Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02036/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02036-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unital States ~rt ~f Appeals Tenth C!rcwt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 0 5 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOANN AACEN, for herself and on ) 

behalf of others similarly ) 

situated, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

SAN JUAN COUNTY SHERIFF'S ) 

DEPARTMENT; DOUG BROWN, in his ) 

individual capacity; JACK A. ) 

RICHARDS, in his individual ) 

and official capacities; BILLY ) 

HILLGARTNER, in his official ) 

capacity and on behalf of a class ) 

of others similarly situated; ) 

GREGORY T. IRELAND 1 ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2036 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. NO. 88-314) 

Stephen T. LeCuyer of Mettler & LeCuyer, P.C., Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Robin D. Strother of Tansey, Rosebrough, Gerding & Strother, P.C., 

Farmington, New Mexico, Attorney for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges . 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-2036 Document: 01019294828 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 1 
JoAnn Aacen brought a civil rights action against the San 

Juan County Sheriff's Department and various law enforcement 

personnel claiming that she did not receive due process when her 

truck, which qualified for an exemption from execution, was seized 

by the sheriff and sold in satisfaction of a judgment against her. 

The court dismissed her action, holding that she received 

meaningful notice under the Fourteenth Amendment regarding her 

personal property exemptions. On appeal, Aacen asserts that the 

notice she received was insufficient for due process purposes and 

that certain New Mexico post-judgment execution statutes are 

unconstitutional because: (1) they fail to require adequate 

notice to a judgment debtor with respect to seizures of exempt 

property; (2) they fail to provide sufficient notice of state 

property exemptions; (3) they also fail to require notice of the 

means for asserting exemption rights; and, (4) that the relevant 

statutes fail to require a prompt hearing to resolve exemption 

claims. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In November 1984, JoAnn Aacen purchased a truck from Ziems 

Motor Co. for $10,700, for which she made monthly payments. After 

several months, she returned the truck to Ziems. She was current 

on her payments at that time. On November 8, 1985, Ziems sued 

Aacen for the deficiency balance remaining after resale of the 

truck. Although served with the summons and complaint, Aacen took 

no action and the district court entered a default judgment 

against her in the amount of $3,946.91. In the meantime, Aacen 

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had purchased another truck for $1,500. On January 3, 1986, the 

court clerk issued a Writ of Execution to the San Juan County 

Sheriff, directing the Sheriff to seize Aacen's property to 

satisfy the judgment. Sheriff Jack A. Richards served the Writ of 

Execution on Aacen on January 10 and advised her that she had 

until the following Friday to pay the creditor to avoid seizure of 

her pickup. 1 Aacen, having no money and being recently 

unemployed, knew that she could not pay the creditor and 

consequently removed her personal possessions from the vehicle on 

Friday morning. Later that day, without further notice, the truck 

was taken by Richards. 

Under New Mexico law, a number of exemptions are available to 

judgment debtors. New Mexico Stat. Ann. § 42-10-2 exempts limited 

amounts of cash, jewelry and tools of the trade, as well as one 

motor vehicle up to $4000 in value, from execution. 2 Also, if the 

debtor does not own a home, she may claim an exemption in lieu of 

homestead, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-10-10, to protect an additional 

$2000 worth of personal property. 

Aacen's truck could have been exempted from execution either 

under the in-lieu-of-homestead exemption or the motor vehicle 

1 The testimony differs regarding the length of time 

between service and seizure. However, that discrepancy 

effect our due process analysis in this case. 

elapsing 

does not 

2 We note that the statute, if taken literally, would not 

exempt the listed property from execution. The provision states: 

"[p]ersonal property other than [the listed property] is exempt 

from ... execution." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-10-2 (Supp. 1990) 

(emphasis added). Apparently, this is a grammatical error and we 

interpret the provision to have the meaning clearly intended by 

the New Mexico legislature -- that certain basic necessities 

should be preserved for the debtor. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2036 Document: 01019294828 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 3 
exemption. However, Aacen never asserted her exemption rights in 

the truck and never contacted the Sheriff's Department or the 

court in an attempt to get her truck back. She did call a friend, 

an employee of Ziems, to see "if there was anything [she] could 

do." Tr. at 28. He said no. The pickup was consequently sold by 

Richards on February 25, 1986 to Ziems in a public sale in partial 

satisfaction of the judgment against Aacen. Later that year, 

Aacen learned that there was some possibility that she could get 

her pickup back and went to a legal aid office for assistance. 

