Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03555/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03555-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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C-05-3555 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 of 34

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STANCY NESBY,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE CITY OF OAKLAND, ET AL.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 05-3555 JL

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(granting Docket # 54)

Introduction

This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. All

parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. section 636(c)

and Civil Local Rule 73. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment. Both parties

moved to exclude certain evidence. The Court heard oral argument. Jivaka Candappa

appeared for Plaintiff Stancy Nesby. Pelayo A. Llamas, Jr., Deputy City Attorney, appeared

for Defendants.

The Court considered the pleadings and arguments of counsel and hereby grants

partial summary judgment for Defendants, as to Nesby’s claims under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §1983, including a Monell claim for excessive

force against the City of Oakland. Defendant Anderson had probable cause to make a

traffic stop because the license plate tabs on Nesby’s car were the wrong color, not the

current color. It was reasonable for Anderson to verify the validity of the temporary

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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registration, once he observed it. When Nesby informed him of a felony no-bail warrant in

her name, he had a duty to investigate further. However, he had no duty to confirm her

identity in the field and taking her into custody was reasonable given that she fit the

parameters of the warrant as to her unique name, her sex, race and birth date. Therefore

the stop and detention were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Defendant

Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity. Nesby cannot maintain any claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment because her claim rests on the same foundation as her claim

under the Fourth Amendment. 

Nesby also fails to show any basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, since she fails

to show racial animus. Nesby cannot maintain a Monell claim against the City in the

absence of an underlying Constitutional violation. Nesby shows no policy regarding arrests

and detentions which was violated and presents no evidence whatever of Defendant

Anderson’s training, or that it was deficient, which also eliminates any liability under Monell

for the city. Defendants do not seek summary judgment on Nesby’s claim of excessive

force by Anderson, only her claim for excessive force against the City under Monell.

Defendants ask the Court to exclude the evidence contained in the declarations of

John “Toby” Saucer, who was in the car with Nesby at the time of her arrest and offers the

main corroboration for her allegations. The Court at this time need not rule on Defendants’

motion, because Saucer’s evidence is relevant for the most part to Nesby’s claim of

excessive force against Anderson, which is not before the Court at this time. The Court

may exclude this evidence at trial and hereby re-opens discovery for the limited purpose of

allowing Defendants to take Saucer’s deposition.

Nesby asks the Court to exclude evidence from several declarations in support of

Defendants’ motion on grounds of hearsay and vagueness. The Court finds that the terms

to which Nesby objects, for example “verification” as applied to the warrant, can be

construed using their dictionary definitions and that the declarants testified according to

personal knowledge of procedures and that their declarations are therefore not hearsay.

The documents to which Nesby objects are the warrants central to this case and the minute

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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C-05-3555 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3 of 34

orders of court proceedings and Nesby cannot credibly claim surprise that Defendants

would rely on them.

Background

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. All parties consented

to trial before this Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. section 636(c) and Civil Local Rule 73.

Defendants move for summary judgment on a number of Nesby’s claims pursuant to Rule

56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The parties were unable to arrive at a Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts. Nesby

and Defendants each submitted a Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.

Defendants also submitted a Request for Judicial Notice and an Index of Evidence offered

in support of their motion for summary judgment. Both parties offered objections to each

other’s evidence, which the Court considered in arriving at its decision. 

At the parties’ request, the Court continued the settlement conference, and dates for

pretrial conference and trial. A settlement conference was conducted by Magistrate Judge

Chen on March 6, 2007. The case did not settle at that time. Pretrial Conference is May 30

and jury trial is June 18.

Defendants’ Motion

Stancy Nesby, an African American female, alleges constitutional claims under 42

U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under

the U.S. Constitution against the City of Oakland and Officer Anderson (the action was

dismissed as to Officers Williams and Wayne.) (Complaint at 4:12) 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the following grounds:

1. As to Nesby's claims against Officer Anderson:

a) His conduct in effecting the traffic stop and detention was based on

probable cause and the subsequent arrest made pursuant to a facially valid

no-bail warrant was lawful.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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C-05-3555 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 4 of 34

b) Nesby's Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are not actionable

since, under the allegations of the complaint, they arise only under the Fourth

Amendment.

c) There is insufficient evidence of any violations of Nesby's right to equal

protection.

d) As to all of Nesby's claims, Officer Anderson is entitled to qualified

immunity.

2. As to Nesby's claims against the City of Oakland:

a) Nesby cannot maintain a Monell claim against the city because there is no

underlying constitutional violation.

b) Even if a constitutional violation occurred, there is insufficient evidence that

Nesby suffered any such violation as a result of an official policy of the City of

Oakland.

Factual Background

This is Nesby’s version of the facts, with notation of Defendants’ disputes as to her

stated facts.

The Traffic Stop

In the afternoon of September 4, 2003, Plaintiff Stancy Nesby was stopped by

Officer James Anderson of the Oakland Police Department at 2100 Telegraph Avenue near

the intersection of 21st Street in Oakland. (Nesby Decl. ¶ 2 and Ex. 3, Consolidated Arrest

Report; Saucer Decl. ¶ 8.) At the time of the traffic stop, Nesby was driving a 2002 Silver

Dodge Intrepid, license number 4WMV283 and VIN Number 2B3HD46R32H264673, that

she had purchased from Magnussen’s Fremont Ford (“Magnussen’s”) approximately twenty

(20) days prior on August 13, 2003. (Nesby Decl. ¶ 2.) Ms. Nesby was on her way to San

Francisco with John “Toby” Saucer when she was stopped by Officer Anderson. (Nesby

Depo, at 65:17-22, 67:12-16, 71:22-25, 72:1-21, Saucer Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) 

Ms. Nesby stopped at a bank in Oakland on Broadway near 22nd Street. (Saucer

Decl. ¶ 5, Nesby Depo, at 67:17-21, 93:10-18.) She used the outside ATM machine to

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withdraw cash. (Nesby Depo, at 95:1-15.) After leaving the bank, Ms. Nesby drove up

Broadway, took a right on 20th Street and another right on Telegraph Avenue. (Saucer

Decl. ¶ 6, Nesby Depo, at 95: 23-25, 96:1-4, 97: 1-4.) Ms. Nesby had traveled about half a

block down Telegraph Avenue when Officer Anderson, who was traveling in the opposite

direction heading towards downtown Oakland, passed Ms. Nesby’s vehicle. (Saucer Decl.

¶ 6.) The officer made a u-turn, got behind Ms. Nesby’s vehicle and turned on his

overhead lights. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 7, Nesby Depo, at 97:9-25.) 

According to the CD recording of the relevant police radio transmission, Officer

Anderson informed Dispatch that he was enforcing a vehicle stop and that his location was

20th and Telegraph. (Washburn Decl. ¶¶ 17-18.) Officer Anderson did not request cover. 

(Id.) Sixteen seconds later, Officer Anderson advised Dispatch of a failure to yield and

gave his location as Giant Burger at 22nd and Telegraph. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 23.)

Approximately ten minutes before advising Dispatch of the vehicle stop, Officer

Anderson ran a CLETS query on Ms. Nesby’s vehicle license plates. (Washburn Decl. ¶¶

28-29, Ex. 3.) The CLETS inquiry did not show any wants on the vehicle including expired

registration. (Id.) 

The outcome of the CLETS query is in dispute. Defendants contend that “the

computer indicated that the plates were indeed expired,” and that Anderson then activated

his lights and siren. (Anderson depo at 11:1-3).

Officer Anderson queried CLETS about the plates a second time, a few minutes

after the vehicle stop at Giant Burger. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff states that the CLETS queries

did not show that the registration on Ms. Nesby’s vehicle had expired. (Id.) Again,

Defendants’ version of the facts is that the CLETS query showed the plates on Nesby’s

vehicle had expired.

