Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02012/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02012-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 1

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

**E-Filed 3/7/07**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

STEVEN R. PREMINGER, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

R. JAMES NICHOLSON, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 1

AN DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; AND (3) ADDRESSING

PLAINTIFFS’ SUBMISSION OF

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND

ARGUMENT

[Doc. Nos. 93, 96, 109, 121, 127]

Defendants move for summary judgment as to all of the claims of Plaintiffs’ second

amended complaint (“SAC”). Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment as to the first two

claims of their SAC. The Court has considered the briefing as well as the oral arguments

presented at the hearing on May 26, 2006. While the Court delayed consideration of the parties’

motions for some time in deference to proceedings pending in the Federal Circuit and in light of

the parties’ settlement efforts, the Court now concludes that the Federal Circuit proceedings may

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 “VA” is used herein to refer to the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. 2

2

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

not resolve in the near future and that the parties’ settlement efforts have reached impasse. For

the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part, and

Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Steven Preminger (“Preminger”) challenges his exclusion from Building 331 of

the Menlo Park VA campus, to which he sought entry in order to register voters. Preminger is

2

the chairman of the Santa Clara County Democratic Central Committee (“SCCDCC”), which

also is a named plaintiff.

On September 24, 2004, the Court issued an order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a

preliminary injunction on the ground that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success

on the merits of their claims. On August 25, 2005, the Ninth Circuit issued a published decision

affirming this Court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs subsequently filed the

operative SAC, alleging the following facts:

Building 331 is a 150-bed nursing facility housing veterans who need long-term care. 

SAC ¶ 29. It appears from the SAC that Preminger or his associates may have been denied

access to Building 331 on February 3, 2004. Plaintiffs allege that on that date, Defendant Saucha

Poulenz (“Poulenz”), a physical therapist at Building 331, stated that “only the League of

Woman Voters [of South San Mateo County (‘LWVSSMC’)] could register voters at the

facility.” Id. at ¶ 32 (bracketed and parenthetical material in the original). It is unclear from the

SAC to whom Poulenz was speaking or whether her comments were in response to attempts to

register voters at Building 331.

It likewise appears from the SAC that Preminger or his associates may have been denied

access to Building 331 on April 5, 2004, although again the SAC is not entirely clear as to this

point. Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n April 5, 2004, in the presence of other VA employees, Poulenz

stated that it was up to families to determine of residents should vote, that LWVSSMC alone was

authorized to register voters, and that registration in Building 331 was inappropriate because

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

some residents were demented.” Id. at ¶ 37. The circumstances giving rise to these comments

likewise are unclear. 

The SAC is more specific in describing an event that occurred on April 15, 2004, in

which Preminger, his attorney Scott Rafferty (“Rafferty”) and an individual named Lennox

Sweeney attempted to enter Building 331 to register voters. Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiffs allege that

Defendant Karen Girton (“Girton”), an administrator at Building 331, stated that she had

received a letter of instruction from Defendant Elizabeth Freeman (“Freeman”), the director of

the Palo Alto Health Care System (“PAHCS”), which administers the Menlo Park VA campus. 

Id. According to Girton, Freeman was angry at Rafferty because he allegedly had lied about his

authorization to enter the VA campus. Id. Girton directed all three men to leave, and summoned

the VA police. Id. One of the VA policemen subsequently stated that Preminger could return at

his convenience to register voters at Building 331 or anywhere else on campus other than the

psychosocial rehabilitation facility. Id. at ¶ 40. However, later that afternoon, Freeman’s

assistant stated that all authorization to register voters on the campus had been withdrawn. Id. 

On June 7, 2004, Rafferty hand delivered to Freeman a letter requesting her to permit

“partisan activities” at all PAHCS facilities. Id. at ¶ 43. The letter also requested correction of

an internal VA memorandum stating that receipt of political contributions on VA property was a

criminal offense. Id. Freeman did not respond to Rafferty’s letter. Id. 

The SAC alleges the following claims: (1) violation of the First Amendment; (2)

intimidation of lawful political contributions; (3) violation of the Equal Protection clause of the

Fifth Amendment; (4) conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); and

(5) violation of the National Voter Registration Act. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears

the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions

of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). 

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to

present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party presents

evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that

party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49;

Barlow v. Ground, 943 F. 2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Claim: Violation Of The First Amendment

Plaintiffs’ first claim for violation of the First Amendment contains a number of

subclaims: (a) application of 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(14) beyond its terms; (b) arbitrary and

viewpoint based discrimination in the application of § 1.218(a)(14); (c) ban of buttons and

bumper stickers; (d) limitation on access based on party status; and (e) failure to accommodate

partisan voter registration / encouragement of illegal registration. The parties have filed crossmotions for summary judgment as to these claims.

