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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ELLEN F. JOHNSEN, R.N., 

Plaintiff/Appellant, 

DEC 1 S 1989 

ROBERT L. f.JOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 86-27 59 

. V •·· 

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 3 

OF TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA; a/k/a 

BROKEN ARROW PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 

THEO SMITH, JIM GOODWIN,. MAX 

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BRISSEY, BOB MORRIS, and D.C. ) 

ANDERSON, Individually and in 

official capacities as Board 

Members of Independent School 

District No. 3, DR. C. G. 

their) 

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) 

OLIVER, JR., Education Director, 

Indivipually and in his official 

capacity as Superintendent of 

Independent School District No. 3, 

and DR. DON HALL, Education 

Director, Individualiy and in his· 

official capacity 

.Defendants/Appellees. 

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Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma 

(D.C~ No. 85-C-54-B) 

Louis w. Bullock of Bullock & Bullock, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff/Appellant. 

Ronald L: Day of Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma (Laurie w. Jones of Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & 

Moon, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for 

Defendant/Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 86-2759 Document: 010110192467 Date Filed: 12/19/1989 Page: 1 
Karen L. Long of Oklahoma Education Association, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, filed Brief Amicus Curiae for Oklahoma Education 

Association. 

Larry Lewis of Oklahoma State School Boards Associatioh, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, filed Brief Amicus Curiae for Oklahoma State 

School Boards Association. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, HENLEY*, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable J. Smith Henley, Senior Judge, United States 

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designat1on. 

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Plaintiff brought this action und.er 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging that her First Amendment rights were violated when her 

contract as a school nurse was not renewed after she spoke out 

against the school district's medication policy. After the jury 

awarded plaintiff $10,000 in d~mages, the district court granted a 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants 

because plaintiff's speech was not protected under the bal~ncing 

~est of Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 

Plaintiff appeals the dist~ict court's decision granting the 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We affirm. 

FACTS 

Pl~intiff Ellen Johnserr was hired as a school nurse·by Broken 

Arrow Public Schools for the 1982-83 school year. 1 Plaintiff· was 

the sole nurse assigned to two different schools between which she 

split her work time. 

As the school iear began, plaintiff became. concerned about 

the school system's medication policy, which allowed nurses, with 

only parental permission, to administer prescription and nonprescription drugs to students. Plaintiff believed that the 

Oklahoma Nuriing Piacti6e Act, Okla. Stat. Ann .. tit. 59, § 567.1 -

567.16 (1989), did not allow a nurse to administer any medicine 

without a dpctor's authorization. 2 Plaintiff expressed her 

1 Under Oklahoma law, a newly hired employee of the publi~ 

schools is probationary for the first three years of his or her 

employment. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 6-102.1(4) (1989). 

2 For example, § 567.3(2) defines ''[t]he practice of professional 

nursing" to include "the administration of medications and 

treatments, as prescribed by a licensed physicia·n or dentist." 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, § 567.3 (2) (1989) (emphasis added). 

(footnote cont.) 

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concern to Dr. Don Hall, the school administrator who supervised 

the health service program within the school system. 

Plaintiff was selected to serve as a member of a committee 

formed by the nurses to review the .~edication policy and draft a 

new policy to present to the administration. The nurses submitted 

the new policy to the administration. In December 1982, Dr. Hall 

announced that the policy submitted by the nurses had not been 

adopted and that the nurses should continue to administer nonprescription drugs as permitted by the existing policy or find 

other employment. 

The School Board, however, did not ignore the nuises' 

concerns and preformed its own independent invest~gation of the 

medication policy. The Board hired legal counsel ~hich determined 

that it was not unlawful for the school nurse~·to administer nonprescription drugs with parental permission. The Board also 

discussed the issue with the state department of .education. 

While ·the nurse committee was studying the· issue and prior to 

using the school district's internal complaint procedure, 

plaintiff hired legal counsel and began to contact outside 

government agencies, including the Governor~s office, the Oklahoma 

(footnote cont.) 

After plaintiff's contract was not renewed, an Attorney General 

Opinion was issued stating that it ·is improper for nurses to 

distribute either prescription or non-prescription drugs without a 

doctor's authorization. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-133, 83-117 (Feb. 

