Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01339/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01339-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BYRON CHAPMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.), INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:04-cv-01339-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through the present motion, Plaintiff Byron Chapman (“Plaintiff”) seeks attorneys’ 

fees and litigation expenses, pursuant to both state law and 42 U.S.C. § 12205 of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), after the protracted litigation in this matter, which 

extended some eleven years and encompassed five different summary judgment 

motions in district court, as well as three different rounds of briefing, two panel hearings, 

and a petition for rehearing before the Ninth Circuit. The case finally ended when the 

district court’s final order granting summary judgment was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in 

May of 2015 after being appealed by Defendant Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc. (“Pier 1”).

Plaintiff now requests that this Court award attorneys’ fees totaling $496,849.60 

as well as costs and litigation expenses of $19,479.92 for a total amount sought of 

$516,329.52. As set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED, but the Court finds that 

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only $312,253.00 in attorneys’ fee are recoverable, as well as the $19,479.92 expended 

as costs, for a total of $331,732.92.

BACKGROUND

On or about July 13, 2004, Plaintiff instituted the present action under the ADA 

and various state laws after claiming that he encountered a number of architectural 

barriers at Pier 1’s store in Vacaville, California. The parties filed their first cross-motions 

for summary judgment in 2005, and Judge Lawrence K. Karlton of this Court, who was 

originally assigned the case, partially granted and partially denied each party’s motion. 

On appeal, the first Ninth Circuit panel found that Chapman had standing as to those 

barriers he had actually encountered, but lacked standing as to any un-encountered 

barrier which did not deter him from re-entering the store. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports 

(U.S) Inc., 571 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2009). On en banc review, however, the Ninth Circuit 

agreed that Plaintiff had standing to sue for injunctive relief on both bases, reasoning 

that Plaintiff had standing if he demonstrated “injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to 

return to a noncompliant facility.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939,

944 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit nonetheless remanded for dismissal 

because Plaintiff had personally failed to establish that he “suffered discrimination as 

defined by the ADA as to encountered barriers on account of his disability.” Id.

On remand, Plaintiff sought leave to amend his complaint and after Judge Karlton 

clarified with the Ninth Circuit that this was permissible under the terms of its mandate, 

he granted leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint continued to 

allege that barriers at the store impeded his access, and after additional discovery, the 

parties filed another set of cross-motions. The Court denied Pier 1’s motion in its 

entirety and granted Plaintiff’s Motion as to his claims under the ADA as well as his 

claims under California’s Disabled Persons Act and Unruh Act. On or about August 22, 

2012, Pier 1 appealed that decision. On or about August 27, 2014, this case was 

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reassigned to the undersigned after Judge Karlton’s retirement. Then, on March 5, 

2015, the Ninth Circuit issued a published decision affirming the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Pier 1’s failure to maintain accessible aisles 

violated his rights under the ADA. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s state law claims since they depended on establishing an ADA violation.

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 779 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit 

reversed only as to Plaintiff’s claims concerning the Vacaville store’s accessible sales 

counter. Id. at 1009-10. On July 2, 2015, after mandate was issued by the Ninth Circuit, 

this Court issued a judgment of permanent injunction consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 

opinion. The instant Motion for fees and costs was subsequently filed on June 20, 2016.

STANDARD

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged violations of federal and California law. Plaintiff’s 

federal claim arose under the ADA, while his state law claims arose under California’s 

Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, California Health & Safety Code § 19953, and the 

California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54-55. 

Section 12205 of the ADA authorizes a court, in its discretion, to “allow the 

prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including 

litigation expenses, and costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. A prevailing plaintiff under a 

statute so worded “should recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would 

render such an award unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1976).

Section 55 of the California Disabled Persons Act provides that “the prevailing 

party in the action shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 55. Also, under California Health & Safety Code § 19953, “[a]ny person who is 

aggrieved or potentially aggrieved by a violation of this part . . . may bring an action to 

enjoin the violation. The prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to recover 

reasonable attorney’s fees.” 

