Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15540/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONNIE D. STILWELL;

COURTNEY STILWELL, 

husband and wife,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF WILLIAMS, an 

Arizona Municipal 

Corporation; JOSEPH DUFFY, 

Interim City Manager of the 

City of Williams; LYDA 

DUFFY, husband and wife; 

RAYMOND GLENN 

CORNWELL, former Public 

Works Director of the City 

of Williams; ELSIE 

CORNWELL, husband and 

wife; BILLY PRUITT; BESSIE 

PRUITT, husband and wife; 

TRACY FULLER; KATHY 

FULLER, husband and wife,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-15540

D.C. No.

3:12-cv-08053-HRH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

H. Russel Holland, District Judge, Presiding

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2 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

Argued and Submitted March 14, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 5, 2016

Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Ronald M. Gould, and 

Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Friedland;

Dissent by Judge Fernandez

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights/Age Discrimination in Employment Act

The panel reversed the district court’s summary 

judgment and remanded in an action brought by a City of 

Williams employee who alleged that he was fired for 

planning to testify against the City in a lawsuit relating to 

age discrimination.

The panel first held that plaintiff was engaged in speech 

as a citizen for First Amendment purposes because his sworn 

statements and imminent testimony about the City’s 

retaliatory conduct were outside the scope of his ordinary job 

duties and were on a matter of public concern.

The panel held that the retaliation provision of the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), did not 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 3

preclude plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment 

retaliation claim. The panel held that the disparities between 

the rights and protections of the ADEA’s retaliation 

provision and the First Amendment as enforced through 

§ 1983 — including differences in who may sue and be sued, 

the standards for liability, and the damages available —

which made the ADEA’s protections narrower than the First 

Amendment’s in some respects, led the panel to conclude 

that Congress did not intend to preclude § 1983 First 

Amendment retaliation suits when it enacted the ADEA.

Dissenting, Judge Fernandez stated that this court was 

bound by Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 

1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009), which held that “the ADEA 

precludes the assertion of age discrimination in employment 

claims, even those seeking to vindicate constitutional rights, 

under § 1983.”

COUNSEL

Charles Anthony Shaw (argued), Law Offices of Charles 

Anthony Shaw, PLLC, Prescott, Arizona, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Kenneth H. Brendel (argued), Mangum, Wall, Stoops &

Warden, PLLC, Flagstaff, Arizona, for DefendantsAppellees.

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4 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronnie Stilwell sued his city 

employer for retaliation, alleging that he was fired for 

planning to testify against the City in a lawsuit relating to 

age discrimination. Stilwell asserted that his termination 

violated both the First Amendment and the retaliation 

provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). The question we must 

answer is whether the retaliation provision of the ADEA 

precludes a plaintiff such as Stilwell from bringing a First 

Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We 

hold that it does not.

I.

Stilwell became Superintendent of the Water 

Department of the City of Williams, Arizona (the “City”), in 

1991, and he served in that position until his termination in 

January 2011. It is the events surrounding his termination 

that gave rise to the instant lawsuit.1 Those events began 

when Stilwell became aware of a lawsuit against the City 

filed by Carolyn Smith, the City’s former Human Resources 

Director (the “Smith suit”). Smith alleged that the City 

retaliated against her in violation of the retaliation provision 

of the ADEA, after she complained about age discrimination 

against a different city employee, Glen Cornwell. In August 

 1 Because this case comes to us on appeal from a grant of summary 

judgment to Defendants, “[w]e view the facts in the light most favorable 

to Stilwell, the non-moving party.” Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 

482 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 5

2009, Stilwell signed a sworn statement that supported 

Smith’s ADEA retaliation claim, and agreed to testify in 

Smith’s lawsuit. Later that month, a formal disclosure 

regarding Stilwell’s involvement as a witness was served 

upon the City as well as on then-Assistant City Manager Joe 

Duffy.

Stilwell alleges that following this agreement to testify, 

Duffy took numerous negative actions towards him that 

constituted retaliation. Between August and December 

2009, Duffy sent Stilwell emails with negative comments,

including emails attacking his job performance. In 

December 2009, Duffy became Interim City Manager and 

met with Stilwell to discourage him from testifying in the 

Smith suit.

In June 2010, the judge in the Smith suit denied a motion 

from the City Attorney to prevent Stilwell’s testimony. 

Duffy then had another meeting with Stilwell, in which 

Duffy stated that he wanted Stilwell to find a way out of 

testifying.

In September 2010, at a meeting with another city 

department head, the issue of Stilwell’s anticipated 

testimony for the Smith suit arose again. Stilwell explained 

that he would tell the truth if he was called to the stand, 

including by describing how Duffy had retaliated against 

Smith. Duffy and Stilwell subsequently had another 

confrontation in which Duffy expressed displeasure about 

Stilwell’s agreeing to testify. Following that confrontation, 

Duffy began to express additional concerns about Stilwell’s 

job performance.

In October 2010, Duffy continued to find problems with 

Stilwell’s job performance, including criticizing Stilwell’s 

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6 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

handling of a situation in which the City’s water turned 

brown. Duffy also sent the City Council a memo accusing 

Stilwell of neglecting security concerns at the City’s water 

plant. Stilwell asserted that these issues were not his fault.

In December 2010, Stilwell was placed on paid 

administrative leave, pending an investigation into Duffy’s 

allegations. In January 2011, the City terminated Stilwell’s 

employment based on the results of that investigation.

