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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-3171 

ROBERT E. SPIERER, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

COREY E. ROSSMAN, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:13-cv-00991 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 25, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2015 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges. 

MANION, Circuit Judge. After a night of heavy drinking, 

Lauren Spierer, a twenty-year-old Indiana University 

student, left the apartment of a classmate and disappeared. 

Four years later, she remains missing. Lauren’s parents 

brought suit against three students who were with Lauren in 

the hours before her disappearance, alleging negligence and 

violations of Indiana’s Dram Shop Act. After some claims 

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were dismissed but before discovery was conducted, the 

defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds 

that the plaintiffs could only speculate about whether the 

defendants were the proximate cause of any injury 

sustained. The district court agreed and granted summary 

judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed, 

contesting both the dismissal of claims and the award of 

summary judgment for the defendants. We affirm. 

I. Background 

Because the district court granted summary judgment 

before general discovery was conducted, the facts are limited 

largely to those stated in the complaint. As alleged, the 

pleadings attempt to impose a measure of cohesion onto 

events spanning several hours and locations and involving 

various individuals—each of whom had been drinking 

alcohol, in some cases heavily. The result, by no fault of the 

plaintiffs, is that much of what we would like to know is 

missing, while much of what we do know defies apparent 

logic. 

What we know with certainty is that this case is a 

tragedy. On June 2, 2011, Jason Rosenbaum, a student at 

Indiana University, threw a party at his apartment. Among 

his guests were fellow students Lauren Spierer, Corey 

Rossman, and Michael Beth, who, by all appearances, were 

well-acquainted with each other. Rosenbaum served 

alcoholic drinks at his party, and Lauren—scarcely five feet 

tall and one hundred pounds—was among those served. 

She was not alone. For his part, Rossman drank heavily, 

and eventually he and Lauren left the party and went to his 

apartment which was located in the same complex. 

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Rossman’s roommate, Michael Beth, had been at 

Rosenbaum’s party and returned to the apartment where he 

encountered the two. Despite the fact that Lauren was 

visibly intoxicated, Rossman encouraged her to join him at a 

bar named Kilroy’s that was located a few blocks from the 

apartment. He informed Beth that he wanted to have “three 

more drinks at the bar and then [he would] be feeling good.” 

Approximately one hour after leaving Rosenbaum’s 

party, Lauren and Rossman went to Kilroy’s where Lauren 

was observed stumbling and requiring Rossman’s assistance 

to walk. Disregarding her precarious condition, Rossman 

bought Lauren several drinks; eventually she lost her shoes 

and mobile phone. They remained at Kilroy’s until 

approximately 2:30 in the morning. 

After leaving Kilroy’s, the pair initially headed to 

Lauren’s apartment complex where they encountered other 

students outside the elevator on Lauren’s floor. Rossman got 

into a physical altercation with one of those students who 

took issue with him for failing to assist the visibly 

intoxicated Lauren into her apartment. Instead of escorting 

Lauren from the elevator to her apartment—a distance less 

than a hundred yards—the pair set off for his apartment 

where Rossman was observed en route carrying Lauren 

slung across his back. 

At around 3:30 in the morning, Michael Beth (Rossman’s 

roommate) returned to the apartment and was startled to 

find Rossman and Lauren there. At first, he suspected that 

they were burglars because the apartment had been the site 

of previous crimes. Instead, he encountered Lauren, who 

appeared even more intoxicated than she had been earlier in 

the evening. The pleadings suggest that Rossman went to 

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sleep at this point and that Beth was left alone with Lauren. 

In light of her condition—she was slurring her speech, for 

example—Beth tried to convince Lauren to sleep on the 

couch in the apartment. Lauren, however, wanted to go back 

to her apartment. For reasons that are not clear, instead of 

escorting Lauren back to her apartment, Beth brought her to 

Rosenbaum’s apartment, which had been the site of the 

party earlier that evening. 

