Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02375/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02375-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gary Karpin,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Attorney General of the 

State of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 13-02375 PHX JAT (MEA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Plaintiff’s pro se habeas action seeks relief from his state court convictions. 

Petitioner docketed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and 448 pages of exhibits on 

November 18, 2013. Petitioner docketed a motion for discovery and two memoranda on 

December 2 and December 5, 2013, and a motion to expand the record on December 10, 

2013. Petitioner then docketed a memorandum on December 20, 2013, another 

memorandum on December 27, 2013, and an addendum memorandum on December 30, 

2013. 

On January 16, 2014, the Court dismissed the petition and the memoranda in 

support and ordered Petitioner to docket an amended petition. See Doc. 15. Petitioner 

docketed an amended petition for relief (Doc. 16) on January 23, 2014. Respondents 

docketed an answer (Doc. 25) to the amended petition on July 3, 2014, and Petitioner 

docketed a reply to the answer to his petition on July 14, 2014, and further docketed an 

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amended reply (Doc. 31) to the answer to his petition on July 21, 2014.

1

 

I Procedural background

Respondents aver, quoting from the Arizona Court of Appeals’ memorandum 

decision in Petitioner’s direct appeal:

[Petitioner] received a juris doctor degree from Vermont Law School in 

1985 and was licensed to practice law in Vermont and Maine in 1987. He 

was suspended from the practice of law in Maine in 1991 and disbarred in 

Vermont in 1993. In 1996, [Petitioner] came to Arizona, but neither applied 

for, nor was admitted to practice law.

[Petitioner] began a private mediation practice in Arizona under the name 

of three different business entities: Divorce with Dignity, Divorce 

Associates, and Relationships with Dignity.

The State Bar of Arizona (SBA) became aware that [Petitioner] had been 

disbarred in Vermont. The SBA sent [Petitioner] a letter in 1998 and 

requested that he stop using labels, such as “J.D.,” in a manner that implied 

that he was authorized to practice law in Arizona. The letter also requested 

that he stop preparing legal documents, giving legal advice, or negotiating 

legal matters. Sometime after 1999, Fran Johansen, who was the newlycreated unlicensed practice of law attorney with the SBA, sent [Petitioner] a 

second letter about complaints and again requested that he cease any 

activities that appeared to be the practice of law. [Petitioner] responded 

with a fax in which he claimed that his work was “attorney supervised” and 

that all his clients signed a fee agreement that clearly stated that he was not 

an attorney. [Petitioner] also threatened to sue the SBA if it contacted any 

of his clients.

In response to additional complaints, Johansen sent [Petitioner] a third 

letter, in 2004, advising him that he had been reported as engaging in 

activities that violated Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31 prohibiting the 

unauthorized practice of law. The 2004 letter asked [Petitioner] to cease 

activities such as preparing legal documents for filing in court, negotiating 

legal rights, and/or using designations such as “J.D.,” “Esq.” and “law 

office” in a manner that was “likely to induce others to believe that [he 

was] authorized to practice law.” Johansen also asked [Petitioner] to send 

her a letter within thirty days confirming his compliance with the SBA’s 

request. [Petitioner] responded by fax, assuring her that he was working 

under the supervision of The Green Law Group, LLC, and that he was a 

paralegal and law clerk for Robert Green.

 

1

Petitioner also filed motions seeking discovery and an evidentiary hearing, which 

motions were denied, see Doc. 36 and Doc. 37, and memoranda in further support of his habeas 

claims. See Docs. 39, 40, 31, 42. 

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The SBA filed a civil lawsuit against [Petitioner] in 2004, seeking an 

injunction against his practice of law and requested restitution for clients 

who had paid him for legal services. [Petitioner] responded by filing a 

lawsuit against Johansen, the SBA and its chief counsel for, among other 

things, defamation, slander, restraint of trade and infliction of emotional 

distress.

Yvette Gray (Gray) took over Johansen’s job as the SBA’s unauthorized 

practice of law attorney and in 2004 worked on the lawsuit involving 

[Petitioner]. During Gray’s tenure, she discovered that [Petitioner] operated 

several businesses, including Divorce with Dignity and Divorce Associates. 

Advertisements for Divorce with Dignity contained statements like 

“Former Prosecutors,” “Certified Paralegals” and “Full representation in 

court by an Arizona Licensed attorney.” The SBA sought an injunction to 

prohibit [Petitioner] from practicing law without a license.

[Petitioner] agreed to drop his lawsuit against the SBA in July 2004 and 

also expressed an interest in coming to a resolution of the SBA’s actions 

against him. [Petitioner] signed a Cease and Desist Agreement as an end to 

the Bar’s civil action against him on May 10, 2005. In signing the 

agreement, [Petitioner] acknowledged that he was not authorized to practice 

law in Arizona or certified as a legal document preparer. The agreement 

further acknowledged that [Petitioner] was disbarred in Vermont and that 

he had practiced law in Arizona without the supervision of a licensed 

attorney.

As part of the agreement, [Petitioner] further agreed to provide the SBA 

“within thirty (30) days, the name(s) of his supervising attorney, and update 

the information within seven (7) days if changes are made.” However, 

[Petitioner] never provided Gray or the SBA with such a letter confirming 

that he was being supervised by an attorney, licensed to practice in Arizona.

The Maricopa County Attorney’s Office (MCAO) began investigating 

[Petitioner] in February 2005, after the office received two boxes of 

documents from the SBA. MCAO obtained copies of advertisements 

[Petitioner] had posted in different Phoenix area newspapers and magazines 

and discovered that [Petitioner] used several different business names for 

his mediation practice in addition to the ones known to the SBA. MCAO 

also obtained a copy of a mediation overview that [Petitioner] distributed to 

clients, which contained several letters of recommendation, including one 

that noted that [Petitioner] was “a sterling example of what a lawyer should 

be.”

Through a search of [Petitioner’s] office pursuant to a search warrant, 

MCAO obtained a business card for Divorce Associates with [Petitioner’s] 

name on it which also said “juris doctorate,” “former prosecutor” and 

“Superior Court certified.” On the wall of [Petitioner’s] office there was a 

Vermont Law School diploma, a Bar certificate for the State of Maine, a 

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certificate of membership in the Trial Lawyers Association of America, and 

a certification of admission to practice in the U.S. District Court of Maine. 

Also a badge bearing [Petitioner’s] name and “State’s Attorney” for 

Orleans County, Vermont, was found in [Petitioner’s] desk drawer.

The State charged [Petitioner] with twenty-five counts of theft by means of 

material misrepresentation and one count of fraudulent schemes and 

artifices, a Class 2 felony in October 2006. One count of theft was 

dismissed prior to trial. The trial court granted [Petitioner’s] Rule 20 

motion on count 11, theft, at the end of the State’s case in chief.

Doc. 25 (Answer) at 2-5 (footnote omitted).

Petitioner was originally indicted for crimes related to his unauthorized practice 

of law in CR2005-010928. As explained more fully infra, Mr. Urbano represented 

Petitioner in CR2005-010928 from July 18 through July 26, 2005, at which time Mr. 

Urbano withdrew from representation in that matter because he was informed he might 

be called as a witness for the prosecution in the criminal proceedings against Petitioner. 

Id., Exh. A & Exh. B. The 2005 criminal matter was later dismissed, and Petitioner was 

re-indicted on the charges in 2006 in CR2006-031057. Mr. Urbano did testify at 

Petitioner’s trial on the 2006 charges. At some point during Mr. Urbano’s testimony he 

referred to his prior legal representation of Petitioner—at that time Petitioner moved for a 

mistrial, which motion was denied. See id. at 11.

Petitioner represented himself at his criminal trial regarding the 2006 charges after 

waiving his right to counsel in writing on December 14, 2007. Id., Exhs G, H, I. Mr. 

Valverde was appointed as Petitioner’s advisory counsel. Id., Exh. H & Exh K. 

Petitioner testified in his own defense at his trial, with his advisory counsel Mr. Valverde 

examining Petitioner using questions prepared by Petitioner. 

At the conclusion of a 28-day trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty on the 

remaining counts of the indictment—two of the counts had been dismissed prior to trial. 

On November 21, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive terms of 

imprisonment on each of the counts of conviction on the charges of theft. Id., Exh. O.2

 

2 Respondents aver:

The theft counts, based on the amount of monies at issue, were the following: 

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Petitioner’s aggregate sentence totals 15.75 years imprisonment. Petitioner was also 

sentenced to a “probation tail” of five years pursuant to his conviction on the count of 

fraudulent schemes and artifices. Id., Exh. O. Following a restitution hearing, the trial 

court ordered Petitioner to pay restitution to the victims in the amount of $240,448.99. 

