Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01392/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01392-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 In determining the filing date of his petitions, Petitioner is

entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule,” which is the date the petitions

were presented to prison authorities for mailing to the court. See Houston v.

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (holding that petitioner’s notice of appeal is

deemed “filed at the time [he] deliver[s] it to the prison authorities for

forwarding to the court clerk”); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir.

2001) (recognizing the application of Houston’s mailbox rule to federal habeas

filings); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003)

(recognizing same with regard to state habeas petitions). Here, the verification

and declaration accompanying Petitioner’s federal habeas petition bear the

-1- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LATONNE A. SINGLETON,

Petitioner,

v.

L.E. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 06cv1392-IEG (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[DOC. NO. 13]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California.

On July 3, 20061, Petitioner Latonne A. Singleton, a state

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handwritten date of July 3, 2006. Lodgment 1. Accordingly, this Court will

construe Petitioner’s federal habeas petition as having been filed on July 3,

2006. Id.

2 The procedural record lodged by Respondent, which includes the Court

of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s direct appeal, contains minimal information

on the dates and charges in this case. Accordingly, the Court cites to the

Petition for purposes of providing background information. 

-2- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

prisoner appearing pro se, filed the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus currently before the Court. Doc. No. 1. In his Petition,

Petitioner alleges four grounds for relief, all of which relate to

the jury’s failure to make a great bodily injury finding in relation

to his conviction for torture. Id.

This Court has considered the Petition (“Pet.”), Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss and accompanying memorandum (“Resp’t Mem.”),

Petitioner’s “Response to Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus” (“Pet’r Resp.”), and all supporting documents

submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this

Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 13] be DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

In a first amended information filed on or about December 9,

1999, Petitioner was charged with eighteen criminal counts

pertaining to two victims, which included charges of cohabitant

abuse, forcible rape, sodomy, assault with a deadly weapon, making

an unlawful threat, possession of a firearm by a felon, and torture.

Pet. at 17-19.2 A jury convicted Petitioner of seven counts of

cohabitant abuse in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal

Code”) § 273.5(a) and one count of assault in violation of Penal

Code § 240. Lodgment 1 at 1. It acquitted him of one count of

forcible sodomy (Penal Code § 286(c)(2)), one count of forcible rape

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-3- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

(Penal Code §261(a)(2)), and one count of assault with a deadly

weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury (Penal Code §

245(a)(1)). Id. at 1-2. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on

the remaining charges. Id. at 2. Petitioner admitted serving one

prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code § 667.5(b). Id.

The district attorney elected to retry Petitioner on four of

the unresolved counts. Pet. at 20; Resp’t Mem. at 2; Lodgment 1 at

2. Following a second jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of

torture (Penal Code § 206) while armed with and personally using a

deadly or dangerous weapon (a broom handle) (Penal Code §§

12022(a)(1) and (b)(1) and 12022.5(a)), forcible rape (Penal Code §

261(a)(2)), forcible sodomy (Penal Code § 286(c)(2)), and being a

felon in possession of a firearm (12021(a)(1)). Lodgment 1 at 2.

The trial court denied Petitioner’s subsequent motion for a new

trial and sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of

parole based on the torture count. Id. In addition, the trial

court added a determinate sentence of eight years and eight months

based on the three year middle term for inflicting injury on a

cohabitant, a three year enhancement for firearm use, a one year

term for a second conviction of inflicting corporal injury on a

cohabitant (one-third of the middle term), eight months for being a

felon in possession of a firearm (one-third of the middle term), and

a one year enhancement for the prior prison term. Id. Finally, the

trial court imposed a concurrent term for the assault conviction and

stayed the sentences for the five remaining convictions. Id. 

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3 Again, Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Houston’s mailbox

rule to determine the filing date of his original state habeas petition. See

supra text accompanying note 1.

-4- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

A. Direct Appeal

In response to Petitioner’s direct appeal, the California

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment but reversed the torture

conviction and firearm-use enhancement to that conviction. Id. On

remand, the trial court dismissed the torture count and sentenced

Petitioner to an aggregate term of twenty-three years in prison.

Id.

Petitioner appealed again, this time asking the Court of

Appeal to review the record for error pursuant to People v. Wende,

25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979). Id. at 3-4. Specifically, Petitioner argued

that the trial court erred by increasing the determinate term after

the life-indeterminate term was reversed and the charge underlying

the indeterminate term was dismissed. Id. at 4. Finding that

Petitioner had failed to raise a reasonably arguable appellate

issue, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Id. 

Petitioner filed a petition for discretionary review in the

California Supreme Court, which that court summarily denied without

citation on May 12, 2004. Lodgments 2 and 3. Petitioner did not

file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme

Court. Pet. at 4. 

