Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00786/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00786-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

James Ward Chapman, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-13-00786-PHX-SRB (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 James Ward Chapman (Petitioner) has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an Answer asserting that 

Petitioner’s claims lack merit (Doc. 12), and Petitioner has filed a reply. (Doc. 14.) In 

his reply, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing and, if the court sets a hearing, he 

requests the appointment of counsel. (Doc.14.) For the reasons below, the Petition and 

motion should be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 A. Trial, Sentencing, and Appeal

 On March 27, 2008, a jury in the Maricopa County Superior Court found 

Petitioner guilty of one count of molestation of a child, a class 2 felony, and one count of 

sexual abuse, a class 3 felony. (Doc. 12, Ex. A.) On April 24, 2008, the trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to seventeen years’ imprisonment for the molestation conviction and 

placed him on lifetime probation for the sexual abuse conviction. (Doc. 12, Ex. B.) 

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 Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Court of Appeals and argued that the trial 

court erred by admitting into evidence statements that he made before he received 

Miranda1

 warnings. (Doc. 12, Ex. C.) On July 9, 2009, the court of appeals affirmed 

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 12, Ex. D.) After Petitioner’s appellate 

counsel declined to file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court (Doc. 12, 

Ex. E), Petitioner filed a pro se petition, which was denied. (Doc. 12, Ex. E; Doc. 1-1 at 

1.)2

B. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

 Petitioner then filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the Arizona Superior 

Court (the superior court), pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. The superior court appointed counsel. Appointed counsel notified the court 

that there were no claims to raise on a post-conviction review. (Doc. 1-1 at 25.) 

Petitioner filed a pro se petition and alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of 

trial counsel because counsel “prevented him from testifying in his own defense by 

failing to advise him that the ultimate decision whether to testify belonged to him.” 

(Doc. 1–1 at 8.) Petitioner also asserted that counsel improperly waived his right to 

testify. Petitioner argued that, if he had been called as a witness on his own behalf, he 

would have testified that the victim had a motive to lie, that she had lied in the past, that 

she had previously made a false allegation of sexual abuse, and that she did not behave 

unusually after the alleged abused. (Id. at 10.) He also would have explained the 

circumstances surrounding his confession. (Id.) Petitioner stated that he had informed 

counsel of his “potential testimony” several months before trial. (Id.) 

 On September 29, 2011, the superior court dismissed the petition. (Doc. 1–1 at 

25.) Applying the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found 

that Petitioner had not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient. (Id. at 25-26); 

 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

2

 The exhibits in support of the Petition are located at Doc. 1-1. For ease of 

reference, the Court cites the CM/ECF pagination. 

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see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The superior court noted that it 

had advised Petitioner at the settlement conference, in the presence of counsel, of his 

right to testify at trial and had told him that whether he testified was “completely up to 

[him].” (Doc. 1–1 at 26; Doc. 12, Ex. H at 4.) The superior court further noted that 

Petitioner acknowledged in his petition that he and counsel had discussed several times 

whether he would testify, and that counsel had advised him that it was “not a good idea.” 

(Doc. 1–1 at 26.) On this record, the superior court stated that it could find no evidence 

“as to how petitioner was precluded from testifying,” and concluded that “petitioner was 

aware that he had the option to testify and that the decision was his to make.” (Id.) 

 The superior court also found that Petitioner failed to satisfy Strickland’s second 

prong because even if he established that counsel’s performance was deficient, he 

suffered no prejudice as a result. The superior court explained: 

Almost all of the testimony he indicated he would present resolved around the credibility of the accuser. Trial counsel 

extensively examined the victim and others on the victim’s 

tendency to lie. Her credibility was made an issue and 

evidence was presented to allow the jury to determine whether she was being honest about the allegations. No specifics were provided as to the testimony petitioner would have given that was in addition to or different from that which 

was presented to the jury. Any additional information about lies presented by the petitioner would not have changed the outcome of the case. 

(Doc. 1–1 at 26.) 

 The superior court further found that Petitioner’s “explanation as to why he 

confessed would not have changed the outcome of the case” because Petitioner provided 

no “specific testimony he would have stated to allow the superior court to determine 

whether there was a basis to evaluate his assertions. Counsel questioned the Detective 

and the jury was instructed that the confession must be found to be voluntarily given.” 

(Id.) 

