Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05509/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05509-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STANLI MAE THROCKMORTON )

TERBUSH, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:02-CV-5509-SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (DOC.

36)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST

TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS

ORDER DECLARING DEFENDANT’S

ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION 

MOOT (DOC. 36)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

DISMISS THIS ACTION

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.

The motion of Defendant United States to dismiss the action,

or in the alternative for summary judgment or summary

adjudication, came on regularly for hearing on December 2, 2005,

at 9:26 a.m. in Courtroom 4 before the Honorable Sandra M.

Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Kristi Culver Kapetan of

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the United States Attorney’s Office appeared on behalf of the

moving Defendant, and John Barr and William Davis appeared on

behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court had reviewed all the papers

submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the motion. After

argument, the matter was submitted to the Court.

I. Background

On May 3, 2002, Plaintiffs, who are the parents, heirs at

law, and successors in interest of decedent Peter Terbush,

brought this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act,

alleging that Defendant United States of America (USA) operated

Yosemite National Park (YNP) where, on June 13, 1999, decedent

was killed by a rockslide at or near the base of Glacier Point. 

Plaintiffs allege that 1) USA was negligent: USA negligently

designed, constructed, operated, and maintained a wastewater

drainage system and leach field on the premises that caused water

to flow into fractures in rock formations, which unnaturally

stressed the rock, causing increased rock-fall (exfoliation)

activity and a dangerous condition, which in turn caused a

rockslide; USA knew or should have known of the condition and

failed to post necessary warning signs to warn of the danger,

which was not reasonably apparent. Plaintiffs further allege that

2) the site was a dangerous condition of the premises resulting

from destabilization from the flow of wastewater, and USA should

have warned of the danger. (Complt.)

USA filed an answer on July 15, 2002, denying many

allegations, asserting that at the time of death decedent was on

a talus pile 240 feet above the base of Glacier Point, and

further asserting defenses including lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, lack of waiver of

sovereign immunity, due care, lack of proximate cause,

contributory fault, and assumption of risk.

On May 16, 2005, Defendant USA filed a motion to dismiss the

action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or, in the

alternative, a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56,

on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over this action for negligence pursuant to the discretionary

function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), or,

alternatively, Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim for negligence

against the government because of the discretionary function

exception; further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not

entitled to recover because he assumed the risk of injury when he

engaged in the sport of rock climbing in YNP. Also filed were a

statement of undisputed facts, declaration of Kristi Kapetan with

Ex. A thereto, declaration of Michael J. Tollefson with Exhibits

A through E, declaration of Sherrod Osbourne with Ex. A in three

parts, and the declaration of John Williamson.

Defendant argues that the decisions the National Park

Service (NPS) made about placement of YNP facilities, rock fall,

and warnings are immunized by the discretionary function

exception to the FTCA; further, decedent assumed the risk of

rocks falling on him when he engaged in technical rock climbing,

and thus he assumed the risk of injury when he engaged in that

hazardous activity.

On June 17, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in

opposition, statement of disputed and undisputed facts,

objections to Defendant’s statements of facts, and declarations,

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with exhibits, of Catherine Crabtree, Chester F. Watts, Fred A.

Brooks, and decedent’s climbing companions, Joseph Kewin and

Kerry Pyle. 

Plaintiffs assert that various policies applicable here were

mandatory, nondiscretionary policies regarding inspections,

engineering reviews, and signing or informing the public

regarding known hazards, especially those created or exacerbated

by NPS construction activities that rendered the rock face ultrahazardous to climbers and the general public who picnic, hike, or

birdwatch at Glacier Point. Even though some discretionary

decisions may have been made at some point about the wastewater

facility, the manner in which it was operated or maintained was

removed from the discretionary function exception. Plaintiffs

assert that the discretionary function exception does not apply

and that the Court does have jurisdiction over the matter.

Further, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their pleadings to

conform to proof and resolve any issues that arise from the

pleadings’ statement of the case which can be cured by amendment.

(Pltf.’s Points and Authorities in Opposition at 23.)

On July 1, 2005, Defendant filed a reply, objections to

Plaintiff’s evidence, responses to Plaintiff’s objections to

Defendant’s evidence, statement of facts in reply (referred to

herein as “factual reply”), declaration of Lloyd Olson, and

declaration of Kristi Kapetan with exhibits.

On August 9, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief in

opposition to the motion, and portions of the NPS-50 document,

which Plaintiffs contend makes OSHA compliance, policies, and

mandates applicable to Defendant’s conduct at issue in this case.

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On August 23, 2005, pursuant to the Court’s order, Defendant

filed a supplemental brief and a complete copy of the NPS-50

document.

On September 8, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a response to

Defendant’s supplemental briefing.

II. Governing Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss

It has been held that a motion to dismiss on the basis of

the discretionary function exception is a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (1988),

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989). The presence or absence of

subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court is a question of

law. Id.

Except in removed cases, it is in effect presumed that the

Court lacks jurisdiction, and it is the plaintiff who bears the

burden of proof of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville

Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989); Valdez v. United

States 837 F.Supp. 1065, 1067, aff’d., Valdez v. United States,

56 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is the government’s

burden to demonstrate the applicability of the discretionary

function exception. Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177,

1181 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Challenges to jurisdiction by way of Rule 12(b)(1) may

proceed on the basis of the face of the complaint, or on the

basis of evidence beyond the complaint. When proceeding on the

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1Nevertheless, where the facts upon which jurisdiction depends are also an essential element of the federal

claim, the challenge to the facts goes both to federal jurisdiction (which is otherwise always a question of law for the

Court) and to the merits of the claim. The Court should not resolve genuinely disputed facts where the question of

jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d

1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). In such a case, the district court assumes the truth of factual allegations in a complaint

unless controverted by undisputed facts in the record. Dismissal is then appropriate where it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. 

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basis of the face of the complaint, the Court must accept all of

the factual allegations of the complaint as true and ask whether

the allegations state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991);

Berkovitz v.United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540 (1988). 

However, when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1), the district court is not restricted to the face

of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits

and testimony, and may weigh the evidence and resolve and

determine factual disputes concerning the existence of

jurisdiction; this consideration of evidence does not convert the

motion into a motion for summary judgment. McCarthy v. United

States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). Under such

circumstances, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the

plaintiff’s allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173,

1177 (9th Cir. 1987).1

The allegations of the complaint define the type of

negligence that is to be evaluated by the Court. Whisnant v.

United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Under limited circumstances, where the attack is on the face

of the pleadings, a court may grant leave to amend a complaint to

remedy jurisdictional allegations that are defective as to form.

Telluride Management Solutions, Inc. v. Telluride Investment

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Group, 55 F.3d 463, 466 (9th Cir. 1995) (abrogated on other

grounds, Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999)).

Plaintiffs request leave to amend their pleadings to conform to

proof and resolve any issues that arise from the pleadings’

statement of the case which can be cured by amendment.

When established governmental policy, as expressed or

implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a

government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that

the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when exercising that

discretion. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. For a complaint to survive

a motion to dismiss, it must allege facts which would support a

finding that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct

that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory

regime. Id. at 324-35.

B. Summary Judgment

Although the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving

subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA, the government bears

the ultimate burden of proving the applicability of the

discretionary function exception. Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d

1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff bears the burden of

coming forth with sufficient evidence to establish that there are

genuine issues of material fact regarding the applicability of

the discretionary function exception, but the government bears

the burden of establishing that the test is met and that the

discretionary immunity applies. Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d

591, 594 (9th Cir. 1998). 

III. Facts

Decedent, Joseph Kewin, and Kerry Pyle met in the Curry

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Village parking lot and decided to do a quick climb at the end of

the day on June 13, 1999. (Decl. of Pyle at 1.) Neither Kewin nor

Pyle saw any warnings at Curry Village, in the Mountain Shop, in

Sunnyside/Camp 4 where they stayed, or along the trail to alert

them to increased rock fall hazard in the area of Curry Village

or the Glacier Point Apron. (Decls.) Kewin was not aware of the

rock fall of May 25, 1999. Kewin said they probably would not

have climbed if there had been a cyclone fence or warning signs,

and they would have relied on the park to notify them of a danger

of a huge rock fall. Pyle confirmed that they would not have

climbed if they had seen any warning signs of a dangerous

condition or if the area had been roped off; they would have

expected a warning. (Decls.)

The precise location of decedent, and whether or not he was

in a wilderness zone, at the time of his death are disputed.

Evidence submitted by the parties warrants conflicting

inferences.

Defendant makes a continuing relevance objection regarding

facts concerning the presence and knowledge of a rock fall hazard

in the area. The events will be recited because they bear upon

the appropriateness of an inference regarding the presence or

absence of safety concerns and the nature and extent of

Defendant’s response to rock fall hazards.

It is undisputed that the General Management Policies (GMP

1980) for NYP issued in 1980 identify 83 tent cabins, including

employee housing, in the Curry Village area that are in a rock

fall hazard area. (Deft.’s Factual Reply at 21.) However, it is

unclear exactly how close that area was to the area at which

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decedent was killed.

