Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05125/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05125-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 4, 2010 Decided July 22, 2011

No. 09-5125

MOATH HAMZA AHMED AL ALWI, DETAINEE,

APPELLANT

v.

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-02223)

Ramzi Kassem argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs were Zachary Katznelson, William J. Murphy, and

John J. Connolly.

Sarang V. Damle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Ian

Heath Gershengorn, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and

Robert M. Loeb, Attorney. Matthew M. Collette and August E.

Flentje, Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, entered appearances.

Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #09-5125 Document #1320097 Filed: 07/22/2011 Page 1 of 28
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the denial

of the petition of Moath Hamza Ahmed Al Alwi -- a detainee at

the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- for a

writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons stated below, we affirm

the judgment of the district court.

I

Al Alwi is a Yemeni citizen who was raised in Saudi

Arabia. According to the government, he traveled to

Afghanistan sometime in or around 2000, intending to join the

Taliban’s fight against the Northern Alliance. By the

government’s account, Al Alwi stayed in several guesthouses

associated with the Taliban, and in at least one that was

associated with al Qaeda where he turned over his passport. 

Taliban fighters escorted him between two of the guesthouses. 

Thereafter, he traveled to a Taliban-linked training camp near

Kabul, where he was trained to fire a rocket-propelled grenade

launcher and was issued a Kalashnikov rifle, ammunition

magazines, and grenades. Al Alwi then joined a combat unit,

led by a high-ranking al Qaeda official, that fought with the

Taliban on two different fronts. Al Alwi did not leave the unit

until well after September 11, 2001, by which time his unit had

been bombed by United States warplanes responding to the

terrorist attacks of that date. Al Alwi fled to Pakistan, where he

was captured and subsequently turned over to U.S. authorities. 

Since then, Al Alwi has been a detainee at Guantanamo Bay.

In 2005, Al Alwi -- through his cousin as next friend -- filed

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was held in

abeyance until the Supreme Court ruled, in Boumediene v. Bush,

that “the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus” extends to

aliens detained as enemy combatants at Guantanamo. 553 U.S.

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723, 732 (2008). In the meantime, pursuant to the Detainee

Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, 119

Stat. 2680 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2005)), Al Alwi filed

an appeal from the determination of his Combatant Status

Review Tribunal (CSRT) that he was an enemy combatant, an

appeal that was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.1

In the summer of 2008, after the Supreme Court issued

Boumediene, the district court reinitiated his habeas

proceedings. On December 16-17, 2008, the court held a habeas

hearing for Al Alwi.

Following the hearing, the district court found that a

preponderance of the evidence supported the government’s

account of Al Alwi’s activities in Afghanistan. Dist. Ct. Op. at

4, 6, 10 (Jan. 9, 2009) (J.A. 1797, 1799, 1803).2 It reached this

conclusion largely on the basis of Al Alwi’s own interrogation

statements, the majority of which were not disputed by his

counsel at the habeas hearing.3

 In light of its factual findings,

1

Al Alwi v. Gates, No. 07-1251 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2009); see

Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the

section of the DTA that granted this court jurisdiction over petitions

to review CSRT determinations could not be severed from the

provision that eliminated habeas corpus jurisdiction, a provision the

Supreme Court had held unconstitutional in Boumediene, and

therefore dismissing the petitions and remitting the petitioners to their

remedy under the habeas corpus statute).

2

All references to “Dist. Ct. Op.” are to a declassified version of

the district court’s classified opinion that is contained in the

declassified Joint Appendix. See Al Alwi v. Bush, No. 05-2223

(D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2009) (J.A. 1794).

3

The government also presented evidence that Al Alwi was a

member of Osama Bin Laden’s personal bodyguard force, and that he

trained at al Qaeda’s al-Farouq training camp. Gov’t Factual Return

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the court determined that Al Alwi was being lawfully detained

because it was “more probable than not that [Al Alwi] was ‘part

of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces’ both prior to and

after the initiation of U.S. hostilities in October 2001.” Dist. Ct.

Op. at 10 (J.A. 1803). Accordingly, the court denied Al Alwi’s

habeas petition.

On appeal, Al Alwi raises two categories of challenges to

the denial of his petition. He argues that the district court erred

in determining that he was being lawfully detained on the record

as it stood before that court. And he further argues that the

court’s procedural errors deprived him of a meaningful

opportunity to develop a record upon which he could challenge

his detention. We consider these arguments in Parts II and III.

II

Al Alwi challenges, on two grounds, the district court’s

substantive determination that he was being lawfully detained. 

First, he contends that the court applied the wrong detention

standard. Second, he maintains that the court erred in resting its

determination primarily on his own statements because those

statements were not sufficiently corroborated. “We review the

at 12-13, 16-20 (J.A. 385-86, 389-93); see Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613

F.3d 1102, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that “[a]t least eight of the

September 11th hijackers had trained at Al Farouq”). Al Alwi did not

make such admissions during his interrogations, and his counsel

vigorously disputed them at the habeas hearing. In light of its finding

that the account of Al Alwi’s activities contained in his own

statements was sufficient to justify his detention, the district court

declined to evaluate the evidence supporting those additional charges. 

See Dist. Ct. Op. at 10 n.2 (J.A. 1803). We decline to do so as well. 

See Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 404 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

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district court’s findings of fact for clear error, its habeas

determination de novo, and any challenged evidentiary rulings

for abuse of discretion.” Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted); see Bensayah v.

Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

A

Following the al Qaeda attacks against the United States on

September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for Use

of Military Force (AUMF).4 Adopting a detention standard

offered by the government, the district court held that the United

States has authority, pursuant to the AUMF, to detain an

individual who, more likely than not: 

was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or

associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against

the United States or its coalition partners. 

Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2008). After

examining the evidence, the court found that “it is more

probable than not that petitioner was supporting the Taliban and

al Qaeda in a manner consistent with the [detention standard]

4

The AUMF provides:

[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and

appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or

persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or

aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,

2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to

prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the

United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (reprinted at 50

U.S.C. § 1541 note).

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this court has adopted.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9-10 (J.A. 1802-03); see

Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“It is

now well-settled law that a preponderance of the evidence

standard is constitutional in considering a habeas petition from

an individual detained pursuant to authority granted by the

AUMF.”).

Subsequent to the district court’s decision, the government

adopted a narrower detention standard, which it has relied on in

this and other Guantanamo appeals. See, e.g., Bensayah, 610

F.3d at 722 n*; Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C.

Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870 n.1. The new standard

retains the original “part of” prong of the former standard, but

modifies the “support” prong to require “substantial” support. 

Under this standard, the government may detain an individual

who, more likely than not:

[was] part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or alQaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in

hostilities against the United States or its coalition

partners.

Gov’t Br. 19 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

omitted). For purposes of this appeal, Al Alwi does not dispute

the lawfulness of this standard. See Pet’r Br. 47-48, 64 n.18; see

also Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. Al Alwi maintains that we

should remand this case to the district court so that it can decide,

in the first instance, whether the government’s evidence meets

the “substantial support” standard. 

As we have explained, “whether a detainee’s alleged

conduct -- e.g., visiting an al-Qaida guesthouse or training at an

al-Qaida camp -- justifies his detention under the AUMF is a

legal question” that we review de novo. Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at

423; see Almerfedi v. Obama, No. 10-5921, 2011 WL 2277607,

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at *4 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2011); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d

400, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2011).5 “On review, we ask whether the

evidence in the whole record . . . establishes that a petitioner’s

detainability is more likely justified than not.” Almerfedi , 2011

WL 2277607, at *4. Accordingly, if we are persuaded that the

record evidence establishes the petitioner’s detainability, a

remand is not required. See id. at *1 (concluding “as a matter of

law that the government has demonstrated by a preponderance

of the evidence that [the petitioner] can be detained,” and

reversing without remanding “the district court’s decision

granting [the detainee’s] petition”); see also Uthman, 637 F.3d

at 402; Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1106 (D.C. Cir.

2010). There may, of course, be cases in which a remand is

warranted because further fact-finding by the district court is

necessary or would be helpful. See Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d

745, 752-53 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (vacating the district court’s grant

of the writ, but remanding “[b]ecause additional fact-finding is

required to resolve” whether the detainee was “part of” al Qaeda

“under this circuit’s evolving case law”). But where “the facts

found by the District Court, along with uncontested facts in the

record, demonstrate that [the detainee] more likely than not”

falls within the detention standard, we may resolve the matter on

our own. Uthman, 637 F.3d at 402.

Nor need we consider whether the detainee “substantially

supported” al Qaeda or the Taliban if we are persuaded that he

was “part of” either entity. As this court has now repeatedly

held, the AUMF “gives the United States government the

authority to detain a person who is found to have been ‘part of’

al Qaeda or Taliban forces.” Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 10; see Awad

5

By contrast, “[t]he question whether the government has proven

that conduct -- e.g., whether [the detainee] in fact stayed at an al-Qaida

guesthouse or trained at an al-Qaida camp -- is a factual question that

we review for clear error.” Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 423.

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v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Adahi, 613

F.3d at 1103; see also Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1076

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that we review de novo whether the

detainee satisfies the “part of” standard). Hence, if we conclude

that the record establishes that it is more likely than not that Al

Alwi was “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban, there is no need for

us to address the “substantial support” prong of the detention

standard or to remand the case. See Uthman, 637 F.3d at 402

(concluding “that the facts found by the District Court, along

with uncontested facts in the record, demonstrate that [the

detainee] more likely than not was part of al Qaeda,” and

therefore reversing the contrary judgment of that court without

requiring a hearing on remand); Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1106

(reversing and remanding with instructions to deny the

detainee’s petition because the evidence showed that the

detainee “was -- at the very least -- more likely than not a part

of al-Qaida”); see also Almerfedi, 2011 WL 2277607, at *6.

Here, the facts found by the district court are alone

sufficient for us to conclude that Al Alwi was “‘part of’ al

Qaeda or Taliban forces.”6

 The district court found that Al Alwi

traveled to Pakistan, and then on to Afghanistan, “specifically in

order to join the Taliban’s fight against the Northern Alliance.” 

Dist. Ct. Op. at 4-5 (J.A. 1797-98). Along the way, the court

found, he stayed in “at least three guesthouses closely associated

with the Taliban and/or al Qaeda.” Id. Al Alwi described his

escorts between the first two guesthouses as Taliban fighters. 

Id. at 5 (J.A. 1798). The court also found that the second

guesthouse, the al-Ansar guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan,

“had strong connections to al Qaeda.” Id. at 4 (J.A. 1797). Al

Alwi identified the assistant to the guesthouse’s leader in a

6

In Part II.B, infra, we address Al Alwi’s contention that the

district court committed clear error and/or abused its discretion in

finding those facts. 

