Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01628/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01628-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIPE LOPEZ,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-1628 FCD GGH P

vs.

D.S. SISTO, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 1983 petitioner was convicted of second degree murder

and sentenced to 15 years to life. In this action, petitioner challenges the 2004 decision by the

California Board of Prison Terms (BPT) finding him unsuitable for parole. This was petitioner’s

ninth parole suitability hearing. Petitioner also argues that the BPT’s decision finding him

unsuitable resulted in him serving a sentence that is outside the matrix established by California

regulations in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

After carefully reviewing the record, the court recommends that the petition be

denied.

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II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The

AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication

of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

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1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

Petitioner raised the claims raised in this action in a habeas corpus petition filed in

the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Answer, Exhibit E. The Superior Court issued a

reasoned opinion denying the petition. Id. The California Court of Appeal and California

Supreme Court issued unreasoned opinions denying petitioner’s habeas petitions raising the

claims brought in the instant action. Answer, Exhibits F, G. Accordingly, the court will consider

whether the opinion of the Superior Court was an unreasonable application of the facts to the

due process law surrounding parole suitability hearings. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072,

1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000) (when reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a claim, the court

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“looks through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision).

III. Background

The factual background of petitioner’s offense is relevant to the analysis of

petitioner’s claims. The transcript from the 2004 hearing contains a factual summary of the

offense: 

Lopez operated a shoe repair shop in Dutch Village Shopping Center in

Lakewood, under a lease from shop owner Alfredo Napoli. On May 19th, 1982,

at around 5:00 p.m., Lopez closed the shop, had two drinks of brandy and cola and

smoked half of a marijuana cigarette. Lopez felt relaxed but not intoxicated and

finished up some shoe repair work. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., Denise Dominguez

took a pair of shoes to Lopez’s shoe repair shop. As the shoes merely needed to

have the bottom flaps glued, she waited for Lopez to complete the work. A

struggle between Lopez and Dominguez ensued and Lopez strangled Dominguez

to death. Lopez left the shop, went to a liquor store, bought a bottle of brandy and

had a few drinks. Lopez drove around, then went to the home of his girlfriend,

Amira, A-M-I-R-A, Cuevas, C-U-E-V-A-S, in Montebello. Cuevas noticed there

were a number of cuts and scratches on Lopez’s face. Lopez explained the

condition of his face by telling Cuevas that two black men had robbed and fought

with him at the store. Lopez stayed with Cuevas approximately 40 minutes or an

hour, then drove home. At home, Lopez told his mother, brother and sisters, who

all resided with Lopez, that two black men had robbed and fought with him at the

store that evening. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Lopez drove back to the store. 

He carried the body of Denise Dominguez into his car. Lopez took the body to an

alley behind the Hideaway Bar in Lakewood, where he left the body. The body

was discovered lying facedown and barefoot, with its blouse completely

unbuttoned and the top button of its shorts unfastened. At the time of Lopez’s

arrest, he had extensive scratch marks on his face and bite marks on his chest. 

Blood and hair were found in the bathroom of his shoe shop and on the front seat

of his car. The vehicle of Dominguez remained parked outside Lopez’s shoe

repair shop in the Lakewood Shopping Center. 

Answer, Exhibit B, pp. 21-23. 

The probation report, also quoted at the 2004 hearing, contained petitioner’s

version of events:

