Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02538/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02538-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2538

___________

Henry Szabla, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, a *

Minnesota municipality; City of *

Crystal, Minnesota, a Minnesota * Appeal from the United States

municipality; Steven Baker, a canine * District Court for the 

officer of the of City of Brooklyn Park, * District of Minnesota.

individually, and in his official *

capacity as a Police Officer of the City *

of Brooklyn Park; Officer Justin *

Tourville; Sgt. Stephen Holm, *

individually, and in their official *

capacities as Police Officers of the * 

City of Crystal, *

*

Appellees. * 

___________

Submitted: April 18, 2006

Filed: May 18, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON, WOLLMAN, ARNOLD,

MURPHY, BYE, RILEY, MELLOY, SMITH, COLLOTON, GRUENDER,

and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

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The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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Henry Szabla appeals the district court’s1

 grant of summary judgment in favor

of the appellees on his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Minnesota

law. A panel of this court affirmed the dismissal of most claims, but reversed the

district court’s grant of summary judgment on Szabla’s claim for municipal liability

against the City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 429

F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 2005). We granted the City’s petition for rehearing en banc

limited to the question of Brooklyn Park’s municipal liability, and we now affirm that

portion of the judgment as well.

I.

At about 1:20 a.m. on August 17, 2000, police officers from the City of Crystal,

Minnesota, responded to a report that an automobile had struck a tree near Becker

Park. The officers found the car, which had been abandoned, and they saw that the

car’s windshield had been shattered and there was an imprint where a person’s head

had struck the windshield. The officers called the registered owner of the car, who

said he had previously sold it. The officers then began to search for the driver, and

one of the officers determined that assistance from a police canine would help to find

the driver. The Crystal Police Department did not have a canine unit, so the officers

requested assistance from the City of Brooklyn Park. Brooklyn Park dispatched one

of its canines, Rafco, with his handler, Officer Steven Baker, to the scene.

When Baker and Rafco arrived at the abandoned car, Baker discovered a

screwdriver, which he thought could have been used as a burglary tool or weapon, and

observed “property” in the back seat of the car, which Baker believed could have been

the fruits of a burglary. Baker testified that because officers did not know whether

they were looking for a criminal suspect or an innocent injured person, he gave Rafco

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the command to “track,” which is the command for Rafco to apprehend or bite the

individual he is tracking. Baker said that he chose not to give Rafco the command to

“search,” a command that directs the dog to refrain from biting a person, because he

was concerned about officer safety in the event the dog led him to a criminal suspect.

Baker began to search Becker Park once Rafco acquired a scent emanating from

the crashed automobile. Baker had Rafco on a fifteen-foot leash, but provided the

canine with only about a six-foot lead. He did not shout a warning that a police dog

was in the area. Rafco led Baker through the park to a shelter within the park. Once

Rafco entered the shelter, he bit Szabla, who had been asleep in the shelter. (Szabla

slept in the park, which closed at 11 p.m., because it was across the street from a

temporary employment agency that hired workers on a daily basis). Szabla kicked

Rafco off, and Rafco bit Szabla a second time. Baker ordered Szabla to show his

hands, and Baker instructed Rafco to release Szabla once he complied with the order.

The Crystal officers arrived moments later, and they temporarily arrested Szabla. The

officers released Szabla within two minutes, after verifying that he was not involved

in the automobile accident. Szabla testified that when the officers were walking away,

he heard one of them say, “I gave the dog too much leash.” Szabla reported that he

suffered 23 punctures on his legs and hip.

Szabla brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Minnesota state

law against the cities of Crystal and Brooklyn Park, as well as the individual officers

involved. The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

The district court concluded that Baker had used excessive force against Szabla, in

violation of Szabla’s Fourth Amendment rights, by commanding Rafco to “track,” or

bite and hold, without first providing a warning. The court held, however, that Baker

was protected by qualified immunity, because the right to a warning was not clearly

established at the time of the incident. The court also dismissed Szabla’s claims

arising under § 1983 against the Crystal police officers and the City of Crystal, as well

as Szabla’s claims under Minnesota law against all of the defendants. A panel of our

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court affirmed the judgment of the district court on each of these claims, Szabla, 429

F.3d at 1173-75, 1176-77, and they are not within the scope of this rehearing.

Szabla also raised a claim of municipal liability under § 1983 against the City

of Brooklyn Park. The district court held that Szabla failed to specify which of

Brooklyn Park’s policies was allegedly unconstitutional, and ruled that the “isolated

incident” of Rafco biting Szabla could not support a claim that the City acted with

deliberate indifference by failing adequately to train its officers. The district court

concluded that Szabla had not raised an argument, comparable to that discussed in

Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 603-07 (8th Cir. 2004), that the City was

liable for adopting a policy that authorized police officers to use a canine to bite and

hold a suspect, but did not mandate that the officer give an advance warning. A panel

of our court concluded that Szabla had adequately raised a claim based on Kuha in the

district court, and held that he presented sufficient evidence to overcome Brooklyn

Park’s motion for summary judgment. 429 F.3d at 1175-76. We granted rehearing

en banc to consider the merits of this claim for municipal liability.

II.

Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality is a “person” that can be

liable under § 1983. Id. at 690. At the same time, the Court concluded that a

municipality may not be found liable “unless action pursuant to official municipal

policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id. at 691. The Court did not

address the full contours of municipal liability under § 1983, but established that a

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municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, that is, solely

because it employs a tortfeasor. Id.

Monell was a case where the city’s policy was itself unconstitutional. The

policy compelled a constitutional violation by requiring pregnant female employees

to take unpaid leaves of absence before their absences from work were medically

necessary. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The potential

for municipal liability in that situation is well established, because a constitutional

violation flows directly from a policymaker’s deliberate choice reflected in an official

policy or action. E.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 484-85

(1986); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 251-52 (1981); Owen

v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 627-29, 633 & n.13 (1980). “Where a plaintiff

claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an

employee to do so, resolving [the] issues of fault and causation is straightforward.”

