Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02324/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02324-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark Reed, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Helen Purcell, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-2324-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

(Doc. 48), accompanied by Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Motion for Fees and Costs (Doc. 52). Plaintiff Mark Reed filed these motions pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), and LRCiv 54.2. (Docs. 48, 52.)

Defendants Maricopa County, Recorder Helen Purcell, and Elections Director Karen

Osborne (collectively, “Defendants”) responded with Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s

Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 49) and Defendants’ Response in

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 53).

I. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees

A. Facts

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants on October 28, 2010, alleging violations

of his First Amendment, due process, and equal protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (Doc. 48 at 1.) Plaintiff’s Complaint challenged Defendants’ per se ban on tea-party

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shirts at polling sites in Maricopa County and requested injunctive relief. (Doc. 1 at 4, 16.)

Defendants’ ban was based on their interpretation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-515. (Doc. 30 at

3.) At the time of the Complaint, A.R.S. § 16-515 stated: “a person shall not be allowed to

remain inside the seventy-five foot limit while polls are open, except for the purpose of

voting . . . and no political or electioneering materials may be displayed within the seventyfive foot limit. Reed v. Purcell, No. CV 10-2324, 2010 WL 4394289, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov.

1, 2010) (quoting A.R.S. § 16-515). 

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on October 28, 2010, to

prevent Defendants from enforcing the per se ban on tea-party apparel at polling stations

during the November 2, 2010 election. (Doc. 48 at 2.) On November 1, 2010, the Court held

a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion at which Elections Director Karen Osborne testified that an

“AFL-CIO t-shirt lacking a specific reference to political action would not be electioneering

material, while a ‘tea party’ t-shirt, without any additional specific reference to political

action, would be electioneering material.” Reed, 2010 WL 4394289, at *3. The Court

granted the Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), finding Plaintiff demonstrated a

likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims that (1) Defendants violated

Plaintiff’s equal protection rights by engaging in viewpoint discrimination and that (2)

Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by failing to issue a clear objective

standard defining “political or electioneering materials” as used in A.R.S. § 16-515. Id.

Because the Legislature of the State of Arizona subsequently amended A.R.S. § 16-

515 by removing the prohibition against “political” materials and clearly defining

“electioneering,” the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint as moot. (Doc. 45 at 2.) Plaintiff

now seeks attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights lawsuit brought pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Doc. 48 at 3.) Plaintiff claims he is a prevailing party because the

Court granted the TRO that “enjoined Defendants’ enforcement of their unconstitutional

policy.” (Id. at 5.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff merely “obtained an emergency and shortlived injunction,” which does not make Plaintiff a prevailing party. (Doc. 49 at 2.) 

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B. Law Governing Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees

The Court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party

in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. A plaintiff is a prevailing party when the

plaintiff (1) “wins on the merits of its claim, (2) [receives relief that] materially alters the

legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior, and (3) that

relief directly benefits the plaintiff.” UFO Chuting of Haw., Inc. v. Smith, 508 F.3d 1189,

1197 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martinez v. Wilson, 32 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

A plaintiff does not need to obtain a final judgment on the merits to “win” on the

merits of its claim. UFO Chuting of Haw., 508 F.3d at 1197 (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton,

446 U.S. 754, 756-57 (1980)). Instead, a plaintiff can satisfy the first and third prevailingparty criteria by obtaining “a preliminary injunction that results in a direct and substantial

benefit” to the plaintiff. UFO Chuting of Haw., 508 F.3d at 1197. For a plaintiff to satisfy

the second criterion of the prevailing-party test, the resulting change in the legal relationship

between the plaintiff and defendant must not be the result of the defendant’s voluntary

actions but instead must be the product of a “judicial imprimatur.” See Buckhannon Bd. &

Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). “A

preliminary injunction issued by a judge has all the judicial imprimatur necessary” for the

plaintiff that wins the injunction to be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of § 1988 if

the plaintiff’s claim subsequently becomes moot. Watson v. Cnty. of Riverside, 300 F.3d

1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that a plaintiff that won

a preliminary injunction, but ultimately lost on the merits of its claim, would not be a

prevailing party). 

