Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-00727/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-00727-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICARDO MERCADO-GUILLEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEVIN MCALEENAN, et al.,

Defendants.

1

Case No. 18-cv-00727-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

ISSUANCE OF U VISA 

CERTIFICATION

Re: Dkt. No. 27

Pending before the Court is the motion for issuance of U visa certification, filed by 

Petitioner Ricardo Mercado-Guillen. Dkt. No. 27 (“Mot.”). For the following reasons, the Court 

DENIES the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 19, 2018, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, finding that Petitioner, then in

the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), was entitled to a bond 

hearing before an immigration judge to determine if his continued detention was warranted. Dkt. 

No. 23 (“April 19 Order”). Prior to the Court’s order, Petitioner had been held pursuant to DHS’s 

discretionary authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). See id. at 3. The Court found that binding 

Ninth Circuit precedent required Petitioner to be provided with a bond hearing before an 

immigration judge at least every six months when removal is not imminent. Id. at 5–6 (citing 

Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Diouf II”)). The government appealed the 

April 19 Order, and the appeal is currently stayed. Dkt. Nos. 25, 38. Petitioner now moves this 

Court to find, based on the same facts underlying his original habeas petition, that his detention 

 

1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the Court substitutes the following Respondents: 

Kevin McAleenan, current Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, for Kirstjen Nielsen; and 

William Barr, current United States Attorney General, for Jefferson B. Sessions.

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constituted a federal crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, and to issue a U visa certification on 

that basis. Dkt. No. 27 at 14–23. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The U visa classification, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), grants temporary 

immigration status for victims of certain crimes who are likely to aid in the investigation of those 

crimes. To qualify for a U visa, an applicant must demonstrate that he: (1) “has suffered 

substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of qualifying criminal 

activity”; (2) “possesses credible and reliable information establishing that he or she has 

knowledge of the details concerning the qualifying criminal activity upon which his or her petition 

is based”; and (3) “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to a certifying 

agency in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity upon which his or her 

petition is based.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b). In addition, the applicant must also demonstrate that 

“[t]he qualifying criminal activity occurred in the United States.” Id. Qualifying criminal activity 

covered under the statute includes the following crimes, or “any similar activity”: 

rape; torture; trafficking; incest; domestic violence; sexual assault; 

abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; stalking; 

female genital mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary 

servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal 

restraint; false imprisonment; blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; 

murder; felonious assault; witness tampering; obstruction of justice; 

perjury; fraud in foreign labor contracting (as defined in section 1351 

of Title 18); or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of 

the above mentioned crimes.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii).

The United States Citizenship and Immigration and Services (“USCIS”) has sole 

jurisdiction over all U visa petitions. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(1). Before an applicant can apply for a 

U visa, an applicant must first obtain “a certification from a Federal, State, or local law 

enforcement official, prosecutor, judge, or other Federal, State, or local authority investigating 

criminal activity described in § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii).” 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1). The certification 

must state that the applicant “‘has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful’ in the 

investigation or prosecution of [the] criminal activity.” Id. “Investigation or prosecution refers to 

the detection or investigation of a qualifying crime or criminal activity, as well as to the 

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prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of the perpetrator of the qualifying crime or criminal 

activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(5). Circuit courts that have addressed this issue have held that the 

decision of whether to issue a U visa certification is discretionary. See, e.g., Ordonez Orosco v. 

Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We think the language of § 1184(p) makes it 

abundantly clear that the decision to issue a [ ] certification is a discretionary one.”); Trevino v. 

Benton Cty., Ark., 578 F. App’x 626, 627 (8th Cir. 2014) (same).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner alleges that because the Court, in its April 19 Order, held that he was entitled to 

a bond hearing under Diouf II, the Court should now certify that Petitioner was a “victim of the 

federal crime of deprivation of rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242.” Mot. at 

4. Because the government has appealed the Court’s April 19 Order, the Court must first consider 

whether it has jurisdiction to reach the merits of the issues presented. 

A. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction

Generally, the filing of an appeal “confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests 

the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. 

Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). The purpose of the “divestiture rule” is 

“to avoid confusion or waste of time resulting from having the same issues before two courts at 

the same time.” United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1984). “Given this 

purpose, it has been suggested that ‘the rule should not be employed to defeat its purpose or to 

induce needless paper shuffling.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has characterized the “divestiture rule” as a “mandatory claimprocessing rule,” rather than a strict jurisdictional rule, and has found that it is subject to certain

exceptions. See Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 790–91 (9th Cir. 2018)

(divestiture rule “may be applied in a ‘less stern’ manner than true jurisdictional rules”) (citation 

omitted). One such exception is that a district court may proceed “in appropriate cases by 

certifying that an appeal is frivolous or waived.” Id. Additionally, a district court may retain 

jurisdiction: (1) “to correct clerical errors or clarify its judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(a)”; (2) “when it has a duty to supervise the status quo during the pendency of an appeal”; (3) 

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“in aid of execution of a judgment that has not been superseded”; or (4) pursuant to statutory 

authority. Stein v. Wood, 127 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1997). The exceptions stated are 

consistent with the purpose of the divestiture rule, as they would not require the district court to 

decide the same issues before the appeals court. See Stein, 127 F.3d at 1189–90. 

Here, the issues to be decided in the present motion clearly involve aspects of the case that 

are the subject of the pending appeal. See Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58. Petitioner’s entire theory of 

eligibility for a U visa certification relies on the Court’s finding that Petitioner’s detention without 

a bond hearing was unlawful under Diouf II. Mot. at 4; see April 19 Order at 4–7. Petitioner 

seeks to have the Court certify, based on the Court’s holding, that Petitioner’s detention 

constituted a qualifying crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(U)(iii). Mot. at 4. But if the Court 

were to issue the U visa certification based on the April 19 Order now on appeal, and the Ninth 

Circuit were then to vacate that order, the two results would be irreconcilable. Petitioner’s

argument regarding the nature of his detention “affect[s] the matters involved in the appeal itself,” 

and the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. See id. at 1189. 

Petitioner does not dispute that the merits of the present motion involve issues that are 

currently on appeal, but instead contends that the Court should retain jurisdiction because of the 

“status quo” exception. Dkt. No. 32 (“Reply”) at 4–5. Petitioner mischaracterizes the nature of 

the status quo exception. The status quo exception generally applies to cases “where the court 

supervises a continuing course of conduct” or where “new facts develop” that require “additional 

supervisory action by the court.” Hoffman for & on Behalf of N.L.R.B. v. Beer Drivers & 

Salesmen’s Local Union No. 888, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers 

of Am., 536 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1976). According to Petitioner, the Court’s issuance of a U 

visa certification would preserve the status quo “by ensuring that the victim remains within the 

jurisdiction of a United States court that can compel the victim’s presence at future proceedings, 

should they be needed.” Reply at 6. But the Court fails to see how this would affect the current

case proceeding before the Court, as any “future proceedings” would occur in an entirely separate 

(and, as of now, hypothetical) action. Rather, if the Court were to address Petitioner’s present 

motion, it would alter the status quo as of the time the appeal was filed, and would “materially 

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alter the status of the case on appeal.” See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sw. Marine Inc., 242 

F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2001).

2

 Accordingly, the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to 

address the merits of the present motion. 

B. Petitioner Fails to Meet the Requirements for U Visa Certification

Although the Court need not reach the merits of the present motion, even if the Court were 

to find that it has jurisdiction, it would reject Petitioner’s novel theory and would not issue the 

requested U visa certification. There is no pending investigation or prosecution of the alleged 

qualifying crimes, and Petitioner thus fails to show how a U visa certification in this case would 

effectuate the purpose of the statute. See Baiju v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 12-CV-5610 KAM, 

2014 WL 349295, at *20–21 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2014).

The Court notes that there is sparse binding legal authority that addresses whether and 

when it is appropriate for a court to grant a U visa certification when the court’s only role has been 

to oversee a civil proceeding brought by an applicant. The majority of district courts that have 

addressed this issue declined to grant U visa certification, in large part because there was no 

pending investigation or prosecution of the alleged qualifying criminal activity. See, e.g., Nsinano 

v. Sessions, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“the record does not reveal whether 

there has been an investigation or prosecution of the alleged criminal violation at issue here”);