1. Application Of § 1.218(a)(14) Beyond Its Terms

Plaintiffs assert that voter registration does not fall within the activities prohibited by §

1.218(a)(14). That section reads in its entirety as follows:

(14) Demonstrations.

(i) All visitors are expected to observe proper standards of decorum and decency

while on VA property. Toward this end, any service, ceremony, or

demonstration, except as authorized by the head of the facility or designee, is

prohibited. Jogging, bicycling, sledding and other forms of physical recreation on

cemetery grounds is prohibited.

(ii) For the purpose of the prohibition expressed in this paragraph, unauthorized

demonstrations or services shall be defined as, but not limited to, picketing, or

similar conduct on VA property; any oration or similar conduct to assembled

groups of people, unless the oration is part of an authorized service; the display of

any placards, banners, or foreign flags on VA property unless approved by the

head of the facility or designee; disorderly conduct such as fighting, threatening,

violent, or tumultuous behavior, unreasonable noise or coarse utterance, gesture or

display or the use of abusive language to any person present; and partisan

activities, i.e., those involving commentary or actions in support of, or in

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

opposition to, or attempting to influence, any current policy of the

Government of the United States, or any private group, association, or

enterprise.

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs assert that, because voter registration workers must offer forms to

persons regardless of their party affiliation, the act of registering voters is not a “partisan” act

within the meaning of § 1.218(a)(14). Plaintiffs also assert that Preminger and Sweeney had

agreed that they would refrain from any political commentary, and would refrain from disclosing

their party affiliation, if they were permitted to register voters at Building 331, but that Girton

nonetheless refused to permit them to register voters.

In its order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, this Court expressed the

opinion that “an outright and unconditional ban on voter registration at a VA facility simply

because of party affiliation likely is unconstitutionally overbroad,” but denied preliminary

injunctive relief based upon evidence that exclusion from Building 331 was reasonable based

upon the state of the record with respect to the alleged conduct of Preminger, Rafferty and

Sweeney. 

In its decision affirming this Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary

injunction, the Ninth Circuit noted that “Plaintiffs have assumed that their voter registration

effort was a partisan activity” within the meaning of § 1.218(a)(14). Preminger v. Principi, 422

F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit’s decision therefore does not resolve the

question of whether a voter registration drive by a political party constitutes “partisan” activity.

Having considered the parties’ extensive briefing on this issue in connection with the

pending cross-motions for summary judgment, and the authorities cited therein, this Court now

concludes that a voter registration drive by a political party properly may be characterized as

“partisan” activity within the meaning of § 1.218(a)(14). In Monterey County Democratic

Central Committee v. USPS, 812 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1987), cited with approval in the appellate

decision in this case, the Ninth Circuit upheld a United States Postal Service guideline

prohibiting voter registration by partisan groups on postal premises. The court concluded that the

postal property in question was a nonpublic forum and that the guideline was reasonable in light

of the purpose that the forum served. Id. at 1198. The court held that objective of the Postal

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the regulation, for overbreadth as well as other alleged 3

constitutional deficiencies, is still pending before the Federal Circuit. 

6

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

Service is to collect, sort and deliver the mail nationwide, and that the Postal Service reasonably

could believe that freedom from the appearance of involvement in the political process is critical

to its ability to carry out this objective. Id. at 1199. The court held that the guideline was

viewpoint-neutral, because “[b]y excluding all partisan groups from engaging in voter

registration – conduct permitted by non-partisan groups – the Postal Service is not granting to

one side of a debatable public question a monopoly in expressing its views.” Id. at 1198-99

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The regulation at issue in the instant case is broader than was the guideline addressed in

Monterey County. However, Monterey County clearly indicates that voter registration by a 3

political party properly can be considered partisan activity, and that the prohibition of such

activity in a non-public forum is constitutional if such prohibition is reasonable and not an effort

to suppress a particular point of view. This Court has determined that Building 331 is a nonpublic forum, which determination has been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, to the

extent that Defendants excluded Plaintiffs pursuant to a viewpoint-neutral policy of declining to

allow any political party to conduct a voter registration drive at Building 331, the Court

concludes as a matter of law that such exclusion does not constitute an application of §

1.218(a)(14) “beyond its terms.” 

