Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04502/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04502-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NANCY DIANE ALVA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-04502-KAW 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; GRANTING 

DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 20, 22

Plaintiff Nancy Diane Alva seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the 

Commissioner’s final decision, and the remand of this case for payment of benefits, or, in the 

alternative, for further proceedings. 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment. Having considered the papers filed by the parties, and for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and 

GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed for Title II benefits on June 23, 2014. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 219.) 

Plaintiff asserted disability beginning November 1, 2011, based on Temporomandibular Joint 

Syndrome, neck and back pain, and perforated disks in the upper spine. (AR 219, 233.) The 

Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application initially and on 

reconsideration. (AR 129, 135.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”); the hearing was held on June 24, 2016. (AR 145-46, AR 34.)

Following the hearing, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application on June 13, 2017. (AR 15-

27.) A request for review of the ALJ’s decision was filed with the Appeals Council on July 6, 

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2017. (AR 218.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on May 23, 2018. 

(AR 1.) On July 25, 2018, Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.)

Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment on February 13, 2019. (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 

No. 20.) Defendant filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment on March 12, 

2019. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 22.) Plaintiff filed her reply on March 26, 2020. (Pl.’s Reply, Dkt. 

No. 24.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may reverse the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits only when the 

Commissioner's findings are 1) based on legal error or 2) are not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 

(9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance”; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Id. at 1098; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). In 

determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the 

Court must consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the 

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion. Id. “Where evidence is susceptible 

to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, disability claims are evaluated 

according to a five-step sequential evaluation. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 

1998). At step one, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in 

substantial gainful activity. Id. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At 

step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment 

or combination of impairments,” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 

721. If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If the answer is yes, the Commissioner 

proceeds to step three, and determines whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment 

under 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If this requirement is 

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met, the claimant is disabled. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. 

If a claimant does not have a condition which meets or equals a listed impairment, the 

fourth step in the sequential evaluation process is to determine the claimant's residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) or what work, if any, the claimant is capable of performing on a sustained basis, 

despite the claimant’s impairment or impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can 

perform such work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). RFC is the application of a legal 

standard to the medical facts concerning the claimant's physical capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). 

If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an inability to perform prior work, the 

Commissioner must show, at step five, that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 

work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. The claimant bears the 

burden of proof at steps one through four. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-954 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id. at 954. 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision on three grounds: (1) the ALJ did not articulate 

reasons for rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician as to mental limitations 

specifically, (2) the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of the examining doctor, and (3) the ALJ 

did not propound a complete hypothetical question to the vocational expert.

A. Dr. Gruber

The court “distinguish[es] among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who 

treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining 

physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight 

should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat 

the claimant.” Id. (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). “At least where 

the treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for 

‘clear and convincing reasons.’” Id. (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 

1991)). If a treating physician’s medical opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ must 

identify specific legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to give more weight to the 

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non-treating doctor’s opinion. Id.

Allen G. Gruber, M.D., is Plaintiff’s treating physician, and began treating Plaintiff in 

September 2013. (AR 645.) On March 7, 2016, Dr. Gruber filled out a Cervical Spine Residual 

Functional Capacity Questionnaire, in which Dr. Gruber diagnosed myofascial pain, degenerative 

disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, chronic neck and back pain, TMJ, osteoarthritis, and 

occipital neuralgia. (AR 835.) Dr. Gruber opined that psychological conditions of depression, 

anxiety, and possible personality disorder contributed to the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms and 

functional limits. (AR 837.) Dr. Gruber further opined that Plaintiff’s pain and other symptoms 

were severe enough to interfere with the attention and concentration needed to perform even 

simple work tasks on a constant basis. (AR 837.) He also found that Plaintiff was incapable of 

even low stress jobs because Plaintiff had very poor stress tolerance, and stress would trigger 

anxiety and pain. (AR 837.)

On June 8, 2016, Dr. Gruber filled out a Chronic Pain Residual Functional Capacity 

Questionnaire, in which Dr. Gruber diagnosed a degenerative cervical spine, cervical and neck 

pain, headaches, occipital neuralgia, and back pain. (AR 991.) Dr. Gruber also identified 

associated psychological problems and limitations of impaired attention and concentration, 

impaired short term memory, reduced ability to attend to tasks reduced ability to persist in tasks, 

depression, and anxiety. (AR 992.) Dr. Gruber opined that Plaintiff’s experience of pain or other 

symptoms would interfere with the attention and concentration needed to perform even simple 

work tasks on a frequent basis. (AR 994.) In contrast to the March 7 Questionnaire, Dr. Gruber

found that Plaintiff was capable of low stress jobs. (AR 994.)

