Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01344/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01344-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Thomas W. McNamara,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 11cv1344 BTM (WMc)

ORDER 

v.

Francis Lee, et al.,

Defendants.

On September 22, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Service of Shane Kavanagh, Contegra

Capital, LLC, Ira Gillum and Good Silver, Inc by Publication (Dkt. 17) (hereinafter “Section

415.50 Motion”) and his Motion for Authorization To Serve Process upon the California

Secretary of State for Defendant San Andrea’s Insurance Agency, LLC (Dkt. 18) (hereinafter

“Section 17061(c)(1) Motion”). For the reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

Section 415.50 Motion without prejudice and DENIES Plaintiff’s Section 17061(c)(1) Motion

without prejudice. Additionally, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff a ninety (90) day extension of

the time limit for service with respect to defendants Shane Kavanagh, Contegra Capital, LLC,

Ira Gillum, Good Silver, Inc and San Andrea’s Insurance Agency, LLC. 

Section 415.50 Motion

The California Code of Civil Procedure permits service by publication “as a last resort.”

Donel Inc. v. Badalian, 87 Cal. App. 3d 327, 332 (2d Dist. 1978). “Personal service remains

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the method of choice under the statutes and the constitution. . . . When substituted or

constructive service is attempted, strict compliance with the letter and spirit of the statutes

is required.” Olvera v. Olvera, 232 Cal. App. 3d 32, 41 (4th Dist. 1991). 

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 415.50(a)(1) permits service by publication

only “if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending

that . . . [a] cause of action exists against the party upon whom service is to be made or he

or she is a necessary or proper party to the action.” (Emphasis added.) In other words,

Section 415.50 requires that the plaintiff provide independent evidentiary support, in the form

of a sworn statement of facts, for the existence of a cause of action against the defendant.

Harris v. Cavasso, 68 Cal. App. 3d 723, 726 (3d Dist. 1977) (holding that Section

415.50(a)(1) requires “an affidavit containing a statement of some fact which would be legal

evidence, having some appreciable tendency to make the [the cause of action] appear, for

the Judge to act upon before he has any jurisdiction to make the order” authorizing service

by publication). 

For example, in City and County of San Francisco v. Upp, No. A123528, 2011 WL

1197524 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Mar. 30, 2011), the court affirmed a trial court order vacating

a default judgment because the declaration supporting service by publication was legally

insufficient. Upp concerned building code and nuisance claims brought by the City of San

Francisco. The City’s declaration supporting service by publication, signed by an attorney

for the City, contained a “short paragraph” stating that the defendant’s property was a

nuisance and that it had unsafe parapet walls. Id. at *5. The court in Upp stated that these

“conclusory” statements were “insufficient to support a cause of action,” and noted that “the

declaration fails to explain how it is that a deputy city attorney has personal knowledge of the

condition of . . . parapet walls . . . .” Id. at 5. 

In this case, the Declaration of Daniel M. Benjamin supporting the Section 415.50

Motion (“First Benjamin Declaration") makes no mention of any facts supporting the

existence of a cause of action against any named defendants in this case. The

memorandum of law supporting the motion includes statements regarding the amounts

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Plaintiff seeks to recover from the named Defendants, but these statements are not included

in an affidavit or a sworn declaration, nor is there any indication that these facts are known

first-hand by Mr. Benjamin (Plaintiff’s attorney). In short, the First Benjamin Declaration is

“devoid of any facts from which the trial court could draw the conclusion that a cause of

action existed against defendants.” Harris v. Cavasso, 68 Cal.App.3d at 726. 

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure Section 415.50(a) states that the affidavit

supporting service by publication must show that “the party to be served cannot with

reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified in this article.” (Emphasis

added.) The statutory requirements that the plaintiff exercise reasonable diligence and that

he submit evidence of such diligence to the court are “required by notions of fair play and

justice embodied in the concept of due process of law . . . before resorting to the fictional

notice afforded by publication.” Donel, Inc., 87 Cal. App. 3d at 332. Citing the Judicial

Council Comment to Section 415.50, the court in Kott v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th

1126 (2d Dist. 1996), stated:

 The term 'reasonable diligence' takes its meaning from the former law: it

denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in good

faith by the party or his agent or attorney. A number of honest attempts to

learn defendant's whereabouts or his address by inquiry of relatives, friends,

and acquaintances, or of his employer, and by investigation of appropriate city

and telephone directories, the voters' register, and the real and personal

property index in the assessor's office, near the defendant's last known

location, are generally sufficient. These are likely sources of information, and

consequently must be searched before resorting to service by publication.” 

