Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00794/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00794-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID EARL PARMER,

Booking # 16125004,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL; SAN 

DIEGO MEDICAL OFFICE; DOCTOR 

BERKMANN

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-0794-JLS-WVG

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL (ECF No. 6)

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On April 18, 2017, Plaintiff, David Earl Parmer, currently housed at the San Diego 

Central Jail, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and a 

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 

2). Because Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the 

Court granted him leave to proceed without full prepayment of the civil filing fees required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 3.)

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Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint in order to correct the 

deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff has now filed 

a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF Nos. 

4, 6.)

II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel to assist him in this matter. (ECF No. 6.) 

However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). While under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts have 

some limited discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, 

Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion is 

rarely exercised and only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional circumstances 

requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an 

evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the 

legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789

F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Applying these factors to Plaintiff’s case, the Court DENIES his Motion to Appoint 

Counsel because a liberal construction of his original pleadings shows he is capable of 

articulating the factual basis for his claims. All documents filed by pro se litigants are 

construed liberally, and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to 

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) requires that “[p]leadings . . . be 

construed so as to do justice.” Neither the interests of justice nor any exceptional 

circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel in this case at this time. LaMere v. 

Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

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III. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-Answer 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the 

Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is 

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

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A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wyatt 

v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Improper Defendants & Municipal Liability

Once again, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff names the “San Diego County

Jail” and the “San Diego Medical Office” as Defendants, his claims must be dismissed sua 

sponte pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

Local law enforcement departments, like the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, 

municipal agencies, or subdivisions of that department or agency, are not proper defendants 

under § 1983. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) 

(“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading 

a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 

814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ 

who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not 

a ‘person.’”). 

The County of San Diego itself may be considered a “person” and therefore, a proper 

defendant under § 1983, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); 

Hammond v. Cty. of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988). As a municipality, the 

County may be held liable under § 1983–but only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show 

that a constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution of “a 

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” 

by the County, or a “final decision maker” for the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Bd. of 

the Cty. Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402–04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 

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712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, “respondeat superior and vicarious liability are 

not cognizable theories of recovery against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark Cty., Nev., 

279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002). “Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the 

alleged constitutional deprivation was inflicted in ‘execution of a government’s policy or 

custom.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might 

plausibly suggest” that the County itself violated his constitutional rights. See Hernandez 

v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading standards 

to Monell claims); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 

provides for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced 

by affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally 

required duties, cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights).

C. Medical Care Claims 

Plaintiff offers very few specific factual details regarding his allegations. It does 

appear that he has requested a wheelchair but Defendant Berkmann told Plaintiff he did 

not need a wheelchair. (See FAC at 4.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Berkmann 

denied him medication but he then alleges that Defendant Berkmann did give him a shot 

of pain medication. (Id. at 4–5.) He further appears to allege that he is challenging the 

choice of pain medication prescribed by Defendant Berkmann and also claims he is denied 

physical therapy. (Id. at 5.)

Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Clouthier 

v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241–44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle’s 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims 

alleged to violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights).

For the purposes of this stage of the screening process, the Court will view Plaintiff’s 

facts in the light most favorable to him and find that he has alleged that his medical needs 

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were objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(defining a “serious medical need” as one which the “failure to treat . . . could result in 

further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”), overruled 

on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). The “existence of an injury that a reasonable 

doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence 

of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a 

‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059-60.

However, even if the Court assumes Plaintiff’s medical conditions were “objectively 

serious,” nothing in his FAC supports a “reasonable inference that [any individual] 

defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In order 

to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate that prison 

officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). 

The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to 

malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 

1204 (9th Cir. 2002)); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

Here, while Plaintiff obviously disagrees with Defendant Berkmann’s assessment of 

his need for a certain type of medication to treat his pain, his disagreement, without more, 

does not provide sufficient “factual content” to plausibly suggest that his physician acted 

with deliberate indifference. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin 

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it ask for more than the sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.”). 

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“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner–or between medical 

professionals–concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122-23. Rather, Plaintiff “must 

show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 

330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege an 

inadequate medical care claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b).

D. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC fails to 

state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix the 

pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

IV. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 6).

2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

3. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is 

cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be 

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complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim 

not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”). 

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983” 

for his use in amending. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2017

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