Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01873/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01873-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 46:30505-30510 Exoneration, Limitation of Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

In the matter of the Complaint of 

MARK S. FRANCIS and WENDY P. 

FRANCIS, as owners of the vessel 

"Fortuna," 

For exoneration from, or limitation of, 

liability. 

 Case No.: 16cv1873 H (JMA) 

ORDER COMPELLING 

AQUANEERING, INC. TO COMPLY 

WITH SUBPOENA [ECF NO. 39] 

Presently before the Court is an Ex Parte Application for an Order 

Compelling Compliance with Third Party Subpoena filed by Claimant-inLimitation Dale Anderson (“Anderson”), in which Anderson seeks an order 

compelling third-party Aquaneering, Inc. (“Aquaneering”) to comply with his 

subpoena for the employment records of Bradley D. Tobias (“Tobias”). (ECF No. 

39.) Plaintiffs-in-Limitation Mark S. Francis and Wendy P. Francis (“the 

Francises”) filed a response to the application (ECF No. 44), as did Aquaneering 

(ECF No. 45). 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Anderson’s ex parte 

application and ORDERS Aquaneering to comply with the subpoena. 

// 

// 

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I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Complaint in this matter. On 

February 20, 2016, the Francises, the owners of the vessel known as Fortuna, 

permitted Tobias to take their vessel for his personal use. Also on board were 

Tobias’s friends, Anderson and Claimant Tatiana Sancheeva. At 6:00 p.m., the 

vessel was underway in San Diego Bay, having departed Coronado Landing and 

heading toward Shelter Island. While the vessel was transiting in the bay in a 

north direction, it struck another vessel, Hallyon, owned by Claimant Jason 

Anderson. Tobias was ejected from the vessel, which continued its trajectory 

and eventually crashed into a chain link fence and rock riprap along the west 

shoreline of the U.S. Coast Guard base, with the passengers still on board. The 

accident resulted in damage to both vessels and personal injuries to the 

passengers. The Francises claim the benefits of exoneration from or limitation of 

liability provided for in the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq. 

The post-casualty value of Fortuna is $7,000. See Compl., ECF No. 1. 

Anderson and his wife, Ana Anderson, assert a claim of general maritime 

negligence against the Francises and Tobias. See Answer, ECF No. 10. The 

Andersons contend the accident was caused by the recklessness and negligence 

of Tobias, as operator of the Fortuna, and that his conduct was in the privity and 

knowledge of the Francises. They allege Tobias suffered from alcoholism and a 

debilitating disease, multiple sclerosis, which was known to the Francises, and 

that he consumed alcoholic beverages the afternoon and evening prior to the 

accident. They further assert that Tobias directed the Fortuna to the A-9 

anchorage, which was full of anchored vessels and is not the route one would 

take to Shelter Island. Tobias was allegedly driving at a high rate of speed when 

the Fortuna collided with the Hallyon, which was anchored and unoccupied at the 

time. Anderson was thrown from his seat on impact, and sustained major trauma 

including an open head wound, fractures, hematomas, a broken jaw, and several 

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facial fractures. Anderson’s medical expenses to date exceed $1,000,000, and 

future medical care is anticipated. Id. 

On June 23, 2017, Anderson served a subpoena upon the custodian of 

records for Aquaneering, Tobias’s employer, commanding the production of the 

following by July 11, 2017: 

Any and all employment records (with the exception of any financial 

related information) from any and all dates pertaining to: Bradley 

David Tobias, DOB: September 2, 1973, including, but not limited to, 

the following: his personnel file; employment application; worker’s 

compensation information (excluding any financial information);

termination records; background checks or investigation information; 

reprimands; write-ups; disciplinary actions; complaints; and, 

correspondence relating to Mr. Tobias’s health (including, but not 

limited to, correspondence related to Mr. Tobias’s diagnosis of

multiple sclerosis and/or affective disorder), his employment status 

and/or Mr. Tobias’s use of drugs and/or alcohol. 

