Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01514/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01514-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERARDO ROBLES

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of the

Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 14-cv-1514 BAS (NLS)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(Dkt. Nos. 5 and 12)

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Gerardo Robles’ First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“FAP”) and Respondent’s Answer to the FAP. (Dkt.

Nos. 5 and 12.) Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief. First, he claims that the

sentencing disparity between himself and his co-defendant violated the Eighth

Amendment. (Dkt. No. 5 at 6.) Second, he claims that the Court of Appeals improperly

failed to consider the merits of his state habeas petition. (Id. at 7.) Respondent contends

that the FAP is untimely and should be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 12 at 2.) Respondent

further argues that Petitioner failed to show that the state courts’ resolution of his claims

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id.) For the reasons set forth below, the FAP is

untimely and therefore the Court need not reach Respondent’s other arguments. 

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that the FAP and action be dismissed with

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prejudice. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Conviction

A jury convicted Petitioner and his co-defendant Samuel Gudino (“Gudino”) of

home invasion robbery in concert (Cal. Penal Code §§ 211 & 213(a)(1)(A)), carjacking

(Cal. Penal Code § 215(a)), three counts of assault with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code §

245(a)(2)), unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a)), and

receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle (Cal. Penal Code § 496d(a)). (Lodgment 2

(Dkt. No. 12-4 at 3).) Petitioner was sentenced to 33 years, 8 months in state prison. 

Gudino was sentenced to 20 years, 8 months in state prison. (Lodgment 1 (Dkt. No. 12-3

at 3).)

B. The Direct Appeal

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Fourth District Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment 1 (Dkt. No. 12-3) .) On November 21, 2008, the court reversed

Petitioner’s convictions for assault and receipt of stolen property and remanded for

resentencing after finding sentencing errors. (Lodgment 1 (Dkt. No. 12-3 at 33-34, 38-

39).) As for Gudino, the court reversed the judgment against him entirely, after finding

that the admission of Petitioner’s statements identifying Gudino as a co-perpetrator

violated Gudino’s confrontation rights.1

 (Lodgment 1 (Dkt. No. 12-3 at 4, 11, 28).) At

resentencing, Petitioner was sentenced to 24 years in state prison. (Lodgment 2 (Dkt. No.

12-4 at 4).) Petitioner appealed this sentence.2

 (Lodgment 2 (Dkt. No. 12-4).) On

September 13, 2010, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim on

direct appeal and affirmed the judgment. (Id.) On November 23, 2010, the California

1

 According to Petitioner, Gudino was subsequently convicted of lesser offenses and sentenced to six years in state prison. (Dkt. No. 5 at 6; see also Dkt. No. 12-1 at 16.) Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim stems from the disparity between his sentence and Gudino’s 6-year sentence. 

2

 While his sentencing appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Court of Appeal claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. (Lodgment 3 (Dkt. No. 12-5).) The court denied the petition without prejudice and directed Petitioner to file his petition in the Superior Court. (Id. (Dkt. No. 12-5 at 3).) 

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Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review, thus concluding Petitioner’s direct

review. (Lodgment 4 (Dkt. No. 12-6).) 

C. The Habeas Petitions

On July 20, 2011, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Imperial County

Superior Court.3

 (Lodgment 5 (Dkt. No. 12-7).) The court denied the petition on

September 1, 2011. (Id.) On July 26, 2013—almost two years later—Petitioner filed a

second state habeas petition in the Imperial County Superior Court. (Lodgment 6 (Dkt.

No. 12-8).) The petition was denied on September 5, 2013. (Id.) On November 15,

2013, Petitioner filed a third state habeas petition in the Imperial County Superior Court,

which was denied on November 19, 2013. (Lodgment 7 (Dkt. No. 12-9).) On December

9, 2013, Petitioner mailed a state habeas petition to the Fourth District Court of Appeal,

and it was denied on January 23, 2014. (Lodgment 8, 9 (Dkt. No 12-10 at 29, Dkt. No.

12-11).) Thereafter, on February 24, 2014, Petitioner mailed a petition to the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment 10 (Dkt. No. 12-12 at 32).) The court denied the petition on

May 21, 2014. (Lodgment 11 (Dkt. No. 12-13).) Petitioner mailed his federal habeas

petition on June 4, 2014 and his FAP on July 18, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1 at 11; Dkt. No. 5 at

12.) 

II. AEDPA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs

this petition because it was filed after the effective date of April 24, 1996. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation

on petitioners to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The relevant section reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

3

 Many of the records lodged with the Court only show the filing date, rather than

the mailing date, so the Court is unable to apply the “prison mailbox rule.” See Huizar v.

Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). Where the lodgment shows either Petitioner’s mailing date or the date he signed his petition, the Court will use that date and the terminology “mailed” rather than “filed.” In any event, the difference has no bearing on the resolution of the statute of limitations issues raised herein.

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court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

As noted in Section I.B above, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

direct appeal on November 23, 2010. (Lodgment 4 (Dkt. No. 12-6).) Accordingly,

Petitioner’s conviction became final 90 days later, on February 21, 2011, the date his

right to seek relief from the United States Supreme Court expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Absent any tolling, Petitioner’s deadline to seek federal

habeas relief was 365 days later, on February 21, 2012. Unless Petitioner can show he is

entitled to sufficient statutory or equitable tolling, the statute of limitations expired more

than two years before he mailed his federal habeas petition on June 4, 2014. (See Dkt.

