Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_88-cv-01658/USCOURTS-caed-2_88-cv-01658-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4332 Environmental Policy - Coop of Agency Reports

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNSEL, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. CIV S-88-1658 LKK GGH

vs.

KIRK RODGERS, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Introduction

As set forth in full in the background to this order, a lengthy saga has ensued with

respect to the inadvertent delivery of privileged-in-part general counsel files of Friant Water

Users Authority (Friant) to plaintiff NRDC et al. With the previous finding that truly privileged

documents would not lose their status as a result of the inadvertent delivery, the end of the saga

was initially contemplated to be a decision by the court as to what documents were actually

privileged, and which documents might be retained by NRDC because inadvertently produced

non-privileged documents were not required to be returned. 

In briefing and at hearing, however, NRDC did not argue that certain documents

were inherently non-privileged, but rather that otherwise privileged documents had lost their

status as such through waiver. That is, the privileged had been lost not because of inadvertent

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1Friant noted in its brief of 8/31/05 that NRDC was raising the waiver-by-disclosure issue

for the “first time in its reply brief” (actually the first brief by NRDC), but Friant went on to

oppose NRDC’s position only on the merits. The hearing involved a discussion only on the

merits.

2

delivery (which had already been decided not to constitute a waiver with unanimous agreement),

but because certain privileges were waived as a result of otherwise privileged documents having

been shown to testifying witnesses or experts. The nature of the court’s hearing had therefore

metamorphosed from a determination whether documents were privileged or not, to a

determination whether the uncontested privilege was waived.

Perhaps realizing the inevitability of adjudication of the waiver dispute, Friant did

not object to the metamorphosis, and opposed NRDC’s contentions of waiver on their merits.1

The court will do likewise. 

Background

The undersigned borrows from his previous orders on the factual background of

the inadvertent delivery of privileged/non-privileged documents.

The facts of the controversy are undisputed for the most part. The parties have

produced electronic versions of their initial disclosure productions as ordered in the Discovery

Plan Order and Schedule of May 3, 2005. As luck would have it, Friant’s electronic production

was difficult or impossible to open and read; it was not searchable. Friant forwarded an

“improved” version of its initial disclosures; however, as [bad] luck would have it again, Friant’s

digital reproduction company inadvertently scanned, or otherwise electronically reproduced, the

files of Friant’s long time general counsel in place of a technically “improved” version of the

initial disclosures. These discs were give to counsel for Friant by the reproduction company with

the incorrect designation, i.e., the discs were not the improved version of the initial disclosures as

indicated, but rather the discs of the general counsel’s files, and presumably containing some

privileged material. The mislabeled discs were then produced to NRDC.

Upon reviewing the newly sent discs, Ms. Poole, counsel for NRDC, and/or others

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on the NRDC attorney staff, recognized that they had inadvertently been sent possibly privileged

material. To their credit, counsel for NRDC contacted counsel for Friant with this information. 

In the meantime, it appeared that NRDC had further reviewed and made some copies of the

documents at issue, but the extent of that copying and whether the copying included privileged

materials, is unclear. Evidently at one time in the course of discussions, Friant offered to create

a privilege log if all the discs would be returned. However, counsel could not ultimately agree on

the procedures for return of the potentially privileged information as well as the non-privileged

information. Friant demanded that the entire inadvertent production be returned. NRDC

believed, based on its limited review, that many of the documents were not privileged, and the

non-privileged documents, inadvertently produced or not, did not have to be returned. NRDC

believed that it was entitled to retain non-privileged documents, and that Friant should produce a

privilege log for the inadvertently produced general counsel files, and disputes over the

designation could then be adjudicated. 

 Friant’s privilege log was produced subject to a variety of objections including

relevance, competence, propriety, admissibility, or any other grounds for exclusion, that they are

not within the scope of production required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B), and that NRDC has

failed to show good cause as required by the May 3, 2005 court order. All documents for which

Friant did not claim a privilege either were produced to NRDC or would be made available to

them. 

The court held a hearing on September 1, 2005. At hearing, among other

discussion, Friant was directed to file an update regarding a small number of documents which

were insufficiently described in the privilege log. 

The documents remaining at issue in the privilege log may be categorized as: (1)

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2

 At the hearing, Friant represented that it had withdrawn its claim of privilege for

documents relating to retained experts McKusick and Hebert.

3

 Many of the disputes concerning documents reviewed by these experts have been

resolved. Only those disputes remaining will be discussed below.

