Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-15619/USCOURTS-ca9-11-15619-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENNIS SHARKEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ERAL O’NEAL; SILVA FOSTER; D.

GRAHAM; CHARLES SYDNEY,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-15619

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-04341-

JSW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 5, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed February 10, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Paul J. Watford, Circuit

Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

* The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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2 SHARKEY V. O’NEAL

SUMMARY**

Americans with Disabilities Act/Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing as

time-barred plaintiff’s claims under Title II of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The district judge applied California’s two-year statute of

limitations for personal injury claims to plaintiff’s claims

against his parole officers, which alleged that defendants

transferred plaintiff from his apartment to motels which did

not accommodate his disabilities. The panel held that with

respect to plaintiff’s claim under Title II of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, the district court was required to borrow

the three-year limitations period applicable to claims under

California Government Code § 11135, rather than the

limitations period applicable to personal injury claims in

California. Underthisthree-year limitations period, plaintiff’s

Americans with Disabilities Act claim was not time-barred. 

With respect to plaintiff’s remaining claims, the panel held

that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the

pro se claims with prejudice without explanation. The panel

remanded for an application of the factors set forth in Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), and the presumption in

favor of granting leave to amend with respect to all claims

other than plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities Act claim.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SHARKEY V. O’NEAL 3

COUNSEL

Lisa Ells (argued) and Sanford JayRosen, Rosen Bien Galvan

& Grunfeld, San Francisco, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Neah Huynh (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Kamala D.

Harris, Attorney General; Jonathan L. Wolff, Senior

Assistant Attorney General; Thomas S. Patterson,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco,

California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Dennis Sharkey appeals from an order of the district court

dismissing as time-barred his claims under Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act, and various provisions of the Constitution

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district judge applied

California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury

claims to all of Sharkey’s claims. With respect to Sharkey’s

claim under Title II of the ADA, we hold that the district

court did not apply the correct statute of limitations. District

courts must borrow the three-year limitations period

applicable to claims under California Government Code

§ 11135, rather than the limitations period applicable to

personal injury claims in California. Under this three-year

limitations period, Sharkey’s ADA claim is not time-barred.

With respect to his other claims, Sharkey does not contest the

applicable limitations periods, but we hold that the district

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4 SHARKEY V. O’NEAL

court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with

prejudice without affording Sharkey leave to amend.

BACKGROUND1

Sharkey is a 55-year-old man with disabilities that require

him to use a wheelchair and two canes. In late 2006 and early

2007, Defendants Graham, Foster, O’Neal, and Sydney were

employees at the Parole Division of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in Berkeley.

In 2006, Sharkey was on parole, living independently in

an accessible apartment in Oakland. On December 28, 2006,

Agent Foster informed Sharkey of new parole terms,

including a housing restriction imposed under the California

Sexual Predator and Control Act that required Sharkey to

move from his Oakland residence. Agent O’Neal, who Agent

Foster had assigned to Sharkey’s case, gave Sharkey only an

hour to relocate and only 25 minutes to pack, notwithstanding

his disability. Sharkey experienced a great deal of pain during

this harried move, and, due to the time pressure, left behind

important medical supplies and personal possessions. Agent

O’Neal forbade Sharkey from ever returning to the apartment

or from calling friends to retrieve his remaining belongings.

That night, Agent O’Neal drove Sharkey to the Harris

Motel and assigned him to a room that lacked the safety

features necessary to accommodate his disability, such as a

1 The operative facts are taken from Sharkey’s complaint. “In reviewing

a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we must accept as true all

factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of

Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014).

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SHARKEY V. O’NEAL 5

wheelchair-accessible entrance, sufficient floor space to

operate a wheelchair, and bathroom grab bars. When Sharkey

complained to Agent Foster, no attempt was made to locate

a suitable residence.

Sharkey was injured at least three times in slip and fall

accidents as a result of the lack of accommodations at the

Harris Motel. He also lost access to a federal program that

had provided him with in-home medical services because the

motel did not meet the program’s residence requirements.

