Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02219/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02219-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

.. 

FILED 

United Star.us Court uf Appeala 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 2 31989 

MICHAEL W. O'ROURKE, SHIRLEY M. O'ROURKE 

and KATHLEEN O'ROURKE, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

THE CITY OF NORMAN, a Municipal Corporation; 

KELVIN WINTER and DOUG McKENZIE, individually and in their official capacity as duly 

authorized law enforcement officers for the 

City of Norman; and STEVE CAIN, individually 

and in his official capacity as a police 

supervisor and a duly authorized law 

enforcement officer for the City of Norman, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) Nos. 86-2098 

) & 86-2219 

) (D.C •. CIV-85-10-B) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

Michael Salem of Salem Law Offices, Norman, Oklahoma, and Louis W. 

Bullock of Bullock & Bullock, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffsAppellants. 

Burton J. Johnson (Patricia D. Herron, Assistant City Attorney, 

Norman, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs) of Looney, Nichols, 

Johnson & Hayes, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantsAppellees. 

Don Ed Payne of Payne & Welch, Hugo, Oklahoma, and Louis F. 

Cooper, Bethesda, Maryland, filed an Amicus Curiae brief for 

American Civil Liberties Union of Oklahoma; Arthur B. Spitzer and 

Elizabeth Symonds, Washington, D.C., filed an Amicus Curiae brief 

for American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area; 

Karen L. Long of Watson & McKenzie, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, filed 

an Amicus Curiae brief for Oklahoma Education Association. 

Before McKAY, BRIGHT * and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior United States 

Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Circuit 

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from a judgment against the plaintiffs in a 

non-jury trial. O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 640 F. Supp. 1451 

:(,W .D .-,,,Okla. ":".:1986) ~ . The. plaintiffs'-. claiin alleged a· violation of 

42 u.s.c. § 1983 arising from the nighttime search of their home 

pursuant to a daytime bench warrant for contempt issued by a small 

claims court. Basing its decision on extensive findings of fact 

and erroneous conclusions of law, the district court awarded the 

defendants attorney's fees and costs totalling $19,956.34 from 

Michael Salem, plaintiffs' attorney, pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 

u.s.c. § 1927, and $2,098.85 from the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 

11. These awards are also on appeal, and the cases are 

consolidated here. 

The plaintiffs make the following conclusions and requests 

for relief from this Court: 

1. The ruling of the trial court that the bench 

warrant was a felony and not a misdemeanor should be 

reversed as provided herein. 

2. The ruling of the trial court that the 

invalidity of the bench warrant under state law is not 

relevant to a federal civil rights action should be 

reversed and appropriate declaratory relief and damages 

entered against Defendants, or in the alternative, this 

matter remanded for a new trial. 

3. The policy, practice, procedure or custom of 

the Defendant City of permitting searches of homes 

incident to bench warrants and misdemeanors and in the 

absence of exigent circumstances should be declared 

unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

4. The sanctions imposed against Plaintiffs and 

their counsel should be reversed. 

5. This Court should enter an order of recusal 

and random reassignment of this action in the district 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 2 
court. 

6. This 

the purposes of 

fort :-costs"; :and 

Section 1988. 

Court determine the prevailing party for 

this appeal and make an order providing 

attorneys fees-as-provided by 42 u.s.c. 

Appellants Brief-in-Chief at 49. 

Because we find that the district court erred in its 

conclusions of law which were at the very core of this§ 1983 

claim, we REVERSE. Consistent with this reversal and plaintiffs' 

success on the substance of their complaint, we also REVERSE as to 

costs and attorney's fees awarded the defendants, and REMAND on 

the issue of costs and attorney's fees for the platntiffs as 

provided by 42 u.s.c. § 1988. 

I. 

The following facts are relevant to this decision. 1 On May 

16, 1983, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officers Winter and 

McKenzie of the Norman Police Department in Oklahoma arrived at 

the home of the O'Rourkes to execute a state, daytime bench 

1 We have adopted only the facts set out in this opinion. Our 

failure to rule on the district court's finding of facts to 

support "probable cause" should not be construed as our acceptance 

of the district court's reasoning, e.g., we do not hold that it 

was reasonable for a police officer to assume that the plaintiffs 

were lying because the officer "had on previous occasions 

encountered deceit and hostility in dealing with other members of 

the O'Rourke family, noteably [sic] the son Wesley, in a criminal 

context." O'Rourke, 640 F. Supp. at 1460. Our legal system has a 

long-time aversion to ''corruption by blood." Loving v. Virginia, 

388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 

242-43 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 

885 (1945); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 3 
1 warrant for contempt. 2 The warrant was to be served on Deborah 

Boyd, the O'Rourkes' emancipated daughter. Obvious from the face 

'Of::.the,-wa·rrant"was·that:•: ·(-1-) t-he",order ·autho·r-ized the arrest of 

Deborah Boyd for contempt; (2) the warrant was issued on February 

22, 1983 -- three months prior to its execution; (3) it was not 

endorsed for nighttime execution; and, (4) the warrant was issued 

for failure to appear in a small-claims proceeding as designated 

by "SC" before the warrant number. 3 Nevertheless, despite all of 

these factors, police officers Winter and McKenzie entered the 

O'Rourke home at 10:00 p.m. (O'Rourke, 640 F. Supp. at 1455.) 

