Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01339/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-01339-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOWARD YOUNG,

Petitioner,

v.

C. PFEIFFER,

Respondent.

No. 1:18-cv-01339-DAD-JDP (HC)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Doc. No. 48)

Petitioner Howard Young is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On April 13, 2020, the court adopted in full the February 26, 2020 findings and 

recommendations issued by the assigned magistrate judge. (Doc. Nos. 41, 46.) In that order, the 

court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, denied petitioner federal habeas relief, and closed 

the case. (Doc. No. 46.) On May 4, 2020, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the final 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. (Doc. No. 48.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the 

district court. Rule 60(b) permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment 

for the following reasons: 

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(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, 

could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 

under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is 

based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or 

applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time, 

typically “not more than one year after the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Id. 

Such a motion should not be granted “absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district 

court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 

intervening change in the controlling law,” and it “may not be used to raise arguments or present 

evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” 

Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 

229 F. 3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that reconsideration should be granted “sparingly in 

the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources”). Further, Local Rule 230(j) 

requires, in relevant part, that a movant show “what new or different facts or circumstances are 

claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion”, “what other 

grounds exist for the motion,” and “why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of 

the prior motion.”

Here, petitioner has not claimed in his pending motion that any of the grounds requiring 

reconsideration are present—such as fraud, new evidence, or mistake—nor has he presented any 

other reason that justifies relief. (See Doc. No. 48.) Rather, he merely reiterates the arguments 

raised in his previous filings with this court. (Compare id. with Doc. Nos. 1, 26, 44.)

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For example, with regards to his due process claim, petitioner again appears to conflate

procedures that courts approved as having met or exceeded due process requirements with what is 

minimally required by the federal Due Process Clause. As the court explained in its April 13, 

2020 order, “the minimum procedures adequate for [federal] due process protection of [the 

interest in parole] are those set forth in Greenholtz,” namely, “an opportunity to be heard and . . . 

a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” Young v. Pfeiffer, No. 1:18-cv-01339-DADJDP (HC), 2020 WL 1853044, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2020) (citing Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 

U.S. 216, 220 (2011) and Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 

16 (1979)). Here, though petitioner was not allowed to be heard in person at his parole 

consideration hearing, there is no question that petitioner received both an opportunity to be heard

and a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.

Petitioner also seeks reconsideration of his claim that the prison wrongfully applied 

nineteen mandatory points (the “points”) to his record for various rules violation reports. (Doc. 

No. 48 at 4–5.) In his motion, he explains that the points prevent him from earning good-time 

and work-time credits, thereby affecting the duration of his confinement. (Id.) Even if it was true 

that the application of these points necessarily prolonged the duration of his confinement,1

petitioner provides no explanation as to why, as required, this information was not presented to 

the court earlier. See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880; Local Rule 230(j). Not only does 

the same deficiency plague his argument that the imposition of the points violates the prohibition 

against ex post facto laws—which he only raises now for the first time in his motion for 

reconsideration—he neglects to identify the law that allegedly applies ex post facto and does not 

provide any legal analysis to support his contention in this regard. (Doc. 48 at 4.)

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 Because it does not appear that removing the points will necessarily lead to him earning goodtime or work-time credits that would lead to his earlier release, petitioner’s claim does not fall 

within “the core of habeas corpus.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 935 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 

banc). Cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78–79 (2005) (noting that actions to restore already 

earned good-time credits “lies at the core of habeas corpus”).

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Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. No. 48) is denied. No further 

orders will issue in this closed case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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