Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290-33/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Greg Moore; et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Sean Garnand; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 19-00290 TUC RM (MAA)

ORDER

Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion, filed on March 20, 2024, to

terminate the deposition of Lisa Miller pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(3) and for expenses

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(3)(C) and 37(a)(5). Doc. 441. The plaintiffs filed a response

on March 22, 2024, which contains a cross-motion for sanctions and/or for an award of costs

and fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(2). Doc. 448. The defendants

filed a reply on March 28, 2024. Doc. 455. The defendants supplemented the motion with

a recorded exhibit on April 8, 2024. Doc. 460.

 The plaintiffs in this action (“the Moores”) claim their constitutional rights were

violated when the defendants obtained and executed two search warrants in connection with

an arson investigation into the destruction of the Forgeus Apartments on June 8, 2017.

Complaint, Doc. 1; see Doc. 391, p. 2 (“The remaining claims in this matter are Counts One,

Three and Four of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.”). The Moores bring this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1, p. 4. The first warrant, for DNA and other personal effects, was

executed on June 9, 2017. Doc. 1, p. 8. The second warrant, for financial documents, was

Case 4:19-cv-00290-RM-MAA Document 465 Filed 04/16/24 Page 1 of 9
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executed on June 14, 2017. Doc. 1, pp. 9-10. The Moores claim, among other things, that

the warrant applications were not supported by probable cause and contained “material

misrepresentations and omissions.” Doc. 1, pp. 16-18.

On March 15, 2024, at 1:58 p.m., the plaintiffs commenced their deposition of former

Tucson Police Detective Lisa Miller. Doc. 441, p. 1. Approximately one hour and 13

minutes later, counsel for the defendants terminated the deposition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

30(d)(3). Id. The defendants argue primarily that the plaintiffs’ counsel’s questions failed

to “stay within the bounds of Rule 26(b)(1) based on the claims actually stated in your

Complaint, as is your obligation.” Doc. 441, p. 3.

Discussion

The Rule reads in pertinent part as follows:

At any time during a deposition, the deponent or a party may move to

terminate or limit it on the ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in

a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or

party. . . . If the objecting deponent or party so demands, the deposition must

be suspended for the time necessary to obtain an order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3). “Although the term ‘bad faith’ can have many meanings depending

upon the context in which it is used, one of its common connotations is to do something for

an ‘improper purpose’.” Boulder Falcon, LLC v. Brown, 2023 WL 2662187, at *12 (D. Utah

Mar. 28, 2023); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 166 (10th ed. 2014) (“Dishonesty of belief,

purpose, or motive”). “The burden of proving such conduct lies with the objecting deponent

[or party].” Rivera v. Berg Elec. Corp., 2010 WL 3002000, at *2 (D. Nev. July 28, 2010).

Detective Lisa Miller, now retired, participated in the execution of the second search

warrant at Greg Moore’s office on June 14, 2017. Doc. 441, p. 2. During the execution, she

took a statement from Greg Moore’s office manager, Guadalupe “Lupita” Bachelier. Id.

In preparation for the deposition, Miller reviewed a redacted audio recording of that

interview. Doc. 441, p. 3. This redacted recording was previously disclosed to the Moores

pursuant to a Public Records Act request in a prior lawsuit. Doc. 441, p. 3.

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The defendants maintain that this recording “became the vehicle for harassment

tactics” by the plaintiffs’ attorney. Doc. 441, p. 4. It turns out that the plaintiffs’ attorney

had in his possession the unredacted audio recording, which he obtained in connection with

Greg Moore’s current felony criminal case in Pima County. Id. The defendants assert that

the plaintiffs’ attorney “never disclosed that unredacted recording, or his knowledge of same,

to Defendants prior to the Lisa Miller deposition, preferring instead to try to intimidate the

witness with ridiculous, unfounded claims and fear of spoiling evidence that has nothing to

do with any of the Moores’ civil claims.” Doc. 441, p. 4. 

