Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02176/USCOURTS-caed-2_99-cv-02176-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CHRISTINE A. CUMMINGS, JANET

TAYLOR DARVAS, RICHARD K.

DEHART, CHRISTOPHER GARBANI,

PATRICIA A. MCCUMSEY, DANIEL

NOWALIS, CLAUDIA STEWART, 

and MONA YASSA, on behalf of

themselves and the class they

represent,

NO. CIV. S-99-2176 WBS KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

KATHLEEN CONNELL, Controller,

State of California; MARTY

MORGENSTERN, Director

California Department of

Personnel Administration,

Defendants; CALIFORNIA STATE

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOCAL

1000; LOCAL 1000 SERVICE

EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,

AFL-CIO-CLC;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

///

///

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The facts of this case are more fully discussed in 1

previous orders issued by this court and the Ninth Circuit. For

the purpose of determining attorneys’ fees, it is sufficient to

recount only the following facts.

The union has since been renamed and now does business 2

under the name “Service Employee International Union, Local 1000”

(“SEIU Local 1000.”)

2

I. Factual and Procedural Background1

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action arises from the

failure of defendant California State Employees Association

(“CSEA”) to provide non-union members with sufficient notice of 2

“fair share” fees pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,

475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986). On May 2, 2001, this court granted

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part and awarded

partial restitution of withdrawn fees to all nonmembers. 

Cummings v. Connell, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (E.D. Cal. 2001). On

appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the majority of this court’s

order. Cummings v. Connell, 316 F.3d 886, 891-99 (9th Cir. 2003)

(Cummings I). However, the Ninth Circuit “fail[ed] to see how

plaintiffs suffered any compensable harm (aside from nominal

damages) from the initial defective notice,” and held that “the

district court went too far in ordering partial restitution to

all class members.” Id. at 894-95. Accordingly, the panel

directed this court on remand to award only nominal damages and

adjust the court’s award of costs and attorneys’ fees if

appropriate. 

On remand, in determining how to award nominal damages

to a class of plaintiffs (a matter of first impression in the

Ninth Circuit), this court decided to award nominal damages in

the amount of $1.00 to each named class representative. Cummings

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3

v. Connell, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1191-92 (E.D. Cal. 2003). This

court reasoned that this approach was the best way to ensure that

nominal damages in a large class action actually remained

“nominal.” On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed and remanded

the case once more with instructions to award nominal damages to

each class member and to hold further proceedings to determine

the impact of that decision on this court’s award of attorneys’

fees and costs. Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir.

2005) (Cummings II). The Ninth Circuit further directed this

court to redetermine “the award of attorneys’ fees and costs

incurred during the district court portion of the proceedings . .

. in light of the new nominal damages award.” Id.; see also

Cummings v. Connell, Nos. 03-17095, 04-15154, 04-15186, slip op.

at 12 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2006) (amending the mandate in Cummings

II and referring calculation of attorneys’ fees on plaintiffs’

cross-appeal regarding attorneys’ fees to this court (to be

determined once this court redetermines the appropriate fee for

the district court proceedings)). 

On remand, this court awarded plaintiffs and each

member of the class they represent nominal damages, to be paid in

the amount of one dollar ($1.00) to each member of the class. 

(June 20, 2006 Order; July 5, 2006 Amended Judgment). This

court, however, refrained from ruling on attorneys’ fees and

costs, because neither party noticed such a motion, and the

parties professed to “have reached a tentative accord” as to an

appropriate amount. (Id.; May 19, 2006 Joint Status Conf. Stmt.) 

Indeed, on May 23, 2006, the parties negotiated and entered into

a settlement agreement that in relevant part agreed that: 1) the

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The settlement agreement additionally mandated that 3

defendants would not oppose a subsequent motion seeking the

attorneys’ fees agreed to. To this effect, defendants have filed

a statement of non-opposition to the present motion. (Statement

of Non-Opp’n.)

