Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00388/USCOURTS-almd-1_05-cv-00388-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 1

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALEASE BARBER o/b/o )

ANASTASIA CIERA BAKER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:05cv388-C

)

JO ANNE BARNHART, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Alease Barber filed this lawsuit on behalf of her daughter, Anastasia Ciera

Baker (“Anastasia”), to review a final judgment by defendant Jo Anne Barnhart,

Commissioner of Social Security, in which she determined that Anastasia is not “disabled”

and therefore, not entitled to supplemental security income benefits. Her application was

denied at the initial administrative level. The plaintiff then requested and received a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied

the claim. The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s

decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(Commissioner). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11 Cir. 1986). The parties 1 th

have consented to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge rendering a final judgment

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 1 of 16
2

in this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1. The court has

jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the

reasons that follow, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision denying Anastasia

supplemental security income benefits should be affirmed.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In 1996, the President signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work

Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which included a new standard for defining child

disability under the Social Security Act. See PUB. L. NO. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2188

(1996). The revised statute provides that an individual under 18 shall be considered disabled

“if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results

in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(I) (1999). The sequential analysis for determining

whether a child claimant is disabled is as follows:

1. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is not

disabled.

2. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the

Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a physical or

mental impairment which, whether individually or in combination with

one or more other impairments, is a severe impairment. If the

claimant’s impairment is not severe, he is not disabled.

3. If the impairment is severe, the Commissioner determines whether the

impairment meets the durational requirement and meets, medically

equals, or functionally equals in severity an impairment listed in 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the impairment satisfies this

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 2 of 16
 Anastasia’s mother met with her teachers to develop an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”)

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for Anastasia on March 26, 2002. (R. 103).

3

requirement, the claimant is presumed disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)-(d) (1997).

The Commissioner’s regulations provide that if a child’s impairment or impairments

does not meet, or is not medically equal or functionally equivalent in severity to a listed

impairment, the child is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d) (2003). In reviewing the

Commissioner’s decision, the court asks only whether her findings concerning the steps are

supported by substantial evidence. See Brown v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1133 (10 Cir. 1997). th

The ALJ considered all of the evidence available in the record before him and on the basis

of that evidence concluded that Anastasia is not disabled. 

II. DISCUSSION

The plaintiff presents one issue for the Court’s review: “[w]hether the ALJ erred by

failing to properly evaluate the combined effect of Anastasia’s impairments according to

Listing 112.05D.” (Pl’s Br. at 1). The plaintiff filed this claim on behalf of Anastasia in

May 2003 because Anastasia has a speech impediment and is a slow learner. (R. 58).

Anastasia was born on October 18, 1993 and was ten (10) years old on the date of the hearing

before the ALJ. (R. 50 & 208). 

While repeating the first grade, Anastasia was evaluated for individualized services

because she needed assistance in speech articulation and language skills. (R. 99). As 2

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 3 of 16
 The CTONI test is an “unbiased test that measures nonverbal reasoning abilities of individuals for 3

whom most other mental ability tests are either inappropriate or biased. . . . Results of the CTONI are most

useful for estimating the intelligence of individuals who experience undue language or fine motor skill

difficulties.” http://www.proedaust.com.au/details.cfm?number=92

4

Anastasia prepared to enter second grade,school officials determined that Anastasia needed

continued speech and language services. (Id.) Her records reflect that although Anastasia

is “a shy but cooperative child,” she “frequently will drift off task and start talking ‘off’ the

topic.” (Id.) In December 2002, Anastasia was performing “below grade level” in language

arts and mathematics; she was continued on her IEP to develop her comprehension and

maximize her progress. (R. 94-97).

On May 8, 2003, Anastasia was reevaluated for special education services. (R. 105-

109). The IEP team ruled out mental retardation as a primary cause of Anastasia’s learning

disabilities. (R. 108). 

During the 2003-2004 school year, Anastasia was shy and quiet. She had good

conduct and good effort. (R. 112). She continued to receive services as she “struggled in

Language Arts, Reading and Math.” (Id.). On May 5, 2003, Anastasia was administered the

Comprehensive Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (“C-Toni”). (R. 113). Anastasia scored in 3

the Average range on the Nonverbal Intelligence Quotient, the Pictorial Nonverbal

Intelligence Quotient, and the Geometric Nonverbal Intelligence Quotient. (Id.)

