Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00548/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00548-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maria Jesus Rios,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn,

Respondent.

No. CV-18-00548-TUC-FRZ (MSA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

This matter is on referral pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Pending before the Court is Petitioner Maria Jesus Rios’s pro se petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondent David Shinn filed an

answer, to which Petitioner has replied. (Docs. 30, 33.) For the following reasons, the 

Court recommends that the petition be denied.

I. Background

On March 19, 2015, a jury convicted Petitioner of possession of marijuana for sale, 

possession of drug paraphernalia, and second-degree money laundering. (Doc. 21 at 4, 

18.)1 The Arizona Court of Appeals described the events leading up to Petitioner’s 

convictions as follows:

In February 2014, Rios (who was on release for a pending felony charge at 

the time) took a car that was for sale for a test drive but did not return; the 

car’s owner later saw his car in a locked yard at Rios’s residence and 

contacted police. Police officers found over two hundred pounds of burlap1 Record citations refer to the page numbers electronically generated by the Court’s 

filing system, not to the original page numbers in the documents cited.

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wrapped marijuana in the car and found in the house approximately $18,000 

in cash, “dozens and dozens if not hundreds of receipts” for cash purchases, 

as well as drug ledgers.

(Id. at 4–5.)

Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied relief. (Id. at 3–

5.) She did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id. at 35.) In September 

2017, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”).2 (Id. at 48–54.) 

On January 10, 2018, the PCR court denied Petitioner’s claims as without merit. (Doc. 22 

at 3–10.) Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied relief in a 

memorandum decision issued on July 24, 2018. (Id. at 12–14, 24–27.)

On November 13, 2018, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition, raising four 

claims. (Doc. 1 at 79–82.) On October 25, 2019, the district court adopted a 

recommendation from this Court to deny two of Petitioner’s claims and partially deny a 

third claim. (Docs. 24, 28.) Remaining are Petitioner’s claims that trial counsel was 

ineffective for (1) failing to call Lazaro Rios (Petitioner’s brother) as a trial witness and (2)

failing to file a motion to suppress statements made by Petitioner in an unrelated criminal 

investigation.

II. Legal Standards

A. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Because Petitioner filed her federal habeas petition after April 24, 1996, the petition 

is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 

See Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014).

Under AEDPA, the Court may not grant relief on any claim decided on the merits 

in state court unless the decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). A 

2 Petitioner proceeded pro se because her court-appointed attorney had identified no 

grounds for relief. (Doc. 21 at 45–46.)

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decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it applies a rule that contradicts the 

law as set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it reaches a result different from a Supreme 

Court case that is materially indistinguishable on the facts. Tamplin v. Muniz, 894 F.3d 

1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). A 

decision unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it “identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies 

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 1083 (quoting Mann v. Ryan, 828 

F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). A decision is based on an unreasonable 

determination of fact if “an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate 

review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” Id.

(quoting Murray, 745 F.3d at 999).

In determining whether the strictures of § 2254(d) have been satisfied, federal courts 

look to the last reasoned state-court decision. Martinez v. Cate, 903 F.3d 982, 991 (9th 

Cir. 2018).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the standard 

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner 

asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance 

and prejudice. Id. at 687. To establish deficient performance, the petitioner “must show 

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 

688. In considering whether counsel was deficient, federal courts “must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Id. at 689. To establish prejudice, the petitioner “must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Review of ineffective-assistance claims under § 2254(d) is “doubly deferential” 

because “Strickland instructs courts to review a defense counsel’s effectiveness with great 

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deference, and AEDPA requires federal courts to defer to the state court’s decision unless 

its application of Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable.” Cheney v. 

Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Renico 

v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)).

III. Discussion

A. Ground One: Failure to Present Witness

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Lazaro Rios as

a trial witness. (Doc. 1 at 79.) According to Petitioner, Lazaro would have testified that 

he was the last person in the vehicle where the marijuana was found, that there was no 

marijuana in the vehicle when he left it, and that he never gave Petitioner the vehicle key. 

(Id.) This testimony, Petitioner asserts, would have created reasonable doubt about when 

the marijuana was placed in the vehicle. (Id.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the PCR court’s rationale for denying this 

claim, making the PCR court’s decision the last reasoned state-court decision. (Doc. 22 at 

26.) The PCR court found it significant that the prosecutor had interviewed Lazaro prior 

to trial, with Petitioner’s trial counsel present. (Id. at 9.) The PCR court found that counsel 

could have determined, based on Lazaro’s pretrial interview, that Lazaro’s testimony 

would have done more harm than good if presented at trial. (Id. at 8–9.) As such, the PCR 

court concluded, Petitioner had not overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s decision 

was reasonable trial strategy. (Id. at 9.)

This was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. As Respondent 

points out, Lazaro’s testimony would not have exculpated Petitioner. Lazaro told 

investigators that he last saw the car at 2:30 p.m., and that he did not know what happened 

with his sister or the car for the rest of the evening. (Doc. 1 at 63.) Lazaro also told 

investigators that he left the only car key in the ignition. (Id. at 62–63.) At trial, the car’s 

owner testified that he found his car at approximately 7:30 p.m. that same day, after he

spotted Petitioner in public and followed her home. (Doc. 31 at 4.) This testimony 

indicates that Petitioner had unrestricted access to the car for several hours after Lazaro 

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last saw it.

