Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00327/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-00327-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

XINGZHONG SHI,

 Plaintiff,

v.

ALABAMA A&M UNIVERSITY, et al.

 Defendants.

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 Case Number: 5:13-cv-00327-JHE 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Plaintiff Xingzhong Shi brings this action for constitutional violations under 28 U.S.C. § 

1983 and for race and national origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Doc. 7). He brings these claims against his 

former employer, the Board of Trustees (“the Board”) of Alabama A&M University (“the 

University”); Dr. Trent Montgomery, Dean of the University’s School of Engineering and 

Technology during Shi’s employment; Dr. Daniel Wims, the University’s Provost and Vice 

President for Academic Affairs; and Dr. Andrew Hugine, Jr., President of the University. (Id.). 

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Shi’s claims. (Docs. 101 & 109). 

Defendants have also moved to strike Shi’s allegedly unsupported allegations and 

unauthenticated evidentiary submissions in his motion and opposition. (Doc. 115).2 The 

 1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge 

conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 46).

2 Defendants also moved to strike Shi’s original dispositive motion, (doc. 100), titled 

“Plaintiff’s Dispositive Motions with Rebuttal to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s 

Interrogatories in Place of Deposition.” (Doc. 104). Because Shi’s motion to amend his 

dispositive motions was granted, (doc. 106), and the original dispositive motion replaced by 

“Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,” raising the same arguments, (doc. 109), 

FILED

 2015 Sep-28 PM 03:24

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-00327-JHE Document 119 Filed 09/28/15 Page 1 of 27
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motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. (Docs. 100-104, 109, & 111-118).

3 For the 

reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Shi’s 

motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper 

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, 

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond 

the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is 

 

Defendants’ first motion to strike, (doc. 104), is DENIED as MOOT.

Defendants’ second motion to strike, (doc. 115), is construed as objections to Shi’s 

evidentiary submissions and will be addressed to the extent they are relevant to the evidentiary 

analysis below. See Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 Fed. App’x 874, 879 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Before 

[the 2010] amendment, parties properly challenged evidence used in a summary judgment 

motion by filing a motion to strike. The plain meaning of these [amended] provisions show that 

objecting to the admissibility of evidence supporting a summary judgment motion is now a part 

of summary judgment procedure, rather than a separate motion to be handled preliminarily.”). 

Any objections not specifically addressed below are deemed MOOT as irrelevant to 

determination of the pending motions.

3 Shi’s “Memorandum on Alabama A&M University Audit Findings,” addressing an 

unrelated investigation into alleged financial improprieties at the University, does not appear to 

contain anything relevant to Shi’s claims, and instead seems intended to undermine the 

credibility of Defendants. (Doc. 118). As courts do not make credibility determination on 

summary judgment, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), nothing in 

that document is relevant to the motions currently under consideration. Therefore, it will not be 

considered.

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such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The Court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 

(1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor). Any factual disputes will be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor when sufficient 

competent evidence supports Plaintiff’s version of the disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco, 

283 F.3d 1275, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2002) (a court is not required to resolve disputes in the nonmoving party’s favor when that party’s version of the events is supported by insufficient 

evidence). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally 

insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mtn. Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 836 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 

1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will 

not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” 

Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). 

II. Background

A. Factual History4

i. Parties

Shi is a male, Asian citizen from China. (Doc. 103-1 at 62 (242-43); doc. 111 at 3 (not 

 4 Shi makes many conclusory and unsupported statements of fact in his motion and 

response to Defendants’ motion, (see docs. 109, 111 & 117); however, as these documents were 

not submitted under oath or under penalty of perjury, they are not evidence upon which facts 

supporting or opposing summary judgment may be based, see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) and Adv. 

Comm. Notes, “Subdivision (c)” (2010 Amendments) (requiring either an affidavit or declaration 

under penalty of perjury). Accordingly, Defendants’ objections to these statements of fact are 

SUSTAINED, and they will not be considered for purposes of summary judgment.

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disputing these statements)).5 He began his employment with the University in fall of 2003,

(doc. 103-1 at 29 (109)), but did not have an employment agreement with the University and was 

never tenured, (id. at 8 (28), 29 (112), 59 (231), & 61 (237)).

Montgomery was the Dean of the University’s School of Engineering and Technology

(“SET”), and, after a University-wide reorganization, the Dean of the College of Engineering, 

Technology and Physical Sciences (“CETPS”). (Doc. 103-12 at 2-3). Hugine has been 

President of the University since July of 2009. (Doc. 103-13 at 2). Wims has been the 

University’s Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs since April 2010, “provid[ing] 

administrative oversight for the divisions of Academic Affairs and Research,” which includes 

responsibilities over decisions related to hiring, tenure, and termination of faculty. (Doc. 103-9 

at 2-3). The Board is the corporate body, created under Alabama law, see Ala. Code § 16-49-21, 

and with exclusive jurisdiction and powers to manage, supervise, control and set policy for the 

University, see Ala. Code §§ 16-49-21 to -24.

ii. University Policies in Effect During Shi’s Employment

When Shi began employment with the University in fall of 2003, the 

Faculty/Administrative Staff Handbook, revised June 2003, (“the 2003 Handbook”) set out the 

applicable policies and procedures for faculty members. (Doc. 103-10 at 1-94). Under Section 

5.2 of the 2003 Handbook, “[n]on-tenure positions [were] by contract term-specific and for the 

most part temporary.” (Id. at 57). Section 5.4 of the 2003 Handbook authorized University 

officials to suspend faculty members “with or without pay, depending upon the circumstances” if 

they “commit[ed] or participate[d] in acts of misconduct, or . . . represent[ed] a potential serious 

 5 All citations to the record refer to document and page numbers as assigned by the 

Court’s electronic filing system. Citations to depositions also include a parenthetical with the 

deposition page number(s).

