Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02681/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02681-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTER BURNETT, Civil No. 09cv2681-MMA (AJB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

v.

JAMES YATES, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner Ester Burnett (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging a prison disciplinary decision of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Respondent filed an answer on July 23, 2010. Petitioner filed a traverse

on September 1, 2010. Upon a complete review of the record and careful consideration of the

arguments presented, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED.

Background

On April 12, 2008, Petitioner received a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) charging him with

indecent exposure without masturbation. (Notice of Lodgment (“Lodgment”) 1 at 42.) On May 2,

2008, a prison disciplinary hearing was held and Petitioner was found guilty of indecent exposure in

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violation of California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3007 and was assessed 90 days of

forfeiture credit. (Id. at 42-46.) Petitioner filed an administrative appeal challenging the Rules

Violation Report. (Id. at 32-33.) His claims were denied at the final level of review on December

19, 2008. (Id.) 

On January 21, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Imperial

County Superior Court. (Lodgment 1.) On April 14, 2009, the Superior Court denied his petition

for writ of habeas corpus. (Lodgment 2.) On May 8, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment 3.) The

Court of Appeal denied the petition on June 16, 2009. (Lodgment 4.) On August 4, 2009, Petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 5.) On

September 23, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus

without comment or citation. (Lodgment 6.) 

On November 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 

Respondent filed an answer on July 23, 2010. Petitioner filed a traverse on September 1, 2010. 

Factual Background

According to the RVR, on April 12, 2008, around 1530 hours, Correctional Sergeant Rico

was monitoring the yard when he was informed that Petitioner was refusing to leave the yard

misters. (Lodgment 1 at 42.) Petitioner had been showering for about 15 minutes while the

observation officer had given Petitioner repeated orders to leave using the public address system. 

(Id.) Consequently, yard officers and Correctional Sergeant Rico approached Petitioner and

explained that the shower misters were not designed for showers and ordered him to leave. (Id.) 

Petitioner became verbally disrespectful while grabbing a bar of soap and lathering his body. He

made statements such as “all you are nothing but faggots!” (Id.) Petitioner was given several

additional orders to leave. (Id.) Then Petitioner “stepped out of the mister area and removed his

boxer shorts (intentionally indecently exposing himself to me thereby creating a sexually hostile

work environment) thus displaying his semi erect, approximately two inch penis.” (Id.) Petitioner

then stated, “I am only leaving because I am done showering; tomorrow none of you faggots will

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make me stop showering.” (Id.) He complied with orders to get dressed by putting on another pair

of dry boxer shorts and walked away. (Id.) 

Discussion

In his petition, Petitioner argues that he was denied “any meaningful written disposition of

the guilty finding and the specific evidence relied upon to reach a guilty conclusion.” (Am. Pet. at

5.) Second he argues that he was denied the right to call witnesses. (Id. at 8.) Third, he contends

that he was never given notice that showering was prohibited on the yard and that he should not be

punished for a rule that he did not know about. (Id. at 10.) 

A. Scope of Review

The Court may entertain a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A writ of habeas corpus is the sole

remedy when a prisoner challenges the fact or duration of confinement, and seeks immediate or

speedier release from that confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498 (1973); Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974). 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As amended, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) now reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

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To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). 

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The threshold question is whether the rule of law

was clearly established at the time petitioner’s state court conviction became final. Id. at 406. 

Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States “refers to

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant statecourt decision.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). However, Ninth

Circuit case law may be “persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state

court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help us

determine what law is ‘clearly established.’” Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.

2000). Only after the clearly established Federal law is identified can the court determine whether

the state court’s application of that law “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of” that clearly established Federal law. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. 