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ANALYSIS

When determining the reasonableness of a fee request, courts typically begin by 

using the lodestar method. Under this approach, “a reasonable hourly rate [is multiplied]

by the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 

1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998). The lodestar figure may then be adjusted based on an 

evaluation of the so called Kerr factors:

The time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of 

the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the 

legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment 

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the 

customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, 

(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the 

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results 

obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature 

and length of the professional relationship with the client, and 

(12) awards in similar cases.

Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000); Kerr v. Screen Extras 

Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975).

Under this analysis, the Court first turns to the reasonable hourly rate. Plaintiff 

requests $480 per hour for lead attorneys Lynn Hubbard and Scottlynn Hubbard, $350 

per hour for associate attorneys working for the Hubbards’ firm (Disabled Advocacy 

Group, APLC (“DAG”)), and $125 an hour for time expended by paralegals. Pier 1, on 

the other hand, submits that reasonable rates should not exceed $300 for Lynn 

Hubbard, $250 for Scottlynn Hubbard, $200 for other attorneys, and $75 for paralegals. 

The fee applicant, here Plaintiff, has the burden of “producing satisfactory 

evidence--in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits-- that the requested rates are in line 

with those prevailing in the community for similar legal services by lawyers.” Blum v. 

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984). A rate determined in this way is deemed the 

prevailing rate and is normally considered reasonable. Id.

Here, the Court does not believe that the evidence presented justifies the hourly 

rates that Plaintiff advocates. In 2007, when Plaintiff last sought attorneys’ fees in this 

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case, he sought hourly rates of $300 and $175, respectively, for Lynn and Scottlynn 

Hubbard, which Judge Karlton reduced to $250 and $150. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports 

(U.S.) Inc., 2007 WL 2462084 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2007); ECF No. 123-1 at 3:14-19. As 

Pier 1 points out, the $480 figure now sought for both the Hubbards represents an 

increase of between 92 and 220 percent in the intervening ten years. 

Despite the Hubbards’ claims to the contrary, in Johnson v. Patel, No. 2:14-cv02078-WBS-AC, 2015 WL 300740 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2015), this Court found, following 

a review of applicable case law, that “the prevailing rate [for attorneys’ fees under the 

ADA] is $250 per hour in the Sacramento division of the Eastern District of California for 

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and quality.” Id.

at * 4, citing Loskot v. D&K Spirits, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-00684-WBS-DAD, 2011 WL 567364 

at * 5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (citing numerous Eastern District ADA cases where $250 

was determined to be a reasonable rate on default judgment);

1 Johnson v. Dhami, 

No. 2:14-cv-01150-KJM-AC, 2014 WL 4368665 at * 3 (same). Moreover, in Johnson v. 

Wayside Property, Inc., No. 2:13-1610-WBS-AC, 2014 WL 6634324 at * 6 (E.D. Cal. 

2014), another district judge here in Sacramento found, in approving a $300 rate in a 

contested ADA case, that there was no evidence showing that Sacramento attorneys 

representing plaintiffs in routine disability access cases charge rates in excess of the 

$300 figure accorded, some seven months previously, to a partner in a disability access 

firm who had devoted some 95 percent of his practice to disability issues for almost 21 

years. Id. at * 5-6, discussing Johnson v. Allied Tractor Supply, No. 2:13-cv-01544-

WBS-EFB, 2014 WL1334006 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014).

While Plaintiff presents the Declaration of John O’Connor in advocating a higher 

figure, the Court is not convinced. O’Connor is a principal in a law firm based in 

San Francisco that specializes in commercial litigation. See O’Connor Decl., ¶ 1. He 

 1 While Plaintiff argues that this case should not be considered because it was subsequently 

vacated by Johnson v. Patel, No. 2:14-cv-02078-WBS-AC, 2015 WL 3451753 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2015), 

the order was vacated because the judgment against Defendants was ultimately deemed to have been set 

aside, and not because its observations concerning the prevailing hourly rate for attorneys’ fees were in 

any way misplaced had default been upheld.

