Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03623/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03623-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PROMETHEUS DORSEY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TETRA TECH EC, INC. (A CALIFORNIA 

CORPORATION); AND TETRA TECH, 

INC. (A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION), 

Defendants. 

Case No.18-cv-03623-EDL 

AMENDED REPORT & 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

ORDER REASSIGNING CASE 

Re: Dkt. No. 3 

Plaintiff Prometheus Dorsey (“Plaintiff”) applied to proceed in forma pauperis with his 

case. On October 15, 2018, this Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP request and indicated that it would 

separately determine compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons set forth below, 

the Court issues this Report and Recommendation recommending that the district court DISMISS 

Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. This case is hereby REASSIGNED to a District Judge. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In the 1990s, the U.S. Navy hired Defendant Tetra Tech Ec, Inc. and Tetra Tech, Inc. to 

process soils at Hunter’s Point Naval Shipyard. In 2005, Defendants employed Plaintiff as an 

unskilled laborer at the Shipyard. Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s duties included digging and processing 

soils manually and with tools. Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s alleged injuries arise from Defendants’ 

concealment of the toxic and highly radioactive nature of these soils, which came to light in early 

2018. Compl. ¶ 7, 9. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was exposed to Plutonium-239, 

Cesium-134 and -137, Potassium-40, and Strontium-90. Compl. ¶ 9. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he has experienced recurring shortness of breath and pain in his side 

that began one year prior to his filing of this action and continue to this day. Plaintiff alleges that 

both symptoms are consistent with the early signs of cancer and other pulmonary illnesses caused 

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by the radioactive substances to which he was exposed, although he has not yet been diagnosed 

with any serious illness. Compl. ¶ 10-11. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Court against Defendants and applied to proceed in 

forma pauperis. Plaintiff asserts eight claims based on physical injury; emotional distress from the 

fear of a cancer diagnosis; social stigma in his former community of Hunter’s Point; the potential 

for future lost earnings and financially devastating medical expenses; and unconscionable 

violation of his personal dignity and bodily integrity. Compl. ¶ 12. He seeks general damages in 

the amount of $2,000,000, punitive damages in the amount of $16,000,000, and attorney’s fees. 

Plaintiff does not seek any injunctive relief. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 When a party files an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the court reviews the 

complaint to determine if the action is “frivolous or malicious;” “fails to state a claim on which 

relief may be granted;” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If the court determines that any of these are true, it 

must dismiss the case. Id. “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff’s first claim is for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2601, the Toxic Substances Control 

Act (the “TSCA”). Section 2619 of the TSCA creates a right for any person to “commence a civil 

action” against any person alleged “to be in violation of the Act . . . to restrain such violation.” 15 

U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the TSCA by “improper handling 

of, failure to warn of, and introduction into the stream of commerce of, toxic substances within the 

meaning of the TSCA.” Compl. ¶ 15. However, Plaintiff is seeking damages, not injunctive 

relief. Section 2619 does not provide private citizens with a right to recover damages. See In re 

Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., 117 F. Supp. 3d 276, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 

2015). 

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 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he most natural reading of “to be in 

violation” is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent 

violation—that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the 

future.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). 

Plaintiff does not suggest that the violation of the TSCA is ongoing. Rather, Plaintiff claims that 

the violation was from 2005 to 2014, when Plaintiff worked at the shipyard. Compl. ¶ 8. Since 

Plaintiff is not claiming that the violation is ongoing and is not asking for injunctive relief, he fails 

to state a claim. 

 Plaintiff’s second claim is for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1961, the Racketeering, Influence, 

and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Section 1964 of the RICO permits any person injured 

in his or her business or property by a violation of RICO to sue the person who violated the act. 

