Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02169/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner and a co-defendant were charged with selling

a debit card to two undercover police officers for $80. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Khalil Shakur, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-02169 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles Ryan, Arizona Attorney ) 

General, )

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus on November, 2011. Respondents filed a

Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”)

(Doc. 11) on February 3, 2012. Petitioner replied to the answer

to his petition on March 5, 2012. See Doc. 13.

I Procedural History

In a direct complaint entered August 13, 2007,

Petitioner, named as Eric Thomas, was charged by a grand jury

indictment with one count of trafficking in the identity of

another. See Answer, Exh. A.1 On September 14, 2007, a

preliminary hearing was ordered. See id., Exh. B.

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 The state initially alleged a 2007 pending charge for

possession of marijuana and a 1997 conviction for aggravated assault,

in addition to two convictions for possession of narcotics in 1992 and

1988, and four other convictions occurring between 1979 and 1986.

Answer, Exh. F. 

3

 Two pre-trial settlement conferences were conducted with

two different commissioners and at both conferences Petitioner

indicated he was not interested in a plea agreement regardless of the

sentence he faced if found guilty. Answer, Exh. L.

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On September 18, 2007, a grand jury indictment was

returned charging Petitioner with one count of trafficking in

the identity of another. See id., Exh. C. That same date the

state moved to vacate the preliminary hearing, which motion was

granted. See id., Exh. C & Exh. D. 

On December 12, 2007, the state amended the indictment

to allege Petitioner had previously been convicted of seven

felonies. See id., Exh. F.2 Petitioner was tried before a jury,

which found him guilty as charged on February 7, 2008.3 Id.,

Exh. O. 

At sentencing, in return for the state recommending a

“super-mitigated” sentence, Petitioner stipulated that he had

two prior convictions. Id., Exh. OO at Exh. D. The trial court

sentenced Petitioner to an “exceptionally mitigated” sentence of

10.5 years in prison. Id., Exh. OO at Exh. D. 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. On October 23, 2008, Petitioner’s

appointed appellate counsel informed the Arizona Court of

Appeals that counsel had found no legitimate argument to raise

on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. V. Counsel averred to the

Court of Appeals that he had contacted Petitioner “soliciting

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suggested issues,” and that Petitioner had identified the

following issues that he wished to raise on appeal: 

1. Petitioner’s rights were violated when his

preliminary hearing was vacated and his case presented to the

grand jury;

2. Petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of

counsel was violated; 

3. Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated by

the state’s selective and vindictive prosecution; and 

4. Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated by

prosecutorial misconduct. 

Petitioner was given the opportunity to file a

supplemental brief in his direct appeal but did not file a pro

se brief. Id., Exh. W & Exh. Z at 2. 

On June 23, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in a memorandum decision

addressing each of the issues related by Petitioner’s appointed

counsel. Id., Exh. Z. The Arizona Court of Appeals also

addressed, inter alia, whether there was sufficient evidence to

convict Petitioner and whether the jury had been properly

empaneled and instructed. Petitioner did not seek review of

this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Petitioner initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Civil

Procedure, on September 9, 2009. Id., Exh. EE. Petitioner was

appointed counsel to represent him in his Rule 32 proceedings.

On May 24, 2010, counsel informed the trial court that she could

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find no colorable claim to present on Petitioner’s behalf. Id.,

Exh. II. 

On July 21, 2010, Petitioner filed a supplemental

petition. Id., Exh. KK. On August 19, 2010, Petitioner filed

a second supplemental petition, which the trial court struck

without prejudice because it did not comply with Rule 32.5,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. LL & Exh. NN.

On September 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a third

supplemental petition in his Rule 32 action, alleging: 

1. The state had “misled” the grand jury by presenting

hearsay testimony rather than “first hand” testimony; 

2. The state violated Petitioner’s rights by depriving

him of a preliminary hearing; 

3. He was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel. Petitioner alleged his counsel failed to challenge

the grand jury proceedings, failed to adequately present

Petitioner’s motion for a voluntariness hearing, failed to

inform Petitioner of his right to have grand jury transcripts,

and failed to object on conflict of interest grounds to the

commissioner who conducted Petitioner’s settlement conference

and a trial management conference; and 

4. Ineffective assistance of counsel, with regard to

establishing Petitioner’s historical priors. See id., Exh. OO.

On February 16, 2011, the state Superior Court

dismissed Petitioner’s action for post-conviction relief. The

trial court found Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel were not colorable and that Petitioner’s remaining

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claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(2), Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, because they had been finally adjudicated on

appeal. Id., Exh. RR. 

