Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00862/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00862-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiff was incarcerated, but it appears he has

since been released as he notified the Court in March 2006 of a change of address “care of” a

residence in Sunnyvale, California. 

2

Claims against three other defendants were dismissed for failure to state a cognizable

claim for relief. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH H. COTTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

JASON DONNER, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________

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No. C 06-0862 MJJ (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; DIRECTING

PLAINTIFF TO FILE NOTICE RE:

INTENT TO PROSECUTE AND

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Docket Nos. 10, 16)

Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

alleges that while he was housed at the Santa Cruz County Jail, he was subject to excessive

force by five jail guards, all of whom he named as defendants.1

 On June 6, 2006, after an

initial review of the complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court ordered the complaint

served on the five defendant jail guards (hereinafter collectively referred to as “defendants”),

finding the allegations, when liberally construed, stated cognizable claims against them.2

Defendants have filed a motion to for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. 

Although given an opportunity to do so, plaintiff has not filed an opposition. Defendants

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The Court treats the allegations in plaintiff’s verified complaint as an opposing

affidavit to the extent that such allegations are based on plaintiff’s personal knowledge and

set forth facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 &

nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995).

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also seek judicial notice of records from plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to plaintiff’s verified complaint,3

 on October 28, 2004, while being booked

into the jail, he refused to sign a document acknowledging he had been granted his right to a

phone call. Plaintiff adopted a “defensive stance,” but after complying with an order to place

his hands on the back of his head, get down on his knees, and face away from the jail guard,

defendant Jason Donner (“Donner”) “grabbed” him by his hair. Plaintiff then stood up and

the other defendants approached. While Donner pulled him by the hair, defendant Scott

Enrico (“Enrico”) held him by his hands, and defendant Ryan Fulton (“Fulton”) punched him

with a closed fist in the throat, chest and ear. Plaintiff “struggled to get out of the melee,”

and defendant Luis Hevia (“Hevia”) shot plaintiff with a taser gun in the side of his torso. 

Plaintiff was knocked to the ground by the various guards who had gathered, and Enrico

twisted plaintiff’s arm “out of joint” while defendant Jacob Ainsworth (“Ainsworth”) bent

plaintiff’s thumb back until it was “out of joint.” During this time, another guard had

shackled plaintiff’s feet. Donner then shot plaintiff four more times with the taser gun,

including twice in the back, once in the leg, and once in the neck, knocking plaintiff

unconscious. Plaintiff was then strapped down in a restraint chair, at which point Donner

shot plaintiff with a taser gun in the groin. 

According to defendants, plaintiff, who is “6'2," 200 pounds and “extremely

muscular,” became “agitated,” “combative,” and “violent,” during booking. As Donner

approached him, plaintiff raised his fists, and Donner called for a taser gun. Plaintiff refused

orders to kneel down, and Enrico grabbed plaintiff’s arms, while Donner reached for

plaintiff’s hair. Plaintiff punched Donner in the face three or four times. Conner then

brought plaintiff to the ground, where he was violently fighting and kicking. Hevia used a

taser gun on plaintiff’s shoulder, but plaintiff kept fighting. Another officer put plaintiff’s

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legs in shackles, but plaintiff continued to violently resist and disobey orders to comply. 

Donner then shot plaintiff with the taser gun once in the shoulder and once in the neck, which

immediately stopped plaintiff’s resistance. Plaintiff was then attached to a restraint chair, but

he stood up and tried to break out of the chair. He was agitated, raised his voice and refusing

to comply, and Donner fired the taser gun at plaintiff’s inner thigh. The entire altercation

took place in less than five minutes, and plaintiff fought against the guards the entire time. 

In Santa Cruz County Superior Court, plaintiff subsequently pled nolo contendere to

one count of battery on a custodial officer, pursuant to California Penal Code § 243(c)(1),

based on Donner’s account of plaintiff’s punching Donner in the face four times. On

December 20, 2005, he was sentenced to a term of two years in state prison.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show

there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those that may affect

the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.

The Court will grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding fact material if it might

affect outcome of suit under governing law, and that dispute about a material fact is genuine

“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party”). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record

that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to

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the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

At summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party: if direct evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with direct

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence

set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d

1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to

make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed

material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987).

B. Legal Claims

1. Defendant Donner

Defendants argues that plaintiff’s state court conviction for battery on a defendant

Donner based on the altercation that gives rise to the present action, his claim of excessive

force against Donner is barred. 

