Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01596/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01596-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allied Waste North America, Inc., a

Delaware corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

ITS Enterprises, Inc., a Texas corporation,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 07-1596-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Allied Waste North America’s (“Allied’s”)

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Dkt. #48) and Allied’s Supplemental Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees. (Dkt. #63) Having reviewed the motion, the response and reply thereto,

and the supplemental motion, the Court issues the following Order. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case arose from a dispute between Allied, a waste collection company, and ITS

Enterprises, Inc. (“ITS”), a temporary staffing agency that provides temporary labor to waste

collection companies. ITS’s employees perform administrative work, yard work, and stand

on the back of waste trucks assisting in the collection of waste. 

ITS provided Allied with temporary labor without a formal contract until Allied

informed ITS that it required a written contract to continue the parties’ relationship. On

April 20, 2005, the companies entered into a Temporary Labor Service Agreement (the

Case 2:07-cv-01596-MHM Document 64 Filed 11/18/09 Page 1 of 6
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“Contract”). The Contract required that ITS purchase certain types and levels of insurance,

including $5 million dollars of comprehensive, general, and contractual liability coverage,

and that ITS add Allied as an additional insured under these policies. The Contract further

required that ITS defend and indemnify Allied against liability arising out of the Contract.

The Contract also contained an entireties clause. 

In May 2007, the estate of Marvin Sneed filed its third amended complaint against

Allied (the “Lawsuit”). Mr. Sneed was an ITS employee furnished to Allied as a temporary

employee pursuant to the Contract. Mr. Sneed sustained fatal injuries while working on an

Allied waste truck when the truck snagged a low-hanging telephone wire. The wire pulled

down a telephone pole which struck Mr. Sneed in the head. The Lawsuit alleged that Allied

was negligent in causing Mr. Sneed’s death. 

Allied accordingly tendered the Lawsuit to ITS for defense and indemnity pursuant

to the terms of the Contract. Upon doing so, Allied discovered that ITS had purchased

insurance in a lower amount than was required under the Contract and had never added

Allied as an additional insured. ITS thereafter denied Allied’s tender of defense and

indemnification, and Allied consequently instituted this litigation. 

Allied’s complaint alleged a breach of contract claim and requested a declaratory

judgment that ITS be required to defend and indemnify Allied in the Lawsuit by the estate

of Mr. Sneed, pay all attorneys’ fees, costs, and other litigation expenses, and indemnify

Allied against any judgment the plaintiff might obtain in the Lawsuit. (Dkt. #4) On May 28,

2008, Allied filed a motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim. (Dkt.

#37) At that time, Allied did not move for summary judgment on the damage claim because

the Lawsuit was ongoing and Allied’s damages were not fixed. 

On March 25, 2009, the Court granted Allied’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its

breach of contract claim. (Dkt. #45) Thereafter, Allied filed the instant Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. (Dkt. #48) In early 2009, Allied obtained a defense verdict in

the Lawsuit, fixing its damages. As a result, on May 29, 2009, Allied filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment on its Damage Claim. (Dkt. #58) The Court granted Allied’s Motion

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 The Contract provides that when an action is brought to enforce any provision

therein, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs and expenses from the nonprevailing party, “including reasonable attorneys’ and expert witness fees, and all costs,

whether considered taxable or non-taxable, in addition to all the rights and remedies available

at law.” (Dkt. #48, Exh. 2) 

2

 A.R.S § 12-341.01(A) provides that “[i]n any contested action arising out of

contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney’s

fees.” 

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for Summary Judgment on the Damage Claim, and ordered the Clerk of the Court to enter

judgement against ITS in the amount of $75,943.60 plus interest. (Dkt. #61) At this time,

the Court also granted Allied leave to supplement its fee application to include the fees

incurred in briefing its Motion for Summary Judgment on its damage claim. (Dkt. #61)

Thereafter, Allied filed a Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ fees. (Dkt. #63) 

II. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Allied moves the Court for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $45,423.50 and nontaxable costs in the amount of $338.90 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2),

LRCiv. 54.2, Local District Court Rules for the District of Arizona, and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

(Dkt. #48 at 1, 4) In its Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Allied requests an

additional $2110.50 in attorneys’ fees. (Dkt. #63) 

Allied asserts that (1) as the prevailing party, it is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs

under the fee provision of the Contract,1

 or in the alternative, under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A)2

and (2) its fee request is reasonable, as determined under the factors in LRCiv. 54.2(c)(3).

