Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02299/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02299-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

(continued...)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAMELA LYNN RUX,

2:05-CV-02299-MCE-EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a

Washington Corporation,

Defendant.

Through the present action, Plaintiff Pamela Lynn Rux

alleges Defendant Starbucks Corporation (“Defendant”)

discriminated against her based on her sexual orientation in

violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq.; retaliated against her

in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940; wrongfully terminated

her in violation of public policy; engaged in negligent hiring,

supervision, training and retention; committed negligence; and

engaged in negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

1

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(...continued) 1

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on all Plaintiff’s claims. For the reasons set forth

below, Defendants’ Motion is denied in part and granted in part. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Pamela Lynn Rux, began her employment with

Defendant Starbucks Corporation in late 1996. Between January of

2002, through her termination in July of 2005, Plaintiff acted as

a Store Manager for Starbucks located at 3815 J Street (“J Street

Store”). In May of 2004, Melissa McKay (“McKay”) was hired as an

Assistant Store Manager and was assigned to the J Street Store

for training. Sometime thereafter, Ms. McKay and Plaintiff

became romantically involved.

Beginning as early as 2001, Plaintiff contends Starbucks’

management made offensive comments regarding her sexual

orientation. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Nancy Beall

(“Beall”), a Starbucks District Manager, stated that if Plaintiff

wanted to be promoted, she would need to move somewhere that

lesbians are accepted. In early 2002, Plaintiff elected to apply

for a Regional Recruiter position and sought a letter of

recommendation from Beall. After initially agreeing to

Plaintiff’s request, Beall later refused to write the letter. 

Plaintiff now contends Beall’s refusal resulted in Plaintiff not

being accorded an interview for the position.

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3

By May of 2004, Plaintiff’s relationship with Beall had

deteriorated to the extent that Beall took corrective action

against Plaintiff. On June 15, 2004, Beall issued a Corrective

Action against Plaintiff stating that Plaintiff “gossips and

slanders people in conversation.” Plf.s’ Stmt. Disp. Facts ¶

108. By July, 2004, Plaintiff was relieved of her position as a

trainer in the company.

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff voiced repeated

complaints to Starbucks’ management about the treatment she

received from Beall including Beall’s refusal to tender a letter

of recommendation; Beall’s comments regarding Plaintiff’s sexual

orientation; and the Corrective Action issued against her.

In March of 2005, Plaintiff advised her then District

Manager, Chris Frickstad (“Frickstad”), and her Partner Resources

Manager, Tanya Hansen (“Hansen”), that she intended to transfer

to Austin, Texas later that year. Plaintiff conveyed to Hansen

her feeling that she had been discriminated against based on her

sexual orientation. Hansen requested that Plaintiff reconsider

her transfer but Plaintiff was not persuaded. Hansen then agreed

to assist Plaintiff with the transition.

In June of 2005, Hansen asked McKay if McKay were planning

to transfer any time in the foreseeable future. McKay indicated

she was planning a transfer to Austin, Texas. Soon thereafter,

Plaintiff and McKay informed Frickstad they were in a committed

relationship and were taking a vacation to Austin together. On

July 13, 2005, Frickstad and Hansen appeared at Plaintiff’s store

and asked to have a private conversation with her.

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4

Frickstad and Hansen then questioned Plaintiff about her

relationship with McKay. Plaintiff confirmed she and McKay had

been in a committed relationship for over a year. Plaintiff was

asked if she was aware of the policy concerning close working

relationships. Plaintiff replied that she was. Plaintiff was

then suspended pending further investigation. On July 14, 2005,

Plaintiff was terminated allegedly for violating the conflict of

interest, anti-harassment, and close relationship policies. 

 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of

Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) on or around September 12,

2005. Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue on September

15, 2005.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

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5

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

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6

The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention

is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169,

Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir.

1987). Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the

jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether

there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon

which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the

party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14

Wall. 442, 448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court

explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of

fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue

for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

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Generally, courts look to pertinent federal precedent in 2

applying FEHA in employment discrimination cases given that FEHA

is modeled after federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Guz v.

