Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00317/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00317-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Paul W. Driggers, ) Case No. CV 10-317-TUC-DCB (JM)

)

Petitioner, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

v. )

)

Lewis Winn, Warden, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

_________________________________)

Petitioner Paul W. Driggers filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 626(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule – Civil 72.1(b). Petitioner contends that his

confinement is unlawful due to Respondents’ failure to properly execute the sentence

imposed by the District Court. Because the Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies and because the claim was not properly filed, the Magistrate Judge recommends

that the Petition be dismissed with leave to amend on the appropriate Court-approved form.

I. Background

Petitioner, who was previously incarcerated at FCI Tucson, is currently incarcerated

at FCI Seagoville, Texas. He is serving a 120 month sentence from the District of Idaho for

Use of Interstate Facilities in Commission of Murder for Hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1958. Answer, Ex. 1. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) projects that he will be

released from custody on April 19, 2015, if he earns all available Good Conduct Time. Id.,

Attachment 2 (Sentence Monitoring Computation Data). 

In his Petition, Petitioner indicates that he is challenging the “execution of the

sentence.” Petition, p. 1. He alleges that “[t]he U.S. Bureau of Prisons unilaterally modified

the sentence imposed upon Petitioner by the sentencing court.” Id. His specific complaint

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is that the BOP “unlawfully modified the sentence imposed by the District Court to the point

where its execution takes the sentence outside of the statutory mandates of 18 U.S.C.S. [§]

3553(A).” Id., p. 4. Petitioner also attached a memorandum to his Petition in which he urges

the Court to apply relaxed pleading requirements to his Petition. Id., Attachment (BriefMemorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting the § 2241 Petition). In terms of relief,

Petitioner seeks his immediate release “or an order that the Respondents execute the sentence

within the provisions of 18 U.S.C.S. [§] 3553(A).” Petition, p. 9. 

II. Discussion

A. Petitioner’s claim is not exhausted.

Section 2241 does not specifically require inmates to exhaust their administrative

remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Huang v. Ashcroft, 390

F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004). However, as a “prudential matter,” a court may require a

federal inmate to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief under section

2241. Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004). A court may waive the

exhaustion requirement where administrative remedies are inadequate, futile, or pursuit of

them would cause irreparable harm. Id. at 1000-01. 

The Bureau of Prisons has established an administrative remedy process to address

prisoners’ complaints about any aspect of imprisonment. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq.;

Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cri. 1994). The process requires an inmate to

proceed through four levels of review: (1) an attempt at informal resolution with institutional

staff; (2) a formal written administrative remedy request to the Warden; (3) an appeal to the

BOP Regional Director; and (4) an appeal to the BOP General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. §§

542.13-542.15. 

In this case, Respondent alleges that Petitioner failed to exhaust his remedies in

relation to his sentencing calculation claim. In his reply, Petitioner argues that the

Respondents are being disingenuous in that they should have deduced from the Petition that

he was claiming that his sentence violates the § 3553(a)(2)(D) requirement that the

sentencing court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider the

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need “to provide the defendant with needed . . . medical care, or other correctional treatment

in the most effective manner . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Specifically, in the reply he

alleges that “Respondent(s) still have not fulfilled the statutory mandates of his [s]entence

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by providing Petitioner with medically necessary teeth, or

denture plates.” Reply, p. 2. Petitioner also attached to the Reply a copy of an administrative

response to his appeal related to dental treatment.

Petitioner’s arguments are unpersuasive. There is no reason to expect Respondents

to divine from the Petition that the claim is related to Petitioner’s dental care. There is nary

a hint in the Petition that this might be the case. In fact, after reviewing the Petition, the

Court found the Respondents’ response to be appropriate in that it addressed, to the extent

possible, the requirements of § 3553 and how the statute was not violated in relation to

Petitioner’s sentence. Moreover, given that Petitioner has filed a total of 34 administrative

remedies, Answer, Exhibit 1, ¶ 4, it is too much to ask that Respondents assume the burden

of determining which of the administrative remedies might be associated with the instant

action.

