Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-05612/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-05612-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON SAUNDERS,

Plaintiff, CV F 97 5612 OWW WMW PC

vs.

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

LOWRIMORE, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Defendant names the

following individual defendants: Cal Terhune, Director of the then California Department of

Corrections; Wasco State Prison Warden Mike Carrillo; Chief Deputy Warden A.K. Fillon;

Lieutenant G. Dobbs; Lieutenant S. Cheney; Lieutenant Chrones; Correctional Officer (C/O)

Joan Lowrimore; C/O Keith Reynolds; C/O Steve Manion; Nurse Julie Santos; Nurse Drag.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action was dismissed on April 20, 2004, on the ground that Plaintiff failed to pay the

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Plaintiff has filed over 30 separate lawsuits in this district. Of the 20 cases that have been 1

closed, one was settled, one was resolved in defendants’ favor on summary judgment, and the

balance were either dismissed without prejudice or for failure to state a claim. 

2

filing fee. Plaintiff was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing this action. On July

5, 2006, Plaintiff sent to the court a letter, indicating that the filing fee had been paid. Though

the docket failed to reflect receipt of the filing fee, Plaintiff provided documentation that the fee

had indeed been paid. On July 6, 2006, an order was entered, granting the motion for

reconsideration and remanding the matter to the Magistrate Judge to screen the operative

pleading, the second amended complaint.

1

ALLEGATIONS

The actions that give rise to this complaint occurred while plaintiff was housed at Wasco

State Prison. Plaintiff names as defendants the following individuals: Cal Terhune, Director of

the California Department of Corrections; Mike Carrillo, Warden at Wasco State Prison; Chief

Deputy Warden A. K. Fillon; Lieutenant Dobbs; Lt. Cheney; Lt. Chrones; Correctional Officer

Lowrimore; C/O Manion; C/O Reynolds; Nurses Santos and Drag. The allegations in the

complaint stem from actions of defendants while plaintiff has housed in the prison infirmary.

On May 8, 1997, plaintiff was admitted to the infirmary following a letter that he had

written to an Associate Warden. In that letter, plaintiff indicated an intention to harm himself. 

Plaintiff was allegedly placed on psychiatric medication. Plaintiff specifically alleges that “upon

plaintiff’s infirmary admission, these defendants [Lowrimore, Santos, Drag and Does 1 and 2]

had either direct or constructively knowledge of plaintiff’s suicidal ideations and his potential for

inflicting self injury.” (Am. Compl.; 8:15-57). Plaintiff alleges that C/O Lowrimore and Nurse

Drag, assigned to the unit, “had either direct or constructive knowledge of plaintiff’s suicidal

ideations and his potential for inflicting self-injury.” Plaintiff was prescribed “extensive

amounts” of psychiatric medication.” 

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From May 8 to May 16, Plaintiff was housed in a cell in the infirmary and was prescribed

“extensive amounts” of psychiatric medication for “documented fears and abnormal reactions of

plaintiff.” During plaintiff’s time in the infirmary, he was prescribed seven medications. 

On May 12, 1997, plaintiff requested a copy of the infirmary regulations and patient

rights. Lowrimore refused plaintiff’s request. Lowrimore also refused Plaintiff’s request for an

inmate grievance form, CDC Form 602. Plaintiff became agitated, pacing back and forth in his

cell and talking to himself in order to “cool off.” Plaintiff alleges that, at times, defendant Drag

fabricates stories regarding plaintiff’s suicidal tendencies in order to manipulate plaintiff’s

medication or order restraints. Plaintiff alleges that based upon the false reports by Defendant

Drag, the treating physician directed that Plaintiff be forcefully medicated and restrained. 

Plaintiff alleges that “defendant Lowrimore was observed extensively confronting defendant

Drag in relation to making such false accounts in which to penalize plaintiff.” Id.; 10:12.

On May 16, 1997, between 10:00 p.m. and midnight, plaintiff submitted 5 items of legal

correspondence to defendant Lowrimore for mailing. Plaintiff informed Lowrimore that the

correspondence was confidential. Lowrimore refused to process them for mailing. Plaintiff

questioned Lowrimore, stating “so you’re refusing to give me my legal mail back?” Lowrimore

responded by turning off the water to plaintiff’s cell “out of her suspicion that plaintiff would

most likely flood the tier despite the absence of any expressed threat of plaintiff to do so.” 

