Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_23-cv-00222/USCOURTS-alsd-1_23-cv-00222-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FAMILY SECURITY CREDIT UNION, 

 

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-00222-TFM-B

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action is before the Court on Defendant Family Security 

Credit Union’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Michael Thomas’

complaint, or in the alternative, motion for a more definite 

statement (Doc. 6). The motion has been referred to the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge for consideration and recommendation 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). (Doc. 5). Upon consideration 

of all matters presented, the undersigned recommends, for the 

reasons stated herein, that Defendant’s motion (Doc. 6) be GRANTED 

in part, and that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND

On June 13, 2023, Plaintiff Michael Thomas (“Thomas”), who is 

proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Defendant Family 

Security Credit Union (“Family Security”) and paid the filing fee 

for a civil action. (Docs. 1, 2). In his complaint, Thomas 

asserts the existence of federal question jurisdiction based on: 

“Federal Reserve Act Section 16 part 1 and 2, Federal Reserve Act 

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Section 29, Bill of Exchange Act 1985, 12 USC 1431, 15 USC 1615, 

15 USC 1605, Cestui Que Vie Act.”1 (Doc. 1 at 3). When prompted 

on the complaint form2 to write a short and plain statement of his 

claim and to state the relief he is requesting, Thomas states: 

“See attached affidavit.” (Id. at 4).

Thomas attaches to the complaint three purported affidavits

that were signed by “Michael Thomas” as “agent” on behalf of 

“MICHAEL THOMAS/Principal.”3 (Doc. 1-1 at 1-3). The first 

purported “Affidavit” states:

On the 28th day of April 2023, I, Thomas, Michael/agent, 

on behalf of MICHAEL THOMAS/Principal, hereby accept all 

titles, rights, intertest and equity owed to MICHAEL 

THOMAS/Principal. I hereby instruct the CFO of Family 

Security Credit Union to transfer the principal’s 

balance to the principal’s account# for set off. I 

instruct the CFO to communicate in writing within five 

(5) business days once instructions are completed. If 

instructions are not completed, I instruct the CFO to 

respond in writing within five (5) business days giving 

reason for non-performance of fiduciary duties. If no 

written communication is made within five (5) business 

days I, Thomas, Michael/agent, on behalf of MICHAEL 

THOMAS/PRINCIPAL can assume the instructions have not

been completed.

(Id. at 1). 

1 Unless otherwise indicated by brackets, quoted language from 

Thomas’ pro se filings is reproduced herein without modification 

or correction for typographical, grammar, or spelling errors.

2 Thomas utilized a complaint form titled “Pro Se 1 (Rev. 12/16) 

Complaint for a Civil Case.” (See Doc. 1).

3 None of the purported affidavits were sworn to and subscribed 

before a notary. (See Doc. 1-1 at 1-3).

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 The second purported “Affidavit” subtitled “Opportunity to 

Cure (Second Tier)” states: 

On the 5th day of May 2023, I, Thomas, Michael/agent, on 

behalf of MICHAEL THOMAS/Principal hereby accept all 

titles, rights, intertest and equity owed to MICHAEL 

THOMAS/Principal. I hereby instruct the CFO of Family 

Security Credit Union to transfer the principal’s 

balance to the principal’s account# for set off. I 

instruct the CFO to communicate in writing within five 

(5) business days once instructions are completed. If 

instructions are not completed, I instruct the CFO to 

respond in writing within five (5) business days giving 

reason for non-performance of fiduciary duties. If no

written communication is made within five (5) business 

days I, Thomas, Michael/agent on behalf of MICHAEL 

THOMAS/PRINCIPAL can assume the instructions have not

been completed. 

(Id. at 2).

The third purported “Affidavit” states: 

On the 11th day of May, 2023, I, Thomas, Michael/agent, 

on behalf of MICHAEL THOMAS/Principal, hereby accept all 

titles, rights, intertest and equity owed to MICHAEL 

THOMAS/Principal. I hereby instruct the CFO or CEO, 

Shane Nobbley, of Family Security Credit Union to 

transfer the principal’s balance to the principal’s 

account# for set off. I instruct the CFO or CEO to 

communicate in writing within five (5) business days 

once instructions are completed. If instructions are 

not completed, I instruct the CFO or CEO to respond in 

writing within five (5) business days giving reason for 

non-performance of fiduciary duties. If no written

communication is made within five (5) business days I, 

Thomas, Michael/agent on behalf of MICHAEL 

THOMAS/PRINCIPAL can assume the instructions have been 

completed. 