B. State Habeas Review

On September 7, 20043, Petitioner filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. Lodgment 4.

Petitioner raised six claims, four of which are nearly identical to

the claims asserted in his federal petition. Id. The Supreme Court

summarily denied his petition without citation on July 27, 2005.

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-5- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

Lodgment 5.

C. Federal Habeas Review

On July 3, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 1.

Respondent moved to dismiss on November 13, 2006, arguing that the

Petition is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Resp’t Mem. at 4-5. While Respondent

acknowledges that Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for

the period of time when his state habeas petition was pending before

the California Supreme Court, Respondent points out that this does

not save the petition from being deemed untimely. Id. at 5-6. With

regard to equitable tolling, Respondent maintains that Petitioner’s

lack of diligence bars any tolling of the limitations period on this

basis. Id. at 6-8. For these reasons, Respondent submits that the

instant Petition must be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 9.

Petitioner does not appear to dispute Respondent’s

calculation of the amount of statutory tolling warranted (see Pet’r

Resp. at 3), but argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the limitations period. Pet’r Resp. at 1-7. Petitioner explains

that he could not file his federal habeas petition on time because

he was denied sufficient access to the law library. Id. His

library privileges were affected by the fact that the prison has

been on either full or modified lockdown almost continuously since

May 26, 2004. Id. at 2, Ex. 1-7. Even when he was granted library

privileges, Petitioner contends that his access to legal materials

remained limited because he had no more than two hours at a time and

was required to share a small number of out-of-date, damaged books

with up to twenty other inmates. Id. at 2-6. In support of his

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-6- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

argument, Petition attaches numerous “Program Status Reports,” which

are signed by the Facility Captain and Prison Warden and explain the

basis for, and extent of, the various lockdowns and “modified

programs” at the prison. Id., Exs. 1-7. To the extent the Court

finds these documents insufficient to justify equitable tolling,

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing to further illuminate the

facts relating to his access issues. Id. at 3, 7. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2006).

DISCUSSION

A. The AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), effective April 24, 1996, imposes a one-year statute of

limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state

prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (West Supp. 2006). Section

2244(d)’s one-year limitations period applies to all habeas

petitions filed by persons in “custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court.” Id. The one-year limitations period runs from the

latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

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-7- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Only section 2244(d)(1)(A) applies in this case. While

section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides no definition of “final by the

conclusion of direct review,” the Supreme Court has explained that

“final” means “a case in which a judgment of conviction has been

rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a

petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally

denied.” Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (citing

United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 n.8 (1982)). Moreover,

in the Ninth Circuit, it is well established that “direct review”

includes the ninety-day period within which a habeas petitioner can

file a petition for writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court,

whether or not that petitioner in fact files such a petition. See

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999).

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s petition for review on direct appeal on May 12, 2004.

Lodgment 2. Petitioner’s conviction, therefore, became final on

August 10, 2004, or upon the expiration of the allotted ninety-day

period in which Petitioner could have sought certiorari. See Bowen,

188 F.3d at 1158-59. Thus, the statute of limitations period

commenced on August 11, 2004, and expired one year later on August

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-8- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

11, 2005. Petitioner, however, delayed filing his federal petition

until July 3, 2006, 326 days after the limitations period had

expired. Consequently, absent tolling, the instant petition is

untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

B. Tolling of the AEDPA’s Limitations Period

1. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction

or other collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). In

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Supreme Court further

instructed that the time an application for state post-conviction

review is “pending” includes the interval between the lower state

court’s adverse decision and the petitioner’s filing of a notice of

appeal in the higher state court, provided that the filing of that

notice is timely under state law. See Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-26;

see also Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, __, 126 S.Ct. 846, 852-53

(2006) (reiterating Saffold, and clarifying that absent guidance

from state courts, federal courts must independently examine the

delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have

held with respect to timeliness). The statute of limitations is not

tolled, however, “from the time a final decision is issued on direct

state appeal [to] the time the first state collateral challenge is

filed.” Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. Similarly, the limitations period

is not tolled after state post-conviction proceedings are final and

before federal habeas proceedings are initiated. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2).

As set forth above, the statute of limitations began to run

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-9- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

on August 11, 2004, and expired on August 11, 2005. Petitioner

filed a habeas petition seeking review by the California Supreme

Court on September 7, 2004, twenty-seven days into the AEDPA

limitations period. In the Ninth Circuit, the “AEDPA’s period of

limitation is tolled during the pendency of a state application

challenging the pertinent judgment, even if the particular

application does not include a claim later asserted in the federal

habeas petition.” Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir.

