Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01135/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01135-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL FLOYD JENKINS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

____________________________________

Case No. 1:15-cv-01135-SKO

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 

SECURITY APPEAL

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Daniel Floyd Jenkins (“Plaintiff”), seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income Benefits pursuant to Titles II and 

XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1381-83. The matter is currently before the 

Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila 

K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on August 13, 1984, and alleges disability beginning on December 17, 

2009. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 37; 45; 231-49.) Plaintiff claims he is disabled due to 

 

1

 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 6; 8.)

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fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, porphyria, and stress. (See AR 268.) In his application for 

disability insurance benefits, he alleged a disability onset date of December 17, 2009. (AR 243.)

In his application for supplemental security income benefits, he alleged a disability onset date of

August 1, 2010. (AR 231.) Plaintiff worked after both these dates. (AR 254, 260, 268, 275, 281, 

292, 398.)

A. Relevant Medical Evidence 

On April 6, 2010, Plaintiff saw his treating rheumatologist Dr. Kyaw Khaing Swe, M.D. 

(AR 656-70.) Dr. Swe emphasized the “benign nature” of fibromyalgia and the “importance of 

exercise and physical activities,” and explained to Plaintiff that “the great majority of patients live 

normal and active lives.” (AR 659-70.) On July 9, 2010, Dr. Swe saw Plaintiff for follow-up and 

found his fibromyalgia symptoms “still mild to moderately active” but “not worsened.” (AR 704.)

Dr. Swe explained that Plaintiff “need[ed] to stay active for fibromyalgia” and informed him that

“[p]lacing him on disability for an extended period w[ould] only worsen the condition” and 

“[documentation of medical impairment] w[ould] not be extended.” (AR 704.) 

On June 15, 2011, Plaintiff underwent a consultative examination by psychologist Dr. 

Benjamin Aleshire, Ph.D. (AR 832-37.) Plaintiff was able to ambulate without assistance, was 

friendly and made good eye contact, and had normal facial expressions throughout the interview. 

(AR 832-34.) Plaintiff’s gross motor function was normal, his behavior was appropriate, his 

grooming was good, and he interacted appropriately with Dr. Aleshire and the office staff during 

the evaluation. (AR 832-35.) Plaintiff reported that he had been depressed since childhood but 

was not participating in mental health treatment and was not taking psychiatric medications. 

(AR 832-33.) Plaintiff reported completing normal living activities, including showering, 

cleaning, washing clothing, and preparing simple meals, though he needed to take several breaks 

to have enough energy to complete tasks. (AR 834.) Plaintiff also reported attending special 

education classes for speech problems and concentration difficulties, though he completed the 

11th grade and eventually earned his GED. (AR 833.) Mental status examination did not reveal 

any abnormalities or psychiatric findings. (AR 834-35.) Plaintiff described his current mood as 

“irritable” and presented as dysthymic with a constricted range of affect. (AR 835.)

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Dr. Aleshire diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder, recurrent and moderate; 

rule out mood disorder due to porphyria; and assigned Plaintiff a GAF2score of 55. Dr. Aleshire 

opined Plaintiff was “able to accurately” perform one- or two-step simple repetitive tasks and

accurately perform complex tasks; has a “good ability” to accept instructions from supervisors and 

interact with coworkers and the public, perform work activities on a consistent basis without 

special or additional instruction, and maintain regular attendance; and was “moderately impaired”

in his ability to complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from a psychiatric 

condition and to deal with the usual stressors encountered in a competitive workplace. (AR 836). 

On June 18, 2011, Plaintiff saw Dr. Ashraf Youssef, M.D., for an internal medicine 

consultative examination. (AR 838-42.) Dr. Youssef diagnosed Plaintiff with porphyria and 

fibromyalgia and opined that Plaintiff had no exertional limitations. (AR 841.)

On July 21, 2011, psychiatric medical consultant Dr. Kwong W. Law, M.D., reviewed the 

medical records and completed a psychiatric review technique form. (AR 843-57.) Dr. Law 

opined Plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to understand and remember detailed 

instructions, carry out detailed instructions, and interact appropriately with the general public, but 

was otherwise not significantly limited. (AR 843-44.) Dr. Law further opined Plaintiff was able 

to understand and remember short and simple instructions; sustain concentration and persistence 

to carry out short, simple tasks, and maintain regular attendance and perform work activities for a 

normal work week and/or workday; interact appropriately with supervisors and coworkers but 

with difficulty with the public; adapt to normal work setting and hazards; and set realistic goals 

and work independently. (AR 843-44.) 

