Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02042/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02042-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiffs’ motion to compel entry of protective order, also filed March 14, 2007, and 1

heard on April 26, 2007, was resolved by entry of a protective order, filed May 14, 2007.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L.H., A.Z., D.K., AND D.R., 

on behalf of themselves and all

other similarly situated juvenile 

parolees in California,

Plaintiffs, CIV. NO. S-06-2042 LKK GGH

vs.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Previously pending on this court’s law and motion calendar for April 26, 2007,

was plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of documents, filed March 22, 2007. Gay Grunfeld, 1

Sarah Laubach and Maria Morris appeared for plaintiffs. Stephen Acquisto and Michelle Angus

appeared for defendants. Having now reviewed the joint statement and heard oral argument, the

court issues the following order.

BACKGROUND

This is a class action lawsuit wherein plaintiffs are juvenile parolees who allege

due process violations throughout the parole revocation process, as well as violations of the

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), the Division of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”), and Board of Parole Hearings

(“BPH”). This case has been related to Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, Civ.S. 94-671 LKK GGH,

which involves the same issues as applied to adult parolees.

DISCUSSION

This motion relates to plaintiffs’ notice of deposition served on defendant John

Monday, Executive Director of the Board of Parole Hearings, seeking documents. Defendants

produced some documents but refused to produce documents on two topics: (1) any budget or

funding requests related to improving parole revocation proceedings; and (2) any documents,

including budget or funding requests, related to providing legal assistance to wards in parole

revocation hearings. At issue are 201 documents for which defendants variously claim selfcritical analysis privilege, deliberative process privilege, privileges under Cal. Gov’t. Code §

6255, Fed. R. Evid. 501, Cal. Evid. Code § 1040, work product immunity, and attorney-client

privilege.

The two document requests at issue are:

ALL DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS reflecting

arrangements between DJJ and attorneys, to provide legal

assistance to WARDS in PAROLE REVOCATION

PROCEEDINGS, including contracts, budgets, budget requests OR

requests for funds to provide counsel to WARDS.

ALL DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS that RELATE to

budgets, budget proposals OR requests for funds for reforms,

improvements OR changes of PAROLE REVOCATION

PROCEEDINGS.

Joint Stmt. at 15.

Plaintiffs assert that the privileges are claimed in a “boilerplate” manner, without

specific factual justification. 

Defendants claim that the only documents not produced in response to these

requests are draft BCPs (Budget Change Proposals) or documents that discuss these drafts. They

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

argue that these BCPs are not relevant because they discuss requests for funding for various

program changes and have no bearing on plaintiffs’ claims, and furthermore they are privileged,

primarily as deliberative process.

The court has now reviewed the amended final privilege log and the documents

submitted at the hearing for in camera review which constitute all the documents listed in the

privilege log, as well as supporting papers. 

A. Deliberative Process Privilege

Defendants claim this privilege over all 201 documents which are responsive to

the two document requests. 

The court is mindful that privileges are narrowly construed because they impede

the full and fair discovery of the truth, Eureka Financial Corp. v. Hartford Acc. and Indemnity

Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183 (E.D. Cal. 1991), and the undisputed proposition that the party

asserting the privilege has the burden to establish its applicability, see, e.g., United States v.

O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 227 (3rd Cir. 1980).

The Supreme Court has pronounced that privileges are not favored:

The common-law principles underlying the recognition of 

testimonial privileges can be stated simply. “‘For more than three

centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that

the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence. When we come

to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the

primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what

testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which

may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations

from a positive general rule.’”

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996) (citing United States v. Bryan, 339

U.S. 323, 331, 70 S. Ct. 724, 730, 94 L. Ed. 884 (1950) (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192,

p. 64 (3d ed.1940)). See also and generally, Maricopa Audubon Soc. v. U.S.F.S., 108 F.3d 1082,

1085-86 (9th Cir. 1997).

On the other hand, if a privilege is applicable within its narrow confines, the

privilege must be applied according to the law in an ungrudging manner. The court will neither

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

over-expansively or under-expansively apply a privilege. 

1. Procedural Prerequisites

Executive privileges asserted by a government agency have procedural

prerequisites:

There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of

the department which has control over the matter, after actual

personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must

determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for a claim of

privilege ...

United States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d at 225 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8

(1953). These requirements have been applied to all forms of “executive” privilege. Yang v.

