Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00860/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00860-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Genaro Evenicio Pina-Aguirre,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Arizona Attorney General,

Respondents.

No. CV 14-00860 PHX NVW (MEA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

Petitioner docketed a petition seeking a petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 

23, 2014. Respondents docketed an answer (Doc. 18) to the habeas petition on 

September 8, 2014. Petitioner docketed a reply to the answer to his petition on October 

17, 2014. See Doc. 19.

I Procedural background

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned December 13, 2006, charged

Petitioner with one count of armed robbery, a class 2 dangerous felony (Count 1), one 

count of theft of a means of transportation, a class 3 felony (Count 2), and one count of 

misconduct involving weapons, a class 4 dangerous felony (Count 3). See Doc. 18, Exh.

A. On January 23, 2007, the state filed allegations of historical priors and also alleged

aggravating circumstances other than prior convictions. Id., Exh. B & Exh. C. On 

January 29, 2007, the state trial court appointed a Spanish-language interpreter to assist 

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Petitioner in his criminal proceedings. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner refused to cooperate with his assigned counsel, and on June 1, 2007, the 

trial court assigned new counsel. Id., Exh. E & Exh. F. On February 19, 2008, 

Petitioner’s new counsel moved for a determination of competency to stand trial pursuant 

to Rule 11, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. G. Counsel reported that

Petitioner claimed “he hears voices around the clock and has suicidal thoughts.” Counsel 

further averred he had “questions about [Petitioner’s] ability to understand him and assist 

in his defense.” Id., Exh. G at 1-2.

On February 26, 2008, the trial court ordered a Rule 11 evaluation and, on March 

4, 2008, the trial court appointed two mental health physicians to conduct an evaluation. 

Id., Exh. H & Exh. I. The parties stipulated that the court could determine competency 

based on the report of one of the appointed doctors. On April 4, 2008, the trial court 

found Petitioner incompetent and ordered that he be committed and receive treatment to 

be restored to competency. Id., Exh. J & Exh. K at 2.

On May 20, 2008, upon stipulation of the parties, the trial court found that 

Petitioner had been restored to competency. Id., Exh. L & Exh. M. On September 10, 

2008, and again on January 28, 2009, Petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with his 

counsel, however, the trial court denied his requests to change counsel on both occasions. 

Id., Exhs N, O, P.

Petitioner’s trial began on July 28, 2009, resulting in guilty verdicts on all three 

charges. Id., Exhs TT, UU, VV, WW.

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts adduced at Petitioner’s trial

as follows:

Late on December 4, 2006, the victim parked her car in her driveway. As 

she got out, Pina-Aguirre pointed a handgun at her and demanded the keys. 

After she relinquished her keys and purse, Pina-Aguirre got into her car and 

drove away. The victim called police and activated her “LoJack” GPS 

tracking device.

The car was quickly located in front of of a house. As police approached, 

Pina-Aguirre fled out the back door. He was captured in a nearby backyard 

and was subsequently identified by the victim.

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Answer at 3-4, quoting Exh. BB at 2.

On September 2, 2009, the state court sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive 

sentence of 15.75 years of imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for armed robbery, to 

the presumptive sentence of 11.25 years of imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for 

theft of a means of transportation, and to the presumptive term of 10 years of 

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for misconduct involving weapon, all sentences 

were ordered to be served concurrently. Id., Exh. U at 2-3.

Petitioner took a timely, counseled direct appeal of his convictions and sentences.

Id., Exh. W. Petitioner, through counsel, asserted the trial court erred by failing to sua 

sponte conduct a hearing to determine the voluntariness of Petitioner’s post-arrest 

statements to police. Id., Exh. Y. On January 20, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. BB. Petitioner did not seek 

review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court.

On March 30, 2011, Petitioner initiated a timely action for state post-conviction 

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. DD. On April 

4, 2011, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his Rule 32 

proceedings. On October 27, 2011, counsel filed a notice averring to the court that they

could find no “meritorious issue, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to 

justify the filing of a petition in this matter.” Id., Exh. EE & Exh. FF. On December 15, 

2011, Petitioner filed a pro per pleading in his Rule 32 action, checking the following 

boxes on the standard form as grounds for relief: 1) admission at trial of an 

unconstitutional identification; 2) ineffective assistance of counsel; 3) unconstitutional 

suppression of evidence by the state; 4) unconstitutional use by the state of perjured 

testimony; 5) newly discovered evidence (video and audio recording of his interview with 

police); 6) denial of his “right” to test for DNA and fingerprint evidence; and 7) denial of 

“right to change my lawyer.” Id., Exh. HH at 1-2. The trial court construed the issues as 

asserting claims of newly discovered evidence, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and 

a faulty police investigation. Id., Exh. LL at 3, 4, 7.

