Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-03009/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-03009-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEVI JAMES,

Petitioner,

v.

HEIDI LACKNER, et al.,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 13-3009-GPC(WVG)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

 I

 INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Levi James (hereafter “Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereafter “Petition”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Heidi Lackner (hereafter “Respondent”) filed an Answer

to the Petition. Petitioner filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer on March 10, 2014. 

Petitioner contends he is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because the

trial court failed to declare a mistrial sua sponte after his trial was allegedly rendered

unfair by a witness’s reference to his status as a parolee-at-large. (Petition, Attachment

A at 6-9).

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The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s

Traverse, and all the supporting documents and evidence presented in this case. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

II

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them

to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003) (“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”) The following statement

of facts is substantially taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion, People v.

Levi James, No. D062386, slip. op. (Cal. Ct. App. June 26, 2013). (Respondent’s

Lodgment 6.) 

[Petitioner] does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to

establish his guilt of the charged offenses. The actual facts of those

offenses are not very significant in the analysis of the legal issues in this case. Accordingly, we will adopt the brief summary of the facts as set forth in the respondent’s brief.

About 9:30 p.m., on February 12, 2012, Micah Clothier was working as a nonuniformed asset protection agent in a drug store on South

Coast Highway in Oceanside, California, when [Petitioner] entered

the store with another man. Clothier watched as [Petitioner] walked

around the store for about a minute and then walked to the liquor section of the store. 

While Clothier was standing in an aisle next to the liquor section and looking at a ceiling mounted mirror over the liquor section and a

television monitor displaying the liquor section, he saw [Petitioner] remove a sensor cap from a bottle of Jack Daniel’s liquor worth $40.00, and put the bottle down his pants leg. Clothier decided to stop [Petitioner] in the store rather than to allow [Petitioner] to leave

the store with the liquor.

As [Petitioner] walked down an aisle towards Clothier, Clothier

identified himself to [Petitioner] as the store’s agent, and demanded [Petitioner] hand Clothier the liquor. [Petitioner] responded, “I don’t give a fuck who you are,” continued to walk towards Clothier, and

caused Clothier to move to the side. [Petitioner] pushed past Clothier and bumped Clothier’s shoulder with his own shoulder. When

Clothier stepped back into [Petitioner’s] path, [Petitioner] responded by rushing at Clothier, with both hands extended and arms bent at

the elbow, and he grabbed Clothier’s throat with an open hand.

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Clothier grabbed [Petitioner’s] neck to protect himself, and the two

men began grappling with each other.

After Clothier managed to place [Petitioner] into a headlock,

Clothier felt a hard, blunt object twice hit the back of his head.

Clothier’s head began to hurt. No one was behind Clothier. Clothier

saw that [Petitioner] was holding the liquor bottle by the neck.

Another worker in the store also saw [Petitioner] holding a bottle as

[Petitioner] was struggling with Clothier.

After Clothier yelled for help, store employees and a bystander

rushed to Clothier’s assistance and helped put [Petitioner] on the ground. The bottle broke on the ground. As [Petitioner] struggled to

get free, he grabbed Clothier’s crotch. Clothier responded by punching him a couple of times. Police arrived soon thereafter and

arrested [Petitioner]. 

Clothier suffered a lump and a laceration on the back of his head and

an injury to the bridge of his nose. 

[Petitioner] had no cash, wallet, or method of payment with him at the time he was arrested.

[Petitioner] did not testify at trial.

(Respondent’s Lodgment 6 at 3-5.)

As indicated in the above statement, the aforementioned facts are not contested

by Petitioner, and are not very significant in the analysis of the legal issue in this case.

