Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06868/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06868-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NICK KING, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

BUMBLE TRADING, INC., et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 18-cv-06868-NC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS; ORDER GRANTING 

MOTIONS TO SEAL 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 67, 78, 79 

Pending before the Court is defendants Bumble Trading, Inc. and Bumble Holding, 

Ltd.’s motion to dismiss out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). See Dkt. No. 67 at 11–18. At issue is 

whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over the claims of the out-of-state named 

plaintiff, Brian Wess, and those of absent out-of-state class members. For the following 

reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. The Court also GRANTS the parties’ administrative motions to seal. 

I. Background 

Defendants own and operate a mobile software application “Bumble” that provides 

dating services for its users. See Dkt. No. 58 (“TAC”) ¶¶ 18, 21. Plaintiffs Nick King, Jr., 

Deena Fischer, Elena Weinberger, and Brian Wess accuse Bumble of violating New York 

and California law by failing to provide statutorily required disclaimers and contract 

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provisions in connection with Bumble’s premium service, “Bumble Boost.” See id. ¶¶ 2, 

25–50. Plaintiffs seek to represent a nationwide class of Bumble Boost purchasers. Id.

¶ 87. 

On September 9, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss certain claims in Plaintiffs’ 

third amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 67. The Court denied in part Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss in-state plaintiffs’ claims under New York law, but deferred ruling on whether 

the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims to give the parties 

time to conduct jurisdictional discovery.1

 See Dkt. No. 76. Jurisdictional discovery is now 

complete. See Dkt. Nos. 77, 80. 

II. Legal Standard 

To determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant is proper, a district court must apply the law of the state in which it sits. 

Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). District courts in 

California may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent 

permitted by the Constitution. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10. Accordingly, under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the defendant must have “certain minimum 

contacts” with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 

316 (1945) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Personal jurisdiction may be general 

or specific. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126–27 (2014). 

“When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 

bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” 

Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). “[I]n the absence of an

evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 

facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods 

Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 671-72 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted); see also Data Disc, 

1

 Defendants do not argue that the Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over the 

named California plaintiffs and absent California class members. 

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Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977) (“If the court 

determines that it will receive only affidavits or affidavits plus discovery materials . . . a 

plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts . . . .”). “Although 

the plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, uncontroverted 

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor 

Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Likewise, 

“[c]onflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the 

plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (citing AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 

(9th Cir. 1996)). 

III. Discussion 

Defendants argue that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the claims 

of the out-of-state named plaintiff, Brian Wess, and those of absent out-of-state class 

members. Plaintiffs raise three arguments in response: (1) Defendants waived any 

challenge to personal jurisdiction; (2) the Court has general jurisdiction; and (3) the Court 

has specific jurisdiction. The Court addresses each in turn. 

A. Forum Selection Clause 

Plaintiffs first argue that Defendants waived any challenge to the Court’s personal 

jurisdiction by virtue of the forum selection clause in their terms of use. See Dkt. No. 69 at 

11–13. As relevant here, Bumble’s forum selection clause states that: 

By using the App, you are consenting to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

courts of the United States and the State of New York. You agree that such 

courts shall have in personam jurisdiction and venue and waive any objection 

based on inconvenient forum. 

Dkt. No. 58-1 (“Terms”) § 12. 

The Court disagrees. That provision unambiguously refers to the user’s waiver of 

personal jurisdiction. The word “you” is used throughout the Terms to specifically 

reference the user, not Defendants. See, e.g., Terms § 1. The provision limits the 

agreement to waive personal jurisdiction and venue to “you,” and says nothing about 

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personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Id. § 12. Accordingly, Defendants did not waive 

their challenge to personal jurisdiction through the Terms. 

B. General Jurisdiction 

General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s activities in the forum are 

“continuous and systematic.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 126 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 

317). For corporate defendants, general jurisdiction exists at its “place of incorporation 

and principal place of business.” Id. at 137. Specific jurisdiction exists when the lawsuit 

“aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Id. at 127 (quoting 

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)) 

(alterations in original). 