4

plaintiffs are prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and 2)

defendant SEIU Local 1000 will pay plaintiffs $125,000.00 in

attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs, divided as (a) $115,000.00

for fees, costs, and expenses prior to May 23, 2006; and (b) a

flat amount of $10,000.00 in fees, costs, and expenses necessary

to bring the matter to a conclusion and avoid further litigation

expenses. (Pet. for Att’ys Fees at ¶ 7.) Pursuant to Federal 3

Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h)(1), the parties drafted a class

notice regarding the attorneys’ fee agreement, which was approved

by the court on September 13, 2006, and dispatched to all class

members on September 22, 25, and 26, 2006. (October 10, 2006

Certification of Mailing.) Seven class members have filed

objections to the notice of motion regarding attorneys’ fees. 

(Objections to Settlement Exs. A-G.) Plaintiffs now move for an

order awarding fees and costs of $125,000.00, as agreed to by the

parties.

II. Discussion

Because plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of their §

1983 claims, Cummings, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1060, the court may allow

them reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b);

Sable Commc’ns v. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 890 F.2d 184, 193 (9th Cir.

1989) (“Plaintiffs prevailing in a civil rights action should

ordinarily receive attorney’s fees unless special circumstances

would render such an award unjust.”). Additionally, out-ofCase 2:99-cv-02176-WBS -KJM Document 288 Filed 11/29/06 Page 4 of 16
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5

pocket litigation expenses are reimbursable as a part of

attorneys’ fees. Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir.

1994). This court is not aware of any special circumstances

which would justify denying an award of fees and costs. 

A. Attorneys’ Fees Agreements in Class Actions

If attorneys’ fees are warranted, the district court’s

primary duty is to determine what constitutes a fair and

reasonable award. Hoirup v. Prof’l Eng’rs in CA Gov’t, 2006 WL

2791158, at *3 (E.D. Ca. Sept. 27, 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). 

Rule 23(h), governing attorneys’ fees in class actions, makes

clear that they may only be paid pursuant to a Rule 54(d)(2)

motion, but Rule 54(d)(2)(B) indicates that courts may consider

fee agreements between the parties in determining a reasonable

fee award. Hoirup, 2006 WL 2791158, at *3; Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d)(2)(B) (“If directed by the court, the motion shall also

disclose the terms of any agreement with respect to fees to be

paid for the services for which claim is made.”). However, the

Ninth Circuit has warned that courts approving fee agreements in

class actions must be cognizant of the “opportunities for

collusive arrangements in which defendants can pay the attorneys

for the plaintiff class enough money to induce them to settle the

class action for too little benefit to the class.” Zucker v.

Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1397 (9th Cir. 1999).

In this case, the court can not conceive of any danger

of collusion between the parties with regard to the settlement

agreement for attorneys’ fees. Most importantly, the settlement

agreement at issue pertains only to the matter of attorneys’

fees--it does not purport to resolve any of plaintiffs’ claims on

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The court may adjust the lodestar figure on the basis 4

of the Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4)

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances,

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9)

the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11)

the nature and length of the professional relationship

with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.

6

the merits. Indeed, plaintiffs’ claims were resolved (in their

favor) approximately five years prior to the May 2006 settlement

negotiations regarding attorneys’ fees. Cummings, 177 F. Supp.

2d 1060. There is nothing to indicate that plaintiffs’ attorneys

have not acted in the interests of the class members at all

times, and thus the court will consider the parties’ agreement in

determining a reasonable award.

B. Lodestar Calcuation

In calculating the amount of an award of attorneys’

fees, the court uses the lodestar calculation--the number of

hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate. Allen v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 456, 458 (9th

Cir. 1995); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is

reasonable. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4

(9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, the court may

adjust the lodestar figure if various factors overcome the

presumption of reasonableness. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. 4

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1975). However, many of the Kerr factors have been subsumed in

the lodestar approach. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879

F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, although the court

should consider the factors established by Kerr, it need not

discuss each factor. Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069,

1073 (9th Cir. 1983). 

7

1. Fees and Costs Prior to Settlement Agreement

On December 12, 2003, this court issued an order

awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiffs. In particular,

the court awarded $44,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and $9,019.28 in

out-of-pocket expenses for work occurring prior to the first

appeal. (Dec. 12, 2003 Order 14.) The order additionally

awarded $28,050.00 in attorneys’ fees for work on the appeal, and

$10,275.00 in attorneys’ fees and $3,025.14 in costs, for work

done after the appeal. The Ninth Circuit, however, subsequently 

reversed the award of $28,050.00 for attorneys’ fees related to

the appeal, based on plaintiffs’ failure to appropriately file an

application with that court. Cummings, 402 F.3d at 947-48.

