Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00336/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00336-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEREK THOMASON, an individual,

 Plaintiff,

 

 vs.

CITY OF FOWLER, FOWLER CITY

MANAGER DAVID ELIAS, an individual, 

POLICE CHIEF MICHAEL BRAND, an 

individual, and TEN UNKNOWN NAMED 

EMPLOYEES OF THE CITY OF FOWLER, 

 

 Defendants. 

 

1:13-cv-0336 AWI BAM

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION 

AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S 

FIRST FOURTH FIFTH AND/OR SIXTH 

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Doc. # 22

This is an action for damages arising from the termination of plaintiff Derek Thomason 

(“Plaintiff”) from his employment with defendant City of Fowler (“City”) by individual 

defendants City Manager David Elias (“Elias”) and Police Chief Michael Brand (“Brand,” 

collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges claims for 

violation of Plaintiff‟s free speech rights under the First Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, and state law claims for violation of various statutes set forth in the California Labor Code 

and for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy under California common law. Currently before the court is 

Defendants‟ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‟s sole federal claim pursuant to section 1983 and 

Plaintiff‟s IIED claim. Defendants also seek to dismiss Plaintiff claim for wrongful termination 

in violation of public policy and/or the claim under the Private Attorney General Act, Labor 

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Code § 2698 et seq. Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

Venue is proper in this court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRODCEDURAL HISTORY

The original complaint in this action was filed in this court on March 8, 2013. The 

currently-operative FAC was filed on April 22, 2013. For purposes of analysis of Defendants‟ 

motion to dismiss, the relevant factual background alleged in the FAC centers around two issues; 

Plaintiff‟s employment status during the time he worked for the Fowler Police Department and 

the nature of certain communications that took place between Plaintiff and certain non-police 

individuals and entities during the time prior to Plaintiff‟s alleged termination on or about 

February 29, 2012. The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff‟s FAC.

Plaintiff began employment with the Fowler Police Department in 2009 as a civilian 

“support services manager.” At the time of his employment, it was understood between Plaintiff 

and then Police Chief, Darrel Jamgochian (“Jamgochian”) that Plaintiff would be appointed to 

the position of Police Lieutenant after a relatively brief time during which Plaintiff‟s application 

for the position of Police Lieutenant would be processed and a background check would be 

completed. During the time of his employment Plaintiff alleges he had a number of 

responsibilities that corresponded to those of a police lieutenant including coordination of the 

target range and training programs, internal affairs reviews, overseeing of office functions and 

investigations and other duties as assigned by Jamgochian. During his three-year tenure, 

Plaintiff was never sworn as a Police Lieutenant or paid salary and benefits commensurate with 

such an appointment. 

Plaintiff‟s FAC alleges that as early as 2005, it was discovered that a significant backlog 

of police reports was accumulating in Jamgochian‟s office. Jamgochian was ordered by City 

manager Elias to “„clean up” the backlog of unfiled cases and to delegate his responsibilities to 

appropriate staff members. Jamgochian did not subsequently file the criminal complaints and 

did not delegate this task.” Doc. # 22 at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Elias “failed to ensure that 

Jamgochian complied” with the order to clean up the backlog. Id. at ¶ 21. In the fall of 2010

Elias asked Plaintiff about the “case filings in the Lieutenant‟s Office.” Id. at ¶ 26. Apparently, 

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the “Lieutenant‟s Office” was a locked, unoccupied office space to which only Jamgochian and 

Elias had keys. Elias produced a key to the Lieutenant‟s Office and he and Plaintiff noted 

“criminal case files all over the floor and furniture.” Id. at ¶ 26. The date of the recovery of 

police reports from the “Lieutenant‟s Office” is not specified in the FAC, but the court infers the 

recovery of the files occurred sometime before October 27, 2010, because that is the date give by 

Plaintiff to mark the beginning of the time he began processing the first batch of fifty-seven 

cases that were submitted on November 3, 2010, to the District Attorney for prosecution. 

Jamgochian was subsequently placed on administrative and Russsell Snow (“Snow”) was put in 

the position of Acting Police Chief. Later, on or about November 9, 2010, again using Elias‟ 

key, Snow and Elias entered Jamgochian‟s locked office1 where they “saw hundreds of unfiled 

criminal cases, internal affairs files, officer‟s psychological and medical reports and other 

confidential and sensitive documents all over the floor and furniture.” Doc. # 20 at ¶ 29. 

