Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04218/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04218-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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The Court, for the reasons stated at the hearing, dismissed respondents Edward

Flores and Toby Wong.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEDAL SHAHWAN,

Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al.,

Respondents /

No. C-05-4218 MMC

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Before the Court is petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus. The matter

came on regularly for hearing on November 30, 2005. Stacy Tolchin and Marc Van Der

Hout of Van Der Hout, Brigagliano & Nightingale, LLP, appeared on behalf of petitioner

Nedal Shahwan. Ila C. Deiss, Assistant United States Attorney, appeared on behalf of

respondents Michael Chertoff, Alberto Gonzales, and Nancy Alcantar.1

BACKGROUND

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), in a Notice to Appear

(“NTA”) issued July 11, 2005, alleges petitioner is a citizen of Egypt who entered the United

States on a student visa in January 1997. (See Deiss Decl., filed November 8, 2005, Ex. B

at 3.) After his arrival in January 1997, petitioner filed with ICE’s precedessor agency, the

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Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), an application to adjust his status to

become a permanent resident. (See id. Ex. D). While said application was pending,

petitioner, on one occasion in 1997 and on one occasion in 1998, requested and received

from the INS permission to travel to Saudi Arabia and thereafter enter the United States on

“parole.” (See id. Ex. E.) On both occasions, the INS provided petitioner with a written

notice pertaining to such travel on parole. (See id.)

The 1997 notice, in relevant part, stated as follows:

NOTE TO ALIEN: This authorization will permit you to resume your

application for adjustment of status on your return to the United States. 

Acceptance of this advance parole constitutes a waiver of your right to a

deportation hearing and you may be placed in exclusion proceedings upon

your return.

(See id. Ex. E, second page.)

The 1998 notice, in relevant part, stated as follows:

NOTICE TO APPLICANT: Presentation of this authorization will permit you to

resume your application for adjustment of status upon your return to the

United States. If your adjustment application is denied, you will be subject to

removal proceedings under Section 235(b)(1) or 240 of the Act. If, after April

01, 1997, you were unlawfully present in the United States for more than 180

days before applying for adjustment of status, you may be found inadmissible

under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the Act when you return to the United States

to resume the processing of your application. If you are found inadmissible,

you will need to qualify for a waiver of inadmissibility in order for your

adjustment of status application to be approved.

(See id. Ex. E, fifth page.)

On December 23, 1999, the INS denied petitioner’s application for adjustment of

status. (See id. Ex. G.) On June 23, 2000, the INS sent petitioner, by certified mail to his

address of record in Oklahoma, an NTA, alleging he was deportable. (See id. Ex. I.) The

United States Postal Service returned the NTA to the INS as “unclaimed,” and noted on the

face of the envelope petitioner’s forwarding address in San Jose, California. (See id.) 

There is no indication the INS attempted to re-serve petitioner at his California address.

On July 11, 2005, ICE issued an NTA, alleging petitioner is an “arriving alien” subject

to deportation, and further alleging that on January 20, 2004 petitioner had falsely

represented himself as a U.S. citizen on a passport application. (See id. Ex. B.) On July

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Subsequently, on October 17, 2005, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the

IJ’s decision without opinion. (See id.)

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12, 2005, petitioner was found guilty of “making a false statement in a passport

application,” (see id. Ex. L), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542, see Docket, United States v.

Shahwan, CR 04-20063 RMW. Thereafter, on July 12, 2005, petitioner was arrested by

ICE agents, (see Deiss Decl. Ex. M), and later that same day, an ICE officer determined

petitioner should be detained pending final determination of removal proceedings, (see id.

Ex. N).

Petitioner was taken to Eloy, Arizona. (See id. Ex. O.) On July 28, 2005, in Eloy,

Arizona, United States Immigration Judge John W. Davis (“IJ”) conducted a hearing on

petitioner’s detention. (See id.) Prior to the hearing, petitioner filed a memorandum,

supported by evidence, in which he argued, inter alia, that he was not a flight risk. (See

Tolchin Decl. Ex. J.) On August 15, 2005, the IJ issued a written decision, finding that as a

matter of regulation, he lacked authority to redetermine ICE’s custody decisions as to an

“arriving alien,” (see Deiss Decl. Ex. O), and, accordingly, denied petitioner’s request for

reconsideration of his detention, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, (see id.)2

On September 15, 2005, Thomas Baranick, ICE Acting Field Office Director in

Phoenix, Arizona, issued a decision denying a request for parole that petitioner, through

counsel, had filed with ICE on July 15, 2005, stating that petitioner “has proven to be a

flight risk due to various inconsistencies located throughout his record.” (See id. Ex P.)