A state court decision is “contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases” or “if the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406. “A

state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the

facts of the particular state prisoner’s case” or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal

principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to

extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at 407. Under Williams, an

application of federal law is unreasonable only if it is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

Further, a state court’s decision results in a “decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State court proceeding” if it “is so

clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

In making such a determination under AEDPA, the court looks to the state’s last reasoned

decision. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where there is no reasoned decision

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1

 Petitioner also argues that prison officials failed to comply with California Penal Code section 2932(c)(5) which

requires that a prisoner may be found guilty at a disciplinary hearing based on a preponderance of the evidence. See Cal.

Penal Code § 2932(c)(5). To the extent Petitioner alleges violations of California law, Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable

on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (mere error in the application of state law does not

warrant federal habeas relief). Even if Petitioner’s claim was cognizable on habeas review, his claim fails. First, the Board

determined that the finding was based on a preponderance of the evidence. (Lodgment 1 at 44.) In addition, California courts

have held that a court challenge to evidence supporting a prison disciplinary action is reviewed under the “some evidence”

standard presented in Hill. In re Powell, 45 Cal. 3d 894, 903-04 (1988); In re Rothwell, 164 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167 (2008).

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from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). A state court need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long

as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. 

When a federal habeas court is faced with reviewing a state court denial for which there is no

reasoned decision, however, the deferential standard under § 2254(d) cannot be applied because

there is “nothing to which we can defer.” Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Under such circumstances, “[f]ederal habeas review is not de novo . . . but an independent review of

the record is required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of

controlling federal law.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). 

B. Due Process Rights 

Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated because he did not receive a

written finding with the specific evidence relied upon.1

 Respondent contends that Petitioner was

provided with a final adjudication report. 

The clearly established federal law governing what process is due in claims challenging

prison disciplinary actions is set forth in Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445 (1985). When a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the inmate’s loss of good time

credits, due process requires that the inmate receive: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary

charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call

witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the

factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Id. at 454 (citing

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974)). The Court held that the “requirements of due

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process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to

revoke good time credits.” Id. at 455. The Court further emphasized that “[a]scertaining whether

this standard is satisfied dos not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of

the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary

board.” Id. at 455-56. In Hill, the evidence was characterized as meager and there was no direct

evidence identifying any of respondents as the assailant but there was “some evidence” in the record

to support the board’s decision. Id. at 457. 

Though this standard is “minimally stringent,” “there must be some indicia of reliability of

the information that forms the basis for prison disciplinary actions.” Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703,

705 (9th Cir. 1987). If the record is “so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary

board were without support or otherwise arbitrary,” a due process violation has occurred. Hill, 472

U.S. at 457. 

The California Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus without citation

or comment. (Lodgment 6.) Therefore, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. The court of appeal held that although delayed, Petitioner

received the final adjudication report and denied his claim. (Lodgment 4.) 

Here, Petitioner was given a copy of the findings and disposition of the CDCR as indicated

on the form itself. (Lodgment 1 at 42-46.) Petitioner also attached the written findings and

disposition of the hearing in his state court petitions. (See Lodgment 3, Ex. A at 11-15; Lodgment 5,

Ex. A at 11-15.) Petitioner received a copy of the written findings which contains the evidence

relied upon by the Board to make its decision. Therefore, Petitioner’s argument that he did not

receive a copy of the decision with its reasoning has no merit and the state court’s decision was not

contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court RECOMMENDS that the

claim that he did not receive a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action be DENIED.

C. Right to Call Witnesses

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Petitioner argues that he was denied the right to call witnesses. Specifically, Petitioner

claims that he requested three inmate witnesses: Carter, Washington and Bennett. He contends his

witnesses were denied with no written reason and at the hearing, he repeatedly and adamantly

requested his witnesses but was denied. He further asserts that Correctional Lieutenant McWilliams

falsified the disciplinary record when he wrote that “Burnett did not request the presence of

witnesses at this hearing.” In addition, he argues that he was denied the opportunity to present

documentary evidence at the hearing. Respondent asserts that Petitioner received all the protections

due and was not denied the right to call witnesses or the opportunity to present documentary

evidence. 