Approximately 600 unprocessed criminal reports were recovered from Jamgochian‟s office from 

which about 200 were prepared for filing with the District Attorney by Plaintiff and another 

employee. Many of the 600 reports concerned criminal activity on which the applicable statute 

of limitations had run.

Of particular importance to Defendant‟s motion to dismiss, the FAC alleges that between 

early November 2010 and Jamgochian‟s resignation on January 4, 2011, Plaintiff undertook a 

number of communications between himself and persons or entities that were not a part of the 

Fowler Police Department. Those communications can be summarized as follows:

1. Sometime in “early November 2010” but prior to November 4, 2010, Plaintiff met in a 

coffee shop with Fowler City Councilman Rick Darling. The meeting was at Plaintiff‟s 

request and on Plaintiff‟s own time. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss “the 

corruption [Plaintiff] had witnessed at the [Fowler Police Department].” Plaintiff and 

Darling decided to present the matter to the Fresno County Grand Jury.

 

1 Although not explicitly stated in the FAC, the court infers that Jamgochian‟s office remained 

unoccupied during the time Snow was functioning as interim Chief of Police.

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2. On November 4, 2010, Plaintiff completed and filed a Citizen‟s Report to the Fresno 

County Grand Jury by way of Darling. The report detailed Jamgochian‟s mishandling of

Police crime reports.

3. On November 21, 2010, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Grand Jury Foreman, Mr. Coburn, 

to update information submitted in the complaint with recent information regarding the 

hundreds of files recovered from Jamgochian‟s office and their status.

4. A second update letter was sent by Plaintiff to Coburn on December 1, 2010. 

5. Between the end of December 2010 and the beginning of January 2011, Plaintiff 

presented testimony before the Fresno County Grand Jury. Plaintiff emphasizes that his

presence was not compelled by subpoena and that he testified on his own time as a 

private citizen.

The Fowler City Council accepted Jamgochian‟s resignation on January 4, 2011. The 

Fresno County Grand Jury issued a final report in response to Plaintiff‟s complaint on or about 

May 18, 2011. Plaintiff alleges the final report criticized the “lack of concern by Defendant City 

leaders to ensure the well-being and safety of their community.” Doc. # 20 at ¶ 41. After 

Jamgochian‟s resignation, Plaintiff made a final communication by briefly addressing the Fowler 

City Council at a “special council meeting to approve the City of Fowler‟s consolidated response 

to the Fresno County Grand Jury Final Report.” Again, Plaintiff emphasizes that City Council 

meeting occurred after Plaintiff‟s work hours and that Plaintiff was not compensated for the time 

he spent at the meeting. 

Of significance to Plaintiff‟s claim that he suffered retaliation in violation of his First 

Amendment rights, Plaintiff alleges that earlier in the same day as Plaintiff gave his brief 

presentation to the City Council, he was approached by Elias regarding the status of Plaintiff‟s 

POST certification. Plaintiff inferred from the conversation that Elias planned to hire Plaintiff as 

a lieutenant soon. Following Plaintiff‟s brief presentation to the City Council, Show informed 

Plaintiff that Elias was angry, presumably because the Grand Jury report cast Elias in a negative 

light. On June 3, 2011, in a letter in response to an inquiry by Plaintiff about making the 

transition to lieutenant, Elias informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff had been hired “as a part-time 

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temporary Support Services Manager.” Plaintiff had never been told that the position was part 

time or temporary. 

On or about October 21, 2011, interim Chief Snow separated from employment from the 

Fowler Police Department. Three Days later Defendant Brand assumed the office of Chief of 

Police. The remainder of the factual background presented in the FAC sets forth a sequence of 

communications between Plaintiff and Defendants Brand and Elias. The upshot of these 

communications was that the scope of Plaintiff‟s duties were reduced to the processing of the 

backlog of criminal complaints and that the position of Elias and Brand with regard to Plaintiff‟s 

employment status was that Plaintiff‟s position was both temporary and part time and that 

funding for the position would be discontinued once the backlog of criminal complaints was 

cleared away. Under Brand, Plaintiff‟s employment was categorized as part time which meant 

that Plaintiff did not receive health or other insurance benefits. 

