Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-03242/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-03242-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM DEREK GRASTY,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN JUAN UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST.,

Defendant.

No. 2:18–cv–3242–KJN PS

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

(ECF Nos. 29, 31.)

This case involves the District’s alleged age discrimination against Grasty.

1

 (See ECF No. 

21.) In the First Amended Complaint, Grasty alleged one claim of age discrimination for the 

District’s failure to interview and hire him for a “Director of Equity” position. (ECF No. 6.) The 

District now moves for summary judgment, which Grasty opposes. (ECF Nos. 29, 35.) 

Additionally, Grasty requested leave to amend in order to add discrimination claims based on race 

and gender, which the District opposes. (ECF Nos. 31, 36.)

After carefully considering the written briefing, the record, and the applicable law, the 

Court GRANTS the District’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Grasty’s motion to 

amend.

///

 

1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge for all purposes, under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(a). (See ECF Nos. 16, 20.)

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Background2

In November of 2017, Grasty applied for the “Director [of] Equity and Student 

Achievement” position with the San Juan School District. (ECF No. 29–6 at Ex. 4, 5.) Grasty’s

application contained the following question: “Are you presently retired or on leave from any 

public agency?” (the “Retirement/Leave Question”). (Id. at p. 11.) Grasty’s application indicated 

he had obtained a certificate from “Harvard Principal’s Center” and a master’s degree from the 

University of Michigan. (Id. at p. 9.) Grasty’s work history showed employment with three 

employers since 2011, including serving two years as a “mentor of administrators” at one school 

district and a combined five years as principal of two other schools. (Id. at p. 10.)

On the whole, the District received 37 applications for this position, and Human 

Resources Analyst Greg Rich found 23 to meet the minimum qualifications––including Grasty’s. 

(Id. at ¶ 5, decl. Rich.) Thereafter, the “Assistant Superintendent of Education Services” Debra 

Calvin reviewed the 23 remaining applications and selected six for an interview. (ECF No. 29–7 

at ¶¶ 1, 4.) Grasty’s was not one of the applications selected. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Calvin stated she did 

not select Grasty “in part because his application revealed several different employers in a short 

period of time.” (Id.) Calvin stated she and the District “want[ed] to find a person that will stay 

in an important administration position for a long time.” (Id.) Calvin stated she believed that 

“each of the six candidates selected were more qualified than Mr. Grasty” because several either 

had or were pursuing a Ph.D., four had some history of working with the District itself, and the 

person ultimately selected, Diana Marshall, had the combined experience of working with 

diversity programs in the District. (Id. at ¶¶ 8–10, 15.) Grasty testified at his deposition that he 

believed he was the most qualified person for the position, but agreed that it was speculative to 

say he would have been hired. (ECF No. 29–4 at Ex. 2, 113:17–114:5.)

In January 2018, Grasty submitted a “Uniform Complaint Procedure Form” to the District, 

contending that the Retirement/Leave Question is discriminatory toward older applicants. (ECF 

No. 29–5 at Ex. 3, p. 6.) Grasty was 57 years old in November 2017. (ECF No. 29–4 at Ex. 2, 

 

2 These facts are stated in a light most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Plaintiff. See

Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002).

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21:22–15, Defendant’s deposition of Grasty.) Of the six applicants selected for an interview, five 

were over the age of 40, and the person hired was 54 years old. (Id. at ¶ 6, decl. Spinelli.) 

Further, Grasty contended in the Complaint Form that certain other questions “were not asked 

when a highly experienced African-American male was not considered for interview[.]” (ECF 

No. 29–5 at Ex. 3, p. 6.) Both Rich and Calvin stated they did not consider the age of any 

applicant in the selection process. (ECF No. 29–6 at ¶ 8; 29–7 at ¶ 11.) Grasty disputes these 

assertions in his opposition brief, appearing to argue these are pretextual fabrications. (ECF No. 

35 at pp. 6–7.)

In April 2018, Grasty filed a charge with the California Department of Fair Employment 

and Housing (“DFEH”). (ECF No. 36–1 at p. 7.) Therein, Grasty checked the boxes alleging 

discrimination based on “sex” and “age,” and asserted he was discriminated against “because of 

[his] race, Black, sex, male, and age, 57 . . . .” (Id.) In August 2018, the DFEH provided Grasty 

with a notice of right to sue. (Id. at p. 9.) On October 20, 2018, Grasty filed a Complaint in the 

Northern District of California, alleging one claim of discrimination under Title VII and the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Grasty alleged age discrimination only, and 

based his claim on the failure to interview him because he was allegedly screened out due to the 

Retirement/Leave Question. (Id. at p. 2.) In December 2018, Grasty filed a First Amended 

Complaint (“1AC”) detailing additional facts and reasserting only his ADEA claim. (ECF No. 6.)

