Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01754/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01754-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH D. RODRIGUEZ,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al.,

 Defendants.

1:15-cv-01754-LJO-EPG-PC

 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANT’S 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS STATE LAW 

CLAIMS BE GRANTED, WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE

(ECF No. 19.)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

TWENTY (20) DAYS

I. BACKGROUND

Joseph D. Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the 

complaint initiating this action against three defendants on November 19, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (SATF) in 

Corcoran, California, where the events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred. 

Plaintiff alleges that SATF was constructed approximately twenty years ago and has not 

undergone any significant modification or repair since then. Since January 2014, Plaintiff has 

been housed on E-Yard at SATF, a level 3 Special Needs Yard reserved for inmates who, 

because of their lack of disciplinary problems, qualify to be housed at an Enhanced Program 

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Facility. There are five housing buildings on E-Yard. Four of the buildings, including 

Plaintiff’s building, are utilized as E-Yard housing units, each designed for a capacity of 100 

inmates. E-Yard is currently operating at approximately 195% of capacity, although this 

number, the actual rate of capacity, has never been reported to the Federal three-judge panel 

overseeing issues of overcrowding of California prisons.

In addition to the four housing units, E-Yard also contains a separate kitchen and dining 

facility, which are subject to California’s health and sanitation standards.

Defendants have failed and refused, and continue to fail and refuse, to maintain SATF 

in conformity with the laws of the state and federal constitutions. Although Defendants have 

known about the deteriorating physical plant at SATF for many years, they have refused to 

remedy the substantial substandard living conditions at SATF.

Neglect of the physical plant is evident by visual inspection. All of the roofs leak. 

During the rainy season, there is continual flooding in the dining facility, visiting facility, 

educational facility, housing unit common areas, and the cells themselves. Inmates often 

awaken to the sound of rain actually coming into the cells. Many of the ceiling tiles in the 

dining facility are missing as a result of Defendants’ neglect.

As a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the health and safety of inmates, 

including Plaintiff, the E-Yard dining facility has been infested with cockroaches and rats for 

many years, in violation of California’s health codes. The rat infestation is so severe that every 

morning the kitchen staff must clean rat feces from the griddle and other cooking surfaces 

before preparing inmate meals on those same surfaces.

Defendants have been aware for years that the E-Yard dining facility is infested with 

vermin. There have been numerous complaints by staff and inmates over the years, all which 

have been ignored. On November 19, 2014, at a meeting with D. Perkins, Correctional Food 

Manager responsible for the E-Yard dining facility, inmate representatives voiced concerns. 

Numerous complaints had been received regarding “debris, cockroaches and screws falling out 

of the ceiling onto inmates’ trays during the evening meal,” and the inmate representatives 

reported an “increase in pest infestation in the Facility E Dining Room.” (Plaintiff here refers 

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to a copy of minutes of the meeting attached to Complaint as Exhibit A.) The vermin problem 

was also directly brought to defendant Sherman’s attention at the Warden’s Meeting on January 

27, 2015. (Copy of minutes attached as Exhibit B.) At another meeting on October 6, 2015 

between inmate representatives and the E-Yard Correctional Food Manager, the Manager 

acknowledged that the issue had been previously discussed, and stated that the reason cold 

cereal could not be stored at the facility was because of the continuing cockroach infestation. 

(Copy of minutes attached as Exhibit C.)

On January 8, 2015, while eating his breakfast in the E-Yard dining facility, Plaintiff 

discovered a live cockroach crawling on his food. Plaintiff was alarmed and reported the 

incident immediately to the correctional officer (C/O) monitoring the morning meal. C/O

Pelayo advised Plaintiff to “get another tray.” (Copy of C/O Pelayo’s acknowledgment of the 

incident attached as Exhibit D.)

On January 13, 2015, Plaintiff was again served a large cockroach crawling on his 

breakfast food. Plaintiff immediately reported the incident to C/O Paz who was monitoring the 

meal. (Copy of C/O Paz’s acknowledgment of the incident attached as Exhibit E.)

