Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-30422/USCOURTS-ca5-09-30422-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

---

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30422

BRIDGESTONE FIRESTONE NORTH AMERICAN TIRE, L.L.C.;

FIRESTONE POLYMERS, L.L.C.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO; INSURANCE COMPANY OF

NORTH AMERICA; PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

2:08-CV-151

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

In this case we consider whether injuries related to hearing loss caused by

long term exposure to noise in plaintiff’s plant resulted from an “accident” as

defined in the defendants’ respective policies. For the following reasons, we now

agree with the district court that the hearing loss of the plaintiff’s employees did

not result from an accident and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 17, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

I.

In February of 1998, a number of former employees of Bridgestone

Firestone (“Firestone”) filed a tort suit (hereinafter the Blackwell suit) against

Firestone for damages related to hearing loss which allegedly arose from

exposure to loud noise in the plant where they worked throughout the course of

their employment. In their complaint, the Blackwell plaintiffs did not point to

one specific event which caused their injuries, only stating that their lawsuit was

filed within one year of discovering that they had experienced hearing loss.

Firestone settled the Blackwell plaintiffs’ claims then filed suit against

three of its Worker’s Compensation (“WC”) / Employer Liability (“EL”) insurers,

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”), Pacific Employer

Insurance Company (“Pacific”), and Insurance Company of North American

(“INA”) (collectively “Defendants”), claiming its insurers failed to honor their

defense and indemnity obligations under their respective policies. Firestone

sought a judgment declaring that the defendants owed coverage for the damages

arising from the tort action brought by the Blackwell plaintiffs. Defendants

countered that they properly denied coverage for the Blackwell claims because

hearing loss was not an “accident” under their policies but a “disease” and that

their Employer Liability policies clearly excluded coverage for “bodily injury by

disease” claims not brought within thirty-six months of the end of the policy

period. Liberty Mutual’s policy with Firestone terminated in 1976, while Pacific

and INA’s policy terminated in 1982. The plaintiffs who asserted claims for

which Firestone sought coverage against the defendant insurers were employed

from various times between 1944 and 2005.

Firestone moved for partial summary judgment against INA and Pacific.

Firestone argued that there were no material issues of fact with regard to

coverage under the policies. Firestone further asserted that the question of

2

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

whether the Blackwell plaintiffs’ claims constituted claims for “bodily injury by

accident” or “bodily injury by disease” was a legal issue to be determined based

on the policies themselves and the claims asserted in the Blackwell petition. The

district court denied Firestone’s motion, holding that under this court’s decision

in Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Employer’s Ins. of Wasau, 420 F.3d 378 (5th Cir.

2005), the Blackwell plaintiffs’ hearing loss was a “bodily injury by disease” and

therefore defendants’ policies provided no coverage. Following this ruling,

defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Firestone’s

claims. This time Firestone offered a different theory of coverage than it had on

partial summary judgment, now arguing that extrinsic evidence was required

to interpret the policies; accordingly, Firestone sought to introduce affidavits by

medical experts on the effects of hearing loss. Restating the reasons given in

denying Firestone’s motion for partial summary judgment, the court granted

summary judgment to the defendants. Firestone timely appealed.

II.

A.

The district court’s ruling on summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Am.

Int’l. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Canal Indem. Co., 352 F.3d 254, 259–60 (5th Cir.

2003). A district court’s interpretation of an insurance policy is also reviewed

de novo. Id. at 260. Summary judgment is properly granted only when, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the record

indicates that there is no genuine issues as to any material fact, and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

B.

On appeal, Firestone argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted

the insurance policy when it found that the Blackwell plaintiffs’ hearing loss was

not an “accident” under defendants’ respective policies.

3

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

Under Louisiana law, general principles of contract interpretation apply

to the interpretation of insurance policies and an insurance policy is the law

between the parties. Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So.2d 1134,

1137 (La. 2002). When the words of a contract are clear, explicit, and lead to no

absurd consequences, the court need not look beyond the contract language to

determine the true intent of the parties. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046. Each

provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so

that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. LA CIV.

CODE art. 2050. In addition, words susceptible of different meanings must be

interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the object of the

contract. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2048.

The three insurance policies at issue in this case are essentially identical.

