Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01705/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01705-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 09cv1705-IEG (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN GREGORY WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 09-CV-1705 - IEG (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

COLLEEN NOLL, Warden,

Respondent.

This matter is before the Court on Respondent Colleen Noll’s Motion to Dismiss Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No. 11.) Respondent contends that the petition is barred by the

one-year statute of limitations. Magistrate Judge Ruben Brooks issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending the Court grant Respondent’s motion. Petitioner filed

objections.

Upon de novo review, the Court concludes Petitioner did not file his petition within the

statute of limitations and is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Accordingly, the Court

adopts the R&R in full and grants Respondent’s motion.

BACKGROUND

The R&R contains a complete and accurate summary of the proceedings in this case, and

the Court fully adopts the Magistrate Judge’s detailed background. (See R&R at 2-6.) In sum, on

August 22, 1984, Petitioner Williams pleaded guilty to one count of robbery and one count of

Case 3:09-cv-01705-IEG-RBB Document 28 Filed 09/20/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Robbery and grand theft are covered by Sections 211 and 487.2 of the California Penal Code,

respectively.

2

The enhancement for infliction of great bodily injury corresponds with Section 12022.7(a)

of the California Penal Code.

- 2 - 09cv1705-IEG (RBB)

grand theft,1 and was to receive a sentence of five years in state prison. (R&R at 2.) More than

ten years later, on February 27, 1995, Petitioner was convicted for robbery, with an enhancement

for infliction of great bodily injury.2

 (Id.) From 1996 to 1999, Petitioner filed a series of

unsuccessful petitions for writ of habeas corpus in state court. (See id. at 3-4.) At the same time,

petitioner sought direct review of his conviction, culminating on July 28,1999 when the California

Supreme Court denied review of the case. (See id. at 4.) Nearly three years later, on May 15,

2002, Petitioner renewed his efforts to obtain state habeas relief. This round of state post

conviction review ended on April 16, 2003, when the California Supreme Court denied his petition

as untimely. 

In 2006, Petitioner first requested copies of the state court record with regard to his 1984

conviction. After receiving the record on March 12, 2007, Petitioner thereafter filed another round

of state habeas corpus petitions beginning on March 24, 2008. This round of state habeas petitions

ended on July 22, 2009, when the California Supreme Court denied a second habeas corpus

petition.

Petitioner filed the current petition on August 5, 2009. On December 18, 2009,

Respondent Noll filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Def.’s Mot.”),

contending that Petitioner had not filed his petition within the statute of limitations. (Doc. No.

11.) Petitioner opposed the motion. (Doc. No. 19.) On May 14, 2010, Magistrate Judge Brooks

filed a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant Respondent’s

motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 24.) Petitioner filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 27.) 

Respondent did not file a reply. 

DISCUSSION

The R&R sets forth the correct legal standard the Court must apply in considering whether the

current petition is time-barred. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244,

Case 3:09-cv-01705-IEG-RBB Document 28 Filed 09/20/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 09cv1705-IEG (RBB)

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.

Petitioner does not contest Magistrate Judge Brooks’ conclusion that, absent any statutory or

equitable tolling, the statute of limitation began to run on October 27, 1999, when his time for

seeking direct review expired. Nor does Petitioner object to the conclusion that he is not entitled

to statutory tolling here, where there were no applications for State post-conviction or other

collateral relief pending between October 27, 1999 and May 15, 2002. Rather, Petitioner objects

to Magistrate Judge Brooks’ conclusion that he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner also

continues to argue he may pursue his breach of plea agreement claim notwithstanding AEDPA’s

statute of limintations.

i. Equitable Tolling

Magistrate Judge Brooks properly set forth the legal standard for determining whether a

habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. “To be entitled

to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” 

Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005)). In order to show the extraordinary circumstance “prevented timely filing,” Petitioner

Case 3:09-cv-01705-IEG-RBB Document 28 Filed 09/20/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 09cv1705-IEG (RBB)

must demonstrate the “extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness,” Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003), and the “extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Magistrate Judge Brooks addressed and rejected each of Petitioner’s arguments in favor of

equitable tolling. In his Objections, Petitioner does not raise any new arguments, but instead

explicitly relies upon the same arguments submitted in his opposition to Respondent’s motion to

dismiss with regard to equitable tolling. As Magistrate Judge Brooks explained in the R&R,

however Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner first requested the transcript of

his 1984 guilty plea in February of 2006 and he has offered no reasonable justification for the

undue delay. There was a delay between the time he requested the transcript in February of 2006

and when he received the transcript on March 13, 2007. However, even after receiving the

transcript Petitioner did not file any state post-conviction challenge for more than a year thereafter,

and did not file this federal habeas corpus petition until August of 2009. Petitioner was present at

the plea proceeding, and he has not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances beyond his

control prevented him from timely filing his federal claims. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable

tolling.

ii. Plea Agreement

Petitioner continues to argue that regardless of AEDPA’s statute of limitations, he is

entitled to pursue his claim that the state breached the 1984 plea agreement. As explained by

Magistrate Judge Books in the R&R, however, Petitioner may only challenge his sentence in this

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. All such petitions under § 2254 are subject to the one-year

statute of limitations. Because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to equitable

tolling, his Petition must be dismissed. 

///

///

///

///

Case 3:09-cv-01705-IEG-RBB Document 28 Filed 09/20/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 09cv1705-IEG (RBB)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set for herein, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Brooks’ R&R and,

accordingly, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. The Court DENIES a certificate of appealability. The Clerk may close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:09-cv-01705-IEG-RBB Document 28 Filed 09/20/10 Page 5 of 5