Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00246/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00246-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL B. RATOFF,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant. __________________________________

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NO. CV 07-246-TUC-DCB (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff filed this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner for

Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). The case has been referred to the United

States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court.

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff on

September 17, 2007 (Doc. No. 10), a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 19) and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 18) filed by Defendant

on December 26, 2007, and a Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.

22), filed on January 9, 2008. For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends

that the ALJ’s decision be reversed and the matter remanded for an immediate award of

benefits.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an Application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits

(“SSDIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) on January 26, 2005, alleging

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1 Due to an inaccurate date stamped on the denial notice, Plaintiff was

granted an extension within which to file a civil action. (Tr. 3) This filing

is therefore timely.

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that he had suffered from a disability since October 1, 2002. (Transcript/Administrative

Record (“Tr.”) 79) Plaintiff alleged he was disabled due to chronic recurrent depression,

among other social and cognitive difficulties. (Tr. 117)

The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied Plaintiff's Application initially, and

on reconsideration. (Tr. 50-58) Plaintiff requested review (Tr. 46-47) and on August 25,

2006, appeared with an attorney, and testified, along with a vocational expert, at a hearing

before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Milan Dostal. (Tr. 425-456) The ALJ found

Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 21-34) Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision, submitting no

further medical evidence. (Tr. 18-20, 395-424) The Appeals Council denied review on April

11, 2007, making the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner1

. (Tr. 8-

10.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981. Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in U.S. District Court

appealing the Commissioner's final decision (Doc. No. 1). 

II. THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED

A. Plaintiff's Education and Work History

Plaintiff was born on October 12, 1966. (Tr. 73) He finished high school and took

some courses after high school, but never formally. (Tr. 430) Plaintiff's past relevant work

consists of being a graphic artist for four years from 1993 to 1997 and a retail sales clerk for

two years form 1998 to 2000. (Tr. 118) Plaintiff’s disability insurance expired on December

31, 2004. (Tr. 30) 

B. Plaintiff's Testimony

On August 25, 2006, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Dostal, with an attorney

representative. (Tr. 425-456) Exhibits 1A, 1B to 3B, 1D, 1E to 6E, and 1F to 4F were

admitted into evidence. (Tr. 427) Plaintiff testified that the last work he did was as a clerk

in a video store checking in and out videos in the children’s department for more than a year,

though he was uncertain of the amount of time he worked there. (Tr. 431) Prior to that, he

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worked in digital pre-press, on a computer, preparing print material, primarily advertising

and catalogs. (Tr. 432-33) 

Plaintiff testified that he had taken his standard medications the day of the hearing,

including Provigil, or Modafinil, which as an anti-narcolepsy drug which also helps with

depression; and Soboxon, Temazepam and Lorazepam. (Tr. 434-36) Plaintiff had tried

taking Ritalin recently, but had discontinued due to feelings of confusion and nervous

energy. (Tr. 436) Plaintiff testified that he was under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Garland,

and a doctor, Dr. Osborne, who he sees as a special arrangement because Dr. Osborne is

specially licensed to prescribe Suboxone, and is one of only twelve doctors in Arizona who

can do so. (Tr. 437) Plaintiff also saw a counselor at some point, although Dr. Garland was

counseling Plaintiff presently. (Tr. 447-48) 

 Plaintiff testified that he lives by himself. (Tr. 438) He eats out mostly, he writes, and

enjoys working on his house, and enjoys having “a creative space to live in.” (Tr. 439)

Plaintiff eats out almost always at the same place because its “really the only safe place

outside of my house.” (Tr. 446) He is otherwise very uncomfortable leaving his house and

going to places he considers not safe. (Tr. 447) He sketches and does art work (Tr. 440),

does not watch television, but does enjoy renting and going out to movies (Tr. 440). 

Plaintiff testified that his general understanding of his psychiatric problems is that he

has chronic recurrent major depression with major current depressive episodes. (Tr. 440)

He does not hear voices, but, prior to taking Soboxone, he did suffer auditory hallucinations.

(Tr. 440) He was freezing all the time, even with layers of sweaters, and even in August

lying in the sun, he was unbearably bitter cold. (Tr. 440-41) 

Plaintiff had, in the past year, asked friends for work, but when he was honest about

his condition with them, they informed him that it didn’t seem they could fit him anywhere

with his particular condition. (Tr. 441) Plaintiff had traveled to Japan in the last year, and

had stayed there for a month with his language teacher. (Tr. 442-43) While there he became

completely lost and completely disoriented. (Tr. 447) Plaintiff had studied the Japanese

language for three and a half years, with lessons twice a week on Tuesdays and Thursdays.

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2 The vocational expert defined “slight nature” as having a small

effect that wouldn’t preclude the activity on a regular and

ongoing basis.” (Tr. 453) 

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(Tr. 443-44) 

Plaintiff also traveled to Italy with family on vacation (Tr. 444-45) but also had

problems; while there he spent all his times “inside the castle walls with [his] family” which

after awhile felt safe to him (Tr. 447). 

Plaintiff testified that he does not drink or smoke. (Tr. 445) 

Stacy Schonbrun, a vocational expert, testified in response to questions asked by the

ALJ. (Tr. 448) Ms. Rissell provided the exertional and skill level involved in Plaintiff’s past

employment as retail sales - light exertion level, SVP of 2, and unskilled; graphic artist -

sedentary exertion level, SVP of 7, skilled.

Ms. Schonbrun was presented with the following hypothetical: “...no exertionals or

other postural or manipulative problems because he’s primarily with psychiatric problems.

However, he does have some problems with his asthma, and therefore he should work with -

- or excessive amounts of dust, fumes or chemicals which are of an excessive nature and

would be in excess of any kind of work that he’s ever completed in his work job. This

hypothetical person has some depression, anxiety, there are various other like a - - problems

that I’ve noticed in the medical records that some doctors thought there might have with

panic attacks or schizo [ph] difficult personality or a post-traumatic stress syndrome. Now,

for the first hypothetical, I want you to assume that psychiatric problems would be of a slight

nature2

 and would have a slight affect on his ability to do basic work activities, or that

condition is or can be controlled by appropriate medication without significant adverse side

effects. So could hypothetical person number two with slight psychiatric problems be able

to do any of the past work that was done by Mr. Ratoff.” (Tr. 450) Ms. Schonbrun

responded affirmatively. (Tr. 450) 

The ALJ then proposed a second hypothetical, with all the same factors, except “now

the psychiatric problems are normally of a moderate affect. They would normally have a

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3 The vocational expert defined moderate effect as “fair limited but not

precluded.” (Tr. 453) 

4 The vocational expert defined severe as being “precluded about 50 percent

of the time.” 

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moderate affect3

 on her ability - - or his ability to do basic work activities; however, that

condition is or can be controlled by appropriate medication without any significant, adverse

side effects. So could hypothetical person number two with moderate but controlled

psychiatric problems be able to do any of the past work that was done by Mr. Ratoff?” (Tr.

451) Ms. Schonbrun responded affirmatively. (Tr. 451) 

The ALJ then proposed a third hypothetical, with all factors of the first hypothetical,

except “now the psychiatric problems are severe; and they are so severe that there is no

amount of psychotropic medication that would help alleviate all these problems; or if it did

alleviate some of the psychiatric problems then the side effects of the psychotropic

medication would be so significantly adverse that they would markedly interfere with ability

to maintain pace and concentration. So could hypothetical person number two with severe4

,

uncontrolled psychiatric problems be able to do any of the work that was done by Mr.

Ratoff? (Tr. 451-52) Ms. Schonbrun responded that he could not. (Tr. 452) 

The ALJ then asked if that was the case, if there were any other kind of work in the

national economy that this hypothetical person could do? (Tr. 452) Ms. Schonbrun

responded negatively. (Tr. 452) 

The ALJ proposed a fourth hypothetical, assuming hypothetical person number one,

except as modified by Exhibit 4F, the report of Dr. Garland. (Tr. 453) Ms. Schonbrun stated

that the hypothetical person would not be able to do any of the work that was done by Mr.

