Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cv-00022/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cv-00022-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

STAN WARREN MOORE,

 Plaintiff,

v.

SERGEANT JAMES SEALEY,

 Defendant.

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Case No. 5:16-cv-00022-MHH-SGC

 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The plaintiff filed a pro se complaint seeking monetary damages or

injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his civil rights. 

(Doc. 1). The plaintiff names Sergeant James Sealey as the sole defendant. (Id. at 

3). The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and requests that the court order 

Sgt. Sealey “to find some other line of work” and to attend “anger management 

classes.” (Id. at 4). In accordance with the usual practices of this court and 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge 

for a preliminary report and recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 

136 (1991).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 8, 2016, the undersigned entered an Order for Special Report 

directing the Clerk to forward copies of the complaint to the named defendant and 

FILED

 2017 Feb-16 AM 11:17

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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directing the defendant to file a special report addressing the plaintiff’s factual 

allegations. (Doc. 5). The undersigned advised the defendant that the special 

report could be submitted under oath or accompanied by affidavits and, if 

appropriate, the court would consider it as a motion for summary judgment filed 

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.). 

On April 4, 2016, the defendant filed a special report, supplemented by 

affidavits and/or other evidence. (Doc. 12). On April 28, 2016, the plaintiff 

requested leave to conduct additional discovery. (Doc. 13). On June 2, 2016, the 

undersigned granted the plaintiff’s discovery to the extent he requested production 

of a second body chart and denied the request in all other respects. (Doc. 14). 

The same day, the undersigned notified the parties that the court would construe 

the special report as a motion for summary judgment and notified the plaintiff that 

he had twenty-one (21) days to respond to the motion for summary judgment by 

filing affidavits or other material. (Doc. 15). The undersigned also advised the 

plaintiff of the consequences of any default or failure to comply with FED. R. CIV.

P. 56. (Id.). See Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985). 

On June 10, 2016, the defendant submitted the additional discovery ordered. 

(Doc. 16). On July 7, 2016, the plaintiff filed a response. (Doc. 19). However, the 

response is not filed under oath or penalty of perjury. (Id.). Therefore, any facts 

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contained therein shall not be considered. This matter is now before the court on 

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the response thereto.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the court has construed the defendant’s special report as a motion 

for summary judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 56 governs the resolution of the motion. 

Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” In making that assessment, the court must view the evidence in a 

light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable 

inferences against the moving party. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 

1023 (11th Cir. 2000). The burden of proof is upon the moving party to establish 

his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by showing the absence of 

genuine issues of material fact and that he is due to prevail as a matter of law. See 

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Unless the 

plaintiff, who carries the ultimate burden of proving his action, is able to show 

some evidence with respect to each element of his claim, all other issues of fact 

become immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Bennett v. Parker, 

898 F.2d 1530, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1990). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Facts in dispute cease to be “material” facts when the plaintiff fails to 

establish a prima facie case. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no 

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genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of 

proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” [citations omitted]. 

Thus, under such circumstances, the public official is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, because the plaintiff has failed to carry 

the burden of proof. This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually 

unsupported claims prior to trial. 

Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1532. 

However, any “specific facts” pled in a pro se plaintiff’s sworn complaint 

must be considered in opposition to summary judgment. See Caldwell v. Warden, 

FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Perry v. Thompson, 

786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1986)). Additionally, because the plaintiff is pro 

se, the court must construe the complaint more liberally than it would pleadings 

drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). “Pro se pleading are 

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, 

therefore, be liberally construed.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th 

Cir. 2006). 

III. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

A. Incident Report

In support of his motion for summary judgment, defendant Sealey submitted 

an Alabama Department of Corrections Incident Report detailing the November 

14, 2015 altercation between the plaintiff and Sgt. Sealey. (Doc. 12-1 at 2). Bibb 

County Correctional Facility Warden Willie Bennett certified the nine page report 

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“as a true and correct copy taken from [the plaintiff’s] electronic file.” (Doc. 12-1 

at 1). The plaintiff asserts Warden Bennett has no personal knowledge of the 

November 14, 2015 incident and Bennett “did not state the information contained 

in the report was true or that he had any personal knowledge concerning who 

prepared it.” (Doc. 19 at 15). From this platform, the plaintiff argues “Warden 

Bennett’s affidavit has no bearing on whether or not” Sealey is entitled to summary 

judgment and is inadmissible under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). (Doc. 19 at 15-16). 