The court agrees that acts of intimidation, the use of “ridiculous” or “unfounded

claims,” or accusations that the witness has spoiled evidence could evince bad faith. The

defendants, however, have not directed the court to specific places in the transcript where

each of these behaviors has occurred. They have provided a video recording of the

deposition for the court’s use, but the court could not identify what portions of the deposition

the defendants’ find objectionable. See Doc. 460.

The defendants do cite to that part of the deposition where the plaintiffs’ counsel asks

Miller about where the original tape recording of her interview with Bachelier was placed.

Doc. 441, p. 4 (citing Tr. 10:8-16:22). But the court does not find these questions

objectionable. It seems reasonable for counsel to want to know if an original recording exists

and where it might be located. The original tape recording could be a valuable resource for

cross-checking the witness’s memory of an interview taken some seven years ago. See, e.g.,

Whiting v. Hogan, 2013 WL 1047012, at *7 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“[K]nowledge and veracity of

the deponent are always at issue during witness testimony.”); Smith v. Logansport Cmty. Sch.

Corp., 139 F.R.D. 637, 646 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (“[A]n oral deposition is not merely a device

to uncover and develop information. It also provides a legitimate and efficient means of

testing a witness’ knowledge, recollection and veracity.”). The court does not interpret this

portion of the deposition as an attack on Miller for possibly mislaying the original recording.

But even if it were, it would not necessarily constitute bad faith. See, e.g., Whiting v. Hogan,

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2013 WL 1047012, at *7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 14, 2013) (Counsel’s statements made at the

deposition that, “I have further proof that perhaps your client has been less than truthful

about these disclosures,” “did not evince harassing conduct.”). 

The plaintiffs’ counsel did not reveal before the deposition everything he knew about

Miller’s original interview of Bachelier, but the defendants do not direct the court to a Rule

or case indicating that such practice would evince bad faith. Moreover, it not clear why

counsel’s access to an unredacted recording of the interview would prejudice the witness.

At the start of the deposition, Miller explained that beforehand, she reviewed her police

report, the photographs that were taken at the offices, and the redacted audio recording of her

interview with Bachelier. Doc. 441-2, p. 17. When counsel asked her, “did you feel there

was anything else that you needed to help refresh your recollection about what happened that

day?” Miller replied “No. Of course, it’s always nice to – when you conduct an interview

with someone, to have the entire audio recording.” Doc. 441-2, p. 18. She continued: “[I]t’s

nice to have the entire recording, but my reports are usually very detailed and thorough into

[sic] regards – in regards to what people tell me when I conduct an interview with them.”

Id. Over the defendants’ counsel’s objection, Miller explained that her original recording

was stored in the DIMS system at the Tucson Police Department. 441-2, pp. 19-20.

It does not appear that the plaintiffs’ counsel’s access to the unredacted recording

caused prejudice to the witness or that he used this recording in a manner that annoyed or

embarrassed the deponent. The defendants do not point to any specific question or portion

of the deposition that seems to rely on information taken from the unredacted interview.

Moreover, Miller stated that while “it’s always nice to . . . have the entire audio recording,”

she did listen to the redacted recording and did review her police report, which are “usually

detailed and thorough.” Doc. 441-2, p. 18. Apparently, the unredacted recording is in the

possession of TPD and the defendants could have provided it to Miller if they wished to do

so. And of course, Miller was actually there, in person, during the Bachelier interview.

The court agrees with the defendants that the timing of the plaintiffs’ disclosure of the

unredacted recording, one business day after the deposition, as part of their duty to provide

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supplemental discovery is problematic. On this record, however, the court cannot find that

the possibly late disclosure evinces bad faith. 

The defendants further assert that the plaintiffs’ counsel’s use during the deposition

of an unredacted version of Miller’s police report was an “impropriety.” Doc. 441, p. 5.

They do not direct the court to a Rule or case explaining why they believe this practice

evinces bad faith. Presumably, this report is already in the possession of the defendants.

Miller wrote it, so its contents could not have been a complete surprise.