The Ninth Circuit also remanded for redetermination the

amounts of the awards relating to pre-appeal and post-appeal

work, in light of the nominal damages issue decided in that

appeal. In particular, plaintiffs’ contend that this court’s

denial of fees and costs for work done on the nominal damages

issue on remand was improper, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s

subsequent ruling. This court agrees, and thus finds an award of

attorneys’ fees and costs appropriate for work done on the issue

of nominal damages, but only with regard to whether they should

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Plaintiffs also claimed that a separate award of 5

nominal damages should issue for each violation, an argument

rejected by the Ninth Circuit.

8

be awarded to each class member. Plaintiffs originally 5

requested $1,621.88 in expenses, and indicated that 78.6 hours

had been expended on the nominal damages issue on remand. 

Plaintiffs now estimate that 70% of the materials submitted

related to the nominal damages issue on which they ultimately

prevailed, which constitutes 55.02 hours. (Pet. for Att’ys Fees

at ¶ 11.) At the prevailing market rate of $250 per hour,

previously found proper by this court for work during that time

period, (Dec. 12, 2003 Order 14), this equals an award of

$13,755.00 in attorneys’ fees.

However, with the exception discussed immediately

above, upon consideration of the final results obtained by

plaintiffs, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, this court sees no reason

to disturb the remaining lodestar calculations made in its prior

December 13, 2003, order, simply because the nominal damages

award increased from $7.00 to roughly $37,000. See Morales v.

City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1996)(quoting

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 117 (1992))(noting that, in

weighing final relief awarded, for calculation of attorneys’

feels, the court must consider “the significance of the legal

issues on which the plaintiff[s] claim to have prevailed” and the

“public purpose” served by the litigation).

Subsequent to their second appeal, Cummings II, 402

F.3d 936, plaintiffs filed an appropriate application with the

Ninth Circuit for attorneys’ fees and out-of-pocket costs related

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The Ninth Circuit estimated that because 4 percent of 6

plaintiffs’ briefs were devoted to the issues on cross-appeal,

the same percentage of their total hours must have been devoted

to that section. (April 25, 2006 Order 12.)

9

to that appeal. Based on plaintiffs’ limited success on the

appeal, the Ninth Circuit awarded plaintiffs $41,910.00 in

attorneys’ fees and $2,523.94 in expenses. (April 25, 2006 Order

13.) The court further remanded to this court the calculation of

reasonable fees and costs for work on the cross-appeal, based on

its assertion that this court would be in a better position to

know “if and to what extent the cross-appeal was successful.” 

(Id. at 12.) Although the Ninth Circuit gave a rough estimate of

the hours it believed plaintiffs spent on their cross-appeal, it 6

did so merely in the process of calculating one factor for

reducing plaintiffs’ fee award on a separate issue. At that

time, plaintiffs did not include in their request for fees the

hours their attorneys’ spent pursuing the cross-appeal. Because

plaintiffs now submit their unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees

based primarily on the settlement agreement between the parties,

they have again decided not to include information about the

hours spent on the cross-appeal. As such, regardless of how this

court might partition the relative success of the cross-appeal

for the purposes of attorneys’ fees, it does not have a basis

upon which is can calculate the lodestar amount for the work done

on the cross-appeal.

2. Fees and Costs Subsequent to Settlement Agreement

In addition to the amounts already awarded or decided

above, plaintiffs’ counsel submits materials demonstrating that

it has performed additional work since May 23, 2006. Provided

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Plaintiffs counsel indicates that no out-of-pocket 7

expenses have been incurred since May 23, 2006. (Young Decl. ¶

5.)

