Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01327/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01327-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TREMAINE DEON CARROLL,

Plaintiff,

v.

TIM VIRGA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-1327 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff consented to proceed 

before the undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). By order filed March 29, 2013, 

plaintiff’s civil rights complaint was dismissed, and plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended 

complaint raising claims based on incidents at California State Prison, Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”) 

within thirty days. Rather than file an amended complaint, plaintiff filed a document styled, 

“Objection to Court’s Order, Motion for Reconsideration on Amendment, Appointment of 

Counsel.” (ECF No. 23.) The court construes this filing as a request for reconsideration of the 

court’s March 29, 2013 orders.

In his request, plaintiff renews his claim that the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) operates a “green wall” in which all the named defendants operate as a 

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gang, and which plaintiff identifies as the CDCR/CCPOA1/Green Wall. (ECF No. 23 at 1.) 

Plaintiff argues that just as any other gang would fall under one uniform indictment, the 

defendants named in plaintiff’s original complaint systematically abused plaintiff and violated his 

civil, constitutional, and human rights while he was incarcerated at various prisons throughout 

California. (ECF No. 23 at 2.) Plaintiff now claims that he has been transferred over 100 times, 

resulting in the loss of thousands of dollars’ worth of personal property, in an effort to hide 

plaintiff from his family, and to mentally and physically torture plaintiff. (ECF No. 23 at 2.) 

Plaintiff provides an article concerning inmates at the Los Angeles County Jail, and claims that he 

is going through the same abuse as the Los Angeles County Jail inmates. (ECF No. 23 at 10-20.)

Plaintiff claims that he has been “beaten, sexually assaulted, and set-up with manufactured 

rules violations reports/manufactured lies in central/medical file, loss of property, loss of

relationships with family and loved ones due to MML/phone manipulation by staff” based on a 

handwritten statement he signed on September 18, 2009. (ECF No. 23 at 2.) Plaintiff now claims 

that the CCPOA has formed a “brown wall” at R.J. Donovan State Prison (“RJD”), where 

plaintiff is presently housed, and are “breaking rules, laws, and acting like the Mexican Mafia.” 

(ECF No. 23 at 3.) Plaintiff contends he suffers from serious mental health issues, and is 

prescribed anti-psychotic drugs, as demonstrated by an order addressing his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus filed in the Central District. (Id.)

In the 2009 handwritten statement, plaintiff contended that seasoned correctional officers 

at CSP-SAC were following the script of the television show, ”The Shield,” using the moniker, 

“The Green Monster,” and claiming nothing can stop them because they are backed by the 

CCPOA. (ECF No. 23 at 22.) Plaintiff claimed the Green Monster was spearheaded by officers 

Skruggs [sic] and Stinson, who allegedly sold cellphones and tobacco, and the officer who did not 

sell the product then conducted a raid to confiscate the product. Plaintiff claimed that the Green 

Monster had tower officers who monitored which inmates used prison collect phone calls and 

then other officers would solicit inmates to purchase cellphones to avoid the collect call rates. 

 

1

 CCPOA is the acronym for the California Correctional Peace Officers Association.

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Plaintiff conceded that he bought a cell phone from an officer and later, when plaintiff’s cell was 

searched, the searching officer demanded to know where the cellphone was that plaintiff had 

purchased from the officer’s “partner.” (ECF No. 23 at 23.) Plaintiff also contended that during 

the search, the officer planted drugs in plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff asked that the Green Monster be 

investigated and stopped. (ECF No. 23 at 23.) Plaintiff also alleged that his anti-psychotic 

medications were withheld for several months to make his claims seem bizarre and without merit.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s habeas petition as barred by the statute of 

limitations, the United States District Court for the Central District of California noted that 

plaintiff’s psychiatrist at Salinas Valley State Prison said that plaintiff suffers from psychosis 

NOS (“Not Otherwise Specified”), “a condition in which the patient’s thinking is fragmented, 

lacks order, and may include bizarre delusional content.” (ECF No. 23 at 40.) Plaintiff was seen 

68 times by mental health clinicians from May 1, 2002, to November 18, 2003. (Id.) Extensive 

medical records indicated that plaintiff was suffering from delusions, hearing voices, and suffered 

from paranoid thinking. (ECF No. 23 at 41.) Psychological staff found plaintiff had “major 

mental illness requiring placement in the CCCMS program,” and he was diagnosed with 

hallucinations. (ECF No. 23 at 41.) 