She then brought this case. 

Aacen claimed at trial that she did not receive notice of any 

exempt property at or before the time of seizure. However, the 

trial court found that she did receive a "Notice of Exemption in 

Lieu of Homestead" ["Notice"], as required by New Mexico law for 

that exemption, and that she failed to claim that exemption 

although she qualified for it. The Notice required a signature 

acknowledging receipt of the "written notice to claim an exemption 

in lieu of homestead, in addition to any other exemptions, in the 

amount of $2000" and allowed the debtor to designate the property 

she sought to be protected by the exemption. The Notice also 

advised the debtor to "notify the Court of Origin" if she wished 

to claim any exemptions. New Mexico law does not require 

additional notice of the availability of other exemptions and 

Aacen received none. 

The court held that the "[w]rit of execution and accompanying 

notice served on [Aacen] constituted meaningful notice under the 

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," Tr. at 91, and 

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Appellate Case: 90-2036 Document: 01019294828 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 4 
denied Aacen declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On 

appeal, Aacen does not challenge the court's finding that she 

received the Notice of Exemption in Lieu of Homestead. She 

reurges only her contention that she did not receive sufficient 

notice about her motor vehicle exemption and that New Mexico's 

post-judgment execution statutes are unconstitutional because they 

do not require notice of seizure, the availability of other 

exemptions (specifically, the exemption of vehicles and other 

specified property) or hearings nor do they require prompt 

procedures for claiming such exemptions. 3 

II. DUE PROCESS 

This case presents an issue of procedural due process and 

thus raises two questions. First, we must determine whether Aacen 

possesses a property right protected by due process. Other 

circuits have uniformly treated garnishment exemptions as property 

interests entitled to due process protections. Reigh v. Schleigh, 

784 F.2d 1191, 1194-96 (4th Cir. 1986); McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 

774 F.2d 543, 548-50 (2d Cir. 1985); Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 

1344, 1350 (1st Cir. 1985); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 56 

(3d Cir. 1980) (en bane); Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Duval, 

539 F.2d 1355, 1365 n.9 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 u.s. 

949 (1977). No circuit has held to the contrary. We agree with 

our sister circuits and hold that by creating exemptions from 

3 Because a New Mexico statute requires notice of the exemption 

in lieu of homestead, we do not review the constitutional 

sufficiency of notice of that exemption. We only review the 

sufficiency of notice with respect to exemptions of other personal 

property, including motor vehicles. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2036 Document: 01019294828 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 5 
execution, New Mexico granted judgment debtors a property interest 

in retaining their exempt property. 4 While the state need not 

grant such exemptions, once given, the property rights they create 

are entitled to due process protection. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 

416 u.s. 134 (1974) (six justices holding that deprivations of 

state entitlements must satisfy due process requirements); Board 

of Regents v. Roth, 408 u.s. 564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 

U.S. 254, 262 & n.8. (1970) (procedural due process is applicable 

to deprivation of benefits to which plaintiff is statutorily 

entitled). 

Second, 

to determine whether a constitutional violation has 

occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State 

provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate. 

This inquiry would examine the procedural safeguards 

built into the statutory or administrative procedure of 

effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for 

erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law. 

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, --, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983 (1990) 

(emphasis omitted). We turn now to that question. 

A. The Analysis: 

The defendants argue that Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. 

4 "Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions 

are defined by ... state law." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 

u.s. 564, 577 (1974). New Mexico Stat. Ann. § 42-10-2 states that 

"one motor vehicle in the amount of four thousand dollars ($4,000) . . . is exempt . • . from . . . execution . . . . " (emphasis 

added). Thus, the New Mexico legislature granted the judgment 

debtor a vested property right to protect a motor vehicle, within 

the stated monetary range, from execution. That the legislature 

intended to grant that right is supported by the fact that the 

1979 amendment to the statute substituted "is exempt" for "may be 

held exempt." 

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Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 u.s. 285 (1924), controls here. In 

that case, the Supreme Court held that a judgment debtor is not 

constitutionally entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the 

issuance and execution of a writ of garnishment. Rather, the 

court found that "after the rendition of the [underlying] judgment 

[the debtor] must take 'notice of what will follow.'" Id. at 288. 

However, we agree with the subsequent cases which find that 

Endicott did not consider the existence of exempt property that 

might nevertheless be erroneously seized if some post-judgment 

notice and hearing are not accorded to the debtor. McCahey v. 

