Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-56453/USCOURTS-ca9-09-56453-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL DEMIRDJIAN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CONNIE GIPSON, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-56453

D.C. No.

2:04-cv-08245-GHK-JTL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. King, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 12, 2014

Pasadena, California

Filed August 10, 2016

Before: John T. Noonan, Jr., Kim McLane Wardlaw

and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher;

Dissent by Judge Noonan

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2 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment

dismissing California state prisoner Michael Demirdjian’s

habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and

sentence for murdering two teenage boys with intent to inflict

torture, committed when Demirdjian was 15 years old.

Demirdjian claimed that his counsel was ineffective by

failing to challenge statements by the prosecutor as either

improper comments on Demirdjian’s decision not to testify,

in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), or

improper shifting of the burden of proof to the defense. 

Under the deferential standard required by AEDPA, the panel

concluded that there is a reasonable argument that, because

there was no prosecutorial error, defense counsel’s decision

to rebut the prosecution’s comments directly rather than

object at trial or on appeal was adequate, and that this strategy

did not undermine the reliability of Demirdjian’s conviction. 

Demirdjian also claimed that his sentence of two

consecutive terms of 25 years to life violates the Eighth

Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455

(2012), because it is the “functional equivalent” of a

mandatory life-without-parole sentence and he was a juvenile

offender. Applying the deferential AEDPA standard, the

panel held that there is a reasonable argument that the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 3

sentence is constitutional because it actually allows for the

possibility of parole.

Dissenting, Judge Noonan wrote that trial counsel’s

performance was constitutionally deficient because he failed

to object to the prosecution’s improper attempts at burden

shifting, multiple Griffin errors, and pleas to the jurors’

passions; that this deficient performance influenced the jury’s

verdict; and that no reasonable argument exists to the

contrary.

COUNSEL

Mark J. Geragos (argued), Geragos & Geragos, Los Angeles,

California, for Petition-Appellant.

Jason Tran (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Kenneth C.

Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Lance E.

Winters, Senior Assistant AttorneyGeneral; Dane R. Gillette,

Chief Assistant Attorney General; Kamala D. Harris,

Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Los

Angeles, California; for Respondent-Appellee.

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4 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Michael Demirdjian appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 habeas petition. In 2001, he was convicted of

murdering two teenage boys with intent to inflict torture; he

was 15 years old at the time of the crimes. During closing

argument, the prosecution repeatedly commented on the

defense’s failure to explain key incriminating evidence or use

competent evidence to support its exculpatory theories. 

Instead of objecting, defense counsel rebutted the comments

by giving non-incriminating explanations of the evidence and

reminding the jury the prosecution bore the burden of proof. 

Demirdjian was later sentenced to two consecutive terms of

25 years to life.

In his habeas petition, Demirdjian claims his counsel was

ineffective by failing to challenge the prosecution’s

statements as either improper comments on Demirdjian’s

decision not to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), or improper shifting of the burden

of proof to the defense. He also claims his sentence violates

the Eighth Amendment because it is the “functional

equivalent” of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence, and

he was a juvenile offender. The district court denied habeas

relief on both claims.

We affirm under the deferential standard required by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA). Under AEDPA, the question is not whether we

think Demirdjian received ineffective assistance or an

unconstitutional sentence, but whether there is anyreasonable

argument to the contrary. We conclude there is. First, there

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 5

is a reasonable argument that, because there was no actual

prosecutorial error, defense counsel’s decision to rebut the

prosecution’s comments directly rather than object at trial or

on appeal was adequate, and this strategy did not undermine

the reliability of Demirdjian’s conviction. Second, there is a

reasonable argument Demirdjian’s sentence is constitutional

because it actually allows for the possibility of parole.

I. Background

On the evening of Saturday, July 22, 2000, petitioner

Michael Demirdjian, then 15, played basketball at a local

park with 13-year-old Chris McCulloch and 14-year-old

Blaine Talmo, Jr. Around 9:50 p.m., he left with the boys to

go to a nearby school. The next evening, McCulloch and

Talmo were found on a playground a few blocks away – dead

from multiple blunt force trauma. Next to Talmo’s battered

head, officers found a 16-pound rock stained with both

victims’ blood. A 12-foot bench weighing more than 60

pounds lay across McCulloch’s chest and neck. The right

front pocket of Talmo’s pants was pulled out, as if emptied. 

A trail of bloody shoe prints indicated someone had walked

away from the scene to an outside sink stained with

McCulloch’s blood.

Police later found traces of McCulloch’s blood on

Demirdjian’s doorjamb. In Demirdjian’s trash were Talmo’s

alarm clock and wallet – with some of the contents burned –

and a pair of recently cleaned, but still bloody, sneakers. The

discarded sneakers matched the bloody shoe prints, two dogs

identified Demirdjian’s scent on the 16-pound rock, and

drops of Demirdjian’s blood were found at the crime scene. 

Demirdjian had fresh cuts on his hands and knuckles and had

lied when asked byTalmo’s stepmother if he had seen Talmo. 

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6 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

The state charged Demirdjian with two counts each of

robbery and murder, with special circumstances for multiple

murders, murder during a robbery and murder involving

torture.

Demirdjian was tried twice. At his first trial, he took the

stand and testified he had witnessed 19-year-old Adam

Walker, a well-known drug dealer, murder the boys, but had

not himself participated in the murders. That trial resulted in

a hung jury, deadlocked at 8–4 in favor of conviction after a

week of deliberations. At his second trial, Demirdjian did not

testify. The prosecution focused on the key physical evidence

tying Demirdjian to the crime scene and implying a guilty

mind. As to motive, the prosecution theorized Demirdjian

and his friend Damian Kim had wanted to “jack” McCulloch

and steal his money because, five days earlier, Walker had

pulled a “jack move” and stolen hundreds of dollars from

Demirdjian and Kim during a fake drug deal. The defense

challenged the reliability of some of the prosecution’s key

evidence, but focused primarilyon introducing circumstantial

evidence that Adam Walker murdered the boys and had his

friends help clean up. Specifically, the defense emphasized

that Walker had scrapes and bruises on his body, and police

found at his friend’s home a washed rug, a blood stain

initially matching the stain on Demirdjian’s door (but later

found not to be a match) and – in the trash – some damp

clothes, gloves and a newspaper article about the crimes.

The first prosecutor to speak at closing, Barshop, noted

the prosecution’s burden of proof, but repeatedly called on

the defense to “explain” certain “unexplainable” evidence,

such as the discarded wallet and clock, the bloody shoe prints

and the blood stain at Demirdjian’s home. Defense counsel,

Mathews, responded with non-incriminating explanations of

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 7

the evidence and stressed that the prosecution bore the burden

of proof. A second prosecutor, Do, spoke on rebuttal,

discrediting the defense’s explanations and theory about

Walker as not based on “reliable, competent evidence.” 

Defense counsel did not object to any of the prosecutors’

statements. The court later instructed the jury that

Demirdjian had a constitutional right not to testify, the jury

could not discuss or draw any inferences from his silence and

the prosecution bore the burden of proof.

The jury deliberated for five days and convicted

Demirdjian of two counts of first-degree murder, with special

circumstances for multiple murders and intentional infliction

of torture. He was acquitted of robbery and specialcircumstance murder during a robbery and was sentenced to

two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. 

On appeal, Demirdjian’s counsel did not directly attack the

prosecution’s closing argument challenges to the defense on

key evidence, but did argue the jury had impermissibly

considered Demirdjian’s silence.

After exhausting his direct appeals, Demirdjian timely

filed a state habeas petition claiming, among other things,

ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s failure to

challenge the prosecution’s closing statements as either

violating Griffin or improperly shifting the burden of proof to

the defense. The trial court summarily denied the petition, as

did the California Court of Appeal, stating the petition “ha[d]

been read and considered.” The California Supreme Court

denied review.