The question before the Court is whether the TRO given to Plaintiff is sufficiently

similar to a preliminary injunction as to qualify Plaintiff as a prevailing party and therefore

entitle Plaintiff to attorneys’ fees. “The standard for issuing a [TRO] is identical to the

standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.” Reed, 2010 WL 4394289, at *2 (quoting

Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Mind’s Eye Interiors, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Haw.

2002)). If a TRO alters the legal relationship between parties and does not merely maintain

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the status quo, the party that was awarded the TRO may be a prevailing party. LSO, Ltd. v.

Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir. 2000); Sound v. Koller, Civ. No. 09-00409, 2010 WL

1992194, at *2-4 (D. Haw. Mar. 19, 2010) (finding that a TRO afforded plaintiffs “prevailing

party status”).

C. Application of Law to Facts

The TRO gave Plaintiff a sufficient amount of relief on the merits of his claim for

Plaintiff to be a prevailing party. The TRO did not merely maintain the status quo. The

reason Plaintiff brought a claim against Defendants was because Defendants’ per se ban on

tea-party apparel would prevent Plaintiff from being able to wear tea-party apparel to a

polling station. Defendants did not voluntarily decide to lift the ban or refrain from enforcing

it on November 2, 2010. Instead, by issuing the TRO, the Court prevented Defendants from

enforcing their “likely” unconstitutional ban, which gave Plaintiff the very relief he sought.

Plaintiff thus won a victory in the litigation process based on the merits of his claim that

directly benefitted Plaintiff and altered the legal relationship between Plaintiff and

Defendants.

Defendants argue that “[f]undamental fairness precludes imposing fee liability on

Defendants for a preliminary proceeding that, by its nature, denied Defendants an adequate

opportunity to develop and present the controlling facts and law.” (Doc. 53 at 3.) The Court

acknowledges that the process for obtaining a TRO can sometimes prevent the party

opposing a TRO from having the opportunity to adequately expound its position. However,

in this case, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for an ex parte TRO and instead ordered a

hearing to allow both parties to present arguments and testimony as to why a TRO was or

was not appropriate. (Doc. 10 at 2.) The Court finds that awarding Plaintiff attorneys’ fees

and litigation expenses is not fundamentally unfair.

II. Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees 

A. Facts

Plaintiff requests $70, 270.00 for attorneys’ fees and $954.00 for other litigation costs.

(Doc. 54 at 10.) Plaintiff claims that he incurred the requested fees and costs through the

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1

 Named after the case that first used the index, Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 572 F.

Supp. 354, (D.D.C. 1983) aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir.

1984).

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process of obtaining injunctive relief, responding to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and

preparing the Motion for Fees. (Doc. 52 at 9.) According to Plaintiff, the amount requested

for fees represents

reasonable nontaxable litigation expenses, as well as hours of professional

services reasonably and necessarily performed by experienced, highly-skilled,

and well-regarded attorneys, all of which are customarily requested in civilrights cases and consistent with the customary hourly rates for civil-rights

cases both nationally and in Maricopa County, Arizona area.

(Id. at 8.).

 Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees for the following amount of hours spent by each of

Plaintiff’s attorneys at the rate at which that attorney bills: Diane Cohen, 139.45 hours at

$425 per hour; Christina Kohn, 21.8 hours at $210 per hour; Clint Bolick, 11.4 hours at $450

per hour; Aditya Pawar (law clerk), 7 hours at $127 per hour; and Steven Grothouse (law

clerk), 4 hours at $100 per hour. (Doc. 52 at Exh. 5, pg. 13, Doc. 54 at Exh. 6.) As required

by LRCiv 54.2(e), Plaintiff provided a detailed explanation for each time entry and provided

receipts for the expenses incurred. (Doc. 52 at Exhs. 2, 3.) 

