Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00617/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00617-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Micah Johnson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Scottsdale, a municipal

corporation; Alan Rodbell, in his official

capacity as Chief of Police, City of

Scottsdale, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-617-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state

a claim for relief. See Doc. #14. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the

motion.

Background

Plaintiff, a former police officer with the City of Scottsdale, commenced this action

by filing a civil rights complaint against Defendants on February 23, 2005. Doc. #1.

Defendants filed a mot ion to dismiss the complaint on August 9, 2005. Doc. #7. Plaintiff

subsequently filed an amended complaint. Doc. #11.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on October 20, 2005.

Doc. #14. When Plaintiff failed to respond, Defendants moved for summary disposition

of the motion. Doc. #16. The next day, Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of t ime to file

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a response and t he proposed response. Docs. ##19-20. The Court granted the motion for

extension of time. Doc. #22. Defendants filed a reply on December 19, 2005. Doc. #21.

Discussion

A. Legal Standard.

The Court may not dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim unless

it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Court must accept all factual allegations of the amended complaint as true and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. See Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217

(9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, may not assume that Plaintiff can prove facts different

from those alleged in the amended complaint. See Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal.

v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his amended complaint: Plaint iff worked as a

p olice officer for the City of Scottsdale from 1999 until the end of 2002. Doc. #11 ¶ 5.

Plaintiff was supervised by Sergeant R. Stringfellow. Id. ¶ 6. During 2002, Stringfellow

devoted inordinate amounts of on-duty time to his privat e used-car business. Id. ¶ 9.

Stringfellow asked Plaintiff for assistance with the business, including help repossessing

cars and a request for $30,000. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. Stringfellow also asked Plaint iff to go into

business with him. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff politely declined each request. Id. ¶ 15.

Stringfellow subsequent ly became more “distant” from Plaintiff and began

questioning Plaintiff’s activities, scrut inizing his police reports, and discussing Plaintiff

with other members of Plaintiff’s squad. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. When Plaintiff object ed to what he

believed were reprisals for not giving Stringfellow money or becoming his business

partner, Stringfellow caused an internal affairs investigation to be initiated against Plaintiff.

Id. ¶¶ 18-19. By October 2002, Stringfellow’s reprisals and harassment became so

intolerable that Plaintiff resigned his position with the Scottsdale Police Dep artment. Id.

¶¶ 20-21.

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Defendants have withdrawn their statute of limitations argument. Doc. #14 at n.2.

Given the Court’s ruling that Plaint iff has failed to state a constitutional violation, the Court

need not address Defendants’ argument that Plaint iff’s claim is barred by A.R.S. § 41-

1828.01(C). See id. at 2-3.

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Plaintiff requested reserve officer status with the Department. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Such

status would assure Plaintiff that his reputation as a law enforcement officer was

unblemished. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff also request ed a name-clearing hearing. Id. ¶ 28. The City

failed to act on the requests. Id. ¶ 29. 

Defendants made an int ernal affairs report available to Plaintiff on April 1, 2003. Id.

¶ 22. Defendants charged Plaint iff with making false statements in a police report. Id. ¶ 23.

Defendant s rep eated the charge to the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training

Board, the body charged by law with certifying, suspending, or revoking the credentials

of Arizona law enforcement officers. Id. ¶ 25.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ failure to grant a name-clearing hearing violates

his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Const it ut ion

because Defendants’ actions have created a stigma that eliminates his liberty to take

advantage of other employment opportunities. Id. ¶¶ 31-32.

C. The Parties’ Arguments.

Defendants argue that Plaint iff has not alleged a liberty interest protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment because he resigned his position with the Scottsdale Police

Department. Doc. #7 at 2-4. Plaintiff argues that termination of employment is not required

to allege a protect ed libert y interest. Doc. #12 at 3-4. Plaintiff contends that damage to his

reputation, Defendant s’ failure to rehire him, and the foreclosure of other employment

opportunities suffice. Id.1

D. Analysis and Conclusion.

It is settled law that “harm to reputation alone is insufficient to implicate an

individual’s liberty interest.” Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th

Cir. 1998) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976)). To raise a prot ect ed liberty

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interest in the employment context a plaintiff must allege that the accuracy of the

stigmatizing charge against him is contested, there is some public disclosure of the charge,

and the charge is made in connection with termination of employment or, perhaps, a refusal

to rehire the plaintiff. See id; Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1552 (9t h Cir. 1988); Bd. of

Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (“There might be cases in which

a State refused to re-employ a person under such circumstances that interests in liberty

would be implicated.”); Paul, 424 U.S. at 710 (discussing Roth and stating that “it was not

thought sufficient to establish a claim under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment that

there simply be defamation by a state official; the defamation had to occur in the course

of termination of employment.”).

In this case, the charge against Plaintiff was not made in connection with

termination of emp loy ment . Plaintiff resigned from the police force and the charge was

made after his resignation. Nor was the charge made in connection with the City’s refusal

to rehire Plaintiff as a reserve officer. Plaintiff request ed reserve officer status on

Sep t ember 9, 2002. Doc. #11 ¶ 26. The charge against Plaintiff was made more than six

months later in April 2003. Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.

Although the charge that Plaintiff made false statements in a police report “would

undoubtedly damage the reputation of one in his position, and impair his future

employment p rosp ect s,” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991), the charge was made

after his resignation and the refusal to rehire him. Plaintiff therefore has failed to allege a

liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; Botefur v. City of Eagle

Point, 7 F.3d 152, 158 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Although he alleged that the false statements

impaired his future employment prospects, Bot efur did not state a valid § 1983 claim

because the alleged defamat ory statements were made, if at all, after Botefur resigned.”);

Moore v . Deschutes County, No. Civ. 01-6189-HO, 2003 WL 23590755, *3 (D. Or. Oct. 2,

2003) (“[A]lthough plaintiff asserts that she was constructively discharged, she was not

terminated and official publication of a stigmatiz ing charge without discharge is not of itself

constitutionally prohibited.”). The Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

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amended complaint.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary disposition of motion to dismiss amended

complaint (Doc. #16) is denied.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. #14) is granted.

3. Defendant s’ mot ion to dismiss the original complaint (Doc. #7) is denied as

moot.

DATED this 17th day of January, 2006.

 

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