L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d at 547-48; Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d at 

1351-52; Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d at 56-57. 5 "Endicott's 

rationale assumed that the judgment resolved all outstanding 

issues between the debtor and the creditor, collection being a 

ministerial act. However, the judgment does not resolve whether 

certain property is exempt." McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 

at 548. That is, while the judgment resolves the issue whether a 

debt exists, it does not address whether the creditor can seek 

satisfaction of the debt from this particular asset. Dionne v. 

Bouley, 757 F.2d at 1352. In addition, Endicott addressed preexecution notice of seizure and hearing, which are not at issue 

here. Rather, Aacen seeks only to be notified of her exemptions 

and to be heard after execution of the writ. Thus, Endicott is 

not dispositive of this case. 

5 A number of authorities have questioned the precedential 

value of Endicott in light of modern due process decisions. See 

sources cited in Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d at 1351 n.10, and 

McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d at 547 n.S. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2036 Document: 01019294828 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 7 
The circuit courts reviewing the constitutional sufficiency 

of notification and hearing procedures in post-judgment garnishment proceedings have universally employed the balancing test 

6 summarized in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). McCahey 

v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d at 548-49; Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 

at 1350; Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d at 58; Brown v. Liberty 

Loan Corp. of Duval, 539 F.2d at 1365 (although Mathews had not 

yet been decided, the court used a similar balancing analysis). 

[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process 

generally requires consideration of three distinct 

factors: First, the private interest that will be 

affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 

procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 

additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 

finally, the Government's interest, including the 

function involved and the fiscal and administrative 

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 

requirement would entail. 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. We similarly review New 

Mexico's statutory framework governing post-judgment execution. 7 

6 The Fourth Circuit, in Reigh v. Schleigh, 784 F.2d 1191 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 847 (1986), did not expressly use 

the balancing test. However, that court relied on the analysis of 

the earlier decisions in determining the requisite specificity of 

such notice. 

7 The defendants argue that reliance on garnishment cases is 

erroneous since "[t]he differences between garnishments and executions can be significant," Appellee's Brief at 10, citing solely 

to the obvious fact that garnishment actions attach to the 

debtor's assets in possession of a third party. However, we find 

that the due process analysis with regard to exemption from the 

two procedures is fundamentally the same. Due process concerns 

are the same for all protected property, whether monetary or 

nonmonetary and "[w)e see no difference in law between [a case 

involving garnishment) and the present case in which the judgment 

debtor's assets are in his own possession at the time of execution." Clay v. Edward J. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F.Supp. 

730, 732 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 

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Appellate Case: 90-2036 Document: 01019294828 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 8 
The analysis of these courts also informs us in balancing the 

competing concerns of creditor and debtor. Essentially, the other 

circuits have consistently found that after obtaining a judgment 

against the debtor, the creditor has a strong interest in a prompt 

and inexpensive satisfaction of the debt since undue delay may 

result in the debtor's disposition of the property or the diminution of its value. McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d at 549; 

Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d at 1352; Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 

at 58; see Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Duval, 539 F.2d at 1366-

67. However, these interests do "not erase all consideration for 

the debtor with respect to property which the law forbids the 

creditor to attach in satisfaction of the debt." Dionne v. 

Bouley, 757 F.2d at 1352; see also McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 

F.2d at 549; Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d at 58. Particularly 

after the property is attached, thereby removing the possibility 

that the debtor will destroy or conceal her assets, the creditor's 

interests are adequately preserved and the debtor's interest in 

the property becomes "very compelling." Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 

F.2d at 58; see also Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d at 1352 (debtor 

entitled to procedural safeguards that can be afforded without 

undermining creditor's adjudicated rights). 

Keeping these considerations in mind, we turn now to the 

facts of this case to evaluate the sufficiency of the notice and 

hearing provided to Aacen under New Mexico law. 

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B. Notice of Seizure: 

We respond first to Aacen's challenge to the statutes regarding notice of seizure. At trial, Aacen admitted that she had been 

served with the writ of execution and was informed at that time 

that Richards would seize her pickup to satisfy the judgment on 

her previously owned truck. It is clear Aacen knew of the pending 

seizure since she removed her personal belongings from the truck. 

Aacen now argues that actual notice of seizure is an inadequate 

substitute for written notice. Appellant's Reply Brief at 4 n.3. 