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danger to others, the University or themselves.” (Id. at 59).

In addition to the 2003 Handbook, Procedure 5.1 set out standards for all University 

faculty, staff, and students when using the University network. (Doc. 103-9 at 4; doc. 103-10 at 

95-98). Prohibited conduct included “Hacking or Spamming” and “Harassment.” (Doc. 103-10 

at 96-97). The former is described as “use [of] the University Network in a way that (a) disrupts, 

adversely impacts the security of, or interferes with the legitimate use of any computer, the 

University Network or any network that the University connects to, (b) interferes with the 

supervisory or accounting functions of any system owned or managed by the University, or (c) 

takes action that is likely to have such effects.” (Id. at 96). The latter is described as “sending 

annoying, abusive, profane, threatening, defamatory or offensive messages.” (Id. at 97).

On September 16, 2011, a new version of the handbook (“the 2011 Handbook”) became 

effective, superseding all prior handbooks. (Doc. 103-9 at 5; doc. 103-11 at 1-152). Section 

3.2.1.3 of the 2011 Handbook discusses non-tenure track appointments, stating:

Non-tenure track faculty are not eligible for tenure, but are eligible for promotion. 

Non-tenured faculty members are at-will employees of the University who may 

be terminated upon three (3) weeks prior notice. The term, if any, of a nontenured faculty member will be stipulated in an Official Offer of Employment 

Notification or Appointment Letter and may be for any period of time.

(Doc. 103-11 at 40). Regarding non-tenured faculty separation, section 6.2.1 of the 2011 

Handbook stated:

The University has no obligation to reappoint a non-tenured faculty member to 

any position or to continue that person’s employment when the term of 

appointment expires. A term is defined as one semester, unless otherwise 

specified in writing. The decision whether to reappoint a non-tenured faculty 

member when the term of appointment expires may be based on any factor 

considered relevant to the total institutional interests. The University may employ 

a member of the faculty at the beginning of a term without commitment to 

employment or payment throughout the semester in question of for the entire 

academic year.

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(Id. at 111).

iii. Shi’s Removal from Tenure-Track Appointment List

In the Spring 2007 semester, the University’s faculty search committee recommended Shi 

for a tenure-track appointment, but Montgomery replaced his name with an African-American 

female candidate, who had a Ph.D. in computer science. (Doc. 103-1 at 25 (95-96)). Shi 

acknowledged at his deposition that Montgomery did not replace his name on the list because of 

his national origin but because of Shi’s lack of a Ph.D. (Id. at 25-26 (95-97)).6 He did not file a 

grievance or other complaint. (Id. at 24 (91)).

iv. Atluri Appointment to Interim Chair in 2010

In late 2010, Montgomery appointed Dr. Venkata Atluri as the Interim Chair of the 

Department of Computer Science (“the DCS”). (Doc. 7 at 5; doc. 103-12 at 4). Atluri was a 

tenured Associate Professor from India with a Ph.D. in Zoology and a masters’ degree in 

Computer Science. (Doc. 103-1 at 21 (78) & 24 (92); doc. 109-1 at 15). He had been employed 

at the University for at least ten years and had previously served as the Interim Chair of the DCS. 

(Doc. 103-1 at 21 (78) & 31 (117-18)). Shi alleges he and Dr. Jian Fu were discriminatorily not 

chosen for the appointment. (Doc. 109 at 4). At the time, Fu, who is from China, had a Ph.D. in 

Computer Science from the University of Alabama in Huntsville (“UAH”) and several years of 

 6 Shi contends in his opposition to summary judgment that the candidate Montgomery 

replaced him with was “not qualified” because she did not want to come to the University, (doc. 

111 at 3-4); however, he does not cite any evidence in the record for these statements. As a 

result, the Court will not accept them as true on summary judgment. (See doc. 18 at 14-15 (“Any 

statements of fact that are disputed by the non-moving party must be followed by a specific 

reference to those portions of the evidentiary record upon which the dispute is based. All 

material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be 

admitted for summary judgment purposes unless controverted by the response of the party 

opposing summary judgment.” (emphasis in original)); doc. 107-1). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c) (“A party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) 

citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . .”).

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hands-on industry experience. (Doc. 109-1 at 15). Shi was an Associate Professor from China, 

with a Ph.D. in Applied Math with minors in Computer Science and Atmospheric Science from 

UAH and nearly five years of hands-on industry experience. (Doc. 109-1 at 16).

v. Wims and Hugine Reorganize the University’s Schools in 2011

In 2011, Hugine authorized the reorganization of the University, changing, among other 

things, SET into CETPS. (Doc. 103-1 at 10 (35-36); doc. 103-13 at 3). Under Alabama law, the 

President is authorized to “regulate, alter, and modify the organization of the university, subject 

to review and concurrence of the board.” Ala. Code § 16-49-23. Montgomery was the dean of 

SET before the reorganization and remained dean of CETPS afterward. (Doc. 103-12 at 3). The 

reorganization did not affect Shi’s pay, benefits, department, office and teaching locations, 

curriculum, or time to arrive at and leave work. (Doc. 103-1 at 34 (129-31)).

vi. Shi Placed on Administrative Leave with Pay in August of 2011 and His 

Employment Is Not Renewed in December of 2011

In spring of 2011, Shi began sending unsolicited emails to the individual defendants and 

various other University employees. On January 27, 2011, Shi sent an unsolicited email to 

Montgomery, Wims, and Hugine and ten other faculty members, stating he had prepared a letter 

for Montgomery urging him to resign. (Doc. 103-5 at 29). Montgomery responded, instructing 

Shi to follow protocol and the chain of command. (Id.). On February 11, 2011, Shi sent another

unsolicited email to the same people, attaching a letter urging Montgomery to resign as dean “by 

comparing and contrasting the [then] current Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak with 

[Montgomery].” (Id. at 24-25). Later that day, he sent another saying “Per cnn.com, ‘Mubarak 

is gone, joy in Cairo streets.’ What about SET/AAMU?” (Id. at 24).

