Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04140/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04140-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In the previous first amended complaint, plaintiff asserted a “failure to prevent” claim

under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). In the SAC, plaintiff cites code

sections from both FEHA and Title VII, even though plaintiff was expressly precluded from

adding any new claims to the complaint without leave of court or the agreement of the parties.

Given the court’s previous order, combined with the fact that the federal code section cited by

plaintiff (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) prohibits only the underlying discrimination/harassment itself, not

the failure to prevent discrimination/harassment, the court will construe this claim as arising

under only FEHA. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMILAH ABDUL-HAQQ,

Plaintiff, No. C 14-4140 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, 

et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Before the court is the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Kaiser Foundation

Hospitals (“Kaiser”) and The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (“TPMG”) (referred to

collectively as “defendants”). The court finds the matter suitable for disposition without a

hearing, and hereby VACATES the April 15, 2015 hearing on defendants’ motion. Having

read the papers filed in conjunction with the motion and carefully considered the arguments

and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS

defendants’ motion as follows.

BACKGROUND

In the operative second amended complaint (“SAC”), plaintiff Jamilah Abdul-Haqq

(“plaintiff”) asserts six causes of action in connection with her employment at various Kaiser

hospitals: (1) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (based on alleged race

discrimination), (2) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and hostile work

environment1

, (3) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), (4) failure to

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engage in the interactive process under FEHA, (5) violation of FEHA, and (6) intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Claims (1), (2), and (5) are asserted against only TPMG,

while claims (3), (4), and (6) are asserted against both defendants. 

The court previously held a hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first

amended complaint (“FAC”), and granted the motion in full, with leave to amend. The court

issued a written order detailing the required elements of each asserted claim and pointing

out which elements were not properly alleged in the FAC. See Dkt. 50. The court also

observed that it was unable to determine whether plaintiff had exhausted her claims under

Title VII, FEHA, and the ADA, and required plaintiff to “specifically plead [in the SAC] that

administrative remedies were indeed exhausted as to all asserted Title VII, FEHA, and ADA

claims,” and to “attach all relevant administrative charge(s) to the complaint.” Id. at 2. 

DISCUSSION

In the current motion, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies with respect to the first, third, and fourth causes of action, and that

the SAC fails to state a claim as to all six causes of action. The court will address the

exhaustion argument before turning to the merits of plaintiff’s claims. 

To establish federal subject matter jurisdiction for a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must

exhaust her remedies by filing an administrative charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) before commencing an action in federal

court. B.K.V. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002); Sommatino v.

United States, 255 F.3d 704,708 (9th Cir. 2001). The ADA incorporates the enforcement

procedures of Title VII. 29 U.S.C. § 12117(a). The relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(1),

requires that a charge under Title VII be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged

unlawful employment practice. 

Under FEHA, a plaintiff must file a complaint before the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and obtain a right-to-sue notice before filing suit. Okoli

v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co., 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1615 (1995).

Under either Title VII, the ADA, or FEHA, allegations in a complaint not included in a

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plaintiff’s administrative charge may not be considered by a federal court unless the new

claims are “like or reasonably related” to the allegations specified in the relevant

administrative charge. See Green v. Los Angeles County Sup. of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472,

1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989); Okoli, 36 Cal.App.4th at 1615. 

Plaintiff attaches two administrative charges to the SAC. The first, which was filed

on September 2, 2014 with both the state’s DFEH and the federal EEOC, alleged race

discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation. See SAC, Ex. A. The charge

alleged the following:

I have been subjected to different terms and conditions in my employment. 

For example, on or about June 2, 2014, I was subjected to a bias

investigation and my complaints were not investigated. I am aware of others

outside my protected category who were not subjected to such treatment. 

Id. at 17. 

The second, which was filed on November 5, 2014 with the DFEH, alleged disability

discrimination and retaliation. The charge alleged the following:

Denied continuation of employee paid medical coverage, [I] was denied

FLMA [sic] due to being short 11 hours so requested medical leave for

treatment of work-related injury. Matthew Kiyoi refused to change leave

status from medical leave to industrial leave because [I] am being treated for

injury caused from work. Matthew did not submit the DWC-1 in August and

October.

Id. at 14. 

Based on these charges, defendants first argue that plaintiff’s first cause of action,

for racial discrimination under Title VII, has not been properly exhausted. In the SAC,

plaintiff alleges that she suffered two adverse employment actions, both in the form of

disciplinary warnings issued on September 18, 2014. Defendants point out that plaintiff’s

first charge was filed on September 2, 2014 – before the alleged adverse actions occurred

– and thus argue that the September 2 charge could not have exhausted the September 18

conduct. Defendants further argue that the November 5, 2014 charge was premised only

on disability-related discrimination, not on race-related discrimination. 