16, 1984). However, the Attorney General Opinion has no bearing 

on this case and was not considered by the district court when it 

fou~d that Oklahoma law was "ambiguous" during the time plaintiff 

was voicing her concerns as to whether a physician's authorization 

was necessary for a school nurse to administer a non-prescription 

medication upon direction of a parent. John~en v. Independent 

School Dist., NOi 85-C-54-B, at 5-6 (N.D. Okla.) (filed Oct. 22, 

1986). . 

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State Board of Education, the Attorney teneral's office, the 

Oklahoma Board of Nurse Registration and Nursing Education, and 

the School Nurses' Association of Oklahoma .. Plaintiff distributed 

the information she received from the outside agencies to the 

other school nurses through inter-school mail. She also called 

other school nurses.during school hours to discus~ the issue. 

Plaintiff frequently voiced her concerns about the medication 

policy ~t the monthly meetings of the school district's nurses. 

Some of the nurses testified that plaintiff dominated those 

meetings, stifling others from speaking out. The meetings became 

unproductive because of the discord surrounding the medication 

policy. 

The information the other school nurses received from : 

plaintiff and the controversy surrounding the medication policy 

caused many of ·the nurses to fear that they might lose both their 

jobs and their nursing licenses. Plaintiif threatened another 

nurse that she would report the nurse to the state board of 

nursing for illegally administering drugs. 

Plaintiff sent the information she gathered to Dr. c. G. 

Oliver, Jr., the Superintendeht of. the Broken Arrow Public 

Schools. Dr. Oliver requested that plaintiff use the formal 

complaint mechanism designed by the school system to allow 

employees to voice their grievances. Dr. Oliver also admonished 

her for seeking legal counsel and contacting outside agencies 

prior to using internal procedures. The complaint procedure was 

set out in detail in the school district's policies. A copy of 

the district's policies including the complaint procedure had be~n 

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Appellate Case: 86-2759 Document: 010110192467 Date Filed: 12/19/1989 Page: 5 
given to plaintiff when she was employed. In addition, ~ 

principal in one of the schools where plaintiff worked went over 

the procedure with her. Plaintiff eventually·used the school 

complaint procedure after being expressly instructed to do so by 

her principal and Dr. Oliver. 

On March 21, 1983, plaintiff spoke at the school board 

hearing discussing proposed changes to the medication policy and 

told the school board at that public meeting that the nurses were 

''indisciiminately" administering drugs to th~ students. Plaintiff 

had previ~usly used the term "indiscriminate" in written 

communications and in discussions with parties outside the school 

system'. ·Plaintiff's allegation of indiscriminate administration 

of drugs was quoted in the newspapers and several nurse·s were 

questioned by the public as to their practices. Evidence at trial 

demonstrated that this accusation was false, and that the nurses 

were cautious in administering the drugs and would exercise their 

discretion not to administer a drug to a child if it would 

endanger the child's he~lth. 

Aiter the school board hearing, the Board adopted a revised 

medication p.olicy which addr_essed the ma jar i ty of plaintiff's 

concerns. The policy precluded the admin1stration of prescription 

drugs without a medical order, but it did continue to permit the 

administration of non-prescription drugs with only parental 

consent. 

On April 4, 1983, two weeks after the meeting on the 

medication policy, the Board met again and voted not to renew 

plaintiff's contract. Plaintiff asked for, and received, a 

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hearing review of the Board's decision not to renew her contract. 

The hearing took place on June 2 through June 3, 1983. At the 

hearing, plaintiff had counsel and the right to offer. evidence. 

The Board upheld its original decision, believing that plaintiff 

had created a divisive atmosphere among the health services staff. 

However, the quality of plaintiff 1 s work was not questioned. 

Plaintiff then filed this§ 1983 suit, alleging that her 

contract was not renewed because she had spoken out against the 

medication policy of the school district. At the end of the 

trial, the district court improperly submitted the determination 

of whether plainti~f's speech was constltutionally protected to 

the jury, 3 which returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded 

her$ 10,000. The district court granted a judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendants, holding that 

plaintiff's speech, as a matter of law, was not constitutionally 

protected under the Pickering balancing test because plaintiff's 

speech disrupted the operation of the school system, undermined 

th~ administration's authority, and impaired the working 

relationships of the health services. Johnsen v. -Independent 

School ~ist., No. 85-C-54-B, at 12-13 {N.D. Okla.) (filed Oct. 22, 

1986) .. 