Tollefson, superintendent of YNP since January 2003, with

thirty years of NPS experience and twenty years of experience as

a superintendent or operations director for various locations in

the NPS, recites data in the 2004 rock fall policy and 2000

Yosemite Valley Plan to the effect that because of the angle of

the cliffs in Yosemite, rock fall is an inevitable geologic

hazard in the park, and indeed, reports have issued (USGS 1992

and 1998) and mapping of geologic hazard zones in Yosemite Valley

has occurred; however, the location and timing of rock falls are

rarely predictable. (Tollefson Decl., Exs. D and E , YVP, App.

C.)

Evidence from Dr. Watts, a geologist, tends to show rock

falls are not unpredictable as claimed by NPS and are in fact

predictable to a great extent by scientific analysis of the rock

formations and conditions, including investigation of the impacts

of construction and water management practices on or in the

vicinity of the rock walls; further, rock fall often begets rock

fall, so the fact of recent rock fall activity in an area is

important predictive information. (At 10.) In Watts’ opinion,

YNP’s operation of its wastewater facility above Glacier Point

exacerbated the naturally occurring exfoliative process on the

face of Glacier Point dominant rock and significantly increased

the risk of harm from falling rocks and the risk of major rock

fall in the area where decedent was killed. He further opines,

without identifying precise standards, that making any kind of

changes to topography, drainage, or water uses on Glacier Point

without carefully considering the potential effects on visitors

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2

 Defendant correctly objects that the evidence regarding what members of the public would have thought or

expected regarding the safety of the area, and whether warnings should have been given, is speculative and

inadmissible opinion.

3

 The Court generally will not review portions of the depositions absent direction by a party with an

appropriate citation.

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at Curry Village directly below the huge cliffs is irresponsible

from a scientific and engineering point of view; and Defendant

failed to observe appropriate standards in declaring Curry

Village-Glacier Point safe after the May 1999 rock fall. Evidence

from geologist Gerald F. Wieczorek, a geologist with the U.S.

Geological Survey who studied and followed rock falls in YNP

beginning in 1980, shows that previous rock slides had been

mapped in March 1999.

Fred A. Brooks, a professor of park management for over

fifteen years who managed developed recreation resources on

Lassen National Forest for twenty years until 2004, sets forth

evidence tending to show that the path which led to the site of

decedent’s death was not in wilderness territory given its wellworn and populated character.2

Much of the evidence attached to the declaration of Crabtree

is objected to as hearsay, lacking an adequate foundation, or

irrelevant. However, with respect to the depositions referred to

in Crabtree’s declaration, Crabtree states that she is custodian

of records, and that the copies are true and correct copies of

deposition excerpts received in the ordinary course of business

and maintained for litigation. Further, Defendant has submitted

copies of the deposition testimony of James B. Snyder and Gerald

F. Wieczorek as a courtesy.3 Thus, the deposition testimony

appears to be admissible. The evidence introduced warrants an

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Information on internet sites presents special problems of authentication. A proponent should be able to

show that the information was posted by the organization/s to which it is attributed. See Wady v. Provident Life and

Accident Insurance Co. of America, 216 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1064-65 (C.D.Cal. 2002); but see Moose Creek, Inc. v.

Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 331 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1224-5 (C.D.Cal. 2004). It has been recognized that anyone with

sufficient hacking ability can put anything on the internet; no web-site is monitored for accuracy, and nothing

contained therein is subject to independent verification absent underlying documentation. Wady v. Provident Life

and Accident Insurance Co. of America, 216 F.Supp.2d at 1064-65.

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inference that there had been earlier rock slides, including a

rock slide in May 1999, which had resulted in a temporary warning

to persons in the area and then a reopening of the area at the

foot of Glacier Point.

Although the information purported to have been written by

Richard Duane in 1998 on the bigwalls.net website is not

sufficiently authenticated, and thus Defendant’s objection to its

admissibility is sustained,4 other evidence warrants an inference

that the camp where decedent was staying was a Mecca for rock

climbers, and at the mountain shop located near the rock face

where decedent was killed, rock climbing gear, maps, and guides

were sold. Although the precise concession arrangements are

unclear, the evidence tends to show that rock climbing commonly

occurred at Glacier Point. Further, Defendant does not dispute

that climbers throughout the world consider Yosemite to be a

premier rock climbing venue, and that Sunnyside/Camp 4, where

decedent stayed, is the historic Mecca for climbers in the

Yosemite Valley that is now on the National Register of Historic

Places. It is likewise undisputed that there were no signs or

other posted warnings at the time to indicate any risk, unusually

increased or not, of rock fall in the area where decedent was

killed. Dr. Wieczorek had seen signs warning of rock fall in the

area on the trail up towards Nevada Falls after a recent rock

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fall; he had never seen any general identifications of where rock

fall hazards were made public within the park. 

Plaintiffs have provided evidence warranting an inference

that a dangerous condition existed at the rock face at Glacier

Point and that Defendants knew of the dangerous condition,

although the precise imminence of the danger, or any knowledge or

understanding thereof, appears to be disputed. It is undisputed

that two sizeable rock falls had occurred in November 1998 and

May 1999 in the Glacier Point area. Defendant does not dispute

that 44 per cent of the injuries caused by rock fall in YNP

between 1860 to 2003 have occurred on Glacier Point rim, which

amounts to less than 20 per cent of the rim of YNP. Wiekzorek

testified that Camp Curry was in the rock fall area below Glacier

Point; he had surveyed it and published an inventory map in 1992.

Watts notified the head of the park service of his concern that

the wastewater had increased the risk of rock fall. 

It is undisputed that following the May 25, 1999 rock fall,

YNP staff erected warning signs and closed areas of the Curry

Village campground and the Glacier Point Apron area where

decedent was later killed; the incident inspection was

accomplished and the closure lifted less than three hours after

the May 1999 rock fall, and the area was declared to be safe. It

is undisputed that Snyder, who had no formal training as a

geologist but had extensive professional experience with rock

falls in Yosemite, was one of two individuals who declared the

area “safe,” and the other was a park ranger.

Watts declared that the NPS failed to follow through with

accepted professional standards of engineering, geological

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practice, and geological scientific evaluation of hazards in

declaring the Glacier Point-Curry Village area safe after the May

1999 rock fall, and it failed to create a suitable monitoring and

warning system for impending danger to visitors as required by

the 1993 RMP. Watts communicated his research findings regarding

the effects of the Glacier Point wastewater management as a

potential cause for rock fall to Director of NPS Stanton before

the rock fall that caused decedent’s death.

Lloyd Olson declared that he was the park safety officer

from December 1996 through August 1999. He says nothing about any

duties relating to visitor or public safety, but rather confines

his declaration to his duties regarding managing the safety and

occupational health program for federal employees located in the

park. He stated that injuries and fatalities to visitors were

managed and investigated by law enforcement personnel in the

visitor and resource protection unit. (Decl. at 1-2.) It is

undisputed that no park safety officer was identified in the

staff positions listed for the incident investigation and

reporting team regarding the incident that resulted in decedent’s

death.

IV. The Discretionary Function Exception to Waiver of

 Sovereign Immunity

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity

of the federal government when its employees are negligent within

the scope of their employment with the aim to establish

consistency between liability incurred by individuals and by the

government for the commission of tortious acts. The FTCA permits

the United States to be sued under circumstances where it, if a

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private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance

with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28

U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1124

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).

The FTCA waives the federal government’s immunity from suit

for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a

private individual under like circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. It 

is a statute intended to compensate individuals harmed by

government negligence; it is a remedial statute that should be

construed liberally, and its exceptions should be read narrowly.

O’Toole v. United States of America, 295 F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir.

2002). Where an exception to the FTCA applies, the United States

has elected not to waive its immunity from suit, and courts are

without jurisdiction over such claims. O’Toole, 295 F.3d at 1033.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) provides for an exception to the

limited waiver of sovereign immunity of the Federal Tort Claims

Act (FTCA):

The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of

this title shall not apply to–

(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission

of an employee of the Government... based

upon the exercise or performance or the failure

to exercise or perform a discretionary function

or a duty on the part of a federal agency or

or an employee of the Government, whether or

not the discretion involved be abused.

The purpose of this exception is to prevent judicial secondguessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in

social, economic, and political policies through the medium of an

action in tort. Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S.

531, 536-37 (1988) (holding that action based on a failure to

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follow standards for vaccine testing and adoption was not barred

by the exception). To determine the scope of the exception, it is

necessary to consider the nature of the conduct, as distinct from

the status of the actor; the conduct challenged by the suit must

be a matter of judgment or choice for the acting employee, and

thus cannot involve a statute, regulation, or policy that

specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to

follow. Id. at 537. Further, only governmental actions and

decisions based on considerations of public policy are protected.

Id.

