Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01404/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01404-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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{ 

'i 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RONNIE ROSS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

RUSSELL NEFF, in his Official ) 

Capacity as Sheriff of Adair _County,) 

Oklahoma: BILLY JACK MCLEMORE, ) 

individually and in his Official ) 

Capacity: and COUNTY OF ADAIR, ) 

OKLAHOMA, a political subdivision ) 

of the State of Oklahoma, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

. PILSD 

Uruted Sr,,-. Cou,t of Ap,nls 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 4 7090 

.ROBERT l. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1404· 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 87-185-C) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Joseph c. Self of Sexton Law Firm, Fort Smith, Arkansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Mark Green of Green and Green, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellee. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1404 Document: 01019851180 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Ronnie Ross brought two separate Fourth Amendment 

based claims against the defendants Deputy Billy Jack McLemore, 

Sher iff----Rus-sell,·Nef.f -and -Adair Ceunty-, -Oklahoma,· -pursuant to 42 

u.s.c. § 1983. 1 In one, Ross alleges that defendants violated 

Ross' rights when McLemore illegally arrested him on Indian Tribal 

Trust land, because Oklahoma peace officers have no jurisdiction 

in Indian country. Second, Ross asserts an independent 

constitutional claim based on McLemore's alleged use of excessive 

force in making the arrest. He argues that the county was party 

to both violations: the first because it was its custom or policy 

to allow officers to make arrests in Indian country; and the 

second because of its failure to train and supervise McLemore and 

its custom and policy allowing its deputies access to and use of 

firearms. 

The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the county. 

After an initial trial ending in a mistrial, Deputy McLemore 

1 Although the pleadings and· briefs are far from clear, we think 

plaintiff's complaint and later pleadings may be fairly read to 

state two separate causes of action. Ross premises his claims, at 

least in part, on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Because the Supreme Court has recently made clear that 

excessive force claims that are based on objections to an arrest 

should be analyzed under the specific provisions of the Fourth 

Amendment, rather than more general "subs·tantive due process" 

provisions, see Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870-71 (1989), 

we will analyze Ross' claims under the Fourth Amendment as made 

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The suits against McLemore and Adair County Sheriff Russell 

Neff in their official capacities we consider to be simply suits 

against the county. See Varela v. Jones, 746 F.2d 1413, 1418 

(10th Cir. 1984) ("1°W]e treat suits against city officials in 

their official capacities as suits against the city."). 

Accordingly, we make no further mention in this opinion of Sheriff 

Neff except as a witness, and the discussion of McLemore, except 

when he is acting as representative of the county, relates to the 

suit against him in his individual capacity only. 

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eventually prevailed on a jury verdict. 2 The central issue on ~ 

appeal is whether the district court erred as a matter of law in 

· ho~din-g,,- that· McLemore · was acting-within· his jurisdict·ion when he 

arrested Ross. This holding, of course, entirely removed Ross' 

§ 1983 claim based on the allegedly extra-jurisdictional arrest 

from the jury's consideration. We conclude that the court did 

err. We hold, however, that McLemore was entitled to qualified 

immunity on this claim, and that the court's error did not taint 

the jury v~rdict on the excessive force claim. Furthermore, the 

directed verdict in favor of the county on the excessive force 

claim was proper. Accordingly, we remand only the extrajurisdictional arrest claim against the county for trial. 3 

I 

Background Facts 

Plaintiff Ross, a Cherokee Indian, spent most of the day of 

July 4, 1986, with friends and relatives at the W.W. Keller 

Ballpark (a/k/a Greasy Ballpark) in Adair County, Oklahoma. The 

Greasy Ballpark is located on Cherokee Indian Tribal Trust land. 

The land was then under a five-year lease, approved by the local 

office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to the South Greasy 

Community Park Association. The record does not reflect whether 

2 Our review of this case is hampered by gaps in the record, 

including a failure of the parties to designate transcripts from 

the second trial. Because the only issue on appeal arising out of 

the excessive force claim deals with the trial court's refusal to 

instruct the jury that McLemore was outside his jurisdiction when 

he made the arrest, we are able to resolve the case without 

reference to the second trial transcript. 

3 The parties waived oral argument;· therefore, the case was 

submitted on the briefs. 

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the Association is a tribal organization, although its president, 

Mose Killer, is a Cherokee Tribe member. 

-.. Sometime in the. early evening of July 4, --1986, Killer called 

the Adair County Sheriff's Department to request that the police 

"make an appearance" at the park. III R. 56. He testified that 

he was concerned that some people were driving too quickly down 

the driveway to exit the ballpark grounds; he was also concerned 

about traffic on the driveway being blocked by persons loitering 

and _drinking beer at the ballpark after the end of the day's 

activities. 

