Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00022/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00022-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alfredo Corral-Lozano

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-022-PHX-MHM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in State Custody

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (docket # 1) Respondents filed an Answer, docket # 15, to

which Petitioner has not replied and deadline has expired. Accordingly, this matter is ripe

for review. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends denying the

Petition. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The following events gave rise to Petitioner’s challenged convictions and sentences. 

A. Proceedings in Arizona Superior Court 

At around 10:45 p.m. on December 10, 2004, Phoenix Police received a call from an

individual stating that someone had offered to sell him drugs at an abandoned house in

Phoenix. (Respondents’ Exhs. A, B) Four officers responded to the call and entered the

abandoned home’s backyard through a large hole in the fence. (Respondents’ Exh. B; Exh.

L at 28-29) The police officers noticed two women sitting inside an open shed in the yard,

and three of the officers entered the shed. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 2; Exh. L at 30) The

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28 1 The Honorable Frank T. Galati presided. 

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fourth officer, Daniel Jones, remained in the backyard where he noticed Petitioner in the

shadows near the house. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 2; Exh. L at 30-31) Officer Jones

announced that he was a police officer and shined his flashlight on Petitioner. (Id.) 

Petitioner turned towards Officer Jones, raised a gun, and pointed it at the officer. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B at 2; Exh. L at 32) Officer Jones moved to his left, and Petitioner

followed him with the gun. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 33) When Officer Jones reached for

his handgun in his holster, Petitioner threw the gun and ran. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 33-34)

Petitioner was apprehended in front of the house, and Officer Jones identified Petitioner as

the person who had pointed the gun at him. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 3; Exh. L at 37) Upon

searching Petitioner, police found crack cocaine, a pipe, and shotgun shells. (Respondents’

Exh. B at 3; Exh. L at 39) 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner was indicted in the Superior Court of Arizona,

Maricopa County, on one count of possession or use of narcotic drugs, one count of

possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of aggravated assault. (Respondents’ Exh.

A) Petitioner’s case proceeded to trial,1

 and the jury found him guilty of all charges.

(Respondents’ Exh. B at 4) On May 25, 2005, the court sentenced Petitioner to 4.5 years’

imprisonment for the narcotics conviction; 1.75 years’ imprisonment for the drug

paraphernalia conviction; and 10.5 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault charge. 

(Id.) The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, and gave Petitioner credit for 166

days of pre-sentence incarceration. (Id.) 

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Respondents’ Exhs. C, D) 

Petitioner’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

asking the court to search the record for fundamental error. (Respondents’ Exh. C)

Additionally, counsel mentioned three issues urged by Petitioner: (1) there was inadequate

minority representation on the jury; (2) the prosecution’s witnesses committed perjury; and 

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there was insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s convictions. Counsel requested leave

for Petitioner to file a supplemental pro per brief addressing those issues. (Respondents’

Exh. C at 4) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a pro per brief arguing that: (1) he could not have

pointed a shot gun at Officer Jones because he lived on the street and could not have been

carrying a gun that large; (2) the police lacked a search warrant or probable cause to enter

the backyard of the house where Petitioner was found; (3) Petitioner did not receive a fair

trial because the jury did not include “three persons of each race;” (4) there was insufficient

evidence to support his convictions; (5) the trial “focus[ed] on the drug charges and [the

jury] used that to [find him] guilty o[f] the aggravated assault;” (6) the four police officers

committed perjury because they gave differing accounts of the incident; (7) Officer Jones

committed perjury when he said that he never had a conversation with Petitioner, and later

destroyed evidence of a tape recorded interview; (8) if the police officers had entered a dark

house and seen an armed suspect, they would have shot or killed him; (9) the court failed to

consider that when police officers arrest armed individuals, the situation turns violent, and

the fact that the situation did not turn violent in this case, proves that Petitioner did not point

a gun at Officer Jones; and (10) Petitioner was not charged with resisting arrest. 

(Respondents’ Exh. D at 1-4) 

On April 11, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions

and sentences. (Respondents’ Exh. B) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona

Supreme Court.

