Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02092/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02092-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ARMANDO CUEVAS and HEATHER

BURLETTE,

NO. 2: 04-CV-2092-MCE-GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EL DORADO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiffs Armando Cuevas

(“Cuevas”) and Heather Burlette (“Burlette”) claim that

Defendants El Dorado County Sheriff’s Office (“Defendant El

Dorado County”), Sheriff Jeff Neves, Officer Brian Golmitz

(“Defendant Supervisors”) Officer Jon De Roco, Officer Richard

Horn, Officer Michael Cook, and Officer Christopher Starr

(“Defendant Officers”)(collectively “Defendants”) violated their

civil rights during the course of entering and searching

Plaintiffs’ home. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege federal claims

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

Although currently occupied by Plaintiffs, the Capella 2

Drive residence was also the last known address of parolee at

large, Randy Witmore. 

2

under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (“Section 1983"), 42 U.S.C. §

1983, including illegal search and seizure and violation of due

process. In addition, Plaintiffs raise state law claims of

negligence, assault and battery, abuse of criminal process, false

arrest and false imprisonment.

All Defendants now seek summary judgment or in the

alternative summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ claims. For the

reasons set forth below, those motions are granted and

Plaintiffs’ state law claims are remanded to the state court.1

BACKGROUND

On the evening of February 25, 2004, Plaintiffs Cuevas and

Burlette were working in the office of their rented home at 464

Capella Drive in Diamond Springs, California. Sometime around

nightfall on that date, parole officer Jon De Roco together with

Deputy Sheriff Christopher Starr approached the front door of the

Capella Drive residence to conduct a "knock-and-talk" with an

absconded parolee by the name of Randy Witmore (“Witmore”), they

believed, resided therein. While Officers De Roco and Starr 2

approached the front of the residence, Deputy Sheriff Officers

Horn and Cook entered the back yard to guard the rear entry. 

Upon reaching the front door, De Roco knocked summoning Cuevas. 

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3

 As Cuevas answered the door, Burlette remained in an adjacent

room of the home. The subsequent events are hotly contested. 

However, considering only Plaintiffs’ version of events as the

Court must, De Roco called out the name “Randy”. Cuevas Depo.

90:20-22. Simultaneously with asking Cuevas whether he was

Randy, De Roco pushed forward on the door. Cuevas Depo. 91:14-

20. At that point, Cuevas said nothing but attempted to close

the door on Defendant Officers. Cuevas Depo. 91:1-25. Cuevas

concedes that, without clarifying his identity or otherwise

explaining his attempt to close the door, he struck De Roco in

the left side of the head with the door causing Roco to suffer a

black eye and chipped teeth. De Roco together with Starr

immediately forced their way into the residence and wrestled

Cuevas to the floor handcuffing him and directing Burlette to

remain in plain view. Upon hearing the commotion, Defendants

Horn and Cook also entered the residence from the rear. 

Defendant Officers then conducted a warrantless search of the

property and ultimately arrested Cuevas for battery on a peace

officer under California Penal Code § 243(c)(2). Ultimately,

that charge against Cuevas was dropped and no charges were

brought against Burlette. 

As a result of the foregoing events, Plaintiffs filed this

action alleging numerous violations of their constitutional and

statutory rights including the right to be free from unreasonable

search and seizure, negligence, assault and battery, abuse of

criminal process, false arrest and false imprisonment, and a

deprivation of their right to due process.

/// 

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STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more that simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record

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taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs generally aver that Defendants violated a number

of their constitutional rights including their Fourth Amendment

right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure as well as

their right to due process and their right to be free from selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. As a result of harms allegedly suffered, they seek

recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants rebut that they did not violate Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights and that, to the extent the Court finds

otherwise, they are protected by qualified immunity.

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed a case factually on all

fours with the case presently before this Court. In Motley v.

Parks, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 29008 (9th Cir. 2005)(en banc), the

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plaintiff was the resident of an apartment that was also the last

known residence of a parolee at large. Defendant peace officers

went to search what they believed to be the parolee’s residence

but what was, in fact, plaintiffs principal place of residence. 

Just as in the case at bar, two officers proceeded to the rear of

the apartment while two other officers went to the front door. 

 Ultimately, plaintiff’s apartment was searched without her

consent and she brought suit alleging generally the same

constitutional violations as Plaintiffs are alleging herein. The

Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of

plaintiff’s claims in their entirety. That en banc decision

clarified a number of issues in the Ninth Circuit regarding

parole related searches and is instructive in the case at bar.