In her opposition, plaintiff argues that defendants’ exhaustion argument is “a false

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statement at its best,” but fails to provide the court with any basis for finding that her first

cause of action is indeed exhausted, or that the exhaustion requirement should be excused

in this case. Although plaintiff’s opposition is less than clear, she appears to contend that

the “agency refused to investigate,” that the exhaustion requirement should be excused

due to “administrative futility,” and that the Ninth Circuit has found certain statutory

exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See Dkt. 66 at 4-6. However, because there is

no indication that plaintiff ever filed an administrative charge with respect to the September

18, 2014 disciplinary warnings, there is no basis for finding that the agency “refused to

investigate.” Nor has plaintiff shown why the “administrative futility” cases or the statutory

exception cases would apply in the present case. 

Plaintiff also includes a heading in her opposition entitled “plaintiff’s administrative

charge alleging violation of Title VII does not relate to her present claim for race

discrimination is a statement that is false [and] misleading.” See Dkt. 66 at 6. Under that

heading, plaintiff “admits she did not report discrimination due to race for fear of retaliation.” 

Id. However, plaintiff provides no basis for this court to find that fear of retaliation excuses

her from the administrative exhaustion requirement. Plaintiff also includes arguments

regarding defendants’ alleged “refus[al] to accommodate when plaintiff was having a panic

attack,” which appear to be relevant only to a disability-related claim, not a race-related

claim. 

Although plaintiff does not argue that her current claim is “like or reasonably related”

to the allegations contained in her administrative charges, even if the court were to

consider that argument, it could not find that plaintiff has properly exhausted her race

discrimination claim. The only charge to claim race discrimination was the September 2,

2014 charge, and the only allegations in that charge were that plaintiff had been subject to

“a bias investigation” and that her “complaints were not investigated” in response to an

undescribed incident that occurred on June 2, 2014. The allegations in the SAC’s first

cause of action, that plaintiff was accused of calling a doctor a liar and given a verbal

disciplinary warning, and that plaintiff was given a written disciplinary warning after she

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“complained about being set up to label the wrong blood,” are not “like or reasonably

related” to the allegations made in the September 2, 2014 charge. 

Overall, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies

as to her first cause of action, and therefore GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss on

that basis. Given that plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend, and was

specifically instructed to “attach all relevant administrative charge(s) to the complaint,” the

dismissal shall be without leave to amend. 

Defendants then argue that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies with respect to her third cause of action, for disability discrimination under the

ADA. In the SAC, plaintiff alleges that defendants discriminated against her by (1) refusing

to bring her back in time for her transfer to take effect, (2) denying her a transfer based on

insufficient documentation from her doctor, (3) attempting to transfer her to a clinic position

even though she was unable to work clinic hours, and (4) denying her a “five minute break

to get herself together.” SAC, ¶¶ 91-92. 

However, as shown above, the only disability-related allegations in plaintiff’s charges

relate to the alleged denial of medical coverage and the refusal to treat her leave as an

industrial leave, rather than a medical leave. Defendants also claim that the alleged

delayed transfer occurred after the filing of plaintiff’s November 5, 2014 charge; and

indeed, the SAC does allege that defendants refused to bring plaintiff “back in time for

transfer to take effect as of 01/06/2015.” SAC, ¶ 91. 

As mentioned above, in her opposition, plaintiff argues that the “agency refused to

investigate,” that the exhaustion requirement should be excused due to “administrative

futility,” and that the Ninth Circuit has found certain statutory exceptions to the exhaustion

requirement. Those arguments are rejected for the same reasons described above. 

Plaintiff also includes a heading in her opposition entitled “plaintiff’s administrative charge

alleging violation of ADA does not relate to her present claim for disability discrimination is

a statement that is false and misleading,” but under that heading, plaintiff cites only to

internal complaints, not to any administrative charges showing that her current disabilityCase 4:14-cv-04140-PJH Document 68 Filed 04/10/15 Page 5 of 11
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related claim was indeed exhausted. See Dkt. 66 at 8. 

Again, while plaintiff does not argue that her current claim is “like or reasonably

related” to the allegations contained in her administrative charges, even if the court were to

consider that argument, it could not find that plaintiff has properly exhausted her disability

discrimination claim. As mentioned above, the November 5, 2014 charge mentions only

the alleged denial of medical coverage and the refusal to treat her leave as an industrial

leave. The September 2, 2014 charge alleges only that plaintiff had been subject to “a bias

investigation” and that her “complaints were not investigated” in response to an

un-described incident that occurred on June 2, 2014. The allegations in the third cause of

action are not “like or reasonably related” to the allegations made in the administrative

charges. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies as to her third cause of action, and therefore GRANTS defendants’ motion to

dismiss on that basis. Given that plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend,

and was specifically instructed to “attach all relevant administrative charge(s) to the

complaint,” the dismissal shall be without leave to amend. 