4Friant’s assertion that NRDC had to demonstrate “good cause” in order to contest

anything on Friant’s privilege log misread the court’s previous order. The court simply advised

that if in retrospect NRDC was unreasonable with respect to attacking Friant’s claims of

privilege, NRDC might be subject to sanctions. As observed previously, the parties moved

beyond the contemplated privilege versus non-privilege issue, and both parties make colorable

assertions about waiver/non-waiver.

4

documents relating to retained designated experts Hanson, Moss and Steiner,2 (2) documents for

which NRDC claims that Friant has not provided sufficient information in its log (“documents

that allegedly may contain information transmitted by an expert”), (3) documents transmitted to

or from a non-retained (employee) expert, and (4) up to nine documents not originally identified

by recipient and/or author. Friant’s retained experts are Dr. Charles Hanson, Rand F. Hebert,

Richard M. Moss, and Daniel B. Steiner.3 Some of these experts were previous employees of

Friant or former consultants, but now designated to testify. Other documents were reviewed by

non-retained (employee) experts. See NRDC’s Reply, filed August 29, 2005, Exh. A at 3-5. 

The majority of privileges claimed involve attorney-client, work product, or settlement

negotiations privilege.

Discussion

Both parties agree that information considered by an expert witness in forming his

or her opinion must be disclosed. They diverge in regard to their interpretation of the term

“considered,” and how this term is constricted by applicable privilege doctrines.4

The resolution of the dispute comes from two different sources: Fed.R.Evid. 612

and Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) which nevertheless must be viewed in conjunction. Fed. R. Evid. 612

provides in pertinent part:

[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying,

either--

(1) while testifying, or

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(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary

in the interests of justice...

an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the

hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to

introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony

of the witness. 

The “interests of justice” require production of shown documents when such documents “may

fairly be said in fact to have an impact upon the testimony of the witness.” Advisory Committee

Notes, 1972 Proposed Rules. At time of enactment, the emphasis on the limited scope of

disclosure was made even more clear so as to not allow “fishing expeditions” into any writing

shown to a witness before testifying. Advisory Committee Notes 1974 enactment.

Rule 612 applies to depositions as well as trial. In re Com Air Disaster Litigation, 100

F.R.D. 350, 353 (E.D. Ky. 1983).

Fed. Rules Civ. P. 26(a)(2) requires disclosure of “the data or other information

considered by the [expert] witness in forming the opinions.” It is important to the outcome of

this dispute to emphasize that the issues revolve about expert witnesses, and not just any client or

lay witness within a privilege’s zone of interest who happens to be shown a privileged document.

Cases run the spectrum in determining the extent of a waiver by disclosure to a

witness or expert witness. 

NRDC cites cases defining considered as coextensive with the terms “supplied” or

“furnished” to an expert. See In re Pioneer Hi-Bred, 238 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001),

relying on the Advisory Comm. Note to 1993 Amend. to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) (“Given this

obligation of disclosure, litigants should no longer be able to argue that materials furnished to

their experts to be used in forming their opinions– whether or not ultimately relied upon by the

expert– are privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure when such persons are testifying or

being deposed.”) Some cases dealing with “ordinary witnesses” are similarly tough on nonwaiver. Disclosure of a document to refresh witness recollection, whether it be before the

witness’ testimony or during his testimony waives the privilege associated with the document. 

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5

 Bogosian and Sporck pre-date the 1993 changes to Rule 26(a)(2) and are doubtful

authority at this point.

6

Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Lab., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 9-11 (N.D. Ill. 1978)

(waiver of attorney-client privilege). However, such waiver is limited to the actual

communication consulted and not communications surrounding the document waived. Marshall

v. United States Postal Service, 88 F.R.D. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C.1980). In regard to work product,

intentional disclosure of opinion work product to a testifying witness waives that protection. 

Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySIMON, INC., 194 F.R.D. 644, 646-47 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (citing

cases reflecting split among courts).

