Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04192/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04192-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 This Court has already ruled that “the instant action against federal officials will be

treated as an action against the United States because ‘the judgment sought would expend

itself on the public treasury [and] the effect of the judgment would be to restrain the

Government from acting, or compel it to act.” Order Denying Defs.’ (Second) Mot. to

Dismiss (Doc. 109) at 8 (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE BAUTISTA-PEREZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney

General of the United States, and

JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary 

of Homeland Security,

Defendants.

NO. C07-4192 TEH

ORDER DENYING 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’ CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court on November 23, 2009, on Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Plaintiffs are nationals of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua who allege the Department

of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has unlawfully charged them fees above a $50 statutory

ceiling to register for Temporary Protected Status, or “TPS.” Defendants Eric H. Holder, Jr.,

the Attorney General of the United States, and Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland

Security (collectively, “Defendants,” the “Government” or “DHS”)1

 contend that the

disputed biometric services fee is permissible, having been authorized by Congress in 1997

and confirmed in legislation enacted on October 28, 2010. For the reasons set out below,

Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED, and Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

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2

 The Immigration Act of 1990 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)

by adding (among other provisions) section 244A, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, which provides the

statutory authority for TPS. Section 244A of the INA was renumbered as section 244 in

1996. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, Subtitle A, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-615 (1996).

3

 The authority to designate countries and administer the TPS program was transferred

from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security in 2003, with the formation

of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), which subsumed the functions of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS” or “Service”). Homeland Security Act of

2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Temporary Protected Status

Congress established TPS in 1990 as a temporary immigration benefit for nationals of

foreign states experiencing “ongoing armed conflict,” “environmental disaster,” or other

“extraordinary and temporary conditions.” Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,

§ 302, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a).2

 The statute empowers

the Attorney General – now the Secretary of Homeland Security3

 – to designate countries for

TPS if, owing to such hardships, they are “unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the

return” of their alien nationals, or their nationals could not return “in safety.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(b)(1). TPS may be granted to aliens who have resided continuously in the United

States – regardless of immigration status – since their country’s designation, as long as they

satisfy other requirements. Id. § 1254a(a)(5) & (c)(1)(A). Aliens granted TPS may receive

employment authorization and remain in the United States as long as their TPS is in effect. 

Id. § 1254a(a)(1)-(2).

Once a country is designated, any nationals of that country residing in the United

States must register “to the extent and in a manner which the Attorney General establishes” if

they seek to qualify for TPS. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(iv). The initial registration period

lasts no less than 180 days. Id. Once granted TPS, an alien must re-register annually. Id.

§ 1254a(c)(3)(C). A country’s designation may be extended in increments of six, twelve, or

eighteen months if the Attorney General does not find that the conditions triggering TPS

have abated. Id. § 1254a(b)(3)(C). The Attorney General originally designated Honduras

and Nicaragua for TPS in 1999. 64 Fed. Reg. 524 (Jan. 5, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 526 (Jan. 5,

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4

 Section 1254a(c)(1)(B) reads as follows in its current form: 

Registration fee. The Attorney General may require payment of a

reasonable fee as a condition of registering an alien under

subparagraph (A)(iv) (including providing an alien with an

“employment authorized” endorsement or other appropriate work

permit under this section). The amount of any such fee shall not

exceed $50. In the case of aliens registered pursuant to a

designation under this section made after July 17, 1991, the

Attorney General may impose a separate, additional fee for

providing an alien with documentation of work authorization.

Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, all

fees collected under this subparagraph shall be credited to the

appropriation to be used in carrying out this section.

3

1999). The designation for both countries has been extended eight times. El Salvador was

designated in 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 14,214 (Mar. 9, 2001), and extended six times.

