Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00757/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00757-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Because the Petition is not consecutively paginated, the

Court will cite to it using the page numbers assigned by the

electronic case filing system.

2

 Agnew originally named “Hedgepath (Warden)” as the

respondent. (Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) On April 22, 2011, United States

District Court Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz issued an order, in part,

substituting Matthew Cate as Respondent in place of Hedgepath. 

(Order Granting Appl. Proceeding in Forma Pauperis 1 n.1, ECF No.

3.) 

1 11cv00757 RBB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JILBRAUN DANDTON AGNEW,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 11cv00757 RBB

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL [ECF NO. 11]

Petitioner Jilbraun Dandton Agnew, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on April 11, 2011 [ECF Nos. 1, 3].1 Agnew argues that

during his jury trial, the prosecutor improperly questioned

witnesses about evidence that the trial judge had previously ruled

was inadmissible. (See Pet. 6-9, ECF No. 1.) On July 27, 2011,

Respondent Matthew Cate2 filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Case 3:11-cv-00757-RBB Document 14 Filed 08/10/11 Page 1 of 7
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Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 12]. The parties consented to magistrate

judge jurisdiction; consequently, Judge Moskowitz referred the case

to this Court [ECF Nos. 9, 13]. 

This Motion for Appointment of Counsel was filed nunc pro tunc

to July 26, 2011 [ECF No. 11]. In support of his request,

Petitioner asserts that the issues in this action are particularly

complex. (Mot. Appointment Counsel 1, ECF No. 11.) According to

Agnew, the complex issues include prosecutorial misconduct, the

admission of evidence that was previously deemed inadmissible, and

the trial court’s error in allowing the prosecutor to ask questions

about other instances of Agnew’s alleged misconduct. (Id.) 

Petitioner also maintains that due to the length of his sentence,

the interests of justice require an appointed attorney. (Id.) 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to

federal habeas corpus actions by state prisoners. McCleskey v.

Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191,

1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th

Cir. 1986). Nonetheless, financially eligible habeas petitioners

seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever “the court determines that the interests of justice

so require . . . .” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (West Supp.

2011); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (9th Cir.

1990); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984); see

Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). The

interests of justice require an appointed lawyer when the court

conducts an evidentiary hearing on the petition. Rule 8(c), 28

U.S.C. foll. § 2254; Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1181; Knaubert, 791

F.2d at 728; see Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir.

Case 3:11-cv-00757-RBB Document 14 Filed 08/10/11 Page 2 of 7
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1994). Otherwise, whether to appoint an attorney is entirely

within the discretion of the district court. Knaubert, 791 F.2d at

728.

“Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief are not

entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a

particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to

prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196; see

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728-29. A due process violation may occur if

the issues involved are too complex for the petitioner to handle

without the assistance of an attorney. In addition, the

appointment of counsel may be necessary if the petitioner has

limited education and is incapable of presenting the claims in the

petition. Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1970). 

“[A] district court should consider the legal complexity of the

case, the factual complexity of the case, the petitioner’s ability

to investigate and present his claim, and any other relevant

factors.” Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573.

Because these factors are useful in determining whether due

process requires court-appointed counsel, they are considered to

the extent possible based on the record before this Court. Agnew

argues, “Counsel should be appointed because the issues in this

case are particularly complex.” (Mot. Appointment Counsel 1, ECF

No. 11.) He continues, “The issues include: Prosecutor

misconduct, admitting inadmissible evidence that was ruled during

[in] limine motion[,] court error allowing the prosecutor to infect

trial with uncharged misconduct.” (Id.) Despite this contention,

Agnew has sufficiently represented himself to date. The Petitioner

has prepared and filed a sixteen-page Petition for Writ of Habeas

Case 3:11-cv-00757-RBB Document 14 Filed 08/10/11 Page 3 of 7
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Corpus with thirty-three pages of exhibits [ECF No. 1], a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2], and this Motion for

Appointment of counsel [ECF No. 11]. Agnew filed these documents

within a period that spanned less than four months, and there is no

indication that anyone other than Petitioner drafted them. He has

adequately represented himself. Agnew’s Petition was pleaded

sufficiently for this Court to direct Respondent to file an answer

or other responsive pleading to the Petition [ECF No. 4]. 

From the face of the Petition, it appears that Petitioner has

a good understanding of this case and the legal issues involved. 

