Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00529/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00529-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Refugio Ceyala, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Unknown Toth, named as South Tucson

Police Officer Toth #296; et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV 17-529-TUC-DCB (LAB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment filed on

October 3, 2019. (Doc. 48) The plaintiff filed a response on December 10, 2019. (Doc. 59)

The defendants filed a reply on December 23, 2019. (Doc. 62)

The plaintiff, Refugio Ceyala, brings state law claims and federal constitutional

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from a police encounter on November 25, 2016

during which her son, Carlos Valencia, was shot and killed. (Doc. 1) In the pending motion,

the defendant police officers move for summary judgment on all claims.

The case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Bowman for report and

recommendation pursuant to the Local Rules of Practice. LRCiv 72.1. A hearing on the motion

was held on February 19, 2020. (Doc. 70)

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent

review of the record, grant the motion. The plaintiff failed to comply with the state notice of

claim statute. The officer’s actions were objectively reasonable. 

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Standard of Review: Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is available only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,

106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). 

The initial burden rests on the moving party to point out the absence of any genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553

(1986). “Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant

must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the

moving party.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). “Where

the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that

there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” In re Oracle Corp.

Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010).

Once initially satisfied, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate through

the production of probative evidence that an issue of fact remains to be tried. Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. “If a reasonable jury viewing the summary judgment record

could find by a preponderance of the evidence that [the plaintiff is] entitled to a verdict in [her]

favor, then summary judgment [is] inappropriate; conversely, if a reasonable jury could not find

liability, then summary judgment [is] correct.” Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439

F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2006).

“In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.,

509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). “Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.” Id.

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1 The court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, as it must on a

motion for summary judgment. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007).

In this case, most of the facts are undisputed. See (Doc. 64) (Defendants’ Statement of Facts); (Doc.

56) (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts) Where the plaintiff objects to the defendants’ characterization of

the officers’ testimony in their Statement of Facts, that testimony is cited directly. 

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

At all relevant times, the defendants, Christopher Toth and Steven Nunez, were

police officers with the South Tucson Police Department. (Doc. 64, par. 1) (Defendants’

Statement of Facts); (Doc. 56; par. 1) (Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts) On November 25, 2016,

at 3:40 a.m., Officer Toth responded to a call from the Gospel Rescue Mission at 312 W. 28th

Street. Id.; (Doc. 64-1, p. 14) (Toth’s deposition) He was informed by the manager, Robert

Brown, that Carlos Valencia had created a disturbance. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 2) Valencia had

been asked to leave, and when he did so, he stole a fire extinguisher. (Id.; par. 2) Brown told

Officer Toth that Valencia “was on parole or probation, was a known drug user, and was acting

erratically.” (Id.; par. 4)

Brown previously had told the police dispatcher that Valencia was more than six feet

tall and weighted more than 200 pounds. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 3) He described Valencia in the

following terms: “unstable,” “you could see anger rising up in his voice,” “definitely has anger

issues,” and “I definitely sense the aggression in him.” (Id.; par. 3) The fire extinguisher was

approximately 2 to 2 1⁄2 feet long and weighed 10 to 15 pounds. (Id.; par. 7) 

Officer Toth later testified that Valencia was about 6' 2" tall, and weighted 200 to

220 pounds. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 5) At the time of the incident, Officer Toth was 55 years old

and between 5' 7" and 5' 8" tall. (Id.; par. 6) Valencia was a much larger man that Officer

Toth. (Id.; par. 6) 

After talking to Brown, Officer Toth left the Mission to search for Valencia in his

patrol vehicle. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 8) Officer Nunez subsequently arrived at the Mission and

joined the search in his own vehicle. (Id.; par. 9) Officer Toth located Valencia near the

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intersection of 29th Street and 8th Avenue. (Id.; par. 10) Valencia was walking very quickly and

was carrying the fire extinguisher. (Id.; par. 10) 

Officer Toth drove up to Valencia and asked him to stop. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 11)

Valencia continued walking away but at a faster pace. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 12) Officer Toth

continued his pursuit in his patrol vehicle. (Id.; par. 12) He reported on the radio that Valencia

was not being compliant. (Id.; par. 13) 

Officer Toth got in front of Valencia and exited his vehicle. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 14)

By this time, Officer Nunez had arrived on the scene. (Id.; par. 15) Officer Toth observed that

Valencia was carrying the fire extinguisher “in a manner that could be used as a weapon.” (Id.;

par. 16) Officer Toth took out his pepper spray canister and told Valencia to drop the fire

extinguisher. (Id.; par. 16) At the time of the incident, Officer Toth had not been issued a