They asked if Deborah Boyd were there; the O'Rourkes answered in 

the negative and this was undisputed at trial. 4 (O'Rourke, 640 F. 

2 The execution of the warrant was precipitated by a telephone 

call to the Norman Police Department by Linda Robillard, the 

mother of Claire Robillard. Claire Robillard was also on the 

line. Linda Robillard conveyed that her daughter had a judgment 

against Deborah Boyd and a warrant out for her arrest. Robillard 

told the operator at the Norman Police Department that Deborah 

Boyd "normally lives out of town." She was in town for a child 

support issue. "She lives, when she's in Norman, with her parents 

at 2602 Chateau." Robillard said she wasn't sure if the address 

was 2602 or not. The operator asked if Deborah Boyd were there 

now. Robillard answered, "I'm not certain of that." Claire 

Robillard told the operator "If you go late at night you know 

she's there because she has a baby." Again the operator asked 

whether she was there or not. Linda Robillard replied, "Well I've 

been told that she is, and it's possible the police could go there 

tonight and she would be there." The operator then replied, 

"O.K., well, we'll see what we can do tonight." 

3 designated 

warrants." 

Concerning 

Captain Darian DeBolt was unsure of what "SC" 

since "we rarely, if ever, serve these types of 

Investigation, Conclusion, and Recommendations 

Complaint 83-09, Section 8, p. 4. In the same 

quoted Officer Winter as also ignorant of what "SC" 

memorandum he 

Id. . 

4 The district court found that the O'Rourkes' 

the residence of Deborah Boyd. 

-4-

designated. 

home was also 

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 4 
Supp. at 1456.) Mr. O'Rourke, doubtful of the legality of the 

nighttime search of his home, telephoned the Norman Police 

____ :Department ,and. 0 spoke·,·:With L.t·. · Cai·ni ·the 0·\·Supervisor on duty. Lt. 

Cain informed Mr. O'Rourke that he already knew of the search and 

that "if the officers had a warrant for Boyd's arrest and probable 

cause to believe that she might be in the residence, they did not 

need a search warrant and did have a right to enter the residence 

and search for Boyd." (O'Rourke, 640 F. Supp. at 1456.) Lt. Cain 

did not address the validity of the nighttime execution of a 

daytime bench warrant, whether Deborah Boyd was at the home, or 

whether, indeed, the O'Rourke home was Deborah Boyd's residence or 

a third party residence. The conversation terminated with Mr. 

O'Rourke informing Lt. Cain that the offlcers did not have his 

permission to search his home. (O'Rourke, 640 F. Supp. at 1456.) 

Mr. O'Rourke then called upon his daughter, Kathleen, and wife to 

witness his statements to the police officers that he would not 

interfere with the search, but was not in any way consenting to 

it. (O'Rourke, 640 F. Supp. at 1456.) At trial, Lt. Cain 

testified he would not have stopped the officers from searching. 

The police officers searched every room in the O'Rourke home. 

They even searched a bedroom in which the O'Rourkes' two year old 

grandson lay sleeping. It was undisputed at trial that the police 

officers were courteous and the district court so held. 

(O'Rourke, 640 F. Supp. at 1457.) Deborah Boyd was not in the 

O'Rourkes' home at the time of the search, nor was there any 

-5-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 5 
evidence that she had been. 

· c·At tr-i-al,, ,-the·,,uefendants.·called. as· an· expert witness, Samuel 

Chapman, a Professor of Political Science at the University of 

Oklahoma and instructor at the Norman Police Academy. He 

acknowledged instructing many of the Norman police officers, 

including some of the defendants, and opined that the police 

officers' 

practice." 

"performed within the context .of accepted police 

Furthermore, he agreed with or recalled making 

comments to the effect that "[w]hether or not it's the person's 

residence is not the obligation of the Police. They are looking 

for a person; not a residence .•.. If it's the home of a third 

person and she does not live there, but probable cause exists to 

believe she is there, it's not intrusive and improper police 

procedure to search." Clearly he did not have a working knowledge 

of Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), decided three 

years prior. 5 Chapman went on to testify that the search of the 

O'Rourkes' home was not a search at all it was merely a 

"recognizance." This is contrary to all Fourth Amendment law 

known to this Circuit. 6 

5 In Steagald, the Supreme Court held 

third-party residence for the subject 

requires a search warrant. Id. at 212-13. 

that 

of 

the 

an 

search 

arrest 

of a 

warrant 

6 On the last day of trial, while explaining the justifications 

for a verdict against the plaintiffs and sanctions, the trial 

judge stated: 