Id., Exh. Q.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal from his convictions and sentences. Id., 

Exh. P. In his opening brief, Petitioner argued that the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion for acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, and that the jury’s guilty verdicts were not supported by “substantial 

evidence.” Id., Exh. R. The brief on appeal did not cite any federal constitutional 

provision or any opinion of a federal court in support of Petitioner’s claims. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision on October 12, 

2010, affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. T. In its decision the 

appellate court found that, in addition to Petitioner’s own testimony, the state had met its 

burden of proof and had provided sufficient evidence that the trial court could properly

deny Petitioner’s Rule 20 motion. Id., Exh. T. The appellate court concluded that there 

was ample evidence presented at trial to support the jury’s guilty verdicts. Id., Exh. T. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which

summarily denied review on April 19, 2011. Id., Exh. Y. Petitioner sought a writ of 

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court 

denied that petition. Id., Exh. DD.

Petitioner initiated an action for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, on November 22, 2011. Id., Exh. FF. On January 

 

Counts 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, and 25, involving 

an amount greater than $3,000 but less than, $25,000, were each Class 3 felonies; 

Counts 3, 4, and 6, involving an amount greater than $2,000 but less than $3,000, 

were each Class 4 felonies; Count 7, involving an amount greater than $25,000 

but less than $100,000, was a Class 2 felony; Counts 5 and 10, involving an 

amount greater than $250 but less than $1,000, were each Class 6 felonies; and 

Count 23, involving an amount greater than $1,000 but less than $2,000, was a 

Class 5 felony.

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31, 2012, Petitioner’s appointed Rule 32 counsel notified the state court that he was 

unable to discern any colorable claim to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. GG.

Petitioner filed a pro per brief in his Rule 32 proceedings, arguing that former 

Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas violated Petitioner’s due process and equal 

protection rights by expressing his personal belief in Petitioner’s guilt at a live televised 

news conference and by intimidating the trial court by filing “fake criminal complaints 

against Maricopa County judges who opposed Thomas in their decisions and rulings.” 

Petitioner also argued that the prosecutor, Ms. Vanwie, committed prosecutorial 

misconduct by obtaining Petitioner’s trial strategy from his advisory counsel, Mr.

Valverde, by conferring a gift upon Mr. Valverde’s family, by exploiting her relationship 

with Mr. Valverde to seek an advantage, by lying about the location of defense witness 

Michelle Crist, by failing to report pervasive juror misconduct, and by intentionally 

interfering with the attorney-client privilege between Petitioner and his advisory counsel 

and his former counsel Mr. Urbano. Petitioner further asserted Mr. Valverde was 

“intentionally ineffective” and personally and professionally compromised because Ms. 

Vanwie had conferred a gift upon Mr. Valverde during the trial and, in return, Mr. 

Valverde provided Ms. Vanwie with privileged information. Petitioner alleged Mr. 

Valverde altered the questions Petitioner had drafted for his direct testimony in violation 

of Petitioner’s right to represent himself and to testify in his own behalf. Petitioner 

asserted Mr. Valverde remained “silent and non-adversarial” during his representation of 

Petitioner at sentencing. 

Petitioner also asserted that Ms. Vanwie failed to report juror misconduct 

involving access to internet information about Petitioner and knowledge of a dismissed 

juror’s contact with one of the state’s witnesses, and that Ms. Vanwie’s “friend[ing]” of 

jurors and witnesses after his trial violated his federal constitutional rights. Petitioner 

further argued that Arizona v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 213 P.3d 258 (Ct. App. 2009), 

constituted a significant change in the law affecting the trial court’s rulings precluding 

Petitioner’s defense witnesses and proposed jury instruction regarding material 

misrepresentations, and that appellate counsel failed to challenge these rulings on appeal. 

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Petitioner also alleged the state withheld exculpatory evidence––“the statement and 

location of material witness, Michelle Crist”––in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 (1963).

Petitioner also asserted his former defense counsel, Mr. Urbano, who represented 

Petitioner for eight days in 2005, was intentionally unconstitutionally ineffective by 

testifying against Petitioner and because he used privileged attorney-client information to 

“convict his own client.” Petitioner further argued his appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to challenge the trial court’s preclusion of defense witnesses, preclusion of 

proposed jury instructions, refusal to allow Petitioner to question jurors about 

misconduct, refusal to grant a mistrial after witness misconduct, admission of Mr. 

Urbano’s testimony, granting of the state’s motions in limine to preclude relevant 

evidence, and for failing to challenge Andrew Thomas’ personal expression of 

Petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner argued that his convictions for the “Deprivation of 

Intangible Right of the Honest Services of a Licensed Provider” were no longer 

cognizable under the due process clause of the United States Constitution pursuant to 

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), which constituted a significant change in 

the law. Petitioner further argued that, although he profited financially from his 

businesses, this fact did not “alter the unconstitutional conviction of defrauding victims 

of non-monetary rights” because, he asserted, Petitioner had actually provided the 

services he promised to his alleged victims. 

Petitioner further maintained he had met his burden of proof of asserting colorable 

claims for relief and that the government had infringed upon his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights when Ms. Vanwie conferred a gift upon Mr. Valverde, thus 

compromising Mr. Valverde’s loyalty to Petitioner. Petitioner asserted the trial court 

should have questioned the jurors at an evidentiary hearing about juror misconduct, i.e., 

about whether the jury discussed a dismissed juror’s contact with a state’s witness. 

Petitioner also asserted that his rights to equal protection and due process were violated 

because the state presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for “theft 

based on a fraud theory,” arguing that he was licensed to practice law in at least one 

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jurisdiction and that each client signed a contract disclosing Petitioner’s “non-attorney 

status” and that attorney Robert Green’s supervision was “adequate authority” to conduct 

legal work and prepare documents without running afoul of the law. Id., Exh. II.

On June 25, 2012, the state trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 

action pursuant to Rule 32.6(c), for “the reasons stated in the State’s response.” Id., Exh. 

LL.

On July 16, 2012, Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s decision by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. MM. Petitioner averred: (1) he was denied the right 

to counsel under the Sixth Amendment when Mr. Urbano testified as a prosecution 

witness and incriminated Petitioner; (2) he was prejudiced, in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment, when Ms. Vanwie obtained privileged information from Mr. Urbano by 

interfering in their attorney-client relationship; (3) Ms. Vanwie’s intrusion into the 

attorney-client relationship violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 

counsel when Ms. Vanwie used Mr. Urbano’s testimony to establish elements of the 

state’s case; (4) Mr. Valverde’s breach of the duty of loyalty and “conflicted status and 

collusion with the state” was a “cognizable claim under Rule 32, denial of counsel”; (5) 

Petitioner was denied counsel when Mr. Valverde formed an opinion and acted upon the 

belief that Petitioner should be convicted and serve a long prison sentence; (6) Ms. 

Vanwie engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by improperly conferring a gift upon Mr. 

Valverde’s family during trial; (7) the jurors and prosecutor engaged in misconduct 

which Petitioner became aware of only after his direct appeal, thus constituting newly 

discovered evidence; (8) Ms. Vanwie withheld exculpatory evidence which Petitioner 

only learned of after his direct appeal, thus constituting newly discovered evidence; (9) 

Fish v. Arizona constituted a significant change in the law affecting the trial court’s 

rulings regarding jury instructions and the preclusion of his defense witnesses; (10) 

Skilling v. United States constituted a significant change in the law, nullifying his 

conviction for “a scheme of non-disclosure and concealment of material information”; 

(11) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise meritorious claims; and (12) the 

trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when Mr. Urbano was allowed 

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to testify against Petitioner on an “issue fundamental to the Government’s case” and 

when Mr. Urbano withdrew prior to trial after the state advised him that he would be 

called as a witness. Petitioner also claimed that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

on claims 6, 7, and 8. Id., Exh. MM.

In a memorandum decision issued on November 13, 2013, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review but denied relief. Id., Exh. SS. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

found that Petitioner’s claims that Mr. Urbano was ineffective in his representation were 

without merit because Mr. Urbano did not represent Petitioner in the 2006 case, and 

therefore, could not have been ineffective. Id., Exh. SS. To the extent Petitioner wanted 

to challenge the admission of Mr. Urbano’s testimony, however, the court held that he 

should have asserted such a claim based on a legal theory other than ineffective 

assistance of counsel in his direct appeal. Id., Exh. SS. The appellate court found

Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims were precluded because they could have 

been raised on appeal. Id., Exh. SS. The appellate court noted that this was true despite 

Petitioner having framed his third claim for relief––regarding Ms. Vanwie’s intrusion 

into his attorney-client relationship with Mr. Urbano––as an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim because it was in fact a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Id., Exh. SS.