There was a point in the deposition when the defendants’ counsel accused the

plaintiffs’ counsel of “being harassing with your tone.” Doc. 441-2, p. 60. Bachelier

explained to Miller that she did not know anything about the fire “until the officers came in

and Greg told her ‘sorry about all of this.’” Doc. 441-2, 60. Miller did not, however, ask

her, “What officers came in?” Id. The plaintiffs’ counsel followed up as follows: “You

didn’t ask her because you already knew that Detective Garnand had come there, put Greg

in handcuffs, and taken him to a substation. You already knew that. That’s why you didn’t

ask her about that, correct?” Id. Miller again stated simply that she “didn’t ask her which

officers came in,” and again the plaintiffs’ counsel asked her a leading question: “The reason

you didn’t ask her was because you already knew that Detective Garnand had come there

days before, put Greg in handcuffs, and taken him to the Alvernon substation, isn’t that

true?” Doc. 441-2, pp. 60-61. Miller answered, “I knew that Detective Garnand had been

to those offices before, yes. I believe I knew that then.” Doc. 441-2, p. 61; Video, Doc. 460

at 57:24.

Counsel’s tone was insistent, and he did ask the same leading question twice, but the

court does not find that this exchange unreasonably annoyed, embarrassed, or oppressed the

deponent. Doc. 460 at 57:16. The witness here is a 20-year veteran of the Tucson Police

Force, who has been deposed before and has testified at trial a number of times. Doc. 441-2,

p. 16. She displayed no acute discomfort during the exchange and, based on her background,

would not be expected to do so. Doc. 460 at 56:15 – 57:24.

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Finally, the defendants argue that the questioning of Miller exceeded the scope of

allowable discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). They assert that counsel for the plaintiffs

asked questions “suggesting, without any foundation, additional claims never asserted in this

case. . . .” Doc. 441, p. 5. For example, he asked if “Detective Garnand told his police

colleagues, prior to their execution of the Second Warrant, that Mrs. Moore was involved in

the crimes under investigation.” Id. He asked if Miller “was somehow responsible for

reviewing and evaluating the already-obtained Second Warrant for compliance with the

Fourth Amendment.” Id. He further “asked questions suggesting that Lupita Bachelier’s

interview had been conducted improperly” or if “Detective Miller had blocked Lupita

Bachelier’s exit from the room where she was interviewed.” Id.

The deposition was finally suspended when counsel asked Miller about the questions

she had asked Bachelier about computers. Counsel asked Miller: “You were asking about

computers because when she [Bachelier] identified computers in the business, those

computers were going to be seized, correct.” Doc. 441-2, p. 62. Miller stated simply that the

“[c]omputers were on the search warrant,” but counsel again asked his leading question:

“You wanted to know how many computers, where they were in the office because you were

going to seize those pursuant to the search warrant, correct?” Doc. 441-2, pp. 62-63.

Counsel for the defendants then objected pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) and suspended the

deposition. Doc. 441-2, p. 63; Doc. 460 at 1:00:23. The defendants argue that these

questions have “no bearing on the civil claims in this case” and accordingly counsel for the

plaintiffs acted improperly.

The court agrees that discovery should be confined to the “claims and defenses

asserted in the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, Advisory Committee’s Note (2000

Amendment). The recent change in the text of Rule 26 “signals to the parties that they have

no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already identified

in the pleadings.” Id. But the court finds to the contrary that the plaintiffs’ counsel’s

questions did relate to the claims that already appear in the Complaint.

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The plaintiffs’ claims related to the second search warrant are as follows: “(1)

Defendants obtained the Second Search Warrant through judicial deception; (2) even absent

judicial deception, the Second Search Warrant lacked probable cause; (3) even if the Second

Search Warrant were valid, Defendants executed it unreasonably by seizing items outside the

warrant’s scope; and (4) Officer Garnand’s detention of Mrs. Moore during the search of the

Moores’ home violated her Fourth Amendment rights.” Doc. 389, p. 5. Counsel’s questions

related to how the Second Search Warrant was obtained and how it was executed. His

questions to Miller about how she identified which computers and electronics were going to

be seized are related to his claim that the scope of the warrant was overbroad and improperly

authorized the seizure of computer records relating to all of Greg Moore’s businesses. Doc.

