Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00990/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00990-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 Federal questions arising under the U.S. Constitution.

2 Recover of damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress

providing for the protection of civil rights.

3 Declaration of rights and other legal relations.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ATM EXPRESS, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:04CV990-M

) [WO]

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, )

ALABAMA, a political subdivision )

of the State of Alabama, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION

In this civil action, the plaintiff, ATM EXPRESS, INC. [“ATM”], challenges the

constitutionality of the business licensing ordinance enforced by the City of Montgomery,

Alabama [“City”] on its face and as applied. ATM invokes this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§1331,1 1343(4),2 2201,3and 2202; it seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,

damages, attorney fees and other supplemental relief because of the City’s denial of a business

license to operate an adult bookstore and videostore in Montgomery. 

This suit is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in support of ATM’s claims that the

City’s denial of a business license to operate the store violates its rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ATM’s challenge is two-fold: It

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 1 of 53
4 ATM seeks partial summary judgment and the issuance of a permanent injunction,

restraining the City from enforcing the license requirement. It has requested the court to

issue an order declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, reserving for a later trial the issue

of damages, based upon its lost profits and attorney fees (Doc. # 21). 

5 The City seeks summary judgment declaring that ATM lacks standing to challenge the

ordinance and that the ordinance is constitutional. The City’s positions in response to

ATM’s motion, however, are inconsistent, as more fully discussed in this Memorandum. 

2

attacks the ordinance on its face, alleging that the municipal statute “is a mode of censorship,

regulation and control of certain specific kinds of speech” (Doc. # 1). It further alleges that,

because the City exacts requirements from license applicants for “adult” businesses that are

not required of “mainstream (non-adult) video stores”, the ordinance is also unconstitutional

as applied. 

The issues are currently before the court on the following motions:

1. ATM’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, filed on 1 December 2004

(Doc. # 20);4 and

2. The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 3 December 2004 (Doc. #

23).5

For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum, the court concludes that ATM’s Motion

For Partial Summary Judgment should be granted in part and denied in part, and the City’s

Motion For Summary Judgment should be denied.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Pursuant to the court’s order, the parties submitted a Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts

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6 Carolyn Mozingo, a revenue administrator, was acting on the Director’s behalf. (Doc. #

19, ¶ 23). 

3

on 1 December 2004 (Doc. # 19). 

ATM’s store, known as “X-Mart Adult Supercenter”, is located on the Birmingham

highway in Montgomery. ATM wishes to sell “videotapes and DVD’s which feature adults

engaged in various explicit sexual activities,” as well as “magazines which include similar

content”. ATM also plans to sell “a variety of lingerie, ‘adult novelties’, ‘marital aids’ and

other products of interest to adults” (Doc. # 1, Doc. # 19, ¶¶ 3, 4). The store would have been

the third of its kind in Montgomery (Doc. # 19, ¶10), but ATM does not operate the other

stores. 

On 23 September 2004, ATM applied for a standard business license but was told by

the city’s Director of Finance [“Director”],6 who administers Montgomery’s business license

regulations, that the application could not be processed until ATM’s principal consented to a

criminal background check (Doc. # 19, ¶ 23). The Director also required ATM to describe

whether the content of the material to be leased and sold would be considered “hard core” or

“soft core” pornography (Doc. # 19, ¶ 23). ATM’s legal counsel drafted a letter to the

Director objecting to the additional requirements on First Amendment grounds (Doc. # 19, ¶

26; Doc. # 1, Pl’s. Ex. A). ATM opened its store for business without having complied with

the additional requests or obtained a business license (Doc. # 19, ¶ 27).

ATM provided the Director with the requested consent and content description on 24

September 2004 (Doc. # 19, ¶ 28). The narrative stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

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7

It is undisputed that ATM had no intention of presenting live entertainment, operating a

bar, or selling alcoholic beverages (Doc. # 19, ¶6). 

8 ATM states that it closed the store for fear that its staff would be arrested otherwise. 

(Doc. # 20, p. 6). In support of ATM’s motion, ATM’s president and director, Evgueni

Souliaguine [“Souliaguine”], provided an affidavit in which he stated that the police

threatened to arrest the store manager. (Doc. # 22, ¶ 7). The alleged threat, which

Souliaguine did not personally hear, constitutes inadmissible hearsay within hearsay, and

the court will not consider Souliaguine’s statement as evidence that such threats were

actually made. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); FED. R. EVID. 801, 802; Macuba v. Deboer,

193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999). However, the court will consider the statement as

evidence of Souliaguine’s reasons for not reopening the store. See, e.g., Rinehimer v.

Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2002) (admitting an out of court statement

offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to explain the reasons for the

4

This business is best characterized as an “adult videostore”. The

primary sales/rentals will consist of videotapes and DVDs with a

sexually explicit content. Your application process apparently

calls for a description of the content of these films - in

particular, whether the films are “hard core” or “soft core”

pornography. Those terms are not recognized in the industry and

we do not believe they have any commonly accepted meaning.

For instance, the commercial distributors of these films merely

rate them as “X” and do not notify retailers whether they are “hard

core” or “soft core”.

These films are limited to adults only. Persons under the age of

18 will not be permitted in the store. None of the films to be

sold or rented are obscene under contemporary community

standards. While many of the films depict actual sexual

activities, those activities are not themselves obscene and, when

viewed in context, have serious literary, artistic, political or

scientific value. We believe that these films are comparable to

those already being sold in Montgomery.7

On 29 September 2004, the City notified ATM that the City Council would consider

the matter at a hearing scheduled for 5 October. (Doc. # 19, ¶ 29). On the day before the

scheduled meeting, City police officers, citing the failure to obtain the necessary business

license, ordered ATM to shut down. (Doc. # 19, ¶ 30).8 At the hearing the next day, after being

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 4 of 53
actions of a party who heard the statement); U.S. v. Horsman, 114 F.3d 822, 825-26 (8th

Cir. 1997) (same); Callon Petroleum Co. v. Big Chief Drilling Co., 548 F.2d 1174,

1177 n.3 (11th Cir. 1977). 

5

advised by the City’s attorney that it was improper to open a business without a license, the

City Council voted to deny ATM’s business license. (Doc. # 19, ¶¶ 33-34). 

ATM then filed a civil complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of City of Montgomery

License Ordinance 48-91 [“48-91”], which ATM cited as the statutory premise of the city’s

denial of the business license (Doc. # 1, ¶ 49), on the ground that the ordinance violates the

First Amendment on its face and as applied (Doc. # 1).

Following ATM’s filing of a Motion For Preliminary Injunction on 15 October 2004

(Doc. # 2), the court, at both counsels’ request, conducted a telephone status conference on

10 November 2004. During the conference, counsel for ATM and the City encouraged the

court to schedule the case non-traditionally, i.e., outside the routine scope of Rule 16 because,

in their opinion, the case was resolvable by reference to the application of law. FED. R. CIV.

P. 16. Counsel also indicated that both parties were willing to submit the disposition of the

case to summary judgment without resort to the usual discovery process. Thereafter, the court

entered an order scheduling the parties’ motions (Doc. # 15).

Thus, on 1 December 2004, ATM filed its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (Doc.

# 20), along with its memorandum in support (Doc. # 21). The City filed its response to the

motion on 8 December 2004 (Doc. # 25), five days after it filed its own Motion For Summary

Judgment (Doc. # 23). 

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9

 The Supreme Court explained that:

6

ATM operated its store for less than 15 days (See Doc. # 16) and has not reopened the

store since 4 October 2004.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown “that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law”. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of

Indians, 541 U.S. 95,111(2004). A dispute is genuine if the “evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Green v. Pittsburgh Plate

and Glass Co., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1352 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A judge’s guide is the same standard necessary to

direct a verdict: ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of

law’.” Id. at 259. “Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of

inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore, the evidence of the

nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at

255.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual

inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.9 Adickes v.

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[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary

judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no

genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (citations omitted). 

7

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970); Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d

739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). Notwithstanding this advantage, the nonmoving party bears the

burden of coming forth with sufficient evidence on each element that must be proved. Earley

v. Champion Intern. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1990); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322-23. When faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must

“go beyond the pleadings and ... designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.’” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. Although the evidence need not be in a form

necessary for admission at trial, id., unsupported, self-serving allegations are insufficient to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995);

Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). 

By stipulation, the parties have agreed that there is no genuine issue of material fact in

this case and that the issues before the court are “resolvable by reference to applicable law”

(See Doc. #15). They further agree that, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, summary judgment may be entered for either party based upon the court’s analysis,

without further evidentiary submissions. The parties’ agreement on the material facts has

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 7 of 53
10 Although the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the legal arguments in

 both motions are virtually identical, and the outcome of the court’s decision on one motion dictates the

outcome on the other motion. The court has therefore reviewed and analyzed the parties’ submissions as

constituting one motion. 

