Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00691/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00691-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:3604(f)(3)(c) Fair Housing Amendments Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHALIECIA WILLIAMS, an Individual, 

S.W., a minor by and through her 

Guardian Ad Litem, SHALIECIA 

WILLIAMS, an Individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CAMDEN USA, INC. a Delaware 

Corporation; CAMDEN OLD CREEK, a 

Business Form Unknown; and DOES 1-

10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00691-AJB-AHG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

In this action plaintiffs Shaliecia Williams, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem 

for S.W., a minor (collectively “Plaintiffs”), allege racial discrimination by Defendant

Camden USA, Inc. (“Defendant”). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure to state a claim as to all claims. (Doc. No. 10.)

Plaintiffs opposed, (Doc. No. 13), and Defendant replied, (Doc. No. 14). For the reasons 

stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion with leave to amend.

/ / /

/ / /

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Shaliecia Williams (“Williams”)1, an African-American woman, and her

minor daughter, S.W. (“S.W.”), are tenants in the Camden Old Creek apartment complex 

located at 1935 Northstar Way, San Marcos, California 92078 (“Property”). (Doc. No. 8

¶¶ 1, 4, 13.) The Property is owned by Camden USA, Inc., which Plaintiffs allege has 

employed Camden Old Creek to manage the Property since December 2002.

2

(Id. ¶¶ 5–6.)

Plaintiffs moved into the Property in February of 2014 and lived there with no issues until 

mid-2018. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) In or around January 2018, Defendant employed Anna Rzepka

(“Rzepka”) as the resident manager of the Property. (Id. ¶ 12.) Rzepka has since remained 

resident manager. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege Rzepka is Latin, and possibly Caucasian. (Id. ¶ 13.)

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs allege nine separate instances as the factual basis for their claims. Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendant has a policy which allows residents to use a printer in the office if 

necessary. (Id.) In July 2018, Williams went into the office at the Property to use the printer 

and Rzepka asked Williams in a “quizzical, and inappropriate” tone whether Williamslived 

at the Property. (Id.)

On August 4, 2018, which was the last day rent was due, Williams paid her rent 

online. (Id. ¶ 14.) The following day, Williams realized she had been charged for three 

months of rent. (Id.) Realizing there was an error, Williams called Rzepka to resolve the 

problem. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege Rzepka spoke to Williams in a condescending tone when 

Williams inquired as to an overcharge of rent. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege Rzepka asked 

Williams, “How do you say your name?” (Id.) After Williams told Rzepka her name, 

Rzepka asked Williams in an odd way, “What kind of name is that?” (Id.) Williams 

 

1 The FAC consistently refers to a single plaintiff, despite there being multiple plaintiffs in this case. 

(See generally Doc. No. 8.) It is clear from the FAC that the singular plaintiff referred to is Williams, 

not S.W. 

2

In the motion to dismiss, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs erroneously named Camden USA, Inc. as 

Camden Old Creek. (Doc. No. 10 at 3.)

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“responded in a friendly tone, ‘A black name.’” (Id.) During this conversation, Plaintiffs 

allege Rzepka informed Williams that she went through Williams’ payment history as a 

resident, and then lectured Williams “in a condescending manner” about waiting until the 

last day to pay her rent. (Id.) Williams responded by questioning Rzepka for checking her 

rental history. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to contact Williams before towing her second 

vehicle, despite it having the required sticker authorizing Williams to park the vehicle at 

the Property. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.) Plaintiffs allege Rzepka told Williams she towed the vehicle 

because “‘[i]t sat there for days. This is not the ghetto. It had cobwebs on the car.’” (Id. ¶ 

16.) Williams refused to pay the towing charge. (Id.) Williams reported the incident to 

