Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00951/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00951-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAMES ARKENS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SUTTER, RON 

SULLENGER, JIM WHITEAKER, DAN 

FLORES, NATE BLACK, IN THEIR 

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS SUTTER 

COUNTY EMPLOYEES, AND DOES 1-

50,

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:16-00951 WBS KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff James Arkens brought this wrongful 

termination and discrimination action against defendants the 

County of Sutter (the “County”), County Board of Supervisors Ron 

Sullenger, Jim Whiteaker, and Dan Flores, and County Auditor Nate 

Black. Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

The County hired plaintiff as its Chief Administrative 

Officer (“CAO”) on January 1, 2013 for a term of three years. 

(Compl. ¶ 17, Ex. A (Docket No. 1).) Between March 2013 and July 

2014, plaintiff and Supervisor Sullenger had a strained working 

relationship after Sullenger allegedly requested certain health 

and retirement benefits that plaintiff explained could not be 

provided. (Id. ¶¶ 23-26.) In April 2015, County Auditor Black

informed the auditors, County Counsel’s Office, the District 

Attorney, and Sullenger that plaintiff had allegedly embezzled 

$2.5 million from a County energy project. (Id. ¶¶ 32-34.) The 

following month, the Board of Supervisors (the “Board”) allegedly 

took plaintiff’s performance evaluation off the agenda because of 

the embezzlement accusations. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff and 

Supervisor Whiteaker’s working relationship allegedly 

deteriorated shortly thereafter. (Id. at ¶ 29.) In July or 

August of 2015, plaintiff allegedly informed Supervisor Flores 

that a contemplated land purchase presented a conflict of 

interest for Flores and other county officials. (Id. ¶ 37.)

In September 2015, plaintiff went on medical leave 

because he was experiencing frequent panic attacks and “felt very 

awkward because of the daily treatment by his superiors and 

County Officials.” (Id. ¶ 46.) On October 15, 2015, without 

providing plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the embezzlement 

accusations, the Board informed plaintiff that it did not intend 

to renew his contract and allegedly told him that, “if he did not 

immediately accept the County’s Offer to resign, he would be

placed on Administrative leave.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was 

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placed on administrative leave and was allegedly constructively 

discharged. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 46.) 

In addition to the embezzlement accusations, the Board 

allegedly placed plaintiff on administrative leave and decided 

not to renew his contract because of plaintiff’s age. (Id. ¶¶

61-62.) Prior to placing plaintiff on administrative leave, 

several Supervisors allegedly “made comments” about plaintiff’s 

age and “commented out loud” about when he would retire. (Id. ¶ 

42.) 

Plaintiff initiated this action in May 2016 and asserts

claims for (1) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 

against all defendants; (2) defamation against the County and 

Black; (3) violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, against the County, 

Sullenger, Whiteaker, and Flores; (4) “federal and state 

retaliation” against all defendants; (5) intentional infliction 

of emotional distress against all defendants; and (6) negligent 

infliction of emotional distress against all defendants. 

Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

II. Analysis

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

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plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in 

original) (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice,” and “the tenet that a court must 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where 

a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between 

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

1. Official versus Individual Capacity

Defendants contend that the claims against the 

individual defendants should be dismissed because plaintiff sued

those defendants in their official capacities. (See Compl. ¶¶ 

12-15.) Although unnecessary disputes and confusion frequently 

arise based on the capacity in which a defendant is sued in the

complaint, determining the appropriate capacity from the 

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allegations in the complaint is neither impossible nor difficult. 

Simply stated, if a plaintiff seeks to have a public officer pay 

damages, the suit is generally against the officer in his 

individual capacity; and if the plaintiff seeks to have the 

public officer perform an official act, the suit is generally 

against the officer in his official capacity. See Price v. 

Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990); Biggs v. Meadows, 66 

F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995). Because of this distinction, a 

majority of the circuits have rejected the argument that a 

plaintiff is required to allege the capacity in which a defendant 

is sued. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 59. Instead, the majority approach 

“look[s] to the substance of the plaintiff’s claim, the relief 

sought, and the course of proceedings to determine the nature of 

a [] suit . . . .” Id. (citing cases from the Second, Fifth, 

Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits). 

The only relief plaintiff specifically requests in his 

prayer for relief is damages,

1 and plaintiff can seek damages 

against the officers only in their individual capacities. The 

court will therefore treat plaintiff’s claims for damages against

Sullenger, Whiteaker, Flores, and Black as against them in their

individual capacities. 