Bechtel Nat., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352,

8 P.3d 1089 (2000); see also Lyle v. Warner Bros. TV Prods., 38

Cal. 4th 264, 279 (2006). 

7

ANALYSIS

I. Discrimination

California’s FEHA prohibits discrimination based on a

person’s sexual orientation. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). 

Specifically, FEHA explains that it shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer, because of ... sexual

orientation, to discriminate against a person in compensation or

in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. See id. In a

claim for such discrimination, gender must be a “‘substantial

factor’” i.e., the adverse action must be because of sex or

sexual orientation. Accardi v. Super. Ct., 17 Cal. App. 4th 341,

348 (1993).

Under the McDonnell Douglas test for FEHA discrimination

claims, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by

showing: (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was

performing according to her employer’s legitimate expectations,

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other

circumstance indicates a discriminatory motive, such as similarly

qualified individuals being treated more favorably. McDonnell 2

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36

L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); see also Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150

F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998).

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8

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-803. If the

defendant meets this burden of production, the burden shifts back

to the plaintiff to establish that defendant’s proffered reason

was a pretext for discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). “The ultimate burden of persuading

the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated

against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”

Id. 

In seeking summary judgment, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination must fail to the extent she

alleges conduct occurring more than one year predating the filing

of her DFEH complaint as those events are time barred. Defendant

further avers that Plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim because

the employment actions of which she complains were not motivated

by discriminatory animus, but rather, by legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.

A. Time Bar

Plaintiff has alleged Defendant engaged in discrimination

when she suffered discriminatory comments and actions as well as

termination based on largely, if not solely, on her sexual

orientation. Defendant rebuts that any claims for injury

occurring more than a year prior to the filing of her DFEH

complaint are time barred. The Court agrees.

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9

Employees who believe they have suffered discrimination

under FEHA may file complaints with the DFEH within a one-year

period. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960; see also Schifando v. City of

L.A., 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1081-1082 (Cal. 2003). Plaintiff alleges

discrimination based on numerous acts occurring from 2002,

through her ultimate termination in July, 2005. If a plaintiff,

as is the case here, chooses to seek relief based on a series of

discrete acts flowing from a systematic, discriminatory practice,

the plaintiff cannot succeed in establishing an employer’s

liability for acts occurring outside the limitations period. 

Specifically, the Supreme Court has determined that each incident

of discrimination, whether or not related, constitutes a separate

actionable unlawful employment practice. See AMTRAK v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 112 (2002); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1107

(9th Cir. 2002). The Court further held that “discrete

discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when

they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” 

AMTRAK, 536 U.S. at 112.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her claim with the

DFEH on or about September 12, 2005. Given the one year time

limit, all acts of alleged discrimination arising before

September 12, 2004, are time barred. Accordingly, Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims occurring prior to

September 12, 2004, is hereby granted.

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10

B. Discriminatory Motive

As noted supra, Plaintiff claims she was subjected to

discrimination when comments evidencing animosity toward gay and

lesbian employees were made to her; when Beall refused to tender

a letter of recommendation on her behalf; when Plaintiff received

an unwarranted Corrective Action; and when Plaintiff was

ultimately terminated from Defendant’s employ. Of these claims,

only one isolated comment and Plaintiff’s termination fall within

the actionable period. Accordingly, only those claims will be

addressed below.

Plaintiff easily establishes three of the four elements of

her prima facie case. Specifically, she is a member of the

protected class of gay and lesbian employees, she was performing

her work to her employer’s expectations and she suffered adverse

employment actions. What Defendant challenges is the causal

connection between those adverse employment actions and

Plaintiff’s sexual orientation. In essence, Defendant contends

its actions were not motivated by discriminatory animus.

A plaintiff must offer evidence that “give[s] rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination.” Tex. Dept. of Cmty.

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed.

