Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01725/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01725-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY ANGEL GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN EVANS,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-1725 DLB HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS, DIRECTING CLERK OF

COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT, AND

DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

Following jury trial in the Fresno County Superior Court, on December 5, 2003,

Petitioner was convicted of carjacking, robbery, and assault with a firearm. Petitioner received

the upper term of nine years for the carjacking offense, which was enhanced by one year pursuant

to California Penal Code section 12022(a)(1). As to the robbery conviction, Petitioner received

the upper term of five years, ordered to be served concurrently. As to the assault with a firearm

conviction, Petitioner received the upper term of four years, also ordered to be served

concurrently. (CT 245-247.) The total term of imprisonment was 10 years. 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District. On August 15, 2005, the Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. 

(Exhibit B.) 

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 The following summary of facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

1

Appellate District appearing as Exhibit B, of the Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court finds

the state Court of Appeal’s summary is a correct and fair summary of the facts of the case. 

2

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court on or about

September 7, 2005. The petition for review was denied on November 16, 2005. (Exhibit C.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 21,

2006. (Court Doc. 1.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition on April 17, 2007. Petitioner

did not file a traverse.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

On December 10, 2002, about 10 p.m., Christopher Border was

vacuuming his 1987 BMW at a car wash when three young males, including

[Petitioner] and Clough, ran toward him. Border noticed that Clough was

carrying a shotgun.

Border tried to get into his car, but Clough grabbed him, pointed the

shotgun in his face and punched him in the mouth. Clough pushed Border to the

ground and demanded his keys and money. [Petitioner] smashed a passenger

window of the BMW with a baseball bat and yelled at Clough to “[s]hut him up. 

Shut him up for good.” Clough took Border’s shoes and ran away. Clough and

[Petitioner] got into the BMW, Clough in the driver’s seat and [Petitioner] in the

front passenger seat. Clough stalled the BMW a few times, but eventually started

the car and drove away.

Border tried to flag down a motorist. Within a few minutes, Border saw

Fresno police officer Adam Cardona and told him what had occurred. En route

they observed two parked black vehicles. One of the vehicles was flashing its

headlights at the other. As the officers approached, one of the cars drove off. The

other car, Border’s BMW, was abandoned with its door open and engine running. 

A description of the second black car, possibly a four-door Honda sedan, was

broadcast.

Several minutes later, Officers Martin Van Overbeek and Sam Hernandez

stopped Clough and [Petitioner] in a four-door black Honda that matched Officer

Passmore’s description. The officers noticed a shotgun between Clough’s legs

and ordered them to exit the vehicle. The shotgun was discovered to be loaded. 

An aluminum baseball bat was found between the door frame and the front

passenger seat of the vehicle. Border was brought to the scene and positively

identified both Clough and [Petitioner].

Clough and [Petitioner] were interviewed at the police station. [Petitioner]

waived his Miranda [(1996) 384 U.S. 436] rights and admitted having been in the

vicinity of the carjacking, claiming he had been looking for a party. Clough and

[Petitioner] were left alone together in an interview room and the conversation

was recorded. During the conversation, Officer Eloy Escareno thought he heard

Clough whisper, “All I wanted was the Bimmer [sic].” He also heard [Petitioner]

say that, if he had been the victim, he would have just run away.

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DEFENSE

Clough and [Petitioner] attacked the interpretation of the recorded

conversation, particularly claiming the alleged statement about the “Bimmer” had

not occurred. [Petitioner’s] mother testified that the Honda that Clough and

[Petitioner] were driving was hers. The baseball bat found in the car had been left

there a week earlier by someone who had broken the window and burglarized the

car.

(Exhibit B, at pp.3-4.)

 DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

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respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Admission of Petitioner’s Tape-Recorded Conversation With His Codefendant

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s admission

of the tape recording of a conversation between Petitioner and his co-defendant. Specifically,

Petitioner contends that the recording was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative because

there was no dispute about any statement brought to light by the audiotape recording. 

Detective Escareno testified that he interviewed Petitioner after his arrest, and Petitioner

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admitted that he had been in the vicinity of the carjacking that evening looking for a party. 

During the interview, Petitioner also stated that if he had been the victim, he would have just run

away. (RT 1656-1660.) Detective Escareno indicated that both suspects were placed together in

an interview room where their actions and conversations were recorded. It was observed that

Clough whispered in a soft voice a statement that, although not entirely clear, could have been:

“All I wanted was the Bimmer.” (RT 1660-1666, 1913-1920, 2128-2131, 2145-2146.)

At trial, co-defendant Clough sought to admit a portion of the tape recording from the

interview room, which was redacted to omit any incriminating information about Petitioner, in an

attempt to rebut the testimony by Detective Escareno that no such statement regarding the 

“Bimmer” comment existed. (RT 1544-1548, 1600-1601, 1802-1826, 1897-1902.) Petitioner

objected to the admission of the recording arguing that it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than

probative because of the offensive language used by the defendants. The trial court overruled

Petitioner’s objection and admitted the tape recording. (RT 1814, 2128-2146.) 