Dr. Law opined Plaintiff was moderately restricted in his activities of daily living and had 

moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence, and pace,

but noted no repeated episodes of decompensation. (AR 854.) Dr. Law only partially credited 

Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, concluding Plaintiff was able to perform simple repetitive tasks 

 

2

 Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale score is a numeric scale (1 through 100) used by mental health 

clinicians and physicians to rate subjectively the social, occupational, and psychological functioning of adults. 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV, American Psychiatric Association (4th ed. 2000) at 34. 

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but would have difficulty performing complex tasks; was able to sustain adequate concentration, 

persistence, and pace and complete a normal workday and workweek; would have difficulty 

interacting with the public; was able to interact appropriately with coworkers and supervisors; and 

was able to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. (AR 856-57.)

On August 8, 2011, State agency physician Dr. James J. Green, M.D., reviewed the 

medical records and assessed Plaintiff’s physical functionality. (AR 864-71.) Dr. Green

diagnosed Plaintiff with history of borderline porphyria, with a secondary diagnosis of history of 

fibromyalgia, and opined that Plaintiff had no exertional limitations. (AR 864-65.) Dr. Green 

only partially credited Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, noting, “[m]any of his statements seem out 

of proportion to the objective medical evidence.” (AR 869.)

On January 15, 2013, treating physician Dr. Jan Mensink, M.D., saw Plaintiff for upper 

respiratory tract infection symptoms. (AR 892.) Dr. Mensink noted that Plaintiff did not smoke 

cigarettes but smoked marijuana, and was currently using only marijuana and no other active 

medications. (AR 892.) On February 15, 2013, Dr. Mensink noted Plaintiff’s long-term history of 

fibromyalgia, porphyria, and marijuana use and observed that Plaintiff had not taken any 

medication for years and that he smoked marijuana daily. (AR 891.) 

B. Testimony

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony at Hearing

Plaintiff testified that he felt as though someone was taking a knife and twisting it into his 

stomach, and that the muscles in his arms, legs, and chest were contracting and moving by 

themselves like spasms, which “hurt very bad.” (AR 82.) He “get[s] out of breath really easily” 

and the skin on his arms and legs are “very sore.” (AR 82.) He has “a hard time doing things, just 

household chores. It might take three to four hours to do -- to clean the kitchen, which is you 

know, unload the dishwasher and load it.” (AR 82.) It is hard for him to do repetitive tasks, he 

must lie down and take naps daily, and sometimes he will sleep for 18 hours, “nonstop.” (AR 82.) 

His “skin is crawling 24/7” and he is unable to sleep soundly because of his pain. (AR 92.) 

Plaintiff testified that he can lift up to twenty pounds at a time, though “[i]t depends on a 

day-to-day basis.” (AR 83.) He can stand for five or ten minutes before needing to sit, walk for 

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five to ten minutes at a time, and sit for 30 minutes before needing to stretch and walk around. 

(AR83.) He tries to read, but “can’t concentrate on things for a long period of time.” (AR 84.) 

He spends an hour or two on a computer each day and plays a video game, World of Warcraft, for 

two to three hours each day. (AR 84-92.) He described his daily activities as including stretching, 

sweeping and vacuuming, doing laundry, preparing simple meals, using a computer, and playing 

video games. (AR 83-85, 90.) He spends four to five hours laying down each day. (AR 104.) He 

hasn’t played World of Warcraft for “a couple years now” because he cannot afford the 

subscription and is unable to sit still long enough to enjoy it. (AR 106.) 

