Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02346/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02346-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO OSUNA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DONATO VINCENT POMPO and 

VINCENT NICHOLAS POMPO,

Defendants.

And Related Counter-Claim.

Case No.: 18-CV-2346 W (MDD)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING-IN-PART AND 

DENYING-IN-PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [DOC. 27];

(2) GRANTING-IN-PART AND 

DENYING-IN-PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [DOC. 28.]

Pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment in this 

malicious prosecution dispute. Plaintiff Alejandro Osuna’s (“Osuna”) motion seeks 

summary judgment on its malicious prosecution claim and Defendants’ counterclaim for 

breach of fiduciary duty. (Pl’s MSJ Notice [Doc. 28] 2:13–27.) Defendants’ motion 

seeks summary adjudication regarding Osuna’s malicious prosecution claim. (Defs’ MSJ

Notice [Doc. 27] 3:1–3.) The parties also filed requests for judicial notice. (Defs’ RJN

[Doc. 27-5]; Pl’s RJN [Doc. 28-5]; Pl’s RJN [Doc. 30-3].) Osuna later filed a motion to 

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amend the motion for summary judgment to correct certain citations to the evidence. 

[Doc. 31.]

The Court decides the matters on the papers submitted, and without oral argument. 

See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART 

and DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiff Osuna’s motion [Doc. 28]; GRANTS-IN-PART and 

DENIES-IN-PART Defendants’ motion [Doc. 27]; GRANTS the requests for judicial 

notice; and GRANTS the motion to correct the motion for summary judgment [Doc. 31].

I. BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from an underlying criminal complaint filed by Defendant 

Vincent Pompo (“Vincent”) in Tecate, Mexico, against Osuna. (Compl. [ Doc. 1] ¶ 33.) 

The criminal complaint accused Osuna of representing both sides of a real property 

contract and subsequently filing suit against one of the parties to the contract. (Id.) 

Under article 337 of the Criminal Code of Baja California, it is a crime for an attorney to 

represent parties with adverse interests in the same matter. (Vincent Decl. [Doc. 27-3] ¶ 

17.)

The facts comprising the basis for the criminal complaint begin in September 2012, 

when Jan Kalicki (“Kalicki”) retained Osuna to file a lawsuit in Mexico regarding real 

property located in Playas de Tijuana (“the Playas Property”). (Osuna Decl. [Doc. 28-2] 

¶¶ 3–4.) By that time, however, Kalicki was behind on payments to Vincent under a buysell agreement for another piece of real property in Rosarito, Mexico (“the Rosarito 

Property”). (Kalicki Decl. [Doc. 28-3] ¶ 4.) As a result, Kalicki and Vincent entered into 

an Addendum to their buy-sell agreement whereby Vincent agreed to “loan [Kalicki] 

$3,000 US Dollars to be used to pay attorney [Osuna] a retainer fee to pursue the 

collection of [Kalicki’s] interest in the [Playas Property] . . . .” (Rosarito Purchase 

Addendum [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 3, ¶ 5.) The Addendum further provided that Kalicki 

expected to receive up to $680,000 for his interest in the Playas Property and would apply 

at least 50% of those proceeds towards the balance owed on the Rosarito Property. (Id.) 

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Donato Pompo (“Donato”)—Vincent’s son—typed up the final Addendum once Vincent 

and Kalicki agreed to the new terms. (Donato Decl. [Doc. 27-2] ¶ 5.) Osuna was not 

involved in the negotiation or drafting of the Addendum. (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts

[Doc. 32] ¶ 5.)

On November 9, 2012, Kalicki and the Pompos met at Osuna’s office. (Kalicki 

Decl. [Doc. 28-3] ¶ 10.) At the meeting, Vincent and Kalicki executed the Addendum,

with Donato and Osuna signing on as witnesses. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 10; Rosarito Purchase 

Addendum [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 3.) The meeting ended with Vincent making out a personal 

check to Osuna for $3,000. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 14.)