I want to say further, that the expert, 

Goddard who came here from Tecumseh, Kansas 

testified as a plaintiff's expert witness and 

Chapman testified as the defendant's expert witness 

-6-

Noah 

and 

Dr. 

and 

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 6 
Also admitted into evidence and relevant to this appeal was a 

copy of an "Office Memorandum" written by Norman Police Captain 

.. ,DeBolt-,~, 0 and. .. addressed .to , .. City .. of,· ... Norman-·-.. Police·- .. chief, 

Holyfield. The subject was "Investigation, Conclusion 

-Don 

and 

Recommendations Concerning Complaint 83-09." Complaint 83-09 was 

filed by Mr. O'Rourke on the evening of the search. In pertinent 

part, the office memorandum contained erroneous conclusions of law 

-- in fact, very old law. As to the authority of the police to 

make a home arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant, the memo cited 

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Dorman v. United 

States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There was no mention of 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Supreme Court's 

constitutional mandate at the time of the search and for the three 

years prior. 7 Also contained in the memo was the following 

from Dr. Chapman's examination and cross examination of 

Mr. Goddard, to me, you completely destroyed his 

testimony. It wasn't worth a nickel. Mr. Goddard's 

testimony absolutely was void of any credibility at all. 

On the other hand, Chapman has been an instructor 

and he's done much with the City of Norman and he's 

capable and he's trained and has trained and continues 

to train the Norman City Police Officers and he's to be 

commended for his work as such. (Tr., Vol. XXI, Ruling 

of the Court, p. 9.) 

7 In Payton, the Supreme Court in a dictum stated that "for 

Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable 

cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a 

dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to 

believe the suspect is within." Id. at 603 (emphasis addedT:° 

This Payton dictum will not support the police action for the 

Court's discussion there related to an arrest warrant for a 

felony, id. at 602, not a contempt as in this case, which is not a 

felony, as we discuss infra, slip op. at 11-15. Moreover, the 

police officer's conversation with the O'Rourkes relating to the 

absence of Deborah Boyd from the premises left police without any 

reason to believe the suspect was within that dwelling. Finally, 

-7-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 7 
11 statement, "Appellate courts are not clear on this issue. Some 

courts have affirmed the power of the police to search residences 

-. noL:- -.that ~-of. the ·defendant,-,:·if ·bhey· chave,iprobable cause to believe 

that the defendant is therein; others have denied that power." 

Obviously the Captain was ignorant of Steagald, controlling law at 

the time and for the two years prior. In the same memo, Captain 

DeBolt declared the search of the O'Rourke home illegal because 

the warrant was improperly served in the nighttime. 8 At trial, 

Norman Police Chief Don Holyfield testified that he read the 

report of Captain DeBolt and agreed with it, but questioned only 

the paragraphs relating to the necessity of a night endorsement 

for a bench warrant. 

Quoting from appellants' brief, "The facts of this case start 

small, 9 but like a[n] .•• avalanche, sweep down the constitutional 

slope of the Fourth Amendment and to date have gathered a record 

on appeal approaching 1000 pages and a trial transcript of over 

that dictum in Payton does not undercut the determination in the 

Steagald case that an arrest warrant for a third person will not 

justify the search of the homeowner who is not named in the 

warrant. Such a search violates the homeowner's rights under the 

fourth amendment. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211-16. 

8 For nineteen months plaintiffs sought unsuccessfully to 

obtain the information contained 1n this memo, dated June 10, 

1983. Plaintiffs' original complaint was filed January 2, 1985. 

Discovery was requested and defendants failed to comply. On 

August 8, 1985, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Discovery. 

9 The small claims judgment against Deborah Boyd resulted from 

a debt owed to her roommate, Claire Robillard, amounting to 

$125.00. When she failed to appear to show cause for nonpayment, 

the bench warrant was issued. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 8 
1250 pages." 

II. 

The prerequisite question we must address is whether the 

bench warrant issued for contempt of court was a felony warrant 

under Oklahoma law. If it were a felony warrant, nighttime 

execution would have been authorized under Oklahoma law, and 

constitutionally valid. The district court held that contempt in 

Oklahoma was a felony at all relevant times to this case. The 

basis for its determi_nation was federal er iminal law, common law, 

and de novo statutory interpretation. We disagree with its 

determination, and the legal reasoning used to arrive at it. 

It is axiomatic that the states, acting pursuant to the Tenth 

Amendment's "police powers," define state criminal law. 10 At 

issue, here, in this§ 1983 action is whether federal criminal law 

or common law defining contempt is a basis for defining contempt 

in Oklahoma, irrespective of contrary Oklahoma judicial 

interpretation spanning the past forty years. 

10 In the Constitution, the power to regulate criminal law has 

been left to the individual States and this power cannot be 

abridged by Congress. All the federal government can do is insure 

that the States do not, via police powers, "invade the sphere of 

national sovereignty, obstruct or impede the exercise of any 

authority which the Constitution has confided to the nation, or 

deprive any citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal 

Constitution." T. Cooley, 7th ed. (1903), A Treatise on the 

Constitutional Limitations at 830-32. 

