Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04045/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04045-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TORRY SMITH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-4045 EMC

FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

ORDER

A Final Pretrial Conference was held in this matter on November 14, 2007. Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e), this order memorializes the rulings made and stipulations

entered into on that day.

I. TRIAL DATE & LENGTH OF TRIAL

A. Jury selection shall be held on November, 20, 2007, at 9:30 a.m. 

B. The trial shall begin on November 26, 2007, at 8:30 a.m. (Counsel, however, should

be present before the Court at 8:00 a.m.) Trial days shall be Monday through Friday, from 8:30 a.m.

to 4:30 p.m., for a total of four court days.

C. Plaintiffs shall have twelve hours to present their evidence, and Defendants eight

hours. This includes direct examination by one side of its witnesses, cross-examination by that side

of the opposing party’s witnesses, and any rebuttal. This does not include opening statements and

closing arguments (the Court will impose separate limits), nor does this include jury selection and

instructions. 

D. The only claims proceeding to trial are as follows: (1) violation of § 1983 (the Fourth

Amendment), (2) false arrest and imprisonment, (3) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, and

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(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. All claims are asserted by both Plaintiffs. The City

of Oakland is subject to liability only through respondeat superior on state law claims. 

II. PROCEDURE FOR EXHIBITS AT/DURING TRIAL

A. No later than the end of each trial day, counsel shall inform opposing counsel of

which exhibits, if any, he or she intends to introduce during the next trial day and, if necessary, with

respect to which sponsoring witness. If any such exhibits are still objected to, both counsel shall

notify the Court after the jury is excused for the day and shall identify the exhibits at issue and the

objections. The Court will then schedule a conference that afternoon or the following morning to

resolve the dispute.

B. With respect to exhibits to be used on the first day of trial, counsel shall inform

opposing counsel of which exhibits, if any, he or she intends to introduce by November 19, 2007. If

any such exhibits are still objected to, both counsel shall notify the Court by 4:00 p.m., November

21, 2007, and shall identify the exhibits at issue and the objections. Counsel should notify the Court

via e-filing and via fax at (415) 522-4200. The Court will then address the dispute on the first day

of trial, i.e., on November 26, 2007, before any testimony begins.

C. If a party intends to use a projector or other equipment to show an exhibit (or

demonstrative) to the jury, that equipment shall be set up and ready for use by 8:30 a.m. each day. 

The parties should immediately file with the Court, if necessary, administrative requests to bring

projectors and/or other equipment to the courthouse for use at trial. 

III. PROCEDURE FOR WITNESSES AT/DURING TRIAL

A. Each party shall be prepared, during its case in chief or any rebuttal, to present its

next witness. At any time, if the party whose case is being presented is not prepared to present its

next witness, that party shall be deemed to have rested that portion of its case. No further witnesses

shall be permitted by the party who has so rested in that portion of the case (e.g., case in chief or

rebuttal) unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

B. Counsel are expected to cooperate with each other in the scheduling and production

of witnesses, including informing one another of witness order. Counsel should give opposing

counsel reasonable notice (at least one day) with respect to which witnesses will be testifying on a

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particular day. Witnesses may be taken out of order if necessary. Every effort shall be made to

avoid calling a witness twice (as an adverse witness and later as a party’s witness). 

C. Only one lawyer for each party may examine any single witness.

D. If a witness is testifying at the time of a recess or adjournment and has not been

excused, the witness shall be seated back on the stand when the court reconvenes. If a new witness

is to be called immediately following recess or adjournment, the witness should be seated in the

front row, ready to be sworn in.

E. Counsel shall refrain from eliciting testimony regarding any undisputed facts as set

forth in any stipulation filed with the Court. The Court may read to the jury such undisputed facts at

appropriate points in the trial.

F. Immediately before each new witness takes the stand, counsel calling the witness

shall place on the witness stand a clearly marked copy of each exhibit that counsel expects to have

the witness refer to during his or her direct examination. Immediately before beginning crossexamination, counsel conducting cross-examination shall do the same with any additional exhibits to

be referenced on cross.

G. If counsel intends to have the witness draw diagrams or put markings on visual

exhibits or diagrams prepared by the party calling the witness, the witness shall do so before taking

the stand. Once on the stand, the witness shall adopt the diagrams and/or markings and explain what

they represent. If the diagram or visual exhibit is prepared by the opposing party, the witness shall

not make any markings on the diagram or visual exhibit without leave of the Court.

