Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00197/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00197-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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1 All references to a “Rule” are to the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

 C.T., a minor, by and through 

 her parent, D.T., 

NO. CIV. S-06-197 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 VACAVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL 

 DISTRICT, LYNDA DONAHUE in 

 her official and individual 

 capacity, and the CALIFORNIA 

 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants Vacaville

Unified School District, Lynda Donahue, and the California

Department of Education’s motion to dismiss plaintiff C.T.’s

(“plaintiff”) first amended complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).1 Defendants

Vacaville Unified School District (“VUSD”) and Lynda Donahue

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2 On December 3, 2004, the IDEA was re-authorized by the

IDEIA, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement

Act of 2004. The court will herein refer to 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et

seq. as the IDEA. 

3 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

(“Donahue”) (collectively, “defendants”) move to dismiss

plaintiff’s FAC, specifically as to claims for relief I, II, III,

IV, V, and VI, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

(“jurisdiction”) and for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies available under section 1415 of the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).2 Further, defendants argue

that plaintiff’s sixth claim for relief should be dismissed

because defendant Donahue is immune from liability in both her

official and individual capacities. Similarly, defendant

California Department of Education (“CDE”) moves to dismiss

plaintiff’s seventh claim for relief, claiming the court lacks

jurisdiction because defendant CDE is protected by Eleventh

Amendment immunity. For the reasons set forth, defendants’

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FAC is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part.3 

BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background - IDEA

The IDEA (or “the Act”) requires state education agencies,

which receive federal funds for providing education to children

with special needs, to comply with the provisions of the Act in

administering a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to

all children with disabilities through individualized education

programs (“IEPs”). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2006). An IEP is a

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3

“written statement for each child with a disability that is

developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with . . . [20

U.S.C. § 1414(d)]” of the IDEA, and is designed to meet each

child’s unique needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14). 

Specifically, these federally-funded agencies must

“establish and maintain procedures in accordance with [§ 1415] 

. . . to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents

are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the

provision of a [FAPE] . . . by such agencies.” 20 U.S.C. §

1415(a). A child eligible for a FAPE and his or her parent(s)

are afforded two procedural avenues to guarantee relief for an

agency’s failure to provide a FAPE - an opportunity to present a

complaint to the state agency through a complaint procedure and,

subsequently, an opportunity to participate in a due process

hearing. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f). Where a complaint is

filed against a local educational agency but remains unresolved

“to the satisfaction of the parents within 30 days of the receipt

of the complaint, the due process hearing may occur . . . .” 20

U.S.C. § 1415(f)(B)(ii). However, parties to a complaint may

also enter a written settlement agreement, pursuant to a

mediation process, which is “enforceable in any State court of

competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United

States.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii).

In compliance with the IDEA, the California Education Code

includes procedural safeguards to guarantee that “all individuals

with exceptional needs are provided their rights to appropriate

programs and services which are designed to meet their unique

needs under the [IDEA] . . . .” Cal. Ed. Code § 56000 (2006). 

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4 Plaintiff states that the hearing officer from OAH,

later cited as the Office of Administrative Hearings, determined

that OAH lacked jurisdiction over whether defendant VUSD breached

the Agreement. (Pl.’s FAC at ¶ 47). Defendants VUSD and Donahue

refer to the office which issued the same determination as the

California Special Education Hearing Office (“SEHO”). (Dfs.’

Mot. at 10:18, 12:5-8). However, plaintiff notes that “SEHO was

the predecessor to OAH as the administrative body responsible for

hearing due process administrative proceedings.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at

14:n.6). As such, the court refers to the office as OAH. 

4

Parties may issue complaints pursuant to the Uniform Complaint

Procedure, and they may request a fair and impartial state-level

due process hearing from the California Department of Education’s

Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”)4 to address unresolved

complaints. Cal. Ed. Code §§ 56501(a), 56501(b)(4), 56505(a); 5

CCR § 4600 et seq. (2006); (Pl.’s Opp’n, filed July 3, 2006, at

14:n.6).

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a student in the Vacaville Unified School

District. (Pl.’s FAC, filed May 8, 2006, ¶¶ 7-16). In or about

January 1997, a physician diagnosed plaintiff with attention

deficit/hyperactivity disorder. (Id. at ¶ 8). After plaintiff

requested VUSD to perform a special education eligibility

assessment based upon her diagnosis, a school psychologist

conducted the assessment. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11). Plaintiff then

received her first IEP on or about February 4, 1998, based upon

the assessment’s results. (Id. at ¶ 11). The IEP declared

plaintiff “eligible for special education services under the

category of Specific Learning Disability” and, accordingly,

itemized the specific programs and services VUSD would provide to

plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 12). 