The plaintiff’s opposition to Warden Bennett’s affidavit, and by implication 

the nine page incident report, is without merit. The purpose of Warden Bennett’s 

affidavit is “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of 

evidence” by “produc[ing] evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is 

what the proponent claims it is.” FED. R. EVID. 901(a). Warden Bennett’s

attestation is simply to certify that the Incident Report is a “public record or 

statement from the office where items of this kind are kept.” FED. R. EVID. 901(7). 

Accordingly, the Incident Report has been properly authenticated. 

The undersigned next addresses what appears to be a general objection to the 

admissibility of the Incident Report as hearsay. The plaintiff asserts “the incident 

report is not even signed or notarized” and that the witness statements included in 

the incident report are “unsworn.” (Doc. 19 at 15-19). Warden Bennett’s 

“certificate of authenticity does not cast any light on the underlying hearsay 

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problem of the statements or their fundamental flaws as affidavits under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56 (e). Simply, the hearsay problem here contains two layers: the report 

itself and the statements contained therein.” Bozeman v. Orum, 199 F. Supp. 2d 

1216, 1222–23 (M.D. Ala. 2002), on reconsideration in part sub nom. Bozeman ex 

rel. Estate of Haggard v. Orum, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (M.D. Ala. 2004), and aff’d,

422 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Incident Report itself is hearsay but it is “admissible under the public 

records exception to the hearsay rule because” it is “the official reporting 

document for” the Department of Corrections for the November 14, 2015

investigation. White v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1273 (N.D. 

Ala. 2015), as amended (May 27, 2015) (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(iii)). This 

hearsay exception, however, only “allows the introduction of “factual findings

resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law[.]” 

Bozeman, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23 (emphasis in original).1 The exception does 

not include “evidence gathered by the investigating body on which to base its 

findings,” i.e., the witness statements attached to the Incident Report. Id. None of 

the witness statements attached to the report are sworn to under oath or penalty of 

perjury. “Unsworn statements ‘do[ ] not meet the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. 

 

1

The defendant has submitted affidavits containing testimony concerning every fact finding 

made in the investigative report. (Doc. 12-1 at 10 (investigative report)); (Docs 12-2 to 12-4 

(Sgt. Sealey, Lt. Waver, and Ofcr. Walker affidavits)). 

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Proc. 56(e)’ and cannot be considered by a district court in ruling on a summary 

judgment motion.” Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 n.26 (11th Cir. 2003), 

as amended (Sept. 29, 2003) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 

158 n.17 (1970)). As such, the witness statements will not be considered. 

B. Inmate Body Chart

The plaintiff sets forth three reasons the November 14, 2015 body chart 

submitted by Sgt. Sealey “should not be considered for summary judgment 

purposes.” (Doc. 19 at 16). First he declares, “a person, like the plaintiff can have 

injuries which will not show up on a visual external view of the body.” (Id.). 

While the plaintiff’s declaration might have some bearing on the evidentiary 

weight of the body chart, it has no bearing on the admissibility of the body chart. 

The content of the body chart falls within a clearly established exception to the 

hearsay rule. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (statements “made for” and “pertinent to --

medical diagnosis and treatment” and that “describe medical history; past or 

present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause” are 

excepted from the hearsay rule). As such, the plaintiff’s objection is overruled, 

and the content of the medical chart shall be considered as evidence in its entirety.

Next, the plaintiff asserts “Bibb County Correctional Officers, as well as 

officers at other facilities in Alabama are known to have facility health care nurses 

fabricate body charts when officers have assaulted or beaten inmates”. (Doc.19 at 

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16). This is an attempt to state a fact, and it will not be considered because the 

plaintiff did not sign his response under oath or penalty of perjury. The statement 

also is a conclusory assertion lacking factual support and having no bearing on the 

validity of the medical chart in the plaintiff’s case. See Evers v. General Motors 

Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“conclusory allegations [in an affidavit] 

without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”).

