Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06335/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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PI LED 

Uoited Sratc-:s Courc of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

J'.JN 2 3 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

CLAIRE C. GORST, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

DR . ROY TROUTT, President, ) 

Un i versity of Science and Arts of ) 

Oklahoma; KATHRYN EMPIE; GARY ) 

BRYANT; FREELAND CUDJOE; KEN ) 

JOHNSTON; MIKE LEWIS; SCOTT OUSLEY;) 

TRUMAN HARRIS, Board of Regents of ) 

University of Science and Arts of ) 

Oklahoma; DR. ROY TROUTT, Presi- ) 

dent, University of Science and ) 

Arts of Oklahoma; DR . CLYDE ) 

SPRUELL, Vice President, University) 

of Science and Arts of Oklahoma; ) 

TROY FOSTER, Supervisor, University) 

of Science and Arts of Oklahoma, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

CLAIRE C. GORST, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v . 

W. DAVID PARDUE; WILLIAM BRETT; 

BILL SMITH; KATHRYN EMPIE; USAO 

BOARD OF REGENTS; ROY TROUTT; 

CLYDE SPRUELL; TROY FOSTER; and 

DOROTHY CORSAUT, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

No. 89-6335 

(D.C. No . CIV-85-2040-R) 

(W . D. Okla.) 

No. 89-6431 

(D.C. CIV-89-1016-R) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

Appellate Case: 89-6335 Document: 010110037109 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 1 
Before McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

This case involves appeals from two cases filed by plaintiff 

Gorst. ·Because the underlying facts of both cases are identical, 

we have consolidated the cases for adjudication on appeal. 

I. Facts 

In case number 89-6335 (the first federal suit), plaintiff 

initially sought to recover for alleged employment retaliation 

which occurred following plaintiff's exercise of his first amendment rights. A jury returned a verdict denying plaintiff's claims 

on September 17, 1988. Instead of appealing the jury's verdict, 

plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial and a Motion for Relief 

From Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Plaintiff now appeals the district court's September 

6, 1989 denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6335 Document: 010110037109 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 2 
On June 12, 1989, plaintiff filed his second federal suit, 

case number 89-6431, against all of the defendants named in the 

first suit and five additional individuals. Defendants filed several motions to dismiss the case. After hearing oral argument 

from the parties, the district court granted the defendants' 

motions to dismiss on November 20, 1989. Plaintiff now appeals 

the district court's dismissal of his second federal suit. 

II. Plaintiff's Claims 

In his first federal suit, plaintiff now claims that he is 

entitled to a new trial and to relief from judgment because 

defendants, by engaging in a variety of conduct, created unfair 

surprise at trial, defrauded defendant, and imposed a fraud upon 

the court. The district court dismissed the Rule 60(b) motion 

primarily because "[p]laintiff [was] attempting to relitigate a 

case which ha[d] already been appropriately decided." Order, 

September 6, 1989, at 1. 

In his second federal case, plaintiff essentially asserted 

the same claims that he asserted in the first federal case. However, plaintiff included five new defendants, all in privity with 

the defendants in the first case. In the second case, plaintiff 

claimed that all the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to 

deny plaintiff his rights. This denial of rights began with 

plaintiff's employment problems. Plaintiff claims that the conspiracy continued to grow and that it continues today. Defendants 

moved to dismiss the second suit based on the adjudication of the 

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Appellate Case: 89-6335 Document: 010110037109 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 3 
first case. The district court's minute sheet recording the dismissal of the second case does not contain reasons for its dismissal. However, in the record of the one-hour hearing on the 

case, the district court explained that it believed the plaintiff 

was merely trying to relitigate issues already adjudicated in the 

first suit. 

III. Standard for Review 

The district court's decision on a new trial motion is 

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Patty Precision 

Prods., Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg., Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1251 (10th 

Cir. 1988); Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 F.2d 609, 616 (10th 

Cir. 1984). We also review a district court's ruling on a Rule 

60(b) motion under an abuse of discretion standard. Republic 

Resources Corp. v. ISI Petroleum West Caddo Drilling Program 1981, 

836 F.2d 462, 465 (10th Cir. 1987); Cessna Finance Corp. v. 

Bielenberg Masonry Contracting, Inc., 715 F.2d 1442, 1445 (10th 

Cir. 1983). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial 

court's decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court 

has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a 

clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible 

choice in the circumstances. When we apply the 'abuse of discretion' standard, we defer to the trial court's judgment because of 

its first-hand ability to view the witness or evidence and assess 

credibility and probative value." United States v. Ortiz, 804 

F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6335 Document: 010110037109 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 4 
There is some confusion over whether the district court 

treated defendants' motion in the second case as a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion for dismissal or as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. 

We believe that the trial court inadvertently orally referred to 

the motion as a motion for summary judgment during the hearing and 

that the court's minute sheet correctly states the court's view 

that it was ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the standard of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) and a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 are 

fairly similar. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6) raises a question of law which we review de 

nova. Accordingly, we apply the same scrutiny to the complaint as 

did the trial court. Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 

(10th Cir. 1986). "Dismissal of a case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6) requires the legal determination that the plaintiff 

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim to entitle him 

to relief." Id. 

"In reviewing a summary judgment order, the appellate court 

applies the same standard employed by the trial court under Rule 

56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Osgood v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). The 

rule directs that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if 

• there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and .. 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6335 Document: 010110037109 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 5 
IV. Conclusion 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying the Rule 60(b) motion for a new trial and relief from 

judgment. All of the matters recited are arguably either not 

newly discovered, inadequate to establish the fraud or other misconduct claimed, fully litigated at trial, or merely cumulative. 

Since we defer to the discretion of the district court, we must 

affirm if there is arguable support for its action. We therefore 

affirm the district court's order denying the plaintiff's Rule 

60(b) motion in his first federal case. 

We also affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 

second federal case. We have reviewed the plaintiff's complaint; 

and we are in agreement with the district court's 

conclusion--voiced in the hearing on the second case--that plaintiff is merely trying to relitigate the same issues already litigated in the first case. Thus, his claims are res judicata as to 

the defendants in the original suit. Plaintiff is also collaterally estopped from asserting the same claims against the new 

defendants (who are in privity with the defendants in the prior 

suit) in the second action. Plaintiff had a full and fair opporturiity to litigate these claims in the first federal case, and he 

is bound by the court's order. Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim for relief, 

and we affirm the trial court's dismissal. Alternatively, we hold 

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 

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Appellate Case: 89-6335 Document: 010110037109 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 6 
.. 

district court correctly applied the law. 

The decisions of the district court in both cases are 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6335 Document: 010110037109 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 7