Plaintiffs argue that the Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendants 

because their principal places of business are in California. See Dkt. No. 77 at 7. The 

principal place of business, or the corporation’s “nerve center,” is “the place where the 

corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 

activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010).2

According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ principal places of business are in California 

because, according to documents filed with the California Secretary of State, Bumble 

Trading’s principal executive office is in San Francisco and both Bumble Trading and 

Bumble Holding have high level officers who work or live in Los Angeles. Id. at 8. In 

response, Defendants contend that they have never been based in California. See Dkt. No. 

80 at 2. Relying on two declarations by Caroline Roche, Bumble’s first employee, 

Defendants assert that the California Secretary of State documents were filed in error and 

that Bumble Trading was always headquartered in Texas. Id. Defendants also assert that 

Bumble Holding is headquartered in the United Kingdom. See Dkt. No. 67 at 12. 

2

 Although Hertz defined “principal place of business” in the context of citizenship for 

diversity jurisdiction, courts have used the Hertz formulation of “principal place of 

business” for personal jurisdiction purposes as well. See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Rockstar 

Consortium U.S. LP, No. 13-cv-5933-CW, 2014 WL 1571807, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

17, 2014).

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Plaintiffs argue that Roche’s declaration should be stricken because she lacks personal 

knowledge regarding the Secretary of State filings. See Dkt. No. 77 at 4–6. 

Even if the Court strikes Roche’s declaration, however, the Secretary of State 

filings alone do not establish Bumble Trading’s principal place of business. In Hertz, the 

Supreme Court “reject[ed] suggestions . . . that the mere filing of a form like the Securities 

and Exchange Commission’s Form 10-K listing a corporation’s ‘principal executive 

offices’ would, without more, be sufficient proof to establish a corporation’s ‘nerve 

center.’” 559 U.S. at 97. 

As additional proof, Plaintiffs offer employment agreements and other documents, 

which show that some of Bumble Trading’s executive officers live and work in California. 

However, Defendants provide uncontradicted evidence showing that Whitney Wolfe Herd, 

Bumble Trading’s CEO, lives and works out of Texas. Although the Court generally 

resolves conflicts over statements contained in the parties’ affidavits in Plaintiffs’ favor 

(see Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800), Plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient to establish 

California as the principal place of business. As the Supreme Court noted in Hertz, even if 

“the bulk of a company’s business activities visible to the public take place in [California], 

while its top officers direct those activities just across the river in [Texas], the ‘principal 

place of business’ is [Texas].” 559 U.S. at 96. Plaintiffs provide no evidence that the 

California executives, not Wolfe Herd, “direct, control, and coordinate” Bumble Trading’s 

activities. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 80. Thus, Plaintiffs have not shown that Bumble Trading’s 

principal place of business is in California. 

Likewise, as to Bumble Holding, Plaintiffs merely point to corporate documents 

showing that some of its officers or shareholders live and work in California. See, e.g., 

Dkt. Nos. 77-4 at 4, 77-6 at 5. But Plaintiffs provide no evidence suggesting that 

California is where Bumble Holding’s “overall direction, control, and coordination” takes 

place. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96. Accordingly, the Court does not have general jurisdiction 

over Defendants. 

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C. Specific Jurisdiction 

A court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if 

(1) the nonresident defendant purposefully directs his activities at the forum or performs 

some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities 

in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the plaintiff’s 

claim arises out of the forum-related activities of the nonresident defendant; and (3) the 

exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is reasonable. Schwarzenegger, 

374 F.3d at 802. 

1. California Plaintiffs and Class Members 

Here, Defendants do not argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over King, 

Fischer, Weinberger, and putative California class members’ claims. See Dkt. No. 67. 

Nor could they. King, Fischer, Weinberger, and California class members are California 

citizens who subscribed to Bumble Boost. See TAC ¶¶ 6–7, 9, 53, 67, 79. By entering 

into a contract with those Plaintiffs, Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the 

privilege of conducting activities in California. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (“A 

showing that a defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in 

a forum state typically consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the forum, such as 

executing or performing a contract there.”). 

