Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56004/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56004-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LONNIE CLARK WILLIAMS, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden; R.

OLSON, Correctional Counselor II;

E. MARRERO,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-56004

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-00113-

BTM-RBB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 15, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed January 7, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, Stephen Reinhardt, and

Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

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2 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel granted a prisoner’s request to proceed in

forma pauperis on appeal, and vacated the district court’s

summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings on

the issue of whether the prisoner exhausted her administrative

remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

The panel held that under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, a prisoner who has three strikes under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g), and who has demonstrated in the district court

that she falls within the imminent danger exception in order

to proceed in forma pauperis must still qualify under this

exception at the time of appeal by alleging a continued

existence of imminent danger at the time the notice of appeal

is filed. The panel further concluded that the standard set

forth in Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir.

2007), applies in determining whether a prisoner has shown

an imminent danger on appeal. Under Andrews, a prisoner

may meet this requirement by alleging that prison officials

continue with a practice that has injured her or others

similarly situated in the past, or that there is a continuing

effect resulting from such a practice. The panel further held

that a prisoner who was found by the district court to

sufficiently allege an imminent danger is entitled to a

presumption that the danger continues at the time of the filing

of the notice of appeal. Applying this standard to plaintiff,

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 3

the panel determined that she could proceed in forma

pauperis on appeal. 

The panel concluded that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of

exhaustion of administrative remedies. Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to plaintiff and applying the

burden-shifting test established in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d

1162, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) and Hilao v. Estate of

Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996), the panel held that

plaintiff met her burden of production in showing that

administrative remedies were not available to her because she

alleged that she was thwarted from filing a grievance and

appeal. The panel held that defendants had not met their

burden of establishing that plaintiff did not exhaust her

available administrative remedies.

COUNSEL

Jennifer Chou (argued), Certified Law Student,UCLASchool

of Law Ninth Circuit Clinic, Los Angeles, California; Strefan

Fauble (argued) and Carlos M. Lazatin, Attorneys,

O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Suzanne Antley (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Kamala

D. Harris, Attorney General of California; Jonathan L. Wolff,

Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Thomas S. Patterson,

SupervisingDeputyAttorneyGeneral, San Diego, California,

for Defendants-Appellees.

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4 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Lonnie Williams, a California prisoner representing

herself pro se,1filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 in 2012 against Officers Daniel Paramo, R. Olsen, and

E. Marrero of the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility

in San Diego (RJD) and against the County of Los Angeles,

alleging violations of her constitutional rights to due process

of law and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In

this appeal, we decide whether the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA) requires a prisoner who is otherwise barred from

proceeding in forma pauperis under its “three strikes”

provision to show that she faces an imminent danger on

appeal when a showing of such danger has already been made

before the district court. We conclude that it does, but that

there is a presumption of continuing danger and that Williams

has accordingly satisfied the statutory requirement. We also

conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Williams’s

suit for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.

I.

Congress enacted the PLRA in an effort to curb the large

number of prisoner lawsuits filed in federal court. Jones v.

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007). The PLRA contains a

number of provisions intended to reduce the number of such

1 Williams identifies as a transgender woman, and we refer to her as a

woman even though she is classified as male in the prison records.

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 5

lawsuits.2See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006)

(citing § 1997e(c) (dismissal of meritless claims), § 1997e(d)

(restricting attorney’s fees), and § 1997e(e) (prohibiting

damages for emotional injury without showing of physical

injury)). Among these provisions, and relevant to this appeal,

is a requirement that prisoners exhaust “such administrative

remedies as are available” prior to bringing an action in

federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In addition to the

screening mechanisms, Congress also amended the

procedures for allowing prisoners to proceed in forma

pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, prisoner litigants are

required to pay court filing fees, although financially

qualified prisoners may pay the fees in increments. Section

1915(g), known as the “three-strikes” provision, prohibits

prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have

brought three or more actions or appeals that have been

deemed frivolous or malicious or have been held to fail to

state a claim.3 Prisoners who are “under imminent danger of

2

It is not clear, however, that a central premise for enacting the

PLRA—that prisoners were flooding courts with frivolous lawsuits in

increasing numbers— is entirely accurate. Prisoner litigation increased in

the 1980s and the 1990s due to the rapid increase in the incarcerated

population over those years, and state and federal prisoners filed lawsuits

in roughly the same proportions as non-inmates, both before and after the

increase. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555,

1692 (2003).