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On April 6, 2012, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. The trial 

court (the same judge before whom the case was tried) recounted the facts of Petitioner’s 

case as follows:

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 4, 2006, the victim, upon 

arriving home from work, got out of her car and walked to her front door. 

As she did so she saw a car by her house. According to the victim, 

Defendant jumped the fence, came into her front yard, ran up to her, 

pointed a gun at her face and demanded her car keys. The victim 

relinquished to Defendant her car keys, purse and a video camera she was 

holding. Defendant then got into the victim’s car and drove away. The other 

car that the victim had noticed followed behind. The victim then called the 

police and activated the “LoJack” GPS tracking device in her car.

The victim’s car was quickly located by the police in front of a house. As 

police began setting up a perimeter around the house, Defendant and at 

least one other man ran out of the house’s back door. Defendant was 

captured in a nearby backyard. At the time he was captured Defendant had 

on [sic] his possession a speed loader with 45 caliber ammunition. 

Defendant was subsequently identified by the victim in a one-on-one 

identification. Defendant was then taken to the police station, read his 

Miranda rights and questioned by police.

Inside the house that Defendant fled from, the police found a silver 45 

caliber handgun and a black leather jacket (according to the victim, the 

Defendant was wearing a black leather jacket when he accosted her). The 

police also found the victim’s cell phone, name tag, keys, credit cards and 

driver’s license. Tools that had been in the victim’s vehicle at the time it 

was stolen were found in the house’s garage.

Upon being questioned by police, Defendant initially denied any 

involvement in the armed robbery and theft. Ultimately, Defendant 

acknowledged that he was there at the victim’s house and that he knew a

robbery was going to occur and he was going to get a couple hundred 

dollars for his involvement in the robbery. However, Defendant continued 

to deny that he was the one who confronted the victim, contending that he 

stayed in the vicinity of the other vehicle while the robbery was going on.

Id., Exh. LL at 2.

The trial court rejected all of the grounds for relief asserted by Petitioner in his pro 

per petition for Rule 32 relief, finding the alleged newly discovered evidence did not 

constitute newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rule 32.1(e) and, therefore, that the 

claim was procedurally barred. The trial court found that, even if the evidence qualified 

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under the rule, the claim was meritless. The court also concluded each allegation of 

ineffective assistance of counsel was meritless. The court further determined Petitioner’s 

claim regarding a “faulty” police investigation was not cognizable in a Rule 32 

proceeding, and even if it were, it was without merit in light of the “overwhelming 

evidence of guilt in th[e] case.” Id., Exh. LL at 3-7. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review of this decision, which the Arizona Court of 

Appeals denied on August 8, 2013. Id., Exh. MM.

On August 13, 2013, Petitioner filed an untimely second Rule 32 petition, 

asserting the trial court erred by admitting other act evidence, that Petitioner had admitted 

to his prior historical felony convictions without a proper plea colloquy, that Petitioner’s 

inability to understand English required reversal of his convictions, that his convictions 

must be reversed based on Blakley error; and that there was insufficient evidence to 

sustain his convictions. Id., Exh. NN. On August 19, 2013, the trial court dismissed the

Rule 32 petition for failure to state a clam for which relief could be granted in an 

untimely Rule 32 proceeding. Id., Exh. OO.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts the trial court failed to sua sponte 

conduct a voluntariness hearing and that he was denied his right to the effective 

assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner also alleges that the police investigation resulting in 

his convictions was unconstitutionally defective. Respondents allow that the petition is 

timely and that Petitioner exhausted his federal habeas claims in the state courts.

III Analysis

A. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision contrary to clearly established federal law or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was 

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‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The AEDPA requires that the 

habeas court review the “last reasoned decision” from the state court, “which means that 

when the final state court decision contains no reasoning, we may look to the last 

decision from the state court that provides a reasoned explanation of the issue.” Murray v. 

Schriro 746 F.3d at 441, quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2000).

