Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-01358/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-01358-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-01358-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PIYUSH GUPTA,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 

MACHINES CORPORATION (IBM),

Defendant.

Case No. 5:14-cv-01358-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Re: Dkt. No. 31

Plaintiff Piyush Gupta (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant employment action against Defendant 

International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”), alleging wrongful termination and 

disability discrimination. Presently before the court is IBM’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, 

in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication. See Dkt. No. 31. 

Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(a). After carefully 

reviewing the parties’ pleadings in conjunction with oral argument, IBM’s motion will be granted 

in part and denied in part for the reasons explained below. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began to work with IBM in May 2009, when IBM acquired Plaintiff’s startup 

company. Dep. of Piyush Gupta (“Pl. Dep.”), Dkt. No. 36, Ex. P at 28, 31. This was Plaintiff’s 

second tour with IBM, as he had previously worked for the company from 1984 to 1995. Id. at 19. 

This case concerns events that occurred in 2013 leading to Plaintiff’s separation from IBM. 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-01358-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICIATION.

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In 2013, Plaintiff worked at IBM as Vice President, Product Management. Decl. of Inhi 

Cho Suh (“Suh Decl.”), Dkt. No. 34 at ¶ 3. Partly as a result of frequent and extended business 

trips, Plaintiff developed back problems and began to experience back pain in 2011. Decl. of 

Piyush Gupta (“Pl. Decl.”), Dkt. No. 41 at ¶ 17. Since February 2011, IBM knew of Plaintiff’s 

back problems, and throughout 2012 and 2013, Plaintiff continued to travel extensively. Id. 

At IBM, Plaintiff reported directly to Inhi Cho Suh (“Ms. Suh”), who at that time served as 

Vice President, Product Management & Strategy. Suh Decl. at ¶ 2. In turn, Ms. Suh reported to 

Bob Picciano (“Mr. Picciano”) who served as Senior Vice President of Information Management. 

Id. at ¶ 5. 

On January 27, 2013, Plaintiff emailed Mr. Picciano expressing discontent with his current 

role at IBM, and wishing to discuss a potential exit strategy to something else within IBM, or from 

IBM. Pl. Dep. at 56, Def.’s Ex. 1. Plaintiff also raised this issue with Ms. Suh, and explained that 

he would be interested in a role within IBM where he could spend time with clients and sales 

teams in India and serve as a trusted advisor to big clients in India. Pl. Dep. at 68-69, 71. On 

March 13th , Ms. Suh emailed Ms. Picciano referencing a discussion she had with Plaintiff about 

moving Plaintiff from a product management role to a different role that included monthly travels 

to India. Pl. Decl., Ex. F; Suh Decl., Ex. C. Mr. Picciano seemingly approved this proposition. 

Also in March 2013, Plaintiff visited his physician to tend to his back problems. Pl. Dep. 

at 108. His physician advised that Plaintiff fly on business class when making business trips, and 

prescribed a sit/stand desk. Id.; Pl. Decl. at ¶ 19. Consequently, Plaintiff requested two 

accommodations from IBM: (1) the ability to fly business class on cross-country and international 

flights; and (2) ergonomic furniture for his home office, which would include a sit/stand desk and 

an ergonomic chair. Pl. Dep. at 109; Suh Decl. at ¶¶ 9-10. IBM approved Plaintiff’s request to fly 

business class on flights longer than six hours, covering only international flights. Pl. Dep. at 109. 

As to the ergonomic furniture, Plaintiff submitted this request to IBM on March 14th. Pl.

Decl. at ¶ 21. At around this time, Plaintiff’s physical therapist discussed the benefits of shortCase 5:14-cv-01358-EJD Document 50 Filed 11/13/15 Page 2 of 19
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Case No.: 5:14-cv-01358-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICIATION.

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term disability leave, but Plaintiff was not interested in pursuing that option at the time because he 

did not want to take the extended time off. Id. at ¶ 41. Thereafter, on March 23rd, Plaintiff 

formally assumed his new role in India South Asia business development. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 15. 