Rosenbaum also grew concerned when he saw Lauren’s 

condition. He attempted to contact several of her friends for 

the purpose of arranging a ride back to her apartment but 

was unable to arrange transport. At this point, Beth left his 

apartment. Shortly afterwards, at approximately 4:30 a.m., 

Rosenbaum allowed Lauren to leave his residence on her 

own and briefly observed her walking in the direction of her 

apartment. He was the last known person to see Lauren 

alive. A security camera located along Lauren’s return route 

did not capture any images of her walking home. 

Despite four years of extensive searching, there is no 

credible information about what happened to Lauren after 

she left Rosenbaum’s apartment. Taking matters into their 

own hands, Lauren’s parents filed this suit, alleging that 

Rossman, Rosenbaum, and Beth were negligent, both at 

common law and by Indiana statute, for failing to fulfill their 

duty to care for Lauren in her incapacitated condition. 

Additionally, the plaintiffs brought a Dram Shop claim 

against Rossman and Rosenbaum for furnishing Lauren 

with alcohol despite knowing that she was intoxicated at the 

time. 

The defendants each filed motions to dismiss and 

discovery was stayed pending their resolution. The district 

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No. 14-3171 5

court granted Beth’s motion and dismissed all claims against 

him. Also, it dismissed the claims for common law 

negligence against Rossman and Rosenbaum but denied 

their respective motions to dismiss the other claims. 

After the resolution of the motions to dismiss, the 

plaintiffs cast a wide net on discovery. To that end, they 

sought to conduct upwards of fourteen depositions, twelve 

of them of non-parties, in multiple locations, including New 

York, Boston, Detroit, and Chicago; they also issued 

subpoenas for an array of academic, disciplinary, telephone, 

and other records from various individuals. 

After the stay of discovery was lifted but before the 

parties exchanged initial disclosures, Rosenbaum moved for 

summary judgment (and was later joined by Rossman) on 

the grounds that the plaintiffs were unable to offer proof that 

the defendants were the proximate cause of any verifiable 

injury to Lauren—disappearance, by itself, is not legally 

deemed an injury, so proof of some injury was required to 

support their claims. The defendants also moved to quash 

the non-party subpoenas and to limit discovery to the issue 

of proximate cause, that is, to address only evidence related 

to whether the defendants’ actions caused severe injury or 

death to Lauren. 

A series of back-and-forth filings ensued that culminated 

with the district court upholding the magistrate judge’s 

decision to limit discovery to the issue of proximate 

causation. Additionally, because the plaintiffs had 

responded to defendants’ summary judgment motions, 

those motions were deemed ripe for adjudication and the 

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 

defendants. 

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On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge three rulings: the 

decision to limit discovery, the grant of summary judgment, 

and the dismissal of the common law negligence claims. 

They argue that the summary judgment motions were 

premature and that the defendants failed to meet their 

burden to demonstrate the absence of material fact 

regarding causation. Additionally, the plaintiffs appeal the 

district court’s dismissal of the common law negligence 

claims, contesting its reading of Indiana law that no duty of 

care existed and that Lauren did not constitute a child to 

support a common law claim for loss of services of a child. 

We review these arguments. 

II. Analysis 

At the outset, we analyze two related issues that overlap 

due to some unique features of this litigation. The first is the 

decision by the magistrate judge (and adopted by the district 

judge) to suspend discovery pending the resolution of the 

summary judgment motions. This is a procedural issue that 

implicates the scope of a litigant’s right to conduct 

discovery. The second issue involves the actual resolution of 

the summary judgment motions and the respective burdens 

carried by the litigants. In short, whether a party can move 

for summary judgment prior to discovery and whether a 

party can support its burden absent such discovery are 

separate inquiries that run together due to particularities of 

this case. 

