Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02816/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02816-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

We Are America, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) No. CIV 06-2816-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Maricopa County Board of )

Supervisors, et al. )

)

Defendants. ) )

Introduction

In 2005, the Arizona State Legislature criminalized human

smuggling. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-2319.

Thereafter, the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (“MCAO”)

interpreted that human smuggling statute, in combination with

Arizona’s conspiracy statutes, as giving it the prosecutorial

discretion to charge and prosecute non-smuggling migrants for

conspiring to transport themselves within Maricopa County.

Accordingly, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) began

arresting and detaining migrants for that crime. This lawsuit

is a direct challenge to the foregoing, which the parties refer

to, as will the court, as the Maricopa Migrant Conspiracy Policy

(the “Policy”). 

Currently pending before the court are defendants’ (Doc.

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1 Given the court’s intimate familiarity with this action and

because the issues have been fully briefed, in its discretion the court

denies the parties’ request for oral argument as it would not aid the

decisional process. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d

920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

2 This court previously denied plaintiffs’ first motion for class

certification without prejudice to renew. We Are America/Somos America

Coalition of Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 2007 WL 2775134,

at * 8 (D.Ariz. Sept. 21, 2007) (“WAA/SACA I”).

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119) and plaintiffs’ (Doc. 121) competing motions for summary

judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The primary issue which

these summary judgment motions raise is whether federal law

preempts and renders invalid the Policy.1 The plaintiffs’

second motion for class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

23 (Doc. 122)2 is also currently pending before the court. 

Background

An examination of the parties’ statements of facts and

controverting statements of facts, reveals that there is little

complete agreement between them. Most of the parties’

objections are not well-taken though; and they obfuscate rather

than sharpen the factual record. 

A court “may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on

a motion for summary judgment.” Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466

F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). However,

“‘objections to evidence . . . [as] irrelevant, speculative,

and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal

conclusion are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard

itself.’” Harris Technical Sales, Inc. v. Eagle Test Sys., Inc.,

2008 WL 343260, at *3 (D.Ariz. Feb. 5, 2008) (quoting Burch v.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1120 (E.D.Cal.

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3 For uniformity and ease of reference, all citations to page

numbers of docketed items are to the page assigned by the court’s case

management and electronic case filing (CM/ECF) system.

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2006)). Many of the parties’ objections are to relevancy. Such

objections are “‘redundant’” though because a court “‘cannot

rely on irrelevant facts[]’” in awarding summary judgment.

Huynh v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2008 WL 2789532, at *4

(D.Ariz. July 17, 2008) (quoting Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119).

“‘A court can award summary judgment only when there is no

genuine dispute of material fact.’” Id. (quoting Burch, 433

F.Supp.2d at 1119) (emphasis in original)). 

Other objections are that the proffered evidence is

argumentative or constitutes an improper legal conclusion.

These types of objections are “superfluous” in this context,

however, because such statements “‘are not facts and likewise

will not be considered on a motion for summary judgment.’” Id.

(quoting Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119 (citation omitted)).

Thus, insofar as the parties’ objections are duplicative of the

summary judgment standard, the court sees no need to expressly

rule on each. 

There are two objections which merit specific

consideration, however. The defendants are objecting to the

plaintiffs’ second statement of fact which, in turn, is based

upon a document entitled “[Criminal Justice-Sheriff-Human

Smuggling Enforcement] Opinion No. 2005-002[,]” dated September

29, 2005. Pls.’ Exh. 5 (Doc. 121-2) at 213-219.3 This unsigned

document purports to be a letter from former Maricopa County

Attorney Andrew P. Thomas to defendant Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio.

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See id. Based upon this letter, the plaintiffs offer the

following statement of “fact[:]” “On September 29, 2005, [the

then] defendant County Attorney announced that his office would

prosecute not only actual coyotes, but also non-smuggler

migrants — ‘people who are trying to enter into this country’

and whom, in the legislature’s view, actual smugglers ‘exploit’

– who agree to pay for their own transport on the theory that

such migrants have conspired to violate § 13-2319.” Plaintiffs’

Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

(“Pls.’ SOF”) (Doc. 121-1) at 3:16-21 (citations omitted). The

plaintiffs also rely upon the September 29, 2005, document as

the source of the Policy. See id. at 3:24-25 (“This [opinion

letter] initiated the . . . MMCP at issue[.]”) 

Objecting to this statement of fact, and the predicate

document, the defendants assert that the latter lacks foundation

because it is unsigned. The defendants further assert that that

unsigned document cannot “serve as an admission by a party

opponent[]” in the absence of any testimony by either its

supposed author, non-party Thomas, or its alleged recipient,

defendant Arpaio. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement

of Facts in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment

and Controverting Statement of Facts (“Defs.’ Resp. SOF”) (Doc.

129) at 3:13-14, ¶ 2. 

 Documentary evidence submitted on a summary judgment

motion “must be authenticated and attached to a declaration

wherein the declarant is the person through whom the exhibits

could be admitted into evidence.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d

1212, 1224 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Orr v.

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Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations

and footnote omitted) (“Authentication is a condition precedent

to admissibility” and “unauthenticated documents cannot be

considered in a motion for summary judgment.”) The Ninth

Circuit has “repeatedly held that unauthenticated documents

cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment.” Orr,

285 F.3d at 773. This authentication requirement is “satisfied

by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in

question is what its proponent claims[,]” Fed.R.Evid. 901(a),

or if the document is self-authenticating pursuant to

Fed.R.Evid. 902. The plaintiffs have shown neither. Therefore,

the court will not consider the unsigned September 29, 2005,

letter due to a lack of foundation. 

For substantially similar reasons, the court also will not

consider what purports to be “Minutes of the Committee on

Judiciary re: H.B. 2539, Arizona House of Representatives, 47th

Legislature, First Regular Session (February 10, 2005).” Pls.’

SOF (Doc. 121-1) at 3:14-17. Attempting to show legislative

intent, the plaintiffs recite from these Minutes several times.

The Minutes themselves are not part of the record, however; nor

have they been authenticated in any way. 

Notwithstanding the parties’ objections, at bottom, the

undisputed facts pertaining to the pending summary judgment

motions are straightforward and few. In 2005, Arizona

criminalized human smuggling, making it a class 4 felony for a

“person to intentionally engage in the smuggling of human beings

for profit or commercial purpose.” A.R.S. § 13-2319(A)-(C)(1)-

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4 Section 13–2319 was amended by section four of “Support Our Law

Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” as amended by H.B. 2162 (“S.B.

1070”). That amendment, which is not relevant here, “made only a minor

change to Arizona’s preexisting human smuggling statute, i.e., section

13–2319[,]” and did not affect its substantive scope. See We Are Am./Somos

Am., Coal. of Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 809 F.Supp.2d

1084, 1086 n. 1 (D.Ariz. 2011) (“WAA/SACA IV”) (citation omitted). 

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(2) (Supp. 2010)4. The statutory definition of “[s]muggling of

human beings” is “transportation, procurement of transportation

or use of property or real property by a person or an entity

that knows or has reason to know that the person or persons

transported or to be transported are not United States citizens,

permanent resident aliens or persons otherwise lawfully in this

state or have attempted to enter, entered or remained in the

United States in violation of law.” A.R.S. § 13–2319(F)(3). 

Significantly, the defendants do not dispute either the

existence of the Policy or its implementation. Indeed, they

expressly acknowledge that “[s]ince March of 2006, the [MCAO]

has reserved the prosecutorial discretion under Arizona law to

charge and prosecute persons for the state crime of conspiracy

under A.R.S. § 13-1003 to violate Arizona’s human smuggling

statute, A.R.S. § 13-2319.” Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Defs.’ SJM”) (Doc. 119) at 1:27-2:2. Along those

same lines, the defendants further acknowledge that the MCSO

“also enforces § 13-1003 as applied to § 13-2319 by arresting

individuals for, and detaining them under, the criminal charge

of conspiring to violate Arizona’s human smuggling statute when

probable cause exists to do so.” Id. at 2:5-7. Defendants also

point out that A.R.S. § 13-1006(B) recognizes that a person may

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5 That statute provides as follows:

 It is not a defense to a prosecution for 

solicitation or conspiracy that the defendant 

is, by definition of the offense, legally 

incapable in an individual capacity of committing 

the offense that is the object of the solicitation 

or conspiracy.

A.R.S. § 13-1006(B).

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commit conspiracy to commit an offense, even if that person

cannot be convicted of the offense itself.5

By June 2011, in accordance with the Policy, MCSO “deputies

had arrested at least 1,800 non-smugglers for conspiring to

violate § 13-2319.” Pls.’ SOF (Doc. 121-1) at 3, ¶ 3 (citations

omitted); see also Defs.’ Resp. SOF (Doc. 129) at 3, ¶ 3

(admit). And, “[a]s of March 2010, the [MCAO] had prosecuted

1,357 non-smugglers for conspiracy to violate § 13-2319.” Id.

at 4, ¶ 4 (citation omitted); see also Defs.’ Resp. SOF (Doc.

129) at 4, ¶ 4 (admit). At his August 23, 2012, deposition,

Maricopa County Sheriff Arpaio confirmed that the MCSO is

continuing to arrest “co-conspirators” and that the MCAO

continues to prosecute them. Pls.’ Exh. 1 (Doc. 121-2) at 36:5-

10. 

The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges four separate

causes of action. Significantly however, believing they are

“clearly entitled” to summary judgment “on their first claim for

relief (preemption)[,]” the plaintiffs are “reced[ing] from

their remaining [three] claims[.]” Plaintiffs’ Responsive

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Pls.’ Resp.”) (Doc. 126) at 16:27-28, n. 5. This

obviates the need to consider much of the defendants’ summary

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6 In We Are America/Somos America Coalition of Arizona v. Maricopa

Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 594 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Ariz. 2009) (“We Are America

II”), based upon Younger abstention, this court held that it lacked

jurisdiction to consider the claims of the six Mexican Nationals – a

holding which the Ninth Circuit affirmed. We Are America/Somos America

Coalition of Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 386 Fed.Appx. 726,

727 (9th Cir. 2010). 