IV. OTHER PROCEDURES AT/DURING TRIAL

A. To make an objection, counsel shall rise, say “objection,” and briefly state the legal

ground (e.g., hearsay or irrelevant). There shall be no speaking objections or argument from either

counsel unless requested by the Court. Only one counsel may make objections for each witness.

B. Bench conferences, or the equivalent of sidebars, will not be permitted absent truly

extenuating circumstances. Disputes regarding exhibits shall be resolved as set forth in Part II,

supra. Any other disputes or problems should be addressed either before the trial day commences,

at the end of the trial day, or during a recess, if necessary. 

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V. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1 (Docket No. 61)

In their first motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to exclude evidence of Mr. Smith’s tax returns

prepared by Jackson Hewitt Tax Service. Defendants contend that they should be allowed to crossexamine Mr. Smith about the tax returns because he lied about having a son and daughter in those

tax returns.

The Court DENIES the motion. “Evidence that a witness has made false statements in a tax

return is obviously a matter which affects the witness’s credibility.” Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d

79, 82 (2d Cir. 1993). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), “[s]pecific instances of the conduct

of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness . . .

may not be proved by extrinsic evidence,” but may, “in the discretion of the court, if probative of

truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning

the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). Consistent with

Rule 608(b), Defendants may cross-examine Mr. Smith about the tax returns but may not introduce

extrinsic evidence related to such. Because of the limited nature of the cross-examination, the

evidence is not unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiffs.

B. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 2 (Docket No. 61)

In their second motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to exclude evidence of Mr. Smith’s alleged

criminal activity and parole compliance following the date of his release from custody (i.e., January

20, 2005). The Court GRANTS the motion, so long as Mr. Smith only testifies about his activity

and parole compliance up to the date of his release from custody.

C. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3 (Docket No. 61)

In their final motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to exclude evidence of the underlying

conviction for which Mr. Smith was on parole at the time of the incident (i.e., armed robbery). 

According to Defendants, they should be allowed to testify about the underlying conviction because

“how they approach the home of a parolee for armed robbery would be different than how they

might approach the home of someone on parole for a lesser crime or one not involving a weapon.” 

Opp’n at 5.

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The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. The Court is dubious that evidence of the

underlying conviction has any relevance. Defendants’ knowledge, even if established, of the nature

of the prior conviction has little to do with whether or not they planted the rifle, which is the central

issue in this case. Plaintiffs are asserting claims for unreasonable search and seizure, not excessive

force -- a claim to what Defendants’ knowledge of the prior conviction would plausibly be relevant

as that would affect whether the officers should have, e.g., approached with guns drawn or used

force. Those issues are not present here. The Court thus concludes that evidence of the underlying

conviction is not relevant or has at best marginal relevance.

The Court further concludes that any relevance that the evidence has is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. If the evidence were admitted,

then a jury likely would believe that Mr. Smith did in fact have a gun on the premises, as Defendants

contend, because he had previously been convicted of armed robbery, even though this conviction

occurred five years before the incident at issue. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (“Evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith.”). 

VI. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE

A. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1 (Docket No. 65)

In their first motion, Defendants ask the Court to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert

Peter Barnett. See also Pls.’ Proposed Ex. 17 (Barnett report). Mr. Barnett was retained by

Plaintiffs to examine the rifle allegedly possessed by Mr. Smith for fingerprints. See Lee Decl., Ex.

A (Barnett report, dated 9/8/06). In his report, Mr. Barnett stated that, based on his examination, he

did not see any visible fingerprint impressions. He further stated that it appeared that the rifle had

previously been examined for fingerprints. Mr. Barnett therefore contacted the Oakland Police

Department and was informed that certain testing had been done and that, after the testing, the rifle

had been wiped down with acetone. According to Mr. Barnett, this 

final processing with acetone would effectively remove essentially all

traces of any latent prints, developed or not, on the carbine. The use

of this final step is inexplicable and, based on the procedures followed

in my laboratory and in other forensic laboratories where I have

inquired, not a usual procedure in those laboratories. The purpose of

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the acetone wipe is, presumably, a safety measure to remove

potentially harmful chemical traces, but the procedure effectively

eliminates the possibility of further processing or review of the work

done in the Oakland Police laboratory.

