Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01016/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01016-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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cal 

1

 On October 23, 2007, Plaintiff notified the Court that he has been transferred to Pleasant

Valley State Prison. (Dkt. No. 15.)

1 07cv1016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Jesus Lopez MUNGUIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. FRIAS, et al., 

Defendants. 

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Civil No.07cv1016 J (AJB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

[Doc. No. 22.]

Defendants D. Pollard, G. Siota, R. Sutton, A. Lopez, and W. Griggs (collectively referred to as

“Defendants”) have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Jesus Lopez Munguia’s First Amended Complaint

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 25,

2008 and another one on June 5, 2008. Defendants filed a reply on February 28, 2008. After a thorough

review of the papers and all supporting documents, this Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to

dismiss be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On June 4, 2007, Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the California State Prison in Calipatria,1

California, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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2

 “All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are

waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Based on the detailed allegations in the

original complaint and the conclusory allegations in the amended complaint, Plaintiff may have incorrectly

assumed that the amended complaint supplements the original complaint. 

3

Based on the contents of the opposition papers, it appears the opposition filed on February 25, 2008

focused on arguments opposing the motion to dismiss the original complaint, while the opposition filed

on June 5, 2008 contained arguments opposing the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. (Dkt.

Nos. 34, 38.) 

4

 Defendant J. Frias has not yet been served with the amended complaint. On June 3, 2008, the Court

issued an Order of Confidentiality Directing Attorney General to Provide Information as to Defendant Frias’

Address to the U.S. Marshall, and Directing the U.S. Marshal to Effect Service of Process Pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4 for Service of the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 35.) 

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§ 1983. On August 27, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. On

August 29, 2007, the Court issued an order informing Plaintiff that he may file a first amended

complaint without leave of court before a responsive pleading is filed. In that order, the Court cited

Ninth Circuit law stating that the amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the

original complaint and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint will be deemed to have been

waived. (Dkt. No. 7.) 

On November 2, 2007, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint. On December 11,

2007, District Judge Napoleon A. Jones allowed the filing of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint2

which was filed nunc pro tunc to November 26, 2007. (Dkt. No. 20.) On December 13, 2007,

Defendants A. Lopez, W. Griggs, D. Pollard, G. Siota and R. Sutton filed a motion to dismiss the First

Amended Complaint. On February 25, 2008 and again on June 5, 20083

, Plaintiff filed an opposition.

Defendants filed a reply on February 28, 2008. 

B. Factual Background

The First Amended Complaint states that Defendants J. Frias4

, D. Pollard, A.Lopez and W.

Griggs were correctional officers at Calipatria State Prison during the alleged incident. Defendant G.

Siota was a correctional lieutenant and Defendant R. Sutton was a correctional sergeant at Calipatria

State Prison during the alleged incident. 

Around February 2006, Plaintiff went to an outside hospital and received nine staples for a two

inch laceration on the back, top and left side of his head. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) at 5.) On

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December 22, 2006, Plaintiff went to an outside hospital for reconstructive knee surgery. (Id. at 5-6.) 

He was scheduled to see Dr. Smith who performed his surgery for the possibility of another knee

surgery in October 2007. (Id. at 6.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have been aware since February 2006 of Plaintiff’s need for

treatment of pain based on their excessive use of force and unnecessary and wanton pain when he was

beaten by a baton. (Id.) Plaintiff suffers from severe knee pain from when he was hit from a baton by

Defendant J. Frias. (Id.) He requires daily treatment with pain medication. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that

his medical condition constitutes a serious medical need and failure to treat the condition will result in

further significant injury. (Id. at 7.) In addition, he claims his medical condition significantly affects his

daily activities in prison. (Id.) 

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable based on theories that: (1) they used excessive force

when Plaintiff was hit with a baton in February 2006; and (2) they acted with a deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs. (Id.) Plaintiff purports to bring claims under section 1983 for violation of his

rights under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, general, compensatory and

punitive damages, nominal damages and costs. (Id. at 8.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants Pollard, Lopez, Siota, Sutton and Griggs now move to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants contend (1) Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim of excessive force against any of the served Defendants and (2) Plaintiff has not

alleged a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 

A. Applicable Legal Standards 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A

claim can only be dismissed when “a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that

would entitle him to relief.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). The court

must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be

drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. N.L.

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Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must construe the

pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in

civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are

not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Excessive Force

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a claim of excessive force against

any of the served Defendants. Claims of excessive use of force arising after conviction and sentence are

analyzed under the Eighth Amendment's “cruel and unusual punishment” analysis. See Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). The United States Supreme Court has established that the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth

Amendment. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5. In determining whether prison officials inflicted “unnecessary and

wanton pain,” the relevant question is whether “force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline or was applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id.

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). 

The Hudson Court laid out five factors to be considering in making this determination: (1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application

of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4)

the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts

made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 

Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-8.) 

Here, the Amended Complaint merely references that he was “beaten with a baton,” that his

“knee still causing pain, from baton hits by J. Frias,” and that he is “still being accosted.” (FAC at 6-7.) 

The Amended Complaint alleges that J. Frias hit him with a baton but J. Frias has not yet been served

with the Amended Complaint and is not subject to the instant motion. Second, the allegations that he

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was beaten with a baton and is still being accosted by the Defendants are conclusory and insufficient to

state a claim for relief. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Plaintiff has failed to state who hit him with

the baton, who else was involved in that incident and specific facts about who and how he is currently

being accosted. The Court notes that the opposition papers and accompanying exhibits describe in

detail the purported incident of excessive force; however in a motion to dismiss, the Court must look at

the sufficiency of the claims in the Amended Complaint and not the arguments in the motion papers. 

See Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the claim of excessive force

should be GRANTED.

C. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for a violation

of the Eighth Amendment. “Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). This principle “establish[es] the government’s obligation to

provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id. at 103. The Supreme Court

has noted that “[a]n inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities

fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Id.; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988). 

Thus, to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must plead sufficient acts or

omissions to show that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989). Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs occurs when prison officials “deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with

medical treatment.” Hunt, 865 F.2d at 201 (quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th

Cir. 1984)). A section 1983 plaintiff must allege facts that show the seriousness of his medical need as

well as “the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

(9th Cir. 1992) overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). The indifference to medical needs must be substantial; inadequate treatment due

to malpractice, or even negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at

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106; McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Further, a mere difference of opinion over proper medical treatment

does not constitute deliberate indifference. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim

for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against Defendants. He generally states that he

has a serious medical condition and failure to treat the condition will result in further significant injury. 

(FAC at 7.) He also summarily claims that Defendants have acted intentionally and with the knowledge

of Plaintiff’s suffering from serious harm caused by Defendants’ actions. (Id.) He has not shown the

seriousness of his medical needs, how each specific Defendant interfered with his medical needs and

that any Defendant acted with the requisite subjective intent to disregard a serious need for medical care. 

See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. His general allegations without specific facts do not support a claim

for deliberate indifference to medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 1060. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this claim should be GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

In light of the above, this Court recommends Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint brought against Defendants be GRANTED and the First Amended Complaint be 

DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff should be given leave to correct the deficiencies in the First

Amended Complaint and file a Second Amended Complaint. 

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 7,

2008, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed no later than July 21, 2008. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 12, 2008

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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