Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02845/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02845-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

APPLERA CORPORATION-APPLIED

BIOSYSTEMS GROUP, a Delaware

corporation,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ILLUMINA, INC., a Delaware corporation,

SOLEXA, INC., a Delaware corporation,

and STEPHEN C. MACEVICZ, an

individual,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-02845 WHA

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION, DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS, 

AND DENYING DEFENDANT

MACEVICZ’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

This is a dispute over which side owns a series of patents and which side is infringing

them. Plaintiff moves for summary adjudication as to its breach of contract claim, breach of

fiduciary duty claim, and conversion claim. Plaintiff also moves to dismiss defendant

Illumina’s counterclaims. In addition, defendant Macevicz moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims

against him. For the reasons below, all motions are DENIED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Applied Biosystems is engaged in the manufacture and sale of products used

in various life sciences, including automated systems used for synthesis, amplification, and

sequencing of DNA and RNA, proteins and other biological molecules (Wilson Decl. Exh. 2

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 1 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

at 2). In 1992, Applied spun off Lynx Therapeutics, Inc., as a separate, privately owned

company to develop drugs for the treatment of diseases while Applied continued to develop

sequencing methods and machines (Wilson Decl. Exh. 1). Initially, Lynx and Applied shared

some intellectual property rights pursuant to a cross-license agreement (ibid.). In 1995, Lynx

created Spectragen as a wholly-owned subsidiary to explore the DNA sequencing techniques

invented by Dr. Sydney Brenner (Labbe Decl. Exh. I). In 1996, Spectragen merged with Lynx,

and in 2005, Lynx merged with defendant Solexa, a corporation engaged in the business of

developing and manufacturing genetic analysis technologies, including novel DNA sequencing

techniques (Labbe Decl. Exh. J). Defendant Illumina later acquired Solexa in 2007.

Dr. Stephen Macevicz is the alleged villain of the piece. He began as plaintiff Applied

Biosystems’s senior patent counsel in 1992. As a condition of his employment, Macevicz

entered into an employee invention agreement that provided, in part:

2. I agree that I will promptly make full disclosure to the

Company, will hold in trust for the sole right and benefit of the

Company, and will assign all my right, title, and interest to any and

all inventions, discoveries, developments, improvements or trade

secrets which I may solely or jointly conceive, develop or reduce

to practice, or cause to be conceived, developed or reduced to

practice, during the period of time I am in the employ of the

Company, except any invention, discovery, development,

improvement or trade secret as to which I can prove that

(a) it was developed entirely on my own time; and

(b) no equipment, supplies, facility or trade secret of the

Company was used in its development; and

(c) (i) it does not relate to the business or actual or

demonstrably anticipated research or development of the

Company, or (ii) it does not result from any work

performed by me for the Company (Wilson Decl. Ex. 15).

The agreement further provided:

7. The provisions of this agreement requiring assignment to the

Company do not apply to any invention which qualifies fully under

the provisions of Section 2870 of the California Labor Code. I will

advise the Company promptly in writing of any inventions,

discoveries, developments, improvement or trade secretes that I

believe meet the criteria in subparagraphs 2(a), (b) and (c) above;

and I will at that time provide to the Company in writing all

evidence necessary to substantiate that belief (ibid.).

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 2 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

At all material times, Section 2870 of the California Labor Code, referenced in the quoted

passage, invalidated any provision in an employment agreement that:

a) [P]rovides that an employee shall assign, or offer to assign, any

of his or her rights in an invention to his or her employer shall not

apply to an invention that the employee developed entirely on his

or her own time without using the employer’s equipment, supplies,

facilities, or trade secret information except for those inventions

that either:

(1) Relate at the time of conception or reduction to

practice of the invention to the employer's business, or

actual or demonstrably anticipated research or

development of the employer; or

(2) Result from any work performed by the employee for

the employer.

