Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01618/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nicholas Anthony Granado,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-1618-PHX-DGC (JFM)

Report & Recommendation on Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on August 8, 2013 (Doc. 1). On April 7, 2014 Respondents filed their Response 

(Doc. 13). Petitioner filed a Reply on May 5, 2014 (Doc. 14).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On June 9, 2009, Petitioner and a co-defendant were indicted in Maricopa County

Superior Court on charges of kidnapping, aggravated assault, and sexual assault, all 

Class 2 or Class 3 felonies in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 13-1304 

(kidnapping), 13-1204 (aggravated assault), and 13-1406 (sexual assault). (Exhibit B, 

Indictment.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 13, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

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The charges arose out of allegations of a gang rape at gunpoint on July 15, 2007, of a 

young woman who had been offered a ride by three unknown males. Petitioner’s older

brother was eventually identified by DNA testing, and he reported Petitioner as one of 

the other assailants. Petitioner was arrested on May 31, 2009. (Exhibit A, Probable 

Cause Statement.) Petitioner was purportedly born on March 11, 1990, and would have 

been 17 years old at the time of the offense, but 19 when arrested and indicted.

Petitioner subsequently entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit D) and 

entered a guilty plea to one count of kidnapping, and three counts of attempted sexual 

assault. (Exhibit C, M.E. 2/4/10.) On March 10, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to 10 

years on the kidnapping charge, and was given suspended sentences with lifetime 

probation on the attempted sexual assault charges, which included a requirement that 

Petitioner register as a sex offender. (Exhibit E, Sentence.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2; Answer, Doc. 13 at 2.

Moreover, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. 

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 

614, 616 (1995).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On April 19, 2010, Petitioner commenced a timely “of-right” PCR petition by 

filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit F). Counsel was subsequently 

appointed, but eventually filed a Notice of Completion of Review (Exhibit G), 

evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. Petitioner eventually filed a Pro Per

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit H), arguing that: (1) he was improperly 

required to register as a sex offender; (2) there was no proper transfer of jurisdiction 

from the juvenile court; (3) and PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The PCR 

court found all of the claims to be without merit, and summarily dismissed the Petition. 

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(Exhibit K, M.E. 4/7/11.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of Appeals

(Exhibit N) reasserting his claims of error in the exercise of jurisdiction over the offense 

outside the juvenile court system, and in imposing a requirement of sex offender 

registration. The Petition was summarily denied. (Exhibit Q, Order 2/27/13.) 

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit R), raising 

the same claims asserted to the court of appeals, but again arguing the ineffective 

assistance of PCR counsel, citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). On July 10, 

2013, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review.

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 8, 2013 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts three grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that his due process rights were 

violated where he was not an adult at the time of the crime, but the 

state court refused to correct his sentence to remove the requirement 

that he register as a sex offender upon release. In Ground Two, he 

alleges that his due process rights were violated where he was tried 

in adult court rather than juvenile court, although he was a juvenile 

at the time the offense occurred. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges 

that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in connection 

with his state post-conviction petition.

(Order 1/7/14, Doc. 6 at 2.) 

Response - On April 7, 2014, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 13). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s grounds for relief do not assert 

claims cognizable on habeas review, and that Plaintiff has failed to properly exhaust his 

state remedies on his claims, and those remedies are now procedurally defaulted.

Reply - On May 5, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14). Petitioner argues 

that Grounds I and II are meritorious because the state laws were violated, and Ground 

III is meritorious because PCR counsel was ineffective. Petitioner asserts as cause to 

excuse his procedural defaults the ineffective assistance of PCR counsel.

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. NON-COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

Respondents correctly point out that the federal statutes permit habeas relief “only 

on the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). (See Answer, Doc. 13 at 6.) 

Respondents argue that the claims asserted by Petitioner do not present claims of any

such violations. Respondents confuse the viability of the claim for the source of the 

claim.

In Grounds I and II, Petitioner asserts violations of his due process rights as a 

result of the state’s failure to follow its own law. Liberally construed, that asserts a 

violation of the Constitution of the United States, and is cognizable in a federal habeas 

proceeding.