3 Section 1915(g) provides, “In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil

action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this

section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical

injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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6 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

serious physical injury,” however, may proceed in forma

pauperis notwithstanding the fact that they fall within the

three-strikes provision. Id. On this appeal, we consider first

whether Williams must continue to face an imminent danger

at the time she files her notice of appeal in order to proceed

in forma pauperis on appeal, and, if so, whether she does

continue to do so in the case before us.4 Second, we consider

whether the Defendants have met their burden of

demonstrating that Williams has failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies under § 1997e.

II.

In her complaint, Williams alleged the following: that

prison officials Daniel Paramo, R. Olson, and E. Marrero

started rumors that she was a convicted sex offender and

added an “R” suffix to her prison record, denoting that she

had a history of sex offenses;5that as a result of her

designation as a sex offender, members of the Two-Five

prison gang threatened her and stated that they would “get”

her; that Williams attempted to report her complaints, but

when she did, Officer Daniel Paramo allegedly told her, “So

what! That is not my problem! That is your problem!”; that

despite Paramo’s rejection, Williams tried again; and that she

attempted to file a grievance to the RJD appeals office on the

4 Williams has not challenged the constitutionality of the three strikes

provision here, and we express no view on the question of § 1915(g)’s

constitutionality.

5 Under the California Code of Regulations, inmates receive an “inmate

custody designation,” which determines where an inmate is housed and

the level ofsecurity necessary. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3377.1. An “R”

suffix is given to inmates “who have a history of specific sex offenses as

outlined in Penal Code . . . Section 290.” Id. § 3377.1(b)(2).

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 7

afternoon of January 5, 2012, but Correctional Counselor R.

Cobb refused to file her grievance and rejected her appeal.

Williams moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,

and the district court granted her motion. Although the

district court found that Williams had filed three previously

dismissed lawsuits and would otherwise be barred from

proceeding in forma pauperis under § 1915(g), it granted her

motion because it concluded that she satisfied the exception

by alleging an “imminent danger of serious physical injury.”6

The Defendants subsequently filed a 12(c) motion for

judgment on the pleadings arguing that Williams had failed

to exhaust her administrative remedies. In support of their

motion, Defendants submitted declarations from J. Ramirez,

the Appeals Coordinator at RJD, and J.D. Lozano, Chief of

the Office of Appeals. Both declarations described the formal

complaint process under Title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations, but the declarations provided no details

regarding how the grievance and appeals procedures were

administered at RJD nor any information regarding how

prisoners were informed of these procedures. The only

portions of the declarations specific to Williams pertained to

the officers’ review of her previously filed grievances and

appeals. Officer Ramirez stated that a search of Williams’s

previous appeals did not turn up an appeal related to her

complaint, and he concluded that she “did not properly

submit any appeals to this office regarding the allegations” in

her complaint. Similarly, Officer Lozano listed several third

6 The district court also concluded that Williams sufficiently stated an

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants Paramo,

Olsen, and Marrero but dismissed the claim against the County of Los

Angeles.

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8 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

level appeals7that had been received by his office from

Williams but stated that none of them involved the allegations

in her complaint, and he similarly concluded that she had

therefore “not exhaust[ed] any appeal at the Third Level

relating to the issues” in her complaint.

The district court notified Williams of Defendants’

motion to dismiss pursuant to Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Albino

v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014), and required

Williams to file her opposition by March 22, 2013. On May

28, 2013, having received no timely opposition from

Williams, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust, dismissed Williams’s case

without prejudice, and entered a judgment for Defendants.

On June 4, 2013, Williams filed late objections to

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and stated

that “prison officials would not file or allow [her] to file a

grievance” and again cited the facts in her complaint. She

further stated that she “‘attempted’ to exhaust her

administrative remedies as to all the allegations alleged in the

complaint and was hampered by prison officials.” 

Approximately two weeks later, Williams submitted a

declaration explaining that she had been transferred to the

Department of Mental Health in Vacaville (DMH) and could

not timely file her opposition because she was not given her

legal documents and personal belongings until after the

district court granted Defendants’ motion.