Stilwell sued the City and Duffy, among others, in the 

United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The 

suit asserted sixteen claims, including retaliation in violation 

of the ADEA and the First Amendment.2 Stilwell moved for 

partial summary judgment, and Defendants cross-moved for 

summary judgment as to all claims. The district court 

granted Defendants’ motion, and Stilwell appealed the 

rulings on eight claims.3

II.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants on Stilwell’s § 1983 First Amendment claim on 

the sole ground that the retaliation provision of the ADEA, 

29 U.S.C. § 623(d), precluded a § 1983 First Amendment 

retaliation claim such as Stilwell’s. We review the district 

court’s decision de novo. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 

627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). Applying the framework 

 2 Stilwell sued along with his wife. Because the Complaint does not 

allege any claims individual to Stilwell’s wife, we have referred to the 

claims as Stilwell’s claims.

 3 Stilwell’s appellate arguments relating to claims other than his § 1983 

First Amendment retaliation claim are addressed in a concurrently-filed 

memorandum disposition.

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 7

set forth in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,

555 U.S. 246 (2009), for determining the preclusive effect of 

a statute on § 1983 actions to remedy constitutional 

violations, we hold that Stilwell’s § 1983 First Amendment 

lawsuit is not precluded.

A.

As a threshold matter, before turning to the preclusion 

question, we reject the City’s argument that Stilwell’s 

speech was not “speech as a citizen on a matter of public 

concern” and so fell outside the First Amendment’s 

protections. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014). 

Stilwell’s sworn statement and imminent testimony were 

“outside the scope of his ordinary job duties,” which means 

that he was engaged in “speech as a citizen for First 

Amendment purposes.” Id. (explaining that an employee’s 

testimony in response to a subpoena about his employer’s 

practices was “outside the scope of his ordinary job duties” 

and thus “speech as a citizen”). And Stilwell’s sworn 

statement and planned testimony about the City’s retaliatory 

conduct were on a matter of public concern. See Alpha 

Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 

2004) (“[W]e hold that a public employee’s testimony 

addresses a matter of public concern if it contributes in some 

way to the resolution of a judicial or administrative 

proceeding in which discrimination or other significant 

government misconduct is at issue.”).

Moreover, contrary to the City’s argument, the fact that 

Stilwell had submitted only an affidavit and did not 

ultimately testify in court does not foreclose First 

Amendment protection. In Alpha Energy Savers, we held 

that although the plaintiff, a city contractor, never actually 

testified in a former associate’s federal discrimination 

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8 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

lawsuit because the suit settled, the conduct that occurred 

prior to the settlement was protected under the First 

Amendment. 381 F.3d at 922, 923–24. That conduct 

included “not only the affidavit that [the contractor] filed on 

[the associate’s] behalf and his testimony at [the associate’s] 

grievance hearing but also [the contractor’s] agreement to be 

listed as a witness in the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 923–

24. Similarly, Stilwell’s sworn statement on a matter of 

public concern and his express plan to testify in court along 

the same lines, fall within the purview of the First 

Amendment. Cf. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, N.J., 136 S. 

Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (holding that whether the protected 

speech was actually engaged in by the employee is not 

determinative because it is the perception of the employer as 

to whether that protected activity occurred that matters to a 

First Amendment retaliation claim).

B.

Congress enacted the ADEA in order to “to promote 

employment of older persons based on their ability rather 

than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 

employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways 

of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on 

employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). Although nearly all of 

the ADEA focuses on direct age discrimination, it contains 

a retaliation provision as well:

It shall be unlawful for an employer to 

discriminate against any of his employees or 

applicants for employment, for an 

employment agency to discriminate against 

any individual, or for a labor organization to 

discriminate against any member thereof or 

applicant for membership, because such 

individual, member or applicant for 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 9

membership has opposed any practice made 

unlawful by this section, or because such 

individual, member or applicant for 

membership has made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in an 

investigation, proceeding, or litigation under 

this chapter.

29 U.S.C.A. § 623(d).

Section 1983, in contrast, is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but is a mechanism for vindicating federal 

statutory or constitutional rights. Baker v. McCollan, 

443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). Specifically, § 1983 provides 

that “[e]very person who, under color of [State law] . . . 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Despite § 1983’s broad wording, that section’s 

availability as a remedy for violations of federal statutory or 

constitutional rights may be foreclosed in the event that 

Congress enacts a statutory scheme indicating an intent to 

preclude § 1983 suits. In a line of cases beginning with 

Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 

Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme 

Court has set forth principles for determining when a § 1983 

cause of action is precluded. Because this line of cases, and 

particularly Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 246, the most recent of 

them, provides the framework for our analysis here, we 

describe the cases in some detail.

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10 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

In Sea Clammers, the Court addressed whether the 

Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine 

Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act precluded § 1983 

suits to remedy violations of those Acts. To divine 

Congress’s intent, the Court examined “the remedial devices 

provided in [each] particular Act,” to determine if they were 

“sufficiently comprehensive” to indicate a “congressional 

intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.” Sea 

Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20. The Court observed the 

“unusually elaborate enforcement provisions” in each Act—

which provided for civil as well as criminal penalties that 

could be assessed by the Environmental Protection Agency, 

and included citizen suit provisions that required private 

plaintiffs to “comply with specified procedures” before 

filing in court. Id. at 13–14. The Court held that these 

comprehensive remedial provisions demonstrated that 

Congress intended to preclude § 1983 lawsuits to remedy a 

violation of the statutory rights created in those same Acts. 

Thus, the Court held that a plaintiff could not bring a § 1983 

suit to remedy a violation of either the Federal Water 

Pollution Control Act or the Marine Protection, Research, 

and Sanctuaries Act.

In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1013 (1984), 

superseded on other grounds by Handicapped Children’s 

Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) 

(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)), the Supreme Court 

considered a related, but distinct question—whether a statute 

precluded a § 1983 suit to enforce a constitutional right. In 

Smith, the Court examined whether the Education of the 

Handicapped Act (the “EHA”) precluded § 1983 suits 

alleging Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations 

based on disability discrimination in education. 468 U.S. at 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 11

1013.

