Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-00348/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-00348-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

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17 Defendants Scott Jacoby as trustee and 22 DM LP seek attorneys’ fees in this action 

18 regarding the Sheriff’s sale of a residential property in Lincoln, California. Shortly after 

19 defendants filed their motion, plaintiff’s counsel Mr. Applbaum moved to withdraw as counsel of 

20 record for plaintiff. Following hearing on the motions, the court issued an order to show cause to 

21 Mr. Applbaum. For the reasons below, the court grants defendants’ motion for fees, denies 

22 plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to withdraw without prejudice and resolves the order to show 

23 cause. 

24 I. BACKGROUND

25 The court has already discussed the history of this case in two prior orders and

26 incorporates those discussions by reference here. Prior Order (Apr. 13, 2023) at 1–3, ECF No. 

27 52; Prior Order (June 30, 2023) at 1–2, ECF No. 61. In relevant part, defendants purchased a 

28 residential property through a Sherriff’s sale. Prior Order (Apr. 13, 2023) at 2. Defendants later 

Johnny Kan, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Verdera Community Association, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:22-cv-00348-KJM-JDP 

ORDER 

Case 2:22-cv-00348-DC-JDP Document 83 Filed 10/12/23 Page 1 of 12
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1 learned plaintiff, the former owner of the property, recorded a lis pendens—a recorded notice that 

2 real property is the subject of pending litigation—against the residence. This court previously 

3 granted defendants’ ex parte motion to expunge the lis pendens, finding plaintiff’s complaint, the 

4 pleading on which the lis pendens was based, could not support a valid real property claim. Prior 

5 Order (June 30, 2023) at 3; see also Doan v. Singh, No. 13-0531, 2014 WL 3867418, at *2 (E.D. 

6 Cal. Aug. 6, 2014). In that same motion, defendants also moved for attorneys’ fees. The court 

7 determined the fees motion should be noticed for hearing, so it denied defendants’ ex parte 

8 request without prejudice. Prior Order (June 30, 2023) at 4. Defendants have now filed a noticed 

motion for attorneys’ fees, Mot. for Fees, ECF No. 62, plaintiff opposes, Opp’n, ECF No. 65,1 9 

10 and defendants have replied, Reply, ECF No. 68. As noted, plaintiff’s counsel separately has 

11 filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. Mot. to Withdraw, ECF No. 63. The court set the matter 

12 for hearing of both motions on September 1, 2023. Hr’g Mins., ECF No. 72. Plaintiff’s counsel 

was not present.2 13 Richard Bernstein appeared for defendants. At hearing, the court granted 

14 defendants’ counsel seven days to file a supplemental brief supporting his motion for attorneys’ 

15 fees, which he has now filed. Supp. Decl., ECF No. 77. 

16 II. MOTION FOR FEES

17 “Federal courts look to state law when deciding matters involving lis pendens.” Pearson

18 v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 16-1079, 2017 WL 6453289, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2017)

19 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1964). California Code of Civil Procedure section 405.31 generally permits

20 an award of attorneys' fees in connection with the expungement of a lis pendens. Specifically, a

21 party prevailing on a motion to expunge “shall . . . be awarded the reasonable attorney’s fees and

22 costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with

23 substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney’s fees and

24 costs unjust.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 405.38. “California cases have defined a ‘substantially

1 Plaintiff filed his opposition late and with no explanation for his tardiness. See generally 

Opp’n. However, because defendants had the opportunity to file a reply, see Min. Order, ECF 

No. 66, the court will consider plaintiff’s arguments. 

2 The court denies plaintiff’s counsel’s ex parte application to continue the September 

1, 2023, hearing, ECF No. 71, as moot. 

Case 2:22-cv-00348-DC-JDP Document 83 Filed 10/12/23 Page 2 of 12
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1 justified’ position to mean one which is justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable 

2 person.” Wertin v. Franchise Tax Bd., 68 Cal. App. 4th 961, 977 (1998). Federal district courts 

3 commonly award fees under these provisions. See, e.g., Navarette v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 

4 12-02270, 2013 WL 1703892 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2013).