Ms. Nesby pulled into the parking lot of 1⁄4 Pound Giant Burger (“Giant Burger”), a

fast food establishment located at the intersection of Telegraph Avenue and 21st Street. 

(Nesby Depo, at 98: 13-23, Saucer Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, Washburn Decl. ¶ 20.) The distance from

Telegraph Avenue at 20th Street and the Giant Burger is no more than a block and a half

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and less than one minute of driving time. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 8.) It took Ms. Nesby about two

minutes to travel from the bank on Broadway to the Giant Burger parking lot. (Id.)

Officer Anderson parked his vehicle about six feet behind Ms. Nesby’s vehicle. 

(Saucer Decl. ¶ 9.) He walked up to her, greeted her and asked for her license and

registration. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 10, Nesby Depo, at 99:14-17, 105:3-4.) Ms. Nesby gave

Officer Anderson her license, advised him of the no-bail warrant which bore her name and

further informed him that she had just been released from jail. (Nesby Depo, at 99:23-25,

100:1-2, 105:7-10, Nesby Decl. ¶ 4.)

Mr. Saucer asked Officer Anderson why he stopped Ms. Nesby. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 10,

Nesby Depo, at 100:5-7.) Anderson claimed that the registration on Ms. Nesby’s vehicle

had expired. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 10.) Ms. Nesby and Mr. Saucer pointed to the temporary

registration permit that was fixed on the front right windshield of Ms. Nesby’s vehicle.

(Nesby Depo, at 100: 8-9, 105:20-23, Saucer Decl. ¶¶ 10-12.) Officer Anderson said that

he did not “acknowledge” that document. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 12.) 

When Ms. Nesby stopped her vehicle in the Giant Burger parking lot, she reached

into her purse and retrieved a copy of the “Alameda County Sheriff’s Department Prisoner

Property Receipt,” which was given to her when she was released from Santa Rita Jail on

September 4, 2003. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 13, Nesby Decl. ¶ 4 and Ex. 2, Nesby Depo, at

106:21-25, 107:1-2, 62:1-4, 63:13-22.) The receipt documented Ms. Nesby’s incarceration

at Santa Rita Jail on September 3, 2003. (Nesby Decl. ¶ 4, Nesby Depo, at 61: 11-13.)

Ms. Nesby handed Officer Anderson the Prisoner Property Receipt document when

he walked up to her vehicle. (Nesby Depo, at 61: 14-17, 65:3-7, Saucer Decl. ¶ 14.) 

Defendants do not include in their statement of facts either that Nesby and Saucer

pointed to the temporary registration or that Nesby produced the property receipt from her

purse. Defendants say instead that Nesby told Anderson that she had in the trunk of her

car the property receipt from Santa Rita Jail, showing that she had just been released from

there and that Anderson allowed her to look for it, but she couldn’t find it. (Anderson Depo

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at 34:21-22, 36:6-9, 15-21).

Ms. Nesby told the officer that there was a warrant for a person who had used her

name and that she was not the person wanted in connection with the warrant. (Nesby

Decl. ¶ 4, Saucer Decl. ¶ 15.) She said that an unknown woman had stolen her identity

and that she was released from Santa Rita jail on September 4 after the authorities had

confirmed that the warrant in question was not for her. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 15, Nesby Depo, at

65:12-16, 65:23-25, 66:1-4, 105:11-16, 107:15-25, 108:1-7.) She explained to the officer

that she would not have been released from jail on September 4, the day of the traffic stop,

if she were the person wanted in connection with the no-bail warrant. (Nesby Depo, at

100:18-23.)

The Arrest

The officer told Ms. Nesby to step out of the vehicle and without waiting for her to

exit the vehicle, tried to pull her out. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 16, Nesby Depo, at 101:2-4, 113:25,

114:1-24.) Ms. Nesby emerged from the vehicle. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 16, Nesby Depo, at 101:

5, 114:24-25.) The officer turned her around so that her back was to him. (Saucer Decl.

¶17.) Ms. Nesby continued to tell the officer that the warrant was not for her and that she

was innocent. (Id.) He ignored her. (Id.) Several police vehicles arrived on the scene. 

(Saucer Decl. ¶ 18, Washburn Decl. ¶¶ 23-24.) Officer Anderson requested a wagon 24

seconds after advising Dispatch of the vehicle stop. (Washburn Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.) 

Officer Anderson arrested Ms. Nesby on the basis of information in an electronic

warrant that was generated pursuant to a bench warrant issued for an individual named

“Stancy Nesby,” residing at 142 Harbor Drive. (Nesby Decl, Ex. 3, Miller Decl. ¶ 30 and Ex.

7, Washburn Decl. ¶ 41.) The electronic warrant abstract states that the individual wanted

on the warrant was a black female with a date of birth of May 12, 1976. (Miller Decl. at ¶

31, Washburn Decl. ¶ 41.) The warrant abstract does not state any other distinguishing

characteristics or information pertaining to the wanted person such as height, weight or eye

color. (Miller Decl. at ¶ 32, Washburn Decl. ¶ 42.)

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C-05-3555 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 8 of 34

Oakland Police Department officers have access to the Automated Warrant System

(“AWS”), CLETS, NCIC and DMV databases from the mobile computer terminals in their

patrol vehicles. (Bolton Depo, at 92:3-11, Ex. E.) Officers can conduct DMV, criminal

history, probation or parole checks to ascertain the identity of a detainee. (Bolton Depo, at

100:6-25, 101:1-5.) NCIC checks would also return particular descriptive information such

as height and weight of the subject queried. (Bolton Depo, at 94:21-25, 95:1-10.) Officer

Anderson and the Oakland dispatchers did not make any inquiries to ascertain the

particular characteristics of the subject wanted in connection with the warrant before

arresting Ms. Nesby. (Miller Decl. ¶¶ 33-39, Washburn Decl. ¶¶ 43-49.) 

Alleged Excessive Force During the Arrest

Nesby alleges numerous facts in support of a claim of excessive force against

Defendant Anderson. Defendants do not seek summary judgment on this claim, except as

applied to the City under Monell v Dept. Of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S.

658 (1978).

When Ms. Nesby got out of her vehicle, two Caucasian male officers rushed towards

her and assisted Officer Anderson with Ms. Nesby’s arrest. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 19.) The

officers grabbed Ms. Nesby by her blouse, took her around to the passenger side of her

car, pushed her against the vehicle and bent her over the hood. (Nesby Depo, at 101:5-8,

121:11-18, 126:3-12, Saucer Decl. ¶ 20-21.) Ms. Nesby’s blouse was raised above her

chest, her skirt was lifted above her waist, her underwear and breasts and buttocks were

exposed. (Nesby Depo, at 101: 9-15, 103:12-25, Saucer Decl. ¶ 21.) The officers kept Ms.

Nesby bent over her vehicle while they handcuffed her. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 22.) The officers

ran their hands over Ms. Nesby’s body in what appeared to be a full body search and one

officer squeezed the cheek of her buttocks. (Id.) 

Ms. Nesby was handcuffed after her hands were pulled up behind the back of her

head. (Nesby Depo, at 118:7-22, 119: 16-25, 120:1-7.) Her arms were raised so high

behind her back that it seemed unnatural. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 21.) Ms. Nesby was in

excruciating pain because her arms would not extend that far behind her back. (Nesby 

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Depo, at 118:15-25, 119:1-7, 120: 13-15, 121: 1-10.) The handcuffs were very tight and

Ms. Nesby told Officer Anderson that they were hurting her really badly. (Nesby Depo, at

134:8-25.) He did not adjust the handcuffs. (Nesby Depo, at 136:5-9.)

