Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00665/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00665-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EASYCARE, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

LANDER INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Defendant, 

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No. 4:08-CV-00665-TUC-CKJ (DTF)

ORDER

LANDER INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Counterclaimant,

vs.

EASYCARE, INC.,

Counterdefendant

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On December 1, 2010, Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro issued a Report and

Recommendation [Doc. 80] construing certain claim terms pursuant to a Markman hearing.1

On December 15, 2010, Defendant/Counterclaimant Lander Industries filed its

Objection to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 81]. On December 27,

2010 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant filed its Response to Defendant’s Objections to Judge’s

December 1, 2010 Report and Recommendation [Doc. 85]. On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff

Case 4:08-cv-00665-CKJ-DTF Document 102 Filed 11/09/11 Page 1 of 17
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filed its Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits [Doc. 86] regarding its previously filed

Response. On January 24, 2011, Defendant filed its Cross Motion for Leave to File Reply

Brief to EasyCare’s Extended Response to Defendant’s Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation [Doc. 87]. On December 27, 2010, the Court issued its Order

[Doc. 84] granting Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages [Doc. 83]. As such,

the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits [Doc. 86], and deny

Defendant’s Cross Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief to EasyCare’s Extended Response

to Defendant’s Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 87].

In its discretion, the Court finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument.

See LRCiv. 7.2(f). The Parties have adequately presented the facts and legal arguments in

their briefs and supporting documents, and the decisional process would not be significantly

aided by oral argument.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the Report and

Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court reviews for clear

error the unobjected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation. Johnson v. Zema

Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); See also, Conley v. Crabtree, 14

F.Supp.2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998).

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant objects broadly to the legal standard used by the magistrate judge, as well

as more specifically to the claim construction. The Court shall address each of these in turn,

and in doing so has reviewed all of the pleadings, exhibits and transcript, including a careful

review of the prosecution history for Plaintiff’s Patent No. 7,461,497 B2 (“‘497 Patent”).

A. Legal Standard

As an initial matter, Defendant complains that the Report and Recommendation (“R

& R”) [Doc. 80] “incorrectly state[s] that ‘there are only two situations when a court should

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ascribe claim terms a meaning other than the ordinary and customary one: if (1) the patentee

acts as his own lexicographer and explicitly defines a claim term; or (2) if the claim term is

so unclear that its scope cannot be ascertained from the language used.’” Def.’s Obj. to R &

R [Doc. 83] at 3 (emphasis added). Defendant inaccurately quoted the R & R. A careful

review of the quoted section of the R & R reveals that the word “only” is absent from the

magistrate judge’s actual statement. The magistrate judge first stated the general rule, “[t]he

terms of a claim are to be given their ‘ordinary and customary meaning,’ which is ‘the

meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the

time of the invention.’” R & R at 3 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313

(Fed. Cir. 2005). The magistrate judge went on to recognize the exceptions to the general

rule, to which Defendant now objects. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, upon which

the magistrate judge relied, stated:

Our case law demonstrates two situations where a sufficient reason exists to

require the entry of a definition of a claim term other than its ordinary and

accustomed meaning. The first arises if the patentee has chosen to be his or

her own lexicographer by clearly setting forth an explicit definition for a claim

term. The second is where the term or terms chosen by the patentee so deprive

the claim of clarity that there is no means by which the scope of the claim may

be ascertained from the language used.

Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal

citations omitted). It is clear that the magistrate judge stated the exceptions correctly, and

Defendant’s argument to the contrary is without merit.

Defendant further avers that the R & R failed to “consider or set forth the legal

standards required under Phillips regarding the prosecution history, especially the

prosecution history limitations.” Def.’s Obj. to R & R at 3. The Court finds this claim also

without merit.

“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the

invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415

F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration

Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Patent Act requires that the

“specification describe the invention as set forth in the claims” and that one must “look to

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the language of the claims to determine what ‘the applicant regards as his invention.’”

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112). First, as recognized by the magistrate

judge, claim terms are to be given their “ordinary and customary” meaning, which is “the

meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the

time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13 (citations omitted); R & R at 3. The

Phillips court goes on to instruct that “[t]he claims, of course, do not stand alone. Rather,

they are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument,’ consisting principally of a

specification that concludes with the claims.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview

Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384

(1996)). As such, “claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a

part.’” Id. (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979).

