Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-03577/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-03577-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Contract Dispute

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

ALABAMA AIRCRAFT 

INDUSTRIES, INC., ALABAMA 

AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC. - 

BIRMINGHAM, AND PEMCO 

AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING 

SERVICES, INC. 

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 Plaintiff, 

 CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 

v. 2:11-cv-03577-RDP 

 

THE BOEING COMPANY, 

BOEING AEROSPACE 

OPERATIONS, INC. AND BOEING 

AEROSPACE SUPPORT 

CENTER, 

 

 Defendant. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Before the Special Master is Boeing’s Motion to Compel Documents 

in Response to Request for Production No. 31 (“the Motion” or “Boeing’s 

Motion”), which was filed with the Special Master on June 8, 2016. The 

Motion has since been fully briefed, with AAI submitting a Response on 

June 21, 2016 (“AAI’s Response”) and Boeing filing a Reply on June 28, 

FILED

 2016 Sep-06 PM 03:57

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 261 Filed 09/06/16 Page 1 of 15
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2016 (“Boeing’s Reply”).1 For the reasons explained below, it is the 

recommendation of the Special Master that Boeing’s Motion be GRANTED 

IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On September 22, 2015, AAI issued its Second Requests for 

Production (“AAI’s Second RFPs”) to Boeing. Boeing’s Motion, Ex. A. 

Included among AAI’s Second RFPs was Request No. 8, which sought the 

following: 

[A]ll communications You have had with any third 

parties related to any subpoena issued pursuant to 

Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

whether it be a subpoena duces tecum or 

otherwise. This request includes but is not limited 

to all communications with Tennenbaum Capital 

Partners, LLC; Kaiser Aircraft Industries, Inc.; The 

Abernathy MacGregor Group; Ernst & Young; Grant 

Thornton LLP; Shipley Associates; Michael B. 

 1 Boeing’s Motion, AAI’s Response, and Boeing’s Reply were all submitted to the 

undersigned in the form of letters, rather than briefs. While such informal briefing 

departs from normal practice, both parties—by emails dated August 17, 2016—rejected 

the opportunity to supplement their submissions in a more formal manner. As such, the 

undersigned considers the matter fully briefed.

Case 2:11-cv-03577-RDP Document 261 Filed 09/06/16 Page 2 of 15
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Taggart; and Dayton Aerospace, Inc. related to 

subpoenas issued to those entities/individuals. 

Boeing’s Motion, Ex. A at No. 8. 

2. On December 7, 2015, Boeing issued its Third Requests for 

Production (“Boeing’s Third RFPs”) to AAI. Boeing’s Motion, Ex. B. 

Boeing’s Third RFPs included a request that was largely identical to 

Request No. 8 from AAI’s Second RFPs; indeed, Request No. 31 similarly 

sought: 

[A]ll communications Plaintiffs have had with any 

third parties related to any subpoena issued by 

Plaintiffs or by Defendants pursuant to Rule 45 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whether it be 

a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise. This 

Request includes but is not limited to all 

communications with Burdeshaw Associates, Ltd.; 

Slay Enterprises, Inc.; L-3 Communications; 

Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC; Kaiser Aircraft 

Industries, Inc; The Abernathy MacGregor Group; 

Ernst & Young; Grant Thornton LLP; Navigators 

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Global LLC; Shipley Associates; Michael B. 

Taggart; and Dayton Aerospace, Inc. 

Boeing’s Motion, Ex. B at No. 31. 

3. AAI objected to Boeing’s Third RFPs on January 6, 2016 

(“AAI’s Objections”), specifically refusing to produce any of the documents 

sought by Request No. 31 (“the Requested Documents”). Boeing’s Motion, 

Ex. D at 3. In refusing to produce the Requested Documents, AAI cited (1) 

relevance, and (2) privilege, both in the form of the attorney-client privilege 

and the work product doctrine. Id. 

4. On January 13, 2016, Boeing produced documents responsive 

to AAI’s Request No. 8. Boeing’s Motion at 2. 

5. Over the next four months, AAI and Boeing exchanged a 

number of letters addressing AAI’s refusal to produce the Requested 

Documents (Boeing’s Motion, Exs. E-I), ultimately concluding in May 2015 

that they were at an impasse over the issue. Boeing’s Motion at 2. 

6. So, on June 8, 2016, Boeing filed a Motion to Compel 

Production of Documents in Response to Request No. 31 (“the Motion” or 

“Boeing’s Motion”). AAI responded on June 21, 2016 (“AAI’s Response), 

reiterating its relevance and privilege objections, but focusing its privilege 

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arguments primarily on the work product doctrine. AAI’s Response at 5-8. 