On March 10, 2011, he sent an email to the three individual defendants, along with over 

sixty other University employees, comparing Montgomery to Hosni Mubarak and Muammar 

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Gaddafi. (Id. at 23-24). That same day, Montgomery responded to Shi (cc-ing Wims), stating 

Shi’s emails had targeted him with “rambling, incoherent and untrue statements” and instructed 

Shi to “bring [his] concerns through the chain of command before sending out rambling emails”

and to “cease these mischaracterizations.” (Id. at 21). Shi responded with a series of emails to 

the individual defendants and dozens of other people, demanding Montgomery respond to each 

of Shi’s allegations individually. (Id. at 16-21).

In May 2011, in the auditorium after a meeting at which the reorganization plan was 

presented to the faculty, Wims spoke with Shi about switching to the math department because 

of Shi’s Ph.D. in math. (Doc. 103-1 at 19 (70)). Montgomery and Hugine were present but did 

not participate in the conversation. (Id. at 19 (70-71)). Shi told Wims he had previously applied 

for a position in the math department but had not been selected. (Id. at 20 (73)).

On June 30, 2011, at the end of an email addressed to dozens of people and reiterating 

Shi’s allegations against Montgomery, Shi stated he “will keep fighting until either [he] will be 

removed from [the University] or the dean will be removed from his position.” (Doc. 103-5 at 

14-15). On July 27, 2011, he sent another email to the individual defendants and dozens of other 

people, referencing Gaddafi again and accusing Montgomery of “exercis[ing] [his] power on 

things that are against one of the most important US values – democracy.” (Id. at 12-13). In an 

August 9, 2011 email to the individual defendants and dozens of others, Shi made the same 

accusation that Montgomery was a “dictatorial leader who exercised his power in ways that are 

against one of the most important US values – democracy, while USA have [sic] been 

spending many years spreading democracy to Iraq and other mideast countries and the rest of 

the world.” (Id. at 11-12). Shi acknowledged at his deposition that comparing Montgomery to 

Gaddafi and Mubarak was unprofessional. (Doc. 103-1 at 52 (203-04)).

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On August 15, 2011, a college-wide CETPS meeting was held, during which Shi spoke at 

the beginning (during introductions) and at the end when Montgomery asked if there were 

questions. (Id. at 55 (215-16)). During the meeting, Shi stated Montgomery was “not a good 

dean,” had “lied” about certain issues, and had “abused his power.” (Doc. 102 at 14 (citing doc. 

100 at 5); doc. 103-8 at 2; doc. 109 at 11).7

 Shi also demanded Montgomery’s resignation “in an 

aggressive and angry manner.” (Doc. 103-9 at 6; doc. 103-12 at 5).8 Montgomery received 

complaints from faculty members who felt threatened by Shi’s behavior and passed these on to 

Wims, who authorized Montgomery to put Shi on administrative leave with pay. (Doc. 103-9 at 

6-7; doc. 103-12 at 5).9

 By a letter dated August 24, 2011, Montgomery notified Shi of the 

decision suspending him immediately. (Doc. 103-12 at 6 & 10).

Even after being put on leave with pay, Shi continued to send emails addressed to Wims,

Hugine, and various other people throughout October and into November. (Doc. 103-5 at 31-37; 

 7 Neither party cites evidence for this fact; however, as shown by the cited briefs and 

exhibits, the parties do not dispute these were the statements Shi made at the meeting. See City 

of Atlanta v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 506, 508 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (“The parties neglected to 

stipulate this fact, but it is implicit in their arguments.”); In re Hanson Dredging, Inc., 15 B.R. 

79, 81 n.* (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (“These ultimate facts were asserted at trial or in the 

memoranda without dispute by any party and therefore there is an implied stipulation to these 

facts.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (allowing summary judgment where “there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact,” requiring support for factual positions where a party is “asserting that a fact 

cannot be or is genuinely disputed,” and allowing the court to “consider the fact undisputed” 

where it is not properly contested).

8 Shi asserts these are merely the statements of a defendant and therefore “have no merits 

at all,” (doc. 109 at 12); however, the sworn statements of a party are suitable evidence on 

summary judgment, cf. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (noting a non-moving party must create a 

question of material fact on summary judgment “by her own affidavits” or other evidence) 

(emphasis added). Shi has not pointed to any admissible evidence inconsistent with the 

statements in Montgomery and Wims’s affidavits.

9 Shi asserts the 2003 Handbook (applicable at the time he was put on leave with pay) did 

not allow for “administrative leave” for employee misconduct, (doc. 111 at 19-20); however, it 

did allow for “suspension” with pay because of employee misconduct, (doc. 103-10 at 59). That 

it was incorrectly identified as “administrative leave” instead of “suspension” does not change 

the fact the 2003 Handbook provided for the discipline imposed on him.

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doc. 109-8). At least one of these emails continued to refer to Montgomery as a dictator who 

abused his power. (Doc. 103-5 at 32; doc. 109-8 at 4).10

Citing Shi’s unsolicited emails and his conduct at the August 15, 2011 college-wide 

meeting, the University did not renew Shi’s employment for the Spring 2012 semester, notifying 

Shi in writing by letter, dated December 13, 2011. (Doc. 103-9 at 7; doc. 103-11 at 154).

B. Procedural History

On March 23, 2012, Shi filed a charge with the United States Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging the University discriminated against him on the 

basis of his race and national origin by placing him on administrative leave with pay and later 

terminating his employment. (Doc. 1-1 at 12). Shi instituted this action on February 19, 2013, 

against Defendants Montgomery, Wims, Hugine, and the University’s Grievance Committee. 

