Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08224/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08224-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kee Nelson Steah, Sr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-8224-PCT-JAT (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which Petitioner challenges his criminal

convictions in Apache County Superior Court, State of Arizona, Case No. CR-2005-004.

(Doc. 6) Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and

Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Docs. 19, 32) As explained below, the undersigned Magistrate

Judge recommends the Amended Petition be denied. 

I. Background

A. Factual Summary

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

On December 20, 2004, suspecting his wife, Laverne Steah, was having

an affair, Steah left his jobsite in Craig, Colorado and drove home to St. Johns,

Arizona. At home, Steah discovered Laverne together with another man, B.C.

A fight ensued between Steah and B.C.

Shortly thereafter, St. Johns Police Officer Aaron Smith responded to

a dispatch concerning a knife fight at Steah’s home. Officer Smith testified

that upon arriving at the scene, he observed Steah kicking and hitting B.C.,

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 The Honorable Donna J. Grimsley presided over Petitioner’s trial and sentencing.

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who was trying to get up from the ground in the front yard. Officer Smith

stated that Steah was covered in blood from “head to toe” and that B.C. had

multiple wounds, including a wound “from the base of his ear . . . [that] was

bleeding very profusely.” Officer Smith recalled Steah stating, “I cut him and

I stabbed him . . . . I, [sic] had the only knife . . . . I’m not hurt, none of this

blood is mine. It’s all his.”

B.C. was transported to a hospital and later died while in the emergency

room. Maricopa County medical examiner, Dr. Vladimir Shvarts, opined that

the cause of death was “multiple wounds.” According to Dr. Shvarts, B.C. had

sustained ten wounds to the head and neck area, including a stab wound by the

ear that damaged a major artery, eleven wounds and multiple superficial cuts

on other parts of his body, and blunt force injuries. 

(Doc. 7 at 33-34)

B. Indictment, Trial and Sentencing

On January 5, 2005, the State of Arizona filed an Information, charging Petitioner

with one count of First Degree Murder, a Class One felony (Count One); one count of

Criminal Damage - Domestic Violence, a Class Five felony (Count Two); and one count of

Disorderly Conduct - Domestic Violence, a Class One misdemeanor (Count Three). (Doc.

19, Exh. B) Following a jury trial1

 in July 2005, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the lesserincluded offense of Second Degree Murder on Count One, and guilty on Counts Two and

Three as charged. (Doc. 19, Exh. V) On November 18, 2005, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to twenty years in prison for the murder conviction, and concurrent terms of oneand-a-half years for the criminal damage conviction and six months for the disorderly

conduct conviction. (Doc. 19, Exh. Y at 260) Because Petitioner was given credit for 333

days of time served, the trial court found he already completed his sentence for the disorderly

conduct conviction. (Doc. 19, Exh. Y at 260, 262) 

C. Direct Review

Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal on November 18, 2005. (Doc. 19, Exh. AA)

Through counsel, Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on August 4, 2006, in which he raised

two issues. (Doc. 19, Exh. CC) First, Petitioner claimed the trial court erred when it failed

to exclude photographs that were gruesome and cumulative. Second, Petitioner claimed the

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trial court erred in failing to grant Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial based on testimony from

a police witness that Petitioner had previously been in a knife fight. After briefing was

completed, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on February 22,

2007 in which it affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 19, Exh. EE) A

subsequent Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court was summarily denied on

August 17, 2007. (Doc. 19, Exh. FF)

D. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

 On September 13, 2007, Petitioner, through counsel, initiated state post-conviction

proceedings by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 19, Exh. GG) Petitioner then

filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on February 23, 2009. (Doc. 19, Exh. HH) In the

petition, Petitioner raised five claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and three

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After briefing was completed, the trial

court denied the petition, finding “that Defendant has not raised a colorable claim for relief,

and therefore is not entitled to a hearing.” (Doc. 19, Exh. JJ) Petitioner then filed a Petition

for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was summarily denied on April 26,

2011. (Doc. 19, Exh. KK, LL) Petitioner’s subsequent pro se Petition for Review in the

Arizona Supreme Court was summarily denied on November 9, 2011. (Doc. 19, Exh. MM,

NN)

E. Federal Habeas Petition

On November 8, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

District Court. (Doc. 1) After the assigned District Judge dismissed the Petition with leave

to amend, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 8,

2013, along with supporting attachments and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

(Doc. 6, 7 and 11) Petitioner raises eight grounds for relief in the Amended Petition, all

