Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01491/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01491-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 Petitioner initially had paid the filing fee for this action but subsequently submitted an

application to proceed in forma pauperis. On June 28, 2005, the court granted petitioner’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis and formally appointed counsel. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL S. LEMELLE, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1491 LKK KJM P

vs.

CHERYL PLILER, Warden,

Respondent. ORDER DENYING EVIDENTIARY HEARING

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. On June 8, 2005, the court held a telephonic status conference with Juliet Haley,

Deputy Attorney General, and Donald Lipmanson, counsel for petitioner1 to explore whether an

evidentiary hearing was necessary and permissible on the question of trial counsel’s belief that he

could not “ethically represent” petitioner. 

The parties have briefed the question and lodged copies of petitioner’s state

collateral attacks.

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01491-LKK -KJM Document 29 Filed 07/19/05 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 CT refers to the Clerk’s Transcript and RT to the Reporter’s Transcript of the state

record, lodged with this court. The transcripts were lodged in a set of exhibits to the Answer on

November 7, 2002.

2

A. Background

Petitioner was charged with robbery and assault with a semi-automatic firearm and

was alleged to have used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury. He also was alleged to have

suffered several prior “strikes.” CT 14-17.2

During state proceedings, petitioner filed a motion in pro per, asking to have

counsel Carl Spieckerman relieved. CT 124-131. The court denied the motion. 7/2/98 RT 11. 

At a later hearing, Spieckerman sought to withdraw as counsel for petitioner. 10/7/98 RT 2-3. 

The court denied this motion as well. Id. at 10. Petitioner ultimately entered a no contest plea,

preserving his right to appeal several issues. 11/13/98 RT 7; CT 241-243. 

Before sentencing, petitioner unsuccessfully sought to withdraw his plea. CT 256-

278; 4/16/99 RT 3. Attorney Daniel Russo was appointed and filed a written motion to withdraw

based on “the attached declaration and attached exhibits, the memorandum of points and

authorities . . ., on the records on file in this action, and on such oral and documentary evidence as

may be presented at the hearing on the motion.” CT 257. The “attached declaration” was

petitioner’s and described the deterioration of his relationship with Spieckerman and his fear that,

had he gone to trial, he would not have received adequate representation. CT 261-262.

The matter was argued on April 16, 1999. The court noted that both Russo and

Spieckerman were in the courtroom. 4/16/99 RT 2. The court asked Russo for comments; Russo

asked if the court had any inquiry and submitted on the pleadings when the court did not. Id. at

2-3. The court denied the motion and proceeded to sentencing, with Spieckerman once again

representing petitioner. 4/16/99 RT 3-4. 

In the state Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, petitioner challenged the trial

court’s refusal to grant his motion to replace Spieckerman and Spieckerman’s motion to

Case 2:02-cv-01491-LKK -KJM Document 29 Filed 07/19/05 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

withdraw. Answer, Ex. G at 9-25 (appellant’s brief in the Court of Appeal) & Ex. D at 13-22

(petition for review in the California Supreme Court). 

At the conclusion of direct review, petitioner filed habeas petitions in the Solano

County Superior Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court. In each of these, he included the

same argument:

Trial court violated petitioners sixth amendment rights to adequate

representation free of conflict when the court denied (1) petitioners motion

to substitute counsel; and (2) defense counsel’s motion to withdraw as

defense counsel.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Trial court denied petitioners marsden motion on July 2, 1998 By

giving his own personal opinion in high regards for defense

counsel’s abilities based on his past observation of defense counsel

in his courtroom. On October 7, 1998, defense counsel orally

moved to withdraw as defense counsel on the following grounds:

(1) defense counsel declaired conflict of interest between attorney

and client, (2) defense counsel claimed he could not represent

defendant “ethically”, (3) that defensant has a right to a fair trial,

and he could not put it on, (4) that in 25 years this is the first time

he’s come to the conclusion that he couldn;t represent someone, (5)

that he (defense counsel) had an obligation to withdraw. On

October 7, 1998 trial . . . court denied defense counsel;s motion to

withdraw (see Reporters transcript of Marsden hearing Thursday,

July 2, 1998 & Wednesday, October 7, 1998). 

Answer, Ex. J (Superior Court petition) at 3 (verbatim reproduction of claim); see also id., Ex. K

(Court of Appeal petition) at 3; Ex. I (Supreme Court petition) at 3. Petitioner did not attach any

declarations, documentary evidence or other exhibits or ask for an evidentiary hearing.

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01491-LKK -KJM Document 29 Filed 07/19/05 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

B. Hearing Under The AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides, in

pertinent part: 

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary

hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on –

 (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing

evidence that but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant

guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

At this stage of consideration of the instant petition, the court is required to

“determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim.” Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). If the facts do not exist or are inadequate and a

hearing might be appropriate, then

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01491-LKK -KJM Document 29 Filed 07/19/05 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In Townsend, the court listed several factors

to be considered to determine whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. These are “(1) the merits

of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is

not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the

state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation

of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the statecourt hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas

applicant a full and fair fact hearing.” 372 U.S. at 313. The fifth factor was overruled in Keeney

v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). 

