Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01577/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01577-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338pt Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WI-LAN INC.; WI-LAN USA, INC.; and 

WI-LAN LABS, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LG ELECTRONICS, INC.; LG 

ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC; and LG 

ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM 

U.S.A., INC.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-01577-H-BGS

ORDER: 

(1) CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 

ORDER; AND

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT 

CERTAIN CLAIMS ARE INVALID 

AS INDEFINITE

[Doc. No. 82.]

In the present action, Plaintiffs Wi-LAN Inc., Wi-LAN USA, Inc., and Wi-LAN 

Labs, Inc. assert claims of patent infringement against Defendants LG Electronics, Inc., 

LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., and LG Electronics Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc., alleging 

infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,787,924, 8,867,351, 9,226,320, and 9,497,743. (Doc. 

No. 1, Compl.) On March 8, 2019, the parties filed their joint claim construction prehearing 

statement, chart, and worksheet, identifying the disputed claim terms from the patents-insuit. (Doc. Nos. 67-69.) On April 19, 2019, the parties each filed an opening claim 

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construction brief. (Doc. Nos. 83, 85.) On May 3, 2019, the parties each filed a responsive 

claim construction brief. (Doc. Nos. 91, 92.) 

In addition, on April 19, 2019, LG filed a motion for partial summary judgment that 

claims 1-2, 5-9, and 12-16 of the ’924 patent are invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 

112, ¶ 2. (Doc. No. 82.) On May 10, 2019, Wi-LAN filed a response in opposition to LG’s 

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 100.) On May 17, 2019, LG filed its reply. 

(Doc. No. 104.) 

On May 23, 2019, the Court issued a tentative claim construction order and an order 

tentatively denying LG’s motion for partial summary judgment. (Doc. No. 108.) The 

Court held a claim construction hearing on May 24, 2019. Christopher M. First, Eric J. 

Enger, Leslie V. Payne, and Victor M. Felix and appeared for Wi-LAN. Richard D. Harris, 

Gary R. Jarosik, Callie J. Sand, and Matthew J. Levinstein appeared for LG. After 

considering the parties’ briefs, the parties’ arguments at the hearing, and all relevant 

information, the Court construes the disputed terms from the patents-in-suit. In addition, 

for the reasons below, the Court denies LG’s motion for partial summary judgment that 

certain claims of the ’924 patent are invalid as indefinite. 

Background

On July 11, 2018, Wi-LAN filed a complaint for patent infringement against LG, 

alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,787,924, 8,867,351, 9,226,320, and 9,497,743. 

(Doc. No. 1.) Specifically, Wi-LAN alleges that LG’s wireless communication products 

that are compliant with the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 4G LTE standard directly 

infringe the patents-in-suit. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 40, 53, 66, 79.)

On October 10, 2018, LG filed an answer to Wi-LAN’s complaint along with

counterclaims for: (1) declaratory judgments of non-infringement and invalidity of the 

patents-in-suit; (2) declaratory judgment of unenforceability for failure to disclose to 

standard setting organizations; (3) declaratory judgment of unenforceability of the ’351 

patent; (4) declaratory judgment that LG is entitled to license the patents-in-suit on 

FRAND/RAND terms and conditions; (5) breach of contract; (6) monopolization and 

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attempted monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act; and (7) unfair 

business practices under California Business and Profession Code § 17200 et seq. (Doc. 

No. 17.) 

On November 13, 2018, the Court issued a scheduling order in the action. (Doc. No. 

36.) On April 12, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part Wi-LAN’s motions to 

dismiss LG’s counterclaims, and the Court dismissed LG’s counterclaim for declaratory 

judgment of unenforceability of the ’351 patent due to infectious unenforceability with 

prejudice. (Doc. No. 79.) By the present claim construction briefs and motion for summary 

judgment, the parties request that the Court construe several disputed claim terms from the 

patents-in-suit.1

 (Doc. Nos. 83, 85, 82-1.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standards for Claim Construction

Claim construction is an issue of law for the court to decide. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. 

v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015); Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 

370, 372 (1996). Although claim construction is ultimately a question of law, “subsidiary 

factfinding is sometimes necessary.” Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 838.

“The purpose of claim construction is to ‘determin[e] the meaning and scope of the 

patent claims asserted to be infringed.’” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. 

Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that 

the ‘claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to 

exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

Claim terms “‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning[,]’” which 

“is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question 

at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1312–13. “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of 

 

1 The Court notes that LG’s motion for partial summary judgment addresses the proper scope of the 

claim terms “at least one of the UL connections” and “the at least two connections” from the ’924 patent. 

(Doc. No. 82-1 at 5-10.) Thus, LG’s motion for partial summary judgment is in essence additional claim 

construction briefing. 

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claim language as understood by a [PHOSITA] may be readily apparent even to lay judges, 

and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely 

accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. “However, in many 

cases, the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is not readily 

apparent.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1360. If the meaning of the term is not readily apparent, 

the court must look to “those sources available to the public that show what a person of 

skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean,” including intrinsic 

and extrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. A court should begin with the 

intrinsic record, which consists of the language of the claims, the patent specification, and, 

if in evidence, the prosecution history of the asserted patent. Id.; see also Vederi, LLC v. 

Google, Inc., 744 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In construing claims, this court relies 

primarily on the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history.”).

In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court should first look to the 

language of the claims. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582; see also Comark Commc’ns v. 

Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The appropriate starting point . . . is 

always with the language of the asserted claim itself.”). The context in which a disputed 

term is used in the asserted claims may provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of 

the term. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In addition, the context in which the disputed 

term is used in other claims, both asserted and unasserted, may provide guidance because 

“the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in 

other claims.” Id. Furthermore, a disputed term should be construed “consistently with its 

appearance in other places in the same claim or in other claims of the same patent.” 

Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001); accord

Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008); see also Paragon Sols., LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) (“We apply a presumption that the same terms appearing in different portions of the 

claims should be given the same meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, 

“‘[a] claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over 

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one that does not do so.’” Vederi, 744 F.3d 1383.

A court must also read claims “in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” 

Markman, 52 F.3d at 979; see 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (“The specification shall conclude with 

one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter 

which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”). “‘Apart from the claim 

language itself, the specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a claim term.’” 

Vederi, 744 F.3d at 1382. For example, “a claim construction that excludes [a] preferred 

embodiment [described in the specification] ‘is rarely, if ever, correct and would require 

highly persuasive evidentiary support.’” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo 

Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

But “[t]he written description part of the specification does not delimit the right to 

exclude. That is the function and purpose of claims.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, 

Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Therefore, “it is improper to read 

limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the 

only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the 

patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 

1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The patentee is entitled to the full scope of his claims, and we will not 

limit him to his preferred embodiment or import a limitation from the specification into the 

claims.”).

In most situations, analysis of the intrinsic evidence will resolve claim construction 

disputes. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. However, “[w]here the 

intrinsic record is ambiguous, and when necessary,” district courts may “rely on extrinsic 

evidence, which ‘consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, 

including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.’” Power 

Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317). A court must evaluate all extrinsic evidence in 

light of the intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. “Extrinsic evidence may not be 

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used ‘to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.’” 

Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Bell 

Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence . . . may not be used to vary, contradict, expand, or limit the 

claim language from how it is defined, even by implication, in the specification or file

history.”); Vederi, 744 F.3d at 1382 (“[E]xtrinsic evidence may be less reliable than the 

intrinsic evidence.”). In cases where subsidiary facts contained in the extrinsic evidence 

“are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic 

evidence.” Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.

“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation 

present in a patent’s asserted claims.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362. In certain situations, 

it is appropriate for a court to determine that a claim term needs no construction and its 

plain and ordinary meaning applies. See id.; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. But “[a] 

determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary 

meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when 

reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.” O2 Micro, 

521 F.3d at 1361. If the parties dispute the scope of a certain claim term, it is the court’s 

duty to resolve the dispute. Id. at 1362; accord Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring 

Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

II. Legal Standards for a Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing 

substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 

Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

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Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1031 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 

accord Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not 

preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors 

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving 

party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the 

nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case that 

the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322-23; Jones v. Williams, 

791 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth, by 

affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); 

accord Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). To carry 

this burden, the non-moving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his 

pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 

(1996) (“On summary judgment, . . . the plaintiff can no longer rest on the pleadings.”). 

Rather, the nonmoving party “must present affirmative evidence . . . from which a jury 

might return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts and draw 

all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court should not weigh the evidence or make 

credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed.” Id. Further, the Court may consider other materials in the record 

not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); 

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

///

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III. Agreed Claim Constructions

In their joint claim construction hearing statement, the parties agree upon the 

constructions for four claim terms. (Doc. No. 67 at 2-3.) In light of this:

1. The Court construes the term “bandwidth” from the ’924 patent as “data 

transmission resources in a particular time period;”

2. The Court construes the term “an indication of [a first reserved set of access 

identifiers usable for non-contention access / a non-contention reserved access identifier]” 

from the ’320 patent as “information from which the mobile station may determine [a first 

reserved set of access identifiers usable for non-contention access / a non-contention 

reserved access identifier];”

3. The Court construes the term “operable to” from the ’320 patent as “capable 

of;” and

4. The Court construes the term “QoS” from the ’924 patent as “quality of 

service.” 

