Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02416/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02416-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CONSERVATION CONGRESS

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES FORREST SERVICE

and UNITED STATES FISH AND

WILDLIFE SERVICE, 

Defendants.

 /

NO. CIV. 2:12-02416 WBS KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Conservation Congress brought this action

against defendants United States Forest Service (“USFS”) and

United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) challenging

defendants’ actions in connection with three proposed vegetation

clearance projects on the Mendocino National Forest. Presently

before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and plaintiff’s

motion to defer consideration of its Endangered Species Act

(“ESA”) claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).

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I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

In 2012, USFS authorized three projects to take place

on the Grindstone Ranger District of the Mendocino National

Forest, a unit of national forest managed by USFS. 

(Administrative Record (“AR”) at 45, 528, 655 (Docket Nos. 20,

35).) The Mendocino National Forest is home to the Northern

Spotted Owl (“NSO”), a species listed as threatened under the

ESA. (Id. at 337.) The Mendocino National Forest also contains

the Buttermilk Late Successional Reserve (“Buttermilk LSR”). 

(Id. at 355, 1477.) The Buttermilk LSR “is the largest LSR on 1

the forest and a crucial link” between various other LSRs in the

region. (Id. at 355.)

When initially planning the projects, “all of the

Buttermilk LSR [was] designated spotted owl critical habitat”

under the 2008 rule for NSO critical habitat, see Endangered and

Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Designation of Critical

Habitat for the N. Spotted Owl, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,326 (Aug. 13,

2008). (AR at 355) In December 2012, a new rule designating NSO

critical habitat was published to become effective January 3,

2013. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;

Designation of Revised Critical Habitat for the N. Spotted Owl,

LSRs are managed to protect and enhance late 1

successional forest habitat for species dependent upon its

attributes, and to help ensure the conservation of species

diversity. (AR at 1675.) The main role of LSRs is to protect

from large scale disturbances such as stand replacing fire,

windthrow, insect and disease epidemics, and major human caused

impacts. (Id.) As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, “LSRs lie at

the heart of the [National Forest Plan’s] ecosystem-based

conservation strategy for the northern spotted owl and other

endangered species.” Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Brong, 492 F.3d

1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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77 Fed. Reg. 71,876 (Dec. 4, 2012). The 2012 rule affected the

NSO critical habitat designation of several areas of the

Mendocino National Forest. (AR at 2542.) 

2

A. Tatham Ridge Fuels Project

The first project, called the Tatham Ridge Fuels

Project (“Tatham Project”), was authorized by a decision memo

issued on May 25, 2012. (Id. at 45-53.) The Tatham Project was

designed to reduce wildfire hazard, to accelerate tree growth for

sustained timber productivity, and to develop late-successional

habitat in accordance with the Buttermilk LSR. (See id. at 106,

367, 415-16, 2141.)

The Tatham Project involves three types of treatments:

(1) 1,300 acres of plantation thinning by removing small trees to

allow larger trees to grow more quickly; (2) approximately 879

acres of fuel break construction; and (3) 1,800 acres of

prescribed burning of the understory to reduce fuel loading of

forests. (Id. at 46, 343-45.) USFS created a biological

assessment (“BA”) for the Tatham Project. (Id. at 334). At the

time of the BA, twenty-six percent of the total action area3

proposed by the Tatham Project would occur within the Buttermilk

LSR. (Id. at 355.) Approximately fifty-four percent of the

action area provides suitable NSO nesting/roosting, foraging, or

USFS maintains that “[b]ecause of this new designation, 2

[t]he Buttermilk LSR is no longer coterminous with a critical

habitat unit.” (Defs.’ Cross-Mot. at 8 n.16 (Docket No. 39-1).)

USFS documents distinguish between the “project area” 3

and the “action area.” “[P]roject areas only encompass the

actual units proposed for treatment,” while “action areas”

“include the proposed treatment units plus a 1.3 mile radius

surrounding the unit boundaries.” (AR at 809 (emphasis added).) 

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dispersal habitat. (Id.) USFS concluded that the Tatham

Project, “‘May Affect, but is Not Likely to Adversely Affect’ the

northern spotted owl.” (Id. at 383.) 

The Tatham Project was determined to qualify for

Categorical Exclusion Six (“CE 6”), 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(e)(6),

involving timber stand and/or wildlife habitat improvement

activities which do not include the use of herbicides. (AR at

48-51.) Thus, while USFS created a BA and decision memo, it did

not create an environmental assessment (“EA”) or environmental

impact statement (“EIS”) in connection with the project. 