C. Post-Conviction Proceedings

On May 10, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. E) The court appointed counsel who subsequently

notified the court that, after reviewing the transcripts and relevant documents, he could find

no colorable claims to raise. (Respondents’ Exh. F) On counsel’s request, the court granted

Petitioner an extension of time to file a pro per petition. (Respondents’ Exh. F) On

December 19, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Respondents’

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 2 Respondents concede that the Petition was timely filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d). (docket # 15 at 6-7) 

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Exh. G) Petitioner argued that he was entitled to relief because he had been denied his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective because:

(1) he failed to challenge the composition of the jury, which did not include any Hispanics;

and (2) during closing argument, counsel failed to point out the police officers’ inconsistent

testimony. (Respondents’ Exh. G at 6) 

On March 21, 2007, the court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief finding

that: (1) Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the racial

composition of the jury was “precluded by Rule 32.5 for failing to provide any record to

support the factual aspect of his claim;” (2) Petitioner failed to meet either prong of the

Strickland test on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing “to address a state

witness’s allegedly inconsistent testimony;” and (3) Petitioner did not satisfy either prong of

the Strickland test with respect to his claim that “trial counsel’s closing argument was

ineffective.” (Respondents’ Exh. H) 

On May 1, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. I) Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective because: (1)

he did not ask the court to excuse a juror based on her “ties with the State;” (2) he did not

“ensure that the racial make-up of the jury [was] more representative of the population;” and

(3) he did not impeach two police officers with their inconsistent statements. (Respondents’

Exh. I) On January 4, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief without comment. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Petitioner subsequently filed a timely2

 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus raising the

following claims: 

Ground One: Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated because “there

was inadequate minority representation on the jury.”

Ground Two: Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for (a) “failing to 

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challenge the minority representation on the jury,” and (b) “by not addressing

inconsistent testimony in his closing argument.”

Ground Three: There was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict

on the aggravated assault count.

Ground Four: The police “failed to obtain a search warrant to enter the premises”

where Petitioner was located, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

(docket # 1 at 5-13) 

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims raised in Grounds 1, 2(a), and 3 are

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. (docket # 15 at 7)

Respondents further argue that all of Petitioner’s claims lack merit. Petitioner has not

replied. The Court will discuss the applicable law below and then discuss Petitioner’s

claims.

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A. Legal Principles 

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The exhaustion

inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Petitioner

“shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to

raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). In other

words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete round”

includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary

appellate review procedure in the State.” Id.

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to

rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest”

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989);

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with the

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necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate

state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona,

unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on

direct appeal or on post-conviction review. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D.Ariz.

2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present his claims to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Fair presentation requires a

petitioner to describe both the operative facts and the federal legal theory to the state courts. 

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal

claim were before the state court or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. 

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not

alert the court to federal nature of the claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state

court to the specific constitutional guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. 

Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,

are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v.

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th

Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner

to have made “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked reference to

“due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). Likewise, a mere reference to

the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a federal claim. Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “selfevident” or if the claim would be decided “on the same considerations” under state or

federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of the claim “explicit either by citing

federal law or the decision of the federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state

prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court if the court must read beyond the

pleadings filed in that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

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In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)(citations omitted). 

Procedural Default

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as

waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. Thus, a state prisoner may be barred from raising federal claims that he did not

preserve in state court by making a contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal, or

when seeking post-conviction relief. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995)

(stating that failure to raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights

during state trial constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of

Appeals held that habeas petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct

appeal or in first petition for post-conviction relief.) If the state court also addressed the

merits of the underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the

independent state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer

v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance

of counsel claims “barred under state law,” but also discussed and rejected the claims on the

merits, en banc court held that the “on-the-merits” discussion was an “alternative ruling”

and the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher

court’s subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court’s application of a

procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

The second procedural default scenario arises when a state prisoner failed to present

his federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the

state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the

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previously unraised claims. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035,

1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (postconviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court's decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal

of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule

32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because,

although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an

available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no

remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). 

Excusing Procedural Default

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Cook v.

Schriro, 516 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2008); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004);

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must

establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply

with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective factors may constitute cause:

(1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

Ordinarily, the ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral proceedings does not constitute

cause because “the right to counsel does not extend to state collateral proceedings or federal

habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a habeas petitioner

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bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not

reach the prejudice prong. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Even if petitioner asserts a

claim of actual innocence to excuse his procedural default of a federal claim, federal habeas

relief may not be granted absent a finding of an independent constitutional violation

occurring in the state criminal proceedings. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94.

