Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08126/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony Joseph Kuc, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MTC Financial Inc., dba Trustee 

Corporation; et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-08126-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike of MTC 

Financial Inc. dba Trustee Corps (“Trustee Corps”). (Docs. 10, 17). For the reasons 

discussed below, both motions are granted. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Anthony Joseph Kuc Junior (“Kuc”), pro se, brought suit against Trustee 

Corps and related parties on June 11, 2012. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) Kuc’s complaint is sparse on 

factual allegations and organization, but apparently seeks to quiet title to his home and to 

obtain relief for the filing of false documents. (Doc. 1-1 at 7–8.) Because Kuc alleged 

very few facts, the information in this section is gleaned from Trustee Corps’ Motion to 

Dismiss and Kuc’s Answer (Response). 

 Trustee Corps has requested that the Court take judicial notice of nine documents 

attached to its Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 10-1 at 2.) A court may take judicial notice of 

“matters of public record” as an exception to the limitation on extrinsic evidence in 

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12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001); Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), 

overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 

104, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). As such, the Court will take judicial notice 

of the Deed of Trust (“DOT”) from Anthony J. Kuc and Kathleen Kuc, as Borrowers, in 

favor of MERS, (Doc. 10-2); the Assignment of Deed of Trust from MERS to BAC 

Home Loans Servicing, (Doc. 10-3); the Substitution of Trustee, appointing Trustee 

Corps as Trustee, (Doc. 10-4); and the Notice of Trustee’s Sale, (Doc. 10-5). See Osuna 

v. Bank of Am., No. CV-11-1147-PHX-GMS, 2011 WL 6182120 at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 

2011), reconsideration denied, No. CV-11-1147-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 10670 (D. Ariz. 

Jan. 3, 2012) (taking judicial notice of deed of trust and subsequent transfers). The Court 

does not find that judicial notice of the remaining documents is necessary for resolving 

this Motion and declines to take notice of them. 

 On December 10, 2007, Kuc obtained a loan from Federal Savings Bank in the 

amount of $535,000, secured by his property at 5804 Kingman Reef Road, in Kingman, 

AZ. (Doc. 10-2 at 1, 3.) The note and DOT were subsequently assigned to BAC Home 

Loans Servicing (“BAC”) on June 21, 2011. (Doc. 10-3 at 1.) Thereafter, Kingman 

allegedly defaulted on his loan. (Doc. 10 at 2.) BAC consequently substituted Trustee 

Corps as foreclosure trustee. (Doc. 10-3 at 1.) Trustee Corps, pursuant to its power of sale 

in the DOT, recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale on March 9, 2012. (Doc. 10-4 at 1.) 

 Prior to filing this suit, Kuc filed suit against Bank of America (successor to 

BAC), MERS, the servicer of his loan, and the former trustee. See Kuc v. Bank of Am., 

N.A., No. CV-12-08024-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL 1268126 (D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 2012). That suit 

was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. at *4. 

 The thrust of Kuc’s current suit against Trustee Corps is that he has paid off his 

loans in full, and that he is therefore entitled to clear title to the property located at 5804 

Kingman Reef Road. Though Kuc makes a reference to a false documents claim, he has 

not alleged facts to support it. 

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DISCUSSION 

I. Motion to Strike 

Without seeking leave of court, Kuc filed a “Reply to Defendant’s Reply for 

Motion to Dismiss,” (Doc. 15), which the Court construes as a surreply. Trustee Corps 

has filed a Motion to Strike this surreply. (Doc. 17.) The Local Rules do not authorize 

filing a surreply without leave of court. See LRCiv. 7.2 (authorizing only responsive and 

reply memoranda); Silvas v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. CV-09-265-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 

4573234 at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2009). Kuc did not seek leave before filing his 

surreply, and nothing in his filing could be construed as a request for leave. Therefore, 

Trustee Corps’ Motion to Strike is granted, and the Court will not consider Kuc’s 

surreply in deciding the Motion to Dismiss. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

 A. Legal Standard 

 A court may not grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 

his claims which would entitle him to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (citing Buckey v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

When analyzing a complaint under this standard, “[a]ll allegations of material fact are 

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. 

Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a complaint must contain more 

than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

 A district court generally will not consider evidence or documents beyond the 

complaint in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

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Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (amended decision). 

However, courts may “consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, 

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—

without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United 

States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 B. Analysis

 Under Arizona law, a trustee 

need only be joined as a party in legal actions pertaining to a breach of the 

trustee’s obligations under this chapter or under the deed of trust. Any order 

of the court entered against the beneficiary is binding upon the trustee with 

respect to any actions that the trustee is authorized to take by the trust deed 

or by this chapter. If the trustee is joined as a party in any other action, the 

trustee is entitled to be immediately dismissed and to recover costs and 

reasonable attorney fees from the person joining the trustee. 