7 The FAC’s caption accurately names David Lujan as a plaintiff,

but later it incorrectly refers to him as “Steve” Lujan” Compare FAC

(Doc. 45) at 1:23 with FAC (Doc. 45) at 8:13, ¶ 13. Despite this

misidentification, it is clear that David Lujan and “Steve” Lujan are the

same plaintiff.

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judgment motion, which addressed all four claims. What remains,

as mentioned at the outset, is the vigorously disputed issue of

federal preemption. The parties each argue their entitlement

to summary judgment on this issue. The defendants argue that

the Policy is not preempted by federal immigration law, whereas

the plaintiffs argue that it is preempted. Additionally, the

plaintiffs are seeking certification of two alternative classes,

as more fully discussed herein.

Discussion

“Bringing a class certification motion together with a Rule

56 motion[,]” as the plaintiffs have done, “is consistent with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” See Evon v. Law Offices

of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1032 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

cases). At the outset, though, the court must determine which

motion to resolve first. In their summary judgment motion, the

defendants argue, inter alia, that each of the remaining named

plaintiffs6 “lack standing to bring this suit for equitable

relief.” Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 15:17. Similarly, in

opposing class certification, the defendants also argue that the

two municipal taxpayer plaintiffs, Dawn Haglund and David7

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Lujan, lack standing. 

If the defendants are correct, and none of the plaintiffs

have standing, then this court would not have subject matter to

consider the merits, including class certification. See

Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(“In the absence of standing, a federal court ‘lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over the suit.’”) (quoting Cetacean Cmty.

v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Steel Co.

v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S.Ct.

1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)). Therefore, the court will first

address the parties’ summary judgment motions. See Tech v.

U.S., 271 F.R.D. 451, 454 (M.D.Pa. 2010) (“[p]rior to rendering

a disposition on the Plaintiff’s class certification motion,

[the court] first consider[ed] the United States’[] motion to

dismiss . . . for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . ,

asserting that Tech lacks standing[]”); cf. Evon, 688 F.3d at

1032 (“While Rule 23 does not require a district court to fully

consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, addressing the

merits of the claims in a related summary judgment motion can

have a substantial bearing on the required Rule 23

determinations.”)

I. Summary Judgment Motions

The court assumes familiarity with what has sometimes been

referred to as the Celotex trilogy wherein the Supreme Court

clarified and refined the standards for deciding Rule 56 summary

judgment motions. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986);

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and Matsushita Elec. Industr. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). There is no

need to repeat the entire body of summary judgment case law

which has developed since then. That is especially so given

that there are no material facts in dispute and the pending

motions turn on legal issues, making them proper for resolution

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S., at

250. 

The summary judgment standards do not “change when the

parties file cross-motions for summary judgment: the court must

apply the same standard and rule on each motion independently

because the granting of one motion does not necessarily

translate into the denial of the other unless[,]” as here, “the

parties rely on the same legal theories and same set of material

facts.” See Feezor v. Excel Stockton, LLC, 2013 WL 2485623, at

*2 (E.D.Cal. June 10, 2013) (citing Pintos v. Pac. Creditors

Ass’n., 605 F.3d 665, 674 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom.

Experian Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Pintos, 562 U.S. ––––, 131

S.Ct. 900 (2011)). 

A. Standing

Defendants assert that a party’s standing “is a fundamental

threshold inquiry[,]” while simultaneously asserting that

plaintiffs’ lack of standing is a “final reason” for granting

summary judgment. Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 15:16 (citation

omitted) (emphasis added). If the plaintiffs lack standing

then, as previously explained, this court would lack subject

matter jurisdiction. Therefore, even though lack of standing

is the defendants’ last asserted basis for seeking summary

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8 This court also found that the FAC adequately alleged

organizational standing as to plaintiff Friendly House. Since then,

however, the parties have stipulated to the dismissal of Friendly House and

others, leaving only two organizational plaintiffs. See Ord. (Doc. 109) at

2. 

9 This court previously also found that the FAC adequately alleged

municipal taxpayer standing as to plaintiffs Kyrsten Sinema and Cecilia

Menjivar. Since then, however, the parties have stipulated to their

dismissal, leaving Haglund and Lujan as the municipal taxpayer plaintiffs.

See Ord. (Doc. 109) at 2. 

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judgment, the court must address that argument first. 

Earlier in this litigation the defendants brought a

“strictly facial[]” challenge to standing, arguing for dismissal

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). WAA/SACA IV, 809

F.Supp.2d at 1089 and n.4. Denying that motion, this court

found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged

organizational standing as to We Are America/Somos America

Coalition of Arizona (“WAA/SACA”) and the American Hispanic

Community Forum (“AHCF”),8 and municipal taxpayer standing as to

plaintiffs David Lujan and LaDawn Haglund.9

Now, however, the standing issue is before the court in a

different procedural posture -– on a summary judgment motion.

Essentially the defendants are arguing that the plaintiffs’

evidence is insufficient to confer standing upon any of them

because their grievances are too general to establish the

requisite Article III injury in fact. The plaintiffs retort

that “the uncontroverted evidence establishes both

organizational and taxpayer plaintiffs’ standing.” Pls.’ Resp.

(Doc. 126) at 8:19-20 (emphasis omitted).

Mere allegations were sufficient to establish standing with

respect to the defendants’ earlier motion to dismiss, but at

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10 The court incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein

its discussion of the governing standing principles and ensuing analysis in

WAA/SACA IV, 809 F.Supp.2d at 1089-1112. 

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this juncture more is required. “In response to a summary

judgment motion . . . to establish Article III standing, a

plaintiff can no longer rest on ‘mere allegations’ but must set

forth by affidavit or other admissible evidence ‘specific facts’

as delineated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) as to the

existence of such standing.” Gerlinger v. Amazon.com Inc., 526

F.3d 1253, 1255-1256 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351

(1992)). 

1. Municipal Taxpayers10

 “‘[I]mproper expenditure of public funds’ is the crux of

any claim that a municipal taxpayer satisfies the injury in fact

prong of constitutional standing[,]” as fully discussed in

WAA/SACA IV, 809 F.Supp.2d at 1108 (citing Cammack v. Waihee,

932 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1991)). “As recently as 2008, the

Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed this view.” Id. (citing

Barnes–Wallace v. City of San Diego, 530 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir.

2008) . . . (“[M]unicipal taxpayers must show an expenditure of

public funds to have standing.”)) “In fact, the premise that an

‘unconstitutional expenditure of government funds can itself be

injury enough to confer municipal-taxpayer standing’ is not

unremarkable as a general proposition.” Id. (quoting Smith

v. Jefferson County Bd. of School Com’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 213 (6th

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (Sixth Circuit noted that its

“sister circuits[,]” including the Ninth in Cammack, “all agree”

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11 Because it is no longer necessary to distinguish between federal,

state and municipal taxpayers, hereinafter all references to taxpayers

shall be read as referring to the municipal taxpayer plaintiffs. 

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with that general proposition).

 Succinctly put, Article III standing comprises three

elements: (1) injury in fact; (2) causal connection; and 

(3) redressability. See Barnum Tiber Co. v. U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, 633 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). Given

that the defendants are once again confining their argument to

the injury in fact element, presumably they are conceding, as

this court previously found, that the municipal taxpayer11

plaintiffs have shown the latter two standing elements. See

WAA/SACA IV, 809 F.Supp.2d at 1105. The court will confine its

analysis accordingly. 

The defendants make the blanket assertion that municipal

taxpayer plaintiff LaDawn Haglund lacks standing because her

“injury . . . is simply a generalized grievance that she does

not like any tax money, . . . , being used for governmental

decisions she disagrees with as a matter of public policy, such

as the Policy.” Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 16:26-17:2 (citation

omitted). This is the sum total of the defendants’ standing

“argument” as to plaintiff Haglund. Overlooking the lack of any

analysis, the court is compelled to comment upon the liberties

which the defendants have taken in describing the portion of

plaintiff Haglund’s deposition to which they cite. 

In that snippet, plaintiff Haglund was explicitly asked,

“[W]hat is the injury to you because of th[is] [P]olicy[?]”

Defs.’ Exh. C (Doc. 120-1) at 18:5-6. Directly responding,

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plaintiff Haglund stated, “[M]y “tax money is being used to

house and prosecute and detain non-criminals, in my view,

economic migrants and treating them as criminals.” Id. at

18:13-15. Describing this use of her tax money as “a misuse in

many ways[,]” plaintiff Haglund further testified that given the

“federal rules . . . for dealing with immigrants, . . . using

. . . my tax dollars to prosecute economic migrants detracts

from prosecuting real criminals.” Id. at 18:16-20. 

This testimony cannot be reasonably interpreted to support

defendants’ characterization thereof. Plainly, the foregoing

does not show a “generalized grievance that [plaintiff Haglund]

does not like any tax money . . . being used for governmental

decisions she disagrees with as a matter of public policy[.]”

See Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 16:27-17:1 (citation omitted)

(emphasis added). Rather, plaintiff Haglund responded to a

narrowly tailored question regarding any injury to her as a

result of the Policy, and she responded accordingly. She was

not asked about any “governmental decisions” beyond the Policy.

Obviously then, there is no way to know from the cited

testimony how plaintiff Haglund views other governmental

decisions as to the expenditure of her tax dollars. Even

assuming the existence of such testimony, it would be

irrelevant. Consequently, the court gives no credence to the

defendants’ depiction of plaintiff Haglund’s testimony, which

does nothing to advance their argument that she lacks standing.

Not only is there no factual basis for that defense

argument, but there is no legal basis for it either. As this

court previously found, the municipal taxpayers sufficiently

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alleged the requisite injury in fact by alleging their status

as municipal taxpayers and the improper expenditure of municipal

funds. See WAA/SACA IV, 809 F.Supp.2d at 1104-1109. The

plaintiffs’ evidence offered in support of their summary

judgment motion substantiates the FAC’s allegations as to

plaintiff Haglund’s standing as a municipal taxpayer. 

