Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01683/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01683-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 Ruth Aquilar, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v.

 Yuma County, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 06-1683-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Stephen J. Linde

(Linde) and Jeanne Linde (together, "Defendants Linde") (Dkt. 15) and joined by Defendants

Yuma County, Sheriff Ralph Ogden, Bryan Quimby, and Officer Esthela Lopez (the "County

Defendants") and Defendant Irene Naputi (collectively "Defendants"). Defendants move to

dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, or alternatively, to stay the instant action pursuant to Colorado

River Water Conservation District v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).

BACKGROUND

Factual History

Plaintiffs Ruth Aguilar, Rosa Moreno, Domonique Aguilar, Lee Montaldo and Francis

Aguilar ("Plaintiffs") are relatives and statutory beneficiaries of the deceased, Margaret

Aguilar ("Aguilar"). (Compl. ¶ 1-4). Linde, who does business as Northend Health

Associates, contracted with Defendant Yuma County to provide medical services to inmates

within the Yuma County Jail at the time the events giving rise to this action occurred. 

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On July 8, 2004, Aguilar was sentenced to 30 days incarceration for driving on a

suspended driver's license, and subsequently booked into Yuma County Jail. (Compl. ¶ 25).

Plaintiffs allege that, during the period of her incarceration, the defendants' negligence and

deliberate indifference to Aguilar's medical condition caused her death. (Compl. ¶ 25-27,

29).

Procedural History

On June 30, 2005, Plaintiffs filed suit in Yuma County Superior Court. They have

since amended their original complaint. The most recent version, the Third Amended

Complaint, asserts claims for: (1) negligence, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress,

and (3) wrongful death. (Dkt. 25). The Third Amended Complaint also revised the named

plaintiffs such that Plaintiff Lee Montaldo sues on behalf of himself and as representative of

the statutory beneficiaries of Aguilar, which includes all of Plaintiffs. A little over a year

later, on July 5, 2006, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court, asserting claims for: (1) violations of

42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) negligence; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4)

wrongful death.

On December 11, 2006, Defendants Linde moved to dismiss, or alternatively, to stay

all federal court matters until the state case is resolved. (Dkt. 15) This motion was

subsequently joined by the County Defendants (Dkt. 16) and Defendant Naputi (Dkt. 21).

On January 17, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Response to Defendant Linde's Motion to Dismiss and

a Motion to Amend seeking to add "various state law claims." (Dkt. 22). Replies were filed

by Defendant Naputi (Dkt. 23) on February 5, 2007, and Defendant Linde (Dkt. 24) on

February 6, 2007, supporting their Motion to Dismiss and responding to Plaintiff's Motion

to Amend. On June 20, 2007, the parties appeared before the Court to provide oral

argument on the pending motion. After considering the briefs filed by the parties and the

arguments raised before the Court, the Court issues the following Memorandum of Decision

and Order on Defendant Linde's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.

//

DEFENDANT LINDE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

As the Supreme Court has explained in Colorado River and its progeny, federal courts

should decline to exercise the jurisdiction given them only in "exceptional circumstances."

424 U.S. 800; Moses H. Cone Meml. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983).

Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging" obligation to exercise their jurisdiction,

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, especially "when those seeking a hearing in federal court

are asserting . . . their right to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d

1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979). This "somewhat overstates the law because in certain

circumstances a federal court may stay its proceedings in deference to pending state

proceedings." Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the

federal forum’s “role as the primary protector of constitutional rights has been severely

undercut” by recent Supreme Court precedent requiring federal courts to accord preclusive

effect to state court rulings. Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 782 n. 6 (9th

Cir. 1997) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Migra v. Warren City School

District, 465 U.S. 75 (1984)). The decision to stay or dismiss a claim is based on

considerations of "wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial

resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817

(quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). 

In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist to warrant a dismissal or stay

on Colorado River abstention grounds, the Supreme Court has provided six relevant factors

for courts to consider: (1) whether either the state or federal court has assumed jurisdiction

over a res; (2) the relative convenience of the forums; (3) the desirability of avoiding

piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether state

or federal law controls; and (6) whether the state proceeding is adequate to protect the parties'

rights. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818; Cone, 460 U.S. at 25-26. These factors are "to be

applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand."

Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. Moreover, "[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant

dismissal" Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-819. The Ninth Circuit added two additional

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1

Since this litigation is not in rem or quasi in rem, there is no assumption of

jurisdiction over any res, and thus this factor is not relevant. Similarly, the issue of forum

shopping is not significant in this case.

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factors to be considered: (7) whether the proceedings are substantially similar, and (8)

whether the second suit is an attempt to forum shop or avoid adverse rulings by the state

court. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416-17. 

DISCUSSION

I. Assessment of the Colorado River Factors1

A. Relative convenience of the forums

In Colorado River, the Supreme Court found the 300-mile distance between the

federal and state forums to be significant. 424 U.S. at 820. While the distance here is a

shorter 185 miles, it is still sufficient to require the parties and witnesses to travel from

Yuma, where most of them reside, (Dkt. 22 at 11, 24 at 3), and to lodge in Phoenix if there

were a trial. Plaintiffs suggest that, because Yuma is located within the District of Arizona,

Phoenix is a presumptively reasonable location for trial. (Dkt. 22 at 11). They cite Travelers

Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990), where a 200-mile distance was

found "unhelpful." That case, however, did not discuss inconvenience to witnesses, and the

two parties were located in different places, one in California and one in New York. Id.

Plaintiffs' argument is unpersuasive. As described above, the Colorado River doctrine is not

a test of dispositive factors, but a nonexclusive list of pragmatic considerations. Cone, 460

U.S. at 21. While the inconvenience of traveling to Phoenix alone might be insufficient to

justify abstention, it should be considered along with the other factors, and here it weighs

slightly for abstention.

//

//

B. Avoidance of piecemeal litigation 

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Piecemeal litigation occurs when "different tribunals consider the same issue, thereby

duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results." Am. Intl. Underwriters, Inc. v.

Contl. Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, with the exception of the § 1983

claim, the state and federal claims are essentially the same, and litigation of the § 1983 claim

will necessarily involve the same issues of fact as the other claims. As discussed below, the

state court has been addressing this issue for over a year now, and has ruled on multiple

substantive motions. It is indisputable that duplicative efforts would result from the

prosecution of this case in two courts. Furthermore, different findings of fact could be made

by the federal and state courts which would affect the claims in both courts. This factor

weighs for abstention. 

C. The order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction 

While the "priority" in time of jurisdiction is relevant, "this factor should not be

measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much

progress has been made in the two actions. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. In Nakash, the Ninth

Circuit found that where a state case had progressed "far beyond" the federal case, it would

be highly inefficient to allow the federal litigation to proceed. Moreover, as the Supreme

Court found in Colorado River, the "apparent absence of any proceedings in the District

Court, other than the filing of the complaint, prior to the motion to dismiss," was significant

and weighed for abstention. In Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.1949), where

parallel-suit abstention – later incorporated into Colorado River – began, the lapse between

filing of the state case and the federal case was approximately a year. See Evans Transp. Co.

v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715,719 (7th Cir. 1982).

The instant case is similar to these precedents. Here: (1) no substantive filings were

made in this Court, other than the Complaint, prior to the Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the state

case has been proceeding for nearly two years, and Defendants Linde assert that substantial

discovery has progressed, with several boxes of files exchanged, and over 12 depositions

taken. (Dkt. 23 at 3). Defendants Linde also report that the state court has heard and decided

at least two substantive motions. (Dkt. 15 at 5). Defendants Linde further reported at oral

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argument that they have substantially completed discovery and are nearly ready to go to trial.

This factor weighs strongly for abstention as it would be highly inefficient to allow the

federal litigation to proceed.

D. Controlling law 

All of the claims in this case are controlled by Arizona law, with the notable exception

of the § 1983 claim. Though the presence of a federal law issue weighs against abstention,

Tovar, 609 F.2d at 1293, because the majority of the claims are state law issues, and the

disposition of those claims will substantially affect the §1983 claim, the claims, taken

together, weigh for state adjudication. 

E. Adequacy of state proceeding to protect parties' rights

Since the majority of the claims in these cases are under state law, the only possible

question of adequacy is with the § 1983 claim. A district court should not be understood to

be assessing the "competence or procedures" of the state court, but whether the state court

has the legal ability to grant relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26.

