Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02087/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK PHELPS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:13-cv-02087-LJO-BAM PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

REMAND

(ECF No. 5)

TWENTY-ONE DAY DEADLINE

I. Background

This civil action, which arises out of prison conditions of confinement, was removed from 

Kern County Superior Court by Defendant Gurule on December 19, 2013.1 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 

Defendants Cate, Campbell, Dalton, Rangel, Stinson, Wadkins and Ramirez joined the notice of 

removal. On January 13, 2014, Plaintiff Mark Phelps (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se, filed a motion to remand on the grounds that (1) Defendant Gurule improperly removed this 

matter on the basis of diversity jurisdiction; (2) removal is not appropriate; (3) removal is 

prejudicial; and (4) not all defendants consented to removal. Defendants Cate, Campbell, Dalton, 

 

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Plaintiff names Matthew Cate, Mike Stainer, Kristofer Campbell, Jordon Dalton, Steve Gurule, Elizach Rangel, 

David Stinson, Derrike Wadkins, and Jason Ramirez as defendants in complaint. The notice of removal was filed by 

Defendant Gurule. Defendants Cate, Campbell, Dalton, Rangel, Stinson, Wadkins and Ramirez are identified on the 

notice of removal as having been served with the complaint and, as with Defendant Gurule, are represented by the 

Attorney General’s Office. (ECF No. 1, p. 2.) Defendant Stainer, who was served with the summons and complaint 

on January 10, 2014, consented to removal on January 29, 2014. (ECF No. 6.) 

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Gurule, Rangel, Stinson, Wadkins and Ramirez filed an opposition on January 29, 2014, and 

Plaintiff filed a reply on February 14, 2014. The motion is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l).

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. ' 1441(a), a defendant may remove from state court any action “of which 

the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” District courts “shall have 

original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The removal statute is strictly construed, and Defendants bear

the burden of establishing grounds for removal. Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 

U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366 (2002); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 

1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). As a threshold matter, courts “must consider whether federal 

jurisdiction exists, even if no objection is made to removal, and even if both parties stipulate to 

federal jurisdiction,” Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations 

omitted), and “federal jurisdiction ‘must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal 

in the first instance.’” Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gaus v. 

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded 

complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff=s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 

482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The rule 

makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive 

reliance on state law.” Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. 

In this instance, Plaintiff’s complaint specifically pleads claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution. Plaintiff also admits that his complaint includes federal questions. (ECF No. 5, p.

3.) Therefore, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 

Plaintiff believes that Defendant Gurule improperly removed this action based on diversity 

jurisdiction because the notice of removal cites 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which is removal based on 

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diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff correctly points out that Defendant Gurule cited 

the incorrect statutory provision. Despite this error, it is evident on the face of the notice that 

Defendant Gurule based removal on federal question jurisdiction, not diversity. First, Defendant 

Gurule captions this case as: “NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. §

1983(b) (Federal Question).” (ECF No. 1.) Second, and more importantly, Defendant Gurule

states:

This action is a civil action of which this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331, and is one which may be removed to this Court by Defendant 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) in that it arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and includes 

due process and deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth and Eighth 

Amendments of the United States Constitution. 

(ECF No. 1, ¶ 4.) Read in its entirety, Defendant’s notice of removal states the grounds for 

removal based on the existence of a federal question and there is no mention of citizenship or 

diversity. In sum, the notice of removal makes the basis for federal jurisdiction clear. Thus, the 

Court finds that Defendant Gurule properly stated the grounds for removal and that removal to 

federal court was proper. 

Plaintiff complains that removal to federal court will prejudice his resolution of this matter 

by the state court. Primarily, Plaintiff appears to assert that Defendant Gurule removed this action 

when responses were due in state court, that removal was done in order to avoid default and that 

removal resulted in this action be placed in limbo. However, as noted above, Defendants were 

entitled to remove this action based on federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s apparent concerns 

regarding delay of this action following removal are well-taken, but do not provide a sufficient 

basis for remand. This Court will screen Plaintiff’s complaint in due course pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A. 

B. Unanimity of Removal

Plaintiff argues that the notice of removal is defective because not all defendants joined in 

the notice of removal. In a case involving multiple defendants, all defendants must join in the 

notice of removal. Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Documentation of individual consent is not required. Id.

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at 1225. A certification in the notice of removal signed by an attorney of record is sufficient to 

effect removal. Id. at 1224-25.

Here, Defendant Gurule filed the notice of removal. (ECF No. 1, p. 1.) Although served at 

the time of removal, Defendants Cate, Campbell, Dalton, Rangel, Stinson, Wadkins and Ramirez 

did not explicitly state that they either joined in removal or consented to removal.2 However, the 

notice of removal clearly indicates that Defendants Cate, Campbell, Dalton, Rangel, Stinson, 

Wadkins, Ramirez and Gurule are all represented by the same counsel. (ECF No. 1, p. 1.) Where 

the pleadings demonstrate that all defendants are represented by the same counsel, the failure of a 

defendant to formally join the removal does not negate its validity. See Lewis v. City of Fresno, 

627 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2008). As all defendants (excluding Stainer) appeared 

through counsel on the removal notice, the Court finds direct evidence of their intent to remove 

this action. 

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is entitled to remand. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY 

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion to remand, filed on January 13, 2014, be DENIED. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 

twenty-one (21) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties 

may file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned ‘Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2014 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

2 As noted above, Defendant Stainer was not served with the summons and complaint until January 10, 2014. 

He timely filed his consent to removal on January 29, 2014. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 

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