Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01899/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01899-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIERRA NORTHERN RAILWAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

PORT OF WEST SACRAMENTO and

RAMCON ENGINEERING &

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, 

INC.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01899-DJC-JDP

ORDER ISSUING PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION

Following the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, the Court now 

considers Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction pending resolution of this case. 

Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to show entitlement to a preliminary 

injunction under the “serious questions” test. As discussed below, there is a 

significant factual dispute between the Parties that may determine the outcome of 

Plaintiff’s claims. If Plaintiff is ultimately able to establish the facts in its favor, then 

Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. Considering the allegations in the 

Complaint and the facts in the record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has 

established at least serious questions about the merits of its claims. Without issuance 

of a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff will be irreparably harmed, while Defendants have 

articulated no real hardship if the status quo is maintained for the duration of the 

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litigation. The balance of hardships, therefore, “tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor” 

warranting issuance of the injunction. The Court accordingly GRANTS the Motion for

Preliminary Injunction. 

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Sierra Northern Railway (“SNR”), a common carrier railroad, brings the 

present suit against the Sacramento-Yolo Port District (which appears to have been 

erroneously sued as the Port of West Sacramento) (“the Port”), a governmental 

independent special district, and the Port’s tenant, Ramcon Engineering & 

Environmental Consulting, Inc. (“Ramcon”) (collectively “Defendants”) over 

Defendants’ decision to revoke Plaintiff’s alleged license to access its property via a 

route through the property leased by Ramcon, the “North Access route.” (Compl. 

(ECF No 1) ¶¶ 3–5.) Plaintiff operates a railway transloading service in West 

Sacramento where it stores and transfers freight between railroads and other means 

of transportation. (Id. ¶ 12.) In order to effect its transloading services, Plaintiff alleges 

that it has historically used the North Access route. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) 

Plaintiff acquired a parcel of land from the Port in 2012 where it houses its rail 

facilities. (Id. ¶ 13.) While the parcel included a deeded easement for an access route 

on the southern portion of the property, the “South Access route,” the Port, through its 

General Manager Rick Toft, granted Plaintiff a license to access the property via the 

contested North Access route. He told Plaintiff’s CEO, Kennan H. Beard, that SNR 

could use the route without restriction, removed the lock on the gate securing the 

road, and allowed Plaintiff to install its own lock on the gate. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 15.) In reliance 

on the license to utilize the North Access route, Plaintiff improved its land and built its 

rail facilities at the northern portion of its property, expending nearly $2,000,000. (Id.

¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that it thereafter began to use the North Access route to 

conduct its operations. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) 

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After constructing the rail facilities, and in apparent reliance on the use of the 

North Access route, in 2023 Plaintiff leased a parcel of land at the southern portion of 

its property to a construction company, Flatiron Contractors, Inc. (“Flatiron”). (Id.

¶ 18.) The lease contract between Flatiron and Plaintiff grants Flatiron exclusive use of 

the southern portion of Plaintiff’s property, including a pathway that connects the 

South Access route to Plaintiff’s rail facilities on the north end of the property. (Beard 

Decl., (ECF No. 21-1) Ex. A at 1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges, it cannot access its rail 

facilitates or carry out its operation except through the North Access route. (Id. ¶ 21.) 

In May 2024, Defendants purported to revoke Plaintiff’s license to use the North 

Access route, which became effective on July 10, 2024. (Ex Parte Appl. for TRO (“TRO 

App”) (ECF No. 2) at 10 –11.) Without use of the North Access route, Plaintiff claims 

that it is unable to access its rail facilities and alleges that the lack of access will cause 

Plaintiff to substantially cease its shipping activities. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff has filed the 

present suit requesting a declaratory judgement that Defendants’ actions are 

preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), 49 

U.S.C. §§10101 et seq., seeking to quiet title to the route and equitably estop 

Defendants from revoking the license, and asserting violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against the Port for unlawful taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. 

B. Procedural Background

On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for a Temporary 

Restraining Order to restore Plaintiff’s movement through the North Access route. 