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5

From the fall of 1999 until on or about March 2000,

plaintiff received vision and central auditory processing

evaluations. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16). She also received an

occupational therapy evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 15). On or about

June 26, 2000, plaintiff enrolled at New Vistas Christian School

in Martinez, California, which implemented specialized teaching

methods. (Id. at ¶ 17). Subsequently, while plaintiff was still

enrolled at New Vistas Christian School, VUSD offered plaintiff a

FAPE, which consisted of placement in a special day classroom and

nine hours of private vision therapy. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18). 

Plaintiff returned to schooling in VUSD in April 2002. (Id.

at ¶ 26). However, she alleges that “VUSD consistently failed to

respond” to her inquiries regarding special education

assessments, special education services, and IEP meetings. (Id.) 

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a compliance complaint on or about

September 9, 2003, with the California Department of Education’s

Procedural Safeguards Referral Service, Special Education

Division. (Id. at ¶ 27). Plaintiff additionally requested a due

process hearing in or about April 2004, after failing to receive

a response to her complaint from the CDE on the ground that VUSD

failed to offer plaintiff a FAPE. (Id. at ¶ 30). That same

month, the CDE responded to plaintiff’s complaint. (Id. at ¶

29).

In response to plaintiff’s due process hearing request,

plaintiff and VUSD entered a Compromise and Release Agreement

(the “Agreement”) on or about May 19, 2004, specifying that both

parties agreed to:

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. . . resolve any and all disputes, causes of action,

and claims concerning Student’s education arising or

occurring up to the date of this Agreement and through

the 2004-05 regular school year including, but not

limited to, Student’s special education and related

services, reimbursement (including attorneys’ fees) and

compensatory education.

(Id. at ¶ 31). The Agreement included “provisions relating to 

. . . summer 2004 programming, 2004-2005 school year programs and

services, and a future IEP meeting.” (Id. at ¶ 32). Plaintiff

alleges that VUSD violated the Agreement during summer 2004, when

it failed to provide certain educational services to plaintiff. 

(Id. at ¶ 33). She then filed new compliance complaints with the

CDE, one of which was based upon VUSD’s alleged breach of the

Agreement. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-36). After responding to plaintiff’s

compliance complaint regarding the Agreement, the CDE issued a

compliance report acknowledging VUSD’s noncompliance with

sections of the Code of Federal Regulations and the California

Education Code. (Id. at ¶¶ 37, 40-41). Accordingly, the CDE

required VUSD to take the necessary corrective actions. (Id. at

¶ 41).

Additionally, on or about April 27, 2005, plaintiff filed a

compliance complaint with the CDE based upon VUSD’s violation of

the Agreement, in failing to convene an IEP meeting by May 1,

2005. (Id. at ¶ 42). On or about June 8, 2005, she also

requested a due process hearing to address VUSD’s alleged denial

of a FAPE to plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 44). One day later, the CDE

again found that VUSD had not complied with the Agreement by

failing to convene an IEP meeting by May 1, 2005. (Id. at ¶ 43). 

CDE then ordered VUSD to take corrective actions. (Id.)

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7

Subsequent to plaintiff’s June 8, 2005 request for a due

process hearing, plaintiff submitted three issues for

consideration at the hearing:

1. Did the district offer the student a FAPE for the

2005-2006 academic school year, including extended

school year (ESY) services?

2. Did the district provide the student with a FAPE

for the ESY in 2004, the regular school term for

2004-05, and/or the ESY 2005?

3. Did the district provide the student with a FAPE

for school years 2001-02 through 2003-04,

including the ESY for each year?

(Id. at ¶ 45). VUSD filed a motion to dismiss the second and

third issues. (Id. at ¶ 46). On or about November 1, 2005, the

administrative law judge (“the hearing judge”) dismissed the

second and third issues to the extent they related to VUSD’s

provision of a FAPE in years prior to, and including, the 2004-

2005 school year, since “the settlement agreement resolved all

issues ‘through the 2004-2005 regular school year.’” (Id. at ¶

47). Additionally, the hearing judge ruled that “OAH does not

have the jurisdiction to determine whether the district [VUSD]

breached the settlement agreement.” (Id.) In so holding, the

hearing judge acknowledged that plaintiff’s “remedies for alleged

breach lie elsewhere.” (Id.) Consequently, plaintiff dismissed

her due process hearing request in or about December 2005. (Id.)

STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to

raise, by motion, a defense that the court lacks “jurisdiction

over the subject matter” of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

As “the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” the

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8

party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden

of establishing its existence. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)(citations omitted); Stock

West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.

1989). 

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the

standards the court is to apply vary according to the nature of

the jurisdictional challenge. A motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction may attack the allegations in the complaint used to

establish jurisdiction as insufficient on their face (“facial

attack”), or a motion may, as a "speaking motion," attack the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact (“factual

attack”). Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594

F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). 