Plaintiff also explained the reasonableness of the rates billed in accordance with

LRCiv 54.2(d)(4)(B). Plaintiff attests that after reviewing “civil rights and other civil

litigation cases in the Phoenix area,” Plaintiff “discovered that hourly rates for comparable

attorneys in the Phoenix legal community customarily ranged between $200 and $500 per

hour and that hourly rates for comparable paralegals and administrative staff ranged from $75

and $150 per hour.” (Doc. 52 at Exh. 5, pg. 8.) Plaintiff also documented that hourly rates

awarded to attorneys in Arizona federal district court cases between 2007 and 2009

“generally ranged between $110 and $400 per hour.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff used the Laffey

Matrix,1

 which is produced by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for

the District of Columbia for the purpose of calculating hourly rates in fee shifting cases, like

the present case, for attorneys of different levels of experience in Washington D.C. See

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2

 The Court may adjust the lodestar calculation upward or downward after

consideration of the following factors: 

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Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Plaintiff

adjusted the Laffey Matrix calculations for Phoenix based upon “the federally-compiled cost

of living data available at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2011 General Schedule

of Locality Pay.” (Doc. 52 at Exh. 5, pg. 10.) According to Plaintiff’s adjusted Laffey

Matrix calculations, the reasonable rate for an attorney in Phoenix with twenty years of

experience or more from 2010 to 2011 was $446 per hour, an attorney with one to three years

of experience was $216 per hour, and paralegals and clerks billed at $127 per hour. (Id.) At

the time of this litigation, Clint Bolick and Diane Cohen each had over twenty years of

experience; Christina Kohn had less than one year of experience; and Aditya Pawar and

Steven Grothouse were law clerks. (Id. at Exh. 5, pgs. 2, 5, 6.) 

Defendants claim Plaintiff’s request is unreasonable for the following reasons: (1)

Plaintiff did not sufficiently demonstrate that the attorneys’ hourly rates were reasonable; (2)

Plaintiff’s attorneys billed for previously completed work; (3) multiple attorneys

unnecessarily performed the same tasks; and (4) an inordinate amount of the fees and costs

requested are related to attorneys preparing Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees. (Doc. 53 at 6.)

B. Law Governing Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees Award

A prevailing plaintiff in a federal civil rights case should recover its attorneys' fees

unless special circumstances would make an award of fees unjust. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 429 (1983). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals uses the “lodestar” method to

determine the permissible amount of attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988. Ballen v. City

of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006). “The lodestar method multiplies the number

of hours ‘the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly

rate.’” Id. (quoting McGrath v. Cnty. of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1995)). The

resulting calculation is “the presumptively accurate measure of reasonable [attorneys’] fees.”

Id.

2

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(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal

service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the

attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount

involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation,

and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case,

(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with

the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

Ballen, 466 F.3d at 746. However, the lodestar amount should only be adjusted in “rare

circumstances.” Id. After review of the factors, the Court determines an adjustment of the

lodestar calculation is not appropriate.

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To meet the prevailing plaintiff’s burden of establishing that the hours listed in an

attorneys’ fees request are reasonable, the plaintiff “should make a good faith effort to

exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary”

and provide adequate documentation supporting the hours expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at

434. Additionally, under § 1988, “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to produce evidence ‘that

the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’” Sorenson v. Mink, 239

F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)).

After the plaintiff meets its burden, the defendant may then provide rebuttal evidence of a

lower hourly rate. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1145.

C. Application of Law to Facts

1. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates

Defendants first claim that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving that the

requested hourly rates are in line with the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.

(Doc. 53 at 6.) However, Defendants do not state how Plaintiff’s calculation and supporting

evidence are insufficient. As required by LRCiv 54.2(d)(4)(B), Plaintiff provided an

affidavit from Diane Cohen, Plaintiff’s lead attorney, that explained the factors relied upon

in determining a reasonable hourly rate. (Doc. 52 at Exh. 5, pgs. 7-11.) According to

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3

 Plaintiff’s attorneys filed a lawsuit against the Coconino County Recorder a few

weeks prior to the commencement of this suit challenging Coconino County’s interpretation

of state and local electioneering rules. Complaint, Wickberg v. Owens, No. CV 10-8177 (D.

