Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00244/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00244-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID LEE TERRY, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0244 GEB KJM P

vs.

MULE CREEK STATE PRISON, et al., ORDER AND 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 1999 El Dorado County Superior Court

convictions. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the petition was filed

beyond the statute of limitations. Petitioner has sought leave to file an amended petition and has

asked that the reply to his opposition be stricken because he believes it was not signed. 

I. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted on June 4, 1999, and sentenced to state prison. 

Document No. 1 lodged on September 26, 2006 (Doc. 1). The Court of Appeal affirmed his

convictions on April 23, 2003, and the California Supreme Court denied review on July 16,

2003. Docs. 2 & 5.

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Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in El Dorado County Superior Court on

September 17, 2004. Doc. 6. It was denied on October 14, 2004 and a motion for

reconsideration was denied on November 23, 2004. Docs. 7 & 8. 

Petitioner filed his next state petition on December 10, 2004 in the Court of

Appeal, which denied it on December 22, 2004. Docs. 9 & 10. This was followed by a state

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, filed January 31, 2005 and denied on December

14, 2005. Docs. 11 & 12.

The instant petition is dated January 23, 2006, and was filed by this court on

February 6, 2006. 

II. The Motion To Dismiss

The AEDPA includes a statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for

a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post- conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244.

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A conviction is final for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations at the

expiration of the ninety day period for seeking certiorari, which in this case was October 15, 2003.

 Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The limitations period began to run on

October 16, 2003, and would have expired on October 15, 2004, absent any tolling. Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (excluding the day from which

the period begins to run from the calculation of the time). 

The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any “properly filed” state

collateral attack on the judgment. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, an untimely state court application for collateral relief will not provide a basis for

tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) because such applications are not “properly filed.” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15 (2005). "Under Pace, if a state court denies a petition as

untimely, none of the time before or during the court's consideration of that petition is statutorily

tolled." Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145,1149 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended on denial of rehearing,

439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The El Dorado County Superior Court denied the initial petition by finding it

untimely:

More than five years after his conviction petitioner filed the present

petition for writ of habeas corpus. All of the grounds stated in his

petition occurred no later than the time of trial in 1999. The Court

finds that there has been a substantial delay in filing the petition and

petitioner has failed to show any cause whatever for his delay in

filing the petition. The petition is denied as untimely.

Doc. 7 at 2. Because the superior court denied the petition as untimely, it did not toll the running

of the statute of limitations, which expired on October 15, 2004. The petitions filed in the Court

of Appeal and the Supreme Court did not revive it. Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 601-02

(6th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner posits several reasons why he is entitled to some form of tolling, whether

statutory or equitable. First, he argues that respondent has the burden of proving that the

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timeliness bar is consistently applied, with citation to Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.

2003). Opposition (Opp’n) at 5; Letter filed 1/12/07 (Letter) at 1. 

If a habeas petitioner has failed to comply with state procedures and thus not

obtained a ruling on the merits of a claim, a federal court will not consider the claim in a habeas

petition if the procedural bar is adequate and independent. If a petitioner can show cause for the

default and prejudice from the error, the court may consider the claim in a habeas petition. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Untimeliness can be a procedural bar in

habeas cases. See Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1153 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). Respondent bears

the ultimate burden of demonstrating the independence and adequacy of a procedural bar. 

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. 

The congruence between the two doctrines cannot be taken as far as petitioner

suggests, however. Pace held that “[w]hen a postconviction petition is untimely under state law,

‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Pace, 544 U.S. at 414. It did not

suggest that a district court should undertake the sort of inquiry pursued in the context of a

procedural default.

Moreover, in Bonner, the Ninth Circuit considered the application of Pace to a

petition that had been denied for a number of reasons, including successive presentation of some

claims and timeliness. 425 F.3d at 1145. Generally, a procedural bar is not “adequate” when it is

unclear what claims are subject to the bar. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of

California, 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996). In Bonner, however, the Court of Appeals found

the finding of untimeliness determinative. It did not find that the state court’s reliance on two

different procedural grounds to deny the writ had any impact on the untimeliness finding for the

purpose of statute of limitations analysis. Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148. 

