Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02001/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02001-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edward Harold Schad, Jr. and

Robert Glen Jones, Jr., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Janice K. Brewer, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-13-2001-PHX-ROS

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Plaintiff Edward Schad, Jr., and Robert Glen Jones, Jr., sought a preliminary

injunction directing Defendants to disclose information about the lethal-injection drugs that

will be used in Plaintiffs’ executions. On October 4, the Court held an evidentiary hearing,

issued a preliminary order granting the request for a preliminary injunction, in part, and

indicated that a more detailed ruling would follow. (Doc. 23.) This is that ruling.

BACKGROUND

In the two-count complaint, Plaintiffs sue the following Defendants: Arizona

Governor Janice K. Brewer; Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of

Corrections (ADC); Ron Credio, Warden of the ADC Eyman Complex; and Lance Hetmer,

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Warden of the ADC Florence Complex. In Count One, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have

violated their First Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings by concealing

information about the manner in which the State will carry out their execution. In Count

Two, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated their right to due process and access to

the courts by failing to disclose information about the lethal-injection drugs they intend to

use to execute them. In the Prayer for Relief, Plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting

Defendants from 

concealing information that is not related to executions, and that is necessary to

ensuring Plaintiff’s First Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings,

including but not limited to information about 

a. The manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs

b. The NDCs of lethal-injection drugs

c. The lot numbers of lethal-injection drugs

d. The expiration dates of lethal-injection drugs

e. Documentation indicating that those who will handle pentobarbital or other

controlled substances in the execution have the appropriate DEA authorization

to do so.

(Doc. 1 at 16.)

In support of the complaint, Plaintiffs attached several letters requesting information

about the drugs ADC intends to use in Plaintiffs’ executions and the responses to those

letters. On July 19, 2013, Dale Baich, Jones’s lawyer, writing on behalf of both Jones and

Schad, requested that Director Ryan disclose the manufacturer of the lethal-injection drugs,

the lot numbers and expiration dates of the drugs, whether they came from domestic or

foreign sources, whether they are approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA), and

the credentials of the execution team members authorizing them to handle controlled

substances. (Doc. 1, Ex. A.) On July 30, 2013, Director Ryan responded that ADC intended

to follow the one-drug protocol set forth in Department Order (DO) 710 and that “ADC

intends to use unexpired, domestically obtained Pentobarbital for these executions.” (Doc.

1, Ex. B.)

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On August 6, 2013, Baich again wrote Ryan requesting the name of the manufacturer

of the drug, the brand name of the drug, the expiration date, whether the drug is compounded,

and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registrations authorizing the execution

team members to handle controlled substances. (Doc. 1, Ex. C.) On August 16, Director

Ryan responded that the name of the drug’s manufacturer and source of the drugs are

confidential and not subject to disclosure under A.R.S. § 13-757(C) and that the credentials

of the execution team could be found in DO 710. (Doc. 1, Ex. D.) 

On September 25, 2013, in response to a public records request by the American Civil

Liberties Union of Arizona (ACLU), ADC General Counsel Dawn Northup provided a

highly redacted document regarding the acquisition of the execution drugs. (Doc. 1, Ex. E.)

The document reveals only that the drug is Nembutal® that was purchased sometime in 2011.

Id. The response explained that the redacted information is confidential under A.R.S. § 13-

757(C). Id. Plaintiffs allege that no further information responsive to their requests has been

provided by Defendants.

Plaintiffs also allege that there is reason to believe that the lethal-injection drugs ADC

intends to use are expired. They allege that the only FDA-approved source of pentobarbital,

a Schedule II drug, is sold under the brand name Nembutal®. Counsel claims that ADC

provided Nembutal® procurement records in August 2011 in unrelated litigation. That

Nembutal® was ordered on September 27, 2010, and it was the only Nembutal® possessed

by ADC as of August 2011. The Nembutal® obtained in 2010 was set to expire in March

2013. Plaintiffs allege that the only source of Nembutal® from 2010 through January was a

pharmaceutical company named Lundbeck. In July of 2011, Lundbeck instituted distribution

controls to prevent the legitimate sale of Nembutal® to departments of corrections in states

that use lethal injection for capital punishment. In December 2011, Lundbeck sold its

interest in Nembutal® to Akorn, which retained Lundbeck’s distribution controls. Therefore,

Plaintiffs surmise, that as of July 2011, ADC had no legitimate source for Nembutal® and the

only Nembutal® ADC possessed as of August 2011 expired in March 2013.

Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief is based on the First Amendment. Relying on

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California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), Plaintiffs

claim that Defendants’ deliberate concealment of information about the lethal-injection drugs

and the authority of the execution team to handle controlled substances deprives them of their

First Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings. Second, Plaintiffs claim that

Defendants’ concealment of the information Plaintiffs requested violates their right to due

process and meaningful access to the courts by preventing them from discovering whether

they have a colorable claim that their executions will be carried out in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. In their motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs assert that they are likely

to succeed on those two claims; that without a preliminary injunction, they will suffer

irreparable harm; that the balance of equities are in their favor; and that disclosure of the

requested information will serve the public interest.

In response to Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs

are unlikely to succeed on the merits because they have no facially plausible Eighth

Amendment claim; they have no First Amendment right to know the manufacturer of the

lethal-injection drugs or the DEA authorization of the execution team; that Arizona’s

executioner-confidentiality statute, A.R.S. § 13-757(C), prohibits disclosure of the

information Plaintiffs seek; that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting its drug

sources from public attack; and that Plaintiffs’ due process claim cannot succeed because

their access to the courts has not been hindered. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs will

not suffer irreparable injury because they have not raised a plausible claim that their

executions will be unconstitutional. Finally, they argue that the balance of hardships tips in

their favor because the state has a “strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without

undue interference from the federal courts.” (Doc. 17 at 12) (quoting Hill v. McDonough,

547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006)).

The Court gave both parties the opportunity to call witnesses at the hearing held on

October 4, 2013. Neither party did so. They instead relied solely on documentary evidence

submitted before and during the hearing. Therefore, the record is presently underdeveloped

and this order is based solely on the parties’ limited submissions. As set forth in more detail

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below, Defendants’ failure to come forward with any evidence figures prominently in the

Court’s analysis.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard for Injunctive Relief

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not

be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (emphasis

in original). The Ninth Circuit has adopted two tests a district court must use when deciding

whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632

F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding District Court “made an error of law” by employing

only one test when denying preliminary injunction). First, a plaintiff can attempt to satisfy

the four-part test adopted by the Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under the Winter test, a plaintiff “must establish that he

is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence

of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is

in the public interest.” Id. at 20. If a plaintiff cannot meet the Winter test, he may attempt

to satisfy the second test by showing there are “serious questions going to the merits,” the

balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor, there is a likelihood of irreparable injury, and

the injunction is in the public interest. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1135. This latter “sliding scale

approach” allows a plaintiff to make a lesser showing of likelihood of success provided he

will suffer substantial harm in the absence of relief. Id. at 1133.

In the context of a capital case, the Supreme Court has emphasized that these

principles apply when a condemned prisoner asks a federal court to enjoin his impending

execution because “[f]iling an action that can proceed under § 1983 does not entitle the

complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of course.” Hill v. McDonough, 547

U.S. 573, 583-84 (2006). Rather, “a stay of execution is an equitable remedy” and “equity

must be sensitive to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without

undue interference from the federal courts.” Id. at 584. 

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1

 Defendants also argue that the holding extended only to the press and the

public—not prisoners. This argument requires little discussion. A prisoner “retains those

First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.

817, 822 (1974). Defendants do not argue that legitimate penological interests preclude

prisoners—as opposed to the public in general—from exercising any putative First

Amendment right to access information about their executions. 

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II. First Amendment Right of Access to Governmental Proceedings

As in California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 

The issues presented involve the balance between the State’s ability to carry

out executions in a safe and orderly manner and the public’s right to be

informed about how the State and its justice system implement the most

serious punishment a state can exact from a criminal defendant—the penalty

of death.

299 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 2002). In California First Amendment Coalition, the Ninth

Circuit held that the press and the public has a First Amendment right to view execution

proceedings from the moment the condemned enters the execution chamber to the time he

is pronounced dead. Id. at 885-86. It also held that California’s Procedure 770 prohibiting

the public from viewing the initial stages of the procedure until after the execution team

exited the chamber was an exaggerated response to the prison officials’ asserted legitimate

interest in the safety of prison staff. Id. Defendants correctly note, however, that California

First Amendment Coalition did not expressly extend the First Amendment right of access to

information about the nature of the lethal-injection drugs, their source, or the DEA

certification of the execution team.1

 The Court must therefore first determine whether the

First Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings extends to disclosure of

information about the means used to carry out an execution.