(Doc. 1).

On April 15, 2013, Shi, at the direction of the Court, amended his complaint, asserting 

five claims under Title VII and § 1983. (Doc. 7 at 4-11). The four defendants moved to dismiss 

the claims, (docs. 15 & 16), and Shi responded, (docs. 20-22). The Court construed Shi’s 

response as a motion for leave to amend his amended complaint to include an additional claim 

and new defendant, the Board of Trustees of the University. (Doc. 28 at 2). The Court also 

granted in part and denied in part the original parties’ motion to dismiss. (Id.). Specifically, 

finding that the Grievance Committee and Board of Trustees were entitled to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity, the Court dismissed the § 1983 claims against them (including Count 3,

the only claim asserted against the Grievance Committee) and any official capacity claims 

 10 Defendants object to these emails as unauthenticated. (Doc. 115 at 19-20). However, 

these same emails are part of Exhibit 5 to Shi’s deposition, submitted with Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment and authenticated in that deposition. (Doc. 103-1 at 53 (207-08); doc. 

103-5 at 31-37). This objection is OVERRULED.

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against the individual defendants. (Id. at 16-20, 23). All other claims remained pending. (Id. at 

23-24).

Those remaining claims are as follows:

Claim 1: Substantive Due Process claim under § 198311 against Montgomery in his 

individual capacity for placing Plaintiff on administrative leave with pay 

between August 25 and December 31, 2011;

Claim 2: Substantive Due Process claim under § 1983 and Title VII claim against 

Montgomery in his individual capacity for appointing Dr. Venkata Atluri as 

the Interim Chair of the University’s Department in the winter of 2010;

Claim 4: Substantive Due Process claim under § 1983 and Title VII claim against 

Wims in his individual capacity for not renewing Plaintiff’s employment with 

the University in December 2011;

Claim 5: Substantive Due Process claim under § 1983 against Wims and Hugine in 

their individual capacities for reorganizing all of the University’s schools and 

departments in 2011 and allegedly not allowing any discussions among lower 

level administrators and/or faculty about it; and

Claim 6: (i) Title VII count against the Board; and (ii) § 1983 and Title VII counts 

against Montgomery, Wims and Hugine in their individual capacities. Claim 

6 simply reasserted the conduct asserted in Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5, and 

contended the Board is responsible for it.

(Doc. 28 at 7-14 & 23); (see also doc. 7 at 4, 5, 7, & 11; doc. 21 at 1-2). Both sides have moved 

for summary judgment in their favor on all remaining claims. (Doc. 101 at 5; doc. 109 at 1). Shi 

was given notice of his right and obligation to respond to Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment. (Docs. 107 & 107-1). Both sides filed oppositions and replies to the other’s motions 

and responses. (Doc. 111, 112, 114, & 117).

 11 Shi asserts this claim also includes a Title VII claim, (doc. 111 at 3); however, the 

amended complaint only lists § 1983 as the legal basis for this claim, (doc. 7 at 4). Regardless, 

Claim 6 includes Title VII claims against Montgomery for this conduct, (doc. 21 at 1-2), and 

Defendants address this factual basis in their analysis of the Title VII claims, (doc. 102 at 18-25). 

The Court does the same below.

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III. Analysis

A. Title VII Claims

Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect 

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s 

race . . . or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “A plaintiff may prove a claim of 

intentional discrimination through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or through statistical 

proof.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). Where, as here, a 

plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence, the court evaluates the sufficiency of his claims 

through the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).

Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie 

case. Id. at 802. To do so, he must show: (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) who was 

qualified for his position, but (3) was subject to an adverse employment action and (4) treated 

less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of his protected class. Burke-Fowler v. 

Orange Cnty., Fla, 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). “The successful assertion of a prima 

facie case then creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated 

against the plaintiff.” Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1275. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to 

produce evidence that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. 

Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1275. If the employer satisfies its burden, the burden shifts back to the 

plaintiff to “show that the proffered reason really is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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1. Claims Against Individual Defendants

First, to the extent Shi asserts Title VII claims against Defendants Montgomery, Wims, 

and Hugine in their individual capacities, those claims are due to be dismissed. “[I]ndividual 

employees are not subject to liability under . . . Title VII . . . .” See Fodor v. D’Isernia, 506 F. 

App’x 965, 966 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006)); 

accord Shuler v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 480 F. App’x 540, 544 (11th Cir. 2012)

(citing Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007)). “[R]elief under Title VII is 

available against only the employer and not against individual employees whose actions would 

constitute a violation of the Act . . . .” Dearth, 441 F.3d at 933.

Shi disputes this conclusion, citing a law review article for the proposition “[a] supervisor 

and employer will be joined in a lawsuit, liable both jointly and severally.” (Doc. 111 at 26) 

(quoting Kathryn K. Hensiak, When the Boss Steps over the Line: Supervisor Liability Under 

Title VII, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 645, 653 (1997)). The article in question, however, is not discussing

what the law is in the Eleventh Circuit, see Hensiak, supra., at 649 n.23 (listing the Eleventh 

Circuit as falling into the category of “courts reject[ing] supervisor liability under Title VII”); 

instead, it is describing a split among the circuits and arguing in favor of an interpretation of 

Title VII that holds individual employees jointly liable with their employers under common-law 

agency principles, see id. at 654 & 666.

Shi also asserts that, if it is true individual-capacity Title VII claims do not exist, 

Defendants should have raised it earlier.12 (Doc. 111 at 26). Shi cites no authority for the 

 12 Defendants moved to dismiss Shi’s complaint on June 3, 2013, but raised only 

Eleventh Amendment Immunity, pleading-standard, and improper-party defenses in their motion 

to dismiss. (See doc. 15). Upon considering those grounds, the judge previously assigned to this 

case dismissed the claims against the University, against the Grievance Committee, and against 

the individual defendants in their official capacities on Eleventh Amendment Immunity grounds. 