The steps to follow in determining the applicability of the

discretionary function exception to the waiver of sovereign

immunity are to determine 1) whether the challenged actions were

discretionary or instead controlled by mandatory statutes or

regulations or other bases of precise formulations. In

determining the first step, it must be determined if a federal

statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course

of action that was not followed. Berkovitz v. United States, 486

U.S. 531, 536 (1988). There can be no exercise of discretion

where an agency or agent has no rightful option but to adhere to

a directive. Id. If there is no choice, then there is no

immunity. 

However, if the actor has choice as to appropriate conduct,

then it must be determined 2) whether the conduct involves policy

judgment, that is, judgments regarding the application of social,

economic, or political policies or purposes of the overarching

enactments, enterprises, or actions in question. United States v.

Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 328-29, 332. With respect to the second

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step, the actions of government agents involving choice grounded

in social, economic, or political goals are protected. The

general aims and policies of a controlling statute or enactment

pertinent to the analysis are usually evident from the text.

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323-24. Some agencies establish policy on a

case-by-case basis. Id. at 324. The focus of the inquiry is the

nature of the actions taken and whether they are susceptible to

policy analysis. Id. at 325. 

In Gaubert, the court rejected the position that once

actions of a federal bank board became operational or managerial

decisions that were routine or frequent, they were no longer

policy-oriented; it held that discretionary day-to-day decisions

regarding mergers, choice of management, and financing were

discretionary because the actors were given the power to exercise

judgment; further, they were policy-oriented because they

involved application of policies of protecting solvency and

assets, maintaining confidence in the industry, and overseeing

the industry. Id. at 330-34.

When established governmental policy, as expressed or

implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a

government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that

the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when exercising that

discretion. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. For a complaint to survive

a motion to dismiss, it must allege facts which would support a

finding that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct

that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory

regime. Id. at 324-35. The presence of some standards by which an

employee or agency is to act does not necessarily render an

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action not discretionary. See United States v. Varig Airlines,

467 U.S. 797 (1984). Likewise, the mere fact that acts are

regulatory or governmental in nature does not render them

discretionary policy conduct. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538-39.

V. Analysis of the Present Action

State tort law governs tort actions against the federal

government. Jones v. United States, 693 F.2d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir.

1982).

With respect to the discretionary function exception, the

Court must consider the allegations of the complaint regarding

how the government is alleged to have been negligent; the type of

negligence alleged is critical. Whisnant v. United States, 400

F.3d 1177, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2005).

A. The Complaint

In the first claim (negligence), it is alleged that

Defendant negligently caused a dangerous wastewater system,

including a drainage system and leach field, that was negligently

designed, situated, constructed, operated, maintained, and

supervised) to exist, to remain, and not to be remedied on its

premises; this exposed persons near the site to an unreasonable

risk of harm asnd directly caused the rock fall that caused

decedent’s death. (Complt. at 3-5.) Warning signs were necessary

because the condition was not reasonably apparent to reasonable

persons exercising due care, and Defendant negligently failed to

post warning signs on the premises despite increased rock fall

activity. (Id. at 4-5.) Defendant knew or should have known that

its negligence would increase the frequency and mass of rock

slides in the area of the wastewater facility that would cause

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injury or death to people present. (Id. at 5.)

In the second claim (dangerous condition of premises), it

was alleged that Defendant’s aforementioned negligence in

constructing and operating the wastewater system created a

dangerous condition in the nature of excess water causing

exacerbation of the naturally occurring exfoliation process of

the rock, which in turn destabilized the cliffs and walls and

caused more frequent and more catastrophic rock slides such that

warning signs were necessary with respect to persons present

exercising due care; however, Defendant failed to post warning

signs; the dangerous condition caused Plaintiffs’ decedent’s

death.

Under California law a possessor of land must act as a

reasonable person in the management of the property in view of

the probability of injury to others and all pertinent

circumstances; where the occupier of land is aware of a concealed

condition involving in the absence of precautions an unreasonable

risk of harm to those coming in contact with it and is aware that

a person on the premises is about to come in contact with it, the

trier of fact can reasonably conclude that a failure to warn or

repair the condition constitutes negligence. Rowland v.

Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 (1968). In California, it is

recognized that a possessor of land has a duty to exercise

ordinary care to keep premises in reasonably safe condition, 6

Witkin, Summary of California Law, 10th ed. 2005, § 1119,

including an affirmative duty to inspect premises, id. at § 1120.

B. Discretionary or Mandatory Policy

Plaintiffs argue essentially that NPS-50 chapters 5 and 22,

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the 1993 RMP, and the 1988 MP render the recreational experience

protected for the visitor. NPS-50 policies, OSHA, and Executive

Order 12196 render it protected for employees. The two schemes or

protections interlink for both visitors and employees to provide

a safe workplace and safe recreational venue. 

Most of the policies relied on by Plaintiffs have been

interpreted not to constitute mandatory, specific policies which

require particular action on the part of governmental agents.

1. 16 U.S.C. § 1

Michael J. Tollefson, Superintendent of YNP since January

2003, superintendent and director of other national parks since

1983, and a National Park Service (NPS) employee since 1973, made

a declaration on the basis of his review of documents kept by

persons in the ordinary course of business at or near the time of

occurrence by persons with actual knowledge of the events

recorded. (Tollefson Decl. at 1.) Superintendents of national

parks are responsible for making policy decisions regarding

management of their parks in the context of the purposes of the

NPS as stated in the Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, namely, to

“conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and

wild life of the national parks and to provide for the enjoyment

of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them

unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” (Id. at 2.)

The statute is a broad, over-arching statement of policy

that frames the activities of management of the national parks.

2. Unwritten Rock Fall Policy

Tollefson states that at the time of decedent’s death on

June 13, 1999, there was no written policy regarding rock fall

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warnings and closures in Yosemite Valley, but the current policy,

adopted February 2004, documents the unwritten policy that had

been in effect at YNP for decades wherein YNP staff evaluates

rock fall release areas and impact zones to determine whether or

not rock fall is imminent and what, if any, closures or warnings

should be issued or areas closed. (Decl. at 2, referring to

Decl., Ex. A.) Plaintiffs object that this evidence is not

relevant and is unfounded hearsay or lay opinion. The 2004 policy

is relevant only if it does embody the policy at the time of

decedent’s death; there is no showing that Tollefson had personal

knowledge of what any unwritten policy was in 1999, although he

stated that he reviewed documents and pertinent business records,

and thus there is a basis for his knowing that there was no

previous written policy. Beyond that, his knowledge is unclear.

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the mere fact that he signed

or authored or possibly drafted the new policy does not mean that

he has personal knowledge of what the previous “unwritten” policy

was. 

The 2004 written policy establishes what appears to be a

discretionary policy; considerable discretion on the part of

staff would exist under it to evaluate the weight of geologic

evidence to ascertain if it was sufficiently compelling and

clear. The policy states that rock fall in Yosemite Valley is

inevitable but rarely predictable as to time and location; thus,

it is managed on a case-by-case basis; the policy is not to post

warning signs or implement area closures for rock fall along or

beneath cliff faces of Yosemite Valley or in designated

wilderness or any other locations except when compelling geologic

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evidence presents itself with sufficient clarity to lead park

staff to an informed conclusion that rock fall is imminent.

Warnings will be posted along improved road and improved trail

network and other improved areas such as areas containing lodging

facilities, restaurants, residential zones, and other built

environments intended for public gatherings; the warning will be

in English and in a format consistent with the area and threat to

effectively communicate the hazard. In cases other than those,

such as on unofficial trails or climbing routes, the NPS will

post warning on bulletin boards at Camp 4, Camp Curry Mountain

Shop, and other stated locations if staff ascertains that rock

fall is imminent. Any closures based on park staff conclusions

that rock fall is imminent will be implemented pursuant to the

regulations contained in Title 36, Part 1, CFR. (Decl. of

Tollefson, Ex. A.) 

Plaintiffs dispute that this unwritten policy governed,

citing to the 1988 NPS Management Policies, which were in effect

at the time of death and which prohibited unwritten policies,

stating:

All policy will be articulated in writing, approved

by an NPS official authorized to issue the policy,

and published or otherwise made available to those

whom it affects and those who must implement it

in the Washington office, regional offices, and

parks. Unwritten or informal “policy” and people’s

various understandings of NPS traditional practices will

not be relied on as official policy.

(Brooks Decl, ¶ 6, Ex. A, Foreword at ix.)

The overarching statute, 16 U.S.C. § 1, charges the NPS with

promoting and regulating the use of the national parks by means

which conform to the fundamental purposes of the parks, which is

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conservation of scenery, natural objects, and wildlife as well as

enjoyment thereof in a manner and by such means that will leave

them unimpaired for future generations. This is interpreted as

requiring a balancing of preservation and public access, which in

turn requires judgment and choice by the NPS about what sorts of

facilities and safety features, if any, to provide. Childers v.

United States, 40 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 1995). In the present

case, the declaration of YNP Superintendent Tollefson establishes

that superintendents make policy decisions regarding the

management of their parks in the context of these purposes.

