Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02169/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Regina L. Stancil, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

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No. CV-06-2169-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment and Defendant has filed a crossmotion for summary judgment. Dkt. ##17, 23. Defendant has filed a response to Plaintiff’s

motion. Dkt. #22. Plaintiff has not filed a response or reply brief, and the time for doing so

has expired. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and deny Defendant’s cross-motion.

I. Background.

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on April 25, 2002, claiming disability

as of January 1, 2001. Dkt. #7, Tr. 57-60. The application was denied initially and on

reconsideration. Tr. 33-34. A hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was

held on April 6, 2005. Tr. 407-38. The ALJ issued a written decision on May 19, 2005,

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

Tr. 23-29. This decision became Defendant’s final decision when the Appeals Council

denied review. Tr. 6-8. Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. #1.

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II. Standard of Review.

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

882 (9th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

preponderance. Id. In determining whether the decision is supported by substantial

evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that

supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d

715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).

III. Analysis.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had several severe impairments: back disorders,

osteoporosis, arthritis, mild obesity, and mild affective disorder. The ALJ also found that

Plaintiff suffered from depression resulting in mild restrictions in Plaintiff’s daily activities

and her ability to maintain social functioning, concentration, persistence, and pace. The ALJ

determined, however, that Plaintiff’s impairments and functional limitations were not severe

enough to meet or equal a listed impairment. Tr. 25, 28 ¶¶ 3-4. The ALJ further determined

that testimony and statements regarding the severity of the impairments were not credible.

Tr. 26, 28 ¶ 5. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was able to perform her past work as a data

entry clerk, telephone representative, and credit card analyst. Tr. 27, 28 ¶¶ 6-8.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by ignoring or improperly evaluating probative

evidence, including the opinions of treating and examining physicians, Plaintiff’s obesity,

and testimony and statements regarding the severity of her impairments. Plaintiff further

contends that she was denied a full and fair hearing due to the ALJ’s failure to call examining

physicians for cross-examination. Dkt. #19. Defendant argues that the ALJ did not err and

that his decision is supported by substantial evidence. Dkt. #25.

As explained more fully below, the Court concludes that Defendant’s decision to deny

benefits must be reversed because the ALJ erroneously rejected testimony and statements

regarding the disabling nature of Plaintiff’s impairments. The Court accordingly need not

address Plaintiff’s other challenges to Defendant’s decision.

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A. Plaintiff’s Testimony.

Plaintiff testified that she is unable to work due to severe pain in her lower back, hips,

legs, shoulders, and hands. She stated that she needs assistance showering, dressing, and

preparing meals and is able to sleep for only a few hours at a time. She further stated that

she needs to use a wheelchair when she leaves the house. She noted that she has lost three

inches in height to due her osteoporosis and that her joints are stiff, bent, and swollen.

Tr. 413-25; see Tr. 105-08. The ALJ found this testimony not credible. Tr. 26.

“Pain of sufficient severity caused by a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormality’ may provide the basis for determining that a

claimant is disabled.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344-45 (9th Cir. 1991)). “Once

a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may

not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on lack of objective medical

evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882,

885 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and alterations omitted); see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The claimant need not produce objective medical evidence of the pain

. . . itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must the claimant produce objective medical evidence

of the causal relationship between the medically determinable impairment and the

symptom.”) (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-48); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (“[W]e will not

reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or

about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the objective

medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.”); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at

*1 (July 2, 1996) (same); see also SSR 95-5p, 1995 WL 670415, at *1 (Oct. 31, 1995)

(“Because symptoms sometimes suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be shown

by objective medical evidence alone, careful consideration must be given to any available

information about symptoms.”).

In addition, and significantly for this case, unless the ALJ “makes a finding of

malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find [the claimant]

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not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and stating clear and convincing

reasons for each.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84). “‘General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must

identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s

complaints.’” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.

