Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00201/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00201-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

THE NATIONAL GRANGE OF THE 

ORDER OF PATRONS OF 

HUSBANDRY, a District of 

Columbia nonprofit 

corporation, and THE 

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, its 

chartered California chapter,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE d/b/a 

“California Guild,” a 

California corporation, and 

ROBERT McFARLAND, a 

California resident,

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:16-201 WBS DB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs the National Grange of the Order of Patrons 

of Husbandry and the California State Grange (collectively 

“plaintiffs”) brought this action, the most recent in a series of 

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actions, against defendants the California Guild1 and Robert 

McFarland (collectively “defendants”) for, inter alia, false 

advertisement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1125(a). Presently before the court is plaintiffs’

motion for preliminary injunction. (Pls.’ Mem. at 1-2 (Docket 

No. 76-1).) 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The National Grange is a nonprofit fraternal

organization founded in 1867 to promote the interests of rural 

America and agriculture. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 15 (Docket 

No. 75).) The organization provides goods and services to 

agricultural communities and is involved in some 2,100 towns 

across the country. (Id.)

The National Grange created the California State Grange

as its California affiliate in 1873. (Id. ¶ 16.) As a chartered 

affiliate, the California State Grange collected dues from local 

granges across California and turned over a portion of those dues 

to the National Grange. (Id.) On October 7, 1946, the 

California State Grange registered as a corporation with the 

California Secretary of State. (Decl. of Betsy Huber Ex. 8, 

California State Grange Corporate Registry (Docket No. 54-6).) 

The California State Grange elected McFarland as its leader in 

2009. (FAC ¶ 17.)

In 2012, disputes arose between the National Grange and 

 

1 A central issue in this case is whether defendants may 

refer to themselves as the “California State Grange.” Consistent 

with the court’s rulings in previous orders, all references to 

the “California State Grange” in this Order refer to plaintiffs, 

not defendants.

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members of the California State Grange. (Id.) As a result, the 

National Grange revoked the California State Grange’s membership

and the two sides disaffiliated in 2013. (Id.; Pls.’ Mem. at 4.) 

Members of the disaffiliated chapter, led by McFarland, continued

as a separate entity under the corporate charter filed in 1946. 

(Pls.’ Mem. at 3-4.) The National Grange chartered a new 

California State Grange in 2014. (Id. at 7.) What resulted 

after the split, then, were two California entities: a newly 

chartered California State Grange (i.e., along with the National 

Grange, plaintiffs to this action) and a disaffiliated entity led 

by McFarland (i.e., defendants).

After the split, defendants continued to use the

registered corporate name “California State Grange” and represent 

themselves publically as the California State Grange. (Id. at 3-

4.) In March 2014, the National Grange filed an action against 

the disaffiliated entity for federal trademark infringement, 

trademark dilution, trademark counterfeiting, and false 

advertisement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act

(“Grange I”). (Id. at 4.)

On July 14, 2015, this court granted the National 

Grange summary judgment on its trademark infringement and false 

advertisement and unfair competition claims. (Nat’l Grange of 

the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, 115 F. 

Supp. 3d 1171, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2015).)2 The court permanently 

 

2 The National Grange voluntarily dismissed its remaining 

Grange I claims with prejudice. (Nat’l Grange of the Order of 

Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS 

AC, 2016 WL 1587193, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. April. 20, 2016).)

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enjoined the disaffiliated entity from using the word “Grange,” 

but declined to extend that prohibition to include “Granger,” 

“CSG,” and “CG” because the National Grange did not expressly 

seek such relief in its Grange I complaint. (Nat’l Grange of the 

Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, Civ. No. 

2:14-676 WBS DAD, 2015 WL 5813681, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 

2015), modified, Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS AC, 2016 WL 1587193 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 20, 2016).) The parties have appealed those rulings to 

the Ninth Circuit, where they are currently pending. (Nat’l 

Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, 

Civ. No. 2:14-676 WBS AC, 2016 WL 1587193 (“Apr. 20 Order”), at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. April. 20, 2016).)