Ratoff, or any other kind of work in the national economy. (Tr. 454) 

C. Plaintiff’s Psychiatric History

Donald James Garland, Jr., M.D., a psychiatrist at the Psychiatric Department at

University Medical Center first evaluated Plaintiff in May, 1998, and diagnosed Major

Depressive Episode, Recurrent, Moderate to Severe. (Tr. 307) Treatment notes indicate that

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Dr. Garland has managed Plaintiff’s psychiatric care, on a nearly monthly basis or much

more frequently at times, since at least January 8, 2001. (Tr. 203-261, 298-393) 

Chart notes document changes in Plaintiff’s medication and Plaintiff’s response and

progress. According to a chart note dated October 2002, he was seeing a therapist, Diane

Hadsell, two to three times a week. He had just returned from a trip to Maine for a reunion.

(Tr. 240) His medications included Xanax, a benzodiazepine tranquilizer, Buspar, a minor

tranquilizer and anti-anxiety drug, Wellbutrin, an antidepressent medication, and Gabitril,

an anticonvulsant medication that can be prescribed for, inter alia, tremors and bipolar

disorder. (Tr. 240; Defendant’s Statement of Facts (“DSOF”), ¶ 2 n.3) Plaintiff was trying

to taper off of Xanax, and chart notes described gradual improvement. (Tr. 229, 231, 232)

Chart notes also indicate that his recurrent major depression was in partial remission. (Tr.

234) 

During this same time period noting gradual improvement and that his major

depression was in partial remission, however, chart notes also indicate that he came to

appointments with his mother (Tr. 237-238), had a severe panic attack when he was talking

to an old friend and then “lost it” (Tr. 234), was working on “semi-independence” as a goal

(Tr. 232), worked on serious problems with communication (Tr. 230), had more panic

episodes (Tr. 229), and worked with his psychiatrist on severe cognitive distortions regarding

his self-worth and self-negation (Tr. 228). 

On August 6, 2004, Dr. Garland noted that Plaintiff’s condition was "fragile" with his

depression being in partial remission. (Tr. 214) In September 2004, Plaintiff was maintaining

positive gains, but was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder, a mood disorder characterized

by depressed feeling, loss of interest in one’s usual activities, and other symptoms typical of

depression, but tending to be longer in duration and less severe than in major depressive

disorder. (Tr. 213, DSOF n.4) On October 12, 2004, Dr. Garland indicated that Plaintiff was

using sleep to "stay away" and that he had decreased social contact. He was taking Ativan,

a benzodiazepine tranquilizer, for anxiety, and was active at his dojo. Dr. Garland's

diagnosis was recurrent depression. (Tr. 212, DSOF, ¶ 8, n.5) On November 4, 2004, Dr.

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Garland evaluated Plaintiff with continued major depression. (Tr. 211) On November 16,

2004, Plaintiff reported that he “tolerated Japan fairly well” but upon return had a bad

weekend and was significantly depressed. (Tr. 210) Dr. Garland assessed Plaintiff with

recurrent major depression, and instructed him to follow up with Dr. Osborne. (Tr. 210) 

Dr. Osborne evaluated Plaintiff on November 17, 2004, and noted that he had tried

all previous anti-depressants in addition to Buspar and Gavatril without success. (Tr. 201)

Because of his major depressive disorder, believed to be permanent, significant, and

untreatable, Dr. Osborne began Plaintiff on Suboxone treatment. (Tr. 202) Plaintiff returned

to Dr. Osborne on November 29, 2004, and Dr. Osborne reported that his impression was that

Plaintiff’s chronic depression, chills, auditory hallucinations and suicidal ideations were

gone. (Tr. 200) Plaintiff continued on the Suboxone. (Tr. 197-199) 

In December 2004, Plaintiff reported that with Suboxone, he was able to do more, and

his sleep was improved. Dr. Garland described him as “clearly improved”. (Tr. 209) By the

end of December, Plaintiff reported he was “doing well,” not having suicidal ideation, going

to sleep “real easy” and not in crisis management mode.” (Tr. 208) 

On January 26, 2005, 26 days after Plaintiff’s insured status expired on December 31,

2004, Dr. Garland noted that Plaintiff had increased stress associated with his parents and

that he was in a "very stressful situation". (Tr. 206) In January 2005, Dr. Osborne described

Plaintiff’s depression as “controlled but variable.” (Tr. 198) 

In February 2005, Dr. Garland noted Plaintiff was feeling “floaty today”, had

questions of not knowing where he was, problems with getting from Point A to Point B, was

not remembering names, and became disoriented after sleeping in a new house. (Tr. 205) In

February 2005, Dr. Osborne described Plaintiff’s depression as well controlled. (Tr. 197)

As part of the disability evaluation process, the Disability Determination Service had

a non-examining psychologist, Paul Tangeman, Ph.D. review the case file. (Tr. 180) Dr.

Tangeman filled out a "Psychiatric Review Technique" form on May 24, 2005 in which he

concluded that Plaintiff had Impairments, Not Severe, (Affective Disorders, Depression NOS

and Anxiety-Related Disorders, Panic D/O) between October 2002 and December 2004 (AR

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180). Dr. Tangeman checked only mild or no functional limitations. (Tr. 190) Dr. Tangeman

explained that Plaintiff had received treatment for depression and anxiety for the period in

question, and a review of the progress notes show a stable adjustment with treatment

compliance. (Tr. 192) 

Plaintiff was evaluated on July 6, 2005, at University Medical Center (“UMC”), and

admitted that same date for suicidal ideation and attempt. (Tr. 167) Plaintiff reported that his

present medication had been effective in controlling or maintaining his depression since

November of the last year, however, it had been ineffective for the past month in controlling

his symptoms. (Tr. 168) Plaintiff reported symptoms of decreased energy and poor sleep

with nightmares, as well as auditory hallucinations, and feelings of disorientation, anxiety

and panic attacks. (Tr. 168) Plaintiff’s report on admission was dictated by resident

physician in Psychiatry, Howard Lin, M.D., and signed John J. Standifer, M.D. Plaintiff was

diagnosed with major depressive disorder, recurrent severe, most likely due to poor

medication efficacy and social situation. (Tr. 172) Plaintiff’s Global Assessment of

Functioning (“GAF”) score was 10. (Tr. 173) 

Plaintiff was discharged from UMC on July 14, 2005. (Tr. 163) The discharge report,

dictated by Lawrence Chan, DO., resident physician, and signed by Dr. Standifer, noted that

Plaintiff’s Axis I diagnosis on discharge was mood disorder, with an Axis II diagnosis of

narcissistic histrionic schizotypical personality traits. (Tr. 163) Plaintiff’s GAF score was

50. (Tr. 163) The report stated that Plaintiff “has been tried on multiple medications with

little to no affect. The patient was started on Suboxone in November 2004, achieved

moderate improvement in his depression including improvement in his suicidal ideation. The

patient did well for a few months, however, in June his depression began to worsen despite

compliance with his Suboxone regimen.” (Tr. 163) Plaintiff was discharged to family on

medications for insomnia and anxiety, and instructed to follow up with Dr. Garland with

gender identity issues and sleep disorders clinic. (Tr. 165) 

Dr. Garland closely followed Plaintiff, and initially saw improvement in Plaintiff

following his suicide attempt. (Tr. 383-388) (Dr. Garland assessed Plaintiff from July 18,

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2005 to July 26, 2005, with “improvement”, “able to sleep”, major depression in partial

remission, ) After the initial improvement, Dr. Garland continued to see Plaintiff regularly,

but his condition returned to his previous pattern of periods of “fragility” and depression

interspersed with periods of stability and stress management. (Tr. 353-383) For example,

on July 27, 2005, Plaintiff was assessed as “Fragile but managing”. (Tr. 383) On September

28, 2005, Dr. Garland described Plaintiff as “Fairly stable.” (Tr. 374) By his next

appointment, on October 4, 2005, however, Plaintiff was again “Fragile.” (Tr. 373) 

A second non-examining state agency doctor, psychiatrist Jack A. Marks, M.D.

reviewed the case on October 20, 2005, for the same time period between October 2002 to

December 2004. (Tr. 148-161) Dr. Marks' also found a non-severe impairment (Affective

Disorders, Depression NOS and Anxiety Related Disorders, Panic Disorder), and mild to no

functional limitations (Tr. 148, 158). Dr. Marks wrote that Plaintiff is compliant with his

therapy, and on medication. (Tr. 160) Dr. Marks suggested that Plaintiff suffers from some

situational stress causing mood lability but that the progress notes indicate a lifting of his

depression, so that his mental problems were not "severe" from Plaintiff's alleged onset date

(i.e., October 2, 2002) through his date last insured for SSDIB (i.e., December 31, 2004).