Bd. of the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997). To establish a

constitutional violation, no evidence is needed other than a statement of the municipal

policy and its exercise. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985)

(plurality opinion).

But where an official policy is lawful on its face and does not compel

unconstitutional action by an employee of the municipality, the analysis is different.

As a plurality of the Court remarked in Tuttle, “[o]bviously, if one retreats far enough

from a constitutional violation some municipal ‘policy’ can be identified behind

almost any such harm inflicted by a municipal official.” Id. at 823 (plurality opinion).

Accordingly, “some limitation must be placed on establishing municipal liability

through policies that are not themselves unconstitutional, or the test set out in Monell

[foreclosing respondeat superior liability] will become a dead letter.” Id.

The appropriate limitation was addressed in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378 (1989), which involved an allegation that constitutional violations resulted from

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a municipality’s failure adequately to train its police force. The Court explained that

“‘[m]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where – and only where – a deliberate

choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives’ by city

policymakers.” Id. at 389 (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84 (plurality opinion)).

Where a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is asserted that a municipality should

have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its employees, a plaintiff must

establish the existence of a “policy” by demonstrating that the inadequacies were a

product of deliberate or conscious choice by policymakers. Id. The standard of fault

in that situation is “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights. Id. at 388.

“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but

nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and

causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for

the actions of its employee.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. “[A] plaintiff seeking to

establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has

led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the municipal

action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious

consequences.” Id. at 407 (emphasis added). Thus, only where a municipality’s

failure to adopt adequate safeguards was the product of deliberate indifference to the

constitutional rights of its inhabitants will the municipality be liable for an

unconstitutional policy under § 1983. Id. at 406-07; see also City of Canton, 489 U.S.

at 391-92; id. at 394-96 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);

Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 757 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The circuits

have uniformly interpreted Canton’s ‘deliberate indifference’ requirement, announced

in the context of a ‘failure to train’ claim, to apply to all cases involving facially

constitutional policies.”).

Our court has long followed this approach. In Dick v. Watonwan County, 738

F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1984), we held that where a municipality adopted a policy that left

discretion to individual officials, two of whom later acted unconstitutionally, the

policy did not give rise to liability under § 1983. Id. at 943. We explained that

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because the policy did not “affirmatively sanction” unconstitutional actions, it was not

an unconstitutional policy, and it could not be the “moving force” of any

constitutional violation. Id. We said that the municipality’s governing board “might

have chosen to adopt more detailed guidelines, and such rules might have averted the

mistake that was made in this case,” but the board’s decision to rely on the judgment

of its employees was “certainly not unconstitutional in and of itself.” Id. at 942. In

Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1985), we reiterated that a plaintiff

asserting municipal liability “must show not only that a policy or custom existed, and

that it was causally related to the plaintiff’s injury, but that the policy itself was

unconstitutional.” Id. at 1367 (emphasis added). We have continued to apply this

reasoning more recently in Golberg v. Hennepin County, 417 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir.

2005), which implemented the Supreme Court’s guidance in Brown and City of

Canton. Because each of these cases involved a municipal policy that was facially

lawful, we analyzed the sufficiency of the claims under the “deliberate indifference”

standard of fault first adopted by our court in Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220,

1224 (8th Cir. 1981), and ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court in City of

Canton. Golberg, 417 F.3d at 812; Patzner, 779 F.2d at 1367; Dick, 738 F.2d at 943.

Accord Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, 452 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A county

is liable if an action or policy itself violated federal law, or if the action or policy was

lawful on its face but led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights [and] was taken

with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.”) (internal

quotation omitted); Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton First Nat’l Bank, 245 F.3d 721,

742 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ‘policy’ of using ‘Directions to the Sheriff’ forms is not

itself unconstitutional, as an express policy or affirmative custom must be to create

municipal liability”), judgment vacated & opinion reinstated in relevant part by 286

F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 

Applying these standards to Szabla’s claim, we conclude that the City of

Brooklyn Park was entitled to summary judgment on the claim of municipal liability.

Brooklyn Park’s written policy concerning the use of dogs is lawful on its face.

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Directive 331, promulgated by the chief of police, permits the use of canines in five

circumstances, including “in arresting known dangerous criminals who will, or might

offer physical resistance to the arresting officer or who might attempt to flee or escape

custody,” and “in search and apprehension work for” criminals and suspects who

might pose a risk to other citizens. (App. at 464). We assume that employment of

canines in “arresting known dangerous criminals” or in “apprehension work” will

sometimes involve using a dog to bite and hold a suspect, but it is not unconstitutional

to use dogs for those purposes. Directive 331 also recognizes that the “use of police

dogs may constitute the use of force,” (id. at 461), but provides that “[u]se of police

dogs shall be in accordance with use of force statutes and Department Policy,” (id. at

464), and another policy, Directive 333, expressly forbids a police officer to use

“unreasonable, unnecessary or unlawful force.” (Id. at 466). These policies as written

are not unconstitutional.

A constitutional problem may arise based on the manner in which the canines

are used. We held in 2004 that “a jury could properly find it objectively unreasonable

to use a police dog trained in the bite and hold method without first giving the suspect

a warning and opportunity for peaceful surrender.” Kuha, 365 F.3d at 598. Our grant

of rehearing in this case was limited to the issues of municipal liability raised in

Brooklyn Park’s petition for rehearing, see Order (Feb. 23, 2006), so we accept

Kuha’s Fourth Amendment holding for purposes of analysis, and assume there is a

submissible case that Officer Baker was required to give a warning before using his

police dog to bite and hold. See Szabla, 429 F.3d at 1173 (panel opinion). But even

so, Brooklyn Park’s directives do not affirmatively sanction the use of the dogs in an

unconstitutional manner. The policy is simply silent concerning the circumstances

under which an officer should provide a warning before a canine is directed to bite and

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Authorities from other circuits cited by the dissent are not inconsistent with our

conclusion, because they involve instances in which a municipality affirmatively

sanctioned unconstitutional conduct by its employees. The city in Garner v. Memphis

Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1993), affirmatively “taught Officer Hymon that it

was proper to shoot a fleeing burglary suspect in order to prevent escape.” Id. at 364.

