Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-15552/USCOURTS-ca9-07-15552-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PATRICK RONALD HOLLEY, SR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF No. 07-15552

CORRECTIONS; CALIFORNIA MEDICAL D.C. No. FACILITY; DAVIS; ARONSEN; R.W.  CV-04-02006- WILLIAMS, MCE/EFB Defendants,

OPINION and

YOUNGBLOOD; M. VEAL; D.S.

JONES; MORENO,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 15, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed April 5, 2010

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Procter Hug, Jr. and

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

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COUNSEL

Joseph Haig Boyd, The Law Offices of Joseph H. Boyd, Kerman, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Barry Alves, Maria G. Chan, and James Flynn, Office of the

California Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for the

defendants-appellees.

HOLLEY v. CDC 5217

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OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

State prisoner Patrick Ronald Holley, Sr., appeals from the

district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant

prison officials. Holley alleges in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

that California Department of Corrections grooming regulations requiring short hair imposed a substantial burden on his

exercise of religion in violation of section 3 of the Religious

Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. He seeks damages from

defendants in their official capacities. We must decide

whether the acceptance of federal prison funding by the state

of California effected a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity that would allow the RLUIPA claim for damages against

state officials in their official capacities to proceed in federal

court. We conclude that California did not waive its Eleventh

Amendment immunity under either RLUIPA or the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, and we therefore affirm the

judgment of the district court.

I. Background

Holley is an inmate at the California Medical Facility in

Vacaville, California. He has, at various times, identified himself as a Christian, a Satan worshiper, and a Nazarite, and has

attended Muslim services. Holley has stated that no established religion adequately describes his religious beliefs,

which involve paying close attention to his spirit. He derived

the religious practice at issue in this case—the requirement

that he refrain from cutting his hair—from Numbers 6:3-5 in

the Bible. 

Holley faced disciplinary action on several occasions for

keeping his hair longer than prison grooming regulations

allowed. On April 19, 2004, Holley filed an administrative

grievance complaining that he should be permitted to grow

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his hair in spite of the grooming regulations because of his

religious beliefs. He appealed this grievance, which was

denied at each stage, to the Director’s Level of review, where

it was denied on September 14, 2004.1

Meanwhile, on May 13, 2004, Holley was cited for letting

his hair grow too long. He challenged this action by filing a

second grievance, contending again that he should be exempt

from the hair grooming regulations because of his religion.

On June 20, 2004, he cut his hair to avoid punishment.

Between August and October 2005, Holley was charged

three more times with violating the grooming regulations for

having braids longer than three inches. These charges were all

eventually dismissed.

The grooming regulations at issue were amended effective

January 17, 2006. Holley was allowed to have long hair under

the amended regulations. Prior disciplinary actions were

reversed and associated penalties rescinded.

Holley filed suit in the district court alleging, among other

claims, that being required to cut his hair violated his rights

under RLUIPA.2 He sought damages against each of the

1Holley contends that the district court erred in holding that he failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies as to all of his grievances. We need

not reach this issue, however. Even assuming that the district court did err,

any error was harmless because it did not affect Holley’s ability to pursue

his claims in federal court. The district court held, and the government

does not dispute, that Holley exhausted administrative remedies as to at

least one of the grievances raising the issues he pursues here. We, like the

district court, may therefore reach the merits of his claims. 

2Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that: 

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . .

unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden

on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 

HOLLEY v. CDC 5219

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defendant prison officials in their official capacities. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The magistrate judge, concluding that the Eleventh Amendment bars

official-capacity suits for damages under RLUIPA, recommended denying Holley’s summary judgment motion and

granting the summary judgment motion filed by defendants.

The district court fully adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations and entered judgment for defendants. This appeal

followed.

II. Discussion

Holley cannot seek injunctive or declaratory relief, because

it is undisputed that he is now allowed to have long hair and

all prior penalties for his violations of the earlier policy have

been rescinded. Holley has abandoned any request for money

damages he might have claimed against defendants in their

individual capacities. The only form of relief he currently

seeks is money damages against defendants in their official

capacities.

[1] We review a party’s immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment de novo. See Holz v. Nenana City Pub. Sch.

Dist., 347 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003). For sovereignimmunity purposes, we treat Holley’s suit against state officials in their official capacities as a suit against the state of

California. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). The

Eleventh Amendment bars such a suit unless Congress has

abrogated state sovereign immunity under its power to

enforce the Fourteenth Amendment or a state has waived it.

See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.

Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (recognizing these

“two circumstances in which an individual may sue a State”).

Abrogation is not at issue in this case. The availability of

damages here turns, therefore, on whether California waived

its immunity to damages in RLUIPA suits by accepting federal funding that was conditioned on such a waiver.

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[2] To be a valid waiver, a state’s consent to suit must be

“unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.” Lane v. Pena,

518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996);3see also Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984). “[T]here can be

no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language.”

United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659

(1947). Courts must “indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver,” Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 682, and waivers “must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign and

not enlarged beyond what the [statutory] language requires.”

United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992)

(citations, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). “To

sustain a claim that the Government is liable for awards of

monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must

extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.” Lane, 518

U.S. at 192.

Holley points to two federal statutes that he contends

accomplish, in conjunction with California’s acceptance of

federal funds, the waiver that he needs: RLUIPA itself, 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-2; and section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act

Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. We conclude that

neither statute employs the explicit and unambiguous language that waiver of sovereign immunity requires.

