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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FlLfiD 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Staw Coutt 0£ Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 19 990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

BARTLEY BOWES CORBETT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

' 

FRANK R. RINO, Detectiv~ in the 

Police Department of the City and 

County of Denver; CITY AND COUNTY 

OF DENVER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 87-1982 

) (D.C. No. 86-HC-1699) 

) (D. Colo.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and JENKINS, Chief 

Judge.** 

**Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

This is an appeal from a decision of the district court 

granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, Detective 

Frank Rino and the City and County of Denver, in an action brought 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The appellant, Mr. Bartley (Bart) 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-1982 Document: 01019961069 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 1 
Corbett, argues that summary judgment was improperly granted as to 

Detective Rino because material issues of fact precluded a 

determination that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Mr. 

Corbett also argues that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of the City, contending that the City 

was liable because of certain customs and practices and its policy 

of indemnifying police officers for damages awarded in civil 

rights actions. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand 

the cause to the district court for further proceedings on the 

merits. 

As apparent from the parties' pleadings and other materials 

submitted in connection with the appellees' motion for summary 

judgment, the facts leading to Mr. Corbett's filing of the instant 

action are as follows. On August 10, 1985, Ms. Jeralyn Caputo 

returned to her apartment in Denver, Colorado, to discover a small 

green memo on her kitchen counter. The memo was from a telephone 

message pad, with the telephone number for a "Riddle Development" 

and the names "Ronnie" and "Mike" written upon it. Although there 

was no indication of forced entry to the apartment and nothing was 

missing, Ms. Caputo suspected that someone had made an 

unauthorized entry and had forgotten the memo. She was also 

concerned because, several weeks earlier, she had found a sexually 

explicit note on her car parked outside the apartment building. 

Two days later, Ms. Caputo reported the alleged unlawful 

entry to her apartment to the police. She contacted Detective 

Rino directly, the police officer who had conducted the earlier 

investigation regarding the sexually suggestive note. Ms. Caputo 

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Appellate Case: 87-1982 Document: 01019961069 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 2 
related to Detective Rino that she had discussed the entry with 

Mr. Corbett, who was then the resident manager of her apartment 

building. She indicated to Detective Rino that Mr. Corbett had 

been hesitant in answering whether he had been in the apartment 

and that he made the unusual statement, to the effect that "anyone 

could have been through her things, even him, and she would never 

know it.'' He also requested that Ms. Caputo give him the memo. 

After meeting with Ms. Caputo, Detective Rino spoke with Mr. 

Michael Croswell, the owner of the apartment building. Mr. 

Croswell told Detective Rino that he had also spoken with Mr. 

Corbett and that Corbett had seemed unusually nervous in telling 

Mr. Croswell that he had not entered Ms. Caputo's apartment. 

Detective Rino also learned that only four persons had keys to the 

apartment: Ms. Caputo, Mr. Corbett, Mr. Croswell, and a plumber. 

Detective Rino then called the number for the Riddle Development 

Company shown on the memo and spoke to Ms. Laurie Sanchez. Ms. 

Sanchez indicated that she thought a person named Bart Corbett had 

called the company on occasion to speak with Ms. Lesli Buckridge, 

an employee, and that perhaps Mr. Corbett was Ms. Buckridge's 

boyfriend. Detective Rino later spoke directly with Ms. Buckridge 

and learned that Ms. Buckridge was acquainted with a person named 

Bart Engstrom, not Bart Corbett. The parties dispute whether this 

occurred prior to or after Mr. Corbett's arrest. 

On the evening of August 12, 1985, the same day that Ms. 

Caputo reported the incident, Detective Rino prepared an affidavit 

and application for a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Corbett 

containing the above information. The warrant was issued by a 

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Appellate Case: 87-1982 Document: 01019961069 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 3 
magistrate at 7:00 p.m., and at 9:00 p.m., Detective Rine arrested 

Mr. Corbett at the hospital where he worked as a security guard. 

Mr. Corbett was advised of his rights and shown a copy of the 

arrest warrant. Mr. Corbett was never prosecuted, however, as the 

district attorney declined the case for lack of sufficient 

identification of the perpetrator. 

