Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-04450/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-04450-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

---

1

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HUIMIN SONG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-04450-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

AND COSTS

Re: Dkt. No. 154

Plaintiffs Huimin Song (“Plaintiff Song”) and Andy Xie (“Plaintiff Xie”) (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants County of Santa Clara, Santa 

Clara Valley Medical Center, and various county employees (collectively, “the County”), alleging 

the violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and other state-related 

claims. This case proceeded to a jury trial in January 2015. The jury returned a verdict for 

Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs now move for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as the 

prevailing parties. See Dkt. No. 154. Having carefully considered the parties’ briefing along with 

oral argument, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion for the 

reasons explained below. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

While the factual background of this case was more extensively discussed in the Order 

Denying Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, 

Motion for a New Trial also filed this date, only the facts relevant to this motion will be discussed 

here. 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 1 of 17
2

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiffs worked as ultrasonographers at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, which is 

operated by the County. As ultrasonographers, Plaintiffs were members of the Service Employees 

International Union 715 (the “Union”). Between February 2009 and November 2010, the County 

implemented a policy concerning the manner in which ultrasonographers who were “on call” 

would report to work. After November 2010, the County realized that as a result of the policy, 

they may have overpaid Plaintiffs. The County sought to collect the overpaid wages by deducting 

the overpaid amount from Plaintiffs’ paychecks. After Plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried to resolve 

this issue through their Union, they filed the instant action. 

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 7, 2011, alleging various claims for the 

violation of § 1983, nonpayment of wages, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other 

state-related claims. See Dkt. No. 1. On December 19, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an amended 

complaint, which is the operative complaint, asserting ten claims against the County: (1) violation 

of § 1983; (2) violation of § 1983—retaliation; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) negligent 

hiring, training, retention; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) nonpayment of 

wages; (7) supervisory liability under § 1983; (8) public entity liability for failure to perform 

mandatory duties; (9) common count services had and received; and (10) injunctive relief. See

Dkt. No. 8. After two rounds of summary judgment motions, the only claim that survived for trial 

was a § 1983 claim alleging the violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See Dkt. Nos. 46, 77.

1

 

Jury trial commenced on January 13, 2015, and concluded on January 27, 2015. The jury 

found that Plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the County deprived them of 

their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide adequate due process in regards 

to their collection of wages overpaid to them by the County. See Dkt. Nos. 147, 148. Moreover, 

 

1

The County’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. See Dkt. No. 162. Therefore, the court 

takes judicial notice of the following documents: (1) Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Dkt. No. 8); 

(2) order granting in part and denying in part motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 46); and 

(3) order granting in part and denying in part motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 77). 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 2 of 17
3

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the jury awarded the following damages: 

 To Plaintiff Song, $33,056.91 in economic damages, and $60,000 in non-economic 

damages; and 

 To Plaintiff Xie, $17,216.22 in economic damages, and $40,000 in non-economic 

damages. 

See id. Judgment was entered on January 28, 2015. 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed the instant motion on February 4, 2015. See Mot., Dkt. No. 

154. The County filed an opposition brief, and Plaintiffs filed a reply brief. See Opp’n, Dkt. No. 

161; Reply, Dkt. No. 163. After Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to appear in person at the motion 

hearing scheduled for February 19, 2015, the hearing was continued to April 30, 2015. All 

counsel were present at the April 30th hearing. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, “[a] party who prevails on a claim under § 1983 is entitled 

to reasonable attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” 

Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 2014). Congress passed the 

statute “to attract competent counsel to prosecute civil rights cases,” thus “fee awards should be 

the rule rather than the exception.” Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013). 

The reasonableness of attorneys’ fees and costs is matter left to the discretion of the court. 

Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1110. In the context of civil rights litigation, “the district court must strike 

a balance between granting sufficient fees to attract qualified counsel to civil rights cases and 

avoiding a windfall to counsel.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2008). The district court, however, must provide a clear and concise explanation of its reasons for 

the fee award. Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1110. 

