Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00006/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00006-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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1

 Plaintiff's counsel represents in his December 8, 2006 Declaration: "Defaults were entered as to

all defendants on November 2, 2006." Meagher Decl. ¶ 25. However, the docket reflects only the filing of his

requests, with no formal action taken by the Clerk's Office, albeit that the entry of a default for failure to timely

respond to a Complaint is a ministerial act.

2

 "My advisory of the default was given to opposing counsel as a courtesy [by letter dated October

26, 2006]. It was at that time that I advised Mr. Ellis and Mr. Bastian, that I would wait until the close of

business on November 2, 2006, before I would submit the Defaults. It was my belief that although already late

- 1 - 06cv0006

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN J. ROUSE, JR., an individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv0006-LAB (RBB)

ORDER EXCUSING DEFAULT

[Dkt Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36]

vs.

LAW OFFICES OF RORY CLARK, RORY

CLARK, an individual, JAN SHAPIRO, an

individual, and WORLDWIDE ASSET

PURCHASING, a Limited Liability

Company,

Defendants.

On September 26, 2006, the court entered an Order denying defendants' anti-SLAPP special

motions to dismiss four of six causes of action alleged in this Fair Debt Collection Practices matter.

Defendants filed no timely Answer thereafter. On November 2, 2006, plaintiff filed requests for entry

of default against each defendant.1 On November 3, 2006, defendants filed an Answer to the

Complaint, one day later than the date plaintiff's counsel had indicated he was willing to forego default

requests and days after the responsive pleading was due under the federal rules.2

Case 3:06-cv-00006-LAB-RBB Document 55 Filed 12/12/06 Page 1 of 4
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28 with Answers, professional courtesy demanded that I give opposing counsel one week to file Answers."

Meagher Decl. ¶¶13, 15.

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In consideration of the strong policy preference to decide cases on their merits, the court

entered an Order To Show Cause ("OSC") on November 17, 2006, instructing defendants to file an

explanation showing good cause why the default should be excused and the late Answer accepted.

Plaintiff was thereafter to file a statement of non-opposition to the denial of his default requests, or to

file opposition adequate to persuade the court to strike the Answer and to enter the defaults. 

The defendants had already appeared in this action through the timely filing of anti-SLAPP

motions. The denial of those motions on September 26, 2006 triggered the Answer deadline clock,

a deadline defendants acknowledge they missed. Defendants have responded to the OSC with a

request to discharge the OSC and to deny plaintiff's requests for entry of default, supported by sworn

Declarations. As pertinent to this decision, they make the following persuasive showings: (1) counsel

June D. Coleman, Esq. avers she changed law firms in late September 2006, with a transition

agreement with her former firm about the processing of all communications about her pending cases

that apparently broke down with respect to notice of this court's decision on the anti-SLAPP motions;

(2) Ms. Coleman was out of her office for portions of the first week of October due to her own illness,

an on-going family medical emergency, and Northern California appearances in other cases during

that month; (3) she first became aware of the court's September 26, 2006 ruling on October 23, 2006;

(4) Ms. Coleman spoke with opposing counsel, M. David Meagher, Esq., on November 1, 2006, after

learning he had contacted her old firm regarding the filing of an Answer, and they discussed issues

related to the need to file a substitution of attorney, among other things, during which conversation

Ms. Coleman committed to file an Answer by November 2, 2006 on behalf of all defendants, timing

Mr. Meagher agreed would avoid his filing of requests for entry of default; (5) Ms. Coleman

electronically filed the Answer shortly after midnight on November 2-3, 2006, the lateness occasioned

by a family medical emergency and difficulties with the new e-filing process; and (6) the chain of

events supports a finding of inadvertence caused by a combination of factors beyond Ms. Coleman's

control rather than lack of diligence. 

The Declaration of William A. Munoz, Esq., an attorney in Ms. Coleman's former firm,

Case 3:06-cv-00006-LAB-RBB Document 55 Filed 12/12/06 Page 2 of 4
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28 3

 The docket reveals each defendant in this case filed a Notice of Substitution of Attorney on October

11 and 23, or November 6, 2006.

- 3 - 06cv0006

substantiates that firm's responsibility to forward incoming mail to her, as well as the results of an

unsuccessful search for the September 26, 2006 Order or anyone who recalls seeing that Order. The

Declaration of Mark E. Ellis, co-counsel with Ms. Coleman in this case, substantiates the move to their

new firm, beginning the week of September 25, 2006, was characterized by misplaced mail,

temporarily lost files, delayed filings of substitutions of attorney and the like,3 and confirms defense

counsel's intention to "zealously defend the action." All the declarations provided in support of

defendants' response to the OSC by persons in both firms responsible for receiving and reviewing court

Orders state none of those individuals recalls seeing the September 26, 2006 Order denying the antiSLAPP motions.

Plaintiff filed opposition to defendants' motion for relief from default in response to the OSC.

He makes two arguments, both going to the merits of the action. He alleges he owed no money to the

defendants (a fact essentially conceded by defendants in the parties' presentations in support of and in

opposition to the anti-SLAPP motions), and that defendants allegedly committed numerous violations

of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. On the strength of his argument

defendants purportedlylack a meritorious defense to the "strict liability" Act, plaintiff urges relief from

the default be denied. The court deems such arguments are appropriately considered in fully-briefed

summary judgment motions rather than informing the narrow decision before the court here: whether

to accept the late Answer based on a satisfactory showing of excusable neglect and to permit

defendants to defend this action. Contrary to plaintiff's characterization, the court finds defendants'

conduct does not support a finding of "deliberate failure to respond." Defendants timely filed motions

in response to the Complaint, and their counsel declare their intention to zealously defend the action.

No prejudice appears from the short delay beyond the time plaintiff's counsel appears to have promised

he would not to seek entry of default. The court finds the default is excusable. 

The court further finds plaintiff's request to recovery attorneys' fees should be denied.

Plaintiff's reliance on authority dealing with recovery of attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining a default

judgment -- in circumstances where the court had previously set aside several defaults and in the

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context of sanctions for misbehavior in the discovery process -- is misplaced. See Nilsson, Robbins

et al. v. Louisiana Hydroelectric, 854 F.2d 1538 (9th Cir. 1988). Without reaching the issue of the

reasonableness of his attempted recovery of $6,175.50 for 17.90 hours counsel represents he has spent

"related to the Default," his authority is inapposite to the procedural posture of this case and to the

conduct of defendants associated with the timing of the filing of their Answer.

. For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's requests to enter defendants' defaults are DENIED.

2. To the extent the filing of the requests for entry of default may be construed as entries

of default, the defaults are hereby excused and set aside, with defendants' Answer deemed timely filed.

3. Plaintiff's request for an award of attorneys' fees associated with his pursuit of the

defaults is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 12, 2006

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00006-LAB-RBB Document 55 Filed 12/12/06 Page 4 of 4