Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00605/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00605-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM BRADLEY,

CDCR #E-48180,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KATCHKA, R.N.; 

M. CASTILLO, Correctional Officer; 

ALVAREZ, Sergeant; 

D. PARAMO, Warden,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00605-JLS-JLB

ORDER:

(1) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

DEFENDANTS KATCHKA AND 

PARAMO PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

& 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

AND 

(2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL 

TO EFFECT SERVICE UPON 

DEFENDANTS CASTILLO AND 

ALVAREZ PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

Plaintiff William Bradley, currently incarcerated at the Substance Abuse Treatment 

Facility in Corcoran, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 21, 2017, in the Central District of California.

(See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1.) 

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Plaintiff claims Correctional Officer Castillo and Sergeant Alvarez at Richard J. 

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego, California, violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights by using excessive force to extract him from his cell in the Ad-Seg Unit 

while he was incarcerated there on December 21, 2016. Plaintiff further contends R.N. 

Katchka failed to properly document his injuries, and Warden Paramo failed to supervise 

his subordinates. (Id. at 2–4, 8–13.) He seeks $600,000 in compensatory and $1.5 million 

in punitive damages, and demands a trial by jury. (Id. at 6.)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence 

a civil action when he filed his Complaint in the Central District in November 2017, but 

on January 5, 2018, U.S. Magistrate Judge Shashi H. Kewalramani granted his request to 

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See ECF No. 6.)

Later, on March 23, 2018, Judge Kewalramani transferred the case here, finding that 

because Plaintiff’s claims are alleged to have arisen at RJD, and all Defendants are alleged 

to reside in San Diego County, the Southern District of California and not the Central 

District, is the appropriate venue. (See ECF No. 9, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), § 1406(a).) 

Judge Kewalramani did not screen Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A before the transfer.

II. Screening Required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims that on December 21, 2016, while he was housed in RJD’s Ad-Seg 

Unit, he experienced “chronic & severe abdominal pains,” for his “I.B.S.,” and requested 

Correctional Officer Castillo to accept his “7632 Health Care Service Request Form.” (See

Compl. 8.) Plaintiff claims Castillo smiled, replied, “We don’t do it that way here, (Just 

call man down!),” and “walked off laughing.” (Id. at 8–9.)

Ten minutes later, however, Plaintiff alleges Castillo returned with R.N. Jones to 

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“issue [his] evening meds.” (Id. at 9.)1 As they approached, Plaintiff claims he was “ben[t] 

over on [the] floor in a fetal position, holding his stomach,” still suffering from “extreme 

pain,” and yelling “Help, Man Down!” (Id.) Plaintiff claims R.N. Jones asked Castillo to 

open the cell, and Castillo did so, together with Sergeant Alvarez, who was armed with a 

“ramming shield.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff claims Castillo and Alvarez then “orchestrated [a] 

bull-dozer assault,” “jump[ed]” on his back, applied “extreme pressure to [his] neck,” and 

“continuously shouted ‘Stop[] Resisting[!]’” which Plaintiff was “not doing at any time.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims he was frightened, feared for his life, and claims Castillo and Alvarez 

did not apply force in a “good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” that he was 

only “seeking emergency medical care,” and that their actions were a “malicious,” 

“sadistic,” and “racist callous act[].” (Id. at 10.)

Plaintiff further claims that after the incident, R.N. Katchka examined him, but failed 

to properly document his injuries on a CDCR Form 7219.2(Id. at 10, see also Ex. A, ECF 

No. 1, at 17.) As to Defendant Paramo, Plaintiff simply alleges he “held [the] position” as 

Warden at RJD at the time of the incident, and that he “failed to stop his subordinates from 

indulging in heinous acts.” (Id. at 4, 8.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

 

1

 R.N. Jones is not named as a Defendant.