2. Tamney Claim

Under the California Supreme Court’s decision in Tameny 

v. Atlantic Richfield Co., “when an employer’s discharge of an 

 

1 For the first time at oral argument, plaintiff informed 

the court and defendants that he intended his request “[f]or such 

other relief as the Court may deem proper” to include a request 

that defendants reinstate him. Such relief, if actually 

requested, would be against the officers in their official 

capacities. 

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employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the 

discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover 

damages traditionally available in such actions.” 27 Cal. 3d 

167, 170 (1980). Pursuant to California Government Code 

subsection 815(a), however, “[a] public entity is not liable for 

an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission 

of the public entity or a public employee or any other person,” 

unless otherwise provided by statute. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a).

Because a common law claim for wrongful termination in violation 

of public policy was judicially-created in Tameny and is not 

codified in any statute, subsection 815(a) bars the claim against 

public entities. Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 44 Cal. 

4th 876, 900 (2008).

While section 815 does not similarly limit the 

liability of individual defendants, “a Tameny action for wrongful 

discharge can only be asserted against an employer,” thus “[a]n 

individual who is not an employer cannot commit the tort of 

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” Id. In his 

opposition, plaintiff nonetheless argues that defendants fail to 

“distinguish between the individual defendants who are merely 

supervisory or management employees of defendant County of Sutter 

and those individual defendants who are elected officials and 

policy-makers of County of Sutter.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5:10-15

(Docket No. 10).) Plaintiff does not, however, cite a single 

case suggesting that such a distinction is relevant under a 

Tamney claim. In fact, whether an official has policymaking 

authority is relevant in other contexts such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983

when determining whether a plaintiff can bring a claim against 

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the municipality itself, not the individual official. See

generally Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 715 F.3d 750, 753 (9th 

Cir. 2013).

Accordingly, because subsection 815(a) precludes 

plaintiff from asserting a Tameny claim against the County and a 

Tameny claim also cannot be brought against the individual 

officials, the court must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s wrongful termination in violation of public policy 

claim with prejudice. See Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Op. Victoria’s 

Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 744 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“A district court may dismiss a complaint without leave to 

amend if ‘amendment would be futile.’”).

3. Defamation

Although the County claims it is also immune from 

plaintiff’s defamation claim under subsection 815(a), subsection 

815.2(a) provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury 

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the 

public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or 

omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a 

cause of action against that employee or his personal 

representative.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a). Unlike a Tameny

claim, which can be brought only against the employer, a 

defamation claim may be brought against an employee, and the 

County would be liable under subsection 815.2(a) to the same 

extent as its employee if the employee was acting in the scope of 

his or her employment. Accord Thomas v. City of Richmond, 9 Cal. 

4th 1154, 1157 (1995) (recognizing that “[a] public entity, as 

the employer, is generally liable for the torts of an employee 

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committed within the scope of employment if the employee is 

liable,” but the public entity generally is not liable if the 

individual employee is immune); Nadel v. Regents of Univ. of 

Cal., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1251, 1259 (1st Dist. 1994) (applying 

subsection 815.2(a) to defamation claims against the public 

entity). 

Under California law, “[t]he elements of a defamation 

claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, 

(4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or 

causes special damage.” Wong v. Tai Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 

1354, 1369 (6th Dist. 2010) (citing Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 

683, 720 (2007)). The Supreme Court has held that the 

Constitution “prohibits a public official from recovering damages 

for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 

unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual 

malice’--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 

reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” N.Y. Times 

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also McCoy v. 

Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 860 (1986) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted) (same). Here, plaintiff alleges that 

his position as CAO is the “highest position” in the County, 

(Compl. ¶ 17), and he concedes in his opposition that he was a 

public official for purposes of his defamation claim, (Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 6:21-22). 

California Civil Code subsection 47(c)(1) also provides 

that a communication is privileged if it is made “without malice, 

to a person interested therein, [] by one who is also interested 

. . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c)(1). “Insofar as the commonCase 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 15 Filed 07/25/16 Page 8 of 22
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interest privilege is concerned, malice is not inferred from the 

communication itself.” Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc., 113 

Cal. App. 4th 1363, 1370 (4th Dist. 2003). “The malice necessary 

to defeat a qualified privilege is actual malice which is 

established by a showing that the publication was motivated by 

hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the 

defendant lacked reasonable ground for belief in the truth of the 

publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the 

plaintiff’s rights.” Taus, 40 Cal. 4th at 721 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Here, plaintiff alleges that Black was working on the 

County’s annual independent audit and “drafted a letter to the 

Auditors” that accused plaintiff of embezzling $2.5 million from 

an energy project. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-33.) Black allegedly sent this 

letter to the auditors, County Counsel’s Office, and the District 

Attorney and informed Sullenger of the alleged embezzlement. 

