Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_98-cv-06052/USCOURTS-caed-1_98-cv-06052-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On May 27, 2005, defendants filed an objection to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as untimely. 1

Defendants’ objection is overruled. Plaintiff was granted an extension of time through June 9, 2005 in which to file

his motion for summary judgment. See Document #187. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DALE G. WILLS,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. TERHUNE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

1: CV-F-98-6052 OWW DLB P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE

CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Docs. 168, 173, 180)

I. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Dale G. Wills (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s second amended

complaint filed October 22, 2001, against defendants Terhune and Galaza for participating in a

policy that caused plaintiff to be exposed to a state of constant illumination within Corcoran State

Prison’s Security Housing Unit (“Corcoran SHU”). On May 6, 2005, defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment and on May 17, 2005, plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment. On 1

May 23, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the declarations in support of defendants’ motion for

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plainitff’s motion to strike defendants’ declarations is DENIED. The declrations comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2

1746 in that they were executed within the United States. Further, Mr. Gittisriboongul is competent to testify that the

Attorney General’s office received the Declration of the Custodian of Records accompnaied by plaintiff’s medical

records. Finally, Ms. Ayers attests to the authenticity of plaintiff’s medical records maintained by the Department of

Corrections through November 15, 2002, at which time plaintiff was incarcerated at California State Priosn -

Sacramento and therefore where is medical record was maintained.

2

summary judgment. Defendants filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on 2

June 23, 2005. On July 14, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion for deferred ruling on defendants’ motion

for summary judgment to which defendants filed an opposition on July 21, 2005. On September 27,

2005, the Court granted plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file a reply to defendants’

opposition to his motion for a deferred ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff was

granted until October 31, 2005 to file his reply. Plaintiff has not filed a reply nor has he filed an

opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

On December 2, 2005, this Court issued an order requiring the parties to file further briefing

regarding the security light at issue and its characteristics. Defendants filed a supplemental

declaration on December 16, 2005 and plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration on December 27,

2005. 

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ.P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Deferred Ruling

On July 14, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion for deferred ruling on defendants’ motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Rule 56(f) provides:

(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party

opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts

essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for

judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or

depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is

just.

The Ninth Circuit has explained that in order to prevail on a Rule 56(f) motion, the party “must show

(1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from further

discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist

the summary judgment motion.” State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.2d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998).

“In making a Rule 56(f) motion, a party opposing summary judgment ‘must make clear what

information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment.’” Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d

850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518

(9th Cir. 1987)). The burden is on the party seeking to conduct additional discovery to put forth

sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought exists. Volk v. D. A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d

1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff’s request pursuant to Rule 56(f) for an extension of time to conduct discovery so as

to oppose the motion for summary judgment is denied. In his motion, plaintiff requests additional

time to conduct discovery regarding defendants’ assertions that inmates assigned to the SHU had

previously vandalized the in cell light controls and that “gassing” is a concern of SHU staff. 

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff neither admitted or denied the facts set forth by defendant as undisputed nor filed a separate 3

statement of disputed facts. Local Rule 56-260(b). Therefore, the court was left to compile the summary of

undisputed facts from defendant’s statement of undisputed facts and plaintiff’s verified complaint and the statement

of facts contained in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Verified complaints and oppositions constitute

opposing affidavits for purposes of the summary judgment rule if they are based on facts within the pleader’s

personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998). Because plaintiff neither

submitted his own statement of disputed facts nor addressed defendant’s statement of undisputed facts, the court

accepts defendant’s version of the undisputed facts where plaintiff’s verified complaint and oppositions are not

contradictory. Plaintiff was provided with the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment by the

court in an order filed on July 10, 2002. Therefore, the requirements of Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th

Cir. 1988) have been satisfied.

5

However, plaintiff has failed to explain how this information is essential to resist defendants’ motion

or how the information would preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff simply states the information

is “necessary rebuttal evidence.” The Court disagrees and fails to see how the proposed discovery

would assist plaintiff in opposing the motion for summary judgement on the dispositive issue of

whether the conditions to which plaintiff was subjected in the Corcoran SHU violated his rights

under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s declaration is insufficient to support a motion pursuant

to Rule 56(f) and the motion is therefore denied.

D. Statement of Undisputed Facts3

1. Plaintiff is a 35 year old inmate who was sentenced to serve 17 years in state prison on July

26, 1996 for first degree burglary. Deposition of Plaintiff, 5:18-19; 10:15-23.

2. On or about March 27, 1998, plaintiff was transferred from High Desert State Prison to the

Security Housing Unit (SHU) at Corcoran State Prison. Deposition of Plaintiff, 17:2-10.

