Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01003/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01003-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 * This case was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR WYATT; MARSHALL K. ) 2:06-cv-1003-GEB-DAD

MCMURRAY; CHARLES MITCHELL; )

EDGAR M. COLLINS; TERRANCE ) 

HALTIWANGER; )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

COUNTY OF BUTTE; DEPUTY )

PATRICK McNELIS; )

 )

Defendants. ) )

Defendants move for partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Plaintiffs oppose the motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are Victor Wyatt (“Wyatt”), Marshall K. McMurray

(“McMurray”), Charles Mitchell (“Mitchell”), Edgar M. Collins

(“Collins”), and Terrance Haltiwanger (“Haltiwanger”) (collectively

“Plaintiffs”). Defendants are the County of Butte (“County”) and

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Deputy Patrick McNelis (“McNelis”). Plaintiffs were arrested in 2004

or 2005 and incarcerated in the Butte County Jail. (SAC ¶ 9). 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants committed various

constitutional violations against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“pursuant to an official county policy of racial discrimination in

making arrests and holding detainees while depriving them of their

rights.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he deprivations and

unequal treatment at the jail were the result of a long term (more

than ten years) custom and practice promulgated by the then incumbent

jail commanders and the Butte County Sheriffs and carried out by

County employees.” (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege claims for

denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, denial of

due process under the Fifth Amendment, violation of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel and speedy trial, and violation of Eighth

Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and

excessive bail. (Id. ¶¶ 10-49.) Plaintiffs also allege Defendants

applied duress to harass or obtain guilty pleas; deprived Plaintiffs

of the right to a fair trial because of, inter alia, the systematic

under-representation of minorities in the jury pool; systematically

and unreasonably deprived Plaintiffs of medical treatment during

incarceration; opened Plaintiffs’ legal mail and withheld Plaintiffs’

other mail; limited their access to the jail library and legal

services (identified in the SAC as “CLC”); eavesdropped on

confidential counsel visits; denied Plaintiffs’ access to appropriate

investigative services; and mishandled and planted drug evidence on

Collins and McMurray “as part of a pattern and practice of the

police.” (Id. ¶¶ 17, 24, 27-28, 40-43, 37, 38, 25, 18, 26.) 

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Plaintiffs also allege a violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. ¶¶ 50-61.) Specifically, Plaintiffs

allege that they “are individuals with serious injuries and

disabilities, both mental and physical”; “[t]hey were entitled to

reasonable accommodation and access as inmates in the Butte County

jail”; and “[e]ach of them was denied such accommodation and/or access

because of his disability while incarcerated as well as denied access

to programs or services outside the jail which could have been

provided with reasonable accommodation.” (Id. ¶ 51.) 

Further, Collins asserts an intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”) claim against McNelis, alleging that

McNelis caused him “severe emotional distress by inflicting on him

brutal treatment and a wrongful arrest and making false allegations

against him.” (Id. ¶ 64.) 

DISCUSSION

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiffs

failed to (1) present a cognizable legal theory, or (2) plead

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When considering a motion to dismiss, all material allegations in the

Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).

In addition, Plaintiffs are given the benefit of every reasonable

inference that can be drawn from the allegations in their Complaint. 

Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Accordingly, a motion to dismiss must be denied “unless it appears

beyond doubt that [Plaintiffs] can prove no set of facts in support of

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[their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 

I. Section 1983 Claims

A. Claims Based on the Conduct of Non-County Actors

Defendants argue that pursuant to the Court’s Order filed

November 22, 2006 (“November 22 Order”), “claims against the County

for the actions of public defenders[,] the District Attorney’s

decisions regarding the prosecution of the plaintiffs[, and] for the

actions of state court judges,” should be dismissed. (Mot. at 4:7-8,

12-13, 17-18.) Plaintiffs respond that “[t]hey are not presenting any

claim against any or all public defenders”; that they “present no

claims against the District Attorneys as an office or as individuals”;

and that they “are not bringing suit against the County for the

actions of ‘state court judges.’” (Opp’n at 3:8, 19, 4:6.)

The November 22 Order granted Defendants’ previous motion to

dismiss allegations in Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint that

alleged the County was liable under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978) for the actions of “public defenders, the

district attorney and state judges.” (Nov. 22 Order at 7:12-14.) 

Plaintiffs again allege that the County is liable for the conduct of

public defenders, district attorneys, and state court judges in

paragraphs 11 through 14, 20, 22, 23, 26, 30, 35, 44, 45 of the SAC. 