Section 1254a permits the Attorney General to “require payment of a reasonable fee

as a condition of registering an alien” for TPS, but caps that fee at $50.4

 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(c)(1)(B). Accordingly, a “filing fee” for TPS applicants has consistently been set at

$50 in the Federal Register. See, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 524 (Jan. 5, 1999) (setting $50 filing fee

for TPS applicants from Honduras); see also 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1) (prescribing fee “not to

exceed fifty dollars” for “filing an initial application for” TPS, with the “exact amount of the

fee” to “be determined at the time a foreign state is designated for” TPS). Although the

registration fee originally included “providing an alien with an ‘employment authorized’

endorsement or other appropriate work permit under this section,” 104 Stat. at 5033, a

separate work authorization fee was carved out in 1991: “[i]n the case of aliens registered

[for TPS] after July 17, 1991, the Attorney General may impose a separate, additional fee for

providing an alien with documentation of work authorization.” Miscellaneous and Technical

Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 304(b)(2), 105

Stat. 1733, 1749 (1991) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(B)). No fees beyond those for

registration and work authorization are specifically provided for in § 1254a.

Although regulations have required TPS applicants to provide fingerprints for

criminal background checks since the program’s inception, the procedures for doing so have

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4

evolved. Under the interim rule implementing the statute, applicants 14 years of age or older

were required to provide “two completed fingerprint cards,” 56 Fed. Reg. 619 (Jan. 7, 1991),

which could be procured from private sources. In 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (“INS” or “Service”) – now DHS – began requiring that outside entities providing

fingerprinting services to applicants for immigration benefits be certified, to “protect the

integrity of the fingerprinting process, and relieve the strain on Service personnel resources.” 

61 Fed. Reg. 28,003 (June 4, 1996); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 57,583 (Nov. 7, 1996) (extending

the effective date of certification program to 1997). Certified entities could charge

“reasonable fees for fingerprinting services,” costs borne by the TPS applicants themselves. 

61 Fed. Reg. at 28,011.

In 1997, however, Congress required that fingerprinting be done by the INS or other

governmental agencies. The INS was prohibited from accepting, “for the purpose of

conducting criminal background checks on applications for any benefit under the

Immigration and Nationality Act, any . . . fingerprint card which has been prepared by or

received from any individual or entity other than an office of” the INS, a state or local law

enforcement agency, or a U.S. embassy, consulate, or military office. Departments of

Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of

1998 (“1998 Appropriations Act”), Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2447-2448 (1997). 

The same act further provided that “agencies may collect and retain a fee for fingerprinting

services[.]” Id.

The INS issued an interim rule in March 1998, establishing a new fingerprinting

protocol and setting a “service fee for fingerprinting by the Service . . . at $25 per applicant,

petitioner, beneficiary, sponsor, or other individual required by Service regulations or form

instructions to be fingerprinted in connection with an application or petition for immigration

benefits.” 63 Fed. Reg. 12,979, 12,981 (Mar. 17, 1998). The regulations cited the 1998

Appropriations Act as authorizing “the Service to charge a fee for fingerprinting in

connection with the new fingerprinting program,” and noted that “[c]harging a fee for

fingerprinting is necessary to fund” the new program. Id. at 12,981, 12,982. The

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5

fingerprinting fee, which applied to all immigration benefits, was codified at 8 C.F.R.

§ 103.7(b)(1). The regulations governing TPS at 8 C.F.R. § 244.6 were revised to require

that “[e]ach application . . . be filed with the filing and fingerprinting fees, as provided in

§ 103.7 of this chapter.” 63 Fed. Reg. at 12,987. The fee for fingerprinting services went up

to $50 in 2002. 66 Fed. Reg. 65,811, 65,816 (Dec. 21, 2001). In 2004, DHS began charging

a “service fee” of $70 for “capturing biometric information,” which covered “electronically

captur[ing] and retain[ing] necessary biometrics (photo, signature, and press-print images).” 

69 Fed. Reg. 5088, 5090, 5092 (Feb. 3, 2004). DHS began using the term “biometric fee”

rather than “fingerprinting fee” to “better describe the services provided under this fee.” Id.

at 5090. The fee was raised to $80 in 2007. 72 Fed. Reg. 41,888, 41,890 (Aug. 1, 2007).