A.R.S. § 33-807(e) (2012). Thus, Arizona law requires plaintiffs to bring suit against 

beneficiaries, rather than trustees, when they wish to challenge actions authorized by a 

deed of trust or Arizona statute. Puzz v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 

1125 (D. Ariz. 2011). Moreover, it requires dismissal of any actions against trustees that 

do not allege a breach of A.R.S. Title 33 Chapter 6.1 or the deed of trust. 

 Here, Kuc brings an action against Trustee Corps alone instead of bringing an 

action against the beneficiary and joining Trustee Corps to that action. The reason for this 

is that Kuc’s action against Bank of America, successor to the beneficiary, has already 

been dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Kuc, 2012 WL 1268126 at *4. 

This order involving Bank of America as beneficiary is also binding on Trustee Corps as 

trustee. A.R.S. § 33-807(e). 

 Nowhere in Kuc’s complaint does he allege that Trustee Corps has breached 

Chapter 6.1 or the DOT. Kuc apparently contends that Trustee Corps is a proper party to 

his quiet title action because it “has the power to deed the property back to [him]” and is 

required to do so “[a]s a matter of fact.” (Doc. 11 at 6.) Kuc’s allegation that Trustee 

Corps is required to deed the property back to him is ostensibly based on his assertions 

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that he has paid off his loans in full. However, Kuc has not pointed to any provision in 

the Arizona statute or DOT that requires Trustee Corps to deed the trust back to him upon 

full repayment, and the Court’s own review has not revealed any such requirement.

Under the DOT, it is the lender, not the trustee, who is obligated to release the 

security interest on Kuc’s property upon full payment of the debt. (Doc. 10-2 at 9.) 

Without allegations beyond mere repayment in full of his debt (e.g., that the lender 

directed Trustee Corps to deed the property back to Kuc because of the repayment and 

Trustee Corps failed to do so), Kuc has failed to state a claim that Trustee Corps breached 

its obligations under the DOT. 

 Furthermore, Title 33 Chapter 6.1 contains no provisions that require a trustee to 

sua sponte deed a property back to the borrower upon full repayment of a debt. 

Therefore, Kuc has also failed to allege that Trustee Corps breached its obligations under 

the statutory scheme. 

 Because Kuc has not alleged that Trustee Corps breached its obligations under 

either the DOT or Arizona’s statutory scheme, Trustee Corps is not a proper party to this 

action. Kuc’s proper recourse is against the beneficiary under the DOT, not against 

Trustee Corps.1

 A.R.S. § 33-807(e) therefore requires that the action against Trustee 

Corps be dismissed. Pursuant to the mandate of the statute, Trustee Corps is awarded 

whatever costs and reasonable attorney fees it has incurred in defending this action. 

These costs and fees will be awarded upon Trustee Corps’ filing of a motion and 

supporting memorandum in compliance with LRCiv. 54.2. 

 Kuc states in his Response that he reserves the right to amend “this document,” 

apparently referring to the Complaint. (Doc. 11 at 9.) In granting a motion to dismiss, a 

 

1

 As noted above, Kuc has already brought suit against the beneficiary, Bank of America. See Kuc, 2012 WL 1268126. Trustee Corps argues that Kuc’s current suit is subject to dismissal because this prior suit operates to preclude Kuc’s current claims. (Doc. 10 at 11–13.) However, Kuc in the current suit apparently claims that he has paid off three separate loans. (Doc. 1-1 at 3–4.) The opinion dismissing Kuc’s claim in the prior suit appears to involve only one loan. Though the previous opinion is binding on Trustee Corps as trustee, it is unclear with these facts on which of Kuc’s three loans, if 

any, the opinion would have preclusive effect. 

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district court should provide leave to amend unless it is clear that the Complaint could not 

be saved by any amendment. Didyoung v. Allstate Ins. Co., CV-12-348-PHX-GMS, 2012 

WL 1983779 at *3 (D. Ariz. June 4, 2012) (citing Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 

898 (9th Cir. 2002)). Therefore, Kuc will be granted leave to amend his Complaint, to the 

extent possible, to state claims against Trustee Corps for breach of obligations under 

either the DOT or Title 33 Chapter 6.1 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. 

CONCLUSION

 Because Trustee Corps is not a proper party to this action, Trustee Corps’ Motion 

to Dismiss is granted. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of MTC Financial 

Inc., dba Trustee Corp. (Doc. 10) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike of MTC Financial Inc., 

dba Trustee Corp. (Doc. 17) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Anthony Joseph Kuc, Jr.’s Complaint 

is DISMISSED with leave to amend, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, to 

state a cognizable claim. If Kuc fails to amend, the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate 

this action without further leave of the Court. 

 Dated this 24th day of October, 2012. 

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