7 A third level appeal is the final step in the administrative appeals

process. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2.

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 9

Construing Williams’s objections as a motion for

reconsideration, the district court denied Williams’s motion. 

The district court concluded that Williams did not provide

“any documents, let alone specific factual allegations, that

would defeat the evidentiary support provided by

Defendants.”

Williams subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Prior to her appeal, however, Williams was transferred from

her original facility, RJD, to the California State Prison in

Sacramento (CSP-Sac).8 This court ordered Williams to

show cause why her in forma pauperis status should not be

revoked on appeal. Williams filed a response stating that she

remained in imminent danger at her current facility, CSP-Sac,

because Defendants had told inmates at CSP-Sac that she was

a convicted sex offender and child molester. In her response,

she stated that the inmates at CSP-Sac constantly threatened

to kill her with “inmate manufactured weapons” and to

unlock their handcuffs with “cuff keys” in order to kill her. 

Defendants filed a reply asking the court to revoke

Williams’s in forma pauperis status and arguing that

Williams failed to show a “nexus” between her lawsuit and

her newly alleged imminent danger at CSP-Sac. We

subsequently discharged the order to show cause and

appointed Williams pro bono counsel. We have jurisdiction

over Williams’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

8 Defendants filed a motion to revoke Williams’s in forma pauperis

status after she was transferred to CSP-Sac on the basis that she was no

longer in imminent danger. Relying on Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d

1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007), the district court denied the motion on the

ground that Williams was required to demonstrate imminent danger only

at the time she filed her complaint.

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10 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

III.

A.

We first address Defendants’ contention that a prisoner

who has three strikes under § 1915(g) and who has

demonstrated in the district court that she falls within the

imminent danger exception in order to proceed in forma

pauperis must still qualify under this exception at the time of

appeal. We expressly declined to address this question in

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007),

because there had been no change in the danger faced by the

prisoner between the time he filed his complaint and the time

he filed his appeal. Id. at 1053 n.4. We now conclude that

the text of the statute requires that plaintiffs must allege the

continued existence of imminent danger at the time the notice

of appeal is filed.

The parties raise several arguments regarding the history

and structure of the PLRA, but we believe that the plain

meaning of the statute controls here. Because we assume that

Congress means what it says in a statute, the “plain meaning

of a statute controls where that meaning is unambiguous.” 

Khatib v. Cnty. of Orange, 639 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2011)

(en banc). Section 1915(g) states,

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action

or appeal a judgment in a civil action or

proceeding under this section if the prisoner

has, on 3 or more prior occasions, . . . brought

an action or appeal in a court of the United

States that was dismissed on the grounds that

it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted,

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 11

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added). By its terms,

§ 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma

pauperis on appeal if the prisoner has three strikes “unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 

We concluded in Andrews that § 1915(g) required a showing

of imminent danger “at the time the prisoner filed the

complaint” because of the section’s use of the present tense

and its concern with the initial act of “bring[ing] the action.” 

493 F.3d at 1053. That analysis applies here as well. The use

of the word “shall” and the present tense “appeal” permits a

Court of Appeals to assess whether the imminent danger

exception applies at the time of the appeal. The final phrase

of § 1915(g) — “is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury” — applies to the entire subsection, not just

to the portion that prohibits a three-strikes prisoner from

bringing a civil action in the district court.

Finally, the use of the disjunctive word “or” between the

verb phrases “bring a civil action” and “appeal a judgment”

denotes two different times at which the prisoner must make

the imminent danger showing. Had the statute stated, “In no

event shall a prisoner bring a civil action and appeal a

judgment in a civil action . . . ” we might conclude that a

single determination at the time the complaint was filed is

sufficient because the conjunctive “and” would require us to

treat both the bringing of the action and the appeal as part of

a single, conjunctive whole. Instead Congress has insisted

that the prisoner take neither of the two actions unless the

specified condition is met. In short, she must be eligible both

at the time the complaint is filed and at the time of the notice

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12 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

of appeal.9 Because “[i]t is not our function to devalue the

English language by disregarding the meaning of words,”

United States v. Saavedra-Velazquez, 578 F.3d 1103, 1110

(9th Cir. 2009) (Reinhardt, J., specially concurring), we

conclude that a prisoner who falls within the three strikes

provision and seeks forma pauperis status may be required to

show that an imminent danger exists at the time the notice of

appeal is filed.