III. DISCUSSION

In their motion, Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees, reimbursement of costs, and pre and postjudgment interest. Each of these requests will be addressed in turn. 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 3 of 17
4

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

A. Request for Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs seek $585,282.65 in attorneys’ fees for the work performed by trial counsel 

Charles A. Bonner (“Mr. C. Bonner”), A. Cabral Bonner (“Mr. A. Bonner”), and their legal 

assistants. See Mot. at 21, Appx. A. Upon examining Plaintiffs’ calculations, however, there 

appears to be certain calculation errors and some figures that are inconsistent with the 

timekeepers’ declarations. According to the court’s calculations, it appears that Plaintiffs are

actually seeking $516,486.02. Plaintiffs’ updated appendix is as follows: 

Title Name Billing 

Rate

Hours on 

Case

Hours on 

Attorneys’ 

Fees Motion2

Total 

Lodestar

Attorney Charles A. Bonner $700 312.90 37.50 $245,280

Attorney A. Cabral Bonner $450 385.2 32 $187,740

Legal Assistant Calvin Bonner $200 7 3 $2,000

Legal Assistant Ilse Wolf $175 99.75 4.75 $18,287.50

Legal Assistant Cynthia Osborne $125 107.5 19.5 $15,875

Legal Assistant Sandra Beltran $125 134 27.5 $20,187.50

Legal Assistant Eric Seifert $150 32.5 0 $4,875

TOTAL 1,078.85 124.25 $494,245

5% Reduction in 

Billing Adjustment

- $24,712.25

$469,532.75

1.1 Multiplier + $46,953.27

TOTAL $516,486.02

See id. 

On the issue of reasonableness, the Ninth Ciruict has instructed the district courts to “start 

by calculating the lodestar amount, which is the number of hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1110 (internal quotations 

omitted). The court may then adjust the lodestar according to the results obtained. 

i. Reasonable Billing Rates

“Fee applicants have the burden of producing evidence that their requested fees are in line 

with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable 

 

2

These hours do not include the additional hours spent on the reply brief.

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 4 of 17
5

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

skill, experience and reputation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The relevant community is the 

district court’s forum, and affidavits regarding prevailing fees are satisfactory evidence of the 

prevailing market rate. Id. “Once a fee applicant presents such evidence, the opposing party has a 

burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence challenging the accuracy and 

reasonableness of the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Id. at 

1110-11 (internal quotations omitted). 

The relevant community for this motion is the Northern District of California. A 

reasonable hourly rate for civil rights attorneys in this community is up to $700 for partners, $350 

for associates, and $200 for paralegals and law clerks. See, e.g., Campbell v. Nat’l Passenger R.R. 

Corp., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099-1103 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Californians for Disability Rights v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 2010 WL 8746910, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010); Simon v. Toshiba 

Am., 2010 WL 1757956, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2010). Here, the County challenges the billing 

rate for Mr. C. Bonner, Mr. A. Bonner, and their legal assistants. 

a. Counsel Charles A. Bonner 

Mr. C. Bonner seeks a billing rate of $700 per hour. See Decl. of Charles A. Bonner, Dkt. 

No. 155 at ¶¶ 7. Mr. C. Bonner has been licensed to practice law in California since 1979, has 

been focusing on civil rights litigation in the San Francisco Bay Area, and is a partner in the Law 

Offices of Bonner & Bonner. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4, 7. In support of his requested billing rate, Mr. C. 

Bonner provided two declarations from civil rights lawyers in the area attesting that a $700 billing 

rate is reasonable. See Decl. of John Houston Scott (“Scott Decl.”), Dkt. No. 155-16 at ¶¶ 6, 8; 

Decl. of Howard Moore, Jr. (“Moore, Jr. Decl.”), Dkt. No. 155-17 at ¶ 18. 

The County contends a billing rate of $700 is excessive. Opp’n at 4. It argues this case 

was not factually complicated, it was not document intensive, and the lawyers did not wrestle with 

intricate legal theories. Id. The County further argues that Mr. C. Bonner did not litigate this case 

in the manner of an attorney earning $700 per hour, given that he did not comply with Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 26 regarding disclosure of witnesses. Id. Thus, the County suggests the 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 5 of 17
6

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

hourly rate be reduced to $450. Id. 

The court agrees that a $700 billing rate in this case is excessive for two reasons. First, 

even though Plaintiffs commenced this action asserting various claims, only one constitutional 

violation claim was tried. Given that the trial addressed only one claim, this case was less 

complex and work intensive than other cases warranting a higher billing rate. Second, Mr. C.