On April 20, 2016, this court found the disaffiliated 

entity in “deliberate and willful” violation of its permanent 

injunction on usage of the term “Grange” and granted the National 

Grange’s motion for post-judgment injunctive relief (“April 20

Order”). (Id. at 2, 34.) The court ordered that the 

disaffiliated entity and “its agents, affiliates, assigns, and 

any party acting in concert with [it] or its agents, affiliates, 

and assigns”:

[R]emove the word “Grange” from all corporate 

registrations and other documents filed with any federal, 

state, or local government, including, but not limited 

to, articles of incorporation and lobbying licenses on 

file with the California Secretary of State and all 

fictitious business name registrations with the County of 

Sacramento . . .

[R]emove the word “Grange” from all public telephone and 

business directory listings, on the internet or 

otherwise, including, but not limited to, online business 

directory listings on www.Google.com and 

www.ZoomInfo.com, to the extent they can do so . . .

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[Refrain] from: (a) conducting business using the name 

“Grange,” including, but not limited to, soliciting dues 

using the name “Grange,” collecting checks addressed to 

any entity whose name contains the word “Grange,” 

endorsing checks using any name containing the word 

“Grange,” using bank accounts or other financial accounts 

under any name containing the word “Grange,” and 

endorsing, signing, or executing any document, lease, 

instruction, or financial instrument using any name 

containing the word “Grange”; (b) using “Grange” in any 

domain name or email address or otherwise representing 

their domain name or email address as containing the word 

“Grange”; and (c) referencing their past affiliation with 

plaintiff or any other entity whose name contains the 

word “Grange,” including representing themselves to be 

the former California State Grange; successor to the 

California State Grange; or formerly known as, trading 

as, or doing business as the California State Grange . . 

. .

(Id. at 37-38.) After the April 20 Order, the disaffiliated 

entity changed its corporate name to the “California Guild.” 

(Pls.’ Mem. at 6.) Since that time, however, it has continued to 

publicly refer to itself as “CSG” and “[f]ormerly the California 

State Grange.” (Decl. of Ed Komski (“Komski Decl.”) Ex. 2, CSG 

Website Screenshots (Docket No. 54-3).3)

 

3 Defendants submitted an ex parte motion challenging the 

validity of representations made in an email attached to the 

Komski declaration. (See Defs.’ Ex Parte Appl. (Docket No. 87).) 

The email recounted a conversation that allegedly took place 

between the author of the email and a member of the California 

Guild. (See Komski Decl. Ex. 6.) Defendants allege that the 

conversation never took place and ask the court to strike the 

entire declaration based on that email. (Defs.’ Ex Parte Appl. 

at 5-6.) The court did not rely on that email in deciding 

plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. Moreover, plaintiffs 

have provided evidence that the author of the email was 

referencing a different person and defendants simply misread the 

email. (See Pls.’ Opp’n, Decl. of Yvette Adams (Docket No. 89-

1).) Accordingly, the court will not strike the Komski 

declaration on that basis.

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Simultaneous to litigation in this court was litigation 

in the California Superior Court over ownership of the California 

State Grange’s property. (Pls.’ Mem. at 6.) On August 18, 2015, 

the Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the National 

Grange and ordered that the California Guild “transfer to the 

Newly Chartered State Grange all Grange property in its 

possession or control as of the date its Charter was revoked”

(“August 18 Order”). (FAC Ex. 1 at 33 (“Aug. 18 Order”) (Docket 

No. 75-1).)

On February 1, 2016, plaintiffs brought the present 

action against defendants for, inter alia, false advertisement

under the Lanham Act.

4 (FAC at 38-40.) Plaintiffs allege that 

since Grange I, defendants have continued to take credit for the 

California State Grange’s history and achievements, spread false 

rumors about adverse tax consequences associated with Grange 

membership, misappropriate Grange assets, and misrepresent 

themselves as successors to the California State Grange. (See

Pls.’ Mem. at 2.)