(Id. at 3).

Thomas also attaches a document providing payoff details for 

his auto loan, which Thomas apparently wrote on and returned to 

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Family Security along with one or more of his purported affidavits. 

(Id. at 4). This document contains handwritten notations “by 

Michael Thomas/agent” that include the terms “Accepted For 

deposit,” “Pay on demand,” and “Payable to bearer.” (Id.). Thomas 

also wrote “[t]wenty three thousand four hundred eighty four

dollars 47/100” on the document, which was the amount required to 

pay off his auto loan. (Id.).

Thomas further attaches correspondence from Family Security 

dated May 22, 2023, which states: 

Mr. Michael Thomas,

We have received your recent communication dated May 11, 

2023. Your communication is not a proper form of 

payment. We hereby deny in all respects your attempt to 

discharge this debt by the terms of your communication. 

We also hereby advise you that our failure to respond to 

this communication or any other communication shall not 

under any circumstances be deemed an admission of 

liability to you for anything or any matter whatsoever. 

All such claims are rejected and denied. 

(Id. at 5).

On July 6, 2023, Family Security filed the instant motion to 

dismiss Thomas’ complaint, or in the alternative, motion for a 

more definite statement. (Doc. 6). Family Security argues that 

Thomas’ complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction because it lacks any definitive claim or cause of 

action and appears to be based upon the legal fictions of the

sovereign citizen movement. (Id. at 3-4). Family Security further

asserts that the complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule 

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of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. (Id. at 4-5). Alternatively, Family 

Security argues that if the Court does not dismiss the complaint 

outright, Thomas should be ordered to file an amended complaint 

that clarifies and specifically enumerates the violations he is 

alleging. (Id. at 5-6).

Thomas filed a response to the motion (Doc. 8), and Family 

Security did not file a reply. Family Security’s motion is

therefore ripe for resolution.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are 

authorized by Constitution and statute to hear only certain types 

of actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 

375, 377 (1994). “In a given case, a federal district court must 

have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: 

(1) jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal

question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) 

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin 

v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997). 

Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction in 

two primary types of cases. First, district courts have federal 

question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 

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Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331. Second, district courts have diversity jurisdiction over 

civil actions between citizens of different states where the amount 

in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

 “The plaintiff bears the burden of affirmatively asserting 

facts that show the existence of jurisdiction and including ‘a 

short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s 

jurisdiction depends.’” DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302, 

1311 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 

1367 (11th Cir. 1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A plaintiff properly 

invokes federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when 

he “pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or 

laws of the United States.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 

513 (2006). A plaintiff invokes diversity jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1332 when he “presents a claim between parties of diverse 

citizenship that exceeds the required jurisdictional amount [of] 

$75,000.” Id. 

A party may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to subject matter jurisdiction 

may take the form of a facial attack or a factual attack on the 

complaint. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 

1990) (per curiam). In a facial attack, such as the one apparently

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made by Family Security in this case, the court must evaluate 

whether the complaint alleges a sufficient basis for subject matter 

jurisdiction, while accepting all factual allegations as true for 

purposes of the motion. Id. at 1529. “If the court determines 

at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court 

must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Dismissal 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “must be without 

prejudice.” McIntosh v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 5 F.4th 

1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021). 

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which 

Relief Can Be Granted.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party 

may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To 

survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This necessarily requires 

that a plaintiff include factual allegations that plausibly 

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support each essential element of his claim. Randall v. Scott, 

610 F.3d 701, 708 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010). 

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a 

court “must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1066 

(11th Cir. 2017). That said, “[l]egal conclusions without adequate 

factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth.” Mamani 

v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011). A complaint 

does not need detailed factual allegations, but it “requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555. A court reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

must typically limit its consideration to the complaint and 

exhibits attached thereto. Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 

F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

C. Motion for a More Definite Statement.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) permits a party to “move 

for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive 

pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the 

party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(e). “The motion must be made before filing a responsive 

pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the 

details desired.” Id. 

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“[M]otions for more definite statement are disfavored and are 

confined to such narrow circumstances as ‘shotgun pleadings’ or 

unintelligible pleadings, not pleadings that are merely less 

detailed than a defendant might like.” Austin v. Auto Owners Ins. 

Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105862, at *20, 2012 WL 3101693, at *5 

(S.D. Ala. July 30, 2012). A motion for a more definite statement 

should only be granted “when the pleading is so vague or ambiguous 

that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, 

in good faith or without prejudice to himself.” Fathom Expl., LLC 

v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 352 F. Supp. 2d 

1218, 1221 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (quoting Campbell v. Miller, 836 F. 

Supp. 827, 832 (M.D. Fla. 1993)). 

D. Pro Se Litigation.

“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than 

pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally 

construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th 

Cir. 1998) (per curiam). However, “this leniency does not give a 

court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to 

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an 

action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 

(11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). Even a pro se litigant “is 

subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 

837 (11th Cir. 1989). 

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III. DISCUSSION 

As noted, Family Security moves to dismiss Thomas’ complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. 6 at 3-4). As an alternative 

basis for dismissal, Family Security contends that the complaint 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and moves 

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (Id. at 4-5).

In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, 

courts must “respect the important distinction between the lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction and the failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. 

Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 1998). A federal court 

may dismiss a claim invoking federal question jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction only if 

the claim “is not colorable, i.e., if it is ‘immaterial and made 

solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ or is ‘wholly 

insubstantial and frivolous.’” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513 n.10 

(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). “[T]he 

category of claims that are ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’ 

is exceedingly narrow.” Resnick v. KrunchCash, LLC, 34 F.4th 1028, 

1034 (11th Cir. 2022). “To strip a district court of subject 

matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s federal claim must have ‘no 

plausible foundation, or [ ] the court [must] conclude[ ] that a 

prior Supreme Court decision clearly forecloses the claim.’” Id.

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at 1035 (quoting Barnett v. Bailey, 956 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 

1992)). A district court should be even more reluctant to dismiss 

a case under Rule 12(b)(1) where the plaintiff is proceeding pro 

se. Simanonok v. Simanonok, 787 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986). 

For reasons explained below, the Court finds that Thomas’ 

threadbare pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted. The Court has also considered whether the complaint

alleges a basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, given 

that the complaint’s factual content is so thin and some of the 

authorities referenced clearly cannot form the basis for a federal 

claim. See Taylor, 30 F.3d at 1366. While it is questionable

whether the complaint raises a federal question, the undersigned

finds that Family Security’s arguments for dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(1) arguably depend on Thomas’ procedurally deficient 

pleading or relate to the merits of his claims.4 Accordingly, the 

4 See Greene v. Discover Bank, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814, at *1, 

5, 7-8, 2024 WL 85872, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2024) (where 

bank did not accept plaintiff’s attempt to pay off his credit card 

account balance by mailing a payment coupon on which he had written 

that payment of his entire balance should be made “on demand,” and 

plaintiff subsequently asserted claims against the bank that 

included an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1615, which obligates 

a creditor to “promptly refund any unearned portion of [an] 

interest charge to [a] consumer” where a consumer “prepays in full 

the financed amount under any consumer credit transaction,” the 

court determinined that to the extent the plaintiff based his claim 

on interest charged despite his attempts to pay his balance by 

mailing a marked-up payment coupon, the mailings did not constitute 

valid payments; thus, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claims under 

Rule 12(b)(6)).

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undersigned submits that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is the 

better approach under the circumstances of this case. 

Assuming arguendo that subject matter jurisdiction exists, 

the undersigned finds that Thomas’ complaint fails to articulate 

facts plausibly suggesting any entitlement to relief. The Court 

notes as a preliminary matter that Thomas’ complaint violates the 

Federal Rules’ requirements that a complaint must contain “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief,” and that a complaint’s allegations must “be 

simple, concise, and direct.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & 

8(d)(1). The allegations in Thomas’ complaint form, to the extent 

they exist at all, are neither plain nor direct. Indeed, Thomas 

fails to provide even a single direct factual allegation in support 

of his putative claims, and he attaches various documents to the 

complaint without offering any explanation as to their relevance

in the complaint itself. Neither this Court nor Family Security

are required to sift through Thomas’ attachments and other filings 

in an effort to decipher his legal theories or the factual grounds 

for his claims. Nevertheless, because the frivolous nature of 

Thomas’ allegations is reasonably apparent based on a review of 

Thomas’ pleadings, the Court will address Thomas’ putative claims 

and the issues raised in Family Security’s motion to dismiss rather 

than requiring Thomas to replead in order to comply with Rule 8.