While Plaintiff was on a business trip abroad, Ms. Suh communicated with Plaintiff to 

discuss a reduction in force, or “resource action,” IBM would be undertaking. Pl. Dep. at 76; Suh 

Decl. at ¶ 12. Ms. Suh told Plaintiff that she needed to lay people off from product management, 

which was Plaintiff’s former group, and she needed his suggestions on who should be laid off 

given that he knew the members of that group very well. Id. After proposing ideas to reduce the 

number of layoffs, Plaintiff told Ms. Suh that if she had to lay off so many people, then she should 

probably put him on that list. Pl. Dep. at 77; Suh Decl. at ¶ 12. He also told her that given his pay 

scale, Ms. Suh should be able to save two employees from layoffs. Id. Ms. Suh responded with 

“that’s not going to happen.” Pl. Dep. at 78. 

On May 29th, IBM’s ergonomic expert completed an ergonomic evaluation and 

recommended Plaintiff receive ergonomic furniture. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 22. On June 3rd, IBM Nurse 

Mary Temo (“Nurse Temo”) entered Plaintiff’s ergonomic furniture request into the system, and 

by early June, Ms. Suh was aware of this request. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. On June 18-19th, while on a 

business trip to India, Nurse Temo emailed Plaintiff inquiring about his back and advised that 

Plaintiff discuss short-term disability with his physician. Id. at ¶ 24; Pl. Decl., Ex. K. 

At around that time, in mid-June, IBM announced its resource action. Decl. of Edward 

Matchak (“Matchak Decl.”) at ¶ 4. The resource action was broad and resulted in layoffs across 

much of IBM’s software group in order to reduce costs. Id. Employees selected for layoffs were 

offered certain severance benefits that included severance pay in exchange for executing a 

separation agreement and release of claims. Id. 

On June 19th, Ms. Suh communicated with Plaintiff and told him she was “going to take 

him up on his suggestion” and select him for layoff. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 25; Pl. Dep. at 74-75, 78; Suh 

Decl. at ¶ 14. Ms. Suh further stated that IBM was going to retire Plaintiff given his combined 15 

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICIATION.

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years of service, which would be more advantageous for him. Pl. Dep. at 78; Suh Decl. at ¶ 14. 

On the same day, Plaintiff initiated an Instant Messenger conversation with Edward 

Matchak (“Mr. Matchak”), who served as IBM’s Human Resources Partner. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 48; 

Matchak Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 8, Ex. M. The conversation focused on the intersection between short-term 

disability and separation with IBM, and Plaintiff stated he was interested in going on short-term 

disability but not returning to IBM. Matchak Decl., Ex. M. 

As to Plaintiff’s ergonomic furniture request, Mei Yee Sam (“Ms. Sam”) from IBM was 

handling the request. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 26. On June 26th, Ms. Sam emailed Ms. Suh a third reminder 

to approve Plaintiff’s request for ergonomic furniture. Id.; Suh Decl., Ex. E. Two days later, on 

June 28th, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Suh notifying her that the sit/stand desk had been moving through 

the IBM process, and it was ready to order. Pl. Decl., Ex. J. Plaintiff further stated that he needed 

to try the sit/stand desk even if he was retiring. Id. Ms. Suh approved Plaintiff’s ergonomic 

furniture request on July 4th. Suh Decl., Ex. E. At around that time, Plaintiff began exploring the 

option of short-term disability. Plaintiff consulted his physician, and on July 2nd, he applied for 

short-term disability at IBM. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 38; Pl. Dep. at 92. 

Concurrently, Plaintiff was planning a final business trip to India, which he considered to 

be a very important trip for IBM. Pl. Dep. at 90. Due to the importance of the trip, Plaintiff talked 

to Ms. Suh about extending his last day with IBM from July 31st to August 15th. Id. at 90, 92; 

Suh Decl. at ¶ 17. Ms. Suh agreed the trip was important, and on July 9th, she emailed Mr. 

Picciano and human resources to approve the extension of Plaintiff’s last day. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 45, 

Ex. P; Pl. Dep. at 90-92, 96; Suh Decl. at ¶ 17. On July 11th, Mr. Picciano approved the 

extension. Pl. Decl., Ex. P. Although Plaintiff’s last day would be August 15th, his employment 

was “bridged” for purposes of retirement benefits to August 31st. Pl. Dep. at 80, 223; Suh Decl. at 

¶ 16; Matchak Decl. at ¶ 16. 

On July 19th, Nurse Temo emailed Plaintiff notifying him that his short-term disability 

request had been approved for July 10th through August 18th, 2013. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 43, Ex. O; Pl.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICIATION.

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Dep. at 91, 150-51. Upon realizing that the short-term disability leave would conflict with his 

business trip to India, Plaintiff spoke to Nurse Temo about delaying the leave. Pl. Dep. at 91; Pl.