In early 2013, after a review of public records, Osuna advised Kalicki that 

Vincent’s title to the Rosarito Property was defective. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 17.) Later that 

same year, a $300,000 lien was recorded on the Rosarito Property due to a suit between 

Defendants and another party. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 20.) In response to the lien, Kalicki filed a 

lawsuit requesting that registration to the Rosarito Property be cancelled and a criminal 

complaint with the District Attorney in Tecate, Mexico, alleging the lien was the result of 

a fraudulent lawsuit intended to cloud title to the Rosarito Property. (Osuna Decl. ¶¶ 22–

23.)

On January 28, 2015, Vincent filed the criminal complaint underlying the present 

dispute. (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts 2 [Doc. 34-2] ¶ 17.) In it, he claimed Osuna had 

violated article 337 of the Criminal Code of Baja California, which prohibits 

representation of adverse interests in the same matter. (Vincent Decl. [Doc. 27-3] ¶ 17.) 

Specifically, the translated Complaint states:

That is, it is settled Law that the crime is evidenced when the constituent 

elements appear and was committed when the active subject helped the said 

[Kalicki] and the undersigned [Vincent] to draft the addendum to the sales 

contract that we made, related to the [Rosarito Property], for which I agreed 

with Attorney [Osuna] that he become involved in this matter so that he 

could clarify some clauses of this commercial contract, amongst them 

[Kalicki’s] obligation to pay me a monthly rent for the use of the property, in 

the amount of $1,650.00 (one thousand six hundred and fifty dollars, United 

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States currency) until he finished paying the debt from the sales contract, 

said contract addendum was drafted by [Osuna’s] own hand, for which the 

undersigned paid him the amount of $3,000.00 (three thousand, currency of 

the United States) so that he would become involved in this matter with the 

undersigned and with [Kalicki], as evidenced with the copy that is attached 

which shows a copy of a check that reads citybank, made out to the name of 

[Osuna] for the amount of $3,000.00 (three thousand dollars, United States 

Currency), notwithstanding when the said [Kalicki] filed a criminal 

complaint against me, the now accused [Osuna] participated, knowing that 

as an attorney at law he was barred from participating in that matter because 

that would mean he would fall within the legal description of the crime of 

Breach of Legal Duty . . . .

(Translation of Crim. Compl. [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 8, at 80.)1

Following a 21-month investigation, which included testimony from Donato, 

Osuna, and Kalicki, the Tecate District Attorney determined sufficient evidence existed 

to issue a warrant for Osuna’s arrest and transmit the case to a Judge of the Mexican 

Superior Court. (Communication from District Attorney [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 8, at 75.) The 

Superior Court Judge agreed and Osuna was arrested on December 15, 2016. (Osuna 

Decl. ¶ 29.) A few days later, an article appeared in El Mexicano newspaper with a photo 

of Osuna captioned as follows: “A crooked lawyer was arrested in Tecate on December 

12th, for swindling Americans out of their money. Since then he has been jailed in the 

State Penitentiary. He was an attorney for Andrew Tahmooressi, the marine that was 

arrested in Tijuana.” (Osuna Decl. ¶ 38.) 

On February 17, 2017, a hearing occurred in the Tecate Criminal court. (Donato 

Testimony [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 8, at 154.) At the hearing, Donato testified that Vincent “paid 

Osuna Three Thousand Dollars United States Currency with a check, so that Osuna 

 

1 The parties each request the Court take judicial notice of the underlying Mexican court proceedings. 

(See Defs’ RJN [Doc. 27-5]; Pl’s RJN [Doc. 28-5]; Pl’s RJN [Doc. 30-3].) The requests are unopposed. 

Because the documents are properly the subject of judicial notice, the Court GRANTS the requests and 

takes judicial notice of the attached exhibits.