-9-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 9 
Since the federal government is strictly limited by the 

powers enumerated in the Constitution, Congress may only 

·.· er iminalLze · an :,activity if .it .. is.uacting, pursuant" to -an enumerated 

power. We have seen the genesis of federal criminal law with the 

Mail Fraud Statute11 enacted in 1872 pursuant to the postal power. 

Later, under the taxing power, Congress enacted the federal tax 

crimes. 12 However, for most federal criminal laws in the past 

century, the jurisdictional basis is the Commerce Clause13 set 

forth in Article I, Section 8. Put simply, absent Constitutional 

violations, there is no jurisdictional basis for a federal judge 

to redefine state criminal law. As such, we hold that it was 

11 18 u.s.c. § 1341. 

12 26 u.s.c. §§ 7201, 7202, 7203, and 7206. 

13 In 1901, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress passed an 

Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic. In Champion v. Ames, 

188 U.S. 321 (1903), this Act was held constitutional. In 1910, 

based on Congress' authority to regulate commerce, Congress 

enacted the Mann Act which was held constitutional in Hoke v. 

United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). These two cases laid the 

foundation for Congressional enactment of our modern federal 

criminal law with federal jurisdiction relying on the Commerce 

Clause. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, cert. denied, 444 

U.S. 990 (1979) (Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, requires an 

interstate commerce nexus); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 

(1971) (the Supreme Court held that in a prosecution under the 

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. 

App. § 1202(a), interstate commerce nexus must be proven; 

otherwise, 1202(a) dramatically intrudes upon traditional state 

crime jurisdiction, id. at 349-50); Perez v. United States, 402 

U.S. 146 (1971) (loansharking, a federal crime under the Consumer 

Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 159, 18 u.s.c. § 891, is a 

permissible exercise by Congress of its powers under the Commerce 

Clause); and United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 

1978) (in prosecution under 18 u.s.c. § 1951, the Hobbs Act, the 

court held that there was a nexus required between the 

extortionist conduct and interstate commerce). 

-10-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 10 
error for the district court to look to federal criminal contempt 

to decide that contempt in Oklahoma may be a felony; therefore, it 

-.... is--a,felony .• 14 .Q!-Rour,ker 6-40 ·F. ,., ,Supp. at .. 14,62 .• The district 

court devoted three full pages of analysis to contempt, but not 

once did it cite an Oklahoma case. The disregard of forty years 

of interpretation by Oklahoma courts was a violation of the Tenth 

Amendment. The federal court must look to state criminal law as 

judicially interpreted by the state courts, and we do so, here. 

B. Contempt Under Oklahoma Law 

Until 1982, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma and the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court were not in harmony over the nature and 

classification of contempt. Gilbert v. State, 648 P.2d 1226, 1230 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1982). However, on one crucial point they were 

always in accord -- contempt was not a felony in Oklahoma. 

As early as the 1940's, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals defined contempt as a misdemeanor at most. Brown v. 

State, 209 P.2d 715, 720 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949) (basing its 

determination on Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 565 (1941) "Punishment for 

14 In addition to using federal law and common law as a basis, 

the district court reasoned that since the Oklahoma statute 

defining contempt imposed no limitation on potential punishment, 

contempt was a felony. It cited to Soetarto v. Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, 516 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1975), as 

authority, and held that "during the time period relevant to this 

case, all contempts were felonies under Oklahoma law .... " 

O'Rourke, 640 F. Supp. at 1463. Soetarto involved the question of 

whether or not a conviction in the Netherlands for the theft of 

about $135 and a ring valued at approximately $100 was a crime of 

"moral turpitude" as the term was used within the deportation 

statute. 

-11-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 11 
contempt shall be by fine or imprisonment, or both, at the 

discretion of the court," the Oklahoma court held that in the 

-,·r-,abse119e .. ,..,··of.,:. .. e.xpress ·::provisions ... mak-d.,ng ,t-he -· of·.fiense of contempt a 

felony, one found guilty thereof cannot be punished by confinement 

in the penitentiary. 15 The sentence of the defendant herein to 

the penitentiary was in excess of the court's power to pronounce. 

Id. at 720)). Brown aiso announced that contempt in Oklahoma is 

controlled by mandatory state constitutional and state statutory 

provisions and not !?,y common law. Id. at 719. In essence, in 

1949, contempt in Oklahoma was defined by Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 

1390 (1941); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 565-568 (1941); and, Const. 

art. 2, § 25 as judicially interpreted in Brown. Id. This was 

later affirmed in Seay v. Howell, 311 P.2d 207 (Okla. 1957) 

(contempts of court are defined by Constitution and statute and 

not by common law). Id. at 209. In 1972, Roselle v. State of 

Oklahoma, 503 P.2d 1293 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), consistent with 

Brown held that the "crime" of contempt was a misdemeanor. Id. at 

1295. Citing to Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 566 (1971), "Punishment 

for contempt shall be by fine or imprisonment, or both, at the 

discretion of the court," the court reasoned that since the 

statute does not specify whether contempt is a felony or 

misdemeanor, the definition of "imprisonment" 

15 At the time of the search in the O'Rourke home, 

tit. 21, § 566 (1981) provided: 

would be 

Okla. Stat. 