Decl., Ex. O. Nurse Temo informed Plaintiff that the only way to change the short-term disability 

arrangement was for Plaintiff’s physician to approve the change. Id. Plaintiff then contacted his 

physician and requested a change on his short-term disability leave so that he could make the 

business trip to India. Pl. Dep. at 91-92, 96. On the same day, Plaintiff notified Nurse Temo that 

his physician would be sending a notification to disregard the short-term disability request. Pl.

Decl., Ex. O. On July 24th, Nurse Temo emailed Ms. Suh to disregard Plaintiff’s previous request 

for short-term disability. Pl. Dep. at 153; Suh Decl. at ¶ 18; Suh Decl., Ex. F.

On July 25th, Plaintiff had a second Instant Messenger conversation with Mr. Matchak 

inquiring about retirement, and then followed with a telephone conversation. Gupta Decl. at ¶ 53, 

Ex. L. The next day, Plaintiff received documents pertaining to his separation package, and two 

days later, he departed to India for his final business trip. Pl. Dep. at 81, 83, 176; Suh Decl., Ex. 

G. While Plaintiff was in India, on July 29th, an IBM employee emailed Plaintiff and Ms. Sam 

notifying them that the ergonomic furniture request had been cancelled because IBM does not 

order equipment for retiring employees, only active employees. Pl. Dep. at 129; Pl. Decl., Ex. M.

Plaintiff spent his last date of employment, August 15th, in India and extended his stay to 

take a personal vacation at the end. Pl. Dep. at 96-97; Suh Decl. at ¶ 19. Thus, when Plaintiff 

returned to the United States on August 18th, he was no longer an active employee. Pl. Dep. at 

97; Suh Decl., Ex. G. On August 22nd, Mr. Matchak conducted Plaintiff’s exit interview where 

they discussed the benefits Plaintiff was entitled to, and Plaintiff ultimately declined to sign his 

separation agreement. Pl. Dep. at 80-81, 83, 97; Matchak Decl. at ¶ 6. 

On September 8th, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Suh requesting additional time to review the 

separation documents and consult with an attorney. Suh Decl., Ex. G. In response, Ms. Suh 

provided Plaintiff with a deadline of September 19th. Id.; Pl. Dep. at 141-42. Thereafter, Plaintiff 

retained an attorney and emailed Ms. Suh expressing concerns over certain terms of the separation 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-01358-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICIATION.

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package, after which Ms. Suh referred Plaintiff’s counsel to speak to IBM’s general counsel . Pl.

Decl., Ex. Q. 

In February 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing and obtained a right-to-sue letter, thereby exhausting his administrative 

remedies. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. A. On February 24, 2014, Plaintiff commenced 

the instant action in Santa Clara County Superior Court, and IBM subsequently removed the 

action to this court claiming diversity jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal, Dkt. No. 1. In his 

complaint, Plaintiff asserts five claims: (1) disability discrimination in violation of the Fair 

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) disability discrimination in failure to engage in 

timely, good faith interactive process; (3) failure to provide disability accommodation; (4) fraud in 

the inducement; and (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. See Compl.

In June 2015, IBM filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, 

Summary Adjudication. See Mot., Dkt. No. 31. Plaintiff filed an opposition brief, and IBM filed 

a reply brief. See Opp’n, Dkt. No. 42; Reply, Dkt. No. 44. A hearing on this motion was held on 

July 30, 2015. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment should be granted if “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and 

identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or 

affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the nonmoving party has no 

obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 

Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). On the other hand, if the 

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moving party does meet this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go 

beyond the pleadings and designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The court must regard as true the opposing party’s 

evidence, if supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 

However, the mere suggestion that facts are in controversy, as well as conclusory or speculative 

testimony in affidavits and moving papers, is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See

Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Instead, the non-moving 

party must come forward with admissible evidence to satisfy the burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

see also Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving 

party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). However, where the 

nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial on a particular issue, the moving party need 

only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Provided there has been adequate time for discovery, summary 

judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of 

the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

III. DISCUSSION 

IBM moves for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s five claims and prayer for 

punitive damages. Mot. at 1. Each claim will be addressed in turn. 

