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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11491

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

GEORGE BALDWIN HUTCHINSON, JR.,

G. BALDWIN: HOUSE OF HUTCHINSON:MAN, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

PEOPLE IN KEY ROLES OF OFFICES OF DIRECTOR AND 

CHIEF COUNSEL OF DEFENSE FINANCE AND 

ACCOUNTING SERVICE, 

DFAS, et al.,

Defendants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

TERESA (TERRI) MCKAY,

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11491

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) et’al Director, 

(Former), 

DWIGHT D. CREASY,

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) et’al Director, 

(Current), 

DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL (IRS) INTERNAL 

REVENUE SERVICE et’al BERKET ARAIA,

Operations Manager AUR/ Agent, 

AUDREY Y. DAVIS,

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) et’al Director: 

(Current), 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-03715-LMM

____________________

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

George Hutchinson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of his civil complaint in part for insufficient service 

of process and in part for failure to state a claim. After review, we 

affirm. 

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24-11491 Opinion of the Court 3

I. Background

On August 21, 2023, Hutchinson filed a pro se complaint, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, against the following 

parties in their official capacity: Audrey Davis, the current director 

of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (“DFAS”); Teresa 

McKay, the former director of DFAS; Dwight Creasy, Chief 

Counsel of DFAS; the IRS; Berket Araia, “Operations Manager 

AUR/Agent”; the Georgia Department of Revenue (“GDOR”); 

David Curry, GDOR revenue commissioner for the year 2020; 

Robyn Crittenden, GDOR revenue commissioner for the year 2021

or the current revenue commissioner;1 and GDOR “Director 

Audits Division Year 2020 Chester Cook.” Hutchinson generally 

alleged that while he was deployed with the military between 2009 

and 2013, his ex-wife made fraudulent child support claims to 

North Carolina Child Support Enforcement (“NCSE”), and NCSE 

took action on these claims. He alleged that upon his medical 

discharge from the military sometime between 2015–2017, he 

began investigating these financial discrepancies, and he reported 

the alleged violations of his rights under the Servicemembers Civil 

Relief Act to DFAS. 

Hutchinson further alleged that, in retaliation for his 

complaint, DFAS falsely reported him to the IRS for non-payment 

of deployment taxes for the year 2015. Accordingly, he generally 

asserted the following claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) violations 

1 Frank O’Connell was the revenue commissioner when Hutchinson filed the 

complaint. 

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of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act; (3) “retaliation and abuse 

of power” by DFAS and the IRS; (4) “intentional emotional harm”; 

and (5) “misuse of tax regulations.”2 He sought $10 million in 

damages and requested several injunctions. 

Hutchison subsequently filed with the court a document 

entitled “Notice of Certificates of Service Upon Said Defendants” 

for Crittenden, Cook, Curry, Araia, McKay, Creasy, and Davis. 

The document included for each defendant a copy of the 

summons; a proof of service form where Hutchinson checked a 

box stating that he “served the summons” but left the remainder of 

the form blank (no process server was listed); and a typed certificate 

of service, indicating that he served “the foregoing Summons” on 

each defendant electronically via CM/ECF3 and by U.S. mail, with

the sender’s portion of the certified mail receipts attached.4 

Defendants GDOR, Curry, Crittenden, O’Connell, and 

Cook (collectively, the GDOR defendants) filed a motion to 

2 Hutchinson appeared to acknowledge in his complaint that his claims were 

outside the applicable statute of limitations, but asserted that he was entitled 

to equitable tolling “due to [his] PTSD.” 

3 Although he was pro se, Hutchinson received permission to receive electronic 

notifications from the court’s electronic filing system. However, he was not 

granted permission to file via the electronic filing system. 

4 On September 14, 2023, Hutchinson filed a notice with the court stating that 

there were errors in the above mailings, which were remedied and re-served 

via U.S. certified mail on September 13. 

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24-11491 Opinion of the Court 5

dismiss, asserting, as relevant to this appeal, that the complaint 

failed to state a claim against them. 