B. Application of Law to Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that there was inadequate minority representation in

the jury pool and the jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (docket # 1 at 6-8) 

Respondents assert that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner: (1) did not

raise it as a federal claim before the state courts; and (2) did not provide any facts or

evidence to the state court in support of this claim. Rather, Petitioner merely argued that

there “was inadequate minority representation on the jury,” and that he was denied a fair

trial because there were no Hispanics or members of any race “but white” on the jury. 

(Respondents’ Exh. C at 4, Exh. D at 2) 

On direct review, the Arizona Court of Appeals characterized Petitioner’s claim as

alleging that he “was denied the right to be judged by a racially neutral jury because his jury

consisted of only Caucasians.” (Respondents’ Exh. B at 5) Relying on Arizona case law,

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the appellate court held that “all the Constitution forbids is systematic exclusion of any

identifiable classes from jury panels and from juries ultimately drawn from those panels.” 

(Id.) The court found that Petitioner “failed to prove that any identifiable classes were

excluded from his jury,” and that he “offered no facts to support his allegation.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. B at 6) The appellate court further noted that “the record lacks any

evidence of the racial makeup of the jury or jury pool.” (Id.) Thus, Petitioner failed to

establish on appeal that “any class was excluded from his jury. (Id.) On post-conviction

review, Petitioner did not assert an independent Sixth Amendment claim based on the jury

composition. (Respondents’ Exhs. F, G, I) Rather, he asserted a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to challenge the jury composition. (Id.) 

As Respondents argue, Ground One of the pending Petition is procedurally defaulted

because Petitioner did not present this federal claim to the state courts. Additionally,

Petitioner did not provide any facts in support of his jury composition claim raised to the

state court. See Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. at 9 (requiring “full factual development” in the

“earlier, state court proceedings” to allow the state court to “correct its own errors in the first

instance.”) The state court, not the federal court, is the “appropriate forum for resolution of

factual issues in the first instance.” Id. Petitioner failed to fairly present Ground One to the

Arizona state courts. 

Petitioner did not raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the jury composition in the

Arizona Courts, and any attempt to return to state court to present such a federal claim

would be futile because it would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. Petitioner

is time-barred under Arizona law from raising his claim in a successive petition for postconviction relief because the time for filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long

expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the

issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) A state postconviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing

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untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition

for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). 

Although Rule 32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of

claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of

these exceptions apply to him. Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, a defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been

raised on direct appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding. See also Krone v. Hotham,

181 Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1995) (capital defendant’s early petition for

post-conviction relief raised limited number of issues and waived other issues that he could

have then raised, but did not); State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112,113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App.

1995) (“Defendants are precluded from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were

adjudicated, or could have been raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for

post-conviction relief.”); State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (App.

1994) (defendant’s claim that his sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior

conviction was precluded by defendant’s failure to raise issue on appeal). Petitioner’s Sixth

Amendment claim could have been raised in his post-conviction relief proceeding.

Consequently, the state court would find this claim procedurally barred. In section E, infra,

the Court will address whether Petitioner has established a basis for overcoming the

procedural bar. 

C. Application of Law to Ground 2(a)

In Ground 2(a), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

“challenge the minority representation on the jury.” (docket # 1 at 9-11) Respondents

argue that this claim is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review

because the state court dismissed this claim on post-conviction review because it did not

comply with Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.5, which requires a defendant to

provide “facts within his personal knowledge” to support a claim, along with “[a]ffidavits,

records, or other evidence currently available to the defendant supporting the allegations of

the petition.” (Respondents’ Exh. H)

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A petition for post-conviction relief must include facts underlying petitioner’s claims,

and must describe evidence in support of the factual allegations. Baja v. Ducharme, 187

F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999). After the trial court rejected, for lack of factual support,

Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the racial composition

of the jury, Petitioner never attempted to file an amended petition providing factual support

for his claim. 

 Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance asserted in Ground 2(a) is procedurally

defaulted by virtue of the state court’s application of a procedural bar when Petitioner

asserted this claim on post-conviction review. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05

(1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30; Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991)

(finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that habeas

petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in first petition for

post-conviction relief.) 