The court held that, because Petitioner could have raised his claim of juror misconduct on 

appeal but did not do so, the claim was precluded. Id., Exh. SS. 

The Court of Appeals also held that Petitioner had failed to provide any support 

for his claim that Ms. Vanwie withheld exculpatory evidence and found Petitioner had 

failed to explain how any evidence was newly discovered. Id., Exh. SS. The appellate 

court rejected Petitioner’s claims that Skilling applied to this case and that his appellate 

counsel was ineffective, finding Petitioner had merely directed the court to his petition 

below for the merits of these arguments and that Petitioner had failed to provide any 

support for his assertion that the state court erred by dismissing these claims. Id., Exh. 

SS. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals further held that there was no legally cognizable 

claim for ineffective assistance of advisory counsel and that Mr. Valverde had not 

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breached his duty of loyalty in his capacity as advisory counsel. Id., Exh. SS. The court 

rejected Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Valverde was ineffective at sentencing, finding that 

Petitioner had failed to identify what counsel could or should have done at sentencing 

that would have affected the outcome. Id., Exh. SS. The appellate court found that 

Petitioner had not established that Fish was a significant change in the law pursuant to 

Rule 32.1(g), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. SS. The court rejected 

Petitioner’s claims that the trial court should have recused itself and also rejected the 

claim that the trial court erred by permitting Mr. Urbano to testify, because Petitioner did 

not raise these issues in the trial court. The Court of Appeals also found Petitioner’s 

claim that the trial judge should have recused himself was wholly undeveloped and 

unsupported by the record. Id., Exh. SS.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts:

(1) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was 

intentionally violated by his advisory counsel.

(2) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel and his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and to not 

incriminate himself were violated when his former defense counsel testified 

against him as a State’s witness.

(3) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel was violated when the prosecutor intentionally intruded upon the 

attorney-client relationship between Petitioner and his attorneys.

(4) Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments were violated when his former defense counsel testified as a 

State’s witness.

(5) Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated 

when the prosecutor illegally suppressed exculpatory evidence.

(6) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel was violated when his advisory counsel interfered with Petitioner’s 

right to self-representation by editing Petitioner’s prepared questions for his 

direct testimony.

(7) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to effective appellate counsel was 

violated when his appeals attorney failed to submit meritorious claims on 

direct appeal.

(8) Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments were violated when the prosecutor failed to disclose juror 

misconduct to the defense.

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(9) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and Fifth

Amendment right to due process and “freedom from self-incrimination” 

were violated by the prosecutor’s “subversion of privileged content 

between Petitioner and his advisory counsel,” which the prosecutor used to 

gain an advantage at trial.

(10) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel and Fifth Amendment rights to due process and to be free from 

self-incrimination were violated when the State dismissed the first 

indictment and re-indicted Petitioner.

(11) Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated 

because there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

every fact necessary to prove the crimes of fraudulent schemes and theft by 

material omission.

Answer at 14-16, citing Doc. 16.

Respondents contend:

This Court should not review the merits of Ground VI of the habeas 

petition because it does not state a federally cognizable claim, and this 

Court can grant habeas relief “only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

In Ground VI, Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to the 

effective assistance of counsel was violated when advisory counsel 

Valverde interfered with his right to self-representation by editing his 

prepared questions for his direct testimony. (Docket # 16.) Petitioner, 

however, does not have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of 

advisory counsel. “A defendant has the right to represent himself or herself 

pro se or to be represented by an attorney. However, a ‘defendant does not 

have a constitutional right to ‘hybrid’ representation' at trial.” U.S. v. 

Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1193 (9th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). Where a 

defendant has no constitutional right to counsel, he cannot be deprived of 

constitutionally required effective assistance. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 

U.S. 586, 588 (1982);

Petitioner’s Ground I, III through X, and XIII claims are procedurally 

defaulted. Because Petitioner has not presented a viable excuse for his 

procedural default, this Court should deny Grounds I, III through X, and 

XIII of the instant petition and dismiss them with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Grounds I through X, XII, and XIII claims are unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted.

Grounds I through X, XII, and XIII were not exhausted in the Arizona state 

courts, and are now procedurally defaulted.

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Because Petitioner never raised Grounds I, II, IV, and X in the state courts, 

his claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner never raised Grounds I, IV, X, and part of II in any state court. 

Accordingly, Petitioner failed to exhaust these claims, and they are now 

procedurally defaulted.

Id. at 17.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

Absent specific circumstances, the District Court may only grant federal habeas 

relief on the merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. 

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly 

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity 

to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s 

“highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 

346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2005). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases 

arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either in a direct 

appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 

2008); Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the exhaustion requirement, the 

petitioner must present “both the operative facts and the legal principles that control each 

claim to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). See

also Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed No. 

14-931 (Jan. 28, 2015). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court reiterated that the 

purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged constitutional errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). 

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas claim to the state court as 

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asserting the violation of a specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation of 

a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas claim was not “fairly presented” 

to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. See also Arrendondo 

v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014). 

However,

[The] AEDPA “leav[es] ‘primary responsibility’ for adjudicating federal 

claims to the States.” Johnson v. Williams, [] 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1097, 185 

L.Ed.2d 105 (2013) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27, 123 

S.Ct. 357, [] (2002)). It follows that absent “evidence lead[ing] very clearly 

to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state 

court,” a federal habeas court presumes that the state court reached a 

petitioner’s fairly presented federal claim. Id.

Williams v. Swarthout, 771 F.3d 501, 506 (9th Cir. 2014)

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a petitioner must present to the state 

courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513–14 (1971); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 

1302, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 2014); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the 

state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of 

facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1138; Gulbrandson 

v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2823 (2013); Scott v. 

Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78, 92 

S. Ct. at 512–13, they must do more than present the facts necessary to support the 

federal claim. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (“If a 

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied 

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, 

not only in federal court, but in state court.”); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. 

Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

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A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has 

the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available to the 

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the 

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state courts. See, e.g.,

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the 

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is 

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 

548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never presented a federal habeas 

claim in state court and is now barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, 

including rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 

351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present 

a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim 

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727–28, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553–57(1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 

F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a 

state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar 

direct review ... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause 

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 

2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts in either a direct 

appeal or on collateral review in an action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, are generally barred from federal review because 

an attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow 

category of claims for which a successive Rule 32 action is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (successive petitions are limited to claims of being held in 

custody beyond sentence expiration, newly-discovered material facts, requests for 

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delayed appeal, significant change in the law retroactively applicable that would probably 

overturn conviction or sentence, and actual innocence); Spreitz v. Ryan, 617 F. Supp. 2d 

887, 899–900 (D. Ariz. 2009).

For the procedural default rule to apply, “the application of the state 

procedural rule must provide an adequate and independent state law basis 

on which the state court can deny relief.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 

580 (9th Cir. 2003) (amended) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for 

denying relief. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 859–60, 122 S.Ct. 2578, [] 

(2002) [] (holding denials pursuant to Arizona waiver rules are independent 

of federal law); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(finding Arizona waiver rule consistently and regularly applied).

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 710 (2014).

To constitute an adequate and independent state procedural ground sufficient to 

support a state court’s finding of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, 

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s purported 

default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Murray v. 

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2014). A state rule is considered consistently 

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the “vast majority of cases.” 

Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 

1211, 1221 n.6 (1989). Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to preclude 

the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court must actually have relied on the 

procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v. 

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985). See also Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989).

“[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on 

either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a 

judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a 

state procedural bar.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, [ ].... Sanders 

v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate 

court’s discussion of waiver is intertwined with its merits analysis, the state 

court’s decision does not rest on an independent and adequate state law 

ground)...

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Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some internal citations and 

quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567 F.3d at 581–82.

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, 

and the preclusion of claims, which have been found to be consistently applied and wellestablished, bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any 

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, 

any claim not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal or in 

his Rule 32 action. See Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 

665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s 

state rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on 

criminal convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for affirming a

conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar).

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner establishes cause for their procedural default and prejudice arising from that 

default. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim 

and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See 

Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 375 (9th Cir. 2014); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of 

establishing that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his compliance 

with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 

2013); Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 2013). To establish 

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1243-44 (internal quotations omitted). 

Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

the Court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish 

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); 

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Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not 

cause to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 

F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). A state criminal defendant does not have a federal 

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during state post-conviction 

proceedings. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 

1993 (1987); Graves v. McEwen, 731 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the 

general rule is that errors of counsel during a state post-conviction action cannot 

constitute “cause” to excuse the procedural default of a federal habeas claim. See, e.g., 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S. Ct. at 2565; Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 374. However, the 

Supreme Court’s opinion in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), established a 

limited exception to this general rule, which exception applies only to Sixth Amendment 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Martinez held that inadequate assistance of 

post-conviction counsel or lack of counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings 

may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance 

at trial.” Id. at 1315. In Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2013), the 

Ninth Circuit expanded Martinez, holding that this doctrine can also apply to excuse the 

procedural default of claims asserting ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel.

