Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00013/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00013-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MILTON OTIS LEWIS,

Petitioner, CIV-S-02-0013 FCD GGH DP

vs. DEATH PENALTY CASE

JEANNE WOODFORD, Warden, ORDER and

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Summary .................................................................................................. 5

AEDPA Standards ............................................................................................................... 8

Facts In a Capital Case Motion for Summary Judgment .....................................................13

Petitioner’s Claim for Automatic Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing ............................... 14

Factual Background ............................................................................................................. 15

Merits Discussion .................................................................................................................20

Claim 8 – Excessive Publicity ..................................................................................20

Claim 33 – Lack of Speedy Trial ..............................................................................23

Claims 34 and 35 (Failure to Swear Jurors Prior to Filling out the

Questionnaires (34) and Misrepresentation on the Questionnaire That

the Jurors Had Been Sworn ......................................................................... 24

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Excusal of Jurors Grose (Claim 36), Trotter (Claim 37) and Burkhardt (Claim

38) for Cause; Claim 39 – the Erroneous Excuals of These Three 

Jurors Requires Reversal; Claim 42 – Jurors Should Not Be Excused

Because of Their Opinions Regarding the Likely Facts to be Presented .....24

Claims 40, 41 and 43 – Failure of the Trial Court to Excuse Juror Martin (40)

and Horn (41) was Constitutional Error ......................................................29

Claim 44 – African-Americans Were Under Represented On the Jury Venire.......30

Claim 45 – Cumulative Error in Jury Selection ......................................................31

Insufficiency of the Evidence – Claim 46 (Hadix Testimony Demonstrated a

Lack of Intent for Robbery or Burglary); Claim 47 (Baker Testimony

Demonstrated a Lack of Intent for Robbery or Burglary); Claim 48

(Rice Testimony Demonstrated a Lack of Intent for Robbery or Burglary);

Claim 49 (Petititioner’s Testimony Demonstrated a Lack of Intent for

Robbery or Burglary); Claim 40 (Petitioner’s Intoxication Prevented Him

From Forming the Intent to Rob or Commit Burglary); Claim 57

(Summation Claim of Why the Evidence Was Insufficient for Felony

Murder and Only Established Only a Manslaughter) .................................32

Evidentiary Error – Claim 51 (Admission of Photos and Videotape); Claims

52 and 53 (Practicing with a Buck Knife as Inadmissible Character

Evidence); Claim 54 (Evidence of Prior Misconduct, i.e., Southard

Fight and Uncharged Robbery); Claim 56 (Failure to Give Limiting

Instruction re Southard Misconduct) ..........................................................37

Claim 51 (Admission of Photos and Videotape) .........................................37

Claims 52 and 53 (Practicing With a Buck Knife and Inadmissible,

Irrelevant Character Evidence) ......................................................41

Claims 54 (Evidence of Prior Misconduct, i.e., Southard Fight and

Uncharged Robbery).......................................................................45

Claim 56 (Failure to Give a Pin Point Instruction) ...................................47

Claim 55 – Petitioner Was Entitled to a Separate Jury for the Penalty Phase ........48

Guilt Phase Instruction Error (Claims 59-68, 82 and 84) .......................................48

Claim 59 (Court Erred By Refusing the Manslaughter Instruction) ..........48

Claim 61 (Failure to Give a Sua Sponte Instruction on Imperfect SelfDefense) ..........................................................................................58

Claim 68 (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to Ask For an

Imperfect Self-Defense Instruction) ................................................58

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3

Claim 60 (Refusal to Give a Proffered Explanatory Instruction on the

Temporal Relationship of Petitioner’s Intent to Steal and Mr.

Rumsey’s Death; Claim 65 (The Jury Was Not Properly

Instructed about the Temporal Relationship) ................................58

Claim 62 (Failure to Give an Instruction Defining Voluntary Intoxication

And Failure to Give That Part of the Intoxication Instruction

Defining Specific Intent Necessary for Burglary and Robbery;

Claim 66 (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Ask

For Definition of Voluntary Intoxication) ......................................61

Claim 63 (Reasonable Doubt Instruction is Defective Because it 

Improperly Defines Presumption of Innocence; Claim 65 (The

Reasonable Doubt Instruction Is Defective Because it Uses

The Terms “Moral Evidence” and “Moral Certainty”) ................66

Claim 67 (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Request

CALJIC 8.83.1 – Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to

Prove Specific Intent); Claim 84 (Trial Court’s Failure to Sua

Sponte Give CALJIC 8.83.1) ..........................................................68

Claim 82 (Failure to Instruct the Jury That It Must Unanimously Agree

On the Theory of Felony Murder Adopted, i.e., Robbery or

Burglary) ........................................................................................69

Claim 71 – The Verdicts Were Inconsistent; Claim 72 – Inconsistencies in the

Special Verdict; Claim 73 – Inconsistencies “Prove” That the Jury Did

Not Understand How to Apply the Facts to the Law; Claim 74 – Failure

to Object to the Inconsistent Verdicts Did Not Waive the Claim ..............70

Claim 75 (Penalty Phase) Use of Preliminary Transcript to Prove the use of a

Gun in the Horiuchi Robbery (Double Jeopardy) ......................................73

Hearsay (Prior Conviction) Was Admitted during the Penalty Phase (Claim 77);

Admission of Prior Convictions Violates Due Process (Claim 78) .......... 78

Admission of Toombs Testimony/Lewis Denial (Claim 79); Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Object (Claim 90) ............................79

Miscellaneous Penalty Phase Asserted Instructional Errors:

Claim 80 – Failure to Instruct that the 1980 Horiuchi Robbery Must Be Found

True Beyond a Reasonable Doubt;

Claim 81 – Failure to Instruct that the Greene Incident Must be proved Beyond

a Reasonable Doubt;

Claim 85 – Failure to Instruct as to the Elements of Unadjudicated Criminal

Activity;

Claim 86 – Petitioner Did not Waive his Right to Have the Jury Instructed as

to Unadjudicated Criminal Activity;

Claim 88 – Use of the Terms “Circumstances,” “Special Circumstances,”

“Aggravating Circumstances,” and “Mitigating Circumstances” Are

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4

Confusing;

Claim 89 – Failure of Counsel to Request that the Jury Be Instructed as to the

Elements of Unadjudicated Criminal Activity Constituted Ineffectiveness;

Claim 95 – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Request Burden of

Proof Instructions About the Greene Incident ............................................81

Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Penalty Phase; Claim 91 – Aguing that

Petitioner Failed to Present Mitigating Evidence; Claim 92 – Arguing

Fact Which Did Not Relate to Statutory Aggravating Factors; Claim

93 – Arguing that Petitioner Lacked Remorse ...........................................86

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to Object to Officer Smith’s

Testimony – Claim 94 ............................................................................... 89

The Checklist Claims:

Claims 25 and 101 – The Death Sentence was Disproportionate in

Violation of the Eighth Amendment Because No Inter-Case

Comparison is Required ............................................................... 90

Claim 29 – The Prosecutor Has Unbounded Discretion in Deciding

To Bring a Death Penalty Case ....................................................90

Claim 76 – Use of Unadjudicated Violent Act Offenses in the Penalty

Phase .............................................................................................92

Claim 83 – Failure to Instruct the Jury That it Must Find the Penalty

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt .........................................................94

Claim 87 – Triple Counting of Evidence Regarding Petitioner’s Intent

To Steal Improperly Resulted in the Death Penalty ......................96

Claim 96 – Ineffective Assistance in Failing to Object to the

Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Statute ...............96

Claim 97 – The Death Sentence Fails Intra-Case Proportionality ..........97

Claim 98 – Failure to Require Written Findings by the Jury .................. 97

Claim 99 – California Death Penalty Statute Fails to Narrow the

Population of Death Penalty Eligible Defendants, Especially

Felony Murder Defendants ...........................................................97

Claim 100 – California Death Penalty Statute is Unconstitutional

Because it is Vague and Uses Otherwise Improper 

Aggravating Circumstances .........................................................98

Claim 101 – California’s Death Penalty Statute is Unconstitutional

Because it Fails to Require Inter-Case Review ........................... 98

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5

Introduction and Summary

Respondent has brought a motion for summary judgment on selected claims;

petitioner has opposed and brought his own motion for summary judgment on selected claims. 

This is the second such motion brought in the case, and brings to an end law and motion on the

merits prior to an evidentiary hearing. In order to understand what has been ruled upon, what is

pending ruling, and what remains to be ruled upon at evidentiary hearing, the undersigned sets

forth the following chart of the 103-claim First Amended Petition:

Claims Ruled Upon By Findings and Recommendations of July 12, 2005, Order of October 14,

2005 (summary judgment awarded to respondent):

1, 2, 3, and 7.

Claims pending ruling in this motion: (“R” = respondent’s motion; “P” =

petitioner’s cross-motion):

8–R

25-R

29-R

33- R & P

34-R

35-R

36-R & P

37-R & P

38-R & P

39-R & P

40-R & P

41-R & P

42-R & P

43-R & P

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6

44-R

45-R

46-R & P

47-R & P

48 -R & P

49 -R & P

50 -R & P

51 -R & P

52 -R & P

53 -R & P

54 -R & P

55 -R & P

56 -R & P

57 -R & P

58 -R & P

59 -R & P

60 -R & P

61 -R & P

62 -R & P

63 -R & P

64 -R & P

65 -R & P

66 -R

67 -R & P

68 -R

71 -R & P

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7

72 -R & P

73 -R & P

74 -R & P

75 -R & P

76 -R & P

77 -R & P

78 -R & P

79 -R & P

80 -R & P

81 -R & P

82 -R & P

83 -R & P

84 -R & P

85 -R & P

86 -R

87 -R & P

88 -R & P

89 -R

90- R

91 -R & P

92 -R & P

93 -R & P

94- R

95 -R

96 -R

97 -R

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 As discussed at status conference, this motion for summary judgment was supposed to 1

be omnibus, i.e., every claim susceptible to summary judgment was to be noticed. Moreover, to

the extent respondent has “reserved the right” to bring further motions on the above listed claims

for adjudication, based upon a different theory such as procedural default, the court recognizes no

such reservation of rights. It is one thing to allow motion practice on various claims at different

times as the court has already permitted; it is quite another to piecemeal motions on a particular

claim. 

8

98 -R & P

99 -R & P

100 -R

101 -R & P

For the reasons set forth below, no claims adjudicated in these motions need be

resolved at evidentiary hearing. The remaining claims, i.e., those not adjudicated previously or in

these motions, will go to evidentiary hearing except for those claims which are procedurally

deficient under AEDPA, or shall otherwise be finally resolved after evidentiary hearing.1

Respondent will be permitted to oppose an evidentiary hearing on grounds that AEDPA

precludes such, but will not be permitted to make another motion for summary judgment on the

merits of these outstanding claims. Accordingly, Claims 4 (petitioner’s “helper” counsel

disbarred), 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32,

69, 70, 102, 103 (probably inadequately stated) are claims not discussed above that will go to

evidentiary hearing barring an AEDPA “diligence” flaw, or will be decided as a matter of law at

that time; petitioner will be allowed to seek necessary discovery on all fact-bound claims set

forth in this paragraph.

AEDPA Standards

The AEDPA applies to this petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the

AEDPA became effective. The AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas

corpus,” establishing more deferential standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in

assessing a state court’s adjudication of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error.

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9

Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

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unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 , 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover,

the established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 10, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

One issue concerning the standard of review is especially important here –that is,

what level of specificity of Supreme Court rulings is required for the “unreasonable application

of established Supreme Court authority.” For example, beyond any doubt, a defendant is entitled

by virtue of Supreme Court authority to due process in the conduct of criminal proceedings. But,

such an absurd level of generality would make AEDPA a dead letter. On the other hand, one

need not obtain completely on-point factual similarity before Supreme Court decisions can be

applied. Of course, the difficult part is correctly drawing the specificity line. The authority

below assists in drawing that line and will be applied herein. 

[A]n affirmative answer to the first section 2254(d)(1) inquiry – 

whether the Supreme Court has prescribed a rule that governs the

petitioner’s claim – requires something more than a recognition

that the Supreme Court has articulated a general standard that

covers the claim. To obtain relief at this stage, a habeas petitioner

must show that Supreme Court precedent requires an outcome

contrary to that reached by the relevant state court. 

We caution that this criterion should not be applied in too rigid a

manner. A petitioner need not point a habeas court to a factually

identical precedent. Oftentimes, Supreme Court holdings are

“general” in the sense that they erect a framework specifically

intended for application to variant factual situations. These rules

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sufficiently shape the contours of an appropriate analysis of a claim

of constitutional error to merit review of a state court's decision

under section 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” prong. 

Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 885, 886 (3rd Cir. 1999).

The precisely similar inquiry in qualified immunity cases aids the discussion here

as well:

The operation of this standard, however, depends substantially

upon the level of generality at which the relevant “legal rule” is to

be identified. For example, the right to due process of law is quite

clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a

sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how

unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a

clearly established right. Much the same could be said of any other

constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of “clearly

established law” were to be applied at this level of generality, it

would bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness”

that is the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be able to

convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly

establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by

alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. Harlow would be

transformed from a guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading.

Such an approach, in sum, would destroy “the balance that our

cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’

constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance

of their duties,” by making it impossible for officials “reasonably

[to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for

damages.” Davis, 640 supra, 468 U.S., at 195, 104 S.Ct., at 3019.

[FN2] It should not be surprising, therefore, that our cases establish

that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been

“clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence more

relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is

protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question

has previously been held unlawful, see Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S., at

535, n. 12, 105 S.Ct., at 2820, n. 12; but it is to say that in the light

of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. See, e.g.,

Malley, supra, 475 U.S., at 344-345, 106 S.Ct., at 1097-1098;

Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S., at 528, 105 S.Ct., at 2816; Davis, supra,

468 U.S., at 191, 195, 104 S.Ct., at 3017, 3019.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038-3039 (1987) (qualified

immunity).

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An instructive application of the above law appears in the “due process” biased

juror issue of Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005):

More importantly, no Supreme Court precedent holds that a failure

to investigate potential juror bias presents structural error, and even

if we were to read Dyer to address potential juror bias, it would be

insufficient authority under AEDPA. See Hernandez, 282 F.3d at

1140. Although the Supreme Court recognized in Tumey v. Ohio

that a trial before a biased judge presents structural error, it has not

applied this principle to trials by biased jurors, much less in cases

where there is only potential bias. 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71

L.Ed. 749 (1927).

Accordingly, it remains for us to decide whether the state court’s

failure to hold an evidentiary hearing sua sponte when presented

with evidence of juror bias is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the

United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We hold

that it is not. The reason is simple: the Supreme Court has not yet

decided whether due process requires a trial court to hold a hearing

sua sponte whenever evidence of juror bias comes to light.

Another recent illustrative example derives from the case of Carey v. Musladin,

__U.S.__, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006), involving an audience wearing “victim” buttons. Although

some parallels existed between the issue of “audience misconduct” and prosecutorial misconduct,

as both should be resolved by the trial judge, the Supreme Court held that its prosecutorial

misconduct authority was not related enough to the audience victim buttons issue to be applied. 

Accordingly, unless the Supreme Court precedent more or less directs the outcome in the sense

that the parallels between the situations are reasonably unavoidable, AEDPA will not permit a

finding that state courts violated clearly established Supreme Court law. The court now turns to

a discussion of the case background and the merits.

Finally, although circuit cases may be of some assistance in determining the

breadth of Supreme Court pronouncements for AEDPA purposes, circuit authority cannot

establish the clearly established law itself. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir.

2006).

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13

Facts In a Capital Case Motion for Summary Judgment

Although motions for summary judgment are appropriate in habeas corpus

proceedings, Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S. Ct. 1621 (1977), the facts for such

motions are presented in a decidedly different manner than in ordinary civil actions. This is so

because habeas corpus law, both statutory and case-made, preempt the normal rules for factual

presentation. Firstly, except for claims made outside the record, the facts are those contained

within the record as a whole. Neither petitioner nor respondent may elevate his stated record

facts to a status of “undisputed” by picking and choosing facts from that record. The record is

what it is and cannot be excised in part.

Closely related to the above principle is that factual determinations made by the

finder of fact at the trial level, including the jury, are entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This would include necessary inferences from the jury’s verdict itself. See

e.g., McCullough v. Bennett, 413 F.3d 244, 249 (2nd Cir. 2005). Moreover, to the extent that the

appellate courts make findings of fact, such fact finding is also entitled to the presumption of

correctness. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981).

Thus, for example, if the jury here rejected a claim that petitioner was intoxicated,

or such was a necessary inference from the verdict, petitioner has the burden of showing the error

of such, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence from the record that petitioner was sufficiently

intoxicated. Sufficiency of the evidence issues are by definition decided upon the record. 

For the most part, claims outside the record are those which closely dovetail with

ordinary summary judgment procedures. It is these claims which will not have a state court

record, unless factual findings were made in the state court habeas proceedings. The court will

refer to the record, and not a party’s statement of undisputed facts, unless the claims

appropriately involve facts outside the record. Of course, facts outside the record presented for

purposes of demonstrating issues of fact, i.e., the need for a full factual hearing, must be

presented in an admissible fashion.

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 The undersigned was that Magistrate Judge and summary judgment was the “entirely 2

reasonable” procedure.

14

Petitioner’s Claim for Automatic Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner does not challenge a summary judgment procedure insofar as such

claims may be entirely legal in nature. However, petitioner is mistaken that he is automatically

entitled to discovery on claims having any factual context simply because he requests discovery. 

He is doubly mistaken that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any claim in which he

simply concludes that there may be facts which he might find through discovery, and might

present at evidentiary hearing.

First, the Ninth Circuit has endorsed summary judgment in the capital case

context as a procedure which can be utilized to ferret out factually baseless claims. Rich v.

Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999): “In fact, the Magistrate Judge established an

entirely reasonable process to deal with the claims for which Rich sought discovery and a

hearing.” This is so whether or not petitioner has generally pled a conclusion of violation of his 2

rights. As seen from the previous section, the Supreme Court has expressly permitted the

allegations of a habeas petition to be tested by summary judgment procedures. Blackledge v.

Allison, supra. Therefore, even if a petition has set forth facts with some specificity and, as such,

a petitioner would normally be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d

1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1998), nothing in AEDPA or the case law precludes the court from

requiring petitioner to come forward earlier at summary judgment and present the court with

some bona fide factual basis for claims whose facts lay outside the record through an evidentiary

showing before moving to the evidentiary hearing itself. Indeed, the Supreme Court has required

a petitioner to do so.

Moreover, “an evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved

by reference to the state court record.” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Finally, it is beyond dispute that even if petitioner alleges specific facts in good

faith, and can present an actual factual basis for the claim, no evidentiary hearing is necessary if

the facts as proven would not constitute a basis for granting the claim. Correll, supra. For

example, on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, if the facts concerning unreasonableness

of counsel’s actions were to be accepted, but such would not demonstrate prejudice, there is no

need to hold a factual hearing on the reasonableness prong of ineffective assistance – the claim

would be denied in any event on the prejudice prong.

Moreover, a petitioner, even a capital case petitioner, has no automatic right to

discovery. Every petitioner must show good cause for such discovery through a factual showing

developed in informal investigation which demonstrates the need for further, formal factual

development. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1991). As stated in Rich, 187

F.3d at 1067: “Habeas is an important safeguard whose goal is to correct real and obvious

wrongs. It was never meant to be a fishing expedition for habeas petitioners to ‘explore their

case in search of its existence.’”

None of the claims referenced below in this adjudication require an evidentiary

hearing or discovery.

Factual Background

Because the factual background contained herein will be helpful to the reader to

place petitioner’s claims in proper context, the court quotes the factual summary of the California

Supreme Court.

A jury convicted defendant Milton Otis Lewis of one count of first

degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), [FN1] and found true the

special circumstance allegations of robbery murder (§ 190.2,

former subd. (a)(17)(i) [now subd. (a)(17)(A)]), and burglary

murder (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(vii) [now subd. (a)(17)(G)]).

The jury also convicted defendant of two counts of robbery, one

count of burglary, and one count of attempted murder. At the

penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death for the first

degree murder with special circumstances. After denying

defendant’s automatic motion to modify the death verdict (§ 190.4,

subd. (e)), the trial court sentenced defendant to death for the first

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degree murder, and to a total determinate term of 21 years in state

prison for the remaining counts.

FN1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise stated.

Defendant’s appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)

We will affirm the judgment in its entirety.

I. Facts

A. The Prosecution’s Guilt Phase Evidence

In December 1988, James and Helen Rumsey lived in a unit of the

Shasta Pines Apartments in Redding. Marie Baker, a

methamphetamine user, lived in another unit in the same building.

Staying with Baker at that time was 15-year-old Amy Hadix, who

also used methamphetamine regularly.

June Rice, another renter at the Shasta Pines Apartments, sold

drugs from her apartment. On December 21, 1988, defendant, who

knew Rice and was a methamphetamine user, came to Rice’s

apartment with a man who wanted to sell some drugs. Rice

directed them to Baker’s apartment.

On December 24, 1988, around 10:00 or 11:00 a.m., the Rumseys

came to Baker’s apartment to give her back some money they owed

her. In defendant’s presence, James Rumsey pulled a wallet from

his back pocket and removed $50, which he handed to Baker. A

short time later, also in defendant’s presence, Baker’s

eight-year-old daughter commented on James Rumsey’s money,

saying, “Oh, Mom, he’s got gobs.”

Later that day, defendant went to June Rice’s apartment and bought

a half-gram of methamphetamine with money he had taken from a

man after a fistfight in Baker’s apartment. After injecting the

drugs, he told Rice they were “decent.” When he returned to

Baker’s apartment, however, he complained to Baker and Hadix

that the drugs were no good. They told him to return to Rice’s

apartment to get either more drugs or his money back. When

Hadix said she was going downstairs to visit another renter,

defendant went with her.