A. Claim #1: Disability Discrimination in Violation of the California Fair 

Employment and Housing Act

As his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that his disability was a motivating factor in IBM’s 

termination of his employment. Compl. at ¶ 24. IBM moves for summary judgment contending 

that Plaintiff’s claim lacks merit. Mot. at 9. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICIATION.

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“When entertaining motions for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases 

arising under state law, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting scheme as a federal procedural rule.” Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 552 

(9th Cir. 2011). Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, the employee “must first establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. If the employee does so, the burden shifts to the employer 

to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Id. If the 

employer meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to “show that the reason is 

pretextual either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 

motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 

unworthy of credence.” Id. 

i. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination 

Under California law, “[a] prima facie case of disability discrimination under FEHA 

requires the employee to show he or she (1) suffered from a disability, (2) was otherwise qualified 

to do his or her job, and (3) was subjected to adverse employment action because of the 

disability.” Nealy v. City of Santa Monica, 234 Cal. App. 4th 359, 378 (2015). Here, only the 

third prong is in dispute: whether Plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action because of 

his disability. See Mot. at 9-10; Opp’n at 11. 

Since it is Plaintiff’s burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff’s 

argument is considered first. Plaintiff, however, offers no argument discussing how his 

termination was due to his disability. An examination of the record shows that Plaintiff was able 

to work from home, his request to fly on business class was approved, his request to obtain 

ergonomic furniture for his home office was also approved even though it was cancelled because 

of his termination, his stay with IBM was extended in order to accommodate his final business trip 

to India, and his termination was considered a retirement recognizing his 15 years of service to the 

company. Further, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that nobody at IBM treated him 

unprofessionally or in a manner that was insensitive to his physical condition, and that he was 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICIATION.

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unaware of any facts causing him to believe that his termination was due to his back problems. 

See Pl. Dep. at 116, 188-89. The court agrees with IBM that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima 

facie case of disability discrimination. 

ii. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason 

Assuming Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to IBM to articulate 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. To do this, the employer must show 

that the procedure it used to terminate the employee was “validly and fairly devised and 

administered to serve a legitimate business purpose.” Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Lucent 

Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2011). “To suffice under McDonnell Douglas, an 

employer’s explanation must explain why the plaintiff ‘in particular’ was laid off.” Diaz v. Eagle 

Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In this instance, IBM offers two arguments. IBM first contends that Plaintiff was laid off 

as part of a broad reduction in force consistent with its ongoing efforts to streamline operations, 

reduce costs, and improve productivity. Mot. at 10; see also Suh Decl. at ¶ 11; Matchak Decl. at ¶ 

4. Generally, reductions in force have been recognized to constitute a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason to terminate employment. See Villanueva v. City of Colton, 160 Cal. 

App. 4th 1188, 1194-95 (2008) (“[T]he law is settled that an employer’s depressed economic 

condition can be good cause for discharging an employee.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

However, courts have also cautioned against relying solely on a reduction-in-force rationale. “An 

employer’s freedom to consolidate or reduce its work force, and to eliminate positions in the 

process, does not mean it may use the occasion as a convenient opportunity to get rid of its 

[protected] workers.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 358 (2000); see also Diaz, 521 

F.3d at 1211-12 (“Workforce reduction explains why [the employer] laid off a group of its 

workers, but it does not explain why [the plaintiff] was chosen to be part of that group.”). Thus, 

the court considers IBM’s reduction-in-force argument in conjunction with its second argument. 

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IBM argues that Plaintiff was selected for layoff because he volunteered himself. Mot. at 

10; see also Suh Decl. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff volunteering himself is well supported by the evidence on 

the record, including by his own admission. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that when IBM 

management was making decisions on who to select for layoffs, Ms. Suh communicated with 

Plaintiff to ask his opinion on which members of his former team should be selected. Pl. Dep. at 

76. After Plaintiff offered Ms. Suh ideas on how to reduce the impact of the layoffs, Plaintiff told 

her: “if you have to lay off so many, you should probably put me on that list instead of taking 

these guys, and given my pay scale, you should be able to save two of them.” Id. at 77. He 

further told her: “[f]rom your narrow perspective, I’m not doing product management. I’m doing 

sales, so you can happily put me on the list.” Id. Plaintiff testified that a month or two later, in 

June 2013, Ms. Suh communicated with him and told him she would “take [him] up on that offer,”

and would select him for layoff. Id. at 78. This evidence, coupled with the reduction in force, is 

sufficient for IBM to meet its burden of establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 

iii. Pretext 

Lastly, the burden shifts to the employee to “demonstrate either that the defendant’s 

showing was in fact insufficient or that there was a triable issue of fact material to the defendant’s 

showing.” Lucent Techs., 642 F.3d at 746. The employee can meet this burden “by producing 

substantial responsive evidence that the employer’s showing was untrue or pretextual.” Id. “[T]he 

employee must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable 

factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did 

not act for the non-discriminatory reasons.” Id. 