“In addition to consulting the specification, [the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has]

held that a court ‘should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’”

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). The Phillips court further

instructs:

The prosecution history, which we have designated as part of the “intrinsic

evidence,” consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the

[Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)] and includes the prior art cited during

the examination of the patent. Like the specification, the prosecution history

provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.

Furthermore, like the specification, the prosecution history was created by the

patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the patent. Yet because the

prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and

the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the

clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction

purposes. Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often inform the meaning

of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the

invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of

prosecution, making the claim scope narrower that it would otherwise be.

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “intrinsic evidence” consisting

of the claim(s), the specification and the prosecution history are of primary importance in

claim construction. See id.

The Federal Circuit has “also authorized district courts to rely on extrinsic evidence,

which ‘consists of all evidence external to the patent and the prosecution history, including

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expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317

(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (citations omitted)) (citations omitted). “[W]hile extrinsic

evidence ‘can shed useful light on the relevant art,’ we have explained that it is ‘less

significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim

language.’” Id. (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp, 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir.

2004) (citations omitted)). Still, “dictionaries and treatises can be useful in claim

construction.” Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, expert testimony can also be useful to

a court; “[h]owever, conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a

claim term are not useful to a court.” Id. 415 F.3d at 1318 (citations omitted). Ultimately,

the district court is directed to use its sound discretion and weigh the evidence “keep[ing] in

mind the flaws inherent in each type of evidence and assess that evidence accordingly.” Id.

at 1319. The Court finds that Magistrate Judge Ferraro applied the correct legal standard.

B. Objections to Claim Construction

Defendant’s objections arise primarily from Claim 10 of the ‘497 Patent. Claim 10

of the ‘497 Patent states, as follows:

A horse boot comprising:

a shell that includes a sole, an upper, and a tongue, said shell being limited in

size to extend everywhere below a hairline of a hoof of a horse wearing the

horse boot;

a gaiter attached to the upper of the shell, said gaiter including a connecting

section enclosing a heel portion of the upper around a back portion of said

hoof, and including an open wrapping section with flaps for releasably

wrapping around the enclosing a pastern of the horse above the hairline and

below a fetlock of the horse, said hairline remaining uncovered by said

open wrapping section around a front portion of the hoof; and

a restraining mechanism for strapping the shell of the boot on the hoof of the

horse wherein said hairline is in a gap between a front lower edge of said

gaiter and an upper edge of said tongue.

Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “A” at 14.

1. Upper

Defendant objects to the magistrate judge’s construction of the term “upper.” Def.’s

Obj. to R & R at 3. Magistrate Judge Ferraro construed the term “upper” as “a portion of the

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shell that extends upward from the sole.” R & R at 9. This is also the definition propounded

by Plaintiff. Pl.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief [Doc. 56] at 8. Defendant asserts that

the magistrate judge’s construction is ambiguous and impermissibly expands the limitations

in the prosecution history. Def.’s Obj. to R & R at 5. Defendant argues that at a minimum,

the term “upper” must account for a definition which includes “the vamp and quarters.” Id.

at 5-6. Defendant originally requested the term “upper” to be construed as “an element of

the shell that is a peripheral wall which extends upward along the back or back portion, and

two sides of the sole and may not rise above the hairline of the hoof of a horse.” Def.’s

Markman Resp. Brief on the ‘497 Patent [Doc. 70] at 8.

As an initial matter, it is express within the claim that the “shell” is “limited in size

to extend everywhere below a hairline of a hoof of a horse wearing the horse boot.” Joint

Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “A” at 14. As such, adding this

limitation to the term “upper” is unnecessary and superfluous. Removing this portion from

Defendant’s preferred construction would leave “upper” defined as “an element of the shell

that is a peripheral wall which extends upward along the back or back portion, and two sides

of the sole.”

In support of its construction, Defendant relies first on the background section of the

‘497 Patent. This portion, entitled “Description of the Prior Art” states that “[a] typical horse

boot consists of a sole and an upper integral with or secured to the sole. The upper wraps

around the back and the side portions of the boot and, in most cases, it defines an opening

for a tongue at the front of the boot.” ‘497 Patent at 1:27-39. Further, the “Description of

the Prior Art” states, “[s]o long as an opening forms during use between the upper of the boot

and the hoof, sand and other material will continue to penetrate and irritate the horse.” Id.

at 2:8-11. Additionally, Defendant relies on the PTO rejection of Patent Application No.