(Tr. 160)

On November 5, 2005, Dr. Garland once again made the assessment of "fragile" to

describe Plaintiff's mental health. (Tr 353) On December 13, 2005 Dr. Garland noted that

Plaintiff looked exhausted and he reported feeling down due to increased stress over the

weekend. Dr. Garland's assessment was that Plaintiff had increased depression. (Tr 366) On

January 6, 2006 Dr. Garland indicated that Plaintiff was upset with a contact with his father

and was back in a crisis mode. (Tr. 348) On February 15, 2006 Dr. Garland noted that

Plaintiff was again “[f]ragile.” (Tr 340). On March 7, 2006 Dr. Garland noted that Plaintiff

was improved but fragile still. (Tr. 335) On April 4, 2006 Dr. Garland noted that Plaintiff

was devastated because his parents recently saw Ratoff's son without telling him and this was

a "significant PTSD trigger". (Tr 326) On May 26, 2006 Dr. Garland noted Plaintiff's

disappointment in two different encounters with women, and that Plaintiff was fragile with

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his depression in partial remission. (Tr 310)

On July 31, 2006, Dr. Garland completed a form providing his opinion of Plaintiff’s

ability to do work related activities for the time period between October 1, 2002 through the

present. (Tr. 142, 145, 394) Dr. Garland noted that Plaintiff ability to understand and

remember very short and simple instructions, carry out very short and simple instructions,

make simple work related decision, get along with co-workers or peers without unduly

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, and be aware of normal hazards and take

appropriate precautions would be seriously limited but not precluded. (Tr. 394) Dr. Garland

noted that Plaintiff’s ability to remember work-like procedures, sustain an ordinary routine

without special supervision, work in coordination with or proximity to others without being

unduly distracted, and accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from

supervisors would be unable to meet competitive standards. (Tr. 394) Finally, Dr. Garland

noted that Plaintiff had no useful ability to function in the areas of carrying out very short

and simple instructions, maintaining attention for two hour segments, completing a normal

workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms,

performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods,

getting along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting

behavioral extremes, and responding appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. (Tr.

394) 

Dr. Garland explained in his transcribed statement the basis for his clinical findings

and how the various mental health work limitations that he placed on Plaintiff were

supported by the evidence. (Tr. 142-145) Dr. Garland explained that Plaintiff has a lot of

problems getting to appointments on the right day or time, or to Japanese class, which has

been held for years at the same day and time, and forgets what would be assigned as

“homework” from Dr. Garland. (Tr. 143) Dr. Garland opined that Plaintiff has difficulty in

sustaining attention for more than minutes, and lose track of a conversation that they are

having in therapy, and has serious problems maintaining his focus. (Tr. 142) Dr. Garland

also explained that Plaintiff has Schizotypal Personality Disorder, and that anyone with that

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condition is going to have significant problems communicating, and will be very distracted

by persons communicating in a more casual fashion, and that Plaintiff in particular has

ongoing problems in getting connected with other persons. (Tr. 144) These communication

difficulties tend to create real friction between himself and anyone who is trying to instruct

him in how to manage the particular job. (Tr. 144) Additionally, Plaintiff does not function

in a normal 16 hours up, eight hours of sleep cycle, rather, Plaintiff has two sleep periods,

including a sleep period in the early afternoon, which is caused by his inability to sustain

consistently for any length of time. (Tr. 144) Additionally, when Plaintiff at one time had

an irregular schedule, he was unable to respond to the changes, and failed to keep more than

half of his appointments. (Tr. 144) Dr. Garland and his Japanese teacher responded by

having his appointments at the same time every week. (Tr. 144) 

Dr. Garland also explained that, in regards to his records of December 2004,

indicating that Plaintiff was doing well, this was not a conclusion that Plaintiff did not have

any mental problems that would impose any limitations on his ability to work. (Tr. 142) Dr.

Garland explained:

...I reviewed that particular date in the records, and what had happened

at that time is for the first time in many years Michael did not have suicidal

ideation. That was the only basic change that had really occurred. We had

tried a new medication, and in documenting that, I certainly said that he was

improved. The lack of suicidal ideation certainly is an improvement. In

contrast to a normally functioning person this does not say that he had regained

his level of function at all. 

(Tr. 142) 

D. Lay Testimony

Plaintiff’s parents submitted a statement to Plaintiff’s attorney describing Plaintiff’s

difficulty in managing his day to day activities. (Tr. 137-138) Plaintiff’s parents noted that

Plaintiff “generally does not know what month or day it is and he has a modest concept and

recognition of the time during the day.” (Tr. 137) Plaintiff’s parents described Plaintiff as

fearful and untrusting of others and believes most people want to harm him. (Tr. 137) He

limits contacts with others and has defined a few places as “safe” and “generally does not

venture outside his defined boundaries. (Tr. 137) He has also chosen to remain silent, and

provides a document (enclosed with his parent’s letter) which he give to people explaining

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his actions in refusing to talk with them. (Tr. 139) Plaintiff’s parents explained that

Plaintiff’s ex-wife has taken legal action related to Plaintiff’s mental illness to deny Plaintiff

visitation with his a 12-year old son. (Tr. 138) Plaintiff’s parents provide Plaintiff with

financial support, but he is unable to effectively manage his money, so they manage his

financial requirements for him, such as paying his expenses such as utilities. (Tr. 138) They

provide him with a cash stipend for his daily needs because he overdrew his bank account.

(Tr. 138) He also abused his credit card that was to be used just for medicines. (Tr. 138)

Plaintiff’s parents note that Plaintiff “has a substantive medical support system, which has

not been able to sufficiently moderate his illness to allow him to function beyond a limited

basis.” (Tr. 138) They “do not see any capacity to perform any activities beyond his current

capacity.” (Tr. 138) 

Plaintiff’s Japanese teacher, Keiko Naito, has known Plaintiff for four years and five

months. (Tr. 136) Ms. Naito noted that his short-term memory is not fully functioning, for

instance, he often does not know why she is showing up in front of his house for Japanese

class at the usual time every week, and that in the middle of a conversation, all of a sudden

he does not remember what they are talking about. (Tr. 136) Plaintiff cannot keep track of

changes in the schedule if the class is rescheduled. (Tr. 136) 

Linda Kalatz, a family friend who has known Plaintiff since he was eight, noted that

Plaintiff has suffered severe asthma since birth, causing “severe emotional and physical

problems his entire life.” (Tr. 146) Ms. Kalatz pointed out that Plaintiff was not able to

attend a regular high school since the pressures of schedule and his not knowing how he

would be physically were too much to handle. (Tr. 146) Ms. Kalatz also noted that Plaintiff

often dresses inappropriately, and that, on one occasion, they waited 45 minutes for him to

meet them at dinner, and he did not show up. He takes many strong prescriptions and was

not able to come to dinner. (Tr. 146) At a recent family dinner, she observed that Plaintiff

spent hours by himself away from all guests because too much stimulation seems to disorient

him. (Tr. 146) 

E. The Commissioner's Decision

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On October 25, 2006, the ALJ made the following findings:

1. The claimant meets the nondisability requirements for a period of disability

and Disability Insurance benefits set forth in section 216(i) of the Social

Security Act and is insured for benefits through December 31, 2004.

Therefore the claimant must establish that his disability began on or prior to

December 31, 2004.

2. .The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful since the alleged onset of

disability.

3. The claimant has impairments which are considered “severe” based on the

requirements in the Regulations. The evidence establishes the claimant has

asthma by history; an affective disorder, depression, not otherwise specified;

and an anxiety related disorder, viz., a panic disorder (20 CFR § 404.1520(c)).

4. These medically determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one

of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4.

5. The [ALJ] finds the claimant’s allegations regarding his limitations are not

totally credible for the reasons set forth in the body of the decision.

6. The claimant was born on October 12, 1966 and is currently forty years old.

He completed high school and possess past relevant work as a graphic artist

and sales clerk.

7. The claimant’s asthma precludes him from working around dusts, fumes and

other chemicals. 

8. The claimant’s mental impairments result in mild restriction of activities of

daily living; mild to moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning;

mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and no

repeated episodes of decompensation or deterioration of extended duration.

The evidence does not establish the presence of the “C” criteria with regard to

Medical Listing 12.04 or 12.06. The claimant retains the mental residual

functional capacity to perform simple, repetitive, as well as complex, detailed

tasks on a sustained basis. 

9. The claimant’s past relevant work as a graphic artist and sales clerk did not

require the performance of work-related activities precluded by his residual

functional capacity (20 CFR § 404.1565). 