The officers tore Ms. Nesby’s blouse. (Nesby Depo, at 122:8-11.) They continued

to apply pressure on Ms. Nesby for a few more minutes after the handcuffs were applied. 

(Id. at 122:19-24, 124:23-25, 125:1-10.) Ms. Nesby was in pain and “everything was

showing.” (Id. at 122:25, 123:1-2, Saucer Decl. ¶ 24.) She was crying. (Id. at 115:1-4.) 

She did not physically resist or struggle with the officers. (Id. at 118:13, Saucer Decl. ¶ 23.) 

She did not yell at the officer. (Nesby Depo, at 115: 5-9.) Ms. Nesby kept telling Officer

Anderson that she was the victim. (Nesby Depo, at 117: 20-24, Saucer Decl. ¶ 24.)

Mr. Saucer told the officers that Ms. Nesby’s skirt was raised, that they were

exposing her. (Nesby Depo, at 128: 10-15, Saucer Decl. ¶ 26.) The officers told him to

stay in the car. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 25, Nesby Depo, at 115: 17-18, 125:15-21.) Mr. Saucer

pulled Ms. Nesby’s skirt down. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 27, Nesby Depo, at 115:19-22, 125:22-23,

128:1-8, 129:1-25, 130:1-10.) The officers then handcuffed Mr. Saucer. (Saucer Decl. ¶

28, Nesby Depo, at 115:22-24, 125:23-25.) After Mr. Saucer pulled down Ms. Nesby’s

skirt, she was taken to the paddy wagon. (Nesby Depo, at 128:23-25, 133:11-13, 133:22-

25, 134:1-3, Saucer Decl. ¶¶ 30-31.) 

Mr. Saucer witnessed a Caucasian male officer open the trunk of Ms. Nesby’s

vehicle and search inside. (Saucer Decl. ¶ 29.) The officer who conducted the search of

the trunk locked Ms. Nesby’s vehicle, threw her car keys in the trunk and shut it. (Id. at ¶

32.) That same officer thereafter released Mr. Saucer. (Id. at ¶ 33.)

Officer Anderson promised Ms. Nesby that he would ensure that Ms. Nesby’s prints

were compared against the subject’s prints on file with issuing agency, San Francisco

(Nesby Depo, at 108:19-22, 139:19-22.) But Anderson did not follow through on his

promise. (Nesby Depo, at 139:22-24, 108:24-25, 109, 110:1-4.) After Ms. Nesby was

transported to the Oakland City Jail, Officer Anderson did not know what happened to her. 

(Candappa Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. 5-Synopsis of Anderson IA interview.) 

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Detention at Oakland City Jail

Ms. Nesby was locked in a cell at the Oakland Police Department jail. (Oakland City

Jail) (Nesby Depo, at 140:11 20.) “Many hours later,” after a shift change, she spoke with

another jailer who followed up on her request to verify whether she was wanted in

connection with the San Francisco warrant. (Nesby Depo, at 140:21-25, 141:1-12.) A few

hours later, she was released. (Nesby Depo, at 141:13-17.)

At 10:10 p.m., the order to release Ms. Nesby was signed by the jail supervisor,

Anthony Wynne, a civilian employee. (Davis Depo, at 36:5-25, 37:1:16, 52:14-17,

Washburn Decl. ¶¶ 37-38.) The order to release Ms. Nesby states that the warrant did not

belong to Ms. Nesby and that someone else was using her name. (Davis Depo, at 36:17-

24, Washburn Decl ¶ 37, Ex. 7.) Wynne, however, did not have a recollection of the

incident when he was interviewed by Internal Affairs. (Candappa Decl ¶ 10, Ex. 7.)

A prisoner must be released no sooner than four hours after the order to release is

received. (Davis Depo, at 51:25, 52:1-17.) An order to release that is approved takes the

utmost priority. (Davis Depo, at 56:19-25, 57:1-5.) The Oakland City Jail Certificate Card,

“402 Form” indicates that Ms. Nesby was released at 11:18 p.m. (Davis Depo, at 52:18-25,

53:1-12.) However, the 402 Form does not always accurately document a prisoner’s

release time. (Davis Depo, at 52:18-25, 53, 54:1-7.) According to the jail activity record,

Ms. Nesby called her mother from jail on September 5, 2003, at12:40 a.m. (Nesby Decl. ¶

6, Ex. 4.) Ms. Nesby signed a property release. (Nesby Depo, at 183:15-25, 185:1-18,

Nesby Decl, Ex. 3.) The release was dated September 5, 2003. (Nesby Decl. ¶ 5 Ex. 3.) 

Ms. Nesby was eventually released on September 5, 2003, at approximately 1:00 a.m. 

(Nesby Depo, at 144:8-11.)

Ms. Nesby suffered bodily injuries consequent to her arrest. (Saucer Decl. ¶¶ 38-39,

Nesby Depo, at 144:16-22.) Both her wrists were swollen, one more than the other. 

(Nesby Depo, at 155:1-2.) Both wrists were discolored, one wrist was purple, the other red. 

(Nesby Depo, at 155:3-7.) The pain remained even after the bruising dissipated. (Nesby

Depo, at 155:15-20.) The pain lasted about two weeks. (Nesby Depo, at 155:21-23.) One

wrist was more painful than the other. (Nesby Depo, at 155:25, 156:1-16.) The

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excruciating pain lasted for about a week and half and Ms. Nesby experienced mild pain for

a while thereafter. (Nesby Depo, at 156:2-9.) Ms. Nesby was traumatized by the entire

experience. (Nesby Depo, at 157, 158, 159:1-13.)

The Oakland Police Department Does Not Have a Policy Articulating the

Particularity of Description Requirement on a Warrant. 

The published policy of the Oakland Police Department states that whenever there is

a question about the identity of a person arrested in connection with a warrant, the

transporting officer must refer the warrant to the patrol division supervisor for a final

decision as to whether or not it should be served. (Bolton Depo, at 78:14-25, 79:1-9.) 

However, the Oakland Police Department does not have a policy as to what constitutes an

adequate or sufficiently particular description on a warrant. (Bolton Depo, at 67:22-25.) 

The Oakland Police Department does not have a policy that would provide guidance and

direction to officers in circumstances where the description on a warrant is deemed

inadequate. (Bolton Depo, at 67:21.) And the Oakland Police Department does not have a

custom or practice of checking FBI databases in circumstances when the identity of a

subject detained in connection with an electronic warrant is in issue. (Bolton Depo, at

103:6-21.)

Officers have subjective discretion to determine the sufficiency of the particular

description requirement in a warrant. (Bolton Depo, at 68:1-3.) According to the published

policy, if there is a doubt that the detainee is the person described in the warrant, the

benefit of the doubt shall be given to the detainee. (Bolton Depo, at 69:9-23, Bolton Depo,

Ex. B.) Officers are required to perform a reasonable investigation. (Bolton Depo, at

69:24-25, 70:1-3.)

Oakland Police Department’s General Order E-6 does not provide any guidance as

to what would constitute an adequate description under California Penal Code section

850(b), which sets forth the information that must be included in a serviceable warrant. 

(Bolton Depo, at 74:7-23, Bolton Depo, Ex. B.) There has been no attempt to articulate a

coherent application of the description requirement in a warrant. (Bolton Depo, at 74:24-

25, 75:1-3, Bolton Depo, Ex. B.) There are no department guidelines articulating what

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officers should do to ascertain the identity of a person wanted in connection with an

electronic warrant. (Bolton Depo, at 81:3-25, 86-89, 90:1-18.) 

Oakland Police Department Officers Do Not Receive Adequate Training 

About The Particularity of Description Requirement on a Warrant. 

