Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02648/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02648-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SPPI-SOMERSVILLE, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

TRC COMPANIES, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-02648 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR JOINDER OF NECESSARY

PARTY

On June 9, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on defendants’ motion for joinder of a necessary

party. After careful consideration of the parties’ papers and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby

GRANTS the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs SPPI-Somersville, Inc. and Somersville-Gentry, Inc. own undeveloped property (the

“SPPI Property”) adjacent to the Contra Costa Sanitary Landfill (the “CCSL Landfill”) and the Old

Antioch Landfill (“Antioch Landfill”) near Antioch, California. Complaint ¶ 58. This property, which

is in an unincorporated part of Contra Costa County located adjacent to and north of the CCSL Landfill,

had been used as a field prior to SPPI’s purchase. Id. at ¶ 59. SPPI also acquired 4 acres of property

owned by Tom Gentry California Company (“Gentry”) northeast of the Antioch Landfill, and is the

assignee of rights previously held by Gentry. Id. At ¶ 1; Padgett Decl., Ex. A at ¶ 3. 

Plaintiffs allege that from the 1950s to 1992, various defendants dumped various waste materials

at the CCSL Landfill, causing groundwater contamination near the SPPI Property. Complaint ¶ 1.

Plaintiffs also allege that solid waste originating from the CCSL Landfill has been deposited on the SPPI

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1

 The Court GRANTS defendants’ request for judicial notice of the documents attached to the

Padgett Declaration, both of which are from the public files of the California Regional Water Quality

Control Board. (Docket No. 34). 

2

 The complaint does not allege any claims with respect to this Order. At the June 9, 2006

hearing, however, defense counsel stated – and plaintiffs’ counsel did not deny – that plaintiffs have

indicated that they may seek to amend the complaint to allege claims regarding the allocation of

2

Property. Id. 

In January 2001, ownership of the CCSL Landfill was transferred to defendant GBF Holdings,

LLC, a subsidiary of defendant TRC Companies, Inc., in connection with the settlement of Members

of the GBF/Pittsburg Landfill Respondents Group v. Contra Costa Waste Services, C 96-3147 SI.

Padgett Decl. ¶ 2. According to defendants, neither GBF Holdings nor TRC owned or operated the

CCSL Landfill prior to 2001, and neither of these parties disposed of any wastes at the CCSL Landfill

at any time. Id. Defendants state that TRC specializes in the cleanup of environmentally impacted

properties and provides a service called “Exit Strategy” which constitutes an insurance-backed risk

transfer. Id. at ¶ 3. According to defendants, as part of the risk transfer, all of the CCSL Landfill-related

liabilities of the parties who (1) owned, (2) operated and/or (3) transported or disposed waste

(generators) at the CCSL Landfill, were transferred to TRC pursuant to indemnity agreements in

exchange for cash. Id. GBF Holdings alone cleans up the CCSL Landfill and interacts with the

regulatory agencies. Id. 

Defendants TRC and GBF Holdings contend that all of the solid waste debris on the SPPI

Property emanated from the Antioch Landfill. The City of Antioch is not a party to this action.

Defendants have submitted evidence showing that City of Antioch operated the Antioch Landfill from

1928 until it was closed in 1968. Padgett Decl., Ex. A (January 7, 2003 Cleanup and Abatement Order

for City of Antioch for Landfill Sites, Including Old Antioch Landfill).1

 During its operation, the

Antioch Landfill accepted municipal solid waste and for part of this time operated as a “burn dump.”

Id. 

On January 7, 2003, the California Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a Cleanup and

Abatement Order for City of Antioch, Tom Gentry California Corporation & GBF Holdings LLC,

Landfill Sites on Markley Creek, Contra Costa County.2

 Id. According to that order, the Antioch

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28 damages under the Water Board order.

3

Landfill is located on both sides of Markley Creek. Id. at ¶ 3. The Antioch Landfill shares a boundary

with both the Gentry Property (which is part of SPPI’s Property) and the CCSL Landfill, and as of

January 2003, all three properties contained solid municipal waste. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 3, & 6. The order states

that as a result of slope failures and erosion along the banks of Markley Creek, solid waste was

discharged into the creek. Id. at ¶¶ 7-11. 

The California Regional Water Quality Board took a number of steps in response, including,

inter alia, sending a joint letter in February 2002 to the City of Antioch and Gentry informing them of

the slope failure and requesting a work plan to characterize site conditions, an engineered feasibility

study for corrective actions, a time schedule to complete corrective actions, and erosion protection

measures. Id. at ¶ 13. 