8

substantially facilitated the court’s analysis of, and decision regarding, the propriety of

summary judgment in this case. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Parties’ Contentions Regarding The Ordinance10

1. The General Text of the Ordinance 

Ordinance 48-91 is a general enactment adopted by the Montgomery City Council on

29 October 1991. It establishes a “license fee” for, inter alia, “[p]racticing, engaging in,

carrying on or conducting any exhibition, trade, vocation, occupation, or profession in the City

of Montgomery, Alabama.” 48-91 § 19C-1(a). All businesses seeking a license under 48-91

must:

! demonstrate compliance with all “zoning ordinances, building codes and

other codes and ordinances of the City”, § 19C-4, as well as the state’s

public health requirements, when applicable, § 19C-9; 

! provide information relevant to the determination of the amount to be

charged as a license fee when “the amount to be paid as privilege license

tax depends upon the sales made, or receipts of business done, or any

other fact or condition” the ordinance specifies, § 19C-7; 

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9

! for certain specified purposes, upon demand by the Director of Finance,

allow an “inspection during business hours of all portions of his place or

places of business”, provide “by sworn statement, or otherwise, all

information requested bearing on the character of business engaged in,

the dollar amount of the business transacted, or other data,” and “make

available for inspection and examination” essentially all business

records, § 19C-8;

! display the license in a “conspicuous place in their business

establishment”, § 19C-17; and

! notify the Director of address changes. § 19C-18.

The ordinance also provides for a “special” or “privilege” license [“privilege license”],

which imposes additional requirements and limitations on businesses engaged in the sale or

distribution of alcoholic beverages, § 19C-21(a), (b), as well as a variety of other businesses,

including contractors, § 19C-21(c); “electric light companies, etc.”, § 19C-21(d); “gas

companies, etc. (Natural)”, § 19C-21(e); “gasoline and oil companies, wholesale”, § 19C21(f); insurance companies, § 19C-21(g); businesses not permanently located in the City, §

19C-21(h); and telephone companies, § 19C-21(i). Each business type and its corresponding,

additional burdens are addressed individually. See generally § 19C-21. 

Ordinance 48-91was clearly intended as a comprehensive enactment. Although it was

designed to regulate the transaction of all business within the City, its text is devoid of any

references to its legislative history, or the imperatives, concerns, interests, or considerations

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 9 of 53
10

which brought it into being. 

Nor is it officially annotated in any way - thus, the regulated industries, the ordinary

citizen, and even subsequently elected members of the City Council cannot discern from its

text any impetus for the legislation based upon findings, studies, surveys, or actual experience.

The first entry in the index of the ordinance is “Purpose and Coverage”, but the pertinent text

yields no indication of either the reasons for its passage or the objectives it seeks to achieve.

These factors are germane to the court’s consideration of “community standards

criteria”, discussed infra.

2. The Challenged Text of the Ordinance

ATM’s complaint addresses none of the aforementioned aspects specifically. Instead,

its focus is limited to two discrete provisions.

The first is a catchall provision for a “license based on community standards criteria”:

Any license determined to be based on community standards

criteria will require City Council approval before issuance. 

§ 19C-21(j) (Docs. # 1, 20). The ordinance provides no definition for “community standards”.

Moreover, it does not set forth any specific “community standards criteria” or any factors

germane to the determination thereof. See generally 48-91; see also § 19C-3 (defining

terms). 

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 10 of 53
11 The ordinance makes it “unlawful for any person to engage in or carry on any business or

to do any act within the corporate limits of the City for which a license is required by this

ordinance without first having taken out such license as herein provided.” See § 19C-5. 

As a specific remedy for violations of that requirement, new businesses that fail to “pay

the prescribed license fee within fifteen (15) days of commencement of operations are

subject to a 10% penalty of the amount placed on deposit for the beginning year’s

operations, plus one percent (1%) interest for each subsequent month of delinquency”. 

See § 19C-20a. 

12 See, e.g., §§ 19C-6 (requiring the Director to keep records of licensees); 19C-7

(requiring licensees to provide information to the Director); 19C-8 (empowering the

Director to inspect and audit licensees); 19C-27 (authorizing the Director to “investigate

into all applications for licenses”)

11

Although the ordinance clearly requires a license to do business,11it does not identify

the person(s) responsible for determining whether a particular business must obtain such a

license based on “community standards criteria”. It is also true that “[t]he City has not adopted

written guidelines for establishing whether a particular business is subject to the ‘community

standards criteria’ and hence required to obtain City Council approval before issuance of a

license” (Doc. # 19, ¶ 20). In practice, the task of evaluating applicants to determine if they

should be referred to the City Council has been assumed by the City’s Director of Finance,

who is charged generally with administering the ordinance.12 In fact, if the Director

determines, for any unspecified reasons (none of which have to be divulged), that the applicant

does not require a license based on “community standards criteria”, he issues the license

without any participation by the City Council (Doc. # 19, ¶ 17). ATM contends that section

19C-21(j) renders 48-91 unconstitutional. 

The second provision that ATM attacks is section 19C-27, on the basis that it

intolerably intrudes upon liberties protected by the First Amendment. Section 19C-27 states

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12

in relevant part:

The City Director of Finance shall have the authority to

investigate into all applications for licenses, and if in his opinion

such shall be necessary or desirable, he may refer such

application to the City Council for a determination on whether

such license shall be issued. If said Council decides to deny the

issuance of any license referred to it, the City Clerk shall

immediately so notify the license applicant. If said applicant

desires to appear before the Council to show cause why said

license should be issued, he shall file a written notice with the

City Clerk within two weeks from the date of mailing of said

notice by the City Clerk. Immediately upon receipt of said notice

from the applicant, the City Clerk shall schedule a hearing, to be

held within 15 days from date [sic] of receipt of such notice,

before the City Council, with notice of such hearing being

furnished applicant [sic]. The applicant shall be given the

opportunity to appear personally, or through counsel, or both, and

the City Council shall proceed to hear any evidence which may be

presented both for and against the issuance of said license. If the

Council determines from the evidence presented that in order to

either provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the

prosperity or improve the morals, order, comfort, and

convenience of the inhabitants of the City said license shall not

be granted, it shall enter an order to that effect; otherwise, said

license shall be ordered issued upon payment of any required

license fees. . . .

§ 19C-27 (emphasis added). 

ATM contends that, because “the ordinance allows licensing decisions to be made in

the unfettered discretion of permitting officials” (Doc. # 21, p. 13), it imposes an

unconstitutional prior restraint on activities protected by the First Amendment. ATM also

contends that portions of the ordinance are unconstitutionally vague, including “the initial

determination of which businesses are subject to mandatory review by the City Council and the

arbitrary ‘standards’ by which license applications are to be considered” (Doc. # 20, ¶ D).

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13 This section of the city code provides for a “general penalty” and “continuing violations”:

Whenever in this Code, in any ordinance of the city or in any rule or

regulation promulgated by any officer or agency of the city under authority

vested in him or it by law or ordinance, any act is prohibited or is declared

to be unlawful, or the doing of any act is required, or the failure to do any

act is declared to be unlawful, and no specific penalty is provided therefor,

the violation of any such provision of this Code or any such ordinance, rule

or regulation shall be punished by a fine of not less than one dollar nor more

than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in jail or at hard labor for a

period not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at

the discretion of the judge of the municipal court. Each day any violation

of this Code or any such ordinance, rule or regulation continues shall

constitute a separate offense.

14 The state statute - apparently an umbrella provision - includes similar prohibitions:

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, or agent of a

13

Finally, ATM argues that the statute is unconstitutionally broad because “the application of the

‘community standards criteria’ potentially subjects mainstream businesses to the burdensome

licensing process nominally reserved for adult businesses” (Doc. # 20, ¶ E).

3. The City’s Contentions

The City of Montgomery has filed two pleadings which are, at best, inconsistent, and

which, when considered together, strongly suggest a concession to some of ATM’s arguments.

a. The City’s Motion For Summary Judgment

The City filed its own motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 23), requesting an order

declaring that ATM does not have standing to challenge the ordinance because it unlawfully

operated its business without a license “in violation of . . . .§ 19C-5 of the ordinance,”

MONTGOMERY, ALA. CODE §1-6,13 and ALA. CODE §11-51-93.14 Alternatively, the City urges

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firm or corporation to engage in business or vocations in a city or town

for which a license may be required without first having procured a

license therefor. 

The state statute sets forth the same penalties as the local ordinance.

14

the court to find that the ordinance is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied. 

In its attempt to synthesize the City’s response to ATM’s claims, the court emphatically

notes that the City’s memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment was

devoted chiefly to a discussion of the standing issue (see Doc. # 24). The City failed to

discuss or analyze ATM’s First Amendment challenge and cited no legal authorities in support

of its argument that the ordinance is constitutional.

b. The City’s Response to ATM’s Motion For Summary Judgment

Although the city persisted, in its response to ATM’s dispositive motion, in arguing that

the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the ordinance, the City acknowledged, through its

attorney, that the ordinance lacks clarity, and that at least the attorney - if not the City Council

itself -

is clearly desirous of amending the [ordinance] to establish

clearer standards, e.g., the definition of such terms as

“contemporary community standards,” “community standards

criteria” and the like.

The City contends that those terms are defined in contexts beyond the text of the ordinance

itself, suggesting that the external definitions are, for purposes of resolving the issues in this

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15 Notably, the City did not provide even the external definitions.

15

case, applicable and sufficient.15

In any case, the court must consider the City’s insistence on the constitutional validity

of the statute alongside its acknowledgment that the text of the ordinance evinces a “need for

amendment” that “is apparent for many reasons” (Doc. # 27, p. 2). That the City has not

elucidated those “reasons” for the court may not invalidate the ordinance, but it arguably

sanctions exploration of its integrity beyond the summary disposition the City encourages.