Plaintiffs are not precluded from bringing the § 1983 claim in state court, as Arizona courts

may decide § 1983 claims. New Times, Inc. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 374

(1974). Furthermore, both punitive damages and attorney's fees are available under a § 1983

claim brought in an Arizona court. Badia v. City of Casa Grande, 195 Ariz. 349, 356 (Ariz.

App. 1999); Moran v. Pima Co., 145 Ariz. 183, 184. (Ariz. App. 1985). Here, Plaintiffs

assert that the "courthouse doors" would be effectively closed to them because in state court

they cannot recover attorney's fees or punitive damages. (Dkt. 22 at 10). The Court

disagrees. First, none of the claims Plaintiffs bring here are precluded in state court. Second,

this Court would apply the same substantive law as an Arizona court and the remedies would

also be the same. Third, Plaintiffs have already been litigating in Yuma County for over a

year, and have given no indication why that forum is inadequate to protect their rights.

Fourth, since both Plaintiffs and Defendants are from Arizona, there can be no claim of bias

against out-of-state litigants. Finally, the only reason that certain remedies are presently

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unavailable to Plaintiffs in Arizona court is that Plaintiffs did not request them in their

pleadings. This factor weighs for abstention.

F. Substantial similarity of state and federal actions

A dismissal or stay under Colorado River may be appropriate when the state and

federal actions are "substantially similar." Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416. In the present situation,

the only difference between the claims asserted in state court and those asserted in this Court

is the addition of the § 1983 claim. After reviewing the pleadings in these cases, this Court

concludes that the actions are substantially similar. Both claims primarily concern the

treatment of Ms. Aguilar while in custody, and the operative facts affecting the §1983 claim

are not distinct from the state law claims. (Compl. ¶ 30-56, Dkt. 25-2, 2-8) Furthermore, the

same parties are named in each suit, either specifically or as statutory beneficiaries or

defendants, or could later be added. Id. This factor weighs for abstention.

II. Conclusion

Many of the factors considered under Colorado River and its progeny weigh toward

abstention, namely: the inconvenience of litigating in two fora, including travel to Phoenix;

the likelihood of piecemeal litigation; the order of jurisdiction and the progress made in state

court; the fact that the majority of the issues are matters of state law; the fact that the state

court may hear all of the claims and grant all of the remedies requested here; the nearly

identical nature of the case in state court with the instant case; and the likelihood that

Plaintiffs are engaging in forum shopping. The question before this Court is whether the

duplicative efforts, inefficiency, waste of judicial resources, and impediment to the

comprehensive disposition of litigation this case will cause is sufficient to overcome this

Court's weighty obligation to exercise the jurisdiction granted it. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1415.

A district court may exercise jurisdiction over state law claims if they form part of the

same case or controversy as a claim for which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a). Nonetheless, a district court may decline to exercise that supplemental jurisdiction

if the state law claims substantially predominate over the federal question, or if there are

other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. § 1367(c)(2), (4). With respect to the

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federal claim, if a court determines that some action is appropriate under the Colorado River

doctrine, a stay is preferable to a dismissal. “This holding ensures that the federal forum will

remain open if ‘for some unexpected reason the state forum does turn out to be inadequate.’”

Attwood v. Mendocino Coast Dist. Hosp., 886 F.2d 241, 243 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Cone,

460 U.S. at 28). Subject to the foregoing, and considerations of wise judicial administration,

the best course would be to sever and dismiss the pendant state court claims and to stay the

§ 1983 claim.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

In Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Linde's Motion to Dismiss, they request leave to

amend their complaint to add "various state law claims." (Dkt. 22 at 2). Local Rule of Civil

Procedure 15.1 states that "a party who moves for leave to amend a pleading must attach a

copy of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion, which shall indicate in

what respect it differs from the pleading which it amends." Because Plaintiffs did not

comply with LRCiv 15.1, the Court will deny their motion.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15) is GRANTED

IN PART as follows: the Court shall DISMISS counts two, three, and four, and STAY

count one pending the outcome of the state proceeding. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall keep the Court appraised of

the status of the underlying state proceeding

//

//

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt.

22) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2007.

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