Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00271/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00271-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Micheal Grzyb-Lopez,

Plaintiff,

v. 

D. Fraser,

Defendant.

No. CV 23-00271 PHX SRB (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to amend the operative complaint. 

(ECF No. 51). 

I. Background

Plaintiff, who is in custody, initiated this matter by filing a pro se § 1983 complaint 

on February 10, 2023. (ECF No. 1). The Court construed the Complaint as follows:

In his one-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants Arizona 

Department of Public Safety Gang Task Force Officers John Does 1 and 2, 

alleging he was subjected to excessive force during his arrest [on September 

17, 2021], in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He seeks monetary 

damages and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff claims Defendants arrested him on an outstanding warrant. 

He alleges that after his hands were cuffed behind his back and Defendant 

Doe 1 was holding him down in a prone position, Defendant Doe 2 “took 

two running steps and kicked [him] with full force, square in the face, twice.” 

After this, Defendant Doe 2 “proceeded to take the Plaintiff into custody, and 

relinquished control over Plaintiff to a sep[a]rate, uninvolved ... officer for 

transport.” Plaintiff contends he suffered permanent nerve damage in his 

face; permanent and persistent neurological, psychological, and emotional 

trauma; facial numbness; migraine headaches; and Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder.

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(ECF No. 15 at 3). 

On June 6, 2023, Plaintiff was given leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the 

Court dismissed Defendant John Doe 1 without prejudice. (ECF No. 15). On June 16, 2023, 

the Court allowed Plaintiff 120 days to discover the identity of Defendant John Doe 2 and 

to file a notice of substitution as to this Defendant’s true identity. (ECF No. 18). On July 11, 

2023, the Court required Plaintiff to file the notice of substitution no later than October 16, 

2023. (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff failed to comply with the order at ECF No. 21, and 

accordingly on November 6, 2023, judgment was entered against Plaintiff and the case was 

dismissed. (ECF No. 23). 

On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the order of judgment. 

(ECF No. 25). Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was granted on January 4, 2024, and 

the Court ordered Glover, the Director of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, to 

provide, via subpoena, “the incident reports from the September 17, 2021 arrest of 

Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 26 at 2-3). The deadline for Plaintiff to file a notice of substitution 

was stayed until Glover produced the requested information. (ECF No. 26 at 3).

On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 29) naming

only Fraser as a defendant. In the Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleged “C. Corwin” held 

him down in the prone position and handcuffed him, and Defendant Fraser then took “two 

running steps towards the Plaintiff and kicked the Plaintiff in the face twice, with full force, 

then proceeded to take the Plaintiff into custody.” (ECF No. 29 at 3). The statement of facts 

in the Amended Complaint is identical to the statement of facts in the Complaint except

that the names and badge numbers of Corwin and Fraser were substituted for John Doe 1 

and John Doe 2, respectively. (Id.). 

On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff was ordered to complete a service packet for 

Defendant Fraser and return it to the Court no later than April 3, 2024. (ECF No. 30). On 

May 13, 2024, Plaintiff was allowed until May 20, 2024, to show cause why the Amended 

Complaint should not be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order issued 

March 13, 2024. (ECF No. 31). On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff was provided with another 

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service packet and Plaintiff was allowed until July 22, 2024, to effect service on Defendant 

Fraser via the United States Marshal. (ECF No. 33). Service on Defendant Fraser was 

returned as unexecuted (ECF No. 34), and Glover was ordered to provide a last known 

address for Defendant Fraser. (ECF No. 35). Defendant Fraser was served on August 19, 

2024. (ECF No. 38). On September 9, 2024, Defendant Fraser was allowed until October 9, 

2024, to answer or otherwise respond to the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 41). 

On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 42) 

and lodged a proposed second amended complaint (ECF No. 43). 

Defendant Fraser answered the Amended Complaint on October 9, 2024. (ECF 

No. 45). An order issued October 10, 2024, requiring any motion to further amend the 

operative complaint be filed by November 15, 2024, that discovery be completed no later 

than January 24, 2025, and that dispositive motions be filed no later than April 25, 2025. 

(ECF No. 46). 

Defendant Fraser docketed a response to Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint 

on October 22, 2024 (ECF No. 49), and Plaintiff did not timely file a reply in support of 

his motion to amend at ECF No. 42. On November 20, 2024, a Report and 

Recommendation was docketed, recommending the motion to amend be denied. (ECF 

No. 53). The Report and Recommendation was adopted on December 12, 2024. (ECF 

No. 61). 

The pending motion to amend was docketed November 15, 2024. (ECF No. 51). 