(See id.; Doc. No. 83 at Appx. 1.)

III. Disputed Claim Terms from the ’924 Patent and ’743 Patent

A. The ’924 Patent and the ’743 Patent

The ’924 patent and the ’743 patent are both entitled “Method and Systems for 

Transmission of Multiple Modulated Signals Over Wireless Networks” and share a 

common specification. U.S. Patent No. 8,787,924, at (54) (filed Jul. 22, 2014); U.S. Patent 

No. 9,497,743, at (54) (filed Nov. 15, 2016). The invention disclosed in the ’924 patent 

and the ’743 patent “relates to wireless communication systems, and more particularly to 

a method and apparatus for efficiently allocating bandwidth between base stations and 

customer premises equipment in a broadband wireless communication system.” ’924 

Patent at 1:23-27. 

As an exemplary claim, claim 1 of the ’924 Patent provides: 

1. A method of operating a wireless cellular mobile unit registered with a base 

station in a bandwidth on demand wireless cellular communication system, 

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the method comprising:

transmitting from the wireless cellular mobile unit a one bit message 

requesting to be provided an allocation of uplink (UL) bandwidth in which to 

transmit a bandwidth request for at least one connection served by the wireless 

cellular mobile unit;

receiving at the wireless cellular mobile unit the allocation of UL bandwidth 

in which to transmit the bandwidth request, the allocation of UL bandwidth 

received pursuant to the one bit message;

transmitting from the wireless cellular mobile unit the bandwidth request 

within the allocation of UL bandwidth, the bandwidth request being indicative 

of a pending amount of UL data associated with the at least one connection;

receiving at the wireless cellular mobile unit an UL bandwidth grant for the 

wireless cellular mobile unit, the UL bandwidth grant received pursuant to the 

bandwidth request; and

allocating the received UL bandwidth grant to at least two UL connections 

served by the wireless cellular mobile unit, based on a QoS parameter of the 

at least two UL connections.

Id. at 22:42-67.

B. “UL connection(s) served by the wireless cellular mobile unit”

Wi-LAN proposes that the claim term “[UL] connection(s) served by the wireless 

mobile unit” be construed as “the [uplink] connection(s) between the wireless cellular 

mobile unit and its users.” (Doc. No. 83 at 3.) LG proposes that this claim term be 

construed as “[uplink] connection(s) between the wireless cellular mobile unit and other 

end user physical devices.” (Doc. No. 85 at 4-5.) Here, in their proposed constructions for 

this claim term, the parties agree that the term encompasses uplink connections between 

the wireless mobile unit and something else, but the parties dispute whether that something 

else is the mobile devices’ users or other end user physical devices. 

The Court begins its analysis of the parties’ dispute by examining the claim 

language. Claim 1 of the ’924 patent claims: “A method of operating a wireless cellular 

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mobile unit registered with a base station in a bandwidth on demand wireless cellular 

communication system, the method comprising” among other steps “allocating the 

received UL bandwidth grant to at least two UL connections served by the wireless cellular 

mobile unit.” ’924 Patent at 22:42-66. Here, the claim language refers to a wireless mobile 

unit and a base station. The claim language makes no reference to other end user devices. 

Thus, the claim language does not support LG’s proposed construction.

In support of its proposed construction for this claim term, LG relies on the following 

language from the ’924 patent’s specification: “CPEs 110 request bandwidth allocations 

from their respective base stations 106 based upon the type and quality of services 

requested by the customers served by the CPEs.” (Doc. No. 85 at 5 (citing ’924 Patent at 

2:21-24).) But, here, the specification is not describing the claimed invention. Rather, the 

specification is describing prior art. See ’924 Patent at 1:22 (“Description of Related Art”). 

Further, in this passage, the specification expressly states that it is a describing an 

“exemplary broadband wireless communication system.” Id. at 2:3-4. A court should not 

import limitations from the specification into the claims absent a clear disclaimer of claim 

scope. See Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 

2007) (“[W]e have warned against importing limitations from the specification into the 

claims absent a clear disclaimer of claim scope.”); Digital-Vending Servs. Int’l, LLC v. 

Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 672 F.3d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The cited passage’s 

description of an exemplary broadband wireless communication system does not constitute 

a clear disclaimer of claim scope. As such, the Court rejects LG’s reliance on the ’924 

patent’s specification to support its proposed construction.2

LG also argues that its proposed construction is supported by an analysis of the claim 

language in a related patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,006,530. (Doc. No. 85 at 5-6.) LG notes, 

 

2 For this same reason, the Court rejects LG’s reliance on U.S. Patent No. 6,016,311’s specification 

to support its proposed construction. (Doc. No. 85 at 6.) Although the ’924 patent references the ’311 

patent, it only does so when describing exemplary communication systems in the relevant art. There is 

no language in the ’924 patent’s specification stating that the claimed invention should be limited to any 

of the disclosures contained in the ’311 patent. 

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for example, claim 1 of the ’530 patent claims: “[a] method of obtaining bandwidth 

requests from a plurality of users of a communication base station . . . where each user is 

an individual connection and the plurality of users is connected to the base station through 

one or more corresponding customer premise equipment (CPE) stations.” U.S. Patent No. 

7,006,530 (filed Feb. 28, 2006), at 39:30-36. LG notes that this claim language in the ’530 

patent expressly states that the bandwidth requests are from “a plurality of users.” (Doc. 

No. 85 at 5.) But this is of no consequence because the claims at issue, the claims in the 

’924 patent, do not include any claim language reciting “a plurality of users” or similar 

language. See generally ’924 Patent at 22:42-24:48. As such, the Court rejects LG’s 

reliance on the claim language from the ’530 patent. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 

Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding the prosecution 

history of other patents irrelevant because those patents did not contain limitations in 

common with the patent-in-suit); see also Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, 

Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Different claims with different words can, of 

course, define different subject matter within the ambit of the invention.”).

Finally, LG also relies on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. 

Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Doc. No. 85 at 6-7.) But the Federal Circuit’s 

Wi-LAN v. Apple decision provides no support to LG. In Wi-LAN v. Apple, Wi-LAN 

appealed the district court’s construction of the claim term “UL connections” from U.S. 

Patent No. 8,315,640, a patent related to the ’924 patent. 830 F.3d at 1380. The Federal 

Circuit rejected Wi-LAN’s proposed construction and affirmed the district court’s 

construction for the term “UL connections.” See Wi-LAN, 830 F.3d at 1379-80, 1392-93. 

But, here, Wi-LAN does not offer the same proposed construction for the term “[UL]

connection(s)” that it argued for on appeal in the Wi-LAN v. Apple case. Compare WiLAN, 830 F.3d at 1380 with Doc. No. 83 at 3. Rather, Wi-LAN’s proposed construction 

for the term “[UL] connection(s)” in this case mirrors the construction that was adopted by 

the district court and affirmed by the Federal Circuit in the Wi-LAN v. Apple case. See

Wi-LAN, 830 F.3d at 1379 n.2 (The district court “adopted the construction ‘an uplink 

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connection between the wireless subscriber radio unit and its users.’”). Thus, the Wi-LAN 

v. Apple decision actually supports Wi-LAN’s proposed construction, not LG’s proposal.

In sum, the Court adopts Wi-LAN’s proposed construction for this claim term, and 

the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction. The Court construes “the claim term “[UL] 

connection(s) served by the wireless mobile unit” as “the [uplink] connection(s) between 

the wireless cellular mobile unit and its users.” 

C. “UL services”

Wi-LAN proposes that the term “UL Services” be construed as “applications that 

generate data for transmission upstream towards the base station.” (Doc. No. 83 at 7.) LG 

argues that this claim term is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. (Doc. No. 85 at 11.) 

In the alternative, LG proposes that the claim term be construed as “functionalities 

supported by an end user physical device connected to the wireless cellular mobile unit.” 

(Id.)

Section 112 of the Patent Act requires that a patent’s specification “conclude with

one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter

which the applicant regards as [the] invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. In Nautilus, Inc. v.

Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014), the Supreme Court “h[e]ld that a 

patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating

the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those

skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” See also id. at 2129 (“[W]e read § 112,

¶ 2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution

history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable

certainty.”). Definiteness is measured from the viewpoint of a PHOSITA at the time the 

patent was filed. Id. at 2128.

Indefiniteness is a question of law involving underlying factual determinations. 

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Green Edge 

Enters., LLC v. Rubber Mulch Etc., LLC, 620 F.3d 1287, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The party

challenging the validity of the patents-in-suit bears the burden of proving indefiniteness by

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clear and convincing evidence. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 n.10 (citing Microsoft 

Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011)); see, e.g., Teva, 789 F.3d at

1345.

