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Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

FRANCES FRANE, f/k/a Frances Riley, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; 

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; LAW 

OFFICES OF ROBERT J. HOPP & 

ASSOCIATES, LLC; ROBERT J. HOPP; 

SALLY ZEMAN, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1321 

(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-00821-RM-NYW) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Frances Frane appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 

of JP Morgan Chase Bank (“Chase”) on her claims related to the foreclosure of her 

home. Ms. Frane does not appeal the district court’s earlier dismissal of her claims 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

May 12, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-1321 Document: 01019618856 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 1 
2 

against the other defendants. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we 

affirm. 

In 2007, Ms. Frane purchased a home with her former husband at 45388 Coal 

Creek Road, Parker, Colorado 30183. Ms. Frane executed a deed of trust in favor of 

Chase to purchase the property. At some point, she fell behind on her payments and 

defaulted on her loan obligations. As a result, Ms. Frane sought loan modification in 

2009 and 2010. Around the end of 2009, she participated in a trial loan modification 

program that required her to make certain payments to become eligible for permanent 

modification. Ms. Frane made timely and correct payments for a time but later 

notified Chase that “she would only be able to [make] payments for $1400 until she 

recovered” from illness, Opening Br. at 4, which was less than the required amount. 

Under threat of foreclosure, Ms. Frane filed for bankruptcy under the assumption that 

Chase would be unable to foreclose due to an automatic stay. Nevertheless, Chase 

foreclosed on the property. 

Under threat of eviction, Ms. Frane filed suit in the District of Colorado to 

overturn the foreclosure. In her complaint, Ms. Frane alleged the following causes of 

action: violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), violations of 

state debt collection laws, violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act 

(CCPA), conspiracy to defraud, lack of standing to foreclose, and fraud upon the 

court. During discovery, Ms. Frane failed to respond to requests for admissions 

served by Chase; the requests were thus deemed admitted under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 36. Ms. Frane moved to withdraw the admissions, arguing that she was in 

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Florida tending to her sick father when they were served, but the district court denied 

the motion, noting that Ms. Frane “made no showing that withdrawing her 

admissions would advance the presentation of merits of her case.” R. at 419. Armed 

with these admissions, Chase moved for summary judgment. 

The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for Chase and 

dismissing Ms. Frane’s claims, and the district judge accepted the recommendations. 

Specifically, the district court dismissed both the federal and state-law debt collection 

claims because Chase, having obtained the debt when it was not in default, is not a 

“debt collector” under the statute. The court held that Ms. Frane’s allegations 

regarding CCPA violations, civil conspiracy, and fraud upon the court were vague 

and conclusory. As to lack of standing to foreclose, the court noted that Ms. Frane 

admitted she obtained the loan from Chase, failed to make the required payments, 

and that Chase is the holder of the deed of trust. 

On appeal, Ms. Frane challenges the district court’s summary judgment grant 

and ruling on her motion to withdraw her admissions. Ms. Frane argues that she did 

not default on her loan. She also maintains that Chase’s lawyers purposefully served 

the requests for admission to her Colorado address when they knew she was in 

Florida tending to her sick father. In essence, Ms. Frane contends that, without the 

admissions that were obtained surreptitiously, Chase would have been unable to 

obtain summary judgment. 

We agree with the district court’s decision and find Ms. Frane’s claims of error 

without merit. While Ms. Frane contends she did not default on her obligations, she 

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admits in the same brief that she notified Chase she would unilaterally reduce her 

payments during the pendency of an illness. Opening Br. at 4. Thus, she concedes 

default. With regard to the admissions, Ms. Frane’s lamentations are attributable to 

the hazards inherent in proceeding without the assistance of counsel. The 

progression of her case in Colorado did not stop or otherwise pause while she 

traveled to Florida. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 

(10th Cir. 2005) (noting that while pro se litigants are held to a less stringent 

standard, they must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants”). 

It is not unscrupulous or in any way improper for Chase’s attorneys to serve 

discovery requests on Ms. Frane at her home address listed with the court. Further, 

though she claims on appeal that there were numerous text-only orders issued by the 

court that she never received due to her lack of PACER access, the docket reflects 

that she was mailed all entries, paperless or not. 

After carefully reviewing the district court’s orders and the record on appeal, 

we conclude that the issues raised by Ms. Frane were correctly analyzed. 

Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the same reasons given by the district court. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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