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proposition a defense asserting the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted is waived if it is not raised in a pre-discovery motion to dismiss. Such defenses are, in 

fact, “expressly preserved against waiver [for failing to raise them in a Rule 12 motion or other 

responsive pleading]” by Rule 12(h)(2). FED. R. CIV. P. 12, Adv. Comm. Notes, “Subdivision 

(h)” (1966 Amendments).

Shi has presented no basis to override the Eleventh Circuit’s clear ruling that Title VII 

claims do not exist against individual employees committing the conduct violating the statute. 

See Dearth, 441 F.3d at 933. As a result, Montgomery, Wims and Hugine are entitled to 

summary judgment on his Title VII claims against them, and those portions of claims 2, 4, and 6 

are DISMISSED.

2. Claims Against the Board

That leaves only the Title VII claims against Shi’s employer, the Board of Trustees of the 

University. He asserts Title VII claims against the Board based on allegations that (a) 

Montgomery removed his name from a list of proposed tenure-track appointments in 2007;13 (b) 

Montgomery appointed Atluri as the Interim Chair of DCS in 2010; (c) Montgomery placed Shi 

on administrative leave with pay in August 2011; and (d) Wims did not renew Shi’s employment 

with the University in December 2011. (Doc. 21 at 1-2). Shi has not established a disputed 

question of material fact on any of these bases. 

 

(Doc. 28).

13 It is not entirely clear from Shi’s Amended Complaint that this was a separate asserted 

basis for Title VII relief against the Board, (see doc. 7 at 9 (stating this allegation against 

Montgomery among a series of free-floating allegations following Claim 4 against Wims); doc. 

21 at 1-2 (failing to include this among the re-alleged conduct of the various individuals)); 

however, construing Shi’s pleadings broadly, the Court will follow Defendants’ lead and address 

it as a separate alleged basis for Title VII relief, (see doc. 102 at 19). (See also doc. 21 at 2) 

(seemingly alleging the Board is responsible for all of the violations the individual defendants 

allegedly committed).

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i. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

First, as a threshold issue, Shi did not timely exhaust his administrative remedies on three 

of the four bases: the tenure-track-appointment-list allegations, the Interim-Chair-appointment 

allegations, and the administrative-leave allegations. Under Title VII, “[i]f the victim of an 

employer’s unlawful employment practice does not file a timely complaint, the unlawful practice 

ceases to have legal significance, and the employer is entitled to treat the unlawful practice as if 

it were lawful.” City of Hialeah, Fla. v. Rojas, 311 F.3d 1096, 1102 (11th Cir. 2002). In a nondeferral state, plaintiffs have 180 days in which to file charges of discrimination with the EEOC. 

See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005), superseded 

on other grounds by statute, Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 

Stat. 5, 5-6.

Shi filed his EEOC charge on March 23, 2012. (Doc. 1-1 at 12). The 180-day statute of 

limitations period would, therefore, encompass any unlawful practice occurring between 

September 25, 2011, and March 23, 2012. This would not include the tenure-track-appointmentlist allegation in 2007, the Interim-Chair-appointment allegation in 2010, and the administrativeleave allegations in August 2011.14 Shi does not contend he filed his EEOC charge within 180 

days of these events; instead, he argues the statute of limitations for filing an EEOC charge in 

Alabama is 300 days. (Doc. 111 at 27). Shi cites no authority for this statement, but, in any 

event, it is incorrect. Alabama is a non-deferral state, in which a plaintiff must file his charge 

 14 Although the administrative leave with pay continued up until Shi’s employment ended 

on December 31, 2011, “the time for filing an EEOC charge begins to run when the employee 

receives unequivocal notice of the adverse employment decision.” Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 

F.3d 1086, 1100 n.19 (11th Cir. 1996). Regarding the administrative leave, that would have 

been when he was notified of it in August 2011, more than 180 days from the date he filed his 

EEOC charge. Regardless, even if the administrative leave were timely, the circumstances 

surrounding Shi being put on administrative leave and being let go are substantially the same, the 

latter of which is addressed below.

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within 180 days of the adverse employment decision. See Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1178 (“For 

claims arising in so-called ‘non-deferral’ states, such as Alabama, to be timely, the applicable 

charge must have been filed within 180 days ‘after the alleged unlawful employment practice 

occurred.’”); Boyd v. Honda Mfg. of Alabama, LLC, No. 1:08-CV-960-VEH, 2010 WL 6084741, 

at *7 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 16, 2010).

15 As a result, these three bases for his Title VII claim against 

the Board are time-barred, and the Board is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

ii. Shi’s Termination/Non-Renewal

Shi alleges he was terminated in December 2011 “for protesting [Wims’s] appointment of 

[Montgomery] as the new dean of the newly re-organized college.” (Doc. 7 at 7). First, this 

allegation does not state Shi’s employment was ended because of his race or national origin. 

Other than a brief, conclusory description of this action as “discrimination” and the citation to 

Title VII, there is no allegation that the basis for Shi being let go was his race or national origin, 

(id. at 7-10). To the contrary, his allegations are he was let go as retaliation for “disclos[ing] the 

dean’s wrongdoings and protest[ing] the Provost’s appointment of Dr. Montgomery as the new 

dean (whose misdeeds are documented elsewhere).” (Id. at 8). This alone is enough to cause his 

claim to fail. See Blue v. Dunn Const. Co., 453 F. App’x 881, 886 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We do not 

analyze whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our sole concern is whether 

unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision.”)

Regardless, Shi has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. To make a 

prima facie case of discriminatory discipline or termination, the plaintiff must show “(1) the 

plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) [he] was subjected to an adverse employment 

 15 See also EEOC’s Birmingham District Office Timeliness Information, 

http://www.eeoc.gov/field/birmingham/timeliness.cfm (“In the State of Alabama, an individual 

has 180 days from the date of alleged harm to file a charge with this office . . . .”).

