Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04150/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04150-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

JOHN HEIFNER PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-4150

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, John Heifner, appealed the denial of her application for social security

disability benefits, by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (hereinafter

"Commissioner") (Doc. #1). On December 15, 2005, the undersigned remanded this matter to

the Commissioner for further consideration (Doc. #15 & 16). 

Plaintiff's attorney, Alan Nussbaum, filed a Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. #17 & 18)

under the EAJA (the Equal Access to Justice Act, hereinafter the "EAJA"), on February 13,

2006. The Commissioner filed a response on February 16, 2006 (Doc. #19). The Court finds

this matter is now ready for consideration. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that the Court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The Commissioner has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits

was substantially justified. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner fails to oppose the

award of a reasonable attorney's fee under the EAJA, the hourly rate for which compensation is

sought, or to object to the number of hours for which compensation is sought (Doc. #19). The

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Court construes the lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that the

government's decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified." 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing

Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the

benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the

contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and, the amount involved. Allen

v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

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487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe

firsthand counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v.

Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359,

361 (8th Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request,

even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d

456, 459 (8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties

requires an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award

accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at the rate of $125.00 per hour for

18.30 hours of attorney time, which he asserts was devoted to the representation of plaintiff in

this Court (Doc. #17 & 18). The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the

claimed fees are reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

Plaintiff’s counsel submits that he is entitled to an EAJA fee rate of $125.00 for 18.30

hours. The Commissioner submits that counsel’s request is reasonable (Doc. #19). We agree. 

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Further, we note the record is devoid of evidence of an alleged increased cost of living (Doc.

#1-19). Thus, upon consideration of the above factors, we find that an appropriate hourly rate

for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $125.00 per hour. 

We further note that the defendant has failed to object to the number of hours for which

counsel seeks a fee award. Nonetheless, we have carefully reviewed the time records submitted

in plaintiff’s counsel’s itemization (Doc. 17, pp. 4-5). 

Counsel seeks a total of 18.30 hours in attorney time. A thorough review of the

itemized billing data, and the Petition for Attorney’s Fees, reveals that the requested number of

hours is both fair and reasonable. Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation

for 18.30 hours at the rate of $125.00 per hour, for a total attorney's fee award of $2,287.50

under the EAJA.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into

account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to

prevent double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of May, 2006.

/s/Bobby E. Shepherd 

Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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