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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

RONALD BEACHUM, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

. FILED 

V<uted Sc~ ~,c of Appeals 

Tenth Circuir 

MAY 2 2 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2951 

ROBERT TANSY, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. Civ. No. 86-727 SC) 

Stephen P. Mccue, Assistant Public Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

William McEuen, Assistant Attorney General (Hal Strattqn, Attorney 

General, and Bill Primm, Assistant Attorney General, on the 

brief), Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Respondent-Appellee. 

Before TACHA and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN*, 

District Judge. 

CHRISTENSEN, District Judge. 

*Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2951 Document: 010110560500 Date Filed: 05/22/1990 Page: 1
Petitioner-appellant Ronald Beachum, a state prisoner, appeals from a final order of the federal district court denying his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his 

present imprisonment for state crime convictions violates his 

rights to due process, a fair trial, equal protection, confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel. Finding no error of 

constitutional dimensions in these convictions, we affirm denial 

of the writ. 

I. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Shortly after midnight on July 8, 1980, Kathy McGuire, a student nurse living alone in a rented house in Roswell, New Mexico, 

was suddenly awakened by a man's entry into her bedroom. Apparently he had gained access through an outside window in an adjoining room. He threatened, brutally attacked with a piece of glass, 

manhandled, raped and robbed her. She did not know the intruder 

and could only generally observe his physical characteristics. 

However, she saw that he was black and had a beard and remembered 

that in their struggles she scratched him. She reported the attack immediately. 

Within four days after the attack, the victim gave a detailed 

statement concerning her recollection of the circumstances and 

observed a police lineup of three black men, including Beachum. 

She was unable to identify visually any of them as her attacker 

but when each man spoke words used by the rapist, she picked out 

Beachum as the one. On August 28, 1980, the Roswell Chief of Police conducted a "hypnosis session" with McGuire. During theses-

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sion and afterwards, she selected Beachum from photographic 

arrays. 

Thereafter, a complaint was filed against Beachum in the justice of the peace's court. McGuire identified him as her assailant during the preliminary hearing and testified that she had 

seen him pacing in front of her house the Saturday before the assault. Beachum was held by the magistrate to answer in the District Court of Chavez County, New Mexico. There he was charged by 

criminal information with two counts of first degree criminal sexual penetration in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-ll(A)(2) 

(1978), one count of aggravated burglary in violation of N.M. 

Stat. Ann. § 30-16-4 (1978), and one count of armed robbery in 

violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-2 (1978). 

Before trial in the state district court, Beachum filed a 

motion to suppress McGuire's testimony in its entirety, claiming 

it to be irrevocably tainted by the hypnosis session and related 

identification procedures. The district court declined to suppress all of her testimony but determined that (1) she would not 

be allowed to make in-court identification of the defendant; (2) 

the witness would not be permitted to testify to any evidence developed from the hypnotic session; and (3) the witness would be 

permitted to testify to the events occurring on July 8, 1980, and 

her voice identification of defendant, but would not be permitted 

to testify to her identification of defendant at any subsequent 

time, nor to testify to her identification of defendant based on 

any subsequent events. This decision was affirmed on interlocutory appeal by the state in State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 

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P.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 

(1982). 

Beachum was convicted by verdict of a jury on all counts of 

the information and, having been found an habitual offender, sentenced to consecutive terms totaling seventy years, with an additional two years on parole. The State Court of Appeals affirmed 

the convictions in an unpublished memorandum opinion. The Supreme 

Court denied certiorari. 

Beachum's initial application for a writ of habeas corpus to 

the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico 

was denied for failure to exhaust state remedies but thereafter, 

following unsuccessful petitions for relief to the state district 

court and the New Mexico Supreme Court, Beachum again applied to 

the federal district court. Upon the basis of the petition and 

briefs, the assigned federal magistrate filed proposed findings 

and conclusions and recommended dismissal of the petition with 

prejudice. He noted that the petitioner had provided an adequate 

statement of the procedural history and determined that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. The federal district judge adopted 

the magistrate's recommendation and entered judgment dismissing 

the petition. 

