Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00431/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00431-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MATTHEW R. BALGORD, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-00431-KD-B

 : 

PLEASURE ISLAND LAND CO., INC., :

et al., :

 :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Matthew R. 

Balgord’s Motion to Remand. (Doc. 14). The motion, which has 

been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution, has been referred 

to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c). Upon 

consideration of all matters presented, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS, for the reasons stated herein, that Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Remand (Doc. 14) be GRANTED, and that this action be 

REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama.

I. Background Facts

Plaintiff Matthew R. Balgord (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or 

“Balgord”) commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Baldwin

County, Alabama on August 12, 2014 against Defendants Pleasure 

Island Land Company, Inc., (hereinafter “PILC”), James E. 

Bridges, III, (hereinafter “Bridges”) and PNC Bank, National 

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Association (hereinafter “PNC Bank”). (Doc. 1-1 at 1). In the 

complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he purchased two properties in 

Orange Beach, Alabama, namely 32571 River Road (hereinafter 

“River Road”) and 32516 Sandpiper Drive (hereinafter 

“Sandpiper”), and that both properties were financed by 

mortgages secured from Gulf State Bank. According to Plaintiff, 

Gulf State Bank serviced the loans, and pursuant to the parties’ 

agreement, Gulf State Bank made automatic draft deductions from 

Plaintiff’s checking account held with the Bank. In 2008, RBC 

acquired First Gulf Bank, and continued to draft from 

Plaintiff’s checking account the funds necessary to service the 

mortgage debt on the River Road and Sandpiper properties. (Id.

at 3). Later, in 2012, PNC Bank acquired RBC, and Plaintiff was 

advised that if his loan payments were being drafted from his 

checking account, the payments “would migrate successfully.” 

(Id.) According to Plaintiff, notwithstanding PNC Bank’s 

representations, it failed to properly service his loans, and he 

suffered damages as a result.

Plaintiff further alleges that in 2007, he leased the 

Sandpiper property to Defendant Bridges, an attorney who was 

providing legal representation to him at the time. Bridges 

signed the Sandpiper lease as president of Pleasure Island Land 

Co. (Id. at 3). Later, the lease was modified into an agreement 

that provided for the purchase of the Sandpiper property by PILC 

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for $575,000. (Id. at 4-5). Per the parties’ agreement, PILC 

was responsible for making 15 monthly payments in the amount of

$2,050, and a final balloon payment on February 1, 2011. (Id.) 

In addition to the modified lease agreement, Plaintiff and PILC 

also executed a vendor’s lien deed. (Id. at 3). As before, 

Bridges signed the documents as president of Pleasure Island 

Land Co. (Id.)

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is a resident 

of Alabama, that Bridges is a resident of Alabama, that PILC is 

an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in 

Alabama, and that PNC Bank is a District of Columbia corporation 

with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. (Id. at 

1). In count one, Plaintiff asserts a breach of contract claim 

against PILC based on its failure to fulfill its obligations 

under the parties’ modified lease agreement and vendor’s lien

deed. (Id. at 4-5). In count two, Plaintiff asserts that 

Defendant Bridges is the alter ego of PILC such that personal 

liability should be imposed on him for the liabilities and 

obligations of PILC. In count three, Plaintiff asserts a breach 

of fiduciary claim against Defendant Bridges and argues that 

Bridges represented Plaintiff in legal matters, including the 

Sandpiper lease transaction, and that Bridges failed to 

represent Plaintiff’s best interests. (Id. at 6-7). In count 

four, Plaintiff contends that Bridges and PILC have been 

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unjustly enriched in that they have accepted and retained the 

benefit and value of the Sandpiper property while failing to pay 

the amounts due under the parties’ agreement. (Id. at 7-8). In 

Court five, Plaintiff asserts a breach of contract claim again 

PNC Bank based on its failure to service his loans by properly 

drafting his checking account. (Id. at 8) In count six, 

Plaintiff alleges that PNC Bank acted negligently and wantonly 

in failing to properly service his loans. (Id. at 9). In count 

seven, Plaintiff alleges that PNC Bank has defamed him by 

falsely reporting to credit agencies that his mortgages are in 

default despite the fact that it is PNC Bank’s failure to 

properly service the loans that caused the problems. (Id. at 

10). In count eight, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary and 

permanent injunction prohibiting PNC Bank from foreclosing on 

the Sandpiper and River Road properties. (Id. at 11).