As Hadix passed the Rumseys’ first floor apartment, she noticed

the door was ajar, and she greeted James, who was seated in an

easy chair just inside the doorway. Suddenly, defendant jumped on

James and stuck a knife in his neck. He then reached into James’s

back pocket, pulled out his wallet and opened it, but found no

money in it.

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When Helen Rumsey tried to come to her husband’s aid, defendant

kicked her hard in the groin area, causing her to fall. As she got

up, defendant thrust the knife into her throat, and she fell to the

floor again. Defendant returned to James and tried to reach into

the front pocket of his pants, but he was unsuccessful. He turned

James’s body over and retrieved a pocketknife from his back

pocket. Defendant then picked up a gun belonging to James from a

nearby table and held it to Helen’s forehead as she struggled to her

knees. Yelling obscenities at her, defendant threatened to shoot

unless he got some money. He pulled the trigger, and Helen heard

a click. She then crawled to where James was lying, opened the

wallet defendant had looked in but discarded, and removed $250 in

$50 bills that had been hidden in a secret compartment. After

Helen handed defendant the money, he picked up James’s

pocketknife and gun, grabbed the knife he had brought with him,

and walked out the door.

Meanwhile, Hadix had run to Tim Smith’s apartment and told him

that defendant was killing the Rumseys. A few minutes later,

defendant appeared at Smith’s door and told Hadix to come with

him to June Rice’s apartment. On arrival, defendant pulled

James’s gun from his pocket and pointed it at Rice, complaining

about “bunk dope.” Hadix ran to the bathroom in fright but came

out a minute later after hearing a neighbor yell that Helen Rumsey

had been stabbed. She ran to Baker’s apartment, and defendant

followed.

Once back inside Baker’s apartment, defendant went to the kitchen

to wash blood from his hands. He ordered Baker to hold the gun

for him, but she refused. Defendant then handed Baker $250 in

$50 bills and told her to hold the money for him. He told Hadix to

come with him, and they left. Baker later found defendant’s buck

knife on her kitchen counter. She wrapped it and threw it away. 

As to the money defendant had left with her, she spent $50 on

groceries and the rest on methamphetamine.

After leaving Baker’s apartment, defendant, accompanied by

Hadix, hid the gun in a shed behind the apartment complex. They

then proceeded to a garbage bin belonging to a nearby church.

Defendant opened the lid, threw Hadix inside, and then jumped in

himself. They hid there for six or seven hours. During this time,

Hadix asked defendant why he had killed James Rumsey.

Defendant replied, “It had to be done.” The next morning,

defendant and Hadix returned to the shed to retrieve the gun, and,

at Hadix’s suggestion, they went to her parents’ home, which was

close by.

Shortly thereafter, the police arrived at the home of Hadix’s

parents. When Hadix’s father opened the door for the officers,

defendant fled into the bathroom. Defendant ignored the officers’

orders to put his gun down and come out. Forty-five minutes later,

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defendant emerged, leaving the gun in the bathroom.

An autopsy showed that James Rumsey died from hemorrhaging

caused by a five-inch-deep knife wound to the front of the neck.

Helen Rumsey sustained knife wounds to the side and back of her

neck; one of these wounds was directly over the carotid artery.

Forensic testing showed that the gun retrieved from the bathroom

of Hadix’s parents’ home was the gun taken from the Rumseys’

apartment. The gun held a full magazine, but there was no round

in the chamber.

B. The Defense Guilt Phase Case

Testifying in his own defense, defendant said he had gone to

Baker’s apartment for the first time on December 21, 1988,

accompanied by a friend who wanted to sell Baker some

methamphetamine. Defendant was homeless and had no money,

so he stayed with Baker for the next three days. During that time,

there was drug use and constant activity in the apartment, and

defendant neither slept nor ate.

On December 24, just after dark, defendant bought

methamphetamine from June Rice and injected it while still in her

apartment. Five minutes later, he bought more methamphetamine

from Rice’s companion and, again, promptly injected it. The drugs

had an immediate and powerful effect. When he went back to

Baker’s apartment, he told Baker he had bought drugs from Rice

and the drugs were “decent.” Baker was angry with defendant for

not sharing the drugs with her and suggested he get some more

drugs from Rice by complaining that what he had bought was no

good. Feeling badgered and upset, defendant left the apartment

with Hadix to see Rice. Defendant carried a steak knife in his hand

in case he encountered violence at Rice’s apartment. On the way,

Hadix harangued him about getting more drugs.

When he and Hadix came to the Rumseys’ apartment, defendant

mistakenly believed it was Rice’s apartment. He became confused

and could feel himself “ball up inside” because he was afraid he

was going to be attacked by Rice’s companion. Suddenly, he heard

a whirring sound and saw James Rumsey start to get out of his

chair by the door. Defendant became scared and stabbed him once,

not knowing whom he was stabbing. When Helen Rumsey rushed

at him, he stabbed her also.

Defendant recalled removing James’s wallet and not finding any

money in it. He admitted yelling at Helen, “Bitch, if you don’t get

me more money, I’ll get you, too.” He also remembered that after

Helen handed him the money from the wallet, he picked up

James’s gun from the table, but he denied pointing it at Helen’s

forehead and pulling the trigger.

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Defendant remembered leaving the Rumseys’ apartment and

proceeding to Rice’s residence. Once inside, he pulled out the gun

and demanded more drugs. About a minute later, he was

interrupted when a neighbor came to the door seeking help for the

Rumseys.

When defendant returned to Baker’s apartment, he dropped the

knife in the sink full of dishwater. At Baker’s direction, he put the

knife in the garbage, which he and Hadix took and disposed of on

their way out.

When called as a defense witness, the investigating officer,

Sergeant Lebak, testified that Hadix had told him of entering the

Rumseys’ apartment with defendant.

C. The Penalty Phase

At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution presented

evidence of six incidents of unadjudicated violent criminal activity,

one robbery that resulted in a felony conviction, and a felony drug

conviction.

In December 1971, a police officer saw defendant fighting with a

woman on a street corner in Los Angeles. Defendant shook the

woman, threw her to the sidewalk, struck her in the head with his

fist, and knocked her against an apartment building, rendering her

unconscious. Defendant resisted arrest, and the officer used a

choke hold to subdue him. 

In July 1980, around 10:00 p.m., defendant entered a liquor store in

Southgate and approached the clerk, Kiro Horiuchi. Defendant

said: “I have a gun; I don’t want to shoot you.” Defendant was

holding one hand behind a straw hat. Defendant told Horiuchi to

empty out the register, and Horiuchi complied. Defendant took

around $250 to $300. Horiuchi’s wife activated a silent alarm, and

defendant was arrested nearby within minutes. He did not have a

gun when arrested. For this incident, defendant was convicted of

robbery (§ 211), a felony.

In February 1985, at a house in Weed, defendant was arguing with

his mother when defendant’s uncle, Leon Johnson, told defendant

to stop. Defendant followed Johnson around the house and, when

Johnson refused to fight, defendant stabbed him twice in the chest

with a folding knife having a blade four and a half to five inches in

length. Defendant left the house, but he returned a short time later,

surrendered to the police, and signed a confession.

In January 1986, defendant was married to a woman named Willie

B. Shumlai. During an argument, he hit her in the eye with his fist.

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In August 1986, defendant and Debra Swango had been living

together in defendant’s house in Weed for around eight months,

and she was three months pregnant. Defendant wanted her to

move out, and during an argument about that, he hit her with his

fist, causing a black eye and a cut to her lip that left a scar. He also

dragged her out of the house.

In September 1986, defendant encountered George Toombs, the

father of Willie B. Shumlai, at a supermarket parking lot in Weed.

Toombs, who was then 63 years old, was sitting in his pickup

truck. Defendant had a handgun, and he fired a shot that punctured

one of the truck’s tires. When Toombs asked defendant why he

did it, defendant said: “Next time you hear son of a bitch I’m going

to be shooting your God damn guts out.”

On an evening in November 1986, Andrew Greene encountered

defendant outside a bar in Weed known as the Nightcap. Greene

warned defendant to stay away from one of Greene’s sons.

Defendant told Greene to wait, and then defendant left. More than

an hour later, defendant entered the bar shouting for Greene and

threatening his life. Defendant was wearing a trench coat. As John

Rogers, the bar’s owner, approached him, defendant reached into

his coat. Rogers pulled the coat down over defendant’s shoulders,

revealing a revolver in a holster. Rogers took the gun from

defendant.

In June 1987, defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of sale

of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379), a felony. 

The defense presented no evidence in mitigation at the penalty

phase. Defense counsel’s terse closing argument was a plea for

mercy based on biblical references and lines from William

Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice.

People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th 610, 623-628, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 640-644 (2001).

Merits Discussion

Claim 8 – Excessive Publicity

Petitioner alleges that substantial pre-trial publicity in the locale where he was

tried (Redding, CA) prejudiced the jury such that his conviction should be vacated. The

excessive publicity claim was not asserted as error before the trial court in either a change of

venue motion or in a request to excuse jurors for cause at voir dire. Petitioner believes that if his

counsel had asked more, or the correct type of questions, counsel would have had a basis for the

potential venue motion or request. Petitioner seeks unspecified discovery to prove the point

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 The undersigned will use respondent’s reference system. This reference is to the Order

3

of the state supreme court for the first habeas corpus filing.

 This is not a situation, as in King v. LaMarque, supra, where the federal courts had 4

previously indicated that the procedural bar in question was not well established or consistently

applied. In such a situation, petitioner need only indicate that he is contesting the bar. Id. In a

situation where the bar has been honored previously, or where the federal courts have not spoken,

21

regarding excessive publicity, including any prejudice component and a de novo review of the

facts of excessive publicity at evidentiary hearing in this habeas action. 

The prejudicial or excessive publicity claim was made in the first state habeas

corpus petition to the California Supreme Court which denied the claim on the merits but also for

failure to raise a timely objection in the trial court. 1SHC.ORD (filed October 24, 2001). On the 3

latter point, the Supreme Court cited People v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 899-900 (1974) and

People v. Laster, 18 Cal. App. 3d 381, 387 (1971). These cases stand for the proposition that one

must contest venue on account of excessive publicity in the trial court to not forfeit the issue.

The procedural ruling by the state supreme court that petitioner failed to raise the

venue issue in the trial court as required by state law precludes petitioner from raising the issue in

federal habeas corpus if the procedural ruling was well established in state law and consistently

applied. King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2006). Shifting burdens of articulation and

production exist to determine whether the procedural bar should be honored. Id. Respondent

must raise the issue – which respondent did. At the very least, petitioner must then contest the

bar in respect to its being well established and consistently applied by the specific articulation of

facts demonstrating a lack of “establishment” or “consistency.” If petitioner satisfactorily

contests the procedural bar, respondent must demonstrate that the state procedural bar is in fact

well established and consistently applied. 

Respondent’s ultimate burden never came into play because petitioner in no way

contests the viability of the “must object to venue” procedural bar – much less set forth an

articulation of specific facts as to why the bar is not viable. Petitioner only urges that he might 4

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petitioner bears a burden of attacking the bar ruling by specific facts demonstrating a lack of the

bar being established or consistently applied. In this case, petitioner did not contest the bar, so

regardless of which situation applied, petitioner did not meet his burden. 

22

be able to demonstrate cause and prejudice as an exemption from the procedural bar. Thus, the

only issue before the court is petitioner’s assertion that he might be able to demonstrate cause

and prejudice. 

Petitioner argues that had trial counsel questioned correctly, he would have

obtained more information about prejudicial publicity and “would have” objected. Petitioner

understands that the claim has been defaulted, but views counsel’s potential ineffectiveness as a

“cause” and seeks further discovery on the cause and prejudice aspect of procedural default. 

Petitioner simply seeks to avoid a ruling now by speculating that something might exist if given

the chance to obtain discovery. Petitioner posits merely a known quantity of publicity and

speculates that if counsel had asked more questions, the jurors surely would have remembered

more about their exposure. This is not good cause for discovery. See Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d

560, 577 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Discovery is indicated where specific allegations give the court reason

to believe that a petitioner may be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997).)”) Petitioner’s

speculation will not defeat summary judgment. And, discovery of jurors regarding any exposure

to pretrial publicity would not be permitted on such speculation.

Not only is petitioner’s opposition to summary judgment based on pure

speculation, the speculation itself could not rise to “cause” sufficient to overcome the procedural

bar.

“[T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or

legal basis for the claim, or failed to raise the claim despite

recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default.”

Murray, 477 U.S. at 486, 106 S.Ct. 2639. Attorney ignorance or

inadvertence does not constitute “cause” unless it rises to the level

of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Coleman v. 

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Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d

640 (1991).

Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 943-944 (9th Cir. 2003).

Moreover, petitioner’s request for more time to demonstrate cause also falls upon

the rule that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be separately exhausted in state court

before they can serve as “cause” for the procedural default of another claim. Cockett v. Ray, 333

F.3d at 943. Was this done? No. Although petitioner did raise the ineffective assistance of

counsel at voir dire, see Claim 26, this claim went only to failure to ferret out pre-determined

views caused by personal bias (not related to pretrial publicity) and matters of obvious potential

juror prejudice, e.g., Juror Hill played tennis with the prosecutor’s wife. No mention of failure to

properly assess the amount of pretrial publicity was asserted against trial counsel in the state

courts.

Because petitioner is precluded from establishing “cause” as part of the cause and

prejudice exemption from application of procedural bar, the court need not assess prejudice or

the need for an evidentiary hearing to establish such. Petitioner is barred in this court from

raising the pretrial publicity issue.

Claim 33 – Lack of Speedy Trial

Petitioner confuses the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial with state

procedures involving stricter time limits for speedy trials. In his opposition, p. 62, petitioner

recounts that he agreed to waive time on several occasions, none of which are under attack here. 

Petitioner only focuses upon the last waiver, and the fact that petitioner’s trial started two days

after the date on which he had agreed to waive time. Petitioner claims this is a violation of his

Sixth Amendment right to a Speedy Trial.

Of course the two day hiatus, even if caused by the prosecutor, has nothing to do

with the overall speedy trial provision in the Sixth Amendment. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.

514, 519, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972). The federal courts will not constitutionalize every state

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 This is not to say that the swearing of a jury has no significance. Indeed, the swearing 5

of a jury has much to do with the triggering of double jeopardy. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28,

98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978).

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procedure designed to effectuate a state’s own view of the necessity of speedy trials, and indeed,

a ruling on the state law issues is out of bounds in this federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991) (reemphasizing that federal habeas courts may not

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions). Petitioner’s claim is not

cognizable as a federal claim and, hence, should be denied.

Claims 34 and 35 (Failure to Swear Jurors Prior to Filling out the Questionnaires (34) and

Misrepresentation on the Questionnaire That the Jurors Had Been Sworn

Nowhere does petitioner show that failure to swear a jury at any time violated any

federal constitutional right under clearly established Supreme Court law. Similarly, there is no

established Supreme Court authority for the proposition that a mistake as to swearing potential

jurors to a jury questionnaire form raises any federal issues whatsoever. See Baldwin v. State of

Kansas, 129 U.S. 52, 56, 9 S. Ct. 193 (1889) (finding no federal issue in the allegedly improper

swearing of a state court jury). This is especially true since the jury was sworn prior to trial. 

Petitioner’s claims should be denied.5

Excusal of Jurors Grose (Claim 36), Trotter (Claim 37) and Burkhardt (Claim 38) for

Cause; Claim 39 – the Erroneous Excusals of These Three Jurors Requires Reversal;

Claim 42 – Jurors Should Not Be Excused Because of Their Opinions Regarding the

Likely Facts to Be Presented

Because in this AEDPA case the rulings of the state supreme court may not be

overturned unless an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court authority, the

undersigned starts with the findings of the state supreme court on all three jurors excused on

request by the prosecution:

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a. Prospective Juror Harold G.

At the outset of voir dire, Prospective Juror Harold G. said he had

no personal convictions that would cause him to automatically

decide which penalty to impose and he could follow the trial

court’s instructions and reach an appropriate verdict. During the

prosecution’s examination, however, Harold G. confirmed he had

answered “yes” to a questionnaire item asking, “Do you believe

there is any reason why you might have any difficulty in

objectively and impartially serving as a juror in this case?” The

prosecutor then asked him if he would still answer “no” to the

question posed to him on the questionnaire as to whether he could

set aside his personal feelings about the death penalty law and

follow the law as explained by the court. He replied that his

answer would still be “no.”

Although he made contradictory statements about his ability to set

aside his own personal views and follow the law, Harold G. ended

his examination with the declaration that he could not set aside his

personal views. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in excusing Harold G. for cause. The record

does not support defendant’s complaint that the trial court failed to

ask enough questions during voir dire to determine whether the

challenge for cause was proper.

b. Prospective Juror Robert T.

When Prospective Juror Robert T. stated during voir dire he was

“not completely sold on that death penalty,” the trial court

admonished him that his personal views were not to be taken into

consideration and that he must follow the court’s instructions.

Robert T. responded that he could set aside his personal feelings

and apply the law as the court explained it. But when the

prosecutor asked him whether, in light of his convictions about the

death penalty, he would be capable of deciding for himself to vote

for the death penalty if that was what the evidence showed and the

law indicated, Robert T. replied, “I’m not positive I could, you

know.” And when the prosecutor asked, “Wouldn’t it be fair to say

you just can’t conceive of a situation where you’d vote for the

death penalty?,” he responded, “I really don’t think so.”

Given these responses to the prosecutor’s questions, we are

satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

excused Robert T. for cause. Defendant argues that Robert T.’s

response of “I really don’t think so” meant he found the

prosecutor’s assessment of his inability to apply the death penalty

in any setting to be inaccurate. This interpretation is untenable in

light of Robert T.’s other comments. Equally unpersuasive is

defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly relied on

answers to the unsworn questionnaire to excuse Harold G. and

Robert T. As the record shows, these prospective jurors took the

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required oath before being orally examined, and they confirmed

their questionnaire responses during that oral examination.

c. Prospective Juror Leonard B.

On voir dire, Prospective Juror Leonard B. said he might have

difficulty if he was asked to decide the penalty and such a decision

would weigh on his conscience. He also said he had been opposed

to the death penalty for a number of years. On further questioning

by the prosecutor, Leonard B. said: “I can conceive of situations,

maybe where I had a personal emotional involvement, where I

would go along with it. But, in general, it would be very disturbing

to me to feel for the rest of my days that I voted in favor of the

death penalty.” He reiterated the point later when he stated, “It’s

conceivable to me that I would vote in favor of the death penalty

but I doubt it very much.” He ended by declaring, “I’m a flexible

person but not that flexible, I think.” After considering defense

counsel’s argument pointing out that the juror had stated there were

circumstances under which he could vote for the death penalty, the

trial court sustained the prosecutor’s challenge for cause.

People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 631-633, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 647-648.

Petitioner relies strongly on Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770

(1968), for the proposition that a juror can be excused for scruples expressed towards capital

punishment only when it is “‘unmistakably clear (1) that they [the challenged jurors] would

automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence

that might be developed....or (2) that their attitude would prevent them from making an impartial

decision as to the defendant’s guilt.’” Opposition at 57 quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, n.

21, 88 S. Ct. at 1777. However, the Supreme Court has since expressly loosened this standard:

We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in

Witherspoon, and to reaffirm the above-quoted standard from

Adams as the proper standard for determining when a prospective

juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on

capital punishment. That standard is whether the juror’s views

would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his

duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” 

[FN5 omitted] We note that, in addition to dispensing with

Witherspoon’s reference to “automatic” decisionmaking, this

standard likewise does not require that a juror’s bias be proved

with “unmistakable clarity.” This is because determinations of

juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions

which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common

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sense should have realized experience has proved: many

veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the

point where their bias has been made “unmistakably clear;” these

veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with

imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may

wish to hide their true feelings. [FN6 omitted] Despite this lack of

clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations

where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a

prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially

apply the law. For reasons that will be developed more fully, infra,

this is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and

hears the juror.

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-425, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852-853 (1985) (footnotes omitted).

Petitioner’s avenue of attack here is to focus on a partial record, favorable to his

position, and ignore the unfavorable part. Petitioner, in essence, posits a scenario where once a

juror at any time states that he could follow the law, further questions which show a substantial

erosion of the bona fides of the initial statement are simply not to be considered. The court will

not repeat the unchallenged factual reporting of the entire pertinent voir dire by the state supreme

court. Suffice it to say that a reasonable judge could have serious misgivings about the

challenged jurors’ ability to follow the penalty phase jury instructions.

Care must be taken to apply the correct standard here. The determination by the

trial court that all of the challenged jurors waffled too much, and that their attitudes precluded

them from following the law, is a fact which must be upheld by the federal courts unless

disproved by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). For example, “Court will

find that Mr. Trotter has personal convictions with respect to capital punishment which would

prevent him from – or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror...” RT 1473. 

The court thanked juror Trotter for his candor. Id. These are clearly findings of fact. This has to

be the standard because the Supreme Court has stated that deference is due to the trial judge’s

non-record credibility observations, i.e., manner and mode of answering the questions. Petitioner

does not attempt to demonstrate that the state courts’ factual decisions were clearly contrary to 

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 The undersigned is puzzled by the standard utilized and finding enunciated in Brown v. 6

Lambert, 431 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2005), cited by petitioner. Other than a footnote expressing that

AEDPA applied, no discussion whatsoever was made about the correct standard in a juror

excusal case. Brown concluded on its record that the state supreme court finding was “directly

contrary to” Supreme Court precedent. However, because Brown was not on all fours with any

Supreme Court case, it is clear that the “unreasonable application” of precedent was the correct

standard. Moreover, the analysis proceeded on the record only, and no deference was given the

trial court’s non-record ability to observe the challenged juror. This potential error may have

been mitigated when the initial opinion was superseded, see 451 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006).