2001); see also Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir.

2005) citing Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-10 (2000) (underlining

that “the relevant question for § 2244(d)(2) tolling purposes is

whether a properly filed application is pending in state court, and

not whether any particular claim was contained in that

application”). In this case, the four claims Petitioner asserts in

his federal Petition appear to be functionally identical to four of

the six claims Petitioner raised in his state habeas petition and

both sets of claims challenge the pertinent judgment. Accordingly,

this Court finds that the pendency of Petitioner’s state habeas

petition triggered the AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, and

tolled the one-year limitations period beginning on September 7,

2004. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This Court also finds that the

limitations period remained tolled until July 27, 2005, the date on

which the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s state habeas

petition.

Even considering this period of statutory tolling, the

Petition still is untimely. As noted previously, twenty-seven days

ran on the statutory clock from the date Petitioner’s conviction

became final (August 10, 2004) to the day Petitioner filed

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4 The Supreme Court has “never squarely addressed the question whether

equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005) (assuming without deciding that

equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA’s limitations period).

-10- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

(presuming the benefit of the mailbox rule) his state habeas

petition (September 7, 2004). The statutory clock began to run

again when the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s habeas

petition on July 27, 2005, and 340 days elapsed before Petitioner

filed his federal habeas petition on July 3, 2006. Combining the 27

and 340 day periods reveals that 367 non-statutorily tolled days

passed after Petitioner’s state judgment became final and before his

federal habeas petition was filed. Thus, the limitations period

expired two days prior to Petitioner’s filing, and absent equitable

tolling, the Petition is untimely. 

2. Equitable Tolling

In the Ninth Circuit, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations is subject to equitable tolling.4 See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997),

overruled on other grounds by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). While equitable tolling

is “unavailable in most cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9th Cir. 1999), it is appropriate where a habeas petitioner

demonstrates two specific elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

“[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under the

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda

v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Petitioners face such a high bar in order to effectuate the “AEDPA’s

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-11- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in

order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear stale

claims.” Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226). As a result, when assessing a

habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable tolling, courts

must conduct a “highly fact-dependent” inquiry. Whalem/Hunt v.

Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002).

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to the

benefit of equitable tolling. Equitable tolling is unavailable

where the failure to timely file a claim is attributed to the

petitioner’s lack of diligence. Resp’t Mem. at 8 (citing Miles, 187

F.3d at 1107). Diligence may be measured by how quickly a

petitioner pursued state as well as federal remedies. Id. (citing

Guillory, 329 F.3d at 1018). Here, Respondent contends that

Petitioner was not diligent in filing either his state or federal

habeas petition. Id. Additionally, Respondent notes that the fact

that Petitioner only missed the federal filing deadline by two days

does not warrant application of equitable tolling. Id. (citing

cases from several circuits). 

Petitioner counters that he is entitled to the benefit of

equitable tolling or, at the very least, an evidentiary hearing to

further develop the evidence supporting his equitable tolling

argument. Pet’r Resp. at 1-7. He offers the following grounds in

support of his argument that equitable tolling is warranted in this

case: (1) the prison has been on perpetual lockdown or a modified

lockdown program since May 2004 (and remained on modified lockdown

as of December 2006), (2) even where the modified lockdown program

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5 Based on several references in Petitioner’s response brief to the

amount of library access afforded to African-American inmates, the Court presumes

that Petitioner is African-American. 

-12- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

allowed for some law library access, he was given only two hours and

had to share the limited number of books with up to twenty other

inmates (which sometimes resulted in a total denial of access), (3)

in reality, the inmates receive significantly less than the full two

hours allotted for library access during lockdown or modified

lockdown because the two hours includes the time used to conduct

mandatory strip searches and cell searches and to apply restraints

(handcuffs, etc.), (4) the books in the library are outdated and

damaged and only two provide the information “needed to prepare a

document” (and again, these two must be shared with a dozen or more

other inmates), (5) even when the prison plan of operation forms

(attached to Petitioner’s response brief) listed law library access

as normal (during modified lockdown), African-American inmates “did

not see much law library [time],”5 (6) after a peace officer was

battered on July 30, 2005, and the prison again modified the

lockdown program, Petitioner was not scheduled for library time for

weeks at a time even though he signed up, (7) Petitioner often would

not receive “prior warning ducat pass (CDC 129) per CCR Title 15 §

3014," which meant that Petitioner “would be given (2) minute to

(8) minute warnings to prepare for access to law library then when

[he] asked officers to escort [him] to law library, [he] was denied

access,” (8) Petitioner has filed appeals (CDC 602 form) pertaining

to these denials of access, (9) he has filed inmate request for

interview forms (GA-22 (9/22)) seeking status reports as to his

requests for exhibit documentation to prove his equitable tolling

claim (and has requested the same from correctional officers), but

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6 Petitioner concedes that he did receive status reports for the month

of May in response to his requests. Pet’r Resp. at 5. However, he cites these

reports as being attached as “Exhibit[s] 13 and 14." Id. In fact, there are

only seven exhibits attached to Petitioner’s response brief. See Doc. No. 17.