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claims to have kept abreast of billing rates in the Bay Area, and while he professes to 

have also done so throughout the country (see id. at ¶ 8), there is no indication he has 

any particular expertise in billing trends in the Sacramento area. In the experience of the 

undersigned, rates here are markedly lower than in the Bay Area.

In short, no evidence has been presented in this proceeding that causes this 

Court to conclude that the prevailing Sacramento rate of $250-$300 as recently as two 

years ago has measurably increased. While the Hubbards are undoubtedly experienced 

in disability access litigation, they are no more so than other counsel who have been 

awarded hourly rates in that range. Consequently, Plaintiff is awarded $300 per hour for 

the time expended by Lynn and Scottlynn Hubbard in this matter. Moreover, and 

commensurate with those rates, the court awards a $200 hourly award for associate 

attorneys, and $100 per hour for paralegals.

Having determined the reasonable rates, the Court now addresses Pier 1’s 

remaining contentions. First, Pier 1 argues that Plaintiff’s failure to seek attorneys’ fee

from the Ninth Circuit should preclude its effort to do so here. As Plaintiff points out, 

however, because no judgment was rendered that changed the parties’ legal relationship 

until this Court’s grant of permanent injunction on July 2, 2015, after both interlocutory 

appeals before the Ninth Circuit had been adjudicated, it would have been premature to 

seek costs. Second, Pier 1 asks this Court to parse the extent to which Plaintiff 

prevailed on the merits as to the issues raised on appeal, and reduce any award to the 

extent that it did not prevail on certain issues. Indeed, Pier 1 goes so far as to advocate 

that because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint changed considerably after the matter 

was remanded by the Ninth Circuit the first time, the Court should disallow any fees 

generated by the first appeal since it was insufficiently related to the matters upon which 

Plaintiff ultimately did prevail in 2015.

The Court believes that separating out the intertwined issues presented by this 

case over the eleven years it remained pending would be all but impossible. As Plaintiff 

points out, the issues were presented in the same case and by the same plaintiff who 

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sought to remove the same barriers under the same statutes from the same defendant 

at the same store. See Pl.’s Reply, 8:10-13. Moreover, as Plaintiff also indicates, when 

Judge Karlton permitted Plaintiff to file an amended complaint after this case was first 

remanded by the Ninth Circuit, he instructed the defense to move for summary judgment 

if it concluded that the claims of the amended pleading did not relate back to the original 

complaint. Pier 1 apparently failed to do so.

It must also be noted that even if Plaintiff did not prevail on all issues, he may still 

seek compensation for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unless those claims were 

“distinct in all respects” from his successful claims. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 

440 (1983). The Court cannot make that determination here.

Finally, after examining the evidence and Pier 1’s arguments with respect to 

whether certain charged items were reasonable under the circumstances, and after 

considering that evidence in light of the Kerr factors, the Court, in exercising its 

discretion, believes the items claimed were reasonable and declines to reduce Plaintiff’s 

lodestar figure on that basis.

CONCLUSION

Based on all of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and 

Litigation Expenses (ECF No. 237) is hereby GRANTED as follows: 

1. Attorneys’ fees are awarded for 250.55 hours expended by Lynn Hubbard in 

this matter at the rate of $300 per hour for a total of $75,165.00.

2. Attorneys’ fees are awarded for 718.90 hours expended by Scottlynn Hubbard 

in this matter at the rate of $300 per hour for a total of $215,670.00.

3. Attorneys’ fees are awarded for 52.70 hours expended by various associate 

attorneys in Plaintiff counsel’s firm at a rate of $200 per hour for a total of 

$10,540.00.

///

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4. Paralegal fees are awarded for 108.78 hours at a rate of $100.00 per hour for 

a total of $10,878.00.

5. Costs are awarded in the amount of $19,479.92.

6. Total attorneys’ fees and costs are therefore awarded to Plaintiff in the sum of 

$331,732.92.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2017

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