With respect to non-final orders . . . , the Ninth Circuit has 

recognized that as long as a district court has jurisdiction over the 

case, then it possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, 

rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be 

sufficient. This inherent power is grounded in the common law and 

is not abridged by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition 

to the inherent power to modify a nonfinal order, Rule 54(b) 

authorizes a district court to revise a non-final order at any time 

before entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims. . . . As to 

inherent authority, a district court may reconsider and modify an 

interlocutory decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the 

absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or 

clarification of controlling law. But a court should generally leave 

a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either 

represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice. Rule 

54(b) does not address the standards which a court should apply 

when assessing a motion to modify an interlocutory order; however, 

courts look to the standards under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) for 

guidance.

Jadwin v. County of Kern, 2010 WL 1267264, *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), citations and 

quotations omitted. “A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 

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circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange Street 

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999).

The undersigned reviewed the March 29, 2013 order, but declines to reconsider the 

dismissal based on the implausibility of plaintiff’s allegations contained in the original complaint. 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic 

Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility 

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions can 

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Plaintiff’s allegations that correctional officers 

across the state are acting as part of a gang, bent on subjecting plaintiff to violations of his 

constitutional rights are implausible on their face. Similarly, plaintiff’s 2009 claim that 

correctional officers at CSP-SAC are part of a gang known as the Green Monster are implausible.

However, in his recent filing, plaintiff claims that he has sustained injuries based on 

prison officials transferring him over 100 times. Plaintiff appends a copy of his prison trust 

account statement that suggests plaintiff was transferred six times between August 7, 2012, and 

September 7, 2012, and four times between January 5, 2013, and January 12, 2013. (ECF No. 23 

at 5-6.) While these ten transfers do not approach the number 100, plaintiff may be able to state a 

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cognizable civil rights claim if he can allege excessive transfers, either retaliatory in nature,2or 

subjecting plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and 

can link such claims to named individuals responsible for each transfer.

Nevertheless, plaintiff is cautioned that exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Exhaustion is a 

prerequisite for all prisoner suits regarding conditions of confinement, whether they involve 

general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some 

other wrong. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. Thus, in any amended complaint, plaintiff should only 

include claims for which he has exhausted his administrative remedies prior to the filing of the 

instant action.

Accordingly, the court grants plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint concerning 

incidents at CSP-SAC, as set forth in this court’s March 29, 2013 order, or3that challenges the 

allegedly excessive transfers, provided plaintiff can allege facts demonstrating that such transfers 

violated his constitutional rights and served no legitimate penological interest.

 

2

 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of 

harm may be sufficient even if an inmate cannot allege a chilling effect. Id. In order to prevail 

on a retaliation claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that he engaged in protected conduct and that 

retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor 

behind the defendant's conduct. See Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th 

Cir. 1989). In the context of a retaliation claim brought by an inmate, the plaintiff must also 

demonstrate an absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct he contends was 

retaliatory. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 

527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment right 

to file a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 

F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).

3

 Plaintiff is advised that he may join multiple claims in the same case only if they are all against 

a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Unrelated claims against different defendants must be 

pursued in multiple lawsuits. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (joinder of defendants not permitted unless both commonality and same 

transaction requirements are satisfied). For example, if plaintiff is challenging the incidents at 

CSP-SAC, he should not include his claims alleging excessive transfers, but should bring such 

claims in a separate civil rights action.

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With regard to plaintiff’s renewed request for appointment of counsel, such request is 

premature. When determining whether “exceptional circumstances” exist, the court must 

consider plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the plaintiff to 

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer v. 

Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse discretion in declining to 

appoint counsel). Because there is no operative complaint on file that demonstrates plaintiff can 

state a cognizable civil rights claim, the court is unable to determine whether appointment of 

counsel is warranted. Plaintiff’s request is denied without prejudice. 

In light of the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s filing, construed as a request for reconsideration (ECF No. 23) is denied.

2. Plaintiff’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 23) is denied.

3. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to (a) raise claims based on incidents at CSP-SAC, 

as set forth in this court’s March 29, 2013 order; OR (b) raise claims alleging excessive transfers, 

as set forth above.

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall file an original and one 

copy of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the 

requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of 

Practice. The amended complaint must also bear the docket number assigned to this case and 

must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

5. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in the 

dismissal of this action.

Dated: November 21, 2013

carr1327.rec

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