Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03537/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03537-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

 v

SEAN ANDRE BEATTIE,

Defendant.

 /

No C-06-3537 VRW

 CR-00-0363

 ORDER

On January 4, 2007, the court dismissed as untimely

defendant Sean Andre Beattie’s motion attacking his sentence under

28 USC § 2255 (CR 00-0363 Doc #555). Doc #557. Defendant has

filed a motion under FRCP 60(b) and Northern District of California

Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(3) to reconsider the court’s order

dismissing his motion. Doc #559. In support of the motion to

reconsider, defendant asserts that the court did not consider his

petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on appeal in computing

the timeliness of his motion under § 2255. For the reasons stated

herein, the motion to reconsider is GRANTED. After

Case 3:06-cv-03537-VRW Document 3 Filed 05/14/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

reconsideration, however, the timeliness of the petition remains in

doubt; petitioner is granted thirty (30) days to establish the

timeliness of his §2255 motion as is more fully explained below.

In computing the one-year limitations period under 28 USC

§ 2255 paragraph 6, the court reviewed the documents in the

district court file. These contain neither copies of, nor any

reference to, a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. 

Defendant’s motion to reconsider (Doc #559) advised the court of

the existence of such petitions, but did not include any evidence

of them. 

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court may take

judicial notice of a fact “capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

be questioned.” Furthermore, “a court shall take notice if

requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” 

FRE 201(d). Judicial records and dockets from the same or a

closely related case are proper facts for judicial notice under

this standard. See, e g, Miles v State of California, 320 F3d 986,

987 (9th Cir 2003) (taking judicial notice of a state court order

and docket). The court, having taken judicial notice of the docket

of defendant’s appeal, now recognizes the following expanded

chronology of procedural steps as relevant to defendant’s § 2255

motion. 

Defendant filed a timely appeal. Doc #495. By

memorandum opinion and judgment dated December 21, 2004, the court

of appeals affirmed. Doc #551. The defendant then timely

petitioned the court of appeals for rehearing and rehearing en

banc. Ct App docket #03-10355, docket entry dated 2/3/05. Both

Case 3:06-cv-03537-VRW Document 3 Filed 05/14/07 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

were denied by order dated on March 2, 2005. Id, docket entry

dated 3/2/05. Mandate issued March 10, 2005 and was filed in the

district court March 15, 2005. Id & Doc #552. Defendant’s § 2255

motion is signed May 31, 2006 and bears the file-stamp of the

clerk’s office dated June 1, 2006. Doc #555. It is not

accompanied by a proof of service, post-marked envelope or other

document explaining the manner in which it reached the clerk’s

office in San Francisco one day after being signed at Terminal

Island. 

Defendant contends that reconsideration is warranted

because the court did not previously consider the above-referenced

facts in the appellate docket before dismissing his § 2255 motion

as untimely. Civil Local Rule 7-9 permits a party to request leave

to file a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order before a

final judgment is entered adjudicating all of the claims. A party

making such a motion must specifically show one of the following:

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave,

a material difference in fact or law exists

from that which was presented to the Court

before entry of the [] order for which

reconsideration is sought [and] that in the

exercise of reasonable diligence the party

applying for reconsideration did not know

such fact or law at the time of the

interlocutory order; or 

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a

change of law occurring after the time of

such order; or 

(3) A manifest failure by the court to

consider material facts or dispositive legal

arguments which were presented to the court

before such interlocutory order.

Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(3).

\\

Case 3:06-cv-03537-VRW Document 3 Filed 05/14/07 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

While defendant’s motion does not precisely meet the

criteria, it appears to be within the spirit of the rule. 

Especially in light of defendant’s pro per status in his § 2255

proceedings, the court finds it appropriate to reconsider the

untimeliness determination in its order of January 4. 

A motion to vacate, set aside or correct a federal

sentence under § 2255 must be filed, as relevant here, within one

year of the date on which the judgment of conviction became final. 

28 USC § 2255, ¶ 6. A federal prisoner’s judgment becomes final

for purposes of the one-year statute of limitations when the time

expires for the petitioner to file a petition for a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the

petitioner actually files such a petition. Clay v United States,

537 US 522, 523-25 (2003); United States v Garcia, 210 F3d 1058,

1060-61 (9th Cir 2000). 

Rule 13 ¶ 3 of the Supreme Court Rules provides, as

relevant to this motion: 

The time to file a petition for a writ of

certiorari runs from the date of entry of the

judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not

from the issuance date of the mandate * * *. But

if a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the

lower court by any party, * * * the time to file

the petition for a writ of certiorari for all

parties * * * runs from the date of the denial of

rehearing or, if rehearing is granted, the

subsequent entry of judgment.

 Under the Supreme Court Rules, calculation of any period

contained in the rules shall exclude the day on which the

triggering event occurs and include the last day of the period. 

Supreme Court Rule 30. Accordingly, the period for defendant to

petition for certiorari began on March 3, 2005 and ended 90 days

Case 3:06-cv-03537-VRW Document 3 Filed 05/14/07 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

later on May 31, 2005, making the judgment final on that date. 

The defendant then had one year in which to file his §

2255 motion. FRCP 6(a) governs computation of the one-year

limitation period under § 2255. Patterson v Stewart, 251 F3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir 2001). FRCP 6(a) prescribes the same method for time

computation as does Rule 30 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. This

method has been dubbed the “anniversary method” because it yields a

final date on the one-year anniversary of the date of the event from

which the period begins to run. Patterson, 251 F3d at 1246. Only

if the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday or the

clerk’s office is inaccessible due to weather or other conditions

are days added to the prescribed period. FRCP 6(a). 

Under these rules, the one-year limitation period that

ran from the date the defendant’s judgment became final ended on

May 31, 2006, a Wednesday. The fact that the petition was not

filed until the following day does not conclusively establish that

it was untimely, however, because of the existence of two doctrines

that have been found relevant in other cases of this kind: the

doctrine of equitable tolling and the “prisoner mailbox rule.” 

The doctrine of equitable tolling applies to petitions

under § 2255. United States v Battles, 362 F3d 1195 (9th Cir

2004). The availability of equitable tolling is subject to a “very

high threshold” of demonstrating that “extraordinary circumstances

beyond [his] control [made] it impossible to file a petition on

time and the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his

untimeliness.” Id at 1197, citing Laws v Lamarque, 351 F3d 919,

922 (9th Cir 2003). 

\\

Case 3:06-cv-03537-VRW Document 3 Filed 05/14/07 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

The prisoner mailbox rule deems a habeas petition filed

at the moment the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for

forwarding to the clerk of the court. Stillman v Lamarque, 319 F3d

1199 (9th Cir 2003). The rule is only available when two

requirements are met: (1) the prisoner is proceeding without

counsel; and (2) the prisoner must deliver the petition to prison

authorities for forwarding to the court within the limitations

period. Id. The mailbox rule applies to § 2255 petitions. United

States v Garcia, 210 F3d 1058 (9th Cir 2000). 

There is nothing before the court to indicate that either

the doctrine of equitable tolling or the prisoner mailbox rule

applies here. Because the court has granted the motion for

reconsideration of its dismissal order and because the filing

appears to be only one day late, however, the court grants

petitioner thirty (30) days from the date of this order to adduce

evidence demonstrating that either the doctrine of equitable

tolling or the prisoner mailbox rule applies to these facts. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-03537-VRW Document 3 Filed 05/14/07 Page 6 of 6