D. Application of Law to Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that “there was insufficient evidence to support”

the jury’s verdict on the aggravated assault count. As Respondents argue, this claim is

procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not alert the state court to the federal nature of

this claim. Rather, Petitioner simply argued that there was insufficient evidence. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. C at 4, D at 2) Petitioner did not cite any federal law in support of his

claim. (Id.) Likewise, the Arizona Court of Appeals relied solely on state law to conclude

that “[t]he evidence permitted the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [Petitioner]

committed the aggravated assault.” (Respondents’ Exh. B at 6) 

Habeas petitioners are required to place state courts on notice that they are seeking to

vindicate federal rights. Henry, 513 U.S. at 365-66 (noting that habeas petitioner must make

federal claim known in both state and federal court); Zenon, 88 F.3d 830 (stating that “[i]f

petitioner fails to alert state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim,

his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state

court.”). A general reference to insufficiency of the evidence lacks the specificity required

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to alert the state court to the federal dimension of such a claim. See Lyons v. Crawford, 232

F.3d 666, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Petitioner’s federal claim of insufficient evidence is procedurally defaulted because it

is too late for him to return to state court to assert this claim. Any attempt to return to state

court to present that claim would be futile because it would be procedurally barred pursuant

to Arizona law. Petitioner is time-barred under Arizona law from raising his claims in a

successive petition for post-conviction relief because the time for filing a notice of

post-conviction relief has long expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for

post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct

appeal, whichever is later.”) A state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred.

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410

(9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for

dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under

Rule 32.2(a)). 

Although Rule 32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of

claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of

these exceptions apply to him. Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, a defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been

raised on direct appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding. See also Krone v. Hotham,

181 Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1995) (capital defendant’s early petition for

post-conviction relief raised limited number of issues and waived other issues that he could

have then raised, but did not); State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112,113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App.

1995) (“Defendants are precluded from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were

adjudicated, or could have been raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for

post-conviction relief.”); State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (App.

1994) (defendant’s claim that his sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior

conviction was precluded by defendant’s failure to raise issue on appeal). The

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aforementioned claim could have been raised in Petitioner’s post-conviction relief

proceeding. Consequently, the state court would find this claim procedurally barred. In

section E, infra, the Court will address whether Petitioner has established a basis for

overcoming the procedural bar. 

 E. Excusing Procedural Bar 

Because Petitioner’s claims raised in Grounds 1, 2(a), and 3 are procedurally

defaulted, habeas review of those claims is barred absent a showing of “cause and prejudice”

or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94.

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The

following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a

showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3)

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Prejudice is actual harm resulting

from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.

1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the court need not

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner does not assert any basis to excuse his procedural default. As a general

matter, Petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of the law do not satisfy the cause standard.

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). “[I]t is well

established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally

does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1999)). Petitioner’s ignorance of the

law and indigent status do not distinguish him from the great majority of inmates pursuing

habeas corpus relief. Such circumstances are not extraordinary and do not justify tolling the

limitations period. “If limited resources, lack of legal knowledge, and the difficulties of

prison life were an excuse for not complying with the limitation period, the AEDPA’s

limitation period would be meaningless since virtually all incarcerated prisoners have these

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same problems in common.” Bolanos v. Kirkland, No. 1:06-cv-00808-AWI-TAG HC, 2008

WL 928252, * 4 (E.D.Cal. April 4, 2008). See also, Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of equitable tolling because neither the district court’s

failure to advise the petitioner of the right to amend his petition to include exhausted claims

nor petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the limitations period were extraordinary

circumstances warranting equitable tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th

Cir. 2000) (holding that delays caused by prison inmate law clerk and law library closures

do not justify equitable tolling). Likewise, Petitioner’s lack of legal assistance is not an

extraordinary circumstance. See Ballesteros v. Schriro, CV-06-675-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL

666927 (D.Ariz., February 26, 2007) (noting that a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of

the law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances) (citing Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 170, 714-

15 (5th Cir. 1999)).

A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. Petitioner does not argue that

failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

In summary, federal review of Petitioner’s claims raised in Grounds 1, 2(a), and 3 is

procedurally barred. Petitioner has not established any basis to overcome the procedural

bar, therefore, the Court need not reach the merits of those claims. However, in an

abundance of caution, the Court will address the merits of Petitioner’s claims. 

III. Standard of Review

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) which “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

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convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 693 (2002). 