Note that the last two exceptions track the two exceptions in paragraph 2(c) of the agreement

above. During his tenure at Applied from 1992 to 1995, Macevicz prosecuted several patents

and, on at least one occasion, submitted an invention proposal for the company in which he

identified himself as the inventor (Wilson Decl. Exh. 15). Before arriving at Applied, however,

Macevicz had worked on a new method of DNA sequencing known as “sequencing by

hybridization” (Macevicz Dep. 139), which received U.S. Patent No. 5,002,867 in 1991, one

year before his employment with Applied (Labbe Decl. Exh. G). Prior to beginning his

employment in 1992, Macevicz offered to licence the ’867 patent to Applied, which declined

the offer (Macevicz Dep. 140). 

After moving to Applied, Macevicz continued to work on the method for sequencing by

hybridization. Several pages of his invention notebook were witnessed by two of Applied’s

scientists, Dr. Paul Grossman and Dr. Steven Fung (Labbe Decl. Exh. F). Although plaintiff

contends that Macevicz concealed his work from Applied and his supervisors (Br. 5), Macevicz

maintains that he did not hide or otherwise conceal his inventions from his colleagues but

rather, freely disclosed them during lunch and other general discussions (Macevicz Dep.105:

8–23). 

On April 17, 1995, Macevicz filed U.S. Patent Application No. 08/242,663 based on his

continued work on sequencing by hybridization (Labbe Decl. Exh. U). The application was

filed while he was still employed by Applied. Macevicz concedes that he filed no written

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 3 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

disclosure regarding his invention to Applied, i.e., he gave no “Section 2870” notice of the type

described above. The application was prosecuted by Vincent Powers, Applied’s in-house patent

counsel from 1999 to March 2007. The patent application led to the issuance of three U.S.

patents: No. 5,750, 341, No. 5,969,119, and No. 6,306,597, all of which issued after Macevicz

had terminated his employment with Applied. The latest patent issued in 2001 (Labbe Decl.

Exh. KK). 

In November 1994, Macevicz sent Lynx a draft agreement to assign certain intellectual

property including the ’663 application to Lynx (Wilson Decl. Exh. 28). Macevicz used

standard Applied fax cover sheets and an Applied fax machine to send the draft agreement

(Wilson Decl. Exh. 29). On May 1, 1995, two weeks after the ’663 patent application was filed,

Macevicz entered into a pre-printed form indemnity agreement with Lynx that identified

Macevicz as an “officer” of Lynx (Wilson Decl. Exh. 30). Macevicz used his home address in

the indemnity agreement. At the time, Macevicz was still employed by Applied but was

performing legal services for Lynx (of which Applied was aware of). Defendants now contend

that Macevicz’s identification as an “officer” in the agreement was a mistake, and that he

should have been identified merely as an “agent.”

On June 1, 1995, Macevicz received a written offer to become vice president of

intellectual property at Lynx (Labbe Decl. Exh. X). On June 6, Macevicz gave Applied written

notice of his employment termination effective July 14 (Labbe Decl. Exh. D). Macevicz’s

termination was delayed to August 7, however, in order to complete a number of pending

projects for Applied (Labbe Decl. Exh. Z). On August 14, Macevicz was given 20,000 stock

options in Spectragen and on August 31, Macevicz assigned the ’663 patent application (and

three other patent applications not in dispute) to Spectragen’s parent corporation, Lynx (Labbe

Decl. Exh. BB). Defendants contend that the stock options were given in consideration for the

assignment of the patent applications (Opp. 10). Neither the stock option grant nor the

assignment document, however, references the other. Macevicz began his employment with

Lynx in September of the same year (Labbe Decl. Exh. E).

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 4 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

On December 26, 2006, Applied filed a state-court action against Solexa and Macevicz,

alleging that Macevicz had breached his employment invention agreement by wrongfully

assigning intellectual property rights that belonged to Applied, to Lynx. After learning of

Illumina’s intent to assert the three resulting patents, Applied filed the instant action for

declaratory relief, and re-asserted the claims pending in the state-court action for wrongful

assignment of intellectual property rights. Illumina counterclaimed alleging infringement of the

patents. Plaintiff now moves to dismiss Illumina’s infringement counterclaims on the grounds

that Illumina lacks standing to assert its claims because it has no ownership rights in the patents. 

