Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02509/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02509-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BRUCE ALAN MORRISON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-02509 PHX ROS (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

On October 20, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed a Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Response”) (Docket No. 14) on March 23, 2007.

Petitioner filed a reply to the response on May 14, 2007. See

Docket No. 19.

I Procedural History

In 2000, Petitioner was charged by indictment with five

counts of sexual abuse, five counts of molestation of a child,

six counts of sexual conduct with a minor, and one count of

attempted sexual conduct with a minor, regarding events

involving two victims occurring over approximately two years.

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Response, Exh. P. One of the victims recanted her allegations

at least once. Id., Exh. B at 114. The indictment alleged the

crimes were dangerous crimes against children, i.e., that the

victims were under 15 years of age when the acts occurred. Id.,

Exh. P. 

Prior to trial, Petitioner rejected a plea offer which

would have provided for a conviction on two counts of attempted

sexual conduct with a minor, with a stipulation for a sentence

of five to fifteen years imprisonment and lifetime probation.

Id., Exh. A at 2-4. Additionally, after a hearing, the trial

court denied a motion to a suppress a taped telephone

conversation between Petitioner and one of the victims, which

was surreptitiously recorded by the victim’s mother and the

victim’s mother’s boyfriend. Id., Exh. CC. At the hearing,

Petitioner’s counsel argued admission of the tape recording

violated “the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, as well as Article 2, Section 8, of the Arizona

Constitution, which contained a right of privacy and was broader

and provided more protection than the Fourth Amendment.” Id.,

Exh. CC at 4. 

Prior to Petitioner’s trial the Superior Court also

denied defense counsel’s motion to exclude expert testimony

regarding characteristics of sex offenders and victims of child

abuse in the context of “child sexual abuse accommodation

syndrome.” Id., Exh. B. The trial court concluded that,

pursuant to Arizona law, a Frye hearing was not required for the

admission of expert witness testimony regarding child sexual

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1

 Fry v. United States, 293 F. 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

Petitioner also argued Arizona common law required admission of expert

testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome be

accompanied by a jury instruction limiting the use of this evidence,

citing Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 480, 1 P.3d 113, 123

(2000). See Answer, Exh. W.

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abuse accommodation syndrome. Id.1

Both victims testified at Petitioner’s trial. Id.,

Exh. D, Exh. E, Exh. F, Exh. H. The government also offered the

evidence of an expert witness in the field of child sexual abuse

accommodation syndrome and a forensic examiner. Id., Exh. D,

Exh. I. Petitioner testified at his trial. Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner denied he had ever committed any of the acts alleged.

Id., Exh. J. Petitioner allowed that he had “played along

somewhat” with one of the girls by engaging in sexual

conversation on the telephone. Id., Exh. J at 73. Petitioner

acknowledged he had engaged in sexually explicit conversation

with one of the victims. Id., Exh. J at 83.

The tape of the telephone conversation between

Petitioner and one of the victims was played by the prosecutor

during closing arguments and the jurors requested the tape

during deliberations and played the tape in the jury room during

deliberations. Id., Exh. CC at 9-10.

Petitioner was convicted on eight of the counts charged

in the indictment. Id., Exh. S. The jury acquitted Petitioner

on four of the counts charged in the indictment, and five of the

counts were dismissed on the government’s motion prior to

deliberations. Id., Exh. S & Exh. Y. Petitioner filed a motion

for a new trial. Id., Exh. T & Exh. U. Petitioner’s motion for

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a new trial argued the exclusion of evidence relative to

Petitioner’s defense deprived Petitioner of his right to a fair

trial, i.e., due process of law. Id., Exh. T at 5. Petitioner

also asserted the trial court’s limitations on his ability to

cross-examine the expert witness as to his motive for testifying

for the prosecution violated his Sixth Amendment right to

confront witnesses against him. Id., Exh. T at 8.

Additionally, Petitioner maintained he was deprived of his right

to due process because the trial court did not declare a

mistrial after a prosecution witness offered a hearsay statement

regarding uncharged bad acts. Id., Exh. T at 9.

On August 17, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to the

presumptive term of five years imprisonment on two of the eight

counts of conviction, these terms to be served concurrently.

Id., Exh. V. Petitioner was sentenced to a presumptive

concurrent term of seventeen years imprisonment on Count 5,

presumptive consecutive terms of 20 years imprisonment on Counts

7, 13, 14, and 15, and a consecutive presumptive term of ten

years imprisonment on count 17. Id., Exh. V. Accordingly, the

aggregate term of imprisonment imposed on all counts was 107

years.

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner asserted

the trial court erred by admitting the expert testimony

regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome without

conducting a Frye hearing and without a limiting instruction to

the jury regarding the proper use of this testimony. Id., Exh.

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2

The defense theory in this matter was simple.

Specifically, [a victim’s father, who was

divorced from her mother] had made repeated

threats against [Petitioner, who was romantically

involved with the victim’s mother], and had

turned him into CPS numerous times, all without

result. Armed with a single tape of [Petitioner]

making foolish statements to his daughter’s best

friend [the other victim], [the father] made a

“mountain out of molehill,” (sic) or, more

precisely, made seventeen felonies (the initial

indictment in this matter) out of a single

misdemeanor (contributing to the delinquency of

a minor, [Petitioner’s] only offense).

