Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03359/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03359-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FIL D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSUnita:l StateaCo~n·tofi Appeal, Tenth C1t"f'!U t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

NOV 12 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

J. T. GARNER, Clerk 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

STEVEN J. DAVIES and ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF KANSAS, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 91-3359 

(D.C. No. 89-3048-S) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before LOGAN, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.** 

Petitioner-appellant J. T. Garner appeals the district 

court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Garner 

was convicted of attempted theft, two counts of forgery, and 

felony murder. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by 

the Kansas supreme court, and his two state post-conviction 

petitions were denied. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-3359 Document: 010110148669 Date Filed: 11/12/1992 Page: 1 
Garner then submitted a pro se federal habeas corpus 

application, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas. This petition was 

denied. On appeal, Garner raises seventeen issues in support of 

his claim that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Because we 

find no errors of constitutional magnitude, we affirm. 

A detailed summary of the facts may be found in State v. 

Garner, 237 Kan. 227, 699 P.2d 468 (1985). Additional facts will 

be provided as necessary. 

Garner first claims that he is entitled to relief based on 

the district court's delay in deciding his petition, the court's 

failure to rule on his motion for default judgment, and the 

state's failure to respond to his motion for production of 

documents. Although the lengthy delay in deciding Garner's 

petition cannot be condoned, Garner has already received 

appropriate relief through our order of October 31, 1991. 

Moreover, a default judgment would be improper because Garner has 

shown neither a due process violation nor a right to habeas 

relief. See. e.g. Bermudez v. Reid, 733 F.2d 18, 21-22 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); Ruiz v. Cady, 660 F.2d 337, 340 

(7th Cir. 1981). 

Garner claims that he was entitled to an appointed attorney 

and an evidentiary hearing in his state court post-conviction 

proceedings, and that his appointed appellate counsel was 

ineffective in his first post-conviction proceeding. Because the 

state post-conviction proceedings were civil, however, Garner had 

no right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 

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Appellate Case: 91-3359 Document: 010110148669 Date Filed: 11/12/1992 Page: 2 
Amendment. Pennsylvania v. Finley. 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987). In 

addition, because the state was not constitutionally required to 

provide post-conviction proceedings, the alleged errors do not 

rise to the level of federal constitutional violations. See id. 

at 557, 559. Habeas relief is unavailable when a prisoner's 

claims represent an attack on collateral matters and not a 

challenge to the state convictions giving rise to his 

incarceration. See, e.g., Bryant v. Maryland, 848 F.2d 492, 493 

(4th Cir. 1988); Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245, 247 (6th Cir. 

1986) . 

Garner also claims that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of felony murder and that, in any case, the evidence 

did not rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . 

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find 

Garner guilty of all charges, beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979); Tapia v. Tansy, 926 

F.2d 1554, 1562 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 115 (1991). 

Garner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. In his 

prior briefs, Garner set forth the witnesses and testimony which 

he claims should have been presented to the jury. Because the 

substance of this testimony was presented through other witnesses, 

there is no showing that, even if the attorney's performance was 

deficient, the results of the proceeding would have been 

different. See Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1564. Moreover, counsel's 

decision not to present these witnesses did not fall below an 

objective standard of reasonableness so as to deprive Garner of 

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effective assistance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

689 (1984); Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1564. 

Garner's claim that the judge should have recused himself in 

his post-conviction proceedings is similarly without merit. 

First, Garner never filed a proper motion requesting recusal of 

the judge in his post-conviction proceedings. Second, based on a 

motion filed by Garner in a separate case, an independent judge 

reviewed the allegations and determined that they were 

insufficient to require recusal of Judge Wahl. See State R. Vol. 

IV, pp. 28-29, 31. We agree that the judge's newspaper comment, 

indicating his belief that the jury reached a correct decision, 

does not establish "bias" or "prejudice" so as to require recusal. 

Garner argues that the trial court's failure to properly 

instruct the jury on felony murder and lesser included offenses 

deprived him of due process. Garner has not met his "heavy 

burden" of showing that the instructions rendered "'the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to cause a denial of a fair trial in the 

constitutional sense.'" Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 508 

(10th Cir.) (quoting Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 854 (10th Cir. 

1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980)), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 393 (1990). The felony murder instruction at issue was 

approved by the Kansas supreme court in the very case which Garner 

now claims created a new element. See State v. Lashley, 664 P.2d 

1358, 1367, 1370 (Kan. 1983). Moreover, there is no evidence in 

the record to support the giving of an instruction on lesser 

included crimes . 

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Garner's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, improper 

exhibition in restraints, and prejudice to his direct appeal were 

all raised, for the first time, in his second state 

post-conviction petition. The Kansas court of appeals, therefore, 

found these issues procedurally barred. Fed. R. Vol. I, "Appendix 

A" to Doc. 2. Where a state court finds, as an adequate and 

independent ground, that a petitioner has procedurally defaulted 

his claims, federal habeas review is barred unless the petitioner 

can demonstrate "cause" for the default and "prejudice 

attributable thereto," or that failure to consider the claims 

would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Shafer, 

906 F.2d at 509. As no such showing has been made here, we are 

precluded from reviewing these claims. 

Garner argues that the search and seizure of evidence from 

the victim's home was illegal. We find no constitutional 

violation, however, because Garner has not demonstrated a 

"legitimate" expectation of privacy in the victim's home. '" [A] 

person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only 

through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search 

of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his 

Fourth Amendment rights infringed.'" United States v. Carr, 939 

F.2d 1442, 1445 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 

U.S. 128, 134 (1978)). Here, the jury expressly found that Garner 

forged the documents upon which he now relies to prove his 

ownership of the searched premises. In any event, because Garner 

was provided an opportunity for full and complete litigation of 

his Fourth Amendment claim in the state proceedings, he is not 

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Appellate Case: 91-3359 Document: 010110148669 Date Filed: 11/12/1992 Page: 5 
entitled to habeas corpus relief pursuant to Stone v. Powell, 428 

U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). 

Finally, Garner's claim regarding the grand jury indictment 

is, on its face, meritless. Garner's convictions do not rest on a 

grand jury indictment, but on a complaint and information filed by 

the prosecution. 

Garner's motions for a certificate of probable cause and for 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis are GRANTED, his remaining 

outstanding motions are DENIED, and the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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