Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-05341/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-05341-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability as Unnecessary

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ROBERT AYERS, JR., Warden, 

Respondent.

 

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No. C 08-05341 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY AS

UNNECESSARY

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2007 decision of the California Board of

Parole Hearings (“Board”) finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. The Court ordered

respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an

answer, and petitioner filed a traverse.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1989, a Los Angeles County Superior Court jury convicted petitioner of

kidnapping for robbery with a firearm enhancement, and possession of marijuana. 

Petitioner was sentenced to life plus one year in prison. On May 3, 2007, the Board

denied petitioner eligibility for parole. Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state

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superior court, which denied the petition in a reasoned opinion on December 12, 2007. 

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition in the California Court of Appeal and a petition for

review with the California Supreme Court, both of which summarily denied review. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on November 25, 2008.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Commitment Offense

The following summary of facts is taken from the opinion of the California Court

of Appeal on direct appeal and read into the transcript of the Board hearing:

The evidence established that at about 7:30 p.m. on June 15, 1987,

Henry Grayson, Junior, a District Attorney investigator and principal

bodyguard for Los Angeles County District Attorney Ira Reiner and his

family, was sitting in a 1985 Buick owned by the County of Los Angeles,

across the street from Spago’s Restaurant as he waited for Reiner and his

wife to finish dinner.

The car had official “E” license plates, two blue lights on the rear,

and two antennae on the trunk, one for a car telephone and one for a twoway radio. The doors were locked, but the front windows on both sides of

the car were open. At the time, Grayson was armed with a .380 caliber

automatic pistol that was loaded with approximately 13 rounds of hollow

point, silver-tipped bullets.

Sometime between 7:30 and 8 p.m., after he had used the car

telephone, two Hispanic men, later identified as Jose Escarcega, and Arturo

Samaniego, suddenly approached the car. Samaniego walked up to the

window on the passenger side, pointed an automatic pistol at Grayson’s head

and told Grayson he was going to blow his head off. Grayson saw that

Samaniego’s finger was on the trigger, the safety was off, and Samaniego

held the gun in a double-hand grip.

Meanwhile, Escarcega went up to the driver’s door, reached inside

the open window and opened the door. Both men entered the car so that

Grayson was sitting between them on the front seat. Grayson dropped the

car keys on the floor, but Escarcega immediately retrieved them and

reinserted them into the ignition.

Escarcega then spoke in Spanish to Samaniego while he touched the

car phone, two-way police radio, and a red spotlight located on the car’s

transmission hump. Samaniego responded to Escarcega in Spanish, while

repeatedly threatening Grayson in English, that he was going to blow his

brains out and ordering him not to move. The entire time he was pointing

the gun at Grayson’s head and ribs with his finger on the trigger.

After Escarcega finished touching the various items in the car, he

noticed Grayson’s weapon and badge. Escarcega removed Grayson’s

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weapon and as he placed it under his leg, said, “policia.” Escarcega started

the car and drove towards Sunset Boulevard. As the car began to move,

Grayson looked around and in the rear view mirror for anything “unusual”

that would indicate someone saw what had happened to him.

As the car turned on to Sunset, in the rear view mirror, Grayson saw a

red Mercedes directly behind the Buick. It was driven by a Latin male, later

identified as [petitioner.] Its front license plate was not a legal California

plate in that it was red, while, and blue with stars and had “USA” on it.

As they continued driving along Sunset, Grayson noted that the

Mercedes was always directly behind the Buick in the same lane. After

traveling for several blocks, Escarcega turned onto Hilldale and then made a

sharp left onto Shoram, which was marked with a sign indicating that it was

not a through street. The red Mercedes followed and was never farther than

a car length from the Buick.

During the entire drive, Samaniego had the gun pointed at Grayson

with his finger on the trigger. Escarcega parked the car near the intersection

on the wrong side of the street next to some tall hedges, and the red

Mercedes pulled up and parked behind the Buick. Samaniego immediately

got out of the car and told Grayson to also get out because he was going to

kill him now. Grayson got out of the car and stood next to the right front

fender, facing towards the back of the car. Escarcega meanwhile stood

between the car and the partially open driver’s door.