The decisions of other circuits appear to support this

conclusion. No other circuit has devoted substantial analysis

to the question whether a court of appeals may require a

prisoner to show an imminent danger at the time the notice of

appeal is filed, but those that have addressed the question

have concluded that a three-strikes prisoner must do so. In

Baños v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 1998), for example,

the Fifth Circuit concluded that an imminent danger finding

must be made at the time the notice of appeal is filed. The

court stated, “In order to implement the statutory scheme, we

must determine if danger exists at the time the plaintiff seeks

to file his complaint or notice of appeal IFP. Likewise, the

language of § 1915(g), by using the present tense, clearly

refers to the time when the action or appeal is filed or the

9 Moreover, the addition of Rule 24(a)(3)(B) to the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure supports the conclusion that a three-strikes prisoner

must make a separate showing of imminent danger on appeal. Rule

24(a)(3)(B) provides that, “Apartywho was permitted to proceed in forma

pauperis in the district-court action . . . may proceed on appeal in forma

pauperis without further authorization, unless: . . . (B) a statute provides

otherwise.” Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(B). Subparagraph B was apparently

added in order to reconcile Rule 24’s automatic authorization with the

requirements of the PLRA and to require a prisoner to seek permission to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) advisory

committee’s note.

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 13

motion for IFP status is made.” Id. at 885; see also Choyce

v. Dominguez, 160 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (5th Cir. 1998)

(interpreting Baños as requiring an imminent danger finding

on appeal). The Third and Eighth Circuits have also

concluded, albeit without discussion, that imminent danger

must be shown at the time the notice of appeal is filed, Ball

v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 467 (3d Cir. 2013); Martin v.

Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003), and the Tenth

Circuit has expressly reserved the question, Hafed v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1180 (10th Cir. 2011). 

Thus, we join the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits in

concluding that a three-strikes prisoner may be required to

demonstrate an imminent danger at the time the notice of

appeal is filed in order to proceed in forma pauperis on

appeal.

We do so reluctantly, because if a prisoner is denied

forma pauperis status on appeal on the ground that he no

longer faces an imminent danger, his inability to pay the

filing fee may deprive a court of appeals of the opportunity to

correct any errors committed by the district court. Although

the PLRA was intended to impose the costs of litigation on

prisoners, its purposes do not extend as far as immunizing

erroneous district court decisions. See Abdul-Akbar v.

McKlevie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3rd Cir. 2001). Moreover, as

scholars and judges have noted, the three-strikes provision

raises grave constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Thomas v.

Holder, 750 F.3d 899, 904–09 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Tatel, J.,

specially concurring). Any extension of § 1915(g)’s

provisions should cause us to proceed with caution.

Although these concerns are not sufficient to overcome

the statute’s plain command requiring a showing of imminent

danger at the time of appeal, they provide good reason for us

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14 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

not to depart on appeal from the standard we have developed

for determining imminent danger at the time of the filing of

the complaint. In that context we have held that a prisoner

need only make a “plausible allegation” that he is in

“imminent danger.” Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1055. More

specifically, it is sufficient for the prisoner to allege that he

faces an “ongoing danger,” even if he is not “directly exposed

to the danger at the precise time he filed the complaint.” Id.

at 1056. Thus, “a prisoner who alleges that prison officials

continue with a practice that has injured him or others

similarly situated in the past will satisfy the ‘ongoing danger’

standard.” Id. at 1056–57. We now adopt Andrews as the

standard for determining “imminent danger” on appeal as

well. We do so having in mind “that § 1915(g) concerns only

a threshold procedural question—whether the filing fee must

be paid upfront or later,” id. at 1055—and that “[s]eparate

PLRA provisions are directed at screening out meritless suits

early on.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)). 

As we explained in Andrews, the limited office of § 1915(g)

in determining whether a prisoner can proceed in forma

pauperis counsels against an overly detailed inquiry into the

allegations that qualify for the exception. Id. This is even

more so when an inquiry must be conducted by a court of

appeals, which, unlike a district court, is ill-equipped to

engage in satellite litigation and adjudicate disputed factual

matters. Von Kennel Gaudin v. Remis, 282 F.3d 1178, 1183

(9th Cir. 2002). It is thus particularly important that the

inquiry ordinarily be conducted through analysis of the

prisoner’s facial allegations and that these allegations be

liberally construed. The inquiry is in essence administrative

and may be conducted as such.

