Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_16-cv-08063/USCOURTS-azd-3_16-cv-08063-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Matthew Oskowis, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Sedona Oak-Creek Unified School District 

#9, 

Defendant.

No. CV-16-08063-PCT-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Defendant Sedona Oak-Creek Unified School District #9’s Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 49, MJP), to which pro se Plaintiff Matthew Oskowis 

filed a Response (Doc. 51, Resp. to MJP), and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 55, MJP 

Reply). 

 Defendant asks the Court to grant judgment on the pleadings with regard to 

Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 49-56) on three separate 

grounds. First, Defendant argues that the claims raised in Count 1 are barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata. (MJP at 4-5; MJP Reply at 5-6.) Second, Defendant argues that 

the claims in Counts 1 and 2 are moot. (MJP at 6-7; MJP Reply at 1-3.) Finally, 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the requisite administrative remedies 

for Counts 1 and 2 prior to seeking judicial relief. (MJP at 7-9; MJP Reply at 4-5.) In 

response, Plaintiff asserts that the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to the current 

proceedings (Resp. to MJP at 6-9), that neither of his claims is moot (Resp. to MJP at 2-

6, 11-12), and that the law does not require Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies 

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prior to seeking judicial relief (Resp. to MJP at 9-12). The Court finds these matters 

appropriate for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 

I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff is the father of E.O., who was diagnosed with classical infantile autism. 

In March 2010, E.O. started attending West Sedona School within Sedona Oak Creek 

Unified School District. In July 2010, Plaintiff requested mediation between the parties 

from the Arizona Department of Education (“ADE”) concerning issues with E.O.’s 

Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). In September 2010, the parties reached an 

agreement (“2010 Agreement”). In September 2011, Plaintiff requested mediation 

between the parties from the ADE for “failure to honor prior mediation.” The parties 

reached a new agreement in October 2011 (“2011 Agreement”). In April 2013, Plaintiff 

filed a third mediation request, which Defendant formally denied. 

 On April 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Civil Complaint in Yavapai County Superior 

Court (“Yavapai Complaint”) for breach of contract, alleging that Defendant failed to 

substantively comply with the 2010 and 2011 Agreements. In May 2013, Plaintiff filed a 

Due Process Complaint under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7) with the ADE. In June 2013, the 

parties participated in four resolution meetings and reached a Resolution Agreement 

(“2013 Agreement”). After the 2013 Agreement, Plaintiff filed a second Due Process 

Complaint, which the ADE dismissed for insufficiency. In July 2013, Plaintiff filed a 

modified version of the June Complaint, but the resulting resolution meeting on July 24, 

2013, was unsuccessful. In September 2013, the state Superior Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 

state claim in accordance with Plaintiff’s stipulation that the Yavapai Complaint be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

 Plaintiff filed the current Complaint on March 28, 2016. Count 1 of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint alleges that Defendant deliberately and willfully violated the 2010 and 2011 

Agreements and requests that the Court enforce those Mediation Agreements under the 

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (Compl. ¶¶ 50-52.) Count 2 of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant deliberately and willfully violated the 2013 

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Agreement and requests that the Court enforce the 2013 Agreement under IDEA. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 54-56.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “a party may move for judgment on 

the pleadings” after the pleadings are closed “but early enough not to delay trial.” A 

motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) challenges the legal 

sufficiency of the opposing party’s pleadings. Westlands Water Dist. v. Bureau of 

Reclamation, 805 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 

 A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted if “the moving 

party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains 

to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). Judgment on the 

pleadings is also proper when there is either a “lack of cognizable legal theory” or the 

“absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). In reviewing a Rule 12(c) 

motion, “all factual allegations in the complaint [must be accepted] as true and 

construe[d] . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 

581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is 

warranted “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that 

could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Deveratura v. Globe Aviation Sec. 

Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 A. Effective Period of the Agreements and Mootness 

 Defendant argues that Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint are moot because 

the Mediation Agreements expired when the parties created a new IEP and the provisions 

of the 2013 Agreement were only effective for the 2013-2014 school year, thereby 

precluding later enforcement of those agreements. (MJP at 6-7; MJP Reply at 1-3.) 