Hutchinson in turn filed a motion for an extension of time 

to respond to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the GDOR 

defendants needed to amend their motion because, prior to its 

filing, his complaint on the court’s electronic docket was missing 

certain pages. 

The district court acknowledged that several pages of the 

complaint were in fact missing due to a docketing error, but it 

explained that the omission of those pages did not justify 

Hutchinson’s failure to file a timely response to the motion to 

dismiss. Further, the district court explained that it considered the 

omitted pages when evaluating GDOR’s motion to dismiss, and 

based on these pages additional briefing by GDOR was not 

necessary. Thus, the district court denied Hutchinson’s motion for 

an extension of time and granted the motion to dismiss. The court 

concluded that Hutchinson’s complaint failed to state a claim 

against any of the GDOR defendants because he generally alleged

in a single sentence that he ”suffered harm due to the actions and 

abuses of” the GDOR defendants. However, Hutchinson failed to 

state what the GDOR defendants’ actions were or connect those 

actions to a violation of law. The district court explained that such 

conclusory assertions were insufficient to state a claim. Moreover, 

the court concluded that “requiring [Hutchinson] to replead his 

allegations against these Defendants [was] likely to be unfruitful” 

because his complaint “seem[ed] primarily concerned with the 

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actions of [NCSE], the IRS, and DFAS” and “GDOR Defendants’ 

only involvement in [the] case appear[ed] to be the collection of 

state taxes.” Accordingly, the district court dismissed all claims

against the GDOR defendants. 

Hutchinson subsequently filed a “notice of objection to 

denial order further clarity on the administrative record,” which 

the district court construed as a motion for reconsideration, 

arguing that the court erred in granting the motion to dismiss 

because he stated a claim against GDOR “due to [GDOR’s] 

involvement with the IRS through the IRS’s Governmental 

Liaisons program.” Therefore, Hutchinson argued, the IRS’s 

actions “passed on to [GDOR]” when GDOR collected taxes, 

meaning that GDOR was subsumed in his claims against the IRS. 

Hutchinson argued that the GDOR also executed a lien against him 

based on the same activity that gave rise to the IRS lien. The 

district court denied the motion for reconsideration, noting that 

Hutchinson’s arguments relating to a connection between GDOR 

and the IRS did not provide grounds for reconsideration because 

Hutchinson did not allege these facts in his complaint. Moreover, 

the district court concluded that even if Hutchinson amended his 

complaint to include these facts, Hutchinson failed to show how 

these facts indicated that the GDOR defendants violated the law. 

In October 2023, Hutchinson filed a motion for default 

judgment against the remaining defendants based on their alleged 

failure to respond to the complaint. The district court denied this 

motion, noting that Hutchinson had to first move for entry of 

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default, but that, even if he moved for entry of default, he would 

not be entitled to an entry of default because the returns of service 

filed by Hutchinson did not show that any of the defendants were 

properly served under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 or Georgia 

law. 

Hutchinson then filed additional proof of service documents 

with the court. These documents indicated the following: a 

process server served defendants Davis and McKay at DFAS 

headquarters on November 13, and service was accepted by an 

employee named Nate Overby who stated that he would accept 

service, but there was “no guarantee it would get to the stated 

[person]”; Hutchinson personally served defendant Aria at the IRS 

office in Atlanta on November 16;5 and a process server served 

defendant Creasy at the DFAS office on November 15, and service 

was accepted by another employee named Cheryl Darby.

Hutchinson then moved to amend his complaint to add 

DFAS itself as a defendant and remove the GDOR Defendants “due

to [the court’s] recent ruling.”6 The district court granted 

Hutchinson’s motion. 

In January 2024, Hutchinson filed a motion for entry of 

default against DFAS, Davis, McKay, Creasy, IRS, and Aria based 

5 The proof of service indicated that Hutchinson left the summons with

another employee, Barbara Cannon. 