11/281,359 and a German patent in support of its contention that the prior art dictates a

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2

Local Rule 7.1(b), Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, provides that “[a]ll pleadings and other papers shall be written in the English language.”

LRCiv. 7.1(b)(1). Defendant’s submission of a German language document in support of its

arguments is not helpful to the Court. Although the hearing transcript references Exhibits 10 and

11 as being the German patent with an English translation, this is not consistent with the Exhibits

available to the Court. Moreover, the Court’s reading of the German patent is that it describes a cap

with a front and running on both sides; however, this is distinguished from the heel part, which in

some figures is absent.

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narrower construction of the term “upper.”2

 The description of the prior art is helpful “to

show what was then old, to distinguish what [is] new, and to aid the court in the construction

of the patent.” Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41, 1 Otto 37 (1875) (discussing admissibility

of evidence of the state of the art). It should not, however, vary the limitations in the claims.

Next, Defendant asserts that the language of the ‘497 Patent Specification mandates

a restricted definition of the term upper. Relying on the “Description of the Preferred

Embodiments,” Defendant urges “the upper 16 consists of a peripheral wall which runs along

the edge of the sole 14 on the back and the sides of the shell 12 and is secured to the sole in

a conventional manner.” ‘497 Patent at 4:41-44 (emphasis in original). The next line

provides, “[t]he upper 16 which is preferably also molded and integral with the sole defines

an opening for receiving the hoof H.” Id. at 4:44-47. “[T]he law does not require the court,

where an applicant describes only a single embodiment to construe the claims as limited to

that one embodiment.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381

F.3d 1111, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although the description of the “upper” relied on by

Defendant is one embodiment, it should not be read to be the only possibility. Toward this

end, the broad description of the “upper” as “defin[ing] the opening for receiving the hoof”

is instructive. 

Finally, Defendant asserts that the magistrate judge deleted a portion of the dictionary

definition of “upper” he purportedly relied upon thereby expanding the scope of the term.

According to Defendant, the definition of “upper” must at a minimum be “the upper portion

of a shoe or boot, above the sole, comprising the vamp and quarters.” Defendant then invites

the Court to analyze the meanings of the terms vamp and quarters. Plaintiff acknowledged

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 Bates No. EC 00441.

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during oral argument that this was the definition of “upper” provided to the PTO during the

application process; however, it is Plaintiff’s position that vamp and quarters is subsumed

in its preferred construction, “a portion of the shell that extends upward from the sole.” Hr’g

Tr. 11/9/10 [Doc. 97] at 23:21-28:18; See also Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing

Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “11,” Pl.’s Resp. to Final Office Action 12/3/2007 at 4.3

 Plaintiff

further defined “vamp” as “the part between the sole and the top of the shoe or boot and in

front of a line drawn downward from the ankle-bone.” Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing

Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “11,” Pl.’s Resp. to Final Office Action 12/3/2007 at 4. “The

quarters are parts above the sole from the middle of the back to the vamp.” Id. These

definitions were provided to the PTO in response to the Examiner’s position regarding

elements of the Barclay horse boot. This reference to human footwear was an effort to aid

the PTO in understanding how Plaintiff’s boot differed from the prior art. A reference to

human footwear is imperfect, however, in that the anatomy of a horse and a human differ.

Although colloquially the fetlock is referred to as the “ankle” of a horse, it is technically a

different joint. See Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement [Doc. 46], Exh. “23,”

Clinical Equine Anatomy and Common Disorders of the Horse at 81-82; Gray, H., Anatomy

of the Human Body (2000). Thus, although the human footwear analogy is helpful, it cannot

precisely translate to equine boots. As such, the Court agrees with Plaintiff’s contention that

the concept of vamp and quarters was necessarily subsumed within the definition of upper

relied upon by the PTO, inasmuch as they served to orient the Examiner as to what features

in a horse boot constitute an “upper.” Furthermore, “[a]n argument made to an examiner

constitutes a disclaimer only if it is ‘clear and unmistakable.’” Schindler Elev. Corp. v. Otis

Elev. Corp., 593 F.3d 1275, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Court does not find an unequivocal

disavowal as urged by Defendant. See Omega Eng’g v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“where the patentee has unequivocally disavowed a certain meaning to

obtain his patent, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary

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meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of the surrender.”). In addition to the support

found in the prosecution history, the magistrate judge’s construction is consistent with the

‘497 Patent Specification which states that “[o]ne aspect of the invention resides in a boot

shell with an upper extending upward below the hairline of the hoof of the horse and with

a protective gaiter attached to the back portion of the upper.” ‘497 Patent at 2:37-40. The

Court will therefore, adopt the magistrate judge’s construction of “upper” as “a portion of

the shell that extends upward from the sole.”