(Respondent’s Lodgment 6 at 3.) The events giving rise to the legal issue under

consideration occurred during Petitioner’s trial, and are described below:

Prior to the commencement of trial, in efforts to avoid prejudice toward

Petitioner, the trial court granted a defense motion to exclude evidence of Petitioner’s

status as a parolee-at-large at the time of his arrest. (Id. at 5.) Nevertheless, during the

testimony of witness Officer Nickolas Nunez of the Oceanside Police Department,

testimonial evidence of Petitioner’s parolee status surfaced. (Id. at 6.) Immediately

thereafter, the court, sua sponte, instructed the jury to disregard Officer Nunez’s

statement, and recessed the jury for a brief duration to confer with counsel out of the

jury’s presence. (Id.) While the trial court discussed the officer’s improper statement

with counsel, it declined a defense motion to dismiss the case, but added that a defense

motion for mistrial would be granted if defense counsel desired. (Respondent’s

Lodgment 4 at 6.) However, Petitioner’s counsel declined to move for a mistrial,

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fearing that it would provide the prosecution an opportunity to retry the case against

Petitioner. (Respondent’s Lodgment 2 at 182). After the court conferred with counsel,

the trial resumed in the presence of the jury, at which point the court gave further

instructions to the jury to disregard Officer Nunez’s statement regarding the Petitioner’s

parolee status, and that the issue raised in the improper statement would not be litigated

in this trial. (Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 8.) 

After the prosecution rested its case, counsel for Petitioner again suggested

that the trial court dismiss the case, or in the alternative, to declare a mistrial sua sponte.

(Id.) The court decided it did not have a legal basis to take either of these actions, and

that these proposed remedies would be too severe because jeopardy would attach to the

charges. (Id. at 8-9. See also Respondent’s Lodgment 2 at 202.) Instead, it again

instructed the jury to disregard the evidence pertaining to Petitioner’s parolee status.

(Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 9). The jury found Petitioner guilty on all charges.

(Respondent’s Lodgment 1 at 18-21; Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 10). 

 III

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court

On June 7, 2012, Petitioner was convicted by jury in California Superior Court

case SCN 302219 on four counts consisting of robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211), assault

with a deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)), misdemeanor petty theft (Cal.

Penal Code § 484), and burglary in the second degree (Cal. Penal Code § 459).

(Respondent’s Lodgment 1 at 18-21, 178.) The jury also found that Petitioner used a

deadly weapon in commission of the robbery and assault [Cal. Penal Code §

12022(b)(1), 1192.7(c)(23)]. (Id. at 18-21.) The Superior Court found that Petitioner

had been previously sentenced to prison within the meaning of California Penal Code

§ 667.2(b), and had previously been convicted of a serious and violent felony within

the meaning of California Penal Code § 667(b)-(i). (Id. at 178.) The trial court struck

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the prior convictions and sentenced Petitioner to four years, eight months in state

prison. (Id. at 159-60, 178.) 

B. California Court of Appeal

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to the California Court of

Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgments 3, 5). There, Petitioner claimed that the trial court

failed to declare a mistrial, and that his petty theft conviction was actually a lesser

included offense of his robbery conviction, and should have accordingly been stricken.

(Respondent’s Lodgment 3 at 6, 17.) In an unpublished decision dated June 26, 2013,

the Court of Appeal agreed with the latter contention and reversed Petitioner’s petty

theft conviction. (Respondent’s Lodgment 6 at 9). However, the Court of Appeal

denied Petitioner’s claim regarding the trial court’s purported failure to declare a

mistrial, explaining that it was well within its discretion to decline to declare a mistrial

sua sponte. (Id. at 5, 9.) The Court of Appeal further found that the trial court’s remedy

of extensive corrective jury instructions and jury admonitions eliminated any possible

prejudice. (Id. at 5.)

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies

On August 7, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in California

Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment 7.) On September 11, 2013, the California

Supreme Court denied the Petition without comment, exhausting Petitioner’s state

remedies. (Respondent’s Lodgment 8.)

On December 16, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in this Court. On February 11, 2014, Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition. On

March 10, 2014, Petitioner filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer.

 IV 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“the AEDPA”), applies to all petitions for Writs of

Habeas Corpus filed in federal court after the AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 

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1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). Because the

Petition was filed on December 16, 2013, the AEDPA applies to this case. Section

2254(a) sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treatises of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a).

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2245(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).

“AEDPA establishes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court

rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” 

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007); quoting Woodford v.

Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002). To obtain federal habeas relief,

Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 403, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1517 (2000). The Supreme Court has ruled that

the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) permits a grant of habeas relief “if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” (Id. at 412-13.) The Supreme Court has also interpreted the

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) to allow a grant of “the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

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case.” (Id. at 413.) The Supreme Court has clarified that under § 2254(d)(2), even an

erroneous or incorrect application of clearly established federal law does not support

a habeas grant, unless the state court’s application was “objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1174 (2003). 

“Where there has been one reasoned judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the

same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594 (1991);

Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F. 3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal court

looks “to the last reasoned decision of the state court,” here the California Court of

Appeal, as the basis for the state court’s judgment. Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998,

1002 (9th Cir. 2007); quoting Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 n.3 (9th Cir.

2002). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas

corpus claim. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 365 (2002).

Notwithstanding the absence of citations to Supreme Court precedent, habeas relief is

not merited if the state court decision neither contradicts the reasoning nor the result

of Supreme Court rulings. (Id.)

V

DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that habeas relief is proper because his due process rights

were violated when his trial was allegedly rendered fundamentally unfair as a result of

Officer Nunez’s testimonial disclosure of Petitioner’s status as a parolee-at-large.

(Petition at 6.) Petitioner argues that in light of the disclosure, the trial court had a duty

to declare a mistrial sua sponte.

1/

1/

Further, Petitioner complains of repeatedly receiving his mail with significant delay since

arriving at the correctional institution in which he resides. (Petition, Attachment A at ii). Petitioner

contends that on several occasions his mail had been opened by the correctional institution’s staff

prior to its delivery to him. (Id.) Petitioner claims that delaying his mail denies him access to the

courts, as required by the United States Constitution. (Id.) However, Petitioner does not contend that

the mail issue provides grounds for federal habeas corpus relief. (See id.)

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A. Petitioner’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated By the Trial Court’s Refusal to Declare a Mistrial Sua Sponte Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights to due process were violated

when the trial court failed to declare a mistrial sua sponte after testimonial evidence was

presented that exposed Petitioner’s status as a parolee-at-large at the time of his arrest.

Petitioner informs the Court that the trial court had issued a pre-trial order for the

parolee-at-large evidence’s suppression. (See id.) Respondent argues that the

complained of error was rendered harmless on the basis of the trial court’s extensive

instructions to the jury to disregard the evidence, and the strength of the other evidence

presented. (Answer at 2.)

The California Supreme Court has held that “a prosecutor has a duty to guard

against statements by witnesses containing inadmissible evidence.” People v. Warren

45 Cal.3d 471, 481. It has further held that when prejudicial prosecutorial error is

“incurable by admonition or instruction[,]” the trial court should declare a mistrial.

People v. Haskett, 30 Cal.3d 841, 854. However, a sua sponte motion for mistrial

should be rarely made, see Carillo v. Superior Court, 145 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1528

(2006), and only where there is a “legal necessity” to do so. Curry v. Superior Court,

2 Cal.3d 707, 713 (1970).2/

 “A mere error of law or procedure, however, does not

constitute legal necessity.” (Id.) Finally, a trial judge maintains broad discretion “which

the ‘fundamental concepts of the federal administration of criminal justice’ allow . . .

in determining whether or not a mistrial is appropriate . . . .” Gori v. United States, 367

U.S. 364, 366, 81 S. Ct. 1523, 1525 (1961) [quoting United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43,

47 (1960)]. “Such exercise of that discretion will not be overturned on appeal unless the

record demonstrates a clear abuse of that discretion.” (Respondent’s Lodgment 6 at 7.)

Furthermore, a court should look particularly at the sufficiency of the court’s remedy

to address the error that could potentially lead to a mistrial. (Id.) 

2/

In Curry, the trial court had declared a mistrial sua sponte on the ground that certain testimony had been

erroneously admitted. The reviewing court held that “[e]ven if it had been clearly improper to admit the testimony, the

ruling would not have constituted legal necessity.”

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In response to Petitioner’s challenge to the trial court’s failure to declare a

mistrial sua sponte, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecutorial

error was relatively insignificant. (See id. at 3). Specifically, the Court of Appeal stated:

After careful review of this colorful record, we conclude the

erroneous comment was brief, unsolicited and never repeated. The court’s prompt and thorough instruction to the jury cured any

prejudice under the circumstances of this case. We do not find

anything in the record to demonstrate misconduct by the prosecu- tion. Indeed the record is devoid of explanation of why the officer volunteered his comment.