While that petition was pending, the California Attorney

General informed the trial court that Demirdjian’s sentence

likely violated California law because he was only 15 years

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8 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

old at the time of the crimes. After a new sentencing hearing,

Demirdjian was resentenced to two consecutive terms of 25

years to life, making him eligible for parole after 50 years. 

On appeal, he argued his new sentence violated the Eighth

Amendment because he was a juvenile offender. The

California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that no

Supreme Court precedent barred his sentence, see People v.

Demirdjian, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 187–88 (Ct. App. 2006),

and the California Supreme Court again denied review.

Demirdjian timely filed a federal habeas petition. After

the district court dismissed the petition, we granted a

certificate of appealability on two issues: whether

Demirdjian’s counsel was ineffective at trial and on appeal by

failing to raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for Griffin

error and improper burden shifting; and whether Demirdjian’s

sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because he was a

minor at the time of the crimes. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas

petition. See Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir.

2014). Our review is governed by AEDPA, which “bars

relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state

court” unless the state court’s decision satisfies 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) or (2). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98

(2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). AEDPA’s relitigation

bar applies to both Demirdjian’s summarily denied

ineffective assistance claim, see id. at 99–100, and his Eighth

Amendment claim, see id. at 98. The California Court of

Appeal’s decision on each claim is the “relevant state-court

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 9

decision” for purposes of § 2254(d). Murray, 745 F.3d at

996. Accordingly, for each of Demirdjian’s claims, we

cannot grant habeas relief unless the California Court of

Appeal’s decision on that claim was “contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme

Court authority. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).1

This standard is “difficult to meet.” Richter, 562 U.S. at

102. We must “determine what arguments or theories

supported or” – for Demirdjian’s summarily denied

ineffective assistance claim – “could have supported the state

court’s decision” and “whether it is possible fairminded

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the

Supreme] Court.” Id. (emphasis added). We can grant

habeas relief only where the state court’s decision is “so

lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.

It is “all the more difficult” to satisfy § 2254(d)(1) where,

as here, the petitioner raises an ineffective assistance claim. 

Id. at 105. Even on de novo review, the standard for showing

ineffective assistance is “highly deferential.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). When we evaluate an

ineffective assistance claim under § 2254(d)(1), our review is

“doubly deferential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,

123 (2009). If “there is any reasonable argument that counsel

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,” we must deny

habeas relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.

1 Demirdjian’s argument that § 2254(d) does not apply to his summarily

denied ineffective assistance claim is precluded by Richter, 562 U.S. at

99–100. Because he does not contend he is entitled to relief under

§ 2254(d)(2), we consider only § 2254(d)(1).

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10 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

III. Ineffective Assistance Claim

Strickland provides the clearly established law governing

Demirdjian’s ineffective assistance claim. See Gentry v.

Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 899 (9th Cir. 2013) (evaluating an

ineffective assistance claim under AEDPA using Strickland’s

two-pronged test). In Strickland, the Supreme Court made

clear “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just

result.” 466 U.S. at 686. The Court then established a twopronged test for meeting that standard: an individual must

show “counsel’s performance was deficient” and “the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. 

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” 

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). We hold

there is a reasonable argument Demirdjian has failed to do so

here.

A. Deficient Performance

We first consider whether the California Court of Appeal

reasonably could have concluded defense counsel’s

performance was not deficient. Under Strickland’s first

prong, an attorney’s representation is deficient if it “fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as seen

“from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 466 U.S. at 688,

689. Because “it is all too easy” for courts to second guess

errors in hindsight, id. at 689, Strickland mandates a “strong

presumption” that counsel acted “for tactical reasons rather

than through sheer neglect,” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S.

1, 8 (2003) (per curiam). To overcome this strong

presumption, Demirdjian must show counsel’s errors were

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 11

“so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Demirdjian contends his counsel performed deficiently at

trial and on appeal by failing to challenge some of the

statements the prosecution made at closing. Before we can

assess that performance, though, we must determine “whether

the prosecutor’s remarks constituted objectionable

misconduct.” Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th

Cir. 2015). In making that determination, we are mindful that

“an unreasonable application of federal law is different from

an incorrect application of federal law.” Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). AEDPA thus prohibits us from

treating a prosecutorial statement as error if “there is any

reasonable argument” to the contrary. Richter, 562 U.S. at

105.2 Because there is a reasonable argument none of the

statements was error, we hold the California Court of Appeal

reasonably could have concluded counsel’s performance was

not deficient.

2 The parties dispute which law governs that inquiry. Demirdjian

assumes we should apply our own precedents on Griffin and burden

shifting, whereas the state argues only clearly established Supreme Court

authority is relevant, see Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th

Cir. 2009) (“In cases where the Supreme Court has not adequately

addressed a claim, this court cannot use its own precedent to find a state

court ruling unreasonable.”). We do not decide the issue because

Demirdjian would not prevail on this prong even under our own

precedents. Assuming our case law on Griffin and burden shifting applies,

we ask whether Demirdjian has proven prosecutorial error “beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.

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12 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

1. Alleged Griffin Errors

Demirdjian has not shown the prosecution committed

Griffin error beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement. Griffin prohibits “comment by the prosecution

on the accused’s silence.” 380 U.S. at 615. We have

distinguished, however, between permissible “comments

about the lack of explanation provided by the defense” and

impermissible “comments about the lack of explanation

furnished by the defendant.” United States v. Mayans,

17 F.3d 1174, 1185 (9th Cir. 1994). A prosecutor’s remark

thus can “call attention to the defendant’s failure to present

exculpatory evidence,” id., so long as it is not “of such a

character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it

to be a comment on the failure to testify,” Lincoln v. Sunn,

807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987).

The nearly two dozen Griffin errors alleged here fall into

three main groups. The first group, by far the largest, consists

of statements asking defense counsel Mathews to explain

certain “unexplainable” evidence. These statements followed

the same pattern. The first prosecutor, Barshop, highlighted

a piece of incriminating evidence – the cuts on Demirdjian’s

hands, the bloody shoe prints that matched the blood-stained

sneakers in Demirdjian’s trash, the stain of McCulloch’s

blood on Demirdjian’s doorjamb and the discarded wallet and

clock – and offered the prosecution’s explanation. Barshop

then expressly asked defense counsel – not Demirdjian – to

“explain” the evidence in a non-incriminating way.

3 Defense

3 For example, after reasoning Demirdjian’s cuts must have come from

handling the 16-pound rock found at the crime scene, Barshop said:

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 13

counsel Mathews responded on rebuttal by offering nonincriminating explanations of this evidence. The second

prosecutor, Do, then criticized the defense’s explanations as

not based on “reliable, competent evidence.”4

So I say to you, Mr. Mathews, explain it. What is

the explanation for this other than mine? What is the

evidence that is offered other than ours? Where did

these injuries on the Defendant’s hands come from? . . .

. . . .

If you are in a fight or if you are delivering a blow,

where are there injuries? To the knuckles. . . . Is there

any other explanation? Is there any other valid, viable

explanation? I think not. That’s what the testimony

is. . . .

. . . How big do you have to be to pick up a big ass

rock? 16-pound rock. . . . It’s where you cut your

hands. How big do you have to be to hit somebody in

the face? You cut your knuckle. You cannot explain

the unexplainable. It’s not possible.

(Emphasis added.)

 

4

 Do said about Demirdjian’s cuts, for example:

[Demirdjian’s] hands were cut and bruised. How does

Mr. Mathews explain that?

Mr. Barshop asked, “explain it with competent,

reliable, admissible evidence.” Howdoes Mr. Mathews

explain it? Well, Michael Demirdjian was playing

basketball. You know how kids are. They get cuts.