After the case was transferred to this Court and an answer was filed, the undersigned 

issued a pretrial scheduling order closing off: (i) fact discovery by January 4, 2020, (ii) expert–

disclosures by March 2, 2020, and (iii) discovery disputes by May 23, 2020. (ECF Nos. 8, 17, 

24.) Therein, the Court also noted Grasty’s assertion that he “may decide to amend the pleadings 

to allege other theories – race discrimination based on future discovery.” (ECF No. 24 at p. 2, 

citing the parties’ joint statement at ECF No. 21.) The Court informed Grasty that no amendment 

would be permitted except with leave of court for good cause. (Id.) The week prior, Grasty 

downloaded a data sheet from the California Department of Education’s website indicating the 

ethnicities of the District’s male administrators, and showing one district–level male employee of 

African–American descent. (See ECF No. 30–3 at Ex. 2.)

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On November 12, 2019, Grasty lodged a document on the docket entitled “Second 

Amended Complaint,” wherein he reasserted his age claim and added discrimination claims based 

on race and gender. (ECF No. 27.) However, because this filing was not accompanied by the 

proper stipulations or request for leave to amend, the Court struck the filing from the docket. 

(ECF No. 28.) On November 20, 2019, the District filed its motion for summary judgment on 

Grasty’s age–discrimination claim. (ECF No. 29.) A week later, Grasty filed a “Third Amended 

Complaint” with an accompanying motion to amend. (ECF Nos. 30, 31.) Grasty then filed two 

opposition motions to the District’s summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 35, 38.) The District 

opposed Grasty’s motion to amend, and filed a reply for its summary judgment motion. (ECF 

No. 36, 39.) 

At the January 23, 2020 hearing, the Court inquired as to Grasty’s proposed amendments 

to the pleadings. (ECF No. 42.) Grasty stated the following:

– He did not initially believe he had been discriminated against because of his 

race or gender, despite his assertions in the DFEH charge.

– He learned throughout the discovery process that he may have in fact been 

discriminated against for these additional reasons. 

– He first learned of the genders and races of District administrators in May of 

2019, but wanted to wait until he had more information before he asserted any 

claims based on race or gender. This included the job applications, which the 

District had not turned over to him until the fall of 2019. 

– As to his ultimate theory of these new claims, Grasty believed Calvin only 

wanted to hire her friends for any positions with the District. Grasty 

acknowledged that both Calvin and Marshall are African–American females.

(See ECF No. 42.)

Discussion

The following two matters are before the Court: (I) whether there are genuine issues of 

material fact regarding Grasty’s ADEA claim, and (II) whether good cause exists to permit the 

addition of race- and gender-discrimination claims at this late stage of the litigation.

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I. The District’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that “[a] party may move for summary 

judgment, identifying each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which 

summary judgment is sought.” Summary judgment (i.e. judgment as a matter of law) is proper 

when the movant demonstrates no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Id. A dispute is 

“genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Freecycle Sunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is “material” if it 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. United States v. Kapp, 564 F.3d 

1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009). A shifting burden of proof governs motions for summary judgment 

under Rule 56, as detailed below. Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re 

Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010).

First, the party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court 

of the legal basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and 

discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Soremekun v. Thrifty 

Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

323 (1986)). Where the moving party will bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the 

movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for 

the movant. Id. Where the moving party will not bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the 

movant may prevail by “merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party's case.” Id. If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then “the 

non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would 

have the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 

1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970)).

Second, if the moving party meets this initial burden, the opposing party must establish 

that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact can be 

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demonstrated by “(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, 

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , 

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B); see also Estate 

of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The opposing party 

cannot rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading, but must instead produce 

evidence that sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”). 

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the opposing party is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences that may be drawn from the facts before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. While a “justifiable inference” 

need not be the most likely or the most persuasive inference, it must still be rational or 

reasonable. Id. Further, a motion for summary judgment may not rely on (i) “the mere existence 

of a scintilla of evidence” (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 253); (ii) evidence that is “‘merely colorable’ or 

‘is not significantly probative” (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50); (iii) “some metaphysical doubt as 

to the material facts” (Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586); of (iv) a party’s “conclusory statement 

[regarding] a genuine issue of material fact, without evidentiary support[.]” (Bryant v. Adventist 

Health Sys./W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002)).

