Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00016/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL KEVIN WHITE,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT MCEWEN,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 12-0016-MMA(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I

INTRODUCTION

Michael Kevin White (hereafter “Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court

conviction on case number SCN 255863 (hereafter “Petition”). Petitioner

was convicted by a jury of unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle in

violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a); two counts of receiving stolen

property in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 496(d), and one count of

receiving stolen property in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 667(b)-(I),

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and three prison priors under Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b).1/ Petitioner

was sentenced to 25 years to life imprisonment and ordered to pay

restitution of $21,293.25.

Respondent Scott McEwen (hereafter “Respondent”) has filed an

Answer to the Petition. Petitioner has filed a Traverse to Respondent’s

Answer. The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

Petitioner’s Traverse, and the lodgments submitted by Respondent. Based

upon the documents and evidence presented in this case, and for the

reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be

DENIED. 

II

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken substantially from the California

Court of Appeal opinion in People v. White, (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

7). The Court relies upon these facts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). 

See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (stating that questions of

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts,

are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness); Sumner v. Mata,

449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (stating that deference is owed to findings

of both state trial and appellate courts); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d

520, 524-26 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that factual findings of both state

trial and state appellate courts are entitled to presumption of

correctness on federal habeas corpus review).

Between December 21 and 23, 2008, a tractor trailer was stolen in

Downey, California. During the same time, a trailer was stolen from the

Lynwood, California facility of Aaron Industries. The trailer was loaded

1/

Petitioner also suffered five prior serious or violent felony convictions and

had been returned to prison several times for parole violations before the offenses

in this case. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 10 - 11).

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with 70,000 bottles of expired cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine. 

The medicine was awaiting destruction.

In December 2008, Petitioner was on parole. He was wearing a global

positioning system (GPS). The device indicated that Petitioner was in

the location of both thefts during the times they were likely committed.

On December 24, 2008, at about 7:40 a.m., Petitioner drove a stolen

tractor trailer, which had been stolen from Aaron Industries, to the

California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) inspection center on Interstate 5 at

San Onofre. The trailer was overweight and Petitioner was required to

drive the tractor trailer to a separate location at the CHP facility.

Instead of driving the tractor trailer to the separate location at the

CHP facility, Petitioner drove the tractor trailer away from the

facility. He was pursued by CHP officers. He stopped, and was required

to return to the facility.

Subsequent investigation discovered that the license plates on the

tractor did not belong to that vehicle. A record search of the vehicle

identification numbers revealed that the tractor trailer had been

stolen. Petitioner was arrested.

III

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Petitioner raises two grounds for relief. First, he requests that

the restitution order be stricken on the grounds that the trial court

exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered Petitioner to pay restitution

for damages not proximately caused by his criminal act. Further,

Petitioner claims that his attorney’s failure to object to the amount of

the restitution order deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. 

Second, Petitioner alleges that his 25 years to life imprisonment

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violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

IV

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction over a petition

for writ of habeas corpus to lie, the petition must allege that the

petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. The current

petition was filed on January 3, 2012 and is therefore governed by the

AEDPA. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either

§ 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403

(2000).

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) states: 

An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding. (emphasis added)

The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) and (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court arrives

at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this

Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under

the unreasonable application clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle

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from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court’s decision may be found to be “contrary to” clearly

established Supreme Court precedent: (1) “if the state court applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in (the Court’s)

cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of (the) Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from the (the Court’s)

precedent.” Id. At 405-406; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-75

(2003). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application”

of clearly established federal law, “if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case,” or,

“if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from

our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably

extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it

should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a

new context where it should apply.” Williams, 539 U.S. at 407; Andrade,

538 U.S. at 76.

In Williams, the United States Supreme Court stated that “clearly

established Federal law” in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) “refers to the

holdings, as opposed to the dicta of this Court’s decisions as of the

time of the relevant state court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

When there is no clearly established federal law on an issue, a state

court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied the law as to that

issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Holley v. Yarborough,

568 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009).