. . . But you’re not getting cut and bleeding at a

crime scene where there are two victims of a double

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14 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

There is a reasonable argument none of these remarks

violated Griffin. No statement directly “comment[ed] . . . on

[Demirjian]’s silence.” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. And we

have upheld similar comments as merely calling attention to

the defense’s failure to explain incriminating evidence or

introduce exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Mayans, 17 F.3d

at 1179, 1186 (“[T]here is no evidence to contradict [the

incriminatorynature of the defendant’s interaction].”); United

States v. Sehnal, 930 F.2d 1420, 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991)

(“[A]sk [defense counsel] if he’s explaining to you why it is

that none of these monies found their way into the corporate

bank account.”); United States v. Wasserteil, 641 F.2d 704,

709 (9th Cir. 1981) (“I asked all the defendants . . . to please

explain to you how this legitimate business transaction

worked . . . . Did you hear an explanation from them?”).

The dissent argues these statements were nevertheless

Griffin error because Demirdjian was the “sole person who

could provide information” on the prosecution’s questions. 

Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 510 (9th Cir. 2010). As

defense counsel’s rebuttal arguments demonstrated, however,

Demirdjian was not necessarilythe only source of explanation

available to the defense.5 Regardless, such comments are

homicide. That’s not a good explanation; not based on

reliable, competent evidence.

(Emphasis added.)

5 On rebuttal, Mathews countered the prosecution’s evidence in the

absence of Demirdjian’s testimony. As Mathews explained, the shoe

prints merely confirmed what the jury already knew: that Demirdjian was

at the crime scene. There was not “even one syllable of medical or

scientific evidence” that Demirdjian’s cuts came from handling a rock, he

added, and they were too healed to have come from the time of the

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 15

impermissible only where there are “very clear signals that

the defendant himself, rather than the defense generally, was

being discussed.” Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1185; see Sehnal,

930 F.2d at 1424 (prosecutor improperly used the rhetorical

tag “ask him” to refer to the defendant); Lincoln, 807 F.2d at

809 & n.1 (prosecutor improperly said the defendant was the

“only . . . person who can tell us”); United States v. Sigal,

572 F.2d 1320, 1322–23 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor

improperly said “the defendants did not deny” heading up

part of the conspiracy). Here, the prosecutors’ focus on the

defense’s failure to introduce “competent, admissible

evidence” arguably was not a very clear signal that

Demirdjian was being discussed. See, e.g., Rhoades,

598 F.3d at 511 (holding that the statement, “If there was

evidence out there that would disassociate this gun from [the

defendant], we’d have heard it,” was not Griffin error because

a “natural reading” was “there was no meaningful challenge

to the government’s evidence”).

The second group of statements came from Do’s rebuttal

closing, where she commented on evidence indicating

Demirdjian had a guilty mind. Do asked counsel to explain

why the contents of Talmo’s wallet were burned and why

Demirdjian had lied to Talmo’s stepmother about whether he

had seen Talmo:

murders. Defense counsel further reasoned the blood stain on

Demirdjian’s doorjamb must have been planted by the police because

McCulloch’s blood was not found anywhere else in Demirdjian’s home

and the prosecution had previously “influence[d] the evidence.” And he

argued the wallet and clock could not have been taken from Talmo’s body

because there were no fingerprints or blood on them.

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16 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

What Mr. Mathews has given is

alternative facts. . . .

How does he explain the fact that the

contents [of Talmo’s wallet] are burned, and

ripped-out, and thrown out with his bloody

shoes? He hasn’t. . . . Has he given you any

explanation for why Michael Demirdjian is

destroying evidence? Any explanation for

why Michael Demirdjian is concealing

evidence?

. . . .

Now, Mr. Mathews wants you to believe

that there’s no way Michael Demirdjian

would harm these two boys because they’re

his friends. Just think about it. . . . 

[Demirdjian] looks at [Talmo’s stepmother]

and he tells her, “I don’t know where they are. 

I haven’t seen them. I’m expecting a phone

call.”

How do you explain that? He certainly

was not Chris McCulloch and Blaine Talmo’s

friends [sic].

(Emphasis added.) Although on de novo review this would

be a closer case, there is at least a reasonable argument these

statements merely commented on the defense’s “failure to

present exculpatory evidence.” Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1185.

Again, none directly “comment[ed] . . . on the accused’s

silence.” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. The first statement, which

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 17

Do expressly addressed to defense counsel, arguably did not

contain “very clear signals” she was referring to Demirdjian

in particular. Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1185. At one point, Do

used the pronoun “he” to refer to both Mathews and

Demirdjian, but the referents are clear enough from context

that the comment need not have “naturally and necessarily”

called for an explanation from Demirdjian himself. Lincoln,

807 F.2d at 809 (emphasis added). For the other two

statements, Do was not necessarily asking the jury to “treat

the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt,”

United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988) (quoting

Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976)), but could

have been permissibly using his earlier lies to discredit the

theory that he was friends with the victims.6

In the final group of statements, Do directly addressed the

defense’s theory that Adam Walker was the murderer. At

trial, defense counsel had presented only circumstantial

evidence to show Walker was the murderer. During closing,

however, Mathews suggested one of Walker’s friends, Greg

Furnish, had seen Walker at the crime scene: “There was one

witness to the murders,” Mathews told the jury, “and it was

not Michael Demirdjian.”7 Mathews also twice suggested

6 Demirdjian points to Barshop’s invitation to determine “[w]hat’s going

on in Michael Demirdjian’s mind,” given that his computer had material

on “[k]illing somebody with a big ass rock.” There is a reasonable

argument this invitation, too, did not comment on Demirdjian’s silence,

but merely pointed out that the jury needed to determine Demirdjian’s

mental state.

7

 Defense counsel never elicited this testimony from Furnish, who was

a witness for the prosecution. On cross-examination, Furnish testified that

Walker had been partying with him all night on the night of the murders,

and that “Adam Walker had nothing to do with this murder.”

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18 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

Demirdjian “saw Adam Walker” at the crime scene – the

second time over the prosecution’s objection. Though

recognizing defense counsel’s remarks were “error,” the trial

court ruled that, to avoid any Griffin error in response, the

prosecution could not “comment” on what Demirdjian saw,

but was “free to comment on” how the defense’s theory lay

“outside any evidence that has been received in this trial.” 

On rebuttal, Prosecutor Do told the jury, “You’ve heard no

testimony, no evidence from this witness stand, that puts

Adam Walker at that crime scene.” And a few times she

called the defense’s theory “smoke and mirrors” or “a bunch

of smoke screens to hide Michael Demirdjian.”

Do’s first statement was troublesome, but arguably

permissible in context. Consistent with the trial court’s

ruling, Do ostensibly highlighted the problems with the

defense’s circumstantial evidence before concluding there

was “no testimony, no evidence” actually placing Walker at

the crime scene. Because she never singled out Demirdjian

as a possible witness – and there was another possible witness

in Furnish – her remarks arguably constituted “legitimate

comment . . . on the weaknesses in the defense case.” 

Robinson, 485 U.S. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see Mayans, 17 F.3d at 1179, 1186 (upholding statement that

“there is no evidence to contradict [the prosecution’s theory]”

given “there [wa]s nothing to single out the defendant from

his case in general”). Do’s “smoke and mirrors” comments,

too, arguablywere “directed to ‘the strength of the defense on

the merits’” and thus were not an impermissible “ad hominem

attack on defense counsel.” United States v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d

1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Nobari,

574 F.3d 1065, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009)). As Do explained, she

was highlighting “each and every area Mr. Mathews has

raised that I believe are smoke and mirrors to trick you into

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 19

believing there’s something there that really isn’t.” See

United States v. Del Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136, 1150–51

(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that similar remarks in another case

only “may have crossed the line”).8

The dissent assumes the prosecution’s remarks, taken

together, necessarily commented on Demirdjian’s silence. 