We review first whether the district court abused its 

discretion by failing to provide plaintiffs additional time for 

discovery. Davis v. G.N. Mortg. Corp., 396 F.3d 869, 885 (7th 

Cir. 2005). In the absence of a local rule or court order stating 

otherwise, Rule 56(b) allows a party to move for summary 

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No. 14-3171 7

judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of 

discovery. No such rule or order exists here, so the 

defendants acted within their rights to move for summary 

judgment even though substantial discovery had not 

occurred. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). But moving for pre-discovery 

summary judgment does not automatically mean that a 

court has to entertain the motion. Rule 56(d) allows the nonmoving party to submit an affidavit or declaration 

requesting the court to defer or deny judgment in order to 

allow for appropriate discovery to address matters raised by 

the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Here, the plaintiffs took an 

unusual course of action: they responded to the motion and 

filed a declaration under Rule 56(d) that included a 

boilerplate request for discovery without identifying specific 

evidence needed to respond to defendants’ motion. The 

magistrate judge found the declaration deficient because it 

was too general to notify the court of any actual evidence 

needed to respond to the motion. Still more problematic, the 

declaration, as composed, did not serve as a motion under 

Rule 56(d) for additional time to respond to the summary 

judgment motion. 

The magistrate judge held a hearing on whether to 

extend discovery and asked plaintiffs what type of discovery 

they needed. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “We’re not asking 

for anything to respond to summary judgment. We think that we 

are going to win ... on the basis ... that [the defendants] haven’t 

met their burden.” (Tr. at 24.) Further driving this point home, 

the plaintiffs argued that they needed extended discovery 

not to respond to defendants’ motions, but in order to file 

their own motion for summary judgment. (Court: “But you 

already told me that you don’t need any discovery to respond to 

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their summary judgment motions?” Plaintiffs’ Counsel: “But I 

need discovery, Judge, to file my own summary judgment 

motion.”) (Tr. at 70.) 

District courts have broad discretion in directing pretrial 

discovery and the rulings here were well within this 

discretion. Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 944 (7th Cir. 2004). 

The only relevant discovery at issue here is that which might 

have been available to plaintiffs to respond to the summary 

judgment motions. The plaintiffs claimed not to need any 

and we take them at their word. Whatever other types of 

discovery the plaintiffs might have wanted is not at issue 

here. 

The more pressing issue on appeal is whether the award 

of summary judgment to defendants was proper—a ruling 

that we review de novo. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th 

Cir. 2013). The standard for summary judgment is well 

established: with the court drawing all inferences in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party 

must discharge its burden of showing that there are no 

genuine questions of material fact and that he is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 

981 (7th Cir. 2014). If the moving party has properly 

supported his motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving 

party to come forward with specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 

722 F.3d 939, 951 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Relying solely on citations to facts alleged in the 

complaint, the defendants brought their motions with no 

additional evidence. The plaintiffs are of the belief that 

summary judgment is impossible unless the moving party 

first submits evidence to meet their burden of production. 

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No such evidence having been produced, they claim that the 

award of summary judgment was wrong as a matter of law. 

Plaintiffs’ argument is almost identical to the one that the 

Supreme Court rejected in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317 (1986), the seminal case outlining the respective 

obligations of the parties in summary judgment motions. 

Like here, the parties to that dispute contested whether, 

under Rule 56, the party seeking summary judgment was 

required to bring evidence in the form of affidavits or other 

materials to demonstrate the absence of a question about an 

issue of material fact. Id. The Court held that the moving 

party had no such burden because there existed “no express 

or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party 

support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials 

negating the opponent’s claim.” Id. at 323 (emphasis in 

original). 

In their briefs, the plaintiffs refer repeatedly to the 

“burden of production” borne by the moving party and we 

suspect this phrase lies at the heart of their confusion. This 

phrase is used to signify the respective allocations of 

evidence that parties must present at a given stage of 

litigation. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 

502, 506 (1993) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792 (1973)); Director, Officer of Workers’ Compensation 

Programs, Dept. of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 

272 (1994) (defining the burden of production under the 

Administrative Procedures Act as “a party’s obligation to 

come forward with evidence to support its claim.”). 

In Celotex, the Court surveyed Rule 56 and found nothing 

in that rule requiring the moving party to produce evidence. 