Id. According to Plaintiffs, Mr. Barnett will provide testimony about his report as well as, inter alia,

his examination of the rifle, procedures for testing firearms for the presence of fingerprints, methods

of preservation of firearms for fingerprint testing, and review of Oakland Police Department records

and procedures of storing and testing evidence for the presence of fingerprints (both generally and

specifically with respect to the instant case). 

The Court DENIES the motion. First, Mr. Barnett’s testimony will assist the trier of fact

with respect to the issue of spoliation. Second, Mr. Barnett’s testimony will assist the trier of fact in

understanding the significance of the Oakland Police Department’s fingerprinting test results.

Under Ninth Circuit law, a court has the inherent discretionary power to issue an evidentiary

sanction in response to the destruction or spoliation of relevant evidence. See Glover v. BIC Corp.,

6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993). A party’s destruction of evidence need not be in bad faith in

order to warrant a sanction. See id. In the instant case, the sanction sought by Plaintiffs is twofold:

(1) testimony by Mr. Barnett about the destruction of evidence and (2) an instruction permitting the

jury to draw an adverse inference from the destruction against Defendants.

Although the Court is inclined to find that there is sufficient evidence to allow the jury to

hear evidence on spoliation, it is not clear what prejudice Plaintiffs suffered as a result of their not

being able to conduct their own testing of the rifle, given that Mr. Camacho already found that there

were no fingerprints, a result which benefits Plaintiffs. The Court reserves ruling on Plaintiffs’

request for sanctions pending further hearing.

B. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2 (Docket No. 66)

In their second motion, Defendants ask the Court to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’

expert Roger Clark. See also Pls.’ Proposed Ex. 16. Defendants argue that his testimony should be

excluded because he will express opinions about the credibility of the officers, which is improper;

because his opinions constitute legal conclusions; and because his testimony is not relevant. The

motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Mr. Clark shall not be allowed to opine on the

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credibility of the officers or make conclusions about whether the search and arrest were legal. Mr.

Clark does not have any specialized knowledge that would assist the jury in assessing credibility or

in determining whether the search and arrest were legal. 

However, Mr. Clark may opine about the alleged failure of the officers to follow standard

procedures -- e.g., their failure to arrest Marcus Belton and Juanita Walton, their failure to keep Mr.

Smith’s bankcard, and their failure to include the alleged confession by Mr. Smith in the police

report. For instance, the jury could infer from the first two failures that the officers went to Mr.

Smith’s residence with the purpose of harassing him rather than for a legitimate law enforcement

purpose; they could infer from the last failure that the officers lied about the confession. The Court

notes that, in so ruling, it does not bar Defendants from making objections to specific instances in

which the officers allegedly failed to follow standard procedures if such failures are trivial or have

little probative value. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403, 404(a).

C. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3 (Docket No. 67)

In their third motion, Defendants move to exclude the testimony of Wayne Meddows and

Fred Abraham. Plaintiffs intend to offer Mr. Meddows to testify about Mr. Smith’s employment at

Home Depot following his release from custody on January 20, 2005. See Joint Pretrial Statement at

5. Plaintiffs intend to offer Mr. Abraham to testify about Mr. Smith’s employment at Pep Boys prior

to the arrest and incarceration at issue. See id. Defendants contend that the testimony of both

individuals should be excluded because Plaintiffs failed to disclose them as witnesses until October

23, 2007, when Plaintiffs provided their draft of the joint pretrial statement. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(c)(1). Plaintiffs argue that they should not be barred from offering the two individuals as

witnesses because Defendants were aware of the witnesses’ identities as of April 2006, when Mr.

Smith was deposed.

The Court GRANTS the motion. There is no dispute that Mr. Smith referred to Mr.

Meddows and Mr. Abraham (and Home Depot and Pep Boys, respectively) during his April 2006

deposition. The issue here is whether Mr. Smith’s reference to these individuals during the

deposition was enough to put Defendants on fair notice of their being witnesses.

