Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02961/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02961-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2961

___________________________

Hershel Lee Robinson

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Mine Safety Appliances Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

American Optical Corporation; 3M Company; Pangborn Corporation; Clark Sand

Company, Inc.; Dependable Abrasives, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants

Precision Packaging, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

Morie Company; Pine Bluff Sand and Gravel Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants

E.D. Bullard Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

Empire Abrasive Equipment Corporation; Empire Abrasive Equipment Company LP

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants

Appellate Case: 14-2961 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301873 
Clemco Industries, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

Schmidt Manufacturing, Inc.; Bob Schmidt, Inc.; Pauli & Griffin Company; Kelco

Sales & Engineering Company; Mississippi Valley Silica Co. Inc.; Standard Sand

& Silica Company; Unimin Corporation; Vulcan Materials Company; Jane & John

Does, 1-500; Doe Corporation, John & Jane 1-491

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

____________

 Submitted: April 17, 2015

 Filed: August 3, 2015

____________

Before WOLLMAN and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges, and GRITZNER, District 1

Judge.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Hershel Robinson, a former sandblaster, claimed various defendants were

responsible for damage to his lungs. The district court concluded that Robinson’s 2

suit was time-barred under Arkansas’s three-year statute of limitations for

product-liability suits. We affirm. 

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

1

Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

The Honorable D.P. Marshall, Jr., United States DistrictJudge for the Eastern 2

District of Arkansas.

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Appellate Case: 14-2961 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301873 
Robinson worked as a sandblaster for decades, spraying surfaces with sand to

scour thembefore painting. This sand sometimes breaks down into silica dust, which,

if inhaled, can cause the incurable lung disease silicosis. Robinson does not claim

that he was otherwise exposed to silica dust, which is the only cause of silicosis.

By 1997, Robinson knew thatsandblasting could cause silicosis. The next year

he saw his primary doctor, Vanessa Ragland, after coughing up white mucus. In

2002, he went to the doctor again, this time for bronchitis. 

By the middle of 2007, three doctors suspected, believed, or had information

reflecting that Robinson had silicosis. In February of that year, Robinson went to an

emergency room for chest pain. The radiology report from that visit lists three

possible explanations: tuberculosis, sarcoidosis (another disease that usually affects

the lungs), or one of the pneumonoconioses—diseases such as silicosis that are

caused by inhaling certain dusts. The next day, Robinson saw Dr. Ragland, and she

referred him to a respiratory specialist, Dr. Albert Lynn Ridgeway. Dr. Ridgeway

“encouraged [Robinson] to wear his . . . mask,” and his medical notes reflect an

“impression” of “silicosis related to sandblasting.” Robinson saw Dr. Ridgeway

again that summer. The notes from the summer visit explain that “Mr. Robinson

returns today to follow up his silicosis.” And these notes too list an “impression” of

silicosis. Dr. Ridgeway sent a copy of his notes from the first visit back to Dr.

Ragland. 

In 2011, Dr. Ridgeway biopsied some of Robinson’s lung. According to

Robinson, this was when Dr. Ridgeway first told him he had silicosis. 

Finally, in 2012, Robinson sued more than a thousand entitiesthat either “sold,

designed, manufactured, or marketed . . . silica related products,” alleging that they

were responsible for his silicosis. The district court eventually ruled the suit untimely

and granted summary judgment to the defendants. 

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Appellate Case: 14-2961 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301873 
We review grants of summary judgment de novo, viewing facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Torgerson v. City of Rochester,

643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Summary judgment is proper “if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no genuine issue for trial.” Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Ricci v.

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009)).

Arkansas law governs this diversity suit. See G & K Servs. Co., Inc. v. Bill’s

Super Foods, Inc., 766 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2014). “We therefore apply decisions

of the Arkansas Supreme Court construing Arkansas law, and we attempt to predict

how that court would decide any state law questions that it has not yet resolved.” Id.

More specifically, Robinson agrees that Arkansas’s three-year limitations period for

product-liability actions applies to this suit. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-103. This

limitations period is subject to a discovery rule: the period “does not commence

running until the plaintiff knew or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should

have discovered the causal connection between the product and the injuriessuffered.” 

Martin v. Arthur, 3 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Ark. 1999); see Uhiren v. Bristol–Myers Squibb

Co., Inc., 346 F.3d 824, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he full extent of the harm is not

required; indeed, the manifestation of the nature of the harm . . . may be slight.” 

Martin, 3 S.W.3d at 690. In short, then, this appeal turns on when Robinson knew

or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that various silicarelated products had damaged his lungs. If he knew or should have known in 2011,

his 2012 suit was timely. If he knew or should have known in 2007, his suit was

barred by the statute of limitations.

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On appeal, Robinson focuses primarily on whether Dr. Ridgeway told him

about his silicosis in 2007 or, as he claims, in 2011. For variousreasons, the question

of when Robinson had actual knowledge of his silicosis is confusing. 