Griffin Decl., Ex. O. The Francises are the owners and directors of Aquaneering. 

Pls.’ Statement of Facts in Supp. of MSJ, ECF No. 38-2, No. 2. On July 11, 

2017, counsel representing Aquaneering in connection with the subpoena sent a 

letter advising that Aquaneering could not unilaterally waive Tobias’s privacy 

rights in his personnel file. Griffin Decl., Ex. Q. Aquaneering’s counsel had been 

unable to contact Tobias regarding his willingness to waive his privacy rights due 

to his being incarcerated due to a felony conviction relating to the subject 

accident. Id., ¶ 3 & Ex. Q. Anderson’s counsel sent Tobias a copy of the 

subpoena on July 28, 2017, after he had been released from custody and had 

resumed living on his boat. Id., ¶ 9. Anderson’s counsel requested that Tobias 

respond with any objections within 14 days, but no objection was received. Id. 

Anderson’s counsel spoke with Tobias in person at a restitution hearing on 

August 1, 2017 and via telephone on August 17, 2017; both times, Tobias 

indicated he wanted to confer with Mr. Francis before signing an authorization to 

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release his Aquaneering employment file. Id., ¶ 10. Anderson’s counsel 

attempted to contact Tobias by telephone approximately 10-15 times after 

issuance of the subpoena to request that he authorize the release of his records 

to no avail. Id., ¶ 14. On October 18, 2017, Anderson’s counsel left a final 

message for Tobias informing him that the instant motion would be filed and 

requesting that he inform counsel whether he had any objections to the 

subpoena by October 20, 2017. Id. Anderson’s counsel does not know whether 

Tobias ever spoke with Mr. Francis about the matter or if Mr. Francis instructed 

Tobias to not execute the release. Id., ¶ 15. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

Discovery is purposefully broad under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Each party generally has the right to discover “any nonprivileged matter that is 

relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the 

case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information within the scope of discovery need 

not be admissible in evidence in order to be discoverable. Id. Rule 45 allows for 

the issuance of subpoenas to produce documents, electronically stored 

information, or tangible things. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C). A person 

commanded to produce documents pursuant to a subpoena may serve on the 

party or attorney designated in the subpoena a written objection before the 

earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is 

served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B). A person subject to or affected by a 

subpoena may move to quash or modify a subpoena if it requires disclosure of 

privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies, or subjects 

a person to undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), (iv). 

Federal courts recognize a constitutional right to privacy. Stallworth v. 

Brollini, 288 F.R.D. 439, 444 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2012) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 

429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)). Federal courts also consider privacy rights protected 

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by state constitutions or statutes. Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 

(N.D. Cal. July 17, 1995). To evaluate privacy objections under either federal or 

state law, the Court must balance the party’s need for the information against the 

individual’s privacy right in his employment files. Tierno v. Rite Aid Corp., 2008 

WL 3287035, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2008) (citing cases). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. The Court Deems the Ex Parte Application to be Timely Filed 

The Francises argue Anderson’s application is untimely as it was filed two 

months after the discovery cutoff, prejudicing their right to a fair hearing on their 

motion for summary judgment, and that Anderson demonstrated a complete lack 

of diligence in obtaining Tobias’s employment file. Pls.’ Resp., ECF No. 44 at 2. 

They contend Anderson had ample opportunity to seek Tobias’s authorization for 

disclosure of his personnel file at his all-day deposition on June 7, 2017, and had 

sufficient time during the discovery period to seek an order compelling 

compliance with the subpoena, but chose instead to wait until one week before 

their opposition to the Francises’ summary judgment motion was due before 

seeking a court order. Id. 

The initial scheduling order in this case included a fact discovery cutoff of 

June 16, 2017. See ECF No. 27. On April 27, 2017, the Court continued the fact 

discovery cutoff to August 15, 2017 pursuant to a joint motion filed by the parties. 

