Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00005/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00005-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

While Walton originally also brought suit for sexual harassment by Conklin during 1

her employment with Neptune, she clarified at the pretrial that she was abandoning such

claims. Her pretrial contentions correctly reflect this election to relinquish those claims.

Accordingly, to the extent that Defendants seek summary judgment on Walton’s claims

pursuant to Title VII for alleged sexual harassment, the motion is due to be DENIED as

MOOT. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

REBECCA F. WALTON, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:08-cv-5-MEF

 )

NEPTUNE TECHNOLOGY GROUP, INC., )

et al., )

 ) (WO-Not Recommended for Publication) 

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This suit is a dispute between Plaintiff Rebecca F. Walton (“Walton”) and her former

employer Neptune Technology Group, Inc. (“Neptune”). Walton contends that during her

employment with Neptune, her supervisor Robert Conklin (“Conklin”) subjected her to

unwelcome sexual advances and retaliated against her after she rebuffed them. She also

1

complains that she suffered discrimination at the hands of Neptune on account of her age and

her actual or perceived disability. Finally, she contends that Neptune retaliated against her

for exercising her statutory rights to seek accommodation of her disability. Walton brings

claims against Neptune under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 1 of 43
 It appeared from the Complaint that Walton also may have had claims pursuant to 2

Alabama law, but she has clarified in her contentions for the pretrial order that she has no

claims pursuant to Alabama law. 

2

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §

12101 et seq. The case is currently before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment 2

(Doc. # 17) filed on March 10, 2009, by Neptune. For the reasons set forth below, the

Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Jurisdiction over this matter is asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or

venue and the Court finds adequate allegations of both.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole

could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. An issue is ‘material’

if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc.

v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 2 of 43
3

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence

showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed

to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate

burden of proof. Id. at 322-23. 

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party

to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the

other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of

the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving

party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. After the nonmoving party

has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment

if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

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4

a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

FACTS

The Court has carefully considered all deposition excerpts and documents submitted

in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the

light most favorable to Walton, the non-moving party, establish the following material facts:

A. Walton’s Experience Prior to Beginning to Work Under Conklin’s Supervision

Neptune hired Walton as a cell meter operator in September of 2003. Initially, Walton

worked on the third shift and Ed Henderson (“Henderson”) was her supervisor. On one

occasion in May of 2004, Henderson documented some concerns about Walton’s work

performance in a document addressing his recommendation that Neptune delay a merit

increase in Walton’s pay. Henderson specially noted was that Walton had been observed not

participating in department housekeeping and that she had conduct and attitude problems in

her interactions with both co-workers and supervisors. Despite this delay in increasing her

pay, in her three and a half years of employment, Neptune eventually increased Walton’s pay

from $10.50/hour to $16.06/hour. 

B. Walton’s Experience with Conklin as a Supervisor

Eventually, Walton transferred to second shift. Her new supervisor on that shift was

Ricky Morgan (“Morgan”). After Morgan transferred to first shift, Conklin became the

second shift supervisor in August of 2006. Neptune terminated Walton’s employment on

November 30, 2006. At the time of the termination of her employment, Walton was fifty-two

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5

years old. This lawsuit arises out of Neptune’s decision to terminate Walton’s employment

and Conklin’s treatment of Walton from August of 2006 until November 30, 2006. 

In 2005, Walton began experiencing various problems with her health. By 2006,

Walton suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, migraine headaches, neuropathy in

her feet, and optic neuritis, which can be a precursor to multiple sclerosis and can affect

depth perception. Walton recalls discussing some of her medical issues with Conklin

including the migraine headaches, fibromyalgia, neuropathy in her feet, and her belief that

she was likely developing multiple sclerosis. On April 21, 2006, one of Walton’s doctors

limited her to a forty hour work week for medical reasons. Neptune approved intermittent

Family and Medical Leave Act leave to accommodate this restriction and did not require her

to work more than forty hours Monday through Friday. She was not assigned to work

weekends or overtime. 

According to Walton, she kept her supervisor and the director of human resources

well informed about her medical problems. Furthermore, Walton indicates that her

supervisors prior to Conklin had allowed her to rotate to less physically taxing jobs and had

let her work where she was less likely to become overheated. Conklin did not accommodate

her in these ways and according to Walton, he changed her assignments to tasks he knew

would be difficult for her given her health problems. It is unclear from Walton’s own

testimony if this failure to accommodate on the part of Conklin began as soon as he became

her supervisor in August of 2006 or if it only began after the two conversations in September

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 5 of 43
 Eventually, the doctors ruled out the MS diagnosis for Walton, but at this time she 3

believed it was possible that she was going to be diagnosed with this condition.

6

of that year, which conversations she characterized as sexual overtures that she rebuffed. 

Walton does not allege that anyone other than Conklin ever made any sexual

comments to her, propositioned her, or told any inappropriate jokes or stories in her presence.

She states generally that Conklin threatened her job “many times.” After a female employee

had been fired, Conklin remarked to Walton that he thought a woman should do anything so

that they could keep their job. Walton perceived this to be a veiled reference of a sexual

nature. She also avers that on one occasion in October of 2006, Conklin stared at her for an

entire shift. The real meat of her sexual harassment claims, however, arise out of two

conversations with Conklin in September of 2006. 

On September 14, 2006, Walton was sitting and working in the “zest room” when

Conklin entered the room and approached the desk where she was working. He pulled up

the crotch of his pants in a way she found sexually suggestive and sat on the corner of the

desk with his crotch two feet in front of her face. He started talking to Walton about his wife

and explained that she had multiple sclerosis (“MS”), a condition which Walton’s doctors

had told her might be causing some of her problems. Conklin told Walton that his wife did 3

not enjoy sex and that she had no feeling and he pointed to his crotch. He asked Walton if

she knew what he was speaking of as far as being MS and not having those sensations. She

replied that she had no idea and turned and left the room. 

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7

On September 18, 2006, Conklin approached Walton near one of the machines that

she operated. He said “in reference to that conversation we had the other day, did you

understand what I meant? What I meant is, my wife doesn’t have any feeling in her privates

and she doesn’t enjoy me to touch her there.” Another Neptune employee walked up and

Conklin left to attend with that employee. 

There is no other evidence before this Court of any other statements or conversations

by Conklin to Walton of a sexual nature. Walton contends that there was talk at Neptune that

Conklin had propositioned Beverly Johnston’s sister, then a Neptune employee. While

Walton has no evidence of any “sexual” harassment by Conklin, she believes that her failure

to favorably respond to what she considered a sexual overture caused Conklin to begin a

campaign to get her fired or subjected to disciplinary action. Walton admits that she did not

report Conklin’s conduct to anyone in a position of authority with Neptune. 

