Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_04-cv-00262/USCOURTS-alnd-7_04-cv-00262-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

JOHN ALLEN BRATTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. CV 04-RRA-262-W

)

WARDEN GRANT CULLIVER, )

and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL )

FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMA, )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a person in custody

under a judgment of a court of the State of Alabama. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The

petitioner, John Allen Bratton, was convicted on March 4, 1996, in the Circuit Court

of Tuscaloosa County, of first degree robbery. He was sentenced as an habitual felon

to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On November 14,

1997, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence

in a memorandum opinion. Bratton’s application for rehearing was overruled on

March 6, 1998. On March 24, 1998, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied Bratton’s

petition for a writ of certiorari and issued a certificate of final judgment 

On March 2, 2000, Bratton filed a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of

Tuscaloosa County. The trial court dismissed the petition on December 15, 2000. On

FILED

 2005 Apr-04 PM 04:14

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:04-cv-00262-RRA Document 8 Filed 04/04/05 Page 1 of 6
2

June 21, 2002, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

denial of the Rule 32 petition in a memorandum opinion. Bratton’s application for

rehearing was overruled. On October 18, 2002, the Supreme Court of Alabama

denied Bratton’s petition for a writ of certiorari and issued a certificate of final

judgment. 

The petitioner filed a second post-conviction motion in December, 2002. The

trial court denied the petition, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

the denial of the petition on June 20, 2003. The certificate of judgment was issued on

December 12, 2003.

Bratton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court on February 9,

2004. In response to the court’s order to show cause, the respondents have filed an

answer in which they assert that the petition is due to be dismissed because it is barred

by the one-year statute of limitations enacted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The parties were advised that the respondents’ answer

would be treated as a motion for summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases. In response, the petitioner has filed a traverse. 

The AEDPA, effective April 24, 1996, amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to read in

part, as follows:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

Case 7:04-cv-00262-RRA Document 8 Filed 04/04/05 Page 2 of 6
3

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest

of — 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C)the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right

has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

Bratton’s conviction became final on June 22, 1998, the date on which the

ninety-day period for filing a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court

expired. See Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, the one-year

period he had to attack the convictions began to run on June 22, 1998, giving him until

June 22, 1999, to file a habeas petition in this court. He did not file a habeas corpus

Case 7:04-cv-00262-RRA Document 8 Filed 04/04/05 Page 3 of 6
4

petition in this court until February 9, 2004. Thus, the petition is barred by the statute

of limitations. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) does not help the petitioner. That section provides

that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” Although

Bratton did successfully file two Rule 32 petitions in state court, those petitions were

not filed until March 2, 2000, and December 19, 2002, well after the statute of

limitations expired on June 22, 1999. The fact that Bratton successfully filed two

Rule 32 petitions after the expiration of the one-year period for filing in federal court

did not start the running of the limitations periods anew:

Section 2244(d)(2) does not state that the AEDPA’s one-year statute

begins to run anew after decision on a state collateral attack; such an

interpretation would allow an inmate to avoid the effect of the AEDPA’s

one-year state of limitations by bringing a belated state collateral attack.

See, e.g., Hamilton v. Miller, No. 98 CV 5669, 1999 WL 438472 at *3

(E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1999); DeVeaux v. Schriver, slip op. at 8; Varsos v.

Portuondo, slip op. at 4; Smith v. McGinnis, No. CV 98-1034, 1999 WL

312121 at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. March 17, 1999); Cromwell v. Keane, 33 F.

Supp. 2d 282, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Rakoff, D.J. & Peck, M.J.).

Rather, § 2244(d)(2) merely excludes the time a collateral attack

is under submission from the calculation of the one-year statute of

limitations. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 199 n. 1 (5th

Cir.1998) ( “Under the plain language of the statute, any time that passed

between the time that [petitioner’s] conviction became final and the time

that his state application for habeas corpus was properly filed must be

counted against the one year period of limitation.”); DeVeaux v.

Case 7:04-cv-00262-RRA Document 8 Filed 04/04/05 Page 4 of 6
5

Schriver, slip op. at 8; Broom v. Garvin, 99 Civ. 1083, 1999 WL 246753

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1999) (“[T]he filing of a collateral attack in the

state court tolls the AEDPA statute of limitations during the period that

it is pending, but it does not commence a new limitations period.”);

Hamilton v. Miller, 1999 WL 438472 at *3; Smith v. McGinnis, 1999

WL 312121 at *3-4; Varsos v. Portuondo, slip op. at 4-5; Brooks v.

Artuz, 98 Civ. 4449, 1999 WL 138926 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 1999)

(“The tolling provision [in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2) ] does not . . . ‘revive’

the limitations period (i.e., restart the clock at zero); it can only serve to

pause a clock that has not yet fully run.”) (quoting Rashid v. Kuhlmann,

991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y.1998)); Cowart v. Goord, 97 Civ. 3864,

1998 WL 65985 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1998) (Sotomayor, D.J.) (“the

filing of a proper state collateral petition does serve to toll (but not start

anew) the AEDPA statute of limitations”); Hughes v. Irvin, 967 F. Supp.

775, 778 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (petitioner’s statute of limitations period was

suspended only during the period state collateral motions were pending,

and began to run again, but not anew, when the state collateral motions

were decided).

Torres v. Miller, No. 99 Civ. 0580 MBM, 1999 WL 714349, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.

August 27, 1999). See also Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir.

2004)(“A state court filing after the federal habeas filing deadline does not revive it.”);

Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir. 2003) (“While a ‘properly filed’

application for post-conviction relief tolls the statute of limitations, it does not reset

or restart the statute of limitations once the limitations period has expired. In other

words, the tolling provision does not operate to revive the one-year limitations period

if such period has expired.”); Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.

2000)(“A state-court petition like [the petitioner’s] that is filed following the

expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because there is no period

Case 7:04-cv-00262-RRA Document 8 Filed 04/04/05 Page 5 of 6
remaining to be tolled.”); Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 472 (5th

 Cir.

1999)(tolling lasts “only as long as the state court takes to resolve the pending

application because any lapse of time before a state application is properly filed will

be counted against the one-year limitation period”); Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp.

254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)(“Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions

can no longer serve to avoid the statute of limitations.”). This action is due to be

dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations.

An appropriate order will be entered. 

DONE this 4th day of April, 2005.

______________________________

United States District Judge

Case 7:04-cv-00262-RRA Document 8 Filed 04/04/05 Page 6 of 6