The well-settled right of access to governmental proceedings “is premised on ‘the

common understanding that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free

discussion of governmental affairs.’” Id. at 874 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior

Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)). “By guaranteeing that ‘the individual citizen can

effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government,’ the

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First Amendment right of access ensures that ‘this constitutionally protected discussion of

governmental affairs is an informed one.” Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-

05). 

Whether the public has a First Amendment right of access to particular governmental

proceedings is informed by two “complimentary considerations”: (1) “whether the place and

process have historically been open to the press and general public” and (2) “whether public

access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in

question.” Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986). This two-pronged

test leads the Court to conclude that there is a First Amendment right of access to information

about the means used to carry out an execution.

As the Ninth Circuit explained in California First Amendment Coalition,

“[h]istorically, executions were fully open events in the United States.” 299 F.3d at 875.

Moreover, the court rejected the state’s argument that the right of public access does not

extend to the “initial execution procedures” that take place before the lethal injection drugs

actually start to flow. Id. at 876. It explained that the “public and press historically have

been allowed to watch the condemned inmate enter the execution place, be attached to the

execution device and then die.” Id. Those historically fully-open executions included

hangings and executions by lethal gas. Id. The court therefore concluded that the “historical

tradition strongly supports the public’s First Amendment right to view the condemned as the

guards escort him into the chamber, strap him to the gurney and insert the intravenous lines.”

Id.

With historical executions, the actual means of execution was open and obvious to the

public: rope, sodium cyanide gas, and electricity. The public could not only view the

prisoner’s death, they could see the precise cause and its effects. The public and the press

therefore historically were allowed to see the specific means used to execute the prisoner.

The only evidence of Arizona’s historical practices offered at the hearing was that recently

Arizona disclosed all information regarding its supply of execution drugs. In light of this

fact, as well as the fact that, historically, the means of execution were open and obvious, the

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first Press-Enterprise consideration supports allowing access to the information Plaintiffs

seek.

The second Press-Enterprise consideration also supports a First Amendment right to

know certain details regarding the lethal-injection drug. Public access to information about

lethal injection drugs plays a significant positive role in the functioning of capital

punishment. “An informed public debate is critical in determining whether execution by

lethal injection comports with ‘the evolving standards of decency which mark the progress

of a maturing society.’” California First Amendment Coalition, 299 F.3d at 876 (quoting

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). “To determine whether lethal injection executions

are fairly and humanely administered, or whether they ever can be, citizens must have

reliable information about the ‘initial procedures,’ which are invasive, possibly painful and

may give rise to serious complications.” Id. So too, the public must have reliable

information about the lethal-injection drugs themselves in order to judge the propriety of the

particular means used to carry out an execution. 

Because there is both an historical tradition with public access to information about

the means of executions and a public importance of public access to that information, the

Court holds that the public enjoys a First Amendment right of access to specific information

about the drugs that are “inextricably intertwined with the process of putting the condemned

inmate to death.” Id.

III. The Turner Test

Having determined that California First Amendment Coalition should extend to the

information Plaintiffs seek, the Court must analyze whether Defendants’ refusal to provide

the information “is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it

represents an exaggerated response to those concerns.” California First Amendment

Coalition, 299 F.3d at 878 (citing Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (quotation

omitted)). That demonstration requires consideration of four factors: (1) whether there is a

“valid rational connection” between Defendants’ refusal and the legitimate governmental

interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right remain

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open to the prisoner; (3) the impact the accommodation of the asserted right will have on

guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether there

are “ready alternatives . . . that fully accommodate[] the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost

to valid penological interests.” Id. at 89-90.

1. Rational Relationship to a Legitimate Penological Interest

Viewed charitably, Defendants proffer two legitimate penological interests nondisclosure serves. First, Defendants argue non-disclosure is mandated by a state law

protecting the identity of certain “persons.” Second, Defendants claim non-disclosure is

necessary to ensure an ongoing supply of drugs. Neither argument is persuasive.