An applicant for TPS is therefore charged (1) a registration fee of $50.00; (2) a

“biometric services fee” of $80.00 (if the applicant is 14 years of age or older); and (3) a

$340.00 fee to apply for work authorization, if desired. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.7(b)(1), 244.6. The

registration fee is charged only once, when the alien first applies for TPS. However, DHS

charges the biometric services fee for every registration and re-registration, even when the

biometric data is already on file and its resubmission unnecessary.

II. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit

This class action lawsuit was filed on August 16, 2007. Plaintiffs are nationals of El

Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua who, in applying for TPS, have paid fees for biometric

services in excess of the $50 registration fee set by statute. They allege that DHS’s policy of

charging additional fees for biometric services violates the $50 cap on registration fees

imposed by § 1254a. In their First Amended Complaint filed August 21, 2007, Plaintiffs

seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including a refund of all registration and biometric fees

paid in excess of the $50 cap.

Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on October 15, 2007, asking the Court to

enjoin DHS from charging the $80.00 biometric services fee for TPS beneficiaries from El

Salvador who were required to re-register by October 22, 2007. This Court denied the

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5 Defendant, in their motion, seek to dismiss any claims regarding payments made

before August 16, 2001, based on the six-year statute of limitations on suits against the

United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(a) & 2501. However, Plaintiffs respond that they are only

asserting liability within the six-year statute of limitations, as reflected in their class

definition. Since Plaintiffs’ claims do not reach outside the six-year window, the Court

agrees that there is nothing to dismiss on this basis.

6

preliminary injunction on October 17, 2007, based on Plaintiffs’ failure to show a likelihood

of irreparable injury. Order Denying Mot. for Prelim. Injunction (“Order Denying PI”) (Doc.

40) at 5. The Court also concluded, however, that Plaintiffs had “shown a high likelihood of

success on the merits.” Id. at 10. The Court rejected DHS’s argument that the biometric

services fee falls outside the registration fee capped at $50 by § 1254a, concluding that

deference to the agency’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), was “not warranted.” Order Denying PI

at 6. Observing that “the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(B) unambiguously

prohibits fees ‘as a condition of registering’ for TPS of over $50.00,” and that the biometrics

fee is charged “for forms that are required ‘as a condition of registering’ an alien for TPS,”

the Court concluded that “collecting biometric information should be considered part of the

registration process.” Id. at 6-7. The Court also observed that the statute “limits the

registration fee to $50.00, but gives explicit permission to charge an extra fee solely for

employment authorization documents,” which “strongly suggests that other fees are not

permitted.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). That conclusion was reiterated when the Court

denied Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, finding that “Defendants have raised no

arguments which should alter the Court’s earlier conclusion that the language of

§ 1254a(c)(1)(B) is unambiguous.” Order Denying (First) Mot. to Dismiss (“Order Denying

FMTD”) (Doc. 68) at 11. A second motion to dismiss, raising a jurisdictional challenge and

objection to venue, was denied on May 1, 2009.

On July 9, 2009, the Court certified a class, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(2), of “all nationals of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua who have applied to

register or re-register for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) at any time from August 16,

2001 to the present.”5

 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and

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6

 Neither summary judgment motion addressed Plaintiffs’ claim that it is unreasonable

for DHS to charge TPS applicants a biometric services fee even when no biometric

information is collected or required. The Court therefore does not address that question in

this Order. 

7

Bifurcation (Doc. 113) at 1. The Court also bifurcated questions regarding liability and

declaratory and injunctive relief from the issue of restitution for registration fees paid in

excess of the $50 limit. Id.

Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on August 17, 2009, and Defendants

filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on October 2, 2009. Plaintiffs ask the Court to

find that Defendants’ practice of assessing a biometric services fee for TPS registration and

re-registration violates the $50 statutory cap set by § 1254a(c)(1)(B). Defendants seek

summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety.6

III. Recent Congressional Action

The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010 (“DHS

Appropriations Act”) was signed into law on October 28, 2009. H.R. 2892, Pub. L. No. 111-

83, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009). Section 549 expressly allows the collection of a biometric

services fee in addition to the registration fee capped by § 1254a, and provides for its

application as of 1998:

Sec. 549. (a) In addition to collection of registration fees

described in section 244(c)(1)(B) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(1)(B)), fees for fingerprinting

services, biometric services, and other necessary services may be

collected when administering the program described in section

244 of such Act.