Aguirre-Palacios v. Doe No. 1, No. 13CV3103 LAB BLM, 2014 WL 584265, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 

Feb. 11, 2014) (denying motion for U visa certification on basis that the court’s jurisdiction does 

not extend “so far as to confer further jurisdiction over questions of Plaintiff’s eligibility for UVisa”); Romero-Hernandez v. District of Columbia, 141 F. Supp. 3d 29, 33(D.D.C. 2015) 

(“[T]here is no existing investigation or prosecution related to the Incident, nor is there any 

evidence indicating that any such investigation or prosecution will take place in the future, and no 

[ ] officers have been charged with any crime or infraction arising out of the Incident.”); Herrera 

 

2 Petitioner also contends that the present motion is not subject to the divestiture rule based on the 

language of the U visa classification statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III), and the provision 

prohibiting restriction of communication about an individual’s immigration status to the 

Immigration and Naturalization Services, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). Reply at 6–8. These statutes are 

inapposite, and Petitioner fails to coherently articulate how they have any application to the 

question of the Court’s jurisdiction. 

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Lopez v. Walker, No. 3:18-CV-170, 2019 WL 937311, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2019) (“The 

Court is not presiding over a criminal prosecution of Defendant, and there is no indication in the 

record that such an investigation or prosecution is ongoing.”); Baiju, No. 12-CV-5610 KAM, 2014 

WL 349295, at *20 (“[T]here is no evidence of any possible pending investigation or prosecution 

of the qualifying crimes that petitioner alleges”); Agaton v. Hosp. & Catering Servs., Inc., No. 

CIV.A. 11-1716, 2013 WL 1282454, at *4 (W.D. La. Mar. 28, 2013) (“[T]his Court may not

certify a U–Visa application when this judge has no responsibilities or even knowledge regarding 

any possible pending investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity.”); In re 

Certification Form for U Visa for Movant Nunez-Ramirez, No. MISC.A. M-13-746, 2013 WL 

6273961, at *5, 10 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying U visa certification because it was unclear 

whether movant was victim of qualified criminal activity and whether movant was “helpful”); 

United States v. Biao, No. 98CR2812-BTM, 2011 WL 607087, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) 

(movants do not qualify as victims of qualifying criminal activity). 

To the Court’s knowledge, only two courts have granted certification on the basis that

movants made a “prima facie showing” that they were victims of a qualifying crime. See Villegas 

v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 907 F. Supp. 2d 907, 912 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (plaintiff made a prima 

facie showing that she was a victim of a qualifying crime, based on the court’s previous findings 

that defendant’s shackling of plaintiff during labor violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights); 

Garcia v. Audubon Communities Mgmt., LLC, No. CIV.A. 08-1291, 2008 WL 1774584, at *2 

(E.D. La. Apr. 15, 2008) (plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of involuntary servitude). 

However, the Court finds the reasoning of those district courts that have denied U visa 

certification to be persuasive, and thus would deny Petitioner’s motion even if it had jurisdiction 

to grant the requested relief, because there is no pending investigation or prosecution of qualifying 

criminal activity.

3

 

 

3 Petitioner relies heavily on Villegas and Garcia for the proposition that federal courts may issue 

U visa certifications “upon detecting the existence of a crime while hearing a factually-related 

civil matter.” Mot. at 10–11. But one of the many problems with this argument is that Villegas 

and Garcia are dramatically unlike this action, in which Petitioner is essentially arguing that the 

federal government’s entire policy concerning detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) is criminal. 

See Mot. at 4–5, 14–15. Petitioner cites no case in which a court found that the grant of a habeas 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion for U visa certification. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

petition transformed generally-applicable government policies regarding detention into criminal 

acts. Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion otherwise, the Court’s April 19 Order did not 

find that Petitioner was entitled to immediate release from custody, but rather that he was entitled 

to a bond hearing to determine whether he was a flight risk or a danger to the community. April 

19 Order at 7; see Diouf II, 634 F.3d at 1092–93, n.13 (non-citizen detained under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1231(a)(6) beyond presumptively-reasonable six month period is entitled to a bond hearing

when removal is not imminent). Accordingly, the Court finds that no authority, including Villegas 

and Garcia, supports Petitioner’s argument here. 

5/6/2019

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