Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01678/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01678-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY ARAFILES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-1678 FCD EFB P

vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His

petition challenges a decision denying him parole. The matter was before this court on

December 6, 2006, for hearing on respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Keith Allen Wattley appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Robert C. Cross appeared

on behalf of the respondents. After careful consideration of the moving and opposing papers and

the oral arguments of counsel, the court finds that the petition must be dismissed with leave to

amend.

In 1978, petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to seven years to life in

prison. In 1991, the California Board of Prison Terms (the “Board”) found him suitable for

parole. 

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 Under state law, the Governor has a 30 day period of time to review and “affirm,

modify, or reverse” any decision of the Board. California Constitution, Article V, section 8(b);

California Penal Code section 3041.2.

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However, the Governor of California reviewed that decision and reversed it, finding that

petitioner was not suitable for parole. This petition claims that the Governor reviewed the

Board’s finding outside the time period allowed by state law for such review.1

 Therefore,

petitioner argues, the Governor lacked authority to reverse the Board’s finding. This failure to

comply with the state’s scheme for determining parole suitability, petitioner contends, resulted in

his continued detention in violation of his federally-protected right to due process. This leads to

the inherent jurisdictional problem that petitioner faces. The substance of his claim is premised

on the contention that the denial of parole violates state law.

Respondent’s motion argues that the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain

petitioner’s claim because it is premised on alleged violations of state law, not a violation of

federal law.

The restrictive standard controlling this court’s review of this federal petition is crucial. 

A federal court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(a)

(emphasis added); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478

U.S. 1021 (1986) (federal habeas relief available only where “the Constitution or other federal

law specifically protects against the alleged unfairness or guarantees the procedural right in state

courts.”).

Without question, California prisoners have a federally-protected liberty interest in

release to parole. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.

2006). Therefore, the procedures utilized in deciding suitability for parole must be adequate to

protect this interest. Kentucky v. Department of Corrections, 490 U.S. 452, 459 (1989). The

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procedures must, at a minimum, be designed to ensure that the decision is not arbitrary or

capricious. See Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is

protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”). However, the petitioner

still must show that the denial of parole (and thus continued incarceration) violates, in some way,

federal law. The mere existence of the federally-protected interest in parole does not, of itself,

equate to a rule that a state inmate establishes subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a federal

habeas petition simply by reason of incarceration. Rather, the petition must be grounded on a

claim that the denial of parole violates federal law. Violations of state law alone are not

cognizable on federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991) (the fact that

[an] instruction was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief); 

Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3rd 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (use of dual juries that may have

violated of state law did not state a claim for federal habeas relief); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255

F.3d 926, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (state’s violation of its own separation of powers doctrine does not

rise to level of federal due process violation).

Here, petitioner asserts that the alleged failure to properly apply the 30 day time period

under California law for the Governor to overturn the Board’s decision constitutes a violation of

the federal constitution. Principles of federal due process protect against arbitrary and capricious

incarceration. However, while the state may not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner and

must follow its own established procedures, if a question of state law must be decided in order to

decide a federal habeas claim, the state’s construction of its own law is binding on the federal

court. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975); Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 576 (9th

Cir. 2005). That is precisely the obstacle petitioner encounters here. He has already litigated in

a state habeas petition the very issue he presents on this petition: whether, under state law, the

Governor acted timely to overturn the Board’s decision. The California District Court of

Appeals found that the Governor’s review of the decision was timely and expressly rejected the

same interpretation of state law that petitioner asserts here. In re Arafiles, 6 Cal.App.4th 1467,

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1474-75 (Cal. App. 1992). The state court considered petitioner’s arguments as to when the 30

day period commenced for the Governor to “affirm, modify, or reverse” the Board’s decision,

construed the language of Article V, Section 8(b) of the California Constitution and California

Penal Code section 3041.2, and concluded that the 30 day period did not commence on the date

petitioner claims and that the Governor’s decision to revers was timely. That construction of

state law is binding on this court. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691.

Given the state court’s conclusive interpretation that the Governor acted timely under

California Penal Code § 3041.2 and Article V, Section 8 of the California Constitution, and its

rejection of the very interpretation petitioner relies on here to establish a federal Constitutional

claim, petitioner has not established a federally cognizable claim. That issue is the sole question

presented on this petition and this court is bound by the state court’s interpretation in that regard. 

As a matter of state law, the Governor timely acted to find petitioner not suitable for parole and

did not violate the state’s statutory scheme for deciding parole. Thus, the procedures challenged

were adequate to protect petitioner’s due process interest in parole. Furthermore, no federal

Constitutional or statutory provision requires parole suitability decisions to be made within any

particular time frame. Therefore, petitioner has no claim that his continued confinement violated

his rights under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.

Recognizing the complexity of the matter, counsel for petitioner seeks leave to file an

amended petition to state a claim over which this court has subject matter jurisdiction. 

Respondent has not yet filed an answer. Therefore, petitioner may file an amended petition. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

Accordingly, it hereby is ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s October 31, 2006, motion to dismiss is granted; and

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2. Petitioner has until January 16, 2007, to file and serve an amended petition.

Dated: December 11, 2006.

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