(b) Subsection (a) shall be construed to apply for fiscal year 1998

and each fiscal year thereafter.

Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 549, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009). Defendants argue that Congress, in

passing this Act, “unequivocally confirmed that, for fiscal year 1998 and each year

thereafter, the Government legally collects fees for fingerprinting and biometric services and

any other necessary services when administrating” the TPS program. Defendants’ Notice of

New Law (Doc. 127) at 2. Plaintiffs dispute this interpretation, asserting that only biometric

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fees for “non-registration services” associated with TPS are authorized by section 549. Pls.’

Surreply to Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Surreply”) (Doc.

131) at 5.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The

Court may not weigh the evidence and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id. at 255.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than

for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007).

However, on an issue for which its opponent will have the burden of proof at trial, the

moving party can prevail merely by “pointing out . . . that there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets

its initial burden, the opposing party must then “set out specific facts showing a genuine

issue for trial” to defeat the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

Questions of law are “suitable to disposition on summary judgment.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank

of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 310 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2002).

//

//

//

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DISCUSSION

No material facts are in dispute. Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ motions require the Court

to resolve a single question of law: whether DHS’s imposition of a biometric services fee

violates § 1254a’s statutory cap on registration fees. The Court has already addressed this

issue in two prior orders, concluding that biometric services are part of the registration

process and therefore subject to the $50 cap. See Order Denying PI; Order Denying FMTD.

Since then, however, Congress has spoken. Section 549 of the DHS Appropriations

Act speaks directly to the meaning of § 1254a. Defendants argue that Congress’s latest word

on this question confirms “that for 1998 and every year thereafter, the Government legally

may collect the fees at issue in this case, in addition to the TPS registration fees described in”

§ 1254a(c)(1)(B). Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’

Reply”) (Doc. 128) at 1. Plaintiffs insist that Defendants’ “construction of Section 549 must

be rejected,” as the new statute does not alter § 1254a’s plain meaning as already construed

by this Court. Pls.’ Surreply at 1, 3.

The Court must begin by assessing the meaning of section 549 in relation to § 1254a. 

If the Court concludes that section 549 permits DHS’s collection of a separate fee for

biometric services, the Court will then consider Plaintiffs’ arguments that such an

interpretation renders section 549 unconstitutional.

I. The Meaning of Section 549

Section 549 provides that “[i]n addition to collection of registration fees described in”

§ 1254a(c)(1)(B), “fees for fingerprinting services, biometric services, and other necessary

services may be collected when administering” the TPS program. Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 549,

123 Stat. 2142 (2009). Section 549 does not amend the statutory language of § 1254a, but

clarifies it. By providing that fees for fingerprinting and biometric services can be collected

“[i]n addition to . . . registration fees,” section 549 establishes that such services do not fall

within the ambit of “registration fees.” Since only the “registration fee” is capped at $50 by

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§ 1254a(c)(1)(B), section 549’s plain language establishes that fingerprinting and biometric

service fees are not subject to the $50 limit. Furthermore, the statute is explicit that it “shall

be construed to apply for fiscal year 1998” – the year Congress first authorized a fee for

fingerprinting services – “and each fiscal year thereafter.” Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 549. 

Section 549 therefore provides that DHS’s collection of a fee for fingerprinting and biometric

services since 1998 has not violated § 1254a(c)(1)(B)’s cap on the registration fee.

This conclusion is contrary to this Court’s previous rulings. However, the Court’s

goal in interpreting a congressional statute is to follow the intent of Congress. See

Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 838 (9th Cir. 2003). Where, as here, an agency’s

interpretation of the statute is in dispute, the inquiry ends if “the intent of Congress is clear”: 

“the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

842-43 (1984). “[T]he language of a statute is controlling when the meaning is plain and

unambiguous.” United States v. Maria-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 664, 668 (9th Cir. 2001). The

Court may also consider “‘the structure and purpose of a statute . . . in determining the plain

meaning of its provisions.’” Resident Councils v. Leavitt, 500 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.