B. Log Springs Project

USFS authorized the Log Springs Project by issuing a

decision memo on June 28, 2012. (Id. at 658.) The Log Springs

Project proposes the thinning of fifty to seventy year old

ponderosa pine over seventy acres to increase resiliency to

western bark beatles and to reduce high fuel loads, as well as to

meet the timber production quotas for the Mendocino National

Forest. (Id. at 655-57, 695-97.) In a joint BA prepared for

both the Log Springs and M9 Sanitation Salvage Project (“M9

Project”), USFS determined that the Log Springs Project does not

contain any designated NSO habitat or activity centers. (Id. at

823-33.) None of the project area occurs within the Buttermilk

LSR, but twenty-one percent of the action area overlaps with the

LSR. (Id. at 821-22.) USFS determined that both the Log Springs

and M9 Projects “‘Would Not Affect’ the northern spotted owl or

its Critical Habitat.” (Id. at 831.)

USFS determined that the Log Springs Project qualified

for Categorical Exclusion Twelve (“CE 12”), 36 C.F.R. §

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220.6(e)(12), involving the timber harvest of seventy acres or

less. (Id. at 658.) USFS did not create an EA or EIS for the

project.

C. M9 Sanitation Salvage Project

The M9 Project was authorized by USFS through a

decision memo issued on June 28, 2012. (Id. at 531.) The M9

Project proposes salvage and sanitation harvest of dead, dying,

and at-risk trees on 250 acres, followed by reforestation “to

timely restore productivity to desired levels.” (Id. at 528-31,

573-75.) The project area exhibits larger than normal pockets of

mortality due to bark beatle infestation which contributes to

heavy fuel loads. (Id. at 528, 530, 571-72.) The M9 Project is

designed to address past beatle attacks, reduce fuel load on the

forest, and contribute to the Mendocino National Forest’s annual

timber harvest levels. (Id. at 529-30.) As with the Log Springs

Project, none of the project area occurs within the Buttermilk

LSR, but twenty-one percent of the action area overlaps with the

LSR. (Id. at 821-22). No designated NSO habitat or activity

centers are present within the M9 Project area. (Id. at 823-33.) 

The joint BA found that the M9 and Log Springs Projects “‘Would

Not Affect’ the northern spotted owl or its Critical Habitat.” 

(Id. at 831.) 

USFS determined that the M9 Project fit within

Categorical Exception Thirteen for the salvage harvest of 250

acres or less of dead or dying trees (“CE 13”), 36 C.F.R. §

220.6(e)(13), Categorical Exception Fourteen for sanitation

harvest to control insects or disease (“CE 14”), id. §

220.6(e)(14), and Categorical Exclusion Five for the regeneration

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of native species (“CE 5”), id. § 220.6(e)(5). (AR at 527, 531.) 

USFS did not create an EA or EIS in connection with the project. 

D. Procedural History

Plaintiff is a non-profit organization dedicated to

maintaining, protecting, and restoring the native ecosystems of

northern California. (Compl. ¶ 18 (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiff

filed suit challenging defendants’ actions in connection with the

approval of the three projects, bringing claims under both the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et

seq., and the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. Plaintiff’s NEPA

claims are brought exclusively against USFS and include: (1)

improper use of a categorical exclusion; (2) failure to analyze

cumulative impacts of the three projects; and (3) failure to

prepare an EIS. (Id. ¶¶ 122-152.) Plaintiff also brings various

ESA claims, the majority of which are brought against both USFS

and FWS. (Id. ¶¶ 153-196.)

On December 21, 2012, defendants moved to limit the

court’s review to the administrative record and deny discovery by

plaintiff. (Docket No. 17.) The court denied the motion without

prejudice to the right to object subsequently to the

consideration of material outside of the record. (Feb. 26, 2013

Order at 2 (Docket No. 29).) The court ordered that “[p]laintiff

may pursue discovery regarding its ESA claims against USFS while

plaintiff litigates its summary judgment motion on its claims

under [NEPA].” (Id.)

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its NEPA claims

under Rule 56. (Docket No. 30.) Defendants, in their crossmotion for summary judgment, moved for summary judgment on both

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the NEPA and ESA claims. (Docket No. 39.) Plaintiff moved to

defer consideration of the ESA claims under Rule 56(d). (Docket

No. 41.)