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A. Authorities Cited as the Basis for Federal Question 

Jurisdiction.

As noted supra, Thomas alleges that federal question 

jurisdiction exists because the following “federal statutes, 

federal treaties, and/or provisions of the United States 

Constitution” are at issue in this case: “Federal Reserve Act 

Section 16 part 1 and 2, Federal Reserve Act Section 29, Bill of 

Exchange Act 1985, 12 USC 1431, 15 USC 1615, 15 USC 1605, Cestui 

Que Vie Act.” (Doc. 1 at 3). However, Thomas fails to articulate 

any facts suggesting that Family Security violated any of the 

statutes or other authorities referenced in his complaint. 

First, to the extent Thomas seeks to assert claims under

Sections 16 and 29 of the Federal Reserve Act, “district courts 

across the country have repeatedly rejected attempts to invoke 

these provisions as a private cause of action.” Payne v. Spectrum, 

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223441, at *5, 2023 WL 8681199, at *2 (W.D. 

Tex. Dec. 15, 2023); see White v. Lake Union Ga. Partners LLC, 

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184024, at *3-5, 2023 WL 6036842, at *2 (N.D. 

Ga. July 14, 2023) (“Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act . . . 

was codified as Subchapter XII of Title 12, Chapter 3 of the United 

States Code; 12 U.S.C. § 411, et seq. Multiple courts across the 

country have held that this section does not provide plaintiffs 

with a private right of action and therefore does not establish 

federal question jurisdiction. . . . Similarly, Section 29 of the 

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Federal Reserve Act does not provide Mr. White with a cause of 

action. Section 29 of Federal Reserve Act was added by Financial 

Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, and 

was codified, as amended, at 12 U.S.C. § 504. But that statute 

provides that ‘[a]ny penalty imposed under subsection (a), (b), or 

(c) shall be assessed and collected by (1) in the case of a national 

bank, by the Comptroller of the Currency; and (2) in the case of 

a State member bank, by the Board [of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System].’ 12 U.S.C. § 504(e). Courts have therefore 

rejected attempts by private individuals to bring claims under 

that statute.”); Morton v. Am. Express, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

209318, at *6, 2023 WL 7923927, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 18, 2023)

(stating that “it is well settled that Sections 16 and 29 of the 

Federal Reserve Act do not create a private cause of action”); 

Harp v. Police & Fire Fed. Credit Union, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

139418, at *12, 2023 WL 5152625, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2023)

(“[T]o the extent that Harp seeks to assert a claim under the 

Federal Reserve Act, she lacks a cause of action to do so. In her 

Complaint, Harp seems to suggest that PFFCU was violating Section 

16 of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 411-21, which governs 

the issuance and redemption of Federal Reserve notes. As a result, 

Harp alleges that PFFCU is subject to penalties under Section 29 

of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 504, which imposes 

penalties on banks for an array of misconduct. But the imposition 

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of civil penalties under Section 29 is carried out by federal 

officials, and private individuals do not have a private right of 

action to enforce Section 29 of the Federal Reserve Act.”); Mims 

v. Bank of Am., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226577, at *4, 2023 WL 

8804324, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2023) (noting courts’ 

“collective agreement that neither Section 16 nor Section 29 of 

the Federal Reserve Act creates a private right of action”); 

Escobar v. All. Credit Union, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225734, at 

*10, 2023 WL 8720903, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2023) (finding 

that Sections 16 and 29 of the Federal Reserve Act, “while federal 

law, do not create a private right of action”), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224445, 2023 WL 

8720693 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2023). 