1995)); see Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff suffers from back disorders, osteoporosis, arthritis, and

mild obesity. The ALJ found that these impairments were severe. Tr. 25, 28 ¶ 3. Plaintiff’s

treating physician, Dr. Ludi Pyter-Kabat (“Dr. Kabat”), opined that Plaintiff’s impairments

caused severe pain. Tr. 331. An examining physician confirmed the existence of chronic

pain associated with Plaintiff’s back disorders. Tr. 142. Plaintiff has thus “produced medical

evidence of underlying impairments consistent with [her] subjective complaints[.]”

Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 166 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1999); see Howard v.

Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[S]o long as the pain is associated with

a clinically demonstrated impairment, credible pain testimony should contribute to a

determination of disability.”) (emphasis in original). 

Because the ALJ made no finding that Plaintiff was malingering, he was required to

give clear and convincing reasons in support of his adverse credibility finding. See Robbins,

466 F.3d at 883. This clear and convincing standard “is the most demanding required in

Social Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir.

2002). The ALJ asserted multiple reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, but none of

them is convincing or supported by substantial evidence.

First, the ALJ found Plaintiff not credible because “the objective findings [did] not

support the alleged severity of her impairments.” Tr. 26. This is an insufficient reason for

disbelieving Plaintiff. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Robbins, 466 F.3d at 884 (lack of

objective medical evidence was an improper reason for rejecting the claimant’s testimony

of disabling pain where there was evidence that the claimant had severe shoulder and back

impairments) (citing SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1; Light, 119 F.3d at 792).

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Moreover, while the evidence in this case includes more than 250 pages of medical

records (see Tr. 136-387), the ALJ cites to a single treatment note from Dr. Kabat to support

his conclusion that the medical evidence undermines Plaintiff’s credibility. Tr. 26 (citing

Tr. 255). The cited treatment note indicates that Plaintiff needed to “support[] herself on the

table” during the examination and tried to “move all the time due to discomfort in [her] low

back after standing in one position for sometime.” Tr. 255. Dr. Kabat diagnosed Plaintiff

with low back pain, muscle tenderness, a slow and painful gait, and moderately reduced

flexibility. Id. The ALJ does not explain, and it is unclear to the Court, why these medical

findings are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s description of disabling pain.

Second, the ALJ stated that while Plaintiff appeared at the hearing in a wheelchair,

“there is no evidence in the record to suggest any of her doctors prescribed the use of a

wheelchair.” Tr. 26. To the contrary, Dr. Kabat stated in a June 2001 treatment note that

Plaintiff “has to use a wheelchair when walking longer distances.” Tr. 245. This is

consistent with both the October 2001 statement of Plaintiff’s son that Plaintiff uses a

wheelchair when she leaves the house and Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that Dr. Kabat

prescribed a wheelchair and that Plaintiff had been using one for four years. Tr. 100, 104,

414, 419. The ALJ’s finding on this issue is not supported by substantial evidence.

Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s ability to do home exercises involving walking

and stretching was “inconsistent with both her testimony and her need for a wheelchair.”

Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 233, 293-296). The Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly asserted that the mere

fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as . . . limited walking for

exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability. One

does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260

F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fair, 885 F.2d at 603); Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d

557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that a disability claimant need not “vegetate in a dark room”

to be eligible for benefits); see also Orn v. Astrue, --- F.3d ---, No. 05-16181, 2007 WL

2034287, at *12 (9th Cir. July 16, 2007) (citing Vertigan). Indeed, a plaintiff may engage

in such activities “despite pain for therapeutic reasons, but that does not mean she could

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concentrate on work despite the pain or could engage in similar activity for a longer period

given the pain involved.” Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050 (emphasis in original).