Under Wolff, Petitioner has the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in

his defense. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). The court of appeal held that there

is nothing in the record to show Petitioner requested witnesses or offered evidence other than his

own testimony. (Lodgment 4.) 

After a review of the record, the Court also finds that there is nothing in the record to show

that Petitioner requested witnesses at his hearing. The final report by the correctional officer

indicates that Petitioner did not request any witnesses at the hearing. (Lodgment 1 at 45.) In the

traverse, Petitioner states that when he was saw that the hearing officer wrote that he did not request

the presence of witnesses at the hearing, he “immediately appealed.” (Traverse at 1.) However, in

the record, there does not appear to be a 602 grievance about his denial to call witnesses. After the

hearing, Petitioner filed several grievances on April 24, 2008, June 12, 2008, July 11, 2008, and

July 14, 2008 concerning issues about the hearing. (Am. Pet., Ex. A at 3; Ex. C. at 157; Ex. J at 165;

Ex. I at 178.) However, none of the grievances concerned the denial of his request for witnesses at

the hearing. Even in his administrative appeal of the hearing, Petitioner did not allege that his

request for witnesses was denied. Therefore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that he was

denied the right to call witnesses. In addition, statements of the three alleged witnesses were

presented as evidence at the hearing. (Lodgment 1 at 45.) Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show

that he was denied his request to call witnesses and there has been no showing of a due process

violation. See Wolff, 418 U.S. 563-67.

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Petitioner also summarily argues that he was denied the right to present documentary

evidence. However, he fails to provide specific facts about what documentary evidence he was

going to present. In addition, the record does not indicate that he made any requests to present

documentary evidence at the hearing. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was

denied the right to present documentary evidence. 

Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, and did not involve an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court RECOMMENDS that the claim that he was denied witnesses and

denied the right to present documentary evidence at the hearing be DENIED.

D. Lack of Notice Regarding Showering in the Yard 

Petitioner claims that he did not know that showering was prohibited on the yard and that he

should not be punished for a rule for which there was no notice and cites to California administrative

law. Respondent argues that claims pertaining to his being disciplined for showering do not have

merit because he was not disciplined for showering in an unauthorized area but for indecent

exposure. 

The court of appeal did not provide a reasoned decision on Petitioner’s claim regarding the

lack of notice. Accordingly, “[f]ederal habeas review is not de novo . . . but an independent review

of the record is required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of

controlling federal law.” Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

The Court agrees with Respondent. Petitioner was not disciplined for showering in an

unauthorized area but he was found guilty of indecent exposure without masturbation. In addition,

Petitioner again relies on California law which cannot be a basis for relief in a federal habeas

petition. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. Therefore, the claim that Petitioner had no notice about the

unauthorized showering at the misters is not only without merit but not cognizable on federal habeas

reivew. The Court concludes that the state court did not clearly err in its application of controlling

federal law and RECOMMENDS that the claim be denied. 

E. Remaining Arguments

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 Petitioner also presents several summary allegations without any factual support. First, he

argues that he was trying to follow the regulations to keep clean personal hygiene; that there was an

alleged discrepancy between his RVR and the order placing him in administrative segregation; that

he cannot be written up on charges for indecent exposure just for taking a shower; that his equal

protection rights were violated because other inmates shower on the yard daily and Petitioner was

singled out for a RVR for taking a shower on the yard; that the RVR was falsified; that there was not

a preponderance of evidence to support the charge; that there were issues as to the conduct of

Correctional Sergeant Rico who wrote the RVR; and that Centinela State Prison limited what he

could appeal relating to his RVR 

The Court concludes that these arguments are conclusory without factual support and do not

warrant habeas relief. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[c]onclusory allegations

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”) Second, none

of these claims were alleged to arise under federal law and since these claims are based on state law,

they are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. Accordingly, the

Court RECOMMENDS that the remaining conclusory, state based claims be DENIED. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the

petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED. This report and recommendation

is submitted by the undersigned Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 22, 2010, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than November 12, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

//

//

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Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 21, 2010

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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