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. 6 at 6-16) In ground one, Petitioner alleges his trial counsel failed to

elicit testimony that, when Petitioner was questioned by police after the incident, he told

police he picked up off a table in the house the knife he used to defend himself, which was

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essential to his claim of self-defense. In ground two, Petitioner alleges his trial counsel failed

to protect his right to a unanimous jury verdict on his claim of self-defense. In ground three,

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel failed to seek a jury instruction on the shifting burden of

proof for an affirmative defense. In ground four, Petitioner alleges his trial counsel, without

Petitioner’s consent, entered a stipulation that was false and allowed the prosecution to

introduce highly prejudicial expert testimony regarding abusive relationships. In ground five,

Petitioner alleges his trial counsel failed to present testimony from available witnesses to

refute the stipulation and show Petitioner was not abusive or controlling. In ground six,

Petitioner alleges his direct appeal counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s decision

denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress statements he made after he was taken into custody

but before he was read Miranda warnings. In ground seven, Petitioner alleges his direct

appeal counsel failed to raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for impeaching Petitioner

with an alleged statement that had not previously been disclosed by the prosecution. Lastly,

in ground eight, Petitioner alleges his direct appeal counsel failed to challenge the trial

court’s denial of trial counsel’s request for a mistrial when a prosecution witness testified to

a prior bad act that the trial court had excluded. For relief, Petitioner requests that the Court

set an evidentiary hearing on his claims and grant the Amended Petition. (Doc. 6 at 15) On

June 14, 2013, Respondents filed their Answer and supporting exhibits. (Doc. 19) Petitioner

then filed his Reply on November 18, 2013. (Doc. 32)

II. Discussion

The eight grounds for relief Petitioner raises here in his Amended Petition are the

same ineffective assistance of counsel claims Petitioner raised in his State petition for postconviction relief. Respondents argue in the Answer that the Amended Petition should be

denied and dismissed with prejudice because the trial court’s resolution of the claims on postconviction review was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

United States Supreme Court precedent.

A. Standard of Review

A federal district court’s review of a habeas petitioner’s claim is constrained by the

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2

 The AEDPA, which was signed into law on April 24, 1996, governs federal habeas

petitions filed after the date of its enactment. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327

(1997).

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standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended in 1996 by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).2

 The ADEPA “modified a federal habeas

court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas

‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible

under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). The standard in § 2254(d) is intended

to be “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

The statute “stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims

already rejected in state court proceedings,” and “preserves authority to issue the writ in

cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s

decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.” Id. (citations omitted). “Section

2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunction in the

state criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”

Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)).

“[W]ith respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings,” a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief unless the State court’s decision

“was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the United States Supreme Court,” or the decision “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before the State court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); Green v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011). As discussed

above, this is a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S.

19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation omitted). The petitioner bears the

burden of proving the standards for habeas relief have been met. Id. at 25. When applying

the standards set forth in § 2254(d), a federal court should review the “last reasoned

decision” by the state court. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

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To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an

“unreasonable application” of federal law, federal courts look exclusively to the holdings of

the Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Cullen v.

Pinholster, __ U.S.__, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged

that it cannot reverse a state-court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth

Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th

Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Even if the State court

neither explains its ruling nor cites United States Supreme Court authority, the reviewing

federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court precedent to determine whether the

State court reasonably applied federal law. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784 (citing Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003)). Compliance with the habeas statute “does not even require awareness

of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8; Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784. “Where a state

court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still

must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state to deny relief.” Richter,

131 S.Ct. at 784. 

Under § 2254(d), a State court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal

law if it applies a rule of law “that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court]

cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of

[the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]

precedent.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 15-16 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000). A state-court’s decision involves an “unreasonable

application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably

applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005);

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-408. This standard requires more than merely an incorrect

application of federal law. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665-66 (2004) (stating

that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court’s decision is objectively

unreasonable.”). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal

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habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state

court’s decision.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664).

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in

case-by-case determination.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The undersigned

Magistrate Judge will consider Petitioner’s grounds for relief in view of the foregoing

standards.

B. Analysis

As noted above, the trial court denied Petitioner’s State petition for post-conviction

relief after finding “that Defendant has not raised a colorable claim for relief, and therefore

is not entitled to a hearing.” (Doc. 19, Exh. JJ) The trial court provided no explanation for

its decision and did not separately address each claim of ineffective assistance. The Arizona

Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court each summarily denied review without

comment. (Doc. 19, Exh. LL, NN) The trial court’s ruling is, therefore, the “last reasoned

decision” to which the habeas standard is applied. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Even though the trial court’s brief decision is

unaccompanied by an explanation or analysis, Petitioner must still satisfy the habeas standard

and show there was no reasonable basis for the State to deny relief. See Richter, 131 S.Ct.

at 784.