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner “whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in

state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638 (2003). Thus, a state prisoner is not

entitled to relief unless he demonstrates that the state court’s adjudication of his claims

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

75-76 (2003); Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether

a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable application” of federal

law, courts must look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court which existed at the

time of the state court’s decision. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-15 (2003);

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged that it cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that decision

conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Even if the state court neither explained its ruling nor cited United States Supreme

Court authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court

precedent to determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that

citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not

even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Id. 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of

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facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003)(citations omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the

court identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a

particular case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An

incorrect application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado,

541 U.S. 652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the

state court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”) “It is not enough that a federal habeas

court, in its independent review of the legal question,” is left with the “firm conviction” that

the state court ruling was “erroneous.” Id.; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, the petitioner

must establish that the state court decision is “objectively unreasonable.” Middleton v.

McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

Where a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine

whether it resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th

Cir. 2002). Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993). In § 2254 proceedings, the federal court must

assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding

under Brecht’s more forgiving “substantial and injurious effect” standard, whether or not the

state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the

“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.

18, 24 (1967). Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-122 (2007). The Brecht harmless error

analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error

had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S.

141, 145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error

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in capital penalty phase, error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jury's

verdict in the penalty phase.). The Court will review Petitioner’s claims under the

applicable standard of review. 

IV. Merits Review

A. Ground One - Jury Composition

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the Sixth Amendment was violated because the

jury was not “drawn from a source fairly representative of the community.” (docket # 1 at

6) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)). Petitioner asserts that, “according to

the internet,” 23 percent of registered Arizona voters are Hispanic. (docket # 1 at 6)

Petitioner argues that the “pool of 100 persons” from which the jury was drawn, only

included two Hispanics, and only one Hispanic sat on the jury that decided his case. (docket

# 1 at 6)

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that he was denied a fair trial because the jury

consisted only of “white” jurors, but there should have been “three persons of each race” on

the jury. (Respondents’ Exh. D at 2) In his petition for review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals of the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner stated

that, although the jury venire included minorities, none were selected for his jury. 

(Respondents’ Exh. I) Petitioner never presented the factual assertions in his Petition to any

state court and, therefore, is precluded from raising new arguments in this proceeding. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435 (2000). 

Moreover, Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right

to a trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community. Duren v.

Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Courts apply the following three-part test to determine

whether a cross-section violation occurred:

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; 

(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is

not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;

and 

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(3) that this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the

jury-selection process.

Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. Where petitioner establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the state to show that “attainment of a fair cross section is incompatible with a significant

state interest.” Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Duren, 439 U.S.

at 367-68). 

The Court assumes that Hispanics constitute a “distinctive group” for purposes of the

first prong of the Duren test. Petitioner, however, fails to satisfy the second prong which

requires that the distinctive group is underrepresented in “venires” from which “juries” are

selected. Duren, 439 U.S. at 668. The Ninth Circuit has explained that the Supreme Court’s

use of the plural in articulating the Duren test indicates that a fair cross-section violation

cannot be based on under representation in a single venire or jury. United States v. Miller,

771 F.2d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1985). Although “juries must be drawn from a source fairly

representative of the community, the composition of each jury need not mirror that of the

community.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). 

Here, Petitioner does not claim that under representation occurred generally in

Maricopa County venires. See Miller, 771 F.2d at 1228 (rejecting fair cross-section claim

where claim was limited to a particular venire from which petitioner’s jury was selected.) 

Rather, Petitioner asserts that “[i]n the present case the pool where the jury was drawn was

not representative of the community, neither was the jury that found the petitioner guilty.” 

(docket # 1 at 8). Additionally, Petitioner fails to allege, let alone provide any evidence, that

Hispanics, or any other minority, are systematically excluded from the jury selection process

in Maricopa County. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 668. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds

that Petitioner fails to establish a fair-cross section claim. Accordingly, he is not entitled to

relief on Ground One. 

Because Petitioner’s underlying challenge to the venire and jury composition fails,

his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object thereto, raised in Ground 2(a),

likewise fails for lack of prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Thomas v. Borg, 159

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F.3d 1147, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that petitioner failed to establish that trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the jury composition where

petitioner failed to show that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged errors.)

B. Ground 2(b) - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his Ground 2(b), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

address inconsistent testimony of state witnesses during closing argument. (docket # 1 at

10-11) 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d

1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When

reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely

limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). “A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective

assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Acts or omissions

that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691-92; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,147 (2006) (stating that “a violation

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of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the

defendant is prejudiced.”) To show prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). Petitioner bears the burden of proving

prejudice, the mere possibility that he suffered prejudice is insufficient to satisfy

Strickland’s prejudice prong. Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001). The

court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148,

1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). The court, however, may not

assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d

at 1155. 

