Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00200/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00200-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Galen Lloyd Houser,

Plaintiff

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Defendants.

CV-13-0200-PHX-GMS (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

re Dismissal of Unserved Defendants

Background - In his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 37), Plaintiff named as 

Defendant Jane Doe Night Nurse.1In the service Order (Doc. 44), the Court adopted 

those portions of the Report and Recommendation that declined to direct service on this 

fictitiously named defendant. (See Doc. 38 at 11.) Subsequently, Plaintiff undertook 

various unsuccessful efforts to identify this defendant. (See Motion for Assistance, Doc. 

61; Order 3/25/14, Doc. 72.)

In an Order filed January 9, 2015 (Doc. 312), the Court observed that the 

deadlines for service and amendments were expired, and directed Plaintiff to show cause 

why Defendant Jane Doe Night Nurse should not be dismissed for failure to timely serve

and failure to prosecute. 

On January 16, 2015, Plaintiff responded (Doc. 316) arguing that he has been 

diligently attempting to identify this defendant, but has been thwarted by the failures of 

defendants, etc. to provide discovery responses.

On January 21, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff’s incorporated motion to amend, 

and directed Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s response to the order to show cause. 

 

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The Court has periodically referred to multiple defendants named as Jane Doe Night 

Nurses. This flows, at least in part from a typographical error in the First Amended 

Complaint referencing “Jane Doe Night Nures [sic].” (Doc. 37 at 1-A.) Plaintiff’s 

Response (Doc. 316) makes clear that he refers to a single nurse. 

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(Order, Doc. 317.)

On January 27, 2015, Defendants Wexford, et al. responded (Doc. 329) to the 

Court’s Order and Plaintiff’s Response to the Order to Show Cause. Defendants argue 

that based on the limited information provided by Plaintiff, the relevant nurse cannot be 

identified. Defendants argue there were 13 nurses on duty during the relevant time, and 

Plaintiff’s medical records do not reveal the relevant nurse. Defendants further argue 

that Plaintiff’s lack of diligence is reflected by his failure to request from ADOC the 

very records he contends Defendants should have consulted to obtain the identity, i.e.

gate entry logs. Defendants further argue that there are no outstanding discovery 

requests from Plaintiff to Defendants regarding the nurse. 

On February 3, 2015, Plaintiff replied (Doc. 340). Plaintiff argues that of the 13 

nurses, only 3 were working on his unit, and only two of the three were female. Plaintiff 

argues that this nurse was “often relieved from her post by Defendant Lahr.” Plaintiff 

complains that he was unaware of the existence of the gate entry logs until recently, but 

Defendants knew of them, and thus should now be permitted to pursue the log. 

Case on Referral – This matter is before the undersigned on referral from the 

District Judge, and the determination of the undersigned is dispositive of some of 

Plaintiff=s claims. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings 

of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. '28(b)(1)(B) and (C). 

Fictitious Defendants – In Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980), the 

Ninth Circuit observed that the use of fictitiously named defendants was not favored, but 

“where the identity of alleged defendants will not be known prior to the filing of a 

complaint...the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the 

unknown defendants.” Id. at 642.

Failure to Prosecute – Plaintiff has the general duty to prosecute this case. See 

Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc., 587 F.2d 27, 29 (9th 

Cir.1978). Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a dismisaal upon 

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order of the Court “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute.” In determining whether 

Plaintiff's failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of the case, the Court must weigh the 

following five factors: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) 

the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the 

public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the availability of less 

drastic sanctions.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.1986). “The first 

two of these factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the fourth 

factor cuts against a default or dismissal sanction. Thus the key factors are prejudice and 

availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th 

Cir.1990).

Failure to Effect Timely Service - Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) 

provides:

If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is 

filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff-

-must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or 

order that service be made within a specified time. But if the 

plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the 

time for service for an appropriate period.

Local Civil Rule 16.2(b)(2)(B), which governs prisoner civil rights suits, provides 

that service shall be completed by the “maximum date to effect service, pursuant to Rule 

4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or sixty (60) days from filing of service order, 

whichever is later.” Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 37) was filed on 

September 26, 2013. The Court’s service Order (Doc. 55) was entered on February 13, 

2014. Under the foregoing rules, service in this matter should have been completed by 

April 14, 2014. Dismissal of a party is appropriate where a plaintiff fails to show good 

cause for delays in service. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(upholding dismissal where no showing of good cause for delay in service).