10. The claimant’s medically determinable impairments do not prevent the

claimant from performing his past relevant work.

11. The claimant was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security

Act, at any time through December 31, 2004, his date last insured (20 CFR §

404.1520(f)). 

(Tr. 30-31)

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his

alleged onset date of October 1, 2002. (Tr. 25) The ALJ found that, although Plaintiff had

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a severe impairment, it did not prevent him from performing his past relevant work prior to

December 31, 2004. (Tr. 26)

 The ALJ noted that there is minimal evidence available with respect to the period at

issue. (Tr. 26) The ALJ found that the evidence did show that Plaintiff has a history of

treatment for depression with Dr. Garland, dating back to about 1999 with symptoms and

problems including problems sleeping, gender identity, passive suicidal ideation, and visual

hallucination, however, medication, including Seroquel, Ativan, and Ambien significantly

reduced his anxiety and other symptoms although he does remain somewhat depressed. (Tr.

26) The ALJ noted that the evidence indicates continued improvement and reported Plaintiff

taking better care of himself on December 9, 2002 (Exhibit 1F). (Tr. 26) The ALJ further

noted that gradual improvement was again noted on January 7, 2003, and in March and April

2003, his depression was noted to be in moderate remission. (Tr. 26) The ALJ remarked that

Plaintiff took a trip to Hawaii with his son in June 2003, and reported doing well in July

2003. (Tr. 26) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff took a trip to Japan and reported having jet lag

on August 6, 2004; his depression was noted to be in partial remission. (Tr. 26) The ALJ

observed that Plaintiff continued to report doing well on December 17, 2004; sleeping well,

some reduced appetite, but no suicidal ideation. (Tr. 27) The ALJ pointed out that progress

notes through August 2005 indicate Plaintiff has his depression under good control with

medication. (Tr. 27) 

The ALJ commented that Dr. Osborne saw Plaintiff on November 17, 2004, and did

initially opine that Plaintiff had “significant, permanent and untreatable depression”,

however, Dr. Osborne later reported that Plaintiff’s depression was gone, with no auditory

hallucinations and no suicidal ideations, which Dr. Osborne attributed to change in

medication with increasing dosage. (Tr. 27) 

The ALJ found that, prior to December 31, 2004, the combination of Plaintiffs mental

impairments resulted in only mild restriction of activities of daily living; mild to moderate

difficulties in maintaining social functioning; mild difficulties in maintaining concentraion,

persistence or pace; and no repeated episodes of decompensation or deterioration of extended

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duration. (Tr. 27) 

The ALJ found that Ms. Naito gave no opinions of Plaintiff functional abilities prior

to his date last insured, and therefore her opinions of his ability to function after his date last

insured were not at issue. (Tr. 27)

The ALJ considered the opinions of Plaintiff’s parents, and found that their opinion

that Plaintiff has modest short term memory difficulties, is fearful and untrusting of others,

and has difficulty managing money was in contrast with the other substantial evidence of

record which revealed that Plaintiff has no more than mild restrictions with functioning prior

to December 31, 2004. (Tr. 27-28) The ALJ found that, to the extent that Plaintiff’s opinions

of functional limitations are not well supported by the other substantial evidence of record,

they are given very little weight with regard to his functional limitations prior to December

31, 2004. (Tr. 28) 

The ALJ also gave very little weight to Ms. Kalatz’s opinion, explaining that she cited

only examples of his current functional limitations, opined that he has severe depression, but

did not actually note the level of his functional inabilities, and that her opinions were not

supported by the other substantial evidence of record with regard to his functional abilities

prior to December 31, 2004. (Tr. 28) 

The ALJ considered Dr. Garland’s opinion of functioning abilities and clarifying

statement and rejected it for the following reasons. First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Garland’s

own progress notes did not reveal that Plaintiff’s mental condition was of the severity he

reported on the assessment. (Tr. 28) Second, the ALJ stated that the other substantial

evidence of record for the period indicates that a medication change has improved the

claimant’s symptoms so significantly that as of November 29, 2004, his chronic depression

is gone. (Tr. 28) The ALJ found that, to the extent Dr. Garland’s opinions of functional

limitations are not well supported by the other substantial evidence of record, including the

Plaintiff’s own admissions, they are not deserving of the great weight generally accorded to

a treating physician and are rejected for the period prior to December 31, 2004. (Tr. 28) 

The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s allegations of significant limitations for the following

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reasons. First, for the period prior to December 31, 2004, Plaintiff’s allegations of significant

limitations were not borne out in his descriptions of his daily activities. Plaintiff admitted

he is able to live alone, care for his personal needs, reads, writes, takes his medications as

prescribed, prepares simple meals, does laundry and light cleaning. Second, there is no

evidence of sleep deprivation due to depression or anxiety. Although he initially reported

problems sleeping, he admitted that he slept much better with medication. He has also been

described as alert and in no acute distress. Third, although the Plaintiff has reported that he

is too disabled to work, the evidence suggests that he has no motivation to do so. His parents

have admitted that they support him financially, provide medical care and housing. Fourth,

although the Plaintiff has reported that he is too disabled to work, he admits that he enjoys

going to movies, learning Japanese, traveling, and meeting friends at a café. Fifth, the

Plaintiff’s medications have not caused disabling side effects. Sixth, despite the Plaintiff’s

complaints of symptoms of depression and anxiety, Dr. Osborne noted the Plaintiff went

from having “significant, permanent, and untreatable” depression on November 17, 2004, to

having no symptoms of depression at all on November 29, 2004, with medication changes.

Seventh, no physician has opined the Plaintiff is permanently or totally disabled. Eighth, the

Plaintiff has alleged incapacitating symptoms and limitations. However, the objective

medical evidence of record does not reflect the existence of an impairment or combination

of impairments which would produce the devitalizing symptoms alleged by the Plaintiff. (Tr.

29) 

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s combination of mental impairments resulted in mild

restriction of activities of daily living; mild to moderate difficulties in maintaining social

functioning; mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and no

repeated episodes of decompensation or deterioration of extended duration. (Tr. 27) The ALJ

found Plaintiff repeated the mental residual functional capacity to perform simple repetitive

as well as complex, detailed tasks on a sustained basis. (Tr. 27) Relying on the testimony

of the vocational expert, the ALJ further found that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a graphic

artist and a sales clerk are light in exertion and skilled, and unskilled, respectively. (Tr. 30)

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Relying on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff was capable

of performing his past relevant work as previously performed and as generally performed in

the national economy, and, therefore, was not under a disability as defined in the Social

Security Act at any time through December 31, 2004. (Tr. 30) 

F. Additional Evidence Presented to the Appeals Council

Following the adverse decision by the ALJ, the Plaintiff submitted a letter raising

several errors in the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, however, no further additional

evidence was submitted. (Tr. 18-20, 395-424) The Appeals Council rejected those arguments

in a brief letter which did not individually address the arguments Plaintiff’s attorney raised,

stating only that the information did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision.

(Tr. 8-10) 

III. ISSUES

A. Plaintiff's Position

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating

psychiatrist, Dr. Garland, by not giving clear and convincing reasons for doing so, and by not

giving Dr. Garldings opinion controlling weight, (2) in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility; (3)

in rejecting the lay witness statements; and (4) in failing to do a function-by-function

assessment of Plaintiff’s residual capacity. Plaintiff submits that this Court should overtun

the ALJ’s decision and remand the case to the Commissioner for a finding that Plaintiff has

been disabled for Social Security disability purposes since October 1, 2002. 

B. Defendant's Position

Defendant contends that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Garland’s opinion, Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints, and the lay witness statements. Defendant also contends that the

ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding was proper. Defendant asserts that, even if this

Court were to find a reversible error in the ALJ’s decision, a remand for further agency

proceedings, not immediate payment, would be warranted.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

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An individual is entitled to Title II Social Security Disability Insurance benefits

("SSDIB") if the individual is insured for those benefits, has not attained retirement age, has

applied for those benefits, and is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The definition of

disability is the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

The Ninth Circuit has stated that "'a claimant will be found disabled only if the

impairment is so severe that, considering age, education, and work experience, that person

cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy.'" Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Marcia v. Sullivan,

900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

The claimant has the burden to establish a prima facie case showing an inability to

engage in previous occupations. Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1982).

The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that other substantial work, for which

the claimant is qualified, exists in the national economy. Id. (citing Hall v. Secretary of

HEW, 602 F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979); Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 990 (9th Cir.

1978)).