On Wednesday, September 20, 2006, Walton fell on a slippery area of floor while at

work. She injured her wrist and hand. A doctor completed a work status report on

September 21, 2006. The doctor released her to work with restrictions for four days. The

restrictions included no lifting, carrying, pushing or pulling and limited stooping and

bending. 

On Thursday, September 28, 2006 at around 4:30 p.m., Conklin told Walton that she

needed to pick a mold machine and clean it from top to bottom. She asked him why, and he

told her that it needed to be done. Walton perceived this request as punishment. According

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8

to Walton, Conklin had falsely accused her of “reading” on this date and required her to clean

a large machine as punishment. Mike Hornsby (“Hornsby”) was present when Conklin told

Walton to clean a mold machine. Later that evening, Hornsby asked Walton which machine

she had chosen. Walton replied that she was not going to clean any machine because it was

not her responsibility. Hornsby told Walton that she probably should do as Conklin asked

because he had heard Mike Granger (“Granger”), the Production Manager, ask Conklin to

have her clean one of the molding machines. Walton expressed further dissatisfaction with

having been assigned the task, but went and obtained cleaning supplies. Walton testified that

she actually cleaned the machine after having questioned why the task had been assigned to

her. She offers no testimony concerning how long the task took. Hornsby and Conklin did

not think that she cleaned the whole machine and told human resources about the incident

noting that after only a few minutes of cleaning she went off to “pout.” Conklin reported this

incident to Granger who also spoke with Hornsby regarding the incident. Granger and

Fulmer met with Walton regarding this incident on October 3, 2006.

On October 4, 2006, Human Resources Director Stephanie Fulmer (“Fulmer”) called

Walton in to discuss the September 28, 2006 issue. After hearing Walton’s version of the

events, Fulmer told Walton she would look into the matter further and that there might be

repercussions from it. Walton heard nothing further from Fulmer about the matter.

On or slightly before October 12, 2006, Conklin reassigned Walton to a position on

the production line. This position did not allow her to rest her feet and legs by sitting. She

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 8 of 43
 Walton assumes that because Conklin was there at that time he must have followed 4

her, but there is no actual evidence of this in the record nor is it a reasonable inference from

the simple fact that they were there at the same time. 

9

asked Conklin on October 12, 2006 to be allowed to rotate into another position, but he

denied her request. Walton began to ask cow-worker Beverly Johnston (“Johnston”) to rotate

positions with her. According to Johnston, Walton was harassing her. Johnston complained

to Conklin about Walton’s harassment at around 9:00 p.m. on October 17, 2006. According

to Johnston, Walton had started asking Johnston to switch jobs with her on October 16, 2006.

Johnston claimed that Walton was purposely holding up production on Johnston’s part of the

line. Conklin told her that if she was tampering with production she could be fired. Walton

denied having done so. Conklin instructed Walton to stay out of Johnston’s area and to focus

on her own job. According to Walton, Conklin told her not to talk to Johnston anymore. 

While he was her supervisor, Conklin was frequently critical of Walton’s work

performance. On October 24, 2006, Conklin told Walton that there was a small crack in the

main cases. According to Walton he accused her of being responsible for that problem

getting through the line. On October 25, 2006, Conklin accused Walton of holding up the

line. On November 1, 2006, Conklin accused Walton of failing to appropriately test the

waters at the wash station. 

On October 27, 2006, Walton left work early because she was sick. After Walton left

work early, Conklin encountered her outside Wal-Mart and demanded what she was doing

there. She told him she was getting some medicine. Conklin was skeptical of Walton’s 4

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 9 of 43
 At the time of the termination of her employment, Walton was 52 years old. 5

Currently, about 25% of Neptune’s employees are 52 years of age or older. At the time

Neptune discharged Walton approximately 135 of its employees were 52 years of age or

older. Walton testified in her deposition about the ages of the other employees, but gave no

indication that she had personal knowledge concerning the actual age of other Neptune

employees. Her testimony is plainly based on her impression or guess regarding the ages of

co-workers. Moreover, she admitted that a number of the first shift employees were older

and had worked for Neptune for many years. 

10

claim that she was ill. He asked other employees if she was really sick. He sent an email

message to Fulmer reporting that he had seen Walton in front of Wal-Mart after she left work

sick and stating that she frequently claims to be sick on most Fridays.

C. Events Resulting in the Termination of Walton’s Employment

Neptune terminated Walton’s employment on November 30, 2006. There is a great 5

deal of information before the Court from a variety of sources regarding the events during

the end of the second shift at Neptune from November 27, 2006 through November 29, 2006.

Some witnesses contradict each other. For purposes of resolving this motion, the Court will

view the facts in the light most favorable to Walton and abstain from attempting to resolve

any disputes as to material fact. That being said the Court will summarize the various

accounts here in the factual recitation noting where they are in conflict.

On the morning of November 27, 2006, Walton had a medical procedure and was not

in good shape. She was experiencing some bladder problems and her knee was swollen.

Nevertheless, she went to work. Once at work on the line, she asked Conklin to go and get

her an Ace bandage. Conklin did so. During his trip to the nurse’s station he also retrieved

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11

some medicine for another worker, Alisha Moore (“Moore”) who was having cramps.

Walton admits that her bladder problems caused her to have to make several visits to the

bathroom during this shift. 

On November 27, 2006, near the end of the second shift at 11:10 p.m., but while the

second shift employees were still “on the clock,” Rhonna Funderburk (“Funderburk”), a lead

employee from third shift, heard Walton in the bathroom tell two other second shift

employees “we can hide in the bathroom. He can’t come in here.” Next Walton said “Ed

will send Rhonna in here because he has done that before.” When Funderburk left the

bathroom she reported what she had seen and heard to Henderson. She also sent him an

email very early on November 29, 2006 documenting the incident. At 2:35 a.m. on

November 29, 2009, Henderson forwarded Funderburk’s email message along with one of

his own confirming that he had seen Walton leave the bathroom at 11:25 p.m. on that night

to Conklin, Fulmer, and other members of the management team. In his affidavit, Henderson

reiterates that he saw Walton and the other employees leave the bathroom at 11:25 p.m. on

November 27, 2006. 

On November 28, 2006, production finished early, and Walton had completed all of

her cleanup work. Walton asked Conklin what he would like them to do as they had finished

early. She avers that Conklin replied: “Out of sight, out of mind. If I was [sic] you, I’d go

to the bathroom.” Walton, Moore and another employee Victoria Roberts (“Roberts”) went

to the bathroom. Walton went into a stall and then came out and washed her hands. Roberts

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 11 of 43
 Conklin is no longer a Neptune employee. Neither party has presented any sworn 6

testimony from Conklin in the form of an affidavit or deposition testimony. For purposes of

his motion, the Court considers the copies of his email predicated upon the assumption that

these documents convey information capable of being rendered admissible without making

any finding as to the admissibility of the emails at trial. 