Taser. (Id.; par. 33)

When Valencia refused to drop the fire extinguisher, Officer Toth used the pepper

spray. (Doc. 64-2, pp. 2-3) (Toth deposition) Officer Toth testified that he used his pepper

spray because Valencia “stole the fire extinguisher,” “was going to be arrested,” and “was just

refusing to comply and refusing to be arrested.” (Doc. 64-2, p. 3) Valencia “raised the fire

extinguisher over his head” and “threw it at Officer Toth” striking him in the leg. (Docs. 64,

56; par. 19) Valencia then turned and ran away. (Id.; par. 20) Officer Toth pursued him on

foot. (Id.; par. 20) 

“Officer Nunez drove ahead and exited his vehicle.” (Docs. 64, 56; par. 21) He

ordered Valencia to stop and get on the ground. (Id.; par. 21) He had previously seen Valencia

hit Officer Toth with the fire extinguisher. (Doc. 64-5, p. 10) (Nunez deposition) Officer

Nunez had “activated” his Taser by this point. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 22); (Doc. 64-5, p. 17)

When it is activated, the Taser emits a red laser light to indicate where the probes will hit. 

(Doc. 64-5, p. 17) Officer Nunez testified that at this point, “His hands are up and his fists are

clenched and he runs toward me and he lets out this yell” when he is “within arms reach of me

. . . .” (Doc. 64-5, p. 12) Then, Valencia turned and ran away from Officer Nunez. (Doc. 64-5,

p. 13) Officer Nunez testified that, “[Valencia] says repeatedly, ‘Fuck you niggas. Fuck you

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niggas.’” (Doc. 64-5, p. 13) Officer Nunez was “shocked” by Valencia’s behavior at this point.

(Id.; par. 24) He testified that most people in this situation “will turn and run,” but Valencia

“approached me like he wanted to fight, [which was] threatening in nature.” (Id.; par. 24)

Officer Nunez ran after Valencia with Officer Toth running behind Officer Nunez. (Id.; par.

25) Officer Nunez continued to order Valencia to stop and get on the ground, but Valencia

ignored him and continued to yell profanities. (Id.; par. 26) 

Officer Toth explained that he was not going to let Valencia go at this point because

Valencia had assaulted two officers and, he believed, posed a danger to others. (Docs. 64, 56;

par. 28) Officer Nunez still had his Taser out as he ran after Valencia. (Id.; par. 29) He chased

Valencia to a closed drive-through bank on 7th Avenue and 29th Street. (Id.; par. 30) When he

closed the distance to 5-6 feet, he discharged his Taser at Valencia’s back. (Id.; par. 31) The

Taser was ineffective, possibly due to the heavy jacket Valencia was wearing. (Id.; par. 32)

It was too dark to see if the probes actually hit Valencia. (Doc. 64-5, p. 20) 

Officer Nunez testified that, “He turns to face me and charges me one more time .

. . . He approaches me. . . . His arms are up, and [he is in a] fighting stance. His fists are

clenched and he approaches me and yells out another yell.” (Doc. 64-6, p. 1) Officer Nunez

tried pulling the Taser trigger again, but it had no effect. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 35) 

At this point, Officer Toth caught up to Officer Nunez and Valencia. (Docs. 64, 56;

par. 36) He tried to physically subdue Valencia. (Id., par. 36) He testified that he “tried to go

hands-on with Mr. Valencia.” (Doc. 64-2, p. 15) Officer Toth, however, was knocked to the

ground. (Doc. 64-2, p. 16) Officer Toth testified that, “[H]e either hit me or pushed me.”

(Doc. 64-2, p. 16) 

Valencia then ran off again. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 38) Officer Nunez continued his

pursuit ordering Valencia to get on the ground. (Id., par. 38) Valencia responded with more

vulgarity. (Id., par. 39) Officer Nunez was feeling physically fatigued by this point. (Id., par.

40) He put out a call on the radio explaining that he and Officer Toth were engaged with a

suspect and asking for assistance from the Tucson Police Department. (Id., par. 41)

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A citizen in a truck stopped to render assistance, but Officer Nunez told the

individual to leave the area. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 42) Officer Nunez discovered that his Taser

lead was broken, so he put his Taser away. (Id., par. 43) He deployed his firearm. (Id., par.