In Trevino v. Thaler, the Supreme Court delineated the Martinez analysis as 

consisting of four prongs:

We consequently read Coleman as containing an exception, allowing a 

federal habeas court to find “cause,” thereby excusing a defendant’s 

procedural default, where (1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being 

“no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review 

proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” 

review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim”; and (4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”

133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013), citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318–19, 1320–21 

(alterations in original).

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The first prong of this test requires a petitioner seeking to rely on Martinez to 

bring forward facts demonstrating that his underlying ineffective assistance of trial or 

appellate counsel claim is substantial. The Supreme Court has defined “substantial” as a 

claim that “has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Stated inversely, a claim is 

“insubstantial” if “it does not have any merit or ... is wholly without factual support.” Id.

at 1319. Determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial 

requires the Court to examine the claim under the standard stated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A petitioner asserting ineffective 

assistance of counsel must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and 

that counsel’s errors “deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable.” Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Additionally, not just any error or 

omission of counsel will be deemed “deficient performance” that will satisfy Martinez; if 

post-conviction counsel “in the initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform below 

constitutional standards,” that attorney’s performance does not constitute “cause.” 132 S. 

Ct. at 1319. Most notably, counsel “is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise even 

a non-frivolous claim,” much less a frivolous claim. Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 

1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 

To establish prejudice arising from a procedural default of a habeas claim in the 

state courts, the petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional error worked to his 

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal proceedings with constitutional 

violations. See Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Correll v. Stewart, 

137 F.3d 1404, 1415–16 (9th Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to 

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations, there is a reasonable probability 

he would not have been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 

1129, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). The 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated that prejudice is established by a 

petitioner’s “actual innocence.” See Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (9th 

Cir. 2014). 

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C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is required if the 

petitioner demonstrates review of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 

1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. 

Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual 

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses 

charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

832, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2001).

D. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court reached a 

decision contrary to clearly established federal law or the state court decision was an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque, 

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was 

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only 

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions. And an 

unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively 

unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. Rather, 

as a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state 

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prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fair minded disagreement.

White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted).

The AEDPA requires that the habeas court review the “last reasoned decision” 

from the state court, “which means that when the final state court decision contains no 

reasoning, we may look to the last decision from the state court that provides a reasoned 

explanation of the issue.” Murray v. Schriro 746 F.3d at 441, quoting Shackleford v. 

Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

A state court applies a clearly established standard unreasonably only if no 

“reasonable interpretation of the controlling [Supreme Court] standard” can 

“support [the state court’s] legal ruling.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 

930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, [] (2007). So, when evaluating the reasonableness 

of a state court’s application of a general standard, we must defer to any 

“principled reason for the state court to distinguish between the case before 

it and Supreme Court precedent.” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 992 

(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Moreover, § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court 

recently explained,

does not require state courts to extend [a Supreme Court] 

precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as 

error. Thus, “if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can 

apply to the facts at hand,” then by definition the rationale was not

“clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.” 

AEDPA’s carefully constructed framework “would be undermined 

if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the 

guise of extensions to existing law.”

White, 134 S.Ct. at 1706 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Yarborough, 

541 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. 2140).

Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1133-34.

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to adjudicate 

claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to 

federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in 

state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking 

in justification that there was an error ... beyond any possibility for fair

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minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, [] 131 S.Ct. 770, 786–787, [] 

(2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet”—and it is—“that is because it 

was meant to be.” [] 131 S.Ct., at 786. We will not lightly conclude that a 

State’s criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme malfunctio[n]” 

for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 786 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it applied a rule contradicting 

the governing law as stated in United States Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a 

set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 

1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 

(2004); Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2014); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 

758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). 

 The “only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as 

of the time of the state court decision.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 

1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 

538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, [] (2003). If Supreme Court “cases give no 

clear answer to the question presented ... it cannot be said that the state 

court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” Wright v. Van 

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, [] (2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In other words, “‘[i]t is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a 

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme 

Court].’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 

U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, [] (2009)).

McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2013).

To satisfy the “unreasonable application” portion of the first prong, the 

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s application of Supreme 

Court precedent to the facts of his case was not only incorrect but 

“objectively unreasonable.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 

357, 360 (2002). “While Supreme Court precedent is the only authority that 

is controlling under AEDPA, we look to Ninth Circuit case law as 

‘persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state 

court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law.’” 

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Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Van Tran v. 

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)...[] 

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Woods, 764 F.3d at 

1121.

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law if it correctly identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in 

a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or fails to extend, a clearly 

established legal principle to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 

See McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The state court’s 

determination of a habeas claim may be set aside under the unreasonable application 

prong if, under clearly established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in 

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should 

have controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 

(2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, 

the state court’s decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 

only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 

766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785. An unreasonable 

application of law is different from an incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; 

Cooks v. Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an objective one 

and does not permit a court to grant relief simply because the state court might have 

incorrectly applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 

F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th 

Cir. 2010).

Pursuant to section 2254(d)(2), the “unreasonable determination” clause, “a statecourt’s factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court 

would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 15 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), quoted by Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 

724-25 (9th Cir. 2014). Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and 

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented with 

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clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 

U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. 

Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Anderson v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption 

of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a state trial 

court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 

1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that, with 

regard to claims adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) 

is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 

merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). See also Murray v. Schriro, 

745 F.3d at 998.

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively 

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, 

the Court must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the 

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the state court’s decision that the 

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 

2842, 2858–59 (2007); Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2014);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 

2011); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008).

E. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner assert his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was 

violated by his advisory counsel.

Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was 

violated by his appointed advisory counsel, Mr. Valverde, because, Petitioner alleges, 

Mr. Valverde “re-wrote” the questions that Petitioner had prepared for his direct 

testimony. Respondents contend that, although Petitioner presented similar claims in the 

state courts, i.e., Petitioner alleged in his Rule 32 action that Mr. Valverde was 

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ineffective in his role as advisory counsel, Petitioner never argued in the state courts that 

his right to self-representation was violated. Respondents maintain, accordingly, that 

Petitioner procedurally defaulted this claim in the state courts. See Doc. 25 (Answer) at 

24, citing Exhs. II, MM & SS.

On December 4, 2007, Petitioner signed a waiver of counsel, choosing to represent 

himself at his criminal trial. Id., Exh. JJ at 3. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Valverde was 

appointed as advisory counsel. Id., Exh. JJ at 3. After Petitioner’s trial, Petitioner asked 

to be represented by counsel in his sentencing proceedings and Mr. Valverde represented 

Petitioner during his sentencing proceedings. In his Rule 32 action Petitioner asserted 

that Mr. Valverde provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not ask 

Petitioner, during Petitioner’s testimony, all of the questions Petitioner had prepared for 

Mr. Valverde to ask Petitioner. Petitioner also alleged the Mr. Valverde changed the 

nature of some of the questions Petitioner had prepared. In response, the state argued 

that, because Petitioner had chosen to represent himself at trial, no ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim could arise with regard to Mr. Valverde’s performance at Petitioner’s 

trial.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust a Faretta claim3, i.e., that he was denied his 

right to represent himself in his criminal proceedings, in the state courts by presenting it 

to the state’s “highest court” in his direct appeal or a state action for post-conviction 

relief. Although Petitioner presented the “operative facts” of this claim to the state court, 

Petitioner did not present the legal predicate for this claim, i.e., any citation to or mention 

of Faretta or his federal constitutional right to self-representation, in his pleadings in the 

state courts subsequent to his conviction. Petitioner did not present a Faretta claim in his 

direct appeal, in which Petitioner was represented by counsel. See Answer, Exh. R & 

Exh. U. In his pro se brief in his Rule 32 action Petitioner alleged, inter alia, a claim of 

“Legal Counsel Misconduct”, and he cited Brady v. Maryland, Skilling v. United States, 

and Strickland v. Washington in his pleading, however, he did not cite Faretta in his Rule 

 

3

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 (1975).

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32 pleadings.

While it is true that new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim 

unexhausted, a petitioner may not “fundamentally alter the legal claim 

already considered by the state courts.” Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 

989–90 ( [9th Cir.] 2002) (citing Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260 [106 S.Ct. 617]). 

To do so deprives the state court of “a meaningful opportunity to consider 

allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary.” 

Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 257 [106 S.Ct. 617]. Here, Petitioner is not simply 

proffering additional evidentiary support for a factual theory presented to 

the state court. Rather, he is alleging an entirely new theory of counsel 

ineffectiveness; one that has not previously been presented in state court.

Poyson v. Ryan, 743 F.3d 1185, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013).

Petitioner did not allow the state courts to apply the correct “governing principles” 

of Faretta to the facts alleged by Petitioner because the claim was presented and analyzed 

as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 

concluded that a petitioner has “fairly presented” a claim not named in a petition if it is 

“sufficiently related” to an exhausted claim. See Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785,

788 (9th Cir. 2004). Claims are “sufficiently related” or “intertwined” for exhaustion 

purposes when, by raising one claim, the petition clearly implies another error. See id.

However, this exception does not apply when language in a petition for review indicates 

a petitioner's “strategic choice” not to present an issue for review. See id.; Wooten v. 

Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). In this matter it appears there was a 

strategic choice to not raise a Faretta claim in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action, but instead to 

style it as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, because a Faretta claim would be

precluded by Petitioner’s failure to raise it in his direct appeal. 

Because Petitioner did not alert the state court to the legal theory he now relies on, 

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted this claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 

103 S.Ct. 276, 277; Wooten , 540 F.3d at 1025–26; Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 

1111-12 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Picard, 404 U.S. at 277, 92 S.Ct. at 513 (rejecting as 

procedurally defaulted an equal protection claim that “entered this case only because the 

Court of Appeals injected it”). 

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Because the time for Petitioner to raise this claim in state court has expired, see 

Rule 32.4 and Rule 32.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, he has procedurally 

defaulted this claim and federal habeas relief is unavailable absent a showing of cause 

and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

In response to the assertion that he procedurally defaulted this claim in the state 

courts, Petitioner asserts the state courts erred by applying the Strickland standard to the 

facts presented with regard to this claim, rather than Faretta. Petitioner alleges he 

properly presented this claim to the state courts as a Faretta claim. As noted supra, a 

review of Petitioner’s pleadings in the state courts indicates he did not raise a Faretta

claim.

In this case, Cook was represented by pretrial counsel from August 1987 

through April 1988. Cook then made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

waiver of his right to counsel, and represented himself at his trial and 

sentencing hearing. Even if Cook’s pretrial counsel performed deficiently 

during the seven months he represented Cook (a contention we reject 

below), Cook could have corrected those errors once he decided to 

represent himself. Faretta therefore precludes Cook from complaining 

about the “quality of his own defense.” 

Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 609 (9th Cir. 2012). See also Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 

1139-40.

Petitioner did not exhaust a Faretta claim in the state courts and has not shown 

cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of this claims. Nor has 

Petitioner established a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent 

consideration of the merits of this claim because Petitioner asserts his legal rather than his 

factual innocence. Therefore, the Court should not consider granting federal habeas relief 

on the merits of this claim.

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2. Petitioner asserts his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel and his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and to not incriminate 

himself were violated when his former defense counsel testified as a witness for the 

prosecution at Petitioner’s trial.

Petitioner asserts that his right to the effective assistance of counsel and his Fifth 

Amendment rights to due process of law and to not incriminate himself were violated 

when his former defense counsel, Mr. Urbano, testified as a state’s witness at Petitioner’s 

trial. In his Rule 32 action Petitioner asserted that he was denied his right to the 

effective assistance of counsel because Mr. Urbano testified against him. In rejecting this 

claim the state court found that, because Mr. Urbano did not represent Petitioner during

his 2008 criminal trial, Mr. Urbano did not engage in any performance which could have 

been unconstitutionally ineffective. Respondents argue that the state court’s decision 

with regard to this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

federal law. 

It is axiomatic that “[w]hen an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, 

as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to 

counsel.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975). 

Accordingly, “a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that 

the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel .’” 

Id., 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n.46. See also Cook v. Ryan , 688 F.3d 598, 

609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 81 (2012).

Petitioner chose to represent himself at trial. Therefore, if Mr. Urbano was not 

Petitioner’s trial counsel, then as a matter of federal law any substandard trial 

representation and resulting prejudice was not the result of Mr. Urbano’s acts. The trial 

court’s decision denying this claim was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonably 

application of federal law.

 

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3. Petitioner contends his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel was violated when the prosecutor intentionally intruded upon the attorneyclient relationship between Petitioner and his attorneys.

Respondents assert:

 Petitioner’s Ground III, V, VIII, and IX claims are unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted. In Grounds III, V, VIII, and IX, Petitioner contends 

that prosecutor Vanwie violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights by intruding upon his attorney-client relationships with 

Urbano and Valverde, illegally suppressing evidence, failing to disclose 

juror misconduct, and “subver[ting] privileged content between Petitioner 

and his advisory counsel.” (Docket # 16.)

 The state court, however, expressly found that these prosecutorial 

misconduct claims were precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3) because they 

could have been raised on direct appeal. (Exhibits LL & SS.) The state 

court further found that this was true even though Petitioner attempted to 

present one of them as an IAC claim because, despite its label, it was in fact 

a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.) There are no procedural avenues 

through which Petitioner can now return to state court and properly exhaust 

Grounds III, V, VIII, and IX, as they are not among those that can be 

brought in a successive PCR proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 

32.2(b).

 Petitioner again asserts that, as a result of the acts of someone other than 

his trial counsel, Petitioner’s criminal proceedings were fundamentally 

unfair because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of trial 

counsel. This is not a logical nor cognizable argument, as the appropriate 

test to determine if a criminal defendant was denied their rights to the 

effective assistance of counsel requires an examination only of trial 

counsel’s acts. 

Doc. 25 at 25-26.

If the United States Supreme Court has not addressed a specific issue in its 

holdings, the state court’s adjudication of the issue cannot be an unreasonable application 

of clearly established federal law. See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007), citing Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S.Ct. 407, 408 (2006). Stated 

another way, if the issue raised by the petitioner “is an open question in the Supreme 

Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that 

the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by rejecting the 

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precise claim presented by the petitioner. See Cook, 538 F.3d at 1016; Crater v. Galaza, 

491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007). The United States Supreme Court “has held on 

numerous occasions that it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court.” Knowles, 129 S.Ct. at 1419, citing Wright, 552 U.S. 

at 124–25, 128 S.Ct. at 746–47.

The Magistrate Judge agrees with Respondents that Petitioner has not properly 

stated a cognizable claim for relief that he was denied his right to the effective assistance 

of trial counsel in the alleged manner, because the test for ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel involves examination of only his counsel’s acts and whether the petitioner was 

prejudiced by his counsel’s acts. Because the Court is unaware of any opinion of the 

United States Supreme Court holding that the actions of a prosecutor deprived a 

defendant of ineffective assistance of counsel, and Petitioner cites to no such opinion, the 

state court’s decision denying this claim was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law. 

4. Petitioner alleges his right to due process of law was violated when his 

former defense counsel, Mr. Urbano, testified as a witness for the prosecution.

Petitioner presented the factual predicate for this allegation of error in his Rule 32 

action as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Attached to Petitioner’s reply in 

support of his petition in his state Rule 32 action is a transcript from a hearing conducted 

September 17, 2008, during which Petitioner objected to the state’s proposal to have Mr. 

Urbano testify for the state. See Doc. 25 (Answer), Exh. KK, Attach. at 8-9. Ms. 

Vanwie represented to the court that a witness/victim would testify at Petitioner’s trial 

that Petitioner “used Mr. Urbano’s name and called him one of his partners... They will 

be asking regarding whether or not he ever was partners with him in that vein...”, in 

regard to the allegation that Petitioner represented himself as an attorney to potential 

clients in his “Divorce with Dignity” business. Id., Exh. KK, Attach. at 9. Mr. Urbano 

was also expected to testify that he had told the Arizona State Bar that he was not 

Petitioner’s attorney “supervisor” with regard to the acts alleged in the indictment 

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asserting Petitioner defrauded clients by misrepresenting that he was a licensed attorney 

or that he was under the supervision of a licensed attorney. Id., Exh. KK, Attach. at 10. 

At the hearing, noting that no contemporaneous attorney-client relationship existed 

between Petitioner and Mr. Urbano, the trial court informed the parties as to the 

limitations of Mr. Urbano’s testimony at trial in order to preserve the prior attorney-client 

relationship. Id., Exh. KK, Attach. at 10. The trial court’s limitation of Mr. Urbano’s 

testimony was also expressed on September 29, 2008. See id., Exh. KK, Attach. The 

state trial court stated:

I ruled that you may testify about any business relationship you may have 

with Mr. Karpin, any supervisory capacity you may have with Mr. Karpin, 

any attorney paralegal relationship you may have had with Mr. Karpin. But 

in terms of any legal advice where Mr. Karpin could be viewed as the 

client, I did grant Mr. Karpin’s objection to any testimony about that. 