Defendants’ primary basis for refusing to produce the requested information is that

the drug’s source is “confidential and is not subject to disclosure under A.R.S. § 13-757(C).”

That statutes provides: “[t]he identity of executioners and other persons who participate or

perform ancillary functions in an execution and any information contained in records that

would identify those persons is confidential and is not subject to disclosure.” Assuming

compliance with this statute can serve as a legitimate penological interest, the question is

whether the drug’s manufacturer is a “person” performing an “ancillary function” in the

execution process. 

As Plaintiffs note, the Court already rejected this argument in Landrigan v. Brewer,

No. CV-10-2246-PHX-ROS, 2010 WL 4269559, at * 12 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2010), rev’d on

other grounds Brewer v. Landrigan, 131 S.Ct. 445 (2010):

The Arizona statute cannot be read as protecting the disclosure

of any information which might eventually, somehow, lead to

the “identity of executioners and other persons.” Defendants do

not point to any provision in the statute itself in support of this

claim. If the Arizona Legislature wished to protect all

individuals potentially involved in executions, the statute should

not have provided protection only to “executioners and other

persons who participate or perform ancillary functions in an

execution.” The statute instead would provide protection to all

information conceivably related to the execution.

In this instance, Defendants again fail to cite any authority for their interpretation of

the Arizona statute, and the Court finds that principles of statutory construction do not

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2

 Moreover, it was state officials who disclosed similar information in Landrigan v.

Brewer and West v. Brewer. Defendants have not explained why their application of the

confidentiality statute varies from case to case and, much more importantly, have not pointed

to any evidence establishing adverse events as a result of those disclosures. 

3

 Although the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining its supply of lethalinjection drugs, Chief Judge Kozinski’s opinion seems to assume the state can pursue that

interest by suppressing public protest and debate about the source of those drugs. The Court

doubts that to be the case. Also, the events that followed the Landrigan case illustrate why

a court should not be so willing to accept the type of speculation Chief Judge Kozinski

engaged in. The motivation for non-disclosure in Landrigan likely was more that the drugs

had been obtained illegally, instead of a legitimate belief that suppliers would be harassed.

See Cook v. Food & Drug Admin., Nos. 12-5176 and 12-5266, 2013 WL 3799987, *10 (D.C.

Cir. July 23, 2013) (“The FDA acted in derogation of [its] duties by permitting the

importation of thiopental, a concededly misbranded and unapproved new drug, and by

declaring that it would not in the future sample and examine foreign shipments of the drug

despite knowing they may have been prepared in an unregistered establishment.”).

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support construing the language in such a broad manner. Indeed, if the pentobarbital

manufacturer were among those “persons” who perform ancillary functions, it is difficult to

imagine any information that could be disclosed under the statute, which, as explained above,

is wholly inconsistent with the First Amendment guarantee of access to the procedures by

which inmates are executed.2

 

Defendants’ second attempt at justifying non-disclosure is to point to the State’s need

to obtain the drugs necessary to carry out lawfully ordered executions. By identifying the

source of those drugs, Defendants claim the manufacturers and distributors could be besieged

by negative attention, refuse to provide lethal injection drugs in the future, and thereby

prevent the state from fulfilling its duty. This concern echoes directly Chief Judge

Kozinski’s dissental in Landrigan v. Brewer, where he justified the State’s refusal to disclose

information about the foreign-source of the drug it intended to use in Landrigan’s execution

because of the State’s interest in “avoiding a public attack on its private drug manufacturing

sources.”3

 625 F.3d 1132, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of

rehearing en banc). There are two problems with Defendants’ reliance on this argument:

Chief Judge Kozinski’s speculation is not sufficient evidence to establish a legitimate

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interest; and, even accepting Chief Judge’s Kozinski’s speculation regarding the interest,

Defendants’ actions go well beyond what is necessary to serve that interest.

In cases such as this, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stressed the need for state

officials to present evidence supporting their arguments that public access to execution

information will cause problems. In California First Amendment Coalition the court stressed

that the state “must at a minimum supply some evidence that such potential problems are

real, not imagined.” 299 F.3d at 882. And in Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821, 825

(9th Cir. 2012), the court chastised Idaho officials for presenting arguments based on “pure

speculation” with “no evidence to support” them. Defendants’ presentation in this case

suffers from the same flaw.