Although not directly inculpatory, Lazaro’s testimony is far from exculpatory; it

shows that Petitioner had ample opportunity to load the marijuana into the car. Because 

trial counsel was aware of what Lazaro would say if called to testify, the PCR court could 

reasonably conclude that trial counsel’s decision to exclude Lazaro was reasonable trial

strategy. See Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that trial 

counsel was not deficient for failing to call defendant’s family members where counsel 

“was aware . . . of the substance of the family members’ testimony, but simply opted not 

to call them”). Consequently, Petitioner’s first claim should be denied.

B. Ground Three: Admission of Statements

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress 

statements made by her in an unrelated criminal investigation. (Doc. 1 at 81.) Petitioner 

contends that her statements were coerced and made under duress because law enforcement 

had threatened to take away her children. (Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this 

claim as follows:

Rios claims her counsel should have sought suppression of a detective’s 

testimony that Rios had stated she “date[d] drug dealers” and “let them live 

with [her].” Before allowing this testimony, the trial court instructed the jury 

it could only consider the evidence as to the money laundering charges, not 

the drug-related charges. Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine 

stating its intention to present such evidence, and Rios’s counsel filed an 

answer objecting to the admission of the statements. Rios has not explained 

what more counsel should have done to object to the admission of the 

statements or shown that had more been done the statements would have 

been precluded. She has therefore failed to state a colorable claim on this 

basis.

(Doc. 22 at 27.)

This was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. As the Arizona 

Court of Appeals observed, trial counsel did not allow the statements to come in without 

objection. The prosecution sought to have the statements admitted under Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 404(b) as evidence of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, etc. (Doc. 

31 at 10–15.) Trial counsel filed a detailed opposition to the prosecution’s motion, arguing 

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both that Rule 404(b) was not satisfied and that, regardless whether the rule was satisfied, 

the statements should be excluded under Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial. (Id. at 17–21.) 

Trial counsel reiterated these points during oral argument on the motion. (Id. at 28–30.)

“There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In this case, the desired goal was exclusion of Petitioner’s 

statements to law enforcement. Trial counsel could reasonably choose to use his response 

to the prosecution’s motion as the primary means to achieve that goal, especially when the 

alternative was a dubious claim of coercion and duress. See Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 

1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Counsel is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise even 

a nonfrivolous claim, so clearly we cannot hold counsel ineffective for failing to raise a 

claim that is meritless.” (internal citation omitted)). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish 

deficient performance.

Petitioner has also failed to establish prejudice. “Where the defendant claims 

ineffective assistance for failure to file a particular motion, he must ‘not only demonstrate 

a likelihood of prevailing on the motion, but also a reasonable probability that the granting 

of the motion would have resulted in a more favorable outcome.’” Leavitt v. Arave, 646 

F.3d 605, 613 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1030 n.5 (9th Cir. 

2008) (per curiam)). As the Arizona Court of Appeals further observed, Petitioner has not 

established that she was likely to succeed on a motion to suppress based on coercion and 

duress. Had a claim of coercion and duress been raised, the trial court would have had to 

resolve a clear dispute whether threats were in fact made. Petitioner accused an officer of 

making threats to “take [her] kids” and “fuck [her] any way that he could” because she 

“was a piece of shit mother.” (Doc. 31 at 70.) The officer in question flatly denied making 

these statements. (Id. at 82, 85–86.)

The record strongly indicates that Petitioner would have lost the battle over 

credibility. During her trial in the unrelated proceeding, which occurred in December 2014 

before the same trial judge, Petitioner conceded that she had been untruthful to law 

enforcement during the very encounters in which the threats were allegedly made. (Id. at

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70 (testimony from Petitioner that she lied about the identity of a suspect because she 

“didn’t want him to get in trouble”), 72 (agreement by Petitioner that “it took the whole 

first interview, plus a good chunk of the second interview before [she] finally started telling 

officers the truth”).) The prosecutor revealed on January 21, 2015, that it intended to 

introduce Petitioner’s prior statements in the upcoming second trial. (Id. at 15.) Thus, had 

trial counsel raised a claim of coercion and duress, the trial judge would have considered 

that claim with knowledge that Petitioner had lied during the encounters at issue. It is 

exceedingly doubtful that the trial court would have found Petitioner more credible than 

the officer under such circumstances. See Leavitt, 646 F.3d at 613 (finding counsel’s 

failure to file a particular motion was not prejudicial where the trial judge was unlikely to 

have granted such motion).

Petitioner has established neither deficient performance nor prejudice. Therefore, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals could reasonably conclude that Petitioner’s ineffectiveassistance claim is meritless. Petitioner’s third claim should be denied.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the remaining claims in Petitioner Maria Jesus 

Rios’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be denied 

because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a federal 

constitutional right, and jurists of reason would not find the Court’s assessment of 

Petitioner’s constitutional claims “debatable or wrong.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment.

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the district court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

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which to file responses to any objections. Filed objections should use the following case 

number: No. CV-18-00548-TUC-FRZ.

Failure to file timely objections to this recommendation may result in the acceptance 

of the recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determination made in this recommendation may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the same finding in an order or judgment 

by the district court which adopts the recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 11th day of February, 2020.

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