Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02646/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02646-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sunday Josiah Ibeagwa, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Phillip Crawford, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV06-2646-PHX-SRB-BPV

ORDER

Petitioner, Sunday Josiah Ibeagwa, filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

November 3, 2006, challenging his continued detention pending his appeal of an order of

removal. Respondent filed his answer on January 11, 2007. Petitioner filed a reply on

January 25, 2007. On May 10, 2007, the Magistrate Judge to whom this case was referred

issued his Report and Recommendation (“R and R”) recommending that the Court enter an

order granting Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Respondent filed his

objection to the Report and Recommendation on May 30, 2007. Thereafter, Petitioner

responded to the objection, and Respondent filed a reply in support of his objection. For the

reasons stated below, the objection will be sustained and the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus will be denied.

The facts and procedural background of this case are set forth in the Magistrate

Judge’s R and R. The Petitioner is the subject of an administrative final order of removal

from which he is presently prosecuting an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He

has obtained a stay from the Court of Appeals of the order of removal pending his appeal.

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Petitioner’s current detention is pursuant to the pre-removal detention statute, 8 U.S.C.

§1226. Petitioner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and to the Court of Appeals

does not challenge the Immigration Judge’s finding that he is subject to removal. Petitioner

was found to have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five

years after the date of his admission and for which he received a sentence of one year or

more. Petitioner’s appeal is only from the denial of his application for relief from removal.

Thus, Petitioner falls within the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. §1226(c). 

 Although the Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§1226(c), the Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner’s continued detention without review

had become presumptively unreasonable, that his detention has far exceeded the brief period

of detention envisioned by the Supreme Court in its decision in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.

510, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (2003), and that his “so called custody review, (before the immigration

judge) did not meet the constitutional standards procedural due process demands in this

case.” R and R at page 11. The Magistrate Judge recommended that:

[T]he District Court order Respondents (sic) to

release Petitioner immediately on reasonable

conditions. 

 Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends

that the District Court order Respondent to provide

Petitioner with a hearing within 60 days before an

Immigration Judge with the power to grant him bail

unless the government establishes that he is a flight risk

or will be a danger to the community. 

 R and R at page 12.

Respondent’s objection is not made to any of the facts determined by the Magistrate

Judge. The objection goes to the Magistrate Judge’s legal conclusion that Petitioner’s

continuing detention, without review, has become presumptively unreasonable. Respondent

argues that 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) constitutionally requires Petitioner’s mandatory detention until

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decides Petitioner’s appeal.

The issue before the Court is whether there are limits on the mandatory detention

required by 8 U.S.C. §1226(c). The clear language of the statute provides none. In Demore

v. Kim, the United States Supreme Court upheld the mandatory detention provisions of 8

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1

Kim challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) while his case was before

the Immigration Judge. The appeal referenced by the Supreme Court in Kim is an

administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals from an Immigration Judge’s

decision. Kim did not consider a further appeal to the circuit Court of Appeals where the

detained alien sought and obtained a stay of the administrative order of removal.

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U.S.C. §1226(c) holding that Congress could require detention of persons who fall within its

provisions for “the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.” 538 U.S. at 513,

123 S. Ct. At 1712. Kim also involved an individual who did not challenge his deportability

or that 8 U.S.C. §1226(c)’s mandatory detention provisions were applicable to him. Kim

argued that he could only be detained upon a determination that he posed a danger to the

community or posed a flight risk. The Supreme Court rejected Kim’s constitutional

arguments holding that detention during removal proceedings was a constitutionally

permissible part of that process. But in so holding the Supreme Court considered, “The

detention at stake under §1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of

cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien

chooses to appeal.” 1

 538 U.S. 530, 123 S. Ct at 1721. Justice Kennedy in his concurring

opinion noted, “Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and

completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to inquire whether the

detention is not to facilitate deportation or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness

but to incarcerate for other reasons.” 538 U.S. at 532, 123 S.Ct. at 1722. 

In Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals recognized the

limits to the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) when an extended period of detention was

involved. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the mandatory detention authority conferred by

§1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of criminal aliens. The Court held that detention

of two years and eight months with no order of removal yet entered was impermissible and

ordered that the district court either grant the writ or the government provide Tijani a hearing

before an Immigration Judge with the power to grant him bail unless the government

established that he was a flight risk or a danger to the community. Id at 1242.

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2

This Court has reviewed, as did the Magistrate Judge, the docket of Petitioner’s

appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Petitioner’s opening brief was filed on March 27, 2007 and

then re-filed after deficiencies were noted by the Court of Appeals on April 11, 2007.

Respondent’s answering brief was due 30 days after the filing of the opening brief. The

Court notes that the answering brief has not been filed. Instead on May 31, 2007,

Respondent filed a Motion to Remand to the Board of Immigration Appeals. An opposition

has been filed and the matter is pending decision. Although the Court does not presently

believe that habeas relief can be granted, a remand and further proceedings before the

Immigration Judge or the Bureau of Immigration Appeals could trigger new concerns

concerning the expeditiousness of the removal proceedings bringing this case more closely

within the facts of Tijani.

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The case before the Court does not present the situation described in Tijani but is

governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim.

 Petitioner’s detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement began on or about

February 1, 2005, upon his release from state custody. The final decision of the Bureau of

Immigration Appeals upholding the removal order was entered on February 10, 2006, one

year later. Petitioner’s continued detention for the 19 months since the administrative final

order of removal is based on a stay of removal sought and obtained by Petitioner when he

filed his appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Although the time between

Petitioner’s original detention and the conclusion of his removal proceedings was

approximately one year rather than the one and a half months to five months contemplated

by the Supreme Court, a review of those proceedings does not show that they were unduly

delayed by either side. Rather they were concluded as expeditiously as possible under the

circumstances and based on the issues presented. 

While the Magistrate Judge notes that since the appeal has been pending there have

been several delays attributed to the government and to the Court of Appeals itself, the Court

does not believe that it would be reasonable to draw the conclusion that the government is

unreasonably delaying the proceedings causing the Court to inquire whether the detention

is not to facilitate deportation or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness but to

incarcerate for other reasons.2

 Were it not for Petitioner’s decision to seek a stay of removal

while he prosecuted his appeal, in all likelihood Petitioner’s removal would have been

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3

Although Kim did not involve an appeal of an administrative final order of removal

he had argued that the length of detention required to prosecute an appeal might deter aliens

from exercising their appeal rights. In a footnote to the opinion, the Supreme Court

commented on this argument “As we have explained before, however, ‘the legal system. .

. is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to

follow,’ and, even in the criminal context, there is no constitutional prohibition against

requiring parties to make such choices.” (Citations omitted) 583 U.S. at 530, 123 S.Ct. at

1721 ftn. 14.

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effected. But for Petitioner’s actions in obtaining a stay of his removal, he would be out of

detention and in his home country. (Neither side has suggested to the Court that a situation

such as existed in the Sixth Circuit decision in Ly v. Hanson, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003),

is present here, that is, if his removal is affirmed on appeal, Petitioner would not be able to

be repatriated to his home country.) 

This Court concludes that Petitioner’s continued detention is not the result of

“unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings.” 583

U.S. at 532, 123 S.Ct. At 1722. 3

 Petitioner’s continued detention is largely as a result of his

decision to appeal his removal and to obtain a stay of removal pending that appeal. The

Court finds that under the facts that presently exist, Petitioner’s continued detention is neither

unreasonable nor unjustified entitling him to an individualized determination as to his risk

of flight or dangerousness. 

IT IS ORDERED sustaining Respondent’s objection to the Report and

Recommendation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

DATED this 14th day of September, 2007.

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