2d 207 (1981). Proof of discriminatory intent may be direct,

circumstantial or inferred from statistical evidence, and all

evidence that the plaintiff submits can contribute to the

inference in a cumulative manner. See Stender v. Lucky Stores,

803 F. Supp. 259, 319 (N.D. Cal. 1992).

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Here, Plaintiff has submitted evidence that heterosexual

employees impermissibly engaged in relationships with other

Starbucks staff were not terminated. Rather, they were

transferred to other stores or given warnings. In addition,

Plaintiff provides statements from a number of Starbucks’

management that no other employee has been terminated on grounds

of violating the “Close Relationship Policy” that was the main

ground for Plaintiff’s termination. See Plf.’s Resp. to Def.’s

Sep. Stmt. of Undis. Mat. Facts # 128-138. Defendant rebuts that

the examples cited by Plaintiff are examples of dissimilarly

situated employees making them irrelevant to this analysis.

At this stage in the litigation, very little proof is needed

to establish a prima facie case. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d

1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987). “The plaintiff need only offer

evidence which ‘gives rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination.’” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889

(9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has

presented evidence tending to show she was treated disparately

from her counterparts. That proof, while insufficient to prove

her case in chief, is sufficient to satisfy her burden of

production for purposes of this Summary Judgment Motion.

C. Legitimate Reasons for Adverse Employment Actions

Defendant next argues that the adverse employment actions it

took were legitimate and warranted. Specifically, Defendant

alleges it terminated Plaintiff because she knowingly violated a

number of its personnel policies.

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Specifically, Defendant presents evidence that Plaintiff violated

its close relationship, conflict of interest, and antiharassment

policies as well as its core values. Plaintiff concedes she was

aware of those policies and was aware that dating a partner over

whom she had direct supervisory responsibility would pose a

conflict of interest.

The Court finds the foregoing sufficient to meet Defendant’s

burden of production that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for terminating Plaintiff. Given that Defendant has

carried its burden, Plaintiff now is charged with raising a

material issue of fact that the Defendant’s proffered

nondiscriminatory reason is mere pretext.

b. Pretext

At this point, Plaintiff must offer substantial evidence

that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for the

adverse action was untrue or pretextual, or evidence the employer

acted with a discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two,

such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer

engaged in intentional discrimination. Morgan v. Regents of

Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 75 (2000). An employee in

this situation cannot simply show the employer’s decision was

“wrong, mistaken, or unwise.” Id. Rather, the employee must

demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder

could rationally find them “unworthy of credence.” Id.

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13

Plaintiff can prove pretext indirectly, by showing

Defendant’s proffered explanation is internally inconsistent or

otherwise not believable, or directly, by showing that unlawful

discrimination more likely motivated the employer. See Raad v.

Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115,

1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court should consider all of this

evidence, whether direct or indirect, cumulatively. Chuang, 225

F.3d at 1127. When the only evidence challenging the veracity of

the employer’s proffered motives is circumstantial, however, the

plaintiff must produce “specific, substantial evidence of

pretext” to create a triable issue of fact. Godwin, 150 F.3d at

1221.

Plaintiff concedes she was aware of the policies regarding

conflicts of interest, anti-harassment and close relationships. 

It is undisputed that her conduct of dating Ms. McKay was a

violation of the conflicts of interest policy and close

relationship policy. However, Plaintiff contends this Court

should deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground

that Plaintiff was not in violation of those policies at the time

of her termination. The Court is not persuaded. A violation of

the policy whether at the precise time of her termination or

immediately before is nonetheless a violation. That said,

Defendant cannot rebut the fact that Plaintiff’s partner and

supervisee, Ms. McKay, was not terminated for violating the

identical policies at the identical times that Plaintiff violated

those policies. This fact indicates some other motive at work in

Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff.

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The Court need not speculate as to what, if any, latent

motive may have combined with Plaintiff’s violation of the

foregoing policies to incite Defendant to terminate Plaintiff. 

It is sufficient that the Court finds an issue of material fact

as to whether Defendant’s motive was legitimate and

nondiscriminatory or combined with an unlawful motive. In either

event, the Court finds summary judgment inappropriate as to this

claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as

to Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination in violation of FEHA is

improper and hereby denied. 

II. Retaliation

Generally, in order to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she

engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the

employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link

existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action. 

Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the

employer is required to offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory

reason for the adverse employment action. Id. (citing Morgan,

88 Cal. App. 4th at 68). If the employer produces a legitimate

reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of

retaliation is removed, and the burden shifts back to the

employee to prove intentional retaliation. Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th

at 1042.