LG argues that the term “UL services” is indefinite because the term “UL services” 

only appears in the ’924 patent’s claim language, and the specification fails to provide 

sufficient information to determine the meaning of the term. (Doc. No. 85 at 11-12.) 

Specifically, LG argues that the ’924 patent fails to adequately explain to a person of 

ordinary skill in the art whether the term “UL services” refers to “services” or 

“connections.” (Id.) In response, Wi-LAN argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would understand with reasonable certainty that “UL services” refers to services. (Doc. 

No. 91 at 2.) The Court agrees with Wi-LAN.

Although the specific term “UL services” only appears in the claim language, the 

claim language itself provides ample guidance as to the meaning of that claim term. First, 

that the term “UL services” uses the word “services” suggests that the term refers to 

services. Second, the claim language provides several examples of claimed “UL services:” 

“voice service,” “data service,” “video service,” and “real time service.” ’924 Patent at 

24:42-48. These examples suggest that the term refers to services. Third, the specification 

also supports the contention that “UL services” refers to services. See ’924 Patent at 6:46-

50 (“[D]ata service applications are relatively delay tolerant. In contrast, real-time service 

applications such as voice and video services require that bandwidth allocations be made 

in a timely manner . . . .”), at 1:66-67 (“broadband services such as voice, data and video 

services”). Indeed, LG concedes in its briefing that these passages in the specification 

suggest that “UL services” refers to services. (Doc. No. 85 at 11.) 

In an effort to create ambiguity as to the meaning of the term “UL services,” LG 

argues that the ’924 patent contains claim language suggesting that a “UL service” may be 

viewed as a “[UL] connection.” (Doc. No. 85 at 12.) The Court disagrees. To support this 

contention, LG relies on the fact that the other independent claims in the ’924 patent, 

specifically claims 1 and 9, use similar language in reciting the claim term “[UL]

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connections” as independent claim 17 does in reciting the term “UL services.” (Id.) But 

this is of no consequence because “[d]ifferent claims with different words can, of course, 

define different subject matter within the ambit of the invention.” Curtiss-Wright Flow 

Control, 438 F.3d at 1380. 

In addition, the Court notes that a review of the claim language shows that although 

the claims use similar language in reciting the term “[UL] connections” as the term “UL 

services,” the claims do not use the terms interchangeably. For example, dependent claims 

6 and dependent claim 14 recite: “wherein one of the at least two connections provides a 

voice service.” ’924 Patent at 23:15-16, 24:11-12. And dependent claim 18 recites: 

“wherein one of the at least two UL services is a voice service.” Id. at 24:41-42. Here the 

claim language distinguishes between “[UL] connections” and “UL services,” explaining 

that a UL service “is” a service whereas a [UL] connection is something that “provides” a 

service. In sum, LG has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the claim term “UL 

services” is indefinite.

Turning to the proper construction of the term “UL services,” in support of its 

alternative proposed construction, LG relies on the arguments that it used to support its 

proposed construction for the claim term “UL connection(s) served by the wireless cellular 

mobile unit.” (Doc. No. 85 at 12-13.) But the Court has rejected LG’s proposed 

construction for that claim term. See supra. 

Wi-LAN’s proposed construction is supported by the intrinsic record. The 

specification refers to the voice, video, and data services as “applications.” ’924 Patent at 

6:46-50. Further, the relevant claim language explains that the data generated by the “UL 

services” is “transmitt[ed] to the base station.” See id. at 24:35-40. 

In sum, the Court adopts Wi-LAN’s proposed construction for this claim term, and 

the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction. The Court construes “UL Services” as 

“applications that generate data for transmission upstream towards the base station.” 

///

///

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D. “queue” / “operable to queue data”

Wi-LAN proposes: (1) that the term “queue” from claims 2 and 12 of the ’924 patent 

be construed as “structure containing data to be transmitted;” (2) that the term “queue” 

from claim 6 of the ’743 patent be construed as “to place into a structure containing data 

to be transmitted;” and (3) that the term “operable to queue data” from the ’743 patent be 

construed as “capable of placing data to be transmitted into a structure.” (Doc. No. 83 at 

8.) LG proposes: (1) that the term “queue” from claims 2 and 12 of the ’924 patent be 

construed as “structure containing data to be transmitted that relates to a particular quality 

of service level;” (2) that the term “queue” from claim 6 of the ’743 patent be construed as 

“to place into a structure containing data to be transmitted that relates to a particular quality 

of service level;” and (3) that the term “operable to queue data” from the ’743 patent be 

construed as “capable of placing data received from another end user physical device 

connected to a cellular telephone into a structure.” (Doc. No. 85 at 13.) 

Here, the parties agree that the term “queue” encompasses a structure containing 

data to be transmitted. (Doc. No. 83 at 8; Doc. No. 85 at 13.) The parties dispute whether 

the term further encompasses the additional requirement that the queue relate to a particular 

quality of service level. (Id.) 

The Court begins its analysis of the parties’ dispute by analyzing the claim language. 

Claim 2 of the ’924 patent claims: “A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the wireless 

cellular mobile unit maintains one or more queues, each queue for grouping data pertaining 

to connections with similar QoS.” ’924 Patent at 23:1-4. By stating that each queue 

pertains to connections with similar QoS, the claim language implies that each queue 

relates to a QoS. This supports LG’s proposed construction. 

Further, the common specification for the ’924 patent and the ’743 patent provides 

additional support for LG’s position. The specification explains: “The base station MAC 

maintains a set of queues for each physical channel that it serves. Within each physical 

channel queue set, the base station maintains a queue for each QoS.” ’924 Patent at 4:25-

28. Wi-LAN concedes that this passage describes each queue having its own QoS. (Doc. 

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No. 83 at 9.) Thus, the intrinsic record supports LG’s proposed construction for the term 

“queue” requiring that the queue be related to a particular QoS level.

In response, Wi-LAN argues that the Court should not limit the claims to a preferred 

embodiment described in the specification. (Doc. No. 83 at 9; Doc. No. 91 at 3.) The 

Court recognizes that “it is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment 

described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent 

a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so 

limited.” Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1327. But the problem with Wi-LAN’s argument is that 

even assuming the above passage from the specification is merely a description of a 

preferred embodiment, the Court is not reading a limitation from the specification into the 

claims.3

 The claim language already includes the limitation at issue, and the Court is 

merely looking at the specification for additional guidance as to that limitation. Claim 2 

of the ’924 patent states that each queue pertains to connections with similar QoS. ’924 

Patent at 23:1-4. Thus, the claim language itself states that each queue is related to a QoS. 

Wi-LAN also argues that the specification teaches that the queues may be 

“associated with the various data sources.” (Doc. No. 83 at 9 (citing ’924 Patent at 3:22-

23).) But in this passage cited by Wi-LAN, the specification is not describing the claimed 

invention. Rather, the specification is describing certain prior art systems. See ’924 Patent 

at 3:20-25. As a result, the Court rejects Wi-LAN’s reliance on this passage from the 

specification.

 

3 Although the Court assumes for the purposes of this analysis that this passage is describing a 

preferred embodiment, the Court notes that the passage at issue is found in the portion of the specification 

describing “[t]he present invention.” ’924 Patent at 3:60; see also id. at 3:58 (“Summary of the 

Invention”). The Court further notes that in this summary of the invention section, the specification at 

times expressly refers to certain aspects of the invention as being an “embodiment.” Id. at 4:38. But in 

the passage at issue, the specification does not use the word embodiment. See id. at 4:25-28. In addition, 

the Court notes that the Federal Circuit has explained that “[w]hen a patentee describes the features of the 

present invention as a whole, he alerts the reader that this description limits the scope of the invention.” 

Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); accord Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 

Regents of Univ. of Minnesota v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

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Wi-LAN notes that unlike in the ’924 patent, the claim language in the ’743 patent 

does not mention a QoS for a “queue.” (Doc. No. 91 at 3; Doc. No. 83 at 9.) In addition, 

Wi-LAN also notes that unlike the ’924 patent, the claim language in the ’743 patent uses 

the word “queue” as a verb. (Doc. No. 83 at 9.) Wi-LAN argues, therefore, that the Court’s 

construction for the term “queue” in the ’743 patent should not include the “particular QoS” 

limitation. The Court acknowledges the distinctions between the ’924 patent’s claim

language and the ’743 patent’s claim language, and, thus, the Court will not include the 

QoS limitation in its construction for the term “queue” in the ’743 patent.

In addition, the parties dispute the proper construction for claim the term “operable 

to queue data.” LG argues that the Court’s construction for this claim term should include 

the requirement that the data is received from another user physical device connected to 

the cellular telephone. (Doc. No. 85 at 13-15.) In support of this proposed construction, 

LG relies entirely on the arguments that it used to support its proposed construction for the 

claim term “UL connection(s) served by the wireless cellular mobile unit.” (Id. at 14-15.) 