Bonner did not conduct any depositions, did not comply with Rule 26 initial disclosures, and did 

not disclose certain evidence and witnesses until the eve of trial, which were excluded from trial 

because they were inadmissible. Given Counsel Bonner’s handling of the trial, a more reasonable 

billing rate would be $550 per hour. 

b. Counsel A. Cabral Bonner 

Mr. A. Bonner seeks a billing rate of $450 per hour. See Decl. of A. Cabral Bonner, Dkt. 

No. 156 at ¶ 7. Mr. A. Bonner has been licensed to practice law in California since 2006, has been 

focusing on civil rights and employment discrimination cases, and is a partner in the Law Offices 

of Bonner & Bonner. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. In support of his requested billing rate, Mr. A. Bonner 

provided two declarations from civil rights lawyers in the area attesting that a billing rate in the 

range of $300-$450 per hour is reasonable. See Scott Decl., Dkt. No. 155-16 at ¶ 8; Moore, Jr.

Decl., Dkt. No. 155-17 at ¶ 19. The County contends a billing rate of $400 is reasonable. Opp’n 

at 4. 

For the same reasons discussed with respect to Mr. C. Bonner’s fees, the requested billing 

rate of $450 per hour is slightly high for Mr. A. Bonner. The court finds that a more reasonable 

billing rate would be $400 per hour. 

c. Legal Assistants

Calvin Bonner has been a legal assistant in the Law Offices of Bonner & Bonner for 24 

years, and seeks a billing rate of $200 per hour. See Decl. of Calvin Bonner, Dkt. No. 155-11 at 

¶¶ 3-4. His work in this case included drafting documents, processing discovery, service of 

process, and communications. Id. at ¶ 8. The County challenges Calvin Bonner’s billing rate, 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 6 of 17
7

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

arguing that it is excessive since the tasks he performed do not warrant an hourly rate of $200. 

Opp’n at 7. The court agrees with the County. As it pertains to this case, Calvin Bonner’s work 

appears to be administrative and clerical in nature. Thus, Calving Bonner’s billing rate will be 

reduced to $50 per hour. See Trustees of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. 

Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that purely clerical or secretarial 

work should not be billed at the paralegal rate). 

Ilse Wolf has been a legal assistant in the Law Offices of Bonner & Bonner for 8 years, 

and seeks a billing rate of $175 per hour. See Decl. of Ilse Wolf, Dkt. No. 155-12 at ¶¶ 1, 5, 11. 

Her work in this case included taking intake of the clients, working on the complaint and amended 

complaints, working on summary judgment, preparing clients for deposition, and preparing for 

mediation and trial. Id. at ¶ 7. To the extent the County challenges Ms. Wolf’s billing rate, the 

court believes such a challenge is misplaced. See Opp’n at 7. Given Ms. Wolf’s substantive legal 

work in this case, the court finds her billing rate of $175 per hour to be reasonable. 

ii. Reasonable Number of Hours 

 Generally “the district court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as 

to how much time he was required to spend on the case.” Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1111. The 

number of hours can be reduced for duplicative or unnecessary work, and the district court can 

impose up to a ten percent reduction without explanation. Id. “However, where the disparity is 

larger, a more specific articulation of the court’s reasoning is expected.” Id. (internal quotations 

omitted). Here, the County challenges the number of hours reported by Mr. C. Bonner, Mr. A. 

Bonner, and their legal assistants. 

a. Counsel Charles A. Bonner

Mr. C. Bonner claims 312.90 hours of work performed on this case, and an additional 

37.50 hours of work on the instant motion. See Mot. at 21, Appx. A. The County argues that the 

number of hours claimed is excessive, and specifically challenges Mr. C. Bonner’s reported 96 

hours of driving time between Sausalito and San Jose, 37.50 hours of work on the instant motion, 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 7 of 17
8

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

and 16.4 hours spent in unsuccessfully opposing the County’s summary judgment motion. Opp’n 

at 5-6, 11. 

As to travel time during trial days, Plaintiffs argue that it was not time wasted since Mr. C. 

Bonner used the time to discuss strategy and prepare for trial. Reply at 6. Nonetheless, billing at 

a rate of $700 per hour for a four-hour round trip, amounting to a billing of $2,800 per day in 

travel time, is excessive. As such, Mr. C. Bonner’s 96 hours of driving time will be deducted. As 

for the amount of time spent on the instant motion, that too is excessive, particularly when Mr. A.