The court will set aside a denial of benefits only if the Commissioner's findings are

based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 

Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d

639, 642 (9th Cir.1982), Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir.1982)); 42

U.S.C. § 405(g)). In determining whether there is substantial evidence, the Court must

consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence

that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th

Cir. 1985). 

Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971), but "less than a preponderance." Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119

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n.10 (9th Cir. 1975); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573,

576 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

The Commissioner, not the court, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence,

resolve material conflicts in the evidence and determine the case accordingly. Reviewing

courts must consider the evidence that supports as well as detracts from the examiner's

conclusion. Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975). Moreover, "if the

evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

ALJ." Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016,1019 (9th Cir. 1992).

Disability claims are evaluated pursuant to a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R.

§§404.1520, 416.920; Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step

requires a determination of whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b). If so, then the claimant is not disabled under the Act and benefits

are denied. Id. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ then

proceeds to step two which requires a determination of whether the claimant has a medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c). In making a

determination at step two, the ALJ uses medical evidence to consider whether the claimant's

impairment more than minimally limits or restricts the claimant's physical or mental ability

to do basic work activities. Id. If the ALJ concludes that the impairment is not severe, the

claim is denied. Id. Upon a finding of severity, the ALJ proceeds to step three which

requires a determination of whether the impairment meets or equals one of several listed

impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1. If the

claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, then the claimant is

presumed to be disabled and no further inquiry is necessary. If a decision cannot be made

based on the claimant's then current work activity or on medical facts alone because the

claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then evaluation proceeds

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to the fourth step. The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform past work. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(e). If the ALJ concludes that the claimant has RFC to perform past work, then the

claim is denied. Id. However, if the claimant cannot perform any past work due to a severe

impairment, then the ALJ must move to the fifth step, which requires consideration of the

claimant's RFC to perform other substantial gainful work in the national economy in view

of claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f). At step five,

in determining whether the claimant retained the ability to perform other work, the ALJ may

refer to Medical Vocational Guidelines ("grids") promulgated by the SSA. Desrosiers, 846

F.2d at 576-577. The grids are a valid basis for denying claims where they accurately

describe the claimant's abilities and limitations. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462, n.5

(1983). However, because the grids are based on exertional or strength factors, where the

claimant has significant nonexertional limitations, the grids do not apply. Penny, 2 F.3d at

958-959; Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 729 (9th Cir. 1998). Where the grids do not apply,

the ALJ must use a vocational expert in making a determination at step five. Desrosiers, 846

F.2d at 580.

A denial of Social Security benefits will be set aside if the Commissioner fails to

apply proper legal standards in weighing the evidence even though the findings may be

supported by substantial evidence. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1987).

When the ALJ has applied an incorrect legal standard in reaching a decision, we must

remand unless, as a matter of law, the result could not be affected. See NLRB v. Enterprise

Assoc., 429 U.S. 507, 522 n.9 (1977); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. V. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 765

(9th Cir. 1986) (agency may rely on harmless error rule only when its mistake had no bearing

on the substance of the decision).

B. Medical Source Opinions 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1)

those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat

the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the

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claimant (nonexamining physicians). Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as

amended (Apr. 9, 1996). 

"By rule, the Social Security Administration favors the opinion of a treating physician

over non-treating physicians." See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir.2007) (citing

C.F.R. § 404.1527). "Generally, a treating physician's opinion carries more weight than an

examining physician's, and an examining physician's opinion carries more weight than a

reviewing physician's." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). In addition, the regulations give more

weight to opinions that are explained than to those that are not and more weight to the

opinions of specialists concerning matters relating to their specialty over that of

nonspecialists. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(5) and

404.1527(d)(3)). Under the regulations, if a treating physician's medical opinion is supported

by medically acceptable diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial

evidence in the record, the treating physician's opinion is given controlling weight. Id.

(citing 20 C.F.R. S 404.1527(d)(2); Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-2p). 

More weight is given to a treating physician's opinion than to the opinion of a

nontreating physician because a treating physician "is employed to cure and has a greater

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (quoting

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987))). "Likewise, greater weight is

accorded to the opinion of an examining physician than a non-examining physician."

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1);

Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician, whether or not controverted;

however, the ALJ may reject an uncontroverted opinion of a treating physician only for clear

and convincing reasons. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. To meet this burden, the ALJ must set

out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, state his

interpretation of the facts and evidence, and make findings. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

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747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). To reject the opinion of a treating physician which conflicts with

that of an examining physician, the ALJ must "'make findings setting forth specific,

legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.' " 

Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir.1987), (quoting Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1230);

see also Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983) (adopting this rule). "The ALJ

can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Cotton

v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir.1986). 

Furthermore, the ALJ must set out specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting a

treating doctor’s credible opinion on disability. See Reddick v. Chatter, 157 F.3d 715, 725

(1998). In the absence of other evidence to undermine the credibility of a medical report, the

purpose for which the report was obtained does not proved a legitimate basis for rejecting

it. Id. at 726. 

The Social Security Adminstration has explained that an ALJ's finding that a treating

source medical opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable evidence or is

inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record means only that the opinion is not entitled

to controlling weight, not that the opinion should be rejected. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 632

(citing § 404.1527). Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and, in

many cases, will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not

meet the test for controlling weight." Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; see also Murray v. Heckler, 722

F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983) ("If the ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating

physician, he or she must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing

so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.")

C. Analysis - Treating Physician

Dr. Garland was Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist from 1998 through and beyond

Plaintiff’s date last insured. Dr. Garland’s opinion is uncontradicted by any examining

mental health professional, and can therefore be rejected only with clear and convincing

evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. By rule, the Social Security Administration favors the

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opinion of treating physicians, and accords it controlling weight unless it is not wellsupported or because it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20

C.F.R. § 414.1527; see also Orn v Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (2007). If a treating physician’s

opinion is not given “controlling weight” because it is not “well-supported” or because it is

inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the Administration considers

specified factors in determining the weight it will be given. Those factors include. the

[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of the examination” by the treating

physician; the “nature and extent of the treatment relationship” between the patient and the

treating physician; the relevant evidence used to support an opinion; the consistency of the

record as a whole, whether or not an opinion is from a specialist about medical issues related

to his or her area of specialty; and any other factor which tends to support or contradict the

opinion. Id. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6). Additionally, since neither Dr. Tangeman nor Dr. Marks

examined Plaintiff, their opinions cannot, by themselves, constitute substantial evidence that

justifies the rejection of the Dr. Garland’s opinion. See Lester, 81 F.3d 831. 

The ALJ provided two reasons for rejecting Dr. Garlands disability opinion. The two

reasons provided by the ALJ for rejecting Dr. Garland’s opinion are insufficient. The

reasons are not “specific and legitimate” nor are they supported by “substantial evidence.”

In fact the record, read as a whole, in context, contradicts them. See Reddick, 157 F.3d 725;

see also Murray, 722 F.2d 502. First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Garland’s own progress notes

did not reveal that Plaintiff’s mental condition was of the severity he reported on the

assessment. (Tr. 28) This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. Dr. Garland

explained in detail the basis for his opinion of functional limitations, and the progress notes,

read in their full context, support his explanation. 

Dr. Garland explained that Plaintiff had major depressive episode, recurrent, moderate

to severe. (Tr. 141) Dr. Garland explained that the criteria for that diagnosis was difficulty

with sleep patterns, appetite, energy, suicidal thoughts, poor self-esteem, weight loss or

weight gain, and decreased ability to focus or concentrate. (Id.) While at times Dr. Garland

did note improvement and that Plaintiff’s depression was in remission, at other times, prior

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to Plaintiff’s date last insured, Dr. Garland reported a decrease in appetite (Tr. 208),

significant depression (Tr. 210), feeling displaced (Tr. 212), using sleep to stay away (Id.)

decreased social contact (Id.), continuing depression, (Tr. 213), variable sleep (Tr. 219, 222),

doing better but is depressed (Tr, 228), worked with Plaintiff on severe cognitive distortions

regarding his self-worth (Id.), decreased concentration (Tr. 238), abrupt shift to a more

depressed mood (Tr. 242), sleep somewhat fractured (Id.) passive suicidal ideation (Tr. 242),

being up and down but really “down and downer” (Tr. 243), sleep a problem (Tr. 245),

tearful at times, sleep interrupted (Tr. 247), anxiety increased, sleep decreased (Tr. 257),

falling asleep sometimes a problem (Tr. 259), mood - somewhat labile, but no steady

depression (Tr. 259), sleep variable, mood - down but not severely (Tr. 261). Additionally,

on several visits Dr. Garland assessed Plaintiff as “fragile” (Tr. 214), as having dysthymic

disorder (Tr. 213), recurrent depression (Tr. 212), and after two years of very active

management of Plaintiff’s treatment, concurrent with weekly or even biweekly counseling

or psychotherapy sessions, Dr. Garland assessed Plaintiff with recurrent major depression

and after attempting to treat Plaintiff with “all previous anti-depressants” without success,

(Tr. 201) referred Plaintiff to Dr. Osborne. 