The plaintiff further attaches the affidavit of inmate Donnie White as 

evidence to support his own unsworn, conclusory statement. (Doc. 19. at 23-25). 

To the extent the affidavit has any bearing on the issue, i.e. medical body charts, 

Inmate White declares he is a former inmate at Bibb County Correctional Facility

and has personally heard “nurses talking about officers wanting them to falsify 

charts” on inmates they had beaten. (Id. at 25). This statement is hearsay within 

hearsay and is not only immaterial and irrelevant to facts underlying the plaintiff’s 

case but is not based on Inmate White’s personal knowledge of the plaintiff’s case

Accordingly, the White affidavit shall not be considered as evidence.

Finally, the plaintiff objects to the medical body chart on the ground that he 

alleged in the complaint his “body was videoed/photographed after the body chart 

was done.” (Id. at 16). The plaintiff made no such allegation in his sworn 

complaint, and his response is not signed under oath. (Docs. 1, 19). Accordingly, 

this declaration shall not be considered as evidence. The plaintiff also complains 

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that the defendant did not produce the photographs or video as part of his special 

report. (Doc. 19 at 16). However, the Order for Special Report afforded the 

plaintiff every opportunity to request leave of court to ask the defendant to produce 

these items as evidence, but the plaintiff did not do so. The plaintiff was aware of 

his ability to make such a request, as he timely requested, and the defendant was 

ordered to produce, a second body chart that had not been made a part of the 

special report. (Docs. 13, 14, and 16-1). It is the plaintiff’s burden to produce 

evidence to support his claims and to rebut the defendant’s summary judgment 

position. The November 14, 2015 body chart shall be considered as evidence. 

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACTS

Around 2:30 p.m. on November 14, 2015, the plaintiff was escorted to the 

shift office in B3 dorm to see Lt. Waver. (Doc. 1 at 3, 5).2 While in the shift 

office, the plaintiff and “several other inmates” were accused “of assaulting inmate 

Ratcliff.” (Doc. 12-2 at 1). Inmate Ratcliff was also present in the shift office. 

(Id.). 

Lt. Waver asked the plaintiff a question about the assault, which he 

answered. (Doc. 1 at 3). Lt. Waver then asked Inmate Ratcliff “if what the 

plaintiff had said was true, and” Inmate Ratcliff “made a motion indicating that he 

did not know.” (Id. at 3). The plaintiff told Inmate Ratcliff to tell Waver the truth, 

 

2 The plaintiff spells this corrections officer’s surname “Wavier,” but the correct spelling is 

‘Waver.” (Doc. 12-3 at 1-2).

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but defendant Sealey yelled at him to “shut the f—k up.” (Id. at 3-4). Sgt. Sealey 

testifies that he gave the plaintiff “a direct order to be quiet,” but the plaintiff 

refused to do so. (Doc. 12-2 at 1). 

The plaintiff does not deny that he ignored Sgt. Sealey and turned to Lt. 

Waver. (Doc. 1 at 4). Lt. Waver attests that during questioning, the plaintiff 

“began to get loud and [was] trying to talk over me.” (Doc. 12-3 at 1). Sgt. Sealey 

ordered the plaintiff “several times to be quiet,” but the plaintiff “kept on talking.” 

(Id.). The plaintiff does not dispute Lt. Waver’s testimony. 

The plaintiff declares Sgt. Sealey then grabbed him from behind by the neck,

choked him until he was about to lose consciousness, slammed him to the floor, 

got on top of him, and continued to choke him with one hand. (Doc. 1 at 4-5). 

With his free hand drawn back into a fist, Sealey called the plaintiff a m-----f----r 

and dared him to say anything else. (Id. at 5). Lt. Waver and Officer Walker 

yelled at Sgt. Sealey to stop, but Sealey acted as though he was “in a world of his 

own” and continued to choke the plaintiff “with severe force” in a fit of rage. (Id.). 

Lt. Waver pulled at Sgt. Sealey, who “finally came to his senses” and got off the 

plaintiff. (Id.). Lt. Waver demanded Sgt. Sealey leave the office several times 

before Sealey complied. (Id.). The plaintiff put up no resistance the entire time 

Sgt. Sealey was assaulting him. (Id.). 