On September 15, 2014, Defendant PNC Bank filed a Notice of 

Removal. (Doc. 1). In the Notice, PNC Bank asserts that the 

citizenship of Defendants PILC and Bridges should be disregarded 

because they have been fraudulently joined. (Id. at 9). PNC 

Bank argues that there are no common facts or issues with 

respect to Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants, nor is 

there any joint or several liability among PNC Bank and the nondiverse Defendants. (Id. at 11). PNC Bank contends that given 

the lack of connection between the claims, the citizenship of 

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PILC and Bridges should be disregarded because they have been 

misjoined. 1

Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand on October 14, 

2014. (Docs. 13, 14). In the motion, Plaintiff concedes that 

the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000. (Doc. 13

at 7). However, Plaintiff argues that diversity jurisdiction is 

lacking because there is not complete diversity among the 

parties. According to Plaintiff, PNC Bank has failed to meet 

its burden of establishing that Bridges and PILC have been 

improperly joined in this action. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that 

the joinder of PNC Bank, PILC and Bridges into “a single action 

advances the express purposes of Rule 20 of the Alabama Rules of 

Civil Procedure [by] “promot[ing] trial convenience, 

prevent[ing] a multiplicity of suits, and expedit[ing] the final 

determination of litigation by inclusion in one suit of all 

parties directly interested in the controversy despite technical 

objections previously existing in many situations. Committee 

Comments to ALA. R.Civ.P.20.” (Id. at 18-19). Plaintiff 

further asserts that PNC Bank has also failed to establish that 

the joinder of PILC and Bridges is “so egregious as to 

constitute fraudulent joinder.” (Id.).

 1 PNC Bank also asserts that the amount in controversy has been 

met because Plaintiff is requesting injunctive relief in the 

form of an order preventing foreclosure on the Sandpiper and 

River Road properties which the Tax Accessor has valued at 

amounts significantly higher than $75,000. (Id. at 4-6).

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In response, PNC Bank argues that the joinder of the nondiverse Defendants is fraudulent because Plaintiff’s claims 

against the non-diverse Defendants do not arise from the same 

alleged transaction, occurrence or same set of operative facts 

as Plaintiff’s claims against PNC Bank. (Doc. 23).

II. Analysis

A removing defendant must establish the propriety of 

removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and, therefore, must establish 

the existence of federal jurisdiction. See Friedman v. New York 

Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1353 (llth Cir. 2005) (“[I]n 

removal cases, the burden is on the party who sought removal to 

demonstrate that federal jurisdiction exists.”) (citation 

omitted). Because removal infringes upon state sovereignty and 

implicates central concepts of federalism, removal statutes must 

be construed narrowly, with all doubts resolved in favor of 

remand. See University of S. Ala. v. American Tobacco Co., 168 

F.3d 405, 411 (llth Cir. 1999). “[T]here is a presumption 

against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all 

uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in 

favor of remand.” Russell Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 

264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001). 

This action was removed by PNC Bank pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§§ 14412 and 14463 on the basis of diversity of citizenship under 

28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1) Where the alleged basis for federal 

jurisdiction is diversity under § 1332, the removing defendant 

has the burden of demonstrating that there is (1) complete 

diversity of citizenship and (2) an amount-in-controversy 

greater than $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also

University of South Alabama, 168 F.3d at 412 (“Where 

jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, all 

plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants.”).4

 2 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides, in relevant part:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by 

Act of Congress, any civil action brought in 

a State court of which the district courts 

of the United States have original 

jurisdiction, may be removed by the 

defendant or the defendants, to the district 

court of the United States for the district 

and division embracing the place where such 

action is pending. 