Oakland Police Department officers and trainee officers do not receive training about

the Automated Warrant System. (Figueroa Depo, at 43:19-25, 44:1-7.) The Oakland

Police Department does not provide training to its officers on reading and understanding

the NCIC system. (Figueroa Depo, at 45:19-23.) There are no training bulletins on the

automated warrant system. (Figueroa Depo, at 44:8-11.) There are no training bulletins on

the NCIC system. (Figueroa Depo, at 45:19-23.) 

The training manual on Laws of Arrest, which is used by instructors at the Police

Academy, devotes about three pages to warrants. (Id., Ex. A) The section on warrants

references California Penal Code sections 815, 817, 840 and 849. (Figueroa depo, at 43,

Ex. A.) Section 850(b) is not mentioned. (Id.) Students at the Police Academy do not

receive any training about the particular description requirement of a warrant. (Figueroa

Depo, at 41.)

The Oakland Police Department Had A Custom or Practice Of Inaction

And Indifference In Complying With The Mandatory Policy That A

Subject Must Not Be Detained For More Than Four Hours Pending

Confirmation Of A Warrant. 

Oakland Police Department Prisoner Release Procedures mandates the release,

within four hours, of a prisoner being held on a warrant when the arresting agency does not

confirm the warrant. (Davis Depo, at 23:6-25, 24:1-13, 23-25, 25:1-3, 30:6-8, Ex. A.) In

practice, the Oakland Police Department does not comply with the mandatory policy that a

subject must not be detained for more than four hours pending confirmation of a warrant. 

(Davis Depo, at 28:1-25, 29:1-10.) Jail staff did not receive any training regarding the

policy mandating detention for no more than four hours for unconfirmed warrants. (Davis

Depo, at 34:3-7.)

Jail staff have access to NCIC and FBI databases to confirm a warrant, but it is

usually done at the County level. (Davis Depo, at 38:1-9, 41:17-25, .42:1-13.) The inmate

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would therefore sit in jail until the County responded. (Davis Depo, at 42:14-16.) FBI

databases can be checked assuming the individual queried has an FBI record. (Davis

Depo, at 38:19-21.) A subject’s FBI number could be run to extract information from FBI

databases. And a subject’s FBI number could be obtained from the NCIC database. 

(Davis Depo, at 38:1-9.)

As a supervisor and the person most knowledgeable about confirmation of warrants

in the Oakland City Jail, Sergeant Davis claimed to be ignorant of the Oakland Police

Department Prisoner Release Procedures mandating the release of a prisoner within four

hours when the arresting agency does not confirm the warrant for the prisoner in question.

(Davis Depo, at 30:6-8.) The policy is clear, however, that a detainee must be released

within four hours if the warrant is not confirmed. (Davis Depo, at 29:4-7.)

Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no

genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those

portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the

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district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in

Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); First

Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-289 (1968). 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party

may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention

that the dispute exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that the

fact in contention is material, that is, a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the

dispute is genuine, that is, the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party, Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing

versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575. Thus, the

“purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order

to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’ ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct.

1348 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any. Rule 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.1982). The

evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn from the facts placed before a court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of

the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which

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the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45

(E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at

1356.

Summary Judgment Should Be Granted

Nesby Fails to Show Material Facts in Dispute Regarding Monell Claim Against

City Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for 4th Amendment Violation or Excessive Force.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted because Nesby’s

opposition to the motion presents no evidence establishing a material issue of fact for trial

relative to her §1983 claims. While Defendants’ motion does not seek summary judgment

on Nesby’s excessive force claim against Officer Anderson, the motion does seek summary

judgment on the excessive force Monell claim against the City of Oakland. (See

Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of MSJ at 13:5-6; 14:3-7.) It

should be noted that Nesby has dismissed her equal protection and substantive due

process claims. (Oppn. at 1 fn.1.)

The undisputed facts show, as a matter of law, that Nesby’s traffic stop for expired

registration tabs and subsequent arrest pursuant to a facially valid no-bail felony warrant

were both lawful. Nesby’s evidence is insufficient to establish a Monell claim against the

city as to any of her constitutional claims. Nesby has offered no evidence that Officer

Anderson’s training was insufficient or that it fell below generally accepted training

standards in the law enforcement field. Neither of Nesby’s experts criticized the Oakland

Police Department’s training or procedures.

 The belated declaration of Toby Saucer submitted by Nesby, that contradicts and

exceeds the scope of Nesby’s own testimony, could be stricken because Saucer’s contact

information was not disclosed through supplemental disclosures as required by FRCP Rule

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26(e). Defendants were prevented from investigating and deposing the witness. Nesby,

who claimed not to have his contact information, has now produced a declaration by the

witness that Defendants characterize as a devious attempt to avoid summary judgment. In

fact, Saucer’s declaration is cited by Nesby throughout the Opposition at least 39 times

and numerous times in support of her response to Defendants’ statement of undisputed

facts. Where facts were not previously in dispute, Mr. Saucer testifies in his declaration to

new contradictory facts. 

Defendants contend that Nesby’s tactics are in clear violation of Rule 26 and that the

declaration should be stricken from her opposition to Defendants’ motion pursuant to FRCP

37. (See Defendants’ Objections to Evidence offered in Support of Nesby’s Opposition at

1:23-3:9.)

Further, Nesby relies heavily on unqualified and admittedly mistaken and

contradictory expert declarations to create otherwise non-existent factual disputes. (See

Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence.) Indeed, the experts (particularly Washburn)

admitted in their depositions that almost everything in their declarations submitted in

support of Nesby’s opposition is incorrect or otherwise unreliable. (Id.) As such, to the

extent that Nesby relies on such evidence to generate issues of fact, it should be

disregarded by the Court. 

Nesby incorrectly contends that Defendants’ motion does not challenge Nesby’s

excessive force claim in any respect. (Oppn. at 10:13-15.) Defendants’ motion addresses

all of Nesby’s constitutional claims generally with respect to her Monell claim against the

City. While the motion does not seek summary judgment as to Nesby’s excessive force

claim against Officer Anderson, the Defendants argue that Nesby has not suffered a

constitutional injury caused by any policy of the City. (Defendants’ MSJ at 12:12-13; 13:5-

6.) The city argued that even if a constitutional violation occurred during the course of

Nesby’s detention and arrest (which would naturally include excessive force), her Monell

claim against the City still fails. (Id. at 13:5-6.) This argument applies to all of Nesby’s

constitutional claims.

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The City further contends that Nesby’s complaint alleges no basis for recovery under

any of the grounds for imposing municipal liability. (Id. at 14:3-4.) More specifically, the City

argued that “[p]laintiff’s reference to the fact that a lawsuit alleging a pattern and practice of

constitutional violations was filed against the City (the “Riders” lawsuit) and subsequently

settled is certainly not evidence of the existence of a policy or practice of unlawful arrests,

racial profiling, or excessive force in that case or this one.” (Id. at 14:3-7.)

A. Nesby’s Detention and Arrest Were Lawful and Nesby’s Experts’ Opinions

Do Not Establish any constitutional Violations.

Officer Anderson’s Traffic Stop To Investigate Nesby’s Expired Registration

Tab Was Lawful.

Police officers may make traffic stops whenever there is reasonable suspicion to

believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). The

issue here then is whether Officer Anderson had reasonable suspicion to believe that

Nesby had expired registration when he pulled her over. It is undisputed that Officer

Anderson, while positioned in his police car behind Nesby’s vehicle, saw that Nesby had

expired registration tabs. (Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SSUF”)

No. 2; Anderson Depo. at 9:11-17.) He knew that the tabs were expired because they were

not the right color. (Anderson Depo. at 9:24-25.) Nesby does not dispute these facts.

Rather, she cites to her non-responsive deposition testimony that she showed Anderson

the temporary registration in her window (see Plaintiff’s response to SSUF No. 2), after

Anderson had already pulled her over and approached her vehicle. (Nesby Depo at 99:13-

23.) 

