will allow the Government to file a Motion

for an Independent Medical Examination pursuant to Civil Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2).

The Court will set the time for the hearing on the Petition after it rules on the forthcoming

Motion for Independent Medical Examination. The Court also notes that if it grants the

forthcoming Motion, it will not allow additional dispositive motion briefing.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED DENYING Respondent Tabari’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction (Doc. 46), Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 43), and Motion to Strike

(Doc. 67).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING United States of America’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 68).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING United States of America leave to file

a Motion for Independent Psychiatric Examination pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 35. The Government shall file its Motion within ten (10) days of the date of this

Order. 

DATED this 22nd day of July, 2011.

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