Sharkey’s doctors in turn canceled several scheduled

surgeries because he no longer had a suitable recovery

environment, and Sharkey was unable to participate in other

medically necessary treatments. Sharkey informed the

defendants about the problems caused by his relocation to the

Harris Motel and the need for an accessible residence, to no

avail.

In March 2007, after Sharkey went to the emergency

room with injuries sustained when he fell in the ill-equipped

motel room, Agent O’Neal moved Sharkey from the Harris

Motel to the Sea Breeze Inn. Located on a truck route in an

industrial area that lacked access to public transportation, this

new motel did not accommodate Sharkey’s disability-related

needs either.

Sharkey alleges that the defendants’ decisions to require

him to live in motels incapable of accommodating his

disabilities caused him significant pain and stress,

exacerbated his medical conditions, and deprived him of

access to important medical treatments. On September 17,

2009, Sharkey filed suit, proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, against the defendants in the Northern District of

California, alleging violations of Title II of the ADA, Title

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6 SHARKEY V. O’NEAL

VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Constitution. On

February 25, 2011, the district court dismissed the entirety of

Sharkey’s complaint with prejudice as time-barred under the

two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury

claims in California.2 We reverse.

DISCUSSION

I.

Sharkey first contends that the district court erred when

it dismissed his claim under Title II of the ADA as barred by

the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal

injury claims in California. We review de novo the district

court’s order dismissing the claim on statute of limitations

grounds. MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael,

714 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th cir. 2013).

Initially, we reject defendants’ argument that we must

apply the same limitations period to all ADA claims. The

ADA is structured as separate titles governing different

conduct: Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117, covers

discrimination in employment; Title II, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12131–12165, covers discrimination in public services,

and Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189, covers

discrimination in public accommodations and services

2 The district judge also concluded that Agents O’Neal and Supervising

Agent Sydney “were not properly served.” On appeal, however, the

defendants concede that they “do not argue, as an alternative basis for

affirmance, that the suits should have been dismissed for lack of proper

service.” Indeed, the district court is responsible for effectuating service

of process where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, as Sharkey

was. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Davis v. Dep’t of

Corr., 446 F.2d 644, 645 (9th Cir. 1971).

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SHARKEY V. O’NEAL 7

operated by private entities. It is clear that Congress did not

intend every title of the ADA to have the same limitations

period. Title I expressly incorporates the limitations period

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, see, e.g., Douglas v.

Cal. Dep’t. of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 (9th Cir. 2001),

whereas Congress omitted express limitations periods from

the other ADA titles. Furthermore, because each title of the

ADA “encompasses different types of discrimination, as well

as different remedies,” Mary J. Topliff, Annotation,

Limitation of Actions Under the Americans with Disabilities

Act, 144 A.L.R. Fed. 307 § 2(a) (1998), there is good reason

for differing statutes of limitations. Here, we express no

opinion as to the limitations period applicable to claims under

titles of the ADA other than Title II.

Title II of the ADA does not contain an express statute of

limitations. The four-year catchall statute of limitations for

actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December

1, 1990 is inapplicable, as the ADA was enacted on July 26,

1990, see 104 Stat. 327, and Sharkey does not contend that

his “claim against the defendant was made possible by a post1990 enactment.” Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,

541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Instead,

we borrow the statute of limitations applicable to the most

analogous state-law claim, so long as “it is not inconsistent

with federal law or policy to do so.” Wilson v. Garcia,

471 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985), partially superseded by statute

as stated in Jones, 541 U.S. at 377–80. See also 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988; Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660

(1987).

No published opinion of this court has determined the

most appropriate state-law analog to claims under Title II of

the ADA. In four published opinions we assumed without

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8 SHARKEY V. O’NEAL

deciding that California’s statute of limitations for personal

injury claims applies to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.3

In three of the four cases we did so because the parties argued

their positions based on that assumption. In the fourth we

stated that the result would be the same whichever statute of

limitations was applicable. In any event, none of these cases

involved Title II.