Reno, 157 F.R.D. 625, 632 (1994); Martin v. Albany Business Journal, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 927,

932 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). Courts have allowed the claim to be made by a person in an executive

policy position. See Reynolds 345 U.S. at 8 n. 20, 73 S. Ct. at 532 n. 20 (“The essential matter is

that the decision to object should be taken by the minister who is the political head of the

department, and that he or she should have seen and considered the contents of the documents

and himself have formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not to be

produced . . .”). See also Scott Paper Co., 943 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Yang, 157 F.R.D.

at 632-34 & n.4 (1994) (considering official status necessary to invoke privilege, collecting

cases, and finding executive secretary of National Security Council could not invoke

governmental privileges); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 102 F.R.D. 1, 6 (N.D.N.Y.

1983) (official invoking the privilege may be an agency head or a subordinate with high

authority). Some jurisdictions do not allow the agency head to delegate the authority to claim the

privilege. Scott, 943 F. Supp. at 502. Other jurisdictions which allow the authority to be

delegated require the delegation to be accompanied by detailed guidelines regarding the use of

the privilege. Id at 503.

Of critical importance, “the information for which the privilege is claimed must

be specified, with an explanation why it properly falls within the scope of the privilege.” In re

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (law enforcement privilege) (emphasis added). 

An official cannot invoke a privilege without personally considering the material for which the

privilege is sought. Yang, 157 F.R.D. at 634. In the instant case, defendants have presented

declarations by John Monday, Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) for the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and Bernard Warner, Chief

Deputy Secretary, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), in support of their privilege claims. Monday and

Warner are proper agency “heads.” Monday’s declaration states that he provided the BCPs in

response to his notice of deposition and document request. The declaration also states that based

on his knowledge, he believes the documents are pre-decisional and deliberative. Warner’s

declaration echoes this opinion that the documents meet the requirements for the deliberative

process privilege. 

One must use a rule of reason in determining whether the procedural requirements

of invoking the deliberative process privilege have been satisfied. There may be cases in which

every single document withheld is unique unto itself, and should be declared privileged only after

a document-by-document analysis or, as is the case here, the documents do not vary in their type

or purpose. In this latter case, a collective judgment on the need for invoking deliberative

process may be given. Defendants have essentially complied with a collective analysis in this

case as the budget change proposal documents are all of the same type and purpose. As stated by

John Monday in his declaration, the policies and procedures that go into budget proposals are

compiled by a committee of individuals, and are evaluated on a continuing basis. As head of

these review functions, Monday is qualified to submit a general declaration of this sort as a

statement of personal consideration.

2. Substantive Standards

The deliberative process privilege protects the quality of agency decisions by

allowing candor in formulating policy, and encouraging public review based on the decision

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

itself rather than the considerations that contributed to the decision. N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck

& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-152, 95 S. Ct. 1504 (1975). Its aim is to protect the policy making

process. It requires a two step review by the court. See Carter v. U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, 307

F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating standards and holding that standards for invoking

deliberative process in a FOIA context are identical to those in civil discovery). 

First, the matter protected must be pre-decisional, generated before the adoption

of an agency policy or decision. Predecisional matters are prepared “in order to assist an agency

decisionmaker in arriving at his decision.” Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g

Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184, 95 S.Ct. 1491, 1500 (1975) ; accord, Assembly of State of Cal. v. U.S.

Dept of Commerce, 968 F2d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1992). Predecisional material is distinguished

from material supporting a decision already made. Id. Accordingly, in determining whether the

“predecisional” prong applies, this circuit looks first to the purpose of the matter to be

discovered. See Assembly of State of Cal., 968 F.2d at 920-21 (looking to the purpose for which

a document was prepared to determine whether it meets the “predecisional” prong). 

Second, the matter to be protected must be deliberative, concerning opinions,

recommendations, or advice about agency policies. F.T.C. v. Warner Communications Inc., 742

F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984). The privilege applies if material to be discovered reveals the

mental processes of decision makers. Assembly of State of Cal., 968 F.2d at 921. If material

sought to be discovered would “inaccurately reflect or prematurely disclose the views of the

agency,” it would come within the deliberative process privilege. National Wildlife Federation v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v.

Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

Although facts are not protected by the privilege, if the facts are inextricably

interwoven with the deliberative process, the entire matter may be protected by the privilege. 