(See Pet. 6-9, ECF No. 1.) The Petition contains a recitation of

relevant facts as well as legal arguments with citations to case

law and other supporting authority. (See id.) Based on the detail

and clarity of the Petition, Agnew has competently presented his

claims. He has not pointed to any particular circumstances that

would make the appointment of counsel necessary at this time. See

Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1234 (denying request for appointed counsel

where petitioner thoroughly presented the issues in his petition

and memorandum of law). Moreover, “[t]he procedures employed by

the federal courts are highly protective of a pro se petitioner’s

rights. The district court is required to construe a pro se

petition more liberally than it would construe a petition drafted

by counsel.” Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 729; see Bashor, 730 F.2d at

1234. At this stage of the proceedings, the interests of justice

do not require that Agnew receive attorney representation. 

“Where the issues involved can be properly resolved on the

basis of the state court record, a district court does not abuse

its discretion in denying a request for court-appointed counsel.” 

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Hoggard, 29 F.3d at 471; McCann v. Armontrout, 973 F.2d 655, 661

(8th Cir. 1992); Travis v. Lockhart, 787 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir.

1986) (per curiam). Here, Agnew alleges that the prosecutor

committed prejudicial misconduct during the jury trial by asking

witnesses questions about whether Petitioner had punched a woman in

an unrelated incident, which was evidence that the trial judge had

previously ruled was inadmissible. (Pet. 6-9, ECF No. 1.) The

Petitioner also asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the

prosecutor to ask witnesses questions about Agnew’s other alleged

misconduct. (Id. at 6.) The Court has been provided with all

relevant documents and transcripts to properly resolve the

allegations in the Petition on the basis of the record. (See

Answer Attach. #1 Notice Lodgment 1-2, ECF No. 12); Hoggard, 29

F.3d at 471; McCann, 973 F.2d at 661; Travis, 787 F.2d at 411. 

Additionally, Agnew maintains that the interests of justice

require appointed representation “[d]ue to the length of

Petitioner’s sentence,” which is thirty-eight years to life. (Mot.

Appointment Counsel 1, ECF No. 11; see Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) “A

habeas petitioner’s interest in release from illegal confinement

undoubtedly is high. However, . . . due process does not require

appointment of counsel when an evidentiary hearing is not held.” 

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 729. Further, in habeas corpus actions,

counsel is typically only appointed in (1) capital cases, (2) cases

that turn on complex procedural or mixed legal and factual issues,

(3) actions litigated by petitioners who are mentally or physically

impaired, (4) matters that will likely require experts, (5) actions

involving petitioners who are unable to investigate crucial facts,

and (6) factually complex cases. Salango v. Sisto, No. CIV S-09-

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0044-TJB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13071, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7,

2011). Thus, Agnew’s prison term of thirty-eight years to life is

not central to whether appointed counsel is necessary to prevent

due process violations. See id.; see also Chaney, 801 F.2d at

1196. 

Indeed, the assistance that counsel provides a petitioner is

valuable. “An attorney may narrow the issues and elicit relevant

information from his or her client. An attorney may highlight the

record and present to the court a reasoned analysis of the

controlling law.” Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 729. Even so, “[u]nless

an evidentiary hearing is held, an attorney’s skill in developing

and presenting new evidence is largely superfluous; the district

court is entitled to rely on the state court record alone.” Id.

(citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-57 (1981); 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)). If a court denies a petitioner’s request for

appointment of counsel, the court will draw an independent legal

conclusion after informing itself of the relevant law. Id.

“Therefore, the additional assistance provided by attorneys, while

significant, is not compelling.” Id. 

 When a pro se petitioner presents a claim that the state

court made an unreasonable determination of the facts, the court

may exercise its discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at

n.6. In that circumstance, counsel must be appointed to a

petitioner who qualifies under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). Id.;

see Rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254; Wood v. Wainwright, 597

F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1979). The Court may also appoint counsel for

the effective utilization of any discovery process. Rule 6(a), 28

U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. An evidentiary hearing has not been ordered

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\AGNEW757\Order re Appointment of Counsel.wpd 7 11cv00757 RBB

in this case, and at this time, it does not appear that discovery

will be necessary.

For the reasons stated above, the interests of justice do not

compel the appointment of counsel to represent Agnew at this stage

of the case. Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is

DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 10, 2011

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: All parties

Case 3:11-cv-00757-RBB Document 14 Filed 08/10/11 Page 7 of 7