Plaintiffs seek a long list of injunctive relief. From 

a broad level, that list includes: (1) prohibiting defendants 

from “referencing the history and goodwill of the California 

 

4 Plaintiffs also seek damages for false advertising, 

trade libel, intentional interference with contractual relations, 

trespass, and conversion under California law, and false 

designation of origin, trademark infringement, copyright 

infringement, and unregistered logo and trade dress infringement 

under federal law. (FAC at 40-51.) Because plaintiffs 

“respectfully defer[]” consideration of these claims, (Pls.’ Mot. 

at 11), the court will not consider them for purposes of this 

motion.

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State Grange”; (2) prohibiting defendants from telling local 

granges that they must disaffiliate with the California Guild to 

“join” the California State Grange and will suffer adverse tax

consequences for doing so; (3) prohibiting defendants from 

performing public and private functions of the California State 

Grange; (4) ordering that defendants “deliver up business 

records, mailing lists, and proprietary data of the California 

State Grange . . . as well as all documents . . . bearing the 

name ‘Grange’”; (5) ordering that defendants return all Grange 

tangible property; (6) restraining defendants from 

misappropriating California State Grange funds; (7) ordering 

defendants to vacate Grange headquarters and properties and

disconnect all telephone numbers formerly registered to the 

California State Grange; (8) prohibiting defendants from 

representing themselves as successors to the California State 

Grange; and (9) ordering that defendants use a disclaimer on all 

public materials stating “NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE CALIFORNIA 

STATE GRANGE.” (Id. at 3; Pls.’ Proposed Order at 1-5 (Docket 

No. 76-3).)

II. Legal Standard

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving 

party “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, 

that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter 

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008); Humane 

Soc. of the U.S. v. Gutierrez, 558 F.3d 896, 896 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one 

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that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, 

carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 

U.S. 968, 972 (1997); see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 24.

“Injunctive relief is the remedy of choice for 

trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no 

adequate remedy at law for the injury caused by a defendant’s 

continuing infringement.” Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. 

Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988). The Lanham Act 

authorizes the court “to grant injunctions, according to the 

principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem 

reasonable . . . .” 15. U.S.C. § 1116(a).

III. Analysis

To succeed in a false advertisement claim under the 

Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove: 

(1) [A] false statement of fact by the defendant in a 

commercial advertisement about its own or another’s 

product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has the 

tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its 

audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is 

likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the 

defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate 

commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to 

be injured as a result of the false statement, either by 

direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by 

a lessening of the goodwill associated with its products. 

Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th 

Cir. 1997).

5

 

5 Lanham Act section 43(a)(1)--the false advertisement 

statute--states:

Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 

services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce 

any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 

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The crux of plaintiffs and defendants’ present dispute

is whether defendants’ post-Grange I conduct constitutes false 

advertisement. “To demonstrate falsity within the meaning of the 

Lanham Act, a plaintiff may show that the statement was literally 

false, either on its face or by necessary implication, or that 

the statement was literally true but likely to mislead or confuse 

consumers.” Id. “When evaluating whether an advertising claim 

is literally false, the claim must always be analyzed in its full 

 

combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, 

false or misleading description of fact, or false or 

misleading representation of fact, which--(A) is likely 

to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 

to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 

person with another person, or as to the origin, 

sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 

or commercial activities by another person, or(B) in 

commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 

nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin 

of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or 

commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action 

by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely 

to be damaged by such act.”

15 U.S.C. § 1125. Defendants challenge whether plaintiffs have 

shown that defendants engaged in “commercial advertisement about 

its own or another’s product” as required under Southland Sod 

Farms. (Def’s Opp’n at 6.) Southland Sod Farms is merely a 

paraphrase of Lanham Act section 43(a)(1), which, in its own 

terms, encompasses “false designation of origin, false or 

misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 

representation of fact.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125. These terms 

encompass defendants’ alleged conduct.

Additionally, plaintiffs have satisfied section 43(a)’s 

“interstate commerce” requirement, as defendants’ alleged 

conduct, if true, tends to diminish the California State Grange’s 

brand, which, in turn, diminishes the National Grange’s brand. 