1. Legal Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a convicted

defendant must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id.

at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that

counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A

fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the

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distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d

1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions

that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

In addition to showing counsel’s deficient performance, a petitioner must establish

that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694;

Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th

Cir. 1998). The prejudice component “focuses on the question whether counsel’s deficient

performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.”

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). It is not enough to merely show “that the

errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693.

A habeas court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong without deciding whether

counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 697; Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155

n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland). The court, however, may not assume prejudice solely

from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155.

 In the context of a habeas petition, a petitioner must do more than demonstrate to the

federal court that the state court applied Strickland incorrectly. Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99.

Rather, a petitioner must show the state court “applied Strickland to the facts of his case in

an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. Because the standards created by Strickland and

§ 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” review under both standards in tandem is even more

deferential. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). “[T]he question is not whether

counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument

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3

 Petitioner mistakenly argues in the Reply that “[w]hat the defendant was not

permitted to say — and what trial counsel was not permitted to ask of the defendant or of the

police chief — was whether the defendant had told the police that he picked the knife up

from the table during the fight.” (Doc. 32 at 5) Neither of those contentions is true. As

discussed above, Petitioner’s counsel was permitted to ask the police chief if Petitioner made

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that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

2. Ground One

Petitioner alleges in ground one that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

when he failed to elicit a statement Petitioner made while being questioned by the police

chief that during the fight with the victim, Petitioner picked up from a table the knife he used

to defend himself and stab the victim. Petitioner contends this statement was necessary to

prove self-defense given the prosecution’s theory that when Petitioner came into the house,

he intended to kill the victim and had the knife with him from the beginning.

As Respondents argue, however, Petitioner’s counsel was able to elicit the statement

at issue from the police chief. During cross-examination of the police chief, who questioned

Petitioner shortly after the stabbing incident, Petitioner’s counsel asked the police chief if

Petitioner, in addition to saying that the victim jumped at him, told the police chief he picked

up the knife off the table in the living room. (Doc. 19, Exh. R at 1182) The police chief

answered, “Yes. That’s what Mr. Steah told me.” (Id.) The prosecutor had tried to keep

Petitioner’s counsel from eliciting that statement because, pursuant to a motion in limine, it

had previously been prohibited by the trial court as self-serving hearsay. (Doc. 19, Exh. R

at 1173-1178) The trial court subsequently ruled, however, that Petitioner’s counsel could

elicit the statement from the police chief, which he did. (Id.) As a result, Petitioner was able

to use the statement he made to the police chief shortly after the incident to bolster his claim

of self-defense.

Petitioner’s claim in ground one is, therefore, not supported by the facts in the record.

Petitioner’s counsel elicited from the police chief the very statement Petitioner claims his

counsel failed to present. Likewise, in the Reply, Petitioner continues to operate under the

misunderstanding that the statement was never elicited by his trial counsel.3

 Petitioner has

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28 that statement. Additionally, Petitioner testified on direct examination that he told the police

chief during questioning that he picked the knife up off the table. (Doc. 19, Exh. S at 1311)

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failed to present any facts in ground one that demonstrate deficient performance. Thus, he

has not shown that the trial court’s decision denying this claim on post-conviction review

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that the decision was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the trial court. For

these reasons, this Magistrate Judge will recommend that ground one be denied.

3. Ground Two

Petitioner alleges in ground two that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

when he failed to protect Petitioner’s right to a unanimous jury verdict on his claim of selfdefense. He claims counsel failed to request a jury instruction requiring a unanimous verdict

on the affirmative defense and failed to inquire after the verdict whether the jury

unanimously rejected the defense.