National Wildlife Federation, 861 F.2d at 1116 (explaining that if the disclosure of facts would

necessarily reveal the deliberative process, the information is protected). It is important to

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

emphasize, as the Ninth Circuit has, that the privilege applies to the deliberative process as well

as deliberative material. National Wildlife Fed. v. U.S. Forest Service, 861 F.2d at 1118. “In

other words, the document is considered to be part of the ‘deliberative process’ as long as it is

‘actually....related to the process by which policies are formulated.’” Id. (Emphasis in original).

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified one and can be overridden if the

need for accurate fact-finding outweighs the government’s interest in non-disclosure. F.T.C. v.

Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1161. Three relevant factors are weighed to

determine if disclosure is appropriate:

1) the relevance of the evidence; 2) the availability of other

evidence; 3) the government’s role in the litigation; 4) the extent to

which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion

regarding contemplated policies and decisions.

Id. 

3. Analysis

Plaintiffs contend that the withheld documents relate to whether the Valdivia

requirement that prompt preliminary hearings regarding probable cause for detention be held

soon after a parolee is detained, is being applied to juveniles, and contain discussions on this

issue. Such documents, they argue, are therefore highly relevant and not available from any other

source.

Plaintiffs provide non-binding cases suggesting that where government

misconduct is at issue, this privilege has been disallowed. Plaintiffs assert there may have been

misconduct here, based on the log which indicates defendants considered and debated

constitutional requirements but then refused to provide them.

Defendants argue that since the BCPs are drafts, they are but a prelude to the

governor’s budget, and are therefore pre-decisional, deliberative, and protected. Disclosure of

this information would prevent candid discussions to consider changes in the budget. Because

these documents do not constitute final agency decisions or positions, but are opinions,

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

suggestions or requests involved in the budget process, they should be protected. 

A review of the documents submitted by defendants which are enumerated in their

privilege log, indicates that they are all pre-decisional. (Angus Decl., Exh. E.) As the name

suggests, BCPs refer to proposals, and by their very nature they indicate the lack of a final

decision. For example, some of the documents refer to requests for a number of positions and a

number of dollars, but the numbers were not yet filled in. All the documents refer to predictions

of budgeting needs in future. The terms “projected” and “requested” are used continually

throughout. Furthermore, the documents were prepared in order to assist the decisionmaker in

coming to a decision. To the extent that any documents were prepared by Monday or Warner,

they were prepared with the goal of coming to a final decision. Whether the documents were

prepared for these officials or by them, they qualify as pre-decisional. Renegotiation Board, 421

U.S. at 184, 95 S. Ct. at 1500. 

The documents are also deliberative in nature. They reveal the opinions of the

individuals contributing to the decisionmaking process, and include recommendations and

predictions of consequences based on alternative recommendations. The thought processes of

the decisionmakers are readily apparent. These predictions, recommendations and thought

processes may have changed during the course of the deliberations, and the documents may not

accurately reflect the final views of the agencies involved. The documents are quintessential

examples of those shielded by the deliberative process privilege which protects governmental

agencies from disclosing the pre-policy development process. If they were produced, the

privilege might as well not exist. 

An example of a confirmed deliberative process close to the issues here is shown

in the National Wildlife case. Material sought in that case included, inter alia, cost-benefit

analyses of various plans. The Ninth Circuit concluded: “These materials represent the tentative

opinions and recommendations of Forest Service employees on matters instrumental to the

formulation of policies....” Id. At 1121. In this case, the formulation of the budget is one of the

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

foundational aspects of policy formulation in state government. The withheld BCPs and related

information are an integral part of that entire budget process. Plaintiffs themselves argue –

“Budget Change Proposals, or BCPs, are government documents that often include significant

and important information about a particular agency’s remedial plans, such as the background

and history of a problem, cost estimates to remedy the problem, and the staff and schedule

proposed.....The BCPs being withheld here are no exception.” Joint Statement at 15-16

(emphasis added).