Thus the issue is whether these allegations should be dismissed

without leave to amend. “When evaluating whether to grant leave to

amend, the Court considers whether the amendment . . . [would be]

futile.” Sentry Ins. v. Heidelberg USA, Inc., 2006 WL 2827238, at *1

(D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2006) (internal citation omitted). Since the County

is not liable under Monell for the actions of non-County actors, “the

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underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff [are not

the] proper subject of relief” and amendment would be futile. Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Therefore, these allegations are

dismissed without leave to amend. 

Defendants also seek dismissal of “claims against the County

for excessive bail” arguing that the November 22 Order prohibits such

claims. (Mot. at 4:20-22.) Plaintiffs counter that “[t]he claim is

not for excessive bail per se but for allowing race to be a factor

when setting the bail policies in effect in the County of Butte.” 

(Opp’n at 4:15-18.) Defendants rejoin that under California Penal

Code section 1269(b) and (c) no County actors are involved with

setting bail schedules and therefore Plaintiffs’ allegation “that the

bail schedule is applied unequally against minority defendants . . .

should be addressed to the Superior Court and not the County.” (Reply

at 3:19, 22, 26-28.) 

The SAC does not contain allegations showing the County is

responsible for setting bail. (see Cal. Penal Code § 1269(b), (c)

(“[i]f a defendant has appeared before a judge of the court on the

charge . . . , the bail shall be in the amount fixed by the judge. If

that appearance has not been made, the bail shall be in the amount

fixed in the warrant of arrest or, if no warrant of arrest has been

issued, the amount of bail shall be pursuant to the uniform countywide

schedule of bail for the county . . . . It is the duty of the

superior court judges in each county to prepare, adopt, and annually

revise a uniform countywide schedule of bail.”) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims of excessive bail and/or unequal

application of the bail schedule against minority defendants alleged

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in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, and 23 of the SAC are dismissed with leave

to amend. 

B. Inadequate Library Access Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ “claim for inadequate

library access should be dismissed” because the November 22 Order

prohibited such claims unless Plaintiffs could allege that such a

prohibition hindered their efforts to pursue a legal claim. (Mot. at

5:1-2, 4:23-24.) Defendants further contend that the SAC “alleges as

evidence of hindrance the fact that both [] Collins and [] Haltiwanger

filed a writ of habeas corpus” and “[a]lthough Collin’s writ was

returned for failing to pay a fee or provide a fee waiver application,

the ability to file writs evidences access to a legal library, not the

lack of such access.” (Mot. at 4:26-28, 5:1.) Plaintiffs respond

that “[t]he fact [that] two plaintiffs filed a writ of habeas corpus

does not prove they had access to the library [since] [t]hose writs

could have been drafted in a number of ways utilizing jail house

lawyers and other methods.” (Opp’n at 5:7-9.) Defendants rejoin that

“[P]laintiffs’ have not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim

because there have been no allegations that they were unable to file

legal claims with the Court.” (Reply at 4:20-21). 

“[P]rison law libraries and legal assistance programs are

not ends in the themselves, but only the means for ensuring [access to

the courts].” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 (1996). Accordingly,

“a prisoner is required to allege that the asserted limitation to ‘the

library or [to the CLC] legal [services] hindered his efforts to

pursue a legal claim’ since ‘inmates do not have ‘an abstract,

freestanding right to a law library or legal [services].’” (Nov. 22

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Order at 5:23-17 (citing Diaz v. Turner, 2004 WL 2165374, at *3 (N.D.

Tex. Sept. 23, 2004).) 

Plaintiffs allege they “were severely limited in their

access to federal courts where they were bringing writs.” (SAC ¶ 37.)

However, Plaintiffs further allege that “[b]oth Collins and

Haltiwanger prepared and submitted writs of habeas corpus seeking to

obtain their release.” (Id.) “While notice pleading does not demand

that a complaint expound facts, a plaintiff who does so is bound by

such exposition.” Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 159 F.3d 186, 192

(4th Cir. 1989); see Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778,

783, n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that by pleading particular facts

that show Plaintiffs have no legal claim, “‘plaintiff[s] may plead

[themselves] out of court.’”) (internal citation omitted). 

Accordingly, despite Plaintiffs’ allegation that they were limited in

their access to federal courts, the allegation that Collins and

Haltiwanger filed habeas writs in federal court evidences access to

the courts. (See SAC ¶ 37.) Further, even though Collins alleges

that his “Writ” was returned because the applicable fee was not paid

and he had not obtained “a fee waiver application,” these allegations

are insufficient to show that the referenced shortcomings resulted

from Collins’s inadequate access to the jail library or other legal

services. (Id.)

