Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00528/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00528-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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-1- 06cv528

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THEY YAM,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06-CV-528 W (CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

& RECOMMENDATION

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff They Yam seeks judicial review of Social Security Commissioner Jo Anne

B. Barnhart’s determination that she is not entitled to disability benefits under Title XVI

of the Social Security Act. On referral, Magistrate Judge Cathy A. Bencivengo issued

a Report & Recommendation (“Report”) advising this Court to deny Yam’s motion for

summary judgment and grant the government’s motion for summary judgment

upholding the decision. On July 18, 2007, Yam filed objections to the Report. Because

de novo review shows substantial evidence to support the Social Security

Administration’s final action, the Court will ADOPT the Report in its entirety.

Case 3:06-cv-00528-W-CAB Document 23 Filed 09/05/07 Page 1 of 10
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I. Background

The facts of this case, including Yam’s medical history, are more fully set forth in

the Report and are incorporated herein by reference. By way of summary, Yam moved

from Cambodia to the United States in 1983. (Administrative Record “AR” at 565.)

She never attended school, except for two or three months of adult school to study

English in 1984. (AR at 566–67.) She last worked in 1986. (AR at 571.)

 Yam alleged disability as of January 1, 1999. (AR at 151.) Her physical problems

included chest pains, stomachache, and numbness in half of her body. (AR at 625.)

She also explained that her asthma interfered with her daily living, because it caused

chest pain and coughing. (AR at 628). She experienced neck and back pain, which she

attributed to a gun beating she suffered in Cambodia for stealing a cucumber. (AR at

601.) She also testified that she was depressed, had problems remembering things, and

had nightmares that ghosts were hunting her two or three times per week. (AR at 630.)

She saw shadows at night and heard voices two or three times a week saying they

wanted to kill her. (AR at 631.) She once cut her wrist with a glass because she was

angry and wanted to hurt herself. (AR 573–75.) Finally, Yam testified that she got

angry and felt like killing herself frequently—even within a few weeks of the hearing,

when she wanted to tie a rope around her neck—but she never actually attempted

suicide. (AR at 590.)

On June 10, 2002, Yam applied for disability benefits. (AR at 151–53.) On

August 23, 2002, the Social Security Administration denied her application because

Yam’s condition was not severe enough to keep her from working. (AR at 69.) Yam

requested reconsideration, but the Administration again denied her application. (AR

at 74–77.)

On November 15, 2002, Yam requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ). (AR at 78–79.) After a hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision finding

that Yam was not disabled. (AR at 102–22.) Yam requested an Appeals Council

Review of the decision. (AR at 123–31.) On April 30, 2004, the Appeals Council

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remanded the case to the ALJ for further consideration. (AR at 132–34.) On

November 17, 2005, after a second hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision

determining that Yam was not disabled. (AR at 13–65.) Yam requested a second

Appeals Council review, but the Appeals Council found no grounds for appeal. (AR at

5–7.) Thus, the ALJ’s second written decision became the Commissioner’s final action.

(AR at 5.)

On March 13, 2006, having exhausted all administrative remedies, Yam

challenged the proceedings here. On July 26, 2006, Yam filed a motion for summary

judgment [Doc. No. 10] arguing that the Court should reverse the ALJ’s decision and

remand for payment of benefits. On August 9, 2006, Defendant filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment [Doc. Nos. 13–15] arguing that the Court should affirm the ALJ’s

decision. Judge Bencivengo recommended that the Court grant the government’s

motion. Yam objected. The Court now reviews the Report de novo. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).

II. Legal Standards

The Social Security Act entitles a claimant to disability benefits if she is unable

to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A). To qualify for benefits, the impairment

must result from “anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are

demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984).

Further, the impairment must be of “such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable

to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A).

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Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allow unsuccessful

applicants to seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). But the scope of review is limited. A court may not overturn

the Commissioner’s final action unless (1) the ALJ’s findings of fact are not supported

by substantial evidence, or (2) the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards. See

Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).

“Substantial evidence” means evidence a reasonable person might accept as adequate

to support the ALJ’s conclusion, considering the record as a whole. See Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir.

2002). In other words, substantial evidence means “more than a scintilla but less than

a preponderance” of the evidence. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.

1997). The Court must consider both the evidence that supports and detracts from the

Commissioner’s conclusions. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir.

2001); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir.

1988).

Even if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, a court must set the

decision aside if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the

evidence and reaching a decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir.

1978). But if the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court

must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1989).

III. Discussion

Yam contends that the ALJ’s adverse decision was not supported by substantial

evidence. Yam makes two main arguments: (1) the ALJ erroneously rejected her

testimony as not credible, and (2) the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Yam’s

treating physicians. As the Report concluded, Yam’s arguments fail as a matter of law.

