Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02524/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02524-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Formerly known as the Board of Prison Terms.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY VAN WINKLE,

Petitioner,

v.

A.P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 05-2524 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Anthony Van Winkle, an inmate incarcerated at

Correctional Training Facility (CTF) in Soledad, California,

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the

grounds that the Board of Parole Hearings (Board)1 denied him a

parole date by improperly considering his commitment offense, by

failing to rely on some evidence as grounds for a denial of a

parole date, and by following an illegal no-parole policy towards

inmates serving indeterminate life sentences. Respondent A.P.

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2

 Unless indicated otherwise, the following facts are taken

from the state superior court’s unpublished opinion denying

Petitioner's direct appeal. Resp.'s Ex. 2, In the Matter of

Anthony Vanwinkle on Habeas Corpus, Case No. SWHSS-6072 (State

Court Order).

2

Kane, Warden of CTF, opposes the petition. Having considered all

of the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES Petitioner's

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND 2

I. Commitment Offense

In 1991, Petitioner plead guilty to a charge of a violation of

California Penal Code § 187(a), murder in the second degree, with a

firearm enhancement. Petitioner was living and manufacturing

methamphetamines with the victim. The victim forced Petitioner to

move out after they had a dispute. Petitioner convinced another

person to drive him to the victim's house in order to pick up some

clothes. When they arrived, they found the victim lying on the

couch. Petitioner kicked the victim in the face, then shot him in

the head. Petitioner admitted aiming the gun at the victim, but

denied that he intended to shoot him. Petitioner and the other

person who witnessed the shooting ran out of the victim's

apartment. Petitioner grabbed a knapsack on the way out. He did

not seek to aid the victim, who died days later. Respondent. Ex. 8

at 1, Sheriff's Crime Report. Petitioner instructed the witness

not to tell anyone about the shooting, and sought to avoid capture

for a few weeks. Petitioner claimed to have been under the

influence of methamphetamines at the time of the killing. He was

sentenced to eighteen years to life in state prison, and was

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3

 A 115 refers to a serious disciplinary problem, and a 128

refers to a minor disciplinary problem. See Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3312.

3

received by the Department of Corrections on August 29, 1991. 

II. Parole Hearing

On August 25, 2004, Petitioner attended his second parole

hearing. The Board considered the factors which favored a grant of

a parole date. Since he has been in prison, Petitioner completed

his GED, obtained a certificate in lead abatement work, and learned

how to do electrical work in construction. He engaged in self help

programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous, anger management and group

therapy. He maintained a good prison record: in thirteen years he

received no 115s and only one 1283 for unauthorized alteration of a

glove. His prison psychiatric report assessed him as posing no

more danger of violence than the average citizen. His file

contained letters of support from his family which offered to

employ him in one of two family businesses if he were released on

parole. The Board also considered factors favoring a denial of a

parole date. Petitioner had a substantial criminal drug and gun

history and an unstable family relationship. The San Bernardino

County Sheriff's Office and District Attorney wrote letters

opposing Petitioner's release. The District Attorney focused on

Petitioner's previous criminal record of guns and drugs, and the

possibility that robbery was the motive for the homicide that

Petitioner committed.

The Board decided that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. 

The Board based this finding, in part, on a determination that the

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killing was committed in an especially cruel manner. In addition,

the Board noted that Petitioner had been engaged in the manufacture

of drugs, that he had an unstable social history and an escalating

history of convictions involving guns, and that he lacked

sufficient vocational training. The Board concluded that there

were positive factors favoring a grant of a parole date, but that

these did not outweigh the factors favoring a finding of

unsuitability. The Board denied Petitioner's parole date for one

year. Resp.'s Ex. 5 at 63:12, Transcript of Parole Consideration

Hearing. The Board recommended that in the following year

Petitioner remain free from discipline problems, sign up for more

vocational training classes, and "cooperate with clinicians in the

completion of a new clinical evaluation." Id. at 65:20-24.

