Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01282/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01282-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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 Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied because Plaintiff was able to file a

written motion and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b);

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lorrie A. Garcia, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Regis Corporation, a Minnesota

Corporation d/b/a Cost Cutters Family

Hair; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV09-1282-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant moves for partial reconsideration of this Court’s May 16, 2011 order

(Doc. 95). Doc. 96. Plaintiff moves to strike the motion.1

 Doc. 97. For the reasons that

follow, the Court will deny the motion for reconsideration and deny the motion to strike as

moot.

I. Legal Standards.

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only in rare

circumstances. See Ross v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-4177-PHX-MHM (ECV), 2008 WL 1776502,

at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2008). A motion for reconsideration will be denied “absent a

showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have

been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1).

Case 2:09-cv-01282-DGC Document 101 Filed 06/15/11 Page 1 of 8
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Mere disagreement with an order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. See Ross, 2008

WL 1776502, at *2. Nor should reconsideration be used to make new arguments or to ask

the Court to rethink its analysis. Id.; see Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip.,

Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988).

II. Discussion.

A. Background.

On March 9, 2011, the Court granted in part Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim on the basis that

Plaintiff had not raised a genuine dispute about being disabled under the ADA – specifically,

having a qualifying physical impairment, having a record of such impairment, or being

regarded by Defendant as having such impairment. Doc. 86. The Court also held that as a

direct result of Plaintiff failing to qualify as disabled under the ADA, Defendant was entitled

to summary judgment on the issues that its alleged acts constituted discrimination and created

a hostile work environment in violation of the ADA. Id. at 5-6.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court’s determination that she failed to raise

a genuine issue of being regarded by Defendant as having a qualifying physical impairment

(Doc. 90), and Defendant responded (Doc. 92). On May 16, the Court ruled in part that its

summary judgment order was in error on the “regarded as” issue, and vacated in part its

March 9 order. Doc. 95 at 9. The ruling extended to all issues based solely on the “regarded

as” holding, including the issues that Defendant’s alleged discrimination and hostile

environment did not violate the ADA. Because Defendant’s summary judgment motion

sought alternative grounds for holding that the alleged acts did not violate the ADA

notwithstanding Plaintiff’s disability, and because the parties briefed these issues on

summary judgment, the Court necessarily had to consider these alternative arguments as part

of the motion for reconsideration. The Court did so and concluded as follows: (1) as to the

argument that Defendant did not fail to accommodate Plaintiff, Plaintiff raised a genuine

factual dispute about whether the accommodations were related to the impairment Defendant

regarded Plaintiff as having; and (2) as to the argument that Plaintiff failed to establish the

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conduct was one that “a reasonable person would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment,” Plaintiff

raised a genuine factual dispute. Id. at 10-11. The Court did not rule that Plaintiff was

regarded as disabled, or that she was discriminated against, or that Defendant created an

abusive working environment – only that these questions should be decided by a jury.

Doc. 95.

B. Analysis of Substantive Arguments.

In its motion for reconsideration, Defendant first argues that the May 16 order

“decided issues that were not raised by plaintiff in her Motion for Reconsideration and were

never briefed by the parties.” Doc. 96 at 1. Although Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration

did not expressly argue that judgment for Defendant on the discrimination and hostile work

environment issues should be vacated, this argument was implicit for four reasons: (1) the

March 9 judgment in favor of Defendant on these issues rested solely on the conclusion that

Plaintiff had not shown she qualified under the ADA; (2) Plaintiff’s successful challenge of

this conclusion would be moot if Defendant prevailed on the alternative arguments made in

its summary judgment motion as to these issues; (3) the Court did not and had no need to

consider these alternative arguments when ruling on the original motion for summary

judgment in light of its finding that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled under the ADA; and

(4) Defendant would have been prejudiced if the Court merely vacated its judgment without

considering the alternative arguments made in Defendant’s original motion for summary

judgment.

