Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02365/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02365-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON LAMONT STRIBLING,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. L. JORDAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-02365-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; 

DENYING MOTION TO DISQULIFY 

UNDERSIGNED JUDGE; AND 

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO 

RESPOND TO ORDER TO SHOW 

CAUSE

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. On November 13, 2018, the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and ordered him 

to show cause why this action should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Dkt. 6. The Court stated as follows:

Plaintiff has indicated that, at the time he filed his complaint, the 

response to his appeal [at] the third formal level was “never returned 

back to [him].” Dkt. 1 at 2.1 It appears that his claims were 

unexhausted at the time he filed this action. Thus, it is unlikely that 

Plaintiff can proceed with this action because failed to fully exhaust 

his claims prior to filing this action. Nor can Plaintiff proceed with 

this case if he exhausts his claim after the filing of this action. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not presented any extraordinary 

circumstances which might compel that he be excused from 

complying with PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Cf. Booth[ v. 

Churner], 532 U.S. [731,] 741 n.6 [(2001)] (courts should not read 

“futility or other exceptions” into section 1997e(a)). 

Id. at 1-2 (footnote in original and brackets added). The Court further directed Plaintiff to respond 

to the Order to Show Cause, stating as follows:

. . . Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to demonstrate that he 

has properly exhausted his claims rather than have the Court allow 

this case to proceed and Plaintiff perhaps miss his opportunity to 

properly exhaust and pursue this action. Plaintiff shall show cause 

within twenty-eight (28) days why this case should not be dismissed 

without prejudice for failure to exhaust. Specifically, to avoid 

dismissal, Plaintiff needs to provide proof that extraordinary 

circumstances existed in order to excuse him from complying with 

 

1 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by Plaintiff.

Case 4:18-cv-02365-YGR Document 8 Filed 07/23/19 Page 1 of 5
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PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See e.g., . Ross[ v. Blake], [__ U.S. 

__,] 136 S. Ct. [1850,] 1856-58 [(2016)].

Id. at 2 (brackets added).

Plaintiff’s response to the Court’s Order was due on December 11, 2018. That deadline 

has passed, and Plaintiff has not filed a response. Instead, Plaintiff is seeking reconsideration of 

the Court’s November 13, 2018 Order. See Dkt. 7. In Plaintiff’s motion entitled, “Motion for 

Reconsideration After Motion for Disqualification of Judge,” he challenges the Court’s decision to 

issue an Order to Show Cause instead of issuing a dismissal with leave to amend. Id. at 1. 

Plaintiff claims that he “could prove [he] exhausted [his] administrative remedies.” Id. However, 

he does not support this statement with any further explanation. See id. 

In the Northern District of California, no motion for reconsideration may be brought 

without leave of court. See Civil L.R. 7-9(a). Under Civil Local Rule 7-9, the moving party must 

specifically show: (1) that at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law 

exists from that which was presented to the court before entry of the interlocutory order for which 

the reconsideration is sought, and that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying 

for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or (2) the 

emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order; or (3) a 

manifest failure by the court to consider material facts which were presented to the court before 

such interlocutory order. See Civil L.R. 7-9(b). 

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff, by failing to seek leave of court before filing 

his motion for reconsideration, has not complied with the Local Rules of this district, and, on that 

basis alone, the motion (dkt. 7) is DENIED. See Tri-Valley CARES v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 671 

F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local 

rules is well within a district court’s discretion.”). The fact that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se does 

not excuse his non-compliance with the procedural rules of this Court. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 

F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Next, even if the Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as one seeking leave to file a motion 

for reconsideration, his motion fails to make the showing required under Civil Local Rule 7-9 or 

otherwise to show good cause for reconsideration. Furthermore, it seems that Plaintiff merely 

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disagrees with the Court’s decision to issue the November 13, 2018 Order to Show Cause, which 

is not a reason to warrant reconsideration. While Plaintiff claims in a conclusory manner that he 

“could prove with one hundred percent sureness and effectiveness that [he] exhausted his 

administrative remedies,” dkt. 7 at 1, he has not specifically elaborated on whether he can show 

that he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint, see 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a) (prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies for constitutional claims prior to 

asserting them in civil rights complaint). As such, even if Plaintiff’s aforementioned statement

means that he exhausted his claims after bringing it before the Court, his subsequent exhaustion 

cannot excuse his earlier failure to exhaust. Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 