If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the court must

consider the factual allegations of the complaint to be true. 

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. In fact, the federal claim must be

“‘immaterial and made only for the purpose of obtaining federal

jurisdiction’” or “‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’” for the

court to dismiss the claim on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Steel Co.

v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)(internal

citations omitted). If the motion constitutes a factual attack,

however, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s

allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will

not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the

merits of jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733

(quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). 

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9

In fact, "[w]here a jurisdictional issue is separable from

the merits of a case," the court "may consider the evidence

presented with respect to the jurisdictional issue and rule on

that issue, resolving factual disputes if necessary." Thornhill,

594 F.2d at 733. Nevertheless, if the “jurisdictional issue and

substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of

jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues

going to the merits, the jurisdictional determination should

await a determination of the relevant facts on either a motion

going to the merits or at trial.” Augustine v. United States,

704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must

accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Cruz v. Beto,

405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). The court is bound to give the

plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn

from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

As such, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular

fact if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly

alleged. Id. As the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears

beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim which would entitle him or her to relief. 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957); NL Industries, Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986)(citation omitted).

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5 Defendants argue that plaintiff fails to establish the

court’s jurisdiction over all her claims for relief. However,

defendant only argues that plaintiff’s case does not arise from a

federal question for purposes of jurisdiction in regards to her

first claim for relief. 

10

Nevertheless, the court may not assume that the plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover, the

court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v.

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

A. Federal Question5

In her first claim for relief, plaintiff seeks a judicial

declaration of her and defendant VUSD’s rights and obligations

with respect to the Agreement. She also requests an appeal of

her claims, in accordance with her June 8, 2005 due process

hearing request. Defendants first argue that plaintiff brings

her claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act to establish

jurisdiction, an insufficient basis for such jurisdiction. They

further contend that plaintiff’s action is a “routine” breach of

contract case, such that it only may be heard properly in state

court. As defendants present a “facial attack” to the existence

of jurisdiction, dismissing plaintiff’s allegations as

insufficient to establish jurisdiction, the court must consider

the factual allegations of the complaint to be true. Mortensen,

549 F.2d at 891.

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6 A review of plaintiff’s FAC reveals that her first

claim for relief is brought pursuant to numerous federal

statutes. Specifically, plaintiff brings this claim in

accordance with the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(2)(A), 1415

(i)(3)(A), 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, Title II of the

Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and the

Agreement between plaintiff and defendant VUSD. As plaintiff

seeks a declaration of her rights related to the Agreement - made

pursuant to the IDEA - and since both parties address whether

jurisdiction is established under the IDEA, the court limits its

analysis to the IDEA as plaintiff’s basis for jurisdiction.

11

Jurisdiction exists where a federal question is involved or

where the requirements of diversity of citizenship are met. 26

C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 116 (2005). The Ninth Circuit has

held that “[a]ny non-frivolous assertion of a federal claim

suffices to establish federal question jurisdiction, even if that

claim is later dismissed on the merits.” Cement Masons Health &

Welfare Trust Fund v. Stone, 197 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir.

1999)(citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). While

defendants correctly point out that jurisdiction “does not exist

merely because a declaratory judgment is sought,” plaintiff does

not attempt to invoke jurisdiction solely under the Declaratory

Judgment Act. 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 116 (2005).

Plaintiff seeks to invoke jurisdiction over claim I under

sections 1415(i)(2)(A) and 1415(i)(3)(A) of the IDEA on the

ground that the Agreement for which she seeks a declaration of

her rights “arises under” federal law.6 She further asserts that

“settlement agreements written pursuant to the IDEA shall be

enforced in federal court,” citing § 1415(e)(2)(F). (Pl.’s

Opp’n, filed July 3, 2006, at 18:12-14). Because all reasonable

inferences must be drawn in favor of plaintiff on this motion, 

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12

the court infers that the Agreement between plaintiff and

defendant VUSD was made pursuant to § 1415(e)(2)(F). 

Defendants argue that the Agreement between plaintiff and

defendant VUSD is a contract that must properly be enforced in

state court. (Dfs.’ Mot., filed June 7, 2006, at 9:6-11). The

court finds defendants’ argument unpersuasive. Defendants rely

upon three Ninth Circuit opinions in which the court held that

the plaintiffs’ claims in those cases did not “arise under”

federal law sufficient to invoke jurisdiction. (Id. at 9:17-28). 

However, none of the cases involve the IDEA or agreements reached

pursuant to provisions of the IDEA. Therefore, defendants’

citations are not applicable to this case.