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photograph with Osama Bin Laden. Id. Upon arrival at the

Kandahar guesthouse, Al Alwi turned over his passport and

money. Al Alwi then stayed in the Kandahar guesthouse for six

weeks. When he left, he retrieved his money but did not retrieve

his passport, a practice followed by other al Qaeda and Taliban

recruits. Id. at 4-5 (J.A. 1797-98).

The court further found that, after Al Alwi left the third,

Taliban-linked guesthouse in Kabul, he traveled in a Taliban

vehicle to a “Taliban-related” training camp known as the

Khalid Center. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6, 8 (J.A. 1799, 1801). There, he

received at least one day’s training on a rocket-propelled

grenade launcher (RPG), fired an RPG, and received a

Kalashnikov rifle, ammunition magazines, and grenades. Id. at

6 (J.A. 1799). He then joined a combat unit, the Omar Sayef

Group, that fought the Northern Alliance and related forces on

two fronts. Id. at 6-7 (J.A. 1799-1800). While with that unit, Al

Alwi fought under the leadership of an Iraqi named Abd

al-Hadi, a high-level al Qaeda member responsible for

commanding Arab and Taliban troops in Kabul. Id. at 8 (J.A.

1801). The court found that Al Alwi was assigned to a “middle

line” or secondary (defensive) position at a front north of Kabul,

where he remained for five to six months, during which time “he

was subject to several artillery attacks and saw other fighters

die.” Id. at 6-7 (J.A. 1799-1800). Upon orders from the head of

the unit, he then moved to a second front in the far north of

Afghanistan, near the Tajikistan border, for the “express purpose

of repelling enemy forces.” Id. at 7-8 (J.A. 1800-01). There, he

spent another three to five months, during which time the

fighters he was with exchanged fire with Tajiks. Id. at 7 (J.A.

1800).

Finally, the court found that Al Alwi was with Taliban

forces that were attacked by United States warplanes after

September 11, 2001, “and stayed with his Taliban unit for a

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period of time thereafter.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9 (J.A. 1802). 

“[M]ost of the people with whom [he] served in northern

Afghanistan were killed by U.S. bombs following the

commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom,” and he saw

two or three American bombing operations before he moved

south to Kabul and later to Khowst with others in his fighting

unit. Id. It was only in Khowst that he returned his weapons,

before fleeing Afghanistan for Pakistan, where he was captured

and turned over to U.S. authorities. Id.

Taking all of these findings together, the district court

concluded that “it is more probable than not that petitioner was

supporting the Taliban and al Qaeda.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9-10

(J.A. 1802-03). Although the court did not expressly say

whether Al Alwi was also “part of” the Taliban, it did repeatedly

describe him as serving with “his Taliban unit.” Id. at 9 (J.A.

1802); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 28. In any event, it

is plain to us that the foregoing facts, taken together (and if not

clearly erroneous), are sufficient to establish that Al Alwi more

likely than not was “part of” the Taliban or al Qaeda -- a point

the petitioner does not seriously dispute.7

 See Al-Madhwani v.

7

Al Alwi does maintain that the district court failed to make the

findings necessary to sustain a second part of the detention standard,

noting that the government must show not only that he was part of

Taliban or al Qaeda or associated forces, but also that those forces

“‘are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition

partners.’” Pet’r Br. 48 (quoting Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872 (emphasis

added)); see Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. Although he acknowledges this

court’s ruling in Al-Bihani that the United States is still engaged in

hostilities with the Taliban and al Qaeda, 590 F.3d at 874-75, Al Alwi

contends that (at most) he fought with an associated force, and that to

detain him the government must show that this force (and not just the

Taliban or al Qaeda) was still engaged in hostilities against the United

States at the time of his habeas hearing. This argument has two flaws. 

First, Al Alwi did not raise it in the district court; his only argument

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Obama, No. 10-5172, 2011 WL 2083932, at *4 (D.C. Cir. May

27, 2011) (stating that “‘carrying a brigade-issued weapon’ is

evidence that in combination with other factors may ‘strongly

suggest’ affiliation with enemy forces” (quoting Al-Bihani, 590

F.3d at 872-73)); Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1076 (holding that

“training at . . . al Qaeda training camps is compelling evidence

that the trainee was part of al Qaeda”); Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 16

(holding that, inter alia, training at a Taliban-run camp on an

AK-47 rifle, and receiving and carrying an AK-47 for days

during which time petitioner and his fellows were attacked by

U.S. warplanes, support the conclusion that he was “‘part of’ the

Taliban and al Qaeda forces”); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872

(holding that, inter alia, accompanying a fighting unit on the

battlefield, carrying a weapon issued by the unit, and retreating

under unit orders “strongly suggest . . . that [the detainee] was

part of” the unit); see also Al-Madhwani, 2011 WL 2083932, at

*3 (finding that the practice of leaving one’s passport and

valuables “‘was standard al Qaeda and Taliban operating

procedure[] when checking into an al Qaeda guesthouse in

Afghanistan’” (quoting Uthman, 637 F.3d at 406) (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 15 (noting that

relinquishing a passport and belongings “was standard al Qaeda

and Taliban operating procedure[]”); Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108

(concluding that “an individual’s attendance at an al-Qaida

there, see Pet’r Mot. for Reconsideration at 1 (J.A. 362), was one that

was rejected in Al-Bihani -- that the hostilities in Afghanistan have

ceased. See Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d

286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[C]laims neither raised nor addressed

below usually may not be heard on appeal.”). Second, as we hold in

the text, the district court’s findings are sufficient to establish that Al

Alwi was “part of the Taliban or al Qaeda,” not merely part of a

separate, “associated” force. Accordingly, even if it were not waived,

the argument would have no application to Al Alwi’s case.