Respondents correctly argue that not every violation of state law amounts to a 

denial of due process. But some violations do amount to such a denial. An error of state 

law may be “sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Pully v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 

41 (1984). To sustain such a due process claim founded on state law error, a habeas 

petitioner must show that the state court "error" was "so arbitrary and fundamentally 

unfair that it violated federal due process." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 

(9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.1986)). To 

receive review of what otherwise amounts to nothing more than an error of state law, a 

petitioner must argue “not that it is wrong, but that it is so wrong, so surprising, that the 

error violates principles of due process”; that a state court’s decision was “such a gross 

abuse of discretion” that it was unconstitutional. Brooks v. Zimmerman, 712 F.Supp. 

496, 498 (W.D.Pa.1989). 

Petitioner may ultimately fail to establish the necessary underlying facts that the 

state law errors in his case rose to that level, or even that any errors occurred. But that 

does not alter the fundamental nature of the claim he raises, namely that errors occurred 

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which did amount to a denial of due process under the Federal Constitution.

 Conversely, with Ground III, it is a legal deficiency (rather than a factual one) 

which Respondents confound with the failure to assert a federal claim. Respondents 

correctly argue that there is no recognized federal constitutional right to the effective 

assistance of counsel in PCR proceedings. “There is no constitutional right to an attorney 

in state post-conviction proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). 

See also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (“Coleman v. Thompson...left 

open...a question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective 

counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of 

ineffective assistance at trial”). 

Petitioner’s Ground III, however, effectively asserts that such a right exists under 

the Constitution (on the basis that in this instance the PCR proceeding amounted to a 

direct appeal). Petitioner may be wrong in his legal argument, but again that does not 

alter the nature of the claim he makes. If claims that went beyond the confines of prior 

decisions could never be asserted, the law would be stagnant.1 That is not the nature of 

American jurisprudence, nor is it a mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The statue only 

requires that a habeas claim be based upon allegations of a violation of the Constitution 

or other federal law. That, Petitioner’s Ground III does.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Grounds for Relief all assert a claim cognizable on 

federal habeas review.

B. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, and thus 

are barred from federal habeas review.

 

1

The vitality of constitutional construction is not a concern embodied in the 

proscriptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) that habeas relief only be granted where a claim is 

based on clearly established law. But neither does that proscription alter the nature of 

claims which otherwise clearly assert a federal claim within the meaning of § 2254(a). 

Moreover, the limits in §2254(b) only apply where the state court resolved a claim on its 

merits.

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1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Generally, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

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to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

13 at 13-14.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal – As a pleading defendant, Petitioner has no right to 

file a direct appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 

256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (1995).

. Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 

2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme 

Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, 

and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as 

among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 

1071. Claims based upon ineffective assistance of counsel are determined by looking at 

“the nature of the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

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Petitioner correctly argues in his Reply that Arizona’s preclusion bar does not 

apply to a first “of right” petition of a pleading defendant. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 4-5.) 

However, the issue is not whether his unexhausted claims could have been properly 

deemed waived at the time of his first PCR proceeding, but whether they would be 

deemed as such in a new PCR proceeding. As concluded hereinafter, the answer to the 

latter question is “yes.”

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Petitioner again confounds the timeliness of his first PCR petition and any 

potential new petition. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 5.) Again, the issue is not whether 

Petitioner’s first PCR was timely (it was), but whether a new petition presenting his 

unexhausted claims would be timely. It would not be.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

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(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Perhaps it might be argued in some instances that a claim of ineffective assistance 

of PCR counsel would arise from “newly discovered material facts,” thus making it 

possible to raise such a claim in a successive PCR proceeding. Here, however, the facts 

were available to Petitioner, and (as discussed hereinafter) argued to the PCR court, just 

not to the Arizona Court of Appeals.2

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

 

2

It might be that an Arizona PCR court would distinguish the ineffectiveness claim now 

presented (based on due process violations) from the ones argued to the PCR court 

(based on the underlying state law violations). In such event, Petitioner’s ineffectiveness 

claim might be considered simply unexhausted rather than procedurally defaulted. Even 

so, for the reasons discussed hereinafter, the claim would be without merit, simply 

resulting in a denial on the merits, rather than a dismissal as procedurally defaulted. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (petition may be denied on merits if unexhausted). 