Petitioner presented this issue to the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal, and to

the California Supreme Court in his petition for review. The opinion of the Court of Appeal is

the last reasoned decision addressing the merits of the claim. In rejecting Petitioner’s argument,

the Court of Appeal held as follows:

The tape-recorded conversation was relevant to prove [Petitioner’s] guilt.

[Petitioner’s] incriminating statement recorded on the tape was obviously more

probative of his guilt than Officer Escareno’s testimony regarding what he had

overheard. Further, to the extent the tape recording validated Escareno’s

recollection of the conversation, it bolstered his credibility as to other facts

relating to [Petitioner’s] and Clough’s guilt to which he testified.

[Petitioner] next contends that even if the tape had some probative value,

the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting it. 

Evidence Code section 352 states that the “court in its discretion may exclude

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that

its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create

substantial danger of undue prejudice . . . .”

[Petitioner] argues that the tape recording should have been excluded

because it was cumulative, citing People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227. Milner

is not on point. There the court properly excluded an 11-hour videotape and a

one-hour edited version to support a doctor’s opinion regarding the mental state of

the defendant. (Id. at pp. 238-239.) The trial court noted that the edited version

took things out of context and the unedited version would be an undue

consumption of time. Both versions included inadmissible evidence, were unduly

distracting, and could confuse the jurors. Further, the doctor’s testimony on the

stand was an adequate basis for describing what he saw on the tape and adequate

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for the jury’s resolution of the issues. (Ibid.) Nothing in Milner obligated the

court to exclude the tape recording in this case. Here, [Petitioner’s] statement on

the tape was probative of his guilt, and while it may have been cumulative,

[Petitioner] does not and cannot argue that it constituted an undue consumption of

time, which is the harm subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 352 was

designed to avoid.

We also reject [Petitioner’s] claim that the tape was unduly prejudicial

because expletives “peppered practically every sentence in that recorded

conversation.” “Evidence Code section 352[, subdivision (b)] is designed for

situations in which evidence of little evidentiary impact evokes an emotional

bias.” (People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1369.) “Prejudicial” is not

synonymous with “damaging,” but refers instead to evidence that “‘uniquely tends

to evoke an emotional bias against [the] defendant”’” without regard to its

relevance. (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121.)

While [Petitioner’s] use of expletives probably did not help his cause, we

cannot say in this day and age that it would uniquely tend to evoke an emotional

bias against him. Given the probative value of [Petitioner’s] taped statement

implicating him in the carjacking, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when

it found that the probative value of the statement outweighed “any prejudicial

effect arising from the jury’s listening to [Petitioner’s] profanity-laden remarks.” 

(People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1044-1045 [defendant’s claim of undue

prejudice due to his “constant use of obscenity” in relevant tape conversation

rejected].)

(Exhibit B, at 5-7.)

In a federal habeas action, review is limited to whether the petitioner’s conviction

violated constitutional standards. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982). Generally, the

admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law, and is not reviewable in a federal habeas corpus

proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9 Cir.), cert. th

denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1985). Nevertheless, with respect to the admission of prejudicial

evidence, habeas relief is available if the admission was fundamentally unfair and resulted in a

denial of due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. 62; Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Walters v.

Maas, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9 Cir. 1995); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9 Cir. 1993), th th

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994); Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9 Cir.1990). th

However, the failure to comply with state rules of evidence alone is neither a necessary nor a

sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. Jammal v. Van de

Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-920 (9 Cir. 1991). “Only if there are no permissible inferences the th

jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence

must ‘be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.’” Id. at 920, quoting Kealohapaoule

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v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9 Cir.1986). th

The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. As stated by the trial court, the

tape-recorded conversation was highly relevant as it contained statements by Petitioner indicative

of his guilt. The presence of obscenities used by Petitioner and his co-defendant, although

numerous, was not so prejudicial as to deny Petitioner a fair trial. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

claim must be rejected. 

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when the prosecutor

repeatedly described the evidence as being “clear and convincing” thereby attempting to lower

the burden of proof. 

The objectionable comments are found in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument as follows:

[MR. HARRELL, PROSECUTOR]: In fact, I’m very proud of this. 

Because this is what separates us from so many other places in the world. What it

basically means that 12 people will come in here and listen to the evidence I

present, and they are going to decide whether they agree with what we have

decided; whether they agree these charges are, in fact, true based on the evidence

presented, without regard to any prejudice, any sympathy, any pity for the

defendants, any pity for the victim, but based upon what is presented during the

course of the trial. You are going to decide the truth of those charges. And

contrary to what Mr. Sok said, if you listen to this evidence, find the evidence to

be clear and find it to be convincing, and therefore find the charge to be true, folks

your job is done.