Beachum contends on this appeal that, contrary to the decision of the district court, his constitutional rights had been 

violated during the state trial because of (1) the admission of 

evidence influenced by hypnosis, related limitations upon his 

rights of confrontation and cross-examination; (2) closing arguments of the prosecution; (3) evidence of emotional trauma suf-

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fered by the victim; (4) insufficiency of the evidence to 

establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel; (6) the court's sua sponte exclusion of the sole 

black juror on the trial panel; (7) inclusion in the information 

of charges greater than those for which he was bound over; (8) 

denial of his right to counsel at the lineup and hypnosis sessions; (9) admission of testimony from an unlicensed clinical 

psychologist; and (10) receipt of testimony concerning the type of 

blood found on the victim's pillowcase. 

We vary the order in which we discuss the points enumerated 

in appellant's brief to throw perhaps helpful light on our discussion finally of the sufficiency of the evidence. 

II. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In a collateral attack pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254 on a 

state criminal conviction, the ultimate burden of establishing 

that the state proceeding violated the Constitution of course 

remains on the petitioner. In given circumstances, reliable and 

adequate written indicia of state court findings are to be 

presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Procedural and historical facts developed at the pretrial 

suppression hearing in the state court were reviewed by the court 

of appeals and appear of record. State v. Beachum, supra, at 247-

48. The court of appeals ruled only upon the sufficiency of the 

evidence, a question essentially of law, declining to address the 

admissibility of the victim's testimony because of its view that 

the issue was not properly reserved at the trial. Memorandum 

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Opinion in State v. Beachum, No. 6032 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 

1983), Record on Appeal, Vol. 1, Tab 1, Exh. B. Following the 

trial, there were no other meaningful findings in the state 

courts, all rulings being summary. The federal magistrate did not 

hold an evidentiary hearing nor make significant findings of fact 

as distinguished from mixed findings of fact and law, observing 

that the "statement of the procedural history of this case, together with a detailed statement of relevant facts [in the petition] provide an adequate procedural and factual background to 

Petitioner's claims." Under these circumstances we need not 

decide whether critical factual findings at a pretrial suppression 

hearing are to be accorded presumptive validity under§ 2254(d) in 

a collateral review of subsequent state trial proceedings. Nor is 

the clearly erroneous rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), applicable to 

the magistrate's findings. See Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388, 

1393 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1490 (1990); Bowen 

v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 610 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 

962 (1986); Castleberry v. Alford, 666 F. 2d 1338, 1342 (10th Cir. 

1981). The issues of this appeal will be decided de novo. ---

III. 

DISCUSSION 

Hy:enosis in Relation to Identification 

The appellant contends that because of the State's improper 

and unduly suggestive identification procedures, in particular its 

use of hypnosis, the victim's testimony at trial violated his 

rights to due process, a fair trial, and confrontation. 

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Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), rejected the theory 

initially relied upon by Beachum before the state court that hypnotically enhanced testimony should be excluded at trial~ se on 

the ground that it tends to be unreliable. There the holding was 

predicated on a defendant's constitutional right to testify in her 

own defense. 

In Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987), where 

the state was a proponent of the questioned evidence, this court 

rejected application of the~ se rule and held that dangers inherent in the use of hypnotically refreshed evidence under the 

circumstances of that case did not constitute denial of the constitutional rights to due process ·or confrontation. We observed 

that "[a] reviewing court must determine whether safeguards have 

been employed to insure reliability of the testimony to make it 

admissible," and concluded that the state court's finding of the 

existence of such safeguards, in the absence of negating evidence, 

was entitled to the presumption of correctness under§ 2254(d). 

Here we do not indulge such presumption of correctness for reasons 

already indicated, but we deal de novo with a record strongly supporting the existence of adequate safeguards. 

Different conclusions have been reached in other circuits 

under variant circumstances concerning the reliability or fairness 

of hypnotically refreshed or induced testimony in relation to due 

process. ~' Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 

1987), vacated on other grounds, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987); 

cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988}; McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 

951 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 (1987); United States 

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v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1203-04 (5th Cir. 1984). These and 

other decisions relied upon by one party or the other are 

significantly different factually from the case before us. 

Here the real question is not so much whether hypnotically 

created, induced or refreshed testimony was unfairly utilized at 

the trial but whether, despite apparently reasonable efforts of 

the state trial judge to preclude such possibilities without entirely aborting the prosecution by application of a~ se 

exclusion rule then contended for by the defendant's counsel, the 

victim's testimony was influenced by hypnosis to any substantial 

degree at all. A reading of the trial transcript is convincing 

that there were "adequate safeguards of reliability" and that the 

admitted testimony was not constitutionally infirm. 