Next, as numerous courts have held when faced with similar 

complaints filed by pro se litigants seeking to evade their 

financial obligations, Thomas’ unexplained reference to a “Bill of 

Exchange Act 1985” does not provide him with a federal cause of 

action. See Slaughter v. US Cellular, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

230723, at *6-7, 2023 WL 9051307, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 29, 2023)

(“The plaintiff says that the defendant has violated ‘The Bill of 

Exchange Act,’ but did not provide a citation. The court has been 

unable to identify a federal statute with this name. The British 

Parliament appears to have adopted a ‘Bills of Exchange Act’ in 

1882 . . . . There is a Canadian statute called the ‘Canada Bills 

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of Exchange Acts.’ . . . These statutes do not apply to commercial 

transactions in the United States.”); Harp, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

139418, at *4 & n.1, 2023 WL 5152625, at *1 & n.1 (where plaintiff 

accused defendant of violating its obligations under the “Bills of 

Exchange Act” by failing to recognize her manufactured documents 

as legal tender, noting that “[t]here is no Act of Congress with 

this title”); Griffin v. Gen. Elec. Credit Union, 2023 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 163030, at *7, 2023 WL 5955735, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 

2023) (“In what may be intended as a reference to federal law, 

Plaintiff includes an allegation that the credit union has refused 

‘to accept my performance per the Bill of Exchange Act of 

transferring accepted credits to the account of performance of 

full contract continuing to keep/withhold my securities.’ . . .

But again, the allegations as pled require this Court to speculate 

as to both what law is referenced and what violation is alleged.”), 

report and recommendation adopted, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207449,

2023 WL 8022825 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2023); White, 2023 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 184024, at *6, 2023 WL 6036842, at *3 (finding that 

plaintiff’s reference to a string of miscellaneous authorities, 

including “Bills of Exchange Act 1882,” did not “provide him with 

a federal cause of action”); Wilson v. Aqua Fin., 2023 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 207303, at *9, 2023 WL 7924150, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2023)

(finding that plaintiff’s reference to “Bills of Exchange Act 1882” 

did not provide plaintiff with a federal cause of action); Des 

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Rochers v. Moynihan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196284, at *5-6, 2016 

WL 11584833, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 16, 2016) (finding plaintiff’s 

“attempt to enforce an English law in an American court” to be 

“legally frivolous” where plaintiff purported to bring suit 

pursuant to the “Bills of Exchange Act of 1882”); Sabrina v. Scott 

Credit Union, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218355, at *2-3, 2023 WL 

8470105, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2023) (“The Plaintiff cites the 

Bill of Exchange Act, which is a Canadian law. Canadian law does

not apply here; thus the Plaintiff’s claims under foreign law are 

invalid.”); Payne, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223441, at *5, 2023 WL 

8681199, at *2 (“Plaintiff is not able to pursue civil remedies 

under the Bill of Exchange Act . . . , and the undersigned finds 

these claims to be legally frivolous. . . . The Bill of Exchange 

Act of 1882 is a Canadian statute with no application here.”). 

Thomas also lists 12 U.S.C. § 1431, “which defines the powers 

and duties of the Federal Home Loan Banks.” Anderson v. Navy Fed. 

Credit Union, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180090, at *4, 2023 WL 6481518, 

at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2023). However, Thomas fails to allege 

any facts relating to this statute or suggesting how it might apply 

to his claims against Family Security. Thomas’ unexplained 

reference to 12 U.S.C. § 1431 does not state a viable claim under 

the statute. See White, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184024, at *6, 2023 

WL 6036842, at *3 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2023) (finding that 

plaintiff’s reference to a string of miscellaneous authorities, 

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including “12 U.S.C. § 1431,” did not “provide him with a federal 

cause of action”); Stephens v. Regal Car Sales & Credit, 2023 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 56021, at *6-7, 2023 WL 2760061, at *3 (N.D. Okla. 

Mar. 31, 2023) (finding that “Plaintiff has not alleged a colorable 

claim arising under federal law” where plaintiff alleged that 

defendants violated 12 U.S.C. § 1431 but made no specific factual 

allegations in support of such a claim); Wilson v. City of Cayce, 

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207301, at *8-9, 2023 WL 7924163, at *4 

(D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2023) (finding that plaintiff’s bare reference to 

12 U.S.C. § 1431 did not provide her with a federal cause of 

action); Barnes v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 47903, at *11-12, 14, 2023 WL 2585537, at *4-5 (N.D. Ohio 

Mar. 21, 2023) (“Plaintiff cites to several statutes that appear 

irrelevant to the facts alleged in this Complaint. These include

. . . 12 U.S.C. § 1431 (defining the powers of banks) . . . . She 

fails to allege any facts to suggest how these statutes might 

apply. . . . I conclude [that plaintiff’s pleadings] fail to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted.”); Stephens v. Reg’l 