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would draft an agreement, to ensure that my father was paid in full for the house or if he 

did not pay in full within one year that he return it.” (Donato Testimony at 155.) 

As the criminal proceeding commenced, Osuna simultaneously filed an “amparo” 

proceeding, which is the Mexican equivalent of a habeas action. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 43.) 

The amparo court concluded that, even if the allegations against him were true, Osuna 

could not have represented “two or more contending parties in the same matter.” 

(Amparo Ruling [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 6, at 40.) Vincent’s appeal of the amparo decision was 

denied in October 2017. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 48.) Thus, the amparo court’s decision became 

final and terminated the criminal proceedings against Osuna. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 48.) 

On October 10, 2018, Osuna filed this lawsuit against Defendants for their role in 

instigating the criminal proceeding against him. The Complaint asserts a single cause of 

action for Malicious Prosecution. [Doc. 1.]

On November 15, 2018, Defendants’ filed a counterclaim asserting a single cause 

of action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. [Doc. 8.]

The parties have now filed timely cross-motions for summary judgment. Osuna’s 

motion seeks to establish the following:

(1)Defendants actively caused Osuna’s criminal prosecution;

(2)The underlying criminal proceeding concluded in Osuna’s favor;

(3)No reasonable person would have believed there were grounds for causing 

Osuna to be prosecuted;

(4)Defendants acted for a purpose other than bringing Osuna to justice;

(5)Defendants harmed Osuna;

(6)Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing that harm; and

(7)No reasonable person would have believed there was an attorney-client 

relationship between Osuna and Defendants.

(Pl’s MSJ Notice 2:13–27.) Defendants’ motion seeks to establish that: 

(1)Donato cannot be liable for malicious prosecution because he did not initiate 

or maintain the underlying criminal action against Osuna;

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(2)Vincent had probable cause to complain of Osuna’s actions;

(3)Osuna cannot overcome the presumption that the Tecate District Attorney 

recommended the criminal court proceeding after conducting an independent 

investigation; and

(4)Defendants’ Eighth and Ninth Affirmative Defenses succeed because 

Vincent only pursued the criminal action after consulting with legal counsel 

and being advised that he was within his rights to do so.

(Defs’ MSJ Notice 2:9–23.)

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment 

as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving 

party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the

nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to 

that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322–23. 

“Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary 

judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 

(9th Cir. 1987). If the moving party fails to discharge this initial burden, summary 

judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s 

evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1970).

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If the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot avoid

summary judgment merely by demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts.” In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Triton 

Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 252) (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving 

party’s position is not sufficient.”). Rather, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the 

pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.’” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Daugherty, 279 Fed. Appx. 500, 501 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Additionally, the court must view all inferences drawn 

from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

Rule 56(d) provides for partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) 

(“[T]he court . . . shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 

substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 

controverted.”). Under Rule 56(d), the court may grant summary judgment on less than 

the non-moving party’s whole claim. Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside 

Baking Co., Inc., 313 F.3d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.). Partial summary 

judgment is a mechanism through which the Court deems certain issues established 

before trial. Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting 6 

Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.20 (3.–2) (2d ed. 1976)). “The procedure was intended to 

avoid a useless trial of facts and issues over which there was really never any controversy 

and which would tend to confuse and complicate a lawsuit.” Id.

“[W]hen parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, each motion must 

be considered on its merits.” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cnty, Inc. v. Riverside 

Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Thus, 

“the court must rule on each party’s motion on an individual and separate basis, 

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determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the 

Rule 56 standard.” Id. (quoting Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, at 

335–36 (3d ed. 1998)). If, however, the cross-motions are before the court at the same 

time, the court is obliged to consider the evidence proffered by both sets of motions 

before ruling on either one. Id. at 1134.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Osuna seeks summary judgment against Defendants’ sole counterclaim for breach 

of fiduciary duty. The Court will address the threshold issue before proceeding with the 

malicious prosecution claim. 