On October 12, 2005, ICE transferred petitioner to a facility in the Northern District,

(see Tolchin Decl., filed October 25, 2005, ¶ 13), wherein petitioner was detained at the

time he filed the instant action, (see id. ¶ 15).

On October 24, 2005, petitioner’s counsel received an undated letter from ICE, in

which ICE denied a September 21, 2005 request by petitioner to be released on bond or on

an electronic monitoring program, reiterating the finding set forth in ICE’s September 15,

2005 decision, and also noting that because petitioner’s “native country ha[d] not confirmed

or substantiated his identity,” petitioner was not eligible for the Intensive Supervision

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Appearance Program. (See id. Ex. P.)

DISCUSSION

When an alien is arrested on the ground he is removable, ICE “may” detain the alien

or “may” release the alien on bond or parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Ordinarily, custody

and bond determinations made by ICE are reviewable by an IJ. See 8 C.F.R.

§§1003.19(a), (b). One exception, however, is that an IJ “may not redetermine conditions

of custody imposed by [ICE]” as to “arriving aliens in removal proceedings.” See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). An “arriving alien” is “an applicant for admission coming to or

attempting to come into the United States.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q).

Petitioner entered the United States on a student visa in January 1997, and thus

was “admitted” at that time. (See Deiss Decl. Ex. B, third page.) Consequently, if

petitioner subsequently had not left the United States, and had been arrested and placed in

removal proceedings, petitioner would be eligible to have an IJ review any custody and/or

bond determinations by ICE. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.19(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1)

(providing IJ may “detain the alien in custody, release the alien, and determine the amount

of bond, if any, under which the [alien] may be released”). As noted, however, petitioner,

with permission, traveled on “advance parole.” (See Deiss Decl. Ex. E.) When he returned

to the United States on parole, he became an “arriving alien.” See Barney v. Rogers, 83 F.

3d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1996) (analyzing claim where alien, who had illegally overstayed on

student visa and was seeking to adjust status, had received permission to leave and return

on parole; holding when alien was paroled upon return, “parole gave [alien] the right to

return for the purpose of completing her Adjustment Application; it did not ‘freeze’ her

status as an illegal overstay”).

Petitioner does not deny he is an “arriving alien” as a matter of regulation. Rather,

he argues that application of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B), the regulation precluding an

IJ’s review of ICE’s custody and bond determinations as to “arriving aliens,” would deprive

him of due process, because when he applied for advance parole, the INS did not notify

him that he would be barred from having a bond hearing before an IJ if he was placed in

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removal proceedings thereafter.

When petitioner applied for advance parole, he was an alien who had lawfully

entered the United States on a student visa, and who, whether or not his presence

thereafter remained lawful, was entitled to due process. See Shaughnessy v. United

States, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953) (recognizing alien who enters United States, whether or

not entry is legal, is entitled to due process); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,

534 (1952) (stating legally admitted “visitors” are “entitled in their persons and effects to the

protection of our laws”).

With respect to aliens who have traveled on advance parole, the Ninth Circuit has

held that when the government seeks to remove such an alien, the government cannot

deprive the alien of the rights that would have otherwise been available to him prior to

leaving the country, if he was not given sufficient notice of the consequences of accepting

advance parole. See Navarro-Aispura v. INS, 53 F. 3d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding

INS could not place alien in exclusion, rather than deportation proceedings, where alien

had departed and returned to United States on advance parole and INS notice as to when

alien on advance parole could be placed in exclusion proceedings was “garbled” and

“unintelligible” and thus “inadequate”); Patel v. Landon, 739 F. 2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding alien was “trapped into exclusion status” when INS approved alien’s request

to travel on advance parole and did not provide notice to “sufficiently indicate” INS could

place alien in exclusion rather than deportation proceedings if he so traveled and his

application for adjustment of status were later denied; holding, as consequence, INS could

not place alien in exclusion proceedings); accord Joshi v. District Director, INS, 720 F. 2d