12

then said that with all three of them in there at the same time “they” (presumably

management) were going to think that “we” (Walton, Moore and Roberts) were avoiding

work. Moore and Roberts said they were going to stay in the bathroom. While Walton was

washing her hands, Funderburk, a third shift lead person who had been in a bathroom stall,

exited the stall. Walton went out on the floor to look for her badge because she had realized

her badge was missing. As she left the bathroom, she passed right in front of Funderburk.

Walton states that she was only in the restroom between 11:19 and 11:24 p.m. and that two

other workers were also in there during that time. Eventually, Walton found her badge and

clocked out late. 

According to an email message from Conklin dated November 29, 2006 at 11:50

p.m., production stopped at 11:00 p.m. on that date and the second shift employees were 6

cleaning and performing required checks, except for Walton who could not be located.

Conklin searched for her and decided that she was hiding in the bathroom again. He watched

that area for awhile and eventually asked an employee named “Lynn” to go in and see who

was in the bathroom. Lynn did as requested and then reported to Conklin that Walton and

Moore were in there. At 11:20 p.m., Conklin saw Walton and Moore come out of the

bathroom. Based on this incident, Conklin recommended that Neptune terminate Walton’s

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 12 of 43
13

employment. He explained that in his view she was not a team player and had repeatedly had

trouble following instructions and performing required tasks. Conklin identified seven

different company rules he believed Walton had violated.

Moore’s testimony provides a conflicting account of the events of November 28,

2006. Moore claims that she went to the bathroom that evening and when she entered the

bathroom Walton was already there. Moore claims that Roberts entered the bathroom after

she did. Once Moore and Roberts were in the bathroom, Moore contends that Walton stated

that they could hide in the bathroom and the supervisor would not be able to find them. This

seems very similar to the description of events Funderburk places on November 27, 2006.

It is not clear who is mistaken about the date or on how many instances Walton was observed

in the bathroom at the end of her shift. In her testimony, Walton denies making any

statement about hiding out in the bathroom or staying in the bathroom. Additionally, Walton

denies having stayed in the bathroom to avoid work on other occasions. She admits that an

employee named Osteen had been sent in to check on Walton on a prior occasion when she

was in the bathroom. 

Fulmer prepared a letter dated November 30, 2006, which informed Walton that her

employment was being terminated effective immediately. The letter indicated that on two

occasions Walton had been observed in the restroom for extended periods of time at the end

of her shift rather than in her assigned work area. The letter further indicated that both

incidents occurred after she had been warned on November 27, 2006 that the overlap time

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 13 of 43
 Because of the lack of specificity in Breeding’s affidavit, it is not entirely clear to 7

the Court which incident or incidents triggered his decision to terminate Walton’s

employment. It appears that he may be referring to the November 27, 2009 incident that

14

between shifts was not free time, but rather a time to clean and perform “TPM checks.”

When Walton arrived at work on November 30, 2006, Fulmer called Walton to her office.

Fulmer, Conklin, and another member of management were present for this meeting with

Walton. Fulmer told Walton that the meeting was concerning an incident on the 27th in the

restroom and that they had learned she had been hiding in the restroom. Walton denied

having done so. Fulmer told Walton she was being insubordinate. Fulmer told Walton that

Walton had been warned previously. Walton asked to see the warnings. Fulmer said they

were in her file. According to Walton, Fulmer did not show her any paperwork, but instead

repeatedly asked Walton to turn in her badge and leave. Walton turned to Conklin’s boss,

who was present, and said “there are things that you need to know that he’s doing and he is

doing things that are not right.” Fulmer repeated her request that Walton submit her badge

and leave. Walton gave Fulmer her badge. Conklin escorted Walton to her locker and then

out to the parking lot. 

Joe Breeding (“Breeding”), the Vice President of Human Resources at Neptune, has

provided this Court with sworn testimony that he is the person at Neptune with final authority

with regard to hiring and firing decisions. Breeding states that he made the decision to

terminate Walton’s employment after he learned of the incident in which Walton had been

reported to have been hiding in the restroom to avoid work. He further contends that 7

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 14 of 43
Funderburk described in the November 29, 2006 email message. It was in that message that

Funderburk claimed that she heard Walton encouraging other employees to join her in hiding

in the bathroom. This is a fact that Breeding references. 

 Roper is Neptune’s parent corporation. 8

15

Conklin’s recommendation that Walton be fired is not what caused him to determine that she

should be fired, but rather, his decision came as a result of his own determination that Walton

had violated company rules. Specifically, he contends Neptune’s investigation of reports of

misconduct by Walton from employees other than Conklin revealed that more than one

employee stated that Walton had not only hidden in the bathroom but had made a comment

about hiding in the bathroom. 

D. Neptune’s Policies

Like many employers Neptune has policies which prohibit workplace discrimination

and harassment whether that harassment be sexual or of another sort. Neptune provides

written versions of these policies to its employees. Walton received a copy. Additionally,

Roper Industries, Inc. (“Roper”) had a hotline, which was publicized at the Neptune facility, 8

for the reporting of inappropriate behavior or ethics violations. Neptune also has a

disciplinary policy which provides for progressive discipline for the violation of certain

company work rules. The first step is a counseling session by the supervisor. While the first

warning may be verbal, a written notice of the counseling should be submitted to the human

resources department for placement in the employee’s file. A second violation in a year

results in a formal written warning. A third violation in a year results in a three day

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16

suspension and a final written warning. Any further violations in a year result in discharge.

The company reserves the right to immediately discharge employees in more serious cases

or to deviate from the policy when there are extenuating circumstances. Other work rule

violations are listed in the disciplinary policy are more serious offenses warranting

suspension or discharge. This more serious list includes: “sleeping on the job or hiding for

the purpose of avoiding work.” 

E. Disciplinary Action Against Other Employees

Neptune did not terminate the employment of Moore and Roberts. Conklin told

Fulmer that they were both hard workers. He also told Fulmer that he believed that neither

of them stayed in the bathroom as long as Walton and that Roberts had told him earlier that

she had been having female problems and stomach cramps. He told Fulmer that he had

verbally reprimanded Moore and Roberts. 