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 Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.3 (Doc. 21, 

Ex. A.)4

 Petitioner argued that, because the superior court did not hold a hearing, it 

lacked “jurisdiction to adjudicate [his] ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the 

merits and to render the particular order entered.” (Id. at 3.) He further argued that the 

superior court’s order “violate[d] due process and [was] void because it [was] a final 

judgment entered without first giving Petitioner an opportunity to be heard.” (Doc. 21, 

Ex. A at 10-11.) Petitioner did not specifically challenge the superior court’s ruling on 

the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

 On September 12, 2012, the appellate court granted review of Petitioner’s claims 

that “he [had] presented a colorable claim and the trial court erred in dismissing his claim 

without an evidentiary hearing.” (Doc. 21, Ex. B at 3.) In determining whether the 

superior court had erred by summarily denying the petition for post-conviction relief 

without a hearing, the appellate court considered the superior court’s ruling on the merits 

of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Id.) The appellate court affirmed 

the superior court’s determination that Petitioner had not raised a colorable claim that 

trial counsel was ineffective. (Id.) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court, which summarily denied review on February 15, 2103. (Doc. 1–1 at 35.) 

C. Habeas Petition 

 On April 18, 2013, Petitioner filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 

this Court asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel 

prevented him from testifying in his own defense. (Doc. 1 at 18.) Petitioner asserts that 

 

3

 Petitioner filed “two petitions for review of post-conviction relief” in Division 

One, 1 CA-CR 11-722 PRPC, and the court later transferred the petitions to Division Two and renumbered the case as 2 CA-CR 2012-0281-PR. (Doc. 21, Ex. A.) The only petition for review of the superior court’s denial of post-conviction relief in the record 

before this Court is identified as an “amended petition for review.” (Id.) 

4

 On February 11, 2014, Respondents filed supplemental exhibits in support of their Answer. (Doc. 21, Exs. A, B, C.) These exhibits pertain to Petitioner’s appeal of the superior court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and include a 

complete copy of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision, dated September 12, 2010. Respondents’ earlier filed exhibits included an incomplete copy of that decision. (Doc. 12, Ex. G.) 

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trial counsel prevented him from testifying by failing to advise him that it was his 

decision whether to testify at trial, and that counsel improperly waived his right to testify. 

(Id.) 

II. Federal Court Review of State Court Decisions 

 The AEDPA limits the federal court’s power to grant a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner. First, the federal court may only consider 

petitions alleging that a person is in state custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws 

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Sections 2254(b) and (c) provides 

that the federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief, with some exceptions, unless 

the petitioner exhausted state remedies. Additionally, if the petition includes a claim that 

was “adjudicated on the merits on State court proceedings,” the federal court review is 

limited by section 2254(d). 

A. Exhaustion 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies.5

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by fairly presenting them to the state’s highest court 

in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o 

provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present her 

claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of 

the claim.”). In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest 

court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction 

proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007). 

 Here, Petitioner presented his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the 

superior court. (Doc. 1-1 at 3.) However, in the amended petition for review that 

 

5

 Under § 2254(b), the exhaustion requirement for federal court review of a 

habeas petitions differs depending upon whether the court grants or denies the petition. 

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Petitioner filed in the appellate court, he only challenged the superior court’s jurisdiction 

to issue an order denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without 

conducting a hearing. Although the appellate court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claim 

required the appellate court to consider whether Petitioner had raised a colorable claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, it did so in the context of determining whether the 

superior court had erred in denying post-conviction relief without holding a hearing. 

(Doc. 21, Ex. B.) 

 Because Petitioner did not specifically raise his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel on appeal, it appears that he did not exhaust that particular claim. However, the 

Court need not resolve that issue because exhaustion can be waived “explicitly by 

respondent’s counsel.” Jones v. Hubbard, 2008 F. Supp. 2d 2008 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 

2008). Here, Respondents state that Petitioner “properly exhausted the claim.” (Doc. 12 

at 4.) Additionally, even if Respondents’ counsel did not explicitly waive exhaustion, a 

federal court may deny a petition on the merits without exhaustion of state court 

remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Accordingly, the Court considers the merits of 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

B. Section 2254(d)

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ 

U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” 

such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” 

Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

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Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 

664 (2004)). “[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires 

considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.” Id. 