4 In holding that such suits were precluded, the Court 

first explained that constitutional equal protection rights and 

the rights protected by the EHA were essentially coextensive. See id. at 1009. Such congruence was 

unsurprising given that the EHA was enacted as a response 

to a series of court cases that established the “right to an 

equal education opportunity for handicapped children,” id.

at 1010, and that “Congress perceived the EHA as the most 

effective vehicle for protecting the constitutional right of a 

handicapped child to a public education” recognized in those 

cases. Id. at 1013. Indeed, the Senate Report on the EHA 

described the statute as having “incorporated the major 

principles of th[ose] right to education cases.” Bd. of Educ. 

of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 

176, 194 n.18 (1982). After concluding that the statutory 

and constitutional claims were “virtually identical,” Smith, 

468 U.S. at 1009, the Supreme Court turned to the EHA’s 

remedial scheme, explaining that “the Act establishes an 

elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of 

handicapped children,” that “begins on the local level and 

includes ongoing parental involvement, detailed procedural 

safeguards, and a right to judicial review.” Id. at 1010–11. 

Ultimately, the Court held that “[a]llowing a plaintiff to 

circumvent the EHA administrative remedies” through a 

§ 1983 action “would be inconsistent with Congress’ 

 4 In City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113

(2005), the Court appears to have mischaracterized Smith as involving 

the question of whether § 1983 suits could enforce statutory rights. 

Compare Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 121 (“We have found § 1983 

unavailable to remedy violations of federal statutory rights in two cases: 

Sea Clammers and Smith.”), with Smith, 468 U.S. at 1008–09 (“As

petitioners emphasize, their § 1983 claims were not based on alleged 

violations of the EHA, but on independent claims of constitutional 

deprivations.” (footnote omitted)).

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12 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

carefully tailored scheme,” id. at 1012, and that because 

Congress gave no indication in the EHA’s legislative history 

that it intended to allow such § 1983 suits, the alternative 

§ 1983 remedy was precluded.

The Supreme Court again confronted the question of 

preclusion of § 1983 actions in City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 

California v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127 (2005). The Court 

there asked whether the Telecommunications Act of 1996 

precluded § 1983 suits alleging violations of that Act—a 

question of enforcement of a statutory right akin to that in 

Sea Clammers. To answer that question, the Court 

contrasted Sea Clammers and Smith with other cases that had 

held § 1983 actions to be available to enforce federal statutes 

that “did not provide a private judicial remedy (or, in most 

of the cases, even a private administrative remedy) for the 

rights violated.” 544 U.S. at 121 (citing Livadas v. 

Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133–34 (1994) and Golden State 

Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108–09 

(1989), among other cases).5 Because the 

 5 In Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 281–83 (2002), the 

Supreme Court made it much more difficult to infer privately 

enforceable rights in federal statutes that lack private rights of action. 

This decision had the effect of cabining the line of cases that had held 

§ 1983 actions to be available to enforce such statutes. Post-Gonzaga, 

“‘[t]he question whether Congress . . . intended to create a private right 

of action [is] definitively answered in the negative’ where a ‘statute by 

its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable class.’” Id. at 283–

84 (alterations in original) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,

442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979)); see Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1057 

(9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that Gonzaga clarified that it is only 

“Congress’s use of explicit, individually focused, rights-creating 

language that reveals congressional intent to create an individually 

enforceable right in a spending statute”). And, where there was no 

private right to enforce, there could be no § 1983 action to enforce it. 

See Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1062 (“After Gonzaga, . . . a plaintiff seeking 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 13

Telecommunications Act created a private right of action—

and, particularly, a limited one with a 30-day statute of 

limitations and no provision for attorney fees or costs—the 

Court held that allowing § 1983 suits that would not have 

those limitations “would distort the scheme of expedited 

judicial review and limited remedies created by [the Act].” 

Id. at 127. The Act thus “precluded resort to § 1983.” Id.

Most recently, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School 

Committee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009), the Supreme Court 

considered again, as it had in Smith, whether a statute 

precluded use of § 1983 to remedy an alleged constitutional 

violation. Specifically, the Court evaluated whether Title 

IX, which prohibits gender discrimination in educational 

programs receiving Federal financial assistance, 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1681(a), was “meant to be an exclusive mechanism for 

addressing gender discrimination in schools,” or whether 

plaintiffs alleging gender discrimination could also bring 

equal protection claims under § 1983. 555 U.S. at 258. 

Looking to Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes

as guiding precedent, the Court emphasized that those “cases 

establish that ‘the crucial consideration is what Congress 

intended.’” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252 (alteration omitted) 

(quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012).

The Court then summarized different approaches for 

determining Congress’s intent with respect to preclusion of 

§ 1983 suits, depending on whether the § 1983 suits would 

enforce statutory or constitutional rights. “In those cases in 

which the § 1983 claim is based on a statutory right, 

 redress under § 1983 must assert the violation of an individually 

enforceable right conferred specifically upon him, not merely a violation 

of federal law or the denial of a benefit or interest, no matter how 

unambiguously conferred.”).

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14 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

‘evidence of such congressional intent [to preclude the 

§ 1983 remedy] may be found directly in the statute creating 

the right, or inferred from the statute’s creation of a 

comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible 

with individual enforcement under § 1983.’” Id. (quoting 

Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added)). 

With respect to constitutional claims, however, the Court 

explained:

In cases in which the § 1983 claim alleges a 

constitutional violation, lack of 

congressional intent may be inferred from a 

comparison of the rights and protections of 

the statute and those existing under the 

Constitution. Where the contours of such 

rights and protections diverge in significant 

ways, it is not likely that Congress intended 

to displace § 1983 suits enforcing 

constitutional rights. Our conclusions 

regarding congressional intent can be 

confirmed by a statute’s context.

Id. at 252–53 (emphasis added).

