Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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28 1 The case was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Eastern District

Local Rule 72-302.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GERALD F. STANLEY,

NO. CIV. S-95-1500 FCD GGH P

Petitioner,

DEATH PENALTY CASE

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEVEN ORNOSKI,

Respondent.

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This matter is before the court on petitioner Gerald

Stanley’s request for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s

order, entered September 2, 2005.1 In said order, the magistrate

judge ruled upon petitioner’s entitlement to an evidentiary

hearing as to Claims 1, 2, 4, and 21-27 of his amended habeas

petition, filed September 30, 2002. As to certain claims,

petitioner was granted a hearing, and as to others he was denied

Case 2:95-cv-01500-JAM-CKD Document 574 Filed 11/09/05 Page 1 of 4
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2 The magistrate judge refers to this subsection as

“1(g)” in the Order, which appears to be in error (Order at 6 

n. 5); the habeas petition, filed September 30, 2002, describes

this subsection as “3(g)” of Claim 1 (Hab. Pet. at 87).

2

a hearing. (Order re: Evidentiary Hearing Issues, filed Sept. 2,

2005 [Docket #524].)

Petitioner now seeks reconsideration of this order as to the

following findings: (1) subsection 3(g)2 of Claim 1 of the

amended petition is procedurally barred; (2) the declaration of

Ms. Morrissey is excluded for purposes of the evidentiary hearing

on petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim; (3) 

petitioner has withdrawn his shackling claim; and (4) petitioner

is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on Claim 27 (regarding

the alleged suppression of evidence related to an inquiry by the

Attorney General’s Office into the evidence the prosecution

relied upon as an aggravating circumstance).

As to the second and fourth findings, pertaining to

petitioner’s entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, they raise 

non-dispositive pre-trial issues, and as such, the magistrate

judge’s order is governed by the “clearly erroneous or contrary

to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). His

order cannot be set aside or modified unless the findings of fact

are clearly erroneous or the conclusions are contrary to law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Grimes v. San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239-40 (9th Cir. 1991). The order should be modified or set

aside only if the reviewing court is left “‘with the definite and

firm conviction,’ that the [magistrate judge’s] key findings are

mistaken.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001)

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3 Respondent filed a “Notice of Intention Not to File a

Response to Petitioner’s Request for Reconsideration,” on

September 28, 2005. In said notice, respondent indicated his

intention to rely on the magistrate judge’s order.

3

(citation omitted).

Having carefully reviewed the magistrate judge’s order and

petitioner’s objections thereto,3 the court finds the second and

fourth findings above to be supported by the record and by proper

analysis. As such, the court cannot find them clearly erroneous

or contrary to law. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as

to these findings is therefore DENIED.

However, the first and third findings present dispositive

issues which ordinarily would be first subject to findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge. (See e.g. F&R, filed

March 3, 2004 [addressing respondent’s procedural default

affirmative defense]; Mem. & Order, filed Aug. 3, 2005, adopting

the same.) This adjudicative process is appropriate here. Thus,

rather than decide these issues in the first instance, by

application of the de novo standard of review, the court finds

that the magistrate judge should be given the opportunity to

prepare findings and recommendations on the first and third

findings relating to the procedural bar to subsection 3(g) of

Claim 1 and petitioner’s withdrawal of his shackling claim,

respectively. Such findings and recommendations will provide a

fuller analysis of the issues, particularly in light of

petitioner’s extensive arguments supporting his request for

reconsideration. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, 

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4

as to these issues only, petitioner’s request for reconsideration

is GRANTED.

DATED: November 9, 2005

 /s/Frank C. Damrell, Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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