Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-01991/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-01991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 896
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Arbitration
Cause of Action: 09:1 U.S. Arbitration Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UniCredit Bank Austria AG,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Inmobiliaria y Arrendadora Cuadro S.A. de 

C.V., et al.,

Defendantss.

No. CV-23-01991-PHX-KML

ORDER 

Plaintiff UniCredit Bank Austria AG provided Defendant Inmobiliaria y 

Arrendadora Cuadro S.A. de C.V (“IyAC”) with a multi-million-dollar dual tranche loan 

to purchase plastic manufacturing equipment. UniCredit denied IyAC’s request for the 

second tranche after IyAC failed to make payments on the first, resulting in IyAC’s default 

on multiple other agreements contingent on IyAC securing financing. IyAC initiated 

arbitration against UniCredit, but the arbitrator ruled against IyAC and awarded damages 

to UniCredit. In this suit, UniCredit attempts to confirm the arbitration award against IyAC 

and asserts claims against other entities and individuals allegedly involved with IyAC. 

Some of UniCredit’s claims, against some of defendants, are sufficient to proceed beyond 

the pleading stage, so defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied in part. 

I. Background

IyAC is a family-run plastic film manufacturing company operated by Amalia 

Cecilia Luna Contreras (“Luna Contreras”) and her son Miguel Angel Peredo Luna

(“Peredo Luna”). (Doc. 29 at 2, 4.) IyAC is a Mexican company with assets and operations 

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in Arizona. (Doc. 29 at 2.) 

In 2016, IyAC started negotiating a loan (the “Credit Agreement”) with UniCredit, 

an Austrian bank. (Doc. 29 at 1, 7.) Under the Credit Agreement, UniCredit would make 

two loans available to IyAC: one in the amount of €3,351,600 (“Facility A”) and another

in the amount of €3,145,500 (“Facility B”). (Doc. 29 at 11.) This financing would be used 

to purchase plastic extrusion equipment from SML Maschinenbaugesellschaft mbH 

(“SML”). (Doc. 29 at 4, 7.) The equipment would be delivered to Zummit, a Nevada 

corporation that Luna Contreras and Peredo Luna represented was IyAC’s “100%-owned 

subsidiary.” (Doc. 29 at 6–8.) The Credit Agreement provided any dispute “arising out of 

or in connection” with the transaction would be subject to arbitration by Austria’s Vienna 

International Arbitral Centre under its Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation. (Doc. 29 

at 15.)

A. Material Misrepresentations

UniCredit alleges that IyAC, Zummit, and Peredo Luna made false statements and 

omissions during negotiations that were intended to induce UniCredit to enter into the 

Credit Agreement. (Doc. 29 at 8–10.) Many of the false statements and omissions involved 

the relationship between various organizations. For example, “IyAC, Zummit and Mr. 

Peredo Luna each provided [UniCredit] with entity organization charts showing, among 

other things, IyAC to have a 100% ownership interest in Zummit.” (Doc. 29 at 8.) Luna 

Contreras signed “all but one of these entity organization charts[.]” (Doc. 29 at 8.) One of 

the charts provided by Peredo Luna and signed by Luna Contreras displayed “Inmobiliaria 

y Arrendadora Grupo, Mexico” (IyAG) as the “100%” owner of Zummit. (Doc. 29 at 8–9

(emphasis added).) Other documents identified IyAC, i.e. Inmobiliaria y Arrendadora 

Cuadro, as the owner. UniCredit asked Peredo Luna about this discrepancy and he stated,

IyAG “is ‘like our dba (Comercial [sic] name).’” (Doc. 29 at 9.) UniCredit later discovered 

that “Zummit’s annual filings with the State of Arizona for 2017, 2018 and 2019 state that 

‘Fruma Plastics’ was Zummit’s shareholder.” (Doc. 29 at 9.)

IyAC and Peredo Luna also provided UniCredit with IyAC’s 2015, 2016, and 2017 

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audited financial statements. (Doc. 29 at 10.) These statements too “were for ‘Inmobiliaria 

y Arrendadora Grupo’ but per Mr. Peredo Luna’s assertion, and as confirmed by the auditor 

who prepared the statements, this was understood by [UniCredit] to be a dba for, and refer 

to, IyAC.” (Doc. 29 at 10.) UniCredit alleges these statements were materially false 

because they failed to disclose two pending litigation claims against IyAC, including one 

reduced to judgment in 2017. (Doc. 29 at 10.) IyAC also represented there were “no 

security interests on its assets” when its real estate was in fact subject to two large 

mortgages. (Doc. 29 at 10.) UniCredit relied on the statements and entered into the Credit 

Agreement. (Doc. 29 at 3.)

B. The Joint Venture Agreement 

Shortly before entering the Credit Agreement, IyAC and Zummit entered into a Joint 

Venture Agreement (the “JVA”) with one another. (Doc. 29 at 12.) Peredo Luna signed on

Zummit’s behalf and another individual acting on Peredo Luna’s instructions signed on 

IyAC’s behalf. (Doc. 29 at 12.) Under the JVA, IyAC would “contribute the SML 

Equipment” to the joint venture and Zummit would “obtain a real estate facility in Arizona 

for the SML Equipment.” (Doc. 29 at 12.) The parties agreed Zummit would receive 70%

of the venture’s profits and IyAC would receive 30%. (Doc. 29 at 12.) The JVA provided 

that in the event of a breach—which it did not define—the breaching party would pay the 

other party a $5 million penalty. (Doc. 29 at 12.) The JVA also contained a strange 

provision requiring that IyAC collaterally assign to Zummit 1,000,000 shares in Zummit 

as a form of security if IyAC breached the JVA. (Doc. 29 at 12.) “Zummit’s Articles of 

Incorporation authorized the issuance of 1,000,000 shares, and therefore, the collateral 

pledge was for 100% of Zummit.” (Doc. 29 at 12.) In other words, if IyAC breached the 

JVA, Zummit could execute on the collateral and own 100% of itself. (Doc. 29 at 12.)

