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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 30, 2015*

Decided April 1, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐3253

RODNEY ROLLINS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

ALLEN MURPHY, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 6153

Sharon Johnson Coleman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Two weeks after Rodney Rollins filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

unlawful arrest, the district court dismissed it for want of prosecution and denied his

request for leave to appear in forma pauperis. We conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in ending the suit so soon, but because part of the suit is frivolous,

we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

                                                 

* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we

have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐3253    Page 2

According to Rollins, while he was in municipal court defending against a traffic

charge, he was arrested for raising a sovereign‐citizen defense. The judge angrily

rejected the defense and told Rollins not to leave the courtroom until the judge arranged

for the next court date on the charge. As Rollins waited, several police officers seized

him and placed him in Cook County Jail. He remained there for six days, during which

time jail officers strip‐searched him in a group setting and confiscated his belongings.

After Rollins pleaded guilty to driving on a revoked license, he was released from jail.

Rollins later sued in federal court to challenge the arrest and detention for

lacking probable cause, but he did not get very far. Along with his complaint, he asked

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Before any defendants had appeared, the district

judge set a status hearing for two weeks later at 9:30 a.m. “on plaintiff’s application for

leave to appear in forma pauperis.” Rollins did not appear on the scheduled date at 9:30

a.m., nor again when the case was recalled 15 minutes later. The judge denied the

application and dismissed the action, citing “want of prosecution.” Rollins timely

moved to reopen the case. He explained that, although he had received notice of the

status hearing, he believed that he did not need to appear because, in previous

litigation, a different judge granted his application without the need to appear at a

status hearing. He added that the notice he received from the court did not include a

courtroom number. The judge denied the motion without explanation but granted him

leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

On appeal Rollins contests the dismissal of his case and the denial of his request

to proceed in the district court in forma pauperis. He repeats that his failure to appear

should be excused as a misunderstanding stemming from his previous experience

before another judge.

We review a district court’s denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis and its

dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute for abuse of discretion. See Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (in forma pauperis); Johnson v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 718 F.3d

731, 732 (7th Cir. 2013) (failure to prosecute). When a suit is dismissed for want of

prosecution without specifying the terms of dismissal, as happened here, the dismissal

is with prejudice. See Hill v. United States, 762 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2014); Arnett v.

Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 756 (7th Cir. 2011). Because dismissal with prejudice for want of

prosecution is a harsh sanction, we typically ask that before district courts end a case for

that reason, they weigh several factors. These include whether the litigant has ignored

previous court orders, the extent of delays, prejudice to other parties, and the

availability of other sanctions. See Johnson, 718 F.3d at 732–33; Kasalo v. Harris & Harris,

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Ltd., 656 F.3d 557, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2011); Gabriel v. Hamlin, 514 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.

2008). It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to dismiss Rollins’s two‐week

old case for failing to appear at a single status hearing when the record does not suggest

that any other factor favoring dismissal with prejudice was present.

We have also considered whether we can affirm on any other ground in the

record. See Talley v. Lane, 13 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1994); Barnhill v. Doiron, 958 F.2d

200, 202 (7th Cir. 1992). Rollins has sued three defendants: the municipal court judge,

the Cook County Department of Corrections, and one arresting officer. We can affirm

the dismissal of the claims against the judge because they are necessarily blocked by

judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991); Richman v. Sheahan, 270

F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2001). The Department of Corrections was also properly

dismissed because, as a division of Cook County, it is not a suable entity. See Castillo v.

Cook Cnty. Mail Room Dep’t, 990 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1993).

The false‐arrest claim against the police officer, however, is not hopeless. Rollins

alleges that he was arrested because, in responding in court to a traffic charge, he raised

an unwelcome, sovereign‐citizen defense; he describes no illegal behavior or violation

of a judicial order. His complaint therefore suggests that he was arrested without

probable cause to believe he had committed an offense. See Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705

F.3d 237, 246 (7th Cir. 2012) (a false‐arrest claim requires an arrest made without

probable cause). Furthermore his allegations—which we must construe at this

preliminary stage in his favor—do not assert that the officer arrested him at the

instruction of the judge; therefore, he has not alleged the impenetrable defense of

quasi‐judicial immunity. See Richman, 270 F.3d at 437–38 (quasi‐judicial immunity not

extended to courtroom deputies without indication that they were acting at judge’s

direction). We recognize that the facts may not be as Rollins has alleged them. Further

proceedings are needed to sort out what happened.

The judgment dismissing Rollins’s lawsuit is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in

part, and REMANDED for the district court to evaluate the merits of his petition to

proceed in forma pauperis and for further proceedings consistent with this order.

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