II. Motion to Defer

Rule 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows by

affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot

present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may

. . . defer considering the motion or deny it.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(d). “To prevail under . . . Rule [56(d)], [a] part[y]

opposing a motion for summary judgment must make (a) a timely

application which (b) specifically identifies (c) relevant

information, (d) where there is some basis for believing that the

information sought actually exists.”• Emp’rs Teamsters Local Nos.

175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Clorox Co., 353 F.3d 1125, 1129

(9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, plaintiff notes that the deposition of its ESA

expert has yet to occur, and documents regarding the defendants’

continued consultation regarding the Tatham Project were produced

during the briefing of the cross-motions for summary judgment. 

(Docket No. 36.) The court finds plaintiff’s application

sufficient to defer consideration of its ESA claims under Rule

56(d), and plaintiff’s motion will accordingly be granted. 

The court now turns to the parties’ cross motions for

summary judgment on plaintiff’s NEPA claims.

III. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

The court reviews NEPA claims to determine whether they

are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law” under the Administrative Procedure

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Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Ctr. for Biological

Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013). 

“Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if ‘the agency has

relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,

entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,

offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could

not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency

expertise.’” Great Old Broads for Wilderness v. Kimbell, 709

F.3d 836, 846 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting City of Sausalito v.

O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1206 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

“A reviewing court ‘generally must be at its most

deferential when reviewing scientific judgment and technical

analyses within the agency’s expertise.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The court also “defers to [the

agency’s] ‘interpretation of its own regulations . . . unless

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations being

interpreted.’” Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1090 (alteration in

original) (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551

U.S. 158, 171 (2007)). “As the Supreme Court stated in Citizens

to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, ‘the ultimate standard

of review is a narrow one,’ and ‘[t]he court is not empowered to

substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” KlamathSiskiyou Wildlands Cntr. v. Bur. of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 993

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.

v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).

A. Standing

“In limiting the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and

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‘Controversies,’ Article III of the Constitution restricts it to

the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, which is to

redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to

persons caused by private or official violations of law.” 

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009). “To

seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under

threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is concrete and

particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the

alleged action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a

favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.” 

Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laildlaw Envtl. Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). 

“‘It is common ground that . . . [an] organization[]

can assert the standing of its members.’ But the organization

asserting standing must provide ‘specific allegations

establishing that at least one identified member [has] suffered

or would suffer harm . . . .’” W. Watersheds Project v.

Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 483 (9th Cir. 2010) (first five

alterations in original) (quoting Summers, 555 U.S. at 494, 498). 

“While generalized harm to the forest or the environment will not

alone support standing, if that harm in fact affects the

recreational or even the aesthetic interests of the plaintiff,

that will suffice.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 494 (citing Sierra Club

v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972)).

In support of its motion, plaintiff submits the

declaration of Denise Boggs, Executive Director and member of

plaintiff’s organization. (Docket Nos. 30-1, 30-2.) Ms. Boggs

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declares that she regularly visits the Mendocino National Forest

where the proposed projects will take place, (Boggs Decl. ¶¶ 2, 7

(Docket No. 30-1)), that she has plans to return in August 2013,

(id. ¶ 7), and that she is interested in the wildlife and

vegetation, particularly raptors and “beautiful large old trees

and snags,” (id.). The proposed projects, and the Tatham Project

in particular, allegedly threaten to injure these interests. 

(Id.) The court finds that Ms. Boggs’ declaration is sufficient

to demonstrate plaintiff’s standing. See Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d

at 484-85 (declaration of Western Watersheds Project’s founder

identifying grazing allotment site that “he has personally

visited and continues to visit, study, enjoy, and in which he

pursues recreational activities,” the regulation of which would

allegedly damage his aesthetic enjoyment, was sufficient to

satisfy standing). 

B. Waiver and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

“Persons challenging an agency’s compliance with NEPA

‘must structure their participation so that it . . . alerts the

agency to the [parties’] position and contentions,’ in order to

allow the agency to give the issue meaningful consideration.” 

Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir.

2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v.

Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764 (2004)). While an issue not

raised during the notice and comment may result in waiver of that

argument in federal court, see N. Idaho Cmty. Action Network v.

U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 545 F.3d 1147, 1156 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008),

“a party has participated in a sufficiently meaningful way when

it has alerted the agency to its position and claims,” City of

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Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1208.