2. Plaintiff’s Wife’s Testimony at Hearing

Michelle Jenkins, Plaintiff’s wife, testified that Plaintiff “gets very ill and experiences 

vomiting on almost a daily basis,” “sleeps excessively because he doesn’t get restful sleep,” and 

“gets very sore muscles and sore skin.” (AR 93.) Plaintiff is unable to help with household 

chores because “he’s just too tired and too sore.” (AR 93.) Mrs. Jenkins is “responsible for 95 to 

99 percent of all of the housework, all of the chores, all of the errands, working, earning money to 

support the family” and expressed frustration with “just seeing him deteriorate continuously over 

time, it just keeps getting worse.” (AR 95.) She testified she had seen Plaintiff go from being a 

welder and heavy duty mechanic and working 16-hour days to losing his job because he would get 

overheated and would get sick and would have to come inside the office to recuperate, to work in 

an office, to “not being able to work in an office.” (AR 96.) The constant vomiting is a symptom 

of Plaintiff’s porphyria. (AR 100.) 

Though Plaintiff takes Prozac to help with his symptoms, Mrs. Jenkins testified she hadn’t 

noticed any difference in his attitude and ability “to do anything.’ (AR 94.) She testified she was 

frustrated that Plaintiff spends about three hours a day playing video games, so that he “was 

sleeping excessively and [ ] when he was awake, this was what he was doing.” (AR 94.) On his 

best days, Plaintiff “could sit for maybe an hour and a half at a time” before needing a break, but 

on his bad days he would not be able to spend more than an hour sitting and concentrating on the 

game before needing to nap or lay down for an hour. (AR 97.) Even at his best, “[i]t’s not like he 

could take a 15-minute break to get up and stretch and sit back down.” (AR 97.) She also 

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testified that she felt like World of Warcraft was Plaintiff’s “only social outlet” and that because 

he can’t leave the house, “talking over the Internet was his social interaction.” (AR 99.) 

3. Vocational Expert Testimony at Hearing

The Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified that Plaintiff has past relevant work as a collection 

clerk, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 241.357-010, sedentary work with an SVP3of 5 

that was performed as light work; check cashier, DOT 211.462-026, sedentary work with an SVP 

of 3; warehouse manager, DOT 184.167-114, light work with an SVP of 8; arc welder, DOT 

810.384-014, heavy work with an SVP of 5; construction equipment mechanic, DOT 620.261-022, 

medium work with an SVP of 7; and driver4, DOT 359.673-010, light work with an SVP of 3. 

(AR 107-09.) 

The ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical individual capable of lifting 20 pounds, 

sitting, standing, and walking for six hours out of an eight-hour day, limited to simple, repetitive 

tasks, and precluded from working in extreme hot or cold weather would be able to work. 

(AR 109.) The VE testified that such an individual could not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant 

work, but could perform other jobs in the national economy including representative occupations 

furniture rental consultant, DOT 295.357-018, light work with an SVP of 2, usher, DOT 344.677-

014, light work with an SVP of 2, and surveillance system monitor, DOT 379.367-010, sedentary 

work with an SVP of 2. (AR 109-11.) 

The ALJ then asked the VE to consider a hypothetical individual with the same postural 

and environmental limitations as the first hypothetical, but without the limitation to simple, 

repetitive tasks. (AR 111.) The VE testified such an individual could perform Plaintiff’s past 

relevant work as a check cashier, DOT 211.462-026, sedentary work with an SVP of 3. (AR 111.) 

Plaintiff’s attorney asked the VE to consider an individual only able to stand, walk, and sit 

for less than two hours out of an eight-hour day; the VE testified such an individual would be 

unable to work. (AR 112-13.) Plaintiff’s counsel then asked the VE whether an individual who

 

3

 Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”), as defined in DOT, App. C, is the amount of lapsed time required by a 

typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average 

performance in a specific job-worker situation. 

4

 Plaintiff’s work as a driver did not last long enough to constitute substantial gainful activity. (AR 111.) 

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must lie down for at least an hour beyond the normal work breaks would be able to work; the VE 

testified such an individual could not work. (AR 113.) 

C. Administrative Proceedings 

On July 15, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision and found that Plaintiff had severe 

impairments of porphyria, fibromyalgia, and depression. (AR 39.) The ALJ determined that these 

impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 39-40.) The ALJ found Plaintiff

retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except that he is limited to lifting twenty pounds; to sitting, 

standing, and walking for six hours each out of an eight hour day; to simple repetitive tasks; and is 

precluded from working in an environment with excessive heat or cold. (AR 40.) 

Given this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work. 

