Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00692/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00692-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 07cv0692

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERRY JOHNS, Civil No. 07cv0692-BTM (CAB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

v.

L.E. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent.

Gerry Johns, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising several grounds for relief based on denial of his parole. The Court

has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and all

supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented in

this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED

and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 21, 1981, Petitioner and James Randall approached a car as it was driving through

the drive-thru of a Jack-in-the-Box. (Lodgment 3, Subsequent Parole Consideration Hearing Transcript,

at 6-7.) Randall was armed with a shotgun, and the two demanded money from the people inside the car. 

(Id. at 7.) Randall discharged the shotgun, causing a fatal wound in the head to Cecilia Sandoval. (Id.) 

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder committed while armed with a deadly weapon and

two counts of robbery and was sentenced to 21 years to life in state prison. (Lodgments 1&2.)

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1

 Citations to the Petition refer to page numbers assigned by CM/ECF.

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Following Petitioner’s third parole suitability hearing on November 1, 2005, the Board of Parole

Hearings (“Board”) denied him parole. (Lodgment 3, at 44.) Petitioner challenged the Board’s decision

in the state superior court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on March 8, 2006. (Lodgment 5.) 

The petition was denied on June 7, 2006. (Lodgment 6.) On July 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the state appellate court. (Lodgment 7.) That petition was denied on July 26,

2006. (Lodgment 8.) On August 25, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

state supreme court. (Lodgment 9.) The petition was denied on February 21, 2007. (Lodgment 10.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on April 4, 2007 in the Central District of

California. The Petition was transferred to this district on April 17, 2007. [Doc. No. 1.] In his federal

Petition, Petitioner argues that the Board violated his right to a fair and impartial parole consideration

hearing, deprived him of his liberty interest in parole, abused its discretion, and failed to weigh the

favorable aspects of his parole suitability. (Pet. 5-6.)1

II. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994) (emphasis added).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus

petitions filed after 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

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by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the

state court decided a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, this Court “looks through” to

the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record “to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of controlling federal law.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado

v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76). 

However, a state court need not cite U.S. Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus

claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). As long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state

court decision contradicts U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the state court decision will not be “contrary

to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

Petitioner asserts four grounds for relief challenging the Board’s decision to deny him parole

during his third parole consideration hearing on November 1, 2005. Petitioner asserts that the Board

violated his right to a fair and impartial parole consideration hearing, deprived him of his liberty interest

in parole, abused its discretion, and failed to weigh the favorable aspects of his parole suitability. (Pet.

5-6.) In essence, Petitioner is arguing that the Board’s denial of parole violated his due process rights. 

Respondent argues the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s due process claim was neither contrary to, nor

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an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Under clearly established federal

law, Petitioner’s due process claim is analyzed in two parts. First, the Court must determine whether

Petitioner has a liberty interest of which he has been deprived. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490

U.S. 454, 460 (1989). If so, the Court must determine whether the procedure used to deprive him of that

liberty interest was constitutionally sufficient. Id.

California’s parole scheme, codified in California Penal Code section 3041, vests all “prisoners

whose sentences provide for the possibility of parole with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in

the receipt of a parole release date, a liberty interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of the

Due Process Clause.” Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Sass v. Cal. Bd. of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir.

2003); McQuillon v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200

F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that Ninth Circuit “cases may be persuasive authority for purposes

of determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme

Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established’”). Having determined that

Petitioner does have a protected liberty interest in a parole date, the Court must proceed to the second,

more contentious prong of the due process analysis, whether the procedure afforded Petitioner was

adequate. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460.

In Sass, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in Superintendent, Mass.

Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), which held that “revocation of good time [credits] does not

comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings of the prison

disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record,” applies with equal force to the denial

of parole “because both directly affect the duration of the prison term.” See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29

(quoting Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.3d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Indeed, the Court concluded

that the “some evidence” standard was clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law for AEDPA

purposes. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; see also Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 600.

The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the Board. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. An examination of the entire record is not

required, neither is an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses nor weighing of the

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evidence. See id. Additionally, the evidence underlying the Board’s decision must have some indicia of

reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390). Accordingly, if the Board’s

determination of parole suitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some

indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005);

McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904.

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was supported by “some

evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole suitability

determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 505 F.3d at 850. Accordingly, in California, the court must

look to California law to determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for

parole, and then must review the record in order to determine whether the state court decision holding

that these findings were supported by “some evidence” constituted an unreasonable application of the

“some evidence” principle articulated in Hill. Id.; Irons, 505 F.3d at 852-53 (finding state court did not

unreasonably apply “some evidence” standard to uphold parole suitability denial where there was some

evidence at the time of the hearing to support a finding that the prisoner would present a danger to

society based on the nature of the commitment offense under the applicable parole regulations).

