Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00845/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00845-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MIGUEL WHITE, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

F. FOULK, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:14-cv-0845 TLN AC (TEMP) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction 

entered against him on September 9, 2011, in the Sacramento County Superior Court on three 

counts of second degree robbery with use of a firearm and one count of attempted carjacking, 

with jury findings that he personally used a firearm and intentionally discharged a firearm causing 

great bodily injury. Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) jury 

instruction error violated his right to due process; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the 

jury finding that he intentionally discharged a firearm; and (3) his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance in failing to request a “pinpoint” jury instruction. Upon careful 

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s 

application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

///// 

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I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Defendant Miguel White and an accomplice robbed three pizza 

delivery men at gunpoint. During the third robbery, defendant shot 

the delivery man in the leg. Following a jury trial, he was 

convicted of three counts of second degree robbery (Pen.Code, § 

211)1 and one count of attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd. 

(a)). Additionally, the jury found true three enhancements for 

personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and an 

enhancement for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm 

causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds.(c), (d)). The trial 

court sentenced defendant to state prison for 18 years four months 

plus 25 years to life. 

On appeal, defendant contends (1) there is insufficient evidence to 

support the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm 

enhancement, (2) instructional error on that enhancement, and (3) 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on 

accident. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

In January 2009, defendant lived in an apartment with Willie 

Soders, Latisha Watkins, and Sarina Lockhart. Defendant and 

Watkins were in a relationship, as were Soders and Lockhart. 

Soders’s hair was styled in dreadlocks or “twisties” at the time, 

while defendant had a short haircut. 

Pizza Guys Delivery Robbery

On January 20, 2009, defendant had Lockhart call in an order with 

Pizza Guys for delivery to an address other than their apartment. 

Defendant and Soders donned hooded sweatshirts and left the 

apartment 20 to 30 minutes later. They returned to the apartment 

with pizza and $90 cash. 

Oleksander Melynk delivered the pizza order. Two men 

approached Melynk, one of whom was armed. The armed man 

pointed a shotgun at Melynk and said, “give me the money.” 

Melynk handed over $100 cash, and the robbers fled with the pizza 

and the money. 

Round Table Pizza Delivery Robbery 

On January 22, 2009, Lockhart, at defendant’s request, called in a 

delivery order to Round Table Pizza. Defendant and Soders donned 

hooded sweatshirts after the order was placed. 

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Joaquin Perez delivered the order to the address given by Lockhart, 

but the family residing there told him they had not ordered any 

food. Perez called the phone number on the receipt, and a male 

voice confirmed the order. There was laughing in the background, 

so Perez tried to verify the address, but the man hung up. Perez 

then called his supervisor, who called the number to verify the 

address. After getting the same treatment as Perez, the supervisor 

told Perez to return to the restaurant with the pizza order. 

Later, Perez received a call from a male at the same number asking 

for the pizza. The caller, defendant, said he would have someone 

outside waiting for the order to arrive. Perez’s supervisor 

authorized a delivery, and Perez drove to the address given in the 

call. As Perez drove up, he saw a “like a younger kid” with 

“dreaded” or “twisted” hair standing by the curb opposite from the 

delivery address. After Perez unloaded the food, he was 

approached by a different man; this man was carrying a shotgun. 

The gunman demanded money and Perez gave him $20 in one 

dollar bills. The gunman then demanded Perez's cell phone and 

Perez reluctantly gave it to him. Perez asked why they were doing 

this since they would only get a small amount. He then asked for 

his cell phone back and the gunman asked Perez if he wanted the 

phone back because he was planning on calling the police. Perez 

said, “no[,] never mind” and was then “sucker-punched” in the face 

by the unarmed man with the dreadlocks or twisties. The gunman 

asked for Perez’s Bluetooth earpiece, but Perez said it fell out of his 

ear when he was hit. He explained it was somewhere on the 

ground. The robbers fled without taking the food. 