2. Arbitrary Or Discriminatory Application Of § 1.218(a)(14)

The question remains, however, whether Plaintiffs’ exclusion in this case was the result

of such a policy rather than – as Plaintiffs contend – an effort to suppress Plaintiffs’ particular

point of view. In its order of September 24, 2004, denying Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary

injunction, the Court expressed frustration at Defendants’ previous failure to articulate their

reasons for denying or restricting Plaintiffs’ access to Building 331. Order of Sept. 24, 2004 at 3. 

The Court went on to state that Defendants had articulated their reasons only in a second

supplemental brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Id. The Court

noted Defendants’ statements that the VA had made a policy decision that it wished to remain

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

non-partisan in the eyes of the public and VA residents, and for that reason had restricted voter

registration to non-partisan groups like the League of Women Voters and California Protection

and Advocacy. Id. at 4. As far as the Court can discern from the record, however, Defendants

have never expressed this policy in an official publication or statement, despite repeated requests

by Plaintiffs that they do so.

Instead, Defendants have made accusations against Preminger and his counsel of

inappropriate conduct at Building 331, citing this conduct as part of the reason for their

exclusion. See Dwight Wilson Decl., ¶ 9; Karen Girton Decl., ¶¶ 2-7; Myrel Willeford Decl., ¶¶

2-4. Prominent in the declarations submitted by Defendants are references to the (undisputed)

fact that Preminger’s counsel was wearing a Kerry button. Karen Girton Decl., ¶ 6; Myrel

Willeford Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7. There also is evidence that Defendants permitted outside persons to

enter Building 347 on the Menlo Park VA campus, a closed drug rehabilitation facility, for the

purpose of registering voters as Republican. On May 25, 2006, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted a

request for judicial notice accompanied by a declaration of counsel bearing the same date. 

Attached to the declaration are fourteen voter registration forms completed by residents of

Building 347 during September and October 2004 with the assistance of three different

individuals whose party affiliation, if any, is not noted on the forms. Scott Rafferty Decl. of May

25, 2006 and Exhs. thereto. All fourteen of the Building 347 residents registered Republican. Id. 

One reasonable inference that could be drawn from this evidence is that members of the

Republican Party entered Building 347 during September and October 2004 for the purpose of

registering individual residents. Because Building 347 is a closed facility, any individual

conducting voter registration therein almost certainly had to have permission from VA officials. 

Defendants object to the registration form evidence on the grounds that the evidence is

not an appropriate subject for judicial notice, it was submitted late, and it does not demonstrate

that anyone actually conducted voter registration inside Building 347 (Defendants suggest that all

fourteen individuals completed their voter registration forms while off the VA campus). The

Court agrees that the registration forms are not an appropriate subject for judicial notice. 

However, the Court in its discretion will accept the forms as late-filed evidence in opposition to

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ counsel explains in his declaration why

the evidence was not available previously, and the evidence clearly is relevant to the issues

before the Court on this motion. Accordingly, Defendants’ objection is overruled.

Defendants note that, despite Plaintiffs’ efforts to redact identifying information from the

voter registration forms, some identifying information such as email addresses does remain on

the forms. Defendants request that the Court order that the voter registration forms be sealed. 

That request is granted.

In conclusion, the Court concludes that triable issues of material fact exist as to why

Defendants excluded Plaintiffs from Building 331. Those triable issues preclude summary

judgment for either side with respect to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim asserting that their

exclusion from Building 331 was arbitrary or discriminatory.

3. Ban Of Buttons And Bumper Stickers

It does not appear from the facts alleged in the SAC that Plaintiffs were banned from

displaying buttons or bumper stickers. The buttons and bumper stickers that Plaintiffs’ counsel

displayed appear to be relevant to Plaintiffs’ contention that they were excluded from Building

331 because they supported Senator Kerry.

4. Limitation Of Access Based Upon Party Status

As discussed above, the Court concludes that the VA properly may exclude political

parties from conducting voter registration at Building 331 if such exclusion is pursuant to a

viewpoint-neutral policy. Accordingly, the articulation of such a policy does not provide the

basis of a First Amendment claim.

5. Failure To Accommodate Partisan Voter Registration

Again, the Court concludes that the VA properly may exclude political parties from

conducting voter registration at Building 331 if such exclusion is pursuant to a viewpoint-neutral

policy. Accordingly, the failure to permit the Democratic Party from conducting voter

registration does not provide the basis of a First Amendment claim.