6 However, the amended complaint submitted by Hutchinson only removed 

the GDOR defendants and did not add DFAS as a party. 

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on their alleged failure to timely respond to the complaint. He 

simultaneously filed a motion for default judgment and permanent 

injunctive relief. 

The district court denied the motion for default judgment, 

concluding that it failed due to lack of proper service. The district 

court explained that because Hutchinson was suing officers of 

federal government agencies—McKay, Davis, Creasy, and Araia—

in their official capacities, he was required under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 4 to serve both the individual officers and the 

United States. And he had failed to properly serve the United States 

under Rule 4(i)(1). Additionally, the district court concluded that 

he had failed to serve the individual officers properly. Instead, 

Hutchinson’s affidavits of service indicated that he or a process 

server delivered the documents to unknown employees, including 

Nate Overby and Barbara Cannon. Accordingly, the district court 

ordered Hutchinson to file, within 21 days, either proof of proper 

service upon the United States and the individual defendants or a 

response showing cause for why the defendants should not be 

dismissed for failure to properly effect service of process. 

Hutchinson then filed a “motion for service,” stating that the 

United States Attorney General, the Ohio Attorney General,7 and 

7 It is unknown why Hutchinson served the Ohio Attorney General as he was 

not a named defendant nor did the complaint contain any allegations related 

to Ohio. 

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the Georgia Attorney General had been properly served by 

certified mail.8 

On March 4, 2024, the district court issued another order to 

show cause, noting that Hutchinson had not rectified his failure to 

effect service. First, the court explained that Hutchinson had still 

failed to offer proof that he served a complaint and copy of the 

summons upon each individually named defendant because his 

filings showed instead that other individuals with no apparent 

relation to the defendants were served. Second, the court noted 

that Hutchinson had failed to properly serve the United States 

because he had not served the United States Attorney for the 

Northern District of Georgia as required by Rule 4(i)(1)(A).

Instead, the record showed that he “sent a packet” to the Georgia 

Attorney General and an Ohio Attorney General. Furthermore, 

although Hutchinson attempted to comply with Rule 4(i)(1)(B) for 

serving the Attorney General of the United States, “it [was] unclear 

whether the packet contained a copy of [the] summons and [the] 

complaint” as Rule 4 required. Accordingly, the district court again 

ordered Hutchinson to file within 21 days either proof of proper 

service of the individual defendants and the United States or a 

response showing cause for why the action should not be dismissed 

for insufficient service of process. The court provided that failure 

8 Shortly thereafter, Hutchinson filed a “motion to amend to correct address 

on court record,” stating that he had provided the incorrect address for the 

“U.S. Attorney Office, Atlanta, GA” in his previous filing, but that the 

documents were in fact sent to the correct address and delivery was 

confirmed. 

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to do so might result in the dismissal of the action. Finally, the 

court noted that this was the second time it had ordered 

Hutchinson to file proper proof of service, and it was therefore “not 

inclined to grant [Hutchinson] additional time to properly serve 

[the] Defendants.” 

In response, Hutchinson filed a motion for leave to amend 

his complaint in order to list only the United States as the sole 

defendant. Hutchinson explained that DFAS and the IRS were 

“subcomponents of the Defendant United States” and permitting 

him to amend and clarify the parties would “cut[] down the 

confusion of actions in this case of effective service.” Hutchinson 

asserted that there was no requirement that he serve the 

individually named defendants in their individual capacities and 

that his service of the named defendants via process server to 

individuals who identified themselves as able to accept service was 

sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 4(i)(2). He also argued 

that the district court was overlooking his previously submitted 

certified mail receipts which showed that he sent certified mailings 

to all the initial defendants. Finally, Hutchinson argued that the 

United States Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia was 

properly served as reflected in his notice to the court that his prior 

filing had incorrectly listed the address for the Georgia Attorney 

General, but that he had corrected the address and confirmed 

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24-11491 Opinion of the Court 11