C. Adjudication on the Merits 

Petitioner argues that because the superior court did not hold an evidentiary 

hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief it did not adjudicate his claim on the 

merits and, therefore, § 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review does not apply to his 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.6

 (Doc. 14 at 4); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 

6

 To the extent that Petitioner argues that the superior court failed to comply with Arizona law governing post-conviction proceedings or violated his Due Process rights, his claims fail. First, he did not raise such claims in this Court until he filed his replies in support of his motion for an evidentiary hearing and in support of his petition. (Doc. 14 at 4-6, Doc. 19 at 2) “The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)). Second, habeas corpus relief is 

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 The Ninth Circuit has held that “a state has ‘adjudicated’ a petitioner’s 

constitutional claim ‘on the merits’ for purposes of § 2254(d) when it has decided the 

petitioner’s right to post conviction relief on the basis of the substance of the 

constitutional claim advanced, rather than denying the claim on the basis of a procedural 

or other rule precluding state court review of the merits.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 

943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). In Lambert, the Ninth Circuit clarified that an evidentiary 

hearing is not a prerequisite to the application of AEDPA’s deferential standard. Id. at 

969 (declining “to accept [the petitioner’s] proposal to inject an ‘evidentiary hearing’ 

requirement as a prerequisite to AEDPA deference”). 

 Here, Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief alleged that he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because counsel “prevented him from testifying in his own 

defense by failing to advise him that the ultimate decision whether to testify belong to 

him.” (Doc. 1-1 at 8.) The superior court considered Petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and 

determined that Petitioner did not satisfy either prong of that test.7

 (Doc. 1-1 at 26-27.) 

The superior court noted that at the settlement conference it had advised Petitioner, in the 

presence of his counsel, that he had the right to testify at trial and whether he did so “was 

completely up to [him].” (Doc. 1-1 at 26.) The superior court further noted that 

Petitioner acknowledged in his petition that he had discussed whether he should testify at 

trial, and counsel had advised him that it “was not a good idea.” (Id.) The superior court 

found that Petitioner did not satisfy Strickland and concluded that Petitioner had not 

presented a “material issue of fact or law which would entitled [him] to relief under 

 not available for violations of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 68 (1991) (habeas corpus review is unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law). 

7

 In his reply in support of his petition, Petitioner contends that his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel has two parts: (1) whether counsel was ineffective for refusing to accept his decision to testify; and (2) whether counsel was ineffective for 

failing to inform him that the ultimate decision to testify belonged to him.” (Doc. 14 at 3.) He argues that the state courts did not address the first part of his claim. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the state courts considered Petitioner’s claim that counsel 

prevented him from testifying. (Doc. 1-1 at 26-27, Doc. 21, Ex. B.) 

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[Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32] and that no purpose would be served by any further proceedings.” 

(Doc. 1-1 at 27.) 

 Because the superior court decided Petitioner’s “right to post-conviction relief on 

the basis of the substance of the constitutional claim advanced,” it adjudicated 

Petitioner’s constitutional claim on the merits, and § 2254(d)’s deferential standard of 

review applies to this case.8

 Accordingly, the court reviews the superior court’s decision 

under that standard.9

 See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 969. 

III. Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

 The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance, now 

and at the time of the superior court’s decision on the petition for post-conviction relief, 

is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s 

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong 

presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 

professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

 

8

 Moreover, even if the Court reviewed Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel de novo, rather than under § 2254(d)’s deferential standard, it would find that 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks merit and would recommend 

that the Petition be denied. 

9

 On habeas corpus review, the district court reviews that “last reasoned state 

court opinion.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). When the state’s highest court denies the claim summarily, the federal court looks through to the last reasoned decision. Avila v. Gomez, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner argues that the “last reasoned decision” on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the decision 

of the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 14 at 4.) 

The Arizona Supreme Court summarily affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The court of appeals considered whether Petitioner raised a colorable claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, but in the context of determining whether the superior court erred in denying post-conviction relief without holding a hearing. Thus, the superior court’s decision is the last reasoned state court opinion on Petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

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circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is 

extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

 To establish a sixth amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show 

prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. at 694; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1998). The 

prejudice component “focuses on the question whether counsel’s deficient performance 

renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” 

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). The court need not address both 

Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should 

be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[f]ailure to 

satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other”) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

 “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.” Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 

S. Ct. 770, 786 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 

(2010)). Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable 

under § 2254(d) is even more difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” 

and because Strickland’s general standard has a substantial range of reasonable 

applications. Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). The issue under 

§ 2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but “whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. 