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A. Prima Facie Case

Plaintiff alleges she engaged in the protected activity of

complaining to Starbucks’ management regarding disparaging

remarks made to her. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she

complained to various members of management on at least four

occasions about ill comments regarding her sexual orientation. 

In order to be deemed protected activity, Plaintiff need only

have communicated to the Defendant her reasonable concerns that

it had acted or was acting in an unlawful discriminatory manner. 

Id. at 1046. The Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in protected

activity when she verbalized in early 2005, her view that

Defendant’s conduct was discriminatory.

Neither party contends, nor could they, that Plaintiff did

not suffer an adverse employment action. To be sure, Plaintiff’s

termination constitutes adverse employment action. See e.g.

Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The salient inquiry here is whether Plaintiff’s termination is

causally related to her protected activity. “The causal link

between a protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action

‘can be inferred from timing alone’ when there is a close

proximity between the two.” Id. at 812 (citing Villiarimo v.

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff alleges she was terminated as a result of her

protected activity. At least one complaint occurred as

proximately as one month before Plaintiff’s termination. At this

stage in the litigation, that proximity in time is sufficient to

infer a retaliatory nexus.

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Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as

this Court must, the Court finds sufficient evidence to meet

Plaintiff’s burden of production. Accordingly, Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is denied.

B. Pretext

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the

employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason

for the adverse employment action. Brooks v. City of San Mateo,

229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000); Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th 1028

(citing Morgan, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 68). If the employer

produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action,

the presumption of retaliation is removed, and the burden shifts

back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation. Brooks,

229 F.3d at 928; Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1042 (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

Again, Defendant points to Plaintiff’s violation of the

close relationship policy as well as the conflicts of interest

policy as legitimate reasons for Plaintiff’s termination. As

noted above, the Court finds this explanation sufficient to

satisfy Defendant’s burden. Consequently, the presumption of

retaliation drops from the case and the burden shifts back to

Plaintiff to introduce evidence from which the Court could

conclude that Defendant’s proffered explanation was pretextual. 

See Burdine, 450 U.S. 256 n. 10.

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Plaintiff has provided uncontroverted evidence that she

complained of the comments made regarding her sexual orientation

and their vexing effect on her working environment. She further

provided evidence that her termination was proximately related to

those complaints given the very short time between her last

complaint and her termination. Analyzed as either a

straightforward “pretext” case or a mixed motives case, the

record reveals that there is a material issue of fact as to

whether Plaintiff’s protected activity motivated, at least in

part, Defendant’s decision to terminate her. Given this finding,

Plaintiff is entitled to a trial on this claim for retaliation in

violation of FEHA. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on this claim is denied.

III. Termination in Violation of Public Policy

In California, at-will employees may bring a tort action for

wrongful discharge if their employer discharges them for a reason

that violates fundamental public policy. Nelson v. United

Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (internal

citations omitted). A public policy satisfying the requirements

of this tort “must be (1) supported by either statutory or

constitutional provisions; (2) public, in the same sense that the

policy ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving

merely the individual’s interests; (3) have been articulated at

the time of the discharge; and (4) be substantial and

fundamental. [Citation]” Id. at 608-609 (citing Gantt v. Sentry

Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1095, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (1992).

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Courts have held that FEHA’s provisions prohibiting

discrimination may provide the policy basis for a claim of

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Phillips v.

St. Mary Reg’l Med. Ctr., 96 Cal. App. 4th 218, 227 (2002). In

addition, given that the violation of the underlying statutory

provision is a predicate for relief under the tort of termination

in violation of public policy, courts have held that the legal

standard for both are identical. Nelson, 74 Cal. App. 4th at

613, fn 4.

Defendant argues that since it has taken the position that

Plaintiff cannot prevail on her FEHA claims, neither can she

prevail on this claim. Likewise, Plaintiff argues that there are

material issues of fact in both her FEHA claims as well as this

claim precluding summary judgment. 