See ECF No. 32. The timing of discovery motions before this Court is not 

determined by the discovery cutoff date, but rather is set forth in the 

undersigned’s Chambers Rules. The Chambers Rules provide that if parties are 

not able to resolve a dispute through the meet and confer process, counsel shall, 

within 45 days of the date upon which the event giving rise to the dispute 

occurred, file a joint statement entitled “Joint Motion for Determination of 

Discovery Dispute.” For written discovery, the event giving rise to the discovery 

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dispute is the service of the response. If a party fails to provide a discovery 

response, the event giving rise to the discovery dispute is the date the response 

was due. See Chambers Rules. 

Here, the response to the subpoena was due on July 11, 2017. Griffin 

Decl., Ex. O. As such, any discovery motion relating to the subpoena was due to 

be filed by August 25, 2017. On August 22, 2017, Anderson’s counsel, Ms. 

Griffin, notified the Court that she and Aquaneering’s counsel had stipulated to 

continue the deadline to file a discovery motion relating to the subpoena to 

September 21, 2017, in the hopes that Tobias would authorize release of his 

personnel file, given that he had authorized the release of his medical records. 

Griffin Decl., ¶ 12. On September 13, 2017, counsel again stipulated to continue 

the discovery motion filing deadline to October 20, 2017, as the parties planned 

to attend mediation on October 16, 2017. Id., ¶	13. Ms. Griffin contacted the 

undersigned’s chambers that same day to request the Court’s approval of 

counsel’s new stipulated deadline. The undersigned’s law clerk advised Ms. 

Griffin advised that if the deadline were continued to October 20, 2017, it would 

not be possible for the discovery motion to be decided prior to the filing of 

dispositive motions, as the deadline for the hearing on dispositive motions was 

November 13, 2017, necessitating that moving papers be filed no later than 

October 16, 2017. After Ms. Griffin assured the Court that would not present a 

problem, the Court authorized the extension and directed that the discovery 

motion be filed as an ex parte application instead of a “joint motion for 

determination of discovery dispute,” as Aquaneering is not a party to this action. 

Ms. Griffin notified all counsel of the extension and requested that any objections 

to the continuance be made immediately. Griffin Decl. in Supp. of Reply, ¶ 3. No 

party objected. Id. 

The Francises thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment on

September 27, 2017, with a hearing date of November 13, 2017. See ECF No. 

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38. After filing the instant ex parte application on October 20, 2017, Anderson 

filed an ex parte application for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), in which he 

requested a continuance of the hearing on the Francises’ motion for summary 

judgment until such time as this Court has ruled on the motion to compel 

compliance with subpoena. See ECF No. 41. No opposition was filed in 

response to the application, and the Honorable Marilyn L. Huff granted a 

continuance of the hearing to January 8, 2018. Id. Anderson’s response to the 

summary judgment motion is currently due by December 1, 2017. Id. 

The Court disagrees that Anderson acted with a “complete lack of 

diligence” with respect to the subpoena. Even if Anderson’s counsel did not seek 

Tobias’s authorization to release his employment records during his June 2017 

deposition, counsel certainly made many attempts to do so thereafter during the 

discovery period. Additionally, while it could be said that Anderson delayed 

somewhat in bringing the instant motion, the Court finds he acted in good faith in 

doing so. Anderson obviously hoped to not have to bring the motion, and chose 

to twice stipulate to continue the filing deadline while attempting to preserve 

resources and reach a resolution which would not necessitate court intervention. 

He initially hoped Tobias would sign an authorization allowing the release of his 

employment file, and then hoped the case would settle at mediation. As neither 

of these occurred, Anderson was forced to proceed with this motion. It cannot be 

said Anderson was dilatory in seeking an order compelling compliance with the 

subpoena; indeed, this Court granted permission to Anderson to file the instant 

motion by October 20, 2017, to which the Francises did not object.1

 The delay 

resulting from considering the ex parte application is not lengthy, and is not the 

 

1 While the undersigned granted the extension with the qualification that any briefing and 

hearings before the district judge should not be disturbed, it is still the case that Anderson had 

permission to file his motion on October 20, 2017. In any event, the district judge granted 

Anderson’s motion pursuant to Rule 56(d) to continue the deadlines relating to the Francises’ 

summary judgment motion.