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Defendant Sealey disputes the plaintiff’s version of events. (Doc. 12-2 at 1). 

Sgt. Sealey testifies that after refusing to obey his second order to be quiet, and 

“[w]hile being questioned by the Shift Supervisor, [the plaintiff] turned in an 

aggressive manner to Sealey, who was in the middle of [the plaintiff] and Ratcliff 

and started yelling at Ratcliff.” (Id.). Sealey “did not know what [the plaintiff]

was about to do and “‘in fear of’ his “life” conducted “a one on one take down of 

[the plaintiff] to the floor and all force ceased.” (Id.). 

Lt. Waver attests defendant Sealey grabbed the plaintiff’s “wrist and 

performed a two on one take down to the front of” the plaintiff. (Doc. 12-3 at 1). 

Both Sgt. Sealey and Moore “landed on the floor. All force ceased.” (Id.). Officer 

Walker testifies that she heard Sgt. Sealey direct the plaintiff “to face the wall and 

submit to being handcuffed” but the plaintiff “had to be taken down in order for the 

handcuffs to be applied.” (Doc. 12-4 at 1). Officer Walker attests that at no time 

did she yell for Sealey to stop. (Id.). 

Officer Walker escorted the plaintiff to the health care unit for a body chart. 

(Doc. 1 at 5). While in the unit, the plaintiff reported that he “was in” an 

“altercation with Sgt.” (Doc. 12-1 at 3). Nurse Morton found the plaintiff to be 

alert and verbally responsive and noted old scars on the top of his head and upper 

left eye, as well as a scratch on the left side of his forehead. (Id.). The plaintiff 

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complained of right elbow pain. (Id.). Nurse Morton reported seeing no redness or 

swelling at that time. (Id.). 

After completion of the body chart, the plaintiff was taken back to the shift 

office. Lt. Waver called Captain John Hutton as the plaintiff “sat in front of him.” 

(Doc. 1 at 5). Lt. Waver reported the assault and informed the plaintiff “he would 

be contacting Warden Willie Thomas immediately” about the incident. (Id.). 

The next day the plaintiff attests his back pain was so severe he could hardly 

get out of bed. (Id.). He declares Warden Thomas directed another body chart be 

performed and that the plaintiff be seen by a doctor. (Id. at 5-6). However, the 

plaintiff has not produced an affidavit from Warden Thomas.

The plaintiff submitted a sick call request about his back pain but was never 

seen by a doctor. (Id.). On November 18, 2015, Nurse Jackson completed a 

second body chart on the plaintiff at the request of Lt. Waver. (Doc. 16-1 at 1). 

The plaintiff stated that he had been attacked by defendant Sealey and “his back 

was injured.” (Id.). He asserted that he “didn’t feel the effects till the next day.” 

(Id.). Nurse Jackson examined the plaintiff and noted tattoos on his neck, right 

arm, back, and lower leg. (Id.). The plaintiff was “able to move all extremities.” 

(Id.). 

The plaintiff testifies he was transferred to another facility “without even 

being question[ed] by any I&I investigator” or “anyone else for that matter.” (Doc. 

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1 at 6). Sgt. Sealey continued to work at the facility as if nothing had happened. 

(Id.). Prior to his transfer, Lt. Waver did obtain a signed statement from the 

plaintiff and the “other authorities” who were in the shift office during the assault. 

(Id.). The plaintiff declares Warden Thomas told him Sgt. Sealey was wrong and 

that he had handled the matter, but the plaintiff has not produced Thomas’

testimony, and Sealey does not admit this assertion. (Id.). 

V. ANALYSIS

A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force 

The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is 

triggered when a prisoner is subjected to an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). 

[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical 

force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 

core judicial inquiry [in determining whether a prisoner has suffered 

unnecessary and wanton pain] is that set out in Whitley, whether force 

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). In extending Whitley to all cases 

involving allegations of the use of force by prison officials, the Supreme Court 

reasoned:

Many of the concerns underlying our holding in Whitley arise 

whenever guards use force to keep order. Whether the prison 

disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, corrections officers must 

balance the need “to maintain or restore discipline” through force 

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against the risk of injury to inmates. Both situations may require 

prison officials to act quickly and decisively. Likewise, both 

implicate the principle that “‘[p]rison administrators . . . should be 

accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of 

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve 

internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’”

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22). 