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action, (3) the employer treated similarly situated employees outside the class more favorably, 

and (4) [he] was qualified to do [his] job.” Brooks v. CSX Transp., Inc., 555 F. App’x 878, 883 

(11th Cir. 2014) (citing Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999)). Defendants 

do not dispute Shi is a member of a protected class, was subjected to an adverse employment 

action, and was qualified to perform the job. (See doc. 102 at 23) (challenging only his failure to 

proffer a similarly situated comparator).

Shi has attempted to show he was treated differently than a similarly situated employee 

outside his class by pointing to Jay Gangasoni. (Doc. 111 at 14-15). He contends his 

“employment was terminated solely due to the claimed but never-can-be-convicted-as-wrong 

behavior at the meeting on Mon 8/15/11, but Mr. Jay Gangasoni’s employment was 

retained . . . .” (Id. at 14). He then states they were both non-tenure track and had never been 

convicted of any violation of “university, state and US federal regulations and/or statutes/laws, 

except for minor traffic violation,” but Gangasoni is from India (where Shi is from China), has 

an MS degree in CS (where Shi has a Ph.D. in Applied Math with minors in CS), and held the 

“instructor” title in December 2010 (where Shi held the “associate professor” title). (Id. at 15).

First, Shi does not cite to any evidence to support his allegations regarding Gangasoni. 

(See id.; doc. 109 at 16-17). Although Gangsoni is mentioned in the interrogatories attached to 

Shi’s motion for summary judgment, those attachments include only questions and do not 

include any answers that could be considered as evidence. (See doc. 109-5 at 15, 22, & 26). Just 

as importantly, though, the allegations never assert Gangasoni ever committed the same actions 

for which Shi was allegedly let go. (See doc. 11 at 15; doc. 109 at 16-17). Even if Gangasoni

were a proper comparator on other characteristics (which is doubtful considering the differences 

in qualifications Shi lists), if Gangasoni never committed the same conduct as Shi, he could not 

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have been more favorably treated in response.16

Finally, even assuming Shi could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, he does 

not show Defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reason is just pretext for discrimination. “To 

avoid summary judgment the plaintiff must introduce significantly probative evidence showing 

that the asserted reason is merely a pretext for discrimination,” but “[a] reason is not pretext for 

discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the 

real reason.” Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 

2006).

Defendants assert Shi was put on administrative leave in August 2011 and ultimately not 

renewed at the end of that term because (1) he “consistently violated Procedure 5.1 by sending 

hundreds of unsolicited, annoying and harassing emails to Drs. Montgomery, Wims and Hugine 

and countless other faculty and administration members” and (2) Montgomery received 

complaints from faculty members “who felt threatened by [Shi]’s behavior at the August 15[, 

2011] meeting.” (Doc. 102 at 23-25). Shi responds by attacking the two reasons separately, 

stating that, because he had not been terminated by the end of the Summer 2011 semester, none 

of the emails before that time could have been a terminable offense, (doc. 111 at 17), and, 

therefore, the only reason he was let go had to be his conduct at the August 15, 2011 meeting, 

from which he was never convicted of any violation and must be presumed innocent, id. at 18-

19.

First, that Shi was not let go at the end of the Summer 2011 term does not establish that 

 16 Shi also mentions in his motion for summary judgment that “[a]t least five (5) other 

faculty members (all with national origins other than China) also questioned Montgomery on 

various issues while none of them but Plaintiff (who was never convicted violating [sic] any 

AAMU regulations) was placed on ‘Administrative Leave with Pay.’” (Doc. 109 at 11). He 

does not name these other faculty members, present any evidence to support his assertions, or 

establish these faculty members were similarly situated comparators.

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his prior conduct did not, in conjunction with later conduct, play into the ultimate decision not to 

renew his contract at the end of the Fall 2011 semester. Second, even if Shi’s conduct at the 

August 15, 2011 meeting was the only basis for his non-renewal, that would be enough. See

Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 482 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007) (“By failing to rebut 

each of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons of the [defendant], [the plaintiff] has failed to 

raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether those reasons were pretext for 

discrimination.” (emphasis added)). Defendants submitted evidence Shi acted “in an aggressive 

and angry manner and made various disparaging remarks” about Montgomery at the August 15 

meeting and Montgomery received complaints from faculty members who felt threatened by 

Shi’s behavior, (doc. 103-9 at 6-7; doc. 103-12 at 5), which are legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reasons not to renew his contract at the end of the semester.

Shi states Defendants have not presented anything to show he has been “convicted” of a 

violation of the University’s policies and he should, therefore, be entitled to the presumption of 

innocence. However, the question is not whether Shi was “convicted” of violations or even 

whether he violated the University’s policies at all; the question at issue here is whether 

Montgomery and Wims did not renew Shi’s contract because he is from China. See Foster v. 

Biolife Plasma Servs., LP, 566 F. App’x 808, 811 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A plaintiff cannot show 

pretext merely by showing that an employer’s good faith belief that she engaged in misconduct is 

mistaken.”) (citing EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (11th Cir. 2000)); 

Blue, 453 F. App’x at 886 (“[O]ur sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus 

motivates a challenged employment decision.”). The Board says the reason Shi was let go was 

because Montgomery and Wims believed Shi’s conduct (which they describe as sending repeated 

emails violating Procedure 5.1 and acting aggressively at the meeting) “fail[ed] to meet the 

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requirements of faculty conduct,” (doc. 109-1 at 17-18), and Shi’s race and national origin were

never considered, (doc. 103-9 at 7; doc. 103-12 at 5). Shi does not present any evidence to 

suggest Defendants’ asserted reasons were not the real reasons he was put on administrative 

leave and ultimately let go.