MR. SOK [defense counsel for Clough]: Your Honor, that misstates the

law. He said clear and convincing. That’s not the burden. I request that

statement be stricken. That’s also prosecutor misconduct that he’s trying to apply

different burden when he’s point at the - - 

MR. HARRELL: Your Honor, do we need to discuss this in font [sic] of

the jury, because I can do that too?

THE COURT: The jury will be instructed as to the proper burden of proof. 

Mr. Sok, your objection is overruled.

MR. HARRELL: Ladies and gentlemen that is the burden of proof. If you

find the evidence to be clear, to be convincing, because that’s what it’s asking

you. You have to have an abiding conviction, a lasting belief that the charge is

true.

MR. SOK: I object again. He keep saying clear and convincing. That’s

not the burden in this case.

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MR. HARRELL: Oh, my goodness.

MR. SOK: He keeps saying - - it’s beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: Mr. Sok, it’s obvious clear and convincing is not the

standard of proof in a criminal case. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt.

MR. SOK: Thank you.

MR. HARRELL: That’s correct. And I don’t think I said anything

different. What I told you, and I’ll say it again because ladies and gentlemen, it is

the law. If you find that evidence clear and convincing and you believe the charge

to be true based upon that evidence, we have met our burden of proof.

MR. SOK: I’m going to object same ground again. He’s doing same thing

again.

THE COURT: I’ll sustain the objection. The burden of proof is beyond a

reasonable doubt.

MR. SOK: This is prosecutor misconduct, Your Honor.

MR. HARRELL: Ladies and gentlemen, there are three separate standards

of proof in the law: Preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing

evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt. Those are standards of proof. Those

are terms. Those are words. They do not - - those are standards and terms for

standards of proof in the law, but that does not tell you what they mean. That’s

why we have an instruction that tells you what reasonable doubt is. And what I

am telling you is that if you are convinced by this evidence that the charge is true,

and you believe the evidence to be clear that the charge is true, then you people

have met the burden.

MR. SOK: Same objection. That statement has been stricken. This

prosecutor keep repeating again and again, and Court has instructed that was

stricken. What he’s doing is keep saying clear and convincing.

THE COURT: Counsel, will you approach, please. Ladies and gentlemen

of the jury, we’re going to take up a matter out of your presence.

(RT 2712-2714.)

After an off-the record discussion, the trial court stated the following:

We’re dealing with a couple of issues that arise in many cases and that is

the scope of argument at the end of a criminal case and objections to arguments

and the difficulty of trying to handle those arguments and objections to them. 

And the second issue, of course, the definition of reasonable doubt. It’s no secret

that our courts have been wrestling with the concept of reasonable doubt for about

as long as we have had the standard. Now, the reason I sustained the objection to

the “clear and convincing” is there is a particular standard of proof in our system,

the lowest standard involving the least burden on the proponent is preponderance

of the evidence, of course, and then there’s a higher standard clear and convincing

that is used in some cases. It used to be used in more cases than it is now, but it is

I think all would concede less than reasonable doubt, and then we have the

reasonable doubt standard.

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Now, there’s nothing in the reasonable doubt instruction about clear and

convincing; that doesn’t mean that counsel can’t argue as imaginatively and

forcefully as possible as to what the jury ought to consider in trying to reach a

decision and applying the reasonable doubt standard. The reason for the Court’s

sustaining the objection is that while clear and convincing are both evidence, are

both adjectives, clear and convincing evidence is a term of art under the law, and

it is not a term of art or definition that’s to be applied in criminal cases. And the

reason - - additional reason the objection was sustained, is that there is at least a

potential for the jury to be confused.

(RT 2718-2719.) 

After the defendants were found guilty, they filed motions for a new trial based on the

prosecutor’s alleged misconduct. (Supp. CT 1-43; Supp. GCT 1-43; RT 3601-3616.) The trial

court held a hearing on the motion, and took the matter under submission, but stated the

following:

I do know that at least twice I addressed the jury. It’s obvious clear and

convincing evidence is not the standard of proof in a criminal case. It’s beyond a

reasonable doubt, and I went on and sustained an objection. 

The jury was correctly instructed. They were instructed prior to the start

of taking of evidence. In other words, they were told of the correct standard

during jury selection. They were told of the correct standard in your instructions,

not only in the instructions that were read to them but also they had a copy of 2.90

for their use during their deliberations. And the Court also did take up the matter

further, and it’s my understanding there weren’t any further claimed

misstatements. But in any event I had a sidebar with counsel and addressed the

issue at the request of the defendants.

I find and determine that Mr. Harrell did not engage in prejudicial

misconduct. He was trying to argue what his burden was. I wouldn’t be surprised

if both prosecutors and defense counsel tried to think of another argument that can

be presented to the jury to make the standard understandable. And while I realize

that bad faith is no longer the test, with respect to Mr. Harrell there was no bad

faith, and I find no prejudice.