Plaintiff argues that the Agreement between herself and

defendant VUSD “sets forth the manner in which VUSD must provide

services in order to comply with the IDEA,” such that the

Agreement “clearly turns on the federal law” to establish the

court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s first claim for relief. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 12:1-4). More specifically, as previously noted,

the Agreement was allegedly made under § 1415(e)(2)(F), which

allows parties to execute a legally binding agreement stating the

resolution they have reached to resolve a complaint. Congress

provided an express right of action to enforce such an agreement

in federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii). In their

reply, defendants attempt to interpret the language of this

subsection as requiring mediation agreements under the IDEA to

explicitly specify that the mediation agreement can be enforced

in either state or federal court. (Dfs.’ Reply, filed on July

14, 2006, at 3:4-10). The court finds no merit to this argument. 

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 Section 1415(e)(2)(F) states that:

In the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the

complaint through the mediation process, the parties

shall execute a legally binding agreement that sets

forth such resolution and that

(i) states that all discussions that occurred during

the mediation process shall be confidential . . .;

(ii) is signed by both the parent and a representative

of the agency . . .; and 

(iii)is enforceable in any State court of competent

jurisdiction or in a district court of the United

States.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) (emphasis added). Congress did

not state that the agreement “shall set forth such resolution and

that it is enforceable” in federal court. Furthermore, in 

§ 1415(e)(2)(i), where Congress required the parties to include a

confidentiality clause in the agreement, it specified that the

agreement must “state” such a clause. The language of 

§ 1415(e)(2)(iii) is not similarly explicit. The plain language

of the statute reveals that Congress unequivocally intended 

§ 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) to confer jurisdiction upon federal courts

and an express right of action to parties over claims arising

from agreements made pursuant to § 1415(e)(2). Therefore,

plaintiff has established the court’s jurisdiction under 

§ 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii). 

Furthermore, plaintiff brings her first claim under 

§ 1415(i)(3)(A), which affords jurisdiction to the federal courts

over actions “brought under this section without regard to the

amount in controversy.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). As

plaintiff’s Agreement with defendant VUSD was executed under

section 1415 of the IDEA, Congress has expressly conferred 

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7 Plaintiff also contends, in her FAC, that the court

has jurisdiction over claim I under section 1415(i)(2)(A) of the

IDEA. Section 1415(i)(2)(A) provides that where a party is

aggrieved by the findings and decision of a state-level due

process hearing or local-level due process hearing, in which case

an appeal to the state level is unavailable, he or she may bring

suit in federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). While §

1415(i)(2)(A) also establishes an express right of action in

federal court, plaintiff’s first claim is based upon the alleged

breach of the Agreement, not a decision made at a due process

hearing. Nevertheless, plaintiff has already established the

court’s jurisdiction such that the court need not reach the

merits of this assertion. 

14

jurisdiction upon the court to hear plaintiff’s claims arising

from the Agreement.7 

Nevertheless, defendants contend that the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District

implicates the court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s

claims here. 223 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). In Wyner, the

plaintiff requested a due process hearing in accordance with the

IDEA and reached a settlement agreement with the defendant school

district during the course of the hearing. Wyner, 223 F.3d at

1027. The hearing officer issued an order requiring both parties

to comply with the settlement agreement. Id. The plaintiff

subsequently initiated another due process proceeding to address

the school district’s failure to comply with the settlement

agreement. Id. at 1028. At the second due process hearing, the

hearing officer determined that the order from the previous

hearing constituted a “final administrative determination of that

matter” such that a “subsequent due process hearing was not

available to address the School District’s alleged noncompliance

with the settlement agreement and SEHO order in a prior due

process hearing.” Id. at 1030. The Ninth Circuit agreed with

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8 Although unnecessary to a decision that plaintiff has

established jurisdiction over her first claim for relief, the

court finds that OAH held the Agreement in itself to constitute

“a final administrative determination” for purposes of the IDEA. 

In Wyner, a hearing officer actually issued an order requiring

both parties to comply with the settlement agreement. 

Accordingly, the decision constituted an unappealable “final

administrative determination.” Here, however, there is no

indication that after defendant VUSD and plaintiff initially

entered the Agreement, the hearing judge issued an actual order

requiring compliance. Nevertheless, the hearing officer

determined that OAH lacked jurisdiction to address defendant

VUSD’s alleged breach of the Agreement based upon the reasoning

of Wyner. As such, the hearing judge treated the Agreement as a

final due process hearing order for purposes of the IDEA. 

15

the hearing officer’s determination. Id. However, in Wyner, the

Ninth Circuit did not address the issue of whether the plaintiff

could appeal her claims related to the settlement agreement to

federal court where OAH lacked jurisdiction over those claims.

Because this is the issue currently before the court,8

defendants’ reliance on Wyner is misplaced. 