As mentioned above, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

emphasize during closing argument that the police officers’ testimony was inconsistent. 

During trial, the four police officers who responded to the scene the night of Petitioner’s

arrest each testified. Officer Jones testified that he remained in the backyard when the three

other officers entered a shed. Jones testified that, after he identified himself as a police

officer, Petitioner pointed a gun at him, and then threw the gun and ran when Officer Jones

reached for his holstered gun. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 30) Another officer testified that he

exited the shed too late to see Petitioner point the gun at Officer Jones, but that he saw

Petitioner throw the gun and run. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 70-74) Another officer testified

that he saw Petitioner holding the gun and moving it away from Officer Jones. 

(Respondents’ Exh. L at 103, 105-06) The fourth officer testified that she probably exited

the shed last and only saw Petitioner running away. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 134-135)

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, counsel’s closing argument focused on the

differences between the police officers’ testimony. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 15) Trial

counsel argued that this “case is all about credibility and believability and accuracy.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. K at 15) He further argued:

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Do you think the testimony of the officers with regard to identification, and

by the way, do you think that the officers thought that was the big-ticket issue,

that that was the winner? How credible were they on that point? One hundred

percent certain. Don’t you think that no one really saw much of anything in 

the pitch blackness of that backyard? Don’t you think that no one really knew

what that object was until it was all over and Officer Wuertz goes outside to

retrieve it from the couch and then they’re probably pissed.

(Respondents’ Exh. K at 16) Trial counsel discussed each police officer’s testimony and

explained how it was different, inconsistent, and incredible with regard to identifying

Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 16-18) Counsel then discussed the officers’ testimony

regarding the timing of the events, emphasized the differences between the officers’

testimony, and explained why their testimony was not credible. (Respondents’ Exh. K at

18-19) Counsel also pointed out the inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony regarding

where Petitioner pointed the gun. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 19-20) In summarizing these

inconsistencies, trial counsel argued:

And these inconsistencies, these discrepancies, on such a crucial issue or so

they believed, doesn’t that create doubts in your mind about the rest of it? 

Doesn’t it create questions? . . . And it doesn’t have to be necessarily anyone

being dishonest, but at the very least, it shows that people can be 100 percent

wrong about very important, crucial facts. So, what else are they 100 percent

wrong about?

(Respondents’ Exh. K at 20) Because trial counsel’s closing argument focused on the

inconsistencies in the police officers’ testimony, Petitioner’s assertion that counsel was

ineffective for failing to “address[] inconsistent testimony in his closing argument” lacks

merit. Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s determination that Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance did not meet either prong of Strickland was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, federal law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

corpus relief on Ground 2(b). 

C. Ground Three - Sufficiency of the Evidence

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction for aggravated assault. Specifically, he argues that he “admitted holding the

gun,” but there was not sufficient evidence to establish that he pointed it at the police officer.

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Petitioner presented a state-law claim of insufficient evidence to the appellate court

which held that, “[t]he evidence permitted the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Defendant committed aggravated assault.” (Respondents’ Exh. B at 6) Petitioner fails to

establish that the trial court’s decision rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts or

is based on an unreasonable application of, or is contrary to, federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254.

When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, the court must

determine whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). If no rational trier-of-fact could find

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must issue. 

Payne v. Borg, 982 F. 2d 335, 337 (9th Cir. 1992). “The reviewing court must respect the

province of the fact-finder to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary

conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the fact-finder

resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict.” Walters, 45 F. 3d at 1358. “In

considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court is required to ‘make its

determination as to the sufficiency of the state court findings from an independent review of

the record or otherwise grant a hearing and make its own findings on the merits.’” Richmond

v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Turner v. Chavez, 586 F. 2d 111, 112

(9th Cir. 1978)). 

In affirming Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated assault, the Arizona Court of

Appeals described the evidence supporting the conviction as follows:

At trial, Officer Jones testified that Defendant pointed a shotgun at him.

The three other officers from the scene testified that they heard Officer Jones 

identify himself as a police officer. Although none of the officers observed

Defendant point the shotgun at Officer Jones, two of the officers testified

that they saw Defendant throw the shotgun. This constitutes sufficient 

evidence to support the verdict.