In November 2019, approximately two years after the Credit Agreement, Zummit 

issued IyAC a default letter for “fail[ure] to provide evidence” of acquiring the SML 

Equipment under the JVA. (Doc. 29 at 13.) That letter demanded the $5 million penalty 

and notified IyAC that Zummit would “‘keep possession and ownership of the shares title 

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certificate pledged since the joint venture contract was signed . . .’ (i.e., the 1,000,000 

shares of Zummit pledged to Zummit by IyAC).” (Doc. 29 at 13.)

C. Private Purchase Agreement

After the Credit Agreement but before Zummit sent the default letter, IyAC entered 

into a Private Purchase Agreement (the “PPA”) with Empaques Poliplasticos S.A. de C.V. 

(“Empaques”). (Doc. 29 at 13.) Under the PPA, IyAC would sell and Empaques would buy 

“30 million pounds of plastic wrap per year at a price of $1 per pound for five years, 

beginning in 2021.” (Doc. 29 at 13.) In the event of a breach—a term the PPA did not 

define—the breaching party would pay a penalty of $30 million. (Doc. 29 at 13–14.) 

UniCredit was not aware of the PPA until IyAC filed its arbitration claim. (Doc. 29 at 13.)

D. Facility A Default and Arbitration

After UniCredit disbursed the Facility A loan to IyAC, the SML Equipment was 

delivered to Zummit. (Doc. 29 at 14.) IyAC failed to timely make the first installment 

payment due under the Credit Agreement. (Doc. 29 at 14.) Nonetheless, IyAC requested 

Facility B funding and provided 2017 and 2018 financial statements to UniCredit as 

required under the Credit Agreement. (Doc. 29 at 14.) These statements “omitted any 

reference to IyAC’s debt to [UniCredit] of approximately €3,351,600” and “IyAC and its 

auditor could not provide a credible explanation for this omission.” (Doc. 29 at 14.)

Because of this and IyAC’s attempts to “change what SML Equipment it could purchase 

under Facility B,” UniCredit advised IyAC it would not make the Facility B loan available.

(Doc. 29 at 14–15.)

Because UniCredit refused to make the Facility B loan, IyAC claimed it could not 

fulfill its obligations to Empaques under the PPA. (Doc. 29 at 14.) Empaques then issued 

a default letter stating IyAC had breached the PPA and demanding payment of the $30 

million penalty. (Doc. 29 at 14.) 

As a result, IyAC filed a statement of claim with the Vienna Arbitral Center 

claiming UniCredit breached the Credit Agreement and demanding €41,858,900.00 in 

damages. (Doc. 29 at 16.) UniCredit asserted a counterclaim for €3,037,823.24 plus 

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interest, representing the amounts IyAC had failed to pay under the Credit Agreement. 

(Doc. 29 at 16.)

On March 8, 2021, the arbitrator issued a final award in favor of UniCredit 

dismissing IyAC’s claims and determining that IyAC was “liable to pay the amount of 

€3,075,192.72 to Plaintiff within 14 days after service of the award” with interest and 

€890,161.08 “for fees, expenses and costs related to the arbitration.” (Doc. 29 at 17.)

E. IyAC Vacates its Facility

UniCredit brought an action against IyAC in Mexico. (Doc. 29 at 18.) On June 16, 

2021, UniCredit’s Mexican counsel attempted to effect service of process on IyAC at its 

facility in Mexico but discovered that IyAC had vacated it, “leaving no equipment and no 

forwarding address.” (Doc. 29 at 18.) UniCredit alleges that discovery was the first time it 

had reason to think IyAC may have defrauded it. (Doc. 29 at 18.) 

UniCredit subsequently investigated Peredo Luna and his associated entities and 

discovered “a long history of defrauding creditors using a similar ‘shell game’ modus 

operandi” that he used against UniCredit. (Doc. 29 at 18.) Peredo Luna “arranges for 

entities of which he has de facto control” to acquire plastic-making equipment and material, 

financed by loans; defaults on those loans after maxing out credit lines on the purchases; 

sends or transfers the purchased assets to another entity under his control; and then goes 

out of existence, “leaving no assets out of which the creditors can recover.” (Doc. 29 at 18.) 

UniCredit alleges Peredo Luna followed a similar pattern of conduct with at least three 

other banks, with entities he controlled either disappearing or transferring their assets 

before filing for bankruptcy when the banks sought to collect. (Doc. 29 at 19–21.) 

F. UniCredit Files Suit

In September 2023, UniCredit filed its complaint in this court against IyAC, 

Zummit, Peredo Luna, Maria de Los Angeles Luna Gale (“Luna Gale”), Luna Contreras, 

and Miguel A. Peredo (“Peredo”).

1

(Doc. 1.) The complaint listed six counts. Two months 

1 The complaint names as defendants the spouses of Luna Contreras (Peredo) and Peredo 

Luna (Luna Gale). UniCredit does not allege any specific facts relating to those spouses 

except for the existence of their marriages. (Doc. 29 at 2.) The marital community “is not 

a legal entity and cannot itself be sued.” Sw. Foodservice Excellence Inc. v. Strub, No. CVCase 2:23-cv-01991-KML Document 80 Filed 12/16/24 Page 5 of 24
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later, UniCredit filed an amended complaint alleging additional facts in support of these 

claims. (Doc. 29.) UniCredit was unable to serve IyAC, Luna Contreras, and Peredo

through normal means and sought permission to complete alternative service. (Doc. 36.)

The court approved alternative service and UniCredit served those three defendants via 

certified mail. (Doc. 40 at 4.) In December 2023, defendants Zummit, Peredo Luna, and 

Luna Gale filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 37.) In February 2024, Zummit notified the 

court it had filed for bankruptcy. (Doc. 52.) A few days later, Luna Contreras and Peredo 

filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 54.) IyAC filed its own motion to dismiss shortly after. 

(Doc. 55.) 