3 The question of whether speech is protected is determined under 

a balancing test found in Pickering v. Bo~rd of Educ., 391 U.S. 

563 (1968). · Whether the speech is constitutionally protected is 

a question of law and should not be submitted to the jury. Wren 

v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. den~ 

479 U.S. 1085 (1987). However, submitting the question to the 

jury does not automatically require reversal. Id. An appellate 

court is not bound by the jury- determination and is able to make 

an independent judgment concerning whether plaintiff's speech is 

protected. Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 893 (4th 

Cir. 1984) (dissenting opinion). 

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DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review 

We review a decision to grant a judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict de novo. Guilfoyle v. Missouri, Kan. and Tex. R. Co., 812 

F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1987). This court must determine 

whether the evidence and inferences drawn frofu the evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, are so 

clear that reasonable minds could not differ as to result. Id. A 

court always reviews de novo the Pickering determination of 

whether the employee's interests in making the statement are 

outweighed _by the _state's interests as emp-loyer-. Koch v. City of 

Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1441 & n. 14 (10th Cir.) (en bane), 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 262 (1988). 

II. Analysis 

The Suprem~ Cotirt in Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of 

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), set out a three-prong test to 

determine ~hether an adverse employment decision violates a public 

employee's First Amendment right to free speech. Under that test, 

a public employee must first show that, as· a matter 9f law1 his or 

her speech was constitutionally protected. Id. at 284. Second, 

the employee must demonstrate that the protected speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 

decision. Id. at 287. Finally, the burden shifts to the employer 

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to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer would 

have made the same deci~ion even in the absence of the protected 

speech. Id. 

With regard to the first prong of the Mount Healthy test, the 

Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), 

articulated a two part test to determine whether speech is 

constitutionally protected. First, the plaintiff must show that 

the speech touches on a matter of public concern. Pickering, 391 

U.&. at 568. Second, after the employer has established its 

interest "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 

performs through its employees," the court must balance the 

employee's int·erests against· the employer's interest. Id. 

A. Public Concern 

In Connick v. Myers, 461 U;S. 138 (1983), the S~p~eme Court 

held that a matter of public concern must relate to a ''matter of· 

political, social, or other concern to the community." Connick, 

461 U.S. at 146. Plaintiff's speech in this case d~als with the 

school district's medication policy. The medication policy 

potentially impacts the health of the children attending the 

school. Therefore, plaintiff's speech sufficiently touches on a 

matter of p~blic concern to warrant placing the speech on the 

Pickering scales to determine whether the speech was 

constitutionally protected. 

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B. Pickering Balance4 

1. Considering speech as a unitary whole or as separate component 

items of speech 

4 The balancing of factors under Pickering and Connick v. 

Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), is at times difficult to apply to the 

many fact patterns which arise, because the court is required to 

balance apples and oranges: the First Amendment rights of the 

emplqyee against the non-constitutional interest of government 

efficiency. In order to confirm the court's analysis under the 

Pick~ring balancing test, it may sometimes be helpful for the 

court to ask alternatively whether the public employee's speech 

was reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. 

Reasonableness, as an objective standard, involves the same 

criteria as the Pickering balancing test but it provides the court 

with a more familiar framework to use in balancing the many 

factors under Pickeririg. To determine whether the speech is 

reasonable, and therefore protectable, the court can look first at 

the mariner, form, and circumstances of plaintiff's speech. That 

is consistent with Connick, where the Court considered the 

"manner, time, and place"- of ·the employee's speech. Connick, 461 

u.~. at 152. Therefor~, the court can look to when and wher~ the 

speech took place and ~o whom the emplbyee spoke. · The court could also consider whether oth~r avenues were 

available to the employee to express his or her concerns. For 

example, if the employee is speaking out against the corruption of 

his or her supervisors, it may be reasonable to forego the 

internal complaint meehanism of the department because it would be 

a .futile gesture .• Cf. Brockell v. Ncirton, 732 F.2d 664, 668 (Bth · Cir. 1984) (allegations warranted going around normal chairi of 

command). However, where an adequate internal complaint mechanism 

is establi~hed, the employee's failur~ to use the complaint 

procedure can be considered in determining WQether the speech was 

reasonable. 