B. Jurisdiction, Venue, and State Action

The court finds that its jurisdiction has been properly invoked and that venue

appropriately lies in this district. The parties stipulate that the court has jurisdiction over the

subject matter and the parties and that venue is proper (Doc. # 19, ¶ 2). 

ATM’s assertion of Section 1983 as a statutory vehicle for challenging the

constitutionality of the ordinance is also valid. Section 1983 authorizes the court to redress

“the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”

committed by any “person” who acts “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State”. 42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, ATM may establish personal liability by

showing “that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal

right”. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

In any case, the parties have stipulated that “[t]he City . . . is amenable to suit under 42

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16

U.S.C. §1983" (Doc. # 19, ¶1). 

C. ATM’s Standing

ATM offers two theories supporting its standing to challenge the constitutionality of

48-91. First, ATM states that it 

actually applied for its business license, it actually appeared

before the City Council and it actually suffered a denial of its

application. In other words, the License Ordinance at issue was

actually applied against the Plaintiff and used as a means of

denying the Plaintiff the opportunity to engage in free speech. 

(Doc. # 21, p. 2). Second, ATM argues that whether it applied for a license is irrelevant, as

traditional standing requirements do not apply to facial constitutional challenges when the

plaintiff is subject to the statute’s provisions (Doc. # 21, pp. 4-6). 

In response, the City argues that denial of ATM’s application does not confer standing

because the Council’s decision was based on ATM’s violation of the law, namely operating a

business without a license (Doc. # 25, pp. 5-7). Thus, ATM has unclean hands and cannot,

consequently, assert a deprivation of rights resulting directly from its own wrongdoing. Id.

By violating the law, ATM “lost its standing to challenge the City’s license ordinance.” (Doc.

# 25, p. 6). Alternatively, the City argues that the doctrine creating limited exceptions to the

traditional standing requirements does not apply in these circumstances. 

1. Constitutional Requirements for Standing

Article III of the U.S. Constitution confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear

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17

“cases” or “controversies”, terms defined to require a plaintiff to demonstrate that

• “it has sustained an injury of a legally protected interest;”

• “a causal connection [exists] between the injury and the conduct

complained of;” and

• “the injury is capable of being redressed by the court.” 

See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Café Erotica of

Florida, Inc. v. St. John’s County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Women’s

Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 943 (11th Cir. 2003). 

“[E]ach element of standing ‘must be supported in the same way

as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of

proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the

successive stages of the litigation.’” Florida Public Interest

Research Group v. EPA, 386 F.3d 1070, 1083 (11th Cir.2004)

(quoting Bischoff [v. Osceola County, Fla.] , 222 F.3d [874,]

878 [(11th Cir. 2000)] (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Lujan[], 504 U.S. [at] 561)). Accordingly, when a

question about standing is raised at the motion to dismiss stage,

“it may be sufficient to provide ‘general factual allegations of

injury resulting from the defendant's conduct.’” Id. (quoting

Bischoff, 222 F.3d at 878). In contrast, when, as here, standing is

raised at the summary judgment stage, "the plaintiff can no longer

rest on 'mere allegations.’” Id. (quoting Bischoff, 222 F.3d at 878

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lujan 504 U.S. at

561)).

Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 04-11542, 2005 WL 779314, at ____(11th Cir. Apr. 7,

2005). Thus, a plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting each element. 

a. Injury in fact

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16 “[T]he degree of First Amendment protection is not diminished merely because the

newspaper or speech is sold rather than given away.” City of Lakewood v. Plain

Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v.

Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 

17 While the court acknowledges ATM’s protest, the court makes no findings regarding the

propriety of ATM’s response to actions it viewed as dilatory and/or unfair.

18

The Supreme Court has defined “injury in fact” as “an invasion of a legally protected

interest which is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’

or ‘hypothetical’”. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Undisputed evidence and the applicable law

establish that ATM was deprived of the ability to engage legally in the business of selling

constitutionally protected speech.16 Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973)

(describing adult oriented materials as “arguably within First Amendment protection” and thus

“presumptively” protected).

ATM’s attempts to secure a license were first impeded by the Director, who refused

to consider the application until ATM provided additional information that was not required

of most other types of retail businesses (Doc. # 19, ¶¶ 21-25). The delay was further

prolonged when the Director determined, for unstated reasons, that the application required

Council approval. (Doc. # 19, ¶ 29). In obvious protest,17 ATM opened and operated its

business prior to the Council’s decision, until the police ordered ATM to cease. ATM

complied with the order. (Doc. # 19, ¶¶ 30-31). By closing the business and terminating its

sales, ATM was unquestionably deprived of its First Amendment rights, and this deprivation

was concrete, particularized and actual. The City’s argument focuses upon the cause of the

deprivation, to which the court now turns. 

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 18 of 53
18 See exhibits to the City’s Memorandum of Law in opposition to ATM’s Motion For

Partial Summary Judgment, i.e., affidavits from each member of the City Council which

state, inter alia, that the vote to deny ATM’s license was cast “solely on the basis of its

unlawful engaging and operating its business without a business license” (Doc. # 27). 

19 However, Education Foundation suggests that even when the prohibition itself is

challenged, an argument that a plaintiff’s injuries resulted solely from the enforcement of

the challenged prohibition will not defeat standing. 

[W]e reject the claim that because the [plaintiff] engaged

in actions Defendants consider prohibited, the Plaintiffs are

the “cause” of any injuries suffered. Whether [the

Defendant’s] denial was appropriate, and whether

19

b. Causation

To satisfy the causation requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury

complained of is fairly traceable to the action complained of. See, e.g., Charles H. Wesley

Educ. Found., Inc., v. Cox, 04-01780, 2005 WL 1121981, at ____ (11th Cir. May 12, 2005)

[herinafter “Educ. Found.”]; Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir.

2004); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1003 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Focusing entirely on the fact that the City Council ultimately refused to issue a business

license to ATM, the City contends that the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the statute

because its injury was the result of its failure to comply with the very statute it challenges.18

If the injury that ATM sustained were caused solely by the Council’s decision, the City’s

argument would be more persuasive. In other words, if ATM had simply chosen to operate a

business without first seeking a license, then ATM’s injuries would be fairly traceable

exclusively to the provision outlawing operation of a business without a license, which applies

equally to all non-compliant business owners.19 

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 19 of 53
Plaintiffs acted within their rights in conducting their [voter

registration] drive as they did, are questions relevant not to

standing, but to the dispute on the merits (so long as

Plaintiffs’ asserted interests are legally protected).

2005 WL 1121981, at ____ . In this case, although ATM advocates invalidating the entire licensing

ordinance, it does not challenge the constitutionality of a law proscribing the operation of a business without

a license.

20 “The City requires a criminal background check for adult bookstores, adult movie houses

[and] adult video stores”. (Doc. # 19, ¶ 24). “The City also requires a disclosure of

content for adult bookstores, adult movie houses [and] adult video stores . . ...” (Doc. #

19, ¶ 25) (emphasis added). Whereas the City may have entirely different reasons for

imposing these additional requirements on the few other types of businesses to which the

City refers, content offers the only possible explanation for requiring such information

from would-be licensees of sexually oriented, or “adult”, businesses distributing literature

and films. It does not matter that the information may be necessary to ensure compliance

with other statutes, as the City suggests. (Doc. # 23, pp. 8-11). While that may be

important for determining whether the content-based requirements are constitutional, it is

irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the requirements are in fact content

based. In any case, regardless of any one Director’s specific intentions, § 19C-27

unquestionably permits the Director to “refer [an] application to the City Council for a

determination of whether [the] license shall be issued” based solely on “his opinion [that]

such shall be necessary or desirable”. 

20

However, that is not what happened in this case. ATM has provided evidence that its

injury resulted as well from provisions which, in practice, authorize the Director to delay the

issuance of a license to sell material protected by the First Amendment based solely on the

material’s content, or the Director’s non-standardized conclusions about the content.20 

Another plausible interpretation of the City’s argument would require the Court to

assume the constitutionality of the allegedly unconstitutional provisions. Thus, the City

“conflates standing with the merits of the case.” Educ. Found., 2005 WL 1121981, at ____

(“Causation in the standing context is a question of fact unrelated to an action’s propriety as

a matter of law.”). ATM’s injury is clearly traceable to the operation of the challenged

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 20 of 53
21 The language in § 19C-20 specifically mentions “conviction” and refers to ALA. CODE

§11-51-93, the state statute which criminalizes conducting business without a license.

22 A fair interpretation of the penalties in § 19C-20 suggests that the goal of the penalties is

to encourage businesses to continue to operate, upon payment of the surcharges, not to

terminate or close the offending businesses.

21

provisions. Even the City admits that it would not consider ATM’s application until it

complied with administrative demands for additional information (Doc. # 19, ¶ 23). 

The City’s assignment to ATM of responsibility for the denial of the license is also

suspect for another reason - one that is beyond the analytical framework structured by the

Supreme Court, yet germane to the particulars of this case. The City, on its own and through

the members of the City Council, insists that ATM’s operation without a license is the sole

cause for the denial. 