(Id. ¶¶ 30, 34.) Plaintiff does not dispute that Black’s report 

of alleged embezzlement comes within the common interest 

privilege of subsection 47(c)(1). (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6:11-

7:27); see also Deaile v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 40 Cal. App. 3d 

841, 849 (2d Dist. 1974) (“[A]n employer is privileged in 

pursuing its own economic interests and that of its employees to 

ascertain whether an employee has breached his responsibilities 

of employment . . . .”). 

Plaintiff therefore must plausibly allege that Black’s 

statements about the alleged embezzlement were made with actual 

malice in order to maintain a defamation claim as a public 

official and overcome the common interest privilege. “[M]alice 

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focuses upon the defendant’s state of mind, not his [or her] 

conduct. Mere negligence in inquiry cannot constitute lack of 

reasonable or probable cause.” Noel, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1370 

(internal quotations marks and citation omitted) (alterations in 

original). 

Although Rule 9(b) provides that “[m]alice, intent, 

knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 

generally,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), the Supreme Court recognized in 

Iqbal that such allegations still require sufficient factual 

support. As the Court explained, “‘generally’ is a relative term 

and, “[i]n the context of Rule 9, it is to be compared to the 

particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake” and 

“merely excuses a party from pleading [] intent under an elevated 

pleading standard.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686; see also Biro v. 

Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing that 

the Supreme Court has not “precisely articulated the effect of 

Iqbal and Twombly on defamation cases, . . . [but] Iqbal makes 

clear that, Rule 9(b)’s language notwithstanding, Rule 8’s 

plausibility standard applies to pleading intent”). 

Without any factual support, plaintiff alleges that 

Black2 “intended to harm” him and “should have recognized that 

such publication would cause [him] harm.” (Compl. ¶ 57.) While 

plaintiff alleges that Black was “told by the County Counsel’s 

 

2 Paragraph 57 actually alleges that “Defendant Brown

intended to harm Plaintiff Arkens or should have recognized that 

such publication would cause [plaintiff] harm.” (Compl. ¶ 57 

(emphasis added).) Because plaintiff asserts his defamation

claim against only the County and Black and none of the 

defendants have the last name “Brown,” the court assumes this was 

a typographical error.

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Office that the allegations were not true and that he should drop 

his issues with [plaintiff],” (id. ¶¶ 34, 35), he does not allege 

when that statement was made or any facts from which it could be 

inferred that Black was reckless in not simply accepting that 

statement at face value. To the contrary, plaintiff alleges that 

the District Attorney convened a grand jury to investigate the 

embezzlement accusations. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36.) The District Attorney 

cannot convene a grand jury without good reason to do so. Cf.

Guillory v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. 4th 168, 174 (2003) (“The 

prosecutor alleges the facts contained in the indictment and is 

bound by rule 5–110 of the California Rules of Professional 

Conduct, which prohibits prosecutors from ‘institut[ing] or 

caus[ing] to be instituted criminal charges when the member knows 

or should know that the charges are not supported by probable 

cause.’”). When the District Attorney thought the accusations 

merited investigation by the grand jury, it can hardly be said

without more that Black was reckless as to the truth or falsity 

of the suspected embezzlement. Nor is there a single alleged

fact from which to infer that Black harbored ill will or hatred 

toward plaintiff. 

Accordingly, because the Complaint lacks any 

factual content from which the court could draw the reasonable 

inference that Black acted with actual malice, the court must 

grant defendants’ motion to dismiss his defamation claim. 

4. ADEA

The ADEA makes it unlawful to “fail or refuse to hire 

or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against 

any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

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conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To establish a prima 

facie case under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show “he was (1) at 

least forty years old, (2) performing his job satisfactorily, (3) 

discharged, and (4) either replaced by substantially younger 

employees with equal or inferior qualifications or discharged 

under circumstances otherwise ‘giving rise to an inference of age 

discrimination.’” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 

1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Defendants do not 

dispute that plaintiff sufficiently alleged satisfactory job 

performance and, while it is surprising plaintiff neglects to 

allege his age anywhere in the Complaint, he does allege that he 

was over forty, (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 61). Defendant contends his 

ADEA claim nonetheless fails because plaintiff does not plausibly 

allege he was constructively discharged or replaced by someone 

substantially younger or under circumstances giving rise to an 

inference of age discrimination.