See Thompson Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Thompson, 693 F.2d 991, 992–93 

(9th Cir. 1982) (holding that where defendant’s activities 

affected intrastate commerce which, in turn, affected interstate 

commerce, Lanham Act’s “interstate commerce” requirement is 

satisfied).

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context.” Id.

A. References to the History and Goodwill of the 

California State Grange

Plaintiffs allege that defendants continue to refer to 

themselves as “the same organization that has existed for 

‘decades’” in violation of the Lanham Act. (See Pls.’ Mem. at 9 

(“Defendants have also continued to advertise that ‘cities and 

townships have grown up around our rural halls’; that the the 

[sic] Defendant’s organization has ‘lobbyists in Sacramento and 

boasts a long history of successful legislative advocacy’; that 

the Defendants’ organization was the first organization to 

support and promote women as equal voting members’ [sic]; and 

that ‘[i]n these uncertain times our members find comfort and 

security by returning to our roots and reaffirming principles and 

goals set by the founders 140 years ago.’” (citing Komski Decl.

Ex. 2, CSG Website Screenshots)).) They argue that “only the 

California State Grange can claim the 140 years’ [sic] of history 

and goodwill associated with the organization” and that 

“Defendant the California Guild recounts plaintiff’s history, and 

not its own.” (Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).)

Plaintiffs are already protected by an injunction 

prohibiting defendants from “referencing their past affiliation 

with [the National Grange] or any other entity whose name 

contains the word ‘Grange,’ including representing themselves to 

be the former California State Grange; successor to the 

California State Grange; or formerly known as, trading as, or 

doing business as the California State Grange.” (Apr. 20 Order 

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at 38.) It appears, however, that defendants have found a way

around that prohibition by taking credit for the California State 

Grange’s history and achievements without referencing it by name.

The Lanham Act prohibits uncredited references to 

another entity’s history and achievements. See, e.g., ITEX Corp. 

v. Glob. Links Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1171 (D. Nev. 2015)

(trade exchange’s claim to forty-year history of unaffiliated 

company constitutes false advertising); Riggs Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. 

Columbia Partners, L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 1250, 1267 (D.D.C. 1997)

(investment company formed by former chairman of investment firm 

made false advertisements when it represented itself as being 

responsible for investment firm’s investment record without 

giving proper attribution).

But defendants have found a loophole around that too:

because the California Guild remains incorporated under the same 

corporate papers that the California State Grange formerly 

existed under, (see Pls.’ Mem. at 3 (referencing “the 1946 

corporation previously named the ‘California State Grange,’ now 

named the ‘California Guild,’ Entity No. C0210454”), defendants 

are technically correct when they refer to the California Guild

as an organization that has existed for “decades” and around 

which “cities and townships have grown up.” 

Plaintiffs argue and provide testimony that such 

statements nevertheless mislead the public as to constitute false 

advertisement. (See id. at 12.) The problem with that argument

is under defendants’ loophole, they have not misled the public: 

their organization has existed for “decades” according to the 

corporate papers filed in 1946, and the corporate entity in those 

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papers is the entity around which “cities and townships have 

grown up.” While the court recognizes that defendants’ claims to 

history and achievements accrued prior to 1946 are undeniably 

false, its hands are tied with respect to claims to history and 

achievements accrued post-incorporation. The court cannot, under 

the Lanham Act’s false advertisement statute, bar defendants from 

telling the public something that is neither false nor 

misleading. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (requiring “false 

designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, 

or false or misleading representation of fact”).

What guides the court’s decision here is not ignorance 

of reality or lack of ability to spot unfair play. Defendants 

have found a way to piggyback off the California State Grange’s 

decades of achievements because, for some reason, plaintiffs have 

not taken effective action in the three years after the parties 

disaffiliated to prevent defendants from occupying the California 

State Grange’s corporate charter. The court cannot step in to 

save plaintiffs here.

Because plaintiffs have not shown likelihood of success 

on the merits with respect to defendants’ references to the 

California State Grange’s post-1946 history and achievements, the 

court cannot extend plaintiffs the full measure of relief they 

seek. The court is limited to enjoining defendants from 

referencing history and achievements accrued by the California 

State Grange prior to its incorporation.