In fact, although 48-91 requires businesses to secure licenses to operate within the city

(§ 19C-2, 3, 4), and although it prohibits businesses from operating without a license (§ 19C5), the penalties in 48-91 for violating the ordinance do not include denial of a license.

Instead, in § 19C-20 of the ordinance, the penalties are limited to monetary assessments and

referrals to the municipal court for criminal prosecution,21 consistent with the penalties set

forth in MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE §1-6 and in ALA. CODE §11-51-93 (See notes 13 and 14,

supra). 

Thus, while the City could certainly have preferred criminal charges against ATM for

operating without a license, there is no statutory support for denial of licensure as punishment

for operating without a license.22 These findings do not necessarily negate the council

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 21 of 53
23 At least not the current route.

22

members’ subjective reasons for denying ATM’s license; they do, however, ratify the court’s

evaluation of causation for purposes of determining standing.

c. Redress of injury

Finally, ATM must demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that a victory would redress

its injury, i.e., would a judicial finding in ATM’s favor permit it to conduct business in

Montgomery? See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights, 426 U.S. 26, 45-46 (1976); Vt.

Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). 

Two reasons loom as conclusive evidence that ATM’s injury can be redressed, because

ATM merely desires a license to do business in Montgomery. First, this court’s declaration

that 48-91 is unconstitutional on its face or was unconstitutionally applied to ATM would

enable ATM to secure a license by paying a fee computed pursuant to §§ 19C-12, 19C-13, and

the appropriate license schedule. In other words, it would no longer be necessary to navigate

the administrative route dictated by - though not defined by - “community standards

criteria”.23 Second, as the court discusses more fully, infra, the City is prepared, even in the

absence of an injunction, to issue a license to ATM upon its re-application for one (Doc. # 23,

p. 4). 

2. Standing to Challenge 48-91 on Its Face

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 22 of 53
23

Once the court resolves jurisdictional issues in a First Amendment challenge, the court

must then determine whether the ordinance is content neutral. This issue is addressed in the

context of standing in this case, however, because whether ATM has standing to challenge the

ordinance on its face necessarily requires a determination of whether the statute is contentor viewpoint-based or specifically and narrowly addresses an activity or conduct commonly

associated with speech. 

In order for the court to determine whether ATM has standing to challenge 48-91 on

its face, the court must first decide whether 48-91 is susceptible to such an attack. It is not.

“A facial challenge, as distinguished from an as-applied challenge,

seeks to invalidate a statute or regulation itself.” United States

v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000). The general

rule is that for a facial challenge to a legislative enactment to

succeed, “the challenger must establish that no set of

circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 . . . (1987). “The

fact that [a legislative act] might operate under some conceivable

set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid .

. . .” Id. This “heavy burden” makes such an attack “the most

difficult challenge to mount successfully” against an enactment.

Id.

Horton v. City of St. Augustine, Fla., 272 F.3d 1318, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that

an ordinance prohibiting street performances in a section of the city was not unconstitutionally

vague) (emphasis added). 

In essence, a party challenging a statute on its face asserts the rights of all those to

whom the statute might conceivably apply, although the challenger may in fact lack sufficient

interest to ensure that those rights are zealously defended. Elk Grove Unified Sch. District

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 23 of 53
24

v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, ___ n.7 (2004); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22

(1999); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 981 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The focus of

the standing inquiry is whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring this suit.”).

The inherent risk accompanying such challenges - that the challenger is not the best

litigant - has led the courts to deny facial challenges in most circumstances, carving out only

a few narrow exceptions, one of which arises in the context of the First Amendment. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999) [hereinafter

“LAPD”] (discussing the exceptions to the general rule disfavoring facial challenges and

holding that a statute limiting access to arrestee information was not subject to a facial

challenge). 

In LAPD, the Ninth Circuit had determined that a statute that imposed restrictions on

commercial access to arrestee information was facially unconstitutional because it drew

distinctions that were irrelevant to the alleged privacy interests the statute was aimed to

protect. LAPD, 528 U.S. at 37. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that “what we have before

us is nothing more than a governmental denial of access to information in [the government’s]

possession”, and holding that such statutes did not fall within any exceptions to the rule against

facial challenges. Id. at 40-41.

A fair reading of LAPD suggests that the proper focus should be the direct

consequences of the statute. Id. “[Plaintiff’s] claim does not fit within the case law allowing

courts to entertain facial challenges. No threat of prosecution, for example, see Gooding [v.

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 24 of 53
24 Elsewhere, the court cited to two other cases establishing exceptions. LAPD, 528 U.S.

at 39 (citing Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997)

(allowing a facial challenge to a local redevelopment plan under the takings clause of the

Fifth Amendment); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995) (addressing facial

challenge to “state regulation restructuring the disbursal of welfare benefits”)). 

25

Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)], or cutoff of funds, see Nat’l Endowment for Arts [v. Finley,

524 U.S. 569 (1998)], hangs over their [sic] heads.” Id.24 The only other exception - one it

referred to as the “prototypical exception[] to th[e] traditional rule” - involves challenges to

statutes that “regulate or proscribe” speech. Id. at 38. 

Ten years prior to LAPD, the Court had addressed such a statute, and its opinion

established the very limited circumstances in which a licensing ordinance is subject to a facial

attack. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) [hereinafter

“Lakewood”]; see also Café Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1281

(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lakewood for the proposition that it had jurisdiction to entertain a

facial attack on a licensing law because the ordinance “creates a realistic danger that the statute

itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections”); Abramson

v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Lakewood as well as other cases

cited therein, 486 U.S. at 756 n.6, as creating an exception to the general rule regarding facial

constitutional challenges); Ward v. Rock Against Racism,

491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (describing Lakewood as having established a “narrow class of

permissible facial challenges to allegedly unconstrained grants of regulatory authority”).

Addressing a municipal ordinance that granted the mayor unfettered discretion to deny

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 25 of 53
25

That ordinance gives the mayor the authority to grant or

deny applications for annual newsrack permits. If the

mayor denies an application, he is required to “stat[e] the

reasons for such denial.” In the event the mayor grants an

application, the city issues an annual permit subject to

several terms and conditions. Among them are: (1)

approval of the newsrack design by the city’s Architectural

Board of Review; (2) an agreement by the newsrack

owner to indemnify the city against any liability arising

from the newsrack, guaranteed by a $100,000 insurance

policy to that effect; and (3) any “other terms and

conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the

Mayor.”

Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 753. 

26

a license to place newsracks on public sidewalks, the Lakewood Court first noted the risks

associated with such “unbridled licensing schemes.” Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 755-59.25 The

Court stated that such statutes chill speech by encouraging self-censorship and obstruct

judicial review by failing to provide “standards by which to measure the licensor’s action.” Id.

at 759. “It is when statutes threaten these risks to a significant degree that courts must

entertain an immediate facial attack on the law.” Id. (emphasis added).

Quoting Lakewood, ATM asserts that “a facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law

gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content

or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers.” Id. (Doc. # 21,

p. 2). While accurately quoted, Lakewood impedes, more than it boosts, ATM’s position. As

the Court continued, “This is not to say that the press or a speaker may challenge as censorship

any law involving discretion to which it is subject. The law must have a close enough nexus

to expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 26 of 53
26 The other was the fact that the license had to be renewed annually. Lakewood, 486

U.S. at 759. 

27

substantial threat of the identified censorship risks.” Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (emphasis

added). 

Crucial to the Court’s holding was the fact that the ordinance was “directed narrowly

and specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated with expression: the

circulation of newspapers.” Id. at 760. This characteristic was one of two “which, at least in

combination, justify the allowance of a facial challenge.”26 Id. at 759.

In contrast to the type of law at issue in this case, laws of general

application that are not aimed at conduct commonly associated

with expression and do not permit licensing determinations to be

made on the basis of an ongoing expression or the words about to

be spoken, carry with them little danger of censorship. For

example, a law requiring building permits is rarely effective as a

means of censorship. To be sure, on rare occasion an opportunity

for censorship will exist, such as when an unpopular newspaper

seeks to build a new plant. But such laws provide too blunt a

censorship instrument to warrant judicial intervention prior to an

allegation of actual misuse. And if such charges are made, the

general application of the statute to areas unrelated to expression

will provide the courts a yardstick with which to measure the

licensor’s occasional speech-related decision.

Id. at 760-61. 

Unlike an ordinance specifically directed toward newsracks, nude dancing or adult

bookstores (to which Lakewood more appropriately applies) 48-91 is a law “of general

application,” id., that applies to all persons seeking to engage in commerce in Montgomery.

Although it applies to businesses whose commercial aim is to sell speech, it applies as well

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 27 of 53
28

to those whose commercial aim is to sell steel, sand, snake oil and soccer balls. The ordinance

not only establishes the circumstances under which business licenses for all manufacturers,

professionals, retailers, service industries, transient dealers, and wholesalers will be

distributed, it also provides for record keeping, compliance with state health requirements,

computation of fees, agents and representatives of non-residents, and use of streets. Its

application is patently general, and there is a strong likelihood that most of the businesses

licensed under its scheme are not identified by their distribution of spoken or written

expression. 