The evidence in this case shows that Plaintiff’s limited exercise is “not easily

transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the workplace, where it might

be impossible to periodically rest or take medication.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. The ALJ

himself acknowledged that Plaintiff was not always able to exercise. Tr. 26. Plaintiff

testified that she tried physical therapy but that it “hurt so bad” she became physically ill and

had to quit. Tr. 424. This testimony is consistent with Dr. Kabat’s treatment notes, which

indicate that Plaintiff “had more pain” after physical therapy and that it “[did] not work at

all [and] actually made [the pain] worse.” Tr. 242, 383. Considering the record as a whole

and in the proper context, the Court concludes that substantial evidence does not support the

ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s exercise regimen is inconsistent with her testimony of

disabling pain. See Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050-51; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (claimant’s

activities were consistent with her testimony of disabling pain where the activities were

“sporadic and punctuated with rest”); Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 2004)

(“The record provides little support for the ALJ’s credibility finding. In discrediting

Benecke’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms, the ALJ relied largely on

Benecke’s ability to carry out certain routine tasks. As described above, Benecke’s daily

activities are quite limited and carried out with difficulty.”).

Fourth, the ALJ claimed that Dr. Kabat “believed [Plaintiff] could lift without back

pain with proper lifting techniques.” Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 230). The cited treatment note

reflects no such belief. Dr. Kabat merely counseled Plaintiff as to the benefits of a healthy

diet, regular exercise, and the “proper methods of lifting for the prevention of low back

pain.” Tr. 230. The treatment note shows that Plaintiff continued to suffer from chronic low

back pain and shoulder and joint pain. Tr. 229. This Circuit has made clear that an ALJ’s

rejection of testimony is in error and not supported by substantial evidence where the ALJ

has “selectively focused on aspects of [medical records] which tend to suggest nondisability[.]” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2001); see Holohan v.

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Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ erred by relying on selective

portions of Dr. Kabat’s treatment notes and failing to read his statements in the “context of

the overall diagnostic picture he [drew].” Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1205; see Switzer v. Heckler,

742 F.2d 382, 385-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[The doctor’s] report is uncontradicted and the

Secretary’s attempt to use only the portions favorable to her position, while ignoring other

parts, is improper.”). 

Fifth, the ALJ relied on a treatment note purportedly showing that Plaintiff

“was taking no medication in January 2001.” Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 258). The treatment note is

dated January 31, 2001, which appears to be the date of Plaintiff’s second visit to Dr. Kabat

following her alleged onset of disability. Tr. 258. Plaintiff previously visited Dr. Kabat on

January 17, 2001. The treatment note from this visit shows that Plaintiff was taking extrastrength Excedrin for her low back pain, and that Dr. Kabat directed Plaintiff to continue

taking the medication. Tr. 261. While the treatment note from Plaintiff’s follow-up visit of

January 31 indicates that she was “currently on no medication,” it is clear from the note that

the Excedrin was not working and Plaintiff was seeking a stronger prescription drug.

Tr. 258. Dr. Kabat complied with Plaintiff’s request by prescribing her a 30-day supply of

Roxicet, a narcotic analgesic. Tr. 259. Considering Dr. Kabat’s treatment notes in their

entirety, as the Court must do, the Court concludes that substantial evidence does not support

the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was taking no medication in January 2001. See Robbins,

466 F.3d at 882 (“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may

not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’”) (quoting

Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)); Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154,

1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (same).

Sixth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medication helped control her pain. The ALJ

based this finding on a single treatment note dated January 15, 2004. Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 321).

Dr. Kabat did indicate in the note that Plaintiff’s OxyContin was “helping to control pain.”

Tr. 321. But he also stated that Plaintiff still had “breakthrough pain,” which is pain that

occurs suddenly for short periods of time and is not alleviated by pain medication.

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The ALJ noted that Plaintiff earned $8,900 in 2001, but does not address how this

amount of compensation compares to Plaintiff’s expected full-time compensation, nor why

this amount is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s assertion that she worked only part time.

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A subsequent treatment note dated January 26, 2005, shows that Plaintiff’s pain had

worsened and that she was having more problems with her shoulders, hips, neck, and low

back. Tr. 289-92. The ALJ does not address this treatment note, nor does he explain why

the treatment note of January 2004 renders Plaintiff’s hearing testimony incredible. The

ALJ’s finding on this issue is neither convincing nor supported by substantial evidence.