Although Anastasia was home-schooled for the fourth grade, she continued speech

therapy at Kelly Springs Elementary School. (R. 126) Her progress was noted as “slow

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 4 of 16
 On April 30, 2003, Anastasia was again administered the WISC-III. At this time, her verbal IQ

4

score was 71, her performance IQ score was 90 and her full scale IQ score was 78. However, because she

had been administered the same test one month earlier, these scores were determined to be invalid. (R. 105).

5

because she has been absent frequently.” (R. 138) On March 10, 2004, it was noted that

Anastasia “continues to miss her speech sessions.” (Id.) 

Prior to the 2003-2004 school year, on March 26, 2003, Anastasia had a psychological

evaluation by Dr. Randall Jordan. (R. 140-141). Her mother reported to him that Anastasia

just learned to tie her shoes a couple of months ago. She does not know her

phone number or her address consistently. She can dress herself and she can

bathe herself, but she must have the water adjusted for her and needs help

getting in and out. . . . She can make a call if she needs to, but again forgets

numbers and addresses.

(Id.) During this evaluation, Anastasia took the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children,

Third Edition (“WISC-III”), and the Slosson Intelligence Test. (R. 140). On the WISC-III,

she achieved a verbal IQ score of 73, a performance IQ score of 71 and a full scale IQ score

of 70. She also scored 76 on the Slosson Intelligence Test. (R. 140-141). Dr. Jordan opined 4

that Anastasia had borderline intellectual functioning. (R. 141). She was not given any

Attention Deficit Disorder (“ADD”) type of screening “as none of these symptoms seem to

be clinically manifested.” (R. 140). In addition, “[w]hile withdrawn and shy, she did not

meet any criteria for formal anxiety or depression type disorders.” (Id.) 

On July 5, 2003, Anastasia had a consultative evaluation in conjunction with her

application for supplemental security income benefits. (R. 163). She was administered the

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 5 of 16
 The OWLS test is an “Oral and Written Language Scales” test designed to measure the receptive 5

and expressive language skills of children.

6

OWLS test. Speech pathologist Patsy Clearman noted that Anastasia was not motivated and 5

her test scores were probably lower as a result of her low motivation. (R. 164). Nonetheless,

the pathologist’s impression was that Anastasia’s “comprehension skills and expressive

language skills have greater than 25% deficits.” (Id.) 

On June 26, 2003, Dr. Jordan evaluated Anastasia for ADD. (R. 180). He

administered the Gordon Diagnostic System, Frontal Lobe Protocol, Hand Sequencing Test,

and ADD Questionnaire. (Id.) Dr. Jordan concluded as follows.

Overall, ADD processes are being seen or demonstrated. However, this

patient has such a high level of shyness, it is difficult to really say if in fact she

absolutely is ADHD. At this point in time, I would defer to a physician for

medication, possibly. I do feel as if might be worth while to have a trial of

stimulant medication.

(Id.). He diagnosed Anastasia with ADD, provisional, and borderline intellectual

functioning. (Id.). Dr. Jordan recommended that Anastasia try a stimulant medication. Dr.

Sester, Dr. Jordan’s partner and Anastasia’s treating physician, then prescribed a trial of

stimulant medication. (R. 182). Dr. Sester also noted that it was “[d]ifficult to determine

whether child’s problems in school are related to her shyness or inattentiveness.” (Id.). She

also noted that Anastasia was “very shy “ with “borderline IQ.” (Id.) 

Anastasia was again home schooled during the 2004-2005 school year. Her speech

therapist noted that Anastasia “is not expected to achieve her speech goals” due to her “many

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 6 of 16
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absences.” (R. 196). By January 15, 2005, Anastasia had only attended three sessions

although she was scheduled to attend every week. (Id.) 

At the administrative hearing, Anastasia’s mother testified that, at age ten, Anastasia

has been home schooled for a year. (R. 208). Her mother testified that Anastasia is “very

difficult to teach” because “I have to sit there and make sure that she is doing her work

without looking around and gazing off, . . . not paying attention.” (R. 209). Anastasia is

taking medication for ADHD, “to help her stay focused.” (R. 209). Her mother testified that

it is difficult for Anastasia to make friends, and she is very, very shy. (R. 210-11). 

After a hearing, the ALJ concluded that Anastasia suffers from severe impairments

of speech/language delays, borderline intellectual functioning and “an Attention Deficit

Disorder without hyperactivity.” (R. 18). He further concluded that Anastasia did not have

an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a Listing. The

ALJ properly then considered whether her impairments were “functionally equal” a level of

severity in a Listing. (R. 20-21). 

