Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01066/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GARY LANE EISENMANN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-1066 PHX ROS (MEA)

)

IVAN BARTOS, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

On April 18, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner challenges the sentence imposed pursuant to his

criminal conviction by an Arizona state court. Respondents

filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”)

on August 10, 2006. Docket No. 12. Respondents assert

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was not filed within the

applicable statute of limitations. Respondents also assert

Petitioner’s habeas claims were not properly exhausted in the

Arizona state courts and are procedurally defaulted. Therefore,

Respondents argue, the petition must be denied and dismissed

with prejudice. Petitioner filed a reply and response to the

answer on September 7, 2006. See Docket No. 13.

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1

 See Arizona v. Eisenmann, 1993 CR 006445, and Arizona v.

Eisenmann, 1993 CR 007295, available at the Maricopa County Superior

Court’s website at www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/criminal. 

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I Procedural History

Petitioner was charged with one count of burglary and

one count of theft in an information filed October 2, 2002.

Answer, Exh. D. At the time Petitioner committed his crime, he

was on supervised parole for crimes committed in Arizona in

1993, i.e., theft, a Class 3 felony, and burglary in the first

degree, a Class 2 felony.1 Id., Exh. B at 10, 16-19, 21.

On December 6, 2002, Petitioner entered into a plea

agreement providing he would plead guilty to one count of theft.

Id., Exh. E. The plea agreement also provided the burglary

charge would be dismissed. Id., Exh. E. At the change of plea

hearing and in the written plea agreement Petitioner averred he

had previously been convicted of two “allegeable” felonies.

Id., Exh. A & Exh. E. The plea agreement averred Petitioner had

“only 2 prior felony conviction[s] from any jurisdiction.” Id.,

Exh. E. 

At his sentencing hearing, Petitioner agreed the

presentencing report correctly indicated Petitioner had

previously been convicted of six felonies. Answer, Exh. B at

16-19. The government agreed to proceed with the plea agreement

notwithstanding Petitioner’s apparent prevarication regarding

his prior convictions in other jurisdictions. Id., Exh. B at

17-20. The government alleged Petitioner was a “career

criminal” and urged the sentencing court to impose the maximum

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sentence allowed under the plea agreement. Id., Exh. B at 17-

20.

On January 6, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to a

“superaggravated” term of 8.75 years in prison, the maximum

allowed by the terms of the plea agreement for his theft

conviction. Id., Exh. B & Exh. G. The sentencing court stated

on the record:

The defendant has multiple prior felony

convictions, at least two of which are

allegeable. He was on parole when he

committed this offense.

I find that based upon his prior conduct...,

as well as the written information and

documents ... submitted in attachment to [the

government’s] supplemental sentencing

information, that it’s apparent to me that

Mr. Eisenmann is a very serious danger to the

community and a danger to reoffend. I say

this based largely upon his apparent signs of

preparation for future offenses. He had

numerous tools, instructions as to how to

circumvent burglary security systems, and, as

I understand it, [], a list of potential

victims....

Id., Exh. B at 20. 

At the time of his incarceration, the Arizona

Department of Corrections noted the state court’s order

sentencing Petitioner did not cite to Arizona Revised Statutes

Annotated § 13-1802, governing the crime of theft. Id., Exh. H.

The ADOC sought clarification from the sentencing judge

regarding this omission. Id., Exh. H. Pursuant to a

stipulation by Petitioner and the government, on August 6, 2003,

the state court amended the plea agreement and the sentencing

order to include a citation to section 13-1802. Id., Exh. I &

Exh. J.

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Petitioner filed a timely notice of his intent to seek

post-conviction relief on March 27, 2003. Id., Exh. K. On June

23, 2003, Petitioner’s appointed counsel notified the state

court he could not find a colorable claim for relief to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner was notified that

he could file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.

Id., Exh. N. On July 10, 2003, Petitioner, through counsel,

filed a pleading seeking dismissal of his action for postconviction relief. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner averred to the

state court he no longer wished to contest his conviction or

sentence. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner stated he understood he

could not file another petition for post-conviction relief

absent, inter alia, a change in the law “which would probably

overturn the conviction or sentence....” Id., Exh. O. On

August 22, 2003, the state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s

action for post-conviction relief based on Petitioner’s failure

to file an actual petition for relief prior to the relevant

deadline. Id., Exh. P.