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(Respondents’ Exh. B at 6) In addition to the foregoing, the record reflects that Petitioner

admitted to police that he pointed a shotgun at Officer Jones, but claimed that he did not

know what he was doing because he had been smoking crack cocaine for three days straight. 

(Respondents’ Exh. L at 86) On review, this Court cannot find that, based on the evidence,

no rational finder of fact could have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Payne, 982 F.2d at 337. Although Petitioner testified to a different version of the events, the

credibility determinations were the province of the jury and are entitled to “near-total

deference.” Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 

Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s decision was contrary to, or based on

an unreasonable application of federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus

relief on Ground Three. 

D. Ground Four - Fourth Amendment Violation

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that police violated the Fourth Amendment by

entering the backyard of the house where Petitioner was found without a search warrant. 

(docket # 1 at 13) Petitioner raised this issue on direct appeal and the court rejected it.

(Respondents’ Exh. B)

Because Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment

claim in state court, he is not entitled to relief on this claim. The Ninth Circuit recognizes

that “[i]f the state has provided a state prisoner an opportunity for full and fair litigation of

his Fourth Amendment claim, we cannot grant federal habeas relief on the Fourth

Amendment issue.” Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)). In determining whether a state prisoner had a

full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, a court should examine the

extent to which the claim was considered by the state trial and appellate courts. See Abell v.

Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir.1981) (finding that a 45-page evidentiary hearing

transcript, a four-page appellate opinion, and substantial briefs demonstrated careful

consideration of appellant's Fourth Amendment claim). 

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Petitioner raised a Fourth Amendment claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. He

argued that the police did not have a search warrant or probable cause to enter the backyard. 

(Respondents’ Exhs. at B, D) The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment

claim, finding that Petitioner “does not assert, nor could he have had, a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the backyard of an abandoned house” where he was discovered by

police. (Respondents’ Exh. B at 8) Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his

Fourth Amendment claim to the state courts and, as such, this Court cannot grant habeas

relief. Moormann, 426 F.3d at 1053. 

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that the State court’s rejection of his Fourth

Amendment claim was contrary to, or rested on an unreasonable interpretation of, federal

law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In addition to arguing that police lacked probable cause or a

search warrant to enter the backyard, Petitioner now argues that the house where he was

found was not abandoned. (docket # 1 at 13) When interviewed by police after the

incident, Petitioner stated that the house where he was found belonged to a “friend,” but

could not recall that friend’s name. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 85-86) He also told police that

he was not sure if the house was abandoned. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 85-86) At trial,

Petitioner explained that the “friend” to whom he was referring was “[t]he one that had

rented the house.” (Respondents’ Exh. M at 19) Petitioner also testified that the house had

“no power at all.” (Respondents’ Exh. M at 12) He further stated that he doesn’t know if

the house was abandoned, but there were people living there. (Respondents’ Exh. M at 19) 

Petitioner testified that he did not live at the house. (Respondents’ Exh. M at 24) Police

Officer Jones testified that, when he received the call on December 10, 2004, he was

familiar with the address and “had known the house was abandoned for some time.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. L at 27-28) The following exchange occurred when Petitioner testified:

Mr.Murray [Petitioner’s Counsel]: I want to talk about the abandoned house.

Petitioner: All right, sir.

Mr. Murray: Do you understand what I am talking about?

Petitioner: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Murray. Why were you there?

Petitioner: I went to buy drugs for my use.

Mr. Murray. Did you ever buy them?

Petitioner: Yes, sir.

(Respondents’ Exh. M at 9) Petitioner’s counsel characterized the house as abandoned. 

The “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon

whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96

(1990) (quotation omitted). “A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is ‘one

that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.

128, 143-44 (1978)). The issue is “whether the challenged search or seizure violated the

Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence

obtained during it.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. “That inquiry in turn requires a determination

of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed on the interest of the defendant

which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.” Id. 

Here, the record supports the State court’s finding that Petitioner did not have

legitimate expectation of privacy in the backyard of the abandoned house. Petitioner neither

owned nor lived in the house. Although he claimed a friend owned the house, he could not

identify that person, and was unsure whether the house was abandoned. In view of the

foregoing, Petitioner has not shown that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination that he

lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backyard was an unreasonable application

of federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Four.

V. Summary

As discussed above, Petitioner claims asserted in Grounds 1, 2(a), and 3 are

procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. Additionally, all of

Petitioner’s claims lack merit. 

Accordingly, 

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (docket # 1) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2009.

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