The Court has rejected LG’s proposed construction for that claim term. See supra. As 

such, the Court also rejects LG’s proposed construction for the claim term “operable to 

queue data.”

In sum, the Court adopts LG’s proposed constructions for the term “queue” in the 

’924 patent, and the Court adopts Wi-LAN’s proposed construction for the terms “queue” 

and “operable to queue data” in the ’743 patent. The Court construes: (1) the term “queue” 

from claims 2 and 12 of the ’924 patent as “structure containing data to be transmitted that 

relates to a particular quality of service level;” (2) the term “queue” from claim 6 of the 

’743 patent as “to place into a structure containing data to be transmitted;” and (3) the term 

“operable to queue data” from the ’743 patent as “capable of placing data to be transmitted 

into a structure.” 

E. “one bit message” / “requesting the base station to poll the cellular telephone”

Wi-LAN proposes that the claim term “one bit message [requesting to be provided 

an allocation of UL bandwidth in which to transmit a bandwidth request]” be construed as 

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“a bit sent by a currently active wireless cellular mobile unit that currently has bandwidth 

allocations indicating a request to be provided an allocation of UL bandwidth in which to

transmit a bandwidth request.” (Doc. No. 83 at 12.) LG proposes that this claim term be 

construed as “a bit sent by a currently active wireless cellular mobile unit in the process of 

transmitting data upstream to a base station that indicates to the base station that the 

wireless cellular mobile unit needs additional UL bandwidth.” (Doc. No. 85 at 7.)

In addition, Wi-LAN proposes that the similar claim term “message requesting the 

base station to poll the cellular telephone” be construed as “a message sent by a currently 

active cellular telephone that currently has bandwidth allocations indicating a request to be

provided a first UL transmission resource in which to transmit an indication of an amount 

of data awaiting transmission to the base station.” (Doc. No. 83 at 12.) LG proposes that 

this claim term be construed as “a message sent by a currently active cellular telephone in 

the process of transmitting data upstream to a base station indicating a request to be 

provided a first UL transmission resource in which to transmit an indication of data 

awaiting transmission to the base station.” (Doc. No. 85 at 7.) 

With respect to these two claim terms, the parties agree that the claimed “bit 

message” is sent by a “currently active” cellular device. (Doc. No. 83 at 13; Doc. No. 85 

at 7.) But the parties dispute what it means to be “currently active.” Wi-LAN argues that 

a cellular device is “currently active” when it “currently has bandwidth allocations. (Doc. 

No. 83 at 13.) LG argues that a cellular device is “currently active” when “it is in the 

process of transmitting data upstream.” (Doc. No. 85 at 7.) Because the parties dispute 

the scope of this claim term, the Court must resolve the parties’ dispute. See O2 Micro, 

521 F.3d at 1361; Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318. 

The Court begins its analysis by analyzing the claim language. Here, the claim 

language is of no assistance in resolving the parties dispute because the term “currently 

active” is not found in the claim language. But the term “currently active” is found in 

several places in the specification. In the specification’s summary of the invention, the 

specification explains that “only those currently active CPEs (CPEs that currently have 

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bandwidth allocations associated thereto) are permitted to request more bandwidth using 

either the piggybacking or poll-me bit methods.” ’924 Patent at 21:64-22:1. Here, the 

specification uses the term “currently active” to mean a device that “currently ha[s] 

bandwidth allocations.” Id. This language supports Wi-LAN’s proposed construction, and 

it does not support LG’s proposal. 

In an effort to support its proposed construction, LG relies on the prosecution 

history, specifically inter partes review proceedings involving the ’924 patent and the ’743 

patent. (Doc. No. 85 at 8.) But the cited portions of the prosecution history are of no aid 

to LG and actually support Wi-LAN’s proposed construction. In the IPR proceedings, the 

PTAB construed the claim terms at issue; explained that “[t]he [’924 patent/’743 patent] 

defines ‘active CPEs’ to mean ‘currently have bandwidth allocations associate thereto;’”

and ultimately adopted Wi-LAN’s proposed constructions for these claim terms. (Doc. 

No. 84-11, Ex. 11 at 12-13; Doc. No. 84-12, Ex. 12 at 11-12.) Thus, Wi-LAN’s proposed 

construction is supported by both the prosecution history and the language in the 

specification describing the invention.

In addition, with respect to the ’924 patent only, the parties dispute whether the 

requested bandwidth may be used for only an additional bandwidth request as is proposed 

by Wi-LAN or whether the requested bandwidth may be used to transmit something else 

as is proposed by LG. (Doc. No. 85 at 7-8.) This dispute can be resolved by reviewing the 

claim language at issue. The claim language recites: “a one bit message requesting to be 

provided an allocation of uplink (UL) bandwidth in which to transmit a bandwidth 

request.” ’924 Patent at 22:46-49; accord id. at 23:28-31, 24:24-26. Thus, the claim 

language itself provides that the purpose of the requested bandwidth is to “transmit a 

bandwidth request.” Id. As such, the claim language supports Wi-LAN’s proposed 

construction, and it does not support LG’s proposal. 

In sum, the Court adopts Wi-LAN’s proposed construction for this claim term, and 

the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction. The Court construes the claim term “one bit 

message [requesting to be provided an allocation of UL bandwidth in which to transmit a 

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bandwidth request]” as “a bit sent by a currently active wireless cellular mobile unit that 

currently has bandwidth allocations indicating a request to be provided an allocation of UL 

bandwidth in which to transmit a bandwidth request.” And the Court construes the claim 

term “message requesting the base station to poll the cellular telephone” as “a message sent 

by a currently active cellular telephone that currently has bandwidth allocations indicating 

a request to be provided a first UL transmission resource in which to transmit an indication 

of an amount of data awaiting transmission to the base station.” 

F. “allocation of UL bandwidth” / “UL bandwidth grant”

Wi-LAN argues the claim terms “allocation of UL bandwidth” and “UL bandwidth 

grant” do not need to be construed further beyond the parties’ agreed upon construction for 

the claim term “bandwidth.” (Doc. No. 83 at 14.) LG proposes that the claim terms 

“allocation of UL bandwidth” and “UL bandwidth grant” both be construed as “resources 

assigned for uplink data transmission.” (Doc. No. 85 at 9.) Because the parties dispute the 

scope of this claim term, the Court must resolve the parties’ dispute. See O2 Micro, 521 

F.3d at 1361; Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318. 

Here, the parties agree that the claim term bandwidth should be construed as “data 

transmission resources in a particular time period.” (Doc. No. 85 at 10; Doc. No. 83 at 14) 

See Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Ericsson, Inc., 675 F. App’x 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017). LG 

argues that the ’924 patent’s specification indicates that the “allocation of UL bandwidth” 

and “UL bandwidth grant” are resources specifically assigned for uplink data transmission. 

(Doc. No. 85 at 10 (citing ’924 Patent at 17:34-39, 6:23-27, 8:50-53).) But none of the 

passages in the specification cited by LG actually refer to “assigning” resources for uplink 

data transmission. See ’924 Patent at 17:34-39, 6:23-27, 8:50-53. Further, in each of the 

passages cited by LG, the specification is describing preferred embodiments. See id.; see 

also id. at 5:22-27. “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment 

described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent 

a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so 

limited.” Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1327; accord GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 

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750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, there is no such clear indication that the claims 

should be limited. 

In sum, the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction for these claim terms. The 

Court declines to construe the terms “allocation of UL bandwidth” and “UL bandwidth 

grant” beyond the parties’ agreed upon construction for the claim term “bandwidth.”

G. “at least one of the UL connections”

In its motion for partial summary judgment, LG argues that the claim term “at least 

one of the UL connections” from claim 9 of the ’924 patent is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112 ¶ 2 because it lacks an antecedent basis. (Doc. No. 82-1 at 5.) “[A] patent is invalid 

for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and 

the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art 

about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124. LG, as the party

challenging the validity of the patents-in-suit, bears the burden of proving indefiniteness 

by clear and convincing evidence. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 n.10; see, e.g., Teva, 

789 F.3d at 1345.

The Federal Circuit has explained that “a claim could be indefinite if a term does not 

have proper antecedent basis where such basis is not otherwise present by implication or 

the meaning is not reasonably ascertainable.” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 

514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Further, the Federal has held that “[a] district court 

can correct [errors in] a patent only if (1) the correction is not subject to reasonable debate 

based on consideration of the claim language and the specification and (2) the prosecution 

history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims.” Novo Indus., L.P. v. 

Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

LG argues that the scope of the term “at least one of the UL connections” cannot be 

ascertained because it lacks a proper antecedent basis, and it would be unclear to a person 

of skill in the art reading claim 9 whether the antecedent basis for the term should be the 

term “a UL connection” or the term “at least two connections.” (Doc. No. 82-1 at 5-6.) In 

response, Wi-LAN argues that when read in its proper context, it is clear that the term “at 

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least two connections” provides the antecedent basis for the term “at least one of the UL 

connections.” (Doc. No. 100 at 7-8.) The Court agrees with Wi-LAN. 