Plaintiff argues that IBM’s purported legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual 

for three reasons. First, he contends that IBM’s reduction-in-force rationale, by itself, is not 

sufficient to defeat Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. Opp’n at 12. As noted above, the court 

agrees. 

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Second, Plaintiff argues that when he volunteered himself for the layoff, he was making a 

spontaneous remark. Opp’n at 11-12. In his declaration, he states that in the heat of the moment 

and in a reflexive effort to protect his colleagues, he volunteered himself but was relieved when 

Ms. Suh responded with “[n]ice try, that’s not going to happen.” Pl. Decl. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff 

considered his spontaneous remark to be in the past and off the table, and he believed that neither 

he nor Ms. Suh took it seriously. Id. This argument, however, is unpersuasive. It is undisputed 

that Plaintiff volunteered himself during a time when Ms. Suh was making decisions on layoffs, 

thus it is reasonable to believe that Ms. Suh relied on his statements in selecting Plaintiff for 

layoff. See Suh Decl. at ¶ 13 (“I [sic] also heavily influenced in reaching this decision by the fact 

that Mr. Gupta himself had suggested to me that he be selected for layoff.”). That Plaintiff now 

regrets having made these statements is insufficient to overcome IBM’s purported legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons. 

Third, Plaintiff argues that the proximity of time between the date Plaintiff’s requests for 

accommodation became more insistent and the date IBM decided to lay him off is itself evidence 

of pretext. Opp’n at 13. Specifically, Plaintiff relies on the following timeline: on March 14th, 

Plaintiff submitted his ergonomic furniture request; by early April, the request was being 

processed; on May 29th, IBM’s ergonomic expert completed an evaluation and recommended 

Plaintiff receive the ergonomic furniture; on June 3rd, Nurse Temo entered the request into the 

system; and on June 19th, Plaintiff was selected for layoff. Id. Despite the temporal proximity, 

this argument does not show pretext considering IBM knew of Plaintiff’s back problems since 

2011, IBM approved Plaintiff’s requests to fly business class and short-term disability, and the 

undisputed facts show that Plaintiff volunteered himself for layoff. Thus, Plaintiff has not 

succeeded in establishing pretext. 

In sum, there is an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim that he was terminated 

because of his disability. Accordingly, IBM’s motion as to this claim is granted. 

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B. Claim #2: Failure to Engage in Timely, Good Faith Interactive Process 

As his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that IBM failed to engage in a timely, good faith 

interactive process with Plaintiff to accommodate his known disability, and instead terminated 

Plaintiff because of his disability. Compl. at ¶ 29. IBM moves for summary judgment contending 

that Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to support this claim. Mot. at 13. 

California Government Code § 12940(n) requires that an employer engage in a “timely, 

good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable 

accommodations.” The statute “requires an informal process with the employee to attempt to 

identify reasonable accommodations, not necessarily ritualized discussions.” Nealy, 234 Cal. 

App. 4th at 379. The court’s “ultimate obligation is to isolate the cause of the breakdown and then 

assign responsibility so that liability for failure to provide reasonable accommodations ensues only 

where the employer bears responsibility for the breakdown.” Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus 

Grp., Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 952, 985 (2008). 

Plaintiff disputes the manner in which IBM handled the ergonomic furniture request. 

Opp’n at 14. He argues that it took over 31⁄2 months for his request to be reviewed and approved 

by Ms. Suh, and when Ms. Suh finally approved the request, the ergonomic furniture order was 

cancelled because Plaintiff had already been selected for layoff. Id. According to Plaintiff, this 

delay was an inconvenience given that his extensive travel continued to take a toll on his back. Id. 

at 14-15. In response, IBM argues that the short delay in processing Plaintiff’s request reflects 

nothing more than routine processing of an accommodation request by a large corporation. Reply 

at 11. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff submitted his ergonomic furniture request on March 14th, 

IBM’s ergonomic expert completed an evaluation on May 29th, and Nurse Temo entered the 

request into the system on June 3rd. It is also undisputed that after Plaintiff was notified of his 

layoff, on June 26th, Ms. Sam emailed Ms. Suh a third reminder to approve the ergonomic 

furniture request. See Suh Decl., Ex. E. Ms. Suh finally approved the request on July 4th. See id. 

