Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02214/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-02214-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EMERGENCY RESPONSE )

SPECIALISTS, INC., )

)

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant )

)

vs. ) Case No. 2:14-cv-02214-WMA

)

CSA OCEAN SCIENCES, INC., )

)

Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The above-entitled civil action was referred to the undersigned magistrate

judge by Senior United States District William M. Acker, Jr., on the Motion to

Compel Discovery Responses, Rule 37 Motion for Sanctions, Motion to Exclude

EmergencyResponse Specialists, Inc.’s Expert Lisa Moore, and the Motion to Quash

Subpoenas to Nobel Energy, Inc. and Nobel Energy Mediterranean, Ltd.

1

filed by

CSA Ocean Sciences, Inc. (Docs. 55, 58, 61 & 62), and the Motion for Protective

Order filed by Emergency Response Specialists, Inc. (Doc. 56). A hearing on the

motions was held on July 29, 2016. Present were James T. Baxter, III, for Emergency

Response Specialists, Inc. (ERS) and Kevin R. Garrison for CSA Ocean Sciences,

Inc. (CSA). The court also heard extensive testimony from Lisa Moore, ERS’s

1 The correct spelling for these entities is Noble Energy and Noble Energy Mediterranean. 

FILED

 2016 Aug-04 PM 02:56

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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president andmajority shareholder. After consideration of the motions and responses

of the parties, and the testimony of Ms. Moore and arguments of counsel at the

hearing, the court rules as follows.

I. Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (Doc. 55)

CSA seeks an order compelling ERS to provide written, executed responses to

CSA’s interrogatories, and to produce certain documents responsive to CSA’s

requests for production of documents. 

A. Executed responses

At the hearing, ERS requested an opportunity for Ms. Moore to review the

unsigned interrogatory responses before signing them and providing a signed copy

to CSA. Executed interrogatory answers shall be provided to CSA within seven (7)

days from the date of entry of this order, upon which it is RECOMMENDED that the

motion to compel as to this issue be deemed MOOT.

B. Emails

Emails produced to CSA indicate that all were sent on February 6, 2014;

however, the emails produced had been corrupted during a computer crash recovery. 

Therefore, CSA requests that the emails be produced in native format. During the

hearing, Ms. Moore testified that her work computer crashed and that she recovered

the emailsfromthe Entourage server using recovery software provided byEntourage. 

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She also provided a CD of the recovered emails to her former attorney.

2 She testified

that the recovery database of the emails is all that is available. However, she stated

that if one looks at the email threads, the actual dates of the emails and the names of

the sender and recipient can be determined. However, it appearsthat any attachments

to the emails are no longer viewable. CSA shall review the emails produced to it by

ERS to determine if the emails can indeed be separated into chronological and time

order, with recipient and sender identified, and promptly notify the court of any

problems doing so. To the extent any of the emails are between ERS and CSA, such

that CSA already would have a copy, counsel for the parties shall exchange a list of

such emails so as to avoid duplication. Further, to the extent that Ms. Moore has any

responsive emails, with their attachments, on her laptop, she shall produce copies of

the emails with attachments, to CSA within fourteen (14) days from the date of entry

of a final order on this report and recommendation. 

C. Videos

CSA states that during the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of ERS on April 6, 2016,

it was revealed that certain photographs produced in response to CSA’s request for

production of documents were in fact videos. CSA then requested the video files

2 At a break during the hearing, Mr. Baxter contacted former counsel for ERS to determine

if they had a copy of the native format emails. However, former counsel represented that they have

the emails only in the recovery format.

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from ERS. It is RECOMMENDED that the video files in question shall be provided

to CSA within fourteen (14) days from the date of entry of a final order on this report

and recommendation.

D. Text Messages

During the deposition of Carl Haywood on May 11, 2016, it was revealed that

text messages responsive to CSA’srequestsfor production are believed to be located

on Carl Haywood’s work cell phone. However, while ERS has possession of the cell

phone, it cannot access the text messages on the phone without obtaining the phone

password from Mr. Haywood. Counsel for ERS was instructed at the hearing to

contact Mr. Haywood, through his counsel, Donna Smalley, to obtain the password. 