After instructing the jury on first-degree murder and the lesser-included offenses of

second-degree murder and manslaughter, the trial court judge instructed the jury on selfdefense. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1411-1413) The judge first instructed that “[t]he defendant must

prove the defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the

evidence means that the defense of self-defense is more probably true than not.” (Doc. 19,

Exh. T at 1411) The judge further explained, however, that the “[b]urden of proof with

regard to the elements of the charged offense is with the State. The burden of proof is beyond

a reasonable doubt as defined in these instructions.” (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1411-1412) At

several points in the instructions, the judge explained that the State must prove guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1403, 1404, 1406, 1410 and 1412) The judge also

instructed the jury that “your verdicts do need to be unanimous. That means that all twelve

of you must agree upon a verdict.” (Doc. 19, Exh. U at 1487)

Petitioner cites several cases in his Reply to argue that a specific unanimity instruction

for his affirmative defense was required and that the failure to request one was ineffective

assistance. (Doc. 32 at 8-11) None of the cases, however, is a United States Supreme Court

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case. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 785 (to determine whether a state court ruling was

“contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, federal courts look

exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court) Indeed, one of the cases cited by

Petitioner, United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005), specifically

addressed the fact that the United States Supreme Court has never resolved the question of

whether an affirmative defense must be unanimously rejected by the jury. Likewise, the

Supreme Court has not addressed the more specific question of whether district courts are

required to give specific unanimity instructions for affirmative defenses, though the Ninth

Circuit has held they are not required in most cases. See United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d

1065, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Kim, 196 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.

1999) (“In the ordinary case, a general unanimity instruction suffices to instruct the jury that

they must be unanimous on whatever specifications form the basis of the guilty verdict.”)

Thus, there is no “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United States

Supreme Court” on the question of whether failing to request a unanimity instruction for an

affirmative defense constitutes ineffective assistance. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner

cannot show here that the trial court’s denial of his ineffective-assistance claim on postconviction review based on his trial counsel’s failure to request a unanimity instruction for

his affirmative defense was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, United States

Supreme Court precedent.

Moreover, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the trial court’s denial of this claim

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the

State court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Based on the instructions that were given, the jurors

knew their verdict had to be unanimous. By unanimously finding Petitioner guilty of seconddegree murder, the jurors also implicitly indicated that they unanimously found Petitioner

did not act in self-defense. There has been nothing presented by Petitioner to show the trial

court unreasonably determined the facts.

For these reasons, Petitioner has failed to meet the standards for habeas relief on

ground two and, as a result, this Magistrate Judge will recommend that ground two be

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denied.

4. Ground Three

Petitioner alleges in ground three that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

when he failed to seek a jury instruction on the shifting burden of proof for an affirmative

defense. Petitioner explains that “[b]ecause of the shift in burdens of proof associated with

an affirmative defense, it was essential to a fair trial that the jury be instructed about the

precise burden that the defense was legally required to bear in order to make a prima facie

case for self-defense.” (Doc. 6 at 8) Petitioner further argues that “[i]n the absence of such

an instruction, the jury was unable to apply the law correctly with regard to the competing

standards of proof borne by the State and the defense.” (Id.) 

Petitioner appears to be operating under the mistaken impression that there was no

instruction provided to the jury regarding who bore the burden of proof on his affirmative

defense. As discussed in the previous section, however, the trial judge instructed the jury that

“[t]he defendant must prove the defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance of the evidence means that the defense of self-defense is more probably true

than not.” (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1411) The judge also instructed that the “[b]urden of proof

with regard to the elements of the charged offense is with the State. The burden of proof is

beyond a reasonable doubt as defined in these instructions.” (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1411-1412)

The judge instructed several other times that the State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1403, 1404, 1406, 1410 and 1412)

Thus, Petitioner’s belief that the jury was not instructed on the burden of proof for his

affirmative defense is simply incorrect. The trial court gave a burden of proof instruction for

the affirmative defense, and gave several instructions on the higher burden of proof required

for the prosecution to prove the elements of the charges. Accordingly, there is no factual

basis to find Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to seek a jury instruction on the burden of proof

for his affirmative defense. This Magistrate Judge will, therefore, recommend that ground

three be denied.

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5. Ground Four

Petitioner alleges in ground four that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

when he, without Petitioner’s consent, entered a stipulation that was false and allowed the

prosecution to introduce highly prejudicial expert testimony regarding abusive relationships

that was otherwise inadmissible. The stipulations at issue were among several read to the jury

by the trial court following the close of evidence. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1400-1402) The two

that form the basis for Petitioner’s claim in ground four read as follows:

Number ten, the parties stipulate that the defendant Kee Nelson Steah, Sr. and

his wife Laverne Steah were involved in an abusive marriage.

Number eleven, the parties further stipulate that the prior stipulation of an

abusive marriage provides the foundational requisite for Kathleen Ferraro,

Ph.D. to testify on the general characteristic of abusive relationships and its

effects.

(Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1401-1402) Although the record contains no discussion of the reasons

the parties entered the stipulations, it is important to note that when the stipulations were read

to the jury, nothing in the record indicates Petitioner was unaware of, or opposed to, the

stipulations. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1400-1402)

As referenced above, when reviewing counsel’s performance in the context of an

ineffective assistance claim, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered

adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 689.

After Petitioner provided notice of his intention to present a claim of self-defense, the

State filed, on June 14, 2005, a motion in limine to allow the introduction of prior bad acts.

(Doc. 19, Exh. E) The State argued such acts were admissible to refute Petitioner’s claim

of self-defense. (Id.) Among the prior acts the State sought to introduce were two alleged

assaults by Petitioner against his wife. (Id.) Petitioner had previously filed a motion in limine

to preclude the State from introducing evidence of five alleged prior acts of violence by

Petitioner against his wife, which the trial court granted. (Doc. 19, Exh. F) Based on that

favorable ruling, Petitioner filed a motion on June 20, 2005, asking the trial court to preclude

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4

 Petitioner’s wife was identified by the State as the victim of the Criminal Damage -

Domestic Violence charge in Count Two of the Information. Pursuant to State v. Moran, 151

Ariz. 378, 381 (1986), the parties agreed that expert testimony regarding general behavioral

characteristics of an alleged victim is admissible which, in this case, involved expert

testimony regarding abusive relationships. (Doc. 19, Exh. F, H) The dispute was whether

specific incidents of alleged domestic abuse were admissible. (Id.) If so, the parties appeared

to agree that such evidence would provide the foundation for the expert testimony. (Id.)

5

 It should be noted that in a previous pre-trial hearing on the prior bad acts motion

filed by Petitioner and referenced above, the trial court, although it granted the motion to

preclude introduction of such acts in the State’s case in chief, indicated it may allow the State

to present the information “on either cross-examination or for impeachment or rebuttal

purposes.” (Doc. 19, Exh. D at 8)

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the State from presenting expert testimony regarding abusive relationships. (Id.) 

Petitioner responded to the State’s motion in limine, arguing that no alleged prior acts

of violence by Petitioner against his wife should be admitted, and that, absent the foundation

established by such acts, expert testimony about abusive relationships should be excluded.

(Doc. 19, Exh. G) The State responded to Petitioner’s motion to preclude expert testimony

by arguing that if the prior acts of violence the State was seeking to introduce were

admissible, the expert testimony had a proper foundation and was likewise admissible.4

 (Doc.

19, Exh. H) 

During a pre-trial motions hearing on June 27, 2005, Petitioner’s wife testified that

during her twenty-five years of marriage to Petitioner, she had endured physical and

emotional abuse. (Doc. 19, Exh. I at 49, 57) She claimed she had been emotionally abused

for the last five years and that there were six or seven incidents of physical abuse during the

marriage. (Id.)

A minute entry pertaining to a June 30, 2005 continuation of the pre-trial motions

hearing, reflects that, before a ruling was issued, the State withdrew its motion for the

admission of prior bad acts by Petitioner against his wife. (Doc. 19, Exh. J) Although there

is no discussion on the record, it appears Plaintiff’s counsel entered the above-referenced

stipulations to eliminate the risk of an adverse ruling by the trial court.5

 Rather than run the

risk of the jury hearing about several specific incidents of domestic violence, it appears

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Petitioner’s counsel instead agreed to the much more general stipulation that Petitioner and

his wife were involved in an “abusive marriage.” 

Presumably as a result of the stipulation, Petitioner’s wife did not testify at trial about

any specific incidents of domestic violence. (Doc. 19, Exh. M at 479-514, Exh. N at 519-623

and Exh. O at 628-684) Similarly, during cross-examination of Petitioner at trial, the

prosecutor asked Petitioner no questions about any specific domestic violence incidents.

(Doc. 19, Exh. S at 1300-1323, Exh. T at 1348-1379) Moreover, the State’s expert on

abusive relationships testified only generally about the characteristics of such relationships

and about behaviors associated with victims of abusive relationships. (Doc. 19, Exh. P at

936-965) She provided no testimony, however, that tied her general statements about

abusive relationships to Petitioner’s relationship with his wife. (Id.) Moreover, Petitioner

fails to identify any testimony by the expert that he claims was prejudicial.