Lowrimore then placed plaintiff’s legal mail on her desk, informing plaintiff that the mail would

be forwarded to the Investigative Services Unit (ISU). 

Lowrimore than contacted C/O Manion. Manion responded, and plaintiff observed

Lowrimore handing plaintiff’s mail to Manion, who opened the mail and read the contents. 

Plaintiff alleges that the contents were amendments to a request for a protective order filed by

plaintiff against officials at Wasco. Subsequently, “plaintiff began agitated and began pacing his

cell prior to punching his cell door middle window pane cracking the glass in his window.” 

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Administrative staff responded and Plaintiff’s treating physician was contacted. The

physician directed that Plaintiff be forcefully medicated and placed into restraints. 

Administrative staff spoke with Plaintiff. Plaintiff agreed to not cause any further disturbance so

long as Defendants Lowrimore and Manion “refrained from their deliberate doings which was

the cause of plaintiff being incited into acting up.” Id.; 12:8-9. Plaintiff alleges that

administrative staff reprimanded Manion and Lowrimore. Plaintiff alleges that Manion and

Lowrimore refused to follow the doctor’s order to forcefully medicate and restrain Plaintiff. 

Once administrative staff departed, Defendants Santos and Lowrimore began to incite and

provoke Plaintiff further. In response, Plaintiff began yelling in order to “smother” the

statements made by Lowrimore and Santos. Plaintiff alleges that despite the absence of any

threat to flood the tier and “abuse his access to free running water.” Lowrimore shut off the water

to Plaintiff’s cell. Lowrimore and Santos “taunted and teased plaintiff upon which they both

expressed their knowledge of plaintiff’s desire for water being linked to the nature of

psychotropic medicines plaintiff was prescribed and had taken up to such point in time.” Id.

12:26-13:1

Plaintiff continued to “plead” with Lowrimore and Santos to give him a glass of water. 

Defendants refused to turn Plaintiff’s water on or give him a glass of water, and continued to

taunt him. They told Plaintiff “you don’t have shit coming.” In response, Plaintiff stated “that’s

exactly what’s coming then, shit.” 

Plaintiff defecated into a cup, mixed it with water from his toilet, and poured it outside of

his cell door. Santos swept it back into his cell with a broom, telling Plaintiff to “keep his

‘negro’ shit in there.” Plaintiff continued to scoop water from his toilet in order to flush the

material outside his cell, and Santos continued to push it back in. Santos placed a piece of linen

in front of Plaintiff’s cell door in order to keep the material in the cell. 

Later in the evening, Defendants Reynolds and Manion arrived. Lowrimore, Reynolds

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and Manion taped the edges of Plaintiff’s cell door. Once the door was sealed, Reynolds and

Lowrimore intentionally turned up the cell heater in Plaintiff’s cell. In response, Plaintiff began

to bang and kick his cell door. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew of the danger caused by

extreme heat to those taking pyschotropic medications. Plaintiff requested, and was again

denied, drinking water. 

“After some time,” Plaintiff made a pile of linen and paper by the cell door. Plaintiff

informed Lowrimore that he would burn his cell if he did not get water. Plaintiff “further

advised defendant Lowrimore of his intentions of injuring himself by fire and toxic smoke of she

refused to provide plaintiff water as entitled plaintiff.” Id. 16:11-12. Lowrimore “continued to

provoke plaintiff into further disturbance” by telling him “do what you have to do!” Plaintiff

alleges that

Plaintiff created a fire in his assigned cell location. Within

minutes, plaintiff’s entire cell location was engulfed in thick black

smoke. The sole verbalization plaintiff recalls prior to losing

consciousness was defendant Lowrimore advising another to ‘hurry

up and remove the tape, quick before they get here.” 

Subconsciously, plaintiff recalls hearing at least one request to exit

his cell prior to losing total consciousness.

According to the defendants’ accounts of transactions following

plaintiff’s alleged refusal to exit his cell, Plaintiff was removed

from the cell by Defendant Reynolds and Officer T. Sharpe. 

