Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_16-cv-08101/USCOURTS-azd-3_16-cv-08101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Blunk,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-16-8101-PCT-NVW (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Kingman, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on May 20, 2016 (Doc. 1). On July 5, 2016, Respondents filed their Response 

(Doc. 10). Petitioner filed a Reply on August 4, 2016 (Doc. 12).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At his change of plea proceeding, Petitioner admitted attempting sexual conduct 

with a minor in the form of digital penetration, and possessing and attempting to obtain 

photographs of minors engaged in sexually-exploitive behavior. (Exhibit C, R.T. 

11/21/14, at 12-14.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 10, are referenced herein as “Exhibit 

___.”) The prosecution added, inter alia, that the victim was three years old at the time 

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of the sexual conduct, and that the minors depicted in the photographs were under 15. 

(Id. at 14-15.)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted in Yavapai County Superior Court on February 15, 2013

on charges of sexual conduct with a minor, and on August 21, 2013 on charges of sexual 

exploitation of a minor. (Exhibit A, Presentence Investigation at 1-2.) 

On November 21, 2014, while represented by counsel, Petitioner entered into a 

written Plea Agreement (Exhibit B), agreeing to plead guilty to one amended count of 

attempted sexual conduct with a minor, one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, and 

two amended counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. (Id. at 1.) The 

agreement provided for a minimum sentence of 15 years on the sexual exploitation 

charge, and consecutive lifetime probation on the remaining charges. (Id. at 2-3.) The 

remaining charges were to be dismissed and any other charges arising from the 

investigation would not be brought. (Id. at 6.) On the same date, Petitioner entered his 

plea of guilty as prescribed in the plea agreement. (Exhibit C, R.T. 11/21/14.) 

Petitioner appeared for sentencing on January 5, 2015, and was sentenced to 15 

years flat time on the sexual exploitation count and consecutive lifetime probation on the 

remaining counts. (Exhibit D, R.T. 1/5/15 at 15-16.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.) Moreover, as a 

pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (1995).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On February 23, 2015, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit 

E.) Counsel was appointed, but eventually filed a Notice of Completion (Exhibit F), 

evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. On October 16, 2015, Petitioner was 

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granted leave to file a pro per petition, and was given 60 days to do so. He failed to do 

so, and on December 16, 2015, the PCR court dismissed the petition. (Exhibit G, M.E. 

12/16/15.)

On January 25, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion to extend the time to file his pro 

per petition. The motion was denied as untimely because the matter had already been 

dismissed. (Exhibit H, M.E. 1/29/16.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 20, 2016 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

In Ground One, he alleges that his sentencing enhancement 

violated the Sixth Amendment pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 

530 U.S. 466 (2006). In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his 

counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Petitioner’s 

sentencing enhancement was unlawful under Apprendi. In Ground 

Three, he alleges that his sentencing enhancement violated his due 

process rights. In Ground Four, he argues that his “illegal 

sentence” constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment.

(Order 5/25/16, Doc. 5 at 2 (emphasis added).) 

Response - On July 5, 2016, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) (Doc. 

10). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s state remedies are unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted, and that he is not entitled to a stay to attempt exhaustion.

Reply - On August 4, 2016, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 12). Petitioner argues 

the merits of his sentencing claims, and that his procedural default should be excused 

because of the ineffective assistance of trial and PCR counsel, and relies, in part upon 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 U.S 1309 (2012).

Supplemental Answer – In an Order filed August 10, 2016, the Court provided 

an opportunity for Respondents to supplement their Answer to address: (1) whether 

Petitioner’s claims in Ground 1 and 2 based on a denial of a right to a jury determination 

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of sentencing factors was of sufficient constitutional magnitude to avoid Arizona’s 

waiver bar absent a knowing and voluntary personal waiver; (2) whether Arizona’s 

timeliness bar applied to Petitioner’s unexhausted claims; and (3) whether Petitioner’s 

assertions of ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause to excuse his procedural defaults) 

was governed by Martinez (and thus not subject to an exhaustion requirement), or 

governed by the normal rule requiring prior exhaustion of constitutional claims of 

ineffectiveness relied on as cause.

On August 24, 2016, Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer (Doc. 14), 

arguing that: (1) because Petitioner’s state remedies are wholly unexhausted, this Court 

can simple dismiss the Petition rather than addressing any procedural default; (2) 

Petitioner’s claim regarding a jury trial on sentencing was knowingly, voluntarily and 

personally waived as part of the plea agreement; (3) Petitioner’s unpresented claims are 

time barred; and (4) there is authority to treat Movant’s claims of ineffective assistance 

of PCR counsel as constitutional claims of ineffectiveness thus requiring exhaustion, and 

that review was available by a second PCR proceeding.

