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Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 2, 2020*

Decided April 6, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3040

IRMA ROSAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

R.K. KENZIE CORP., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District 

of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:19-cv-00005

John Robert Blakey,

Judge.

O R D E R

Irma Rosas brought a lawsuit against four of her previous employers, all 

restaurants, which, she alleged, discriminated against her based on her race, age, and 

disability (carpal tunnel syndrome), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623, 

and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The district court repeatedly 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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warned her that she could not join unrelated claims against different defendants, and 

then dismissed the suit after she continued to disregard those instructions. Because the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the suit, we affirm. 

At different points during a nine-month period, Rosas worked for Red Lobster,

Olive Garden, and two different McDonald’s stores. She sued all four restaurants for 

employment discrimination, alleging that their failures to accommodate her carpal 

tunnel collectively worsened her condition, and that their race and age discrimination 

caused mental distress. During the proceedings, the district court advised Rosas several 

times that she could not bring distinct claims against different defendants in the same 

lawsuit; twice, the court allowed her to amend her complaint. After striking a third 

amended complaint that Rosas filed without leave, the court encouraged her to look for 

counsel to help cure the joinder issue. When Rosas could not find an attorney to take 

her case, the court ordered her to make an appointment with the Hibbler Help Desk, the 

court’s pro se assistance program. 

After Rosas amended her complaint a fourth time without addressing the joinder 

problem, the defendants moved to strike or dismiss the complaint. In a hearing that 

followed, Rosas admitted that she had not followed the court’s order to visit the pro se 

help desk. The court again warned her that further attempts to join unrelated claims in 

the same suit would result in dismissal: “You need to find an attorney to help you 

respond to these motions and correct the problems I’ve identified for you. If you do not, 

your case will be over.” The court then urged her to “go to the Help Desk” and “either 

correct the problem or ... litigate the motion to strike.”

Rosas responded by filing a fifth amended complaint that mirrored her earlier 

submissions, which prompted the court sua sponte to dismiss the case with prejudice. 

Reprimanding Rosas for her “stubborn determination to pursue improperly joined 

claims,” the court found her conduct willful. Because she refused to seek counsel, the 

court concluded that allowing her another opportunity to amend would be “pointless.”

On appeal, Rosas argues that she properly joined her claims because each 

instance of discrimination contributed to the same harm. In support, she cites Diehl 

v. H.J. Heinz Co., 901 F.2d 73, 73–74 (7th Cir. 1990), which recognizes that joint 

tortfeasors (who each aggravate the same physical injury albeit at different times and in 

different locations) may be sued in the same complaint “despite the lack of concert 

between them.” But Diehl was a tort case in which both defendants contributed to the 

same injury. By contrast, Rosa’s discrimination claims arose from distinct adverse 

employment actions by separate employers. Unrelated claims against different 

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defendants belong in different lawsuits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20; George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 

605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Rosas also argues that the district court, acting sua sponte, should have severed 

her claims or dismissed the complaint without prejudice. True, misjoinder alone is not 

grounds for dismissal, FED. R. CIV. P. 21; UWM Student Ass’n. v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854, 864

(7th Cir. 2018), but the district court dismissed her case based on her repeated failure to 

cure her complaint’s deficiencies. Judge Blakey warned Rosas, over and over, that she 

courted dismissal of her case if she did not respond to the joinder problem. Even pro se 

litigants must follow procedural rules. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 

2006). Given Rosas’s willful noncompliance with its instructions, the court acted well 

within its discretion to dismiss her case with prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Salata 

v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 757 F.3d 695, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2014).

We have considered Rosas’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.

AFFIRMED

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