Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02304/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02304-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12117ad - Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

LINDA S. LANE,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, 

Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense,

Defendant.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02304-MHH

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this employment action against the Department of Defense Missile Defense 

Agency, plaintiff Linda Pedersen (formerly Linda Lane) alleges that the agency 

discriminated against her on the basis of a disability and retaliated against her for 

reporting acts of discrimination. The Court previously entered judgment for the 

Secretary of Defense with respect to Ms. Pedersen’s Title VII retaliation claim

because Ms. Pedersen’s evidence does not indicate a causal relation between her 

protected activity and the adverse employment action she experienced. (Doc. 84). 

The Court also entered judgment for the Secretary with respect to Ms. Pedersen’s 

claim for compensatory and punitive damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

because under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lane v. Pena, money

FILED

 2020 Feb-28 PM 06:48

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:14-cv-02304-MHH Document 102 Filed 02/28/20 Page 1 of 6
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damages are not available in a suit against a federal executive agency. 518 U.S. 187 

(1996). (Doc. 84). That left Ms. Pedersen with a claim for declaratory or injunctive 

relief under the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

The Court reserved ruling on the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment 

on Ms. Pedersen’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief and, by separate

order, asked the parties to brief the following issues:

Whether discriminatory intent is an element of the Rehabilitation Act 

claim that Ms. Lane must prove, given that she cannot recover 

compensatory damages, and whether Ms. Lane, if she does not wish to

be reinstated, has standing to request declaratory or injunctive relief, 

and if not, whether this case may proceed on any other grounds.

(Doc. 86). The question regarding standing concerns this Court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a plaintiff lacks standing 

to pursue her claim, a district court may not exercise jurisdiction over the claim. 

A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. Geico General Ins. Co., 925 F.3d 1205, 1210 

(11th Cir. 2019).

“The fundamental prerequisite for standing is that the claimant have ‘a 

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [such] as to warrant his invocation 

of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on 

his behalf.’” In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 780 F.3d 1031, 1038 

Case 5:14-cv-02304-MHH Document 102 Filed 02/28/20 Page 2 of 6
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(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975)). To have

standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” that injury must be “fairly 

traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” and it must be likely that “a 

favorable decision” will redress the plaintiff’s injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

A prospective remedy like an injunction “will provide no relief for an injury 

that is, and likely will remain, entirely in the past.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 

F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994). “[W]hen a plaintiff cannot show that an injury is 

likely to occur immediately, the plaintiff does not have standing to seek prospective 

relief even if he has suffered a past injury.” 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d

1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003). 

In her third amended complaint, Ms. Pedersen requested reinstatement to her 

former position, but Ms. Pedersen abandoned the request during discovery. In her 

deposition, Ms. Pedersen stated repeatedly that she is not seeking reinstatement with 

MDA: 

Ms. Everitt: And if you turn to page 14 [of the complaint], the 

next page, one of your requests for relief is to be reinstated. 

Are you seeking reinstatement still?

Ms. Pedersen: Not with MDA.

Ms. Everitt: You do not wish to be reinstated with MDA; 

correct?

Case 5:14-cv-02304-MHH Document 102 Filed 02/28/20 Page 3 of 6
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Ms. Pedersen: No way.

Ms. Everitt: But are you seeking some form of federal 

employment or just no reinstatement?

Ms. Pedersen: I think that would be open for negotiation.

Ms. Everitt: But you do not seek reinstatement with MDA?

Ms. Pedersen: Correct.

(Doc. 68-1, p. 15, tp. 55) (emphasis added). Ms. Pedersen reiterated this position in 

her briefs. She stated: “I do not wish to be reinstated for employment at the Missile 

Defense Agency. I have felt their condemnation of me while protecting MDA upper 

management. My mental health and physical safety are more important to me.”

(Doc. 97, p. 9). 

Absent reinstatement, the Secretary will not be in a position to violate Ms. 

Pedersen’s rights under the Rehabilitation Act in the future. As a result, Ms. 

Pedersen lacks standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief under the 

Rehabilitation Act. Ms. Pedersen argues that she has standing because of the harm 

she endured as an MDA employee. She states she has “suffered past, present and 

future earnings [sic] due to their termination of my employment due [sic] and the 

loss of my ability to successfully pass a background and clearance check.” (Doc. 

97, p. 9). But these are the lingering effects of a past injury—Ms. Pedersen’s 

termination—not a concrete future injury. “To pursue an injunction or a declaratory 

judgment, [a plaintiff] must allege a likelihood of future violations of [her] rights by 

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[the defendant], not simply future effects from past violations.” Wood v. Dixon, No. 

13-0278-KD-N, 2013 WL 6183143, at *4 n.6 (S.D. Ala. November 26, 2013) 

(quoting Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 563 (5th Cir. 1998)). 

Even if Ms. Pedersen’s alleged “loss of her ability to successfully pass a 

background and clearance check” were to constitute an injury that is not entirely in 

the past, the record contradicts Ms. Pedersen’s allegation. Ms. Pedersen 

acknowledges that Integrated Federal Solutions, a government contractor, hired her 

to work at the IRS. (Doc. 98, p. 1). That admission demonstrates that MDA has not, 

and is not likely in the future to have, the ability to hamper Ms. Pedersen’s ability to 

pass a background check. Because Ms. Pedersen has not asserted an injury that this 

Court’s grant of declaratory or injunctive relief is likely to redress, Ms. Pedersen

does not have standing to seek injunctive relief. 

“[O]nce a federal court determines that [the plaintiff has no standing], the 

court is powerless to continue.” A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC, 925 F.3d at 1230 

(quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 

1999)). Ms. Pedersen has described troubling behavior at the Missile Defense 

Agency, but the Court has no means to address or correct that conduct, were Ms. 

Pedersen to prove it, because Ms. Pedersen no longer works at MDA, and she does 

not wish to return.

Case 5:14-cv-02304-MHH Document 102 Filed 02/28/20 Page 5 of 6
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Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Ms. Pedersen’s Rehabilitation Act claim 

for injunctive or declaratory relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To the 

extent that Ms. Pedersen asks the Court to consider new claims against MDA (see, 

e.g., Doc. 98), the Court will not entertain new claims asserted for the first time at 

the summary judgment stage. See Manley v. Dekalb County, 587 Fed. Appx. 507, 

511 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A] plaintiff may not add new claims to her complaint through 

an argument in a brief opposing a motion for summary judgment.”). The Court asks 

the Clerk to please send a copy of this opinion to Ms. Pedersen at her address of 

record. Because the Court has resolved all of Ms. Pedersen’s claims, by separate 

order, the Court will close the file.

DONE and ORDERED this February 28, 2020.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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