Plaintiffs also allege that they “were in need of library

access to obtain forms, read statutes and engage in meaningful legal

research”; they were “hampered by having to hand write pleadings in

pencil,”; and “were denied access to the [] resources of the

Internet.” (SAC ¶ 38.) These allegations do not show how Plaintiffs

were “hindered in [their] efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis,

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518 U.S. 343 (stating that plaintiffs may show hindrance in their

efforts to pursue a legal claim by, “for example, [alleging that] a

complaint [they] prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some

technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s

legal assistance facilities, [they] could not have known” or “that

[they] suffered arguably actionable harm that [they] wished to bring

before the courts, but w[ere] so stymied by inadequacies of the law

library that [they were] unable even to file a complaint.”) 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning limitations to library

access in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the SAC are dismissed with leave to

amend. 

C. “Vague or Conclusory Claims”

1. Denial of Investigative Services

Defendants argue the allegation that “Collins and

Haltiwanger . . . did not have appropriate investigative services paid

by the [C]ounty . . . is insufficiently alleged.” (Mot. at 5:6-8.) 

Specifically, Defendants contend that “if [Plaintiffs] were

represented by [a] public defender at the time, the claims should be

made against the public defender,” and “[i]f self-represented . . .

Plaintiffs must have formally requested an investigator from the

court.” (Id. at 5:8-11.) Defendants argue that had Plaintiffs done

so, “the [denial of investigative services] claim then would properly

be brought against the court which is a state actor.” (Id. 5:16-17.) 

Plaintiffs respond that both Collins and Haltiwanger were not selfrepresented, had “appointed public defenders at arraignment,” and

“were not refused such an appointment by the Court.” (Opp’n at 5:13-

15.) Plaintiffs further state that “[t]hey were not apprised of the

potential for provision of [investigative] services by appointment”

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and that “[i]f this information is not routinely imparted to African

American defendants by Court or County policy; such discrimination is

actionable.” (Id. at 5:16-18.) 

Defendants rejoin that since “Plaintiffs’ claims regarding

the denial of investigative services are properly directed against

their public defenders, . . . the claims should be dismissed against

the County.” (Reply at 5:4-5.) Further, Defendants argue that

pursuant to California Penal Code section 987.2, “Plaintiffs or their

public defenders must formally request an investigator of the Court in

order to receive the assistance of an investigator”; Plaintiffs admit

that they did not do so; and therefore “[t]he party with the legal

responsibility of [notifying] the defendants, if any . . ., would be

the plaintiffs’ public defenders [who are not County actors].” (Id.

at 5:7-13.) 

A request for investigative services is made by “a motion

for the appointment of an investigator at public expense . . . showing

that the investigative services [were] reasonably necessary.” Puett

v. Superior Court for the County of San Bernardino, 96 Cal. App. 3d

939, 938-39 (1979); see People v. Faxel, 91 Cal. App. 3d 327, 329

(1979) (stating that a “self-represented defendant must make a showing

at least equal to that which must be made by counsel seeking the same

right [the appointment by the trial court of a state compensated

investigator] for his indigent client.”). Since Plaintiffs’ claim in

paragraph 18 of the SAC for lack of investigative services fails to

allege a claim against the County, it is dismissed without leave to

amend. 

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2. Drug Evidence 

Defendants argue that “[a]llegations that Defendant somehow

planted drugs on Collins and McMurray are conclusory and unsupported

by evidence,” or, alternatively, are only allegations of a single

incident [of a constitutional wrong] as precluded by the November 22

Order. (Mot. at 5:22-23, 20.) Plaintiffs counter that “Defendants

offer no support for their assertion [that] a single incident cannot

support a [s]ection 1983 claim.” (Opp’n at 5:21-22.)