Defendant responded to the most recent motion to amend on December 2, 2024, asserting 

the motion should be denied because of undue delay, because the claims against the newlynamed defendants are barred by the statue of limitations, and because allowing Plaintiff to 

proceed on the proposed newly-added claims would be futile. (ECF No. 55). Plaintiff did 

not file a reply in support of his motion to amend at ECF No. 51. 

II. Governing Law

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).1 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a plaintiff should be 

given leave to amend their complaint when justice so requires. Granting or denying leave 

to amend is a matter committed to the Court’s discretion. E.g., Hartmann v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). Before granting leave to 

amend, Rule 15(a) requires the Court to evaluate the elements of bad faith, undue delay, 

prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment. See, e.g., Serra v. Lappin, 600 

F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). Leave to amend may be denied when allowing a plaintiff 

to proceed on an amended complaint would delay the on-going proceedings, or when the 

amendment seeks to add new claims unrelated or only tangentially related to the original 

allegations. See, e.g. Pierce v. Multnomah Cnty., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Eckard v. Langdon, No. 21-35729, 2023 WL 6129523, at *1 (9th Cir. 2023). Relevant to 

the factor of undue delay is “whether the moving party knew or should have known the 

facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original pleading,” and whether 

“permitting an amendment ... would produce an undue delay in the litigation.” Jackson v. 

Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1990).

Futility of amendment is sufficient to justify denial of leave to amend. See, e.g.,

Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). A proposed amended 

complaint is futile if, accepting all of the facts alleged as true, it would be immediately 

“subject to dismissal” for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 

Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998); Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Medical Mut. of 

Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Town of Quartzsite, 677 F. 

1 Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint at ECF No. 52 does not comply with 

Rule 15.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Nonetheless, the proposed second amended 

complaint will be screened in the interest of judicial efficiency. 

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App’x 317, 318 (9th Cir. 2017). Futility is also found when the amended complaint would, 

on its face, be subject to dismissal based on the applicable statute of limitations. See Platt 

Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2008); Conerly v. 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1980); Doering v. Lamb, No. 20-

cv-00404, 2022 WL 2760056, at *9 (D. Ariz. May 27, 2023), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2022 WL 2753773 (D. Ariz., July 14, 2022); Consiglio v. Brown, No. 16-cv01268, 2019 WL 2153138, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2019), report and recommendation 

adopted, 2019 WL 6338117 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Consiglio v. Ahlin, 

837 F. App’x 508 (9th Cir. 2021). Cf. Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 296 (3d Cir.

2001) (noting, in a takings action, that failure to file a claim within the statute of limitations 

renders a proposed amendment futile).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does not demand 

detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. Additionally, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id., quoting 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 A plaintiff must 

state sufficient plausible factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

The Court is obliged to liberally construe an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s 

complaint. See, e.g., Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, although 

pro se pleadings are liberally construed, conclusory and vague allegations will not support 

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a cause of action. E.g., Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Additionally, “legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption 

of truthfulness and conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not 

sufficient” to state a claim for relief that will survive a motion to dismiss. McGrath v. Scott, 

250 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (D. Ariz. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. See also Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th 

Cir. 2014). And the Court need not assume the plaintiff “can prove facts different from 

those alleged in the complaint.” McGrath, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. 

To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff prisoner must show an act by the named 

defendant, taken under color of state law, which deprived the plaintiff of a federal

constitutional right, and caused the plaintiff harm. See, e.g., Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 

425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege they suffered 

a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and must also 

sufficiently allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. 

E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). A claim may be properly dismissed 

when the pleading lacks specific factual allegations showing the named defendant’s 

participation in the alleged constitutional violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Richards v. Harper, 864 F.2d 85, 88 (9th 

Cir. 1988); Carey v. Von Blanckensee, 515 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2021). To 

survive screening, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that 

an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren,

152 F.3d at 1194.

The use of excessive force by law enforcement officers in the course of an arrest 

can violate the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 

See White by White v. Pierce Cnty., 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986). Whether the force 

was excessive depends on “whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in 

light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying 

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intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tatum v. City & Cnty.

of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006); Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 

F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Additionally, law enforcement officers “have a duty to intercede when their fellow 

officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” Cunningham v. 

Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000); Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F. 

Supp. 3d 990, 1002 (C.D. Cal. 2014). “[A]n officer who failed to intercede when his 

colleagues were depriving a victim of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable force in the course of an arrest would, like his colleagues, be responsible for 

subjecting the victim to a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” Tobias v. Arteaga, 

996 F.3d 571, 584 (9th Cir. 2021). However, law enforcement officers can be held liable 

for failing to intervene only if the officer had a “realistic opportunity” to intervene. See 

Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1290. See also Ortiz v. Kazimer, 811 F.3d 848, 853 (6th Cir. 