Additionally, Petitioner asserts that he has “appealed this institution’s

procedure concerning law library only to be retaliated against.” Pet’r Resp. at

5. Again, Petitioner cites to missing exhibits in support of this argument

(Exhibits 15 and 16). See Doc. No. 17. The fate of these missing exhibits is

unknown. For purposes of deciding this motion to dismiss and because Petitioner

is proceeding pro se, the Court accepts Petitioner’s representation that he filed

appeals (using CDC 602 forms) and inmate requests for interviews related to his

library access issues. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“we also here reaffirm the clear principle that, even though pro se status alone

is not enough to warrant equitable tolling, it informs and colors the lens

through which we view the filings, and whether these filings made sufficient

allegations of diligence”). 

-13- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

has been denied6, and (10) his facility (yard A) shares a law library

with another yard, thereby increasing the number of prisoners

utilizing the same books. Id. at 2-6. Petitioner further notes

that he would have filed his state habeas petition sooner, but was

prevented from doing so because twelve days after the California

Supreme Court denied his petition for direct review (May 12, 2004),

the prison was put on lockdown. Id. at 2. In light of the

foregoing, Petitioner submits that equitable tolling is warranted

because he has pursued his case diligently whenever he has had

access to legal research materials. Id. at 4-5. 

Under Pace, the Court must first consider whether or not

Petitioner diligently pursued his rights. See Pace, 544 U.S. at

418. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, “our precedents do not

provide us much guidance regarding what diligence might mean in the

AEDPA context.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006).

Under the facts presented by Roy v. Lampert, the Ninth Circuit found

that the prisoners presented sufficient evidence of their diligence

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7 The Court notes the likely difficulties Petitioner encountered

trying to craft coherent legal arguments when only permitted sporadic, short,

communal visits to a law library, which only had a limited number of out-of-date

books.

-14- 06cv1392-IEG (BLM) 

“[b]ecause both Roy and Kephart filed their habeas petitions pro se,

allege[d] specific efforts they pursued in order to file habeas

petitions, and because both filed their claims within a reasonable

period of time after they were transferred back to the Oregon

facility and the extraordinary circumstances were removed.” Id.

Similarly, Petitioner is proceeding pro se and alleges that

he filed appeals and requests for interviews in an effort to remedy

his lack of library access. Even though he was required to work

under continuous modified lockdown conditions, Petitioner only

missed the statutory deadline by two days. This suggests that he

worked diligently to complete his Petition, despite significant

obstacles.7 This suggestion is buttressed by the facts that

Petitioner repeatedly challenged his restricted law library access

and that he apparently only had shared access to limited and out-ofdate legal books. Pet’r Resp. at 3; see Roy, 465 F.3d at 971

(distinguishing case where inmate made no showing that he was even

aware of contents of law library in finding inmate Kephart was

diligent because “Kephart stated with specificity that the Arizona

library ‘consisted of only three outdated legal books, which

contained no information about AEDPA’”). Accordingly, given the

specific facts of this case, the Court finds that Petitioner has

diligently pursued his rights. 

The next issue is whether “extraordinary circumstances”

prevented Petitioner from filing his Petition in a timely manner.

See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner argues that the requisite

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extraordinary circumstances exist because his access to legal

authority was denied or severely limited due to the fact that the

prison was in a lockdown or modified-lockdown state for almost the

entire limitations period. Neither the United States Supreme Court

nor the Ninth Circuit have ruled directly on whether prison

lockdowns constitute “extraordinary circumstances.” However a few

relevant decisions have been issued by district courts within this

circuit. In Hood v. Galaza, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (S.D. Cal. 1999),

the court found that the petitioner’s generalized, nonspecific

allegations “that he experienced delays in photocopying materials

and utilizing the prison law library services” did not constitute

“extraordinary circumstances.” Hood v. Galaza, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1144,

1148 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (Huff, J.). Likewise, in a case frequently

cited on this issue, U.S. v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp. 1108 (C.D. Cal.

