Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01411/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01411-54/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DUHN OIL TOOL, INC., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

COOPER CAMERON CORPORATION, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-1411 OWW/GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO

DISMISS CLAIMS OF

CONTRIBUTORY AND INDUCEMENT

INFRINGEMENT WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND (Doc. 414)

Defendant Cooper Cameron Corporation (“Cameron”) moves to

dismiss the contributory and inducement infringement claims in

Plaintiff Duhn Oil Tool’s (“Duhn”) Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted on the ground that the SAC fails to allege direct

infringement of the ‘925 Patent by anyone other than Cameron.

A. GOVERNING STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) th

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where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the

complaint presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead

essential facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a th

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences

from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). “A district court th

should grant a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs have not pled

‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Williams ex rel. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 F.3d

934, 938 (9 Cir.2008), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley,

th

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “‘Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Bell Atlantic, id. at 555. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The

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plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully, Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that

are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___

U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court explained:

Two working principles underlie our decision

in Twombley. First, the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitations of

the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice

... Rule 8 marks a notable and generous

departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does

not unlock the doors of discovery for a

plaintiff armed with nothing more than

conclusions. Second, only a complaint that

states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss ... Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief

will ... be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense ... But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ....

In keeping with these principles, a court

considering a motion to dismiss can choose to

begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While

legal conclusions can provide the framework

of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.

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 Immunities and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on

a motion to dismiss only when they are established on the face of

the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th

Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

Cir. 1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached

to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc, 146

F.3d 699, 705-706 (9 Cir.1988). th

B. MERITS OF MOTION

35 U.S.C. § 271 provides:

(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of

a patent shall be liable as an infringer.

(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells ... a

component of a patented machine, manufacture,

combination or composition, or a material or

apparatus for use in practicing a patented

process, constituting a material part of the

invention, knowing the same to especially

made or especially adapted for use in an

infringement of such patent, and not a staple

article or commodity of commerce suitable for

substantial noninfringing use, shall be

liable as a contributory infringer.

Cameron cites Fuji Mach. Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Hover-Davis,

Inc., 936 F.Supp. 93, 94-95 (W.D.N.Y.1996):

Numerous courts have held that in order for a

plaintiff to prevail on a claim for either

inducement of infringement or contributory

infringement, direct infringement must be

proved. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v.

Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.

476, 483 ... (1964)(‘[I]t is settled that if

there is no direct infringement of a patent

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there can be no contributory infringement.’

(quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top

Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 ...

(1961)); Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt,

Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed.Cir.

1993)(‘Liability for either active inducement

of infringement or for contributory

infringement is dependent upon the existence

of direct infringement.’); C.R. Bard, Inc. v.

Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d

670, 673 (Fed.Cir.1990)(‘Of course, a finding

of induced or contributory infringement must

be predicated on a direct infringement

....’); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS,

Inc., 872 F.2d 407, 410 (Fed.Cir. 1989)(‘In

the absence of direct infringement,

[defendant] cannot be held liable for

inducing infringement under section

271(b).’); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners

Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687

(Fed.Cir.1986)(‘Absent direct infringement of

the patent claims, there can be neither

contributory infringement ... nor inducement

of infringement ....’ ...)); Blackman v.

Hadron, Inc., 450 F.2d 781, 782 (2nd

Cir.1971)(‘[A]bsent direct infringement, no

action for contributory infringement can be

maintained.’).

It appears, however, that only one other

court has addressed the precise issue

presented in this action: Whether direct

infringement must be specifically pleaded in

the complaint in order for a plaintiff to

state a claim for inducement of infringement

and contributory infringement?

In Shearing v. Optical Radiation Corp., 1994

WL 382444 (D.Nev.1994), plaintiff sued

several defendants for inducement of

infringement and contributory infringement. 

Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to

state a claim because the complaints did not

plead direct infringement. The court granted

the motions, finding that direct infringement

must be pleaded in order to state a claim for

either inducing infringement or contributory

infringement.