I simply cannot understand or cannot believe that the jury can understand

that the standard was anything other than beyond a reasonable doubt, and I am

convinced that the way the evidence came in, and I do believe that and find that

the evidence was more compelling or stronger than the defense might be willing

to concede at this point.

They did have an eyewitness victim who was able to make two in-field

identifications, and we do have one of the defendants found with a sawed-off

shotgun between his legs in the vehicle being driven by the other defendant very

close to where the events took place. So the evidence was strong against the

defendants and did support the jury determinations of the guilt on the three

different counts.

As I say, I find there is no prejudicial misconduct on the part of the people

because the issue was brought to their attention during the argument as well as

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before the taking of evidence and during their instructions, so they could not have

been misled as to what test in a criminal trial is.

The Court’s referring to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard that is set

forth in CAL-JIC 2.90.

(RT 3615-3616.)

 The trial court subsequently denied defendants’ motion for a new trial in a minute order. 

(CT 259.) Petitioner presented this issue on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, and

to the California Supreme Court by way of petition for review. The opinion of the Court of

Appeal is the last reasoned state court decision addressing the merits of the claim. In rejecting

the claim, the Court of Appeal held:

Assuming without deciding that the prosecutor’s statements constituted

misconduct, we find no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied these

comments and found appellants guilty on proof less than beyond a reasonable

doubt.

First, the trial court corrected the prosecutor’s statements. When the

prosecutor misstated the burden of proof - - “If you find the evidence clear and

convincing and you believe the charge to be true based upon that evidence, we

have met our burden of proof” - - the court promptly sustained defense counsel’s

objection and instructed the jury: “The burden of proof is beyond a reasonable

doubt.” When the prosecutor used “clear” and “convincing” as adjectives to

describe the state of the evidence, the court overruled defense counsel’s objections

to the statements but reiterated to the jury, “it’s obvious clear and convincing is

not the standard of proof in a criminal case. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

After the arguments concluded, the court instructed the jury that it must apply the

law “that I state to you,” and “[i]f anything concerning the law said by the

attorneys in their arguments or at any other time during the trial conflict with my

instructions on law, you must follow my instructions.” (See CALJIC No. 1.00.) 

The court also instructed on the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor’s

burden of proving appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (CALJIC No.

2.90.)

Second, the prosecutor’s last objectionable statement was ambiguous and

confusing and therefore probably worthless to the jury deciding the case:

“[Conflicts in the evidence] does not equal reasonable doubt because it’s after you

have made that comparison consideration that you decide whether the charge is

true or not, and only if you find the charges are not true, only if you find that you

don’t have a lasting belief in the truth of the charge, that’s when you have

reasonable doubt.”

Third, before the prosecutor made his objected-to remarks, all three

counsel had argued the proper beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof to the

jury.

Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury applied

the complained-of comments in an objectionable way. (People v. Morales, supra,

25 Cal.4th at p.44.)

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(Exhibit B, at 12-13.)

 A habeas petition will be granted for prosecutorial misconduct only when the misconduct

“so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 171, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974)); see Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d

815, 843 (9 Cir. 1995). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct th

must be “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” 

Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 (1987) (quoting United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985)). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that

there is a reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial -

i.e., that absent the alleged impropriety, the verdict probably would have been different.

In the context of improper argument, the reviewing court must examine the likely effect

of the statements in the context in which they were made in order to determine if the comments

so infected the trial with unfairness as to render the resulting conviction a denial of due process. 

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 868 (9 Cir. 2002); Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 778 th

(9 Cir. 2001); see also Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643; Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-183. Accordingly, th

in order to place the objectionable comments in context, the court must examine the entire

proceedings to resolve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. See United

States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988) (“[P]rosecutorial comment must be examined in

context. . . .”). 

After a thorough review of the entire proceedings, this Court finds that the state courts’

finding that Petitioner suffered no prejudice as a result of any alleged prosecutorial misconduct

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. As the Court of Appeal stated, even if this Court assumes that the prosecutor’s

comments were improper, Petitioner makes no showing that he suffered any prejudice as a result. 

Prior to the prosecutor’s statements, both defense counsel had thoroughly argued the appropriate

standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. (RT 2445-2457, 2513, 2517-2518, 2551, 2555-2557.)

The Court repeatedly admonished the jury that the standard of proof was obviously not clear and

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a reasonable doubt standard. (RT 2715-1726.) 

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convincing, but rather beyond a reasonable doubt. (RT 2713, 2741-2742, 2755-2757.) In 2

addition, the jury was instructed that statements made by the attorneys during trial are not

evidence. (RT 2734; CT 182 [CALJIC 1.02].) Immediately following the prosecutor’s rebuttal

argument, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC 2.90 and 2.91 which defined the

standard of proof as follows:

“Reasonable doubt” is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt

because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or

imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which after the entire comparison and

consideration of all of the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition

that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.