Defendants focus their arguments on personal jurisdiction over the claims of 

putative out-of-state class members and Wess, a New York citizen. The Court addresses 

Defendants’ arguments below. 

2. Out-of-State Class Members 

Defendants argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 

Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2016) precludes personal jurisdiction over the claims of 

out-of-state class members. As Defendants recognize, this Court previously addressed this 

issue in Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, No. 17-cv-0564-NC, 2017 WL 

4224732 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017). In that case, the Court held that Bristol-Myers, which 

dealt with a mass tort action, was materially distinguishable from class actions like this 

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one. See Fitzhenry-Russel, 2017 WL 4224732, at *5. Because unnamed class members 

“may be parties for some purposes and not for others,” the Court declined to apply BristolMyers to class actions and did not consider unnamed class members for jurisdictional 

purposes. Id. (quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002)). 

Since the Court decided Fitzhenry-Russell, other courts in this district have 

confronted the issue. Although some courts have applied Bristol-Myers to class actions 

(see, e.g., In re Samsung Galaxy Smartphone Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 

No. 16-cv-6391-BLF, 2018 WL 1576457, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018)), others have 

not (see, e.g., Pascal v. Concentra, Inc., No. 19-cv-2559-JCS, 2019 WL 3934936, at *4–6 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2019)). The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, however, have yet 

to decide this issue. Cf. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783–84 (“[W]e leave open the 

question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction by a federal court.”). 

Defendants urge the Court to reconsider its decision in Fitzhenry-Russell for two 

reasons. Neither are persuasive. 

First, Defendants argue that the due process and federalism concerns in BristolMyers “is the same in the class and mass action contexts.” Dkt. No. 67 at 15–16. 

Although the Court agrees that the due process and federalism concerns in Bristol-Meyers

are relevant to class actions (see Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224732, at *4), there are 

significant procedural differences between class and mass actions that address those 

concerns. In particular, class actions are subject to the numerosity, commonality, 

typicality, and adequacy requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Those 

requirements act as due process safeguards to ensure fairness. See Allen v. ConAgra 

Foods, Inc., No. 13-cv-1279-WHO, 2018 WL 6460451, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). 

Second, Defendants argue that applying Bristol-Myers to preclude personal 

jurisdiction over non-resident class members’ claims would “protect[] against what would 

otherwise be nearly unfettered forum shopping that could lead to absurd results.” Dkt. No. 

67 at 16. According to Defendants, failing to apply Bristol-Myers would force “[a] 

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defendant that sells even one good or service in a state [to] face litigation in that state” 

even if it “almost exclusively” sells its good or services elsewhere. Id.

But the analysis for specific jurisdiction already reflects those concerns. The 

exercise of specific jurisdiction “must comport with traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. It may 

not be reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction in a case where all but one class 

members reside outside the forum state. This, however, is not that case. Defendants 

provide no evidence suggesting that class members are so concentrated in a single state 

that the exercise of personal jurisdiction outside that state is unreasonable. Rather, as they 

noted themselves, Defendants “provide[] services to individuals across the nation” and 

seek to impose “a uniform national standard to govern its agreements with users.” Dkt. 

No. 44 at 12; see Sloan v. General Motors, LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 862–63 (N.D. Cal. 

2018) (finding no unreasonable burden in the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a 

nationwide class action where the defendant sought to apply Florida law over a nationwide 

class and also sought transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan for the application of 

non-Michigan law). 

Accordingly, the Court will follow its prior decision in Fitzhenry-Russell and finds 

that it has specific jurisdiction over the out-of-state class members’ claims. 

3. Wess 

Whether the Court can assert specific jurisdiction over Wess’s claims presents a 

more difficult question. Unlike the out-of-state class members, Wess is a named plaintiff 

and must be considered a party for all purposes, including personal jurisdiction. 

Plaintiffs assert that specific jurisdiction over Wess’s claims is proper because 

various aspects of the Bumble application’s product design, user experience, or marketing 

was developed in California. See Dkt. No. 77 at 7. But these activities are not relevant to 

the specific jurisdiction analysis for Wess. Wess’s claims do not “arise[] out of” Bumble’s 

product design or marketing. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Wess’s claims arise out 

of Defendants’ decision to deny refunds. See TAC ¶¶ 102–09, 116–30. 