However, Aacen received written notice in the form of the writ of 

execution. Because we find that Aacen received sufficient notice 

of the seizure, we do not reach the constitutionality of New 

Mexico's statutes in this regard. 

C. Notice of Exemptions and Hearing: 

Aacen next contends that New Mexico law does not provide for 

constitutionally sufficient notice of personal property exemptions 

in execution cases because it requires notice only of the exemption in lieu of homestead and that Notice is inadequate. She 

further argues that the post-judgment execution statutes are unconstitutional because they do not require notice of an exemption 

hearing and the Notice provided did not adequately inform her of 

that right. We agree. 

Due process requires notice which is "reasonably calculated, 

under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 

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Appellate Case: 90-2036 Document: 01019294828 Date Filed: 09/05/1991 Page: 10 
their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 

339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Furthermore, due process requires that 

the notice "apprise the affected individual of, and permit 

adequate preparation for, an impending hearing." Memphis Light, 

Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 u.s. 1, 14 (1978). Aacen did not 

receive such notice nor do New Mexico's statutes provide for it. 

The defendants argue that the Notice of Exemption in Lieu of 

Homestead provided to Aacen is sufficient notice of exemptions 

because the Constitution does not require that a list of all 

available exemptions be provided to the debtor and cite to Reiqh 

v. Schleiqh, 784 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 847 

(1986). However, in Reiqh, the court held that an exhaustive list 

of exemptions was unnecessary "if the notice alert[s] the judgment 

debtor that there are certain exemptions under state and federal 

law which the debtor may be entitled to claim with respect to the 

attached property . . . " Reiqh v. Schleiqh, 784 F.2d at 1196. 

Similarly, in Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d at 1354, the First 

Circuit held that the debtor need not be informed of all available 

exemptions as long as she is informed that there are certain 

exemptions which she may be entitled to claim. See McCahey v. 

L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d at 550-52 (general explanation of 

exemptions with expressly partial list of exempt properties 

constitutional). Aacen, however, was not provided with general 

notice of the availability of various other property exemptions. 

Rather, she was served only with the Notice of Exemption in Lieu 

of Homestead. 

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The Notice of Exemption in Lieu of Homestead, by its own 

terms, 8 informs the debtor only of her right to claim the exemption in lieu of homestead. It does not purport to nor is it 

intended to notify the debtor of other possible exemptions. As 

for the obscure reference to the "other exemptions," it is 

unlikely that a reasonable judgment debtor, reading the document 

8 NOTICE OF EXEMPTION IN LIEU OF HOMESTEAD 

-----------------, being a resident of San Juan County, State of 

New Mexico, and being the person named in an action seeking to 

attach, execute or foreclose by judgment, do hereby acknowledge 

that the Sheriff of San Juan County, State of New Mexico, has 

provided my with this written notice of my right to claim an 

exemption in lieu of homestead, in addition to any other exemptions, in the amount of two thousand and 00/100 ($2,000.00) 

dollars. 

I hereby declare that I 

exemptions. 

do do not desire to claim the 

I desire to claim the exemption in lieu of Homestead on the 

following described property which has the stated value set 

opposite the described property: 

Property: 

Signed: 

Person Claiming Exemption 

Witnessed: 

Deputy Sheriff 

Stated Value: 

If you wish to claim any exemptions please notify the Court 

of Origin. 

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at the time of service, would be aware that additional exemptions 

exist and are available to her. 9 

The defendants contend that by notifying Aacen of a specific 

exemption, Aacen had more information than debtors provided with 

general references to available exemptions and, therefore, in 

comparison, she received constitutionally sufficient notice. We 

disagree. Exemptions are not fungible. Thus, notice of a single 

exemption does not necessarily meet the due process requirements 

as to any additional exemptions. 