The November 22 Order dismissed “allegations of a single

incident of a constitutional wrong that fail[ed] to specify that it

was ‘caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy . . .

attributed to a municipal policymaker.’” (Nov. 22 Order at 7:7-11,

(citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24

(1985)).) “Collins and McMurray contend drug evidence was mishandled

and planted by law enforcement as part of a pattern and practice of

the police.” (SAC ¶ 26.) These allegations are sufficient to

withstand the County’s motion since the claims are based on the

allegation that “‘individual officers’ conduct conformed to official

policy, custom, or practice.’” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Shah v. County of Los

Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

3. Duress

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ allegation “that they

were subject to duress” should be dismissed “[b]ecause these claims

are unduly vague as to who Plaintiffs’ allege are the responsible

actors.” (Mot. at 6:7, 11-12.) Specifically, Defendants contend that

“Plaintiffs allege wrongful prosecution” but that the district

attorney is a state actor; “excessive bail [which is a] claim that

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does not sound against [the] [C]ounty”; and “excessive pretrial

detention [where] no [C]ounty actor is alleged to have been

responsible for the detention.” Plaintiffs counter that “[e]xcept

when specified to be Deputy McNelis, the claims are all against the

County of Butte.” (Opp’n at 6:12-13.) 

Plaintiffs can only state a Monell claim against the County

“if the actor responsible for the alleged actions is a County actor.” 

(Nov. 22 Order at 7:14-15.) Plaintiffs allege in the SAC that their

“civil rights were ignored by [the] County while various forms of

duress were applied to them to pressure them into making [] guilty

plea[s].” (SAC ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he duress took

several forms” assuming “the character of cruel and unusual punishment

. . . by the incarcerating officers”; that “[t]he lengthy pretrial

detention itself became a form of punishment”; and that Plaintiffs

“endured other types of duress . . . such as prosecution asserting

multiple unlikely charges, incarceration without attainable bail, and

excessive periods of pretrial detention.” (Id.) Plaintiffs fail to

specify how the County is responsible for the allegations of duress

stated in the SAC. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations of

duress are dismissed with leave to amend. 

D. Medical Mistreatment Claims

Defendants argue that “it appears that allegations

[concerning medical mistreatment at the jail] from the first amended

complaint have simply been repeated in the [SAC] [and] [t]herefore,

these allegations are prohibited [by] the [C]ourt’s Order.” (Mot. at

7:1-3.) Plaintiffs counter that “there is no need for each

[P]laintiff to describe in great detail every aspect of his medical

condition and the treatment omissions that have occurred” and that

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“these claims should not be dismissed . . . because [P]laintiffs do

not yet possess all the facts which will become available during

discovery to prove what information the jail commander or any other

correctional officer had at what time and why he ignored it.” (Opp’n

at 6:23-24, 7:5-8.) 

“[T]o state a cognizable claim [of medical mistreatment], a

prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to

evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estella

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1979). Deliberate indifference is only

evidenced when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety; the official must be both aware of the

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Clement

v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “[M]ere negligence is

insufficient for liability” under the deliberate indifference

principle. Id. 

Plaintiffs allege in the SAC that “Collins, Mitchell, [and]

McMurray contend they were deprived of medical care as part of a

policy of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners.” 

(SAC ¶ 40.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Mitchell personally

and through his cardiologist made known to jail personnel his medical

monitoring and medication needs”; [t]he jail personnel failed to

assure he received his prescribed medication timely [and] failed to

provide him access to medical providers and unreasonably delayed

transporting him to the hospital, knowingly jeopardizing his life.” 

(Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs also allege that “McMurray repeatedly asked

for treatment and an opportunity for surgery [and] [h]is letter from

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 1 However, allegations that “McMurray is a practicing

vegetarian, but he was unable to receive a healthy diet” and that

Collins “was seen briefly in the ER and then taken to the jail without

pain medication, further care for his medical condition and no

treatment for his emotional distress” do not state a claim for medical

mistreatment because Plaintiffs have not “allege[d] acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” (SAC ¶¶ 28, 30; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.) These

allegations are dismissed with leave to amend.

13

his treating orthopedist, indicating waiting too long could cause him

to pass the operable point, was ignored.” (Id. ¶ 42.) The SAC also

alleges that “Wyatt, Collins and Haltiwanger allege deliberate

indifference in regard to the lack of provision of treatment for

obvious mental health problems” and that “[j]ail officials were aware

of the mental health issues manifested by these [P]laintiffs.” (Id.

¶ 43.) These allegations indicate that jail personnel knew, and

disregarded, that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and are

thus sufficient to state a claim against the County for medical

mistreatment.1

 

E. Handling of Mail and Eavesdropping on Counsel Visits

Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs have not adequately

alleged that they were prejudiced by alleged mail searches or

eavesdropping on counsel visits” because even though they “allege that

they suffered a ‘chilling effect,’” this allegation is “unduly vague.” 