Supplemental Reply – On October 7, 2016, Petitioner filed his Supplemental 

Reply (Doc. 17). Petitioner argues his claims of PCR counsel ineffectiveness are not 

raised as a claim for relief, but solely as a basis for cause and prejudice to excuse his 

procedural defaults. Petitioner concedes that he has procedurally defaulted on his 

claims. Petitioner argues that his failure to exhaust should be further excused because he 

did not receive the court transcripts and was denied an extension of time by the trial 

court to file his pro per PCR petition. Petitioner argues that the analogy between a direct 

appeal and an Arizona of-right PCR petition is not complete, and that the Martinez

exception for exhaustion of that basis for cause should be applied. Finally, Petitioner 

asks that if the procedural default is excused that he be granted leave to amend.1

 

1 Because the undersigned does not find the procedural default excused, the request to 

amend is not addressed. Moreover, the Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 9) required that 

“all motions to amend, motions to supplement, motions to stay, motions for evidentiary 

hearing, motions to expand the record, and the like, seeking to expand the petition, or the 

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents alternatively argue that Petitioner’s state remedies on his claims are 

wholly unexhausted or procedurally defaulted, and thus are barred from federal habeas 

review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Proper Forum - “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, 

‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the 

Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Proper Vehicle - Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a 

petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction 

in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 

 

record herein, shall be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the service of Respondents’ 

answer to the Petition.” (Order 6/9/16, Doc. 9 at 1.) 

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F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted 

before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative 

avenues of reviewing constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. 

Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). 

Application to Petitioner – Here, Petitioner has never presented any claims to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, whether on direct appeal, or in his PCR proceeding. 

Accordingly, all of his claims are not properly exhausted. 

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents suggest that the Court should simply dismiss the Petition based on 

the admitted failure to properly exhaust, rather than addressing the procedural default. 

However, such a dismissal would be without prejudice, rather than a final adjudication if 

dismissed with prejudice as procedurally defaulted. Assuming this Court had the power 

to avoid the procedural default defense actually raised, doing so simply invites Petitioner 

to return to this Court at some future date. Judicial economy calls for a final 

adjudication when the facts and law support such a result, as they do here.

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s waiver bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3) (Answer, Doc. 10 at 10), and at the Court’s prompting, on the 

timeliness bar in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.4(a) (Supp. Answer, Doc. 14 at 4).

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Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, as 

discussed hereinabove, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner has no right to a direct appeal 

under Rule 31.3. Accordingly, such direct appeal is no longer available for review of 

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver bar, Petitioner 

can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 

1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, to file timely petition in 

prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the 

ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional 

rights “that can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 

390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in 

Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to 

counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelveperson jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a 

personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly 

affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

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Here, with the exception of his jury trial claims, Petitioner’s claims are of the sort 

requiring a personal waiver, and Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly 

have at their core the kinds of claims not within the types identified as requiring a 

personal waiver.

Although Petitioner’s Grounds 1 (Apprendi) and 2 (ineffectiveness re Apprendi)

are founded upon a claim of the denial of a right to a jury determination of sentencing 

factors, such a claim has been held waived by failure to raise it earlier, albeit where the 

procedural bar was actually applied. See Scott v. Ryder,CV-04-0376-PHX-MHM, 2007 

WL 505117, at *9 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2007); Bailey v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1663484, at *21, 

n. 4 (D.Ariz., June 7, 2006). No waiver bar has been applied by the state courts to 

Petitioner’s claims. Respondents argue that the waiver bar would nonetheless apply, 

because Petitioner explicitly waived his right to challenge his sentence in his plea 

agreement. (Supp. Ans., Doc. 14 at 4.) This Court need not resolve the issue, because 

the claim is any event barred under the timeliness bar, discussed hereinafter.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

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d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Paragraph (e) 

has no application, because Petitioner does not assert that the claims are based on newly 

discovered evidence. Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely 

notice of of-right post-conviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because 

Petitioner has not asserted a change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, 

paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no application to the 

procedural claims Petitioner asserts in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and/or waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

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procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that this Court should find cause to excuse his procedural 

defaults based on: (a) the ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (b) the ineffective 

assistance of counsel in his PCR proceeding; and (c) the refusal of his request to extend 

the time to file a pro per PCR petition based on his non-receipt of the court transcripts.

a. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 14.) 

