Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01218/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01218-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY TYRONE CAMPBELL, SR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01218 LJO DLB PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 

COMPLAINT 

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Anthony Tyrone Campbell, Sr., (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prisoner proceeding 

pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this 

action on August 4, 2014. He names Director Jeffrey Beard, Chief of Appeals J. A. Zamora, 

Warden P. D. Brazelton, Chief Deputy Warden R. Fisher, Jr., Associate Warden J. Buckley, Captain 

D. B. Allen, Lieutenant C. Nevarez, Appeals Coordinator J. Morgan, and Prison Guard D. Cardenas

as Defendants. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 

(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions or 

omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 

1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim 

for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) in Tehachapi, 

California. The events giving rise to this action took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated at 

Pleasant Valley State Prison. 

Plaintiff alleges the following. On July 3, 2013, an administrative segregation unit placement 

notice (CDC 114-D) was generated based on Plaintiff’s commission of battery on a peace officer 

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with serious injury. On July 26, 2013, a disciplinary hearing was held. It was determined that the 

initial CDC 114-D failed to provide any explanation or circumstances of the alleged incident from 

which Plaintiff could prepare an adequate defense. Therefore, a new CDC 114-D was ordered and 

subsequently issued on August 6, 2013. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant D. Cardenas deliberately falsified the date on the August 6, 

2013, CDC 114-D form and falsely indicated the actual date of Plaintiff’s placement in 

administrative segregation. The act was committed to cover up the Defendant’s violation of a 

CDCR policy and time constraint regulation.

On August 7, 2013, Defendant D. Cardenas collaborated with Defendant D. B. Allen and 

urged the reviewer not to remedy the wrong.

On August 15, 2013, Plaintiff was summoned to appear before a second initial classification 

hearing at Pleasant Valley State Prison. The committee members included Defendants Fisher, 

Buckley, and Allen. Plaintiff protested the elapsed time constraint violation. Defendants denied 

Plaintiff’s request and allowed the illegal CDCR 114-D to be considered. 

Plaintiff appealed the decision. On October 8, 2013, Defendant Morgan denied the appeal 

despite clear and convincing knowledge of a constitutional violation. Also on October 8, 2013, 

Defendant Brazelton willfully failed to remedy the wrong at the second level of review despite clear 

and convincing knowledge of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brazelton acknowledged 

the wrong, but stated that the initial CDC 114-D dated July 3, 2013, did not provide enough 

information for Plaintiff to prepare an adequate defense, and for this reason a new 114-D was issued 

on August 6, 2013.

On June 2, 2014, Defendant Zamora failed to remedy the wrong at the third level of review. 

Defendant Zamora further stated untruthfully that Plaintiff was issued a new CDC 114-D prior to the 

disciplinary hearing.

Plaintiff states Defendant Beard failed to enforce policy and willfully allowed the 

constitutional violation and abuse of power to stand on final administrative review.

Plaintiff requests the disposition of the disciplinary hearing be rescinded and Plaintiff’s lost 

time credits be restored. He further requests compensatory damages for pain and suffering and 

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mental anguish due to long term confinement in segregation. Last, he requests punitive damages for 

Defendants’ wanton and deliberate violations and abuses of power.

C. DISCUSSION

1. Linkage

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must link the named defendants to the participation in the 

violation at issue. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009); 

Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of 

Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). Liability may not be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, and there must exist 

some causal connection between the conduct of each named defendant and the violation at issue. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 

(9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v. 

Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012).

Here, Plaintiff fails to state how Defendant Nevarez participated in the violations at issue. 

Plaintiff must specifically state how each named Defendant personally acted to deprive him of his 

rights. 

2. Placement in Administrative Segregation

With respect to placement in administrative segregation, due process requires only that 

prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is 

segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons for considering segregation, 

and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th 

Cir. 1986) (quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995); accord Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Prisoners are not entitled to detailed written notice of charges, representation by counsel or counsel 

substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for 

placing the prisoner in administrative segregation. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01 (quotation marks 

omitted). Further, due process does not require disclosure of the identity of any person providing 

information leading to the placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation. Id. (quotation 

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marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff readily admits prison officials held a hearing on July 26, 2013, concerning a 

notice of placement in administrative segregation generated on July 3, 2013. At the hearing, it was 

determined that Plaintiff had not been given sufficient information concerning the placement in 

order to present a defense. Therefore, a new notice was requested in order to provide Plaintiff with 

sufficient information. On August 6, 2013, the notice was generated and provided to Plaintiff. 

Subsequently a hearing was held wherein Plaintiff made his opposition known and the committee 

members determined that a placement in administrative segregation was necessary. Based on the 

facts alleged, it is clear that all due process requirements were met under § 1983. Because the 

defects in the complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court will recommend that the 

complaint be dismissed.

3. Heck Bar

Plaintiff also appears to challenge the disciplinary hearing held with respect to the underlying 

offense of battery on a peace officer. Plaintiff requests that the disciplinary hearing be rescinded and 

the forfeited time credits be restored.

“[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief 

sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading 

to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily 

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-2, 

125 S.Ct. 1242, 1248 (2005).

Where, as here, “success in a . . . [section] 1983 damages action would implicitly question 

the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable 

termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying 

conviction or sentence.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004) 

(citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994)); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 

648 (1997) (applying Heck to a prison disciplinary hearing where good-time credits were affected). 

Because the punishment imposed at the disciplinary hearing affects the duration of Plaintiff’s 

sentence, Plaintiff’s due process claim is barred until such time as Plaintiff invalidates the result of 

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the disciplinary hearing.

4. Inmate Appeals Process

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of 

life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that 

one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). 

Plaintiff does not a have protected liberty interest in the processing his appeals, and therefore, he 

cannot pursue a claim for denial of due process with respect to the handling or resolution of his 

appeals. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)).

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any cognizable federal claims against any named 

Defendant. Because the nature of the deficiencies are not curable by amendment, Akhtar v. Mesa, 

698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

the Complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim, thus terminating the action.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days 

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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