Applied also moves for summary judgment of its first claim for breach of contract by Macevicz,

its third claim for breach of fiduciary duty against all defendants, and its fifth claim for

conversion. In addition, Macevicz moves to dismiss all claims against him or, in the alternative,

strike portions of the complaint on the grounds that he holds no title to the patents in question

and no monetary relief is sought against him.

ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARD.

Plaintiff and defendant Macevicz move to dismiss claims under FRCP 12(b)(6). 

“If matters outside the pleadings are considered, [a] motion to dismiss is to be treated as one for

summary judgment.” San Pedro Hotel Co ., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 477 

(9th Cir.1998). Both plaintiff and defendant’s motions depend on the outcome of plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment and matters outside of the pleadings. Accordingly, plaintiff and

defendant Macevicz’s motions will be treated as summary judgment motions. 

Under FRCP 56(c), summary judgment shall be rendered if “there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary

judgment is not granted if the dispute about a material fact is “genuine” — that is, if the

evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 5 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

The moving party “has both the initial burden of proof and the ultimate burden of

persuasion on a motion for summary judgment.” On a motion by the party without the burden

of proof at trial, the party may carry its initial burden by either of two methods. “The moving

party may produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that the nonmoving party does not have

enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d

1099, 1102–06 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party

must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to

interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Summary judgment for a defendant is appropriate when plaintiff fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on

which party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322–24 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).

2. APPLIED’S CLAIMS.

The central fact question for a jury is whether the inventions were: (1) developed

entirely on Macevicz’s time; (2) developed with no equipment, supplies, facility, or trade secret

of Applied; and (3) not related to Applied’s business or actual or demonstrably anticipated

research or development or not as a result from any work Macevicz performed for Applied.

Applied has a strong case on the merits in regard to this claim. The particularly strong

sources of evidence include the relative similarity between the field of the patents and Applied’s

business and Macevicz’s complete lack of written disclosure regarding his inventions. Given

the clause requiring notice of private inventions, the failure to give notice is an admission that

the invention was not private. But the admission does not appear to be conclusive under the

law, strong as it may be.

The record indicates, however, that a reasonable jury could find that Macevicz’s

inventions qualified for the assignment exemption. In regard to the first two requirements,

Macevicz testified that his inventions were “thought up on [his] own time” and were developed

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 6 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

using [his] own sources at home” (Macevicz Dep. 113:9–11). The mere fact that Macevicz

used his work phone and facsimile numbers on his correspondences with PTO and requested the

signatures of two Applied employees to witness his notebook do not, as Applied urges,

automatically mean that Macevicz used company resources and time to develop his invention. 

A jury might find that Macevicz used company resources and time to pursue the inventions

after it was developed.

Given the amount of evidence suggesting Applied was well aware of the invention, a

reasonable jury could find that the invention did not relate to Applied’s business or anticipated

research in 1995. First, Applied declined an offer by Macevicz to license similar technology

before Macevicz began his employment in 1992. Second, the ’341 patent issued in 1991. If a

jury determines that Applied had notice of the patent, it could also determine that Applied did

not regard it as related to its own business because of the prolonged delay in bringing this

action. Third, Macevicz contends that he openly discussed the inventions with his colleagues at

work and Vincent Powers (who later became Applied’s in-house patent counsel) prosecuted

each of the patents at issue. In sum, a reasonable jury could find that such evidence

demonstrates that the invention did not relate to Applied’s business or anticipated research at

the time of its conception.

Applied also contends that Macevicz independently breached the employee invention

agreement by failing to comply with the written disclosure requirements for inventions that

Macevicz believed were exempted. This is too bound up in the main issue to be decided on

summary judgment.

Applied next argues that even if it is not entitled to summary judgment as to its breach

of contract claim, it still is entitled to summary judgment on its breach of fiduciary duty claim

because Macevicz entered into an indemnity agreement with Lynx while he was still an

employee at Applied and Macevicz usurped Applied’s corporate opportunities. Because the

indemnity agreement was a standard pre-printed form and Applied was aware of Macevicz’s

involvement with Lynx, however, a reasonable jury could determine that Macevicz did not

breach any fiduciary duty by entering into the indemnity agreement. Applied’s second claim

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 7 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 * Defendants solely addressed the issue in one short paragraph in a lengthy brief. The one paragraph is mostly

conclusory.