(AR 45.) After considering Plaintiff’s age, limited education, work experience and RFC, the ALJ 

determined there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could 

perform, including representative occupations furniture rental consultant, DOT 295.357-018, light 

work with an SVP of 2; usher, DOT 344.677-014, light work with an SVP of 2; and surveillance 

system monitor, DOT 379.367-010, sedentary work with an SVP of 2. (AR 45-46.) The ALJ 

therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (AR 46-47.)

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on December 29, 2014, making 

the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final determination for purposes of judicial review. 

(AR 6-10.) 

D. Plaintiff’s Complaint

On July 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint before this Court seeking review of the ALJ’s 

decision. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by silently rejecting the medical opinion of 

consultative examiner Dr. Aleshire and in discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective fibromyalgia

testimony. (Doc. 14.) 

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The ALJ’s decision denying benefits “will be disturbed only if that decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error.” Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 

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601 (9th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Instead, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards 

and whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's findings. See 

Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). “Substantial evidence” means “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both 

the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, and 

may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 

1382c(a)(3) (A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or 

impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are 

demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of 

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering 

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that 

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential 

analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In Step 1, the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b). If not, the ALJ must determine at Step 2 whether the claimant has a severe 

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impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic 

work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, the ALJ moves to Step 3 and determines 

whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal 

the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, and is 

therefore presumptively disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, at Step 4 the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC despite the impairment or various limitations 

to perform her past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, at Step 5, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers 

in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Tackett v. 

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in silently rejecting portions of psychological consultative 

examiner Dr. Aleshire’s opinion and by discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. (Docs. 14; 16.) 

A. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Medical Evidence

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by refusing to credit a portion of Dr. Aleshire’s opinion 

without providing any legitimate or specific reason for doing so. Plaintiff argues Dr. Aleshire 

found him moderately limited in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without 

interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms and moderately limited in the ability to deal 

with the usual stressors encountered in a competitive workplace, but the ALJ ignored these 

moderate limitations in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC and did not address Dr. Aleshire’s opinion in 

this regard at all. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly accommodated Dr. 

Aleshire’s opinion in his RFC assessment by limiting Plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks. 

Dr. Aleshire noted that Plaintiff “displayed no difficulty” with concentration, persistence, 

and pace and assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 55 (AR 835), indicating Plaintiff had “moderate

symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate

difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning.” (DSM-IV at 34 (emphases added). Dr. 

Aleshire further opined Plaintiff’s mental health functioning appeared “moderately impaired” due 

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to his medically determinable depression impairment, but that were Plaintiff to participate in 

mental health treatment, it was “likely that his symptoms would decrease in severity if he did so.” 

(AR 835-36.) Finally, Dr. Aleshire opined that Plaintiff was “moderately impaired” in his ability 

to complete a normal workday or work week without interruptions from his psychiatric condition 

and in his ability to deal with the usual stressors encountered in a competitive workplace. (AR 

836.) Agency psychiatric consultant Dr. Law reviewed the record -- including Dr. Aleshire’s 

opinion -- and determined that, despite moderate limitations with social functioning and 

concentration, persistence, and pace, Plaintiff was able to perform simple, repetitive tasks without 

restrictions on his ability to complete a normal workday and workweek, interact appropriately with 

coworkers and supervisors, and respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. (AR 854-

57; see AR 44.) See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (the opinions of 

non-examining physicians “may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other 

independent evidence in the record”). The ALJ therefore incorporated a limitation to simple, 

repetitive tasks in his RFC assessment to address these restrictions in Plaintiff’s mental health 

functioning. (AR 400.) 

The Ninth Circuit has determined the limitation to unskilled work adequately encompasses 

a claimant’s “moderate mental residual functional capacity limitations.” See, e.g., Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 948, 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). Specifically, the Court has repeatedly

concluded the limitation to “simple, routine, repetitive” tasks accommodates findings that the 

claimant had a “slow pace” and “several moderate limitations in other mental areas.” StubbsDanielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Sabin v. Astrue, 337 Fed. App’x 617, 

620-21 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding the ALJ properly assessed medical evidence when finding --

despite moderate difficulties as to concentration, persistence, or pace -- the claimant could perform 

simple tasks on a consistent basis). 