3. Plaintiff was sent to Corcoran SHU to serve a 15-month term for committing battery on an

inmate while at High Desert State Prison. Deposition of Plaintiff, 29:8-15.

4. Plaintiff remained at Corcoran SHU from March 27, 1998 until December 1998, when he

was transferred to the Pelican Bay SHU. Deposition of Plaintiff, 18:17-19.

5. The cells at Corcoran SHU have overhead fluorescent lights that consist of three elongated,

40 watt bulbs that are approximately four feet in length and are kept on during the daytime.

Deposition of Plaintiff, 19:22-25; Declaration of Robert Sweeney, ¶ 4; and Declaration of

Captain Raul Lopez, ¶ 4.

6. Each cell is also equipped with a six-inch elongated 13-watt security bulb (“security light”)

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Total lumens emitted from the security light 800 (13 watts X 61.538 lumens per watt). A 60-watt regular 4

incandescent bulb yields about 855 lumens according to the Federal Trade Commission website at

http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/products/ffclight.htm.

6

that remains on 24 hours a day. Deposition of Plaintiff, 20:3-4: Declaration of Robert

Sweeney, ¶; and Declaration of Captain Raul Lopez, ¶ 4.

7. The security light is a fluorescent six-inch rod that has a frosted coating. Supplemental

Declaration of Robert Sweeney, ¶ 5. There is a muted plastic cover on the light fixture. Id.

The lumens per watt emanating from the security light is 61.538. Id. The security light is

4 to 5 feet from an inmate’sface when they are sleeping. Supplemental Declaration of Dale

Wills, ¶ 4. 

4

8. Before 1996, inmates housed in the SHU had control over their daytime cell-lighting.

However, the security lights remained on 24 hours a day without exception. In 1996, due to

constant vandalism by SHU inmates in tampering with the in-cell controls for various illicit

reasons, the institution rewired the cell lights to disconnect the inmates’ control over the

lights. No changes were made to the security lights. Declaration of Captain Raul Lopez, ¶

5 and Exhibit A attached thereto.

9. The security lights provide a low wattage illumination within the cells allowing correctional

officers to see inside them at any time. Periodic security checks of the cells are necessary to

ascertain the inmates’ well being and deter criminal or inappropriate activities. While

performing these security checks or when walking by the cells, officers often put themselves

in harm’s way. One way they are placed in harms way is from inmate “gassings.” The lights

are essential for the officers’ safety and operate as a deterrent for inappropriate behavior.

Declaration of Captain Raul Lopez, ¶¶ 6, 7 and 8.

10. The security light provides enough illumination to allow officers to observe activities within

the cell and check on the inmates’ disposition. The light, however, is not bright enough by

itself to allow a person to read or write in the cell. Declaration of Captain Raul Lopez, ¶¶

6 and 8.

11. Plaintiff admits that the security lighting is not bright enough to allow him to read or write

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

without straining his eyes. Deposition of Plaintiff, 21:1-9.

12. The security light interfered with plaintiff’s personal sleep program. In particular, plaintiff

testified that he wanted to consistently maintain uninterrupted sleep from 9:30 p.m. until 5:30

a.m. Deposition of Plaintiff 2626:14-25.

13. The security light interfered “a little bit” with plaintiff’s sleep. Deposition of plaintiff, 27:4-

10.

14. Plaintiff was “awakened a few times by the irritation of the light, what [he] perceived to be

the irritation of the light.” Deposition of Plaintiff, 27:13-19; 28:7-13.

15. On March 31, 1998, four days after arriving at Corcoran SHU, plaintiff filed a grievance

asserting that the security light constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eight and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff requested that he be

given personal control over his cell light and that prison staff refrain from turning on the light

unless plaintiff refuses to comply with their ordersto turn on the light for legitimate reasons,

such as meals or count times. Declaration of Jennifer Jones, Litigation Coordinator, ¶ 4 and

Exhibit A attached thereto.

16. Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at all levels due to institutional safety and security concerns.

Plaintiff was informed in the Director’s Level of Review that relinquishing staff control over

the lights would unduly compromise the safety and security of the staff and the institutional

operation. Moreover, having to rewire the cells to relinquish control to the prisoners would

also be unduly burdensome and costly to the institution. Plaintiff disagreed with the

institution’s safety and security concerns, and insisted that he is entitled to maintain control

over the lighting in his cell. Deposition of Plaintiff, 35: Declaration of Jennifer Jones,

Litigation Coordinator, ¶ 4 and Exhibit A attached thereto.

