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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1353

ALFONSO TORRES‐CHAVEZ,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 9405 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 27, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 7, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Alfonso Torres‐Chavez was sentenced to 14

years’ imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of con‐

spiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), pos‐

sessing with intent to distribute cocaine, id. § 841(a)(1), and

using a cellular phone to facilitate the distribution conspira‐

cy, id. § 843(b). After his conviction was affirmed on appeal,

Torres‐Chavez sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2255. Torres‐Chavez claims that six months before trial, the

government offered a plea agreement that provided for

10 years’ imprisonment—the statutory minimum for con‐

spiring to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II). He alleges that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective for advising him that the gov‐

ernment lacked enough evidence to convict him at trial and

that he should therefore reject the plea agreement. The dis‐

trict court denied Torres‐Chavez’s motion without holding

an evidentiary hearing, finding that this advice was not ob‐

jectively unreasonable. But that ruling was premature: the

record contains no evidence about what Torres‐Chavez’s

counsel knew about the government’s case against his client

at the time of the offer, and the government’s case at trial

was quite strong. So we vacate the district court’s dismissal

of Torres‐Chavez’s § 2255 motion and remand for an eviden‐

tiary hearing.

I. Background

Torres‐Chavez was a member of the drug‐trafficking car‐

tel “La Familia,” which is based in Michoacán, Mexico. The

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recorded

phone conversations between José Gonzalez‐Zavala (one of

Torres‐Chavez’s co‐conspirators) and “Guero” (later identi‐

fied as Torres‐Chavez) in which the two discussed the car‐

tel’s cocaine transactions. In those conversations, Gonzalez‐

Zavala instructed Torres‐Chavez and another co‐conspirator,

Bartolo Lucatero, to distribute cocaine in Chicago.  

Lucatero was indicted first, in November 2009. Almost a

year later, Torres‐Chavez was indicted after Lucatero agreed

to cooperate with the government and identified Torres‐

Chavez as Guero. (Before Lucatero’s cooperation, and de‐

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No. 15‐1353 3

spite a lengthy investigation, Torres‐Chavez had not been

identified.) Torres‐Chavez says that approximately six

months before trial, the government approached him with a

plea offer, which he rejected upon the advice of his counsel.

A few weeks before trial, the defense strategy solidified

and a clearer picture of the government’s evidence emerged.

At a pre‐trial status hearing, Torres‐Chavez’s counsel said

“the defense is predicated on the fact that they have the

wrong party.” The government proffered the testimony of

Jorge Ayala‐German, a co‐conspirator and the caretaker of

one of the cartel’s stash houses; the testimony of Lucatero,

who would identify Torres‐Chavez as Guero and testify

about a 2007 drug deal with Torres‐Chavez; and a summary

of eight intercepted phone calls. A few days before trial, the

government informed defense counsel that Ayala‐German

would also identify Torres‐Chavez’s voice.  

At trial, the government introduced substantial evidence

involving Torres‐Chavez’s participation in the conspiracy:

(1) the recorded phone calls, translated from Spanish; (2) Lu‐

catero’s testimony that Torres‐Chavez was Guero, about

Torres‐Chavez’s involvement in the charged conspiracy and

drug transactions, and about his previous drug dealing with

Torres‐Chavez; (3) a contract linguist’s testimony that

Torres‐Chavez’s voice matched Guero’s voice on the record‐

ings; (4) Ayala‐German’s testimony that he recognized

Torres‐Chavez’s voice on the phone recordings; and (5) air‐

line records showing that a ticket was issued to “Alfonso

Chavez” for a flight departing O’Hare International Airport

a few hours after Guero was recorded saying he needed to

catch a flight.  

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Torres‐Chavez’s counsel tried to discredit the identifica‐

tion of Torres‐Chavez as Guero. Counsel elicited testimony

from a DEA agent that the DEA was unaware of Guero’s

identity until Lucatero identified Torres‐Chavez. Counsel

later argued that Lucatero was a “self‐admitted liar” who

conveniently inculpated Torres‐Chavez whenever he got in

trouble with the police. Counsel also elicited testimony from

the linguist that her analysis was based solely on listening to

audio samples from the intercepted calls and the recordings

made of Torres‐Chavez’s voice in jail, and that she did not

use voice‐recognition software or analyze sound waves or

biometric captures. In addition, counsel attacked Ayala‐

German’s credibility by pointing to his plea agreement, his

memory problems from drug use, and his illegal entry into

the United States. Counsel also emphasized that Ayala‐

German had lied when he first met with government offi‐

cials, and that his voice identification of Torres‐Chavez was

based on only two conversations. The jury returned a guilty

verdict on all counts and the district court sentenced Torres‐

Chavez to 168 months’ imprisonment.  