With respect to such relief, plaintiffs have shown 

likelihood of irreparable injury, as further uncredited 

references to their history may permanently dilute their brand in 

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California. (See Pls.’ Reply at 10 (“[For] individuals, families 

and communities, regardless of their position in the present 

dispute, the California State Grange is understood as a network 

of fraternal relationships that extend back for generations . . . 

with personal friendships and a common belief in service to their 

community. For these members of the relevant public, the 

categorical goodwill and common spirit driving the California 

State Grange was not a mere attribute of the goods and services 

offered by Plaintiffs, but was the sine quan non of Plaintiffs’ 

identity and reputation.”) (Docket No. 83)); see also Century 21, 

846 F.2d at 1180 (“[T]here is no adequate remedy at law for the 

injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement [in 

trademark and unfair competition cases].”). 

The balance of equities favors plaintiffs, as 

defendants “cannot complain of the harm that will befall [them] 

when properly forced to desist from [their] infringing 

activities.” Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330,

1338 (9th Cir. 1995). The public has an interest in being able 

to distinguish between the two entities.

B. Interactions with Local Granges

Plaintiffs allege that defendants “continue to throttle 

the California Granges into becoming members of Defendant 

California Guild by falsely claiming that they must 

‘disaffiliate’ with the California Guild in order to join [the 

California State Grange].” (Pls.’ Mem. at 10.) They also claim 

that defendants “dispense false claims regarding the taxation of 

California Grange, claiming that the local chapters are ‘no 

longer nonprofit, must pay taxes, cannot accept tax deductible 

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donations, or receive various grants.’” (Id.) Defendants 

respond that they are entitled to make such statements because 

the statements “may be true.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 13 (Docket No. 

79).)

Plaintiffs have not proven that the statements are 

false. They carry the burden of persuasion on a motion for 

preliminary injunction. See Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. 

Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiffs’ request to enjoin 

defendants from making such statements.

C. Performance of Grange Functions

Plaintiffs request that the court enjoin defendants 

from “exercising functions within the exclusive authority of the 

California State Grange such as the collection of Grange dues; 

disposition of assets formerly or currently owned by the 

California State Grange, writing and cashing checks on the 

account of the California State Grange; reorganization of local 

[granges]; induction of new Grange members and installation of 

Grange officers; [and] performance of Grange rituals.” (Pls.’ 

Proposed Order at 3.) The court will address disposition of 

Grange assets in Parts D through F of this section.

The April 20 Order already bars defendants from 

“soliciting dues using the name ‘Grange’” and “collecting checks 

addressed to any entity whose name contains the word ‘Grange.’” 

(Apr. 20 Order at 37-38.) As such, plaintiffs fail to prove 

likelihood of irreparable harm with respect to collection of 

Grange dues, as relief is already available to them pursuant to

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the April 20 Order.

6

With respect to reorganization of local granges and 

induction of new Grange members and officers, to the extent 

defendants engaged in such activities while purporting to act in 

the official capacity of the California State Grange, such 

activities would be in violation of the April 20 Order. (See id.

(prohibiting defendants from “conducting business using the name 

‘Grange’” or “representing themselves to be the former California 

State Grange [or] successor to the California State Grange”).) 

To the extent defendants were merely soliciting new guild members 

and officers in their own capacity, such acts do not constitute 

false advertisement. As the April 20 Order offers plaintiffs 

relief for acts defendants may have performed in Grange capacity, 

no further injunction with respect to such activities is 

necessary.

With respect to “performance of Grange rituals,” the 

court finds plaintiffs’ request to be vague and overly broad and, 

 

6 Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ Grange II claims “are 

barred under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral 

estoppel.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 6.) While it is true that such 

claims may be barred to the extent they arise out of the same 

transaction or occurrence as those in Grange I, plaintiffs’ 

allegations in the present case concern activities that occurred 

subsequent to the commencement of Grange I. (See, e.g., Pls.’ 