The policies provide coverage under two classifications: Coverage A–Worker’s

Compensation, provides coverage for compensation or other benefits under

worker’s compensation law required to be paid by the employer and Coverage

B–Employer’s Liability, provides coverage for damages the employer shall

become legally obligated to pay “because of bodily injury by accident or disease

to an employee of the insured arising out of and in the course and scope of the

employment of the insured, subject to exclusions in the policies.” In a tort action

for employee injury under Coverage B, the policies provide coverage to the

employer for injury to its employees arising

(1) by accident occurring during the policy period, or (2) by disease

caused or aggravated by exposure of which the last day of the last

exposure, in the employment of the insured, to conditions causing

the disease occurs during the policy period.

Bodily injury by accident and bodily injury by disease are defined in the policies:

4

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

V. DEFINITIONS (c) Bodily Injury By Accident; Bodily

Injury By Disease. The contraction of disease is not an

accident within the meaning of the word “accident” in the

term “bodily injury by accident” and only such disease as

results directly from a bodily injury by accident is included

within the term “bodily injury by accident.” The term “bodily

injury by disease” includes only such disease as is not

included within the term “bodily injury by accident.”

Finally, the policies specifically exclude any bodily injury by disease claim not

made within thirty-six months of the policy’s expiration,

This policy does not apply . . . . Under Coverage B, to bodily injury

by disease unless prior to thirty-six months after the end of the

policy period written claim is made or suit is brought against the

Insured for damages because of such injury or death resulting

therefrom.

Since the Blackwell suit was brought more than thirty-six months after

defendants’ policies terminated, the exclusion of coverage for a “bodily injury

from disease” is triggered. Therefore, coverage under defendants’ policies is

only available to Firestone if the Blackwell plaintiffs’ alleged hearing loss can be

characterized as a “bodily injury by accident.” In finding that the injury at issue

in the Blackwell suit was not an “accident” but a “disease,” the district court

relied on our decision in Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wasau, 420

F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2005).

In Riverwood, employer Riverwood purchased a series of excess Workers’

Compensation and Employers’ Liability policies from Wasau Insurance

Company. The policies provided coverage from 1974 to 1984. In early 2000, a

group of employees sued Riverwood, seeking damages for asbestosis and other

asbestos-related diseases, allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos while

working at Riverwood’s paperboard manufacturing facility. Riverwood sent

5

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

notice letters to its multiple insurers, advising them of the claims. Wasau

denied coverage based on an exclusion in the policy which provided that “bodily

injury by disease” claims were excluded from coverage if not brought within

thirty-six months after the end of the policy period.

Riverwood argued that the policy was ambiguous because it did not define

the word “accident.” Addressing this argument, the Riverwood court maintained

that since the policy’s purpose was to provide workers’ compensation and

employers’ liability insurance, it should apply the definition of “accident” from

Louisiana’s workers’ compensation statute to the policy. Under the statute,

“accident” is defined as “an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable,

precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault,

and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more

than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.” See LA. REV.

STAT. § 23:1021(1). This definition, the court found, suggested

[T]hat an asbestos-related disease cannot be considered an

“accident” since exposure to asbestos is normally not violent and

does not, at the time of exposure, produce objective findings of an

injury. Rather, an asbestos-related disease has a long latency

period and normally manifests itself after continued exposure.

Riverwood, 420 F.3d at 383.

1

Riverwood also argued that the contract was ambiguous since the policy stated that 1

“bodily injury by disease” could constitute a “bodily injury by accident,” if it results from a

“bodily injury by accident.” The court rejected this claim:

According to the Policies, coverage for a "bodily injury by disease" claim is triggered if

the last exposure occurred during the policy period and the claim is asserted within

thirty-six months of the policy's expiration. Since an exposure is required to trigger

coverage for a "bodily injury by disease" claim, a disease caused by an exposure should

be considered a "bodily injury by disease." If an exposure equates to an accident, then

a claim resulting from an exposure could be considered a "bodily injury by accident"

claim. To interpret the Policies in this way would render the provision providing for

"bodily injury by disease" claims (and the provision providing that disease claims are

triggered by an exposure during the policy period) superfluous. Indeed, the Louisiana