First, plaintiff Haglund’s status as a Maricopa County

taxpayer is undisputed. Since 2005, she has been a Maricopa

County resident. See Pls.’ Supp. Exh. 19 (Doc. 126-3) at 68:11-

16. From 2005 until 2011, she owned real property in Maricopa

County and paid property taxes thereon. Id. at 68:17-23. In

October 2011, plaintiff Haglund began renting a house in

Maricopa County. Id. at 69:6-13. She is charged for and pays

property taxes and rent on that residence. Id. at 69:14-70:14.

By statute, such taxes are paid to the treasury of Maricopa

County which “shall apportion and apply the[m] . . . to the

several special and general funds as provided by law.” See

A.R.S. § 11-492. 

In addition to property taxes, as a Maricopa County

resident, plaintiff Haglund pays a “special sales tax[]” – the

“Jail Excise Tax.” See Pls.’ Supp. Exh. 20 (Doc. 126-3) at 90;

see also Pls.’ Exh. 1 (Doc. 121-2) at 39:15-17 (Defendant Arpaio

testified that “the operations of the [County] jails come from

a tax that was passed by the people of this [C]ounty several

years ago[]” — “a special budget[.]”) This Jail Excise Tax is

used to “fund construction and operation of adult and juvenile

detention facilities[]” where defendants detain, among others,

those arrested pursuant to the Policy. See Pls.’ Supp. Exh. 20

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(Doc. 126-3) at 90. In fiscal year 2011, Maricopa County

collected $112,451,802.00. Id. This Tax will continue until

approximately 2027. See id.

Besides establishing that plaintiff Haglund is a Maricopa

County taxpayer, the evidence bears out the FAC’s allegations

that County funds are being expended to carry out the Policy.

County taxes, such as those paid by plaintiff Haglund, are used

for a variety of MCSO’s activities related to the Policy, as

defendant Arpaio admits. As defendant Arpaio admitted, those

activities include: (1) “training MCSO deputies to detect and

arrest persons who conspire to transport themselves in violation

of A.R.S. § 13-2319[;]” (2) “transport[ing] persons arrested for

conspiring to transport themselves in violation of” that

statute; and (3) “jail[ing] persons arrested for conspiring to

transport themselves in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2319.” Pls.’

Supp. Exh. 11 (Doc. 126-2) at 77:12-14, ¶ 63; 77:16-18, ¶ 64;

and 77:9-10, ¶ 62. 

County taxes are likewise being expended by the MCAO to

carry out the Policy, as defendant Maricopa County Attorney

Montgomery admits. The defendant Maricopa County Board of

Supervisors “appropriates funds for the operations of the MCAO.”

Pls.’ Supp. Exh. exh. 12 (Doc. 126-2) at 93:27-94:1, ¶ 72. The

MCAO, in turn, “spends tax revenues to prosecute persons for

conspiring to transport themselves in violation of A.R.S. § 13-

2319[,]” as well as for training personnel to conduct such

prosecutions, as defendant Montgomery also admits. Id. at 93:4-

10, ¶¶ 68-69. 

Furthermore, the defendants concede that “[b]y June 10,

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12 This figure was derived by dividing the total number of jailed

adults in fiscal year 2011 by the total spent for detaining those adults.

See Pls.’ Controverting SOF, exh. 18 thereto (Doc. 126-3) at 44. 

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2011, [MCSO] deputies had arrested at least 1,800 non-smugglers

for conspiring to violate § 13-2319[;]” and “[a]s of March 2010,

the [MCAO] had prosecuted 1,357 non-smugglers” for that same

crime. Pls.’ SOF (Doc. 121-1) at 3:26-4:7, ¶¶ 3 and 4

(citations omitted); see also Defs.’ Resp. SOF (Doc. 129) at

3:15-16. It costs $91.73 per day to detain an individual in the

Maricopa County jail.12 Pls.’ Supp. Exh. 18 (Doc. 126-3)

(Maricopa Co. Justice System Annual Activities Report FY 2011)

at 44. This evidence confirms the expenditure of plaintiff

Haglund’s County taxes to arrest, detain, and prosecute

individuals pursuant to the Policy. 

In short, plaintiffs’ evidence fully corroborates the FAC’s

allegations that Ms. Haglund is a municipal taxpayer, as well

as the expenditure of Maricopa County taxes in connection with

the Policy. There is thus no dispute that she satisfies the

injury in fact prong of municipal taxpayer standing – the only

element with which the defendants take issue. Cf. Page v. TriCity Healthcare District, 806 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1165 (S.D.Cal.

2012) (no municipal taxpayer standing where plaintiff did not

“show[] an expenditure of public funds[]” and “provided no

evidence indicating how much money had been spent” regarding the

challenged conduct “or where the funds came from[]”). 

Tellingly, in the face of this undisputed evidence, the

defendants’ reply is conspicuously silent on the issue of

standing. The defendants do not contest plaintiffs’ evidence

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or legal position in any way. For all of these reasons, the

court finds that plaintiff Haglund has standing as a municipal

taxpayer. Thus, the court denies this aspect of defendants’

summary judgment motion.

There are no readily discernible differences between

taxpayer plaintiffs Haglund and Lujan in terms of the evidence

pertaining to their standing. Plaintiff Lujan is a Maricopa

County resident of longstanding and “regularly pays taxes to

Maricopa County, including, but not limited to, the . . . Jail

Excise Tax[.]” Pls’. Controverting SOF (Doc. 126-3), exh. 17

thereto (Lujan Decl’n) at 191, ¶ 2. And, the plaintiffs are

proffering the same undisputed evidence outlined above to

establish his standing as a taxpayer. See Pls.’ Resp. (Doc.

126) at 9:11-10:26. Despite that, the defendants,

inconsistently, are not challenging plaintiff Lujan’s standing.

Nonetheless, the evidence which supports a finding of taxpayer

standing as to plaintiff Haglund supports the same finding as

to plaintiff Lujan. Thus, both taxpayer plaintiffs have

standing to pursue the preemption claim. See Haro v. Sebelius,

2013 WL 4734032, at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2013) (quoting

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct.

1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006)) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate

standing for each claim[.]’”)

“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross[,]” however. Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d

606 (1996). Therefore, the court’s inquiry cannot end here.

It also must decide whether the taxpayer plaintiffs have

“‘standing . . . for each form of relief sought.’” See Haro,

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2013 WL 4734032, at *4 (quoting DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S., at

352). The difference between the FAC and the plaintiffs’ summary

judgment motion, in terms of the relief sought, requires the

court to first ascertain exactly what types of relief the

plaintiffs are seeking. 

In their prayer for relief, the plaintiffs are seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees

and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). FAC (Doc. 45) at 28-

29, ¶¶ 3-5. In their summary judgment motion, however, the

plaintiffs are expanding the scope of the relief. Now, the

plaintiffs are also seeking “to make whole class members

previously injured by defendants detaining, arresting, and

prosecuting non-smuggler migrants for conspiracy to transport

themselves in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319[.]” Pls.’

SJM (Doc. 121) at 3:5-9 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs’

proposed summary judgment order reveals the nature of such

relief. More specifically, the plaintiffs request that the

“[c]onvictions secured against persons for conspiring to

transport themselves, and no one else, in purported violation

of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319 are inconsistent with the

Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and are

accordingly declared null and void.” Proposed Summary Judgment

Order (Doc. 123) at 2:2-5, ¶ 3. 

The court will not consider whether the taxpayer plaintiffs

(or, for that matter, the organizational plaintiffs) have

standing to pursue this belated request for retrospective

declaratory relief. In the first place, neither of the

plaintiffs’ two proposed class definitions includes putative

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class members who were “previously injured by” the Policy. See

id. at 3:6. As plaintiffs themselves define it, their first

proposed class is: “All individual who are . . . stopped,

detained, arrested, incarcerated, prosecuted, or penalized for

conspiring to transport themselves, and themselves only, in

violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319[.]” Class Certification

Mot. (Doc. 122) at 5:26-28 (emphasis added). The second

proposed class pertains to municipal taxpayers. Thus, even

assuming arguendo that the court were to grant class

certification to both classes, by plaintiffs’ own definition,

neither would include “class members previously injured” by the

Policy. See Pls.’ SJM (Doc. 121) at 3:6. 

The second reason for declining to consider whether any of

the plaintiffs have standing to pursue retrospective declaratory

relief is that this request is belated and has not been

adequately addressed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not

seek this form of relief in their FAC. In the final paragraph

of the FAC, the plaintiffs do request the court to “[g]rant such

further relief as [it] deems just.” FAC (Doc. 45) at 29, ¶ 6.

That boilerplate phrase is insufficient to put the defendants

on notice that as part of this lawsuit the plaintiffs are asking

this federal court to nullify potentially thousands of prior

state court convictions. 

Rule 54(c) does permit a court to “grant the relief to

which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded

that relief in its pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c). The

plaintiffs certainly have not shown their entitlement to this

particular relief, however. They only mention it once in

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passing in their summary judgment motion, and then include it

in a proposed order submitted in connection with that motion.

The lack of any briefing on plaintiffs’ supposed entitlement to

retrospective declaratory relief is problematic because it is

not a “predictable remedy” as to their preemption claim. Contra

Mueller v. Auker, 2010 WL 2265867, at *5 (D.Idaho June 4, 2010)

(“A predictable remedy for constitutional violations includes

declaratory and injunctive relief[.]”) Lastly, the court is

concerned about possible prejudice to the defendants given that

the plaintiffs’ demand for this retrospective declaratory relief

was explicitly raised for the first time in their proposed

summary judgment order. 

Having determined that the potential available relief in

this case is prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, the

court will next address whether the taxpayer plaintiffs have

standing to seek such relief. “‘The standing formulation for

a plaintiff seeking prospective injunctive relief’ generally

requires that the plaintiff’s concrete injury be ‘coupled with

‘a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a

similar way.’’” Haro, 2013 WL 4734032, at *4 (quoting Bates v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc) ((quoting in turn City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.

