Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00235/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GILBERT AGUILAS OCHO BUELNA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-00235 PHX EHC (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL:

On January 31, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 17) on October 5, 2007.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner filed a reply to the

answer on November 2, 2007. See Docket No. 18. 

I Procedural History

In 1996 Petitioner was charged with one count of child

molestation, classified as a class 2 felony and a dangerous

crime against a child. Answer, Exh. A. On May 20, 1997, the

state trial court concluded Petitioner was voluntarily absent

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from trial and allowed the prosecution to proceed against

Petitioner in absentia. Id., Exh. B. A jury found Petitioner

guilty as charged. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner was arrested in

California after his Arizona in absentia trial, on or about May

25, 1997, and returned to the custody of the State of Arizona on

or about October 16, 1997. Id., Exh. Q at 1. On November 3,

1997, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of 17

years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on one charge of

child molestation. Id., Exh. A.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner’s appointed

counsel filed an Anders brief averring to the court that he

could find no arguable issues to raise on Petitioner’s behalf.

Id., Exh. C. In a decision issued June 9, 1998, the Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence.

Id., Exh. B. Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by

the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh. D.

On January 20, 1998, prior to the date the Arizona

Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s direct appeal, Petitioner

filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the Arizona trial

court. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner was appointed counsel in his

Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. F. On August 24, 1998, Petitioner’s

appointed counsel declared to the court that he could find no

arguable claims to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner filed a motion to “continue” this action for postconviction relief on October 7, 1998. Id., Exh. G. There were

apparently no further proceedings in Petitioner’s first action

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1

 The Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the record before

the Court does not contain an apparent speedy-trial violation claim.

See Answer, Exh. H.

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for post-conviction relief. 

Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction

relief on September 30, 1999. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner asserted

that “no decision” was issued with regard to his first Rule 32

action and that he had new evidence of his innocence. Id., Exh.

H. The Arizona Superior Court denied Petitioner’s assertion

that his right to a speedy trial was violated and dismissed this

petition on October 15, 1999. Id., Exh. I.1 Petitioner sought

reconsideration of this decision, which was denied on November

17, 1999. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner apparently attempted to seek

review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

denied review on May 2, 2000. Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner filed a third action for state postconviction relief, asserting an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, in the Arizona Superior Court on or about April

17, 2003. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner was appointed counsel,

briefing was conducted, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted

regarding the circumstances of a plea agreement and Petitioner’s

failure to appear to enter a guilty plea and at his trial. Id.,

Exh. R. On February 5, 2004, the Arizona Superior Court denied

Petitioner’s claims for relief. Id., Exh. R. Petitioner sought

review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

denied review on July 19, 2005. Id., Exh. T. Petitioner sought

review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which

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denied review on January 26, 2006. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on January

31, 2007. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas relief

because he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial

counsel. Petitioner also asserts his conviction violated his

right to be present at all stages of his trial, and his right to

confront witnesses against him. 

Petitioner alleges he agreed to sign a plea agreement

but that he was unable to sign the plea agreement on the

required date and was tried in absentia the following day.

Petitioner alleges his counsel never explained to him that, if

he failed to appear to sign the plea agreement, a trial would

commence “with or without him” the following day. Petitioner

further argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to his trial in absentia based on the existence of an oral

binding agreement with Petitioner, i.e., the verbal agreement

underlying the plea agreement. Petitioner argues his conviction

and sentence are in violation of his rights because he was

verbally offered a plea agreement, he verbally accepted the

agreement through counsel, and the trial court could have made

the agreement binding. Petitioner contends the state should be

bound by its oral contract to the terms of the plea agreement

and seeks “specific performance” of the plea agreement. 

II Analysis

The petition is barred by the statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th

Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(1994 & Supp. 2007); Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000).

Irregardless of when Petitioner’s first action for

post-conviction relief became final and the one-year statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run

at the termination of that action, more than 365 days of untolled time passed between the termination of Petitioner’s

second action for post-conviction relief and the date that he

filed his federal habeas petition.

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of

Petitioner’s second action for post-conviction relief on May 2,

2000. Answer, Exh. M. Petitioner filed a third action for

state post-conviction relief in the Arizona Superior Court on

or about April 17, 2003. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner did not have

any action for state post-conviction relief pending in the state

courts, which would have tolled the one-year statute of

limitations, for a period of almost three years. Accordingly,

his habeas action was not timely filed. 

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The Arizona state court ordered briefing and held an

evidentiary hearing with regard to Petitioner’s third action for

state post-conviction relief, asserting an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, on or about April 17, 2003. Id.,

Exh. H. However, that action for post-conviction relief could

not and did not restart the already-expired statute of

limitations for filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing

Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston

v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

Even if the Court presumed the statute of limitations

re-started with the state court’s evaluation of Petitioner’s

third action for post-conviction relief on the merits of the

claims presented, his federal habeas petition would still not be

timely filed. Petitioner’s third action for state postconviction relief was denied by the Arizona Superior Court on

February 5, 2004. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review on

July 19, 2005, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on

January 26, 2006. Assuming the statute of limitations began to

run on January 27, 2006, it expired on January 26, 2007 and,

accordingly, Petitioner’s federal habeas petition filed January

31, 2007, is too late even using the most generous calculation.

In response to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner states he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. See Docket No. 18. Petitioner contends

extraordinary circumstances beyond his control “made it

impossible to file a petition with the right case laws and on

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2 This holding does not affect a petitioner’s ability to

raise claims involving a change in the law made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or claims

involving newly-discovered evidence of innocence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2007). Absent those circumstances, which are

not present here, the strict application of the jurisdictional

deadline is appropriate in a collateral proceeding and is now

established Supreme Court precedent. See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at

2365–66.

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time.” Id. at 2. Petitioner alleges both his trial and his

appellate counsel were unconstitutionally ineffective. Id.

Petitioner asserts he has diligently pursued his claims. Id.

Section 2254 habeas applicants are no longer entitled

to consideration of the merits of their untimely petitions based

on the doctrine that the statute of limitations could be

equitably tolled. The Supreme Court recently concluded section

2254 petitioners are not entitled to equitable tolling of the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations because this does not comport

with the plain meaning of the statute. See Bowles v. Russell,

127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (2007) (holding that “time limits enacted

by Congress” are “jurisdictional” and rejecting the argument

that the federal courts could craft an “equitable” exception to

the jurisdictional requirement).2 But see Lawrence v. Florida,

127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (assuming, without deciding, that

section 2244(d) provides for equitable tolling).

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Even allowing for the most generous construction

of the applicable statute of limitations, more than 365 days of

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un-tolled time passed after the date Petitioner’s conviction

became final and the date he filed his federal habeas petition.

Pursuant to a recent United States Supreme Court opinion,

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

applicable statute of limitations as a matter of federal

statutory law. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Buelna’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

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to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 9th day of November, 2007.

 

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