(TRO App. at 1.) The Court held a hearing on July 12, 2024, with David Diepenbrock 

appearing for Plaintiff and Lauren Jones and Jeff Mitchell appearing for the Port. 

Defendant Ramcon did not appear at the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the Court granted the Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, (ECF No. 11), 

and later issued a written order (ECF No. 13). 

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Pursuant to the briefing schedule set by the Court, Plaintiff filed the instant 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“PI Mot.”) ECF No. 14), Defendants 

filed Oppositions (Def. the Port’s Opp’n (ECF No. 16); Def. Ramcon’s Opp’n (ECF No. 

18)), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (ECF No. 21). The Court held oral argument on the 

Motion on July 25, 2024 with David Diepenbrock and William Scott Cameron

appearing for Plaintiff, Lauren Jones appearing for Defendant the Port, and Kristen 

Renfro appearing for Defendant Ramcon. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court 

extended the Temporary Restraining Order for an additional fourteen (14) days and 

took the matter under submission. 

II. Legal Standard for Preliminary Injunction 

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 

in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 

The Ninth Circuit also recognizes the “serious questions” test which is a type of sliding 

scale test. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Under the sliding scale, “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker 

showing of another.” Id. “For example, a stronger showing of irreparable harm to 

plaintiff might offset a lesser showing of likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. 

Accordingly, “[a] preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates 

. . . that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of 

hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor.” Id. at 1134–35. After Winters, in order to 

meet the serious questions test, the Plaintiff must also make a showing of irreparable 

injury and public interest. Id.

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III. Discussion

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

i. Plaintiff’s License to the North Access 

As an initial matter, at this stage of the proceedings the evidence supports a 

finding that General Manager Toft granted a license to Plaintiff to use the North 

Access route. A license is a grant of authority “to perform an act or acts on the 

property of another pursuant to the express or implied permission of the owner” 

which would otherwise be considered trespassing. 6 Miller & Starr Cal. Real Est. (4th 

ed.) § 15:2. While he does not use the word “license,” in his declaration, Toft states 

that he granted Plaintiff permission to use the North Access route. (Toft Decl. (ECF 

No. 16) ¶ 11.) Toft does not dispute that he then proceeded to remove the lock on 

the gate to the North Access route and allow Plaintiff to replace the lock with a rail

lock. This was an express grant of permission for Plaintiff to use the North Access 

route, i.e., a license to use the route. 

Even if Toft did not have the authority to grant a license on behalf of the Port, a 

license may be found without the express permission of the licensor where it is 

“exercised with the licensor's knowledge and under such circumstances as would 

prompt a reasonable person to object.” 6 Miller & Starr Cal. Real Est. (4th ed.) § 15:2. 

As Plaintiff asserts, it used the access route openly and regularly, and Defendants did 

not object to Plaintiff’s use of the route for a number of years. While Defendants 

dispute the frequency and exclusively of Plaintiff’s use of the license, Defendants have 

not disputed that Plaintiff did utilize the route openly and maintained their own lock 

on the gate since 2019. Accordingly, the Port had knowledge that Plaintiff was 

exercising a license, and effectively ratified the license by failing to object to it. 

Irrevocable License

While a license is ordinarily revocable at will, it becomes irrevocable as an 

equitable remedy “when the licensee, acting in good faith under the terms of the 

instrument, constructs valuable improvements on the property, making it unjust to 

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permit the cancellation [of the license] . . . .” Belmont Cnty. Water Dist. v. State of 

California, 65 Cal. App. 3d 13, 17 (1976). In order for a license to be considered 

irrevocable under these equitable estoppel principles, it must be unjust to allow the 

license to be revoked. Gamerberg v. 3000 E. 11th St., LLC, 44 Cal. App. 5th 424, 430 

(2020). Similarly, the license is only irrevocable “for so long a time as the nature of it 

calls for.” Stoner v. Zucker, 148 Cal. 516, 520, 83 P. 808, 810 (1906); accord

Richardson v. Franc, 233 Cal. App. 4th 744, 757–58 (2015). 