95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). “In addition,

the claimed threat of injury must be likely to be redressed by

the prospective injunctive relief.” Bates, 511 F.3d 985

(citation omitted). That does not mean “‘‘that a favorable

decision will inevitably redress [their injuries][.]’’” See

Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 993 (9th Cir.

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2012) (quoting Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir.

2005) (internal quotations omitted, emphasis and alterations in

original) (quoting in turn Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1003

(9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Levin v. Commerce

Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 130 S.Ct. 2323, 176 L.Ed.2d 1131

(2010)).” Rather, the “‘‘[p]laintiffs must show only that a

favorable decision is likely to redress [their injuries][.]’’”

Id. That standard is met here. 

The taxpayer plaintiffs have shown a concrete, “necessary

injury – actual expenditure of tax dollars” vis-a-vis the

Policy. See Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir.

1991). Furthermore, the defendants admit that they “continue

to . . . arrest and prosecute” persons for conspiring to

transport themselves in violation of Arizona’s human smuggling

statute. See Pls.’ SOF (Doc. 121-1) at 4:8-10, ¶ 5; see also

Defs.’ Resp. SOF (Doc. 129) at 3:17-4:6, ¶ 5. Therefore, the

injury to the taxpayer plaintiffs continues unabated.

Consequently, there is “a sufficient likelihood” that the

taxpayer plaintiffs “will again be wronged in a similar way[,]”

i.e., by having their County taxes expended to enforce a Policy

which they maintain federal law preempts. See Haro, 2013 WL

4734032, at *4 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Additionally, the claimed threat of injury – the misuse of

the taxpayers’ County taxes to fund the Policy – is likely to

be remedied by prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.

As plaintiff Lujan succinctly put it, enjoining the Policy would

mean that his “local tax payments would no longer be diverted

to th[e] unlawful purpose” of the Policy. Pls.’ Supp. Exh. 17

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(Doc. 126-3) at 42, ¶ 4. This is fully consistent with the long

held view, as laid out in WAA/SACA IV, 809 F.Supp.2d 1084, that

“‘[t]he interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the

application of its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy

by injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate.’”

Id. at 1106 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-

487, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923)). For all of these

reasons, the court finds that plaintiffs Haglund and Lujan have

municipal taxpayer standing as to the preemption claim and as

to the prospective equitable relief sought. Thus, the court

denies this aspect of defendants’ summary judgment motion. 

If the court finds, as it has, that the municipal taxpayer

plaintiffs have standing, then, they contend (and the defendants

do not disagree), that there is no need to consider whether the

organizational plaintiffs also have standing. Plaintiffs base

their contention upon the “general rule [in] federal court

suits with multiple plaintiffs . . . that once the court

determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need not

decide the standing of the others.” See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695

F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d

885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993)). In Melendres, Latino motorists and

passengers and the organization Somos America, brought an action

under § 1983 alleging that the MCSO and Sheriff Arpaio, among

others, engaged in a policy of racially profiling Latinos in

connection with traffic stops. Applying that general rule in

Melendres, the Ninth Circuit, after finding that Latino

motorists and passengers had standing, expressly declined to

“address whether Somos America, an organization, met the

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13 As the defendants acknowledge, although the preemption issue

arose earlier in this case in a different context, the court “has not

dispositively ruled on whether the Policy is preempted by federal

immigration law.” Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 2:19, n. 1. Therefore, nothing

about those prior decisions precludes revisiting the preemption anew. This

is all the more so given: (1) the completion of discovery, and hence a more

fully developed record; (2) the federal preemption issue is squarely raised

by the parties’ summary judgment motions; and (3) the evolving state of the

law in this area.

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requirements for associational standing.” Id. 

This court did depart from that general rule in WAA/SACA

IV, 809 F.Supp.2d at 1090-1094, as the parties are well aware.

The standing issue is before the court now in a different

procedural posture --– on a motion for summary judgment motion,

not on a motion to dismiss. Consequently, as it strongly

intimated in WAA/SACA IV, having found that the municipal

taxpayer plaintiffs have standing as to the preemption claim and

for the relief sought, the court will not address whether the

WAA/SAC and AHFC, the organizational plaintiffs, also have

standing. See id. at 1093 (“By contrast, if defendants were

moving for summary judgment on the dual grounds of lack of

standing and the merits, plaintiffs’ argument that the court

need not reach the issue of organizational plaintiffs’ standing,

if it finds that the taxpayers have standing, would carry far

more weight.”) It is simply not necessary. 

B. Federal Preemption13

The plaintiffs are pursuing only their “Federal Preemption”

claim, opting for voluntary dismissal of their other claims.

See FAC (Doc. 45) at 25:25. The plaintiffs allege that the

Policy “is an impermissible attempt by state actors to regulate

immigration, and as such unlawfully usurps the federal

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14 The constitutional basis for plaintiffs’ argument is Congress’

power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization[,]” and its power

“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations[.]” See U.S. Const. Art. I,

§ 8, cls. 3-4. 

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government’s exclusive power to regulate immigration in

violation of the United States Constitution”14 and the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.

(“INA”). Id. at 25:28-26:2, ¶ 53. In moving for summary

judgment on this claim, the plaintiffs argue that federal law

impliedly preempts the Policy. Contrariwise, the defendants

argue that federal law does not impliedly preempt the Policy.

The defendants thus assert that they, and not the plaintiffs,

are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of field

preemption.

Before considering the parties’ preemption arguments,

there is one prefatory issue. From the inception of this

lawsuit, the plaintiffs made a seemingly deliberate choice to

challenge only the Policy --- and not A.R.S. § 13-2319. The

defendants are taking the position, however, that because the

plaintiffs are not attacking the constitutionality of A.R.S.

§ 13-2319, or arguing that federal law preempts that state

statute, they cannot argue that federal law preempts the Policy

itself. The defendants offer no legal support for this novel

proposition. The allegations of plaintiffs’ FAC and the legal

theories which they pursue are their prerogative. The court,

therefore, agrees with the plaintiffs that they may challenge

the Policy as conflict and field preempted “regardless of § 13-

2319's facial constitutionality.” See Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 134)

at 9:20-21. 

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“The Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal

law ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in

every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary

notwithstanding.’” Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct.

2492, 2500, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (quoting U.S. Const. Art. VI,

cl. 2). It is thus “[a] fundamental principle of the

Constitution . . . that Congress has the power to preempt state

law.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372,

120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (citations omitted).

Moreover, on “the subject of immigration and the status of

aliens[,]” “[t]he Government of the United States has broad,

undoubted power[.]” Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2498 (citations

omitted); see also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354, 96 S.Ct.

933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976), superseded by statute on other

grounds as stated in Chamber of Comm. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ----,

131 S.Ct. 1968, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011) (The “[p]ower to

regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal

power.”) Indeed, that power is “well settled[,]” reflective of,

among other things, the fact that “[i]mmigration policy can

affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for

the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations

of aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its

laws.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2498 (citations omitted). 

This federal immigration power derives, in part, from the

federal government’s “constitutional power to ‘establish an

uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ . . . , and its inherent power

as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign

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nations[.]” Id. (citations omitted). That said, the Supreme

Court “has never held that every state enactment which in any

way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus

per se pre-empted by this constitutional power[.]” DeCanas, 424

U.S., at 355 (citations omitted). 

Federal preemption can be either express or implied. Gade

v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112

S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 72 (1992). Implied preemption is the

only issue which these summary judgment motions raise, however.

Implied preemption comprises two, albeit “not rigidly

distinct[,]” subcategories, –- field and conflict preemption.

Crosby, 530 U.S., at 372 n. 6 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Field preemption precludes States “from

regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its

proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its

exclusive governance.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2501 (citation

omitted). Conflict preemption occurs where “compliance with

both federal and state regulations is a physical

impossibility[.]” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,

373 U.S. 132, 142–143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963).

It can also occur in “those instances where the challenged state

law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution

of the full purposes and objectives of Congress[.]’” Arizona,

132 S.Ct., at 2501 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S., at 67, 61 S.Ct.

399). In the present case, the parties’ conflict preemption

arguments center on actual and obstacle preemption, as opposed

to impossibility. The court will similarly confine its

analysis. 

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“There are ‘two cornerstones’ of preemption jurisprudence.”

Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 917 (2011) (quoting Wyeth v.

Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194, 173 L.Ed.2d 51

(2009). First, “[r]egardless of the type of preemption involved

. . . ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of

pre-emption analysis.’” Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709

F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett

Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407

(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, a court

“should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’

are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest

purpose of Congress.’” See Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2501 (quoting

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct.

1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)) (other citation omitted). With

these principles firmly in mind, the court will first consider

whether federal law, and more particularly the INA, preempts the

Policy.

1. Field Preemption

The crux of the defendants’ field preemption argument

is the latter principle. That is, the defendants argue that

they should prevail on the field preemption issue because the

plaintiffs cannot “prove . . . that it was ‘the clear and

manifest purpose of Congress’ to oust state power from the

field” of alien smuggling. Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 8:25-9:1

(citing, inter alia, DeCanas, 424 U.S., at 357) (emphasis added

by defendants). On the other hand, the plaintiffs argue that

because Congress “fully regulates conspiracies to transport

unauthorized entrants[,]” the Policy is field preempted. Pls.’

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15 This appeal was argued and submitted in the Ninth Circuit on

April 2, 2013. Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. 12-17152. A decision has yet

to be issued. 

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SJM (Doc. 121) at 10:5-6. In making this argument, the

plaintiffs rely upon the Supreme Court’s rationale in Arizona,

132 S.Ct. 2492. Pls.’ SJM (Doc. 121) at 10:7. There, the

Supreme Court held, inter alia, that because “the Federal

Government has occupied the field of alien registration[,]” 

§ 3 of S.B. 1070, which made it a state misdemeanor to fail to

comply with federal alien registration requirements, was field

preempted. Id. at 2502 (citations omitted). 