Indeed, the notice of the single exemption provided here may 

actually tend to mislead the debtor. Specifically, since one 

exemption is listed and a claim form provided, the debtor may 

reasonably believe that the exemption in lieu of homestead is the 

exclusive form of relief. Then, being unadvised as to the 

availability of additional remedies, the debtor may not pursue her 

other exemption claims. Accordingly, she may either fail to 

protect any property or claim the exemption in lieu of homestead, 

listing her truck or other specifically exempt property as 

protected property, believing it to be the sole method of protection. Thus, the debtor would mistakenly use her in-lieu-of9 Not only is this lack of notice evident from the face of the 

form, the Sheriff's Department admittedly did not intend to give 

such notice of other exemptions. Prior to 1985, the Sheriff's 

Department served all judgment debtors with a list of specific 

exemptions, including one motor vehicle up to $4000 in value, 

along with the notice of exemption in lieu of homestead. That 

addendum was removed in 1985 upon the advice of District Attorney 

William Birdsall. Birdsall's recommendation was based on his 

analysis that since the statutes required notice of the exemption 

in lieu of homestead, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-10-10(B), the sheriffs 

should "do what the law said and . . . not . . . go beyond that .... " Tr. at 65. 

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homestead exemption to protect property which the legislature 

clearly and expressly intended to protect "in addition to" that 

exemption. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-10-10(A). As a result, $1500 of 

the debtor's property would be subject to execution that would 

otherwise have been protected under the in-lieu-of-homestead 

exemption. Therefore, while a list of all exemptions may not be 

necessary, notice of the single exemption in this case does not 

replace general notification of other unlisted exemptions and, 

thus, violates Aacen's due process rights. 

Even if Aacen had realized the availability of other state 

exemptions, Aacen was not provided with meaningful notice that any 

process existed by which to assert her exemption rights or 

information regarding how to pursue such claims. 

First, the information regarding the assertion of exemption 

rights is at the bottom of a form expressly and intentionally 

notifying the debtor solely of a particular exemption. Thus, we 

cannot find that, as to the motor vehicle exemption, Aacen 

received meaningful notice. Second, the Notice does not inform 

the debtor that a hearing for asserting her exemption claims is 

available. Rather, the Notice states only that to claim any 

exemption, the debtor should "notify the Court of Origin." And, 

third, the information given may not even adequately inform the 

debtor of how to trigger the process. Certainly some forms of 

notification to the court may trigger a hearing, such as the 

filing of a claim of exemption form or other papers indicating 

that the debtor has a right she wishes to assert. However, other 

forms of "notification" would not afford the debtor her process. 

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The clerk at the "court of origin" testified that, upon contact, 

she would redirect the debtor to an attorney since the court did 

not handle paperwork and since she did not know anything about 

exemptions. Thus, if the debtor were to follow the instructions 

provided, a hearing would not necessarily be scheduled and her 

deprivation of exempt property may be unnecessarily prolonged. 

Furthermore, the frustration of being directed to the court and 

then redirected to hire an attorney, when, as here, the debtor has 

few assets or cash reserves, may dishearten and discourage many 

debtors from pursuing their legitimate remedies. 10 

Aacen contends that since the Supreme Court held in Memphis 

Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 u.s. at 14-15 n.15, that 

"recipients of a [utility] cutoff notice should be told where, 

during which hours of the day, and before whom disputed bills 

appropriately may be considered" to satisfy due process, "then 

surely it requires more information as to the procedure for 

asserting exemption from execution," Appellant's Brief at 33. We 

disagree. Such specificity may not be practical and may place too 

great a burden on the state. Furthermore, we recognize that 

"[e]laborate explanation of the procedures for asserting an 

exemption may so confuse a layman that he or she may be put off by 

10 The defendants argue that New Mexico's statutes go further in 

protecting judgment debtors than other circuits have held is 

necessary and so should be upheld. They contend that the hearing 

for claiming the in-lieu-of-homestead exemption in New Mexico is 

automatically activated by the sheriff's filing of the signed 

claim of exemption form. However, they do not claim that other 

exemptions are similarly handled. Thus, we cannot find that the 

debtor has been informed adequately as to the procedure for 

asserting her other exemptions. 

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the complexities and simply allow the seizure." McCahey v. L.P. 

Investors, 774 F.2d at 550. 

Thus, since "[k]nowledge of ... exemptions is not widespread," Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d at 62, particularly "in 

this context . which involves destitute people whose property 

has suddenly been seized as well as exemptions pertaining to 

life's basic necessities," Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d at 1352, we 

find that the Constitution requires, at minimum, that the debtor 

be informed that various state exemptions as to certain real and 

personal property exist and, if an incomplete list is given, state 

that the list is partial and advise the debtor regarding discovery 

of unlisted exemptions. 11 Due process also requires some 

indication that a procedure exists to protect one's exempt 

property and how, in general, either to trigger the process or to 

gain information regarding the process. McCahey v. L.P. 