However, as to Defendant’s contention that the specific 2004

policy existed in unwritten form, the Department of the

Interior’s 1988 NPS Management Policies (1988 MP) provided that

all policy would be articulated in writing, approved by an

authorized official, and published or made available to those

affected; further, it expressly stated that unwritten or informal

policy and understandings of NPS traditional practices would not

be relied on as official policy. (Brooks Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. A,

Foreword at ix.)

The Court concludes that the government has not established

that the 2004 Rock Fall Policy was in effect at the time of

decedent’s death.

3. 1988 Management Policies (1988 MP) re: Signs

Tollefson declares that the 1988 MP are a set of policy

directives for NPS managers covering a broad spectrum of issues.

(Decl. at 3.)

The 1988 MP provide that the use of signs is particularly

limited in wilderness areas because they detract from the

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wilderness character of an area; it would violate the NPS nonproliferation of signs policy for the NPS to install signs along

the base of all the cliffs surrounding Yosemite Valley. (Decl. at

3.) Reference to the 1988 MP (Tollefson Decl., Ex. C) reveals

that where a wilderness area is designated, preservation of

wilderness character and resources becomes an additional

statutory purpose of the park, and that preservation while

providing for appropriate use is the primary management

responsibility (other than activities related to the saving of

human life), and is to be carried out by the directors and

superintendents of the parks, and the latter shall develop and

maintain a wilderness management plan. Superintendents are to

select the minimum tool or administrative practice necessary to

successfully and safely accomplish management objectives with the

least adverse impact on wilderness character and resources. 

As to signs, it is stated that signs detract from the

wilderness character of an area and make the imprint of man and

management more noticeable. Only those signs necessary to protect

wilderness resources or for public safety, “such as signs

identifying trails and distances,” will be permitted. Where signs

are used, they should be compatible with their surroundings and

be the minimum size possible. (Id., chs. 6:3-6:6.)

Further, with respect to signs relating to visitors, the

1988 MP state that each park will have an approved park-wide sign

plan establishing design criteria based on the park’s unique

resources and values; signs will be carefully planned to convey

appropriate park image as well as information; and signs will be

held to the minimum number, size, and wording required to serve

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their intended functions so as to minimally intrude upon the

natural or historic setting, and will be placed where they do not

interfere with park visitors’ enjoyment and appreciation of park

resources.

 Although signs are limited, signs necessary for public

safety will be permitted. (Id. at 6:6.)

Tollefson declared that it would be a violation of the NPS

non-profliferation of signs policy, as well as completely futile,

for the NPS to install signs along the base of all the cliffs

surrounding Yosemite Valley stating the open and obvious fact

that rocks fall from the cliffs. (At ¶ 6.) He states generally

that the decision to provide more rock fall warning signs or to

close to guard the public requires a balancing of public policy

objectives such as resource allocation, visitor access and

safety, and scenic preservation. (At ¶¶ 5,6.) 

Plaintiffs dispute this by citing NPS-50, ch. 5, and

asserting that these are mandatory, specific policies when there

is a known hazard and previous known injuries. Plaintiffs cite to

evidence of permanent-appearing signs along a section of road in

YNP warning vehicles not to stop due to rock fall hazard as well

as warning signs along the path to the rock face at the base of

Bridal Veil Falls. 

Although Tollefson maintains that the decision to provide

rock fall warning signs or to close parts of the park to guard

the public requires a balancing of public policy objectives,

including resource allocation, visitor access and safety, and

scenic preservation (sign minimization) (at ¶¶ 5, 6), Plaintiffs

contend that where there are previously known injuries and a

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5

 Evidence in the form of a response to a RFP of November 1999 regarding comprehensive study of visitor

safety, which refers to the NPS having previously established a management policy that puts the saving of human life

over all other management activities lacks foundation and authentication, is marginally relevant, and is cumulative in

any event to the policy itself. (Crabtree Decl., Ex. E.)

25

known hazard, the government policies are mandatory and specific.

Defendant counters that because practically the entire park is a

known hazard, the decision to identify a hazard and/or post a

sign is one involving a balancing of policy considerations.

The sign policy appears to vest considerable discretion in

the park manager to balance resources and safety and to determine

when action is necessary for the public safety. Even assuming

that decedent was not killed in a wilderness area, it appears

that the sign policies recognize the value of minimal intrusion

of signs in natural settings and anticipate a process of

determining what signs are necessary for safety--a process that

necessarily involves the discretion of the manager or staff

person making determinations regarding the existence, siting, and

content of signs. 

The 1988 MP provide that the saving of human life will take

precedence over all other management actions. (Brooks Decl., Ex.

A, ch. 8:5.)5 If decedent died in a wilderness area, the 1988 MP

provide that within a designated wilderness area, the

preservation of wilderness character and resources while

providing for appropriate use is the primary management

responsibility (other than activities related to the saving of

human life). (Id. at ch. 6:3.) However, there is no specific,

mandatory direction with respect to how to determine degrees of

danger to human life in the context of a dangerous natural

setting, or what signs are necessary to public safety.

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Plaintiffs argue that the Management Policies of the United

States Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1988

(1988 MP) are mandatory because they state that policy sets the

framework and provides direction for management decisions; policy

direction may be general or specific, may prescribe the process

by which decisions are made, how an action is to be accomplished,

or the results to be achieved; but in any event, they specify:

Adherence to policy will be mandatory unless waived or

modified by an appropriate authority. Servicewide policy

may be waived only by the Secretary, the Assistant

Secretary, or Director. Policy waivers and modification 

will be considered on a case-by-case basis, and previous

waivers or modifications will not necessarily be 

regarded as precedents for similar waivers or modifications.

(Brooks Decl., Ex. A, Foreward, at ix.) It has been held that

even though the MP provides that adherence to NPS policy is

mandatory unless waived or modified, the specific policy itself

may nevertheless permit a degree of discretion. Blackburn v.

United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Likewise, the 1988 MP provide:

The saving of human life takes precedence over all

other management actions.

(At 8.5.) However, this language, which is part of the section on

“Visitor Safety and Protection,” is followed by a proviso that

park visitors assume a certain degree of risk and responsibility

for their own safety when visiting areas that are managed and

maintained as natural or recreational environments. (Id.)

Further, it has been held that the section on visitor safety and

protection is discretionary on its face because the language in

the section is discretionary (“will seek to provide,” “strive

to,” “efforts will be made to,” and “where practicable”). Whalen

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6

 Because these policies state only general goals, there does not appear to be any determinative significance

to the additional provision of the 1988 MP that provides that within a designated wilderness area, preservation of

wilderness character and resources while providing for appropriate use is the primary management responsibility

other than the saving of human life. (Brooks Decl., Ex. A, ch. 6:3.) 

27

v. United States, 29 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1098 (D.S.D. 1998). This is

consistent with the understanding that a general statutory duty

to promote safety is not specific or mandatory. Kennewick

Irrigation District v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th

Cir. 1989). Further, although a goal or objective, such as the

importance or preeminence of saving of human life, may be stated,

if there are no specific prescriptions regarding the manner of

reaching the goal or specific actions required in pursuit of the

objective, then the policy is not mandatory and specific.

Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 976.6

Plaintiffs argue that the 1988 MP make the Loss Control

Management Program NPS-50 (1991) (NPS-50) guidelines mandatory:

NPS guidelines generally allow for management discretion;

however, they are mandatory where language so indicates.

Management Policies at x.

Pursuant to these general provisions, Plaintiffs argue that

safety inspections, identification of recognized hazards, hazard

abatement planning, and notice or warnings to visitors and

employees in the YNP where there is a recognized hazard are all

mandatory. 

4. NPS-50

 Plaintiffs assert that NPS Loss Control Management NPS-50

(NPS-50), chapter 22, in effect at the time of death, governed

this by providing that all park areas will provide any specific

materials, signs and programs to alert the public of potential

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dangers. (Watts, Decl., ¶ 15; Tollefson Decl., Ex. D, ch 22, page

2, ¶ G.)

Tollefson declares that the NPS Loss Control Management

Guidelines of 1991 (NPS-50), in effect at the time of decedent’s

death, provided some guidance regarding warnings and closures in

the park setting, providing for periodic inspections to identify

hazards and for immediate corrective action if an imminent hazard

is identified. (Decl. at 3, and Ex. D.) Tollefson declares that

NPS-50 provides for periodic inspections to identify hazards and

for immediate corrective action if an imminent hazard is

identified. (At ¶ 7.) 

Exhibit D includes portions of chapter 22, entitled “PUBLIC

SAFETY AND HEALTH,” which, with respect to “Program Objectives,”

states that it specifies the minimum program requirements for

protecting the visiting public from recognized hazards related to

Department and National Park Service “facilities or operations.”

