Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06663-35/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CENTRAL VALLEY CHRYSLER CASE NO. CV-F-04-6663 AWI LJO

VALLEY JEEP, INC., et al., 

 ORDER ON MOTION RE PROTECTIVE

ORDER FOR ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL

Plaintiff, DOCUMENTS BY OUTSIDE COUNSEL

vs. (Doc. 346)

CATHERINE E. WITHERSPOON, 

Defendants.

 /

 

Pursuant to a Joint Statement filed on September 5, 2006, plaintiffs move to modify/for

enforcement of the Protective Order filed on June 6, 2006. (Doc. 235.) Plaintiffs’ motion requests the

Court preclude defendant intervenor’s outside counsel, Matthew Pawa and Benjamin Krass, from

accessing plaintiffs’ highly confidential information. The matter came on for hearing on September 8,

2006 in Department 8 of the above-entitled court. (Local Rule 37-251(a).) Plaintiffs appeared by

telephone by counsel Derek Bentsen. Plaintiff-intervenor appeared by telephone by counsel Charles

Haake. Defendant-intervenors appeared by telephone by counsel Patrick Gallagher and Matthew Pawa.

Having considered the Joint Statement and evidence submitted, as well as the arguments of counsel and

the Court’s file, the Court issues the following order.

/////

/////

/////

Case 1:04-cv-06663-AWI-GSA Document 351 Filed 09/08/06 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

On March 23, 2006, this Court issued a protective order and an amended protective order on June

6, 2006. The parties began working on a proposed protective order starting in May 2005 and seriously

in November 2005 to March 2006. A large stumbling block to the parties agreement to a protective

order was that the defendant-intervenors’ in-house counsel sought access to plaintiffs’ admittedly

confidential information disclosed in discovery. This Court held a hearing on March 17, 2006 to address

the in-house counsel access issue, in light of Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465,

1470 (9th Cir.1992). The parties submitted a proposed protective order on March 23, reserving the issue

of in-house counsel access, and the parties ultimately reached an agreement, which resulted in the June

6, 2006 amended protective order. The discovery produced information about the plaintiffs’ costs and

efficacy of vehicles designs, hardware systems that affect fuel economy technologies, market demand,

consumer preferences research, marketing strategies and future produce plans and financial records,

among other things. 

Outside counsel Mr. Matthew Pawa and Mr. Benjamin Krass, of the Law Offices of Matthew

F. Pawa, applied for pro hac vice admission on March 28, 2006 and were admitted on March 31, 2006.

Plaintiffs’ concern is that there is a substantial risk of inadvertent disclosure of confidential

information should Mr. Pawa and Mr. Krass gain access. Plaintiffs argue Mr. Pawa is a vigorous

advocate who appears to use of the media as part of his advocacy. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Pawa

regularly makes public statements on his cases and has sat on a Boston College panel in a symposium

that “explore[d] the interaction between law and media in the context of the global warming issue.” Mr.

Pawa, and through him, his associate Mr. Krass, are public figures who speak regularly on matters of

environmental concern.

Plaintiff also argues that Mr. Pawa refuses to limit his public comments, as in-house counsel

have agreed to do in the protective order, further causing concern to plaintiffs. Mr. Pawa indicates in

his declaration that he makes public statements and does not want to have to identify publicly available

Case 1:04-cv-06663-AWI-GSA Document 351 Filed 09/08/06 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The protective order provides in part (¶6): “Until at least three years after this litigation is concluded . . . these

1

persons shall make no statements of fact or opinion . . . relating to any subject contained in the Highly Confidential

Information . . . Quoting or paraphrasing facts or opinions from a publicly available source that is identified by the speaker

or writer would not violate this provision . . .”

3

information.1

In the Joint Statement, plaintiffs argued the timing of Pawa’s coming into the case, in relation

to the protective order. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Pawa was representing intervenors during the protective

order negotiations. The negotiated settlement of the protective order was predicated on the

defendant-intervenors’ statements that they were not seeking to have Mr. Pawa and Mr. Krass access

confidential information. Plaintiffs negotiated the resolution of the protective order, amended on June

6, and stated that the agreement was based on their understanding that Mr. Pawa and Mr. Krass would

not be seeking confidential information and under the protective order would not be entitled to access.

At oral argument, however, plaintiffs’ counsel treated from this argument that there was a

misrepresentation or other inappropriate conduct during negotiations as to whether Mr. Pawa or Mr.

Krass would seek access to the confidential information.

In addition, in responding to the Court’s question about whether plaintiffs did not “trust” outside

counsel from disclosing confidential information, counsel agreed that Mr. Pawa and Mr. Krass would

not flout the protective order. The sole issue to plaintiffs is inadvertent disclosure such as to preclude

Mr. Pawa and Mr. Krass from all access to confidential documents..

Assuming, without deciding, that Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp. applies to the facts of

this case, the Court finds that there is basically no chance of inadvertent disclosure. Mr. Pawa and Mr.

Krass submitted evidence that they have complied with other numerous protective orders, they are

officers of the Court and have agreed to be bound to the provisions of the Protective Order at issue

relevant to outside counsel. Further, they understand the result of disclosure. Indeed, it is not disputed

that Mr. Pawa and Mr. Krass meet the definition of outside counsel. Each counsel has signed the

Protective Order agreeing to be bound by the relevant provisions. 

The evidence that plaintiffs submit in support of the possibility of inadvertent disclosure, i.e, Mr.

Pawa’s speaking engagements, do not balance in favor of the possibility of inadvertent disclosure so as

to preclude counsel from all access to information necessary to the representation.

Case 1:04-cv-06663-AWI-GSA Document 351 Filed 09/08/06 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court denies plaintiffs’ request to preclude counsel Pawa and

counsel Krass from access to confidential information. Counsel are bound to this Court’s Protective

Order as outside counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06663-AWI-GSA Document 351 Filed 09/08/06 Page 4 of 4