6

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

In the case before us, both the language of the insurance policies and the

nature of the underlying claims against the insured are indistinguishable from

those in Riverwood. Guided by Riverwood, we apply the definition of “accident”

from the Louisiana worker’s compensation statute to the Blackwell plaintiffs’

petition. In their petition, the Blackwell plaintiffs alleged that their hearing loss

resulted from exposure to the loud noises associated with their employment:

Plaintiff was employed by Bridgestone/Firestone . . . in Calcasieu

Parish, Louisiana during the years 1946-1983. In the course of

plaintiff’s work at Firestone, he was occupationally exposed to

unreasonably loud noise. As a result of plaintiff’s work at Firestone

and his unreasonable exposure to the noise, plaintiff has suffered

hearing loss.

Blackwell Petition for Damages, ¶¶ 2–4. On appeal, Firestone argues that under

the definition of “accident” applicable at the time the workers were exposed to

the loud noise–but long before their injuries were manifest–the Blackwell

plaintiffs’ hearing loss as alleged in the 1997 petition would have been deemed

an “accident.” When Firestone entered into the insurance contracts with

defendants, the worker’s compensation statute defined “accident” as “an

unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently with or without

human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.” LA.

REV. STAT. § 23.1021(1) (1975).

2

First Circuit Court of Appeal has recognized that "to find that disease that results from

accidental contact with a foreign body, such as an asbestosis fiber, is bodily injury by

accident would be to subsume the definition of bodily injury by accident."

Id. at 384 (emphasis in original) (interior citation omitted). Firestone makes this same

argument on appeal, and for the same reasons we expressed in Riverwood, we find Firestone’s

argument unavailing. 

In 1989, the Louisiana legislature revised the definition of “accident” under the 2

worker’s compensation statute to “an unexpected or unforeseenactual,identifiable, precipitous

7

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

Prior to the 1989 revision of LA. REV. STAT. § 23.1021, Louisiana courts

gave varied interpretations to the meaning of “accident” as it applied to worker

injuries. One line of cases makes it clear that where an injury such as a heart

attack or stroke occurs and the manifestation of that injury is sudden or violent,

then that sudden manifestation–even if it was the culmination of a slowly

developing malady–would be an “accident” under the worker’s compensation

statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270

So.2d 867 (La. 1972) is an example of this interpretation. In Ferguson, an

employee received a pay check that was lower than he expected, after which he

became angry and went to argue about the amount to his employer. While

arguing with his employer, the employee felt a flash of pain followed by

paralysis. Although an argument with his employer was not in and of itself “a

violent or sudden event,” the Ferguson court found that the employee had

suffered an injury from an accident, stating, “Although he received no blow or

trauma . . . . the injury was accidental because it was unexpected and

unforeseen. It happened suddenly and violently. It produced at the time

objective symptoms of an injury.” Id. at 869.

3

event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing

at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration

or progressive degeneration.” LA. REV. STAT. § 23.1021(1) (1989). Although the policies at

issue in Riverwood were perfected (and terminated) before the definition was changed, the

Riverwood court cited to the revised definition of “accident”in holding thatthe asbestos claims

were not accidents. Riverwood, 420 F.3d at 383. Nevertheless, the court’s application of the

revised definition to plaintiffs’ asbestosis claims makes clear that those injuries would have

been “accidents” under the pre-revision definition as well: “This definition [of accident]

suggests that an asbestos-related disease cannot be considered an “accident” since exposure

to asbestosis normally is not violent and does not, at the time of exposure, produce objective

findings of an injury. Rather, an asbestos-related disease has a long latency period and

normally manifests itself after continued exposure.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in this

case, we find that the hearing loss as alleged in the Blackwell petition would not have been

an “accident” under either definition.

 The required “injury by accident” has thus been found to have occurred in instances 3

of heart attack, see, e.g., Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982);

8

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

A second line of cases suggests that when an employee is exposed to work

conditions which either aggravate a pre-existing condition or cause a

symptomatic degeneration in the employee’s health, and a distinct event occurs

where the symptoms become disabling, then this may also be characterized as

an “accident.” In Parks v. Insurance Company of North America, 340 So.2d 276

(La 1976), the employee was a seamstress who was bothered by conditions of the

factory where she worked. After working for four months, plaintiff started to

experience a sore throat, running nose, and nagging cough. Shortly after these

symptoms presented, plaintiff lost weight and contracted a fever. Days later,

she was hospitalized with chronic bronchitis and sought worker’s compensation

benefits from her employer. The court found that although the seamstress could

not point to one event which had precipitated those acute symptoms requiring

hospitalization, she had in fact suffered an “accident.” Relying on Ferguson v.

