Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04222/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04222-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Farzan Roohparvar,

Plaintiff,

 v.

Fairchild Semiconductor of California, and

Kirk Miklavic,

Defendant(s).

 /

NO. C 05-04222 JW 

ORDER GRANTING FAIRCHILD’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE

TO STATE A CLAIM AND MOTION TO

STRIKE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff (“Plaintiff”) in this case is Farzan Roohparvar, a former employee of Fairchild

Semiconductor Corporation. Defendants (“Defendants”) are Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation

of California (“Fairchild”) and Kirk Miklavic (“Miklavic”), Fairchild’s Director of Human

Resources for the Analog Products Group, the Standard Products Group and the Sales Department. 

In February 1999, Plaintiff began employment with Fairchild. The employment was pursuant to an

oral and written employment agreement where it was agreed that Plaintiff’s annual salary would be

$188,531.00. Plaintiff’s lawsuit arises out of changes made to his salary schedule. The parties came

to several agreements whereby Plaintiff would be paid an hourly rate for a maximum set of hours,

yet he would continue to work his normal fifty to sixty hours per week. In return, Fairchild

allegedly agreed to pay the remainder of Plaintiff’s unpaid wages at an unspecified later date, but

failed to do so. Plaintiff’s complaint contains primarily claims for breach of contract and fraud. 

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Presently before the Court is Fairchild’s motion to dismiss and motion to strike. Fairchild

contends that Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with the requisite specificity. The motion was scheduled

for hearing on December 5, 2005. The Court finds it appropriate to take the motion under

submission for decision based upon the papers filed by the parties, without oral argument pursuant

to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Based upon all the papers filed to date, the Court grants the motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim and motion to strike. 

II. BACKGROUND

In February 1999 Plaintiff began employment with Fairchild. (Complaint, hereinafter

“Complaint,” ¶ 7.) The employment was pursuant to an oral and written agreement under which

Plaintiff would receive $188,531.00 annually. (Complaint ¶ 7.) 

In June 2001, Defendants entered into an oral agreement whereby Plaintiff would work his

normal fifty to sixty hours per week, but would be paid for only 10 hours a week, on an hourly basis. 

(Complaint ¶ 8.) The remainder of the wages were to be paid at an unspecified later date. 

(Complaint ¶ 8.) Between July 8, 2001 and October 8, 2001, Fairchild paid Plaintiff for ten hours

per week at a rate of $90.64 per hour while he continued to work fifty to sixty hours per week. 

(Complaint ¶ 9.) 

On October 8, 2001, Fairchild modified the agreement and began paying Plaintiff for eleven

hours instead of ten hours of work per week. (Complaint ¶ 10.) Fairchild never paid Plaintiff for the

hours worked over eleven hours per week. (Complaint ¶ 11.) On December 15, 2002, Fairchild

restored Plaintiff to his annual income of $188,531.00. (Complaint ¶ 12.) 

Around June 2, 2003, both parties entered into a new oral agreement, whereby Plaintiff

would work fifty to sixty hours per week, but would receive pay for only two weeks of every month. 

(Complaint ¶ 13.) Between June 2, 2003 and December 19, 2003, Fairchild failed to pay Plaintiff

any amount for the fourteen week period that he worked. (Complaint ¶ 14.)

Between January 2, 2001 and December 31, 2004, Fairchild required several employees,

including Plaintiff, to take “shut down” days, where employees did not work and were not paid. 

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1

 Plaintiff is a California resident. Fairchild is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delware and its

principle place of business is in Maine. Miklavic is a citizen of Maine.

3

(Complaint ¶ 15.) Fairchild gave Plaintiff 101 “shut down” days. (Complaint ¶ 15.) The parties

agreed, however, that Plaintiff would continue to work on his “shut down” days but would receive

reimbursement at a later date. (Complaint ¶ 15.) 

Between June 2001 and July 26, 2005 Fairchild and Miklavic reassured Plaintiff that they

would reimburse him for the hours that he worked unpaid. (Complaint ¶ 17.) The last affirmation

was by Miklavic on July 26, 2005. (Complaint ¶ 17.) 

Around August 8, 2005, Fairchild, through its managing agent Joel Pond, informed Plaintiff

that Fairchild would not pay Plaintiff for unpaid wages, salary, and earnings. (Complaint ¶ 18). 

Around August 16, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily ended his employment with Fairchild. 

Plaintiff’s complaint contains nine claims: (1) breach of oral contract, (2) breach of written

contract, (3 through 5) breach of oral contracts, (6) fraud, (7) negligent misrepresentation, (8) failure

to pay earned income and overtime compensation, (9) injunctive relief and treble damages. 