Investors, 774 F.2d at 550 (sufficient to recommend in capital 

letters that debtor contact an attorney or Legal Aid in 

combination with notice of existence of procedures to test 

exemption claims); see Reigh v. Schleigh, 784 F.2d at 1196; Dionne 

v. Bouley, 757 F.2d at 1354; Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d at 62. 

Since New Mexico's post-judgment execution statutes do not require 

such notice, we find that they are unconstitutional in that 

respect. 

11 This holding is consistent with the decisions of the other 

four circuits analyzing the constitutionality of post-judgment 

notice of exemptions. Reigh v. Schleigh, 784 F.2d 1191; McCahey 

v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543; Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344; 

Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50. 

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As a final point, we note that providing additional information would not place any greater burden on the state than it has 

already chosen to bear in notifying the debtor of her exemption in 

lieu of homestead. It merely requires the addition and clarification of information to the notice already provided. See Finberg 

v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d at 62. Furthermore, we note that New Mexico 

already requires that extensive notice explaining and listing 

garnishment exemptions, N.M. S.Ct. R. Ann. 4-808, -809 (1986), be 

given to the debtor in certain garnishment situations, Id. at 

1-065.l(C). Presumably, similar provisions for execution cases 

would not greatly increase the administrative burden. 

To summarize: we reverse the district court's finding that 

Aacen received meaningful notice under the Fourteenth Amendment 

and we hold that since New Mexico's post-judgment execution 

statutes did not require that sufficient notice be given, they are 

constitutionally deficient. 

C. Hearing: 

Due process also requires a prompt hearing to resolve the 

exemption issue. Aacen argues that New Mexico does not provide 

for a prompt hearing to resolve execution exemption claims and 

thus violates due process. We disagree. 

The statute states: 

1-065.1. Garnishment and writs of execution. 

A. Issuance of execution. After the filing of the 

judgment, the clerk shall issue writs of execution upon 

request of the prevailing party. Executions shall be 

made in the manner provided by law . . . . 

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c. Financial institutions: representative payee. 

If the garnishee is a commercial bank, savings and loan 

association, credit union or representative payee and 

the judgment debtor is a natural person on or before the 

fourth business day following the issuance of the writ 

of garnishment, the judgment creditor shall mail to each 

named judgment debtor and to their attorneys of record, 

under separate cover, the application for the writ, writ 

of garnishment, notice of right to claim exemptions, and 

two (2) copies of the claim of exemption form, each of 

which shall be in the official form approved by the 

supreme court. 

E. Claim of exemption: setting hearing. Upon 

receiving a completed claim of exemption form from a 

judgment debtor, the clerk shall transmit the same to 

the assigned judge who shall set a hearing on the claim 

of exemption which shall be held within five (5) 

business days after the clerk receives the form. 

F. Claim of exemption: hearing. The judge or his 

designee shall give notice to the judgment creditor and 

the judgment debtor of the date and time for the hearing. The applicant's notice of hearing shall also 

include a copy of the claim of exemption form, as filed 

by the judgment debtor. The hearing on the claim of 

exemption shall be held within five (5) business days 

after the clerk's receipt of the completed claim of 

exemption form, notwithstanding any other rule to the 

contrary. 

N.M. s.ct. R. Ann. 1-065.1 (1978). 

She contends that subsections (E) and (F), provisions requiring a hearing within five days of the court's receipt of a 

completed claim of exemption form from the debtor, apply only to 

writs of garnishment, not writs of execution. She bases this 

argument on subsection (C) which requires service of claim of 

exemption forms in certain garnishment situations. While no such 

forms are required to be served upon the debtor in execution 

cases, claim of exemption forms exist for writs of execution. Id. 

4-803. Upon the filing of one of these forms, S.Ct. R. Ann. 1-

065.1, on its face, requires a prompt hearing to be held. Thus, 

New Mexico provides for a prompt hearing to resolve exemption 

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claims in execution, as well as garnishment, cases and we uphold 

that portion of the post-judgment execution procedures as 

constitutional. 

III. CLASS CERTIFICATION 

Aacen asserted the claims discussed above on behalf of 

herself and those individuals who have had, or will have, money 

judgments entered against them and who do or will own non-monetary 

property in New Mexico that is or may be exempt from execution. 

The district court denied the motion. Aacen raised the issue at 

trial and it was again denied. Tr. at 60. 

We affirm the district court's denial of class certification 

on the grounds that, given our holding today, certification is not 

necessary. See Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (lOth Cir. 