The burden is on the people to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant is the person who committed the crime with which he is charged - - or

crimes in this case. If after considering the circumstances of the identification and

any other evidence in this case you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant

was the person who committed the crime, you must give the defendant the benefit

of that doubt and find him not guilty.

(RT 2741-2742; CT 204-205 [CALJIC 2.90 & 2.91].) 

Accordingly, based on a review of this record, even if it is assumed that the prosecutor

committed misconduct, Petitioner has simply failed to demonstrate that the comments so infected

the trial with unfairness as to render the resulting conviction a denial of due process, and the state

courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. 

E. Admission of Enhanced Recording of an Audiotape Previously Admitted at Trial

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when the trial court allowed

the jury to consider evidence that was not admitted into evidence during trial. 

During the presentation of the defense case, Jeffrey Hall, a sound production engineer,

testified concerning the manner in which he enhanced the tape recording of the conversations in

the interview room between the defendants in an attempt to make the conversations more

audible. Although he was successful in doing so, much of the conversations remained very soft. 

(RT 1827-1830.) He recorded the enhanced version of the recording on a CD, which he gave to

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the Public Defender’s Office. (RT 1841.) Mr. Hall neglected to bring a duplicate the day of his

testimony, and apparently the Public Defender’s Officer returned their copy of the CD to his

company. (RT 1846.)

The prosecution subsequently obtained a copy of the CD and requested permission to play

it through the computer in the courtroom. Defense counsel objected stating that the jury had

already heard the original tape and that playing the enhanced version was unnecessary and

repetitive as well as objectionable under California Evidence Code section 352. (RT 2174-2178,

2189.) The court allowed the CD to be played to the jury. (RT 2190-2192.) Specifically, the

court stated:

THE COURT: I considered the objections by the defendants, and I have

considered the factors in Evidence Code Section 352. I don’t think it will take up

so much of the Court’s time that it would be objectionable on that ground,

although we’ve spent a lot of time on this issue. I’m talking about how much time

it would take to present it to the jury. And I don’t see confusion being caused by

it. And I don’t think it’s more prejudicial than probative. And I don’t think that

the jury is going to get misled.

This has been - these two claimed statements have been the subject of a

considerable amount of testimony, and they don’t come as surprises to the

defendants. I think that the people’s case has from the beginning, in effect,

featured one statement by [Petitioner] - or alleged statement by [Petitioner], and

alleged statement by Mr. Clough. And when I say - I say that because I believe

the reports turned over to the defendants, or defense counsel, put both of them on

notice that the people wanted to prove up those two statements.

So it’s the two statements to the extent the jury finds they were made, have

been in the case from early on, and don’t come as a surprise to anybody.

(RT 2195-2196.)

 The relevant portions were located on the disk, and then played for the jury. (RT 2198.) 

While the jury was deliberating, they requested to hear the CD again. Defense counsel objected

arguing that it was not admitted into evidence and had not been redacted. (RT 3001-3003.) The

trial court stated:

THE COURT: I’m going to allow the CD to be played, but first of all,

we’ll find out how much of the CD the jury wants played. They have made this

request. The CD is quite similar to the tape, and the tape has been admitted as G

and has already been played to the jury. And at least a portion of the CD was also

played during the taking of the evidence. So I will grant the request. I will

inquire of the foreperson exactly how much of the tape they want to hear.

MR. HARRELL: You [sic] Honor, I should add that the only reason the

people did not move that into evidence or attempt to move it into evidence is

because it wasn’t redacted. We learned about the existence of the CD during the

course of the trial, and we don’t have the equipment to redact it here in the middle

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of the courtroom. So while the CD represents exactly what’s on the tape and the

tape could be redacted and therefore it could go in there to the jury, the CD could

not because we couldn’t do it during the course of the trial.

(RT 3006-3007.)

The attorneys subsequently agreed upon the appropriate sections to be played for the jury,

and it was played in open court, not in the jury room. (RT 3311, 3314.) At the conclusion, the

attorneys agreed that the only the appropriate sections had been played for the jury. (RT 3316.) 

Petitioner presented this issue to the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal, and to

the California Supreme Court by way of petition for review. Like Petitioner’s other claims, the

opinion of the Court of Appeal is the last reasoned decision addressing the merits of the claim. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

“‘It is a fundamental rule that all evidence shall be taken in open

court and that each party to a controversy shall have knowledge of,

and thus be enabled to meet and answer, any evidence brought

against him.’” (People v. Bogle (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 770, 778.)

However, when a jury considers evidence that was provided in error, the

defendant must show prejudice, and we will not reverse unless it is reasonably

probable that an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have resulted in

the absence of the error. (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1213-1214;

People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 668.)

In this case, given that all parties agreed that the content of the CD played

for the jury during deliberations was identical to the content of the tape played for

the jury during trial, even if we assume error, appellant have failed to show how it

is reasonably probable that an outcome more favorable to them would have

resulted in absence of the error.

