Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02967/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02967-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALU BANARJI, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILSHIRE CONSUMER CREDIT,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-02967-BEN-KSC

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[ECF No. 64]

Plaintiff Alu Banarji initiated this action on December 17, 2014, alleging a 

violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 

She claims that Defendant Wilshire Consumer Credit (“Defendant” or “WCC”) 

repeatedly called her cell phone without her prior express consent. WCC now moves for 

partial summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff’s standing to bring the TCPA claim. 

(Mot., ECF No. 64.) For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES WCC’s motion.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Sami Banarji, Plaintiff’s father, took out a 

loan with WCC. On the application, Sami listed a cell phone number ending 0861 as his 

own. In fact, that number belonged to Alu. Alu claims that she had no involvement with 

Sami’s loan, except to pay a bill for him on occasion.

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At some point, Sami failed to make a payment to WCC, and WCC began calling 

the 0861 number to inquire about the debt. WCC used an automatic telephone dialing 

system to dial the 0861 number. Alu received several calls from WCC. She asserts that 

she was called constantly and being harassed. The calls irritated her. She asked WCC to 

stop calling her cell phone multiple times, and asked Sami to also convey that message to 

WCC. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In 

considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255.

A moving party bears the initial burden of showing there are no genuine issues of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It can do so by 

negating an essential element of the non-moving party’s case, or by showing that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. The burden 

then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. 

“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes 

that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. As a 

general rule, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” will be insufficient to raise a 

genuine issue of material fact; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably 

find for the non-moving party. Id. at 252.

DISCUSSION

The issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff has satisfied the injury in fact 

requirement of Article III standing to pursue her TCPA claim. See Spokeo, Inc. v. 

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Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“[S]tanding consists of three elements. . . . The 

plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision.”). To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that she 

“suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and 

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Defendant WCC argues that but for the TCPA, 

Plaintiff did not suffer a real, concrete injury. It relies on the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Spokeo, which explained that a plaintiff does not “automatically satsif[y] the injury-infact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to 

authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Id. at 1549. 

The Ninth Circuit recently addressed a plaintiff’s standing to bring a TCPA claim 

in light of Spokeo. See Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 

2017). In general, the TCPA prohibits anyone from using an automatic telephone dialing 

system to make an unsolicited call to a cell phone number without the called party’s prior 

express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). In Van Patten, the Ninth Circuit 

explained that, in enacting the TCPA, “Congress sought to protect consumers from the 

unwanted intrusion and nuisance of unsolicited telemarketing phone calls and fax 

advertisements.” 847 F.3d at 1043 (citing Pub. L. 102-243, § 2, ¶ 12.) The legislature 

“identified unsolicited contact as a concrete harm, and gave consumers a means to redress 

this harm.” Id. In rejecting the defendant’s challenge to plaintiff’s standing, the Ninth 

Circuit held that “[u]nsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their 

nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging 

a violation under the TCPA ‘need not allege any additional harm beyond the one 

Congress has identified.’” Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).

In this case, WCC is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that 

Plaintiff does not have standing. Plaintiff has established that she received unsolicited, 

automated calls to her cell phone from WCC, which is sufficient to confer Article III 

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standing under Van Patten. Plaintiff received five to seven calls a day. (Opp’n, Decl. of 

Mona Amini, Ex. A at 66.) The calls disrupted and bothered her. (Id. at 29, 42, 94.) She 

testified that she “kept getting harassed. They kept calling me constantly.” (Id. at 42.) 

Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has satisfied the injury in 

fact requirement. WCC’s motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 5, 2017

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