“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in 

the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Moreover, “[a] party may object that the material cited to 

support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The parties have the obligation to particularly identify material facts, 

and the court is not required to scour the record in search of a genuine disputed material fact. 

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Fundamentally, summary judgment may not be granted “where divergent ultimate 

inferences may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts.” Fresno Motors, LLC v. 

Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2015).

///

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Parties’ Arguments

The District’s argument in favor of summary judgment on Grasty’s ADEA claim is 

multifaceted. The District avers (A) Grasty has not met his initial burden of production; (B) even 

if the initial burden is met, the District had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons why Grasty was 

not interviewed or hired, as others were more qualified for the position; and (C) the 

Retirement/Leave question exists for reasons unrelated to age. For any one of these reasons, the 

District contends no genuine dispute of fact exists on the ADEA claim, necessitating summary 

judgment. (See ECF No. 30.)

Grasty argues the following in support of his case that material facts are in dispute:

– Calvin’s assertion that the Retirement/Leave Question was not considered is “false” 

because the question appeared on the application “for a purpose, and no other school 

districts include this kind of question. (p. 6:1–20)

– If Calvin didn’t consider the Question, maybe she also disregarded other information, 

like Grasty’s experience and work history. (p. 6:22–7:5)

– There’s a difference between 57 and 54 years old, because the latter cannot answer 

‘yes’ to the Question. (p. 15:5–7)

– Calvin is not a human–resources professional, and therefore should not be screening 

applications to “hand pick” the new employee. (p. 7:23–27)

– If the District wanted to hire an internal candidate, they could have limited the search 

to “internal only” (and conversely) internal candidates should not have an advantage.

– Marshall had 3 different employers in the relevant years and had a gap in her work 

history, despite Calvin’s declaration. (p. 9:13–22)

– Rich perjured himself when discussing the position and CalSTRS. (p. 8:1–8)

– The District has history of race discrimination. (p. 13:1–3)

– Grasty has a right to come out of retirement (p. 8:10–15), is a lifelong learner (p. 9:1), 

and was either the most qualified or very qualified. (p. 11:1–13)

– The Exhibits for the applications are missing the race and retirement questions. (p. 10)

In his opposition brief, Grasty also raises a number of issues he has with aspects of his August 

2019 deposition and certain responses from the District to his interrogatories. (ECF No. 35.)

Analysis

Grasty’s failure-to-interview claim is a claim of disparate treatment under the ADEA. 

See, e.g., Fang-Yuh Hsieh v. Shinseki, 342 F. App'x 295, 297 (9th Cir. 2009) (analyzing a 

failure–to–interview claim under the same standards as other ADEA cases such as failure–to–

promote cases). The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate “because of [an] 

individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The prohibition is “limited to individuals who are at 

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least 40 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). To prevail on a claim for age discrimination under the 

ADEA, a plaintiff must prove at trial that age was the “but-for” cause of the employer's adverse 

action. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). The Ninth Circuit analyzes 

ADEA cases using the framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must carry the initial burden to 

establish a prima facie case that creates an inference of discrimination. Id. at 802. If the plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, an inference of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the 

employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Id. If the 

employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's explanation 

is a pretext for discrimination. Id.

To establish a prima facie case of an ADEA violation in the hiring process, the plaintiff 

must show he (1) belonged to a protected class; (2) was qualified for hire; (3) was rejected for 

employment or otherwise subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) the position was 

given to “a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications.” France v. 

Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2015). In the Ninth Circuit, “substantially younger” 

means a difference of over 10 years in age, and a difference less than that is “presumptively 

insubstantial.” Id. Here, it is undisputed that Grasty was 57 at the time he applied for the 

position. (See ECF No. 29–4 at Ex. 2, 21:22–15, Defendant’s deposition of Grasty.) Further, 

Grasty does not dispute that of the six applicants selected for an interview, five were over the age 

of 40, and the person hired was 54 years old. (Id. at ¶ 6, decl. Spinelli.) Thus, Grasty’s claim that 

the District’s failed to interview him because of his age (because of the Retirement/Leave 

Question on the application) is presumptively insubstantial. See France, 795 F.3d at 1174.

However, under this framework, the Ninth Circuit instructs that this presumption can be 

rebutted. To do so, a plaintiff can present additional evidence to show the employer considered 

age to be important. For example, the plaintiff in France submitted a declaration stating that the 

hiring agent “explicitly expressed a preference for promoting younger agents.” Id. This, the 

Ninth Circuit explained, was sufficient to make out a prima facie case on the “substantially 

younger” element. France, 795 F.3d at 1174. 