Defendants removed the case to this Court based upon diversity jurisdiction.1

 Presently before the

Court is Fairchild's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and motion to strike. Fairchild

contends that Plaintiff failed to plead the fraud claim with particularity. 

III. STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must

accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe said allegations in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Western Reserve Oil & Gas Co. v. New, 765 F.2d 1428, 1430

(9th Cir. 1985). Any existing ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the pleading. Walling v.

Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1973). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable

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legal theory or (2) insufficient facts stated under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). In order to grant a motion to dismiss, it must

appear to a certainty that a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could

be proved. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

B. Motion to Strike

 Pursuant to Rule 12(f), Fed.R.Civ.P., “the court may order stricken from any pleading any

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Rule 7(a),

Fed.R.Civ.P., defines pleadings as “complaints, answers, and replies to counterclaims.”

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Fails To Plead His Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud with Particularity.

Fairchild contends that Plaintiff’s claim for fraud should be dismissed because none of

Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud are sufficiently pled under Rule 9(b) Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 9(b) requires

that allegations of fraud be pled with particularity. Every element of a fraud cause of action must be

alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand the nature of the charge. See

Roberts v. Ball, Hung, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 109. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to plead his fraud cause of action with sufficient

particularity. Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff only alleges that "Defendants and each of them,

made these representations to Plaintiff" without referencing what was said, by whom, when, and in

what format (oral or written). (Complaint ¶¶ 55, 57, 59, 64, 65, and 66.) Plaintiff fails to specify

exactly what promises he detrimentally relied upon. 

In summary, Plaintiff's Complaint only pleads generalized accusations regarding his fraud

claim; therefore, the heightened pleading requirements for fraud have not been satisfied. The sixth

claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 

B. Plaintiff's Claims for Emotional Distress Damages Are Preempted By California's 

 Workers' Compensation Act.

Fairchild contends that Plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress damages are barred by

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California’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Plaintiff argues that his emotional distress claim falls

outside the scope of California’s Workers’ Compensation Act because the alleged illegal conduct

did not arise out of the normal course of employment. To determine if conduct is outside the scope

of the normal employment relationship, courts look at whether the alleged conduct at issue is a risk

reasonably encompassed within the compensation bargain. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083,

1101, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992). Plaintiff argues that misrepresentations regarding his wages are a

risk not encompassed within the compensation bargain. 

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff. Wage negotiations are a normal part of employment

relationships. Disagreements regarding compensation are a risk reasonably encompassed in the

compensation bargain. Plaintiff erroneously relies on Lazar v. Superior Court (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.),

12 Cal. 4th 631 (1996), Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 959 (2001), and Finch v.

Brenda Raceway Corp., 22 Cal. App. 4th 547 (1994) to argue that misrepresentations regarding

compensation are outside the normal scope of employment. These cases can all be distinguished

from the present in that they all involved fraudulent statements made to induce plaintiffs to become

employees. In Lazar, the employer made fraudulent statements that induced the employee to leave

his job in New Work and move across the country. In Lenk, fraudulent statements about the

company’s financial conditions induced the employee to join the company. In Finch, the employer

knowingly made misrepresentations about the length of employment. In the present case, the

promises regarding compensation were made after Plaintiff became an employee of Fairchild. (See

Complaint ¶¶ 7,8.) The statements were not made to induce him to become a Fairchild employee. 

Because the statements at issue were made while Plaintiff was a Fairchild employee, his claim for

emotional distress damages is preempted by California’s workers’ compensation system. Plaintiff’s

claim for emotional distress damages contained in the Complaint at paragraphs 73 and 79 and in his

Prayer at paragraph 2 are ordered stricken.

C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages is Deficient

Plaintiff’s complaint contains an allegation that Fairchild acted with oppression, fraud, and

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malice, and a prayer for punitive damages. This prayer for relief, however, is dependent upon the

allegations of fraud and emotional distress, which are legally deficient. See Sections “A” and “B”

above. Therefore, the prayer for punitive damages must be stricken. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to strike are

granted. The fraud claim is dismissed and the emotional distress claim is dismissed with prejudice. 

Paragraphs 73, 74, 75, and 79 of the Complaint and paragraph 2 of the prayer are stricken. Plaintiff

is granted leave to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff shall file and serve an amended complaint by

March 1, 2006. 

Dated: February 7, 2006

05cv4222fairchild

/s/James Ware 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Gerald A. Emanuel jemanuel@hinklelaw.com

Joel P Waelty jwaelty@hinklelaw.com

Michael Mayron mmayron@hinklelaw.com

Sharon S. Kirsch skirsch@mfmlaw.com

Dated: February 7, 2006 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:__/s/JW Chambers________

Melissa Peralta

Courtroom Deputy

Case 5:05-cv-04222-JW Document 20 Filed 02/07/06 Page 7 of 7