Hyundai, LLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139391, at *11, 2022 WL 

3139749, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 5, 2022) (“Plaintiff cites 12 

U.S.C. § 1431, and she could be alleging that defendants willfully 

or negligently violated the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 

§ 1421 et seq. However, she fails to allege that either defendant 

would qualify as a federal home loan bank as that term is defined 

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in § 1422(1)(A). . . . She also alleges no facts suggesting that 

her credit transaction would qualify as a home mortgage that would 

fall within the scope of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act. Plaintiff 

has not stated a claim under against either defendant under the 

Federal Home Loan Bank Act, and her claim described as ‘Banks and 

Banking’ is dismissed.”). To the extent Thomas suggests that 

Family Security violated 12 U.S.C. § 1431 by failing to pay 

interest to his “principal,” he has identified no facts plausibly 

supporting his assertion that “[i]nterest is owed to [his]

principal from FAMILY SECURITY CREDIT UNION.” (See Doc. 8 at 5). 

Thomas also cites 15 U.S.C. § 1605, a portion of the Truth in 

Lending Act (“TILA”) which sets forth items that should and should 

not be included when a finance charge is calculated. However, the 

complaint fails to provide any facts to suggest how this statute

applies to the circumstances of this case or was violated by Family 

Security. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim under 

15 U.S.C. § 1605. See, e.g., Parker v. Reg’l Acceptance Corp., 

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172099, at *5-6, 2021 WL 4137527, at *3 

(D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2021) (“Parker fails to allege any facts from 

which the court, using even the most liberal construction, can 

discern how Regional violated any disclosure obligations imposed 

by [15 U.S.C.] § 1605 or any other provision set forth in [the 

Truth in Lending Act]. Thus, the court concludes that Parker has 

failed to state a claim under TILA.”); Clark v. Carvana, 2021 U.S. 

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Dist. LEXIS 115841, at *9-10, 2021 WL 2478570, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 

Apr. 28, 2021) (“[A]s for Clark’s claim based on [15 U.S.C.] § 

1605 that defendants took cash in a consumer credit transaction in 

which a finance charge was involved, . . . he does not elaborate 

on this claim or provide any facts in support, and his allegation 

is therefore insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.”).

Thomas further references 15 U.S.C. § 1615, which “obligates 

a creditor to ‘promptly refund any unearned portion of [an] 

interest charge to [a] consumer” where a consumer ‘prepays in full 

the financed amount under any consumer credit transaction.’” 

Greene v. Discover Bank, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814, at *7, 2024 

WL 85872, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2024) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 

1615(a)(1)). Thomas’ complaint fails to allege any facts in 

support of a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1615. However, Thomas’ 

response to Family Security’s motion to dismiss arguably expounds 

on his claim, as follows: 

15 USC 1615 states if a consumer prepays in full the 

financed amount under any consumer credit transaction, 

the creditor shall promptly refund any unearned portion 

of the interest charge to the consumer. The transaction 

with FAMILY SECURITY CREDIT UNION was a consumer credit 

transaction and a refund of unearned interest is owed to 

the principal, which I’m the agent of on behalf of the 

principal.

 

(Doc. 8 at 5). To the extent Thomas suggests that Family Security

violated 15 U.S.C. § 1615 by charging or failing to return interest

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after refusing to accept his “endorsed bill of exchange”5 (i.e., 

the document on which Thomas had handwritten an array of financial 

buzzwords) as payment for his remaining auto loan balance, it is 

clear that Thomas’ submissions did not constitute valid loan 

payments. See Greene, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814, at *8, 2024 WL 

85872, at *3; see also Slaughter, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230723, at 

*9, 2023 WL 9051307, at *5 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that 

defendant’s alleged refusal to accept his “Bill of Exchange” as 

payment for his cell phone bill violated 15 U.S.C. § 1615 because 

“the defendant is not a consumer credit lender and the plaintiff 

has not alleged that he is owed a refund of unearned interest on 

a consumer credit transaction”). Accordingly, Thomas has failed 

to plausibly allege that Family Security violated 15 U.S.C. § 1615. 

Finally, Thomas purports to bring a claim under the Cestui 

Que Vie Act of 1666, “a seventeenth century Act of the English 

Parliament that presumes a person is dead if there is no 

‘sufficient and evident proofe’ that the person is still alive,

for instance if a person is lost at sea.” Faulkner v. Decker, 

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223978, at *1, 2023 WL 8653847, at *1 (D. 