The plaintiffs also heavily rely upon two Eleventh Circuit

decisions – Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal,

691 F.3d 1250, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012) (“GLAHR”); and United

States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1285 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.

denied, 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2022, 185 L.Ed.2d 905 (Apr. 29,

2013). As part of sweeping immigration reform legislation in

2011, Georgia and Alabama criminalized a variety of activities

pertaining to unauthorized or illegal aliens, including

transporting, concealing or harboring such aliens. In GLAHR,

the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding that

those Georgia statutes were field preempted by the INA’s

criminal provisions, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1324. GLAHR, 691

F.3d at 1285-1287; see also Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1285-1287

(applying GLAHR’s reasoning to finding similar Alabama statutes

field preempted); Valle del Sol v. Whiting, 2012 WL 8021265, at

*5 (D.Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012)15 (adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s

rationale, and holding that § 5 of S.B. 1070, Arizona’s

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counterpart to the statutes at issue in GLAHR and Alabama, was

field preempted).

Maintaining that “[t]here is no principled way to

distinguish” the Policy from the state statutes at issue in

Arizona, GLAHR, Alabama, and Valle del Sol, the plaintiffs argue

that those cases are determinative of the field preemption issue

herein. See Pls.’ SJM (Doc. 121) at 11:7. The defendants’

rejoinder is that the Policy is “materially and substantively

different” from the challenged statutes in the cases just

listed. Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 132) at 4:4-5. Based upon those

claimed differences, the defendants argue that none of the cases

upon which the plaintiffs are relying apply to the field

preemption issue now before this court. The parties’ strong

dispute as to the applicability of Arizona and the Eleventh

Circuit’s decisions in GLAHR and Alabama require closer

examination of each. 

In Arizona, to determine whether § 3 of S.B. 1070 intruded

on the field of alien registration, the Supreme Court began by

reiterating that “the States are precluded from regulating

conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper

authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive

governance.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2501 (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court also recited the well settled rule that “[t]he

intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a

framework of regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left

no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there is a

‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will

be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same

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subject.’” Id. (quoting Rice, 331 U.S., at 230) (other citation

omitted) (emphasis added).

Examining the history of federal alien registration

requirements against that legal backdrop, the Arizona Court held

that the federal government has occupied that field because

“[t]he federal statutory directives provide a full set of

standards governing alien registration, including punishment for

noncompliance[,] . . . designed as a harmonious whole.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In such a

case, “[w]here Congress occupies an entire field,” the Supreme

Court found that “even complementary state regulation is

impermissible.” Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2502. Such state

regulation is “impermissible” because “[f]ield preemption

reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state

regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal

standards.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

The defendants assert that the plaintiffs’ “heavy reliance”

upon Arizona is “mistaken[,]” as the Supreme Court’s “analysis[]

is not controlling.” Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 128) at 2:12 (emphasis

omitted); Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 132) at 3:6. The main basis for

this defense argument is the difference in subject matter. 

Unlike the present case involving alien smuggling, the portion

of Arizona which the plaintiffs invoke dealt with alien

registration, and it has long been held “that the Federal

Government . . . occupie[s]” that field. See Arizona, 132

S.Ct., at 2502 (citations omitted). This distinction does not

render Arizona any less applicable here. That is because, as

discussed next, in GLAHR the Eleventh Circuit soundly reasoned,

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and this court agrees, that Arizona “provides an instructive

analogy” even outside the realm of alien registration. See

GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1264. In other words, Arizona’s significance

lies not in its subject matter but because it provides a useful

framework for examining preemption in the context of federal

immigration.

Broadly stated, Georgia enacted statutes criminalizing the

transport, concealment and harboring of illegal aliens, as

earlier mentioned. When confronted with the issue of whether

those statutes were preempted by the INA, the Eleventh Circuit

looked first to the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 to ascertain

Congressional intent. Section 1324 creates several discrete

crimes with respect to unlawfully present aliens. That statute

makes it a federal crime for any person to bring an alien into

the United States; to “transport or move an unlawfully present

alien within the United States; to conceal, harbor, or shield

an unlawfully present alien from detection; or to encourage or

induce an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United

States.” Id. at 1263 (citation, internal quotation marks and

footnote omitted). It is also unlawful pursuant to § 1324 for

any person to conspire or aid in the commission of any of those

enumerated offenses. Id. (citation omitted). 

“[P]ermit[ting] local law enforcement officers to arrest

for these violations of federal law,” while simultaneously

“maintaining exclusive jurisdiction” for “federal prosecution

in federal court[,]” provided further indicia of the

comprehensive framework of the INA, the GLAHR Court reasoned.

Id. at 1264 (citations omitted). The sweep of § 1324 includes

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dictating evidentiary rules for one of the enumerated offenses,

as well as mandating a community outreach program regarding the

penalties associated with bringing in and harboring aliens in

violation of that statute. Citing to De Canas, 424 U.S. 351, the

Court in GLAHR, concluded that “[i]n the absence of a savings

clause permitting the regulation in the field, the inference

from these enactments is that the role of the states is limited

to arrest for violations of federal law.” Id. The foregoing

persuaded the Eleventh Circuit in GLAHR that “[t]he INA provides

a comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation,

concealment, and inducement of unlawfully present aliens.” Id.

at 1263.

To bolster this conclusion, the GLAHR Court examined

section 1324's place in the “larger context of federal statutes

criminalizing the acts undertaken by aliens[.]” Id. at 1264.

After so doing, the Court found that “the federal government has

clearly expressed more than a ‘peripheral concern’ with the

entry, movement, and residence of aliens within the United

States,” and that “the breadth of th[o]se laws illustrates an

overwhelmingly dominant federal interest in the field.” Id.;

accord Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 2013 WL 3855549, at *14 (3rd

Cir. July 26, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit and other courts

that have held that the federal government has clearly expressed

more than a peripheral concern with the entry, movement, and

residence of aliens within the United States and the breadth of

these laws illustrates an overwhelmingly dominant federal

interest in the field.”)

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Furthermore, like the “federal registration scheme” in

Arizona, the Eleventh Circuit held that “Congress has provided

a ‘full set of standards’ to govern the unlawful transport and

movement of aliens.” Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2502).

Continuing, and again relying upon Arizona, the GLAHR Court

found that “[t]he INA comprehensively addresses criminal

penalties for these actions undertaken within the borders of the

United States, and a state’s attempt to intrude into this area

is prohibited because Congress has adopted a calibrated

framework within the INA to address this issue.” Id. (citing

Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2502–03). The GLAHR Court’s final

justification for finding that the Georgia statute was field

preempted was that Congress did “not sanction[] concurrent state

legislation ‘on the subject covered by the challenged state

law.’” Id. at 1265 (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S., at 363). 

Adopting wholesale GLAHR’s reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit

in Alabama, likewise held that “Alabama is prohibited from

enacting concurrent state legislation in this field of federal

concern[,]” Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1287, i.e., “the

transportation, concealment, and inducement of unlawfully

present aliens[.]” Id. at 1285 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also U.S. v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 531

(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Arizona, 132 S.Ct. 2501) (“find[ing]

the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning persuasive[,]” and holding

that state statutes making it a felony to transport, move,

conceal, harbor, etc. unlawful aliens were “field preempted

because the vast array of federal laws and regulations on this

subject . . . , is ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no

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room for the States to supplement it[]’”). Particularly

significant here is that much like the Policy, Alabama also

specifically criminalized “conspiring to transport an unlawfully

present alien, including an alien’s conspiracy to be

transported[.]” Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1285 (emphasis added).

South Carolina likewise made “it a state felony for[,]” among

other things, “an unlawfully present person to allow himself or

herself to be ‘transported or moved’ within the state[.]” South

Carolina, 720 F.3d at 529. The striking similarity between the

Policy and the Alabama and South Carolina statutes, which the

Eleventh and Fourth Circuits respectively found were field

preempted, further erodes the defendants’ contention that

Arizona and its progeny are not germane to the field preemption

herein. 

The defendants also attempt to distinguish the GLAHR line

of cases because, in their view, unlike the Policy, those

various state statutes “did not involve . . . criminal human

smuggling . . . per se[;]” nor did they prohibit human smuggling

“for profit or commercial purposes[]” as does A.R.S.§ 13-

2319(A). Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 132) at 3:17-19, ¶ C. These claimed

distinctions are, once again, unavailing. To be sure, none of

those state statutes explicitly mention “human smuggling,” or

even “smuggling[,]” but each criminalizes transporting

unauthorized or illegal aliens. The court is thus hard pressed

to see how those statutes could be read to exclude smuggling,

which necessarily has a transport or movement component.

Furthermore, pursuant to the Policy, an unlawfully present alien

who is being transported is subject to arrest and prosecution.

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That proscribed conduct fits within the INA’s “comprehensive

framework to penalize the transportation, concealment, and

inducement of unlawfully present aliens[]” as defined in GLAHR,

691 F.3d at 1263 (emphasis added). 

The defendants fare no better with their argument that it

was the breadth of the state statutes in GLAHR and its progeny

which led to the conclusion that the federal government had

fully occupied the field of alien transportation and movement

within the United States. The defendants’ have it backwards.

When the issue is field preemption, the focus is on the breadth

of the federal statutes purporting to occupy a given field, not

upon the breadth of the challenged state statute. See GLAHR,

691 at 1264 (“Based on the breadth of federal regulation,” the

Arizona Court held that the federal government occupied the

field of alien registration.) Consistent with that view,

neither the Eleventh Circuit in GLAHR and Alabama, nor the

Arizona District Court in Valle del Sol, considered the breadth

of the challenged statutes as a basis for finding field

preemption. 

Equally unavailing is the defendants’ contention that the

Policy is not field preempted because it is “completely

harmonious with the federal law[.]” Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 128) at

7:18 (emphasis added). Unlawful presence, alone, is not a

federal crime, as more fully discussed next in connection with

conflict preemption. By making it a state felony for

unlawfully present aliens or non-smuggling migrants to transport

themselves and no one else, however, the Policy is criminalizing

mere unlawful presence. It thus strains credulity to insist,

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as do the defendants, that the Policy is “completely harmonious

with federal law.” See id. Even assuming arguendo that the

Policy could somehow be deemed “parallel to federal

standards[,]” as in Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2502, such an

argument “ignore[s] the basic premise of field preemption ---

that States may not enter, in any respect, an area that the

Federal Government has reserved for itself[,]” such as the

transportation and movement within the United States of

unlawfully present aliens. See id. (emphasis added). 