The Ninth Circuit has similarly concluded a limitation to simple tasks adequately 

encompasses moderate limitations with social functioning. See Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 490 Fed. App’x 15 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that an RFC for simple routine tasks, which 

did not expressly note the claimant’s moderate limitations in interacting with others, nonetheless 

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adequately accounted for such limitations); see also Henry v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-00100-JLT, 

2016 WL 164956, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2016); Langford v. Astrue, No. CIV S-07-0366-EFB, 

2008 WL 2073951 at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2008) (“unskilled work . . . accommodated [the 

claimant’s] need for ‘limited contact with others’”); SSR585-15. Although Plaintiff contends the 

ALJ improperly rejected portions of Dr. Aleshire’s opinion, the restriction to simple tasks 

adequately encompasses Plaintiff’s moderate limitations both with dealing with stressors 

encountered in a competitive workplace and with completing a normal workday. 

A claimant’s low tolerance for stress or moderate limitations in dealing with changes in the 

workplace are encompassed in a residual functional capacity of simple, repetitive tasks. See, e.g., 

Keller v. Colvin, No. 2:13-cv-0221-CKD, 2014 WL 130493 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) 

(finding the ALJ “appropriately captured” a physician’s opinion that the plaintiff required “low 

stress settings” by limiting the plaintiff to simple tasks, “equating to unskilled work”); Acuna v. 

Colvin, No. EDCV-14-2404-AGR, 2015 WL 7566624, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2015), judgment 

entered, No. EDCV 14-2404 AGR, 2015 WL 7566947 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2015) (finding the 

plaintiff did not “show a moderate limitation in his ability to respond appropriately to changes in 

the work setting would preclude him from performing simple, routine tasks”); Longston v. Calvin, 

No. 1:14-cv-01905-MC, 2015 WL 7761065 at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 1, 2015) (finding “moderate mental 

limitation in responding appropriately to changes in the work setting” were encompassed in a 

limitation to unskilled, simple tasks). In sum, Dr. Aleshire’s opinion that Plaintiff is moderately 

impaired in his ability to deal with stressors in the workplace is adequately addressed by the ALJ’s 

RFC assessment. 

Further, moderate limitations in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek 

without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms do not preclude a finding of nondisability. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2007). In fact, “a moderate 

limitation in the ability to complete a workday or workweek without interruption is consistent with 

 

5

 Social Security Rulings (SSR) are “final opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations” issued 

by the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). While SSRs do not have the force of law, the Ninth Circuit gives the 

rulings deference “unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Act or regulations.” Han v. Bowen, 882 

F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006).

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and properly captured by a limitation to simple repetitive tasks.” Rodriquez v. Colvin, No. 1:13-

CV-01716-SKO, 2015 WL 1237302, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015); McLain v. Astrue, No. 

SACV-10-1108-JC, 2011 WL 2174895, at * (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2011); Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d 

at 1171 (limitation for simple, repetitive tasks adequately captured physician opinion that the 

claimant had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace). 

The ALJ is entitled to formulate an RFC and resolve any ambiguity or inconsistency in the 

medical evidence, see Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001), and is required to 

formulate the RFC based on the entire record, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) (the RFC is based on all 

the relevant evidence, including diagnoses, treatment, observations, and opinions of medical 

courses, as well as observations by family members and the claimant’s own subjective symptoms). 

In considering Plaintiff’s mental abilities and limitations, the ALJ gave significant weight to the 

opinion of agency psychiatric consultant Dr. Law, who had specifically opined Plaintiff could 

perform simple, repetitive tasks, maintain regular attendance and complete a normal work week 

and/or workday, and respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. (AR 44, 843-57.) 

Based on this evidence, as well as other testimony and evidence in the record, the ALJ 

concluded Plaintiff retains the ability to complete simple repetitive tasks. (AR 14.) Plaintiff’s 

difficulties with completing a workday and dealing with stressors in the workplace were included 

in the ALJ’s RFC when she imposed the restriction of simple, routine tasks. Sabin v. Astrue, 337 

F. App’x 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding the ALJ properly “determined the end result of 

[plaintiff’s] moderate difficulties as to concentration, persistence, or pace was that she could do 

simple and repetitive tasks”); see also Stanley v. Astrue, No. 1:09-CV-1743 SKO, 2010 WL 

4942818, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) (“in limiting Plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks, the ALJ 

properly incorporated in his RFC finding [the doctor’s] opinion that Plaintiff had moderate 

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace”). 