Plaintiff argues that the Mediation Agreements persist independently of any subsequent 

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IEPs because: (1) Defendant failed to check some of the boxes on the Mediation 

Agreements that state that each individual resolution will be added to the student’s IEP 

(Resp. to MJP at 2-4, 6); (2) Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with a statutorily 

required Prior Written Notice (“PWN”), notifying Plaintiff of Defendant’s intent to 

incorporate the Mediation Agreements into E.O.’s IEP (Resp. to MJP at 3-5); and (3) 

Plaintiff would not have agreed to any Mediation Agreement that would be effective for 

less than three months (Resp. to MJP at 3, 4-5). 

 1. Count I: 2010 and 2011 Agreements 

 Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(2)(F) and 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii), federal courts have 

jurisdiction to enforce IDEA settlement agreements reached during mediation or a 

resolution session. See Justin R. ex rel. Jennifer R. v. Matayoshi, No. 10-00657, 2011 WL 

2470624, at *10 (D. Haw. June 17, 2011). Although Defendant argues that the 2010 

Agreement expressly applied, in its entirety, as an addendum to E.O.’s IEP (MJP at 2), 

there is no evidence that the parties actually incorporated the 2010 Agreement into the 

IEP. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges, and Defendant does not dispute, that Defendant failed 

to provide a PWN by which either Mediation Agreement could be incorporated into 

E.O.’s IEP. (Resp. to MJP at 3, 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that he would not have accepted 

limiting the provisions solely to the IEPs currently in effect when the parties signed the 

Mediation Agreements. (Resp. to MJP at 3, 4-5.) Notably, Defendant does not even 

address the 2011 Agreement’s applicability to E.O.’s IEP. Accepting Plaintiff’s 

allegations as true, pursuant to the applicable legal standard, Count 1 of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is not moot. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking redress for Defendant’s 

failure to incorporate the Mediation Agreements into E.O.’s IEP, Count 1 of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint presents a live controversy. 

 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that any part of the Mediation Agreements 

persists independently of E.O.’s IEP. The 2010 Agreement specifically states three times 

that “[t]his agreement will be considered an addendum to the IEP.” (Compl., Ex. A at 2, 

4-5.) Although the language of the 2011 Agreement is less clear, the checked boxes 

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stating an intent to apply some of the resolutions to E.O.’s IEP at an IEP meeting on or 

before December 7, 2011 (Compl., Ex. B at 1-3) indicate the parties’ intent to apply the 

resolutions in the 2011 Agreement to the IEP. Furthermore, Defendant argues 

persuasively that allowing a mediation agreement to apply independently of an IEP does 

not fulfill IDEA’s purpose of serving the “changing needs of the child.” (MJP Reply 

at 2.) The IEP must be capable of adapting to a child’s needs, free from the encumbrances 

of previous resolutions that may no longer serve those needs. 

 On the other hand, the Court also rejects Defendant’s argument that the provisions 

of the Mediation Agreements could apply only to the IEP in effect when the parties 

signed the Agreements. Under IDEA, an educational agency’s IEP Team must review

each child’s IEP “not less than annually,” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i), and revise the 

IEP when necessary to address all appropriate matters regarding the child’s IEP, 20 

U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii). “[T]he purposes of the IDEA [are] to provide disabled 

students a free appropriate public education [“FAPE”] and to protect the educational 

rights of those students.” Doug C. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 720 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 

2013) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)). According to reports from the House Committee 

on Education and the Workforce as well as the Senate Committee on Labor and Human 

Resources, the purpose of an IEP is to create an educational program that is tailored to a 

child’s needs. See S. Rep. No. 105-17, at 24 (1997); H.R. Rep. No. 105-95, at 104 (1997). 