The claim at issue refers to “UL connections” in the plural, which implies that it is 

referring to the previously mentioned “at least two connections,” which is also plural, and 

not the singular “a UL connection.” Further, although the claims as written do not 

expressly describe the “at least two connections” as UL connections, it is clear from the 

context of the claims that they are UL connections. Claim 9 explains that the “UL 

bandwidth grant” is allocated to the “at least two connections.” ’924 Patent at 23:40-41. 

Thus, they are UL connections. This is also supported by the language in claim 10, which 

recites: “one of the at least two UL connections.” Id. at 23:49. Here, the claim language 

expressly refers to the claimed two connections as being “two UL connections.” Id. 

Further, that the term “at least two connections” provides an antecedent basis for the 

term “at least one of the UL connections” is supported by the structure of claim 9 and an 

understanding of the method claimed therein. Claim 9 recites a method involving several 

distinct steps, including determining an amount of data; transmitting a message to be 

provided with a bandwidth request; receiving an allocation of bandwidth to transmit a 

bandwidth request; transmitting a bandwidth request; receiving a bandwidth grant; and

allocating the bandwidth grant. See ’924 Patent at 23:26-45. That these are distinct steps 

is supported by the specification, which explains that “[t]he present invention utilizes a 

combination of a number of bandwidth request and allocation techniques to control the 

bandwidth request process.” Id. at 1:67-2:2. Here, the specification distinguishes between 

bandwidth request techniques and allocation techniques, both of which are claimed in claim 

9 of the ’924 patent. Further, in its motion for summary judgment, LG acknowledges that 

the ’924 patent’s claims recite a distinct multi-step process. (See Doc. No. 92-1 at 5 (“The 

Asserted Claims describe a two-step process for requesting bandwidth involving an initial 

message, followed by a bandwidth request. When the requested bandwidth is received, it 

is allocated to various connections.”))

That claim 9 recites separate and distinct steps is important because the term “at least 

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one of the UL connections” is contained within and is part of the “allocating” step of the 

claimed method. See ’924 Patent at 23:40-45. The term “at least two connections” is also 

contained in and part of the “allocating” step. See id. Further, the term “a UL connection” 

is found in different steps of the claimed method. See id. at 23:26-27, 23:35-37. Thus, an 

analysis of the structure of claim 9 demonstrates that the term “at least one of the UL 

connections” refers to and has an antecedent basis in the term “at least two connections” 

because they are both part of the claimed “allocating” step. And the term “at least one of 

the UL connections” does not refer to the term “a UL connection” because that term is part 

of different and separate steps.

LG further argues that claim 9 remains indefinite even under the Court’s 

interpretation of the claim and the antecedent basis for the term “at least one of the UL 

connections” because it is unclear from the claim how the “a UL connection” limitation 

recited earlier in the claim relates to the “at least two connections” limitation recited later 

in the claim. The Court disagrees and does not share LG’s purported confusion. As 

explained above, claim 9 recites a method involving several distinct steps, with a first set 

of steps being related to bandwidth request techniques and the final step being related to 

allocation techniques. See ’924 Patent at 23:26-45, 1:67-2:2. The claimed “a UL 

connection” is recited in and part of the bandwidth request techniques in the claimed 

method, and the “at least two connections” is recited in and part of the allocation techniques 

in the claimed method. Id. Further, that the bandwidth techniques portion of the method 

refers to “a UL connection” (i.e., a single connection) and the allocation techniques portion 

of the method refers to “at least two connections” (i.e., two or more connections) causes 

no confusion when the intrinsic record is considered. In order to request bandwidth and 

receive a bandwidth grant from the base station, the mobile device need only possess one 

connection with the base station. But to allocate the received bandwidth grant among 

different connections, the mobile device would need to possess at least two connections. 

See WEBSTER’S’ THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 57 (1981) (defining “allocate”

as “1: to apportion for a specific purpose or to particular persons or things”); see also id. at 

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105 (defining “apportion” as “to divide and assign in proportion: divide and distribute 

proportionally”).

In addition, the specification in the “summary of the invention” provides further 

clarity in explaining: 

The CPE[, i.e., the mobile device,] is responsible for distributing the allocated 

uplink bandwidth in a manner that accommodates the services provided by 

the CPE. The CPE is free to use the uplink bandwidth that was allocated to it 

in a manner that is different than that originally requested or granted by the 

base station. The CPE advantageously determines which services to give 

bandwidth to and which services must wait for subsequent bandwidth 

requests.

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 This passage from the specification combined with the claim language more 

than adequately explains to one skilled in the art with reasonable certainty the relationship 

and difference between the claimed “a UL connection” and the claimed “at least two 

connections.”

In sum, the claim language provides one skill in the art with reasonable certainty that

the term “at least two connections” provides an antecedent basis for the term “at least one 

of the UL connections.” As a result, LG has failed to meet its burden of establishing that 

the claim term “at least one of the UL connections” is indefinite, and the Court denies LG’s 

motion for partial summary judgment on this issue.

H. “the at least two connections”

In its motion for partial summary judgment, LG also argues that the claim term “the 

at least two connections” from claims 6-8 of the ’924 patent is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112 ¶ 2 because they lack an antecedent basis. (Doc. No. 82-1 at 8-10.) In response, WiLAN argues that when read in its proper context, it is clear that the term “the at least two 

 

4 The Court notes that in this passage, the specification discusses allocating bandwidth among 

“services,” not connections. ’924 Patent at 4:6. But this does not cause any confusion as a review of 

claim language in claims dependent to claim 9 shows that the claimed “at least two connections” can be 

utilized to provide a service. See id. at 24:14-15 (“wherein a connection from the at least two connections 

provides a voice service, a data service or a video service”); 24:17-18 (“wherein a connection from the at 

least two connections provides a real time service”).

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UL connections” provides the antecedent basis for the term “the at least two connections.” 

(Doc. No. 100 at 11-12.) The Court agrees with Wi-LAN. 

Similar to the prior claim term, the claim language when read in the context of the 

entire intrinsic record provides reasonable certainty that the term “the at least two 

connections” refers to the term “the at least two UL connections” because: (1) both terms 

refer to “connections” in the plural; (2) the connections at issue are UL connections; and 

(3) both terms are part of the “allocating” step of the claimed method. In sum, LG has 

failed to meet its burden of establishing that the claim term “the at least two connections” 

is indefinite, and the Court denies LG’s motion for partial summary judgment on this issue.

IV. The Disputed Claim Terms from the ’351 Patent

A. The ’351 Patent

The ’351 Patent is entitled “apparatus, system and method for the transmission of 

data with different QoS attributes.” U.S. Patent No. 8,867,351, at (54) (filed Oct. 21, 2014). 

The invention disclosed in the ’351 patent “relates to an apparatus, system and method for 

providing and managing QoS for data flows transmitted over at least one link in a data 

network capable of transmitting data with different [quality of service] QoS requirements 

and/or attributes.” Id. at 1:21-26. 

Claim 1 of the ’351 patent claims:

1. A method of operating a mobile device, comprising:

operating a plurality of logical channel queues, each of the logical channel 

queues associated with a priority and a traffic shaping rate;

selecting, from the plurality of logical channel queues, a highest priority 

logical channel queue having data for transmission and whose traffic shaping 

rate is not reached;

allocating a portion of a data transmission capacity available to the mobile 

device, to the selected logical channel queue, wherein the allocated portion is 

limited by:

the traffic shaping rate associated with the selected logical channel queue,

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the data available for transmission in the selected logical channel queue, and

the data transmission capacity;

repeatedly considering a next highest priority logical channel queue for 

selecting and allocating, until at least one of:

the data transmission capacity is exhausted, and

each of the plurality of logical channel queues is considered for selecting; and 

thereafter

allocating a remaining portion, if any, of the data transmission capacity to one 

or more of the logical channel queues having data for transmission, selected 

in priority order.

B. “each of the logical channel queues associated with a priority and a traffic 

shaping rate”

Wi-LAN proposes that the claim term “each of the logical channel queues associated 

with a priority and a traffic shaping rate” does not need to be construed, and that the phrase 

should just be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Doc. No. 83 at 15; Doc. No. 92 at 5-

6.) LG proposes that claim term be construed as “each of the logical channel queues having 

the priority and traffic shaping rate quality of service attributes of the held packets.” (Doc. 

No. 85 at 16.) Here, the parties dispute whether the priority and traffic shaping rate are 

associated with just the logical channel queues as is Wi-LAN’s position or whether they 

are specifically associated with packets that are held within the logical channel queues as 

is LG’s position. Because the parties dispute the scope of this claim term, the Court must 

resolve the parties’ dispute. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361; Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318. 

The Court begins its analysis of the parties’ dispute by analyzing the claim language. 