1988) (affirm judgment on any grounds supported by record even if 

not relied upon by lower court). The effect of our holding is 

"tantamount to a grant of classwide relief." Everhart v. Bowen, 

853 F.2d 1532, 1538 (lOth Cir. 1988). "A class action [is] not 

demanded here because the same relief [can] be afforded [the class 

members] without its use . .. 12 Martinez v. Richardson, 472 

F.2d 1121, 1127 (lOth Cir. 1973). 

12 A number of other courts have similarly held that the 

district court may decline certification when all class members 

will benefit from an injunction issued on behalf of the named 

plaintiffs. See cases cited in Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d at 

1355-56. 

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IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 

Aacen challenges the district court's determination that 

defendants Jack A. Richards, deputy sheriff, and Doug Brown, 

sheriff of San Juan County, are entitled to "qualified or good 

faith immunity." 

Qualified immunity "shield[s government officials] from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 800, 818 (1982). The burden is on Aacen to 

prove that the law was clearly established. Powell v. Mikulecky, 

891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (lOth Cir. 1989); Rozek v. Topolnicki, 865 

F.2d 1154, 1157 (lOth Cir. 1989). To meet this burden, Aacen must 

show that "the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that 

a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 

(1987). 

Aacen contends that, in the absence of a ruling by this 

circuit, the necessary notice regarding exemptions is clearly 

established by three federal appellate cases holding that postjudgment execution procedures must supply the debtor with notice 

of seizure, exemptions and procedures to challenge the seizure, 13 

citing to Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. 

denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987). However, in Weber, the court found 

13 Aacen cites to McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543 (2d 

Cir. 1985), Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985), and 

Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane). 

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that the law was clearly established because "[a]t least eleven 

circuit court decisions, three of them antedating the search in 

this case, hold similar policies [body cavity searches without 

reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband] 

unconstitutional" the exact issue and fact situation presented 

in Weber. Id. at 803. Furthermore, the court held that "although 

we have not directly ruled on the precise issue presented in this 

case, we have variously described 'the indignities of a rectal 

search' as 'insensitive, demeaning and stupid,' 'degrading,' and a 

'major invasion into privacy.'" Id. (citations omitted). Here, 

Aacen cites to only three circuits that have addressed the due 

process requirements of post-judgment seizures and, even in those 

cases, the facts revolved around garnishment proceedings. 

Although the due process concerns are the same for both garnishment and execution procedures, a reasonable person may not realize 

the close correlation in duties and rights that must be accorded 

in both situations. In addition, this court has not ruled at all 

on this issue to indicate its disapproval of the type of notice 

and procedures provided by New Mexico to judgment debtors. 

Furthermore, while it may be clear that due process requires 

notice of exemptions and a hearing upon seizure of a judgment 

debtor's property, the test of "clearly established law" is not to 

be applied at this level of generality. Rather the law must be 

"clearly established" in a more particularized, relevant sense. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 639-40. We cannot say that the 

few cases cited by Aacen are sufficiently specific to clearly 

establish to the reasonable official that notice of a single 

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exemption and provision of an exemption claim form to the judgment 

debtor do not comport with the notice requirements of the 

Constitution. 14 

And finally, the defendants acted in accordance with New 

Mexico law. As the parties do not cite to and our research has 

uncovered no other case in New Mexico or this circuit ruling upon 

the constitutionality of the statute, the sheriffs' compliance 

with the law as it existed at the time was objectively reasonable. 

Coen v. Runner, 854 F.2d 374, 377-78 (lOth Cir. 1988) (citing 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818). Thus, since the law 

regarding the sufficiency of notice and hearing for execution 

exemptions was unclear, we find that the defendants are entitled 

to qualified immunity. 

We AFFIRM the district court's holding as to class 

certification and qualified immunity; and VACATE its holding as to 

due process and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

14 Aacen points out that the defendants "never argued that the 

due process constraints upon post-judgment execution procedures 

were unclear or uncertain." Appellant's Brief at 38. However, 

the burden falls on Aacen to show that the law was clearly 

established, Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (lOth Cir. 

1989), not on the defendants to assert or prove the contrary. 

"[U]nless and until the plaintiff is able to make the required 

showing that defendant's conduct violated a 'clearly established' 

right, the government official is properly spared the burden and 

expense of proceeding any further." Id. Aacen has not met that 

burden. 

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