5 In determining fees, the court utilizes the lodestar method, which multiplies the number of 

6 hours counsel “reasonably expended” litigating the motion by counsel’s “reasonable hourly rate.” 

7 PLCM Group v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000). The reasonable hourly rate is based on 

8 trends in the relevant community, which is the “forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho 

9 v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496,

10 500 (9th Cir. 1997)).

11 Defendants prevailed on their prior motion to expunge, see Prior Order (June 30, 2023) at 

12 3, so are eligible for attorneys’ fees. Defendants’ counsel asks this court to grant $13,400 in fees 

13 for 26.7 hours of work relating to the motion to expunge. Bernstein Decl. ¶¶ 17–18, ECF 

14 No. 62–2; Client Invoice, Bernstein Decl. Ex. 9, ECF No. 62–2; Reply at 3; Supp. Decl. 

15 ¶¶ 13–14. Counsel spent these hours drafting the initial motion to expunge, after being unable to 

16 resolve the matter with plaintiff’s counsel, drafting the renewed motion to expunge and reviewing 

17 plaintiff’s opposition, reading this court’s June 30, 2023, order, researching next steps, preparing 

18 for hearing on this motion for fees, responding to plaintiff’s opposition to this motion, attending 

19 oral argument and drafting a supplemental brief. Bernstein Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5-10, 12, 14-15, 17–18; 

20 Reply at 3; Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 13–14. Counsel billed these hours at an hourly rate of $400, a $50 

21 reduction from his standard rate of $450. Bernstein Decl. ¶ 20. 

22 While plaintiff opposes this motion, he has not met his burden to show he - or more 

23 appropriately his counsel - “acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make 

24 the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs unjust.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 405.38; see Am. Nat'l 

25 Red Cross v. United Way Calif. Cap. Region, No. 07-1236, 2007 WL 4522967, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 

26 Dec. 19, 2007). The arguments counsel lays out in the opposition appear to defend the actions of 

27 plaintiff’s counsel by blaming plaintiff himself. See generally Opp’n. The opposition states the 

28 imposition of attorneys’ fees and costs would be unjust but makes no reasoned argument to 

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support this claim. Id. at 3. Instead, the opposition contends plaintiff “demanded that counsel 

record a lis pendens after counsel [] advised him of the risks” and plaintiff “refused to expunge 

his lis pendens after” defendants learned of the lis pendens and contacted plaintiff’s counsel. 

Opp’n at 4–6.3 These representations support the conclusion that plaintiff’s counsel’s recording 

of the lis pendens was not substantially justified. Moreover, as defendants have informed the 

court, plaintiff’s counsel did not serve them with a copy of the notice of lis pendens, as required 

by California law. See Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 405.22; Bernstein Decl. ¶ 3. That counsel now 

claims he advised against filing the notice but still effected it does not change the analysis; if 

anything, it weighs in defendants’ favor. Plaintiff’s counsel has shown neither he acted with 

substantial justification nor that it would be unjust to award fees to defendants. 

Defendants’ counsel has provided the court with billing records describing the work 

performed. The work appears reasonable. Additionally, defendants’ counsel identifies cases in 

which courts within the relevant community have approved hourly rates similar to his, including a 

prior order by another judge in this district awarding attorneys’ fees of $400 for counsel in a 

related case. Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7, 9, 10; 22 DM, LP v. Kan, No. 2:22- 00754, 2022 WL 2718795, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2022).4 The court finds counsel has properly justified his hourly rate and 

grants counsel’s motion for fees, to be paid by plaintiff’s counsel given that he effected the filing 

18 of the lis pendens, did not serve it and then delayed the matter. 

19 III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

Plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Applbaum, moves to withdraw as counsel of record.5 20 Mot. to

21 Withdraw. If withdrawal would leave a client in propria persona, Local Rule 182(d) requires the 

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 Plaintiff’s counsel also makes arguments regarding his deteriorating relationship with 

plaintiff. Opp’n at 4 (stating plaintiff has become “progressively more difficult, combative, and 

uncooperative” with counsel). Because these arguments are irrelevant to the motion for fees, the 

court disregards these statements. 