Defendants argue Osuna owed them a fiduciary duty by means of an implied-infact attorney-client relationship resulting from their November 9 meeting. (Defs.’ Opp’n

[Doc. 29] 6:7-11.) Whether an implied-in-fact attorney-client relationship can be inferred 

is determined by the conduct and intent of the parties. Hecht v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 

App. 3d 560, 565 (Ct. App. 1987). The existence of an attorney-client relationship is a 

question of law to be determined by the court. Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 

287 (1956). 

There are no facts here permitting any reasonable inferences from which the 

existence of an attorney-client relationship between Defendants and Osuna could be 

found. Defendants knew Kalicki hired Osuna to represent him regarding the Playas 

Property litigation, had never communicated with Osuna before the November 9 meeting, 

and never communicated directly with Osuna again. (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts [Doc. 

32] ¶¶ 6, 7, 12.) Defendants’ only contact with Osuna was when they visited his office to 

execute an Addendum that was drafted by Donato based on a meeting Osuna did not 

attend. (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts ¶ 5.) In the Addendum, Vincent agreed to “loan 

[Kalicki] $3,000 US Dollars to be used to pay attorney [Osuna] a retainer fee to pursue 

the collection of [Kalicki’s] interest in the [Playas Property] . . . .” (Rosarito Purchase 

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Addendum [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 3, ¶ 5.) Therefore, the $3,000 check given to Osuna at the 

meeting was in fact a loan to be repaid by Kalicki along with 50% of the Playas Property 

litigation proceeds. (Id.)

Defendants’ belief that Osuna’s signature on the Addendum was confirmation of 

his legal opinion regarding its validity and enforceability under Mexican law is both 

inconsequential and unreasonable. First, Defendants’ subjective belief, without more, is 

insufficient to create an attorney-client relationship. Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal. App. 3d 

954, 959 (Ct. App. 1986). In other words, Defendants cannot unilaterally establish an 

attorney-client relationship merely because they believe his signature meant he was 

advising them. This is especially true considering that the express language disputes that 

belief—Osuna’s signature is expressly limited to that of a “Witness.” (Rosarito Purchase 

Addendum [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 3.) In addition, Donato, who is not a lawyer, also signed the 

Addendum under the identical designation of “Witness.” This strongly suggests the 

witness signatures were acknowledgements of the Addendum’s execution by Vincent and 

Kalicki, rather than attestations as to its legality. Finally, even if Osuna expressed a legal 

opinion as to the Addendum’s validity, the reasonable conclusion is that he did so in his 

established capacity as Kalicki’s lawyer. Without more, it is unreasonable to conclude 

that Osuna’s signature on the Addendum meant he was representing both sides of the 

agreement. Consequently, as to the cause of action based on breach of fiduciary duty, the 

Court grants summary judgment to Osuna.

B. Malicious Prosecution Claim

Osuna argues he is entitled to summary judgment on his malicious prosecution 

claim or partial summary judgment on each of its elements. Osuna must show (1) the 

underlying action was commenced by Defendants, (2) concluded in Osuna’s favor, (3) 

brought without probable cause, and (4) initiated with malice. See Sheldon Appel Co. v. 

Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 864 (1989).

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Initiation of the Criminal Action

That Vincent initiated the criminal action is not in dispute. What is disputed is 

whether Donato can also be construed as having “initiated” the action merely by 

providing witness testimony.

The undisputed evidence is that Vincent filed the criminal complaint against Osuna 

on January 28, 2015. (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts [Doc. 32] ¶ 13; J. Stmt. Undisputed 

Facts 2 [Doc. 34-2] ¶ 17; Osuna Decl. [Doc. 28-2] ¶ 25.) On February 19, 2015, Donato 

provided an oral statement to the investigating District Attorney, wherein he claimed 

Vincent “hired [Osuna] . . . to draft the contract . . . .” (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts [Doc. 