After setting forth these inquiries, the Court first 

observed that, in contrast to the statutes at issue in Sea 

Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes, “Title IX has 

no administrative exhaustion requirement and no notice 

provisions.” Id. at 255. Rather, Title IX’s implied right of 

action allows plaintiffs to “file directly in court,” and to 

“obtain the full range of remedies.” Id. The Court stated 

that, “[a]s a result, parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims will 

neither circumvent required procedures, nor allow access to 

new remedies.” Id. at 255–56.

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 15

The Court then compared the “substantive rights and 

protections” provided by Title IX to those afforded under 

§ 1983 suits to remedy violations of the Equal Protection 

Clause. The Court examined the mismatch in which entities 

may be sued and which entities are exempted, id. at 256–57, 

the differences in what conduct is prohibited, id. at 257, and 

the disparate standards of liability and burdens of proof 

required to prevail under each provision, id. at 257–58. With 

respect to which entities may be sued under Title IX and 

§ 1983 equal protection causes of action, respectively, the 

Court explained that “Title IX reaches institutions and 

programs that receive federal funds, which may include 

nonpublic institutions,” but does not “authoriz[e] suit against 

school officials, teachers, and other individuals.” 555 U.S. 

at 257 (citations omitted). In contrast, “[t]he Equal 

Protection Clause reaches only state actors, [and] § 1983 

equal protection claims may be brought against individuals 

as well as municipalities and certain other state entities.” Id.

In its comparison of the “substantive rights and 

protections,” the Court also underscored the differences 

between the types of conduct prohibited under each of the 

schemes. The Court explained that “Title IX exempts 

elementary and secondary schools from its prohibition 

against discrimination in admissions, § 1681(a)(1); it 

exempts military service schools and traditionally single-sex 

public colleges from all of its provisions, §§ 1681(a)(4)–

(5).” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 257. But, the Court noted, 

some of what is exempted under Title IX “may form the 

basis of equal protection claims” for gender discrimination 

under § 1983. Id.

Finally, the Court observed that “[e]ven where particular 

activities and particular defendants are subject to both Title 

IX and the Equal Protection Clause, the standards for 

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16 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

establishing liability may not be wholly congruent.” Id. at 

257. It explained that “a Title IX plaintiff can establish 

school district liability by showing that a single school 

administrator with authority to take corrective action 

responded to harassment with deliberate indifference,” 

whereas “[a] plaintiff stating a similar claim via § 1983 for 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause by a school district 

or other municipal entity must show that the harassment was 

the result of municipal custom, policy, or practice.” Id. at 

257–58 (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

The Court concluded that “[i]n light of the divergent 

coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, as well 

as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme 

comparable to those at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and 

Rancho Palos Verdes, . . . Title IX was not meant to be an 

exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination 

in schools.” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 258. Because Title IX 

was not intended as a “substitute for § 1983 suits as a means 

of enforcing constitutional rights,” the Court held “that 

§ 1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remain 

available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender 

discrimination in schools.” Id.

The Supreme Court then reasoned that its “conclusion 

[was] consistent with Title IX’s context and history.” Id.

The Court explained that “Congress modeled Title IX after 

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” and “[a]t the time 

of Title IX’s enactment . . . Title VI was routinely interpreted 

to allow for parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims.” Id. 

Given “the absence of any contrary evidence, it follows that 

Congress intended Title IX to be interpreted similarly to 

allow for parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims.” Id. at 259. 

The Court noted that “the relevant question is not whether 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 17

Congress envisioned that the two types of claims would 

proceed together in addressing gender discrimination in 

schools; it is whether Congress affirmatively intended to 

preclude this result,” id. at 259 n.2, and the Court found no 

such intent reflected in the legislative history, id. at 259.

The Sea Clammers line of cases teaches that when 

Congress creates a right by enacting a statute but at the same 

time limits enforcement of that right through a specific 

remedial scheme that is narrower than § 1983, a § 1983 

remedy is precluded. This makes sense because the limits 

on enforcement of the right were part and parcel to its 

creation. When a right is created by the Constitution, 

however, and a statute merely recognizes it or adds 

enforcement options, the analysis differs. Fitzgerald teaches 

that, in that situation, if the statute’s rights and protections 

diverge in “significant ways” from those provided by the 

Constitution, a § 1983 remedy is not precluded. 555 U.S. at 

252–53.

C.

Following Fitzgerald, to determine whether the ADEA’s 

retaliation provision precludes § 1983 First Amendment 

retaliation suits, we must determine whether the “contours 

of such rights and protections” provided by the two “diverge 

in significant ways.” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252–53. The 

ADEA provides an express private right of action, which 

weighs in favor of finding preclusion under Sea Clammers 

and its progeny. But the disparities between the rights and 

protections of the ADEA’s retaliation provision and the First 

Amendment as enforced through § 1983—including 

differences in who may sue and be sued, the standards for 

liability, and the damages available—which make the 

ADEA’s protections narrower than the First Amendment’s 

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18 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

in some important respects, cause us to conclude that 

Congress did not intend to preclude § 1983 First 

Amendment retaliation suits.

1.

The ADEA provides both an express private right of 

action, see Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 

(2000), and an administrative exhaustion requirement to file 

a complaint with the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)–(d).

If we were evaluating the preclusion of § 1983 suits as a 

mechanism to enforce a statutory right created by the 

ADEA, the detailed nature of its remedial scheme might be 

dispositive. But, under Fitzgerald, it is not. Fitzgerald

instructed that, “[i]n cases in which the § 1983 claim alleges 

a constitutional violation,” the presence of significant 

differences in the “rights and protections” offered by the 

Constitution and the statute in question make it unlikely

“that Congress intended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing 

constitutional rights” by enacting the statute. 555 U.S. at 

252–53.6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Fitzgerald

looked not only to whether Title IX had an express cause of 

action; it also engaged in a detailed comparison of Title IX’s 

implied right of action and § 1983 equal protection claims. 

