Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_04-cv-05173/USCOURTS-arwd-5_04-cv-05173-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

BETTY J. PEYTON PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 04-5173

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff Betty J. Peyton appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

September 8, 2005, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 10). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $4,048.95 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 27.00 attorney hours of work before the court

at an hourly rate of $143.50. (Doc. # 11-14). The defendant has filed a response, objecting to

certain hours claimed. (Doc. # 15).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

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sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

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However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $143.50.00 an hour based

on an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour- the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

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in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel did not attach a summary of the Consumer Price Index

or present evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's

counsel is not entitled to an award above the maximum statutory $125 per hour.

As to the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel seeks compensation, defendant objects to

the 2.50 hours submitted on November 15, 2005, pertaining to the drafting of pleadings

associated with the request for EAJA fees. Defendant argues that the preparation of these

pleadings consists of nothing more than the changing of names from a previous request for fees.

The court has read all the documents submitted by plaintiff’s counsel and points out that while

the style of the case is correct the body of the Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for

Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. # 12) pertains to someone

other than the plaintiff in the case before this court. Therefore, we are reducing the time

submitted for the preparation of the current petition for fees by 2.00 hours. Accordingly, we

deduct 2.00 hours from the total number of compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.25 hour on July 22, 2004, (correspondence to U.S. Clerk),

from which we deduct 0.25 hour; 0.75 hour on August 17, 2004, (prepare and file Affidavit of

Service on each defendant), from which we deduct 0.65 hour; 0.25 hour August 18, 2004,

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(correspondence to U.S. Atty), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; and 0.25 hour on October 8,

2004, (correspondence to U.S. Attorney and to client), from which we deduct 0.25 hour. This

time cannot be compensated, in full, under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of

HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff

is not compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, 1.40 hour must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.25 hour on August 5, 2004, (receive/review Order of

reference); and 0.25 hour on September 15, 2004, (receive/review Magistrate correspondence).

This court concludes that the time submitted on the above referenced dates, should not have

taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases more than five or six minutes to

review these documents. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989).

Therefore we are reducing the 0.25 hour submitted on each of these dates to 0.10 hour.

Accordingly, 0.30 hour must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $174.45 in expenses incurred with regard to the

filing fee, postage and photocopying. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find

$174.45 to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 23.30

(27.00 - 3.70) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $125.00 per hour, and $174.45 in expenses,

for a total attorney's fee award of $3,086.95. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not

out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

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The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10 day of April 2006. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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