2003)). When the Court concludes that Congress was clear, it will “not defer to a contrary

agency interpretation.” Id. If, however, the statute is ambiguous, the Court will “defer to the

agency’s construction of its governing statutes, unless that construction is unreasonable.” 

Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158, 1169 (9th

Cir. 1997).

The Court previously concluded that § 1254a(c)(1)(B) unambiguously barred fees for

biometric services and fingerprinting from exceeding the $50 cap. In revisiting that analysis,

the Court finds it erred with respect to the statute’s ambiguity. Section 1254a(c)(1)(B)

allows a “reasonable fee” to be charged “as a condition of registering” for TPS, and provides

that the “amount of any such fee shall not exceed $50.” Although the Court held that

biometric services fees are “plainly part of the fees charged ‘as a condition of registering,’”

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 In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the TPS statute’s

“structure and purpose,” as permitted by Resident Councils, 500 F.3d at 1031. Although the

plain language of § 1254a did not explicitly bar additional fees, the Court identified a

congressional intent to set a $50 ceiling on TPS application fees. Since that time, however,

Congress has articulated its intent more explicitly in section 549. In reconciling § 1254a

with section 549, the Court recognizes that permitting a biometric services fee – while still

capping the registration fee at $50 – is in no way inconsistent with the plain language of

§ 1254a(c)(1)(B).

8 Having reconsidered Defendants’ arguments, the Court concludes that the agency’s

interpretation of § 1254a(c)(1)(B), while contrary to this Court’s original reading, is

nonetheless reasonable. First, the plain language of § 1254a(c)(1)(B) caps only the

registration fee, without specifying what that fee should cover. Second, DHS began charging

fingerprinting and biometric fees only after Congress had required the agency to provide –

and authorized a fee for – such services. Finally, charging for biometrics is consistent with

the agency’s pre-1998 practice of requiring TPS applicants to procure and pay for

fingerprinting on their own; the only difference is that TPS applicants now pay the agency

for that service, rather than an outside entity. 

11

Order Denying FMTD at 12, that is not the only reasonable reading of the statute.7

 DHS’s

interpretation – that § 1254a(c)(1)(B) caps only the fee to register, but does not bar a separate

fee for biometric services – is also reasonable.8

 As the statute is susceptible to two

reasonable interpretations, it is therefore ambiguous.

The DHS Appropriations Act settles this ambiguity by clarifying that Congress did

not intend to preclude an additional fee for biometric services. The Court previously

observed that Congress’s passage of “a law allowing the agency to collect a biometric

services fee without amending § 1254a(c)(1)(B) – when it did amend the statute to allow a

fee for a work permit – shows, if anything, an intent to keep the $50.00 cap in place.” Order

Denying FMTD at 14 (emphasis in original). While correct that Congress intended to

maintain the $50 cap on registration fees, the Court erred in concluding that this cap

unambiguously applied to biometric services. With section 549, Congress has clarified that

the biometric services fee, like the work authorization fee, is not part of the registration fee. 

It is Congress’s intent as recently clarified by Congress – and not this Court’s earlier

assessment of congressional intent – that governs.

Plaintiffs, however, believe that the Court is bound by its prior rulings on this subject. 

Plaintiffs argue that section 549 “neither repeals nor alters the basic $50 TPS registration fee

cap set by 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(B),” nor allows “the Government to charge biometric or

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fingerprinting services fees as part of the TPS registration process if the total fee per person

would then amount to more than the $50 statutory cap.” Pls.’ Surreply at 1. Plaintiffs quote

this Court’s decisions to assert that “Section 549 does not ‘give [the Government] license to

ignore the [TPS] statute’s plain meaning.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Order Denying PI at 9).

