Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00519/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00519-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1132 E.R.I.S.A.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID BARBOZA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-2:08-519-KJM-GGH 

vs.

CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF

PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS, et al.,

Defendants. 

 ORDER /

This matter is before the court on (1) the motion for attorneys’ fees brought by

defendants California Association of Professional Firefighters (“CAPF”) and California

Administration Insurance Services, Inc.’s ("CAISI") (ECF 116) (collectively “defendants”);

(2) plaintiff David Barboza's motion for attorneys' fees, non-taxable costs and pre-judgment

interest (ECF 114); (3) defendants’ bill of costs (ECF 107); and (4) plaintiff's bill of costs (ECF

106). Based upon the submissions of the parties, and for the reasons set forth below, all the

motions are denied.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action under the federal Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Plaintiff was a firefighter with the

city of Tracy, and a participant in the long-term disability plan (the “Plan”) offered by CAPF;

CAISI administered the Plan. Plaintiff sought damages in the form of long-term disability

(“LTD”) payments plaintiff maintained defendants improperly withheld from him. Plaintiff also

sought statutory penalties and injunctive relief. Defendants argued they granted plaintiff’s claim

for LTD benefits, but properly offset the amount of benefits due plaintiff in accordance with the

express terms of the Plan. Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on April 11,

2012. ( ECF 75-1.) On April 13, 2012, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 

(ECF 78.) Plaintiff also filed a motion for summary judgment on defendants’ counterclaim on

April 13, 2012. (ECF 77.) 

In resolving the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled as

follows: 

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are

granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, defendant is

ordered to distribute to plaintiff the remainder of the LTD benefits

plaintiff is currently owed after offsetting for benefits to which he

was entitled under Section 4850 of the California Labor Code and

the $18,000 workers’ compensation settlement into which he

entered.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff’s earnings from self-employment is denied as to the

$192,705 of gross revenue from plaintiff’s alpaca farm and

$26,443 in gross income from other self employment but granted

as to the $1,173 plaintiff received from employment with Sierra

Entertainment and Sierra Northern Railways. 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to his request

for statutory penalties is denied.

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to his request

for injunctive relief is granted. Defendant is hereby ordered to

revise the Plan’s appeals procedure to comply with the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Barboza v. Cal. Ass’n Prof’l Firefighters, 651

F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on defendants’

counterclaim is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically,

plaintiff’s motion is granted as to the $192,705 of gross revenue

from plaintiff’s alpaca farm and $26,443 in gross income from

other self employment but denied as to the $1,173 plaintiff

received from employment with Sierra Entertainment and Sierra

Northern Railways. 

Barboza v. Cal. Ass'n Prof'l Firefighters, 2012 WL 4490981 at *21-22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30,

2012).

II. ANALYSIS 

Both plaintiff and defendants filed motions for attorneys’ fees under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(1). Both parties respectively argue that they had sufficient success on the merits to

justify an award of fees.

Defendants specifically contend that, “despite the potent relief prayed for by

[p]laintiff – which included an exaggerated amount of LTD benefits and ‘an Order removing

[CAISI] as Plan fiduciary and barring it from any further responsibility for claims determinations

under the Plan,’ – the Court merely ordered [d]efendants to do something that they had already

done and awarded them $19,173 in offsets.” (ECF 116-1 at 5:4-8.) Defendants also argue the

“relative merits of the parties’ respective positions is evidenced by the number of substantial

claims won and lost.” (Id. at 6:5-7 (internal citation omitted).) 

Plaintiff argues he had some degree of success on the merits because, “[w]hile

[he] did not succeed on the Plan’s asserted offsets for 4850 pay and his Workers Compensation

settlement, he did succeed on the [asserted] offset for ‘gross revenues’ from self-employment, as

well as [d]efendants’ claim that Barboza had ‘waived’ his right to 4850 pay in his 2006

employment settlement, where [d]efendants provided no legal or factual evidence in support of

that allegation in the Counterclaim.” (ECF 114 at 6:21-25.) Plaintiff also asserts he “succeeded

in obtaining injunctive relief for the Plan’s breach of fiduciary duty in failing to maintain a

claims and appeals procedure that complied with DOL regulations . . . .” (Id. at 6:25-7:1.)

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Claims for attorneys’ fees in ERISA actions are determined by ERISA's statutory

fee shifting scheme. "In any action under [ERISA] . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or

fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to

either party." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). 