Moreover, the specific provision outlining a license based on “community standards

criteria” may be applied to every applicant, not solely to those engaged in activity protected

by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Potts v. Bennett, 487 So.2d 919 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)

(addressing a challenge to an administrative denial of an off-premises beer license based on

“community standards”, though not through application of 48-91); Mims v. Russell Petroleum

Corp., 473 So.2d 507, 509 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (“Community standards, i.e., opposition to

the location of retailers of intoxicants, also have a bearing on each case. There is evidence in

the present case that the mayor, city council, school board, other community leaders, and

citizens are strongly opposed to this particular location . . ..” (emphasis in original)). In fact,

ATM admits that “‘community standards criteria’ is nowhere defined in the Ordinance” and that

the “Clerk and City Council” determine “which businesses involve ‘community standards

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 28 of 53
27 Preceding this admission, and on the same page, ATM stated that the license based on

community standards itself established “a separate category for adult businesses”. 

ATM’s contention that “adult businesses are the only category for which a referral to the

City Council is mandatory” is unsupported by the language of the ordinance, which does

not specifically mention adult or sexually oriented business. Moreover, it is disingenuous,

on the one hand, to argue that the statute suffers because it does not define “community

standards criteria” and, on the other hand, to contend that “community standards criteria”

means “adult businesses” only. 

28 All but one of the cases ATM cites that could arguably, if not marginally, support its

position that 48-91 is subject to a facial attack are distinguishable on this point. Contrast

City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 514 U.S. 774 (2004) (ordinance

specifically regulating sexually oriented businesses); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,

535 U.S. 234 (2002) (statute addressing child pornography); United States v. Playboy

Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (statutory section addressing sexually explicit cable

channels); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Communications

Decency Act); Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992)

(assembly and parade ordinance); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990)

(ordinance specifically regulating sexually oriented businesses); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601 (1973) (statute restricting state employees’ political activities);

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (ordinance requiring permit to

participate in parade, procession or other public demonstration); Freedman v. Maryland,

380 U.S. 51 (1965) (motion picture censorship statute); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372

U.S. 58 (1963) (statute creating a commission whose purpose was to “educate the public

concerning any book, picture, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or other thing” deemed

obscene); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (anti-loitering and picketing

statute); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute classifying certain types of

newspapers as public nuisances); Zibtluda, LLC v. Gwinnett County, Ga. ex rel. Bd.

of Comm’rs of Gwinnett County, No. 03-15685, 2005 WL 1362711, at *3 (11th Cir.

June 9, 2005) (ordinance applying specifically to adult entertainment businesses);

Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004) (city policy requiring all persons

wishing to participate in a protest to undergo magnetometer screening); Burk v.

Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (anti-protesting ordinance);

Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112 (11th

Cir. 2003) (sign ordinance); Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of St.

29

criteria.’” (Doc. # 21, p. 7).27 

Neither 48-91 as a whole nor the individual provisions therein are “directed narrowly

and specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated with expression.” Lakewood,

486 U.S. at 760.28 Therefore, it is not subject to a facial attack.

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 29 of 53
Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) (sign ordinance); Fly Fish v. Cocoa Beach,

337 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (ordinance applying specifically to adult entertainment

businesses); Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Atlanta Dep’t of Aviation, 322

F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (plan governing sale of newspapers at airport); Giovani

Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2002) (statute specifically proscribing

public nudity and any “entertainment that includes or simulates sexual intercourse”); Deja

Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 274 F.3d 377, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2001)

(ordinance specifically regulating sexually oriented businesses); Artistic Entm’t, Inc. v.

City of Warner Robins, 223 F.3d 1306, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2000) (ordinance and

regulation applying specifically to adult entertainment businesses); Frandsen, 212 F.3d

1231 (permitting requirement for “public expressions of views”); Boss Capital, Inc. v.

City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 1999) (ordinances applying specifically to

adult entertainment businesses, recognized as overruled in Zibtluda, LLC, 2005 WL

1362711 at *3) ; Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1362

(11th Cir. 1999) (ordinances applying specifically to adult entertainment businesses);

Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495 (11th Cir. 1994) (ordinance applying specifically to adult

entertainment businesses); Sentinel Comm. Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1197 (11th Cir.

1991) (newsrack ordinance); City of Paducah v. Investment Entm’t, Inc., 791 F.2d 463

(6th Cir. 1986) (license revocation procedures established in an ordinance regulating

“obscene films” and “obscene publications”); Miami Herald Pub’g Co. v. City of

Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1984) (newsrack ordinance); Gayety Theatres,

Inc. v. City of Miami, 719 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1983) (ordinance specifically providing

for revocation of a business license for “exhibiting, showing, selling, lending, or

transmitting any motion picture film(s), book(s), magazine(s), and video tape(s), or other

material that has been found to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent”); 

Osediacz v. City of Cranston ex rel. Rossi, 2004 WL 2580179, *11 (D. R.I. 2004)

(outdoor decoration ordinance); Executive Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids,

227 F. Supp. 2d 731 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (zoning ordinance applying specifically to adult

bookstores); Red-Eyed Jack, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1322

(M.D. Fla. 2001) (zoning ordinance applying specifically to adult theaters); Fla.

Cannabis Action Network, Inc., v. City of Jacksonville, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (M.D.

Fla. 2001) (permitting a facial challenge to an ordinance requiring a “festival permit” after

describing the ordinance as regulating the issuance of “permits that represent a necessary

prerequisite to using public fora for disseminating certain types of protected expression”);

T-Backs Club, Inc. v. Seaton, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (addressing

statutes and ordinances specifically directed to “adult bookstore[s]”, “adult movie

house[s]”, “adult video store[s]” or “other form[s] of adult-only entertainment

enterprise[s]” and public nudity); Fla. Video Xpress, Inc. v. Orange County, Fla., 983

F. Supp. 1091 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (ordinances applying specifically to adult entertainment

businesses); Swearson v. Meyers, 455 F. supp. 88, 91 (D. Kan. 1978) (ordinance

regulating charitable solicitations) with Silver Spurs v. Palm Shores, 1997 WL 809203

(M.D. Fla. 1997) (addressing a general occupational licensing ordinance and drawing

30

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 30 of 53
different conclusions than this court). Notably, Silver Spurs is unpublished, has been

cited only once by the same court, and has not been cited by any other court.

31

3. Standing to Challenge 48-91 as Applied

The City contends that ATM lacks standing to mount an “as applied” challenge for two

reasons:

1. ATM violated the law by engaging in business without first obtaining a license;

and

2. “ATM’s claims of an alleged infringement upon its First Amendment rights fall

far short of carrying the burden of establishing that ATM has suffered ‘an

invasion of a legally protected interest . . . concrete and particularized.’”

(Doc. # 27, pp. 4-5, quoting T-Backs Club, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 n.2). The court

disagrees. 

The City’s first argument can be interpreted to mean, generally, either that a person may

not challenge the legality of a law he is accused of violating (the city frames the question as

“whether ATM violated the law and lost its standing to challenge the . . . ordinance” (Doc. # 27,

p. 6)) or that the City may deny a license to any person who first engages in business without

a license, and such denial, objectively grounded, does not implicate the First Amendment.

Both interpretations fail. 

Many challenges against statutes are mounted defensively. See, e.g., Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing the conviction of a person who had engaged in

illegal “offensive conduct” when he entered the Los Angeles County courthouse wearing a

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 31 of 53
32

jacket bearing a “plainly visible” expletive); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)

(entertaining a challenge by an interracial couple convicted of violating the allegedly

unconstitutional statute outlawing interracial marriages); Freedman, 380 U.S. at 61 (reversing

a conviction under a state law requiring movies to be submitted to the state’s board of censors).

An argument that one who violates the law may not subsequently challenge the legality

of the law would turn our nation’s body of constitutional law on its head and would encourage

legislatures to enact vague laws. Given the limitations imposed on facial challenges, a litigant

who asserted a pre-enforcement challenge to a vague law would have difficulty establishing

federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc.

v. Pinellas County, 221 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting the need for plaintiffs to

“demonstrate that a ‘credible threat of an injury exists,’ not just a speculative threat which

would be insufficient for Article III purposes,” quoting Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285,

1290 (11th Cir. 1999)). 

Applying the City’s rationale, the litigant would also lack standing to challenge the law

after it had been determined that her behavior had violated the law. The fact that 48-91's

prohibition on engaging in business without a license is unambiguous and clearly applicable

to the plaintiff does not alter the landscape. A person accused of violating the law does not

lose standing to challenge the very law she is accused of violating. In fact, status as a violator

is often the precipitant of a “case or controversy” and the sine qua non of “actual injury”.

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 32 of 53
29 As discussed infra, while 48-91 empowers the Council to deny a license for virtually any

reason, it does not specify denial as a punishment for operating a business without a

license. 

33

Whether ATM has standing to mount a First Amendment challenge in the face of the

City’s alleged right to enforce the ordinance’s proscription on engaging in business without

a license presents a closer question. The City’s argument, however, faces at least two

significant hurdles: 

1. 48-91 does not specifically reserve unto the Council the power to deny a

license to a business that has begun operating without a license, and the

ordinance is readily susceptible to conflicting interpretations;29 and

2. as discussed in greater detail infra, the court has no satisfactory way to

determine whether the Council’s exercise of its alleged power was genuine or

pretextual. See Cohen v. City of Daleville, Ala., 695 F. Supp. 1168, 1172-73

(M.D. Ala. 1988) (overturning the city’s decision to revoke an adult oriented

business license, noting that the license ordinance “has no provisions, explicit

or implicit, for sentencing” and “in simple and direct terms, authorizes the city

to put out of business those businesses used for illegal or immoral purposes”).