Claim 1 of the ’351 patent claims a method comprising, among other steps, “operating a 

plurality of logical channel queues, each of the logical channel queues associated with a 

priority and a traffic shaping rate.” ’351 Patent at 13:56-58. Similarly, claim 7 of the ’351 

patent claims a mobile device comprising, among other things, “a link controller operable 

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to: operate a plurality of logical channel queues, each of the logical channel queues is 

capable of being associated with a priority and a traffic shaping rate.” Id. at 14:33-37. 

Here, the plain language of claims explains that the priority and the traffic shaping rate are 

“associated” or “capable of being associated” with the logical channel queues. See also id.

at 13:59-62 (“a highest priority logical channel queue . . . whose traffic shaping rate is not 

reached”). The claim language in the two independent claims of the ’351 patent does not 

even mention “packets.” Thus, the claim language supports Wi-LAN’s position and not 

LG’s position.

To support its position that the priority and the traffic shaping rate are associated 

with packets, LG relies on various passages from the ’351 patent’s specification. (Doc. 

No. 85 at 17.) But the ’351 patent’s specification actually conflicts with LG’s proposed 

construction. LG argues that its proposed construction is correct because the specification 

explains that the packets are held in the logical channel queues, and the packets have the 

priority and traffic shaping rate QoS attributes. (Doc. No. 85 at 16-17.) But, in describing 

a preferred embodiment of the invention, the ’351 patent’s specification states: 

At step 124, classifier 112 determines if a logical channel queue LC is 

available for the packet and if such a logical channel queue is not available, 

the method creates the required logical channel queue at step 128, either by 

creating a new logical channel queue with the necessary QoS attributes, or by 

modifying the QoS attributes of an existing, empty, logical channel queue. 

When the required logical channel queue is available, the method enqueues 

the received packet at step 132.

’351 Patent at 7:59-67. In this passage, the specification describes an empty, existing 

logical channel queue that has QoS attributes, but does not possess a packet. LG’s 

proposed construction requires that each logical channel queue hold a packet. (Doc. No. 

85 at 16.) Thus, LG’s proposed construction would read out this preferred embodiment 

described in the above passage of the specification. “[A] claim construction that excludes 

[a] preferred embodiment [described in the specification] ‘is rarely, if ever, correct and 

would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.’” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, 

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616 F.3d at 1290. Here, there is no such highly persuasive support for LG’s construction, 

particularly in light of the claim language which expressly states that the priority and the 

traffic shaping rate are associated with the logical channel queues.

In sum, the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction for this claim term. The Court 

declines to further construe the claim term “each of the logical channel queues associated 

with a priority and a traffic shaping rate” to require that the priority and the traffic shaping 

rate are associated with packets.

C. “logical channel queues”

Wi-LAN proposes that the claim term “logical channel queues” be construed as 

“structures containing data to be transmitted over logical channels.” (Doc. No. 83 at 17.) 

LG proposes that this claim term be construed as “queues of packets to be transmitted 

wherein each entry in each queue holds one packet.” (Doc. No. 85 at 15.) Here, the parties 

dispute whether the term “logical channel queues” requires that each entry in each queue 

holds one packet. 

The Court begins its analysis of the parties’ claim construction dispute by examining 

the claim language. Claim 1 of the ’351 patent describes the “logical channel queues” as 

“having data for transmission.” ’351 Patent at 13:60-16; see also id. at 14:1-2, 14:57-59. 

This supports Wi-LAN’s proposed construction. Further, the claim language does not 

include any language stating that each entry in each logical channel queue holds one packet. 

Thus, the claim language does not support LG’s proposed construction.

In support of its proposed construction, LG relies on the following passage from the 

’351 patent’s specification describing a preferred embodiment:

In the illustrated embodiment of the disclosure, each PQE 108 includes 

sixteen logical channel queues, specifically, LC.sub.0 through LC.sub.15.

Logical channel queues LC.sub.i comprise queues of packets to be 

transmitted, where each entry in a queue holds one packet.

’351 Patent at 7:6-12. (Doc. No. 85 at 15-16.) But “it is improper to read limitations from 

a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only 

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embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the 

patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1327; accord GE 

Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, there 

is no such indication that the patentee intended the term “logical channel queues” to be 

limited to this specific disclosure in the specification. To the contrary, the passage at issue 

expressly describes this description of logical channel queues as merely be illustrative. See

’351 Patent at 7:7. As a result, the Court rejects LG’s reliance on this portion of the 

specification.

In sum, the Court adopts Wi-LAN’s proposed construction for this claim term, and 

the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction. The Court construes “logical channel 

queues” as “structures containing data to be transmitted over logical channels.” 

D. “priority”

Wi-LAN argues that the claim term “priority” does not need to be construed, and the 

term should just be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Doc. No. 91 at 6.) LG proposes 

that the claim term “priority” be construed as “the priority of a packet placed into a logical 

channel queue compared to the priority of packets placed into other logical channel 

queues.” (Doc. No. 85 at 18.) Here, the parties dispute whether the claimed “priority” 

refers to either a packet or a logical channel queue. (Doc. No. 85 at 18; Doc. No. 91 at 6.) 

To support their respective claim construction positions for this claim term, both 

parties rely on the same arguments they presented in support of their dispute regarding the 

claim term “each of the logical channel queues associated with a priority and a traffic 

shaping rate.” (Id.) In construing that claim term, the Court rejected LG’s contention that 

claim term “priority” is associated with a packet. The plain language of the claims specifies 

that the “priority” is associated with a logical channel queue. See ’351 Patent at 13:56-58,

14:33-37. As a result, the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction.

In sum, the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction for this claim term. The Court 

declines to construe the term “priority” to require that the priority is associated with a 

packet. 

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E. “traffic shaping rate”

Wi-LAN proposes that the term “traffic shaping rate” be construed as “a rate used 

to accomplish traffic shaping, where the rate is used to regulate traffic flow on the 

network.” (Doc. No. 83 at 18.) LG argues that this claim term is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 

112, ¶ 2. (Doc. No. 85 at 18.) In the alternative, LG proposes that the term “traffic shaping 

rate” be construed as “a maximum quantity of data that can be selected from a particular 

logical channel queue over a particular period of time.” (Id.)

“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification 

delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, 

those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124. LG, 

as the party challenging the validity of the patents-in-suit, bears the burden of proving 

indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 n.10; 

see, e.g., Teva, 789 F.3d at 1345.

LG argues that the term “traffic shaping rate” and the related term “whose traffic 

shaping rate is not reached” is indefinite because the term “traffic shaping rate” is only 

found in the ’351 patent’s claim language, and it does not appear anywhere in the 

specification. (Doc. No. 85 at 18-19.) Although the specific term “traffic shaping rate” is 

only found in the claim language, LG concedes that the term “traffic shaping” has a plain 

and ordinary meaning. (Id. at 19; see also Doc. No. 83-30, Ex. 29 at 488-89; Doc. No. 83-

31, Ex. 30 at 466; Doc. No. 83-32, Ex. 31 at 407; Doc. No. 84-25 at 495.) 

In addition, the claim language of the ’351 patent provides guidance as to the 

meaning of the term “traffic shaping rate.” For example, claim 1 recites “[a] method of 

operating a mobile device” with multiple “logical channel queues” for data transmission,

each of which is “associated with a priority and a traffic shaping rate.” ’351 Patent at 

13:55-58. The claimed method requires that the mobile device “select[] . . . a highest 

priority logical channel queue . . . whose traffic shaping rate is not reached” and then 

“allocate a portion of the data transmission capacity available . . . to the selected logical 

channel queue.” Id. at 13:59-65. The method further requires that the “traffic shaping rate 

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associated with the selected logical channel queue” limits the allocated portion of data 

transmission capacity. Id. at 13:63-67.

Further, the specification provides additional guidance as to the meaning of the term 

“traffic shaping rate:”

[T]raffic shapers can be implemented and configured on a per logical channel 

basis. This allows, for example, voice telephony data to be transferred over 

link 40 as necessary, while other data types can be data rate limited according 

to parameters defined by the network operator. Thus, a telephony call can be 

conducted unimpeded while a file transfer or other large data transfer can be 

subject to a leaky bucket, or other traffic shaping process.

Id. at 13:26-33. Wi-LAN argues that this portion of the specification along with the claim 

language provides substantial guidance to a person of ordinary skill in the art as to the 

meaning of the term “traffic shaping rate.” (Doc. No. 91 at 7.) The Court agrees. As a 

result, LG has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the claim terms “traffic shaping 

rate” or “whose traffic shaping rate is not reached” are indefinite.