In his federal habeas action Petitioner asserts that

his constitutional rights were violated by prosecutorial

misconduct (Ground One), the denial of his right to a

preliminary hearing (Ground Two), prosecutorial misconduct and

ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to Petitioner’s

prior convictions (Ground Three), and ineffective assistance of

counsel during his trial and appellate proceedings (Ground

Four).

Respondents contend that Grounds One, Three, and Four

of Petitioner’s habeas claims have not been properly exhausted

in state court, and therefore, are procedurally barred.

Respondents assert habeas relief should not be granted on Ground

Two of the petition because the Arizona court’s conclusion that

Petitioner was not denied his federal constitutional rights by

the termination of the preliminary hearing upon Petitioner’s

indictment was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

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 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2011).

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federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).4 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

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Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2011). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

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procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

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C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

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substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to prove that, “but

for” the alleged constitutional violations, there is a

reasonable probability he would not have been convicted of the

same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th

Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999).

Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a

procedural default, the Court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43

(1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

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standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

E. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims 

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41,

125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003); Crittenden v. Ayers, 624

F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873,

881 (9th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212

(9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption of correctness is equally

applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a state

trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455

U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304-05 (1982).

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A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544

U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004). 

A state court decision is contrary to clearly

established federal law if it arrives at a

conclusion of law opposite to that of the

Supreme Court or reaches a result different

from the Supreme Court on materially

indistinguishable facts. Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). A

state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal

law if it correctly identifies a governing

rule but applies it to a new set of facts in

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if

it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly

established legal principle to a new set of

facts in a way that is objectively

unreasonable. Id. An unreasonable

application of federal law is different from

an incorrect application of federal law. Id.

McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.

denied, 131 S. Ct. 3066 (2011). 

For example, a state court’s decision is considered

contrary to federal law if the state court erroneously applied

the wrong standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim.

See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright

v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47

(2008); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2010),

cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557 (2011). See also Frantz v. Hazey,

533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d

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 “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court

to grant relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly

applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v.

Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2011).

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1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009). 

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994 (9th Cir. 2010); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2008). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). An unreasonable

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See

Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077,

1080 (9th Cir. 2005).5

A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief

so long as “fairminded jurists could

disagree” on the correctness of the state

court’s decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, []

(2004). And as this Court has explained,

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes

in case-by-case determinations.” Ibid. “[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that

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has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, [] 129 S.Ct.

1411, 1413–14, [] (2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

The phrase “clearly established Federal law”

refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta,” of the Supreme Court’s decisions “as

of the time of the relevant state-court

decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412, 120 S. Ct. 1495 [] (2000). A state

court’s decision is “contrary to” this body

of law if it applies a rule that contradicts

the governing law articulated by the Supreme

Court or arrives at a result different than

that reached by the Supreme Court in a case

with materially indistinguishable facts. Id.

at 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495.

 A decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal

law if it “identifies the correct governing

legal principle ... but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case.” Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. 1495. The

Supreme Court has emphasized that “an

unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of

federal law.” Id. at 410, 120 S. Ct. 1495.

Accordingly, “a federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly.” Id. at 411, 120 S. Ct. 1495.

Instead, the court must determine whether the

state court’s application of Supreme Court

precedents was objectively unreasonable. Id.

at 409, 120 S. Ct. 1495. Although the Supreme

Court’s decisions are the focus of the

unreasonable-application inquiry, we may look

to Ninth Circuit case law as “persuasive

authority for purposes of determining whether

a particular state court decision is an

‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court

law.” Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000).

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Additionally, the United States Supreme Court recently

held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits in

the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise

requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54, 127

S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59 (2007); Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790,

805-06 (9th Cir. 2011); Norris, 622 F.3d at 1286; Howard, 608

F.3d at 568.

F. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner contends that his rights were violated

by “Prosecutorial Misconduct: misleading the Grand Jury to

Indict.”

Respondents assert this claim is procedurally barred

because Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his claim either

on direct appeal or in a properly-filed action for state

post-conviction relief. Respondents contend that, although

Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel noted in an “Anders”

brief that Petitioner believed his “constitutional rights” were

violated by “prosecutorial misconduct,” Petitioner did not

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provide the court with any factual basis for this claim because

Petitioner did not file a pro per brief in his direct appeal.

A petitioner must present to the state courts the

“substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-

14 (1971); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir.

2009). Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to

present the substance of his claim to the state courts,

including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and

a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v.

Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and

verse on the federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to

the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-

13, they must do more than present the facts necessary to

support the federal claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4,

6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982). Petitioner never even presented

the facts necessary to support this claim to the state court in

a direct appeal. Accordingly, because the factual and legal

predicate for this claim was not fairly presented to the state

court in Petitioner’s direct appeal, Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted this claim. Rose, 395 F.3d at 1111.