It was also appropriate for the Respondents to review Petitioner’s administrative

claims to determine if any had included a claim under § 3553. The review disclosed that

Petitioner had not filed any administrative claims challenging the BOP’s computation of his

sentence. As such, the only claim discernible from the Petition clearly has not been

exhausted. However, an entirely different claim– involving his dental care-- was raised in

the Petitioner’s reply. Although the § 3553 claim has not been exhausted, Respondents did

not have any reason to address whether Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies

in relation to his dental claim. The Court could exercise its discretion and either excuse the

faulty exhaustion and reach the merits, or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative

remedies before proceeding in court. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990). The

problem with that course of action is twofold: The first issue is that the dental claim has not

been presented on its merits so it cannot be properly evaluated. Second, it is unknown to the

Court whether the dental claim has been exhausted. Given this situation, and the fact that the

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claim, as discussed below, should not have been filed as a habeas action, the Court

recommends that the claim be dismissed without prejudice and that Petitioner be allowed

thirty days to remedy the deficiencies. 

B. Petitioner’s claim is no cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

A habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “challenge[s] the manner, location, or

conditions of a sentence's execution.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th

Cir.2000). Here, Petitioner is not challenging the manner, location, or conditions of the

execution of his sentence. Rather, he is challenging the conditions of his confinement. If this

case represented Petitioner’s first attempt to bring a claim about his dental treatment under

the habeas statutes, the Court would readily excuse Petitioner’s error. However, in Driggers

v. United States, CV 10-144-TUC-DCB (Dist. Az. 2010), Petitioner alleged, as he does here,

he was denied appropriate dental care in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In its screening

order, the District Court construed the action as a civil action pursuant Bivens v. Six

Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and explained:

If a prisoner is challenging the conditions of his confinement

rather than the validity or duration of the confinement, his

remedy arises under the civil rights law, not habeas corpus. See

Muhammad v. Close 540 U.S. 749, 750-751 (2004). If a

prisoner seeks civil rights relief by filing a habeas petition, he

has mislabeled his case and is entitled to have his action treated

as a claim for relief under civil rights law. Wilwording v.

Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d

728, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974).

CV 10-144-TUC-DCB, Doc. 6, p. 2. The Court dismissed CV 10-144-TUC-DCB without

prejudice, but, to aid Petitioner in properly filing his claim, attached filing instructions and

a complaint form and granted Petitioner 30 days to file an amended complaint. Id., p. 3. 

However, rather than filing the amended complaint as ordered, Petitioner elected to

immediately appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit. Id., Doc. 10 (Notice of Appeal). On

August 11, 2010, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and the

mandate became effective on November 15, 2010. Id., Doc. 19. As of the date of this Report

and Recommendation, Petitioner has not filed an amended complaint in CV 10-144-TUCDCB and the matter has been dismissed.

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Given that Petitioner’s claim in CV 10-144-TUC-DCB was dismissed without

prejudice, it was not a decision on the merits and thus lacks preclusive effect. Weinberg v.

Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 2001). As such, the claim potentially remains

viable despite Petitioner’s refusal to file it properly as previously instructed. Because

Petitioner was warned of the possibility of dismissal if he failed to file an amended complaint

in CV 10-144-TUC-DCB (which involved the same claim he raises here), his recalcitrance

might support the outright dismissal of the instant action. Computer Task Group, Inc. v.

Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004) (noncompliance “must be due to willfulness,

fault, or bad faith” to support dismissal). However, given that Petitioner has not yet been

warned of the possibility of dismissal of this action, the Court will recommend that the

District Judge provide Petitioner with a final opportunity to properly file his dental claim in

this action. 

III. Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District

Court, after its independent review:

1. Construe Petitioner’s § 2241 as a civil rights action brought pursuant to Bivens

v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);

2. Dismiss without prejudice for failure to file on the proper court-approved

form and allow Petitioner thirty (30) days to file a first amended complaint in compliance

with discussion above;

3. If Petitioner fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, dismiss the

action with prejudice due to Petitioner’s willful noncompliance with Court directives.

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to

the objections. If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV

10-317-TUC-DCB. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc).

DATED this 15th day of April, 2011.

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