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies as to her fourth cause of action, for failure to engage in the interactive process in

violation of FEHA. Defendants argue that neither the September 2, 2014 administrative

charge nor the November 5, 2014 administrative charge mention the failure to engage in

the interactive process, nor do they mention a failure to provide a reasonable

accommodation generally. 

In addition to making the above-mentioned arguments regarding administrative

futility and statutory exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement (which are

rejected for the reasons discussed above), plaintiff’s opposition also includes a heading

entitled “plaintiff’s administrative charge alleging violation of FEHA does not relate to her

present claim for failure to engage in the interactive process is a statement that is used to

deter their obligation to act.” Dkt. 66 at 8. Plaintiff argues that “plaintiff made manager

aware of disability [in] June 2013,” and that “symptoms started to appear in January 2014.” 

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Id. However, plaintiff does not provide any basis for finding that she did indeed exhaust her

administrative remedies with respect to her claim for failure to engage in the interactive

process. The two charges attached to the SAC fail to mention any request for a

reasonable accommodation, nor any failure to engage in an interactive process about any

such accommodation.

And again, while plaintiff does not argue that her current claim is “like or reasonably

related” to the allegations contained in her administrative charges, even if the court were to

consider that argument, it could not find that plaintiff has properly exhausted her claim for

failure to engage in the interactive process. As mentioned above, the November 5, 2014

charge mentions only the alleged denial of medical coverage and the refusal to treat her

leave as an industrial leave. The September 2, 2014 charge alleges only that plaintiff had

been subject to “a bias investigation” and that her “complaints were not investigated” in

response to an undescribed incident that occurred on June 2, 2014. The allegations in the

fourth cause of action are not “like or reasonably related” to the allegations made in the

administrative charges.

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies as to her fourth cause of action, and therefore GRANTS defendants’ motion to

dismiss on that basis. Given that plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend,

and was specifically instructed to “attach all relevant administrative charge(s) to the

complaint,” the dismissal shall be without leave to amend. Having found that plaintiff has

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to claims (1), (3), and (4), the court does

not reach the question of whether any of those three claims state a viable cause of action. 

Turning to the merits of plaintiff’s remaining claims, plaintiff’s second cause of action

is based on the alleged failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. 

Because this claim depends on a viable claim for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation,

the court will defer consideration of this claim until after it has addressed plaintiff’s

underlying discrimination claims.

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges a violation of FEHA. The court previously

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dismissed this claim based on plaintiff’s failure to “explain whether she alleges

discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or some other type of mistreatment,” and failure to

“plead whether the alleged mistreatment was based on her race, sex, or some other

protected characteristic.” Dkt. 50 at 6. The SAC suffers from the same defects, though the

body of the claim appears to suggest that this claim is based on either a failure to

accommodate plaintiff’s alleged disability, and/or the alleged subjection of plaintiff to an

adverse employment action based on disability, and/or the “failure to engage in an

interactive meeting” regarding plaintiff’s disability. See SAC, ¶¶ 103, 105.

Plaintiff’s opposition provides no additional insight as to the legal theory upon which

this claim is based. The opposition states that “Kaiser was aware since June 2013 and

January 2014 that plaintiff has a disability and adverse employment actions were no due

process which plaintiff illness was increased,” and “[t]his is explained enough to rise burden

of proof that Kaiser actions was not motivated by disability.” Dkt. 66 at 9. 

Regardless of which disability-related claim plaintiff intends to pursue, the court finds

that plaintiff has not adequately stated a claim under FEHA. To the extent that plaintiff’s

fifth cause of action attempts to assert a claim for failure to engage in the interactive

process, it is duplicative of the fourth cause of action, and is dismissed for the same

reason. 

To the extent that plaintiff alleges a failure to accommodate a disability, plaintiff does

not adequately allege the nature of the requested accommodation, or any facts regarding

defendants’ alleged refusal to provide the requested accommodation. Although plaintiff’s

third cause of action contains a brief reference to being “denied the transfer as a

reasonable accommodation,” plaintiff does not adequately allege what the requested

accommodation was or explain why it was reasonable. 

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff alleges disability discrimination, while the SAC

arguably alleges an adverse action in the form of a written disciplinary warning for allegedly

calling a doctor a liar, plaintiff does not adequately allege that similarly situated individuals

outside her protected class were treated more favorably, nor any other circumstances

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As a separate basis for dismissal, the court notes that its previous dismissal order

required plaintiff to “specifically plead that administrative remedies were indeed exhausted as

to all asserted Title VII, FEHA, and ADA claims.” Dkt. 50 at 2. The only adverse action alleged

in the complaint is the written disciplinary action after plaintiff allegedly called a doctor a liar.