5 See Doc. 8 at 1 (Thomas’ statements that he “sent a letter of 

instructions to FAMILY SECURITY CREDIT UNION along with an endorsed 

bill of exchange and a [power of attorney] showing that I’m the 

agent acting on behalf of the principal[,]” and that Family 

Security “sent a letter on May 22nd 2023 denying and rejecting my 

endorsed bill of exchange and my [power of attorney] claiming all 

rights, titles, interest and equity as the agent on behalf of the 

principal”).

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Idaho Dec. 14, 2023). However, this English law appears to have 

no application to Thomas and in any event plainly provides him 

with no federal cause of action. See White, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

184024, at *3-5, 2023 WL 6036842, at *2 (finding that plaintiff’s 

reference to the “Cestui que Vie Act 1666” did not provide him 

with a colorable federal cause of action). Indeed, Thomas’ 

reliance on the Cestui Que Vie Act “appears to be derived from 

popular but erroneous ‘Constitutionalist’ or ‘sovereign citizen’ 

theories of government” that have “been consistently rejected by 

the courts.” Faulkner, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223978, at *5, 2023 

WL 8653847, at *2; see Wood v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 30, 34-

35 (Fed. Cl. 2022) (“Sovereign citizens also sometimes reference 

the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666, or a ‘cestui que vie’ trust, as 

support for their arguments in court. . . . In short, the legal 

fiction presented by plaintiff in the complaint is not based in 

law but in the fantasies of the sovereign citizen movement.”); 

Anderson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180090, at *7, 2023 WL 6481518, at 

*3 (“Although Anderson does not expressly state he is a ‘sovereign 

citizen,’ his allegations, explanations, and exhibits are all 

demonstrative of his claims being rooted in sovereign citizen 

ideology. Specifically, Anderson cites the Cestui Que Vie Act of 

1666 as basis for federal question jurisdiction and includes a 

document entitled ‘DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY[,]’ both of which are 

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tied to theories associated with the sovereign citizen movement.”) 

(internal citation omitted). 

B. Breach of Contract.

In his response to Family Security’s motion to dismiss, Thomas 

states that “[t]he reason for the claim is breach of contract.” 

(Doc. 8 at 1). To the extent Thomas’ complaint can be construed

to assert a standalone claim for breach of contract, that cause of 

action is presumed to arise under state law, not federal law. “The 

elements of a breach-of-contract claim under Alabama law are (1) 

a valid contract binding the parties; (2) the plaintiffs’

performance under the contract; (3) the defendant’s 

nonperformance; and (4) resulting damages.” Tangen v. Ideacom of 

the Gulf Coast, Inc., 590 F. App’x 836, 838 (11th Cir. 2014) (per 

curiam) (quoting Shaffer v. Regions Fin. Corp., 29 So. 3d 872, 880 

(Ala. 2009)).

Thomas does not plead facts plausibly suggesting that each of 

the above-listed elements are met. Thomas has not identified any 

specific contractual provision that he believes has been breached. 

More fundamentally, to the extent Thomas suggests that handwriting 

financial buzzwords on loan-related correspondence and repeatedly 

sending “instructions to set off the principal’s balance” amounted 

to legitimate performance under a contract, Thomas’ assertion is 

highly implausible and, indeed, frivolous. Also highly 

implausible is Thomas’ suggestion that Family Security’s refusal

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to accept or comply with his nonsensical demands amounted to 

nonperformance under a contract between the parties. See Bryant 

v. Washington Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758-60 (W.D. Va. 

2007) (finding plaintiff’s “claim that tendering the Bill of 

Exchange amounted to legitimate performance of the contract . . . 

highly implausible” when “the legal authorities [plaintiff] cites 

and the facts she alleges suggest that she did not tender payment, 

but rather a worthless piece of paper”), aff’d, 282 F. App’x 260 

(4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); McGee v. Nissan Motor Acceptance 

Corp., 619 F. App’x 555, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding 

plaintiff’s assertion that his loan obligations were discharged by 

lender’s refusal to honor a “bill of exchange” that plaintiff said 

made the United States Treasury responsible for his debt to be 

frivolous); Harp, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139418, at *8-9, 2023 WL 

5152625, at *3 (dismissing with prejudice breach of contract claim 

where it was clear from the complaint’s exhibits that plaintiff’s 

“bill of exchange” was not valid legal tender for payment of credit 

card debt, and “rather than a legally enforceable document noting 

an existing debt that [defendant] owed to her, [plaintiff] simply 

handwrote an array of financial buzzwords on her credit card 

statement and tried to pass this off to [defendant] as valid legal 

tender for her credit card debt”) (emphasis in original). 