HDE, the court stated,

We have held that extraordinary physical stress and strain is not

essential to the definition of disabling accident: when the

performance of the usual and customary duties of a workman cause

or contribute to a physical breakdown, the statutory requirements

for an accidental injury are present. . . . We are satisfied therefore,

that the acute illness suffered by plaintiff in the instant case

constitutes an “accident” as that term is defined in the

compensation act and interpreted in our jurisprudence.

Id. at 281 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). To find an accident under these

terms, the vast majority of the Louisiana appellate courts at least require some

cerebral hemorrhage, see, e.g., Griffin v. Employers’ Liability Ins. Co., 186 So.2d 349 (La. App.

4th Cir. 1966); hernia, see, e.g., Hill v. J.B. Beaird Corp., 19 So.2d 295 (La. App. 2nd Cir.

1944); abscessed lung, see, e.g., Stiles v. International Paper Co., 39 So.2d 635 (La. App. 2nd

Cir. 1949); spontaneous pneumothorax, see, e.g., Dortch v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 30

So.2d 792 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1947); ruptured intervertebral disc, see, e.g., Williams v. Harris,

77 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955). See also H. Alston Johnson, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW

TREATISE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 215,

9

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

identifiable event or incident within the policy term where the employee can

demonstrate a palpable injury. We read Riverwood as consistent with this

interpretation of the law.

4

 See also, Chism v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., 332 So.2d 784 (La. 1976) 4

(plaintiff received a series of occupational injuries for which he sought medical care; after

returning to work and performing same strenuous duties, the pain became so severe that he

was hospitalized with a herniated disc; characterized as “accident:”) Lum v. Employer's Mut.

Lia. Ins. Co. of Wis., 216 So.2d 889 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1968) (plaintiff's job required him to

stuff giblets into frozen chickens; plaintiff suffered from pre-existing arthritis; court found he

suffered "accident" because on one occasion while stuffing chicken plaintiff felt a sudden

"popping" of wrist); Romero v. Otis International, 343 So.2d 405, 409 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1977)

(hearing loss when working with air hammer was an “accident” because, “a part of [plaintiff’s]

body, his inner ear, suddenly gave way while he was discharging his usual and customary

duties”); Hall v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 So.2d 948 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1980) ("accident"

when plaintiff with pre-existing automobile injury worked in lumber mill and experienced a

"sudden popping in his shoulder in the course of working with the plywood"); Harper v. Kast

Metals Corp., 397 So.2d 529 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1981) (plaintiff with pre-existing arthritis

whose employment left him with sore wrists testified that on a specific date, he twisted one

of his wrists; found to be an “accident”); Melder v. Century Telephone Enterprises, Inc., 413

So.2d 1325, 1328 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1982) (worker with pre-existing back condition was

aggravated by the demands of the job such that worker’s ultimate injury–a herniated disc–was

deemed an “accident”). In one instance, a Louisiana court suggested that the definition of

“accident” did not require a final conclusory event; however,this interpretationwas dependant

on a worker injury caused by the aggravation of a pre-existing condition. McCoy v. Kroger Co.,

431 So.2d 824, 827 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1983) (“In our view the currentjurisprudential definition

is such that an “accident” has occurred within the meaning of the compensation act when the

conditions of employment provide continual strain or trauma, as here, or exposure, as in

Parks, and these events cumulatively combine to aggravate a pre-existing condition so as to

disable the employee.”)

In its Reply Brief, Firestone cites two cases Quine v. Ideal Cement Co., 351 So. 2d 1303

(La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) and Chatelain v. American Can Co., 344 So.2d 1180 (La App. 4th Cir.

1977), which purportedly show that hearing loss was an injury by “accident” under the pre1989 statute; however, we are not persuaded that these cases are instructive in determining

whether the claims at issue in this case arise from “accidents.”