To support their position, Plaintiffs offer an interpretation of section 549 that cannot

be reconciled with its plain language. Plaintiffs construe section 549 as authorizing the

Government to collect biometric fees “when administering the TPS program in general,

except when such fees conflict with the more specific TPS registration fee cap.” Pls.’

Surreply at 5 (emphasis in original). Their interpretation hinges on an artificial distinction

between “registration” services and “non-registration” services. The fees permitted by

section 549 could be charged, under Plaintiffs’ theory, only for “non-registration services

that are administered as part of the TPS program” – for example, when a TPS applicant seeks

to waive certain grounds of inadmissibility or applies for travel authorization. Id. at 5-6

(emphasis in original). Plaintiffs contend that the biometric services at issue in this class

action, as “registration” services, cannot be collected in addition to the registration fee as

they are subject to the $50 cap.

This reading is unsupported by the text of the statute. Section 549 allows fees for

“biometric . . . and other necessary services” to “be collected when administering the

program described in” § 1254a – i.e. the TPS program. Such a fee is “[i]n addition to” the

capped registration fee. Section 549 never distinguishes between registration and nonregistration services, nor does it suggest that the biometric services fees it expressly

authorizes may be collected in some contexts but not others. Section 549, by its own

language, supports Defendants’ position that DHS can collect a biometric services fee

without violating the statutory cap on registration fees.

Plaintiffs attempt to justify their reading of section 549 by characterizing it as a

“saving interpretation” that is necessary to avoid holding the statute unconstitutional. Pls.’

Surreply at 6 (citing Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1568 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

“[F]ederal statutes are to be construed so as to avoid serious doubts as to their

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constitutionality, and . . . when faced with such doubts the Court will first determine whether

it is fairly possible to interpret the statute in a manner that renders it constitutionally valid.” 

Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988). However, “statutory

construction may not be pressed ‘to the point of disingenuous evasion,’” id. (quoting United

States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985)), “and in avoiding constitutional questions the Court

may not embrace a construction that ‘is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress,’” id.

(quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades

Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).

Plaintiffs’ proffered interpretation exhibits such “disingenuous evasion.” Congress’s

intent in passing section 549 was clear. The report of the House Committee on

Appropriations (“Appropriations Committee”) establishes that section 549 was meant to

“clarif[y] that [DHS] is allowed to charge fees for services related to TPS applications.” 

H.R. Rep. No. 111-157, at 132 (2009). The report does not acknowledge any distinction

between registration and non-registration services; that dichotomy is Plaintiffs’ own creation. 

The Appropriations Committee also rejected a request “to raise the $50 application charge

since Congress has determined in the past that this humanitarian program should be available

for a modest fee.” Id. Plaintiffs have argued – and this Court previously concluded – that

allowing DHS to charge for biometric services would run contrary to Congress’s intent that

the registration fee be limited due to the humanitarian nature of TPS. The Appropriations

Committee, however, sees no inconsistency between capping the registration fee at $50 – for

humanitarian reasons – and allowing additional fees to be collected for services associated

with administering TPS. Plaintiffs’ reading of section 549 therefore cannot be justified even

as a “saving interpretation.”

Given that section 549 permits only one plausible interpretation, the Court must now

consider Plaintiffs’ arguments that the statute – so interpreted – is unconstitutional.

//

//

//

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 Defendants’ interpretation of section 549 would not, as Plaintiffs claim, effectively nullify § 1254a(c)(1)(B). DHS charges filing fees well in excess of $50 for other

immigration benefits: for example, $930 to apply for permanent resident status, $300 to

extend or change nonimmigrant status, and $595 to apply for naturalization. 8 C.F.R.

§ 103.7(b)(1). Given that the $50 registration fee cap maintains the filing fee for TPS

applicants at a level far lower than what other applicants pay, the addition of a biometric

services fee does not render that cap meaningless. 

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II. Plaintiffs’ Challenges to Congressional Action

Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ – and this Court’s – reading of section 549 on a

variety of fronts. They claim that such an interpretation effects an implied repeal of the $50

cap codified in § 1254a(c)(1)(B), and that the statute’s retroactivity to 1998 violates the due

process rights of Plaintiffs and the certified class. Plaintiffs further argue that section 549

violates the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches, and that DHS

has circumvented the administrative process by implementing section 549 without engaging

in notice-and-comment rulemaking. None of these arguments has merit.