“The exhaustion doctrine serves ‘to permit

administrative agencies to utilize their expertise, correct any

mistakes, and avoid unnecessary judicial intervention in the

process.’” Kimbell, 709 F.3d at 846 (quoting Lands Council v.

McNair, 629 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010)). “The APA requires

that plaintiffs exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing grievances to federal court, 5 U.S.C. § 704,” including

the specific appeal procedures established by the agency. 

Kimbell, 709 F.3d at 846. The Ninth Circuit has “defined the

exhaustion requirement broadly: ‘The plaintiffs have exhausted

their administrative appeals if the appeal, taken as a whole,

provided sufficient notice to the [agency] to afford it the

opportunity to rectify the violations that plaintiffs alleged.” 

Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir.

2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Native Ecosystems Council

v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 899 (9th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiffs are

not barred from bringing claims when the plaintiffs “‘presented a

much less refined legal argument in their administrative

appeal.’” Id. (quoting Native Ecosystems, 304 F.3d at 898).

USFS argues that plaintiff waived and failed to exhaust

its arguments regarding the Log Springs Project because

plaintiff’s comments were submitted five days late, (Defs.’

Cross-Mot. at 20 (Docket No. 39)), while plaintiff argues that,

due to a publishing error regarding the related M9 Project, the

notice and comment date was delayed such that its joint comments

on the Log Springs and M9 Projects were timely, (Pl.’s Reply at

8–9 (Docket No. 42)). It appears to the court that plaintiff, at

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the very least, participated in a way that sufficiently alerted

USFS to its position and claims regarding the Log Springs

Project, see Barnes, 655 F.3d at 1132, especially when the two

projects shared many of the same expert reports, were originally

published on the same day, and were close geographically. Since

USFS does not dispute that it was put on notice of plaintiff’s

claims and arguments regarding the project, the court will

consider those arguments. 

USFS also asserts that plaintiff’s comments and

administrative appeal did not raise the argument that the size of

the Tatham Project precludes the use of a categorical exclusion,

and therefore this argument is waived and barred. In its

comments and administrative appeal, plaintiff argued generally

that use of a categorical exclusion was inappropriate for the

Tatham Project. (AR at 467-68, 18-20.) Since “[t]he court of

appeals . . . has declined to require more than general

objections during the administrative process to avoid ‘unduly

burden[ing] those who pursue administrative appeals unrepresented

by counsel who may frame their claims in non-legal terms rather

than precise legal forumlations,’” the court will consider

plaintiff’s arguments regarding the size of the Tatham Project. 

Save Strawberry Canyon v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 830 F. Supp. 2d

737, 746 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that raising only general

concerns about noise, and not specifically criticizing the manner

in which noise was calculated, was sufficient for the district

court to consider the argument).

C. Improper Use of Categorical Exclusions 

“NEPA requires that federal agencies perform

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environmental analysis before taking any ‘major Federal actions

significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’” 

Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1094 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)). 

“NEPA does not require particular environmental standards or

mandate that agencies achieve substantive environmental results.” 

Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir.

2010). Congress in enacting NEPA “required only that the agency

take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences before

taking a major action.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).

“Under the CEQ regulations, which were promulgated

pursuant to NEPA, each agency is directed to identify

‘categorical exclusions’ which are categories of actions which do

not, individually or cumulatively, have a significant effect on

the human environment and therefore, do not require an EA or

EIS.” Alaska Ctr. For Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851,

857 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4). Federal

agencies are also required to “provide for extraordinary

circumstances,” which are circumstances “in which a normally

excluded action may have a significant environmental impact.” 40

C.F.R. § 1508.4. “When extraordinary circumstances are present,

the agency must prepare environmental documentation despite the

fact that the activity in question falls within a categorical

exclusion.” California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir.

2002).

