Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00188/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00188-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS RADFORD, )

AIS #156846, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-188-MEF

) [WO]

)

KIM TOBIAS THOMAS, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Thomas Radford

["Radford"], a state inmate, in which he challenges conditions and adverse actions which have

occurred during his confinement at the Bullock Correctional Facility. On July 25, 2013, Radford

filed a document seeking issuance of an order directing defendants Kim Thomas, Kenneth Jones,

Sandra Giles and Rene Mason to show cause why a motion for preliminary injunction should not

issue for their alleged illegal seizure of funds from his inmate account. Doc. No. 51. 

After review of this motion and in light of the relief sought by Radford, the court construed

the document to contain a motion for preliminary injunction and required a response to the motion

from the defendants. Order of July 26, 2013 - Doc. No. 54. In their response, the defendants

maintain that they are denying the plaintiff access to certain funds deposited to his inmate account

as he gained access to these funds in violation of institutional rules. Defendants' Exh. A (Aff. of

Sandra Y. Giles) - Doc. No. 57-1 at 1-2 ("An investigation revealed that inmate Radford had been

Case 2:13-cv-00188-WHA-TFM Document 70 Filed 08/19/13 Page 1 of 5
involved in a scheme where he would loan inmates store goods [and] ... also allow inmates who were

on restriction (as a result of disciplinary action) to have money placed on his PMOD account [in

exchange for providing these inmates access to store items]. All of which is a violation of

institutional rules. Inmate Radford then had other inmates to collect on his debt which included

interest.... The money that was determined to be placed on inmate Radford's account as a result of

his illegal activities [was] frozen. There was not any money removed, nor seized from inmate

Radford's account."). 

Upon consideration of the motion for preliminary injunction and the response filed

by the defendants, the court concludes that this motion is due to be denied.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction "is within the sound discretion of the

district court...." Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11 Cir. 2002). This court may grant a

th

preliminary injunction only if Radford demonstrates each of the following prerequisites: (1) a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat irreparable injury will occur

absent issuance of the injunction; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the potential damage the

requested injunction may cause the non-moving parties; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse

to the public interest. Palmer, 287 F.3d at 1329; McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301,

1306 Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176 (11 Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht th

Corp., 697 F.2d 1352 (11 Cir. 1983). “In this Circuit, ‘[a] preliminary injunction is an th

extraordinaryand drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the “burden

of persuasion”’ as to the four requisites.” McDonald’s, 147 F.3d at 1306; All Care Nursing Service,

2

Case 2:13-cv-00188-WHA-TFM Document 70 Filed 08/19/13 Page 2 of 5
Inc. v. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11 Cir. 1989) (a preliminary th

injunction is issued only when “drastic relief” is necessary); Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d

175, 179 (5 Cir. 1975) (grant of preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule,” and th

movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party’s failure to demonstrate a

“substantial likelihood of success on the merits” may defeat the party’s claim, regardless of the

party’s ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332,

1342 (11 Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11 Cir. 2000) (noting that th th

“the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injurywould, standing alone, make preliminary

injunctive reliefimproper”). “‘The chieffunction of a preliminaryinjunction is to preserve the status

quo until the merits of the controversycan be fully and fairlyadjudicated.’ Northeastern Fl. Chapter

of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fl., 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th

Cir.1990).” Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11 Cir. 2001). th

III. DISCUSSION

Turning to the first prerequisite for issuance of preliminary injunctive relief, the court finds

that Radford has failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. 

The assertions contained in the motion for preliminaryinjunction aremerelyconclusory, self-serving

allegations regarding a purported improper denial of access to funds in the plaintiff's inmate account. 

In addition, Radford has utterly and completely failed to demonstrate a substantial threat that he will

suffer a requisite irreparable injury absent issuance of the requested preliminary injunction. The

third factor, balancing potential harm to the parties, clearly weighs more heavily in favor of the

defendants as issuance of the requested injunction would severely undermine the authority of

3

Case 2:13-cv-00188-WHA-TFM Document 70 Filed 08/19/13 Page 3 of 5
correctional personnel and limit their ability to enforce rules governing inmate behavior. In essence,

granting the reliefrequested byRadford would provide an inmate the means by which to circumvent

prison disciplinary rules. Finally, the public interest element of the equation is, at best, a neutral

factor at this juncture. Thus, Radford has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the existence

of the necessary prerequisites for issuance of a preliminary injunction. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The motion for preliminary injunction filed by the plaintiff on July 25, 2013 be DENIED. 

2. This case be referred back the undersigned for additional proceedings.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before September 6, 2013 the parties may file objections to the 

Recommendation. Any objection must specifically identify the findings in the Recommendation

objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. 

The parties are further advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and,

therefore, it is not appealable. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings in the

Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues

addressed in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings

in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest

injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.,

th

667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en th th

banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued prior to

4

Case 2:13-cv-00188-WHA-TFM Document 70 Filed 08/19/13 Page 4 of 5
September 30, 1981.

Done this 19th day of August, 2013.

/s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

5

Case 2:13-cv-00188-WHA-TFM Document 70 Filed 08/19/13 Page 5 of 5