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 Despite the court’s explicit instructions at hearing, counsel also submitted hourly rates 

from attorneys practicing outside this district. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. The court disregards these references. 

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 In evaluating Mr. Applbaum’s motion to withdraw, the court learned he has provided the 

court with an incorrect state bar number in his moving and opposition papers, as well as many 

other filings before this court. He lists his California bar number as “555211,” but this number is 

Case 2:22-cv-00348-DC-JDP Document 83 Filed 10/12/23 Page 4 of 12
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1 withdrawing party to seek leave of court, file a formal motion and provide notice of the 

2 withdrawal to the client and all other parties who have appeared. The attorney must also provide 

3 an affidavit stating the current or last known address or addresses of the client and the efforts 

4 made to notify the client of the motion to withdraw. Id. Withdrawal must also comply with the 

5 Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California. Under California Rule of 

6 Professional Conduct 1.16, a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if at least one of ten 

7 circumstances is present, including as potentially relevant here, “the client by other conduct 

8 renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively[.]” Cal. 

9 R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(4). But ultimately, “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to

10 withdraw is within the court's discretion.” Staychock v. Klean Kanteen, Inc., No, 17-1012, 2017

11 WL 6383603, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2017) (citing United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107,

12 1113 (9th Cir. 2009)). Courts consider several factors, “including the reasons for withdrawal,

13 possible prejudice to the client and other litigants, harm to the administration of justice, and

14 possible delay.” Id. (citation omitted).

15 Counsel argues it would be unreasonably difficult to continue carrying out the 

16 representation here effectively because the relationship between counsel and plaintiff “has 

17 deteriorated,” and counsel and plaintiff face “irreconcilable differences.” Mot. to Withdraw at 2. 

18 For example, counsel states plaintiff, who is currently facing criminal charges also related to the 

19 Sherriff’s sale, has been “advised by his criminal attorney not to execute a declaration in this 

20 case” and as such counsel could not properly object to defendants’ motion for fees. Id. at 2–3. 

21 Counsel also states he cannot financially continue to represent plaintiff as he has already 

22 “expended substantial financial resources” on this case. Applbaum Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 63. 

23 Although counsel blames plaintiff for “demand[ing] that counsel record a lis pendens” over 

24 counsel’s objections in his response to the motion for fees, Opp’n. at 4–5, he does not expressly 

25 argue he must withdraw because plaintiff insisted on “presenting a claim or defense . . . that is not 

26 warranted under existing law.” Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(1). 

invalid. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 63, 65, 71. Mr. Applbaum is cautioned to provide the court with his 

correct state bar number on all future filings. 

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1 The court finds counsel’s explanation deficient in a number of respects. First, although 

2 counsel cites this district’s relevant local rule, Mot. to Withdraw at 4, counsel has not complied 

3 with the rule. For example, counsel has not provided an affidavit with the current or last known 

4 address of plaintiff. E.D. Cal. L.R. 182(d). Moreover, although counsel states he will be 

5 “advising opposing counsel that [he] is withdrawing from this case,” his declaration does not state 

6 he has done so, nor does he provide any proof that he informed any party of his intent to 

7 withdraw. Applbaum Decl. ¶ 6; see also; E.D.L.R. 182(d). Second, counsel states he contacted 

8 plaintiff on July 24, 2023, and “requested that he obtain new legal counsel.” Mot. to Withdraw 

9 at 3. Counsel did not give his client even a full day’s notice before filing this motion with the 

10 court on the same day, July 24, and so did not provide plaintiff reasonable notice as required by 

11 California Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(b), (d). Cf. DCR Mktg., Inc. v. U.S. All. Grp., Inc., 

12 No. 19-1897, 2020 WL 7086147, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2020) (finding attorney who gave 

13 client two months’ notice and “persistent[ly] urg[ed] his client to hire new counsel in that time 

14 complied with California Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(b)). Third, although there is no 

15 formal opposition to this motion on the docket, counsel himself states plaintiff has not consented 

16 to the withdrawal. Mot. to Withdraw at 3; see also Letter from Mr. Kan, ECF No. 73 at 1 (“I 

17 have not requested that Mr. Marc Applbaum of Medway Law to relieved as my council.” 