“[C]onstructive discharge occurs when the working 

conditions deteriorate, as a result of discrimination, to the 

point that they become sufficiently extraordinary and egregious 

to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and 

reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and 

to serve his or her employer.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 

F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). The plaintiff must show that conditions were 

“so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify a reasonable 

employee’s decision to resign,” which requires “some aggravating 

factors, such as a continuous pattern of discriminatory 

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treatment.” Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 

(9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“Where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate the severe or pervasive 

harassment necessary to support a hostile work environment claim, 

it will be impossible for her to meet the higher standard of 

constructive discharge.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 930. The Ninth 

Circuit sets the “bar high for a claim of constructive discharge 

because federal antidiscrimination policies are better served 

when the employee and employer attack discrimination within their 

existing employment relationship, rather than when the employee 

walks away and then later litigates whether his employment 

situation was intolerable.” Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 

1184 (9th Cir. 2007).

Although plaintiff appears to base his ADEA claim on 

his alleged constructive discharge, he does not allege that he 

resigned from his employment with the County. According to 

plaintiff’s Complaint, the Board “request[ed] his resignation” 

and told him that, “if he did not immediately accept the County’s 

Offer to resign, he would be placed on Administrative leave.”

(Compl. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges he was subsequently placed on 

administrative leave in October 2015, not that he resigned. (See

id. ¶ 46 (“In September 2015, prior to Arkens being placed on 

administrative leave on October 15, 2015 Arkens started having 

frequent panic attacks and felt very awkward because of the daily 

treatment by his superiors and County Officers. Arkens 

thereafter filed a Workers Compensation Claim, sought medical 

attention and was placed on stress leave. One Month later Arkens 

was placed on administrative leave.”) (emphasis added).) 

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Plaintiff also does not allege how long he remained on 

administrative leave or whether it was paid or unpaid, which are 

necessary to determine whether he plausibly alleges constructive 

termination. Compare, e.g., Herzog v. Banner Churchill Cmty. 

Hosp., No. 3:09-CV-567 ECR RAM, 2010 WL 1418867, at *4 (D. Nev. 

Apr. 7, 2010) (“The act of placing Plaintiff on paid 

administrative leave, alone, is insufficient to support a charge 

of constructive discharge.”), and Stearns-Groseclose v. Chelan 

Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 04-CV-0312 RHW, 2006 WL 195788, at *17 

(E.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2006) (“The Court finds that a reasonable 

person in Plaintiff’s position, on paid administrative leave 

pending the results of an internal investigation, would not be 

forced to resign, just as Plaintiff did not resign.”), with 

White v. Honeywell, Inc., 141 F.3d 1270, 1279 (8th Cir. 1998) 

(“We are not prepared to say that ‘quit’ is the magic word in a 

constructive discharge instruction. A person who has suffered a 

forced unpaid medical leave of absence, from which she is unable 

to return and which resulted from objectively intolerable working 

conditions, is in no better position than one who was forced to 

quit as a result of objectively intolerable conditions.”), and

Violan v. On Lok Senior Health Servs., No. 12-CV-05739 WHO, 2013 

WL 6907153, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2013) (“Courts have denied 

summary judgment on constructive termination claims where the 

plaintiff has not formally resigned and is on an extended medical 

leave of absence.”).

Moreover, while plaintiff’s Complaint and opposition 

brief are far from a model of clarity, the Complaint also seems

to allege that plaintiff’s contract automatically renewed for 

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another three years and thus the Board’s decision not to renew 

the contract was essentially a decision to terminate him.3 The 

inability to decipher whether plaintiff is pursuing an ADEA claim 

based on his constructive discharge, the Board’s termination of 

him after his contract allegedly renewed, the Board’s decision 

not to renew his contract, or an entirely different theory of his

discharge falls short of giving defendants notice of the claim it 

must defend against. See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics 

C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[C]onfusing 

complaints . . . impose unfair burdens on litigants and judges. . 