Plaintiffs observe, correctly, that “Congress did not expressly repeal or amend the $50

TPS registration fee cap set by 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(B).” Pls.’ Surreply at 7. They further

contend that the only way to effect Defendants’ interpretation would be to find that Congress

impliedly repealed § 1254a(c)(1)(B), which the Court cannot do because neither of the “two

well-settled categories of repeals by implication” is applicable. Radzanower v. Touche Ross

& Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (allowing repeal by implication only where (1) “provisions

in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict” or (2) the later act “covers the whole subject of

the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute”). The Court need not grapple with

implied repeal, however, as the two provisions are consistent: § 1254a(c)(1)(B) caps the

registration fee for TPS applicants, while section 549 establishes that “fees for fingerprinting

services, biometric services, and other necessary services” are separate from, and may be

collected in addition to, the capped registration fee. As such, section 549 clarifies, rather

than repeals, § 1254a(c)(1)(B).9

Plaintiffs also argue that applying section 549 as of fiscal year 1998 is retroactive and

therefore violates their due process rights. The due process test for retroactive legislation

requires a “showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a

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10 The Court does not here consider Plaintiffs’ allegation that it was unlawful for DHS

to require the payment of a biometrics fee even when no biometric data was collected or

required, as the parties did not address that claim on summary judgment.

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rational legislative purpose.” Pension Ben. Guaranty Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S.

717, 730 (1984). Given this standard, “it will be a rare circumstance where federal

legislation that is retroactive will be held unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.”

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This is

not such a circumstance, as the Appropriations Committee articulated a rational purpose: to

“clarif[y] that [DHS] is allowed to charge fees for services related to TPS applications.” 

H.R. Rep. No. 111-157, at 132 (2009). It is rational for Congress to affirm that an agency’s

longstanding interpretation of federal law is correct.

Even severely retroactive legislation will pass constitutional muster if (1) the party

subjected to retroactive obligations benefitted from the activity at issue and does not face

disproportionate liability, and (2) such liability would not “be contrary to that party’s

reasonable expectations.” Commonwealth Edison Co., 271 F.3d at 1346. Plaintiffs clearly

benefit from TPS, which confers a temporary immigration status and entitles them to work

authorization. In addition, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that the biometric fee is in any way

disproportionate;10 in fact, a common biometrics fee is set for all immigration benefits that

require such fees. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1). Finally, having to pay a biometrics fee cannot

be contrary to Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations in that they have already paid the fee. 

Congress is not retroactively requiring payment from Plaintiffs, but is merely reaffirming the

statutory authority for fees they previously paid. Congress’s actions satisfy due process. 

The Ninth Circuit has “long recognized that clarifying legislation is not subject to any

presumption against retroactivity and is applied to all cases pending as of the date of its

enactment.” Abkco Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2000). In Abkco, the

Ninth Circuit had to choose whether its own precedent – or a congressional statute passed in

response to that precedent – governed a copyright dispute regarding songs that had been

released on phonorecord in 1938 and 1939. The court had held in 1995 that the distribution

of a phonorecord constituted a “publication” under the Copyright Act of 1909; two years

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later, Congress amended the act to provide that pre-1978 distribution was not a publication. 

The Ninth Circuit found the statute controlling, having concluded that “no retroactivity

problem is presented” where the new statute is a “statement of what [the original statute] has

meant all along.” Id. at 691. “An amendment in the face of an ambiguous statute . . .

indicates that Congress is clarifying, rather than changing, the law.” Id.; see also Beverly

Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n v. Belshe, 132 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1997) (“It has been established

law since nearly the beginning of the republic . . . that congressional legislation that . . .

expresses the intent of an earlier statute must be accorded great weight.”). Plaintiffs dispute

the applicability of Abkco, arguing that § 1254a(c)(1)(B) “was and still remains unambiguous

as to the meaning of ‘registration fee.’” Plaintiffs’ 11/25/09 letter brief (Doc. 137) at 2. 