On or about May 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Fowler Grand Jury2 which 

detailed Plaintiff‟s allegations of corrupt practices by Elias including granting contracts to 

friends in violation of the city‟s bidding procedures. Plaintiff alleges that he was informed by 

Brand, in the course of a casual discussion that occurred on February 3, 2012, that the 

lieutenant‟s position had been eliminated subsequent to the reclassification of three corporals to 

the rank of sergeant which non-typically reduced the ratio of supervisor to supervisee to 1:1. 

Plaintiff alleges that the decision to reclassify three corporals to sergeants was made following 

Plaintiff‟s exposure of “Jamgochian‟s and Elias‟ corrupt practices to the City council and Grand 

Jury as part of [Elias‟] pre-textual scheme to terminate [Plaintiff‟s] employment.” Doc. # 20 at 

11:21-23. Plaintiff alleges that on February 2, 2012, he received an inter-office memorandum 

from Brand informing Plaintiff that his position would be eliminated as of February 29, 2012. 

 

2

 Pursuant to California Penal Code, section 888, the authority to form a grand jury resides with the 

counties, not the cities. Plaintiff‟s reference to the “Fowler Grand Jury” is therefore puzzling. For 

purposes of the present discussion, a clarification of the title and function of the grand jury to which

Plaintiff addressed his second complaint is not necessary. At some point in the future, however, 

clarification may be beneficial. 

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Defendants‟ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‟s first, fourth fifth, and/or sixth claims for relief 

was filed on May 10, 2013, Plaintiff‟s opposition was filed on June 3, 2013, and Defendant‟s 

reply was filed on June 10, 2013. On August 22, 2013, Plaintiff‟ filed a notice of intervening 

authority, noting the recent filing of a case by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overruling 

Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696 ( 9th Cir. 2009). Defendants filed a response to 

Plaintiff‟s notice of intervening authority on August 23, 2013.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

can be based on the failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient 

facts under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 

533-34 (9th Cir.1984). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint 

must set forth factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Twombly”). While a court 

considering a motion to dismiss must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), and must construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve factual 

disputes in the pleader's favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 

869 (1969), the allegations must be factual in nature. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a 

plaintiff‟s obligation to provide the „grounds‟ of his „entitlement to relief‟ requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do”). The pleading standard set by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does not 

require „detailed factual allegations,‟ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“Iqbal”). 

The Ninth Circuit follows the methodological approach set forth in Iqbal for the 

assessment of a plaintiff‟s complaint:

“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying 

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellCase 1:13-cv-00336-AWI-BAM Document 32 Filed 09/06/13 Page 6 of 12
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pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 

1950).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s First Claim for Violation of First Amendment Rights\

Plaintiff‟s first claim for relief alleges he was subject an adverse employment action in 

retaliation for his report of the misdeeds of Jamgochian and Elias to the Fresno County Grand 

Jury and to the Fowler City Council in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. 

Defendants‟ motion to dismiss relies entirely on the Ninth Circuit‟s now-reversed holding in 

Huppert. Defendants, recognizing the effect of the overruling of Huppert on their argument,

suggest that the court permit Defendants to re-plead their grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff‟s first 

claim for relief in order to allege a defense of qualified immunity as to the two individual 

Defendants. 

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) the Supreme Court held recognized that “the 

First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a 

citizen addressing matters of public concern.,” id. at 417, but that the public employee must be 

speaking as a private citizen to be afforded constitutional protection. See id. at 421-422 

(“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities 

does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen”). In a 

decision filed in January 2009, the Ninth Circuit distilled elements of a claim for First 

Amendment retaliation in the context of a public employee as follows: (1) the speech in question 

must be on a matter of public concern; (2) the employee spoke as a private citizen; (3) the 

protected speech was a substantial or motivating in the adverse employment action; the 

governmental employer did not have an adequate reason for treating the employee differently 

from other members of the general public; and (5) the governmental employer would not have 

taken the adverse action absent the protected speech. Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9 

Cir. 2009). 

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The Ninth Circuit‟s opinion in Huppert was filed in July of the same year as the decision 

in Eng and confronted the question of the scope of a police officer‟s official duties in reporting 

the malfeasance of governmental officials. In making that decision, the Huppert court relied on 

a very broad description of police duties set forth in Cristal v. Police Comm‟n of City & County 

of San Francisco, 33 Cal.App.2d 564 (1939). See Huppert, 574 F. 3d at 707. In Dahlia v. 