“The use of force must stop when the need for it to maintain or restore 

discipline no longer exists.” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 

2002) (citing Whitley, 475 at 320-21). Therefore, if a non-compliant inmate has

been restrained by guards and no longer poses a threat, he “cannot be subjected to 

gratuitous or disproportionate force that has no object but to inflict pain.” (Id.). 

With these concerns in mind, the Supreme Court set out certain factors to be 

considered when evaluating whether the force used was excessive. These factors 

include: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the relationship between that need 

and the amount of force used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the 

responsible official; (4) any efforts to temper the severity of a forceful response; 

and (5) the extent of the injury suffered by the inmate. Id. at 7; see Hewett v. 

Jarrad, 786 F.2d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1986). 

In applying the foregoing factors to the facts of a particular case, the 

Supreme Court has instructed:

That is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives 

rise to a federal cause of action. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 

1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem 

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unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s 

constitutional rights.”). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 

“cruel and unusual” punishments necessarily excludes from 

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided 

that the use of force is not a sort “‘repugnant to the conscience of 

mankind.’”

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (internal citations omitted).

B. Qualified Immunity

The defendant asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in 

connection with plaintiff=s excessive force claim. (Doc. 12 at 4-13). However:

In this Circuit, a defense of qualified immunity is not available in 

cases alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, 

because the use of force ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm’

is clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution by the 

Supreme Court decisions in Hudson [502 U.S. at 8] and Whitley [475 

U.S. at 320-21]. See Johnson. v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th 

Cir. 2002). There is simply no room for a qualified immunity defense 

when the plaintiff alleges such a violation. Id. The only question, 

then, is whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive a 

motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. If he has done 

so, that is the end of the inquiry. 

Skrtich v Thornton, 280 F.3d at 1301. Since qualified immunity is not at issue, the 

remainder of this section is dedicated to determining whether the plaintiff has 

alleged sufficient facts to survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

C. Discussion

Applying the first, second and third factors in evaluating the excessive force 

claim against Sgt. Sealey, it is undisputed that the plaintiff continued to talk and 

became loud during the investigation. (Doc. 12-3 at 1). Although his speech was 

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directed toward Inmate Ratcliff and Lt. Waver, the plaintiff does not deny that 

defendant Sealey was standing in between the plaintiff and Inmate Ratcliff. (Doc. 

1 at 3; Doc. 12-2 at 1). The plaintiff twice refused Sgt. Sealey’s orders to be quiet. 

(Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 12-3 at 1). 

“Prison guards may use force when necessary to restore order and need not 

wait until disturbances reach dangerous proportions before responding.” Danley v. 

Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 

1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)). “And prison guards do not have the luxury or 

obligation to convince every inmate that their orders are reasonable and wellthought out.” Id. (quoting Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1533). 

The plaintiff’s contention that no force should have been used because all 

Sealey “had to do was inform the plaintiff under Administrative Regulation #403 

that he was giving the plaintiff a direct order to be quiet” or be written a 

disciplinary infraction is unavailing. (Doc. 19 at 11). Sgt. Sealey had no 

obligation to convince the plaintiff to obey his direct orders by threatening him 

with disciplinary action. Considering the events that occurred in the shift office 

prior to Sgt. Sealey’s altercation with the plaintiff, it cannot be said “that it was 

unreasonable for” Sealey “to believe that some force was necessary. Fennell v. 

Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2009). Therefore, factors one through 

three weigh heavily in favor of Sgt. Sealey. 

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The undersigned now turns to factors four and five, i.e. Sgt. Sealey’s efforts 

to temper the severity of his forceful response and the extent of the injury suffered 

by the plaintiff. The parties hotly dispute the type and level of force used by Sgt. 

Sealey. The plaintiff attests Sgt. Sealey grabbed him from behind by the neck,

choked him until he was about to lose consciousness, slammed him to the floor, 

got on top of him, and continued to choke him with one hand. (Doc. 1 at 4-5). 