The ALJ first reviewed Dr. Gruber’s March 2016 opinion, listing Dr. Gruber’s diagnoses 

and assessed limitations, including those on the ability to concentrate. (AR 24.) The ALJ then 

gave “partial weight to this opinion, because this opinion is contradicted by the opinions of the 

medical expert and consultative examiner and the longitudinal examinations.” (AR 24.) The ALJ 

next reviewed Dr. Gruber’s June 2016 opinion, again identifying both physical and mental 

limitations, including the associated psychological problems of impaired attention and 

concentration, impaired short-term memory, reduced ability to attend to tasks, reduced ability to 

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persist in tasks, depression, and anxiety. (AR 24.) The ALJ again “afforded partial weight to this 

opinion, for the same reasons as to the prior opinions. In addition, these two opinions were 

written close in time but are not consistent.” (AR 25.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because the ALJ did not address the mental limitations 

separately. (Pl.’s Mot. at 8.) Instead, “the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Gruber’s opinions belong in a 

section where the ALJ was, almost entirely, assessing [Plaintiff]’s physical limitations. The ALJ’s 

summary of the objective and clinical evidence in this section relates to physical impairments.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff contends that “[t]he ALJ’s analysis of [Plaintiff’s] mental impairments belong in 

another section of the decision, which relates to identifying what impairments are severe and nonsevere.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to articulate specific and legitimate 

reasons for rejecting Dr. Gruber’s opinions regarding [Plaintiff]’s mental limitations.”

The Court finds no error. While the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Gruber’s opinion was in a 

section focused on physical limitations, the discussion itself was not limited to the physical 

impairments only. Instead, the ALJ described all of Plaintiff’s limitations, including those related 

to attention and concentration, ability to persist, memory, and ability to perform low stress jobs. 

(See AR 24-25.) There is no suggestion that the ALJ gave Dr. Gruber’s partial weight as to the 

physical limitations only, and the ALJ’s rationale applies to the mental limitations as well. For 

example, with respect to mental limitations, the agency doctors found that Plaintiff’s alleged 

affective and anxiety disorders were non-severe, with only mild restrictions on maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace. (AR 102, 121.) The longitudinal examinations also did not 

indicate any abnormalities; in the ALJ’s previous description of Plaintiff’s mental health record, 

the ALJ noted that there was no record of ongoing counseling or treatment, and Plaintiff’s 

November 2014 mental status exam was “relatively normal.” (AR 18-19.) Further, there were 

inconsistencies between Dr. Gruber’s March and June 2016 opinions specific to Plaintiff’s alleged 

mental impairments, including a diagnosis of possible personality disorder in March 2016 but not

in June 2016, as well as a finding that Plaintiff could not perform low-stress jobs in March 2016 

but could perform low-stress jobs in June 2016. (AR 837, 992, 994.)

Notably, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s reasoning in giving partial weight to Dr. 

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Gruber’s opinion. Instead, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s alleged failure to provide reasons 

specific to the mental impairments. The Court, however, finds that the ALJ has provided specific 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Compare with Sandoval v. Astrue, Case No. 

EDCV 08-1588-OP, 2009 U.S Dist. LEXIS 102000, at *11-14 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (finding 

no error where the ALJ rejected a doctor’s opinion as to both physical and mental limitations 

where the ALJ only explicitly provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the physical 

limitations).

B. Dr. Yee

Bonnie Yee, Psy.D., is an examining doctor. (AR 19.) Dr. Yee conducted a psychological 

consultative exam on November 7, 2014. (AR 806.) During the exam, Plaintiff’s chief 

complaints were depression and anxiety. (AR 806.) Plaintiff reported being able to complete 

most activities of daily living, including washing dishes, grocery shopping, and doing laundry. 

(AR 807.) Plaintiff was emotional and appeared to cry, but had no tears and would be in a 

different mood within seconds. (AR 807-08.) Dr. Yee commented that Plaintiff’s “behavior 

appeared to attempt to portray herself as emotionally impaired, but it lacked credibility.” (AR 

808.) Dr. Yee further found that Plaintiff “presents with some vague depressive and anxious 

symptoms,” but that “the symptoms . . . did not appear to be consistent with a diagnosis for 

depression or anxiety. However, it does appear that the claimant is somewhat anxious and 

somewhat depressed.” (AR 809.) Dr. Yee opined that Plaintiff would have no difficulty 

performing simple and repetitive tasks, minor difficulty performing complex and detailed tasks, 

and no difficulty working with the public or supervisors and co-workers. (AR 809.) Dr. Yee also 

opined that Plaintiff would have difficulty maintaining attention and concentration, and moderate 

difficulty handling the stress of employment at the current time. (AR 809.) The ALJ ultimately 

gave Dr. Yee’s opinion “little weight . . . because the longitudinal evidence does not support 

severe mental impairments.” (AR 20.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to articulate specific and legitimate reasons based on 

substantial evidence in the record. Again, the Court disagrees. The ALJ previously did discuss 

the medical evidence related to mental impairments, as well as his interpretations of those 

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findings. Contrast with Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The ALJ must 

do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why 

they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.”). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had only 

mild limitations in concentrating, persisting, and pace, noting that Plaintiff had reported that she 

could handle stress and changes in routine. (AR 19.) The ALJ also pointed to Dr. Yee’s 

examination, where Plaintiff was “able to perform simple mathematical problems and do serial 

3s.” (AR 19.) While Plaintiff was not able to “correctly subtract 7 serially from 100,” the ALJ 

noted that Plaintiff “did not attempt the task.” (AR 19.) The ALJ could conclude from such 

findings that Plaintiff had only mild limitations, and Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. (See Pl.’s 

Mot. at 12.)