2016) (holding police officers are “liable for failing to stop ongoing excessive force when 

they observe it and can reasonably prevent it.”); Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 

919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding a police officer had a duty to intervene when he 

witnessed the use of excessive force and had the ability to intervene); Knapps v. City of 

Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“A reasonable officer could not 

have reasonably but mistakenly believed that he had no duty to intervene to stop another 

officer in their immediate presence from inflicting excessive force on a subject when they 

could have prevented it.”). See also Fernandez v. Virgillo, No. 12-cv-02475, 2014 WL 

2930749, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2014), citing, e.g., Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1290, and

O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding an officer present at the 

scene was not liable where the trial evidence showed “three blows were struck in such rapid 

succession that [the officer] had no realistic opportunity to attempt to prevent them. This 

was not an episode of sufficient duration to support a conclusion that an officer who stood 

by without trying to assist the victim became a tacit collaborator.”).

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“[S]upervisory officials may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of 

respondeat superior, but only for their own wrongful behavior.” McGrath, 250 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1222, citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor “can 

be held liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the 

training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the 

constitutional deprivation[;] or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference 

to the rights of others.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 485 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotations omitted, bracketing in original). However, “mere failure to act in the 

face of the constitutional violations fail[s] to provide a sufficient basis for imposing § 1983 

liability.” McGrath, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 1223. “[S]omething more than mere failure to 

control must be shown in order to hold the supervisor liable for his own alleged wrongs.” 

Id. “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the 

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to 

act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

“In limited circumstances a supervisor’s subsequent ‘ratification’ of another’s 

conduct can form the basis for liability under § 1983.” Peschel v. City of Missoula, 686 F. 

Supp. 2d 1092, 1102 (D. Mont. 2009), citing Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 

646 (9th Cir. 1991) ). However, “[t]he mere failure to discipline does not show condoning 

or ratification.” Booke v. City. of Fresno, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2015). To 

survive screening the plaintiff must assert facts, rather than simply conclusions, plausibly 

establishing the supervisor was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s civil 

rights. See Maxwell v. City of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]here is 

no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Rather, a government official may be held 

liable only for the official’s own conduct.”).

III. Analysis

The proposed second amended complaint adds as Defendants Jeffrey Glover, the 

Director of the Arizona Department of Public Safety (“DPS”), and DPS officer C. Corwin.

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In Count One of the proposed second amended complaint Plaintiff reasserts his 

Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force against Defendant Fraser. (ECF No. 52 at 3). 

Count Two of the proposed second amended complaint asserts a claim for “Fourth 

Amendment unreasonable deliberately indifferent excessive force search/seizure/arrest” 

against Glover. (ECF No. 52 at 6). Plaintiff alleges Glover’s “deliberately indifferent 

failure, and inaction as ADPS Director, to properly implement, disseminate and enforce an 

appropriate Department use of force policy;” and Glover’s failure to properly train DOS 

officers; and Glover’s failure to “investigate officer use of force complaints” and discipline 

officers for excessive use of force, “directly and indirectly” resulted in Fraser and Corwin’s 

“excessive use of force against Plaintiff ...” (Id.). Plaintiff contends “[s]upervisory level 

authorities, like and including Defendant Glover, are just as responsible, negligent, and 

liable as their subordinates, and should be held accountable as such.” (Id.). 

Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege sufficient specific facts to support a claim that 

Glover was personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s civil rights by Fraser, or 

that Glover participated in or directed the violations, or that Glover knew of the violations 

and failed to act to prevent them.

Count Three of the proposed second amended complaint states a Fourth Amendment 

claim for excessive force against Corwin. (ECF No. 52 at 8). Plaintiff asserts Corwin is 

liable for a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights because Corwin “failed to physically 

or even verbally intervene or stop Defendant Fraser’s maliciously sadistic excessive use of 

force against Plaintiff.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges Corwin did not physically or verbally 

intervene to stop Fraser’s “unlawful attack on Plaintiff,” thereby “demonstrat[ing] 

deliberate indifference.” (ECF No. 52 at 9). Plaintiff contends that “even after the first kick 

to Plaintiff’s face, at no time did [] Corwin even attempt to intervene or stop Defendant 

Fraser’s attack on Plaintiff ...” (Id.). 