18 (verbatim transcription)). Instead, counsel states plaintiff “has the services of multiple attorneys 

19 that are providing him with legal advice in connection with this case,” but has not identified a 

20 single attorney who has agreed to take on plaintiff’s representation if counsel withdraws here. Id.

21 at 3. The professional conduct requirements are not mere technicalities that are easily excused, 

even if the relationship between counsel and client has deteriorated.6 22 See Lanier v. City of 

23 Fresno, No. 1:10-01120, 2011 WL 5118526 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011) (“As Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

24 motion to withdraw fails to meet the requirements of L.R. 182(d), the Court cannot consider the 

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 The court also notes counsel filed no response to a defendant’s pending motion to 

dismiss set for hearing later this month, even though he was not relieved at the time opposition 

was due. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 67; Notice of Non-Opp’n, ECF No. 70; cf. Cal. Rule of 

Prof. Conduct 1.16(c), (d). 

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1 motion at this time.”). For these reasons, if the court were to reach the merits of counsel’s motion 

2 to withdraw, it would deny the motion without prejudice. 

3 The court does not reach those merits, however, because more fundamental issues are 

4 raised by counsel’s conduct in responding to the motion for attorney’s fees addressed above, as 

5 well as in responding to the court’s order to show cause. These issues are discussed below and 

6 lead the court to sanction counsel by relieving him as plaintiff’s attorney and suspending him 

7 from the bar of this court, subject to the conditions set forth below to protect plaintiff’s 

8 interests, and denying counsel’s motion to withdraw as moot. 

9 IV. COUNSEL’S RESPONSE TO COURT’S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

10 Given counsel’s divulging of what the court must assume were confidential

11 communications between himself and his client in filings before this court, as well as counsel’s 

12 nonappearance at hearing and plaintiff’s letter delivered to the court on the day of hearing saying 

13 he had not consented to withdrawal and alleging further misconduct by counsel, Letter, ECF No. 

14 73, the court issued its order to show cause why it should not suspend or revoke counsel’s 

15 admission to the bar of this court and report his conduct to the State Bar of California, Prior Order 

16 (Sept. 7, 2023), ECF No. 78; Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1996) 

17 (“District judges have an arsenal of sanctions they can impose for unethical behavior. These 

18 sanctions include monetary sanctions, contempt, and the disqualification of counsel.”); E.D. Cal. 

19 L.R. 180(e) (all members of the Bar of this Court must “comply with the standards of

20 professional conduct required of members of the State Bar of California and contained in the

21 State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, and court

22 decisions”). Counsel filed a response through retained counsel, specially appearing, taking the

23 position that his conduct, through regrettable, does not “render him ineligible to practice before

24 the Court.” Response at 2, 3, ECF No. 80; Applbaum Decl., ECF No. 80–3. Specifically, he

25 states his disclosures were reasonable given the circumstances, says a medical emergency

26 prevented him from appearing for the hearing before this court and contests plaintiff’s claims

27 regarding their fee dispute. See generally id. The court reviews each argument in turn.

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1 A. Disclosure of Attorney Client Privileged Communications

2 Although counsel “recognizes that it was against his better judgment to divulge any 

3 confidential attorney-client information and communications in his Motion,” he states his sharing 

4 of the information as he did does not support sanctions because his representations were in 

5 response to accusations made by plaintiff against counsel and fall under the privilege exceptions 

6 set forth in California Evidence Code section 958 and Federal Rule of Evidence 502. Response at 

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8 Specifically, counsel states his filings were in response to “accusations” made against him 

9 by a third-party attorney, Mr. Segal, who “purport[ed] to represent Plaintiff” and claimed counsel 

10 “breached his professional duties.” Id. at 4. Counsel believed his relationship with plaintiff “had 

11 completely broken down” and made disclosures only “in response to such inflammatory 

12 allegations” by Mr. Segal because the disclosures were “no longer protected by his duty of 

13 confidentiality.” Id. at 4. But the court had not reviewed Mr. Segal’s letter at the time, and 

14 counsel’s motion to withdraw did not provide the court any of this background and instead cited 

15 generally to “irreconcilable differences and lack of communication,” in addition to pointing the 

16 finger at plaintiff. Mot. to Withdraw at 2. Counsel did not offer to provide the court with the 

17 details in camera, if the court felt the need to know more; making such an offer would have 

18 acknowledged Mr. Kan’s likely claim of privilege and been consistent with efforts to protect it. 