The city in O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1994), adopted an

official policy to follow the teachings of an expert consultant who trained police

officers that search warrants were not required in “critical incidents,” although the

Fourth Amendment did require warrants. Id. at 1004. The city in Matthias v. Bingley,

906 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1990), engaged in “persistent, widespread, and longstanding

practices” that violated constitutional rights and constituted “a custom that fairly

represent[ed] municipal policy.” Id. at 1054. The city’s policy in Kostrzewa v. City

of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 645 (6th Cir. 2001), allegedly required police officers to apply

handcuffs to all detainees, even when the handcuffs necessarily caused severe pain

and risk of injury. And the county in Tardiff v. Knox County, 397 F. Supp. 2d 115,

131 (D. Me. 2005), implemented a policy requiring employees to strip-search all

felony detainees, even when such a search was constitutionally unreasonable.

3

The separate doctrine providing for municipal liability in a case of widespread

unconstitutional practices that constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law” is

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hold a suspect. The directives do not reflect a deliberate choice by policymakers to

refrain from warning citizens about the use of dogs.

Indeed, Szabla’s principal contention has been that the City’s “failure to have

a policy” giving guidance on the use of canines “foster[ed] the use of excessive force,”

and thus amounted to a constitutional violation. (Br. of Appellant at 26) (emphasis

added). As we have explained, however, a written policy that is facially

constitutional, but fails to give detailed guidance that might have averted a

constitutional violation by an employee, does not itself give rise to municipal liability.

There is still potential for municipal liability based on a policy in that situation, but

only where a city’s inaction reflects a deliberate indifference to the constitutional

rights of the citizenry, such that inadequate training or supervision actually represents

the city’s “policy.”3

 

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not at issue in this case. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 796 (1997);

St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion).

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The evidence presented on this record is insufficient to make a submissible case

of deliberate indifference. The evidence does not show that Brooklyn Park had a

history of police officers unreasonably using canines to apprehend suspects without

advance warning, such that the need for additional training or supervision was plain.

See Brown, 520 U.S. at 407-08; City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 & n.10. So far as the

record reveals, this was a one-time incident, and there is no evidence of a pattern of

constitutional violations making it “obvious” that additional training or safeguards

were necessary. Id. at 390 & n.10; see also id. at 397 (O’Connor, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part). We agree with the district court that this “isolated

incident” cannot support a claim that the City acted with deliberate indifference by

inadequately training its officers on the use of canines. See Dick, 738 F.2d at 943; see

also Brown, 520 U.S. at 408.

The Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that a single violation of

constitutional rights could trigger municipal liability, where the violation is

accompanied by a showing that the municipality had “failed to train its employees to

handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.”

Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. In determining whether the need for training or other

safeguards was “obvious,” however, we look to whether the employee violated a

“clear constitutional duty” and whether there were “clear constitutional guideposts”

for municipalities in the area. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 396-97 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). Clarity of the municipal obligation is

important in this context, because “[w]ithout some form of notice to the city, and the

opportunity to conform to constitutional dictates both what it does and what it chooses

not to do, the failure to train theory of liability could completely engulf Monell,

imposing liability without regard to fault.” Id. at 395. See Robles v. City of Fort

Wayne, 113 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A municipality would thus evince a

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deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens by failing to train its

employees with respect to a clear constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations

that a particular employee is certain to face.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation

omitted); Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1172 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he need

for a particular type of training may be obvious where jailers face clear constitutional

duties in recurrent situations.”) (emphasis added); Febus-Rodriguez v. BetancourtLebron, 14 F.3d 87, 94 n.10 (1st Cir. 1994) (observing that because there were “no

clear constitutional guideposts as to the precise nature of the obligations that the Due

Process Clause places upon the police . . ., it is difficult to conclude that the failure to

train officers to recognize the need for medical treatment in the first instance, in and

of itself, reflects callous or reckless indifference to constitutional rights.”) (emphasis

added).

In this case, a constitutional requirement that an officer in Baker’s situation give

advance warning before commanding a canine to bite and hold a suspect was not

clearly established as of August 2000. See Kuha, 365 F.3d at 602. The need for

training or other safeguards relating to warnings, therefore, was not so obvious at the

time of this incident that Brooklyn Park’s actions can properly be characterized as

deliberate indifference to Szabla’s constitutional rights. While a municipality does not

enjoy qualified immunity from damages liability that results from a policy that is itself

unconstitutional or from an unconstitutional decision by municipal policymakers,

Owen, 445 U.S. at 638, we agree with the Second Circuit and several district courts

that a municipal policymaker cannot exhibit fault rising to the level of deliberate

indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly

established. Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1999); Young

v. County of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1998); accord Williamson v. City of

Virginia Beach, 786 F. Supp. 1238, 1264-65 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff’d, No. 92-1420,

1993 WL 127961 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 1993) (unpublished) (per curiam); Watson v.

Sexton, 755 F. Supp. 583, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Zwalesky v. Manistee County, 749 F.

Supp. 815, 820 (W.D. Mich. 1990).

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That the Supreme Court in City of Canton remanded the case for further

proceedings does not mean the Court rejected Justice O’Connor’s view that clear

constitutional duties and guideposts are vital to a showing of deliberate indifference.

Cf. post, at 29. While the precise obligations of city employees to pre-trial detainees

under the Due Process Clause were unsettled when City of Canton was decided, it was

clearly established that a detainee was entitled to protections at least as great as those

available to convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. Revere v. Mass. Gen.

Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). The Court relied on a concession by the city, for

purposes of the decision, that its employees had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

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This conclusion is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Owen

and Pembaur, cf. post, at 28, because neither of those cases involved an alleged

municipal policy of deliberate indifference. In Owen, municipal liability was based

on official conduct of the city’s lawmakers, which amounted to “official policy”

causing an infringement of constitutional rights. 445 U.S. at 633. In Pembaur, the

county was liable because the county prosecutor established county policy and

ordered the sheriff to take an action that violated the constitutional rights of the

plaintiff. 475 U.S. at 485. In other words, the municipality was liable in each case

because a particular municipal action itself violated federal law. Fault and causation

were obvious in each case. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 404-06.

Where the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, however, “rigorous

standards of culpability and causation must be applied,” id. at 405, and a showing of

deliberate indifference is required. The absence of clearly established constitutional

rights – what Justice O’Connor called “clear constitutional guideposts,” 489 U.S. at

397 – undermines the assertion that a municipality deliberately ignored an obvious

need for additional safeguards to augment its facially constitutional policy. This is not

an application of qualified immunity for liability flowing from an unconstitutional

policy. Rather, the lack of clarity in the law precludes a finding that the municipality

had an unconstitutional policy at all, because its policymakers cannot properly be said

to have exhibited a policy of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights that were

not clearly established.4

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rights under the Eighth Amendment’s clearly-established “deliberate indifference”

standard, so the absence of clear constitutional duties and guideposts was not a basis

for directing entry of judgment as a matter of law. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89

n.8 (“[W]e must assume that respondent’s constitutional right to receive medical care

was denied by city employees – whatever the nature of that right might be.”); Tr. of

Oral Arg. at 9, City of Canton, 1988 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 119 (“[W]e had to take it as

a given that there was deliberate indifference [on the part of individual officers]”). As

noted, consistent with our view, a number of circuits have focused on the existence

of “clear constitutional duties” or “clear constitutional guideposts” when applying City

of Canton. Robles, 113 F.3d at 735; Young, 59 F.3d at 1172; Febus-Rodriguez, 14

F.3d at 94 n.10.

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Finally, Szabla’s deliberate indifference claim also fails for lack of causation.

See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. Our colloquy at oral argument with Szabla’s

counsel highlighted that the shortcoming in municipal policy that Szabla alleges could

not have caused the injury in this case. Szabla’s claim is that Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments require the City to have a policy mandating a warning whenever a

canine is “deployed” by release from a leash or the physical control of an officer. He

argues that the City was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights when it

failed to adopt such a policy. Even assuming that were so, it is conceded that in this

case, Officer Baker never deployed the canine in the sense described. The dog

remained on its leash during the entire episode, and the injury to Szabla occurred

because Baker failed to maintain proper control of the dog while it was leashed, not

because the dog was “deployed” without a warning.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Szabla contends that the municipal liability

analysis of our decision in Kuha demonstrates that he has presented a submissible

claim against Brooklyn Park. Kuha reasoned that because the plaintiff had alleged

that his constitutional rights were violated “by an action taken pursuant to an official

municipal policy (as opposed to a failure to train, for instance),” he was not required

to demonstrate that the city was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights.

365 F.3d at 605. We observed that the chief of police had testified that the use of a

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canine without advance warning to apprehend Kuha was “in accordance with

Department policy.” Id. at 606. The opinion concluded that if a jury determined that

the canine handler acted unreasonably by failing to give a verbal warning before using

a police dog trained to bite and hold a suspect, then “the jury can also reasonably

conclude that the City’s policy on police dogs – which authorizes the use of dogs

trained only to bite and hold, and which did not mandate a verbal warning in this

scenario – caused the constitutional violation.” Id. at 607. Our decision allowed that

if the city could establish that its written policies did, in fact, require warnings before

the use of a canine trained only to bite and hold, then the city would not be liable. Id.

A case can be made that Kuha is distinguishable on its facts, see 429 F.3d at

1178 (dissenting opinion), but we think the more fundamental difficulty with Szabla’s

reliance on Kuha is that the analysis of municipal liability in that case deviates in

some respects from the principles we have outlined above. Rather than consider

whether the city’s policy affirmatively sanctioned an unconstitutional practice by

directing or compelling officers to use canines to bite and hold without advance

warning, the Kuha opinion appeared to place the burden on the city to demonstrate

that it had adopted a policy that affirmatively required the officer in that scenario to

give a warning. Instead of asking whether the city made a deliberate choice to

proceed in a manner that was unconstitutional, Kuha seemed to allow for municipal

liability – without the rigorous, deliberate indifference standard of fault – if the city

simply had failed to implement a policy that would have prevented an unconstitutional

act by an employee otherwise left to exercise his own discretion. Aside from the

practical difficulties of requiring a city to produce a policy that dictates when advance

warnings are required in the myriad circumstances that officers confront in the field,

we believe the approach in Kuha conflicts with the rule that a claim for municipal

liability premised on actions taken pursuant to an official municipal policy must

demonstrate that the policy itself is unconstitutional. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404-05;

Pietrafeso, 452 F.3d at 982; Golberg, 417 F.3d at 812; Audio Odyssey, 245 F.3d at

742; Patzner, 779 F.2d at 1367; Dick, 738 F.2d at 943. 

Appellate Case: 04-2538 Page: 14 Date Filed: 05/18/2007 Entry ID: 3310962
5

See O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 1004 (6th Cir. 1994).

6

See Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1052, amended, 915 F.2d 946 (5th

Cir. 1990).

-15-

We thus conclude that Szabla’s reliance on Kuha is not persuasive, and his

claim against Brooklyn Park fails as a matter of law for the reasons set forth above.

Because aspects of the analysis in Kuha are inconsistent with our opinion today, and

are likely to sow confusion if left undisturbed, we abandon Part II.C of our opinion

in Kuha as circuit precedent.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, with whom WOLLMAN, BYE, and MELLOY,

Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.