32] ¶ 14; Donato Witness Stmt. [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 8, at 86.) Twenty months later, the 

District Attorney determined there was sufficient evidence to prosecute Osuna. (J. Stmt. 

Undisputed Facts 2 [Doc. 34-2] ¶ 19.) At the criminal proceedings, Donato testified that 

his father, Vincent, had retained Osuna as an attorney. (Donato Testimony [Doc. 28-6] 

Ex. 8, at 155.) He also claimed Osuna drafted the Addendum and that Vincent paid 

Osuna $3,000 for these alleged legal services. (Id.)

It is clear that one does not need to sign the complaint commencing the criminal 

proceeding to be liable for malicious prosecution. Zucchet v. Galardi, 229 Cal.App.4th 

1466, 1481 (2014). The Restatement of Torts states, “one who continues a civil 

proceeding . . . for an improper purpose after he has learned there is no probable cause for 

the proceeding becomes liable as if he had initiated the proceeding.” Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 674 (1977). The comments to section 655—which are applicable to 

section 674—further provide that “[the section] applies also when the proceedings are 

initiated by a third person, and the defendant, knowing that there is no probable cause for 

them, thereafter takes an active part in procuring their continuation.” Id. § 655. “The test 

is whether the defendant was actively instrumental in causing the prosecution.” Sullivan 

v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 720 (1974). “Cases dealing with actions for

malicious prosecution against private persons require that the defendant has at least 

1. 

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sought out the police or prosecutorial authorities and falsely reported facts to them 

indicating that plaintiff has committed a crime.” Id.

Merely providing testimony and responding to law enforcement questioning in an 

active criminal proceeding is not enough. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 

206 Cal. App. 3d 414, 417–18 (1988). In Cedars-Sinai, two witnesses testified at a 

preliminary hearing against the plaintiff after being approached by authorities in an 

ongoing arson investigation. The court found the witnesses did not “instigate, nor were 

they ‘actively instrumental in causing,’ the prosecution” merely by responding to 

inquiries during an ongoing investigation. Id. at 417. 

To be liable for malicious prosecution without filing the initial complaint, the 

person must affirmatively encourage the prosecution, either through advice or 

encouragement. Zucchet, 229 Cal.App.4th at 1485. In Zucchet, the issue was whether a 

cooperating codefendant who gave false information to prosecutors and testified at trial 

was actively instrumental in causing the prosecution. Id. at 1482. Although the 

testimony significantly changed the outcome of the case, there was no evidence the 

codefendant “insisted upon or urged further prosecution of the case against Zucchet, or 

that he gave advice to the prosecutors or placed pressure on the government to continue 

the case against Zucchet.” Id. at 1485.

Similarly, here, there is no evidence that Donato affirmatively encouraged the 

prosecution to continue the case against Osuna. Rather, it appears that Donato was 

interviewed during an ongoing investigation and later testified at trial. By itself, that is 

not enough. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 206 Cal. App. 3d at 417–18. Nor is it enough 

to say that he lied in giving that testimony. See Zucchet, 229 Cal.App.4th at 1485. 

Osuna has failed to show that Donato was actively instrumental in causing the 

prosecution. Thus, the cause of action against Donato for malicious prosecution 

necessarily fails. 

//

//

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Concluded in Osuna’s Favor

A plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution must prove that the prior proceeding was 

terminated in their favor. Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal. 4th 336, 341 (2004). A 

termination is favorable if it reflects on the plaintiff’s innocence of the charged 

misconduct, rather than mere technical or procedural reasons. Ray v. First Fed. Bank, 61 

Cal. App. 4th 315, 318 (1998).

The parties do not dispute that the underlying criminal complaint terminated in 

Osuna’s favor. The Amparo court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show 

the elements of the crime attributed to Osuna. (Amparo Ruling [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 6, at 33.) 