However, Petitioner fails to explain how any action of trial counsel prevented Petitioner 

from exhausting his state remedies. At best, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to pursue at trial the claims he now asserts. That is unrelated to the 

failure to raise the claims subsequently to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Moreover, claims of ineffective assistance of constitutionally required counsel 

must be properly exhausted to be considered as cause to excuse procedural defaults or 

procedural bars. “To constitute cause for procedural default of a federal habeas claim, 

the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must first have been 

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presented to the state courts as an independent claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943 

(9th Cir. 2003). See Murray, 477 U.S. at 489. 

Petitioner has not properly exhausted any claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel, let alone one related to some failure to present claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals.

b. Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel

Petitioner also argues that his procedural defaults should be excused because PCR 

counsel was ineffective in failing to find and argue the issues he raises in his Petition. 

Counsel Constitutionally Required - Ordinarily, to meet the “cause” 

requirement, the ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an independent 

constitutional violation. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, where no constitutional right to an attorney exists, ineffective assistance 

will not amount to cause excusing the state procedural default. Id. "Ineffective 

assistance of counsel can constitute cause to excuse a procedural default only if the 

petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in the proceeding in which the default 

occurred. . . . The fact that counsel is appointed by the state court does not change the 

result, because counsel is not constitutionally required." Smith v. State of Idaho, 392 

F.3d 350, 357 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original, citations omitted). If there is no 

federal constitutional right to counsel, a petitioner "cannot establish cause because of the 

state trial court’s failure to appoint him counsel, even if such failure was erroneous as a 

matter of state law." Smith, 392 F.3d at 357 . In Patrick Poland v. Stewart, 169 F. 3d 

573 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause there is no right to an attorney 

in state post-conviction proceedings, there cannot be constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Id. at 588 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)). 

The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the general rule that 

ineffectiveness of PCR counsel is not cause.

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The first exception was recognized in Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), 

where the Supreme Court held that cause could be shown when PCR counsel was not 

merely negligent (and under the law of agency that negligence being chargeable to the 

petitioner) but had abandoned the representation without notice to the petitioner, 

resulting in the loss of his state remedies. 

Here, however, Petitioner does not suggest that counsel abandoned the 

representation without notice, merely that counsel was deficient in not bringing claims 

Petitioner asserts are meritorious. Indeed, PCR counsel filed the appropriate notice to 

the Court when he was unable to find an issue of review. Thus, any such deficiency was 

not external to the defense, and is chargeable to Petitioner. 

The second exception to the general rule that ineffectiveness of PCR counsel does 

not establish cause concerns the failure of PCR counsel to bring claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel.

In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Supreme Court recognized that 

because state courts increasingly reserve review of claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel to post-conviction relief proceedings, the ineffectiveness of counsel in such 

PCR proceedings could effectively defeat any review of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

Accordingly, the Court recognized a narrow exception to the Court’s ruling in Coleman, 

supra, that the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel cannot provide cause. Arizona, the state 

at issue in Martinez, is just such a state, and accordingly ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel can establish cause to excuse a procedural default of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. However, the Martinez court made clear that the limited 

exception it was creating for ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as “cause” did not extend 

outside the initial PCR proceeding.

The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other 

kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review 

collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, 

and petitions for discretionary review in a State's appellate courts. It 

does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first 

occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral 

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proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320. 

For Petitioner to rely upon Martinez, Petitioner must “demonstrate[e] two things: 

(1) ‘counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been 

raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318).

However, Martinez is not applicable because Petitioner’s of-right PCR proceeding 

was the functional equivalent of an appeal. 

Admittedly this approach seems to go where the Martinez Court avoided going. 

Coleman v. Thompson left open, and the Court of Appeals in 

this case addressed, a question of constitutional law: whether a 

prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings 

which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial. These proceedings can be called, for purposes of 

this opinion, “initial-review collateral proceedings.” Coleman had 

suggested, though without holding, that the Constitution may 

require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral 

proceedings because “in [these] cases ... state collateral review is the 

first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.” As 

Coleman noted, this makes the initial-review collateral proceeding a 

prisoner's “one and only appeal” as to an ineffective-assistance 

claim, and this may justify an exception to the constitutional rule 

that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings. 

This is not the case, however, to resolve whether that 

exception exists as a constitutional matter.

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315.