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the factual record, he merely asserts that the court should have wound up on the other side of the

issue.

Even if the standard is ultimately one of mixed law and fact, and based on the

record only, the undersigned cannot say that the California Supreme Court was unreasonable, i.e.,

much more than simply wrong, when it determined that the excused jurors’ performance as jurors

applying the law were “substantially impaired” by their personal beliefs concerning capital

punishment. When pressed, all stated very significant reluctance to impose the death penalty to

the point where it became obvious that their ability to follow the law as instructed was in much

doubt.6

Petitioner’s reply cited case of Brown v. Lambert (see footnote 6) does not direct

any conclusion in petitioner’s favor. In that case, the Ninth Circuit read the record in such a

manner that it was clear that the excused juror had simply voiced doubts about overuse of the

death penalty, but clearly indicated that he would follow the law regarding it’s imposition. All

that can be said about that case is that the record in this case is much different. The trial judge’s

factual finding that all three jurors would not put aside their personal anti-death penalty

convictions has not been challenged herein and, if simply a record review is at issue, the state

supreme court’s decision is far from “unreasonable” in the AEDPA sense.

Claim 39 is simply a consolidated repeat of the previous three claims except that

petitioner now correctly cites Wainwright. However, for the reasons explicated above,

petitioner’s claim must fail. Similarly, Claim 42 ( Jurors Should Not Be Excluded Because of

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 Claim 43 is simply a legal argument that respondent’s defense to Claims 40 and 41, i.e., 7

that failure to utilize all peremptory challenges forfeits a challenge for cause claim, is not lawful. 

As such, it is not actually a claim for relief. 

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Their Opinions Regarding the Likely Facts to Be Presented) is simply a repetition of the previous

claims (despite the slight difference of wording in the title) and should be denied.

Claims 40, 41 and 43 – Failure of the Trial Court to Excuse Juror Martin (40) and Horn 

(41) was Constitutional Error7

In Claim 40, petitioner contends that juror Martin should have been dismissed for

cause because she indicated inflexibility in her views that the death penalty should be imposed. 

Claim 41 posits that juror Horn should have been dismissed because she was integrally

connected in another case being handled by defense counsel, and investigation with respect to

that case would unduly influence her verdict in the instant case. Critical to the outcome of this

case is that neither juror ultimately sat on petitioner’s jury. Martin was excused with a

peremptory challenge, RT 3002, and juror Horn was never called to be on the jury at all. RT

2995-3008.

The court need not assess the propriety of the refusals to excuse for cause because,

whether or not the refusal to dismiss for cause “wasted” a peremptory challenge, such a “waste”

does not state a federal claim. The ultimate inquiry is whether the jurors who did sit on the jury

were biased. The court also need not assess whether the claim was procedurally defaulted under

California law.

In United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S. Ct. 774 (2000),

defense counsel unsuccessfully challenged for cause a certain juror who he later excused with a

peremptory challenge. It so happened that defense counsel used all his peremptories. Defendant

claimed on appeal that the forced use of a peremptory, which he might well have used on another

juror, unconstitutionally deprived him of the right to a peremptory. The Supreme Court

unequivocally held, however, that the loss of a peremptory challenge, whether viewed by itself or

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 Even before the Supreme Court decided Martinez-Salazar, the Ninth Circuit had 8

already concluded that no constitutional claim could be stated in a capital case for the “waste” of

a peremptory when defendant had not exhausted his complement of peremptories. Such was the

case here. Petitioner herein failed to use a great many peremptory challenges (failed to use 21

peremptory challenges). The Ninth Circuit in Martinez-Salazar distinguished Siripongs on the

basis that all peremptories in Martinez-Salazar had been exhausted so that counsel had to utilize

a peremptory to excuse a juror who “should have been excused for cause,” and which peremptory

he could have used on another juror. The Supreme Court in reversing the Ninth Circuit rejected

even that “had-to-use-my-last-one” situation as a due process violation. 

 Respondent disputes the fact that no African-Americans were in the jury venire by 9

pointing out that petitioner presents no record or extra-record evidence of this fact.

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in the context that by unnecessarily having to use a peremptory challenge one was not given the

entire complement of challenges allowed by law, does not state a constitutional claim. Id. at 313-

315, 120 S. Ct. at 78-781. The court reiterated that “peremptory challenges are not of federal

constitutional dimension.” Id. at 311, 120 S. Ct. at 779.

In this case, petitioner argues: “By not performing its proper function and

dismissing jurors Martin and Horn, the trial court changed the dynamics of voir dire and forced

counsel to be overly cautious in his use of challenges – instead of using peremptory challenges as

sound trial strategy dictated, counsel instead was forced to focus on retaining his ability to

prevent Ms. Martin and Ms. Horn from being placed on the final jury panel.” Opposition at 61. 

This argument is not even a variation on the Martinez-Salazar theme. It is simply not cognizable

as a constitutional claim. All three claims should be denied. 8

Claim 44 – African-Americans Were Under Represented On the Jury Venire

Petitioner posits the following facts, and only these facts/conclusions, to set forth

his claim of lack of representation: (1) There were no African-Americans on petitioner’s jury;9

(2) the failure to have African-Americans on the jury came about by way of systematic exclusion;

(3) the systematic exclusion resulted in (1) above – no African-Americans on the jury. First

Amended Petition at 233, citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979). This

speculative and conclusory statement of a claim does not even approach the requirements for

pleading habeas cases with specificity, nor could it possibly qualify for discovery. No

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 The 1990 census figures were derived from U.S.Census, American Fact Finder, Quick

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Table, 1990 Summary Tape File 1; See http//factfinder.census.gov. This table gave a total

population for Shasta County in 1990 as 147,036; the number of African-Americans was only

1,081. Rounded to the nearest tenth, the percentage figure is .74%. The 2000 figure was derived

from the U.S. Census Bureau website page: quickfacts.census.gov.qfd/states/06/06089.hmtl. The

court takes judicial notice of these figures.

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information whatsoever is imparted regarding why or how petitioner believes a systematic

exclusion occurred – just that it did. The court assumes from the lack of information, lacking

even after placed at issue in a summary judgment motion, that petitioner has no such information. 

Therefore, petitioner desires discovery simply to fish for any problems that might arise after an

expensive and time-consuming study of the juror selection process. Bracy, supra does not permit

“good cause” to include such speculative ventures.

Moreover, even assuming petitioner’s proffered fact of no African-Americans in

the jury venire, not having African-Americans in a jury venire would not be unusual given the

demographics of Shasta County. In 1990, the year of petitioner’s trial, African-Americans

constituted a mere .74% of the population in Shasta County. In 2000, the percentage of AfricanAmericans had only increased to .8%. As a matter of law, petitioner has failed to plead even a 10

prima facie case. 

A survey of the cases show that the exclusion of a group

constituting 7.7% or less of the total population is, standing alone,

generally insufficient to establish a prima facie case of systematic

exclusion. See United States v. Cannady, 54 F.3d 544, 548 (9th

Cir. 1995); United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir.

1982); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1977). 

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d at 1068.

This claim has no merit.

Claim 45 – Cumulative Error In Jury Selection

There being no federal constitutional error in jury selection, petitioner’s claim of

cumulative prejudicial error must be denied.

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Insufficiency of the Evidence – Claim 46 (Hadix Testimony Demonstrated a Lack of

Intent for Robbery or Burglary); Claim 47 (Baker Testimony Demonstrated a Lack of

Intent for Robbery or Burglary); Claim 48 (Rice Testimony Demonstrated a Lack of

Intent for Robbery or Burglary); Claim 49 (Petitioner’s Testimony Demonstrated a Lack

of Intent for Robbery or Burglary); Claim 50 (Petitioner’s Intoxication Prevented Him

From Forming the Intent to Rob or Commit Burglary); Claim 57 (Summation Claim of

Why the Evidence Was Insufficient for Felony Murder and Only Established Only a

Manslaughter)

Petitioner focuses upon certain testimony (as opposed to the record as a whole), to

make his assertions of insufficient evidence. After a plenary review of the pertinent transcripts in

this case, the court finds that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the insufficiency claims

was not AEDPA unreasonable. Petitioner mistakes his burden here in that simply pointing to

evidence that supports his contentions, or evidence from which an inference could reasonably be

drawn in his favor, does not establish insufficiency of the evidence.

First, the burden on petitioner to demonstrate insufficiency of the evidence is

extraordinary in an AEDPA case. When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence,

federal habeas corpus relief is available if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at

trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have

found “the essential elements of the crime” proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). Under Jackson, the court reviews the

entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on habeas. Adamson v. Ricketts,

758 F.2d 441, 448, n. 11 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986)

(en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts.” Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. “The question is not whether we are personally convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether rational jurors could have reached the same conclusion

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reiterated the legal standards for felony robber/burglary murder:

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that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991).

If the trier of fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in

its review will assign the inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465,

469 (9th Cir. 1994). The fact that petitioner can construct from the evidence alternative scenarios

at odds with the verdict does not mean that the evidence was insufficient, i.e., that no reasonable

trier of fact could have found the conviction scenario beyond a reasonable doubt.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a

conviction, we search the record to determine “whether a

reasonable jury, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, could have found the defendants

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential element of the

crime charged.” United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1476 

(9th Cir.1986). The relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence

excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether the jury could

reasonably arrive at its verdict. United States v. Fleishman, 684

F.2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct.

464, 74 L. Ed.2d 614 (1982); United States v. Federico, 658 F.2d

1337, 1343 (9th Cir.1981), overruled on other grounds, United

States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). 

United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).

Superimposed on these already stringent insufficiency standards is the AEDPA

requirement that even if a federal court were to initially find on its own that no reasonable jury

should have arrived at its conclusion, the federal court must also determine that the state

appellate court could not have affirmed the verdict under the Jackson standard in the absence of

an unreasonable determination. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner (reasonably) argues that certain evidence favors his position, and the

court will summarize that evidence below. No claim is made that petitioner was not the person

who stabbed the Rumseys; rather, petitioner focuses upon his argument that he did not actually

have the intent to rob or burglarize at the time, or before, he stabbed Jim Rumsey to death.11

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Liability for first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory is proper when

the defendant kills in the commission of robbery, burglary, or any of the other

felonies listed in section 189. For conviction, the prosecution must establish that

the defendant, either before or during the commission of the acts that caused the

victim’s death, had the specific intent to commit one of the listed felonies. (People

v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 34, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942; People v.

Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 532, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) Thus, to

find a defendant guilty of first degree murder based on a killing perpetrated during

a robbery, the evidence must show the defendant intended to steal the victim’s

property either before or during the fatal assault. (§ 211; People v. Sakarias (2000)

22 Cal.4th 596, 619, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152; People v. Marshall, supra,

15 Cal.4th at p. 34, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Conviction of felony

murder in the commission of burglary requires proof that the defendant entered

the residence with the intent to commit a felony or theft. (§ 459; People v. Frye

(1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 954, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Proctor,

supra, at p. 533, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.)

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Petitioner, however, (unreasonably) argues two inconsistent theories: (a) at the time he left the

Baker apartment with Amy Hadix, petitioner had intended to confront June Rice, and perhaps

Roger Beard over being cheated on the quality of illegal drugs petitioner had ingested, and (2)

petitioner was so intoxicated by his drug use at the time of the murder that he could not actually

form the intent to rob or burglarize in connection with the Rumsey murder and assault. The

theories are inconsistent because petitioner freely concedes that he actually formed the intent to

seek some type of recompense or retribution against bad quality drug pushers, but when it comes

to robbing the Rumseys, petitioner could not (did not) form the required intent because of his

intoxication. Which is it? – did petitioner form intent to act despite his intoxication, or did he

not? The required mental state to form the intent to “get even” and the intent to rob/burglarize is

not of any meaningful different degree. The resort to blatant inconsistency reveals the paucity of

the insufficiency argument. 

Credible evidence was presented from several witnesses which indicated that

petitioner’s initial purpose when leaving the Baker apartment, that at least one of his motivations,

perhaps even his primary motivation, was to seek some type of recompense for the alleged bad

drugs he had received. There was no direct evidence at that time that petitioner had indicated he

was also going to rob the Rumseys along the way. However, the California Supreme Court

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an issue has been raised, the undersigned’s duty is to decide it correctly, whether or not the

parties have advanced the most appropriate theory.

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found that a reasonable jury could infer that petitioner possessed the requisite state of mind

because:

(1) in the month preceding the crime, defendant had neither money

nor a place to live, and he was involved in drug activity; (2) on the

day of the murder, defendant saw James Rumsey take $50 from his

wallet and overheard Baker’s eight-year-old daughter say that

Rumsey had “gobs” of money; (3) several hours before the murder,

defendant had fought with a man in Baker’s apartment and had

forcibly taken his money, which he used to buy methamphetamine;

and (4) before leaving Baker’s apartment and going to the

Rumseys’ apartment, defendant had armed himself with a knife.

Also, Helen Rumsey and Amy Hadix testified that when defendant

followed Hadix past the opened door to the Rumseys’ apartment,

he pushed her out of the way and entered the residence, then

quickly slammed the door shut after jumping on James Rumsey

and stabbing him in the neck. Helen Rumsey further testified that

after defendant had stabbed James and kicked her away as she

approached, he removed the wallet from James’s back pocket and

went through it. When defendant found no cash in the wallet, he

stabbed Helen in the throat, then pointed a gun at her head, yelling

obscenities and demanding money.

People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 655, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655.

Petitioner could certainly argue that the jury would not be compelled to find that

he had robbery or burglary of the Rumseys on his mind when he left the Baker apartment;

petitioner could argue that arming himself with a knife was for the purpose of confronting Rice. 

But the point is not whether petitioner has a valid take on the evidence, but rather whether a

rational jury could make the inferences which were made by the California Supreme Court. The

undersigned cannot find the state supreme court unreasonable in the AEDPA sense, even more

incorrect than clear error, in inferring the appropriate intent by use of the undisputed facts stated

above.

Moreover, this court is not ultimately limited to the rationale expressed by the

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found the appropriate intent. It was not necessary for petitioner to have established his intent to

rob and/or burgle the Rumseys at the time he left the Baker apartment. If at any time prior to the

Jim Rumsey murder, the evidence demonstrates that a rational jury could have found the required

intent, the jury’s verdict will be upheld. In reviewing the transcript, the court finds nearly

unequivocal evidence of petitioner’s felonious state of mind prior to the Jim Rumsey murder. 

Keeping in mind the facts emphasized by the California Supreme Court, i.e., that

petitioner needed money and he knew the Rumseys had money, the testimony of Amy Hadix

shows that petitioner had robbery/burglary on his mind at the time he entered the Rumsey

apartment, and not that he was somehow mistaken, or so intoxicated that he did not know where

he was.

It is not disputed that both petitioner and Amy Hadix knew where June Rice’s

apartment was located. On their way to that apartment (even giving petitioner the benefit of the

doubt that such was his true and only intent at the time of leaving the Baker apartment), they

passed by the Rumsey apartment.

Q. And was Milton in front of you, behind you, where was he?

A. [Amy Hadix] He was like kind of beside me, behind me, kind of following me.

 ***

Q. When you get in the vicinity of the Rumsey’s apartment, do you see Jim?

A. Well, as I was [walking] by Milton says stop and the door was open about two

or three inches and you can see in just a little bit. Jim’s chair was right next to the

door, so you could see him sitting there if you look through the door. And I says

hi–

 ***

I said, “Hi, Jim how are you. And he said , “Hi, how are you

doing?” And that’s when Milton pushed me out of the way and

went in, jumped on Jim....

RT 3178-3179 (emphasis added).

If this witness is to be believed, and petitioner does not attack her credibility,

indeed, he relies on her, a jury could surely believe that petitioner knew precisely where he was,

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ordered Hadix to stop, heard her identify the man petitioner knew had “gobs” of money, made a

decision to break into Jim Rumsey’s apartment and jumped on him. Petitioner had no other

motive apparent from the evidence besides robbery which would have caused him to initiate the

cutting of Rumsey’s throat. So much for petitioner hearing a “whirr,” or being “surprised” by

Jim Rumsey, or “not knowing where he was” on account of intoxication. According to Hadix,

petitioner was in control of the events. Moreover, petitioner’s actions then in threatening Helen

Rumsey if she did not get him money, and his taking the wallet of the now dead Jim Rumsey,

tend to confirm in a strong fashion precisely what petitioner had in his mind just before going

through the Rumsey door. Petitioner himself testified that he remembered details about the

events such as taking Rumsey’s wallet, and what he said to Helen Rumsey – hardly the man who

was acting like an automaton because of drug intoxication. Petitioner later related to Hadix that

the murder “had to be done,” RT 3189; not that he had been surprised or unknowing – just that in

a calculated manner, “it had to be done.” Clearly, it appears that petitioner made a last minute

decision to pick up some “easy money” on the way to the Rice apartment. And, last minute or

not, petitioner had sufficient time in which to form the requisite intent. Any rational juror or jury

could have reached this conclusion based on the evidence.

All of the insufficient evidence claims should be denied.

Evidentiary Error – Claim 51 (Admission of Photos and Videotape); Claims 52

and 53 (Practicing with a Buck Knife as Inadmissible Character Evidence); Claim

54 (Evidence of Prior Misconduct, i.e., Southard Fight and Uncharged Robbery);

Claim 56 (Failure to Give Limiting Instruction re Southard Misconduct) 

Claim 51 (Admission of Photos and Videotape)

In general, alleged evidence admission errors are difficult for a petitioner in

habeas corpus. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 at 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475 (“[I]t is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.”); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e do not review

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 According to respondent, and not disputed by petitioner, Exhibit 16 depicted victim 13

James Rumsey in the face down position in which he was found. Exhibit 20 is a close-up

photograph depicting Mr. Rumsey’s stabbing neck wound. Exhibit 21 shows his shoulder stab

wound. Exhibit 22 shows Mrs. Rumsey in the hospital with an oxygen mask as well as her stab

wound to the neck. Exhibit 23 was a videotape of the Rumsey apartment focusing upon the

location of Mr. Rumsey’s body and some of his belongings as well as the presence of blood in

the bathroom. The videoptape corroborated Mrs. Rumsey’s testimony as to how the murder

unfolded.

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questions of state evidence law. On federal habeas we may only consider whether the

petitioner’s conviction violated constitutional norms.”) The level of error must rise to that of

fundamental fairness, i.e., that the erroneously admitted evidence was so prejudicial that it

deprived petitioner of a fair trial. Not only is the standard high, but even if this federal court

were to find that the level of error reached fundamental fairness, petitioner could not prevail

unless the state courts in reviewing the federal issue were not only wrong, not only made clear

error, but were unreasonable in their determination of the federal issue in light of clearly

established Supreme Court law. See generally Holgerson v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th

Cir. 2002) (habeas relief not warranted unless due process violation clearly established by the

Supreme Court). 

Petitioner does not demonstrate how these pictures of corpses were any more

gruesome than any picture of a corpse would be whose previous embodied person was stabbed to

death. Nor has petitioner even provided the pictures to the court. This is a summary judgment

motion in which petitioner will ultimately bear the burden of proof and certainly has the burden

to raise a material issue of fact. The court could never find as a matter of due process that

graphic pictures per se violated one’s due process rights. But more importantly, if the pictures

are relevant to an issue in the case, it is nearly impossible to find that admission of the pictures

violated due process. 13

The opinion of the California Supreme Court is the one which must be found to be

unreasonable in the sense that fundamental due process was not violated. The undersigned sets

forth the pertinent part of the opinion here:

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Defendant contends the admitted evidence was irrelevant because

it had no bearing on the only contested issues, which concerned

defendant’s specific intent to commit the underlying felonies. He

argues, moreover, that any probative value the evidence might

possess was far outweighed by its prejudicial impact, given the

graphic and bloody images portrayed.

The admissibility of victim and crime scene photographs and

videotapes is governed by the same rules of evidence used to

determine the admissibility of evidence generally: Only relevant

evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350; see also id., § 210;

People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 171 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d

485, 6 P.3d 150]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 132

[36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) The trial court has broad

discretion in deciding the relevancy of such evidence. (People v.

Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d

1171]; People v. Crittenden, supra, at p. 132.)

Although defendant contends the photographs were inadmissible

because they had no bearing on the only disputed question at trial

(his mental state), we have made clear that the absence of a defense

challenge to particular aspects of the prosecution’s case or its

witnesses does not render victim photographs irrelevant. (People v.

Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 973-974; People v. Scheid (1997)

16 Cal.4th 1, 17 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748]; People v.

Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 132-133.) Here, the

photographs of the victims’ injuries and the videotape depicting the

crime scene taken by investigating officers tended to corroborate

Helen Rumsey’s account of the incident and were therefore

relevant to the prosecution’s theory of robbery murder and burglary

murder. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 171.) For

example, a photograph showing murder victim James Rumsey as

he was found by officers, with his face against the chair seat and

his knees on the floor, supported Helen’s testimony that shortly

after defendant stabbed her husband, he turned the body over to

gain access to James’s back pocket after having tried but failed to

get his hand inside the front pocket of James’s pants. Two

photographs depicting the deep stab wound in Helen Rumsey’s

neck not only corroborated her testimony but also showed the

nature and placement of her wound; in this way, they tended to

bolster the prosecution’s theory that defendant entered the

Rumseys’ apartment with the intent to obtain money from them by

force, and undermined defendant’s testimony describing the

stabbings as a startled, reflexive reaction to sudden movements by

the victims. (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 133.)

Defendant further asserts that because the bloody and graphic

nature of the photographs and videotape must have inflamed the

jury, the trial court erred in refusing to exclude the evidence as

more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. 