In order to functionally equal a listing, Anastasia’s impairments must result in

“marked” limitations in two or more of six functional domains or “extreme” limitation in one

functional domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). These six functional domains are set forth in

the applicable regulations: Acquiring and using information; Attending and completing tasks;

Interacting and relating to others; Moving about and manipulating objects; Caring for

yourself; and Health and physical well-being. Id. at 416.926a(b). 

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 That Anastasia made “mostly D’s and F’s” in second grade is not evidence of a marked limitation. 6

8

The ALJ concluded that Anastasia has “less than marked limitation” in the domain of

acquiring and using information. (R. 23). The ALJ “acknowledge[d] that the claimant may

have some slight deficits in acquiring and using information, particularly given her

Borderline intellectual functioning as evidenced by IQ test scores.” (Id.). However, based

primarily on her performance while in school, the ALJ found that the claimant’s functional 6

limitations did not rise to the level of a “marked” or “extreme” limitation. (Id.)

The ALJ concluded that Anastasia has “less than marked limitation” in the domain of

attending and completing tasks, interacting and relating to others, and health and well-being.

(R. 24-25). He further concluded that Anastasia has no limitation in the domains of moving

about and manipulating objects and self-care. (R. 25). The ALJ concluded that Anastasia

does not have an extreme limitation in one area of functioning, nor does she have a marked

limitation in two areas of functioning. (R. 26). The ALJ reached the following findings and

conclusions. 

When the claimant’s functioning is compared to functioning of children who

do not have impairments, there appears to be no significant drop-off regarding

her overall physical and mental abilities. The Administrative Law Judge has

considered the combined effects of the claimant’s impairments and has

indicated functional limitations in the appropriate domains as described above.

The Administrative Law Judge finds that, despite the applicant’s earlier

allegations as to the severity of the claimant’s condition, there is documentary

evidence which refutes her claims. There is no evidence suggesting that the

claimant is receiving any significant degree of help in performing ageappropriate activities that is more than would be expected for a normal child

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 8 of 16
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her age. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any significant medicinal or

treatment-related side effects which adversely affect the claimant’s

functioning. The claimant has attended school in a regular classroom setting

and has not had any intensive therapy, either in or out of the school

environment, due to the effects of her condition.

The evidentiary record reflects that the claimant does not have any chronic

illness that has produced severe limitations over an extended period of time.

The claimant has not engaged in any early intervention program. There is no

evidence of record, which indicates that the claimant’s treatment has adversely

affected her ability to function over a period of time. The record establishes

that when the claimant so desires, she can initiate, sustain and complete

activities. The claimant’s impairment does not require treatment over a long

period of time (at least a year), under circumstances where the treatment itself

(e.g.., multiple surgeries) results in marked and severe functional limitations.

The record also reflects that the claimant was able to function in an unfamiliar

setting, such as the hearing.

...

To summarize, the claimant does not have an “extreme” limitation in one area

of functioning or “marked” limitation in two areas; therefore, based it cannot

be concluded that the claimant is disabled on the basis that he (sic) has

impairments that are functionally equivalent in severity to any listed

impairment. Therefore, the undersigned concludes that the claimant does not

have either an impairment, or combination of impairments, that meets,

medically equals, or functionally equals any of impairments listed in Appendix

1, Subpart P, of Regulation No. 4. 

(R. 26).

Anastasia argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate whether she meets Listing

112.05D. (Pl’s Br. at 4). Specifically, the plaintiff argues that because she suffers from

speech/language delays and ADD which are severe impairments, coupled with her I.Q.

scores, she meets the functional equivalence of Listing 112.05(D). (Id.) Listing 112.05

relates to mental retardation.

 112.05 Mental Retardation: Characterized by significantly subaverage

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 9 of 16
 “Deficits in adaptive behavior” relates to the ability of people to interact and function on a daily 7

basis.

 Adaptive behavior refers to those social and practical skills that people use to effectively

function in their everyday lives. These include skills in such areas as communication, social

interactions, taking care of oneself, managing money, and using transportation, among

others. Various tests of adaptive behavior assess skills by either observing the individual in

situations where these skills are required, or by interviewing those who know the individual

well.

http://ericec.org/digests/e637.html

Counsel argues that the use of the phrase “deficits in adaptive behavior” is simply a description of

the condition; it does not set forth the elements of 112.05D. The court disagrees. This paragraph defines

what constitutes mental retardation under this Listing. Sections A, B, C, D, E, and F of the Listing go to the

severity of the impairment, not the existence of it.