The fact that Nesby showed Officer Anderson her temporary registration after the

stop had already been made, if true, does not disprove that Anderson had already

observed the expired tabs on the rear of her vehicle when he pulled her over. The issue is

not whether Nesby’s car was actually temporarily registered, but whether Officer Anderson

had probable cause to believe that it was not and that a traffic violation had occurred. 

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Hence, Nesby’s argument that Officer Anderson did not have reasonable suspicion

to stop Nesby because she had a lawful operating permit misses the point. This is not a

case involving a traffic stop because someone has temporary tags as in U.S. v. Wilson, 205

F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 2000) cited by Nesby. (Oppn. at 12, fn. 6.) The temporary identification

which was displayed in Nesby’s front windshield was not something that Officer Anderson

could have seen from behind Nesby’s car, or that he could have validated even from in

front of her car. Thus, there is no dispute that Officer Anderson did not see evidence of the

temporary registration before pulling Nesby over as in the unpublished case of Imperiale v.

City of San Diego, 2005 WL 1463474, 137 Fed.Appx. 13, 14 (9th Cir. 2005) cited by Nesby.

(Oppn. at 12, fn. 6.)

Defendants contend that Officer Anderson verified that Nesby’s license plates were

expired before he activated his lights and siren to make the traffic stop, and Nesby has

offered no competent evidence to the contrary. (SSUF No. 3, 4; See Defendants’

Objections to Evidence.) Nesby has not disputed with competent evidence Officer

Anderson’s testimony that he saw Nesby’s expired registration tabs and confirmed that they

were expired before pulling her over as set forth in Fact Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 

Even if the CLETS inquiry showed that Nesby’s registration was current, as she

contends and Defendants dispute, even so, the absence of current stickers on her license

plate was sufficient to justify a stop, to determine if she had valid temporary registration as

required by law. California Vehicle Code section 5202 states that license plates are to be

attached for the period of their validity. When a vehicle has no valid plate or plates, as in

this instance where the stickers were not current, “Special permits issued in lieu of plates

shall be attached and displayed on the vehicle for which issued during the period of their

validity.” Even if the temporary registration would have been visible if Anderson’s police car

had approached Nesby’s car from the front and then made a U-turn, as she contends, the

officer was still entitled to examine the temporary registration to determine if it was valid,

and not just a piece of cardboard stuck in the windshield of her car. Even if the facts are as

alleged by Nesby, Officer Anderson had reasonable suspicion that Nesby’s registration was

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expired and had probable cause to stop her and determine if she was displaying a

temporary tag in compliance with the Vehicle Code.

The Detention Did Not Exceed the Scope of the Traffic Stop.

Nesby contends that her detention exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. This

contention, however, is undermined by the undisputed evidence. Detentions which are

initially justified as Terry investigatory stops, or traffic stops, will not justify seizures which

are unreasonable in length or scope in light of their original purpose. Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968). 

For officers to continue to hold someone, to broaden the scope of the investigation,

or to progress to an arrest, they must legally obtain sufficient evidence to justify the greater

intrusion on the person's liberty. Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 2005).

Here, it is undisputed that Officer Anderson pulled Nesby over for having expired

registration tabs and that upon contact with Anderson, Nesby immediately began telling him

that she had no- bail warrants outstanding in her name. (SSUF No. 9) Although Nesby

agrees that this fact is disputed, her contention is contradicted by her own deposition

testimony. Nesby’s response to this putative fact is, “Ms. Nesby gave Officer Anderson her

license, advised him of the no-bail warrant which bore her name...” (Plaintiff’s response to

SSUF No. 9.) Indeed, Nesby claims she always tells every officer she comes in contact

with before they walk away to run her name. (Plaintiff’s response to SSUF No. 10.) At this

point, Officer Anderson had sufficient reason to justify prolonging the detention to confirm

the existence and status of any warrants in Nesby’s name.

A reasonable officer conducting a traffic stop confronted with a detainee’s admission

that she has warrants for her arrest would prolong the investigation to investigate and

conduct a warrant check. Indeed, it would be unreasonable for an officer not to do so. The

fact that Nesby also told the officer that she had either taken care of the warrants or that

she had just been released from jail did not render further investigation unnecessary. As

Officer Anderson stated in his declaration and in his deposition, it is not uncommon for a

person who has a warrant for his or her arrest to say that the warrant has been cleared up

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or is really for someone else in order to avoid being arrested. Nesby contends that this is

an opinion rather than a fact. (Pltf’s response to SSUF No. 36) It is, however, a factual

statement based on Officer Anderson’s 17 years of experience as a police officer, not

merely an opinion. Thus, Fact Number 36 is not disputed.

Similarly, assuming that Nesby showed Officer Anderson her temporary registration

attached to the right front windshield as she claims, he was justified in investigating her

admission that she had two no-bail warrants in her name. Thus, Nesby’s argument that the

detention should have been aborted immediately after she showed him the temporary

operating permit and she told him that she had no-bail warrants for her arrest is wholly

without merit. Under normal circumstances, it is true, that an officer who stops a driver to

investigate the status of her registration and then finds that she has valid temporary

registration, without more, would have no basis to detain her any longer. Those, however,

are not the facts in this case. The officer was duty bound to investigate Nesby’s admission

that she had two no-bail warrants in her name.

Nesby’s reliance on U.S. v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 1994) is

misplaced. (Oppn. at 14 8-14.) McSwain is distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts of

this case. In that case, the court found that the traffic stop was unlawful because the

officer’s reasonable suspicion regarding McSwain’s registration sticker was completely

dispelled prior to the time he questioned McSwain. In this case, Nesby began telling Officer

Anderson about her felony no-bail warrants when he approached her vehicle and asked for

her license and registration. Hence, even if the status of her registration could have been

dispelled by the sticker on the windshield on the other side of the car, he was then faced

with new information that required further investigation.

Officer Anderson Had Probable Cause to Arrest Nesby Pursuant to a Facially

Valid No-Bail Warrant.

Nesby argues that Anderson lacked probable cause to arrest her since the warrant

was invalid because it did not meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth

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Amendment. However, the warrant did meet the particularity requirements under both

state and federal law, and the cases Nesby cites are inapposite.

California Penal Code Section 850 sets out the particularity requirements for

electronic arrest warrants. Specifically, Section 850(b) provides that “... an abstract of the

warrant as herein referred to shall contain the following information: the warrant number,

the charge, the court or agency of issuance, the subject’s name, address and description,

the bail, the name of the issuing magistrate or authority, and if the offense charged is a

misdemeanor whether the warrant has been certified for night service.”

According to Nesby’s own experts, the warrant at issue in this case contained all

nine of the elements required by §850. (See Declaration of Pelayo Llamas in Support of

Defendants’ Reply, Exhibit C at 161:16-165:11; Exhibit D at 144:6-149:12.). 

 In Ex. C, Plaintiff’s expert, Valeria Washburn admitted that the license plate for

Nesby’s car was only queried once, not twice, that it would not necessarily show up on the

kind of query that was made and that the descriptors on the warrant of the name, date of

birth, race and gender all matched exactly the San Francisco warrant for Ms. Nesby. In Ex.

D, Taylor Miller, also an expert for Plaintiff, testified that he didn’t know whether or not the

warrant on which Nesby was arrested met the factors required by Penal Code section 850.

