Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-12-06262/USCOURTS-ca10-12-06262-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM GENE EATON, 

Defendant – Appellant.

No. 12-6262

(D.C. No. 5:98-CR-00183-R-1)

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LUCERO, O’BRIEN, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

 

William Gene Eaton, a federal prisoner appearing pro se,1

 seeks a certificate of 

appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 

motion on the ground that the motion was untimely. Mr. Eaton’s Rule 60(b) motion 

asked the district court to set aside a November 2000 order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

 

*After examining Appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is 

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not 

binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and 

collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. 

R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Mr. Eaton is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See 

United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). “[T]his rule of liberal 

construction stops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as his advocate.” Id. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 4, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 12-6262 Document: 01018977768 Date Filed: 01/04/2013 Page: 1 
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petition for habeas relief. The motion relied on Rules 60(b)(4) and (6). Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny a COA as to the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. We 

grant a COA as to the Rule 60(b)(4) motion and affirm the district court on the alternative 

ground that the motion lacked merit.2

 

In 1999, a jury in the Western District of Oklahoma convicted Mr. Eaton of two 

counts of bank robbery, one count of using a firearm during a crime of violence, one 

count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and several counts of obstruction of 

justice and witness tampering. We affirmed his convictions and life sentence on direct 

appeal. United States v. Eaton, No. 99-6151, 208 F.3d 227 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2000) 

(unpublished table). 

In 2000, Mr. Eaton filed a § 2255 habeas petition claiming, inter alia, ineffective 

assistance of counsel based on four alleged errors, including failure to seek dismissal 

because of the Government’s allegedly unexcused failure to file the indictment within 30 

days of his arrest. The district court analyzed this argument as a Speedy Trial Act 

objection. It denied relief on all grounds in a 27-page order. United States v. Eaton, CR98-183-R (W.D. Okla. Nov. 7, 2000) (“November 2000 order”). We denied Mr. Eaton’s 

application for a COA. United States v. Eaton, No. 00-6454, 20 F. App’x 763 (10th Cir. 

 2

 We do not address Mr. Eaton’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”). The 

district court has granted an ifp motion Mr. Eaton filed in that court, rendering the ifp

request filed here moot. 

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Sept. 20, 2001) (unpublished).3 

In October 2012, Mr. Eaton filed a motion under Rules 60(b)(4) and (6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure asking the district court to reconsider its nearly 12-yearold decision denying his § 2255 petition. He argued, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), that the 

November 2000 order is void for incompleteness. He asserted that his § 2255 petition 

had raised a claim that the Government’s preindictment delay violated his due process 

rights and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, and that the district court erroneously 

construed these arguments as a Speedy Trial Act claim. He contended that, by failing to 

address his actual claims, the court’s order denying his petition was incomplete. Mr. 

Eaton offered no argument specific to Rule 60(b)(6). 

Mr. Eaton’s motion represents a “true” claim for Rule 60(b) relief, rather than a 

second or successive § 2255 motion, because he asserted that “the district court failed to 

consider one of his habeas claims.” See Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th 

Cir. 2006). The district court denied the motion because it was not brought within a 

reasonable time as required by Rule 60(c). United States v. Eaton, No. CR-98-183-R 

(W.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2012). Mr. Eaton asks this court for a COA to appeal this denial. 

 3

 Mr. Eaton has since filed a number of motions raising various new and old 

claims attacking his conviction and sentence. None has been successful in the district 

court or in this court. See United States v. Eaton, No. 12-6089, 475 F. App’x 710 (10th 

Cir. Aug. 20, 2012) (unpublished); In re Eaton, No. 08-6086, slip op. (10th Cir. July 25, 

2008); In re Eaton, No. 07-6296, slip op. (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 2008); United States v. 

Eaton, No. 06-6328, 223 F. App’x 798 (10th Cir. Apr. 25, 2007) (unpublished); Eaton v. 

United States, No. 06-6198, slip op. (10th Cir. July 12, 2006); Eaton v. United States, No. 

5:06-CV-00227-R, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Jun. 2, 2006). 

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See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring a COA to appeal a final order in a proceeding 

under § 2255); Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d at 1217-18 (a COA is required to appeal a 

Rule 60(b) motion in a habeas case). 

A COA may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1225. To 

make the requisite showing, Mr. Eaton must show “that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or for that matter, agree that) the petition [(here, the Rule 60(b) motion)] should 

have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003) (quotations omitted). 

A Rule 60 motion must be made “within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(c)(1); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). This reasonable time frame 

applies to motions brought under Rule 60(b)(6). Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1225. A movant 

must show “extraordinary circumstances justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” 

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (quotations omitted). We agree with the district court that Mr. 

Eaton’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not brought within a reasonable time. The motion was 

filed nearly 12 years after the denial of his original § 2255 petition, and he has since filed 

numerous motions without raising this claim. He has alleged no extraordinary 

circumstances justifying reopening of the judgment, and we do not find any. We 

therefore deny COA as to the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 

The law is different with respect to Rule 60(b)(4). This subsection allows a court 

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to grant relief from a final judgment if “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). 

We have held that a motion brought under Rule 60(b)(4) “may be brought at any time.” 

Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1225; Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994). Thus, 

jurists of reason could debate whether (or agree that) the Rule 60(b)(4) motion should 

have been resolved in another way, and we therefore grant a COA on that issue. See 

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. Having granted a COA, we find that the district court should 

have addressed the merits of the Rule 60(b)(4) motion. We nonetheless affirm the district 

court on the alternative ground that Mr. Eaton’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion lacked merit. 

We have carefully reviewed Mr. Eaton’s original § 2255 petition and related 

filings.4

 The petition explicitly relied on Speedy Trial Act grounds in its arguments 

regarding the timing of the indictment: “Ground Three: (C) Government failed to timely 

indict under, [sic] ‘Speedy Trial Act’, [sic] pursuant to [18] U.S.C. 3161-3174.” Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at 8, United States v. Eaton, CR-98-183-R (W.D. Okla. filed 

July 10, 2000). The petition’s brief allusions to jurisdiction and procedural fairness with 

respect to the indictment were made in reference to the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day time 

limitation—an issue that was thoroughly analyzed in the district court’s November 2000 

order. 

 4

 Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, United States v. Eaton, CR-98-183-R (W.D. 

Okla. filed July 10, 2000); Motion to Amend, CR-98-183-R (filed Aug. 18, 2000); 

Second Motion to Amend, CR-98-183-R (filed Aug. 28, 2000). This court was not 

provided copies of these materials as part of the record in this appeal. We exercise our 

discretion “to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in our court and certain other 

courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.” 

United States v. Pursley, 557 F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009). 

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Finding the November 2000 order to be complete, we affirm the district court’s 

denial of Mr. Eaton’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion and deny his motion to remand. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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