Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15368/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15368-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TODD RUNDGREN; MICHELE C.

RUNDGREN, individually and as

Trustees respectively of the Todd

Rundgren Revocable Trust, dated

November 1, 2005 and the Michele

C. Rundgren Revocable Trust, dated

October 6, 2005,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA, a

Federal Savings Bank; JPMORGAN

CHASE BANK NA, a Delaware

corporation; DOES, 1-30,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-15368

D.C. No.

1:09-cv-00495-

JMS-KSC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 10, 2014—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed July 29, 2014

Before: William A. Fletcher, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Andrew

D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

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2 RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL

SUMMARY*

FIRREA

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Todd

and Michele Rundgren’s claims against JPMorgan Chase

Bank, in a case arising out of allegedly fraudulent acts by

Washington Mutual Bank, which was placed into the

receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company.

The FDIC transferred certain WaMu assets, including the

Rundgrens’ mortgage, to Chase. The panel held that because

WaMu was placed into the receivership of the FDIC and the

Rundgrens failed to exhaust the administrative remedies

provided by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and

Enforcement Act of 1989, as required by 12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(13)(D), the district court correctly determined it

lacked jurisdiction to hear the Rundgrens’ claims. The panel

concluded that the claims in the Rundgrens’ complaint are

“claims” for purposes of § 1821(d)(3)(D) and that their

claims “relate to any act or omission” of WaMu.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL 3

COUNSEL

Gary Victor Dubin (argued) and Frederick John Arensmeyer,

Dubin Law Offices, Honolulu, Hawaii, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Paul D. Alston (argued) and Tina L. Colman, Alston Hunt

Floyd & Ing, Honolulu, Hawaii; Jeffrey H. K. Sia, Diane W.

Wong, and David A. Gruebner, Ayabe, Chong, Nishimoto,

Sia & Nakamura, Honolulu, Hawaii for Defendant-Appellee

JPMorgan Chase Bank.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to consider whether the Financial

Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989

(FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, stripped the

district court of jurisdiction over Todd and Michele

Rundgren’s claims arising out of allegedly fraudulent acts by

Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu). Because WaMu was

placed into the receivership of the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (FDIC), and the Rundgrens failed to exhaust the

administrative remedies provided by FIRREA, the district

court correctly determined it lacked authority to hear the

Rundgrens’ claims. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).

I

In considering this facial challenge to the district court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, we assume the veracity of the

Rundgrens’ allegations. See Savage v. Glendale Union High

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4 RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL

Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). In early 2005,

the Rundgrens obtained a loan secured by a mortgage in favor

of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc, on their property in

Kilauea, Hawaii. Three years later, the Rundgrens refinanced

their mortgage with WaMu for around $3,000,000. 

According to the Rundgrens, the loan refinancing was tainted

by WaMu’s numerous fraudulent acts. For example, the

Rundgrens allege that WaMu falsified the loan application,

highlyexaggerated the Rundgrens’ income and assets without

their knowledge, misled the Rundgrens as to the terms of the

note, secured a false appraisal, and rushed them through the

signing process, among other things.

WaMu was later seized by the Office of Thrift

Supervision and placed into the receivership of the FDIC. 

The FDIC then transferred certain WaMu assets, including

the Rundgrens’ mortgage, to defendant JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A. (Chase) under a Purchase and Assumption

Agreement. Pursuant to this agreement, the FDIC retained

most liabilities associated with those assets.1

1 The Purchase and Assumption Agreement between Chase and the

FDIC provided that:

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this

Agreement, any liability associated with borrower

claims for payment of or liability to any borrower for

monetary relief, or that provide for any other form of

relief to any borrower, whether or not such liability is

reduced to judgment, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed

or contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or

undisputed, legal or equitable, judicial or extrajudicial,

secured or unsecured, whether asserted affirmatively or

defensively, related in any way to any loan or

commitment to lend made by [WaMu] prior to failure,

or to any loan made by a third party in connection with

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RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL 5

After Chase determined that the Rundgrens were in

default on their loan, Chase accelerated the payments secured

by the mortgage and notified the Rundgrens that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale would occur on August 26, 2009. In

response, the Rundgrens sent Chase a letter stating that “they

each hereby timely exercise their right to cancel said

referenced loan transaction and mortgage and promissory

note” based on allegations that Chase and WaMu violated

state and federal law.