California prescribes indeterminate sentences for non-capital murders: 25 years to life for first

degree murder and 15 years to life for second degree murder. Cal. Penal Code § 190. One year prior to

the expiration of a prisoner’s minimum sentence, a Board panel meets with the inmate and “set(s) a

release date unless it determines that the gravity of current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing

and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public

safety requires a more lengthy incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code § 3401(a). Regardless of the length of

time served, “a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the

panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(a).

1. The Board’s decision and the superior court’s decision

The record shows that on November 1, 2005, Petitioner appeared with counsel before the Board

for his third parole consideration hearing. (Lodgment 3.) Petitioner waived hearing his rights, because

he indicated he had gone over them with his attorney. (Id. at 2-3.) The commissioner informed

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2

 Form 128 is used to report minor acts of non-conformance to rules.

3

 Form 115 is used to report rules violations.

6 07cv0692

Petitioner that he had the right to a fair and impartial panel, and Petitioner indicated he had no objections

to the panel. (Id. at 3.) The panel then discussed with Petitioner the facts of the crime, Petitioner’s

criminal and social history, his post conviction factors, and his parole plans. (Id. at 4-23, 26-28.) The

panel also reviewed Petitioner’s psychological evaluation from 2003. (Id. at 24.) In closing, the panel

heard final statements from the deputy district attorney, Petitioner’s attorney and Petitioner. (Id. at 33-

39.)

After deliberations, the Board concluded that Petitioner was “not suitable for parole and would

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison.” (Id. at

41.) Specifically, the Board found the crime was carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner,

multiple victims were attacked, one was killed, and the offense was carried out in a manner that

“demonstrates exceptional callous disregard for human suffering.” Further, the motive for the crime was

inexplicable. The Board also noted that previous to this incident, Petitioner had inflicted or attempted to

inflict serious injuries on others. (Id.) Before the commitment offense, Petitioner had been sentenced to

the California Youth Authority (“CYA”) and was convicted of the commitment offense while he was on

parole from the CYA. (Id. at 42; Lodgment 11, Board of Prison Terms Life Prisoner Evaluation, April

21, 2003, at 3.) The Board noted that Petitioner had had 12 128s2 and 27 115s3, with the last one being

in 1995. (Lodgment 3, at 42.) The Board noted that the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department

opposed a finding of parole suitability. The Board concluded that Petitioner’s gains were recent and he

needed to demonstrate an ability to maintain gains over an extended period of time. (Id.) The Board

recommended that Petitioner become and remain disciplinary free, work toward reducing his custody

level so that he could get more program opportunities, upgrade his vocational ability, and continue his

self-help programs. (Id. at 43.) The Board denied Petitioner parole for three years. (Id. at 44.)

The superior court upheld the decision of the Board (lodgment 6), and the state appellate and

supreme courts summarily affirmed (lodgments 7&8). Because the California Supreme Court issued a

summary denial, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision which

addressed the claim on the merits. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. In this case, that is the superior court’s

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denial. The superior court found that there was “some evidence” which lead to the Board’s finding of

unsuitability for parole. (Lodgment 6, at 3.)

The state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

the Hill standard, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The Board’s November 1, 2005 decision to deny Petitioner parole after his third parole consideration

hearing is supported by some evidence in the record and that evidence bears some indicia of reliability. 

See Pedro v. Or. Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017 (1988);

see, e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial of parole based on gravity of offense and

psychiatric reports); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 919 (9th. Cir. 2003) (upholding denial of parole

based solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior to imprisonment); Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr.,

16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding denial of parole based on criminal history, cruel nature of

offense, and need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry under Hill is simply “whether there is

any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [Board].” Hill, 472 U.S. at

455-56. As discussed below, the Court finds there is.

2. Petitioner fails to show that he was denied a fair and impartial parole consideration

hearing

Petitioner contends that the Board violated his right to a fair and impartial parole consideration

hearing. A prisoner is entitled to have his release date considered by a parole board that is free from bias

or prejudice. O’Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456

U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); and Sellars v. Procunier, 641

F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981)). Here, Petitioner fails to offer any evidence in support of his assertion

that the panel at his parole consideration hearing was bias in any way. Furthermore, Petitioner and his

counsel declined to object to the panel at the hearing. (Lodgment 3, at 3.) He may not now attack the

partiality of the Board simply because he received an unfavorable decision. Petitioner asserts that the

Board had pre-determined the outcome of the hearing and therefore misstated facts and declined to

consider other facts. (Pet. 14.) Petitioner, however, does not specify what facts the Board misstated or

what facts they did not consider. To the contrary, it appears from the record that the Board went over in

detail all the facts of Petitioner’s case, and Petitioner had an opportunity to participate throughout the

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hearing.