As to plaintiffs’ claim of a misconduct exception which, in essence, swallows the

whole privilege, the amended complaint alleges that defendants’ policies violate due process and

equal protection, deny effective assistance of counsel, and deny rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, with respect to granting, extending or revoking parole. There is no allegation of

government misconduct as plaintiffs’ cases seem to require. Plaintiffs cite In re Sealed Case, 121

F.3d 729, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1997), Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309945 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2007),

and In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Office of Comptroller of Currency, 145 F.3d 1422,

1425 (D.C. Cir. 1998), for the proposition that the privilege disappears where there is reason to

believe government misconduct has occurred. Sealed Case is inapposite in involving the

presidential privilege as the court found that the deliberative process privilege did not apply to

the documents at issue. The court pointed out that one of the differences between the

deliberative process privilege and the presidential privilege was that although misconduct must

not be shielded, there must still be a showing of need which does not turn on the alleged

misconduct, but must show that the documents are necessary for the government to fulfill its

responsibilities. 121 F.3d at 746, citing Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign

Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Furthermore, government misconduct

must have been charged. Id. at 751. Not only is this case inapplicable based on the privilege

applied, it is not binding on this circuit. Furthermore, government misconduct of the type

indicated in Sealed Case has not been alleged in this case. See e.g. Alexander v. F.B.I., 193

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

F.R.D. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (denying deliberative process privilege where White House

improperly obtained FBI files in violation of Privacy Act, as issue was misconduct, i.e. whether

files were obtained through unintentional mistake or intent). 

Allen, 2007 WL 309945, is also distinguishable and not binding. The holding

there indicated that the deliberative process privilege did not apply because the deliberations

were not policy formulation, but rather one specific incident, a physician’s alleged malpractice on

a prisoner, after the prison allegedly had been notified of this doctor’s previous injury to another

patient. The court found the misconduct exception to apply where the documents might reveal

the prison’s prior knowledge. Id. at *5. 

Plaintiffs’ third cited case found that the deliberative process privilege did not

apply at all. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Office of Comptroller of Currency, 145

F.3d at 1425. The court did note the district court’s recognition that the misconduct exception to

the privilege did not fit the situation where there was no alleged taint of misconduct, but rather

attacked the actual goals of the regulators. In a footnote, the court gave a good explanation of the

limits of the misconduct exception. “The word ‘misconduct’ does not even really fit this

situation, because the government could have violated the Bankruptcy Code without the

nefarious motives that the word ‘misconduct’ implies.” Id. at 425, n. 2. One court emphasizes

the problem with the misconduct exception, stating that the very basis for the existence of the

privilege would be undermined if the privilege is not found as its purpose is to protect

government decisionmaking from the chill of potential disclosure. Arizona Rehabilitation

Hospital, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 263, 267, n. 3 (D. Az. 1998). Cf. Newport Pacific Inc. v. County of

San Diego, 200 F.R.D. 628, 640 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that allegations of violations of due

process and equal protection merit exception to deliberative process privilege). 

Plaintiffs’ misconduct exception, as broadly asserted by them, lacks reasonable

boundaries. The government is not often sued because the plaintiff alleges wholesome activities

on the part of the government. Officials are sued because they are alleged to have engaged in

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

misconduct of some sort, i.e., actions taken in violation of law or the Constitution. Plaintiffs’

expansive misconduct exception interpretation to deliberative process has never been endorsed

by the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court. Plaintiff’s suggestion at argument that deliberative

process has been relegated only to third party subpoena actions finds no support in the law. 

Nor does plaintiffs’ contention that the BCPs are highly relevant to their claims

hold water. Whether defendants were good, bad, or indifferent in their alleged intent to violate

plaintiffs’ rights is not particularly significant in this injunctive relief case. Either plaintiffs’ due

process, equal protection and ADA rights were violated, or they were not. Plaintiffs do not assert

that they must demonstrate any state of mind on the part of defendants in order to prevail. The

court questioned defendants whether they were raising some type of “feasibility” defense, in

which case, of course, budget documents would be very relevant. Defendants represented that

they were not, and their answer in this case contains no such affirmative defense. While the

formulation of a remedy in this case, if plaintiffs were to prevail, may well take into account

economic concerns, these economic concerns are universally understood without the necessity of

revelation of deliberative process, and will not be the deciding remedial factor in any event. 

Moreover, plaintiffs have other evidence available to them, such as final budgets for the years in

question.

Although defendants have some valid claims of other privileges and protections

over a number of documents submitted for in camera review (self-critical analysis not being one

of them), the court finds that all documents are protected by the deliberative process privilege. 

Therefore, other privileges will not be addressed.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of

documents, filed March 22, 2007, is denied.

DATED: 5/25/07 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

U.S. Magistrate Judge

L.H.2042.dsy 

Case 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-DAD Document 119 Filed 05/25/07 Page 11 of 11