Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02125/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02125-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRELL CORDARRYL STANFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

DONNA STASHYN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-cv-02125-JDP (PC)

ORDER

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 

DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT 

JUDGE TO THIS MATTER

ECF No. 2

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THAT PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM

ECF No. 8

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

DAYS

Plaintiff Terrell Cordarryl Stanford, a state inmate, alleges in his amended complaint that 

defendants Judge Donna Stashyn, defense attorney Peter Firpo, and deputy district attorney 

Melissa Marshall violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff has failed to cure the 

deficiencies noted in the court’s prior screening order. I will grant plaintiff’s application to 

proceed in forma pauperis, which makes the required showing. Accordingly, I will recommend 

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that this action be dismissed. 

Screening and Pleading Requirements

A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 

in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 

dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. Id. 

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 

require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 

identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 

give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 

However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

Analysis

The amended complaint’s allegations are similar to those in the original complaint. In 

September 2010, defendant-attorney Peter Firpo convinced plaintiff to fraudulently sign a plea 

agreement while defendants Judge Stashyn and District Attorney Marshall watched without 

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intervening. ECF No. 8 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants exhibited deliberate 

indifference towards plaintiff during the plea hearing. The complaint also alleges that in August 

2008, Firpo and Marshall did not intervene when Judge Stashyn failed to read plaintiff his “pre 

[bargain] dialect.”

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Id. at 4. 

Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies noted in the court’s prior order. See ECF No. 7. 

Thus, for the same reasons noted therein, the court will recommend that plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 

The allegation that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights in connection with 

his plea deal sounds in habeas corpus and is not appropriate in this § 1983 action. See Badea v. 

Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a habeas corpus petition is the proper vehicle 

for challenging the “legality or duration” of confinement). Further, no claim for civil damages is 

cognizable unless and until plaintiff’s criminal conviction is invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his criminal conviction is invalid. 

Moreover, defendants are immune to plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims against Judge 

Stashyn are foreclosed by judicial immunity. “[J]udges are absolutely immune from civil liability 

for damages for their judicial acts.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Crt. for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 

1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). And criminal defense lawyers, like defendant Firpo, are not subject 

to liability under § 1983 for their handling of criminal cases. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 

312, 325 (1982) (public defenders do not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983 liability); 

Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (privately retained attorneys do not act 

under color of law for purposes of § 1983 liability). Finally, defendant Marshall is immune as a 

prosecutor. A prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from liability in a civil rights suit for 

damages “when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 

U.S. 118, 131 (1997) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Imbler v. 

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1 The court understands this as a reference the colloquy between the trial court and a

criminal defendant relating to the waiver of the criminal defendant’s rights. 

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1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is granted. 

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this action.

Further, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without leave to amend.

I submit these findings and recommendations to the district judge under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within 14 days of the service of the findings and

recommendations, any party may file written objections to the findings and recommendations

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. That document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the findings

and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. See Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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