Defendant and Soders returned to the apartment with $20 and no 

food. Lockhart asked Soders where the pizza was; Soders replied it 

was none of her business. Lockhart later saw Soders reenact hitting 

a person. 

Domino’s Delivery 

On January 23, 2009, Lockhart refused defendant’s request to call 

in a pizza order to Domino’s, as she now suspected it was a 

pretense to robbery. Soders choked Lockhart, and someone else 

placed the order. Defendant and Soders dressed in hooded 

sweatshirts and left the apartment. 

John Martinez delivered the pizza order. The house was “kind of 

dark” when Martinez arrived. He backed the car into the driveway 

and started unloading the pizzas. When he turned around, two men 

were standing in front of him. One of the men, defendant, held a 

shotgun. 

Defendant told Martinez to “give me everything.” Martinez put 

down the pizza, took out his wallet, and pulled out $20. The 

unarmed man then searched Martinez's pockets and, after finding 

another $20, held it up for defendant to see. Defendant then asked 

Martinez for his keys and cell phone; Martinez gestured toward his 

car by moving his head. 

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Martinez decided to leave after it became quiet for a moment. 

Martinez took a step backward toward his car door, and defendant 

leaned forward and shot Martinez in the leg. Martinez turned 

around, saw a “huge hole” in his leg, and the two robbers slowly 

jogging from the scene. The robbers left the pizza. Martinez 

thought he had been shot to keep him from pursuing the robbers. 

Defendant and Soders were out of breath and looked worried when 

they returned to the apartment. Lockhart asked if something was 

wrong, and defendant said, “[s]omeone got hurt.” 

Sometime thereafter, defendant and Watkins got into an argument 

and defendant moved out of the apartment. According to Lockhart, 

defendant took a shotgun wrapped in a shirt with him when he left. 

Investigation, Arrest and Defendant’s Admissions

Police determined the phone number used to order the pizza on all 

three occasions belonged to Soders. Soders, who was on probation, 

was arrested with the cell phone in his possession. It had been used 

to call each pizzeria on the night their delivery man was robbed. 

The phone contained a photograph of defendant holding a shotgun. 

When he was arrested, defendant tried to evade the police by 

exiting a fourth floor apartment balcony and climbing along a threeinch ledge to the balcony of an adjacent apartment, where he was 

found. In an interview with the police, defendant admitted that he 

was the person holding the shotgun in the photograph on Soders’s 

phone. 

Defendant initially claimed he knew about only one of the 

robberies. Later, he admitted participating in the second robbery, 

and explained that the first robbery was “easy.” He also admitted 

participating in the third robbery. 

Defendant knew Martinez, the victim of the third robbery, was 

lying when he said that he had only $20. When Soders demanded 

the car, Martinez refused and took a step toward them. Defendant 

and Soders told Martinez to stop. When Martinez “tried to pull a 

move,” defendant jumped back, and the shotgun accidentally 

discharged. Defendant said, “we didn't know that the gun was 

loaded.” Defendant did not provide this accidental discharge 

scenario until after the detective who was interrogating defendant 

suggested the shooting was accidental as an interrogation technique. 

People v. White, No. C069249, 2013 WL 1277880, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2013). 

 After the California Court of Appeal affirmed his judgment of conviction, petitioner filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, claiming that “review should be granted as 

to whether it is error to instruct that intentional discharge of a firearm is a general intent gun use 

allegation when the defense theory of the case is accident.” (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 11.) The petition 

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for review was summarily denied. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 12.) 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 

859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court 

precedent “may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state 

court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 

F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen 

a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] 

Court has not announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) 

(citing Parker v. Matthews, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012)). Nor may it be 

used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal 

Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct. Id. Further, 

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where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of an issue, it cannot be said that there is 

“clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 

(2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

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de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but 

does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could 

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have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 562 U.S. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to 

demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims 

A. Jury Instruction Error 

 In his first asserted ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right 

to due process by instructing the jury that intentional discharge of a firearm is a general intent gun 

use allegation when the defense theory of the case is accident. (ECF No. 5 at 4; Resp’t’s Lod. 