Deputy McLemore reported to the ballpark, where he·attempted 

to arrest Ross for public intoxic~tion. The evidence is disputed 

whether Ross resisted arrest. We need not resolve the factual 

conflict, however, to decide the legal question at issue. 4 In any 

event, an altercation occurred during which McLemore shot Ross in 

the leg, which later required amputation. 

II 

Jurisdiction to Arrest 

The deputy's jurisdiction to arrest is an issue of law which 

we review de novo. See,~' In re Tri-State Equipment, Inc., 

792 F.2d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1986). 

4 The record before us does not reflect whether Ross was charged 

with or convicted of public intoxication or resisting arrest, or 

whether he was even formally arrested. The Supreme Court has 

recently held, however, that the intentional use of deadly force 

to stop a suspect constitutes a seizure for the purpose of Fourth 

Amendment analysis. See Brower v. Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1381 

(1989). Therefore, we will analyze this case as though Ross had 

been formally arrested. 

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Land held in trust for Indian use, like the Greasy Ballpark, 

is "Indian country" as that term. is_defined in_l8 u.s.c. § 1151. 

· · - United States v. John, "4'3'7- U·. S. 634, 648-49 · ·{-1"978-); · · CheyenneArapahoe Tribes v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir. 1980). 

Indian country is subject to exclusive federal or tribal criminal 

jurisdiction "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law." 

18 u.s.c. § 1152. Congress has granted general criminal 

jurisdiction to some states over Indian country within their 

borders, see,~, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1162 (various states), 3243 

(Kansas), but no such provision has been made for Oklahoma. 

Congress has also provided, now in 25 U.S.C. § 1321, "a statutory 

method by which a state, with the consent of the tribe, can assume 

jurisdiction over Indian country." United States v. Burnett, 777 

F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1985). Oklahoma, however, has not acted 

to assume jurisdiction by this method. See Citizens Band 

Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 888 F.2d 1303, 

1307 (10th Cir. 1989); Burnett, 777 F.2d at 597; State v. Klindt, 

782 P.2d 401, 403 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). If there has been no 

express delegation of jurisdiction to the state,~ fortiori, there 

has been no grant of local jurisdiction. Because the state of 

Oklahoma has neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant 

to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction 

. 1 over this Indian country, Adair County, its sheriff, and its 

subordinate police officers had no jurisdiction to arrest Ross at 

the Greasy Ballpark. See United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144, 

1146 (10th Cir. 1990) (county district court exceeded its 

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authority in issuing search warrant for property within Indian 

country) e 

Defendants argue that,· despite the plain language of 18 

u.s.c. § 1152, a state may assert criminal jurisdiction over 

Indians in Indian country whenever such action would not undermine 

tribal or federal interests. On numerous occasions the Supreme 

Court has stated that "even on reservations, state laws may be 

applied unless such application would interfere with reservation 

self-government or would impair a right granted or reserved by 

federal law." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 

(1973) (citing cases). Such statements, however, have uniformly 

been made in civil cases, in connection with a determination that 

paramount federal law does not expressly exclude state 

jurisdiction. See,~, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 

(1959) ("Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the 

question has always been whether the state action infringed on the 

right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled 

by them.") (emphasis added). Congress has provided, however, for 

exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians in 

Indian country, through the broad reach of 18 u.s.c. §§ 13 

(allowing federal enforcement, on federal enclaves, of state and 

local laws, such as the public intoxication ordinance involved 

. here)., 1152, .and .1153. There is no question but that 18 U.S. C. 

§ 13 would allow federal enforcement of the local ordinance 

against public intoxication involved in this case. See In re 

Denetclaw, 83 Ariz. 299, 320 P.2d 697, 700-01 (1958). The 

"borrowing" provision of this act, however, does not grant states 

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independent authority to enforce their own laws over Indians on 

Indian land. See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 379-80 

(..R .... ,.,stri-ckland ed. 1982 )··· ( he·reinafter Cohen);· United States v. New 

Mexico, 590 F.2d 323, 329 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 

832 (1979). The Supreme Court has expressly stated that state 

criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is limited to crimes 

committed "by non-Indians against non-Indians •.. and victimless 

crimes by non-Indians." Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 

(1984). 