As discussed above, in the context of plaintiff’s first cause of action, plaintiff did not mention

this incident in any of her administrative charges, nor is the incident “like or reasonably related”

to the conduct that was alleged in the charges. Thus, to the extent that plaintiff intends to

assert a disability discrimination claim under FEHA, the court finds that plaintiff has not

exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to that claim. 

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giving rise to an inference of discrimination.2

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the fifth cause of action is GRANTED.

Because plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend this claim, and has twice

failed to identify a theory of relief for this claim, the dismissal shall be without leave to

amend. 

Turning back to plaintiff’s second cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendant

TPMG failed to prevent discrimination, harassment, and hostile work environment. 

However, plaintiff’s discrimination claims have been dismissed without leave to amend. 

Plaintiff does not assert a separate claim for harassment or hostile work environment, nor

do the allegations of this claim establish a viable claim for harassment or hostile work

environment. Plaintiff alleges that her managers “did not interview” her after she

complained about a hostile work environment, and that a group of nurses referred to as the

“Filipino Mafia” are “abrupt, aggressive, demeaning, confrontational, and abrasive” to other

employees. SAC, ¶¶ 78, 81. 

To prevail on a hostile workplace/harassment claim under FEHA, an employee must

show that she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct related to a protected trait, that

the conduct was unwelcome, and that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. Lyle v.

Warner Bros. Television Productions, 38 Cal.4th 264, 279 (2006); see also Faragher v.

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-87 & n.1 (1998) (finding that the same standard applies to

sexual harassment claims and racial harassment claims). Although plaintiff alleges that the

conduct described above was unwelcome, she does not allege that it was related to any

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The court again notes that its previous order required plaintiff to “specifically plead that

administrative remedies were indeed exhausted as to all asserted Title VII, FEHA, and ADA

claims.” Dkt. 50 at 2. While plaintiff’s September 2, 2014 administrative charge did allege that

she was subject to “a bias investigation” and that her “complaints were not investigated,” it is

unclear whether or how those allegations relate to plaintiff’s current allegations that her

managers “did not interview” her after she complained about a hostile work environment. And

even if the court were to consider those allegations to be properly exhausted, no reading of

plaintiff’s administrative charges would suggest that her current allegations regarding the

“Filipino Mafia” were properly exhausted. Thus, even the SAC had adequately alleged the

elements of a harassment/hostile work environment claim, plaintiff’s failure to exhaust those

allegations would be fatal to her “failure to prevent” claim under FEHA. 

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protected trait, nor does she adequately allege that the conduct was more than “occasional,

isolated, [or] sporadic.” Lyle, 38 Cal.4th at 283. Thus, the court finds that plaintiff has not

alleged a viable claim for harassment or hostile work environment.3

 

As the court noted in its previous order, a “failure to prevent” claim cannot be viable

absent a finding of actual discrimination or harassment. See, e.g., Tritchler v. County of

Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the district court did not abuse its

discretion in requiring a finding of actual discrimination before a violation of section

12940(k) becomes actionable) (citing Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., 63 Cal.App.4th

280, 283-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)). “[T]here’s no logic that says an employee who has not

been discriminated against can sue an employer for not preventing discrimination that

didn’t happen.” Trujillo, 63 Cal.App.4th at 289.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action is

GRANTED. The dismissal is without leave to amend. 

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The

elements of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and

outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intent to cause, or reckless disregard for the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the suffering of severe or extreme emotional

distress by plaintiff; and (3) actual and proximate causation between the two. Potter v.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001 (1993). 

“Extreme and outrageous” conduct must “exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated

in a civilized community.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51 (2009). Liability “does

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not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other

trivialities.” Id. at 1051 (internal citation omitted). 

In the SAC, plaintiff alleges that she was denied a return to work and “recklessly

denied” a transfer, that defendants attempted to assign her to a new position “without

assessing that clinic hours are difficult” for plaintiff, that she was “teased about her

disability” and that her managers were “very much annoyed” with her complaints and

“purposely ignored” her, and that certain unnamed employees had a “vindictive demeanor”

towards plaintiff.”

In dismissing plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the court found that plaintiff had not

adequately alleged the type of “extreme and outrageous” conduct required to state a claim,

and now finds that the SAC still fails to do so. While plaintiff was certainly dissatisfied with

her treatment by defendants, the alleged conduct does not “exceed all bounds of that

usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED with respect to the sixth cause of action, and the dismissal shall be without

leave to amend. 

As a separate basis for dismissal, to the extent that the complained-about conduct is

based on normal parts of the employment relationship (e.g., the attempt to transfer plaintiff,

along with any conduct that constitutes discipline or criticism), even if such conduct may be

characterized as “intentional, unfair or outrageous,” it is preempted by California’s workers’

compensation exclusivity provisions.” Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 25 (1990). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s second amended complaint is DISMISSED

without leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2015 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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