Of course, in Martinez, Respondent argued that its PCR proceeding in that case, 

which involved a non-pleading defendant, was not an appellate proceeding in which 

there was a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Respondent’s Brief on 

Merits, Martinez v. Ryan, 2011 WL 3947554 6 (2011). In contrast to Martinez, 

however, Petitioner did not go to trial, but pled guilty, and thus had no ability whatsoever 

to a traditional direct appeal. At least he had no such opportunity beyond an of-right 

PCR proceeding.

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Undoubtedly, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit has 

uniformly declined to find a constitutional right to counsel in collateral review 

proceedings. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315; and Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 633 

(9th Cir. 2000). But both recognize a right to counsel in a direct appeal. See Halbert v. 

Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (“the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 

require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who seek 

access to first-tier review”); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The Ninth Circuit has already recognized in a different context that an Arizona ofright PCR proceeding by a pleading defendant is the functional equivalent of direct 

appeal. In Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit noted in 

the context of applying the habeas statute of limitations that prior decisions treating such

a proceeding as collateral review, rather than direct review was “based on the parties' 

uncontested joint position, [and] was unconsidered dictum.” Id. at 712. The court 

referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in Halbert that Michigan’s “first-tier ‘of-right’

review procedure available to a plea-convicted Michigan defendant in lieu of a 

conventional direct appeal is a form of ‘direct review’.” Id.at 713. The court opined that 

Halbert “signals that some non-traditional state review procedures are forms of direct 

rather than collateral review.” Id On that basis, the Summers court concluded that 

Arizona’s of-right PCR proceeding “is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” 481 F.3d at 717. 

In at least two other cases in the District of Arizona, the courts have concluded 

that an Arizona pleading defendant has a constitutional right to counsel in an of-right 

PCR proceeding. See Walker v. Ryan, 2015 WL 10575864, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 

2015) report and recommendation adopted, CV-15-00072-PHX-ROS, 2016 WL 

1268487 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2016); and Ree v. Ryan, CV-13-00746-TUC-RM, 2015 WL 

3889360, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 23, 2015).

Similarly here, this Court can and should determine that Petitioner’s of-right PCR 

proceeding must be treated, like the Michigan procedure in Halbert, as a direct appeal, 

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rather than collateral review.

Petitioner argues that there are distinctions to be made between a traditional direct 

appeal and Arizona’s of-right PCR proceeding that preclude treating them the same, but 

declines to present them. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 17 at 5.) The undersigned discerns none. 

(See e.g. 

Petitioner argues that counsel is not constitutionally required in Arizona’s of-right 

PCR proceedings. For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned concludes that such 

counsel is required by the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner points to the decision in 

Martinez, addressing Arizona’s PCR proceedings but finding no constitutional right to 

counsel. But Martinez did not involve an of-right proceeding of a pleading defendant, 

such as Petitioner, but a routine PCR proceeding of a defendant who “[a] jury 

convicted,” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1313, and who had access to a traditional direct 

appeal, id. at 1314.

Accordingly, Martinez has no application to evaluating the performance of 

Petitioner’s counsel in that of-right PCR proceeding. Instead, the normal rule applicable 

to counsel in direct appeals, that applied in Halbert, should apply. And the clear rule is 

that ineffective assistance of counsel in a direct appeal can establish cause to excuse a 

procedural default. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 492. 

Exhaustion of Claim Required - The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a 

Martinez ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim used to establish cause for a 

procedural default of a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel need not be 

exhausted itself. Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1322 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2014) (“where 

Martinez applies, there seems to be no requirement that the claim of ineffective 

assistance of PCR counsel as cause for an ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel 

claim be presented to the state courts”).

Conversely, claims of ineffective assistance of constitutionally required appellate 

counsel must be properly exhausted to be considered as cause to excuse procedural 

defaults or procedural bars. “To constitute cause for procedural default of a federal 

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habeas claim, the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must first have 

been presented to the state courts as an independent claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 

938, 943 (9th Cir. 2003). See Murray, 477 U.S. at 489. 

Here, Petitioner has not properly exhausted any claims by presenting them to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, including claims in a second PCR proceeding that his counsel 

in his of-right PCR proceeding was ineffective. Petitioner clearly had the right to assert 

such claims in a subsequent PCR proceeding. See Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 

485, 489, ¶ 17, 250 P.3d 551, 555 (App. 2011) (finding right to counsel in PCR 

proceeding asserting ineffectiveness of counsel in of-right PCR proceeding). 