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Based on the record, it appears that it took 31⁄2 months—and three reminders—for Ms. Suh 

to approve Plaintiff’s request for ergonomic furniture request. In addition, Ms. Suh approved the 

request while knowing that Plaintiff was already selected for layoff, and there is no indication that 

Ms. Suh alerted Plaintiff that he would be ineligible to receive the ergonomic furniture due to the 

layoff. As such, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether IBM participated in a timely, good 

faith interactive process. See Swanson v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 232 Cal. App. 4th 954, 971 

(2014) (“Each party must participate in good faith, undertake reasonable efforts to communicate 

its concerns, and make available to the other information which is available, or more accessible, to 

one party.”).

Accordingly, IBM’s motion as to this claim is denied. 

C. Claim #3: Failure to Provide Disability Accommodation 

As his third claim, Plaintiff alleges that IBM failed to provide him with a reasonable 

accommodation. Compl. at ¶ 33. IBM moves for summary judgment contending that this claim 

lacks merit. Mot. at 14. 

Under California Government Code § 12940(m), an employer is required to provide 

reasonable accommodations. “A reasonable accommodation is any modification or adjustment to 

the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or 

desired.” Swanson, 232 Cal. App. 4th at 968-69 (internal quotations omitted). However, the 

employer is not required “to make an accommodation that is demonstrated by the employer or 

other covered entity to produce undue hardship to its operations.” Id. at 969 (internal quotations 

omitted). The elements of this claim are “(1) the plaintiff has a disability under the FEHA; (2) the 

plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position; and (3) the employer failed 

to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.” Id. Here, only the third element is in 

dispute: whether IBM failed to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. 

Plaintiff argues that IBM failed to meet its obligations to accommodate Plaintiff’s 

disability when it granted the ergonomic furniture request, but ultimately never delivered the 

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furniture to Plaintiff. Opp’n at 16. In essence, Plaintiff appears to argue that IBM failed to 

provide a reasonable accommodation—the ergonomic furniture—because by the time the request 

was approved, his separation date with IBM was nearing, thus making him ineligible to obtain the 

ergonomic furniture. Consequently, Plaintiff never received the ergonomic furniture. As 

discussed above, it is undisputed that Ms. Suh approved Plaintiff’s ergonomic furniture request 31⁄2 

months after he first submitted it to IBM, and IBM then cancelled the ergonomic furniture order in 

light of Plaintiff’s separation with IBM.

“An employer cannot prevail on summary judgment on a claim of failure to reasonably 

accommodate unless it establishes through undisputed facts that reasonable accommodation was 

offered and refused . . . [or] that the employer did everything in its power to find a reasonable 

accommodation, but the informal interactive process broke down because the employee failed to 

engage in discussions in good faith.” Lucent Techs., 642 F.3d at 743-44. While Plaintiff does not 

dispute the ergonomic furniture itself was appropriate as a reasonable accommodation, his

argument that the 31⁄2 month delay in approving the request could constitute a failure to provide 

reasonable accommodation is persuasive. 

First, IBM has not been able to establish through undisputed facts that Plaintiff refused the 

ergonomic furniture. In fact, though he may not have been entitled to it by then, Plaintiff 

continued to inquire about the ergonomic furniture even after the date of separation. See Pl. Decl., 

Ex. M. Second, IBM has not been able to establish through undisputed facts that the informal 

process broke down because Plaintiff failed to engage in discussions in good faith. Instead, the 

evidence shows that Plaintiff continuously inquired about the ergonomic furniture, and Plaintiff 

emailed Ms. Suh to follow-up on a third reminder she received about approving the ergonomic 

furniture request. See Pl. Decl., Exs. I, J. 

Furthermore, the court cannot determine whether the 31⁄2 month delay in approving the 

ergonomic furniture request is “reasonable.” The record does not provide information on how 

long IBM typically takes to approve such request, nor was IBM able to offer that information at 

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oral argument. Given that this delay could have impeded Plaintiff’s ability to obtain a reasonable 

accommodation, there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether IBM fulfilled its duty to 

provide a reasonable accommodation. See Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 4th 

935, 954 (1997) (“Ordinarily, the reasonableness of an accommodation is an issue for the jury.”); 

see also Swanson, 232 Cal. App. 4th at 971 (“[A]n employer’s failure to properly engage in the 

process is separate from the failure to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability and gives 

rise to an independent cause of action.”).