Response, Exh. O at 2. Petitioner sought to introduce evidence that

the victim’s father had previously accused other men of sexually

abusing his daughter, and evidence that the two victims had previously

“conspired” to take pictures of themselves flirting with a different

adult male. Id., Exh. O & Exh. CC. Petitioner also sought to

introduce evidence that Petitioner and one of the victims were

reciting song lyrics, rather than describing actual events, during the

surreptitiously-recorded telephone conversation introduced at his

trial. Id., Exh. O.

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O. Petitioner also asserted the trial court erred by

restricting the cross-examination of the expert witness with

regard to his potential motive or bias for testifying in favor

of the prosecution. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner further alleged

the trial court abused its discretion in excluding some evidence

“central to [Petitioner’s] theory of his defense,” including a

track from a music CD, a statement of a police officer, a diary

kept by one of the victims, and a “thank you” letter written by

one of the victims to the other. Id., Exh. O.2 

Petitioner also argued in his direct appeal that the

trial court erred by allowing the tape-recorded telephone

conversation between Petitioner and one of the victims to be

admitted into evidence, citing both federal and state law. Id.,

Exh. O. Petitioner further asserted the trial court erred by

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not declaring a mistrial after “multiple instances of

introduction of unanticipated allegations of prior bad acts,”

and that cumulative error had deprived him of a fair trial, in

violation of his right to due process of law. Id., Exh. O.

Additionally, Petitioner maintained there was insufficient

evidence to convict him on one of the counts of conviction and

that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new

trial. Id., Exh. O. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied all of Petitioner’s

claims and affirmed his convictions and sentences in two

opinions issued October 22, 2002. See Arizona v. Morrison, 203

Ariz. 489, 56 P.3d 63; Answer, Exh. W. In its published opinion

the Arizona Court of Appeals held the trial court properly

denied the motion to suppress the taped telephone conversation,

even though the minor victim did not consent to the recording,

because the trial court concluded the minor’s mother vicariously

consented to the recording on behalf of her daughter. See

Morrison, 203 Ariz. at 64-65, 56 P.3d at 490-91. The Court of

Appeals concluded the issue was one of statutory interpretation,

stating:

Both A.R.S. § 13-3005 and 18 U.S.C. § 2511

criminalize the unlawful interception of

wire, electronic, and oral communications,

but neither provides for the exclusion of

evidence obtained unlawfully. The federal

constitution likewise does not require

exclusion of the audiotape in this case

because there was no state action. [].

Id., 203 Ariz. at 64, 56 P.3d at 490 (emphasis added). The

Arizona Court of Appeals’ unpublished opinion denied

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Petitioner’s other claims for relief on the merits of those

claims. Response, Exh. W. 

Petitioner sought review of his convictions and

sentences by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh. X. The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the Court of Appeals’

decision affirming the convictions and sentences on March 19,

2003. Id., Exh. Y. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from

the United States Supreme Court. Id., Exh. Z. The Supreme

Court denied certiorari on October 6, 2003. Id., Exh. AA;

Morrison v. Arizona, 540 U.S. 867.

Petitioner filed an action for state post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court on April 16, 2003. Id.,

Exh. BB. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

his action for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. CC. In his

petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserted his

Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the police and

prosecutor listened to the tape-recorded telephone conversation

between Petitioner and a victim without first obtaining a

warrant. Id., Exh. CC. Petitioner also asserted his trial

counsel was constitutionally ineffective for “not more fully

arguing these constitutional issues...” Id., Exh. CC at 2.

During oral argument on the merits of the Rule 32 petition,

Petitioner’s counsel clarified that he was only raising a Sixth

Amendment ineffective assistance of claim, predicated on

counsel’s failure to argue a Fourth Amendment violation in the

pretrial motion to suppress the recorded conversation. Id.,

Exh. DD at 12-13. Petitioner’s counsel acknowledged a per se

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Fourth Amendment claim would be precluded. Id., Exh. DD at 12-

13. 

However, Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel

vigorously argued the Fourth Amendment issue to the state court

in both his brief and at oral argument, citing opinions of the

United States Supreme Court regarding the right to privacy.

Id., Exh. CC at 10-17 & Exh. DD. Petitioner’s post-conviction

counsel argued Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for

arguing the motion to suppress the tape primarily on the basis

that it violated the Arizona Constitution. Id., Exh. DD at 10-

16.

The Arizona Superior Court denied the petition for

post-conviction relief after oral argument, concluding

Petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance was not deficient and

that Petitioner was not prejudiced by the alleged deficiency.

Id., Exh. DD. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review in a decision

issued November 22, 2005. Id., Exh. FF. Petitioner sought

review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which

denied review on July 25, 2006. Id., Exh. HH. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on October

20, 2006. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to relief because:

1. His Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated by the admission into evidence of the tape-recorded

telephone conversation between Petitioner and a victim.

2. His right to due process was violated by the trial

court’s improper admission of expert testimony regarding child

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sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.