Under these circumstances, this Magistrate Judge cannot conclude the trial court

“applied Strickland to the facts of [t]his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” See

Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99. It was reasonable here for the trial court to conclude that the

“abusive marriage” stipulation by Petitioner’s trial counsel did not rise to the level of

ineffective assistance. By stipulating, Petitioner’s counsel prevented Petitioner from being

cross-examined at length about specific instances of domestic violence against his wife. The

trial court could reasonably have concluded that counsel’s agreement to stipulate was a sound

strategic decision that helped Petitioner by preventing the introduction of highly damaging

evidence. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s decision denying this claim on

post-conviction review was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that

the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record

before the trial court. For these reasons, this Magistrate Judge will recommend that ground

four be denied.

6. Ground Five

Petitioner alleges in ground five that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

when he failed to present testimony from available witnesses to refute the abusive marriage

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stipulation and show Petitioner was not abusive or controlling. Petitioner claims counsel was

aware that Petitioner’s children would have testified that Petitioner did not abuse their mother

and control her. He claims they would have testified that their mother was often controlling

and argumentative and Petitioner was more likely to diffuse a hostile situation by leaving

rather than engaging in arguments.

In the previous section, this Magistrate Judge determined the trial court had a

reasonable basis to conclude that trial counsel’s decision to enter the “abusive marriage”

stipulation did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance, and that the trial court could

reasonably have concluded the stipulation was a sound strategic decision that helped

Petitioner by preventing the introduction of highly damaging evidence. In light of counsel’s

decision to enter the stipulation, it would have made no sense for counsel to then call

Petitioner’s children as witnesses for the purpose of refuting the stipulation. That simply

would have opened the door for the prosecution to question Petitioner’s wife, and crossexamine Petitioner, about specific instances of domestic violence. Because the primary

purpose of the stipulation was to prevent the jury from hearing specific evidence of domestic

violence, calling the children to testify to refute the stipulation would have defeated the very

purpose for which it was entered.

Thus, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s decision denying this claim on

post-conviction review was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that

the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record

before the trial court. For these reasons, this Magistrate Judge will recommend that ground

five be denied.

7. Ground Six

Petitioner alleges in ground six that his direct appeal counsel provided ineffective

assistance when she failed to challenge the trial court’s decision denying Petitioner’s motion

to suppress statements he made after he was taken into custody but before he was read

Miranda warnings. Petitioner contends his trial counsel had preserved the issue by objecting

at trial.

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 In an order filed on May 26, 2005, the trial court ruled on “Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress certain [sic] Statements.” (Doc. 19, Exh. C) The trial court did not identify specific

statements in the order. (Id.) For example, the trial court ruled that statements made to the

officer when the officer initially arrived at the scene were admissible because Petitioner was

not in custody and “the statements were made in response to questions from the officer that

the officer was asking to determine the status of the scene and the safety risks to the officer

and others.” (Id.) The trial court further found that Petitioner’s statements to the police chief

while in the back of the ambulance were admissible because the police chief was asking

questions concerning Petitioner’s physical well-being, the statements were voluntary, and

there was no custodial interrogation. (Id.) Neither Petitioner nor Respondents included a

copy of the motion to suppress in the habeas materials submitted to this District Court.

Petitioner fails to identify, either in his Amended Petition or his Memorandum of

Points and Authorities, the specific statements he is claiming should have been suppressed

and, in turn, should have been addressed on direct appeal. Rather, in the Amended Petition,

Petitioner refers generally to statements made “after he was in custody but prior to being

provided Miranda warnings.” (Doc. 6 at 11) Likewise, in the Memorandum of Points and

Authorities, Petitioner fails to identify any specific statements he made to law enforcement

that he is claiming should have been addressed on appeal after not being suppressed by the

trial court. (Doc. 11 at 17)

As noted above, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that the high standards for

habeas relief have been met. See Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25. Petitioner has not met that

burden here. Without knowing the specific statements Petitioner is challenging, this

Magistrate Judge has no basis to determine that the trial court’s decision denying this claim

on post-conviction review was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, or

that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

record before the trial court. For these reasons, this Magistrate Judge will recommend that

ground six be denied.

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6

 Counsel did not argue in the motion that the prosecutor’s actions constituted

prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 12)

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8. Ground Seven

Petitioner alleges in ground seven that his direct appeal counsel provided ineffective

assistance when she failed to raise a claim of misconduct by the prosecutor for impeaching

Petitioner with an alleged statement that had not previously been disclosed, and when she

failed to seek appellate review of the trial court’s ruling on the issue. Petitioner is referring

to the prosecutor’s decision to call the police chief as a rebuttal witness after Petitioner

testified. During his testimony, Petitioner said he told the police chief that after he and the

victim started fighting, he picked up the knife off the table. (Doc. 19, Exh. S at 1311, Exh.

