Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00522/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00522-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KIER ANDERSON, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JOE LIZARRAGA, 

Respondents. 

No. 2:14-cv-00522 JAM AC P 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. Pending before the court is 

respondent’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner is outside the one-year statute of 

limitations. ECF No. 11. Petitioner has responded to the motion (ECF No. 13) and respondent 

has replied (ECF No. 16). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 A jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder and on March 18, 2009, he was 

sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of twenty-five years to life. ECF No. 1 at 1; 

Lodged Doc. No. 2. 

 A. Direct Review 

 Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, appealed to the California Court of Appeal, 

Third Appellate District. ECF No. 1 at 2. The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment on June 13, 

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2011. Lodged Doc. No. 1. 

 On July 1, 2011, again with assistance of counsel, petitioner petitioned for review of the 

Court of Appeal’s decision in the California Supreme Court. Lodged Doc. No. 3. The state 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on September 21, 2011. Lodged Doc. No. 4. 

 B. State Collateral Review 

 On December 19, 2012,1 petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

Sacramento County Superior Court (the “Superior Court Petition”). Lodged Doc. No. 5. The 

application stated that petitioner had been delayed in filing his Superior Court Petition because he 

“did not receive the record on appeal and trial counsel’s files until July 2012.” Id. at 6. The 

Superior Court Petition was denied on May 16, 2013, as untimely and on the merits. Lodged 

Doc. No. 6. 

 On July 15, 2013, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filled a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District (the “Court of Appeal Petition”). 

Lodged Doc. No. 7. The Court of Appeal Petition was denied without comment or citation on 

July 26, 2013. Lodged Doc. No. 8. 

 On September 23, 2013, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Supreme Court (the “Supreme Court Petition”). Lodged Doc. No. 9. The 

Supreme Court Petition was denied without comment or citation on February 11, 2014. Lodged 

Doc. No. 11. 

 C. The Federal Petition 

 On February 19, 2014, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the instant federal petition. 

ECF No. 11. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

 Respondent now moves to dismiss the instant petition as untimely. ECF No. 11. 

Respondent argues that petitioner’s judgment became final on December 20, 2011, and, absent 

tolling, the last day to file his federal habeas petition was December 20, 2012. Id. at 3. He 

 

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 The prison mailbox rule was used in determining the filing date of petitioner’s state and federal 

habeas petitions because they were submitted pro se. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). 

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further argues that petitioner is not eligible for statutory tolling because the Superior Court 

Petition, filed by that court on December 24, 2012, was filed four days after the statute of 

limitations expired and petitioner’s subsequent state petitions were filed even longer after the 

statute of limitations expired, making the state petitions ineffective to toll the statute of 

limitations. Id. at 4. Alternatively, he argues that even if the Superior Court Petition was filed 

prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, it would not have tolled the limitations period 

because it was denied as untimely. Id. 4-5. 

III. Response 

 In response to the respondent’s motion, petitioner agrees that the one-year statute of 

limitations began to run on December 20, 2011. ECF No. 13 at 1. Petitioner argues that under 

the prison mailbox rule, his Superior Court Petition was filed on December 19, 2012, one day 

before the statute of limitations expired, entitling him to statutory tolling. Id. at 3. 

Petitioner also argues that the denial of the Superior Court Petition should not prevent 

statutory tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations because California does not have a set 

deadline for filing habeas petitions in non-death cases. Id. at 3-5. He argues that since there is 

not a defined timeframe, the Superior Court Petition was not clearly untimely and the court erred 

in dismissing it as such, especially because the delay was outside his control and he diligently 

pursued litigation. Id. 

Petitioner’s final argument is that he is entitled to equitable tolling because the “delay in 

bringing his habeas claims was the direct result of trial counsel’s refusal to turn over critical 

records.” Id. at 5. 

IV. Reply 

 Assuming that the Superior Court Petition was filed on December 19, 2012, before the 

statute of limitations expired, respondent argues that it still does not toll the statute of limitations 

because it was deemed untimely under state law. ECF No. 16 at 2. Respondent further argues 

that California has clear procedures for the timeliness of a state habeas petition, but that the court 

need not consider whether those procedures were clear or properly applied because when a 

habeas petition is untimely under state law, it is not “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 

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2244(d)(2). Id. at 3. 