Therefore, the Court will uphold the ALJ’s decision.

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A. The ALJ properly discredited Yam’s inconsistent testimony.

Yam’s porous account of the status of her driver’s license compromised her

credibility. Yam first denied having a driver’s license at all. Then, she admitted that she

had a license at one time. On further questioning, she stated that the license expired

in 1988. Only after the questioning attorney produced a photocopy of her current valid

and unexpired driver’s licence did Yam acknowledge she did in fact have a driver’s

license. (AR at 568.) Thus, the ALJ properly concluded that Yam’s perception,

memory, and sincerity all undermined her credibility in general.

Put simply, Yam either could not recall, or lied about, essential facts establishing

her identity and willingness to follow basic laws. As noted in the Report, the ALJ has

the authority to determine whether a claimant’s testimony is credible. Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345–46 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, “[i]f the ALJ’s credibility

finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage

in second-guessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). And even

if Yam merely forgot or misunderstood the question, substantial evidence still supports

the ALJ’s credibility determination. Yam’s shoddy recollection of facts she had no

incentive to misrepresent casts doubt on all her testimony.

Yam contends that the ALJ erroneously concluded that she lied under oath by

testifying that her license was automatically renewed by mail. Yam testified that “they

just sent [sic] to me and [she did]n’t know anything about it.” (AR at 570.) Dr.

Henderson also testified that Yam’s license was automatically renewed by mail. (Pl.’s

Obj. to Report at 3.) Yam also cites portions of the California Department of Motor

Vehicles’ website regarding automatic renewal by mail. (Id.) But these provisions still

require an application and a fee to renew a license—hardly an “automatic” renewal.

Further, it strains credulity to suggest that the DMV sent Yam a new license without her

knowledge. Thus, the Court will not second-guess the ALJ’s credibility finding.

Yam also argues that because the Appeals Council reversed the ALJ’s first

decision, the finding therein that Yam lied under oath cannot affect Yam’s credibility.

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(Pl.’s Obj. to Report at 2.) The Appeals Council, however, remanded the case only to

consider additional evidence—leaving the ALJ’s factfinding legally intact. More

pointedly, the Appeals Council did not reverse the ALJ’s credibility determination.

Thus, the ALJ properly relied on unreversed conclusions from the first hearing in

denying Yam’s disability benefits.

Further, leaving aside that testimony, several other instances undermine Yam’s

credibility. For example, Yam claims that she does not speak English. But the DMV

issued her a driver’s license over twenty years ago, even though anyone who is “unable

to read and understand simple English used in highway traffic and directional signs”

does not qualify for one. (See Report at 20.) In addition, Yam has given inconsistent

testimony regarding her ability to do different types of work. Yam claimed that she

could not do anything around the house, however, she testified that she participated

extensively in her children’s care by washing clothes, shopping for groceries, cooking

about six days a week, and walking her children to school. (Report at 21.) Standing

alone, these inconsistencies constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s

credibility determination.

Yam further contends that the ALJ committed legal error by holding her failure

to seek prompt medical treatment against her. (Pl.’s Obj. to Report at 13.) Under

Gamble v. Chater, 68 F.3d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1995), Yam argues that disability benefits

may not be denied because of a claimant’s failure to obtain treatment she cannot afford.

But the ALJ did not assign dispositive weight to Yam’s failure to seek treatment.

Rather, the ALJ implicitly reasoned that she did not subjectively believe that her

condition warranted treatment—which, in turn, contradicted her testimony about the

severity of her condition. Thus, in conjunction with the other inconsistencies, the ALJ

justifiably rejected her testimony regarding the severity of her condition as not credible.

Yam also misconstrues the ALJ’s conclusions regarding her ability to work. Yam

testified that she could, and did, care for her family members. But the ALJ did not

determine that simply because she can care for her family she is therefore able to work.

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Again, the ALJ found that Yam’s ability to care for her family implicitly contradicted her

other testimony regarding the existence and severity of her disability. Thus, whether

Yam’s skills transfer to a work setting or not, Yam’s credibility suffers.

Therefore, having reviewed the record as a whole, the Court must conclude that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination.

B. The ALJ properly assessed the testimony of Yam’s doctors.

An ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion if the ALJ sets forth “specific,

legitimate reasons . . . based on substantial evidence” in the record. Rodriguez v.

Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1992). Yam contends that the ALJ erroneously

rejected the opinions of Drs. Henderson, Zappone, Grisolia, and Sidrick. Yam further

contends that the ALJ improperly credited Dr. Soliman’s testimony because it was

unreliable. Finally, Yam argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded the testimony of

Tuan Le, a physician’s assistant. But specific and legitimate reasons justified favoring

Dr. Soliman over Yam’s other witnesses. Therefore, the court will affirm the ALJ’s

decision.

