Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00538/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00538-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODOLFO C. ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEN CLARK, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-00538-AWI-SMS PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Standard

Plaintiff Rodolfo C. Anderson (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

February 28, 2007.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

///

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is currently housed at California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility and State

Prison-Corcoran (“CSATF”). The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at CSTAF and

California State Prison-Corcoran (“CSP-Corcoran”). Plaintiff names CSATF Warden Ken Clark,

and prison staff members L. Polk, S. Sherman, D. Cuevas, V. Garcia, R. Diaz, D. Braxmeyer, V.

Lamb, L. Apodaca, J. Gallagher, R. Roberson, R. Linn, D. Garcia, R. Hall, A. Reveira, J. Short, R.

M. Comfort, J. Garza, N. Grannis, and Jane and John Does as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money

damages and equitable for the alleged violation of his rights under the First Amendment and the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

///

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

1. Due Process Claims

On November 8, 2006, at CSTAF, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation (“adseg”) after being accused by defendant Lamb of masturbating in the shower. Plaintiff was issued a

Rules Violation Report (“RVR”), and on November 22, 2005, plaintiff was found guilty of indecent

exposure with priors following a prison disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff was assessed a credit

forfeiture of one-hundred twenty-one days and referred to the Institutional Classification Committee

(“ICC”) for program review. On January 20, 2006, while at the Correctional Treatment Center,

plaintiff was issued an RVR by defendant Linn for masturbating in his cell in front of her. On

February 22, 2006, plaintiff was found guilty of indecent exposure with priors at his disciplinary

hearing. Plaintiff was assessed a credit forfeiture of one-hundred fifty days and referred to ICC for

consideration of Security Housing Unit placement. Both charges were later reduced to indecent

exposure. Plaintiff alleges various due process violations arising out of the events relating to the

issuance of the RVRs and the disciplinary hearings.

On April 13, 2006, plaintiff was transferred to CSP-Corcoran and housed in an ad-seg unit

for inmates with mental health issues. Plaintiff alleges he was not provided with a new 114-D lockup order. On May 4, 2006, plaintiff attended an ICC hearing for initial review and was retained in

ad-seg pending DRB (Departmental Review Board) referral. On July 25, 2006, plaintiff was

transferred to a general population ad-seg unit. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Garza did not take

him to ICC for review on his scheduled dates of August 3, 2006, August 17, 2006, or August 24,

2006. On August 8, 2006, plaintiff was notified he was going to be transferred back to CSATF,

without notice, a hearing, or valid endorsement. Later that day, plaintiff was rehoused at the CSPCorcoran Acute Care Hospital for observation. On September 1, 2006, plaintiff was transferred back

to CSATF without an ICC hearing. 

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Along with his due process and retaliation claims, plaintiff alleges state law tort claims against defendant 1

Apodaca. (Comp., ¶55.) In addition to the fact that the claims are barred because plaintiff was assessed a credit

forfeiture, plaintiff has not alleged compliance with California’s Tort Claims Act, which requires that a tort claim

against a public entity or its employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims

Board, formerly known as the State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. 

Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2 (West 2007). Presentation of a written claim, and action on

or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Superior Court of Kings County (Bodde), 32

Cal.4th 1234, 1245, 90 P.3d 116, 124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 543 (2004); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n,

67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege

compliance with the Tort Claims Act. State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th at 1245, 90 P.3d at 124, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d at

543; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988).

4

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.”

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).

With respect to plaintiff’s two disciplinary hearings, plaintiff lost time credits as punishment,

which affects the length of his sentence. Where “success in a . . . [section] 1983 damages action

would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first

achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the

underlying conviction or sentence.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304

(2004) (citing to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-2,

125 S.Ct. 1242, 1248 (2005); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). Because plaintiff lost

time credits and has not shown that the credits were restored, either via a petition for habeas corpus

relief or through prison procedures, plaintiff may not pursue any claims for relief under section 1983

arising from the events relating to the issuance of the RVRs or the disciplinary proceedings,

including but not limited to any claims that defendants acted or failed to take action in order to

retaliate against plaintiff for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

1

Plaintiff’s next due process claims arise after his transfer to CSP-Corcoran, which appears

to have been the result of the punishment imposed at one or both of the disciplinary hearings.