Zummit’s bankruptcy automatically stayed all counts against it. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 

Thus, assuming they are properly viewed as standalone counts, the counts brought only 

against Zummit (i.e., counts three and five) are stayed. The bankruptcy stay did not, 

however, automatically reach any of the other defendants. Klinkenborg Aerial Spraying & 

Seeding, Inc. v. Rotorcraft Dev. Corp., 690 F. App’x 540, 540–41 (9th Cir. 2017). The 

counts not subject to the bankruptcy stay are:

• Count 1: recognition of the Austrian arbitral award against IyAC (based on Zummit 

allegedly being IyAC’s successor); 

• Count II: fraud against IyAC, Zummit, Peredo Luna, and Luna Contreras for 

material misrepresentations and omissions during the parties’ negotiations of the 

Credit Agreement; 

• Count IV: piercing the corporate veil—alter ego against all defendants, based on 

IyAC being a “mere instrumentality” of Peredo Luna, Luna Contreras, and Zummit 

(Doc. 29 at 28); 

• Count VI: fraudulent transfer under the Arizona Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 

19-05063-PHX-SRB, 2020 WL 6323823 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2020). However, “[u]nder 

Arizona law, spouses must be sued jointly in order to reach assets of community property.” 

R. Prasad Indus. v. Flat Irons Envt’l. Sols. Corp., No. CV 12-8261-PCT-JAT, 2013 WL 

2217831, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2013) (citing A.R.S. § 25–215(D); Spudnuts, Inc. v. Lane, 

676 P.2d 669, 670 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). There are no substantive claims asserted against 

the spouses but “the Court understands that [the spouses are] named solely for purposes of 

collecting any potential judgment from the marital community.” Greenburg v. Wray, 

No. CV-22-00122-PHX-DLR, 2022 WL 2176499, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2022).

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against Peredo Luna, and Luna Contreras. 

(Doc. 29 at 21–31.) This listing of the non-stayed counts is not entirely accurate. The 

Arizona Supreme Court recently clarified that “an attempt to pierce the corporate veil is 

not itself a cause of action but is raised in the context of another cause of action such as 

ones based on contract or tort.” Specialty Companies Grp., LLC v. Meritage Homes of 

Arizona, Inc., 492 P.3d 308, 310 (Ariz. 2021). Therefore, Count IV is not a standalone 

claim but merely an allegation that Peredo Luna, Luna Gale, Luna Contreras, Peredo, and 

Zummit should “be liable for the actions and debts of IyAC, including but not limited to 

the amounts owning [sic] under the Arbitration Award.” (Doc. 29 at 29.)

II. Jurisdiction

Each of the three motions to dismiss presents a variety of jurisdictional arguments. 

There is “no mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues” and a court may assess 

jurisdictional issues in the order it deems reasonable. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l 

Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007). The court begins with challenges to service of 

process, then analyzes personal jurisdiction and finally subject matter jurisdiction.

A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction due to Improper Service of Process

IyAC, Luna Contreras, and Peredo argue the complaint must be dismissed under 

Rule 12(b)(5) because UniCredit did not serve them properly. (Doc. 54 at 6–8; Doc. 55 

at 4–5.) “A federal court is without personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the 

defendant has been served in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. 

Co. of Am. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted).

The serving party bears the burden of establishing the validity of service. Brockmeyer v. 

May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). Because IyAC, Luna Contreras, and Peredo were 

properly served under Arizona law, their Rule 12(b)(5) motions are denied.

“A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant 

has been served properly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat 

Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988). Rule 4(e)(1) permits service 

by following state law “where the district court is located or where service is made[.]” Fed. 

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R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). In Arizona, if a party shows that service by ordinary means is 

impracticable, the court may allow service by another manner. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(k)(1). 

UniCredit attempted service on Luna Contreras, Peredo, and IyAC (through its 99%

shareholder, Luna Contreras) by sending a process server to the Scottsdale address Luna 

Contreras identified as her own on the 2022 Annual Report that Zummit filed with the 

Arizona Corporation Commission. (Doc. 36 at 2.) The process server reported that the 

person who answered at this address stated, “no one [was] living here by that name” and 

“[m]ail has been received for them, but the Defendant is unknown.” (Doc. 36 at 2.)

UniCredit also identified a Paradise Valley address as Luna Contreras and Peredo’s

through a public records search and attempted to serve defendants there, but the person 

who answered at this address stated “Amalia does not live here, she lives with her husband 

. . . address unknown.” (Doc. 36 at 2–3; Doc. 36-1 at 4.) UniCredit conducted another 

Arizona Corporation Commission search and discovered on September 19, 2023, two days 

before UniCredit filed the complaint, Zummit reported Luna Contreras’s address and its 

own as one on North 48th Avenue in Phoenix. (Doc. 36 at 3.) But when a process server 

attempted service there less than a month later, an individual in the office reported “[t]here 

is no one here by this name” and “[s]ubject is not known.” (Doc. 36-1 at 16.) 

After unsuccessful attempts to serve IyAC, Luna Contreras, and Peredo in 

September and October 2023 and again in December 2023 after filing its amended 

complaint, UniCredit moved for alternative service arguing its “efforts were thwarted, 

likely intentionally.” (Doc. 36 at 3–4; Doc. 36-1 at 4–5, 15–16.) The court granted that

motion and allowed service by certified mail. (Doc. 40 at 2.) 

1. Luna Contreras and Peredo

Luna Contreras and Peredo argue they were improperly served because they are 

Mexican citizens and do not reside at any of the addresses where UniCredit attempted to 

serve them. (Doc. 54 at 7, 9.) They argue that as Mexican residents, they “cannot be served 

within Arizona.” (Doc. 54 at 7, 9 (citing In re Est. of Norman, No. 1 CA-CV 22-0244, 2022 

WL 17588231 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2022)).) But unlike in Norman, public records 

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indicated that Luna Contreras and Peredo potentially resided at one of three Arizona 

addresses. Cf. Norman, 2022 WL 17588231, at *1, *4 (reversing superior court’s grant of 

alternative service in Arizona where there was no evidence defendant resided in Arizona). 