19 See Leiba v. Radnor Specialty Ins. Co., No. 2102009, 2022 WL 17222232, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. 

20 Oct. 24, 2022) (“The Court is sensitive to the potential privilege issues that may have led counsel 

21 to assert the grounds in opaque terms. To the extent that those issues are at play, the Court invites 

22 counsel to submit substantiating documentation for in camera review.”). 

23 While counsel points to a state statute and federal rule of evidence as justifying his 

24 disclosure, neither citation supports his position based on the record before the court. California 

25 Evidence Code section 958 provides “[t]here is no privilege under this article as to a 

26 communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out 

27 of the lawyer-client relationship.” Cal. Evid. Code § 958. Section 958 applies on its face only 

28 “as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach,” and is available to counsel in malpractice 

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actions and fee disputes. See Styles v. Mumbert, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1168 (2008). At the 

time counsel filed his motion, plaintiff had raised no issue before this court that counsel could 

have been responding to. In Re Lewis, No. 22-650, 2022 WL 2065590, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 

2022) (section 958 applies when it becomes necessary for an attorney to divulge confidential 

information for “the protection of the attorney's own rights, such as when the attorney's integrity, 

good faith, authority or performance of duties is questioned.”). As of this writing, the court is 

aware of no case alleging counsel’s breach of any lawyerly duties. Moreover, the 

communications counsel disclosed that prompted the court’s order to show cause do not relate to 

any breach of a fee agreement, but rather to the disclosure of confidential legal advice and actions 

counsel says he took at his client’s direction. Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a) “is reserved for 

those unusual situations in which fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected 

information, in order to prevent a selective and misleading presentation of evidence.” Advisory 

Committee Notes to Fed. R. Evid. 502. Counsel suggests Federal Rule of Evidence 502 

immunizes him because plaintiff has intentionally waived the privilege. ECF No. 80 at 3. 

Nothing before the court supports the conclusion Mr. Kan waived his privilege in attorney-client 

communications regarding the filing of a lis pendens. See generally Applbaum Decl.; cf. Letter, 

ECF No. 73, at 4-5 (saying Mr. Kan received a draft declaration from counsel’s paralegal in 

which Mr. Kan would have “accept[ed] responsibility for Mr. Applbaum’s filing and refusal to 

expunge the lis pendens on the house that is the subject of this lawsuit,” without any indication 

Mr. Kan signed such a declaration). If counsel is suggesting Mr. Kan has waived his privilege 

because he did not promptly take steps to correct counsel’s error in making the disclosure in his 

opposition briefing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 502(b)(3), the suggestion means counsel once again is 

pointing the figure at his client rather than accepting responsibility for his actions, and saying Mr. 

Kan should have sought sealing or redaction of counsel’s filing while still represented by counsel. 

Counsel’s actions in the first instance, in disclosing what on their face qualify as attorneyclient communications and blaming his client for his purported need to withdraw, followed by his 

insufficient response to the court’s order to show cause lead the court reluctantly to conclude that 

28 counsel has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to members of this court’s bar. 

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The court thus exercises its discretion and authority to suspend counsel from practice before this 

court and refers him to the California State Bar for that body to consider whether his conduct here 

should affect his license to practice more broadly. If the California State Bar determines that 

counsel’s ability to practice generally should not be suspended, counsel may then promptly notify 

this court and request reconsideration of this suspension order. 