"[p]unishment for contempt shall be by fine or imprisonment, 

or both, at the discretion of the court." 

The wording of the statute was precisely that construed in Brown. 

-12-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 12 
determinative. In the ordinary sense "imprisonment" contemplates 

the common jail, rather than the penitentiary; therefore, the 

.. ;, ::.,, : .crime. ,-of,,..----contempt-· is ,a'-,misdemeanor. Id. -

In another line of cases, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals defined contempt as sui generis, i.e., not civil or 

criminal. Pate v. State, 429 P.2d 542, 547 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1967); Sullivan v. State, 419 P.2d 559, 560 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1966) (citing Fulreader v. State, 408 P.2d 775, 776 (Okla. 1965). 

In 1982, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma followed 

the Oklahoma Supreme Court and declared that direct contempt 

proceedings "are neither civil nor criminal in character but are 

sui generis." Gilbert v. State, 648 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1982) (citing State ex rel. Young v. Woodson, 522 P.2d 1035, 

1039 (Okla. 1974); Fulreader v. State, 408 P.2d 775, 776-77 (Okla. 

1965); State ex rel. Short, Att'y Gen. v. Owens, 256 P. 704, 708-

09 (Okla. 1927)). The appellant in Gilbert was seeking the 

classification of contempt as a misdemeanor so that he would be 

"formally arraigned and provided a jury trial." Id. at 1228. By 

classifying contempt as sui generis, these rights could no longer 

be claimed. The court declared that no such rights attached since 

contempt was now sui generis and "[a]ll prior holdings to the 

contrary on this point are overruled •..• " Id. at 1231 (emphasis 

added). Therefore, at the time of the nighttime search of the 

O'Rourke home in 1983, contempt was defined as sui generis under 

all Oklahoma law. 

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Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 13 
The categorization of contempt as not a felony is pivotal to 

the outcome of this case. Under Oklahoma law, if the warrant is 

·.;,~ ..... issued. for.c-commission .of -a ,cr:ime··.·def-i.ned .. as a -felony, .. no nighttime 

endorsement is required. The warrant may be served day or night. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 189. 16 Also under Oklahoma law, persons 

charged with misdemeanors may not be subject to arrest at night 

unless a judge determines it necessary. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 

189. 17 Only after an assessment of necessity may the judge add an 

endorsement permitting nighttime execution. The classification of 

contempt as sui generis does not vitiate this requirement, it 

strengthens it. Absent legislative authority for day or nighttime 

service, it is for the issuing magistrate to determine the 

reasonableness of a nighttime execution. Wiggin v. State, 755 

P.2d 115, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Fletcher v. State, 735 P.2d 

1190, 1193 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Yates v. State, 117 P.2d 811, 

813 (Okla. Crim. App. 1941). 

The bench warrant for the arrest of Deborah Boyd had no 

nighttime endorsement. For search and seizure purposes, nighttime 

in Oklahoma starts thirty minutes after sunset and ends thirty 

16 

17 

Section 189 reads: 

Arrest, when made 

If the offense charged is a felony, the arrest may be 

made on any day, and at any time of the day or night. If it 

is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made at night, unless 

upon the direction of the magistrate endorsed upon the 

warrant. 

Id. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 14 
_,..,,c... 

minutes before sunrise. Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § ll-80l(b) 

(1981). 18 The search of the O'Rourke home at 10:00 p.m. was well 

. a-f ter sunset. 

In sum, the district court was clearly in error in its 

classification of contempt as a felony in Oklahoma. First it 

looked to federal criminal law for guidance. Federal criminal law 

does not define state criminal law. Second, it looked to common 

law. While this may be permissible in some instances, it was 

contrary to Oklahoma law. Third, the district court judge 

completely ignored forty years of judicial interpretation of the 

Oklahoma contempt statute and interpreted the Oklahoma statute de 

novo. On all three bases we find error. At all times relevant to 

this case, contempt was classified as sui generis in Oklahoma. 

This court could find no Oklahoma case defining contempt as a 

felony and neither did the district court. 

III. 

The primary issue on appeal is whether the nighttime 

execution of a daytime bench warrant in a family residence for an 

offense defined in Oklahoma as sui generis violates the Fourth 

Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 

18 Although there was no Oklahoma case construing "nighttime'' in 

1983, Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-801 (1981) was in effect since 

1981 and was later used in Fletcher, 735 P.2d at 1197, as the 

controlling definition for search and seizure purposes. We also 

note that Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1440 defines nighttime in 

Oklahoma as the period between sunset or sunrise. Under either 

statute in effect in 1983, the search of the O'Rourke home at 

10:00 p.m. was certainly in the nighttime. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 86-2219 Document: 01019957913 Date Filed: 05/23/1989 Page: 15 
seizures. 