And although Luna Contreras and Peredo provided affidavits with their motion to dismiss 

averring they are not residents of Arizona, Zummit’s 2023 Annual Report filed with the 

Arizona Corporation Commission on September 19, 2023, listed a specific address for

Luna Contreras on North 48th Avenue in Phoenix. (Doc. 36 at 3; Doc. 54-1 at 3.) Notably, 

Luna Contreras and Peredo never say they were not Arizona residents during the months 

UniCredit was attempting service, nor that they have never lived or resided at the Scottsdale 

and Paradise Valley addresses. (Doc. 54-1 at 3; Doc. 54-3 at 3.) Instead, they claim to now

“live full time in Mexico,” “visit” their family in Arizona twice per year, “stay in Arizona 

for approximately twenty days each visit,” and not “have [any] other personal contacts with 

Arizona[.]” (Doc. 54-1 at 3; Doc. 54-3 at 3.) Their failure to say whether this was true 

during UniCredit’s monthslong attempts at service is fatal to their argument.

Luna Contreras and Peredo also argue UniCredit should have attempted to serve 

them at their address in Mexico because it is identified on IyAC’s filings with the Mexican 

commercial registry. (Doc. 54 at 7.) But Arizona Rule 4.1(k) authorizes alternative means 

of service within Arizona when ordinary means are “impracticable.” Ariz. R. 

Civ. P. 4.1(k)(1). The impracticable standard “does not mean impossible, but rather that 

service would be extremely difficult or inconvenient.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Dodev, 433 

P.3d 549, 558 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). Luna Contreras provides IyAC’s filings with the 

Mexican commercial registry appearing to list her address from 2005 and 2020. (Doc. 54-

2 at 14, 42.) But Luna Contreras and Peredo’s affidavits avow that they currently reside at

a different Mexican address and do not argue they ever lived at the address identified in 

IyAC’s filings. (Doc. 54-1 at 3; Doc. 54-3 at 3.) UniCredit is not required to attempt 

service at every possible previous known address before seeking alternative service.

Alternative service “must be reasonably calculated under all the circumstances[] to 

apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 

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to present their objections.” Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016–17

(9th Cir. 2002). UniCredit’s certified mail service, authorized by this court’s order, meets 

this standard. (Doc. 40 at 3; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(k)(1).) Luna Contreras listed Zummit’s 

last known address as her own with the Arizona Corporation Commission just two days 

before UniCredit filed its complaint. (Doc. 26 at 3.) It is reasonable to expect that Luna 

Contreras and her husband could be served at that address when she publicly associated 

herself with it mere months earlier. And indeed, Luna Contreras and Peredo have been 

apprised of UniCredit’s complaint and given the opportunity to respond, as evidenced by 

their motion to dismiss and declarations. (Doc. 54, Doc. 54-1 at 3; Doc. 54-3 at 3.)

2. IyAC

IyAC argues that the Hague Convention only allows UniCredit to serve it through 

the Mexican Central Authority. (Doc. 55 at 5 (citing Cardona v. Kreamer, 235 P.3d 1026, 

1029 (Ariz. 2010)).) UniCredit’s failure to do so, IyAC alleges, renders its service 

ineffective. 

The Hague Convention does not apply when a defendant’s address is not known. 

Cardona, 235 P.3d. at 1028. UniCredit alleged in its complaint that its Mexican counsel 

went to IyAC’s address and found that it “had vacated its facility, leaving no forwarding 

address.” (Doc. 29 at 5.) IyAC’s argument that UniCredit was required to first attempt 

service through the Mexican Central Authority fails because here, too, Arizona Rule 4.1(k) 

authorizes alternative means of service within Arizona when ordinary means are 

“impracticable.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(k)(1).

Alternative service on IyAC was “reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, 

to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an

opportunity to present their objections.” Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2002).

UniCredit served IyAC by certified mail in accordance with Arizona Rule 4.1(k)(2) at an 

address where its 99% shareholder and general manager held herself out as President and 

as an agent for service of process for another business (and was her last known address). 

(Doc. 40 at 3.) It is reasonable that IyAC would be apprised of this suit by serving it at the 

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same addresses where Luna Contreras was served. And IyAC has actually been apprised 

of this suit as demonstrated by its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 55.) Additional service would 

only cause unnecessary delay given Luna Contreras and IyAC’s knowledge of this suit. 

WAM USA Inc. v. Fierros, No. CV-23-00448-PHX-ROS, 2023 WL 6690648, at *1 (D. 

Ariz. Oct. 12, 2023). Accordingly, Luna Contreras and IyAC’s motions to dismiss for 

improper service are denied. 

B. Personal Jurisdiction

IyAC, Luna Contreras, and Peredo moved to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). In opposing a defendant’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction, it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that jurisdiction is 

proper. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). A 

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts where the motion is 

based on written materials and “uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken 

as true,” but a plaintiff cannot “simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint.”

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 

citations omitted). Although conflicts between statements contained in affidavits are 

resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, “disputed allegations in the complaint that are not 

supported with evidence or affidavits cannot establish jurisdiction.” AMA Multimedia, LLC 

v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2020). IyAC’s motion is denied and Luna 

Contreras and Peredo’s motion is granted.

1. IyAC

UniCredit argues the court has general and specific personal jurisdiction over IyAC 

because it has such jurisdiction over Zummit and Zummit is IyAC’s alter ego. “[T]he alter 

ego test may be used to extend personal jurisdiction to a foreign parent or subsidiary when, 

in actuality, the foreign entity is not really separate from its domestic affiliate.” Ranza v. 

Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015). When the alter-ego test is satisfied, the 

court may impute an alter ego’s contacts to the ostensibly separate entity. Chorost v. Rotor 

Am. Inc., No. CV-21-00235-TUC-RCC (LCK), 2022 WL 17361299, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 

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8, 2022). 