In his initial appeal, Torres‐Chavez challenged the suffi‐

ciency of the evidence identifying him as Guero. See generally

United States v. Torres‐Chavez, 744 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2014).

But we affirmed his conviction, concluding that the testimo‐

nies of Lucatero, Ayala‐German, and the linguist were suffi‐

ciently persuasive. Id.  

Torres‐Chavez then moved for collateral relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He

argued that his trial counsel advised him to reject the plea

offer because the “government lacked the evidence to con‐

vict,” and because “there was no way that he could get ten

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No. 15‐1353 5

years.” Torres‐Chavez further complained that his lawyer

did not show him the plea agreement.  

In response, the government argued that Torres‐Chavez

merely alleged that his attorney “wrongly predicted victory

at trial”—an insufficient ground for an ineffective‐assistance

claim. The government also argued that Torres‐Chavez had

not pointed to any facts demonstrating that his counsel’s

forecast was unreasonable. Instead, the record suggested

that Torres‐Chavez’s conviction was not a forgone conclu‐

sion before trial: the government’s evidence centered on Lu‐

catero’s identification of Torres‐Chavez, which Lucatero

agreed to provide in exchange for a favorable plea deal. The

government argued in the alternative that if counsel’s per‐

formance unreasonable, an evidentiary hearing should be

held to explore whether Torres‐Chavez had suffered preju‐

dice.

The district court agreed with the government and, with‐

out holding an evidentiary hearing, denied Torres‐Chavez’s

motion. Accepting his allegations as true, the court found

that Torres‐Chavez had not overcome the presumption that

his counsel’s advice to proceed to trial was a sound strategic

decision based on his assessment of the government’s evi‐

dence. The court also found that conviction was not assured

because of the importance of Lucatero’s credibility. In addi‐

tion, the court found that an evidentiary hearing was unnec‐

essary, since the trial record conclusively showed that

Torres‐Chavez was not entitled to any relief. The district

court did not certify any issues for appeal.  

We granted Torres‐Chavez’s request for a certificate of

appealability, concluding that he made a substantial show‐

ing “as to whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

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allegedly advising [him] to reject the government’s plea offer

and proceed to trial because of a lack of evidence to support

a conviction.”  

II. Analysis

We review a district court’s denial of a § 2255 petition on

factual matters for clear error and on questions of law de

novo. Mason v. United States, 211 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir.

2000). To succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, Torres‐Chavez must show that his counsel’s advice to

reject the plea agreement and go to trial was objectively un‐

reasonable, and that absent this advice he would have ac‐

cepted the plea offer. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,

1408–09 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–85

(2012); Martin v. United States, 789 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir.

2015). While there is a wide range of conduct that constitutes

reasonable performance, an attorney’s performance is defi‐

cient if the attorney grossly mischaracterizes the evidence or

advises a client to reject a plea offer and go to trial in the face

of overwhelming evidence and no viable defenses. See, e.g.,

Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 495 (7th Cir. 2007); Gallo‐

Vasquez v. United States, 402 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2005); Toro

v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991).

We review a district court’s decision to deny an eviden‐

tiary hearing in a § 2255 action for abuse of discretion. Boulb

v. United States, 818 F.3d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 2016). If “the files

and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner

is entitled to no relief,” or if the allegations are too vague

and conclusory, then an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see Ryan v. United States, 657 F.3d 604,

606–07 (7th Cir. 2011). But if a petitioner “alleges facts that, if

true, would entitle him to relief,” then an evidentiary hear‐

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No. 15‐1353 7

ing is necessary. Lafuente v. United States, 617 F.3d 944, 946

(7th Cir. 2010); see Sandoval v. United States, 574 F.3d 847, 850

(7th Cir. 2009). The petitioner’s burden for receiving an evi‐

dentiary hearing is relatively light, see Smith v. United States,

348 F.3d 545, 550–51 (6th Cir. 2003), and one is generally re‐

quired when “the record contains insufficient facts to ex‐

plain counsel’s actions as tactical,” Osagiede v. United States,

543 F.3d 399, 408 (7th Cir. 2008).

If we assume (as Torres‐Chavez and the government do)