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Having reviewed the challenged exhibits, we are satisfied their

admission violated neither state evidentiary law nor defendant’s

federal constitutional rights to fundamental fairness and reliability

of verdicts. Although the blood-splattered surroundings and the

images of the victims depicted in the photographs and crime scene

videotape are disturbing to view, as such evidence always is

(People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 134), none of these

exhibits is unduly gruesome or inflammatory. (People v. Mendoza,

supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 171; People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at

p. 974; People v. Crittenden, supra, at p. 134; People v. Pride

(1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243-244 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d

643].)

People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 641-642, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 653-655.

The introduction of photographs in a capital case is a difficult issue, and the trial

judge is given great discretion in determining what is relevant. Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859,

865 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Goseyun, 789 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986); see also,

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 878, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2721 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (reaching

the issue in dissent with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White that the majority did not

reach). Especially given the fact that the evidence in the guilt phase was also evidence in the

penalty phase, it may be that demonstrative evidence legitimately separates this case from a

murder case where the facts were less egregious. Capital case juries are asked to distinguish

between murders that deserve the death penalty and murders that do not; these juries cannot

perform that task well if material evidence is kept from them simply because the evidence is

itself repulsive to human sensibilities. Murder is not pretty; it is not sterile. And the jury should

not be led to believe otherwise. On the other hand, our system does not want juries deciding life

and death matters, and ignoring mitigating evidence, simply because the juries are angered or

shocked out of their sensibilities. The key in walking this extraordinarily fine line is the

determination of whether the evidence is relevant to a guilt or penalty phase issue.

Thus, in according the trial judge the deference he or she deserves, the vast

majority of capital cases involving gruesome photographs or other demonstrative evidence have

refused to overturn verdicts because of the introduction of gruesome photographs. See, e.g.,

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Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 368 (5th Cir. 1988) (photographs showed buttocks areas with

blood trickling down from the genital area and of victim’s legs spread apart showing genital

area); Schneider v. Delo, 890 F. Supp. 791, 841 (E.D.Mo. 1995), aff’d., 85 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.

1996) (gruesome aspect of photos is directly attributable to the crime itself, and counsel’s desire

to stipulate to facts of death was irrelevant); Odle v. Calderon, 884 F. Supp. 1404, 1425 (N.D.

Cal. 1995); Murray v. Delo, 767 F. Supp. 975, 987 (E.D.Mo. 1991) (photographs aided the jury

in analyzing the oral testimony); Williams v. Chrans, 742 F. Supp. 472, 491 (N.D.Ill. 1990),

aff’d., 945 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1991) (use of photos justified, in part, for demonstrating nature of

force used on victim).

In sum, petitioner does not in any meaningful way contest the California Supreme

Court’s relevancy finding, and petitioner’s unsupported contention that the pictures were unduly

prejudicial fails in light of the AEDPA deference due the state courts. 

Claims 52 and 53 (Practicing With a Buck Knife and Inadmissible, Irrelevant

Character Evidence)

During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked petitioner about a buck knife with

which he used to practice. There was no evidence at trial directly linking the buck knife with the

murder and attempted murder weapon although, despite petitioner’s testimony, some inferential

evidence existed that the buck knife may have been used. See testimony of Marie Baker

commencing at RT 3129 et seq. Baker testified that petitioner left her apartment complaining

about the quality of drugs he had received from June Rice, and came back to the apartment with a

gun and a knife, and that the knife was confirmed as a “fold-up knife, like a Buck knife.” RT

3153. The Rumseys were attacked during the time petitioner had left Baker’s apartment.

However, no forensic evidence was produced linking this knife with the murder weapon, and it

could have been simply one petitioner carried with him. 

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The California Supreme Court determined as follows :

[D]efendant indicated he at one time had carried a buck knife and

had told people he practiced with it. He denied having this knife in

his possession during the events leading to the present charges,

however. In response to the prosecutor’s question about how he

used to practice with the knife, defendant explained that he would

grab the knife from his pocket and open it as fast as he could.

When defendant was then asked to describe this knife, defense

counsel objected on relevancy grounds and the trial court sustained

the objection.

On further cross-examination, defendant said he took a knife with

him when he went to see June Rice about getting more drugs. The

prosecutor asked defendant where he got this knife, and defendant

replied that it came from Marie Baker’s kitchen. The following

exchange then took place:

Prosecutor: “Well, you have some familiarity with knives, didn’t

you?”

Defendant: “Not a specialist, I’m not, different than a steak knife.”

Prosecutor: “Well, you used to practice with your buck knife?”

Defendant: “Not competition that I was preparing for, if you

understand what I mean.”

Defense counsel objected that this line of questioning was not

relevant, but the trial court overruled the objection without

comment. Defendant continued, “I wasn’t practicing to kill

somebody, if that’s what you’re trying to ask.” The prosecutor

then inquired, “What did the knife look like?” Defendant replied

with a detailed description of his buck knife, including the length

of the blade. The trial court interrupted the cross-examination,

however, to ask defendant if he was describing the knife he got

from Baker’s kitchen. When defendant indicated he thought the

prosecutor was asking him to describe the buck knife he used to

carry, the trial court clarified that the prosecutor’s question related

to the knife taken from Baker’s residence. After the prosecutor

confirmed the trial court’s understanding of the question, defendant

described that knife as a regular kitchen-set knife with a black

handle.

 ***

As to the prosecutor’s question about defendant’s having formerly

practiced with his buck knife, that was also proper. Defendant

argues that evidence of his past practice was irrelevant because

there was no evidence he used a buck knife to stab the victims.

Although there was no direct evidence the murder weapon was a

buck knife, the testimony on this issue was inconclusive and

therefore did not foreclose that possibility. For example, Marie

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Baker testified that the knife defendant left on the kitchen sink

after the stabbings was one she had never seen before. Moreover,

evidence of defendant’s earlier efforts to perfect his ability to

quickly retrieve and open a pocketknife tends to undermine

defendant’s version of his attack on the victims as an unthinking

response to being startled first by James Rumsey and then by Helen

Rumsey.

Nor did the trial court err by not prohibiting the line of questioning

under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than

probative. The inquiry was relevant under applicable standards, as

previously discussed. The trial court could reasonably conclude

that any danger of prejudice in portraying defendant as having a

propensity for violence did not substantially outweigh this

probative value, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in failing to exclude the evidence under Evidence Code section

352.

Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 638-640, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652-653.

Petitioner first runs afoul of AEDPA in that no clearly established Supreme Court

law forbids the introduction of propensity evidence.

The Supreme Court “has never expressly held that it violates due

process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing

conduct in conformity therewith, or that it violates due process to

admit other crimes evidence for other purposes without an

instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to such

purposes.” Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.

2001). In fact, the Court has expressly declined to answer these

questions. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75, 112 S.Ct. 475,

116 L.Ed.2d 385, n. 5 (1992) (“Because we need not reach the

issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate

Due Process if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to

show propensity to commit a charged crime.”). Petitioner is

therefore precluded from federal habeas relief on his claim that the

admission of evidence that he sold drugs violated his federal due

process rights. See Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th

Cir. 2001) (The question under § 2254(d) “is not whether [the

conviction] violates due process as that concept might be

extrapolated from the decisions of the Supreme Court. Rather, it is

whether [the conviction] violates due process under ‘clearly

established’ federal law, as already determined by the Court.”).

Chaidez v. Knowles, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

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is not an AEDPA case.

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See also Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1038-1039 (9th Cir. 2005)14

Thus, petitioner has not stated a cognizable federal claim. However, even if the

AEDPA standard were to be reviewed on the general premise of whether the introduction of

propensity evidence could violate constitutional rights, see McKinney, supra, petitioner cannot

establish a deprivation of fundamental fairness as opposed to a wrong conclusion on a fairly

minor matter. 

The rationale of the state supreme court – that years ago aimless “practice” tends

to show purposefulness years later – is somewhat of a stretch. No matter how one pares it, the

once-upon-a-time “quick-draw” practicing with a buck knife reasonably says nothing about one’s

state of mind years later. If it did, every child who ever played quick-draw, a la Hopalong

Cassidy or Roy Rodgers, with a toy cap gun would do so at his own later peril in demonstrating

an intent to rob. But the court need not decide whether this stretch violated some general

prohibition against the introduction of propensity evidence because it cannot possibly be said to

have violated fundamental fairness.

Although not formally stipulating to the prosecution’s evidence that petitioner was

the person who committed the murder and assault, for all practical purposes this issue was

unopposed. Just as in the previous section, one sees that petitioner’s defense was state of mind –

not that petitioner was not around when the stabbings occurred. After all, Mrs. Rumsey

identified petitioner as her attacker and the murderer of her husband. No contrary evidence was

introduced. When testifying on direct, petitioner admitted the stabbings. RT 3411, 3412. 

Petitioner testified on direct, prior to the prosecutor’s questioning, that he had stabbed the

victims. Therefore, it makes little difference what specific knife petitioner used and whether the

buck knife was linked to the murder. Nor could the practice testimony have any conceivable,

significant effect on the jury’s determination whether petitioner had the mental state requisite for

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burglary or robbery at the time the murder of Mr. Rumsey took place (despite the conclusion of

the state supreme court that the evidence had some relevance). Indeed, the prosecutor thought so

little of this evidence that he never mentioned it in closing. 

This claim should be denied. 

Claim 54 (Evidence of Prior Misconduct, i.e., Southard Fight and Uncharged

Robbery)

As stated in several places up to this point, a key issue in the case was whether

petitioner harbored an intent to burgle/rob when he entered the Rumsey’s apartment. If he did

not, petitioner could not be found guilty of felony murder, and hence the special circumstances

and death penalty would drop out of the case. At trial, one of the witnesses (Amy Hadix) began

to describe an incident which took place just prior to the Rumsey murder/assault, i.e., on the

same day. After defense objection based on relevance, the trial judge permitted Hadix to testify

that petitioner had acquired an unknown sum of money from a person named Southard who

happened to be in Baker’s apartment. Later, when cross-examining petitioner, the prosecutor

requested of the judge that he allow extended questioning into this matter based on the fact that

when arrested, petitioner had Southard’s license in his wallet and that petitioner had taken $52

from a person named Southard by beating him up. The prosecutor argued that this evidence was

probative of petitioner’s state of mind vis-a-vis the Rumseys, i.e, petitioner continuously had

money and drugs on his mind because petitioner immediately took the Southard money to go to

June Rice to buy drugs so that was probably his intention when he robbed Rumsey. Over

continued objection, the prosecutor was permitted to ask petitioner about his behavior with

Southard. Petitioner admitted beating up Southard, and admitted taking the $52 from Southard

when Southard’s wallet “presented itself” during the struggle. This evidence would be

important, especially to rebut petitioner’s “I did it without thinking” defense, and the prosecutor

emphasized the Southard evidence (along with other evidence) in closing before the jury. RT

3629, 3637, 3638, 3644, 3645, 3647, 3648, 3649, 3713 (rebuttal).

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Rice’s apartment. RT 3182.

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Again, however, petitioner’s claim is barred by AEDPA because admission of

propensity evidence has not been determined to violate the due process clause.

But even assuming no AEDPA bar, the court does not find the admitted evidence

to be simply “propensity” evidence. It was properly used to buttress the intent to rob the

Rumseys. The state supreme court held [all internal citations to California case law omitted]: 

Evidence of prior criminal acts is admissible “when relevant to

prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge ...),” but not to prove the defendant carried out the

charged crimes in conformity with a character trait. (Evid.Code, §

1101.) “To be relevant on the issue of identity, the uncharged

crimes must be highly similar to the charged offenses.... [¶] ... [¶]

A lesser degree of similarity is required to establish relevance on

the issue of common design or plan.... [¶] The least degree of

similarity is required to establish relevance on the issue of intent.

[Citation.] For this purpose, the uncharged crimes need only be

sufficiently similar [to the charged offenses] to support the

inference that the defendant” ‘probably harbored the same intent in

each instance.’ [Citations.]” ’ ”....

As we have observed, however, evidence of uncharged misconduct

“‘is so prejudicial that its admission requires extremely careful

analysis’” and to be admissible, such evidence” ‘must not

contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those

contained in Evidence Code section 352.’” ....Thus, “[t]he

probative value of the uncharged offense evidence must be

substantial and must not be largely outweighed by the probability

that its admission would create a serious danger of undue

prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”....

Applying these principles, we find no abuse of discretion and no

federal constitutional violation in the admission of the uncharged

crimes evidence. In both the charged and uncharged crimes,

defendant overcame the victim by force, then reached into the

victim’s back pocket to obtain his wallet. Both times, after having

taken the money, defendant proceeded to June Rice’s apartment to

buy methamphetamine.[ ] Although the incidents themselves are 15

not particularly distinctive, they are sufficiently similar to support

an inference that defendant harbored the same intent in both

instances, that is, to forcibly obtain cash from the victim. Contrary

to defendant’s assertion, this is not a case in which the evidence

relating directly to the charged crimes was so compelling on the

question of defendant’s intent as to render the uncharged crimes

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evidence merely cumulative on the issue.... Furthermore, the trial

court limited any prejudicial impact of the uncharged crimes

evidence by instructing the jury, in the language of CALJIC No.

2.50, that such evidence could not be considered to prove

defendant was a person of bad character or that he had a

disposition to commit crime.

People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 637, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651.

The law and application cogently stated by the California Supreme Court is

commonplace in criminal jurisprudence. See Fed. R. Ev. 404(b). Petitioner cannot be suggesting

that all such law violates the Constitution. Petitioner does argue that he did not testify that

robbing Southard was his intent when the struggle broke out. Rather, petitioner contends that

Southard had made some racial epithets towards him, and this precipitated the fight with the

taking of the wallet simply being an afterthought when the wallet “presented itself” during the

fight. However, the state supreme court was not limited in judging the Southard circumstances

solely by reference to petitioner’s testimony. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion of “no evidence”

to support the similarity, the two situations corroborated petitioner’s common motive to

unlawfully acquire money to purchase drugs. The prosecutor saw the connection, the trial judge

saw the connection, the state supreme court saw the connection, respondent sees the connection –

as does the undersigned. That petitioner does not see this rather simple and similar, albeit not

identical, connection between the two incidents is insufficient to overturn his verdict.

Claim 56 – (The Failure to Give a Pin Point Instruction)

Although a general limiting instruction was given to restrict the jury’s use of

uncharged misconduct to a showing of intent and not propensity to commit crimes, petitioner

argues that a limiting instruction specifically mentioning the Southard incident should have been

given. Petitioner cites no authority that the failure to give a cautionary pin point instruction

violates due process. Certainly, the U.S. Supreme Court has not established law on this

particular subject. And, as the California Supreme Court held, there was no other uncharged

misconduct of “other crimes” in the guilt phase to which the general pinpoint instruction was

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given which would have confused the jury into believing that the general instruction given did

not apply to the Southard evidence. The claim should be denied.

Claim 55 – Petitioner Was Entitled to a Separate Jury for the Penalty Phase

This claim was never raised on appeal, and hence the California Supreme Court

denied it when first raised in the state habeas corpus proceedings. Finding that the claim was

procedurally barred, the state supreme court went on to deny the claim on its merits as well.

California Penal Code 190.4 directs that capital cases shall have a unitary jury for

guilt and penalty phases unless good cause is shown. See also People v. Lucas, 12 Cal. 4th 415,

483, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525 (1995). Federal capital case law requires the same unitary approach

with exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b). Indeed, it has been held that a defendant cannot waive the

requirement of a unitary jury. United States v. Green, 407 F.3d 434, 443 (1st Cir. 2005).

Against this backdrop, petitioner cites no Supreme Court case which announces a

rule, or anything close to it, that a defendant is entitled to separate juries for guilt and penalty,

and that failure to provide such establishes constitutional error. Because petitioner’s argument

cannot advance further without such a citation, and the court’s independent research has not

discovered such a citation, this claim must fail.

As the claim lacks merit, there is no reason to examine the issue of procedural

default.

Guilt Phase Instructional Error (Claims 59-68, 82 and 84)

Claim 59 (Court Erred By Refusing the Manslaughter Instruction)

Petitioner claims that he had a right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the

case (involuntary and voluntary manslaughter) because there was evidence to support his theory. 

Petitioner further asserts that the error is reversible per se, i.e., no harmless error.

Petitioner’s counsel is somewhat vague in explaining his precise theories for

manslaughter, but the court understands from the petition that counsel believes there was

sufficient evidence on petitioner’s intoxication to warrant the giving of an involuntary

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that occurs “‘in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful

manner, or without due caution and circumspection.’” Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 645, 106 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 657, citing Cal. Penal Code § 192. The only possible theory for involuntary manslaughter

would depend on voluntary intoxication, see People v. Ochoa , 19 Cal. 4th 353, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d

408 (1998). A person who kills because of a good faith, but unreasonable, belief he is in serious

harm’s way is now guilty of voluntary manslaughter, i.e., there are now no imperfect self-defense

claims which will result in involuntary manslaughter. People v. Blakely, 23 Cal. 4th 82, 88-89,

96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 455 (2000). (If remanded for a new trial, petitioner could only have current

law applied). “When the defendant killed in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she

was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, this is termed ‘imperfect self- defense,’

and the killing is reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter.” Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 645,

106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657-658.

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manslaughter instruction, and also an instruction based on imperfect self-defense which, if valid,

would have warranted a voluntary manslaughter instruction. In sum, petitioner presents three 16

theories:

(1) he was so intoxicated that he was acting like an automaton, hence negating the

actual capacity to form specific intent for burglary/robbery; hence the homicide resulting

therefrom was involuntary manslaughter;

(2) he was sufficiently intoxicated that as a result petitioner formed a “good faith”

belief that his life was in imminent peril when he struck out at Mr. Rumsey, hence constituting

an imperfect self-defense situation which would have reduced any homicide to voluntary

manslaughter;

(3) regardless of intoxication, petitioner formed a good faith belief that his life

was in imminent peril when he struck out at Mr. Rumsey, hence constituting an imperfect selfdefense situation which would have reduced any homicide to voluntary manslaughter.

The undersigned will discuss each in turn.

Although there was plenty of evidence to suggest that petitioner was not

intoxicated enough to be legally unconscious, such is not the standard regarding giving an 

instruction on the defense theory of the case. As the state supreme court recognized, defendant

had a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the

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doing, and there was some other evidence of intoxication of whatever degree, petitioner would be

entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case despite overwhelming evidence that his degree

of intoxication would not qualify for involuntary manslaughter.

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statute in 1995. Cal. Penal Code § 22.

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evidence, and failure to instruct on a theory supported by some evidence constitutes a denial of

that right. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 645, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657; see also Beardslee v. Woodford,

358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004). On first glance, this is petitioner’s strongest guilt phase 17

claim, but after much legal and factual analysis, the undersigned cannot find AEDPA error. 

In order to understand the significance of the claims made, it is necessary to

understand how the jury was instructed. Petitioner’s jury was instructed in first degree felony

murder and second degree implied malice murder. In essence, petitioner could be guilty of first

degree murder if he possessed the specific intent to rob or burgle prior to the actual killing of Mr.

Rumsey, and guilty of second degree murder on an implied malice theory if the specific intent

described above was found wanting but petitioner had the following mental state: one, the

killing resulted from an intentional act[;] [t]wo, the natural consequences of the act are dangerous

to human life[;] [a]nd, three, the act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to

and with conscious disregard for human life. (CALJIC No. 8.11.) At the time of petitioner’s

trial, second degree implied malice murder was considered a crime of specific intent in terms of

applying any intoxication instruction. People v. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th 437, 441, 450-451, 453

(1994).18

A voluntary intoxication instruction was given in petitioner’s trial, RT 3737:

“[for crimes of robbery, burglary, and attempted murder]: If the

evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of

the alleged crime from the use of alcohol, the use of drugs, or a

combination of alcohol or drugs, you should consider that fact in

determining whether the defendant had such specific intent. If

from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the

defendant formed such specific intent, you must find that he did

not have such specific intent.”

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 The undersigned says “somewhat analogous” because, as the jury was actually 19

instructed, the jury’s choice for homicide charges was capital murder, second degree murder and

nothing.

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The intoxication jury instruction was erroneous in leaving out second degree murder, because of

the absence of any manslaughter instruction; legally, the jury could find that petitioner was guilty

of first degree murder (with or without special circumstances), second degree murder, or nothing

at all in terms of the death of Mr. Rumsey. That is, if the jury found intoxication, there was no

other homicide charge available aside from murder. The undersigned is confused by the trial

judge’s acceptance of the need to instruct on intoxication which, if believed, would negate the

required intent for any murder charge, but his belief that no manslaughter crime was possible

under the evidence. As the discussion on prejudice shows below, intoxication which actually

robbed a person of the intent required for murder of any degree is quintessential involuntary

manslaughter. In a sense, petitioner was in the somewhat analogous position of the defendant in

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S. Ct. 2382 (1980), where the law precluded consideration

of lesser offenses than capital murder even if the evidence supported such. (But the evidence

must exist to support the lesser charge, see Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S. Ct. 2049

(1982)).

19

The undersigned finds that there was sufficient testimony from petitioner to

warrant the giving of the involuntary manslaughter instruction based on intoxication. There is no

doubt that petitioner had heavily engaged in substance abuse prior to the Rumsey murder. The

undersigned will not repeat all of petitioner’s testimony but, viewing his testimony in isolation,

evidence existed that petitioner, impaired as he was by his drug and alcohol use, became

confused as to where he was, thought he was entering the June Rice apartment, was surprised

from behind by a “whirring” sound, and then saw a blur coming towards him. At this point,

petitioner struck out with the knife. While such evidence of intoxication would barely warrant

the giving of an involuntary manslaughter instruction, and would in all probability have failed,

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 There simply was no evidence of an unintentional (accidental) murder. In order for 20

that scenario to have existed, petitioner would have to have been in the room unlawfully and, as

he was surprised, turned around and unintentionally (accidently) stabbed Rumsey. Even

petitioner’s testimony rules this out in that, at absolute best for petitioner, petitioner intended to

stab Rumsey, albeit as alleged now, because he had a good faith belief of serious imminent

bodily harm to himself. There was nothing accidental about petitioner’s stabbing action.