Additionally, to the extent Thomas seeks to assert a breach of 

contract claim under any of the sources cited in his complaint as 

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bases for federal question jurisdiction, he fails to state a 

plausible claim for relief under those authorities for the reasons 

previously discussed.

C. Dismissal With Prejudice. 

“Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, 

a [pro se] plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend 

the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with 

prejudice.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 

1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). However, leave to amend

may be denied if amendment would be futile. Bryant v. Dupree, 252 

F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Here, the 

undersigned concludes that the most glaring defects in Thomas’ 

complaint are substantive, such that amendment would be futile. 

More specifically, as the Court has explained previously,6 Thomas’

pleadings bear unmistakable hallmarks of the sovereign citizen 

movement and are plainly founded on redemptionist legal theories 

that have been uniformly rejected as a frivolous waste of court 

resources.7

6 See Thomas v. Servbank, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218115, at *17-23 

(S.D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2023) (explaining why the claims in Thomas’ 

pending actions bear hallmarks of discredited sovereign citizen 

and redemptionist legal theories and are frivolous).

7 Thomas filed several substantially similar actions in June 2023

that appear to be predicated on the same bizarre and frivolous 

legal theories presented in this action. See Thomas v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, No. 1:23-cv-00206-TFM-B (S.D. Ala. 2023); Thomas v. All In 

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Thomas’ complaint and other filings in this action are similar 

to many others “filed by pro se litigants filled with frivolous 

and nonsensical quasi-legal assertions and baseless theories in an 

attempt to avoid paying their debts and the consequences of their 

failure to pay their debts, in particular by alleging that they 

have satisfied their obligations through their own manufactured 

documents rather than legal forms of payment.” White v. RegularAscendant Holidays, 2023 WL 8797513, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 25, 

2023). The legal authorities Thomas cites and the documents he 

attaches to his complaint and response reflect that, like many 

other borrowers who have attempted to discharge their debts under 

a redemption theory by unilaterally issuing “bills of exchange” or 

similar manufactured documents, he did not tender valid payment 

“but rather a worthless piece of paper” when he “simply handwrote 

an array of financial buzzwords” on his loan correspondence “and 

tried to pass this off” to Family Security as valid payment for 

his auto loan. See Bryant, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 760; Harp, 2023 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139418, at *8-9, 2023 WL 5152625, at *3. 

Like the redemptionist theory itself, Thomas’ legal arguments 

are convoluted. (See Doc. 8). Nevertheless, it is readily 

Credit Union, No. 1:23-cv-00215-TFM-B (S.D. Ala. 2023); Thomas v. 

Capital One, No. 1:23-cv-00216-TFM-B (S.D. Ala. 2023); Thomas v. 

Servbank, No. 1:23-cv-00223-TFM-B (S.D. Ala. 2023); Thomas v. BMO 

Harris Bank, No. 1:23-cv-00224-TFM-B (S.D. Ala. 2023); Thomas v. 

Progressive, No. 1:23-cv-00225-TFM-B (S.D. Ala. 2023).

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apparent despite the nonsensical nature of Thomas’ arguments that 

the obscurely pled claims in his complaint are predicated on a 

variation of the redemptionist legal theory, which is 

fundamentally frivolous. Consequently, any amendments to Thomas’ 

complaint would be futile and non-curative. Thus, this action 

should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends

that Family Security’s motion to dismiss Thomas’ complaint (Doc. 

6) be GRANTED in part,8 and that this action be DISMISSED with

prejudice. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14) 

days of the date of service of this document, file specific written 

objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c). The parties should 

note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

8 Because the complaint is due to be dismissed with prejudice for 

failure to state a claim, Family Security’s motion is MOOT to the 

extent it seeks a more definite statement of Thomas’ claims.

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object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge 

on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual

and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period 

for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. 

In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review 

on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 

11th Cir. R. 3-1. 

In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 17th day of January, 2024. 

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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