[Petitioner,] Escarcega and Samaniego began conversing with each

other in Spanish, while Samaniego held the gun pointed at Grayson’s head.

[Petitioner] remained in the Mercedes and during their conversation, which

was conducted in a normal tone of voice, [petitioner] was “extremely calm”

and appeared to “have almost a smirk on his face.”

Grayson decided to try to escape and he noticed that Samaniego

would occasionally direct his attention away from Grayson, and look over

his shoulder at [petitioner.] As Samaniego turned his head, Grayson ran up

Shoram in a zig-zag pattern. When he looked back, he saw Samaniego get

into the Buick and the Buick drive away towards Sunset Boulevard. The

Mercedes was directly behind the Buick.

As Grayson ran after the two cars, he flagged down a green van,

identified himself as a police officer, and asked the driver of the van to

follow the Buick. The driver agreed but when they reached Sunset, traffic

was extremely heavy and they were unable to pursue the Buick. Grayson

jumped out of the van when he saw the Buick clear the traffic signal, and

almost ran into the Mercedes which was driving against traffic, almost on the

wrong side of the street.

Grayson ran after the Mercedes and memorized the license number

and also wrote it down, partially on a three-by-five card, and partially on his

hand. The Mercedes accelerated and got away by cutting through traffic. 

Grayson ran into a shop and called 911. A patrol car arrived almost

immediately.

 (Pet., Ex. A, Transcript “Tr” at 25-29.)

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 B. Parole Suitability Hearing

Petitioner’s minimum parole eligibility date was December 25, 1998. On May 3,

2007, petitioner appeared with counsel before the Board for a parole suitability hearing. 

The Board first recited petitioner’s version of the underlying crime, in which petitioner

states he and his co-defendants were drunk at the time and petitioner did not plan or

intend to take Grayson as a hostage. (Tr. at 35.) The Board then looked at petitioner’s

prior criminal history and noted he had a 1984 juvenile arrest for possession of a

controlled substance. (Id. at 39.) Petitioner then received a 1987 adult conviction for

spousal abuse, for which he was sentenced to 45 days in jail and 18-months probation. 

(Id. at 40.) Then, three months later, petitioner was arrested for the instant offense. (Id.

at 41.) Petitioner absconded while on bail and was arrested and convicted in Arizona in

1989 for assault with a deadly weapon. (Id. at 44.) Then petitioner again was arrested in

1991 in Merced for possession of marijuana for sale. (Id. at 41.)

The Board then looked at petitioner’s personal history. Petitioner was 21 years

old at the time of the underlying convictions. (Id. at 49.) Petitioner is the oldest of five

children. (Id.) His mother brought he and his siblings to the United States from Mexico. 

(Id.) Petitioner began drinking alcohol when he was 14 or 15 years old. (Id. at 53.) 

Petitioner also used marijuana and cocaine, but mostly he preferred drinking beer. (Id. at

55.) 

While in prison, petitioner has not gone to school, although he achieved his GED

in 1985, and has not engaged in self-studies. (Id. at 58-59, 60.) Petitioner has worked in

maintenance at the prison and has participated in Alcholics Anonymous and Narcotics

Anonymous since 1995. (Id. at 59, 62.) Petitioner has received five disciplinary reports. 

(Id. at 60.) Petitioner received a 115 in 1995 for an administrative matter; in 1996 for

trafficking narcotics; and in 1997 for engaging in mutual combat. (Id. at 61.) Petitioner

also received two counseling chronos. The first in 1997 for failure to return medication

and the last occurring in 2001 for failing to comply with giving saliva and blood. (Id.) 