Moving beyond this primarily textual analysis of § 1324 to

its history reveals that Congress’ purpose was one of

“continuing efforts to strengthen [that] federal anti-smuggling

law by broadening the scope of proscribed conduct.” See U.S.

v. Sanchez-Vargas, 878 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1989). Tracing

the evolution of that statute and its predecessors, the Ninth

Circuit found that “[f]rom its genesis as a statute prohibiting

only the bringing in of aliens, § 1324(a)(1) now presents a

single comprehensive ‘definition’ of the federal crime of alien

smuggling -- one which tracks smuggling and related activities

from their earliest manifestations (inducing illegal entry and

bringing in aliens) to continued operation and presence within

the United States (transporting and harboring or concealing

aliens).” Id. This history reinforces the view that, through

the INA, Congress has fully occupied the field of transporting,

moving, concealing, harboring, etc. of unlawfully present

aliens. Moreover, because this field necessarily encompasses

the conduct which the Policy proscribes, i.e., making it a state

felony for unlawfully present aliens or non-smuggling migrants

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to conspire to transport themselves, it, too, is field preempted

by the INA. In sum, none of the defendants’ arguments persuade

this court to depart from the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning and

conclusion in GLAHR, 691 F.3d 1250, particularly in light of

section 1324's history. 

Having found that the Policy is field preempted by the

INA’s comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation,

concealment, and inducement of unlawfully present aliens, there

is no need to consider the second prong of the plaintiffs’ field

preemption argument, that is, that the Policy impermissibly

“circumvents Congress’[] framework for federal-local cooperation

in regulating immigration.” Pls.’ SJM (Doc. 121) at 11:16-17

(emphasis omitted). Accordingly, the court grants summary

judgment as to plaintiffs on the issue of field preemption, and

denies the defendants’ summary judgment motion in that regard.

Resolution of the field preemption issue in plaintiffs’

favor is dispositive of their preemption claim. Nevertheless,

the court will also address, as did the parties, the issue of

conflict preemption. The court will do so for three reasons.

First, the plaintiffs’ conflict preemption argument is equally

if not more compelling than its field preemption argument.

Second, proceeding in this way recognizes that field and

conflict preemption are not “rigidly distinct.” See Crosby, 530

U.S., at 372 n. 2 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Finally, even if Congress had not occupied the field

in this case, because “state law is naturally preempted to the

extent of any conflict with a federal statute[,]” the prudent

course is to consider the possibility of conflict preemption

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16 The court agrees with the general proposition that, standing

alone, A.R.S. § 13-2319 does not “criminalize[] unlawful presence.” See

Melendres v. Arpaio, 2013 WL 2997173, at *76 (D.Ariz. May 24, 2013).

However, the Policy, which is based upon Arizona’s human smuggling statute

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here as well. See id. at 372 (footnote and citations omitted).

2. Conflict Preemption

Keeping in mind that an “[i]mplied preemption analysis does

not justify a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state

statute is in tension with federal objectives[,]” the court will

next consider whether the Policy conflicts with federal law.

See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ––––, 131

S.Ct. 1968, 1985, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Distilling the parties’ conflict

preemption arguments to their essence, there are two core

issues: (1) whether the Policy actually conflicts with federal

law; and (2) whether the Policy “‘stands as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives

of Congress[.]’” See Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2501 (quoting

Hines, 312 U.S., at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399). The Policy does both.

a. Actual Conflict

Contending that the Policy is not conflict preempted, the

defendants again claim that it is “harmonious” with federal law.

See Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 11:5. The defendants are

overlooking a critical aspect of the Policy, however. The Policy

effectively criminalizes conduct which federal law does not.

More specifically, by deeming it a felony for unlawfully present

aliens to conspire to transport themselves, the Policy is

“criminalizing unlawful presence, a stance plainly at odds with

federal law.”16 See South Carolina, 720 F.3d at 530. Indeed,

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and its conspiracy statute, does criminalize unlawful presence, as fully

discussed above. 

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the Ninth Circuit has “long made clear that, unlike illegal

entry, mere unauthorized presence in the United States is not a

crime.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012)

(citing, inter alia, Martinez–Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029,

1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Nor is there any other federal criminal

statute making unlawful presence in the United States, alone, a

federal crime, although an alien’s willful failure to register

his presence in the United States when required to do so is a

crime, and other criminal statutes may be applicable in a

particular circumstance.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, in

Arizona, “[t]he Supreme Court recently affirmed that, ‘[a]s a

general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain

present in the United States.’” Id. (quoting Arizona, 132 S.Ct.,

at 2505). Thus, it defies logic to suggest, as the defendants

do, that the Policy, which contravenes federal law by

criminalizing conduct which Congress has chosen not to, is

harmonious with federal law. 

There is another way in which the Policy conflicts with

federal law. Among other activities, Alabama criminalized “an

alien’s conspiracy to be transported[.]” Alabama, 691 F.3d at

1288 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That

statute “appear[ed]” to the Fourth Circuit “to prohibit an

unlawfully present alien from even agreeing to be a passenger in

a vehicle.” Id. The Court held that that statute could not

“co-exist” with the federal smuggling statute, “as unlawfully

present aliens who are transported ‘are not criminally

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responsible for smuggling under 8 U.S.C. § 1324[.]’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 622, 626

(9th Cir. 1992)). Because the Policy at issue herein likewise

“appears to prohibit an unlawfully present alien even from

agreeing to be a passenger in a vehicle[,]” the court finds that

it, too, cannot “co-exist with § 1324(a).” See id. 

The Policy and federal law conflict in another way, as the

plaintiffs point out. The federal crime of alien smuggling

includes transporting or moving an illegal alien within the

United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). That offense

requires that “the smuggling be ‘in furtherance of such

violation of law,’ meaning that the defendants moved the alien

‘in order to help him or her to remain in the United States

illegally.’” United States v. Aguilar-Reyes, 2013 WL 3829489, at

*2 (9th Cir. July 28, 2013) (quoting Ninth Circuit Model Criminal

Jury Instructions § 9.2 (2010)). In contrast, Arizona’s

smuggling statute requires that the person transporting or

moving “knows or has reason to know” that the transported

person is an alien, and that the smuggling be for “profit or

commercial purpose.” A.R.S. §§ 13-2319(F)(3) and (A). Thus,

neither the § 13-2319 nor the Policy include the “in

furtherance” element of the federal statute. As a result, the

Policy “penalize[s] persons whom the narrower federal statute

does not.” Pls.’ SJM (Doc. 121) at 17:7-10. 

Not only does the Policy substantively conflict with federal

law, but it also conflicts from an operational standpoint.

Indeed, despite the defendants’ insistence to the contrary,

there is record proof of an actual conflict. The defendants

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admit that the MCSO has “arrested at least 1,800 non-smugglers

for conspiring to violate § 13-2319[.] Pls.’ SOF (Doc. 121-1) at

3:27-28, ¶ 3 (citation omitted); Defs.’ Resp. SOF (Doc. 129) at

3:15, ¶ 3. The defendants further admit that the MCAO has

“prosecuted 1,357 non-smugglers for conspiracy to violate § 13-

2319.” Id. at 4:5-6, ¶ 4 (citation omitted); Defs.’ Resp. SOF

(Doc. 129) at 3:16, ¶ 4. The foregoing belies the defendants’

blanket assertion that plaintiffs have not offered any evidence

of an actual conflict between the Policy and federal immigration

law. See Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 10:23-25 (“[T]here is no

evidence from the Policy’s nearly seven years of history that

there has been any conflict between federal immigration law, 

. . . , and the Policy.”) What is more, because the Policy

“criminalizes actions that Congress has, as a policy choice,

decided are a civil matter[,]” it is hard to imagine a more

blatant conflict than that. See South Carolina, 720 F.3d at

530. Given these various conflicts, the court gives no

credence to the defendants’ argument that there is no “clear

proof of conflicts between federal law” and the Policy. See

Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 10:26-27. 

b. Obstacle Preemption 

Turning to obstacle preemption, the Supreme Court has

instructed that “[w]hat is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of

judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a

whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects[.]”

Crosby, 530 U.S., at 373. It matters not “whether that obstacle

goes by the name of conflicting; contrary to; . . . repugnance;

difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation;

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curtailment; . . . interference, or the like.” Geier v.

American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873, 120 S.Ct.

1918, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

Viewed from this perspective, the court likewise is

persuaded that the Policy “presents an obstacle to the

execution of the federal statutory scheme and challenges federal

supremacy in the realm of immigration.” See GLAHR, 691 F.3d at

1265 (footnote omitted). “[M]ere unauthorized presence is not

a criminal matter.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. By the same

token though, unauthorized presence is a civil violation that

can lead to deportation under federal law. See South Carolina,

720 F.3d at 530 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227) (“Under federal law,

unlawfully present aliens are subject to civil removal

proceedings.”); see also Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d

468, 476–477 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that illegal presence is

“only a civil violation”), overruled on other grounds by

Hodgers–Durgin, 199 F.3d 1037). 

Recognizing that important distinction, the Fourth Circuit

held that the district court correctly enjoined a South Carolina

statute making it “a state felony for an unlawfully present

person to allow himself or herself to be ‘transported or moved’

within the state or to be harbored or sheltered to avoid

detection.” Id. at 522 (footnote omitted). Borrowing heavily

from Arizona, the Court explained:

‘A principal feature of the removal system 

 is the broad discretion exercised by 

 immigration officials.’ Arizona, 132 S.Ct. 

 at 2499. This discretion is necessary 

 because it ‘involves policy choices that bear

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 on this Nation’s international relations.’

 Id. The State, by criminalizing what Congress 

 has deemed a civil offense and entrusted to

 the discretion of the executive branch, is 

‘pursu[ing] policies that undermine federal law.’