The rulings of the trial court on objections to the victim's 

testimony were consistent with reasonable standards it had established in advance as confirmed by the state court of appeals after 

sensitively reviewing the problem. While departures from generally accepted controls for assuring the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony had been found, some important safeguards existed, including a relatively comprehensive statement to 

police officers of the victim's recollections shortly after the 

attack occurred and a tape recording of the session itself, however imperfect and incomplete it may have been because of 

telephone and other interruptions. All identification of the 

defendant connected with the hypnosis was excluded by the trial 

judge and any subsequent identification carefully avoided. While 

there were some minor failures of recollection, uncertainties and 

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contradictions, the victim's testimony at trial remained, after 

searching cross-examination, essentially the same as her prehypnosis statements. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated by 

physical and circumstantial evidence. 

The appellant argues that McGuire's pre-hypnotic descriptions 

of the assailant were "uncertain, inconsistent and at odds with 

her trial testimony," particularly as to his height and build and 

as to where on his body she scratched him, and that at trial she 

was more certain and assured than indicated by her pre-hypnosis 

statements, observing that "it is quite likely, given the nature 

of the hypnosis session in this case and its apparent effects upon 

McGuire's factual testimony, that [she] acquired a more confident 

demeanor as a result of her hypnosis." Petitioner's brief 25-27. 

We read little, if anything, in the record to support this 

argument, given the uncertainties and minor variations normal to 

the recollection of honest witnesses after lapse of time. On the 

contrary, we are impressed by her seeming forthrightness and 

candor under difficult circumstances, her apparent effort to avoid 

any relationship of her testimony to the hypnosis, and her candid 

concession that in some instances she did not recall portions of 

her prior statements. And we agree with the conclusion of the 

federal magistrate that the petitioner failed to establish by 

preponderance of the evidence that any differences between the 

pre-hypnosis statements and her trial testimony were the products 

of hypnosis. 

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There remains to be addressed, however, appellant's related 

contention that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was 

impaired by the trial court's limitation of cross-examination. 

Beachum contends that he was "effectively precluded by the 

trial court from impeaching McGuire's self-assured demeanor with 

evidence of her hypnosis and its likely effects." He argues that 

"[a]s recognized by the Magistrate the trial judge made it clear 

that if petitioner attempted to introduce that evidence, he would 

allow the admission of McGuire's visual identification testimony." 

"Thus," the argument continues, "the judge improperly curtailed 

petitioner's cross-examination by conditioning its full exercise 

upon the admission of evidence, which, as he himself had ruled, 

was offensive to due process." 

The magistrate found "a fairer characterization of the trial 

court's ruling to be that if Petitioner attempted to impeach 

McGuire's trial testimony through admissiorr of her post-hypnosis 

statements, the state would be entitled to use otherwise inadmissible post-hypnosis statements for rehabilitation or rebuttal, or 

to place in context any post-hypnosis statements introduced by 

petitioner." He added: "This ruling was in no way violative of 

Petitioner's rights." Magistrate's proposed findings and recommended disposition~ 19-20. It is true that after reference to 

additional extracts from the transcript, the magistrate enigmatically indicated that the trial judge had expressly ruled out 

any reference whatever to the fact of McGuire's hypnosis itself. 

We do not agree, and interpret the comments as only a reiteration 

of what had been said before -- if the subject were gone into on 

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cross-examination it would open the way for broadened inquiry on 

redirect. The situation is rendered clear by the colloquy between 

court and counsel at the beginning of the trial: 

MR. KNANISHU: •.. Your Honor -- and we would ask 

the court to take judicial notice of the testimony of 

Dr. Diamond in the pretrial matter when he talked about 

other evidence as becoming possibly enhanced by the 

hypnosis process. What other evidence we have after 

hypnosis that is going to be coming in that we don't 

think should be coming in, I guess we are basically asking is exactly what does the Appellate Court opinion say 

in terms of what is left in this Court's discretion as 

to post-hypnotic evidence. And secondly, what type of 

ruling do we have on the merits in this case in terms of 

what will open the door for the district attorney. It 

would be our opinion that nothing can open the door with 

regard to the identification, her making an in-court 

I.D. or bringing up the out-of-court I.D., but your 

Honor, we have a subsequent to the hypnosis, we have 

testimony of a preliminary hearing, we have testimony at 

a parole revocation hearing, which we will not refer to 

as a parole revocation hearing, but as an earlier 

proceeding. We have testimony that differs 

substantially from her initial statements, which we are 

going to tender into evidence here, pursuant to this 

motion, defendant's exhibits 1, and state that this is 

the only recorded statement made by Kathy McGuire .. 