Dr. Garland also explained that Plaintiff had a panic disorder. Progress notes discuss

a severe panic attack that occurred when he was talking to an old friend and then "lost it" (Tr.

234), and other panic episodes that occurred during the relevant period (Tr. 229). Although

Dr. Garland did not apparently document every episode or panic attack that Plaintiff

experienced, Dr. Garland would occasionally document improvements, such as “Pt’s

anxiety/panic levels only partially controlled [with] Xanax.” (Tr. 243)

Dr. Garland explained that the basis for his diagnosis of Plaintiff with Post Traumatic

Stress Disorder (“PTSD”)was a number of problems in his background, more recently

occurring around his marriage and repeated legal problems between he and his ex-wife. (Tr.

142) Discussions of Plaintiff’s legal situation regarding Plaintiff’s son are consistent

throughout Dr. Garland’s progress notes. The progress notes also include a phone

consultation where Plaintiff was “verbally accosted at his son’s school [and] then has been

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contacted by [the Tucson Police Department] re possible charges.” (Tr. 258) Dr. Garland’s

notes indicate an assessment of PTSD superimposed over panic disorder in January 2002,

when Plaintiff reported the holidays were stressful, and he didn’t get time with his son

despite exhaustive efforts to do so. (Tr. 251) 

It is evident when read in context, and read as a whole, that Dr. Garland’s progress

notes are no more or less than what they profess to be - clinical notations of Plaintiff’s

treatment progress from a baseline starting point, when Dr. Garland first began treating

Plaintiff, through the course of his treatment as his mental health both improved and, at

times, became worse. That is to say, Dr. Garland’s notations of “improved” or “improving”

cannot be equated with having no functional limitations, as the progress notes were never

meant to document his functional limitations or to assess his mental or cognitive capabilities.

Ultimately, despite Plaintiff’s progress, or lack thereof, Dr. Garland assessed Plaintiff, in

November 2004, with recurrent major depression. (Tr. 210) When asked to assess his

functional limitations, Dr. Garland did so, and provided a basis for doing so that, contrary

to the ALJ’s assertions, was fully supported by the evidence. 

The ALJ’s second reason for rejecting Dr. Garland’s opinion is also not supported by

the evidence. The ALJ stated that a medication change has improved the claimant’s

symptoms so significantly that as of November 29, 2004, his chronic depression was gone.

(Tr. 28) The ALJ thus concluded that, to the extent Dr. Garland’s opinions were not

supported by the other substantial evidence of record, including the Plaintiff’s own

admissions, they were not deserving of the great weight generally accorded to a treating

physician and were rejected for the period prior to December 31, 2004. (Id.) 

Dr. Osborne did report on November 29, 2004, that after treatment began with

Suboxone that, along with his previous symptoms of chills, auditory hallucinations, and

suicidal ideation, his chronic depression was “gone.” (Tr. 284) Dr. Garland noted that

Plaintiff had decreased suicidal ideation and increased focus on December 7, 2004, and

Plaintiff was “clearly improved.” (Tr. 209) By December 17, 2004, Dr. Garland noted that

Plaintiff reported not having suicidal ideation and was “clearly improved.” (Tr. 208) But on

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January 7, 2005, only seven days past the date last insured, Dr. Garland noted that while

Plaintiff had a clear improvement in mood, his depression was only in moderate remission,

and Plaintiff was reporting increased tension and anxiety. (Tr. 207) On January 26, 2005,

less than a month after his date last insured, Plaintiff was reporting increased stress. (Tr.

206) By January 31, 2005, however, Dr. Osborne noted that, while Plaintiff’s depression

was controlled, it was variable, and increased his Suboxone dosage. (Tr. 198) His

depression was again “well controlled” by February 28, 2005. (Tr. 197) By July 2005,

Plaintiff was admitted to UMC for suicidal ideation and attempt, and diagnosed with major

depressive disorder, recurrent severe, most likely due to poor medication efficacy and social

situation. (Tr. 172) On November 5, 2005, Dr. Garland once again made the assessment of

"fragile" to describe Plaintiff's mental health. (Tr. 353) On December 13, 2005 Dr. Garland

noted that Plaintiff looked exhausted and he reported feeling down due to increased stress

over the weekend. Dr. Garland's assessment was that Plaintiff had increased depression. (Tr.

366)

Again, the ALJ’s statement, “that as of November 29, 2004, his chronic depression

is gone”(Tr. 28), read in the context of the entire record is not supported by the evidence, nor

is it convincing. But for the improvement initially seen in the few months following the

initial course of treatment with Suboxone, the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff not only

did not maintain at the level of improvement initially observed, but, within less than a year

worsened to the point of a suicide attempt and to the point where he was diagnosed at UMC

with major depressive disorder, recurrent severe. (Tr. 172) Plaintiff’s mental health history,

as noted above, demonstrates both episodes of improvement, decline, and plateaus. The

illustration which the ALJ chose to demonstrate that Plaintiff no longer had chronic

depression was perhaps the highest peak in all of the mountains, valleys and plateaus of

Plaintiff’s progress, but it was not sustained for any appreciable amount of time, and was not

indicative of Plaintiff’s functional ability. 

Dr. Garland explained in his interview the progress that Plaintiff had achieved during

the time period following initial treatment with Suboxone: “...for the first time in years

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Michael did not have suicidal ideation. That was the only basic change that had really

occurred. We had tried a new medication, and in documenting that, I certainly said that he

was improved. The lack of suicidal ideation certainly is an improvement. In contrast to a

normally functioning person this does not say that he had regained his level of function at

all.” (Tr. 142) 

Because the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Garland’s opinion, and in not giving Dr.

Garland’s opinion controlling weight, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Judge reverse the decision that plaintiff is not disabled. 

D. Plaintiff's Credibility

"An ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain or other

nonexertional impairment." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). While an ALJ is responsible for determining the

credibility of a claimant, an ALJ cannot reject a claimant's testimony without giving clear and

convincing reasons. Holohon v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722.) In addition, the ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she

or he finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony. Id.

The evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be substantial. Id. In assessing the claimant's

credibility, the ALJ may consider ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the

claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements about the symptoms, and other

testimony from the claimant that appears less than candid; unexplained or inadequately

explained failure to seek or follow a prescribed course of treatment; the claimant's daily

activities; the claimant's work record; observations of treating and examining physicians and

other third parties; precipitating and aggravating factors; and functional restrictions caused

by the symptoms. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. See also Robbins, 466 F.3d at 884 ("To find the

claimant not credible, the ALJ must rely either on reasons unrelated to the subjective

testimony (e.g., reputation for dishonesty), on conflicts between his testimony and his own

conduct; or internal contradictions in that testimony.")

E. Analysis - Plaintiff’s Credibility

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The ALJ gave provided eight reasons for rejecting the Plaintiff’s testimony. (Tr. 29)

1. Daily Activities

The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s testimony, stating, as his first reason for doing so, that

“for the period prior to December 31, 2004, the claimant’s allegations of significant

limitations are not borne out in his description of his daily activities. Even after his date last

insured, he admitted that he is able to live alone, care for his personal needs, reads, writes,

takes his medications as prescribed, prepares simple meals, does laundry and light cleaning.

(Tr. 29) The fourth reason the ALJ stated for discrediting Plaintiff was that, although

Plaintiff has reported that he is too disabled to work, he admits that he enjoys going to

movies, learning Japanese, traveling, and meeting friends at a café. (Tr. 29)

The Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has

carried on certain daily activities ... does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her

overall disability.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The ALJ did not question Plaintiff during the hearing about any of his limitations.

(Tr. 425-455) The only allegations that Plaintiff alleged, therefore, and that the ALJ rejected,

must have been derived from Plaintiff’s disability reports. 