As to whether the issues were “never briefed by the parties,” Defendant is in part

correct – but this undercuts the thrust of its argument for reconsideration. Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment did brief these issues by arguing as follows: (1) “[P]laintiff

cannot establish that Regis retaliated against her or failed to provide her with a reasonable

accommodation related to any disability. . . . [A]s evidenced by plaintiff’s own testimony,

this schedule request was not made to accommodate any purported disability. To the

contrary, plaintiff’s articulated reasons for this schedule change request had absolutely

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 This argument also appears to be absent from Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration. Doc. 92.

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nothing to do with her medical condition[,]” (Doc. 76 at 9:10-11, 10:17-19); and (2) “To

demonstrate cognizable harassment, a plaintiff must establish conduct which a reasonable

person would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment

and create an abusive working environment. . . . In the instant case, there is absolutely no

evidence that plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment[,]” (Id. at 12:21-25, 13:1-

2). 

In addition, Defendant’s motion appears premised on Plaintiff failing to show she had

an actual impairment that qualified as a disability under the ADA. See Doc. 76. Plaintiff

responded that she qualifies under the ADA because, in part, she was regarded by Defendant

as being disabled under the ADA. Doc. 82. In replying, Defendant asserted that “Plaintiff

has not produced a scintilla of admissible evidence to establish a ‘regarded as’ claim under

the ADA” and proceeded to argue what relevant evidence was missing. Doc. 84 at 10-11.

Defendant’s reply did not argue that an employer has no obligation to accommodate a

“regarded as” plaintiff, nor was this argument made in its initial motion for summary

judgment.2

 Docs. 76, 84.

Defendant appears to argue that when reconsideration of a summary judgment order

is granted on one issue, and that issue necessarily requires reconsideration of other issues

raised in the motion for summary judgment, a court must order a re-briefing of the summary

judgment motion. Defendant has cited no authority in support of this argument. Nor has

Defendant moved for permission to file two summary judgment motions. Doc. 16 at 4 (“No

party shall file more than one motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure unless permission is first obtained, by joint telephone call, from the

Court.”). Accordingly, the Court properly reconsidered the vacated portions of the summary

judgment order in light of the arguments presented in the parties’ initial summary judgment

briefings. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (noting that a party seeking

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summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis

for its motion . . . .”). 

In its motion for reconsideration, Defendant argues for the first time that Ninth Circuit

precedent, more specifically Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir.

2003), stands for the proposition that “there is no duty to accommodate an employee in an

‘as regarded’ case.” Doc. 96 at 2 (quoting Kaplan). To the extent Defendant’s motion for

reconsideration tries to obtain summary judgment in its favor on the basis of a new argument,

it will be denied. See Northwest Acceptance Corp., 841 F.2d at 925-26. Also, to the extent

Defendant seeks to finalize jury instructions on the law regarding employer duties to

“regarded as” employees under the ADA, the attempt is premature – the parties may do so

in connection with the final pretrial conference.

Defendant also requests reconsideration of the hostile environment ruling, under two

independent arguments: lack of duty under Kaplan and Plaintiff’s failure to establish a

sufficiently-severe or pervasive conditions under Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th

Cir. 1991). The Kaplan argument is insufficient to warrant summary judgment for the

reasons mentioned above. The Court addressed Ellison in its May 16 order (Doc. 95 at 10-

11), and Defendant has not persuaded the Court that, in light of the parties’ summary

judgment briefings, the ruling was manifest error.

The motion to reconsider on these grounds will therefore be denied.

C. Admissibility of Evidence.

 Defendant also argues, in the alternative, the Court’s suggestion that Defendant “did

not specifically identify Dr. Walter’s letter and prescription as inadmissible nor state the

grounds on which the evidence was admissible” is error that by itself requires

reconsideration. Doc. 96 at 3 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant notes that

“[i]n objecting to Plaintiff’s Statement of Fact . . . [Defendant] specifically cited lack of

foundation and inadmissible hearsay, as well as the fact that the exhibit on which plaintiff

relied failed to support the factual assertions contained in Plaintiff’s SOF ¶58.” Id.