17. Plaintiff’s medical records show that the first time he requested to see a physician after his

transfer to Corcoran SHU was on August 10, 1998, five months after his arrival at Corcoran.

Plaintiff complained of headaches before going to bed and requested reading glasses.

Plaintiff was seen by a physician, prescribed Motrin and given an optometry referral. There

were no discussions regarding the SHU’s lighting condition. Declaration of Alvin

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Gittisriboongul, ¶ 3, Exhibit B attached thereto.

18. Plaintiff was again seen by a physician on November 17, 1998. Plaintiff complained of

headaches. Plaintiff indicated that he had reading glasses, but they were allegedly taken from

him. The medical records do not indicate that there were any complaints regarding the

SHU’s lighting condition. Declaration of Alvin Gittisriboongul, ¶ 4, and Exhibit C attached

thereto. 

19. On March 10, 1999, plaintiff confided to the medical staff that since his arrival at Pelican

Bay State Prison, he had only been able to sleep three hours a night due to anxiety over his

legal issues. Declaration of Alvin Gittisriboongul, ¶ 5 and Exhibit D attached thereto.

20. According to the Mental Health Progress Notes of March 26, 1999, Plaintiff informed

medical staff that he was fearful of being housed in the general population. Plaintiff was

prescribed Hydroxyzine to help him sleep. Declaration of Alvin Gittisriboongul, ¶ 6 and

Exhibit E attached thereto.

21. Plaintiff testified that sleeping pills helped him sleep straight though the night. Deposition

of Plaintiff, 46: 19-25; 47:1-3.

22. On May 11, 1999, plaintiff told mental health staff that he was depressed and stressed over

the fact that by the time he is released from prison, he will be too old to have children.

Plaintiff admitted that he often ruminated about his predicament, which disrupted or

interfered with his ability to sleep. Declaration of Alvin Gittisriboongul, ¶ 7 and Exhibit F

attached thereto.

23. Plaintiff contends that defendants Galaza and Terhune should be held legally responsible by

virtue of their positions, during the relevant periods in this action, as the Warden for

Corcoran State Prison and the Director of the Department respectively. Plaintiff admits that

the only communication he had with either individual was through his inmate grievance

requesting that he be given control over his cell lights. Deposition of Plaintiff, 36:11-25,

37:5-20.

24. Since his arrival at the Corcoran SHU in 1999, inmate Herman Johnson has been confined

in a number of different cells and in each of the cells, he was subjected to constant

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

illumination and disallowed access to a functioning on and off light switch. He alleges the

constant illumination caused him adverse side effects. Declaration of Herman Johnson in

support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

25. Since his arrival at the Corcoran SHU, inmate William Slay has been forced to live in

constant illumination with no access to an on/off switch. He alleges the illumination has

caused him adverse side effects, including inconsistent sleeping. Declaration of William

Slay in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

26. Since his arrival at the Corcoran SHU, inmate Justin Woods has been forced to live in

constant illumination with no access to an on/off switch. He alleges the illumination has

caused him adverse side effects, including inconsistent sleeping. Declaration of Justin

Woods in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

27. Since his arrival at the Corcoran SHU, inmate Michael Newman has been forced to live in

constant illumination with no access to an on/off switch. He alleges the illumination has

caused him adverse side effects, including inconsistent sleeping. Declaration of Michael

Newman in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

28. Since his arrival at the Corcoran SHU in 2001, inmate Steven Brenneman has been forced

to live in constant illumination with no access to an on/off switch. He alleges the

illumination has caused him adverse side effects, including inconsistent sleeping.

Declaration of Steven Brenneman in support of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

D. Discussion

In his complaint, plaintiff asserts that he was sentenced to the Corcoran SHU following an

assault on another inmate. He was assigned to the SHU from March 1998 to December 1998 and

again on April 29, 2004. He contends that in the SHU he is forced to “live in a state of constant

illumination and disallowed access to a functioning on-off light switch.” Plaintiff describes the light

fixture inside his cell as having four (4) light bulbs, three of which are simultaneously activated at

approximately 5:45 a.m. each morning and remain activated until 9:30 p.m. each evening. He

describes these as the “bright lights.” Plaintiff states that the other light bulb, the “night light,” is

on continuously, twenty four hours a day. Plaintiff does not know the wattage of the light bulbs.

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants object to the declarations pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 701 and 802. The Court 5

does not deem it necessary to rule on the objections because considering the declarations does change the Court’s

recommendation.