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Plaintiffs’ position does find some support in Rule 26(e). The 1993 advisory committee

notes for Rule 26(e) expressly state that “[t]here is . . . no obligation to provide supplemental or

corrective information that has been otherwise made known to the parties in writing or during the

discovery process, as when a witness not previously disclosed is identified during the taking of a

deposition . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e), 1993 advisory committee notes. However, neither the rule

nor the advisory committee notes support the proposition that the mere mention of a person’s name

during a party’s deposition is enough to alert the deposing party that the person is a witness. As a

matter of fairness, there should be some indication as to why that person is someone “likely to have

discoverable information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). See, e.g., Gutierrez v. AT&T Broadband,

LLC, 382 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that district court did not err in failing to strike

affidavit of witness where witness was identified in 30(b)(6) deposition as having relevant

information); Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Intercounty Nat’l Title Ins. Co., Nos. 00 C 5658, 00 C

7086, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7207, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2003) (noting that, “[d]uring her

deposition, Claire Allen identified Crane as a person who may have knowledge of Old Intercounty’s

real estate closing procedures”). In the instant case, there is little in the deposition testimony that

indicates that Mr. Meddows and Mr. Abraham are likely to have discoverable information; their

names came up largely in the context of defense counsel asking general background information.

Although the Court shall not permit Mr. Meddows and Mr. Abraham to testify as witnesses,

the Court shall not award Defendants fees based on Plaintiffs’ failure to disclose. Plaintiffs’ failure

to disclose was not entirely unreasonable in light of the text of Rule 26(e) and the advisory

committee notes.

D. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4 (Docket No. 68)

In their fourth motion, Defendants ask the Court to exclude evidence of the dismissal of the

criminal charges against Mr. Smith. See, e.g., Pls.’ Proposed Exs. 9-10, 18. Defendants contend

that the dismissal of the criminal charges is irrelevant to the issues of whether Defendants’ searched

Plaintiffs’ home for legitimate law enforcement reasons and whether there was probable cause to

arrest Mr. Smith. Defendants further argue that, even if relevant, the evidence would be unfairly

prejudicial and confusing as “[a] jury may well improperly conclude[] that the dismissal of the

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1 And even if they did, as Defendants point out, that position would be foreclosed by Anda v.

City of Long Beach, 7 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1993). In Anda, the plaintiff had been arrested on a charge

of assault with a deadly weapon but subsequently the criminal charges against him were dismissed at

a preliminary hearing pursuant to California Penal Code § 871. See id. at 1420. Under § 871, a criminal

complaint is to be dismissed if it appears that no public offense has been committed or there is not

sufficient cause to believe that the criminal defendant is guilty of a public offense. See id. at 1420 &

n.2. The district court held that, while the testimony at the preliminary hearing could be used for

impeachment purposes, evidence of the dismissal itself was not admissible because it was not relevant.

See id. at 1420, 1422.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the district court had erred in excluding evidence

that the state court had dismissed his criminal charges at the preliminary hearing. See id. at 1421. The

Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the lower court. It explained that, to be relevant, the dismissal of

the criminal charges had to “make the issue of the existence of probable cause [for the arrest] more or

less likely.” Id. at 1422. Although, under § 871, criminal charges may be dismissed for lack of

sufficient cause, “a dismissal under this provision is not necessarily relevant to the existence of probable

cause. A preliminary hearing is a post facto determination of probable cause that is concerned primarily

with whether the prosecution meets its burden of proof and, at least in some instances, can result in a

dismissal of criminal charges even though the existence of probable cause is not considered.” Id. In

the plaintiff’s case, the dismissal was not due to a lack of probable cause; rather, the charges were

dismissed on procedural grounds, i.e., because certain witnesses and physical evidence were unavailable

on the day of the preliminary hearing. See id. at 1422-23.

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criminal charges means that the search of plaintiffs’ residence and/or arrest of plaintiff Torry Smith

was unconstitutional or improper in some other way.” Mot. at 4.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the dismissal of the criminal charges is irrelevant to the issues of

whether Defendants’ searched Plaintiffs’ home for legitimate law enforcement reasons and whether

there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Smith.1

 See also Opp’n at 9 (stating that Plaintiffs have no

intention of using the dismissal to prove that the criminal charges were false). Plaintiffs argue,

however, that the dismissal is relevant impeachment evidence and that any prejudice can be

diminished by a limiting instruction as to how the jury may consider the evidence.

The Court DENIES the motion. Evidence of the dismissals is relevant to Officer

Parkinson’s motive and the truthfulness of his testimony. That is, Officer Parkinson’s failure to

mention the alleged confession until the parole revocation hearing is arguably even more suspect

once it is known that, at the time of the parole hearing, the criminal charges had already been

dismissed twice despite his testimony in one of the earlier hearings. A jury could infer Officer

Parkinson was especially willing to do anything to make sure that Mr. Smith stayed behind bars. 