Defendants also urge this court to recognize state criminal 

jurisdiction over the Greasy Ballpark, lest the park become "a 

land in which there is no law." Brief of Appellees at 4 (quoting 

statement of trial judge, IV R. at 247). We cannot tell from the 

record whether either the federal government or the Cherokee tribe 

have officers who police this Indian country. But even if both 

the federal government and the Cherokee tribe have abdicated 

responsibility for law enforcement at the Greasy Ballpark, this 

void does not empower Oklahoma or Adair County to assume general 

criminal jurisdiction simply because it is the nearest police 

authority. Avenues to extended jurisdictipn must come from the 

legislature, not from the courts and not from the fiat of county 

governments • 

. .In In re Denetclaw, ... a .. s.omewhat similar case, . the Arizona 

Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the state could 

enforce traffic ordinances against Indians on highways within the 

boundaries of the reservation. The Denetclaw court held that, 

pursuant to 18 u.s.c. S 13, "federal jurisdiction over offenses, 

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Appellate Case: 88-1404 Document: 01019851180 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 7 
either felonies or misdemeanors, committed by an Indian in Indian 

country is exclusive and not concurcent with state jurisdiction." 

320 ·P. 2d at 700. -,-The court, t,herefore, discharged the Indian 

defendant because the state lacked jurisdiction to make the 

traffic stop. The court recognized the "jurisdictional gap" that 

was being left but stated, 

"[w]e are bound to follow the law as we find it 

irrespective of the apparent 'void' this will leave in 

safeguarding the rights of the traveling public. At 

present the State Highway Patrol and Sheriff's deputies 

are, insofar as we know, the only agencies patrolling 

county and state highways that cross Indian lands ••. 

It is further well known that the federal officers 

neither police nor attempt to prosecute traffic 

violations by Indians on our highways under the 

Assimilative Crimes Act, although unquestionably the 

federal courts would have jurisdiction over such 

offenses •••. We might ask what procedure is left to 

remove drunk and reckless Indian drivers from state 

highways lying on the reservation and punish them for 

traffic violations? The answer appears to be the tribal 

policeman and the tribal courts. . • • We are 

uninformed as to whether any Navajo tribal ordinances 

are in effect that cover such offenses." 

Id. at 701. Accord C.M.G. v. State, 594 P.2d 798, 804 (Okla. 

Crim. App. 1979). 

Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that 

state authorities have criminal jurisdiction over the ballpark. 

III 

We must now consider the consequences of the district court's 

error with respect to each of Ross' § 1983 claims and each of the 

defendants herein. 

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A 

Illegal Arrest--Qual.ified Immunity5 

, We have-=implied that an arrest· made outside of the arresting 

officer's jurisdiction violates the Fourth Amendment to the 

Constitution and is therefore actionable pursuant to 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983 under the appropriate circumstances. Smith v. City of 

Oklahoma City, 696 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1983). We now so hold 

expressly. 6 A warrantless arrest executed outside of the 

arresting officer's jurisdiction is analogous to a warrantless 

arrest without probable cause. See Karr v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1029, 

1031 (10th Cir. 1985) (warrantless arrest without probable cause 

is constitutionally invalid); Hinshaw v. Deffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 

1266 (5th Cir. 1986) (same). Absent exigent circumstances, such 

an arrest is presumptively unreasonable. Michigan v. Summers, 452 

U.S. 692, 700 (1981).7 

5 The issue of good faith immunity was not briefed on appeal, and 

therefore arguably was not preserved for our consideration. We 

consider the issue, however, because the district court made 

specific legal holdings with regard to qualified immunity and 

cl;larged the jury with resp·ect to McLemore' s qualified immunity 

defense, and we may affirm the court below on any grounds 

supported by the record. Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United 

States, 724 F.2d 871, 880 (10th Cir. 1984). 

6 We do not in this opinion intend to cast doubt upon the 

constitutional validity of extra-jurisdictional arrests made by 

police officers in "hot pursuit." 

7 Our_decision_is not undermined by the.fact that McLemore was 

technically an invitee of Mose Killer at the time he made the 

arrest. McLemore was clearly acting in his capacity as a deputy 

sheriff when he made the arrest. There is no evidence that Mose 

Killer had the authority to extend the jurisdiction of Adair 

County into Indian trust land by cross-deputizing county officers. 

See Blatchford v. Sullivan, F.2d , No. 87-1547, slip op. 

at 14 n.5 (10th Cir. May 3o;-1990);tfii'Ited States v. Reid, 517 

F.2d 953, 963 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that local sheriffs may be 

cross-deputized by the Indian tribes). 