 Id. at 2510. 

Id. at 530. Based upon that rationale, the Fourth Circuit held

that certain sections of South Carolina’s immigration law were

“conflict preempted because they stand as an obstacle to the

execution of the federal removal system and interfere with the

discretion entrusted to federal immigration officials.” Id.

Simply put, the Fourth Circuit held that federal immigration

law preempted certain state statutes “because they criminalize

actions that Congress has, as a policy choice, decided are a

civil matter.” Id. The South Carolina Court’s reasoning

applies with equal force here, where the Policy also

criminalizes conduct, an alien’s unlawful presence, that

Congress has determined is a civil violation. 

Put differently, the Policy “creates a new crime

unparalleled in the federal scheme.” See GLAHR, 691 F.3d at

1266. And, by making it a felony for unlawfully present

aliens, or non-smuggling migrants, to conspire to transport

themselves, much like the statutes at issue in GLAHR and

Alabama, the Policy is “an impermissible ‘complement’ to the INA

that is inconsistent with Congress’[] objective of creating a

comprehensive scheme governing the movement of aliens within the

United States.” See GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1266 (quoting Hines, 312

U.S., at 66-67, 61 S.Ct., at 404).

Moreover, as in Alabama, the Policy “undermines the intent

of Congress to confer discretion on the Executive Branch in

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17 Maintaining that the Policy does not create an obstacle to

compliance with federal law, the defendants assert that “states may

prosecute an act which constitutes both a federal and state offense under

the state’s police power without impinging on federal jurisdiction.”

Defs.’ SJM (Doc. 119) at 11:10-11 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Of

course, in making this assertion, defendants wholly disregard that the

“state offense” which the Policy proscribes is not a federal offense.

Thus, the defendants cannot avoid a finding of conflict preemption by

invoking the state’s police power. See Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v.

Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604, 35 S.Ct. 715, 717, 59 L.Ed.

1137 (1915) (“The legislation is not saved by calling it an exercise of

the police power[.]”) 

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matters concerning immigration.” See Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1287.

Congress granted local law enforcement officials limited

authority under the federal smuggling statute. They may arrest

for such crimes, but not prosecute because section 1324 crimes

are subject to prosecution in federal court. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1329. Thus “[b]y confining the prosecution of federal

immigration crimes to federal court, Congress limited the power

to pursue those cases to the appropriate United States

Attorney.” See GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1265 (citations omitted).

The Policy, which makes criminal, what Congress has deemed to be

a civil violation, is “not conditioned on respect for the

federal concerns or the priorities that Congress has explicitly

granted executive agencies the authority to establish.” See id.

(citation omitted).17 

In a similar vein, local arrest, detainment and prosecution

of unlawfully present aliens, or non-smuggling migrants, for

conspiring to transport themselves under the Policy

“unconstrained by federal law threaten[s] the uniform

application of the INA.” See GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1266. That is

because, as the Eleventh Circuit soundly reasoned:

 Each time a state enacts its own parallel

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 to the INA, the federal government loses 

 ‘control over enforcement’ of the INA, thereby 

 ‘further detract[ing] from the integrated 

 scheme of regulation created by Congress.’ 

Id. (quoting Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v.

Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288–89, 106 S.Ct. 1057, 1062, 89

L.Ed.2d 223 (1986) (quotation marks omitted)) (other citations

omitted). “Given the federal primacy in the field of enforcing

prohibitions on the transportation” and movement, among other

activities, of “unlawfully present aliens,” the court concurs

with the Eleventh Circuit that “the prospect of fifty individual

attempts to regulate immigration-related matters cautions

against permitting states to intrude into this area of dominant

federal concern.” Id. These various conflicts between the

Policy and federal law strengthen the court’s earlier finding of

field preemption. See Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2503 (finding that

“specific conflicts . . . underscore[d] the reason for field

preemption[]”).

Given that the Policy actually conflicts with federal

immigration law, and that it “stands as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives

of Congress[,]” Arizona, 132 S.Ct., at 2501 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted), the plaintiffs have met the “high

threshold” necessary to support a finding of conflict

preemption. See Whiting, 131 S.Ct., at 1985 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). To conclude on the issue of

conflict preemption, the court grants summary judgment in favor

of the plaintiffs, and denies the defendants’ summary judgment

in this regard. 

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C. Dismissal of Remaining Claims

The plaintiffs are “reced[ing]” or backing away from “their

remaining claims[,]” that is, their claims for unlawful search

and seizure, denial of due process and a pendent state claim for

violations of A.R.S. §§ 13-2319 and 13-1003. Pls.’ Resp. (Doc.

126) at 16:27-28, n. 5. The plaintiffs expressly seek voluntary

dismissal of these claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2).

However, they do not specify whether they are seeking dismissal

with or without prejudice, “implicitly accepting either

determination by th[is] district court.” See Hargis v. Foster,

312 F.3d 404, 412 (9th Cir. 2002). 

If an order granting voluntary dismissal in accordance with

Rule 41(2) is silent, that Rule presumes dismissal without

prejudice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(2) (“Unless the order states

otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without

prejudice.”) That said, “‘[t]he ‘broad grant of discretion’ that

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) vests in the district

court to dismiss ‘on terms that the court considers proper’

‘does not contain a preference for one kind of dismissal or

another.’” Real Estate Disposition Corp. v. National Home

Auction Corp., 2009 WL 764529, at *1 (C.D.Cal. 2009) (quoting

Hargis, 312 F.3d at 412; and Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2)). “As such,

th[is] district court has discretion as to whether to grant a

voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)(2) with or without prejudice.” See id. (citing Hargis,

312 F.3d at 412). 

The defendants do not object to the dismissal of the three

claims just identified, but from their standpoint that dismissal

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should be “with prejudice.” Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 132) at 1:27

(emphasis in original). As justification, the defendants point

out that the “[p]laintiffs have had sufficient time to develop

an evidentiary record to present genuine issues of material fact

precluding summary judgment and to substantively respond to”

defendants’ summary judgment motion on the three non-preemption

claims. Id. at 1:27-2:1. 

The defendants’ position is well-taken. In addition, the

defendants should not have the cloud of future litigation over

the other claims when, apparently, the plaintiffs made a

deliberate choice to pursue only the preemption claim.

Moreover, the plaintiffs have not provided any reason for

granting their request without prejudice. Under these

circumstances, the court, in the exercise of its discretion,

dismisses with prejudice the FAC’s second, third and fourth

claims.

II. Class Certification 

The plaintiffs are seeking to certify two classes. The

first they define as “[a]ll individuals who are - . . stopped,

detained, arrested, incarcerated, prosecuted, or penalized for

conspiring to transport themselves, and themselves only, in

violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319[] [“the individual

class”][.]” Class Certification Motion (Doc. 122) at 5:26-28

(emphasis added). Alternatively, the plaintiffs are seeking to

certify a class of “[a]ll individuals who . . . pay taxes to

Maricopa County and object to the use of county tax revenues to

stop, detain, arrest, incarcerate, prosecute, or penalize

individuals for conspiring to transport themselves, and

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themselves only, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319

[“the taxpayer class”].” Id. at 5:26 and 6:2-3. The defendants

oppose certification of both. 

Rule 23 “give[s] the district court broad discretion over

certification of class actions[.]” Stearns v. Ticketmaster

Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011). However, class

certification remains “‘an exception to the usual rule that

litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named

parties only.’” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. ––––, 133

S.Ct. 1426, 1432, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013) (quoting Califano v.

Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–701, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176

(1979)). “[T]o justify a departure from that rule, a class

representative must be part of the class and possess the same

interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”

Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 2541,

2550, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011)(internal quotation marks and

citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Before delving into the parties’ contentions as to each of

the Rule 23 factors, there is a preliminary, dispositive issue

with respect to the first proposed class. Essentially, the

defendants contend that because none of the named plaintiffs

have been stopped, detained, arrested, prosecuted, etc. in

accordance with the Policy, they are not members of the proposed

first class, and so cannot serve as class representatives

thereof. The court agrees. See Juvera v. Salcido, 2013 WL

1367354, at *3 (D.Ariz. April 4, 2013) (citing Bailey v.

Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512

(1962)) (“[T]he named representative must be a member of the

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class.”) 

Although the defendants did not mention it, there is another

compelling reason for not certifying the first proposed class.

That is because, regardless of the class definition, the

requested relief here is identical. Basically, both classes are

seeking: (1) a declaration that federal law preempts the Policy;

and (2) an injunction permanently enjoining the defendants from

taking any further action under the Policy. In light of the

foregoing, if the court finds that class certification is proper

as to the proposed alternative class – the taxpayers – the

plaintiffs will recover complete relief, obviating the need for

certification of the first proposed class. The court will,

thus, proceed to the issue of whether the plaintiffs have met

their burden of “‘affirmatively demonstrat[ing] . . .

compliance’ with Rule 23.” See Comcast, 133 S.Ct., at 1432

(quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct., at 2551-2552). 

“A party seeking class certification must satisfy the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and the

requirements of at least one of the categories under Rule

23(b).” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 2013 WL 4712728, at

*2 (Sept. 3, 2013). In the present case, the plaintiffs are

seeking class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) premised

on the defendants having “acted or refused to act on grounds

that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive

relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate

requesting the class as a whole[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). 

A. Rule 23(a)

“‘Rule 23(a) ensures that the named plaintiffs are

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appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish

to litigate.’” Wang, 2013 WL 4712728, at *2 (quoting Wal–Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 180

L.Ed.2d 374 (2011)). Rule 23(a) provides:

One or more members of a class may sue or 

be sued as representative parties on behalf 

of all members only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder 

of all members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact 

common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the 

representative parties are typical of 

the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will 

fairly and adequately protect the interests 

of the class.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Succinctly put, that Rule “requires a party

seeking class certification to satisfy four requirements:

numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of

representation.” Wang, 2013 WL 4712728, at *2 (citation

omitted). 