Defendants have offered no admissible evidence in support of their claim that

revealing the information Plaintiffs seek would result in Arizona losing the ability to obtain

future execution drugs. Defendants’ only attempted evidentiary submission was a letter from

a pharmacy in Texas. That pharmacy had produced and supplied pentobarbital for the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice. Even assuming the letter is admissible evidence—a doubtful

proposition—Defendants’ reliance on this evidence is misplaced. Defendants offered no

evidence that calls and letters would prevent a corporation from operating or would be

sufficiently disruptive to force them to refuse to sell its product to the Arizona Department

of Corrections. In fact, there is absolutely no evidence that Lundbeck’s July 2011 decision

to restrict the acquisition of pentobarbital by states with active lethal injection programs was

in response to a public backlash. Lundbeck explained that the reason for its decision was

because it “adamantly opposed the distressing misuse of our product in capital

punishment”—not because it feared a public backlash. (Doc. 11, Ex. I at 1.)

In addition to not offering evidence, Defendants also failed to link their alleged

penological interest to their actions. Defendants’ concern with preserving its supply of drugs

has no obvious connection to the expiration date or lot number of the pentobarbital. There

simply is no evidence in the record that the manufacturer’s identity could be gleaned from

this information. Thus, there is absolutely no connection between keeping that information

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secret and the interest in maintaining a source of lethal injection drugs. Prison Legal News

v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir.2001) (“The rational relationship of the Turner

standard is a sine qua non.”). Defendants also failed to offer evidence that revealing the

National Drug Code will, by necessity, reveal the supplier or manufacturer. Thus, again,

keeping the National Drug Code confidential has no connection to Defendants’ alleged

interest. Therefore, the only piece of information with an obvious connection to Defendants’

speculative interest is the identity of the manufacturer itself. 

The evidence available at present, however, shows that revealing the manufacturer

will not frustrate Defendants’ interest. Arizona previously disclosed the manufacturer of its

lethal injection drugs. See Document 39 in West v. Brewer, CV-11-1409-PHX-NVW. And

at the October 4, 2013 hearing, Defendants could not articulate any harm stemming from that

disclosure. In other words, the state chose not to provide this Court with any evidence on

which the Court might conclude that there is a real risk that Arizona’s supply of drugs will

be cut off. Unlike the situation in Otter, 682 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 2012), Defendants did

not offer even conclusory declarations. Accordingly, Defendants may be able to establish

a legitimate interest in keeping confidential Arizona’s source of lethal injection drugs. But

they have not presented a sufficient basis to so hold in this particular case.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the State’s refusal to disclose the requested

information constitutes an exaggerated response to their asserted penological justification.

See California First Amendment Coalition, 299 F.3d at 882. The only exception to this

conclusion involves a final piece of information Plaintiffs seek: documentation indicating

that those who will handle pentobarbital or other controlled substances in the execution have

the appropriate DEA authorization to do so. This disclosure may result in the identification

of individuals involved in the actual execution process. California First Amendment

Coalition explicitly discussed the concern of identifying individuals involved in executions

and, indeed, affirmed the practice of using surgical garb to conceal those individuals’

identities. 299 F.3d at 884-85. The Court recognizes that Defendants have a legitimate

interest in preserving the anonymity of execution team members and will not require

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Defendants disclose information that may lead to a loss of that anonymity. 

In light of Defendants’ failure to satisfy the first Turner factor, the Court need not

continue its analysis. See Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that

a court need not examine the remaining Turner factors once the first is resolved in either

party’s favor). The Court will do so, but only in brief.

2. Alternative Means of Exercising the Right

The Court next considers whether Plaintiffs have alternative means of exercising the

constitutional right they seek to assert. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. There is no dispute that

Plaintiffs have no alternative means of obtaining the information they seek. The Supreme

Court explained in Overton v. Bazzetta that “[w]ere it shown that no alternative means of

[exercising the asserted constitutional right] existed, though it would not be conclusive, it

would be some evidence that the regulations were unreasonable.” 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003).

The Court therefore finds that this factor weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.

Further, not only is vindication of this right important for Plaintiffs to know and

understand the origin of the drugs that will be used to execute them, but providing this

information to the public furthers the complementary goal of “[a]n informed public debate”

which “is the main purpose for granting a right of access to governmental proceedings.”