2. Tongue

Defendant objects to the magistrate judge’s construction of the term “tongue.” The

magistrate judge adopted the following construction: “a flap located at the front portion of

the shell with a free end projecting upward from an opening in the shell.” R & R at 10. The

magistrate judge adopted Plaintiff’s construction as defined in its Response brief. Pl.’s Claim

Construction Resp. Brief [Doc. 69] at 9. Defendant asserts that the construction should be:

“an element of the shell that is located in the front portion of the shell, is integral with the

sole, extends upward from the sole to a free end.” Def.’s Obj. to R & R [Doc. 83] at 7.

Defendant argues that through his construction, the magistrate judge improperly expanded

the limitation of claim scope.

During the prosecution history, Plaintiff made the following statement to the PTO:

Generally speaking, a tongue is [a] flap with a free end projecting upward from

an opening in the upper of the shoe or boot. The tongue facilitates entry of the

foot into the shoe or boot and often a gusset is attached on both sides of the

tongue in order to maintain continuity in the enclosure provided by the upper

in spite of the opening resulting from the presence of a tongue protruding

upward from the lower, front portion of the upper.

Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “15,” Pl.’s Resp. to Office

Action and Amendment 5/25/2007 at 10. Plaintiff also provided the Examiner with

dictionary definitions of the term “tongue” including Merriam-Webster’s definition as “the

flap under the lacing or buckles of a shoe at the throat of the vamp” and Encarta’s definition,

“the middle flap in the opening of a shoe or boot.” Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing

Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “15,” Pl.’s Resp. to Office Action and Amendment 5/25/2007 at

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10; Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “6,” Pl.’s Amended Brief

on Appeal 5/27/2008 at EC 00081-83. The ‘497 Patent’s “Description of the Preferred

Embodiments” provides the following:

The tongue 18, located in the front portion of the shell 12, also extends upward

from the sole 14 and is integral with the sole. Separated by the upper 16 by

two symmetrical slits 28, the tongue 18 has a free end 30 that is movable in

and out of the shell opening defined by the tongue and the upper, thereby

facilitating the process of placing a hoof in the shell and also allowing the

tongue 18 and the upper 16 to conform to the hoof. The tongue is preferably

manufactured as a molded structure integral with the upper and its extent is

defined by the slits that separate the top portion of the tongue from the forward

edges of the upper. These edges may be folded backward inside the boot to

provide a retaining structure for an alternative restraining mechanism used to

secure the boot on the hoof, as described below.

‘497 Patent at 4:61-5:7 (emphasis in original).

Defendant argues that the magistrate judge’s exclusion of the second sentence of the

dictionary definition of “tongue” presented by Plaintiff to the PTO, impermissibly broadened

the scope of the claim, as well as introduced ambiguity to the term. The Court disagrees.

The omitted portion, “[t]he tongue facilitates entry of the foot into the shoe or boot and often

a gusset is attached on both sides of the tongue in order to maintain continuity in the

enclosure provided by the upper in spite of the opening resulting from the presence of a

tongue protruding upward from the lower, front portion of the upper,” provides an

explanation of the function of a “tongue” in human footwear. Joint Claim Constr. and PreHearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “15,” Pl.’s Resp. to Office Action and Amendment

5/25/2007 at 10. It does not provide elements essential to the construction of the term

“tongue.” Indeed, in consideration of the preferred embodiments, the ‘497 Patent provides,

“the tongue 18 has a free end 30 that is movable in and out of the shell opening defined by

the tongue and the upper, thereby facilitating the process of placing a hoof in the shell and

also allowing the tongue 18 and the upper 16 to conform to the hoof.” ‘497 Patent at 4:61-

5:7 (emphasis in original).

The ‘497 Patent provides that the preferred embodiment is one in which the tongue

is integral with the sole and the upper. ‘497 Patent at 4:61-5:7. Merriam-Webster’s

Dictionary defines “integral” as “essential to completeness” or “formed as a unit with another

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part.” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integral (last visited 9/20/11). As such,

for a “tongue” to be integral with the sole and the upper, suggests that the “tongue” is an

essential element to the horse boot, not that it must be physically adhered as Defendant

argues. “A flap located at the front portion of the shell with a free end projecting upward

from an opening in the shell” may be integral with the sole either by directly attaching to it

or in combination with a portion of the upper. Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the

magistrate judge’s construction of tongue is neither contradictory or incompatible with the

prosecution history. Accordingly, the Court adopts the magistrate judge’s construction of

“tongue” as “a flap located at the front portion of the shell with a free end projecting upward

from an opening in the shell.”