3. The trial court violated his right to due process by

improperly excluding evidence regarding the victims’ motives and

credibility. 

4. He was denied his right to due process of law

because the trial court did not declare a mistrial after

testimonial references to prior bad acts.

5. His Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the

tape-recorded conversation.

Respondents argue Petitioner did not properly exhaust

all but one of his federal habeas claims in state court because

the claims were either never fairly presented in state court or

they were procedurally barred. Respondents contend any attempt

to return to the state courts to exhaust a habeas claim would

now be futile because the Petitioner’s claims are procedurally

barred by state law regarding waiver and preclusion.

Respondents argue that, because the claims are procedurally

defaulted and because Petitioner has not established either

“cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

to excuse his procedural default of his claims, the Court may

not grant relief on the merits of the claims. 

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion

A state prisoner must “exhaust” a claim in the state

courts before the District Court may grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of the claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Castille v.

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3 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2006). 

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Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1989). To

properly exhaust a claim, the petitioner must afford the state

the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2971 (2005).3

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 348 (2005). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement regarding a federal habeas claim, the

petitioner must present “both the operative facts and the legal

principles that control each claim to the state judiciary.”

Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). See also

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin

v. Reese, the Supreme Court reiterated the purpose of exhaustion

is to give the states the opportunity to pass upon and correct

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alleged constitutional errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct.

1347, 1349 (2004). The Court stated: “To provide the State with

the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’

his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state

supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby

alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Id.

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the

federal habeas claim to the state court as asserting the

violation of a specific federal constitutional right, as opposed

to violation of a state constitutional right or state law, the

federal habeas claim was not “fairly presented” to the state

court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351 (“The

petition refers to provisions of the Federal Constitution in

respect to other claims but not in respect to this one. The

petition provides no citation of any case that might have

alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim.”).

A petitioner’s passing reference to “broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right

to a fair trial” in their state court proceedings is not

sufficient to establish a claim was fairly presented to the

state courts as a federal constitutional claim. Castillo, 399

F.3d at 999 (internal citations omitted). 

B. Procedural default

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2006). Because the exhaustion requirement

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refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See id.; Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002) (“Failure to comply with the state’s procedural

rules furnishes an independent and adequate state ground of

decision that blocks federal collateral review.”). “If a

prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a state

procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent

grounds to bar direct review ... he may not raise the claim in

federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or

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actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th

Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir.

1994). 

Because the Arizona rules of criminal procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and preclusion bar Petitioner from

now returning to state court to exhaust any unexhausted federal

habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally

defaulted any claims not previously fairly presented to the

state courts. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.

2002).

Federal courts hearing habeas petitions may

not review state convictions, even for

federal constitutional claims, if the state

court judgment procedurally barring the

petitioner’s claims rests on an independent

and adequate state law ground. []. Procedural

default, a particular type of adequate and

independent state ground, applies to bar

federal habeas review when the state court

has declined to address the petitioner’s

federal claims because he failed to meet

state procedural requirements...

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

C. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

miscarriage of justice, or cause and actual prejudice to excuse

his default of the claim. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51, 111

S. Ct. at 2555-56;. 

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from

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the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate cause, a

petitioner must show the existence of some external factor which

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules.

See Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.

1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.

152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595 (1982). See also Correll v.

Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998). Establishing

prejudice requires Petitioner to prove that, “but for” the

alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable

probability he would not have been convicted of the same crimes.

See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy

v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both

cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural

default, the Court need not examine the existence of prejudice

if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982);

Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is also appropriate if the petitioner demonstrates review

of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

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of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, Petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable juror could have found him guilty of

the offenses charged. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. at 393, 124

S. Ct. at 1852; Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir.

2005). Additionally, even if Petitioner asserted a claim of

actual innocence as excusing his procedural default of his

habeas claims, federal habeas relief may not be granted on this

basis absent a finding that a constitutional violation occurred

in Petitioner’s state criminal proceedings. See Dretke, 541

U.S. at 393-94, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.

390, 400-01, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860-61 (1993).

D. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 &

Supp. 2006).

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A state court’s decision is “contrary to” our

clearly established law if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth

in our cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent.

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Absent a direct conflict with Supreme Court

authority, habeas relief is available only if

the state court decision is factually or

legally unreasonable in light of the evidence

present in the state court proceeding. []

Notwithstanding, an unreasonable application

of federal law is not the equivalent of an

incorrect application of federal law. []

Moody v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2007), petition

for cert. filed, No. 06-11338 (May 14, 2007) (internal citations

omitted).

 When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim,

the Court must analyze the last reasoned decision by a state

court to determine if the state’s denial of relief on the claim

was clearly contrary to federal law. See Barker v. Fleming, 423

F.3d 1085, 1091-92 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 2041 (2006). Additionally, United States Supreme Court

holdings at the time of the state court’s last reasoned decision

are the source of “clearly established federal law” for the

purpose of federal habeas review of state court decisions

regarding federal constitutional claims. Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000); Barker, 423

F.3d at 1093.

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When reviewing a habeas claim, the federal courts must

afford great deference to the state court’s rulings with regard

to issues raised in the petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357, 359-60

(2002). Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct.