(Mot. at 7:12-15.) Defendants also contend that “even if the inmates’

defense strategy was revealed, such revelation is no violation of the

[Sixth] Amendment where [Plaintiffs’ ability to defend themselves was

not impaired].” (Id. at 7:16-18.) Plaintiffs counter that

“monitoring incarcerated defendants when they communicate with their

counsel is prejudicial in its practice [because] [i]t prevents access

to and confidentiality with counsel and deprives the defendant of

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effective counsel and violates the [Sixth] Amendment.” (Opp’n at 8:6-

8.) Plaintiffs also argue that “[m]aking a direct showing of the harm

at this stage of the pleadings . . . is difficult; particularly when

the use made of what was overheard has not yet been revealed through

discovery.” (Id. at 9:17-19.) 

Plaintiffs’ “assertion that Defendants eavesdropped on

confidential counsel visits fails to state a claim because the

allegation ‘that a party monitored the accused’s conversations with

his attorney does not necessarily establish a Sixth Amendment

violation. Rather, the accused must [allege], in addition, that the

substance of the overheard conversation was of some benefit to

enforcement officials. Absent this [assertion], a monitoring

allegation must be denied.’” (Nov. 22 Order at 6:12-16 (citing

Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1977); see also

United States v. Hernandez, 937 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1991)

(“[T]he Supreme Court has twice held that government invasion of [the

attorney-client privilege] . . . is not sufficient by itself to cause

a Sixth Amendment violation. The defendant must have been prejudiced

by some actions. Our circuit has also explicitly held that prejudice

is required.”) 

Although Plaintiffs allege prosecutors received privileged

communications, they fail to state a claim because they do not allege

that “the information . . . was used against [them] in some way.” 

Riddick v. Baker, WL 221133, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 28, 1997) (citing

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 555-57 (1977)); see SAC ¶ 25. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding handling of their legal

mail and eavesdropping on their counsel visits are dismissed with

leave to amend. 

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F. Jury Pool Claims

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ allegations that

“various jury pools did not represent a fair cross-section of the

population of Butte County,” arguing that under section 195 of the

California Code of Civil Procedure juries are selected by the Jury

Commissioner for the California Superior Court in Butte County;

therefore, “jury selection is not . . . within control of a County

[a]ctor.” (Mot. at 7:28, 8:1, 3-13.) Plaintiffs counter, without

citing any authority, by indicating that the Defendants are exposed to

liability for how jury pools are created. (Opp’n at 10:5, 7-9.) 

Section 195 of the California Code of Civil Procedure

prescribes that “[t]he jury commissioner shall be primarily

responsible for managing the jury system under the general supervision

of the court [and] shall have authority to establish policies and

procedures necessary to fulfill this responsibility.” Cal. Code of

Civ. P. § 195(c). Section 195(a) further provides that “[i]n each

county, there shall be one jury commissioner who shall be appointed

by, and serve at the pleasure of, a majority of the judges of the

superior court.” (Id. at § 195(a).) The statutory authority reveals

that the County is not responsible for the composition of the jury. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations of under-representation of

minorities on jury panels in paragraph 24 of the SAC are dismissed

without leave to amend. 

II. ADA Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ ADA claim should be

dismissed because the SAC “alleges no facts that Plaintiffs were

denied accommodation or access ‘by reason of’ or ‘because of’ their

alleged disabilities.” (Mot. at 9:28, 10:1-2.) Plaintiffs argue that 

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they “have pled sufficient facts to support their allegations of

violation of the letter and spirit of the ADA statute.” (Opp’n at

11:12-13.) 

Title II of the ADA prescribes: 

no qualified individual with a disability shall,

by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public

entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

such entity. 

42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Supreme Court has held that “[s]tate prisons

fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity,’” and

thus the provisions of the ADA apply. Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Accordingly,

“programs or services provided at jails, prisons, and any other

‘custodial or correctional institution’” come within the scope of the

ADA. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001). 

This includes “mental health services and other activities or services

undertaken by law enforcement and provided by correctional facilities

to those incarcerated . . . .” Id. 

Plaintiffs allege that “McMurray had a shoulder and neck

injury” and “needed a mattress which would support his injured neck”

but that “[t]his accommodation was denied as all inmates must use the

same thin mattress.” (SAC ¶ 52.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that

McMurray was also denied physical therapy, “access to diagnostic

testing or follow up evaluations to determine whether his condition

was deteriorating,” and “evaluation services from any orthopedic

surgeon.” (Id. ¶¶ 52, 53.) Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that

Mitchell had a serious heart condition but that it was not “treated or

reasonably monitored” while he was incarcerated; that Collins “suffers 

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 2 The discrimination requirement is explicitly stated in Title

II: “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132 (emphasis added). 