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IV. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

 Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective because she “prevented him 

from testifying in his own defense by failing to advise him that the ultimate decision 

whether to testify belonged to him” and by waiving his right to testify. (Doc. 1 at 6, 18.) 

Petitioner argues that had he known that the ultimate decision to testify was his to make, 

he would have taken the stand and testified. (Doc. 1 at 18.) The superior court rejected 

this claim finding that Petitioner failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland. Petitioner 

has not shown that the state court’s determination was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. 

 The Supreme Court has held that the right to be heard includes the right to testify 

on one’s own behalf. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987) (“It cannot be doubted 

that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and testify in his 

or her own defense.”). With respect to this right, “defense counsel’s role is to advise the 

defendant whether he should take the stand, but the ultimate decision belongs to the 

defendant.” United States v. Hover, 293 F.3d 930, 934 (6th Cir. 2002). The right to 

testify in one’s own defense is personal; it may only be relinquished by the defendant, 

and such a waiver must be knowing and intentional. United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 

177 (9th Cir. 1993). However, such a waiver need not be explicit and may be implied. 

United States v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999). The “waiver of the 

right to testify may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and is presumed from the 

defendant’s failure to testify or not inform the court of his desire to do so.” Id. at 1095 

(quoting Joelson, 7 F.3d at 177). If a defendant remains “silent in the face of his 

attorney’s decision not to call him as a witness,” he waives his right to testify. United 

States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 In applying Strickland, the superior court applied the correct law to the issue. The 

superior court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was a 

reasonable application of Strickland. First, Petitioner was aware of his right to testify and 

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that the decision to testify rested with him. Petitioner has stated that he and defense 

counsel discussed whether he should testify at trial and she advised him that it was “not a 

good idea.” (Doc. 1-1 at 26.) While Petitioner asserts that counsel did not inform him 

that the ultimate decision regarding whether to testify at trial belonged to Petitioner, the 

record reflects that he was aware of this right. Specifically, during the settlement 

conference before trial, the trial court specifically told Petitioner “[y]ou have a right to 

testify at trial or not to testify. That’s completely up to you.” (Doc. 12, Ex. H. at 4.) In 

his reply in support of his Petition, Petitioner agrees that “the record plainly shows that he 

knew he had the ‘right to testify . . . .’” (Doc. 14 at 12.) 

 Second, even if Petitioner’s counsel failed to inform him of his right to testify, 

Petitioner remained silent in the face of the counsel’s decision to rest the defense’s case 

without calling Petitioner as a witness. Although Petitioner asserts that he had informed 

counsel that he wanted to testify during jury selection, at the end of the first day of trial, 

and before the state rested its case (Doc. 1 at 16-17), he does not allege that he renewed 

his request to testify after defense counsel rested the case. The record before the Court 

reflects that Petitioner did not advise the court that he wanted to testify. (Doc. 12, Exs. I, 

K.) Thus, Petitioner implicitly waived his right to testify. See Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1244. 

 Moreover, even assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient for the reasons 

Petitioner asserts, Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 

performance. To establish prejudice, Petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S at 694. 

 Petitioner argues that if he had testified at trial, he would have testified that the 

victim had a motive to lie because at the time the charges were brought there was a 

custody battle between the victim’s grandparents (who had custody of the victim) and the 

victim’s mother. (Doc. 1 at 21.) Petitioner contends that the victim fabricated the 

charges “to please her mother.” (Id.) Petitioner next states that he would have testified 

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that the victim had a history of lying and manipulating situations, and she had made prior 

false allegations of sexual abuse against someone else. (Doc. 1 at 21-22.) Petitioner 

further argues that the day after the alleged abuse, the victim did not act unusual around 

him. (Doc. 1 at 22.) Finally, he asserts that he would have testified that during the 

interview with police, he did not feel free to leave, and he felt that he would be at the 

police station until he admitted guilt. (Doc. 1 at 22.) 

 As the superior court noted, most of the testimony Petitioner would have given 

centers around the victim’s credibility. (Doc. 1-1 at 26.) The record reflects that the 

victim’s credibility was made an issue during trial and evidence was presented from 

which the jury could weigh her credibility. For example, a school counselor to whom the 

victim had reported the alleged abuse agreed on cross-examination that when she 

reported the incident to the Gilbert Police, she told them the victim “was known to lie.” 