2317, 2325 (2005); Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th

Cir. 2006); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“The state court’s factual findings are entitled to a

presumption of correctness unless the petitioner rebuts the

presumption with clear and convincing evidence.”). The

“presumption of correctness is equally applicable when a state

appellate court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the

finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct.

1303, 1304-05 (1982). 

Furthermore, a conclusion of an Arizona court regarding

an issue of Arizona state law is entitled to deference by this

Court. See Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir.

2005); Hartman v. Summers, 120 F.3d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: “If a state law

issue must be decided in order to decide a federal habeas claim,

the state’s construction of its own law is binding on the

federal court.” Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir.

2005), citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S. Ct.

1881, 1886 (1975).

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D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner contends his Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process of law was violated by the admission into

evidence of the tape-recorded telephone conversation between

Petitioner and a victim.

Respondents assert:

Petitioner never presented this claim as a

violation of his 14th Amendment due process

rights. Rather, the allegation in Ground I

was presented in state court as a violation

of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Street Act (18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.),

A.R.S. § 13–3005, and Article 2, §§ 4 and 8

of the Arizona Constitution (right to

privacy). (Exhibits O, Q, X.) Petitioner

raises the instant constitutional due process

claim for the first time in federal court.

Response at 17-18.

In his direct appeal, Petitioner alleged the admission

of the taped telephone conversation violated both state and

federal statutes. Petitioner did not explicitly assert, either

in his direct appeal or in his action for post-conviction

relief, that his federal constitutional right to due process of

law was violated by the admission of the tape. Defense counsel

argued in Petitioner’s direct appeal and in his motion for a new

trial, inter alia, that the admission of a surreptitiously taperecorded telephone conversation violated Arizona state statutes

and the Arizona state constitution and federal statutes.

Counsel asserted these sources of law provided Petitioner with

more protection and provided a sounder basis for seeking relief

than asserting Petitioner’s rights pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. See id., Exh. O &

Q. 

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Replying to Respondents’ assertion he did not properly

exhaust this federal habeas claim in the state courts,

Petitioner contends he exhausted this claim in the state courts

by alleging the admission of the tape violated both state and

federal law. Reply at 3. Petitioner maintains the state courts

had “ample notice of the federal question that would be

questioned.” Id. Petitioner asserts: “if a question was

presented it is considered exhausted.” Id. at 4. Petitioner

notes he is pro se and contends he should “not be held to the

same standard as an attorney...” Id. at 5. Petitioner argues

the state courts had notice the admission of the tape violated

his federal right to due process because the state’s “violation”

of federal law, i.e., the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street

Act, itself constitutes a violation of his right to due process

of law. Id. at 6. Additionally, Petitioner contends his direct

appeal “states violation of [Petitioner’s] Fourteenth Amendment

rights all through his direct appeal, and Supreme Court appeal.”

Id. at 7. Petitioner also argues any failure to exhaust his

claims “should be excused considering the state had ample notice

of his claims and returning to the state court would be futile.”

Id. at 8.

The due process claim stated as Ground I for federal

habeas relief was not squarely presented to the Arizona state

courts in Petitioner’s direct appeal as a claim that

Petitioner’s right to federal due process was violated solely by

the admission of this evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner did not

fairly present this federal habeas claim to the state courts in

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4

 In Castillo, the Ninth Circuit stated:

Consistent with the recognition that state and

federal courts are jointly responsible for

interpreting and safeguarding constitutional

guarantees, we have held that citation to either

a federal or state case involving the legal

standard for a federal constitutional violation

is sufficient to establish exhaustion. [];

Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[F]or purposes of

exhaustion, a citation to a state case analyzing

a federal constitutional issue serves the same

purpose as a citation to a federal case analyzing

such an issue.”). In short, the petitioner must

have either referenced specific provisions of the

federal constitution or cited to federal or state

cases involving the legal standard for a federal

constitutional violation. Mere general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial, do not

establish exhaustion. [] Nor is it enough to

raise a state claim that is analogous or closely

similar to a federal claim.

399 F.3d at 999 (internal citations and quotations omitted and

emphasis added).

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a procedurally correct manner. See Anderson v. Harless, 459

U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 276 (1982); Castillo, 399 F.3d at

999;4 Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003);

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996); Shumway v.

Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2000); Joubert v. Hopkins,

75 F.3d 1232, 1240 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding the petitioner

must present the same legal theory, not just the same facts, to

exhaust a claim). Cf. Tigner v. Cockrell, 264 F.3d 521, 526-27

(5th Cir. 2001) (finding a federal habeas claim had not been

fairly presented when the petitioner had objected to expert

witness testimony on evidentiary grounds, not on constitutional

grounds). Compare Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 999-1001 (9th

Cir. 2003) (holding the petitioner had fairly presented an

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ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he had cited

both the Sixth Amendment and Strickland).

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim by not

fairly presenting it to the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause nor prejudice

regarding his procedural default of his claim that admission of

the tape violated his right to due process of law. Because

Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice regarding his

procedural default of this due process claim, the Court may not

grant relief on the merits of the claim. See, e.g., Bargas v.

Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, the

claim may be denied on the merits. See Barboza v. Bissonnette,

434 F. Supp. 2d 25, 34-35 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding state court

decisions denying the petitioner’s motion to suppress tape

recordings made by a minor victim’s father, on the ground that

they were made in violation of the federal wiretap statute, was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law).

2. Petitioner contends the trial court improperly

admitted expert testimony regarding “child abuse accommodation

syndrome” without first conducting a Frye hearing. Petitioner

also alleges the trial court erred by excluding crossexamination of the expert witness as to his motive or bias for

testifying on behalf of the prosecution. Petitioner asserts he

was deprived of his right to due process of law by these errors.

Respondents assert:

... Petitioner alleges that his 14th

Amendment right to due process was violated

when: (1) the trial court failed to conduct

a Frye hearing regarding Mr. Robert Emerick’s

expert testimony (Ground II(a)); (2)

Petitioner was not permitted to cross-examine

Mr. Emerick until after the victim had

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testified (Ground II(b)); (3) the trial court

precluded cross-examination of Mr. Emerick

“with respect to his motive, bias, or

prejudice” (Ground II(c)); and (4) because

Mr. Emerick’s testimony had “no application

to the case” (Ground II(d)). [] But in state

court, Petitioner never presented these

claims as violations of his 14th Amendment

due process rights.

Response at 14. Respondents further state:

The allegation in Ground II(a) was presented

in state court as a violation of state

evidentiary rules... Similarly, the

allegation in Ground II(c) was presented as

a violation of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment

right to cross-examination. [] The

allegations in Grounds II(b) and II(d) were

never raised in state court under any legal

theory, constitutional or otherwise. []

Instead, Petitioner raises these

constitutional due process claims for the

first time in federal court.

Id. at 18-19.

Petitioner asserted in his direct appeal, citing

various state supreme court cases discussing Frye, that allowing

the testimony of the expert was improper because “child sexual

abuse accommodation syndrome” was not generally accepted within

the scientific community. Answer, Exh. O. In the very last

paragraph of this section of his appellate brief, Petitioner

alleged that admitting the expert testimony without a limiting

jury instruction violated his “right to a fair trial, guaranteed

... under both the United States Constitution, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments,” and the Arizona Constitution. Response,

Exh. O at 32. The Court concludes this habeas claim was fairly

presented to the Arizona state courts.

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5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.

Ct. 2786 (1993).

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However, the claim Petitioner’s rights were violated

because the trial court refused to conduct a Frye hearing is

arguably not cognizable in the context of a petition seeking

federal habeas relief because it raises an issue of state law,

rather than federal constitutional law. 

A state prisoner may obtain a writ of habeas corpus

only upon a showing that he is being held in violation of the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. 2006); Engle, 456 U.S. at 119,

102 S. Ct. at 1567. Federal habeas relief is not available for

alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state

law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct.

475, 480 (1991); Beaty, 303 F.3d at 986.

The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have

uniformly held that a state trial court’s decision whether to

admit evidence relating to scientific theories generally

acceptable within the scientific community is a matter of state

law. See Kinder v. Bowersox, 272 F.3d 532, 545 (8th Cir. 2001)

(“Daubert5 does not bind the states, which are free to formulate

their own rules of evidence subject only to the limits imposed

by the Constitution.”); Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 419 (3d

Cir. 2001) (“the admission of expert testimony in a state trial

presents a question of state law unless, of course, the evidence

violates due process or some other federal constitutional

right”...). 

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6

The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the

damaging potential of the cross-examination were

fully realized, a reviewing court might

nonetheless say that the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error

is harmless in a particular case depends upon a

host of factors.... the importance of the

witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case,

whether the testimony was cumulative, the

presence or absence of evidence corroborating or

contradicting the testimony of the witness on

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In denying this type of habeas claim, the Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals has reasoned:

The admissibility of evidence is generally a

matter of state law. ... Absent a showing

that the admission of the evidence violated

a specific constitutional guarantee, a

federal court can issue a writ of habeas

corpus on the basis of a state court

evidentiary ruling only when that ruling

violated the defendant’s right to due process

by denying him a fundamentally fair trial.

[]. The standard, then, is not whether the

testimony satisfied the Frye or Daubert

tests-neither of which purports to set a

constitutional floor on the admissibility of

scientific evidence-but rather is whether the

probative value of the state’s evidence was

so greatly outweighed by its prejudice to

[the petitioner] that its admission denied

him a fundamentally fair trial...

Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 1994).

To be entitled to habeas relief on a claim of erroneous

admission of evidence, the petitioner must demonstrate the error

had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s

verdict. See Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2325-27 (2007);

Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721-22

(1993); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct.

1431, 1435 (1986);6 Cummings v. Adams, 172 Fed. App. 188, 190

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material points, the extent of cross-examination

otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall

strength of the prosecution’s case.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438

(1986).

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(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 95 (2006); Christian v.

Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Under this standard, an error is harmless

unless the record review leaves the

conscientious judge in grave doubt about the

likely effect of an error on the jury’s

verdict ... i.e., that, in the judge’s mind,

the matter is so evenly balanced that he

feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the

harmlessness of the error.