3

Rather than confront that confusion, we simply accept as true that Dr.

Ridgeway did not tell Robinson about his silicosis until 2011. We ask instead

whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to when Robinson, by the exercise of

reasonable diligence, should have discovered that varioussilica-related products had

damaged his lungs. We do not focus on a diagnosis because Arkansas law considers

the connection between the product and merely the “nature of the harm.” Martin,

3 S.W.3d at 687;see Uhiren, 346 F.3d at 828 (explaining that plaintiff “need not have

been fully aware of all the physical consequences of her [drug] dependency” to

trigger the limitations period of § 16-116-103); Mulligan v. Lederle Labs., Div. of Am.

Cyanamid Co., 786 F.2d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Adkison v. G.D. Searle &

Co., 971 F.2d 132, 136 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[A] doctor’s diagnosis of a causal

connection is not necessary for the limitations period to start running.”). 

The issue of Robinson’s actual knowledge is so confused because of the

3

actions of Robinson’s two lead attorneys in the district court. One attorney received

Dr. Ridgeway’s 2007 records months before Robinson filed suit. The attorneys

concede that they improperly failed to disclose these records, which are crucial to the

issue of Robinson’s actual knowledge. Moreover, despite the first attorney’s

possession of the 2007 records, he did not correct Robinson’s misstatement in a

deposition that he first saw Dr. Ridgeway in 2011—a misstatement the defendants

effectively could not question because the attorney had not disclosed the 2007

records. And the other attorney signed an interrogatory answer providing visitation

dates ranging back to 1990 for eight of Robinson’s medical providers, yet listing

“cannot recall exact dates” for Dr. Ridgeway—again despite the other attorney’s

possession of the 2007 records. The district court denied without prejudice a motion

for sanctions as moot in light of the grant ofsummary judgment. It did, however, call

the nondisclosure “troubling.” We agree.

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Appellate Case: 14-2961 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301873 
What, then, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should Robinson have

known in 2007? In 2007, Robinson had sandblasted for decades, knew sandblasting

could cause silicosis, was not otherwise exposed to silica dust, had some history of

respiratory problems, and went to an emergency room for chest pain. A radiologist

noted that Robinson might have a disease caused by dust inhalation. Then, at the

suggestion of Dr. Ragland, Robinson visited a respiratory specialist, Dr. Ridgeway,

who formed an impression of silicosis and told Robinson to wear a mask while

sandblasting. That summer, Robinson visited Dr. Ridgeway again to, in Dr.

Ridgeway’s words, “follow up his silicosis.” And Dr. Ragland received notes

reflecting Dr. Ridgeway’s impression. Even if, for some reason, Dr. Ridgeway had

not yet told Robinson about his silicosis, Robinson, by the exercise of reasonable

diligence, should have known that certain silica-related products had damaged his

lungs. All he had to do was ask either Dr. Ridgeway or Dr. Ragland whether

sandblasting had hurt his lungs, and either could have told him that he appeared to

have silicosis. Given Robinson’s history and his knowledge of silicosis, reasonable

diligence required this question. There is no genuine dispute that in 2007 Robinson

reasonably should have known of his lung damage and its connection to silica-related

products.

Our holding is particularly similar to that in Stewart v. Philip Morris, Inc.,

205 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), in which we found actual knowledge as

a matter of law even before a diagnosis. Linda Stewart, a smoker for forty years, had

heard warnings about cigarettes and had come to believe that they could cause

emphysema. Id. at 1055. She had developed a “smoker’s cough” in the late 1980s

and other symptoms in August 1994: trouble breathing, chronic fatigue, lost appetite,

constant coughing, and coughing up blood. Id. But she was not diagnosed with lung

cancer until October 1994. Id. After she sued Philip Morris, we concluded that

summary judgment was appropriate under the same Arkansas statute of limitations. 

Id. The limitations period, we held, began not when Stewart was diagnosed in

October 1994, but in August, when she knew the risks of smoking and when her

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Appellate Case: 14-2961 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/03/2015 Entry ID: 4301873 
symptoms arose. Id. at 1056. Similarly, in 2007, Robinson undisputedly had actual

knowledge of the risk of lung injury from sandblasting. And, as just discussed,

Robinson should have had at least as much knowledge of his condition as Stewart had

of hers. Stewart, not yet diagnosed in August 1994, triggered the limitations period

merely with knowledge of her symptoms. Robinson also had symptoms of lung

damage, and he should have had knowledge of his underlying condition from two or

perhaps even three doctors. 

There is no genuine dispute that, by the exercise of reasonable diligence,

Robinson should have known in 2007 that silica-related products had damaged his

lungs. Because he did not sue until 2012, his suit is barred by the three-year statute

of limitations. We affirm the grant of summary judgment.

______________________________

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