Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01322/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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-1- 06cv1322

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MINH QUANG LE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05-CV-1322 W (AJB)

ORDER DENYING

v. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

JO ANNE BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

On June 29, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking review of an administrative

decision denying Supplemental Security Income benefits. On April 14, 2006, the Hon.

Anthony J. Battaglia issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) suggesting that

the Court remand to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for a determination of

benefits. After considering Defendant’s objection, however, the Court declined to rule

on the ultimate issue of disability and remanded to the SSA for further proceedings. On

September 15, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party

under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Defendant opposes.

The Court DENIES the motion.

Case 3:05-cv-01322-W-AJB Document 30 Filed 11/03/06 Page 1 of 7
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I. BACKGROUND

On September 12, 1994, Plaintiff alleged that tuberculosis, major depression, and

anxiety disorder rendered him disabled. On October 27, 1997, after an evidentiary

hearing, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Albert Tom determined that Plaintiff was not

eligible for benefits principally because his allegations of disabling limitations were not

credible and because could perform numerous jobs in the local and national economy.

(Admin. R. at 235–36.) He considered opinions from Drs. Tuan Nguyen, Can Bui, Dao

Phan, Don Miller, Stephen Greenleaf, and Ajit Raisinghani, all treating or examining

physicians. Dr. Ansar Haroun also reviewed Plaintiff’s medical file before the hearing.

As relevant here, Dr. Miller concluded that the Plaintiff was totally disabled based

on his diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and other findings indicating thought

disorder and borderline mental retardation. (Admin. R. at 231.) Nevertheless, the ALJ

stated that “substantial evidence contradict[ed] Dr. Miller’s conclusion.” (Id.) ALJ

Tom provided numerous reasons for discounting the opinion. First, Dr. Miller was not

a treating physician. Second, he based his opinion on physical impairments, yet he “did

not evaluate the [Plaintiff’s] physical ailments and is not a medical doctor.” (Id.)

Third, his conclusion on the ultimate issue of disability was not entitled to great weight

because it is reserved to the Commissioner, and was contradicted elsewhere in the

medical record. Fourth, he relied too heavily on Plaintiff’s “subjective complaints,

rather than his own objective findings.” (Id.) And fifth, some of his assessments were

self-contradictory and inconsistent with his own observations and findings. (Id. at 232.)

Instead, the ALJ credited the opinion of Dr. Greenleaf, an examining physician.

(Admin. R. at 232.) Dr. Greenleaf diagnosed Plaintiff with a depressive disorder

without psychotic features. (Id. at 230.) Based on his examination, Dr. Greenleaf

opined that Plaintiff “is able to understand, carry out, and remember complex

instructions, to function in an environment with little peer and public contact, to

tolerate reasonable and constructive criticism, to get to work promptly and regularly,

and to tolerate a low stress job.” (Id. at 231.)

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In 2002, Plaintiff joined a class action alleging that ALJ Tom was biased. The

terms of the settlement permitted Plaintiff to appeal ALJ Tom’s adverse disability

determination. After exhausting all SSA appeals, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this

Court seeking review of the original denial. The parties filed cross–motions for summary

judgment, which the Court referred to the Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia for a Report and

Recommendation. Judge Battaglia’s Report suggested Plaintiff should receive disability

benefits. Defendant objected to the Report.

On June 8, 2006, having reviewed the Report and considered Defendant’s

objections, this Court rejected the Report in part, and remanded to the SSA for a

disability determination in light of the Court’s opinion. The Court’s order constituted

a “sentence-four” remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Finally, on September 15, 2006,

Plaintiff timely filed this motion for attorneys’ fees.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

 Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), district courts may award

attorneys’ fees to a party who prevails in an action against the government when the

government’s position is not substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412. A party

“prevails” when “actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal

relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that

directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992).

Because the EAJA applies to Social Security appeals, see Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d

213, 217 (9th Cir. 1994), the Commissioner bears the burden to show that her position

was “substantially justified,” i.e., “justified in substance or in the main,” or “justified to

a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person,” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565

(1988).

In a social security case, the Commissioner’s position may be reasonable even if

the court finds that substantial evidence did not support it, and even if the claimant is

subsequently found disabled. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995); see

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also Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002)(explaining that attorneys’

fees under Flores do not depend on the ultimate disability determination). Thus, if the

district court issues a “sentence-four” remand, it must analyze the government’s position

on the remanded issue. Flores, 49 F.3d at 569; see also Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051,

1053 (9th Cir. 1998). In other words, the court must turn to the “nub of the remand

proceedings,” Lewis, 281 F.3d at 1086, to determine whether the government was

substantially justified in supporting that aspect of the administrative decision, id. “The

fact that one court or another agreed or disagreed with the Government does not

establish whether its position was substantially justified.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569.

III. DISCUSSION

The Commissioner bears the burden to show that its position was substantially

justified. Under Flores, the Court must focus on the Commissioner’s position on the

issue leading to the remand. The Court’s Order Adopting in Part and Rejecting in Part

Report and Recommendation (“Order”) discussed two issues: legal error in classifying

Dr. Miller (Order at 7–10), and legal error in evaluating Dr. Miller’s opinion (id. at

10–15). On remand, the SSA was “instructed to weigh Dr. Miller’s conclusions in

conjunction with the findings of other medical professionals, and medical findings.” (Id.

at 15.) Thus, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner justifiably argued

that the ALJ committed no legal error in classifying Dr. Miller and evaluating Dr.