It follows from these principles that where the licensee would suffer no 

substantial loss, or where the circumstances no longer necessitate the license, the 

licensee would not be entitled to the equitable remedy. Broads v. Mead, 159 Cal. 

765, 768, 116 P. 46, 47 (1911). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s license should not be 

considered irrevocable because it would not be unjust to revoke the license for two 

related reasons: (1) the improvements were not made to the licensed land itself, and 

(2) Plaintiff maintains the ability to access the improvements it made to its own land 

through the South Access route such that it is not losing the value of the 

improvements it made. 

While Defendant is correct that many cases have found an irrevocable license 

where the improvements were made to the licensed land itself, that is not a 

requirement for an irrevocable license. A licensee must expend valuable resources in 

furtherance of and in reliance on the license, but not necessarily on the licensed 

property. Gamerberg, 44 Cal. App. 5th at 430. Courts have found irrevocable 

licenses where licensees made improvements to their own land in reliance on the 

license because revocation of the license would prevent the licensee from enjoying 

the benefit of their expenditure. As one California court put it, “[i]n the paradigmatic 

case, a landowner allows his neighbor the right to use some portion of his property —

often a right-of-way or water from a creek — knowing that the neighbor needs the right 

to develop his property. The neighbor then builds a house, digs an irrigation ditch, 

paves the right-of-way, plants an orchard, or farms the land in reliance on the 

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landowner's acquiescence.” Richardson v. Franc, 233 Cal. App. 4th 744, 751–52 

(2015); see, e.g., Higgins v. Kadjevich, 186 Cal. App. 2d 520, 521 (1960) (plaintiff 

established irrevocable license to use a pipeline where plaintiff built an extension of 

the pipeline running to the well on plaintiff’s property in reliance on the license to use 

the main pipeline). 

Here, Plaintiff has provided evidence that it made valuable improvements on its 

property in reliance on the license to use the North Access facility. After being 

granted the license, Plaintiff spent nearly $2 million on installation of its rail facilities on 

the northern portion of its property close to the North Access route. That Plaintiff 

chose to install the facilities there instead of installing them on the southern portion of 

the property near the South Access route evinces its reliance on the license. These 

improvements are sufficient to support a finding of irrevocable license. 1

That the valuable improvements are on Plaintiff’s property and not on the 

licensed route does, however, factor into whether Plaintiff will be able to enjoy the 

benefit of its expenditures if the license were revoked. The parties fundamentally 

disagree about whether Plaintiff maintains access to the rail facilities through the 

South Access route. In his declaration, Rollo Stephens, the Construction Manager for 

Defendant Ramcon, attests that he is regularly on the property adjacent to Plaintiff’s 

property, and has observed Plaintiff’s activities on the property over the years. 

(Stephens’s Decl. (ECF No. 17) ¶ 3.) He states that Plaintiff did not historically use the 

North Access route, and that only recently, in May 2024, did it begin to use the North 

Access route as a regular means of ingress. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 7–9.) To facilitate this route, SNR 

placed signs directing SNR traffic to the North Access route for the first time in May 

2024. (Id. ¶ 8.) Stephens stated that he has not observed any physical barrier to 

1

In his declaration, Beard attests that Plaintiff did make improvements to the North Access route as 

well, stating that “SNR removed the weeds, graded the road to remove the potholes, and then added 

road base so it would not become muddy” and that SNR continues to maintain the road. (Beard Decl. 

¶ 12.) However, Plaintiff fails to allege that these improvements were valuable sufficient to support its 

claim to an irrevocable license. 

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accessing the northern portion of Plaintiff’s property from the South Access route and 

through the portion of the property leased by Flatiron. (Id. ¶ 10.) Defendants have 

also provided photographs of the southern portion of Plaintiff’s property which Toft 

has declared accurately depict the current state of the property. (Toft Decl. ¶ 30; Exs. 