The seriousness of the issue of public concern should also be 

considered in determining whether the Speech was reasonable. The 

more serious the issue, the greater latitude that should be given 

the public employee to speak out. Cf. Connick .v. Myers, 461 U.S. 

138, 152 (1983} ("a stronger showing .[by defendant] may be 

necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved 

matters of public concern"); Conaway v. ~mith, 853 F.2d 7B9, 797-

98 (10th Cir. 1988} (whistle blower exposing governmental 

corruption allowed greater latitude even though the speech results 

in disharmony). · Another factor that could be considered by the court is the 

consequences of the public employee's speech. If the disruptions 

to the operations of the public employer are slight, the public 

employee's speech is more likely·to be reasonable. Cf. Ware v; 

Unified School Dist., 881 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1989) (speech 

did not justify termination because "effective functioning of the 

office was not affected by [plaintiff's] speech"). In contrast, · (footnote cont.) 

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Plaintiff's crusade to change the school board's medication 

policy stretched over several months and involved multiple 

incidents, some of which were more deserving of protection then 

others. 5 However, the district court considered plaintiff's 

entire activity as a unitary whole and performed a single 

Pickering balancing analysis. Potentially different.results might 

be obtained lf each individual incident was _weighed separately 

against the disruption caused by that particula~ iricident. 

Although a small portion of ·speech taken by itself may be 

protectable under Pickering, when tpe speech in its totality is 

considered it might not be protected. See,~' Berry v. Baily, 

726 F.2d 670, 676 (11th Cir. 1984) (Combining one remark unrelated 

· to plaintiff's job· as deputy sheriff with other remarks that did 

relite to the plaintiff's job for the purpose of performing a 

single Pickering balancing analysis because all the.remarks were 

related to the disciplinary structure of plalntiff's job), cert. 

denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985). Thus, we must first decide whether 

the Pickering balancing test should be ~pplied to plaintiff's 

speech, considered as a whole, or w~ether each instance of speech 

(footnote cont.) 

if the normal functioning of the government operation is. brought 

to a halt, plaintiff's speech is more likely to be deemed 

unreasonable. A reasonableness analysis is applied to the facts 

of this case at. note 7 of this opinion. 

5 For example, plaintiff hired legal counsel and sought 

information from governmental agencies. R. 106, 133. Plaintiff 

spoke,at the school board meeting where she made false accusations 

of indiscriminate administration of drug~. R. 155-156. Plaintiff 

continually discussed the medication policy in the monthly nurses 

meetings. R. 370. Also, plaintiff threatened a-nurse that she 

would report her to the state board of nursing. R. 783. 

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should be balanced separately. See Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 

797 F.2d 953, 957 (11th Cir. 1986) (district court reversed for 

improperly dividing a poem into protected and unprotected stanzas 

before performing the Pickering balance test), cert. denied, 483 · 

U.S. 1020 (1987). 

The issue of whether speech involving multiple incidents or 

subjects should be considered separately in applying the Pickering 

balancing test arises in a wi~e spectrum of circumstances. At one 

extreme is the situation where there is a single instance of 

speech that touches on interrelated subjects. Because of the 

difficulty in determining the impact of a portion of a single 

instan~e of speech without examining the entire -instance, 11 [ t ]he 

task ~~der Pickering is ••. to determine whether the employee's 

interests in the speech as a whole outweigh the public employer's 

interests.'' Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 957 (11th 

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987) (emphasis· added). 

[A]ny such instances of speech should not be broken down 

into separate pieces of protected and nonprotected 

speech, but should rath~r be treated as protected speech 

for the purposes of the Pickering balance and the 

causation determinatiori. In other words, when 

undertaking the Pickering-balancing equation, the 

district court may take into account the fact that not 

all·of the speech may have been protected. 

Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855. F.2d 723,. 733 (11th Cir. 1988). 