Doc. 11 at 4-10.) He argues the jurors should have been instructed, instead, that they were 

required to find he specifically intended to discharge the firearm. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 11 at 10.) 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by 

instructing the jury that the intentional discharge of a firearm 

enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) is a general intent allegation. 

He is mistaken. 

During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court: “Definition of 

the legal term intent per the first special finding in Count Five . . . . 

As written in PC 12022.53(b), page 39, and section 12022.53(d), 

page 40, and violation of section 664 dash 184 subsection A, page 

38.” The question refers to the firearm allegations and the 

attempted murder charge in count five. 

The trial court told the jury that attempted murder was a specific 

intent crime that required an intent to kill and that the personal use 

enhancement was a general intent allegation that required an intent 

to do one of the proscribed acts. Regarding the intentional 

discharge allegation, the trial court stated: “this is a general intent 

allegation . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . For you to find this allegation true, 

that person must not only commit the prohibited act, but must do so 

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with wrongful intent, to wit, that: ‘the defendant intended to 

discharge the firearm.’ A person acts with wrongful intent when he 

or she intentionally does a prohibited act, however, it is not required 

that he or she intend to break the law. [¶] For each crime and 

allegation, each of the elements for that crime and allegation must 

be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the Prosecution.” 

Defendant objected to the use of general intent in defining the 

intentional discharge allegation, asserting that the enhancement 

requires a “specific intent” to discharge the firearm. 

Defendant contends on appeal the court’s answer regarding general 

intent was incorrect and confused the jury. Noting that the 

distinction between general and specific intent can be confusing 

(see People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456 [“Specific and 

general intent have been notoriously difficult terms to define and 

apply”]), defendant asserts that the trial court's response “merely 

begs the jury's question” as to whether defendant specifically 

intended to fire the shotgun as opposed to doing so by accident or 

negligence. 

We must review jury instructions based on how a reasonable juror 

would construe them. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 688.) 

The ultimate test on appeal is “‘whether there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a 

way’ that violates the Constitution. [Citation.]” (Estelle v. McGuire 

(1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [116 L.Ed.2d 385].) We do not review 

fragments of instructions divorced from the entire instruction; nor 

can we review an instruction isolated from the complete charge to 

the jury. (People v. Thomas (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 304, 310.) 

Here, the trial court’s instruction was proper. People v. Wardell 

(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1484, a case not cited by either party, is 

relevant to this issue. In Wardell, the court held that the 

enhancement in section 12022.5, subdivision (a) for personal use of 

a firearm requires a general intent, not a specific intent. The court 

noted, “‘“When the definition of a crime [or enhancement] consists 

of only the description of a particular act, without reference to 

intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask 

whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This 

intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the 

definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or 

achieve some additional consequence, the crime [or enhancement] 

is deemed to be one of specific intent.’” [Citation.] [¶] The 

definition of personal use of a firearm consists of a description only 

of the proscribed act- ‘personal[ ] use[ ][of] a firearm in the 

commission of a felony or attempted felony.’ (Pen.Code, § 

12022.5, subd. (a).) No intent to ‘do some further act or achieve 

some additional consequence’ is part of the statutory definition.” 

(Wardell, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494.)1 And as our high 

 

1

 This explanation of general and specific intent criminal provisions is found in cases the parties 

do discuss. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 518–519, fn. 15; People v. Verlinde (2002) 

100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1166–1167 [great bodily injury enhancement required general intent, not 

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court has recognized, when the Legislature intends to require proof 

of a specific intent in an enhancement provision, it has done so 

explicitly by referring to the required specific intent in the statute. 

(In re Tameka C. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190, 199; see, e.g., former § 

12022.7, subd. (a), as amended by Stats.1994, ch. 873, § 3 [former 

great bodily injury enhancement in § 12022.7 which read, “[a]ny 

person who, with the intent to inflict the injury, personally inflicts 

great bodily injury,” required a specific intent to cause great bodily 

injury].) 