Application - This case has been pending for over two years. Plaintiff has known 

at least since the service Order on February 13, 2014 (Doc. 55) that he was obligated to 

identify and amend to name his fictitiously named defendant. Discovery has been 

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available to Plaintiff since at least March 25, 2014. (Scheduling Order 3/25/14, Doc. 

73.) 

Plaintiff initially sought assistance in identifying these defendants. He sought the 

Court’s assistance on October 7, 2013 (Doc. 42), and February 24, 2014 (Doc. 61). In 

response to the latter, the Court directed Defendant Wexford (the purported employer of 

Jane Doe Night Nurse) to provide an identity and service address. (Order 3/25/14, Doc. 

72.) On April 4, 2014, Wexford responded asserting there were 13 nurses on duty, and 

without access to Plaintiff’s records they could not identify the specific one (Doc. 78.) 

Thus, not only has the Court permitted Plaintiff the opportunity for discovery, as 

mandated by Gillespie, the Court has actively attempted to assist Plaintiff in efficiently 

obtaining the information.

The Scheduling Order made clear to Plaintiff that motions to join or amend were 

due by June 23, 2014, that discovery requests were due by August 22, 2014, and that 

discovery motions due by September 22, 2014. Plaintiff proffers nothing to show that 

between the April 4, 2014 notice by Wexford and the June 23, 2014 cutoff for motions to 

join or amend, or even through the August 22, 2014 discovery cutoff that he propounded 

a single discovery request which would reveal the identity of Jane Doe Night Nurse. 

Plaintiff now points to the potential of information in gate logs. He wrongly 

attempts to foist this duty to investigate onto Defendant Wexford. Moreover, he proffers 

nothing to show he was diligent in attempting to became aware of the log, when he 

became aware of it, and/or that he was diligent in seeking discovery of the log. Plaintiff 

has not timely sought to reopen discovery.

Nor does Plaintiff show any effort to seek the information by other means. 

Plaintiff shows no effort to get the list of 13, to depose the 13, or the 3 or the 2 nurses. 

Plaintiff does not indicate that he requested information on Defendant Lahr to identify 

Jane Doe, despite arguing that Lahr regularly relieved Jane Doe at the end of a shift.

Now, all of the deadlines in this case have expired, including the dispositive 

motions deadline. At this eleventh hour, and only after an order to show cause, has 

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Plaintiff showed renewed interest in pursuing Defendant Jane Doe Night Nurse. 

Thus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not been diligent in his pursuit of 

identifying, naming, and service Defendant Jane Doe Night Nurse. Plaintiff has not 

shown good cause for his failure to do so heretofore, nor good cause to be allowed to do 

so now, in light of the procedural posture of this case. Accordingly, Defendant Jane Doe 

Night Nurse should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to timely serve.

Further, the other parties will be prejudiced from this eleventh hour addition of a 

new defendant. Discovery will have to be reopened, pleadings reopened, and dispositive 

motions deadlines reopened. This will delay the resolution of the case, protract the 

litigation, and increase the costs to all parties. Thus, the undersigned finds prejudice 

from Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute.

One less drastic sanction apparent to the Court would be to attempt to shift some 

of the costs of the protracted litigation to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has, however, appeared in 

this action in forma pauperis, suggesting that such efforts would be futile. Moreover, 

such sanctions would not address the inherent burdens of being embroiled in litigation 

for a protracted time period. The undersigned does find, however, that dismissal of 

Defendant Jane Doe Night Nurse without prejudice would leave Plaintiff the ability to 

pursue this defendant in a separate action (albeit perhaps subject to statute of limitations 

defenses), while avoiding the prejudice to the other Defendants from delaying this 

action.

Therefore, Defendant Jane Doe Night Nurse should also be dismissed without 

prejudice for failure to prosecute.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendant Jane Doe Night Nurse 

be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

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of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file 

objections to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be 

considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute 

a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. 

Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 10, 2015

13-0200r RR 15 02 09 re Unserved Defs.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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