delivery of the documents he mailed to the United States Attorney 

for the Northern District of Georgia.9 

The district court dismissed Hutchinson’s amended 

complaint without prejudice for lack of proper service. The district 

court found that Hutchinson failed to serve the United States as 

required by Rule 4(i) because had had not delivered the relevant 

documents to the United States Attorney for the Northern District 

of Georgia or sent them by registered or certified mail to the civil 

process clerk at the United States attorney’s office. Additionally, 

he had “offered no proof” that the packet he sent to the United 

States Attorney General contained a copy of the summons and his 

complaint. And rather than offering proof that he had satisfied the 

requirements of Rule 4(i) for serving the United States, Hutchinson

had merely pointed to prior exhibits submitted before the court’s 

show cause order, which the court had already deemed insufficient 

to establish service. The district court then explained that even 

considering Hutchinson’s evidence that he served the individual 

defendants, it did not matter because he had still failed to serve the 

United States. Finally, the district court denied Hutchinson’s 

request to amend the complaint to remove the individual 

defendants and replace them with the United States as a single 

defendant, explaining that amending the complaint would “not 

solve the persistent service issues.” Accordingly, the district court 

9 In support, he attached a tracking printout of his certified mailings to the 

United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia and the 

individual defendants. 

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-11491

dismissed Hutchinson’s amended complaint without prejudice. 

Hutchinson, proceeding pro se, appealed.

II. Discussion

A. Whether the district court erred in granting the 

GDOR defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Hutchinson argues that the district court erred in granting 

the GDOR defendants’ motion to dismiss because it was based on 

an incomplete electronically docketed complaint “due to the 

court’s error.” 

“We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure 

to state a claim . . . .” Evanto v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 814 F.3d 1295, 

1297 (11th Cir. 2016).

Here, the district court did not err in ruling on the GDOR 

defendants’ motion to dismiss despite the clerical error in the 

docketing of Hutchinson’s complaint. The district court 

acknowledged that Hutchinson was correct that there were some 

pages of the complaint missing from the electronically docketed 

version, but it considered the missing pages in ruling on the motion 

to dismiss. Therefore, Hutchinson did not suffer any prejudice 

from the district court ruling on the motion to dismiss despite the 

court’s docketing error. Therefore, any error was harmless. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court must 

disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s 

substantial rights.”). 

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To the extent that Hutchinson argues that the district court 

erred in denying his motion for an extension of time to file a 

response to the motion to dismiss, we review the district court’s 

decision for an abuse of discretion. Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 

358 F.3d 859, 863 (11th Cir. 2004). Under this standard, “[t]he 

district court has a range of options; and so long as the district court 

does not commit a clear error in judgment, we will affirm the 

district court’s decision.” Id. The district court denied 

Hutchinson’s request for an extension of time to file a response 

because the only ground he provided was that the motion to 

dismiss was based on an incomplete docketing of his complaint. 

The district court explained that the fact that his complaint was 

missing pages on the court’s docket did not explain why 

Hutchinson could not have filed a timely response to the motion 

to dismiss. And Hutchinson has failed to explain why he suffered 

prejudice from not being able to file a response. Under the 

circumstances, we conclude that this was not an abuse of discretion 

because it was within the district court’s range of options.10 

10 Hutchinson asserts in a conclusory fashion that GDOR’s “actions and 

communications with the IRS make [it] a proper party to the case,” but he 

does not provide any authority to support this contention. Similarly, he does 

not explain how the allegations in his complaint stated a claim against the 

GDOR defendants. Accordingly, we conclude that he has abandoned any

challenge to the district court’s determination that he failed to state a claim 

against the GDOR defendants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not 

briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” (internal citation 

omitted)); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 

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B. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the 

amended complaint without prejudice for lack of 

service

Hutchinson argues that the district court erred in dismissing

without prejudice his amended complaint for lack of proper service 

because he complied with the requirements of Rule 4(i). 