I. Qualified Immunity

A private right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

exists against law enforcement officers who, acting under the

color of authority, violate federal constitutional or statutory

rights of an individual. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609,

119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999). The defense of

qualified immunity, however, shields an officer from trial when

the officer "reasonably mis-apprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted," even if the officer’s conduct was

constitutionally deficient. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,

125 S. Ct. 596, 599, 160 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2004)(per curiam). 

Where, as here, some or all of the defendants seek qualified

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immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the

proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided

where the defense is dispositive. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). In Saucier, the

Supreme Court laid out the framework for determining an officer’s

entitlement to qualified immunity. The threshold inquiry

requires a court to ask, "taken in the light most favorable to

the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id. at 201. 

The inquiry ends at this stage if no constitutional right is

found to have been violated. Id. 

 If, on the other hand, the plaintiff’s allegations do make

out a constitutional injury, the court must then determine

whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the

time of the violation. Id. If the right was not clearly

established, the qualified immunity doctrine shields the officer

from further litigation. Id. Finally, even if the violated

right was clearly established, the Saucier court recognized that

it may be difficult for a police officer fully to appreciate how

the legal constraints apply to the specific situation he or she

faces. Under such a circumstance, "if the officer’s mistake as to

what the law requires is reasonable, . . . the officer is

entitled to the immunity defense." Id. at 205.

As noted above, the threshold inquiry requires this Court to

ask, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, do the

facts alleged show the Defendants’ conduct violated a

constitutional right?

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1. Violation of Fourth Amendment

A. Illegal Search

A reasonable parole search conducted by law enforcement

officers without a warrant does not run afoul of the Fourth

Amendment. Motley, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 29008 at *16 (quoting

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-75, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97

L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987)). A reasonable parole search exists when

law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe that the

parolee is a resident of the house to be searched. Motley, 2005

U.S. App. LEXIS 29008 at *19. “In dealing with probable cause,

... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These

are not technical; they are the factual and practical

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent

men, not legal technicians, act.” Id. at *24-25 (quoting

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93

L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). Accordingly, if Defendant Officers in this

instance had probable cause to believe the Capella Drive

residence was, in fact, Witmore’s residence, no constitutional

violation will be found and Plaintiffs’ claim must fail.

Plaintiffs moved into the Capella Drive residence five

months prior to this incident. Undisp. Fact 2. The Capella

Drive residence was the only known address and emergency contact

address for Witmore, who was released from prison January 16,

2004. Undisp. Fact 4. On the day of the incident, De Roco

determined that Witmore was not in custody by referring to the

Department of Corrections’ database, OPUS, and then telephoning

the releasing institution. De Roco Depo. 131:17-19; Undisp. Fact

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7. Horn then checked the ACIS local law enforcement database

which confirmed at least one law enforcement contact in 2002 with

Witmore at the Capella Drive residence. Undisp. Fact 13.

In assessing whether the foregoing steps were sufficient to

constitute probable cause, the Court again turns to the Motley

decision. In that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was

reasonable for officers to rely on information of the parolee’s

whereabouts obtained a week in advance of the search. This is in

stark contrast to the present case where the information

regarding Witmore’s whereabouts was verified on the very day of

the search. In addition, the Motley court concluded that the

officers had probable cause to search despite the fact that the

parolee in the Motley case was in custody at the time of the

search, a fact which could have easily been ascertained in

advance. Here, Witmore was not in custody and, in fact,

Defendant Officers were in search of him on the night they

approached the Capella Drive residence.

In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that

Defendant Officers had probable cause to believe they were, in

fact, at Witmore’s residence. They did not rush the residence

blindly but rather, they confirmed the Capella Drive residence 

as Witmore’s last known address and emergency contact address

through at least two police databases and Witmore’s parolee

interview sheet. Undisp. Facts 4, 7, 13. In addition, Defendant

Officers were certainly reasonable in assuming they had the

correct residence when Cuevas responded to De Roco’s question of

whether he was “Randy” by attempting to close the door and then

striking De Roco with enough force to give him a black eye and

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The Court need not address the constitutional issues raised 3

by a suspicionless search as the Defendants had a particularized

suspicion that Witmore was a parole violator because he had

failed to report. De Roco Depo. 21:18-19.

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chip his teeth. Given that Defendant officers had probable cause

to believe Witmore resided at the Capella Drive residence, they

acted lawfully in entering and searching Plaintiffs’ residence.

In addition, because Defendant officers had probable cause

to believe they were at the correct residence, the Court finds

that they were entitled to maintain that belief until presented

with convincing evidence that the information they had relied

upon was incorrect. Motley, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 29008 at *26. 

