Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00933/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00933-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Richard Rojas, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00933-PHX-JJT (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Federal Proceedings, in 

which Petitioner requests the Court stay his habeas proceedings so that he can exhaust his 

claims in state court. (Doc. 4.) On July 1, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review of Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings, rendering his request for a stay 

moot. (Doc. 12-3, Ex. X.) However, Respondents also request the Court stay this matter 

until the United States Supreme Court issues a decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 

S. Ct. 1546. (Doc. 11.) 

 Petitioner asserts in his habeas Petition, among other claims, that the Supreme 

Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), applies retroactively to his 

case, and his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Miller. On March 23, 

2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery. At issue in Montgomery is 

whether the Supreme Court in Miller adopted a new substantive rule that applies 

retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the 

Court’s analysis regarding whether Petitioner’s habeas claims are time-barred and 

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 1 of 9
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

whether they fail on the merits. Therefore, the Court recommends that this matter be 

stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery. 

I. Background 

a. Petitioner’s Convictions, Appeal, and PCR Proceedings 

 On February 6, 2001, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree 

murder and one count each of armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and 

conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary. (Doc. 12-1, Ex. B.) The trial court 

sentenced him to several concurrent terms of imprisonment, including natural life for one 

count of murder, and a consecutive term of natural life for the second count of murder. 

(Id., Ex. C.) 

 Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences by filing an opening brief in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, raising claims unrelated to his current habeas Petition. (Id., 

Ex. E.) On April 24, 2003, the State filed an answering brief (Id., Ex. F), and on June 2, 

2003, Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 12-2, Ex. G). On October 21, 2003, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id., Ex. H.) On 

November 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a pro per petition for review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Id., Ex. I.) On December 10, 2003, the State filed a notice of acknowledgment. 

(Id., Ex. J.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on March 15, 2004. (Id., Ex. W.) 

 On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 

132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012), holding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing 

scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” 

The Court explained that “[m]andatory life without [the possibility of] parole for a 

juvenile precludes consideration” of the defendant’s “chronological age and its hallmark 

features,” including the defendant’s “family and home environment,” the “circumstances 

of the homicide offense,” that the offender “might have been charged and convicted of a 

lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth,” and “the possibility of 

rehabilitation.” Id. at 2468. The Court stated that the Eighth Amendment requires “a 

judge or jury . . . to consider [such] mitigating circumstances before imposing the 

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 2 of 9
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Id. at 2475. 

 On June 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”), 

indicating that Miller reflected a significant change in the law because the Supreme Court 

had decided that “mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles are 

unconstitutional.” (Id., Ex. K.) On July 9, 2013, the trial court noted that this proceeding 

was Petitioner’s “first Rule 32 proceeding” and concluded it was untimely. (Id., Ex. L.) 

The court also addressed Petitioner’s argument and dismissed his PCR notice: 

 Defendant is claiming, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g), that there has been a significant change in the law that if applied retroactively to the defendant’s case, would probably affect the outcome. Specifically, Defendant cites Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). 

 The Defendant claims Miller constitutes a significant change in the law that applies to his case. For the purpose of this order only, the Court shall consider that Miller could be a significant change in the law. Defendant asserts that under Miller, a juvenile could not be sentenced to life imprisonment. This is a misreading of Miller which does not place a categorical ban on juvenile life sentences without the possibility of parole. Rather, in Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional. Hence, the judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances such as age prior to imposing either life with the possibility of parole or the harshest sentence possible for a juvenile, that being natural life without the possibility of parole. 

 In the instant case, the record demonstrates that the age of the Defendant was determined to be a mitigating factor. Even after considering the Defendant’s age as a mitigating factor, the Court chose to sentence him 

to the term of his natural life. Since the sentence of natural life without the 

possibility of parole was not statutorily mandated and the Court had the discretion to order life with the possibility of parole but chose not to, defendant has failed to demonstrate that Miller is a significant change in the law as applied to his case. 

(Id.) 