Boeing replied on June 28, 2016 (“Boeing’s Reply”). 

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

For the reasons outlined below, it is the undersigned’s legal 

conclusion that (a) the Requested Documents are relevant; (b) the 

Requested Documents are not protected by the attorney-client privilege; 

and (c) the Requested Documents are likely protected by the work product 

doctrine, but AAI must submit a privilege log if it wishes to continue 

invoking the work product doctrine as to such documents. 

A. Relevance 

AAI’s threshold argument in resisting production is that the 

Requested Documents are not relevant, AAI’s Response at 4 (“Boeing’s 

letter ‘motion’ in no way sets forth any reason why the communications in 

FRP 31 could possibly be relevant. The requested post-litigation 

communications between AAI and its counsel and the subpoenaed parties 

in this action provide absolutely no information that bear on whether or not 

Boeing did or did not breach its contractual obligations to AAI between 

2005 and 2007.”), and, while the undersigned recognizes the underlying 

merit of AAI’s logic, its relevance argument falls on deaf ears, as AAI 

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cannot be permitted to pursue a particular class of documents from Boeing, 

but then resist Boeing’s efforts to obtain the same on grounds of relevance. 

AAI attempts to escape the inescapable equity of this conclusion by 

arguing that Boeing, like AAI, could have resisted production on the basis 

of relevance and that Boeing’s failure to do so does not prevent AAI from 

making such an objection. AAI’s Response at 3 (“AAI concluded that just 

because Boeing may have produced a few documents in response to a 

similar RFP does not alter Plaintiffs’ relevancy determination or discovery 

obligations.”) (internal citations omitted). However, AAI’s argument misses 

the point: the relevancy of the Requested Documents does not flow from 

Boeing’s production or AAI’s objections, but, instead, was determined by 

AAI’s request. Indeed, AAI’s Request No. 8 was a declaration of 

relevance, one that now encompasses the Requested Documents. 

B. Attorney-Client Privilege 

AAI also attempts to resist production of the Requested Documents 

by asserting the attorney-client privilege. It is well established that “[t]he 

attorney-client privilege exists to protect confidential communications 

between client and lawyer made for the purpose of securing legal advice.” 

In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9, 899 F.2d 1039, 1042 (11th Cir. 1990) 

(internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). As would be expected by use 

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of the term “confidential,” it is generally accepted that “a client’s and his 

attorney’s communications are not deemed confidential when made in the 

presence of a third party.” United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 

975 (5th Cir. 1975). However, there exists an exception to this general 

rule—the “common interest doctrine”—and, in both its Objections and 

Response, AAI invokes this exception in attempting to justify its privilege 

assertions as to the Requested Documents.2

 

It should initially be noted that the common interest doctrine is “an 

amorphous concept,” existing in different forms and being applied with 

divergent standards throughout the country. In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 

F.3d 705, 714 (5th Cir. 2001).3

 That being said, the concept can be 

broadly described as follows: “In effect, the common interest doctrine 

extends the attorney-client privilege to otherwise non-confidential 

 2 AAI’s Objections, Exhibit A at 3 (“[T]his request improperly calls for the 

production of documents and communications that are protected from disclosure by 

either the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine pursuant to the 

common interest doctrine . . .”) (emphasis added); AAI’s Response at 2 (“AAI’s primary 

objections to Boeing’s RFP 31 were based upon relevancy grounds and upon claims of 

privilege/work-product, including the common interest doctrine.”) (emphasis added). 

3 The Eleventh Circuit has yet to directly address the common interest doctrine, 

leaving the undersigned to look to the law of other Circuits in applying the doctrine. See 

Hope For Families & Community Service, Inc. v. Warren, 2009 WL 1066525 at *13, n.16 

(M.D. Ala. April 21, 2009) (referencing United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 

806, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2007)) (“The parties have not cited, and the court is unaware, of 

any published Eleventh Circuit cases discussing the common legal interest doctrine, as 

defined in Seidman. Nor has any precedent been cited from this circuit that rejects the 

doctrine. The court finds Seidman’s analysis persuasive and applies it.”). 

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communications . . . where the [communicating] parties [have] undertake[n] 

a joint effort with respect to a common legal interest . . . [and the] 

communications [were] made to further an ongoing enterprise.” United 

States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2007). “The 

common interest doctrine, then, has both a theoretical and a practical 

component. In theory, the parties among whom privileged matter is shared 

must have a common legal, as opposed to commercial, interest. In 

practice, they must have demonstrated cooperation in formulating a 

common legal strategy.” Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais 

(Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 

The leading approach to the common interest doctrine requires that 

the parties’ shared interest be (1) identical, and (2) legal. In re Teleglobe 

Communications Corp., 493 F.3d at 365. This approach was most 

famously articulated in Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., where the 

court noted: “A community of interest exists among different persons or 

separate entities where they have an identical legal interest with respect to 

the subject matter of a communication between an attorney and a client 

concerning legal advice . . . The key consideration is that the nature of the 

interest be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial.” 397 

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F. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974). Here, AAI has failed to demonstrate 

that it shared an identical legal interest with the Subpoenaed Parties. 

