Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01558/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01558-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN WESELEYE WALKER,

CDCR #D-44672, Civil No. 14cv1558 BEN (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

AS MOOT; AND 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING 

TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

AND § 1915A(b)(1)

vs.

M. BECERRA; M.D. CARPIO;

J. HATFIELD; S. ANDERSON,

Defendants.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On June 26, 2014, John Weseleye Walker (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at

Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”) located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se,

filed a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1). 

This Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) but sua

sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. (Doc. No. 3.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint in order

1 14cv1558 BEN (PCL)

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 12 Filed 12/19/14 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) On October

23, 2014, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. No. 7.)

The Court, once again, found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim and dismissed

his FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1). (Doc. No. 8.) 

Plaintiff was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). On

November 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of time to file his SAC but

before the Court could rule on this motion, Plaintiff filed his SAC (Doc. No. 11.) 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time is DENIED as moot.

II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, notwithstanding IFP status or the

payment of any partial filing fees, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates

the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP, and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced

for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions

of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable

after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), § 1915A(a), (b). Under these statutes,

the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d

1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

2 14cv1558 BEN (PCL)

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 12 Filed 12/19/14 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient

to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

3 14cv1558 BEN (PCL)

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 12 Filed 12/19/14 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff was charged with a rules violation following a racial riot and placed in

Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”). (SAC at 4.) Following the issuance of the rules

violation report, Plaintiff was “seen” by Senior Hearing Officer Carpio on August 28,

2012. (Id. at 5.) At this hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of the rules violation, held

in Ad-Seg, given a ninety (90) day “SHU” term and lost ninety (90) days of behavior 1

credit which extends the length of Plaintiff’s criminal sentence by ninety (90) days. (Id.

at 11.)

D. Due Process Claims

Once again, Plaintiff alleges to have been deprived of ninety days of behavior

credit as a result of his disciplinary conviction and seeks money damages, in part, for the

extension of his criminal sentence. See SAC at 11, 17. The Court finds Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim must be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which section 1983 can be granted because a finding in Plaintiff’s favor would

“necessarily imply the invalidity” of his disciplinary conviction. See Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-44 (1997). 

Heck and Balisok make clear that constitutional claims involving a prison’s

disciplinary decision to revoke behavioral credits fail to state a claim under section 1983

since habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy whenever a claim for damages

depends on a determination that a disciplinary judgment is invalid or the sentence

currently being served is unconstitutionally long. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 643-44; Heck,

512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (holding

that a person in state custody may not use § 1983 to challenge “the very fact or duration

of . . . confinement” by seeking “a determination that he is entitled to immediate release

or a speedier release from that imprisonment.”); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875

(9th Cir. 2002) (“It has been clear for over thirty years that a state prisoner seeking

injunctive relief against the denial or revocation of good-time credits must proceed in

 “SHU” is an acronym for “Segregated Housing Unit.” 1

4 14cv1558 BEN (PCL)

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 12 Filed 12/19/14 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

habeas corpus, and not under § 1983.”).

Plaintiff has already been informed by the Court that if he were to file an amended

pleading he would have to allege facts sufficient to show that Defendants’ decision to

revoke ninety days of his behavioral credit has already been “reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make

such a determination, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S.

at 486-87. Until and unless he can do so, no cause of action will accrue under § 1983. 

Id. (See Nov. 5, 2014 Order, Doc. No. 8, at 6.) Plaintiff has failed to make such a

showing, and thus, his entire action must be dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Second Amended

Complaint (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED as moot.

2. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 11) is DISMISSED for

failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1).

3. Further leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion

where further amendment would be futile); and

4. The Court CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order of dismissal

would not be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge

v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th

Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would

not be frivolous). 

The Clerk shall close the file.

DATED: December 18, 2014

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

5 14cv1558 BEN (PCL)

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 12 Filed 12/19/14 Page 5 of 5