Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00511/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00511-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeannie Mendoza, for her minor child

B.M., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-08-511-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review of the denial of social security

benefits on March 14, 2008. Dkt. #1. The parties sought a remand to allow the Appeals

Council to affirm a finding of disability as of May 9, 2007, and to permit the ALJ to

determine the issue of disability prior to that date. Dkt. #8. The Court granted the stipulation

and remanded the case pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). Dkt. ##9-10.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice

Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Dkt. #11. “The EAJA creates a presumption that fees will

be awarded to prevailing parties.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). The

Court shall award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party unless the United States shows that

its position was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 2:08-cv-00511-DGC Document 15 Filed 09/09/08 Page 1 of 2
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Plaintiff is a prevailing party because the denial of benefits has been reversed and

remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act. Dkt. ##9-10 see Gutierrez,

274 F.3d at 1257 (“An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for

purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded[.]”); Flores, 49

F.3d at 567 (“If the district court enters judgment reversing and remanding under sentence

four, then the claimant must apply for fees within 30 days of the date the judgment becomes

final.”). Defendant does not contend that the position of the United States in this case was

substantially justified or that special circumstances make a fee award unjust. Dkt. #13. The

Court therefore concludes that an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate.

See 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(a); Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257-58.

Plaintiff’s counsel, Stephanie Lake, has filed an affidavit and an itemized statement

of fees showing that she worked 7.6 hours on this case and that the legal fees and costs total

$1,615.10. Dkt. ##11-2, 11-3. Having reviewed counsel’s affidavit and the statement of

fees, and having considered the favorable result counsel obtained for Plaintiff and the

relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 & n.3 (1983), the

Court concludes that the requested fee award is reasonable. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s

motion and award her $1,615.10 in attorney’s fees and costs.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (Dkt. #11) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is awarded $1,615.10 in attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.

DATED this 9th day of September, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-00511-DGC Document 15 Filed 09/09/08 Page 2 of 2