Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02487/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02487-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONZELL GREEN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-2487 LKK DAD P

vs.

JAMES WALKER, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. On October 22, 2007, plaintiff

commenced this civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of

California by filing a civil rights complaint. On November 9, 2007, the Northern District

transferred the case to this court, which has proper venue. This proceeding was referred to the

undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule 72-302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 On January 9, 2008, this court issued findings and recommendations, recommending 1

that this action be dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to either pay the required filing fee or file a

properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff objected to the findings

and recommendations and requested an extension of time to comply with the court’s order.

Plaintiff has timely filed a properly completed application to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Accordingly, the court will vacate its findings and recommendations and allow the case to

proceed. 

2

Plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis application that makes the showing

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis.1

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) & 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee of $11.67 will be assessed by this

order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate

agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s prison trust account and forward it to

the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of

twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 

These payments will be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the

Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in

full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a

complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it

must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital

Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421

(1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

/////

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff’s complaint is a difficult to decipher, ten page, hand-written, unsigned

document to which plaintiff has attached approximately thirty-five pages of miscellaneous

exhibits. In his complaint plaintiff has named as defendants Associate Warden James Walker,

Correctional Captain R. Mandevill, Correctional Lieutenant D. Baughman, Correctional

Lieutenant R. Ramos, Correctional Lieutenant C. Tennison, Correctional Lieutenant J. Cantu,

Correctional Sergeant D. Roth, Correctional Sergeant S. Barleski, Correctional Sergeant Rios,

Correctional Sergeant Gibson, Correctional Sergeant M. Murry, Correctional Sergeant R.

Dickinson, Correctional Counselor A. Masuret, Correctional Counselor T. Woods, Correctional

Officer Darosa, Correctional Officer P. Stotts, Correctional Officer M. Roberts, Correctional

Officer G. Wooden, Correctional Sergeant G. Blodgett, Correctional Officer J. Porter,

Correctional Officer D. Sherburn, Correctional Officer T. Snyder, Correctional Officer J. Valice,

Correctional Officer S. Boyack, Correctional Officer J. Prentice, and Registered Nurse R. Hale. 

Plaintiff alleges that all of the twenty-six named defendants are employed at New Folsom State

Prison and are members of “The New Untouchable Green Wall Gang Infamous Domestic

Terrorist Organization.”

Plaintiff alleges that he is a mentally ill patient who is illegally confined at New

Folsom State Prison. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants have subjected him to

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 There are exceptions. In this regard, plaintiff alleges that defendants Baughman, 2

Masuret, and their committee have disregarded his medical concerns and informed him that he

will not receive enhanced outpatient treatment while in CDCR custody. Plaintiff also alleges that

defendant Stotts has disrupted his mental health treatment and conspired to move him to a double

cell in order to receive additional funding from the federal government. Plaintiff alleges that

when he refused to give up his “rights” to a single cell, defendant Stotts threatened him with false

rules violation reports. Plaintiff claims that defendant Gibson aided and abetted defendant Stotts

when he subsequently found plaintiff guilty of a false 115 and deprived him of his recreational

therapy. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Barleski told him that, because he refused to help the

Green Wall Gang receive additional federal funds, his property was being vandalized and stolen

out of his assigned cell. Thereafter, plaintiff returned to his cell and several inmates allegedly

told him that defendant Darosa had taken and vandalized his property. Plaintiff asserts that when

he confronted defendant Darosa, he was told that New Folsom was Green Wall’s prison, and they

could do what they wanted. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have threatened him with torture

and told him that the Green Wall Gang runs CDCR prisons. In addition, plaintiff alleges that

defendant Dickinson sprayed him with pepper spray and left him blind and scared for several

weeks. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Baughman subsequently apologized for authorizing

the assault and said he would let plaintiff back on his yard as long as he did not inform the F.B.I.

about the assault. Even these few allegations identifying specific acts allegedly engaged in by

named defendants lack the necessary specificity to allow the court to determine whether this

action is frivolous or fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.