California First Amendment Coalition, 299 F.3d at 884. Ensuring a vigorous public debate

is particularly important when we know that the State previously imported two shipments of

a controlled substance in violation of the federal Controlled Substance Act, see Doc. 11-1,

Ex. F, and the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. Cook v. FDA, Nos. 12-5176,

12-5266, 2013 WL 3799987 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2013). 

3. The Impact of Accommodation on Prison Resources

Another relevant consideration is the impact that accommodation of the asserted right

would have on guards, other inmates, the allocation of prison resources, and the safety of

visitors. See Turner, supra, at 90. Accommodating Plaintiffs’ request would have no impact

on prison resources. But this factor also conflates with the first Turner factor and

Defendants’ speculative assertion that disclosure of the requested information will have

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deleterious results. But, as stated in California First Amendment Coalition, “we will not

accord defendants deference on the basis of mere speculation.” 299 F.3d at 884. 

4. Presence or Absence of Ready, Low-Cost Alternatives

As for Turner’s final factor, the State’s refusal to disclose information in this action

is, again, undercut by their disclosure without consequences in West. See Ashelman v.

Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.1997) (finding that accommodation of some

prisoners’ religious dietary rights without disruption precluded a finding that the difficulties

envisioned by the prison were insurmountable).

In sum, none of the Turner factors weigh in the State’s favor. A.R.S. § 13-757(C)

does not apply and there is no evidence that the refusal to disclose the requested information

will serve Defendants’ interest in preserving its supply of drugs. Accordingly, the Court

finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim.

IV. Irreparable Injury & Balance of Equities

The failure to disclose information about the lethal-injection drugs will cause

Plaintiffs irreparable injury because “‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even

minimal periods of time, unquestionably causes irreparable injury.’” Associated Press v.

Otter, 682 F.3d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2012) (granting a preliminary injunction requiring Idaho

to allow witnesses to view an entire execution) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373

(1976). 

The Court’s balancing of the equities “turns on whether there is any realistic

possibility that a preliminary injunction will delay [Plaintiffs’] execution.” Id. As in

Associated Press, “there is minimal chance that the injunction will lead to a successful stay

application by [Plaintiffs]. Not only is the prospect of such application speculative, but if

filed, it would likely fail.” Id. Moreover, as discussed above, Defendants have failed to

persuade the Court that disclosure of the manufacturer of the lethal-injection drugs will cause

significant harm to the Defendants. Accordingly, the balance of equities tips in Plaintiffs’

favor.

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V. The Public Interest

The public has a legitimate interest in the timely enforcement of criminal judgments.

Id. But in light of the Court’s conclusion that a preliminary injunction is not likely to delay

Plaintiffs’ executions, that interest carries no weight. In contrast, there is a substantial public

interest in vindicating First Amendment principles. Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist.

Court, 303 F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Courts considering requests for preliminary

injunctions have consistently recognized the significant public interest in upholding First

Amendment principles.”). Accordingly, the public interest will best be served by granting

a preliminary injunction in this case. 

VI. Due Process and Access to the Courts

Unlike their First Amendment claim, Plaintiffs have presented no plausible basis for

injunctive relief on their due process claim. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’

concealment of the drug information violates their right to due process and meaningful access

to the courts by preventing them from discovering whether they have a colorable claim that

their executions will be carried out in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As a matter of

standing to assert an access to the courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he suffered an

“actual injury” with respect to contemplated litigation; the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

conduct of the defendants prevented him from bringing to court a nonfrivolous claim for

relief. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53. An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with

respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline

or present a claim.” Id. at 348. The right of access to the courts does not include a right to

discover causes of action or to litigate effectively once in court. Id. at 354.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that because of Defendants’ failure to disclose information,

“they cannot even assess whether they have a valid Eighth Amendment claim.” (Doc. 20 at

3) (emphasis in original). Because Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to assess

whether they have a claim, they have failed to state a claim for denial of access to the courts

in violation of their due process rights.

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IT IS ORDERED granting in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(Doc. 11). The following information must be disclosed:

a. The manufacturer of lethal-injection drugs;

b. The NDCs of lethal-injection drugs;

c. The lot numbers of lethal-injection drugs; and

d. The expiration dates of lethal-injection drugs.

In all other respects, the Motion is denied.

DATED this 7th day of October, 2013.

Roslyn O. Silver

 Senior United States District Judge

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