There is little doubt that the Subpoenaed Parties are not strangers to 

AAI, as AAI has, at one time or another, maintained business relationships 

with all of the Subpoenaed Parties; however, shared business 

relationships—even those involving related or mutually-owned 

companies—do not equate to identical legal interests. See, e.g., Neighbors 

Law Firm, P.C. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., 2011 WL 761480 at 

*4 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 24, 2011) (citing United States v. Okun, 281 Fed. Appx. 

228, 231-32 (4th Cir. 2008)) (“Defendant conclusorily [sic] asserts that the 

common interest privilege applies, relying on the fact that [it] is an equity 

shareholder in HySky and that plaintiffs have asserted a veil-piercing claim 

about their relationship. But the fact that [Defendant] is an equity 

shareholder in HySky does not necessarily entitle it to the benefit of the 

common interest privilege.”); Net2Phone, Inc. v. Ebay, Inc., 2008 WL 

8183817 at *8 (D.N.J. June 26, 2008) (“[T]he relationship between plaintiff 

and IDT was that of a corporation and its controlling shareholder. Simply 

because in-house counsel enforced the corporation’s patents, which would 

benefit its shareholders, does not mean that they shared a legal interest. 

Put differently, a legal interest cannot arise simply because a company acts 

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in a way that advances the economic interests of its majority shareholder.”); 

Bank Brussels, 160 F.R.D. at 447 (“[T]he common interest doctrine does 

not encompass a joint business strategy which happens to include as one 

of its elements a concern about litigation.”). Indeed, none of the 

Subpoenaed Parties have ever been involved as party in the various 

stages of litigation between AAI and Boeing, and the ultimate outcome of 

such litigation carries no consequences for the Subpoenaed Parties, save 

for its effect on any attenuated commercial interests that they may share 

with AAI. 

As such, the undersigned concludes that the common interest 

doctrine is inapplicable in the present situation and cannot be used to 

justify AAI’s assertion of the attorney-client privilege as to the Requested 

Documents. 

C. Work Product Doctrine 

Perhaps acknowledging the uphill battle it faces in withholding the 

Requested Documents on the basis of the narrow attorney-client privilege 

(and recognizing the friendlier confines of the broader, more waiver-averse 

work product doctrine),4

 AAI focuses much of its Response on the 

 4 Because “the purpose of the work product rule is not to protect the evidence 

from disclosure to the outside world but rather to protect it only from the knowledge of 

opposing counsel and his client,” Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Richard L. 

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applicability of the latter, arguing that the Requested Documents fall 

squarely within the ambit of the work product doctrine. AAI’s Response at 7 

(“[C]ounsel for AAI engaged in communications with those subpoenaed 

third parties or their counsel to prevent the production of documents 

protected from disclosure by a privilege or other recognized protection. 

Those communications are the epitome of the kind [of] documents that are 

protected under the work product doctrine.”). 

“The work-product doctrine ‘protects from disclosure materials 

prepared by an attorney acting for his client in anticipation of litigation.’” 

Hope For Families, 2009 WL 1066525 at *8 (quoting In re Grand Jury 

Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979) (internal citations omitted)). 

“The core goal of the doctrine is ‘to preserve a zone of privacy in which a 

lawyer can prepare and develop legal theories and strategy “with an eye 

towards litigation,” free from unnecessary intrusion by his adversaries.’” 

Haugh, 2003 WL 21998674 at *4 (quoting United States v. Adlman, 134 

F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted)). Indeed, “[t]he 

doctrine protects a lawyer’s ability to prepare his client’s case, protects 

 

Marcus, 8 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2024 (2d ed. 1994) (internal citations 

omitted), the doctrine is “not automatically waived by the disclosure to a third party.” 

Hope For Families, 2009 WL 1066525 at *9 (M.D. Ala. April 21, 2009) (quoting In re 

Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2000)). 

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against the disclosure of the attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, 

strategies, or theories, and also avoids the unfairness that would occur if 

one party were allowed to appropriate the work of another.” Id. 