First, the two critical parts of the CD had been played for the jury during

trial—Clough’s alleged “Bimmer” statements and [Petitioner’s] “just took off”

statement. Second, every part of the CD played for the jury during deliberations

covered the exact part of the audiotape played for the jury during trial, and the jury

had the audiotape available to play during deliberations. Third, the transcript

accompanying the CD was the same transcript the jury used to help it decipher the

audiotape. Finally, nothing about the CD per se rendered it inadmissible. The CD

would have been admitted into evidence had the necessary technology been

available during trial to redact it consistent with the audiotape.

On this record, appellants have not shown it is reasonably probable that an

outcome more favorable to them would have resulted in the absence of the error. 

We also rejected appellants’ perfunctory claim that the error violated due process. 

In any event, we find no basis for reversal under the harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (See People v.

Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 669, fn. 10.) 

(Exhibit B, at 8-9.) 

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The Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminally accused a fair trial by an impartial jury

and all findings must be based only on the evidence presented at trial. Turner v. Louisana, 379

U.S. 466, 472-473 (1965). In rendering its verdict, the jury may not consider extrinsic evidence,

i.e. evidence not presented at trial. Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9 Cir. 1987). Jury th

exposure to extrinsic evidence does not necessarily constitute per se reversible error. In

determining whether exposure of the jury to unauthorized information denies Petitioner a fair

trial, the reviewing Court must determine whether the jury would have decided the facts of the

case differently as a result of their exposure. Dyer v. Calderon, 113 F.3d 927, 946-948 (9 Cir. th

1997), vacated on other grounds, 151 F.3d 970 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc). Petitioner is only th

entitled to relief under section 2254 if he can establish that the exposure to unauthorized

information had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9 Cir. 2000) (quoting Brecht v. th

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). That is, “actual prejudice” must be present. Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637. 

The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. It is clear from the record that any

alleged error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict. Although the CD was not actually admitted into evidence, it was nonetheless played for

the jury as part of the prosecution’s rebuttal case. (RT 2198.) In addition, the tape recording of

the exact conversation was admitted into evidence and was present in the jury room during

deliberations. (RT 1814, 2128-2146.) Further, as Respondent correctly states, the only reason

the CD was not admitted into evidence was because it had not and could not be redacted. The

attorneys spent a significant amount of time determining which portions were relevant, all agreed

on the portions to be played, and all agreed that only those relevant portions were actually played

for the jury. Because the jury did not hear anything that it had not already heard during the trial,

it simply cannot be said that Petitioner suffered any resulting prejudice, and his claim fails on the

merits. 

///

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F. Sentencing Error/Violation of Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial

Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s

imposition of the upper term on his carjacking conviction. More specifically, Petitioner contends

that, under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the trial court erred by imposing an

upper term based on facts that were neither found by the jury nor admitted by Petitioner. 

(Petition, at 7.) 

As previously stated herein, Petitioner was sentenced on February 10, 2004, to the upper

term of nine years on his carjacking conviction. As to the robbery conviction, Petitioner received

the upper term of five years, ordered to be served concurrently. As to the assault with a firearm

conviction, Petitioner received the upper term of four years, also ordered to be served

concurrently. (CT 245-247.) The total term of imprisonment was 10 years. 

In imposing the sentence, the trial judge found no factors in mitigation. As circumstances

in aggravation, the court found that Petitioner’s juvenile convictions were numerous and of

increasing seriousness. In addition, Petitioner’s prior performance on probation and/or parole

had been unsatisfactory. (RT 3927-3928.) 

As with all of Petitioner’s other claims, this claim was presented to the California Court

of Appeal on direct appeal, and to the California Supreme Court by way of petition for review. 

The opinion of the Court of Appeal is the last reasoned state court decision addressing the merits

of the claim. The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s Blakely claim based on the

trial court’s imposition of the upper term in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in

People v. Black, 34 Cal.4th 1238, 1244 (2005). (Exhibit B, at 19-20.)

Because the state court’s decision was issued prior to Cunningham, the issue becomes

whether that decision should be applied retroactively to Petitioner on collateral review, which has

not yet been addressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. For the reasons discussed infra,

this Court, like several other district courts, finds in the negative. 

In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1986), the Supreme Court held that

“new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have

become final before the new rules are announced.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. A new rule is one

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which “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal

Government;” in other words, a new rule is one where “the result was not dictated by precedent

existing at the time of the defendant’s conviction became final.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; Snook

v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir. 1996). 

A Teague analysis requires the Court to engage in a three step process. First, the Court

must determine the date the petitioner’s conviction became final. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510

U.S. 383, 390, 114 S.Ct. 948, 953-954 (1994); Snook, 89 F.3d at 612. Second, the Court must

survey the legal landscape as it existed when the petitioner’s conviction became final and

determine whether a state court considering the petitioner’s claim at that time would have felt

compelled by existing precedent to conclude the new rule was required by the Constitution. 

