Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01258/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01258-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JENNETTE N. NELSON, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-01258-MMA (RNB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 19, 20) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Michael M. Anello, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On June 20, 2017, plaintiff Jennette N. Nelson filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying her applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits 

and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED, that the Commissioner’s crossCase 3:17-cv-01258-MMA-RNB Document 22 Filed 06/13/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 8
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motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, and that Judgment be entered affirming the 

decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. . 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 24, 2013, plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits and SSI under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security 

Act, alleging disability beginning November 21, 2008. (Certified Administrative Record 

[“AR”] 234-39, 240-51.) After her applications were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration (AR 125-33, 138-42), plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before 

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 143-44.) An administrative hearing was held 

on December 14, 2015. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel, and testimony was 

taken from her and a vocational expert (“VE”). (AR 33-64.) 

As reflected in his January 21, 2016 hearing decision (AR16-27), the ALJ found that 

plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from her 

alleged onset date through the date of the decision. The ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner on June 29, 2017, when the Appeals Council denied 

plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-4.) This timely civil action followed. 

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that 

plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 21, 2008, her 

alleged onset date. (AR 18.) 

At step two, the ALJ found that that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

disorders of the lumbar spine and left knee. (AR 18.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 20.) 

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Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform less than a full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b). Specifically, plaintiff could lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 

ten pounds frequently; stand and walk for up to four hours total during an eight-hour 

workday; sit for up to four hours total during an eight-hour workday; never climb ropes, 

ladders, or scaffolds; and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl and climb 

ramps or stairs. She should also avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibration 

and hazards. (AR 21.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that plaintiff’s earnings record revealed that her work experience was not at a 

level of substantial gainful activity and did not constitute past relevant work. (AR 26.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile could 

perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy (i.e., folder, hand packager, and information clerk), the ALJ found that plaintiff 

was not disabled. (AR 26-27.) 

SOLE ISSUE IN DISPUTE 

The sole issue in dispute in this case is whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate 

the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. William McMurray of Vista Community 

Clinic. In a medical source statement dated December 12, 2014, Dr. MacMurray opined 

inter alia that plaintiff constantly experienced pain serious enough to interfere with 

attention and concentration needed to perform even simple work tasks; that she could walk 

zero blocks without rest or severe pain; that she could sit and stand/walk for only two hours 

each in an 8-hour work day; that she would sometimes need to take unscheduled breaks; 

that she should rarely lift above 10 pounds; and that she would be absent from work more 

than four days per month. (See AR 1626-30.) In his decision, the ALJ stated that he was 

giving no weight to this treating source opinion. (See AR 25.) 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION 

 The law is well established in this Circuit that a treating physician’s opinions are 

entitled to special weight because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater 

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. See McAllister v. Sullivan, 

888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). “The treating physician’s opinion is not, however, 

necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). The weight given a treating 

physician’s opinion depends on whether it is supported by sufficient medical data and is 

consistent with other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 

416.927(d)(2). If the treating physician’s opinion is uncontroverted by another doctor, it 

may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 

821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.3d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). Where, 

as here, the treating physician’s opinion is controverted, it may be rejected only if the ALJ 

makes findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are based on the substantial 

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evidence of record. See, e.g., Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A 

treating physician’s opinion on disability, even if controverted, can be rejected only with 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.”); 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). 

One of the four reasons proffered by the ALJ for according no weight to Dr. 

MacMurray’s opinion that plaintiff had extreme pain and extreme limitations was that he 

was a primary care physician and not an orthopedic specialist. (See AR 25.) While under 

the Commissioner’s regulations, the ALJ is permitted to “give more weight to the opinion 

of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her own area of specialty than to the 

opinion of a source who is not a specialist,” see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(5), 

416.927(c)(5), the Court finds that this first reason proffered by the ALJ does not constitute 

a specific and legitimate reason for according no weight to Dr. MacMurray’s opinion. See

Lester, 81 F.3d at 833 (rejecting argument that treating physician’s opinion as to the 

claimant’s mental functioning could be rejected because the treating physician was not a 

mental health specialist); Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987) (treating 

physician was qualified to give medical opinion as to claimant’s mental state even though 

physician was not a psychiatrist). Indeed, the Court notes that the Commissioner did not 

even bother to cite this first reason proffered by the ALJ. 