Following this guidance from Fitzgerald, we turn to 

comparing the substantive rights and protections afforded by 

the ADEA’s retaliation provision and those provided under 

the First Amendment, as enforced through § 1983.

 6 Of course, because Fitzgerald was discussing a statute that lacked an 

express private right of action, the Supreme Court was not confronted 

with the question of how important the comprehensiveness of the 

remedial scheme is vis-à-vis the significant divergence of “the contours 

of . . . rights and protections.” 555 U.S. at 252–53. Nor did it attempt to 

answer that question.

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 19

2.

a.

Like the disparities identified in Fitzgerald, our 

examination of the ADEA’s retaliation provision and First 

Amendment retaliation claims brought under § 1983 reveals 

differences in who may sue and be sued. First, the ADEA 

does not allow for suit against individuals, whereas § 1983 

does. See Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587–

88 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that individual defendants cannot 

be held liable for damages under the ADEA); Hafer v. Melo, 

502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) (“We hold that state officials, sued in 

their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning 

of § 1983.”); see also Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 621 

(7th Cir. 2012) (“In contrast [to an ADEA plaintiff], a § 1983 

plaintiff may file suit against an individual, so long as that 

individual caused or participated in the alleged deprivation 

of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)).

Second, state employees, in practice, cannot sue under 

the ADEA but can sue under § 1983. In Kimel, the Supreme 

Court held that “in the ADEA, Congress did not validly 

abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity to suits by private 

individuals,” and thus, state employers could not be sued by 

state employees under the ADEA. 528 U.S. at 91. This 

holding, combined with the fact that the ADEA does not 

allow suits against individuals (and thus does not allow suits 

against state officials or supervisors), means that state 

employees may not bring claims under the ADEA. See 

Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “[i]f the ADEA is the 

exclusive remedy for age discrimination in the workplace, 

then plaintiffs are left without a federal forum for age 

discrimination claims against state actors.”). Although 

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20 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

§ 1983 likewise did not abrogate States’ Eleventh 

Amendment immunity and therefore does not allow suits 

against States themselves or individuals in their official 

capacities, Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989), § 1983 does provide a remedy to state employees 

by allowing suits against state officials in their individual 

capacities, see Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31.

Third, the ADEA is generally applicable to private and 

public (but not state) employers with twenty or more 

employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (defining “employer”).7 In 

contrast, § 1983 is generally inapplicable to private 

employers.8 See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 

526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999) (“[T]he under-color-of-state-law 

element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private 

conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’” 

(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982))).

Finally, the Supreme Court has held that independent 

contractors may sue under § 1983 for First Amendment 

retaliation. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty., Kan. v. 

Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686 (1996) (“[W]e recognize the 

right of independent government contractors not to be 

terminated for exercising their First Amendment rights.”). 

In contrast, “[a] claimant under . . . the ADEA must establish 

himself as an ‘employee,’” thus excluding independent 

 7 The 1974 Amendments to the ADEA extended the protections of the 

ADEA to federal employees. Bunch v. United States, 548 F.2d 336, 338

(9th Cir. 1977); 29 U.S.C. § 633a (setting forth ADEA requirements for 

federal employers).

 8 In certain circumstances a private employer could be considered a 

state actor. In such circumstances, an employee plaintiff could sue such 

an employer under § 1983 as well as under the ADEA. See Dennis v. 

Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980).

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 21

contractors. Barnhart v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1310, 

1312 (9th Cir. 1998).

b.

Also similar to the differences identified in Fitzgerald, 

there is a difference between ADEA retaliation suits and 

§ 1983 First Amendment retaliation suits in how liability is 

established under each. See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 257 

(examining different standards of liability for Title IX and 

§ 1983 claims).

First, an ADEA plaintiff bears a greater burden of proof 

as to causation than a plaintiff bringing a First Amendment 

retaliation claim. Once the plaintiff bringing a First 

Amendment retaliation claim via § 1983 has demonstrated 

that the protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in the 

retaliatory action, “the burden shifts to the government to 

show that it ‘would have taken the same action even in the 

absence of the protected conduct.’” O’Brien v. Welty, 

818 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pinard v. 

Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir.2006)); 

see also Thomas v. County of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1169 

(9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (explaining that First 

Amendment retaliation cases are governed by Mt. Healthy 

City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 

274 (1977), under which, once a plaintiff makes a showing 

that protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor 

in the employer’s taking a non-trivial adverse employment 

action, a defendant can escape liability only by meeting the 

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it 

would have reached the same decision even absent the 

plaintiff’s protected speech).

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22 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

In contrast, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical 

Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), the Supreme Court 

outlined a different framework in the context of Title VII 

retaliation claims—which is relevant to ADEA retaliation 

claims because we have long considered the ADEA 

retaliation provision to be the “equivalent of the antiretaliation provision of Title VII,” O’Day v. McDonnell 

Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In Nassar, the Court held that a plaintiff alleging retaliation 

under Title VII must prove “that the unlawful retaliation 

would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged 

wrongful action or actions of the employer.” 133 S. Ct. at 

2533. The Court explained that this burden on the plaintiff 

to “establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for 

cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer” is 

“more demanding than the motivating-factor standard.” Id.

at 2534.

Second, exactly as in Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 257, there 

is a difference in the requirements for establishing liability 

between the ADEA retaliation clause and § 1983 when the 

defendant is a municipality. Under § 1983, “municipalities 

[may not] be held liable unless action pursuant to official 

municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional 

tort.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 

658, 691 (1978). In contrast, no such requirement exists for 

ADEA claims brought against municipalities. See Hill v. 

Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(explaining that “a municipality may be held liable for the 

conduct of an individual employee or officer only when that 

conduct implements an official policy or practice” in § 1983 

actions, but that “a plaintiff may bring an ADEA claim 

against a political subdivision of a state based on the actions 

of its employee(s)” (footnotes omitted)); see also Spengler 

v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 491 (6th Cir. 2010) 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 23

(explaining in the context of an ADEA retaliation claim that 

“[a]n employer will be strictly liable for a supervisor’s 

proven discrimination where such discrimination results in 

an adverse employment action”).

c.

Finally, the remedies available to those individuals 

bringing suit under the ADEA’s retaliation provision and 

§ 1983 are different. For example, ADEA plaintiffs may 

recover lost wages and liquidated damages from employers 

but may not recover damages for emotional pain and 

suffering. See C.I.R. v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 326 (1995) 

(“[T]he Courts of Appeals have unanimously held, and 

respondent does not contest, that the ADEA does not permit 

a separate recovery of compensatory damages for pain and 

suffering or emotional distress.”). In contrast, the Supreme 

Court has explained that “compensatory damages [in § 1983 

suits] may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other 

monetary harms, but also such injuries as ‘impairment of 

reputation . . . , personal humiliation, and mental anguish 

and suffering.’” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 

477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (second alteration in original) 

(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 

(1974)).

3.

These distinctions demonstrate that the ADEA’s 

retaliation protections diverge significantly from those 

available under § 1983 First Amendment lawsuits.9 Most 

 9 The list of differences between ADEA retaliation actions and § 1983 

First Amendment retaliation actions discussed herein is not necessarily 

exhaustive.

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24 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

significantly in our view, the ADEA’s retaliation provision 

provides less protection to an alleged victim of retaliation 

than does the First Amendment in several important ways—

the ADEA’s protections exclude independent contractors 

and state employees, do not allow for suit against 

individuals, require plaintiffs to bear a heavier burden of 

proof as to causation, and exclude certain types of remedies 

like damages for mental suffering. And although the ADEA 

affords greater protection to some individuals that would not 

normally be covered by § 1983 because it subjects private 

employers to suits and it does not require proof of a 

municipal policy for those suing municipalities, this does not 

negate the fact that the ADEA provides less protection in the 

important ways discussed above.

If we were evaluating a purely statutory right, as in Sea 

Clammers or Rancho Palos Verdes, the fact that some 

aspects of the ADEA’s protections are narrower would 

suggest preclusion. That is because, if a statute creating a 

right also creates a mechanism for enforcement that is more 

limited than § 1983, we assume Congress intended those 

limits to apply to that right. See Rancho Palos Verdes, 

544 U.S. at 121 (“[T]he existence of a more restrictive 

private remedy for statutory violations has been the dividing 

line between those cases in which we have held that an action 

would lie under § 1983 and those in which we have held that 

it would not.”).

When considering “substantial” constitutional rights, 

however, we are “[m]indful that we should ‘not lightly 

conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on 

§ 1983 as a remedy.’” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 256 (quoting 

Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012). Thus, if there are differences in 

the protections offered by the statute as compared to those 

provided by the Constitution, particularly if the protections 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 25

granted by the statute are narrower, we will not hold § 1983 

suits to be precluded unless Congress manifested an intent to 

preclude. See id. at 259 n.2 (explaining that the relevant 

inquiry is not whether “Congress envisioned that the two 

types of claims would proceed together,” but whether 

“Congress affirmatively intended to preclude,” § 1983 suits 

to vindicate constitutional rights) (emphasis added)). Here, 

as in Fitzgerald, the disparities—in particular those that 

demonstrate the ADEA’s protections are narrower than 

those guaranteed by the Constitution—are sufficient to cause 

us to conclude that, unless Congress manifested a clear intent 

to do so, § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suits are not 

precluded. And there is no express statement of preclusion 

in the text of the ADEA that would cause us to conclude that 

Congress did in fact affirmatively intend to preclude § 1983 

First Amendment retaliation suits relating to speech about 

age discrimination.

D.

The Senate and House Reports on the ADEA also offer 

no reason to believe that Congress intended through the 

ADEA to preclude § 1983 First Amendment retaliation 

claims related to allegations of age discrimination. “Speech 

by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of 

the First Amendment, which ‘was fashioned to assure 

unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 

political and social changes desired by the people.’” Lane v. 

Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014) (quoting Roth v. 

United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). Given the 

importance of speech in our democracy, it seems unlikely 

that Congress would narrow First Amendment protections 

without serious consideration. At a minimum, we would 

expect to find some discussion of such a significant change 

in the official Reports on the ADEA. Yet we find nothing in 

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26 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

those Reports suggesting that Congress even considered 

preclusion of First Amendment claims, let alone intended 

such a result.10

Unlike in Smith where the legislative history made clear 

that the EHA was specifically designed to “protect[] the 

constitutional right of a handicapped child to a public 

education,” Smith, 468 U.S. at 1013, the Senate Committee 

Report accompanying the original ADEA legislation says 

nothing about the purpose of the retaliation provision, and it 

never mentions the First Amendment. With respect to the 

retaliation provision, the full statement in the “section by 

section” analysis portion of the Report provides:

[This subsection] makes it unlawful for 

employers, employment agencies and labor 

unions to discriminate against a person 

because he has opposed a practice made 

unlawful by this act, or because he has made 

a charge, testified, or assisted or participated 

in any manner in an investigation, 

proceeding, or litigation under this act.

S. Rep. No. 90-723, at 8 (1967). This statement is essentially 

a recitation of the language of the retaliation provision and 

sheds no additional light on its purpose.

The House Report accompanying the original legislation 

is similarly devoid of any indication that Congress 

considered the preclusive effect of the retaliation provision 

 10 We “rel[y] on official committee reports when considering 

legislative history.” Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076, 

1082 (9th Cir. 1999). The parties have not pointed us to any other 

legislative history, beyond the Committee Reports, describing the 

purpose or intent of the retaliation provision of the ADEA.