Reply at 3 (citing defendants’ July 30, 2016 email in which 

defendants claim “[t]he California Guild is the same organization 

. . . for decades”).) In light of these differences, res 

judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to the claims 

raised in this motion. See L.A. Branch NAACP v. L.A. Unified 

Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Plaintiffs may 

bring events occurring after the filing of the complaint into the 

scope of the litigation by filing a supplemental complaint . . .

but there is no requirement that plaintiffs do so.”).

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therefore, unenforceable. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 

682, 706 (1979) (holding that “injunctive relief should be no 

more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 

complete relief to the plaintiffs”); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. 

Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 

2003) (defendant may seek modification of preliminary injunction 

because injunction was “vague and ambiguous”); Lamb-Weston, Inc. 

v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991)

(“Injunctive relief . . . must be tailored to remedy the specific 

harm alleged.”).

While performance of similar functions can contribute 

to a violation of the Lanham Act, see, e.g., Herb Reed 

Enterprises, Inc. v. Monroe Powell’s Platters, LLC, 25 F. Supp. 

3d 1316, 1325 (D. Nev. 2014) (finding trademark infringement 

where one music group “market[ed] similar live vocal 

performances” as another), plaintiffs’ request encompasses 

legitimate commercial activities such as soliciting new members 

and providing services to farm communities. Accordingly, the 

court will deny plaintiffs’ request to enjoin defendants’ 

“performance of Grange rituals.”

D. Intellectual Property

Plaintiffs seek to have defendants “deliver up all 

business records, mailing lists, and proprietary data of the 

California State Grange.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 3.) They allege that 

defendants are using such records, lists, and data to falsely 

advertise themselves to the public as being affiliated with the 

California State Grange. (See id. at 2.) While plaintiffs may 

be entitled to such records, data, and items as a proprietary 

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matter, the sole matter being considered in this motion is 

whether defendants are using the property to commit false 

advertisement.7

With respect to business records and mail lists, 

plaintiffs have not provided evidence that defendants’ alleged 

use of such records and lists constitutes false advertisement. 

The most discrete act plaintiffs allege defendants have taken 

with respect to such records and lists is “us[ing] the 

proprietary mailing lists of the California State Grange . . . 

albeit under different names” to--presumably--contact Grange 

members. (Id.) Contacting Grange members with proper 

identification is not, in itself, false advertisement. See

Southland Sod Farms, 108 F.3d at 1139 (requiring a “literally 

false,” “mislead[ing],” or “confus[ing]” statement for a false 

advertisement finding).

With respect to proprietary data, plaintiffs have 

provided evidence that defendants are using website logos, 

images, and backgrounds that are nearly identical to plaintiffs’ 

to cause confusion to the public. (See Komski Decl. at 8-12 

(comparing screenshots of defendants’ and plaintiffs’ websites).) 

Such use may constitute violation of Lanham Act section 43(a)(1). 

See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (finding likelihood of success on trademark 

infringement claim where defendant used “glaringly similar” logo 

as plaintiff’s); CJ Prod. LLC v. Snuggly Plushez LLC, 809 F. 

 

7 Plaintiffs’ proprietary claims appear more suitably 

considered under the doctrines of trespass and conversion, which 

they have alleged in their Complaint, (see FAC at 50-51).

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Supp. 2d 127, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that plaintiff 

established likelihood of success on trademark infringement claim 

where defendant‘s website “looks substantially similar to the 

plaintiffs’ website”); Gmes, LLC v. Line of Sight Commc'ns, Inc., 

No. 2:16-CV-04085-NKL, 2016 WL 3566254, at *5 (W.D. Mo. June 27, 

2016) (finding plaintiff sufficiently pled unfair competition 

where defendant “revised its website to look substantially 

similar” to plaintiff’s).

However, plaintiffs’ request, as phrased in their 

proposed order, is overly broad. It encompasses far more than 

the website images they allege defendants are using to confuse 

the public. Under their proposed order, plaintiffs would be 

entitled to data for which they have not shown defendants’ use in 

false advertising schemes. Such overbreadth is grounds for 

denial. See Califano, 442 U.S. at 706; Lamb-Weston, 941 F.2d at

974. Accordingly, the court will not grant plaintiffs’ request 

for return of intellectual property at this time.