Is it constitutional to authorize police to search houses, without requiring a

warrant?5

 Is it constitutional to authorize police to dispose of seized property, without

requiring notice to persons with claims to the property?6

 Is it constitutional to

authorize use of a dog to bite and hold a suspect, without giving a warning first? The

Constitution requires that each question be answered with a resounding "no." 

If a city's policy affirmatively authorizes a procedure without requiring a

safeguard that is constitutionally required, the city authorizes constitutional violations

that result when its officers perform the procedure without the safeguard and in the

process violate someone's constitutional rights. 

This case, like Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2004), was

decided against the plaintiff on summary judgment, and we must consider the

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7

Brooklyn Park Directive No. 331 gives five areas in which "dogs may be

properly used." The areas include: "b. To use in arresting known dangerous criminals

who will, or might offer physical resistance to the arresting officer or who might

attempt to flee or escape custody" and "c. To use in search and apprehension work for

intruders, prowlers, escapees, burglars, window peepers, persons known or believed

to have committed a crime of violence, persons attempting to flee or escape from

police, and to use in trail work to locate missing persons." Officer Baker said item c

was the one that covered the situation in issue. The policy does not state that a

warning is necessary or, indeed, mention warnings at all.

8

Baker, the officer who handled the dog, gave testimony that equates

apprehensions and biting:

Q:"What does 'bitework' mean? 

A: Apprehensions."

Baker talked about the difference between "search," which does not include

apprehension, and "track," which does include apprehension. "Track" was the

command he used. 

-16-

evidence in the light most favorable to Szabla and give him the benefit of all

reasonable inferences in the record. The City of Brooklyn Park adopted a policy

allowing the use of dogs for apprehension.7

 The record supports the conclusion that

apprehension was the same thing as tracking,"bite and hold," or "bitework."8

 The

policy did not have any warning requirement. There is evidence from which a jury

could conclude that Officer Baker used the dog in accordance with City policy,

commanding the dog to "track", i.e., bite and hold, without issuing any warning. A

jury could find that the result of this use was a violation of Szabla's Fourth

Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force in seizing his person. 

The opinion of the court today turns on its conclusion that the policy at issue

here, which authorizes use of dogs to apprehend, i.e., bite and hold, suspects but does

not mention the need to warn first, is constitutional. Whether to warn, we are told,

concerns merely "the manner" in which the dogs are used. Slip op. at 8 (emphasis in

original). The court considers the policy deficient only in failure to give "detailed

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9

If this case proceeded to trial, a jury might find that this was one of those

exceptional cases in which, for some reason, a warning was not feasible, or that even

if Baker had given a warning, the same harm would have occurred. This depends on

the resolution of fact issues that are entrusted to the jury: Would Szabla have heard

a shouted warning? Would he have been able to surrender before the dog got to him?

-17-

guidance that might have averted a constitutional violation by an employee," a

deficiency for which Brooklyn Park is not liable. Id.

The need for a warning is not a detail. Under our precedent, it is a generally

required safeguard, which may be dispensed with only if there are exigent

circumstances. In Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2004) (the part

of it that is not overruled by the court's decision today), we held that "a jury could

properly find it objectively unreasonable to use a police dog trained in the bite and

hold method without first giving the suspect a warning and opportunity for peaceful

surrender." Id. at 598. We held that "there may be exceptional cases where a warning

is not feasible." Id. at 599. I understand Kuha to hold generally that it is unreasonable,

hence unconstitutional, to command a dog to bite and hold without warning the person

about to be bitten. The Fourth Circuit has so held. See Vathekan v. Prince George's

County, 154 F.3d 173, 179 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[F]ailure to give a warning before

releasing a police dog is objectively unreasonable in an excessive force context."). In

Kuha we phrased the issue in part as a question for the jury because there was a

dispute about whether there were exceptional circumstances making the warning

unfeasible, but the constitutional question of whether force was excessive under the

Fourth Amendment on undisputed facts is a question of law. Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d

637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003); see Vathekan, 154 F.3d at 179 ("[I]t was clearly established

in 1995 that failing to give a verbal warning before deploying a police dog to seize

someone is objectively unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment.").

Thus, generally, an officer commanding a dog to bite and hold must warn first, unless

there are additional case-specific facts that make it unfeasible or undesirable in the

particular case.9

 The need for a warning is the general rule, the permissibility of

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We cannot say. I contend only that the facts that Baker commanded the dog to track

(i.e., bite and hold) without first issuing a warning, that this was authorized by city

policy, and that the dog injured Szabla are enough to go to a jury on causation.

-18-

dispensing with the warning is the exception. The possible exceptions may be

"details," but the general rule is not.

This case involves a legislative-type, prospective city policy, which is the

prototypic case for municipal liability. Monell v. Department of Social Services of

the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), held that a municipality could

be liable under § 1983 for its own constitutional violations, but not violations by

others, and in particular, not under the theory of respondeat superior. Id. Section

1983 imposes "liability on a government that, under color of some official policy,

'causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights." Id. at 692. Monell

also extended municipal liability to customs or practices which may have originated

within the lower levels of the city government but which had acquired the force of

law. See id. at 691.

Once Monell opened up the possibility of § 1983 liability for city "policy," the

question quickly arose whether such liability would be limited to prospective,

legislative-type policies or whether it would extend to ad hoc, on the spot decisions

by those in high positions within the city. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.

469, 480 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the city could be liable for a "policy"

that consisted of a single decision by municipal policymakers. In that context, the

Court defined "policy" as a "deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . from

among various alternatives." Id. at 483. 

As municipal liability continued to expand with the elastic meaning of "policy"

to cover situations in which the injurious act was linked to policymakers only by their

failure to prevent it, the Court crafted the "deliberate indifference" standard to

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10Szabla's underlying constitutional claim, is of course, for use of excessive

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A Fourth Amendment claim for use of

excessive force in making an arrest requires a seizure, consisting of (1) "an intentional

acquisition of physical control," (2) through means intentionally applied. Brower v.

Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989); McCoy v. City of Monticello, 411 F.3d

920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005). The intentional seizure requirement is satisfied as against

the City of Brooklyn Heights, since it authorized the use of dogs to apprehend persons

by biting. The fact that Szabla was not the person who fled from the car is irrelevant,

since "[a] seizure occurs even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the

detention or taking, but the detention or taking itself must be willful." Brower, 489

U.S. at 596 (citations omitted). Additionally, an excessive force claim requires

unreasonable use of force, which is judged by an objective, not subjective standard.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).

-19-

distinguish between cases in which the city's inaction could fairly be said to have

caused the injurious action and those in which it could not. See City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The Court held that a municipality sometimes can

be liable for the actions of an employee that was not directed or authorized by the city,

but that in such cases the deliberate indifference standard of fault will be

superimposed on section 1983, which itself requires no particular state of mind other

than that which is necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right.

Id. at 405.10 "Deliberate indifference" is a "stringent standard of fault . . . requiring

proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his

action." Bd. of Comm'rs of Brown Co. v. Bryan, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). City of

Canton was not a case where the policymaker was alleged to have directed or

authorized the offending act (failure to provide medical care for pre-trial

detainees)–the City was only alleged to have failed to train its employees so as to

prevent them from committing the offending act.

In the last of the major Supreme Court cases in this area, Board of

Commissioners of Brown County v. Bryan, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), the Court applied

the deliberate indifference standard even though the plaintiff's claim characterized the

county's act as an affirmative act–wrongful hiring of a police officer who later used

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-20-

excessive force–rather than as an omission like failure to train. The important thing

for our purposes is that the "policy" alleged in Bryan did not authorize the injurious

action–the policymaker sheriff did not authorize the use of excessive force; at most,

the policy allowed the injurious action to happen. Justice O'Connor distinguished

between cases where the deliberate indifference element was not necessary and those

where it was, which she described as "[c]laims not involving an allegation that the

municipal action itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation

of federal rights." 520 U.S. at 406. Szabla claims that the municipality authorized the

act which deprived him of his rights, so his case falls on the side of the line where the

deliberate indifference element should not be required.

Our court today argues that the deliberate indifference standard must be applied

if the city's policy was "lawful on its face and does not compel unconstitutional action

by an employee of the municipality." Slip op. at 5. This standard contains an implicit

distinction between policies that compel unconstitutional action by an employee

(which need not be supplemented by the additional deliberate indifference element)

and those that merely authorize such actions (which must be supplemented). I see no

reason for this distinction. It is not mandated by the Supreme Court; Justice

O'Connor's opinion in Brown puts these two categories on a par when she refers to

municipal actions that "directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights." 502

U.S. at 406. Here, where the municipality authorized an action without a

constitutionally required safeguard, I do not think that its policy should be considered

"facially lawful"–perhaps a better term would be "superficially lawful." 

The Supreme Court has not had occasion to explain what "facial" lawfulness

means in the Monell context. The term is ordinarily used as a standing test, where it

determines whether a person can mount a challenge to a statute even though the statute

is not unconstitutional as applied to him. See generally Sabri v. United States, 541

U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004). In the strictest formulation, for a measure to be

unconstitutional on its face, there need only be a possibility that it could be applied

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-21-

constitutionally in some case. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)

(measure unconstitutional on its face only if no set of circumstances exists under

which the [measure] would be valid"). This test does not ask whether the measure is

likely to lead to unconstitutional results in the vast majority of cases. If a policy

causes a constitutional violation 99 times in a hundred, it will be facially constitutional

if it can be applied once without such a violation. In a case such as this one, where

there is a generally applicable safeguard which must be required in the absence of

exceptional circumstances, the policy will usually cause a violation. Would it be fair

to say that the municipality did not cause the harm in the 99 cases where the safeguard

was required? Would it be consistent with Monell? I think not. 

There is disagreement within the Supreme Court over whether the Salerno test

is a correct formulation. See Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996).

If our court were to propose a less categorical definition of "facially constitutional,"

one for instance that would hinge on whether the measure would lead to constitutional

violations in a "large fraction" of cases, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.

v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992), the test might more closely coincide with a proper

reading of the Monell cases. It would, of course, be a more liberal standard than the

one I stated in the second paragraph of this dissent.

Despite the lip service given to the facially constitutional test, courts have in

fact found that liability could be imposed for a municipal policy that affirmatively

authorized a foreseeable constitutional injury, even though the policy was not

unconstitutional on its face, at least according to the Salerno test. A good example is

the municipal policy that authorized using deadly force against fleeing felony suspects

in Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court

had decided earlier in the same litigation that it was unconstitutional to use deadly

force against an unarmed, non-dangerous felony suspect. Tennessee v. Garner, 471

U.S. 1, 11 (1985). The Supreme Court remanded for consideration of the City's

liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436

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-22-

U.S. 658 (1978). 471 U.S. at 22. On remand, the Sixth Circuit held that "there is a

sufficient link between defendants' deadly force policy and [the officer's] actions to

establish that the policy was the 'moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Garner,

8 F.3d at 365 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Earlier in the case the Supreme

Court had held that the comparable state statute authorizing deadly force against

fleeing felony suspects was not unconstitutional on its face, since if there were reason

to think the suspect dangerous, such force could be used (if, where feasible, warning

had been given), 471 U.S. at 11-12, but it was unconstitutional when applied to the

plaintiff's son. "The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the

use of deadly force against [unarmed, nondangerous] fleeing suspects." 471 U.S. at

11. Thus the Sixth Circuit held that the City could be liable for the deadly force

policy, even though it was not facially unconstitutional, because it was a blanket

authorization that extended to cases where the force authorized was excessive. The

Sixth Circuit rejected the idea that the City policy had to be tested for deliberate

indifference, since the City had in effect "trained their officers to exceed" the

constitutionally allowed limits on use of deadly force. 8 F.3d at 366. The City of

Memphis trained its officers to exceed the constitutional limits in exactly the way the

City of Brooklyn Park did here: by authorizing force that might be constitutional in

some cases, but was excessive in many others. The Ninth Circuit made a similar

holding in a dog-bite case, Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1994),

when it held that a city policy that "authorized seizure of all concealed

suspects–resistant or nonresistant, armed or unarmed, violent or nonviolent–by dogs

trained to bite hard and hold" could be found to be the moving force behind injuries

to a plaintiff who was bitten.