Rogriguez, --- F.3d ----, No. 10-55978, 2013 WL 4437594 (9th Cir. August 21, 2013), the Ninth 

Circuit, in an en banc decision, reversed the decision in Huppert “to the extent that it improperly 

relied on a generic job description [from Cristal] and failed to conduct the „practical,‟ factspecific inquiry required by [Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)].” Dahlia, No. 10-55978 

at 21. To a significant extent, Defendant‟s argument for dismissal of Plaintiff‟s first claim for 

relief relies on the now-rejected proposition in Huppert that certain duties of police officers to 

report malfeasance could be assumed to be a part of the officer‟s duties obviating the need for a 

fact-based examination. Thus, Defendants recognize, and the court agrees, that Defendants‟ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff‟s first claim for relief is substantially undercut by the decision in 

Dahlia.

Both the majority opinion in Dahlia and the concurring opinion by Justices O‟Scannlain 

and Kozinski underscore that the major effect of the majority decision is to firmly establish the 

proposition that the determination of whether the speech of a public employees is that of a 

private citizen or a public employee is an issue of fact or, at minimum , an issue of mixed law 

and fact which is often not amenable to decision on a preliminary record. See Dahlia, No. 10-

55978 at 25 n.12 (adhering to view that it is often inappropriate to take from the finder of fact 

the determination of scope of a public employee‟s duties ); id. at 56 (decision of majority 

forecloses preliminary challenge based on categorical understanding of duties of a police 

officer). 

Even if Plaintiff was a sworn police officer at the time of his communications with city 

officials or grand juries, the Decision in Dahlia would require a fact-based examination of the 

scope of Plaintiff‟s duties. Given that Plaintiff was never sworn as a police officer, the question 

of whether he was he was expected in his “civilian” capacity to bring concerns of official 

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malfeasance to anyone‟s attention is not something the court can even begin to address on 

anything less than a full record. The court is of the opinion that there it would be premature to 

address the issue of qualified immunity in this case without the benefit of information that would 

become available, if at all, only through discovery. The court will therefore deny Defendants‟

motion to dismiss Plaintiff‟s first claim for relief without leave to re-plead with the expectation 

the issue will be addressed following discovery.

II. Motion to Dismiss Fourth Claim for Relief

Plaintiff‟s fourth claim for relief alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(“IIED”) under California common law against all defendants. Briefly, Defendants contend that 

the City of Fowler is immune from common law claims under California Government Code § 

815 and that the individual Defendants are similarly immune because they were sued in their 

official capacities. See McMillian v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (suit against 

public official in his official capacity is essentially a suit against the public entity the official 

represents). Plaintiff does not address Defendants contention that the individual Defendants are 

being sued in their official capacities. Rather Plaintiff contends that a public entity is liable for 

torts committed by its individual employees during the course and scope of their employment. 

The court has reviewed Plaintiff‟s FAC and finds that it is ambiguous whether Defendants are 

being sued in their individual or official capacities or both. In any event, if it were the case that 

Defendants were being sued in their official capacities, the claim would be curable simply by 

amendment of the complaint.

The court is of the opinion that it is a better use of judicial resources at this point to 

address the sufficiency of Plaintiff‟s fourth claim for relief on the merits rather than on the 

grounds of immunity. A claim for IIED arises when there is “outrageous conduct by the 

defendant” proximately causing emotional distress. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932, 946 

(1979). The conduct in question must be “more than mere insult, indignities, threats, 

annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Engineering, 143 

Cal.App.3d 219, 231 (1st Dist. 1983). Of paramount importance to this action “[m]anaging 

personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct 

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essential to the welfare and prosperity of society.” Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 

Cal.App.4th 55, 80 (1996). Thus, actions that are within the realm of ordinary personnel actions 

by an employer -- such as hiring, firing, setting duties and priorities – are insufficient to support 

a claim of IIED even when those decisions are motivated by improper considerations such as 

retaliation or discrimination. Id. 

The court has carefully reviewed the factual basis of Plaintiff‟s FAC and finds that all of 

the actions alleged against Defendants were actions well within the realm of personnel 

management. Those actions included redirecting Plaintiff‟s priorities, narrowing the scope of 

Plaintiff‟s duties, determining the conditions of Plaintiff‟s employment and, ultimately 

defunding Plaintiff‟s position. While those actions may well have been taken for impermissible 

retaliatory reasons, they are nonetheless the sorts of actions normally within the realm of 

personnel management decision making and therefore will not support a claim for IIED under 

Janken. Plaintiff‟s fourth claim for relief will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.