On this record, there is a dispute as to whether IBM provided Plaintiff a reasonable 

accommodation. Therefore, IBM’s motion as to this claim is denied. 

D. Claim #4: Fraud in the Inducement 

As his fourth claim, Plaintiff alleges that IBM made certain misrepresentations regarding

short-term disability benefits that induced Plaintiff not to pursue such benefits, under the belief 

that he would lose the benefits when IBM terminated his employment. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-42. IBM

moves for summary judgment contending that Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of fraud. 

Mot. at 14. 

The elements giving rise to a claim for fraud are: (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of 

falsity, or “scienter;” (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. Davis 

v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 236 Cal. App. 4th 619, 642 (2015). IBM’s motion addresses only the first 

four elements. 

i. Misrepresentation

 Plaintiff contends that Mr. Matchak, from IBM’s human resources, made certain 

statements about the intersection between short-term disability benefits and termination that 

constitutes a misrepresentation. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 37. Specifically, Plaintiff refers to an Instant 

Messenger conversation between him and Mr. Matchak that took place on June 19, 2013—the 

same date Plaintiff was notified he was being laid off. See Matchak Decl., Ex. M. Plaintiff 

initiated the conversation by making general inquiries about whether IBM could separate an 

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employee who is on short-term disability or is applying for it. In response, Mr. Matchak stated 

that typically human resources reviews with IBM Medical before delivering the message of 

termination to the employee. When Plaintiff kept inquiring, Mr. Matchak stated: “if there’s a 

particular case we might have brewing, let me know and I can arrange a call with you, I, and the 

nurse case manager.” Id. Plaintiff continued to make general inquires, and Mr. Matchak stated: 

“again, feel free to let me know if when you return [to the United States], we need to get a call 

with the medical folks.” Id. After Plaintiff explained to Mr. Matchak that he was inquiring about 

himself, Mr. Matchak responded: “ok, so if you ended up having the Dr. submit an MTR to go on 

[short-term disability], then she and her HR partner would probably review with IBM Medical . . . 

to determine impact on package offer.” Id.

In evaluating the Instant Messenger conversation, there is no indication Mr. Matchak made 

the misrepresentation that an employee on short-term disability could not be affected by the layoff. 

First, Mr. Matchak’s statements were general responses to Plaintiff’s general inquiries. There was 

no misstatement of fact. See L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. Insomniac, Inc., 233 Cal. App. 

4th 803, 831 (2015) (“To allege fraud based on an affirmative misrepresentation, a plaintiff must 

allege a misrepresentation—normally an affirmation of fact.”). Second, at the time of the 

conversation, Plaintiff was neither on short-term disability nor in the process of applying, thus Mr. 

Matchak could not have made a misrepresentation on a past or existing material fact. See Cansino 

v. Bank of Am., 224 Cal. App. 4th 1462, 1469 (2014) (“[A]ctionable misrepresentations must 

pertain to past or existing material facts; [s]tatements or predictions regarding future events are 

deemed to be mere opinions which are not actionable.”). Third, on two occasions, Mr. Matchak 

offered to arrange a phone call between Plaintiff and IBM Medical to obtain more information 

about his inquiries, which weakens Plaintiff’s argument. As such, Plaintiff has not established that 

Mr. Matchak made a misrepresentation. 

ii. Knowledge of Falsity 

Even assuming Plaintiff could establish a misrepresentation based on the Instant 

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Messenger conversation or other conversations, the court considers whether Plaintiff would be 

able to establish that Mr. Matchak knew his statements were false. Plaintiff offers no argument on 

that issue. Moreover, in examining the Instant Messenger conversation, there is no indication that 

Mr. Matchak had knowledge of falsity; on the contrary, he offered to schedule a phone call 

between Plaintiff and IBM Medical to obtain the necessary information to Plaintiff’s inquiry. As 

such, Plaintiff cannot establish that Mr. Matchak had knowledge of falsity. 

iii. Intent to Defraud 

Even assuming Plaintiff could establish knowledge of falsity, the court considers whether 

Plaintiff would be able to establish an intent to defraud. Plaintiff, again, offers no argument. 