The text messages in question shall be provided to CSA within fourteen (14) days

from the date of entry of a final order on this report and recommendation. The Court

ORDERS Mr. Haywood to cooperate in providing the password within the time frame

set out in this order. If Mr. Haywood refuses to cooperate, counsel for ERS shall

inform the court, and the court will enter a further order compelling Mr. Haywood’s

cooperation. 

II. Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 56)

ERS seeks an order quashing the deposition subpoena issued for Lisa Moore

and served on May 19, 2016, noticing her deposition for May 25, 2016. The motion

was filed May 24, 2016. Because the date of the deposition has passed and because

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CSA deposed Ms. Moore on June 2, 2016, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion

for Protective Order be deemed MOOT.

III. Rule 37 Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 58)

CSA seeks sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, Fed.R.Civ.P., dismissing ERS’s

claims against it, or precluding Ms. Moore fromtestifying as an expert witness at trial

and awarding CSA itsfees and costsincurred for the May 25, 2016, deposition which

Ms. Moore failed to attend. CSA’s deadline for disclosing its expert was June 2,

2016. Ms. Moore’s expert deposition previously was canceled three times on the eve

of deposition, during the months of April and May; however, the dates for those

depositions were not agreed upon in advance, nor was the May 25 date. Ms. Moore

was deposed as the 30(b)(6) representative of ERS on or about April 6, 2016. 

However, she declined to answer any questions at that deposition regarding her expert

opinion. Ms. Moore’s expert report was filed on April 21, 2016, but the report is

conclusory, and CSA’s expert did not have the benefit of Ms. Moore’s testimony

prior to the deadline for its retained expert report, June 2, 2016.

At the hearing, Mr. Baxter stated that there were many back-and-forth

communications about deposition dates, but it was difficult to accommodate the

schedules of counsel for ERS and CSA, and Ms. Moore. Mr. Baxter stated that the

deposition notice for the May 25 expert deposition of Ms. Moore was served at his

office, but he did not receive it right away because it was delivered to another

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attorney in his office. Mr. Baxter stated that he advised Mr. Garrison that Ms. Moore

would not be available on May 25. Mr. Baxter also filed the motion for protective

order on May 24; however, no ruling on the motion was issued by May 25. Ms.

Moore testified at the hearing that she was scheduled to be in Jefferson County

Circuit Court on May 25; however, this schedule conflict was not conveyed to

counsel for CSA, and Mr. Baxter was unaware of the reason for the schedule conflict

until the day of the hearing before the undersigned. Ms. Moore did leave a voice mail

for Mr. Garrison on May 25 to offer copies of requested videotapes, but Mr. Garrison

did not return the call because she is represented by counsel. Ms. Moore claims she

was unaware she was supposed to be present for deposition on May 25, and she felt

there was never a direct communication from Mr. Baxter or his office that she was

due in Huntsville for a deposition on May 25. Mr. Baxter stated he did talk with Ms.

Moore about being deposed on May 25, but she advised him she could not get

prepared to give an expert deposition by then.

3 Mr. Baxter expressed surprise when

he arrived at his office on May 25 to find a court reporter and videographer present

for Ms. Moore’s deposition. 

Rule 37, Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that a court may order sanctions for failure to

appear for a deposition. Sanctions may include:

3

It is noted that Ms. Moore had months to prepare for her individual deposition; therefore,

her claim that she could not be prepared by May 25 rings hollow. 

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(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated

facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, asthe prevailing

party claims;

(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing

designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters

in evidence;

(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;

(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;

(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;

(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; . . .

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). The rule also provides, “[i]nstead of or in addition

to these sanctions, the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising

that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused

by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances

make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d)(3). 

Rule 37 permits the court to impose sanctions upon a party or its attorney or

both and establishes no preference between these options. The apportionment of fault

between an attorney and client is the court’s responsibility. Devaney v. Cont’l Am.

Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 1993). “A motion for sanctions under Rule

37, even one which names only a party, places both that party and its attorney on

notice that the court may assess sanctions against either or both unless they provide

the court with a substantial justification for their conduct.” Id. There is no

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requirement that the court find bad faith in an attorney’s or party’s actions before

imposing sanctions. Id. at 1162. “In narrowly defined circumstances federal courts

have inherent power to assess attorney’s fees against counsel.” Roadway Exp., Inc.

v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980).

