Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02702/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02702-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald A Poetz,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-23-02702-PHX-KML

ORDER 

Plaintiff Ronald A. Poetz seeks review of the Social Security Commissioner’s final 

decision denying him disability insurance benefits. Because the Administrative Law 

Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on 

harmful legal error, it is affirmed.

I. Background

Poetz protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 

7, 2020.1(Administrative Record (“AR”) 15.) The ALJ determined his severe impairments 

were degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine with radiculopathy, remote history of 

left shoulder surgery, idiopathic neuropathy, residuals of varicose vein surgeries, history 

of respiratory failure, history of peripheral vestibular hypofunction/vertigo, and obesity. 

(AR 18.) Poetz does not allege he had any other severe impairments. (See Docs. 14, 15.) 

1 Poetz filed an application for disability insurance benefits in 2018 and received an 

unfavorable decision. (AR 77–94.) Such a decision creates a rebuttable presumption that a 

claimant is not disabled. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citing Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1988)). The ALJ determined 

the presumption was rebutted here because Poetz alleged new impairments. (AR 16.) 

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The ALJ denied Poetz’s claim (AR 23) and the appeals council denied his request 

for review. (AR 1.) Poetz then appealed to this court. 

II. Legal Standard

The court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 

630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance” of evidence and is such that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 

2005)). The court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. 

See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. Discussion

A. The ALJ’s Five-Step Disability Evaluation Process

Under the Social Security Act, a claimant for disability insurance benefits must 

establish disability prior to the date last insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131. 

A claimant is disabled under the Act if he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity 

because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted, or can 

be expected to last, for a continuous period of twelve months or more. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

Whether a claimant is disabled is determined by a five-step sequential process. See 

Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022) (summarizing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th 

Cir. 1999). At step three, the claimant must show his impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart 

P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). At step four, the claimant must 

show hisresidual functional capacity (“RFC”)—the most he can do with hisimpairments—

precludes him from performing his past work. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant 

meets his burden at step three, he is presumed disabled and the analysis ends. If the inquiry 

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proceeds and the claimant meets his burden at step four, then at step five the Commissioner 

must determine if the claimant is able to perform other work that “exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy” given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work 

experience. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id.

At step three the ALJ determined Poetz did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment, and he had the 

RFC to perform “light work” with additional limitations given his impairments. (AR 19.) 

The ALJ used this RFC to conclude at step four that Poetz could perform his past relevant 

work as a packaging supervisor, which does “not require the performance of work-related 

activities precluded by” his RFC. (AR 22.) These conclusions were based, in part, on the 

ALJ discounting some of Poetz’s symptom testimony. (See AR 19–22, 32–43.) 

Poetz only argues the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons to find 

his testimony about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms 

unpersuasive. Poetz argues properly accounting for his symptom testimony “would require 

an ALJ to find [him] disabled.” (Doc. 12 at 14.) 

B. Poetz’s Symptom Testimony

The ALJ stated Poetz’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause some of [his] alleged symptoms; however, [his] statements concerning 

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 18–19.) Poetz 

contends the ALJ improperly relied on his daily activities and objective medical 

evidence—specifically, repeated normal findings on physical examinations—as reasons to 

discount his symptom testimony. (Docs. 12 at 8–14, 15 at 4–8.)

When a claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment which could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptoms 

alleged and there is no evidence of malingering, an ALJ may only reject subjective 

symptom-severity testimony by offering “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing 

so.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 655 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 

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759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)). Such findings are sufficiently specific when they 

permit a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ “did not arbitrarily discredit [a] claimant’s 

testimony.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (simplified), 

superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R § 404.1502(a). The ALJ did not find that Poetz 

was malingering. So, the ALJ could only discredit his symptom testimony by providing 

“specific, clear and convincing” reasons for doing so. Revels, 874 F.3d at 655. 

Contradictions between a claimant’s symptom testimony and his daily activities 

provide a valid ground for discounting his symptom testimony. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even where [daily] activities suggest some difficulty 

functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent 

that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment”), superseded on other 

grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). And here, the ALJ was specific in describing why 

Poetz’s activities contradicted his testimony; for example, in finding that preparing meals, 

cleaning the kitchen, and doing laundry all involve moving the neck and using upper 

extremities for gross and fine manipulation, contradicting Poetz’s claims of disabling pain 

in the shoulder and cervical spine. (AR 20; see also AR 20 (describing how Poetz’s daily 

walks contradicted his claim of disabling neuropathy).) But in considering daily activities 

to discount a claimant’s symptom testimony, the ALJ must conduct a “transferability” and 

“substantiality” analysis. That analysis requires an ALJ consider whether a claimant can 

spend a “substantial part” of his day “engaged in pursuits involving the performance of 

physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphases 

added). The ALJ did not conduct such an analysis here (see AR 19–22) and the 

Commissioner does not argue otherwise. (See Doc. 14.) It was therefore legal error for him 

to use Poetz’s daily activities as a reason to discount his symptom testimony.2

The ALJ, however, properly used objective medical evidence to discount Poetz’s 

2 Poetz also argues the ALJ improperly relied on his travel history to discount his symptom 

testimony. (Docs. 12 at 12–13, 15 at 7–9). But it was Poetz’s burden to describe how he 

was able to travel in light of allegedly disabling impairments given the lack of other 

ambiguities in the record. See Lewis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 121-CV-01243-ADASAB, 2023 WL 2182464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2023), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. 121-CV-01243-ADA-SAB, 2023 WL 3794402 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2023).