To comply with NEPA when evaluating a particular

project for categorical exclusion, an agency must first determine

whether the proposed action falls within a categorical exclusion

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and then determine whether “extraordinary circumstances” exist

that would prevent application of the exclusion. See id.;

Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1097. “Application of a categorical

exclusion is not an exemption from NEPA; rather, it is a form of

NEPA compliance, albeit one that requires less than where an

environmental impact statement or an environmental impact is

necessary.” Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1096 (citing 40 C.F.R. §

15084.4). “[W]here a proposed action fits within a categorical

exclusion, full NEPA analysis is not required.” Id. at 1097

(citing Wong v. Bush, 542 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

Consistent with CEQ regulations, USFS has promulgated

seventeen categorical exceptions which require a project or case

file and decision memo to satisfy NEPA. See 36 C.F.R. §

220.6(e). In providing for “extraordinary circumstances”

sufficient to preclude use of its categorical exclusions, USFS

has determined that:

Resource considerations that should be considered in

determining whether extraordinary circumstances related

to a proposed action warrant further analysis and

documentation in an EA or an EIS are:

(i) Federally listed threatened or endangered species or

designated critical habitat, species proposed for Federal

listing or proposed critical habitat, or Forest Service

sensitive species;

(ii) Flood plains, wetlands, or municipal watersheds;

(iii) Congressionally designated areas, such as

wilderness, wilderness study areas, or national

recreation areas;

(iv) Inventoried roadless area or potential wilderness

area;

(v) Research natural areas;

(vi) American Indians and Alaska Native religious or

cultural sites; and

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(vii) Archaeological sites, or historic properties or

areas.

36 C.F.R. § 220.6(b)(1).

 

“The mere presence of one or more of these resource

conditions does not preclude use of a categorical exclusion . . .

.” Id. § 220.6(b)(2). “It is the existence of a cause-effect

relationship between a proposed action and the potential effect

on these resource conditions, and if such a relationship exists,

the degree of the potential effect of a proposed action on these

resource conditions that determines whether extraordinary

circumstances exist.” Id. 

1. Tatham Project

The USFS determined that the Tatham Project fit within

CE 6. (AR at 48-51.) CE 6 is an exclusion for “[t]imber stand

and/or wildlife improvement activities that do not include the

use of herbicides or do not require more than 1 mile of low

standard road construction.” 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(e)(6). Examples

include, but are not limited to: 

(i) Girdling trees to create snags; 

(ii) Thinning or brush control to improve growth or to

reduce fire hazard including the opening of an existing

road to a dense timber stand; 

(iii) Prescribed burning to control understory hardwoods

in stands of southern pine; and 

(iv) Prescribed burning to reduce natural fuel build-up

and improve plant vigor.

Id. If a proposed project fits within this exclusion and no

extraordinary circumstances exist, USFS need only create a

project or case file and decision memo. Id. § 220.6(e). 

Plaintiff does not contest that the Tatham Project’s plantation

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thinning, fuel break construction, and prescribed burning are

activities that fit within CE 6. 

Keeping in mind that an extraordinary circumstance is a

circumstance “in which a normally excluded action may have a

significant environmental impact,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (emphasis

added), USFS’s determination that no extraordinary circumstances

existed to preclude the use of a categorical exclusion does not

appear to be supported by the record. A significant portion of

the Tatham Project occurs in NSO nesting/roosting or foraging

habitat, (AR at 363), short-term effects of thinning include “a

possible loss of suitable spotted owl habitat,” (id. at 367), and

“[a]ll treatments have the potential to directly affect nesting,

foraging or dispersing individuals due to disturbance, noise or

smoke, which could possibly disrupt reproductive behavior and/or

cause nest failure,” (id. at 371). The BA prepared in support of

the Tatham Project admits that the Project “May Affect, but is

Not Likely to Adversely Affect the northern spotted owl.” (Id.

at 383 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

Similarly to California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, (9th

Cir. 2002), “there is substantial evidence in the record that

exceptions to the categorical exclusion may apply, and the fact

that the exceptions may apply is all that is required to prohibit

use of the categorical exclusion.” Norton, 311 F.3d at 1177.4

Norton also states that “[w]here there is substantial 4

evidence in the record that exceptions to the categorical

exclusion may apply, the agency must at the very least explain

why the action does not fall within one of the exceptions.” 

Norton, 311 F.3d at 1177. Phrased another way, an agency’s

explanation as to why a categorical exclusion applies is a

necessary, but not sufficient, condition to correctly apply a

categorical exclusion. While USFS included discussion in the

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The court also notes that, while the USFS Handbook “does not have

the independent force and effect of law,” see Southwest Center

for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443,

1450 (9th Cir. 1996), the Handbook provides that “[i]f the degree

of potential effect raises uncertainty over its significance,

then an extraordinary circumstance exists, precluding use of a

categorical exception.” U.S. Forest Serv. Handbook 1909.15, ch.