In Quine v. Ideal Cement Co., the court of appeals dismissed a worker’s claim for

compensation benefits. The employee in Quine had complained of hearing loss for four years

and sought medical treatment before his hearing loss prevented him from performing his

duties. Although setting forth the analysis related to the definition of “accident” under the

worker’s compensation statute, the first circuit focused on the plaintiff’s failure to show that

his hearing loss was caused by the conditions of his employment and not caused by Meniere’s

disease. 

In Chatelain v. American Can Co., plaintiff alleged that the loud noises associated with

his employment forced him to request a change in position with his employer, after which he

sought permanent disability. The district court found that the plaintiff did not allege an

accident. The court of appeals, stated that “we agree with appellant that extraordinary

10

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

The Blackwell plaintiffs do not allege any such event. According to the

petition, their hearing was affected by the prolonged exposure to loud noises

associated with their employment; no sudden manifestation of hearing loss is

alleged. Furthermore, the Blackwell petition filed in February of 1998 alleges

that plaintiffs discovered their injuries at the earliest in February of 1997.

Blackwell Petition for Damages, ¶ 12. We found no cases where Louisiana

courts characterized an injury as resulting from an “accident” within the policy

period when the only “event” occurring during a policy period was general

exposure and the “injury” was not discovered until many years after the policy

had terminated. In this case, over fourteen years elapsed from the time

defendants’ policies terminated and the Blackwell plaintiffs discovered their

injury. These facts belie any possibility that an “accident occurred during the

policy period.”

Because it is undisputed that the Blackwell claims were brought long after

the thirty-six month period expired for seeking recovery for “bodily injury by

disease,” defendants’ policies clearly and unambiguously excluded coverage to

Firestone for the injuries alleged in the Blackwell suit.

5

physical stress and strain is not essential to the definition of disabling accident. . . . the real

issue before us is whether the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof of causation of the

hearing loss.” Id. at 1182–83. Finding that the plaintiff failed to prove causation, the fourth

circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim. 

Along with the fact that the employees’ claims for compensation were dismissed by the

courts of appeal, both Quine and Chatelain concerned a hearing loss injury that created a

conclusive and final event: the inability of the worker to perform his duties. See Quine, 351

So.2d at 1304 (“On May 22, 1974, plainitff was unable to continue his work”); Chatelain, 344

So.2d at 1181 (requested a change of positions because of hearing loss on May 5, 1975). In this

case, the Blackwell petition–insofar as it concerns exposure during defendants’ policy periods–

makes clear that the employees’ alleged injuries did not lead to a sudden breakdown or force

the employees to cease working; instead, the injuries were not discovered until many years

after the defendants’ policies were terminated.

Firestone raises two additional issues on appeal: 1) that the district court erred in 5

failing to consider extrinsic evidence to interpretthe policies and 2) that the insurers breached

their duty to defend Firestone from the underlying Blackwell claims. Both of these claims,

11

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/17/2010
No. 09-30422

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED

however, are based on Firestone’s erroneous premise that defendants’ policies were

ambiguous. 

With respect to Firestone’s first claim, under Louisiana law, the meaning and intent

of parties to a written instrument are determined from the instrument’s four corners. Abshire

v. Vermillion Parish School Bd., 848 So. 2d 552, 555 (La. 2003). If the meaning of the

instrument is clear, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible either to explain or to contradict the

instrument’s terms. Id. For the reasons expressed above, the language in defendants’ policies

is clear and unambiguous; therefore, the district court did not err when it refused to consider

the extrinsic evidence proffered by Firestone.

With respect to defendants’ duty to defend, under Louisiana law, an insurer’s duty to

defend suits brought against its insured is determined by the allegations of the plaintiffs’

petition. If assuming the allegations of the petition to be true, there would be both coverage

under the policy and liability to the plaintiff, the insurer must defend the insured regardless

of the outcome of the suit. American Home Assur. Co. v. Czarniecki, 230 So.2d 253, 269 (La.

1970). In this case, the unambiguous policy language coupled with the allegations of the

Blackwell petition make clear that the defendants had no duty to defend Firestone.

12

 Case: 09-30422 Document: 00511144662 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/17/2010