Based on the Instant Messenger conversation, and as noted above, there is no indication that Mr. 

Matchak had any intent to defraud Plaintiff. 

iv. Justifiable Reliance 

Lastly, assuming that Plaintiff could establish misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, and 

intent to defraud, the court considers whether Plaintiff would be able to establish justifiable 

reliance. The undisputed evidence shows that he cannot. 

Plaintiff argues that he relied on IBM’s misrepresentations and did not apply for short-term 

disability because he was led to believe that he would lose his short-term disability benefits when

his employment became terminated. Opp’n at 17. This argument, however, is belied by the 

evidence on the record. First, Plaintiff has stated that he applied for short-term disability, and the 

paperwork was submitted to IBM on July 2, 2013. See Pl. Decl. at ¶ 38; Pl. Dep. at 92-93. 

Second, Plaintiff has stated that his short-term disability leave was approved by IBM. See Pl.

Decl. at ¶ 43, Ex. O; Pl. Dep. at 91. Third, Plaintiff testified that he requested a change to his 

short-term disability leave so that he could make a final business trip to India. See Pl. Dep. at 91-

92, 96. Consequently, Plaintiff’s short-term disability leave was terminated. See id. at 153; Pl.

Decl., Ex. O. Given the clear undisputed evidence, there is no indication that Plaintiff was 

deterred from applying for short-term disability because of Mr. Matchak’s statements, or that he 

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decided to terminate his short-term disability status because of Mr. Matchak’s statements. As 

such, Plaintiff would not be able to prove this element at trial. 

In sum, there is an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim that IBM committed 

fraud in the inducement. Accordingly, IBM’s motion as to this claim is granted. 

E. Claim #5: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy 

As his fifth claim, Plaintiff alleges that IBM violated his statutory rights when it terminated 

Plaintiff because of his disability. Compl. at ¶ 49. IBM moves for summary judgment contending 

that this claim fails because Plaintiff cannot establish a public policy exception to the at-will 

doctrine based on disability discrimination or other FEHA violation. Mot. at 17. 

In California, an employer can terminate an at-will employee for any reason “so long as it 

is not grounded on a prohibited bias.” McGrory v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 212 Cal. App. 4th 

1510, 1524 (2013). An exception to the at-will doctrine is when the employer terminates an 

employee and the termination violates “fundamental public policy.” Sinatra v. Chico Unified Sch. 

Dist., 119 Cal. App. 4th 701, 705 (2004). “To establish a claim for wrongful discharge in 

violation of public policy, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) a termination or other adverse 

employment action; (2) the termination or other action was a violation of a fundamental public 

policy, as expressed in a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision; and (3) a nexus between 

the adverse action and the employee’s protected status or activity.” Rope v. Auto-Chlor Sys. of 

Wash., Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 635, 660 (2013).

In this instance, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was an at-will employee and that he was 

terminated from his employment with IBM. See Pl. Dep. at 167-68. As to the second element, 

termination due to disability discrimination is a recognized fundamental public policy. See Rope, 

220 Cal. App. 4th at 660 (“FEHA’s policy prohibiting disability discrimination in employment is 

sufficiently substantial and fundamental to support a claim for wrongful termination in violation of 

public policy.”). Here, however, Plaintiff’s first claim asserting disability discrimination has been 

dismissed. See supra § III(A). Since there is no remaining claim that is contingent on Plaintiff’s 

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termination, this claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, IBM’s motion as to this claim is 

granted. 

F. Punitive Damages 

Pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294(a), “the jury may award punitive damages where 

it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, 

fraud, or malice.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 712 (2009). IBM moves for 

summary judgment contending that Plaintiff’s claims do not warrant punitive damages. Mot. at 

17. The court agrees. Given that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages for his fraud claim, which was 

dismissed above, there are no legal grounds for seeking punitive damages. See Opp’n at 20; supra

at § III(D). Accordingly, IBM’s motion as to this issue is granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IBM’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, 

Summary Adjudication is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

The motion is GRANTED as to the following claims: (1) first claim alleging disability 

discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) fourth claim alleging fraud in the inducement; (3) fifth 

claim alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (4) Plaintiff’s prayer for 

punitive damages. 

The motion is DENIED as to the following claims: (1) second claim alleging failure to 

engage in timely, good faith interactive process; and (2) third claim alleging a failure to provide 

disability discrimination. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 13, 2015 

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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