Petitioner filed a second action for post-conviction

relief in the state trial court on September 13, 2004, Id.,

Exh. G. Petitioner asserted this post-conviction action was

timely because it fell within the exception to the timeliness

rule stated in Rule 32.1(g), Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner argued the action fell

within the exception because he was raising a claim premised on

a significant change in the relevant law. Id., Exh. Q.

Petitioner asserted he was entitled to resentencing based on the

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2 The state court concluded Petitioner’s state conviction

became final upon the conclusion of his “Rule 32 of-right proceedings”

on September 21, 2003, when the time expired for seeking appellate

review of the dismissal of his first Rule 32 action. Petition,

Attach.; Answer, Exh. R. 

-5-

United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington,

i.e., his sentence was based upon facts not admitted by

Petitioner and not found by a jury. Id., Exh. Q.

The Arizona Superior Court dismissed Petitioner’s

second action for post-conviction relief on September 20, 2004,

concluding the action was not timely filed. Id., Exh. R. The

trial court determined Petitioner’s action did not fall within

the Rule 32.1(g) exception because his conviction became final

prior to the decision in Blakely and Blakely is not to be

applied retroactively on collateral review. Id., Exh. R.2

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. S. Petitioner asserted the

Arizona Superior Court had violated his right to due process of

law by dismissing his second action for post-conviction relief.

Id., Exh. S. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition

for review on July 21, 2005. Id., Exh. T. Petitioner sought

review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh.

U. Petitioner argued that Blakely and the opinion in United

States v. Booker, issued in 2005, constituted a significant

change in the law which applied retroactively to Petitioner’s

sentence. id., Exh. U. The Arizona Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s petition for review on March 9, 2006. Id., Exh. V.

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28 -6-

 Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because:

1. His sentence was wrongly aggravated in violation of

his Sixth Amendment rights;

2. His right to an appeal of his conviction and

sentence was violated by the state courts’ summary dismissal of

his second action for post-conviction relief, citing to the

Sixth Amendment;

3. His right to procedural due process was violated by

the state courts’ summary dismissal of his second action for

post-conviction relief. Petitioner contends the state courts

“refuted new evidence pertaining to [his] sentence.” Petition

at 9.

II Analysis

A. Relevant statute of limitations

Because Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to Arizona law

he had no right to a direct appeal and his conviction arguably

became “final” for the purpose of federal habeas relief on the

date judgment was entered and he was sentenced by the state

trial court, i.e., January 6, 2003. See Montgomery v. Sheldon,

181 Ariz. 256, 258 (1995); Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 383

F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). Cf. Hernandez-Almanza v.

United States Dep’t of Justice, INS, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir.

1976) (holding, for purposes of an immigration proceeding, that

a criminal conviction was final when the defendant entered a

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3

 The Court notes the state court determined Petitioner’s

conviction became final when proceedings concluded regarding his

“appeal” as of right pursuant to his guilty plea, i.e., his “Rule 32

of-right” proceedings. This apparently contradicts the conclusion in

Isley, which has been regularly followed by the District of Arizona.

See, e.g., Smith v. Schriro, 2006 WL 2547294, at *2 (D. Ariz.);

Halliburton v. Bartos, 2006 WL 2504315, at *1 (D. Ariz.); Bradford v.

Schriro, 2006 WL 1722310, at *3 (D. Ariz.); Mares v. Schriro, 2006 WL

898164, at *3 (D. Ariz.). Additionally, using the later date does not

allow that the petition is timely filed.

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guilty plea and waived direct appeal).3 Therefore, Petitioner’s

conviction became final after the effective date of the AEDPA

and is subject to the one-year statute of limitations.

The AEDPA requires state prisoners to file any petition

for federal habeas corpus relief within one year of the date

that their state court conviction becomes “final.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2006) (“A 1-year period of

limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court.”). This section provides:

The limitation period shall run from the

latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have

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been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(emphasis added). 