Mr. Garrison stated at the hearing thatCSA paid $173.50 for the courtreporter,

$340.00 for the videographer, and $109.00 for his mileage to and from Huntsville. 

He also stated he expended five hours at a rate of $320 per hour.

4 The court notes

that Mr. Garrison is a shareholder in Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &

Berkowitz and has been admitted to practice since 2007.

Given the circumstances and the obvious mis-communication between Mr.

Garrison, Mr. Baxter and Ms. Moore, the undersigned finds that the drastic sanction

of dismissal of ERS’s complaint is not warranted. Dismissal is a sanction of last

4 Mr. Baxter took issue with the claimed hourly rate and stated $225 to $275 per hour would

be a more accurate rate for attorneys practicing in Huntsville. However, this action was filed in the

Southern Division of the Northern District of Alabama, and the rate charged by attorneys in

Birmingham is the relevant rate. “A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the

relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,

experience, and reputation.” Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299

(11th Cir. 1988). “The general rule is that the relevant market for purposes of determining the

reasonable hourly rate for an attorney’s services is the place where the case is filed.” American Civil

Liberties Union of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Cullens v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1494 (11th

Cir. 1994) (“The rate of attorney’s fees is that of the place where the case is filed.”). The court may

utilize its own “knowledge and expertise” to come to an independent judgment regarding the

reasonableness of requested attorney’s fees. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir.

1994).

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resort, applicable only in extreme circumstances, and appropriate only when less

drastic sanctions would be ineffective. McKelvey v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 789

F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986); State Exchange Bank v. Hartline, 693 F.2d 1350,

1352 (11th Cir. 1982); Martin-Trigona v. Morris, 627 F.2d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 1980).

ERS did seek a protective order regarding the deposition on May 24, but the court did

not issue a ruling before May 25. Mr. Baxter did offer to schedule Ms. Moore’s

deposition between May 25 and June 2, even on the Memorial Day weekend;

however, it is unclear when he offered this compromise. ERS did not file any motion

to extend the discovery or expert disclosure deadline to allow Ms. Moore to be

deposed after May 25. Despite having a deposition noticed for May 25, Mr. Baxter

did not affirmatively advise his client that she had to attend, and Ms. Moore never

advised him that she had to be in court in Jefferson County on that day. The only

excuse she offered to Mr. Baxter was that she could not be prepared in time to be

deposed on May 25. 

The language of Rule 37(d)(3) states that the court “must” award fees and

costs, unless the failure to attend the deposition was “substantially justified or other

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” The undersigned finds that the

exceptionsto the mandatory nature of the fee and cost award are not present, and that

Mr. Baxter and Ms. Moore are equally to blame for her failure to appear on May 25. 

Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that CSA’s Motion for Sanctions be GRANTED,

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and that CSA be AWARDED attorney’s fees in the amount of $1600.00 and costs in

the amount of $622.50, jointly and severally against Mr. Baxter and ERS. 

IV. Motion to Exclude Emergency Response Specialists, Inc.’s Expert Lisa

Moore (Doc. 61)

The decision on this motion is guided by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,

509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Federal Rule of Evidence

702. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 lays out the circumstances in which expert

testimony is admissible:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a

witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,

if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the

testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the

witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of

the case.

Fed.R.Evid. 702.

A trial court, in determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule

702, must conduct “a rigorous three-part inquiry,” considering whether:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he

intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his

conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry

mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact,

through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise,

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

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United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of

Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). The

Daubert gate-keeping requirement applies to both scientific and experience-based

expert testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143

L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). 

The proponent of the expert testimony carries a substantial burden under Rule

702. “The burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert

testimony is on the party offering the expert, and admissibility must be shown by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300,

1306 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 n.10).

Thus, the proponent must demonstrate that the witness is qualified to testify

competently, that his opinions are based on sound methodology, and that his

testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact. See, e.g., Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260

(“The burden of establishing qualification, reliability, and helpfulness rests on the

proponent of the expert opinion. . . .”); McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298

F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002).

Expert testimony that does not assist the trier of fact can be excluded under

Daubert. 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. at 2795-96; see also Hibiscus Assoc. Ltd. v.

Board of Trustees of Policemen & Firemen Ret. Sys. of Detroit, 50 F.3d 908, 917

(11th Cir. 1995) (citing Salem v. U.S. Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119,

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1122, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962)) (“Expert testimony is properly excluded when it is not

needed to clarify facts and issues of common understanding which jurors are able to

comprehend for themselves.”). 