H and I (ECF No. 25).) These photographs depict a physically unencumbered pathway 

from the South Access through the portion of the property leased by Flatiron to 

Plaintiff’s rail facilities. At oral argument, Plaintiff did not contest that the pathway is 

physically unencumbered with the exception of movable construction equipment.

Plaintiff disputes Stephens’s and Toft’s assertions that Plaintiff’s use of the North 

Access is new, and disputes whether the route through the Flatiron property provides 

a means of access. Beard attests that Plaintiff has exclusively used the North Access

route to conduct its operations since it installed its rail facilities on the property in 

2019. (Beard Decl. ¶ 11.) Beard attests that the loop described by Stephens —

wherein both SNR and Flatiron have used the North Access route as a means of 

ingress and the South Access route as a means of egress — was only temporary and is 

not a feasible option for Plaintiff’s continued operations. (Id. ¶ 10.) He declares that 

the route was used in a limited capacity while the Port made improvement on the 

South Access road, describing the path as a "temporary route that ran through the 

area Flatiron has leased from SNR,” which “is narrow and ungraded, uncompacted, 

and is mostly just dirt, without any gravel.” (Id.) Beard further attests that “[s]ignificant 

work would have to be performed to make it a viable route for SNR’s employees and 

customers." (Id.) Accordingly, this route may not be a feasible means for Plaintiff to 

access and enjoy the benefit of the improvements it made to the northern portion of 

its property. 

Defendants further contest Plaintiff’s assertion that it is legally precluded from 

using the South Access route under the terms of its lease with Flatiron. Defendants 

include the application submitted by Flatiron to the City of West Sacramento for a 

temporary use permit in February 2024 which states that, per the terms of the lease 

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agreement between Flatiron and Plaintiff, Flatiron is not allowed to operate when the 

railway is operating at the entrance, and is required to coordinate with Plaintiff’s 

activities. (Toft Decl., Ex. E at 4.) Defendant argues that this representation by Flatiron 

contradicts Plaintiff’s allegations that Flatiron has exclusive use of the leased portion of 

the property. 

In response Plaintiff includes the agreement between Flatiron and SNR which 

states that Flatiron was granted exclusive use of the property by the leasing 

instrument. (Beard Decl., Ex. A at 1.) At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that 

Flatiron’s representation in the use permit application refers to section 6 of the 

agreement which states that Flatiron will not interfere with Plaintiff’s operations. (See 

id. at 2–3.) The Court does not see an inconsistency between the application to West 

Sacramento, which states that the lease prohibits Flatiron from operating when the 

railway is operating at the entrance, and Plaintiff’s position that the lease does not 

permit it to drive across the leased property on a regular basis. 

In sum, while Plaintiff has satisfactorily established reliance on the license, there 

is a factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff has a meaningful ability to access and enjoy 

the benefit of the improvements it made to the land, and whether revocation of the 

license would therefore be unjust such that the license is irrevocable. Given the 

factual showing at this stage, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has shown a serious 

question on the merits of its claim that it possesses an irrevocable license to the North 

Access route. 

Statute of Frauds 

Defendants argue that any license Plaintiff purports to possess is invalid under 

the statute of frauds. The statute of frauds requires the conveyance of any interest in 

land for more than a period of a year to be made in writing, otherwise such agreement 

is unenforceable. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(a)(3). All parties concede that any 

agreement for the use of the North Access road was made orally and not in writing. 

A license, however, is not a conveyance of land to which the statute of frauds 

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applies. Instead, as stated above, it is a grant of authority to use property for a 

purpose. 6 Miller & Starr Cal. Real Est. (4th ed.) § 15:2. A license is granted to an 

individual and does not run with the land. Id. It may be granted orally, and may even 

be granted without any express authorization of the licensor. Id. Thus, a license is not 

subject to the statute of frauds in the first instance. 

An irrevocable license, which is finding based in equitable estoppel principles, 

is similarly not subject to the statute of frauds. 6 Miller & Starr Cal. Real Est. (4th ed.) 