The court need not decide the issue based on the denial alone, however, because ATM

challenges not only the Council’s denial of its license, but also the pre-denial operation of the

ordinance itself. ATM has presented sufficient evidence for the court to conclude (at least for

a determination of standing) that operation of the ordinance impermissibly and indefinitely

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 33 of 53
30 The court limits its focus to the City’s information request and application of the

challenged sections, 19C-21(j) and 19C-27. (Doc. # 21). 

34

delayed ATM’s ability to engage in activity presumptively protected by the First Amendment.

See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. at 504; Gayety Theatres, Inc., 719 F.2d at 1552 (holding,

in a case addressing the revocation of an adult theater’s business license, that while the city

could prevent the viewing of an obscene videotape, “it cannot constitutionally pierce the First

Amendment shield and bar . . . presumptively protected expression based only on prior

unprotected conduct”); City of Daleville, Ala., 695 F. Supp. at 1171 . The City’s contention

to the contrary notwithstanding, such a delay constitutes a sufficiently concrete injury in fact

to give ATM standing to challenge the ordinance to the extent it was applied,30and in the event

of an outcome favoring ATM, its injury may be redressed.

D. Prior Restraint

The court has already determined that 48-91 is content neutral. ATM also contends,

however, that the application of the ordinance imposes a prior restraint upon its exercise of

First Amendment rights (i.e., the commerce of speech). Thus, the court is faced with

determining whether the ordinance also satisfies the requirements of content-neutral time,

place and manner regulations. 

The court is somewhat reluctant to label an ordinance imposing a licensing requirement

- even one which singles out adult oriented businesses - as a time, place or manner

regulation. Although aspects of 48-91 may regulate when, where or how business is

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 34 of 53
31 Thomas, a unanimous opinion written by Justice Scalia and unaccompanied by additional

opinions, is a rarity in that regard within the relevant body of case law. Compare

Thomas with Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of

the Court in which four other justices concurred. Although none dissented, there was

some splintering); Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (Blackmun, J., delivering the

opinion of a 5-4 Court with Scalia, J., joining the dissent); FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. 215

(O’Connor, J., announcing the judgment of the Court and delivering the opinion of the

Court with respect to Parts I (six-justice majority), III (five-justice majority) and IV (six

justice majority). Three justices, Salia, J., among them, wrote separate opinions

concurring in part and dissenting in part.); Lakewood, 486 U.S. 150 (Brennan, J.,

delivering the opinion of a 4-3 court, in which Scalia, J., joined in the majority);

Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 147 (Stewart, J., delivering the opinion of the court. Black, J.,

concurred in the result. Harlan, J., entered a separate concurring opinion. Marshall, J.,

took no part.); Freedman, 380 U.S. 51 (Brennan, J., delivering the opinion of the court. 

Douglas, J., with Black, J., filed a concurring opinion). The issues discussed in the cases

35

conducted, the ordinance, as it is currently written and as it was applied to ATM, serves chiefly

to regulate whether a person may conduct business. In any case, courts continue to refer to

such legislative enactments as time, place and manner regulations and, accordingly, apply the

same analysis. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802 (1988)

(characterizing North Carolina’s fund raiser licensing requirement as a time, place or manner

restriction); Zibtluda, LLC, 2005 WL 1362711 at *7 (analogizing an adult business licensing

requirement to adult business zoning restrictions, which City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,

Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) held were subject to “the standards applicable to content-neutral

time, place, and manner regulations”).

1. Governing Case Law

The Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316

(2002) controls the court’s decision.31 The Thomas court addressed an ordinance “requiring

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 35 of 53
cited supra most closely reflect the issues in the case before the court. 

36

individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events” in a city park. Id. at 317.

Specifically, the ordinance required a permit in order to “‘conduct a public assembly, parade,

picnic, or other event involving more than fifty individuals,’ or engage in an activity such as

‘creat[ing] or emit[ting] any Amplified Sound.” Id. at 318 (citing CHICAGO PARK DIST. CODE,

CH. VII, §§ C.3.A(1), C.3.A(6)). 

Arguably, the activities mentioned in the Chicago ordinance, such as assemblies,

parades or events involving amplified sound, are more closely related to the First Amendment

than the activity regulated by 48-91. The Thomas court held, however, that the ordinance was

“not even directed to communicative activity as such, but rather to all activity conducted in a

public park” and was, thus, a “content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.” Id. at 322.

The picknicker and soccer player, no less than the political

activist or parade marshal, must apply for a permit if the 50-

person limit is to be exceeded. And the object of the permit

system (as plainly indicated by the permissible grounds for

permit denial) is not to exclude communication of a particular

content, but to coordinate multiple uses of limited space, to

assure preservation of the park facilities, to prevent uses that are

dangerous, unlawful, or impermissible under the Park District’s

rules, and to assure financial accountability for damage caused by

the event. 

Id. Consequently, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require the ordinance to

include the specific procedural safeguards established in Freedman and subsequently applied,

to a lesser extent, in opinions addressing licensing schemes far more reflective of the

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32 Three other justices, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, would

have required all three Freedman requirements. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 238-39. 

“[T]he holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those [m]embers

who concurred in the judgmen[t] on the narrowest grounds.” Lakewood, 486 U.S. at

764 n.9 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). Thus, FW/PBS,

Inc. unarguably requires analogous licensing schemes to include the two safeguards

discussed in Justice O’Connor’s opinion. See Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1499-1500

(11th Cir. 1994). 

37

ordinance addressed in Lakewood than the one before the court in the instant case. See

Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60 (requiring the censorship board statute to include the following

procedural safeguards: (1) limitation of restraint on expression while submission was under

review; (2) availability of expeditious judicial review; and (3) imposition upon the censor the

burdens of going to court to suppress speech and of proof in court); see also, e.g., FW/PBS,

Inc., 493 U.S. at 223-30 (distinguishing Freedman but requiring, in part of the opinion in

which only two other justices joined, an ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses

primarily engaged in “purveying sexually explicit speech” to provide for a “specified and

reasonable time period during which the status quo is maintained” and within which the

licensing decision must be made and to ensure the “possibility of prompt judicial review in the

event that the license is erroneously denied”);32 Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1499-1500

(11th Cir. 1994) (applying FW/PBS, Inc.). 

In spite of the exemption from Freedman’s requirements, the Court recognized,

however, that prior restraints may materialize through the application of content-neutral,

standardless licensing regulations. 

Of course, even content-neutral time, place, and manner

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 37 of 53
38

restrictions can be applied in such a manner as to stifle free

expression. Where the licensing official enjoys unduly broad

discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit, there

is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content.

See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 ...

(1992). We have thus required that a time, place, and manner

regulation contain adequate standards to guide the official’s

decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.

Niemotko [v. State of Maryland], 340 U.S. 268,] 271 [(1951)].

Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323. 

With that in mind, the Court upheld the ordinance because it found that

1. the grounds on which the denial was based were “reasonably specific and

objective, and do not leave the decision to the whim of the administrator”; and

2. the ordinance provided “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards” to

guide the licensor’s determination and that “are enforceable on review”, first to

an administrative body and then to the state courts. 

Id. at 324 (quoting Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 133 and Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 271.

Notably, the ordinance also required licensing decisions to be made within a specific,

relatively brief period of time, though the Court did not specifically address this issue. Id.

Finally, the Court addressed the plaintiff’s claim that the ordinance provided too much

discretion because denial of a permit on one or any of the enumerated grounds was permissive.

Id. This fact was not enough to defeat the ordinance. Id. at 325. 

Granting waivers to favored speakers (or, more precisely, denying

them to disfavored speakers) would of course be

unconstitutional, but we think that this abuse must be dealt with

if and when a pattern of unlawful favoritism appears, rather than

by insisting upon a degree of rigidity that is found in few legal

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 38 of 53
33 Thomas expressly left undisturbed the additional requirements for time, place and manner

regulations, “under which the permit scheme ‘must not be based on the content of the

message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and must

leave open ample alternatives for communication.’” Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 n.3

(quoting Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130). 

39

arrangements. On petitioners’ theory, every obscenity law, or

every law placing limits upon political expenditures, contains a

constitutional flaw, since it merely permits, but does not require,

prosecution. The prophylaxis achieved by insisting upon a rigid,

no-waiver application of the ordinance requirements would be far

outweighed, we think, by the accompanying senseless prohibition

of speech (and of other activity in the park) by organizations that

fail to meet the technical requirements of the ordinance but for

one reason or another pose no risk of the evils that those

requirements are designed to avoid. On balance, we think the

permissive nature of the ordinance furthers, rather than

constricts, free speech. 

Id. 

Thomas therefore sets the standard for addressing “as applied” prior restraints on

speech resulting from the administration of licensing legislation.33 Contrast Granite State

Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 348 F.3d at 1281-82 (determining that a sign ordinance was

content neutral and, consequently, governed by Thomas) with Solantic, LLC v. City of

Neptune Beach, No. 04-12758, 2005 WL 1262094, at *14 (11th Cir. May 31, 2005)

(holding that Freedman, and presumably FW/PBS, Inc., controlled the analysis of a sign

ordinance the court considered content-based). Because 48-91 is not, under Lakewood,

sufficiently related to speech or activity commonly associated with speech to be considered

content-based, Thomas controls. 