Both Parties’ arguments depend on the Court’s earlier

conclusion that there are material issues of fact with respect to

whether Defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for

Plaintiff’s termination are mere pretext. Because the Court has

found such issues to exist in this matter, the Court finds this

claim too survives Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Consequently, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to this

claim is denied.

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While Plaintiff couches this cause of action as one for 3

“Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Training, and Retention” under

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k), various courts including this one

have construed a violation of Section 12940(k) as an action for

“Failure to Prevent Unlawful Discrimination, Harassment and

Retaliation.” See e.g. Alaniz v. Peppercorn, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 32694 (D. Cal. 2007). Accordingly, this claim shall be

discussed by the Court in those terms. 

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IV. Negligent Supervision, Training and Retention3

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action prays for relief for her

employer’s failure to take reasonable steps to prevent

discrimination and retaliation from occurring in violation of

FEHA under section 12900, et seq. In fact, FEHA makes it

unlawful “for an employer ... to fail to take all reasonable

steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from

occurring.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k).

The California Supreme Court has stated that FEHA “makes it

a separate unlawful employment practice” for an employer to

violate section 12940(k). State Dept. of Health Servs. v. Super.

Ct., 31 Cal. 4th 1026, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 441, 79 P.3d 556 (2003).

Numerous other California courts have recognized a separate cause

of action against an employer for failure to investigate or take

reasonable steps to prevent harassment or discrimination under

section 12940(k). See, e.g., Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358

F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the district court did

not abuse its discretion in requiring a finding of actual

discrimination before a violation of section 12940(k) becomes

actionable) (citing Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., 63

Cal. App. 4th 280, 283-84, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (1998));

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Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 103 Cal.

App. 4th 1021, 1035, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 285 (2002) (“Prompt

investigation of a discrimination claim is a necessary step by

which an employer meets its obligation [under section

12940(k)]”).

Defendant argues that because Plaintiff’s discrimination and

retaliation claims fail, this claim too must fail. For the

reasons previously discussed, Plaintiff’s FEHA claims of

discrimination and retaliation survive summary judgment. Given

that finding, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether, in the event the jury concludes Plaintiff did suffer

discrimination and retaliation, Defendant violated section

12940(k) by failing to prevent the same. Consequently,

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is denied.

V. Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff alleges she is entitled to damages for the

negligent conduct of Defendant that resulted in her severe

emotional distress. Defendant avers that there was no

discrimination nor retaliation. Consequently, Defendant

contends, no claim for negligence can stand. The Court agrees,

albeit on different grounds, that these claims cannot proceed.

As an initial matter, the California Supreme Court has

clarified there is no independent tort of “negligent infliction

of emotional distress.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6

Cal. 4th 965, 984 (1993); see also Delfino v. Agilent Tech.,

Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 796 (2006).

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The tort is negligence. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 984. In addition,

there is no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress

to another unless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff

in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object. 

Id. Recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises

out of the defendant’s breach of some other legal duty and the

emotional distress is proximately caused by [breach of the

independent duty]. Id. Even then, with rare exceptions, a

breach of the duty must threaten physical injury, not simply

damage to property or financial interests. Id.

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant breached its duty by

negligently and carelessly allowing the insensitive and unlawful

discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff is untenable for

the following reasons. First, even assuming the existence of a

special relationship as between employer and employee, Plaintiff

cannot show that this relationship gives rise to a duty. 

Specifically, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s emotional

well being is, or should be, an object of concern vis-a-vis

Defendant. Rather, the relationship between Plaintiff and

Defendant has as its primary object the payment of wages in

exchange for the performance of obligations. More importantly,

recovery is not available to Plaintiff in this instance as the

alleged breach of duty did not threaten physical injury to

Plaintiff. Lastly, California courts have held that an

employer’s supervisory conduct is inherently “intentional.” 

Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1105 (1990) (citations

omitted). Such intentional conduct will not support a claim for

negligence. Id.

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Consequently, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on both

Plaintiff’s negligence claim as well as her purported negligent

infliction of emotional distress claim are granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination is

granted in part and denied in part. Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation and

termination in violation of public policy are denied. 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim

for negligence and her purported claim for negligent infliction

of emotional distress are granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 17, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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