Here, the enhancement in section 12022.53, subdivision (d) consists 

of a description only of the proscribed act – personal and intentional 

discharge of the firearm, i.e., the defendant intended to pull the 

trigger. It does not require that a defendant intend to pull the 

trigger with the intent to do some further act or accomplish some 

other goal.2 Thus, the enhancement calls for general criminal 

intent. 

Defendant insists the trial court should have told the jury the 

enhancement requires that a defendant specifically intend to 

discharge the firearm. He relies on People v. Villanueva (2008) 

169 Cal.App.4th 41, in which the trial court told the jury as much. 

(Id. at p. 54.) The appellate court in Villanueva did not sanction the 

trial court's language; nor do we. Adding the word “specifically” to 

the instruction does not change what intent must be proven, i.e., that 

defendant intended to pull the trigger. 

The instructions taken as a whole properly defined the mental 

element of the intentional discharge enhancement. The court's 

reply defined the mens rea element for the enhancement as “the 

defendant intended to discharge the firearm.” This was the 

definition already given to the jury through the standard instruction 

on the enhancement, CALCRIM No. 3148. The court's reply also 

referred the jury to CALCRIM No. 252 (union of act and intent) 

and CALCRIM No. 3146. Taken together, the court’s response to 

the jury question instructed the jury to apply the correct mens rea 

element required for the enhancement allegation and helped the jury 

determine the issue central to the enhancement – whether defendant 

intended to pull the trigger. 

White, 2013 WL 1277880, at *4-5. 

 

specific intent].) This well-settled rule has its origin in People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456–

457. 

2

 We reject the argument in defendant’s reply brief that the enhancement does require a further 

consequence – causing great bodily injury – and thus, requires a specific intent. Defendant 

seemingly overlooks the rule that specific intent provisions require the commission of the act with 

the intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence. For example, if the statutory 

language in question here provided for an enhancement when the defendant personally and 

intentionally discharges a firearm with the intent to cause great bodily injury or death, then the 

enhancement would require specific intent. 

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 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional claim. 

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 

1983). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely 

‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process 

right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). 

The appropriate inquiry “is whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) 

(quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). 

 “[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be 

viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Id. (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378 

(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Instructions that contain errors of state law may not 

form the basis for federal habeas relief.” Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993). “If the 

charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ‘reasonable likelihood that the 

jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Dixon v. 

Williams, 750 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc 

(June 11, 2014) (citations omitted). 

 Petitioner is entitled to relief on this jury instruction claim only if he can show prejudice. 

Dixon, 750 F.3d at 1034. Prejudice is shown for purposes of habeas relief if the trial error had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). A reviewing court may grant habeas relief only if it is 

“‘in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error.’” Id. (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 

432, 437 (1995)). 

 3. Analysis 

 The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not violate state law in 

instructing the jury that the intentional discharge of a firearm enhancement, as set forth in Cal. 

Penal Code § 12022.53 (d), is a general intent allegation. That conclusion is binding on this 

court. Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 2005.) As set forth above, petitioner is not 

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entitled to federal habeas relief on a claim alleging a violation of state law. In order to prevail on 

his federal due process claim, petitioner must demonstrate that the trial court’s instruction “so 

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

Petitioner has failed to make the required showing. 

Under the circumstances of this case, instructing the jury that the intentional discharge of 

a firearm enhancement is a general intent allegation, and not a specific intent allegation, did not 

render the proceedings fundamentally unfair. The jury instructions as a whole correctly defined 

under California law the mental state requirement for a true finding on the intentional discharge 

enhancement. Petitioner’s trial was not rendered unfair through the use of jury instructions that 

correctly described the elements of the firearm enhancement. 