The Rundgrens then sued Chase and WaMu in Hawaii

state court. In their complaint, the Rundgrens alleged that

WaMu defrauded them and breached its fiduciary duty during

the refinancing negotiation. The Rundgrens sought, among

other things: a declaratory judgment that the loan transaction

was void and unenforceable and that Chase could not proceed

with its nonjudicial foreclosure action; rescission of the loan

and treble damages under state law; injunctive relief

preventing Chase from attempting to foreclose on the

property or “further damage their finances”; statutory

damages under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA),

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f, and other state and federal

consumer protection acts; and punitive damages.

Chase then removed the action to federal court. The

district court dismissed the case against Chase for lack of

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure because the Rundgrens had failed to exhaust their

claims with the FDIC prior to bringing suit, as required by

a loan which is or was held by [WaMu], or otherwise

arising in connection with [WaMu]’s lending or loan

purchase activities are specifically not assumed by

[Chase].

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6 RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D). In the alternative, the court held

that the Rundgrens failed to state a claim under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This appeal followed.

II

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Campbell v.

Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2005). In

determining whether the Rundgrens’ action against Chase is

barred by the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of FIRREA,

we first consider the Act’s purpose and structure.

Congress enacted FIRREA “in an effort to prevent the

collapse of the [savings and loan] industry” in the late 1980s. 

Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th

Cir. 2011). In order “to enable the federal government to

respond swiftly and effectively to the declining financial

condition of the nation’s banks and savings institutions,”

FIRREA granted “the FDIC, as receiver, broad powers to

determine claims asserted against failed banks.” Henderson

v. Bank of New Eng., 986 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1993).

To maximize the FDIC’s ability to fulfill its role as claim

adjudicator, FIRREA “provides detailed procedures to allow

the FDIC to consider certain claims against the receivership

estate.” Benson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d

1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2012). The comprehensive claims

process, see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)–(10), allows the FDIC to

“ensure that the assets of a failed institution are distributed

fairly and promptly among those with valid claims against the

institution, and to expeditiously wind up the affairs of failed

banks,” Benson, 673 F.3d at 1211 (internal quotation marks

omitted), “‘without unduly burdening the District Courts,’”

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RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL 7

Henderson, 986 F.2d at 320 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-

54(I), at 419 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86,

215). As set forth in FIRREA, once the FDIC is appointed

receiver for a failed depository institution, it must publish a

notice to all of “the depository institution’s creditors” with

instructions “to present their claims, together with proof, to

the receiver” by a specific date. 12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(3)(B)(i). The FDIC must also mail the notice “to

any creditor shown on the institution’s books,” id.

§ 1821(d)(3)(C)(i), and “upon discovery of the name and

address of a claimant not appearing on the institution’s

books,” the FDIC must mail the notice to the claimant

“within 30 days after the discovery of such name and

address,” id. § 1821(d)(3)(C)(ii). Late claims “shall be

disallowed and such disallowance shall be final,” id.

§ 1821(d)(5)(C)(i), unless “the claimant did not receive notice

of the appointment of the receiver in time to file such claim

before [the designated] date,” and “such claim is filed in time

to permit payment of such claim,” id. § 1821(d)(5)(C)(ii). 

Within 180 days (or another agreed-upon period of time) after

receiving the claim, the FDIC “shall determine whether to

allow or disallow the claim and shall notify the claimant of

any determination with respect to such claim.” Id.

§ 1821(d)(5)(A); see also id. § 1821(d)(5)(D). If the claimant

timely submits the claim to the FDIC and the FDIC disallows

the claim, “the claimant may request administrative review of

the claim . . . or file suit on such claim” in the district court

whose jurisdiction covers the depository institution. Id.

§ 1821(d)(6)(A).

FIRREA strips courts of jurisdiction over claims that have

not been exhausted through this process:

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8 RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL

Except as otherwise provided in this

subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction

over—

(i) any claim or action for payment from, or

any action seeking a determination of rights

with respect to, the assets of any depository

institution for which the [FDIC] has been

appointed receiver, including assets which the

[FDIC] may acquire from itself as such

receiver; or

(ii) any claim relating to any act or omission

of such institution or the [FDIC] as receiver.

Id. § 1821(d)(13)(D).

III

In light of the exhaustion requirement set forth in

§ 1821(d)(13)(D), we begin by asking whether the

Rundgrens’ complaint alleges a “claim” and if so, whether

the claim relates to “any act or omission,” id.

§ 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii), of an “institution for which the [FDIC]

has been appointed receiver,” id. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(i).