Next, petitioner alleges that applying the more stringent standard of Pace to his

case will violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution and the rule of Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288 (1989). Opp’n at 6-7; Letter at 2. Teague held “new constitutional rules of criminal

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procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are

announced.” Id. at 310. Teague may be used by the state, but not by petitioner, as a shield. 

Moore v. Anderson, 222 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 2000). 

In addition, 

[n]ot every law that work[s] to the disadvantage of a defendant

violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Changes that are merely

procedural will withstand scrutiny, as will statutes that leave

unaffected [t]he crime for which the [ ] defendant was indicted, the

punishment prescribed therefor, and the quantity or the degree of

proof necessary to establish his guilt.... A law does not violate the

clause if it creates only the most speculative and attenuated risk of

increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered

crimes.

Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations & quotations

omitted). The changes in habeas jurisprudence since petitioner’s conviction have nothing to do

with the crime of which he was convicted, his punishment, or the degree of proof necessary to

establish his guilt. There is no constitutional violation.

Third, citing Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) and In re

Barnett, 31 Cal.4th 466, 476-77 (2003), petitioner argues that he could not file a pro se petition

during the pendency of his direct appeal. Opp’n at 6; Letter at 2. In Barnett, the California

Supreme Court held it would not accept for filing pro se submissions from a capital defendant

when counsel has filed a habeas on the defendant’s behalf, while in Martinez, the Supreme Court

held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to represent himself on appeal. 

Petitioner also has submitted a copy of an order from the Yuba County Superior Court in another

case, dismissing a habeas petition filed during the pendency of a direct appeal. Opp’n, Ex. E. 

These cases show, he argues, that the superior court’s finding of untimeliness is not justified

because he could not file a habeas petition from the time of his conviction in 1999 until the

conclusion of his direct appeal in 2003. 

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In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the Supreme Court noted:

In common understanding, a petition filed after a time limit, and

which does not fit within any exceptions to that limit, is no more

“properly filed” than a petition filed after a time limit that permits

no exception. 

544 U.S. at 413.

In California, unlike many states, there are no fixed guidelines for determining

when an initial habeas petition will be deemed timely. However, in California, it is the

petitioner’s burden to “fully disclose his reasons for delaying in the presentation” of his claims. 

Ex parte Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949); see also Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148. Indeed, the state

judicial council form for a habeas petition, the form petitioner used, asks the petitioner “to explain

any delay in the discovery of the claimed grounds for relief and in raising the claims in this

petition”; it cites to Swain. Doc. 6 at 6 (question 15 on the printed form). Petitioner left this

portion of the form blank. Because petitioner did not demonstrate to the state court that he fit

within any exceptions to California’s admittedly amorphous timeliness exceptions, the superior

court’s finding that the writ was untimely is conclusive. This court is bound by the superior

court’s finding. See Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645-46 (9th Cir. 2007) (federal court is

bound by finding of untimeliness even if ruling did not specify which of two periods of delay was

the basis of its finding). 

Fourth, petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because he suffered from

post traumatic stress disorder and insomnia, which interfered with his ability to think clearly and

thus to pursue his post-conviction remedies. His initial symptoms did not arise, however, until

November 2005, long after the statute of limitations had expired; they cannot support a finding of

equitable tolling. Opp’n, Exs. A, B & D. 

II. Motion To Amend

In light of the court’s finding that the federal petition is not timely, the motion to

amend is futile. Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).

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III. Motion To Strike And Request For Copies Of Lodged Mental Health Records

Petitioner argues that he received a copy of the reply without a signature and that

because the copy is a “true copy,” the original must not contain a signature as required by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a). The signature on the reply complies with the local rules for an

electronically filed document. L.R. 1-101, 5-135(g).

Whether or not the mental health records were properly lodged as opposed to filed

is not relevant in light of the court’s determination that petitioner’s mental health has no bearing

on the timeliness of the habeas petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion to file an amended petition is denied; and

2. Petitioner’s motion to strike the reply and for copies of the lodged documents

(docket number 23) is denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss be

granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 21, 2007.

2 terr0244.157

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