30, § 31.2 (2010); see Alaska Ctr., 189 F.3d 858 (citing the USFS

Handbook in its analysis of categorical exclusions).

One of the primary cases relied upon by USFS, Southwest

Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service,

100 F.3d 1443 (9th Cir. 1996), noted that “an agency may issue a

categorical exclusion even where threatened or endangered species

are present if the agency determines that the project will not

impact negatively on the species.” Sw. Ctr., 100 F.3d at 1449

(emphasis added) (citing Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t

of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1414-16, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

Here, the agency did not determine that the project will not

affect the NSO; rather, it concluded that the project is not

likely to adversely affect the NSO. In Southwest Center, the

defendant agency in that case made a “no effect” finding

regarding the species at issue–-similarly to the M9 and Log

Springs Projects here–-whereas the Tatham Project involved a

finding that the Project may affect, but is not likely to

adversely affect, the NSO. See id. at 1449-50. 

Decision Memo explaining its decision, the court finds that

USFS’s explanation was not sufficient to establish that

extraordinary circumstances were not present. 

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Since the court finds that USFS’s decision to apply a

categorical exclusion to the Tatham Project is arbitrary and

capricious, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Tatham

Project be granted and USFS’s motion for summary judgment will be

denied. USFS must therefore prepare legally adequate NEPA

documentation for the Tatham Project.

2. Log Springs Project

As for the Log Springs Project, USFS determined that it

fit within CE 12, which provides for the exclusion of

[h]arvest of live trees not to exceed 70 acres, requiring

no more than 1/2 mile of temporary road construction. .

. . Examples include, but are not limited to: (i) removal

of individual trees for sawlogs, speciality products, or

fuelwood, and (ii) Commercial thinning of overstocked

stands to achieve the desired stocking level to increase

health and vigor.

 

36 C.F.R. § 220.6(e)(12). 

The Log Springs Decision Memo notes that project area

is “currently over stocked for ponderosa pine stands; this has

been shown to make the stands vulnerable to western bark beetle

attacks.” (AR at 655.) In addition, the Memo notes that the

over stocking has created high fuel loads “which are above levels

which would allow for beneficial effects from fire.” (Id. at

656.) These determinations are supported by the Log Springs

Project Silviculture Report. (Id. at 694-95.)

The BA created in connection with the Log Springs and

M9 Projects notes that some NSO activity centers overlap the

action area of the projects, but after analyzing both the direct

and indirect effects on the NSO, USFS determined that the

projects “Would Not Affect” the NSO. The BA found that no NSO

nesting, roosting, or foraging habitat will be treated, the

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projects are outside the NSO critical habitat, any proposed

treatments are not within a quarter mile of any suitable NSO

nesting habitat so disturbance would not occur, and “[although]

some prey species may be temporarily displaced, the distance to

spotted owl foraging habitat is such that spotted owl foraging

success would not be affected.” (Id. at 831.) After the 2012

critical habitat rule was passed, USFS again determined that the

Log Springs Project would not adversely affect the NSO because

its project areas were not within newly designated critical

habitat. (Id. at 2574.)

From the record before the court, USFS’s decisions that

the Log Springs Project qualifies for categorical exclusion under

CE 12 and that no extraordinary circumstances exist were not

arbitrary or capricious. The court will accordingly deny

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its favor while

granting USFS’s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff on

this claim.

3. M9 Project

USFS determined that the M9 project fit within CE 13,

CE 14, and CE 5. (AR at 531-33.) To be excluded under CE 13,

the project must involve “[s]alvage of dead and/or dying trees

not to exceed 250 acres, requiring no more than 1/2 mile of

temporary road construction. . . . Examples include, but are not

limited to “(i) [h]arvest of a portion of a stand damaged by a

wind or ice event and construction of a short temporary road to

access the damaged trees, and (ii) [h]arvest of fire-damaged

tree.” 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(e)(13).

CE 14 involves “[c]ommercial and non-commercial

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sanitation harvest to control insects or disease not to exceed

250 acres, requiring no more than 1/2 mile of temporary road

construction, including removal of infested/infected trees and

adjacent live uninfested/uninfected trees as determined necessary

to control the spread of insects or disease.” 36 C.F.R. §

220.6(e)(14). “Examples include, but are not limited to: (i)

Felling and harvest of trees infested with southern pine beetles

and immediately adjacent uninfested trees to control expanding

spot infestations, and (ii) Removal and/or destruction of trees

affected by a new exotic insect or disease . . . .” Id. 