10

that the party seeking attorneys’ fees submits supporting

documentation, courts regularly award attorneys’ fees for legal

activities such as communications by phone with clients or

opposing counsel, document review, and meetings. See, e.g.,

Assembly of State of Cal. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, No. 91-990,

1993 WL 188328, at *12 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 1993) (finding a

billing entry that included phone calls reasonable); Monsanto Co.

v. Pacificorp, No. 01-607, 2006 WL 1128226, at *8 (D. Idaho Apr.

24, 2006) (awarding attorneys’ fees for “considerable time

investigating the potential success of filing such a complaint,

including interviewing witnesses and reviewing relevant

documents”); Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., 03-1843, 2005

WL 3287233, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005) (concluding that

meetings for support staff were reasonable billing entries). In

this case, plaintiffs’ attorney W. James Young submits a

declaration, with an attached summary of time-sheets, indicating

that 40.05 hours have been expended on this matter since the

settlement agreement was reached. (Young Decl. ¶ 3.) At the

current prevailing market rate of $275 per hour, (April 25, 2006

Order 8), an award of an additional $11,013.75 in attorneys’ fees

is proper.7

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In addition, one class member, A. Lawrence Fibich, 8

stated his intention to speak at the hearing, but he did not

appear.

In response to the objection by Catherine Haynes, this 9

court notes that in a class action the issue is “whether the

class as a whole had notice adequate to flush out whatever

objections might reasonably be raised to the settlement. If an

individual [class member] later claims he did not receive

11

C. Class Members’ Objections

In late September, 2006, an appropriate notice of

motion for attorneys’ fees was approved by this court, and mailed

to the class members pursuant to Rule 23. Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(h)(2). According to the Rule, as explained in the notice, all

class members have the right to object in writing to the motion

for attorneys’ fees. Id. Accordingly, seven class members have

timely filed objections with plaintiffs counsel, W. James Young,

submitted to this court on November 20, 2006. (Objections to 8

Settlement Exs. A-G.)

Class member A. Lawrence Fibich objects to the motion

on various grounds. First, he objects to the nominal damage

award of $1.00, as compared to what he views as a “reward” to the

attorneys’ for their time. Secondly, Mr. Fibich proffers a

general objection to attorney billing practices, including the

billing rate and number of hours. Finally, Mr. Fibich contends

that it is unfair that his money, paid via his dues to the CSEA,

be given to plaintiffs’ attorneys, when they achieved a result

which “solved nothing.” (Objections to Settlement Ex. A.)

Class member Catherine Haynes objects to the motion on

the grounds that she was not consulted about, or notified of,

this suit. (Objections to Settlement Ex. B.) 9

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adequate notice and therefore should not be bound by the

settlement, he can litigate that issue on an individual basis

when the settlement is raised as a bar to a lawsuit he has

brought.” Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375

(9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, Haynes may pursue an individual

remedy in a separate action, but her asserted lack of notice does

not constitute a substantive objection to the present motion.

Accordingly, the court need not consider this to be a 10

substantive “objection” to the motion for attorneys’ fees, as Mr.

Heflin merely appears to be trying to remove himself from the

class.

12

Class member James G. White objects to the motion on

the grounds, based on what appears to be a general disagreement

with the fairness of the nominal award of $1.00. (Objections to

Settlement Ex. C.)

Class member Robert M. Heflin, although he files an

objection, does not object to the motion per se, but instead

asserts that because he was paying a “Fair Share-CSEA” fee for

approximately two years, he was to be considered a “member” of

the union, and thus not a class member. (Objections to 10

Settlement Ex. D.)

Class member Ramiro Hernandez objects to the motion

based primarily on what appears to be his disagreement with the

fairness of the nominal damages award of $1.00. (Objections to

Settlement Ex. E.)

Class member James Schlienz objects to the motion based

on what appear to be ideological grounds, arguing that ultimately

the motion “do[es] not represent [his] wishes.” (Objections to

Settlement Ex. F.)

Class member Edward Kotani objects to the motion

because he believes it was a “personal case” and thus he should

not be obligated to pay such expenses. (Objections to Settlement

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13

Ex. G.)

These seven objections appear to fall into several

general categories, which the court will address in turn. As a

preliminary matter, it appears that several of the class members

are not in fact objecting in substance to the motion for

attorneys’ fees, but instead object to what they perceive to be a

lack of fairness in the final award of nominal damages. 