,:-:-=!I!he,,.e.ssentiaL.,i~nquiry when.,-faced with challenges under the 

Fourth Amendment is whether the search or seizure was reasonable -

- reasonableness is analyzed in light of what was reasonable at 

the time of the Fourth Amendment's adoption. Carroll v. United 

States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 

616, 622-23 (1886); United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 

(10th Cir. 1979); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 

896, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1968). It is axiomatic that the Fourth 

Amendment was adopted as a direct response to the evils of the 

general warrants in England and the writs of assistance in the 

Colonies. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. at 220 (1981); 

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 583-84, n.26 (1980); United States 

v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 

476, 481-82, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926 (1965}; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 

624-30 (1886). Therefore, we look to history for guidance on 

reasonableness. 

A. General Warrants 

In 1762, the English government, seeking to censure authors, 

printers and publishers of seditious and treasonable papers, 

namely the North Briton, issued general arrest warrants 

authorizing home searches. Pursuant to these "roving 

commissions," the government, on the scantiest evidence, arrested 

forty-nine printers in three days, "even taking some from their 

beds in the middle of the night." The printers brought suit 

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against the government messengers for false imprisonment. Chief 

Justice Pratt ruled the warrants illegal. The London jury awarded 

...... "the •pl·aintiffs -300,.'.pounds· sterli-ng in damages •19 In response to 

defendants' claim of excessive verdict, Pratt admitted that 20 

pounds sterling would have been sufficient for six hours of 

imprisonment; however, he found that: 

[T]he small injury done to the plaintiff, or the 

inconsiderableness of his station and rank in life did 

not appear to the jury in that striking light which the 

great point of the law touching the liberty of the 

subject appeared to them at the trial; they saw a 

magistrate over all the king's subjects, exercising 

arbitrary power, violating Magna Carta, and attempting 

to destroy the liberty of the kingdom, by insisting on 

the legality of this general warrant before them; they 

heard the King's Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the 

Treasury endeavor to support and maintain the legality 

of the warrant in a tyrannical and severe manner. These 

are the ideas which struck the jury on the trial; and I 

think t~0y have done right in giving exemplary 

damages. 

In one case, a printer received a verdict for 400 pounds 

sterling. The government appealed to the King's Bench, which 

affirmed the decision and held that "[i)t is not fit that the 

judging of the information should be left to the officer. The 

magistrate should judge, and give directions to the officer." 

(Emphasis added.) 21 

19 Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763). 

Cited in N. Lassan, The History and Development of the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937), at 44. 

20 Id. at 45, n.111. 

21 Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1692, 1742, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1075 

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The English government defended all actions arising from the 

general warrants -- the damages totalled 100,000 pounds sterling. 

··"·· -These ca.sesc1 were,. prai-sed and",welcomed ,.in,··England,ceand 0 ,"even in faraway America." Wilkes, a member of Parliament and the author of 

the North Briton, was corresponding with leading Americans of the 

period James Otis, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, John Adams and 

Josiah Quincy. N. Lassen, The History and Development of the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937), at 43-

50. 

Finally in April of 1776, the House of Commons resolved that 

the general warrants were illegal. Coming from the floor debates, 

William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, eloquently conveyed the clear 

message: 

The poorist man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all 

the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may 

shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may 

enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may 

not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold 

of the ruined tenement. 

T. Cooley, 7th ed. (1903), A Treatise on the Constitutional 

Limitations at 425, n.l (also quoted in Payton, 445 U.S. at 601, 

n.54; and Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)). 

(1765). Cited in N. Lassen, The History and Development of the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937), at 47. 

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B. Writs of Assistance in the Colonies 

Meanwhile on this side of the Atlantic, the argument centered 

-a.x,ound .--.the;;nwr.its:,~, .. :ofi.ass-is-tance.._·-employed,.,by ,cust.oms. officers for 

discovering smuggled goods. The writs were also general warrants 

but they were even more abusive, i.e., they were not returnable at 

all after execution. In essence, they were a continuing license 

to search a home with practically absolute discretion delegated to 

the petty officer. N. Lassan, supra, at 51-59. 

In the Writs of Assistance Case of 1761, Boston became the 

center of the debate. James Otis electrified the audience with 

his argument against the practice. He pronounced the writs '"the 

worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of 

English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever 

was found in our English law book;' since they placed 'the liberty 

of every man in the hands of every petty officer.'" Boyd, 116 

U.S. at 625. Accord Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965). 

Later in recounting the speech, John Adams declared that: 

"'Mr. Otis's oration ..• breathed into this nation the 

breath of life.' He 'was a flame of fire! Every man of · a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, 

ready to take arms against the Writs of Assistance. 

Then and there was the first scene of opposition to the 

arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the 

child Independence was born •••• [I]n 1776, he grew to 

manhood and declared himself free.'" 

N. Lassen, supra, at 51-59. Today she is embodied in the Fourth 

Amendment. 

