Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00569/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00569-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDY GLENN SHERMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOE LIZARRAGA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 19-cv-0569 WBS KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (ECF 

No. 16.) For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed. 

In the section of the complaint form for identifying defendants, plaintiff lists the following 

defendants: Joe Lizarraga, A. Krouse, J. Lyman, C. Cassidy and C. Lamb. (Id. at 1-2.) 

However, in the discussion of his three claims, plaintiff identifies additional defendants. The 

undersigned herein discusses each of plaintiff’s claims and the additional defendants. 

Claim One

In claim one, plaintiff alleges violation of his right to due process and equal protection. 

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to obtain his federal rap sheet, criminal arrest history 

and Department of Defense service records in order to prepare for an initial parole consultation 

hearing with Nina Starr on November 4, 2018. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he also required these 

Case 2:19-cv-00569-WBS-KJN Document 18 Filed 02/13/20 Page 1 of 8
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documents in order to receive service related disability pension compensation. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges that, “The M.C.S.P. [Mule Creek State Prison] litigation office and law library is seriously 

inadequate, so M.C.S.P. Supervisor A. Krouse is named and is evidence through exhibits.” (Id.) 

The undersigned does not understand what plaintiff means by parole consultation hearing. 

In the second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was entitled to parole consideration as 

a youthful offender because he committed his controlling offense before he was 26 years old. (Id.

at 4.) It appears that the parole consultation hearing plaintiff refers to may be a hearing pursuant 

to People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), under which a prisoner may make a record of 

information relevant to his eventual youthful offender hearing.

If plaintiff is alleging that he was denied access to documents he wanted to present at a 

parole suitability hearing, he may be alleging a violation of his right to present his case for parole 

at his suitability hearing. See Greenholtz v. Inmates v. Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 

(1979). If plaintiff is alleging that he was denied access to documents he wanted to present at a 

Franklin hearing, the extent of plaintiff’s due process rights at a Franklin hearing, if any, are not 

clear.1 In any event, whether plaintiff is alleging that he was denied access to documents he 

wanted to present in support of parole at a parole suitability hearing or at a Franklin hearing, 

plaintiff has not linked defendant Krouse to the alleged deprivation. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . 

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Congress did not intend § 1983 

liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no 

 

1

 Whether plaintiff is alleging that he was denied his right to present his case at a parole 

suitability hearing or a Franklin hearing, either claim is properly brought in this civil rights action 

because a finding in plaintiff’s favor would not necessarily lead to plaintiff’s immediate release or 

earlier release from confinement. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 935 (9th Cir. 2016).

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affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy 

demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’ another 

to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally 

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) 

(no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 

438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal participation), cert. 

denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of 

official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of personal 

participation is insufficient).

While plaintiff suggests that the inadequacy of the MCSP law library contributed to his 

inability to obtain documents related to parole proceedings and his application for veterans’ 

benefits, plaintiff does not describe any specific actions by defendant Krouse which caused him 

not to obtain these documents. For this reason, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has not 

adequately linked defendant Krouse to the alleged deprivations. The undersigned also reviewed 

the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s second amended complaint. The undersigned cannot locate any 

exhibits supporting plaintiff’s claim that defendant Krouse interfered with plaintiff’s attempts to 

obtain the documents discussed above.2

 

2

 The undersigned observes that one of the exhibits attached to the second amended complaint 

undermines plaintiff’s claim that prison officials thwarted his attempt to obtain documents related 

to his attempt to obtain veterans’ benefits. In grievance MCSP 19-3435, submitted by plaintiff on 

August 1, 2019, plaintiff complained that prison officials were opening his mail, outside of his 

presence, related to his attempt to obtain veterans’ disability benefits. (ECF No. 16 at 25.) 

Plaintiff requested that his mail from the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland 

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Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that claim 

one be dismissed.

Claim Two

In claim two, plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment and his right to due 

process and equal protection. (ECF No. 16 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants Mendoza and 

Mailroom Supervisor Camp were derelict in their duties. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that these 

defendants opened his mail from the O.G.I.S.3on July 23, 2019, even though it was clearly 

marked “legal mail.” (Id.) Plaintiff cites grievance 19-3435 attached to the second amended 

complaint in support of this claim. (Id.) Plaintiff states that his grievance was then improperly 

screened out/rejected. (Id.) As his injury, plaintiff alleges that, “[d]ue to the parties involved this 

plaintiff was and still is hamstrung in preparing for and attempting to comply with any and all 

guidelines for an upcoming BPH (Board of Parole Hearing) initial consultation hearing...” (Id.)

In grievance 19-3435, plaintiff requested that prison officials treat as confidential his mail 

from the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Judge Advocate General, 

Naval Criminal Investigative Services, the Department of Veteran’s Affairs and Cal-Vet. (Id. at 

25.) Plaintiff also appeared to claim that prison officials had opened legal mail addressed to him 

from the National Personnel Records Center and Office of Government Information Services 

outside of his presence. (Id.)

The undersigned construes claim two as alleging that the opening of plaintiff’s mail from 

the agencies listed above, outside of plaintiff’s presence, violated plaintiff’s First Amendment 

right to receive legal mail. Prison inmates retain a First Amendment right to send and receive 

 

Security, Judge Advocate General, Naval Criminal Investigative Services, Departments of 

Veterans’ Affairs and Cal-Vet be treated as confidential. (Id.) Plaintiff also wrote in the

grievance that the Department of Defense had been attempting to provide him with assistance in 

obtaining his disability benefits through Cal-Vet. (Id.)