Dissent at 40–41. We agree the prosecution’s statements

were aggressive, and some were close enough to crossing the

line that, on de novo review, they would present a closer case. 

But “AEDPA demands more.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. No

statement directly called attention to Demirdjian’s failure to

testify; and each statement, whether in isolation or in

conjunction with others, reasonably could be understood as

calling attention to the defense’s failure to present

exculpatory evidence. Because we cannot say any statement

violated Griffin “beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement,” id. at 103, the California Court of Appeal

reasonablycould have concluded there were no Griffin errors.

2. Alleged Burden Shifting

Demirdjian has not shown the prosecution clearly shifted

the burden of proof to the defense. Barshop began his

argument by emphasizing the jury must “decide the case

based on the facts that you analyze,” and characterizing

counsel’s presentation of the defense as “attack[ing]”

8 Demirdjian further argues the prosecution’s remarks violated Griffin

because two jurors later said they “should have heard from Michael

Demirdjian.” But the jurors’ comments arguably indicated only that the

jury might have interpreted the remarks in a way that would constitute

Griffin error, not that it “naturally and necessarily” did so. Rhoades,

598 F.3d at 510.

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20 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

Talmo’s stepmother, “infer[ring]” the facts were

“compromised” because Talmo’s father was a deputy sheriff

and claiming Demirdjian’s race was the “reason” for the firstdegree murder charge. “In the bottom of the line,” he said:

[I]t is always easier to attack a case than to

defend it. And it is clear that the People have

the burden of proof, and that will be an

instruction that you receive.

But attack the case with real evidence,

with competent evidence, not meanness, not

nastiness. 

(Emphasis added.) Asserting that “the evidence supports a

theory that clearly the defendant is a perpetrator,” Barshop

then asked defense counsel, “What is the evidence that is

offered other than ours?” with respect to Demirdjian’s cuts,

and invited counsel to explain the blood on the doorjamb

“[b]y competent, admissible evidence. . . . Not by way of

hypothesis, not by way of attorney spin, but by evidence

admissible in a court of law.” Do echoed Barshop’s

argument during rebuttal, saying, “The evidence is what

comes off this witness stand, not what from the attorneys say

or spin.” She also twice quoted Barshop’s refrain in rebutting

counsel’s explanations of the blood stains and Demirdjian’s

cuts, each time arguing Mathews had not explained the

evidence with “competent, reliable, admissible evidence.”

Demirdjian contends these statements impermissibly

implied he had a duty or burden to produce evidence. But we

rejected a similar burden-shifting claim under a plain-error

standard in United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696 (9th Cir.

1995), where the prosecution repeatedly told the jury there

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 21

was “no evidence” the defendant, who had been charged with

distributing methamphetamine, had ever had a job aside from

drug dealing. Id. at 701–02 (citing United States v. Mares,

940 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1991)). We reasoned such

“comment on [the defendant’s] failure to present exculpatory

evidence” was permissible because it did not “expressly or

implicitly shift[] the burden of proof,” and the prosecutor

“expressly told the jury the burden of proof was on the

government.” Id. at 702.

Here, too, Barshop told the jury the prosecution “clear[ly]

. . . ha[s] the burden of proof”; no statement expressly shifted

that burden, and arguably none implicitly shifted that burden

either. The jury reasonably could have inferred that – in

context – each repetition of Barshop’s refrain was intended,

like his original statement, merely as comment on the

defense’s trial tactics and weaknesses in the defense’s theory

of the case. Cf. United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 1122

(9th Cir. 2011) (“While the prosecutor’s phrasing was

inartful, his meaning is evident from context: to believe the

defendant’s account, the jury would have to believe

implausible aspects of his testimony. This sort of

argumentation is permissible.”). We agree with Demirdjian

that it is problematic the prosecution referred to its burden

only once. But we acknowledge, as we must under AEDPA,

that a fairminded jurist nevertheless could conclude the

repetition of “competent, reliable, admissible evidence”

merely highlighted that the defense had challenged the

prosecution’s case with innuendo and accusation, not

exculpatory evidence.

The dissent contends the prosecutors’ statements

“impermissibly crossed the line” by arguing the defense had

failed to counter the prosecution’s theory. Dissent at 40. 

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22 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

That distinction made no difference in Vaandering, however,

where we upheld the prosecution’s statement that “[t]here is

no evidence . . . [the defendant] ever had a job other than

dealing drugs.” 50 F.3d at 701. Even the dissent’s sole

authority on this point held that “brief comments . . . noting

the absence of evidence contradicting what was produced by

the prosecution on several points . . . . did [not] impermissibly

shift the burden of proof to defendant.” People v. Bradford,

939 P.2d 259, 322–23 (Cal. 1997); see also People v. Woods,

53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 11 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Comments on the . . .

defense’s failure to call logical witnesses, introduce material

evidence, or rebut the People’s case are generally

permissible.” (emphasis added)). The California Court of

Appeal reasonably could have concluded there was no

burden-shifting.

3. Alleged Appeals to the Jury’s Passions

The dissent asserts defense counsel performed deficiently

by failing to object to the prosecution’s various “appeals to

jurors’ emotions” during closing. Dissent at 41–42. We do

not reach these additional statements because they are not

properly before us. Demirdjian mentions only the

prosecution’s reference to “[t]errorism against the state” –

and even then only as evidence of prejudice, not deficient

performance. Demirdjian failed to raise the remaining

statements before the California Supreme Court and the

district court, and does not dispute that those statements are

therefore forfeited, see Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 494 n.19

(9th Cir. 2013), and unexhausted, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)

(requiring habeas petitioners to exhaust their claims in state

court); Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 901 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“Exhaustion requires a statement of the ‘operative facts’ that

support the federal legal theory giving rise to the claim.”).

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 23

4. Counsel’s Performance at Trial and on Appeal

Defense counsel Mathews did not object to any of the

statements we have been discussing. In assessing his

performance, we begin with the “strong presumption” that he

did not object “for tactical reasons.” Yarborough, 540 U.S.

at 8. Although Demirdjian has not provided a declaration

from Mathews to show his actual reasons for not objecting,

the record suggests Mathews made a strategic decision not to

object and instead to address the prosecution’s comments

through his rebuttal. During rebuttal, counsel repeatedly said

Barshop had “invited me” or “challenged me” – not the

defendant – to explain the evidence. He then gave an

exculpatory explanation for each “unexplainable” fact, and

stressed – three times – that the prosecution bore the burden

of proof. To demonstrate the prosecution had failed to meet

its burden, Mathews criticized the prosecution’s failure to

offer a coherent motive, catalogued how the investigation had

been “botched” and challenged the prosecution to “explain”

evidence that he said “proves conclusively that Adam Walker

did this crime.” And he reminded the jury that it would be

instructed to disregard the prosecution’s “opening appeals to

passion, prejudice, and sympathy.”

The California Court of Appeal thus reasonably could

have presumed that counsel made a strategic decision to

address the prosecution’s comments directly instead of

objecting. We cannot say that such a strategic decision would

have been objectively unreasonable beyond any possibility

for fairminded disagreement. We have repeatedly held that,

“absent egregious misstatements,” failing to object to error

during closing argument falls within the “‘wide range’” of

reasonable assistance. Cunningham v. Wong, 704 F.3d 1143,

1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Necoechea,

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24 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

986 F.2d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Zapata v.

Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that

“patent, inflammatory and repeated misconduct” was

“egregious”). Arguably none of the statements here was error

– let alone egregious error. In these circumstances, the state

court could have concluded Mathews reasonably thought any

objection would be “meritless,” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d

1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005), or decided not to object “to avoid

highlighting [the statements],” Cunningham, 704 F.3d at

1159. Because Mathews directly responded to the

prosecution’s comments, and those comments arguably were

not “patent, inflammatory and repeated,” the state court was

not required to conclude he performed deficiently by failing

to object. Zapata, 788 F.3d at 1116.