The May 16 order states in part as follows:

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A nonmoving party need not “produce evidence in a form

that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary

judgment,” . . . but the substantive evidence itself must be

admissible, Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir.

2002).

The letter and prescription are not sworn statements and

are not submitted under affidavit by Plaintiff’s attorney.

Defendant’s reply contains a catch-all paragraph objecting to

admissibility of evidence, but Defendant does not specifically

identify Dr. Walter’s letter and prescription as inadmissible, nor

does it state the grounds on which the evidence in general is

inadmissible other than to cite generally to Rule 56 and Local

Rule 56.1. Accordingly, the Court finds that the above

documents, if appropriately admitted at trial after foundation is

established, do raise a genuine dispute about whether Plaintiff’s

need for a day shift was related to the impairment Plaintiff had

or Defendant regarded her as having.

Doc. 95 at 10. 

Defendant’s summary-judgment reply refers to evidentiary defects generally,

specifically identifies several defects other than issues with Exhibit 16, and contains a

footnote asserting that “[t]he analysis of procedural infirmities is detailed more fully in

Regis’ Response and Objections to Plaintiff’s Controverting and Separate Statement of

Facts.” Doc. 84 at 2-4. Such statements in the reply memoranda do not comport with Local

Rule 56.1(e): “Memoranda of law filed in support of . . . a motion for summary judgment,

including reply memoranda, must include citations to the specific paragraph in the statement

of facts that supports assertions made in the memoranda regarding any material fact on which

the party relies in support of or in opposition to the motion.” Therefore, Defendant is not

entitled to relief on the basis of objections not referenced with specificity in the reply. 

The Court would not, however, have reached a different outcome had the reply

complied with local rules. Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s statement of facts, filed on

the same day as the reply to its summary judgment motion, asserts in part: “Regis disputes

and objects to PSOF ¶ 58. Plaintiff has failed to provide any foundation for Exhibit 16 on

which she relies. . . . To the extent Exhibit 16 is being provided to prove the truth of the

matter contained therein, it constitutes inadmissible hearsay.” Doc. 85 at 9-10. The Court’s

March 9 order found Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue as to having an ADA-qualifying

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Defendant may seek an appropriate limiting instruction with respect to Exhibit 16.

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physical impairment. As a result, Exhibit 16 will not be received at trial to prove the truth

of the matter asserted – that Plaintiff had an ADA disability. Rather, Exhibit 16 will be

received as evidence of Defendant’s state of mind – its awareness and belief regarding

Plaintiff’s impairment. Such use of the exhibit does not depend on the truth of the matter

asserted and therefore is not barred as hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).3

 Moreover, to the

extent the foundation objection attacks authenticity of these documents, authentication is

“satisfied by ‘evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its

proponent claims.’” Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed.

R. Evid. 901(a)). Plaintiff’s statement of facts asserts that “In May 2008, [Plaintiff] provided

[Defendant] with a doctor’s prescription, and letter from Dr. Debra A. Walter, M.D.”

(Doc. 83 ¶ 58), and Defendant does not deny receiving such a prescription and letter (Doc. 85

at 9-10). Whether the prescription and letter were in fact written by Dr. Walter (i.e., whether

the documents in the exhibit are authentic) is not relevant to Defendant’s receipt of these

documents. Defendant did not deny in the summary judgment briefing that it received the

documents. Whether Defendant believed the medical assertions stated in the documents is

a factual issue for the jury.

III. Conclusion.

Because the motion for reconsideration is denied, Plaintiff’s motion to strike will be

denied as moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 96) is denied.

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2. Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 97) is denied as moot.

DATED this 15th day of June, 2011.

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