A state court applies a clearly established standard unreasonably only if no 

“reasonable interpretation of the controlling [Supreme Court] standard” can 

“support [the state court’s] legal ruling.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 

930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, [] (2007). So, when evaluating the reasonableness 

of a state court’s application of a general standard, we must defer to any 

“principled reason for the state court to distinguish between the case before 

it and Supreme Court precedent.” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 992 

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Moreover, § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court 

recently explained,

does not require state courts to extend [a Supreme Court] 

precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as 

error. Thus, “if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can 

apply to the facts at hand,” then by definition the rationale was not 

“clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.” 

AEDPA’s carefully constructed framework “would be undermined 

if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the 

guise of extensions to existing law.”

White, 134 S.Ct. at 1706 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Yarborough, 

541 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. 2140).

Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1133-34.

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate 

claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to 

federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in 

state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking 

in justification that there was an error ... beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 786–

787, [] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—and it is—“that is 

because it was meant to be.” [] 131 S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly 

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conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the 

“extreme malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. []

131 S.Ct., at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 

1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 

(2004); Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2014); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 

758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). 

 The “only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as 

of the time of the state court decision.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 

1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 

538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, [] (2003). If Supreme Court “cases give no 

clear answer to the question presented, ... it cannot be said that the state 

court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” Wright v. Van 

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, [] (2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In other words, “‘[i]t is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a 

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme 

Court].’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 

U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, [] (2009)).

McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2013).

To satisfy the “unreasonable application” portion of the first prong, the 

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s application of Supreme 

Court precedent to the facts of his case was not only incorrect but 

“objectively unreasonable.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 

357, 360 (2002). “While Supreme Court precedent is the only authority that 

is controlling under AEDPA, we look to Ninth Circuit case law as 

‘persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state 

court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law.’” 

Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Van Tran v. 

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)...[] 

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Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Woods, 764 F.3d at 

1121.

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 

(2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, 

the state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 

766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable 

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; 

Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one 

and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court might have 

incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 

F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th 

Cir. 2010).

Pursuant to section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a statecourt’s factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court 

would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 

724-25 (9th Cir. 2014). Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and 

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with 

clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 

U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

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340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. 

Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881; Anderson v. 

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption of correctness is 

equally applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes 

the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304–05 

(1982). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with regard to 

claims adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited 

to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 

at 998.

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 

2842, 2858–59 (2007); Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2014);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 

2011); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008).

B. Petitioner’s claims for relief 

1. Petitioner contends that the trial court should have, sua sponte, held a 

voluntariness hearing before admitting Petitioner’s post-arrest statements to police

as evidence at his trial.

The state appellate court rejected this claim, finding, inter alia:

We find no error, much less fundamental error, here. First, there is no 

requirement that the trial court must sua sponte determine that a 

defendant’s statements were voluntary before they can be admitted. The 

defendant must raise any issue of voluntariness. State v. Alvarado, 591 P.2d 

973, 975 (1979). Once raised, the court has to address the issue pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 3988(A) (2010). Absent a request, the United States Constitution 

does not require the trial court to conduct a voluntariness hearing. 

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Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); Alvardo, 591 P.2d at 975.

***

Moreover, Pina-Aguirre alleges his statements were involuntary because he 

was wet and cold during interrogation. Specifically, he testified that a 

police officer pushed him into a backyard swimming pool during the chase, 

even though the backyard where he was captured “was strictly dirt.” He 

also testified that the air conditioner in the police station was on during the 

interrogation. Even assuming, arguendo, that he was cold and wet, there 

was no evidence that shows his will was overborne and his statements were 

involuntary. See State v. Spears, 908 P.2d 1065, 1071 (1996) (quoting State 

v. Arnett, 579 P.2d 542, 547 (1978...Moreover, there was no evidence of 

coercion during the interrogation. In State v. Smith, our supreme court held 

that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate before a trial court can 

find a confession was not voluntary. 974 P.2d 431, ¶ 14 (1999) (quoting 

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)). Here, Pina-Aguirre was 

read the Miranda warnings and agreed to answer questions. No threats or 

promises were made during the interrogation. See State v. Boggs, 185 P.3d 

111, ¶ 44 (2008) ... The detective testified that Pina-Aguirre never 

complained to him about his physical condition. In fact, Pina-Aguirre 

testified that he was not forced to make statements during the interrogation. 

Consequently, there was no voluntariness issue.

Answer, Exh. BB at 3-4.

