Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01319/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01319-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Lonnie Lee Poslof, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff consented to the 

jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 5.) On March 3, 2015, the Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend within thirty days. (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint, filed on March 19, 2015, is currently before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief 

LONNIE LEE POSLOF, JR.,

 Plaintiff,

v.

TOM CAVALERO, et al., 

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01319-BAM (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR FAILURE 

TO STATE A CLAIM

Case 1:14-cv-01319-BAM Document 8 Filed 03/24/15 Page 1 of 6
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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. 

United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant 

acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is a Merced County jail inmate. In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff names the 

following defendants: (1) Raquel Rios, Merced Police Detective; (2) Merced County Sheriff’s 

Department; and (3) Does 1 to 100. 

In Claim 1, Plaintiff alleges the following: 

On July 25th 2014, at approximately 3:00 pm, Merced County Sheriff Deputy handed me 

an envelope from my attorney. Upon receiving this opened envelope, I noticed that the 

contents within were the Discovery Documents related to the current legal matter I am 

incarcerated for. To respect the attorney-client privilege communications Merced County 

Sheriffs Dept is required to have in effective policy in which protects the person(s) right. 

However, I questioned the Merced County Sheriff’s Deputy regarding this issue and was 

told they don’t have such a policy. Therefore it’s a direct violation of my constitutional 

right to Due Process, Attorney-Client privileged communications. Furthermore, Merced 

County Sheriff’s dept has been violation of my Right to Due Process and Attorney-Client 

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privileged communications by using a document called, “Merced Public Defender 

Communications Form.” I’m supposed to fill this document out give it to the Sheriff 

Deputy, which the Merced County Sheriff’s Dept faxes this document over to the Public 

Defender Officer, while being exposed to being read by unauthorized parties. 

(ECF No. 7, pp. 3-4.) 

In Claim 2, Plaintiff alleges as follows:

On or about July 1st 2014 and numerous other occasions Raquel Rios, Detective of the 

Merced Police Dept and DOES 1 to 100, deliberately provided information to the public 

which was misleading and condemned me as “Sexual Predator.”; also released wrong 

information to the public pertaining to unrelated individual’s prior convictions and used 

that information as if I had committed such acts. Therefore, Detective Rios, Does 1 to 

100 has infringed my Due Process of Law Guaranteed by both State and Federal 

Constitution . . .which will [impede] my fair opportunity to a fair trial by any Court.

(ECF No. 7, pp. 4-5.)

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 

III. Discussion

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18

Plaintiff is raising claims based on discrete events against different defendants. Plaintiff may 

not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); 

Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 

2007). Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim arises out of 

the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) there are 

commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 

(9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th 

Cir. 1980). Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule 20(a) will the Court review the other 

claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a), which permits the joinder of multiple 

claims against the same party.

Plaintiff may not assert multiple claims against unrelated defendants in this action. As a basic 

matter, Plaintiff may not bring claims against defendants at the Merced County Jail while 

simultaneously pursuing an unrelated claim against a defendant from the Merced City Police 

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Department. Despite being provided the relevant pleading standard, Plaintiff has been unable to cure 

this deficiency. 

2. Merced County Sheriff’s Department 

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff again names the Merced County Sheriff’s Department as 

defendants. A municipality, such as a city or county, is a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and may be 

sued. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 

166, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 

S.Ct. 2018 (1978). A local government unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees 

under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 

588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson 

v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). Instead, a local government unit may only 

be held liable if it inflicts the injury complained of. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Gibson, 290 F.3d at 

1185.

Generally, a claim against a local government unit for municipal or county liability requires an 

allegation that “a deliberate policy, custom, or practice ... was the ‘moving force’ behind the 

constitutional violation ... suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th 

Cir.2007); City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 

(1989). Alternatively, and more difficult to prove, municipal liability may be imposed where the local 

government unit’s omission led to the constitutional violation by its employee. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 

1186. Under this route to municipal liability, the “plaintiff must show that the municipality’s 

deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the employee to commit the 

constitutional violation.” Id. Deliberate indifference requires a showing “that the municipality was on 

actual or constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation.” Id.

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to sue the Merced County Sheriff’s Department, he fails to 

make any allegations supporting liability under Monell. Although Plaintiff asserts that he must 

complete a form to communicate with his public defender, there is no indication that Plaintiff is 

required to include privileged information on the form or that there are no other means to 

communicate with his legal counsel. Plaintiff therefore does not allege facts to support a claim that an 

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alleged constitutional violation was the result of a policy instituted by Merced County or that any 

omission by the Sheriff’s Department caused an employee to commit a constitutional violation.

3. Legal Mail

Prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 

264, 265 (9th Cir.1995). However, an isolated incident of mail interference or tampering usually does 

not support a claim under section 1983 for the violation of a constitutional right. See Davis v. Goord, 

320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir. 2003) (isolated incident of mail tampering usually insufficient to state 

claim); Grant v. Warden, 2011 WL 4048524, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2011).

Plaintiff alleges that an envelope from his attorney containing legal mail was opened. As this 

was an isolated incident, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim related to his opened mail. 

Insofar as Plaintiff complains that the Merced County Correctional Facilities have a specific 

document for inmates to utilize for communicating with their attorney, he has not identified any 

particular injury related to this policy or practice. Further, it is unclear from the factual allegations 

whether the form is simply a request to communicate with an attorney or for some other purpose. 

4. Right to Fair Trial

Plaintiff complains that Detective Rios of Merced Police Department and Does 1 to 100 have

been releasing misleading information to the public regarding pending criminal charges in violation of 

Plaintiff’s right to a fair trial. Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable section 1983 claim. This claim 

relates solely to a pending criminal action. As he has not been convicted and has not yet sustained an 

“actual injury” stemming from the alleged release of misleading information, any constitutional claim 

is not ripe. Further, once convicted, Plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal pursuant to Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). “[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly 

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of 

a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. “A claim for damages bearing 

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that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 

1983.” Id.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18 and fails to state 

a cognizable claim. Despite being provided with the relevant legal and pleading standards, Plaintiff 

has been unable to cure the deficiencies in his complaint. As such, further leave to amend is not 

warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint 

is HEREBY DISMISSED for failure to state a cognizable claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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