In any event, as set forth below in this court’s analysis of petitioner’s claim of insufficient 

evidence, the evidence introduced at petitioner’s trial strongly supports the jury’s finding that he 

intended to fire the weapon at Martinez. The jury verdict reflects that the jurors rejected 

petitioner’s claim to have shot the firearm by accident. Under these circumstances, the trial 

court’s failure to inform the jury that it must find petitioner specifically intended to fire the 

shotgun, as opposed to firing it by accident or negligence, could not have had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court adjudication of the merits of his jury 

instruction claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 

Certainly, the decision of the California Court of Appeal is not “so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on this jury instruction claim. 

 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

 In his next asserted ground for relief, petitioner claims that the evidence introduced at his 

trial was insufficient to support the jury finding that he intentionally discharged the firearm when 

he shot Martinez. (ECF No. 5 at 4.) Respondent argues that this claim is unexhausted because it 

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was not presented to the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 13 at 21.) 

 Generally, a state prisoner must exhaust all available state court remedies, either on direct 

appeal or through collateral proceedings, before a federal court may consider granting habeas 

corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). However, a federal court considering a habeas petition 

may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to 

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Assuming 

arguendo that petitioner’s claim of insufficient evidence was not exhausted in state court, this 

court recommends that it be denied on the merits. 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s claim that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the jury finding that he intentionally discharged the firearm when he shot 

Martinez. The court reasoned as follows: 

Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the true 

finding for intentional and personal discharge of a firearm resulting 

in great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) in count three, the 

robbery of John Martinez. We disagree. 

Section 12022.53, subdivision (d), states in pertinent part: “. . . any 

person who, in the commission of a felony specified in subdivision 

(a), . . . personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and 

proximately causes great bodily injury, as defined in Section 

12022.7 . . . to any person other than an accomplice, shall be 

punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in 

the state prison for 25 years to life.” Robbery is one of the felonies 

enumerated in subdivision (a) of section 12022.53. (§ 12022.53, 

subd. (a)(4).) 

The test for sufficiency of the evidence to support an enhancement 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the judgment, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

elements of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. (People 

v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 225.) Defendant argues there is 

insufficient evidence that he intentionally discharged the shotgun. 

He claims the evidence shows he shot Martinez accidentally rather 

than intentionally. Noting the jury could not reach a verdict in an 

attempted murder count stemming from the assault,3 defendant asks 

us to reverse the true finding. 

The cases cited by defendant do not support his contention. He 

 

3

 The jury deadlocked at 10 to two on the attempted murder charge in count five and the trial 

court declared a mistrial as to that charge. 

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relies on a passage from People v. Silbertson (1985) 41 Cal.3d 296. 

But the passage he cites is part of a discussion finding failure to 

instruct on intent to kill (an element of the felony murder special 

circumstance at the time) in which the court determined the failure 

was not harmless in light of evidence negating defendant’s intent to 

kill. (Id. at pp. 304, 306–307 & fn. 13.) Silbertson is irrelevant to 

defendant’s contention. 

This court’s decision in People v. Treadway (2010) 182 

Cal.App.4th 562 is likewise inapposite. Treadway involved a 

mentally disabled defendant who shot the victim purportedly after 

the victim threw his lunch bag at the defendant and charged him in 

an attempt to obtain the defendant's gun. (Id. at p. 565.) The issue 

this court decided in Treadway was whether the prosecution's plea 

agreement barring the codefendants from testifying at defendant's 

trial violated defendant’s right to compulsory process and due 

process. (Id. at p. 567.) 

In People v. Jones (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1303, the Court of 

Appeal held the trial court’s failure to give a sua sponte instruction 

on the defense of accident was harmless error. (Id. at p. 1314.) 

That ruling is not relevant as to whether substantial evidence 

supports the true finding on the enhancement here, and the holding 

that a trial court has a duty to instruct sua sponte on accident has 

since been disapproved. (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 

989, 998, fn. 3.) 

The evidence here shows that defendant and Soders responded with 

force if their victims showed any independence. When the victim 

of the Round Table robbery questioned the wisdom of robbing him 

for such a small amount of money and asked defendant to return his 

cell phone, Soders struck him in the face. The victim of the 

shooting, Martinez, initially did not give the robbers all of his 

money, and unsuccessfully tried to keep $20. He was shot as he 

took a step backward in an effort to leave the scene before 

defendant and Soders made their escape. 

