Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00119/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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1 The Commissioner contends that this figure is a “drafting error,”

Resp. (doc. 17) at 4, because the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) withheld

$18,440.80, representing “25 percent of [plaintiff’s] past-due benefits[,]”

expressly “to pay the approved lawyer’s fee.” Errata to Pl. Mot. (doc. 16),

appendix 5 (doc. 16-2) thereto at 5. By the court’s calculations, however, 25%

of the past-due benefits in the amount of $73,765.40 would be the total claimed

by attorney Slepian – $18,441.35. Thus, the court will use the latter figure.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lisa M. Fox, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV-04-0119-PHX-RCB

O R D E R

Introduction

Currently pending before the court is a motion by plaintiff

for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

(doc. 15). Plaintiff’s attorney, Eric G. Slepian, is seeking a

total of $18,441.351 in fees for the 49.70 hours of legal

Case 2:04-cv-00119-RCB Document 19 Filed 12/11/07 Page 1 of 10
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2 Plaintiff’s attorney did not file a declaration or affidavit in

support of his fee application, thus leaving the court to rely upon factual

assertions in his memorandum of law. Because he signed that memorandum, in

accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), the court assumes that there is

evidentiary support for these representations. The court’s preferred practice,

however, is for such factual representations also to be included in counsel’s

supporting declaration or affidavit. 

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services which he provided while representing plaintiff in this

district court. The defendant Commissioner of the SSA expressly

takes “no position” as to the reasonableness of this fee request,

stressing that his “response should neither be construed nor

cited as an implicit agreement to counsel’s request.” Resp.

(doc. 17) at 1; and at 2 n.1. However, in his role as “trustee,”

if this court awards attorney’s fees, the Commissioner accurately

“note[s] that [plaintiff’s] counsel must refund to Plaintiff the

$5,694.02 in EAJA [Equal Access to Justice Act] fees he has

already received.” Id. at 4. For the reasons set forth below,

the court grants this motion. 

Background

Evidently plaintiff’s counsel began representing Ms. Fox at

the administrative level as early as April 1, 1998.2 See Mot.

(doc. 15) at 5. Following a denial of Social Security disability

benefits at that level, on July 19, 2000, plaintiff filed a

complaint seeking judicial review of that denial. Fox. v. Apfel,

2:00-CV-01385-LOA (“Fox I”) (doc. 1). Thereafter, the court

granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the

case for further proceedings. Id., docs. 22 and 23. The court

in Fox I also granted plaintiff’s motion for $4,550.00 in

attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Mot.

(doc. 15), Appendix 2 thereto. 

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3 Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, the court takes judicial notice of

this Notice of Award from the SSA attached to plaintiff’s errata memorandum of

law. See Overstreet v. United Broth. Of Carpenters, 409 F.3d 1199, 1203 n. 7

(9th Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of ALJ’s decision, as an adjudicative

fact, where neither its existence nor its contents were disputed). 

4 As mentioned at the outset, plaintiff’s attorney submitted only a

memorandum of law, to which he attached various documents. Given that format,

the fee agreement, which is an appendix to the memorandum has not been properly

authenticated. However, because the Commissioner does not challenge its

authenticity, the court deems it to be authentic in accordance with Fed. R. Evid.

901(b)(4). See Garcia v. Astrue, 500 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1241 n. 3 (C.D.Cal. 2007)

(same) (citing, inter alia, Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.,

586 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)).

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After that remand, plaintiff’s counsel “re-tried the case

before the same ALJ [administrative law judge] at the [SSA]” Id.

at 5. The ALJ again issued a decision unfavorable to plaintiff,

id.; and again, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial

review of the ALJ’s finding that she was not disabled and hence

not entitled to disability insurance benefits. See Doc. 1. In

response to defendant’s motion for a remand, to which there was

no objection, a third trial was conducted before the ALJ. Mot.

(doc. 15) at 6. This time plaintiff received a “Partially

Favorable” decision. Id. She therefore received an award of

past-due benefits in the amount of $73,765.40. Errata to Mot.

(doc. 16), Appendix 5 thereto.3

 After affirming that decision,

this court awarded plaintiff an additional $1,144.02 in

attorney’s fees under the EAJA. Mot. (doc. 15), Appendix 3

thereto. 