F. Walton’s Unemployment Compensation Claim

After the termination of her employment, Walton sought unemployment

compensation. In response to her claim, the State of Alabama Department of Industrial

Relations (“the ADIR”) requested information from Neptune about the termination of her

employment. Neptune responded that it had employed Walton until November 30, 2006, but

that she was discharged due to an incident on November 29, 2006 in which she violated work

rules by hiding in the restroom to avoid work. Neptune further contended that Walton had

been previously warned about the inappropriateness of this type of conduct on November 27,

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17

2006. Under Section 25-4-78(3)(b), an employee discharged from a position for misconduct

at work after having previously been warned is not entitled to unemployment compensation.

The ADIR awarded Walton unemployment compensation benefits. After having conducted

an evidentiary hearing, the ADIR determined that Walton was absent from work on

November 26, 2006, the date on which the supervisor gave a general counseling to all

employees regarding the requirement to continue working and not to leave their assigned

areas. Because it found that she had not previously been warned against the misconduct for

which she was discharged, it found that § 25-4-78(3) did not apply and she was entitled to

the unemployment compensation payments she sought. The ADIR Administrative Hearing

Officer mentioned that Walton denied having engaged in the conduct for which she was

discharged, but did not make a finding to award benefits on the basis of that denial, rather

its finding was based on the failure of Neptune to demonstrate that she had been warned not

to engage in the misconduct for which it terminated her prior to discharging her. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 5, 2007, Walton filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In her charge, Walton complained of

discrimination due to her sex, age, and disability, as well as retaliation. The EEOC issued

a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on October 3, 2007. Walton filed this lawsuit on January

2, 2008. In this lawsuit, she seeks damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorney’s

fees, and costs. She alleges a violation of Title VII arising out Conklin’s sexual harassment

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 17 of 43
 In the Complaint, Walton alleges that “Calhoun had an actual or perceived disability 9

and was denied an employment opportunity and terminated from a position she was already

performing. Calhoun was refused employment due to her disability and Defendant’s

perception that Plaintiff was disabled.” Compl. at ¶ 37. The Court is at a loss to understand

how those allegations relate in anyway to the fact of this case. 

18

of her. She alleges age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. She alleges disability

discrimination in violation of the ADA. Finally, Walton alleges retaliation against her after 9

she has exercised her statutory rights. Notably, the Complaint fails to specify under which

statutory or statutes the retaliation claim is made. Although the Complaint alludes to claims

pursuant to Alabama law in the introductory paragraphs, none are actually set forth in the

allegations of the Complaint.

 Neptune and Roper have sought summary judgment on all of Walton’s claims.

Walton responds by opposing this motion. In so doing, she sheds additional light on the

specific nature of her claims in this action. She elaborates on the incidents with Conklin in

support of her sexual harassment claim. She explains the nature of her disabilities during her

employment with Neptune and complains that while prior supervisors had accommodated

her, Conklin refused to do so and in fact, assigned her to tasks he knew she could not perform

without pain. She contends that the termination of her employment was discriminatory

because other employees who were not as old or who did not have a disability engaged in the

same conduct she did, but were not fired or even disciplined. She also denies engaging in

the conduct for which Neptune fired her. As for her claim of retaliation, Walton specifies

that she had no problems at Neptune until after she rebuffed Conklin’s sexual advances. She

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 18 of 43
 At the Pretrial Conference, counsel for Walton appeared to concede that there were 10

no viable claims against Roper. 

19

attributes all of her problems with Conklin after his overtures to his desire to retaliate against

her for rejecting him and ultimately to see her get fired. Walton also faults Fulmer for failing

to follow Neptune’s own progressive discipline policy and failing to properly inquire into the

allegations made against Walton after Walton denied the charges against her. 

DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against Roper

It is unclear from the Complaint itself whether Walton is attempting to hold both

Neptune and its parent company Roper liable. To be sure both entities are identified in the 10

section of the caption where the defendant’s name is to be placed. Walton alleges that

Neptune employed her, but further states that Roper is the parent company of Neptune and

identifies the number of employees it employs. Compl. at ¶¶ 3 & 4. Walton sought service

of both Neptune and Roper. Due to this ambiguity, Roper has joined in the Neptune motion

for summary judgment arguing that it cannot be held liable under the applicable law. Walton

makes no effort to refute this argument or to address whether she intended to state a claim

against Roper as well as against Neptune. Consequently, the Court lacks both a factual and

a legal predicate upon which to base any finding of liability against Roper. For this reason,

the motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED to the extent that it seeks

judgment as a matter of all as to all of Walton’s claims against Roper. This preliminary issue

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 19 of 43
20

having been addressed, the Court will not address Walton’s remaining claims against her

employer, Neptune.

B. ADEA Claim

The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer...to fail or refuse to hire or to

discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s

age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 

When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, ‘liability depends

on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually

motivated the employer’s decision. That is, the plaintiff’s age

must have “actually played a role in [the employer’s

decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on

the outcome.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper

Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). The courts have often recognized that this inquiry

implicates analyses of the mental processes of employers for which there is seldom eyewitness testimony. Id. Consequently, the courts have applied some variation on the

framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and its

progeny to analyze ADEA cases brought primarily on circumstantial evidence. Reeves, 530

U.S. at 141 (collecting cases); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 962 (1998). Thus, an employee bringing a claim under the

ADEA must initially establish a prima facie case of discrimination through one of three

methods: by presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent, presenting circumstantial

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 20 of 43
 Walton offers no evidence that could be appropriately considered direct or 11

statistical evidence of age discrimination. Accordingly, the Court will limit its discussion to

her circumstantial evidence. 

21

evidence of discrimination by satisfying the analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas and its

progeny, or by introducing statistical evidence of discrimination. See, e.g., Walker v.

NationsBank of Florida, N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1556 (11th Cir. 1995). 

11

To establish a discrimination claim by circumstantial evidence using the McDonnell

Douglas framework, the employee has the initial burden of showing, by a preponderance of

the evidence, a prima facie case of the proscribed practice. Young v. General Foods Corp.,

840 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989). The essence of the

prima facie case is that the employee presents circumstantial evidence sufficient to generate

a reasonable inference by the fact finder that the employer used prohibited criteria in making

an adverse decision about the employee. If established, the prima facie case raises a

rebuttable presumption that the employer is liable to the employee. Texas Dep’t of Cmty.

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). “Demonstrating a prima facie case is not onerous;

it requires only that the plaintiff establish facts adequate to permit an inference of

discrimination.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Once a plaintiff establishes the requisite elements of the prima facie case, the

defendant has the burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

challenged employment action. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d at 1564 (citing Texas

Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)). The employer’s burden is

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 21 of 43
22

“exceedingly light.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564. This burden is one of production, not

persuasion and consequently, the employer need only produce evidence that could allow a

rational fact-finder to conclude that the challenged employment action was not made for a

discriminatory reason. See, e.g., Davis v. Qualico Miscellaneous, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1314,

1321 (M.D. Ala. 2001). 