Miller’s opinion. The Court holds that she was “substantially justified,” and thus denies

the motion for attorneys’ fees.

A. The Legal Standard Created Doubt Regarding Dr. Miller’s Status. 

Although the Court concluded that the ALJ improperly classified Dr. Miller, the

Commissioner’s position was nonetheless reasonable because the Commissioner offered

plausible arguments under the proper legal standard. Plaintiff argues that the

Commissioner’s position was unreasonable simply because the Court determined that

substantial evidence did not support it. (Pl. Mem. P. & A. at 6.) But the Court must

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independently assess the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s arguments and rationale.

 See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569. The Court concludes that these arguments, though they

did not prevail, establish a “substantially justified” litigation position.

First, a broad legal standard designed to characterize the all types of doctorpatient relationships governed Dr. Miller’s status. SSA regulations define “treating

source” as follows:

Treating source means your own physician, psychologist, or other

acceptable medical source who provides you, or has provided you, with medical

treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment

relationship with you. Generally, we will consider that you have an ongoing

treatment relationship with an acceptable medical source when the medical

evidence establishes that you see, or have seen, the source with a frequency

consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation

required for your medical condition(s).

20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (emphasis added). Ninth Circuit law describes the standard as a

“continuum reflecting the duration of the treatment relationship and the frequency and

nature of contact.” Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.

2003).

Following this legal standard, the Commissioner reasonably argued that five twohour sessions over the course of three years did not comport with accepted medical

practice for Plaintiff’s medical condition—whether for treatment or evaluation alone.

The Commissioner attempted to apply the legal standard to the case by relying on the

expert testimony of Dr. Haroun. (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. Summ. J. at 7.) In his opinion,

Dr. Miller “provided no treatment,” implying that accepted medical practice would

require more frequent contact, or contact of a different nature or duration. (Id.)

Further, the Commissioner noted Dr. Miller’s failure to produce progress notes,

suggesting several isolated office visits rather than an ongoing evaluation. (Id.)

In essence, the Court held that Dr. Miller was a treating source even though he

never treated Plaintiff. Given the nonspecific legal standard and significant facts

supporting the Commissioner’s position, however, the Court cannot conclude that the

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Commissioner’s argument could not satisfy a reasonable person. While the Court did

not ultimately agree with the Commissioner, it finds the Commissioner’s position on this

issue plausible and well-grounded in law and fact.

B. The ALJ Arguably Committed Harmless Error.

The Commissioner was also substantially justified in arguing that the ALJ properly

discounted Dr. Miller’s opinion. In the Ninth Circuit, “[i]t is not necessary, or even

practical, to draw a bright line distinguishing a treating physician from a non-treating

physician.” Benton, 331 F.3d at 1038. Again, then, the Commissioner argued that even

if the ALJ deemed Dr. Miller a non-treating physician, a flexible legal standard

permitted him to discount the opinion significantly—almost as though it were a nontreating physician’s. Taking into account the limited nature and duration of Dr. Miller’s

contact with Plaintiff, the Commissioner argued that the ALJ’s classification error was

essentially harmless. 

Further, to discount a treating physician’s controverted findings, an ALJ only

needs to set forth “specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the

record.” Benton, 331 F.3d at 1036. And the ALJ purported to provide “substantial

evidence” contradicting Dr. Miller’s conclusion that Plaintiff was disabled (Admin. R.

at 231), even though he concluded that Dr. Miller did not treat Plaintiff. Thus, the

ALJ’s opinion may have included an implicit alternative rationale: that even if Dr.

Miller treated Plaintiff, specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence

allowed him to reject the opinion. So, unless the ALJ’s rationale was nonspecific or

illegitimate on its face, the Commissioner would be justified in arguing that his legal

error was harmless.

In its summary-judgment memorandum, the Commissioner elaborated on four of

the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Miller’s opinion: (1) Dr. Miller failed to document

specific functional limitations; (2) he opined beyond his area of expertise; (3) some of

his findings contradicted others, or were inconsistent with his conclusions; and (4) his

opinion often relied on subjective complaints rather than objective clinical findings.

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(Def.’s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 7–11.) The Commissioner provided ample legal

citation showing that these defects would diminish the credibility of even a treating

physician’s opinion. (Id.) Moreover, the opinion of Dr. Greenleaf, though he was

merely an examining physician, undermined and in some aspects directly contradicted

Dr. Miller. (Id.) In that respect, the Court agreed with the Commissioner that the

medical record was contradictory. Thus, it permitted the ALJ to discredit Dr. Miller’s

opinion on remand, provided the ALJ included a sufficient explanation. Therefore, the

Court cannot characterize this position as unreasonable or not substantially justified.

Having reviewed its prior decision as a whole, the Court concludes that it

confronted a “close case.” Obviously, the Court did not agree with the Commissioner

on either remanded issue. But the EAJA does not permit an award of attorneys’ fees

every time the government loses a close case. On the contrary, the Court should

exercise discretion in favor of the government in a close case because, by definition, the

Court had to choose between two well-reasoned positions. Otherwise, the Court would

effectively nullify the phrase “substantially justified” in the EAJA.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’

fees.

DATED: November 3, 2006

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-01322-W-AJB Document 30 Filed 11/03/06 Page 7 of 7