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in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

In his PCR Petition, Petitioner arguably raised the factual substance underlying 

his claims in all three of his grounds for relief. He argued that because he was a juvenile, 

the state sex offender requirement registration requirement could not be applied to him. 

(Exhibit H, PCR Pet. at 3-7.) He argued that his case was not properly transferred from 

the juvenile court system to the adult court system. (Id. at 7-9.) And, he argued that his 

PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to assert those claims. (Id. at 10-

13.) With regard to the ineffectiveness claim, he clearly asserted this right under the 

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as arguing a violation of the 

Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. at 12-

13.) (See also id. at 1-2 (referencing “the Constitution of the United States” in 

connection with the ineffectiveness claim).) 

With regard to Grounds I and II, however, Petitioner did not assert a due process 

violation. Indeed, Petitioner made no reference to any federal law, and made no 

reference to any federal constitutional rights. 

At most, Petitioner argued as part of his arguments in connection with his 

complaints about the lack of a transfer that he “had a constitutional right to evidence and 

any other documents pertaining to my case,” and that the record provided to him did not 

include a State’s Notice of Discovery Disclosure.” (Id. at 9.) Those allegations do not, 

however, pertain to the claims raised in the instant habeas petition.

In his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner again raised 

the factual substance of his first two claims. He argued that his case was not properly 

transferred from the juvenile court system to the adult court system. (Exhibit N, Pet. 

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Rev. at 5.) He argued that because he was a juvenile, the state sex offender requirement 

registration requirement could not be applied to him. (Exhibit H, PCR Pet. at 6-8.) (Id.

at 6-8.) Again, however, he did not assert any claim that this amounted a violation of 

due process. Moreover, his Petition for Review made no assertion that his PCR counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance. 

In his Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petition again raised the 

factual substance of one of his due process claims. He argued that his case was not 

properly transferred from the juvenile court system to the adult court system. Again, 

however, he did not assert any claim that this amounted to a violation of due process. 

(Exhibit R, Pet. Rev. Az. Sup. Ct. at 6-8.) He made no argument that because he was a 

juvenile, the state sex offender requirement registration requirement could not be applied 

to him. He did again assert that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and 

cited in support of his claim Martinez v. Ryan. (Id. at 9-10.) 

Thus, although Petitioner presented the factual underpinning of his due process 

claims at least through the Arizona Court of Appeals, he never asserted them as federal 

due process claims. A claim has been fairly presented to the state court only if petitioner 

has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is 

based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). 

And, he arguably raised a federal ineffective assistance claim to the PCR Court 

and to the Arizona Supreme Court, but not to the Arizona Court of Appeals. "Submitting 

a new claim to the state's highest court in a procedural context in which its merits will 

not be considered absent special circumstances does not constitute fair presentation." 

Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 

346, 351 (1989)). In Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004), the court reiterated 

that to properly exhaust a claim, "a petitioner must properly raise it on every level of 

direct review." Id. at 916.

Academic treatment accords: The leading treatise on federal habeas 

corpus states, “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion 

requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire 

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direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire 

judicial postconviction process available in the state.” 

Id. (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b 

(4th ed. 1998) (emphasis added)). In this instance, the Arizona Supreme Court generally 

will not consider issues raised for the first time before it, although it has the discretion to 

do so. See Town of South Tucson v. Board of Supv’rs of Pima County, 52 Ariz. 575, 84 

P.2d 581 (1938). Raising “federal constitutional claims for the first and only time to the 

state’s highest court on discretionary review” is not fair presentation. Casey v. Moore, 

386 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, the presentation of a claim in a petitioner’s 

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court but not to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals is not sufficient to fairly present the claim to the Arizona courts. 

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner failed to 

properly exhaust his state remedies on his claims by properly raising them as federal 

claims at each stage through the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

For the reasons discussed hereinabove, Petitioner may no longer return to state 

court to present these claims and thus Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his state 

remedies on all of his claims. 

C. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term ‘cause’ precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

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... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel - Petitioner argues that this Court should 

find cause to excuse his procedural defaults based on PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness in 

failing to present the claims he now asserts. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 6.) 

Where no constitutional right to an attorney exists, ineffective assistance will not 

amount to cause excusing the state procedural default. Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932. 

“Because there is no right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, there 

cannot be constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Patrick 

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F. 3d 573, 588 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991)). Consequently, any ineffectiveness of PCR counsel will 

ordinarily not establish cause to excuse a procedural default.

Plaintiff contends that as a pleading defendant his “of-right” first PCR proceeding 

was the functional equivalent of a direct appeal in Arizona and thus he does have a right 

to counsel (and effective counsel) in that proceeding. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007) (“of right” PCR in Arizona is equivalent of direct appeal for 

purposes of habeas statute of limitations). However, the Supreme Court has recognized 

only two exceptions concerning the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel.

Abandonment - First, in Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), the Court held 

that where PCR counsel is not merely negligent or ineffective, but actually abandons the 

representation of the petitioner, then the attorney is no longer acting as the agent of the 

petitioner, and his actions may establish cause to excuse a procedural default. In Maples, 

the purported PCR counsel had left their employment in which they had represented the 

petitioner while awaiting the trial court’s ruling, had both accepted employment 

precluding their representation of the petitioner, and had not moved to withdraw or 

provided other notice that they no longer were representing Petitioner, thus allowing the 

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time for further review to lapse after the trial court’s ruling. Here, however, Petitioner 

makes no assertion that his PCR counsel abandoned him, but rather only that counsel 

failed to identify and present the claims he now seeks to raise.

PCR Claims re Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel - Second, in Martinez v. Ryan, 

132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Court held: “Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review 

collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim 

of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1315. For Petitioner to rely upon Martinez, 

Petitioner must “demonstrate[d] two things: (1) ‘counsel in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards 

of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),’ and 

(2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, 

which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook 

v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318).

However, Petitioner does not contend that there was a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel to be presented by PCR counsel. Rather, he simply contends 

that there was error at trial which PCR counsel should have argued. 

Accordingly, Petitioner cannot now rely on the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as 

a means to avoid his procedural defaults.

Claim Without Merit - Moreover, even if Petitioner could establish a 

constitutional right to counsel in his of-right first PCR proceeding because it functioned 

as a direct appeal, a claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel would in any event

be without merit. Cf. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1317 (“Where, as here, the initial-review 

collateral proceeding is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of 

ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of 

a prisoner's direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”) But see id. at 1319-

1320 (rejecting any modification to the rule of no constitutional right to counsel in PCR 

proceedings). 

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687 88, 694. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

In determining whether counsel performed deficiently, the court must focus on 

whether the attorney's actions were appropriate under the circumstances existing at the 

time. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Moreover, there is a strong presumption counsel’s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that, under 

the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. 

United States v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). The court 

should “presume that the attorneys made reasonable judgments and decline to second 

guess strategic choices.” United States v. Pregler, 233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

To establish prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Here, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance depends upon the merits of his 

due process claims. If the claims are without merit, then PCR counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to raise them. It is clear that the failure to take futile action can 

never be deficient performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996). 

“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

As noted above, and argued by Respondents, the underlying facts are an alleged 

violation of state law, and a state law violation only amounts to a due process violation if 

it is egregious. Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest anything more than a routine error 

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of state law. For this reason, his claims are without merit, and thus PCR counsel would 

not have been ineffective for failing to raise them.

Moreover, Petitioner fails to even make out a state law error. 

In Ground I, Petitioner complains that because of his age at the time of the 

offense, he is not required under Arizona law to register as a sex offender. However, 

Arizona law does not so provide. The Arizona registration statute does provide that 

where registration is required for an offense for which a minor has been adjudicated 

delinquent, the duty to register terminates when the person reaches the age of 25. Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-3821(D) and (F). Here, however Petitioner was not adjudicated 

delinquent as a juvenile, but was convicted of the offenses as an adult. (Exhibit E, 

Sentence.)3

In Ground II, Petitioner complains that he could not properly have been convicted 

as an adult because he was a minor at the time of the offenses, and had a case pending 

before the juvenile court. Petitioner misapprehends the nature of the juvenile court 

jurisdiction over his criminal offenses. 