(Doc. 12, Ex. I at 13.) The counselor also testified that “there can be times in which [the 

victim’s] story will be mixed with truth and lie.” (Id.) She further stated that the victim 

was “vague” about the time period of the incident. (Id. at 14.) On redirect examination, 

the school counselor explained that the victim told her peers “things” that she “made up,” 

but she considered such untruths minor compared to the allegations of sexual abuse. (Id. 

14.) She further stated that the victim had never lied to her about anything serious. (Id.) 

Petitioner has not explained how the testimony he would have given about the victim’s 

tendency to lie would have differed from the testimony that was presented at trial. 

 Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the trial would have been different if he had testified at trial regarding the 

circumstances surrounding his confession. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner 

asserts that he confessed because: (1) the police would not accept his protestations of 

innocence and that he “would never be able to leave the police station unless I admitted 

guilt;” (2) the police told him the charges were not serious that “everything would be 

fine” if he confessed; (3) given his respect for authority, he felt intimidated by the police; 

and (4) “by the end of the interview I questioned myself and ended up believing that it 

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was possible that I could have committed the crimes I stood accused of.” (Doc. 1 at 18-

19.) 

 At trial, Town of Gilbert police detective Ralph Cornejo testified that Petitioner 

drove himself to the police station, where he was told he was free to leave. (Doc. 12, 

Ex. K at 57, 59.) He was not handcuffed or arrested until he made incriminating 

statements. (Id. at 60-61, 66) After Petitioner was read his Miranda rights, he continued 

answering questions. (Doc. 12, Ex. K at 66-67.) Petitioner’s counsel cross-examined 

Cornejo about the circumstances of the questioning. Cornejo testified that he interviewed 

Petitioner in an interview room with the door closed, the interview lasted four hours, and 

he used various interviewing techniques. (Doc. 12, Ex. K at 74-77.) Cornejo also 

testified that about three hours into the interview, Petitioner started to get sad and seemed 

nervous and defeated. (Doc. 12, Ex. K at 79-80.) The trial court instructed the jury that 

it “must not consider any statements made by the defendant to a law enforcement officer 

unless you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made the statement 

voluntarily.” (Doc. 12, Ex. I at 20.) Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable 

probability that his testimony about his confession would have changed the result of the 

trial. 

Therefore, Petitioner has not established that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because counsel prevented him from testifying or waived his right testify. Thus, 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to or based on an 

unreasonable application of established federal law. 

V. Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 14.) 

Respondents oppose that assertion. (Doc. 15.) As Respondents correctly argue, 

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this Court. The Supreme Court’s 

decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011), makes clear 

that review of § 2254(d) claims “is limited to the record that was before the state court 

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that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” The Supreme Court reasoned that the 

“backward-looking language” of § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the statecourt decision at the time it was made,” and thus the record under review must be 

“limited to the record in existence at that same time i.e., the record before the state court.” 

Id. at 1398. Accordingly, under Pinholster, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing. 

 Further, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted when, as in this case, even 

assuming Petitioner’s allegations are true, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. See 

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 481 (2007) (district court properly exercised 

discretion to deny evidentiary hearing when, even assuming the truth of all facts sought 

to be proven at an evidentiary hearing, claim failed on merits); West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 

477, 485–90 (9th Cir. 2010) (when defendant failed to allege facts that, if found to be 

true, would establish a colorable claim under Strickland, there was “nothing to be 

determined in an evidentiary hearing” and the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying one); Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] federal 

court must consider whether such a[n] [evidentiary] hearing could enable an applicant to 

prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to 

federal habeas relief.” (citation omitted) (alterations in original)). 

 Petitioner also requests the appointment of counsel. Rule 8(a) instructs the court 

to “review the answer, any transcripts and records of state-court proceedings, and any 

materials submitted under Rule 7 to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is 

warranted.” Pursuant to Rule 8(c), “[i]f an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge 

must appoint an attorney to represent a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.” In this case, there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing 

and, therefore, no need to appoint counsel. 

VI. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied. 

 

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 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion for an 

Evidentiary Hearing and for the Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 14) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 5th day of March, 2014. 

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