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the threshold of evidence to warrant the giving of an instruction is very low. Moreover, given 20

the fact that the trial judge found sufficient evidence of intoxication with which to instruct the

jury, the undersigned believes it to have been in error to refuse the manslaughter request based on

petitioner’s testimony and that of others about intoxication. 

Petitioner now asserts that having found the jury should have been instructed on

involuntary manslaughter, the lack of such instruction was reversible per se, i.e. “never

harmless.” Petitioner cites Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.

Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1485 (9th Cir. 1995); Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 743 (9th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1993), and the initial Ninth Circuit case that

stands for the proposition, United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir.

1984). With the exception of Conde, which murkily combines the error at issue with other errors

in its per se analysis, the cases do indeed stand for the “never harmless” proposition cited by

petitioner’s counsel. However, there is a dispositive problem – none of the cases are AEDPA

cases, none of the cases examined the Brecht harmless error application in habeas cases, and

most importantly, an AEDPA capital case examining the very same failure to give a defense

theory instruction issue held that the Brecht harmless error doctrine applied. Beardslee v.

Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577-578 (9th Cir. 2004).

Beardslee argues that any such error [failure to give defense theory

instruction] is per se reversible, citing United States v. Escobar de

Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (9th Cir.1984).

 ***

More importantly, Escobar involved a direct appeal from a district

court conviction on federal drug charges. Beardslee attacks his

conviction collaterally, after the state supreme court held that no

mistake of fact instruction was required under state law. 

Beardslee, 53 Cal.3d at 87-88, 279 Cal.Rptr. at 284-85, 806 P.2d at

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regardless of the error standard, if any, applied by the state court. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d

964, 976 (9th Cir.2000); see also Inthavong v. LaMarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir.2005).

53

1319-20. As we have indicated, “the fact that a jury instruction is

inadequate by Ninth Circuit direct appeal standards does not mean

a petitioner who relies on such an inadequacy will be entitled to

habeas relief from a state court conviction.” Duckett v. Godinez,

67 F.3d 734, 744 (9th Cir.1995). Beardslee must show that the

alleged error had a substantial or injurious effect on the verdict.

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1090 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d at 577-578 (emphasis added).21

In this AEDPA case, petitioner cannot establish that the claimed error is “never

harmless,” i.e, structural error, unless he cites established Supreme Court authority for that

proposition, and this he has not done. Nor could he. No such cases have been cited, and the

undersigned cannot find any either. Therefore, as on all but structural error situations, petitioner

bears the burden of demonstrating that the failure to give the manslaughter instruction had a

harmful and injurious impact on the verdict.

Although an involuntary manslaughter instruction based on intoxication should

have been given, the evidence was so weak that substantial and injurious harm caused by its

omission cannot be found. Overindulgence in illegal drugs or alcohol does not per se warrant the

giving of an intoxication instruction. One must present evidence that he is legally unconscious. 

Under California law when a person renders himself unconscious through voluntary intoxication

and kills in that state, the killing is attributed to his negligence and is treated as involuntary

manslaughter. People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th at p. 423, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408. Unconsciousness

for this purpose need not mean that the actor lies still and unresponsive. Id. at 423-424, 79 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 408. Instead, a person is deemed “unconscious” if he committed the act without being

conscious thereof. Id. See also CALJIC 8.47 “If you find that a defendant, while unconscious

as a result of voluntary intoxication...When a person voluntarily induces his own intoxication to

the point of unconsciousness...” (emphasis added). Although unconsciousness does not require

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 “Automaton” is defined in this context as “a person or animal acting in an automatic or 22

mechanical way.” Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third College Edition at 93. “Automatic”

in its pertinent meaning is defined: “done without conscious thought or volition, as if

mechanically, or from force of habit.” Id.

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the incapacity to move or act, the given definition is somewhat of a tautology; however, other

cases and authority define the level of lack of consciousness – and the level is very difficult to

reach. One court has held that the level is that of an automaton. People v. Webber, 228 Cal.

App. 3d 1146, 1163, 279 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1991). In other cases, courts found insufficient 22

evidence to support a sua sponte intoxication jury instruction when (1) the defendant had drunk

some beer and whiskey and was “‘pretty well plastered’” People v. Spencer , 60 Cal. 2d 64, 88,

31 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963); (2) the defendant had been drinking for several hours, but was “only

woozy and not completely ‘blacked out’” People v. Simpson 192 Cal. App. 3d 1360, 1370, 237

Cal. Rptr. 910) (1987); (3) the defendant had been drinking before the crime; he appeared to be

“‘a little high’” at the time of the crime, and he testified he was “‘pretty drunk,’” (People v. Cram

(1970) 12 Cal. App. 3d 37, 42, 90 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1970)); and (4) the defendant had drunk a

dozen beers and some wine and thought he was drunk, but knew what he was doing, People v.

Gonzales (1970) 4 Cal. App. 3d 593, 607, 84 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1970).

The issue of how unconscious is unconscious is a critical one to the outcome here. 

If it means simply that one’s judgment has been “impaired” by alcohol or drugs, or even 

“significantly impaired,” nine out of ten murderers are not murderers, and petitioner is one of the

nine. If, however, unconscious means that one has essentially lost the ability to think through

any act, see footnote 22 below, a much fewer number of life takers are absolved of murder.

The court finds that impairment in thinking per se does not satisfy the standards of

unconsciousness as that term is utilized in California law. Based on the above law, any

impairment in thinking, or making judgments, or being able to intend an act, must be so severe as

to render a person in the circumstances at issue unable to exhibit any significant ability in those

areas. An “unconscious” person might have the ability to simply respond, more or less

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automatically, to stimuli, but from a cognitive standpoint, he does not have the ability to

purposefully influence his own response.

While there is no doubt that petitioner was impaired by having used

methamphetamine and alcohol over a long period, petitioner points to no evidence in the record

that he was automaton-like in his actions, and the record certainly bespeaks otherwise. No one

testified to this effect, rather, petitioner left the Baker apartment on that fatal trip with a stated

purpose in mind. No one testified that petitioner was staggering or could not communicate in a

coherent fashion. According to his escort, petitioner was the one giving orders to “stop” at the

Rumsey apartment. While petitioner testified that he was confused as to his whereabouts, and

surprised by someone coming at him, such that he reacted more or less automatically to the

perceived threat, this evidence does satisfy the “legally unconscious” standard. An allegedly

instinctive reaction is not an unconscious response. Tellingly, petitioner’s clearly recalled intent

to defend himself and his argued good faith belief is totally inconsistent with this argument that

he was so intoxicated he could not know or control what he was doing. Moreover, petitioner’s

purpose driven actions immediately after the murders, even as related by himself, are totally

inconsistent with someone who could be termed unconscious, i.e., the taking of Mr. Rumsey’s

wallet, his directions to Mrs. Rumsey to give him more money, his later travel to the Rice

apartment, his attempts to conceal evidence and hide from the police, his ability to recall that the

murder “had to be done.”

Therefore, a failure to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter occasioned by

intoxication did not have a substantial and injurious impact on the verdict. If required, the

undersigned would make this finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The court now turns to

imperfect self-defense. 

First, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense is incompatible with involuntary

delusions or voluntarily induced delusions of reality occasioned by ingestion of drugs or alcohol;

the repudiated doctrine of diminished capacity cannot masquerade as imperfect self-defense. 

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People v. Mejia-Lenares, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1437, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404 (2006). Thus, petitioner

was either unconscious enough for an involuntary manslaughter finding, or he was not. 

Defendants cannot claim easier prerequisites for imperfect self-defense because they were

intoxicated and judgment/perception was only impaired. If the case were otherwise, defendants

who had killed would always be better off because of intoxication. Thus, petitioner was not

prejudiced legally if petitioner’s contention is that he is entitled to imperfect self-defense because

his intoxication made the whirring sound and surprise encounter more threatening than it might

have been to the sober individual. In other words, a delusion caused by mental defect or

intoxication impairment cannot give rise to a “good faith belief of imminent harm” as a matter

of law.

Assuming that petitioner is separating claims of intoxication from his imperfect

self-defense theory, petitioner remains lacking in actionable prejudice. The undersigned will not

repeat all of the testimony characterized thus far but will emphasize a few points. Hearing a

whirring sound and being surprised by a person does not give rise, usually, to a good faith belief

that one’s life or bodily integrity is imminently threatened. Petitioner’s testimony to this effect

would probably be viewed with great scepticism even if the testimony were the only evidence on

the issue. But, it was not the only evidence on the issue. As pointed out earlier, Amy Hadix

accompanied petitioner on the fateful trip, ostensibly to June Rice’s apartment. When proximate

to the Rumsey apartment, Hadix saw Mr. Rumsey through the door opening, identified him by a

greeting, and watched petitioner attack him – not vice versa. The Hadix testimony is the

antithesis of imperfect self-defense.

The California Supreme Court also found petitioner not to be prejudiced, but for a

different reason.

Error in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is

harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual questions

posed by the omitted instructions adversely to defendant under

other properly given instructions. (People v. Sedeno, supra, 10

Cal.3d at p. 721, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) Here, the trial

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which petitioner could have sought an involuntary manslaughter instruction.

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court instructed the jury on first degree felony murder and the

crimes of robbery and burglary. In addition, the court instructed

the jury on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery and

burglary, an instruction emphasizing that if defendant formed the

intent to steal only after he had entered the Rumseys’ apartment

and assaulted them, he was guilty of the lesser crime of theft. The

jury found defendant guilty of robbery and burglary, and it found

true the special circumstance allegations that defendant killed

James Rumsey in the commission of robbery and burglary. (§§

211, 459, 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i), (vii) [see now subd.

(a)(17)(A), (G)].) To render these verdicts, the jury had to find that

defendant had already formed the intent to steal when he entered

the Rumseys’ apartment and assaulted them, thus necessarily

rejecting defendant’s version of the events. 

Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 646, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.

The state supreme court was correct. It was not just the fact that the jury found

petitioner guilty of the felony murder that matters. If that were the case, a refusal to give

instructions to cover a defense theory could always be cured because the defendant was found

guilty of the greater offense anyway. There is more than just a slight bootstrapish quality to such

a finding. However, the key here is that the instruction relating to the lesser offense of theft was

given (which would have precluded robbery, and hence felony murder), and the jury did have a

choice. If the jury believed petitioner’s imperfect self-defense testimony, it would have also

found that he did not have the intent to rob at the time he entered the Rumsey apartment, and

hence would have found petitioner only guilty of theft – which crime had no requirement of an

intent to steal at the time of apartment entry. Enough of the alternative instruction petitioner was

claiming was before the jury – the jury simply did not pick the offense which petitioner had

hoped for.

23

For all of the reasons given above, the ruling of the California Supreme Court was

not an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court authority. This claim should be

denied. 

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Claim 61 (Failure to Give a Sua Sponte Instruction on Imperfect Self-Defense)

Imperfect self-defense is antagonistic with a finding of felony murder. That is,

even unintentional, accidental murders committed during the course of a robbery or burglary are

first degree murders. See footnote 6 of Lewis state supreme court opinion set forth in response to

Claim 60 below. For the reasons expressed above, including that the jury rejected the theft

charge and expressly and necessarily found that petitioner did have the intent to burgle and/or

rob, no imperfect self-defense was possible. Petitioner could not have been harmed by the failure

to instruct on imperfect self-defense.

Claim 68 (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to Ask For an Imperfect

Self-Defense Instruction)

For the reasons expressed for Claims 59 and 61, petitioner did not suffer prejudice

as defined by Strickland [v. Washington], 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). If substantial

and injurious injury did not result from any error in not giving an imperfect self-defense

instruction, it follows that one’s confidence in the verdict is not undermined. 

Claim 60 (Refusal to Give a Proffered Explanatory Instruction on the Temporal

Relationship of Petitioner’s Intent to Steal and Mr. Rumsey’s Death); Claim 65

(The Jury Was Not Properly Instructed about the Temporal Relationship)

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it rejected the proposed

explanatory instruction: “If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had the intent to

steal at the time the unlawful killing took place, you must find him not guilty of first degree

murder.” Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 647, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659. The California Supreme Court

answered:

Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in

failing to give this requested instruction because the omission left

the jury with no guidance on the requirement of a “unified

temporal relationship” between the perpetration of a felony and the

killing of a victim for purposes of establishing felony murder. He

asserts the refusal to so instruct the jury amounted to a failure to

instruct on the defense theory of the case in violation of the Sixth

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Amendment, and denied him the rights to due process, fair trial,

fundamental fairness and a reliable verdict. [FN5] [omitted]

To prove first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory, the

prosecution must establish that the defendant intended to commit

one of the felonies enumerated in section 189 “either prior to or

during the commission of the acts which resulted in the victim’s

death.” (People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 34, 73

Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942.) Conversely, when the killer forms

the intent to commit an independent felony only after delivering

the fatal blow to the victim, the felony-murder doctrine does not

apply. (People v. Jeter (1964) 60 Cal.2d 671, 676-677, 36 Cal.Rptr.

323, 388 P.2d 355; see also People v. Gonzales (1967) 66 Cal.2d

482, 486, 58 Cal.Rptr. 361, 426 P.2d 929 [jury properly instructed

that intent to rob formed after infliction of mortal wounds is

insufficient to support finding of first degree felony murder].)

Here, the relevant principles concerning the timing of the requisite

intent to steal were adequately covered by the instructions given,

CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 9.40 (formerly No. 9.10), defining first

degree felony murder and robbery, respectively. [FN6] (People v.

Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 625-626, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d

376; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642-643, 244

Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836.)

FN6. As given in this case, CALJIC No. 8.21 provides: “The

unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional,

unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the commission or

attempted commission of the crime of first degree robbery or first

degree burglary is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator

had the specific intent to commit the crime of first degree robbery

or first degree burglary. [¶] The specific intent to commit first

degree robbery and the commission or attempted commission of

such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The

specific intent to commit first degree burglary in the commission or

attempted commission of such crime must be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. The specific intent required for first degree

robbery and the specific intent required for first degree burglary are

contained in the definitions of those offenses.”

Former CALJIC No. 9.40, as given in this case, provided:

“Defendant is accused in Count 2 and Count 4 of the crime of

robbery. Every person who takes personal property in the

possession of another against the will and from the person or

immediate presence of that person accomplished by means of force

or fear, and with the specific intent permanently to deprive such

person of property, is guilty of the crime of robbery. In order to

prove such crime each of the following elements must be proved.

[¶] One, a person had possession of property of some value,

however slight. [¶] Two, such property was taken from such person

or from the person's immediate presence. [¶] Three, such property

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was taken against the will of such person. [¶] Four, the taking was

accomplished either by force, violence, fear or intimidation. [¶]

And five, such property was taken with the specific intent to

permanently deprive such person of the property.”

 [text continued]

Defendant acknowledges that in People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d

577, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376, we rejected an identical

claim, finding no error in the trial courts refusal to give two jury

instructions requested by the defense that related to the formation

of intent to steal because the pattern instructions defining first

degree felony murder and robbery that were given in the case,

CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and former 9.10 (now No. 9.40), adequately

covered the issue. (People v. Hayes, supra, at pp. 625-626, 276

Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) He asserts, however, that Hayes is

not dispositive of his claim because the wording of CALJIC No.

8.21 as given here was fundamentally different from the version

given in Hayes. He points out that while the Hayes jury was

instructed that felony murder requires a finding the unlawful killing

occurred “‘as a result of the commission of the crimes of robbery

and burglary’” (People v. Hayes, supra, at p. 626, fn. 9, 276

Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376, quoting CALJIC No. 8.21, italics

added), the jury here was told that to convict of felony murder it

must find the killing occurred “during the commission, or

attempted commission of” robbery and burglary.

The differing language represents two options appearing in a

bracketed portion of CALJIC No. 8.21, a standard instruction.

Which one is given depends on whether the victim’s death

occurred close in time to the commission of the predicate felony or

at a later period. (See Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.21 (6th ed.1996)

p. 392.) Under both variations of the standard instruction,

however, the jury is properly informed that first degree felony

murder applies if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant formed the intent to steal before or contemporaneously

with, rather than after, the killing. Here, as in People v. Hayes,

supra, 52 Cal.3d 577, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376, the trial

court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction

elaborating on CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 9.40.

Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 647-648, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659-660.

Petitioner’s federal claim is lacking. This is not a case where an element of a

crime has been left out of the instructions, or even that an element has been misdescribed. At its

essence, petitioner’s claim is that California law, upon which there is no disagreement, was not

explained enough. Petitioner now has two published state supreme court cases to contend with

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(his and People v. Hayes) which hold that California law was accurately and sufficiently

described by the instructions given. It is not up to this federal court to quibble with the state

supreme court on its own law. Estelle v. McGuire, supra. Estelle’s proscription of adjudicating

alleged state law error is not to be avoided simply because the claim is wrapped with a due

process label. 

Moreover, assuming that petitioner could cross the federal threshold with his

ambiguity claim, he is then faced with the AEDPA requirement that the state supreme court was

unreasonable in its express or implicit finding that due process was not violated by the

instructions. Clearly, the explanation of the state supreme court is not unreasonable.

Claims 60 and 65 fail. 

Claim 62 (Failure to Give an Instruction Defining Voluntary Intoxication and

Failure to Give That Part of the Intoxication Instruction Defining Specific Intent

Necessary for Burglary and Robbery); Claim 66 (Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel for Failing to Ask for Definition of Voluntary Intoxication)

Petitioner sought to have the jury find that because he was voluntarily intoxicated

with drugs, he lacked the specific intent to commit burglary and robbery, and hence, he could not

be liable for felony murder. The jury was given a voluntary intoxication instruction. As

discussed above, in California, a defendant may not argue that he lacked the capacity to commit a

crime because of intoxication, but is permitted to argue that he actually lacked the specific intent

required on account of voluntary intoxication. (People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 635, 677, 66 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 573 (1997)). In order to be intoxicated to the point where one actually lacks the required

intent, one must be acting as if an automaton. See discussion supra for Claim 59.

The ordinary instruction regarding intoxication and specific intent is as follows:

CALJIC 4.21. Voluntary Intoxication--When Relevant To Specific

Intent

In the crime[s] of _______, [_______,] [and _______,] of which

the defendant is accused in Count[s] _______, [or that of _______,

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which [is a] [are] lesser crime[s] thereto,] [or in the allegation that

_______] a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the

defendant of the [specific intent to _______] [mental state[s] of

_______].

If the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the

time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in deciding

whether defendant had the required [specific intent] [mental state].

If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the

defendant formed that [specific intent] [mental state[s]], you must

find that [he] [she] did not have such [specific intent] [mental state[s]].

The state supreme court held as follows:

With defense counsel’s assent, the trial court used a modified

version of CALJIC No. 4.21 to instruct the jury on the relevance of

evidence of defendant’s intoxication to the question whether he

formed the specific intents required to prove the charged crimes of

robbery, burglary, and attempted murder, and the necessarily

included offense of theft. [FN7] Defendant asserts the trial court

erred in omitting from the standard instruction the first paragraph,

which would have described for the jury the specific intent

necessary for robbery or burglary. He argues the error was

compounded by the trial court’s failure to instruct on the lesser

crime of manslaughter and on imperfect self-defense.

FN7. The trial court read the following modified version of

CALJIC No. 4.21: “In the crime of robbery, burglary and

attempted murder and the included or related crime of theft, a

necessary element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of a

certain specific intent, included in the definition of each crime. If

the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time

of the alleged crime from the use of alcohol and drugs, you should

consider that fact in determining whether the defendant had such

specific intent. If from all the evidence you have a reasonable

doubt whether the defendant formed such specific intent, you must

find that he did not have such specific intent.”

[text continued]

In assessing defendant’s claim of error, we consider the entire

charge to the jury and not simply the asserted deficiencies in the

challenged instruction. (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505,

538, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251, overruled on another point

in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968

P.2d 445.) A trial court is not obliged to condense the required

explanation of a legal rule or concept in a single instruction; a

charge is not erroneous or prejudicial simply because a required

explanation is given in two instructions rather than one. (People v.

Burgener, supra, at pp. 538-539, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d

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1251.)

The record shows that in instructing the jury how evidence of

voluntary intoxication relates to the question of specific intent, the

trial court did not expressly define the specific intents required to

establish the various crimes at issue in the case but instead stated

as follows: “In the crime of robbery, burglary and attempted

murder and the included or related crime of theft, a necessary

element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of a certain

specific intent, included in the definition of each crime.” The

“definition of each crime” was given in other instructions such as

CALJIC Nos. 9.40 and 14.50, which set forth the elements of

robbery and burglary, respectively, including the specific intents

necessary to establish those crimes. The jury was also instructed

under CALJIC No. 1.01 to consider the instructions “as a whole

and in light of all the others.”

In People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966

P.2d 442, we found no reasonable likelihood a jury that had been

similarly instructed would be confused or misled about the

relationship between evidence of the defendant's voluntary

intoxication and the formation of the specific intent required for

proving the felony-murder charges at issue in that case. (Id. at p.

421, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442 [further citations omitted])

Defendant fails to point to anything in the record suggesting

grounds for reaching a contrary conclusion here. (See People v.

Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d

754 [finding similar claim of error waived by counsel’s failure to

request additional or clarifying instruction].)

Defendant also contends the trial court should have further defined

voluntary intoxication for the jury by giving CALJIC No. 4.22 on

its own initiative. He asserts the omission violated his federal

constitutional rights to due process, fundamental fairness,

confrontation of witnesses, and freedom from cruel and unusual

punishment. That instruction states: “Intoxication of a person is

voluntary if it results from the willing use of any intoxicating

liquor, drug or other substance, knowing that it is capable of an

intoxicating effect or when [he][she] willingly assumes the risk of

that effect. [¶] Voluntary intoxication includes the voluntary

ingestion, injecting or taking by any means of any intoxicating

liquor, drug or other substance.” (Ibid.)