Of course, there can be no “burden of production” absent a 

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mandate to produce evidence. The actual requirement in 

Rule 56 is less specific: the moving party need only inform 

the court of the basis for the motion and identify supporting 

materials. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] party seeking 

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and 

identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”) (citing Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56). That the moving party need not produce 

evidence does not give them an easy path to summary 

judgment, it only means that their burden is one of 

demonstration rather than production. 

The text of Rule 56 has been subject to various 

amendments (in 1987, 2009, and 2010) since the Celotex 

decision was handed down but none of these conflicts with 

the substance of the ruling in that case. Contrary to 

plaintiffs’ arguments, the only burden of production 

recognized in Rule 56 falls upon the nonmoving party once a 

basis for summary judgment has been established (and this 

can be initiated sua sponte by a court under Rule 56(f) with 

proper notice). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2010 

Amendments state that: “[s]ubdivision (c)(1)(B) [of Rule 56] 

recognizes that a party need not always point to specific 

record materials ... And a party who does not have the trial 

burden of production may rely on a showing that a party 

who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible 

evidence to carry its burden as to the fact.” See also, Ricci v. 

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (“[W]here the nonmoving 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive 

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issue, the nonmoving party bears the burden of production 

under Rule 56 to designate specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

To be sure, it is a rare case in which a moving party can 

establish a basis for summary judgment without putting 

forth some evidence. But such cases exist, as evidenced by 

the one here. The defendants cited to the pleadings to 

contend that the plaintiffs would not be able to meet their 

burden of production at trial to demonstrate a verifiable 

injury to Lauren that was caused by the defendants’ actions 

and not other intervening factors. Given this set of facts, that 

was sufficient to meet their burden for summary judgment. 

Dram Shop Act and Negligence Per Se

To be liable under the Indiana Dram Shop Act, a person 

must: (1) furnish alcohol to another person; (2) have actual 

knowledge that the person to whom the alcoholic beverage 

was furnished was visibly intoxicated at the time; and, (3) 

the intoxication of the person to whom the alcoholic 

beverage was furnished must be the proximate cause of the 

death, injury, or damage alleged in the complaint. I.C. § 7.1-

5-10-15.5. 

Negligence per se (sometimes called “legal negligence”) 

occurs when a violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes 

negligence as a matter of law. Erwin v. Roe, 928 N.E.2d 609, 

616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (an “unexcused violation of a 

statutory duty constitutes negligence per se ‘if the statute or 

ordinance is intended to protect the class of persons in which 

the plaintiff is included and to protect against the risk of the 

type of harm which has occurred as a result of its violation.’” 

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(quoting Kho v. Pennington, 875 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. 2007)). 

Per se negligence can be distinguished from common law 

negligence because the former requires proof of violation of 

a statute or ordinance while the latter does not. 

The district court first reviewed these claims on the 

motions to dismiss which argued that the claims failed 

because the plaintiffs could not prove that Lauren was 

injured or deceased. Persons are presumed alive under 

Indiana law for seven years after their disappearance 

whereupon a presumption of death might arise from an 

unexplained absence. See Roberts v. Wabash Life Ins. Co., 410 

N.E.2d 1377, 1382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Prudential Ins. Co. of 

Am. v. Moore, 149 N.E. 718, 721 (Ind. 1925). The district court 

recognized this presumption but noted that a second avenue 

of proof was available to the plaintiffs: they could use direct 

or circumstantial evidence to show that the missing person 

was, in fact, deceased. Significantly, the district court ruled 

for the plaintiffs for one simple reason—during the 

pleadings stage of litigation, the court was bound to accept 

the factual assertion that Lauren had died. The judge noted: 

“it would be inappropriate for the Court to ... make a 

finding as a matter of law that Lauren is presumed to be 

alive. The Spierers should be afforded the opportunity to 

present circumstantial evidence in order to prove that 

Lauren is deceased ... .” App. Ex. at 30–31. This language 

should have signaled to plaintiffs that they were not likely to 

survive later stages of litigation merely on the strength of 

their allegations; sooner or later they would have to put 

forth evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, 

demonstrating a discrete injury to Lauren resulting from the 

actions of the defendants. 