According to the court, ‘[u]nder § 271(b) one

who actively induces infringement of a patent

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is liable as an infringer. In order for that

liability to arise, however, there must have

been direct infringement by someone other

that the inducer ... Nowhere in the complaint

is this alleged.’ Id. at *2. Further, ‘as

with active inducement, liability for

contributory infringement under § 271(c)

cannot arise unless there is direct

infringement ... None of the complaints

allege this. Id. ....

...

The case law is clear that Fuji may recover

from Hover-Davis for inducement of

infringement or contributory infringement

only if it is able to prove that Fuji’s

customers, the end users, directly infringed

the patent by using the patented device with

Hover-Davis parts.

Because direct infringement ultimately must

be proved, it stands to reason - as the

Nevada district court held - that direct

infringement also must be pleaded in the

complaint in order to state a claim for

inducement of infringement and contributory

infringement.

Cameron argues that the allegations of the SAC fail to

allege direct infringement by anyone other than Cameron. Cameron

complains:

By avoiding the pleading of allegations of

direct infringement by anyone other than

Defendant Cameron, Duhn Oil continues to

vacillate between contentions on one day that

the tubing head lockscrews must be run in to

contact the accused frac mandrels in order

for infringement to occur, and on any given

other day contending that Cameron’s accused

products infringe because they have lock

screws that are capable of being run in to

contact the frac mandrels. Such gamesmanship

should not be tolerated, and can be cured by

not allowing contributory or inducement

claims to persist without the required

pleading of the direct infringement upon

which any such indirect infringement must be

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based.

Cameron argues that the closest Duhn gets to alleging direct

infringement by anyone other than Cameron is in Paragraph 7 of

the SAC. However, Cameron asserts, nowhere in the SAC is it

alleged that these customers and third party installers are

directly infringing the ‘925 Patent. Cameron complains that the

SAC does not allege whether the direct infringement is making,

selling or offering to do so and that “nowhere in the [SAC] can

one determine the acts that constitute any such direct

infringement.” Cameron asserts:

If an act of direct infringement by Cameron’s

‘customers and certain third party installer

companies’ is at some point alleged to be the

making or use of a wellhead assembly

including Cameron’s accused frac mandrels,

will these allegations of direct infringement

apply when the lock screws are not run in to

contact the frac mandrel? Duhn Oil so far

leaves this question unanswered by limiting

its allegations to a combination of direct

and indirect (contributory and inducement)

allegations against Cameron in its [SAC], and

by failing to assert any allegations of a

direct infringement by others which must be

the basis for the indirect infringement

claims.

If Cameron’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

is granted with leave to amend to allege contributory or

inducement infringement by alleging direct infringement by

someone other than Cameron, Cameron requests that the Court

require Duhn to “specify the statutory class for each such

alleged direct infringement (e.g., making or using), and specify

the acts of alleged infringement.” 

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Duhn responds that the SAC sufficiently alleges direct

infringement by persons other than Cameron, specifically in

Paragraph 7. Duhn cites Rambus, Inc. v. Nvidia Corp., 2008 WL

4911165 at* 1 (N.D.Cal., Nov. 13, 2008), where the defendant

argued that the plaintiff must allege that use of the accused

devices constituted an act of direct infringement:

Plaintiff argues that the cases defendant

relies on address proof, not pleading, and

that the complaint sufficiently alleges a

claim of contributory infringement. The

Court agrees, and finds that while

plaintiff’s complaint is rather conclusory,

it is sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss. See, e.g., Fuji Mach. Mfg. Co. v.

Hover-Davis, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 93

(W.D.N.Y.1996)(denying a motion to dismiss

contributory infringement claim where

complaint alleged supplier infringed claims

of patent by selling parts which were used by

others in devices within scope of patent);

One World Techs., Ltd. v. Robert Bosch Tool

Corp., ... 2004 WL 1576696 (N.D.Ill., July

21, 2004)(holding that a complaint that

alleges ‘[d]efendants have infringed and are

now directly infringing, inducing

infringement by others, and/or contributorily

infringing’ is sufficient.