Another reason proffered by the ALJ for according no weight to Dr. MacMurray’s 

opinion that plaintiff had extreme pain and extreme limitations was that it was “so 

inconsistent with the remainder of the record.” (See AR 25.) However, since the ALJ did 

not specifically identify the evidence of record that he was referring to, the Court finds that 

this vague reason is not sufficiently specific to constitute a legally sufficient reason for 

according no weight to Dr. McMurray’s opinion. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 

(9th Cir. 1988) (“To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient objective 

findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions mandated by the objective findings 

does not achieve the level of specificity our prior cases have required.”); Rodriguez v. 

Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 

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632 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth 

his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.”) (citing 

Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22); Regennitter v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 

1299 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[C]onclusory reasons will not justify an ALJ’s rejection of a medical 

opinion.”). Moreover, to the extent the ALJ was referring to the inconsistency between 

Dr. MacMurray’s opinion and the opinions of the other physicians of record, the Court 

notes that any such inconsistency was merely determinative of the standard to be applied 

to the ALJ’s proffered reasons for not crediting Dr. MacMurray’s opinion; it was not a 

legally sufficient reason in itself. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (in the event of conflict in the 

medical opinion evidence, an ALJ still must provide legally sufficient reasons to reject a 

treating or examining physician’s opinion); see also Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 

1066-67 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (existence of a conflict among the medical opinions by itself 

cannot constitute substantial evidence for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion). 

Another reason proffered by the ALJ for according no weight to Dr. MacMurray’s 

opinion that plaintiff had extreme pain and extreme limitations was that the opinion was 

unsupported by the Vista Clinic progress notes, and specifically the progress notes from 

2015 indicating that plaintiff had a “moderate activity level” and had been encouraged to 

exercise. (See AR 25, citing AR 1651, 1656.) The Court finds that this reason does 

constitute a legally sufficient reason on which the ALJ could properly rely to accord no 

weight to Dr. MacMurray’s opinion. See, e.g., Valentine v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 

574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009) (contradiction between a treating physician’s opinion 

and his treatment notes constitutes a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting that 

opinion); Tommasetti v. Astrue 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[An] incongruity 

between [a physician’s opinion] and [the physician’s] medical records provides a[] . . . 

specific and legitimate reason for rejecting [the physician’s] opinion of [the claimant’s] 

limitations.”); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); Johnson 

v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995) (same). 

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The fourth reason proffered by the ALJ for according no weight to Dr. MacMurray’s 

opinion was that it was “inconsistent with [plaintiff’s] ability to care for her children, drive 

a car and attend church and engage in moderate activity levels.” (AR 25.) The Court finds 

that this reason also constitutes a legally sufficient reason on which the ALJ could properly 

rely to accord no weight to Dr. MacMurray’s opinion. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 

853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly rejected treating physician’s opinion of disability 

because it was inconsistent with claimant’s level of activity); Morgan v. Comm’r of Social 

Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ could properly reject medical report 

by citing its inconsistency with the claimant’s own testimony); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 

751, 754 (same). 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

In conclusion, the Court finds that, while the ALJ proffered two legally insufficient 

reasons for according no weight to Dr. McMurray’s opinion, the error was harmless 

because the ALJ also proffered two other independent, legally sufficient reasons supported 

by substantial evidence. See Stout v. Comm’r of Social Security, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (an ALJ’s error is harmless when such an error is inconsequential to the ultimate 

non-disability determination); see also Howell v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 349 Fed. Appx. 

181, 184 (9th Cir. 2009) (now citable for its persuasive value per Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3) 

(ALJ’s erroneous rationale for rejecting treating physician’s opinion was harmless because 

the ALJ otherwise provided legally sufficient reasons to reject opinion). 

The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment be DENIED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment be 

GRANTED, and that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner 

and dismissing this action with prejudice. 

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

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should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). See id. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 13, 2018 

 _________________________________ 

 ROBERT N. BLOCK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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