§ 15:2. Equitable estoppel is by its nature an exception to the statute of frauds:

The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been 

consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that 

would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain 

circumstances. Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that 

would result from denying enforcement of the contract after one party 

has been induced by the other seriously to change his position in 

reliance on the contract. 

Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 623, 220 P.2d 737 (1950). A license becomes 

irrevocable when the licensee can make this showing of reliance on the license and an 

injury if it is revoked. Belmont Cnty. Water Dist., 65 Cal. App. 3d at 17 (a licenses 

becomes irrevocable “when the licensee, acting in good faith under the terms of the 

instrument, constructs valuable improvements on the property, making it unjust to 

permit the cancellation . . . .”). Thus, an irrevocable license is not within the purview of 

the statute of frauds. See id.; Colvin v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1312 

(1987), abrogated on other grounds by Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095 (1993). 

Accordingly, the statute of frauds is not a defense to the finding of an irrevocable 

license. 

ii. ICCTA Preemption

Plaintiff contends that ICCTA preempts Defendant from revoking Plaintiff’s 

license to use the North Access route because it would effectively cause an 

abandonment of a rail line and unreasonably interfere with railway transportation. 

“ICCTA contains an express preemption clause, which grants the U.S. Surface 

Transportation Board (“STB”) exclusive jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carrier” 

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“as part of the interstate rail network.” 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a); Levin Richmond Terminal 

Corp. v. City of Richmond, 482 F. Supp. 3d 944, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2020). 

The statute defines rail transportation expansively to encompass any property, 

facility, structure, or equipment “related to the movement of passengers or property, 

or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 10102(9). (emphasis added) “Moreover, 49 U.S.C. § 10501(6) defines “railroad” 

broadly to include track, terminal facility, ground, etc., used or necessary for 

transportation.” Jie Ao and Xin Zhouf, Petition for Declaratory Ord., No. FD 35539, 

2012 WL 2047726, at *4 (June 4, 2012). Transloading facilities, like those operated by 

Plaintiff, are considered to be “rail carriers” and part of the rail transportation system 

under ICCTA. See Levin Richmond Terminal Corp., 482 F. Supp. 3d at 961 (collecting 

cases); Valero Ref. Company Petition for Declaratory Order, No. FD 36036, 2016 WL 

5904757, at *3 (S.T.B., Sept. 20, 2016) (“The [STB]’s jurisdiction extends to rail-related 

activities that take place at transloading (or, as here, off-loading) facilities if the 

activities are performed by a rail carrier . . . .”). 

ICCTA preemption may be categorical, preempting state laws that have “the 

effect of managing or governing rail transportation” or as applied, where the law 

“would have the effect of unreasonably burdening or interfering with rail 

transportation.” Levin, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 961 (quoting Franks Inv. Co. LLC v. Union 

Pac. R. Co., 593 F.3d 404, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2010)). ICCTA does not “preempt state or 

local laws if they are laws of general applicability that do not unreasonably interfere 

with interstate commerce.” Ass'n of Am. Railroads v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 

622 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010). Similarly, “[r]outine non-conflicting uses, such as 

non-exclusive easements for at-grade crossings, are not preempted, as long as they 

would not impede rail operations or pose undue safety risks.” Whether a law 

unreasonably burdens rail transportation “involves a fact-bound case-specific 

determination.’” Franks, 593 F.3d at 413-14.

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Although “general principles of state property and contract law [] cannot be 

said to [categorically] ‘have the effect of manag[ing] or govern[ing] rail 

transportation,’” Burgoyne, LLC v. Chicago Terminal R.R. Co., 169 N.E. 3d 815, 824 (Ill. 

App. 2020), “[t]he agency's broad and exclusive jurisdiction over railroad operations 

and activities prevents application of state laws that would otherwise be available” 

where the application of these laws would effectively cause an abandonment of rail

lines or otherwise interfere with the railway’s use of the land. Jie Ao and Xin Zhouf, 

2012 WL 2047726, at *5. “ICCTA preemption does not depend upon the source of a 

state law claim” but on whether the “requested remedy will, in the words of the STB's 

governing test, ‘impede rail operations . . . .’” City of Ozark, Arkansas v. Union Pac. R.R. 

