Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01735/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01735-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Defendants Kuhn, Griffith, and Friend filed their motion to dismiss on November, 20,

2006. Defendants Hollingsworth and Peddicord joined in that motion on December 14, and 26,

2006, respectively.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD C. BACHMAN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-1735 LKK EFB P

vs.

J. KUHN, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants1

 filed an unenumerated Fed. R. Civ. P. motion

to dismiss on November 20, 2006, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing

suit. 

I. Standards Applicable to This Motion

Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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2

 Wyatt is clear that regardless of nomenclature, a motion attacking failure to exhaust is

not a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. It is a motion in which defendant must raise

and prove by evidence the absence of exhaustion. Id. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit in Wyatt

provides further guidance. It recognizes that when the district court looks beyond the pleadings

to a factual record in deciding the exhaustion motion it necessarily does so under “a procedure

closely analogous to summary judgment.” Id., n.14

3

 On September 7, 2006, the court expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). Pursuant to Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1120, n.4, that order also expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a failure

to exhaust motion that is supported by affidavits or declarations and exhibits.

2

While the Ninth Circuit has stated that Rule 12(b) is the proper mechanism for resolving

questions arising under 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(a), Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003),

the reason underlying that decision has been undermined. The Ninth Circuit found that failure to

exhaust was a matter in abatement which should be raised in a motion made under

“unenumerated Rule 12(b).”2 Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. However, the United States Supreme

Court recently clarified that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense which defendant has the

burden of pleading and proving. Jones v. Bock, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007). Federal

courts appropriately consider affirmative defenses on summary judgment. Here, defendant’s

motion necessarily requires the court to consider the affidavits and exhibits presented for the

purpose of proving the absence of exhaustion. Accordingly, the court finds that a motion for

summary judgment is the proper mechanism for resolving the question of whether plaintiff

satisfied the exhaustion requirement. 

II. Rule 56 Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).3

 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the utility of Rule 56 to

screen which cases actually require resolution of disputed facts over material issues (through

presentation of testimony and evidence at trial) has been clarified and enhanced.

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3

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

III. Failure to Exhaust

The applicable statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which provides in relevant part:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted. 

This requirement is mandatory and unequivocal. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001);

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute

making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statue makes

exhaustion a precondition to suit.” (citation omitted)). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed in

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26 4

 The facts are taken from defendants’ November 20, 2006, motion to dismiss. 

4

forma pauperis in an action challenging the conditions of his confinement brings an action for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e when he submits his complaint to the court. Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a prisoner must exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing any papers in federal court and is not entitled to a stay of

judicial proceedings in order to exhaust. Id. at 1051; McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th

Cir. 2002). Defendant has the burden of proving that plaintiff did not exhaust. Brown v. Valoff,

422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

California prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(a). The regulations require the use of specific forms but contain no guidelines for

grievance content. Id., at §§ 3084.2, 3085. Prisoners ordinarily must present their allegations on

one informal and three formal levels of review, although the informal and the first formal levels

may be bypassed. Id., at § 3084.5. A division head reviews appeals on the first formal level, see

Id., at § 3084.5(b)(3) (authorizing bypass of the first formal level when the division head cannot

resolve it), and the warden or a designee thereof reviews appeals on the second formal level. See

Id., at § 3084.5(e)(1). Generally, completion of the third level, the Director’s Level of Review,

exhausts the remedy. Id., at § 3084.1(a).

IV. Facts4

At all times relevant to the complaint, plaintiff was a lawfully incarcerated inmate at

High Desert State Prison in Susanville, California. In his fourth amended complaint, filed on

May 18, 2004, plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when defendant

Kuhn, a correctional officer, applied excessive force in restraining him and defendant

correctional officers Griffith, Friend, and Hollingsworth assisted in handcuffing and escorting

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5

 Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint originally contained two causes of action.

Following dismissal and a decision on appeal, only the Eighth Amendment claim survived.

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him to a holding cage.5

V. Analysis

As stated above, defendants contend that plaintiff cannot proceed with this action against

them because plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies. Defendants

present evidence that plaintiff’ Director’s Level appeal was screened out as untimely as plaintiff

did not timely request a Director’s Level decision. Defs.’ Mot. to Dism., Decl. of N. Grannis at 

¶ 4 & Ex. A. Although plaintiff has argued that he properly exhausted, he submits no evidence

upon which it could reasonably be found that he has satisfied the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a) that he pursue the available appeal to the Director’s level prior to commencing this

action. Therefore, all other facts are rendered immaterial and defendants are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.

Plaintiff’s response in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss includes a request for

discovery. Additionally, plaintiff filed a document styled as a motion for a protective order,

which the court construes as a motion to compel the discovery of plaintiff’s trust-account

statements and trust withdrawal slips. The court denies these motions as they will become moot

upon the adoption of these findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s December 15, 2006, request for discovery is denied as moot; and

2. Plaintiff’s January 8, 2007, motion is denied as moot.

Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s November 20, 2006, motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies be granted; and

2. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 23, 2007.

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