Once Vincent’s appeal was subsequently denied, the Amparo court’s decision became 

final and terminated the criminal proceedings against Osuna. Because it addressed 

Osuna’s innocence of the charged crime—representation of adverse interests in the same 

matter—the termination was in Osuna’s favor.

Brought Without Probable Cause

The malicious prosecution plaintiff must allege and prove the prior action was 

initiated or continued without probable cause. Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 

Cal. 4th 811, 824 (2002). Probable cause is a question of law to be decided by the court. 

Id. at 817. Further, probable cause is to be determined objectively. Thus, it exists if “any 

reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable.” Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert 

& Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 886 (1989). 

Applying the probable cause standard to the case at hand, the Court concludes the 

prior action was instituted without probable cause. The criminal complaint filed against 

Osuna states, “[the] contract addendum was drafted by [Osuna’s] own hand, for which 

the undersigned paid him the amount of $3,000.00.” (Translation of Crim. Compl. [Doc. 

28-6] Ex. 8, at 80.) Vincent initiated the proceedings against Osuna knowing full well 

the $3,000 payment was a loan to Kalicki for which he expected to be repaid, rather than 

a payment to Osuna for drafting the Addendum and providing legal advice as to its 

2. 

3. 

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enforceability. (See Rosarito Purchase Addendum [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 3, ¶ 5.) Additionally, 

Donato has since admitted that he was the drafter of the Addendum, not Osuna. (Donato 

Decl. [Doc. 27-2] ¶ 5.) Thus, Osuna had no involvement in the negotiation or drafting of 

the Addendum. (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts [Doc. 32] ¶ 5.) No reasonable attorney would 

have believed that Osuna then represented the Defendants where they knew he was the 

other party’s attorney, they did not pay him for his services, and they had no contact with 

him other than the single occasion when they visited his office for the sole purpose of 

executing the Addendum. (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts [Doc. 32] ¶¶ 6, 7, 12.)

Defendants argue the interim adverse judgment rule precludes liability because the 

Tecate District Attorney and the Mexican court determined there was sufficient evidence 

to proceed with the criminal prosecution. However, the interim adverse judgment rule 

only forecloses liability for malicious prosecution after a ruling on the merits of the 

claim. Parrish v. Latham & Watkins, 3 Cal. 5th 767, 778 (2017). Further, “even where a 

ruling is based on the court’s evaluation of the merits of the claim, the ruling does not 

establish the existence of probable cause if the ruling is ‘shown to have been obtained by 

fraud or perjury.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 

820 (2002)). Not only was there not a ruling on the merits in the underlying 

prosecution—such as a trial verdict or a summary judgment order—but any decisions to 

proceed with the criminal prosecution were obtained by fraud or perjury. The Mexican 

District Attorney and Mexican court’s determinations of probable cause were made on 

the basis of falsely sworn statements by Vincent and Donato. Namely, that Osuna drafted 

the Addendum—it was drafted by Donato—and that Vincent paid Osuna $3,000 for his 

involvement—it was a loan stipulated to under the Addendum. (Donato Decl. [Doc. 27-

2] ¶ 5; Rosarito Purchase Addendum [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 3, ¶ 5.) 

Defendants also argue that Osuna has failed to “overcome the presumption that the 

prosecutor exercised independent judgment in prosecuting the criminal charge.” (Defs’ 

MSJ 11:11–33 (citing Lasic v. Moreno, 504 F.Supp.2d 915, 921 (E.D. Cal 2007).)) 

However, the rebuttable presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment 

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in prosecuting a criminal charge applies to shield investigating officers from damages, 

not citizens initiating a criminal complaint. See Lasic, 504 F.Supp.2d at 921 (explaining 

that the “[t]he Ninth Circuit has long recognized that filing a criminal complaint 

immunizes investigating officers . . . .”) The presumption does not apply here. Even if it 

did, the presumption has been rebutted by proof that Vincent knowingly supplied false 

information. See id. at 922 (“[T]o overcome the presumption of independent judgment, a 

plaintiff must show . . . that the [initiating party] knowingly supplied false information.”)