The Board first reviewed Petitioner’s family background. His mother is a Baptist minister and

his father is self-employed. (Lodgment 3, at 4.) His younger brother is a homicide detective, and his

younger sister is a correctional officer. (Id.) The Board noted that Petitioner had been married since

1997, and Petitioner credited his wife for many of the changes he had made in his life. (Id. at 5.) 

Petitioner stated his family was the basis of support for him. The Board also noted, however, that

Petitioner reported marijuana use from age 15 and alcohol use from age 16 or 17. Petitioner developed a

juvenile record during this time, which included two petitions for vehicle theft and one for burglary. 

(Id.) In 1978, Petitioner was involved in an armed home invasion robbery with another person, James

Randall, and was sent to the California Youth Authority. (Id. at 6.) In that incident, Randall fired three

shots, one of which struck the victim in the arm. (Id. at 9.) Petitioner was required to stay away from

Randall, but he did not abide by that requirement, because he was involved in other matters with Randall

after that. (Id. at 6.) In one of the other incidents, a 71-year-old woman refused to open the door of her

home, and Petitioner and Randall kicked in the door and demanded money. (Id. at 9.) Randall beat the

woman around the face and shot her in the chin, and the bullet lodged in her shoulder. (Id.)

The Board also discussed the facts of the commitment offense, when Petitioner and Randall

approached a car in the Jack-in-the-Box drive-thru and Randall fatally shot Cecilia Sandoval. (Id. at 6-

7.) Petitioner denied being present when Randall fired the shotgun. (Id. at 8.) Petitioner claimed he was

walking away from the car at the time. (Id.) When asked what he had to say, Petitioner stated he was

young at the time of the commitment offense (20 years old), inconsiderate of others, selfish and had a

low self-esteem. (Id. at 10.)

The Board then reviewed Petitioner’s programming and psychological reports. (Id. at 12.) The

commissioner noted that Petitioner currently had a custody level of 169 points, which was considered

bad, but Petitioner had brought them down from 260 points a year ago. (Id. at 13-14.) The

commissioner noted most of Petitioner’s problems came in his early years in prison. (Id. at 14.) He had

a total of 27 115 disciplinary reports, but the last 115 was in 1995. (Id.) Petitioner noted that his

improvements came about, because during this time, he was involved in a number of self-help programs

and had met his wife. (Id. at 15.) Petitioner also completed three vocation certificates, including

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 General Equivalency Degree, equivalent to a completing high school.

9 07cv0692

upholstering in 1997 and data processing in 2003. (Id. at 15-16.) Petitioner also completed a number of

computer certificates, including PowerPoint, Microsoft Access, Microsoft Word and Microsoft Labels. 

(Id. at 16.) Petitioner also got his GED4 in 1991. (Id.) Petitioner also had a number of other certificates,

including criminal thinking and life management. (Id. at 17-21.) Petitioner noted that he had been

working consistently for 14 years. (Id. at 22.) Petitioner indicated that, if paroled, he planned to work in

his father’s business, and he had four different residences where he could live, depending on the

requirements of his parole. (Id. at 26-28.)

Petitioner and his counsel had ample opportunity to present evidence at the hearing. Only after

an extensive hearing during which the Board reviewed Petitioner’s commitment offense, his juvenile

record, his prior drug use, his prison behavior, the vocational training he obtained in prison, prison

psychiatric reports, recommendations, the district attorney’s statement in opposition to parole, his

attorney’s statement, and Petitioner’s own statement, did the Board deny Petitioner parole for three

years. As such, Petitioner’s contention that the Board misstated facts or did not consider facts is not

supported by the record.

3. Petitioner fails to show he was deprived of his liberty interest in parole

Petitioner contends the Board deprived him of his liberty interest in parole, because it

disregarded the statutory mandate and aggravated his sentence by using factors that were never proven to

be true at trial. (Pet. 14.) Respondent argues that California law allows the Board to consider evidence

that would have justified a higher degree of punishment than that of the commitment offense. (Answer

11.) A claim challenging the Board’s decision or the state court’s opinion on state law grounds is not

cognizable on federal habeas. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (“a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only

on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.”); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (holding that federal habeas relief is not

available merely for an alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law). Thus, to the extent

Petitioner is challenging the state court’s interpretation of state law, it is not cognizable on federal

habeas. To the extent Petitioner contends a federal due process violation occurred because the

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preponderance of the evidence weighed in favor of his suitability for parole, he is not entitled to federal

habeas relief because, as set forth above, there was some evidence to support the Board’s decision. 