The Board reviewed petitioner’s March 2007 psychiatric evaluation. (Id. at 62-

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67.) Petitioner’s parole plans include being deported to Mexico because he has an INS

hold. (Id. at 67.) The Board then reviewed support letters for petitioner’s release. (Id. at

70-74.) The Board heard closing statements from the Attorney General’s office against

parole and from counsel for petitioner in favor of parole. The Board then took a recess

before rendering its decision finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. (Id. at 106-117.)

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge to a state parole

eligibility decision, the applicable standard is contained in the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895,

901 (9th Cir. 2002). Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief unless

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court’s

factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the merits issued a summary

opinion which does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under

section 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v. Cambra,

204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to

address the merits of petitioner’s claim is the opinion of the Los Angeles County

Superior Court.

B. Analysis of Legal Claims

Petitioner claims that (1) the Board’s decision violates due process because it was

not supported by some evidence, (Pet. 9); (2) the Board used unconstitutionally vague

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terms when it found the commitment offense was “very cruel and callous,” (id. at 15);

(3) the Board violated due process when it failed to “balance the cruelty and callousness

of the commitment offense against the passage of time and other factors,” (id. at 12); (4)

there is no nexus between the commitment offense and petitioner’s present

dangerousness; and (5) the Board’s reasoning that the commitment offense was carried

out in a way that “mental anguish was inflicted upon the victim” was unconstitutionally

vague and violated due process, (id. at 32). 

After further reflection, it appears that Claims 1, 3 and 4 can be subsumed into

one claim, and Claims 2 and 5 can be subsumed into one claim. Thus the Court will

address petitioner’s claims as follows: (1) the Board’s decision violates due process

because it was not supported by some evidence and (2) the Board used unconstitutionally

vague terms when it found the commitment offense was “very cruel and callous,” and

concluded that the commitment offense was carried out in a way that “mental anguish

was inflicted upon the victim”. Respondent argues that California inmates do not have a

federally protected liberty interest in parole release.

1. Some Evidence

The Ninth Circuit has held that California prisoners have a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in release on parole, and therefore they cannot be denied a

parole date without adequate procedural protections necessary to satisfy due process. 

See Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has clearly

established that a parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the

board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the record,” or is “otherwise

arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006)

(adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). The “some evidence” standard identified in Hill is

clearly established federal law in the parole context for AEDPA purposes. Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128-29. Additionally, the evidence underlying the board’s decision must have

some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

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Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, if the Board’s determination

of parole suitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some

indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th

Cir. 2005); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904.

Recently, the Ninth Circuit reheard en banc the panel decision in Hayward v.

Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir.

2008), which presented a state prisoner’s due process habeas challenge to the denial of

parole. The panel had concluded that the gravity of the commitment offense had no

predictive value regarding the petitioner’s suitability for parole and held that because the

Governor’s reversal of parole was not supported by some evidence, it resulted in a due

process violation. 512 F.3d at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an en banc

decision in Hayward. Unless or until the en banc court rules otherwise, the holdings in

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, and Irons are still the law in

this circuit.

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was

supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and

regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 505

F.3d at 850. Accordingly, in California, the court must look to California law to

determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and

then must review the record in order to determine whether the state court decision

constituted an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” principle. Id.

California law provides that a parole date is to be granted unless it is determined

“that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public

safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

The California Code of Regulations sets out the factors showing suitability or

unsuitability for parole that the Board is required to consider. See 15 Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15 § 2402(b). These include “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available,” such as:

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. . . the circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present mental

state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment

offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and

present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control,

including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

results in finding of unsuitability.

Id.

Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include the nature of the

commitment offense and whether “[t]he prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Id. at § 2402(c). This includes consideration of

whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner,”

whether the victim was “abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense,”

whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrated an exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering,” and whether “[t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id. Other circumstances tending

to show unsuitability for parole are a previous record of violence, an unstable social

history, previous sadistic sexual offenses, a history of severe mental health problems

related to the offense, and serious misconduct in prison or jail. Id.