It states as a program requirement that the NPS region and park

should establish a public safety program that minimizes the

potential for injury, illness, death and/or property damage to

the public while visiting NPS facilities, including

identification of hazards, whereby every effort should be made to

identify the hazards in the park that have caused or have the

potential to cause injury, illness, death or property damage to

park visitors, considering the reasonable level of knowledge of

the environment possessed by most visitors in ascertaining lossproducing sources. It states that a system for reporting hazards

should be established in each park and that employees should be

able to impart accurate information to the public about

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locations, activities, climate, and special environmental threats

(earthquakes or flash floods, etc.) to allow the visitor to make

informed decisions about activities while in the park. It also

provides that with respect to educational materials, signs, and

programs, 1) all areas will provide any special materials, signs,

and programs to alert the public of potential dangers; 2)

brochures specific to the area should contain safety messages

that direct attention to special hazards or attractions that

could be potentially hazardous to the visitor (noting that

visitor centers and bulletin boards in campgrounds are an ideal

location to keep the public informed of any emergency information

or pertinent safety messages), and 3) the park safety officer

should review the signing of the park and determine if it is

appropriate for the area and in good repair. It further provides

that the park safety officer is responsible for identification of

hazards that have potential to cause injury, illness, death or

property damage to park visitors; and such officer is responsible

to assist in all investigations of public/visitor

accidents/incidents and assuring that all reports meet

requirements set forth in Chapter 6 of the NPS-50.

The foregoing provisions are general and do not appear to

mandate specific action. However, with respect to inspecting

workplaces and facilities for public hazards, and identifying

hazards in the park, it states that chapter 5 will provide

details for inspection procedures. 

Chapter 5 specifically requires facilities, operations, or

work sites to be inspected formally by a safety inspector

annually via a comprehensive survey of all or part of a workplace

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to detect safety and health hazards completed with sufficient

resources; a presentation of potential solutions for hazardous

conditions, with documented inspections and follow-up inspections

sufficient to determine that hazardous conditions or work

practices have been corrected; within fifteen calendar days of

completion of a formal safety inspection a written notice where a

hazardous working condition exists, identifying its location,

nature, and extent as well as whether it is an imminent danger,

serious violation, or non-serious violation; and establishment of

a time for abatement (immediately for imminent dangers, five

working days for serious dangers, and fifteen working days for

non-serious working days, and further, for imminent dangers work

stoppage and evacuation, as well as preparation by the

establishment manager of an abatement plan if abatement is not

possible within fifteen calendar days). Formal inspections should

be conducted by inspectors qualified to recognize and evaluate

hazards of the working environment and suggest general abatement

procedures; informal inspections are to be conducted by managers

and employees with sufficient training or experience to evaluate

the hazards and suggest abatement. Informal inspections are to be

performed with reasonable frequency. 

These procedures are general and permit discretion with

respect to the frequency of inspections, the process of

inspection, and the determination of the presence and severity of

dangers. These procedures also appear to apply primarily to the

workplace, and to facilities or operations, as distinct from the

natural landscape in general.

Chapter 22 also mentions investigating and reporting public

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safety-related accidents, requiring all accidents to be

investigated to an extent reflecting the seriousness of the

accident or potential for reoccurrence, and to be reported, and

mandating that a board of inquiry review all accidents resulting

in death. Program responsibilities include placing on employees,

and specifically the park safety officer, the responsibility to

identify hazards within NPS areas that may cause injury, illness,

death or property damage to park visitors and their property, and

identifying any additional signs needed in the park area and

advising management and assisting in preparation of safety

messages to be included in park/area brochures or interpretive

programs. It also states that employees should be able to impart

accurate information to the public about locations, activities,

climate and special environmental threats. Chapter 22 refers to

chapter 6 for details for accident investigation and reporting.

The superintendent of the park is responsible for establishing a

public safety program, which should include all of the abovementioned requirements. 

Tollefson admitted that NPS-50 provided guidance regarding

warnings and closures in the park setting by providing for

periodic inspections and immediate corrective action for imminent

hazards. (Id. at 3.) Professor Brooks declared that 1999 NPS

policies regarding safety determinations and warning or notice of

known hazardous situations were not matters of weighing and

balancing policy considerations, but rather were made by

reference to mandatory and established policies and according to

scientific investigation of causes, potential for harm, and

degrees of risk; although there may have been discretion as to

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decide how to warn, the duty to warn and give notice in some form

was a mandatory duty of the NPS staff in the local area. (Decl.

at 5.) He referred to NPS-50, chs. 5 and 22, and OSHA

regulations. Defendant objects that his conclusion that it was

not a discretionary decision lacked foundation and was

unsupported by evidence; further, it is a legal conclusion. When

viewed in light of the following paragraph in the declaration,

which identifies the policy relied upon, it is not without

foundation; and it appears to constitute an opinion regarding the

operative interpretation of those policies from a park manager’s

point of view and thus within the scope of Brooks’ expertise as a

professor of park and natural resource management and manager of

the operation of the developed recreation resources on the Lassen

National Forest from 1984 through 2004. However, to the extent

that it approaches a legal conclusion regarding the mandatory or

discretionary nature of the operative policies, it is noted that

it is for the Court to draw the legal conclusions.

Plaintiffs argue that the area in which decedent was killed

was closed and then reopened after the May 1999 rock fall, just a

few days before decedent’s death. Further, Plaintiffs argue that

in improving the top of Glacier Point, the park failed to use

geological researchers and thus failed to use accepted

professional standards in developing its improvements on top of

Glacier Point by failing to inspect, identify hazards, abate

them, develop the mandated early warning system, otherwise give

notice or warning of recognized hazards to employees and

visitors, or otherwise implement the studies and monitoring for

safety imposed by the RMP and all other standards referred to

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hereinabove, and failing to follow accepted professional

standards in making the safety determination to reopen Glacier

Point and Camp Curry after the May 1999 rock fall that occurred

in the same place that killed decedent. (SOF 11-13, 67-68.)

Plaintiffs’ evidence tends to show that between two expert

park managers there are differing understandings of the nature of

the policies, and different understandings or results with

respect to the process of making determinations regarding the

presence of rock fall hazard and notifying the public of it. The

evidence does not tend to show that the policies themselves are

mandatory or specific such that it has been established that

Defendant violated a mandatory, specific policy with respect to

assessing the danger from rock fall and warning the public of it

at the time of decedent’s death. 

With respect to the coverage or applicability of OSHA,

Defendant submitted the declaration of Lloyd Olson, who was the

YNP safety and occupational health manager/park safety officer

from December 1996 through August 1999; as safety officer, his

duties included managing the Safety and Occupational Health

program for federal employees located in the park, including

providing and implementing a comprehensive safety management

program for all national park service employees that was in

compliance with applicable OSHA regulations. He states:

The OSHA regulations apply only to employer’s

responsibilities to provide their employees with

safe workplaces and do not apply to private individuals

or visitors to the Park. Instead, injuries and fatalities

to visitors were managed and investigated by Law

Enforcement personnel in the Visitor and Resource Protection

Unit. 

(Decl. at 1-2.)

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Plaintiffs rely on NPS-50, Chapter 5, which provides that 29

C.F.R. part 1960 is the legal authority underlying it, and it

further states:

Program Objectives: This chapter details the

minimum requirements for conducting both formal and

informal inspections of all NPS establishments and 

for the timely abatement of identified hazards. By

applying the requirements of this chapter to NPS

facilities, site managers will ensure compliance

with established safety and health codes, thus

producing a safe and healthful work environment....

(NPS-50, Ch. 5, page 1.) Chapter 5 further provides:

Program Requirements: Every NPS facility, operation

and/or worksite, including employee housing, shall

be formally inspected annually. More frequent

inspections will be conducted when there is an 

increased risk of accidents...The term “inspection”

means a comprehensive survey of all or part of a

workplace in order to detected safety and health

hazards.

(Id.)

With respect to hazards, chapter 5 specifically identifies

three categories of hazards and time frames within which to abate

each. The various types of hazards are defined by 29 C.F.R. §

1960.2, including imminent danger (conditions or practices in any

workplace such that a danger exists which could reasonably be

expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or

before the imminence of such danger can be eliminated through

normal procedures) (u)), and serious hazards (hazard, violation

or condition such that there is a substantial probability that

death or serious physical harm could result) (v). A “workplace”

is a physical location where the agency’s work or operations are

performed.” Plaintiffs note that NPS-50, chapter 5, requires

notices to be posted within thirty days of completing a formal

occupational health inspection or within fifteen calendar days of

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a formal safety inspection, with prescribed information as to the

hazard and abatement thereof; the manager “will initiate”

protective action at once for imminent dangers and “should”

prepare an abatement plan. (Id., ch. 5 at pp. 5-6.)

Plaintiffs also assert that chapter 5 of NPS-50 identifies

safety and health inspectors who are to be qualified to perform

safety inspections and reviews, and it refers to the OSHA

regulations governing the identification and abatement of

workplace safety issues as its legal authorization. 29 C.F.R.

part 1960.