III. State Habeas Petition

On November 4, 2004, Petitioner filed in the San Bernardino

Superior Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on his

parole denial. In support of his contention that he was denied due

process, he made the same three arguments that he now makes in this

Court.

The state court relied primarily on In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.

4th 616 (2002). The court interpreted Rosenkrantz to require that

the Board grant a parole date, "unless the Board finds in the

exercise of its discretion that the applicant is unsuitable." 

Respondent. Ex. 2 at 3, State Court Order, Case No. SWHSS-6072

(emphasis in original). The court was limited "to a determination

of whether there is 'some evidence' in the record to support the

decision" and "this standard of 'some evidence' is extremely

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deferential." Id. The state court concluded that the Board relied

not only on Petitioner's commitment offense, but also on his

escalating pattern of criminal conduct and his unstable social

history, and therefore there was some evidence to support the

Board's finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole.

The court interpreted Rosenkrantz also to require that the

Board consider the prisoner's background, institutional

participation, post-parole plans, and psychological evaluations,

but to allow the Board to base a finding of unsuitability solely on

the nature of the prisoner's commitment offense. The court found

that "the Board did consider the positive factors which favored

parole and made its finding that these did not outweigh the factors

surrounding the circumstances of the crime." In Rosenkrantz, 29

Cal. 4th at 685-86, the court held that statistics which showed a

very low rate of parole dates granted by the Board were

insufficient evidence to establish a blanket no-parole policy or

that the petitioner's parole hearing was tainted by a no-parole

policy. On this authority, the superior court denied the

petitioner's claim based on the Board's alleged no-parole policy. 

Thus, the Rosenkrantz court denied the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus.

After the superior court denial, Petitioner here filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the California court of

appeal and with the California Supreme Court, both of which were

denied.

LEGAL STANDARD 

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas

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corpus "on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21

(1975).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) amended section 2254 to limit the ability of district

courts to grant habeas relief only when a state court proceeding

resulted in a decision that was (1) "contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," or

(2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006). A district court must presume that

all factual findings of the state court are correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). The district court is to review the decision of the

highest state court that issued a reasoned opinion. Lajoie v.

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the last

reasoned opinion was issued by the San Bernadino Superior Court.

 I. Liberty Interest in Parole

There is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted

person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a

valid sentence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr.

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). However, if a state's statutory

parole scheme uses mandatory language, it may create a presumption

that parole release will be granted when or unless certain

designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a

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constitutionally protected liberty interest. Greenholtz, 442 U.S.

at 11-12. The Supreme Court held that the Nebraska parole statute

providing that the board "shall" release prisoners, subject to

certain restrictions, creates a due process liberty interest in

release on parole. Id.; see also, Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (Montana parole statute providing that

board "shall" release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions,

creates due process liberty interest in release on parole). In

such a case, a prisoner gains a legitimate expectation in parole

that cannot be denied without adequate procedural due process

protections. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S.

at 11-16. 

California's parole scheme uses mandatory language:

The panel or board shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense

or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of

the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date,

therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Accordingly, under the clearly

established framework of Allen and Greenholtz, "California's parole

scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole. The scheme creates a presumption that parole release will

be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are made." 

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). This is

true regardless of whether a parole release date has ever been set

for the inmate, because "[t]he liberty interest is created, not

upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the

inmate." Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2003);

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cf. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 903 (finding decision to rescind

previously-granted parole release date implicated prisoner's

liberty interest). The Ninth Circuit recently made clear that

"California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole

after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070 (2005)." Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006)

(finding that Dannenberg did not explicitly or implicitly hold that

there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, 

but upholding trial court's denial of petition because it was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law).

 Because California prisoners have a constitutionally protected

liberty interest in release on parole, the parole board cannot

decline to grant a parole date without adequate procedural

protections necessary to satisfy due process. Irons v. Carey, 479

F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007).