Plaintiff is sickened by the unsanitary conditions in which his food is prepared, handled, 

and served. Plaintiff has been unable to consume any of the food served at the E-Yard dining 

facility since being served a live cockroach on January 13, 2015. Plaintiff sought medical 

attention for persistent and severe abdominal pain and cramps that resulted from the unsanitary 

conditions. Plaintiff was also required to seek psychological and psychiatric care for severe 

shock and anxiety. Plaintiff filed and exhausted his remedies via a form 602 administrative 

appeal complaining about the conditions. (Copy of 602 appeal attached as Exhibit F.) Plaintiff 

has suffered and will continue to suffer injuries in the form of pain and suffering, shame, 

humiliation, degradation, extreme anxiety, emotional distress, and mental distress.

Plaintiff requests monetary damages, temporary restraining orders, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, costs of suit and attorney’s fees.

\\\

\\\

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A. Initial Screening

The Court screened the complaint pursuant to its authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A on 

December 8, 2015, and found that the complaint stated a cognizable federal claim against 

Defendant Sherman for adverse conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. (ECF No. 6.) In the screening order, the Court also found that Plaintiff failed to 

state a cognizable claim against the two other defendants listed in Plaintiff’s complaint, and 

that it was appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for 

Plaintiff’s state law claims for violation of the California health codes and constitution. (Id.) 

The findings and recommendations in the screening order were adopted on May 9, 2016. (ECF 

No. 16.) The case now proceeds against Stuart Sherman (Warden of the SATF) (“Defendant”), 

for unconstitutional adverse conditions of confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for related 

state claims. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges violations of a California state law, Cal. Health & 

Safety Code § 114259.1, providing that food facilities in the state must be kept free of vermin. 

The screening order did not rule upon the viability of the state law claim. (ECF No. 6, pp. 8-9.) 

B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss State Law Claims

On June 28, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 19.) On July 11, Plaintiff filed an opposition to 

the motion. (ECF No. 21.) Defendant then filed a reply in support of the motion on July 18. 

(ECF No. 22.)

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss challenges only the sufficiency of the state law claims 

found in the initial screening order. A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, 

taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341–42 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotations 

omitted). The Court is required to construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs, particularly in civil 

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rights cases, liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt. Id. (citing Bretz v. 

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc)).

A. California Tort Claims Act

As a starting point, Defendant argues that all of Plaintiff’s state law claims must be 

dismissed because Plaintiff did not plead the claim presentation requirement contained in 

California Government Code § 900 et seq. In order to bring a lawsuit against for damages as 

part of the California Tort Claims Act establishes certain conditions precedent to the filing of a 

lawsuit against a public entity. State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1237, 90 

P.3d 116, 118 (2004). “[A] plaintiff must timely file a claim for money or damages with the 

public entity, (§ 911.2.), and the failure to do so bars the plaintiff from bringing suit against that 

entity, (§ 945.4.).” Id. Compliance with the claim presentation requirement is an element of the 

cause of action, Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1240, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116, is required, 

Mangold v. California Public Utilities Com'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995), and “failure 

to file a claim is fatal to a cause of action,” Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dist. Of Los 

Angeles v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 1992); City of Stockton, 42 Cal.4th at 738. 

Here, Plaintiff failed to plead compliance with the claim presentation requirement of the

California Tort Claims Act. (ECF No. 1.) In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff 

concedes that he did not comply with the requirement. (ECF No. 21.) Dismissal is thus 

appropriate as to Plaintiff’s state law claim for violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code § 

114259.1.

Plaintiff states that any dismissal should be without prejudice because the defect can be 

cured. (Id.) Whether dismissal is with or without prejudice will depend upon whether it is 

possible for Plaintiff to cure any defects. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 

1107–08 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).