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result of neglect or disrespect for the Court or the other parties. The impact on 

the proceedings is minimal, and the Francises are not unduly prejudiced. 

“Prejudice requires greater harm than simply that relief would delay resolution of 

the case.” Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2009). The 

Court will therefore address the merits of the instant motion. 

B. Tobias Did Not Challenge the Subpoena

A party that is not the recipient of a subpoena has standing to challenge the 

subpoena “where its challenge asserts that the information is privileged or 

protected to itself.” Belling v. DDP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 12140986, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. May 30, 2013) (citing Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil Co., Inc., 

157 F.R.D. 691, 695 (D. Nev. 1994)). Tobias has standing to challenge the 

subpoena as it seeks his personnel files. He has not, however, done so. He has 

not moved to quash the subpoena, to modify the subpoena, or for a protective 

order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).2 

C. Anderson’s Need for the Information Sought Outweighs Tobias’s Privacy 

 Interests 

The Francises’ assertion that the documents sought are irrelevant is 

without merit. Clearly, there may be information in Tobias’s personnel files 

relevant to this case. “The Limitation of Liability Act limits shipowner liability 

arising from the unseaworthiness of the shipowner’s vessel or the negligence of 

the vessel’s crew unless the condition of unseaworthiness or the act of 

negligence was within the shipowner’s ‘privity or knowledge.’” In re Bowfin M/V, 

339 F.3d 1137, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). “’Privity or knowledge’ may be 

active or constructive; therefore, in addition to showing a lack of actual 

knowledge or the cause of the loss, the owner must also demonstrate that it has 

 

2 The Francises, as the plaintiffs-in-limitation in this action and as the owners of Aquaneering, 

have provided no argument or authority that they have standing to challenge the subpoena, 

and indeed have not challenged the subpoena. 

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‘avail[ed] itself of whatever means of knowledge are reasonably necessary to 

prevent conditions likely to cause losses.’” Washington State Dept. of Transp. v. 

Sea Coast Towing, Inc., 148 Fed. Appx. 612, 613 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 

Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724, 732 (9th Cir. 1969)). 

The determination of what the Francises knew or should have known about 

Tobias and whether he could safely operate their vessel is a key issue in this 

litigation. Documents relating to a background check or lack thereof, driver’s 

license check or lack thereof, criminal history, performance reviews, medical 

and/or disability issues, insurance coverage issues, disciplinary proceedings, 

history of being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and complaints are 

relevant to the Francises’ knowledge of whether Tobias could safely operate the 

vessel, as well as the credibility of the Francises and Tobias as witnesses. 

Although the Francises argue Tobias’s 2006 motor vehicle accident and 2007 

misdemeanor charge are inadmissible, discovery need not be admissible in 

evidence in order to be discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

The importance of the information sought outweighs Tobias’s privacy 

interests, particularly given that the subpoena does not seek any of Tobias’s 

personal financial information, and because the parties can enter into a stipulated 

protective order to lessen the impact the disclosure will have on Tobias’s privacy. 

The Court therefore requires the parties to enter into a stipulated protective order 

which limits the dissemination of the documents in the personnel file and allows 

use of the documents for purposes of this litigation only. Such a protective order 

will amply protect Tobias’s privacy interests. See, e.g., Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616 

(stating that “[a] carefully drafted protective order could minimize the impact of . . 

. disclosure”). 

IV. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth above, Aquaneering’s objection to the subpoena 

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served by Anderson is OVERRULED. The parties shall prepare a stipulated 

protective order and file a request for entry of the protective order forthwith. 

Aquaneering is ORDERED to produce Tobias’s personnel file pursuant to the 

stipulated protective order by November 22, 2017. No further discovery is 

permitted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 15, 2017 

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