Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02097/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02097-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY VASQUEZ,

CDCR #C-81129,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden; 

AGUIRRE, Correctional Lieutenant; 

A. GONZALEZ, Correctional Sergeant; 

N. UHDE, Correctional Officer; 

R. HERRERA, Correctional Officer; 

R. CERVANTES, Correctional Officer; 

R. JANSEN, Correctional Officer,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02097-GPC-MDD

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE OF COMPLAINT 

AND SUMMONS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

HENRY VASQUEZ (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego, California, filed a Complaint pursuant to the 

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on September 8, 2018, together with a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Plaintiff claims RJD’s Warden, a Correctional Lieutenant, Sergeant, and several 

Correctional Officers violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights either by using 

excessive force against him, or failing to intervene while he was beaten on May 7, 2018, 

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after he threatened to file an inmate appeal. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4-8.) He seeks 

injunctive relief as well as $250,000 in damages. (Id. at 15.)

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a Prison Certificate issued by 

an Accounting Officer Specialist at RJD, as well as copies of his CDCR Inmate Statement 

Report attesting to his trust account activity and balances for the 6-month period preceding 

the filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 3 at 1-3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 

3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show Plaintiff carried a $99.75 average 

monthly balance and had $47.50 in average monthly deposits to his account. (See ECF No. 

3 at 1.) Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses his initial partial filing fee to be $19.95 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, because Plaintiff also had an available balance of only $.05 on the books 

at the time of filing, the Court will direct the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, 

to collect the initial $19.95 fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account 

at the time this Order is executed. See ECF No. 3 at 1, 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 

F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing 

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of 

funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 

total fee owed in this case must be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner 

and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a 

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, 

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who 

are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

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(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims to be permanently disabled, requires a wheelchair, and is a 

participant in the CDCR’s Mental Health Services Delivery System at the “enhanced 

outpatient (EOP) level of care.” (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4.) On May 7, 2018, Plaintiff

claims RJD Correctional Officer Uhde “became enraged” and confronted him during 

breakfast after discovering Plaintiff had two food trays. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff claims Uhde 

threw both trays in the trash, and after Plaintiff threatened to “write [Uhde] up,” he became 

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“hostile,” “grabbed Plaintiff by the arm,” “forcefully pull[ed] [him] from [his] wheelchair,” 

“slammed [him] on the floor,” and “handcuffed [him] without provocation or resistance.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff contends Correctional Officers Cervantes and Jansen “watched without any 

form of aid to Plaintiff or intervention.” (Id.)

Plaintiff then claims Officers Herrera and Cervantes returned him to his wheelchair, 

and Herrera pushed him to the gym where “in isolation” he “pulled the front of Plaintiff’s 

shirt up and over [his] face and head and began punching [him] repeatedly in the face and 

head.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff again fell from his wheelchair and Herrera continued to kick 

him in the stomach, side, and torso with his boots while yelling, “You p[i]ece of shit.” (Id.

at 6.)

Plaintiff claims to have suffered pain, bruising, cuts, and swelling as a “direct result 

of the[se] malicious acts,” but claims Correctional Lieutenant Aguirre, Sergeant Gonzalez 

and Officers Uhde, Herrera, Cervantes, and Jansen “each conspired to file false peace 

officer reports charging [him] with assault against ... Uhde.” (Id.) In fact, Plaintiff claims 

Aguire and Gonzalez “maintain[] an ongoing practice of allowing subordinates, including 

Herrera to use the facility gym as an arena to beat, torture, and abuse prisoners ... in 

solitude,” and then “manufacture false reports” in order to “conceal the[ir] wanton act[s].” 

(Id. at 6-7.)

Finally, Plaintiff claims Warden Paramo personally interviewed him during an 

Institutional Classification Committee hearing held on May 19, 2018, “as a result of [his] 

... place[ment] in Administrative Segregation (Ad-Seg) on [the] false assault charges.” Id.

at 7. Plaintiff contends Paramo “saw [his] bruised face” and torso, and asked him what 

happened. Id. Plaintiff claims he told Paramo that Uhde “slammed [him] to the floor for 

informing of [his] intent to file a 602 appeal.” Id. Plaintiff claims Paramo said he’d “take 

care of the 602,” and ordered a video recording of Plaintiff’s injuries, but otherwise “turned 

a blind eye to a prison guard gang of subordinate defendants[’] ongoing pattern[s] [and] 

practice.” (Id. at 8.)

///

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Based on these allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint contains “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true,” to state First and Eighth Amendment claims for relief that 

are “plausible on its face,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and therefore, sufficient to survive the 

“low threshold” set for sua sponte screening as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 5, (1992) (unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 

37 (2010) (per curiam) (for claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the 

issue is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7); Robins v. 

Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] prison official can violate a prisoner’s 

Eighth Amendment rights by failing to intervene.”); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse 

action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such 

action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.”).

Therefore, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service of the summons 

and Plaintiff’s Complaint on his behalf.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the 

court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or 

deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915.”).

///

 

2 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative 

of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may 

choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

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III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. ORDERS the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $19.95 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available 

at the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full $350 

owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account 

exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY 

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph Diaz, 

Acting Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 

1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each named 

Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, 

certified copies of his Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve the Defendants. 

Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 285s as 

completely and accurately as possible, include an address where each named Defendant 

may be found and/or subject to service pursuant to S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1c., and return them 

to the United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter 

accompanying his IFP Package.

5. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to him. All 

costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

6. ORDERS Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while Defendants may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and 

thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that 

Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the Defendants are 

required to respond).

7. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any 

document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or which 

fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, or their counsel, may be 

disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 30, 2018

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