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In contrast, the Court sees no evidence in the record that rebuts this finding. The District 

submitted a declaration from Ms. Calvin that the Retirement/Leave question played no part in 

why Grasty was not interviewed. (ECF No. 29–7 at ¶ 11.) Calvin stated she believed “each of 

the six candidates selected were more qualified than Mr. Grasty” because several either had or 

were pursuing a Ph.D., four had some history of working with the District itself, and the person 

ultimately selected, Diana Marshall, had the combined experience of working with diversity 

programs in the District. (Id. at ¶¶ 8–10, 15.) Further, the District submitted a declaration from 

Mr. Rich, who provided context for why the Retirement/Leave Question was included in the 

application. (See ECF No. 29–6 at ¶ 8.) Mr. Rich stated that if an individual accepts full–time 

employment with the District, CalSTRS and CalPERS requires the employer to “ensure that 

‘pension spiking’ does not occur.” (Id., referencing Id. at Ex. 6, the CalSTRS Fact Sheet.) 

Finally, though Grasty argues that only an applicant over 55 could answer ‘yes’ to the 

Retirement/Leave Question, the District correctly points out this Question is not even facially

discriminatory––as it asks in the disjunctive whether the applicant is “presently retired or on 

leave from any public agency?” (ECF No. 29–6 at p. 11, emphasis added.) An applicant could 

be less than 55 years old and, for example, be on disability or maternity leave. 

Grasty acknowledged many of these damaging facts at various points in this litigation. 

For example, when asked about the effect of accepting the position on his own CalSTRS 

eligibility, Grasty stated he “would have to rescind my retirement, yes.” (ECF No. 29–4, Grasty 

depo. at 91:13–20.) Further, when asked whether an individual’s being on leave status would 

indicate their age, Grasty testified “on leave would not.” (Id. at 88:10–13.) In fact, the only 

information the Court could arguably rely upon for contrary evidence3is a portion of the Grasty’s 

deposition testimony––submitted by the District––and a portion of Grasty’s opposition brief that 

he signed as a declaration. In the deposition, Grasty stated he believed he was the most qualified 

person for the position––a stated belief he thereafter qualified by admitting the speculative nature 

of his assertions. (ECF No. 29–4 at Ex. 2, 113:17–114:5.) In his opposition declaration, Grasty 

 

3 The Court cannot rely on allegations in the complaint, nor on conclusory assertions in a brief, 

for evidentiary support. See Bryant, 289 F.3d at 1167.

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simply stated he was discriminated against because a “required question referring to AGE was on 

the application.” (ECF No. 35 at p. 14.) These statements are simply too self–serving to create 

genuine issues of material fact regarding Grasty’s attempt to rebut the presumptively insubstantial 

differences in age. Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The 

district court can disregard a self-serving declaration that states only conclusions and not facts 

that would be admissible evidence.”). The remainder of Grasty’s arguments presented in his 

opposition are irrelevant to the ADEA claim, and so are disregarded.4

Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the fourth element of Grasty’s 

claim of age discrimination––the “substantially younger employee with equal or inferior 

qualifications” element––summary judgment will issue in the District’s favor. France, 795 F.3d 

at 1174; see also e.g., Carlos v. Old Dominion, 726 F. App'x 576, 577–78 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding 

no ADEA claim where “the driver who took over [the plaintiff’s] route was two years younger,” 

and where plaintiff’s only rebuttal evidence was his personal, irrelevant observations).

 

4 This includes Grasty’s conclusory challenge regarding the reason for the Retirement/Leave 

Question, his allegations of perjury, and his irrelevant attack on the District’s right to authorize its 

employees to review applications or hire internal candidates. (See ECF No. 35 at pp. 6–9). 

Further, Grasty’s attack on the Exhibit applications (that the applications do not list the Question)

is inapposite, as Mr. Rich proffered an explanation as to their absence and, more importantly, the 

District does not dispute that all 37 applicants were asked the Question. (See ECF No. 39–3.)