The prisoner has submitted a written statement, which is in the hands of the

defense Counsel for review, prior to submission to the court. Orally, the prisoner

told the Probation Officer that he is guilty of killing the victim but it was

accidental. He did not mean to do it and it was a case of self-defense. The victim

came to the shoe shop just at closing time and insisted that she needed some shoes

dyed right away, as she was going on vacation. The prisoner agreed to paint the

shoes while she waited, but it turned out they were made of plastic, not leather,

and the paint absolutely ruined the shoes. The prisoner tried to stall and told her

he could fix the shoes the next day, but the victim became very angry, even

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though the prisoner agreed to pay her for the shoes if she brought in a receipt. She

said she had no receipt and they were worth 65 dollars. Then she hit me with a

shoe on the head and in the face and with a key holder that had jagged edges. She

hit me with that in the mouth. I began to bleed from the face and when I saw all

the blood, I lost control and grabbed her hands. I was afraid she would hit me

again. When I grabbed her, she hit one of the machines and I pulled her off

because I was afraid she would break it. She fell back on me and bit my face and

scratched me with a jagged key holder on the face and neck and then she bit me

again. I tried to get her off me and I held her back by the neck, so she wouldn’t

bite me again. I held her just one and a half minutes, not more, and suddenly felt

her body go heavy, like she fainted. The blood was on my eyes and I went to

wash it off my face. Then I went to her and tried to revive her and gave her

mouth-to-mouth, but she didn’t wake up. When I realized she wouldn’t wake up,

I ran out of the shop and left the body. I returned at 3:00 a.m. and moved the body

into the car. I took the body to an alley and left her there. I had opened her blouse

to give her artificial respiration, that’s all. I never tried to rape the victim. How

could I do that in my shop, which is open to everyone in a shopping center. The

whole thing happened in a few minutes. I didn’t want to take a life. I was trying

to get her off of me. There was no malice on my part. I panicked. 

Answer, Exhibit B, pp. 23-25.

IV. Discussion

Since the approximate five years since the issuance of McQuillion v. Duncan, 306

F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002), we know this about the liberty interest implicated by California’s

parole laws regarding indeterminate sentences, i.e., parole suitability hearings, which if

successful for the petitioner, will result in the establishment of an actual parole date (but never

less than the minimum term):

1. A liberty interest exists, Irons v. Carey, __F.3d__, 2007 WL 656345 (9th Cir.

2007) citing cases;

2. Reliance on unchanging factors in denying parole suitability might implicate a

violation of that liberty interest. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003);

3. A finding by the Board of Parole Hearings (formerly BPT) (or at a later time,

by the Governor) concerning the circumstances or gravity of the crime in and of itself is

sufficient to deny suitability; In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 161;

Irons, at *5; but the nature of the offense must be “particularly egregious” to constitute a basis to

deny parole suitability. Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 683, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161.

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 Nothing in California statutes or regulations, see Cal. Penal Code 3041, 15 CCR § 1

2402, would expressly so limit the decision of the BPH and Governor, thus the potential

limitation must be of federal origin. However, as undue reliance on unchangeable factors has

never been found thus far by the Ninth Circuit, the commencement point of the limitation, or the

precise blend of crime circumstances and years since, has not been defined. We do know that in

Irons, five times of application was insufficient. Irons did not decide that reliance on unchanging

factors after the minimum term had been served was unlawful. We simply know that “maybe”

that will be the case. 

 The Board of Prison Terms recently had its name changed to the Board of Prison 2

Hearings. 

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4. However, “particularly egregious” means nothing more than finding elements

in excess of those “minimally necessary to convict.” In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1095,

23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 440 (2005);

5. If the petitioner has served less than the minimum term of his indeterminate

sentence, “all we hold today, therefore, is that, given the particular circumstances of the offenses

in these cases, due process was not violated when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for

parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms.” Irons at *5, but see footnote 1 of Irons

expressing no opinion if the prisoner has served more than his minimum term, i.e., maybe that is

the time frame against which reliance on unchanging factors is truly suspect ;

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6. If the BPH determined that the crime was vicious, or performed in a callous

manner, or the motive was trivial, and so forth – all factors relating to the circumstances of the

crime – and such is adopted by the state courts on review, a federal court must find the state court

decision(s) AEDPA-unreasonable before a writ of habeas corpus may be granted. Irons, supra.