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guesthouse” was powerful evidence that “the individual was part

of al-Qaida” (quoting Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2)).

B

Al Alwi contends that, even if the district court’s

fact-findings are sufficient to satisfy the appropriate detention

standard, the court’s judgment should nonetheless be vacated

because those findings erroneously rested on statements by Al

Alwi that were insufficiently corroborated. In support of this

proposition, he cites the “corroboration rule,” applicable in

federal criminal trials, which provides that a conviction may not

rest solely on “the uncorroborated admission or confession of

the accused.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-89

(1963); see Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1954);

United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

This court has expressed some skepticism as to whether

“the Supreme Court would today” apply the corroboration rule,

even in the criminal context. Dickerson, 163 F.3d at 641 n.2. 

Be that as it may, the district court’s determination here was

made in a habeas proceeding, not a criminal trial, and such

proceedings are not “subject to all the protections given to

defendants in criminal prosecutions.” Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at

1111 n.6; see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783; Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d

at 876. Rather, what “[t]he habeas court must have” is

“sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the

cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain.” 

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783. The corroboration rule is a

“common law” rule, with neither constitutional nor statutory

bases, Dickerson, 163 F.3d at 641; see Smith, 348 U.S. at 153,

and we have not previously regarded corroboration as a

requirement of a meaningful habeas proceeding. To the

contrary, we have recently upheld a detainee’s detention based

on “evidence [that] consist[ed] almost entirely of [the

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detainee’s] own testimony.” Al-Madhwani, 2011 WL 2083932,

at *3; see also Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870 (upholding detention

where the evidence was “primarily drawn from [the detainee’s]

own admissions during interrogation”).

At oral argument, Al Alwi’s counsel acknowledged the

force of this general argument, and clarified that he was not

advocating the per se application of the common law rule. Oral

Arg. Tr. 11-13. Rather, he contended that the court must take

the absence of corroboration into account in assessing the

reliability of the petitioner’s out-of-court statements. Id. at 13. 

We agree with this contention because it is in line with our own

precedents, which have explained that “the question a habeas

court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is

admissible[,] . . . but what probative weight to ascribe to

whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits.” Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d

at 879. The question whether evidence is sufficiently reliable to

credit is one we review for clear error. See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d

at 424; Awad, 608 F.3d at 8. But cf. Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 13-14

(concluding that a district court’s decision that certain hearsay

evidence was reliable “was no abuse of discretion”).

In this case, the district court did evaluate the reliability of

Al Alwi’s statements before accepting them. The court noted

that its duty was to “assess whether petitioner’s interrogation

reports are ‘sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to

demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition with the

requisite degree of certainty.’” Dist. Ct. Op. at 2 (J.A. 1795)

(quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 

It then gave several reasons for finding the statements reliable. 

The court found that, from the time his “fear of retribution

dissipated,” Al Alwi “consistently reported the essential details

of [his] story . . . over the course of multiple interrogation

sessions.” Id. at 3 (J.A. 1796). Although Al Alwi “made

generalized allegations that he was subject to” harsh

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interrogation tactics, he did “not contend that he gave false

answers during any particular interrogation session with U.S.

officials as a result of these alleged tactics.” Id. Indeed,

although Al Alwi “disagree[d] with many of the inferences the

Government draws from the reports, . . . [he] d[id] not deny the

majority of the principal facts” upon which the court relied. Id.

We find neither clear error nor abuse of discretion in the

district court’s determination that Al Alwi’s statements were

reliable. In addition to the consistency of Al Alwi’s repeated

statements, we note, as the court stressed, that Al Alwi did not

deny -- either at the hearing or in his pre-hearing filings -- that

“the majority of the principal facts” in his interrogation

statements were true. Dist. Ct. Op at 3 (J.A. 1796). Moreover,

at the habeas hearing, his attorney expressly conceded or did not

disavow several of those facts. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 10 (Dec. 16,

2008) (J.A. 1457) (conceding that Al Alwi traveled to

Afghanistan to fight against the opponents of the Taliban in the

Afghan civil war); Amended Traverse at 4 (J.A. 940) (same); 

Hr’g Tr. 75-78 (Dec. 16, 2008) (J.A. 1608-11) (stating that Al

Alwi “doesn’t disavow the Omar Sayef Group part of the

narrative”); id. at 111-12 (J.A.1644-45) (stating that “I don’t

think he denies that he was issued” a Kalashnikov rifle, four

magazines, and two grenades). As we have said before, a

detainee’s decision to “not contest the truth of the majority of

his admissions upon which the district court relied . . .

enhanc[es] the reliability of those reports.” Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d

at 880; see Esmail, 639 F.3d at 1077 (affirming detention based

on the petitioner’s concessions and the district court’s rejection

of his exculpatory explanations).

Finally, we note that, although the district court did largely

rely on Al Alwi’s own statements to establish underlying facts,

it also relied on government evidence to support important

inferences from those facts. For example, while Al Alwi stated

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that he stayed in a particular Kandahar guesthouse for

approximately six weeks, it was a government expert’s

declaration that identified that guesthouse as having strong

connections to al Qaeda. Dist. Ct. Op. at 4 (J.A. 1797). That

inference, in turn, was “reinforced by petitioner’s [statement

that] he recognized the assistant to the guesthouse’s leader . . .

in a photograph with Usama Bin Laden.” Id. Similarly, while

Al Alwi admitted that he turned over his passport to the

guesthouse’s leader and never retrieved it, it was another expert

declaration that identified this conduct as consistent with

common practice by Taliban and al Qaeda recruits. Id. at 5 (J.A.