3 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides:

The notice of removal of a civil action or 

proceeding shall be filed within 30 days 

after the receipt by the defendant, through 

service or otherwise, of a copy of the 

initial pleading setting forth the claim for 

relief upon which such action or proceeding 

is based, or within 30 days after the 

service of summons upon the defendant if 

such initial pleading has then been filed in 

court and is not required to be served on 

the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

4 The parties do not dispute that the amount in controversy 

requirement has been met, nor do they dispute the timeliness of 

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As noted supra, Plaintiff alleges that removal is improper 

because the Court lacks complete diversity. The parties agree 

that Defendant PNC Bank is a citizen of Delaware for purposes of 

determining diversity jurisdiction and that Plaintiff, as well 

as Defendants PILC and Bridges, are all citizens of the State of 

Alabama, a fact that, on its face, destroys diversity. However, 

as noted, PNC Bank contends that the non-diverse Defendants have 

been fraudulently joined in an effort to defeat complete 

diversity; thus, the citizenship of non-diverse Defendants PILC 

and Bridges cannot be considered for purposes of determining 

diversity jurisdiction. 

“The determination of whether a resident defendant has been 

fraudulently joined must be based upon the plaintiff’s pleadings 

at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits and 

deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.” Pacheco de 

Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998). The 

proceeding appropriate “for resolving a claim of fraudulent 

joinder is similar to that used for ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).” Crowe v. 

Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting B, Inc. 

v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981)). 

In such a proceeding, the district court must “resolve all 

 

Defendants’ removal. The dispute in this case centers solely on 

the diversity requirement.

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questions of fact . . . in favor of the plaintiff.” Cabalceta 

v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Additionally, any uncertainties about substantive state law must 

be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538. 

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, joinder is fraudulent in 

three situations: (1) when there is no possibility that the 

plaintiff can prove a cause of action against the resident 

defendant; (2) when there is outright fraud in the plaintiff’s 

pleading of jurisdictional facts; and (3) when a diverse 

defendant is joined with a nondiverse defendant as to whom there 

is no joint, several, or alternative liability and where the 

claim against the diverse defendant has no real connection to 

the claim against the nondiverse defendant. See Triggs v. John 

Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998); accord

Loop v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of North America, 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 31322, *10, 2009 WL 981988, *4 (S.D. Ala. 2009).

The burden of proving fraudulent joinder rests with the 

removing party. See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th 

Cir. 1997). In evaluating whether there has been fraudulent 

joinder, all allegations and submissions must be viewed in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, and "the district court 

should resolve all questions of fact and controlling law in 

favor of the plaintiff . . . ." See Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit 

Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.1989); Crowe, 113 F.3d at 

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1538. Further, as observed by the Eleventh Circuit in Tapscott

v. MS Dealer Service Corp., 77 F. 3d 1353, 1360 (llth Cir. 

1996), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, 

Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (llth Cir. 2000), mere misjoinder is not 

enough to establish fraudulent joinder. Only in egregious 

circumstances does misjoinder constitute fraudulent joinder. See

Tapscott, 77 F. 3d at 1360 (rejected assertion that a 

misjoinder, no matter how egregious, is not fraudulent joinder). 

In Tapscott, the plaintiff filed a class action in state 

court against an “automobile” class of defendants regarding the 

sale and financing of automobile service contracts. The 

plaintiff later amended his complaint to add a claim against a 

“merchant” class of defendants involved in the sale of retail 

extended service contracts. Id. at 1354. At the trial level, 

the plaintiff argued that the claims could be joined because 

both classes engaged in similar business practices. The trial 

court rejected the argument, and on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 

held that the misjoinder of two separate classes — an 

“automobile” class and a “merchant” class constituted a 

fraudulent joinder because defendants in the “automobile” class 

had “no real connection with the controversy” involving the 

“merchant” class and the only similarity between the class 

allegations were that both classes violated a particular 

provision of the Alabama Code. Under those circumstances, the 

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Court found that the attempt to join the classes was “so 

egregious” as to constitute a fraudulent joinder. Id. at 1360.

