Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01074/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 460
Nature of Suit: Deportation
Cause of Action: 

---

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RAMANATHAN PADMANABHAN, KRITHIKA 

SRINIVAS, AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF A 

MINOR CHILD, I.R.I.,

Petitioners-Appellants

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1074

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:11-vv-00141-MCW, Judge Mary Ellen 

Coster Williams.

______________________ 

Decided: February 8, 2016

______________________ 

 RAMANATHAN PADMANABHAN, KRITHIKA SRINIVAS, San 

Ramon, CA, pro se.

 HEATHER LYNN PEARLMAN, Vaccine/Torts Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also repreCase: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 1 Filed: 02/08/2016
2 PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 

sented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, RUPA BHATTACHARYYA,

VINCENT J. MATANOSKI, VORIS E. JOHNSON, JR. 

______________________ 

Before WALLACH, CLEVENGER, and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Appellants Krithika Srinivas and Ramanathan Padmanabhan, on behalf of their minor son I.R.I., appeal the 

decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims 

(“Claims Court”) that upheld the dismissal of their petition for compensation under the National Childhood 

Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (“Vaccine Act”), 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 300aa-1–300aa-34 (2012). See Padmanabhan v. Sec’y 

of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-141V (Fed. Cl. Aug. 6, 

2015) (upholding Chief Special Master’s dismissal) (J.A. 

11–16); Padmanabhan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

No. 11-141V, 2015 WL 1736345 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 26, 2015) 

(Chief Special Master’s dismissal) (J.A. 17–56). Because 

the Claims Court correctly concluded that Chief Special 

Master Denise Vowell’s dismissal for failure to prosecute 

was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I.R.I. was born to the Appellants in November 2006. 

Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 1736345 at *9. “During his first 

two years, I.R.I. received the recommended childhood 

vaccines . . . . No reactions to any of the vaccinations 

were reported in the medical records.” Id. at *10 (footnote 

omitted). During I.R.I.’s two-year wellness visit on December 2, 2008, the pediatrician “assessed him as a well 

child, but this assessment was followed by a note reflecting ‘slower’ social communication development.” Id. at 

*11. “This consultation note appears to reflect the first 

report of concerns about I.R.I.’s speech development and 

behavior.” Id. 

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 2 Filed: 02/08/2016
PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS 3

On January 20, 2009, Appellants first expressed a 

concern to I.R.I.’s pediatrician about his development. 

Appellants “were concerned primarily with his lack of 

social development.” Id. at *12. The same year, I.R.I. 

was tested and found to be “in the mildly autistic range”

of the Childhood Autism Rating Scale. Id. at *13. On 

October 19, 2010, a metabolic specialist evaluated I.R.I., 

but concluded “he did not have enough information to 

exclude a mitochondrial disorder and suggested an [electroencephalogram (“EEG”)], skin and muscle biopsies, a 

lumbar puncture, a brain [magnetic resonance imaging 

(“MRI”)], and blood, urine, and plasma tests.” Id. at *21

(citation omitted). In January 2011, I.R.I. was tested for 

a short-chain acyl-CoA dehydrogenase (“SCAD”) deficiency. Id. The results “stopped short of diagnosing I.R.I with 

SCAD and recommended parental [deoxyribonucleic acid 

(“DNA”)] studies to determine if all the DNA changes 

were on the same chromosome.” Id. (citation omitted). 

In March 2011, Appellants filed a petition on behalf of 

I.R.I. for compensation under the Vaccine Act. See generally J.A. 116–23. Appellants asserted a number of vaccines1 that I.R.I. received on or about March 13, 2008, 

“aggravated a preexisting Mitochondrial disease resulting 

in immune deficiency that resulted in but not limited to 

encephalopathy, nutritional disorders, metabolic disorders, immune dysfunction, oxidative [s]tress, inflammation, [and] inflammation of the [b]rain that damaged and 

continues to damage his physical, mental and emotional 

development.” J.A. 117. 

 

1 These vaccines included measles, mumps, and rubella (“MMR”); diphtheria, tetanus, and acellular pertussis (“DTaP”); Haemophilus influenzae type b (“Hib”); and 

varicella vaccines. See Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 1736345 

at *1. 

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 3 Filed: 02/08/2016
4 PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 

Appellants continued to seek medical evaluation and 

treatment for I.R.I. after they filed their petition. On July 

27, 2011, I.R.I. underwent an EEG that showed abnormal 

results, indicating “a mild, diffuse, encephalopathy.” 

Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 1736345 at *22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On October 28, 2011, a 

“brain pattern test (a qualitative EEG)” was performed 

but “was not interpreted by any physician.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

In March 2015, the Chief Special Master dismissed 

Appellants’ claim for “failure to prosecute.” Id. at *8

(citing Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“Claims 

Court Rules”) App. B (Vaccine Rules of the United States 

Court of Federal Claims) 21(b)(1)). The Chief Special 

Master alternatively denied the Appellants’ petition for 

compensation based on the record evidence submitted by 

the Appellants. Id. at *30. The Chief Special Master 

determined the Appellants did not establish “preponderant evidence of a Table[2] encephalopathy. [Appellants] 

have also not demonstrated by preponderant evidence 

that vaccines caused or significantly aggravated their 

son’s condition.” Id. 