Conversely, circumstances tending to support a finding of suitability for parole

include: no juvenile record; a stable social history; signs of remorse; that the crime was

committed as a result of significant stress in the prisoner’s life; a lack of criminal history;

a reduced possibility of recidivism due to the prisoner’s present age; that the prisoner has

made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use

upon release; and that the prisoner’s institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability

to function within the law upon release. See id. at § 2402(d).

In making its determination in this case, the Board analyzed numerous factors

weighing for and against suitability for parole. The Board began by reviewing the

commitment offense and determined that the offense was carried out in a cruel and

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callous manner in a way that inflicted mental anguish upon his victim in that the victim

was held at gunpoint while repeatedly being told that his “head was going to be blown

off” and he would be killed. (Tr. at 106-107, 112.) The Board commented that the

crime was carried out in a calculated manner in that petitioner and his co-defendants

were looking for antennas on cars to steal a car phone. (Id. at 107.) The Board noted

that the motive was trivial in relation to the crime because it was motivated by basic

greed of obtaining a free phone. (Id.) The Board found that petitioner has a record of

assaultive behavior and an escalating pattern of criminal conduct and it appeared that

nothing would stop petitioner from committing crimes as he jumped bail after he was

arrested for the kidnapping conviction and then was arrested again for a different crime.

(Id. at 109-110.) The Board stated that petitioner has failed from previous grants of

probation. (Id. at 110.) The Board observed that even after being institutionalized,

petitioner was still involved in drugs. (Id. at 114.) The Board summarized his

institutional behavior as not upgrading educationally and receiving at least three chronos

for drug-related activity and mutual combat. (Id. at 110.) Finally, the Board noted that

the psychological report indicated that petitioner had adult anti-social behavior and

demonstrated a need for a longer period of observation and treatment. (Id. at 114.) The

Board recommended additional programming and that petitioner gain some

understanding and insight into himself and the life crime. (Id. at 114-115.) The Board

concluded that the factors tending to show suitability were outweighed by factors

showing unsuitability and denied parole. 

The superior court rejected petitioner’s habeas petition, finding that the Board’s

decision was supported by “some evidence.” (Resp. Ex. 2.) Specifically, the court

concurred with the Board’s determination that petitioner’s crime was committed in a

dispassionate and calculated manner, that petitioner had a previous record of violence

including the fact that he had absconded from arrest for the underlying kidnapping

conviction and was arrested for a separate crime in the meantime, and petitioner received

several 115s while incarcerated, including one for drug trafficking and another for

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mutual combat. (Id. at 2.) 

This court also concludes that the Board reasonably found that the circumstances

of the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner. The victim was

held at gunpoint for the entire duration of the crime and repeatedly threatened with

death. Further, the motive was trivial as petitioner stated that they wanted to steal a

phone because one of the co-defendants owed petitioner money. These facts alone

amount to “some evidence” that petitioner would present an unreasonable threat to the

public if released, but there was additional evidence in the record supporting the Board’s

parole denial as well. The Board also relied upon petitioner’s prior criminal history, his

institutional behavior, and his psychological report. Although petitioner had been

participating in AA and NA since 1995, he received several 115s and an administrative

chrono relating to either physical combat or drug trafficking. Petitioner asserted during

the parole suitability hearing that the underlying crime and all previous crimes were

committed while he was under the influence of substance abuse. In light of the

petitioner’s criminal history, such institutional infractions in 1996, 1997, and 2001 --

while petitioner is participating in AA and NA -- are causes for concern as to whether

petitioner can abide by societal norms and refrain from being an unreasonable risk of

danger to the community. 

The record of the 2007 parole hearing demonstrates at least “some evidence” that

petitioner would pose a risk of harm to society if released and that parole should be

denied. See Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232–33 (facts of the offense and psychiatric reports

about the would-be parolee sufficient to support denial). The state court’s rejection of

petitioner’s due process claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

the “some evidence” requirement of due process. Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s

assertion, the concern expressed in Biggs is not triggered here because the Board did not

deny parole solely because of the unchanging factor of the nature of petitioner’s offense. 

Cf. Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33. Therefore, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s due

process claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the “some evidence”

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standard. 