The running of this one-year statute of limitations is

tolled during any period when “a properly filed application for

state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in any state court.

See id. § 2244(d)(2); see also Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. Kelly, 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Section 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling

during the time a “properly filed” state

court petition is pending. “Properly filed”

means the petition’s “delivery and acceptance

are in compliance with the applicable laws

and rules governing filings” in that state.

In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the United States

Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a

postconviction petition is untimely under

state law, that [is] the end of the matter

for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”

Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005).

Respondents argue the petition is not timely filed

because Petitioner did not file his habeas action within one

year of the date his conviction became final, absent any tolling

of the limitations period during the pendency of Petitioner’s

first state action for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner’s conviction became final, for purposes of

the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, on January 6, 2003.

Therefore, Petitioner had until January 5, 2004, to file his

habeas petition, absent any statutory or equitable tolling of

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the statute of limitations. 

The statute of limitations ran from January 7, 2003,

until March 27, 2003, a period of approximately 80 days, when

Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief,

which tolled the statute of limitations regarding his federal

habeas action. The statute of limitations was tolled until

August 22, 2003, when the state trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s action for post-conviction relief. Petitioner had

thirty days to seek review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals and, therefore, the statute of limitations on his

federal habeas action was further statutorily tolled during this

time. See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir.

2000); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420-24 (3d Cir. 2000).

See also Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 563 n.3 (7th Cir.

2001) (declining to decide the issue but collecting cases so

holding).

Therefore, the remaining nine and a half months of the

statute of limitations regarding Petitioner’s federal habeas

action began to run again on September 22, 2003, and expired on

approximately July 5, 2004, unless further tolled by another

“properly filed” action for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner’s federal habeas action, filed April 18, 2006, was

not filed within the applicable statute of limitations.

Petitioner filed a second action for post-conviction

relief in the state trial court on September 13, 2004, asserting

he was entitled to relief from his sentence based on the United

States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington. The

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Arizona courts determined this action was not timely filed,

concluding the petition did not fall within the exception to the

rule regarding timely filing stated in Rule 32.1(g), Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because this action was not

“properly filed” because it was untimely, the second action for

post-conviction relief did not toll the statute of limitations

regarding Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See Pace, 544

U.S. at 416-17; Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148-49. Additionally, this

second action for post-conviction relief could not “revive” the

already-expired statute of limitations. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Preston v. Gibson,

234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only be considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the

filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only

if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); Malcom v. Payne,

281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling is only

appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s

lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

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tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034. 

Petitioner has not established that there were

extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made it

impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition.

Petitioner does not assert there were “extraordinary”

circumstances precluding him from timely filing his habeas

petition. Petitioner only asserts his second state action for

post-conviction relief was timely and should have statutorily

tolled the statute for limitations on Petitioner’s federal

habeas relief. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief

based on the decision in Blakely, and, therefore, that his

action was timely because it fit the exception for relief based

on new law. Petitioner also asserts his federal habeas petition

is timely because he is entitled to relief based on the decision

in Blakely, which was not available prior to June of 2004. 

The Court is unaware of any federal court opinion

concluding a change in the law entitles a petitioner to

equitable tolling of the relevant statute of limitations and,

therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling based

on the decision in Blakely. Neither does Blakely provide for an

alternative date for beginning the statute of limitations

regarding Petitioner’s habeas action. Section 2244 provides the

statute of limitations regarding a federal habeas claim may

begin to run on the “date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28

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U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(). This section is not applicable to

Petitioner’s Blakely claim because the United States Supreme

Court has not made Blakely retroactive to cases on collateral

review. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir.

2005), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-9237 (Nov. 10, 2005).

See also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482

(2001) (holding that a new rule is “made retroactive to cases on

collateral review” only if the Supreme Court holds it to be

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review). 

Additionally, Petitioner’s assertion that Blakely is

equivalent to “new evidence” regarding his sentence is not

legally cognizable; the Blakely opinion is the legal predicate

for Petitioner’s claim, not evidence relevant to his guilt or

sentence. Cf. Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir.