Unlike its assertion of the attorney-client privilege, AAI’s invocation of 

the work product doctrine appears to be well founded: evidently, the 

Requested Documents consist of subpoena-related communications 

between AAI’s attorneys and the Subpoenaed Parties. As such, the 

Requested Documents would appear to satisfy the two core elements of 

the work product doctrine, i.e., that covered documents be prepared (1) by 

an attorney, and (2) in anticipation of litigation.5

 Likewise, if the Requested 

Documents conform to the undersigned’s understanding, they would also 

be free from any waiver issues.6

 

 5 Although withholding parties often try to satisfy the “in anticipation of litigation” 

requirement by employing a literal—and incorrect—interpretation of the phrase (i.e., the 

withheld documents would not have been created, but for the ongoing litigation), there 

seems to be little doubt—at least on the surface—that the Requested Documents come 

within the more accurate interpretation of the phrase (i.e., the withheld documents were 

created by or at the direction of an attorney for purposes of advancing a party’s litigation 

position), as AAI was communicating with the Subpoenaed Parties in an attempt to 

ensure that the Parties were making proper privilege assertions, so as to prevent 

Boeing from obtaining privileged documents that would jeopardize AAI’s ability to 

pursue its claims at trial. 

6 Given the established relationships between AAI and the Subpoenaed Parties, 

AAI’s disclosure of its work product to such entities does not result in waiver, as the 

Subpoenaed Parties are not AAI’s adversaries. See, e.g., Niagra Mohawk Power Corp.

v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 125 F.R.D. 578, 587 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) 

(“Generally, the work product protection is waived when documents are voluntarily 

shared with an adversary or . . . when protected materials are disclosed in a manner 

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However, it is axiomatic that the work product doctrine can only be 

applied on a document-by-document basis, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 

831 F.2d 225, 227 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Blanket assertions of privilege before 

a district court are usually unacceptable . . . instead, [an attorney] must 

present himself with his records for questioning, and as to . . . each record 

elect to raise or not to raise the defense.”) (emphasis not added), and, 

accordingly, AAI should be required to produce a privilege log if it wishes to 

continue asserting the work product doctrine as to the Requested 

Documents.7

 

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons outlined above, the undersigned makes the following 

recommendations to the Court: 

 

which substantially increases the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the 

information. However, sharing work product material with a friendly party does not 

waive the work product protection as it applies to an adverse third party.”) (internal 

citations omitted). 

7 In its Response, AAI not only asserted that the Requested Documents were 

guarded from disclosure by the work product doctrine, but, as to those involving 

communications with Tennenbaum Capital Partners and Kaiser Aircraft Industries, Inc., 

also claimed the protection of “joint defense agreement[s].” AAI’s Response at 6 (“AAI 

has refused to produce these documents . . . because they are protected from 

disclosure under the work product doctrine and pursuant to a joint defense 

agreement.”). However, given the lack of available information regarding the nature of 

such joint defense agreements, the undersigned declined to factor the same into his 

legal conclusions. That being said, if AAI wishes to reassert this privilege basis, it may 

do so in its privilege log, expounding the parameters of the joint defense agreements, 

as well as their privilege implications. 

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 To the extent that Boeing’s Motion seeks immediate production 

of the Requested Documents, the Motion is DENIED. 

However, the Motion is GRANTED to the extent that the 

undersigned recognizes Boeing’s entitlement to any Requested 

Documents not covered by the work product doctrine. To that 

end, AAI should be required to produce a privilege log on or 

before September 21, 2016 that details the application of the 

work product doctrine on a document-by-document basis. If 

Boeing wishes to challenge any of AAI’s work product 

assertions, it may do so, filing challenges on or before 

October 6, 2016 that detail either (1) why the work product 

doctrine is inapplicable to the Requested Documents, or (2) 

why Boeing has substantial need for the Requested Documents 

and why Boeing cannot obtain the information contained in the 

Requested Documents by other means without undue hardship. 

After review of Boeing’s challenges, the undersigned will 

conduct an in camera review of the Requested Documents, if 

warranted. 

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Respectfully Submitted, 

s/ David J. Middlebrooks 

David J. Middlebrooks ASB- 8553-D58D 

OF COUNSEL: 

LEHR MIDDLEBROOKS VREELAND & THOMPSON, P.C. 

P.O. Box 11945 

Birmingham, Alabama 35202-1945 

(205) 326-3002 

Fax: (205) 326-3008 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on September 6, 2016, I electronically filed the 

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will 

send notification of such filing to the following: 

Counsel for Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc., Alabama Aircraft 

Industries, Inc. – Birmingham, and Pemco Aircraft Engineering Services, 

Inc. 

Counsel for The Boeing Company, Boeing Aerospace Operations, 

Inc. and Boeing Aerospace Support Center 

s/ David J. Middlebrooks 

OF COUNSEL 

532350 

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