Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05190/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 14, 1998 Decided July 10, 1998

No. 97-5190

Ivan Ficken,

Appellant

v.

Aida Alvarez, Administrator,

Small Business Administration,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv00042)

Erik S. Jaffe, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae on behalf of appellant.

Ivan Ficken, appearing pro se, argued the cause and filed

the briefs.

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Stephen R. Martin, II, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: Wald, Williams, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: A pro se Title VII plaintiff seeks

review of a district court's denial of his motion for appointment of counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).

Because this non-final order does not qualify as a collateral

order within the meaning of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), we lack jurisdiction to hear

this appeal.

I

An attorney, appellant Ivan Ficken worked in various

capacities for the Small Business Administration. Ficken

claims that after he provided statements to an SBA Equal

Employment Opportunity investigator in support of a coworker's discrimination case and filed an age discrimination

claim of his own, the SBA retaliated against him, eventually

terminating him from the agency.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Ficken filed

a Title VII suit against the SBA and moved to proceed in

forma pauperis. He also moved for appointment of counsel

under section 2000e-5(f)(1), which states that "[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the

court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for

such complainant." 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(f)(1). Although the

district court granted Ficken IFP status, it denied appointment of counsel, applying the test set forth in Poindexter v.

FBI, 737 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which directs district

courts to consider "(1) the ability of the plaintiff to afford an

attorney; (2) the merits of the plaintiff's case; (3) the efforts

of the plaintiff to secure counsel; and (4) the capacity of the

plaintiff to present the case adequately without aid of counsel," id. at 1185. Acknowledging that Ficken "may well not

be able to afford an attorney," and lacked experience with

Title VII matters, the court concluded that it could not

"justify squandering its limited resources of attorneys willing

to take pro bono appointments."

Ficken moved for reconsideration, which a different district

court, also applying the Poindexter factors, denied. The

court explained that Ficken's abilities as an attorney weighed

heavily against appointing counsel, and that "[t]o date, [Ficken] has ably presented his case to the Court." The district

court also noted that "[a]t this early stage of the litigation,

the pleadings do not permit the Court to find that the merits

of [Ficken's] case are so compelling that appointment of

counsel is necessary to ensure the vindication of important

federal civil rights."

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Without waiting for any further proceedings in the district

court, Ficken appealed. We appointed amicus curiae on his

behalf.

II

This court has jurisdiction of appeals only from "final

decisions of the district courts," 28 U.S.C. s 1291 (1994)--

decisions that "end[ ] the litigation on the merits and leave[ ]

nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."

Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). This

jurisdictional limitation, however, is not absolute. In Cohen

v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the Supreme Court

recognized a "small class" of decisions that "finally determine

claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too

independent of the cause itself to require that appellate

consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. In order to qualify for immediate

appeal under Cohen's collateral order doctrine, a district

court order must meet three requirements: "conclusively

determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue

completely separate from the merits of the action, and be

effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); see,

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e.g., United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1241-42

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing standard).

This court has never decided whether orders denying appointment of counsel under section 2000e-5(f)(1) qualify as

appealable collateral orders. The question has divided our

sister circuits. The Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits

allow interlocutory appeal of such orders. See Spanos v.

Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 807 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972);

Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.

1977); Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 588-89

(8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301,

1305-18 (9th Cir. 1981). The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh

Circuits read the Cohen/Coopers & Lybrand factors to reach

the opposite conclusion. See Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 763 F.2d 757, 761-64 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc);

Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1065-67

(7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Hodges v. Department of Corrections, 895 F.2d 1360, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).

Circuits also disagree about the closely related question of

the immediate appealability of orders denying appointment of

counsel under the general civil appointment statute, 28

U.S.C.A. s 1915(e)(1) (West Supp. 1998) ("The court may

request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford

counsel."), although a heavy majority find no appellate jurisdiction. See Marler v. Adonis Health Prods., 997 F.2d 1141,

1142 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing cases).

Reviewing this extensive debate, we join those circuits that

hold that orders denying appointment of counsel under section 2000e-5(f)(1) fall outside Cohen's collateral order doctrine. Most important, because the Poindexter factors as

applied to a particular case often change as litigation progresses, denials of motions for appointment of counsel rarely,

as a practical matter, "conclusively determine the disputed

question." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468. Consider,

for example, a plaintiff's "capacity ... to present the case

adequately without aid of counsel." Poindexter, 737 F.2d at

1185. Plaintiffs who file perfectly adequate complaints and

respond well to motions to dismiss might be entirely unable

to handle discovery or respond to motions for summary

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judgment. Even pro se plaintiffs with sufficient skills to

survive summary judgment are unlikely to be able to try a

case.