43) Officer Toth was behind Officer Nunez and Valencia. (Id., par. 44) All three men were

walking at this point because they were tired. (Id., par. 45) 

Officer Toth again tried to physically subdue Valencia. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 46) He

tried using his pepper spray again, but he did not have enough spray remaining for it to be

effective. (Id., par. 46) Officer Toth’s leg was hurting him at this point, and he was feeling the

second-hand effects of his own pepper spray. (Id., par. 47) Valencia knocked Officer Toth

down again hitting him in the head with his fists. (Id., par. 48) Officer Toth got up and

reattached his body camera, which he noticed had fallen off. (Id., par. 50)

Valencia then charged Officer Nunez with his hands up yelling obscenities and

acting aggressively. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 54) Officer Nunez was concerned that Valencia would

try to take away his firearm. (Id., par. 55) Valencia then punched Officer Nunez in the head.

(Id., par. 56) Officer Nunez focused on keeping his firearm from being grabbed by Valencia.

(Id., par. 56)

 Valencia then turned back toward Officer Toth, who by this time had also drawn his

firearm. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 57) Officer Toth yelled for Valencia to get on the ground. (Doc.

64-3, p. 6) Officer Nunez was 10 to 15 feet away from Officer Toth and Valencia at this time.

(Doc. 64-6, p. 16) He saw Valencia knock Officer Toth to the ground twice. (Doc. 64-6, pp.

16-17) Officer Nunez testified that, “They’re in very, very close contact.” (Doc. 64-6, p. 17)

Officer Nunez took a moment to radio their position to the approaching back-up

officers. (Doc. 64-6, p. 17) He could hear sirens, but they were still “off in the distance.”

(Doc. 64-66, pp. 17-18) Officer Nunez then heard a loud bang and looked up toward Officer

Toth and Valencia. (Doc. 64-66, p. 18) He heard a second bang and saw a flash of light

between them. Id. Officer Toth and Valencia were “[c]loser than arms’ distance [apart].”

(Doc. 64-6, p. 19)

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Officer Toth testified that Valencia “grabbed the barrel of my gun.” (Doc. 64-3, p.

7) He stated, “I pulled back my gun, pulled it out of his grasp and that’s when I fired.” (Doc.

64-3, p. 6) He explained, “[A]t that point my fear was he was going to grab my weapon and

use it on us.” (Doc. 64-3, p. 7) Officer Toth clarified, “He never fully took it away from me.

He had grab [sic] of the barrel.” (Doc. 64-3, p. 8)

Valencia stopped fighting at this point. (Docs. 64, 56; par. 69) Officer Toth and

Officer Nunez assisted Valencia to the ground. (Id., par. 69) Tucson Police Department

officers arrived shortly thereafter. (Id., par. 71) Valencia died as a result of the gunshot

wounds. (Id., par. 72)

Discussion: Excessive Force

In Count 3, Ceyala, claims the defendants’ actions violated Valencia’s “right to be

free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to be free from excessive force during an

arrest” pursuant to “the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”

(Doc. 1, p. 7) She brings this action in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of

Carlos Valencia, her son. (Doc. 1, p. 2)

The defendant officers argue that summary judgment is proper on this count because

their actions were objectively reasonable. In the alternative, they argue that they are entitled

to qualified immunity. The court agrees that the defendants’ actions were objectively

reasonable. The court does not reach the defendants’ alternate arguments.

“To prevail on a section 1983 claim based on the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff

must show that the state actor’s conduct was an unreasonable search or seizure.” Sandoval v.

Cty. of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2018). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of

force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97, 109 S. Ct. 1865,

1872 (1989). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

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uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular

situation.” Id. 

 “In determining whether the force used was reasonable, [the court] must balance the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Tekle v. U.S., 511 F.3d 839, 844-845 (9th Cir.

2007) (internal punctuation removed). “The first factor in determining whether the force used

was excessive is the severity of the force applied.” Id. “The second factor, and the most

important, is the need for the force.” Id. “Factors to be considered in determining the need for

the force include the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (internal punctuation omitted). “Finally, we must

balance the force used against the need, to determine whether the force used was greater than

is reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. The court will assume, without deciding, that an

unsuccessful use of force also must be reasonable. But see Torres v. Madrid, 769 F. App'x 654

(10th Cir.), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 680 (2019).

In this case, the defendants employed an escalating level of force against Valencia

culminating in lethal force when Officer Toth shot Valencia twice. The court finds that each

time a certain level of force was used, there was a commensurate need for that force.

The first significant use of force occurred when Officer Toth used pepper spray

against Valencia. At this point, the officers knew that Valencia had created a disturbance, was

acting erratically, and had stolen a fire extinguisher. Officer Toth observed that Valencia was

carrying the fire extinguisher in a threatening manner and told Valencia to drop it. When

Valencia refused to do so, Officer Toth used his pepper spray. 