Following Plaintiff’s removal from the burning cell mechanical

restraints were applied to both plaintiff’s wrists and ankles by

defendant Manion which were later discovered by plaintiff to be

extremely tight cutting plaintiff’s circulation, cutting plaintiff and

causing swelling and pain to both of plaintiff’s hands. Immediately

following the securing of Plaintiff’s unconscious body in

mechanical restraints, plaintiff was then placed on a gurney and

strapped down in five point restraints whereupon oxygen was

applied to plaintiff outside of the infirmary housing area by

defendant Santos. Thereinafter, plaintiff was urgently transported

to the nearest community medical facility via code II ambulance

upon where plaintiff became conscious and was treated. 

Id; 16:19-17:13.

 When Plaintiff was returned from the hospital, he was subjected to two disciplinary

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reports. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Reynolds and Manion “further authored known to be

false and misleading reports with respect to the May 16, 1997, incidents and in which to conceal

the culpability of the Defendants herein. On July 4, 1997, Plaintiff appeared before Defendants

G. Dobbs and S. Cheney for adjudication of his disciplinary allegations. Plaintiff alleges that

they “continued the conspiracy” by finding him guilty. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Dobbs

and Cheney “doctored the actual occurrence” at the hearing.

On July 23, 1997, Plaintiff received the final disposition of the disciplinary hearings. 

Plaintiff filed an appeal of those dispositions. On July 31, 1997, Plaintiff appeared before

Defendant Chrones for the adjudication of the destruction of property case regarding the

damaged mattress. Plaintiff alleges that Chrones “further conspired to falsely convict plaintiff

without regard to plaintiff’s exonerating evidence presented by plaintiff.” Id.; 20:6. 

On review of the appeals, Defendant Fillon “condoned the obvious conspiracy” by

refusing to address “the obvious fabrications.” 

Plaintiff also sets forth generalized allegations of inhuman living conditions, and claims

that his medical and psychiatric treatment are related to “policies, practices, pervasive practices,

customs, procedures, ordinances and regulations of the supervisorial defendants herein. Plaintiff

alleges that the supervisory defendants routinely disregard foreseeable risks of danger to Plaintiff

and other psychiatric patients. Plaintiff also levels allegations of “anti- African American hatred

and disregard for the health of inmates participating in confrontational encounters with the

correctional defendants, which has been fostered and tolerated at the WSPRC in particular. . .”

Id.; 22:4-5.

In paragraph 45 of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff specifically alleges that

contemporaneous with and subsequent to the events at issue in the May 16, 1997, cell removal,

Defendants Terhune, Carillo, Fillon, Dobbs, Cheney, Chrones and Does 1 and 2, “implemented,

maintained, tolerated and/or enforced the following deficient policies, practices, and customs.” 

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The balance of the complaint includes allegations of failure to properly hire and train

correctional staff, as well as allegations of “fostering a code of silence.” 

EIGHTH AMENDMENT

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second,

the prison official must “know] of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . .

.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a

substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 

Id. at 837-45. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked

knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to

the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to

establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152

F.3d at 1128. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

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Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and

responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that though he did suffer injury, his injury was not caused

by any conduct of the named Defendants. Plaintiff’s allegations reveal that Defendants, at most, 

subjected Plaintiff to teasing, taunting, and verbal harassment. Mere verbal harassment or abuse,

including the use of racial epithets, does not violate the Constitution and, thus, does not give rise

to a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th

Cir. 1987). Accepting as true, Plaintiff’s allegations and treating Defendants’ taunts and

allegations as a threat, such conduct, while inappropriate, does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987).

As to Plaintiff’s allegation that the heat in his cell was turned up, knowing that it would

cause Plaintiff discomfort, the Supreme Court noted in Hudson that “[E]xtreme deprivations are

required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. 

The crux of Plaintiff’s allegations are his belief that Defendants’ conduct caused him to

light his cell on fire. The facts of the second amended complaint provide a reasonable basis for 

Defendants to have engaged in the conduct at issue. Plaintiff contends that the water to his cell

was shut off on false premises. Plaintiff alleges that there was no threat of flooding the tier. In

essence, Plaintiff is challenging the justification for shutting off the water. As noted above, in

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order to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts indicating that Defendants’ conduct was

motivated by deliberate indifference. Plaintiff’s subjective impression of Defendants’ intent does

not govern - Plaintiff must come forward with facts indicating that Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to a serious risk of injury to Plaintiff. The fact that Plaintiff conditioned

his conduct on having his water turned back on or getting a glass of water does not mean that

defendants were deliberately indifferent. Given Plaintiff’s behavior as alleged in the second

amended complaint, a liberal construction of the complaint does not indicate deliberate

indifference on Defendants’ part for refusal to provide Plaintiff with a glass of water or to turn on

the water in his cell. Indeed, once Plaintiff started the fire, his own facts allege that Defendants

pulled him out of the cell, provided him with oxygen at the scene, and transported him

immediately for medical care.