In order to recover damages for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid

by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87

(1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has

not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. Therefore, whenever a

state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, as plaintiff does here, a district court must

consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity

of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

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4

Hereafter, all statutory references are to the California Penal Code, unless otherwise

specified.

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conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. See id.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed

the circumstances under which Heck bars excessive force claims arising out of an incident in

which the plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d

689, 696 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). As the Smith opinion explained, an essential element of a

conviction for resisting a peace officer pursuant to California Penal Code § 1484

 is that the

police officer was “engaged in the performance of his official duties.” Id. at 695. Under

California law, this means that the police officer was engaged in “lawful” conduct, including

not using excessive force. See id. at 695-96 (citing California state court decisions). Thus, if

a plaintiff was convicted under § 148 for resisting a police officer during the course of an

arrest, his subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the police officer used excessive force

during the course of that arrest would, if successful, necessarily undermine the conviction. 

Id. at 697-98. In such circumstances, the Heck bar applies. Id.. 

It is undisputed that plaintiff was convicted of committing battery upon Donner

pursuant to § 243(c)(1), and that this conviction has not been expunged, reversed, invalidated

or otherwise called into question. Although plaintiff’s conviction in this case was not

pursuant to § 148, but rather pursuant to § 243(c)(1), this makes no difference for the present

analysis. Like § 148, under California law, a defendant can only be convicted of battery

under § 243(c)(1) if the officer’s conduct was “lawful” when the defendant committed

battery on him. See Cal. Pen. Code § 253(c)(1) (forbidding battery upon a custodial officer

“engaged in the performance of his or her duties”); In re Manual G., 16 Cal.4th 805, 815

(1997) (“because an officer has no duty to take illegal action, he or she is not engaged in

‘duties’ for purposes of an offense defined in such terms, if the officer’s conduct is

unlawful.”); In re Joseph F., 85 Cal.App.4th 975 (2000). Moreover, for purposes of a §

243(c)(1) conviction, like a § 148 conviction, the officers’ conduct was not “lawful” if they

used excessive force. Cf. Smith, 394 F.3d at 695-96 (explaining that under California law

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Defendants also argue that the claims against the remaining four defendants are also

barred by Heck due to plaintiff’s battery conviction. Plaintiff’s battery conviction was for

striking Donner, not the other defendants. Thus, plaintiff’s conviction only depends on

Donner’s conduct having been lawful; nothing about plaintiff’s conviction requires that the

other officers, upon whom he was not convicted of battery, were also engaged in lawful

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the use of excessive force renders the officers’ conduct unlawful). Thus, as in Smith,

plaintiff’s conviction for battery upon defendant Donner pursuant to § 243(c)(1) 148 or § 69,

Heck bars the plaintiff from pursuing claims that the officers used excessive force while

effectuating that arrest. 

Smith drew a distinction between a plaintiff who resists officers before they use force,

and a plaintiff who resists during the course of the arrest and accompanying application of

force. Id. at 697-98. In Smith, the court identified different “phases” of the encounter

between the plaintiff (Mr. Smith) and the officer, and held that if Smith’s § 148 conviction

was for his resisting the officers during the “investigative phase,” i.e. before the officers had

begun to arrest and use force against him, then Heck did not bar his claims that the force was

excessive. Id. at 698. On the other hand, if Smith’s conviction was for resisting the officers

during while the officers were using the purportedly excessive force, then Heck did bar his

claims that the officers used excessive force. Id. at 698-99. 

The distinction drawn in Smith is not applicable here because, unlike in Smith,

plaintiff’s battery on Donner and the officers’ use of force against him did not occur in

different “phases” of the incident. Here, plaintiff punched Donner in the face after Donner

and Enrico had begun to use force upon him by grabbing his hair and hands. The evidence is

undisputed that the entire altercation, including the officers’ use of force and plaintiff’s

striking Donner, was a single course of events that lasted less than five minutes. As such,

under the reasoning of Smith, Heck bars plaintiff’s claims that Donner’s use of force against

him was excessive, and on this basis, Donner is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

claims.

2. Remaining Defendants

Defendants assert, inter alia, that they are entitled to qualified immunity.5

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activity. As a result, success on plaintiff’s claims of excessive force against the other

defendants would not “necessarily imply” that his conviction for battery upon Donner was

invalid.

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In considering the merits of qualified immunity defense in a case involving excessive

force during an arrest, the threshold question is: based on the facts taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, did the officer's conduct violate a constitutional

right? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the answer is no, there is no need for

further inquiry. Id. If the answer is yes, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right

violated was clearly established. Id. 