T at 1367) On cross-examination, Petitioner denied telling the police chief during the

booking process that “I should have kicked his ass instead of pulling the knife.” (Doc. 19,

Exh. T at 1365-66) Petitioner explained, “I picked up the knife. I didn’t pull it.” (Id.) Thus,

Petitioner disputed that he ever said he “pull[ed] the knife.” (Id.)

On rebuttal, the police chief testified that he reviewed that morning the audio

recording of Petitioner’s statements during the booking process. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1382-

1384) He then testified that after a detective who was also present made a statement about

eating too much pizza, Petitioner said, “I should have just kicked his ass. I shouldn’t have

pulled the knife. I should have just kicked his ass.” (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1383) He further

testified that the term “pulled the knife” was exactly what was on the audio tape. (Doc. 19,

Exh. T at 1384) 

Petitioner’s trial counsel objected on the ground that the prosecutor was asking the

same questions he asked of this witness when he was previously on the stand. (Doc. 19, Exh.

T at 1383) The trial court overruled the objection. (Id.) Counsel did not object on the basis

of non-disclosure or prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.) In a subsequent motion for new trial,

however, counsel argued the prosecution failed to disclose the statement about “pulling the

knife” that the police chief attributed to Petitioner. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 14-15)6

 Counsel

explained that the State provided an audio recording of Petitioner’s statements during the

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booking process, including the statement at issue, but the quality of the recording was very

poor. (Id.) The State also provided a transcript of the recording, and then in the middle of

trial, provided an amended transcript annotated by the police chief. (Id.) Counsel argued that

the police chief’s rebuttal testimony was different than what was in the transcripts. (Id.) He

argued that the “pulling the knife” statement attributed to Petitioner is not in the transcripts,

and that the first mention of the statement was when the police chief testified on rebuttal that

he first heard the statement that morning when he reviewed the audio recording. (Id.)

In denying the motion for new trial, the trial court found the police chief’s rebuttal

testimony was proper impeachment evidence. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 23-24) In addition, the

trial court rejected the argument that the police chief’s rebuttal testimony, specifically the

“pulling the knife” statement, was not properly disclosed. (Id.) The trial court found that the

audio recordings and transcripts were “troublesome,” but everyone knew that going into the

trial, and any problems could have been resolved prior to trial. (Id.) Further, the trial court

found no error on the part of the State. (Id.) Subsequently, on post-conviction review, the

trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective when she

failed to pursue this issue on direct appeal. (Doc. 19, Exh. JJ)

This Magistrate Judge finds no basis to conclude that the trial court’s denial of this

claim on post-conviction review was objectively unreasonable. It is highly unlikely the

Arizona appellate court would have concluded that the trial court erred in its ruling on the

police chief’s rebuttal testimony, even if appellate counsel had raised it. The trial court

properly found that the audio recordings were timely disclosed to Petitioner. If Petitioner

disagreed with the police chief’s interpretation of the statements on the recording, he could

have cross-examined the police chief on that issue. He could have asked that the recording

be played for the jurors so they could hear for themselves that the “pulling the knife”

statement was, according to Petitioner’s counsel, inaudible. He could have questioned the

police chief’s credibility by pointing out how two previous transcripts of the audio recording

contained nothing about Petitioner saying he “pull[ed] the knife.” Petitioner, however, did

none of these things at trial and instead simply argued that the statement used to impeach

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Petitioner was not properly disclosed, even though the audio recording had been disclosed.

Under these circumstances, even if appellate counsel had raised on direct review a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct and a claim challenging the trial court’s ruling on this issue, such

claims would likely have failed. 

For these reasons, the trial court’s decision on post-conviction review denying this

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Strickland. Nor was the decision based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the record before the trial court. Accordingly, this Magistrate Judge will

recommend that ground seven be denied.