6. Summary

In summary, the Court concludes as a matter of law that, assuming the facial validity of §

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

1.218(a)(14), the VA properly may exclude partisan groups from conducting voter registration at

Building 331 if such exclusion is pursuant to a viewpoint-neutral policy designed to avoid actual

endorsement or the appearance of endorsement with respect to any particular political party. The

unresolved issues in this case are (a) whether Defendants actually have formulated such a policy

and (b) whether Plaintiffs were excluded from Building 331 pursuant to such a policy rather than

for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, while the Court will grant Defendants’

motion for summary judgment with respect to the majority of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment

claims, the Court will deny summary judgment to either side with respect to Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment claim asserting arbitrary or discriminatory exclusion from Building 331.

The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ SAC makes reference to a desire to register voters in

other areas of the Menlo Park VA campus. All of the allegations and evidence in the record

indicate that Plaintiffs were excluded from Building 331 only. Accordingly, the Court concludes

that claims with respect to other areas of the campus are unripe. There has been no

determination whether other areas of the campus constitute non-public fora and no development

of a factual record as to any exclusions from such areas. 

B. Second Claim: Intimidation Of Lawful Political Contributions

Plaintiffs claim that they and potential contributors to the Democratic Party were

“intimated” by an internal VA memorandum dated April 14, 2004, stating that 18 U.S.C. § 607

imposes criminal liability for the solicitation or receipt of political contributions on federal

property. There is no evidence that any individual member of the Democratic Party, or any

potential contributor, saw this internal memorandum or was threatened with prosecution under §

607 during the events in question. Moreover, Plaintiffs have cited no authority for the

proposition that they may sue the VA to force it to correct an internal agency memorandum, even

assuming that such memorandum interprets § 607 incorrectly. Accordingly, the Court will grant

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ second claim.

C. Third Claim: Violation Of Equal Protection

Plaintiffs claim that the VA has violated the equal protection rights of minority and

disabled voters by refusing Plaintiffs entry to Building 331. Plaintiffs’ theory appears to be that

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

voter registration groups other than the Democratic Party will not adequately ensure that minority

and disabled veterans are given the opportunity to register to vote. As is discussed above, a

federal agency may make a policy decision to permit only non-partisan groups to conduct voter

registration on federal property that constitutes a non-public forum. See Monterey County, 812

F.2d at 1198-99. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that non-partisan organizations

will not adequately ensure that minority and disabled veterans are given the opportunity to

register to vote. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

with respect to Plaintiffs’ third claim.

D. Fourth Claim: Conspiracy To Violate Civil Rights

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights as guaranteed

by the First and Fifth Amendments. A conspiracy to effect a deprivation of a civil right is not

actionable unless there has in fact been a deprivation of the civil right. Woodrum v. Woodward

County, 866, F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1986). As discussed above, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim. With respect to

Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether there has

been a deprivation. However, Defendants contend that even assuming a deprivation of Plaintiffs’

First Amendment rights, Defendants cannot be held liable for conspiracy in light of the

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which states that a conspiracy requires agreement between

two or more persons or distinct business entities. See United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., Inc.,

20 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1994). Defendants contend that all Defendants are VA employees

alleged to have excluded Plaintiffs from Building 331 pursuant to official VA policy and thus

that no liability can attach if the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies. Defendants concede

that the Ninth Circuit expressly has left open the issue of whether the doctrine applies to

government entities as well as private corporations, see Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995

F.2d 898, 910 (9th Cir. 1983), but argues that this Court should follow the reasoning of other

courts that have applied the doctrine to government entities.

If it were clear from the record that all of the individual Defendants acted pursuant to a

single VA policy, the Court might be inclined to follow those decisions that apply the

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to government entities. However, as is discussed above, there

is conflicting evidence as to why Plaintiffs were excluded from Building 331. While some

evidence suggests that the exclusion was pursuant to an official VA policy, other evidence

suggests that some of the individual Defendants sought to discriminate against Plaintiffs’

viewpoint or simply took a dislike to Plaintiffs, or both. Under these circumstances, it is not

clear that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would apply in this case, even assuming that the

doctrine is applicable to government entities generally. Accordingly, the Court will deny

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ fourth claim. 

E. Fifth Claim: Violation Of The National Voter Registration Act

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated the National Voter Registration Act of 1993

(“NVRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants knowingly

and willfully attempted to coerce Plaintiffs as a result of the voter registration activities in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(1)(A). However, this section sets forth criminal penalties for

violation of the NVRA. Plaintiffs have not cited, and the Court has not discovered, any authority

permitting the enforcement of this criminal provision in a private civil suit. The NVRA does

provide for a private right of action to enforce provisions set forth at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-2

through 1973gg-6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b)(2). However, Plaintiffs do not appear to be

alleging any violations of §§ 1973gg-2 through 1973gg-6. Accordingly, the Court will grant

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ fifth claim.