Caspari, 510 U.S. at 390; Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990). Third,

if the Court determines that the petitioner seeks the benefit of new rule, the Court must consider

whether the relief sought falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to non-retroactivity. See

Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 2119 (1993). The two narrow exceptions

are (1) “the rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe . . .

or addresses a substantive categorical guarante[d] accorded by the Constitution;” or (2) the rule

announces a “watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and

accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Graham, 506 U.S. at 477-78, 113 S.Ct. 892, 903 (internal

quotations omitted). The first exception only applies to rules that place certain private

“individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”

Teague, 489 U.S., at 307. The second exception applies to watershed rules, which are those rules

that are “central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 313,

109 S.Ct. 1060. Watershed rules of criminal procedure implicate “the fundamental fairness and

accuracy of the criminal proceeding,” Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495; Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, and are

the small core of rules that require procedures which are implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty. Graham, 506 U.S. at 478, 113 S.Ct. at 903.

First, neither Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker, have been applied retroactively. SanchezCervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 666-667 (9 Cir. 2002); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025 (9 Cir. th th

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 Justices Kennedy and Breyer also believed that Apprendi could be applied to only sentencing 3

enhancements based on the nature of offense (jury determination) and not the nature of the offender (judicial

determination). 127 S.Ct. at 872-873. 

18

2005); United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9 Cir. 2005). This being so, it appears

th

highly unlikely that Cunningham would be applied retroactively. This finding is supported by

several district courts that have addressed the issue. See e.g. Fennen v. Nakayema, 494

F.Supp.2d 1148, 2007 WL 1742339 (E.D. Cal., June 14, 2007); Rosales v. Horel, 2007 WL

1852186 (S.D. Cal., June 26, 2007); Salerno v. Schriro, 2007 WL 2153584 (D. Ariz., July 24,

2007). 

 As was the case in Blakely, Cunningham shifted the decision-making authority from the

judge to the jury to determine any facts which may increase a defendant’s sentence, such

determination is a procedural rather than substantive rule. Further, a mere change in the law as to

the decision-making authority regarding factual findings bearing on a sentence enhancement is

not a watershed rule in criminal procedure. See Schardt, 414 F.3d at 1036. 

Here, the California Court of Appeal’s decision, was subsequently affirmed by the

California Supreme Court’s decision in Black, which was overruled by the United States

Supreme Court in Cunningham. Petitioner argues that Blakely was decided before his conviction

became final, and Cunningham is merely an extension of the holding in Blakely and should be

applied to the cases that were not final prior to the decision in Blakely, such argument is not

persuasive. To make that determination, this Court would have to find that the holding in

Cunningham was dictated by Blakely. The Cunningham decision was a six-member majority

opinion. Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Breyer, filed a dissenting opinion, reasoning that Apprendi

should not be extended to California’s determinate sentencing law, because the sentencing

scheme was indistinguishable from the advisory Guideline scheme approved of in Booker.3

Justice Alito, writing for the dissent stated that “the Booker Court unanimously agreed that

judicial factfinding under a purely advisory guidelines system would [] comport with the Sixth

Amendment.” Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 874. It was noted that “the California law gives a

judge at least as much sentencing discretion as does the post-Booker federal scheme.” Id. at 877.

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“The California scheme-like the federal ‘advisory Guidelines’-does require that this discretion be

exercised reasonably.” Id. at 878. 

In light of the split and strong dissent in the Cunningham decision, it simply cannot be

said that the result in Cunningham was dictated by Blakely. Even though the holding in Blakely

was the central reasoning in support of the majority opinion in Cunningham, mere application of

a prior decision is not equivalent to being “dictated by precedent.” A new rule is defined as “a

rule that ... was not ‘dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became

final.’” Whorton v. Bockting, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1181 (2007). In light of the fact that

three justices found that California’s sentencing scheme was more akin to the advisory

Guidelines of which Booker approved, this Court finds that “reasonable jurists” could find the

same. See e.g. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S.Ct. at 1181. 

Next, the issue becomes whether the state courts’ determination of this issue was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court authority. The

imposition of the upper-term was reasonable as it was based primarily on the circumstances of

Petitioner’s prior criminal history including, his prior juvenile convictions, the increasing

severity of his prior offenses, and his prior performance on probation and parole. (RT 3927-

3928.) Although in Cunningham, the Supreme Court invalidated California’s upper-term

sentencing scheme based on facts not found by the jury, it specifically acknowledged, as it did in

prior cases, that sentences based on a defendant’s prior convictions does not violate the Sixth

Amendment. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. At 860, 864, 868; accord Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301;

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). To this

end, the trial court found that the upper-term was warranted based on the fact that Petitioner’s

prior juvenile convictions were numerous and increasing in seriousness, and his prior

performance on probation and parole has been unsatisfactory. (RT 3927-3928.) Petitioner did

not object at trial or dispute these findings. 