(Objections to Settlement Exs. A-C, E.) Indeed, this confusion

on the part of the class members may be warranted, as it appears

that plaintiffs’ counsel W. James Young chose to include the

nominal damage award of $1.00 cash along with the mailing

containing notice of the motion for attorneys’ fees. (Objections

to Settlement Ex. C (October 2, 2006 W. James Young Letter).) It

thus appears that several class members are using their right to

object to the present motion as a forum for objecting to the

ultimate judgment in the case. While this court is sympathetic

to the class members’ disappointment, the issue of ultimate

damages has already been litigated and decided by the Ninth

Circuit, Cummings I, and this is not the proper forum for such

objections.

The second main ground on which class members object to

this motion consists of a general attack on the practice of

awarding attorneys fees based on “arbitrary” billing practices,

including excessive hours and “extensive billing/costs.” 

(Objections to Settlement Exs. A, F.) While cognizant of the

potential harms inherent in legal services billing, as well as

the danger for collusion in class action settlements, this court

has sufficient faith in the rigorous statutory and common-law

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protections that exist to enable courts to protect parties from

abusive billing practices. See e.g., Zucker, 192 F.3d 1323; Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(h) & 54(d); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Sable Commc’ns,

890 F.2d 184. As discussed in detail above, the amount agreed to

by the parties is entirely reasonable, considering the time and

effort that plaintiffs’ counsel exerted and the partially

favorable result achieved, especially given that large portions

of award have already been analyzed and granted by the courts. 

(December 12, 2003 Order; April 25, 2006 Order.)

Finally, several class members object to this motion by

arguing that they do not believe their money should go to paying

for such services, when the result of the law suit was nominal at

best. (Objections to Settlement Exs. A, G.) To the extent that

the class members may be concerned that an award of attorneys’

fees will come out of any monetary judgment in their favor, this

is not the case. The only award granted to class members was the

nominal damages of $1.00 per class member, which has already been

paid. The attorneys’ fees referenced in the present application

are to come from a separate fund. To the extent that the class

members are objecting merely because they have paid money to

CSEA, and CSEA is paying for the attorneys’ fees, this argument

does not constitute a meritorious objection to the present

motion. Although not named plaintiffs, objecting class members

are still parties, represented by counsel, to a suit seeking

monetary damages from CSEA. It is beyond dispute that a party

(even if the party only prevails in part) may be entitled to

attorneys’ fees, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), even when the ultimate

judgment is for nominal damages, see Hoirup, 2006 WL 2791158. 

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15

Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case pursued the matter diligently,

and won a victory (albeit not a financial victory) for all class

members. Attempting to punish class counsel because of

dissatisfaction with the ultimate judgment is not a proper basis

for objecting to the present motion, and plaintiffs’ counsel is

thus entitled to be compensated for their efforts. Out of the

approximately 37,000 class members that are parties to this

action, this court does not find merit in the seven objections

filed to this motion.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the

lodestar calculation of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses

equals:

Prior to First Appeal: Attorneys’ Fees

Costs

=

=

$44,000.00

$9,019.28

Post-First Appeal:

(prior order)

Attorneys’ Fees

Costs

=

=

$10,275.00

$3,025.14

Post-First Appeal:

(nominal damages issue)

Second Appeal:

Attorneys’ Fees

Costs

Attorneys’ Fees 

Costs

=

=

=

=

$13,755.00

$1,621.88

$41,910.00

$2,523.94

Post-Second Appeal Attorneys’ Fees = $11,013.75

TOTAL = $137,143.99

As stated, the parties to this action have settled this claim in

order to avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty of a dispute

over the appropriate amount. This court concludes that the

unopposed amount sought, $125,000.00, is reasonable and will thus

award it to plaintiffs. Hoirup, 2006 WL 2791158, at *5 (awarding

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the amount agreed to in a settlement, $110,000.00, based on a

lodestar calculation of $193,889.34). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion

attorneys’ fees and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in

the total sum of $125,000.00.

DATED: November 27, 2006

Case 2:99-cv-02176-WBS -KJM Document 288 Filed 11/29/06 Page 16 of 16