To the extent Petitioner raised the factual and

constitutional basis for this habeas claim in his action for

state post-conviction relief, the state court found the issue

precluded because it was decided on the merits in Petitioner’s

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6

 The state court concluded that, as a matter of fact,

Petitioner was not subjected to either prosecutorial vindictiveness

nor was he subjected to prosecutorial misconduct. The state court did

not discuss nor cite to federal cases discussing the United States

Constitution when denying these claims. 

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direct appeal.6

To constitute an adequate and independent state

procedural ground sufficient to support a state court’s finding

of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s

purported default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 2001). A state rule is considered consistently

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in

the “vast majority of cases.” Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1221

n.6 (1989). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that

“federal courts should not insist upon a petitioner, as a

procedural prerequisite to obtaining federal relief, comply[]

with a rule the state itself does not consistently enforce.”

Id., 567 F.3d at 581-82, quoting Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d

1308, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994). It is Respondents’ burden to prove

the rule cited and relied upon by the state court in denying

relief was clear, consistently applied, and well-established at

the time the rule was applied to Petitioner’s case. Id. 

As noted supra, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims have

been found to be clear, consistently applied, and wellestablished at the time the rules were applied to Petitioner’s

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state action for post-conviction relief. See Stewart, 536 U.S.

at 860, 122 S. Ct. at 2581 (holding Arizona’s state rules

regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims raised in

attacks on criminal convictions are adequate and independent

state grounds for affirming a conviction and denying federal

habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar). Therefore,

to the extent that it can be found that Petitioner properly

presented this habeas claim to the state court in his Rule 32

action, the state court found relief on the merits of the claim

procedurally barred by operation of the state rules of criminal

procedure. Additionally, Petitioner did not seek review of the

Superior Court’s denial of relief by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Therefore, Petitioner did not fairly present this

habeas claim to the state’s “highest court” in a procedurally

correct manner.

In response to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts that he could not properly pursue his habeas

claims in the state courts because his appellate counsel’s

performance was deficient, i.e., counsel failed to raise and

properly present the issues in Petitioner’s direct appeal.

Petitioner also asserts that his transfer to a prison in

Colorado prevented him from filing a pro per brief in his direct

appeal. Petitioner also contends that he was denied his right

to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel,

asserting that his appointed post-conviction counsel had a

conflict because all public defendants’ counsel are conflicted

with regard to their representation of defendants in Rule 32

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proceedings.

Petitioner has not established cause for nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of this habeas claim. Nor

has Petitioner established that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice will occur if the merits of this claim are not

considered. 

2. Petitioner claims that he was denied his “right to

have a preliminary hearing,” arguing that the trial court’s

failure to afford Petitioner such a hearing “clearly circumvents

the United States Constitution Amendment Fourth (14)-due process

of law, as well as both the Arizona claims.” In his traverse

Petitioner states that he was subjected to prosecutorial

misconduct by the denial of his “right” to a preliminary

hearing. 

 Petitioner alleges that he was denied his right to a

preliminary hearing, which constituted prosecutorial misconduct

and a violation of his right to due process of law. Petitioner

raised similar claims in his direct appeal. The Arizona Court

of Appeals denied relief on this claim, stating:

 First, Shakur’s rights were not violated

when the court vacated his preliminary

hearing upon indictment by the grand jury on

the same charge. The United States

Constitution, Arizona Constitution, Arizona

statutes and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 5.1 do not

grant the defendant an absolute right to a

preliminary hearing. A preliminary hearing is

only required when a person is prosecuted for

a felony by information rather than

indictment. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 30.

The preliminary hearing may be waived

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 5.1(b) by

written waiver signed by the defendant and an

attorney or when the charges are dismissed

upon return of a grand jury indictment. See

State v. Gonzales, 111 Ariz. 38, 42, 523 P.2d

66, 70 (1974) (holding the defendant has no

right to choose whether the State proceeds by

either indictment or information). Here, the

court vacated Shakur’s preliminary hearing

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upon return of the grand jury’s indictment on

the same charge. Thus, the superior court did

not fundamentally err by vacating the

preliminary hearing.

Answer, Exh. Z. 

The state court’s decision was not clearly contrary to

federal law. The Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution does not require indictment by a grand jury,

although it clearly requires some pretrial screening of criminal

charges. See Cooksey v. Delo, 94 F.3d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir.

1996). However, the federal courts have uniformly concluded

that “a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is not a federal

constitutional right which, if denied, requires a petitioner’s

release on habeas corpus.” Pappillion v. Beto, 257 F. Supp.