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 27

of the ADEA on § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims. 

See H.R. Rep. No. 90-805, at 9 (1967). The House Report 

offered essentially the same recitation of the statutory 

language as the Senate Report, with no additional analysis 

that would shed light upon Congress’s intent. Id. (“[This 

subsection] makes it unlawful for employers, employment 

agencies and labor unions to discriminate against a person 

because he has opposed a practice made unlawful by this act, 

or because he has made a charge, testified, or assisted or 

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 

or litigation under this act.”).11

E.

The result that the retaliation provision of the ADEA 

does not preclude § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suits 

makes sense in light of the heightened level of protection that 

the Constitution affords First Amendment rights. Rights 

subject to heightened scrutiny are much more likely to be the 

basis of a successful constitutional claim than are those 

subject to rational basis review. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 

of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (explaining the greater 

difficulty in prevailing on an equal protection claim subject 

 11 This lack of comment on the retaliation provision’s relationship to 

the First Amendment is unsurprising because as originally enacted, the 

ADEA did not apply to states or the federal government. See Kimel v. 

Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 68 (2000) (“In 1974, in a statute 

consisting primarily of amendments to the FLSA, Congress extended 

application of the ADEA’s substantive requirements to the States.”). 

The focus of the Reports accompanying those amendments was on the 

expansion of coverage, and there is no indication that Congress reconsidered the retaliation provision in light of the expansion of coverage. 

See S. Rep. No. 93-690, at 55–56 (1974) (discussing the amendments to 

the definition of employer to expand coverage, but not mentioning the 

retaliation provision); H.R. Rep. No. 93-913, at 40–41 (1974) (same).

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28 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

to rational basis review than on one subject to heightened 

scrutiny).

When a statute creates a cause of action to enforce a right 

that would only be subject to rational basis review under the 

Constitution, it is very unlikely as a practical matter that the 

statute will provide less protection than the Constitution. For 

example, as the Supreme Court explained in Kimel, “[t]he 

[ADEA], through its broad restriction on the use of age as a 

discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state 

employment decisions and practices than would likely be 

held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, 

rational basis standard.” Id. at 86. As a consequence, we 

look to such a statute for the substance of the right, just as 

we do with a right created entirely by statute. And as with 

situations in which the right is entirely created by statute, see 

Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 121, if Congress has also 

limited enforcement through the provisions in the statute, 

those limits indicate an intent to preclude recourse to § 1983 

as a remedy.

In contrast, where a constitutional right is protected by 

heightened scrutiny, neither the substance nor the 

enforcement of the right will typically depend on any statute 

further defining the right. We do not assume that when a 

statute merely touches upon conduct that would violate the 

Constitution, the statute precludes the enforcement of that 

constitutional right unless there is a clear indication of 

Congressional intent that it do so. See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 

at 256, 259 n.2 (declining to preclude § 1983 suits alleging 

constitutional equal protection claims for gender 

discrimination in the absence of an indication that Congress 

affirmatively intended such preclusion).

Consistent with this, courts have allowed § 1983 

constitutional claims and statutory claims to coexist when 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 29

the constitutional claim gets heightened scrutiny, but not 

when the constitutional claim gets rational basis review. For 

instance, in Fitzgerald, as discussed above, the Supreme 

Court held that Title IX does not preclude § 1983 suits 

alleging equal protection violations based on gender 

discrimination, 555 U.S. at 258, which are subject to 

heightened scrutiny, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 

127, 135 (1994). Similarly, we have explained that Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers 

from discriminating on the basis of “race, color, religion, 

sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, does not 

preclude suits under § 1983 alleging constitutional equal 

protection violations for discrimination on the basis of race 

or sex, both of which receive heightened scrutiny under the 

Equal Protection Clause. Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher 

Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that 

Title VII does not deprive plaintiffs of other avenues for 

asserting claims of race and sex discrimination) (citing 

Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 

(1975)); City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 

473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining that classifications 

based on race, alienage, national origin, and gender all 

receive heightened scrutiny).

In contrast, in Smith, the Supreme Court held that the 

EHA precluded § 1983 equal protection claims regarding 

disability discrimination in education. Smith, 468 U.S. at 

1009. Disability, like age, is subject to rational basis review, 

not heightened scrutiny, under the Equal Protection Clause. 

See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.

It is well established that First Amendment claims like 

Stilwell’s, that allege retaliation following speech on a 

matter of public concern, are reviewed with heightened 

scrutiny. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014) 

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30 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

(explaining that “a stronger showing [than legitimate 

government interests] may be necessary if the employee’s 

speech . . . involve[s] matters of public concern” (last 

alteration in original) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 

138, 151–52 (1983))). Our holding today that § 1983 suits 

alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment are 

not precluded by the ADEA’s retaliation provision is thus 

consistent with the tendency of courts to conclude that there 

is a lack of preclusion when the right to be enforced is 

subject to heightened scrutiny.

F.

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, a different result is 

not required by our prior decision in Ahlmeyer v. Nevada 

System of Higher Education, 555 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 

2009), which held that the ADEA precludes § 1983 suits to 

remedy equal protection violations based on age 

discrimination.

In Ahlmeyer, we compared § 1983 equal protection 

claims based on age discrimination in employment to such 

claims under the ADEA and determined that “the ADEA 

provides broader protection than the Constitution,” so “a 

plaintiff has ‘nothing substantive to gain’ by . . . asserting a 

§ 1983 claim” in addition to an ADEA claim. Id. at 1058 

(quoting Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 

2008)). In light of the ADEA’s greater protections, we held 

that its discrimination provisions are sufficiently 

comprehensive to preclude § 1983 equal protection claims.12

 12 There is a circuit split on this issue. Compare, e.g., Hildebrand v. 

Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that because the 

ADEA provides more expansive protection against age discrimination 

than the Equal Protection Clause, the ADEA precludes § 1983 suits 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 31

Ahlmeyer’s holding was motivated at least in part by the 

fact that classifications based on age are subject to rational 

basis review. Ahlmeyer relied heavily on Zombro v. 