In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2149

(2010), the Supreme Court held that the plain language of the statute dictates that prevailing

party status is not a prerequisite to receiving attorney’s fees; instead, “a court ‘in its discretion,’

may award fees . . . as long as the fee claimant has achieved ‘some degree of success on the

merits.’” Id. at 2152, 2156 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)). The

Court further explained that "[a] claimant does not satisfy that requirement by achieving ‘[t]rivial

success on the merits’ or a ‘purely procedural victor[y],’ but does satisfy it if the court can fairly

call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits without conducting a ‘lengthy

inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party's success was ‘substantial’ or occurred on a

‘central issue.’” Id. at 2158 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 n.9). Fee shifting schemes of

this nature vest district courts with broad discretion to determine whether attorneys’ fees are

appropriate. Id. 

If the court determines that the fee claimant has achieved some degree of success

on the merits, it must then apply the five factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit to determine

whether granting fees is appropriate. Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.

1980); see Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158 n.8 (“[O]nce a claimant has satisfied th[e] [some success]

requirement, and thus becomes eligible for a fees award under § 1132(g)(1), a court may

consider the five factors adopted by the Court of Appeals.") These factors are:

(1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith;

(2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees;

(3) whether an award of fees against the opposing parties would

deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether

the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and 

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beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal

question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the

parties' positions.

Hummell, 634 F.2d at 453.

A. Some Degree of Success on the Merits

In this case, both plaintiff and defendants achieved some degree of success on the

merits. Defendants had some degree of success on the merits by virtue of the court agreeing

with defendants’ position that plaintiff’s LTD benefits should be offset by Section 4850 pay and

plaintiff’s worker’s compensation settlement. The court also denied plaintiff’s request for

statutory penalties. While the court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on

defendant’s counterclaim as to the majority of the gross revenue plaintiff earned from selfemployment, it denied plaintiff’s motion as to the “$1,173 plaintiff received from employment

with Sierra Entertainment and Sierra Northern Railways.” Barboza, 2012 WL 4490981 at *21. 

Similarly, plaintiff’s victory on defendants’ counterclaim, his request for injunctive relief, and

the court’s order that defendants “distribute to plaintiff the remainder of LTD benefits he is

currently owed,” id., constitutes, at least, some degree of success on the merits. The court

therefore finds that both plaintiff and defendants have made the requisite showing under Section

1132(g)(1) of “some degree of success on the merits.” Hardt, 130 S.Ct. at 2152.

B. Hummell Factors

After consideration of the five Hummel factors, however, the court concludes, in

its “broad discretion,” that an award of attorneys’ fees is not appropriate in this case. The parties

have not demonstrated that any party has acted in bad faith; rather, the court finds that both

plaintiff’s request for LTD benefits under the plan and defendants’ attempt to offset those

benefits in accordance with their interpretation of the plan terms were inherently reasonable.

Plaintiff argues he does not have the ability to pay attorneys’ fees. (ECF 114 at

8:4-8.) This factor, however, is insufficient to tip the scale in favor of awarding plaintiff

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attorneys’ fees because the court also denies defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and plaintiff,

thus, will not have to pay any fees out of pocket. 

With respect to the relative merits of the parties’ positions, the court concludes

that neither party had significantly greater success on the merits than the other. Indeed, the

disposition of the cross-motions for summary judgment required difficult and complex statutory

interpretation and application of case law. In other words, none of the court’s conclusions was

easily reached; rather, the resolution of each issue presented to the court required concentrated

analysis of close questions of both law and fact. See Barboza v. California Ass'n of Professional

Firefighters, No. CIV. S-08-02569 FCD/GGH, 2011 WL 1343030, at *6 (E.D. Cal. April 7,

2011) (holding that an award of costs under ERISA was not appropriate because the case

involved “complex, statutory interpretation without the aid of clear, precedential authority on

either side”).1 The complexity of the questions presented underscores the court’s conclusion that

neither party acted in bad faith. 

An award of fees against defendants would not properly be awarded as a

deterrent. Moreover, as set forth above, both plaintiff and defendants achieved some success on

the merits, tempered by the court's denial of summary judgment on several of the parties’

respective claims and defenses. 

Under these circumstances, the court finds, in its discretion, attorneys' fees are not

justified to either plaintiff or defendants. Plaintiff and defendants' motions for fees are

DENIED.

C. Plaintiff's and Defendants' Bill of Costs

Both plaintiff and defendants filed a bill of costs; both parties also filed objections

to the opposing parties' bill of costs. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that the

party that prevails on the merits should be awarded costs. However, this court has found that

1

 The Barboza case cited here is a parallel case involving different claims. 

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where the court grants “a portion of each side's request for summary judgment . . . . the [court]

will not award costs to either side.” United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 415 F. Supp

1373, 1379 (E.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980). Because

both parties prevailed on portions of their motions for summary judgment, the court declines to

award costs to either plaintiff or defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 5, 2013. 

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