Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02997/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02997-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NANCY GORDON

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, THE SHERIFF OF

ALAMEDA COUNTY, CHARLES C.

PLUMMER, DEPUTY SHERIFF C. SCOTT

Badge No. 1239, MONTE HANRAHAN, THE

PERALTA COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DISTRICT, MERRITT COLLEGE, and DOES 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

. _______________________________________

No. CV-06-02997-SBA 

ORDER

[Docket No. 61] 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Nancy Gordon’s Objection to Defendants’ Bill of Costs

[Docket No. 61]. Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties in the papers

submitted to the Court, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Nancy Gordon was arrested at Merritt College on March 31, 2005 for trespass and

resisting and delaying the lawful duties of an officer. She brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

that she was subjected to false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force, and emotional distress. On

numerous occasions throughout the pretrial process Gordon utterly failed to abide by the rules pertaining

to discovery and flagrantly disregarded court orders, despite numerous warnings of sanctions.

Accordingly, on June 15, 2007 the Court granted the Defendants’ Motion for the Sanction of Dismissal

under Rule 37(b)(2)(c). Docket No. 55. The Court also awarded Defendants costs, including attorney’s

Case 4:06-cv-02997-SBA Document 68 Filed 10/04/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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fees, that were incurred in preparation for the two scheduled depositions that Plaintiff failed to attend

without notice or excuse, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d). Id. Plaintiff now objects to the

Defendant’s Bill of Costs. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides for sanctions available for failure to make

disclosures or cooperate in discovery. “Rule 37(b)’s sanctions for failure to comply with discovery

orders, including holding parties and counsel personally liable for expenses, ‘including attorney’s fees,’

must be applied diligently both to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a

sanction, and to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.”

Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 753 (1980). A party’s failure to attend its own deposition

need not be willful, but only unjustified, for a court to award reasonable expenses (including attorney

fees). Lew v. Kona Hosp. 754 F2d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985). 

ANALYSIS

I. The Nature of the Monetary Sanctions Awarded by the Court

Plaintiff argues that the Court did not award attorney fees, but only costs. Docket No. 61 at 2:11-

21. Under Rule 37(d), in the event of a party’s failure to attend its own deposition, the party must pay

reasonable expenses caused by the failure. As noted in the Court’s June 15, 2007 order, Gordon’s

behavior amounted to willfulness and bad faith, and was certainly unjustified, which is all that is

required for a court to impose reasonable fees, including attorney fees, under Rule 37(d). Although

Gordon quotes a portion of the order that refers only to “costs,”it is clear from reading the order as a

whole that the Court awarded Defendant the attorney fees incurred in preparation for the two depositions

that Gordon failed to attend without notice or excuse. For example, the order refers to Rule 37(d). The

order says, “When a party fails to attend its own deposition, ‘the court must require the party failing to

act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,

caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award

of expenses unjust’” (emphasis added). Docket No. 55 at 4:2-5. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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II. Lack of Motion for Attorney Fees

Plaintiff argues that a motion for attorney fees is required for a court to award attorney fees and

that no such motion was filed. Docket No. 61 at 2:23-25. However, Plaintiff offers no legal authority

to support this claim. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) reads, “. . .the court shall require the party failing to

act or the attorney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,

caused by the failure unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust” (emphasis added). Furthermore, federal courts have

an inherent power to impose sanctions, including an award of attorney's fees, against attorneys and

parties for “bad faith” conduct or “willful disobedience” of a court order. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). Accordingly, the Court has the ability to issue monetary sanctions regardless

of whether the Defendant filed a motion requesting such sanctions. 

III. Reasonableness of Amount

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ Bill of Costs, which lists attorney fees of $5,628.00. The

Defendants’ attachment does not itemize the attorney fees. An hourly rate is not provided nor is a total

calculation of the attorney hours expended. 

The Ninth Circuit has adopted the “lodestar” approach for determining reasonable attorney’s

fees. See Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). Under this method, a court must calculate reasonable attorney

fees by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly

rate. See Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1258. While the lodestar is strongly presumed to be reasonable, it may

be adjusted on the basis of other considerations that have not already been subsumed in the initial

lodestar calculation. Id. Here the Defendants have provided only a lump sum of the attorney fees,

which makes it impossible for the Court to determine the reasonableness of the fees using the lodestar

method. Accordingly, the Defendants must provide an itemized account so that the Court can determine

the reasonableness of the amount. 

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United States District Court

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In Miller the Court required pro se plaintiff to pay prevailing defendant nearly $50,000 in

attorney fees, almost ten times the amount in question here.

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IV. Plaintiff’s Ability to Pay

Plaintiff, who is pro se, argues that the Court should take her financial hardship into account

when determining whether it is appropriate to award attorney fees. She notes that the Court allowed her

to proceed in forma pauperis. See Docket No. 7. 

In some cases a court may take into account a party’s ability to pay when determining the

appropriateness of awarding attorney fees. For example, in cases involving the award of attorney fees

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 or Title VII, which often involve awarding sizable attorney fees to the

prevailing defendant, a district court should consider the financial resources of the plaintiff in awarding

fees to a prevailing defendant. Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir.

1987).1

 In those cases, courts have held that while an award of attorney’s fees for a frivolous lawsuit

may be necessary for deterrent purposes the award should not subject the plaintiff to financial ruin. See

id. Here, Plaintiff has not provided any specific argument that imposing attorney fees of $5,628.00

would be unduly burdensome, but has merely pointed out her in forma pauperis status. Furthermore,

this Court has already determined that Plaintiff acted willfully and in bad faith. “Pro se petitioners have

a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources because they are not

subject to the financial considerations-filing fees and attorney’s fees-that deter other litigants from filing

frivolous petitions.” In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180. Plaintiff’s failure to attend the two depositions

is but one of many instances where she has acted willfully and in bad faith. Here, an award of attorney

fees is necessary to perform the deterrent effect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Objection to the Defendants’ Bill of Costs regarding the

lack of itemization of attorney’s fees [Docket No. 61] is SUSTAINED. The remaining objections are

OVERRULED. Within 14 days of the date of this Order, Defendants shall file with the Court a detailed

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itemized account of the number and rate of attorney hours relating to the two depositions that Plaintiff

failed to attend without notice or excuse. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: 10/3/07 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NANCY GORDON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA et al,

Defendant.

 /

Case Number: CV06-02997 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 4, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Nancy Gordon

416 Perkins Street

Suite 1A

Oakland, CA 94610

Dated: October 4, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:06-cv-02997-SBA Document 68 Filed 10/04/07 Page 6 of 6