Accordingly, the Board is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Shi’s claim of 

discriminatory termination/non-renewal under Title VII. Because the Board is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law on all of Shi’s Title VII claims, those claims are DISMISSED.

B. § 1983 Claims

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes private parties to enforce federal constitutional rights 

(and some federal statutory rights) against defendants who act under color of state law. Section 

1983 states as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia [i.e., law], subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 

any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 

officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 

purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 

District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 

Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Notably, § 1983 does not itself create or establish any federally protected 

right. Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010). Instead, it 

creates a cause of action for a plaintiff to enforce federal rights created elsewhere, such as 

constitutional rights. Id. To assert a cause of action based on § 1983, a plaintiff must establish 

two elements: (1) a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was 

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committed by a person acting under color of law. Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th 

Cir. 2005).

Shi’s amended complaint makes a series of substantive-due-process claims against 

Montgomery and Wims based on the same facts as his Title VII claims, plus a substantive-dueprocess claim against Wims and Hugine for reorganizing the University without considering 

employee opinion. (Doc. 7 at 4-11; doc. 21 at 1-2). However, he does not establish a dispute of 

material fact as to any violations of a constitutional right on any of these claims.

1. Substantive Due Process – State-Created Interests

The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects “fundamental” rights that 

are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d 1274, 1279 

(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). As 

fundamental rights are created by the Constitution, they do not include property interests created 

“by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Id. 

A plaintiff’s right to employment is not “so fundamental that our democratic society and its 

inherent freedoms would be lost if that right were to be violated.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1561. 

By extension, if a right to employment does not give rise to substantive due process rights, the 

lesser interest in a potential promotion also would not. Similarly, this Court cannot say a faculty 

member’s interest in being consulted before reorganization of a university is fundamental to a 

democratic society. As a result, Shi’s substantive due process claims fail because these rights do

not implicate substantive due process concerns.17

 17 There is an exception to this general rule: “Where a person’s state-created rights are 

infringed by a ‘legislative act,’ the substantive component of the Due Process Clause generally 

protects that person from arbitrary and irrational governmental action.” Kentner, 750 F.3d at

1279-80. However, that exception is not applicable here because employment terminations are 

executive acts, not legislative ones, id. at 1280, as is reorganization of the University, which, 

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2. Procedural Due Process

State-created property rights, such as those represented by an employment contract, are 

protected, instead, under the procedural component of the Due Process Clause and 

“constitutionally may be rescinded so long as the elements of procedural—not substantive—due 

process are observed.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556. Regardless, a constitutionally protected 

interest must exist. See Gray v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 150 F.3d 1347, 1350 

(11th Cir. 1998) (“The success of due process arguments depends upon the finding of a 

constitutionally protected property interest in the expectation of continued employment or of a 

liberty interest having been infringed upon by the State; absent such interest, no due process 

protections attach.”).

None of the state property interests Shi asserts are entitled to any particular process: (1) 

not when being put on administrative leave with pay, cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 

470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985) (noting in dicta that, where employees have a property right in their 

employment (such as tenure), putting an employee perceived as threatening on administrative 

leave with pay would avoid a due-process-violating termination until sufficient process could be 

provided)18; (2) not when being terminated/non-renewed, see Gray, 150 F.3d at 1352-53 (“[The 

plaintiff] never had tenure (and therefore no property right entitled to protection under the 

Fourteenth Amendment).”); and (3) not when being passed over for appointment to a higher 

position, see Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[A] prospective promotion 

 

under state law, is an executive power explicitly given to the President of the University, see Ala. 

Code § 16-49-23 (“The president may regulate, alter, and modify the organization of the 

university, subject to review and concurrence of the board.”).

18As he is not tenured, Shi does not have such a protectable interest in his employment 

and can be terminated without any degree of process. See Gray, 150 F.3d at 1352-53. It would 

be illogical then to say he has a protectable interest in being provided process for the lesser 

sanction of being paid to not do the job he does not have an interest in performing.

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is not a property or liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.”). As noted above, 

Shi has no right to be consulted about the University’s reorganization, see Ala. Code § 16-49-23,

so he has no right to process before being deprived of it. To the extent Shi’s complaint can be 

construed to assert a procedural due process claim, it is DISMISSED.

3. Substantive Due Process – First Amendment Retaliatory Discharge

Lastly, although he does not explicitly refer to it as such, Shi brings a First Amendment 

retaliatory discharge claim against Wims under § 1983. (See doc. 7 at 7 (“That decision [to 

terminate Shi’s employment] was an act of . . . retaliation against me for protesting [Wims’s] 

appointment of [Montgomery] as the new dean . . . .”)); doc. 109 at 22 (“The Constitution does 

not prohibit firing public employees, but it does prohibit firing them . . . in retaliation for 

protected speech.”); doc. 111 at 10 (“[M]aking the foregoing statements and questioning 

Montgomery a couple of issues . . . is protected by US constitution, under the free speech laws.”) 

& 19 (“Questioning a dean’s power abusing and lying, before near 100 colleagues, is not 

prohibited but protected by US constitution.”)). Unlike with his discriminatory discharge claim 

asserting state-law employment rights, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause 

incorporates against the states the fundamental rights protected by the First Amendment and will

support a claim of discharge in retaliation for protected speech. See Beckwith v. City of Daytona 

Beach Shores, Fla., 58 F.3d 1554, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding on this basis that McKinney

did not prevent First Amendment retaliatory discharge claims).