The Arizona state court’s conclusion was not clearly contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law. As found by the appellate court, a trial court is 

not obliged to sua sponte order a hearing to determine whether a confession was given 

voluntarily. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506 (1977)(“ the 

Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous 

challenge to the use of the confession”); Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 

802, 810 -11 (9th Cir. 2003)1. Additionally, the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s

 

1

Other cases finding coercion have been far more outrageous. See, e.g., Mincey v. 

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398–99, 98 S.Ct. 2408, [] (1978) (finding statement 

obtained from a defendant who was in the hospital, in near coma condition, and in 

great pain, while fastened to tubes, needles, and a breathing apparatus, could not 

have been voluntary); Haynes, 373 U.S. at 511–12, 83 S.Ct. 1336 (1963) 

(invalidating confession where suspect was held for over five days and never 

advised of his rights); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149–54, 64 S.Ct. 921, 

[] (1944) (invalidating confession because police questioned suspect for thirty-six 

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will was not overborne by any police conduct or coercion was not clearly contrary to nor 

an unreasonable application of federal law. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 

163-67, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520-22 (1986).

2. Petitioner argues that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of 

counsel. 

Petitioner maintains that his counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to 

request a voluntariness hearing, because counsel failed to challenge the victim’s 

identification of Petitioner, and because counsel failed to impeach Detective Salgado with 

an interview transcript. The state court denied these claims in Petitioner’s first Rule 32 

action. The state court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application 

of federal law.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must 

show both that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency 

prejudiced the outcome of his criminal proceedings. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range of reasonable professional 

assistance required of attorneys in that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 

at 2064. Counsel’s performance will be held constitutionally deficient only if the habeas 

petitioner proves counsel’s actions “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 

as measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 

at 2064-65. See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2010).

 To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction 

must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must 

apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The challenger’s burden 

is to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.

 

hours straight); Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir.1 999) (finding 

confession was involuntary because detectives admittedly continued the 

interrogation after the suspect clearly invoked his Miranda rights)...

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Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted), 

citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must establish that there is “a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. See also, 

e.g., Cheney, 614 F.3d at 994. To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was 

deficient because counsel failed to raise a particular argument, the petitioner must 

establish the argument was likely to be successful, thereby establishing that he was 

prejudiced by his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, 

counsel’s performance is not deficient nor prejudicial when counsel “fails” to raise an 

argument that counsel reasonably believes would be futile. See Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 741; 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. 

Additionally, it is Petitioner’s burden to establish both that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced thereby. See, e.g., Wong v. 

Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16-17, 130 S. Ct. 383, 384-85 (2009). “It is not enough for the 

defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 

proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “Surmounting Strickland’s 

high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 356, 371-72, 130 S. Ct. 

1473, 1485 (2010), quoted in Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

Counsel is constitutionally deficient if the representation “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness” such that it was outside “the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88, 104 

S.Ct. 2052 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Judicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and we must guard 

against the temptation “to second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

conviction or adverse sentence.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Instead, we 

must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id.; see also

Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 789, [] (2011). Because of the 

difficulties inherent in fairly evaluating counsel’s performance, courts must 

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“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,

104 S.Ct. 2052. This presumption of reasonableness means that not only do 

we “give the attorneys the benefit of the doubt,” we must also 

“affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [defense] counsel may 

have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, [] 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1407, [] (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

 To establish prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 

Under this standard, we ask “whether it is ‘reasonably likely’ the result 

would have been different.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 792 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052). That is, only when “[t]he 

likelihood of a different result [is] substantial, not just conceivable,” id., 

has the defendant met Strickland’s demand that defense errors were “so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,” id. at 787–88 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

 Under AEDPA, we do not apply the Strickland standard de novo. Rather, 

“[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 785. “A 

state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation 

when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Id.

“[B]ecause the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has 

even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not 

satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 

S.Ct. 1411, [] (2009). Deference to a state court’s determination that 

counsel's performance was not deficient requires us to ask “whether there 

is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788. Deference to a state court’s 

conclusion that any deficiency did not result in prejudice requires us to ask 

whether such a determination by the state court “would be unreasonable.”

Premo v. Moore, [] 131 S.Ct. 733, 744, [] (2011); see also Harrington, 131 

S.Ct. at 792 (holding that “[i]t would not have been unreasonable” for the 

state court to conclude that the petitioner's evidence of prejudice did not 

make it “reasonably likely” that the result would have been different).

Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 988-89 (emphasis added).