8

that Macevicz usurped corporate opportunities also does not warrant summary judgment. 

Under California law, there is no breach of a fiduciary duty where the beneficiary was aware of

the opportunity and dismissed it as undesirable. See Robinson, Leatham & Nelson, Inc. v.

Nelson, 109 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1997). Given the substantial evidence regarding Applied’s

knowledge of the patents discussed above, summary judgment is not proper.

Accordingly, as issues of material fact exist, plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment

are DENIED. 

3. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

While Applied would seem to have a reasonable case on the merits, it faces an uphill

battle on the statute of limitations defense. Defendants contend that plaintiff’s breach of

contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion claims are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. “Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive

issue, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24. 

Defendants’ inattention to the statute of limitations defense in its opposition brief is hard to

fathom, considering that most of the events giving rise to the present action occurred well over

10 years ago.* Defendants made no cross motion for summary judgment. 

Under California law, the limitations period for actions grounded in breach of contract

and breach of fiduciary duty is four years. See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §§ 337 and 343. The

limitations period for conversion claims is three years. See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 338(c). 

Breach alone does not trigger the statute of limitations. The limitations period only begins to

run when the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the facts giving rise to the claim. 

See April Enterprises., Inc. V. KTTV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 828–29 (1983). California Civil

Code Section 19 provides, “[e]very person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 8 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in

all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact.” 

“[I]ssuance of a patent and recordation in the Patent Office constitute notice to the world

of its existence.” Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 393

(1936). The ’663 patent application issued on May 12, 1998. Notice of the patent itself,

however, may not be enough for our purposes.

In Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 147–58 (S.D. Cal.1954), Kimberly

claimed that two of its employees failed to assign rights to a patent to it despite being under a

duty to so. Instead, the employees left Kimberly and assigned the patent to a newly formed

company. The district court held that Kimberly’s claims were barred by the California statute

of limitations because Kimberley was on constructive notice of its claims as soon as the patent

was issued and the assignment recorded. 

Faced with somewhat similar facts, however, the Ninth Circuit came out the opposite

way in General Bedding Corp. v. Echevarria, 947 F.2d 1395, 1396–99 (9th Cir. 1991),

reversing the district court’s finding that plaintiff was on constructive notice of its claim when

the patent in question issued. General Bedding had authorized its vice president, Brandau, to

investigate the uses of polyvinyl in waterbeds. Brandau worked with Echevarria, whose

company supplied mattresses to General Bedding. Echevarria subsequently filed for a patent a

year later, wherein Brandau was entitled to a one-half interest in the invention and any profits

derived from it. After learning of the arrangement years later, General Bedding brought an

action against Echevarria and Brandau, alleging that Brandau was required to assign any rights

to the invention to it. In rejecting the defendants’ statute of limitations defense, the Ninth

Circuit found that the mere issuance of the patent did not put General Bedding on notice as to

its conversion and breach of contract claims. In distinguishing the facts of Hartley Pen, where

the employer had actually used the invention and the former employees were listed as inventors

on the patent, the Ninth Circuit held:

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant,

only Brandau knew the details of his research and cooperation

with Echevarria. In that case, only Brandau could have known if

the patent was for the same design. Because only Brandau would

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 9 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

have been alerted by the design, arguably only Brandau should

have been alerted by this patent. What was most likely to alert

the other employees of General Bedding— Brandau's name—was

absent from the patent.

Thus, despite evidence including the issuing of the patent indicating that General Bedding had

notice regarding its claims, the Ninth Circuit chose “to leave resolution of the conflicting

inferences to the jury.”