2005) (“a state-court decision establishing an abstract

principle of law arguably helpful to the petitioner’s claim does

not constitute a ‘factual predicate’ for that claim.”). Compare

Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 305-06, 125 S. Ct. 1571,

1579-80 (2005) (concluding a court order vacating the

petitioner’s prior conviction constituted a factual predicate

for his claim challenging his current sentence as enhanced by

the prior conviction).

Because Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was not

timely filed, absent statutory or equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations, the habeas petition should be denied and

dismissed.

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B. The merits of Petitioner’s claims for relief

Alternatively, the petition for habeas relief may be

denied on the merits of the claims raised by Petitioner,

regardless of any failure to properly exhaust his claims in the

state courts.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas relief

premised on the holding in Blakely. Petitioner’s conviction

became final, arguably, on January 6, 2003, when he was

sentenced and judgment entered. The United States Supreme Court

announced a new constitutional rule regarding criminal procedure

in Blakely v. Washington on June 24, 2004. Therefore,

Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the date that the

United States Supreme Court issued the Blakely decision in June

of 2004. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has conclusively

held the Supreme Court’s Blakely decision does not apply

retroactively to a state conviction which was final before June

24, 2004. See Schardt, 414 F.3d at 1038. Because Petitioner’s

conviction was final prior to Blakely, he is not entitled to

resentencing based on this opinion.

Additionally, Petitioner could properly be sentenced to

a term of 8.75 years imprisonment for his conviction on a Class

3 felony based solely on facts admitted by Petitioner, i.e., his

two 1993 felony convictions within Arizona, and his parole

status at the time he committed his 2001 crime. Petitioner

admitted in the written plea agreement and in open court at the

time of sentencing he had previously been convicted of two

felonies and that he was on parole at the time of the instant

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4

Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. [] Here, only the existence of

a prior conviction is at issue, and Petitioner

has no federal right to have a jury decide that

question. .... The Constitution permits prior

convictions to be used to enhance a sentence,

without being submitted to a jury, so long as the

convictions were themselves obtained in

proceedings that required the right to a jury

trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S. Ct. 2348; [].

There is no suggestion that Petitioner’s 1986

conviction was obtained without the requisite

procedural safeguards. Thus, we reject

Petitioner’s claim that his sentence violated

Apprendi. Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2006).

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conviction. At the time Petitioner was sentenced, Arizona law

provided for a statutory maximum of 13 years imprisonment for an

individual convicted of a Class 3 felony if the individual was

previously convicted of a felony. The fact that Petitioner’s

sentence was aggravated by prior convictions and that he

admitted these prior convictions removes his circumstance from

the umbrella of both Apprendi and Blakely.4 See Hughes v.

Harrison, 129 Fed. App. 340, 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126

S. Ct. 130 (2005); Stevenson v. Lewis, 116 Fed. App. 814, 815

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Apprendi carved out a “narrow exception” for

sentence enhancements based on “the fact of a prior

conviction.”).

Additionally, Petitioner’s assertion that he was denied

his right to procedural due process by the state courts’ summary

dismissal of his second action for post-conviction relief,

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without consideration of the merits of his Blakely claim, may be

denied because this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas

review. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that

federal habeas relief is not available to address alleged errors

in a state post-conviction review process. See Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998); Gerlaugh v. Stewart,

129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877

F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989). 

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief was not

timely filed and, therefore, the petition should be denied and

dismissed. Alternatively, Petitioner is not entitled to relief

on the merits of his Blakely claim because Blakely was decided

after Petitioner’s state conviction became final. Additionally,

Petitioner’s sentence was within the statutory maximum for his

crime and his sentence was predicated on facts, including his

prior convictions, admitted by Petitioner. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of his

Blakely claim. Furthermore, Petitioner’s claim that the state

courts’ summary dismissal of his Blakely claim violated his

right to due process of law is not cognizable in an action for

federal habeas relief.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Eisenmann’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 25th day of September, 2006.

 

Case 2:06-cv-01066-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/26/06 Page 16 of 16