The ALJ also cited to Dr. Yee’s consultative examination in finding that Plaintiff had only 

mild limitations in other functional areas. For example, with respect to understanding, 

remembering, or applying information, the ALJ explained that during the psychological 

consultative examination, Plaintiff’s immediate and remote memory were within normal limits 

and her fund of knowledge was intact. (AR 18-19.) Plaintiff was also able to provide most of her 

background without any observed limitation and demonstrated adequate insight and judgment. 

(AR 19.) Likewise, the ALJ pointed to Dr. Yee’s findings in concluding that Plaintiff had mild 

limitations in the ability to adapt or manage herself. (AR 19.) Taken together, the ALJ did not 

simply conclude that Dr. Yee’s medical opinions were not supported by the longitudinal evidence, 

but discussed that evidence and explained why it showed only mild limitations.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence for giving little weight to Dr. Yee’s opinion.

C. Hypothetical to the Vocational Expert

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to propound a complete hypothetical to the 

vocational expert because the ALJ did not include any limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to 

understand, remember, or apply information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain 

pace; or adapt or manage herself. (Pl.’s Mot. at 12-13.) Plaintiff contends this is error because the 

ALJ had found mild limitations in these areas when concluding that Plaintiff’s medically 

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determinable mental impairments were non-severe. (Id.; see AR 18-19.)

In support, Plaintiff relies on Hutton v. Astrue, 491 Fed. Appx. 850 (9th Cir. 2012). (Pl.’s 

Mot. at 13-14.) There, the ALJ found that the plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) 

was non-severe, and caused no limitations with respect to daily activities or social functioning and 

only mild limitations in the area of concentration, persistence, or pace. Hutton, 491 Fed. Appx. At 

850. The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the ALJ erred in determining the plaintiff’s RFC 

because the ALJ did not consider the plaintiff’s PTSD at all, despite having found that it caused 

mild limitations in the plaintiff’s ability to concentrate, persist, or pace. Id. at 850-51. In doing 

so, the Ninth Circuit explained that the ALJ essentially “disregarded his own finding that [the 

plaintiff]’s nonsevere PTSD caused some ‘mild’ limitations in the areas of concentration, 

persistence, or pace.” Id. at 851.

District courts in this circuit, however, “have generally declined to find reversible error 

when an ALJ found the claimant’s mental impairments to be non-severe at step two and 

considered related, additional evidence of the claimant’s mental impairments at step four.” 

Denney v. Saul, No. 1:18-cv-689-GSA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147760, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 

2019) (listing cases); see also George A. v. Berryhill, Case No. 5:18-cv-405-AFM, 2019 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 71138, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019) (“Other courts have found Hutton to be 

inapplicable where the record demonstrates that the ALJ considered a claimant’s non-severe 

mental impairments before concluding that they did not cause any significant limitation 

necessitating inclusion in the RFC.”). Such is the case here. The ALJ did not ignore Plaintiff’s 

mental limitations at step four, but discussed it further, including explaining that Plaintiff 

“engaged in a somewhat normal level and range of daily activity and interactions[, and that s]ome 

of the physical and mental abilities and social interactions required to perform these activities are 

the same as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment.” (AR 23.) The ALJ also 

noted that the activities of daily living reported to Dr. Yee exceeded that stated by Plaintiff and her 

husband. (AR 23.) The ALJ then reviewed the Third Party Function Report completed by 

Plaintiff’s husband, which stated that Plaintiff did not finish tasks, before rejecting it as 

unsupported. (AR 25.) Further, the ALJ reviewed Dr. Gruber’s opinions at step four, including 

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the alleged mental limitations. (AR 24-25.) Thus, this was not a case where the ALJ simply 

ignored prior findings of mild limitations made at step two; the ALJ instead discussed those 

limitations at step four in determining the appropriate RFC. The ALJ did not err. See Sisco v. 

Colvin, Case No. 13-cv-1817-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84614, at *23 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 

2014) (finding Hutton inapposite because “the ALJ specifically addressed [the plaintiff]’s mental 

condition at step four of his disability, by evaluating all of the evidence regarding [the plaintiff]’s 

mental condition . . . .”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2020

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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