E. Tangible Property

Plaintiffs seek return of “any Grange regalia[,] 

paraphernalia,” “tangible things bearing the name ‘Grange,’” 

“equipment, fixtures,” and “other real and personal property.” 

(Pls.’ Proposed Order at 3-4.) They allege that defendants are 

“performing Grange rituals and using Grange paraphernalia in such 

rituals, and, in general, functioning as a Grange.” (Decl. of 

Betsy Huber at 8.) As discussed above, while plaintiffs may be 

entitled to such property as a proprietary matter, the sole 

matter being considered here is whether defendants are using the

items to commit false advertisement. 

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To the extent defendants are confusing the public by

“performing Grange rituals . . . using Grange paraphernalia,” 

plaintiffs already have an avenue of relief via the April 20 

order, which bars defendants from “conducting business using the 

name ‘Grange’” or “representing themselves to be the former 

California State Grange [or] successor to the California State 

Grange.” (April 20 Order at 37-38.) Accordingly, the court will 

not grant plaintiffs’ request for return of tangible property at 

this time.

F. Alleged Misappropriation of Grange Funds

Plaintiffs request that the court “restrain[]

Defendants from further misappropriation and dissipation of 

assets and accounts held in the name of the California State 

Grange, the California Guild, or the 1946 [corporation].” (Pls.’

Mem. at 3.) They allege that defendants continue to engage in 

schemes--sometimes with the aid of local granges--to 

misappropriate their assets. (Id. at 10.)

The April 20 Order bars defendants and their “agents, 

affiliates, assigns, and any party acting in concert with [them]” 

from “using bank accounts or other financial accounts under any 

name containing the word ‘Grange’” or “endorsing, signing, or 

executing any document, lease, instruction, or financial

instrument using any name containing the word ‘Grange.’” (Apr. 

20 Order at 37-38.) That provision provides plaintiffs the 

protection they seek. Beyond that, plaintiffs have not proven 

that freezing defendants’ assets is necessary to prevent 

unavailability of relief following final judgment in this case. 

Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiffs’ request with respect 

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to defendants’ alleged misappropriation of Grange funds.

G. Grange Buildings and Former Telephone Numbers

Plaintiffs ask the court to evict defendants from the 

buildings alleged to belong to the California State Grange and

require defendants to disconnect all telephones numbers formerly 

registered to the California State Grange. (Pls. Mem. at 3.) 

Given defendants’ deceptive tactics throughout these and previous 

proceedings, (see, e.g., Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ 

Mot. to Dismiss at 1 (referring to selves as organization 

“created in 1873,” “provid[ing] 160 years of service,” and 

“oldest agricultural organization in California”) (Docket No. 

40)), their use of plaintiffs’ buildings and former telephone 

numbers would serve to further create a false impression among 

the public that they are affiliated with or successors to the 

California State Grange. Cf. Delaware Valley Fin. Grp., Inc. v. 

Principal Life Ins. Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 603, 614 (E.D. Pa. 2009)

(considering defendants’ use of “same offices” and “same 

telephone numbers” in deciding Lanham Act unfair competition 

claim). As explained in Part A of this section, such impression 

irreparably harms plaintiffs and the balance of equities and 

public interest favor plaintiffs.

That being said, requiring defendants to vacate the

office buildings they presently occupy constitutes a drastic 

measure at the preliminary injunction stage. Such measures are 

disfavored. See Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 

(9th Cir. 1979) (“Mandatory preliminary relief, which goes well 

beyond simply maintaining the status quo . . . is particularly 

disfavored . . . .”). As such, the court will settle at this 

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stage for the more measured solution of requiring defendants to 

display a disclaimer. That measure is discussed below in Part I.

Requiring defendants to cease using plaintiffs’ old 

telephone numbers, on the other hand, is reasonable. 

Accordingly, the court will grant that request, subject to the 

terms stated in the conclusion of this Order.