Defendant’s District Coordinator, Leyna Trinh (“Trinh”), who ultimately agreed to pay the 

towing charge. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that for several weeks Rzepka “would stare intently” and in an 

intimidating manner at 14-year-old S.W. whenever she would go to the pool with her 

friends. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Plaintiffs allege Rzepka deceived Williams to conduct an improper inspection of her 

unit. (Id. ¶ 18–20.) On August 29, 2018, Rzepka emailed Williams indicating that she 

wanted to do an inspection of Williams’ unit. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs allege the letter 

referenced California law and referred to a move-out inspection. (Id.) Williams responded 

to the email requesting the inspection be postponed until she moved out as the letter 

referred to a move-out inspection and Plaintiffs were not yet moving out. (Id.) Williams 

also spoke to someone in the office named Stacy who informed Williams that they had 

received her email and that it would not be a problem. (Id.)

On September 19, 2018, Rzepka emailed Williams about an annual fire alarm test.

(Id. ¶ 19.) The email indicated that inspection would occur, and that they were going to 

walk through the unit to make sure they could hear the fire alarm throughout the unit. (Id.)

The email indicated that the inspection would occur on September 27, 2018. (Id.) Despite 

Williams’ request, Defendant refused to accommodate Williams to allow her to be present 

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for the inspection. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege the 2018 fire alarm inspection had 

already occurred in March 2018. (Id.) When Williams returned home the day of the 

inspection, she realized that all the drawers and cabinets were open and had been clearly 

looked at. (Id.) After questioning Rzepka about the inspection, Williams learned Defendant 

conducted a move-out inspection, not a fire alarm inspection. (Id.)

On September 27, 2018, upon learning of the deception, Williams reported Rzepka’s 

deception regarding the inspection to Trinh. (Id. ¶ 20.) Williams informed Trinh she did 

not feel comfortable with Rzepka there, and that Rzepka was harassing Plaintiffs. (Id.)

Williams informed Trinh that Rzepka had harassed Plaintiffs in apparent retaliation for 

complaining about the car towing incident, that she feared for her and S.W.’s safety, and 

that Rzepka made her feel “subhuman.” (Id.)

On September 29, 2018, Trinh called Williams to discuss the incidents raised in the 

September 27, 2018 email. (Id.) During that conversation, Williams told Trinh she would 

like Rzepka removed as resident manager because of Rzepka’s harassment and 

mistreatment of Plaintiffs. (Id.) Trinh told Williams she would speak with her team and get 

back to her. (Id.)

On October 1, 2018, Trinh emailed Williams and offered her the opportunity “‘to 

move out without any lease break penalties or turnover charges.’” (Id. ¶ 21.). Plaintiffs 

allege the email was silent as to any discussions or actions Trinh had taken against Rzepka.

(Id.)

The following day, on October 2, 2018, Trinh sent another email to Williams 

informing her that Rzepka would remain the community manager at the complex. (Id. ¶ 

22.) Trinh again reiterated that Williams was free to move out and break her lease, but that 

she would be required to decide within three days. (Id.) Williams and Trinh exchanged two 

more emails on October 22, 2018. (Id.) After that, Williams had no contact with Rzepka, 

nor any other of Defendant’s employees. (Id. ¶ 25.)

On December 5, 2018, Williams received a letter from Defendant’s attorney 

indicating that management reported an “altercation” with Williams, stating that she 

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“cursed at and scared management team members at the complex.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs

contend these claims were “patently false.” (Id.) Williams responded to the email, also 

sending a carbon copy to Trinh, and indicated that the claims were false. (Id.) Williams 

reported the history of harassment she and S.W. had suffered by Rzepka. (Id.) The only 

response alleged occurred the same day and was an automatic email from Trinh indicating 

that she was out of the office. (Id.)

On December 10, 2018, Williams’ toilet leaked in the middle of the night and water 

seeped through the walls and into the unit below Williams. (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendant called 

Williams the next morning to notify her of the issue and repairmen were sent that day to 

fix the issue. (Id.)