We thus hold, consistent with Andrews, that a prisoner

subject to the three-strikes provision may meet the imminent

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 15

danger exception and proceed in forma pauperis on appeal if

he alleges an ongoing danger at the time the notice of appeal

is filed. The prisoner may meet this requirement by

“alleg[ing] that prison officials continue with a practice that

has injured him or others similarly situated in the past,”

Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1057, or that there is a continuing effect

resulting from such a practice. We also conclude that a

prisoner who was found by the district court to sufficiently

allege an imminent danger is entitled to a presumption that

the danger continues at the time of the filing of the notice of

appeal. Just as the financial filings required of prisoners

seeking to proceed in forma pauperis in the court of appeals

are not subjected to detailed factual review and are handled

administratively, we see no need to subject a prisoner’s

allegations of imminent danger to “overlydetailed” review by

panels of the court. Id. at 1055. In enacting the PLRA,

Congress intended to reduce the flood of litigation brought by

prisoners, see Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84, not by a process that

would have the opposite effect, spawning additional litigation

and creatingmini-trials over whether a prisoner has shown an

imminent danger. An affidavit or declaration by the prisoner

that alleges an ongoing danger at the time of the filing of the

notice of appeal will ordinarily suffice to end the inquiry and

allow the prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis.

Applying our test to Williams, we conclude that she

sufficiently alleged an ongoing danger at the time she filed

her notice of appeal. Williams alleges an ongoing

danger—threats to her safety by other inmates—that arises

from the conduct of the original Defendants. In her response

to our order to show cause, she stated that she “is receiving

constant, daily threats of irreparable harm, injury and death

due to the prison officials and defendants revealing to other

inmates (where the appellant is incarcerated) that the

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16 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

appellant is, allegedly, a convicted sex offender and child

molester, which is not true.” Properly construed, Williams’s

allegations are clearly related to her initial complaint

regarding the rumors started by Defendants and their

erroneous assignment of an “R” suffix to her prison file. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). For

these reasons, Williams may proceed in forma pauperis on

this appeal.

B.

The district court granted Defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings because it concluded that Williams

“failed to submit any evidence to rebut Defendants’ showing

that she failed to properly exhaust her administrative

grievances prior to bringing this action.” Because there were

genuine disputes of material fact and because Defendants did

not carry their burden of demonstrating that Williams failed

to exhaust available administrative remedies, summary

judgment was inappropriate and we remand for further

proceedings.

The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust “available

administrative remedies” before bringing an action with

respect to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001). A defendant

may raise failure to exhaust administrative remedies as an

affirmative defense. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216

(2007). Until recently, the law in our circuit held that the

proper procedural device to raise a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies was an unenumerated 12(b) motion. 

See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. In Albino v. Baca, however, we

reversed our prior judgment and held that the proper

procedural device for determining whether administrative

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 17

remedies have been exhausted is a summary judgment

motion. 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 

Although the district court granted Defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings, a district court’s dismissal of a

complaint may be treated as a summary judgment order if the

court considered extraneous evidence submitted bythe parties

in adjudicating the motion. See Del Monte Dunes at

Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1507 (9th

Cir. 1990). Because it is clear that the district court

considered evidence submitted by the parties in reaching its

decision, we construe the district court’s order as a grant of

summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion.10See

Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168. A grant of summary judgment is

appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The evidence must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168.

Albino also established that the appropriate means of

determining whether a defendant has proved a failure to

exhaust is governed by the same burden-shifting regime used

to evaluate exhaustion under the Torture Victim Protection

Act, as articulated in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767

(9th Cir. 1996). 747 F.3d at 1172. Under that regime, a

10 Construing the district court’s order as one granting summary

judgment also comports with Albino’s recognition that the procedural

change it effected may have been merely one of “nomenclature.” Albino,

747 F.3d at 1166.

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18 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

defendant must first prove that there was an available

administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust

that available remedy. Id. (quoting Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 n.

