Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01040/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01040-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES GREESON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MITCHELL, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-1040 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a former county jail inmate, proceeding without counsel. Numerous motions 

are pending, which the court addresses as set forth below.

1. Motion for Legal Copies

On February 10, 2016, plaintiff filed motion for a court order requiring El Dorado County 

Jail authorities to provide him with legal copies. However, on April 22, 2016, plaintiff filed a 

notice of change of address to a residential address in Carmichael, California. (ECF No. 40.) 

Moreover, plaintiff is no longer listed as an inmate at the Placerville County Jail.1 Thus, 

plaintiff’s motion for legal copies is moot and is denied.

////

////

 

1

 This information is available through www.jailexchange.com.

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

2. Discovery Motions 

On March 23, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery. (ECF No. 32.) Plaintiff 

argues that defendants may or may not have produced the mentioned documents but he had no 

way of verifying or viewing the documents because the thumb drive device on which the 

documents were provided was confiscated by a jail official and placed in plaintiff’s property. 

(Id.) On March 30, 2016, plaintiff filed a second motion to compel discovery. Plaintiff again 

argues that he cannot respond to the documents provided because he does not have access to the 

thumb drive device. Defendants oppose plaintiff’s motions to compel based on plaintiff’s release 

from jail, obviating his inability to review the documents contained on the thumb drive. Plaintiff 

did not file a reply.

Plaintiff’s motions to compel are inappropriate to resolve plaintiff’s apparent inability to 

review defendants’ responses. Because defendants provided responses, plaintiff may not move to 

compel further responses prior to reviewing the responses and seeking to compel further 

responses only in those instances where the response provided was inadequate. Thus, plaintiff’s 

motions to compel are denied without prejudice. However, because plaintiff was unable to 

review the responses, plaintiff is granted an extension of time to renew his motion to compel, as 

set forth below.

3. Request to Extend Discovery Deadline

On March 11, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to file and serve motions 

to compel discovery. Although this is plaintiff’s second request to extend the scheduling order, 

plaintiff seeks authorization to file only motions to compel discovery because he will have 

insufficient time to review defendants’ discovery responses and prepare the appropriate motion to 

compel. Defendants object to plaintiff’s request for extension, noting that plaintiff waited to 

conduct discovery until after the initial discovery cutoff, and he was already provided more time 

to conduct discovery when the scheduling order was revised. (ECF No. 27.) Defendants contend 

that further extensions of time are not warranted and will delay resolution of the case, including 

the filing of dispositive motions. Defendants responded to plaintiff’s discovery requests on 

March 15, 16, and 17, 2016. (ECF No. 33-1 at 1-2.)

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

“The district court is given broad discretion in supervising the pretrial phase of litigation.” 

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Rule 16(b) provides that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good 

cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “The schedule may be modified 

‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’” 

Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 607). 

Here, pursuant to the revised scheduling order, the discovery deadline is April 1, 2016, 

and the pretrial motions deadline is July 1, 2016. (ECF No. 27.) 

Defendants state that at the time the thumb drive was produced, plaintiff had access to a 

computer to view the documents. However, due to unrelated security concerns the computer was 

removed from the jail. Plaintiff states that a few days before plaintiff received the electronic 

device from defendants, a computer was available in the jail law library, but the computer was 

removed. (ECF No. 34 at 5.) Neither party provided the exact date the computer was removed 

from the jail, but it appears that at most plaintiff may have had a few days in which to access the 

thumb drive on the jail computer. It is undisputed that plaintiff was unable to obtain copies of 

documents on the thumb drive due to the jail’s policy of not providing photocopies to prisoners. 

(ECF No. 29-1 at 1 (“The El Dorado County Jail does not make copies for any inmate for any 

reason.”).) Given plaintiff’s pro se status, a few days to review the numerous discovery responses 

appears insufficient. The record makes clear that plaintiff was attempting every effort to obtain 

the discovery responses, including seeking assistance from Mr. Holston, plaintiff’s “legal 

ancillary,” also the focus of defendants’ motion for protective order discussed below. 

In an abundance of caution, plaintiff’s request for extension until May 15, 2016, in which 

to file a motion to compel discovery responses is granted. However, no party is permitted to 

propound new discovery requests. Moreover, plaintiff is cautioned that although the court does 

not hold litigants proceeding pro se to the same standard that it holds attorneys, at a minimum, 

plaintiff, as the moving party, has the burden of informing the court (1) which discovery requests 

are the subject of his motion to compel, (2) which of the defendants’ responses are disputed, (3) 

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

why he believes that defendants’ responses are deficient, (4) why defendants’ objections are not 

justified, and (5) why the information he seeks is relevant to the prosecution of this action. This 

court will not examine each of plaintiff’s discovery requests and each of defendants’ responses 

thereto in order to determine whether any of defendants’ substantive responses are somehow 

deficient. See, e.g., Gamez v. Gonzalez, 2015 WL 236684 at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) 

(Plaintiff may not simply assert . . . that he is dissatisfied for general reasons with Defendants’ 

objections, and that he wants an order compelling production of documents.); Calloway v. Kelley, 

2014 WL 7140576 at *2 (“Plaintiff bears the burden of identifying which responses are in dispute 

and providing sufficient information so that the Court can discern why he is challenging the 

response. It is insufficient for Plaintiff to merely attach all discovery requests and responses 

thereto and claim he is not satisfied and request a further response.”). 