A

FIRREA does not define the term “claim” for purposes of

exhaustion, so we use the ordinary meaning of the term. See

Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d

1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), as amended by

360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). A “claim” is a

cause of action or the aggregate of facts that gives rise to a

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RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL 9

right to payment or an equitable remedy. See Black’s Law

Dictionary 281–82 (9th ed. 2009); see also Black’s Law

Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 1991). Given this general meaning of

the word claim in normal legal usage, the Rundgrens’

complaint clearly raises “claims” against WaMu and Chase

for monetary and nonmonetary relief.

The Rundgrens raise two arguments against this

straightforward conclusion. First, the Rundgrens argue that

their claims are not the sort of claims contemplated by

§ 1821(d)(13)(D) because the Rundgrens are not WaMu’s

creditors. We have previously rejected this argument as

inconsistent with the statutory language. See McCarthy v.

FDIC, 348 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the

exhaustion rule . . . is not limited to creditors, but applies as

well to debtors”). Section 1821(d)(13)(D) is drafted broadly

to preclude courts from exercising jurisdiction over “any

claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a

determination of rights with respect to” the assets of a failed

bank in the hands of the FDIC, or “any claim relating to any

act or omission” of a failed bank, without respect to the

identity of the claimant. Nothing in this section suggests that

“any claim” refers only to those asserted by creditors. 

Although FIRREA refers to the FDIC’s duty to provide

notice to “the depository institution’s creditors,” 12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(3)(B)(i), the statute also provides for notice to

other “claimant[s],” id. § 1821(d)(3)(C)(ii) (requiring the

FDIC to mail notice to any “claimant not appearing on the

institution’s books” that is later discovered). More important,

although Congress specifically referred to “creditors” at

various points in FIRREA, it did not do so in

§ 1821(d)(13)(D), further indicating its intent to preclude

federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over nonexhausted claims by any claimant. Our sister circuits agree.

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10 RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL

See McCarthy, 348 F.3d at 1079–80 (collecting cases and

noting that our sister circuits “have uniformly held that

debtors’ actions are subject to FIRREA exhaustion”).

Nor can we conclude that the Rundgrens’ claims are not

“claims” because the FDIC would lack the authority to

adjudicate them. We have held that FIRREA “bars judicial

review of any non-exhausted claim, monetary or

nonmonetary, which is ‘susceptible of resolution through the

claims procedure.’” Henderson, 986 F.2d at 321 (quoting

Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 394 (3d Cir.

1991)); see also Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. FDIC, 79 F.3d 707,

714 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 1821(d)(13)(D) applies to

declaratory judgment actions); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.

City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 385 (3d Cir. 1994) (same). 

And the Rundgrens “give us no reason to believe that

FIRREA exhaustion would have been futile,” Benson,

673 F.3d at 1213, or that their claims are otherwise not

susceptible of resolution through FIRREA’s administrative

procedure, see McCarthy, 348 F.3d at 1081 (holding that

“apart from claims made in connection with bankruptcy

proceedings or arising out of a breach of contract fully

performed by the aggrieved party but not repudiated by the

receiver, all claims or actions [against a failed bank] must be

submitted for administrative resolution”).

The Rundgrens also assert that because they are

attempting to prevent a nonjudicial foreclosure, their

complaint should be construed as raising affirmative

defenses, as “§ 1821(d)(13)(D) does not divest a district court

of jurisdiction over an affirmative defense.” Resolution Trust

Corp. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank of Minot, 36 F.3d 785, 793

(9th Cir. 1994).

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RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL 11

We disagree. At the time of this suit, Hawaii, like many

states in this circuit, had both judicial and nonjudicial

foreclosure regimes. Hawaii law authorized lenders like

Chase to bring an action in Hawaii state court to foreclose on

the property in the event of a default. See Haw. Rev. Stat.

§ 667-1.5. Borrowers like the Rundgrens could then raise

defenses to the judicial foreclosure proceeding. See id. § 667-

4. But Hawaii law also permitted a borrower and lender to

agree that the lender could exercise a power of sale should the

borrower default. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 667-5(a), 667-5.7 (2008

ed.); Lee v. HSBC Bank USA, 121 Hawai’i 287, 291 (2009).2

When the parties have agreed to use these nonjudicial

foreclosure proceedings and the borrower defaults, the lender

is contractually and statutorily authorized to commence a

public sale of the property without the need to resort to the

judicial process. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 667-5 (2008 ed.). A

nonjudicial foreclosure is intended to be “‘relatively quick

and inexpensive. It does not require a lengthy time period

between the notice of default and foreclosure sale, and does

not require court costs and legal fees associated with

discovery and drafting of pleadings.’” Lee, 121 Hawai’i at

292 (quoting Georgina W. Kwan, Mortgagor Protection

Laws: A Proposal for Mortgage Foreclosure Reform in

Hawai’i, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 245, 253 (2001)). In order to

halt a nonjudicial foreclosure, the borrower may “impeach[]

by action or otherwise, any foreclosure proceeding” by

bringing action “prior to the entry of a new certificate of

title.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 501-118; see also Aames Funding

