Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00574/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00574-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN TENNISON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et

al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-04-0574 CW (EMC)

ORDER RE RULE 11 SANCTION

Previously, the Court ordered Defendants Napoleon Hendrix and Prentice Earl Sanders to

show cause why they did not violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) by signing, filing,

submitting, and advocating a motion arguing for a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (discussing certification by attorney that, to the best of the person’s

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, the

legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the

extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law). Having

considered Defendants’ response and accompanying submissions, the Court hereby concludes that

no Rule 11 sanctions are warranted. 

In United National Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth

Circuit laid out the appropriate standard to apply when a court raises the issue of Rule 11 sanctions

sua sponte. The Ninth Circuit began by noting:

Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed only in response to claims that are

not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the

extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” This standard is

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 359 Filed 08/24/05 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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applied with particular stringency where, as here, the sanctions are

imposed on the court’s own motion. In that circumstance -- unlike the

situation in which an opposing party moves for Rule 11 sanctions --

there is no “safe harbor” in the Rule allowing lawyers to correct or

withdraw their challenged filings. In light of this important

distinction, sua sponte sanctions “will ordinarily be imposed only in

situations that are akin to a contempt of court.”

Id. at 1115-16; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), 1993 advisory committee notes (“Since show cause

orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a contempt of court, the rule does

not provide a “safe harbor” to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a show cause

order has been issued on the court's own initiative.”).

The Court finds that, in the instant case, Defendants’ actions do not rise to the level of

contempt of court. There was some basis for Defendants’ motion for civil contempt against Mr.

Blue given Mr. Blue’s blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Townsend v.

Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f there is a colorable claim to a

particular type of relief on a given set of facts and the signer relies on an unsupportable legal theory

to bolster his claim when a supportable one exists as well, the signer cannot be sanctioned under

Rule 11.”). 

However, the Court still concludes that Defendants’ position regarding waiver was not well

supported. Clearly, Mr. Blue’s November 2000 declaration was not a part of the instant litigation. 

The fact that Plaintiffs cited the declaration as evidence in their complaint does not mean that Mr.

Blue thereby waived his right against self-incrimination in the current proceeding. As for the

alleged conversation that Mr. Blue had with an investigator in this litigation, there has been little to

no evidentiary support for the conversation. Defendants, for example, never provided a declaration

from the investigator recounting the purported conversation. Thus, at most, Defendants are left with

the argument that there should be an exception to the general Licavoli rule when the prior

proceeding is the subject of the current proceeding. See Resp. at 9 (arguing that “the earlier criminal

case is the subject of this civil rights action”). While the Court has its doubts about whether this is a

nonfrivolous argument for the modification of existing law -- and notes that Defendants never in

their briefing even acknowledged what the existing law is -- as noted above, Defendants did not rely

on this argument alone in support of their motion for civil contempt.

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 359 Filed 08/24/05 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall not issue any Rule 11 sanctions. However, it takes

this opportunity to caution Defendants, as well as all other parties, that, while this litigation has been

contentious, that does not free them or their counsel from their obligations and duties, whether under

Rule 11, other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or, if applicable, ethical rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 24, 2005

 EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:04-cv-00574-CW Document 359 Filed 08/24/05 Page 3 of 3