Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01814/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01814-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 47:0605 Unlawful Reception Broadcast Signal i.e., Satellite - Theft of Satellite Communications

---

1

3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Julia C. Beltran, Clamatos and Cocos on 

Broadway,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT 

(Doc. No. 11)

Before the Court is Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc’s motion for default judgment 

against Defendants Julia Beltran and Clamatos and Cocos on Broadway. (Doc. No. 11.) 

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this copyright infringement suit against Defendants for broadcasting 

a boxing match that Plaintiff had exclusive distribution rights over. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 6, 

13.) Defendants advertised the match and received financial benefits by airing the boxing 

match. (Id. ¶¶ 13–15.) Yet, Defendants failed to gain proper authorization to air the match 

at their business, and instead gained access to the match by purchasing the heavily 

discounted subscription made for personal, at-home use—then aired that for customers. 

(Id. ¶¶ 21–26.) Plaintiff served both Defendants in October 2018, but Defendants failed to 

answer. (Docs. No. 5–7.) An entry of default was entered against Defendants in January 

Case 3:18-cv-01814-AJB-NLS Document 14 Filed 07/31/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 8
2

3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2019, and this motion followed. (Docs. No. 9–11.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court, following default by a 

defendant, to enter default judgment in a case. It is within the sound discretion of the district 

court to grant or deny an application for default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this determination, the Court considers the following 

factors, commonly referred to as the Eitel factors: (1) “the possibility of prejudice to the 

plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 

material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong 

policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). “In applying this discretionary 

standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. 

v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citation omitted).

Generally, once the court clerk enters default, the factual allegations of the complaint 

are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. 

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). However, although well-pleaded 

allegations in the complaint are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary 

facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not 

established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 

(9th Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 

4669.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings claims under (1) 47 U.S.C. § 605 for unauthorized publication of use 

of communications; (2) 47 U.S.C. § 533 for unauthorized reception of cable services; and 

(3) 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) for Copyright Infringement.

1. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff

There is a possibility of prejudice to a plaintiff when denying default judgment 

Case 3:18-cv-01814-AJB-NLS Document 14 Filed 07/31/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 8
3

3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

would leave them without an alternate recourse for recovery. See PepsiCo Inc. v. Cal. Sec. 

Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, Plaintiff would have no other 

recourse against Defendants if they cannot pursue these claims in Court. (Doc. No. 11-2 at 

8.) Further, Plaintiff could face future prejudice if other offenders feel emboldened by 

Plaintiff’s lack of enforcement on its copyrights. Thus, this factor favors granting default 

judgement.

2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of Claim

Under the second and third Eitel factors, the Court must examine whether the 

plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to establish and succeed on its claims. See Eitel, 782 F.2d 

at 1471. These factors require the complaint “state a claim on which the plaintiff may 

recover.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.

Title 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605 prohibit the unauthorized receipt of satellite signals. 

47 U.S.C. §§ 553(a), 605(a). To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove 

two elements: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements 

of the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 

(1991).

The Court finds the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint state a claim for violations 

of 47 U.S.C. § 553, § 605, and 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Plaintiff 

owned the rights to the boxing match and that Defendants intercepted, received, and 

exhibited the match. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 25, 27, 34, 36, 43.) Plaintiff also alleges it owned the 

copyright for the broadcast, (id. ¶¶ 40–41), and that Defendants never obtained authority 

to broadcast the match and thus infringed on Plaintiff’s rights, (id. ¶¶ 42–45). Because the 

Court presumes these statements to be true, TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917–18, Plaintiff 

has sufficiently alleged meritorious claims against defendants. Thus, these factors weigh 

in favor of granting a default. 