Corp. v. Mores, 107 Hawai’i 95, 101 (2005). In other words,

if the loan documents give the lender the power to proceed by

 

2

 The Hawaii State Legislature has significantly altered the nonjudicial

foreclosure process since Chase’s 2009 foreclosure attempt. See 2012

Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 182.

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12 RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL

means of nonjudicial foreclosure, a borrower who wants to

stop the process may bring an independent action raising

claims that provide a legal basis for enjoining the lender from

exercising its rights under the contract.

Here, the Rundgrens had contractuallyagreed to allow the

lender to exercise a power of sale and foreclosure without

judicial proceedings. Because the lender had no need to

pursue foreclosure through a court action, the Rundgrens

could not block a foreclosure by raising affirmative defenses;

rather, they exercised their right under Hawaii state law to

bring a lawsuit raising their claims against WaMu and Chase. 

Nothing in FIRREA allows us to ignore common legal usage

and recharacterize the Rundgrens’ lawsuit for legal and

equitable relief and damages as one raising affirmative

defenses.

Our decision in Midwest Federal is not to the contrary. 

In that case, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), acting

as receiver for a failed bank, brought a legal action against a

borrower (and various guarantors) to foreclose on the

mortgage. Midwest Fed., 36 F.3d at 789. Because the loan

documents did not state the loan was nonrecourse, the RTC

also sued for a deficiency amount. The defendants filed an

answer and a counterclaim, alleging mutual mistake and

seeking reformation of the terms of the loan agreement to

include a nonrecourse provision. Id. at 789–90. Consistent

with FIRREA’s broad reference to “claims,” we noted that

the mere “fact that the pleading was labeled a counterclaim

does not avoid the jurisdictional limitations imposed by

FIRREA.” Id. at 791. Nevertheless, we thought that “a better

description of the reformation claim is ‘affirmative defense,’”

id. at 791, because the defendant filed the pleading to avert

personal liability in the RTC’s action against it, and because

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RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL 13

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) authorizes federal courts

to “treat the pleading as an affirmative defense rather than a

counterclaim,” id. at 792, when “justice requires,” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(c)(2). Accordingly, we concluded that “a district

court has subject matter jurisdiction over affirmative defenses

raised by a defendant who, prior to being sued by the RTC,

was not a creditor of the RTC and who had no independent

basis for filing a claim against the RTC, even though the

defendant had not exhausted the administrative procedures

established by FIRREA.” Midwest Fed., 36 F.3d at 793.

Here, by contrast, the Rundgrens are not defendants in

any lawsuit by the RTC, FDIC, or a lender. They are the

plaintiffs bringing an independent action against the lender,

raising common law and statutory claims based on WaMu’s

alleged fraud. The Rundgrens’ argument that such an action

should be construed as an affirmative defense finds no

support in FIRREA. Nor do the Rundgrens cite any authority

equivalent to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

that would allow us to recharacterize the claims in the

Rundgrens’ independent lawsuit as affirmative defenses. 

Accordingly, we are bound by the plain language of the

statute, which strips us of jurisdiction over “any claim

relating to any act or omission” of a failed bank. 12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii).

The Rundgrens also rely on Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB,

167 F.3d 667 (1st Cir. 1999), to support their argument that

we must construe their legal action as an affirmative defense

for purposes of FIRREA. In Bolduc, the First Circuit

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14 RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL

examined whether a lawsuit by borrowers against the FDIC

3

to stop a nonjudicial foreclosure was barred by

§ 1821(d)(13)(D). 167 F.3d at 669–70, 672. Bolduc reasoned

that under FIRREA, it did not matter “who happens to be the

plaintiff” because “[t]he purpose of the exhaustion

requirement is to make persons with claims against bank

funds or property submit them promptly in a single

administrative forum.” Id. at 671. According to Bolduc,

“[o]ne alleged merely to owe the bank money” is not bringing

such a claim, “whether the debtor asks a court for a

preemptive declaration or injunction against the bank claim

or merely awaits suit by the bank and then defends.” Id. at

671–72. Nevertheless, Bolduc expressed uncertainty as to

whether a borrower attempting to stop a foreclosure was

equivalent to a person who merely owed the bank money. 