1798).

For the foregoing reasons, we reject Al Alwi’s contention

that the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. 

And because, as explained in Part II.A, those findings are

enough to establish that Al Alwi was “part of the Taliban or al

Qaeda,” we reject the petitioner’s contention that the record

before the district court was insufficient to establish the

lawfulness of his detention. 

III

In addition to his challenge to the district court’s substantive

determinations, Al Alwi contends that the court committed

procedural errors that deprived him of the “meaningful

opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held” unlawfully that

Boumediene requires. 553 U.S. at 779. We review the

challenged decisions -- the court’s denial of Al Alwi’s request

for a continuance and its treatment of his discovery requests --

for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d

818, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denial of a continuance); Al Odah v.

United States, 559 F.3d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (denial of

discovery).

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16

A

Al Alwi contends that the district court abused its discretion

in denying his request for a thirty-day continuance of the

deadline for filing his traverse.8 When the court began

considering Al Alwi’s habeas petition in the summer of 2008, it

set an ambitious schedule for the proceedings. Citing

Boumediene’s call for expedition in holding detainee habeas

proceedings, see 553 U.S. at 795, the district court stated its

intention to hear Al Alwi’s case before the end of the year. 

Status Conf. Tr. 11-12 (July 10, 2008) (J.A. 125P-125Q). On

July 31, 2008, the court ordered the government to file its

factual return by September 23, 2008. See supra note 8. The

government subsequently sought and received a thirty-day

continuance, finally filing the return on October 22, 2008. The

court then ordered that discovery be completed by December 1,

2008, and that Al Alwi file his traverse by December 4, 2008. 

The habeas hearing was set for December 16. 

 Al Alwi’s counsel had scheduled a meeting to go over the

government’s factual return with Al Alwi during the week of

October 6, 2008, in Guantanamo. After the court granted the

government a continuance to file the return by October 22,

counsel scheduled additional meetings for November 14 and 15. 

When the attorneys arrived, Al Alwi informed them that he had

begun a hunger strike. Although he was able to meet with the

lawyers the first day, he was unable to continue on the second. 

When counsel returned from Guantanamo, they requested a

8

Under the district court’s Case Management Order, “[t]he

Government was required to submit a return stating the factual and

legal bases for detaining th[e] prisoner, who was then required to file

a traverse stating the relevant facts in support of his petition and a

rebuttal of the Government’s legal justification for his detention.” 

Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 721.

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17

thirty-day continuance of the deadline for filing the traverse. 

They explained that they had not had sufficient opportunity to

discuss the government’s allegations due to Al Alwi’s inability

to meet on November 15, see Pet’r Unopposed Mot. for

Extension of Time at 5 (J.A. 796), and that they had begun

making arrangements to meet with him instead on the next

available date, December 5, see id. at 6 (J.A. 797).

Although the government did not oppose counsel’s request

for a continuance, the district court nonetheless denied it,

stating, in part, that Al Alwi was the “author of his own delay”

because he had chosen to go on the hunger strike that left him

unable to meet on November 15. Status Hr’g Tr. 9 (Dec. 1,

2008) (J.A. 846). The district court did, however, indicate that

counsel could seek leave to amend the traverse if new

information came to light in the later meetings with Al Alwi that

by then had been scheduled for December 5 and 6. Id.

Al Alwi contends that the denial of his motion for a

continuance was an abuse of discretion. He points out that the

“requested delay was trivial,” that he “had not sought other

continuances,” and that “on the contrary, [he] had consistently

pressed forward.” Pet’r Br. 31. He also notes that the court had

granted the government a continuance to prepare its own return,

and that the government did not object to the grant of a similar

continuance for his traverse. Under these circumstances, we

agree with Al Alwi that the denial of the thirty-day continuance

is hard to understand. There was certainly no magic in the

court’s self-imposed deadline of hearing the case before

December 31, 2008. In Boumediene, the Supreme Court

declared that “the detainees . . . are entitled to a prompt habeas

corpus hearing.” 553 U.S. at 795. This was indeed a call to act,

but it was not a call to act in haste.

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Nonetheless, we cannot disturb the district court’s judgment

unless the petitioner shows “that actual prejudice resulted from

the denial” of the requested continuance. Celis, 608 F.3d at 839

(citing United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 

Al Alwi attempts to meet this burden by arguing that the denial

deprived him of adequate time to review the allegations in the

government’s factual return and undermined his ability to

develop an effective attorney-client relationship. We conclude

that Al Alwi has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.

1. First, we agree with the government that, although the

court denied Al Alwi’s request for a continuance before filing a

traverse, it effectively provided the same relief by granting his

attorneys leave to file an amended traverse after they

subsequently met with their client. As noted above, counsel’s

request had explained that they lacked sufficient opportunity to

discuss the government’s allegations due to Al Alwi’s inability

to meet on November 15, and they sought a thirty-day

continuance so that they could instead meet with him on the next

available date, December 5. See Pet’r Unopposed Mot. for

Extension of Time at 5-6 (J.A. 796-97). After the continuance

was denied and the traverse filed, counsel did meet with Al Alwi

on both December 5 and 6. Thereafter, on December 12,

counsel filed an amended traverse, the content of which the

court considered at the habeas hearing on December 16-17. It

is therefore hard to conclude that the appellant was prejudiced

when he essentially obtained the relief he had sought.

