Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00481/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00481-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIANO VALENZUELA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF CALEXICO, SERGEANT

FRANK URIARTE, OFFICER PETER

J. WEST, OFFICER VICTOR

FLORES, OFFICER CARLOS

RAMIREZ, Chief of Police POMPEYO

TABAREZ, Former Chief of Police

JIM NEUJAHR, and DOES 1 through

25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-481-BAS-PCL

ORDER RE:

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL

DISCOVERY

 [Doc. 17]

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, filed on January 27, 2015 pursuant

to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 37(a)(1). (Doc. 17.) Plaintiff seeks to compel the

Defendants to: (1) respond to Plaintiff’s interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 11 and 12; (2) comply

with Plaintiff’s request for production of documents, Set One, No. 31; and (3) respond to

Plaintiff’s requests for admissions, Set One, Nos. 19 through 31. (Id.) 

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The Court has read and considered all of the documents filed in connection with this

motion, including Plaintiff’s moving papers (Doc. 17), Plaintiff’s exhibits (Docs. 17-1 through

17-5), and supporting declaration of Brody McBride (Doc. 17-1); Defendants’ Opposition (Doc.

21), objections to Mr. McBride’s declaration (Doc. 21-1), and Request for Judicial Notice (Doc.

21-2); and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 24). As discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s

Motion to Compel.

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the alleged illegal arrest of the Plaintiff, Mr. Valenzuela, and the

use of excessive force during that arrest by Defendants Ramirez and Flores on June 11, 2013.

(Doc. 1, at 6-9.) Plaintiff’s causes of action arising from this incident include: (1) false arrest and

imprisonment; (2) battery; (3) negligence; (4) unlawful seizure, arrest, and detention; (5)

unlawful entry into home; (6) use of excessive force; (7) a claim against Defendant City of

Calexico under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (8)

failure to properly train; (9) failure to supervise and discipline; and (10) violations of the Bane

Act, California Civil Code §§ 52.1 and 52. (Id.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard on Motion to Compel

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables the propounding party to bring a

motion to compel responses to discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3)(B). The party opposing

discovery bears the burden of resisting disclosure. Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 299

(C.D.Cal.1992). Additionally, the moving party carries the burden of informing the court: (1)

which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel; (2) which of the defendants’

responses are disputed; (3) why the responses are deficient; (4) the reasons defendants’

objections are without merit; and (5) the relevance of the requested information to the

prosecution of his action. See, e.g., Brooks v. Alameida, No. CIV S–03–2343–JAM–EFB P,

2009 WL 331358, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Feb.10, 2009) (“Without knowing which responses plaintiff

seeks to compel or on what grounds, the court cannot grant plaintiff's motion.”); Ellis v. Cambra,

No. CIV 02–05646–AWI–SMS PC, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Mar.27, 2008) (“Plaintiff

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must inform the court which discovery requests are the subject of his motion to compel, and, for

each disputed response, inform the court why the information sought is relevant and why

Defendant's objections are not justified.”). Williams v. Adams, 105-CV-00124AWISMSPC,

2009 WL 1220311 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2009). Additionally, a litigant may not file suit in order to

“use discovery as the sole means of finding out whether [she has] a case.” Szabo Food Serv. Inc.

v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir.1989).

Lastly, when deciding whether to grant a motion to compel response to discovery request

or interrogatory, the court considers the prior efforts of the parties to resolve the dispute, the

relevance of the information sought, and the burden or expense of production. Barnes v. D.C.,

289 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2012).

B. Relevance

It is well established that a party may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged

matter that is relevant to any claim or defense. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information need

not be admissible at trial so long as the discovery appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to

the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. Relevance is construed broadly to include any matter

that bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that may be

in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d

253 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947))

(footnote omitted). However, liberal discovery does not mean unlimited discovery,

Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 351–52, and Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to

tailor discovery narrowly and dictate its sequence. CrawfordEl v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598, 118

S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). District courts have broad discretion to determine

relevancy for discovery purposes. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir.2002).

On August 22, 2014, Plaintiff served Defendants with discovery requests, Set One. (Doc.

17-1, “Declaration of Brody McBride,” ¶3.)1/ On October 3, 2014, Defendants responded to Set

1. The Court has no original copy of Plaintiff’s discovery requests, Set One, to verify this

date. The interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admissions

themselves are produced for the Court, in full, only through Defendant’s Responses. (Docs. 17-3;

17-4; 17-5.)

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One and objected to Interrogatories Nos. 11 and 12, Request for Production of Documents No.

31, and Requests for Admissions, Nos. 19, 23, and 28, as irrelevant. (Id. at 9-10.) Interrogatories

11 and 12 present the following requests:

11. State any and all reasons why CPD Sergeant German Duran approached

Plaintiff while Plaintiff was in Alex Rivera Park on May 23, 2014.

12. If CPD Chief Pompeyo Tavarez and CITY employee Nick Servin have ever

had any conversations in which Plaintiff’s name was mentioned, please state the

content of any and all such conversations, including any facts pertaining to

Plaintiff or the mention of Plaintiff’s name. 

