Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02318/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02318-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ANTHONY PADILLA, individually, 

and on behalf of other members 

of the general public similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

APL LOGISTICS AMERICAS LTD., a 

California corporation; APL 

LOGISTICS WAREHOUSE MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES INC., a Florida 

corporation; CARMICHAEL 

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, a 

California corporation; APL 

LOGISTICS GROUP, an unknown 

business entity; APL LOGISTICS 

LTD., an unknown business 

entity; and DOES 1 through 100, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-02318 WBS SCR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Anthony Padilla filed this putative wage-andhour class action in San Joaquin County Superior Court against 

defendants APL Logistics Americas Ltd., APL Logistics Warehouse 

Case 2:24-cv-02318-WBS-SCR Document 18 Filed 12/10/24 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Management Services Inc., Carmichael International Service, APL 

Logistics Group, and APL Logistics Ltd. (Compl. (Docket No. 1-

1).) Defendants removed the action to this court pursuant to the 

Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). (Docket 

No. 1.) Plaintiff now moves to remand. (Mot. (Docket No. 12).)

Under the federal removal statute, “any civil action 

brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 

United States have original jurisdiction may be removed by the 

defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for 

the district . . . where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1441(a). Under CAFA, the federal courts have original 

jurisdiction over class actions in which the parties are 

minimally diverse, the proposed class has at least 100 members, 

and the aggregated amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). “[N]o antiremoval presumption attends cases 

invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication 

of certain class actions in federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin 

Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014).

“The mechanics and requirements for removal are 

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446,” which “identifies two thirty-day 

periods for removing a case.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA 

LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). “The first thirty-day 

removal period [under § 1446(b)(1)] is triggered if the case 

stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face.” 

Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The second 

thirty-day removal period [under § 1446(b)(3)] is triggered if 

the initial pleading does not indicate that the case is 

Case 2:24-cv-02318-WBS-SCR Document 18 Filed 12/10/24 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

removable, and the defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended 

pleading, motion, order or other paper’ from which removability 

may first be ascertained.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)).

“A CAFA case may be removed at any time, provided that 

neither of the two thirty-day periods under § 1446(b)(1) and 

(b)(3) has been triggered.” Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., 

L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff argues that “[w]hile the Complaint does not 

necessarily signal an amount in controversy or the number of 

putative class members, this information was easily accessible 

and in Defendant’s exclusive possession, custody, and control as 

the employer,” and therefore “Defendant could have exercised 

reasonable diligence to determine its removability.” (See Mot. 

at 1, 4.) This argument lacks merit.

“[N]otice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined 

through examination of the four corners of the applicable 

pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make 

further inquiry.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 

689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). “[E]ven if a defendant could have 

discovered grounds for removability through investigation, it 

does not lose the right to remove because it did not conduct such 

an investigation and then file a notice of removal within thirty 

days of receiving the indeterminate document.” Roth, 720 F.3d at

1125. While a defendant must “apply a reasonable amount of 

intelligence in ascertaining removability,” for instance by 

conducting calculations based on the figures provided in the 

complaint, the defendant is “not obligated to supply information” 

omitted by plaintiff’s pleadings in order to determine

Case 2:24-cv-02318-WBS-SCR Document 18 Filed 12/10/24 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

removability. See Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141.1

As plaintiff apparently concedes (see Mot. at 1), the 

complaint did not “affirmatively reveal[] on its face the facts 

necessary for federal court jurisdiction.” See Blumberger v. 

Tilley, 115 F.4th 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2024). The complaint 

states that “the class is estimated to be greater than fifty (50) 

individuals and the identity of such membership is readily 

ascertainable by inspection of Defendants’ employment records.”

(Compl. ¶ 19(a).) This allegation falls short of the 100 class 

members required by CAFA. The complaint provides no figures that 

would enable the calculation of an amount-in-controversy greater 

than $5 million. The first removal window under § 1446(b)(1) 

therefore was not triggered. And plaintiff does not argue, nor 

is there anything in the record to indicate, that plaintiff 

served some other pleading that could trigger the second removal 

window under § 1446(b)(3).

Defendants removed approximately four months following 

the filing of the complaint “on the basis of [their] own 

information,” which is permissible because neither 30-day period 

was triggered. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125-26. Accordingly, the

action was not improperly removed.

1 Plaintiff cites three district court cases that 

concluded otherwise, holding that removability was triggered 

based on information outside the pleadings within the defendants’ 

possession. See Dempsey v. Raley’s, No. 2:21-cv-02300 KJM DB, 

2022 WL 1211241, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2022); Thomas v. CVS 

Health Corp., No. 2:19-cv-04283-R-FFM, 2019 WL 3526344, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019); Banta v. Am. Med. Response Inc., No. 

11-cv-03586 GAF RZX, 2011 WL 2837642, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 

2011). Because the court cannot reconcile these cases with the 

Ninth Circuit authority cited above, they are unpersuasive.

Case 2:24-cv-02318-WBS-SCR Document 18 Filed 12/10/24 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to 

remand (Docket No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: December 10, 2024

Case 2:24-cv-02318-WBS-SCR Document 18 Filed 12/10/24 Page 5 of 5