2 Pursuant to the Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Operations Manual, “[l]icensed [h]ealth 

care staff shall determine and identify any injuries sustained by the alleged victim and suspect, assess and 

identify if they are urgent/emergent, and provide immediate emergency medical care to the alleged victim 

and suspects. The injuries sustained by the alleged victim and suspect shall be documented on a CDCR 

Form 7219, Medical Report of Injury or Occurrence and CDCR Form 837-C for use in the inmate 

disciplinary process and provide to custody.” See CDCR, Op. Man., § 54040.8.3 “Medical Services 

Responsibilities” (rev. July 27, 2017).

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1035–36 (9th Cir. 2015).

D. Warden Paramo

First, the Court notes that in addition to Officer Castillo, Sergeant Alvarez, and R.N. 

Katchka, Plaintiff has named the Warden of RJD, Daniel Paramo, as a Defendant. (See

Compl. 1, 4.) However, nowhere in the body of his Complaint does Plaintiff include 

“further factual enhancement” which describes how or when Warden Paramo was 

personally involved in the December 21, 2016 incident, or to what extent the Paramo was 

the cause of any injury. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, 

Plaintiff simply identifies Paramo as RJD’s Warden, and alleges he had the authority to 

“oversee,” but failed to “stop his subordinates,” from harming Plaintiff. (See Compl. 4.) 

However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. 

Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437–38 (9th Cir. 1993). “Because vicarious liability is 

inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, [Plaintiff] must plead that each government-official 

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” 

Iqbal, 556 at 676; see also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los 

Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least 

me degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a 

claim). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint offers no factual detail from which the 

Court might reasonably infer a plausible claim for relief based on a violation of any 

constitutional right on the part of Warden Paramo. Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 678 (noting that Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation,” and that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). Therefore, the Court sua sponte dismisses 

Paramo as a party to this action based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a plausible claim against 

him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 

Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

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E. R.N. Katchka

As to R.N. Katchka, Plaintiff alleges only that this Defendant “acted under color of 

state law by not documenting [his] injuries” correctly on the CDCR Form 7219 completed 

after he was examined following the December 21, 2016 incident. (See Compl. 3, 8, 10 & 

Ex. A at 17.) Plaintiff fails to include any further factual content as to Katchka’s acts or 

omissions, and critically, fails to allege how Katchka’s alleged failure caused the violation 

of any constitutional right. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[P]laintiff must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated 

the Constitution.”); Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (prisoners 

have no “due process right to accurate information in [their] prison record[s].”). 

Therefore, the Court also sua sponte dismisses R.N. Katchka as a party to this action 

based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004; see also King v. 

Holland, No. 1:15-cv-1885-BAM (PC), 2016 WL 6666836, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (sua 

sponte dismissing prisoner’s claim that nurse “did not document his injuries” for failing to 

state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

F. Correctional Officer Castillo and Sergeant Alvarez

As to Correctional Officer Castillo and Sergeant Alvarez, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

Complaint contains Eighth Amendment excessive force claims sufficient to survive the 

“low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm 680 F.3d at 1123; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 

1, 5, (1992) (unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) 

(per curiam) (for claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is 

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon 

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Defendants Castillo and Alvarez on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The 

officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] 

cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United 

States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma 

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1. DISMISSES Warden Daniel Paramo and R.N. Katchka based on Plaintiff’s 

failure to state a claim against them sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to 

terminate Paramo and Katchka as parties to this action.

2. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 

1), and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for 

Defendants Castillo and Alvarez. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a 

certified copy of this Order, together with the Central District of California’s Order 

granting Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, (ECF No. 6), a certified copy of his 

Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve these Defendants. Upon receipt 

of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s as completely and 

accurately as possible, include an address where Defendants Castillo and Alvarez 

may be found and/or subject to service pursuant to Civ. L. R. 4.1(c), and return them

to the United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the 

letter accompanying his IFP package.

3. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon Defendants Castillo and Alvarez as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 

285s provided to him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

4. ORDERS Defendants once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of 

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Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may 

occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a 

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 

1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based 

on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to 

prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required to respond).

5. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon 

Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document 

submitted for the Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff 

must include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the 

Court, a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that 

document has been was served on Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that 

service. See Civ. L. R. 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been 

properly filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon 

the Defendant may be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2018

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