Co., 843 F.3d 1167, 1172 (8th Cir. 2016). “Whether that interference with rail 

transportation arises from a public or private easement, or from opening a new 

crossing or restoring an abandoned crossing, is irrelevant to the federal preemption 

analysis.” Id. 

A rail line cannot be removed without authorization from the STB even if doing 

so would otherwise be warranted under the applicable state law because “a rail carrier 

cannot lawfully ‘abandon any part of its railroad lines’ or ‘discontinue operation of all 

rail transportation over any part of its railroad lines’ unless the STB ‘finds that the 

present or future public convenience and necessity’ are satisfied.” Ass'n of Am. 

Railroads v. Hudson, No. 1:23-CV-815-DJN, 2024 WL 1626105, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 

2024) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d)) (emphasis added); see Thompson v. Texas Mexican 

Ry. Co., 328 U.S. 134, 145 (1946) (holding that rail lines cannot be removed without 

authorization even if their underlying leases have terminated). For example, in 

Burgoyne, the plaintiff attempted to terminate the railway’s easement pursuant to the 

terms of the deed which provided that the easement would automatically terminate if 

not in use for twelve (12) consecutive months. 169 N.E. 3d at 821. The court found 

that termination of the easement would be an abandonment of the rail line because it 

would make it impossible for the railway to conduct rail services on the line, and that 

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ICCTA therefore preempted the action. Id. at 82. This was true even though the rail 

line was not actively in use. Id.; see also Jie Ao and Xin Zhouf, 2012 WL 2047726, at *5

(holding that adverse possession claim was preempted by ICTAA even though the rail 

line was not in current use because it would prevent potential future use of the rail 

line). Similarly, in B & S Holdings, LLC v. BNSF Railway Company, the plaintiff’s adverse 

possession claim was preempted because the possession would “interfere with 

railroad operations, [and] would divest the railroad of the very property with which it 

conducts its operations.” 889 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (E.D. Wash. 2012).

Defendant’s revocation of the license to use the North Access route would be 

preempted by ICCTA if Plaintiff can prove that its operations are unreasonably 

burdened by the revocation. Plaintiff asserts that it has been using the licensed area 

to conduct its transloading operations (though the Parties disagree about whether it 

has been doing so exclusively), and has effectively established the route as a rail line

over which it conducts its transloading activities. By revoking the license to use the rail 

line, Defendants’ actions could have the effect of removing that portion of the rail line 

and discontinuing Plaintiff’s operation over that rail line. 

As discussed above, the parties disagree about whether Plaintiff is able to 

access its rail facilities and conduct its operation via the South Access road. The lease 

with Flatiron contemplates that Flatiron will comply with the laws, regulations, 

enactments, and rules of, among other entities, the STB, suggesting that the STB 

could order access over Flatiron’s property rather than that of the Port, which might be 

a more equitable result given that Plaintiff acted to release its legal right to the South 

Access route. Even so, this appears to be an issue for the STB, and weighs in favor of 

finding ICCTA preemption. Further, even if Plaintiff is able to conduct operations 

using the South Access route, Plaintiff claims the route will need to be improved for 

year-round use, and therefore moving the operations may burden, at least 

temporarily, the railway’s operations. Therefore, while the facts still need to be 

developed, the revocation of the license to use the North Access route may cause 

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unauthorized abandonment or unreasonably interfere with rail transportation such 

that the action falls under the preemptive scope of ICCTA. 

iii. Section 1983 Claim

To establish a section 1983 cause of action against a municipality, the plaintiff 

must prove “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was 

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is 

the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 

654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of 

Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). “[A] plaintiff seeking to impose liability on 

a municipality under § 1983 [must] identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused 

the plaintiff's injury,” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 

403 (1997) because “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury 

inflicted solely by its employees or agents,” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of 