 Respondent also disagrees that petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. He argues that 

petitioner has failed to establish that extraordinary circumstances existed that were beyond his 

control and made timely filing impossible. Id. at 3-4. Respondent maintains that petitioner’s 

claims that trial counsel refused to turn over critical records is vague and that petitioner failed to 

establish that he was diligent in both obtaining the records and proceeding with his attempts to 

obtain habeas relief. Id. at 3-5. Finally, respondent argues that even if petitioner was entitled to 

equitable tolling for the seven months he was without his records, his petition would still be 

untimely because it was filed fourteen months after the expiration of the statute of limitations and 

statutory tolling was not available. Id. at 5-6. 

V. Discussion 

Section 2244(d)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code contains a one-year statute of 

limitations for filing a habeas petition in federal court. The one-year clock commences from one 

of several alternative triggering dates. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In this case the applicable 

date is that “on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The parties agree that the statute of limitations commenced on December 20, 2011, the 

day judgment became final. ECF No. 11 at 3; ECF No. 13 at 1. The parties also agree that, 

absent any statutory or equitable tolling, the statute of limitations expired one year later on 

December 20, 2012. ECF No. 11 at 3; ECF No. 13 at 3. The instant petition was filed on 

February 19, 2014. ECF No. 1. Without statutory or equitable tolling, the petition was filed 

nearly fourteen months after the statute of limitations expired. 

 A. Statutory Tolling 

 Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). An application is “properly filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in 

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 

(2000). “An untimely petition, however, is not ‘properly filed’ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

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2244(d)(2), and so it does not toll the statute of limitation.” Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005); Thorson v. Palmer, 479 

F.3d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2007)). “A California court’s determination that a filing was untimely . . . 

is dispositive.” Banjo, 614 F.3d at 968 (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2002)). 

The “statute of limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct 

state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case 

‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.1999), overruled 

on other grounds, Carey, 536 U.S. 214. State habeas petitions filed after the one-year statute of 

limitations has expired do not revive the statute of limitations and have no tolling effect. See 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.2003); Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 

(9th Cir.2001); Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (petitioner is not entitled to 

tolling where the limitations period has already run). 

Respondent initially argues that the Superior Court Petition was filed December 24, 2012 

(ECF No. 11 at 4), the date it was filed by the Superior Court (Lodged Doc. No. 5 at 1). 

Respondent later assumes, without conceding, that under the prison mailbox rule it was filed 

December 19, 2012 (ECF No. 16 at 2), the date it was signed (Lodged Doc. No. 5 at 6). Since 

respondent offers no evidence that the Superior Court Petition was not delivered to prison 

officials for mailing on December 19, 2012, the court will consider the date the petition was 

signed to be the date of filing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(date petition is signed may be considered earliest possible date an inmate could submit his 

petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule), overruled on other grounds, Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); see also Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1059 n. 1 

(C.D. Cal. 2001) (delivery for purposes of constructive filing under the prison mailbox rule is 

presumed to be on the date of signing of the petition, absent evidence to the contrary) (citations 

omitted). 

Since the Superior Court Petition was filed on December 19, 2012, it was filed the day 

before the statute of limitations expired. However, on May 16, 2013, the Superior Court denied 

the petition as untimely and on the merits, in an eight page written order. Lodged Doc. No. 6. If 

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a state court rules that a petition is untimely, that is “the end of the matter,” regardless of whether 

the state court also addressed the merits of the claims or whether the timeliness ruling was 

“entangled” with the merits. Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-14 (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 225-26). 

Therefore, even though the state court addressed the merits of the Superior Court Petition, the 

ruling that it was untimely means it was not “properly filed.” 

Because it is clear that petitioner’s first state habeas petition was denied as untimely, the 

summary denials of petitioner’s subsequently-filed state habeas petitions are similarly construed. 

See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 (1991) (this court must “look through” the silent 

denial to the last reasoned state court decision). Application of the look-through presumption 

compels the conclusion that all three state courts found that petitioner had waited too long to seek 

collateral relief. Accordingly, none of petitioner’s habeas petitions were “properly filed” and 

none of them served to statutorily toll AEDPA’s limitation period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) 

(statutory tolling authorized only during the pendency of “a properly filed” application for state 

court review); Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8 (a state petition is “properly filed,” and qualifies for statutory 

tolling only if “its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings”); Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 (time limits are “filing conditions,” and a state court’s 

rejection of a petition as untimely means that it was not “properly filed” and not entitled to 

statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)). 