 On July 21, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, contending the 

imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole violated the Eighth 

Amendment. (Doc. 12-3, Ex. N.) On July 24, 2013, the Arizona Justice Project filed a 

“Brief of Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,” 

requesting the court reconsider its dismissal of Petitioner’s PCR notice, appoint Petitioner 

counsel, and allow Petitioner to file a PCR petition “to develop several issues of first

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 3 of 9
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

impression and statewide importance.” (Id., Ex. M.) On July 29, 2013, the trial court 

denied Petitioner’s Motion: 

The record in this matter is clear that the sentencing judge took into account the age of the defendant as part of the sentencing determination (page 13 of sentencing transcript). Therefore, if Miller has retroactive application, its requirements regarding mitigation have been met in this matter and there is 

no basis for defendant to be relieved from the natural life sentence that was 

imposed upon him. 

(Id., Ex. O.) On August 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals (Id., Ex. P), and on October 23, 2013, the State filed a response (Id., Ex. 

Q). On November 12, 2013, the Arizona Justice Project filed another Amicus Curiae brief 

in the Arizona Court of Appeals, to which the State filed a response on January 15, 2014. 

(Id., Ex. R.) On February 12, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but 

denied relief, based on the following reasoning: 

 Rojas contends the Supreme Court opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), constitutes a significant change in the law that 

required the trial court to vacate his sentences of natural life. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1(g) (significant change in the law as a ground for post- conviction relief); 32.2(b) (rule of preclusion does not apply to claims for relief based on Rule 32.1(g)). In Miller, the Supreme Court held “that mandatory life [sentences] without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 132 S.Ct. at 2460. The court further held that a trial court may sentence a juvenile offender convicted of murder to 

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole so long as the court takes into account “how children are different, and how those differences 

counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 

2469.

 We assume arguendo that Miller is retroactive. Even so, we deny relief. Miller prohibits mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Id. at 2460. Rojas’s sentences to natural life were not mandatory. The trial court knew it had the option to sentence Rojas to natural life or life with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years’ imprisonment. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13–703(A) (1999). 

Further, in its determination of which sentence to impose, the trial court acknowledged Rojas’s “miserable childhood,” and found that his age at the time he committed the murders and his lack of prior felony convictions were mitigating factors. Therefore, the court took into account “how 

children are different” and Rojas’s sentences to natural life complied with Miller. 

(Id., Ex. T ¶¶ 3–4.) 

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 4 of 9
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

b. Petitioner’s Habeas Proceedings 

 On May 22, 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(Doc. 2), a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3), and a Motion to Stay these proceedings 

pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s state remedies (Doc. 4). In his Petition, Petitioner 

asserts three grounds for relief: 

1. his life sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment and are unconstitutional under Miller; 

2. the state trial court erred by summarily dismissing his PCR proceeding as untimely, failing to appoint him counsel, and 

depriving him of an opportunity to file a PCR petition; and 

3. Miller applies retroactively to Petitioner’s case. 

(Doc. 1 at 6-9.) 

 In his Motion to Stay, Petitioner requests the Court stay this matter because his 

Petition for Review regarding his Rule 32 proceedings is pending with the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 4.) However, on July 1, 2015, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review of Petitioner’s Petition. (Doc. 12-3, Ex. X.) 

 On July 13, 2015, the Court denied Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, and 

ordered Respondents to answer the Petition and respond to the Motion to Stay. (Doc. 7.) 

 On August 21, 2015, Respondents filed a Response to Petitioner’s Motion to Stay 

and an Answer to the Petition. (Docs. 11, 12.) In their Response to the Motion to Stay, 

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s request for a stay to allow him to exhaust his state 

court remedies is now moot because the Arizona Supreme Court denied his Petition for 

Review on July 1, 2015. (Doc. 11.) However, Respondents argue that a stay of these 

proceedings is appropriate because the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 

Montgomery, in which the Court will decide whether the holding in Miller applies 

retroactively to cases on collateral review. (Id. at 2.) Although Respondents contend that 

Petitioner’s Petition fails on the merits regardless of whether Miller applies retroactively, 

and, therefore, a stay would delay the entry of judgment in the district court, Respondents 

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 5 of 9
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

argue a stay here is nonetheless appropriate because it would reduce the risk of 

unnecessary appeals. (Id. at 2-4.) Petitioner has not filed a reply to Respondents’ 

Response or Answer. 