Though Plaintiff is correct the ALJ was silent as to the weight accorded to these specific 

limitations, the ALJ was not required to individually reference the moderate limitations Dr. 

Aleshire listed in his evaluation, see Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(the ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence when interpreting the record), where the 

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ALJ noted the agency opinion of Dr. Law and expressly adopted the limitation for simple 

repetitive tasks to address Plaintiff’s mental health functioning. Plaintiff has not pointed to any 

ambiguities in the record or other evidence contradicting the RFC assessment, because there are 

none. Dr. Aleshire’s opinion that Plaintiff is moderately limited in his ability to complete a 

normal workday and deal with stressors in the workplace is not contradicted by the ALJ’s RFC

assessment, as Dr. Aleshire also explicitly opined Plaintiff retained the mental ability to perform 

both simple and complex tasks and maintain regular attendance in the workplace with little 

supervision. (AR 836.) To the extent there was any ambiguity between Dr. Aleshire’s narrative 

of Plaintiff’s abilities and the other medical opinion evidence, the ALJ was entitled to resolve it 

based on an assessment of all the evidence. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509 (ALJ resolves conflicts 

and ambiguities in the evidence). 

Even if the ALJ should have more specifically addressed Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in 

maintaining social functioning, the ALJ’s failure to do so was harmless given that the limitation to 

simple, repetitive tasks adequately addressed both Dr. Aleshire’s opined moderate limitations and 

led to the conclusion that Plaintiff could perform the requirements of light work. See Carmickle v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (an error is harmless where 

there “remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusions on . . . credibility and the 

error does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate [credibility] conclusion”) (internal citation 

and quotations omitted) (alteration in original); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (harmless error exists when it is clear that the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the 

ultimate non-disability determination) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Batson v. 

Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding error harmless 

where it did not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion).

In sum, the ALJ did not err in his assessment of Plaintiff’s mental health functioning. 

B. The ALJ’s Consideration of Testimony

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for discounting 

his statements regarding the severity and extent of his ongoing symptoms. (Docs. 14; 16.) The 

Commissioner contends the ALJ properly relied on evidence in the record that undermined the 

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credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (Doc. 15.) 

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ 

must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Bunnell 

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The ALJ must first determine whether 

the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. 

The claimant is not required to show that his impairment “could reasonably be expected to cause 

the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have 

caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036). If the 

claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the 

claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives “specific, clear and 

convincing reasons” for the rejection. Id. 

The ALJ also may consider (1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent 

statements, or other inconsistent testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to 

seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041; see also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226-

27 (9th Cir. 2009); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 

416.929. “If the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in 

second-guessing.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. 

The ALJ reviewed the medical record and Plaintiff’s allegations that he is unable to 

perform all work due to her alleged impairments and other symptoms. (AR 41-44.) The ALJ 

found that while Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to 

cause his alleged symptoms, his statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. (AR 43.) The ALJ found that 

. . . Despite his alleged impairments, [Plaintiff] has engaged in a somewhat 

normal level of daily activity and interaction as noted above, and some of the 

physical and mental abilities and social interactions required in order to perform 

these activities are the same as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining 

employment. [Plaintiff]’s ability to participate in such activities undermines the 

credibility of his allegations of disabling functional limitations.

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(AR 43.) 

Here, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility on the basis of his inconsistent 

statements regarding his ability to engage in some degree of daily activity. (AR 43.) See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.(c(3)(i) (daily activities are relevant to assessing whether a 

claimant’s statements are true); SSR 96-7p (same); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent

with the alleged symptoms”). “The importance of the credibility of subjective complaint is 

underscored where, as here, the underlying condition is one that defies objective clinical findings.” 

Calkosz v. Colvin, No. C-13-1624-EMC, 2014 WL 851911 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014). 