On December 15, 2018, repairmen were again sent to fix the issue. (Id.) The repairs 

were done over a two-day period. (Id.) At some point during the repairs, one of the workers 

said to Williams: “‘Don’t say anything, but your manager was talking very negatively 

about you. She doesn’t like you. She told us that you are black, and you’ll go off on her.

She told us to watch-out.’” (Id.) 

On January 15, 2019, Plaintiffs’ toilet began to leak again. (Id. ¶ 28.) Williams 

reported the problem at around 9:00 p.m., and two maintenance men immediately came 

and fixed the issue. (Id.) Most of the work was completed in twenty minutes, however, the 

men needed a vacuum to complete their work. (Id.) As such, one of the men went to get a 

vacuum while the other, Carlos, waited at the apartment with Williams. (Id.) After waiting 

for some time, Plaintiffs allege “Carlos blurted a statement out-of-the-blue, ‘I’m sorry that 

Camden Old Creek is not up to your standards.’” (Id.) The comment made Williams 

uncomfortable, however, she did not say anything. (Id.). Finally, Williams informed Carlos 

that she wanted to postpone the remainder of the work so she could go to sleep. (Id.) Carlos 

refused to leave, stating that they needed to wait. (Id.) Williams called Rzepka, who 

instructed Carlos to leave. (Id.)

For the next several months, Williams had no contact with Defendant, or any of its

employees. (Id. ¶ 29.)

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Lastly, on April 9, 2019, Defendant sent a 60-day notice to terminate Plaintiffs’ 

tenancy. (Id. ¶ 30.) The notice was accompanied by a letter from an attorney indicating that 

Williams would be evicted if she did not comply with the Notice of Termination. (Id.)

Williams contacted Trinh via email and requested a reason for termination. (Id.) Trinh 

responded explaining that it was up to the team’s discretion about whether to renew a lease.

(Id.) Williams again responded stating that she was disturbed as she had not done anything 

wrong that would justify terminating her lease, outlined the wrongs she had previously 

suffered, and stated that harassment was forcing her to move. (Id.) Trinh again responded 

indicating that she did not believe Williams had done anything wrong, but rather, she 

believed it was best since Williams did not seem satisfied with her residency. (Id.)

B. Procedural History

On April 16, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint with the Court. (Doc. No. 

1.) On May 5, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their FAC “as a matter of course,” pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). (Doc. No. 8.) The FAC alleges five causes of action including: (1) Fair 

Housing Act (“FHA”), (2) California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (3) 

California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”); (4) Unfair Business Practices; and (5) 

Negligence. (See Doc. No. 8.) The Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Defendant moves to dismiss the entire FAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) and contends that because Plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim upon which 

relief can be granted as to the FHA claim, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction as to the state law claims. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency.

See N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). A complaint 

may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for 

insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 

F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume 

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the truth of all factual allegations and “construe them in the light most favorable to [the 

nonmoving party].” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). “While a 

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, the allegations in the complaint 

“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. To survive 

a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must have “nudged their claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 570. 

A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it 

stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A court need not accept “legal 

conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It is not proper for a court to assume that “the 

[plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have violated 

the ... laws in ways that have not been alleged[,]” regardless of the deference shown to 

plaintiff’s allegations. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

III. DISCUSSION

A. FHA, FEHA, and Unruh Act Claims

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first three causes of action in the FAC 

arguing that Plaintiffs failed to allege any direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or 

indirect evidence of discrimination.

The FHA was enacted to “eradicate discriminatory practices within a division of the 

United States economy.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 

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Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511 (2015). The FHA incorporates the ideology and practices of 

many California statutes, including the FEHA as well as the Unruh Act. Cabrera v. 

Alvarez, 977 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Each statute provides broad protection 

against arbitrary discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 

national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). The provisions of the FEHA3and the Unruh Act4

at issue “protect substantially the same rights as the FHA, and are subject to the same 

analysis.” See Cabrera, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 975; Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 

1114, 1131 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the Court will begin its analysis under the FHA. See

Walker, 272 F.3d at 1131 n.8 (“Because we apply the same standards to FHA and FEHA 

claims, the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to the FEHA claim as well.”) (internal 

citation omitted).