Other cases take a much harder line concerning waiver of privileges simply by

showing a witness a privileged document before his or her testimony– a witness must have in

fact “relied upon” the document before a waiver will be found. Suss v. MSX Int. Engineering

Services, Inc, 212 F.R.D. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See also Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Co., 738 F.2d

587 (3rd Cir. 1984); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3rd Cir. 1985) (refusing to find a waiver of

work product by a mere showing of the document to a witness or expert witness).5

Still other cases employ a balancing test, although such tests sometimes permit

too much of an ad hoc or unpredictable decision. In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139

F.R.D. 384, 391 (N.D. Cal. 1991), the court, prior to the 1993 amendments, applied a balancing

test to determine whether communications between a lawyer and a testifying expert regarding the

subject matter of the expert’s proposed testimony could be discoverable. The test requires

consideration of the following factors:

(1) identify the interests that the work product doctrine is intended

to promote, (2) make a judgment about how much those interests

would be either (a) harmed by a ruling that the kinds of

communications in issue here are discoverable or (b) advanced by

a ruling that these kinds of communications are not discoverable,

(3) identify the relevant interests that are promoted by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) and by Federal Rules of Evidence 702,

703, and 705, and then (4) make a judgment about how much those

interests would be either (a) harmed by a ruling that the kinds of

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communications in issue here are not discoverable or (b) advanced

by a ruling that these kinds of communications are discoverable.

(Id.) This balancing test is also appropriate for attorney-client privileged communications.

The tension between a search for the truth and upholding privileges is one that has

bedeviled the courts for decades. Of course, without an emphasis on a search for the truth, our

system of litigation would be arbitrary, useless; nevertheless, a party should also be able to

prepare his, her or its case in relative peace without having the probing eyes of one’s adversary

inspecting every doubt, “blocked road,” mistake, frank discussion or afterthought. In this case

(as in all cases) the undersigned believes that although privileges serve an important role in the

litigation process, they are also impediments to the truth seeking process, and should not be

expanded beyond their core purpose. United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir.

1989). Privileges should not be seen as an “end” in litigation, but simply as one means to a just

end. 

Therefore, with primary reliance on Rule 26(a)(2), as interpreted by In re Pioneer

Hi-Bred, but also in light of Rule 612: (1) when a party determines to disclose otherwise

privileged information with a party’s testifying expert, there is no valid purpose allowing that

expert to testify in matters where the disclosed information had (or in the exercise of common

sense, must have had) a substantial impact on the substance of the expert’s testimony–but

without reference to, or cross-examination on, the otherwise privileged, disclosed information. 

In a related vein, (2) a previously undisclosed consultant, be that consultant employed by a party

or retained, will not be permitted to feign ignorance upon designation to testify as an expert with

respect to privileged information, previously known or disclosed, but purportedly “undisclosed”

to that expert after his designation, but which nevertheless, in the exercise of common sense has

some present, substantial impact (either positive or negative) on the testimony of that witness. 

That is, the instant litigation will not be decided on a crabbed record, where the potential “real

views” of the experts remain unexposed or unchallenged, but rather on a complete, explained

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6The undersigned need not fashion a rule for non-expert witnesses as the instant motion,

even as evolved, only involves disclosures to designated experts, including previously employed

or retained consultants which are now designated as witnesses.

7Rule 408 precludes admission of evidence of offers or accepting settlement offers from

being utilized at trial, and “[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in compromise

negotiations.” It specifically does not preclude use of otherwise admissible documentation used

in the settlement process. Friant does not contend that any of the disputed documents constitute

evidence of actual settlement communications between Friant and NRDC.

8

record. The parties, and other numerous persons and entities relying on a correct verdict deserve

no less.6

Finally, Friant is correct that documents prepared within a settlement process, i.e.,

communications made to the other side for settlement purposes, will be shielded from admission

in this litigation. Ed. R. Evid. 408. However, Friant is incorrect that every non-disclosed-to- itsadversary document in its file, which may be germane to a settlement thought process, is thereby

shielded from discovery. If the case were otherwise, every document in a lawyer’s file would be

protected from discovery because it could be utilized to form a settlement position or reveal

analysis. Rule 408 protects settlement negotiations from being utilized at trial7; it does not serve

as a super privilege insulating every undisclosed analysis from seeing the light of day, assuming

the otherwise non-privileged or waived privilege status for the document. In other words, the

privilege afforded by Rule 408 pertains to communications, not underlying documentation or

analysis.

Turning to the documents listed in Friant’s privilege log for which NRDC seeks

production based on waiver, the court has made the following determinations based on the

principles outlined above.