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A state court must apply legal principles

established by a (United States) Supreme Court

decision when the case ‘falls squarely within

those principles, but not in cases where there

is a ‘structural difference’ between the prior

precedent and the case at issue, or when the

prior precedent requires ‘tailoring or

modification’ to apply to the new situation... 

We conclude that when a (United States)

Supreme Court decision does not ‘squarely

address the issue in the case, or establish a

legal principle that ‘clearly extends’ to a

new context to the extent required by the

(United States) Supreme Court, it cannot be

said under AEDPA, there is ‘clearly

established’ Supreme Court precedent

addressing the issue before us, and so we must

defer to the state court’s decision.

Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 753-754 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(emphasis added).

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court,

the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. 

Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the dispositive

state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled in part

by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74-77).

V

PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF

1. Petitioner’s First Ground for Relief

Petitioner’s first ground for relief contends that “the restitution

order to [the victim] was unauthorized and should be stricken.” (Pet. at

6.) However, a challenge to the amount of a restitution order does not

concern Petitioner’s custody and is accordingly not cognizable on

federal habeas corpus review. Furthermore, Petitioner’s claim is

procedurally defaulted.

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a. Liability Under a Restitution Order Is Insufficient To

Meet § 2254's Jurisdictional Requirements.

Petitioner’s first ground for relief, that the restitution order

should be stricken, fails for lack of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)

states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground

that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

The Ninth Circuit likened liability under a restitution order to a

fine, noting that the imposition of a fine is merely a collateral

consequence of a criminal conviction and does not meet the ‘in custody’

requirement of § 2254. Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir.

2010). 

The relevant facts in Bailey are nearly identical to the facts

present here. In Bailey, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief

claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation

of his Sixth Amendment rights on the basis of his attorney’s failure to

object to the imposition of restitution as part of his sentence. In

Bailey, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that it

lacked jurisdiction over Bailey’s habeas corpus petition, holding that

to sustain a habeas corpus challenge, the petitioner must show that his

custody itself, or its conditions, offends federal law. A restitution

order is not the sort of “significant restraint on liberty” contemplated

in § 2254(a). Id. at 979 [citing Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180,

1183 (9th Cir. 1998)]. 

In the present case, Petitioner’s first ground for relief fails

because, as in Bailey, his challenge to the state court’s restitution

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order pertains only to a collateral consequence of his custody and not

the fact of his custody or the conditions thereof. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim that he suffered ineffective

assistance of counsel as a result of his counsel’s failure to object to

the restitution order similarly fails. Bailey, 599 F.3d at 978-980, Funk

v. Uribe, 2011 WL 2939146 at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

b. Even if the Restitution Order Concerned Petitioner’s

Custody, Petitioner’s First Ground for Relief is Procedurally

Defaulted.

Petitioner’s challenge to the restitution order is procedurally

defaulted because its rejection in state court was based on application

of California’s contemporaneous objection rule, an independent and

adequate state procedural bar.

As a general rule, a federal habeas court “will not review a

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that

court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal

question and adequate to support the judgment.” Calderon v. United

States District Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640

(1991)). For a state procedural rule to be independent, the state law

basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal law. 

LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir.2001). To be deemed

adequate, it must be well established and consistently applied. Poland

v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 575, 577 (9th Cir.1999). An exception to the

general rule exists if the prisoner can demonstrate either cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of

federal law, or that failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

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Once the state has pleaded the existence of an independent and

adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden

shifts to petitioner to place the adequacy of that procedural rule in

issue, as the scope of the state's burden of proof thereafter will be

measured by the specific claims of inadequacy put forth by the

petitioner.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 58586 (9th Cir. 2003).

If placed in issue, the state retains the ultimate burden of proving

adequacy of the asserted bar. Id. at 585–86. 

Here, Petitioner did not object to the restitution order at trial

and has not offered any argument that his failure to object at trial and

the contemporaneous objection rule invoked by the state court was not an

independent and adequate basis for its decision. Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated cause for his default or that a miscarriage of justice

would result if his claim in this regard is not adjudicated. 