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c. Early Aversion to Nighttime Searches 

Of special significance to this case on appeal is that 

"·,·:':,'.,despite. the-- unbrid-l·ed·,discret-i0n .:-delegated .to .. the· petty officer by 

the general warrants in England, nighttime execution in a home was 

not authorized. 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, Stokes & Ingersoll 

ed. 1847, 113; T. Cooley, su:era, at 430; accord United States v. 

Gibbons, 607 F.2d at 1326 (1979); United States ex rel. Boyance v. 

Myers, 398 F.2d at 897-98 (1968). Even the Writs of Assistance, 

more odious and abusive than the general warrants, permitted 

searches of dwellings only in the daytime. N. Lasson, su:era, at 

54. Accord Gibbons, at 1326; Myers at 897-98. We see this 

aversion to nighttime searches of the home codified in two 

statutes passed by our first Congress: Act of July 31, 1789 § 24, 

1 Stat. 43, authorizing the search for goods subject to duty in 

"dwelling - house, store, building upon application on oath or 

affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant 

to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) 

II e o • o Id. (Emphasis added); and Act of March 3, 1791 § 29, 1 

Stat. 206, authorizing the search of distilled spirits "in the 

daytime, upon request, to enter into all and every houses, storehouses, ware-houses ..•• " (Emphasis added.) 

In the words of Justice Frankfurter, "[s]earches of the 

dwelling house were the special object of this universal 

condemnation of official intrusion. Night-time search was the 

evil in its most obnoxious form." Monroe v. Pa:ee, 365 U.S. 167, 

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210 ( 1961) : 22 

·cc· D. ~,.,Contemporary Law 

Aside from history, we do not write on a clean slate on this 

issue. Looking toward more contemporary analysis of nighttime 

searches, we find clear support for the unreasonableness of this 

nighttime search. In United States v. Merritt, 293 F.2d 742 (3d 

Cir. 1961), the Third Circuit held that where a warrant provided 

for execution in the daytime, but was executed in the nighttime, 

it was legally invalid. As such, the police officers' entry into 

the defendants' apartment was on the same plane as an entry 

without a warrant and, therefore, a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. at 746. In United States ex rel. Boyance v. 

Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968), the Third Circuit, pursuant to 

a writ of habeas corpus, held that a warrant expressly limited to 

daytime searches, executed in a private home in the nighttime was 

"constitutionally invalid." Id. at 899. It held the search 

unreasonable based on the common law aversion to nighttime 

searches, early Congressional statutes authorizing only daytime 

searches, similar limitations imposed under state statutes, and 

the directive in Fed. R. Crim. P. 4l(c). Id. at 888-89. In 

Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 385 (1970), the United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, en bane, 

held that nighttime entry of a home to effect an arrest 

necessarily implicates "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment 

22 Overruled solely on the issue of municipal liability under 42 

u.s.c. § 1983. Monnell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 

436 U.S. 658, 664-89 (1977). 

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and "may elevate the degree of probable cause .•. both as 

implicating the suspect, and as showing that he was in the place 

.,,> .. entered ..• , ••• " .;.,,Id. ·.a,t 393. ,.,,·,·In·~Uni-bed~States . .v. Smith,.340 F. 

Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1972), the District Court of Connecticut held 

that to justify the nighttime execution of a state daytime warrant 

in an occupied family home, there must be shown to~ magistrate a 

greater proof that the property to be seized is on the premises 

than is necessary for a daytime search. "[T]he fact that a 

private dwelling is entered at night has constitutional 

significance." Id. at 1029 (citing Myers, 398 F.2d at 897-98, and 

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. at 498). The court held that the 

nighttime search did not meet the reasonableness requirement of 

the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1029. In United States v. Gibbons, 

607 F.2d at 1320, this circuit, presented with the reasonableness 

of a nighttime search of a car trunk pursuant to a state daytime 

warrant, held that the "factor of a nighttime search is 

sensitively related to the reasonableness issue" in the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. at 1326. Its determination was based on the 

common law aversion to nighttime searches prior to the adoption of 

the Fourth Amendment. Id. Holding the nighttime search of a car 

trunk to be reasonable, this circuit qualified its holding by 

explaining that the: (1) "search involved no intrusion into a 

home"; (2) the search of a car does not present a strong case for 

claiming unreasonableness for a nighttime search; and (3) the 

facts presented the "necessity of immediate police action." Id. 

at 1327. 

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To determine that.a warrant limited to daytime execution 

authorizes the nighttime search of a home is to completely 

. eviscerate.•· the-,"1'<,issuing ~··1· ,magis.trate's · .-de.termination 

reasonableness. 

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not 

grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 

enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 

reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection 

consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by 

a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 

judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 

enterprise of ferreting out crime •••• When the right of 

privacy must yield to the right of search is, as a rule, 

to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman 

or government enforcement agent. (Footnote omitted.) 