Authorizing a course of action without including constitutionally required

safeguards or exceptions to the authorization has been a sufficient basis for municipal

liability in other cases. In Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1990),

amended, 915 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990), City Ordinance 34-31 outlined the steps a

police officer had to take before disposing of personal property that had been seized.

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-23-

The Ordinance failed to require notification of persons who had claims in the property

other than ownership interests and did not require publication of notice. "[E]ven if

every City employee strictly complies with the City's system for processing seized

property . . . the system itself still blatantly violates the Due Process Clause." Id. at

1058. The city was liable. 

Similarly, in O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 1004 (6th Cir.

1994), the city had adopted a "critical incident" plan that included "probes" of houses

and was silent as to the need to obtain a warrant. Id. at 994, 1004. (An expert

consultant had also trained the police force that warrants were not required in critical

incidents, "making no distinction between the varying circumstances that could be

presented," id. at 1004.) In O'Brien's case, there were no exigent circumstances, so

the probe violated the Fourth Amendment. The city was liable for the Fourth

Amendment violations. Id. at 1005. 

In Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187-93 (9th Cir. 2002), a

county jail had a medical care policy requiring provision of medical care generally,

but which excluded immediate care for "combative" or "uncooperative" prisoners.

This policy, though valid with regard to most prisoners, commanded a delay in care

for a combative manic prisoner, which violated the Eighth Amendment; the county

was therefore not entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim filed by the

representative of such a prisoner who was injured by the lack of treatment. Accord

Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 645 (6th Cir. 2001) (policy requiring police

to handcuff all persons arrested could support municipal liability where police put

cuffs that were too small on non-violent detainee and thereby injured him); Tardiff v.

Knox County, 397 F. Supp. 2d 115, 131 (D. Me. 2005) (County's policy of strip

searching all felony detainees was unconstitutional as applied to detainees charged

with non-violent, non-weapon, and non-drug offenses; county liable for resulting

searches under § 1983), motion for reconsideration denied, 425 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.

Me. 2006). 

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-24-

Even if one were to conclude that "deliberate indifference" was prerequisite to

Monell liability in a case of affirmative authorization of the unconstitutional act,

deliberate indifference exists where a city authorizes a course of action without

mandating safeguards that are required in every case or required unless there are

mitigating or exceptional circumstances. In City of Canton, Justice White, writing for

the Court, held that a failure to train theory could conceivably result in municipal

liability, but that the municipality's degree of fault would have to rise to the level of

deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons who will be affected. 489 U.S. at

388. The Court made clear however, that, deliberate indifference did not require

evidence of an actual subjective choice:

[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or

employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the

inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that

the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to provide

proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city

is responsible, and for which the city may be liable if it actually causes

injury.

Id. at 390. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), explained that "deliberate

indifference" in the § 1983 context does not require a subjective consciousness of the

risk, even though the same term requires subjective consciousness in the Eighth

Amendment context. Id. at 841 ("It would be hard to describe the Canton

understanding of deliberate indifference, permitting liability to be premised on

obviousness or constructive notice, as anything but objective. Canton's objective

standard, however, is not an appropriate test for determining the liability of prison

officials under the Eighth Amendment . . . .").

In City of Canton Justice White addressed something like the question before

us when he gave the following example:

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[C]ity policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers

will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers

with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, the

need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly

force, see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), can be said to be "so

obvious," that failure to do so could properly be characterized as

"deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights. 

489 U.S. at 390 n.10. This example demonstrates that even where a city did not

explicitly authorize a certain action, it is responsible for assuring that constitutional

safeguards are observed if it knows "to a moral certainty" that the situation will arise

that requires its employees to observe those safeguards. See id. at 396 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring) (City would be liable for harm caused by failure to address "a clear

constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular employee is

certain to face."); Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 2005) ("A

policy is deliberately indifferent to a person's constitutional rights when its inadequacy

is both obvious and likely to result in the alleged deprivation of constitutional

rights."); Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584-85 (3d Cir.

2003) (county jail's failure to establish policy to address immediate medication needs

of prisoners created obvious risk and likelihood of Eighth Amendment violation

presenting issue of fact for Monell liability). 

By Justice White's reasoning in City of Canton, the City of Memphis in Garner,

supra at 7, would have been responsible to train its officers not to shoot unarmed, nondangerous fleeing felons, even if it had not had a policy saying police could shoot

them. But since Memphis in fact had a written policy saying police could shoot at all

fleeing felons, its responsibility is even more direct than in Justice White's

hypothetical, and even more securely within the Monell doctrine. Memphis did not

merely know "to a moral certainty" that the officers would shoot fleeing felons (as in

Justice White's hypothetical), it told them they could do so. The City's policy was an

affirmative link, a moving force, and a direct cause of its officers shooting Garner.

Likewise, in this case there is no question that the City of Brooklyn Park knew that

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-26-

its officers would use dogs to apprehend (i.e., bite and hold) people, since the City

adopted a written policy telling them they could do so. The need to warn was a "clear

constitutional duty" inherent in a situation created by City policy "and it is equally

clear that failure to inform city personnel of that duty will create an extremely high

risk that constitutional violations will ensue." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 396

(O'Connor, J., concurring). 