. . Defendants are . . . put at risk that . . . plaintiffs will 

surprise them with something new at trial which they reasonably 

did not understand to be in the case at all, and that res 

judicata effects of settlement or judgment will be different from 

what they reasonably expected.”) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); Salazar v. County of Orange, 564 F. App’x 322, 

322 (9th Cir. 2014) (“A complaint should fully set[ ] forth who

is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough 

 

3 Plaintiff alleges that his employment contract with the 

County provided that it would automatically renew for an 

additional three years unless the County gave him notice ninety 

days prior to termination of the contract and thus the October 

15, 2015 notice of non-renewal was several days past this 

deadline. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff attached his employment 

contract with the County as an exhibit to his Complaint and it 

provides for 120 days of advance notice of intent not to renew, 

not ninety. (See id. Ex. A (“At the end of the three-year term, 

this agreement shall automatically renew for an additional term 

of three years unless the Board, by 120-days advanced written 

notice, notifies Employee of its intent to terminate the 

agreement.”); see United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 

(9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a court may consider documents 

attached to the complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss). 

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detail to guide discovery.” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted) (alteration in original)). 

Plaintiff also alleges only that his replacement was 

“younger” than him, but does not allege any facts from which the 

court could infer she was substantially younger than him. 

(Compl. ¶ 42.) In fact, plaintiff alleges that his replacement 

had commented that plaintiff “wasn’t as old as her parents,” (id.

¶ 44), which suggests that the age difference between the two of 

them might not have been substantial. 

Nor does he plausibly allege that the Board made a 

decision under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age 

discrimination. Plaintiff merely alleges that “several” 

supervisors made “comments” about his age and “commented out loud 

‘when [he] would retire.’” (Id. ¶ 42.) While he alleges that 

Flores was aware of plaintiff’s age before plaintiff was hired 

and had inquired about when plaintiff planned to retire, (id. ¶ 

43), it is not plausible to infer that Flores discriminated 

against plaintiff on the basis of his age only three years after 

deciding to hire him despite his age. Plaintiff also alleges 

that a friend of Flores mentioned to Flores that plaintiff “was 

old.” (Id. ¶ 44.) A mere comment that a person is “old” does 

not raise the inference of discrimination against that person 

because of his or her age. Not only is the context of this 

statement unknown, “old” is a meaningless and relative term. To 

the twelve year old, an eighteen year old may be “old,” but to 

the seventy year old, a sixty-five year old may not be “old” at 

all.

Accordingly, because the “discharge” giving rise to 

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plaintiff’s ADEA claim remains unclear and plaintiff fails to 

allege sufficient facts to plausibly support his conclusory

allegation that his age was a motivating factor in any decision, 

the court must grant plaintiff’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

ADEA claim.

5. Federal and State Retaliation

In his fourth claim for relief, plaintiff generally 

alleges that he participated in “protected activity” when he did 

not comply with requests made against County policy and was 

“constructively terminated” for participating in that protected 

activity. (Id. ¶¶ 64-67.) Plaintiff does not, however, identify 

the statutory or common law federal and state rights giving rise 

to his retaliation claim. When numerous federal and state 

statutes prohibit retaliation for engaging in an activity 

protected by the particular statute, plaintiff cannot shift the 

burden to the court or defendants to determine which statute or 

common law right, if any, gives rise to his claim. Moreover, the 

only factual allegations in the Complaint involving plaintiff’s 

refusal to comply with requests made against County policy were 

requests Sullenger allegedly made for certain health and 

retirement benefits between March 2013 and July 2014. Plaintiff 

does not include any factual allegations giving rise to the 

plausible inference that the Board considered those incidents in 

making its October 15, 2015 decision not to renew his contract. 

Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to comply with even the 

liberal notice requirements of Rule 8, the court must grant 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s generic claim for 

“federal and state retaliation.” 

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6. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional 

Distress

“California’s Workers’ Compensation Act [“WCA”] 

provides an employee’s exclusive remedy against his or her 

employer for injuries arising out of and in the course of 

employment.” Melendrez v. Ameron Int’l Corp., 240 Cal. App. 4th 

632, 638 (2d Dist. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “[A]n employee’s emotional distress injuries are 

subsumed under the exclusive remedy provisions of workers’ 

compensation” unless the employer’s conduct (1) “contravenes 

fundamental public policy” or (2) “exceeds the risks inherent in 

the employment relationship.” Livitsanos v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. 

4th 744, 754 (1992) (citations omitted). 

“The exception for conduct that ‘contravenes 

fundamental public policy’ is aimed at permitting a Tameny action 

to proceed despite the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy 

rule,” not a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. Miklosy, 44 Cal. 4th at 902-02; see also Thomas v. 

