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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11142

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WILLIAM HAWKINS, 

as next friend of minor child,

CARLON HAWKINS, 

as guardian and next friend of KLB and KLB, 

surviving minor children of Kurtavious L. Butts,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC,

deceased Kurtavious L. Butts,

Plaintiff,

versus

DAVID STODDARD,

d.b.a. Stoddard Trucking,

GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11142

DAVID L. STODDARD,

ESTATE OF DAVID L. STODDARD, 

Defendants-Appellees,

JOHN DOES 1-4,

Defendant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-00073-LAG

____________________

Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kurtavious Butts died after he was struck by a tractor-trailer

operated by Stoddard Trucking. William Hawkins, acting on behalf of Butts’s minor children, filed the instant suit against Stoddard 

Trucking and its insurer, Great West. Although he lacked privity 

of contract with Great West, Hawkins sued the company under 

Georgia’s direct-action statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-112 and 40-2-

140(d)(4), which permit joinder of a motor carrier and its insurer in 

the same action. The district court dismissed Hawkins’s claims 

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24-11142 Opinion of the Court 3

against Stoddard Trucking. Subsequently, Great West filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The 

district court reasoned that, under the direct-action statutes, Hawkins may not sue Great West without joining Stoddard Trucking.

Hawkins appealed the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, which we review de novo. Perry v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of 

Corr., 664 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 2011). On appeal, Hawkins 

raises only one question: “Is a plaintiff required to sue a motor carrier in the same action if they sue the motor carrier’s insurer under 

Georgia’s direct action statutes?” Br. of Appellant at 9 (emphasis in 

original). The answer is “yes.”

Georgia’s direct-action statutes are in derogation of the common law and, accordingly, must be strictly construed. Hughes v. 

Ace Am. Ins. Co., 888 S.E.2d 341, 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). Ordinarily, 

Georgia common law disallows an injured party from directly suing the insurer of the party that caused his injury. “The general 

rule in Georgia is that ‘a party may not bring a direct action against 

the liability insurer of the party who allegedly caused the damage 

unless there is an unsatisfied judgment against the insured or it is 

specifically permitted either by statute or a provision in the policy.’” Barnes v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 907 S.E.2d 305, 308 (Ga. 

Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Hartford Ins. Co. v. Henderson & Son, 258 

Ga. 493, 494 (1988)). The direct-action statutes “derogate”—or deviate—from this common law rule. Specifically, in cases involving 

“motor carriers,” they permit direct actions against liability-insurance companies. Because the direct-action statutes derogate from 

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-11142

the common law, we must strictly construe them. In other words, 

our reading of the statutes “must be limited strictly to the meaning 

of the language employed, and not extended beyond the plain and 

explicit terms of the statute.” Pferrman v. BPS of Tifton, Inc., 364 Ga. 

App. 624, 628 (2022) (quoting Delta Airlines v. Townsend, 279 Ga. 

511, 512 (2005)).

The statutes expressly permit joinder of a motor carrier and 

its insurer in the same suit: “It shall be permissible under this part 

for any person having a cause of action arising under this part to 

join in the same action the motor carrier and the insurance carrier, 

whether arising in tort or contract . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c)(1)

(2023) (emphasis added); accord id. § 40-2-140(d)(4) (2023) (“Any 

person having a cause of action, whether arising in tort or contract, 

under this Code section may join in the same cause of action the 

motor carrier and its insurance carrier . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

But the statutes do not expressly permit a direct action against the 

insurer without joinder of the motor carrier. Rather, they are silent 

on this issue.

Hawkins interprets this silence as tacit permission. He argues that, because “[n]othing in Georgia’s direct action statutes 

prohibits a plaintiff from pursuing a lawsuit against the motor carrier’s insurer only,” he can sue Great West without joining the motor carrier. Br. of Appellant at 11. That is incorrect. Georgia common law forbids direct actions against an insurer, except as expressly provided by the direct-action statutes. Because the statutes 

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do not expressly allow Hawkins to pursue a lawsuit against Great 

West alone, he may not do so.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment for Great West.

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