3. Connecting Section

Defendant objects to the magistrate judge’s construction of “connecting section.” The

magistrate judge construed “connecting section” as: “a structure of the gaiter that allows it

to be connected to the upper.” R & R [Doc. 80] at 14. Defendant asserts that the magistrate

judge’s construction is impermissibly vague and improperly expands the limitation of claim

scope in the intrinsic record. Defendant avers that the proper construction is “a durable

transition between a mounting section and an open wrapping section.” Def.’s Obj. to R &

R at 10. Plaintiff contends that the proper construction is “a structure of the gaiter that allows

it to be connected to the upper” as determined by the magistrate judge. Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s

Obj. to R & R [Doc. 85] at 8; See also, Pl.’s Opening Claim Constr. Brief [Doc. 56] at 17.

Claim 10 provides “a gaiter attached to the upper of the shell, said gaiter including a

connecting section enclosing a heel portion of the upper around a back portion of said hoof.”

‘497 Patent at 10:9-12 (emphasis added). The plain language of the claim describes the

“connecting section” as a part of the gaiter. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has

instructed that “different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings.” John v.

Bobrick Wash. Equip., 527 F.3d 1379, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Moreover, “[o]ther claims of

the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of

enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (citations

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omitted). Non-asserted claim 1 provides “wherein the gaiter includes a mounting section for

releasable connection of the gaiter to a heel portion of the upper.” ‘497 Patent at 9:22-3

(emphasis added). As such, Defendant’s proposed construction must fail because it

incorporates a term of art, “mounting section,” not required by the asserted claim. Thus, the

term “mounting section” and “connecting section” are presumed to be distinct. 

This distinction is further reinforced by the specification, describing the preferred

embodiments, which provides that:

The connecting section 36 is used to provide a durable transition between the

rigid mounting section 34 and the stretchable wrapping section 32. To that

end, it is made of a flexible but not stretchable material and it preferably

overlaps the back side of the wrapping section, as illustrated in FIG. 4. The

material used should advantageously be stronger and more resistant to wear

than the material of the wrapping section 32. Suitable materials for the

connecting section 36 include leather as well as textiles made from natural and

or synthetic substances. As a result of this configuration, the stretchability of

the lower heel portion of the wrapping section 32 is partly limited by the

overlapping material of the connecting section 36, but it is also greatly

reinforced thereby.

‘497 Patent 5:60-6:5 (describing preferred embodiments) (emphasis in original). The

specification further provides:

It is noted that the gaiter 22 is much more susceptible to wear and tear than the

shell 12 of the invention because of the softer and less resistant materials used

to provide comfort and attached to the shell 12 by means of connections that

can be easily uncoupled, such as screws, snaps, ball-and-socket, tongue-andgroove, channel-and-rod, a hook-and-loop strip, or the like. Accordingly, the

gaiter is made replaceable during the life of the horse boot in order to take

advantage of the longer useful life of the plastic shell. As the quality of

materials improves and materials with durability comparable to that of the

shell 12 are developed that provide the described gaiter functions, it is

anticipated that the boot of the invention may be manufactured with a

permanently attached gaiter.

‘497 Patent 6:35-48 (describing preferred embodiments) (emphasis in original). This latter

paragraph contemplates a gaiter which connects permanently to the boot, without a mounting

section, thereby supporting Plaintiff’s contention that a connecting section is a structure of

the gaiter that allows it to be connected to the upper.

Defendant further asserts that the magistrate judge “incorrectly applied limitations

found in the prosecution history” and improperly looked to Plaintiff’s intent when

considering its response to PTO action. Def.’s Obj. to R & R at 12. Defendant argued the

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limitations of the prosecution history in objecting to the legal standard applied by the

magistrate judge, but now requests the Court to unwaveringly rely upon that history in

support of its construction. “[B]ecause the prosecution history represents an ongoing

negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that

negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim

construction purposes.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (internal citations omitted). Although,

Plaintiff stated that “both claims 1 and 19 require that the gaiter have a ‘section for releasable

connection of the gaiter to a heel portion of the upper[,]’” the term releasable does not appear

in independent claim 10. Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh.

