Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00898/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00898-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYLVESTER CONWAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MUVA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-00898-SAB (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 

TO THIS ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF CLAIM

(ECF No. 11)

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed October 18, 

2023. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 

“seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

///

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 

at 969. 

II.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of 

the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

When Plaintiff was booked into the Madera County Jail, he had two broken bones in his 

neck, two broken ribs, a broken collar bone, and a cracked shoulder blade. The booking officer 

said that Plaintiff would be housed in the medical unit, but during transport he was taken by 

officer Shields to the security housing unit and left there for six months. 

On May 26, 2022, at about 1:00 a.m., officer Muva went to Plaintiff’s cell and demanded 

one of his medical mattresses. Plaintiff asked him to look at his medical file on the computer to 

see that medical gave him two mattresses. Muva left and waited for Plaintiff to fall asleep and 

then returned to Plaintiff’s cell with two more officers. Plaintiff was asleep and not a threat to 

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anyone when his cell door was opened and officer Muva went straight for Plaintiff’s arm with the 

broken collar bone and tried to yank him off his bunk by jerking his arm. When Muva was not 

successful, officer Lopez then lifted the top mattress Plaintiff was sleeping on causing his head to 

slam against the wall with his neck brace almost rendering Plaintiff unconscious. Then officer

Ortiz slide the bottom mattress out and they walked out of Plaintiff’s cell laughing. After 

Plaintiff’s head cleared a little bit he went to his cell door and yelled for medical attention. 

Officer Muva refused to call medical and gave Plaintiff a write-up. Medical went to Plaintiff’s 

cell five days later, no x-rays were ordered, but his mattress was returned to him and he was given 

stronger medication. Plaintiff’s pain continues to this day. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

The right of pretrial detainees to be free from excessive force is guaranteed by the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is governed by Fourth Amendment standards. 

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397-398, 399 (2015). Accordingly, a pretrial detainee 

establishes that excessive force was used against him by showing “that the force purposely or 

knowing used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396-397. “[O]bjective 

reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. (quoting 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). A “pretrial detainee can prevail by providing only 

objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate 

governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 

398.

“A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 

scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 

397. “A court must also account for the ‘legitimate interests that stem from [the government's] 

need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,’ appropriately deferring to 

‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal 

order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

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U.S. 520, 240 (1979)).

“Considerations such as the following may bear on the reasonableness or 

unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the need for the use of force and the 

amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper 

or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably 

perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 

397.

Assuming the validity of Plaintiff’s allegations and construed liberally, Plaintiff states a 

cognizable claim for excessive force against Defendants Muva, Lopez, and Ortiz in violation of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. 

B. Failure to be Placed in Medical Unit/Medical Treatment

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution imposes duties on officials to ensure that 

inmates receive adequate medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The due 

process rights of a pretrial detainee are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections 

available to a convicted prisoner.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (citing City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). The Supreme 

Court has treated medical care claims substantially the same as other conditions of confinement 

violations including failure-to-protect claims. Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 

(9th Cir. 2018). Therefore, “the elements of a pretrial detainee's medical care claim against an 

individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are: (i) the 

defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff 

was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; 

(iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a 

reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 

involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking 

such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.” Id. at 1125 (citing Castro, 833 F.3d 

at 1071). With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be objectively 

unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular 

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case. Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that upon his booking at the Madera County Jail he was not placed 

in the medical unit as stated by the booking officer. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Muva 

did not call medical after they confiscated the extra mattress from his cell. However, Plaintiff has 

not sufficiently alleged that the conditions of Plaintiff's detainment put him at substantial risk of 

suffering serious harm, nor allege facts and circumstances indicating that Defendants’ actions 

were unreasonable. 

Plaintiff merely alleges that the “booking officer” told him he would be placed in the 

medical unit and the transportation officer instead took him to the security housing unit. 

Although Plaintiff alleges he suffered several injuries prior to his booking, he has not sufficiently 

alleged facts to demonstrate that any jail official put him at a substantial risk of serious harm 

because he was placed in the security housing unit. Indeed, there are not allegations that any of 

the named individuals had the authority to place Plaintiff in the medical unit, yet failed to do so. 

In addition, although Plaintiff alleges that officer Muva did not provide immediate 

medical treatment and treatment was not provided for five days, he has not sufficiently alleged 

that was in need of immediate treatment or that the delay of five days in providing treatment was 

objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 

1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that denial of medical treatment for several days did not 

amount to a constitutional violation); see also Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 

1994). In addition, allegations of differences of opinion over proper medical care, inadequate 

medical treatment, medical malpractice, or even gross negligence by themselves do not rise to the 

level of an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 

(“[N]egligen(ce) in diagnosing or treating a medical condition” does not amount to deliberate 

indifference), quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) (holding that “an 

inadvertent failure to provide medical care,” allegations that “a physician has been negligent in 

diagnosing or treating a medical condition,” or “medical malpractice” do not state an Eighth 

Amendment claim as “[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 

because the victim is a prisoner.”); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (a 

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disagreement over the necessity or extent of medical treatment does not show deliberate 

indifference); Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124-25 (a pre-trial detainee must show more than lack of due 

care or negligence). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief based on the 

denial and/or delay in medical treatment.

IV.

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly 

assign a District Judge to this action

Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action proceed against Defendant Muva, Lopez, and Ortiz on Plaintiff’s 

excessive force claim in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; 

2. All other claims and Defendants be dismissed from the action for failure to state a 

cognizable claim for relief. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 

(14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 6, 2023 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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