Pursuant to the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), a claim for discrimination “against any 

person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the 

provision of services in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial 

status, or national origin” can be established through either disparate impact or disparate 

treatment theory. Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008); 

Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304–05 (9th Cir. 1997).

a. Pleading standard required for FHA claims

With respect to pleadings in discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that 

the survival of a complaint in a discrimination case does not rest on whether it contains 

 

3 California Government Code Section 12955(a) states that it is unlawful for “the owner of any housing 

accommodation to discriminate against or harass any person because of race, color, religion, sex, 

gender, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, ancestry, 

familial status, source of income, disability, or genetic information of that person.” 

4 The Unruh Civil Rights Act, as codified in California Civil Code Section 51(b), states: “All persons 

within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, 

ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual 

orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal 

accommodations, advantages, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 

whatsoever.” 

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specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (“The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . is an 

evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”). Thus, the ordinary rules for assessing 

the sufficiency of a complaint apply. Id. at 511 (“[U]nder a notice pleading system, it is not 

appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case [of 

discrimination]”). As such, the Court must follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to 

determine whether Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Defendant intentionally discriminated 

against Plaintiffs because of their race. 

Rule 8(a)(2) states that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Court in Twombly ruled that “the 

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it 

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 550 

U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While brevity is required, it is 

not enough to simply allege that a wrong has been committed and demand relief. The 

underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and 

that “grounds upon which it rests.” Id.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556.

b. S.W.’s FHA, FEHA, and Unruh Act Claims

The FAC alleges that Williams is African-American, but is silent as to S.W.’s race.

(See generally Doc. No. 8.) Here, the Court cannot assume S.W.’s race and thus, cannot 

assume that S.W. is a member of a protected class under the FHA. See Associated Gen. 

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983)

(“AGC”) (“It is not . . . proper to assume that [the plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not 

alleged”). Without facts to support S.W.’s race, the Court cannot draw a reasonable 

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inference that Defendant discriminated against S.W. as a result of her race. As such, S.W.’s 

FHA, FEHA, and Unruh Act claims must be dismissed.5

c. Williams’ FHA, FEHA, and Unruh Act Claims

Defendant’s motion tends to confuse the disparate impact and disparate treatment

theories. Defendant first contends “Plaintiffs does [sic] not appear to be making a disparate 

impact case, rather Plaintiffs’ allegations tend to sound in a disparate treatment theory; 

however, Plaintiffs’ pled allegations do not amount to disparate treatment.” (Doc. No. 10

at 6.) Defendant continues by arguing that “Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest that Defendant’s

enforcing of facially neutral policies amount to discrimination against her.” (Id.) Plaintiffs 

did not specifically allege in the FAC under which theory of discrimination they intend to 

proceed. (See generally Doc. No. 8.) However, at the pleading stage, they are not required 

to do so. See Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Notice pleading requires 

the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims for relief, not causes of action, statutes or 

legal theories.”). The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations seem to be based in both 

theories, and therefore, finds a discussion of both theories to be appropriate and necessary.

i. Disparate Impact

The Court first addresses the disparate impact theory allegation. Disparate impact 

occurs when a plaintiff “show[s] at least that the defendant’s actions had a discriminatory 

effect.” Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 711 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The disparate impact theory 

“involve[s] practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that 

in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by . . . necessity.”

Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Further, 

the disparate impact theory protects people from “practices that are fair in form, but 

discriminatory in operation.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).