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As an alternative, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should assert pendent personal 

jurisdiction over Wess’s claims. “[A] court may assert pendent personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant with respect to a claim for which there is no independent basis of personal 

jurisdiction so long as it arises out of a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim in 

the same suit over which the court does have personal jurisdiction.” Action Embroidery 

Co. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004). “When a defendant 

must appear in a forum to defend against one claim, it is often reasonable to compel that 

defendant to answer other claims in the same suit arising out of a common nucleus of 

operative facts.” Id. at 1181. “Pendent personal jurisdiction is typically found where one 

or more federal claims for which there is nationwide personal jurisdiction are combined in 

the same suit with one or more state or federal claims for which there is not nationwide 

personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 1181–82. Pendent jurisdiction serves the interests of “judicial 

economy, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and overall convenience of the parties.” Id. 

Plaintiffs rely heavily on Sloan and Allen. In Sloan, a court in this district applied 

Action Embroidery to find pendent jurisdiction over named out-of-state plaintiffs in a 

putative nationwide class action where those plaintiffs asserted the same claims as in-state 

plaintiffs. 287 F. Supp. 3d at 861–62. Three factors were key to the court’s analysis. 

First, the court noted that it likely had jurisdiction over absent out-of-court class members. 

Id. at 861. Second, the court noted that the additional burden on the defendant was de 

minimis due to the substantial overlap between the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims and the 

in-state plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 861–62. Third, the court noted that if it declined to 

exercise jurisdiction, piecemeal litigation would result. Id. at 862. These factors 

established a “sufficient nexus between the claims of the 5 out-of-state plaintiffs and [the 

defendant’s] contacts with California over which [it] has jurisdiction” to justify the 

exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Id.; see also Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at *7–8 (following 

Sloan and finding pendent jurisdiction over nonresident named plaintiffs’ claims). 

However, Sloan, at least when the above-cited order was issued, is materially

distinguishable from this case. Sloan involved a putative class action asserting federal 

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warranty claims. And as the Ninth Circuit noted in Action Embroidery, pendent 

jurisdiction is “typically found where one or more federal claims . . . are combined in the 

same suit with one or more state claims . . . .” 268 F.3d at 1181–82 (emphasis added). By 

contrast, Plaintiffs assert no federal claims here. Indeed, when the Sloan plaintiffs’ federal 

claims were dismissed, the court revisited its prior holding and declined to assert pendent 

jurisdiction without a federal question “hook.” See Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 16-cv7244-EMC, 2019 WL 6612221, at *8–10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019). Other district courts 

have similarly concluded that pendent jurisdiction may be inappropriate in diversity cases. 

See id. at *9 (collecting cases); cf. Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723, at *4 (rejecting 

argument that Bristol-Myers did not apply to federal courts sitting solely in diversity). 

On the other hand, Allen adopted Sloan’s reasoning even though there were no 

federal claims in that case. See Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at *1, 7–8. But Allen did not 

consider whether a federal question was necessary before a court could exercise pendent 

jurisdiction.3

There is some appeal to asserting pendent personal jurisdiction in this case. Wess 

and the California named plaintiffs all assert the same claims under the same New York 

laws.4

 Their claims arise from the same nucleus of alleged facts. Requiring Wess to 

separately litigate his claims on an individual basis would be an extremely inefficient use 

of judicial resources and could subject Defendants to inconsistent obligations. 

And despite district courts concluding otherwise, it is not clear that Action 

Embroidery limited pendent jurisdiction to federal question cases. See 368 F.3d at 1181 

(“[p]endent personal jurisdiction is typically found” in federal question cases) (emphasis 

3

 In any case, the Allen plaintiffs’ victory was short-lived. In October 2019, the Allen court 

reconsidered its decision to assert pendent jurisdiction after it denied certification of a 

nationwide class. See Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 13-cv-1279-WHO, 2019 WL 

5191009, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2019) (“Now that plaintiffs have failed to achieve 

certification of a nationwide class, the foundation for my decision to exercise of pendent 

personal jurisdiction is no longer present.”). 