The constitutional right at issue when it is alleged that a law enforcement officer used

excessive force in the course of an arrest or other seizure is the Fourth Amendment right to

be free from "unreasonable . . . seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure

is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and

quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.’” Id. at 396 (citations omitted). Because the

reasonableness standard is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, “its

proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular

case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. The reasonableness inquiry in excessive force

cases is an objective one, the question being whether the officer's actions are objectively

reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to his

underlying intent or motivation and without the "20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. Moreover,

police officers may also be held liable if they have an opportunity to intercede when their

fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a plaintiff but fail to do so. See

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Taking the verified factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all

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Defendants do not submit plaintiff’s medical records or other evidence as to the

extent of plaintiff’s injuries. 

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inferences therefrom in plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must do at this stage under Saucier,

there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the remaining prison guards’ use of force was

unreasonable under the circumstances. The issue of whether the amount of force used was

reasonable generally questions of fact for a jury because the Fourth Amendment test for

reasonableness is inherently fact-specific. See Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of

Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 2001); Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir.

1995). With respect to Fulton, plaintiff asserts that Fulton punched plaintiff three times in

the throat, ear and chest while plaintiff was being restrained by two guards, Donner and

Enrico, and after plaintiff had obeyed orders to kneel down, put his hands on his head and

turn away. Punching a restrained and compliant inmate three times would, if true, be an

unreasonable application of force. With respect to Enrico and Ainsworth, plaintiff asserts 

Enrico twisted plaintiff’s arm “out of joint” and Ainsworth bent plaintiff’s thumb back until

it was “out of joint,” after plaintiff had been knocked to the ground and was surrounded by at

least five guards. It is not clear what plaintiff means precisely by “out of joint,” but drawing

all inferences in his favor from this allegation could mean that his arm and thumb were

dislocated.6

 Even if, as plaintiff indicates, he had “struggled to get out of the melee,” that

amount of force by Enrico and Ainsworth while plaintiff was on the ground and surrounded

by guards would, if true, be unreasonable under the circumstances. 

With respect to Hevia, who was a Supervising Correctional Officer, according to

plaintiff, Hevia shot plaintiff with a taser gun once in the side of his torso while plaintiff

“struggled to get out of the melee.” Hevia states in his declaration that he attempted to taser

plaintiff once in the leg, but plaintiff was thrashing around so much that the taser stunned

everyone but plaintiff, and Hevia then passed the taser to Donner who used it on plaintiff’s

shoulder and elsewhere. (Hevia Decl. at ¶ 4.) Even assuming plaintiff’s allegation is true,

Hevia’s firing a single taser shot at plaintiff does not in and of itself amount to an

unreasonable amount of force to restrain a struggling inmate of plaintiff’s size and strength. 

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Nevertheless, Hevia may be held liable for failing to intercede in the use of excessive force

by the other guards, see Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289-90, especially given his opportunity

as a supervisor to order the other guards to cease their use of force. 

Moreover, the case law at the time of defendants’ actions in this case, in 2004, clearly

prohibited punching a restrained and heretofore compliant inmate, twisting his arm and

thumb “out of joint” while he was on the ground and surrounded by at least five guards, and

to failing to intercede in the use of excessive force by other law enforcement officials when

given the opportunity to do se. See, e.g., Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052,

1058-60 (9th Cir. 2003); Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061(9th Cir. 2003);

Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289-90. As a result, no reasonable officer could believe that such

actions were constitutionally permitted. In sum, taking plaintiff’s verified allegations as true

and drawing all inferences therefrom in his favor, there is a genuine issue of fact that

defendants Enrico, Ainsworth, Fulton and Hevia violated his constitutional rights, and they

are not entitled to summary judgment either on the basis of qualified immunity or on the

grounds that they did not violate his constitutional rights. 

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders as follows:

1. For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED as to defendant Donner, and DENIED as to defendants Enrico, Ainsworth,

Fulton and Hevia. 

//

//

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2. As plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment or

to defendant’s prior motion to dismiss, and has not filed a document in this matter since a

change of address notice filed over one year ago, it is unclear whether he wishes to proceed

with the action. Accordingly, within thirty days of the date this order is filed, plaintiff

shall notify the Court as to whether he intends to prosecute this matter, and also

whether or not he wishes to have counsel appointed to represent him in this matter. 

Plaintiff is hereby advised that his failure to timely notify the Court of these matters

will result in the dismissal of the above-titled action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 10, 16 and all other pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/30/2007

_____________________________

MARTIN J. JENKINS

United States District Judge

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