We now hold that California Government Code § 11135

provides the most analogous state-law claim to a Title II

claim.4 Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,

be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

3

See Pickern v. Holiday Quality Food Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.2

(9th Cir. 2002); Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d

1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth.,

271 F.3d 812, 823 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001); Alexopulos v. San Francisco

Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 554 (1987).

A number of unpublished dispositions have also stated—without

analysis other than citation to the above cases declining to reach the

issue—that the personal injury limitations period applies to ADA claims.

See, e.g., Thunderbird v. Or., 570 F. App’x 693, 694 (9th Cir. 2014);

Hubbs v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 519 F. App’x 468, 469 (9thCir. 2013);

Lancaster v. City of Reno, 479 F. App’x 774, 774 (9th Cir. 2012).

4 Although we find that section 11135 provides the most analogous statelaw claim to an ADA Title II claim, we note that the other state statutes

proffered by Sharkey—the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California

Disabled Persons Act (DPA)—also provide analogous causes of action for

disability discrimination. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51(f); 54(c); Cohen v. City

of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 701 (9thCir. 2014) (holding that because the

City was not entitled to summary judgment on Cohen’s ADA Title II

claim, the district court also erred in granting summary judgment to the

City on Cohen’s claims under the DPA and the Unruh Act).

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SHARKEY V. O’NEAL 9

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132. Section 11135(a) similarly provides that “No person

in the State of California shall, on the basis of . . . disability,

be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of,

or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any

program or activity that is conducted, operated, or

administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded

directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from

the state.” Section 11135(b) then expressly incorporates “the

protections and prohibitions contained in Section 202 of the

federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.

Sec. 12132) [Title II], and the federal rules and regulations

adopted in implementation thereof . . . .” Thus, section 11135

provides an almost identical state-law counterpart to Title II,

and we accordingly borrow the limitations period applicable

to such claims.5

Some circuits have applied state limitations periods for

personal injury claims to ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims.

These courts reason that in Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme

Court held that the forum state’s personal injury statute of

limitations applies to § 1983 claims, see Wilson, 471 U.S. at

5 The principal difference between section 11135 and Title II is that the

former statute “may be enforced by a civil action for equitable relief,” Cal.

Gov’t. Code § 11139, whereas under the latter statute, a plaintiff may

recover compensatory damages if he makes a showing of discriminatory

intent. See Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9thCir. 1998).

Notwithstanding this distinction, we conclude that section 11135 is the

closest state-law analog to Title II. Listing differences between the two

statutes merely “begs the question of which [California] statute is most

analogous . . . . The difference . . . simply means that . . . there is no

perfect counterpart . . . and we must determine which statute is more

appropriate.” McCullough v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127,

132 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271–72.

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280, and ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are in turn

analogous to § 1983 claims. These circuits do not discuss,

however, whether the forum state provides a state-law

disability discrimination claim to which a closer analogy

might be had,6often relying on the parties’ agreement that the

personal injury limitations period applied.7 Thus, there is no

precedent holding that the personal injury limitations period

is applicable where, as in the case before us, state law

provides an almost identical counterpart to Title II.

We follow the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in A

Society Without AName v. Commonwealth of Virginia, which

held that the limitations period under the Virginia Rights of

Persons with Disabilities Act (Virginia Act), rather than the

personal injury statute of limitations, applies to ADA Title II

claims. 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit

had previously applied the Virginia Act limitations period to

Rehabilitation Act claims in Wolsky v. Medical College of

6

See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199,

208 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rehabilitation Act and ADA Title II); Faibisch v.

Univ. of Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2002) (Rehabilitation Act);

Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 550–51 (7th Cir.

1996) (ADA Title III); Baker v. Bd. of Regents of Kan., 991 F.2d 628,

631–32 (10th Cir. 1993) (Rehabilitation Act); Morse v. Univ. of Vt.,

973 F.2d 122, 125–27 (2d Cir. 1992) (Rehabilitation Act). Butsee Gaona

v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1054–56 (8th Cir. 2003)

(rejecting state-law disability discrimination analog for ADA Title III

claim because prior decisions—none of which considered whether state

law provided an analogous disability discrimination claim—applied

personal injury limitations period to Rehabilitation Act claims).