that Torres‐Chavez’s counsel knew about all the evidence

that was presented at trial when the plea offer was made,

then his counsel’s performance was deficient. But our analy‐

sis does not stop here, since the relevant inquiry is what

Torres‐Chavez’s counsel knew when the plea offer was re‐

jected, not what he knew at the conclusion of trial. See Premo

v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125–27 (2011) (emphasizing the im‐

portance of analyzing the facts known at the time of the plea

offer because, in the case of an early offer, the lawyer may

not yet know the course of a case); Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (instructing courts to “eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight” by “evaluat[ing] the conduct

from counsel’s perspective at the time” of counsel’s chal‐

lenged conduct); accord Owens v. Guida, 549 F.3d 399, 406

(6th Cir. 2008); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1220 (10th Cir.

2003) (en banc). Here, the record does not show whether at

the time of the plea offer, Torres‐Chavez’s counsel knew

about Lucatero’s testimony, the linguist’s testimony, the

phone‐call recordings, or the flight records. So a hearing is

needed to determine these facts, and then to determine

whether the counsel’s advice was objectively reasonable.

See United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 235–

36 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that evidentiary hearing was

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necessary to resolve ineffective‐assistance claim, since state

court’s determination that defense counsel acted strategical‐

ly was “entirely speculative”); Bruce v. United States,

256 F.3d 592, 598–99 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that eviden‐

tiary hearing was necessary to determine whether counsel

had adequately investigated potential alibi witnesses’ testi‐

mony, in light of “conflicting affidavits and defense coun‐

sel’s conclusory assertions”).

The government’s reliance on Almonacid v. United States,

476 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2007), is misplaced. In Almonacid, we

affirmed the denial of a § 2255 motion in which the petition‐

er alleged that his counsel’s advice to reject a plea deal was

deficient. In doing so, we held that an evidentiary hearing

was unnecessary because the evidence against Almonacid

was not strong: there was no forensic or photographic evi‐

dence, no wiretaps, and no witness who had observed Al‐

monacid’s alleged criminal activity. Id. at 522. True, we

reached this conclusion after examining evidence admitted

at trial, rather than requiring an evidentiary hearing to de‐

termine what the lawyer knew at the time of the plea offer.

See 476 F.3d at 522 n.2. But the lawyer’s assistance was rea‐

sonable regardless of whether we assumed that he knew

about all or none of the evidence. Not so here. If the district

court finds that Torres‐Chavez’s counsel knew about all the

evidence, then his performance was unreasonable. But if an

evidentiary hearing reveals that he did not know about cer‐

tain of the government’s evidence, then his assistance may

have been constitutionally adequate.  

An evidentiary hearing would also provide context for

why Torres‐Chavez’s counsel allegedly advised him that he

could not be sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, since

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No. 15‐1353 9

that’s the statutory minimum for conspiring to distribute

more than 5 kilograms of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II). As Torres‐Chavez’s allegations stand,

his counsel’s advice about his sentencing exposure is wrong.

And this is information his counsel should have known by

the time the plea offer was made. See Julian, 495 F.3d at 495–

96 (finding that attorney’s performance was objectively un‐

reasonable when advice about sentence was “clearly

wrong”); Moore v. Bryant, 348 F.3d 238, 241–42 (7th Cir. 2003)

(same). Although the government argues that Torres‐Chavez

waived this claim, his § 2255 motion included this as part of

his argument—that the advice to reject the plea offer was ob‐

jectively unreasonable in light of the fact that there was

overwhelming evidence against him and that the govern‐

ment was offering favorable terms (the statutory minimum).

Finally, Torres‐Chavez argues that the government

waived any argument that he was prejudiced by his coun‐

sel’s deficient performance. The government counters that it

did not waive the argument, but rather reserved it in case

the argument about the performance prong failed. The gov‐

ernment then argues, for the first time on appeal, that

Torres‐Chavez’s “allegations of prejudice are legally insuffi‐

cient on their face.” The question of prejudice should also be

resolved at an evidentiary hearing, as the government ar‐

gued before the district court. See Hutchings v. United States,

618 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2010); Nichols v. United States, 75

F.3d 1137, 1145 n.17 (7th Cir. 1996).

III.Conclusion

We VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Torres‐

Chavez’s § 2255 motion, and REMAND for the district court to

hold an evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.

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