However, as the Court previously noted, § 1254a(c)(1)(B) is susceptible of more than one

reasonable interpretation and is, therefore, ambiguous.

As in Abkco, Congress clarified an otherwise ambiguous statute, and the constitutional

concerns associated with retroactivity are not present here. For example, although the

presumption against retroactivity “is based, in part, on a hesitancy to reverse settled

expectations,” Abkco, 217 F.3d at 691, ruling for Defendants on this issue will not disturb the

settled expectations of Plaintiffs and class members. For more than a decade, DHS has

interpreted the Appropriations Act of 1998 as authorizing a fee for fingerprinting and

biometric services in addition to the registration fee capped by § 1254a(c)(1)(B). Congress,

in passing section 549, has merely ratified that interpretation. While Plaintiffs advance a

contrary interpretation – one that this Court originally credited – Congress’s recent action

does not reverse settled expectations; rather, Congress “resolved a problem of unsettled

expectations that had arisen” from the statute’s ambiguity. Abkco, 217 F.3d at 692.

Plaintiffs further argue that Congress’s passage of section 549 violates the separation

of powers between the legislative and judicial branches. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.

128, 145 (1872). The Supreme Court in Klein “refused to give effect to a statute that was

said ‘[to] prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases

pending before it.’” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (quoting Klein, 80

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U.S. at 146). “Whatever the precise scope of Klein, however, later decisions have made clear

that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress ‘amend[s] applicable law.’” Id.

(quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992)). Here, Congress

merely clarified a statute; it did not “compel[] . . . findings or results” in a pending case. 

Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438. The “great and controlling purpose” of section 549 is not to

deny relief to Plaintiffs, but to clarify DHS’s authority to charge biometric fees for TPS

applicants from all countries, not simply those in the class. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 145. 

Although this Court has heeded the words of Congress in reexamining its previous

interpretation of § 1254a(c)(1)(B), Congress has by no means directed the outcome.

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are subverting the administrative process. 

Since the existing regulations are premised on what Plaintiffs allege is a flawed interpretation

of § 1254a, they argue that those regulations can no longer be relied upon as authority for

collecting the biometric services fee. The regulations cited the 1998 Appropriations Act –

which expressly allowed the agency to charge for fingerprinting – as the statutory authority

for the fee. Furthermore, DHS’s reading of § 1254a(c)(1)(B) is not only permissible but also

– in light of Congress’s clarifying legislation – faithful to congressional intent. There is no

need to engage in additional notice-and-comment rulemaking to implement section 549,

which merely reaffirmed the statutory interpretation reflected in DHS’s existing regulations.

Plaintiffs characterize Congress’s actions as an “‘absolute and despotic’ exercise of

legislative powers,” and accuse Congress of engaging in self-dealing that “‘shocks the

conscience.’” Pls.’ Surreply at 9-10 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535

(1884), and Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2008)). Such strong

language is misplaced. The “shocks the conscience” standard applies to substantive due

process claims premised on executive abuse of power, such as a killing by a police officer. 

See Porter, 546 F.3d at 1136-37; County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47

(1998). It is inapplicable here. Congress, in passing section 549, simply clarified that the

statutory cap on the TPS registration fee was not intended to bar any other fee. “[L]egislative

acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a

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presumption of constitutionality[.]” Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15

(1976). “[T]he burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the

legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.” Id. Plaintiffs have failed to sustain

such a burden. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is

DENIED, and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ claim that the charging of a biometric services fee in

addition to the $50 registration fee violates § 1254a(c)(1)(B) is DISMISSED.

The Court does not address the legality of DHS’s practice of charging a biometric

services fee when the collection of biometrics is not required, a question that the parties did

not raise here. That issue therefore survives summary judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the parties shall appear for a case management

conference on Monday, May 3, 2010, at 1:30pm. The parties shall file a joint case

management statement no fewer than seven days prior to the conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/6/10 THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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