Plaintiff argues that by virtue of the NPS-50, chapter 5,

and OSHA regulations definitions of “workplace,” the federal park

employees’ workplace includes the area in and around Camp Curry

at the base of Glacier Point, which includes residences used by

visitors and employees, areas requiring maintenance and

patrolling, and park facilities used by park staff. Further, this

area is in the “rock fall zone” recognized in the 1980 General

Management Plan, an area for which reports of hazard were made to

NPS staff by a federal employee, the USGS geologist working with

NPS, and private geologists. Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to 29

C.F.R. § 1960.19, which provides that where employees of

different agencies engage in joint operations, the standards

adopted by the host agency shall govern, the NPS standards

govern. 

Additional specific policies that Plaintiff argues are

mandatory include NPS-50, Chapter 22, in which the program

objectives state:

This chapter specifies the minimum program requirements

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for protecting the visiting public from recognized

hazards related to Department and National Park Service

(NPS) facilities or operations. 

(NPS-50, ch. 22, p.1.) However, these provisions are not

reasonably interpreted to apply to recreational activities at

rock faces, which are not NPS “facilities or operations.” This is

confirmed by the description of the “Program Requirements,” which

are that the NPS should establish a public safety program that

minimizes the potential for injury, illness, death and/or

property damage to the public “while they are visiting NPS

facilities.” (Id.) 

Further, even if the scope of the chapters were amenable to

Plaintiffs’ argument, the terminology in chapter 22, and the

substance of chapter 5, are not mandatory because terms such as

“should” are used in referring to what employees should do. The

discretionary nature of these provisions has been recognized.

Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1996)

(holding that NPS-50's policy to identify hazards in the park

environment to protect park visitors from accident or illness,

give adequate warning or alternative action, provide for the

health and safety of the public from recognized hazards of NPS

operations, lands, and facilities, conduct inspection and hazard

abatement (NPS-50, ch. 5), and specifically to undertake

corrective action once a hazard or potential hazard was

identified, were discretionary and not mandatory).

In Summers v. United States, 905 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1990),

the court held that NPS’s failure to warn visitors to a beach of

the concealed danger of hot coals in a fire ring was not subject

to the discretionary function exception because it was not a

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policy decision under the second prong of the analysis; the

Summers court also stated that because the danger had not been a

known danger, the NPS had not violated its mandatory duty to take

corrective action once the hazard was known. The court in

Blackburn specifically disavowed this part of Summers, stating

that the conclusion in Summer that NPS manuals or guidelines

mandated corrective action once a hazard is identified was dictum

and was inconsistent with the court’s holdings in Childers, and

Valdez, 56 F.3d 1177 (holding that the discretionary function

exception applied to the NPS’s decision not to bring a natural

hazard to the attention of the public).

Plaintiffs also rely on NPS-50, chapter 22, “G. Educational

Materials, Signs, Programs,” where it is stated:

[A]ll areas will provide any special materials, signs

and programs to alert the public of potential dangers.

Likewise, under “Program Responsibilities: E. Park Safety

Officer,” the description of the officer is:

1. Is responsible for identification of hazards that

have potential to cause injury, illness, death or 

property damage to park visitors.

Various methods of bringing information to the public regarding

potential dangers are mentioned as possible or good methods of

warning the public, and it is stated what brochures and

interpretive programs “should” contain. (Id., items 1-5.) These

provisions, and provisions that safety officers should review

signing to see if it is appropriate, have also been held to be

discretionary because they are policy guidelines that outline

general policy goals regarding visitor safety but retain

discretion in the staff to determine how to meet the goals.

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Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995). In

rejecting the assertion that the Management Guidelines’ broad

mandate to warn the public of special hazards through various

means was mandatory, the court stated:

Because the NPS cannot apprise the public of every

potential danger posed by every feature of the Park,

a degree of judgment is required in order to determine

which hazards require an explicit warning and which

hazards speak for themselves.

56 F.3d at 1180.

Pursuant to the authority of these cases, the Court

concludes that the provision that park superintendents implement

program requirements, participate actively in providing for the

safety of the public, secure appropriate safety and health

training for employees, monitor operations and activities,

inspect areas for hazards (NPS-50, ch. at p. 7), and abate as

soon as possible are not mandatory provisions requiring specific

action by park management.

5. OSHA and Executive Orders regarding Employees

Plaintiffs rely on Executive Order 12196 (Decl. of Crabtree,

Ex. U), which provides that the head of each agency shall furnish

to each employee employment and a place of employment which are

free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to

cause death or serious physical harm.

Plaintiffs further rely on OSHA regulations that require,

pursuant to Executive Order 12196, that safety inspectors be

qualified, have the competence to recognize hazards, require at

least annual inspections to identify hazards, define hazards and

inspections, require a response to employee reports of hazards,

and effectuate abatement of hazards, including plans, reports,

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and interim protective measures. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1960.2(k),

1960.8, 1960.25(a), (c), 1960.28(d)(3)-(4), 1960.30. 

In relying on the OSHA standards, Plaintiffs cite to Marlys

Bear Medicine v. United States, 241 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir.

2000), in which it was held that the discretionary function

exception did not apply to a claim for wrongful death of a worker

predicated on negligent supervision of the safety of contract

logging operations. The Court reasoned that OSHA standards and

mandatory standards of the BIA manual, which required regular

inspections and a safe workplace, were applicable and mandatory

because the work contract provided that the operation would

comply with federal law. The other case cited by Plaintiffs, and

mentioned in Marlys Bear Medicine, namely, Camozzi v.

Roland/Miller and Hope Consulting Group, 866 F.2d 287 (9th Cir.

1989), also involved a suit by an employee of a contractor with

the federal government in which the contractor was required to

comply with safety standards at a postal facility. Plaintiffs

cite no cases applying OSHA standards to suits involving a

decedent who was not an employee of the government or of a

governmental contractor.

The declaration of Lloyd Olson, YNP safety and occupational

health manager/park safety officer in June 1999, establishes that

in practice, at least, the OSHA regulations applied only to the

employer’s responsibilities to provide employees with safe

workplaces, not to visitors to the park. 

The mere existence of another standard applicable to

employees who might be present in the same area does not

supercede other policies pertinent to the public or automatically

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divest the NPS of what is otherwise a discretionary function with

respect to the use of the park by the public. Otherwise, there

would be no purpose in articulating separate policies or

regulations for workers and the public. Plaintiffs’ reliance on

workplace guidelines and reporting standards, and on policies to

train staff to recognize unsafe and unhealthful work practices

and conditions, take corrective actions, and to follow safety

work rules and procedures, are not relevant to the decisionmaking process of the NPS with respect to the public. Whalen v.

United States, 29 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1097. Further, there is no

indication that any of the provisions of the NPS-50 regarding

inspection and abatement (chapter 5) or those respecting

investigation and reporting of accidents in the park (chapters 6

and 7), are mandatory and specific as to any particular hazard,

as distinct from mere recommendations for ameliorating the risk

of harm. Whalen, 29 F.Supp.2d at 1097. Plaintiffs have not

established that the provisions of the NPS-50 set forth

mandatory, specific policy provisions which divested the NPS of

discretion, and they have not established that the OSHA or

executive standards apply to the Defendant’s action with respect

to the public visitors of the park.

6. 1993 RMP

Plaintiffs rely on the 1993 Resource Management Plan (RMP)

for YNP adopted December 31, 1993.

The 1993 RMP provides:

Mitigation: Avoid placement of facilities... and trails in 

known areas of high hazard due to rockfalls, mud and debris

flows, and in flood hazard zones.

...

In development zones, construct and maintain catchments

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7

 The Court’s invitation at argument for specific references to portions of that title did not result in

clarification of this point.

41

and other appropriate structures to mitigate geologic

hazards.

Protection: Implement and maintain remote sensing

and other early warning systems to alert park

populations of impending hazardous conditions.

...

Education: Within one year, develop and

implement parkwide a geologic hazards education program,

including familiarizing park populations with early

warning systems and response procedures.

Research: Develop geologic hazard predictive model

and produce hazard probability map for the GIS.

(Watts Decl., Ex. E, at 4-9.)

Plaintiffs submit evidence tending to show that the area

where decedent was killed was in a rock fall zone sufficiently

hazardous to require removal of cabins pursuant to the Yosemite

General Management Plan of 1980. (Watts. Decl., Ex. C.) Despite

NPS’s own USGS geologist’s having given NPS notice of the

hazardous condition of Glacier Point, Defendant did not warn of

the general hazard of rock fall in the area, the specific hazard

of major rock fall events in the magnitude of many tons, or

engage in the monitoring and study or the creation of an early

warning system mandated by the 1993 RMP. (Watts Decl., Ex. E.) 

Brooks declares that if the 1999 YNP superintendent’s

compendium, as specified in Title 36 of the CFR,7 had been

completed as required, it would have identified that rock fall

hazard from Glacier Point, and all actions required by NPS-50

(signage, notice, or closure) would have occurred. (Decl. at 18.)

Defendant objects that this is irrelevant, speculative, lacking

foundation as to what the document would have identified as a

hazard and what it might have done, and assumes facts not in

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evidence. Defendant’s objections are sustained. 