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No. 14-3171 13

Unsurprisingly, the defendants moved immediately for 

summary judgment in order to revisit the same issue—this 

time under the more stringent summary judgment standard. 

They cited to the pleadings to argue that there was no 

genuine issue of fact that Lauren was missing and therefore 

there was no evidence to allow a jury to determine what 

happened to her. Because of this, they claimed that the 

plaintiffs could not demonstrate proximate cause and their 

claims must fail. 

Instead of requesting discovery to address proximate 

cause, the plaintiffs argued that they had no burden to 

produce countervailing evidence because the earlier ruling 

that Lauren would not be presumed alive had a preclusive 

effect. (Tr. at 13–14.) They did submit an affidavit from a 

pharmacologist demonstrating that Lauren suffered that 

night from diminished mental and physical capacity as a 

result of her alcohol consumption, but these materials did 

not address the more relevant question of whether Lauren 

had suffered a verifiable injury sufficient to support the 

claims. 

Plaintiffs’ preclusion argument fails because the district 

court did not issue a ruling about whether Lauren was alive 

or not; it merely stated that it treated all of the facts in the 

complaint as true because it was required to do so on a 

motion to dismiss. Once the pleadings phase ended, the 

plaintiffs’ facts are no longer taken as true but must be 

substantiated by evidence if challenged. The pleadings in 

this case are clear enough—Lauren has been missing since 

leaving Rosenbaum’s apartment that night. The defendants 

had to do little more than cite to the pleadings to establish 

this fact. At that point, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to 

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provide some evidence that Lauren sustained a distinct 

injury and that the defendants’ actions were the cause of this 

injury. 

The plaintiffs declined to produce evidence to offer any 

plausible account of what happened to Lauren after she was 

last seen. For this reason, the district court correctly granted 

summary judgment because the plaintiffs carried the burden 

of proving that the defendants (and not other causes) were 

the proximate cause of any injury to Lauren, and speculation 

cannot support a finding of proximate cause. Here, the 

specter of criminal actions by third parties hovers over this 

tragic case, and this is precisely the type of circumstance 

which breaks the causal chain under Indiana law. See Johnson 

v. Jacobs, 970 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“A willful, 

malicious criminal act is an intervening act that breaks the 

causal chain between the alleged negligence and the 

resulting harm.”). 

On a motion for summary judgment, “facts must be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 

only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). As it stands, there are no 

facts to present to a jury to determine the nature of the injury 

suffered by Lauren. Still more problematic, it remains pure 

speculation whether any injury was caused by the 

defendants’ actions or the criminal intervention of a third 

party. For this reason, the district court correctly granted 

summary judgment. “Where the record taken as a whole 

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587 (1986). 

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No. 14-3171 15

Common Law Negligence 

The district court also dismissed the common law 

negligence claims against all defendants for failing to state a 

claim capable of relief. We review these rulings de novo. 

AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To 

survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff

must state enough facts that, when accepted as true, “state a 

claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6)). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs must allege 

facts that show that the defendants: (1) owed a duty to 

Lauren; (2) that they breached that duty; and, (3) that 

Lauren’s death was proximately caused by the breach. 

Witmat Dev. Corp. v. Dickerson, 907 N.E.2d 170, 173 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009). Indiana courts use a three-part balancing test to 

determine whether a duty exists when it has not been 

declared or otherwise articulated. Northern Indiana Public 

Service Co. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2003). 

Specifically, courts consider: the relationship between the 

parties, the foreseeability of the occurrence, and public 

policy concerns. See Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 

1991). 

Opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs asserted 

four bases for a duty of care, none of which the district court 

accepted. On appeal, they narrow their focus to argue that 

the defendants owed a duty of care to Lauren once they 

voluntarily undertook to assist her at various points in the 

evening. 