3. Sum of Money at Stake 

Here, Plaintiff first seeks a statutory penalty up to $110,000 under the first claim for 

a willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a), or a statutory penalty under the second claim of 

Case 3:18-cv-01814-AJB-NLS Document 14 Filed 07/31/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 8
4

3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

up to $60,000 for a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553. (Doc. No. 1 at 15.) (Id.) Second, Plaintiff 

requests statutory penalties under the third claim of up to $150,000 for violations of 17 

U.S.C. § 501(a). Finally, Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs under as 

allowed by 47 U.S.C. § 605(e), § 553(c)(2)(C), or 17 U.S.C. § 505. (Id.) 

“[T]he court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the 

seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. Default judgment 

is disfavored where the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable in light of 

defendant’s actions. See Totten v. Hurrell, No. 00–2718, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20259, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001) (stating that “the ‘sum of money at stake’ factor [under Eitel] 

is meant to focus on the size of the award requested, as courts are hesitant to enter default 

judgments where large sums of money are at stake,” and finding an award of $19,977.74 

not a “large money judgment” in today’s world). The Court considers Plaintiff’s

declarations, calculations, and other documentation of damages in determining if the 

amount at stake is reasonable. See Walters v. Shaw/Guehnemann Corp., No. C 03-04058 

WHA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11992, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2004) (finding plaintiff’s 

calculations of damages and attorney fees reasonable, based on plaintiff’s sworn 

declarations and pay stubs and other documentation submitted by plaintiffs). 

a. Award under 47 U.S.C. § 605 for Unauthorized Publication of Use of 

Communications

The Court will only analyze damages only under § 605, rather than § 553, as the 

Court finds liability under both but recovery is only permitted under one. Joe Hand 

Promotions, Inc. v. Streshly, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2009). Plaintiff elects § 605. 

(Doc. No. 11-2 at 18.)

Under 47 U.S.C. § 605(a), the Court may award a private party damages as set forth 

in § 605(e)(3)(C) as well as costs and attorney’s fees. § 605(e)(3)(B)(ii), (iii). Subsection 

C allows for either (1) the recovery of actual damages and any profits made; or (2) statutory 

damages between $1,000 and $10,000. Id. at (C)(i)(I), (II). If the Court finds the violation 

was willful and for direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain, the 

Case 3:18-cv-01814-AJB-NLS Document 14 Filed 07/31/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 8
5

3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court may increase the award up to $100,000. Id. at (C)(ii).

The guidelines for measuring statutory damages are not clearly delineated. The 

Ninth Circuit has mentioned consideration of the nature of the copyright and the 

circumstances of the infringement. Peer Intern. Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 

1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition, whether the act involves a single act of piracy and 

whether the Defendant is a repeat offender could be significant. Here, Plaintiff requests the 

maximum statutory fee, $10,000, as well as an additional $25,000 for willful violation.

Plaintiff argues to obtain rights to the broadcast, it would have cost Defendants 

$5,200. (Doc. No. 11-2 at 26.) To prove this, Plaintiff points to “Attorney’s Affidavit 

Exhibit ‘A’.” (Id.) However, the Court cannot locate such an exhibit with supporting 

information. For example, in a similar case with District Judge Bashant in which she 

granted Plaintiff’s default motion, the Court had the benefit of the attorney’s affidavit, 

which included an exhibit showing the rates it charged to broadcast the match. Joe Hand 

Promotions, Inc. v. Garcia Pacheco, Case No. 18-cv-1973-BAS-BGS, Doc. No. 12-2 at 9 

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2019). However, here, the exhibit and affidavit Plaintiff refers to was 

omitted—leaving Plaintiff’s claims in this case unsupported. Plaintiff also omits any 

information about Defendants’ establishment, whether they charged a cover fee, their 

maximum occupancy, how many people watched the broadcast, whether Defendants 

charged a premium for food or drinks, or whether Defendants were repeat offenders.

Without any information surrounding the details of the violations in this case, or 

whether Defendants profited from their violations, the Court awards $1,500. This amount 

reflects the statutory minimum, plus $500 to act as an deterrence from future violations. 

As Defendants admitted to the willful violation by failing to answer, the Court finds it 

appropriate to enhance the award. However again, without any information regarding the 

depth of Plaintiff’s injury, the Court awards enhanced damages in the amount of $500.