B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

1. Exhaustion

Defendants ask the court to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for

relief I, II, III, IV, V, and VI on the ground that plaintiff

failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the

IDEA. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the need for a party to

exhaust his or her administrative remedies under the IDEA,

because exhaustion

. . . allows for the exercise of discretion and

educational expertise by state and local agencies,

affords full exploration of technical educational

issues, furthers development of a complete factual

record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving

these agencies the first opportunity to correct

shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled

children.

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Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 

(9th Cir. 1992)(citation omitted). In the context of the IDEA, 

the exhaustion doctrine requires that, “before the filing of a

civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also

available under this part [20 U.S.C. § 1411 et seq.], the

procedures under subsections (f) [due process hearing] and (g)

[appeal] of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as

would be required had the action been brought under this part 

[20 U.S.C. § 1411 et seq.].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 

A party need only exhaust the due process hearing system

before filing suit for violations of the IDEA or other laws

seeking relief available under the IDEA. Porter v. Bd. of Trs.

of Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 307 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th

Cir. 2002). Under § 1415(f) parents “shall have an opportunity

for a due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State

educational agency or by the local educational agency . . . .” 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). If a local educational agency

conducts the hearing, and parents are “aggrieved by the findings

and decision rendered,” they may “appeal such findings and

decision to the State educational agency.” 20 U.S.C. §

1415(g)(1). However, pursuant to section 56505 of the California

Education Code, a state-level due process hearing “shall be the

final administrative determination and binding on all parties.” 

Cal. Ed. Code § 56505(h). 

In addition to her first claim for relief, plaintiff brings

claims for relief II, III, IV, V, and VI under section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the ADA, California

Education Code section 56000, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and 42 

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9 Plaintiff asserts that she is not required to exhaust

her administrative remedies when bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (Pl.’s FAC at ¶ 52). However, defendants are correct in

noting that plaintiff is “required to exhaust administrative

remedies before instituting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

predicated on a violation of the IDEA,” even if only seeking

money damages under that statute. Walden v. Moffett (E.D. Cal.

Apr. 12, 2006) 2006 WL 947738 at *3. 

17

U.S.C. § 1983, respectively.9 She maintains that, in accordance

with § 1415(l), she has not only exhausted the due process

hearing system pursuant to § 1415(f), but also the Uniform

Complaint Procedure of the California Education Code, which

satisfies § 1415(b)(6) by implementing a state-level complaint

procedure. However, defendants attempt to refute plaintiff’s

contention, arguing that a due process hearing was never held

such that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies under the IDEA. (Dfs.’ Mot. at 15:11,28, 16:1-5). 

Defendants contend that “the initiation of a state level

review which did not proceed to a due process hearing is not

literal exhaustion exhaustion [nor] . . . its equivalent.” Tyler

B. v. San Antonio Elem. Sch. Dist., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118

(N.D. Cal. 2003). In Tyler, the plaintiff suffered from a lifethreatening illness. Id. at 1113. After the plaintiff’s school

district implemented an IEP for him, his parents complained to

the school district’s officials about their dissatisfaction with

the IEP. Id. The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with

the CDE. Id. After the CDE issued a compliance report, the

defendants allegedly failed to comply, prompting the plaintiff’s

mother to request state intervention. Id. at 1116. While a due

process hearing was initially scheduled, the parties began

mediating their dispute. Id. In fact, the plaintiff’s mother

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received a letter from the Special Education Hearing Office

“indicating its understanding that the parties had agreed to take

the due process hearing off the calendar.” Id. In subsequent

years, the plaintiff filed a complaint in Monterey County

Superior Court. Id. His mother and he also brought suit in

federal court, eventually dismissing the state action. Id. The

court found that the plaintiff had agreed to cancel his due

process hearing, such that he failed to exhaust the

administrative remedies available to him. Id. at 1118.

The facts of this case, however, are distinguishable from

the facts in Tyler B.. Here, plaintiff filed numerous complaints

with the CDE alleging defendant VUSD failed to comply with the

provisions of the Agreement, for which the CDE issued compliance

reports in response. On June 8, 2005, she requested a due

process hearing to address defendant VUSD’s alleged breach of the

Agreement. However, on November 1, 2005, the hearing officer

determined that OAH lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the

Agreement was breached. Furthermore, the hearing judge granted

defendant VUSD’s motion to dismiss two issues, to the extent they

were covered by the settlement agreement. Unlike the plaintiff

in Tyler B., plaintiff here did not voluntarily cancel her due

process hearing in light of mediation efforts between her and

defendant VUSD. Defendants argue that even though plaintiff

requested a hearing, she later “dismissed her OAH Request for Due

Process in or about December of 2005.” (Dfs.’ Mot. at 15:25-25). 