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 

of 

It was the absence of the neutral and detached magistrate 

which led to the abuses in England and the Colonies. It is the 

absence of the neutral and detached magistrate's determination of 

the reasonableness of the nighttime search of the O'Rourke home 

which renders it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

IV. Recusal 

We are being asked in the first instance to exercise our 

inherent power in the administration of appeals and remands to 

reassign this case in the event of retrial or remand. Ordinarily 

28 u.s.c. § 144 and§ 455 are invoked at the district court level 

to effectuate recusal. However, these statutory provisions are 

not the exclusive route for disqualification. The appellate 

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court's authority to reassign exists apart from the judicial 

disqualification statutes. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 

,,-.,16-18, ,(1954.)-;, ~Cooke. v ..•. ,;;,Uni-ted-States,· 267 .. U.S. ·517, 539 (1925); 

United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988 (1986); Verniero v. Air Force 

Academy Sch. Dist. No. 20, 705 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1983} 

(McKay, J., dissenting); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 

(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960); United States 

v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 926 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 

899 (1958). However, absent proof of personal bias, we remand to 

a new judge only under extreme circumstances. 

In Sears, the Ninth Circuit held that "reassignment is 

admissible to preserve the appearance of justice." Id., 785 F.2d 

at 780; accord United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th 

Cir. 1979); United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) 

(en bane). While the "appearance of justice" basis for 

reassignment seems persuasive in the context of 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 

we hesitate to formally order reassignment. Instead, we remand to 

the district court for its own consideration of whether recusal is 

warranted. In the remand, we are mindful that the function of the 

district court is to determine the attorney's fees to be allowed 

to the O'Rourkes under 42 u.s.c. § 1988. The district judge who 

decided this case is familiar with the amount of effort put into 

the trial by the attorney for the O'Rourkes. We believe this 

effort can be recognized by the district judge and will be fairly 

assessed, such an assessment to be subject to our review, should 

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any of the parties feel aggrieved by such a determination. 

,,. ,_,,. -,CONCLUSION 

Considering the common-law origins of the aversion to 

nighttime searches, the abuses present in the minds of the 

Framers, the protection historically afforded the sanctity of the 

home, and the cases cited above, we hold that the search of the 

O'Rourke home at 10:00 p.m. without a nighttime endorsement on the 

warrant was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As such, we 

REVERSE the district court on that issue. On the issue of 

municipal liability, we hold the City of Norman liable. We find 

it unnecessary to undergo analysis on the issue of municipal 

liability since the order and stipulation entered into and signed 

by the City of Norman provides that "in the event that the 

Plaintiffs should prevail upon any issue ••• , the Defendant shall 

pay to the Plaintiffs the sum of $4,000.00 heretofore as damages." 

We find this binding as to the City. In addition, in their briefs 

both Appellants and Appellees agree that damages are limited to 

$4,000.00. Appellees argue that the stipulation is not a waiver 

of the city's defense as to municipal liability. We disagree. 

The plain language establishes liability upon the plaintiffs' 

success on any issue. Appellees also argue that the stipulation 

does not amount to a waiver of the qualified immunity of the 

individual police officers. Assuming there was a waiver, the 

police officers are liable; assuming there was not, on the issue 

of qualified immunity, we find that the law was clearly 

established to satisfy the standard set forth in Anderson v. 

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Creighton, 483 u.s. 635, 107 s.ct. 3034, 3039 (1987). Therefore, 

we hold Police Officers Winter and McKenzie liable -- they should 

.. . .,:hav.e.,.known----thab2--the -n-i-CBht time-,e-xecution of--a ,·day-time --war rant in a 

family residence was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In 

addition, we hold Lt. Cain liable under§ 1983. As supervisor in 

a position of responsibility, he knew or should have known of the 

misconduct, and failed to prevent the violation of the Fourth 

Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. McClelland v. Facteau, 610 

F.2d 693, 696-67 (10th Cir. 1979). We therefore order the 

district court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the 

total amount of $4,000 and against the defendants jointly and 

severally. 

In view of our decision, we must also vacate the imposition 

of sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel. 

was not frivolous. 

The suit 

Based on the circumstances giving rise to the Fourth 

Amendment, we conclude that a police officer does not have 

unbridled authority under a warrant -- it is for an impartial 

judge to decide what is reasonable. A fortiori it is for an 

impartial judge to decide the reasonableness of a nighttime search 

in a home. The case here does not present consent, hot pursuit or 

exigent circumstances. The police officers' nighttime execution 

of a daytime warrant in the O'Rourke home for an offense defined 

as sui generis was like "burning a barn to roast an egg, 1123 and we 

23 N. Lassen, supra, at 68, n.60 .(referring to the whole customs 

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so hold. 

We REVERSE on the constitutionality of the search and REMAND 

on the issue of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1988. We direct the district court to enter judgment in favor of 

the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, against each of the 

defendants, together with interest in an appropriate amount to be 

computed by the district court, such interest to run from and 

after the date of the stipulation referred to in this opinion. 

systems and the writs of assistance). 

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