448, pp. 5-6. These were proper areas of inquiry. See, e.g., Doc. 389, pp. 6-7 (“The Second

Search Warrant authorized, among other things, without any limitation as to time, the seizure

of a vast array of financial information related to Mr. Moore and ‘associated businesses’ that

constitute evidence of a crime . . . . But Officer Garnand’s affidavit failed to establish

probable cause to believe that all these items were connected to criminal activity.”)

(punctuation modified, emphasis in original); Doc. 389, p. 7, n. 5 (“Even if we were to

overlook this flaw in the affidavit, the warrant allowed a search of a vast list of electronic

devices and data . . . [t]he supporting affidavit did not even attempt to justify such a broad

search.”).

The defendants assert in their reply brief that the Complaint does not contain a claim

relating to particularity or overbreadth. Doc. 455, pp. 1-2. The Ninth Circuit, however,

found otherwise in a prior interlocutory appeal. Doc. 389, pp. 6-8; p. 8, n. 6 (“We reject

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs did not make an overbreadth claim as to the Second

Search Warrant.”). And this court is required to follow the Ninth Circuit. 

But even if these were not proper areas of inquiry, simply asking questions outside the

scope of Rule 26(b)(1) does not, by itself, constitute “bad faith” or otherwise prove that the

deposition is being conducted “in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or

oppresses the deponent or party.” See Rivera v. Berg Elec. Corp., 2010 WL 3002000, at *2

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1

 Counsel also repeated his questions if the witness did not have a chance to give an

answer the first time due to attorney rhubarb.

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(D. Nev. July 28, 2010) (“[T]he mere fact that more than one, or even that a series of

irrelevant questions is asked does not, by itself, constitute the annoyance or oppression

contemplated by (30)(d)(3).”). 

In their reply, the defendants direct the court to Boyd v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys.,

173 F.R.D. 143, 146 (D. Md. 1997), which quotes the District of Maryland Local Discovery

Guidelines for the proposition that “it is also presumptively improper to ask questions clearly

beyond the scope of discovery permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) . . . and continuing to do

so after an objection shall be evidence that the deposition is being conducted in bad faith, or

in such a manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass or oppress the deponent or party,

which is prohibited by Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(3).” This court agrees that asking questions

“clearly beyond the scope of discovery permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)” and “continuing

to do so after an objection” is some evidence that the deposition is being conducted in bad

faith. Boyd at 146 (emphasis added). This is particularly true if the questions are “of a

personal nature” or if the attorney “repeatedly ask[s] the same or substantially identical

question of a deponent if the question has already been asked and fully and responsibly

answerer by the deponent.” Id. In this case, however, counsel’s questions were not clearly

beyond the scope and not of a personal nature. When he repeated a question it was usually1

when he believed that Miller was giving an incomplete or evasive answer. The court finds

that the Miller deposition did not violate Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(3).

The deposition here started at 1:58 and went until 2:52 when the parties took a break

for twelve minutes. Doc 441-2, pp. 13, 57. The deposition started again at 3:04 and was

suspended at 3:11 after only 7 minutes. Doc. 441-2, pp. 57, 63. All in all, the deposition

lasted little over one hour. It does not appear that the deposition was conducted in a manner

that was oppressive in its length. Neither does it appear to have been conducted in a manner

that was particularly annoying or embarrassing especially considering the deponent who, as

the court noted above, was a 20-year veteran of the Tucson Police Department. One would

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expect that a police detective would be used to questions about what she did, or heard, or said

during the execution of a search warrant. 

IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion, filed on March 20, 2024, to terminate

the deposition of Lisa Miller pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(3) and for costs is DENIED.

Doc. 441. The witness shall be produced for deposition within 30 days. Counsel shall work

together to set the deposition on a mutually agreeable date. The plaintiffs’ cross-motion for

sanctions and/or for an award of costs and fees is also DENIED. Doc. 448. This deposition

took place before the court issued its order resolving the plaintiffs’ previous motion to

compel discovery. Doc. 432. Counsel conducted this deposition without having the benefit

of the directions contained in that order.

DATED this 16th day of April, 2024.

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