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Indiana law recognizes a common law duty of care 

where “one party assumes such a duty either gratuitously or 

voluntarily. The assumption of such a duty creates a special 

relationship between the parties and a corresponding duty 

to act in the manner of a reasonably prudent person.” Yost v. 

Wabash College, 3 N.E.3d 509, 517 (Ind. 2014) (quotation 

omitted). Although the existence and extent of an assumed 

duty is generally a question of fact for the jury, it may be 

resolved as a matter of law if the designated evidence is 

insufficient to establish an injury. See Teitge v. Remy Const. 

Co. Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1008, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). 

Here, the allegations establish that each defendant tried 

to assist Lauren in some way and that his assistance was 

found wanting. The critical question then is whether, as 

alleged, the assistance provided by the defendants created a 

legal duty to care for Lauren. Indiana courts have had few 

occasions to consider this question as the vast majority of 

assumption-of-duty cases relate to official or business 

obligations rather than the purely voluntary actions of social 

peers. The district court found the closest analogues in the 

cases of Lather v. Berg, 519 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), 

and Hawn v. Padgett, 598 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), 

which address whether persons can be held liable for failed 

attempts to prevent others from driving while drunk. 

In Lather, a group of teenage friends got drunk together 

before one announced his intention to drive home. The 

friends attempted to intervene to the point of taking his keys 

but relented when the prospective driver became 

increasingly belligerent; eventually they kicked him out of 

the house and threw the keys at him. While driving home, 

the driver engaged police in a high-speed chase before 

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crashing into a patrol car and killing a police officer. The 

Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a grant of summary 

judgment for the defendant on the grounds that a person 

does not undertake to perform a legal duty owed to another 

unless he does so on behalf of and in lieu of that person. Lather, 

519 N.E.2d at 766. “Liability does not arise in the situation 

when one undertakes to perform functions coordinate to—or 

even duplicative of—activities imposed by another by a legal 

duty, but rather the situation in which one actually undertakes 

to perform for the other the legal duty itself.” Id. (emphasis in 

original but internal quotation omitted). A simpler 

formulation of this is to say that Indiana courts do not 

recognize liability unless the actor, by assuming this duty, 

effectively displaces the other from performing the same 

action. Because the prospective driver never ceased 

attempting to regain possession of his keys, the defendant 

could not be deemed to act on behalf of or in lieu of the driver. 

Hawn involved similar facts. A group of friends drank 

alcohol together at a campsite until late in the evening when 

one of them sought to leave in his truck to buy cigarettes. 

The defendants, two female acquaintances, took his keys to 

prevent him from driving. After they were threatened and 

physically accosted by the prospective driver, the defendants 

threw his keys out of their tent. Shortly thereafter, the driver 

crashed into a tree, killing a passenger who had fallen asleep 

in the bed of the truck. Recognizing that “Indiana courts 

have shown great reluctance to require an individual to take 

any action to control a third party when there is no special 

relationship between them,” the Indiana Court of Appeals 

held that the defendants were not negligent as there was no 

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18 No. 14-3171 

special relationship between the parties. Hawn 598 N.E.2d at 

634. 

The plaintiffs counter with the case of Buchanan v. Vowell, 

926 N.E.2d 515, 520–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), which also 

involved drunk driving but with a distinct twist: rather than 

trying to prevent a drunk person from driving, the 

defendant in that case sought to aid the drunken person in 

her driving, with predictably tragic consequences. In this 

case, a mother and daughter drank alcohol together at a 

work event to such extent that the daughter was legally 

intoxicated. Instead of calling a cab, the two hatched a plan 

whereby each drove her own car home, but with the 

daughter in a lead car and the mother trailing behind as the 

two spoke to each other on their cell phones. On the way 

home, the daughter struck a pedestrian, causing severe 

injuries. 

The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and held that the 

mother had assumed a duty of care to prevent the daughter 

from injuring others when she entered into an agreement 

with her to make sure she drove home successfully. In so 

holding, the Court distinguished both Lather and Berg 

because the defendants in those cases sought to intervene to 

prevent tortious behavior while the mother actively sought 

to encourage it. 