This Court finds that the circumstances in this case are distinguishable from Rogan v. City

of Los Angeles, 668 F.Supp. 1384, 1391 (C.D. Cal. 1987) 

In Rogan, the warrant in question had an alias or aka on its face. Thus it did not

contain the subject’s correct legal name. The court noted that an arrest warrant does not

meet the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement unless it provides a person’s correct

legal name. See Rogan at 1391. Such a problem does not exist in this case. The warrant in

this case did not contain an alias or aka. Indeed, the warrant displayed Nesby’s correct

legal name - - Stancy Nesby - - which Officer Anderson noted was unique. (SSUF No. 20.)

The warrant also contained her correct birth date, race and sex – more than required under

state and federal particularity requirements. (Id.) Nesby argues that this fact is disputed

because there is no evidence that the name Stancy Nesby is unique. (Plaintiff’s response

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1

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(Llamas Decl., Exhibit D at 133:12-135:9.) 2

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to SSUF No. 20.) It is a fact, however, that anyone can recognize as true. Even Nesby’s

own experts acknowledged the uniqueness of her name. (Llamas Decl. at Exhibit C at

61:20-62:15; Exhibit D at 129:17-130:1.) It is by no means a common name, and Nesby

has provided no evidence to the contrary.

Notwithstanding the uniqueness of Nesby’s name, the subject warrant meets the

Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirements because it does provide Nesby’s correct

legal name. Generally, the inclusion of the name of the person to be arrested on the arrest

warrant constitutes a sufficient description to satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement

that the subject be described with particularity. Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 4(c); 18 U.S.C.A. Const.

Amend. 4. Unlike the authorities in Rogan, Officer Anderson had no reason to suspect that

the name on the warrant was not the real name of the intended arrestee, and no

heightened particularity requirements which applied in Rogan are applicable to this case.

Nesby’s argument that the warrant at issue did not state the actual name of the

person sought and therefore is invalid is incorrect. At the time of Nesby’s arrest, Anderson

had no reason to believe that Plaintiff was not the Stancy Nesby named in the warrant.

Nesby has cited no legal authority for the proposition that an otherwise facially valid warrant

is rendered invalid when a detainee named and described in the warrant claims that he or

she is a victim of identity theft or gives some other alibi.1

 Indeed, faced with Nesby’s claims

that she was not the person listed in the warrant and the consistent description (birth date,

race and sex), Anderson believed it was necessary to take her into custody to determine

whether it was really her. Only fingerprints could show whether Nesby was the person

sought in the warrant.2

Nesby cites the inapposite case of Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 682-683 (5th

Cir. 1980) for the proposition that an arrest warrant with a proper name, but improper

address is invalid and thus violates the Fourth Amendment. Wanger is distinguishable

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3 See e.g., Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 273 (3d Cir. 2000)(apparently

valid warrant does not make officer immune from suit if reliance on it is unreasonable in light

of other information the officer possesses); Kennell v. Gates, 215 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2000)(report,

based on fingerprints, over in-house computer message system indicating that wrong sister

was in custody was sufficient to allow jury to find that officer had actual knowledge of

substantial risk that plaintiff was mistakenly imprisoned); Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d

730 (8th Cir. 2001)(where police arguably had sufficient information to realize they were holding

the wrong person, there was close question whether 4th Amendment was violated, but officers

entitled to qualified immunity).

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because it involved a misdemeanor search warrant served in the middle of the night at the

home of a person who was able to establish that he was not the person named in the

warrant. Nesby oversimplifies the holding in Wanger out of context. The case at bar does

not involve a warrant with the right name being served at the wrong address. This case is

about an officer with knowledge of a facially valid warrant (under state or federal standards)

with the correct name, birth date, race and sex of Nesby who by her own admission had

outstanding felony no-bail warrants in her name. 

The seminal case on this question is Baker v. McCollan 443 U.S. 137 (1979). In

Baker, a warrant was issued in the name of Linnie McCollan based on the acts of Leonard

McCollan, who was using Linnie’s driver’s license with a substituted photograph. Linnie was

arrested for running a red light and then held for three days because of the warrant. He was

released after deputies compared his appearance with the photograph of Leonard, which

was associated with the warrant. The Supreme Court held that the arrest and detention did

not constitute a violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

 “Whatever claims this situation might give rise to under state tort law, we 

 think it gives rise to no claim under the United States Constitution. 

Respondent was indeed deprived of his liberty for a period of days, but it 

 was pursuant to a warrant conforming, for purposes of our decision, to the 

 requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” (Baker v. Mccollan, supra 443 U.S. at 144.) “[W]e

are quite certain that a detention of three days over a New Year’s weekend does not and

could not amount to such a deprivation [of due process].” Id. at 145.

In cases that have declined to follow Baker the officers knew they were holding an

innocent person, even though they had a facially valid warrant for his arrest, or they

unreasonably relied on the warrant in light of other information they possessed.3

 That is not

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the case here. Anderson had nothing more than Nesby’s claims of innocence, and he did

not disregard those claims. He had Dispatch double check the status of the warrant (SSUF

No. 14, 16, 17); he ran her name in his computer a second time and again compared the

identifying information (SSUF No. 35); and he followed the arrest wagon to the jail to inform

jail staff of what Nesby had told him to ensure that her identity would be confirmed. (SSUF

34.) As stated above and in Defendants’ objections to Nesby’s evidence, Nesby has offered

no evidence to the contrary. 

Hence, Baker applies, because Officer Anderson had probable cause to arrest

Nesby under the facially valid warrant and took reasonable steps to make sure that her

claims of innocence were investigated. Her claims were investigated and she was released.

Thus, Nesby suffered no constitutional violation, and Defendants are entitled to judgment in

their favor as a matter of law.

Nesby’s Mistaken Arrest Was Valid Under the Fourth Amendment.

Nesby argues that even if the warrant was valid, Officer Anderson still violated her

Fourth Amendment rights because he did not have sufficient information that Plaintiff was

the person identified as Stancy Nesby. (Oppn. at 16:26-27; 17:14-15.) Nesby relies on the

distinguishable case of Simons v. Marin County, 682 F.Supp. 1463 (N.D.Cal.1987), that a

higher level of particularity was required for the warrant, including height, weight, social

security number, CII number. (Oppn. at 17:7-16.) In Simons, however, the court only

concluded that more particularity was required when there was an issue as to whether the

officer reasonably believed that Nesby was the person sought in the warrant. Simons at

1471. In Simons the officers served a warrant on a person with the same first and last

names as the suspect, but a different middle name. No date of birth, race or sex was on the

warrant in Simons.

The court in the Simons case noted that the arrest of a person other than the actual

subject sought is valid under the Fourth Amendment if (1) the police have probable cause

to arrest the person and (2) the arresting officers reasonably believe the arrestee to be the

person sought. Id. at 1471, citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 

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Here, it is undisputed that Nesby had felony no-bail warrants in her name and that

she informed the officer of that fact. Thus, there was probable cause to arrest her based on

those warrants. Unlike the situation in Simons, nothing about the name in the warrant in

this case was inconsistent with Nesby’s. Further, in Simons, the officers relied on nothing

more than “superficial congruence of names” whereas here, Officer Anderson had the

correct name as well as other identifying information such as the same birth date, race and

gender. In addition, the officers in Simons did nothing more than run the name “Fred M.

Simons” through the Department of Motor Vehicles computer. And the court noted that “the

name is too common and the computer is unable to distinguish by a more accurate name

or a birth date.” Id. at 1472. Whereas here, Officer Anderson ran Nesby’s unique name and

date of birth through the computer. (SSUF No. 12.)

Nesby contends that more information could have been obtained by Officer

Anderson with a reasonable investigation through Dispatch or law enforcement databases

accessible to him in his patrol vehicle. But Nesby cites no legal authority that would require

such an investigation in the field. In fact, Officer Anderson did conduct an investigation of

the warrant through Dispatch and requested that the information received be confirmed

directly with San Francisco. No further investigation by Officer Anderson was required.