Although the Tapscott Court did not define what constitutes 

egregious misjoinder, it would appear that a finding of 

egregiousness “depend[s] upon the extent to which the resident, 

non-diverse defendant has ‘any real connection with the 

controversy’ involving the diverse defendant.” Luke v. O’Hearn,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36495, *6 (M.D. Ga. March 20, 2014)(citing 

Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S. Ct. 

35, 66 L. Ed. 144 (1921)); see also Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1288-90

(although plaintiff asserted claims against two different 

classes, court held that the plaintiff’s allegations arose out 

of a series of transactions, which would give rise to common 

questions of law and fact; thus, there was no fraudulent 

joinder). 

In this case, PNC Bank argues that Plaintiff’s claims 

against PNC Bank and his claims against non-diverse Defendants 

PILC and Bridges are totally unrelated and share no common facts 

or issues. (Docs. 1, 23). Specifically, PNC Bank points to the 

fact that it is not referenced in any of the claims that 

Plaintiff has asserted against Defendants PILC and Bridges, and 

likewise, PILC and Bridges are not referenced in any of the 

claims asserted against PNC Bank. (Doc. 23 at 5). PNC Bank also 

argues that the claims against it involve the servicing of 

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Plaintiff’s mortgage loans, including the Sandpiper and the 

River Road properties, whereas Plaintiff’s claims against PILC 

and Bridges relate to their lease agreement, modified lease 

agreement and vendor’s lien deed for the Sandpiper property. 

PNC Bank asserts that it is not a party to Plaintiff’s lease 

agreement, modified lease agreement, or vendor’s lien deed for 

the Sandpiper property, and as a result, there is no joint or 

several liability between PNC Bank and the non-diverse 

Defendants, nor is there any basis for finding the existence of 

a logical relationship between Plaintiff’s claim against PNC 

Bank and the non-diverse Defendants. (Id.)

Additionally, PNC Bank notes that the default by nondiverse Defendants PILC and Bridges is alleged to have occurred 

in February 2011, whereas the breach by PNC Bank is alleged to 

have occurred more than a year later in March 2012. According 

to PNC Bank, “Plaintiff’s long delay in taking action against 

the other Defendants shows that Plaintiff has joined the other 

Defendants in hopes of using claims with no logical relationship 

to his claims against PNC [Bank] to prevent this Court from 

exercising jurisdiction. 5 (Id. at 7-8)

Plaintiff in turn argues that PNC Bank has failed to show, 

by clear and convincing evidence that PILC and Bridges were 

 5 PNC Bank also argues that Plaintiff’s claims against the 

nondiverse Defendants should be severed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 

21.

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fraudulently joined under Rule 20, and has further failed to

show that their joinder was egregious so as to constitute 

fraudulent joinder. (Doc. 31). According to Plaintiff, his 

claims against PNC Bank and the non-diverse Defendants are 

logically related because “[t]he conduct of and threatened 

foreclosure by the removing diverse defendant (PNC Bank) coupled 

with the activity of and default by the non-diverse defendants 

(PILC and Bridges) has interfered with Plaintiff’s interest in 

the Sandpiper Drive property and contributed to Plaintiff’s 

damages. (Id. at 12).

Plaintiff asserts that if PILC had made the payments

required under the vendor’s lien deed, he could have satisfied 

PNC Bank’s mortgage on the Sandpiper property, and that the 

Bank’s mismanagement of his accounts also caused the Sandpiper 

property, which is occupied by Bridges and PILC, to go into 

default. (Id.). Plaintiff maintains that PNC Bank’s conduct 

resulted in PILC and Bridges filing a counterclaim against 

Plaintiff for breach of contract; thus, even if PNC Bank had not 

been an original party to the action against PILC and Bridges, 

the counterclaim by the non-diverse Defendants would have 

compelled the joinder of PNC Bank as a party because the Bank’s 

threatened foreclosure would inevitably extinguish Plaintiff’s 

vendor’s lien deed on the Sandpiper property. (Id. at 6-7). 