Analyzing first personal jurisdiction over Zummit, the court is permitted to exercise 

general jurisdiction over a nonresident if “the defendant’s activities in the state are 

‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic.’” Est. of Studnek v. Ambassador of Glob. 

Missions UN Ltd., No. 04-0595-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 3328595, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 

2006), aff’d sub nom. Est. of Studnek ex rel. Studnek v. Williams, 312 F. App’x 18 (9th Cir. 

2008). This presence can be shown by “mak[ing] sales, solicit[ing] or engag[ing] in 

business in the state, serv[ing] the state’s markets, designat[ing] an agent for service of 

process, hold[ing] a license, or [being] incorporated there.” Monje v. Spin Master Inc., 

No. CV-09-1713-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 2390625, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2013). 

Although Zummit is a “Nevada corporation,” it is incorporated in Arizona.2

(Doc. 29 at 3; Doc. 66-1 at 11.) It maintains an office in Arizona; is registered to do 

business in Arizona; designates a statutory agent with an Arizona address; reports all of its 

officers as having Arizona addresses; obtained a real estate facility in Arizona to fulfill the 

terms of the Joint Venture Agreement; intended to produce $30 million pounds of plastic 

in Arizona for IyAC to sell to Empaques; and planned to take 70% of the profit from the 

Arizona plastic manufacturing. (Doc. 29 at 12–13; Doc. 66-1 at 2, 4, 11.) These facts are 

sufficiently substantial to exercise general jurisdiction over Zummit and IyAC, assuming 

there are sufficient alter-ego allegations between the two.

A parent company can be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary if plaintiff shows 

(1) “unity of control” between parent and subsidiary and (2) that “observance of the 

corporate form would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.” Gatecliff v. Great Republic 

Life Ins. Co., 821 P.2d 725, 728 (Ariz. 1991). Unity of control can be demonstrated by “(1) 

under-capitalization; (2) failure to maintain a separate corporate identity; (3) diversion of 

corporate property for personal use; (4) lack of corporate formalities; and (5) failure to

2 As with the other parties, Zummit’s bankruptcy stay does not automatically extend to 

alter egos of the debtor. Klinkenborg, 690 F. App’x at 541. A bankruptcy court may choose 

to extend the stay to a debtor’s alter ego only after “‘hearing and the establishment of 

unusual need to take this action to protect the administration of the bankruptcy estate.’” Id. 

(quoting Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2007).

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maintain books and records of account in reasonable order.” In re Keesling, No. 2-10-BK00433-CGC, 2012 WL 5868883, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 19, 2012). Arizona courts have also 

credited a showing of “stock ownership by the parent; common officers or directors; 

financing of subsidiary by the parent” and “payment of salaries and other expenses of 

subsidiary by the parent.” Gatecliff, 821 P.2d at 728. Parties alleging alter-ego liability do 

not need to meet all of these factors. Allen v. Am. Cap. Ltd., 287 F. Supp. 3d 763, 809

(D. Ariz. 2017). Fraud can be found where “incorporation is for fraudulent purposes or 

where, after organization, the corporation is employed for fraudulent purposes.” Keesling, 

2012 WL 5868883, at *4. 

UniCredit has alleged facts sufficient to plead a plausible basis to conclude IyAC 

and Zummit are alter egos. The amended complaint alleges that Zummit and IyAC 

commingle their assets because they operate the same plastic manufacturing business from 

the same location in Arizona using equipment IyAC purchased on Zummit’s behalf. 

(Doc. 29 at 27.) IyAC is undercapitalized, having transferred “substantially all of its assets, 

business, and going concern value” to Zummit and “bec[oming] insolvent as a result.” 

(Doc. 29 at 27, 31.) They similarly fail to maintain a separate corporate identity because 

Zummit “benefits from the skills, knowledge, workforce, market contacts, assets, and 

customer relationships of IyAC’s ownership and management” and are both controlled by 

Peredo Luna (Zummit’s Vice President of Operations, IyAC’s General Manager, and 

holder of general power of attorney during the Credit Agreement negotiations), and Luna 

Contreras (Zummit’s President and Director and IyAC’s General Manager and controlling 

shareholder). (Doc. 29 at 2, 7, 27.) 

UniCredit has also alleged sufficient facts to meet the fraud prong. “A fraud or 

injustice arises if observance of the corporate form would confuse the opposing parties and 

frustrate their efforts to protect their rights, while allowing the party responsible to evade 

liability.” Keg Restaurants Arizona, Inc. v. Jones, 375 P.3d 1173, 1184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2016). In particular, “a fraud may be perpetrated by the giving of a promise to perform a 

future act made with the present intention not to perform.” Id. Here, UniCredit has alleged 

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facts showing that observance of the corporate form would allow the parties to evade 

liability. After UniCredit obtained the arbitration award, IyAC vacated its Mexico facility 

without leaving a forwarding address. (Doc. 29 at 5–6.) UniCredit later discovered IyAC 

and Zummit operated from the same location in Arizona. (Doc. 29 at 27.) And UniCredit 

alleged Peredo Luna “has a long history of defrauding creditors using a similar ‘shell 

game[,]’” supporting its allegations with citations to three other similar transactions.

(Doc. 29 at 18–21.) These facts are sufficient to meet the fraud prong. Gatecliff, 821 P.2d

at 729 (holding fraud prong satisfied where plaintiff could not “protect their rights before 

suit” and defendant could “evade liability after suit”).

The court has general jurisdiction over Zummit and there are sufficient alter-ego 

allegations to allow for Zummit’s contacts to be attributed to IyAC.

2. Luna Contreras and Peredo

UniCredit argues Luna Contreras and Peredo are subject to this court’s general

personal jurisdiction because they and Peredo Luna are also alter egos of IyAC and 

Zummit. (Doc. 66 at 7.) If there were sufficient factual allegations establishing an alterego relationship here, UniCredit would be correct. But between these parties, there are not.