Other than the allegations Plaintiff stated in the Complaint against “John Doe 1,” 

Plaintiff does not add additional factual allegations against Corwin in the proposed second 

amended complaint. In the Complaint Plaintiff alleged:

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During [the arrest on September 17, 2021] I was handcuffed behind 

my back and held down in the prone position by one D.P.S. officer (John 

Doe #1 ...). As I was held down already handcuffed by (John Doe #1), 

[Fraser] took two running steps and kicked the Plaintiff will full force square 

in the face, TWICE, then proceeded to take the Plaintiff into custody ... 

(ECF No. 1 at 3) (emphasis in original). 

In the screening order the Court concluded Plaintiff failed to state a claim against 

“John Doe 1,” stating:

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a conclusion that any force 

Defendant Doe 1 used was excessive. He has therefore failed to state an 

excessive force claim against Defendant Doe 1. 

In addition, officials can be held liable for failing to intercede when 

their fellow officers violate constitutional rights, and the officials have a 

reasonable opportunity to intercede. See Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 

1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 

(7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a 

conclusion that Defendant Doe 1 had a reasonable opportunity to intervene 

and failed to do so. 

(ECF No. 15 at 15). 

In his proposed second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges:

During this September 17, 2021 arrest of Plaintiff, Plaintiff was 

handcuffed behind his back while lying face down on his stomach and held 

down in this prone position by Detective Corwin, while Defendant Fraser, in 

an objectively unreasonable excessive use of force, then took two running 

steps towards Plaintiff, and with full momentum and force, Defendant Fraser 

maliciously and sadistically kicked Plaintiff twice in his face ...

(ECF No. 52 at 3-4). 

Plaintiff also asserts “Defendant Corwin was employed by the Arizona Department 

of Public Safety Gang Task Force Division,” and that Corwin was Fraser’s “partner during 

Defendant Fraser’s objectively unreasonable maliciously sadistic excessive use of force 

attack on Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 52 at 8). Plaintiff further alleges that, during the use of force,

Corwin “not only held Plaintiff handcuffed behind his back down in the prone position on 

his stomach while Defendant Frazer maliciously and sadistically kicked Plaintiff twice in 

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his face,” but Corwin also “failed to intervene, prevent, or stop Defendant Fraser physically 

or verbally, from kicking, or continuing to kick, Plaintiff in his face.” (Id.). 

The Court previously concluded Plaintiff had “not alleged sufficient facts to support 

a conclusion that [Corwin] had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and failed to do so.” 

(ECF No. 15 at 15). Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint does not add any 

additional factual allegations to those stated in the Complaint with regard to the timing of 

Fraser’s attack or indicating Corwin had a “reasonable opportunity to intervene.” Instead,

Plaintiff adds conclusory allegations that Corwin “failed to intervene, prevent,” or stop 

Fraser from kicking Plaintiff, and that Corwin failed to verbally or physically prevent 

Fraser from kicking “or continuing to kick” Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to 

overcome the Court’s prior conclusion that he can state sufficient facts to support a claim

that Corwin had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and failed to do so. Plaintiff alleges 

Fraser took two “running” steps and kicked Plaintiff twice, in succession, in the face. This 

incident apparently happened quite quickly, and Plaintiff’s statement of facts indicates 

Fraser did not “continue to kick” Plaintiff but instead kicked him twice and then Plaintiff 

was “formally” arrested and taken to jail. (ECF No. 52 at 4).

Additionally, Plaintiff does not explain the undue delay in moving to amend his 

complaint to state a claim against Corwin or Glover. Plaintiff’s claim against “John Doe 1” 

was dismissed June 6, 2023 (ECF No. 15), and seven months later when Plaintiff filed his 

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 29) on January 26, 2024, Plaintiff identified Corwin as 

“John Doe 1” but did not state a claim against either Corwin or Glover, whose identity as 

the Director of DPS was known to Plaintiff at that time. Plaintiff proffers no reason for 

now seeking, ten months later, to add Corwin and Glover as Defendants. Plaintiff has 

unduly delayed adding these individuals as defendants, and allowing Plaintiff to add 

additional defendants and claims would unduly delay resolution of Plaintiff’s claim against 

Fraser as it is unlikely these defendants would be served and appear prior to the deadline 

for completing discovery in this matter, even providing newly-added defendants answered 

an amended complaint rather than filing motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

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Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 51) seeking leave to 

amend his complaint be denied. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2). Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2(e)(3), Local Rules 

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, 

objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed ten (10) pages in length.

Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 27th day of December, 2024.

Case 2:23-cv-00271-SRB-CDB Document 62 Filed 12/27/24 Page 12 of 12