9. Ground Eight

Lastly, Petitioner contends in ground eight that his direct-appeal counsel provided

ineffective assistance when she failed to challenge the trial court’s decision to overrule an

objection, and subsequently denied a request for a mistrial, after a prosecution witness

testified to a prior bad act that the trial court had ruled inadmissible. Petitioner claims his

direct-appeal counsel “failed to assert the claim in Petitioner’s direct appeal.” (Doc. 6 at 13)

Pursuant to a pre-trial motion in limine, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request to

preclude the State from introducing evidence of a prior knife fight between Petitioner and his

brother in 1982. (Doc. 19, Exh. D at 5-8) However, during the police chief’s testimony in

the State’s case-in-chief, he explained in response to a question from the prosecutor that

when he asked Petitioner’s wife what kind of man Petitioner was, she responded that he was

a very violent man and that “[t]his is not his first knife fight.” (Doc. 19, Exh. R at 1168) 

Based on that testimony, Petitioner’s counsel objected and moved for a mistrial given

the trial court’s earlier ruling precluding evidence of the prior knife fight with his brother.

(Doc. 19, Exh. R at 1168-69) The trial court denied the oral motion, but did offer to order

the testimony stricken. (Id.) Petitioner’s counsel declined. (Id.) Petitioner’s counsel raised

the issue again during a subsequent break in the proceedings. (Doc. 19, Exh. R at 1180)

Counsel said he was “deeply concerned about this statement by [the police chief] that

[Petitioner’s wife] had told him that [Petitioner] had been in a knife fight before.” (Id.)

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Counsel argued this was highly prejudicial. (Id.) The trial court explained that while it had

excluded evidence of the previous knife fight between Petitioner and his brother because it

was too remote in time, the statement that the police chief attributed to Petitioner’s wife

“probably reflects more on her state of mind.” (Id.) The trial court found there had been

much testimony on the wife’s state of mind. (Id.) As a result, the trial court concluded the

statement did not warrant a mistrial. (Id. at 1181)

Petitioner’s counsel again argued the issue in his motion for new trial. (Doc. 19, Exh.

X at 13) The trial court again rejected the argument, finding that the court’s ruling cured any

error, and concluding it did not give rise to a new trial. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 24)

Petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on direct appeal

is wrong. The second main argument in the Opening Brief on direct appeal was that the trial

court erred in failing to grant Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial regarding the prior bad act

evidence. (Doc. 19, Exh. CC at 26-28). Specifically, appellate counsel argued, “In the case

at bar, testimony that it was not [Petitioner’s] first knife fight left the jury to conclude that

[Petitioner] had a habit of engaging in knife fights. This fact almost surely ensured that the

jury reached its verdict on an improper basis.” (Id. at 27-28) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals then addressed the argument in its Memorandum

Decision. (Doc. 19, Exh. EE at 7-11) The Court explained that evidence of Petitioner’s

involvement in a prior knife fight was not the only evidence of his violent nature before the

jury. (Id. at 10) The Court further noted:

Moreover, as the State contends, and we agree, the statement, “This is not his

first knife fight,” could not be so prejudicial as to tip the scale against

[Petitioner] because that statement alone does not suggest [Petitioner] was the

aggressor in that fight or that [Petitioner] was acting in ways other than selfdefense. Additionally, because the jury’s verdict was strongly supported by

other evidence in the record, we cannot say that [the police chief’s] erroneous

statement so prejudiced [Petitioner] as to require a new trial. 

(Id. at 10-11) (citations omitted)

Thus, it is clear from the Opening Brief and the Court of Appeals’ Memorandum

Decision, that a challenge to the trial court’s ruling on Petitioner’s request for a mistrial

based on the improper reference to a prior knife fight was properly presented, and decided,

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on direct review. Consequently, Petitioner has not shown the trial court’s denial on postconviction review of Petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim for

allegedly failing to raise this issue was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Strickland, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the record before the trial court. For these reasons, this Magistrate Judge will

recommend that ground eight be denied.

C. Evidentiary Hearing 

 As noted above, Petitioner has requested an evidentiary hearing on his claims. (Doc.

6 at 15) However, “[b]ecause a federal court may not independently review the merits of a

state court decision without first applying the AEDPA standards, a federal court may not

grant an evidentiary hearing without first determining whether the state court’s decision was

an unreasonable determination of the facts.” Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166-1167 (9th

Cir. 2005); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (review under §

2254(d)(1) of whether a state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, established federal law is limited to the record that was before the state court that

adjudicated the claim on the merits). As the above analysis demonstrates, this Magistrate

Judge has not determined the State courts’ decisions on Petitioner’s claims were based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing.

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s eight grounds for relief alleging ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel fail to satisfy the standards for habeas relief under

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d). Accordingly, the Court will recommend that the Amended Petition be

denied.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 6, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Amended

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Petition is justified because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

DATED this 3rd day of June, 2014.

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