Although UniCredit has met the second prong for the reasons described above, it 

has not shown—as it must—how “there is such unity of interest and ownership that the 

separate personalities of the corporation and owners cease to exist.” Keesling, 2012 WL 

5868883, at *2. UniCredit described how IyAC failed to observe corporate formalities, for 

instance, allowing Peredo Luna to enter the Credit Agreement on behalf of IyAC even 

without holding its power of attorney. (Doc. 29 at 7.) But UniCredit has not alleged facts 

supporting the other factors, such as intermingling or diversion of corporate property for 

personal use. Keesling, 2012 WL 5868883, at *2. UniCredit emphasizes that Peredo Luna 

and Luna Contreras were IyAC’s controlling officers, but acting as a company’s sole 

shareholders, officers, and directors is insufficient to find alter ego when the other factors

have not been shown. Honeywell, Inc. v. Arnold Const. Co., 654 P.2d 301, 307

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); see also Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Improvita Health Prod., 663 

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F. Supp. 2d 841, 846 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“[C]orporate directors are not personally liable for 

torts committed by the corporation or by one of its officers merely by virtue of the office 

they hold.”). And UniCredit alleges no facts even suggesting Peredo is IyAC’s alter ego.

UniCredit also argues Luna Contreras and Peredo are subject to specific personal 

jurisdiction. The court applies the law of the state in which it sits when, as here, there is no 

applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction. Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 

F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). Arizona law permits courts to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the maximum extent permitted under the due 

process clause of the United States Constitution. Arizona Sch. Risk Retention Tr., Inc. v. 

NMTC, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 3d 931, 935 (D. Ariz. 2016). Exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident comports with due process if that individual has “certain minimum contacts” with 

the relevant forum such that maintaining the suit “does not offend ‘traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice.’” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (quoting Int’l 

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

To determine whether there are “minimum contacts,” UniCredit must show, among 

other factors, that Luna Contreras and Peredo purposefully availed themselves of the 

privilege of doing business in the forum or purposefully directed their activities at the 

forum. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 

1206 (9th Cir. 2006). The purposeful direction test in turn requires a defendant to have “(1) 

committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that 

the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. “‘Intent’ in the context 

of the ‘intentional act’ test refer[s] to an intent to perform an actual physical act in the real 

world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.” 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. And an “‘act’ denotes an external manifestation of the 

actor’s will.” Id.

UniCredit cites a number of allegations in support of its argument but few 

specifically relate to Luna Contreras and none relate to Peredo. (Doc. 66 at 10–11.) And 

even if Luna Contreras’s alleged knowing misrepresentation that IyAC owned 100% of 

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Zummit and signature to that effect on the organization charts meets prong one’s 

intentional act test, UniCredit fails to meet prong two. Specifically, UniCredit alleges Luna 

Contreras’s actions were expressly aimed at Arizona because she acted to procure the SML 

Equipment for Zummit’s use in Arizona and the effects of her actions were “felt” in 

Arizona. (Doc. 66 at 11.) But the cases UniCredit cites involve situations where the 

defendant’s actions were expressly aimed at a plaintiff in the forum state where the plaintiff

allegedly felt harm. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (defendant’s actions to defraud California plaintiff aimed at California); Metro. 

Life Ins. Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1990) (same). Here, “[a]ny economic harm 

suffered by [UniCredit] would have been suffered where [UniCredit] lives,” i.e., in Austria. 

See Al-Rajhi v. Mayfair Holdings, LLP, No. 2:18-CV-0581-HRH, 2018 WL 3926439, at 

*4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2018). 

UniCredit also argues Luna Contreras aimed her activities at Arizona to procure the 

SML Equipment as General Manager and controlling shareholder of IyAC and the 

President and Director of Zummit. But besides identifying her roles, UniCredit does not 

explain what actions Luna Contreras took. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 849

(“[A] person’s mere association with a corporation that causes injury in the forum state is 

not sufficient in itself to permit that forum to assert jurisdiction over the person.”).

Accordingly, the court does not have specific jurisdiction over Luna Contreras and 

Peredo as currently alleged. UniCredit asks the court for jurisdictional discovery over these 

defendants. (Doc. 66 at 18.) “[D]iscovery should ordinarily be granted where pertinent 

facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory 

showing of the facts is necessary.” Laub v. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 

2003). Here, UniCredit has alleged that Luna Contreras and Peredo visit and own a home 

in Arizona and Luna Contreras was the President, Director, and registered corporate agent 

of Zummit, which operates in Arizona. (Doc. 66 at 18.) Although Luna Contreras and 

Peredo have submitted affidavits stating they are not currently Arizona residents, the full 

scope of their contacts with the state during the relevant period is unclear. Accordingly, 

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jurisdictional discovery is appropriate here and UniCredit’s request is granted.

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion like IyAC’s here “allows litigants to seek the dismissal of 

an action from federal court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Kinlichee v. United 

States, 929 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (D. Ariz. 2013) (quoting Tosco Corp. v. Comtys. for a 

Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001)). “When the motion to dismiss attacks the 

allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, all 

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Renteria v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (D. Ariz. 2006). 

“A plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Id.

9 U.S.C. § 203 grants the court original jurisdiction over “action[s] or proceeding[s] 

falling under” the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 

Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”), as here (see Doc. 29 at 21). 9 U.S.C. § 203. 

Under the Ninth Circuit’s admittedly broad reading of this statute, federal courts have 

original jurisdiction over an action or proceeding if (1) “there is an underlying arbitration 

that falls under the Convention,” and (2) “the action or proceeding relates to that arbitration 

agreement or award.” Day v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, 42 F.4th 1131, 1138 (9th 

Cir. 2022). An action “relates to” an arbitration proceeding when the arbitration “‘could 

conceivably affect the outcome of the plaintiff’s case.’” Id. (quoting Infuturia Global Ltd. 

v. Sequus Pharms., Inc., 631 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011)). And although these 

standards are broad, they are “not limitless.” See Cerner Middle E. Ltd. v. Belbadi 

Enterprises LLC, 939 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019).