In contrast to Fox I, almost a year after the commencement

of the present action, plaintiff entered into a contingency fee

agreement with her attorney.4 Mot. (doc. 15), Appendix 4

thereto. That agreement was “standard for Social Security

claimant representation,” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,

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798 (2002), or as the Supreme Court also put it in Gisbrecht, it

was “the most common [type] of fee arrangement between attorneys

and Social Security claimants[]” in that plaintiff agreed to pay

her attorney 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered. See

id.

Discussion

In contrast to section 406(a) of the Social Security Act,

which “governs [attorneys’] fees for representation in

administrative proceedings[,]” section 406(b) of that Act

“controls [such] fees for representation in court.” Gisbrecht,

535 U.S. at 794 (citing 20 CFR § 404.1728(a)(2001)). Under

section 406(b), “[a]s part of its judgment, a court may allow ‘a

reasonable fee . . . not in excess of 25 percent of the . . .

past-due benefits’ awarded to the claimant.” Id. at 795 (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A)). That statute expressly provides that

any fee award thereunder be payable “out of, and not in addition

to, the amount of [the] past due benefits.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In other words, a denial of

benefits results in no fee award. See id. at 795 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (“The Commissioner has

interpreted § 406(b) to prohibit a lawyer from charging fees when

there is no award of back benefits.”) Similarly,“attorneys may

not gain additional fees based on a claimant’s continuing

entitlement to benefits.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 795. Not only

that, “any endeavor by the claimant’s attorney to gain more than

that [statutory] fee, or to charge the claimant a noncontingent

fee, is a criminal offense.” Id. at 806-07 (citing 42 U.S. 

§ 406(b)(2); 20 CFR § 404.1740(c)(2) (2001)) (emphasis added). 

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Based upon this statutory framework, in resolving a

“division among the Circuits on the appropriate method of

calculating fees under § 406(b)[,]” the Supreme Court in

Gisbrecht “conclude[d]” that that statute “does not displace

contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are

set for successfully representing Social Security benefits

claimants in court.” Id. at 807. “Rather,” according to the

Gisbrecht Court, “§ 406(b) calls for court review of such

arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield

reasonable results in particular cases.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

Observing that “Congress has provided one boundary line[]” for

reviewing section 406(b) fee arrangements, the Gisbrecht Court

reiterated that such arrangements “are unenforceable to the

extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the

past-due benefits.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807 (citing 

§ 406(b)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V)) (footnote omitted). At the

same time, however, “[w]ithin th[at] 25 percent boundary, . . . ,

the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee

sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. (citation

and footnote omitted). 

After Gisbrecht, the court “must first determine whether a

fee agreement has been executed between the plaintiff and [her]

attorney[]” in accordance with section 406(b). Garcia, 500

F.Supp.2d at 1242 (citing, inter alia, Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at

807). If so, the next step is to determine “whether such

agreement is reasonable.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Gisbrecht,

535 U.S. at 807). In performing that reasonableness assessment,

the Gisbrecht Court identified a number of relevant factors: the

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attorney’s risk of loss; “the character of the representation and

the results . . . achieved[;]” delay by counsel; and the amount

of the benefits “in comparison to the amount of time counsel

spent on the case[.]” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. No one factor

is dispositive. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Gisbrecht seemed to

give district courts a great deal of latitude, noting both that

those courts “are accustomed to making reasonableness

determinations in a wide variety of contexts, and their

assessments in such matters, in the event of an appeal,

ordinarily qualify for highly respectful review.” Id. at 808. 

 A. Execution of Fee Agreement?

As previously noted, plaintiff Fox and attorney Slepian

entered into a contingent fee agreement “[c]haracteristic” of

social security benefit cases, calling for a fee award of 25

percent of all past-due benefits awarded. See id. at 803

(citations omitted). Crediting that agreement as it must in

light of Gisbrecht, next the court will conduct an “independent

check” of that arrangement to assure the reasonableness of any

fees ultimately paid thereunder. See id. at 807. 

B. Reasonableness?

As Gisbrecht suggests, to assist the court in its

reasonableness inquiry, plaintiff’s attorney provided his billing

records in this matter. See id. at 808. He did not, however, as

Gisbrecht also suggests, provide a statement of his “normal

hourly billing charge for non-contingent fee cases.” See id.

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5 Perhaps this is because for the past seven years, his practice “has

been devoted almost exclusively to disability law[,]” and hence he necessarily

only works on a contingent basis. Mot. (doc. 15) at 15. 

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(citation omitted).5 That omission is not fatal to this fee

motion, however, especially given the ample record as to the

other relevant factors outlined in Gisbrecht and discussed

below. 