H. Other Alleged Misrepresentations

As a final catchall, plaintiffs ask the court to 

prohibit defendants from “misrepresenting that they are the 

successors to the California State Grange, or the authorized 

representatives of the California Granges, or of the 1946 

corporation.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 3.) They seek a declaration that

plaintiffs are “the exclusive authorized representatives of the 

California Granges[,] . . . the exclusive authorized 

representatives of the 1946 corporation[, and] . . . the 

exclusive owner of all assets and accounts held, registered or 

recorded in the name of the California State Grange and/or 

California Guild.” (Pls.’ Proposed Order at 2.)

The April 20 Order already prohibits defendants from 

“representing themselves to be the former California State 

Grange; successor to the California State Grange; or formerly 

known as, trading as, or doing business as the California State 

Grange.” (Apr. 20 Order at 38.) That provision covers any claim 

defendants may make that they are “authorized representatives of 

the California Granges.” The court declines to extend these

prohibitions to include defendants’ references to their corporate 

registration.

As for plaintiffs’ proposed declaration, such relief is 

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not required to prevent harm to plaintiffs in light of the relief 

they are already entitled to under this Order, the April 20

Order, and the August 18 Order. Accordingly, the court will deny

that request.

I. Use of a Disclaimer

Finally, plaintiffs request that the court order 

defendants to “commence use of a prominent disclaimer in all 

business, commercial, official and public communications, for a 

period of time extending until two years following a final order 

in this case or such other such time as may be judged appropriate 

by the Court, stating: NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE CALIFORNIA STATE 

GRANGE.” (Pls.’ Proposed Order at 5.)

While such orders are not always necessary, they are 

well within the discretion of the court. See Consumers Union of 

U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 

1983) (“Disclaimers are a favored way of alleviating consumer 

confusion as to source or sponsorship. Absolute prohibitions of 

speech as provided for in the instant preliminary injunction are 

improper where there is any possibility that an explanation or 

disclaimer will suffice.” (internal citations omitted)); see also

Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1143 

(C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Consumers Union favorably), aff’d, 296 

F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. 

Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (S.D. Cal.) (citing Consumers Union

favorably), aff’d, 162 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, because the court has not precluded defendants 

from claiming credit for the history and achievements of the 

corporate entity formerly named the California State Grange from 

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1946 to 2013, unless the public is notified that defendants are 

not in fact the California State Grange there would be a strong 

probability of confusion. A disclaimer is therefore necessary on 

any such communication in order to avoid the inference that 

defendant is in fact still the California State Grange.

Accordingly, on all business, commercial, official, 

and public communications discussing the history or achievements 

of the corporate entity formerly named the California State 

Grange the court will require defendants to state or display a 

prominent disclaimer stating: “NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE CALIFORNIA 

STATE GRANGE.”8

IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs THE NATIONAL 

GRANGE and THE CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE’S motion for preliminary 

injunction be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 

IN PART as follows:

(1) defendants the CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE d/b/a 

“California Guild,” ROBERT MCFARLAND, and their agents, 

affiliates, and assigns, and any party acting in 

concert with them or their agents, affiliates, or 

assigns, are enjoined from referencing any history or

goodwill accrued by the California State Grange prior 

to October 7, 1946, in any advertising, promotional, 

 

8 Defendants have already used a disclaimer stating they 

“are not affiliated with . . . the Grange of the State of 

California’s Patrons of Husbandry Chartered.” (Komski Decl. at 

7-8.) Plaintiffs allege that the “name is unknown to the 

California Granges.” (Id.) The court sees no harm in making the 

disclaimer clearer.

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commercial, official, or public communications; 

(2) within seven (7) days from the date of this Order, 

defendants shall cease using all telephone numbers used 

by defendants that were ever registered to the 

California State Grange, and refrain from further use 

of such telephone numbers in any business, commercial, 

or official communications;

(3) within seven (7) days from the date of this Order, 

defendants shall, until such time as the court deems

proper, commence use of a prominent disclaimer on all 

business, commercial, official, and public 

communications discussing the history or achievements 

of the corporate entity formerly named the California 

State Grange stating: “NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE 

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE”; and

(4) plaintiffs’ remaining requests are DENIED.

Dated: September 23, 2016

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