Id., Exh. KK, Attach. at 129. The rest of the transcript is Mr. Urbano’s testimony, in 

which he does not divulge any information apparently derived from the attorney-client 

relationship. Petitioner cross-examined Mr. Urbano. Id., Exh. KK, Attach. at 131-179.

On June 25, 2012, the state trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 

action pursuant to Rule 32.6(c), for “the reasons stated in the State’s response.” Id., Exh. 

LL. The Court of Appeals determined that, to the extent Petitioner challenged the 

admission of Mr. Urbano’s testimony as a basis for vacating Petitioner’s convictions, 

Petitioner should have asserted such a claim based on a legal theory other than ineffective 

assistance of counsel, i.e., as a claim of violation of his right to due process of law, in his 

direct appeal. 

The last reasoned opinion of the state courts on this issue, i.e., the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ decision, found that an allegation that Mr. Urbano’s testimony constituted 

ineffective assistance of counsel was not cognizable and that Petitioner had procedurally 

defaulted a claim that the admission of Mr. Urbano’s testimony violated Petitioner’s right 

to due process of law by failing to raise such a claim in his direct appeal.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust his federal habeas claim that allowing Mr. 

Urbano’s testimony violated his federal constitutional right to due process of law in the 

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state courts. The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that Petitioner had procedurally 

defaulted this claim. Petitioner has not shown cause for nor prejudice arising from his 

procedural default of this claim because Mr. Urbano’s testimony was not comprised of 

evidence used to prosecute Petitioner, which evidence derived from information 

protected by the attorney-client privilege.

The claim may also be denied on the merits, because the introduction of Mr. 

Urbano’s testimony did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process of law. To rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation, introduced evidence must be of such quality as 

necessarily prevents a fair trial. See, e.g., Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 

1465 (9th Cir. 1986). A due process violation occurs only if the admitted evidence was

“irrelevant to the prosecution’s case” and there was no permissible inferences that the 

jury could draw from the evidence. McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1380 & 1384 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (“Evidence is considered irrelevant if it fails to make any fact of consequence 

more or less probable.”). See also, e.g., Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919–20 

(9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner is only entitled to habeas relief on this claim if the trial court’s 

evidentiary decision created an absence of fundamental fairness that “fatally infected the 

trial....” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996)

The basis for Petitioner’s claim is the argument that Mr. Urbano’s testimony 

violated the attorney-client privilege established by Petitioner and Mr. Urbano during the 

eight days that Mr. Urbano represented Petitioner in criminal proceedings subsequent to 

his indictment in 2005. However, the transcript reveals that Mr. Urbano did not testify as 

to any communication between himself and Petitioner in the context of their attorneyclient relationship. Accordingly, Mr. Urbano’s testimony did not violate the attorneyclient privilege. See Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2010).4

 Mr. 

 

4

Because the attorney-client privilege protects only a communication between an 

attorney and a client, not the facts that are communicated, a defendant would 

remain free to question the witness about the underlying facts, just as happened 

here. Despite not having access to the letter, Murdoch was able to cross-examine 

Dinardo on a wide range of subjects, including Dinardo’s earlier denial of 

involvement in the murder. As the Supreme Court has explained, the attorneyCase 2:13-cv-02375-JAT Document 43 Filed 03/05/15 Page 31 of 46
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Urbano’s testimony was limited to his relationship with Petitioner in regard to 

Petitioner’s desire to have Mr. Urbano “supervise” his mediation practice. Mr. Urbano’s 

testimony was relevant to establishing that Petitioner did not have the proper attorney 

“supervision” with regard to the acts alleged in the indictment. Because Mr. Urbano’s

testimony was not irrelevant and there were permissible inferences to be drawn by the 

jury from his testimony, Petitioner’s right to due process of law was not violated by the 

admission of this testimony. Compare Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 887 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

5. Petitioner argues his right to due process of law was violated when the 

prosecutor illegally suppressed exculpatory evidence.

Petitioner contends that Ms. Vanwie violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to 

due process of law by illegally suppressing evidence. Petitioner contends the prosecutor 

suppressed the evidence of Ms. Crist, his “co-mediator.” Petitioner alleges Ms. Crist 

informed all of the clients that Petitioner was not a licensed attorney at the onset of 

“their” representation of clients in mediations. Petitioner alleges Ms. Crist reviewed with 

clients involved in divorces a “non-attorney disclosure,” which alerted these clients to the 

fact that Petitioner was not a licensed attorney. Petitioner contends the defense could not 

locate Ms. Crist, to subpoena her to provide substantiating testimony, prior to his trial. 

Petitioner alleges that, prior to his criminal trial, the prosecutor’s investigator located Ms. 

Crist and obtained a taped statement from her which corroborated Petitioner’s testimony. 

Petitioner asserts this exculpatory evidence was not disclosed to the defense. Petitioner 

alleges that the prosecutor informed defense counsel prior to trial that Ms. Crist could not 

be located and that, if the defense produced Ms. Crist, she would be prosecuted for 

crimes associated with Petitioner’s businesses.

 

client privilege does not “create a broad ‘zone of silence’ over” the subject matter 

of the communication. “The privilege only protects disclosure of [the] 

communications [themselves]; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying 

facts,” so long as the underlying facts can be proven without resort to the 

privileged materials. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395, 101 S.Ct. 677.

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Petitioner raised a similar factual predicate for this claim in his Rule 32 action, 

alleging that he had “newly discovered evidence” that the prosecution had “suppressed” 

Ms. Crist’s evidence. The state court found that Petitioner’s claim was one of

prosecutorial misconduct, which was precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(3) because it

could have been raised in his direct appeal. The court further found:

Karpin likewise fails to provide any support for his argument that the 

prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence, a claim he characterizes as one 

of newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rule 32.1(e)(claim eight). Other 

than stating the evidence “was discovered post-trial and occurred outside 

the purview of J. Granville’s court[]room,” and directing this court to the

affidavit he attached to his petition below, Karpin fails to explain why it is 

newly discovered and why he was entitled to relief on this ground....

Doc. 25 (Answer), Exh. SS at 4.

Petitioner raised this claim in the state courts, which found the claim precluded by 

Petitioner’s failure to raise it in a procedurally correct fashion. Petitioner has not shown 

cause for nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of this claim. Petitioner has 

not presented any evidence, other than his own self-serving statement, to support the 

contention that the prosecution located Ms. Crist and tape-recorded an interview with her, 

or that Ms. Crist’s testimony would have overcome the weight of the evidence presented 

against Petitioner. Petitioner has not established that a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

will occur absent consideration of the merits of this claim. Accordingly, habeas relief 

may not be granted on the basis of this procedurally defaulted claim.

6. Petitioner asserts his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated 

when his advisory counsel interfered with Petitioner’s right to self-representation by 

editing the questions Petitioner had prepared questions for his direct testimony.

Petitioner raised this claim in his state action for post-conviction relief. The state 

appellate court determined that Petitioner had not properly delineated how counsel’s 

alleged “editing” of the questions propounded to Petitioner in his own defense had 

resulted in prejudice to Petitioner. This conclusion was not clearly contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of federal law because a state court defendant does not have a 

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federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of advisory counsel when the 

defendant has waived the right to counsel and chosen to represent themself. See, e.g., 

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, 95 S.Ct. at 2540 n.46 (“a defendant who elects to represent 

himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a 

denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”). Therefore, to the extent Petitioner asserts an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his advisory counsel’s performance at 

Petitioner’s criminal trial, the claim is not cognizable in an habeas action. 

7. Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of appellate counsel was violated when his attorney failed to submit 

meritorious claims in Petitioner’s direct appeal.

Petitioner asserted an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in his state 

Rule 32 action. In his pro se brief to the trial court Petitioner asserted his appellate 

counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel did not raise specific issues in the 

appeal, i.e., the preclusion of witnesses, the refusal of particular jury instructions, juror 

misconduct, the refusal to grant a mistrial after “misconduct” by a witness, allowing Mr. 

Urbano’s testimony, the trial court’s granting of motions to preclude evidence, and 

prosecutorial misconduct by Mr. Thomas. 

In response the state argued that Petitioner’s appellate counsel was not ineffective 

for not pressing the claims specified by Petitioner in Petitioner’s direct appeal, but instead 

asserting in Petitioner’s appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Petitioner’s motion for an acquittal and that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s guilty verdicts. The state argued, inter alia, that appellate counsel’s performance 

could not be judged as deficient and prejudicial where counsel “fail[ed] to raise minor 

and arguably frivolous claims.” Doc. 25 (Answer), Exh. KK at 19. The state trial court 

denied relief in Petitioner’s Rule 32 action without analysis, other than referencing the 

state’s responsive brief. 