“15,” Pl.’s Resp. to Office Action and Amendment 5/25/2007 at 12. Non-asserted claim 1

states that the “mounting section” provides a “releasable connection of the gaiter.” ‘497

Patent at 9:22-3. Claim 10 does not require the “connecting section” to be releasable. Id. at

10:9-12; See also, discussion, supra. Moreover, dependant claim 18 provides, “[t]he horse

boot of claim 10, wherein said connecting section is releasably connected to the heel portion

of the upper.” Id. at 10:43-5 (emphasis in original). “[T]he presence of a dependent claim

that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is

not present in the independent claim.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. As such, the plain

language of the claims and the specification of the ‘497 Patent, with due consideration of the

prosecution history, do not demonstrate that the presence of a connecting section necessarily

implies the presence of a mounting section. See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs, AG, 318

F.3d 1081, 1089-91 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no clear disclaimer because the statement made

was “facially inaccurate” in light of the remainder of the prosecution history). The Court

adopts the magistrate judge’s construction of “connecting section” as “a structure of the

gaiter that allows it to be connected to the upper.”

4. Heel Portion of the Upper

Defendant objects to the magistrate judge’s construction of the term “heel portion of

the upper” as impermissibly vague, failing to consider the prosecution history, and

improperly expanding upon the disclaimers of claim scope. Def.’s Obj. to R & R [Doc. 83]

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This presumes that a hoof is roughly circular, and therefore 360-degrees.

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at 14. The magistrate judge construed this term as “the rear 180-degrees of the upper.” R

& R [Doc. 80] at 17. Defendant asserts that “heel portion of the upper” should be construed

as “the back portion of the upper – not the two sides – of the upper.” Plaintiff supports the

magistrate judge’s interpretation.

Claim 10 provides “a gaiter attached to the upper of the shell, said gaiter including a

connecting section enclosing a heel portion of the upper around a back portion of said

hoof[.]” ‘497 Patent 10:9-11. Dependent claim 11 provides “said connecting section

encloses the heel portion of the upper over at least 180 degrees around the back portion of

the hoof[.]” Id. at 10:21-3. The limitation contained within claim 11 that at a minimum 180

degrees of the back portion of the hoof suggests that the heel portion may be the rear 180

degrees of the hoof or something less.4

Plaintiff, in its initial application explained that “it is recommended that the back side

of the gaiter 22 cover at least the entire back of the hoof (that is, at least 180-degree

coverage)[.]” Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “22,” Pl.’s

Utility Patent Application 11/17/2005 at 16. This would suggest that the entire back of the

hoof encompasses the rear half of the hoof, which would indicate that the heel portion is

something less than 180-degrees. At oral argument, Plaintiff contended that “heel portion

of the upper . . . has to be construed with respect to the anatomy of a hoof and that the heel

includes the sides as well as the back.” Hr’g Tr. 11/9/10 at 68:5-8. Anatomically speaking,

the heel portion of the hoof encompasses between approximately 120 and 240 degrees of the

rear of the hoof. Id. at 113:5-117:14; Hr’g 11/9/10 Exh. 21, Stashak, Ted, Adams’ Lameness

in Horses 95 (Lea & Febiger, 4th ed., 1987).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff narrowed its construction of “heel portion of the

upper” by designating it as the “rear lip” in its appeal. See Joint Claim Constr. and PreHearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “6,” Pl.’s Amended Brief on Appeal 8/21/2008 at 3 &

Fig. 7. As Plaintiff notes, the PTO expressly states that “[t]he use of reference characters is

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to be considered as having no effect on the scope of the claims.” Manual of Patent

Examining Procedure 608.01(m). Nor does it represent a disavowal of the claim scope. See

Verizon v. Vonage Holdings, 503 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Further, the ‘497 Patent

specification provides:

The mounting section 34 of the gaiter is designed to be attached to the rear lip

24 of the upper 16 of the boot. As seen better in the rear and side views of

FIGS. 4 and 5, the shape of the mounting section 34 conforms to the lip 24 and

the sides of the upper 16, so that it can be mounted around them.

‘497 Patent 5:42-6. This section distinguishes the lip of the upper from the sides of the

upper. It does not, however, define the heel portion.