“A.R.S. section 13–501(A) (emphasis added) provides that the prosecutor ‘shall 

bring a criminal prosecution against a juvenile in the same manner as an adult’ when the 

juvenile is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age and is accused of certain specific 

offenses, while section (B) (emphasis added) of the statute provides that the prosecutor 

‘may bring a criminal prosecution against a juvenile in the same manner as an adult’ if 

the juvenile is at least fourteen and commits certain specified crimes or is a chronic 

offender.” In re Timothy M., 197 Ariz. 394, 399, 4 P.3d 449, 454 (Ariz.App. 2000). 

Here, at a minimum, Petitioner’s offenses fell within § 13-501(B), because they were all 

 

3

The PCR court also properly rejected Petitioner’s claim that because he was under the 

age of 22, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821(H) entitled him to a termination under of his duty 

to register. That section allows the court to terminate the duty at a hearing under Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 13-923. Those hearings are for annual probation reviews for probationers 

who are under 22, and who were under 18 at the time of the offense. Petitioner meets the 

latter category, but as the PCR court observed, after serving his 10 year prison term, 

Petitioner would be over 22 before he ever was on probation, meaning no hearing under 

§ 13-923 would ever be held. (See Exhibit K M.E. at 2.)

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class 2 and class 3 felonies. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-501(B)(1) and (2) (discretion to 

prosecute on Class 2 felonies, and Class 3 felonies in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§13-

1001 et seq. through 13-1701 et seq.). Thus, the offenses were properly charged as adult

offenses, not as grounds for an adjudication of delinquency in juvenile court. 

Moreover, under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-302(C), it was irrelevant that Petitioner may 

have already been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, even if on the same 

offenses:

Section 8–302(C) states that “during the pendency of a delinquency 

action in any court of this state,” that court “shall dismiss without 

prejudice” any count in a petition in which the juvenile is subject to 

prosecution as an adult. Section 8–302(C) thereby requires the 

juvenile court to dismiss any charges pending at the time the state 

proceeded with those charges in the adult criminal court, even if a 

prior delinquency petition had been filed and was “pending.”

In re Timothy M., 197 Ariz. at 399, 4 P.3d at 454. 

Petitioner argues that the juvenile court transfer procedures should have been 

followed. However, as recognized in In re Timothy, “after the amendment of Article 6, 

section 15 of the Arizona Constitution and the enactment of A.R.S. section 13–501” the 

transfer proceedings are necessary only “when the county seeks adult prosecution in 

instances not covered under A.R.S. section 13–501.” 197 Ariz. at 400, 4 P.3d at 455. 

Here, the transfer was covered by § 13-501, thus the transfer procedures had no 

application.

Accordingly, no state law error was committed, due process was not violated, and 

any attempt by PCR counsel to assert such claims would have been futile and would not 

support a claim of ineffective assistance. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot establish cause 

to excuse his procedural default base upon such ineffectiveness.

Prejudice - “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional 

violation. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Establishing prejudice 

requires showing "not merely that the errors [of petitioner's] trial created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 

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(1982).

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Because Petitioner has filed to establish cause for 

his procedural default, no finding of an absence of prejudice is necessary.

Nonetheless, because Petitioner’s state law claims are without merit, his due 

process claims and ineffective assistance claims are as well, and thus he cannot show the 

required prejudice. 

Summary re Cause and Prejudice – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner had failed to establish cause and prejudice to excuse his 

procedural defaults.

D. ACTUAL INNOCENCE AS CAUSE

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

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(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner makes no proffer of actual innocence. Accordingly his 

procedurally defaulted claims, and his Petition, must be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

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and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and jurists of reason 

would not find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed August 28, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent that the Court adopts 

this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be 

DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

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party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: August 28, 2014

13-1618r RR 14 08 20 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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