Turning to the parties’ proposed constructions for the term “traffic shaping rate,” 

LG’s proposes that the Court’s construction for this term require that the traffic shaping 

rate be the maximum quantity of data that can be selected from a particular logical channel 

queue over a period of time. (Doc. No. 85 at 18.) In response, Wi-LAN argues that LG’s 

proposed construction is not supported by the claim language. The Court agrees. Nothing 

in the claim language supports LG’s contention that traffic shaping rate sets a maximum 

cap on the data that can be selected from a logical channel queue. Indeed, to the contrary, 

claim 1 of the ’351 patent provides that under the claimed method, any remaining data 

transmission capacity will be allocated to the “logical channel queues” in their priority 

order. ’351 Patent at 14:10-14. This additional data transmission capacity would allow a 

queue to exceed its traffic shaping rate, contrary to LG’s proposed construction. 

Further, in an effort to support its proposed construction, LG relies on a passage 

from the ’351 patent’s specification. (Doc. No. 85 at 21 (citing ’351 Patent at 5:66-6:12)). 

But the cited portion of the specification does not discuss traffic shaping or traffic shaping 

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rates. See ’351 Patent at 5:66-6:12. As such, the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction.

Wi-LAN proposes that the Court construe the term “traffic shaping rate” as a rate 

used to accomplish traffic shaping where the rate is used to regulate traffic flow on the 

network. (Doc. No. 83 at 18.) Wi-LAN’s proposed construction is supported by both the 

claim language and the specification. See ’351 Patent at 13:26-33, 13:55-67. But the Court 

agrees with LG that Wi-LAN’s proposed construction is circular because it uses the words 

“traffic shaping” and “rate” within its proposed construction for the term “traffic shaping 

rate.” (Doc. No. 92 at 8.) 

In its briefing, Wi-LAN explains that under the claim language, the mobile device 

uses the “traffic shaping rate” to limit the amount of data transmission capacity allocated 

to a particular logical channel and regulate traffic follow on the network. (Doc. No. 83 at 

19.) Wi-LAN also argues that the specification teaches that the “traffic shapers” limit the 

rate at which data can be transmitted over the network. (Id.) The Court agrees with WiLAN’s interpretation, and the Court concludes that this interpretation would provide a more 

useful construction for this claim term. 

In sum, the Court adopts Wi-LAN’s proposed construction as modified, and the 

Court rejects LG’s proposed construction.

5

 The Court construes “traffic shaping rate” as 

“a limitation on the amount of data transmission capacity allocated to a particular logical 

channel queue, where the rate is used to regulate traffic flow on the network.” 

V. Disputed Claim Terms from the ’320 Patent

A. The ’320 Patent

The ’320 Patent is entitled “Pre-Allocated Random Access Identifiers.” U.S. Patent 

No. 9,226, 320 (filed Dec. 29, 2015), at (54). The invention disclosed in the ’320 patent 

relates to “[s]ystem and methods of pre-allocating identifiers to wireless devices for use in 

requesting resources over a random access channel . . . .” ’320 Patent at 1:37-39. 

 

5 The Court notes that at the claim construction hearing, Wi-LAN did not object to the Court’s 

modification of its proposed construction for this claim term.

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Claim 1 of the ’320 patent claims:

1. A method of operating a mobile station, comprising:

receiving, from a serving base station, an indication of a first reserved set of 

access identifiers usable for non-contention access over a first random access 

channel in a coverage area of the serving base station;

obtaining, during a handover of the mobile station from the serving base 

station to a target base station, an indication of a non-contention reserved 

access identifier identifying the mobile station in a coverage area of the target 

base station;

transmitting the non-contention reserved access identifier to the target base 

station over a second random access channel in the coverage area of the target 

base station;

receiving, from the target base station, a feedback message comprising a 

timing adjustment; and

adjusting at least one operating parameter of a transmission from the mobile 

station to the target base station based at least in part on the feedback message.

Id. at 21:7-25.

B. “[a/the] non-contention reserved access identifier”

Wi-LAN proposes that the claim term “[a/the] non-contention reserved access 

identifier” be construed as “[a / the] reserved code that (i) is not randomly selected by the 

mobile station, (ii) identifies a mobile station to a base station, and (iii) avoids the 

probability of collision caused by randomly selected codes on a random access channel 

during handover.” (Doc. No. 83 at 21.) LG proposes that this claim term be construed as 

““[a / the] distinct reserved code that uniquely identifies a mobile station to a target base 

station independently of when it is transmitted and avoids the probability of collision on a

random access channel during handover.” (Doc. No. 85 at 21.) 

In their proposed constructions for this claim term, the parties present several 

disputes regarding the proper scope of this claim term. First, the parties dispute whether 

the claimed identifier must be a “distinct” code that “uniquely” identifies a mobile station 

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to a “target” base station. (Doc. No. 83 at 22-23; Doc. No. 85 at 22-23.) Second, the parties 

dispute whether the claimed identifier identifies a mobile station to a base station 

“independently of when it is transmitted.” (Doc. No. 83 at 23-25; Doc. No. 85 at 23-24.) 

Third, the parties dispute whether the identifier must completely avoid collisions. (Doc. 

No. 91 at 10; Doc. No. 85 at 24-25; Doc. No. 92 at 9.) Fourth, the parties dispute whether 

the claimed identifier can be “randomly selected by the mobile station.” (Doc. No. 83 at 

21-22; Doc. No. 85 at 25.) Because the parties dispute the scope of this claim term, the 

Court must resolve the parties’ dispute. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361; Eon, 815 F.3d at 

1318. The Court addresses each of these disputes in turn below. 

i. whether the identifier is “distinct” and “unique”

Under their proposed constructions, the parties agree that the claimed “noncontention reserved access identifier” is a reserved code that identifies a mobile station to 

a base station. (Doc. No. 83 at 21; Doc. No. 85 at 21.) LG argues that the Court’s 

construction for this claim term should include the additional requirements that the 

reserved code is “distinct” and that it “uniquely” identifies a mobile station to a target base 

station. (Doc. No. 85 at 22-23.) 

The Court begins by analyzing the claim language. LG’s proposal is not supported 

by the claim language. The language in the ’320 patent’s independent claims does not 

include either the requirement that the code be distinct or that it uniquely identify a mobile 

station. See, e.g., ’320 Patent at 21:8-25. Further, contrary to LG’s position, dependent 

claim 15 recites, in its entirety: “The method of claim 12, wherein the non-contention 

reserved access identifier uniquely identifies the mobile station in the coverage area of the 

target base station.” Id. at 22:25-27; see also id. at 24:24-26. LG’s proposed construction 

would render dependent claim 15 meaningless. The Federal Circuit has explained that 

“‘each claim in a patent is presumptively different in scope.’ Thus, in a situation where 

dependent claims have no meaningful difference other than an added limitation, the 

independent claim is not restricted by the added limitation in the dependent claim.” 

Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1370 

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(Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, it would be improper to construe the claims to import the single 

additional limitation from dependent claim 15 into the independent claims of the ’320 

patent.

To support its contention that the Court’s construction should include these two 

requirements, LG relies on several passages in the ’320 patent’s specification. (Doc. No. 

85 at 22 (citing ’320 Patent at 2:66-3:1, 5:22-28, 6:26-28, 8:25-36, 15:64-67, 19:25-31, 

19:58-61).) But in each of these passages, the specification is describing a preferred 

embodiment. See ’320 Patent at 2:63. “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred 

embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the 

claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims 

to be so limited.” Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1327; accord GE Lighting Sols., 750 F.3d at 

1309. Here, there is no such clear indication. Indeed, to the contrary, in many of the cited 

passages the specification uses permissive language in describing the features. See, e.g., 

’320 Patent at 6:14-15 (“an embodiment of a base station”), 8:25-26 (“[t]he configuration 

module 220 can pre-allocate a distinct code”), 15:64 (“[t]he base station can pre-allocate a 

distinct code”). As a result, the Court rejects LG’s reliance of these portions of the 

specification.

Finally, LG relies on statements made by Wi-LAN during the prosecution history, 

specifically inter partes review proceedings involving the ’320 patent. (Doc. No. 85 at 22 

(citing Doc. No. 84-29, Ex. 29 at 5, 19; Doc. No. 84-30, Ex. 30 at 4, 22, 35; Doc. No. 84-

32, Ex. 32 at 5, 7).) LG argues that during the IPR proceedings Wi-LAN repeatedly 

confirmed that the claimed “non-contention reserved access identifier” must uniquely 

identify the mobile station to the target base station. (Id.) “[S]tatements made by a patent 

owner during an IPR proceeding can be considered during claim construction and relied 

upon to support a finding of prosecution disclaimer.” Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 

856 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “Under the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer, a 

patentee may limit the meaning of a claim term by making a clear and unmistakable 

disavowal of scope during prosecution.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 

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F.3d 1123, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 

F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Prosecution disclaimer or disavowal must be clear and 

unmistakable.”). 

The Court has reviewed the statements at issue and the cited statement do not contain 

a clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope. Many of the cited passages do not 

even use the word “unique” or “uniquely.” (See Doc. No. 84-29, Ex. 29 at 5, 19; Doc. No. 