We have found deliberate indifference where a municipality ignored an obvious

risk it created. In Hayes v. Faulkner County, 388 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 2004), this

court held that a policy that "ignores" the municipal actor's constitutional obligations

inherent in the situation addressed by the policy could be deemed "deliberately

indifferent." There, when the county arrested suspects, its policy was to submit their

names to the court and wait for the court to schedule a hearing. The county followed

its policy, resulting in the plaintiff in the case languishing in the county jail for 38

days before receiving a hearing. We held that the county's policy was deliberately

indifferent to the detainee's due process rights, not because the county affirmatively

ordered the plaintiff to be held 38 days without a hearing (it did not), but because the

policy attempted to delegate responsibility to the court and had no safeguard of its

own, though such a safeguard was required. Accord Berg v. County of Allegheny,

219 F.3d 261, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2000) (County created danger and did nothing to allay

it; "Having employed a design where the slip of a finger could result in wrongful

arrest and imprisonment, there remains an issue of fact whether the County was

deliberately indifferent to an obvious risk.").

The court today argues that this case is one where the policy did not

"affirmatively sanction" the violation, but the municipality instead properly decided

to rely on the judgment of its employees. Slip op. at 6-7, citing Dick v. Watonwan

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11We should use caution in relying on Dick because Dick stated that municipal

liability depended on whether the policy in question was constitutional. 738 F.2d at

943. After Dick was decided, in City of Canton the Supreme Court said: "[W]e reject

petitioner's contention that only unconstitutional policies are actionable" under § 1983.

489 U.S. at 387. On this point, Dick has been overruled.

-27-

County, 738 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1984).11 In Dick, the county had a policy that allowed

its social work officers to decide whether there was enough evidence to justify taking

an involuntary commitment case to the County Attorney. The officers decided there

was such evidence and referred the case based solely on the false statements of the

plaintiffs' fifteen year-old daughter; the County Attorney had the plaintiffs committed

in a detoxification center for three days. Judge Richard Arnold said that the policy left

it up to individual officers to use their discretion and that this was not unconstitutional

and therefore could not lead to Monell liability. Id. at 942-43. But Dick is

distinguishable from Szabla because in Dick there was no particular procedure (like

the warning) that was constitutionally required, but was omitted. Moreover, in Dick

we relied on the fact that the policy did not authorize the specific course of action the

officers took, but merely left the decision up to officers' discretion. Id. at 942-43.

Judge Arnold said that the county may have been able to prevent the violation by more

narrowly channeling officers' discretion, but failure to channel their discretion did not

lead to liability. But what if the county had had guidelines that said if a child reports

that his or her parents are drunk, then the County Attorney should put the parents in

a detoxification center, with no mention of the need to investigate further or take into

account contrary evidence? In the hypothetical, the county could be said to have

directly caused the reporting and detention. 

One last point. The Supreme Court held in Owen v. City of Independence, 445

U.S. 622, 635-58 (1980), that municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity

under § 1983. There, the City of Independence failed to provide a name-clearing

hearing for a government employee stigmatized in the course of being fired by the

City, but the City contended that it had acted in good faith because the right to such

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a hearing did not become established until two months after the City's actions. Id. at

634. Justice Brennan considered at length the legislative history of § 1983 and the

relevant policy considerations and concluded that good faith would not shield the City

from § 1983 liability. Similarly, in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 474,

485 (1986), the City of Cincinnati was held liable for allowing police to enter

Pembaur's business without a warrant to execute an arrest warrant on a third person,

even though it was not established at the time of the entry that this violated Pembaur's

Fourth Amendment rights. 

In the face of these two Supreme Court holdings, our court today holds that in

cases of municipal liability that depend on a showing of deliberate indifference (i.e.,

most of them), a municipality cannot be liable unless the law was clearly established

at the time of its action. Slip op. at 10-12. Thus, via the words "deliberate

indifference," our court imports the qualified immunity standard into municipal

liability. The court relies on the Second Circuit's statement in Townes v. City of New

York, 176 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1999), and Young v. County of Fulton, 160 F.3d

899, 904 (2d Cir. 1998). In both those cases, the discussion is a single sentence and

relies on Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), which does not

support affording qualified immunity to municipalities, and what is more, actually

holds that the City of New York could be liable for failure to train specifically because

the applicable law was not "obvious or easy to apply" at the time of the events in

question. Id. at 300. 

Our court also relies on Justice O'Connor's concurring and dissenting opinion

in City of Canton, in which she contended that the constitutional law governing rights

of pre-trial detainees to medical treatment was not sufficiently clear to support

municipal liability. Contrary to Justice O'Connor's view, the majority opinion in City

of Canton does not require that the offending act must be contrary to clearly

established law at the time of the act in order to give rise to municipal liability. The

holding of the majority in City of Canton was to remand the case–as Justice Brennan

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-29-

pointed out in his concurrence, that meant remanding for new trial. 489 U.S. at 393.

Thus, if the majority in City of Canton had agreed with Justice O'Connor that the law

had to be clearly established at the time of the offending act to meet the standard of

causation and fault outlined in the case, the majority would have ordered entry of

judgment for the City. It did not do so. "In [City of Canton v. ]Harris, 'deliberate

indifference' refers to indifference to injuries likely to result from a failure to act, not

indifference to whether such injuries constitute deprivation of a constitutional right."

Garner, 8 F.3d at 366. 

All our discussions about the refinements of Supreme Court cases considering

municipal liability in § 1983 cases can obscure the point of the line of cases as a

whole, which is to ask who should be liable for the constitutional tort–the city or only

its employee. The rights and wrongs of this case can be clarified by asking whether

the city could blame Baker for commanding the dog to bite and hold without giving

a warning first. Baker would respond, in all justice, that he just did what the city told

him to do. Here, the city had an official, legislative-type policy that authorized Baker

to do what he did and Szabla was harmed in just the way one would expect from

looking at the policy. Who did something wrong, who caused the tort? The jury

could find that the city did. That should be enough to send this case to trial. 

I respectfully dissent.

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Appellate Case: 04-2538 Page: 29 Date Filed: 05/18/2007 Entry ID: 3310962