10

While there is a light switch in his cell, plaintiff states that it is inoperable. Plaintiff contends that

these conditions cause him nausea, dizzy spells, chronic headaches, vision impairment and emotional

distress. He also alleges that he is unable to maintain a consistent sleeping habit because his cell is

constantly illuminated. He contends that while the night light is the only one constantly illuminated,

it alone is too bright to sleep. He also states that the conditions prevent him from engaging in an

exercise regime due to chronic exhaustion. Plaintiff further contends that the constant illumination

increases the temperature of his cell which is already extremely hot in the summer time. Plaintiff

submits numerous declarations from inmates who have been in the SHU at various conditions.

These inmates confirm the conditions described by plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that defendants 5

Terhune and Galaza are responsible for the policy of constant illumination. 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health orsafety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting

evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence

on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s

conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Requiring inmates to live in constant illumination, under certain circumstances, rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9 Cir. 1996). th

Defendants argue that the lighting plaintiff complains of does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment in that the security lights at issue provide minimal

illumination, much like a night light. See UDF 9, 10. Defendants argue the light is only bright

enough to allow the offices to safely look into the cells without jeopardizing their safety and plaintiff

admits that the lights are not bright enough to read by. Id. Defendants point out that inmates in the

SHU are generally more violent, unruly, mentally unstable and dangerous and the low wattage

security lights only provide enough light to allow officers to observe the activities within the cell at

a reasonable distance as not to put themselves in harm’s way. UDF 9. In response to the Court’s

order, defendants submitted additional evidence regarding the lighting, which plaintiff does not

dispute. It is undisputed that the security light is a fluorescent, six inch rod that has frosted coating,

there is a muted plastic cover over the light fixture and the lumens per watt emanating from the

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

security light is 61.538. UDF 7. 

The court finds that defendants have met their initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for his motion, and identifying those portions of the record which he believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish that

a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As stated above, in attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but

is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1973). 

Plaintiff does not dispute defendants’ description of the security light, but maintains that

while in the SHU, he was forced to live in a “state of constant illumination” and was prohibited from

activating and deactivating the security light and that these conditions constitute cruel and unusual

punishment. While plaintiff states that he was “unable to maintain a consistent sleeping habit”

because his cell is “constantly illuminated,” plaintiff admits that the security light is not even bright

enough for him to read or write without straining his eyes. UDF 11, 12. 

In Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d at 1090, cited by plaintiff, the Court held that constant

illumination of a cell could qualify as an unconstitutional condition of confinement where it causes

the inmate “grave sleeping problems.” However, in Keenan plaintiff alleged that large florescent

lights directly in front of and behind his cell shone into his cell 24 hours a day, so that his cell was

"constantly illuminated, and [Keenan] had no way of telling night or day," and this condition caused

him "grave sleeping problems" and other mental and psychological problems. Unlike the situation

in Keenan, the security lights at issue in this case are similar to night lights and provide only enough

illumination for officers to conduct security checks on the inmates during the night. Plaintiff admits

that the lights are not bright enough to read without straining.

Plaintiff offers no evidence that he was subject to the type of “grave sleeping problems” that

occurred in the Keenan case. At his deposition, he testified that the lighting interfered with his sleep

“a little bit” and he was “awakened a few times.” UDF 13, 14. Indeed, the first time plaintiff

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

requested to see a physician after his transfer to the SHU was on August 10, 1998. While he

complained of headaches, the records do not indicate any discussion regarding the SHU’s lighting

condition. UDF 17. Further, on March 10, 1999, plaintiff told medical staff that he was having

difficulty sleeping since his arrival due to anxiety over his legal issues. UDF 19. 

The conditions complained of by plaintiff, namely the constant illumination of the cells in

the SHU by the security light at issue, do not violate the Eighth Amendment. While plaintiff was

indeed subject to “constant illumination,” the illumination was, based on the evidence, akin to a

night light. While plaintiff has submitted the declarations of other inmates who support plaintiff’s

contention that the cells in the Corcoran SHU are constantly illuminated by the security lights; the

declarations together with plaintiff’s statements do not convince the Court that the conditions rise

to the level of a constitutional violation. This is especially true given the reasons for the lights. The

security lights are necessary within the SHU to allow officers to observe inmate activity in cells, to

maintain security and safety. Accordingly, the court finds that defendants are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. Because of this finding, it is

unnecessary to reach defendants’ arguments that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

E. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter

of law on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against them and HEREBY RECOMMENDS that

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, filed May 6, 2005, be GRANTED and plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment filed May 17, 2005 be DENIED, thus concluding this action in its entirety.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written 

///

///

///

///

///

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 10, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:98-cv-06052-OWW -DLB Document 209 Filed 02/10/06 Page 14 of 14