B. Private Right of Action

Secondarily, Defendant argues that Cal. Health & Safety Code § 114259.1 does not 

contain a private right of action. In his complaint, Plaintiff’s factual allegations contain the 

following: 

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As a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the health and safety of 

inmates, including Plaintiff, the E-Yard dining facility has been for many years, 

and continues to be to this day, infested with cockroaches and rates in violation 

of California Health and Safety Code § 11425.1. The rate infestation is so 

severe that every morning the kitchen staff must clean rat feces from the griddle 

and other cooking surfaces before preparing inmate meals on those surfaces.

(ECF No. 1, p. 7 ¶ 13.) In continuing to describe how the unsanitary conditions of the prison 

fail to minimum sanitation standards, Plaintiff mentions the California Retail Food Code in 

three more paragraphs.1 (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21-22.) Thus, Plaintiff’s state law claim is brought 

pursuant to California Health and Safety Code § 114259.1, the complete text of which provides 

only that “[t]he premises of each food facility shall be kept free of vermin.”

2 Cal. Health & 

Safety Code § 114259.1 (West 2015).

Defendant argues that § 114259.1 does not contain a private right of action because the 

California Health & Safety Code provides that primary enforcement responsibility of § 

114259.1 rests primarily with the local enforcement agency and secondarily with the State 

Department of Public Health.

3

See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 113713 (West 2015). “A 

statute creates a private right of action only if the enacting body so intended.” Farmers Ins. 

Exch. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 4th 842, 849–50, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 657 (2006)

(citing Moradi–Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 305, 250 

Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58; Crusader Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 

121, 131, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 620.)). 

Plaintiff responds to this argument by citing to Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.6, which provides 

that:

 

1

It is unclear whether Plaintiff intended to bring a state law claim or whether he merely cited to the 

California Health and Safety Code to provide context to his constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Consistent with its duty to liberally construe allegations in pro se petitions, Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341–42, the Court 

found a state law claim and exercised supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (ECF No. 6, pp. 8-9).

2

Plaintiff does not dispute that an alleged violation of § 114259.1 is the state law claim at issue here. 

(ECF No. 21.)

3 Defendant did not present an argument that a prison is not a “food facility,” as defined by Cal. Health &

Safety Code § 113789, and therefore, that argument is not considered. 

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Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that 

is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public 

entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to 

discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised 

reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.

Cal. Gov't Code § 815.6 (West 2015). According to Plaintiff, § 114259.1 contains a mandatory 

duty, and he was injured by SATF’s failure to keep the facility free of vermin. Thus, Plaintiff 

argues that § 815.6 gives him a private right of action.

Defendant replies to this argument by asserting that he is not a “public entity” for 

purposes of § 815.6.4 A “Public entity” is defined to include “the state, the Regents of the 

University of California, the Trustees of the California State University and the California State 

University, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political 

subdivision or public corporation in the State.” Cal. Gov't Code § 811.2 (West 2015). 

Defendant is certainly correct that he is not a public entity in his personal capacity. 

However, Defendant has been sued both in his personal capacity and his official capacity as 

Warden of the SATF, a California state prison. (ECF No. 1.) Under Ex parte Young, “a suit 

against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is 

a suit against the official's office.” Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 

45 (1989)). A state official sued in his official capacity has been found to be a public entity in 

other contexts. See, e.g., Miranda B., 328 F.3d at 1187–88 (holding that a public official sued 

in his official capacity is “public entity” under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 

an action seeking injunctive relief). In such cases, however, monetary damages are generally 

unavailable to a Plaintiff. See id.

The Court cannot conclude, under the arguments presented here, that it would be 

impossible for Plaintiff to reassert his state law claim. While relief in the form monetary 

damages is unavailable here, it could be available in a separate state court action if Plaintiff can 

 

4 Defendant did not present an argument that the duty imposed by § 114259.1 is not mandatory, and 

therefore, that argument is not considered.

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properly allege compliance with the presentation requirement of the California Tort Claims 

Act. Accordingly, it is more appropriate that Plaintiff’s be dismissed without prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s be

GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice. If the 

recommendation is adopted, this case will proceed only on Plaintiff’s claim against defendant

Sherman for unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within twenty 

(20) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file 

written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be 

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 

1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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