As an initial matter, the Court finds Defendant’s construction more vague than that

which was adopted by the magistrate judge. Moreover, it is not supported by how one skilled

in the art would interpret a “heel portion” of a hoof. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The

equine heel encompasses the area between approximately 120 and 240 degrees or the rear

third of the hoof. Logically, the heel portion of a horse boot would encompass, at a

minimum, this same area. Further, Plaintiff propounded such a definition in oral argument

and its briefing. The magistrate judge’s construction, however, is broader than this

definition. As such, the Court will construe “heel portion of the upper” as “the rear third of

the horse boot upper, encompassing the area between approximately 120 and 240 degrees,

where zero is the toe apex at the front of the boot.”

5. Open Wrapping Section with Flaps

Defendant urges that the magistrate judge improperly expanded the claim scope in his

construction of the term “open wrapping section with flaps.” Def.’s Obj. to R & R [Doc. 83]

at 15. Defendant further urges this Court to adopt its construction, “an element of the back

portion of the gaiter that is open to the front, with at least two flaps for wrapping around the

front of the pastern.” Id. at 16. The magistrate judge construed this term consistently with

that propounded by Plaintiff, as “an element of the gaiter that is open to the front, with at

least two flaps for wrapping around the front of the pastern.” R & R [Doc. 80] at 20.

Claim 10 provides for:

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a gaiter attached to the upper of the shell, said gaiter including a connecting

section enclosing a heel portion of the upper around a back portion of said

hoof, and including an open wrapping section with flaps for releasably

wrapping around and enclosing a pastern of the horse above the hairline and

below a fetlock of the horse, said hairline remaining uncovered by said open

wrapping section around a front portion of the hoof.

‘497 Patent at 10:9-16. In its initial application, Plaintiff defined the “wrapping section” as

including “a central portion designed to cover the back of the hoof of the horse and two flaps

38, 40 extending forward, so that they can be wrapped around the pastern of the horse above

the front hairline of the hoof and below the fetlock.” Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing

Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “22,” Pl.’s Utility Patent Application 11/17/2005 at 13.

Subsequently, in response to the Examiner’s objection to claims 1-10, Plaintiff further

explained, “[t]he back portion 32 of the gaiter 22 is described in the specification as a

wrapping section (see the second line of Paragraph 32), separate and distinct from the flaps

38, 40 that extend forward from the wrapping section. Therefore, the flaps of the invention

do not extend to the back of the gaiter.” Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement

[Doc. 44], Exh. “15,” Pl.’s Resp. to Office Action and Amendment 5/25/2007 at 6. With

regard to both claims 1 and 19, Plaintiff defines a gaiter as “a structure that wraps around the

pastern.” See Joint Claim Constr. and Pre-Hearing Statement [Doc. 44], Exh. “15,” Pl.’s

Resp. to Office Action and Amendment 5/25/2007 at 12. As such, the “open wrapping

section” could be something less than the entire gaiter.

Dependent claim 11 provides, “[t]he horse boot of claim 10, wherein said connecting

section encloses the heel portion of the upper over at least 180 degrees around the back

portion of the hoof, and said hairline remains uncovered by said open wrapping section over

at least 120 degrees around the front portion of the hoof.” ‘497 Patent at 10:21-5 (emphasis

in original). Dependent claim 12 provides, “[t]he horse boot of claim 11, wherein said

wrapping section is approximately six inches high around a heel of a hoof and at least one

and a half inches high around the front portion of the hoof and the horse wearing the boot.”

Id. at 10:26-9 (emphasis in original). “[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a

particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present

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in the independent claim.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. By urging a construction that would

define an “open wrapping section with flaps” as “an element of the back portion of the

gaiter,” Defendant improperly limits the term as contemplated by claim 10, which must be

broader than the limitations provided by the dependent claims. As such, the Court adopts the

magistrate judge’s construction of the term “open wrapping section with flaps” as “an

element of the gaiter that is open to the front, with at least two flaps for wrapping around the

front of the pastern.”

Accordingly, after an independent review of the pleadings, exhibits and transcript, IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits [Doc. 86] is GRANTED;

2) Defendant’s Cross Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief to EasyCare’s

Extended Response to Defendant’s Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation [Doc. 87] is DENIED; and

3) The Report and Recommendation [Doc. 80] is REJECTED in part. The Court

construes “heel portion of the upper” as “the rear third of the horse boot upper, encompassing

the area between approximately 120 and 240 degrees, where zero is the toe apex at the front

of the boot.” The remainder of the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 80] is ADOPTED.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2011.

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