Padilla v. Terhune, 309 F.3d 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2002)

(regarding erroneous admission of non-testifying co-defendant’s

out-of-court statement) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has instructed federal

courts applying Brecht to review the state court record as whole

and, if the court has “grave doubt” about the influence of the

offending evidence on the verdict, the court should treat the

error as having a substantial and injurious effect. See O’Neal

v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995).

“Grave doubt” exists when the record as a whole reflects that

the matter is so evenly balanced that the court feels itself “in

virtual equipoise” regarding the errors harmlessness. Id.

As to whether the expert witness testimony regarding

child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome satisfied the Frye

test for admissibility, as the Arizona courts determined, the

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7

 There was no contemporaneous objection to the bifurcation

of the expert witness’ testimony.

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Court concludes the admission of this evidence was not so

arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due

process. The expert witness testimony was offered primarily to

establish the credibility of the victims. Petitioner and the

victims testified at his trial and the victims’ credibility was

challenged by defense counsel through cross-examination.

Petitioner took the stand, denied the charges against him, and

asserted the victims were lying. The question for the jury was

an issue of credibility, and the expert’s testimony was

obviously not a decisive factor in this regard because the jury

found Petitioner innocent of some of the acts alleged by the

victims.

Additionally, Petitioner contends his right to due

process was violated by the trial court’s postponing crossexamination of the expert witness until after one of the victims

had testified and excluding questions to the expert witness with

regard to his ex-wife, who was employed by Maricopa County,

prevented Petitioner from showing bias.7 Petitioner asserted in

his direct appeal that postponing cross-examination of the

expert witness until after one of the victims had testified

violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against

him. Petitioner also argued the trial court’s failure to allow

questions to the expert witness with regard to his ex-wife, who

was employed by Maricopa County, prevented him from showing

bias. Accordingly, the Court concludes Petitioner has exhausted

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these claims. However, the Arizona Court of Appeals did not err

in concluding Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were

not violated in this regard.

“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or

Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,

690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2147 (1986) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). 

While cross-examination is the chief means by

which criminal defendants may exercise their

right to confront witnesses, [], trial judges

retain wide latitude insofar as the

Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose

reasonable limits on such cross-examination

based on concerns about, among other things,

harassment, prejudice, confusion of the

issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation

that is repetitive or only marginally

relevant.[].

King v. Trippett, 192 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 1999). 

As noted supra, Petitioner was afforded a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense, including the

opportunity to meaningfully challenge the victims’ credibility.

Additionally, these assignments of error did not render

Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair.

To the extent that Petitioner exhausted his claim that

failure to conduct a Frye hearing violated his right to due

process, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim because the claim raises an issue of Arizona evidentiary

law. The admission of the evidence does not leave the Court

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with “grave doubt” that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different absent the admission of the expert

testimony. Additionally, Petitioner was not deprived of his

right to due process by the trial court’s decision to exclude

cross-examination of the expert witness regarding his ex-wife’s

employment. Ultimately, the information regarding the ex-wife’s

employment was presented to the jury upon redirect examination

by the government. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on the basis of the claims stated as

Ground II for relief.

3. Petitioner contends the trial court improperly

excluded evidence regarding the victims’ bias and credibility,

in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

Petitioner contends the trial court erred by not

allowing the admission at his trial of: (1) a track from a

musical CD, which Petitioner claims would have convinced the

jury the content of the tape-recorded telephone conversation was

merely Petitioner and the victim mimicking this song; (2) a

statement by a police detective regarding a victim’s father’s

efforts to have Petitioner investigated for abuse of his

daughter; (3) a taped conversation between a victim’s father and

the victim’s mother, who were divorced; (4) a diary kept by one

of the victims regarding a “plot” to entrap an adult male into

a compromising situation; (5) a letter from one victim to the

other. 

Respondents do not argue this claim was not properly

exhausted in the Arizona state courts. Respondents argue

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim because the

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“state courts’ findings were neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the holdings of the United States Supreme Court.”

Response at 28. Petitioner responds that the state court had

“no justifiable reason” to preclude the evidence as cumulative.

Reply at 12. 

The Arizona trial court precluded the evidence

referenced by Petitioner primarily because it was cumulative,

pursuant to Rule 403, Arizona Rules of Evidence. This rule

provides “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” On direct appeal the

Arizona Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did not err

in excluding the evidence because it was cumulative and, in some

instances, inadmissable hearsay. Answer, Exh. W. 

As noted supra, “the Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense.” Crane, 476 U.S. at 690, 106 S. Ct. at 2146. A

defendant’s due process rights are violated by the exclusion of

evidence if the precluded evidence, if introduced, would have

created “a reasonable doubt that did not exist without the

evidence.” Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir.

1997) (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,

868, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3447 (1982)); Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d

788, 798 (10th Cir. 2005). However, the right to present

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evidence in one’s defense is not unlimited. State rules which

operate to exclude evidence from criminal trials do not abridge

a defendant’s right to present a complete defense to the charges

against him if the rules are not arbitrary or “disproportionate

to the purposes they are designed to serve.” United States v.

Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1264 (1998)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). “[W]here

constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of

guilt are implicated, [evidentiary rules] may not be applied

mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973).

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has “found the exclusion

of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or

disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty

interest of the accused.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308, 118 S. Ct.

1261. See also Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir.

2002).

The Arizona courts’ conclusions that the evidence was

cumulative and that Petitioner’s right to due process was not

violated by the exclusion of the evidence were not clearly

contrary to established federal law. See Holmes v. South

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1732 (2006); Crane, 476

U.S. at 689–90, 106 S. Ct. at 2146; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at

679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435. 

In Scheffer, the Court revisited the issue of

balancing the defendant’s right to present a

defense against the state’s right to prevent

unreliable evidence. Scheffer held that a per

se ban on polygraph evidence did not

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constrain unconstitutionally a defendant’s

right to present exculpatory evidence. []

Scheffer distinguished Washington and Rock. The Court noted that the exclusions of

evidence in those cases “significantly

undermined fundamental elements of the

defendant’s defense.” Id. at 315, 118 S. Ct.

1261. Specifically, Scheffer held that

barring the admission of an allegedly

exculpatory polygraph test did not do so, [],

and it contrasted the polygraph limitation

with the preclusions on the testimony of a

percipient witness and the testimony of the

defendant, respectively, in Washington and

Rock, [] The distinction between Washington, Rock, and this case, on the one hand, and

Scheffer, on the other, is this: In the

former, a trial court prohibited presentation

of the substantive content of a defendant’s

testimony or a percipient witness’ testimony,

[], while in the latter a trial court

prohibited something much less direct, and

much more within the jury’s province --

third-party evidence of the truthfulness of

the substantive content of the defendant’s

testimony, []. ...

Greene, 288 F.3d at 1091-92. See also Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d

911, 922 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that, where the precluded

testimony was the defendant’s only defense, the preclusion of

the testimony violated the defendant’s right to due process of

law because it had a substantial and injurious effect in

determining the verdict).

4. Petitioner alleges he was denied his right to due

process because the trial court did not declare a mistrial after

references to other, uncharged bad acts.

Respondents assert:

In his opening brief to the Arizona Court of

Appeals [on direct appeal],[] Petitioner did

not re-assert a federal constitutional due

process violation with respect to these

claims. (Exhibit O.) Nor did he raise any

constitutional violation to the Arizona

Supreme Court in his petition for review.

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(Exhibit X.) Instead, the allegations were

presented on direct appeal only as a

violation of Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure 15.1 and Arizona Rule of Evidence

404(b). (Exhibit O at 45–49.) Thus, Ground

IV, as it pertains to these factual bases,

was not properly exhausted in state court.

Response at 22.

In his direct appeal, Petitioner asserted the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to declare a mistrial

after “multiple instances of introduction of unanticipated

allegations of prior bad acts.” Answer, Exh. O at 45.

Petitioner asserted the victims testified at Petitioner’s trial

as to alleged instances of abuse which were not charged or

previously alleged. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner also asserted a

mistrial should have been declared after a witness offered

hearsay evidence regarding a statement made by one of the

victims. Id., Exh. O. In support of this argument, Petitioner

cited to Arizona state court opinions and the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See id., Exh. O at 45-49. Under a separate

heading in his appellate brief, Petitioner summarily stated the

Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution required

Petitioner receive a “fair trial,” which he did not receive

because of the trial court’s cumulative errors. Id., Exh. O at

49. 

The Court concludes Petitioner did not fairly present

this federal habeas claim to the Arizona state courts.

Petitioner did not squarely assert his right to due process was

violated solely by the trial court’s failure to declare a

mistrial after the testimony of alleged uncharged bad acts. See

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Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding

a habeas petition may not “transform a state law issue into a

federal one merely by asserting a due process violation.”);

Beard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The

exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if the petitioner

presents new legal theories or factual claims for the first time

in his federal petition.”); Joubert, 75 F.3d at 1240 (holding

the petitioner must present the same legal theory, not just the

same facts, to exhaust his habeas claim).

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim by not

fairly presenting it to the state courts in a procedurally

correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause nor prejudice

regarding his procedural default of his claim that admission of

this evidence violated his right to due process of law. Because

Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice regarding his

procedural default of this due process claim, the Court may not

grant relief on the merits of the claim. 

Additionally, the claim may be denied on the merits

because the “admitted” evidence, i.e., the failure to declare a

mistrial based on the evidence, did not deny Petitioner a

fundamentally fair trial. See Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496,

512 (6th Cir. 2003) (“There is no clearly established Supreme

Court precedent which holds that a state violates due process by

permitting propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts

evidence.”); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 439 (6th Cir.

2001) (stating in reference to habeas corpus challenge to

admission of other-acts evidence that “[s]tate court evidentiary

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8

 In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted admitting the

tape recording into evidence violated his rights pursuant to both

state and federal statutes. Response, Exh. O. Petitioner argued,

inter alia, that admission of the tape-recorded conversation violated

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, which criminalizes the interception of an

electronic conversation and provides no improperly intercepted

conversation may be admitted into evidence in a criminal proceeding.