Officers in the field do not violate the Constitution by relying on process and orders

apparently valid on their face (Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 790 (5th Cir. 1968) or by relying

on information received through “official channels.” See U.S. v. Hensley , 469 U.S. 221

(1985).

Therefore, Officer Anderson went beyond what was required of him and reasonably

believed that Plaintiff was the “Stancy Nesby” sought in the warrant based on the match of

Nesby’s unique name, her birth date, gender and race and by her admission that she had

warrants in her name. At the very least, as Officer Anderson concluded, (SSUF No. 19) the

information he had justified taking her to the jail, where her fingerprints could be compared

and her identity confirmed. 

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received his only training on warrants from OPD. (Llamas Decl., Exhibit D at 127:24-128:7.)

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Nesby’s Claim That Her Detention Did Not Comport with State Law Fails to

State a Claim for Relief Under Section 1983.

In order to assert a violation cognizable under section 1983, Nesby must show that

Fourth Amendment constitutional standards have been violated. The fact that state law

regarding the requirements for arrest may have been violated does not suffice as a basis

for a section 1983 action. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1995). To the extent that

Nesby’s claims rest on her contention that any aspect of state law was violated (Oppn at

13:1-24), Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor accordingly.

Nesby Has Failed to Establish a Monell Claim Against the City.

 The “policies or customs” of the City upon which Nesby bases her §1983 claims are

that the City does not have a policy articulating the particularity requirement for warrants

(Oppn. at 7:13-14); Oakland police officers do not receive adequate training about the

particularity of description requirements on warrants (Oppn. at 8:10-22)4

; and the Oakland

Police Department has a custom or practice of inaction and indifference in complying with

its internal policy requiring that subjects may not be detained for more than four hours

pending confirmation of a warrant. (Oppn. at 8:23-25.) None of these assertions are

supported by fact or law. Furthermore, Nesby has not offered any evidence that the

Oakland Police Department’s training and policies fall below standard police practices

anywhere in the United States.

Nesby’s allegations that Defendants violated their own internal policy cannot form

the basis of a §1983 claim. Although inadequacy of training may serve as the basis for

municipal liability under certain circumstances, the evidence presented by Nesby does not

support such a claim. Nesby has offered no evidence to contradict the undisputed facts

demonstrating that Officer Anderson’s arrest of Nesby pursuant to the facially valid warrant

was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Whatever Anderson’s training may have

been, Nesby could not have been injured by it one way or the other. Anderson’s training

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would only be relevant if Nesby had demonstrated that her constitutional rights were

violated as a result of Anderson’s lack of understanding of the Automated Warrant System,

the NCIC system or Penal Code Section 850(b). 

Nesby has failed to show a constitutional injury at all, let alone one that was the

result of Anderson’s lack of training. In fact, Nesby offers absolutely no evidence of

Anderson’s training. Her general evidence of current training practices is vague as to time,

irrelevant and lacking in foundation as to what knowledge Anderson obtained regarding

AWS, NCIC and Penal Code section 850 over his 17 years of service as a police officer. In

fact, Nesby has offered no evidence regarding Anderson’s knowledge of electronic warrant

systems nor how any deficiencies in his knowledge caused her alleged constitutional

violation. Without more, Nesby’s argument that had the police department properly trained

its employees in the enforcement of warrants, she would not have been arrested is wholly

without merit and cannot form the basis of a Monell claim against the City in this case. 

Nesby has failed to establish a nexus between the alleged lack of training of officers

in general and Anderson’s reliance on the communication from Dispatch which confirmed

the active status of Nesby’s warrant with the issuing county. Anderson was entitled to rely

on that information regardless of his training or lack thereof. An officer may arrest someone

solely or partly based on information received from official police communications, such as

information from Dispatch. See U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985); see also U.S. v.

Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1979) (probable cause for arrest can be based on

“collective knowledge” of law enforcement officers).

Moreover, the requisite policy, custom or usage may not be proved through a single

unconstitutional incident unless “proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by

an existing unconstitutional policy.” Rogan v. City of Los Angeles, 668 F.Supp. 1384, 1395

quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). In contrast, it is sufficient to

show a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured or endangered by

intentional or negligent police misconduct or that serious incompetence or misbehavior was

general or widespread throughout the police force. Id. 

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Nesby has made no showing of custom or usage in this case. She references this

single incident and offers no proof that the alleged constitutional violation occurred as a

result of inadequate training of officers in general. Therefore, Nesby has failed to show a

material issue of fact in dispute relative to her Monell claim against the city.

Anderson is Entitled to Qualified Immunity.

Nesby relies on Simons, fully distinguished above, for her contention that Anderson

is not entitled to qualified immunity. Although Nesby is correct that in Simons, the court

found that the law was clearly established that an officer must have reasonable probability

to believe that the person served is the person named in the warrant in order for the arrest

to pass Fourth Amendment muster, unlike the plaintiff in Simons, Nesby fails to raise triable

issues as to whether Anderson reasonably believed that Nesby was the person named in

the warrant. 

In Simons, the court noted that there were triable issues because none of the

officers checked for any information about the man they were serving, and they looked only

for information about the suspect named in the warrant. After they obtained some

information which tended to rebut their assumption that plaintiff was the suspect, they did

nothing further, even though other investigation was possible. Simons at 1475. 

Here, Officer Anderson obtained Nesby’s license and ran a warrant check based on

her name and date of birth. He then determined that other identifying information in the

warrant such as birth date, race and gender matched Nesby’s description. He had Dispatch

run a warrant check and then had them confirm the warrant with the issuing county. He

then went to the jail after she was arrested and informed the jail staff about Nesby’s claims

of identity theft. Jail staff followed up on her claim of innocence and confirmed that she

indeed was not the person sought in the warrant and released her. These are facts that

Nesby has failed to dispute. As such, the reasoning in Simons is unavailing to Nesby here.

In determining whether Officer Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity we must

answer two questions: (1) was the law governing the officer’s conduct clearly established?

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(2) under that law, could a reasonable officer believe that his conduct was lawful? Case v.

Kitsap County Sheriff’s Dept., 249 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

With respect to the arrest and detention, Nesby had no clearly established right to be

free from detention pursuant to a facially valid warrant. As stated above, the warrant in this

case contained everything required in Penal Code Section 850 and more than is required

under the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement. Even conceding that Nesby’s

constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment are clearly established, under the second

prong of the analysis, Officer Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity because a

reasonable officer could believe that his conduct did not violate Nesby’s constitutional

rights.

In Case v Kitsap, the court addressed the question whether a reasonable officer

could believe that Case’s arrest on an Oregon warrant was lawful. 249 F.3d at 926. The

court noted that “it is well established that, in an action for unlawful arrest pursuant to a

facially valid warrant, a police officer is entitle to qualified immunity unless “no officer of

reasonable competence would have requested the warrant.” Id., citing Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 345-46 & n. 9 (1986); accord Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir.

1991) (“A police officer generally has qualified immunity for conducting an unconstitutional

search if he is acting on the basis of a facially valid warrant.”); Mills v. Graves, 930 F.2d

729, 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that “immunity will be lost only where the warrant

application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its

existence unreasonable”).

Here, it is undisputed that the warrant was facially valid. Nesby’s arguments to the

contrary are unavailing. To the extent Nesby argues that Officer Anderson or other city staff

violated state law or an internal departmental policy, that is not the proper focus for a

qualified immunity analysis. Indeed, violation of a police departmental regulation is

insufficient for liability under section 1983. Kitsap at 928 (citations omitted). Any state

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5

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to show a violation of any constitutional right,” despite violation of internal policy). Thus, to the

extent that any of plaintiff’s §1983 claims are based on Defendants’ violation of their own

internal policies, Defendants argue they should be similarly dismissed.