This also includes Grasty’s numerous challenges to certain aspects of discovery, including that 

the District failed to answer his interrogatories. The Court discussed with Grasty the difficulties 

of bringing a case in federal court as a pro se litigant, and apprised him multiple times of his duty 

to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that 

govern other litigants”); see also E.D. Cal. Local Rule 183(a) (“Any individual representing 

himself or herself without an attorney is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal 

Procedure, these Rules, and all other applicable law.”). Local Rule 251 governs all discovery 

disputes, and Grasty has never taken advantage of these proceedings––despite having received the 

District’s responses in August of 2019. More importantly, Grasty’s assertions as to the District’s 

alleged failures in discovery ultimately have no effect on the Court’s holding on the ADEA claim. 

This includes his assertion as to any “personnel certificate,” the number of administrators 

working in the District, and the number of applicants who answered the Retirement/Leave 

question. Further, Grasty’s complaints about the District’s objection to his race/gender claims are 

indeed irrelevant, as his only live claim is for age discrimination. Finally, Grasty’s assertion that 

he had no time to conduct discovery is absurd on its face. The Court issued the pretrial discovery 

schedule in December of 2018, leaving Grasty almost a year to depose Ms. Calvin, Mr. Rich, 

serve interrogatories and requests for production––and bring any disputes to the Court’s attention.

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II. Grasty’s Motion to Amend the Complaint

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading 

only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

Rule 15(a)(2) further provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires,” 

id., and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “requests for leave should be granted 

with ‘extreme liberality,’”––especially in the case of pro se litigants. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 

572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 

However, the Court of Appeals has also cautioned that “liberality in granting leave to 

amend is subject to several limitations,” which include “undue prejudice to the opposing party, 

bad faith by the movant, futility, and undue delay.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 

F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted); AmerisourceBergen 

Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). Correspondingly, when the 

court requires a showing of good cause for any further amendments to pleadings, the plaintiff is

required to satisfy this “good cause” standard to obtain leave to amend. See Coleman v. Quaker 

Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 

604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Finally, although the Court generally liberally grants leave to amend in the earlier 

pleadings stage of the action, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a pending motion for summary 

judgment “weighs heavily” against allowing leave to amend. Schlacter-Jones v. Gen. Tel. of 

California, 936 F.2d 435, 443 (9th Cir. 1991) (overruled in part on other grounds in Cramer v. 

Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 692 (9th Cir. 2001). This distinction is because “[a]

motion for leave to amend is not a vehicle to circumvent summary judgment.” Id.; see also

Maldonado v. City of Oakland, 2002 WL 826801, at *4 (N.D. Cal. April 29, 2002) (noting the 

higher standard that a “substantial showing” be made to support the amendment once the 

opposing party has moved for summary judgment).

///

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Parties’ Arguments

Grasty states that amendment should be granted because he discovered new information in 

discovery that shows “out of 161 administrators in the [District], only one is an African–

American male.” Thus, he argues he should be granted leave to amend in order to bring Title VII 

discrimination claims based on race and gender. (ECF No. 31.)

The District opposes amendment on multiple grounds. The District points out Grasty did 

not check the “Race” box when he filed his DFEH charge, and so argues this claim is waived. It 

also points to Grasty’s delay of over a year in raising these new claims––which were noticed 

around when the above summary judgment motion was filed. The District also notes the “new 

information” Grasty claimed to recently discover was publicly–available information that Grasty 

became aware of in May of 2019. The District claims undue prejudice, as amendment would 

require reopening of discovery to refocus the inquiry. Finally, the District claims amendment 

would be futile, given the substance of Grasty’s race- and gender-allegations. (ECF No. 36.)

Analysis

Given the late–stage request and the futility of the request to amend, and considering 

Grasty’s representations both in his moving brief and at the January hearing, the Court denies 

Grasty’s motion to amend. 

First, the Court notes Grasty’s undue delay in bringing this motion. In January 2018, 

Grasty submitted a “Uniform Complaint Procedure Form” to the District. (ECF No. 29–5 at Ex. 

3, p. 6.) This exhibit shows that, in addition to his allegation of age discrimination, Grasty argued 

that certain other questions “were not asked when a highly experienced African-American male 

was not considered for interview[.]” (ECF No. 29–5 at Ex. 3, p. 6.) In April 2018, Grasty stated 

in his DFEH charge5that he believed he was discriminated against “because of [his] race, Black, 

 

5 The Court declines to take up the District’s argument that Grasty waived any race–

discrimination claim due to his failure to check the “Race” box on the DFEH form. It is 

reasonable to conclude that the DFEH’s investigation would have included a related race–based 

charge based on Grasty’s description of the charge. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 

F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies 

with regard to retaliation by his supervisor because, “[w]hile the EEOC charge does not contain 

the relevant legal theory of retaliation, it does contain the relevant factual allegations.”). 