Therefore, the state superior court opinion was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. Even to the extent that Petitioner contends the state

court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, Petitioner has not

demonstrated that the factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of his claims actually

rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

4. Petitioner fails to show that the Board’s decision had no indicia of reliability

Petitioner argues that the Board abused its discretion, because it failed to point to evidence

bearing on an indicia of reliability to support their reasons for denying him parole. A relevant factor in

determining whether the evidence underlying the Board’s decision has some indicia of reliability is

whether the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to, the Board. 

See Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399. When applying these standards, the court may look to whether a prisoner’s

allegations of any violations by the Board are of a “minor” nature, whether they are supported in fact,

whether the prisoner had an opportunity to participate, and whether he took full advantage of that

opportunity. See Morales, 16 F.3d at 1005; see also McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 900 (acknowledging

general right to call witnesses at parole rescission hearing). Here, the hearing transcript reveals that

Petitioner was given every opportunity to participate and speak on his own behalf. In fact, Petitioner

was given the last opportunity to speak before the Board began its deliberations, so he could address all

the evidence presented. (Lodgment 3, at 37-39.) Petitioner has provided no support for his contention

that the Board’s decision had no indicia of reliability, nor is his contention supported by the record.

5. Petitioner fails to show that the Board did not take into account the favorable

factors supporting parole

Petitioner also contends that the Board was required to take into account the favorable factors

supporting parole, but the Board instead concluded the favorable factors were recent. (Pet. 14.) The

superior court determined that while the Board’s decision did not reflect the weighing process of the

Board, In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (Cal. 2002) clearly stated that the Board need not explain its

decision or the precise manner in which the specific facts were relevant to parole suitability. (Lodgment

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6, at 3.) In any case, even though the Board did not specifically weigh positive and negative factors

during its decision, it did go over in detail the positive factors supporting parole during the parole

hearing. First, the Board noted that Petitioner had a supportive family. (Lodgment 3, at 4-5.) The

Board noted that while Petitioner had a number of disciplinary infractions, most of his problems came in

his first years in prison. (Id. at 14.) The Board also discussed Petitioner’s various vocational training,

computer certificates, and the courses he took in criminal thinking and life management. (Id. at 16-21.) 

The Board also noted that Petitioner was currently working and had been consistently working for 14

years. (Id. at 22.) The Board also took into consideration that Petitioner had employment lined up if he

were to be released and he had four different residences where he could live. (Id. at 26-28.)

On the other hand, the Board review Petitioner’s record, starting from when he was a juvenile

and noted that he had been involved in theft and burglary from a young age. (Id. at 5.) He also became

involved with James Randall and participated in an armed robbery with him, which resulted in Petitioner

being sent to the California Youth Authority. (Id. at 5-6.) As a condition of his release from CYA,

Petitioner was not to get involved with Randall again, but he nevertheless continued to associate with

Randall and participated in the commitment offense with him. (Id. at 6.) The Board found Petitioner

had a history of unstable relationships with others. (Id. at 43.) In addition, Petitioner had numerous

disciplinary problems while in prison. (Id.) While he had made improvements, the Board concluded

Petitioner needed to demonstrate that he could maintain those improvements over an extended period of

time. (Id. at 42.)

Petitioner had a juvenile record in the 1970s. He was then was convicted for the commitment

offense and sentenced to prison in 1981. During the first 14 years of his time in prison, between 1981

and 1995, he had 27 rules violations. The parole consideration hearing occurred in 2005, so Petitioner

had been making improvements for the last 10 years. Considering that Petitioner had discipline issues

from a young age and after he entered state prison, it was reasonable that the Board would want to see

the improvements maintained for longer than 10 years. In fact, the commissioner told Petitioner,

“Basically, what’s hurting you is your points. And you’re getting them down like I told you. You got

them down 100 points. That’s a lot and you gotta continue to get them down. I can’t speak for the

Board of course, but I think you’ll become a contender for release after you’re down under three digits.” 

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(Id. at 43-44.) It appears from the record that the Board did take into account the factors favoring parole

in making its decision.

IV. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter and based upon the above discussion, this

Court finds that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s due process claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As such, this Court

RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and this action be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 11, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than ten days after being served with the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 7, 2008

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00692-BTM-CAB Document 6 Filed 07/07/08 Page 12 of 12