This argument, though, ignores the major distinction between

plaintiff’s decision to dismiss her due process request only

after the hearing judge refused to hear her claims regarding the

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alleged breach of the Agreement, and the plaintiff’s voluntary

cancellation of his scheduled hearing in Tyler B.. 

Similarly, defendants’ reliance upon the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Robb v. Bethel School District #403 is unavailing. 

308 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). In Robb, the plaintiffs - a

student and her parents - alleged that the student’s school

district violated the IDEA by depriving the student of

educational opportunities and causing “emotional stress,

humiliation, embarrassment, and psychological injury.” Robb, 308

F.3d at 1048. However, the plaintiffs failed to either initiate

a state level review through the complaint procedure, or request

a due process hearing, before filing suit in federal court under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1048, 1052. The court held that, since

plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies

available under the IDEA, and since their alleged injuries “could

be redressed to some degree” by such remedies, the district court

properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for lack of

jurisdiction. Id. at 1053-54. 

The court does not dispute that the initiation of a state

level review must culminate with a due process hearing to fully

exhaust the administrative remedies available under the IDEA,

where a due process hearing is available to the requesting party. 

Tyler B., 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. However, here, the court

finds that since the hearing judge denied plaintiff a due process

hearing on the ground that OAH lacked jurisdiction over her 

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10 Unlike plaintiff’s claims for relief I, II, III, IV,

and V, claim VI on its face does not appear related to the

alleged breach of the Agreement. Plaintiff brings claim VI under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendant Donahue violated her

constitutional and statutory rights by retaliating against

plaintiff “for Plaintiff’s assertion of her legal rights.” 

(Pl.’s FAC at ¶¶ 99, 100, 104). Based upon the allegations of

the complaint, it appears these actions were committed prior to

execution of the Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 28). However, the

Agreement resolves “any and all disputes, causes of action, and

claims concerning [plaintiff’s] education arising or occurring up

to the date of this Agreement . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 31). The

court, then, infers that defendant Donahue’s actions were covered

by the Agreement. Accordingly, when the hearing judge determined

that OAH lacked jurisdiction to hear her claims regarding the

alleged breach of the Agreement, plaintiff also exhausted her

administrative remedies for Count VI to the extent possible.

20

claims, she carried her burden to the extent possible in the

circumstances of this case.10 

2. Excuse to Exhaustion 

Nevertheless, to the extent that plaintiff failed to exhaust

her administrative remedies through the absence of a due process

hearing, she is excused from exhaustion under the doctrine’s

inadequate relief and futility exceptions. A party is freed from

the exhaustion requirement set forth in § 1415(l) where her use

of due process procedures would be futile, or where she would not

obtain adequate relief by pursuing administrative remedies. 

Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303-04; see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327

(1988).

Here, plaintiff contends that seeking a due process hearing

would be futile, as she could not obtain relief regarding

defendant VUSD’s alleged breach of the Agreement because OAH

lacked jurisdiction over her claims. Defendants challenge

plaintiff’s argument, maintaining that, in Hoeft, the Ninth

Circuit found that the district court was “burdened . . . with a

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dispute which first should have been addressed in an

administrative forum.” Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1308. The court’s

decision in Hoeft has no application in this case. In Hoeft, the

plaintiffs failed to request a due process hearing pursuant to

the IDEA and filed suit in court before the state could fully

investigate their state-level complaints such that they could not

avail themselves of the exhaustion exception of inadequate

relief. Id. In this case, however, as detailed previously,

plaintiff did request a due process hearing to address defendant

VUSD’s alleged failure to comply with the terms of the Agreement,

only cancelling her request after the hearing judge determined

that OAH lacked jurisdiction over her claims. 

The Ninth Circuit previously found that where a plaintiff

was denied a due process hearing under the IDEA, and where

further attempts at seeking a due process hearing will be futile,

he or she need not exhaust administrative remedies. Kerr Ctr.

Parents Ass’n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In Kerr, the plaintiffs requested a due process hearing from the

defendant school district and the defendant state agency, after

the school district “already determined that it would not provide

the funds necessary for plaintiffs’ free appropriate public

education.” Id. The school district refused to provide a due

process hearing, and the state agency deferred responsibility to

the state legislature, which appropriated funds to the agency. 

Id. The court found that a hearing before the school district

and an appeal to the state education agency would have been

futile, “since the problem posed by the legislature’s failure to 

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11 The inadequate relief and futility excuses to

exhaustion “may in some circumstances overlap” but are distinct. 

5 Jacob Stein, Glenn Mitchell & Basil Mezines, Administrative Law

§ 49.02 (1992). However, in specifying the exceptions to the

exhaustion requirement of the IDEA, Congress noted that where

“the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief

sought,” a party may avail him or herself of the inadequate

relief excuse. H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7

(1985). Therefore, since the hearing judge did not have

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim, warranting a denial of a due

process hearing, plaintiff is not required to exhaust

administrative remedies under either excuse. However, in so

holding, the court limits overlap of these excuses to the

specific facts of this case.