10

general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive behavior.

The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the

requirements in A, B, C, D, E, or F are satisfied. . . . 

D. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and

a physical or other mental impairment imposing additional and significant

limitation of function; . . . 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P App. 1. A claimant meets the strictures of 112.05D by presenting

evidence of (1) a sub-average general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive

behavior; (2) valid IQ score of 60 to 70 inclusive; and (3) evidence of an additional mental 7

or physical impairment that has more than a “minimal effect” on the claimant’s ability to

perform basic work activities. Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835 (11 Cir. 1992); Edwards th

v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513, 1517 (11 Cir. 1985) th

It is undisputed that Anastasia has a full scale score of 70 on the WISC-III. (R. 140).

However, in this circuit a claimant’s IQ score is not conclusive evidence of mental

retardation, particularly when the score is inconsistent with other evidence of the claimant’s

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 To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find Anastasia’s limitations 8

“marked” because her WISC III scores fall “two or more standard deviations before the mean,” she is entitled

to no relief on this basis. “[T]he regulations require more than an IQ score that is three standard deviations

below the mean in order to classify an impairment as ‘extreme,’” Cf Moore v. Barnhart, 413 F.3d 718, 723

(8 Cir. 2005); Scales v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 699, 704 (8 Cir. 2004) (“Having one raw score at the borderline th th

of three standard deviations below the mean does not require a finding of extreme limitation.”) (emphasis

in original).

In addition, while the regulations expect “ marked” limitations with standardized testing scores at

least two deviations below the mean, the regulations do not mandate a finding of “marked” limitations on

that basis alone. See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(ii)(2). In fact, the regulations repeatedly reiterate that the

Commissioner will consider all the relevant information” in each case, including test results and descriptions

from parents, teachers and other individuals. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a.

11

daily activities and behavior. See Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497 (11 Cir. 1986). In Popp,

th

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Listings for mental retardation do not

require the Commissioner to make a finding of mental retardation based upon the results of

an I.Q. test alone. The test results must be considered in context with other evidence 8

including the daily activities and behavior of the claimant. Id. at 1499. Furthermore,

Social Security POMS Section DI 24515.055 discusses evaluation of cases involving mental

retardation and use of psychological or psychometric testing.

In the adjudication of cases involving alleged mental retardation, accurate

information pertaining to the claimant’s daily activities and current behavior

is required in order to determine the level of impairment severity. . . . Mental

retardation must be manifested by severe mental and social incapacity as

evidenced by marked dependence upon others for personal needs (e.g.,

toileting, eating, dressing, or bathing) and inability to follow directions such

that the use of standardized measures of intellectual functioning is precluded.

Consequently, the ALJ must review the test results in conjunction with the other evidence

in the record of the child’s behavior and daily activities including reports of teachers or

testimony at the hearing. The ALJ’s decision is reviewable by the court for substantial

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 11 of 16
12

evidence. 

In this case, the ALJ concluded that although Anastasia has deficits in acquiring and

using information as a result of her borderline intellectual functioning, her limitations do not

rise to the level of marked or extreme. (R. 23). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination. None of Anastasia’s physicians nor any of the consultative psychologists who

evaluated Anastasia diagnosed her as being mentally retarded. None of her teachers suggest

that Anastasia may be suffering from mental retardation. If fact, Anastasia’s IEP team ruled

out mental retardation as a primary cause of Anastasia’s learning disabilities. (R. 108). 

In addition, Anastasia’s mother completed a “Function Report” for Anastasia in which

she states that Anastasia can read, print, add and subtract, and tell time. (R. 68). The only

deficits in Anastasia’s “ability to progress in learning” noted by her mother were an inability

to read and understand simple sentences, stories in books and magazines, inability to write

a simple story and an inability to understand money. (Id.) Anastasia can walk, run, throw

a ball, ride a bike, jump rope, use scissors, work video game controls and dress and undress

dolls. (R. 69). Anastasia has friends her own age, can make friends, gets along with others

and can play team sports. (R. 70). Although Anastasia has only recently learned to tie her

shoes, she is able to use zippers by herself, button her clothes, take a shower or bath by

herself, brush her teeth, comb her hair, help around the house, follow direction, and finishes

projects. (R. 71-73). 