Thus, provisions within a student’s IEP, including those provisions adopted through the 

mediation process, are not necessarily limited to the school year in which the parties 

adopt them but can persist as long as they are necessary to provide the student with a 

FAPE. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that the resolutions adopted in the Mediation 

Agreements are not effective in perpetuity, but Count 1 of Plaintiff’s Complaint is not 

moot. The parties expressed an intent to incorporate the resolutions within the Mediation 

Agreements into E.O.’s IEP, and those resolutions may persist beyond the IEP currently 

in effect when the parties signed the Mediation Agreements. If Plaintiff demonstrates that 

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Defendant failed to incorporate the terms of the Mediation Agreements into E.O.’s IEP, 

the Court may enforce the Agreements. 

 2. Count 2: 2013 Agreement 

 The 2013 Agreement states that “these terms shall be implemented for the 2013-

2014 school year only.” (Compl., Ex. C at 1.) Plaintiff does not argue that the 2013 

Agreement should apply beyond that particular school year. Nor does Plaintiff argue that 

Defendant failed to incorporate the resolutions in the 2013 Agreement into E.O.’s IEP. 

Plaintiff’s only request for relief is enforcement of the 2013 Agreement—relief that is not 

available under the circumstances because Plaintiff does not dispute that the 2013 

Agreement was only enforceable during the relevant school year. Similar to Count 1, 

however, Plaintiff does allege violations under IDEA in Count 2. (Resp. to MJP at 12.) If 

all other threshold requirements are satisfied, the Court could grant relief for such 

violations. Although Plaintiff seemingly requests improper relief, it is not clear that “no

relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the 

allegations.” Deveratura, 454 F.3d at 1046 (emphasis added); see also Watison v. Carter, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that courts should construe a pro se

plaintiff’s complaint “liberally” and afford the plaintiff “the benefit of any doubt”) 

(internal citation omitted). Accordingly, Count 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint is not moot. 

 B. Res Judicata

 Defendant argues that Count 1 of Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the doctrine of 

res judicata because Plaintiff filed the same claim in the state Superior Court, which 

dismissed that claim with prejudice. (MJP at 4-5; MJP Reply at 5-6.) Plaintiff argues that, 

under Arizona law, this proceeding does not constitute the same cause of action, an 

element necessary for application of res judicata. (Resp. to MJP at 7-8.) Alternatively, 

Plaintiff argues that, even if this proceeding involves the same cause of action, a letter 

from Superintendent David Lykins (Compl., Ex. E) constitutes a changed fact in the form 

of worsening of the earlier conditions, barring application of res judicata. (Resp. to MJP 

at 8-9.) 

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 Federal courts must look to state law to determine the preclusive effect of a state 

court judgment. See Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Under Arizona law, there must be (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) 

common identity of the parties and the capacity in which they appeared, (3) common 

identity of the subject matter, and (4) common identity of the cause of action. Beseder, 

Inc. v. Osten Art, Inc., No. CV 05-00031-PHX, 2006 WL 2730769, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sep. 

25, 2006) (citing Hall v. Lalli, 952 P.2d 748, 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)). “Two causes of 

action which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence are not the same for 

purposes of res judicata if proof of different or additional facts will be required to 

establish them.” E.C. Garcia and Co., Inc. v. Ariz. State Dep’t of Revenue, 875 P.2d 169, 

179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Rousselle v. Jewett, 421 P.2d 529 (Ariz. 1966)). Under 

this “same evidence” test, a plaintiff may avoid preclusion “merely by posturing the same 

claim as a new legal theory,” even if both theories rely on the same underlying 

occurrences. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 934 P.2d 801, 805 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1985); see also Power Rd.-Williams Field LLC v. Gilbert, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 

1309 (D. Ariz. 2014) (recognizing that the “same evidence” test is to be interpreted 

liberally). However, the doctrine of res judicata bars any claims that could have been 

determined in a prior action. Hall, 977 P.2d at 779; Tumacacori Mission Land Dev., Ltd. 

v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 297 P.3d 923, 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). 

 Here, the first, second, and third elements of Arizona’s res judicata test are easily 

satisfied. First, the state Superior Court’s dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s 2013 

Yavapai Complaint (MJP, Ex. C)1

 was a final judgment on the merits. See Torres v. 