According to Martinez’s testimony, defendant held the shotgun at 

shoulder level and pointed it at Martinez throughout the robbery. 

Martinez was standing at the rear driver’s side of his car, while 

defendant was “on the sidewalk, like maybe a little bit up on the 

driveway.” After it became silent for a moment, Martinez took a 

step back to get into his car. He was then shot in the leg, “in the 

perfect spot, just like to cripple me.” Martinez did not see the gun 

when he was shot, but testified that defendant “lean[ed] forward 

and shot.” Martinez saw the muzzle flash. Defendant was four or 

five feet from Martinez when the shotgun was discharged. 

The evidence supports an inference that defendant intentionally 

shot Martinez in the leg to prevent him from leaving the scene. 

Defendant, who had been pointing the shotgun at Martinez, leaned 

forward as he shot Martinez, indicating the shot was aimed and 

therefore intentional. Shooting Martinez in the leg accomplished 

the task of allowing defendant and Soders to escape the scene. In 

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short, the true finding on the enhancement is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

White, 2013 WL 1277880, at *3-4. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There is sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). If the evidence supports conflicting 

inferences, the reviewing court must presume “that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in 

favor of the prosecution,” and the court must “defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326. See also Juan 

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274, 1275 & n. 13 (9th Cir.2005). “[T]he dispositive question under 

Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 318). Put another way, “a reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground 

of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos 

v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011). 

 In conducting federal habeas review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, “all 

evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Ngo v. Giurbino, 

651 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). “Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what 

inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial,” and it requires only that they draw 

“‘reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. Johnson,___ U.S. ___, 

___, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (citation omitted). “‘Circumstantial evidence and inferences 

drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.’” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 

///// 

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(9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).4

 “A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus faces a heavy burden when challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due process grounds.” 

Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. In order to grant relief, the federal habeas court must find that the 

decision of the state court rejecting an insufficiency of the evidence claim reflected an objectively 

unreasonable application of the decisions in Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Ngo, 

651 F.3d at 1115; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 & n.13. Thus, when a federal habeas court assesses a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a state court conviction under AEDPA, “there is a double 

dose of deference that can rarely be surmounted.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 

2011). See also Kyzar v. Ryan, 780 F.3d 940, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2015) (same); Long v. Johnson, 

736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (same). 

 3. Analysis

 The state appellate court’s decision that the evidence introduced at petitioner’s trial was 

sufficient to support the jury finding that he intentionally discharged the firearm when he shot 

Martinez is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Jackson and In re Winship to the 

facts of this case. Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 4. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, the 

evidence reflected that petitioner and Soders used force against any victim who showed 

resistance; petitioner was pointing the shotgun at Martinez throughout the robbery; petitioner shot 

Martinez only after Martinez took a step toward his car, as if to escape; and petitioner leaned 

forward before he shot Martinez in the leg, as if he was aiming. (White, 2013 WL 1277880, at 

*3-4; see also Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 49-50, 73-77, 79, 98, 100, 103.) Martinez 

thought the robbers intended to wound him so that they could get away, because they shot him “in 

the perfect spot, like just to cripple me, I think.” (RT at 74, 100.) Viewing this evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that petitioner intended to discharge a firearm when he shot Martinez. Accordingly, petitioner is 

 

4

 The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive 

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 

373 F.3d at 983. 

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not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim of insufficient evidence. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In his third asserted ground for relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to request a “pinpoint” jury instruction on the defense of accident, 

pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3404. (ECF No. 5 at 5.) As in the claim above, respondent argues 

that this claim is unexhausted because it was not presented to the California Supreme Court. 