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violation of its own policy is irrelevant to the question of whether state officials are entitled

to qualified immunity. Id. citing Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1985).5

Thus, the issue is whether a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct

violated Nesby’s federal statutory or constitutional rights rather than merely a state law or

policy provision. Id. citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 & n. 12 (1984). Here, a

reasonable officer with a facially valid warrant, the detainee’s admission that there are

felony no-bail warrants in her name, matching descriptions between the warrant and the

detainee including a full unique name, date of birth, race, and sex, would reasonably

believe that taking her to jail pursuant to the warrant did not violate her constitutional rights.

With respect to her protests of innocence and identity theft, a reasonable officer could have

believed it did not violate Nesby’s constitutional rights to do what Officer Anderson did –

take her to jail where her fingerprints could be compared with to those on file in San

Francisco for the person being sought in the warrant and make sure that jail staff was made

aware of her claims of innocence.

A reasonable officer under the same circumstances could have believed that nothing

more was required of him under the law. Therefore, Officer Anderson is entitled to qualified

immunity.

Nesby’s Detention Was Not Unduly Prolonged.

Citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 560 (1983), Nesby asserts that a detention

may continue only for so long as necessary and must be conducted in the least intrusive

manner. The entire basis for her assertion that her detention was unduly prolonged is that

Officer Anderson failed to follow through on an alleged promise to have her fingerprints

compared with those maintained by San Francisco, so that she could be cleared and

released. It is not clear how, even if true, such a vague allegation would rise to the level of

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a constitutional violation. It is undisputed that after Nesby was taken to jail, her fingerprints

were compared with those maintained by San Francisco and that she was released after it

was determined that her fingerprints and photo did not match those of the person wanted in

the warrant (who had stolen Nesby’s identity). (SSUF No. 38, 39.) Whether or not Anderson

was responsible for having the confirmation done or not is irrelevant. The issue is whether

the length of Nesby’s detention under the circumstances amounts to a constitutional

violation. It does not.

It is undisputed that Officer Anderson released Nesby to the custody of the arrest

wagon (SSUF No. 33) and followed her to jail. He related to the intake officer what Nesby

had told him. (SSUF No. 34.) Nesby’s allegation that Anderson told her that he would

ensure that her fingerprints were compared and failed to do so does not contradict this fact.

Nor does her allegation (based on double hearsay) that Officer Anderson did not know

what happened to her after she was transported to jail. (Plaintiff’s response to SSUF No.

34.) Thus, Fact Numbers 33 and 34 remain undisputed.

Nesby’s argument that jail staff failed to comply with the city’s policy that a subject

not be detained for more than four hours pending confirmation of a warrant is equally

unavailing. The internal standards set by the police department do not confer federal

constitutional rights on detainees. Only the Federal Constitution or laws can be the

underlying basis for a section 1983 claim. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 

Even if the violation of an internal policy could create a constitutional violation,

Nesby has presented no evidence of a practice of deliberate indifference to the

constitutional rights of those being detained while warrants are being confirmed. The city’s

internal policy clearly sets a higher standard than is required under the Constitution.

Therefore, Nesby cannot establish liability against the city under a prolonged detention

theory.

Defendants’ Objections to Nesby’s Evidence

Defendants ask the Court to strike the Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition

to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and all evidence offered by John “Toby”

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Saucer and preclude Nesby from using it at trial, on the basis that Rule 26, Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, mandates that this evidence be stricken due to Nesby’s procedural

violations. Her counsel timely disclosed this witness but gave defense counsel no address

(Nesby claims she gave the location at 41st and Market, including that it was “across the

street from California Linens”, and a telephone number for Mr. Saucer which proved to be

incorrect). 

On November 15, more than three months after the close of discovery on July 28,

Ms. Nesby went to Saucer’s home and left him a message, He contacted her counsel and

agreed to be interviewed November 28 2006. Consequently, although Nesby used

Saucer’s testimony extensively in her opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion,

Defendants never had an opportunity to depose him. 

Saucer is the Plaintiff’s most significant witness in this case, next to Nesby herself,

since he was in the car with her when she was arrested. Defendants object that his

testimony “miraculously” corroborates Nesby’s, in places where there was formerly no other

corroboration. As a result his testimony is extremely prejudicial to Defendants. Nesby cites

him 26 times in Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts and 42

times in her Opposition Memorandum.

Nesby’s counsel contends that he did the best he could to inform him of Saucer’s

whereabouts and that defense counsel did not follow up and remind him to obtain more

accurate contact information for Saucer. There is really no excuse, and it is tempting to

speculate that this witness was kept under wraps because he may not withstand close

scrutiny and Nesby really needs him to corroborate her claim for excessive force against

Anderson, which will be the only issue at trial. Nesby must show substantial justification or

lack of prejudice in order to oppose the motion to exclude this evidence. NutraSweet Co. v.

X-L Engineering, Co., 227 F.3d 776, 785-786 (7th Cir. 2000); Saudi v. Valmet-Appleton,

Inc., 219 F.R.D. 128, 132 (E.D. Wis. 2003).

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Nesby’s Objections to Defendants’ Evidence

Nesby objects to such words as “verification” as vague and ambiguous with

reference to the warrant, to “active” with reference to the warrant, and to “effectively closed

down” as referring to the jail during a change of shift. The Court finds that these words and

phrases may be interpreted according to their plain dictionary meaning and are not vague

and ambiguous.

Nesby also objects on the basis of lack of personal knowledge by Anthony Wynne 

to whether “City Jail staff worked with the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office” to determine

whether Nesby was the proper subject of the warrant. She objects as well to whether

Anderson had personal knowledge that Stancy Nesby “is a pretty unique name.” She also

objects that this is improper opinion testimony. Both declarants are qualified to testify to

matters within their personal experience without being qualified as experts.

Nesby objects to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice of Court Documents on

relevance grounds and as a discovery violation, since some of the documents were not

disclosed to Nesby as required by FRCP Rule 26, specifically Exhibits B, C, D and E

(respectively, the bench warrant #576880, 579116, the minutes of a San Francisco

Superior Court proceeding, printed on April 30, 2002, describing Stancy Nesby as a

fugitive, and a second set of minutes, with a different MC#, both showing that fingerprints

were taken of the person in court. 

Nesby objects that Defendants did not disclose that they were going to rely on these

documents. It is not credible that Nesby could be ambushed by Defendants’ reliance on the

court documents that led directly to her arrest, or contend that she has been ambushed or

in any way prejudiced by Defendants’ using these documents.

Conclusion re Evidence

Defendants ask the Court to exclude the evidence contained in the declarations of

John “Toby” Saucer, who was in the car with Nesby at the time of her arrest and is the only

corroboration for many of her allegations. The Court at this time need not rule on

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Defendants’ motion, because Saucer’s evidence is relevant for the most part only to

Nesby’s claim of excessive force against Anderson, which is not before the Court at this

time. The Court may either exclude this evidence at trial. In the meantime discovery is

reopened for the limited purpose of allowing Defendants to take Saucer’s deposition.

Nesby asks the Court to exclude evidence from several declarations on grounds of

hearsay and vagueness. The Court finds that the terms to which Nesby objects, for

example “verification” as applied to the warrant, can be construed using their dictionary

definitions and that the declarants testified according to personal knowledge of procedures.

Therefore their declarations are neither hearsay nor impermissible opinions. The Court also

declines to exclude documents in Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, since Nesby

cannot claim surprise or prejudice from Defendants’ reliance on the warrants which are

central to this case.

Conclusion re Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted in its entirety. While the circumstance underlying this case were indeed

unfortunate, Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact in dispute sufficient to

take these Defendants to trial on these claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 19, 2007

__________________________________

 James Larson

 Chief Magistrate Judge

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