Finally, it is unavailing that Vincent obtained advice from counsel prior to 

initiating the criminal complaint. While good faith reliance on advice of counsel is a 

complete defense, the advice must have been given after truthful disclosure of all relevant 

facts. Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1534, 1544 (2009). 

The burden of proving the advice of counsel defense is on Defendants. See Nunez v. 

Pennisi, 241 Cal.App.4th 861, 877 (2015). Defendants fail to describe what information 

they provided their attorney, Carloz Gonzales. Given the demonstrable falsehoods 

contained in Defendants’ initial complaint and later sworn statements, either Defendants 

did not truthfully disclose all the relevant facts to Gonzales or Gonzales knew they were 

false and proceeded anyway. Either way, Defendants’ defense fails. Gonzalez’ claim 

that he independently corroborated the information Defendants supplied does not save the 

defense. “Although attorneys may rely on their clients’ allegations at the outset of the 

case, they may not continue to do so if the evidence developed through discovery 

indicates the allegations are unfounded or unreliable.” Cuevas-Martinez v. Sun Salt 

Sand, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 5th 1109, 1121 (Ct. App. 2019). All Gonzales needed to find the 

allegations unfounded was read the Addendum, which stated the $3,000 was a loan for a 

different matter. The advice of counsel defense fails.

Initiated with Malice

Finally, Osuna must prove Vincent initiated the underlying action with malice. 

The malice element refers to an improper purpose for initiating the prior action. Daniels 

4. 

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v. Robbins, 182 Cal. App. 4th 204, 224 (2010). It exists when a suit is actuated to misuse 

the legal system for some purpose other than enforcing legitimate rights. Drummond v. 

Desmarais, 176 Cal. App. 4th 439, 452 (2009). “[A] plaintiff acts with malice when he 

asserts a claim with knowledge of its falsity, because one who seeks to establish such a 

claim ‘can only be motivated by an improper purpose.’” Id. (citing Albertson v. Raboff, 

46 Cal. 2d 375, 383(1956)); see also Nunez v. Pennisi, 241 Cal. App. 4th 861, 877 (2015)

(inferring malice from “knowingly false allegations” in the underlying complaint).

There is ample evidence that Vincent filed the underlying action with malice. As 

discussed above in the context of probable cause, Vincent’s criminal complaint was 

based in part on allegations that Vincent paid Osuna $3,000 for drafting the Addendum. 

(See Translation of Crim. Compl. [Doc. 28-6] Ex. 8, at 80.) Defendants have since 

admitted those allegations were false. (J. Stmt. Undisputed Facts [Doc. 32] ¶ 5.)

Moreover, Defendants admit that “[t]he criminal complaint against Osuna was brought as 

part of a broader strategy to maintain possession of the Rosarito Property.” (J. Stmt. 

Undisputed Facts [Doc. 32] ¶ 18.) In other words, Defendants’ purpose for bringing the 

criminal complaint was not to bring Osuna to justice, but in fact to defend against 

Kalicki’s adversarial interest in the Rosarito Property. There is no genuine issue of 

material fact here—the false allegations and admitted pecuniary purpose establish 

Vincent’s malicious intent.

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS the following:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty claim and Malicious Prosecution claim against Defendant 

Vincent Pompo, and DENIED as to Defendant Donato Pompo [Doc. 28];

2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Defendant 

Donato Pompo and DENIED as to Defendant Vincent Pompo [Doc. 27];

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3. The Requests for Judicial Notice are GRANTED. (Defs’ RJN [Doc. 27-5]; 

Pl’s RJN [Doc. 28-5]; Pl’s RJN [Doc. 30-3]); and

4. GRANTS the motion to amend the motion for summary judgment [Doc. 

31].

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 2, 2020

H n. T. omas J. Whelan 

un· States District Judge 

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