CE 5 allows for the exclusion of “[r]egeneration of an

area to native tree species, including site preparation that does

not involve the use of herbicides or vegetation type conversion.” 

36 C.F.R. § 220.6(e)(5). “Examples include, but are not limited

to: . . . (ii) Planting trees or mechanical seed dispersal of

native tree species following a fire, flood, or landside.” Id. 

USFS’s determination that the M9 Project fit within

these three CEs is not arbitrary or capricious. The M9 Project

includes commercial thinning of 250 acres of ponderosa pine to

limit mortality caused by western bark beetle attacks, (AR at

528-29, 571-72), an activity which plausibly fits within CE 14,

see 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(e)(14). USFS’s determination that the M9

Project also fit within CE 13, which involves the salvage of dead

and dying trees is also not implausible, as just under a quarter

of all board feet of timber products harvested in the Project

would involve dead timber products, (AR at 529), and one of the

primary purposes of the project was to “recover the economic

value of salvageable dead trees,” (id. at 570). Finally, the M9

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Project proposes reforestation for under stocked areas to restore

productivity to timber producing areas, (id. at 529), which

plausibly conforms with CE 5, see 36 C.F.R. § 200.6(e)(5). 

As noted above, USFS adequately considered the impacts

on the NSO and was not arbitrary and capricious in finding that

no extraordinary circumstances existed to preclude application of

a categorical exclusion. (See AR 831.) Accordingly, the court

will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and will grant

summary judgment in favor of USFS on this claim. 

D. Cumulative Impacts

In addition to challenging the projects independently,

plaintiff alleges that USFS failed to consider “cumulative

impacts” of the combined Log Springs and M9 Projects, as well as

the projects’ effects in combination with other regional

projects, such as nearby Smokey Project. (Compl. ¶¶ 141-45;

Pl.’s Mot. at 32-35; Pl.’s Reply at 17-19.) In Center for

Biological Diversity v. Salazar, the Ninth Circuit analyzed this

very issue in connection with the Bureau of Land Management’s

application of a categorical exclusion to the issuance of a

gravel extraction permit. Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1096. The court

explained that the language of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25, which

requires that an agency consider “indirect” and “cumulative”

impacts, “explicitly applies to environmental impacts

statements,” and “application of [its] requirements to

categorical exclusions is inconsistent with the efficiencies that

the abbreviated categorical exclusion process provides.” Id. at

1097. Noting that “where a proposed action fits within a

categorical exclusion, full NEPA analysis is not required,” the

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court concluded that § 1508.25’s requirements “do not apply to

[the agency’s] categorical exclusion analysis in this case.” 

Id. 

5

While the Salazar court engaged in a cumulative effects

analysis, it did so because BLM’s regulations required a finding

of extraordinary circumstances when a proposed action would

“‘[h]ave a direct relationship to other actions with individually

insignificant but cumulatively significant environmental

effects.’” See id. at 1097 (alteration in original) (citing BLM

NEPA Handbook App’x at 5, § 2.6; 43 C.F.R. § 46215(f)) (“Though

not required to do so by section 1508.25, under BLM’s own

regulations, this ‘extraordinary circumstances’ analysis required

BLM to consider whether issuance of the gravel permit would

‘[h]ave a direct relationship to other actions with individually

insignificant but cumulative significant environmental effects.’”

(emphasis added)). Here, however, the Forest Service’s

regulations do not require a cumulative impacts analysis when

determining whether there are extraordinary circumstances, and

plaintiff points to no applicable regulation requiring any such

analysis. See 36 C.F.R. § 220.6(b); Forest Serv. NEPA Handbook §

31.2. In the absence of a clear requirement that the USFS

consider cumulative impacts in its categorical exclusion

analysis, the court declines to require consideration of

cumulative impacts. 

Salazar specifically declined to apply Kern v. U.S. 5

Bur. of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), a case cited

by plaintiff in support of its “cumulative impacts” argument, in

the categorical exclusion context. See Salazar, 706 F.3d at

1097.

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Plaintiff also argues that USFS improperly split the

Spring Logs and M9 Projects into two separate projects in order

to avoid the acreage limits of their respective CEs. (Pl.’s Mot.

at 26-27; Pl.’s Reply at 18-19.) In Alaska Center for the

Environment, the Ninth Circuit addressed a plaintiff’s argument

that USFS was attempting to avoid NEPA review by “breaking

proposed actions down into one-year temporary actions so as to

fit within the categorical exclusion and not complete an EA.” 