On August 9, 2002, the City of Antioch submitted a report titled “Site Characterization Report,

Old Antioch Landfill.” Id. at ¶ 15. That report stated, inter alia, that in places the south bank of

Markley Creek is composed entirely of solid waste (over 30 feet) with a thin cover of soil, and in the

north bank there were at least 20 feet of waste covered with 1 to 3 feet of clayey soil. Id. On September

18, 2002, Gentry submitted a report demonstrating that “1 to 5 feet of waste has been deposited over

the entire area of the Gentry Property; waste is thicker nearest the Old Antioch Landfill and thins to the

east . . . .” Id. at ¶ 16.

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to join the City of Antioch as a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 19(a). That rule provides:

A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the

court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the

action if (1) in the persons’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those

already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action

and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s absence may (i) as a

practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave

any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,

multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19(a). The determination of whether a non-party should be joined pursuant to Rule

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19(a) rests within the discretion of the Court based on a consideration of the facts of the case and the

policies underlying the rule. See Bakia v. County of Los Angeles, 687 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982).

The Ninth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following when deciding whether a non-party

should be joined,

Underlying policies include plaintiff'’s right to decide whom he shall sue, avoiding

multiple litigation, providing the parties with complete and effective relief in a single

action, protecting the absentee, and fairness to the other party. The determination is

heavily influenced by the facts and circumstances of each case. It is a misapplication of

Rule 19(a) to add parties who are neither necessary nor indispensable, who are not

essential for just adjudication and who have a separate cause of action entirely.

Id.

Here, defendants contend that the City of Antioch is a necessary party because the solid waste

deposited on the SPPI Property could only have emanated from either the Antioch Landfill or the CCSL

Landfill, or both. (Defendants maintain that all of the solid waste came from the Antioch Landfill.)

Defendants argue that joinder is appropriate under both prongs of Rule 19(a) because without the City

in this case, “complete relief cannot be afforded,” and defendants would be at “substantial risk of

incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.” 

The Court concludes that joinder under Rule 19(a) is appropriate. There is no dispute that

joinder of the City is feasible. The Court finds that if the City is not made a party to this action, there

is a high likelihood of a second round of litigation involving the City and plaintiffs, and that defendants

could be brought into that action. Such duplicative litigation would be a waste of resources, and it

would create a potential for inconsistent outcomes. Moreover, this is not a case in which joinder would

impose a burden on the plaintiff, such as situations where there are numerous non-parties who are

potentially responsible for the claims alleged in the complaint. To the contrary, based upon the record

before the Court, it appears that aside from plaintiffs (or their predecessors-in-interest), there are only

two potential sources of the solid waste on the SPPI Property: the CCSL Landfill or the Antioch

Landfill. 

 Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Antioch Landfill may be a source of the solid waste on the SPPI

Property. Instead, plaintiffs contend that the City is not a necessary party because defendants and the

City would be jointly and severally liable for the solid waste disposal, and that if defendants want the

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3

 Defendants’ reply states that they do not believe that the CERCLA claims alleged in the

complaint encompass the solid waste allegations. Plaintiffs did not address this issue in the papers or

at oral argument. 

4

 Section 881 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:

If two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously cause distinct harms or a single

harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of

each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has himself

caused.

Illustration 1 states:

Each of the owners of three mines permits an unreasonable amount of debris from his

mine to get into the stream that flows past the plaintiff’s land. The debris from all three

accumulates in large heaps upon the land and prevents its profitable use. Each of the

mine operators is subject to liability to the plaintiff for the proportion and only for the

proportion of the harm that his proportion of the debris bears to the total amount of

debris.

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City in this case, defendants should implead the City under Rule 14. However, while it may generally

be true that joint tortfeasors are not considered necessary parties, here there is a serious question as to

whether any liability would be joint and several, under either CERCLA or state tort law.3

 See

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 881 & Illus. 1 (2006).4 Defendants assert that it is highly likely that

the composition and location of the solid waste will permit the identification of its proportionate

sources. At this time, the Court need not resolve the question of whether any liability here would be

divisible or joint; for purposes of the instant motion, it is sufficient to note that this is a fairly disputed

question.

In sum, the Court concludes that the joinder of the City is in the interests of fairness, avoiding

multiple litigation, and in providing the parties with complete and effective relief in a single action. See

Bakia, 687 F.2d at 301.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion

for joinder of a necessary party, (Docket Nos. 53, 54), and GRANTS defendants’ request for judicial

notice. (Docket No. 34). Plaintiffs shall join the City of Antioch on or before June 30, 2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: June 9, 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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