Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00089/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00089-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD OLANGO ABUKA,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-00089-BAS-NLS

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

STRIKE (ECF No. 16); AND

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION 

TO DISMISS (ECF No. 17)

v.

CITY OF EL CAJON, et al.,

Defendants.

Richard Abuka is the father of Alfred Olango, shot and killed by El Cajon 

Police Officer Richard Gonsalves. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 10, ECF 

No. 6.) Mr. Abuka has filed a two count Complaint against both Officer Gonsalves 

and the City of El Cajon (“City”), alleging a violation of his right to substantive due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment by the unjustified shooting of his son and 

interference with his familial relationship and freedom of association by Officer 

Gonsalves’s use of excessive force and failure to intervene or provide medical 

treatment. (FAC.) Both counts are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The City and Officer Gonsalves move both to strike any references to 

negligence on the part of Officer Gonsalves (ECF No. 16) and to dismiss the FAC 

for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 17). The 

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Court finds these motions suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 

without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1).

For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Motion to Strike (ECF 

No. 16) and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 17). The Court dismisses the City from the Complaint, but denies Officer 

Gonsalves’s Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

According to the FAC, on September 27, 2016, Mr. Olango’s sister called 911 

three times seeking emergency medical help for her brother “who she believed was 

experiencing a mental breakdown” at a shopping center in El Cajon. (FAC ¶ 19.) 

Fifty minutes after her telephone calls, El Cajon Police Officer Richard Gonsalves 

arrived at the shopping center. (FAC ¶ 20.) Within one minute of his arrival, Officer 

Gonsalves shot Mr. Olango four times, killing him. (Id.) Mr. Olango was unarmed. 

(Id.) Officer Gonsalves provided no advance warning to Mr. Olango before shooting. 

(FAC ¶ 24.)

The FAC alleges that, before arriving at the scene, Officer Gonsalves knew 

Mr. Olango was having a mental crisis. (FAC ¶ 21.) Officer Gonsalves allegedly 

was not investigating a crime at the time, and he knew Mr. Olango had not threatened 

anyone with harm. (Id.) Nonetheless, Officer Gonsalves “confronted, chased, and 

cornered” Mr. Olango. (Id.) 

Mr. Abuka alleges Officer Gonsalves acted negligently in his pre-shooting 

tactical conduct and decision-making by escalating to deadly force without warning, 

failing to wait for the PERT (Psychiatric Emergency Response Team) to arrive before 

confronting Mr. Olango, and not attempting non-lethal alternatives. (FAC ¶ 23.) 

According to the allegations, Mr. Olango posed no threat to Officer Gonsalves, 

and Officer Gonsalves knew Mr. Olango posed no threat. (FAC ¶ 24.) Finally, the 

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FAC alleges that Officer Gonsalves “failed to request medical aid for [Mr. Olango]

as he lay dying on the ground as the result of multiple bullet wounds.” (Id.) 

With respect to the City, Mr. Abuka alleges the City made “dilatory dispatch 

decisions,” failed to train and supervise Officer Gonsalves, and negligently retained 

Officer Gonsalves as an officer “despite his demonstrated unfitness.” (FAC ¶ 27.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe 

them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, 

rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement 

to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (alteration in original). A court need 

not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite the deference 

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the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume 

that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants 

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. 

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 

(1983).

B. Motion to Strike

Pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may 

strike from a complaint any matter that is “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The function of a 12(f) motion is to avoid the 

expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by 

dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 

1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins, Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 

(9th Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994)).

“‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to 

the claim for relief.” Id. “‘Impertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not 

pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Id. 

“Rule 12(f) motions are generally disfavored” partly “because of the limited 

importance of pleadings in federal practice.” Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 

1450, 1478 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

When the court considers a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, 

the court must ask first, assuming all facts in the complaint are true and taking these 

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do the alleged facts show the officer’s 

conduct violated a constitutional right? Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th

Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 

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__U.S.__, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017). “If not, then ‘there is no necessity for further 

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.’ If so, then, ‘the next sequential step is to 

ask whether the right was clearly established.’ A constitutional right is clearly 

established when, ‘on a favorable view of the [allegations],’ ‘it would be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id.

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). Thus, this Court looks first at 

the alleged constitutional violation.

