Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01417/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01417-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFF WALKER, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Dr. WECHSLER, et. al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-01417-JLT (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS

FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WITH PREJUDICE 

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

(Docs. 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14)

Plaintiff has filed multiple motions seeking injunctive relief and/or temporary restraining 

orders on various aspects of the conditions under which he is confined at CSH. 

In his first motion for injunctive relief1, Plaintiff asserts that three staff members, Omar, 

Alex, and Alfredo have been assigned to monitor him (“1:1”). (Doc. 4.) Plaintiff states that, 

because of his underlying Post Traumatic Stress Disorder from sexual assaults while he was 

incarcerated, this causes him great anxiety and has resulted in his hospitalization for high blood 

pressure. (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts that Alfredo sexually assaulted him when he was asleep 

and that “Janet and Carolyn placed him 1:1 on purpose in Plaintiff’s belief to assault him as 

Alfredo later told Plaintiff he was bisexual.” (Id.) Plaintiff requests that “the defendants” be 

restricted from having “any contact 1:1 Danter [sic] to Others or if ever on Suicide watch or any 

 

1

Findings and Recommendations issued on this motion. (Doc. 7.) Subsequently, Plaintiff consented to 

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 9.) Thus, this order issues in lieu of an order adopting thereon. 

Case 1:16-cv-01417-JLT Document 15 Filed 12/14/16 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

watch 1:1 to be placed from sitting or watching Plaintiff” and that prohibitions extend to CSH 

personnel in Unit 5 -- leads Carolyna and Sandy Galaraza, as well as Alfred Doe, Randy Doe, and 

Alex Doe. 

In his second motion, which requested a temporary restraining order, Plaintiff asserts that 

Alfred McAllister threatened to kill Plaintiff when he alleged that McAllister sexually assaulted 

him while he slept. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff requests that McAlister and Alex Hill be removed from his 

unit and ordered to have no contact with his unit. (Id.) 

In his third motion, Plaintiff requests to be moved to from Unit #9 to Unit #10, or for his 

safety to be guaranteed while if he remains in Unit #9. (Doc. 11.)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for 

preliminary injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it 

have before it an actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 

(1983); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 

U.S. 464, 471 (1982). This Court recently screened the First Amended Complaint and found that 

it states a cognizable claim for excessive force against Defendant Nurse Domiano, RN that 

Plaintiff proceeds on in this action. All other claims and Defendants have been dismissed. 

Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. ' 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find the Arelief [sought] is narrowly 

drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 

least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.@ This means that the 

Court is limited to addressing issues that relieve or correct Nurse Domiano’s use of excessive 

force against Plaintiff, nothing more. The pendency of this action does not give the Court 

jurisdiction over prison officials in general or over the general conditions of Plaintiff=s detention. 

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009); Mayfield v. United States, 599 

F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court=s jurisdiction is limited to the parties in this action and 

to the cognizable legal claims upon which this action is proceeding. Summers, 555 U.S. at 492-

93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969.

In the three motions noted above, Plaintiff does not seek a temporary restraining order 

Case 1:16-cv-01417-JLT Document 15 Filed 12/14/16 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

and/or preliminary injunction against Defendant Nurse Domiano. AA federal court may issue an 

injunction [only] if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over 

the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.@ Zepeda v. 

United States Immigration Service, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Thus, 

Plaintiff=s motion must be denied for lack of jurisdiction over the officials at CSH whom Plaintiff 

wishes to be precluded from making certain decisions about his supervision and housing. 

It is not that Plaintiff=s allegations are not serious, or that if properly supported and 

brought in the proper forum, they would not entitle him to relief. However, the seriousness of 

Plaintiff=s accusations cannot overcome a jurisdictional bar. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103-04 

(A[The] triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III=s 

case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 

establishing its existence.@) This action is simply not the proper vehicle for the relief Plaintiff 

seeks. 2 However, the Executive Director and Litigation Coordinator are requested to look into 

the matter and if possible, facilitate a housing arrangement which does not exacerbate Plaintiff=s

mental condition.

3

 

In Plaintiff’s last two motions for injunctive relief, he requests the Court order CSH 

personnel to cease and desist involuntarily medicating him. (Docs. 12, 14.) As discussed above, 

the Court lacks jurisdiction over CSH personnel or administrators to issue orders directed at 

controlling their actions. Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727. Further, “the due process clause permits the 

involuntary medication of a competent SVP with antipsychotic drugs in the absence of an 

emergency, provided that such treatment is in the SVP's medical interest.” In re Calhoun, 121 

Cal.App.4th 1315, 1349 (2004) (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). The SVPA 

contains no provision comparable to Penal Code section 2600, which affords state prisoners the 

right to refuse antipsychotic medication in the absence of compliance with the Keyhea

 

2

Plaintiff=s motions also fail to make the requisite showing, supported by admissible evidence, to obtain a 

preliminary injunction. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20-4 (2008). However, it is 

unnecessary to reach the merits of Plaintiff=s motions in light of the fact that the jurisdictional issue is fatal to his 

requests for relief. Summers, 555 U.S. at 493, 129 S.; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969. 

3 How this is best facilitated in light of Plaintiff=s housing status and other detention or classification factors is 

left to the sound discretion of CSH officials.

Case 1:16-cv-01417-JLT Document 15 Filed 12/14/16 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

injunction.

4

 Id., 121 Cal.App.4th at 1349. Though a prison inmate has a right to due process 

before he can be medicated, a SVP has already been judicially determined to be suffering from a 

mental disorder that renders him dangerous to others. In re Calhoun, 121 Cal.App.4th at 1348. 

Accordingly, the due process clause permits the involuntary medication of a competent SVP with 

antipsychotic drugs in the absence of an emergency, provided that such treatment is in the SVP's 

medical interest. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210. Thus, Plaintiff may be involuntarily 

medicated if it is in his medical interest.5 

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief, filed on 

September 30, 2016 (Doc. 4), October 14, 2016 (Doc. 8), November 18, 2016 (Doc. 11), 

November 30, 2016 (Doc. 12), and December 5, 2016 (Doc. 14), are DENIED WITH 

PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction; and the Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of 

this order and of Plaintiff’s motions (Docs. 4, 8, 11, 12, 14) on the CSH Executive Director and 

Litigation Coordinator.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 14, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

4

See Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal.App.3d 526 (1986) (providing procedural requirements and substantive 

standards for medication of different durations of state inmates; involuntarily medication of an inmate more than 24 

days after the initial medication requires a court order requiring due process compliance). 

5 Decisions made by medical professionals are presumptively valid. Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 443 

(9th Cir. 2016)

Case 1:16-cv-01417-JLT Document 15 Filed 12/14/16 Page 4 of 4