5). Then, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show

that there is something particular in his case that made the

existing and generally available administrative remedies

effectively unavailable to him by “showing that the local

remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged,

inadequate, or obviously futile.” Id. (quoting Hilao, 103 F.3d

at 778 n. 5). The ultimate burden of proof, however, remains

with the defendants. Id.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Williams and applying the Albino/Hilao burden-shifting test,

the district court erred in granting judgment to the

Defendants. First, Williams met her burden of production in

showing that administrative remedies were not available to

her. “To be available, a remedy must be available ‘as a

practical matter’; it must be ‘capable of use; at hand.’” Id. at

1171 (quoting Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir.

2002)). Williams alleged in her complaint that she first tried

informing Officer Paramo about the facts alleged in her

complaint, but that he did not help her and told her, “So what!

That is not my problem! That is your problem!”11 She then

attempted to file a grievance and an appeal on January 5,

2012 with Officer Cobb, who rejected the grievance and

refused to file the appeal. Because an administrative remedy

is not available if “prison officials inform the prisoner that he

cannot file a grievance,” Williams’s statements that she was

thwarted from filing a grievance and appeal meet her burden

11 We treat Williams’s complaint as an affidavit because it was made

under penalty of perjury. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 n.1 (9th Cir.

1996).

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 19

of production. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 937 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Croak, 312 F.3d at 113 (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

The evidence produced by the Defendants at most meets

their burden of demonstrating a system of available

administrative remedies at the initial step of the Albino

burden-shifting inquiry, but Defendants have not carried their

ultimate burden of proof in light of Williams’s factual

allegations. The evidence submitted byDefendants generally

outlines the procedure for filing a formal complaint, but it

does not rebut Williams’s evidence that administrative

remedies were not available to her because her filings were

rejected by prison officials. Nor do Defendants provide

evidence that Williams failed to follow prison procedures by

attempting to file her grievance and appeal with Officers

Cobb and Paramo. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–91

(holding that proper exhaustion requires compliance with

agency’s deadlines and procedures).

Defendants argue that remedies were available to

Williams as evidenced by the multiple unrelated appeals that

she was able to file successfully. This argument is a virtual

non-sequitur because it does nothing to rebut Williams’s

evidence that administrative remedies were not available to

her at the time she tried to file the relevant grievance and

appeal in this case. Other circuits have similarly concluded

that defendants may not simply rely on the existence of an

administrative review process to overcome a prisoner’s

showing that administrative remedies were not available to

him. In Hemphill v. New York, for example, the Second

Circuit held that merely showing that grievance mechanisms

are in place does not end the inquiry into availability where

the plaintiff claims that threats by prison officials made the

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20 WILLIAMS V. PARAMO

remedy functionally unavailable to him. 380 F.3d 680,

687–88 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d

260, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that records showing 53

other inmates had filed grievances during the period in

question did not demonstrate that administrative remedy was

available to plaintiff). Moreover, permitting a defendant to

show that remedies merely existed in a general sense where

a plaintiff has specifically alleged that official action

prevented her from filing a particular grievance would force

a plaintiff to bear the burden of proof, a burden which the

plaintiff does not bear. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172.

Because Defendants did not meet their burden of

demonstrating that Williams had not exhausted available

administrative remedies, we conclude that summaryjudgment

was improper and we remand for further proceedings. See

Dillon, 596 F.3d at 267 (remanding the case because the

record was not sufficiently developed when the district court

granted summary judgment); Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 689

(remanding to district court for further proceedings because

the court could not conclude based on the evidence whether

the threats plaintiff received rendered administrative remedies

unavailable).

IV.

We conclude that a court of appeals may require a threestrike prisoner seeking forma pauperis status to show an

imminent danger at the time the notice of appeal is filed. We

further conclude that the Andrews standard is the appropriate

one to be applied in determining whether a prisoner has

shown an imminent danger on appeal, and that applying that

standard to Williams’s case, she may proceed in forma

pauperis on appeal. Finally, we conclude that the district

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WILLIAMS V. PARAMO 21

court erred in granting summary judgment to the Defendants

on the issue of exhaustion, and that Defendants have not met

their burden of establishing that Williams did not exhaust

available administrative remedies. Accordingly, we grant

Williams the right to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal; we

also vacate the order of the district court and remand for

further proceedings on the issue of exhaustion.

GRANTED; VACATED and REMANDED.

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