If such a reason is produced, a plaintiff then has the ultimate burden of proving the

reason to be a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1565;

Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff “has the

opportunity to discredit the defendant’s proffered reasons for its decision”). Thus, once the

employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the burden returns to the

employee to supply “evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the

prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the reasons

given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.”

Davis, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th

Cir. 2000) (en banc)). The plaintiff may seek to demonstrate that the proffered reason was

not the true reason for the employment decision “either directly by persuading the court that

a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256;

Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528. A plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence

to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 22 of 43
 As will be discussed later, Walton also claims that the termination of her 12

employment was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for her exercise of her rights

under the ADA and for refusing Conklin’s sexual advances.

 The exact events relating to the hiding in the bathroom are replete with disputed 13

issues as to material facts. Due to the procedural posture of this case, the Court cannot and

will not attempt to resolve those disputes or make credibility determinations. Unfortunately,

even the affidavit from Breeding, the person alleged to have decided to terminate Walton’s

employment, fails to clearly explain the precise basis for this decision. 

23

conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. 

In this case, Walton claims that the termination of her employment was

discriminatory because Neptune did not terminate the employment of the two younger 12

women employees who stayed in the restroom in the same incident or incidents which gave 13

rise to the termination of Walton’s employment. 

A plaintiff’s prima facie case for a discharge-discrimination

claim must show the following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a

member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for

the position at issue; (3) the plaintiff was discharged despite his

qualification; and (4) the plaintiff was subject to differential

treatment, that is, he was either (a) replaced by someone who

was not a member of the plaintiff’s protected class or (b) a

similarly situated employee who was not a member of the

protected class engaged in nearly identical conduct and was not

discharged.

Keel v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2003), aff’d without

opinion, 99 Fed. Appx. 880 (11th Cir. Mar 02, 2004); Davis v. Qualico Miscellaneous Inc.,

161 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1319 (M.D. Ala. 2001). Accord, Williams v. Motorola, 303 F.3d

1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002). Importantly, an employee cannot establish a prima facie case

of discrimination by simply arguing that he belonged to a protected class and that he did not

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 23 of 43
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals withdrew part of its opinion in this case 14

on rehearing and substituted a new section which can be found at Jones v. Bessemer

Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998). Nothing in this Memorandum Opinion

is based on the portion of the opinion in Jones which was withdrawn on rehearing. 

 Walton denies ever hiding to avoid work and denies encouraging others to hide in 15

order to avoid work. 

24

engage in the conduct for which he alleges his employment was terminated. See, e.g., Jones

v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir.), superseded in part on

denial of reh’g, 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998) ; Keel, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1285; Thomas v. 14

Ala. Council on Human Relations, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1119 (M.D. Ala. 2003);

Cooper v. Diversicare Mgmt. Servs. Co., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1318-19 (M.D. Ala. 1999).

There is no dispute in this case that Walton is a member of a protected class in that

at the time of the termination of her employment she was more than forty years of age.

Indeed, in this case there is no dispute that Walton was a member of that protected class of

persons over forty years of age at the time Neptune hired her, as well as at the time of her

discharge. There is no dispute in this case that Walton was qualified for the position which

she held with Neptune and that she was discharged despite this qualification. Walton does

not attempt to establish a prima facie case by showing that Walton was replaced by someone

who was younger than forty. Instead, she denies having engaged in the conduct for which

she was terminated and points to two employees she contends are similarly situated except 15

for the fact that they were under forty years of age, who engaged in what she argues was

nearly identical conduct and were not discharged. 

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 24 of 43
25

In evaluating this claim, the Court must be mindful of the binding precedent from the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals which requires Walton to be similarly situated in all

relevant respects to those comparators she identifies. See, e.g., Morris v. Emory Clinic, Inc.,

402 F.3d 1076, 1082 (11th Cir. 2005) (doctor discharged from clinic due to patient

complaints about his conduct who couldn’t show that he was replaced by someone outside

his protected class and who couldn’t show that a comparable person outside his protected

class received “nearly identical” complaints, but was not fired failed to establish a prima

facie case); Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001)

(reversing judgment in favor of plaintiff because employer entitled to judgment as a matter

of law where plaintiff’s comparator engaged in fewer instances of misconduct than plaintiff);

Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment

in employer’s favor where alleged misconduct of comparators was not sufficiently similar

to support disparate treatment claim); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir.

1997) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that

non-minority employees with which he compares his treatment were similarly situated in all

aspects, or that their conduct was of comparable seriousness to the conduct for which he was

discharged); Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540-42 (11th Cir. 1989); Nix, 738 F.2d at

1185-87 (African-American plaintiff who was replaced by another African-American after

termination for violation of work rule failed to make out a prima facie case of race

discrimination because he did not meet his burden of showing that a white employee in

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 25 of 43
 Walton denies having stayed in the restroom as long as Moore and Roberts did. 16

She also denies exhorting the others to stay in the restroom to avoid work and attributes a

comment about staying in the bathroom so their supervisor could not find them to Roberts.

26

similar circumstances was retained while he was fired). In evaluating the similarity of the

comparators identified by the plaintiff, the most important variables in a discriminatory

discipline case are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments

imposed. See, Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d at 1539. Both the “quantity and the quality of the

comparator’s misconduct must be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing

employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples and oranges.” Maniccia, 171 F.3d at

1368. In making this analysis a court must keep in mind that “Title VII does not take away

an employer’s right to interpret its rules as it chooses, and to make determinations as it sees

fit under those rules[.]” Id. at 1369. Moreover, the actions of the employer toward the

proffered comparators are only relevant if the decisionmaker knew of the rule violations by

the comparators and took no action against them. Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d at 1542.

It is undisputed that Neptune terminated the employment of Walton. It took this

action after Funderburk, Henderson, and Conklin reported to management that Walton,

Moore, and Roberts was hiding in the restroom to avoid work and that Walton was exhorting

others to do the same. It is undisputed that hiding to avoid work is a serious work rule 16

infraction that can result in discharge under Neptune’s disciplinary policy. It is undisputed

that Neptune did not terminate the employment of two women younger than forty years of

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 26 of 43
 Certainly there is evidence of this in the letter Neptune produced which articulates 17

the reasons for the termination of Walton’s employment. Again, Breeding’s affidavit is not

nearly as clear about the reasons for the decisions, but he does indicate that he believed she

27

age, Moore and Roberts, who were also spotted in the restroom at the same time as Walton.

