Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00836/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00836-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331mm Fed. Question: Medical Malpractice

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3:15-cv-00836-GPC-DHB

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA FLORES, by and through her 

guardian, Josie Clark,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-00836-GPC-DHB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

RE-TAX DEFENDANT'S BILL OF 

COSTS

[ECF No. 65]

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to re-tax Defendant’s bill of costs. For the 

reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

Plaintiff filed this action in April 2015, asserting California law claims of 

negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and elder abuse. (ECF 

No. 1.) Plaintiff asserted that San Ysidro Health Center, a federally-funded facility, 

failed to properly administer her medication. On October 20, 2016, the Court granted in 

favor of Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s IIED and elder abuse claims. (ECF 

No. 23.) A bench trial over Plaintiff’s negligence claim was held on June 5 and 6, 2017, 

and the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant on June 30, 2017. (ECF Nos. 52–

53.) On July 14, 2017, Defendant submitted a bill of costs. (ECF No. 54.) On 

September 20, 2017, the Clerk of Court issued an order assessing costs in favor of

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Defendant in the amount of $4,154.55, representing the cost of service of the summons, 

subpoenas, transcripts, and printing. (ECF No. 64.) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that unless “a court order 

provides otherwise, costs--other than attorney’s fees--should be allowed to the prevailing 

party.” While “[t]he clerk may tax costs on 14 days’ notice[,] . . . [o]n motion served 

within the next 7 days, the court may review the clerk’s action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). 

Plaintiff’s motion seeking review of the Clerk’s costs award is timely: it was filed within 

seven days of the Clerk’s order. 

“Indigency is a factor that the district court may properly consider in deciding 

whether to award costs.” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999); see

also Assoc. of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 592 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir. 1983); Nat’l Org. for 

Women v. Bank of Cal., N.A., 680 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit has 

also suggested that district courts should consider the merits of the non-prevailing party’s 

case as a factor to consider when deciding whether to deny costs. Assoc. of Mexican-Am. 

Educators, 231 F.3d at 593 (“Although Plaintiffs have not prevailed in this action, their 

claims are not without merit.”). 

According to the declaration of Josie Clark, Plaintiff’s daughter and guardian, 

Plaintiff is indigent and her only source of income is Social Security benefits. (ECF No. 

65-2.) Plaintiff is 83 years old, unable to walk on her own, speak, or understand the 

speech of others. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “[i]t would be unjust for [her] to have debt 

obligation of $4,154.55 when she was simply pursuing her legal rights as an innocent 

victim of the events” underlying her claim. (ECF No. 65-1 at 3–4.) 

In response, Defendant argues that $4,154.55 is a “reasonable figure given the 

complexity of this medical-malpractice case,” and that it “had to expend considerably 

more than this amount by defending the case at trial.” (ECF No. 67 at 2.) Defendant 

explains that the nature of this action “involved highly specialized knowledge which 

required expert testimony and related expenses.” (Id. at 4.)

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The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to re-taxation of costs. While 

Plaintiff does not offer specific dollar amounts when asserting her indigency, the Court 

finds that the combination of her age, severe disability, and lack of substantial income 

demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot afford to pay Defendants thousands of dollars in costs. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s suit was not without merit—her negligence claim survived 

summary judgment. These are appropriate and sufficient grounds to rebut the 

presumption of taxation of costs. While the Court is sympathetic to Defendant’s 

argument that this case was complex and thus may have been costly to litigate, the reality 

of Plaintiff’s circumstances would make it unjust to order her to pay the amount assessed. 

Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 65) is GRANTED. The motion hearing scheduled for 

November 17, 2017, is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2017

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