Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00990/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00990-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.L.

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL GERALD HARRIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09-CV-990-CSC

) (WO)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

The plaintiff applied for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., alleging that he was unable to work

because of a disability. His application was denied at the initial administrative level. The

plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

("ALJ"). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the claim. The Appeals Council

rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ's decision consequently became the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner).1

 See Chester v.

Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the

United States Magistrate Judge.

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A "physical or mental impairment" is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3).2

 Based on the court's review of the

record in this case and the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the decision of the

Commissioner should be reversed and this case remanded to the Commissioner for further

proceedings.

II. Standard of Review

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months...

 To make this determination3

 the Commissioner employs a five step, sequential

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person's impairment severe?

(3) Does the person's impairment meet or equal one of the specific

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of

"not disabled."

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McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).

The standard of review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one. This court

must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ingram v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260

(11th Cir. 2007). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a

preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A

reviewing court may not look only to those parts of the record which supports the

decision of the ALJ but instead must view the record in its entirety and take account of

evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804

F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner's] . . . factual findings . . . No similar

presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner's] . . . legal

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied

in evaluating claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. The Issues

A. Introduction. The plaintiff was 49 years old at the time of the hearing before

the ALJ and has a General Equivalency Diploma. The plaintiff’s prior work experience

includes work as a truck driver. Following the administrative hearing, the ALJ concluded

that the plaintiff has impairments of right leg pain, low back pain, high blood pressure,

hearing problems, and impaired night vision. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that the

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plaintiff was not disabled because the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to

perform full range of sedentary work.

B. The Plaintiff's Claims. The plaintiff advances three claims which, as stated by

the plaintiff, are set out below.

1. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, because the ALJ failed to

issue a credibility finding in compliance with the law of the Eleventh Circuit

2. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, because there is no support

for the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment.

3. The Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, because the ALJ erred in

mechanically applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines and in not obtaining

vocational expert testimony

IV. Discussion

A. The Credibility Determination. The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s

“medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms . . . ” (R. 13) However, the ALJ did not fully credit the plaintiff’s testimony

about disabling pain. “[The] effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they

are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” Id. In

evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding his symptoms, the ALJ may

consider (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) “the location, duration frequency and

intensity” of the pain and other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate and aggravate the

symptoms; (4) the “type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication”; and

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(5) other treatments the claimant uses to relieve his pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). 

Where an ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’s testimony about pain (or other nonexertional impairments), the ALJ must articulate specific and adequate reasons for doing

so, or the record must be obvious as to the credibility finding. Foote v.Chater, 67 F.3d

1553, 1561-62 (11th Cir.1995); Jones v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d

1529,1532 (11th Cir. 1991) (articulated reasons must be based on substantial evidence). A

reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial

supporting evidence in the record. See Hale v. Bowman, 831 F.2d 1007,1012 (11th Cir.

1987); MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050,1054 (11th Cir.1986). “[T]here is no rigid

requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so

long as the ALJ's decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable the

district court or this Court to conclude that the ALJ considered her medical condition as a

whole.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir.2005) (quotations and alterations

omitted). In this case, the ALJ provided an explanation.

The claimant has a history of degenerative joint pain and lower back pain,

for which he has undergone successful treatment and management. Progress

notes from Dr. Vyas indicate that the claimant has not experienced any

weakness or numbness or the lower extremity. When seen in July 2008,

claimant indicated he was feeling fine, and reported no special problems.

As for the opinion evidence, determinative weight is assigned to Dr. Vyas'

assessment which reflects that the claimant had no specific problems when

seen on July 2008, and in fact indicated he was feeling fine. Although a

medical impression of osteoarthritis was rendered, no limitations were

enforced which would preclude the claimant from performing work at the

sedentary level of exertion.

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(R. 13-14)

While not the most thorough or detailed explanation, the ALJ’s reasons are

sufficient to support his credibility conclusion which the court will not disturb.

B. Residual Functional Capacity and Application of the Grids. The ALJ

concluded that the plaintiff could perform a full range of sedentary work. (R. 13) Based

on that conclusion, the ALJ applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt.

404, Subpt. P. App. 2, (Grids) to conclude that the plaintiff was not disabled. The

plaintiff argues this was error, and the plaintiff is right. “ ‘[E]xclusive reliance on the

grids is not appropriate either when the claimant is unable to perform a full range of work

at a given residual functional level or when a claimant has a non-exertional impairment

that significantly limits basic work skills.’ “ Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th

Cir. 1995) (quoting Francis v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1985).

The ALJ in this case concluded that the plaintiff could not return to his prior work

as a truck driver. (R. 14) The ALJ also concluded that the plaintiff’s hypertension and

vision and hearing impairments were not severe. Thus, the only impairment identified by

the ALJ which could cause functional limitations is the plaintiff’s back pain. Pain, of

course, is a non-exertional impairment. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1003 (11th

Cir.1987). The ALJ does not explain why the plaintiff’s pain compromises his ability to

perform the medium work of a truck driver but not sedentary work. In other words, the

ALJ does not explain how he concluded that the plaintiff can perform a full range of

sedentary work with the pain he does experience. In the absence of that explanation,

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The ALJ incorrectly identifies this document as Exhibit B5E. The Administrative Record lists

the document as B3F. (R. 163-170)

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there is no substantial evidence in this case to support the ALJ’s conclusion that the

plaintiff can perform a full range of sedentary work. See Welch v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 436,

439 (11th Cir. 1988) (ALJ must make specific finds about whether non-exertional

impairments are severe enough to preclude a wide range of work at a given level). See

also Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Thus, exclusive reliance on

the grids in this case was erroneous. On remand, the ALJ must seek vocational expert

testimony. Foote, supra.

A few comments about the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination are in

order since this case must be remanded. The ALJ recites that a physical activities

questionnaire4

 “indicates that the claimant can perform some jobs, but with some level of

difficulty due to leg and back pain.” (R. 13) The ALJ also recites the testimony of the

plaintiff about his ability to sit/stand and walk. On remand, the ALJ should provide a

more complete explanation of the basis on which he concluded that the plaintiff can

perform sedentary work.

For the foregoing reasons, this case will be reversed and remanded to the

Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion. It is

further

ORDERED that, in accordance with Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d

1273, 1278 fn. 2 (11th Cir. 2006), the plaintiff shall have sixty (60) days after he receives

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notice of any amount of past due benefits awarded to seek attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.

§ 406(b). See also Blitch v. Astrue, 261 Fed. Appx. 241, 242 fn.1 (11th Cir. 2008). A

separate final judgment will be entered.

Done this 11th day of March, 2011.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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