Because he failed to exhaust his available state remedies on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of of-right PCR counsel, such ineffectiveness cannot be considered as cause to 

excuse his procedural defaults.

c. Denial of Motion to Extend

Petitioner also argues that his procedural defaults should be excused because 

following the grant of leave for him to file a pro per PCR petition he had not received 

the court transcripts by the deadline, and the court denied his motion to extend the time 

to file. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 17 at 3-4.) While a lack of access to transcripts that 

precluded exhaustion might constitute cause, Petitioner did not lose his ability to seek 

review in his PCR proceeding because he had no transcripts. Instead, he lost it because 

he did not timely seek an extension of time based on the lack of such access. 

Petitioner asserts he “diligently informed the Court of the fact that he lacked 

transcripts and, therefore, could not adequately investigate any potential claims.” (Id. at 

3.) However, Petitioner proffers no evidence of any such diligence. The record reflects 

the antithesis. The trial court ruled:

The Court has received and reviewed Defendant's Motion for 

Extension of Time which was filed with the Court on January 25, 

2016. 

The Court notes the Defendant's Motion is untimely as the 

Court dismissed this matter on December 16, 2015 as the Defendant 

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failed to file his pro per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as 

ordered by the Court on October 13, 2015.

(Exhibit H, M.E. 1/29/16.) Indeed, the copy of the motion to extend submitted by 

Petitioner shows that it was dated January 19, 2016. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 17, Exhibit.) 

The Court’s order granting leave for the pro per petition was issued October 13, 2015, 

and required a petition within 60 days. (See Exhibit G, M.E. 12/16/15.) Petitioner’s 

motion was not dated until some 30 days after the expiration of that deadline. 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to show what portion of the transcript was necessary to 

presenting the claims he raises in this proceeding.

Finally, Petitioner fails to show how his lack of a transcript before the PCR court 

prevented him from seeking to present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Thus, it cannot fairly be said that Plaintiff’s procedural default resulted from the 

lack of a transcript, as opposed to his own lack of diligence in seeking an extension, or 

otherwise filing his PCR petition, and then seeking review by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. 

d. Summary re Cause and Prejudice

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner had failed to 

establish cause to excuse his procedural defaults.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

4. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

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Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner fails to make a showing that no reasonable juror would have found him 

guilty. Accordingly his Petition must be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

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result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

To grant a certificate of appealability on a procedural decision, the Court must 

also find that the petition states a valid claim. The valid claim determination for 

procedural rulings does not require the Court to make a “definitive” determination of the 

merits of the claims, but rather only a “preliminary” one. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 338 (2003). It requires only “a general assessment of their merits,” id. at 336, and 

not a “certainty of ultimate relief,” id. at 337. The Ninth Circuit has taken a particularly 

broad view of this standard, at least in comparison to some other circuits. See David 

Goodwin, An Appealing Choice: An Analysis of and A Proposal for Certificates of 

Appealability in "Procedural" Habeas Appeals, 68 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 791, 821 

(2013) (comparing circuits). The Ninth Circuit has concluded: “we will simply take a 

‘quick look’ at the face of the complaint to determine whether the petitioner has ‘facially 

allege[d] the denial of a constitutional right.’ ” Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 

1026 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jefferson v. Welborn, 222 F.3d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

Thus, in resolving the instant issue, the Court need not evaluate whether Petitioner’s 

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claims are ultimately substantiated by the record, but simply whether the Petition has 

made out a constitutional claim.

Moreover, circuit court precedent is not determinative in deciding whether a claim 

is substantial. “Even if a question is well settled in our circuit, a constitutional claim is 

debatable if another circuit has issued a conflicting ruling.” Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 

946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Neither is the court bound by the deference normally required for review of 

claims of state prisoners under the AEDPA. See Camargo v. Ryan, CV-13-02488-PHXNVW, 2015 WL 2142711, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2015). 

Standard Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. 

Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling with regard to the finding 

of a constitutional right to counsel in Petitioner’s PCR proceeding, and consequent 

conclusion that exhaustion of a claim of ineffective assistance in such proceeding was 

required to rely upon it as a basis to establish procedural default. 

Further, the Court has determined upon issuing its service Order that Petitioner 

has asserted facially valid constitutional claims. (See Order 5/25/16, Doc. 5.) See 28 

U.S.C. § 2243 (“A court...entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall 

...issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be 

granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not 

entitled thereto.”); Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“If it plainly appears 

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in 

the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition”). 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be granted.

/ /

/ /

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed May 20, 2016 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be GRANTED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: November 22, 2016

16-8101r RR 16 08 09 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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