Ariz. Sept. 20, 2010) ECF No. 1.

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Cohen’s affidavit, Plaintiff evaluated and presented evidence of the following: civil-litigation

rates in Phoenix, attorneys’ fees awards in Arizona federal district court, and customary civilrights litigation rates in Phoenix based on the Laffey Matrix. Id. The Laffey Matrix is “a

widely recognized compilation of attorney and paralegal data” and is “especially useful when

the work to be evaluated was performed by a mix of senior, junior, and mid-level attorneys,

as well as paralegals.” Craigslist, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. But see Prison Legal News v.

Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that the Ninth Circuit could not

fault a district court for declining to use the Laffey Matrix because it is not necessarily a

sound basis for determining rates outside of Washington D.C.). Plaintiff also provided an

affidavit from a practicing attorney in the relevant areas of law and location that supported

Plaintiff’s hourly rates. (Doc. 52 at Exh. 4.) 

Defendant did not provide any specific reasons for disputing Plaintiff’s hourly rates,

but instead merely asserted that the rates were “unreasonable for this litigation.” (Doc. 53

at 6.) Defendant’s conclusory response is insufficient to rebut Plaintiff’s evidence of

reasonableness. See LRCiv 54.2(f). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested rates are

reasonable.

2. Reasonableness of Hours Expended

Defendants’ remaining claims challenge the reasonableness of the number of hours

in Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees request. (Doc. 53 at 6.) Plaintiff provided sufficient

documentation showing that the hours expended by Plaintiff’s attorneys were reasonable and

were not “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

Plaintiff’s documentation also adhered to the procedural requirements of LRCiv 54.2(d). 

In response, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s billing is excessive given that Plaintiff

had already been compensated for similar work in a “nearly identical” lawsuit.3

 (Doc. 53 at

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6.) However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the hours listed in Plaintiff’s fee request

reflect Plaintiff’s attorneys’ experience gained from other matters including the “nearly

identical” lawsuit. (Doc. 54 at 6.) 

Defendants also claim that Plaintiff’s billing is excessive because multiple attorneys

performed the same task. (Doc. 53 at 7.) Although Defendants claim there were several

situations where this occurred, Defendants only offer one: the presence of three attorneys at

the TRO hearing. (Id.) Given the essential character of the TRO hearing and the minimal

amount of time Plaintiff’s attorneys had to prepare for the hearing, the Court does not find

it unreasonable for Plaintiff to have three attorneys at the hearing to ensure that Plaintiff

received immediate relief. 

Finally, Defendants complain about the amount of time spent by Plaintiff’s attorneys

in their quest for attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 53 at 8.) The Court has little sympathy for

Defendants given Plaintiff’s numerous attempts to settle the matter before unnecessary

litigation expenses would be incurred as evidenced by Plaintiff’s Statement of Consultation,

which Defendants did not dispute. (Doc. 52 at Exh. 5, pgs. 14, 15.)

Defendants also did not adhere to the procedural requirements of LRCiv 54.2(f),

which requires Defendants’ responsive memorandum to “separately identify each and every

disputed time entry or expense item.” LRCiv 54.2(f). Like Defendants’ challenge to

Plaintiff’s hourly rates, Defendants again offer only conclusory statements that challenge

Plaintiff’s itemized listing of hours expended. Thus, Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiff’s

request for attorneys’ fees fails substantively and procedurally. 

III. Conclusion 

By obtaining the TRO, Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this litigation. Plaintiff

followed the procedural requirements of LRCiv 54.2 and provided sufficient evidence that

the requested rates and hours were reasonable. Plaintiff also appropriately and accurately

calculated the total amount of attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method. The Court

determines an adjustment of the lodestar award is not appropriate in this case.

Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and

Costs (Doc. 48) for the amount requested in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion for Fees and Costs (Doc. 52), plus the amount requested

in Plaintiff’s Reply in Further Support of his Memorandum and Points of Authorities (Doc.

54) for a total amount of $71,224.00.

DATED this 31st day of October, 2011.

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