Moss Documents

Richard Moss was the General Manager of Friant Water Users Authority for

fifteen years, until August 31, 2001. He became a retained expert after he left Friant. Friant

represents that all but three documents were created during the time Moss was General Manager

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of Friant and “were not considered by him in developing his opinions for this case.” Friant’s

Response, at 4. Those documents were reviewed, and the court finds that of the documents not

allegedly considered by Moss in developing his opinions, some of them must have had some

present, substantial impact on his testimony. Based on the two principles outlined above, the

court has made the following determinations. It should be noted that the documents have only

been reviewed in relation to Moss. If they were considered by another designated, non-retained

expert, see infra, they will be disclosed if they meet the tests set forth above.

I. Documents Created During Moss’ Employment As General Manager of Friant

A. Documents to be Disclosed Based on Substantial Impact on Moss’ Testimony

114, 141, 142, 165, 167, 170, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 221, 222, 227, 240,

241, 254, 256, 274, 276.

B. Documents Not to be Disclosed as Not Sufficiently Pertinent to Impact Moss’

Testimony

16, 93, 97, 109, 118, 119, 143, 144, 145, 146, 173, 180, 181, 202, 216, 217, 224, 270, 271, 272,

273, 277, 278, 279, 280, 285.

II. Documents Created After Moss’ Tenure as General Manager of Friant

The three documents created after Moss resigned as general manager are

numbered 128, 149 and 150. Friant contends numbers 128 and 149 do not relate to this

litigation. It also argues that as to numbers 149 and 150, Moss did not receive copies of these

documents. After review of these documents, the court finds that only document number 128

shall be disclosed because it is sufficiently related to this litigation. Documents 149 and 150

shall not be disclosed.

Hanson Documents

Chuck Hanson has had several assignments for Friant. Recently, he was retained

to consult confidentially with Friant’s litigation counsel after settlement efforts collapsed in

spring, 2003. After that, he was designated as a testifying expert regarding restoration of a

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 This document will be disclosed in full because none of it constitutes communicated

offers to compromise under Fed. R. Evid. 408. 

9

 Friant has withdrawn claims of privilege as to documents numbered 37, 49, 52, 53, 203,

257 and 264.

10 NRDC’s response and corrected response maintain that Friant represented at the

hearing that it would withdraw claims of privilege for documents relating to experts McKusick,

Herbert and all documents except number 51 for Hanson. The court has reviewed the hearing

tape and Friant’s August 31st filing to which it refers at the hearing, and concludes that Friant did

not waive its assertion of claim of privilege for the documents enumerated herein in regard to

Hanson.

10

historical fishery below Friant Dam. His previous assignment for Friant occurred prior to the

collapse of the settlement effort. He consulted confidentially with Friant’s general counsel,

Sawyers, regarding the quantity of water needed to be released from the Friant Dam in order to

accomplish fishery restoration goals under discussion at the time. 

In contrast to the Moss documents, for which Friant represented that documents were not

considered by Moss in developing his expert opinion, Friant’s argument regarding the Hanson

documents contain no such representation. Friant’s omission on this point is appreciated,

especially because review of this group of documents leads to the conclusion that it would be a

strain to represent that Hanson did not consider them in forming his opinion.

Because finding a waiver of highly sensitive documents, e.g., Document 51,

would have a significant impact on Friant’s case, the court proposes a choice to Friant. In the

interests of justice, see Fed.R.Evid. 612, Friant may withdraw Hanson’s designation as a

testifying expert witness and redesignate a “clean” expert, thereby avoiding having to produce

these documents, or Friant may keep Hanson as its designated expert, which will result in

disclosure of all documents considered by him. The following documents will be disclosed in

the event that Friant retains Hanson as its designated expert: Number 28, 29, 51,8 55, 260, 262.9

Document number 259 will not be disclosed because it is not relevant to the substance of

Hanson’s opinion.10 

Steiner Document

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This document, number 276, is claimed to be protected under the joint defense

privilege. Friant has not listed Mr. Steiner in its supplemental notice of lodgment of expert

reports, and has not included any information on or report by this expert. In plaintiffs’

September 9, 2005 response to Friant’s supplement briefing regarding the privilege log, plaintiffs

do not list this document as one of the documents in Friant’s privilege log. (Plaintiffs’ Exh. A.) 

Friant claims this document concerns subject matter unrelated to this litigation

and is unrelated to Steiner’s opinion in this case.

The document shall not be produced on account of this witness; if germane to

other experts, that section shall govern ultimate disclosure.

Documents For Which Friant Has Not Provided Sufficient Information in its Log

Documents 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 48, 58, 66, 168, and 171 are listed in the privilege

log but do not contain an author’s name. According to NRDC, Friant has refused to provide the

missing information. This category is described as “Documents that allegedly may contain

information transmitted by an Expert.” Friant has not proffered an explanation for the lack of

information in its log and makes no argument in support of protecting this category, other than

claiming work product, attorney-client privilege, and/or joint defense privilege in its log. 

