Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-mc-00371/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-mc-00371-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 999
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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1

 Petitioner named Revenue Agent LaVonne Tobia and Group Manager Jill Page as in

his petition; however, the government correctly points out that the sole proper defendant is the

United States. Rodio v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, 138 F.R.D. 341 n. 1

(D.R.I. 1991). The caption has accordingly been changed to reflect the substitution.

2

 On March 1, 2005, the court took the matter under submission without a hearing,

having determined that it was unnecessary.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS McFADDEN,

Petitioner, No. Misc. S-04-0371 WBS GGH 

vs.

UNITED STATES,1

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a petition to quash a third party summons

issued by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). On December 22, 2004, this court directed the

Clerk to serve the petition to quash on the United States Attorney. The United States filed a

motion to dismiss on February 1, 2005. On February 28 and March 3, 2005, petitioner filed

oppositions.2 Having reviewed the filings, the court now issues the following findings and

recommendations.

Case 2:04-mc-00371-WBS-GGH Document 9 Filed 04/25/05 Page 1 of 5
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2

The government’s motion to dismiss raises the following issues: failure to effect

proper service on the United States, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and that the government

has established a prima facie case to deny the petition under Powell.

DISCUSSION

I. Proper Service on the United States

The government contends that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) requires service on the United

States Attorney for the applicable district and on the United States Attorney General, and that

plaintiff did not effect proper service. The government is incorrect in this case.

As a preliminary matter, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to

enforcement proceedings involving the Internal Revenue Service, except as otherwise provided

by statute, rules of the district court or court order in the proceedings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3)

(emphasis added). United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57, 85 S. Ct. 248, 255 (n. 18) (1964);

Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.1942); United States v. Church of

Scientology of California, 520 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1975). Fed. R. Civ. P. 81 is just as much a

federal rule of civil procedure as Rule 4, 5, 6 and so forth. The court in this case invoked the

authority of Rule 81 to except from the Federal Rules this “proceeding to compel the giving of

testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or

agency of the United States,” insofar as service of the petition was concerned, i.e., as authorized,

the court order of December 22, 2004, dispensed with the specific requirements of Rule 4. While

Rule 4 would apply in a situation where a court order to the contrary had not issued, the

government cannot contend, given the plain wording of Rule 81, that the court ordered service

was insufficient.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The government contends that petitioner did not timely file his petition within

twenty days pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A), and Heritage Bank does not reside nor is

found in this district, as required by § 7609(h)(1). 

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3

In regard to the timeliness of the filing of the petition, § 7609(b)(2)(A) provides

that petitioner had twenty days from the date notice was sent, or until November 4, 2004, to bring

the instant action. See Stringer v. United States, 776 F.2d 274, 275 (11th Cir. 1985) (petition to

quash service summons not timely where it was not filed until more than 20 days after date on

which notice was sent by certified mail); accord Grisham v. U.S., 578 F. Supp. 73 (D.C.N.Y.

1983); Riggs v. U.S., 575 F. Supp. 738 (D.C.Ill. 1983). See also Callahan v. Schultz, 783 F.2d

1543 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that Government’s consent to suit on Internal Revenue Service

summons requires strict compliance with 26 U.S.C.A. § 7609(b)(2)).

It is undisputed that the petition in this case was not filed until November 17,

2004, more than twenty days following the date of notice that the summonses had been served. 

Notice was served on petitioner by certified mail on October 15, 2004. (See Tobia Decl., ¶ 4;

Exhs. A, B.) 

 The United States argues that the twenty-day time limit is jurisdictional, citing

Ponsford v. United States, 771 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, the United States

requests the court to dismiss these related cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In

Ponsford, the Ninth Circuit held that “the twenty-day limit must be strictly construed because it is

a condition precedent to the waiver of sovereign immunity,” and stated that the limitations period

was “jurisdictional.” However, Irwin v. Dept. of Veteran’s Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S. Ct. 453

(1990) has abrogated cases, including Ponsford, holding that limitations periods, such as the one

here, are “jurisdictional.” Ninth Circuit opinions, issued after Irwin, have recognized that

limitations periods for suing the federal government are not strictly jurisdictional. See

Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, (9th Cir. 1997); Fadem v. United States,

52 F.3d 202, 206 (9th Cir.1995), vacated, 520 U.S. 1101, 117 S. Ct. 1103, 137 L.Ed.2d 306

(1997), reinstated, 113 F.3d 167, 168 (9th Cir.1997) (earlier statements that statutes of

limitations are jurisdictional in nature “have no continuing validity after the Court’s decision in

Irwin”); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1437 (9th Cir.1993) (“[i]n [ Irwin ], the Supreme

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Court held that federal statutory time limitations on suits against the government are not

jurisdictional in nature”); Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir.1993). Without an

explicit Congressional statement that the limitations period of § 7609(b)(2) is jurisdictional, this

court cannot find that the failure to timely file the petitions to quash is a jurisdictional defect. 

See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 125 F.3d at 770.

Nevertheless, in the absence of any facts to demonstrate that the late filing in the

instant case is anything more than garden variety neglect, Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, or simple lack of 

diligence in preserving legal rights, Carpenter v. Department of Transportation, 13 F.3d 313, 317

(9th Cir. 1994) the court cannot find any special circumstances that could possibly warrant

equitable tolling of the limitations period. Rather, it appears that plaintiff has failed to exercise

due diligence in preserving his legal rights. 

Moreover, the court finds that Heritage Bank does not reside nor can it be found

in this district. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h)(1) provides in part that “[t]he United States district court for

the district within which the person to be summoned resides or is found shall have jurisdiction to

hear and determine any proceeding brought” to quash an IRS summons. See Fortney v. U.S., 59

F.3d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1995). In this case, the party summoned, Heritage Bank, has offices only

in Nevada. (See Tobia Decl., ¶ 10.) It has no offices in California. Therefore, this court lacks

jurisdiction over the petition to quash the IRS summons. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the government’s

February 1, 2005, motion to dismiss the petition to quash the IRS summons be granted, and this

action be dismissed with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to this case pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty (20) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

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captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 4/25/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076

McFadden0371.qsh.wpd

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