II. Procedural Due Process Protections

The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole

board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the board's

decision is not supported by "some evidence in the record," or is

"otherwise arbitrary." Id.; see McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904

(adopting, for review of parole hearings, "some evidence" standard

used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985)); Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). The "some evidence"

standard identified in Hill is clearly established federal law in

the parole context for AEDPA purposes. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at

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904. The evidence underlying the board's decision must have some

indicia of reliability. Id.

When assessing whether a state parole board's suitability

determination was supported by "some evidence," the court's

analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole

suitability determinations in the relevant State. Irons,

479 F.3d at 662. Accordingly, in California, the district court

must look to California law to determine what findings are

necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and then must

review the state court record in order to determine whether the

holding that the Board's findings were supported by "some evidence"

constituted an unreasonable application of the principle

articulated in Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. Irons, 479 F.3d at 662-64.

The court may find that there has been a violation of due

process if the Board has relied on the prisoner's commitment

offense over the course of many parole hearings in order to find

that he was unsuitable for parole. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. "A

continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor . . . runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system

and could result in a due process violation." Id. In Biggs, the

Ninth Circuit upheld the initial denial of a parole release date

based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner's conduct

before incarceration, but cautioned that "[o]ver time . . . ,

should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and

evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply

because of the nature of Biggs' offense and prior conduct would

raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole." 

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Id.

In Irons, the Ninth Circuit cited Biggs, but noted that all of

the cases in which it had previously held that a denial of parole

based solely on the commitment offense comported with due process

involved situations where the prisoner had not yet served the

minimum number of years set in his sentence. Irons, 479 F.3d at

665. In Sass and Irons, the Ninth Circuit also noted that the

parole board appeared to give little or no weight to evidence of

the prisoner's rehabilitation, and stated its "hope that the Board

will come to recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention

based solely on an inmate's commitment offense, regardless of the

extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due

process." Irons, 479 F.3d at 665.

III. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors

The California Supreme Court summarized the standards which

the Board is to use in determining whether a prisoner is suitable

or unsuitable for parole.

[C]ircumstances tending to establish unsuitability for parole

are that the prisoner (1) committed the offense in an

especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner; (2) possesses

a previous record of violence; (3) has an unstable social

history; (4) previously has sexually assaulted another

individual in a sadistic manner; (5) has a lengthy history of

severe mental problems related to the offense; and (6) has

engaged in serious misconduct while in prison. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c). 

The regulation further provides that circumstances tending to

establish suitability for parole are that the prisoner: 

(1) does not possess a record of violent crime committed while

a juvenile; (2) has a stable social history; (3) has shown

signs of remorse; (4) committed the crime as the result of

significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time; (5) committed the criminal

offense as a result of battered woman syndrome; (6) lacks any

significant history of violent crime; (7) is of an age that

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reduces the probability of recidivism; (8) has made realistic

plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can

be put to use upon release; and (9) has engaged in

institutional activities that indicate an enhanced ability to

function within the law upon release. Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 2402(d). 

[T]he regulation explains that the foregoing circumstances

'are set forth as general guidelines; the importance attached

to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.' Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 2402(c), (d). In sum, the governing

statute provides that the Board must grant parole unless it

determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of

incarceration for the individual because of the gravity of the

offense underlying the conviction.

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 653-654. The California Supreme Court

further explained that 

Factors that support a finding that the prisoner committed the

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner

include the following: (A) multiple victims were attacked,

injured, or killed in the same or separate incidents; (B) the

offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder; (C) the victim was

abused, defiled, or mutilated during or after the offense; 

(D) the offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrates

an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering; and

(E) the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial

in relation to the offense. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 2402(c)(1). 

Id. at 654 n.11.

DISCUSSION

I. Some Evidence 

Petitioner argues that he did not receive due process because

the Board's decision was not supported by some evidence that he was

unsuitable for parole. 