(Dkt. #48 at 3-5) In its response, ITS mainly disputes the “reasonableness of the time and

labor expended by Allied’s counsel,” though it does not dispute that Allied is the prevailing

party, or that as such they are entitled to “an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.” (Dkt. #51

at 2) 

 A party moving for attorneys’ fees must establish that it is eligible and entitled to an

award, and that the requested award is reasonable. See LRCiv 54.2(c). A successful party

in an action arising out of a contract is eligible for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees

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 Because the Court exercises its discretion to award Allied reasonable attorneys’ fees

under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) and LRCiv. 54.2, the Court does not address Allied’s argument

that the Court lacks discretion to deny a party attorneys’ fees under a contractual fee

provision, but must award them as a matter of right under Chase Bank of Arizona v. Acosta,

179 Ariz. 563, 575, 880 P.2d 1109, 1121 (App. 1994). 

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pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). See Sparks v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz.

529, 544 (1982). “In deciding whether to award fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), [courts]

consider several factors: (1) the merits of the unsuccessful defense, (2) whether the litigation

could have been avoided, (3) whether an award would cause extreme hardship, (4) whether

plaintiff completely prevailed, (5) the novelty of the legal issues, and (6) whether an award

would discourage parties with tenable claims from litigating.” BBQ Hut, Inc. v. Maelin

Enterprises, LLC, 2008 WL 2687685, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2008) (citing Associated Indem. Corp.

v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570 (1985)). “An award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to this statute

is discretionary in nature, and no presumptions arise in favor of the prevailing party.”

Biltmore Associates, LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2007 WL 496766, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2007)

(citing Associated Indem. Corp., 143 Ariz. at 569). After weighing the factors listed above,

the Court in its discretion concludes that Allied is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorneys’ fees.3

ITS disputes the reasonableness of Allied’s requested attorneys’ fees, and asks the

Court to “exercise its discretion to significantly reduce any award of fees granted pursuant

to Allied’s Fee Application” accordingly. (Dkt. #51 at 2-3) 

The considerations in determining reasonableness of fees are set out in LRCiv.

54.2(c)(3), and include: 

(A) The time and labor required of counsel; (B) The novelty and difficulty of

the questions presented; (C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly; (D) The preclusion of other employment by counsel because of the

acceptance of the action; (E) The customary fee charged in matters of the type

involved;(F) Whether the fee contracted between the attorney and the client is

fixed or contingent; (G) Any time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances; (H) The amount of money, or the value of the rights involved,

and the results obtained; (I) The experience, reputation and ability of counsel;

(J) The “undesirability” of the case; (K) The nature and length of the

professional relationship between the attorney and the client; (L) Awards in

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similar actions; and (M) Any other matters deemed appropriate under the

circumstances. 

A review of Allied’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Attorney Lopez’s

Declaration in support thereof, and attached itemized description of all work performed

reveals that the attorneys’ fees sought are reasonable under LRCiv. 52.4(c)(3). Likewise, the

Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ fees is also reasonable. Allied was charged a reduced

hourly billing rate for all attorneys working on the matter because of its longstanding

relationship with the law firm, and therefore the hourly billing rate was more than reasonable

considering the “experience, reputation and ability” of counsel. The nature and progression

of the litigation merited the amount of time spent on the matter. Moreover, Allied’s attorney

was clearly effective in obtaining a favorable result. The Court’s detailed review of all

Allied’s expenditures shows that they comport with the definition of reasonableness outlined

in LRCiv. 54.2(c)(3). 

ITS specifically objects to the fact that attorneys for Allied “billed approximately 78.7

hours” working on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Reply, and Statement of Facts. (Dkt.

#51 at 3; Exh. 1 (detailing all time entries in Allied’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees that involve

the Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, or Reply)) Local Rule 54.2(f)

requires that a responsive memorandum in opposition to a motion for award of attorneys’

fees and related non-taxable expenses shall “identify with specificity all disputed issues of

material fact and shall separately identify each and every disputed time entry or expense

item.” The rule also permits respondents to “attach controverting affidavits.” Here, counsel

for ITS has made only the general assertion that 78.7 hours is excessive for the work

described. ITS has failed to provide any evidentiary support for the general proposition that

78.7 hours is excessive. ITS also failed to object to any specific billing entry as inappropriate

for inclusion in an award of attorneys’ fees, instead objecting generally to the entries relating

to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, and Response as a whole. In its

Reply, Allied rejects the assertion that 78.7 hours was excessive and describes the extent of

the work involved in the abovementioned motion and related documents, providing a

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sufficient justification for the amount of time spent. (Dkt. #55) The Court finds this

explanation adequate to support the request for attorneys’ fees.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED granting Allied’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Dkt. #48)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. #63) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding Allied $45,423.50 for attorneys’ fees and

$338.90 for costs, plus an additional $2,110.50 for attorneys’ fees, for a total award of

$47,872.90. 

DATED this 17th day of November, 2009.

 

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