Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00058/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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1

The plaintiff admits that defendant Hogue was fraudulently joined for purposes of

determining diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 21 at 2).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARTIN FRIDDLE, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0058-WS-C

 )

HUNTER’S EDGE, INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. 10). The

parties have filed briefs and evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions, (Docs.

14, 19, 21), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After carefully considering these submissions

and all other relevant materials in the file, the Court concludes that the motion to remand is due

to be granted.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court of Clarke County, naming as defendants

Hunter’s Edge, Inc. (“Hunter’s Edge”), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”), Kim Hogue and

James Chaney. Hunter’s Edge was served with process on December 31, 2005, (Doc. 10,

Exhibit C), but the state clerk of court nevertheless noted on the case action summary that

service was accomplished on January 3, 2006. (Doc. 14, Exhibit 1). The notice of removal was

filed on January 31, 2006, alleging that Hogue and Chaney were fraudulently joined and that

diversity jurisdiction otherwise exists. The instant motion followed on February 28, 2006. 

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff argues that removal was untimely and that defendant Chaney was not

fraudulently joined.1

 As discussed below, the first argument is dispositive.

Case 1:06-cv-00058-WS-C Document 22 Filed 03/24/06 Page 1 of 5
2

The parties also agree, at least by their silence, that the timeliness of removal does not

depend on when Wal-Mart, Hogue and Chaney were served.

3

Preliminarily, and in an apparent effort to suggest that remand based on the 30-day

period of Section 1446(b) is uncommon if not disfavored, the defendants report that “[t]his

District has applied this rule for untimely filing of notice of removal in only one case.” (Doc. 14

at 2 n.1). In fact, at least seven judges in this district — including the undersigned — have

remanded cases on this basis. See Cartee v. Precise Cable Construction, Inc., 2005 WL

2893951 (S.D. Ala. 2005)(Cassady, M. J.); Curtis v. Geo Centers, Inc., Civ. No. 05-0202-CB-M

(Doc. 34)(S.D. Ala. 2005)(Butler, J.); Dunigan v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., Civ. No. 04-

0376-WS-M (Doc. 21)(S.D. Ala. 2004)(Steele, J.); Alexander v. Teledyne Continental Motors,

Civ. No. 03-0311-WS-D (Doc. 26)(S.D. Ala. 2003)(Steele, J.); Hoven v. Commercial Federal

Mortgage Corp., 2001 WL 228349 (S.D. Ala. 2001)(Pittman, J.); Tipp v. AmSouth Bank, 89 F.

Supp. 2d 1304 (S.D. Ala. 2000)(Vollmer, J.); Naef v. Masonite Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.

Ala. 1996) (Howard, J.); McLaughlin v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 603 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.

Ala. 1985) (Hand, J.). 

4

E.g., Cox v. Sprung’s Transport & Movers, Ltd., 407 F. Supp. 2d 754, 756 (D.S.C. 2006)

(“That [30-day removal] period must be computed ... from the date a defendant actually receives

service.”)(internal quotes omitted). 

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“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days

after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading

setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based ....” 28 U.S.C. § 

1446(b). The thirtieth day after December 31, 2005 was Monday, January 30, 2006 — the day

before the notice of removal was filed. On this much, the parties agree.2

The defendants offer a welter of reasons why this awkward state of affairs is not fatal to

removal, none of which withstands scrutiny.3 First, they argue that the “official date for service

upon Hunter’s Edge is January 3, 2003 [sic] as recorded in the Clark [sic] County Circuit Court.” 

(Doc. 14 at 1). The date of service for purposes of Section 1446(b), however, is not the date a

state court employee assigns but the actual date of service.4 In particular, Section 1446(b)

“requires that a notice of removal be filed within 30 days of service, not within 30 days of the

date upon which the clerk of courts records that service was made.” Washington v. Jefferson

Township Local School District School Board, 2005 WL 2277419 at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2005) Here,

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For reasons unknown, the “green card” accompanying the certified mailing does not

reflect the date of delivery. (Doc. 10, Exhibit B). However, the computer tracking confirmation

sheet, unchallenged by the defendants, reflects that Hunter’s Edge signed for and accepted

delivery at 10:35 a.m. on December 31, 2005. (Id., Exhibit C). While unnecessary to the

resolution of the pending motion, the Court notes the state clerk’s uncontroverted explanation

that, upon receipt of an undated green card on January 3, 2006, she supplied that date as the date

of service merely as a default entry. (Id., Exhibit B). 