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Police officers, however, sued in their individual capacity, 

are entitled to qualified immunity when they could not reasonably 

. have known ·--that- their .. challenged-·- actions violated the law. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) ("[W]hether an 

official protected· by qualified immunity may be held personally 

liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns 

on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action ••• 

assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly 

established' at the time it was taken." (citations deleted)). 

At the time Ross was arrested, the law regarding the 

jurisdiction of local police officers on Indian Tribal Trust land 

in Oklahoma was not clearly established. Broad language in 

Supreme Court opinions, some of which we have quoted above, gave 

the appearance of allowing state intervention when it was 

determined that such intervention would not compromise tribal or 

federal interests. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 148; 

Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1962); 

Williams, 358 U.S. at 220. See also Cohen at 277-78 ("[S]tate 

laws otherwise preempted because of interference with tribal selfgovernment may apply" in Indian countiy not near settled Indian 

communities). Although we have discussed above why these cases 

are not applicable to the issue of state criminal jurisdiction, 

the .question. was .confused. enc.ugh at the. time of. trial that the 

district cou~t, after its own research on the matter, thought that 

the county sheriff's office could enforce state law at the Greasy 

Ballpark: "I conclude frankly that the officer had a right to be 

there, and ••• it is undisputed that they believed completely 

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Appellate Case: 88-1404 Document: 01019851180 Date Filed: 06/04/1990 Page: 10 
that they had that right, and the law is so unsettled that the 

qualified privilege should be_applied." IV R. 252-53. "I don't 

, - think ·that"· ·t:-hese·· lands a·re· outlaw ·lands and ·that you've got to 

call the FBI before anybody can do anything on them. 

think that's the status of these lands." Id. at 261. 

I don't 

Taking these factors into consideration, we hold as a matter 

of law that a reasonable county officer, executing the law at the 

time Ross was arrested, would not have known that he was 

prohibited from making an arrest in the Greasy Ballpark. 

Therefore, McLemore is entitled to qualified immunity and cannot 

be held liable for his extra-jurisdictional arrest of Ross, per 

se. The issue of his liability for use of excessive force, of 

course, is a separate matter. 

Regardless of the state of the law at the time the arrest 

took place, however, the qualified immunity defense is not 

available to the county. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 

622, 638 (1980); Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 

1285, 1287 n.2 (10th Cir. 1989). The county can be held liable, 

of course, only for constitutional deprivations resulting from 

county "custom or policy." Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 

817 (1985). The sheriff testified that he had no policy with 

respect to the Indian country, because he was not aware of any 

.Indian_ trust land in the county. .. III. R. 66. Nevertheless, he --

clearly believed the arrests were legal; his testimony would 

permit the jury to find a custom or policy to allow county 

officers to make arrests at the Greasy Ballpark. Therefore, the 

directed verdict in the county's favor was error, and this claim 

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must be remanded for trial. 

B 

Excessive Force 

Ross' action against defendants for use of excessive force in 

effecting the arrest is separate and distinct from the issue of 

the legality of the arrest per se. The issue of McLemore's use of 

excessive force was submitted to the jury, which found in his 

favor. Ross argues that the jury should have been instructed that 

McLemore was acting outside of his jurisdiction at the time he 

effected the arrest. Under the circumstances of this case, we 

fail to see how McLemore's lack of jurisdiction would affect the 

issue of the appropriate use of force in executing the arrest. 

The use of force in effecting an arrest is to be evaluated 

under the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Graham v. 

Connor, 109 s. Ct. 1865 (1989). The objective standard laid out 

by the Supreme Court requires that a court weigh all circumstances 

known to the officer, or which he reasonably should have known at 

the time of the arrest, in evaluating his use of force. Id. at 

1872. Because we have held that a reasonable officer would not 

have known that he lacked jurisdiction for arrests at the Greasy 

Ballpark, and because no evidence was introduced that McLemore in 

fact knew that he lacked jurisdiction, the lack of jurisdiction 

, ..,, was .not a circumstance for the jury. to -consider in.,..,._.. evaluating 

Ross' excessive force claim. 

The district court's directed verdict in favor of the county 

necessarily included the excessive force claim. The county can be 

held liable only for deprivations of constitutional rights 

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resulting from "custom or policy." Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 

U.S. at 817. Ross made no showing of a policy or custom of 

"'· improper-.·· tr.a-ining; -superv,is,ion or- use .of arms. Therefore, the 

directed verdict in favor of Adair County on this claim was 

proper. 

C 

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED 

in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for retrial of the§ 1983 

extra-jurisdictional arrest claim against Adair County. On 

remand, the county may not be held liable for the consequences of 

the alleged excessive force. 

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