1997), the Central District of California rejected the prisoner’s

argument that the statute should be equitably tolled because the

security lockdowns only prevented the defendant from accessing the

law library for two weeks. U.S. v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp. 1108,

1111 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The district judge explained that two weeks

“could hardly be characterized as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’”

because the defendant “still had fifty other weeks to prepare a §

2255 motion [habeas petition challenging federal conviction] in his

prison’s library facilities.” Id. 

In contrast, in the instant case, Petitioner provided the

Court with substantial evidence, in the form of prison “Program

Status Reports,” documenting the exact duration of each lockdown or

modified program. See Pet’r Resp., Exs. 1-7. These reports also

detail the limitations on the number and race of prisoners allowed

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into the law library as well as the duration and frequency of said

visits. Id. Furthermore, these reports demonstrate that Calipatria

state prison was under continuous modified lockdown conditions from

June 9, 2005 until at least October 13, 2006 - thereby nearly

covering the entire one-year statutory limitations period. Id.

Accordingly, this Court finds that in Petitioner’s case, the

duration and characteristics of the lockdowns at Calipatria prison

constitute “extraordinary circumstances.”

Finally, the Court must determine whether the alleged

“extraordinary circumstances” (i.e. the prison lockdowns) “were the

but-for and proximate cause of [Petitioner’s] untimeliness.” Allen

v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting standard used

by Second and Tenth Circuits). Reviewing the statutory limitations

period chronologically, the Court finds that no equitable tolling is

warranted for the initial twenty-seven day period between when

Petitioner’s conviction became final (August 10, 2004) and when he

filed his state habeas petition (September 7, 2004) because no

lockdown, modified program, or other interference with library

access is alleged for that time period. On the other hand, from

July 27, 2005, when the California Supreme Court denied his habeas

petition and the statutory clock resumed running, until

approximately July 1, 2006, Petitioner’s access to the law library

was severely restricted. See generally Pet’r Resp., Exs. 3-4.

While the Court does not find that the lockdowns and associated

restrictions were so onerous that the entire period should be

tolled, the Court does find that the restrictive nature of the

lockdowns, the multi-month duration of the lockdowns, and

Petitioner’s diligence in challenging his chronic inability to gain

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8 Respondent argues that the fact that Petitioner only missed the

statutory filing deadline by two days does not, in and of itself, justify

equitable tolling. Resp’t Mem. at 8. Respondent cites only to cases from other

circuits in support of this contention. Id. However, even presuming the Ninth

Circuit adopts this view, it is immaterial to the Court’s resolution of this

issue because the Court finds that the restrictions on library access caused by

the modified lockdown program, coupled with Petitioner’s diligence, justify the

limited equitable tolling (i.e. the Court’s determination is not premised solely

on the fact that this case presented a near-miss scenario). 

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meaningful library access warrants equitable tolling for at least 3

days of this period.8 As such, the Court finds that the library

access restrictions “were the but-for and proximate cause of

[Petitioner’s] untimeliness” for at least three days, see Allen,

255 F.3d at 800, and therefore, holds that the AEDPA limitations is

tolled for at least three days.

For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that

Petitioner diligently pursued his rights but that the perpetual

modified lockdown programs at the prison presented extraordinary

circumstances which prevented Petitioner from filing his federal

Petition in a timely manner. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the AEPDA limitations period is

equitably tolled for three days during the period Calipatria State

Prison was under a prolonged period of modified lockdown and

Petitioner was granted minimal access to the law library (July 27,

2005 to July 1, 2006). With this additional period of equitable

tolling, Petitioner’s federal petition is timely. 

This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

3. Evidentiary Hearing

To the extent the Court finds his evidence of the modified

program conditions insufficient to support equitable tolling,

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Petitioner requests that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing to

allow him to further illuminate the facts supporting his equitable

tolling argument. Pet’r Resp. at 3, 7. An evidentiary hearing may

be appropriate where a significant conflict exists between the

affidavits submitted on the issue. See Roy, 465 F.3d at 975

(remanding for evidentiary hearing where many conflicts existed on

many issues among the affidavits); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919,

921, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (where record “patently inadequate,” court

remanded for further factual development because petitioner “made a

good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable

tolling”); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 1988)

(holding that “[i]n a habeas case, when there are only conflicting

affidavits regarding the facts underlying the issue of cause, the

district court must hold an evidentiary hearing”). Here, Respondent

did not file any evidence disputing or contradicting Petitioner’s

evidence and this Court finds that the Program Status Reports filed

by Petitioner present sufficient evidence to justify limited

equitable tolling during the modified lockdown period. Accordingly,

this Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary in this

case. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation; (2) denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; and (3)

ordering Respondent to file an answer to the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 2, 2007 any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

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to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 23, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 9, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

 

COPY TO:

HONORABLE IRMA E. GONZALEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL AND PARTIES

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