Accordingly, review of his claim regarding his attorney’s failure to

object to the restitution order is barred. See generally King v.

Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Bennett requires the

petitioner to ‘place [the procedural default] defense in issue’ to shift

the burden back to the government”). The Ninth Circuit has held

California's contemporaneous objection rule to be independent and

adequate on various occasions, affirming the denial of a federal

petition on grounds of procedural default where there was a failure to

object to at trial. See Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th

Cir.2005); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir.2004) (jury

instruction claim procedurally barred for failure to object); Melendez

v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.2002) [citing Garrison v.

McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir.1981); Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d

1064, 1069–70 (9th Cir.1999)] (declining to review various prosecutorial

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misconduct claims as procedurally barred for failure to

contemporaneously object).

Accordingly, since Petitioner’s first ground for relief was

rejected by the California Court of Appeal based on its application of

California’s contemporaneous objection rule, the claim is procedurally

defaulted on federal habeas corpus review. As a result, this court

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this regard be DENIED. 

3. Petitioner’s Second Ground For Relief Fails Because The

California Court of Appeal Reasonably Rejected His Argument Under

United States Supreme Court Law.

Petitioner argues that his sentence of 25 years to life

imprisonment violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the

United States and California Constitutions. To the extent Petitioner

challenges his sentence under the California Constitution, his argument

is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 68 (1991). 

Petitioner’s claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of

the United States Constitution was reasonably rejected by the California

Court of Appeal. The Eighth Amendment does not require strict

proportionality between the sentence and the crime; rather, it forbids

only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime. 

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.

277, 288 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980). 

“[O]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to

the proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly rare.” 

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 289-90 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at

272) (emphasis omitted); see Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285 (sentence of life

with possibility of parole imposed under recidivist statute for third

felony conviction does not violate Eighth Amendment). The United States

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Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld sentences under state recidivism

statutes, including California’s Three Strikes Law. See Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (upholding three strikes sentence of

25 years to life imprisonment for a defendant who shoplifted golf clubs

worth about $1,200, because seven years earlier the defendant had been

convicted of three residential burglaries and one first degree robbery);

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 63 (upholding two consecutive 25 years to life

imprisonment sentences under Three Strikes Law for a defendant who

stole $150 worth of videotapes with three prior convictions for first

degree burglary); Rummel, 445 U.S. 265-266 (life sentence for fraudulent

use of credit card, passing forged check, and theft by false pretenses).

When the California legislature enacted the

three strikes law, it made a judgment that

protecting the public safety requires

incapacitating criminals who have already been

convicted of at least one serious or violent

crime. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment

prohibits California from making that choice.

Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25.

The California Court of Appeal appropriately cited to and followed

United States Supreme Court law when concluding that Petitioner’s

sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution:

[I]n light of the holdings in Harmelin v. Michigan, and the more recent United States Supreme Court

companion cases of Ewing v. California, which held

lengthy indeterminate life sentences imposed under

California's Three Strikes Law for recidivist

criminals did not violate the Eighth Amendment, any

reliance in this case upon the federal prohibition

of cruel and unusual punishment would likewise be

unsuccessful. As already noted, (Petitioner)

suffered five prior serious or violent felony

convictions before the offenses in this case. He

had served three prior prison terms and had been

returned to prison several times for parole

violations before committing the current crimes.

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(Petitioner) was on parole at the time of the

current offense.

Given all the relevant considerations, the fact

(Petitioner) will serve 25 years to life for his

current case simply does not shock the conscience

or offend concepts of human dignity. We thus

conclude (Petitioner) has failed to show his

sentence is so disproportionate to his “crimes,”

which include his recidivist behavior, and that the

lengthy term imposed for this case does not violate

the constitutional prohibitions against cruel

and/or unusual punishment. (citations omitted.)

Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7 at 10-11. 

This court agrees with the California Court of Appeal in this

regard. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s second

ground for relief be denied. 

VI. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

be DENIED with prejudice.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge

is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case,

pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 3, 2012, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than May 17,

2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

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specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 17, 2012

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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