Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05595/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05595-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOKUKO H. SYLVESTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-05595-RS 

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE

In her first amended complaint (“FAC”), plaintiff Tokuko Sylvester, a California resident 

of Japanese origin with limited English proficiency (“LEP”), explains that she “experienced a lifechanging trauma in the California courts.” The alleged circumstances surrounding that trauma are 

summarized in the May 14, 2015 order (the “May Order”) dismissing Sylvester’s original

complaint with leave to amend and will not be repeated here. Defendants move to dismiss the 

FAC. Like the original complaint, the FAC is a clear and articulate statement of Sylvester’s 

grievances. Like the original complaint, it does not state any viable claim upon which relief may 

be granted. 

The FAC’s first two claims are based on allegations that, as a pro se plaintiff pursuing 

medical malpractice litigation in state court, Sylvester was at a crippling disadvantage. Sylvester 

advanced very similar claims in her initial complaint. As Sylvester knows from the May Order, a 

pro se plaintiff generally has no right to legal representation in civil litigation. Lassiter v. Dep’t of 

Social Services of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (“an indigent litigant has a 

right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty”)

(emphasis added). As Sylvester also knows, unrepresented litigants are “entitled to the same, but 

no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” Burnete v. La Casa Dana 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Apartments, 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267 (2007).1 Because Sylvester’s first two claims are 

predicated on the fundamental misapprehension that there exists an inalienable right to civil 

counsel, they must be dismissed. 

The remainder of the FAC is devoted to allegations that Sylvester was mistreated by the 

California court system, the State Bar, and the Medical Board because of her LEP status, in 

violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq. Like the initial 

complaint, the FAC lacks any averments sufficient to give rise to a plausible inference that 

Sylvester was purposefully singled-out for mistreatment because of her national origin. Sylvester 

does assert that the California courts systematically discriminate against LEP litigants by failing to 

provide translation assistance. As explained in the May Order, however, there is simply “no 

private right of action for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI.” Colwell v. Dept. of 

Health and Human Serv., 558 F.3d 1112, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009).2 

Because Sylvester has failed to state any viable claim upon which relief may be granted, 

the FAC must be dismissed in its entirety. Under the circumstances of this case, further 

amendment would be futile. See Reddy v. Litton Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 

1990). The factual underpinnings of Sylvester’s grievances have always been clear. Her legal 

theories, however, are irreparably defective. Confirming the conclusion that further amendment 

would be futile, Sylvester suggests that she has no interest in continuing to battle over the 

sufficiency of her pleadings.

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 This action is therefore dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is 

 

1

Sylvester also asserts that the state court “insulted and humiliated” her because of her pro se

status. As determined in the May 14 order, her allegations in that regard are “evidence of, at most, 

an absence of tact on the part of the superior court judge.” Sylvester has not offered any new 

averments to change that conclusion. 

2

In support of her disparate impact theory, Sylvester relies on Lau v. Nichols, a 1974 Supreme 

Court decision holding that Title VI required San Francisco schools to address the language needs 

of LEP students of Chinese origin even in the absence of intentional discrimination. 414 U.S. 563, 

568-69 (1974). The Supreme Court, however, has “since rejected Lau’s interpretation of [Title 

VI] as reaching beyond intentional discrimination.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 

(2001). Simply put, Lau is no longer good law. 

3

Sylvester indicates in the FAC that unless she is provided with appointed counsel, “she would 

like to withdraw this lawsuit at this time.” For the reasons discussed in the May Order—and 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

instructed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2015

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

 

restated in the June 9, 2015 order denying Sylvester’s motion for reconsideration—this case does 

not present the exceptional circumstances necessary to justify the appointment of counsel.

Sylvester’s amended pleadings do not change this conclusion. 

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