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appropriate sufficient funds is not one which could have been

effectively addressed through the administrative process.” Id.

Similarly, prior to any hearing, the hearing judge in this

case determined that OAH had no jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

claims related to the alleged breach of the Agreement. 

Additionally, plaintiff could not appeal the hearing judge’s

determination, since plaintiff had already requested a hearing

before the state’s OAH. Therefore, the issue of whether

defendant VUSD in fact failed to comply with the terms of the

Agreement could not be resolved through the administrative

process. The hearing judge’s decision to deny plaintiff a due

process hearing on the ground of lack of jurisdiction renders the

administrative process futile. Plaintiff is thereby excused from

the exhaustion requirement.11

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12 In her opposition, “[p]laintiff acknowledges that

defendant Donahue cannot be sued in her official capacity in a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 22:14-17) (citing

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). 

Accordingly, based upon plaintiff’s non-opposition, the court

GRANTS defendant Donahue’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim VI

to the extent that it is brought against her in her official

capacity. 

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C. Qualified Immunity12

Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s sixth claim for

relief on the ground that defendant Donahue is immune from

liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Dfs.’ Mot.

at 18:26-28). The doctrine of qualified immunity protects from

suit government officers who do not knowingly violate the law. 

Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Qualified immunity is a generous standard designed to protect

“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (citation

omitted). The question of immunity generally is not one for the

jury. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (citation

omitted). Qualified immunity “should be decided by the court

long before trial.” Id. Nevertheless, if a genuine issue of

material fact exists regarding the circumstances under which the

officer acted, then the court should make the determination after

the facts have been developed at trial. Act Up!\Portland v.

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993).

At the motion to dismiss stage, though, the court accepts

the allegations of the complaint as true, such that the court

must determine the existence of qualified immunity based upon the 

pleadings. As such, the court refers to plaintiff’s FAC in

determining the existence of qualified immunity at this stage.

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The Supreme Court defined a two-part test to determine

whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-202 (2001). The court must first ask

whether the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that her constitutional

rights have been violated. Id. If no violation has occurred,

the officer may invoke the qualified immunity defense. Id. at

201. Where a constitutional right has been violated, though, the

court must then determine if those rights were clearly

established, in which case the officer is not immune to

liability. Id. at 202. Such rights are clearly established if

“it would be clear to a reasonable officer that . . . [her]

conduct was unlawful in the situation . . . [she] confronted.” 

Id. However, if the officer’s conduct stems from a reasonable

mistake as to what the law requires, she is still entitled to the

qualified immunity defense. Id. at 205.

Applying the Saucier test to the case at hand, the court

finds that defendant Donahue cannot claim the qualified immunity

defense at this stage. First, plaintiff’s FAC sufficiently

alleges that her constitutional and statutory rights have been

violated. Plaintiff alleges that, after plaintiff filed a

compliance complaint with CDE, defendant Donahue “acted in a

retaliatory manner against Plaintiff by refusing to convene any

IEP meetings for Plaintiff after she requested them.” (Pl.’s FAC

at ¶ 37). It is a fundamental principle that the right to

petition government for redress of grievances is “among the most

precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” 

United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217,

222 (1967). Moreover, “[d]eliberate retaliation by state actors

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against an individual’s exercise of this right is actionable

under section 1983.” Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d

1310, 1314, 1319 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s right to seek

redress from the CDE for VUSD’s alleged breach of the Agreement

is clearly a constitutionally-protected freedom, such that

defendant Donahue’s alleged retaliatory action against plaintiff

is a violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment right. Similarly,

plaintiff’s FAC also alleges that defendant Donahue violated

plaintiff’s right under the California Education Code § 56043(j),

pursuant to the IDEA, by failing to convene an IEP meeting as

plaintiff requested. (Pl.’s FAC at ¶¶ 99-104).

Second, plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights were

clearly established. As mentioned, the court must determine

whether a reasonable official would find defendant Donahue’s

alleged conduct unlawful in light of the circumstances. Saucier,

533 U.S. at 202. Furthermore, the court “need not find a prior

case with identical, or even ‘materially similar,” facts” to find

that the law is clearly established. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 738 (2002). Defendant Donahue argues that plaintiff does

not show that a reasonable person would find defendant Donahue’s

alleged conduct unlawful. (Dfs.’ Reply at 7:14-18). However,

the Ninth Circuit has held that “where prior cases have

delineated governing legal principles,” or where an applicable

statute or regulation exists, “the law is ‘clearly established’

for immunity purposes.” Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch.

Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the law was

clearly established that it was illegal to retaliate against

plaintiff’s constitutional right to seek redress. Morgan, 874

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13 Defendant CDE requests the court to dismiss claim VII

for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), asserting that the “federal Constitution,

federal statutes, nor Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives this

Court any jurisdiction” over its alleged violation of 20 U.S.C.

section 1415(a). (Df. CDE’s Mot. at 1:28, 5:17-19). However,

defendant CDE later asserts that “the facts alleged in the FAC

fail to set forth a cognizable claim under the IDEIA” since

“Congress neither provided nor intended monetary damages to be

available under the IDEIA.” (Id. at 5:22). As such, it appears

defendant CDE moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim VII for lack of

jurisdiction, and alternatively, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court addresses the motion

accordingly. 

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F.2d at 1314, 1319. Additionally, the existence of the IDEA and

California Education Code § 56043(j) provided her with fair

warning that she was required to convene an IEP meeting in

accordance with the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3); Cal. Ed. Code

§ 56043(j). As such, a reasonable person would find defendant

Donahue’s alleged conduct unlawful. Therefore, at this stage,

the court cannot determine that defendant Donahue is entitled to

qualified immunity. 

D. Claims Against Defendant CDE

Plaintiff’s seventh claim for relief alleges that defendant

CDE is in violation of section 1415(a) of the IDEA by “fail[ing]

to enforce the corrective actions that it required of VUSD in its

June 3, 2005 compliance report.” (Pl.’s FAC at ¶ 115). That

section requires any state educational agency receiving federal

funding under section 1411 of the IDEA to “establish and maintain

procedures in accordance with [section 1415]” to guarantee the

provision of a FAPE to children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. §

1415(a). Defendant CDE moves to dismiss claim VII,13 on the

grounds that it is immune from liability under the Eleventh

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Amendment and that plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. (Df. CDE’s Mot., filed on June 12, 2006,

at 1:28, 2:1-3).

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.

It is a well-settled principle that “nonconsenting States

may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Board

of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.

356, 363 (2001). However, “Congress may abrogate the States’

Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends”

and is constitutionally authorized to do so. Id.

Here, Congress explicitly declared that a state cannot

invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court for

a violation of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a). Further, in

enacting the IDEA, Congress permitted parties to seek remedies

“at law and in equity” for such a violation so long as those same

remedies would be available in a suit against a public entity

other than the state for the same violation. 20 U.S.C. §

1403(b). Plaintiff brings suit against defendant CDE under

section 1415(a) of the IDEA. Defendant CDE does not contest that

it receives federal funds under section 1411 of the IDEA to

provide FAPE to children with disabilities. As such, defendant

CDE is not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

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 2. Failure to State a Claim 

 However, defendant CDE argues that claim VII must still be

dismissed because plaintiff has also failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, as Congress “neither provided nor

intended for monetary damages to be available under the IDEIA.” 

(Df. CDE’s Mot. at 5:22-23). Defendant CDE contends that

plaintiff only seeks one remedy - “general damages” - unavailable

under the IDEA. (Id. at 6:12-14). Defendant CDE is correct in

asserting that monetary damages are ordinarily unavailable under

the IDEA. Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275

(9th Cir. 1999). However, plaintiff’s FAC seeks more than

general damages. In addition to alleging that she suffered 

“general damages” subsequent to defendant CDE’s alleged noncompliance with the IDEA, plaintiff asks the court to award her

compensatory educational services, costs, reasonable attorney

fees, a declaration, and any other relief “as the Court shall

deem just.” (Pl.’s FAC at ¶ 121). While plaintiff does not

specify which of these demands derives from defendant CDE’s

alleged failure to enforce the corrective actions it demanded of

defendant VUSD in its June 3, 2005 compliance report, under the

liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a), a plaintiff is only required to assert “a demand for

judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). Rule 8(a) does not require a plaintiff to make such a

demand with specificity, and, on a motion to dismiss, the court

must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Accordingly, the court cannot dismiss plaintiff’s 

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seventh claim for relief on the ground that plaintiff only seeks

monetary damages unavailable under the IDEA. 

 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has found that available

relief under the IDEA is “relief suitable to remedy the wrong

done the plaintiff . . . .” Robb, 308 F.3d 1047, 1049. Setting

aside the other forms of relief plaintiff seeks to recover, the

court finds that, at a minimum, plaintiff’s request for

compensatory educational services is relief available under the

IDEA, for a violation of section 1415(a). As such, plaintiff

sufficiently states a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

 CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Donahue’s motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s claim for relief VI against her in her

official capacity is GRANTED. In all other respects, defendants

VUSD and Donahue’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FAC, as to

claims for relief I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, is DENIED. 

Defendant CDE’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FAC as to claim for

relief VII is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 27, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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