84-30, Ex. 30 at 4, 22, 35.) In Wi-LAN’s June 8, 2018 preliminary response, Wi-LAN 

refers to identifiers that are “not unique,” but Wi-LAN only does so in describing a prior 

art reference, not the claimed invention. (Doc. No. 84-32, Ex. 32 at 7.) This is insufficient 

to constitute a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope. In sum, the Court rejects 

LG’s proposal to include in its claim construction the requirements that the reserved code 

is “distinct” and that it “uniquely” identifies a mobile station to a target base station.

ii. whether the claimed identifier identifies a mobile station to a base 

station “independently of when it is transmitted” 

LG argues that the Court’s construction for the term “non-contention reserved access 

identifier” should include the requirement that the code identify the mobile station 

“independently of when it is transmitted.” (Doc. No. 85 at 23-24.) But there is no support 

for this particular limitation in the intrinsic record. In its briefing, LG fails to identify any

passage in the claim language or the specification of the ’320 patent stating that the code 

identifies a mobile station independent of when it is transmitted. Instead, LG relies on 

passages in the specification reciting that the claimed invention utilizes “pre-allocated 

codes.” (Doc. No. 85 at 23 (citing ’320 Patent at Abstract, 1:42-49, 3:1-7).) LG argues 

that because the invention utilizes codes and not unique transmission times, the Court’s 

construction should include LG’s proposed limitation. (Id.) The Court disagrees. The 

Court declines to import a limitation into the claims that does not appear anywhere in the 

intrinsic record.

iii. whether the identifier must “avoid the probability of collisions”

The parties agree that the claimed “non-contention reserved access identifier” is a 

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reserved code that “avoids the probability of collision” “on a random access channel during 

handover.” (Doc. No. 83 at 21; Doc. No. 85 at 21.) Wi-LAN asserts that the claimed 

identifier specifically avoids the probably of collision caused by randomly selected codes, 

whereas LG asserts that the claimed identifier must completely avoid and eliminate any 

collisions. (Doc. No. 85 at 24; Doc. No. 92 at 9.) 

Here, the parties’ dispute can be resolved by a review of the intrinsic record, 

specifically the ’320 patent’s specification.6

 In the summary of the invention section, the 

specification recites a base station that “reduces the probability of random access channel 

collisions” by pre-allocating codes to select wireless devices. ’320 Patent at 1:42-46. In 

this passage, the specification refers to reducing collisions, not eliminating them, contrary 

to LG’s position. The specification further states: “The use of pre-allocated codes avoids 

the collision probability associated with random subscriber selected access codes.” Id. at 

3:1-3. This passage is nearly identical to and supports Wi-LAN’s proposed construction, 

and it does not support LG’s position.

To support its contention, LG notes that during the IPR proceedings Wi-LAN stated 

that the claimed identifier “avoids” collision. (Doc. No. 85 at 24 (citing Doc. No. 84-32, 

Ex. 32 at 5, 44-45; Doc. No. 84-33, Ex. 33 ¶¶ 107, 138; Doc. No. 84-29, Ex. 29 at 4, 17-

19; Doc. No. 84-30, Ex. 30 at 16; Doc. No. 84-34 ¶ 44; Doc. No. 84-35, Ex. 35 at 106-09, 

112).) But this is of no aid to LG. In the cited passages, Wi-LAN merely takes the same 

position that it takes in its current claim construction briefing, that the claimed identifier 

specifically avoids the probably of collision caused by randomly selected codes. (See, e.g., 

Doc. No. 84-32, Ex. 32 at 5 (“The ’320 Patent solves the aforementioned problems using 

pre-allocated codes that prevent collisions caused by randomly chosen identifiers . . . .”); 

Doc. No. 84-29, Ex. 29 at 4 (same), at 17 (“The ’320 Patent, in contrast, ‘avoids the 

collision probability associated with random subscriber selected access codes . . . .’”) In 

 

6 The ’320 patent’s claim language does not specifically refer to “avoid[ing] collisions.” See ’320 

Patent at 21:8-24:26.

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the cited passages, Wi-LAN never takes the position that the claimed identifier eliminates 

any and all collisions. In sum, the Court rejects LG’s contention that the claimed identifier 

must completely avoid and eliminate any collisions.

iv. whether the reserved code can be “randomly selected by the mobile

station”

Wi-LAN argues that the Court’s construction for this claim term should include the 

limitation that the reserved code “is not randomly selected by the mobile station.” (Doc. 

No. 83 at 21-22.) The Court begins its analysis by reviewing the claim language. None of 

the claims include the proposed requirement that the code is not randomly selected.

To support its proposed construction, Wi-LAN relies on the following passage from 

the ’320 patent’s specification: 

The code assignment module 320 can presume that those codes absent from 

the usage type map represent codes reserved for pre-allocation, and that the 

reserved codes are not to be randomly selected for a random access channel 

request and can indicate in the storage device that the codes are reserved or 

can otherwise indicate that the codes are not available for selection.

’320 Patent at 12:50-56. But in the cited passage, the specification is describing a preferred 

embodiment of the invention. See id. at 2:53-55, 2:63-64. “[I]t is improper to read 

limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the 

only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the 

patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1327; accord GE 

Lighting Sols., 750 F.3d at 1309. Here, there is no such clear indication. In the passage at 

issue, the specification uses permissive language in explaining that the code assignment 

module “can presume” this. See ’320 Patent at 12:50-51. The passage does not state that 

this must occur.

In addition, the Court notes that in its decision granting IPR, the PTAB declined to 

import Wi-LAN’s proposed limitation into the claims. (Doc. No. 84-38, Ex. 38 at 25-26.) 

Although this decision is not binding on the Court, the Court finds the reasoning and 

analysis presented by the PTAB with respect to this issue persuasive. Wi-LAN notes that 

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in the PTAB’s September 5, 2018 decision granting IPR, the PTAB applied a different 

claim construction standard – the broadest reasonable interpretation standard – than the 

standard utilized by district courts. (Doc. No. 91 at 9.) Wi-LAN is correct. Although 

beginning on October 11, 2018, the PTAB now uses the same claim construction standard 

that is utilized by district courts – the Phillips standard, see 37 C.F.R. 42.100(b), at the time 

of the September 5, 2018 decision, the PTAB was still utilizing the broadest reasonable 

interpretation standard. (See Doc. No. 84-38, Ex. 38 at 6.)

Nevertheless, this is of no consequence because, in the analysis at issue, the PTAB 

utilized the legal principle that claims should not be limited to preferred embodiments or 

specific examples in the specification. (Doc. No. 84-38, Ex. 38 at 25-26 (citing Williamson 

v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).) This same legal 

principle applies to district court claim constructions under the Phillips standard. Indeed, 

Williamson is an appeal from a district court’s claim construction under the Phillips

standard. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1345.

Wi-LAN also argues that the PTAB’s analysis relied on the contention that there is 

a distinction between the “preallocated codes” in the specification and the “non-contention 

reserved access identifies” in the claims, but that LG has subsequently conceded the two 

are the same.7

 (Doc. No. 91 at 9.) Even assuming Wi-LAN is correct, this is of no 

consequence because the PTAB also rejected Wi-LAN’s claim construction proposal on 

the grounds that Wi-LAN improperly sought to import limitations from preferred 

embodiments in the specification into the claims. (See Doc. No. 84-38, Ex. 38 at 25-26 

(citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).) It is 

this portion of the PTAB’s analysis that the Court finds persuasive and consistent with the 

 

7 At the claim construction hearing, Wi-LAN asserted that this concession occurred during a recent 

trial before the PTAB during the relevant IPR proceedings, and Wi-LAN offered to supplement the record 

to provide the Court with the transcripts from the PTAB proceedings. The Court declines Wi-LAN’s offer 

to supplement the record with the transcript as it is unnecessary for resolution of the present claim 

construction dispute because, for the purposes of this analysis, the Court will assume that Wi-LAN’s 

representation is correct.

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Court’s own analysis. 

To support its proposed claim construction, Wi-LAN cites to only descriptions of 

preferred embodiments in the specification. (See Doc. No. 83 at 21 (’320 Patent at 12:52-

54, 7:37-40); Doc. No. 91 at 8-9 (citing ’320 Patent at 12:5-54, 7:37-40).) And Wi-LAN 

has failed to identify any language within those passages that would constitute a clear 

disclaimer. As a result, the Court rejects Wi-LAN’s proposal to include the limitation that 

the reserved code “is not randomly selected by the mobile station.”

v. conclusion

In sum, the Court adopts in part Wi-LAN’s proposed construction for this claim 

term, and the Court rejects LG’s proposed construction. The Court construes the claim 

term “[a/the] non-contention reserved access identifier” as “[a / the] reserved code that (i)

identifies a mobile station to a base station, and (ii) avoids the probability of collision 

caused by randomly selected codes on a random access channel during handover.” 

Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court adopts the constructions set forth above. In 

addition, the Court denies LG’s motion for partial summary judgment that certain claims 

of the ’924 patent are invalid as indefinite. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 28, 2019

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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