Bonner and their legal assistants also spent significant time working on the instant motion. As 

such, Mr. C. Bonner’s 37.50 hours of work on this motion will be deducted. As to Mr. C.

Bonner’s work in opposition to the County’s summary judgment motion, there is no reason to 

make a deduction because that is work performed in advocating for his clients. Upon reviewing 

Mr. C. Bonner’s itemized billings, the court will also make a deduction of 20 hours related to 

discovery-related matters since Mr. C. Bonner failed to comply with Rule 26 initial disclosures 

and other discovery rules. See Dkt. No. 155-9 at 2-11. 

Therefore, Mr. C. Bonner’s hours will be reduced from the reported sum of 350.4 hours to 

196.9 hours. 

b. Counsel A. Cabral Bonner

Mr. A. Bonner claims 385.2 hours of work performed on this case, and an additional 32 

hours of work on the instant motion. See Mot. at 21, Appx. A. The County challenges Mr. A.

Bonner’s reported 32 hours of work on the instant motion and 28.5 hours spent in unsuccessfully 

opposing the County’s summary judgment motion. Opp’n at 6, 11.

As for the amount of time spent on the instant motion, the reported time is high. As such, 

22 hours will be deducted. As to Mr. A. Bonner’s work in opposition to the County’s summary 

judgment motion, as with Mr. C. Bonner, an unsuccessful opposition does not take away from the 

time invested in advocating for one’s clients. Thus, no deductions will be made there. However, 

upon reviewing Mr. A. Bonner’s itemized billings, the court will make a deduction of 20 hours 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 8 of 17
9

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

related to discovery-related matters since Mr. A. Bonner failed to comply with Rule 26 initial 

disclosures and other discovery rules. See Dkt. No. 156-1. 

Therefore, Mr. A. Bonner’s hours will be reduced from the reported sum of 417.2 hours to 

375.2 hours. 

c. Legal Assistants

Ms. Wolf is reported to have performed 104.5 hours of work on this case. See Mot. at 21, 

Appx. A. The County challenges four hours billed for preparing Plaintiffs for their deposition, 

eight hours billed for attending mediation, and 50 hours billed for observing trial. Opp’n at 7-8. 

Ms. Wolf’s presence in preparing Plaintiffs for their deposition and attending mediation is not 

unreasonable since her role as a legal assistant may be helpful in those circumstances. However, 

upon reviewing her itemized billings, the 50 hours billed for merely observing trial is 

unreasonable. Thus, these hours will be deducted. See Dkt. No. 155-12 at 5-6. Therefore, Ms. 

Wolf’s hours will be reduced from the reported sum of 104.5 hours to 54.5 hours. 

Sandra Beltran has been a legal assistant in the Law Offices of Bonner & Bonner for over 

one year, but has four years of experience as an administrative assistant. See Decl. of Sandra 

Beltran, Dkt. No. 155-14 at ¶¶ 1, 4. Ms. Beltran’s work in this case includes gathering and 

organizing all trial exhibits, finalizing a deposition, tracking trial testimony, and reviewing trial 

transcripts. Id. at ¶ 7. She reports to have performed 136 hours of work on this case, and 27.5 

hours of work in the instant motion. See Mot. at 21, Appx. A. The County challenges 76.5 hours 

Ms. Beltran spent observing the trial, and the hours spent working on the instant motion. Opp’n at 

8, 11. Upon reviewing Ms. Beltran’s itemized billings, the court agrees that certain hours reported 

are excessive. See Dkt. No. 155-14 at 4-7. As such, 72 hours for merely observing trial will be 

deducted, as well as 5 hours of work on the instant motion. Therefore, Ms. Beltran’s hours will be 

reduced from the reported sum of 163.5 hours to 86.5 hours. 