On the basis of these events, Mr. Corbett filed the instant 

action in state district court, and it was later removed to 

federal court. The complaint alleged that, by obtaining an arrest 

warrant without probable cause, Mr. Corbett was subjected to an 

unconstitutional search and seizure, in violation of 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983. 1 It also alleged that Detective Rine was "acting under 

the color of statutes, ordinances and regulations, customs and 

usage of the State of Colorado and of the City and County of 

Denver." On September 26, 1986, Detective Rine moved for summary 

judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The district court 

denied this motion to permit Mr. Corbett to undertake discovery. 

On May 15, 1987, the appellees renewed their motion for summary 

judgment, which motion was granted by the district court on 

June 11, 1987. Mr. Corbett now appeals. 

We first address whether summary judgment was proper as to 

Detective Rine on the basis of qualified immunity. In considering 

a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the 

district court must determine whether a reasonably well-trained 

1 Mr. Corbett also alleged pendent state law claims, which 

district court dismissed upon granting summary judgment. 

Corbett does not appeal this dismissal. 

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the 

Mr. 

Appellate Case: 87-1982 Document: 01019961069 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 4 
officer "would have known that his affidavit failed to establish 

probable cause and that he should not have applied for the 

warrant." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986); see also 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When deciding 

this question, the court considers the information known to the 

officer at the time the warrant was requested. Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3040 (1987). If the 

affidavits and other evidence in the record on summary judgment 

indicate a material issue of fact regarding what the officer knew 

at the time of the arrest, summary judgment is properly denied. 

See De Vargas v. Mason & Hangar-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 719 

(10th Cir. 1988); Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1027-29 (7th 

Cir. 1987). 

In determining that Detective Rino's actions were reasonable 

and that the warrant was supported by probable cause, the district 

court noted that Ms. Caputo had earlier received the sexually 

explicit note, that only three people other than Ms. Caputo had 

keys to her apartment, and that neither Mr. Croswell nor the 

plumber had been in the apartment. The court additionally cited 

that Mr. Corbett had "evasively stuttered" when responding to Ms. 

Caputo and "evasively replied" to her questioning and that Mr. 

Croswell indicated that Mr. Corbett "appeared nervous and hurried'' 

over the phone. Finally, the court viewed the fact that Ms. 

Sanchez identified Mr. Corbett as Ms. Buckridge's boyfriend as 

affirmatively linking Mr. Corbett to the memo. 

While we agree that, if established as true, this evidence 

would have been sufficient to show probable cause for the arrest, 

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the record indicates that there was a material issue of fact as to 

whether Detective Rino knew that Mr. Corbett was not connected 

with Ms. Buckridge of the Riddle Development Company prior to 

preparing the application for the arrest warrant. Ms. Buckridge's 

affidavit states: 

That some time in August 1985 I did receive a phone call at 

my home on Capital Hill from a Detective Frank Rino. 

Detective Rino did at that time ask me if I knew an 

individual named Bart Corbett. I told Detective Rino that I 

did not know a man by that name, but that I was dating a man 

named Bart Engstrom. I received this phone call from 

Detective Rino on the same day that he called Laurie Sanchez 

and spoke with her at Riddle Development Company. After my 

phone conversation with Detective Rino I did go to my office 

at Riddle Development Company. When I arrived Laurie Sanchez 

did tell me that Detective Rino had called a while earlier 

and was looking for me to talk to me. 

It is undisputed that Detective Rino initially spoke with Ms. 

Sanchez on the same day as the warrant for Mr. Corbett's arrest 

was obtained and executed, although he indicated that he had also 

spoken with her on the day after the arrest. Ms. Buckridge's 

affidavit thus raises the possibility that Detective Rino knew 

that Mr. Corbett had no connection to the Riddle Development 

Company prior to requesting the warrant. 

Absent this connection to the Riddle Development Company, we 

believe that a reasonable officer would have known that the 

remaining evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause 

for Mr. Corbett's arrest. The affidavit and application for the 

arrest warrant contains few additional matters which would support 

a finding of probable cause for the arrest. Detective Rino does 

not indicate in the affidavit that Mr. Corbett was one of four 

persons with a key to the apartment and relies primarily on the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1982 Document: 01019961069 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 6 
suspicions of others to show Mr. Corbett's connection to the 

crime. He cites the earlier incident regarding the sexually 

explicit note left on Ms. Caputo's windshield; however, there is 

no objective evidence connecting Mr. Corbett to this incident. 