Kennecott Copper Corp., 488 P.2d 477, 479 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (“[A] dismissal with 

prejudice is an adjudication on the merits and is therefore [res judicata] as to every issue 

reasonably framed by the pleadings.”) (internal citation omitted). Second, the parties to 

the present dispute are identical to the parties in the state court litigation. Third, the 

 1

 The Court takes judicial notice of both Exhibits A and C in Defendant’s Motion 

as court filings or other matters of public record. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa 

USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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subject matter of Count 1 of Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case—alleged violations of the 

Mediation Agreements (Compl. ¶¶ 49-52)—was the subject matter of Plaintiff’s Yavapai 

Complaint in the 2013 state court action (MJP, Ex. A at 2-3). The last element, common 

identity of the cause of action, requires further consideration. 

 Arizona law does not follow the transaction test applied in the federal case cited 

by Defendant (MJP at 4-5); rather, the Court must rely on Arizona’s “same evidence” 

test. On April 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Yavapai Complaint in the state Superior Court, 

alleging Defendant’s failure to substantively comply with the 2010 and 2011 

Agreements. (MJP, Ex. A. at 2-3.) In Count 1 of the Yavapai Complaint, Plaintiff alleged 

that Defendant specifically failed to comply with Issue 2 (i.e., data sheet requirements) of 

the 2010 Agreement. (MJP, Ex. A at 2.) In Count 2 of the Yavapai Complaint, Plaintiff 

alleged that Defendant specifically failed to comply with Issue 3 (i.e., short term 

objectives and data collection), Issue 4 (i.e., new goals handbook), and Issue 6 (i.e., IEP 

documentation) of the 2011 Agreement. (MJP, Ex. A at 3.) 

 Here, Plaintiff alleges again that Defendant failed to comply with Issue 2 of the 

2010 Agreement and Issues 3 and 6 of the 2011 Agreement. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Additionally, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to comply with Issue 4 (i.e., provision for an aide) 

and Issue 7 (i.e., communications between the parents and the District) of the 2010 

Agreement and Issue 7 (i.e., information to be contained in PWNs) of the 2011 

Agreement. (Compl. ¶ 33.) 

 Plaintiff’s claims alleging Defendant’s failure to comply with Issues 4 and 7 of the 

2010 Agreement and Issue 7 of the 2011 Agreement are not barred by res judicata

because Plaintiff alleges violations of those issues under a new legal theory—violation of 

IDEA rather than breach of contract—and proof of such violations will require new 

evidence. Plaintiff’s claims regarding Issue 2 of the 2010 Agreement and Issues 3 and 6 

of the 2011 Agreement may be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, but only if the 

resolutions pertaining to those issues did not persist in E.O.’s IEP beyond Plaintiff’s 2013 

state claim—a fact which this Court cannot determine based on the pleadings. 

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 The letter from Superintendent Lykins (Compl., Ex. E), upon which Plaintiff relies 

to argue “worsening of the earlier conditions” (Resp. to MJP at 8-9), merely expresses 

Defendant’s intention to not apply the terms of the Mediation Agreements to the extent 

that those provisions interfere with providing E.O. a FAPE. Because the Court rejected 

Plaintiff’s argument that the Mediation Agreements persist independently of E.O.’s IEP, 

that letter does not constitute a “worsening of the earlier conditions.” Nevertheless, at this 

time, none of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies 

before petitioning this Court as required by the IDEA. (MJP at 7-9; MJP Reply at 4-5.) In 

response, Plaintiff argues that, as of 2006, the regulations governing IDEA do not require 

administrative exhaustion prior to seeking judicial relief. (Resp. to MJP at 9-11, 12.) 

Plaintiff does not argue that he has already exhausted all administrative remedies. Nor 

does Plaintiff argue that such administrative remedies would be futile or inadequate. 