With respect, after Irons, the undefined “mights” and “maybes” serve as an

indecipherable present guide to knowing just when the liberty interest in parole may be violated 

by reliance on unchanging factors. Moreover, one does not know whether such reliance, if it is

ever held to be insufficient, is based on passage of time alone, or is an uncertain blend of crime

circumstances and passage of time. The state courts’ adoption of the BPH (BPT ) or Governor’s

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decision about the circumstances of the crime is now essentially unreviewable – at least prior to

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 The undersigned has previously determined the arbitrary nature and lack of predictive 3

value generally found in a circumstances of the crime parole suitability denial based on

unchanging circumstances despite the passage of sixteen years and more from the date of the

conviction coupled with an unblemished prison record. See Irons v. Warden of California State

Prison-Solano, 358 F. Supp. 2d 936, 947 (E.D. Cal. 2005). That analysis, focusing on the

predictive nature of the crime for future violence in combination with expert psychiatric reports

or other forward looking evidence, has been cited with approval by the California Court of

Appeal. In re Elkins, 144 Cal. App. 4th 475, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 522 (2006); In re Scott, 133

Cal. App. 4th 573, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905 (2005). However, since that analysis only received the

comment that it was an “understandable [AEDPA] error” in the concurrence of Judge Reinhardt,

that analysis concerning the trigger time of undue reliance will not be utilized herein.

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the expiration of the minimum term. That is, the circumstances of the crime in terms of

viciousness, callousness, triviality and the like, is essentially an unchanging value judgment

whose correctness cannot often be disputed regardless of the time when such a judgment is made

– right after the conviction, just prior to expiration of a minimum term, well after the expiration

of a minimum term. 3

Review of the federal appellate cases demonstrates that no guided finding of

undue reliance on unchanging factors can be made in this case. Biggs v. Terhune, supra, the case

that commenced the discussion on unchanging factors, involved the first degree bludgeoning

murder of a witness facilitated, but not committed, by Biggs. He was denied parole eligibility at

his initial hearing in 1999 in part because of the gravity of the crime. All might agree that such a

murder was grave, and it will never be properly classified as anything but such. Nevertheless, the

Ninth Circuit found that “continued reliance” on unchanging factors could violate due process. 

Although not stating such, the intimation of Biggs was that the third or fourth time of reliance on

the circumstances of the crime would be too much. Certainly, it was not understood by the

undersigned from reading Biggs that the time at which continued reliance would be too much

would occur in 2010 – the time at which Biggs will have served his minimum term. Biggs’

minimum term is served in 2010, and Biggs will have had approximately 5 or 6 more hearings by

that time. However, subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have not upheld the undersigned’s reading

of Biggs.

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 In Sass, no comparison review of other cases was undertaken, there was simply

the one sentence holding that the “evidence of Sass’ prior offenses [prior DUIs] and the gravity

of his convicted offenses [DUI resulting in a death and injury] constitute some evidence to

support the Board’s decision.” Id., 461 F.3d 1123; the dissent disagreed, and found AEDPA

unreasonableness. The Ninth Circuit was reviewing a third denial of suitability. If jurists of the

Ninth Circuit cannot agree whether the circumstances of the crime can constitute some evidence

given three hearings, how will the BPH or the undersigned know when to stop using the

circumstances of a crime as the reason to deny parole eligibility. What will be the analytical

watershed point of departure from routinely upholding the BPH assessment of the circumstances

of the crime, and more importantly, why? Will the fourth hearing be sufficient, or should it be

the seventh? Will the analysis simply hinge on the non-analytical fact that Sass will have passed

his minimum terms of years under his sentence? Would a later BPT finding of egregiousness be

AEDPA unreasonable simply because Sass just passed his minimum term as opposed to just

before the expiration of his minimum term? None of these questions have been answered.