Ms. Moore has a Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry from the University

of South Alabama, with a minor in biology. She also has taken courses over a fouryear period toward a Ph.D. in environmentalscience and toxicology at the University

of Alabama at Birmingham. Although she does not have a degree in oceanography,

Ms. Moore testified that she has taken coursesin the ocean sciences. In addition, she

has extensive certifications and training in the area of hazardous waste operations and

emergency response and substantial experience in that field. (See Doc. 76-1 at 8-13,

Lisa Moore Curriculum Vitae). Additionally, Ms. Moore has authored conference

abstracts on Isobaric Collection of Discrete Phase Samples from Deepwater Oil/Gas

Seeps, Key Factors in Obtaining Representative Samples of Subsurface Oil/Gas

Plumes in Deep Sea Releases, and Deepwater Oil/Gas Plume Sampling:

Thermodynamic Properties Key to Accurate Sampling. (Id. at 12).

In 1989, she started Emergency Response Specialists, Inc. The company was

designed to respond to emergencies involving hazardous materials to ameliorate the

danger these materials present. 

Most of Ms. Moore’s experience in emergency response to hazardous wastes

was with regard to surface materials. Prior to 2010, she had no experience with deep

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water sampling. In 2010, however, she was hired to participate in the collection of

samples from the plume of the Deep Water Horizon oil well blowout in the Gulf of

Mexico. A metal cylinder was used to take samples at a depth of 5200 feet. The

device used operated as intended and took volume samples and held the pressure at

depth without a problem. Ms. Moore’s job included doing some analysis onboard

ship with regard to methane concentration in the plume. 

In 2011, with regard to this project she designed a smaller volume, higher

pressure sampling device with a safety release. However, for various reasons, these

samplers were not used. 

Moore waslater hired to perform water testing in a brine pool at the Leviathan2 (Lev-2) site in the Mediterranean Sea. It was her intent to use the cylinders she

designed for thistesting. Although she had no previous experience with a brine pool,

Ms. Moore testified that she studied them by reading about them and looking at

videos of deep water brine pools taken by organizations such as the Woods Hole

Oceanographic Institution.

5

Ms. Moore testified that her company was hired to take deep water samples

from a depth of approximately 5100 feet in the east Mediterranean Sea by CSA. She

5 According to Ms. Moore, a brine pool is a pool that forms in relation to an underwater salt

formation which, because of its density and lack of currents, stays in a pool underneath the water.

She testified that a brine pool can be artificially created by underwater drilling.

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stated thatshe was advised thatshe was expected to determine whether and what type

of methane might be present at a capped oil well at that location. She testified that

she was told that she would take samples from a brine pool located just above the

well cap. 

Ms. Moore further testified that, when she got to the Lev-2 site, she observed

that the pool over the well cap appeared to be more viscousin nature than brine pools

that she had seen. Furthermore, it appeared to contain a substance of very fine, light

solid material not consistent with sediment that stayed suspended in the viscous

solution. She also observed a sample taken from the ocean floor in the area she was

supposed to take samples and she noted that it had an acrid, chemical odor. 

Unsure of what substances might be in the solution, Moore sent an email

requesting an inventory of the chemicalsthat had been used to cap the well. Whatshe

received was a list of 3.3 million pounds of various chemicalsubstancesthat had been

pumped into the well. She was advised that these chemicals “could” still be on the

bottom of the ocean at this site. She noted that there were a number of chemicals that

caused her concern. For example, she noted that there was a chemical compound

known as Starside, which she stated would, over time, decompose into nitrous oxide

and sulphur dioxide. Moore stated that, at that time, she was not sure what would

happen if she brought some of these chemicals to the surface, either instantaneously,

such as a result from the reduction in pressure, or over a period of time, from the

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increased temperature on the surface. She testified that she needed time to research

these facts, but was not allowed to do so. 

In addition, she testified that she was led to believe that she would be able to

do some testing of samples on-board ship, only to learn when she arrived, that all

samples would have to be sent to a university in Israel for testing. Furthermore, she

was not provided with proper equipment to keep the items cold, as they were at 5100

feet, during transport and that transport could take many hours by boat to the shore

and then by taxi to the university. Ms. Moore testified that she also not have

necessary protective gear or equipment to clean up any hazardous material leaks. 