5

[the] court’s first task in determining whether to grant an

evidentiary hearing is to ascertain whether the petitioner has ‘failed

to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court.’ If so, the

court must deny a hearing unless the applicant establishes one of the

two narrow exceptions set forth in §2254(e)(2)(A) & (B). If, on the

other hand, the applicant has not ‘failed to develop’ the facts in state

court, the district court may proceed to consider whether a hearing

is appropriate, or required under Townsend.

3

Id.

A petitioner will be charged with a “failure to develop” the facts if “there is lack

of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000). The petitioner must have “made a reasonable

attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state

court.” Id. at 435. “Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek

an evidentiary hearing in the state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Id. at 437. 

In Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of

rehearing, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001), petitioner argued his trial counsel had been burdened by

a conflict of interest and failed to provide effective assistance of counsel because he did not

undertake the investigation that could have revealed the conflict. The trial court held several

meetings with counsel and petitioner and ultimately concluded there was no conflict. Bragg, 242

F.3d at 1085-86. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected petitioner’s claims, though recognizing that “the record

leaves unanswered some key factual questions.” Id. at 1089. It concluded it could not remand

Case 2:02-cv-01491-LKK -KJM Document 29 Filed 07/19/05 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

the case for an evidentiary hearing because Bragg

never moved for an evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual

ambiguities. Also, Bragg brought his ineffective assistance of

claims before state court only on direct review and did not take

advantage of state collateral proceedings to develop the factual

record before he filed his federal habeas petition. Bragg’s inactions

show insufficient diligence to satisfy the standard set forth in

Williams and Baja. Because he failed to request a state evidentiary

hearing and failed to file a state habeas petition, Bragg ‘failed to

develop the factual basis of [his] claim in State court proceedings.’

Id. at 1090 (footnote omitted). 

Respondent argues that petitioner, like Bragg, has shown “insufficient” diligence

because he failed to submit a declaration from Spieckerman or otherwise request an evidentiary

hearing at the motion to withdraw his plea, and did not seek an evidentiary hearing during the

direct appeal process. Opp’n at 2-3. Petitioner counters that he was indeed diligent because he

sought state collateral review of his conviction and this court thus may consider the Townsend

factors. Reply at 2-3.

In California, it is defendant’s burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing

evidence the good cause necessary to support his request to withdraw a guilty plea. People v. 

Cruz, 12 Cal.3d 562, 566 (1974); Cal. Penal Code § 1018. Although Russo presented

petitioner’s affidavit, he did not include anything from Spieckerman or ask the court for the

opportunity to call Spieckerman as a witness to explain the impact of his ethical difficulties on

petitioner’s decision to plead guilty. The parties have not suggested nor has this court found any

requirement that a trial court hold an evidentiary hearing sua sponte when such a motion is filed,

or if certain circumstances accompany the filing of a motion. Compare Cannon v. Mullin, 383

F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied , U.S. , 125 S. Ct. 1664 (2005) (petitioner diligent

when he submitted his own affidavit about counsel’s advice not to testify and requested an

evidentiary hearing). Moreover, there is no suggestion that Spieckerman, who was present at the

argument on the motion, refused to cooperate with Russo. Compare United States ex. rel. 

Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 240-41 (7th Cir. 2003) (petitioner diligent even though he

Case 2:02-cv-01491-LKK -KJM Document 29 Filed 07/19/05 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 4

 The Court of Appeal also cited Waltreus. Answer, Ex. J.

7

had not presented declaration to state court because witness had refused to cooperate). 

Petitioner’s reliance on his state habeas petitions to show diligence is similarly

unavailing. The California Supreme Court has established pleading requirements for state

habeas petitions:

The petition should both (i) state fully and with particularity the

facts on which relief is sought, as well as (ii) include copies of

reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim,

including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or

declarations. Conclusory allegations made without any explanation

of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an

evidentiary hearing.

People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995) (citations omitted). In this case, petitioner neither

requested an evidentiary hearing in any of his state pleadings nor presented anything beyond his

own allegations that would have required the state courts to hold an evidentiary hearing. Finally,

the California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition included a citation to In re Waltreus, 62

Cal. 2d 218, 225 (1965), which rejected habeas arguments that had been rejected on direct

appeal, because “habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal.”4 This suggests that

the California courts would not have held an evidentiary hearing on the petitions absent some

showing of facts not presented to the courts below. Petitioner’s pursuit of collateral review does

not demonstrate sufficient diligence in this case. 

While the undersigned remains troubled by the ambiguities and gaps in the factual

record, she cannot find that petitioner exercised diligence to develop that record in the state

courts. 

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-01491-LKK -KJM Document 29 Filed 07/19/05 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(2); 

2. The evidentiary hearing set for August 1, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. is hereby

vacated; 

3. The order and writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued July 6, 2005 are

hereby vacated and recalled; and 

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve copies of this order on Warden 

Mark Shepherd, the out-to-court desk of the California Department of Corrections and the United

States Marshal’s Service.

DATED: July 19, 2005.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2/leme1491.dh

Case 2:02-cv-01491-LKK -KJM Document 29 Filed 07/19/05 Page 8 of 8