Instead, Neptune allowed Conklin to merely give them an oral reprimand. 

When the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Walton and refrains

from attempting to resolve the extant genuine issues of material fact, the Court must find that

Walton has offered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury might find of a prima

facie case of age discrimination in that similarly situated employees who were not more than

forty years of age engaged in nearly identical conduct and were not discharged.

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima-facie case, the burden then shifts to the

employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment

action. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 1997); Davis, 161 F.

Supp. 2d at 1321. The employer’s burden is “exceedingly light.” Id. This burden is one of

production, not persuasion and consequently, the employer need only produce evidence that

could allow a rational fact-finder to conclude that the challenged employment action was not

made for a discriminatory reason. See, e.g., Davis, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1321. Neptune has

done this by showing that it decided to terminate Walton’s employment because Breeding

believed that she was the one who had hidden in the bathroom and exhorted others to do so

and because Breeding believed that this was not the first time that Walton had engaged in

such conduct.17

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 27 of 43
had been hiding to avoid work and telling other employees that they could hide to avoid

work. While it is clear that part of the reason Breeding reached this conclusion was the

information he received from Conklin, it is also clear that Breeding also relied on

information received from other employees. 

28

Once the employer offers this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the burden

returns to the employee to supply “evidence, including the previously produced evidence

establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude

that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment

decision.” Davis, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012,

1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Where an employer has subjected an employee to

disciplinary action or terminated the employment of the employee for misconduct, the

employee may show that the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual by setting forth

evidence that other employees, not within the plaintiff’s protected class, who engaged in

similar acts were not similarly treated. Davis, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. 

Some cases suggest that a plaintiff in these circumstances may also establish pretext

by showing that the employer’s proffered reasons have no basis in fact because the employee

did not engage in the conduct on which the employer acted. See, e.g., Anderson v. Savage

Labs., Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting this means of proof in dicta in a

case where employee conceded that he had violated the work rule on which his termination

was based); Davis, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (citing Anderson in overview of paradigm). 

Other cases suggest that reliance on this method of proof of pretext is “problematic.”

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 28 of 43
29

Cooper, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 (citing Walker v. NationsBank of Fla., 53 F.3d 1548, 1564

(11th Cir. 1995) (Johnson, J., specially concurring).

Evidence showing a false factual predicate underlying the

employer’s proffered reason does not unequivocally prove that

the employer did not rely on the reason in making the

employment decision. Instead, it may merely indicate that the

employer, acting in good faith, made the disputed employment

decision on the basis of erroneous information. It is obviously

not a violation of federal employment discrimination laws for an

employer to err in assessing the performance of an employee.

Thus, establishing pretext is not merely demonstrating that the

employer made a mistake, but that the employer did not give an

honest account of its behavior. 

Id. (internal citations omitted). Rather than simply disputing whether she engaged in the

conduct at issue, the employee could establish pretext by “presenting evidence tending to

show that the predicate facts underlying the proffered reason were false” and that “the

employer knew them to be false at the time of [its] purported reliance” or that “the proffered

reason may involve a disputed fact of a kind that it is improbable that the employer could be

mistaken about it.” Walker, 53 F.3d at 1564 n.7; Cooper, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1320.

In order to show that the proffered reason for the termination of Walton’s employment

was pretextual, Walton must show that Breeding based his decision to discharge her on an

unreasonable belief that Walton hid in the restroom to avoid working at the end of her shift

and exhorted other employees to do the same. See, e.g., Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd.,

244 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 402 (2001) (pretext means

more than a mistake by the employer; actions taken based on a mistaken, non-discriminatory

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 29 of 43
30

belief do not violate Title VII); Lee v. GTE Fla, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001) (“A plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant’s

employment decisions were mistaken, but that were in fact motivated by [the protected

characteristic].”); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221

F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff could be properly discharged on defendant’s good faith

belief that she lied in an internal investigation); Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d

1303, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000), reh’g denied, 218 F.3d 749 (11 Cir. 2000) (“a plaintiff must th

show not merely that the defendant’s employment decisions were mistaken but that they were

in fact motivated by race.”); Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.

1991) (court’s pretext inquiry is properly limited to whether the decision-makers believed the

employee had engaged in conduct for which he was terminated and if so whether this belief

was the reason for the discharge, not whether plaintiff was actually guilty of the conduct);

Connor v. Fort Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (employer’s belief,

honest but mistaken, may nonetheless provide legitimate reason for discharge). 

With respect to her age discrimination claim, Walton offers little evidence or

argument beyond the facts offered in support of the prima facie case to establish pretext.

Walton has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find that

Breeding did not really believe that Walton had hidden in the restroom to avoid work and

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 30 of 43
 There is no evidence that this employee, Funderburk, was connected in any way to 18

Conklin. 

31

encouraged others to do the same. Indeed, more than one Neptune employee had reported 18

to higher management that Walton had done both prior to the decision to terminate her

employment. Walton has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable factfinder

could find that Breeding decided to terminate her employment because of her age. Walton

has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could call into question

Breeding’s determination that the other employees had engaged in less serious conduct

warranting a lesser punishment. In the absence of these types of evidence, Neptune is

entitled to summary judgment on Walton’s ADEA claims alleging that the termination of her

employment was age discrimination. Neptune’s motion is due to be GRANTED as to

Walton’s claims pursuant to the ADEA.

C. Title VII Claims

1. Sexual Harassment

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating

“against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It has

long been recognized that “[t]he phrase terms, conditions, or privileges of employment

evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men

and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily

hostile or abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 31 of 43
Walton’s counsel specifically relinquished them at the pretrial conference and 19

amended her contentions for the pretrial order to omit any reference to such claims.

32

(internal citations omitted). 

While Walton originally alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of her

sex because while she was employed with Neptune her supervisor subjected her to sexual

harassment, she has subsequently abandoned these claims. For this reason, Neptune’s 19

motion for summary judgment is due to be DENIED as MOOT.

2. Retaliation

In addition to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, Title VII also contains

provisions which prohibit retaliation against employees who engage in certain protected

conduct. Under Title VII, it is also an unlawful employment practice for an employer to

discriminate against an employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful

employment practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participate in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Walton alleges that Conklin retaliated against her after

she rebuffed his sexual advances. 

As previously stated, Walton’s final federal claim against Neptune is brought pursuant

to Title VII for what she alleges was retaliation against her. Specifically, Walton contends

that rebuffing or rejecting what she believed to be Conklin’s sexual overtures towards her

resulted in Conklin causing the termination of Walton’s employment. 