II. Discussion 

The Court finds that it is appropriate to stay this matter until the Supreme Court 

issues its decision in Montgomery. Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss the 

Petition because it is time-barred, Miller does not apply retroactively, and even assuming 

Miller applies retroactively, Petitioner’s claims fail on the merits. (Doc. 12 at 7-8.) The 

issue before the Supreme Court in Montgomery is whether the Supreme Court in Miller 

adopted a new substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. 

Consequently, the Montgomery decision will impact the Court’s analysis regarding 

whether Petitioner’s habeas claims are time-barred, and whether Petitioner’s claims fail 

on the merits. 

More specifically, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(ADEPA) states that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The ADEPA’s one year statute of limitations begins to run 

from the latest of four dates, one of which is “the date on which the constitutional right 

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D). If the Supreme Court determines that its 

holding in Miller does not apply retroactively, based on long-settled law, Petitioner’s 

Petition is untimely. If, however, the Court finds the holding applies retroactively, 

Petitioner’s claims may not be time-barred. 

Likewise, the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery will impact the Court’s 

analysis of the merits of Petitioner’s habeas claims. If the Supreme Court decides that its 

holding in Miller does not apply retroactively, Petitioner’s first and third grounds for 

relief must fail on the merits. If, however, the Court finds Miller does apply 

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 6 of 9
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

retroactively, Petitioner’s first and third grounds for relief may or may not fail. 

Additionally, the Court is required to issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

(COA) when it issues a final order on Petitioner’s Petition. See Rule 11 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court (“the district court 

must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.”). Petitioner may also seek a COA from the Ninth Circuit. Id. (“If the 

[district] court denies a certificate, the parties may not appeal the denial but may seek a 

certificate from the court of appeals.”). In deciding whether to issue a COA, the district 

court must determinate whether Petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right” and, if the district court dismisses the Petition on a procedural 

ground, whether the dismissal is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists 

would not find the ruling debatable. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 327 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Given the impact of 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery and the COA standard, issuing a decision 

on Petitioner’s claims before the Supreme Court decides Montgomery would be 

premature. If the Court rules on Petitioner’s habeas Petition now, and the Supreme Court 

later makes a ruling that is contrary to the Court’s analysis, unnecessary appeals would 

likely result. Therefore, this Court finds that a stay of these proceedings until the 

Supreme Court issues its decision in Montgomery is appropriate. 

Other district courts have stayed habeas proceedings based, at least in part, on the 

unsettled question of whether the holding in Miller applies retroactively. See Lewis v. 

Hoffner, No. 2:15-cv-10766, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141607, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 

2015) (“because the retroactivity of Miller is a concern, and because the Supreme Court 

is expected to rule on that issue this term, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546, 

191 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2015) (granting the petition for writ of certiorari), the Court will stay 

this case until the Supreme Court issues a dispositive decision in Montgomery”); 

Williams v. Harlow, No. 07-2845, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47026, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 

19, 2015) (“Finally, because the issue of Miller’s retroactivity to cases on collateral 

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 7 of 9
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

review remains unsettled, a continued stay and abeyance is warranted in this case”) 

(Report and Recommendation adopted by Williams v. Harlow, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

46906 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 10, 2015)); Zuber v. Wenerowicz, No. 14-0128, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 52829, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2015) (“Accordingly, I believe that it is 

appropriate to stay and hold in abeyance Zuber’s petition for habeas corpus until the law 

becomes more settled on the Miller issue either with a ruling by the Supreme Court in 

Montgomery, or with a ruling by the Court of Appeals in Songster; and, until Zuber has 

fully litigated his pending PCRA petition in state court.”) (Report and Recommendation 

adopted by Zuber v. Wenerowicz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51984 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 

2015)). Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to stay these proceedings pending the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay 

Pending Exhaustion of State Court Remedies (Doc. 4) be denied as moot. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents’ request for a stay be 

granted and this matter be stayed pending the outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Montgomery. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 8 of 9
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of November, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle 

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00933-JJT Document 14 Filed 11/16/15 Page 9 of 9