Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00862/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00862-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BLANCA GALVAN, an individual,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 14-cv-862 BAS (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

REMAND (ECF 5)

v.

NASSCO HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

On April 10, 2014, Defendants National Steel and Shipbuilding Company 

(now replaced by NASSCO Holdings, Inc.) removed this matter from California 

state court to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. ECF 

1.Consequently, Plaintiff Blanca Galvan moved to remand the matter back to state 

court. ECF 5. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Galvan’s motion.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In her Complaint, Galvan alleges she was sexually harassed during her 

employment as a welder at the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company 

(“NASSCO”). Compl. ¶¶ 20, 26. She claims her supervisor, Defendant Mirsad 

Velic, coerced her into repeatedly performing sexual acts with him. Id. at ¶¶ 23–

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36. She was then transferred to a new supervisor, Defendant Jonathan Jones, who 

allegedly made lewd and graphic gestures towards her at work and expressed his 

desire to have sex with her. Id. at ¶¶ 37–41. Additionally, Defendant Guillermo 

Jimenez called her into his office and allegedly sexually assaulted her and told her 

to become a prostitute. Id. at ¶¶ 42. As a result of her refusal to accept these 

advances, she was allegedly retaliated against in both job placement and 

evaluations. Id. at ¶¶ 43–71. She also claims the retaliation increased after she filed 

a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id.at ¶¶ 73.

In her state court Complaint, Galvan alleges four causes of action under 

California Government Code § 12940 for sexual harassment, retaliation, failure to 

prevent harassment, and gender discrimination. Additionally, she claims negligent 

supervision and failure to pay overtime wages against NASSCO Holdings and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants.

Defendants removed the case to federal court, and Galvan moved to remand 

it. Defendants argue that Galvan’s state law claims are preempted by Section 301 

of the Labor Relations Management Act (“LMRA”).

DISCUSSION

A party may remove a suit to federal court only if it could have been brought 

there initially. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 

392 (1987). If an area of state law is completely preempted, the suit is 

characterized as arising from federal law and is therefore removable. Caterpiller, 

Inc., 482 U.S. at 393. Section 301 of the LRMA provides federal courts 

jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a 

labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Such suits invoke complete preemption 

and are removable. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust 

for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983). Section 301 preemption “must be construed to 

cover most state-law actions that require interpretation of labor agreements.” 

Balcorta v. Twentieth Century–Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 

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2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“However, ‘not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially 

involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 

or other provisions of the federal labor law.’ Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 

U.S. 202, 211 (1985). ‘[T]he Supreme Court has distinguished between claims that 

require interpretation or construction of a labor agreement and those that require a 

court simply to “look at” the agreement.’ Balcorta, 208 F.3d at 1108. And the 

Ninth Circuit ‘ha[s] stressed that, in the context of § 301 complete preemption, the 

term “interpret” is defined narrowly—it means something more than “consider,” 

“refer to,” or “apply.” ’ Id. Moreover, ‘the mere fact that a broad contractual 

protection ... provide[s] a remedy for conduct that coincidentally violates state-law 

does not make the existence or the contours of the state law violation dependent 

upon the terms of the private contract.’ Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,

486 U.S. 399, 412–13 (1988). ‘[W]here a plaintiff contends that an employer's 

actions violated a state-law obligation, wholly independent of its obligations under 

the CBA, there is no preemption.’ Espinal v. Nw. Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452, 1456 (9th 

Cir. 1996).” Williams v. Centerplate, Inc., 14-CV-02967-VC, 2014 WL 4748320 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014). Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit has found 

California Government Code § 12940 et seq. not preempted by § 301. Cook v. 

Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir. 1990); Kirton v. Summit Med. 

Ctr., 982 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (N.D. Cal. 1997).

In this case, Galvan claims the defendants sexually harassed her, retaliated 

against her, and that her employer failed to pay her overtime wages. While some of 

these allegations could be stated as breaches of her Collective Bargaining 

Agreement, they are based on “nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual 

employees as a matter of state law, ... independent of rights under the collectivebargaining agreement.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994) (internal 

quotations omitted) (as quoted by Williams, 2014 WL 4748320). 

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Galvan’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is 

likewise not preempted. The defendants cite to no provision of the CBA which 

speaks to the reasonableness of requiring an employee to sexually service her 

supervisors or suggest she become a prostitute. Although Galvan alleges other 

wrongful conduct, these speak to the retaliation claim and not to the intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. 

Accordingly, Galvan’s motion to remand is GRANTED. This matter is 

REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, San Diego County for further 

adjudication.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 3, 2014

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