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 32 of 43
 There is no direct evidence of retaliation in this case. 20

 This is not inconsistent with the Court’s finding that Walton was not sexually 21

harassed. Even if Conklin’s treatment of Walton was not a violation of Title VII, Walton

could have engaged in protected expression by opposing it if she establishes that she had a

good faith and reasonable believe that Conklin’s conduct was unlawful. “To establish that

a plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected expression, ... a plaintiff must show that she ‘had

a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment

practices.’” Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). 

33

The analysis of a claim of retaliation based on circumstantial evidence is similar to 20

the analysis of a discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence. 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [an employee]

must show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her

employer was aware of that activity; (3) she suffered adverse

employment action; and (4) there was a causal link between her

protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Little v. United Tech., 103

F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997)). Accord, Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460

(11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Neptune does not challenge Walton’s contention that

the evidence supports the first three elements of the prima facie case, and the Court accepts

Walton’s assertion that they are established for purposes of this motion.21

As is common in these types of cases, the real issue with respect to Walton’s prima

facie showing on her retaliation claim is the fourth element which requires a showing of a

causal link between the alleged adverse employment action and the protected activity. “The

causal link element is construed broadly so that ‘a plaintiff merely has to prove that the

protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely unrelated.’”

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 33 of 43
34

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). One

common method of establishing the causal link element is close temporal proximity between

the adverse employment action and the protected activity. Of course, this is not the sole

means of establishing the causal link element; rather it is merely the most commonly used

approach. Indeed, the close temporal proximity between Walton’s rejection of Conklin and

the events resulting in the termination of Walton’s employment less than three months later,

is sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy the requirement that Walton have evidence of

all the elements of the prima facie case of retaliation. 

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden then shifts to

the employer to rebut the presumption by articulating legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for

its employment action. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 (11 Cir. 1997); th

Olmsted, 141 F.3d at 1460. “This intermediate burden is exceedingly light.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted). The employer has the burden of production, not of persuasion, and thus

does not have to persuade a court that it was actually motivated by the reason advanced. See

McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Texas Dep’t of Comty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-255 (1981). 

The provisions in Title VII against retaliation are designed and intended to prevent

employers from improperly punishing employees who have exercised their right to engage

in protected conduct. These provisions are not intended to insulate an employee from

discipline for violating the employer’s rules or disrupting the workplace. 

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 34 of 43
35

Once the employer satisfies this burden of production, as Neptune has here, “the

presumption of [retaliation] is eliminated and ‘the plaintiff has the opportunity to come

forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima

facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by

the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.’” Chapman v.

AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The establishment

of a prima facie case does not in itself entitle a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary

judgment. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987); Pace v.

Southern Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir. 1983). After an employer proffers nonretaliatory reasons for its actions, “[i]n order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must

produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that each of the

employer’s proffered . . . reasons is pretextual.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1037.

In support of her contention that Neptune’s proffered reasons are pretextual again

appears to argue that the timing of the events in question constitutes circumstantial evidence

of some connection between her protected conduct and her suspension and termination.

Close temporal proximity between protected conduct and an adverse employment decision

cannot alone create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the employer’s

proffered non-retaliatory reason was pretextual. See, e.g., Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1245;

Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 1997);

Padron v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256-60 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 35 of 43
This argument is mostly supported by the evidence. She did have negative 22

comments from a prior supervisor which resulted in a delay in her receiving a raise, but that

was very early in her employment. Nearly all of the negative information in Walton’s file

came after Conklin was her supervisor. 

Of course, Conklin is the person Walton charges had the motive to retaliate against 23

her because of her rebuff of his sexual advances. Walton contends and Neptune does not

dispute that rebuffing unwelcome sexual advances is protected conduct under Title VII. This

makes Conklin’s involvement in sullying Walton’s name and trying to get her discharged or

disciplined suspect especially in view of the timing of these events. Because there is no

evidence that Conklin or anyone else at Neptune had any bias against Walton because of her

age, the analysis is a bit different than that of the Walton’s claim that her discharge

constituted age discrimination. 

36

without opinion, 62 Fed. App. 317 (11th Cir. 2003). Accord, Tran v. Trustees of State Colls.

in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004). 

Walton argues far more than just the temporal proximity to establish evidence that the

reason given was a retaliation for pretext. She contends that Neptune did not follow its own

progressive discipline policy; however given the language of the policy itself, the Court

cannot say that is a fair and reasonable inference in this case. She contends that she never

had any disciplinary problems during more than three years of employment until after she

rebuffed Conklin. She notes the great many problems she had with Conklin criticizing her 22

work after she rebuffed him. She contends that Neptune gave false information about a prior

warning having been given to her when it argued against her receiving unemployment

compensation. She contends that Neptune did not ask for or listen to her version of the

events and conducted a one-sided investigation. She points to the involvement of Conklin

as a key force in influencing the decision to terminate her employment. Walton has 23

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 36 of 43
 The Court notes that Walton offers far more evidence of pretext in support of her 24

two retaliation claims than she does in support of her age discrimination claim. With respect

to the retaliation claims, there is evidence of suspect timing and involvement of persons with

possible reasons to retaliate against Walton. Thus, while no reasonable factfinder could find

that the real reason for the termination of Walton’s employment was her age, a reasonable

factfinder might find that the real reason for the termination of Walton’s employment was

illegal retaliation.

37

presented evidence which if believed establishes that all the workers other than Walton were

warned against failing to work during their whole shift on November 26, 2006; that on

November 27, 2006, Conklin was aware of a report by another supervisory employee

accusing Walton of hiding in the bathroom to avoid work; and that on November 28, 2006,

Conklin exhorted Walton to hide in the bathroom at the end of her shift. Certainly, a

reasonable fact-finder could decide based on these facts that Conklin was trying to set

Walton up for discharge. Given that Walton’s problems with Conklin follow so closely on

the heels of her rejection of him, a reasonable factfinder could determine that he did so to

retaliate against her for rejecting him. Of course, Conklin was not the final decision-maker

in the adverse employment action at issue; Breeding was. The “cat’s paw” theory could

afford Walton a remedy nonetheless. If a reasonable factfinder believes that Conklin

manipulated events to get Walton in a position of having committed an offense warranting

termination and influenced Breeding to take that action and that Breeding did so without

conducting a reasonable inquiry into the basis for the conduct, Neptune could be held liable

under Title VII for retaliation. In view of the evidence before the Court, the Court cannot 24

say as a matter of law that Neptune is entitled to summary judgment on Walton’s Title VII

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 37 of 43
 Neptune has argued an alternative ground for summary judgment. It contends that 25

it is entitled to summary judgment even this is a mixed-motive case because it would have

made the same decision anyway. It will be for the jury to decide whether legitimate and

illegitimate reasons motivated Neptune when it terminated Walton’s employment. To the

extent that Neptune seeks summary judgment on a mixed-motive defense, its motion is

denied, as it has not sufficiently shown that there is no way a reasonable jury could find by

a preponderance of the evidence that it would have terminated Walton’s employment even

in the absence of the impermissible motive. Pulliam v. Tallapoosa County Jail, 185 F.3d

1182, 1184 (11th Cir. 1999). Similarly, Neptune’s argument that it is entitled to summary

judgment on Walton’s claims for punitive damages is not inadequate in the circumstances

of this case.