No such evidence was forthcoming from Plaintiffs and, in fact,

Defendant Officers’ belief was likely bolstered by Cuevas’

decision not to address De Roco and, instead, to attempt to close

the door followed by striking De Roco in the head. 

In sum, the Officers required probable cause to believe that

the Capella Drive residence was Witmore’s, and they met that

burden. Accordingly, no constitutional right is found to have

been violated and Defendant Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment

as to Plaintiffs’ claim of illegal search in violation of the

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is granted.3

B. Illegal Seizure

Again, Cuevas alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated in that he was illegally seized by Defendants. Cuevas

avers that his warrantless arrest is constitutionally infirm

because the Defendant Officers were objectively unreasonable in

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seizing his person. He further explains that he should not have

been arrested because his battery of De Roco was solely a result

of his mistaken belief that De Roco was a home invader. Plf.s’

Opp. 11:13-14. Since the ultimate charge against Cuevas was

battery on a peace officer, Cuevas claims he cannot be guilty of

that crime making his arrest constitutionally unreasonable. 

The law on this issue is patently clear. A warrantless

arrest by a law enforcement officer is reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a

criminal offense has been or is being committed. Devenpeck v.

Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537

(U.S. 2004)(citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,

417-424, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976). The arresting

officer’s subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the

criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable

cause. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153. Indeed, a peace officer may

arrest an individual for any minor criminal offense where

supported by probable cause even if the offense is not punishable

by confinement. See generally Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532

U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001). Further,

whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable

conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting

officer at the time of the arrest. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153. 

Consequently, if Cuevas engaged in any activity that appeared to

violate California’s Penal Code, probable cause existed whether

or not that same crime was the ultimate basis for his arrest. 

Here, the uncontroverted facts establish that Cuevas struck 

De Roco almost immediately after answering the door. The use of

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A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or 4

violence upon the person of another. Cal. Pen. Code § 242

(Deerings, 2005).

13

force or violence upon any person, whether or not a peace

officer, is a violation of California Penal Code section 243 and

would have given Defendant Officers probable cause to arrest

Cuevas. Accordingly, Defendant Officers’ motion for summary 4

judgment as to Cuevas’ claim of illegal seizure in violation of

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is

granted.

Plaintiff Burlette concedes that she was not touched,

threatened, arrested, handcuffed or cited on the evening of the

incident. Undisp. Facts 1 - 34, 38 - 43. Although Burlette was

questioned, mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure

for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Bostick,

501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). 

The salient inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel

free "to disregard the police and go about his business." Id. 

Burlette conceded that, in fact, there was no effort on the part

of Defendant Officers to subdue or restrain her movements. In

fact, immediately upon hearing the struggle between Cuevas and

Defendants De Roco and Starr in the entry of the home, Burlette

went to the telephone in another room and dialed 911. She then

returned to where Cuevas was. Later, she was asked to retrieve

Cuevas’ wallet and, again, left the presence of Defendant

Officers without issue. It is clear from Plaintiffs’ version of

the facts that Burlette freely moved about the residence

throughout the course of the incident. Such free motion does not

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give rise to a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 

Accordingly, summary judgment as to Plaintiff Burlette’s claim of

an illegal seizure is, hereby, granted in favor of Defendant

Officers.

C. Violation of Fifth Amendment

1. Due Process

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that

Defendants deprived them of protections under the Fourth, Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs are relying on 42 U.S.C. §

1983 to support their claim that Defendants deprived them of

their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Cuevas

essentially argues that Defendants deprived him of due process by

conducting a warrantless arrest followed by confinement in jail. 

Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an

opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to the deprivation of

a significant property or liberty interest. See Memphis Light,

Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 98 S.

Ct. 1554 (1978). Summary governmental action taken in

emergencies and designed to protect the public health, safety and

general welfare does not violate due process. Hodel v. Virginia

Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 299-300, 69 L.

Ed. 2d 1, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981). Government officials need to

act promptly and decisively when they perceive an emergency, and

therefore, no pre-deprivation process is due. As noted above, if

an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has

committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he

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may, without violating constitutional principles, arrest the

offender. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (2001). 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if there is no

constitutional violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Plaintiffs

concede that Cuevas struck De Roco in the face blackening his eye

and chipping his teeth. This battery on Defendant De Roco gave

Defendant Officers probable cause to believe that Cuevas had

violated California Penal Code section 243(c)(2). Since probable

cause has been established, no constitutional right has been

violated ending the inquiry. Accordingly, Defendant Officers’

Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for deprivation

of due process pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the United

States Constitution is granted.

