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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 2005 Decided March 8, 2005

No. 04-5317

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS,

APPELLEE

v.

CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE,

APPELLANT

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 04-5318

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(02cv01948)

Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellant

Corporation for National and Community Service. With him on

the briefs were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General,

Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Robert M. Loeb and

Lewis S. Yelin, Attorneys.

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Michael A. Carvin argued the cause for appellant University

of Notre Dame. With him on the briefs were Stephen J. Brogan

and Mary Beth B. Young.

Daniel S. Pariser argued the cause for appellee American

Jewish Congress. With him on the brief were Irvin B. Nathan,

Donald R. Gordon and Robyn M. Holtzman.

Ayesha N. Khan, Richard B. Katskee, Alex J. Luchenitser,

Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Elliot M. Mincberg, and Judith E. Schaeffer

were on the brief for amici curiae Americans United for

Separation of Church and State in support of affirmance. Martin

E. Karlinsky entered an appearance.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: The First Amendment provides

that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion.” Laws intended to advance or inhibit religion, or

having either effect, violate the Establishment Clause. Agostini

v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997). The issue in this appeal

from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the

American Jewish Congress (“AJC”) is whether portions of the

AmeriCorps Education Awards Program, a nationwide

community service program operated by the Corporation for

National and Community Service, have the effect of advancing

religion. 

The Corporation funds programs designed to “expand

educational opportunity by rewarding individuals who

participate in national service with an increased ability to pursue

higher education or job training.” 42 U.S.C. § 12501(b)(3). No

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financial assistance from the Corporation may be used “to

provide religious instruction, conduct worship services, or

engage in any form of proselytization.” 42 U.S.C. § 12634(a).

Those running an approved program may not discriminate on

the basis of religion in selecting program participants. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12634(a), 12635(c)(1).

The Corporation created the AmeriCorps Education Awards

Program “to expand opportunities for individuals to serve as

AmeriCorps Members and earn educational benefits, broaden

the network of national service programs and strategies, and

increase the number of communities joining with AmeriCorps

to better meet their education, public safety, environmental, and

other human needs.” 61 Fed. Reg. 46,628 (Sept. 4, 1996). An

organization (such as a local government or a non-profit

organization) proposing to sponsor a national service program

must send an application to the Corporation. Proposed service

programs must “address unmet human, educational,

environmental, or public safety needs and produce a direct

benefit for the community in which the projects are performed.”

42 U.S.C. § 12582(b)(4). If the Corporation approves the

application, the sponsoring organization may recruit individuals

to fill its approved national service positions.

Individuals wishing to receive an Education Award perform

community service in a program sponsored by an organization

approved by the Corporation. The Corporation offers $4,725 in

financial aid to those individuals if they complete at least 1700

hours of service in an approved position. The individuals may

use the award for education-related expenses, such as graduate

school tuition and the repayment of student loans. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12604(a).

This case involves only individuals who fulfill their service

requirement as teachers in religious schools. The University of

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Notre Dame, a party to this case, sponsors an approved

AmeriCorps program that trains individual AmeriCorps

participants and places them in needy Catholic schools, where

they teach a variety of subjects, including science, mathematics,

foreign languages, English, and religion. Brief of Appellant

Notre Dame at 2. AJC thinks that the AmeriCorps Education

Awards Program violates the Establishment Clause because

individuals, such as those at Notre Dame, who are fulfilling their

service requirement by teaching secular subjects in religious

schools, also may teach religion courses. 

AJC objects to another aspect of the AmeriCorps Education

Awards Program. In addition to providing training to individual

participants, organizations incur a variety of other

responsibilities in sponsoring an AmeriCorps national service

program. To help defray the expense of training participants

and other administrative costs, the Corporation provides grants

in the amount of $400 per AmeriCorps participant to all

organizations that sponsor participants -- religious and nonreligious alike. AJC believes the $400 grants to religiouslyaffiliated organizations violate the Establishment Clause. 

The district court granted AJC’s motion for summary

judgment and denied the cross motions of the Corporation and

NotreDame. Am. Jewish Cong. v. Corp. for Nat’l&Community

Serv., 323 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2004) (“AJC”). The court

found that the practice of permitting individual participants to

teach religion in addition to secular subjects and the $400 cash

grants to sponsoring organizations result “in impermissible

government indoctrination in violation of the establishment

clause of the First Amendment.” Id. at 45-46. Concluding that

prevailing Establishment Clause precedent permits both portions

of the AmeriCorps program, we reverse.

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I.

While claiming to have standing to bring this suit because

of its status as a taxpayer, Brief of Appellee at 62, AJC describes

itself as “a non-profit organization,” id. at iii, which makes one

wonder whether it pays any federal taxes. No matter. Even if

it does not, it is fair to assume that AJC’s members do. Meek v.

Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 356 n.5 (1975). Notre Dame questions

AJC’s standing, not on this basis, but on the ground that it has

not brought itself within the exception to the general rule that

taxpayers do not have standing to challenge the manner in which

the government spends its tax revenue. Frothingham v. Mellon,

262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923). The exception is for taxpayer

suits claiming that Congress exercised its Article I, § 8, taxing

and spending power in violation of the Establishment Clause.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 

Whatever doubt there might have been before Bowen v.

Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), it is now clear that the exception

includes more than just taxpayer suits, based on the

Establishment Clause, attacking taxing-and-spending statutes on

their face. Also within the exception are taxpayer actions

claiming a violation of that constitutional provision because of

the manner in which the Executive Branch is administering the

statute. Id. at 618-20. A “claim that funds appropriated by

Congress are being used improperly by individual grantees” is

no less “a challenge to congressional taxing and spending power

simply because the funding authorized by Congress has flowed

through and been administered by” an executive official. Id. at

619.

Notre Dame thinks this case is distinguishable from Bowen

because AJC alleged that some, but not all, of the Corporation’s

actions violated not only the Establishment Clause, but also the

National Community Service Act and the regulations

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thereunder. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885

F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989). The distinction cannot be sustained.

Despite a suggestion in its complaint, AJC has made clear that

it relies solely on the Establishment Clause. Brief of Appellee

at 63. No argument it has made to us rests on a statutory

violation; all are aimed at the constitutionality of the

Corporation’s administration of the AmeriCorps program and

the manner in which it allocates funds. Those arguments

persuaded the district court and framed its decision. As the case

now stands, it therefore fits comfortably within the rationale of

Bowen: “The [National Community Service Act] is at heart a

program of disbursement of funds pursuant to Congress’ taxing

and spending power, and [AJC] calls into question how the

funds authorized by Congress are being disbursed pursuant to

the [Act’s] statutory mandate.” 487 U.S. at 619-20. It follows

that there is “a sufficient nexus between the taxpayer’s standing

as a taxpayer and the congressional exercise of taxing and

spending power, notwithstanding the role the [Corporation]

plays in administering the statute.” Id. at 620.

II.

AJC’s principal complaint is that individuals, while

teaching secular subjects at religious schools under the

AmeriCorps program and receiving credit toward an

Educational Award, may also teach religious subjects. See

Compl. ¶¶ 4, 63-66. Under School District of City of Grand

Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), according to AJC, if an

AmeriCorps participant decides to teach religion, the decision is

attributable to the government. Ball struck down two school

district programs -- a “Shared Time” program and a

“Community Education” program. AJC focuses on the

“Community Education” program in which the school district

hired religious school teachers to teach secular classes in afterschool programs in religious schools. The Supreme Court held

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that this program violated the Establishment Clause because it

created a “symbolic union” between government and religion;

“the students would be unlikely to discern the crucial difference

between the religious school classes and the ‘public school’

classes, even if the latter were successfully kept free of religious

indoctrination.” Id. at 391-92.

Much of the reasoning in Ball has been overturned. See

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997). We believe the

Supreme Court’s more recent decisions upholding programs of

true private choice, particularly Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536

U.S. 639, 649 (2002), control this case. See also Zobrest v.

Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v.

Washington Dep’t of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986);

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). When a government

program is neutral toward religion and “provides assistance

directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct

government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their

own genuine and independent private choice,” the Establishment

Clause is not violated. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. In that

situation, no “objective observer familiar with the full history

and context” of the program would believe that the aid flowing

to the religious institution carries with it “the imprimatur of

government endorsement.” Id. at 655.

The AmeriCorps participants and the grantees are, and must

be, chosen without regard to religion. The Education Awards

are available to a broad class of citizens. Any citizen at least 17

years old who holds a high school diploma or its equivalent and

is selected to fill a national service position may qualify. 42

U.S.C. § 12591. Individual participants who elect to teach

religion in addition to secular subjects do so only as a result of

“their own genuine and independent private choice.” The

AmeriCorps program creates no incentives for participants to

teach religion; they may count only the time they spend engaged

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in non-religious activities toward their service hours

requirement. And if they do teach religious subjects, they are

prohibited from wearing the AmeriCorps logo when they are

doing so. In this situation, no reasonable person, “knowing all

the circumstances,” Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of

Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. 229, 232 (2002), would

believe that a participant’s choice to teach a religion course had

-- in Zelman’s words -- “the imprimatur of government

endorsement.” 536 U.S. at 655.

AJC sees two reasons why the AmeriCorps program should

not be considered a program of private choice. The first is that

the AmeriCorps program is not neutral. The district court

agreed, in part because an Internet search had revealed that three

grantees were requiring AmeriCorps participants to “be of a

particular faith.” AJC, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 60. These grantees

were violating the governing statute and regulations, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12635(c); 45 C.F.R. § 2540.210; the Corporation took

corrective action when it discovered their postings; and before

the district court rendered its decision, they had lifted the

restriction. AJC, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 58 n.8; Brief of Appellant

National Corporation at 35. 

The district court also thought neutrality was missing

because the Corporation uses “highly discretionary criteria” to

choose AmeriCorps grantees. AJC, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 60. AJC

strikes much the same note. Why, as a matter of constitutional

law, this ought to be significant is not clear. The Supreme Court

has not treated discretionary distribution of government funds as

lacking in neutrality. In the program upheld in Bowen v.

