Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00965/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00965-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY BELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. PAYAN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 14-cv-0965 GEB KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s May 20, 2014 motion to recuse the 

undersigned from this action. (ECF No. 11.) The grounds of this motion are that actions 

assigned to the undersigned concerning conditions at the California Medical Facility (“CMF”) are 

generally ruled on in defendants’ favor.

“Judicial impartiality is presumed.” First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. v. Murphy, 

Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). “Because a judge is presumed to be impartial, 

a party seeking recusal bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise.” United States v. 

Martinez, 446 F.3d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 2006).

If “the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either 

against [a party] or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further ...” 28 

U.S.C. § 144. Additionally, a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 

Case 2:14-cv-00965-GEB-KJN Document 13 Filed 05/29/14 Page 1 of 2
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impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Ninth Circuit has held 

that under both recusal statutes “the substantive standard is ‘whether a reasonable person with 

knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.’” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (brackets omitted) 

(quoting United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)).

In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the Supreme Court recognized that 

“extrajudicial source” is the common basis for establishing disqualifying bias or prejudice. Id. at 

551. The Court held:

First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for 

a bias or partiality motion. In and of themselves (i.e., apart from 

surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot 

possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only 

in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or 

antagonism required (as discussed below) when no extrajudicial 

source is involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for 

appeal, not for recusal. Second, opinions formed by the judge on 

the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the 

current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a 

basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 

impossible.

Id. at 555 (citation omitted).

The undersigned’s rulings do not show a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 

make fair judgment impossible.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal of the 

undersigned (ECF No. 11) is denied.

Dated: May 28, 2014

Case 2:14-cv-00965-GEB-KJN Document 13 Filed 05/29/14 Page 2 of 2