However, in discounting a plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ may still rely on ordinary indicators of 

credibility, including inconsistencies in the record in evaluating a plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; Moisa, 367 F.3d at 885; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59; Verduzco v. Apfel, 

188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJs may consider whether the Plaintiff’s testimony is 

believable or not). 

While the mere fact that a claimant engages in certain daily activities does not necessarily 

detract from his credibility as to overall disability, daily activities support an adverse credibility 

finding if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the 

performance of physical functions or skills that are transferable to a work setting. Orn, 495 F.3d 

at 639; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. A claimant’s performance of chores such as preparing 

meals, cleaning house, doing laundry, shopping, and interacting with others has been considered 

sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding when performed for a substantial portion of the 

day. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175; Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 

2005); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. Plaintiff’s admitted daily activities, including stretching, 

sweeping, vacuuming, doing laundry, preparing simple meals, using a computer, and playing 

World of Warcraft for more than two hours a day, suggest he is capable of performing the 

requirements of a reduced range of light work. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (the claimant’s ability 

“to perform various household chores such as cooking, laundry, washing dishes, and shopping” 

suggested the ability to perform a reduced range of light work); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 

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F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997); Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The ALJ also did not err in discounting Plaintiff’s credibility based on his admitted social 

interactions. (AR 43.) Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (the ALJ sufficiently explained his reasons for 

discrediting the claimant's testimony because the record “suggest[ed] that she is quit functional. 

She is able to care for her own personal needs, cook, clean and shop. She interacts with her 

nephew and her boyfriend”); McIntire v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-00036-SKO, 2015 WL 4662411, at 

*17 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015). As discussed above, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to 

include a more restrictive social functioning limitation in his RFC assessment, due to his 

“moderate” limitations in social functioning. (Doc. 14, p. 7.) However, the ALJ specifically 

found that Plaintiff’s admitted social interactions, including being married, having social visits 

with friends, and playing immersive video games with others, undermined his allegations of more 

restrictive limitations in social functioning. (AR 43.) Plaintiff’s social functioning and ability to 

maintain longstanding relationships, including six years of marriage, was a permissible reason on 

which the ALJ could base his credibility determination. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. 

In sum, the ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff less than fully credible based on his 

“somewhat normal level of daily activity and [social] interaction.” Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 

685, 694 (9th Cir.2009) (ALJ properly recognized that daily activities “did not suggest [the 

claimant] could return to his old job” but “did suggest that [the claimant's] later claims about the 

severity of his limitations were exaggerated”).

Finally, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate Plaintiff’s credibility in light 

of his medically determinable fibromyalgia impairment. (Doc. 14, pp. 7-11.) However, it is 

unclear how Plaintiff’s testimony as to his fibromyalgia impairment, which was not discredited, in 

any way affected the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (See AR 40-45.) The ALJ incorporated a limitation 

of lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time into the RFC based on Plaintiff’s testimony he

could lift twenty pounds. (AR 41; 83.) There is no evidence in the record, either medical opinion 

or testimony, that Plaintiff is further limited. (See AR 41-44; 82-84; 659-70; 704; 832; 841; 865.) 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated how a limitation to light work failed to fully address the restrictions 

imposed by his fibromyalgia. See Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (the ALJ 

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properly discounted plaintiff’s allegations where no doctor “expressed the opinion that [plaintiff] 

was totally disabled” or implied that he “was precluded from all work activity”); Shinseki v. 

Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1706, 173 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2009) (the party attacking 

the agency’s determination bears the burden of proving any error was harmful). Thus, Plaintiff’s 

contention lacks merit. 

Even to the extent that Plaintiff’s testimony was “somewhat equivocal about how regularly 

[he] was able to keep up with all of these activities, and the ALJ’s interpretation of h[is] testimony 

may not be the only reasonable one[. . . .] it is still a reasonable interpretation and is supported by 

substantial evidence; thus, it is not our role to second-guess it.” Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at

1175 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 604); see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (where “evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld[,]”); Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. (See, e.g., AR 65 (testifying at 

the hearing that her symptoms are severe “to the point where I have days I can’t even get up or I 

don’t want to deal with anything”).) Just because there is more than one way to reasonably 

interpret the evidence in the record does not mean that the ALJ committed reversible error. See, 

e.g., Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In sum, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Daniel Floyd Jenkins. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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