On appeal, Al Alwi argues that the grant of leave to file an

amended traverse was not sufficient because, when the district

court initially advised counsel that they could seek leave to

amend, the court instructed them that any amendment to the

traverse “should be narrow and limited only to what has been

learned as a result of your meeting with your client in the next

few days,” and that it should not “launch into a new line of

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19

defense.” Reply Br. 4 (quoting Status Hr’g Tr. 6 (Dec. 1, 2008)

(J.A. 843)). After the court gave that instruction, however, Al

Alwi’s attorney explained his concern that the instruction was

too restrictive, and the court clarified that it meant only that

counsel should not “be coming in with a supplement that relates

to things unrelated to your discussions with him.” Id. (J.A. 846). 

And after counsel met with their client in December and filed

the amended traverse, they neither renewed the motion for a

continuance nor expressed concern that the court’s instruction

had caused them to leave anything out of the amended

document.

2. Second, it is not completely accurate to suggest, as Al

Alwi does, that without the continuance his counsel had less

than six weeks to develop an attorney-client relationship and

prepare a response to the charges against him. It is true that Al

Alwi’s counsel did not receive the government’s factual return

until October 22, 2008, and did not receive an unclassified

version until November 5. But the vast majority of the

allegations and evidence contained in that return had already

been released in connection with Al Alwi’s 2007 DTA appeal,

in which he was represented by the same counsel who handled

his habeas hearing.

Al Alwi’s counsel, from the law firm of Clifford Chance,

LLP, began representing him in 2005, when they first filed his

habeas petition. They were not court-appointed, but rather were

retained on Al Alwi’s behalf by his cousin. In June 2007,

counsel filed Al Alwi’s appeal under the DTA, and on August

24, 2007, they received the unclassified version of the CSRT

record. See Status Report, July 18, 2008 (J.A. 137). That record

revealed most of the factual allegations upon which the district

court ultimately based its detention decision, including the

allegations that Al Alwi had traveled to Afghanistan to fight

with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, stayed in

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20

specified Taliban guesthouses, trained and received weapons at

the Khalid Center, and joined the Omar Sayef Center group in

a middle line position in the fighting, where he witnessed

“artillery attacks and saw other fighters die.” Unclassified

Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision (J.A. 1069-71);

Unclassified Summary of Evidence for CSRT (J.A. 1077-78).

The CSRT record also disclosed that the government was

principally relying on Al Alwi’s own statements regarding his

activities in Afghanistan. See, e.g., Unclassified Summary of

Basis for Tribunal Decision (J.A. 1069) (explaining that the

“detainee . . . stated he traveled through Yemen to Pakistan and

Afghanistan and joined the Taliban to fight against the Northern

Alliance; received weapons training at the Khalid Center . . . ;

stated that he was issued a weapon with ammunition and

grenades while at the Khalid Center; that he was trained on the

rocket-propelled grenade launcher; that he was assigned to the

middle lines at the Omar Saif Center where he saw artillery

attacks and other fighters die; that he fought on the front lines at

Khvajeh Ghar, and that he was captured by Pakistani forces as

he fled from Afghanistan to Pakistan crossing the border”).

In August 2008, the government provided Al Alwi’s

counsel with the classified version of the CSRT materials. That

record contained virtually all of the facts the district court

ultimately found sufficient to justify his detention. It included

several of Al Alwi’s interrogation reports as well. Together,

those reports provided virtually all of the content of Al Alwi’s

statements upon which the district court relied, including

detailed accounts of: his journey to Afghanistan; his guesthouse

stays; his turning over and failing to retrieve his passport at the

Kandahar guesthouse; his training and arming at the Khalid

Center; his military activities with the Omar Sayef Group; his

belief that the group was led by al-Hadi; and his witnessing of

U.S. aerial bombings while part of that combat unit. See CSRT

Record: Criminal Investigative Task Force Report of

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21

Investigative Activity, Interview of Muah Hamzah Ahmed

Khader Al Alwi (Apr. 14, 2003) (J.A. 1084-86); CSRT Record: 

Memorandum for Record, Interview of Mu’az Hamza Ahmad

(Al Alwi) (May 03, 2003) (J.A. 1113-20).

A protective order permitting attorney-client

communication with respect to the CSRT materials was entered

in September 2007. Thus, Al Alwi’s counsel had approximately

fourteen months to review the core allegations disclosed in the

unclassified CSRT materials before the traverse was due on

December 4, 2008. Al Alwi had four meetings with his

attorneys during this time: on May 19, August 11, October 6,

and November 14, 2008. See Decl. of James M. Hosking (Dec.

5, 2008) (J.A. 1230); Pet’r Unopposed Mot. for Extension of

Time at 2-3 (J.A. 793-94). And, as noted above, he had two

additional attorney-client meetings after he filed the traverse --

on December 5 and 6, 2008 -- which provided the basis for the

amended traverse that he filed prior to his habeas hearing. See

Decl. of Omar A. Farah (Dec. 12, 2008) (J.A. 1444).

Al Alwi correctly observes that the DTA/CSRT process was

substantially more limited than habeas proceedings. The point

about the CSRT materials, however, is not that they contained

all that the detainee might say in response to the charges against

him, but that (at least in this case) they contained virtually all of

the charges the government made in the habeas proceeding. Al

Alwi suggests this is not so, noting that the government’s factual

return in the habeas hearing ran to well over 400 pages, and

arguing that the substantially shorter unclassified and classified

versions of the CSRT materials therefore could not have

sufficiently conveyed the government’s allegations. It is true

that the CSRT materials did not contain the government

intelligence declarations that provided general information about

al Qaeda and Taliban personnel, practices, and training camps. 