The dissent disagrees based on its assumption that the

prosecution’s statements were, in fact, “egregious,” Dissent

at 42–44, but the California Court of Appeal was not required

to make that assumption. To be sure, Mathews could have

developed a record for appeal or tried to curtail the

prosecution’s repetition by objecting to some of the

statements. But he also “could have legitimately thought that

an objection would have served only to draw further attention

to the damaging statement while clearly not erasing its effect

from the jurors’ minds.” United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d

1069, 1087 (9th Cir. 1977). Strickland simply does not allow

us to “second-guess” Mathews’ decision with the benefit of

hindsight. 466 U.S. at 689. Under AEDPA, we must “afford

‘both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of

the doubt.’” Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016)

(per curiam) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13

(2013)).

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 25

As to the competence of Mathews on appeal, because a

fairminded jurist could conclude counsel was not deficient at

trial, she “could certainly conclude that the [state] court was

not objectively unreasonable in deciding that appellate

counsel was not incompetent.” Id. at 1153; see Turner v.

Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A failure to

raise untenable issues on appeal does not fall below the

Strickland standard.”). Mathews focused the appeal on

challenging what he argued was the “only link” allowing the

jury to find Demirdjian had participated in the murders: the

dog scent identifications. Counsel also raised five other

claims of prosecutorial misconduct, including one for

implying during closing argument that Demirdjian was a

“terrorist against the government.” Although counsel did not

separately challenge the prosecution’s statements on the

“unexplainable” evidence, he addressed them indirectly

through a jury misconduct claim alleging the jury

impermissibly considered Demirdjian’s silence during its

deliberations. There is a reasonable argument Mathews’

failure to raise additional claims in this context was not “so

serious” an error that he “was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Defense counsel no doubt could have done more to

address the prosecution’s aggressive line of argument, or

made a better record by objecting to some of the statements. 

But, given that the prosecution’s argument did not

unquestionably cross the line, Demirdjian’s present claim

entails precisely the kind of “second-guess[ing]” of counsel’s

strategy that Strickland prohibits. 466 U.S. at 689. We

therefore hold the California Court of Appeal reasonably

could have concluded defense counsel’s failure to object fell

within Strickland’s “wide range” ofreasonable assistance. Id.

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B. Prejudice

Even if Demirdjian’s counsel had performed deficiently,

he would not be entitled to habeas relief if the California

Court of Appeal reasonably could have concluded he failed

to establish prejudice. Under Strickland’s second prong, an

individual must show “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. That requires a “substantial, not just

conceivable” likelihood of a different result. Richter,

562 U.S. at 112 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

Demirdjian argues there was a substantial likelihood of a

different result because the evidence against him was weak,

two jurors were actually prejudiced and the prosecution

stressed an inference of guilt from his silence. We hold the

California Court of Appeal reasonably could have concluded

otherwise.

Demirdjian first argues the evidence against him was

weak and thus indicative of prejudice. See Strickland,

466 U.S. at 696 (“[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly

supported by the record is more likely to have been affected

by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”). 

Although we agree the evidence of motive was weak, that

arguably could not have affected the verdict. The jury was

instructed that the prosecution need not prove motive and that

the jury could – but need not – consider a lack of motive as a

“circumstance” that might “tend to show” Demirdjian was not

guilty. Moreover, Talmo’s wallet and clock were in

Demirdjian’s trash, as were the burnt contents of the wallet

and a pair of recently cleaned, blood-stained sneakers. No

evidence negated this probative evidence of a guilty mind. 

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 27

Defense counsel also acknowledged Demirdjian had been at

the crime scene, and there was significant physical evidence

that reliably tied him to the murders. Drops of his blood were

next to the shoe prints leading away from the victims’ bodies;

his sneakers matched the shoe prints; and two different dogs

identified his scent on the 16-pound rock. Demirdjian does

not contest the reliability of the drops of blood and shoe

prints, and there is a reasonable argument his challenges to

the scent identifications did not undermine that evidence

either.9

Accordingly, a fairminded jurist could conclude the

evidence convincingly established (a) Demirdjian was at the

crime scene, (b) handled the 16-pound rock, then (c) walked

away bleeding and (d) went to a sink before returning home,

where he (e) cleaned then discarded his sneakers and

(f) discarded and burned some of Talmo’s property. 

Although the defense offered non-incriminating explanations

of some of this evidence, those explanations were arguably

9 Demirdjian faults the first scent identification because, on her first

attempt, the dog went past his home and lost the trail. But on that same

attempt, the dog had reliably tracked the scent from the rock to

Demirdjian’s own shoe prints, then to the sink and onto the road where

Demirdjian lived. As the dog handler explained, the dog may have gone

past Demirdjian’s home merely because she had picked up another trail he

had left. Demirdjian “discredit[s]” the second identification because the

second dog also identified the scents of two other individuals whom the

defense asserted were in Palm Springs at the time of the crimes. But the

prosecution used cell phone records and an eyewitness identification to

place both individuals at the crime scene. A fairminded jurist thus could

conclude neither scent identification was unreliable.

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28 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

implausible.10It therefore would have been reasonable to

conclude Demirdjian did not establish prejudice based on the

evidence against him. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 112 (“[i]t was

also reasonable to find Richter had not established prejudice

given that he offered no evidence directly challenging other

conclusions reached by the prosecution’s experts” that

supported only the prosecution’s theory of the crime scene).

Demirdjian next argues there was actual prejudice

because one juror told a reporter, “I thought we should have

heard from Michael Demirdjian,” and another reportedly was

“persuaded to change her vote from not guilty to guilty . . .

because of [Demirdjian’s] failure to testify.” But there is no

evidence the jury ever discussed Demirdjian’s silence; on the

contrary, the first juror explained the “big factors” that

weighed most heavily in the jury’s decision were the shoe

prints and Demirdjian’s blood at the crime scene – not his

silence. There were arguably other indications that the jury

did not struggle to determine his guilt. On the fourth day of

deliberations, the jury asked the court if Demirdjian could be

guilty of special-circumstance murder as an aider and abettor,

or if he had to be the “actual perpetrator.” Mere hours after

the court answered that he could be convicted as an aider and

abettor, the jury convicted him. Based on the timing and

substance of this colloquoy, a fairminded jurist could

10 For example, defense counsel argued Demirdjian’s shoe prints were

at the scene because “[i]f you had seen what Michael Demirdjian saw in

your stupor, you’d get out of dodge too.” That explanation, however,

arguably was inconsistent with the actual shoe prints, which indicated

Demirdjian had walked away from the crime scene. Counsel now argues

Demirdjian “checked to see if [Talmo] and [McCulloch] were alive.” But

that argument, too, does not explain why he simply walked away after

purportedly seeing his friends brutally murdered.

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 29

conclude the key question for the jury was not whether but

how Demirdjian had participated in the murders.11

Regardless, there is a reasonable argument the jury

instructions mitigated any prejudice. The jury was informed

of the prosecution’s burden four times – once by the

prosecution, and three times by the defense. The court

likewise instructed the jury the prosecution had “the burden

of proving [Demirdjian] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,”

and the jury was not to discuss or “draw any inference from

the fact that [he] d[id] not testify.” Because “[j]urors are

presumed to follow the court’s instructions,” it would have

been “reasonable for the state court to conclude that the

prosecutor’s remarks . . . were not prejudicial.” Cheney v.

Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2010); see

Cunningham, 704 F.3d at 1159 (holding there was no

prejudice where the “comments were a single paragraph of a

twenty-page argument and the trial judge explained to the

jury that closing arguments are not evidence”).