However, to reduce the danger of unfair prejudice, the Court shall, at Defendants’ request, issue a

limiting instruction as to how the evidence of the dismissals may or may not be considered. The

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parties shall meet and confer to determine whether they can reach agreement on an appropriate

limiting instruction. They shall submit a proposed limiting instruction (or instructions if no

agreement is reached) no later than November 20, 2007. Furthermore, the dismissals of the criminal

charges shall be elicited through the examination of Officer Parkinson, not Torry Smith.

E. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5 (Docket No. 69)

In their fifth motion, Defendants move to exclude all evidence concerning Mr. Smith’s parole

revocation hearing, including the transcript of the hearing, the disposition report, and the result. See,

e.g., Pls.’ Proposed Ex. 11. The motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The

disposition report and the result are both excluded. So too is that part of the hearing transcript which

contains the hearing officer’s conclusions. Plaintiffs’ sole contention is that this evidence is relevant

to impeachment of Officer Midyett, but this argument is not persuasive. Officer Midyett, unlike

Officer Parkinson, did not testify at the parole revocation hearing. Plaintiffs can adequately

challenge Officer Midyett’s credibility simply by asking why he never mentioned the alleged

confession until his deposition in this case. 

As to the remainder of the hearing transcript, Plaintiffs may use excerpts to impeach. 

Defendants argue that the transcript is unreliable because the hearing was only tape recorded and

parts of the hearing were not intelligible, but that should not bar the use of any relevant, nonhearsay

testimony that was intelligible. Defendants have failed to point to any part of the transcript prepared

by Plaintiffs that is inaccurate or misleading.

Moreover, testimony by Officer Parkinson at the parole revocation hearing can be used by

Plaintiffs for the truth of the matter asserted because an admission by a party-opponent is not

considered hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (providing that an admission by a party-opponent is

not hearsay). However, with respect to testimony by Mr. Smith or Ms. Gray at the parole revocation

hearing, the Court will have to reserve judgment. Presumably, Plaintiffs will be offering their own

prior consistent statements from the parole revocation hearing. But, under Federal Rule of Evidence

801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement is admissible only if, inter alia, offered to rebut an express

or implied charge against the witness of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. See Fed.

R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).

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Plaintiffs contend still that, at the very least, they should be permitted to introduce excerpts

of the tape containing statements by Mr. Smith at the hearing, made in reaction to Officer

Parkinson’s assertion of the confession. According to Plaintiffs, Mr. Smith’s reaction is not hearsay

because it is a present sense impression or an excited utterance. 

The Court reserves ruling on this aspect. Plaintiffs have presented no authority applying this

exception to hearsay where the alleged present sense impression or excited utterance relates to a

event or condition objectively observable rather than a statement the declarant perceives as

untruthful.

F. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 6 (Docket No. 53)

In their sixth motion, Defendants ask the Court to exclude evidence of any prior criminal

charges against Defendant Officer Midyett. Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, although they

“reserve the right to introduce such evidence should Defendants somehow open the door to such

evidence.” Opp’n at 11. The Court therefore GRANTS the motion, although it will not bar

Plaintiffs from moving to introduce the evidence if Defendants “open the door to such evidence.” 

Id.

G. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 7 (Docket No. 70)

In their seventh motion, Defendants move the Court to exclude all evidence regarding the

purported reputation of Officer Parkinson and/or Officer Midyett – in particular, testimony by Mr.

Smith that the officers are “notorious in the streets.” Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, although

they “reserve the right to introduce such evidence should Defendants somehow open the door to

such evidence.” Opp’n at 12. The Court therefore GRANTS the motion, although it will not bar

Plaintiffs from moving to introduce the evidence if Defendants “open the door to such evidence.” 

Id.

H. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No.8 (Docket No. 54)

In their eighth motion, Defendants move the Court to exclude any evidence related to the

Internal Affairs, Citizen Police Review Board, and personnel histories of the officers who responded

to the scene of the incident at issue. Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, although they reserve the

right to introduce such evidence if “Defendants should open the door to such evidence.” Id. The

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Court therefore GRANTS the motion, although it will not bar Plaintiffs from moving to introduce

the evidence if Defendants “open the door to such evidence.” Id.

I. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 9 (Docket No. 71)

In their ninth motion, Defendants move to exclude any evidence related to the “Nightriders”

case. Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, although they reserve the right to introduce such evidence

if “Defendants somehow open the door to such evidence.” Id. The Court therefore GRANTS the

motion, although it will not bar Plaintiffs from moving to introduce the evidence if Defendants

“open the door to such evidence.” Id.

J. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 10 (Docket No. 79)

In their tenth motion, Defendants ask the Court to exclude any evidence of their failure to

contact Mr. Smith’s parole agent prior to going to the residence. Defendants argue that the evidence

“is completely irrelevant because there is no requirement to contact a parole agent before conducting

a search.” Mot. at 2 (emphasis in original).

The motion is DENIED. Plaintiffs represented at the hearing that Mr. Smith’s parole agent

will testify that it is common for an officer(s) to contact a parole agent prior to conducting a parole

search. If so, then Defendants’ failure to do so in the instant case is probative to the issue of whether

they went to Mr. Smith’s residence with a purpose to harass rather than in earnest. The Court will

not issue a limiting instruction to inform the jury that there is no legal requirement that an officer(s)

contact a parole agent prior to doing a parole search, because Defendants may testify that they are

not legally required to do so, and Plaintiffs have represented that they will not offer any evidence to

the contrary. To the extent that fact is considered relevant by the jury, they will be made aware of it.

K. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 11 (Docket No. 79)

In their final motion, Defendants move the Court to exclude evidence of their alleged

statement to Mr. Smith that there was a warrant out for his arrest when in fact there was no such

warrant.

The motion is DENIED. The course of Defendants’ conduct and their intent is at issue. 

Whether they made alleged false statements to Mr. Smith may be probative to their intent. The

Court will not issue a limiting instruction to inform the jury that an officer(s) may use guise or

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pretext when interrogating a suspect because Defendants may testify to such and Plaintiffs have not

indicated that they offer any evidence to the contrary.

VII. WITNESSES

A. Plaintiffs

For their case-in-chief, Plaintiff intends to call or may call, if the need arises, the following

witnesses.

1. Torry Smith.

2. Patricia Gray.

3. Tommie Smith.

4. Terry Johnson.

5. Roger Clark. 

6. Peter Barnett. 

B. Defendants

For their case-in-chief, Defendants intend to call or may call, if the need arises, the following

witnesses.

1. John Parkinson.

2. Marcus Midyett.

3. Michael Wells.

4. Gregg Williams.

5. Gus Galindo.

C. Deposition Testimony

The parties have agreed to introduce the testimony of Tommie Smith by videotaped

deposition in the event he is unavailable for trial. See Joint Pretrial Statement at 6. Because

Tommie Smith may be unavailable such that the parties would, as a result, be compelled to rely on

his deposition testimony, the parties should meet and confer to determine which segments they will

designate. The parties should also meet and confer to determine which objections need to be ruled

upon by the Court and provide that to the Court by November 20, 2007 so the Court may rule on

those objections in time to allow for proper editing of the videotape.

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VIII. WRITTEN DISCOVERY RESPONSES & EXHIBITS

A. Written Discovery Responses

Plaintiffs wish to present the City of Oakland’s responses to Plaintiffs’ document requests

(set two) as an exhibit. See Joint Pretrial Statement at 6.

B. Exhibits

Attached is the Court’s ruling on the parties’ objections to exhibits (Attachment A).

IX. DEMONSTRATIVES

The parties shall meet and confer in advance (prior to the date of demonstration) and

exchange demonstratives to avoid objections. Any objections shall be brought to the Court’s

attention before 4:00 p.m. the day prior to being exhibited.

X. JURY QUESTIONNAIRE, JURY VOIR DIRE,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS & VERDICT FORM

A. Short Statement to Potential Jurors

The Court shall read to the potential jurors a short statement about the case prior to voir dire. 

The parties shall provide a stipulated statement (one or two paragraphs) to the Court by 12:00 p.m.,

November 19, 2007.

B. Jury Questionnaire and Voir Dire

The Court shall not use a jury questionnaire but shall voir dire the potential jurors (taking

into account the proposed voir dire submitted by the parties). The Court has already described in its

last Case Management Conference order the list of standard questions it intends to ask. The Court

shall also give each party a brief opportunity (twenty minutes each) to voir dire the potential jurors

after questioning by the Court.

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C. Jury Instructions

The Court shall address jury instructions at a later time.

D. Verdict Form

The Court shall address the verdict form at a later time.

This ruling disposes of Docket Nos. 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 53, 70, 54, 71, and 79.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2007

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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