 

5 At this time, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ allegation that Rzepka stared intently at S.W. 

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Here, only one of the instances alleged in the FAC involves a situation in which 

Defendant enforced a facially neutral policy. The instance occurred when Williams went 

into the office at the Property to use the printer. (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs allege 

Defendant has a policy which allows residents to use a printer if needed. (Id.) When 

Williams sought to do so, Rzepka asked Williams in a “quizzical, and inappropriate” tone 

whether Williams lived at the Property. (Id.) This instance is more closely aligned with a 

disparate impact theory, as it involves the enforcement of a facially neutral policy (the 

requirement that a person be a resident in order to use a printer in the office). Defendant 

argues that this incident “does not sound in discrimination [because] Defendant was 

enforcing a neutral policy by inquiring as to Williams’ resident status, as tenancy was a 

prerequisite for printer use.” (Doc. No. 10 at 6.) The Court agrees. It is not plausible to 

infer that Defendant’s enforcement of its printing policy has a racially discriminatory 

effect.

ii. Disparate Treatment

Disparate treatment occurs when “a protected group has been subjected to explicitly 

differential or discriminatory treatment.” Cabrera, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 976. The FAC 

alleges that “Defendants . . . have engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination against 

plaintiffs because of race, . . . in the operation of the Subject Property.” (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 8.)

The Court finds this statement to be conclusory, and thus, need not accept it as true. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (finding that a court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true).

However, the allegation reasonably suggests that Plaintiffs’ claim appears to be based on 

a disparate treatment theory, as it alleges intentional discrimination because of Plaintiffs’ 

race.

Disparate treatment claims are analyzed under the standards developed in connection 

with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 

F.3d 1169, 1180 n.11 (9th Cir. 1998); Gamble, 104 F.3d at 304–05 (finding that courts

employ a three-part burden-shifting framework as articulated in McDonnell Douglas). A 

plaintiff may succeed in persuading the court that she has been a victim of intentional 

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discrimination, “directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 

motivated the [defendant].” Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 

(1981). “Proof of discriminatory motive is crucial to a disparate treatment claim.” Gamble, 

104 F.3d at 305 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “An individual suffers 

disparate treatment when he or she is singled out and treated less favorably than others 

similarly situated on account of race.” Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1134 

(9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Direct or circumstantial 

evidence may be used to show intentional discrimination. Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 

1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

At this stage, in order to proceed under a disparate treatment theory, the FAC must 

plausibly allege that Defendant acted with discriminatory motive. Despite its inclusion of 

detailed facts, there are no facts in the FAC which would allow this Court to infer that 

Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs because of their race. Plaintiffs do 

not allege that they were treated any differently than any other resident, let alone a resident 

of another race. (See generally Doc. No. 8.)

There are only three specific incidents described in the FAC in which race was either 

directly or indirectly addressed. The first incident occurred when during a conversation 

between Rzepka and Williams, “Rzepka asked Williams in an odd way, ‘What kind of 

name is that?’” (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 14.) Williams “responded in a friendly tone, ‘A black name.’”

(Id.) While the Rzepka’s question may have been distasteful, distasteful comments do not 

necessarily rise to the level of direct evidence of discrimination. See Hadeed v. Abraham, 

265 F. Supp. 2d 614, 622 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d, 103 Fed. Appx. 706 (4th Cir. 2004)

(holding that defendant’s reference to the plaintiffs as “the girls” in gender-based FHA case 

“may be distasteful, but it does not rise to the level [of direct evidence] of discrimination”).

The first incident addressed here is not direct evidence of discriminatory intent.

The second incident occurred when Rzepka stated “[t]his is not the ghetto” when 

explaining why Williams’ car was towed. (Id. ¶ 16.) The Eighth Circuit has held that a 

defendant’s statement is not direct evidence of defendants’ illegal intent unless it shows “a 

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specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision.”

Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831–32 (8th Cir. 2010) (direct evidence does not 

include “stray remarks . . ., statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by 

decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself”). If this Court were to follow the 

standard outlined by the Eighth Circuit, Rzepka’s statement that “This is not the ghetto” 

might be considered direct evidence of discriminatory, as it could reasonably be inferred 

that the statement was made by a decisionmaker in relation to the decisional process of 

whether to tow the vehicle. Rzepka was the manager of the Property and made the comment 

to Williams when explaining why the car was towed. In their opposition, Plaintiffs argue 

that “[a] reasonable jury could readily ascribe the use of the word ‘ghetto’ to an AfricanAmerican as racial in nature.” (Doc. No. 13 at 5.) However, the FAC does not allege this 

contention. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 526 (“It is not . . . proper to assume that [the plaintiff] 

can prove facts that it has not alleged”); see also Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763

(9th Cir. 2007) (“In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only 

allegations contained in the pleadings.”).

The third occurred when one of the repairmen said to Williams: “‘Don’t say 

anything, but your manager was talking very negatively about you. She doesn’t like you.

She told us that you are black, and you’ll go off on her. She told us to watch-out.’” (Doc. 

No. 8 ¶ 27.) The third instance is the most persuasive fact that might lead to a showing of 

racially motivated intent by Defendant; however, standing alone, this comment is 

insufficient for the Court to infer that the actions taken by Defendant were racially 

motivated.

These three instances alone, coupled with Plaintiffs’ failure to allege they were 

treated differently than others similarly situated, do not support an inference of 

discrimination disparate treatment theory above the speculative level as required by Rule 

8. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Plaintiffs next contend that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiffs by conducting

an irregular inspection of Plaintiffs’ home on September 27, 2018. (Doc. No. 13 at 5–6.)

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Plaintiffs allege Defendant deceived Plaintiffs as to the purpose of the inspection. (Doc. 

No. 8 ¶¶ 18–20.) Plaintiffs contend this instance was “apparent retaliation” for Williams’ 

complaining about her car being towed. (Doc. No. 13 at 6.) Thus, this allegation should be 

analyzed under a disparate treatment theory as it is based on the premise that Rzepka acted 

intentionally. Plaintiffs’ allegation that the instance was “apparent retaliation” is too bare 

and conclusory to be “entitled the assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 681.

Upon learning of the inspection, Williams emailed Trinh and informed her that she did not 

feel safe with Rzepka there and felt that Rzepka was harassing them. (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 20.) On 

October 1, 2018, Trinh responded to Plaintiff via email, and offered to allow Plaintiffs to 

move out without any penalties or turnover charges. (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 21.) In their opposition, 

Plaintiffs argue “[t]his ‘offer’ to move out was the culmination of Ms. Rzepka’s shaded 

racial attitudes, and retaliatory conduct related thereto.” (Doc. No. 13 at 6.) However, this 

contention is unsupported by the allegations made in the FAC. Defendant notes that the 

FAC shows that Williams was generally combative and aggressive with Rzepka. (See Doc. 

No. 8 ¶¶ 14, 19, 20.) The Court agrees. Even if a plaintiff alleges facts consistent with 

illegal behavior, if there is an “obvious” and legal alternative for the conduct, the facts 

alleged by plaintiff will not “plausibly establish” the improper purpose. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 682 (holding that an allegation that plaintiff’s arrest was the result of unlawful 

discrimination against Muslim men was not “plausible” in view of more likely explanation 

for arrest).

Here, it is plausible that Defendant’s October 1, 2018 offer to allow Plaintiffs to 

move out without a penalty was as a result of Plaintiffs’ discontent with the Property’s 

management, fear for their safety, and feeling that they were being harassed by Rzepka. 

Thus, it is not plausible, based on the face of Plaintiffs’ complaint, that the inspection or 

Defendant’s subsequent offer to allow Plaintiffs to move out was a violation of the FHA.

See Swartz, 476 F.3d at 763 (“In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally 

consider only allegations contained in the pleadings.”). Additionally, there are no 

allegations to support that this behavior was selectively conducted against anyone else, 

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regardless of race. Thus, it is not plausible that this incident was a result of disparate 

treatment. 