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sex, male, and age, 57 . . . .” (ECF No. 36–1 at p. 7.) However, when Grasty filed his Complaint 

in federal court in October of 2018––and amended in December 2018––he only asserted an age–

discrimination claim under the ADEA. (See ECF Nos. 1, 6.) Thus, it is clear Grasty had some 

belief he was discriminated against because of his race and gender well before he filed his initial 

complaint. See, e.g., Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 767 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming 

denial of leave to amend where the plaintiff had asserted these claims well prior to her motion to 

amend); see also Kowalow v. Correctional Services Corp., 35 Fed. Appx. 344 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“This Court does not look favorably on delayed motions to amend when the facts and theory 

have been known to the party seeking the amendment since the beginning of the action”).

To Grasty’s credit, he stated at the January 2020 hearing that he did not want to include 

any race- or gender-claims until he had a factual basis to support them, as is required by Rule 11. 

Thus, the Court imputes no bad faith on Grasty’s part. However, when the Court inquired further 

into Grasty’s knowledge of the alleged discrimination at the hearing, it became clear that Grasty 

first “discovered” his factual basis for these claims in May of 2019. In line with these findings, 

Grasty’s moving brief relies almost wholly on his Exhibit 2, a spreadsheet detailing the racial 

composition of male administrators in the District and showing one district–level male employee 

of African–American descent. (See ECF No. 30–3 at Ex. 2.) Grasty admitted at the hearing that 

this information was downloaded from the California Department of Education’s website in May 

of 2019, and could have been available to him at any point prior to then (including in January 

2018 when he first complained to the District or in April 2018 when he filed his DFEH charge). 

(See Id. at p. 2, noting a May 23, 2019 creation date.) Thus, Grasty’s undue delay and lack of 

good cause weighs against allowing amendment. Ryan, 786 F.3d at 767; Mammoth Recreations, 

975 F.2d at 607–08 (“[T]he ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party 

seeking amendment.”); see also e.g., Kowalow, 35 Fed. Appx. at 346–47 (failure to point to 

“newly discovered facts” is a valid reason to deny motion to amend); Verducci v. Sonoma Valley 

Hosp. Dist., 87 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (affirming denial of leave to amend 

where the evidence relied upon by the plaintiff of the alleged gender–discrimination was known 

to her at least seven months prior to her motion to amend).

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Further, the Court finds that allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the District. 

See Sonoma Cty. Ass'n of Retired Employees v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 

2013) (“[T]he consideration of prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight.”). 

Despite Grasty’s sporadic assertions to the District’s counsel that he was thinking of adding these 

new claims (see e.g. ECF No. 21), he delayed until after the District had completed all of its 

discovery––including its deposition of Grasty––and delayed further until after the District filed its 

summary judgment motion. (See ECF Nos. 27–31, all filed in November 2019.) Allowing 

amendment now would be allowing for Grasty to “circumvent summary judgment” on his 

discrimination claim. Khobragade v. Covidien, 2019 WL 65424 at *14 (S.D. Cal. February 15, 

2019) (citing Roberts v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 661 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1981); see Ryan, 786 

F.3d at 767; see also e.g., Adams v. California Dept. of Health Services, 220 Fed. Appx. 590, 592 

(9th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of motion to amend where the plaintiff waited until “after 

substantial discovery had taken place,” which “would have prejudiced the defendants and caused 

undue delay.”); Verducci, 87 F.3d at *8 (denial appropriate where “discovery was near an end, 

and the [defendant] was about to file its motion for summary judgment.”).

Finally, the Court finds that allowing amendment for Grasty to bring race- and genderdiscrimination claims would be futile. The core facts Grasty relies upon to assert these new 

claims are substantially similar to those in his ADEA claim, which the Court has just rejected. 

(See Section I above.) Further, at the hearing, the Court inquired into Grasty’s theory of the case. 

After some discussion, Grasty acknowledged that both Calvin and Marshall are African–

American females, and ultimately admitted that he believed Calvin only wanted to hire her 

friends for any positions with the District. See United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 

984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Leave to amend is warranted if the deficiencies can be cured with 

additional allegations that are consistent with the challenged pleading and that do not contradict 

the allegations in the original complaint.”) (cleaned up).

For these reasons, the Court denies Grasty’s motion to amend in order to add new claims 

of race- and gender-discrimination.

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ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 31) is DENIED;

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 29) is GRANTED;

3. Judgment is entered for Defendant;

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

Dated: February 7, 2020

gras.3242

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