A Field Office - Disability Report was completed by interview with Plaintiff on

February 25, 2005. (Tr. 133-35) The interviewer noted that Plaintiff had difficulty

concentrating, talking, and answering. (Tr. 134) Specifically, the interviewer wrote that

Plaintiff “appeared a little nervous at outset. He was slow thinking and talking at times. He

had to refocus in order to answer.” (Tr. 134) Plaintiff completed the report, responding to

the questions how his illnesses, injuries or conditions limit his ability to work, with:

“Disorientation, suicidal ideation, exhaustion; auditory hallucinations; inability to focus,

cannot be around more than 1 person; not comfortable around other people; I will hide and

cry if I am around too many people” (Tr. 127) Plaintiff stated that he stopped working

because he could not focus on his work, people, or numbers. He was getting anxiety and was

becoming irritated. (Tr. 127) 

In March 2005, Plaintiff completed a Function Report, noting that he lives alone in

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a house, and goes to doctor’s appointments, reads and writes, and takes medicine. (Tr. 110)

While on medication, Plaintiff is able to adequately take care of personal hygiene, but

requires reminders on notes or whiteboards “for everything,”including taking medication.

(Tr. 112) Plaintiff fixes soups, sandwiches and salads, but not daily, and his parents help him

by inviting him to dinner, or he eats out. (Tr. 112) Plaintiff does laundry, although he

requires a whiteboard reminder to help with this. (Tr. 112) Plaintiff goes outside, and can

walk, drive, or ride a bicycle. (Tr. 113) Plaintiff can shop, but he is unsure how often he

shops, and how long it takes. (Tr. 113) Plaintiff does not pay bills, or handle his checking

or savings account. (Tr. 113) His family pays most of his bills. (Tr. 113) Plaintiff describes

remembering planning and more control of his finances prior to his illness. (Tr. 114)

Plaintiff’s hobbies and interests are reading, martial arts, and studying Japanese. (Tr.

114) Plaintiff goes to martial arts training, the Muse Community Arts Center, and the dojo

in Phoenix once a month. (Tr. 114) Plaintiff notes that his condition affects his memory,

completing tasks, concentration, understanding, following instructions, and getting along

with others. (Tr. 115) Plaintiff states that he does not follow written instructions very well,

is worse at following spoken instructions, and sometimes finishes what he starts. (Tr. 115)

Plaintiff states that he does not get along at all with authority figures, and handles changes

in his routine very badly. (Tr. 116) 

Plaintiff remarked additionally that he has a great deal of difficulty with forms and

linear time, and that he does not like people, and suffers from chronic recurrent depression.

(Tr. 117) Plaintiff further remarked that so many things have changed that he is not really

sure of explaining and that it is hard for him to see how things “used to be.” (Tr. 117) 

Plaintiff has described a few particular things that he enjoys doing, and places he goes

that he feels are “safe.” Eating at one café and going to the movies are two such “safe”

places. He studies Japanese at his home, or at the café. He has traveled, but for the most part

describes difficulty doing so, although some family vacations have been without remarkable

incident, (Hawaii) others have been remarkably difficult, such as his family trips to Italy and

Kentucky, and his vacation to Japan. 

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The Government argues that it is reasonable for the ALJ to infer from the evidence

that Plaintiff’s depression, while imposing some limitations, was not totally incapacitating.

(Doc. No. 21, at 8) Claimants, however, need not be “utterly incapacitated” in order to be

eligible for benefits. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ did not

explain how Plaintiff’s testimony, that he lives alone, care for his personal needs, reads,

writes, takes his medications as prescribed, prepares simple meals, does laundry and light

cleaning, are activities that would transfer to the work environment. This is especially true

in light of Plaintiff’s particular illness, which does not necessarily limit his ability to

physically complete certain tasks. To the extent that the ALJ concludes that Plaintiff’s

activities of daily living render his allegations of limitations beyond belief, the ALJ has

focused only on those statements which support such a conclusion and ignored those which

do not. 

For example, while the ALJ stated that Plaintiff prepares simple meals (Tr. 29), he

ignored the other statements in the "Function Report" where Ratoff indicated that he does not

prepare food or meals daily all the time, that he is not sure how long it takes him, and that

his parents will help him by inviting him to dinner. (Tr.112) In addition, the ALJ notes in

his decision that Plaintiff indicates that he lives alone (Tr. 29) but ignores the fact that

Plaintiff also indicated that his family must pay his bills because he does not have a savings

account and does not use checks. (Tr. 113) The ALJ further ignored the fact that Plaintiff

indicated that he does not spend time with others (Tr. 114), and that his illness affected his

ability to remember things, complete tasks, concentrate, understand, follow instructions, and

get along with others. (Tr. 115) 

2. Sleep Deprivation

The ALJ noted that the second reason for rejecting the Plaintiff’s allegations was that

there was no evidence of sleep deprivation due to depression or anxiety. (Tr. 29) The ALJ

noted that, although he initially reported problems sleeping, he admitted that he slept much

better with medication, and has also been described as alert and in no acute distress. (Id.)

Initially, it should be noted that the ALJ does not explain why this observation would

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detract from Plaintiff’s credibility. It appears that the ALJ is attempting to find that

Plaintiff’s allegation, that he has depressive disorder, is not well supported because Plaintiff

does not demonstrate one of the diagnostic criteria for depression, i.e., sleep deprivation. The

ALJ, however, found that Plaintiff had three severe medically determinable impairments:

asthma; an affective disorder, viz., depression, not otherwise specified; and an anxiety related

disorder, viz., a panic disorder. (Tr. 27) Thus, to the extent that the ALJ is attempting to

discredit Plaintiff’s allegation that he has depressive disorder, it is not supported by the

record, or by the ALJ’s own findings. To the extent that the ALJ is attempting to discredit

Plaintiff by noting inconsistencies in the record, or in Plaintiff’s testimony, that, also, is not

well supported. Plaintiff did not testify that he suffered from sleep deprivation. Plaintiff

alleged that he had “nightmares, fear of sleep.” (Tr. 111) Plaintiff did not elaborate much

beyond this description, as to how, functionally, his sleep difficulties would limit his ability

to work. Plaintiff did defer to his doctors for a “better understand[ing] of his condition.” (Tr.

117) 

Dr. Garland observed that Plaintiff had difficulties functioning at a normal “16 hours

up, eight hours of going to bed” cycle. (Tr. 144) Dr. Garland noted that Plaintiff generally

has two sleep periods, and attributed this to his inability to “sustain consistently for any

length of time” rather than sleep difficulties. (Tr. 144) As to Plaintiff’s insomnia, Dr.

Garland’s treatment notes did indicate on several instances that Plaintiff had difficulty with

sleep, and Dr. Garland discussed management of Plaintiff’s insomnia with medication. (See

Tr. 212, 219, 222, 242, 245, 254, 257, 259, 260 and 261) Plaintiff submitted disability

reports that indicated that he was prescribed medications for the purpose of treating his

difficulties with sleep problems. (Tr. 83, 98) Additionally, it appears that, at least initially,

Plaintiff’s Suboxone treatment provided relief in this area, as well as improving his mood.

(Tr. 207-209)

The ALJ’s description of Plaintiff as “alert and in no acute distress” is not well

supported. The ALJ cites to exhibit 1-F in support of this description. In addition to the

Psychiatric Review Technique’s completed by the state agency reviewers, Exhibit 1-F

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contains treatment notes from Dr. Garland, Dr. Osborne, and from UMC during July 2005,

when Plaintiff was admitted and diagnosed with major depressive disorder, recurrent severe.

(Tr. 148-268) It is only in the treatment notes from UMC that Plaintiff is described, upon

admission, as “alert” (Tr. 172), and upon discharge as “in no acute distress” (Tr. 165). The

treating psychiatrists at UMC discharged Plaintiff on two different medications for treatment

of insomnia. (Tr. 165) During the treatment period at UMC, it was noted that Plaintiff

experienced severe insomnia, and “did not sleep three days while on the unit.” (Tr. 164)

After trials of different medications, Plaintiff continued to have difficulty with insomnia, but

finally responded to doses of Ambien and Seroquel, and was sleeping an average of 4-5

hours a night toward the end of his hospital course. (Tr. 164) It is disingenuous for the ALJ

take the words “alert and in no acute distress” out of the context of this record in an attempt

to discredit Plaintiff’s allegations of sleeping difficulty. 