F. Qualified Immunity

Defendants contend that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for

their conduct in excluding Plaintiffs from Building 331. A determination as to an official’s

entitlement to qualified immunity involves a two-pronged inquiry. First, do the facts alleged,

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct

violated a constitutional right? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Sorrels v. McKee, 290

F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002). This first prong mirrors the substantive summary judgment

inquiry on the merits of the constitutional claim. Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 969. Second, if the

plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right, was that right clearly established? 

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 969. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

This inquiry is wholly objective; the defendant’s subjective belief as to the lawfulness of his or

her conduct is irrelevant. Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 970.

In the instant case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Plaintiffs were excluded from Building 331 not

pursuant to an official, viewpoint-neutral VA policy prohibiting voter registration by political

parties, but rather for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. The Court concludes that such

exclusion would violate Plaintiffs’ clearly established First Amendment right to register voters

and that no reasonable official in Defendants’ positions could have believed that exclusion for

arbitrary or discriminatory reasons was constitutional. Accordingly, based upon triable issues of

material fact as to the actual reasons for Plaintiffs’ exclusion, the Court will deny Defendants’

motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

G. Plaintiffs’ Submission Of Additional Evidence And Argument

Following the close of briefing in this matter under the Civil Local Rules, Plaintiffs made

three additional submissions of evidence and argument: (1) a request for judicial notice, filed

May 25, 2007; (2) a motion for leave to file two decisions from the Fourth Circuit decided after

submission of the motions, filed January 24, 2007; and (3) a motion for leave to file the

government’s brief with respect to the facial challenge to § 1.218(a)(14) pending in the Federal

Circuit, filed February 9, 2007. 

As discussed above, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of the voter

registration forms but has considered the forms as evidence relevant to the pending motions. The

Court will overrule Defendants’ objections to this evidence. 

 The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the two decisions from the Fourth

Circuit, Child Evangelism Fellowship of South Carolina v. Anderson School District Five, 470

F.3d 1062 (4th Cir. 2006) and Child Evangelism of Maryland, Inc. v. Montgomery County Public

Schools, 457 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2006). However, as noted by Defendants, these decisions are

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

non-binding and have limited application to the instant case. Both decisions address school

district policies that vested “unbridled discretion” in school district officials to exclude speech

based upon viewpoint. Nothing in the decisions undermines the Ninth Circuit decision relied

upon by this Court in the instant order, Monterey County, holding that a federal agency may

prohibit voter registration by partisan groups on agency premises, so long as such prohibition is

reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.

Finally, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the governments’ brief

addressing Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to § 1.218(a)(14). As noted by Defendants, the brief is

irrelevant to the issues before this Court. However, this Court perceives no harm in permitting

Plaintiffs to file the brief in this action. 

IV. ORDER

(1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART as follows: the motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ first claim

that they were excluded from Building 331 for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons

in violation of their First Amendment rights, as to Plaintiffs’ fourth claim for

conspiracy to violate their First Amendment rights, and as to the individual

Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity. The motion is GRANTED as to the

remainder of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Claims, as to Plaintiffs’ second claim

for intimidation of lawful political contribution, as to Plaintiffs’ third claim for

violation of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, and as to Plaintiffs’ fifth

claim for violation of the NVRA; 

(2) Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED; 

(3) Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice dated May 25, 2006 is DENIED; however,

the Court has considered the voter registration forms attached thereto as evidence

relevant to the pending motions. Defendants’ evidentiary objections are

OVERRULED; however, Defendants’ request that the voter registration forms be

sealed is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall SEAL the request for judicial

notice and attached exhibits, filed as Docket No. 109;

(4) Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file two decisions from the Fourth Circuit decided

after submission of the motions, filed January 24, 2007, is GRANTED; and 

(5) Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the government’s brief with respect to the facial

challenge to § 1.218(a)(14) pending in the Federal Circuit, filed February 9, 2007,

is GRANTED. 

DATED: 3/7/07 

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Case No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SJ ETC.

(JFLC2)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Owen Peter Martikan owen.martikan@usdoj.gov, lily.c.ho-vuong@usdoj.gov

Scott Joseph Rafferty rafferty@alumni.princeton.edu, rafferty@alumni.princeton.edu

Case 5:04-cv-02012-JF Document 133 Filed 03/07/07 Page 14 of 14