2. Vagueness

Petitioner contends that the Board’s description of the commitment offense as

“very cruel and callous” and carried out in a way that “mental anguish was inflicted upon

the victim” is unconstitutionally vague. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). In essence,

petitioner argues that the criteria of § 2402 is unconstitutionally vague. (Pet. at 11.)

Vagueness challenges made under the Due Process Clause “rest on the lack of

notice.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988). A statute or regulation is

unconstitutionally vague “if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary

intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if it invites arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir.

1989). Vagueness challenges to statutes or regulations that do not threaten First

Amendment rights, such as this one, are analyzed on an as-applied basis. Maynard, 486

U.S. at 361. To avoid unconstitutional vagueness, a statute or ordinance must (1) define

the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct

is prohibited; and (2) establish standards to permit police to enforce the law in a

non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner. Vlasak v. Superior Court of California, 329

F.3d 683, 688-89 (9th Cir .2003). In a vagueness challenge, the federal court must look

to the plain language of the statute, as well as construe the statute as it has been

interpreted by the state courts. Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 941-42 (9th

Cir. 1997). Thus, the question here is whether Section 2402(c)(1) provided petitioner

with adequate notice and the state court with adequate guidance.

The phrases “very cruel and callous” and “mental anguish” are not only absent

from the statutory language but merely descriptions used by the Board to depict the

seriousness of petitioner’s crime. Further, those phrases are no more vague than “the

utmost disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer,” which has been

held sufficiently determinate for death penalty use. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463,

470-78 (1993) (Idaho death penalty statute citing as an aggravating factor crimes carried

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability as Unnecessary

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out in an “utter disregard for human life” was not impermissibly vague because limiting

construction had been adopted which defined factor as those crimes demonstrating “the

utmost disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer”). Given that “[t]he

Due Process Clause does not require the same precision in the drafting of parole release

statutes as is required in the drafting of penal laws,” Hess v. Board of Parole and

Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2008), and a phrase no less

vague was been upheld by Arave in the penal law context, it is clear that this claim is

without merit. See, e.g., Edwards v. Curry, 2009 WL 1883739, * 9 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

(unpublished) (“because these sub-factors [which include ‘exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering’] are set forth in simple plain words, such that a

reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would understand their meaning and the

conduct they proscribe, the notice requirement is satisfied.”); Wagoner v. Sisto, 2009

WL 2712051, *6 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (unpublished) (stating “the five sub-factors outlined

in § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E) serve to limit the ‘heinous, atrocious or cruel’ language of section

2402(c) and narrow the class of inmates that are found unsuitable for parole . . . thus, the

terms are not unconstitutionally vague”); Burnright v. Carey, 2009 WL 2171079, *5

(E.D. Cal. 2009) (unpublished) (finding that after reading Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b)

together with 15 C.C.R. §§ 2402(c) and (d), a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence

would understand, and therefore be on notice, regarding the standards for parole

eligibility).

Thus, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s void for vagueness claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have

recently been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or

deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

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However, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that a state prisoner challenging the Board of

Prison Terms’ administrative decision to deny a request for parole need not obtain a

certificate of appealability. See Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232. Accordingly, any request for a

COA is DENIED as unnecessary. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED on the merits and a COA is DENIED as unnecessary. 

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

April 13, 2010 

Case 5:08-cv-05341-JW Document 8 Filed 04/14/10 Page 13 of 15
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

ROBERT AYERS JR, Warden,

Respondent. /

Case Number: CV08-05341 JW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Victor Lopez H-70404

San Quentin State Prison

San Quentin, Ca 94974

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk

4/14/2010 4/14/2010 /s/

Case 5:08-cv-05341-JW Document 8 Filed 04/14/10 Page 14 of 15
Victor Lopez H-70404

San Quentin State Prison

San Quentin, Ca 94974

CV08-05341 JW 

Case 5:08-cv-05341-JW Document 8 Filed 04/14/10 Page 15 of 15