As a party to the arbitration proceeding, IyAC argues the court does not have subject 

matter jurisdiction only because it does not have personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 55 at 6.) It

otherwise concedes this court’s jurisdiction to hear the count requesting confirmation of 

that award. Because the court does have personal jurisdiction over IyAC and accordingly

subject matter jurisdiction over the arbitration count, the key question is therefore whether 

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the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the non-arbitration claims. 

D. Supplemental Jurisdiction

UniCredit asks the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its fraud and 

fraudulent transfer claims. (Doc. 51 at 9.) A court may exercise jurisdiction over all other 

claims “that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 

form part of the same case or controversy” but may decline to exercise such jurisdiction if 

“the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court 

has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a), (c). A claim does not “substantially 

predominate[]” over another if it “share[s] a common nucleus of operative facts.” Mincy v. 

Staff Leasing, L.P., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (D. Ariz. 2000).

UniCredit argues its fraud claims “arise out of the same transaction, involve the 

same parties, and arise from the same project” as the arbitration award. (Doc. 51 at 10.)

The court agrees. UniCredit’s fraud claims arise out of the Credit Agreement, the 

performance and alleged failure of the parties to perform under the Credit Agreement, and 

disputes regarding the Zummit plastics equipment. The parties’ arbitration claims arise out 

of these same facts. (Doc. 1 at 64, 110.) And even if, as defendants argue, an arbitration 

confirmation “is intended to be a ‘summary proceeding’” that does not “involve complex 

factual determinations[,]’” (Doc. 58 at 4 (quoting Castro v. Tri Marine Fish Co. LLC, 921 

F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2019)), that does not preclude the claims from arising out of a common 

factual nucleus. Accordingly, the court exercises its supplemental jurisdiction over 

UniCredit’s state law claims and must address whether they are sufficiently pleaded.

III. Failure to State a Claim 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(internal citations omitted)). This is not a “probability requirement,” but a requirement that 

the factual allegations show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is 

context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common 

sense.” Id. at 663–64.

A. Fraud

UniCredit alleges one non-stayed count of common law fraud against IyAC, Peredo 

Luna, and Luna Contreras. The complaint identifies six false statements or omissions as 

the basis for this count: (1) IyAC was “the 100% owner of Zummit”; (2) the financial 

statements of Inmobiliaria y Arrendadora Grupo were those of IyAC; (3) IyAC was not 

subject to “two pending litigation claims . . . for a large amount of money,” “certain 

mortgages,” and “contingent liabilities of $5 million and $30 million” “encumber[ed] IyAC 

property” (4) IyAC had not entered any material contracts that required disclosure, 

specifically the JVA with Zummit and the PPA with Empaques; (5) IyAC intended to repay 

financing from UniCredit; and (6) the arbitration claims brought against UniCredit were 

for the purpose of “obtaining the demanded ‘damages’” rather than “for the purpose of 

defrauding” UniCredit. (Doc. 29 at 10, 22–24, 26–27.) UniCredit alleges these 

misrepresentations or omissions induced it to enter into the Credit Agreement and issue 

Facility A. (Doc. 29 at 22.)

Defendants argue the fraud claim is barred by the statute of limitations and 

inadequately pleaded. (Doc. 37 at 7.) Although the claim may not be barred by the statute 

of limitations, it is not adequately pleaded. 

1. Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations period for fraud is three years and begins to run once a 

plaintiff has “knowledge of facts sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious 

of fraud, thus putting him on inquiry.” Orbis Glob. Equity Fund Ltd. v. NortonLifelock Inc., 

No. CV-21-01995-PHX-JJT, 2023 WL 1800963, at *8 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2023) (quoting 

Coronado Dev. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 678 P.2d 535, 537 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)). UniCredit 

filed its initial complaint on September 21, 2023. (Doc. 1.) Defendants argue UniCredit 

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should have discovered the alleged fraud earlier because several of the statements at issue 

were publicly available before 2019 and UniCredit learned of others that year when the 

arbitration was filed. (Doc. 37 at 7–8, 10, 12.) UniCredit responds that it reasonably trusted 

the misrepresentations both because banks “assume a basic level of honesty” and because 

the falsity of certain statements could only be appreciated in context after it attempted to 

serve the arbitration award on an empty facility in June 2021. (Doc. 51 at 11–12.) 

Neither side provides any case law to support when a party in UniCredit’s position 

should have reasonably become suspicious of fraud. But “[g]enerally, the timeliness of a 

claim depends on matters outside the pleadings and is not ‘amenable to resolution on a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Alger Dynamic Opportunities Fund v. Acadia Pharms. Inc., No. 

24-CV-451-WQH-MSB, 2024 WL 4647297, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2024) (quoting 

Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, a 

defendant seeking dismissal based on an affirmative statute-of-limitations defense must 

show “it is ‘beyond doubt’ that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish 

the timeliness of his or her claims.” Orbis, No. CV-21-01995-PHX-JJT, 2023 WL 

1800963, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2023) (quoting Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 402).

Defendants have not met this standard. UniCredit has alleged facts showing at least 

three banks lent comparable sums to Peredo Luna or entities he controlled that later went 

bankrupt or disappeared without providing recovery. (Doc. 29 at 19–21.) They have not 

explained why UniCredit’s diligence regarding IyAC and Zummit’s financial statements 

fell below what was expected from a comparable bank in its position.

2. Adequacy of Pleading

To state a claim for common law fraud, the complaint must allege “with particularity 

the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy 

Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting “Rule 9(b)’s particularity 

requirement applies to state-law causes of action”). Under this standard, UniCredit must 

identify the “who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.” Id. at 1106.

In Arizona, this requires that UniCredit plead the nine elements of fraud: “(1) a 

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representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality;” the speaker’s (4) knowledge of its falsity;

(5) intent that it be acted upon as it was reasonably expected; the hearer’s (6) ignorance of 

its falsity; (7) reliance on its truth; (8) right to rely on it; and (9) consequent and proximate 

injury. Comerica Bank v. Mahmoodi, 229 P.3d 1031, 1033–34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).