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 39 of 53
40

2. The Law of the Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit has had few opportunities to address Thomas. Solantic, LLC,

2005 WL 1262094 at *14 (supra); Burk, 365 F.3d at 1254 (distinguishing Thomas on the

grounds that the ordinance addressed by the court was “directed only to communicative

activity, rather than to all activity, and its applicability turns solely on the subject matter of

what a speaker might say”); Café Erotica of Fla., Inc., 360 F.3d at 1284 (addressing a sign

ordinance the court deemed content-based and relying, nevertheless, on Thomas to guide the

defendant in correcting the statute to include “content-neutral bases for which the County

Administrator may deny a permit”); Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 351 F.3d at

1118 (citing Thomas for the propositions that time limits are not categorically required in a

content-neutral scheme and the risk that the City may demonstrate favoritism in its application

should “be dealt with if and when a pattern of unlawful favoritism appears”); Granite State

Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 348 F.3d at 1281-82 (supra and discussed more fully infra); Fly

Fish, Inc., 337 F.3d at 1314 n.25 (distinguishing the ordinance addressed in Thomas from one

specifically addressing adult entertainment businesses and noting that Thomas had not “altered

the Freedman and FW/PBS requirements for content-based licensing provisions targeting

adult entertainment establishments”). And, only the earlier Granite State case thoroughly

discussed and applied Thomas. 

After holding that Thomas controlled its analysis, the Granite State court then sought

to determine whether “the ordinance contains adequate standards to guide official

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 40 of 53
41

decisionmaking”. 348 F.3d at 1282. The court upheld the ordinance and held that time limits

were not necessary under the circumstances. Id.

After all, City officials may not exercise unlimited discretion.

They can only process permit applications based upon objective

criteria set forth in the ordinance. [FN4] No official is able to

reject an application simply because of the proposed content.

Moreover, anyone adversely affected by the ordinance may resort

to either administrative review or–as Granite has done–the

courts.

FN4. Consider, for instance, the case of someone

wishing to erect a billboard. If that person applies

for a sign permit, the City can only deny the

application based on specific, objective

criteria–e.g., the proposed billboard is too close to

the road, too large in size, too tall, located on a lot

with other structures, or located on a lot not zoned

commercial/industrial . . ..

We realize City officials could potentially delay the processing

of certain permit applications and thereby arbitrarily suppress

disfavored speech. We will not, however, address hypothetical

constitutional violations in the abstract. As the Supreme Court

noted in Thomas, we believe “abuse must be dealt with if and

when a pattern of unlawful favoritism appears, rather than by

insisting upon a degree of rigidity that is found in few legal

arrangements. [Thomas, 534 U.S.] at 325. Furthermore, we are

reluctant to invalidate an entire legitimately-enacted ordinance

absent more of a showing it is as problematic as Granite claims.

[FN5]

FN5. In one short sentence, the district court

termed permit delays a “serious issue” and

referenced several news clippings attached to one

of the affidavits. The news clippings, however,

simply explain that the Mayor of the City decided

to improve permit-processing time. Keeping

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 41 of 53
42

Thomas’s admonition in mind about the need to

avoid deciding hypothetical claims (and realizing

that the district court did not have the benefit of an

opinion from this Court addressing billboard cases

post-Thomas), we note the Mayor’s decision to

improve administrative services does not

necessarily mean a constitutional problem existed.

Id.

3. 48-91 As Prior Restraint

As discussed more fully infra the challenged provisions of Montgomery’s business

licensing ordinance constitute “as applied” prior restraints. They are fraught with pitfalls and

lack all of the redeeming qualities that allowed the courts to uphold the ordinances in Thomas

and Granite State. Although there is some evidence to suggest that the ultimate denial of the

license was unrelated to the content of ATM’s wares, application in this case of the provision

establishing a community standards license smacks of censorship. And a lack of standards

guiding the City’s decision and objective grounds limiting its discretion make it impossible

for the Court to ascertain whether a denial stems from motives unrelated to the desire to limit

pornography in Montgomery.

The risk of censorship is ever present. Thus, while the City is not required as a matter

of law to incorporate the specific procedural safeguards outlined in Freedman, if the City

chooses to continue regulating the issuance of business licenses through a facially contentneutral law of general application, the necessary reforms nonetheless must exceed those giving

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 42 of 53
34 To the extent ATM’s business does not include the sale of speech, the First Amendment

does not apply, and the Freedman/Thomas requirements are likewise inapplicable. The

court offers no opinion as to whether the “lingerie” and “adult novelties” offered for sale

(Doc. # 19, ¶ 4) constitute speech. 

35 The court will not act as the City’s legal advisor by prescribing a remedy that may or may

not reflect the legislative body’s goals and priorities. Burk illustrates a number of

possible approaches, each of which are consequentially distinct. Burk, 365 F.3d at 1255. 

The City could, “for example, target only offensive behavior or the manner of delivery of

speech without regard to viewpoint or subject matter. Or it could tailor its regulation

more closely to fit expressive instances or conduct likely to threaten the harm it fears.” 

Id. It could also continue with the approach it has taken. That is, the City need not

transform its ordinance into something other than a law of general application. It need

only reform the ordinance to guard against censorship by including measures designed to

ensure commercial speakers that, as a law of general application, the business license

ordinance is being applied as intended: generally. 

36 Although the requirement that the City provide grounds for denial applies only to the

ultimate licensing decision, the need for time limits as well as narrowly drawn, reasonable

and definite standards to guide the implementation of the ordinance applies to every

aspect highlighted by the court. 

43

comfort to the courts in Thomas and Granite State. Specifically, not only will the City need

to establish “reasonably specific and objective” grounds that limit the decision maker’s ability

to deny permits and ensure that the standards under which applications must be investigated and

reviewed are “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite”, but it will also need to provide strict

time limits beyond which the City may not restrain ATM’s expressive34 activities without

providing a written, objectively-reasoned denial based on the grounds explicitly provided in the

amended ordinance. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 324.35 

a. Section 19C-21(j)36

This section, as stated above, sets forth the “license based on Community Standards

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 43 of 53
37 It is important to note that a requirement that the City Council, as opposed to the Director,

approve ATM’s license based on objective criteria does not operate as a prior restraint. 

44

Criteria”. To the extent that application of this section delayed ATM’s exercise of its right

to speak, it was a prior restraint. Although a requirement that ATM’s license be approved by

the Council instead of the Director is theoretically innocuous, the uncertainty and infinity of

the delay in ATM’s ability to exercise its constitutionally protected rights until the Council

makes its decision intrudes upon the First Amendment. 

Furthermore, the ordinance does not define “community standards criteria” or provide

objective criteria by which the Director can determine whether a business qualifies.

Consequently, it risks distinguishing, implicitly as written, and perhaps, explicitly as amended,

businesses engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, such as ATM. The more

distinctions the ordinance draws in that regard, the more likely the ordinance will be open to

a facial attack and subject to Freedman’s requirements. 

The line dividing cases governed by Freedman and those governed by Thomas is not

clearly established. The court finds it unlikely that section 19C-21(j) can be applied to

speakers without crossing that line. If the City aims to regulate the issuance of licenses to

adult businesses differently, the law is well-settled that it may do so, and numerous examples

of constitutionally acceptable ordinances exist throughout the case law.37

2. Section 19C-27

This section is similar to 19C-21(j) in that the Director has standardless discretion,

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 44 of 53
38 48-91 does not provide for a period of time during which a licensing decision must be

made. The Director of Finance has the authority to investigate all applications, but the

ordinance does not impose a time restraint on the investigation. § 19C-27. He may also

refer the application to the City Council, but, again, he need not do so within a specified

period of time. Id. The Council then determines, apparently at its leisure, whether to

grant or deny the license. Id. Only if the Council denies the license must the applicant

be notified, and the applicant then has the burden of responding with a written response

requesting a hearing. Id. In that event, the city must hold a hearing within 15 days, but

the Council may take as long as it wishes to make a decision. Id.

45

unrestrained by time, to submit any application for Council approval. Compromised by the

same deficiencies, it similarly violates ATM’s First Amendment rights, as applied.38 

In addition to those flaws, this section empowers the Director to investigate license

applications but fails to set forth acceptable triggers to investigation, define the scope of the

investigation, or identify the bases for referral to the Council. Absent these safeguards, the

authority to investigate constitutes the authority to harass. Nothing in the ordinance prevents

the Director or his or her agents from embarking on overly burdensome, intrusive, unending

and repetitive investigations designed to stifle speech. This schema operates as a prior

restraint in violation ATM’s First Amendment rights. 