As to the allegations that Defendants taped up his cell and turned up the heat, the facts, as

alleged, do not indicate an extreme deprivation. Though Defendants were aware that high heat

could cause discomfort, there are no specific allegations that Plaintiff suffered injury beyond

discomfort. Simply put, on the facts alleged, Plaintiff believes he was provoked and; voluntarily

chose to start a fire in his cell. Though Defendants’ alleged conduct was inappropriate, even

abusive, it does not rise to the level of an Eight Amendment violation. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief, the

complaint should be dismissed. Though Plaintiff’s original complaint and first amended

complaint were dismissed with leave to amend, neither of those orders addressed the facts

alleged in the second amended complaint. The order dismissing the original complaint was

grounded on Plaintiff’s failure to articulate facts that charged the named defendants with specific

conduct. The order dismissing the first amended complaint addressed the exhaustion issue noted

below.

The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file a third amended complaint. Plaintiff

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is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended

complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in

itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

EXHAUSTION

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution. . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 7 of The Prison Litigation Reform Act was amended to read as follows: 

(a) APPLICABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. No action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised

Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In Booth v. Churner,532 U.S. 731 (2001). The Supreme

Court, in addressing the question of whether a prisoner need exhaust available remedies when

monetary damages are unavailable, held that “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough,

regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Id. at 1821. In order to bring

his claim in federal court, plaintiff must completely exhaust his available administrative

remedies.

In California, there are four levels of review - informal level, first formal level, second

formal level, and third formal level. The third formal level constitutes the Director’s decision on

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appeal. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 3084.5(e)(2). The following time limits apply. 

Appeal Time Limits.(a) Commencement. Time limits for

submitting or reviewing appeals shall commence upon the date of

receipt of the appeal document by the appeals coordinator or the

appellant.(b) Departmental response. Appeals shall be responded to

and returned to the appellant by staff within the following time

limits:(1) Informal level responses shall be completed within ten

working days. 2) First level responses shall be completed within 30

working days.(3) Second level responses shall be completed within

20 working days, or 30 working days if first level is waived

pursuant to section 3084.5 (a)(3).(4) Third level responses shall be

completed within 60 working days.

Cal. Code Rets. Tit. 15, § 3084.6.

A prisoner's concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal of an action.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.2003); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198,

1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam). Because plaintiff's complaint contains a concession to

nonexhaustion of available administrative remedies and plaintiff's ground for nonexhaustion is

futility, this action should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new civil rights action

after plaintiff has exhausted available administrative remedies. Exhaustion is an affirmative

defense, and “inmate are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their

complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007). Here, however, Plaintiff has pled

exhaustion. Plaintiff specifically pleads in the second amended complaint that “to the extent that

administrative remedies were available, Plaintiff has exhausted all such processes consistent with

Booth.

The events that give rise to this lawsuit occurred on May 16, 1997. This action was filed

27 days later, on June 13, 1997. As to the claims regarding the disciplinary process, those events

occurred after the filing of this action. Even had Plaintiff exhausted his claims regarding the

disciplinary process, the Court of Appeals has held that District Courts are required under Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to dismiss actions without prejudice where prisoner failed to

exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit but was in process of doing so when motion

to dismiss was filed. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9 Cir. 2002). In order for Plaintiff th

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to have properly exhausted his grievance prior to filing suit, he would have had to avail himself

of the informal, first formal, second formal, and third (Director’s) level of review prior to filing

suit. Though not required to plead exhaustion, Plaintiff did so, but does not specify what

grievance he filed, when he filed it, and what response he received. Assuming Plaintiff filed

grievances and received no responses within the required time frame, it would have taken him

90-140 days to appeal each level. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

 1. Plaintiff's second amended complaint is dismissed; and

1. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

third amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "Third Amended Complaint." Failure to

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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