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants’ conduct violated his right to substantive 

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. A parent has a Fourteenth 

Amendment right to the companionship and society of his son. Curnow v. Ridgecrest 

Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991). “Official conduct that ‘shocks the 

conscience’ in depriving [a parent] of that interest is cognizable as a violation of due 

process.” Hayes v. County of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010)). “In determining 

whether excessive force shocks the conscience, the Court must first ask ‘whether the 

circumstances are such that actual deliberation [by the officer] is practical.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 

2008)). “Where actual deliberation is practical, then an officer’s ‘deliberate 

indifference’ may suffice to shock the conscience. On the other hand, where a law 

enforcement officer makes a snap judgment because of an escalating situation, his 

conduct may be found to shock the conscience only if he acts with a purpose to harm 

unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” Id.; see also Moreland v. Las 

Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting the controlling 

question is whether the officer acted with a purpose to harm that was unrelated to his 

attempt to stop the individual from endangering others). 

Thus, an officer using deadly force to support a legitimate law enforcement 

objective does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. However, an officer using 

force that is (i) meant to teach a suspect a lesson, (ii) committed to “get even” with 

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the suspect, or (iii) used in the “rare situations where the nature of an officer’s 

deliberate physical contact is such that a reasonable factfinder would conclude the 

officer intended to harm, terrorize or kill” does violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140-41 (quoting Davis v. Township of Hillside, 190 F.3d 167, 

172-74 (3d Cir. 1999)); Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d at 554 (“[A] purpose to harm 

might be found where an officer uses force to bully a suspect or get even.”).

For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes that the decision 

by Officer Gonsalves to shoot Mr. Olango, which according to the FAC was made 

within one minute of his reaching the scene, was a snap judgment that was the result 

of an escalating situation. Therefore, the Court looks at whether the FAC makes 

allegations that support a conclusion that Officer Gonsalves acted with a purpose to 

harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. 

Assuming the allegations in the FAC are true, Plaintiff claims that at the time 

Officer Gonsalves shot and killed Mr. Olango, he knew: (1) Mr. Olango was having 

a mental breakdown (FAC ¶ 21); (2) Mr. Olango had not committed any crime (id.); 

(3) Mr. Olango had not threatened anyone (id.); and (4) Mr. Olango posed no threat 

to Officer Gonsalves (FAC ¶ 24). Finally, the FAC alleges that after shooting Mr. 

Olango, Officer Gonsalves “failed to request medical aid for [Mr. Olango] as he lay 

dying on the ground as the result of multiple bullet wounds.” (Id.) Taking these 

allegations in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as the Court must do at this stage 

of the proceedings, the Court concludes these allegations are sufficient to support the 

claim that Officer Gonsalves acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate 

law enforcement objectives, and hence his conduct “shocked the conscience” and 

violated a constitutional right.

Under part two of the qualified immunity analysis, the Court must determine 

whether the right that was violated was clearly established at the time it was violated. 

See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (“Qualified immunity gives 

government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments 

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about open legal questions.”). The court must determine whether the rule was 

sufficiently clear that “every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what 

he is doing violates that right.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 442 (9th Cir. 

2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743). “[E]xisting precedent must 

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly,

__U.S.__, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,

__U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)). “[T]he clearly established law must be 

‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (citing 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

Although it is in the Fourth Amendment context, reviewing case law on 

constitutional violations resulting from an officer shooting a suspect is helpful in 

evaluating whether a reasonable officer would have understood that he violated a 

clearly established right. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court held 

definitively, “[a] police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by 

shooting him dead.” 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). The Court further articulated, “[t]he use 

of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the 

circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.” Id. Furthermore, “[w]here the 

suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm 

resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do 

so.” Id. 

The Court finds the allegations in the FAC, as articulated above, are sufficient 

to conclude that—at the time Officer Gonsalves shot and killed Mr. Olango—it was 

clearly established that someone who is unarmed, is not a threat to anyone, and had 

not committed any crime has the right not to be shot and killed. The Court 

distinguishes the recent Supreme Court case of County of Los Angeles v. Mendez,

which held that an officer may not be liable for an otherwise reasonable use of force 

where the officer intentionally or recklessly provoked the violent confrontation, 

because Plaintiff in this case clearly articulates an unreasonable use of force that 

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violates the Fourteenth Amendment without any reference to the old Ninth Circuit 

“provocation rule.” See 137 S. Ct. at 1547-48.

Hence, assuming everything in the FAC is true and drawing all reasonable 

conclusions in favor of Plaintiff, the Court concludes Plaintiff has sufficient 

allegations to meet the qualified immunity burden at this stage of the proceedings.

B. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike any reference to the fact that Officer Gonsalves’s

pre-shooting conduct may have been negligent. (ECF No. 16.) In the FAC, Plaintiff 

alleges that Officer Gonsalves acted negligently in his pre-shooting tactical conduct 

and decision-making by escalating to deadly force without warning, failing to wait 

for the PERT (Psychiatric Emergency Response Team) to arrive before confronting 

Olango, and not attempting non-lethal alternatives. (FAC ¶ 23.) 