III. Motion to Dismiss Fifth Claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Policy

Plaintiff‟s fifth claim for relief alleges wrongful termination in violation of public policy 

against the City of Fowler only. Defendants contend that Plaintiff‟s fifth claim for relief alleges 

a common law claim for relief against a public entity; a claim that is prohibited by Government 

code section 815. Plaintiff opposes Defendants‟ motion by contending that the claim is 

authorized by Government Code section 815.6, which renders a public entity liable where the 

entity is under “a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against 

the risk of a particular injury” and where the failure to discharge the duty proximately causes the 

injury. 

Plaintiff‟s argument is unavailing. The immunity of Public entities to common law 

claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is well established. See, e.g., 

Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California, 44 Cal.4th 876, 900 (2008); Palmer v. 

Regents of the University of California, 107 Cal.App. 4th 899 (2003). “[T]o come within 

section 815.6 on a claim of damages liability, the enactment at issue, in its direction to the public 

entity, must require (not merely authorize or permit) that a particular action be taken or not 

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taken.” Mueller v. County of Los Angeles, 176 Cal.App.4th 809, 818 (2nd Dist. 2009) (italics 

added). Plaintiff contends that California‟s “Whistle-blower” statute, Labor Code section 

1102.5, creates a mandatory duty on the part of public entities to not retaliate against an 

employee for the reporting of what the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of state or 

federal statute. Plaintiff‟s argument fails because retaliation is not a particular action that is to 

be taken or not taken. Retaliation is a legal conclusion based upon the taking or not taking of 

discretionary managerial actions for reasons that are not permissible. As long as the actions 

themselves are discretionary in nature, section 815.6 does not apply. Id. The court concludes 

Plaintiff‟s fifth claim for relief is barred by Government Code section 815 and will therefore be 

dismissed with prejudice.

IV. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim Under Private Attorney General Statute

Plaintiff‟s sixth claim for relief seeks penalties against defendants under California‟s 

Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004; Labor Code § 2698 et seq, Pursuant to 

Labor code § 2699.3, an aggrieved employee may commence a civil action under any of the 

labor code sections enumerated in section 2699.5 once the aggrieved employee has; (1) given 

“written notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and the 

employer of the specific provisions of this code alleged to have been violated including the facts 

and theories to support the alleged violation.” Cal. Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(1). Defendants 

contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under section 2699.3 because he did not alleged 

facts to show he complied with the preliminary requirements to commence a civil action under 

the statute because he did not allege the specific labor code or codes that were violated. The 

court has examined the letter from Plaintiff‟s counsel to Defendants and agrees that the letter 

does not specify the labor code or codes that are alleged to have been violated. See Doc. # 20-3 

(Exhibit “C” to Plaintiff‟s FAC). 

Significantly, Plaintiff does not argue that he did provide notice of the specific labor 

codes that are alleged to have been violated; he simply contends that the requirement for notice 

of the specific labor codes alleged to have been violated does not exist. The court has carefully 

reviewed the statutory language and must disagree with Plaintiff‟s contention. Section 2699.3(a) 

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very clearly states that it sets forth the requirements for the commencement of a civil action 

under section 2699, and section 2699.3(a)(1) and that notice to the employer of the specific labor 

codes alleged to have been violated is required. The court has no reason to conclude that section 

2699.3(a)(1) means anything other than precisely what it says. Notice to the employer of the 

specific labor codes that are alleged to have been violated is a necessary prerequisite to the 

commencement of a civil action under section 2699. The documents attached as exhibits to 

Plaintiff‟s FAC do not establish that Defendants were provided with notice of the specific labor 

code that are alleged to have been violated and Plaintiff does not argue that notice was otherwise 

provided. The court must therefore conclude that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to that would 

permit the court to grant relief as to Plaintiff‟s sixth claim for relief.

THEREFORE, in accord with the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Defendants‟ Motion to dismiss Plaintiff‟s first claim for relief is DENIED. Defendants‟

request to re-plead their motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity is DENIED.

2. Defendant‟s motions to dismiss Plaintiff‟s fourth, fifth and sixth claims for relief are

GRANTED. Plaintiff‟s fourth, fifth and sixth claims for relief are hereby DISMISSED

with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 5, 2013 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

0m8i788

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