Baltimore City Police Department, 868 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th 

Cir. 1989), a pre-Fitzgerald case holding that § 1983 suits 

alleging age discrimination were precluded by the ADEA in 

part because of this level-of-scrutiny characteristic. See

Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1057. Zombro had emphasized that 

“the equal protection clause does not recognize a ‘class 

defined as the aged’ to be a suspect class in need of special 

protection in which alleged discrimination is subject to 

‘strict judicial scrutiny,’” 868 F.2d at 1370 (quoting Mass. 

Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (per 

curiam)), and that this differentiated age discrimination 

claims from “§ 1983 actions predicated on race, sex, or 

religious discrimination or an infringement of specific First 

Amendment rights.” Id. at 1370. Ahlmeyer itself also noted 

that, unlike “claims of discrimination based on race or sex 

[that] are entitled to heightened scrutiny, age discrimination 

claims under the Constitution are subject to rational basis 

scrutiny.” Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d 1059 n.8. Thus, a plaintiff 

“has little to gain by circumventing the ADEA, which 

affords more protection in the area of age discrimination 

than does the federal Constitution.” Id.

 alleging equal protection violations based on age discrimination in 

employment), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1398 (2015), with Levin v. 

Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that “[a]lthough 

the ADEA enacts a comprehensive statutory scheme for enforcement of 

its own statutory rights, akin to Sea Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes, 

. . . it does not preclude a § 1983 claim for constitutional rights” because 

of “the ADEA’s lack of legislative history or statutory language 

precluding constitutional claims, and the divergent rights and protections 

afforded by the ADEA as compared to a § 1983 equal protection claim” 

(citing Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252–53)).

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32 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

Because the ADEA’s retaliation provision is critically 

different from the ADEA’s discrimination provision at issue 

in Ahlmeyer, that opinion is not controlling here. As 

explained above, the ADEA’s retaliation protections are 

narrower than the First Amendment’s in some important 

respects, whereas the ADEA discrimination provision 

provides more protection against age discrimination than 

does the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 

(“Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection 

jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is ‘so out of 

proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that 

it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to 

prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’” (quoting City of 

Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).

Given the substantial difference between the level of 

scrutiny afforded age discrimination equal protection claims 

and First Amendment retaliation claims, we cannot assume 

that Congress intended the ADEA to affect the availability 

of § 1983 claims in the same manner in both subject areas.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and 

REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

Our quest here is not to search for or to explicate 

constitutional principles; it is to search for congressional 

intent. That is to say, Congress can set up a statutory scheme 

wherein it demonstrates its intent to have that scheme, not 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, apply to claims for enforcement of rights 

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STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS 33

under the statute. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. 

Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252–54, 129 S. Ct. 788, 793–94, 

172 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2009); Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. 

Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13, 20–21, 101 S. Ct. 

2615, 2622–23, 2626–27, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981). Here our 

task is to determine whether Congress intended to make the 

ADEA1 exclusive in that sense.

We have already said that Congress did just that. 

Specifically, we have held that “the ADEA precludes the 

assertion of age discrimination in employment claims, even 

those seeking to vindicate constitutional rights, under 

§ 1983.” Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 

1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009). In that case, lest there be any 

doubt, we went on to conclude that: “the ADEA is the 

exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination in 

employment, even those claims with their source in the 

Constitution.” Id. at 1060–61. In Ahlmeyer, we were 

dealing with the claim of an older employee that her 

employer had discriminated against her on account of her 

age. Id. at 1054; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The 

majority says that this case differs from Ahlmeyer because 

what is involved here is a claim of retaliation.2 See 29 

U.S.C. § 623(d). In effect, the majority says that Congress 

has had two different intents regarding the ADEA.

The first of those relates to individuals whose need for 

protection formed the mainspring of the ADEA—employees 

 1 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.

 2 Ahlmeyer did not draw that distinction. Of course, it is not at all 

unusual for those who make claims of discrimination to make claims of 

retaliation also. In fact, at the trial court level that happened in Ahlmeyer

itself. See Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1054 n.1.

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34 STILLWELL V. CITY OF WILLIAMS

discriminated against on account of their age. See id. § 621; 

see also id. § 623(a)–(c). The second, somewhat more 

collateral, intention was designed to more fully protect the 

older employees for whom the ADEA was created. It relates 

to individuals who are retaliated against, not necessarily 

because of their own ages, but because they have “opposed 

any practice made unlawful” by the ADEA. Id. § 623(d).

While the majority’s opinion is quite persuasively 

written, I am not quite persuaded because I do not believe 

that in creating this relatively simple piece of legislation 

Congress held two very different intentions regarding the 

ADEA. Those for whom the ADEA was primarily designed 

had to rely upon ADEA remedies alone, but those who were 

protected in order to assure that the protection of those in the 

first group would be more effective did not have their 

remedies so limited. The latter could spell out a § 1983 

claim also. Nothing Congress said makes that so,3 and I am 

unable to conclude that Congress contemporaneously held 

separate intentions when enacting and amending this fairly 

uncomplicated piece of legislation.

Again, it is congressional intent that we must seek, and 

even if we ignore the broad and encompassing language of 

Ahlmeyer, I cannot say that Congress held those two separate 

intents. In short, I believe that in deciding this case we are 

bound by Ahlmeyer.

Thus, I must respectfully dissent.

 3 Indeed, the majority explains that the legislative history helps not at 

all.

 Case: 14-15540, 08/05/2016, ID: 10076575, DktEntry: 31-1, Page 34 of 34