 

2 The Vaccine Act allows petitioners to recover 

compensation by either proving an injury listed on the 

Vaccine Injury Table (i.e., a “Table” injury) or by proving 

causation-in-fact. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)–

13(a)(1). A Table injury may be demonstrated by showing 

“that the person who suffered injury or who 

died . . . sustained, or had significantly aggravated, any 

illness, disability, injury, or condition set forth in the 

Vaccine Injury Table in association with the vaccine 

referred to . . . or died from the administration of such 

vaccine,” within the proscribed time period. Id. § 300aa11(c)(1)(C)(i)–(ii); see id. § 300aa-14 (Vaccine Injury Table). 

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 4 Filed: 02/08/2016
PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS 5

In April 2015, Appellants filed a Motion for Review of 

the Chief Special Master’s decision with the Claims 

Court. In its August 6, 2015 decision, the Claims Court 

determined Appellants failed to demonstrate the “Chief 

Special Master’s dismissal of their petition for failure to 

prosecute was an abuse of discretion” and thus denied the 

Appellants’ motion for review of the Special Master’s 

decision. J.A. 16. Appellants timely appealed the Claims 

Court’s decision. This court possesses jurisdiction to 

review this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) 

(2012). 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

“In reviewing a ruling by the Court of Federal Claims 

that a special master’s findings of fact were not arbitrary 

and capricious, this court exercises de novo review.” 

Lampe v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 219 F.3d 1357, 

1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “In effect, this 

court performs the same task as the Court of Federal 

Claims and determines anew whether the special master's 

findings were arbitrary or capricious.” Id. 

We review dismissals for failure to prosecute claims 

under an abuse of discretion standard. See Claude E. 

Atkins Enters., Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1180, 1183 

(Fed. Cir. 1990) (In reviewing “a decision of the Claims 

Court to dismiss ‘pursuant to Rule 41(b) [of the Rules of 

the Court of Federal Claims], our inquiry is whether the 

court abused its discretion.’”); see also Fed. Cl. App. B, R. 

41(b) (“If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with 

these rules or a court order, the court may dismiss on its 

own motion or the defendant may move to dismiss the 

action or any claim against it.”); Fed. Cl. App. B, R. 

21(b)(1) (“The special master or the court may dismiss a 

petition or any claim therein for failure of the petitioner 

to prosecute or comply with these rules or any order of the 

special master or the court.”). 

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 5 Filed: 02/08/2016
6 PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 

“An abuse of discretion exists when, inter alia, the 

lower court’s decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” 

Matos ex rel. Rivera v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & 

Human Servs., 35 F.3d 1549, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The decision 

below will not be disturbed unless upon a weighing of 

relevant factors we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of 

judgment.” Adkins v. United States, 816 F.2d 1580, 1582 

(Fed. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

II. The Chief Special Master Did Not Abuse Her Discretion in Dismissing Appellants’ Petition for Failure to 

Prosecute 

The Chief Special Master dismissed Appellants’ claim 

for failure to prosecute. Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 

1736345 at *8. In reaching this determination, the Chief 

Special Master indicated Appellants filed some medical 

records in March 2011 and some additional records in 

June 2011, December 2011, and August 2013; however, 

“the medical records remain incomplete.” Id. at *2. “In 

the four years since filing this petition on their son’s 

behalf, [Appellants] have refused to comply with numerous orders. They have refused to follow the Vaccine Rules 

regarding the filing of motions.” Id. Appellants “repeatedly asserted that the incomplete medical records and 

other documents filed, which d[id] not include any expert’s or treating physician’s opinion regarding vaccine 

causation of I.R.I.’s condition, demonstrate entitlement to 

compensation.” Id. (citations omitted). “I.R.I.’s case has 

essentially been at an impasse since December 2012.” Id. 

Appellants present numerous arguments that allege 

procedural errors during the pendency of their case before 

the Claims Court. Appellants contend the Chief “Special 

[M]aster and [the Claims Court] are relying on false and 

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 6 Filed: 02/08/2016
PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS 7

incomplete information from the record to arrive at their 

conclusion[s].” Appellants’ Br. 26; see id. at 13–16 (discussing factual errors and omissions by the Claims 

Court); id. at 20–24 (discussing alleged errors and impropriety of the Chief Special Master and opposing counsel). 

Appellants further contend the Chief Special Master and 

the Appellee, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, were “adversarial, and at times insulting.” Id. at 

19. Appellants make assertions of “falsifying record[s] to 

create prejudice against [Appellants],” id. at 21, and that 

the “[Chief] Special Master altered [the] record at the 

time of dismissing the case,” id. at 24. 

