Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00315/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00315-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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28 1 Defendants are the City of Rocklin (the “City”), Mark

J. Siemens (“Siemens”), Chief of Police, and Carlos A. Urrutia

(“Urrutia”), City Manager (collectively, “defendants”).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

RICK EATON,

NO. 2:07-cv-315 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARK J. SIEMENS, an individual

and in his capacity as Chief

of Police, CARLOS A. URRUTIA,

an individual and in his

capacity as City Manager, CITY

OF ROCKLIN, a public

municipality and public

entity, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants’1 motion for

certification of this court’s May 23, 2007 order, denying

defendants’ motion to dismiss (the “Order”), for interlocutory

appeal under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b) and for a stay of this action

pending the appeal. Plaintiff Rick Eaton (“plaintiff”) opposes

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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-320(h).

3 Plaintiff alleges claims against defendants for

violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights (free speech,

procedural and substantive due process and equal protection)

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and for violation of

plaintiff’s rights under state law pursuant to California’s

“whistleblower” statute, Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5, and the Public

Officers’ Procedural Bill of Rights Act (“POPBRA”), Cal. Gov’t

Code § 3309.5(e). (Compl., filed Feb. 16, 2007.)

2

the motion, arguing it is a “delay tactic” by defendants since

there are no “exceptional circumstances” warranting an

interlocutory appeal in this case. (Opp’n, filed July 27, 2007,

at 1-2.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that

defendants have met their burden to demonstrate that the court’s

Order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion, and that an

immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination

of this litigation. Thus, pursuant to Section 1292(b),

defendants’ motion is GRANTED.2

BACKGROUND

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint3 on the

ground the City’s administrative decision resulting in

plaintiff’s termination bars this action, which either raises the

same factual and legal issues presented in the arbitration

proceeding, wherein plaintiff challenged his termination, or

issues which could have been raised in that proceeding. Thus,

the question before the court on the motion to dismiss was

whether “plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the doctrine of res

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4 Because this initial requirement for preclusion was not

met, the court did not consider the other requirements for

preclusion, including whether the agency resolved disputed issues

of fact properly before it and whether the parties had an

adequate opportunity to litigate. (Id. at 10:13-15, 14.)

3

judicata.” (Mem. & Order at 3:2-3.) The court’s decision

focused on the first requirement for preclusion under the

fairness standards identified in United States v. Utah

Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966): the requirement

that the administrative agency “act in a judicial capacity.” 

(Id. at 10:12.)4 On that issue, the court held:

The underlying administrative proceeding was not of a

judicial nature, in that the arbitrator was not 

empowered to adjudicate the rights of the parties before

him, but rather, he offered only an advisory decision

designed to assist the City Manager make his decision as

to the propriety of plaintiff’s termination.

(Id. at 3:5-10.) Because this first requirement for preclusion

was not met, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

(Id. generally.)

Defendants filed their answer to plaintiff’s complaint on

June 1, 2007. They now move for interlocutory appeal of the

court’s May 23 Order and for a stay of the action pending said

appeal.

STANDARD

The general rule is that an appellate court should not

review a district court ruling until after entry of a final

judgment. Coopers & Lyband v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978);

In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.

1982), aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S.

1190 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. There is, however, an

exception to this general rule:

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4

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable under this section,

shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal for the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he

shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals . . . may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . .

. if application is made to it within ten days . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The party seeking certification of an

interlocutory appeal has the burden to show the presence of those

exceptional circumstances. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474-

75.

Section 1292 identifies three factors that must be present

in order for the court to certify an appeal. First, the issue to

be certified must involve a controlling issue of law. An issue

is “controlling” if “resolution of the issue on appeal could

materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district

court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026 (citing

U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)). 

Second, there must be substantial ground for difference of

opinion on that issue. A party’s strong disagreement with the

court’s ruling is not sufficient for there to be a “substantial

ground for difference;” the proponent of an appeal must make some

greater showing. Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. Bakersfield, 634 F.

Supp. 656, 667 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part

on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). Third, an

interlocutory appeal must be likely to materially speed the

termination of the litigation. This factor is linked to whether

an issue of law is “controlling” in that the court should

consider the effect of a reversal by the court of appeals on the

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5

management of the case. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673

F.2d at 1026.

As to a stay of the pending action, Section 1292(b) states: 

“[A]pplication for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings

in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of

Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.” Thus, by statute,

this court has authority to stay the proceedings pending an

interlocutory appeal. This court also possesses the inherent

power to control its own docket and calendar. “A district court

has inherent discretion to control the disposition of the causes

on its docket in a manner which will promote economy of time and

effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Filtrol

Corp. v. Kelleher, 467 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1972) (quotations

and citations omitted). In Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v.

Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations

omitted), the Ninth Circuit recognized: 

A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient

for its own docket and the fairest course for the

parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending

resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon

the case. This rule . . . does not require that the

issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling

of the action before the court.

Id.

ANALYSIS

As to the first requirement for interlocutory appeal, the

court’s Order addressed a single question of law; namely, whether

plaintiff’s complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

That inquiry, contrary to plaintiff’s protestations in his

opposition herein, was not fact-dependent. See Keystone Tobacco

Co., Inc. v. Nat’l Tobacco Co., 217 F.R.D. 235, 238 (D.C. Dist.