Connick v. ·Myers, 461 U.S. 138 ( 1983), is an ex.ample of a 

court considering speech as a whole even though portions.of the 

speech did not touch on matters of public concern. In Connick, an 

assistant distridt'attorney was discharged after distributing· a 

multi-question questionnaire concerning office policy, _morale, and 

employee confidence in supervisors. The Court determined that 

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only the question asking whether employees felt pressured to work 

in political campaigns touched on a matter of public concern. 

Nevertheless, the Court went on to consider the entire 

questionnaire in balancing the interests. 461 U.S. at 149-54. 

The Court held that because the "questionnaire touched upon 

matters of public.concern in only a most limited sense" the 

employer could discharge the employee for speech which he 

reasonably believed would di~rupt the office. Connick, 461 U.S. 

at 154. 

Courts have cited Connick for the proposition that a single 

instance of speech ~hould not be divided for purposes of applying 

the Pickering balance. See,~, Hesse v. Board of Educ., 848' 

F.2d 748, 753 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 s~ Ct. 1128 

(1989); Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 957 (11th Cir. 

1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987). In <;::onnick, "the Court 

applied the Pickering balancing test to the survey as a whole, 

rather than to the single question relating to a. matter of public 

concern." Kurtz, 855 F.2d at 732 n. 7 (emphasis in original). 

At the other end of the spectrum is the situation where the 

court must consider multiple instances of speech, each dea1i~g 

with separate subjects. There, the court may treat each instance 

of speech separately in applying the Pickering balance. See 

Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723, 732-33 (11th Cir .. 1988). 

Between those two situations lies less clear circumstances 

where the speech involves one instance but multiple distirict 

subjects or the speech involves multiple instances but only one 

subject. Under those circumstances,.the question of whether 

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speech should be balanced separately is fact sensitive and depends 

on how interrelated are the different aspects of the speech. 

Factors that could be considered in determining whether the speech 

is interrelated include the time frame in which the speech 

occurred, the different audiences to which the speech may have 

been directed, the continuity of the speech, and the degree to 

which the different aspects of speech built upon each other to 

create a cumulative impact on the ~tate employer. 

Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1988), is an 

example of how the time frame of the speech wa$ considered by the 

court in permitting.the division of different instances of speech. 

In Kurtz, a university professor filed suit because he was denied 

a_ promotion allegedly in violation of his First Amendment rights.' . . . 

The speec~ in question involved several instances over many years 

concerning different subjects of varying degrees of importance. 

In part because of the number of years in which the speech 

occurred, the court in Kurtz upheld the district court's decision 

to separate the speech for purposes of conducting the Pickering 

balancing te~t. Id. at 732-33. 

In Hesse v. Board of Education, 848 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 11~8 (1989), the court held that a 

teacher's transfer in status was warranted by the school's 

interest in disciplin~. The speech involved in Hesse included 

multiple memoranda. to school officials. The court found that only 

on~ of the memoranda arguably touched on a matter of public 

concern. Id. at 752. However, the court did not merely view the 

memorandum in "isolation" but also consldered the memorandum ''from 

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the vantage point of its cumulative disruptive effect on the 

Board's ability to maintain harmony and discipline in the 

workplace." Id. at 753 n. 4 (emphasis added); see also Berry v. 

Baily, 726 F.2d 670, 676 (11th Cir. 1984) (five instances of 

speech considered jointly because they were "part of a set of 

ac~ions posing a threat to the disciplinary structure"), cert. 

denied, 471 U.S. 1101 (1985). 

In this case, plaintiff's speech consisted of multiple 

instances addressing the same issue of the medication policy. 

Although the speech spanned several months, plaintiff was actively 

pursuing her concerns throughout that period. Most importantly~ 

the different instances of plaintiff's speech b~iit on each other 

to such an extent that it is difficult to separate the impact of 

one instance from the impact of another. It is difficult to 

determine whether the other school nurses feared that plaintiff 

was j~o~ardizing their nursing licenses because plaintiff sent 

them information that she had received from her contacts with 

outside agencies, because of the publicity she was generating in 

part ·through false accusatioris, because of her thr~ats to turn in 

a nurse, or because of pl~intiff's conduct du!ing the m6nthly 

nursing meetings. Therefore, because the speech was a concerted, 

·dohesive campaign on a single subject, the speech should be 

considered in its entirety for purposes of the Pickering balancing 

test. 