Alternatively, he argues that, at a minimum, he substantially 

complied with the requirements of Rule 4(i) and that the district 

court’s “strict interpretation of the service requirements 

overlooked [his] good-faith efforts to serve all parties properly.” 

We generally review a district court’s interpretation of 

Rule 4 de novo, and we review the dismissal of a complaint without 

prejudice for failing to serve a defendant for abuse of discretion. 

Lepone–Dempsey v. Carroll Cnty. Comm’rs, 476 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th 

Cir. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court 

commits a clear error of judgment, fails to follow the proper legal 

standard or process for making a determination, or relies on clearly 

erroneous findings of fact.” Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 

846 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, dismissals 

without prejudice are rarely abuses of discretion because parties 

2014) (“We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either 

makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner 

without supporting arguments and authority.”); Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 

F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that, although we liberally 

construe pro se pleadings, the Court will not “serve as de facto counsel for a 

party” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an 

action” (quotations omitted)). 

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can re-file their complaints. See Dynes v. Army Air Force Exch. Serv., 

720 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983).

“Proper service of process is a jurisdictional prerequisite.”

Fuqua v. Turner, 996 F.3d 1140, 1154 (11th Cir. 2021). When a 

plaintiff sues a federal government official in his or her individual 

capacity, the plaintiff must serve both the individual officer and the 

United States. Id. at 1155; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2) (“To serve 

a United States agency or corporation, or a United States officer or 

employee sued only in an official capacity, a party must serve the 

United States and also send a copy of the summons and of the 

complaint by registered or certified mail to the agency, 

corporation, officer, or employee.”). Pursuant to Rule 4, in order 

to serve the United States, the plaintiff must:

(A)(i) deliver a copy of the summons and of the 

complaint to the United States attorney for the 

district where the action is brought—or to an assistant 

United States attorney or clerical employee whom the 

United States attorney designates in a writing filed 

with the court clerk—or

(ii) send a copy of each by registered or 

certified mail to the civil-process clerk at the 

United States attorney’s office;

(B) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail 

to the Attorney General of the United States at 

Washington, D.C.; and

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(C) if the action challenges an order of a nonparty 

agency or officer of the United States, send a copy of 

each by registered or certified mail to the agency or 

officer.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1). “Unless service is waived, proof of service 

must be made to the court. Except for service by a United States 

marshal or deputy marshal, proof must be by the server’s affidavit.” 

Id. R. 4(l)(1).

“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the 

complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice 

to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against 

the defendant or order that service be made within a specified 

time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “[I]f the plaintiff shows good cause for 

the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an 

appropriate period.” Id. Good cause for a failure to effect service 

exists only “when some outside factor, such as reliance on faulty 

advice, rather than inadvertence or negligence, prevented service.” 

Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1281 (alteration adopted) (quotations 

omitted). Absent a showing of good cause, the district court has 

the discretion to extend the time for service and must consider 

whether any other circumstances warrant an extension of time 

based on the facts of the case. Id. at 1282. Only after considering 

whether any such factors exist, may the district court exercise its 

discretion and either dismiss the case without prejudice or direct 

that service be effected within a specified time. Id.

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Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

dismissing Hutchinson’s complaint for failure to properly serve the 

defendants. It is undisputed that the individual defendants named 

in the suit were officers of federal agencies and that Hutchinson 

sued them in their official capacity. Therefore, Hutchinson was 

required to serve both the individual officers and the United States. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2). We note that the district court erred in 

concluding that Hutchinson had failed to serve the United States 

Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia as required by Rule 

4(i)(1)(A).11 Nevertheless, that error does not warrant reversal 

because, as the district court found, there is no evidence that 

Hutchinson sent a copy of the summons and complaint to the 

United States Attorney General in Washington, D.C. as required 

by Rule 4(i)(1)(B). 