In sum, considering the billing rate and time adjustments discussed above, the lodestar 

breakdown is as follows: 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 9 of 17
10

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Title Name Billing 

Rate

Hours on 

Case

Total 

Lodestar

Attorney Charles A. Bonner $550 196.9 $108,295

Attorney A. Cabral Bonner $400 375.2 $150,080

Legal Assistant Calvin Bonner $50 10 $500

Legal Assistant Ilse Wolf $175 54.5 $9,537.50

Legal Assistant Cynthia Osborne $125 127 $15,875

Legal Assistant Sandra Beltran $125 86.5 $10,812.50

Legal Assistant Eric Seifert $150 32.5 $4,875

TOTAL 882.6 $299,975

The adjusted total lodestar amounts to $299,975, which represents $216,511.02 reduction 

from Plaintiffs’ request. The court finds that the adjusted lodestar amount of $299,975 is

reasonable. 

iii. Enhancement of Lodestar

Plaintiffs further seek an enhancement to the lodestar of 1.1. Mot. at 16. After calculating 

the lodestar amount, the court may adjust the lodestar based on the degree of success achieved by 

the prevailing party. Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1110. “[T]he district court should focus on the 

significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably 

expended on the litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983).

Here, Plaintiffs argue that an enhancement of the lodestar amount is warranted for five 

reasons. First, since this action was filed in September 2011, Plaintiffs’ counsel have spent 

significant time and labor working on this case. Mot. at 16. Second, this case presented a novel 

issue because Plaintiffs challenged not only the County, but also their labor union. Id. Third, due 

to the mediation-focused litigation path taken by the parties, Plaintiffs did not depose Defendants’ 

witnesses prior to trial, thus placing Plaintiffs at a disadvantage at trial. Id. Plaintiffs further 

argue that their victory at trial is a testament to their counsel’s skill and abilities given that they 

were precluded from calling all of their witnesses and from introducing many key documents, and 

were able to effectively explain the concept of due process. Id. at 16-17. Fourth, this case was 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 10 of 17
11

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

undesirable because Plaintiffs were challenging both the County and their labor union, and many 

attorneys would have been concerned about prejudice against Plaintiffs because of their national 

origin. Id. at 17. Fifth, counsel took this case on a contingency fee basis, thus noting the risk 

assumed by counsel. Id. 

The County challenges Plaintiffs’ request for a lodestar enhancement and, instead, requests 

a downward adjustment of 50% of the lodestar. Opp’n at 8, 10. The County argues that a 

downward adjustment is justified because only one legal issue was tried, which was not a novel 

issue of law, there were no liability experts or complex medical testimony, and this case was not 

“undesirable” given that Plaintiffs were affluent medical professionals. Id. at 9. It further argues 

that Plaintiffs achieved a limited degree of success since this case began with nine claims asserted 

against five defendants, and by the time of trial, only one claim was asserted against one 

defendant. Id. Moreover, the County argues that the verdict is modest when compared to the 

scope of the litigation and Plaintiffs’ requested attorneys’ fees. Id. at 10. 

The record shows that this case began with ten claims asserted against six defendants. See

Dkt. No. 1. After two rounds of summary judgment motions, the issues were narrowed to one 

claim asserted against one defendant. See Dkt. Nos. 46, 77. After an eight-day trial, the jury 

returned a verdict for Plaintiffs and awarded Plaintiff Song the sum of $93,056.91 in damages, and 

Plaintiff Xie the sum of $57,216.22 in damages. See Dkt. Nos. 147, 148. This amounts to a total 

verdict of $150,273.13. In evaluating the results obtained, the court recognizes that Plaintiffs 

prevailed at trial and obtained a favorable verdict, but this alone is insufficient to justify an 

enhancement in the lodestar figure. 

The court finds Plaintiffs’ arguments to be unpersuasive. While Plaintiffs’ counsel have 

litigated this case since September 2011, time and labor invested in the case is inherent in any 

litigation and is awarded through the lodestar amount; this is insufficient for an enhancement. As 

to the due process claim tried, the court recognizes that Plaintiffs’ counsel were skilled in 

explaining the legal concept of due process and, consequently, reached a favorable verdict. 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 11 of 17
12

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

However, the due process claim alone did not constitute a novel or complex issue for trial 

deserving of an enhancement. Plaintiffs also boast that counsel were skilled at trial despite of their 

“disadvantage” since they did not take any depositions prior to trial and many of their witnesses 

and evidence was excluded. This, however, is not a disadvantage. Plaintiffs’ counsel made a 

strategic decision not to take any depositions and failed to comply with discovery rules, thus any 

disadvantage Plaintiffs could have suffered were derived from their counsel’s own actions. Lastly, 

it is difficult to conceive that Plaintiffs’ national origin and challenging a labor union makes this 

case “undesirable,” thus that argument is unpersuasive. While Plaintiffs’ counsel did take this 

case on a contingency fee arrangement, this alone is not sufficient to warrant an enhancement of 

the lodestar. 