Taking into account the reasonableness factors identified

in Gisbrecht, among others, the court easily finds that the

requested fee of $18,441.35, which calculates to an hourly rate

of $371.05, is reasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the

court notes that plaintiff’s counsel did not delay in pursuing

this action. So there is no need for a downward adjustment

because he did “not profit from the accumulation of benefits

during the pendency of the case in court.” See Gisbrecht, 535

U.S. at 808 (citation omitted). Also, no “windfall” to

plaintiff’s attorney resulted here in terms of the benefit being

“large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the

case[.]” See id. (citations omitted). The benefits obtained

correspond, roughly, to the relatively significant number of

hours which plaintiff’s counsel billed. Consequently, there is

no need for a downward adjustment based on a benefits versus

hours spent comparison. 

The court has also considered, as it must, the necessarily

contingent nature of this representation, especially in this case

where plaintiff “had a substantial risk of loss” in that 

benefits had been “denied at eight levels of agency review prior

to receiving a partially favorable determination.” Mot. (doc.

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15) at 14-15. Pursuant to his fee arrangement with plaintiff,

attorney Slepian “assumed the risk of receiving nothing for his

time and effort if plaintiff was unsuccessful.” See Hearn v.

Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 

Accordingly, although an hourly rate of $371 may exceed what

plaintiff’s attorney would receive in a non-contingent case, the

court cannot ignore the risk of non-payment in social security

benefits cases such as this. See id. (citing cases) (“Since

Gisbrecht was handed down . . . , the district courts generally

have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts

in § 406(b) cases, accepting that the resulting de facto hourly

rates may exceed those for non contingency-fee arrangements.”)

Further, this hourly rate takes into account the experience of

plaintiff’s counsel who has been practicing law “for

approximately 15 years, the last seven of which ha[ve] been

devoted almost exclusively to disability law.” Mot. (doc. 15) at

15. Moreover, this hourly rate is well within the range of

approved rates. See Ellick v. Barnhart, 445 F.Supp.2d 1166

(C.D.Cal. 2006) (cataloging cases awarding hourly rates varying

from $150.00 to $800.00). 

There are several other factors, albeit not specifically

mentioned in Gisbrecht, which inform the court’s reasonableness

determination here. The first is the fact that plaintiff

received substantially more than the $73,765.40 in past-due

benefits because he will also receive future benefits - benefits

from which a fee award is prohibited from being taken. Those

future benefits are not, however, expressly factored into this

fee award. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 795 (“Because benefits

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amounts figuring in the fee calculation are limited to those past

due, attorneys may not gain additional fees based on a claimant’s

continuing entitlement to benefits.”) Second, plaintiff has

expressly indicated that she does “not object to attorney fees in

the amount of $18,441.35.” Addendum Pl. Mot. (doc. 18), Appendix

6 (18-2) at 1. “There is no basis for the court to question the

sincerity” of plaintiff’s statement, particularly given the

favorable result which plaintiff’s counsel obtained for her. See

Hearn, 262 F.Supp.2d at 1038. Third, because plaintiff was

ultimately successful in obtaining disability benefits, her

attorney also is entitled to the fees which he is seeking in

connection with Fox I. See Garcia, 500 F.Supp.2d at 1242-1244

(citations omitted) (“Section 406(b) authorizes a district court

to award attorney’s fees when [it] remands the case to the S.S.A.

for further proceedings and, following the remand, the claimant

is subsequently awarded past-due benefits.”) All of these

factors, when viewed together, easily persuade the court that the

requested fee award here is reasonable. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS the motion

by plaintiff’s attorney, Eric Slepian, for attorney’s fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and awards him the sum of

$18,441.35 to be paid out of the monies withheld by the

Commissioner from Ms. Fox’ past-due benefits. There is no

dispute that this section 406(b) award must be offset by the

$5,694.02 in attorney’s fees previously granted to attorney

Slepian under the EAJA. See Mot. (doc. 15) at 2-3; and Resp.

(doc. 17) 4); see also Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (quoting Act.

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Of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186) (“Fee awards

may be made under both [the EAJA and section 406(b)], but the

claimant’s attorney must ‘refun[d] to the claimant the amount of

the smaller fee.’”) Thus, the court orders plaintiff’s counsel to

reimburse plaintiff in the amount of $5,694.02, which represents

the two EAJA fee awards he was previously awarded.

IT IS ORDERED granting plaintiff’s motion for an award of

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (doc. 15), and awarding

fees as set forth in this order.

DATED this 11th day of December, 2007.

copies to all counsel of record

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