7

See Disabled in Action of Pa., 539 F.3d at 208 (stating the parties did

not dispute the district court’s conclusion that the personal injury

limitations period applied); Soignier v. Am. Bd. ofPlastic Surgery, 92 F.3d

at 550–51 (same).

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SHARKEY V. O’NEAL 11

Hampton Roads, where it explained that the Virginia Act

constitutes a much closer state-law analog to the federal

statute than does a personal injury action. 1 F.3d 222, 224–25

(4th Cir. 1993); see also McCullough v. Branch Banking &

Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127, 132 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying statute

of limitations in North Carolina Handicapped Persons

Protection Act to Rehabilitation Act claim). Our holding (and

that of the Fourth Circuit) is also consistent with the decisions

of a handful of circuits that apply the personal injury

limitations period simply because the relevant state lacks an

analogous disability discrimination cause of action.8

As Wolsky persuasively explained, Wilson supports

borrowing the limitations period applicable to state-law

disability discrimination claims, rather than the personal

injury limitations period. See Wolsky, 1 F.3d at 225. Wilson

requires us to select “‘the most appropriate,’ or ‘the most

analogous’ state statute of limitations.” 471 U.S. at 268.

Applying the limitations period applicable to section 11135,

the nearly identical state-law counterpart to Title II, more

faithfully adheres to this command than does applying the

limitations period of § 1983. More important, Wilson’s

8

See McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 664 (6th Cir. 2012)

(“Because § 4112.022 is not modeled after the ADA and does not set forth

its own statute of limitations, the appropriate statute of limitations for a

Title II claim is the two-year limitations period applicable to personal

injury actions in Ohio”); Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 237 n.

116 (5th Cir. 2011) (“In selecting Texas’s personal-injury limitations

period, we note that Texas has not adopted a general disability

discrimination law modeled on Title II or the Rehabilitation Act.”);

Everett v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1998)

(“Because Georgia has not passed a state law identical to the

Rehabilitation Act from which to borrow a limitations period, we . . .

apply Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations period for personal injury

actions.”).

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12 SHARKEY V. O’NEAL

reasons for characterizing § 1983 claims as analogous to

personal injury claims do not apply here. Wilson explained

that § 1983 provides a “unique remedy” that “encompass[es]

numerous and diverse topics and subtopics” with “no precise

counterpart in state law.” 471 U.S. at 272–73. Thus, “a

simple, broad characterization of all § 1983 claims” is

appropriate, and applying the personal injury limitations

period avoids the problem of conflicting analogies “to more

than one of the ancient common-law forms of action.” Id. By

contrast, the specific nature of claims under Title II of the

ADA allows for a direct analogy to section 11135, which

expressly incorporates the protections of Title II, and is not a

common-law claim.

It remains for us to determine the statute of limitations

applicable to section 11135 claims, a question of state law.

Although the California Supreme Court has not ruled on this

issue, the applicable statute of limitations under state law is

readily ascertainable. “[W]hen (1) a federal court is required

to apply state law, and (2) there is no relevant precedent from

the state’s highest court, but (3) there is relevant precedent

from the state’s intermediate appellate court, the federal court

must follow the state intermediate appellate court decision

unless the federal court finds convincing evidence that the

state’s supreme court likely would not follow it.” See Ryman

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d 993, 994 (9th Cir. 2007).

