Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03249/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03249-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIE MINNS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ADVANCED CLINICAL EMPLOYMENT 

STAFFING LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-03249-SI 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 124

Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is scheduled for a hearing on August 7, 

2015. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that the matter is appropriate for 

resolution without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing. The case management 

conference scheduled for 3:30 p.m. on August 7, 2015 remains on calendar. For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court DENIES plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment of the sixth cause of action as stated in the 

fifth amended complaint. That cause of action alleges that ACES is a "temporary services 

employer" and that ACES failed to pay plaintiffs and other ACES employees on a daily basis as 

required by California Labor Code section 201.3(b)(3).

California Labor Code section 201.3(b)(3) provides that "[i]f an employee of a temporary 

services employer is assigned to work for a client engaged in a trade dispute, that employee's 

wages are due and payable at the end of each day, regardless of when the assignment ends." Cal. 

Lab. Code § 201.3(b)(3). It is undisputed that prior to the May 2013 strike, ACES did not pay 

Case 3:13-cv-03249-SI Document 137 Filed 08/05/15 Page 1 of 3
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

plaintiffs wages on a daily basis. However, the parties dispute whether ACES is a "temporary 

services employer." California Labor Code section 201.3(a)(1) defines a “temporary services 

employer” as "an employing unit that contracts with clients or customers to supply workers to 

perform services for the clients or customers and that performs all of the following functions:

(A) Negotiates with clients and customers for matters such as the 

time and place where the services are to be provided, the type of 

work, the working conditions, and the quality and price of the 

services. 

(B) Determines assignments or reassignments of workers, even if 

workers retain the right to refuse specific assignments. 

(C) Retains the authority to assign or reassign a worker to another 

client or customer when the worker is determined unacceptable 

by a specific client or customer. 

(D) Assigns or reassigns workers to perform services for clients or

customers. 

(E) Sets the rate of pay of workers, whether or not through 

negotiation. 

(F) Pays workers from its own account or accounts. 

(G) Retains the right to hire and terminate workers."

Cal. Lab. Code § 201.3(a)(1). The parties dispute whether ACES "[r]etains the authority to assign 

or reassign a worker to another client or customer when the worker is determined unacceptable by 

a specific client or customer," and whether ACES "[d]etermines assignments or reassignments of 

workers, even if workers retain the right to refuse specific assignments." The parties also dispute 

whether section 201.3 is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act pursuant to Machinists v. 

Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), a question that the Court need 

only reach if ACES is subject to section 201.3.

The Court concludes that there are disputes of fact that cannot be resolved on summary 

judgment.1 ACES contends, inter alia, that it did not retain the authority to reassign a nurse to 

 

1

 Plaintiffs assert that because "this Court will be the ultimate trier of fact regarding 

Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action, the Court should draw whatever reasonable inferences and 

conclusions it can from the evidence and rule on Plaintiffs’ motion notwithstanding any factual 

dispute." Dkt. 124 at 5:2-5. However, while plaintiffs are correct that where “the evidentiary 

facts are not disputed, a court in a nonjury case may grant summary judgment if trial would not 

enhance its ability to draw inferences and conclusions[,]”Matter of Placid Oil Co., 932 F2d 394, 

398 (5th Cir. 1991), here, there are material disputes of fact such that a trial on the merits will aid 

Case 3:13-cv-03249-SI Document 137 Filed 08/05/15 Page 2 of 3
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

another ACES client in the event that Sutter determined that a particular strike replacement nurse 

was unacceptable. ACES has submitted the declaration of Regina Alcorn, one of the ACES 

Directors of Clinical Operations. She states that "ACES has not entered and does not enter into 

contracts with healthcare workers authorizing ACES to assign the worker to multiple ACES 

clients" and that "[i]f any nurse was unacceptable to Sutter Health, ACES's only options were to 

attempt to negotiate a new contract with the nurse if another potential opportunity was available to 

him or her or, much more commonly, send the nurse home." Allcorn Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5. Plaintiffs 

assert that notwithstanding Alcorn's testimony, ACES retained the authority to reassign nurses, 

even if ACES did not exercise that authority. In their reply brief, plaintiffs cite language in the 

contract between ACES and Sutter which states that "Supplier shall have the right to hire, 

supervise . . . promote or demote, reassign . . . the Supplied Employees." Gildor Decl.. Ex. 2 at §

3.1(e). As this language was first cited in the reply, defendant's opposition did not address this 

specific argument.

The Court finds that a fuller factual record is necessary to resolve the issues presented by 

plaintiffs' motion. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 

judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2015 ________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

 

this Court in determining whether ACES is a "temporary services employer." 

Case 3:13-cv-03249-SI Document 137 Filed 08/05/15 Page 3 of 3