Anastasia’s grandmother also completed a “Function Report.” Her grandmother

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 12 of 16
 When asked about riding a bike, her mother testified that “she have trouble sometime with a 9

bicycle, staying balanced on the bicycle. And so I do have to watch her constantly and there was time

whenever she had gotten on the bicycle and she pedaled and ran into the bushes.” (R. 213.)

13

reports that Anastasia can read some, print some, add and subtract, and knows the days of the

week. (R. 87). Anastasia can walk, run, throw a ball, ride a bike, jump rope, use scissors,

work video game controls and dress and undress dolls. (R. 88). Her grandmother confirmed

that Anastasia has friends her own age, can make new friends and gets along with others.

(Id.) 

At the administrative hearing, Anastasia’s mother expressed concern that Anastasia

has trouble riding a bicycle. When asked to describe Anastasia’s limitations, her mother 9

testified that Anastasia is extremely shy; she has difficulty making friends because they make

fun of her speech; her memory is not good; and she needs help with her hair and adjusting

the bath water temperature. (R. 210-218). These limitations are insufficient to support a

finding that she has an extreme or marked limitation of functioning in any of the six domains

sufficient to meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a Listing. Unquestionably,

Anastasia has some degree of limitation acquiring and using information and interacting and

relating to other based on her borderline intellectual functioning and her speech/language

delays. However, the evidence does not support a finding that Anastasia has an “extreme”

or “marked” limitation in these or any other areas of functioning. In addition, Anastasia’s

mother’s testimony does not support a finding that Anastasia has a marked or extreme

limitation in any of the areas of functioning. 

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 13 of 16
14

In brief, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ “erred as a matter of law by not obtaining

a medical expert opinion to determine whether Anastasia’s impairments medically equal a

listing.” (Pl’s Br. at 7). The ALJ was required to “consider all relevant” information before

making a determination. The regulations do not require the ALJ to secure a medical expert

to testify, and the ALJ is not required to secure medical expert testimony unless the record

demonstrates that such testimony is necessary for the ALJ to render a decision. See POMS

Section DI 24515.055 (“At the hearing level, the testimony of a medical or psychological

advisor or vocational expert may be required.”) (emphasis added). The record clearly

contains sufficient evidence from which the ALJ could determine the plaintiff’s level of

mental functioning. Thus, the court concludes that, on this record, the ALJ did not err by

failing to secure medical expert testimony to determine medical or functional equivalence.

To the extent that the plaintiff argues that her ADD is sufficient to support a “marked”

or “extreme” limitation, she is entitled to no relief. First, Dr. Jordan’s diagnosis of ADD is

provisional; he was unable to determine whether she is extremely shy or ADHD. (R. 180).

Next, Anastasia’s GAF scores do not indicate a marked or extreme limitation in functioning

as a result of any ADD processes she may be experiencing. On March 26, 2003, Dr. Jordan

opined that Anastasia’s GAF score was 65. (R. 141). On June 26, 2003, he assessed her

score at 70. (R. 180). A score of 70 on the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale

(DSM - IV Axis V) suggests “[m]ild symptoms in one area OR difficulty in one of the

following: social, occupational, or school functioning. BUT, the person is generally

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 14 of 16
15

functioning pretty well and has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.”

http://www.gpc.peachnet.edu.

Finally, the court addresses the issue of whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate

whether Anastasia meets, medically equals or functionally equals Listing 112.05D. Although

the ALJ did not state, in his opinion, that he specifically evaluated the plaintiff’s impairments

within the parameters of Listing 112.05D, the ALJ stated that he considered the plaintiff’s

impairments in conjunction with the Listings. (R. 18)

The Administrative Law Judge finds that the child does not have an

impairment which meets or medically “equals” the severity of a listed

impairment; therefore, it must be determined whether the child’s impairments

are functionally equivalent in severity to any listed impairment. In making this

determination, the functional limitations resulting from the claimant’s

impairments will be compared with the functional limitations which result

listed impairments, whether or not related to the claimant’s specific medical

condition. 

(Id.). The ALJ then considered the severity of all of Anastasia’s impairments, and concluded

that the plaintiff does not meet any of the Listings, including 112.05D. Accordingly, this

claim has no merit. 

In short, the ALJ’s conclusion that Anastasia is does not functionally meet Listing

112.05D is supported by substantial evidence and, thus, the decision of the Commissioner

should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record, and concludes that the

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 15 of 16
16

decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 

A separate order will issue.

Done this 30 day of December, 2005. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00388-CSC Document 18 Filed 12/30/05 Page 16 of 16