The defendants readily agree, and the court so finds, that

the first two Rule 23(a) elements –- numerosity and commonality

–– are satisfied in this case. See Defs.’ Resp. (Doc. 127)

2:24-25 (“Based on research and review of Plaintiffs’ Motion,

Defendants agree that this case satisfied the numerosity and

impracticability element required for a class action.”); and at

3:8-10 (“Based on the foregoing authority and review of

Plaintiffs’ Motion, Defendants agree that this case raises

issues of both law and fact that are common to the members of

the proposed class.”) The parties are at odds, however, as to

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whether the plaintiffs can satisfy Rule 23(a)’s typicality and

adequacy requirements. 

a. Typicality

 The plaintiffs assert that because they have satisfied the

commonality requirement, they have also satisfied the typicality

requirement. The defendants counter by repeating their argument

that the named taxpayer plaintiffs lack standing. The

defendants thus imply that that purported lack of standing means

that the claims of these plaintiffs are not typical of the

taxpayer class. This is the only reason the defendants offer as

to why the plaintiffs have not shown typicality as to the

proposed taxpayer class. Of course, the court has already found

that the taxpayer plaintiffs Haglund and Lujan do have standing

- a finding which undermines this defense argument. What is

more, “[i]n a class action, standing is satisfied if at least

one named plaintiff meets the requirements.” Haro, 2013 WL

4734032, at *4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, as this court has found, two of the named plaintiffs have

standing. Thus, the defendants’ lack of standing argument

simply has no place in deciding whether to grant class

certification. 

Typicality, like commonality, “serve[s] as [a] guidepost[]

for determining whether under the particular circumstances

maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the

named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated

that the interests of the class members will be fairly and

adequately protected in their absence.” Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct., at

2551, n. 5 (quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v.

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Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740

(1982)). “The test of typicality is whether other members have

the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on

conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether

other class members have been injured by the same course of

conduct.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 984

(2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

That test is easily met in the present case. Plaintiffs

Haglund and Lujan and the putative taxpayer class members claim

the same injury and object to the same conduct. The taxpayer

plaintiffs, and the class which they are seeking to represent,

allege misuse of their Maricopa County taxes to fund all aspects

of the Policy. Further, this action is based on conduct which

is not unique to the named taxpayer plaintiffs, i.e.,

enforcement of the Policy, which federal law preempts. And,

obviously other taxpayer class members have been injured by the

use of their Maricopa County taxes to fund the Policy. The

court thus finds that plaintiffs have met the “permissive

standards” of typicality. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150

F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).

b. Adequacy

 Rule 23(a)(4) “satisf[ies] due process concerns [ ]” in

that “absent class members must be afforded adequate

representation before entry of a judgment which binds them.”

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,

42–43, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940)). This requirement thus

“raises concerns about the competency of class counsel and

conflicts of interest.” Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct., at 2551 n. 5

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(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,

“[a]dequate representation depends on, among other factors, an

absence of antagonism between representatives and absentees, and

a sharing of interest between representatives and absentees.”

Ellis, 657 F.3d at 985 (citation omitted). Consequently, “[t]o

determine whether named plaintiffs will adequately represent a

class, courts must resolve two questions: ‘(1) do the named

plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with

other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their

counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the

class?’” Id. (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020). 

In addition to the foregoing, Rule 23(g) articulates four

criteria that a court must consider in evaluating the adequacy

of proposed class counsel. Those mandatory criteria are: 

(i) the work counsel has done in identifying

or investigating potential claims in the action; 

(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions,

other complex litigation, and the types of claims

asserted in the action; 

(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and 

(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to

representing the class[.]

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1)(A)(i)-(iv) (emphasis added). In addition,

the court “may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s

ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the

class[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P.23(g)(1)(B). “No single factor should

necessarily be determinative in a given case.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(g) Advisory Committee note. 

Here, the parties’ adequacy of representation arguments are

lacking, but for different reasons. The defendants did not

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address the critical issue of potential conflicts and vigorous

prosecution. Instead, in reliance upon their typicality

argument, the defendants simply declare that “the named

Plaintiffs cannot fairly and adequately protect the interests of

either one of the two alternative proposed classes.” Defs.’

Resp. (Doc. 127) at 5:4-5. 

To be sure, the typicality requirement does “tend to merge

with the adequacy-of-representation requirement[.]” Wal-Mart,

131 S.Ct., at 2551 n. 5 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). In the present case, however, because the defendants’

typicality argument attacked only the taxpayer plaintiffs’

standing, it has no bearing on the adequacy of representation.

Given this context, the defendants’ reliance upon their

typicality argument is misplaced. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’

discussion of the conflict of interest and vigorous prosecution

issues is perfunctory, to say the least, as is their discussion

of the Rule 23(g).

Despite these shortcomings, the court concludes that the

plaintiffs have satisfied the adequacy of representation

requirement. Not only have the defendants failed to point to

any claimed conflicts of interest, but the court can perceive of

none. As should be abundantly clear by now, the interests of

the named plaintiffs and their counsel are nearly identical in

every way to those of the putative taxpayer class members.

Furthermore, during the nearly seven year course of this

litigation, the vigorous prosecution of this lawsuit by

plaintiffs’ counsel is evident from, among other things, the

extensive discovery, motion practice, and an appeal to the Ninth

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Circuit. The decision by plaintiffs’ counsel to pursue only one

of the four claims in the FAC demonstrates that they have

seriously engaged in identifying and investigating potential

claims as well. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1)(A)(i). 

The other three Rule 23(g) factors weigh heavily in favor

of appointing Peter A. Schey and Carlos Holguín of the Center

for Human Rights and Constitutional Law Foundation (“the

Foundation”) as lead counsel for the plaintiffs. This nonprofit, public interest foundation routinely litigates on behalf

of immigrants and refugees raising constitutional and civil

rights issues. Attorney Schey is the President and Executive of

the Foundation, and has been from 1980 to the present.

Http:/centerforhumanrights.org/staff (last visited Sept. 15,

2013); see also Schey Decl’n (Doc. 21-1) at 8, ¶ 1. Attorney

Holguín has served as General Counsel with the Foundation since

1984. Id. The depth of their collective experience in handling

class actions and immigration issues can be discerned from a

representative sampling of lawsuits where they have successfully

litigated in this area. See, e.g., Immigration Assistance

Project of the Los Angeles Fed’n of Labor v. I.N.S., 306 F.3d

842 (9th Cir. 2002) (summary judgment granted in favor of an

immigrant class challenging provisions of the Immigration Reform

and Control Act of 1986, where attorney Schey served as co-lead

counsel); Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d

1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction

to alien class qualified to challenge advance parole policy);

and Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez, 248 F.R.D. 248 (C.D.Cal. 2008)

(certifying a nation-wide class and granting permanent

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18 Because their response does not even mention this aspect of

plaintiffs’ class certification motion, the court assumes that the

defendants concede that the plaintiffs are properly relying upon Rule

23(b)(2).

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injunctive and declaratory relief where defendants’ application

of a specific consent requirement deprived immigrant migrants in

federal custody of the special immigration juvenile provisions

of the INA). 

Through their extensive experience litigating immigration

issues, attorneys Schey and Holguín certainly are knowledgeable

in the applicable law. Finally, there is no reason to doubt

that they, and the Foundation in particular, have the necessary

resources to devote to representing the plaintiff class.

Therefore, the court finds that Peter Schey and Carlos Holguín

satisfy the Rule 23(g) criteria and can adequately represent the

plaintiff class certified herein. 

B. Rule 23(b)(2)

 Here, where the plaintiffs are seeking an injunction and

declaratory relief which would “provide relief to each member of

the class[,]” and no compensatory damages, they are properly

invoking Rule 23(b)(2).18 See Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct., at 2557.

As the Wal-Mart Court instructed, “[t]he key to the (b)(2) class

is the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory

remedy warranted — the notion that the conduct is such that it

can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class

members or as to none of them.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). The equitable relief which the

plaintiffs herein are seeking fits that description. Thus,

because the plaintiffs have met their burden of satisfying each

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of the Rule 23(a) requirements, and that of Rule 23(b)(2), the

court grants their motion for class certification as to the

taxpayer plaintiffs. 

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the court hereby ORDERS that:

(1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 119) is

DENIED;

(2) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 121) is

GRANTED as to their first claim (“Federal Preemption”);

(3) Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief (“Unlawful Search

and Seizure; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983"), third claim for

relief (“Denial of Due Process; violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983");

and fourth claim for relief (“Pendent State Claim: Violation of

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-2319 and 13-1003") are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2);

(4) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ. 23(b)(2) (Doc. 122) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. The court certifies a class defined as: “All individuals

who pay taxes to Maricopa County and object to the use of county

tax revenues to stop, detain, arrest, incarcerate, prosecute, or

penalize individuals for conspiring to transport themselves, and

themselves only, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(5) Carlos Holguín and Peter A. Schey of the Center for

Human Rights and Constitutional Law, 256 S. Occidental Blvd.,

Los Angeles, CA 90057; telephone: (213) 388-8693; facsimile:

(213) 386-9484; e-mail: crholguin@centerforhumanrights.org, and

pschey@centerforhumanrights.org, are appointed as lead class

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counsel for the class certified herein;

(6) Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that federal

law preempts and renders invalid the Maricopa County Migrant

Policy;

(7) Defendants Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio and

Maricopa County Attorney William G. Montgomery, and their

agents, employees, successors in office, and all other persons

who are in active concert or participation with the Maricopa

County Sheriff’s Office and the Maricopa County Attorney’s

Office, are permanently enjoined from further implementing the

Maricopa Migrant Conspiracy Policy including detaining,

arresting, and prosecuting persons for conspiring to transport

themselves, and no one else, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 13-2319;

(8) Defendants shall promptly serve Class Counsel with

copies of any instructions or guidelines they issue to implement

this Order; 

(9) Prior to bringing any motion or application to clarify,

modify or enforce this injunction, the parties, through counsel,

shall meet and confer in good faith to resolve their differences;

and 

(10) The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction to

enforce the terms of this Order and Permanent Injunction. 

 Dated this 27th day of September, 2013.

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Copies to all counsel of record

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