Plaintiffs rely on the Resource Management Plan approved by

the NPS and YNP management in 1993 (RMP 1993, Decl. of Watts, Ex.

E.) That plan established that the park would study and monitor

rock fall and geologic hazards and establish an early warning

system in the interest of visitor safety.

Reference to the 1993 RMP reveals that although plan

elements and formats are prescribed, there is no specific time

table for the performance of the resource management study or

plan; only the educational component is subjected to a time

limit, but it does not necessarily mandate that early warning

systems and responses be fully developed. Further, the terms of

the document are general and not specific (“Avoid placement of

facilities... in known areas of high hazard due to rockfalls,”

“Continue the inventory and mapping of geologic hazards near

developed areas and access corridors (systematic mapping and

rating system,” “Park rockfall hazard zones...need to be

digitized for input to the GIS.”) It does not appear that any of

these provisions mandated specific action to be taken with

respect to warning of the danger of rock fall on Glacier Point at

the time of decedent’s death.

7. 1988 NPS Sign Manual

Tollefson states that the placement and use of signs in YNP

is governed by the NPS Sign Manual, adopted January 1988 (1988

NPS Sign Manual), which governs the use and placement of signs,

and gives discretion to individual NPS park managers to

determine, in their professional judgment, drawing upon available

guides, resources, and traffic safety engineering expertise, and

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considering a variety of other factors, such as the appearance of

the road as a whole and its relationship to the natural and/or

historical environment through which it passes, whether a sign is

necessary or appropriate at a given location, and where and what

signs to place to insure minimal intrusion upon the natural and

historic setting of parks. (Decl. at 2-3, Ex. B at 1-1.) 

Reference to the 1988 NPS Sign Manual reveals that it is designed

as an aid to implementing the NPS Traffic Control Sign System

Guideline “and in arriving at management decisions regarding

other park signing needs.” It was intended for managers to use

the manual as a guide in designing and ordering all vehicular and

pedestrian traffic control signing and other pertinent devices,

and it was intended to assume uniform and distinctive signing and

graphics in obligations under the Highway Safety Act of 1966. It

states that the park manager has the responsibility to determine

whether a sign is necessary or appropriate at a given location,

following the guidelines and procedures set down in NPS-52 (the

National Park Service Traffic Control Sign System Guideline). It

states:

It is important in this regard, too, that such decisions

bear in mind long standing NPS policy to minimally

intrude upon the natural or historic setting in 

National Park System areas, and to avoid an unnecessary

proliferation of signs, while striving to ensure for

the safety of park visitors. 

(Id. at 1-1.)

The provisions of the 1988 MP regarding signs are previously

set forth and reveal a strong discretionary component with

respect to the choice of using signs and the placement and nature

thereof.

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It has been held that the NPS sign manual was a component of

an area plan that revealed a larger policy requiring the weighing

of public access and visitor safety considerations. Childers v.

United States, 40 F.3d 973, 975. Here, the sign manual clearly

grants the discretion to balance safety, environmental, and

aesthetic concerns to park managers, and it is reasonable to

interpret is as a part of the larger set of policies previously

discussed which likewise state overarching policy goals (access,

preservation, visitor safety) which nevertheless rest

considerable discretion in park staff to balance the competing

considerations. Whalen, 29 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1097-98. The process

of identifying hazards, determining which require an explicit

warning, and deciding the precise manner in which to warn is a

discretionary process. Blackburn, 100 F.3d at 1431. The NPS Sign

Manual permits discretion regarding resource allocation, visitor

access, and visitor safety in the decision to warn. Kahan v.

United States, 73 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (D.C.Hawaii 1999). 

Plaintiffs also argue that even if Defendant had discretion

to decide whether to post signs or what type/color to post, or to

put warnings in brochures or boards, nevertheless, once Defendant

became aware of a recognized hazard, it had a mandatory duty

under the above-mentioned policies to investigate the workplace,

abate it or protect workers and visitors, and give some type of

notice and warning. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant simply

ignored the mandatory duty to provide a safe workplace or warn;

it did not exercise discretion as to how to do it, but rather

just ignored it. However, it is undisputed that after the May

1999 rock fall, Defendant’s staff did investigate the area,

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warned and closed it briefly, and then reopened the area after

apparently determining that no warnings were necessary any

longer. 

Further, the more fundamental defect with Plaintiffs’

argument is that the decision cannot be boiled down to a simple

recognition of the existence of some hazard. The entire process,

including identifying hazards, determining which hazards require

a warning, and determining how and when and where the warning

should proceed, involves discretion. Although there is evidence

that would support an inference that there was a known danger of

rock fall at the Glacier Point site, there is no way to determine

what standard to use to evaluate any duty to provide a warning at

the particular time of decedent’s death, how much evidence to

require pursuant to such a standard before a duty is clear, or

what type of warning was required. Although it is tempting to

posit that some duty existed because there was some knowledge of

a hazard, how should that hazard have been evaluated? Questions

of how extensive and imminent and certain a hazard must be before

a warning is issued are presented; there follow questions

regarding the type of warning to be given. These questions are at

the core of the discretionary function articulated in the

policies. Plaintiffs have not shown that a specific, mandatory

policy existed that created a duty to provide some warning, as

distinct from no warning, at any specific point in time or space

after the May 1999 rock slide. In Blackburn, the court recognized

that its holding in Summers that guidelines somehow mandated

action was inconsistent with the holdings in Valdez and Childers,

which involved known hazards but yet determined that the

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discretionary function exception applied. 100 F.3d at 1432.

8. 1989 Wilderness Management Plan

It is undisputed that the 1989 Wilderness Management Plan of

1989 quotes the 1988 MP to the effect that the visitor to a

wilderness area must accept the wilderness largely on its own

terms and must accept the risks of wilderness travel, possible

dangers from accidents, wildlife, and natural phenomena as part

of the wilderness experience; however, it also states, “Beyond

notifying and warning of obvious or hidden hazards, the National

Park Service leaves wilderness users to assume most of the

responsibility for their own safety.” It also provides that the

NPS will provide educational and interpretive media and programs

which will ultimately promote wilderness safety, and it will

enhance public safety through the use of safety warnings. (Brooks

Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. C at 12, 14.)

It is not clear that this applies because the location of

the decedent at the time of death has not been established.

However, the terms of this policy are extremely broad, not

specific and mandatory.

9. 1988 MP re: Wastewater Facilities

Tollefson declares that the 1988 MP (Decl. at 3, Ex. C)

include general policies for facility development and placement,

including wastewater treatment facilities. The MP state that

development of facilities to serve users will generally be

avoided, but campsites may be designated when essential for

resource protection or enhancement of opportunities for solitude,

and may include a toilet if determined by the superintendent to

be the minimum facilities necessary for the health and safety of

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wilderness users or for the protection of wilderness resources

and values. Toilets will be placed only in locations where their

presence and use will resolve health and sanitation problems or

prevent serious resource damage and where reducing or dispersing

visitor use has failed to alleviate the problems or is

impractical. (Ex. C, ch. 6:6.) 

Further, in chapter 9, the 1988 MP states that the NPS will

provide appropriate facilities necessary for resource protection

and required for visitor enjoyment of parks that will be

harmonious with park resources, compatible with natural

processes, aesthetically pleasing, functional, energy-efficient,

cost-effective, and as accessible as possible to all segments of

the population. (Ex. C, ch. 9:1.) As to location, it states that

major facilities within park boundaries will be placed only in

development zones established by the parks’ approved general

management plan; facilities will be integrated into the park

landscape and environs as to cause minimum impact and will not

compete with or dominate park features. Full integration

involves, among other things, sensitivity to cultural, regional,

aesthetic, and environmental factors in the selection of the

site, materials, and forms. It also states:

Facilities will not be located in areas where natural

processes pose a persistent threat unless no practicable

alternative site exists and unless all safety and

hazard probability factors have been considered. Hazardous

areas include sites with unstable soils and 

geologic conditions.... Where facilities must be

located in such areas, their design and siting will consider

the nature of the hazard and include appropriate mitigating 

measures to minimize risks to human life and property.

(Brooks Decl., Ex. A, ch. 9:2-3.)

Further, MP 1988 provides that when there is thought to be a

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potential for resource impairment, actions will be based on

strategies that retain the resource in an unimpaired condition

until doubts are resolved; if a development might impair a park

resource, the development will be postponed or reconfigured until

it can be established whether it will or will not within

reasonable limits of certainty; absent that assurance, the action

will not be taken. (Id. at ch. 1:4.)

Plaintiffs characterize the policies in MP 1988 regarding

siting facilities as mandatory; then Plaintiffs point to evidence

(Watts Decl. ¶ 20, Crabtree Decl., Ex. A, Dep. of Wieczorek of

June 8, 2005, at p. 75) that rock fall hazards associated with

wastewater management at the top of the geologic formation were

not taken into account. However, the policies appear to be

discretionary because whether a natural hazard exists requires a

decision by park management, and due to the scope of the geologic

hazard in the park, to decide where to place facilities requires

a balancing of factors. It appears that the decision to place

facilities is discretionary in nature because the decision

requires a balancing of policy considerations.