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Liability under Monell may be premised on the 

decision of a decision-making official who was, as a matter of state law, a final 

policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 

policy in the area of decision. See Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008); 

Thomas v. Cnty. of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff argues that the Port deprived Plaintiff of its Fifth Amendment rights by 

revoking the license to use the North Access route without compensation because 

Plaintiff holds an irrevocable license to the North Access route. An irrevocable license 

to enter and use land is the functional equivalent of an easement, see Gramerberg, 44 

Cal. App. 5th at 433, and would therefore be a property interest for purposes of the 

Fifth Amendment, see Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States, 170 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 

1999). As discussed above, there are serious factual questions about whether the 

license to the North Access route is irrevocable. 

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Further, there is a serious question about whether Toft’s actions can be imputed 

to the Port. The evidence provided by Defendants suggests that General Manager 

Toft, is not the “final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 

represent official policy in the area of decision.” The Port is controlled by a governing 

body, the Port Commission, and operates according to a policy manual. The manual 

specifies that any contracts or agreement must be executed by the Chairman of the 

Port Commission, the CEO, or the designee of those entities. Specifically, only the 

Port CEO or designee “is authorized to grant rights, licenses, and/or permits for use of 

port facilitates and/or property in an amount not to exceed $100,000, (revenue), nor 

for a period exceeding five (5) years.” (Toft Decl., Ex. J, at 1.) Any grant of a license 

for a term of more than five years must be approved by the Port Commission. (Id.) 

Accordingly, under the Port’s official policies, General Manager Toft is not entrusted 

with the authority to grant licenses, and is therefore also unlikely to be the final 

authority with respect to revoking such a license. 

Plaintiff contends that Toft’s conduct shows that he is the designee of the Port 

CEO or Commission on the issue of granting licenses. Toft initially held himself out as 

having authority to grant the license to use the North Access route, and was able to 

remove the lock from the gate. Toft also negotiated the terms of a possible lease 

agreement for the access route. Prior to the revocation of the license, Beard and Toft 

had reached a tentative agreement on potential monthly rent for the North Access 

route. (Beard Decl. ¶ 9.) During these discussions, Toft did not mention that he 

needed any permission from the Commission or the CEO to enter into such an 

agreement. Toft was then the only party from the Port to communicate to Plaintiff

about the decision to revoke the license. Further, in communications between Plaintiff 

and the Port concerning the revocation, the Port’s counsel indicated that it would 

need to wait until Toft was back from vacation to provide a response to Plaintiff’s 

cease and desist letter. (Diepenbrock Decl. (ECF No. 2-2) ¶ 3.) Counsel for the Port 

later proposed a 48-hour standstill after speaking with Toft. (Id., Ex. B.) At no point 

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did counsel indicate that the Port CEO or Commission would need to approve any 

decisions related to the revocation of the license, but instead treated Toft as the final 

decision-making authority. This evidence suggests that Toft makes final decisions on 

behalf of the Port with respect to granting and revoking licenses, or at least with 

respect to decisions about the use of this specific property. It is therefore plausible 

that Toft was the CEO or Commission’s designee, and that his actions constitute the 

policy of the Port. 

If Plaintiff is able to establish that it had an irrevocable license and that Toft had 

the authority to make policy on behalf of the Port, then it is likely to succeed on the 

merits of its section 1983 claim. 

B. Irreparable Harm 

Plaintiff has established that there is a likelihood of irreparable harm if the 

injunction is not issued. Plaintiff has alleged that it will not be able to reach its rail 

facilities or operate its transloading activities if it cannot use the Northern Access 

route. While there is an outstanding factual issue as to whether Plaintiff can physically 

access the facilities, Plaintiff has no legal right to do so under the terms of its lease. 

Plaintiff has also established that it would be forced to change its current operations if 

the license to use the North Access is revoked, which would reduce or cease Plaintiff’s 

operations for a period of time. 