Demirdjian finally argues there was prejudice because the

prosecution stressed an inference of guilt from his silence. 

But this rationale turns on whether any statement was itself

error. As we have seen, it would have been reasonable to

conclude that there were no errors and that the prosecution

11 We generally treat the “difficult time the jury had reaching a

unanimous verdict” as an “indicator of prejudice,” Stankewitz v. Wong,

698 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012). We do not accord this factor great

weight here, though, because there is a reasonable argument the jury’s

conduct was “not an unambiguous sign it was a close case.” Walker v.

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 943 (9th Cir. 2013). Based on the timing of the

questions and the quick turn-around after the response, the jury could have

been exercising “diligence and care” in deciding Demirdjian’s role in the

murders. Id.

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30 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

never actually asked the jury to infer guilt from Demirdjian’s

silence. See Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 587 (9th

Cir. 2004) (holding that “clearly not extensive” Griffin errors

were not prejudicial under an analogous standard where the

prosecution implied, but did not stress, that the defendant’s

silence meant a lack of remorse).

The “ultimate focus” of the Strickland inquiry is on

whether “the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable

because of a breakdown in the adversarial process.” 466 U.S.

at 696. Although aspects of Demirdjian’s trial give us pause,

we cannot say all fairminded jurists would find the result

unreliable. Given both the strength of the incriminating

evidence and the jury instructions, we hold the California

Court of Appeal reasonably could have concluded there was

no prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to the

prosecution’s statements.

IV. Eighth Amendment Claim

Demirdjian contends his sentence of two consecutive

terms of 25 years to life violates the Eighth Amendment

because he was a juvenile at the time of his crimes. This

claim relies solely on the retroactive application of Miller v.

Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which held “a sentencing

scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of

parole for juvenile offenders” violates the Eighth

Amendment. Id. at 2469. Demirdjian argues he is entitled to

habeas relief because his sentence is the “functional

equivalent” of the mandatory life-without-parole sentences

overturned in Miller. We disagree. Although it is now

established that Miller applies retroactively, see Montgomery

v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016), Demirdjian still

must show Miller’s legal principles were “clearly

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 31

established” at the time of the California Court of Appeal’s

decision (six years before Miller) and this decision was

“contrary to” Miller for purposes of § 2254(d)(1).12

Demirdjian has not attempted to satisfy the first requirement;

and we hold he has not satisfied the second.

Miller’s prohibition of mandatory life-without-parole

sentences for juvenile offenders rested in part on the premise

that “a distinctive set of legal rules” applies to a life-withoutparole term for juveniles. 132 S. Ct. at 2466. Because such

a term is the “ultimate penalty for juveniles . . . akin to the

death penalty,” id., it “demand[s] individualized sentencing,”

including consideration of the juvenile’s age and the

circumstances of the crime, id. at 2467. Miller noted,

however, that “no other sentences” “share [these]

characteristics with death sentences.” Id. at 2466 (quoting

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010)). There is a

reasonable argument that Miller thus applies only to lifewithout-parole sentences.

Demirdjian concedes he has not received a life-withoutparole sentence, but contends Miller nevertheless applies

because his sentence is the “functional equivalent” of life

without parole. The Supreme Court, however, has held an

12 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306–10 (1989), generally bars

retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure

on collateral review. Teague’s retroactivity rule, however, is “quite

separate fromthe relitigation bar imposed by AEDPA.” Greene v. Fisher,

132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011). Even if applying a rule retroactively “would

comport with Teague,” we still must ask whether “doing so would

contravene section 2254(d)(1),” Meras v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th

Cir. 2012), by granting relief based on federal law not clearly established

“as of the time the state court render[ed] its decision,” Greene, 132 S. Ct.

at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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32 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

identical sentence was not controlled by federal precedent

involving a life-without-parole sentence. See Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73–74 (2003). Lockyer reasoned a

sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life was

“materially[]distinguishable” from a life-without-parole term

because the petitioner actually “retain[ed] the possibility of

parole,” id. at 74, albeit when he was 87 years old, see id. at

79 (Souter, J., dissenting). So too here: because Demirdjian

will be eligible for parole when he is 66 years old, his

sentence arguably does not “share [any] characteristics with

death sentences,” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (quotingGraham,

560 U.S. at 69), and thus does not necessarily trigger Miller’s

requirements.13

Because fairminded jurists could disagree with

Demirdjian that Miller’s requirements applied to his sentence,

we hold he is not entitled to habeas relief on his Eighth

Amendment claim.

13 As the state notes, a recently enacted California statute entitles

Demirdjian to “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release[]” at a hearing

“during the 25th year of [his] incarceration” – when he is 41 years old. 

Cal. Penal Code § 3051(b)(3), (e). Because this new authority would not

change our holding, we neither rely on it nor decide whether 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) permits us to do so. Cf. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,

181 (2011) (holding that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the

merits”). Our holding, however, does not foreclose Demirdjian’s

eligibility for a parole hearing after 25 years, or sooner, whether under

California law or the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal

law.

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 33

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court dismissing

Demirdjian’s habeas petition is AFFIRMED.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

“Difficult” is the term chosen by the Supreme Court to

characterize the process of a federal court reviewing a state

criminal conviction under AEDPA. “Difficult” is not the

same as “impossible.” The Supreme Court has not cut off our

review of state criminal convictions. Nor has Congress

eliminated our review.

We are not engaged in an illusory examination of the

proceedings that have taken place. We may not reverse the

state court if “any theories or arguments could have

supported” the state court’s denial of relief. Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). We are, therefore, bound

to consider not only the actual reasoning of the state court,

but the broader range of reasons that could support the result

reached by that court. “Difficult,” not impossible.

The standard set by the Supreme Court makes the test

objective. The standard is not the subjective state of mind of

the actual state judge but the objective test of what a properly

functioning state judge would have done.

Under California law, a prosecutor of murder need not

prove motive. People v. Solomon, 234 P.3d 501, 520 (Cal.

2010). But, the prosecutor must either prove intent or a

conscious disregard for human life. See People v. Lasko,

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34 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

999 P.2d 666, 668 (Cal. 2000). When the prosecutor attempts

to prove motive and fails to do so, the lack of intent is drawn

into question. Here, no motive for the defendant to kill was

shown. What intent was shown?

* * *

Michael Demirdjian was convicted at age fifteen of the

brutal murders of thirteen-year-old Chris McCulloch and

fourteen-year-old Blaine Talmo, Jr. The evidence against

Demirdjian was so weak that his first trial ended with a hung

jury. At his second trial, it took a jury five days to convict

him. The prosecution’s stated motive for Demirdjian to have

committed the murders—a transferred desire for revenge—

was risible. In fact, the evidence clearly pointed to a

nineteen-year-old drug dealer with a burning need for cash as

the killer. Yet fifteen years later, in spite of the prosecution’s

promise to the jury that other individuals who had

participated in the killings would be brought to justice,

Demirdjian is the only person to have been charged with and

punished for the killings.

Had Demirdjian been convicted as the result of a fair trial,

we would be obligated to overlook these problems. But his

conviction was not the result of a fair trial. During closing

argument, Demirdjian’s attorney, Charles Mathews, sat

silentlywhile the prosecution repeatedly shifted the burden of

proof onto the defense, referred to the fact that Demirdjian

did not testify, and raised with the jury the specter of the 9/11

attacks and the Columbine mass murders. Demirdjian was

effectively without the assistance of counsel while the

prosecution made impermissible argument after

impermissible argument. Due to this lack of effective

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 35

counsel, Demirdjian’s petition for habeas relief should be

granted.