There was no error. Because a trial court has no duty on its own

initiative to give an instruction relating evidence of voluntary

intoxication to the question of defendant’s mental state generally

(People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 90-91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623,

990 P.2d 506; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120, 2

Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588), the trial court here had no

obligation to clarify or elaborate on the voluntary intoxication

instructions it gave. (People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp.

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1021-1022, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.)

Nor did the absence of an instruction further defining voluntary

intoxication prejudice defendant. As previously noted, the

modified version of CALJIC No. 4.21 told the jury: “[I]f the

evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of

the alleged crime from the use of alcohol and drugs, you should

consider that fact in determining whether the defendant had such

specific intent.” In addition, defense counsel urged the jury to find

defendant lacked the specific intent to steal when he entered the

Rumseys’ apartment and attacked them, stressing the evidence of

defendant’s intoxication on methamphetamine and alcohol. (See

People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990

P.2d 506.) Because the absence of an instruction further defining

voluntary intoxication did not prejudice defendant, we also reject

his contention that trial counsel’s failure to request CALJIC No.

4.22 violated his constitutional right to the effective assistance of

counsel.

In order to avoid the rigorous standard for generic jury instruction claims in a

federal habeas action, counsel for petitioner attempts to wrap the alleged error here under

“Winship” error, i.e., failure to require proof of facts of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It

simply is not the case that failure to define a concept, voluntary intoxication, which detracts from

the element of specific intent, is failure to require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Rather, petitioner must meet the ordinary habeas jury instruction standard if he is to obtain relief.

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional claim. See

Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Habeas corpus is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or

application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1981); see also

Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381

(9th Cir. 1986). The standard of review for a federal habeas court “is limited to deciding whether

a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (citations omitted).” 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68, 112 S. Ct. at 480. In order for error in the state trial

proceedings to reach the level of a due process violation, the error had to be one involving

“fundamental fairness.” Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at 482. The Supreme Court has defined the

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see CALJIC 8.47, necessary to reduce a murder to manslaughter was not modified and given to

the jury. This instruction defines the level of intoxication necessary to relieve a specific intent,

65

category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness very narrowly. Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at

482.

Where, as in the present case, what is at issue is the failure to give an instruction,

petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” because it has been held that “[a]n omission or an

incomplete instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson

v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (1977). 

Petitioner does not demonstrate that the state supreme court patently,

unreasonably erred in its result or reasoning regarding the lack of further definition of “voluntary

intoxication” such that petitioner’s trial was “fundamentally flawed.” The state supreme court is

simply correct in its analysis. 

With respect to CALJIC 4.22, the undersigned adds also that the primary reason

the definition appears as a written instruction is to differentiate voluntary intoxication from

involuntary intoxication (which appears as CALJIC 4.23). CALJIC 4.22 provides, “Intoxication

of a person is voluntary if it results from the willing use...knowing that it is capable of an

intoxicating effect....” Unless the “voluntary” part of voluntary intoxication is disputed on

peculiar facts, the further definition so ardently sought here is one that would be assumed and

common sense to most laypersons. Moreover, petitioner never contested the fact that he had

voluntarily intoxicated himself, or that he had any doubt that the use of methamphetamine and

alcohol could result in an intoxicating effect. Petitioner’s argument here is simply that because

the instruction was not given, it was error – there is no analysis behind the claim. 

Neither counsel nor the trial court would have thought that this further definition

was necessary under the facts of the case which did not dispute at all the voluntariness of

petitioner’s intoxication. Both Claims 62 and 66 should be denied.24

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i.e. “unconsciousness.” As the jury instructions were given to the jury without this qualitative

modifier, petitioner reaped a windfall in that the jury could have ascribed any level of

drunkeness/drug use as sufficient intoxication. For petitioner’s trial, the potential of sub rosa

“diminished capacity” was alive and well.

66

Claim 63 (Reasonable Doubt Instruction is Defective Because it Improperly

Defines Presumption of Innocence); Claim 64 (The Reasonable Doubt Instruction

Is Defective Because it Uses the Terms “Moral Evidence” and “Moral

Certainty”)

These claims have no possibility of success in an AEDPA world. Again, the

analysis of the state supreme court cannot be improved upon, and is simply repeated:

While conferring with the trial court and the prosecutor on jury

instructions, defense counsel suggested a modification to CALJIC

No. 2.90, the standard instruction on presumption of innocence and

reasonable doubt. The pattern instruction in use during defendant’s

trial began, “A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be

innocent until the contrary is proved.” Defense counsel requested

that the word “until” be replaced by the word “unless” because, he

argued, “‘until’ is a word that presupposes that an event will

happen and you are simply waiting for that eventuality to occur,

where the word ‘unless’ more correctly defines the law.” The trial

court declined to adopt the requested modification, opting instead

to follow **420 the exact wording of CALJIC No. 2.90. [FN8]

FN8. The jury was instructed: “A defendant in a criminal action is

presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. And in case

of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he

is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon

the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. [¶] Reasonable doubt is defined as follows. It is not a mere

possible doubt because everything relating to human affairs and

depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or

imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire

comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds

of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an

abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.”

Defendant renews the argument of his trial counsel by asserting

that the standard instruction read in his case impermissibly shifted

the burden of proof in violation of due process by suggesting to the

jury that it will find him guilty and that he is only presumed

innocent until that time. Relying on dictionary definitions, he

contends that the term “unless” more accurately reflects the law

and should replace the word “until” in CALJIC No. 2.90.

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The challenged portion of the instruction derives from section

1096, which embodies “a cardinal rule of Anglo-American

jurisprudence”--the presumption of innocence and its

corresponding burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. (People v. Morris (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 848,

849-850, 67 Cal.Rptr. 566.) That provision states in pertinent part,

“A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until

the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether

his or her guilt is satisfactorily shown, he or she is entitled to an

acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place upon

the state the burden of proving him or her guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” (§ 1096, italics added.)

Although other language in the standard reasonable doubt

instruction used at defendant’s trial has been strongly criticized by

justices of both this court and the United States Supreme Court

(see People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 525-526, 34

Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at pp.

526-531, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249 (conc. opn. of George,

J.); Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 23, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127

L.Ed.2d 583 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.); id. at pp. 23-28, 114 S.Ct.

1239 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.)), we find no infirmity in the

portion of CALJIC No. 2.90 defendant challenges here. Viewing

that language in context and with reference to the entire charge

(People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 943, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259,

838 P.2d 1212), we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood

that the jury in defendant’s case would understand the instruction

to mean that to convict defendant, the state could sustain its burden

without proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the

instruction first informed the jury that “a defendant in a criminal

action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved” and

that if there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, he must be

acquitted. The next sentence stated that the just-described

presumption of innocence “places upon the People the burden of

proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The jury was then

provided a definition of reasonable doubt. Contrary to defendant’s

argument, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood

the disputed language to mean it should view defendant’s guilt as a

foregone conclusion.

Defendant further argues that the part of CALJIC No. 2.90 defining

the term “reasonable doubt” must have confused the jurors because

the references to “moral evidence” and “moral certainty” invited

them to convict him based on vague notions of “morality” in

violation of his rights to due process, fair trial, fundamental

fairness, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. He

acknowledges the definition of reasonable doubt used in his case

survived a similar constitutional attack in Victor v. Nebraska,

supra, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583. Echoing the

view of Justice Mosk in his concurring opinion in People v.

Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 450, 526- 528, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882

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P.2d 249, defendant asserts, however, that the time has come for a

judicial rewriting of the reasonable doubt instruction, since the

Legislature has failed to act.

In Victor, the United States Supreme Court expressed the view that

although the terms “moral evidence” and “moral certainty” do not

render the standard instruction unconstitutional, they did not add

anything of value. (Victor v. Nebraska, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 14,

114 S.Ct. 1239.) Aware of the high court’s concerns, we strongly

recommended in Freeman that trial courts modify CALJIC No.

2.90 by omitting the references to moral evidence and moral

certainty. (People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 504, fn. 9, 34

Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249.) Thereafter, the Legislature

amended section 1096 by adopting the wording suggested in

Freeman (Stats.1995, ch. 46, § 1, p. 95), and CALJIC No. 2.90 was

revised accordingly. Thus, the terms of which defendant here

complains do not appear in the standard instruction now in use.

Lewis , 25 Cal. 4th at 651-653, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662-663.

The state supreme court cited the pertinent U.S. Supreme Court authority which

applied to petitioner’s trial and final conviction. No more need be said. Claims 63 and 64

should be denied. 

Claim 67 (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Request CALJIC 8.83.1

– Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Specific Intent); Claim 84

(Trial Court’s Failure to Sua Sponte Give CALJIC 8.83.1)

Petitioner’s claims here are a reprise of the same claims made to the state supreme

court. CALJIC 8.83.1 tells the jurors that they may use circumstantial evidence to find specific

intent, but that the surrounding circumstances must be (1) consistent with the theory that the

defendant had the required specific intent, and (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational

explanation. The instruction goes on to repeat that if the circumstances are consistent with two

reasonable theories, one pointing to the existence of the specific intent, and one not, the one

pointing away from establishment of the specific intent must be chosen. The state supreme court

found that, although the requested instruction was appropriate, it had been essentially duplicated

by the giving of CALJIC 8.83, 3.31, 2.01 and 2.02. The state supreme court was correct.

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CALJIC 8.83 tells the jury that it may not find a special circumstance in the case

true unless the two requirements set forth in the text for 8.83.1 are met. Of course, the existence

of the special circumstances in this case depended on the finding of the specific intent for robbery

and burglary. CALJIC 2.01 repeats the terminology of the sought 8.83.1, but is directed to a

“finding of guilt.” CALJIC 2.02 refers generally, in the same language utilized by 8.83.1, to the

sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to demonstrate specific intent. It is clear that giving 8.83.1

would simply have been a duplication of a duplication.

There is no way that the rules of Henderson and Estelle, supra, were unreasonably

applied by the state supreme court. Claims 67 and 84 should be denied.

Claim 82 – Failure to Instruct the Jury That It Must Unanimously Agree on the

Theory of Felony Murder Adopted, i.e., Robbery or Burglary 

Petitioner does not oppose respondent’s motion for summary judgment on this

claim. Nor could petitioner legitimately do so. The Supreme Court has not determined that such

unanimity is required. 

Under Arizona law, first-degree murder is a unitary crime, and a

defendant can be convicted even though the jurors are not

unanimous on the theory, i.e., premeditated murder or felony

murder. State v. Schad, 163 Ariz. 411, 788 P.2d 1162, 1168

(1989). Submitting a multi-theory crime to the jury without

requiring unanimity on any one predicate theory is not a

constitutional violation. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 644-45,

111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991).

Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922,

928 (9th Cir. 2000).

Claim 82 should be denied.

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Claim 71 – The Verdicts Were Inconsistent; Claim 72 – Inconsistencies in the Special

Verdict; Claim 73 – Inconsistencies “Prove” That the Jury Did Not Understand How to

Apply the Facts to the Law; Claim 74 – Failure to Object to the Inconsistent Verdicts Did

Not Waive the Claim 

First, Claim 74 is not a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus – it is an

argument against the imposition of a procedural bar, which itself is a defense to a claim. Because

respondent does not argue the affirmative defense, “Claim” 74 is entirely inoperative as even a

relevant argument, much less a claim, and should be dismissed. Similarly, Claim 73 (the jury did

not understand the law) is not a claim recognized by the Constitution. Again, it is an argument,

or a non-cognizable conclusion, from the asserted fact of an inconsistent verdict. It cannot stand

alone. Claim 73 should be dismissed.

Turning to the other claims, the verdicts at issue were set forth in the Lewis

opinion:

The jury returned these verdicts:

Count one: Guilty of first degree murder of James Rumsey with

findings that the murder was committed during the commission or

attempted commission of a robbery and a burglary and that

defendant had personally used a knife. (§§ 187, 190.2, former subd.

(a)(17)(i), (vii), 12022, subd. (b).)

Count two: Guilty of first degree robbery of James Rumsey with a

finding that defendant personally used a knife. (§§ 211, 12022,

subd. (b).) 

Count three: First degree burglary with a finding that defendant

intentionally inflicted great bodily injury on Helen Rumsey. (§§

459, 12022.7.) 

Count four: First degree robbery of Helen Rumsey, with findings

that defendant personally used a firearm but did not inflict great

bodily injury. (§§ 211, 12022.5, 12022.7.) 

Count five: Attempted murder of Helen Rumsey, with findings

that defendant personally used a knife, personally used a firearm,

and intentionally inflicted great bodily injury. (§§ 664/187, 12022,

subd. (b), 12022.5, 12022.7.)

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Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 655 (n.9), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665.

Petitioner argues:

The third, fourth and fifth verdicts are necessarily and logically

inconsistent. [footnote omitted] In the fifth verdict, the jury found

true the allegation that petitioner inflicted great bodily injury while

attempting to murder Helen and in the third verdict it found

petitioner guilty of burglary with intent to inflict great bodily injury

on Helen. However, in the fourth verdict, the jury determined

petitioner was not guilty of intent to inflict great bodily injury upon

Helen in the course of a robbery.

It is inconceivable that the jury could find true the allegation that

petitioner was guilty of robbery and use of a knife relating to James

Rumsey in verdict form two, but find untrue petitioner’s intent to

inflict great bodily injury upon Helen in connection with robbery in

verdict form four even though she was stabbed in the same manner

as Jim Rumsey. Accordingly, the jury’s verdicts were necessarily

logically inconsistent and petitioner’s due process rights were

violated.

 ***

If petitioner did not have the intent to rob at the time he stabbed

Helen, he also could not have had the intent necessary to commit a

burglary...because the so-called burglary (i.e., entry of the

dwelling) occurred before the stabbing.

Opposition at 65-66.

Before discussing the fatal flaws in petitioner’s reasoning, the undersigned finds,

as did the California Supreme Court, that even if petitioner’s thought process is correct, and

inconsistent verdicts were obtained, petitioner has not stated an AEDPA survivable claim. 

The Supreme Court has made it clear that inconsistent verdicts may

stand when one of those verdicts is a conviction and the other an

acquittal. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct.

471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390,

393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932). The underlying rationale

of these cases is that the acquittal on one count may be explained

as an exercise of lenity by the jury that is not necessarily grounded

in its view of the evidence. See Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393, 52 S.Ct.

189. In adhering to this rule in Powell, however, the Court noted: 

Nothing in this opinion is intended to decide the proper resolution of a

situation where a defendant is convicted of two crimes, where a guilty

verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other. 

Powell, 469 U.S. at 69 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 471.

Ferrizz v. Giurbino, 432 F.3d 990, 992-993 (9th Cir. 2005)

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 As instructed: “Every person who enters a inhabited apartment with the specific intent 25

to steal, take and carry away the personal property of another...and with the further specific intent

to deprive the owner permanently of such [property] is guilty of the crime of first degree

burglary. RT 3735. The instruction does not require that the property be in the actual physical

possession of any particular person.

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physical possession, when petitioner rushed in to take it. It would be ludicrous to assert that the

burglary could only have taken place against the man.

72

Petitioner argues that the total guilty verdict for James is inconsistent with the

partial “acquittal (“not true”) found for Helen. Even if true, no claim is stated.

But, in the alternative, such is not true. First, taking the burglary comment,

petitioner assumes that unless petitioner had an intent to steal physically from everyone in the

Rumsey apartment when he entered that apartment, he could not be found guilty of burglary

except as to the one from whom he personally took the money. Burglary, unlike robbery, is not

person specific in the sense that the perpetrator must have desired to take property from every

person residing within the dwelling. As long as petitioner had the intent to steal from anyone 25

when he entered the apartment, he has committed a burglary as to all in-dwelling residents – at

least all who owned the taken property. The property at issue here (“gobs” of money) which

happened to be located on the person of James also belonged to Helen, i.e., except as specifically

provided by statute, assets acquired by a spouse during marriage are community property, Cal.

Civil Code 760. Petitioner does not, and did not, contest that fact, nor does he allege any

exceptions to the characterization. Therefore, when petitioner entered the apartment with the

intent to steal that co-owned money from James, he had the same intent at that instant vis-a-vis

Helen, and was guilty of burglary at the time vis-a vis Helen . During the course of the 26

burglary, petitioner did intentionally cause great bodily harm to Helen. There is no requirement

that the intent to cause great bodily injury must have coincided with the intent to burgle in the

first instance. Moreover, the attempted murder of Helen, which also occurred during the course

of the burglary, and the verdict of great bodily harm caused by that attempted murder (the

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 In other words, the course of the burglary took place over the entire time petitioner was

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in the Rumsey dwelling, and included that time in which the other specified acts, e.g., attempted

murder, took place. Petitioner labors under the misimpression that the burglary was already over

when petitioner first attempted to kill Mrs. Rumsey with a knife inflicting great bodily injury

upon her, and when he later attempted to rob and kill her with the gun.

73

stabbing aspect of Count 5) is consistent. The verdict for Count 3 was perfectly acceptable.27

Furthermore, as found by the California Supreme Court, Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at

655, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666, the robbery verdicts, insofar as the specific intent to rob was

concerned, were not inconsistent. Petitioner assumes that the timing of the intent to rob from

persons whose property was actually taken must have occurred all at the same time or from the

same actions. While such often happens, it is not legally required. As found by the California

Supreme Court it is just as logical to find that the intent to rob from Helen (who petitioner had

not initially seen from the ajar door and had only seen when she confronted him) occurred at the

time he threatened to shoot her as opposed to the time he stabbed her. Indeed, such is more

logical in that he stabbed Helen upon confrontation without saying anything, but only demanded

money from Helen after her stabbing, while she was struggling to her feet and at the time he

pointed James Rumsey’s gun at her. If the robbery occurred with the pointing of the gun, the

great bodily injury having occurred earlier with the stabbing, the verdicts are neither inconsistent

nor irrational. Counts 3, 4 and 5 are consistent.

For the given reasons, Claims 71-74 should be denied.

Claim 75 (Penalty Phase) Use of Preliminary Transcript to Prove the Use of a Gun

in the Horiuchi Robbery (Double Jeopardy)

If one has a sense of deja vu for this claim, such would be correct. Earlier in this

case, petitioner brought a motion for summary judgment on use of the Horiuchi evidence at the

penalty phase. (Claims 1, 2, 3 and 7). By Findings and Recommendations, and then by final

Order, these claims were decided adversely to petitioner. Inexplicably, Claim 75 was not

included within that initial motion. However, the belated aspect of presentation of Claim 75 does

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not change the inevitable result which stems from the prior Horiuchi rulings – the claim is simply

a related theory that has no merit. 

In the initial motion, petitioner complained:

a. use of Horiuchi’s preliminary hearing testimony violated the Confrontation

Clause (Claim 1);

b. use of Horiuchi’s testimony violated due process (trial court errors in making

factual findings (Claim 2a));

c. use of Horiuchi’s testimony constituted a knowing use of false testimony by

the prosecutor (Claim 2b);

d. the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in connection with the

Horiuchi testimony (Claim 3); and

e. he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to

completely review the Horiuchi evidence (Claim 7).

In Claim 75, petitioner again complains that use of the preliminary hearing

testimony was improper because the finding of the trial court during plea bargaining

proceedings in 1980 that petitioner had not used a gun (the facts showed that he had simulated

use of a gun) was binding upon petitioner’s capital case proceedings, and hence violated double

jeopardy protections as well as protections in numerous other Amendments. 

In adjudicating the earlier motion, the undersigned found that the Confrontation

Clause had not been violated by use of the preliminary hearing transcript. Moreover, although

petitioner’s capital case trial judge may have made a slight factual error concerning the use of a

gun record, that error was entirely harmless in that the jury would have been given the Horiuchi

evidence in any event. The undersigned also found no Brady violations.

Respondent is essentially correct in asserting that Claim 75 is a reprise of the

earlier claims, although there is a slight Double Jeopardy twist. In this claim, petitioner contends

that the capital case trial judge was bound by the Double Jeopardy Clause, i.e, criminal collateral

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estoppel, in respect to whether petitioner used a gun in the Horiuchi robbery. As set forth in the

earlier Findings and Recommendations, the undersigned quoted from Lewis: 

The prosecutor [in petitioner’s capital case] had intended to also

call as a witness the victim of the robbery, Kiro Horiuchi, but

Horiuchi died before the penalty phase began. The prosecutor

therefore sought to admit Horiuchi’s 1980 preliminary hearing

testimony under Evidence Code section 1291. After finding the

witness unavailable, the trial court considered defense hearsay and

relevancy objections to the evidence. With respect to relevancy,

defense counsel pointed out that the transcript makes repeated

references to defendant’s use of a gun, contrary to a specific “not

true” finding by the trial court on a firearm use allegation charged. 

Referring to the docket sheet in the prior matter, counsel observed

that the case apparently involved a court trial at which the

prosecution presented no evidence of gun use, and counsel noted

that the trial court made an express “not true” finding on the

sentencing allegation. He argued that because there was a “not

true” finding on the gun use, the issue was not relevant and the

prosecutor should not be permitted to relitigate it.

The prosecutor challenged defense counsel’s characterization of

the prior proceeding. Quoting from the minute order that reflected

the trial court’s “not true” finding, the prosecutor pointed out that

defendant’s 1980 robbery conviction, including the absence of

evidence in support of the gun use allegation, was the result of a

plea bargain. As he noted, the minute order included the notation

“DA will not offer proof on [section] 12022.5, settlement is

mid-term three years or less with probation open up to five years.” 

He argued further that the jury was entitled to know the facts

surrounding the prior violent incident, whether or not a conviction

was obtained.

The trial court agreed with the prosecutor and found that the 1980

robbery conviction was the result of a plea bargain that included

dropping the firearm-use allegation. It further agreed that the

details of an alleged crime of violence, whether or not a conviction

occurred, could be considered by the jury and that robbery, by

definition, is such a crime. The trial court then considered defense

counsel’s objections to specific portions of the offered transcript

and ordered one of the witness’s statements redacted to omit

reference to a hearsay statement by the witness’s wife. 