Dr. Henderson. Dr. Henderson’s opinions lacked support elsewhere in the record

and contradicted portions of the opinions of Drs. Soliman, Rivera-Miya and Hurwitz.

As the Report points out, Yam’s visits to Dr. Henderson were sporadic. (Report at 25.)

Moreover, the treating notes from Yam’s visits with Dr. Henderson were scant, and Dr.

Henderson did not perform standard clinical tests on Yam. (Id.) Even further, Dr.

Zappone’s opinions and notes directly contradicted Dr. Henderson’s opinions and notes.

Together, specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s conclusion as to Dr. Henderson.

Dr. Zappone. Yam does not offer any substantive argument as to why the ALJ

improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Zappone. Rather, Yam simply states a bare

conclusion that the ALJ erred. Having reviewed the record, the Court finds no basis for

error.

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Dr. Grisolia. The ALJ properly credited Dr. Grisolia’s opinions but refused to

accord them controlling weight. Dr. Grisolia diagnosed Yam with sonophobia (fear of

sound)—but Yam herself testified that she frequently listens to Cambodian music. (AR

at 50.) Moreover, Dr. Grisolia noted Yam’s persistent headaches, but never prescribed

anything stronger than Tylenol. Indeed, Dr. Grisolia never performed repeated physical

examinations or provided a clinical finding that Yam actually suffered from severe and

disabling headaches. (AR at 50.) Thus, although Dr. Grisolia treated Yam, the ALJ

provided specific and legitimate reasons to reject parts of his testimony.

Dr. Sidrick. Dr. Sidrick wrote two different opinion letters regarding Yam, but

these contrasted sharply. (AR at 46.) Dr. Sidrick also stated that Yam had attempted

suicide, whereas Yam only claimed she wanted to hurt herself. (AR at 47.) Dr. Sidrick

stated that Yam had endured years of torture, but this too contradicts Yam’s own

testimony. (AR at 48.) Finally, although Dr. Sidrick reported that Yam was unable to

use her hands for any repetitive motion, the ALJ noted that there was no objective

clinical or laboratory evidence in the record that Yam had issues with her right wrist or

hand, nor did Dr. Sidrick’s treating notes document any complaints of problems with

Yam’s right wrist or hand. (AR at 48.) On the whole, these inconsistencies support an

inference that Dr. Sidrick based her opinion on dubious information or lacked a firm

grasp of Yam’s condition. Together, they constitute specific, legitimate reasons to

discredit Dr. Sidrick’s testimony.

Dr. Soliman. Yam contends that the ALJ improperly credited Dr. Soliman, a

government-hired physician who only examined Yam only once. But the ALJ only gave

moderate weight to Dr. Soliman’s opinions. (AR at 49.) Further, Dr. Soliman is a

board-certified psychiatrist who conducted a mental-status examination and report far

more detailed than any other in the record. (Id.) Dr. Soliman’s opinions are generally

supported by the record as a whole and are corroborated by two other board-certified

state-agency psychiatrists, Drs. Hurwitz and Rivera-Miya. (Id.) These are specific,

legitimate reasons for crediting Dr. Soliman’s opinions.

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Tuan Le. The ALJ properly determined that the physician’s assistant, Tuan Le,

is not an acceptable medical source, and thus rejected his testimony as it related to the

existence of a medical condition. Under 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(1), a physician’s

assistant is considered an “other source,” not an “acceptable medical source.” Gomez

v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 1996), does not control. As Judge Bencivengo ably

explained, Gomez relies on the now-nonexistent 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(6). Thus, the

ALJ properly held Gomez inapplicable.

Under 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(1) a person seeking to establish the severity of an

impairment may use evidence from “other sources.” Thus, to the extent Le’s testimony

was relevant to the severity of Yam’s condition, the ALJ found his opinions unsupported

or outweighed by other evidence. Nothing required the ALJ to take Le’s opinions as

conclusive. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in determining that Tuan Le’s opinions

were not entitled to controlling weight.

In short, Yam’s objections boil down to one incorrect proposition: that a treating

physician’s opinion is usually given controlling weight, and therefore Yam’s treating

physicians must be given controlling weight. But Yam misunderstands the law. She has

identified no cognizable legal error.

IV. Conclusion & Order

Because the ALJ properly found Yam’s testimony not credible, and rejected the

opinions of her treating physicians with specific, legitimate reasons, the Court hereby

ADOPTS the Report & Recommendation in its entirety.

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Thus, the Court hereby DENIES Yam’s motion for summary judgment and

GRANTS Barnhart’s motion for summary judgment. The Clerk shall close the case file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 4, 2007

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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