Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01304/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01304-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL LIVINGSTON ROUSE,

CDCR #AA-5835, Civil No. 10cv1304 WQH (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS, ASSESSING NO

INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE

AND GARNISHING $350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 2]; AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM AND FOR

SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES

AGAINST IMMUNE DEFENDANTS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A(b).

[Doc. No. 3]

vs.

ANTHONY CAMPAGNA; ANDY

SPEAR; CHARLES ADAIR;

WILLIAM CAHILL; DENNIS HODGES;

PITUCCI, 

Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison located in

Susanville, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 3].

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust

fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified

trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in

the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no

assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement

shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(4). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 3] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A.

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As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a

claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and

(2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that a deputy district attorney, a San Diego police

detective, his criminal defense counsel and an investigator with the District Attorney’s office

conspired to violate his constitutional rights which resulted in his criminal conviction. However,

a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged constitutional violations during his

criminal proceedings amounts to an attack on the validity of Plaintiff’s underlying criminal

conviction, and as such, will not be cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless Plaintiff is able

to show that his underlying conviction in his San Diego Superior Court Case has already been

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87. A civil rights

claim challenging the legality of a conviction or the length of confinement that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643

(1997).

Heck also held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply

the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless

the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But

if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate

the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be

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1

 The Court will not convert the present action into a habeas petition due to the implications of

the abuse of the writ doctrine. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble, 49

F.3d at 586.

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allowed to proceed.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis in original). An action that is barred by

Heck should be dismissed for failure to state a claim without prejudice to re-alleging claims for

damages after the underlying conviction has been invalidated. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649;

Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995).

If Plaintiff were to succeed on his claims that all the named Defendants conspired to

violate his constitutional rights, he would necessarily call into question the validity of his

conviction and continuing incarceration. Plaintiff has not alleged that his conviction has been

declared invalid as required by Heck. Therefore, his Complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, and this action is subject to dismissal without prejudice.1

 Heck, 512 U.S.

at 486-87.

Second, Plaintiff’s claims against the San Diego Deputy District Attorney must likewise

be dismissed on immunity grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). Criminal prosecutors are

absolutely immune from civil damages suits premised upon acts committed within the scope of

their official duties which are not administrative or investigative in nature, but rather are

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Burns v.

Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-93 (1991).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed sua sponte both for failing to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted, and for seeking monetary relief from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is GRANTED.

(2) The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing

fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount equal

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to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

(3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(4) Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice both for failing to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary relief against defendants

who are immune pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), (iii) and § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

However, Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty (30) days leave from the date this Order is stamped

“Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

original pleading. See S. D. CAL. CIVLR. 15.1. Any Defendant not named and any claim not

re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

(5) The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form § 1983 complaint to

Plaintiff.

DATED: August 6, 2010

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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