Finally, the ALJ found Plaintiff not credible because she purportedly testified that she

worked full time until May 2001. Tr. 26. A review of the hearing transcript shows that

Plaintiff actually stated that she unsuccessfully attempted to return to work part time, not full

time:

Q. When did you quit working in 2001? What month?

A. I quit in January. Then I went back again and tried part time. I believe

it was May that I finally realized that I couldn’t even go part time.

Tr. 429 (emphasis added). This testimony is consistent with Plaintiff’s October 2001

statement that after her disability began she “went to work part time” but her “condition

worsened and [she] was unable to continue.” Tr. 107.1

“[T]he Social Security Act and regulations are designed ‘to encourage individuals who

have previously suffered from a disability to return to substantial gainful employment[.]’”

Moore, 278 F.3d at 925 (quoting Flaten v. Sec. of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1995)).

To effectuate this policy, the “regulations provide for a ‘trial work period’ in which a

claimant may ‘test [her] ability to work and still be considered disabled.’” Id. at 924-25

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592). Plaintiff’s attempt to work part time is an insufficient

reason for disbelieving Plaintiff. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 833 (“In evaluating whether the

claimant satisfies the disability criteria, the Commissioner must evaluate the claimant’s

‘ability to work on a sustained basis.’ Occasional symptom-free periods – and even the

sporadic ability to work – are not inconsistent with disability.”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §

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404.1512(a); emphasis in original); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (defining “sustained

work” as a 40-hour work week). 

B. Statements of Plaintiff’s Relatives.

“In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness

testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to work.” Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454

F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(4)

& (e)). “Indeed, ‘lay testimony as to the claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects

ability to work is competent evidence and therefore cannot be disregarded without

comment.’” Id. (emphasis in original; citation and alteration omitted). “Consequently, ‘if the

ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane

to each witness.’” Id. (citation and alteration omitted).

Plaintiff’s relatives provided statements corroborating her claim of disabling pain.

Her son completed a questionnaire detailing her restrictions in daily living activities and

social functioning. Tr. 99-104. Her parents and two sisters provided letters describing how

her health has deteriorated to the point that she is no longer able to perform simple tasks

without difficulty or help. Tr. 133-35.

The ALJ found these statements “exaggerated with regard to [Plaintiff’s] lack of

ability to perform certain daily activities.” Tr. 26. The ALJ provided specific reasons for

this finding, but none of them is a proper basis for rejecting the statements.

The ALJ asserted that the statements are not consistent with Plaintiff’s ability to

exercise. Tr. 26. As explained above, Plaintiff’s limited exercise does not support an

adverse credibility finding. See Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050.

The ALJ also asserted that the statements do not explain how Plaintiff was able to take

two trips to Pennsylvania during the adjudicatory period. Tr. 26. The ALJ, however, does

not address the nature of the trips or explain how the mere fact that Plaintiff traveled to

another State is inconsistent with her relatives’ statements. Plaintiff testified at the hearing

that she had to fly to Pennsylvania to visit her seriously ill father. Plaintiff further testified

that she was accompanied on each flight because she could not travel alone. Tr. 426-27.

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Defendant contends that the ALJ’s adverse credibility findings are supported by

substantial evidence because examining and consultive physicians noted that Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints outweighed the objective findings. Dkt. #25 at 11 (citing Tr. 142,

181). But the ALJ did not rely on this evidence in making his credibility findings, see Tr.

26, and the Court “cannot affirm the decision of [the ALJ] on a ground that the [ALJ] did not

invoke in making [his] decision.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Dr. Kabat’s treatment notes indicate that on two occasions Plaintiff “had to fly” and her

“back pain got worse.” Tr. 307, 368. One of Plaintiff’s sisters stated that during the trips

Plaintiff “could not go places or do the things she could do before” her disability. Tr. 134.

Plaintiff’s parents stated that Plaintiff’s back bothers her when she travels and that she is no

longer able to go on long road trips due to the pain. Tr. 135.

“Several courts, including [this Circuit], have recognized that disability claimants

should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations.”

