Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02158/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02158-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Matthew Linden Harris, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendant. 

No. CV-14-02158-PHX-DGC (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 This matter is before the Court on its own review. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, 

brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) When he filed this action, 

Plaintiff identified his address as Phoenix, Arizona Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office 

(MCSO) Towers Jail, 3127 W. Gibson Lane, Phoenix, AZ 85009. (Id.) In an Order 

granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, the Court directed Plaintiff to notify the Court 

in writing of any change in his address and warned him that failure to do so could result 

in dismissal of this action. (Doc. 11 at 6 (citing LRCiv 83.3(d)).). 

 On September 2, 2015, the Court received a notice from the MCSO stating 

Plaintiff was no longer in MCSO custody. Plaintiff, however, did not notify the Court of 

his new address. Therefore, on September 15, 2015, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show 

cause on or before September 29, 2015 why this matter should not be dismissed without 

prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s December 29, 2014 Order (Doc. 11) and 

LRCiv 83.3(d). (Doc. 45.) On September 28, 2015, the Court’s September 15, 2015 

Order was returned as undeliverable because Plaintiff was no longer in custody. 

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(Doc. 46.) Plaintiff has not responded to the September 15, 2015 Order, which he 

apparently did not receive, and he has not notified the Court of his current address. 

 Because Plaintiff has not provided notice of his current address, and has not 

responded to the order to show cause, the Court considers whether to dismiss this case. 

Plaintiff has the general duty to prosecute this case. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co. v. 

Pioche Mines Consol., Inc., 587 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1978). A plaintiff who has filed a 

pro se action must keep the Court informed of his current address and comply with the 

Court’s orders in a timely fashion. The Court does not have an affirmative obligation to 

locate a plaintiff. “A party, not the district court, bears the burden of keeping the court 

apprised of any changes in his mailing address.” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 

(9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of his current address constitutes 

failure to prosecute his case and a failure to comply with the Court’s orders. 

 Rule 41(b) provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with 

these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim 

against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The Supreme Court has recognized that a federal 

district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute, 

even though the language of Rule 41(b) appears to require a motion from a party. See 

Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962). Moreover, in appropriate 

circumstances, the Court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute even without 

notice or hearing. Id. at 633. 

 In determining whether Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of the 

case, the Court weighs the following five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious 

resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice 

to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and 

(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440 (quoting 

Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). “The first two of these 

factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the fourth factor cuts 

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against a default or dismissal sanction. Thus the key factors are prejudice and availability 

of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 Here, the first, second, and third factors favor dismissal of this case. Plaintiff’s 

failure to keep the Court informed of his address prevents the case from proceeding in the 

foreseeable future. The fourth factor, as always, favors disposition on the merits and 

weighs against dismissal. The fifth factor requires the court to consider whether a less 

drastic alternative is available. Here, the Court has already issued an order to show 

cause, which took a “round trip tour through the United States mail.” Carey, 856 F.2d at 

1441. 

 The Court finds that a sanction less drastic than dismissal with prejudice is 

available. Rule 41(b) provides that a dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as an 

adjudication upon the merits “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 41(b). In this case, the Court finds that dismissal with prejudice would be 

unnecessarily harsh. Therefore, the Court recommends that this matter be dismissed 

without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without prejudice for 

failure to comply with Court orders pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which to 

file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

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any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 30th day of September, 2015. 

 

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