The fact that an officer’s conduct, leading up to a deadly confrontation, was 

imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless is not sufficient to avoid dismissal where 

the officer’s conduct at the time of the shooting does not otherwise shock the 

conscience. George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 839, n.14 (9th Cir. 2013); see also City 

& County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, __U.S.__, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1771 (2015) 

(alleging merely bad tactics that result in a deadly confrontation that could have been 

avoided is insufficient) (citing Billington, 292 F.3d at 1188). Moreover, looking at 

pre-shooting tactics does risk “the sort of hindsight bias the Supreme Court has 

forbidden.” Id. Furthermore, the Court recognizes that in Mendez, the Supreme 

Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule” that an officer may be liable for 

an otherwise reasonable use of force where the officer intentionally or recklessly 

provoked the violent confrontation by an act that was itself an independent Fourth 

Amendment violation. 137 S. Ct. at 1547-48.

Nonetheless, as discussed above, whether Officer Gonsalves acted with a 

purpose to harm unrelated to any law enforcement objective will be a key factual 

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analysis in this case. His pre-shooting conduct may be relevant to support a claim 

that Officer Gonsalves was not acting to fulfill a law enforcement objective, but 

instead was trying to teach the suspect a lesson, bullying him, attempting to get even 

with him, or intending to harm, terrorize, or kill him. See Davis, 190 F.3d at 173;

Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d at 554.

Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion to Strike while noting that the fact 

that Officer Gonsalves may have acted negligently will be insufficient on its own to 

support the alleged constitutional violation.

C. Monell Liability

A municipality generally is not liable for the unconstitutional conduct of its 

employees. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

“[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself

causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 

385 (1989) (citing Monell) (emphasis in original). “It is only when the execution of 

the government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the municipality may 

be held liable under § 1983.” Id. (quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 

(1987)) (internal quotations omitted).

Thus, under Monell, in order to allege a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a 

plaintiff must allege: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the 

municipality had a policy that amounted to deliberate indifference of plaintiff’s 

constitutional right; and (3) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional 

violation that injured the plaintiff. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 

438 (9th Cir. 1997)).

The failure of a municipality to train its employees “may amount to a policy 

of deliberate indifference” such that liability under Monell has been sufficiently 

alleged “if the need to train was obvious and the failure to do so made a violation of 

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constitutional rights likely.” Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at

390). “Similarly, a failure to supervise that is ‘sufficiently inadequate’ may amount 

to ‘deliberate indifference.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 

1235 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Mere negligence in training or supervision, however,” is 

insufficient. Id. 

The City argues that the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to amount to 

municipal liability under Monell. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff fails to address this 

argument in his Opposition (ECF No. 19), and the Court could construe this silence 

as “abandonment of the claim and concession that the claim be dismissed.” Quick 

Korner Mkt. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 180 F. Supp. 3d 683, n.12 (S.D. Cal. 2016) 

(citing Conservation Force v. Salazar, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2009)).

However, even without construing the lack of reply as a concession, the 

allegations in the FAC are insufficient to amount to municipal liability under Monell. 

First, the Plaintiff alleges that the City made “dilatory dispatch decisions.” (FAC ¶

27.) Presumably this resulted in the alleged fifty minute delay between the time Mr. 

Olango’s sister called 911 and the time a police officer responded. However, Plaintiff 

fails to allege how this delay was a policy of “deliberate indifference,” as opposed to 

the negligence of an employee. Furthermore, the FAC does not explain how this 

alleged delay was the moving force behind or cause of the constitutional violation 

(the later shooting of Mr. Olango by Officer Gonsalves). 

Next, Plaintiff alleges the City failed to train and supervise Officer Gonsalves. 

(FAC ¶ 27.) This allegation amounts to little more than a “label and conclusion” 

found insufficient under Twombly. See 550 U.S. at 555. To succeed at the pleading 

stage, Plaintiff must allege facts that support this largely legal conclusion.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the City negligently retained Officer Gonsalves 

despite his “demonstrated unfitness.” (FAC ¶ 27.) Again, this conclusory statement 

is devoid of factual support. Furthermore, simple negligence on the part of the City 

is insufficient. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. 

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Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting a theory that the City is liable for the 

acts of Officer Gonsalves or any other city employee. Hence, the Court GRANTS

the City’s Motion to Dismiss on this ground. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 16). The Court 

GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 17), denying Officer Gonsalves’s Motion to Dismiss, but granting the 

City’s Motion to Dismiss. 

As a general rule, a court freely grants leave to amend a complaint that has 

been dismissed, unless “the court determines that the allegation of other facts 

consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 

1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Hence, the Court gives Plaintiff leave to amend the FAC. 

Any amended Complaint must be filed by September 8, 2017.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 25, 2017

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