4

 King and the putative California sub-class assert two claims under California law. See 

TAC ¶¶ 110–15, 131–46. All other claims are asserted by Fischer, Weinberger, and Wess 

on behalf of the putative nationwide class. 

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added). Likewise, it is also far from clear that the Supreme Court intended to “so starkly 

change the landscape of class actions.” Allen, 2018 WL 6460451, at * 8 n.5; see BristolMyers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783–84 (leaving open “the question whether the Fifth Amendment 

imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court”); 

see also id. at 1788–89 & n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

However, the weight of authority weighs heavily against the exercise of pendent 

jurisdiction in a diversity case such as this one. See Sloan, 2019 WL 6612221, at *9. 

Because the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary (see Action Embroidery, 368 

F.3d at 1181 (“the actual exercise of personal pendent jurisdiction in a particular case is 

within the discretion of the district court”)) and Wess could “proceed” as an unnamed class 

member if he were dismissed from this lawsuit, the Court declines to create a split of 

authority and will not assert pendent jurisdiction over Wess’s claims. 

4. Certification for Appeal 

As an alternative to dismissal, Defendants request that the Court certify the issue of 

personal jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal. See Dkt. No. 67 at 17–18. Plaintiffs 

oppose certification. See Dkt. No. 69 at 16–17. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court may certify an order for immediate 

appeal if it “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground 

for difference of opinion” and where “an immediate appeal from the order may materially 

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” A substantial ground for difference of 

opinion exists where “novel and difficult questions of first impression are presented.” 

Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The Court agrees with Defendants that there is a substantial ground for difference of 

opinion as to the personal jurisdiction issue. As mentioned above, courts within this 

district have reached different conclusions as to whether Bristol-Myers applies to class 

actions and that question remains open. 

However, the Court does not find that an interlocutory appeal would “materially 

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Plaintiffs also 

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seek to represent California class members and Defendants do not contest the Court’s 

personal jurisdiction over their claims. Thus, even if the Ninth Circuit were to reverse the 

Court’s finding of personal jurisdiction as to Wess and the out-of-state class members, this 

lawsuit would continue to march towards trial on every claim in the third amended 

complaint. 

Accordingly, the Court declines to certify this order for interlocutory appeal under 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

D. Motions to Seal 

In connection with their supplemental briefing on personal jurisdiction, both parties 

move to seal various declarations, exhibits, and portions of Plaintiffs’ brief referencing 

those documents. See Dkt. Nos. 78, 79. Those documents include a deposition transcript, 

corporate statements, discovery responses, and employment agreements. 

There is a presumption of public access to judicial records and documents. Nixon v. 

Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). Access to motions and their 

attachments that are “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case” may be sealed 

only upon a showing of “compelling reasons” for sealing. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler 

Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2016). On the other hand, motions and 

records that are only tangentially related to the merits of the case may be sealed for “good 

cause.” Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101. The “‘good cause’ standard presents a lower 

burden for the party wishing to seal documents than the ‘compelling reasons’ standard.” 

Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010). To satisfy good cause, 

the party wishing to seal documents must make a “particularized showing” of harm. See 

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180; see also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (“good cause” requires the party to show “that specific 

prejudice or harm will result”). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 

examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., 

Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California

Here, the documents sought to be sealed are only tangentially related to the merits 

of the case. Each document relates to the question of personal jurisdiction, not the 

underlying merits of Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims. Thus, the “good cause” 

standard for sealing applies. 

The Court finds that there is good cause to seal the documents in question. Each 

document contains non-public information relating to Defendants’ internal processes for 

decision making or employment terms. Revealing that information could cause Bumble to 

suffer competitive harm. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS both parties’ motions to seal. 

IV. Conclusion 

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

as to Wess. Wess is terminated as an individual plaintiff. The Court DENIES Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to absent out-of-state class members. 

The Court declines to certify this order for interlocutory appeal. The Court GRANTS both 

parties’ motions to seal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 11, 2020 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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