In Irons, after five parole suitability hearings, the Ninth Circuit determined that

the second degree murder of a perceived thieving drug dealer by a wildly shooting, and then

stabbing, angry “victim” of the deceased was comparatively more egregious than the murder in

Sass. Perhaps so; perhaps other jurists would locate this line in another position because of the

societal impact that drunk drivers impose in this country. Both positions have their points. But

one can validly question whether the ultimate goal of every parole eligibility hearing,

determining future safety of the community, can forever be based on personal judgments on the

comparative seriousness of crimes committed decades ago.

Nevertheless, taking an implied cue from Irons that the minimum term might

serve as an analytical change point, the undersigned finds that prior to that time, absent

extraordinary circumstances, the BPH determination on factors relating to the circumstances of

the crime are essentially unreviewable, i.e., the determination constitutes “some evidence”

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 Unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions may be cited commencing with decisions issued in 4

2007. Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Although still not precedential in the binding sense, the

unpublished decisions do have a certain amount of persuasive value, and indicate how Ninth

Circuit judges apply binding precedent.

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sufficient to deny parole eligibility (suitability).

This case cannot be decided on the above finding because petitioner’s (Lopez)

incarceration has exceeded his minimum term. Even at fifteen years, he surpassed his minimum

term in 1998. Petitioner was denied on his ninth suitability hearing.

Nearly the same day as Irons was decided, the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of

parole eligibility in Kunkler v. Muntz, 2007 WL 683970 (9th Cir. 2007). The facts of the 4

second degree murder were not set forth in the opinion, but the fact of Kunkler’s 1983

conviction, and the fact that Kunkler had been considered for parole suitability ten times were set

forth. Kunkler had been imprisoned well beyond any minimum term. On his last two BPT (now

BPH) hearings, the commissioners had found Kunkler suitable for parole, but the Governor

reversed both decisions in part on his perception of the seriousness of the crime. Indeed, this was

the ground on which the state courts in unpublished orders had ultimately upheld the Governor’s

decision. The district court applied the Biggs dictum regarding reliance on unchanging factors. 

In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit, citing Sass, viewed the Biggs dictum as merely

advice to the next BPH panel that it might wish to depart from its continued reliance on a nonchanging factor. Kunkler at *2 (“‘it is not [this court’s] function to speculate about how future

parole hearings could proceed.’”). Evidently, no matter how many times the BPH and/or the

Governor utter an undoubtedly correct conclusion that a murder is serious, or a motive trivial, or

that the victim suffered, these unchanging factors will always constitute “some evidence” in

federal habeas corpus review.

In petitioner’s case before this court, the BPT found that the offense was carried

out in a cruel and callous manner (true, but unchanging), in a dispassionate and calculated

manner (the seeming antithesis of the facts of the case), and that the offense demonstrated an

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 Rosenkrantz also required that the then BPT also make an individualized consideration 5

of the other factors regarding parole suitability. Of course, the Commissioners always make such

a determination as the Commissioners know that they must. Whether these determinations are

supported by some evidence is another matter, but as long as the consideration is made, the

circumstances of the crime are sufficient to deny suitability. 

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exceptional disregard for human suffering (true, but what will never change about this), and the

motive was unexplained (but the Commissioners believed it to be attempted rape). Nevertheless,

in light of the above authority, the undersigned cannot find at this time that the state courts in this

case were AEDPA unreasonable by failing to reject the unchanging circumstances conclusion of

the BPT. Thus, as a matter of law, some evidence existed to satisfy the standards of the parole

suitability liberty interest.

Because circumstances of the crime alone can constitute some evidence, there is

no point in discussing the other factors of parole suitability, and whether some evidence existed

for the conclusions reached in the other factors by the BPT.5

Conclusion

If the undersigned were reviewing this matter on a clean slate, the undersigned

would not analyze the liberty interest involved merely by reference to a checklist of crime

circumstances and whether the BPH understood that a murder was serious. Nevertheless, no

binding authority at present would require more than use of the checklist for the circumstances of

the crime factors as “some evidence” upon which to deny parole suitability.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

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shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 3/20/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

lop1628.157

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