At this point, Valencia was suspected of stealing a fire extinguisher. He was

carrying it in a threatening way and refused to put it down when ordered to do so. He was

actively resisting arrest. Officer Toth’s use of force at this point was commensurate with the

need for that force.

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The second significant use of force occurred when Officer Toth tried to physically

subdue Valencia. At this point, Valencia had already assaulted both Officer Toth and Officer

Nunez. He threw the fire extinguisher at Officer Toth and took a run at Officer Nunez with his

fists clenched, yelling obscenities. He refused multiple commands to get on the ground and was

actively resisting arrest. Officer Toth tried to use his pepper spray, but it was ineffective.

Officer Nunez tried to use his Taser, but it also was ineffective. Officer Toth then tried to

physically subdue Valencia. 

At this point, Valencia was acting in an angry and aggressive manner. He had

assaulted the two officers. It was reasonable to assume he posed a danger to them and others.

He was actively resisting arrest. Attempts to use lesser amounts of force had failed. Officer

Toth’s use of physical force at this point was commensurate with the need for that force.

The most significant use of force occurred when Officer Toth employed lethal force.

At the moment that the lethal force was applied, Valencia was still actively attempting to evade

arrest. He originally tried to escape on foot, but when that proved ineffective, he resisted

physically. He threw the fire extinguisher at Officer Toth, and when the officers continued their

pursuit and attempted to physically restrain him, he used his fists against them. During his final

struggle with Officer Toth, Valencia attempted to wrest the officer’s gun away from him.

Valencia’s actions posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and others because he

could have used that gun against them or members of the public. Valencia was acting in a

highly agitated and aggressive manner. It was reasonable to believe that Valencia might use the

gun if he gained possession of it. 

The court finds that Officer Toth’s use of deadly force was commensurate with the

need for that force. At the time the lethal force was applied, the officers had already tried lessthan-lethal methods to apprehend Valencia but to no avail. Officer Toth tried pepper spray

twice, but it was ineffective. Officer Nunez tried to use his Taser, but it too was ineffective.

Eventually they tried to physically restrain Valencia, but their “hands-on” attempt to do so also

proved to be ineffective due to his large size and aggressive behavior. At the moment when

lethal force was used, the officers had tried the less-than-lethal means at their disposal and

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found them ineffective. Officer Toth could not wait for help to arrive because Valencia was

actively trying to take his gun away from him and he no longer had the strength or stamina to

keep the gun away from his larger and more aggressive opponent. The court finds that the

defendant officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Billington v. Smith, 292

F.3d 1177, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002) (Detective who tried to arrest reckless driver after he crashed

his car did not use excessive force when he shot the driver who “actively, violently, and

successfully resisted arrest and physically attacked [the detective] and tried to turn [the

detective’s] gun against him.”), abrogated on other grounds by, Cty. of Los Angeles, Calif. v.

Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017); Jensen v. Burnsides, 2008 WL 4700020, at *5 (D. Ariz. 2008)

(Summary judgment was granted on excessive force claims for the defendant officer who shot

suspect while he “was locked in hand-to-hand combat and losing.”), aff'd, 356 F. App’x 928 (9th

Cir. 2009). Summary judgment should be granted to the defendant officers on Count 3.

Ceyala argues generally that the officers had other “less intrusive” options available

to them. (Doc. 59, p. 9) For example, she suggests the officers could have “let him go and

apprehend[ed] him at another time.” Id., p. 10 This argument, however, misinterprets the

nature of reasonableness inquiry. While the availability of “less intrusive” options may be

considered when deciding if the officers acted reasonably, the fact that “less intrusive” options

existed does not, by itself, make the officer’s actions unreasonable. “[A]s the text of the Fourth

Amendment indicates, the appropriate inquiry is whether the officers acted reasonably, not

whether they had less intrusive alternatives available to them.” Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912,

915 (9th Cir. 1994). The officers were under no obligation “to ascertain the least intrusive

alternative (an inherently subjective determination) and choose that option and that option only

. . . they need only act within that range of conduct [the courts] identify as reasonable.” Id. 

The court concludes that the officers in this case did so. But see, e.g., Headwaters Forest Def.

v. Cty. of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Jan. 30, 2002) (“[I]t

would be clear to a reasonable officer that using pepper spray against the protestors was

excessive under the circumstances,” which included the following: “(1) the pepper spray was

unnecessary to subdue, remove, or arrest the protestors; (2) the officers could safely and quickly

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remove the protestors, while in ‘black bears,’ from protest sites; and (3) the officers could

remove the ‘black bears’ with electric grinders in a matter of minutes and without causing pain

or injury to the protestors.”).