See also Bender v. National Semiconductor Corp., 2009 WL 4730896

at *3 (N.D.Cal., Dec. 7, 2009)(allegation that Defendant induced

infringement “by providing its customers and others with detailed

explanations, instructions, and information as to arrangements,

applications, and uses of its products that promote and

demonstrate how to use its products in an infringing manner”

states a claim for inducement by alleging that Defendant’s

customers directly infringe the patent by using Defendant’s

products in an infringing manner). Duhn asserts:

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The claims for contributory and inducement

infringement arise based on discovery taken

during the deposition testimony of Cameron’s

employee, Nolan Massey. During his

deposition, Massey testified that, contrary

to Cameron’s arguments and in-court

representations, Cameron is not the only

installer of the frac mandrels. Instead,

there are other third party installers who

have had possession of the Cameron frac

mandrels. [Whitelaw Decl., ¶ , Exhibit B,

Massey Deposition, 21:13-27:3.] Moreover,

Cameron provides manuals and other

installation-related guides to such third

party installers. [Whitelaw Decl., ¶ 4,

Exhibit C.] Finally, Cameron has produced

documents that include recent letters to

third party installers and fracing companies

advising them to no longer install the

Cameron frac in an infringing configuration

with the lock screws torqued in to engage the

frac mandrel. [Whitelaw Decl., ¶ 5, Exhibits

D and E.] As such, Cameron has knowingly

contributed to and/or induced the

infringement by such third parties.

Duhn also notes that it is continuing to conduct discovery on

this issue. 

Cameron replies that the Cameron documents upon which Duhn

relies in asserting contributory and inducement infringement

actually advise the third party installers not to allow the lock

screws to contact the frac mandrel during fracing operations:

Duhn Oil describes its contributory and

inducement claims as based on Cameron’s

instructions to make sure that the lockscrews

are not run in to contact the frac mandrel.

Cameron asserts that Duhn has confirmed through judicial

admissions that there is no infringement of the ‘925 Patent when

the frac mandrel is installed in the tubing head with the lock

screws retracted and not in contact with the frac mandrel. 

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Therefore, Cameron argues, Duhn can prove no set of facts in

support of a claim for contributory or inducement infringement

based on Cameron’s instructions to install the frac mandrel in

the configuration which Duhn agrees does not infringe the ‘925

Patent.

At the hearing, Duhn explained that Cameron made constant

revisions to the manuals, earlier versions of which did instruct

the torquing in of the lockscrews.

Duhn also objects to Cameron’s request that the Court order

Duhn to specify the acts of alleged infringement if the motion to

dismiss is granted with leave to amend. Duhn contends that the

allegations of the SAC suffice to put Cameron on notice of the

facts alleged to enable Cameron to answer and defend itself. 

Duhn contends that the same acts that constitute infringement of

the ‘925 Patent were alleged in the First Amended Complaint (Doc.

291) and that Cameron filed an answer (Doc. 306). Duhn likens

Cameron’s request to a motion for more definite statement under

Rule 12(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and contends that

it is improper pursuant to Rule 12(g), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

A motion for more definite statement under Rule 12(e) is

appropriate if a pleading is “so vague or ambiguous that the

party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Rule 12(g)(2)

provides:

Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a

party that makes a motion under this rule

must not make another motion under this rule

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raising a defense or objection that was

available to the party but omitted from the

earlier motion. 

See Lemanski v. Regents of University of ..., 2008 WL 3916021 at

*3 & n. 1 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 22, 2008)(citing cases that Rule 12(g)

applies to waive a motion for more definite statement if not

included with a previous Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). 

CONCLUSION

1. Cameron’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. Duhn shall allege the specific conduct by Cameron which

invites third parties to directly infringe and shall identify any

such third party infringers of the ‘925 Patent and how that

infringement is or was accomplished. Duhn shall allege how

Cameron’s actions or conduct contributed to or induced direct

infringement of the ‘925 Patent by third parties presently or in

the past;

2. Counsel for Cameron shall prepare and lodge a form of

Order consistent with this Memorandum Decision within five (5)

court days following service of this Memorandum Decision;

3. Duhn shall file a Third Amended Complaint within 15 days

of the filing date by the Court of the Order. Cameron’s response

shall be filed within 15 days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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