People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 657-658, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667, 668.

Moreover, again, while the state supreme court was deciding issues other than

what petitioner specifically brings here, its commentary concerning the record in deciding the

propriety of admitting the Horiuchi evidence under California law is very relevant:

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Here, we will assume, without deciding, that the trial court’s “not

true” finding on the gun use was a “‘judicial determination with

respect to the truth or falsity of the charge’” (People v. Bacigalupo,

supra, 1 Cal. 4th at 131, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 820 P.2d 559), barring

its use at the penalty phase [because facts underlying “acquittals”

cannot be presented at the penalty phase]. Nonetheless, there was

no error in admitting the prior preliminary hearing testimony to

show the details and circumstances underlying the offense of which

defendant was convicted, namely, the robbery itself. Significantly,

the victim did not testify that he ever saw defendant holding a gun. 

Rather, the victim said defendant told him he had a gun and did not

want to shoot. Defendant’s threat to use a possibly nonexistent gun

was thus a relevant circumstance underlying the robbery, which

involves the felonious taking of the victim’s personal property

from his person and against his will by force or fear. 

 ***

Nor did its admission result in any unfairness. [citation omitted]. 

As noted, the evidence was limited to the facts supporting the prior

conviction and did not indicate that defendant had in fact used a

gun in the commission of that offense. [citation omitted]. 

Moreover, the jury was informed of the “not true” finding on the

gun-use enhancement and heard testimony by the investigating

officer in the 1980 robbery case about his notation in the police

report that defendant’s modus operandi appeared to be a

“simulated gun.”

People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 659, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 668-669.

Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim fails for two reasons. Of course, petitioner does

not, and could not, contest the use per se of priors to enhance a sentence. The Supreme Court has

consistently determined that recidivist statutes do not violate double jeopardy because “the

enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense ‘is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy

or additional penalty for the earlier crimes,’ but instead as ‘a stiffened penalty for the latest crime,

which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.’” Witte v. United States,

515 U.S. 389, 399, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1995) (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732, 68

S. Ct. 1256 (1948)). Nevertheless, in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46, 90 S. Ct. 1189

(1970), the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause includes the doctrine of

collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel “means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has

once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between

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the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id. at 443, 90 S. Ct. at 1194.

Even assuming that the Horiuchi trial judge’s acceptance of the plea bargain in

which the allegation of use of a gun was dropped was a “factual finding” for purposes of collateral

estoppel, more than that must be established before the Constitutional impact of double jeopardy

may be found.

In Pettaway v. Plummer, 943 F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.1991) we explained: 

Constitutional collateral estoppel exists where ‘a fact necessarily

determined in the defendant’s favor by his earlier acquittal [makes]

his conviction on the challenged second trial ... impossible unless

the fact could be relitigated and determined adversely to the

defendant.’ On the other hand, ‘double jeopardy guarantees are not

engaged by collateral estoppel which, if applied, would merely

restrict proof but not make conviction impossible.’

Id. at 1046 (quoting United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1205

(4th Cir.1982)) (citation omitted). 

United States v. James, 109 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Pettaway v. Plummer, 943

F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds by Santamaria v. Horsley, 133 F.3d

1242, 1245-47 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc)).

Clearly, even accepting the Horiuchi plea bargain dropping of the use of a gun

allegation as an “acquittal” on that point, such “acquittal” did not prevent the use of the Horiuchi

evidence as a whole. At best, the finding of collateral estoppel would not prevent use of the

evidence establishing the robbery (a crime of violence by definition), it would only prohibit

evidence that an actual gun had been used. This would be quintessential “evidentiary” collateral

estoppel because the actual use of a gun did not preclude a robbery finding, and thus, not

collateral estoppel in the Constitutional sense. Again, assuming that the jury was presented with

evidence that as a whole indicated actual use of a gun, and the trial judge permitted such, 

petitioner has raised no Constitutional issue because the capital case trial judge committed simple

evidentiary error.

\\\\\

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 The document entitled Judgment and Sentencing only referenced the fact that 28

petitioner had not appeared for his judgment and sentencing.

78

Moreover, as found by the California Supreme Court, and as characterized in the

July 12, 2005 Findings and Recommendations, the capital case trial judge did not instruct the jury

that petitioner had used a gun, nor did the prosecutor argue such. Rather, the facts from the

Horiuchi preliminary examination transcript (which would have generally been permitted in any

event), and other evidence presented in connection with the Horiuchi enhancement at the capital

case trial, clearly indicated that petitioner had simulated the use of a gun – not actually used one. 

No one at the capital trial would have been reasonably concluded that petitioner actually used a

(real) gun for the Horiuchi robbery.

Use of the actual Horiuchi evidence was neither (1) a violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause nor (2) unfair in the general due process sense (as expressly found in the July 12,

2005 Findings etc.). 

Hearsay (Prior Conviction) Was Admitted During the Penalty Phase (Claim 77);

Admission of Prior Convictions Violates Due Process (Claim 78)

Petitioner complains of the admission of documents evidencing a prior conviction

on hearsay grounds (Claim 77) as well as being violative of due process (Claim 78). During the

penalty phase, paperwork demonstrating that petitioner had suffered a prior drug conviction was

admitted for purposes of aggravation. Because of an incompleteness/ambiguity in the Judgment

and Sentencing order, that particular document was withdrawn , and the information along with a 28

minute order showing a plea of guilty was admitted. See People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 663-664,

106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672. There was no doubt that petitioner was convicted of this offense as he

had admitted such during his guilt phase testimony. RT 3393-94; 3436-37. Moreover, outside the

presence of the jury, the robbery was admitted. RT 3980.

As previously set forth, petitioner must show that the state law evidentiary error

caused a fundamental unfairness. Estelle supra. Petitioner argues from both a relevance and

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barred hearsay basis that the documents do not actually show a conviction. However, it is clear

that admission of such was not fundamentally unfair because petitioner’s own admission in the

previous phase shows that he was in fact convicted. No unfairness, much less a fundamental

unfairness, has been demonstrated here. Petitioner simply argues plain evidentiary [and

completely harmless] error.

The case petitioner does cite, Harris by & through Ramseyer v. Blodgett, 853 F.

Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994) is not only pre-AEDPA, but relies on Johnson v. Mississippi, 486

U.S. 578, 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988), which was somewhat appropriate given the ambiguous nature

of petitioner’s conviction in the Washington case. Johnson involved a materially inaccurate prior

conviction being presented to a jury, and the violation of due process which results from use of

such inaccurate convictions. Here, even petitioner admitted the correctness of the prior

conviction. Hence a materially inaccurate prior conviction was not utilized in petitioner’s penalty

phase. See Petrocelli v. Angelone, 248 F.3d 877, 891, n.17 (9th Cir. 2001). Claim 77 is

mertiless.

In Claim 78, petitioner asserts that the penalty phase admission of any nonviolent

prior conviction offends notions of fundamental fairness. However, petitioner does not cite a

Supreme Court case for this proposition, nor even an on-point lower court decision. The

California Supreme Court determined to the contrary of petitioner’s contention, Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th

at 664, and that is where the matter will lie. 

Admission of Toombs Testimony/Lewis Denial (Claim 79); Ineffective Assistance of 

Counsel for Failing to Object (Claim 90)

The California Supreme Court dispensed with both these claims as follows:

Prosecution witness Police Chief Nicholas of the Weed Police

Department testified he had investigated an incident on September

26, 1986, in which George Toombs reported that defendant had shot

a hole in the tire of Toombs’s truck. When asked whether

defendant had offered an explanation, the witness responded, “As I

recall, he made a statement that he didn't have a firearm, he hadn’t

shot a gun or something of that nature, that it was a firecracker.”

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When the witness answered “yes” to the prosecutor’s next question

asking whether defendant had also said something about Toombs,

defense counsel objected on relevancy grounds. After an

unreported sidebar conference, the trial court sustained defense

counsel’s objection. The prosecutor asked no further questions of

the witness.

A short time later, and outside the jury’s presence, defense counsel

clarified for the record that at the bench he had objected to the

testimony about defendant’s statements on the ground there was no

evidence defendant had been advised of his rights before speaking

with the officer, as required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.

436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Counsel also noted for the

record the trial court had rejected his motion to exclude on that

ground. When the court reminded defense counsel it had sustained

his objection to a portion of the questioning about what the witness

had heard defendant say about Toombs and that the prosecutor had

ceased his questioning altogether, defense counsel indicated he had

objected to the entire line of questioning and noted that some

statements did come in.

 ***

In any event, we find no error. For purposes of section 190.3,

“relevant evidence” is evidence relevant to the specific factors set

forth in that provision. (People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762,

773-774, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) Section 190.3, factor (b)

permits the jury to consider “[t]he presence or absence of criminal

activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of

force or violence....” The factor of violent criminal activity

encompasses not only the existence of such activity but all the

pertinent circumstances surrounding it (People v. Ashmus, supra, 54

Cal.3d at p. 985, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214), and these

circumstances may be shown through testimonial evidence. (People

v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 201-202, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862

P.2d 664.)

Here, the prosecution presented evidence that in 1986 defendant

approached his former father-in-law George Toombs as he sat in his

parked truck, shot the front tire, and then threatened Toombs with a

handgun through the driver’s side window. Toombs testified about

the incident and, as previously noted, Police Chief Nicholas testified

about his investigation. Although defendant’s statement to the

police denying his use of a gun is only marginally relevant to

establishing that the crime actually occurred beyond a reasonable

doubt, it arguably pertains to the broader circumstances surrounding

the incident and was therefore admissible. Even if the statement

should have been excluded as irrelevant to any statutory factor in

aggravation, however, the prosecutor did not mention it again

during summation and the testimony constituted such a minor

portion of the case-in-aggravation as to render its admission

harmless. (See People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 765-766,

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47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d

432, 447, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.) For the same reason,

we reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was incompetent

for not promptly objecting when the prosecutor first inquired about

defendant’s statement. (People v. Medina, supra, at p. 770, 47

Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.)

Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 661-663, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 671-672.

“A petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief if evidence introduced at either the

guilt or the penalty phase rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 75, 112 S. Ct. 475, 483, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991); Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S. Ct. at

2608.” Odle v. Calderon, 884 F. Supp. 1404, 1430 (N.D.Cal. 1995). The opinion of the state

supreme court on this subject has been set out at length as it clearly demonstrates that the

California Supreme Court did not unreasonably dispose of these issues as the term “unreasonable”

has been defined by AEDPA.

Since it was not harmful error to admit the evidence, counsel could not have been

ineffective for not objecting.

Claims 79 and 90 should be denied.

Miscellaneous Penalty Phase Asserted Instructional Errors:

Claim 80 – Failure to Instruct that the 1980 Horiuchi Robbery Must Be Found True

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt;

Claim 81 – Failure to Instruct that the Greene Incident Must be proved Beyond a

Reasonable Doubt;

Claim 85 – Failure to Instruct as to the Elements of Unadjudicated Criminal

Activity;

Claim 86 – Petitioner Did not Waive his Right to Have the Jury Instructed as to

Unadjudicated Criminal Activity;

Claim 88 – Use of the Terms “Circumstances,” “Special Circumstances,” “Aggravating

Circumstances,” and “Mitigating Circumstances” Are Confusing;

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Claim 89 – Failure of Counsel to Request that the Jury Be Instructed as to the Elements of

Unadjudicated Criminal Activity Constituted Ineffectiveness;

 Claim 95 – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Request Burden of Proof

Instructions About the Greene Incident

Petitioner raises a potpourri of penalty phase instructional error, perhaps out of a

desire to ensure that nothing is waived. However, and again, no alleged error is actionable unless

it violates fundamental fairness. Estelle, supra. None of these errors rise to such a level either by

themselves or collectively. 

In discussing the jury instructions, the trial court indicated that it would give

CALJIC 8.87, the instruction regarding finding prior criminal acts of force or violence beyond a

reasonable doubt. The trial judge determined to specify the violent conduct at issue for the jury

pertinent to 8.87. However, the judge was concerned that the Horiuchi robbery might be double

counted in the penalty phase as both prior violent conduct and a prior conviction. Defense

counsel agreed with the trial judge that the robbery should only be characterized in the

instructions once – and that it should be as a prior conviction. RT 3982. Petitioner argues now

that the jury should have been instructed, nevertheless, with 8.87 in connection with the Horiuchi

robbery ostensibly on the chance that the jury might consider the robbery as prior violent conduct.

 Obviously, there was no fundamental error, and just as clearly, petitioner probably

received a benefit from what happened as opposed to some fundamentally unfair disadvantage. 

That is, the jury was instructed in connection with the other violent conduct aggravating factor –

“A juror may not consider any evidence of any other criminal activity as an aggravating

circumstance.” Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 665 (n. 14), 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674. Since the violent

conduct for the jury’s consideration was expressly characterized within the 8.87 instruction, it was

just as likely that the jury would not consider the Horiuchi conduct in connection with 8.87

because it was not specified, and it might not have considered it at all having been instructed that

no other evidence of criminal activity could be considered. In the scheme of things, this omission

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of the Horiuchi invited “error” could not possibly constitute a fundamental unfairness. Estelle

supra.29

Claim 81 is a reprise of Claim 80, except that the November 28, 1986 Greene

incident is at issue. The Greene incident involved a confrontation in a bar that petitioner had with

Andrew Greene and John Rogers. This time, petitioner got into an argument with Greene and

shouted that he would kill him. When petitioner reached into his coat, Rogers pulled the coat off

of petitioner’s shoulders, perhaps making it more difficult for petitioner to reach his weapon,

which became fully exposed. Rogers removed the weapon, and the police were called. It so

happened that this violent, criminal incident was left off the initial list of aggravating factors (the

“violence and force” list), but this incident had appeared on a supplemental, filed list. The fact

that the Greene incident had not been initially listed apparently caused the omission of this

incident from the specific list of violent acts given to the jury in connection with instruction 8.87. 

Neither counsel brought the oversight to the judge’s attention. 

Again, the state supreme court observed that leaving an incident off the list was to

petitioner’s advantage as the jury would probably not consider it. Lewis , 25 Cal. 4th at 666-667,

106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675. If the jury did consider it, there existed no reason why the jury would

not apply the same standard given to the other violent, criminal acts. Petitioner’s counterintuitive

speculation that the jury would apply some unannounced standard falls far short of demonstrating

a fundamental unfairness. For this same reason, petitioner was not prejudiced in any meaningful

fashion by his counsel’s failure to bring the omission to the attention of the trial judge (Claim

95).30

Petitioner cites no established Supreme Court authority for the proposition that

before a penalty phase jury may consider prior violent conduct, it must be instructed in all the

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 Petitioner’s counsel argues with respect to Claim 89 that counsel was ineffective for 31

not finding “something” to mitigate the previous unadjudicated criminal activity. However, that

has nothing to do with the stated claim that counsel should have asked for instructions on the

elements of the prior, violent criminal activity.

84

elements of the underlying criminal conduct (Claim 85). No such authority exists. Moreover,

petitioner misconstrues the function of the jury in analyzing prior criminal activity. In order to be

utilized as an aggravating circumstance, the jury must find the activity beyond a reasonable doubt. 

It is not the function of the jury to “convict” petitioner as the activity is defined for the jury as

potentially “criminal” if it exists. See 8.87. Such was the case here. Finally, a jury might well

become confused if a welter of instructions on underlying criminal activity were given along with

other penalty phase instructions. As the California Supreme Court held in Lewis in refusing to

overturn its rule that the jury need not be instructed on the elements of the underlying violent

crime: “Instructions to the jury on the elements of unadjudicated crimes are not required by logic

or by the constitutional guarantees of due process, fundamental fairness, right to a fair trial, equal

protection, or reliability of penalty.” Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 668, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676. This

remains the rule in California to this day. People v.Cook, 39 Cal. 4th 566, 611, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d

22, 61 (2006). Since no error occurred under California law, counsel cannot be ineffective in the

Strickland sense for failing to press for instructions defining the criminal elements of the violent

activity. (Claim 89). Finally, petitioner cites no established Supreme Court authority for the 31

proposition that a defendant must personally waive his counsel’s decision not to ask for element

instructions of the underlying criminal activity, and hence, no actionable claim is stated. (Claim

86). Respondent’s cited cases to the contrary in analogous situations are persuasive. See United

States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 64 (2nd Cir. 1999); United States v. Durham, 139 F.3d 1325, 1333

(10th Cir. 1998). 

Finally, petitioner asserts with respect to Claim 88 that overuse of the word

“circumstances,” both alone and in connection with legal terms such as “special circumstances,”

“aggravating circumstances, ” and “mitigating circumstances,” is confusing. The undersigned is

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unsure of the federal claim petitioner is attempting to raise, as he simply argues a truism that

sufficiently confusing jury instructions may violate due process. However, petitioner points to no

particular jury instruction. Nor does petitioner take issue with the definitions of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances which were given to the jury [in this claim]. And, the word

“circumstances” alone meaning “fact[s] or event[s] accompanying another,” is commonly 32

known and used. The California Supreme Court held:

Defendant contends the various uses of the term “circumstances” in

the standard jury instructions at the penalty phase misled and

confused the jury, in violation of the due process clause and other

federal constitutional guarantees. He asserts that a jury could

confuse the special circumstances found true during the guilt phase

with the aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of the

death penalty, particularly in a case such as his, in which the same

evidence was used to prove both special circumstances and

aggravating circumstances.

Defendant’s complaint appears to be with CALJIC No. 8.85, which

directs the penalty jury to take into consideration “[t]he

circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in

the present proceeding and the existence of any special

circumstances found to be true.” (See also § 190.3, factor (a).) If

defendant’s argument is that the standard instructions at the penalty

phase invite the jury to artificially inflate the aggravating weight of

the underlying offense by considering the same evidence under

more than one statutory factor in aggravation, we have in prior

decisions held that the standard instructions do not inherently

encourage such double-counting under section 190.3 [citations

omitted].

Nor does defendant point to anything in the record suggesting any

possible confusion by the jury in his case. Here, the prosecutor’s

closing argument suggested how each piece of evidence fit under

the specified statutory factors. He also told the jury, in language

similar to CALJIC No. 8.88, also given to the jury, that it should not

engage in a “mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an

imaginary scale” and that, in determining which penalty is justified,

it should consider the totality of the aggravating circumstances with

the totality of the mitigating circumstances. In light of the

prosecutor’s remarks and the standard instructions about the

weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances given in this

case, we find no reasonable likelihood the jurors were misled or

confused in the manner defendant suggests [citation omitted].

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Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 669, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677.

Nothing in the above quote is AEDPA unreasonable. Claim 88 should be denied.

Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Penalty Phase: Claim 91– Arguing that Petitioner

Failed to Present Mitigating Evidence; Claim 92 – Arguing Fact Which Did Not

Relate to Statutory Aggravating Factors; Claim 93 – Arguing that Petitioner

Lacked Remorse

It is difficult to conceive of what a prosecutor could argue in a penalty phase in

which petitioner presented no evidence, if the above arguments were not permitted. Reading

between the lines, the arguments here are not so much about prosecutorial misconduct as they are

about the lack of activity of petitioner’s counsel in the penalty phase.

Petitioner attacks that part of the prosecutor’s argument as follows:

I suggest to you that there is no evidence of that [sympathetic]

nature. I mean, you can grope as you might, but you haven’t heard

it because it – it just does not – does not exist.... You have abundant

evidence of aggravating factors, including the crime itself and the

evidence you heard during the penalty phase. I suggest to you, you

have no evidence that would mitigate the enormity or the gravity of

this particular crime....I suggest to you that there are no mitigating

circumstances.

RT 4001-4003, as quoted at page 291 of the Amended Petition.

Defense counsel made no objections to this argument. In Claim 91, petitioner

assigns Griffin error to this statement (commenting on petitioner’s silence) and state law

Davenport error (arguing that the absence of mitigating factors is an aggravating factor). The

prosecutor’s argument violated neither case. First, with respect to Davenport error, the California

Supreme Court is in the best position to determine whether its case law was violated. The state

supreme court found that such was not the case, and that is the end of the matter. Lewis, 25 Cal.

4th at 671, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679. See High v. Ignacio, 408 F.3d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 2005) (“this

court accepts a state court ruling on questions of state law”).

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procedural default issue as the claim so clearly fails on the merits.

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The alleged Griffin error is equally lacking in merit. Clearly, a prosecutor is

permitted to call to the jury’s attention that the defense has not presented evidence on a certain

subject, or at all. And that is so even if the evidence could have been presented by the defendant

himself. Commentary on the defense, as opposed to the defendant, does not qualify as a Griffin

violation. See United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d at 461. See also United States v. Mayans, 17

F.3d 1174, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1994). The Lewis court could not have been AEDPA unreasonable

in finding no Griffin error. Claim 91should be denied. 33

In Claim 92, petitioner complains that the prosecutor argued that petitioner was

“con-wise” and “tried to manipulate the system,” and “that [petitioner] became abrasive when

questioned by the police after the murder.” Amended Petition at 292. Again, there was no

objection. Petitioner does not (and could not) argue that the comments are unduly inflammatory,

or that the evidence did not support the characterizations. Rather, petitioner argues that the

characterizations went beyond the aggravating factors set forth in state law. Lewis at 25 Cal. 4th

671-672, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679, held that the characterizations in argument were different from

presentation of evidence outside of statutory factors, and denied the claim. This issue of state law

is foreclosed from federal review. Claim 92 should be denied.

Finally, in Claim 93, petitioner asserts that the prosecutor committed Griffin error

by arguing: “You may take into account the absence of remorse on the part of the defendant. 

Nowhere in this trial did you see evidence of any remorse on his behalf.” Amended Petition at

293 quoting RT 3986. Petitioner does not argue that the lack of remorse is off limits per se for

prosecutorial argument, but only that the argument implicated petitioner’s right to remain silent. 

