Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-43/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, 

HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and 

PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and 

on behalf of all others 

similarly situated and all 

aggrieved employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: MOTION TO RESTRICT 

COMMUNICATIONS AND ISSUE 

CURATIVE NOTICE

----oo0oo----

This case is again before the court on a motion by 

defendant Charter Communications, challenging a letter and twopage survey sent to a selection of putative class members 

requesting information related to recipients’ work for Charter, 

sent by a research consulting group hired by plaintiffs’ counsel. 

(Mot. (Docket No. 253); see Opp. at 10-11 (Docket No. 267).) 

The court would have preferred to confer with counsel 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 274 Filed 02/24/22 Page 1 of 6
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to reach a resolution of Charter’s concerns with the letter and 

survey. However, the traditional modes of communication are 

unfortunately no longer available to the court. On February 22, 

2022, the court attempted to hear the arguments of counsel by 

Zoom, but a few minutes into the proceeding the electronic 

communication system malfunctioned to the point where the hearing 

had to be aborted. The court’s IT department thinks it has the 

problem pinpointed, but it is uncertain when if at all it can be 

resolved. 

The court has considered inviting counsel to appear in 

person for oral argument on the motion, but aside from requiring

plaintiffs’ counsel to travel from Southern California and 

defendants’ counsel to travel from Georgia, we would have to sit 

in a socially distanced room with plexiglass partitions between 

us and converse with masks covering our faces. That option does 

not appear to the court to be much more conducive to a meaningful 

dialogue. Accordingly, the court will take the motion under 

submission on the papers and address it in this Order. 

Charter’s motion seeks several forms of court 

intervention including: (1) a restriction on further 

communications between plaintiffs’ counsel and members of the 

putative class; (2) a requirement that a curative notice be 

issued to putative class members, at plaintiffs’ counsel’s 

expense; (3) compelled production of plaintiffs’ counsel’s 

records relating to the survey, including a list of recipients, 

all materials sent, and all responses received; and 

(4) imposition of monetary sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel. 

(Mot. at 2, 27.)

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First, the court recognizes that Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(d) affords district courts “broad authority to 

exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate 

orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.” Gulf Oil 

v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1981). Nevertheless, the court 

does not deem it appropriate to prohibit plaintiffs’ counsel from 

further communicating with members of the putative class in this 

case. The ability to communicate with potential class members, 

moreover, is a freedom that litigants and their counsel enjoy 

under the First Amendment. See id. at 103-04; Kutzman v. 

Derrel’s Mini Storage, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1153 (E.D. 

Cal. 2018) (“Before a class is certified, counsel for both 

parties maintain a free-speech right to communicate with putative 

class members, ex parte, about the lawsuit . . . .”), vacated 

pursuant to settlement, 2018 WL 11389263 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 

2018); Mevorah v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 05-cv-1175 MHP, 

2005 WL 4813532, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2005). 

In nearly every decision Charter cites in which a court 

limited communications or took other remedial measures pursuant 

to Rule 23(d), the court did so in response to concerns that 

defendants’ communications would prevent class members’ 

participation in the action, whether through intimidation, 

solicitation of waivers, or other coercive means. See Kutzman, 

354 F. Supp. 3d at 1153-58; McKee v. Audible, Inc., 17-cv-1941 

GW(Ex), 2018 WL 2422582, at *3-8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2018); 

Talavera v. Leprino Foods Co., 1:15-cv-105 AWI BAM, 2016 WL 

880550, at *4-6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016); O’Connor v. Uber 

Techs., 13-cv-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 1760314, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. May 

Case 2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC Document 274 Filed 02/24/22 Page 3 of 6
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1, 2014); Wright v. Adventures Rolling Cross Country, Inc., 12-

cv-982 EMC, 2012 WL 2239797, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2012); In 

re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deep Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 

on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866, at *6-7 (E.D. La. 

Feb. 2, 2011); Laguna v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 09-cv-2131 JM 

(BGS), 2010 WL 11508987, at *5-10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010); In 

re M.L. Stern Overtime Litig., 250 F.R.D. 492, 498-500 (S.D. Cal. 

2008); Longcrier v. HL-A Co., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224-30 

(S.D. Ala. 2008); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d 671, 681-

84 (3d Cir. 1988); Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 751 

F.2d 1193, 1201-07 (11th Cir. 1985).1

In the few cases Charter cites in which courts 

addressed concerns about communications by plaintiffs or their 

counsel, the extent the courts’ intervention was simply to order 

parties to meet and confer regarding the creation of a revised 

questionnaire, see Sutton v. Hopkins Cnty., Ky., 4:03-cv-3 JHM, 

2007 WL 9798245, at *1-2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 7, 2007) -- a measure 

Charter has not requested -– or to order them to confer and 

prepare a proposed order imposing “some level of court 

1 See also Pierce v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 

3:13-cv-641 PLR CCS, 2015 WL 574501, at *2-3 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 

2015) (denying, in FLSA collective action, defendant employer’s 

request to include mandatory questionnaire requiring recipients 

to affirm answers on penalty of perjury); City of Farmington

Hills Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 10-cv-4372 DWF 

JJG, 2012 WL 12898811, at *6 (D. Minn. July 27, 2012) 

(conditioning defendant employer’s ability to obtain class 

discovery via questionnaire on inclusion of disclaimer notifying 

recipients that failure to respond would not cause them to 

forfeit recovery); Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 185 

F.R.D. 313, 319 (D. Colo. 1999) (ordering deletion of 

questionnaire language indicating it was mandatory to prevent 

“exclusion of any party member that does not return the 

questionnaire”).

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supervision of communications,” Doyon v. Rite Aid Corp., 279 

F.R.D. 43, 50-51 (D. Maine 2001). None restricted plaintiffs’ 

counsel from communication with putative class members 

altogether.

Second, the court does not deem it appropriate to send 

out a curative notice to the recipients of Charter’s letter. 

Dignifying the original communication with another one from the 

court could create the false impression that the court somehow 

has an interest in the questionnaire. However, the court shares 

several of Charter’s concerns with the contents of letter and 

survey and sees nothing wrong with Charter sending its own 

communication to those who received it, although the court does 

not deem it appropriate to dictate the contents of any such 

communication at this time.

Third, in order for Charter to send such a 

communication it would need a list of all the recipients, copies 

of all the materials that were sent to them, and the addresses to 

which they were sent. The court sees nothing wrong with 

requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to provide the defense with such 

information. 

Fourth, the court does not perceive the conduct of 

plaintiffs’ counsel to be sufficiently egregious to merit the 

imposition of sanctions.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, if defense counsel wishes 

to send a follow-up communication to the recipients of the 

attached letter and survey, counsel meet and confer, either 

remotely or in person, to the extent that such is possible, to 

discuss the details of such communication;

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AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fourteen days 

from the date of this Order, or at such other time as may be 

agreed upon by stipulation between the parties, plaintiffs’ 

counsel shall provide defendants’ attorneys with a list of the 

names and addresses of all recipients of any communications sent 

or caused to be sent by plaintiffs’ attorneys or any of their 

consultants, along with copies of all materials sent to them.

Dated: February 24, 2022

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