Petitioner appealed the trial court’s denial of Rule 32 relief to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. In denying relief on this claim and Petitioner’s contention regarding Skilling, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals stated: “Karpin merely directs us to his petition below ‘for 

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the merits of [these] claim[s] and argument[s],’ while failing to provide any argument to 

support his assertion that the court erred by dismissing them. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.9(c); Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, n.9, 94 P.3d at 1147 n.9.” Answer, Exh. SS at 4.

The state court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not denied his right to the effective 

assistance of appellate counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of federal law.

The Strickland prejudice requirement applies to claims of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel:. To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, it is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland

to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. “An unreasonable 

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” 

Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25, 123 S.Ct. at 360 (internal quotations omitted). Vague or 

conclusory claims do not establish evidence sufficient to conclude the state court's 

decision was clearly contrary to federal law. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th 

Cir. 1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the 

right to effective appellate counsel. However, appellate counsel need not 

advance every possible argument, even those that are non-frivolous, and 

should instead concentrate his advocacy on winnowing out weaker 

arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at 

most on a few key issues. The two-part Strickland test, which the Court has 

used in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, supra, 

also guides an analysis of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel.

Davis v. Singletary, 853 F. Supp. 1492, 1549 (M.D. Fl. 1994) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted).

To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance was deficient because 

counsel failed to raise a particular argument, either in his trial proceedings or in his direct 

appeal, the petitioner must establish the argument was likely to be successful, thereby 

establishing that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 

493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir.

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2006). The appropriate inquiry is not whether raising a particular issue on appeal would 

have been frivolous, but whether there is a reasonable probability raising the issue would 

have led to the reversal of the petitioner’s conviction. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 

1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). If Petitioner had only a remote chance of obtaining reversal 

based upon a specific issue he alleges counsel should have raised, neither element of the 

Strickland test is satisfied. Id.

 In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court 

can be certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or 

whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if 

counsel acted differently. Instead, Strickland asks whether it is reasonably 

likely the result would have been different. This does not require a showing 

that counsel's actions more likely than not altered the outcome, but the 

difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a more-probablethan-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case. The 

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 791-92 (2011) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted and emphasis added), quoted in Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 

1162 (9th Cir. 2013).

Petitioner has not established that, had his appellate counsel raised any of the 

issues urged by Petitioner, there is a reasonable probability Petitioner’s convictions 

would have been reversed. Accordingly, the state court’s determination that Petitioner’s

appellate counsel’s performance was not unconstitutionally ineffective was not clearly 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 

732; Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 943 (9th Cir. 2013); Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 

944 (9th Cir. 2003); Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003); James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir. 1994); Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir.

1992).

 8. Petitioner argues that his right to due process of law was violated because

the prosecutor failed to disclose juror misconduct to the defense.

In his state action for post-conviction relief Petitioner asserted that Ms. Vanwie 

failed to report to the trial court and to the defense juror misconduct involving access to 

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internet information about Petitioner and knowledge of a dismissed juror’s contact with 

one of the state’s witnesses. Petitioner also asserted Ms. Vanwie’s “friend[ing]” of jurors 

and witnesses upon the trial’s conclusion constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The state 

court found Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims were precluded pursuant to Rule 

32.2(a)(3) because they could have been but were not raised in his direct appeal. See

Answer, Exhs. LL & SS. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from 

his failure to properly exhaust this claim in the state courts.

Even if not properly exhausted, this claim can be denied on the merits. The events 

Petitioner asserts constituted “juror misconduct” do not rise to the level of juror 

misconduct. See Tong Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d 1067, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(discussing relevant case law). Accordingly, Petitioner’s right to due process was not 

violated by Ms. Vanwie’s alleged “failure” to alert the court to these events. Neither 

could Ms. Vanwie’s “friending” of trial participants after the entry of Petitioner’s 

conviction affect the decision reached by the jury. 

9. Petitioner argues his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and his 

Fifth Amendment right to due process and “freedom from self-incrimination” were

violated by the prosecutor’s “subversion of privileged content between Petitioner 

and his advisory counsel,” which the prosecutor used to gain an advantage at trial.

Petitioner alleges that Mr. Valverde supplied to Ms. Vanwie “defense plans and 

strategy, Karpin’s emails, privileged communications, the content of cross examination 

questions for prosecution witnesses, Karpin’s prepared questions for his direct 

testimony...” Petitioner alleges that Mr. Valverde then “substituted” questions prepared 

by Ms. Vanwie in place of questions prepared by Petitioner when examining Petitioner 

on the stand. Petitioner alleges that Mr. Valverde was essentially a “government 

instrument.” 

As noted supra, Petitioner did not raise a claim that he was denied his right to 

represent himself in his criminal proceedings in a procedurally correct manner in the state 

courts. Accordingly, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted any claim premised on 

Faretta. Additionally, Petitioner did not raise a claim that he was denied his right to be 

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free from self-incrimination in the state courts and, therefore, Petitioner has also 

procedurally defaulted this claim. Because Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor 

prejudice arising from his procedural default of his claims, the Court should not consider 

the merits of the claims.

10. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 

and Fifth Amendment rights to due process and to be free from self-incrimination 

were violated when the state dismissed the first indictment and re-indicted 

Petitioner.

Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel and Fifth Amendment rights to due process and to be free from self-incrimination 

were violated when the state dismissed the first indictment and re-indicted him in this 

case. Respondents argue that, although Petitioner asserted in the state court that the state 

improperly obtained privileged information from Mr. Urbano that allowed it to re-indict 

Petitioner with additional counts, Petitioner asserted these facts only in alleging an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Answer at 25, citing Exhs. II, MM, SS. In his 

brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his Rule 32 action, Petitioner alleged Mr. 

Urbano had “intimate knowledge” of and supervised Petitioner in his mediation practice. 

See Answer, Exh. NN at 4. Petitioner states that, after Mr. Urbano withdrew from 

representing Petitioner in the 2005 matter the charges stated in the 2005 indictment were 

dismissed. Petitioner states that the 2008 indictment contains the same “charges, 

evidence, witnesses and victims with a few added victims” as the 2005 indictment. Id., 

Exh. NN at 5. Petitioner asserted the trial court erred by allowing Mr. Urbano 

to testify on an issue fundamental to the government’s case: Whether there 

was a supervising, business or paralegal relationship between Urbano and 

Karpin. Karpin’s defense to all the allegations of theft and fraud was that 

he was Attorney Supervised, and therefore authorized under law as a 

legitimate mediation and document preparer service; A complete defense to 

the criminal charges.

Id., Exh. NN at 6.

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Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in the state courts as one asserting a 

violation of his right to due process of law. Petitioner has not established cause for nor 

prejudice arising from his procedural default of this claim. Additionally, the Magistrate 

Judge is aware of no published Supreme Court opinion which finds that the dismissal 

without prejudice and re-filing of charges violated a defendant’s federal constitutional 

rights, absent a showing that doing so violated the defendant’s speedy trial rights and 

resulted in prejudice. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27–29, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2102-

03 (1974) (holding that vindictiveness could be presumed where prosecutors brought 

additional charges after a defendant appealed his conviction); Nunes v. Ramirez-Palmer, 

485 F.3d 432, 441 (9th Cir. 2007) Inter alia, the United States Supreme Court has held 

that a prosecutor can legitimately use the “threat” of re-indicting a defendant on more 

serious charges if they do not agree to a plea agreement without violating the defendant’s

right to due process. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65, 98 S.Ct. 663, 

668-69 (1978). Accordingly, Petitioner’s right to due process was not violated by his reindictment. 

Petitioner’s allegation that the state could only bring the additional charges 

because they received information from Mr. Urbano which Mr. Urbano only obtained in 

the context of his brief attorney-client relationship with Petitioner conflicts with the 

factual findings of the state court and the transcript of Mr. Urbano’s testimony. Mr. 

Urbano testified only as to acts by Petitioner which occurred outside of their attorneyclient relationship. Petitioner was not convicted on the charges in the indictment on 

which he stood charged when Mr. Urbano was his counsel. Accordingly, Mr. Urbano’s 

representation of Petitioner could not be considered either unconstitutionally deficient nor 

prejudicial. Therefore, to the extent Petitioner exhausted this claim in the state courts as 

one asserting the violation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, the state 

court did not err in determining that Petitioner had failed to state a claim on which relief 

could be granted.

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11. Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated 

because there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every 

fact necessary to prove the crimes of fraudulent schemes and theft by material 

omission.

 In his direct appeal Petitioner argued that the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion for acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdicts. 

