Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05543/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-05543-85/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY NICHOLAS STESHENKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMAS MCKAY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 09-cv-05543-RS 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 

CONTINUATION OF IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS

Plaintiff moves to have a trial transcript prepared at public expense, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 753(f). That section provides, in relevant part, that “[f]ees for transcripts furnished in other 

proceedings to persons permitted to appeal in forma pauperis shall also be paid by the United 

States if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but presents a 

substantial question).” Where a party is seeking public funding for trial transcripts, “courts must 

be rigorous in their examination of applications . . . to ensure that the treasury is not unduly 

imposed upon.” Walker v. People Exp. Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989)

Here, plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal based on Rule 24 of the 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which generally permits a litigant who was granted IFP 

status in the district court to maintain that status on appeal absent an order to the contrary. 

Plaintiff filed his application for IFP status in the district court in November of 2009, and it was 

granted the following day. See Dkt. Nos. 2 and 4. Item 5 of the IFP application form asked, “Do 

Case 5:09-cv-05543-RS Document 1018 Filed 04/14/15 Page 1 of 4
CASE NO. 09-cv-05543-RS

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

you own or are you buying a home?” Plaintiff checked “No.” Recently, in two other cases 

pending in this court, a judicial finding of fact has been entered against plaintiff that his 

representation on the IFP application in this case, as well as identical representations made in 

those two other cases, that he did not own a home were knowingly false when made. See 

Steshenko v. Gayard, C 13-3400 LHK, Order dated April 1, 2015 (Dkt. No. 111) and Steshenko v. 

Albee, C 13-4948 LHK, Order dated April 1, 2015 (Dkt. No. 79). Through principles of issue 

preclusion, that factual finding may very well be binding on plaintiff in this action, absent it 

subsequently being set aside as the result of the reconsideration plaintiff is seeking or the appeal 

he has expressed intent to pursue if necessary.

Even assuming plaintiff is free to relitigate the factual question, however, it appears that 

his only quarrel is with the legal conclusions drawn in Gayard and Albee. Neither in those cases 

nor in this one has he offered any basis to refute the finding that he was the legal owner of his 

residence in November of 2009 (and still is), and that he had full knowledge of that fact when he 

answered “no” to item 5 on his IFP application. Plaintiff instead merely argues that his interest in 

the property is, in effect, fully encumbered as the result of certain unrecorded familial loan 

transactions. While plaintiff asserts he offered to present yet further evidence in camera in the 

Gayard and Albee matters, there is no conceivable basis on which such evidence would serve to 

vitiate plaintiff’s legal ownership of the property.

In his motions for reconsideration in Gayard and Albee and in his reply brief here, the 

thrust of plaintiff’s argument is his insistence that he is truly indigent now, and that he was truly 

indigent at the time his IFP applications were filed, notwithstanding holding legal title to the real 

property.1 While that may be so, plaintiff is missing the point. His IFP application was submitted 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff expressly acknowledged in writing that he understood any false 

 

1

 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that defendants previously raised the issue of his home ownership in 

a “failed” motion in limine regarding the testimony of Dr. Phillip Allman. In fact, defendants 

raised the issue in a separate motion seeking to exclude evidence of the financial resources of 

either side. See Dkt. No. 842. That motion was granted, on grounds or relevance and potential 

prejudice, without any determination of the factual basis of plaintiff’s claims of indigence.

Case 5:09-cv-05543-RS Document 1018 Filed 04/14/15 Page 2 of 4
CASE NO. 09-cv-05543-RS

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

statement in the application “may result in the dismissal of my claims.” Item 5 of the application 

asks a simple, straightforward, non-ambiguous, “yes or no” question: “Do you own or are you 

buying a home?” The following line of item 5 solicits information from the applicant as to the 

amount of any mortgage on such property.

Plaintiff elected to check “no” and to leave the mortgage information blank. Even under 

plaintiff’s present characterizations of the facts, his response to item 5 was knowingly false when 

made. Plaintiff may have genuinely believed then, and may believe now, that a court evaluating 

his eligibility for IFP status in 2009 should not have considered his home an asset in light of the 

familial loans and/or other circumstances. It was not, however, plaintiff’s prerogative to decide 

unilaterally that his legal home ownership was irrelevant, and then to submit an IFP application 

that was false on its face. Plaintiff’s obligation was to disclose truthfully his ownership of the 

home (as he had done in a prior action, see Steshenko v. Christey, C 04-3626 JF) and then provide 

whatever further information he believed necessary to support his position that the home was 

effectively not an asset.

Thus, the immediate question is not whether plaintiff is indigent within the standards of 28 

U.S.C. §1915 today, or whether he met those standards in November of 2009. Even if plaintiff 

were to establish that the court likely would have found that he lacked any equity in his home in 

2009, or that he lacks it now, that would not excuse his false answer to item 5 on the IFP 

application.2 The issue, in light of that false representation, is whether it would be appropriate to 

permit plaintiff to retain IFP status on appeal, regardless of whether a fully truthful application 

submitted today would likely be granted. Accordingly, within 15 days of the date of the order, 

plaintiff may submit a brief and/or declaration, not to exceed 15 pages total, presenting any 

 

2

 The orders in Gayard and Albee reached the further conclusions of law and/or fact that 

plaintiff’s false answer to item 5 rendered his allegation of poverty untrue, such that dismissal 

under 28 U.S.C §1915 (e)(2)(a) was warranted. As judgment has already been entered in this 

action, it would not be appropriate for this court to reach those issues. Whether the Court of 

Appeal might conclude dismissal of the appeal to be warranted on that basis is, of course, a 

question for that tribunal.

Case 5:09-cv-05543-RS Document 1018 Filed 04/14/15 Page 3 of 4
CASE NO. 09-cv-05543-RS

4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

arguments he may have against revocation of his IFP status. Because entitlement to a trial 

transcript at public expense depends on IFP status in the first instance, a ruling on plaintiff’s 

transcript request will be deferred pending resolution of this issue.

It is not clear that defendants have standing to support or oppose continuation of plaintiff’s 

IFP status, although the Court certainly has discretion to consider arguments or authority they may 

wish to bring to its attention. Accordingly, while defendants are not encouraged to submit a 

response to plaintiff’s filing, they may do so within 5 days if they deem it appropriate, and any 

such response shall not exceed 10 pages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2015

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

Case 5:09-cv-05543-RS Document 1018 Filed 04/14/15 Page 4 of 4