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (citations omitted). The mere fact that Plaintiff made two out-ofstate trips to visit her sick father “does not in any way detract from her [relatives’] credibility

as to her overall disability.” Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050.

Finally, the ALJ found that the statements do not explain how Plaintiff could drive

herself to the doctor’s office. Tr. 26. The ALJ does not explain the basis for this finding, nor

does he cite any evidence to support it. “[G]eneral findings are an insufficient basis to

support an adverse credibility determination.” Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1208 (citing Reddick,

157 F.3d at 722). Moreover, the ALJ’s finding is belied by the record. Plaintiff testified at

the hearing that she quit driving in 2001 due to her medication and that “now there’s no

possible way [she] could drive” because she cannot “even turn [her] head to look in the

mirrors[.]” Tr. 430. This testimony is corroborated by the October 2001 statements of

Plaintiff and her son that Plaintiff is unable to drive and that her son and daughter-in-law

drive her to the doctor’s office. Tr. 101, 107.

In summary, the reasons the ALJ provided for finding Plaintiff and her family not

credible are neither convincing nor supported by substantial evidence. The Court

accordingly will grant summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor with respect to this issue.2

 

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C. The Decision to Remand for Further Proceedings or an Award of Benefits.

Having decided to vacate Defendant’s decision, the Court has the discretion to remand

the case for further development of the record or for an award benefits. See Reddick, 157

F.3d at 728. In Smolen, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence should be credited and an action

remanded for an immediate award of benefits when the following three factors are satisfied:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, (2) there

are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be

made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant

disabled were such evidence credited. 80 F.3d at 1292; see Varney v. Sec. of HHS, 859 F.2d

1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (Varney II) (“In cases where there are no outstanding issues that

must be resolved before a proper determination can be made, and where it is clear from the

record that the ALJ would be required to award benefits if the claimant’s excess pain

testimony were credited, we will not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific

findings regarding that testimony.”); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1989)

(same); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In a recent case where the

ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting the opinion of claimant’s

treating physician, we accepted the physician’s uncontradicted testimony as true and awarded

benefits.”) (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988)); Hammock, 879 F.2d

at 503 (extending Varney II’s “credit as true” rule to a case with outstanding issues where the

claimant already had experienced a long delay and a treating doctor supported the claimant’s

testimony). On many occasions since Smolen, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed the rule that

improperly rejected evidence must be credited as true. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Reddick,

157 F.3d at 729; Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000); McCartey v.

Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Moisa, 367 F.3d at 887; Benecke, 379

F.3d at 593-95. At least one panel, however, has explicitly held that the “credit as true”

doctrine is not mandatory in the Ninth Circuit. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th

Cir. 2003).

The Court need not choose between these “two opposing lines of authority, neither

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of which has an unimpaired claim to being the law of the circuit.’” Greenhow v. Sec. of

HHS, 863 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled in part by United States v. Hardesty, 977

F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The Court concludes, on the specific record before it,

that the testimony and statements of disabling pain should be credited as true and the case

remanded for an award of benefits. The ALJ acknowledged in his decision that he had

considered all of the evidence of record in making his adverse credibility determinations.

Tr. 23; see Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (setting forth factors relevant to the credibility

determination). Moreover, the subjective complaints of pain are consistent with the medical

evidence as a whole. The vocational expert testified that if Plaintiff’s testimony is credited,

a disability finding would be required. Tr. 437. Thus, “a remand for further proceedings

would serve no useful purpose.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 730; see Orn, 2007 WL 2034287, at

*14 (remanding for an award of benefits where it was “‘clear from the record that the ALJ

would be required to determine the claimant disabled if he had credited the claimant’s

testimony’”) (quoting Connett, 340 F.3d at 876).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #17) is granted.

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #23) is denied.

3. Defendant’s administrative decision denying benefits is reversed.

4. The case is remanded to Defendant for an award of benefits.

5. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 25th day of September, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-02169-DGC Document 26 Filed 09/25/07 Page 12 of 12