A. Reliance on Commitment Offense

Petitioner argues that the Board violated his due process

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4 Petitioner argues that the parole board may only consider

his commitment offense at the first hearing and in support cites

Masoner v. California, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9222, *1 (C.D. Cal.). 

Masoner had been sentenced to fifteen years to life based on a

conviction for second degree murder. He had driven his vehicle

while he had a blood alcohol level of .26% and crashed into a

house, killing a little girl. He had a spotless prison record, had

completed vocational training and rehabilitation programs, and had

served more years than the minimum for his offense. The district

court held that "although the gravity of the commitment offense and

other pre-conviction factors alone may be sufficient to justify the

denial of a parole date at a prisoner's initial hearing, subsequent

[Board] decisions to deny a parole date must be supported by some

post-conviction evidence that the release of an inmate is against

the interest of public safety." Id. at *3-4. However, the

argument that the Board may only consider the commitment offense at

the first hearing is undermined by the holding of Irons, 479 F.3d

at 665 (affirming fifth parole denial based on commitment offense),

and Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125 (affirming third parole denial based on

commitment offense). 

12

rights because it relied solely on his commitment offense.4

 He

argues that under Irons, 479 F.3d at 664, the decision of the Board

to deny parole based solely on the commitment offense is a due

process violation because, based on his calculation, he has served

the minimum time to which he had been sentenced. Petitioner also

argues that the Board failed to provide some evidence to support

its finding that his commitment crime was exceptionally callous. 

Finally, Petitioner argues the Board violated state law by relying

on his commitment offense, because it was not particularly

egregious and Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1094-95, held that a

denial of parole is appropriate only in cases in which the

"underlying offense [was] particularly egregious." 

Petitioner's argument that it is improper to deny parole based

solely on his commitment offense once he has served the minimum

time imposed by his sentence fails. First, in Irons, the Ninth

Circuit held only that based on the specific facts of the cases

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that had been before it, there was no due process violation when

the prisoners in those cases had not served their minimum time. 

Second, Petitioner has based his calculation on the California Code

of Regulations, title 15 §§ 2403-10, which requires the Board to

"set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for

parole," to calculate post-conviction credits, and then calculate a

parole date. Based on these regulations, Petitioner has calculated

that he has served the minimum time to which he had been sentenced. 

However, in Irons, the Ninth Circuit was not considering the base

term calculations of sections 2403-2410, but rather was considering

the minimum time imposed by the trial court at sentencing. Because

the Board did not find Petitioner suitable for release, it was

under no obligation to set a base term or apply post-conviction

credits. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1078-1079. Petitioner was

sentenced to eighteen years to life, and at the time of the hearing

that he contests, he had served only thirteen years. Therefore,

the language in Irons which distinguishes between those parole

denials before and after minimum time had been served is not

applicable. Further, the state court found that the Board relied

not only on Petitioner's commitment offense, but also on his

escalating pattern of criminal conduct and his unstable social

history. This finding is supported by the record of Petitioner's

parole hearing. Resp.'s Ex. 5 at 63-65. For this reason,

Petitioner's state law argument also fails because Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th at 1076, refers to parole board decisions which rely

solely on the underlying offense.

The Board must rely on some evidence to support its conclusion

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that a petitioner's crime was exceptionally callous and beyond the

normal range of second degree murder. In re Smith, 114 Cal. App.

4th 343, 367 (2003). In Smith, a California appellate court

granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus where the Governor

reversed a decision of the Board granting a parole date. The Smith

court found that the Governor had determined, without the support

of some evidence, that Smith's crime was exceptionally callous. 

The court decided this, in part, by comparing the facts of Smith's

case with other cases in which the commitment offense was

determined to be exceptionally callous. Smith shot his wife in

anger after she confessed to having an affair. He showed remorse

by immediately going to his church and asking others to pray for

his victim and to turn him in to the police. The court noted that

although Smith's crime was callous, so were all murders, and there

was no evidence that it was exceptionally callous. 