“‘[F]ailure to [plead] any one of [these elements] is fatal to the cause of action.’” Tavilla 

v. Cephalon, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 759 (D. Ariz. 2012) (Fridenmaker v. Valley Nat. Bank 

of Arizona, 534 P.2d 1064, 1068 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1975)).

Defendants argue UniCredit improperly relies on group pleading, failing to 

differentiate each defendant’s alleged participation in the fraud. (Doc. 37 at 8.) The court 

agrees. Although a complaint need not identify each defendant’s false statements, “Rule 

9(b) does not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together,” and instead

“require[s] plaintiffs to differentiate their allegations when suing more than one defendant

. . . [to] inform each defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged 

participation in the fraud.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2007).

Each of UniCredit’s allegations suffers from this same grouping problem. For 

instance, UniCredit argues defendants misrepresented “that IyAC was the 100% owner of 

Zummit when, in fact, IyAC was not the 100% owner of Zummit,” in part by transmitting 

“organization charts (at least five in total) to [UniCredit] showing that ‘Inmobiliaria y 

Arrendadora Grupo’ . . . was the 100% owner of Zummit.” (Doc. 29 at 22.) UniCredit’s

only specific allegations are as to the individual defendants: that Peredo Luna “provided” 

it with an organizational chart showing IyAG as the owner of Zummit and falsely replied 

IyAG was the “dba” for IyAC when UniCredit when asked; and that Luna Contreras signed 

and dated the organizational chart. (Doc. 29 at 8–9.) In another example, UniCredit claims 

defendants fraudulently concealed the existence of the JVA and the PPA because doing so 

“would have deterred Plaintiff from entering the Credit Agreement.” (Doc. 29 at 24–25.)

But UniCredit again relies on group pleading without explaining the roles of each 

defendant, and does not allege any defendant’s knowledge of or duty to disclose the 

existence of the JVA and PPA, or whether any defendant “intentionally prevented Plaintiff 

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from acquiring information about the JVA and PPA.” (Doc. 37 at 11.) In short, UniCredit 

has not pleaded each defendant’s participation in the fraud with the required particularity.

Group pleading aside, UniCredit’s fraud allegations suffer from additional 

deficiencies. In general, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009). 

This standard required UniCredit to plead in its complaint—rather than ultimately 

explaining in a footnote in its response to a motion to dismiss (Doc. 51 at 14 n.2)—why 

Zummit’s ownership was material to it. Similarly, UniCredit failed to allege the “who, 

what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged” as it relates to IyAC’s 2015, 2016 

and 2017 financial statements, see Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106, including when the statements 

were transmitted, the identity of the relevant mortgages and pending litigation claims, and 

in what way the financial statements understated expenses and liabilities while overstating 

profit and book value. UniCredit also fails to allege any facts showing why these omissions 

were material and that they were made with the intent to induce UniCredit into entering 

the Credit Agreement, instead relying on conclusory statements in support. (Doc. 29 at 23.)

Unicredit’s allegations concerning the concealment of the JVA and PPA, the 

conspiracy to defraud, and the bad-faith arbitration claim are similarly inadequate. As to 

the JVA and PPA, UniCredit does not explain why any defendants were required to disclose 

the JVA and PPA—especially where the PPA was finalized after the Credit Agreement. 

(Doc. 29 at 12–13)—or alternatively that defendants intentionally prevented it from 

acquiring material information as fraudulent concealment claims require. Tavilla, 870 F.

Supp. 2d at 774. And finally, as to the bad-faith arbitration claim, UniCredit fails to identify 

which “underlying documents” IyAC relied on in starting the arbitration case, what 

material misrepresentation is at issue, in what way UniCredit reasonably relied upon it, or 

that defendants intended for UniCredit to rely on it. And although UniCredit alleges that it 

was harmed by IyAC’s “merge[r] into Zummit” preventing it from recovering “on the 

award except from the other Defendants in this case” (Doc. 51 at 16), it does not explain 

how the underlying misrepresentation is proximately connected to its failure to recover.

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In sum, UniCredit has not provided the requisite specific allegations to support its 

fraud claim.3

B. Fraudulent Transfer

UniCredit claims Zummit, Peredo Luna, and Luna Contreras fraudulently 

transferred IyAC’s “assets, including but not limited to the SML equipment, to Zummit” 

in violation of the Arizona Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. (Doc. 29 at 30.) 

Claims brought under A.R.S. §§ 44-1004 and 44-1005 are subject to a four-year 

statute of limitations period starting from the date “the transfer was made or the obligation 

was incurred” or within one year after “the fraudulent nature of the transfer or obligation 

was or through the exercise of reasonable diligence could have been discovered by the 

claimant.” A.R.S. § 44-1009.

The only transfer UniCredit identifies is that of the SML Equipment, which was 

delivered to Zummit in 2018. (Doc. 29 at 5, 30.) And UniCredit argues that it first had 

“reason to suspect that it might have been the victim of a fraud” in June 2021. (Doc. 29 

at 18.) Accepting that UniCredit had reason to suspect fraud in June 2021, its fraudulent 

transfer claim filed in September 2023 is nonetheless time-barred.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED the Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 37, 54, 55) are GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants Luna Contreras and Peredo are DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, the fraud claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND, and the fraudulent transfer claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Unicredit is permitted to take jurisdictional

discovery. All jurisdictional discovery must be completed within 45 days of this order. 

/

/

3 UniCredit also alleges a conspiracy (Doc. 29 at 26) but it is not clear why it did so. To 

the extent the alleged conspiracy involves the same misrepresentations discussed above, 

these statements are inadequately pleaded for the same reasons.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Unicredit shall file its amended complaint, 

including additional fraud allegations and factual allegations establishing jurisdiction over 

Luna Contreras and Peredo, no later than 60 days from the date of this order. If no amended 

complaint is filed, IyAC shall file its answer to the current complaint no later than fourteen 

days after the deadline for amending the complaint.

Dated this 16th day of December, 2024.

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