A privilege log or evidence submitted in support of a privilege claim must show

that the documents claimed to be privileged adhere to the essential elements of the privilege. In

re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.1992). For example, at least the

following information is needed to determine a claim of attorney client privilege: (a) the attorney

and client involved, (b) the nature of the document, (c) all persons or entities shown on the

document to have received or sent the document, (d) all persons or entities known to have been

furnished the document or informed of its substance, and (e) the date the document was

generated, prepared, or dated. Id. (citing Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 885, 888 n. 3 (9th Cir.1989));

see Eureka Fin. Corp v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183-84 (E.D.Cal.

1991) (failure to properly assert a privilege may result in waiver of privilege). Friant has waived

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the privilege as these documents, for which it has not provided sufficient information. All of

these documents shall be produced.

Documents Transmitted To or From “Non-Retained Experts”

NRDC asserts that designation of the individuals referenced in regard to this

group as non-retained experts is improper and they will be moving to strike these designations. 

NRDC may be under a misconception that an employee who may be an expert in a particular

field, but is not paid separately for his expertise, cannot be a testifying Rule 26 expert. Such an

individual is still an expert, although not “retained” and the same law outlined above applies to

these experts. Friant may be under the misimpression that it did not have to provide Rule 26

reports for its employees who were more than percipient experts, i.e., would be testifying to more

than historical opinions and would be testifying to opinions acquired for the purposes of

testimony in this litigation. See Discovery Plan Order & Schedule at Section F which clearly

defines a purely percipient expert, a Rule 26 expert, and a hybrid, percipient/Rule 26 expert. The

latter category would most likely encompass employees or officers.

Nevertheless, Friant does not make an argument or representation that the nonretained experts referenced in their log in regard to these documents have not considered the

documents in forming their opinions. Therefore, it will be assumed that these experts have

reviewed the following documents and they will be disclosed: 16, 61, 63, 65, 82, 129, 130, 132,

133, 142, 146, 150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 179, 202, 205, 206, 219, 220, 224, 235, 258, 259, 260,

262, 263, 265, 268, 280.

Additionally, NRDC’s filing of September 9, 2005 indicates that Friant has

withdrawn its claim of privilege over documents 28 and 29 as to Hanson but not as to Deflitch

and Welch. Huffman Decl., Exh. A at 1, 2. Friant has not indicated otherwise. Therefore, those

documents will be produced when this order becomes final because the privilege is waived as to

Hanson.

Six Documents Not Originally Identified

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At the hearing, the parties were directed to file updates regarding nine documents

for which Friant had not listed a recipient and/or an author. On September 7, 2005, Friant filed a

response to plaintiffs’ supplemental reply brief, representing that it would produce documents

numbered 15, 56, and 136, leaving only six documents still in dispute. They are numbered 10,

47, 59, 79, 130 and 147. Plaintiffs have since withdrawn their request for document numbers 10

and 79.

Document number 47 - The court will accept Friant’s representation that this

document was communicated to the attorney in connection with settlement, and presume that this

document was not shared with any designated expert. As such, it will not be ordered disclosed. 

If this presumption is incorrect, Friant must produce this document.

Document number 59 - This document contains matters related to settlement

negotiations and appears to be attorney-client privileged. It will not be disclosed.

Document number 130 - This document has been ordered disclosed as a document

transmitted to or from a non-retained expert supra because it has been reviewed by a designated

expert.

Document number 147 - This document is attorney-client privileged and will not

be disclosed.

Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that 

1. Friant shall submit a statement within ten days indicating whether it will designate any

new expert to replace Mr. Hanson, or whether it will continue to designate him and produce the

documents as set forth within this order; if Friant decides to continue with Hanson, it shall also

disclose the Hanson documents ordered disclosed at the same time; 

2. All other documents ordered to be disclosed shall be disclosed within ten days;

3. For those documents for which Friant has withdrawn its claim of privilege but which

have not yet been produced, Friant will be held to its stated withdrawal. Those documents shall

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be produced forthwith.

DATED: September 16, 2005

/s/ Gregory G Hollows 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076

NRDC1658.prv

Case 2:88-cv-01658-JAM-GGH Document 1211 Filed 09/16/05 Page 14 of 14