The case which best illustrates why petitioner’s argument must fail, even in

addition to the fact that no objection was made, is Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d at 586. In

Beardslee, the prosecutor made comments somewhat similar to those by the prosecutor in this

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case, but in a wholly different context. The Beardslee prosecutor:

called attention to the absence of any demonstration of emotion by

Beardslee, arguing that he was incapable of showing emotion

because he had no remorse. The prosecutor then continued: “Since

you only heard the defendant through the tape recorder and his

previous testimony, you were not able to observe his demeanor and

sincerity at the time he testified so you, too, could judge if there was

any feeling in the man.” The court overruled a defense objection,

and the prosecutor continued: “Wouldn’t you expect a man on trial

for his life would, through his statements, cry out for forgiveness,

cry out for pity? He did not. Never heard any in the statements.”

Beardslee, 358 F.3d at 586.

Because the statements referenced by the prosecutor appeared in the case proceedings at which

Beardslee testified either by way of prior statement or in person, and which would not have been

the appropriate time to “beg for mercy,” the clear implication (argued by the Beardslee petitioner)

was that one should have seen Beardslee “beg for mercy” at the penalty phase – the appropriate

time to do so. The Ninth Circuit found Griffin error, but ultimately that the error was harmless

because it was not emphasized.

In petitioner Lewis’ case, there was not any reference to times at which petitioner

made statements in court proceedings; there was a simple reference to the fact that the defense had

never produced evidence at any part of the trial which established remorse. And, it is not the case

that the only time remorse could have been shown was at the trial by the defendant. Remorse

often comes into play by way of statements or letters made to friends or relatives, completely apart

from any trial proceedings. Remorse could be shown by actions, e.g., great depression, etc. This

evidence coming into trial does not depend on a defendant testifying to such facts (as opposed to a

personal begging for mercy before the factfinder). Indeed, it is often more persuasive, and less

self-serving, if such facts establishing remorse are introduced by others. Thus, the prosecutor’s

comments in petitioner’s case were completely appropriate. Our legal system is not so perverse

that the complete lack of defense evidence from any source on an important penalty phase factor

must remain unmentioned by the prosecutor. Claim 93 should be denied.

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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to Object to Officer Smith’s

Testimony – Claim 94

The Horiuchi robbery, as used in the Lewis penalty phase, has been the subject of

numerous claims, and its facts will not be repeated. However, one fact in that scenario involved

the testimony of an officer involved with petitioner in that robbery commenting on a statement

made by petitioner, to wit, petitioner’s statement: “I didn’t have a knife and I didn’t have a

gun...I’ll be out of here in [seventy-two] hours.” Petitioner asserts that his counsel was ineffective

for not objecting to this statement in that the statement did not relate to any aggravating factor. 

The California Supreme Court disagreed:

We have long recognized that counsel’s decision whether or not to

object to inadmissible evidence is a matter of trial tactics. (People v.

Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 621.) Because we accord great

deference to trial counsel’s tactical decisions, counsel’s failure to

object rarely provides a basis for finding incompetence of counsel.

(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1185 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998

P.2d 969]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215 [66

Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710].) Here, nothing in the record

suggests defense counsel lacked a rational tactical reason for not

objecting to Officer Smith’s testimony. (See People v. Pope (1979)

23 Cal.3d 412, 426, fn. 16 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2

A.L.R.4th 1].) For example, counsel could reasonably have viewed

the officer’s testimony as further support for the defense position

that defendant did not actually use a weapon during the robbery. 

We find no incompetence on this record.

People v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 661, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 670-671.

The California Supreme Court implicitly (or perhaps explicitly) found that the

evidence was inadmissible. Whether counsel had a valid reason for not objecting would require

an evidentiary hearing. However, no evidentiary hearing need be held in that no matter what the

reason, or lack thereof, petitioner’s statement is so minor in the scheme of things that no prejudice

in the Strickland sense, i.e., undermining of confidence in the penalty phase verdict, could be

found. As stated earlier in these Findings, any person paying attention to the evidence knew that

petitioner was simulating the use of a gun during the robbery, and no knife was ever mentioned by

the 1980 plea agreement or other court records as a tool used in the robbery. And, in any event,

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petitioner was denying the use of such weapons. The only part of the statement with any

prejudicial effect would have been petitioner’s cocky statement that he would be out of jail in

seventy-two-hours or less. The excessive amount of violence exhibited by petitioner in previous

crimes, along with the violence of the one at issue, would have been the focus of any reasonable

jury. That petitioner was cocky as well added nothing of significance to the aggravating

circumstances. 

The Checklist Claims

Every capital habeas corpus petition contains a core of common claims either not

specific to the case under review, or raise general claims based on the overall results in this case. 

These claims have never found favor in the California courts or the federal courts. These claims

fare no better here. To the extent that petitioner has made such claims for their preservation, they

are therefore preserved.

Claims 25 and 101 – The Death Sentence was Disproportionate in

Violation of the Eighth Amendment Because No Inter-Case Comparison is

Required

Petitioner cites no Supreme Court case which requires that a capital defendant

involved in a murder case have his case compared with those of murder defendants against whom

the death penalty was not sought in order that some type of proportionality under the Eighth

Amendment be established – be that comparison within a particular state (Claim 25) or with other

states (Claim 101). While some type of such review might be in order for capital cases not

involving the death of another person, this case, of course, involves such a death, and such review

is not required. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-51, 104 S. Ct. 871, 875-878 (1984).

Claim 29 – The Prosecutor Has Unbounded Discretion in Deciding to

Bring a Death Penalty Case

Petitioner, of course, does not mean that the prosecutor is not bound by the state

statutes which describe those situations in which prosecution of a capital case is permitted, but

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 This case has a lengthy subsequent history unrelated to the point in issue. Suffice it to

34

say here, without a string of citations, that the district court case remains pending appeal in the

Ninth Circuit at this time.

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that within those statutory parameters, the prosecutor has “unbounded” discretion to seek the

death penalty. Petitioner goes on to state the wholly speculative and baseless conclusion that race

played a part in the prosecutor’s decision simply because petitioner is African-American and the

victim was Caucasian.

No Supreme Court case has held unconstitutional a selection process in which the

District Attorney makes a decision to seek the death penalty within the bounds of state law. 

Under AEDPA that is the end of the analysis. General notions of due process or general

statements that the finder of fact in a death penalty prosecution should not have unfettered

discretion to find in favor of the death penalty in a particular case do not play a role in this

argument. And indeed, the direct authority that exists is adverse to petitioner. Silagy v. Peters,

905 F.2d 986, 993 (7th Cir. 1990), discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909

(1976). See also, Lambright v. Lewis, 932 F. Supp. 1547, 1582 (D.Ariz. 1996).34

Nor is petitioner entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his race based conclusion. 

Habeas corpus is not a notice pleading exercise, but petitioner is expected to state claims with

factual specificity. The petitioner has the burden to specifically allege and demonstrate error of

constitutional proportion, McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1418 (9th Cir. 1994), although

the court has the ultimate “burden” to determine for itself whether the error was harmless, or

whether it has grave doubt that such error was harmless. Importantly, petitioner may not speculate

or hypothesize about alleged error – petitioner must possess a colorable, factual basis for claimed

constitutional error before the claimed error may stand as a basis for evidentiary hearing and the

possible overturning of a state conviction, Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir.

1995); the petitioner must allege facts that point to the “real possibility” of constitutional error. 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75, n.7, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1630 (1977); Wacht v. Cardwell, 604

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F.2d 1245, 1246 (9th Cir. 1979); there must be some evidentiary “spelling out” of the

constitutional claim, Gentile v. Mancusi, 426 F.2d 238, 239 (2d Cir. 1970), i.e., the pleader must

lay a foundation for proper factual averments and competent evidence must support the

averments. Davis v. Bomar, 344 F.2d 84, 86 (6th Cir. 1965). Nor is petitioner entitled to

speculate about a claim in the first instance, and then request investigative monies and discovery

to determine whether there is any factual basis for the speculated claim. The court’s point has

been best put by Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970), adopted by Calderon v.

U.S.D.C. (Nicolaus), 96 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1996): “Habeas corpus is not a general form of

relief for those who seek to explore their case in search of its existence.” The bare race animus

conclusion based on a mere difference in races between the aggressor and the victim fall far short

of that standard.

Claim 76 – Use of Unadjudicated Violent Act Offenses in the Penalty Phase

Again, no Supreme Court case has prohibited the admission of unadjudicated

violent acts offenses to be placed before the jury. Nor is there any authority with sufficient

specificity to make an “unreasonable application” finding. The authority is to the contrary of

petitioner’s contention:

Petitioner next alleges that the state court violated his right to due

process when it heard evidence of unadjudicated crimes in imposing

his third death sentence. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,

69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), the trial judge considered

evidence that the defendant had committed several burglaries for

which he had not been convicted. Id. at 244, 69 S.Ct. at 1081-82.

The trial judge had cited this evidence in sentencing the defendant

to death despite the jury’s recommendation that he receive life in

prison. Id. In reviewing the conviction, the Supreme Court noted

that “[t]he belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal

category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past

life and habits of a particular offender.” Id. at 247, 69 S.Ct. at 1083.

The Court therefore held that it was constitutionally permissible for

a sentencing judge to seek information from out-of-court sources

indicating that the defendant had participated in unadjudicated

offenses. Id. at 251-52, 69 S.Ct. at 1085-86.

The Court has since discredited some of the logic that undergirded

its decision in Williams. Most notably, in Gardner v. Florida, 430

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do with the principle at issue. The undersigned will not therefore list those citations.

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U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (opinion of

Stevens, J.), the Court repudiated Williams’ assumption that a death

penalty is constitutionally indistinguishable from other forms of

punishment. Id. at 357, 97 S.Ct. at 1204 (noting that a majority of

the Court had “recognized that death is a different kind of

punishment from any other which may be imposed in this

country.”). The Court has not, however, called into question the

essence of Williams’ holding--that a judge’s consideration of

evidence of unadjudicated crimes in imposing the death sentence

does not violate a petitioner’s due process rights. See Nichols v.

United States, 511 U.S. 738, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1928, 128

L.Ed.2d 745 (1994) (citing Williams and stating that “[s]entencing

courts have not only taken into consideration a defendant’s prior

convictions, but have also considered a defendant’s past criminal

behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior.”).

Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that “relevant,

unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the

factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and

contrary evidence by the opposing party.” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at

898, 103 S.Ct. at 3397. We therefore follow Williams and join

three other Circuit Courts in holding that the admission of evidence

of unadjudicated offenses at a sentencing proceeding does not

violate due process. [FN12] See Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1464-

65 (11th Cir.1993) (“[I]t is acceptable to consider evidence of

crimes for which a defendant has been indicted but not convicted.

Activities for which there has been no charge filed can be

considered as well.”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1161, 115 S.Ct. 1125,

130 L.Ed.2d 1087 (1995); Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 459

(9th Cir.1988) (“We have long held that the due process clause does

not preclude the sentencing judge from considering evidence of

prior criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction.”), rev’d on

other grounds sub nom. Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280

(9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944, 110 S.Ct. 349, 107

L.Ed.2d 337 (1989); Williams v. Lynaugh, 814 F.2d 205, 208 (5th

Cir.) (“[T]he admission of unadjudicated offenses in the sentencing

phase of a capital trial does not violate the eighth and fourteenth

amendments.”), cert. 6 denied, 484 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 311, 98

L.Ed.2d 270 (1987).

Hatch v. State of Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1465 (10th Cir. 1995) (a capital case).

35

The California Supreme Court, therefore, did not act unreasonably in denying

petitioner’s claim. Claim 76 should be denied.

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Claim 83 – Failure to Instruct the Jury That it Must Find the Penalty Beyond a

Reasonable Doubt

Again, petitioner cites to no authority that the jury must be instructed that it make

its penalty phase determination beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the court cannot find that

petitioner has even opposed summary judgment on this issue in his opposition. But, in any event, 

the older authority which exists is contrary to petitioner’s claim. 

The joint opinion issued the same day in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.

262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), makes clear that

specific standards for balancing aggravating and mitigating

circumstances are not constitutionally required.

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (n.13), 2733, 2742 (1983).

Petitioner might have argued that Apprendi changed everything. Apprendi

required that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2348 (emphasis added). In Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 585, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), the Supreme Court held that Apprendi applied to

penalty phase determinations in capital cases. However, Ring involved only the judge vs. jury

aspect of Apprendi because Arizona law already required the proof of aggravating factors beyond

a reasonable doubt no matter who made the decision. Finally, the Supreme Court held in Schriro

v. Summerlin, 524 U.S. 348, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004), that Ring would not be applied retroactively

because the judge vs. jury aspect of Apprendi was not a watershed rule of procedure. Again,

Schriro involved only the judge vs. jury aspect because in determining whether Ring was

retroactive, the reasonable doubt standard was necessarily not at issue.

It is an interesting and open question whether the reasonable doubt aspect of the

Apprendi ruling would constitute a watershed rule in the penalty phase context. Unlike the judge

versus jury aspect, the reliability of the death finding may well be enhanced by a requirement that

the jury must find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable

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doubt as opposed to the undelineated present standard. However, even assuming that Ring would

be retroactively applied to petitioner’s case, insofar as Apprendi’s reasonable doubt requirement

is concerned, and that the jury should have been charged to make its ultimate determination

beyond a reasonable doubt, any such failure to charge is harmless error.

“In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Washington v. Recuenco, __U.S.__, 126

S. Ct. 2546 (2006), we hold that Apprendi errors are reviewed for harmlessness using the

framework of Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999).”

United States v. Zepeda-Martinez, 470 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2006). Under that standard, “an error is

harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same

absent the error.’” Id. In this case, application of the harmless error standard is easy. Aside from

the predatory aspects of the murder and attempted murder of the Rumseys, the prosecution

submitted numerous episodes from petitioner’s violent and predatory past. On its side of the

balancing ledger, petitioner’s trial counsel presented nothing. Whether application of the

reasonable doubt standard could be likened to mathematically doubling, or tripling or quadrupling

the prosecution burden, two, three or four times zero remains zero. The jury had nothing to

balance in petitioner’s favor. While petitioner’s drug usage was known to the jury regardless of

the defense presenting no evidence on the subject during the penalty phase, it is just as likely that

jurors would consider this an aggravating factor than one mitigating the violent death of Mr.

Rusmey and the near death of his wife. Many death penalty cases have involved evidence of drug

usage, and many juries have returned the death penalty as their penalty phase verdict nonetheless. 

See e.g., People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1990). Certainly, in the absence of

any medical presentation regarding drug usage it cannot be said that unexplained drug usage is

necessarily mitigating.

The failure to instruct that the jury had to find that the aggravating factors

outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, assuming retroactive Ring

application, had no effect on the penalty phase verdict – and the undersigned can say that beyond a

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reasonable doubt. 

Claim 87– Triple Counting of Evidence Regarding Petitioner’s Intent to Steal

Improperly Resulted in the Death Penalty

Petitioner complains that the jury “triple counted” petitioner’s intent to steal to find

felony murder in the guilt phase, as a special circumstance (guilt phase), and at the penalty phase

(where jury could consider the facts and circumstances of the murder as a factor). Petitioner cites

no pertinent established Supreme Court authority, much less any on-point authority, precluding

such triple counting. Petitioner does cite Allen v. Woodford, 366 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2004), a

preAEDPA case, which stands for the proposition that multiple counting of aggravating factors in

the penalty phase may constitute a violation of due process. Not only is Allen a pre-AEDPA case,

and reasonably applicable established Supreme Court authority is required for petitioner to

prevail, the Allen case is completely inapposite to the claim made by petitioner here. Nothing in

Allen (or in common sense) precludes a jury from considering intent to steal in the guilt phase,

and then again in the penalty phase as a fact and circumstance of the crime. See Lewis, 25 Cal.

4th at 676, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683. Petitioner cannot prevail on this claim. 

Claim 96 – Ineffective Assistance in Failing to Object to the Constitutionality of

California’s Death Penalty Statute

The amended petition vaguely claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he

“failed to object to the ‘triple-charging’ and other constitutional deficiencies in California’s 1978

death penalty statute.” Amended Petition at 297. No further explanation is given. The

undersigned has already found no merit in the triple charging allegations in terms of a federal

claim. Petitioner does not suggest how the California Supreme Court’s denial of such a claim

could constitute ineffective assistance from a state law perspective. See Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at 678,

106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684, ruling adversely to petitioner on the triple charging, and on the allegation

of ineffective assistance. Moreover, no other claim about counsel’s ineffectiveness vis-a-vis the

constitutionality of the 1978 statute would be exhausted as such level of generality fails to state a

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claim in federal habeas. 

Claim 97 – The Death Sentence Fails Intra-Case Proportionality

Petitioner asserts: “The California Constitution requires intra-case proportionality

review (determination of whether sentence is proportional to the individual culpability of

petitioner). The trial court’s failure to conduct such a review violates petitioner’s Fourth, Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Amended Petition at 298. In making this nonsequitur, i.e., except for the creation of liberty interests, a violation of state law cannot itself give

rise to a violation of the federal Constitution, petitioner in essence requests that this court overrule

the state supreme court’s decision that petitioner was sufficiently culpable. Lewis, 25 Cal. 4th at

678, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684. This court may not override the state court’s determination under

state law. Bonin v. California, 59 F.3d 815, 841 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor does petitioner cite to a

Supreme Court case which is sufficiently applicable to the principle which he would like to

establish.

Claim 98 – Failure to Require Written Findings By the Jury

Neither state law nor the federal Constitution requires written findings by a jury. 

Petitioner cites no case which requires such. The claim is meritless.

Claim 99 – California Death Penalty Statute Fails to Narrow the Population of

Death Penalty Eligible Defendants, Especially Felony Murder Defendants

In footnote 11 of Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002), the court

held:

Because our decision entitles Karis to a new sentencing hearing, we

do not address his other claims of error at the penalty phase with the

exception of his constitutional challenge of California's sentencing

scheme. With regard to this claim, we reject Karis’ argument that

the scheme does not adequately narrow the class of persons eligible

for the death penalty. The California statute satisfies the narrowing

requirement set forth in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct.

2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). The special circumstances in

California apply to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder

and are not unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 972, 103 S.Ct.

2733. The selection requirement is also satisfied by an

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individualized determination on the basis of the character of the

individual and the circumstances of the crime. See id. California

has identified a subclass of defendants deserving of death and by

doing so, it has “narrowed in a meaningful way the category of

defendants upon whom capital punishment may be imposed.” Arave

v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 476, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188

(1993).

Petitioner claims that the above quote is dicta. It is not. The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed

a claim made in the case and ruled adversely to it. Petitioner cites no Supreme Court case at odds

with Karis. That is the end of the matter.

Claim 100 – California Death Penalty Statute is Unconstitutional Because it is

Vague and Uses Otherwise Improper Aggravating Circumstances

Again, Karis held that California special circumstances are not unconstitutionally

vague. To the extent that petitioner attacks the aggravating circumstances as being vague, the

undersigned does not understand the argument. Petitioner argues in his Opposition at page 97

that as applied to him the aggravating factors were vague. In the same paragraph, petitioner then

faults his trial counsel for not producing evidence during the penalty phase regarding mitigation,

and that therefore, no “individualized determination on the basis of the character of the

individual” was possible. The argument does not follow a logical path with respect to vagueness

of aggravating factors, and the undersigned will not construct a traditional vagueness analysis of

all the factors sua sponte. 

Claim 101– California’s Death Penalty Statute is Unconstitutional Because it

Fails to Require Inter-Case Review

Petitioner cites no reasonably pertinent Supreme Court case for the proposition that

inter-case or comparative review among other capital defendants is required in order for a death

sentence to be valid. The undersigned is not aware of any such authority. The case cited by

petitioner, Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984) stands for the precise opposite

proposition as proffered by petitioner – that is, no comparative analysis is required. The claim is

meritless under AEDPA.

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Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that all claims identified as raised in these

motions, see Introduction, do not warrant the grant of a habeas corpus petition; summary

judgment should be awarded to respondent on all claims at issue herein. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that unless otherwise provided below, the claims

identified in the Introduction as remaining to be adjudicated will be adjudicated after evidentiary

hearing. After consultation with the undersigned’s clerk, petitioner and respondent shall choose a

date in June 2007 for the commencement of the evidentiary hearing. No later than February 8

2007, petitioner and respondent shall agree on those claims for which discovery shall be

permitted, and shall submit a stipulation and order by that date to this effect. In the event that 

petitioner and respondent cannot agree on discovery, said disagreements shall be the subject of a

court hearing on February 22, 2007. On February 15, 2007, the parties shall file a joint statement

of disputed discovery and issues pertinent thereto. All discovery, including expert discovery, shall

close on May 1, 2007. That is all responses and depositions shall have been scheduled prior to

this date. All discovery motions shall have been filed prior to this date, and noticed as near as

possible to May 1, 2007.

Experts shall be disclosed by petitioner on February 28, 2007; respondent shall

disclose experts by April 1, 2007. Each party’s disclosures shall be accompanied with the

information required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). Should a party desire to take depositions of

adverse experts, such discovery is authorized by this Order.

Each party shall serve an exhibit list, as well as copies of all exhibits, on the

adverse party no less than two weeks prior to evidentiary hearing. All objections to exhibits shall

be heard at evidentiary hearing. Also two weeks prior to hearing, each party shall file a witness

list identifying those persons, by name address and telephone number, who will testify at

evidentiary hearing. Failure to include an exhibit or witness on a list shall preclude that exhibit

from admission or that witness from testifying.

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Respondent may file a motion, no later than March 16, 2007, if respondent believes

that a claim or claims scheduled for evidentiary hearing would be precluded by 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

The hearing shall be noticed for hearing date as soon as possible, but in no event later than May

10, 2007.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 1/22/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:gh:035

lewi0013.sj

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