Grievance MCSP 19-3435 suggests that plaintiff was able to communicate with several 

agencies regarding his attempt to obtain veterans’ disability benefits. In this grievance, plaintiff 

did not complain that prison officials prevented him from obtaining documents from, or otherwise 

communicating with, the agencies identified in this grievance. 

3

 It appears that by O.G.I.S. plaintiff refers to the Office of Government Information Services.

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mail despite the “inordinately difficult undertaking” to exercise and protect that right within a 

prison setting. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78, 85 (1987)). As a general rule, a prison may adopt regulations that impinge on a 

prisoner’s constitutional rights if the regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

Under federal law, “legal mail” is narrowly defined as confidential correspondence 

between a prisoner and his attorney and is protected by the First Amendment. See Nordstrom v. 

Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Nordstrom I”). The Ninth Circuit “recognize[s] that 

prisoners have a protected First Amendment interest in having properly marked legal mail opened 

only in their presence.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017). In 

criminal cases, such correspondence is also protected by the Sixth Amendment. See

Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017) and cases cited therein. “[P]rison 

officials may open, but not read, incoming legal mail in the presence of the inmate.” Nordstrom 

v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Nordstrom II”) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 

U.S. 539, 577 (1974). “[T]he practice of requiring an inmate to be present when his legal mail is 

opened is a measure designed to prevent officials from reading the mail in the first place.” 

Nordstrom I, 762 F.3d at 910 (citing Wolff at 577).

“A prison may set a higher standard than that required by the First Amendment, but doing 

so does not elevate a violation of a prison policy into a constitutional claim.” Blaisdell v. Dep’t 

of Pub. Safety, 2014 WL 5581032, at *6 (D. Haw. Oct. 31, 2014) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir 1988)). Federal law requires only that incoming legal mail from a 

prisoner’s attorney, clearly marked as such be opened in the prisoner’s presence.

None of the alleged legal mail cited by plaintiff in the second amended complaint and 

grievance 19-3435 came from an attorney representing plaintiff. Therefore, prison officials did 

not violate the First Amendment by allegedly opening this mail outside of plaintiff’s presence. 

For this reason, plaintiff’s allegations in claim two do not state potentially cognizable First 

Amendment claims. Accordingly, claim two should be dismissed.

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Claim Three

In claim three, plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment and his rights to due 

process and equal protection. (ECF No. 16 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that law librarian technician L. 

Curran’s “machinations” continued on September 24, 2019, during another modified lockdown. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he (plaintiff) waited to be called to the law library for priority legal user 

(“PLU”) status as he had during the five previous lockdowns on August 20-23 and August 27 and 

August 28. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he had a court deadline on October 13, 2019. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on October 13, 2019, L. Curren told the floor officer that plaintiff had 

refused his PLU appointment. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his inability to attend the law library 

denied him access to the courts and an ability to prepare for his upcoming Board of Parole 

Hearings consultation hearing. (Id.)

The undersigned construes claim three to allege a violation of plaintiff’s right to access 

the courts. Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). To establish a violation of the right of access to the courts, a prisoner must 

allege facts sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or 

conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury 

as a result. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353-55; Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (to 

state an access to courts violation, plaintiff must describe the non-frivolous nature of the 

“underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost”). The prisoner must demonstrate that he 

has suffered or will imminently suffer actual injury. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348.

Plaintiff does not allege that a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence or 

conditions of confinement was frustrated or impeded as a result of his alleged inability to obtain 

law library access on the dates alleged. Plaintiff does not identify any specific case filed in court 

related to his conviction or concerning conditions of confinement that was injured as a result of 

inadequate law library access. The right to access the courts does not extend to parole 

consultation/suitability hearings. Even if it did, plaintiff does not specifically allege how his 

ability to represent himself at the parole consultation/suitability hearing was impacted by his 

alleged inadequate law library access. 

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For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has not stated a 

potentially cognizable claim for denial of the right to access the courts. Accordingly, claim three 

should be dismissed. 

Defendants Lizarraga, Lyman, Cassidy and Lamb

The second amended complaint contains no allegations against defendants Lizarraga, 

Lyman, Cassidy and Lamb. Because plaintiff has failed to link these defendants to the alleged 

deprivations, the undersigned recommends that these defendants be dismissed. 

Conclusion

Because plaintiff has not stated potentially cognizable claims, despite having been twice 

previously granted leave to amend, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed. It 

does not appear that plaintiff can cure the pleading defects discussed above.4

On October 11, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to file further 

briefing in support of the second amended complaint. (ECF No. 17.) This motion is denied as 

unnecessary.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time 

to file further briefing (ECF No. 17) is denied; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that 

 

4 The undersigned observes that attached to the second amended complaint as exhibits are 

grievances filed by plaintiff related to prison officials’ refusal to allow him to receive a magazine 

containing photographs of partially nude women. (See ECF No. 16 at 9.) The second amended 

complaint contains no claims regarding this matter. Moreover, neither the original or first 

amended complaints contained claims regarding this matter. Plaintiff is not entitled to change the 

nature of his suit by adding new, unrelated claims in an amended complaint. George v. Smith, 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the undersigned will not further address this 

matter. 

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failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 13, 2020

Sher569.56

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