Therefore, the discovery deadline is extended to June 21, 2016, to address plaintiff’s 

motion to compel. Plaintiff’s motion to compel shall be filed on or before May 15, 2016, and 

shall be briefed pursuant to Local Rule 230(l) without oral argument. No additional discovery 

requests may be propounded by any party. No further extensions of the discovery deadline will 

be granted.

In light of this extension of time, the pretrial motions deadline is extended to September 

13, 2016. In all other respects, the October 6, 2015 discovery and scheduling order remains in 

effect. 

4. Request for Protective Order

On April 1, 2016, defendants filed a motion for protective order. Defendants contend that 

plaintiff is using the services of a “legal ancillary,” who is not an attorney, and who “will have 

access to documents that are meant to be kept solely within this litigation.” (ECF No. 35 at 2.) 

Defendants argue that a protective order is appropriate “because discovery has concerned the 

operations, policies, and procedures of the El Dorado County Jail.” (Id.) Defendants ask the 

court to order that discovery previously produced as Bates Nos. DEF000001 - DEF000256 and 

any subsequent discovery be deemed as confidential information, and that dissemination not be 

made to any person other than plaintiff or his attorney of record. Further, defendants request that 

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

any violation of the protective order be punishable by contempt of court or other order, and that 

all copies or originals of all discovery produced in this case be returned to defense counsel at the 

conclusion of this case.

Plaintiff opposes the protective order, arguing that if part of the discovery produced on the 

thumb drive contains subject matter concerning the operations, policies, and procedures at the 

jail, the court should limit any protective order to those matters. Plaintiff contends that the 

requested protective order hinders his ability to obtain assistance with his litigation, and that he is 

entitled to have other inmates assist him if they are willing to do so. Plaintiff claims that Mr. 

Holston is also a C-Pod protective custody inmate whose safety was put in jeopardy by the same 

jail staff. Plaintiff notes that defendants fail to identify any specific jeopardy they would face if 

Mr. Holston has access to the discovery material. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Holston is professional 

and has been assisting plaintiff and drafting plaintiff’s filings since the original complaint. (ECF 

No. 37 at 3.) Plaintiff also states that Mr. Holston will be filing his own civil rights action about 

conditions at the El Dorado County Jail.

On April 21, 2016, defendants filed a reply. Defendants state that since their request was 

filed, plaintiff was released from the jail. Defendants sought the prior limited request for a 

protective order based on plaintiff’s request for hard copies of all documents produced and the 

high likelihood the documents would be disseminated to other inmates. (ECF No. 38 at 1.) 

Defendants contend that all of the documents concern the policies, procedures and operations of 

the facility in which plaintiff was incarcerated. Defendants note that Mr. Holston is still 

incarcerated,2and thus it is unclear what, if any, involvement Mr. Holston will still have. But 

defendants continue to ask the court to issue a simple protective order prohibiting plaintiff from 

disseminating discovery to non-parties. 

The scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is broad. 

Under Rule 26(c)(1), however, the court may, for good cause, nonetheless issue an order to 

 

2

 As of April 26, 2016, at 2:40 p.m., Theron Holston was listed as an inmate at the El Dorado 

County Jail. 

<http://www.jailexchange.com/countyjails/California/el_dorado/Placerville_jail_inmate>. 

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, 

including . . . specifying terms . . . for the disclosure or discovery . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(c)(1)(B). When a party seeks an order protecting from public disclosure information that has 

been produced in discovery but not filed in court, the Rule 26(c) good cause standard applies. 

Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Kamakana v. City and 

County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 900 (2011); 

Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen’l Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). It is 

well established that absent a court order to the contrary, the fruits of pretrial discovery are 

presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 

1103 (9th Cir. 1999).

To establish good cause, the party seeking a protective order in this context bears the 

burden of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted. 

Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210-11. Broad and general allegations of harm do not satisfy the Rule 

26(c) test. Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). 

For this reason, blanket protective orders are disfavored. See San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d 

at 1103.

Here, defendants fail to specifically identify each discovery response provided and explain 

why defendants will be harmed if no protective order is granted. In addition, defendants seek a 

protective order that covers any future discovery provided. Defendants assert only that the 

discovery concerns the operations, policies, and procedures of the El Dorado County Jail. At 

present, the discovery appears to encompass some 256 documents. 