Further, if Plaintiff is able to establish that its constitutional rights were violated, 

such a continuing violation of those rights is an irreparable harm. Hernandez v. 

Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017) (a finding of irreparable harm “follows 

inexorably” from a “conclusion that the government's current policies are likely 

unconstitutional”). And, as explained in the Court’s Order issuing the Temporary 

Restraining Order, if in fact Plaintiff has a property interest in the licensed area, “[i]t is 

well-established that the loss of an interest in real property constitutes an irreparable 

injury.” Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass'n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 

1159 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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C. Balance of Hardships 

In contrast, Defendants have not articulated a hardship that outweighs Plaintiff’s 

potential harm. First, while Defendant Ramcon has stated that it intends to install 

drainage on the North Access route, it stated in its Opposition and at oral argument 

that it does not plan to begin any construction until after a final adjudication on the 

merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, Ramcon will not be harmed by a preliminary 

injunction while the claims are adjudicated. 

Next, the Port purports that it will be harmed by not generating income through 

leasing the North Access route. As an initial matter, the Port does not show how it will 

receive any additional funds if the Court denies the Preliminary Injunction; it is not as 

though there is another entity willing to pay for the North Access route. Moreover, the 

Port has not charged for the use of the route since at least 2017 when the license was 

granted and there is no indication that the Port has a ready leasee. Prior to this 

litigation, the Parties engaged in discussions whereby Plaintiff agreed to pay the Port’s 

asking rent price of $750, and the Port ultimately reneged on this agreement. (Beard 

Decl. ¶ 9.) The fact that the Port declined to lease the route to Plaintiff is evidence that 

the Port does not imminently require those funds. 

Because the preservation of the status quo will not harm Defendant Ramcon,

and will impose at most a minimal hardship on the Port, the balance of hardships 

clearly tips in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. 

D. Public Interest 

The public interest also weighs in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. 

Plaintiff is a common carrier which ships supplies for various companies, including for 

other common carriers. If Plaintiff must substantially cease it shipping activities 

Plaintiff’s customers will be harmed, and the interruption in services may cause other 

supply stream issues which will affect the public. Further, the tenant leasing Plaintiff’s 

property is performing a public works project on a major California highway. If 

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Plaintiff is forced to route through the property occupied by Flatiron, it may disrupt 

Flatiron’s operations and impact Flatiron’s work on the project.

Defendant the Port argues that its inability to monetize the North Access route 

will impact its ability to carry out its major operations — rice exports and cement 

imports — and will affect the employment of 50 employees, both of which will harm the 

public. As the Court noted above, the potential revenue for the North Access route is

minimal, and the Port has thus far not collected income on the property. Accordingly,

it is not credible that the preliminary injunction will impact the Port’s financial status to 

such an extent that it will be unable to operate or retain its employees. 

The public interest factor therefore favors maintaining the status quo while the 

merits of the case are adjudicated so that Plaintiff can continue its common carrier 

shipping activities without impacting Flatiron’s involvement in the public works 

project.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff has established that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction. While 

there are factual questions, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence to establish, at 

a minimum, serious questions on the merits, if not a likelihood of success on the 

merits. Plaintiff has shown that absent the preliminary injunction, it will suffer 

irreparable injury, that the public interest favors imposing a preliminary injunction, 

and that the balance of hardships “tips sharply” in Plaintiff’s favor. All. for the Wild 

Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134–35. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby GRANTED as follows: 

Pending the ultimate disposition of this matter, Defendants Sacramento-Yolo Port 

District (sued here as the Port of West Sacramento) and Ramcon Engineering & 

Environmental Consulting, Inc., and all those acting in concert with each or both of 

them, are hereto ordered to cease and desist from preventing or impeding Plaintiff 

Sierra Northern Railway, its employees, or any of its customers from using the 

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Northern Access route to SNR’s West Sacramento rail yard in order to effect Plaintiff’s 

transloading operation.

This order shall take effect immediately. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 7, 2024 

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DJC2 — SNR24cv01899.PI

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