Whenever any wire or oral communication has been

intercepted, no part of the contents of such

communication and no evidence derived therefrom

may be received in evidence in any trial,

hearing, or other proceeding in or before any

court, grand jury, department, officer, agency,

regulatory body, legislative committee, or other

authority of the United States, a State, or a

political subdivision thereof if the disclosure

of that information would be in violation of this

chapter.

18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000 & Supp. 2007).

-34-

rulings do not rise to the level of due process violations

unless they offend some principle of justice so rooted in the

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

fundamental.”).

5. Petitioner contends his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated by the admission into evidence of the tape-recorded

telephone conversation.

Petitioner asserts the fact that the police listened to

the tape recording of the telephone conversation without first

obtaining a search warrant constituted an unreasonable search,

in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Petitioner’s

Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in an action for

federal habeas relief because he had the opportunity to litigate

this claim in the state courts. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 494, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976).8 A claim that the

petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated does not

provide a basis for granting federal habeas relief from a state

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conviction if the petitioner had the opportunity to fully and

fairly litigate the claim in the state courts. See, e.g.,

Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1993)

(concluding that, unless the habeas petitioner made an

affirmative showing that the state denied him a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, Stone

requires dismissal of the claim); Patterson v. Runnels, 288 F.

Supp. 2d 1092, 1097-98 (C.D. Cal. 2003). The relevant inquiry

is whether the petitioner was afforded a full and fair hearing

of his claim in the state court, not whether the state court

reached a correct decision regarding the legitimacy of the

“search.” See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th

Cir. 1996) (“The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the

opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do

so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.”); Siripongs

v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that a

habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment “argument goes not to the

fullness and fairness of his opportunity to litigate the claim,

but to the correctness of the state court resolution, an issue

which Stone v. Powell makes irrelevant”).

Petitioner alleges he “is allowed to bring up a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel based on deficient

representation in litigating a Fourth Amendment issue.” Reply

at 11. In Petitioner’s action for post-conviction relief,

Petitioner’s counsel vigorously argued Petitioner’s Fourth

Amendment right to privacy was violated by the admission of the

tape recording and, accordingly, that Petitioner’s trial

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counsel’s performance was deficient and Petitioner was

prejudiced by the failure to raise this claim. 

The Arizona state courts concluded, after a hearing on

this assertion, that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective

for failing to argue the admission of the tape violated his

Fourth Amendment rights because the argument was unlikely to

succeed. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded, as a matter of

fact, that counsel had consciously decided to argue the tape

recording should be suppressed on grounds which were more

beneficial to Petitioner than the Fourth Amendment, as a matter

of trial strategy.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that

Petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of counsel was

not violated was not clearly contrary to established federal

law. To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a

petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064; Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005).

As noted supra, the federal district courts are

required to examine a state court’s ruling with regard to an

issue raised in a federal habeas petition with great deference.

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See Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24, 123 S. Ct. at 359-60. With regard

to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is the

habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied

Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively

unreasonable manner. An unreasonable application of federal law

is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”

Id., 537 U.S. at 25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations

omitted). 

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim premised on his counsel’s failure to raise an argument,

the petitioner must establish that the argument was likely to be

successful, in order to prove that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s failure to raise the argument. See Juan H. v. Allen,

408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) (“trial counsel cannot have

been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection”);

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000). A

defendant has no constitutional right to compel counsel to raise

particular claims if counsel, as a matter of professional

judgment, decides not to present those issues. See Jones v.

Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983)

(declining to promulgate “a per se rule that the client, not the

professional advocate, must be allowed to decide what issues are

to be pressed”).

“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

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perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable....” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066. 

Deficient performance alone, however, is not

enough to render counsel’s representation

constitutionally ineffective. [The

petitioner] must also establish prejudice, by

“show[ing] that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.”

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 873 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

The Court’s thorough review of the extensive record

submitted by Respondents indicates that trial counsel vigorously

defended Petitioner, and that counsel’s performance was not

deficient. Petitioner’s trial counsel competently argued a

motion to suppress the tape based on both federal and state law.

Counsel made a strategic decision that Petitioner’s interests

were better served by arguing admission of the tape violated

Petitioner’s rights pursuant to federal statutes and the Arizona

state constitution, which provides broader privacy protection to

criminal defendants than the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. Accordingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision that Petitioner was not deprived of the effective

assistance of counsel was not an unreasonable application of

federal law nor clearly contrary to federal law and Petitioner

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is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.

III Conclusion

Petitioner procedurally defaulted some of his federal

habeas claims in the Arizona state courts by not presenting them

to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct

manner. Other than the fact that he is now pro se, Petitioner

does not allege cause for, nor prejudice arising from his

procedural default of these claims. Because Petitioner has not

shown cause for nor prejudice arising from his procedural

default of some of his federal habeas claims, the Court may not

grant relief on the merits of those claims. Additionally, with

regard to the claims which were exhausted in the state courts,

the state courts’ decisions regarding the claims were not

clearly contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal

law and, accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

those claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Morrison’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 27th day of June, 2007.

 

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