Therefore, the court will not approve a lodestar enhancement nor will it reduce the fee 

amount further. The adjusted lodestar amount of $299,975, without enhancement, is a reasonable 

amount of attorneys’ fees for this case. 

B. Request for Reimbursement of Costs 

Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of litigation costs in the amount of $7,151.34. Mot. at 18. 

The breakdown is as follows: 

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 12 of 17
13

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Expense Amount

Dr. Lau’s Testimony at Trial $1,800

Deposition of Dr. Lau $450

Deposition of Dr. Johnson $450

Hilton San Jose – one night during trial

Includes: 

1. Guest Room ($334)

2. Taxes ($49.34)

3. Affinity Restaurant ($115.53)

$498.87

The Fairmont in San Jose – one night during trial

Includes:

1. Guest Room ($331)

2. Taxes ($49.46)

3. In Room Dining ($160.82)

4. Fountain Restaurant ($32.19)

$573.47

Mediation Costs $3,125

Parking for Trial for Charles A. Bonner $191

Parking for Trial for A. Cabral Bonner $63

TOTAL $7,151.34

See Dkt. No. 155, Exhs. 3-8; Am. Bill of Costs, Dkt. No. 159. 

The prevailing party may seek “fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which allows 

for recovery of reasonable out-of-pocket expenses that would normally be charged to a fee paying 

client.” Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1179 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013). “Expenses normally charged 

to fee-paying clients include photocopying, paralegal expenses, and travel and telephone costs.” 

Id. Here, the County challenges various costs claimed by Plaintiffs. 

First, the County argues that Plaintiffs’ request of $1,800 for Dr. Lau’s testimony is 

improper because Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover expert fees in a § 1983 case. Opp’n at 12. 

In this instance, however, Dr. Lau did not testify as an expert witness. Instead, Dr. Lau, as 

Plaintiffs’ treating physician, testified as a fact witness regarding Plaintiffs’ health condition. See

Tr., Dkt. No. 127 at 577-91. Moreover, Plaintiffs submitted documentation showing that when 

they requested Dr. Lau’s appearance, it was contemplated he would testify as a “witness” rather 

than “expert witness.” See Dkt. No. 155-3 at 2-3 (email exchange with Kaiser Permanente’s 

medical-legal department, arranging for Dr. Lau’s personal appearance at trial); id. at 4 (check 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 13 of 17
14

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

made payable to The Permanente Medical Group, Inc.); Dkt. No. 159 at 3 (bill of costs); id. at 12 

(subpoena for Dr. Lau to testify at a deposition). Since Dr. Lau testified as a fact witness, 

reimbursement for his appearance is appropriate. 

Second, the County argues that Plaintiffs’ request for $1,875 in mediation fees are not 

recoverable because they are not considered taxable costs. Opp’n at 12. Pursuant to § 1988, 

however, mediation fees could be considered expenses normally charged to a fee-paying client. 

Thus, the court approves Plaintiffs’ request for mediation fees. 

Third, the County argues that Plaintiffs’ request for $191 in parking reimbursement is not 

recoverable because they are non-taxable. Opp’n at 12. As stated above, however, pursuant to 

§ 1988, parking costs could be considered an expense normally charged to a fee-paying client. 

Thus, the court approves Plaintiff’s request for parking reimbursement. 

Fourth, the County argues that Plaintiffs’ request for $1,242.84 in subpoenas should not be 

recoverable because certain individuals were not served with a subpoena or were subpoenaed even 

though they were serving as the County’s witness. Opp’n at 12-13. This expense, however, does 

not appear to be included in the $7,151.34 requested costs, as shown on the table above. 

Fifth, the County argues that Plaintiffs’ request of $1,278 for daily copies of trial 

transcripts should be stricken because, in this case, it was not necessary to order daily transcripts. 