799, 802-03 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding INS not entitled to place petitioner in exclusion

proceedings, where notice provided to petitioner when he applied to travel on advance

parole “did not notify [petitioner] that departure, travel, and return pursuant to the advance

parole would result in the loss of entitlement to a deportation hearing”); cf. Barney, 83 F. 3d

at 321 (rejecting argument that notice inadequate if alien not given “detailed explanation”;

holding alien was “not misled or trapped” where INS expressly notified alien she would be

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Where, as here, proceedings against an alien were instituted after April 1, 1997, the

alien is subject to § 1229a, i.e., the alien is placed in removal proceedings, and is not

subject to the statutes providing for placement in either exclusion or deportation

proceedings. See Romani v. I.N.S., 146 F. 3d 737, 739 n .3 (9th Cir. 1998).

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subject to exclusion proceedings if her then-pending application for adjustment was denied

after her return on advance parole).

Here, respondents do not argue petitioner was not entitled to notice that if he

traveled on advance parole, he would become ineligible to have a bond hearing before an

IJ. Rather, respondents dispute petitioner’s contention that the notices he was provided

were inadequate. (See Resp’ts’ Return in Opp., filed November 8, 2005, at 11:20-22.) 

Accordingly, the Court turns to the notices in question.

The 1997 notice, dated July 9, 1997, advised petitioner that if he traveled on

advance parole, he would waive his right to a deportation hearing, and could instead be

placed in “exclusion proceedings.” Unlike the alien in Barney, however, at the time

petitioner received the 1997 notice, the distinction between “exclusion” and “deportation”

proceedings no longer existed; rather, as a result of a new statute, all aliens who were

alleged to be unlawfully in the country were subject to “removal” proceedings. See 8

U.S.C. § 1229a; Twum v. INS, 411 F. 3d 54, 57 n.1 (2nd Cir. 2005) (holding, “effective April

1, 1997,” formerly separate exclusion and deportation proceedings were replaced by “new

unified ‘removal’ proceeding” as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a).3 Under such

circumstances, notice to petitioner that a consequence of travel on advance parole was that

he could be placed in exclusion proceedings was not meaningful, or, put differently, it was

“unintelligible,” see Navarro-Aispura, 53 F. 3d at 236, given that the INS could no longer

place anyone in exclusion proceedings.

The 1998 notice, dated May 5, 1998, advised petitioner, correctly, that if his

adjustment application was later denied, he would be subject to “removal proceedings,” and

referenced §§ 235(b)(1), 240, and 212(a)(9)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. 

At the hearing conducted November 30, 2005, the parties agreed that § 212(a)(9)(B)(i) is

inapplicable to petitioner, and that § 235(b)(1), pertaining to expedited removal

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Neither § 235(b)(1) nor § 212(a)(9)(B)(i) refers, in any manner, to detention of

persons in removal proceedings.

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In light of this finding, the Court does not consider the alternative arguments raised

by petitioner as to the enforceability of § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B).

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proceedings, does not apply to persons on advance parole. Consequently, the remaining

section is § 240, which sets forth procedures applicable in removal proceedings. Section

240, codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1229A, does not refer, in any manner, to the subject of

detention,4 and is applicable to all persons in removal proceedings, whether or not they are

classified as “arriving aliens.” In short, the 1998 notice did no more than advise petitioner

he would be subject to removal proceedings if his application for adjustment of status was

denied, proceedings to which petitioner would have been subject irrespective of whether he

accepted advance parole. In other words, the 1998 notice failed to advise petitioner that he

would be subject to any adverse consequence as a result of traveling on advance parole.

In sum, in 1997 petitioner received an unintelligible notice concerning outdated

procedures and in 1998 received a notice indicating only that he would be subject to the

same consequences to which he would have been subject had he not traveled on advance

parole, namely, removal proceedings. Under such circumstances, the Court finds petitioner

did not receive any notice, let alone adequate notice, that if he traveled on advanced

parole, he would be subject to detention without the possibility of a bond hearing before an

IJ, and, accordingly, respondents are not entitled to apply 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) to

petitioner.5

 See Navarro-Aispura, 53 F. 3d at 236; see also Martinez-De Bojorquez v.

Ashcroft, 365 F. 3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding where BIA failed to advise alien of

such regulation, BIA violated alien’s right to due process in applying regulation providing for

dismissal of appeal from deportation order where alien departs country during pendency of

appeal).

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby GRANTED. Respondents shall promptly provide

petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 12, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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