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symptom testimony, making any error in failing to make explicit transferability and 

substantiality findings harmless. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(simplified) (an ALJ’s error is harmless when it is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.”). The ALJ cited medical records at length to support his 

nondisability determination and to discount Poetz’s symptom testimony, far exceeding the 

“mere scintilla” required by the substantial evidence standard. Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. (See

AR 18–22.) Poetz cites purportedly contrary medical records, but the relevance of those 

records is not obvious and even if they could support a disability determination, that is not 

the standard here. Rather, if “the evidence [in the record] is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation” the court “will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d 

at 1039.

Poetz contends the ALJ rejected his symptom testimony by highlighting selective 

normal findings in his medical records such as medical documentation of normal sensation, 

strength, shoulder range of motion, and gait. (Doc. 12 at 9.) Poetz argues the ALJ failed to 

explain why he considered those normal findings but disregarded other evidence in the 

record that supported or was consistent with Poetz’s symptom testimony. (Doc. 12 at 10.) 

Again, though, where the record evidence supports multiple rational interpretations—as it 

does here—the court must uphold the ALJ’s conclusion. Id. Poetz relies on a case from this 

district that held an ALJ had erred by failing to consider “a significant piece of medical 

evidence,” but he cites no such evidence here, so that argument also fails. (Doc. 12 at 11 

(citing Lewis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 625 F. Supp. 3d 942, 949–50 (D. Ariz. 

2022)).)

The ALJ also discounted Poetz’s testimony of “constant dizziness” because he 

exhibited “normal gait at multiple appointments,” denied dizziness at several 

appointments, and showed “only slight difficulties with balance at his consultative 

examination.” (AR 20–21.) Poetz contends the ALJ misinterpreted his testimony because 

he did not claim constant dizziness but rather “dizziness when performing certain 

movements.” (Doc. 12 at 10 n.5.) It is far from clear Poetz testified to that effect. The ALJ 

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asked Poetz if his dizziness “comes and goes or is [ ] there all the time[.]” (AR 37.) Poetz 

replied “[i]t’s there all the time[.]” (AR 38.) He then went on to describe certain activities 

that make him “extremely dizzy.” (AR 38.) When the ALJ asked whether Poetz gets dizzy 

when “getting up from a seated position,” Poetz replied “[n]ot every time.” (AR 37.) It is 

not clear from the transcript whether Poetz was or was not claiming constant dizziness. 

(See AR 37–38.) But if Poetz “misspoke at the hearing . . . then his attorney should have 

clarified the record at that time[,]” Ramirez v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-03755-KES, 2017 WL 

5495505, at *24 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017), and Poetz’s attorney asked no questions about 

dizziness. (See AR 40–43.) So, it was reasonable for the ALJ to believe Poetz was testifying 

he had constant dizziness and the contrast between the objective medical evidence and 

Poetz’s testimony (see AR 20, 40–43) provides a valid basis for the ALJ to discount his

symptom testimony.

As Poetz points out, “ALJs may not cherry-pick portions of the evidence that 

support the ALJ’s preferred outcome of a case while ignoring evidence that supports a 

claimant’s symptom testimony.” (Doc. 12 at 10.) See Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 

877–78 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting an ALJ is “not permitted to ‘cherry pick’ from [ ] mixed 

results to support a denial of benefits” but rather the ALJ’s examples must “constitute 

examples of a broader development.”) (simplified). But Poetz does not explain how the 

ALJ “cherry-picked” when normal findings and denials of symptoms existed throughout 

the disability period. (See Doc. 12 at 11–12.) Contrary to Poetz’s argument that the ALJ 

failed to “look to the record as a whole” (Doc. 15 at 6), the ALJ did discuss multiple 

abnormal findings, noting some “could explain” or “could contribute” to the symptoms 

Poetz complained of. (AR 20.) These included several of the records Poetz cited as 

supporting a disability finding and as contradicting the ALJ’s findings. (Compare AR 20 

with Doc. 12 at 10.) The ALJ evaluated the record as a whole and simply came to a different 

conclusion than Poetz preferred. For these reasons, Poetz’s argument that the ALJ “cherrypicked” portions of the medical records that supported his nondisability finding fails. 

Although the ALJ erred in using Poetz’s daily activities in the testimony-rejection 

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analysis without explicit substantiality and transferability findings, the error was harmless 

because the discrediting was otherwise supported by objective medical evidence. That 

evidence provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discrediting Poetz’s 

symptom testimony and was sufficiently specific to conclude the ALJ “did not arbitrarily 

discredit” his testimony. Revels, 874 F.3d at 655 (quoting Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15); 

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. Thus, the ALJ’s decision to discredit Poetz’s testimony was 

supported by substantial evidence. See Marsh, 792 F.3d at 1173.

IV. Conclusion

Poetz’s contention that it was error for the ALJ to discount his symptom testimony 

fails. The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on harmful 

legal error, so it is affirmed. 

IT IS ORDERED affirming the March 28, 2023, decision of the ALJ. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case. 

Dated this 10th day of January, 2025.

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