(Doc. 17-3, at 9.) Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents No. 31 states:

31. Please produce any and all DOCUMENTS relating to any calls or reports

received by the CPD that people were having sex in Alex Rivera Park on May 23,

2014.

(Doc. 17-4, at 14.) Lastly, Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions, Nos. 19, 23, and 28, state:

19. Admit that on the morning of May 23, 2014, CPD sergeant German Duran

approached Plaintiff while Plaintiff was in Alex Rivera Park.

23. Admit that on or about June 20, 2014, CPD Chief Pompeyo Tavarez and

Officer C. Gonzalez met with CITY employee Nick Servin.

28. Admit that after CPD Chief Pompeyo Tavarez and officer C. Gonzalez met

with CITY employee Nick Servin on or about June 20, 2014, Mr. Servin

instructed CITY employee Nick Fenly to write a reprimand to Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 17-5, at 8-10.) 

Defendant provided identical responses to interrogatories 11 and 12, request for

production of documents No. 31, and request for admissions Nos. 19 and 23, which read:

Objection. This [request] seeks information which is neither relevant to any claim

or defense, nor reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.

(Doc. 17-3, at 9; Doc. 17-4, at 14; Doc. 17-5, at 8-10.) Defendant’s response to Request for

Admission No. 28 presents a relevance objection as well, but also objects to the form of the

request for admission as compound. (Doc. 17-5, at 10-11.) 

Defendants’ responses are effectively boilerplate, if not marginally better, and their

objections should have been argued with specificity. See Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners

Ass’n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D.Cal.1999) (“Boilerplate, generalized objections are inadequate

and tantamount to not making any objection at all.”) However, Defendants have elaborated on

their relevance argument in their opposition, and the Court will consider that argument here. See

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Calderon v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 508, 516 n. 4 (D. Idaho 2013).

The Court agrees with Defendants that the alleged events of May 23, 2014 are irrelevant

to this action as pleaded. Indeed, “the complaint makes no claim of harassment or retaliation”

stemming from any incident other than the events of June 11, 2013. (Doc. 21, at 2.) The scope

of the complaint does not appear to contemplate any theory of ongoing harassment or retaliation

which makes post-event evidence relevant: “harassment” is mentioned only in relation to the

alleged events of June 11, 2013, and retaliation is not mentioned at all. (See Doc. 1.) While the

Court recognizes that “post-event evidence is not only admissible for purposes of proving the

existence of a municipal defendant’s policy or custom, but may be highly probative with respect

to that inquiry,” Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 519 (9th Cir.1997), as amended, 137

F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.1998), there are simply no allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint which suggest

the events on May 23, 2014 are relevant to the events of June 11, 2013. (See Doc. 1.) 

Similarly, there are no allegations in the complaint which explain the nature, or even the

presence, of a prevalent custom or policy instituted by Defendants. To succeed on his Monell

cause of action, Plaintiff must prove, and thus allege, that his constitutional rights were violated

as a result of a widespread policy, practice, or custom that Defendants were aware of but failed

to correct. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694. In order to prevail on this theory of liability, Plaintiff must

prove more than just one, or two, or even three instances of similar constitutional violations

resulting from the widespread custom of the defendants. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (citing

Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 983 (7th Cir.1998). Further, “Plaintiff must demonstrate that there

is a policy at issue rather than a random event.” Id.

In his complaint, Plaintiff describes the underlying events as resulting from a “permanent

and settled culture, policy, and/or practice.” (Doc. 1, at 18-20.) However, Plaintiff makes no

allegations to suggest the events of May 23, 2014 are connected to his Monell claim by similar

constitutional violations, to wit, that the events of May 23, 2014 are an example of a particular

custom or policy that has a common thread with the underlying events. For example, Plaintiff

argues in his Reply that “It is difficult to imagine an act that demonstrates ratification,” of a

custom or policy within the meaning of Monell, “more clearly than [Defendants] harassing

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Plaintiff” on May 23, 2014, but fails to make clear what custom or policy is being ratified, and if

that custom is the same one that caused the underlying events of June 2013. (Doc. 24, at 3.)

Therefore, it is difficult to entertain this encounter as anything other than a random event.

Further, Plaintiff failed to allege or otherwise demonstrate that a constitutional violation,

similar or dissimilar to the underlying events, occurred on May 23, 2014. Plaintiff readily states

that, “Defendants did not arrest Mr. Valenzuela, nor did they issue Mr. Valenzuela any sort of

citation” on May 23, 2014. (Doc. 17-1, at 3.) The fact that no constitutional violation is alleged

to have occurred on May 23, 2014 makes that encounter significantly less relevant to a Monell

claim. “If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police

officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of

constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475

U.S. 796, 799, 106 S. Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1986). 

At this time, the Court has nothing in the complaint or motion to compel on which to find

the events of May 23, 2014 are relevant to Plaintiff’s underlying action. The Court therefore

seeks to limit the scope of discovery to the allegations, claims, and defenses present in the

complaint. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the contested discovery requests are not relevant

to the claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Motion to Compel is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 4, 2015

_________________________

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Cynthia Bashant

All Parties and Counsel of Record

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