What we are basically asking is what can we impeach 

with, what is--what is the witness here limited to 

testifying to. We have some further unsettled questions 

here, that are --

THE COURT: Not unsettled in my mind, my order was 

affirmed. I can't make it any clearer as to what she 

can testify and what she can't. Now if you want to open 

up post-hypnotic statements of this, well you open them 

up. You are going to open up a whole bunch of things 

when you do that. I have shut her off at the request of 

the defense, I have closed her mouth, on July 8, 1980 

(the date the prosecutrix gave her statement to a police 

officer shortly prior to the hypnosis session), and she 

will not be permitted on the part of the state totestify to anything beyond that date, connected with this 

case. Now if you want to open up beyond that, she's 

open. 

Trial Transcript at 189-191. 

We find in the trial record no request from defense counsel 

to cross-examine concerning the fact of hypnosis in and of itself 

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or any attempt to do so. Despite the magistrate's gratuitous 

assumption, he concluded that the "evidence of the fact of 

McGuire's hypnosis and its possible effects was of marginal 

relevance, while at the same time likely to result in considerable 

confusion of the issues," and that there was no related 

constitutional error. While we would not necessarily disagree 

with such conclusion were it germane, we are convinced that as to 

no aspect of the case revealed by the record does it appear that 

constitutional limits were transgressed by the court's rulings 

concerning cross-examination. 

Closing Arguments 

Appellant contends the prosecutor's comments in closing a;gument were so egregious as to deprive him of a fair trial within 

the teachings of In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). He complains 

of assertions by the prosecutor that Beachum "admitted" that on 

the night of the crime he had been one and a half blocks from the 

residence of the victim. Objections were made by counsel for the 

defendant that this was a misstatement of the record because of 

the distinction between "staying at" and "being at", and Beachum's 

claim to an alibi on the particular night in question. The trial 

court did not expressly rule on the objection but told the jurors 

to rely on their own memories. 

An investigating officer had testified on the subject: 

Q. All right. Now do you recall, sir, what he 

(Beachum) said in connection with his whereabouts on the 

night of July 7, 1980? (The night of the assault.) 

A. If --let me start from the beginning. 

Q. Yes, sir. 

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A. He at first denied we had asked him of his previous whereabouts and I believe he had denied ever being 

in the Roswell area. Thereafter he did change his story 

and admitted to being in the Roswell area on these 

nights. 

Q. On the night of July 7? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And into the morning of July 8? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. When he ultimately admitted that he was in Roswell on that particular date, did he tell you where he 

was in the Roswell area? 

Yes, sir. 

Q. Where did he say he was? 

A. He was staying at the residence of 2121⁄2 West 

Bland here in Roswell. 

Trial Transcript at 520-521. 

Despite the vagueness of the phrase "staying at," the context 

of the testimony demonstrates that the comment of the prosecutor 

was not without some arguable basis. In any event, we find no 

constitutional infirmity in it, nor in the court's response to 

defense counsel's objection. 

It is also asserted that the prosecutor misstated the 

evidence concerning how much light shown in the McGuire's bedroom 

window at the time of the assault and her related statement about 

scratching her assailant. Again, there was some colorable basis 

for the prosecution's argument, and any related error would not be 

of constitutional significance. Appellant also argues that the 

prosecutor's statement "now again here we go, who is the script 

writer?" implied that the defense bore the burden of proof. We 

agree with the magistrate that read in context the prosecutor's 

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remarks could not be reasonably interpreted as appellant suggests. 

The prosecutor apparently had sensed that on cross-examination it 

was inferred that the victim had been programmed to answer, and he 

had juxtaposed her answers with physical facts in evidence, 

continuing: 

But she knew she had scratched him and described 

the general areas of where she scratched this person 

that attacked her, and on the 11th of July, this defendant was photographed and he had scratch marks on the 

neck, on the shoulder, on the back of the shoulder, just 

as it is in the photographs and the exhibits we have 

shown you. Now again here we go, who is the script 

writer? 