2. Self-Incrimination

Plaintiffs allege that their right to be free from selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution was violated when they were coerced to provide a

statement regarding the incident of February 25, 2004. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs claim the submission and acceptance of

their citizen’s complaint was conditioned upon their agreement to

be interviewed regarding said incident. For purposes of this

summary judgment motion, the Court assumes that Plaintiffs were,

in fact, required to give a statement regarding the incident

before their civil complaint would be received by Defendants.

Again, the law is patently clear on this issue. Civil

litigants do not state a valid Section 1983 claim for a violation

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of the privilege against self-incrimination, under the Federal

Constitution’s Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the states

by the Fourteenth Amendment, where (1) the litigant has never

been charged with any crime related to the altercation; and (2)

the litigant’s answers to an interrogation had never been used

against them in any subsequent criminal prosecution. See Chavez

v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984

(2003). Here, as in Chavez, Plaintiffs have never been charged

with any crime related to the February 25, 2004, altercation nor

have any of the answers they provided in the later interrogation

been used against them in any criminal prosecution. Accordingly,

no viable Section 1983 action exists. 

Summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for a violation of

their Fifth Amendment rights is warranted and is, hereby, granted

in favor of Defendants.

II. Claims Against Defendants Golmitz and Neves

With respect to Plaintiffs’ claim that Officer Golmitz and

Sheriff Neves are liable as supervising officers for their

alleged injuries, that claim too must fail. A supervisor can be

liable under Section 1983 if he "set[s] in motion a series of

acts by others . . ., which he knew or reasonably should have

known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." 

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.

1991)(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). "Absent

some indication to a supervisor that an investigation was

inadequate or incompetent, supervisors are not obliged either to

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undertake de novo investigations or to cross examine subordinates

reasonably believed to be competent as to whether their

investigations were negligent." Motley, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS

29008 (quoting Cecere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826, 829 (2d

Cir. 1992). The record clearly shows that neither Golmitz nor

Neves had any reason to believe that the investigation regarding

Witmore’s last known address and parole status were inadequate or

incompetent. 

Accordingly, Defendant Supervisors’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claims is granted.

III. Claims Against Defendant El Dorado County

In addition to the foregoing Defendants, Plaintiffs name El

Dorado County as a Defendant in this litigation. Generally, a

plaintiff may not sue a local government agency under Section

1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 

See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct.

2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Rather, a plaintiff must prove

that execution of a government’s policy or custom inflicted the

injury. See id. 

The alleged injury of which Plaintiffs complain was

inflicted solely by El Dorado County’s employees. Consequently,

to sustain this Section 1983 action against El Dorado County,

Plaintiffs must establish a direct causal nexus between one of

its policies and Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. To that end,

Plaintiffs argue that El Dorado County’s policy of permitting law

enforcement agencies, other than the California Department of

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Corrections, Parole and Community Services Division ("Parole

Division"), to assist with the search for and apprehension of

parolees inflicted their alleged injury.

The Court fails to see how this policy directly inflicted

Plaintiffs’ alleged injury. Had all the officers that entered

Plaintiffs’ home on that February night been from the Parole

Division rather than from both the Parole Division and the El

Dorado County Sheriff’s Department, Plaintiffs would nonetheless

have suffered the very injury they now complain of. The

existence of officers from multiple agencies did not cause the

alleged constitutional injury. Rather, if anything, it was the

unwelcome intrusion by Defendant Officers that caused the alleged

injury. Because the policy of permitting law enforcement

agencies to work in tandem in apprehending parole violators did

not cause Plaintiffs’ alleged injury, Plaintiffs’ claim against

Defendant El Dorado County must fail. 

Defendant El Dorado County’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted.

IV. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs have alleged a number of state law causes of

action including negligence, assault and battery, abuse of

criminal process, false arrest and false imprisonment. The

district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. As is set forth

above, the Court has concluded that none of Plaintiffs’ federal

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causes of action survive summary judgment. Consequently, the

Court elects not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and,

hereby, remands the remaining state law causes of action to the

state court for final adjudication.

V. Motion for Leave of Court to Disclose Expert Witnesses

Simultaneously with Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave of court to disclose expert

witnesses. Because the Court has summarily adjudicated all

federal claims in favor of Defendants and has remanded

Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims to state court,

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave of this Court is moot.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth fully above, Plaintiffs claims for

violation of their constitutional rights including their right to

be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth

Amendment as well as their right to due process and their right

to be free from self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment are

summarily adjudicated in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs

remaining state law claims for negligence, assault and battery,

abuse of criminal process, false arrest and false imprisonment

are dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 13, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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