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6

2003) (recognizing that an issue is not a “controlling issue of

law” where the issue decided by the court is “fact-dependent”). 

Rather, the court surveyed the relevant law and determined 

thereunder that the arbitrator in this case did not act in a

judicial capacity because his decision, rendered after the

arbitration, was only a recommendation to the City Manager as to

the propriety of plaintiff’s termination, and the City Manger had

ultimate and unilateral authority to render any decision he saw

fit. (Mem. & Order at 12-13.) The facts underlying this

decision, concerning the applicable procedures employed by the

City to terminate plaintiff’s employment, were not disputed by

the parties on the motion to dismiss. Instead, the parties

disputed only the legal effect of the facts under the preclusion

standards. 

That question of law is “controlling” within the meaning of

Section 1292(b) because an interlocutory appeal would “materially

affect the outcome of [the] litigation in [this court].” In re

Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026. Indeed, the

preclusion issue here would completely dispose of this case if

defendants prevail on appeal since defendants advance the defense

of res judicata/claim preclusion with respect to all of

plaintiff’s claims asserted in the complaint.

For this same reason, defendants have also demonstrated that

the appeal will advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation. The potential for bringing the litigation to a more

expeditious close is related to the “controlling issue of law”

factor for certification. The court must consider the effect of

a reversal by the court of appeals on the management of the case. 

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5 The court affirmed a summary judgment ruling for the

defendant in a Section 1983 action on the ground the

administrative ruling sustaining the plaintiff’s termination had

preclusive effect on the action pending in federal court. 

6 Plaintiff was represented by counsel and allowed to

call witnesses and present documentary evidence.

7

Id. Here, a reversal of this court’s Order could resolve this

case in its entirety, should the Ninth Circuit find the other

elements for preclusion are also met.

As to the final requirement for certification of

interlocutory appeal, the court acknowledged in its Order that

there was a “paucity of relevant case law on the specific issue

critical to this case.” (Mem. & Order at 12 n. 10.) While

defendants argued the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Miller v.

County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1994)5 compelled

dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint herein, the court found that

Miller was distinguishable on the precise question presented in

this case. In Miller, the Santa Cruz County Civil Service

Commission affirmed the plaintiff’s dismissal after a “public

evidentiary hearing at which Miller was represented by counsel

and was permitted to present oral and documentary evidence and to

call witnesses.” Id. at 1032. The parties in Miller did not 

dispute that in so ruling the Commission had acted in a “judicial

capacity.” Id. at 1032, 1038. To the contrary, in this case,

the arbitration proceeding, which was in some respects similar to

the Commission’s “public evidentiary hearing” in Miller6,

resulted only in an advisory decision by the arbitrator; unlike

the Commission in Miller, the arbitrator did not adjudicate the

parties’ rights and issue a binding decision on them. Instead,

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7 In some respects, in the current briefing, the parties

simply re-argue their positions as stated in the briefing on the

motion to dismiss. The court does not repeat its analysis of

those arguments herein as the bases for the court’s decision are

fully set forth in the Order.

8 Indeed, the court notes that defendants raise in the

instant briefing several arguments not previously briefed on the

(continued...)

8

the arbitrator made a recommendation to the City Manager as to

whether plaintiff’s employment termination should be sustained;

the City Manager then had ultimate authority to either accept,

modify or reject the recommendation. It was for this reason that

the court found that the City had not acted in a “judicial

capacity” in terminating plaintiff’s employment. (Mem. & Order

at 12-14.)7

In rendering this decision the court relied on out-ofcircuit authority and an unpublished decision of the Ninth

Circuit, finding these decisions persuasive because, contrary to

any authority cited by the parties, these cases discussed the

specific inquiry at issue in this case (namely, when does an

agency act in a “judicial capacity” for purposes of the Utah

Construction-fairness requirements?). However, admittedly, even

in the cases cited by the court the issue is not exhaustively

discussed. Thus, the court finds that there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion on the issue considering that

defendants’ motion raises substantial and complicated questions

for which there is no clear answer in controlling law. As

reflected in the parties’ briefing on this motion, there are many

facets to this inquiry which have not been fully discussed by the

courts generally, and more specifically, by the Ninth Circuit.8

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8(...continued)

motion to dismiss, including whether the procedures used by the

City in this case are “widespread” in California by other

governmental agencies and whether procedural due process case law

should be applied by analogy to resolve the preclusion issue

presented here. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A., filed June 13, 2007, at

6-7, 10-11.)

9

Because a reversal of this court’s Order by the Ninth

Circuit could resolve this case, in that plaintiff’s complaint

may be dismissed as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the

court stays this action in its entirety pending resolution of

defendants’ appeal of the Order. Said stay promotes economy of

time and effort both for the court and the parties. Filtrol

Corp., 467 F.2d at 244.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that its May 23,

2007 Order, denying defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

complaint as barred by res judicata, involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

difference of opinion, and that an immediate appeal from the

Order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation. As such, defendants’ motion for certification of the

court’s May 23, 2007 Order for interlocutory appeal is GRANTED. 

The court stays this action in its entirety pending resolution of

said appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 10, 2007 

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