No. 1 at 11.)

A. Statutory Tolling

A petitioner’s statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas

corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitions for state

habeas relief may be deemed pending “even during the intervals between the denial of a

petition by one court and the filing of a new petition at the next level, if there is not undue

delay.” Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223-25 (2002). In the absence of a clear indication that a petition filed at

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the next level was timely, a federal court must examine the case and determine whether

the petition was filed within what California courts would consider a “reasonable time.”

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006). A period of 30 to 60 days is reasonable,

while a 6-month unexplained delay will likely be deemed “unreasonable.” Id. at 201; but

see Skoor v. Tilton, 2008 WL 152144, at *19 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008) (holding sixmonth delay reasonable because the petitioner had to review a large database of felony

cases between filings); Moore v. Clark, 2008 WL 449706 *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2008)

(holding six-month delay reasonable because the petitioner was seeking transcripts from

an evidentiary hearing during the delay). The statute of limitations is not tolled by

proceedings in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). 

Moreover, no statutory tolling is available after the statute of limitations has expired. 

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 924 (2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does

not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition

was filed.”).

After his conviction became final on February 21, 2011, Petitioner filed a state

habeas petition in the Imperial County Superior Court on July 20, 2011. (Lodgment 5

(Dkt. No. 12-7).) The Superior Court habeas petition was denied on September 1, 2011,

44 days later. (Id.) Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to 44 days of tolling, extending the

statute of limitations deadline from February 21, 2012 to April 5, 2012. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2).

Still, by the time Petitioner filed his second state habeas petition in the Imperial

County Superior Court on July 26, 2013, the statute of limitations had already expired by

more than a year. (Lodgment 6 (Dkt. No. 12-8).) But even if this second petition was

filed before the statute of limitations had expired, it still would not provide any statutory

tolling because one of the independent grounds on which the Superior Court based its

September 5, 2010 denial was its finding that “Petitioner failed to timely file his

petition.” (Id. (Dkt. No. 12-8 at 14).) Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005)

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(holding that a state habeas petition is not “properly filed” for purposes of statutory

tolling under AEDPA if the state petition was determined by the state court to be

untimely as a matter of state law); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“[I]f a state court denies a petition as untimely, none of the time before or during the

court’s consideration of that petition is statutorily tolled.”) Likewise, the Court of

Appeals and California Supreme Court each denied Petitioner’s state habeas petitions on

timeliness grounds. (Lodgment 9 (Dkt. No. 12-11 at 5) and Lodgment 11 (Dkt. No. 12-

13 at 2).)4

 Therefore, Petitioner would not be entitled to statutory tolling for his petitions

to those courts either. By the time Petitioner mailed his federal habeas petition on June 4,

2014, the statute of limitations had been long expired. Unless equitable tolling can save

his petition, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is untimely, and the Court need not

consider Respondent’s other arguments.

B. Equitable Tolling

The Court next considers whether equitable tolling is applicable. Holland v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010) (holding that the one-year limitations period under

AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling). Petitioner bears the burden of proving that

equitable tolling is appropriate, and must establish that (1) he has been pursuing his rights

diligently; and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way of timely filing a

petition. Id. at 649; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also EspinozaMatthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). The determination of

whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling is “highly fact-dependent.” Id. (citing

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000)). Equitable tolling “is

unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999); see

also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he threshold necessary

to trigger equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

4

 The California Supreme Court issued a summary denial of Petitioner’s state habeas petition on May 21, 2014, with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780

(1998). (Lodgment 11 (Dkt. No. 12-13 at 2).) It is well settled that a summary denial

with a citation to Robbins means that the petition was rejected as untimely. See Walker v.

Martin, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1126 (2011). 

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rule.”)

Petitioner makes no equitable tolling arguments. In his traverse, Petitioner states

only that he “must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and

could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time

substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ.” (Dkt. No. 14.) Yet he does

not explain how the facts or circumstances in his case prevented him from timely filing

his habeas petition. The primary basis for Petitioner’s habeas petition is the sentencing

disparity between himself and a co-defendant Samuel Raymond Gudino. (See Dkt. Nos.

5, 14.) Judgment against Gudino was reversed on November 21, 2008 (Lodgment 1 (Dkt.

No. 12-3 at 1, 21)), and ultimately Gudino was sentenced to approximately six years in

prison on lesser-included offenses on August 4, 2010. (Dkt. No. 5 at 14-15.) As

previously explained, the statute of limitations expired on April 5, 2012. Therefore, even

if Petitioner was unaware of the facts and circumstances underlying his federal habeas

petition until Gudino’s sentencing in August 2010, he still had plenty of time to file his

federal habeas petition before the statute of limitations expired on April 5, 2012. The

Court cannot conclude that any amount of equitable tolling is appropriate in this case, and

certainly not enough to save a federal habeas petition that was mailed on June 4, 2014,

and amended on July 18, 2014. 

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the district court issue

an Order: approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) dismissing

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 5, 2015, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than June 19, 2015. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

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objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 6, 2015

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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