(Id.)

The Court of Appeal reasoned that the trial court had appropriately addressed

the impropriety by giving extensive jury instructions to disregard the parolee-at-large

testimony, and by providing the defense an opportunity to move for a mistrial. (Id.)

However, defense counsel declined to move for a mistrial, and instead desired the

court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, or a dismissal of the charges. (Id.) In other

words, “the defense was satisfied with the state of evidence at that time and refused to

request a mistrial.” (Id.) Petitioner’s counsel’s last hope in avoiding Petitioner’s

convictions hinged on a sua sponte declaration of mistrial by the trial court, which

would have effectively barred retrial of the state’s claims against Petitioner, as double

jeopardy would have attached. Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 707, 714 (1970).

In the present case, the trial court’s declination to declare a mistrial sua sponte 

was sound. To have done differently would have effectively barred the retrial of the

charges against Petitioner. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit

have held that federal habeas corpus relief is not appropriate in these circumstances.

“Failure to comply with [a] state’s rules of evidence is . . . [not] a sufficient basis for

granting habeas relief.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).

Furthermore, the erroneous admission of evidence is “not part of a federal court’s

habeas review” unless it resulted in a violation of the “Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Even evidence admitted in violation of due process only warrants relief when it is “of

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such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920 (quoting

Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit has

recognized this restrictive standard: 

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Although the

Court has been clear that a writ should be issued when constitutional

errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant

issuance of the writ. Absent such ‘clearly established Federal law,’ we cannot conclude that the state court’s ruling was an ‘unreasonable application.’ Under the strict standards of AEDPA, we are therefore

without power to issue the writ on the basis of [Petitioner’s erroneous admission of evidence] claims (citations omitted).

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).

This Court cannot disturb the trial court’s discretion to allow the jury to

disregard the complained-of testimony unless the admission of the testimony rendered

the trial “arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.” Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 865 (9th

Cir. 1982). This Court agrees with the decision rendered by the Court of Appeal, insofar

as its determination that extensive jury instructions and admonitions, and the extension

of an offer to grant a defense motion for a mistrial, eliminated any prejudice towards

Petitioner that would warrant federal habeas corpus relief. The Court finds that the

complained-of testimony did not render the trial “arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.” 

Even if Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the trial court’s refusal

to declare a mistrial sua sponte (which they were not), the evidence supporting

Petitioner’s conviction was overwhelming. Petitioner attempted to steal liquor from a

drug store, then engaged in a physical altercation with the store’s asset protection agent

after the agent confronted Petitioner, which then led to the Petitioner’s infliction of

physical harm and injuries to the store’s agent. (See Respondent’s Lodgment 6 at 3-5.)

The veracity of these allegations against Petitioner were substantiated through credible

witness testimony at Petitioner’s trial. These acts support Petitioner’s convictions for

robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211), assault with a deadly weapon [Cal. Penal Code §

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245(a)(1)], and burglary in the second degree (Cal. Penal Code § 459). Therefore,

Petitioner’s claim in this regard is DENIED.

B. Petitioner’s Complaint Regarding the Timely Receipt of Mail

Petitioner also alleges that the correctional institution in which he resides has

failed to deliver his mail in a timely fashion. (Petition, Attachment A at ii.) Petitioner

claims that delaying his mail denies him access to the courts, as required by the United

States Constitution. (Id.) However, Petitioner does not contend that the mail delivery

issue provides grounds for federal habeas corpus relief. (See id.) Thus, despite

Petitioner’s claim, it is irrelevant in this Court’s determination of federal habeas corpus

relief. The Court agrees with Petitioner. A prison’s failure to timely deliver mail to an

inmate is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. Moreover, even if the mail

delivery issue was cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, the claim is unexhausted

because it was never presented to the California Supreme Court. (See Respondent’s

Lodgment 7). As a result, Petitioner’s claim in this regard is DENIED.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge

RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This report

and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 3, 2014, any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed

with the court and served on all parties no later than July 17, 2014 The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

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raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 3, 2014

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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