But those declarations did not contain accusations as to which

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22

counsel needed to consult Al Alwi in order to respond; rather,

counsel employed their own experts to counter those

declarations. See, e.g., Decl. of Arthur Brown (Oct. 13 2008)

(J.A. 1271). As to the remainder of the additional materials,

they largely consisted of interrogation reports of other detainees,

relevant only to allegations that the district court did not reach --

such as Al Alwi’s alleged role as one of Osama Bin Laden’s

bodyguards. See, e.g., Gov’t Factual Return Exhibit: FBI

Interview Reports (J.A. 511-537); see supra note 3. Almost all

of the allegations that the district court found sufficient to justify

his detention were in the unclassified CSRT materials that Al

Alwi’s counsel received some fourteen months before his

hearing.

3. Finally, we do not underestimate the difficulty that

counsel have in developing rapport with clients detained at

Guantanamo Bay. Nor do we doubt that more time spent with

a client can improve case preparation.9

 But we must evaluate Al

Alwi’s claim of prejudice not in some theoretical sense, but in

the context of the motion for a continuance that the district court

actually denied on December 1, 2008. That motion did not

mention any concern about the development of an effective

attorney-client relationship. Although it did request more time

for case preparation, it did not contend that substantially more

time was needed -- only that thirty more days were required to

successfully reschedule the attorney-client meeting that had

been cut short by Al Alwi’s hunger strike on November 15.

9

Of course, detainee counsel must balance the need for more

preparation time against their client’s own interest in expedition. 

Indeed, Al Alwi’s counsel opposed the government’s request for a

thirty-day continuance on the ground that “[e]very additional day that

[he is] detained, and delayed in the[] opportunity to present challenges

to [his] detention will only cause [him] further harm.” Pet’r Opp’n to

Resp’t Mot. for Relief from Scheduling Order at 1 (J.A. 321).

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Accordingly, the question before us is whether another

thirty days -- not another six months or a year or longer -- would

have affected the outcome of Al Alwi’s habeas hearing. Cf.

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Given the

time Al Alwi’s attorneys had after their receipt of the CSRT

record, the district court’s grant of leave to file an amended

traverse, and the absence of any subsequent request for

additional time or discovery,10 we conclude that Al Alwi has

failed to show that he was prejudiced by the denial of the

thirty-day continuance. Indeed, even now -- with appellate

counsel who is experienced in Guantanamo litigation, speaks

Arabic, and “has also had more time with Petitioner” -- Al Alwi

has only “begun to furnish the ‘alternative [exculpatory]

narrative’ that the [district] court found absent in the

proceedings below.” Pet’r Br. 4. Whatever difficulty this may

reflect, it does not suggest that the absence of that narrative in

the district court proceedings was due to the denial of the

thirty-day continuance.

B

Al Alwi’s final argument is that the district court abused its

discretion in its management of the discovery process.

1. Al Alwi contends, first, that “remand is required to

determine whether the government produced relevant

exculpatory evidence.” Pet’r Br. 44. He does not argue that the

government did fail to produce such evidence, only that it may

have done so. 

10In initially denying several of Al Alwi’s requests for additional

discovery, see infra Part III.B, the district court indicated that it would

be open to renewed requests if Al Alwi’s counsel developed

justifications following their December meetings with him. See Status

Hr’g Tr. 45, 76, 81 (Dec. 1, 2008) (J.A. 882, 913, 918).

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The district court adopted a Case Management Order

(CMO) that required the government to “provide on an ongoing

basis any evidence contained in the material [it] reviewed in

developing the return for the petitioner, and in preparation for

the hearing for the petitioner, that tends materially to undermine

the Government’s theory as to the lawfulness of the petitioner’s

detention.” CMO at 2, Al Alwi v. Bush, No. 05-2223 (D.D.C.

Oct. 31, 2008) (J.A. 342). Al Alwi notes that, in Bensayah v.

Obama, we subsequently interpreted the same CMO as requiring

that any exculpatory “material reviewed in developing the

return” must be disclosed, “even if the individual doing the

filtering works for a Government agency other than the

Department of Justice.” 610 F.3d at 724. And he fears that the

government did not comply with that understanding in this case: 

i.e., that it only produced exculpatory evidence that Justice

Department attorneys saw in the course of preparing the

government’s return, but not evidence that employees of other

agencies saw.

To justify his concern, Al Alwi cites what he regards as

ambiguous remarks made by the district court and the

government during the habeas proceedings. As Al Alwi

observes, the court told the government that it was required to

“produce any exculpatory evidence that they saw in the course

of reviewing the documents that they reviewed to prepare the

return,” while the government responded that, “pursuant to [the

CMO] we produced any and all information that may materially

undermine” the government’s case. Status Hr’g Tr. 31-32 (Dec.

1, 2008) (emphases added) (J.A. 868-69). However, “[n]owhere

was it stated,” Al Alwi points out, “whether ‘they’ or ‘we’

included any government agency employee, or solely the

Department of Justice lawyers assigned to the case.” Pet’r Br.

45. 

