Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00863/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00863-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD DUANE DUNHAM,

Petitioner,

v.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF, STAN 

SHIFF; MARK HAKE, Chief Probation 

Officer,

Respondents.

Case No.: 18cv863-GPC(JMA)

ORDER 1) ADOPTING REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION AND 

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION 

FOR A STAY OF STATE COURT 

RESTITUTION ROCEEDINGS; 2) 

DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[Dkt. No. 5.]

On May 4, 2018, Petitioner Ronald Duane Dunham (“Petitioner”) filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state court 

conviction. (Dkt. No. 1.) Shortly thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion to stay state court 

restitution proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251. (Dkt. No. 5.) Magistrate Judge Jan 

M. Adler issued a report and recommendation (“Report”) denying Petitioner’s motion to 

stay. (Dkt. No. 10.) Petitioner filed an objection. (Dkt. No. 11.) Based on the reasoning 

below, the Court ADOPTS the Report and DENIES Petitioner’s motion to stay state court 

restitution proceedings. 

Background

On December 15, 2014, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of twenty counts of 

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grand theft, elder theft and securities fraud, and found as true allegations relating to the 

amount of losses sustained by individual victims and in aggregate in San Diego Superior 

Court in Case No. SCD246838. People v. Dunham, D068100, 2018 WL 739806, at *1 

(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2018). He was sentenced to twelve years in state prison. Id. at *8. 

Petitioner appealed the conviction and on February 7, 2018, the California Court 

of Appeal reversed the convictions for grand theft involving elder adults and attendant 

true findings on loss enhancements, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Id. at 

*1.

Prior to Petitioner’s trial, the trial court froze the bank accounts of a company 

controlled by Petitioner, Rodan Enterprises, LLC (“Rodan”), pursuant to California Penal 

Code section 186.11 to preserve assets for victim restitution. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet., Ex. D at 

327.) Section 186.11, known as the “Freeze and Seize Law,” provides restitution to 

victims of white collar crimes from assets under the convicted criminal’s control. (Id.)

At trial, the jury found a section 186.11 aggravated white collar crime enhancement 

allegation to be true. (Id.) On February 5, 2016, at the restitution hearing, the trial court 

ordered (1) the named victims in the prosecution’s charging document would receive full 

restitution for their losses and (2) any remaining funds would be paid to two individuals, 

one of whom was Mr. Lee. (Id. at 328.)

Scott Lee, a third party claimant who was not involved in Petitioner’s criminal

activities, asserted he had invested $400,000 in Rodan and was entitled to recover that 

amount from the frozen funds. Id. at 328. Lee appealed the trial court’s restitution order. 

(Id. at 327.) On February 7, 2018, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition for 

writ of mandamus filed by Mr. Lee, finding that “substantial evidence supports the 

court’s implicit finding that Lee did not establish an ownership interest in the frozen 

funds . . . and Lee was not entitled to an equitable share of the frozen funds as a crime 

victim” and vacated the stay it had previously issued as to the trial court’s restitution 

order. Id. at 328, 339. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court dated 

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February 19, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 289, 321.) On April 18, 2018, the California 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review and dissolved the stay previously issued by 

the court. (Id. at 324-25.) 

Petitioner claims he was released from prison on October 13, 2017 and is currently 

on community supervision in Riverside County with a projected release date of October 

11, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 1.) On May 4, 2018, Petitioner filed his federal petition 

for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

Discussion

A. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where a party 

timely objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the court is required to 

“make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed 

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. Because objections were 

made, the Court reviews the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo. 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2003) (en banc). 

B. Motion to Stay

“A justice or judge of the United States before whom a habeas corpus proceeding 

is pending, may, before final judgment or after final judgment of discharge, or pending 

appeal, stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State court or by or under 

the authority of any State for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.” 28 

U.S.C § 2251. “Section 2251 does not mandate the entry of a stay, but dedicates the 

exercise of stay jurisdiction to the sound discretion of a federal court.” McFarland v. 

Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 858 (1994) (concerning stay of execution); Coleman v. California, 

No. C 09-5742 MHP(pr), 2010 WL 695380, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010) (noting that 

cases granting stays have primarily concerned stays of execution). 

Stays under § 2251 are not automatic. Coleman, 2010 WL 695380, at *2. A 

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petitioner must demonstrate substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.

Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 

U.S. 880, 895 (1983)). To establish substantial grounds requires Petitioner to 

demonstrate “the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve 

the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Id. (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n. 4). 

The Report concluded that Petitioner’s reasons for seeking a stay were insufficient 

because the harm asserted is not irreparable because loss of money can be remedied by an 

award of damages. (Dkt. No. 10 at 3-4.) Petitioner also does not want to pay restitution 

before his federal habeas proceeding is concluded in the event the court grants habeas 

relief but the Magistrate Judge reasoned that the same sentiment is likely held by the 

majority of habeas petitioner who are ordered to pay restitution. (Id. at 4.) Finally, the 

Magistrate Judge explained that Petitioner has been convicted and the state appellate 

courts have mostly upheld his convictions and Mr. Lee’s third party claims were denied 

by the trial and appellate courts. (Id.) 

In his objection, Petitioner argues that he was merely a manager of Rodan 

Enterprises, not one of the owners, and that Mr. Lee held funds in Rodan in the amount of 

approximately $594,000 and was the second largest member owner of Rodan. (Dkt. No. 

11 at 1.) Therefore, this significant amount of money demonstrates irreparable harm. 

(Id.)

Petitioner makes a general assertion concerning the alleged harm to Mr. Lee, a

third party, and not as to him, as the moving party. He has not demonstrated substantial 

grounds to warrant a stay of the state court restitution proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 

2251. See Vargas, 159 F.3d at 1166. Moreover, the court of appeal concluded that 

substantial evidence supported the trial court’s implicit finding that Mr. Lee did not 

establish ownership interest in the frozen funds and he was not entitled to an equitable 

share of the frozen funds as a crime victim. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet., Ex. D at 328.) 

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and DENIES Petitioner’s motion to 

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stay the state court restitution proceedings. 

C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Petitioner also seeks a renewed appointment of counsel based on the Magistrate 

Judge’s denial of his request and asserting that he has no legal background and the issues 

are too complex for him. (Dkt. No. 11 at 1.) He states that his appellate counsel assisted 

him with preparing the petition and motion to stay. (Id.) 

The Magistrate Judge denied appointment of counsel because the court will be able 

to resolve issues presented on the basis of the state court record and the Petition that had

sufficiently plead claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2.) 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas

corpus petitions. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis,

801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987). Under 18 

U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

may obtain representation if they are financially unable to obtain adequate representation 

and whenever a magistrate judge or the district court “determines that the interests of 

justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). “In deciding whether to appoint counsel 

in a habeas proceeding, the district court must evaluate the likelihood of success on the 

merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.” Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 

1983). 

Here, Petitioner paid the filing fee of $5.00 and it is not clear whether he is 

currently financially unable to afford adequate counsel as he has been released from 

prison in October 2017 and may have been released from the community supervision 

program on October 11, 2018. Next, Petitioner has not demonstrated his inability to 

articulate his claims in relation to the complexity of the legal issues involved. He merely 

argues that he has no background in the law and the issues involved are “far too 

complex.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 1.) These conclusory arguments do not support his request for 

appointment of counsel. Moreover, the likelihood of success is questionable based on the 

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court of appeal’s ruling affirming in part the trial court judgment in his case as well as the 

court of appeal’s ruling denying Mr. Lee’s petition for writ of mandamus. Accordingly, 

the Court does not find that the interests of justice warrants appointment of counsel, and 

the Court DENIES Petitioner’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the report and recommendation and DENIES 

Petitioner’s motion for stay of restitution proceedings in state court. The Court also 

DENIES Petitioner’s renewed request for appointment of counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 25, 2018

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