A. RLUIPA

[3] The RLUIPA language Holley identifies as supporting

a waiver of sovereign immunity provides that “[a] person may

assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a

3That Lane involved waiver of the federal government’s sovereign

immunity does not change the waiver analysis. The Supreme Court has

held that “[i]n considering whether the Eleventh Amendment applies . . .

cases involving the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government . . .

provide guidance.” California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491,

506 (1998); see also, e.g., Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 653 (8th Cir.

2009) (relying on federal-immunity cases in analyzing waiver under

RLUIPA); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 883-85 (7th Cir. 2009) (same).

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judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”4

 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (emphasis added). Holley

argues that “appropriate relief” includes monetary damages

and that recipients of federal funding waive sovereign immunity under this phrase to make such damages available.

[4] This statutory text does not “unequivocally express[ ]”

a waiver of sovereign immunity. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192. The

phrase “appropriate relief” does not address sovereign immunity specifically at all, let alone “extend [a waiver of sovereign immunity] unambiguously to . . . monetary claims” in

particular. Id. We join five of the six circuits to have considered this question in holding that “RLUIPA’s ‘appropriate

relief’ language does not unambiguously encompass monetary

damages so as to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity from

suit for monetary claims . . . .” Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d

639, 654 (8th Cir. 2009).5

The contrary holding of the Eleventh Circuit in Smith v.

Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007), stands alone. But

4The statute’s definition of “government,” which includes “any . . . person acting under color of State law,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii), covers the defendants acting in their official capacities. 

5

See also Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 131 (4th Cir. 2006)

(“[‘Appropriate relief’] falls short of the unequivocal textual expression

necessary to waive the State immunity from suits for damages.”); Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 331 (5th Cir. 2009) (“RLUIPA is clear

enough to create a right for damages on the cause-of-action analysis, but

not clear enough to do so in a manner that abrogates state sovereign

immunity from suits for monetary relief.”); Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d

794, 801 (6th Cir. 2009) (“RLUIPA does not contain a clear indication

that Congress unambiguously conditioned receipt of federal prison funds

on a State’s consent to suit for monetary damages.”); Nelson v. Miller, 570

F.3d 868, 885 (7th Cir. 2009) (“ ‘[A]ppropriate relief’ does not provide the

‘unequivocal textual expression’ necessary to effect a waiver of sovereign

immunity to suits for damages.”). The Third Circuit has also held that the

Eleventh Amendment bars RLUIPA official-capacity claims for money

damages, but it did so without analysis. See Scott v. Beard, 252 F. App’x

491, 492-93 (3d Cir. 2007). 

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Smith’s reasoning, which relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S.

60 (1992), was undercut by the Supreme Court’s later clarification of Franklin in Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996). The

Eleventh Circuit relied on Franklin for the proposition that

“where Congress ha[s] not given any guidance or clear indication of its purpose with respect to remedies, federal courts

should presume the availability of all appropriate remedies.”

Smith, 502 F.3d at 1270. Franklin, however, involved no

claim of sovereign immunity. As the Court noted in distinguishing Franklin in Lane, “[w]here a cause of action is

authorized against [an immune sovereign], the available remedies are not those that are ‘appropriate,’ but only those for

which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived.” 518

U.S. at 196-97. The phrase “appropriate relief” alone does not

trump sovereign immunity to make monetary relief available

under RLUIPA.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7

[5] Holley argues that even if the language of RLUIPA

does not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity, a separate

statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, does. This section, included as

part of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, reads: “A

State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of

the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal

court for a violation of [several enumerated antidiscrimination

statutes], or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1). Holley contends that

RLUIPA falls within the catch-all reference to “Federal statute[s] prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal

financial assistance,” and that § 2000d-7 therefore effects a

waiver of sovereign immunity for RLUIPA violations.

[6] We disagree. The Eighth Circuit considered and

cogently rejected this argument in Van Wyhe:

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The institutionalized persons section of RLUIPA . . .

(Section 3) . . . does not unambiguously prohibit

discrimination—it prohibits substantial burdens on

religious exercise, without regard to discriminatory

intent. Congress understands how to create a federal

statute prohibiting discrimination, and it did so

within RLUIPA’s separate section (Section 2) dealing with land use regulations. Section 2 of RLUIPA

prohibits “discrimination” against religious institutions “on the basis of religion” with regard to land

use regulations and prohibits land use regulations

that treat a religious institution “on less than equal

terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1), (2). Similar language, prohibiting discrimination or requiring equal treatment,

is conspicuously omitted from the RLUIPA protections afforded to institutionalized persons under Section 3. . . . The antidiscrimination statutes listed in

[42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1)] all explicitly prohibit

discrimination, and the institutionalized persons section of RLUIPA does not fit neatly within that genre.

. . . Absent an unequivocal textual indication that [42

U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1)] applies to Section 3

institutionalized-person-RLUIPA claims, we will not

rely on [42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1)] to effectuate a

knowing waiver of sovereign immunity from money

damages on those claims.

581 F.3d at 654-55 (footnotes and citations omitted). We

agree with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that Section 3 of

RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, is not among the “other Federal statute[s] prohibiting discrimination” to which § 2000d7(a)(1) refers. Section 2000d-7, therefore, does not effect a

waiver of sovereign immunity for damages claims brought

under section 3 of RLUIPA.

III. Conclusion

[7] Neither the “appropriate relief” language of RLUIPA,

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2, nor the catch-all provision of 42 U.S.C.

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§ 2000d-7 caused California to waive its sovereign immunity

by accepting federal prison funds. The Eleventh Amendment

bars Holley’s suit for official-capacity damages under

RLUIPA. 

AFFIRMED.

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