Here, Petitioner's commitment offense is more callous than

Smith's. The state court described the Board's finding that

Petitioner's commitment offense was exceptionally callous as

follows:

The Board concluded that the killing was done in such a manner

as to demonstrate a total disregard for the victim's life. 

The Board made this finding based on the facts and

circumstances of the killing. These facts and circumstances

certainly provide "some evidence" in support of the

conclusions of the Board.

When the petitioner entered the victim's home, the victim was

lying on the couch and the petitioner without any kind of

provocation kicked the victim in the face and then shot him in

the head. Apparently the petitioner and victim had a dispute

over their enterprise of manufacturing methamphetamine. 

Resp.'s Ex. 2 at 3, State Court Order, Case No. SWHSS-6072. 

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Because Petitioner had not yet served the minimum time to

which he had been sentenced, the Board did not rely solely on his

commitment offense, and the Board had some evidence that his

commitment offense was exceptionally callous, it was not an

unreasonable application of federal law for the state court to

conclude that the Board relied on some evidence in finding

Petitioner to be unsuitable for parole. 

B. Positive Factors

Petitioner claims that the Board failed to consider evidence

of the factors which favored a finding that he was suitable for

release. However, the state court found that the Board did

consider the positive factors, but found that they were outweighed

by the factors favoring a finding of unsuitability. Respondent.

Ex. 2 at 3, State Court Order, Case No. SWHSS-6072. Title 15,

section 2402(d) of the California Code of Regulations allows the

Board to weigh the relative importance of the factors favoring a

finding of suitability with the factors favoring a finding of

unsuitability. Therefore, it was not an unreasonable application

of federal law for the state court to find that the Board

considered the factors which favored Petitioner's release.

Based on all of these factors, the state court was not

unreasonable in finding that the Board correctly applied the "some

evidence" standard and considered all relevant factors, and thus

did not violate Petitioner's due process rights.

III. Policy Against Granting Parole

Petitioner argues that he did not receive individualized

consideration, because the Board's findings were a post hoc

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rationalization for a decision that it had already made under a noparole policy. Based on this alleged no-parole policy, Petitioner

argues that his due process and equal protection rights have been

violated. 

To support his contention that the Board has a no-parole

policy, Petitioner presents statistics that the Board has granted

parole in only two percent of the cases that it has heard. In his

traverse, Petitioner cites Coleman v. Board of Prison Terms, et

al., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29929, *12 (E.D. Cal.), a habeas case in

which the court found that the prisoner "presents a convincing case

that a blanket policy against parole for murderers prevented him

from obtaining a parole suitability determination made after a fair

hearing." However, in Coleman, the remedy for the finding of a

systemic bias against granting a parole date was an order that the

petitioner was to receive a hearing before an unbiased parole

board. Id. at *12-13. 

In Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 683-86, the California Supreme

Court rejected claims alleging that the Board or the Governor had

either a no-parole policy or a policy of interpreting the parole

statute in an improperly narrow manner. It held that there was

sufficient evidence of individualized consideration of parole

hearings and of actual grants of parole to undermine the claim that

there is an illegal no-parole policy. Id. In addition, the court

reasoned that statistical data showing a low rate of grants of

parole is insufficient to establish that the Governor or the Board

has a no-parole policy. Id. at 685-86. 

There is no evidence that Petitioner's hearing was biased by a

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no-parole policy, or that his parole denial was caused by such a

policy. The Board considered all the evidence presented and found

that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole based upon a reasoned

determination. Therefore, the state court did not unreasonably

apply federal law in denying Petitioner's claim of a no-parole

policy.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Petitioner's petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/21/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VANWINKLE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KANE et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-02524 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on August 21, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Anthony E. VanWinkle

H-07652

Correctional Training Facility

P.O. Box 689, F-Wing-324

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Patricia Webber Heim

Attorney at Law

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Dated: August 21, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-02524-CW Document 7 Filed 08/21/07 Page 18 of 18