(ECF No. 13 at 26.) Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel was not exhausted in state court, this court will recommend that it be denied on the 

merits, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

request a pinpoint instruction on the defense of accident with regard 

to the intentional discharge enhancement. 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

show (1) counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the 

deficient performance prejudiced defendant. (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 691–692 [80 L.Ed.2d 674] 

(Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216–217 

(Ledesma).) “‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy 

task.’” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) ___ U.S. ____, ____ [178 

L.Ed.2d 624, 642 (Richter), quoting Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 

U.S. ___, ____ [176 L.Ed.2d 284, 297.) 

To establish prejudice, “It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had 

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’” 

(Richter, supra,___ U.S. at p.____ [178 L.Ed.2d at p. 642].) To 

show prejudice, defendant must show a reasonable probability that 

he would have received a more favorable result had counsel’s 

performance not been deficient. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 

693–694; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217–218.) “A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694; accord, 

Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 218.) 

Even assuming trial counsel should have requested the accident 

instruction, defendant has failed to show how he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s failure to do so. The jury was instructed with CALCRIM 

No. 3148 that the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that defendant intentionally fired the shotgun. The accident 

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instruction offered no additional guidance on the issue that would 

have been helpful here.5 The defense was able to, and did argue 

that the shotgun was fired accidentally rather than intentionally. 

The jury’s true finding as to the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) 

firearm allegation necessarily means that the jury found the firearm 

was not accidentally discharged. The evidence on this issue was 

compelling. 

The evidence suggesting that defendant accidentally fired the 

shotgun, on the other hand, was suspect. His statement to the 

detective that the gun discharged accidentally was made only after 

the detective suggested as much as an interrogation tactic. 

Defendant denied wielding the shotgun during the second robbery, 

yet the victim said the unarmed person had dreadlocks or twisties. 

That described Soders’s hairstyle, not defendant’s. Defendant 

claimed that neither he nor Soders knew the shotgun was loaded 

when it discharged and wounded Martinez. Yet, the evidence 

suggested defendant was familiar with shotguns. He had posed for 

a picture holding one and it was defendant who later took a shotgun 

from the apartment when he moved. 

Defendant has failed to show a reasonable probability that he would 

have received a more favorable result had the accident instruction 

been given. 

White, 2013 WL 1277880, at *5-7. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

that set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that (2) the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is 

constitutionally deficient if his or her representation “fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness” such that it was outside “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so 

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 562 at 

 

5

 CALCRIM No. 3404 reads in pertinent part as follows: “[The defendant is not guilty of 

______________ <insert crime[s] > if (he/she) acted [or failed to act] without the intent required 

for that crime, but acted instead accidentally. You may not find the defendant guilty of 

_______________ <insert crime[s] > unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 

(he/she) acted with the required intent.]” Even if modified for the section 12022.53, subdivision 

(d) firearm enhancement, the instruction would tell the jury no more than what it had been told in 

other instructions – the People needed to prove defendant intentionally discharged the firearm 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

 Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792. 

 “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” and 

when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations 

omitted). Thus, in federal habeas proceedings involving “claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, . . . AEDPA review must be “‘“doubly deferential”’” in order to afford “both the state 

court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Daniel, ___U.S.___, ___, 135 

S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013)). 

As the Ninth Circuit has recently acknowledged, “[t]he question is whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Bemore v. 

Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 105). See also 

Griffin v. Harrington, 727 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The pivotal question is whether the 

state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from 

asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.”) (quoting 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 101). 

 3. Analysis

 This court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that petitioner has failed to show 

prejudice with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the circumstances 

of this case, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been 

different had petitioner’s trial counsel requested a jury instruction based on the defense argument 

that petitioner fired the shotgun at Martinez accidentally. As noted by the state court, the trial 

evidence supporting this argument was weak. On the other hand, as described above, there was 

substantial circumstantial evidence that petitioner intentionally shot Martinez in the leg in order to 

prevent him from leaving. The jurors’ true finding on the firearm allegation “necessarily means 

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that the jury found the firearm was not accidentally discharged.” White, 2013 WL 1277880, at 

*6. Under these circumstances, petitioner was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to 

request a pinpoint jury instruction. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief 

on this claim. 

IV. Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: February 8, 2016 

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