2. Balancing the Interests 

Considering plaintiff's speech as a whole, the district court 

was correct in det~rmining that the speech was not protected 

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because of its disruptive effect on the school district's health 

service program. In general, "an employee's First Amendmen_t 

rights are protected unless the employer shows that some 

restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official 

functions or to insure·effectiv~ performance by the employee." 

Childers v. Independent School District No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1341. 

(10th Cir. 1982). Here, the inquiry is whether the school 

district adequately proved that her speech disrupted the health 

service program of the school. See Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 

1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987). 

We conclude that plaintiff'~ speech was needlessly disruptive 

of _the school district's health service programs. First, 

plaintiff erroneously sta te_d that the nurses were 'administering 

drugs "indiscriminately." R. 392 •. The charge·of indiscriminate 

administration of drugs was repeated orally at a public meeting ·of 

the school board and appeared in some of ·plaintiff's written 

communications. R. 155-56, 250. Plaintiff's statement w~s at 

least careless and could be characterized as reckless in light of 

the predictable impact that such a statement would have on the 

public. Evidence introduced at trial indicates that the nurses 

had exercised their professional discretion in administering drugs 

to the students. R. 244-45, 405-06. False statements by an 

employee are weighed against plaintiff's interests on the 

Pickering balance if the stat~ments were ''so cloiely related to 

the day-to-day operations of the schools that ·any harmful impact 

on the public would be difficult to counter because of the 

[employee's] presumed greater access to the real facts." 

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Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572. An allegation of indiscriminate 

administration of drugs is serious and bears directly on the "dayto-day operations of the schools." Id. 

Publicity about the allegation of indiscriminate 

administration of drugs caused several nurses to be questioned by 

the public as to their practices. R. 405-408. The public's 

concern about the nursing program created by the false allegation 

resulted in a "harmful impact on the public [which was] difficult 

to counter." Id. Moreover, the exaggerated allegation of 

indiscriminate administration of drugs unfairly discredited the 

school nursing program. In Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 

(1987), _the Court ·held that the ·employee's speech was prot~cted, 

but in examining the speech under Pickering, the Court considered 

whether plaintiff "had discredited the office by making her. 

s-tatement in puolic. 11 Id. at 389. Plaintiff's statement that the 

school nu_rses were administering drugs II indiscriminately" weighs 

against plaintiff in applying·the Pickering balance because her 

statement was false and unfairly discredited the school nursing 

program. 

Secortd; the monthly meetings of.all the school nurses in the 

district eventually became unproductive because of the discord 

created by plaintiff's continual complaints about the medication 

policy. R. 370 .. The other nurses feared to speak during the 

meetings. Plaintiff was taking copious notes at the meetings, and 

the nurses worried that pl~intiff would later quote the nurses out 

of context. R. 628-29. 

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Third, several nurses felt that plaintiff had threatened to 

report them to the nursing board, thus jeopardizing their nursing 

licenses for illegally administering medication. R. 402-03, 511; 

534-35. The threats were extremely disruptive to the hursing 

staff and to the school districtrs ability to coordinate the 

health service program because plaintiff's threats resulted in a 

high level of anxiety among the nurses. R. 511, 527. 

The Supreme Court has stated that pertinent considerations in 

applying the Pickerin~ balance include: "whether the statement 

impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-~orkers, has a 

detrimental impact on close working relationships for which 

personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the 

performance_ of the speaker's d~ti~s or interferes w~th the regular 

operation of the enterprise." ·Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 

388 (1987). The monthly nurses meetings, which became 

unproductive because of plaintiff's actions, were an important 

part of the overall health service program of the school district. 

Plaintiff's ability to get along ~ith her co-workers was also an 

important .part of ~he program. Similarly, it was important to the 

school district to be able to maintain discipline whereby its -

nurses would follow dis~rict guidelines without being intimidated 

by fear that plaintiff would turn them in and cause them to lose 

their nursing license. Plaintiff's speech resulted in serious 

discord betweeri the other school riurses and plaintiff and 

consequently the speech "interfere[d] with the regular operation 

of the enterprise." Id. 