2006) (“[A prisoner] may initiate litigation in federal court only after the administrative process 

ends and leaves his grievances unredressed. It would be inconsistent with the objectives of the 

statute to let him submit his complaint any earlier than that.”) When the district court concludes 

that the prisoner has not exhausted administrative remedies on a claim, “the proper remedy is 

dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d, 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) 

overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). In 

the instant action, the Court determined that Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative 

remedies on his claims because he had indicated that, at the time he filed his complaint, the 

response to his appeal at the third formal level was “never returned back to [him].” Dkt. 1 at 2. 

Instead of dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court allowed Plaintiff to have an opportunity to

show that he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, which he has still not done

and thus this action could be dismissed without prejudice. 

In sum, Plaintiff has not articulated any substantive reason why the Court should 

reconsider its November 13, 2018 Order to Show Cause. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to file 

the above-referenced motion for reconsideration (dkt. 7) is hereby DENIED for the reason that 

Plaintiff fails to identify a cognizable basis for reconsideration. See Civil L.R. 7-9(b). At this 

time, and again in lieu of dismissing this action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 

Plaintiff will be provided one final opportunity to show cause within twenty-eight (28) days, why 

this case should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust, as directed below. 

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Finally, it seems that the title of the instant motion also indicates that Plaintiff requests to

disqualify the undersigned judge. Dkt. 7. However, other than Plaintiff’s disagreement with the 

Court’s decision to issue an Order to Show Cause instead of an Order of Dismissal With Leave to 

Amend, Plaintiff presents no other reason as to why disqualification is warranted.

Recusal is the process by which a federal judge may be disqualified from a given case. 

Motions to recuse a district judge are governed by two statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 144 and § 455. 

Section 144 provides for recusal of the judge before whom a matter is pending upon the filing by a 

party of a “sufficient affidavit that the judge . . . has a personal bias or prejudice either against him 

or in favor of any adverse party.” Section 455 also provides grounds for disqualification, and 

requires a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably 

be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). As a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, a 

substantial burden is imposed on the party claiming bias or prejudice to show that this is not the 

case. See United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 506 n.30 (N.D. Cal. 1976).

Here, Plaintiff’s recusal request does not meet the legal sufficiency requirement of section

144. Even if Plaintiff’s aforementioned allegations could be construed as those of bias, such 

allegations are conclusory and do not allege an extrajudicial basis for the alleged bias or prejudice. 

See United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1995) (affidavit 

inadequate when based on conclusory allegations of bias); Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 

F.2d 1381, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1988) (district judge correctly rejected disqualification motion as 

legally insufficient and had no duty to refer it to another judge because the alleged bias or 

prejudice did not arise from an extrajudicial source). For similar reasons, the motion is 

insufficient to show bias under section 455. It is well-established that actions taken by a judge 

during the normal course of proceedings are not proper grounds for disqualification. See United 

States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 1999) (judge properly denied motion for 

disqualification based on his prior service as prosecutor and his actions during the proceedings 

because neither ground required recusal); see also Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (court's adverse rulings are not an adequate basis for recusal). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

request for the undersigned judge to recuse herself is DENIED. Dkt. 7.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion entitled, “Motion for Reconsideration After

Motion for Disqualification of Judge,” which has been construed in part as a motion seeking leave 

of court to file a motion for reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9. Dkt. 7.

2. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for the undersigned judge to recuse herself.

Dkt. 7.

3. As explained above, Plaintiff has been given a final opportunity to show cause

within twenty-eight (28) days, why this case should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure 

to exhaust. Specifically, to avoid dismissal, Plaintiff must specifically explain whether he 

exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint. If Plaintiff is unable to do so, 

then he needs to provide proof that extraordinary circumstances existed in order to excuse him 

from complying with PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See e.g., Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 

1859-60 (2016) (identifying “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, 

although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.”) Failure to reply will 

result in dismissal without prejudice with no further warnings. 

4. This Order terminates Docket No. 7.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

July 23, 2019

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