6

The defendants emphasize Hollins v. Department of Corrections, 191 F.3d 1324 (11th

Cir. 1999), but that case involved the failure of the federal electronic docket system to reflect

entry of an appealable order. The critical difference between that case and this, of course, is that

Hunter’s Edge was not dependent on court action to determine when its removal period began

but could (and did) rely on its personal knowledge of the salient facts and could (but did not)

confirm its personal knowledge through the United States Postal Service. The defendants’ other

authorities do recognize an “exceptional circumstances” exception to the 30-day rule, but they

limit it to instances in which the plaintiff engages in “forum manipulation,” as by the deliberate

postponement of naming or serving a defendant likely to remove until the removal period has

expired. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1986); White v. White, 32 F. Supp. 2d

890, 893 (W.D. La. 1998). That principle is not remotely implicated here. 

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it is uncontroverted that the actual date of service on Hunter’s Edge was December 31, 2005.5

The defendants next argue that, even if December 31, 2005 is nominally the relevant date

for purposes of Section 1446(b), counsel reasonably relied on the state court case action

summary in determining the date of service and calculating the time for removal. (Doc. 14 at 1-

3; Doc. 19 at 7). This is a curious position, not least because Hunter’s Edge admits telling its

counsel, prior to removal, that it believed it was served on December 31, 2005. (Doc. 14, Peake

Affidavit, ¶ 3). Hunter’s Edge argues that it is reasonable to ignore a client’s information in

favor of a state court notation because clients are often wrong or uncertain about the date of

service. (Id.). The threshold difficulty is that counsel did not ignore the date of service provided

by Hunter’s Edge; on the contrary, the notice of removal not once but twice declares that

“Hunter’s Edge was served on December 31, 2005.” (Doc. 1 at 1, 9). 

At any rate, the defendants have neither identified any legal authority authorizing a

defendant to rely on a state court notation in calculating the time for removal6 nor reconciled

their position with those cases holding that the 30-day limitation period is to be strictly

Case 1:06-cv-00058-WS-C Document 22 Filed 03/24/06 Page 3 of 5
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E.g., Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Industrial Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir.

1982)(“[T]he [30-day] time limitation imposed by § 1446(b) is ... a strictly applied rule of

procedure ....”); Holston v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 1991 WL 112809 at *3 (6th Cir.

1991)(“[A]ny ambiguity regarding the scope of § 1446(b) must be resolved in favor of remand to

the state courts.”); see also Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040,

1050 (11th Cir. 2001)(the historical narrowness of removal counsels against judicial adoption of a

“fairness” exception to the unanimity requirement).

8

Cf. Naef v. Masonite Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1504, 1511 (S.D. Ala. 1996)(“[T]he burden is

on the defendant seeking removal to scrutinize the case and remove it in a timely fashion.”)

(internal quotes omitted).

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construed.7

 The Washington Court has expressly rejected the defendants’ position, noting that

the responsibility rests squarely on the defendant of “ensuring that the green card has been dated,

or even recording the date upon which it was served.” 2005 WL 2277419 at *2.8

 This Court

concurs and goes further; in lieu of a dated green card or corporate notation (or memory) of the

date served, the defendant’s recourse is to inquire of the postal service as to the actual date of

service, as the plaintiff did here. A defendant relies on a state court notation at its peril. 

In a related vein, the defendants contend that the purpose of the 30-day limitation on

removal is to preclude defendants from trying their luck in state court and removing if they don’t

like the results, and they insist that this purpose is not in play because removal came only one

day late. (Doc. 19 at 5). Assuming without deciding that the defendants have correctly isolated

the purpose — and the only purpose — of the limitation period, it does not follow that Congress

left it to the courts to determine under the facts of each case whether a particular defendant’s

delay implicates the purpose so as to preclude removal; on the contrary, Congress’s

establishment of a 30-day period for removal makes such unique determinations both

unnecessary and improper. That the limitation period selected may not perfectly accommodate

the supposed purpose behind it scarcely gives this Court license to ignore it. 

Invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, the defendants next insist that it would be

“unjust to prevent Defendant from filing its notice just one day past th[e] deadline.” (Doc. 14 at

3-4). Their reasoning is that, if Chaney is in fact fraudulently joined, it would be unfair to

deprive them of a federal forum based on a procedural technicality. Rule 1, of course, governs

only the construction and application of federal procedural rules, not statutes. Nor is it easy to

Case 1:06-cv-00058-WS-C Document 22 Filed 03/24/06 Page 4 of 5
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discern the unfairness of holding a defendant to a statutory limitations period when it has both

personal knowledge of the date the period was triggered and the means to definitively confirm

that date. At any rate, the procedural requirements of the removal system “that some might

regard as arbitrary and unfair ... are an inevitable feature of a court system of limited jurisdiction

that strictly construes the right to remove.” Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264

F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Finally, the defendants correctly note that a plaintiff may waive compliance with the 30-

day removal limitation. (Doc. 19 at 5). The plaintiff here, however, has not waived compliance

but has filed a timely motion to remand on this ground.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff’s motion to remand is granted. This case is

remanded to the Circuit Court of Clarke County.

 

DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of March, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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