Starz Entm’t LLC, No. 2:15-CV-09239 CAS MRW, 2016 WL 844799, at 

*8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (explaining that the “‘fundamental 

public policy’ exception is of exceedingly limited import” after 

the Miklosy court limited it to Tameny claims); see also Charles 

J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 24 Cal. 4th 800, 

822 (2001) (recognizing that the public policy exception has also 

been applied to wrongful termination under California’s Fair 

Employment and Housing Act and statutory whistleblower claims). 

Under the second exception, an employer’s conduct 

may exceed the risks inherent in the employment relationship when 

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the conduct has “a ‘questionable’ relationship to the 

employment,” the injury “did not occur while the employee was 

performing service incidental to the employment and [] would not 

be viewed as a risk of the employment,” or the employer “stepped 

out of [its] proper role[].” Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 

43 Cal. 3d 148, 161 (1987). In contrast, “when the misconduct 

attributed to the employer is actions which are a normal part of 

the employment relationship, such as demotions, promotions, 

criticism of work practices, and frictions in negotiations as to 

grievances, an employee suffering emotional distress causing 

disability may not avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the 

Labor Code by characterizing the employer’s decisions as 

manifestly unfair, outrageous, harrassment [sic], or intended to 

cause emotional disturbance resulting in disability.” Id. at 

160; see also Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th at 821 

(“[T]ermination, a known risk of any employment relationship, 

does not, by itself, insulate a cause of action from the 

exclusive remedy provisions.”). 

The conduct plaintiff alleges gives rise to his 

negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims 

is not entirely clear because his Complaint merely incorporates 

all the factual allegations preceding those claims. (See Compl. 

¶¶ 68, 73.) Nor does plaintiff attempt to identify the conduct 

underlying these claims in his opposition. Nonetheless, all of 

the conduct alleged in plaintiff’s Complaint occurred during and 

because of his employment with the County and was a “normal part 

of the employment relationship.” Plaintiff alleges only that the 

Board did not renew his employment contract and placed him on 

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administrative leave, (id. ¶¶ 20, 38), some of the Supervisors 

were hostile toward plaintiff or avoided interacting with him, 

(id. ¶¶ 23-26, 29-30, 37), the Board delayed his annual 

performance evaluation, and the County Auditor reported plaintiff 

had allegedly embezzled money from a County project, (id. ¶¶ 32-

34). 

Although plaintiff alleges some of the defendants acted 

intentionally and for a wrongful purpose, including 

discriminating against him based on his age, an employee cannot 

“avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor Code by 

characterizing the employer’s decisions as manifestly unfair, 

outrageous, harrassment [sic], or intended to cause emotional 

disturbance.” Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160. “[T]he critical issue is 

whether the alleged acts, bereft of their motivation, can ever be 

viewed as a normal aspect of the employer relationship.” Charles 

J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th at 822; see also Cole, 43 

Cal. 3d at 160 (“If characterization of conduct normally 

occurring in the workplace as unfair or outrageous were 

sufficient to avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor 

Code, the exception would permit the employee to allege a cause 

of action in every case where he suffered mental disability 

merely by alleging an ulterior purpose of causing injury.”); see 

also Jones v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 

1382 (4th Dist. 2007) (“Even if the discriminatory conduct 

[plaintiff] complained about ‘may be characterized as 

intentional, unfair or outrageous, it is nevertheless covered by 

the workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions.’”).

Accordingly, because plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for 

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the emotional distress he allegedly suffered from defendants’ 

conduct lies under the WCA, the court must grant defendants’ 

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligent and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claims with prejudice. 

The court will also strike plaintiff’s requests for 

punitive damages against the County and on his ADEA claim, which 

plaintiff concedes are not available. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 12:20-24, 

13:1-3); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 818 (“Notwithstanding any 

other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages 

awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages 

imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing 

the defendant.”); Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 

1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Compensatory damages for pain and 

suffering and punitive damages are not available under the ADEA . 

. . .”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims be, and the 

same hereby is, GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE; and defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

defamation, ADEA, and “federal and state retaliation” claims be, 

and the same hereby is, GRANTED and those claims are DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s requests for 

punitive damages against the County and on his ADEA claim be, and 

the same hereby are, stricken from the Complaint. 

Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is 

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signed to file an amended complaint, if he can do so consistent 

with this Order.

Dated: July 25, 2016

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