As an initial matter, we find Appellants’ allegations of 

impropriety and misconduct unfounded. Appellants have 

not provided any evidence to substantiate their claims of 

misconduct. See generally id. at 9–28; see also J.A. 93–94 

(Appellants were provided with the opportunity to submit 

evidence in camera to the Chief Special Master regarding 

alleged intimidation of physicians treating I.R.I.; however, no evidence was submitted to the court.). 

In any event, we agree with the Claims Court’s determination that the Chief Special Master did not abuse 

her discretion in dismissing I.R.I.’s proceeding for failure 

to prosecute. The record demonstrates the Chief Special 

Master afforded the Appellants considerable leeway to 

pursue their claims. She granted the Appellants a suspension of proceedings for a combined total of 180 days, 

which is the maximum amount of time permitted for 

suspension of proceedings. See Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 

1736345 at *6–8; see also Fed. Cl. App. B, R. 9(b) (allowing for an initial 30-day suspension of proceedings and up 

to an additional 150 days if deemed appropriate). 

The Chief Special Master issued numerous orders requiring the Appellants to file complete medical records 

with the court. See, e.g., J.A. 4–8 (docket entries 18, 32–

33, 36, 38, 42–43). Additionally, repeated warnings were 

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 7 Filed: 02/08/2016
8 PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 

issued to the Appellants that their case would be dismissed if they did not comply with these orders. See 

Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 1736345 at *3–6. “Over the four 

years their petition has been pending, the Chief Special 

Master ordered [Appellants] to file additional medical 

records a total of 10 times, in orders spanning December 

18, 2012, until March 28, 2014.” J.A. 13 (citing Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 1736345 at *3–6). In May 2013, the 

Chief Special Master issued an Order to Show Cause, 

which required the Appellants to “file additional medical 

records or otherwise show cause for why this case should 

not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.” J.A. 101 (emphasis omitted). 

Despite the Appellants’ repeated non-compliance with 

these orders, on November 15, 2013, the Chief Special 

Master issued another Order to Show Cause stating that 

“[a]lthough [she] could dismiss this case now for [Appellants’] failure to prosecute, [she] will afford [Appellants] 

one last chance to comply with [her] orders and establish 

they are entitled to compensation because the interests of 

a minor child are involved.” J.A. 98 (emphasis omitted). 

In this order, the Chief Special Master explained the 

Appellants had the burden of proving entitlement to 

compensation, which “must be supported by either medical records or by the opinion of a competent physician.” 

J.A. 99 (citation omitted). Appellants were ordered to “file 

any additional documentation they believe w[ould] establish their entitlement to compensation, or otherwise show 

cause why this case should not be dismissed for their 

failure to prosecute and failure to establish vaccine causation, by no later than . . . January 17, 2014.” J.A. 100

(emphasis omitted). Appellants did not comply with this 

Order. 

On March 28, 2014, the Chief Special Master made 

“one final attempt to explain to [Appellants] the devastating effect that their refusal to comply with court orders 

[was] about to have on their son’s vaccine injury claim.” 

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 8 Filed: 02/08/2016
PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS 9

Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 1736345 at *5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This order also noted 

that the Appellants could request that the Chief Special 

Master “rule on the record as it now stands or . . . move 

for summary judgment.” J.A. 64 (footnotes omitted). She 

“urg[ed] [Appellants] to seek out an attorney” before doing 

so. J.A. 64. She also provided Appellants with “a list of 

attorneys who [had] recently indicated that they are 

willing to review cases filed by pro se petitioners.” J.A. 64 

(footnote omitted). Appellants were required to file by 

May 27, 2014, “updated medical records covering all 

doctor appointments and lab/genetic testing performed 

since October 2011.” J.A. 64 (emphasis omitted). Appellants failed to file any medical records in response to this 

order. Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 1736345 at *6; see generally J.A. 2–3 (docket entries). 

Despite the Appellants’ repeated failure to comply 

with the Chief Special Master’s orders, “prior to taking 

any further action, [she] afforded them the opportunity to 

point out in a telephonic conference any matters in the 

record that support[ed] their claim of vaccine causation of 

I.R.I.’s condition.” Padmanabhan, 2015 WL 1736345 at 

*6. 

Based on the Chief Special Master’s actions throughout this proceeding, we are not “left with a definite and 

firm conviction that the court below committed a clear 

error of judgment.” Adkins, 816 F.2d at 1582 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, we are 

left with a firm conviction that the Chief Special Master 

went out of her way to accommodate the needs of pro se 

litigants. Accordingly, we find there was no abuse of 

discretion in dismissing the Appellants’ petition for failure to prosecute. 

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 9 Filed: 02/08/2016
10 PADMANABHAN v. SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the decision of 

the United States Court of Federal Claims is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

Case: 16-1074 Document: 16-2 Page: 10 Filed: 02/08/2016