Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02539/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02539-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Camillo Castillo Medrano III, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-02539 PHX GMS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Arizona Attorney General, )

Charles L. Ryan, Sheryl Watkins, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition seeking

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

November 28, 2012. Respondents filed a response to the petition

on March 27, 2013. See Doc. 12 & Doc. 13. A timely traverse or

reply to the response was due April 26, 2013. As of May 15,

2013, Petitioner had not filed a reply or traverse to the

response to his petition.

I Procedural History

Petitioner is currently serving prison sentences

imposed pursuant to his convictions on three counts of sexual

abuse, four counts of child molestation, and ten counts of

sexual conduct with a minor. An indictment returned June 13,

2003, in Maricopa County Superior Court charged Petitioner with

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17 counts; three counts of sexual abuse, class 3 felonies

(Counts 1, 3, 14), four counts of molestation of a child, class

2 felonies (Counts 2, 4, 11, 17), and 10 counts of sexual

conduct with a minor, class 2 felonies (Counts 5–10, 12–13,

15–16), all dangerous crimes against children. See Answer, Exh.

A. The victims of the alleged offenses, which occurred over a

period of more than 16 years, were Petitioner’s four daughters

and two step-daughters. 

At the conclusion of an eight-day trial, a jury found

Petitioner guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced

Petitioner to presumptive terms of five years imprisonment on

Counts 1, 3, and 14, to presumptive terms of seventeen years

imprisonment on Counts 2, 4, 11, and 17, and to presumptive

terms of twenty years imprisonment on Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,

12, 13, 15, and 16. Id., Exh. UU & Exh. VV. The trial court

ordered that all of the sentences be served consecutively. Id.,

Exh. VV. 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Petitioner argued that the trial

court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a directed

verdict on Count 11. Id., Exh. WW. On December 11, 2007, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. YY. On January 15, 2008, Petitioner

filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court,

which denied review on April 1, 2008. Id., Exh. ZZ & Exh. AAA.

On June 18, 2008, Petitioner initiated an action for

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

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Criminal Procedure. Petitioner alleged: “This petition is based

on newly evidence [sic] and possible ineffective assistance at

trial and on appeal.... Petitioner has to discuss these issues

with court appointed counsel prior to raising the facts of the

issues to be raised.” Id., Exh. BBB. Petitioner was appointed

counsel to represent him in his Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. CCC.

On November 12, 2008, counsel filed a notice of completion of

post-conviction review, in which she informed the state Superior

Court that she was not able to find “colorable claims to raise

in a petition for post conviction relief.” Id. Exh. DDD. On

December 29, 2009, having received no pro per petition and no

further request for an extension of the time allowed Petitioner

to file a pro per petition, the Superior Court sua sponte

dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding. Id., Exh. MMM. Petitioner

did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona Court of

Appeals.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner contends he

is entitled to relief because he was subjected to “a violation

of due process in connection with his criminal proceedings, and

seeks to reopen his state criminal case.” (Ground One)

Petitioner also asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

(Ground Two) Petitioner also alleges he was denied his right to

“a fair trial in violation of due process” and reiterates that

he was denied “effective assistance of counsel.” (Ground Three)

In his fourth claim for relief Petitioner asserts he was denied

his right to the effective assistance of counsel “regarding the

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issue of his competence based on the failure to appoint an

appropriate interpreter for him.” 

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s claims are barred

by the statute of limitations and that the claims are

procedurally barred.

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions begins to run on “the date on which the

judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled

to tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of

a “properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8,

121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000). 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on or about July

1, 2008, when the time expired for seeking certiorari in

Petitioner’s direct appeal. At that time Petitioner had a

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pending action for state post-conviction relief which tolled the

statute of limitations. The statute of limitations was tolled

until the completion of these post-conviction proceedings. On

December 29, 2009, the state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s

Rule 32 action. Petitioner had thirty days to seek review of

this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the

one-year statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas

action began to run on or about January 30, 2010, and expired on

or about January 30, 2011. Petitioner’s federal habeas action,

docketed November 27, 2012, was filed approximately 22 months

after the statute of limitations expired. 

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 769 (2012); Porter v. Ollison,

620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke,

556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme

Court eschewed a “mechanical rule” for determining extraordinary

circumstances, while endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case”

approach, drawing “upon decisions made in other similar cases

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for guidance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011;

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable

tolling is also available if the petitioner establishes their

actual innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v.

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

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that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

Furthermore, most alleged errors by a petitioner’s

counsel do not per se constitute an “extraordinary circumstance”

warranting equitable tolling. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564;

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959-61; Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047,

1058 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Randle v. Skolnik, 131

S. Ct. 474 (2010); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.

2009). It is not sufficient that counsel was negligent; only

representation that meets the extraordinary misconduct standard

can be a basis for applying equitable tolling. See Porter, 620

F.3d at 959. The United States Supreme Court concluded in

Holland that federal courts could equitably toll the statute of

limitations for filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

when a petitioner’s attorney failed to satisfy professional

standards of care. See 130 S. Ct. at 2563–64. The Supreme

Court held that “at least sometimes, professional misconduct ...

[could] amount to egregious behavior and create an extraordinary

circumstance that warrants equitable tolling.” Id. Equitable

tolling has been applied when an attorney's misconduct is

“sufficiently egregious,” i.e., for example when a privatelyretained attorney failed to prepare a petition and also kept the

petitioner’s case file so that it was “unrealistic” to expect

the petitioner to file pro se. See Porter, 620 F.3d at 959-60;

Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 800–01. See also Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d

1311, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008).

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. Petitioner does not assert that he is actually

innocent, accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of

the statute of limitations based on the theory of actual

innocence.

Petitioner presents no reply to Respondents’ assertion

that his habeas petition is barred by the statute of limitations

and does not offer the Court any reason why equitable tolling

might be warranted. Accordingly, the petition may be denied and

dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to timely file this action.

B. Exhaustion and procedural default

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state courts.

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

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489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

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any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to

remedies still available to the petitioner at the time they file

their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in

the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93, 126

S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the habeas

petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law,

the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural

default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at 92, 126 S.

Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

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F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010).

Petitioner did not “fairly present” any claims to

Arizona’s “highest court” in his Rule 32 action because, after

dismissal of his Rule 32 action by the trial court, Petitioner

did not appeal the trial court’s dismissal to the Arizona Court

of Appeals. Therefore, because the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of

claims bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to

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exhaust any unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has

exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously

fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct

appeal. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir.

2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See

also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

Petitioner did not present his federal habeas claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal. Petitioner

did not present his federal habeas claims to the “highest” state

trial court in a timely Rule 32 action. As stated supra,

Arizona’s Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding waiver and the

timeliness of claims have been found to be an adequate and

independent basis for affirming a petitioner’s convictions and

sentences and denying federal habeas relief. Accordingly,

unless Petitioner can establish cause for and prejudice from his

procedural default of his claims in the state courts, the Court

should not consider the merits of his claims.

Petitioner presents no reply to Respondents’ contention

that Petitioner did not exhaust his claims in the state courts.

Petitioner has not shown cause for nor prejudice arising from

his procedural default of his federal habeas claims in the state

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courts. Therefore, the Court should not consider the merits of

his claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final, allowing for

the tolling of the statute of limitations during his Rule 32

proceedings. Petitioner has not established that he is entitled

to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Petitioner’s habeas claims were not exhausted in the state

courts. Petitioner has not established cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his default of these claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Medrano’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

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of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 16th day of May, 2013.

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