Trial Transcript at 700-701. 

The appellant's rights were not thereby impaired. 

Evidence of Emotional Trauma 

The appellant says testimony that he stared at the victim 

during the preliminary hearing and that she suffered severe 

emotional trauma as a result of the testimony in that hearing, 

violated his right to due process. 

Under New Mexico law, an essential element of the felony of 

criminal sexual penetration in the first degree is its perpetration "by the use of force or coercion which results in 

mental anguish to the victim." That this element was deemed 

great 

important at the trial is indicated by defendant's motion at the 

close of the state's case in chief for a directed verdict for, 

among other reasons, the insufficiency of the evidence on the 

"question of great mental anguish." Trial Transcript at 542. 

Dr. Allen Young, Clinical Psychologist for the State of New 

Mexico's Rehabilitation Center, had testified that the victim was 

debilitated and emotionally traumatized by the rapes and described 

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the victim's mental anguish from the time she first came to himo 

His direct testimony was quite extensive as was cross-examination; 

the only portions touching upon McGuire's reactions at the 

preliminary hearing were brief: 

Q. Tell this jury, please, what the specific problem that you are dealing with? 

A. Severe emotional trauma, severe depression, she 

was totally and completely wiped out, it was just a very 

definite serious trauma in her life, totally different 

than any experience that she could have gone through in 

her life. 

Q. And over the series of sessions that you had 

with her, were you able to make any progress in the 

treatment of this severe problem? 

A. I felt very good, each session, even the first 

session, I felt there was a lot of purging and a lot of 

releasing, and the second and the next session, I felt 

good about them, and then she went through a second 

trauma, completely and totally wiped out again, and that 

was the court hearing upstairs, and --

MR. KNANISHU: I'm going to object to that, your 

Honor, we can't make determinations about great mental 

anguish, based upon court proceedings, and at so'me point 

this all becomes very circular .... It seems to me, 

your Honor, that the trauma resulting from court testimony can't be considered here. 

THE COURT: Well, I think you are probably correct. 

I'm not sure how we handle it at this point. 

MR. KNANISHU: Move to strike. 

THE COURT: He has distinguished between the two 

all right. 

MR. KNANISHU: I move 

THE COURT: Noted and proceed. 

Q. What did you do in this progress of the treatment beyond that point? 

A. Well, the reason I made the statement is because within just a few days I was called by Dr. O'Malley's office to go to the hospital and visit with her at 

the hospital, and in talking with her, and I was person-

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ally it was very grueling testimony that I was involved 

in in that session and I felt it for days 

and 

Q. Excuse me, are you acquainted with the term 

preliminary hearing? 

A. Yes, sir, I am. 

Q. Is that what you were referring to a preliminary hearing in this case? 

A. Right. I assume it was the preliminary hearing. It was the defendant and the plaintiff and the 

attorneys and the judge. 

Q. Okay. 

A. And when she came to me, you know, in this hospital situation, or I went to her, actually, I went to 

the hospital and visited her, she had just relived the 

entire experience. I watched the defendant during the 

time that I was in there giving my testimony. 

MR. KNANISHU: Your Honor -

A: -- and he was staring at her. 

MR. KNANISHU: Your Honor I will object. 

THE COURT: Sustained, and the jury will disregard. 

Counsel you better come up. 

(Short discussion at the bench, between the court 

and counsel.) 

Trial Transcript at 473-74. 

During his argument to the jury, defense counsel himself, 

commenting on the testimony of Dr. Young, said, "and he mentions 

something about somebody -- about the defendant staring at her in 

another hearing, and that was stricken and you are not supposed to 

consider that," adding "that is exactly the role of the witness, 

that people look, they have to." 

With this further amelioration beyond the court's striking 

the reference to staring and the general relevancy of the testi-

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mony of McGuire's continuing state of mind, we agree with the magistrate that, however inappropriate Dr. Young's re~ark may have 

been, it did not deprive petitioner of a fair trial. In a habeas 

corpus action the significant inquiry is not whether the state 

court has applied properly the rules of evidence but whether an 

error of constitutional magnitude has been committed. Hopkinson 

v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1197 (10th Cir.), aff'd on 

rehearing, 888 F.2d 1286 (1989) (en bane). See also Nichols v. 

Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 

3169 (1989). 