Plaintiff further asserts that PNC Bank has failed to present 

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evidence that the joinder was egregious.

The Court begins its analysis by determining whether the 

non-diverse Defendants could have been permissively joined in 

this action against PNC Bank. “If permissive joinder is 

appropriate, then there obviously can be no fraudulent joinder; 

but as noted, a finding of improper joinder is not dispositive 

of fraudulent joinder. Instead, if permissive joinder is not 

appropriate, the Court must look closer to determine whether 

there is such a lack of connection between the claims that not 

only is joinder improper, but it is clearly or obviously so. 

Luke v. O’Hearn, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36495. 

Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure provide 

that persons may be joined as defendants in a single action if 

“(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, 

severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out 

of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions 

or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to 

all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2); 

see also Rule 20, Ala.R.Civ.P. (using near identical language in 

Alabama’s permissive joinder rule). 6

 6 Rule 20, Ala.R.Civ.P. provides, in pertinent part:

All persons may be joined in one action as 

defendants if there is asserted against them 

jointly, severally, or in the alternative, 

any right to relief in respect of or arising 

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Based upon the record before the Court, the undersigned 

finds that PNC Bank is correct to the extent it argues that 

Plaintiff’s claims in this action against PNC Bank are based on 

mortgage loans secured by the PNC Bank and serviced by the PNC 

Bank whereas, his claims against non-diverse Defendants PILC and 

Bridges are based on wholly separate and distinct contracts, 

namely the Sandpiper lease, modified lease agreement, and the 

vendor’s lien deed between Plaintiff and PILC. Plaintiff does 

not allege and there is nothing before the Court suggesting that 

PNC Bank was a party to the Sandpiper lease, modified lease, or 

the vendor’s lien deed, or that it had any involvement with 

these contracts. However, there is no question that the 

Sandpiper property is at the heart of Plaintiff’s claims against 

all of the Defendants, and that resolution of the claims will 

necessarily involve a common issue, namely the determination of 

Plaintiff’s rights and obligations with respect to the Sandpiper 

property. Thus, under the circumstances, the joinder of PNC 

Bank and the non-diverse Defendants appears to be permissible 

under Rule 20. 

Even if the joinder of these Defendants was not 

 

out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 

series of transactions or occurrences and if 

any question of law or fact common to all 

defendants will arise in the action. A 

plaintiff or defendant need not be 

interested in obtaining or defending against 

all the relief demanded.

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permissible, PNC Bank has not carried its burden of establishing 

that the joinder of the non-diverse Defendants was egregious. 

The fact that the non-diverse Defendants are alleged to have 

breached their contracts with Plaintiff in 2011, which is a year 

before PNC Bank’s alleged breach, does not establish that their 

joinder was egregious particularly where Plaintiff has alleged 

that the actions of all of the Defendants have damaged his 

rights with respect to the Sandpiper property. “To find 

fraudulent joinder, the joinder must be shown to be more than 

impermissible; it must be egregiously or obviously so.” Hearn, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36495, *8. Because PNC Bank has not 

carried its burden of establishing fraudulent misjoinder, the 

Court is not authorized to ignore the citizenship of non-diverse 

Defendants PICL and Bridges. The presence of these non-diverse 

Defendants means that complete diversity is lacking, and 

deprives this Court of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is due to be granted.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 14) be 

GRANTED, and that this action be REMANDED to the Circuit Court 

of Baldwin County, Alabama. 

Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

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all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who 

objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within 

fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file 

specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 

72.4. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, 

state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 30th day of December, 2014.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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