Thus, the total award is $2,000.

b. Award under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) for Copyright Infringement

Similarly, under 17 U.S.C. § 502(a)(1), the Court may award statutory damages in 

Case 3:18-cv-01814-AJB-NLS Document 14 Filed 07/31/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 8
6

3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

amount between $750 and $30,000 “as the court considers just.” And, if the Court finds 

the violation was done willfully, the Court may award an additional amount not to exceed 

$150,000. Assessing all the factors as discussed above, the Court awards an additional $750 

in statutory damages for copyright infringement and declines, in its discretion, to award 

any enhanced damages under this section.

c. Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Plaintiff requests $1,600 in costs and $332.50 in fees. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 6–7.) For 

costs, Plaintiff includes the $400 filing fee, a $450 service of process fee, and a $750 

auditing fee. (Id.) However, although Plaintiff states process service and auditing invoices 

are attached as exhibits, (id.), they are not included in Plaintiff’s motion. Nevertheless, 

Plaintiff’s counsel, in his declaration, stated he paid a $450 service of process fee. (Id.) 

Thus, the Court will award the fee.

Regarding Plaintiff’s request for auditing fees, although Plaintiff does not include 

the invoice for this service, Plaintiff explains they hired auditors to investigate 

establishments during the night of the boxing broadcast to determine if any were displaying 

the match without authorization. (Doc. No. 11-2 at 5–6.) For this, they submit a $750 fee. 

(Doc. No. 11-1 at 6–7.) However, these types of pre-filing investigative costs are not 

typically awarded by courts in this circuit. G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Aguilar, 

No. 18cv465-JM-BGS, 2018 WL 6445883, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). Thus, the Court 

declines granting this fee.

As to attorney’s fees, Plaintiff requests $332.50. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 6–7.) “In 

determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate 

prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, 

experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210–11 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Generally, the relevant community for determining the prevailing market rate 

is the forum in which the district court sits. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 

973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the Court finds counsel’s rate of $175.00 per hour 

reasonable for the district. Moreover, the Court finds 1.80 hours for $332.50 a reasonable 

Case 3:18-cv-01814-AJB-NLS Document 14 Filed 07/31/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 8
7

3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

amount based on work done thus far in the case. Thus, the Court awards full attorney’s 

fees.

4. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The next pertinent Eitel factor considers whether there are disputed material facts.

“Upon entry of default, all well pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except 

those relating to damages.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 117. Here, as analyzed above,

Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support its claims. Defendants failed to rebut them. 

Thus, there is no dispute of material facts and this factor favors the entry of default 

judgment against Defendants.

5. Excusable Neglect

There is no indication of excusable neglect. After being served with the complaint, 

Defendants simply failed to respond. Consequently, this factor weighs in favor of the entry 

of default judgment.

6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits

Although default judgment is disfavored, a decision on the merits is impractical, if 

not impossible, when the defendant takes no part in the action. Penpower Technology Ltd. 

v. S.P.C. Technology, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Given that Defendants

have failed to respond, the general preference for resolution on the merits is not equally 

applicable. See, e.g., id. In sum, the relevant considerations weigh in favor of entry of 

default judgment against Defendants. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED. 

(Doc. No. 11.) The Court ORDERS the Court Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff 

and against both Defendants jointly and severally in the total amount of $3,932.50, which 

includes:

(1) $2,000.00 for violations under 47 U.S.C. § 605, including $1,500 in statutory 

damages and $500 in enhanced damages; 

(2) $750.00 for violations under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a);

Case 3:18-cv-01814-AJB-NLS Document 14 Filed 07/31/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 8
8

3:18-cv-1814-AJB-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(3) $850.00 in costs; and,

(4) $332.50 in attorney’s fees,

The Clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 31, 2019

Case 3:18-cv-01814-AJB-NLS Document 14 Filed 07/31/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 8