In denying Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the state court 

found that counsel’s alleged “failure” to challenge the voluntariness of Petitioner’s 

statements because Petitioner was wet and cold was “clearly” not deficient performance 

because such a motion was unlikely to succeed. The trial court further found that 

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although the method of identification was unduly suggestive, the victim’s identification 

of Petitioner as the perpetrator (“100%” within one hour of the crime) was reliable and, 

accordingly, that any challenge to the identification would would have been futile. 

Accordingly, the trial court determined, counsel’s alleged “failure to challenge—in no 

way” prejudiced Petitioner. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that counsel did not 

visit Petitioner prior to trial and that counsel was unprepared, the trial court found that, 

other than the failure to impeach Detective Salgado, counsel was prepared.

The trial court did find that counsel’s failure to impeach Detective Salgado’s 

rendition of the details of the interview with the transcript of the interview was deficient 

performance. However, the trial court concluded, because of the “overwhelming” 

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt presented at trial, the deficient performance was not 

prejudicial.

The trial court delineated the evidence of guilt:

As noted above, at trial the victim identified Defendant with certainty as 

her assailant. Defendant ultimately admitted to the police that although he 

did not confront the victim, he was there, knew that a robbery was going to 

occur, agreed to assist, was to be paid money for his assistance, and gave a 

gun to one of his accomplices. The victim’s car was found outside the 

house from which the Defendant ran. The victim’s property was found 

inside that house. A gun was found inside the house next to a black leather 

jacket (according to the victim, a gun was pointed at her by the Defendant 

during the robbery and the Defendant was wearing a black leather jacket). 

When apprehended, Defendant had a speed loader in his pocket that was the 

same caliber as the weapon found in the house by the black leather jacket. 

In light of the overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt, the Court is of 

the opinion even if defense counsel had impeached Detective Salgado, the 

result of the proceeding would have been the same. Thus, Defendant was 

not prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.

Answer, Exh. LL at 6.

The state court’s determination that Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not 

unconstitutionally ineffective, i.e., that the only instance of deficient performance was not 

prejudicial and that the other allegations involved counsel’s alleged “failure” to raise 

meritless arguments, was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

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federal law. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 732; Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 943 (9th 

Cir. 2013); Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003); James v. Borg, 

24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir.1992) 

(finding that a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on the ground that 

counsel failed to argue inadequate notice of the charge 

3. Petitioner also maintains that the police conducted a “faulty investigation” 

by failing to retrieve fingerprints and DNA evidence. 

The trial court dismissed this claim as follows:

The final argument Defendant makes in his Petition is that the investigation 

was faulty because the police did not dust for fingerprints or conduct any 

DNA analysis. These facts, however, were pointed out to the jury during 

defense counsel’s examination of the witnesses and during his closing 

argument. The jury nevertheless found Defendant guilty on all three 

charges.

In this Court’s opinion, this is not a claim that is properly raised under Rule 

32.1. However, even if it was, it does not warrant Rule 32.1 relief. Quite 

simply, the police’s failure to dust for fingerprints and/or conduct DNA 

analysis is no way deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Moreover, in light of 

the overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case, and as evidenced by the 

jury’s verdicts, Defendant simply cannot demonstrate by clear and 

convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have found 

Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without such evidence.

Answer, Exh. LL at 7.

The state court’s decision that the police or prosecution’s “failure” to conduct 

DNA analysis or to acquire fingerprints did not violate Petitioner's right to due process of 

law or a fair trial was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal 

law. Under certain circumstances, the state’s failure to collect or preserve potentially 

exculpatory evidence constitutes a due process violation. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 

488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337 (1988); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 625–26 

(9th Cir.1997). 

However, the duty to preserve evidence is limited to material evidence, i.e., 

evidence whose exculpatory value was apparent before its destruction and that is of such 

nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence from other sources. 

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California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534 (1984). “[U]nless a 

criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve 

potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337. See also Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365,

371 (9th Cir. 1997). Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the police, “failure to 

preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337. The mere failure to preserve evidence 

which could have been subjected to tests which might have exonerated the defendant 

does not constitute a due process violation. See Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 987 

(9th Cir. 2001).

Because the state court’s opinion was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law, see Grisby, 130 F.3d at 371, Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

on this claim. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner properly exhausted his federal habeas claims by presenting them to the 

state courts. The state court’s last reasoned decision denying the claims was not clearly 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Pino-Aguirre’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

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pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

Dated this 15th day of December, 2014.

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