Effectiveness of Counsel 

The appellant argues here, as he did before the federal 

magistrate, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

before the trial by his then lawyer's failure to file timely 

motions to dismiss, to suppress the victim's voice identification 

and for an independent psychiatric ex~mination. The magistrate 

found that no such issue was presented in the petition and should 

not be considered; he nonetheless noted that the petitioner's 

conclusory allegations of prejudice were inadequate for meeting 

his burden of proving some deprivation of constitutional rights. 

We agree, but add a few words only against the possibility that 

the claim of prejudice could be implied from other allegations of 

the petition. 

To establish a deprivation of the right to effective 

assistance of counsel, the defendant would have to show that 

counsel's performance fell below objective standards of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that there 

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was a reasonable probability but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 and 694 

(1984). No presumption of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 

representation should be indulged without cogent reason. See 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986). "We approach this 

review with considerable restraint." United States v. Rivera, 

F.2d ; Nos. 85-1768 and 85-1771, slip op. at 19 (10th 

Cir. Apr. 4, 1990) (rehearing en bane). To find that the 

defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed 

by the Sixth Amendment, we would have to find that his counsel 

undermined the.functioning of the adversary system to the extent 

that the trial cannot be relied upon as producing a just result. 

Id. slip op. at 18. 

The record suggests no substantial possibility that the court 

would have granted a defense motion to suppress the voice 

identification whether filed after or before the preliminary 

hearing. Due process does not require the rote performance of 

futile exercises. It is sheer speculation, too, that were the 

prosecutrix examined by an independent expert on the mental 

anguish issue, the result of the trial would have been different. 

The record as a whole indicates that the claimed errors would not 

have affected the outcome of the trial. 

Denial of Right to Counsel at Lineup and Hypnosis Session 

Petitioner contends that he had a constitutional right to be 

represented by counsel at the lineup and hypnosis sessions. While 

there is such right at post-indictment lineups, United States v. 

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Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-37 (1967), it has now been authoritatively 

established that any such right does not attach until there is a 

criminal prosecution and its "critical stage" has been reached. 

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Nees v. Bishop, 730 

F.2d 606, 611 (10th Cir. 1984). The same limitation would 

obviously apply to a pre-charge hypnosis session at which the 

defendant was not present. 

At the time of the lineup, the defendant apparently was in 

police custody on an independent charge, he had not been charged 

with the crimes involved in this appeal, and he was then only a 

suspect whose possible involvement was under continuing 

investigation. Brewer and Nees are controlling against this 

claim. 

Exclusion of Juror 

The defendant contends that his right to a representative 

jury and to equal protection were violated by the court's sua 

sponte exclusion from the jury of the only black member. The 

trial court at the commencement of the trial excused a black 

alternate juror because of tardiness in her previous attendance on 

the court and its effect upon the trial, commenting "she's gotten 

too old for me . she didn't feel she had to be here before 

that time, she had gone to work a little bit . she doesn't 

seem to be too much in tune with the program." Appellant does not 

charge directly that the judge was racially motivated but relies 

upon a "presumption of racial discrimination" which he reads from 

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We believe Batson to be 

inapposite and conclude that, far from any racial bias, the court 

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exercised its legitimate prerogative of judicial management. As 

pointed out in Batson, "[A] defendant has no right to a 'petit 

jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his known race.'" 

The Constitution does not demand a representative jury, but only 

an impartial one. Holland v~ Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 803, 807 (1990). 

When it is the court that has dismissed a venire member of a given 

race, an equal protection claim is defeated by a neutral 

explanation for that dismissal. United States v. Martinez-Nava, 

838 F.2d 411, 413 (10th Cir. 1988). There is a satisfactory one 

here. 

Other Contentions 

The defendant's contentions that he was deprived of a fair 

trial by the admission of testimony from an unlicensed clinical 

psychologist and by the inconclusive character of testimony of 

blood typing, and his complaint of variance between charges at the 

preliminary hearing and in the information are without merit and 

warrant limited discussion. 

The defendant's blood was type "O." Blood found on the 

victim's pillowcase was classified by an expert as type "O" by 

using only one of two possible tests, but the witness explained 

this to the jury and testified he was "fairly confident" of the 

result. The admission of this cumulative circumstantial evidence 

for evaluation by the jury was within the court's discretion. 