The court noted that mortgages “have a double aspect”: if the

borrower’s lawsuit is deemed a response to potential claims

of the bank to recover debts owed to the bank by the

borrowers, then “the exhaustion requirement does not apply,”

but if the borrower’s lawsuit is viewed “as cutting off the

bank’s rights to property currently in the bank’s possession,

namely, a contingent property interest represented by the

mortgages themselves,” then the exhaustion requirement

might apply. Id. at 672. In the end, the court did not resolve

this “double aspect” problem, but concluded that the

borrower’s suit in that case “does not quite fit within the

statutory language that delineates the exhaustion

requirement” primarily because “it is hard to describe the

3 Although the lawsuit was actually brought against the bank which had

acquired the failed bank’s assets from the FDIC, the First Circuit

proceeded “as if the FDIC still held the second mortgages” and the

borrowers “were suing to enjoin their threatened foreclosure.” Bolduc,

167 F.3d at 671.

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RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL 15

[borrowers’] action as one seeking ‘a determination of rights

with respect to’ a bank asset.” Id.; cf. 12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(13)(D)(i) (stripping a court of jurisdiction over

“any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to,

the assets of any depository institution” in the hands of the

FDIC). Bolduc did not address the language of

§ 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii), which refers to a “claim relating to any

act or omission” of the failed bank.

In our view, the reasoning of Bolduc is neither clear nor

persuasive. Bolduc itself acknowledges that a lawsuit to

enjoin a nonjudicial foreclosure can be characterized as a

claim against the lender, in that the borrower is asserting a

cause of action intended to deprive the lender of a valuable

right, namely, a secured interest in property. In our view, a

claim aimed at preventing a lender from obtaining repayment

of a loan or any realization on its security interest is clearly a

claim against the lender that seeks “a determination of

rights with respect to a bank asset” for purposes of

§ 1821(d)(13)(D)(i). Moreover, a borrower’s claim that the

bank is not entitled to foreclose due to past misdeeds plainly

satisfies the criterion of being a “claim relating to any act or

omission” of a bank. Id. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii). To the extent

Bolduc held otherwise, we disagree. Therefore, Bolduc does

not change our analysis here, and we conclude that the

Rundgrens’ claims are not affirmative defenses exempt from

FIRREA’s exhaustion requirement.

B

Having concluded that the Rundgrens’ claims in their

complaint are “claims” for purposes of § 1821(d)(3)(D), we

now consider whether they relate to “any act or omission” of

WaMu or the FDIC as receiver. Id. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii). 

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16 RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL

Although the Rundgrens named Chase as well as WaMu in

their complaint, all claims in the complaint rest on the theory

that WaMu took deceptive and fraudulent actions to induce

them to enter into a loan agreement, and their mortgage and

note are therefore unenforceable. The complaint makes no

independent claims against Chase.

4 A claimant cannot

circumvent the exhaustion requirement by suing the

purchasing bank based on the conduct of the failed institution. 

“Where a claim is functionally, albeit not formally, against a

depository institution for which the FDIC is receiver, it is a

‘claim’ within the meaning of FIRREA’s administrative

claims process.” Benson, 673 F.3d at 1214 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that the

Rundgrens’ claims relate to WaMu’s acts or omissions for

purposes of § 1821(d)(13)(D).

IV

The Rundgrens’ complaint alleges claims “relating to any

act or omission” of WaMu, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii),

and they have not explained why their claims are not

susceptible of resolution through the administrative process,

see McCarthy, 348 F.3d at 1081 (noting the “special

situations” that constitute an “exception[]” to the rule that “all

claims or actions must be submitted for administrative

resolution”). Because the Rundgrens have not exhausted

their administrative remedies under § 1821(d), the plain

 

4

 The Rundgrens argue that Chase violated TILA by failing to respond

to the Rundgrens’ rescission notice. The Rundgrens’ complaint did not

include such a claim, nor would such a claim have been ripe, given that

the Rundgrens filed their complaint on the same day they provided Chase

a notice of rescission, and no TILA violation can arise until 20 days after

the lender receives such a notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).

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RUNDGREN V. WASHINGTON MUTUAL 17

language of § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) stripped the district court of

jurisdiction to consider the Rundgrens’ complaint.

AFFIRMED.

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