Like the Director’s investigation, the Council’s decision making process is

constitutionally inadequate. As prescribed by § 19C-27, no time limits exist, and the Council

is empowered to deny any license “in order to either [sic] provide for the safety, preserve the

health, promote the prosperity or improve the morals, order, comfort, and convenience of the

inhabitants of the City.” Although the Court offers no opinion regarding these standards as

applied outside the First Amendment context, these grounds for denial - especially since they

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 45 of 53
39 The ordinance has no recorded legislative history. Thus, the Council’s consideration of

licenses after referral by the Director typically consist of hearings at which citizens

appear on an ad hoc basis to contest or encourage the license. Some of them may have

vested interests in discouraging or encouraging licensure, e.g., some may be employees,

competitors, owners of property as well as non-owners, or Montgomery residents and

non-residents. In sum, the City has no systematic means by which to gather or compile

empirical information germane to the advisability of granting or denying a license. This

means, of course, that an applicant’s fate could depend inordinately upon attendance at

the Council meeting (by members or others) or the weather (if it keeps enough people

away). Compare with City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002), involving

a challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting the establishment or maintenance of more than

one adult entertainment business in the same building or structure. The court held that

the city could reasonably rely on a study it conducted some years before enacting the

ordinance to demonstrate that its ban on multiple-use adult establishments served its

interest in reducing crime. The court set forth Los Angeles’ findings:

In 1977, the city of Los Angeles conducted a

comprehensive study of adult establishments and

concluded that concentrations of adult businesses are

associated with higher rates of prostitution, robbery,

assaults, and thefts in surrounding communities. See App.

35-162 (Los Angeles Dept. of City Planning, Study of the

Effects of the Conc entration of Adult Entertainment

Establishments in the City of Los Angeles (City Plan Case

No. 26475, City Council File No. 74-4521-S.3, June 1977)).

Accordingly, the city enacted an ordinance prohibiting the

establishment, substantial enlargement, or transfer of

ownership of an adult arcade, bookstore, cabaret, motel,

theater, or massage parlor or a place for sexual encounters

within 1,000 feet of another such enterprise or within 500

feet of any religious institution, school, or public park. See

Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.70(C) (1978).

City of L.A., 535 U.S. at 530.

46

are informed only by happenstance - impose far too great a risk of censorship.39

c. Additional Information 

Upon applying for its license, ATM’s principal was required to consent to a criminal

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 46 of 53
40 The City also admits that it did not require ATM to apply for a special operating license

under seciton 13A-12-200.12. (Doc. # 19, ¶ 21).

47

background check and to describe the content of the materials ATM aimed to sell by indicating

either “hardcore” or “soft core” pornography. (Doc. # 19, ¶ 23). The City does not deny this

and states that the information is necessary to ensure ATM’s compliance with state law. (Doc.

# 27, p. 13). However, Alabama laws regarding obscenity do not require a criminal background

check and impose no restrictions on a person’s ability to operate an adult oriented business on

the basis of a criminal history, other than to mandate revocation of the relevant state license

for violating the state licensing requirements. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.12 (2005).

Moreover, the state obscenity laws do not draw distinctions between what some may consider

“hardcore” or “soft core” pornography. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.1 (definitions). Finally,

while requiring the information may further government interests, the City has failed to

identify any legitimate purpose for these requirements in this case.40 

D. Unconstitutional Vagueness: Due Process

ATM also argues that 48-91 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define

“community standards criteria”, and the grounds on which the City may deny a license are

limitless. As ATM acknowledges, these are the “same subjective features” that render the

ordinance unconstitutional, as applied, under the First Amendment. 

ATM’s overbreadth claim is by its nature a facial challenge, while vagueness challenges

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment attack statutes “as applied”.

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 47 of 53
48

Contrast, Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003) (“Rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth

challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or

to conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating).

Applications of [a statute] that violate the First Amendment can still be remedied through asapplied litigation, but the [court in this case] should not have used the ‘strong medicine’ of

overbreadth to invalidate the entire . . . policy.”); LAPD, 528 U.S. at 39 (equating a facial First

Amendment challenge to an “overbreadth” challenge); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324

(1991) (distinguishing between “overbreadth” and an “as applied” challenge); Bd. of Airport

Comm’rs of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (describing

the “First Amendment overbreadth doctrine” to be a challenge to a statute “on its face”); TBacks Club, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 (citing Geaneas v. Willets, 911 F.2d 579, 586 (11th

Cir. 1990) for the proposition that “the overbreadth doctrine’s ‘application becomes more

unlikely as the allegedly chilled expression moves from pure speech toward conduct . . ..’”)

with, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988) (due process vagueness

challenge “is judged on on an as-applied basis). In essence, Lakewood established the standard

for applying the overbreadth doctrine to licensing ordinances. 

Because ATM has not asserted the deprivation of any fundamental rights unrelated to

free speech and subject to due process protection, it is unnecessary for the court to discuss

the vagueness argument beyond its previous discussion.

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 48 of 53
49

F. Relief 

1. Declaratory Judgment

For a declaratory judgment to issue, there must be a dispute

which "calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical

basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established

facts." 

Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.

227, 242 (1937); See also Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).

The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, which permits federal courts to issue

declaratory judgments in appropriate cases, provides that "in a case of actual controversy within

its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal

relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or

could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 57; Fairchild v. Hughes, 258

U.S. 126, 129 (1922); Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745-746 (1998). 

Because this case arises from a genuine controversy which requires the court to

adjudicate the plaintiff’s rights, it is appropriate for a declaratory judgment, and the court will

issue one narrowly tailored to identify the specific statutory deficiencies and to define the

parties’ legal relations.

2. Injunctive Relief

ATM has particularized its contentions regarding its entitlement to injunction relief:

The court should . . . . enter a permanent injunction restraining

Case 2:04-cv-00990-WC Document 35 Filed 07/08/05 Page 49 of 53
50

the City from enforcing the license requirement of Ordinance

No.: [sic] 48-91 against the Plaintiff. This injunction should

include a directive that Plaintiff be allowed to open and operate

as a matter of right without obtaining the unconstitutional license.

Ordinarily, a declaration that a statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied warrants

injunctive relief to protect the plaintiff against impermissive enforcement. However, in the

instant case, the City has warranted that

an injunction against the enforcement of [the] ordinance by [the]

City against ATM would be unnecessary in the event the Court

[declared] Ordinance 48-91 to be unconstitutional or otherwise

invalid. 

(Doc. # 23, p. 1). Indeed, the City reiterates that “[r]egardless of the outcome, the Court need

not enter an injunction, because if ATM refiles its application,

including the material filed on September 24, 2004 with

certification that ATM has not engaged in business without a

license since October 4, 2004, there will be no further

impediment to the immediate issuance of the license for which

it applied to operate as such business within the permitted

operations and activities.

(Doc. # 23, p. 4).

The City’s representations, taken literally, may obviate the need for the court’s issuance

of an injunction to restrain enforcement of 48-91 or to compel the issuance of a license to

ATM to do business. Although it is apparent that the City was willing to forego this litigation

if ATM had simply chosen to re-apply for a license, it is equally apparent that ATM desired

a judicial ruling on its challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance.

The Court will therefore issue an injunction limited to ATM’s license and extend to the

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City a structured opportunity to remedy the constitutional impairments of 48-91 for the

benefit of future applicants.

3. Other Relief

By filing a motion for “partial” summary judgment, addressing only the constitutionality

of the ordinance, ATM reserved the issues of damages and attorney fees. Accordingly,

notwithstanding its ruling on the motions, as a matter of law, the court has scheduled further

proceedings to conclude the parties’ legal relationship.

III. CONCLUSION

The court’s ruling today is designed to assess the extent to which Ordinance 48-91

complies with the mandate of the First Amendment and to afford to the plaintiff the

opportunity to engage in protected activity unfettered by impermissible restraints. Although

the court has denied the facial challenge and has amply discussed why First Amendment

interests are not central to “the rights of all those to whom the statute might conceivably

apply” for a business license in Montgomery, ATM has impliedly acted on behalf of itself and

others. 

To be sure, the potential evil of censorship and content based determinations were

critical factors in the court’s decision, but the ruling was driven by the need to protect the

First Amendment rights of all prospective applicants from the unregulated opinions of the

City’s Director of Finance (whoever it may be). 

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The court is also mindful that Directors, City Council members, and mayors come and

go; thus one Director, based on his personal philosophy, may be inclined to censor adultoriented bookstores, while another may not. In short, all of the community’s values deserve

protection, and the application of consistent standards in the investigation and decision making

processes is, thus far, the most effective means of assuring that standards are applied - and

that they are applied with equal force to everyone.

The City now has the opportunity - and hopefully the impetus - to enact measured

amendments to 48-91 to imbue the ordinance with neutral criteria and transform it into a

regulatory scheme that is immune from constitutional challenge. The court urges it to do so.

To redress, in part, the injury which precipitated this litigation, however, and to establish

the parties’ legal relations hereafter, it is hereby ADJUDGED, ORDERED, and DECREED as

follows:

1. ATM’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. 

a. To the extent that the motion challenges the constitutionality of 48-91

on its face, the motion is DENIED.

b. To the extent that the motion challenges the constitutionality of 48-91

as applied, the motion is GRANTED.

c. To the extent that the motion challenges 48-91 as an unconstitutional

prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights, it is

GRANTED.

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2. The City’s Motion For Summary Judgment is DENIED.

3. An appropriate judgment and injunction will be entered.

DONE this 8th day of July, 2005.

/s/ Vanzetta Penn McPherson

VANZETTA PENN MCPHERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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