Opp’n at 13. The County, however, acknowledges that transcripts are an administrative cost that 

is entitled to reimbursement. Id. Moreover, this expense does not appear to be included in the 

$7,151.34 requested costs, as shown on the table above. 

Sixth, the County disputes the following charges: (1) $173 for a Rescue Delivery charge 

that is not related to this lawsuit; (2) $64.85 for the purchase of an easel and marking pens at 

Office Depot; (3) $104.91 for printing and other purchases at FedEx Office; and (4) $29.27 for 

gasoline at an ARCO station. Opp’n at 13-14. These expenses, however, do not appear to be 

included in the $7,151.34 requested costs, as shown on the table above. 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 14 of 17
15

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Seventh, the County challenges the food and lodging expenses of Plaintiffs’ counsel, 

amounting to $1,072.34 for two nights. Opp’n at 5-6, 14. The court agrees that this expense is 

excessive, particularly the amount charged for meals at the hotels. As such, half of this amount--

$536.17—will be deducted.

In sum, of the requested $7,151.34 in costs, this court approves reimbursement of 

$6,615.17 in costs. 

C. Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Interest 

i. 28 U.S.C. § 1961

Plaintiffs seek pre- and post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Mot. at 18. 

Section 1961 provides: 

Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case 

recovered in a district court . . . . Such interest shall be calculated 

from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the 

weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as 

published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 

for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.

28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). “Under [§ 1961], the award of post judgment interest on a district court 

judgment is mandatory.” Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). As to prejudgment interest, while the district court has discretion to award pre-judgment interest, the 

decision must be based upon a balance of the equities. Id. If pre-judgment interest is awarded, it 

can be applied to both economic and non-economic damages, and can be awarded on a prorated 

portion of the damages award that was likely given to the plaintiff in order to compensate for past 

pain and suffering and medical expenses. Id. Further, “the interest rate prescribed for postjudgment interest under [§ 1961] is appropriate for fixing the rate of pre-judgment interest unless 

the trial judge finds, on substantial evidence, that the equities of that particular case require a 

different rate.” Nelson v. EG&G Energy Measurements Grp., Inc., 37 F.3d 1384, 1391 (9th Cir. 

1994). 

Here, the County does not oppose the motion on the issue of interest. Plaintiffs’ request 

will therefore be granted. 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 15 of 17
16

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

ii. California Labor Code § 218.6

Plaintiffs further seek interest pursuant to California Labor Code § 218.6. Mot. at 19. 

Section 218.6 provides: 

In any action brought for the nonpayment of wages, the court shall 

award interest on all due and unpaid wages at the rate of interest 

specified in [the California Civil Code § 3289(b)], which shall 

accrue from the date that the wages were due and payable as 

provided [in § 200].

Cal. Lab. Code § 218.6. The Labor Code “provide[s] specific standards governing when and how 

employers must pay wages and provide meal and rest breaks to their employees” and “provides 

specific remedies designed to encourage employees to bring civil actions to enforce those rights,” 

including the remedy provided by § 218.6. Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P., 237 Cal. App. 4th 141, 

156-57 (2015).

In opposition, the County argues that Plaintiffs may not recover interest under § 218.6 

because no issue concerning the violation of the Labor Code was tried at trial. Opp’n at 11. 

Instead, Plaintiffs’ claims concerning Labor Code violations were dismissed on summary 

adjudication, thus there is no basis for recovering such interest. Id. The court agrees with the 

County. While this case is, at its core, a dispute between an employer and employees, it did not 

involve traditional wage-and-hour issues or any other type of Labor Code violation in the end. 

Instead, the only issue that was tried was a due process constitutional claim. See Zavala v. Scott 

Bros. Dairy, Inc., 143 Cal. App. 4th 585, 596 (2006) (noting that § 218.6 is one of the remedies 

provided to individual employees who vindicate California’s laws protecting rest periods and 

wage-stub itemization). As such, there is no basis for the recovery of interest based on § 218.6. 

Plaintiffs’ request is denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART. The court orders that Plaintiffs are entitled to the following: 

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 16 of 17
17

Case No.: 5:11-cv-04450-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(1) $299,975 in attorneys’ fees, (2) $6,615.17 in reimbursement of costs, and (3) pre- and postjudgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 15, 2015 

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

Case 5:11-cv-04450-EJD Document 191 Filed 12/15/15 Page 17 of 17