Specifically, as proof of service on the United States Attorney 

General, Hutchinson filed a “certificate of service” indicating that 

he served the Attorney General a document entitled “Change of 

Action for Entry of Default on the Administrative Record.” As part 

11 Hutchinson’s initial proof of service indicated that he served the Georgia 

Attorney General, but he shortly thereafter filed a motion to amend his 

notification of service to correct the name and address to the United States 

Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia. Although the district court 

stated that it considered the updated address, it still found that Hutchinson 

had in fact served the Georgia Attorney General. This finding was clearly 

erroneous because the updated address provided by Hutchinson was the 

correct address for the United States Attorney for the Northern District of 

Georgia, and Hutchinson offered proof that his certified mailing was delivered 

to the correct address. 

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of this proof of service filing, Hutchinson also submitted a letter 

dated February 20, 2024, which stated as follows: 

This letter serves to notify you of the lawsuit I filed 

on August 21, 2023, Case No. 1:23-cv-03715-LMM, in 

the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

Georgia. This action arises from multiple verified 

SCRA violations originating in North Carolina, 

leading to my issuance of a cease and desist, met with 

retaliation by DFAS leadership and counsel, 

culminating in false reporting to the IRS in 2015. This 

reporting violated wartime privileges and resulted in 

a wrongful lien against me, disregarding the Armed 

Forces Tax Guide for exiting a combat zone.

Despite adherence to Rule 4 for service, it seems a 

copy may not have been furnished to your offices, 

prompting this communication to ensure awareness 

and facilitate possible intervention.

I seek remedy, compensation, and the removal of the 

lien unjustly placed upon me and my person by the 

IRS. This matter demands prompt attention to 

address and resolve the violations at hand.

I appreciate your consideration and look forward to 

your prompt response or non-participation to

amicably resolve these issues.

The letter did not mention the summons or a copy of the 

complaint. Thus, the district court explained that it was unclear 

whether Hutchinson actually sent a copy of the summons and the 

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complaint. The court then gave Hutchinson 21 days to “prove that 

he served copies of the summons and his complaint—not his own 

form of notice—on the United States Attorney General.” Yet 

Hutchinson’s later filing made no attempt to address this aspect of 

the show cause order. Based on these circumstances, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint 

without prejudice for failing to effect proper service.12 

Finally, Hutchinson argues that the service deficiencies in 

his case should be excused because he was in substantial 

compliance with Rule 4. Hutchinson is correct that “[w]e have 

12 Although the district court did not expressly discuss whether good cause or 

some other factor warranted an extension of time for service of process, we 

conclude that the district court implicitly conducted such an analysis. See 

Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Georgia Military College, 125 F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th 

Cir.1997) (explaining that “[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to 

apply it in making their decisions”). Although Hutchinson never offered any 

good cause for extending the time for service in his filings, the district court 

gave him multiple chances to cure these deficiencies and effect proper service. 

For instance, the district court initially notified Hutchinson that, under the 90-

day window provided for in Rule 4(m), Hutchinson had until November 23, 

2023, to effect service of process and provide proof of service. As of February 

2024, Hutchinson had failed to do so, and the district court again gave him 

additional time to provide proof of proper service. Then, almost a month 

later, in March 2024, the district court again notified Hutchinson of the 

problems with service and provided him additional time to correct the 

deficiencies, while also warning him that the court was not inclined to grant 

further additional time to cure the defects and that failure to comply could 

result in dismissal. These circumstances demonstrate that the district court 

considered whether good cause was shown or whether other circumstances 

existed that warranted extending the time for service of process, which is all 

that is required. See Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1282.

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sometimes excused minor service defects when they have neither 

prejudiced the defendant nor deprived him of notice.” Fuqua, 996 

F.3d at 1156. However, we have declined to apply this principle in 

the face of significant service defects, such as a complete failure to 

serve a necessary party. See id. Here, as in Fuqua, the record 

supports the conclusion that Hutchinson failed to ensure that the 

“Attorney General received a copy of the summons and complaint 

and therefore failed to serve a necessary entity—the United States.” 

Id. This defect is not a minor one that can be overlooked. Thus, 

the substantial compliance principle does not apply.

Accordingly, for the above reasons, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

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