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Regardless of state regulations, plaintiff may pursue federal due process claims under section 1983

only if the violations complained of rise to the level of a violation of federal law. In this instance,

plaintiff’s due process claims arise from his alleged placement in ad-seg at CSP-Corcoran without

written notice via a lock-up order and from not being taken to his ICC hearings. Plaintiff does not

have a protected liberty interest in remaining free from ad-seg. Sandin, 515 U.S.at 484; Myron, 476

F.3d at 718; May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). Because there is no protected

liberty interest at stake, the alleged failure to provide plaintiff with a lock-up order and ICC hearings

is not actionable under federal law. In addition, assuming for the sake of argument that there existed

a protected liberty interest, plaintiff is not entitled to written notice prior to placement in ad-seg.

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff was transferred on April

18, 2006, and appeared at a hearing on May 4, 2006. Due process under federal law does not require

anything further. Id. With respect to periodic reviews, plaintiff was rehoused on July 25, 2006,

hospitalized on August 8, 2006, and transferred back to CSATF on September 1, 2006. Although

plaintiff is entitled to periodic reviews under federal law, Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01, the failure

to take plaintiff for his hearings on August 3, 2006, August 17, 2006, and August 24, 2006, does not

rise to the level of a federal due process violation. 

Finally, plaintiff’s allegation that he was transferred back to CSATF without a hearing does

not state a claim. Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in being housed at a particular

prison and as a result, is not entitled to any procedures under federal law prior to transfer. Meachum

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1983).

For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff has not stated any cognizable due process claims

under section 1983.

2. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff alleges that prior to his scheduled August 3, 2006, hearing defendant Garza

threatened not to take him to the hearing. On August 15, 2006, plaintiff filed an inmate appeal

complaining that he was not taken to his August 3 hearing. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Garza

retaliated against him for filing that inmate appeal and threatened to transfer him if he kept filing

inmate appeals. 

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An

allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is

sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting a claim that defendant Garza took adverse

action against him as a result of the inmate appeal he filed. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467

F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006) (adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary

firmness” from engaging in that activity); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000). The

threat to transfer plaintiff simply does not support a claim for violation of plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief

against defendant Garza, or any other named defendant, for retaliation. 

3. Inmate Appeals Process

Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief against defendant Hall based on his failure to allow plaintiff

to file complaints and his act of screening out plaintiff’s complaints.

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under

color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal

law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). “[A prison] grievance

procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.”

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8,

10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty

interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey

v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Actions in reviewing

prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a section 1983 action.

Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. Plaintiff’s allegationsfail to state a claim for relief against defendant Hall.

4. Supervisory Liability Claim Against Defendant Clark

Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Clark, Warden of CSATF, “is supervisory liability

who personally participated and/or knew of the violations set forth herein and failed to correct them.”

(Comp., ¶67.) Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under section 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds

a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state

a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts

indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and

is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.

1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Here, plaintiff’s complaint does not state any cognizable claims for relief for violation of

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Absent the existence of a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights,

there is no basis upon which to impose supervisory liability against defendant Clark. Further, even

if plaintiff had alleged a cognizable violation of his constitutional rights, plaintiff’s complaint is

devoid of any allegations supporting a claim that defendant Clark personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of a constitutional right; knew of the violation and failed to act to prevent it; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at

646. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief against defendant Clark under a theory of supervisory

liability. 

///

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

 C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may be granted under

section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint

curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

///

///

///

///

///

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00538-AWI -SMS Document 10 Filed 06/08/07 Page 9 of 9