California provides a three-year statute of limitations for

“[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a

penalty or forfeiture,” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a), which

“applies only where the liability is embodied in a statutory

provision and was of a type which did not exist at common

law.” Brandenburg v. Eureka Redevelopment Agency, 62 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 339, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis and internal

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SHARKEY V. O’NEAL 13

quotation marks omitted). In Gatto v. County of Sonoma, the

California Court of Appeal explained that while state-law

counterparts to Title I of the ADA would not be subject to the

three-year limitations period in section 338(a) because they

derive from common-law public accommodation claims, “the

ADA also addresses other rights of the disabled, such as the

right[] . . . to receive the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity (42 U.S.C. § 12132 [Title II]),

which are unrelated to public accommodations and do not

derive from the common law.” 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 561

(Ct. App. 2002). Because Gatto concluded that Title II does

not derive from the common law, Title II’s state-law

counterpart, section 11135, does not either; both are

“embodied in a statutory provision” for the purposes of

section 338(a). Thus, under Gatto, section 11135 is subject to

section 338(a)’s three-year limitations period. Gatto has

remained good law in California for over a decade, and no

countervailing authority convinces us that the California

Supreme Court would reach a different result.

Finally, applying this three-year statute of limitations to

an ADA Title II claim is not inconsistent with federal law or

policy. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266–67. Section 11135

expressly provides that insofar as it incorporates Title II

standards, Title II provides a floor and not a ceiling for the

scope of section 11135 protections and prohibitions. Cal.

Gov’t Code § 11135(b) (“[I]f the laws of this state prescribe

stronger protections and prohibitions, the programs and

activities subject to subdivision (a) shall be subject to the

stronger protections and prohibitions.”). Thus, “[i]t is most

unlikely that the period of limitations applicable to [Title II]

claims ever was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would

discriminate against federal claims, or be inconsistent with

federal law in any respect.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279.

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14 SHARKEY V. O’NEAL

Sharkey filed suit two and a half years after the last events

alleged in his complaint occurred. Under the applicable threeyear statute of limitations, his claim under Title II of the

ADA is not time-barred.

II.

Sharkey also contends that the district court erred in

dismissing his other claims with prejudice. While Sharkey

does not contest the statute of limitations applicable to these

claims, he seeks leave to amend his complaint to allege

additional facts defeating the statute-of-limitations defense.

We review the denial of an opportunity to amend for abuse of

discretion. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Sharkey missed the deadline to amend his pleadings as a

matter of course, as he was required to do so within twentyone days of being served with a motion to dismiss. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). However, “Rule 15(a) declares that

leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires;

this mandate is to be heeded.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182

(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[w]e are very

cautious in approving a district court’s decision to deny pro

se litigants leave to amend.” Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank,

295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc);see also Lucas

v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir.1995) (per

curiam).

The Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis held that district

courts should consider the following factors in deciding

whether to dismiss with prejudice:

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SHARKEY V. O’NEAL 15

In the absence of any apparent or declared

reason such as undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant,

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, futility of

amendment, etc. the leave sought should, as

the rules require, be ‘freelygiven.’ 371 U.S. at

182. “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing

of any of the remaining Foman factors, there

exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor

of granting leave to amend.” Eminence

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048,

1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

In the instant case, the district court provided no

explanation for dismissing with prejudice, despite the fact

that the operative complaint was the first and only complaint

filed by Sharkey, who was proceeding pro se. “A simple

denial of leave to amend without any explanation by the

district court is subject to reversal.” Id. “Of course, the grant

or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion

of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave

without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not

an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion

and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.” Foman,

371 U.S. at 182. Similarly, dismissal with prejudice

constitutes an abuse of discretion where the district court fails

to make a determination “that the pleading could not possibly

be cured by the allegation of other facts,” Lopez, 203 F.3d at

1127 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted),

and this is so “‘even if no request to amend the pleading was

made.’” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.

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16 SHARKEY V. O’NEAL

1995) (quoting Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Collection

Service, 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir.1990)). We therefore

conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Sharkey’s

entire complaint with prejudice without explanation and we

accordingly remand for application of the Foman factors and

the presumption in favor of granting leave to amend with

respect to all claims other than his ADA Title II claim.

CONCLUSION

We hold that California’s three-year limitations period for

an action upon liability created by statute applies to claims

under Title II of the ADA, and that Sharkey’s Title II claim

is not time-barred. We also hold that the district court abused

its discretion in dismissing Sharkey’s remaining claims with

prejudice without affording him leave to amend.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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