Dr. Allen Young was called by the prosecution on the mental 

trauma issues as an expert in psychology. He was a clinical 

psychologist for the State of New Mexico, had both a master's 

degree and doctor's degree in counseling and guidance and had 

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testified in a number of civil cases, including child custody and 

disability cases, but he was neither licensed nor certified as a 

psychologist and had not testified before in a criminal caseo A 

trial court's assessment of the qualifications of an expert 

witness will be disturbed only for a clear abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1986). We find 

none here. 

Defendant's contention that his due process right was 

violated when he was bound over for trial on lesser charges than 

those contained in the subsequent information is without merit. 

It is undisputed that at the preliminary hearing the prosecutor 

announced that the charges were two counts of criminal sexual 

penetration in the first degree, one count of robbery, and one 

count of aggravated burglary. The defendant was bound over on 

those charges. The fact that he may have been bound over on 

"robhery" and the information charged him with "armed robbery" had 

no unconstitutional implications. Armed robbery is not a distinct 

offense from robbery. "'Armed robbery' is a way to commit 

'robbery' and if done in that way, the penalty is greater but the 

basic offense remains robbery." State v. Roque, 91 N.M. 7, 569 

P.2d 417, 419 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 4, 569 P.2d 414 

(1977). Both courts had jurisdiction of the charges before them. 

Evidence received at the preliminary hearing established that the 

assailant used a pi~ce of glass as a weapon to accomplish his 

crimes. The defendant had fair notice of the charges. 

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Sufficiency of the Evidence 

It is the further contention of the appellant that there was 

insufficient evidence at the trial to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he was the perpetrator of the crimes charged. 

A conviction can constitutionally stand only if, after 

viewing all of the evidence presented at the trial in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier-of-fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime charged 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). To be sufficient, the evidence supporting the conviction 

must be substantial; that is, it must do more than raise a mere 

suspicion of guilt. United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 

1455 (10th Cir. 1987). 

We do not say that the proof in this case was so overwhelming 

as to render some other impairment of constitutional rights, had 

it occurred, harmless beyond reasonable doubt within the doctrine 

of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). But we do hold, 

there being no error of constitutional dimensions to taint the 

verdict, that the evidence of guilt was so substantial that any 

rational juror could have found all of the essential elements of 

the crimes charged beyond all reasonable doubt. 

The evidence was undisputed that Kathy McGuire was brutally 

raped by a black man and the other charged offenses were committed 

at the time and place alleged in the indictment. The evidence 

that sexual penetration was accomplished with force and coercion 

resulting in great mental anguish to the victim was overpowering, 

if not conclusive, as was the proof of the other crimes charged. 

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The identity of their perpetrator is the critical issue in 

evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy 

constitutional criteria. 

The victim's voice identification of the defendant within 

three days of the rapes; the victim's description of the rapist 

and its general correspondence with that of the defendant; the 

scratch marks found upon the body of the defendant corresponding 

generally to those the victim testified she had inflicted upon the 

rapist; the fact that the defendant, after first denying that he 

had been in the vicinity on the night in question, admitted that 

at that time he had been staying within two and a half blocks; the 

blood found on the victim's pillow following the crime likely 

being the same type "O" as the defendant's (the victim's blood 

being type "A"); the fact that tennis shoe prints were found on 

the ground outside the victim's window following the attack and 

that Beachum was wearing tennis shoes that night; credibility 

problems with respect to the testimony of witnesses called to 

substantiate the contention that the scratches found on Beachum's 

body were administered by his girl friend rather than by the 

victim and concerning a claimed alibi (the defendant did not 

testify on his own behalf), correlated persuasively with 

established surrounding facts and circumstances to provide 

adequate support for the identification. 

IV 

CONCLUSION 

The trial court committed no error of constitutional 

dimensions. Testimony of the prosecutrix was properly treated and 

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received at the trial, despite her previous hypnosis. The 

prosecuting attorney's arguments did not deprive the defendant of 

a fair trial. The effectiveness of defendant's counsel was not 

constitutionally deficient, nor was there any deprivation of the 

right to counsel. Evidence and rulings concerning emotional 

trauma and reactions of the victim did not involve error or 

prejudice of constitutional magnitude, the evidence as a whole was 

adequate to support the verdict, and defendant's claims of 

constitutional errors in other areas of the case also are without 

merit. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying the 

Writ is AFFIRMED. 

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