Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02814/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02814-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

14cv2814-DMS (DHB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TERRELL DESHON LEMONS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

ALEJANDRO CAMARILLO, et al. , 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 14cv2814-DMS (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

 Plaintiff Terrell Deshon Lemons, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Centinela State 

Prison (“Centinela”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a variety of claims against fourteen Centinela staff members.1

 

Defendant Camarillo has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

                                                                

1 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint names the following Centinela staff members 

as defendants: Correctional Officer Alejandro Camarillo, Warden Domingo Uribe; 

Lieutenant C.S. McWilliams, Officer J. Butcher, Captain M. Greenwood, Sergeant Debra 

Pollard, Officer D. Zamora, Lieutenant L. Valenzuela, Sergeant Cortez, Officer R. Castro, 

Lieutenant J. Sias, Shady Villalobos L.V.N., I.S.U. Officer S. Luker, and Warden Amy 

Miller. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff sues Defendants Uribe and Villalobos in their individual 

and official capacities. (Id.) Plaintiff sues all other Defendants in their individual capacity 

only. (Id.) 

Case 3:14-cv-02814-DMS-RNB Document 45 Filed 09/30/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
2 

14cv2814-DMS (DHB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(ECF No. 11.) Defendant Camarillo also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s official capacity 

claims against him. (Id.) The remaining thirteen Defendants have joined in the Motion to 

Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 43 and 44.) 

 After a thorough review of the pleadings and the parties’ submissions, this Court 

hereby RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff commenced this action on November 25, 2014 by filing a form Complaint 

and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On January 20, 2015, 

the Honorable Dana M. Sabraw granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and, following an initial screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), directed U.S. Marshal to serve the Complaint on Plaintiff’s 

behalf. (ECF No. 3.) In his original Complaint, Plaintiff indicated that he may not have 

exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his lawsuit. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) 

Specifically, in response to a prompt on the form Complaint regarding exhaustion, Plaintiff 

stated “Being that there was clear indication that this incident would be referred to the D.A. 

for prosecution – I was adviced [sic] by my public defender to not initiate any court relief 

until he litigate [sic] my case, and the case is adjudicated. (Brian Bells, P.D.). By the time 

the Plaintiff’s case was completed, and while all administration [sic] remedies was 

postponed . . . one year, 8 months have passed – at which time, the appeals coordinator 

time barred my complaint.” (Id., ellipses original.) 

 On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. 

(ECF No. 6.) On April 13, 2015, the motion was granted, and Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint was filed. (ECF No. 7, 8.) Plaintiff added additional Defendants and causes of 

action in the First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff also amended his 

allegations regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies. Plaintiff stated “The Plaintiff 

has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to all claims and all defendants.” 

(Id. at 11.) 

Case 3:14-cv-02814-DMS-RNB Document 45 Filed 09/30/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 6
3 

14cv2814-DMS (DHB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 On May 11, 2015, Defendant Camarillo filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (ECF 

No. 11.) Defendant Camarillo contends Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies, and his failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the Complaint. Defendant 

Camarillo also argues he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for acts he 

performed in his official capacity. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion on 

June 17, 2015. (ECF No. 23.) Defendant Camarillo filed a reply on July 16, 2015. (ECF 

No. 39.) On September 2, 2015, Defendants Butcher, Luker, Uribe, Castro, Miller, 

Greenwood, Cortez, Sias, McWilliams, Zamora, Villalobos, and Pollard joined in the 

motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 43.) Defendant Valenzuela joined in the motion on 

September 21, 2015. (ECF No. 44.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because 

Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive 

merits, “a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion 

to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ [Citation omitted.] 

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570). “All 

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). “In a civil rights 

case where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and 

must afford [the] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim–Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 

/ / / 

Case 3:14-cv-02814-DMS-RNB Document 45 Filed 09/30/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 6
4 

14cv2814-DMS (DHB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal 

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion 

is “mandatory.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 

U.S. 731, 739 (2001)); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Jones 

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). “In a typical PLRA case, a defendant will have to 

present probative evidence [in a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment] . . . that the 

prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies under § 1997e(a).” Albino v. Baca, 

747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). However, “in . . . rare cases where a failure 

to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may successfully move to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (citing 

Jones, 549 U.S. at 215-16; Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (per 

curiam) (“[A]ffirmative defenses may not be raised by motion to dismiss, but this is not 

true when, as here, the defense raises no disputed issues of fact.”); Aquilar-Avellaveda v. 

Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[O]nly in rare cases will a district court be 

able to conclude from the face of the complaint that a prisoner has not exhausted his 

administrative remedies and that he is without a valid excuse.”)). 

 Here, Defendant Camarillo argues that is it clear from the face of the Complaint that 

Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, Defendant Camarillo 

moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). However, Defendant’s argument is premised 

on Plaintiff’s allegations as they appeared in the original Complaint, and not the First 

Amended Complaint. In the First Amended Complaint – which is the operative complaint 

– Petitioner alleges that he “has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to all 

claims and all Defendants.” (See ECF No. 8 at 11, ¶ 54.) Thus, it is not evident from the 

face of the First Amended Complaint that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative 

Case 3:14-cv-02814-DMS-RNB Document 45 Filed 09/30/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 6
5 

14cv2814-DMS (DHB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

remedies. Moreover, the Court cannot consider the evidence Plaintiff presented in his 

opposition to the Motion to Dismiss to find a failure to exhaust. Schneider v. California 

Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the propriety 

of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s 

moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendants’ motion to dismiss.”). 

Therefore, the Court finds this case is not among the “rare cases” where dismissal for 

failure to exhaust is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies be DENIED without prejudice to the filing of a Rule 56 motion for summary 

judgment. 

 B. Official Capacity Claims 

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he is suing Defendants Camarillo and 

Villalobos in both their official and individual capacities. (ECF No. 8 at ¶¶ 5, 12.) 

Defendant Camarillo contends that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for 

acts he performed in his official capacity. Although Defendant Villalobos has not 

specifically argued she is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court 

will construe her joinder in the Motion to Dismiss as also requesting dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

claims against her in her official capacity. 

 “The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from private damage actions brought 

in federal court.” Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997). The 

Eleventh Amendment also bars § 1983 suits for money damages against state officers in 

their official capacities unless the state waives such immunity. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 

2007); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); 

Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Here, Plaintiff sued Defendants Camarillo and Villalobos in both their official and 

individual capacities for money damages. (ECF No. 8 at ¶¶ 5, 12.) Since the State of 

California has not waived immunity, Defendants Camarillo and Villalobos are immune 

Case 3:14-cv-02814-DMS-RNB Document 45 Filed 09/30/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 6
6 

14cv2814-DMS (DHB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

from Plaintiff’s suit for money damages in regard to actions taken in their official capacities 

as state officers. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss the claims for money damages against Defendants Camarillo and Villalobos in 

their official capacities be GRANTED. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Dana M. Sabraw pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.3. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District 

Judge issue an order GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than October 14, 2015, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply 

to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

October 24, 2015. 

 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 30, 2015 

Case 3:14-cv-02814-DMS-RNB Document 45 Filed 09/30/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 6