See Answer, Exh. R. Petitioner’s brief in his direct appeal did not cite any federal 

constitutional provision or any opinion of a federal court with regard to this argument. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision on October 12, 2010, 

affirming Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. T. In its decision the 

appellate court found that, in addition to Petitioner’s own testimony, the state had met its 

burden of proof and had provided sufficient evidence that the trial court could properly 

deny Petitioner’s Rule 20 motion. Id., Exh. T. The appellate court concluded that there 

was ample evidence presented at trial to support the jury’s guilty verdicts. Id., Exh. T. 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim in the state courts as a federal 

constitutional claim. Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by the failure to 

exhaust, because, assuming the Court could address the claim, the state court’s decision 

that there was sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s convictions was not clearly 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, i.e., the standard set forth in 

Jackson v. Virginia. 

A due process claim based on insufficiency of the evidence can only succeed 

when, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). 

When undertaking habeas review of a state court decision rejecting a claim of 

insufficiency of the evidence, the Court’s inquiry is very limited; the Court may ask only 

whether the state court's decision was contrary to or reflected an unreasonable application 

of Jackson to the facts of a particular case. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 

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(9th Cir. 2005). 

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we may grant habeas relief only if 

“no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, [] 

(1979); see also McDaniel v. Brown, [] 130 S.Ct. 665, 673 [] (2010) ... In 

this review, all evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, and we presume “that the trier of fact resolved any 

[conflicting inferences] in favor of the prosecution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

326, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Furthermore, “[a]fter AEDPA, we apply the standards 

of Jackson with an additional layer of deference” to state court findings. 

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005).

Ngo v. Giurbino 651 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011).

Having thoroughly reviewed all of the pleadings in this matter and the portions of 

the record presented to the Court, the Court concludes that the Arizona Court of Appeals’

decision denying Petitioner's claim of insufficiency of the evidence was not contrary to 

nor an unreasonable application of federal law. See Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896-

97 (9th Cir. 2013); Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2004). Compare

Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1102–04 (9th Cir. 2005). “[D]raw[ing] reasonable 

inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner 

that supports the verdict,” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995), the 

Court concludes that a rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this 

claim.

12. Petitioner contends his right to due process of law was violated because

the trial court allowed the jury to convict him without requiring the state to prove 

“every element” of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

In his state action for post-conviction relief Petitioner argued that his rights to 

equal protection of the law and due process of law were violated because the state 

presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for “theft based on a fraud 

theory”; Petitioner asserted there was no fraud because he was licensed to practice law in 

at least one jurisdiction, because each client signed a contract which disclosed

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Petitioner’s “non-attorney status,” and because attorney Robert Green’s supervision of 

Petitioner’s activities was “adequate authority” to conduct legal work and prepare 

documents. Answer, Exh. II. In response, the state argued that Petitioner had not 

properly raised this claim and noted that Petitioner had alleged an insufficiency of the 

evidence claim in his direct appeal. On June 25, 2012, the state trial court summarily 

dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action pursuant to Rule 32.6(c), for “the reasons stated in 

the State’s response.” Id., Exh. LL.

As explained supra, Petitioner is unable to establish prejudice for any failure to 

properly exhaust in the state courts a claim that there was insufficient evidence of every 

“element” of the crimes of conviction to sustain his convictions in violation of his federal 

constitutional rights, because the record indicates the state appellate court properly found, 

in the context of considering Petitioner’s argument that the trial court improperly denied 

his motion for acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, that 

the state had met its burden of proving every element of the crimes alleged such that the 

jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner had committed those crimes. 

Petitioner has not brought “clear and convincing evidence”, as compared to argument, 

which would establish facts contrary to the state appellate court’s factual findings. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has not established prejudice arising from his procedural default 

of a claim of insufficient evidence in violation of his federal constitutional rights. 

13. Petitioner asserts his right to substantive due process right and his Sixth 

Amendment right to have “compulsory process for obtaining witnesses” were 

violated when the trial court barred all defense witnesses from testifying.

At his trial, in addition to his own testimony, Petitioner presented a witness who 

testified that an individual does not have to be a licensed attorney to practice law in the 

state of Arizona and that no special certification was required to conduct mediations. See

Answer, Exh. S at 72-78. In his state action for post-conviction relief, in his brief to the 

state trial court, Petitioner alleged his appellate counsel’s performance was 

unconstitutionally ineffective because counsel did not assert the trial court erred by 

precluding Petitioner’s defense witnesses. In his brief to the state appellate court in his 

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Rule 32 action Petitioner alleged that Fish v. Arizona constituted a significant change in 

the law affecting the trial court’s rulings regarding jury instructions and the preclusion of 

his defense witnesses. 

Petitioner was entitled to the application of the change in the law State v. 

Fish, 222 Ariz. 109 (2009), which if applied in 2008, would have included 

an instruction that a material misrepresentation must be definition affect the 

outcome of the transaction. Similarly, the application of Fish, would have 

allowed the testimony of defendant’s precluded witnesses. 

Id., Exh. NN at 18.

The Arizona Court of Appeals found Petitioner had not established that Fish was a 

significant change in the law pursuant to Rule 32.1(g), Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. 

Petitioner did not present the claim presented to this Court, regarding the right to 

compel witnesses, to the state courts. Petitioner has not shown cause for nor prejudice 

arising from his procedural default of this claim because the trial court’s exercise of its 

discretion to preclude certain defense witnesses was not a deprivation of Petitioner’s 

federal constitutional rights.

Petitioner asserts the deprivation of interrelated constitutional guarantees that 

merge into the rule that a criminal defendant is entitled to “a meaningful opportunity to 

present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 

2147-48 (1986). A criminal defendant has a well-recognized constitutional right to 

present a complete defense. See, e.g., id., 476 U.S. at 690, 106 S.Ct. at 2147-48

(“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in 

the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the 

Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a ‘meaningful opportunity to present a 

complete defense.’”). Necessary to the realization of this right is the ability to present 

evidence, including the testimony of witnesses. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 

14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967).

However, “[a] defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but 

rather is subject to reasonable restrictions,” such as evidentiary and procedural rules. 

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United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1264 (1998). “[S]tate and 

federal rule makers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding 

evidence from criminal trials,” id., and the Supreme Court has indicated its approval of 

“well-established rules of evidence” that permit state trial judges to exclude evidence. 

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1732-33 (2006); Montana 

v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2022 (1996) (“[T]he introduction of 

relevant evidence can be limited by the State for a ‘valid’ reason.”). The Supreme Court 

has observed that “[o]nly rarely have we held that the right to present a complete defense 

was violated by the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence.” 

Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S.Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013). See also Phillips v. Herndon, 730 F.3d 

773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2013). Defendants do not have a federal constitutional right to 

present evidence that is irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible under evidentiary rules of 

procedure. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10 (1974);

Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1549–50 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[i]t is within the trial court’s 

discretion to determine which issues are relevant”).

Petitioner was able to present his defense to the charges against him, i.e., that he 

did not misrepresent to his clients that he was not a currently licensed attorney, that he 

did provide services to his clients, and that he was under the reasonable belief that he was 

being properly supervised by licensed attorneys, to the jury, notwithstanding the 

exclusion of any proposed witnesses. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief based on the trial court’s exclusion of testimony because he has not presented any 

Supreme Court opinion holding that the discretionary exclusion of his proposed witnesses

warrants federal habeas relief under clearly established federal law. See Brown v. Horell, 

644 F.3d 969, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2011). In Brown the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

found: “Between the issuance of Moses and the present, the Supreme Court has not 

decided any case either squarely addressing the discretionary exclusion of evidence and 

the right to present a complete defense or establishing a controlling legal standard for 

evaluating such exclusions.” Id. (internal quotations omitted), citing Moses v. Payne, 555 

F.3d 742, 757–60 (9th Cir. 2009). Nor has Petitioner established, even assuming 

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constitutional error, that the exclusion of this evidence had a “substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1714 (1993); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir.

2000). Accordingly, Petitioner should not be grated relief on this habeas claim.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not exhaust most of his federal habeas claims in the Arizona state 

courts by fairly presenting them as federal constitutional claims to the state’s highest 

court in a procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice 

arising from his procedural default of these claims. Some of Petitioner’s claims may be 

denied on the merits notwithstanding his failure to properly procedurally exhaust those 

claims and some claims are not cognizable in a federal habeas action. The claims which 

were decided by the state courts were not decided in a fashion that was clearly contrary to 

nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Therefore,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Mr. Karpin’s petition seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus be denied and dismissed.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

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consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

 

Dated this 5th day of March, 2015.

Case 2:13-cv-02375-JAT Document 43 Filed 03/05/15 Page 46 of 46