“It is axiomatic that a state may not demote or discharge a public employee in retaliation 

for protected speech.” Tindal v. Montgomery Cnty. Comm’n, 32 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 

1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). To analyze a First Amendment retaliatory discharge 

claim requires four steps: first, the court must determine whether the plaintiff’s speech “may be 

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fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern”; second, if the speech 

addresses a public concern, the court must weigh the plaintiff’s First Amendment interest against 

“the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 

performs through its employees”; third, if the plaintiff prevails on the balancing test, the factfinder must determine whether the plaintiff’s speech played a “substantial part” in the 

government’s decision to discharge him; and, lastly, if the employee shows his speech was a 

substantial motivating factor, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence “its 

legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision.” Bryson v. 

City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989). Assuming Shi could establish his 

speech was made as a citizen (instead of an employee dissatisfied with a supervisor’s decisions

regarding the employee and his department), Shi has not established his First Amendment 

interests outweigh the interests of the Defendants’ interests as Shi’s employer.

This second step of the analysis, balancing the state’s interest in efficient provision of 

public services against the plaintiff’s speech interest, is referred to as the Pickering balancing 

test, see id. at 1565, and, along with the first step, is a “question[] of law designed to determine 

whether the employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment,” Beckwith, 58 F.3d at

1564. The Eleventh Circuit has noted three specific factors to consider in the analysis: “(1) 

whether the speech at issue impedes the government’s ability to perform its duties efficiently, (2) 

the manner, time and place of the speech, and (3) the context within which the speech was 

made.” Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1565. Specifically regarding statements by employees about their 

superiors, the court has held “‘[t]he First Amendment does not require a public employer to 

tolerate an embarrassing, vulgar, vituperative, ad hominem attack,’ even if such an attack 

touches on a matter of public concern. If the manner and content of an employee’s speech is 

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‘disrespectful, demeaning, rude, and insulting,’ and is perceived that way in the workplace, the 

government employer is within its discretion to take disciplinary action.” Mitchell v. 

Hillsborough Cnty., 468 F.3d 1276, 1288 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Morris v. Crow, 117 F.3d 

449, 458 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Even assuming Shi’s speech touched on an issue of public concern, the evidence shows 

Shi’s speech was consistently embarrassing, vituperative, and ad hominem, and certainly 

disrespectful and insulting. Emails Shi sent throughout 2011 to Defendants and other faculty

referred to Montgomery as power-abusing, anti-democratic, and a dictator, specifically 

comparing him to Muammar Gaddafi and Hosni Mubarak. (Doc. 103-5 at 11-13 & 23-25; doc. 

103-9 at 6; doc. 103-12 at 5). At the August 15, 2011 meeting, Shi called for Montgomery’s 

resignation “in an aggressive and angry manner,” (doc. 103-9 at 6), and called him a liar, a 

power-abuser, and bad at his job in front of other University faculty members, (doc. 102 at 14 

(citing doc. 100 at 5); doc. 103-8 at 2; doc. 109 at 11). Shi’s behavior at the meeting resulted in 

complaints from other faculty members who felt threatened and had concerns for Montgomery’s 

safety. (Id.). Furthermore, Shi’s emails made it clear this behavior would not end short of him 

being fired or getting his way. (Doc. 103-5 at 15) (“I will keep fighting until either I will be 

removed from AAMU or the dean will be removed from his position.”).

“[P]ublic employers do not have to wait for actual disruption or internal damage to take 

place . . . ,” Mitchell, 468 F.3d at 1289 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 152), and the courts will not 

question the government employer’s reasonable determination that conduct will cause future 

disruption. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (“[W]e have given substantial 

weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech 

involved is on a matter of public concern, and even though when the government is acting as 

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sovereign our review of legislative predictions of harm is considerably less deferential.”); 

Mitchell, 468 F.3d at 1289 & n.31 (finding the government’s determination reasonable and 

declining to question that decision). Shi’s behavior was already affecting other faculty members’

state of mind, and the continuation of the behavior could have easily “cause[d] serious 

disciplinary problems, undermine[d] employee morale, and impair[ed] harmony among coworkers.” Morris, 117 F.3d at 458. Defendants were well within their rights to take disciplinary 

action in response to Shi’s conduct.

Shi asserts the fact he was not put on administrative leave or terminated before August 

2011 shows he was not terminated because of the emails and they should not be considered. (See

doc. 111 at 15-19). However, as noted earlier, the fact he was not put on leave or immediately 

terminated after any particular email does not mean the threat of continuing those emails, in 

conjunction with reports of the effect Shi’s conduct was having on other faculty, did not combine 

to result in his being put on leave and ultimately let go. In fact, this tends to work against his 

argument he was fired because of the speech itself as opposed to the effect the manner of his 

speech was having on the workplace. At times throughout the spring of 2011, Montgomery 

responded to Shi’s emails by stating he needed to use the proper protocols and chain of 

command and stop sending emails to the faculty mischaracterizing things Montgomery had done. 

(Doc. 103-5 at 21 & 28-29). The evidence indicates it was not until Shi confronted Montgomery 

personally in front of other faculty, who expressed distress from Shi’s conduct, that Defendants 

decided to take disciplinary action against him.

Because Shi has not established disputed facts to support a finding his speech interest 

outweighs Defendants’ interest in maintaining efficient workplace operation, Defendants are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his First Amendment retaliatory discharge claim and 

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that claim is DISMISSED.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ first motion to strike, (doc. 104), is DENIED as MOOT.

2. Defendants’ second motion to strike, (doc. 115), is construed as objections to 

Shi’s evidentiary submissions and SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED 

IN PART. Specifically, Defendants’ objections to Shi’s conclusory, unsupported

and hearsay statements of fact are SUSTAINED; Defendants’ objection to the 

emails attached to Shi’s motion for summary judgment as unauthenticated is 

OVERRULED; and Defendants’ remaining objections are MOOT.

3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (doc. 101), is GRANTED and Shi’s 

motion for summary judgment, (doc. 109), is DENIED. All of Shi’s claims 

against the Defendants are, therefore, DISMISSED. A separate order will be 

entered.

DONE this the 28th day of September 2015.

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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