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If there was ambiguity in these statements, however, it was

not because the court or the government failed to respond to Al

Alwi’s concerns, but because he did not express them as

precisely as he does on appeal. Al Alwi’s counsel told the court,

using the same pronoun to which his counsel now objects, that

Al Alwi was entitled to all documents that would put the

credibility of a witness in doubt, and that the government

“cannot simply say that we didn’t look at that.” Status Hr’g Tr.

62 (Dec. 1, 2008) (emphasis added) (J.A. 899). The government

attorney did not disagree. “[L]et me make clear,” he said, that

“we have produced all evidence that we are aware of, that we

became aware of in the process of our putting together this

return, that may relate in any way to the credibility of a witness

being in question.” Id. at 62-63 (J.A. 899-900). It was not the

case, he continued, that the government had turned a “willfully

blind eye” to potentially exculpatory material. Id. at 64 (J.A.

901).

It may be that this court’s subsequent opinion in Bensayah

has sharpened the nature of Al Alwi’s argument. But in

Bensayah, we did no more than interpret the terms of the CMO

in the course of rejecting a detainee’s claim that the CMO was

inconsistent with Boumediene. See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 724. 

We did not suggest that the government had misunderstood

those terms in that case, and there is no reason to believe that it

did so in this one. To the contrary, at oral argument, the

government represented that, in both the Bensayah habeas

proceeding and this one, the government had the same

understanding of the CMO as that expressed in our Bensayah

opinion. Oral Arg. Tr. 33-35; see id. at 33 (“[W]hen we were

reviewing information, every agency involved . . . in that

process [was] instructed to provide exculpatory information that

they [saw] as they [were] putting together the factual return.”). 

The government has reconfirmed this representation by

post-argument letter. See Letter from Sarang V. Damle, Dep’t

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26

of Justice, at 3 (Nov. 17, 2010) (stating that the government’s

discovery practice at the time of Al Alwi’s habeas proceedings

was “consistent with this Court’s discussion of the case

management order in Bensayah”). Accordingly, there is no

warrant for a remand on this issue.

2. In addition to requiring the government to provide

exculpatory information, the district court’s CMO permitted the

detainee to request additional discovery “for good cause

shown.” To obtain additional discovery, the request had to:

(1) be narrowly tailored; (2) specify why the request is

likely to produce evidence both relevant and material

to the petitioner’s case; (3) specify the nature of the

request . . . ; and (4) explain why the burden on the

Government to produce such evidence is neither

unfairly disruptive nor unduly burdensome to the

Government.

CMO at 2 (J.A. 342). Pursuant to this provision, Al Alwi filed

a number of additional requests, all but one of which the district

court denied. The court denied those requests on the ground that

Al Alwi had failed to satisfy the four predicate conditions of the

CMO. Al Alwi now contends that the denial constituted an

abuse of discretion, principally on the ground that the court

should not have required him to satisfy any burden before

ordering production of several categories of information.

In Boumediene, the Supreme Court made clear that

“[h]abeas corpus proceedings need not resemble a criminal

trial.” 553 U.S. at 783; see Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1111 n.6; AlBihani, 590 F.3d at 876. Rather, the touchstone is that they must

provide a “meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that [the

detainee] is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or

interpretation’ of relevant law.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779

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(quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)). In

Bensayah, this court expressly held that the same CMO was

consistent with Boumediene’s requirements, and that “the

district court did not abuse its discretion in structuring

discovery” so as to place the burden of establishing the CMO’s

predicates on the detainee. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 724; see also

Al-Madhwani, 2011 WL 2083932, at *6 (affirming district

court’s denial of a detainee’s additional discovery request

because it “did not establish the conditions required under the

CMO for further discovery”).

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in the manner

in which it applied the CMO. The government represented that

it had produced all evidence that it used in preparing its factual

return and “that may inform the court with respect to the bases

for his detention,” Status Hr’g Tr. 16 (Dec. 1, 2008) (J.A. 853),

and the court expressly required production of any and all

statements by Al Alwi that the government had reviewed, id. at

43-44 (J.A. 880-81); see id. at 43 (J.A. 880) (holding that “it is

material” if it “came out of his mouth[; t]hat’s a ruling”). The

court denied Al Alwi’s additional requests only after first

assuring itself that the government had already satisfied its

obligation to produce any evidence “that tends materially to

undermine the Government’s theory as to the lawfulness of the

petitioner’s detention.” CMO at 2 (J.A. 342); see Status Hr’g

Tr. 31-33 (Dec. 1, 2008) (J.A. 868-70). The court also obtained

specific representations from the government that, had there

been any material evidence in the important categories of Al

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Alwi’s request,11 the government would have produced it as part

of that obligation, see, e.g., id. at 62-63 (J.A. 899-900).12

In light of these circumstances, we find no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s refusal to issue further discovery

orders without a showing that there was a basis for believing

that the requests satisfied the CMO’s predicate conditions.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of Al

Alwi’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

Affirmed.

11As we have previously explained, evidence is “material” if “it

is at least helpful to the petitioner’s habeas case.” Al Odah, 559 F.3d

at 544; see also Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 724 (“Information that

undermines the reliability of other materials, e.g., inculpatory evidence

. . . , also tends ‘materially to undermine the Government’s theory as

to the lawfulness of the petitioner’s detention’ and hence must be

disclosed by the Government.” (quoting the district court’s CMO)).

12The government specifically denied that it had any evidence that

Al Alwi had been mistreated while at Guantanamo Bay. Status Hr’g

Tr. 63-64 (Dec. 1, 2008) (J.A. 900-01).

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