502, 503 (S.D. Tex. 1966). See also Murphy v. Beto, 416 F.2d

98, 100 (5th Cir. 1969).

 Petitioner was not deprived of a constitutional right

because he was not afforded a complete preliminary hearing, and,

accordingly, relief may be denied on this claim because it is

not cognizable in a section 2254 action. 

3. Petitioner asserts that he was subjected to

“prosecutorial misconduct” and denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because the state alleged prior

convictions that Petitioner contends could not properly be used

to enhance his sentence. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner did not fairly

present this claim to the state courts in a procedurally correct

manner and that the claim has been defaulted. 

Petitioner did not file a pro per brief in his direct

appeal. Accordingly, Petitioner did not allege that he was

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denied his federal constitutional right to a fair trial or due

process of law based on the prosecutor alleging prior

convictions which Petitioner asserts could not be used to

enhance his sentence. Petitioner did not “fairly present” this

claim to the state’s highest court in a procedurally correct

manner. 

Additionally, even if Petitioner properly presented

this claim in his state action for post-conviction relief,

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals

of the trial court’s decision denying relief pursuant to Rule

32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the claim

was not “fairly presented” to the state’s “highest court” in a

procedurally correct manner and the claim has been procedurally

defaulted.

As noted supra, Petitioner has not shown cause for nor

prejudice arising from his procedural default of this claim.

Petitioner has not established that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice will occur absent a consideration of the merits of the

claim. Therefore, the claim does not warrant the granting of

relief.

4. Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to

the effective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner raised an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim in his first Rule 32 proceedings.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a habeas petitioner must show both that his attorney’s

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

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petitioner’s defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was

within the range of reasonable professional assistance required

of attorneys in that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687,

104 S. Ct. at 2064. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must

establish that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.

Ct. at 2068. See also, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct.

770, 786-88 (2011). Counsel’s performance will be held

constitutionally deficient only if the defendant proves thier

actions “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as

measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052. See also Cheney v. Washington,

614 F.3d 987, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2010).

 To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. See also, e.g., Cheney, 614 F.3d at 994. Therefore, to

succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was deficient

because counsel failed to raise a particular argument, either in

his trial proceedings or in his appeals, the petitioner must

establish the argument was likely to be successful, thereby

establishing that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s omission.

See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007);

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Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). “It is

not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Accordingly,

prejudice from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance is less

likely when the case against the defendant is strong. See,

e.g., Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390-91 (2009); Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2002); Godwin v. Johnson,

632 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2011). It is Petitioner’s burden to

establish both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and

that he was prejudiced thereby. See, e.g., Wong, 130 S. Ct. at

384-85 (2009).

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy

task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010),

quoted in Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. However, the Court

must apply an extremely deferential standard of review with

regard to Strickland claims presented by a state habeas

petitioner. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (“A state court

must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in

operation when the case involves review under the Strickland

standard itself.”).

Establishing that a state court’s application

of Strickland was unreasonable under §

2254(d) is all the more difficult. The

standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d)

are both “highly deferential,” id., at 689,

104 S.Ct. 2052; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 333, n.7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d

481 (1997), and when the two apply in tandem,

review is “doubly” so, Knowles, 556 U.S., at

––––, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. The Strickland

standard is a general one, so the range of

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reasonable applications is substantial. 556

U.S., at ––––, 129 S. Ct. at 1420. Federal

habeas courts must guard against the danger

of equating unreasonableness under Strickland

with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When

§ 2254(d) applies, the question is not

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable.

The question is whether there is any

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

The state court thoroughly examined Petitioner’s claims

regarding ineffective assistance of counsel presented in his

state Rule 32 action and denied relief on this claim. The state

court concluded that no alleged incident of deficient

performance was prejudicial with regard to the outcome of

Petitioner’s criminal proceedings. 

This decision was not clearly contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of Strickland. The Court notes that

Petitioner’s counsel was prepared to try the issue of his prior

felonies. See Answer, Exh. T. Additionally, as noted by the

state court, the sentencing agreement to stipulate to two prior

historical felony convictions in return for receiving a supermitigated sentence was extremely beneficial to Petitioner. The

state alleged seven prior felony convictions and, if proved,

Petitioner faced a considerably longer term of imprisonment.

III Conclusion

With the exception of his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal habeas

claims in the Arizona state courts by fairly presenting the

factual and legal basis for the claims to the Arizona Court of

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Appeals in a procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not

shown cause for nor prejudice arising from his default of his

claims, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur

absent consideration of the merits of the claims. Additionally,

the state court’s decision that Petitioner was not denied the

effective assistance of counsel was not clearly contrary to nor

an unreasonable application of federal law.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Shakur’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 8th day of March, 2012.

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