3. No Motivation

The ALJ states as a third reason for discrediting Plaintiff, that “although he has

reported that he is too disabled to work the evidence suggests that he has no motivation to

do so. His parents have admitted that they support him financially, provide medical care and

housing.” (Tr. 29) The ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence is speculative at best, and biased

at worst. The evidence is “suggestive” of many things, among others that Plaintiff is

disabled, cannot work, and is in need of financial support which his parents “admittedly”

provide. In the absence of any evidence in the record, however, as to whether or not Plaintiff

is motivated to work, and considering the possibility that such lack of motivation, if it

existed, could be related to his impairment, it is improper for the ALJ to rely on this

speculation to discredit Plaintiff. 

4. Medication Side Effects

The ALJ states as the fifth reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility that the Plaintiff’s

medications have not caused disabling side effects. (Tr. 29) This statement, by itself, without

demonstration that Plaintiff testified to disabling side effects that conflicted with evidence

of record or between such testimony and his own conduct; or internal contradictions in that

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testimony, is not a relevant indicator of Plaintiff’s credibility. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.

See also Robbins, 466 F.3d at 884. Furthermore, the ALJ does not explain why a finding that

there are no disabling side effects renders Plaintiff’s allegations not credible. An ALJ must

specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what

evidence undermines the testimony. Holohon, 246 F.3d at 1208. The evidence upon which

the ALJ relies must be substantial. Id.

5. No Symptoms of Depression on November 29, 2004

The sixth reason the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s allegations for lack of credibility was,

“despite the claimant’s complaints of symptoms of depression and anxiety, Dr. Osborne

noted the claimant went from having ‘significant, permanent and untreatable’ depression on

November 17, 2004, to having no symptoms of depression at all on November 29, 2004, with

medication changes (Exhibit 1F/53-55).” (Tr. 29) This reason is not supported by the

evidence, for the same reasons the Magistrate Judge found the ALJ’s second reason for

rejecting Dr. Garland’s opinion improper, as previously discussed in section IV.C., above.

6. No Physician Opinion of Disability

The ALJ states as the seventh reason for finding Plaintiff not credible that, during the

relevant period, no physician has opined that the Plaintiff is permanently or totally disabled.

(Tr. 29) This conclusion is not supported by the record. To the contrary, Dr. Garland

prepared a statement in which he offered his opinion as to Plaintiff's mental limitations for

the period from October 1, 2002 to present. (Tr. 142-145, 394). Plaintiff's inability to respond

appropriately to changes in a routine work setting, by itself, would prevent him from doing

the "basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work". (Tr. 394) To the

extent that the ALJ is asserting that no physician offered the opinion itself, contemporaneous

with or prior to the end of, the relevant period, it seems apparent from the record that there

is no opinion prior to December, 2004, because no opinion was necessary until Plaintiff

applied for benefits. The opinion is not inconsistent with the treatment notes during the

relevant period, of which there is ample documentation of Plaintiff’s disability. 

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7. No Objective Medical Evidence

Lastly, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s credibility for the reason that Plaintiff alleged

incapacitating symptoms and limitations, but the "objective medical evidence of record" does

not reflect the existence of an impairment that would produce those type of symptoms. (Tr.

29). Plaintiff suffers from anxiety and depression, and it is not clear what objective medical

evidence the ALJ would require Plaintiff to produce to substantiate such symptoms. As

Plaintiff argues, Plaintiff’s problems cannot be documented by an x-ray. As SSR 96-8p notes,

"Careful consideration must be given to any available information about symptoms because

subjective descriptions may indicate more severe limitations or restrictions than can be

shown by objective medical evidence alone". The ALJ erred in this case by failing to give

the evidence such careful consideration in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility. This error is

further confounding because the ALJ acknowledged that Ratoff did have severe mental

impairments. (Tr. 30).

In sum, the ALJ’s reasons for finding Plaintiff not credible are not supported by

substantial evidence. 

F. Lay Witness Testimony

Lay testimony making a medical diagnoses is beyond the competence of lay witnesses

and do not constitute competent evidence requiring consideration by the ALJ. Nguyen v.

Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996)(citing Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395

(9th Cir. 1984). However, lay testimony as to a claimant's symptoms is competent evidence

which the ALJ must take into account unless he expressly determined to disregard such

testimony, in which case he must give reasons that are germane to each witness. Nguyen,

100 F.3d at 1467 (citing Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

1. Keiko Naito

The ALJ rejected the statements of Plaintiff’s Japanese teacher, Keiko Naito, on the

basis that Ms. Naito gave no opinions of Plaintiff’s functional abilities prior to his date last

insured, therefore, her opinions to function after his date last insured are not at issue. (Tr.

27) 

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2. Plaintiff’s Parents

The ALJ discussed the opinions of Plaintiff’s parents, stating that the “substantial

evidence of record reveals the claimant has no more than mild restrictions with functioning

prior to December 31, 2004. His treating psychiatrists have all noted good improvement in

his symptoms and functioning since treatment with medications and therapy.” The ALJ

found the opinions of Plaintiff’s parents not applicable after the date last insured, and before

the date last insured, gave the opinions very little weight as the ALJ found them not well

supported by the other substantial evidence of record. (Tr. 28) 

3. Linda Kalatz

The ALJ gave the opinion of Linda Kalatz, who had known Plaintiff all his life, very

little weight. (Tr. 28) The ALJ explained that although Ms. Kalatz noted that Plaintiff has

suffered severe asthma since his birth which has caused him emotional and physical

problems all of his life, she provided only current examples of functional limitations.

Additionally, she opined that Plaintiff has severe depression, but did not actually note the

level of his functional inabilities. The ALJ found that her opinions were not supported by

the other substantial evidence of record and could be given very little weight with regard to

his functional abilities prior to December 31, 2004. (Tr. 28) 

The ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s parent’s and Ms. Kalatz’s opinions were not

supported by the other substantial evidence of record is incorrect. As previously discussed

in section IV.C., above, for the same reasons the Magistrate Judge found the ALJ’s second

reason for rejecting Dr. Garland’s opinion improper, the evidence supports Plaintiff’s these

opinions. 

Furthermore, to the extent that the ALJ again concludes that Plaintiff’s improvement

of symptoms and functions on November 29, 2004, is a lasting improvement which renders

Plaintiff functional and his depression “gone,” Plaintiff’s parent’s testimony as to symptoms

and functional limitations after November 31, 2004, is relevant. To the extent the ALJ

rejects Ms. Naito’s opinions because she did not limit her discussion to Plaintiff’s ability to

function prior to December 31, 2004, her testimony is relevant in this respect as well. 

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G. Function-by-Function Assessment of Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity

Because the Magistrate Judge finds that the ALJ erred at step four in evaluating the

opinion of Dr. Garland, Plaintiff’s credibility, and the lay witness testimony, it is unnecessary

to reach plaintiff's further alleged errors. 

H. Remand/Reverse

The district court has discretion to remand for further proceedings or to award

benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.1989). Remand for an award of

benefits is appropriate where:

(1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the

evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record that

the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence

credited.

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593, (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Where the test

is met, "we will not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings...Rather we

take the relevant testimony to be established as true and remand for an award of benefits."

Id. (citations omitted); see also Lester, 81 F.3d at 834.

The ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Garland’s opinion, and in finding Plaintiff not credible.

Furthermore, the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons to give little weight to the

opinions of the lay witnesses. 

Because the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Garland’s opinion, this Court must credit the

evidence as true. See Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594 (citations omitted). The vocational expert

addressed specifically the opinion of Dr. Garland as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations, and

testified that, taking those limitations into account, Plaintiff would not be able to perform his

past relevant work or any work which exists in significant numbers in our national economy.

(Tr. 454) Thus, crediting Dr. Garland’s opinion as true would result in a finding that Plaintiff

would be disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation process due to his inability to

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perform past relevant work or any other kind of work in the national economy. 

No similar vocational opinion is available to address Plaintiff’s allegations of

limitations or the allegations made by lay witnesses, however, no useful purpose would be

had in remanding the case for further administrative findings as it is clear from the record

that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled if Dr. Garland’s opinion is

credited. 

Because the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr.

Garland’s opinion, and that opinion, if credited as true establishes that Plaintiff is disabled,

the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge reverse the decision that plaintiff

is not disabled, and remand for an immediate award of benefits. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, it is the recommendation of this Court that the District

Judge, after his independent review and consideration, enter an Order GRANTING

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 10), DENYING Defendant's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 18), and REMAND this case for an immediate

award of benefits. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 07-246-TUC-DCB.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc). 

DATED this 30th day of May, 2008.

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