The other Poindexter factors can likewise change during

litigation. With respect to the merits of the plaintiff's case

(Poindexter's second factor), or at least the district court's

perception of the merits, complaints that appear weak could

strengthen as discovery progresses or plaintiffs respond to

dispositive motions. Plaintiffs who have adequate financial

resources (Poindexter's first factor) to hire counsel for relatively simple cases might be unable to hire more experienced

counsel should a case blossom in complexity later in the

litigation. Plaintiffs making no efforts to secure counsel

(Poindexter's third factor) before filing the complaint might

begin contacting lawyers or referral organizations in response

to dispositive motions or as trial nears.

Because of the evolutionary nature of the Poindexter factors, district judges often re-evaluate the need for appointed

counsel at various stages of the proceedings. Although a

court may well appoint counsel at the outset of a case, it

might also decide to postpone the decision--for example, until

after resolution of dispositive motions--in order to give itself

both more time and information to evaluate the plaintiff's

capabilities and the merits of the case. Here, for example,

the district court emphasized that its decision rested on its

assessment "at this point in the litigation," evaluating the

merits only "[a]t this early stage" and Ficken's capabilities

"[t]o date." District judges may also believe that given some

additional time, pro se plaintiffs might obtain counsel on their

own. As the Eleventh Circuit observed in holding orders

denying appointment of counsel unreviewable until the close

of litigation, such orders "usually indicate[ ] 'nothing more

than that the district court is not completely confident of the

propriety of [court appointed counsel] at that time.' " Holt v.

Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 852 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (quoting

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S.

271, 278 (1988)); see also Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962,

965 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[S]uch [a] preliminary order does not

foreclose future consideration by the trial court of the approUSCA Case #97-5190 Document #365703 Filed: 07/10/1998 Page 5 of 10
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priateness of appointment of counsel as facts and circumstances dictate.").

Other factors contribute to the tentative nature of orders

denying appointment of counsel. Because district judges are

reluctant to "squander[ ] [their] limited resources of attorneys

willing to take pro bono appointments," they often postpone

the appointment decision until after dispositive motions as a

means of weeding out frivolous or unmeritorious cases. The

timing of the appointment may also reflect the district court's

assessment of the adequacy of the record for purposes of its

own decisionmaking. A district court that initially denies a

motion to appoint counsel because it feels comfortable resolving a motion to dismiss on the basis of a record produced by a

pro se plaintiff may later appoint counsel to ensure the

development of a record adequate for summary judgment or

trial.

Although our conclusion that orders denying appointment

of counsel under section 2000e-5(f)(1) fail Cohen's first test

requires dismissal of this appeal, see Digital Equip. Corp. v.

Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868-69 (1994) (finding

order not immediately appealable because not all Cohen

factors met); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449

U.S. 368, 376 (1981) (same); see also D & H Marketers, Inc.

v. Freedom Oil & Gas, Inc., 744 F.2d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir.

1984) (noting that orders must meet all prongs of the Cohen

test in order to be immediately appealable), we also doubt

whether such orders meet Cohen's third requirement--that

the order in question be "effectively" unreviewable on appeal

at the conclusion of litigation, Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at

468. To be sure, "[a] pro se litigant denied appointed counsel

is subject to numerous errors, many of which cannot be cured

post hoc, and seems far more likely to abandon the case

entirely or accept a deficient settlement." Br. of Amicus at

15. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that such

problems flow inevitably from the general rule prohibiting

interlocutory appeals. As the Court said in rejecting immediate appeal of an order vacating a dismissal based on a

settlement agreement:

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A fully litigated case can no more be untried than the

law's proverbial bell can be unrung, and almost every

pretrial or trial order might be called "effectively unreviewable" in the sense that relief from error can never

extend to rewriting history. Thus, erroneous evidentiary

rulings, grants or denials of attorney disqualification and

restrictions on the rights of intervening parties may

burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment, and other errors, real enough, will not seem serious enough to warrant reversal at all, when reviewed

after a long trial on the merits. In still other cases, an

erroneous district court decision will, as a practical matter, sound the "death knell" for many plaintiffs' claims

that might have gone forward if prompt error correction

had been an option. But if immediate appellate review

were available every such time, Congress's final decision

rule would end up a pretty puny one....

Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 872 (citations omitted).

Orders denying appointment of counsel present Title VII

plaintiffs with similar problems: they may "burden [them] in

ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment," id.; and such orders

may "not seem serious enough to warrant reversal at all,

when reviewed after a long trial on the merits," id. But as

our decision in Poindexter demonstrates, denial of interlocutory appeal does not " 'render impossible any review whatsoever.' " Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376 (quoting United States v.

Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)); see also Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1986) (on appeal after

grant of summary judgment, court found no abuse of discretion in denial of appointment of counsel earlier in litigation);

cf. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984)

(noting that "post-conviction review [of a disqualification order] is concededly effective to the extent that petitioners'

asserted right is like the Sixth Amendment rights violated

when a trial court denies appointment altogether").

It is also true that orders denying appointment of counsel

may, as Digital Equipment put it, "sound the 'death knell' for

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many plaintiffs' claims that might have gone forward if

prompt error correction had been an option." Digital Equip.

Corp., 511 U.S. at 872. But whether some pro se plaintiffs--

indeed, even this plaintiff--might choose not to pursue their

cases without appointed counsel is not the controlling question under Cohen. As the Supreme Court made clear in

Digital Equipment, whether an order qualifies as a collateral

order under Cohen "is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that

the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a 'particular

injustic[e]' averted by a prompt appellate court decision." Id.

at 867 (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517,

529 (1988)) (citation omitted). The Court's decision in Roberts v. United States District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (per

curiam), on which amicus relies, illustrates just this point. In

Roberts, the Court held that orders denying in forma pauperis status are immediately appealable. Id. at 845. Unlike

orders denying IFP status, which effectively close the courthouse door to indigents, orders denying appointment of counsel do not prevent pro se plaintiffs from proceeding. While

some pro se Title VII plaintiffs denied appointed counsel may

abandon their claims for lack of assistance, orders denying

appointment of counsel present no absolute bar to proceeding.

Many pro se plaintiffs respond to dispositive motions, and

some even successfully litigate at trial and on appeal. See,

e.g., Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (pro se

plaintiff prevailing).

In reality, moreover, postponing review of denials of counsel risks fewer and less serious burdens than Ficken and

amicus fear. Most Title VII cases terminate at the dispositive motion stage. See Administrative Office of the United

States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts

1997, at 153 (1998) (providing data indicating that a minority

of Title VII cases proceed to trial). At that point, the

problems inherent in appellate review of denials of appointment of counsel are considerably less formidable. When

reviewing orders dismissing complaints or granting summary

judgment, appellate courts will have less difficulty focusing on

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the district court's application of the Poindexter factors and

isolating any prejudice resulting from the denial of counsel.

They will also have less difficulty fashioning a remedy. Instead of having to retry a case, the appeals court simply sets

aside the order granting the dispositive motion and remands

with directions to appoint counsel.

III

While we understand the concerns that led four circuits to

hold that motions denying appointment of counsel are immediately appealable, particularly the unique nature of section

2000e-5(f)(1) and the challenges facing pro se plaintiffs seeking to vindicate important federal rights under Title VII, we

read Cohen to require appellate courts to postpone review

until final judgment. Not only would a contrary ruling--

allowing interlocutory appeals of orders denying appointment

of counsel, and therefore also repeated appeals as district

judges deny successive motions--delay expeditious resolution

of Title VII cases, but given the fact-intensive and interrelated nature of the Poindexter factors, we think leaving appointment of counsel to the continued and uninterrupted evaluation of district judges actually promotes the goals of section

2000e-5(f)(1). It is the district courts that occupy the best

position to evaluate and monitor plaintiffs' skills and the

strength and complexity of plaintiffs' claims, as well as to

determine whether and when to appoint counsel. Indeed,

district courts have their own strong incentives for ensuring

adequate representation for pro se plaintiffs. Except in those

few cases where pro se plaintiffs are unusually skilled, we

cannot imagine why any district court would want to try a

complex Title VII case without competent counsel.

Equally important, we expect district courts sitting in this

circuit have little difficulty finding competent counsel to appoint in Title VII cases raising promising claims. Many

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organizations, firms, and lawyers in the District of Columbia

provide pro bono counsel. We have every confidence that

they will continue to respond to requests for help from our

colleagues on the district court.

Because we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's

denial of Ficken's motion for appointment of counsel, we

dismiss this appeal.

So ordered.

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