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Finally, plaintiff only resorted to the s6hool district's 

internal complaint mechanism late in the school year and only 

after being expressly instructed to do so by her principal. 

R. 46-52, 148-50. The complaint procedure was _in writing and a 

copy of it was given to plaintiff when she was employed. R. 50, 

273. Therefore, plaintiff had access to the complaint procedure 

from the beginning of her employment. The Court in Rankin stated 

. that "[i]n performing the balancing, the [speech] will not be 

considered in a vacuum; the manner, time, and place of the 

employee's expression are relevant, as is the context in which the 

dispute arose." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. In examining the 

manner, time, and place_ of ~he speech the court in Conaway v. 

Smith, 853 F.2d 789 (lO~h Clr. 1988), n6ted that the plaihtiff had 

used ''less disrupti~e internal channels, rather than going outside 

the city administration. The relatively low key context in which 

[plaintiff] voiced his complaints further persuades us that the 

Pickering balance tilts in his favor." Conaway, 853 F.2d at 798. 

Therefore, in examining the manner of the speech, the court should 

consider whether the employee used internal complaint procedures. 

Plaintiff initi~ted multiple outside contacts prior to using 

the internal complaint channels of the scho61. 6 Plaintiff is 

6 In Luethje v. Peavine School Dist. of Adair County, 872 F.2d 

352 (10th Cir. 1989), we held that a.rule preventing employees 

from speaking to parties outside of the school about school 

concerns was improper. However, the court explained that 

"[g]uidelines for school employees' public comments might in some 

circumstances be permissible, but the broadly worded rule here 

covered more ground than was necessary to satisfy the school's 

interest in functioning efficiently." 872 F.2d at 356. Luethje· 

demonstrates that an employee's right to speak to outside parties 

cannot be unreasonably restricted. However, in the present 

(footnote cont.) 

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decision to contact outside agencies prior to using the complaint 

mechanism of the school was unnecessarily disruptive because there 

was no indication that the internal mechanism would not be 

sufficient. The adequacy of the internal mechanism is 

demonstrated by the School Board's eventual willingness to address 

the majority of plaintiff's concerns by adopting a new medication 

policy. 

III. Conclusion 

Although plaintiff was addressin9 an important issue and 

genuinely held point of view regarding a matter of undeniable 

public interest, we hold that, on balance, her interests in making 

the particular speeches here involved is outweighed by the sch6ol 

district's interest in promoting the efficien6y of its public 

services because of the manner, time and place which plaintiff 

used to express her viewpoint. Therefore, plaintiff's speech in 

its entirety was not constitutionally protected under the 

Pickering balance test. 7 It is therefore unnecessary to reach the 

(footnote cont.) 

appeal, plaintiff was not prohibited from going to outside 

agencies but was merely advised to use internal complaint 

mechanisms. Also, her refusal to use effective internal complaint 

procedures was only one factor used in applying the manner, time, 

and place component of the Pickering balance. 

7 Applying the reasonableness standard, discussed supra note 4, 

to the facts before us, plaintiff's speech would similarly be-held 

to be unprotected~ Plaintiff's speech was unreasonable, and 

therefore unprotected, because of her false allegations, her 

.continual dominance of the health service meetings, her disruptive 

threats to fellow nurses, and her failure to use the schools own 

complaint mechanism when there was no indication.that resort to 

internal channels would be futile. Cast in the light of 

reasonableness, it is clear that plaintiff's speech was unneces-

(footnote cont.) 

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last two prongs of the Mount Healthy test to determine whether the 

speech was a motivating factor in the non-renewal of plaintiff's 

contract, or whether the employer would have made the same 

decision even in the absence of .the plaintiff's speech. Mount 

Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 

(1977). Similarly, it is unnecessary to reach the other issues 

raised in appellant's appeal, such as the refusal of the court to 

give an instruction on punitive damages. The district court's 

granting of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the 

defendants is AFFIRMED. 

(footnote cont.) 

· sarily disruptive of the health service program of the school and 

therefore unreasonable. 

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