Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05459/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05459-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARYLON BOYD, for herself and as

Executor of the Estate of CAMMERIN

BOYD, deceased, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-04-5459 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR BIFURCATION AND

MOTION TO STAY; VACATING

HEARING

(Docket No. 41)

Before the Court is defendants’ motion, filed February 8, 2006, for bifurcation of

claims at trial, pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to stay

discovery on such claims. Plaintiff has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. 

Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court

deems the motion suitable for decision on the papers, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the

hearing scheduled for March 17, 2006, and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

The instant action arises out of the death of Cammerin Boyd (“Boyd”) on May 5,

2004. (See Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff Marylon Boyd is Boyd’s mother and the executor of his

estate; plaintiffs Isabel Gonzalez and Kanani Boyd are Boyd’s children. (See id. ¶ 3.) 

Plaintiffs allege Boyd was shot and killed by San Francisco police officers while he was

attempting to surrender. (See id.) According to plaintiffs, Boyd was a double amputee with

prosthetic legs below the knees, was unarmed, and did nothing to provoke the shooting. 

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(See id. ¶ 20.) Because of his disability, plaintiffs allege, Boyd could not run or get down on

the ground, and required assistance when walking or standing. (See id.) Plaintiffs allege

Boyd told the officers, before he was shot, that he did not have legs. (See id.) 

The instant action was filed December 27, 2004 against defendants City and County

of San Francisco (“City”), San Francisco Police Chief Heather J. Fong (“Chief Fong”), and

San Francisco police officers William Elieff, Gregory Kane, James O’Malley, Timothy Paine,

and Steven Stearns (collectively, “individual officers”). Plaintiffs assert the following causes

of action:

1. A claim against the individual officers, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for use of

excessive force resulting in deprivation of Boyd’s life and liberty in violation of the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and deprivation of plaintiffs’

right to Boyd’s companionship in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;

2. A claim against the City, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. New York

City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), based on asserted policies and

practices of (1) permitting and encouraging police officers to use violence against AfricanAmericans and members of other minority groups; (2) refusing to investigate and taking no

responsive action to known incidents of unjustified shootings and violent acts by police

officers; (3) maintaining an inadequate system of “use of force reports”; (4) preparing

inadequate investigative reports designed to vindicate the use of force; and (5) failing to

adequately train officers in the proper use of force.

3. A claim against the City and Chief Fong, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on

supervisory liability for the individual officers’ constitutional violations;

4. A claim against all defendants for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act,

42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., based on asserted discrimination against Boyd because of his

disability and the City’s asserted failure to train officers in the proper manner of detaining

individuals with physical disabilities and restricted mobility;

5. A claim against all defendants for wrongful death;

6. A survival action against all defendants to recover damages for Boyd’s pain and

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suffering; and

7. A claim against all defendants for negligence and negligent hiring, supervision

and retention.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court, in

furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive

to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,

counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue, . . . always preserving inviolate

the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as

given by a statute of the United States.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek to bifurcate the trial of plaintiffs’ claims in such manner that

plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers would be tried separately from their claims

against the City and Chief Fong. Defendants further seek to stay discovery on the claims

against the City and Chief Fong until plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers are

adjudicated.

For the reasons stated in defendants’ motion and reply, the Court finds bifurcation, in

the manner proposed by defendants, is appropriate. In particular, as defendants have

shown, bifurcation will avoid prejudice to the individual officers, as the evidence relevant to

the claims against the individual officers does not overlap in any meaningful way with the

evidence relevant to the claims against the City and Chief Fong. See, e.g., Quintanilla v.

City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming exclusion of Monell evidence

from separate trial of excessive force claims against individual officers because “[a]dmitting

evidence pertaining to the Monell issue could well have unfairly prejudiced the Chief and

city and confused the jury as it considered the individual officers’ actions.”) 

Further, as defendants point out, bifurcation is conducive to expedition and economy

because a finding that the individual officers did not deprive Boyd of his constitutional or

statutory rights or negligently cause his death is dispositive of plaintiffs’ claims against the

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 Although plaintiffs correctly note that a municipality may be held directly liable

under § 1983 where a plaintiff shows that the “municipality itself violated someone’s rights

or that it directed its employee to do so,” see Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290

F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002), there is no such allegation of direct liability in the instant

action.

2

 A municipality may be held liable for injuries caused by an employee even where

the employee is entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-52, 657 (1980) (holding individual officers’ entitlement to qualified

immunity does not immunize municipalities from Monell liability); see also Gibson v. County

of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting “a municipality may be

liable if an individual officer is exonerated on the basis of the defense of qualified

immunity”).

4

City and Chief Fong. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)

(“[N]either Monell . . . nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages against

a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has

concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”);1

 see also Fairley v. Luman, 281

F. 3d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Exoneration of [the individual officer] of the charge of

excessive force precludes municipal liability for the alleged unconstitutional use of such

force.”); Quintanilla, 84 F. 3d at 356 (holding where trier of fact found individual officers did

not use excessive force, trial court “correctly entered judgment” for police chief and

municipality; distinguishing case where officer’s exoneration based on qualified immunity);

Scott v. Henrich, 39 F. 3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding, where individual officers were

entitled to judgment on ground they did not use excessive force, municipality was entitled to

judgment on claim municipality failed to adequately train officers).

The same reasons provide good cause for a stay of discovery with respect to the

claims against the City and Chief Fong until plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers

are adjudicated. As plaintiffs acknowledge, in order to prove the unlawful municipal policies

alleged, plaintiffs may require discovery with respect to, inter alia, incidents involving nonparty officers. (See Opp. at 14.) Because such discovery has no apparent relevance to

the claims against the individual officer defendants herein, a stay will conserve the

resources of the parties and the Court by deferring such discovery until such time as one or

more of the individual officers has been found liable or entitled to qualified immunity.2

 See

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (providing courts may issue protective order to effect that discovery

“may be had only on specified terms and conditions” in order “to protect a party or person

from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, defendants’ motion for bifurcation is hereby GRANTED, and

plaintiffs’ claims against the individual officers shall be tried separately from the claims

asserted against the City and Chief Fong. All discovery relating solely to the claims against

the City and Chief Fong is hereby stayed until such time as one or more of the individual

officers has been found liable or entitled to qualified immunity. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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