17

from Schnizophrenia” and in jail “he received no follow up evaluation

or treatment”; that “Haltiwanger was suffering from a mental

disability at the time of his arrest” and “was denied an appropriate

and timely mental status examination.” (Id. ¶¶ 56, 57, 59.)

 Plaintiffs also allege that they were “denied []

accommodation and/or access because of [their] disabilit[ies].” (SAC

¶ 51.) However, these allegations are conclusory since they do not

indicate that the denials of accommodation or access were because of

Plaintiffs’ disabilities. (See id. ¶¶ 56, 57, 59.) “The Court does

not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory allegations

cast in the form of factual allegations.” Manning v. City of Rohnert

Park, 2006 WL 3591149, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2006); see Miranda v.

Clark County, Nevada, 279 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir.2002) (“conclusory

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”) Accordingly, a claim is

not stated under the ADA because “plaintiff[s] [do] not allege that

[they] were denied [accommodation or access] because of [their]

disability.” Mark v. Imberg, WL 1587797, at *10 (W.D. Wis. July 6,

2005).2

 These allegations are dismissed with leave to amend. 

III. IIED

McNelis moves for partial dismissal of Collins’ IIED claim

asserting that he is immune from liability for allegedly providing

false testimony against Collins. (Mot. at 10:5-19.) McNelis argues

that under California Government Code section 821.6, “police officers 

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are immunized from suit for filing false police reports and providing

false statements pertinent to charges against defendants, even when

such statements are made in a malicious prosecution.” (Id. at 10:10-

12.) Plaintiffs’ counter that “McNelis is not immune from inflicting

physical and mental damage to [] Collins.” (Opp’n at 11:19-20.) 

Under California Government Code section 821.6, “[a] public

employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or

prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope

of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable

cause.” Cal. Govt. Code § 821.6. Police officers are public

employees within the meaning of section 821.6. Herve v. City and

County of San Francisco, 2004 WL 2806165, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7,

2004) (internal citations omitted). Further, section 821.6 applies to

claims for IIED that are based upon malicious prosecution. See

Scannell v. County of Riverside, 152 Cal. App. 3d 596, 609 (1984)

(“[t]o allow an [IIED] cause of action [based upon conduct that falls

within section 821.6 to go forward] would permit . . . employee

immunity to be avoided simply by denominating the cause of action as

one for intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than

malicious prosecution.”); see also Herve, 2004 WL 2806165, at *7

(“[u]nder § 821.6, police officers’ actions during an investigation

are ‘cloaked with immunity,’ even if they ‘acted negligently,

maliciously, or without probable cause in carrying out their duties.”) 

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Collins suffered “severe emotional

distress” because “[d]uring trial, Collins was subjected to the

contrived and false testimony of [] McNelis.” (SAC ¶ 64.) Since

Plaintiffs’ cannot state a claim for IIED claim based upon the 

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allegation that McNelis gave false testimony against Collins, this 

allegation is dismissed without leave to amend. 

 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ IIED claim that

alleges that Plaintiffs’ did not receive adequate medical care at the

jail should be dismissed because “the State and the Department of

Corrections, as public entities, [are] statutorily immune from

liability for prisoner[s’] claims for [IIED] and negligence arising

out of alleged medical malpractice and failure to furnish medical

care.” (Mot. at 10:20-24.) It is unclear whether Plaintiffs’

allegations include an IIED claim against the County. (See SAC ¶¶ 62-

64 (“McNelis . . . committed the acts and omissions described

hereinabove [and] [t]he intentional and/or negligent acts of the

individual defendant[] was designed to cause . . . severe emotional

distress); but see Opp’n at 11:19-20, 12:6-8 (where Plaintiffs respond

to Defendants’ argument concerning the lack of medical care even

though such conduct would be attributable to the County and not

McNelis.) Nonetheless, under California Government Code section

845.6, “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for

injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or

obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody.” Cal. Govt. Code.

§ 845.6. Accordingly, to the extent that the IIED claim is based upon 

the inadequate provision of medical care, it is dismissed without

leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, the dismissal motion is granted in

part and denied in part. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a Third

Amended Complaint solely on the claims that have been dismissed with 

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leave to amend, provided that the Third Amended Complaint is filed

within ten days of the date on which this Order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 10, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

 

 

 

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