B. Non-Appearance

Regarding his nonappearance for hearing before this court, counsel “sincerely apologies”

and represents he was “prepared to attend the hearing on his Motion to Withdraw” but was 

“debilitated by an illness for which he was ultimately hospitalized.” Response at 5. Specifically, 

counsel says that the week of the hearing, he suffered from increasingly painful symptoms, 

“which he had hoped would improve in time” but when “it became clear” he would not be able to 

attend hearing, he arranged for a replacement special appearance attorney, who he then learned 

also could not attend the hearing in his place. Id. The court finds counsel’s explanation lacks 

credibility. 

Counsel’s paralegal first emailed the courtroom deputy the afternoon of Thursday, August 

31—the day before hearing—asking the court for instructions for counsel, located in San Diego, 

to appear remotely. This correspondence made no mention of any illness and appeared to assume 

counsel could automatically appear remotely. After being informed of this court’s standing order 

requiring in person appearances without prior approval, counsel’s paralegal informed the court he 

had contacted opposing counsel for a stipulation to continue the hearing. The next morning, 

counsel himself emailed this court, explaining he would be unavailable to travel, stating he had 

attempted to arrange for an appearance attorney and asking for an exception to this court’s rules 

so that he might appear remotely. Again, counsel did not inform the court of any illness. 

According to his later-filed declaration, counsel at the time was suffering from symptoms of 

25 “nausea, vomiting, severe stomach pain, migrane [sic] headache and back pain,” Applbaum Decl. 

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¶ 32.7 1 In the meantime, counsel filed an ex parte motion to continue the hearing at 10:17 a.m. 

2 after the hearing had begun. ECF No. 71. Neither this motion, nor the attached declaration, said 

3 anything about illness. Id. Counsel’s declarations do not explain how, on the day of the hearing, 

4 with the symptoms he said he was experiencing, he could have appeared remotely and then was 

5 able to file a motion during hearing. While the court does not rely on the inconsistencies in 

6 counsel’s communications with the court in referring him to the state bar, it notes them for the 

7 record. If he seeks readmission to this court’s bar in the future, counsel must explain the steps he 

8 will take to ensure he is aware of and fully follows the court’s local rules and each judge’s own 

9 rules for proceedings in the cases over which they preside. 

10 C. Fee Dispute

11 Counsel spends much of his response addressing Mr. Segal and plaintiff’s accusations 

12 against him, which are not before the court for resolution. The court has considered information 

13 related to the fee dispute only to the extent referenced above. 

14 V. CONCLUSION

15 As explained above, the court grants defendants’ motion for $ 13,400 in fees.

16 Plaintiff’s counsel must pay these fees within thirty (30) days of the filing of this order, without 

17 passing them on to Mr. Kan, and file a notice confirming the payment has been made. 

18 The court sanctions Mr. Applbaum by relieving him as counsel for plaintiff and 

19 suspending him from membership in the bar of this court. Mr. Applbaum shall 

20 immediately provide to plaintiff a complete copy of his client file and otherwise comply with 

21 all applicable Rules of Professional Conduct. Mr. Applbaum also shall immediately, and no 

22 later than seven days from the filed date of this order, provide to the courtroom deputy the 

23 mailing address(es) he has for Mr. Kan. The court thus denies plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to 

24 withdraw as moot. 

7

 Counsel’s response includes a copy of counsel’s visit summary to Sharp Memorial 

Hospital, where he was registered at 11:55 a.m., approximately two hours after the hearing 

started. 

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Plaintiff is provided thirty (30) days in which to identify new counsel and to have that 

counsel make an appearance before the court. The court sets a midlitigation status conference for 

December 14, 2023, at 2:30 p.m. before the undersigned to discuss the status of this case and 

any pending motions. 

The court refers Mr. Applbaum to the California State Bar for consideration of whether he 

has violated California’s Rules of Professional Conduct based on the information discussed in this 

order. 

The Clerk of Court is directed to make a record of Mr. Applbaum’s suspension from 

membership of the bar of this court and serve a copy of this order on the California State Bar’s 

Office of Chief Trial Counsel, 845 South Figueroa Street, Los Angles, CA 90017, 213-765-1168 

(fax).

This order resolves ECF Nos. 62, 63 and 71. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

14 DATED: October 12, 2023. 

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