Petitioner also argues that because California does not have specific filing timelines for 

non-death habeas petitions, the denial of his Superior Court Petition as untimely is not sufficient 

to bar his federal petition as untimely. ECF No. 13 at 3-5. To the extent petitioner is trying to 

raise an adequacy argument related to procedural bars, “the adequacy analysis used to decide 

procedural default issues is inapplicable to the issue of whether a state petition was ‘properly 

filed’ for purposes of section 2244(d)(2)” and his reliance on these arguments is misplaced. 

White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 

1018 (9th Cir.2009)). 

For these reasons, there is no basis for statutory tolling of the statute of limitations in this 

case. 

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B. Equitable Tolling 

A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations only if the petitioner shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing. See Holland 

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). An 

“extraordinary circumstance” has been defined as an external force that is beyond the inmate’s 

control. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is “reasonable diligence,” not “maximum feasible diligence.” See 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653; see also Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Under extraordinary circumstances, counsel’s malfeasance may support equitable tolling. 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 652-53 (equitable tolling may be appropriate where post-conviction counsel 

effectively abandoned client); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (statute of 

limitations equitably tolled where attorney was retained to prepare and file a habeas petition for 

incarcerated inmate, failed to do so, and then disregarded requests to return files pertaining to the 

case until well after the petition was due). 

In this case, petitioner alleges that the period during which trial counsel refused to turn 

over “critical records” was an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control that justifies 

equitable tolling. ECF No. 13 at 5-6. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel refused to turn over 

unspecified “critical records” and that when they were eventually turned over they were not 

redacted as required and he had to have an attorney friend complete the redaction. Id. at 5. He 

fails to identify when he requested his files from trial counsel, what attempts he made to obtain 

the files, or how long his friend had the records for purposes of redacting them. ECF No. 13 at 5-

6. However, according to the Superior Court Petition, petitioner received the redacted records 

sometime in July 2012, Lodged Doc. No. 5 at 6 and Exhibit B, meaning he had the records 

between four and five months prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Simple delay in 

counsel’s provision of the files falls well below the standard of egregious attorney conduct that is 

necessary to constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” supporting tolling under Holland and 

progeny. The facts presented here do not support tolling. 

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Furthermore, as respondent points out, even if petitioner were granted equitable tolling for 

the period of time he was without his records, he would only be entitled to tolling for a period of 

approximately seven months.2 ECF No. 16 at 5-6. Because petitioner is not entitled to statutory 

tolling, the instant petition was filed nearly fourteen months after the statute of limitations 

expired.3 Even with equitable tolling, the petition is approximately seven months late. The court 

therefore finds that even assuming equitable tolling is appropriate, it is not enough to save 

petitioner’s federal habeas petition from being untimely filed. 

To the extent that petitioner seeks equitable tolling because there is no specific deadline 

for filing a state habeas petition in California (ECF No. 13 at 3-5), that argument is foreclosed by 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.2003). In Ferguson, the Ninth Circuit held 

that “AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, even if in tension with a longer state statute of 

limitations, does not render federal habeas an inadequate or ineffective remedy” so as to violate 

the Suspension Clause. The fact that California state law provides no specific statute of 

limitations does not change the fact that Congress has set a one-year statute of limitations on the 

filing of federal habeas corpus petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Therefore, petitioner is not 

entitled to equitable tolling on these grounds and the instant habeas petition remains barred by the 

statute of limitations. 

For these reasons petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling -- and even if he was, his 

petition would still be untimely. 

VI. Conclusion 

 Because petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, his petition was filed 

outside the statute of limitations and it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted. 

VII. Certificate of Appealability 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must 

 

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 The tolling period would run from December 20, 2011, when the statute of limitations began to 

run until sometime in July 2012, when petitioner allegedly received the “critical records.” ECF 

No. 16 at 5-6; Lodged Doc. No. 5 at 6. 

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 The parties agree that, absent any statutory or equitable tolling, the statute of limitations expired 

on December 20, 2012. ECF No. 11 at 3; ECF No. 13 at 3. The instant petition was filed on 

February 19, 2014. ECF No. 1. 

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issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A 

certificate of appealability may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in these 

findings and recommendations, a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has 

not been made in this case. Therefore, no certificate of appealability should issue. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) be granted and petitioner’s application 

for a writ of habeas corpus be denied as untimely. 

2. This court decline to issue the certificate of appealability referenced in 28 U.S.C. § 

2253. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 23, 2015 

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