While recognizing the dissimilarities between the fact 

patterns and the one presented here, the analysis in those 

cases leaves little doubt that Indiana courts would not 

recognize an assumption of duty in this case. The court in 

Hawn offered the most specific formulation of when a duty 

of care arises based on one’s voluntary actions. Citing to 

Sports Inc. v. Gilbert, 431 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), 

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No. 14-3171 19

it recognized three factors that frequently accompany an 

assumption of duty over a third person. They are: (1) where 

one person is in need of supervision or protection (such as a 

child, intoxicated person, or business invitee); (2) from 

someone who is in a superior position to provide it (parent, 

supplier of alcohol, business owner, hospital) and (3) that 

person has a right to intervene or control the actions of the 

other person. See Hawn, 598 N.E.2d at 634. 

Lauren was in a vulnerable state and therefore in need of 

protection and the plaintiffs easily satisfy the first factor. But 

the second factor fails because defendants were classmates 

of Lauren and not in positions of superiority. While one 

could argue that, by providing Lauren with alcohol, 

Rossman and Rosenbaum assumed such responsibility, the 

courts in Lather and Hawn declined to impose liability in 

those cases where a group of social peers provided each 

other with alcohol. (This contrasts with the holding of 

Buchanan, which recognized the position of superiority of a 

mother to her daughter.) Additionally, each of the three 

defendants was apart from Lauren during important parts of 

the evening; Rossman was not present when Lauren 

returned to Rosenbaum’s apartment, while Rosenbaum and 

Beth had both parted ways with Lauren hours earlier with 

no indication that they would see her again that evening. 

That they express surprise (Beth) and concern (Rosenbaum) 

when they see her shows that they were not expecting to 

encounter her at that late hour, still less in that condition. 

There is simply no case where Indiana courts have 

recognized responsibility on the part of a person to ensure 

the safety of intoxicated persons with whom they have 

unexpectedly come into contact. To recognize a special 

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20 No. 14-3171 

relationship based only on these factors would be to greatly 

expand the class of relationships subject to special duties 

under Indiana law. 

The third factor also favors the defendants. Despite 

Lauren’s visible intoxication, the facts do not establish that 

defendants had the right or ability to control her movement 

to such degree as to force her to remain in a certain place. 

Rossman escorted Lauren to her floor before bringing her to 

his apartment for reasons that are not clear. From there, Beth 

attempted to get Lauren to sleep on the couch but was 

unable to do so for reasons that are also not known. 

Rosenbaum attempted to arrange transport for Lauren, and 

it was only after he was unable to do so that Lauren 

departed. There is no indication that Rosenbaum compelled 

or even encouraged her to leave his apartment. Despite her 

diminished capacity, the pleadings demonstrate that Lauren 

left Rosenbaum’s apartment under her own volition and was 

not encouraged to leave. 

Because he was with Lauren the majority of the evening 

and bought drinks for her, Rossman was nearest to 

assuming a duty to care for her. But he also appears to have 

been intoxicated—so much so that it is questionable whether 

he could effectively take care of himself, still less another 

person. “Indiana courts have shown great reluctance to 

require an individual to take any action to control a third 

party when there is no special relationship between them.” 

Hawn, 598 N.E.2d at 633. We have found no decisions under 

Indiana law where persons were held liable for the actions of 

their social peers, absent additional factors not present here. 

To hold otherwise would be to extend the reach of 

negligence far beyond special relationships and into 

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No. 14-3171 21

virtually all social relationships and situations where a risk 

of danger might be present. 

For these reasons, we agree with the district court that 

the plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim under 

Indiana law for common law negligence. Because we affirm 

the dismissal, we need not consider the plaintiffs’ claim 

under Indiana’s Child Wrongful Death Statute as that type 

of claim is functionally identical to one for common law 

negligence and would fail for the same reasons. See Ed. 

Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1994). Likewise, we need not review the district court’s 

ruling that Lauren’s age precluded relief for the loss of 

services of a child under Indiana law. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

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