Alaska Ctr., 189 F.3d at 858 n.5. The court rejected this

argument, explaining that “[t]he question of whether an action is

temporary and fits within the categorical exclusion is a factual

determination that implicates substantial agency expertise . . .

.” Id. The court held that USFS’s “categorization of one-year

helicopter permits as temporary is not unreasonable or does not

rise to the level of arbitrary and capricious.” Id.

Similarly here, whether the Log Springs and M9 projects

are sufficiently distinct to qualify as two separate projects

under different CEs is a “factual determination that implicates

USFS expertise.” Id. While USFS created a single BA due to the

projects’ geographic proximity, (AR at 807), the two projects

target different sections of forest, (id. at 817), and the

primary aims of the two projects are different, (compare id. at

590 (explaining that the M9 Project is “primarily designed to

recover the economic value of salvageable dead trees”), with id.

at 694 (explaining that the Log Springs Project is “primarily

designed to reduce stand densities through commercial

thinning”)). Plaintiffs’ assertion that every specialist report

covered both projects,” (Pl.’s Reply at 19), while not at all

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dispositive on the issue if true, is in fact false, as USFS

issued separate silviculture reports for the projects, for

example. (AR at 570, 694). Plaintiff thus fails to convince the

court that USFS’s decision to create two separate projects

instead of a single project is “so implausible that it could not

be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency

expertise.” Kimbell, 709 F.3d at 846. 

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor

of USFS and against plaintiff on plaintiff’s claim that USFS’s

failure to consider cumulative impacts was arbitrary and

capricious.

E. Failure to Prepare an EIS

“Under NEPA, an agency must prepare an EIS for any

proposed federal action ‘significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment.’” Kimbell, 709 F.3d at 854 (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)). Plaintiff essentially argues that an EIS,

rather than an EA, is required for the projects because the

projects will significantly affect the environment. (Compl. ¶¶

146-52; Pl.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summary J. at 36-37

(Docket No. 31).)

Since USFS’s decision that the Log Springs and M9

Projects qualify for categorical exclusions was not arbitrary or

capricious, USFS’s compilation of a project file and issuance of

a decision memo satisfy its obligations under NEPA. See 36

C.F.R. § 220.6(e); Salazar, 706 F.3d at 1096 (“Application of a

categorical exclusion is not an exemption from NEPA; rather, it

is a form of NEPA compliance, albeit one that requires less than

where an environmental impact statement or an environmental

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impact is necessary.”). The court will accordingly deny

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and will grant USFS’s

motion for summary judgment regarding failure to prepare an EIS

for the Log Springs and M9 Projects. 

As for the Tatham Project, plaintiff “asks this court

to conclude, without the benefit of even an EA,” that the Tatham

Project will have significant impacts sufficient to require an

EIS. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric.,

481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1088-89 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Plaintiff

“put[s] the cart before the horse, and request[s] that the court

make a finding regarding the precise nature of and exact

foreseeability of significant effects in this case, when all that

is required to render the CE inappropriate is the possibility of

significant effects.” Id. at 1088. Here, as in Citizens,

because a CE was invoked and thus no EA was prepared to consider

whether significant effects would exist, USFS “did not create a

record that enable this court to make the type of determination

that [plaintiff] now seeks.” Id. “[T]he court should not make

the determination requested by [plaintiff] without such a

record.” Id. Only after preparation of an EA will the matter be

ready for judicial review, id. at 1090, and if USFS chooses to

prepare an EIS, this claim would be moot. Accordingly, the court

will defer consideration of whether the Tatham Project requires

an EIS. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) plaintiff’s motion to defer consideration of its

ESA claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) be, and

the same hereby is, GRANTED;

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(2) with respect to the Log Springs and M9 Projects,

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED and USFS’s

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and

(3) with respect to the Tatham Project, plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and USFS’s motion for

summary judgment is DENIED. USFS shall not begin its proposed

actions on the Tatham Project without the preparation and

consideration of legally adequate documentation under NEPA.

Within fourteen days of this Order, the parties shall

submit a joint Status Report conforming to the April 26, 2013

Stipulation Scheduling Order, or explaining why the court should

modify that Scheduling Order.

DATED: June 5, 2013

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