As Respondent correctly submits, the United States Supreme Court has never defined the

scope of the prior conviction exception; however, circuit case law supports the finding that it is

reasonable to conclude that this exception includes the type of judicial findings made by the trial

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a particular state court adjudication. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.6 (9 Cir. 2000), th

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court in this case. To illustrate, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, has held that the prior 4

conviction exception includes “not only the mere fact of previous convictions but other related

issues as well. Judges frequently must make factual determinations for sentencing, so it is hardly

anomalous to require that they also determinate the ‘who, what, when, and where’ of a prior

conviction.” United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2001); see United States v.

Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 141-142 (2d Cir. 2005) (“the type and length of a sentence imposed seem

logically to fall within this exception.”) The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that

the prior conviction exception applies to “sentencing-related circumstances of recidivism,”

stating “that it is entirely appropriate for judges to have ‘the task of finding not only the mere fact

of previous convictions but other related issues as well.’” United States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287

F.3d 699, 703 (8 Cir. 2002). In addition, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “the th

‘prior conviction’ exception extends to ‘subsidiary findings’ such as whether a defendant was

under court supervision when he or she committed a subsequent crime.” United States v.

Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10 Cir. 2005). th

In addition, several state courts, including the California Supreme Court have likewise

found that the prior conviction exception includes the type of finding as was made in the instant

case. More specifically, the California Supreme Court has noted that the exception includes

more than the mere fact of a prior conviction and includes such matters as the sentence imposed

and the status and timing of the incarceration in relation to the subsequent offenses. People v.

McGee, 38 Cal.4th 682, 700-703 (2006) (citing with approval People v. Thomas, 91 Cal.App.4th

212, 221-222 (2001)); see also State v. Stewart, 791 A.2d 143, 151-152 (Md. 2002) (prior

conviction exception “is not limited solely to prior convictions. The general rule is that there is

no right to a jury trial on matters related to the broader issue of recidivism.”). The Supreme

Courts of Washington, Connecticut, Indiana, and Minnesota have all held that the exception may

include a determination of whether the defendant was on probation at the time of the current

offense. See State v. Jones, 149 P.3d 636, 640-641 (Wash. 2006); State v. Fagan, 905 A.2d

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1101, 1121 (Conn. 2006); Ryle v. States, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323-325 (Ind. 2005); State v. Allen,

706 N.W.2d 40, 47-48 (Minn. 2005). 

Moreover, in California, “[a] single aggravating factor is sufficient to impose an

aggravated upper prison term where the aggravating factor outweighs the cumulative effect of all

mitigating factors. . . .” People v. Nevill, 167 Cal.App.3d 198, 202 (1985); see also People v.

Black, 41 Cal.4th 799, 806 (2007). Here, it was reasonable for the state appellate court to find

that Petitioner’s constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated when the trial court imposed

the upper term based on the finding that his juvenile convictions were numerous and increasing

in seriousness and his prior performance on probation and parole had been unsatisfactory. 

Accordingly, because the trial court’s imposition of the upper term was properly based on

Petitioner’s recidivism and prior criminal history, it was reasonable to reject Petitioner’s jury trial

claim.

Furthermore, even if there was error under Blakely, Petitioner has not established the

requisite harm. Blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis as it is not considered to be a

structural error. Washington v. Recuenco, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2546 (2006). In a habeas

corpus proceeding, the proper standard of review is that announced in Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993), whether the error had a “substantial and injurious effect.” This is so,

regardless of whether the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for

harmlessness under the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of Chapman v. California, 386

U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Fry v. Pliler, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct 2321, 2325-2327 (2007). Because only

one aggravating factor need be found to impose the upper term sentence, the error is harmless if

the jury could have found, at a minimum, at least one of the aggravating circumstances true

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Here, any error was harmless as the imposition of the upper term was based on

uncontested or overwhelming evidence. It was undisputed that Petitioner had a lengthy juvenile

criminal history, beginning at the age of eight and ending with the commitment offense at age

sixteen. (RT 3927.) The probation report reflects several juvenile adjudications including first

degree burglary, petty theft, vehicle theft, and possession of deadly weapon. (CT 269-270.) 

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Petitioner had previously performed unsatisfactorily on parole or probation and his offenses were

increasing in seriousness. There was ample evidence for the jury to render a verdict beyond a

reasonable doubt on the above recidivist circumstances, any one of which would have authorized

the imposition of the upper term. This is particularly so, given the lack of any mitigating factors

and the strong overwhelming evidence supporting the factors in aggravation. Based on the

foregoing, the Court finds that any error was harmless under Brecht, and the claim must be

denied. 

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent; and,

3. The court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (a COA should be granted where

the applicant has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right,” i.e., when “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong”; Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926,

943 (9 Cir. 2006) (same). In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable th

jurists would not find it debatable that the state courts’ decision denying

Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus were not “objectively

unreasonable.”

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 23, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-01725-DLB Document 18 Filed 01/24/08 Page 22 of 22