As to wastewater treatment systems, it prohibits new

wastewater treatment plants or enlargement of existing plants

until it has been determined that reductions in water use are not

possible. It states:

In selecting an appropriate method of wastewater treatment,

the factors of all-season reliability, cost-effectiveness,

and minimum adverse impact on the environment will all

be considered. Wastewater will be adequately treated so that 

on its return to water courses it meets or exceeds 

applicable state and federal water quality standards.

(Id. at 9:5.)

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Tollefson also declares that the Yosemite Valley Plan (YVP),

adopted in November 2000 (almost a year and one-half after the

decedent’s death), provides expressly that decisions about

locating and relocating facilities are an exercise of discretion

based on various specified policy factors; geologic processes,

such as mass movement and rock fall, shall proceed unimpeded

despite exposure of some facilities in the Yosemite Valley. The

mere fact that it reflects a set of criteria does not seem to

support an inference that deliberations regarding those criteria

occurred before the plan was adopted.

Plaintiffs object to the YVP as irrelevant. Because it postdates decedent’s death, and because there is no foundation

establishing a basis for relevance to the time of the decedent’s

death, it does not immediately appear to be relevant. 

The policies concerning the siting and maintenance of

wastewater facilities state broad policy objectives and refer to

competing policy considerations. There is no mandatory, specific

policy that required particular action of any NPS agent in

connection with the death of decedent.

NPS-50 provides that the associate director of operations

establishes a procedure for conducting engineering reviews of

major construction and alteration projects. (Ch. 1, p. 3.) This

provision does not impose a mandatory, specific duty with respect

to visitor safety. 

Plaintiffs argue that this case is unique in that the

government’s wastewater facility is alleged to have contributed

to the natural hazard involved. However, to the extent that it is

involved at all in the first prong of the analysis, the fact that

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the government’s proprietary activity of building and operating a

wastewater facility, which was artificial, on the land and

thereby possibly contributing to the cause of the rock fall,

should not distinguish this case from the cases discussed herein.

In both Valdez (government made and maintained the trail) and

Blackburn (government constructed the bridge and put up some

signs), the government’s own conduct created or contributed to

the hazards.

In summary, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not

established a specific, mandatory policy regarding identifying

and warning decedent or other visitors of rock fall hazard at the

time of decedent’s death.

C. Policy Decision

It must be determined whether or not the government’s

investigation, analysis and determinations regarding the hazard

and warning were subject to policy analysis or consideration. It

must be determined whether there was a government action

involving the exercise of policy judgment or choice, susceptible

to policy analysis, involving a decision grounded in social,

economic, and political policy.

Plaintiffs argue that because in the 1980 GMP the NPS had

already determined that the area below Glacier Point near Curry

Village was a recognized hazard, and because in the 1993 RMP the

NPS had already determined that geologic study, monitoring, and

early warning system were necessary to protect persons in the

park, the NPS had a duty to act. Further, the safety

determinations and scientific investigations required under the

1988 Management Policies, the 1993 RMP, NPS-50, OSHA, and

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Executive Order 12196 were not discretionary; no balancing of

policy considerations remained to be performed. The only duty was

the mandatory duty to make safety and scientific determinations

necessary to protect human life and prevent injuries.

It has been held that what constitutes adequate warning is

not typically related to broad public policy, and where a safety

plan does not give the option of doing nothing, a failure to warn

involves considerations of safety and not policy. Faber v. United

States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 1995) (failure to follow

an established plan required implementation of specific safety

measures); Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1994

(failure to warn of known water hazard held not a policy

decision). Further, a failure to adhere to accepted professional

standards is not susceptible to a policy analysis. ARA Leisure

Services v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 195 (failure to maintain

road in safe condition not protected under discretionary function

exception because the conduct involved safety considerations

under an established policy rather than competing public policy

considerations); Arizona Maintenance Co. v. United States, 864

F.2d 1497, 1502-05 (9th Cir. 1989) (failure to implement

established, objective industry standards for the amount of

dynamite used in blasting canals held not to involve policy

considerations); O’Toole, at 1037 (failure to perform required

maintenance not policy-oriented); Chaffin v. United States, 176

F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (triable issue of fact existed as to

whether the government had superior knowledge of the risk of harm

from polar bears and failed to reduce the risk).

However, where the policy in question permits the government

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agent to exercise discretion, the very existence of the

discretionary policy creates a strong presumption that a

discretionary act authorized by the policy involved consideration

of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the policy.

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324 (concerning a regulation permitting

discretion).

Plaintiff has produced evidence of two relatively recent

rock falls on Glacier Point, preceding decedent’s death by months

and weeks, respectively. Plaintiff has provided expert opinion

that previous rock falls are important factors in prediction of

future rock falls and that wastewater from the government’s

facility probably contributed to the rock fall that killed

decedent. This evidence warrants an inference that some factors

important to prediction of future rock falls were present.

However, in view of the nature of the hazard, the apparent

difficulty of prediction of rock falls, and the setting of the

hazard in a national park in which rock fall hazard abounded, it

is concluded that even though a reasonable person might have

apprehended a danger of rock fall at some unknown point in the

future, and thus a safety concern was present, Plaintiff’s

evidence is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the

discretionary act authorized by the policy involved the relevant

competing policy considerations. The government’s decision

regarding assessment of the danger of rock fall and of the need

to protect or warn the public was not a case of routine

maintenance, or of objective, established safety standards which

were required to be implemented. Instead, the decision appears to

have been clearly linked to considerations of not only safety,

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but also public access to natural resources and conservation of

the natural environment. Cf. Childers, 40 F.3d at 975-76. Summers

should not be read too broadly so as to exclude all decisions

involving a safety concern from the range of public policy.

Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180. Here, the nature of

the government’s action involved considerations of maximizing

access to the rock face for recreational use, judicious use of

signs in an area riddled with almost limitless hazards and many

obvious dangers, and competing concerns regarding the need to

minimize potential safety hazards. Here, as in Valdez, Blackburn,

and Whalen, managing public access to resources, identifying the

nature and extent or imminence of the hazard, and determining the

need for warning or other protection constitute actions

susceptible to policy analysis.

D. Conclusion

The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that if this action

is dismissed, this Court will fall into the trap identified in

O’Toole, 295 F.3d 1029 (holding that an agency’s decision to

forego routine maintenance on an irrigation system for fiscal

reasons was not the type of policy decision protected by the

discretionary function exception), namely, to permit the

discretionary function exception to swallow the FTCA where the

government acts in the role of a private landowner. The present

case did not involve a routine decision regarding maintenance.

Further, it was not a simple failure to perform a mandatory duty

under an established, specific policy or pursuant to scientific,

objectively determinable standards. The Court is not guided by 

Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 876-77 (10th Cir. 1976)

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(holding that the failure to warn of thin earth crusts near a

thermal pool, where there were warnings about such hazards posted

in other locations, was not a discretionary decision linked to

the decision to keep the area underdeveloped), in which the court

declared that the decision of the government, as a landowner, not

to warn of known dangers or to provide safeguards cannot

rationally be deemed discretionary. The Tenth Circuit courts have

since recognized that the government’s status as landowner does

not create a special type of discretionary function case, and

that where the decision not to place warnings is part of some

overall policy, the discretionary function exception applies.

See Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F.2d 951, 953-56 (10th Cir.

1991) (decision not to mark a trail at a national monument in a

wilderness area held to be discretionary where the pertinent

policies provided that park personnel would first determine which

sections of the trail were hazardous, without directions on how

to make the determination, and where it was part of an overall

decision to maintain the area in a wilderness state). This case

is more like Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 975, where

the action taken was part of an overall plan involving public

policy considerations. In the unique circumstances of the present

case, there is a clear connection between the discretionary

policy considerations and the action undertaken.

Accordingly, it is concluded that Defendant has shown that

the discretionary function exception to the waiver of immunity

applies. Plaintiffs have not shown that the Court has subject

matter jurisdiction. 

It does not appear that any amendment of the complaint has

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been suggested by Plaintiffs, would be appropriate, or would

change the Court’s analysis. Thus, Plaintiffs’ request to be

permitted to amend the complaint will be denied.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction will be granted.

VI. Assumption of the Risk

With respect to assumption of risk, because the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the Court lacks

jurisdiction to consider or grant Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on the grounds of assumption of the risk. California

Save Our Streams Council, Inc. v. Yeutter 887 F.2d 908, 912-913

(9th Cir. 1989). Defendant’s motion is moot. The appropriate

remedy is to order the action dismissed. Id.

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that 

1) Defendant’s motion to dismiss this action pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) IS GRANTED,; and

2) Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend the complaint IS

DENIED; and

3) Defendant’s motion in the alternative for summary

judgment or summary adjudication IS DECLARED MOOT; and

4) The Clerk IS DIRECTED TO DISMISS this action for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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