Ceyala further notes that Valencia was “mentally disoriented and going through all

sorts of emotions.” (Doc. 59, p. 8) She is correct to suggest that Valencia’s mental state is a

factor to be considered when determining whether the officers acted reasonably. But she does

not explain how Valencia’s mental state made the officer’s actions objectively unreasonable.

In fact, in this case, Valencia’s mental agitation made the officer’s use of force more reasonable,

not less. Valencia was not responding to the officers’ directions. He was angry, aggressive, and

a potential threat to the officers and the public. The officers acted reasonably when they applied

a gradually escalating level of force culminating in lethal force when Valencia threatened to

wrest Officer Toth’s gun away from him. But see, e.g., Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272,

1285 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is objectively unreasonable to shoot – even with lead shot wrapped

in a cloth case – an unarmed man who: has committed no serious offense, is mentally or

emotionally disturbed, has been given no warning of the imminent use of such a significant

degree of force, poses no risk of flight, and presents no objectively reasonable threat to the

safety of the officer or other individuals.”).

Discussion: Wrongful Death Claim under § 1983

In Count 1, Ceyala claims she is entitled to damages for her son’s wrongful death

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, p. 6) “[A] wrongful death claim brought under § 1983

alleges that the decedent’s death violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by interfering with

the plaintiff’s liberty interests in the companionship and society of the decedent.”

Rodriguez-Wakelin v. Barry, 2019 WL 4736922, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2019). “Such a claim is

properly analyzed under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.

at *13. “To prove a violation of substantive due process, a plaintiff must establish more than

mere negligence.” Id. “Typically, only conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable

by any government interest will rise to the conscience-shocking level necessary to violate

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substantive due process.” Id.; see also Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“[I]t is the intent to inflict force beyond that which is required by a legitimate law enforcement

objective that ‘shocks the conscience’ and gives rise to liability under § 1983.”).

In this case, the defendants’ use of force was objectively reasonable. Accordingly,

summary judgment is proper on the plaintiff’s due process claim, which is subject to a more

stringent standard. See Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9th Cir.

1998), as amended (Nov. 24, 1998) (“[I]f the district court correctly determined Burns’s actions

were objectively reasonable, it follows that his conduct did not offend the more stringent

standard applicable to substantive due process claims.”). Summary judgment should be granted

to the defendant officers on Count 1.

Discussion: State Law Claims

In Count 2, Ceyala brings state law claims including wrongful death, negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 1, p. 6)

The defendants argue that the state law claims are precluded by the notice of claim statute,

A.R.S. § 12-821.01. They are correct. The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:

Persons who have claims against a public entity, public school or a

public employee shall file claims with the person or persons authorized

to accept service for the public entity, public school or public employee

as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil procedure within one hundred

eighty days after the cause of action accrues. . . . Any claim that is not

filed within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues is

barred and no action may be maintained thereon.

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) “[T]he notice of claim statute clearly places the burden on the claimant

to make a statutorily compliant settlement offer.” Drew v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 233 Ariz.

522, 526, 314 P.3d 1277, 1281 (App. 2013). If the plaintiff’s “notice of claim does not fully

comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01, [her] claims are barred.” Id. Where, as here, the claim is

against a public employee, service must proceed via Ariz.R.Civ.P. 4.1(d), which governs service

upon individuals. Simon v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 225 Ariz. 55, 61, 234 P.3d 623, 629 (App.

2010). The plaintiff here was required to “deliver a notice of claim to the officer[s] personally,

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an individual of suitable age and discretion residing with the officer[s], or the officer[s’]

appointed agent.” Id. 

In this case, the plaintiff sent notices of claim to the City Clerk of the City of South

Tucson, return receipt requested. (Id., par. 82) She presents no evidence to prove that she

served the individual officers in accordance with Rule 4.1(d) as required by statute. (Doc. 64-9,

pp. 13, 16) Accordingly, her state law claims are barred. See, e.g., Simon v. Maricopa Med.

Ctr., 225 Ariz. 55, 61, 234 P.3d 623, 629 (App. 2010) (Summary judgment was properly

entered for Phoenix Police Officers where the plaintiff “filed his notice of claim with the clerk

of the City of Phoenix and the Clerk of the Maricopa County Special Healthcare District, but

not with any of the Officers.”). Summary judgment should be granted to the defendant officers

on Count 2.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order 

GRANTING the defendants’ motion for summary judgment filed on October 3,

2019. (Doc. 48) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within 14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections

are not timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. The Local Rules permit

the filing of a response to an objection. They do not permit the filing of a reply to a response

without the permission of the District Court.

DATED this 5th day of March, 2020.

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