Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02306/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02306-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PACIFIC INFORMATION RESOURCES,

INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DIANA MUSSELMAN, et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-06-2306 MMC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DIANA

MUSSELMAN’S MOTION FOR MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT; GRANTING

AIRON DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT;

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW

CAUSE WHY DEFENDANTS OTHER

THAN MUSSELMAN SHOULD NOT BE

DISMISSED DUE TO MISJOINDER

Before the Court is defendant Diana Musselman’s (“Musselman”) motion, filed

September 26, 2006, for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Separate notices of joinder have been filed by three groups of

defendants: (1) Renee Dunbar and Peter Dunbar (“Dunbar Defendants”); (2) Paretologic

Inc., Elton Pereira, Adrian Pereira, and Jason Corvalho (“Paretologic Defendants”); and

(3) defendants Airon Corporation, Alexei Borisov, and Levon Gasparian (“Airon

Defendants”). Plaintiff Pacific Information Resources, Inc. has filed opposition, to which

Musselman has replied. Additionally, plaintiff has filed a separate opposition to arguments

made by Airon Defendants in their notice of joinder, to which Airon Defendants have

replied. Having considered the above-referenced filings, the Court deems the matter

suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for November 3,

2006, and rules as follows:

Case 3:06-cv-02306-MMC Document 82 Filed 11/01/06 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Because plaintiff has not objected to Airon Defendants’ having included additional

legal arguments in their notice of joinder in Musselman’s motion, and, instead, has

responded to the merits of the additional arguments, the Court does not address the

propriety of Airon Defendants’ “joinder.”

2

Plaintiff does allege that defendants accessed plaintiff’s computers to obtain

plaintiff’s property, which defendants then misappropriated, i.e, stole. Theft, standing

alone, however, does not constitute fraud.

2

1. Musselman cites no authority providing that an allegation of agency must be

pleaded with specificity, and has not otherwise shown the agency allegation in the Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”), (see SAC ¶ 21), is “so vague or ambiguous that a party

cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 

Indeed, Musselman has offered an affidavit in which she denies the truth of plaintiff’s

allegation that she has ever been the agent of any of the other defendants, (see

Musselman Affidavit ¶ 4), thereby effectively demonstrating she can frame a response to

the agency allegation. Accordingly, Musselman’s motion for a more definite statement is

hereby DENIED.

2. Airon Defendants challenge the sufficiency, under Rule 9(b), of plaintiff’s Fourth

Claim for Relief, to the extent such claim alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).1

Although a claim under § 1030(a)(4), similar to a claim of mail fraud or wire fraud, does not

require an allegation that the defendant used a computer to make a false statement, it does

require an allegation that the defendant made use of a computer to further a fraudulent

scheme. Cf. United States v. Bohonus, 628 F. 2d 1167, 1171-1172 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding

“essential elements of mail fraud are: (1) the formation of a scheme or artifice to defraud,

and (2) use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme”; holding “depriving an employer of

[an employee’s] honest services and of its right to have its business conducted honestly

can constitute a ‘scheme to defraud’”). Here, plaintiff does not identify the nature of any

scheme to defraud implicated by defendants’ alleged accessing of plaintiff’s computer,

much less plead the facts pertaining to such scheme with particularity.2

 Accordingly, Airon

Defendants’s request for a more definite statement, as to the § 1030(a)(4) claim in the

Fourth Claim for Relief, is hereby GRANTED. The Court will set a deadline for plaintiff to

Case 3:06-cv-02306-MMC Document 82 Filed 11/01/06 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Similarly, Airon Defendants have stated in their notice of joinder, albeit not in

evidentiary form, that none of them has an agency relationship with any of the other

defendants.

3

amend after resolution of the briefing with respect to the order to show cause, discussed

infra.

3. As set forth in Musselman’s motion, and not disputed by plaintiff, joinder of each

defendant herein is proper only if plaintiff can establish his allegation that an agency

relationship exists between each and every defendant. As noted, however, Musselman

has offered evidence denying she is or ever has been the agent of any other defendant

herein.3

Accordingly, plaintiff is hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why its claims against

defendants other than Musselman should not be dismissed, without prejudice to plaintiff’s

refiling such claims in separate actions, on the ground such defendants have been

misjoined herein. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (providing parties may be “dropped or added by

order of the court on . . . its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms that

are just”); see, e.g., Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 849 F. Supp. 785, 787 (N.D. Ga. 1994)

(holding claims by eleven plaintiffs against one defendant not properly joined in single

action, where plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient evidence to show joinder was proper).

Plaintiff shall file, no later than November 17, 2006, its response to this order to

show cause. No later than December 1, 2006, any defendant may file a reply to plaintiff’s

response. As of December 1, 2006, unless the parties are otherwise advised, the matter

will stand submitted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02306-MMC Document 82 Filed 11/01/06 Page 3 of 3