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retaliation claim. 

25

D. ADA Claims

1. Disability Discrimination

As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, 

[t]he ADA mandates that covered employers shall not

“discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability

because of the disability of such individual in regard to job

application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of

employees, employee compensation, job training, and other

terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(a). Under the Act, the term “discriminate” is defined to

include, among other factors, “excluding or otherwise denying

equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the

known disability of an individual with whom the qualified

individual is known to have a relationship or association.” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). 

Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001). Given the absence

of the direct evidence to support Walton’s disability discrimination claim, as that type of

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 38 of 43
A summary of Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases explaining the nature of 26

direct evidence in employment discrimination cases is found in Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1242

n.2.

 The United States Supreme Court has set forth a burden-shifting scheme for 27

discriminatory-treatment cases. Under this scheme, a plaintiff must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination. The burden then shirts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. If the employer meets this

burden, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still

prove disparate treatment, by offering evidence demonstrating that the employer’s

explanation is pretextual. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003).

39

evidence has been defined by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court will analyze 26

this case as one in which the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Wascura,

257 F.3d at 1242 (applying Title VII burden shifting analysis to case brought pursuant to 27

the ADA based on circumstantial rather than direct evidence). 

“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the [Rehabilitation Act or the

ADA], an individual must show that (1) [s]he has a disability; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified

for the position; and (3) [s]he was subjected to unlawful discrimination as the result of [her]

disability.” Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999). The court notes that

some courts have criticized the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ articulation of the third

element of the prima facie case. See, e.g., Boyd v. Province Healthcare Co., 2005 WL

3132394, *4 n.16 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 22, 2005); Brandon v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical

Sys., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345-46 (N.D. Ga. 2005). The Court agrees that the third

element of the prima facie case is more properly understood as obliging a plaintiff to show

that she was subjected to adverse employment action under circumstances suggesting a

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 39 of 43
 Specifically, Walton contends that Morgan allowed her to work in an area where 28

she would not get overheated and allowed her to rotate to the “sit-down portion” of the job.

She also states that he installed a rail on a machine she had difficulty climbing. On the other

hand, Walton contends that Conklin knew about her health problems, but did not allow her

to sit down, did not grant her request to be rotated to another position, assigned her physically

difficult tasks to punish her, and assigned her to a job that required repetitive action. 

40

causal link to her disability. 

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must

articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. See Wascura,

257 F.3 at 1242. If the employer articulates one or more such reasons, the presumption of

discrimination created by the prima facie case is eliminated and the plaintiff has the

opportunity to come forward with evidence, including the evidence offered in support of the

prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the reasons

given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision. See,

e.g., Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1243. 

Neptune contends and Walton has not disputed that Neptune accommodated all work

restrictions Walton’s doctors imposed including granting her FMLA leave so she could be

excused from working more than forty hours per week or at any time on the weekend.

Neptune contends and Walton has not disputed that Neptune put her on light duty after a

workplace fall in September of 2006. Walton contends that her supervisors had previously

made informal accommodations of her health conditions in the way that they assigned tasks,

but that Conklin did not do so. She further contends that failure to make reasonable 28

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 40 of 43
 Neptune merely argues that Walton fails to establish a prima facie case on this 29

claim. It does not proffer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Conklin’s actions.

Thus, the Court need not discuss the remaining portion of the burden-shifting analysis.

41

accommodations for a qualified individual with a disability constitutes sufficient evidence

that Neptune subjected her to unlawful discrimination as the result of her disability. See

D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005). Viewing the

record before it in the light most favorable to Walton, the Court is compelled to find that a

reasonable factfinder could find that Neptune discriminated against Walton by failing to

make reasonable accommodations for her conditions, at least after Conklin became her

supervisor. Accordingly, Neptune is not entitled to summary judgment on Walton’s claim

of discrimination pursuant to the ADA. 

29

2. Retaliation

Neptune did not move for summary judgment on any retaliation claim other than

Walton’s retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII. This is understandable given the rather

vague and general nature of the allegations of retaliation in the Complaint. Nevertheless,

Walton argued in her opposition to Neptune’s motion for summary judgment that Neptune

subjected her to harassment and ultimately terminated her employment in retaliation for

Walton’s statutorily protected conduct under both Title VII and the ADA. At the pretrial

conference the Court attempted to seek clarification from Walton’s counsel as to whether

Walton intended to pursue a claim for retaliation under the ADA as well as her claim for

retaliation under Title VII. It appeared at that time that Walton intended to pursue both types

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 41 of 43
42

of claims. The Court clearly advised counsel to review and revise their contentions and gave

them a deadline for submitting them to the Court. Walton’s counsel did amend her

contentions. Walton’s revised contentions in the Pretrial Order are as follows:

Plaintiff contends that she was discriminated [sic] on the basis

of her disability which was well known by the company,

discriminated against on the basis of age, in that she was fired

while younger women identically accused were not terminated

or disciplined, and retaliated against by her supervisor, after she

refused to respond to his sexual demands. He steadily

complained about her until she was terminated. 

Noticeably absent from these contentions is any mention of any fact which would arguably

support a retaliation claim pursuant to the ADA. Accordingly, the parties are advised that

such a claim may not be presented to the jury in this case because the Pretrial Order, which

supplants the pleadings does not include such a claim. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

(1) Roper’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #17) is GRANTED with respect to

all counts against it, and all claims against Roper are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(2) Neptune’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #17) is DENIED as MOOT with

respect to Walton’s claims of sexual harassment (Count One) as Walton has specifically

abandoned such claims.

(3) Neptune’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Walton’s

claims of age discrimination (Count Two), and those claims are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

Case 2:08-cv-00005-MEF-SRW Document 47 Filed 10/20/09 Page 42 of 43
43

(3) Neptune’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #17) is DENIED with respect to

all of Walton’s claims of retaliation pursuant to Title VII only (Count Four) and to her claim

of discrimination pursuant to the ADA (Count Three).

DONE this the 20 day of October, 2009. th

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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