The court finds defendants’ arguments are insufficiently specific to warrant a blanket 

protective order over all discovery produced in this action. In addition, defendants point to no 

specific harm that would result from dissemination to Mr. Holston or the public. Such basic 

showing is required before a protective order will issue. Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210-11 (“For good 

cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or 

harm will result if no protective order is granted”). 

////

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Thus, defendants’ motion for blanket protective order is denied without prejudice. If 

defendants can identify particular documents that are confidential and pose a risk of harm to the 

jail, the motion can be renewed. In the alternative, the parties are encouraged to meet and confer 

in an effort to stipulate to an appropriate protective order, now that plaintiff is out of custody. 

Within fourteen days, plaintiff is directed to notify counsel whether, in light of his release from 

jail, plaintiff intends to continue working with Mr. Holston.

With regard to Mr. Holston’s assistance to plaintiff, plaintiff is correct that he is entitled to 

use other inmates or “jailhouse lawyers” to assist him in litigation. That said, Mr. Holston is not 

permitted to dictate to defense counsel how plaintiff’s case is handled, or demand that counsel 

provide Mr. Holston with copies of discovery or legal work. Moreover, Mr. Holston is certainly 

not entitled to interfere with settlement negotiations between defendants and plaintiff, or dictate 

whether or not such negotiations may occur. (ECF No. 35-1 at 30-31.) “[A] non-lawyer ‘has no 

authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.’” Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 

F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Mr. Holston is not plaintiff’s attorney and he 

may not officially represent plaintiff in any capacity, including with defense counsel or with the 

court. Thus, while Mr. Holston is free to assist plaintiff with his litigation, Mr. Holston cannot 

litigate for plaintiff. 

As of April 26, 2016, Mr. Holston was back in jail, and plaintiff was recently released to 

an address in Carmichael. Thus, it is unclear whether plaintiff intends to continue working with 

Mr. Holston. In any event, however, if plaintiff intends to continue working with Mr. Holston, 

plaintiff shall ensure that Mr. Holston writes no further letters to defense counsel on plaintiff’s 

behalf because Mr. Holston is not a lawyer. Plaintiff must personally prosecute his own action 

unless he retains an attorney. Plaintiff is cautioned that if Mr. Holston contacts defense counsel 

on behalf of plaintiff in the future, the court may impose sanctions on plaintiff. 

5. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

In his opposition to the motion for protective order, plaintiff requests that the court 

appoint counsel. District courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners 

in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In 

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

exceptional circumstances, the court may request an attorney to voluntarily represent such a 

plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); 

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). When determining whether 

“exceptional circumstances” exist, the court must consider plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the 

merits as well as the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity 

of the legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court 

did not abuse discretion in declining to appoint counsel). The burden of demonstrating 

exceptional circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id. Circumstances common to most prisoners, such 

as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional 

circumstances that warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. 

Having considered the factors under Palmer, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to 

meet his burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of 

counsel at this time.

6. Motion to Amend

In the alternative to appointment of counsel, plaintiff asks the court to consider granting 

him leave to amend the complaint to add Mr. Holston as a co-plaintiff. (ECF No. 37 at 4.) 

Defendants oppose his request. 

Plaintiff’s motion was not accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. As a prisoner, 

plaintiff’s pleadings are subject to evaluation by this court pursuant to the in forma pauperis 

statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Because plaintiff did not submit a proposed amended complaint, 

the court is unable to evaluate it. In addition, prisoners are required to exhaust their 

administrative remedies before filing a complaint in federal court. As amended by the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Title 42, United States Code, § 1997e(a), provides that “[n]o 

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other 

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiff concedes 

that Mr. Holston is still in the process of exhausting his administrative remedies. Section 

1997e(a) “requires exhaustion before the filing of a complaint and . . . a prisoner does not comply 

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

with this requirement by exhausting available remedies during the course of the litigation.” 

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). Because Mr. Holston did not exhaust 

his claim prior to the filing of the instant action, his claim cannot be added to plaintiff’s 

complaint. Therefore, plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for legal copies (ECF No. 28) is denied;

2. Plaintiff’s motions to compel discovery (ECF Nos. 32, 34) are denied without 

prejudice;

3. Defendants’ motion for protective order (ECF No. 35) is denied without prejudice;

within fourteen days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall notify counsel whether, in light of 

his release from jail, plaintiff intends to continue working with Mr. Holston;

4. Plaintiff’s motion to modify the scheduling order (ECF No. 31) is granted;

5. Plaintiff is granted an extension of time in which to file a motion to compel discovery; 

any such motion shall be filed on or before May 15, 2016; no new discovery requests may be 

propounded by any party;

6. The scheduling order is revised as follows: the discovery deadline is continued to June 

21, 2016, and all pretrial motions shall be filed on or before September 21, 2016;

7. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 37 at 4) is denied without 

prejudice; and

8. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 37 at 4) is denied without prejudice.

Dated: April 28, 2016

/cw/gree1040.dsc

Case 2:15-cv-01040-KJN Document 41 Filed 04/29/16 Page 9 of 9