5

“discrimination, abuse of process, inhumane treatment, assault and battery, inadequate mental

health treatment, cruel and unusual punishment, vandalism, robbery, retaliation, reprisals,

terrorist threats, obstruction of justice, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, incompatible activity, and

being deprived of his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution.” (Comp. at 2.) Beyond these broad, sweeping and unspecific claims,

plaintiff’s complaint contains few factual allegations involving the named defendants. Plaintiff 2

requests that each defendant named in the complaint be criminally charged and ordered to pay

him $4,100 in damages. Plaintiff also requests that the court release him to his family and

friends where he will be safe and where he can obtain adequate mental health treatment. 

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court

is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. 

The complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to

the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support his

claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint.

If plaintiff files an amended complaint, he is advised that he must sign his

complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). Although plaintiff included separate lines at the end of his

complaint for his signature and the date, plaintiff failed to actually sign and date the complaint. 

Plaintiff is also advised that all defendants must be identified in the caption of his pleading, and

all defendants must be named, with position and place of employment, in the section of the form

designated for that purpose. In addition, in the section of the complaint in which the plaintiff is

required to set forth a brief statement of the facts of the case, he must describe how each

defendant has deprived him of his constitutional rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Plaintiff should clarify what constitutional right he believes each defendant has

violated and support each claim with factual allegations about each defendant’s actions. Plaintiff

opens his complaint by identifying more than twenty defendants and alleging that defendants

have engaged in a series of wrongdoings and deprived him of a number of constitutional rights. 

However, plaintiff has not included any allegations against several of the named defendants. 

Moreover, where plaintiff has included allegations against named defendants, he has failed to

allege any specific causal link between the claimed constitutional violations and the defendants

or he has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

If plaintiff files an amended complaint, the court advises him of the following

legal standards that govern his civil rights claims. First, with regards to his mental health care

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

claims, plaintiff is advised that, in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Supreme

Court held that inadequate medical care did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment

cognizable under § 1983 unless the mistreatment rose to the level of “deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs.” In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be

said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must

be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle,

429 U.S. at 105-06). 

The “deliberate indifference” standard also applies in cases involving the

adequacy of mental health care in prisons. Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir.

1994); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). To establish unconstitutional

treatment of a mental health condition, “a prisoner must show deliberate indifference to a

‘serious’ medical need.” Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050,

1059 (9th Cir. 1991)). A medical need is “serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” 

Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059). 

Second, with regards to his property claims, plaintiff is advised that the United

States Supreme Court has held that “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a

state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is

available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Thus, where the state provides a

meaningful postdeprivation remedy, only authorized, intentional deprivations constitute

actionable violations of the Due Process Clause. An authorized deprivation is one carried out

pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d

1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

In his complaint, plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that the taking of

his property was authorized. The California Legislature has provided a remedy for tort claims

against public officials in California Government Code, §§ 900, et seq. If plaintiff has not

attempted to seek redress in the state system, he will not be able to sue in federal court on the

claim that the state deprived him of property without due process of the law. 

Third, with regards to his excessive use of force claims, plaintiff is advised that

the Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const.

amend. VIII. It is well established that the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the United States Constitution. Whitley

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977);

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel

and unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good

faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.

What is needed to show unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain “varies

according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). The plaintiff must show that objectively he

suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation and that subjectively each defendant had a culpable

state of mind in allowing or causing the plaintiff’s deprivation to occur. Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991).

Fourth, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to pursue a claim that prison officials

failed to protect him, plaintiff is advised that the Supreme Court has held that a prison official

violates the Eighth Amendment “only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious

harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Under this standard, a prison official must have a

/////

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” one of deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or

safety. Id. at 834. 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that verbal harassment or abuse generally does not

violate the Constitution and thus does not give rise to a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2004); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d

136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (vulgar language and verbal harassment do not state a constitutional

deprivation under § 1983). Even verbal conduct that constitutes a threat does not rise to the level

of a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 924 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Also before the court is plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent

indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298

(1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the voluntary

assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017

(9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990).

The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328,

1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances

common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of

counsel. In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The court’s January 9, 2008 findings and recommendations are vacated.

2. Plaintiff’s February 26, 2008 application to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted.

3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $11.67. All fees shall be collected and paid in

accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

4. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.

5. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to file an

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action

be dismissed without prejudice.

6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a

civil rights action.

7. Plaintiff’s October 22, 2007 request for appointment of counsel is denied.

DATED: March 7, 2008.

DAD:9

gree2487.14

Case 2:07-cv-02487-LKK -KJN Document 9 Filed 03/07/08 Page 10 of 10