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated RICO by fraudulently 

misrepresenting the nature of the soils and that he was injured in his business and property as a 

result. Compl. ¶ 20. Racketeering activity as defined by the statute consists of activities that 

would be indictable as crimes. Plaintiff states, without specifying which indictable acts he is 

alleging Defendants have committed, that racketeering activity includes “any act” that is indictable 

under 18 U.S.C § 1513, 18 U.S.C § 1546, 18 U.S.C. § 2320, and 18 U.S.C. § 831. These statutes 

relate to retaliation against witnesses, victims or informants; fraud and misuse of immigration and 

related documents; trafficking in counterfeit goods; and illegally handling nuclear waste, 

respectively. This allegation is conclusory and fails to provide Defendants with adequate notice. 

Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 831, the statute prohibiting certain transactions involving nuclear 

materials, requires the accused to have handled the nuclear material “without lawful authority” and 

“knowingly” caused death or serious bodily injury, which Plaintiff does not allege. Therefore, 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of RICO. 

Plaintiff brings his third claim under 42 U.S.C. § 6972, which authorizes any person to 

commence a civil action against any person alleged to be in violation of any requirements relating 

to solid waste disposal found in the chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants’ misrepresentation about the toxic nature of the soils that were processed at Hunter’s 

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Point violate many pertinent solid waste regulations. However, as with the TSCA, the Supreme 

Court has interpreted § 6972 to authorize only an injunction, holding that it does not contemplate a 

“private cause of action to recover prior response costs for cleaning up of toxic waste.” Meghrig 

v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996). Since Plaintiff seeks damages and not injunctive 

relief, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 

Plaintiff asserts his fourth claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

acted under color of state statute(s), ordinance(s), regulation(s), custom(s), and/or usage(s) and 

that his rights secured by federal law were violated as a result. Compl. ¶ 30. Plaintiff does not 

specify which of his federal rights have been violated. Defendants were employed by the US 

Navy to perform a cleanup of Hunter’s Point; Plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused by 

Defendant’s conduct in that capacity. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), a plaintiff may “bring a civil action for constitutional 

violations committed by federal employees or their agents.” Western Radio Servs. Co. v. U.S. 

Forest Serv., 578 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). “Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens

are identical save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under 

Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, Plaintiff may be able 

to recover under a Bivens claim, but cannot recover under § 1983 because Defendants were not 

acting under color of state law. 

Plaintiff also brings several state law claims. Plaintiff’s fifth claim is that Defendants 

engaged in fraudulent business acts in violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 

17200-17500. Plaintiff’s sixth claim is a common law claim for negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. Plaintiff’s seventh claim is that Defendants are strictly liable for Plaintiff’s injuries 

because they entered into a business enterprise involving ultra-hazardous activities, specifically, 

the radioactive substances Plutonium-239, Cesium-134 and -137, Potassium-40, and Strontium-90. 

Compl. ¶ 41Plaintiff’s eighth claim is a common law claim for battery. 

Although Plaintiff’s state claims may pass the § 1915 standard, all four of Plaintiff’s 

federal law claims fail to state a claim. Because Plaintiff may be able to amend his allegations, the 

Court recommends that the claims be dismissed without prejudice. Generally, “when a viable case 

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may be pled, a district court should freely grant leave to amend,” absent bad faith on the part of 

the plaintiff or prejudice to the defendant. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 

637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s federal claims be dismissed under § 1915. A 

district court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if it has 

“dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). In 

determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the court should balance “judicial 

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 

n. 7 (1988). That balance will usually favor declining to exercise jurisdiction when a court 

dismisses the federal-law claims in the early stages of a lawsuit. Id. Because this case has 

not progressed beyond the pleadings, exercising supplemental jurisdiction would neither 

promote judicial economy nor convenience to the parties. See Multi Denominational 

Ministry of Cannabis & Rastafari, Inc. v. Gonzales, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 

2007), aff'd sub nom. Multi-Denominational Ministry of Cannabis & Rastafari, Inc. v. 

Holder, 365 F. App'x 817 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing state claims when the court dismissed 

the federal claims at an early stage in the case). The Court recommends declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims unless Plaintiff is able to amend his federal 

claims. 

Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Dated: October 15, 2018 

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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