Then, while screaming obscenities and ignoring Lt. Waver and Officer Walker’s

pleas to stop, Sgt. Sealey continued to choke the plaintiff “with severe force” in a 

fit of rage. (Id.). Lt. Waver pulled at Sgt. Sealey, who “finally came to his senses” 

and got off the plaintiff. (Id.). Lt. Waver demanded Sgt. Sealey leave the office 

several times before Sealey left. (Id.). 

On the other hand, Sgt. Sealey attests the plaintiff was talking in a loud and 

heated manner toward Lt. Waver and Inmate Ratcliff, refused to obey his orders to 

be quiet, and continued to behave in a heated manner while he was positioned in 

between the plaintiff and Inmate Ratcliff. (Doc. 12-2 at 1). Sealey testifies “[he] 

did not know what [the plaintiff] was about to do” and “in fear of [his] life [he] did 

a one on one take down of [the plaintiff] to the floor and all force ceased.” (Id.). 

Lt. Waver and Officer Walker declare the plaintiff refused to obey Sgt. Sealey’s 

direct orders, assert they witnessed Sealey conduct a takedown of the plaintiff, and 

thereafter observed all force ceased. (Doc. 12-3 at 1; Doc. 12-4 at 1). Officer 

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Walker denies yelling at Sgt. Sealey to stop. (Doc. 12-4 at1). 

The plaintiff was examined by medical staff immediately after the incident. 

The only injury Nurse Morton observed was a scratch on the left side of the 

plaintiff’s forehead. (Doc.12-1 at 3). The only complaint made by the plaintiff 

was “right elbow pain,” but Nurse Morton saw no redness or swelling to the area. 

(Id.). Even when construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, these de 

minimis injuries are completely contrary to the plaintiff’s version of events. They 

are, however, completely consistent with Sgt. Sealey’s declaration that he 

conducted a takedown. 

Some four days later, the plaintiff received another body chart. (Doc. 16-1). 

His only complaint was that his “back was injured.” (Id.). Nurse Jackson 

observed no injuries to the plaintiff’s body and “he was able to move all 

extremities.” (Id.). The plaintiff has produced no other evidence concerning his 

back pain or verifying any back injury. (Id.). Again, even when construed in a 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, his complaints of back pain for several days 

after the incident are indicative of de minimis injury. Even though the plaintiff’s 

primary complaint against Sgt. Sealey is that Sealey choked him with severe force 

to the point of unconsciousness for an extended period of time, the plaintiff never 

complained of neck or throat pain and swelling, nor was any swelling, bruising, 

fingerprints and the like ever observed about the plaintiff’s head and neck. In 

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short, the undisputed medical records show the plaintiff had no injuries consistent 

with being choked with severe force for an extended period of time. 

Based upon the undisputed medical records compared to the parties disputed 

version of events, the evidence overwhelmingly weighs in favor of defendant 

Sealey because it shows that Sealey tempered the forcefulness of his response and 

the plaintiff suffered little to no injury. The plaintiff has failed to create a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against 

defendant Sealey, and defendant Sealey is entitled to summary judgment in his 

favor. 

VI. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the motion 

for summary judgment be granted and this action be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE

VII. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT 

Any party may file specific written objections to this report and 

recommendation. Any objections must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 

fourteen (14) calendar days from the date the report and recommendation is 

entered. Objections should specifically identify all findings of fact and 

recommendations to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. 

Failure to object to factual findings will bar later review of those findings, except 

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for plain error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 

1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Objections also should specifically identify all claims 

contained in the complaint that the report and recommendation fails to address. 

Objections should not contain new allegations, present additional evidence, or 

repeat legal arguments. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections on 

each other party to this action.

On receipt of objections, a United States District Judge will make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which 

specific objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, 

the findings of fact and recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The 

district judge must conduct a hearing if required by law. Otherwise, the district 

judge may exercise discretion to conduct a hearing or otherwise receive additional 

evidence. Alternately, the district judge may consider the record developed before 

the magistrate judge, making an independent determination on the basis of that 

record. The district judge also may refer this action back to the magistrate judge 

with instructions for further proceedings.

A party may not appeal the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation 

directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. A party 

may only appeal from a final judgment entered by a district judge.

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