Id. at 1137 (citing Cal. Judicial Council Com., 14 West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1973 ed.))

(emphasis added). In the sworn statement supporting the request for service by publication,

the plaintiff must detail these necessary efforts to serve by other means. See Sanford v.

Smith, 11 Cal. App. 3d 991, 999 (1st Dist. 1970) (“A test of the sufficiency of the affidavit is

whether it is so clear and certain that a charge of perjury could be sustained if its specified

facts showing diligence are false.”). 

The First Benjamin Declaration, on its face, fails to establish reasonable diligence

within the meaning of the rule. With respect to each of the four defendants listed in the

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Section 415.50 Motion, it references “internet searches” conducted by Mr. Benjamin’s staff

(¶¶ 7, 15 and 20), but the content of these searches is unstated and therefore the Court is

unable to determine whether Plaintiff has investigated all necessary sources of information.

Additionally, the First Benjamin Declaration states that Plaintiff hired a private investigator

to find Shane Kavanagh, to no avail. (Id. at ¶ 4.) However, it does not list any of the steps

taken by the private investigator to locate Mr. Kavanagh, nor does it include as an exhibit a

sworn statement by the private investigator, and thus the Court is unable to determine

whether the private investigator’s efforts were sufficient to establish reasonable diligence.

Cf. Kott, 45 Cal. App. 4th at 1132, 1137-38 (finding no reasonable diligence, despite

submission of investigator’s affidavit, where affidavit showed that investigator never followed

crucial lead). Thus, aside from its failure to provide independent support for Plaintiff’s cause

of action against the defendants named in the Section 415.50 Motion, the First Benjamin

Declaration also falls short of establishing Plaintiff’s reasonable diligence with the requisite

level of detail.

Section 17061(c)(1) Motion

California Corporations Code Section 17061(c)(1) permits service on limited liability

companies by hand-delivering to the California Secretary of State a copy of the process,

together with a court order authorizing such service. A court may enter an order authorizing

such service “if the designated agent [for the LLC] cannot with reasonable diligence be found

at the address designated for personal delivery of the process, and it is shown by affidavit

to the satisfaction of the court that process against a limited liability company or foreign

limited liability company cannot be served with reasonable diligence upon the designated

agent . . . .” Cal. Corp. Code § 17061(c)(1). The Court interprets “reasonable diligence” in

Section 17061(c)(1) to require the same efforts to serve by other means as Cal. Code. Civ.

P. § 415.50.

Plaintiff’s Section 17061(c)(1) Motion seeks an order authorizing Plaintiff to serve

Defendant San Andrea’s Insurance Agency, LLC by personal service on the California

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Secretary of State. The Declaration of Daniel M. Benjamin supporting the Section

17061(c)(1) Motion (“Second Benjamin Declaration”) states that Plaintiff attempted to serve

Patricia Lopez, San Andrea’s registered agent for service of process, at the address

registered with the California Secretary of State. (Second Benjamin Dec. ¶¶ 2-3.) It also

states that Plaintiff used a research tool called “Merlin” to search for Patricia Lopez, and

attempted service at a second address produced by that search. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Lastly, the

Second Benjamin Declaration states that “[s]taff acting under [Mr. Benjamin’s] direction

conducted internet searches for San Andrea’s Insurance Agency, which revealed little useful

information.” (Id. ¶ 5.) 

As with the similar statements in the First Benjamin Declaration (see First Benjamin

Dec. ¶¶ 4, 7, 15 and 20), the statements that Plaintiff used an internet search tool called

“Merlin” and that Mr. Benjamin’s staff “conducted internet searches” are not sufficient to

establish reasonable diligence where there is no explication whatsoever of the contents of

those searches. 

Conclusion

Based on the forgoing, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s Section 415.50

Motion and DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s Section 17061(c)(1) Motion. The Court also

GRANTS Plaintiff a ninety (90) day extension of the time limit for service with respect to

defendants Shane Kavanagh, Contegra Capital, LLC, Ira Gillum, Good Silver, Inc and San

Andrea’s Insurance Agency, LLC. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 5, 2011 HONORABLE BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ

United States District Judge

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