Applied argues that regardless of whether it was on constructive notice regarding its

claims, Macevicz, as a fiduciary, cannot invoke the statute of limitations as a defense when he is

the one who should have informed Applied about the facts giving rise to its claims. Under

California law, “[w]here a fiduciary obligation is present, the courts have recognized a

postponement of the accrual of the cause of action until the beneficiary has knowledge or notice

of the act constituting a breach of fidelity.” Eisenbaum v. Western Energy Resources, Inc.,

218 Cal. App. 3d 314, 324 (1990). This does not mean, however, that a plaintiff can be

willfully ignorant when it has knowledge of facts that would lead it to inquire about a potential

claim. As the court held in Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 130–31 (1975):

[The] third assertion that because of the fiduciary relationship

between the parties the accrual of the causes of action was

postponed until the actual discovery of fraud and/or professional

negligence and that the jury should have been so instructed is

derived from an obvious misinterpretation of law. . . . [It is]

abundantly clear that the general rules relating to pleading and

proof of facts excusing a late discovery of fraud remain applicable

to cases involving a confidential relationship. The only distinction

between the rules of discovery in the ordinary fraud case and those

in the confidential relationship category is that in the latter

situation the duty to investigate may arise later by reason of the

fact that the plaintiff is entitled to rely upon the assumption that his

fiduciary is acting in his behalf. But, once the plaintiff becomes

aware of facts which would make a reasonably prudent person

suspicious, the duty to investigate arises and the plaintiff may then

be charged with the knowledge of facts which would have been

discovered by such an investigation. (internal citations omitted)

Although Applied may arguably be excused from performing due diligence regarding discovery

of its claims, it may still be considered on notice if it had knowledge of facts that would make a

reasonably prudent person sufficiently suspicious so as to investigate the possibility of a claim.

In the present action, a fully developed record may eventually yield substantial evidence

showing plaintiff’s notice of the existence of its claims. First, Macevicz was listed as the

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 10 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

inventor on each of the patent applications and issued patents in questions, the first of which

issued in 1998. This is stronger evidence than if the named inventor was a third-party, as in

General Bedding. Second, the record does not reveal the extent of plaintiff’s patent searches and

results from 1995 onwards, which may have put plaintiff on notice of at least the patent itself

given the similarity between the invention and plaintiff’s area of business. Third, Vincent

Powers, who also did work for Applied and who became plaintiff’s in-house patent counsel in

1998, prosecuted each of Macevicz’s applications. Powers’ knowledge of the filing of these

patents, though not outcome determinative, provides support for the argument that plaintiff was

also aware of its claim in at least 1999. Fourth, defendants contend Macevicz openly discussed

the inventions at work and with other employees, evidenced by Dr. Fung and Dr. Grossman’s

signatures in Macevicz’s notebook. In sum, there is significant support to show that plaintiff’s

claims might well be barred by the statute of limitations. This is yet another reason to deny

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. There is no occasion to grant summary judgment the

other way, i.e., for defendants on this point, for no cross motion for summary judgment was

made.

4. MACEVICZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS.

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks no monetary relief from Macevicz and only requests equitable

relief in the form of an injunction or imposition of a constructive trust (Compl. 6–10). Macevicz

contends that because he claims no interest in the patents in question and only equitable relief is

sought by plaintiff, all claims brought against him should be dismissed. If Macevicz has no legal

or equitable interest in the patents in suit, plaintiff’s complaint would fail to state a claim against

Macevicz that could be granted. The relevant inquiry becomes whether there are any set of

circumstances in which Macevicz could gain title, legal or equitable, to the patents in question. 

If he can, then his motion must be denied. Macevicz argues that any interest he had in the

patents was assigned to Lynx, pursuant to the assignment agreement he entered when he began

his new employment.

Macevicz is a central party to this litigation. It is his alleged fraudulent conduct that has

given rise to the dispute over patent ownership. There are various circumstances and

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

contingencies that may ultimately require Macevicz to be a party to this action in order to protect

his own interests. For instance, if Macevicz is determined to have engaged in fraudulent

conduct, his reputation interest alone would best be protected if he was represented. Given his

central role to the facts of this case and the high possibility that his interests might be affected, it

is essential that he remain a party to this action. As such, Macevicz's motion to dismiss or in the

alternative to strike portions of the amended complaint is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication, plaintiff’s

motion to dismiss Illumina’s counterclaims, and Macevicz’s motion to dismiss are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2008. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-02845-WHA Document 88 Filed 01/17/08 Page 12 of 12