Kendrick -- the Adolescent Family Life Act -- the Secretary of

Health and Human Services awarded grants based, in part, on

what can only be viewed as subjective determinations. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 300z-1(3), 300z-2(a) (1982); see also Bowen, 487

U.S. at 597 (noting that the Secretary awarded 141 grants from

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a pool of more than 1000 applications). We are aware of

nothing in the law requiring that government aid, to pass muster

under the Establishment Clause, must be handed out according

to objective criteria only. All the law requires is that the

government distribute funds in a manner that is neutral with

respect to religion. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652; Agostini, 521

U.S. at 230-31. Perhaps discretionary criteria, in some

circumstances, might serve as a pretext for the government to

“grant special favors that might lead to a religious

establishment.” Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000)

(plurality). But AJC did not allege that the Corporation had

used its discretionary authority to favor religious organizations,

and it conceded at oral argument that there was no evidentiary

support for such an allegation. We conclude, therefore, that the

program is neutral.

AJC’s other argument is that a participant’s decision to

perform his national service obligation in a religious school is

not “a genuine and independent private choice.” Zelman, 536

U.S. at 652. “Eligibility for an AmeriCorps award is

established,” AJC argues, “only through participation in a

limited number of the government’s hand-picked, pre-selected

programs.” Brief of Appellee at 50. The relevant question is

whether participants seeking to earn an Educational Award

possess a genuine independent choice between religious and

non-religious organizations in which to perform their national

service. Of course the number of such opportunities is, as AJC

puts it, “limited.” It could hardly be unlimited. The important

points are (1) that there are numerous AmeriCorps teaching

positions in public and private secular schools; and (2) that there

is no evidence of any participant who wanted to teach in a

secular school, but was impermissibly channeled to a religious

school. A program may be one of “true private choice” even

when more religious than non-religious choices are available.

In Zelman, 82 percent of the eligible private schools

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participating in the voucher program were religious schools and

96 percent of the students who took advantage of vouchers

attended religious schools. 536 U.S. at 655-58. Here, only 328

of the 1608 schools employing AmeriCorps participants as

teachers in 2001 were religious schools. When enough nonreligious options exist, those participants who choose to teach in

religious schools do so only as a result of their own genuine and

private choice.

AJC also faulted the Corporation for failing to police its

prohibition against a participant’s counting time spent teaching

religion courses toward the service hours requirement. In

Mitchell v. Helms, four Justices concluded that neutrality is the

touchstone of Establishment Clause inquiries in government aid

cases, and that when eligibility for aid is determined neutrally,

“any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the

government and is thus not of constitutional concern.” 530 U.S.

at 820. The two concurring Justices in Mitchell concluded that

de minimis diversion of aid tends to show that a program’s

safeguards are, in fact, working. Id. at 865-66 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in judgment). In the district court, AJC presented

evidence suggesting that, since 1999, four AmeriCorps

participants may have counted time spent teaching religion

toward their service hour requirement. See AJC Statement of

Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 92-126. The Corporation disputed the

evidence. AJC, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 55. Even if we credited

AJC’s version, it proves nothing of significance. During the

same period, one sponsoring organization alone -- the Catholic

Network of Volunteer Service -- placed 492 AmeriCorps

participants as teachers in religious schools. AJC Statement of

Undisputed Facts ¶ 80. AJC therefore failed to substantiate its

claim that the present monitoring of participants’ timekeeping

is so ineffective, and the violations so pervasive, that the

AmeriCorps program must be seen as one in which the

government is giving participants Education Awards for hours

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they spend teaching religion. 

III.

This leaves the question of the $400 program management

grants to organizations operating service programs. The $400

grants reimburse grantees for a portion of the costs they incur

when complying with various AmeriCorps requirements. The

Supreme Court upheld a similar system in Committee for Public

Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 657-58

(1980), and rejected the idea that the Establishment Clause

required it to invalidate “reimbursements simply because they

involve payments in cash.” The program in Regan provided

“direct cash reimbursement” to religious and secular nonpublic

schools for performing various testing and reporting services

mandated by state law. Id. at 657. Here, detailed AmeriCorps

guidelines require, among other things, that grantees train

participants, provide them with adequate supervision by

qualified supervisors, keep various records, and make regular

reports to the Corporation. The $400 is meant to defray some of

the costs. 

AJC focuses on the lack of auditing or accounting of the

AmeriCorps grants. Brief of Appellee at 58-59. The program

in Regan included extensive auditing to verify that the schools

did not receive public funds in excess of the expenditures

incurred as part of the testing. 444 U.S. at 650 n.3, 659-60.

Here audits would be senseless. The evidence showed that $400

is much less than the actual administrative costs grantees incur

per participant. In Notre Dame’s program, for instance, the

$400 grants cover only about eight percent of the salaries of

those who train the AmeriCorps participants to teach in

elementary schools. AJC marshaled no evidence to show

otherwise nor did it make any allegation to this effect. 

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Regan therefore controls this aspect of the case. The

government does not promote religion in violation of the

Establishment Clause when it reimburses all grantees, religious

and secular alike, for a portion of the costs they incur in

complying with the requirements of the AmeriCorps program.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the district court’s judgment is

Reversed.

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