 Judicial review under IDEA in a particular case is normally available only if the 

plaintiff exhausts his administrative remedies through IDEA’s due process hearing 

procedures. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); see also Kutasi v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 494 

F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007). The IDEA exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional 

question but rather “a claims processing provision that IDEA defendants may offer as an 

affirmative defense.” Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(en banc) (overruled on other grounds in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(en banc)). IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies in cases where a plaintiff seeks relief 

available under IDEA. Payne, 653 F.3d at 871. The fact that settlement agreements 

arising from IDEA claims are judicially enforceable “does not necessarily dispense with 

the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before the parties seek judicial 

intervention to resolve their differences.” Hayden C. ex rel. Tracy C. v. W. Placer Unified 

Sch. Dist., No. 2:08-CV-03089, 2009 WL 1325945, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2009); see 

also Pedraza v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist., No. 05-04977, 2007 WL 949603, at *5 (N.D. 

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Cal. Mar. 27, 2007) (holding that IDEA’s exhaustion requirement “is not satisfied when 

parties enter into a mediated settlement agreement”) (emphasis in original)). 

 Plaintiff argues that 34 C.F.R. § 300.537 allows him to seek judicial remedy 

without exhausting available administrative remedies. (Resp. to MJP at 10.) But Plaintiff 

misinterprets the applicability of this regulation. By its plain language, this regulation 

allows a state enforcement agency to use other mechanisms to enforce an agreement. 

34 C.F.R. § 300.537. Furthermore—as Plaintiff noted in the Statement of Facts in support 

of his Response (Doc. 54 at 6)—the legislative intent behind this provision was to allow a 

state to provide other mechanisms to enforce agreements. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,703. 

Plaintiff has provided no authority, and the Court is unaware of any, to support the 

argument that Arizona law allows seeking judicial remedy for alleged violations of IDEA 

prior to exhausting administrative remedies. 

 Here, Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the Mediation Agreements and 2013 

Agreement under IDEA. (Compl. ¶¶ 52, 56.) Although Plaintiff does not specifically 

request relief for denial of a FAPE, Plaintiff’s allegations—violations of the Mediation 

Agreements and 2013 Agreement—implicate FAPE issues. Therefore, Plaintiff is 

required to exhaust all available administrative remedies. See Hayden C., 2009 WL 

1325945, at *5 (holding that any settlement agreement that implicates issues of a FAPE 

requires administrative exhaustion). Defendant, however, inappropriately shifted the 

burden to Plaintiff to prove that he exhausted all available administrative remedies. (MJP 

at 8-9.) Administrative exhaustion is an affirmative defense that defendants “must plead 

and prove.” See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

 Accordingly, while the Court finds that Plaintiff is required to exhaust all available 

administrative remedies under IDEA, Defendant will bear the burden of proof to succeed 

on this defense. 

IV. CONCLUSIONS 

 The Court finds that Defendant cannot clearly establish on the face of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint that he failed to state a claim in Counts 1 and 2. Although the provisions of the 

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Mediation Agreements do not exist independently of E.O.’s IEP, Plaintiff alleges, in part, 

that Defendant failed to incorporate the terms of the Mediation Agreements into E.O.’s 

IEP. Because the Court has the authority to enforce such incorporation, Count 1 is not 

moot. Likewise, Count 2 is not moot because Plaintiff alleges violations of the 2013 

Agreement under IDEA—relief the Court has the authority to deliver. 

 The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to Count 1 because some of Plaintiff’s 

claims arise under a new legal theory, requiring new evidence, thereby satisfying the 

applicable Arizona law. The rest of Plaintiff’s claims, though dismissed with prejudice in 

the state Superior Court in 2013, are only barred if the resolutions governing those claims 

did not persist beyond Plaintiff’s 2013 state claim—a fact which is not clear from the 

pleadings alone. 

 Finally, Plaintiff is required to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking 

judicial intervention, but failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense for which Defendant 

bears the burden of proof. Defendant may re-raise this defense on summary judgment.2

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on 

the Pleadings (Doc. 49) as to Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

 Dated this 27th day of March, 2017. 

 

2

 Although the Court can find no case law specifically barring Defendant from raising the failure to exhaust defense in a Rule 12(c) motion, current Ninth Circuit case 

law strongly suggests that such questions are appropriately addressed only in Rule 56 motions. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171 (recognizing that the summary judgment procedures for addressing exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act are 

appropriate for addressing exhaustion under the IDEA). 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge 

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