Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02051/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02051-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH WHITTIER BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-02051-VC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Doc. Nos. 25, 26

The Court has determined, after reviewing the briefs and the record, that a hearing is not 

necessary to decide these cross-motions for summary judgment. The Commissioner's motion for 

summary judgment is granted, and Brown's motion is denied. 

The ALJ concluded that the divorce decree issued by the District of Columbia in 1974 is 

valid and enforceable, and that Virginia would give this order full faith and credit. This 

conclusion was not marred by legal error, and it was supported by substantial evidence. Brown

contends the decree is invalid because she was not served in the divorce proceedings and because 

she was mentally incompetent at the time. But Brown admits she signed an answer to the 

complaint, which was accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgement notarized by the 

Consulate General of the United States Consul of Spain. The evidence further indicates that she 

was not hospitalized when she signed the answer, and that the Consulate was required to assess 

her competency at the time. Based on this evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Brown 

had notice of the divorce proceedings. 

Brown also contends that her separation from her husband, which served as the legal basis 

for the divorce, was not voluntary because she was mentally incompetent during the separation. 

But the record indicates that Brown and her husband were separated for three years before she was 

Case 3:14-cv-02051-VC Document 37 Filed 04/30/15 Page 1 of 2
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

first hospitalized. Only one year of separation was required for divorce, and substantial evidence 

supported the ALJ's conclusion that this separation qualified Brown and her husband for the 

divorce. 

Finally, the ALJ reasonably concluded that the testimony of Mr. Koenick and Mr. Gespass 

were not "reasonably necessary" to a proper assessment of Brown's claim for benefits. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2015

______________________________________

 VINCE CHHABRIA

 United States District Judge

Case 3:14-cv-02051-VC Document 37 Filed 04/30/15 Page 2 of 2