I

On Sunday, July 23, 2000, the bodies of Chris

McCulloch, age thirteen, and Blaine Talmo, Jr., age fourteen,

were found on an elementary school playground in La

Crescenta, California. Both boys had died of multiple blunt

force trauma. Next to Talmo’s body, officers found a sixteenpound rock stained with the blood of both of the victims. A

twelve-by-ten-foot bench, weighing more than sixty pounds,

lay across McCulloch’s chest and neck.

The previous day, fifteen-year-old Michael Demirdjian

had been playing basketball at the school with the two boys. 

There was physical evidence tying Demirdjian to the crime

scene, including blood samples, a shoe print, and positive dog

scent identifications. Demirdjian’s first trial ended in a

mistrial because the jury remained deadlocked following a

week of deliberations. Eight jurors voted to convict, four to

acquit. Demirdjian testified.

Jury selection for Demirdjian’s second trial began the day

before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Trial

commenced six days later. The prosecution theorized that

Demirdjian had committed the murders out of revenge

because one of the victims had introduced him to Adam

Walker, a nineteen-year-old drug dealer who subsequently

stole hundreds of dollars from Demirdjian in a drug deal gone

sour. According to the prosecution, Demirdjian spent a week

unsuccessfully trying to ambush Walker to recover his money

and exact revenge from him. The prosecution said that

Demirdjian’s chosen weapons were “beebee guns and knife,

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36 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

simulated weapons.” But then, according to the prosecution,

Demirdjian decided to rob and beat to death his two friends

because they were young and “vulnerable.” He allegedly

used his fists, a rock, and a park bench.

The defense acknowledged that Demirdjian was at the

crime scene and witnessed the murders. It maintained that he

did not participate in them in any way. Instead, the defense

argued that Walker had killed the teens in a drug-induced fit

of rage because he needed their money to pay a debt. 

Demirdjian did not testify.

On November 1, 2001, after five days of deliberations, the

jury convicted Demirdjian on two counts of first-degree

murder. However, the jury acquitted him of the two robbery

counts, rejecting the prosecution’s primary theory that

Demirdjian had conspired to commit robbery, resulting in

felony murder.

II

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus. Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612,

617 (9th Cir. 2010). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) prohibits our granting relief

unless the state court’s “adjudicat[ion] on the merits . . .

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Because no California court has provided a reasoned

decision on Demirdjian’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel (“IAC”), we must determine whether any theories or

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 37

arguments “could have supported” the state court’s denial of

relief. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. If so, we “must ask

whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that

those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding

in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id.

Trial counsel’s failure to object to remarks made by the

prosecution in closing argument and rebuttal may serve as the

basis for an IAC claim. Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106,

1112 (9th Cir. 2015); Trillo v. Biter, 769 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th

Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the clearly

established federal law under which IAC claims arise. To

prevail under Strickland, a defendant must show (1) that his

counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that he was

prejudiced by that deficient performance. Id. at 687. Based

on analysis of Strickland’s deficient performance and

prejudice prongs, I conclude that Demirdjian’s counsel was

constitutionally ineffective and that no reasonable argument

exists to the contrary. Under the stringent standards

established by AEDPA, habeas relief is appropriate.

III

Under the first prong of Strickland, “the proper measure

of attorney performance [is] simply reasonableness under

prevailing professional norms.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 521 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). In evaluating

reasonableness, we ask whether counsel could have had a

tactical or strategic purpose guiding her conduct. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–91.

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38 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

A.

Clearly established federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court forbids attempts by the prosecution in a

criminal case to shift the burden of proof of any elements of

the crime to the defendant. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358

(1970). The state bears the duty to establish guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. at 362. In violation of this basic rule,

the prosecution repeatedly indicated to the jury that

Demirdjian bore the burden of providing evidence of his

innocence.

At the outset of its closing argument, the prosecution told

the jury it was going to “explain the theory of the prosecution

and relation of the facts to the law.” The prosecutor then told

the jury that “it is always easier to attack a case than to

defend it. And it is clear that the People have the burden of

proof, and that will be an instruction that you receive. But

attack the case with real evidence, with competent evidence,

not meanness, not nastiness.”

Having framed for the jury an approach in which the

defense was required to produce “real” and “competent”

evidence, the prosecution then repeatedly called on the

defense to present “real evidence” during the remainder of its

initial closing argument. After detailing for the jury evidence

of multiple lacerations on Demirdjian’s hands, the prosecutor

demanded the defense produce evidence to refute that the

lacerations were caused by using a rock to beat the two

victims: “So I say to you, Mr. Mathews, explain it. What is

the explanation for this other than mine? What is the

evidence that is offered other than ours.” After discussing

the blood stain evidence, the prosecution demanded the

defense produce evidence to prove the blood stains did not

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 39

link Demirdjian to the murders: “So, Mr. Mathews, please

explain to us, if you can, if you will, the unexplainable, which

is how did Chris McCulloch’s blood get on the doorjamb. By

competent, admissible evidence. Not by way of hypothesis,

not by way of attorney spin, but by evidence admissible in a

court of law.”

In spite of these clear and repeated suggestions by the

prosecution that the defense was required to provide

“competent, admissible evidence,” Mathews never once

objected during the prosecution’s initial closing argument. 

Following defense counsel’s closing remarks, the prosecution

in its rebuttal immediately repeated its framing of the

approach it had urged on the jury: “I’m going to revisit all the

questions that Mr. Barshop posed to Mr. Mathews, and I’m

going to ask you whether they were answered. . . . I think that

you’ll find that most of the questions, if any at all, were not

answered.” After commenting on the prosecution’s evidence

(cuts and bruises on Demirdjian’s hands) and permissibly

asking a rhetorical question—“How does Mr. Mathews

explain that?”—the prosecution repeated its impermissible

demand: “Explain it with competent, reliable, admissible

evidence.” It again repeated this demand while criticizing

Mathews’s explanation: “That’s not a good explanation; not

based on reliable, competent evidence.” And immediately

repeated again: “[Mr. Mathews] has not explained it with

competent, reliable, admissible evidence.”

Nearing the end of its rebuttal, the prosecution continued

to impermissibly catalogue the failures of the defense to

explain the state’s evidence, arguing the defense had

produced no “competent, reliable, admissible evidence.”

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40 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

The prosecution may permissibly comment on the

defense’s failure to provide evidence to support its version of

the story. People v. Bradford, 939 P.2d 259, 323 (Cal. 1997). 

Here, the prosecution impermissibly crossed the line, arguing

the defense had provided no evidence to refute the

prosecution’s story. In doing so, the prosecution implicitly

told the jury that Demirdjian bore the duty to establish his

innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court silently

acquiesced in these statements. The demand that Demirdjian

prove his innocence violated Demirdjian’s due process right

“against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable

doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.

B.

Demirdjian’s attorney remained silent while the

prosecution repeatedly commented on the fact that at his

second trial Demirdjian did not testify. Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609 (1965), prohibits a prosecutor from commenting

on a defendant’s decision not to testify. Such “comment is

unacceptable ‘if it is manifestly intended to call attention to

the [defendant’s] failure to testify, or is of such a character

that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a

comment on the failure to testify.’” Rhoades v. Henry,

598 F.3d 495, 510 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lincoln v. Sunn,

807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Comment is also unacceptable “if the defendant is the

sole person who could provide information on a particular

issue.” Id.; see also Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614–15 (forbidding

prosecutorial comment where an “inference of guilt” arises

out of an accused’s “failure to testify as to facts peculiarly

within [his] knowledge”).

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 41

Regarding the defense’s theory that Demirdjian had

injured his hands while playing basketball, the prosecutor

commented:

So I say to you, Mr. Mathews, explain it. . . .

Where did these injuries on the defendant’s

hands come from?

Later, the prosecution asked:

So, Mr. Mathews . . . how did Chris

McCulloch’s blood get on [Demirdjian’s]

doorjamb? By competent, admissible

evidence. Explain it to us. Not by way of

hypothesis, not by way of attorney spin, but

by evidence admissible in a court of law.