Finally, the last sentence of the affidavit recites, 

Because of the traumatic reaction which the victim has 

suffered in the other offense and now with this offense 

and since the suspect has denied the incident to the 

victim and to the owner and based upon the reasonable 

suspicion surrounding this episode, your affiant 

requests that probable cause warrant be issued for the 

suspect, ... in order that he may be questioned in 

this matter. 

This statement indicates that Detective Rino believed that he 

could arrest Mr. Corbett solely for the purpose of questioning him 

based on Mr. Corbett's denial of involvement, Ms. Caputo's trauma, 

and general suspicion. We believe that an experienced officer in 

Detective Rino's position would have known that a request for a 

warrant under these circumstances clearly lacked probable cause. 

Consequently, because of this unresolved factual issue as to 

whether Detective Rino actually knew Mr. Corbett had no connection 

to Ms. Buckridge and the Riddle Development Company, the district 

court erred in granting Detective Rino's motion for summary 

judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. We therefore 

remand for further proceedings on this issue. 2 

2 In so holding, we are not persuaded by Mr. Corbett's 

arguments to consider the fact that the district attorney declined 

to prosecute the case or the fact that the arrest warrant was 

never served. It is well-established that the standard of 

evidence necessary to support a conviction is higher than that for 

probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 

(1949). Consequently, the district attorney's decision not to 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1982 Document: 01019961069 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 7 
As to Mr. Corbett's allegation that the City is also liable 

under§ 1983, we concur with the district court's grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the City, although we affirm on a different 

legal basis. The court below granted summary judgment for the 

City based on its conclusion, noted above, that no constitutional 

violation had taken place. Since we remand for further 

proceedings on this issue, we cannot rely on these grounds for the 

dismissal of the City from this action. 

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

691 (1978), a city cannot be held liable solely on the basis of 

the doctrine of respondeat superior. To establish the liability 

of a municipal body under§ 1983, the plaintiff must allege that 

the alleged unconstitutional action "implements or executes a 

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially 

adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690; 

see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 s. Ct. 915, 923 

(1988). More particularly, conclusory allegations of municipal 

policy or custom will not support a cause of action against the 

City; Mr. Corbett must plead specific facts that support the 

existence of a policy or custom which was a moving force behind 

the constitutional violation. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 

(continued from previous page) 

prosecute Mr. Corbett has little probative value as to the 

existence of probable cause. Furthermore, Mr. Corbett's 

contention that, since he was not served with the warrant, the 

principles relating to warrantless arrests are applicable to this 

case is without merit. See Colo. R. Crim. P. (4)(c)(III)(officer 

need not have warrant in his possession at time of arrest); 

Sergent v. People, 177 Colo. 354, 497 P.2d 983 (1972). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1982 Document: 01019961069 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 8 
312, 326 (1981); Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768 

(7th Cir. 1985). Mr. Corbett's allegations and the materials 

submitted to defend the motion for summary judgment are wholly 

deficient in this area. 

We are not persuaded by Mr. Corbett's argument that, at 

trial, he may be able to uncover more substantial evidence of a 

custom or policy which led to the alleged constitutional 

violations. The purpose behind the stringent pleading 

requirements under § 1983 with respect to municipal liability is 

to protect such entities from the burden of often far-reaching 

discovery in insubstantial actions. See Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. 

Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Conn. 1978). In this case, even after 

discovery, Mr. Corbett has not identified any credible evidence of 

a custom or practice by the City which was a moving factor behind 

the arrest. Mr. Corbett urges us to consider evidence that the 

City indemnifies public officers for damages awarded in actions 

such as these as probative of such a policy or custom. We view 

any inference of this nature as unreasonable. See also Brown v. 

City of Chicago, 573 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1983); 

Ekergren v. City of Chicago, 538 F. Supp. 770, 772-73 (N.D. Ill. 

1982). 

The appellees have additionally moved that this court award 

them excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1927. In light of our disposition herein, the motion 

is denied. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1982 Document: 01019961069 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 9 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance herewith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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