Lastly, on April 9, 2019, after several months of no contact, Defendant sent Williams 

a 60-day notice to terminate Plaintiffs’ tenancy, indicating that Williams would be evicted 

if she did not comply with the Notice of Termination. (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 30.) When asked the 

reason for the Notice of Termination, Trinh refused to provide a reason and stated that “it 

was up to the team’s discretion” about whether to renew a lease. (Id.) Williams responded 

that she did not do anything wrong and believed that harassment was forcing her to move.

(Id.) Trinh responded that she did not believe Williams had done anything wrong, but 

believed it was best as Williams did not seem satisfied with her residency. (Id.) Plaintiffs 

contend “[a] reasonable jury could readily find that a landlord evicting a tenant who always 

paid her rent on time, and who admittedly had done nothing wrong, was being removed 

due to Ms. Rzepka’s dislike of her, which dislike was clearly tinged with racial attitudes.”

(Doc. No. 13 at 8.) Even viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it is implausible that 

the Notice of Termination was a based on discriminatory intent.

A complete reading of the FAC shows that over the course of Plaintiffs’ tenancy, the 

relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant significantly deteriorated. (See generally

Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiffs’ own admissions undermine their claim of discriminatory intent.

The FAC alleges several instances in which Williams acted with hostility towards Rzepka, 

Trinh, and various other employees. (Id.) As discussed above, allegations of wrongdoing 

will be deemed “implausible” if there are “obvious alternative explanation[s]” for the facts 

alleged indicating lawful conduct, not the unlawful conduct urged by the plaintiff. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 682. Here, the deterioration of the relationship between Plaintiffs and 

Defendant is an obvious, alternative, and legal explanation for the termination of Plaintiffs’ 

tenancy. Thus, the Court must find that Plaintiffs’ FHA cause of action, as well as their 

FEHA and Unruh Act claims, fail under a disparate treatment theory. Accordingly, the 

Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the FHA, FEHA, and Unruh Act 

claims.

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B. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over UCL and Negligence Claims

In addition to the claims discussed above, Plaintiffs claim Defendant violated the 

California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et. seq. (“UCL”) by 

engaging in unfair business practices. (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 43.) Additionally, Plaintiffs claim 

Defendant were negligent in operating the Property free from unlawful discrimination. (Id.

¶ 45.)

The Court acquired original subject matter jurisdiction over this action because 

Plaintiffs alleged a federal claim of an FHA violation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court 

“has supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the 

action within . . . original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy 

under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). “A state law claim 

is part of the same case or controversy when it shares a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ 

with the federal claims and the state and federal claims would normally be tried together.”

Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendant does not contend 

that the state law claims do not form part of the same case or controversy, as all claims are 

based on the same facts. Therefore, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state 

law claims.

Defendant moves the Court to exercise its discretion under §1367(c) to decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction. “The district courts may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . (3) the district court has 

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §1367(c). As 

discussed above, Plaintiffs’ federal FHA is dismissed. As such, the claim under which the 

Court had original jurisdiction is dismissed. Thus, the Court has discretion to decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Here, the Court finds 

it appropriate to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims, without prejudice, as a result of 

dismissal of the FHA claim. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1998) 

(“when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only 

state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by 

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dismissing the case without prejudice”); see also United Mine Workers of America v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even 

though no insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as 

well.”). Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ UCL and 

negligence claims.

C. Leave to Amend

The Court next considers whether to grant leave to amend. “The court should freely 

give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court has 

“broad discretion in deciding whether to grant leave to amend and whether to dismiss an 

action with or without prejudice.” WPP Lux. Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 

F.3d 1039, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled in part, Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1100 

(2019). “[C]ourts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be 

saved.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). With sufficient pleadings, the Court finds it is possible for Plaintiffs to 

allege that Defendant discriminated against them on the basis of race. Thus, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to amend. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs must file an amended complaint by thirty (30) 

days from the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2020

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