And still later:

Then [Demirdjian] lied to [Talmo’s

stepmother]. Have you heard an explanation

for that?

OnlyDemirdjian could have supplied the answers to these

questions. This line of questioning necessarily called

attention to his decision not to testify. There can be “no

fairminded disagreement” that such pervasive commentary

violated Griffin. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706

(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

C.

Trial counsel’s failure to object when the prosecution

sought to capitalize on the public hysteria that followed the

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42 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which had taken

place less than a week before trial, only strengthens the

conclusion that he was constitutionally ineffective. For

instance, the prosecution emphasized that these murders were

an act of “evil” and that “evil has no age barriers, no

nationality barriers, nor boundaries.” The prosecution also

linked Demirdjian’s alleged crime to “[t]errorism against the

state,” referenced the “World Trade Center attack,” and

reminded the jury of “Columbine” when asking rhetorically

whether “kids kill kids.” These appeals to jurors’ emotions

were clearly improper. See United States v. Weatherspoon,

410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (condemning

“prosecutorial statements designed to appeal to the passions,

fears and vulnerabilities of the jury”). Again, Demirdjian’s

attorney raised no objections.

D.

There were several bases for trial counsel to object. The

question remains whether Mathews’s failure to do so fell

“within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance

[that] might be considered sound trial strategy.” Tilcock v.

Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2008).

“Absent egregious misstatements” by the prosecution,

defense counsel’s failure to object during closing argument is

typically considered “a reasonable strategic decision” that

falls within the “wide range of permissible professional legal

conduct.” Cunningham v. Wong, 704 F.3d 1143, 1159 (9th

Cir. 2013). Here, the prosecution’s clear and repeated

statements that the defense was required to provide

“competent, admissible evidence” were “egregious

misstatements.” These misstatements went beyond

misstating facts—they instructed the jury to require that

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 43

Demirdjian provide evidence to counter the prosecution’s

case. The prosecution first framed for the jury an analytical

approach that required the defense to “attack the case with

real evidence, with competent evidence.” Mathews’s failure

to object, and the court’s silent acquiescence in the

prosecution’s demand, said one thing to the jury: You may

find the defendant guilty if he did not provide evidence to

refute the prosecution’s case.

Defense attorneys may refrain from objecting for a wide

variety of reasons, including a desire to avoid calling

attention to unfavorable facts. See id. (“[Defense counsel’s]

decision not to object to [the prosecutor’s] comments,

possibly to avoid highlighting them, was a reasonable

strategic decision.”). No reasonable jurist could conclude that

counsel’s failure to object to clear instructions by the

prosecution to the jury that shifted the burden of proof onto

the defense falls within the “wide range of professional legal

conduct.” To be sure, withholding objection might be a

reasonable strategy in the context of isolated errors or

otherwise harmless commentary. See id. Here, however, it

would have been readily apparent to any reasonable counsel

after the first several burden-shifting statements that such

improper commentarywould not cease and, as a result, would

be highly prejudicial to the client.

Similarly, Demirdjian’s counsel sat through the

prosecution’s repeated Griffin violations yet failed to object

despite numerous opportunities to do so. While in some

cases we have recognized the strategic value in forgoing

objection during opposing counsel’s closing argument, such

a tactic would have been unreasonable here after the

prosecution’s first several requests for information

exclusively within Demirdjian’s knowledge, and grossly

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44 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

unreasonable upon counsel’s discovery that the prosecution’s

strategy in its closing arguments was apparentlyto underscore

Demirdjian’s decision not to testify. See id. Yet defense

counsel said not a word.

Defense counsel’s failure to respond to the prosecution’s

statements was not a strategic decision taken to avoid

highlighting unfavorable facts. The failure to object

permitted the prosecution to lower its burden of proof by

shifting the burden onto the defense, highlighted

Demirdjian’s choice not to testify, and allowed the

prosecution to pander to the jury’s heightened sensibilities. 

No possible defense strategy could explain these failures.

IV

We may not grant habeas relief unless counsel’s failure

satisfies Strickland’s second prong, such that the

prosecution’s comments resulted in prejudice to the

defendant. Zapata, 788 F.3d at 1116–17. Under Strickland,

“the likelihood of a different result [absent counsel’s deficient

performance] must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. On habeas review, the question is

whether it would have been unreasonable for a state court to

have concluded “[the defense’s] evidence of prejudice fell

short of this standard.” Id.

“[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the

record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one

with overwhelming record support.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

696. Considering “the totality of the evidence,” id. at 695,

absent counsel’s ineffective performance, there is a

reasonable probability that at least one juror would have

resisted a guilty verdict, just as four jurors did in

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 45

Demirdjian’s first trial. See Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 974

(9th Cir. 2014) (finding Strickland prejudice because of “a

reasonable probability that at least one juror would have

struck a different balance” (citation and quotation marks

omitted)).

This is not a case where the evidence of the defendant’s

guilt was otherwise overwhelming. The most significant

weakness in the prosecution’s case was its inability to

establish a plausible motive. The prosecution permissibly

asked the jury to apply its common sense as it analyzed the

case, yet the prosecution’s theory of Demirdjian’s motive

defied any reasonable application of common sense.

According to the prosecution, Demirdjian and Damian Kim,

angered by being robbed in a drug deal by nineteen-year-old

Adam Walker, spent a week unsuccessfully trying to ambush

Walker to recover their money and exact revenge. Their

chosen weapons: “beebee guns and knife, simulated

weapons.” But then, according to the prosecution, when

Demirdjian’s attempts to ambush Walker failed, he decided

to turn on his own friends, Chris McCulloch and Blaine

Talmo, in an attempt to rob them of $200. During the course

of this robbery, the prosecution alleged, Demirdjian beat the

two boys to death. Demirdjian supposedly put aside the

beebee guns and knife and simulated weapons, and instead

used his fists and a rock and a park bench to bludgeon Chris

and Blaine, simply because they were younger and more

vulnerable. It is no small wonder the prosecution repeatedly

emphasized that it was not required to prove motive to the

jury.

Several problems with the physical evidence linking

Demirdjian to the murders also highlight the weakness of the

prosecution’s case. It was only after several inconclusive

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46 DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON

attempts and a tip from Blaine Talmo’s stepmother that the

officers connected Demirdjian to the crime using dog scent

evidence. Ultimately, however, the defense’s expert

discredited this evidence as likely having been influenced by

the dog handlers’ own methodological errors. What is more,

the defense identified deficiencies in the State’s initial DNA

testing, which failed to implicate Demirdjian at all.

Finally, the jury heard evidence implicating Walker as the

murderer, consistent with the defense’s narrative. Blood was

found on Walker’s shoes and he had scrapes on his hands,

arms, and back, and bruises on his leg. Incriminating

evidence was found at Walker’s residence, including washed

rugs, damp and discolored clothes, gloves, a hand towel, and

a newspaper article about the crimes. Evidence also

suggested that Walker had told his friend about the murders

several hours before the police discovered the victims’

bodies.

No reasonable jurist could dispute the substantial

weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. These weaknesses

explain the jury’s difficulty in reaching a verdict at both of

Demirdjian’s trials. As a result, there is a reasonable

probability that trial counsel’s failure to object to the

prosecution’s highly improper attempts at burden shifting,

multiple Griffin errors, and pleas to the jurors’ passions

influenced the jury’s verdict. Fairminded jurists could not

disagree.

* * *

I would reverse the district court’s denial of Demirdjian’s

habeas petition and remand with instructions to grant a writ

requiring the State to release him from custody unless it

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DEMIRDJIAN V. GIPSON 47

initiates new trial proceedings within a reasonable period of

time as determined by the district court.

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