Moore also testified that she was concerned that chemicals that were used to

cap the well would get into the sampling containers and would block the pressure

safety release mechanisms, potentially causing an explosion when the items reached

the reduced pressure of the surface or after warming up during their transport to the

university for testing. 

CSA has moved to exclude the proposed opinion testimony of Ms. Moore. 

CSA asserts that the opinions of Moore should be excluded because they are not

based on reliable facts or data, are not the product of reliable principles or methods,

and do not result in the application of such principles of reliability to the facts of this

case. One reason given by CSA is that Moore has virtually no experience in

conducting pressure-stable, deep-water sampling procedures. However, as set out

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below, this objection goes more to the foundation for Moore’s testimony than it does

to her qualifications to testify concerning the dangers presented by performing deepwater sampling at this site.

First, it is interesting to note that, while CSA claims that Moore has “virtually

no experience in conducting pressure-stable, deep-water sampling procedures,” this

is precisely what CSA hired her to do. Thus, CSA is alleging that Moore has no

experience in properly conducting the activity that CSA itself hired her to perform.

Apparently, Moore had sufficient expertise when she was hired to perform this

testing, but lost her expertise when she failed to do the testing because she believed

the conditions might be too dangerous to do so safely and wanted to do further

research into this before proceeding. 

Moore’s expert report is conclusory in nature and does not provide a basis for

her conclusions. The report is, indeed, very conclusory. However, Moore is not an

expert retained solely to give testimony in this case. She isthe president and majority

shareholder of ERS and is providing testimony in her own defense. Rule 26(a)(2),

Fed.R.Civ.P., distinguishes between retained and non-retained experts. Ms. Moore

is not an expert witness retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony. 

Thus, she is an expert who must be disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2), but she is not

required to provide an expertreport. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 AdvisoryCommittee Notes,

1993 Amendments, subdivision (a), para. (2) (“The requirement of a written report

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in paragraph (2)(B), however, applies only to those experts who are retained or

specially employed to provide such testimony in the case. . . . A treating physician,

for example, can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any requirement for

a written report.”). Consequently, the fact that her report is merely conclusory is not

a basisfor excluding her testimony. The report itself, of course, is not admissible, but

her testimony may be.

In this case, CSA asserts that Moore’s lack of experience in conducting

pressure-stable, deep-water sampling procedures disqualifies her from testifying. 

However, the basis of her testimony does not relate as much to the principles of deepwater sampling as it does to basic scientific principles and basic laws of chemistry. 

It is clear, based on her education and experience, that Ms. Moore is qualified

to testify with regard to chemical reactions and the effects of temperature and

pressure on chemical elements and compounds. This is basic Chemistry 101.

Likewise, she holdsthe patent on the deep-water sampling device that was to be used

in the Lev-2 brine pool testing and is clearly qualified to testify about how it works. 

Consequently, her testimony regarding her concerns for the safety of the procedures

she was asked to undertake are based on her knowledge of chemistry and the

sampling device itself. Any further knowledge of deep-water testing procedures is

unnecessary. Her concern was with what would happen if unknown or potentially

dangerous chemicals were lifted from 5100 feet to the drastically reduced pressure

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of the surface and transported for a period of several hours withoutsufficient cooling

or the ability to monitor the device holding the samplesfor dangerous pressure levels

or chemical reactions. 

Under these circumstances, ERS has demonstrated that Ms. Moore is qualified

to testify competently as to these issues, that her opinions are based on sound

methodology, and that her testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact. City of

Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 563 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794). A district court’s gatekeeper role under

Daubert “is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.”

Allison v. McGhan, 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999). “‘Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden

of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking [debatable] but

admissible evidence.’” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2786). 

Consequently, CSA’s objections are a basis for cross-examination of Moore, but not

for the exclusion of her testimony. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that CSA’s

motion to exclude the expert testimony of Ms. Moore be DENIED.

V. Motion to Quash Subpoenas to Noble Energy, Inc. and Noble Energy

Mediterranean, Ltd. (Doc. 62)

CSA seeks an order quashing a Rule 45 subpoena sent by ERS to Noble

Energy, Inc. and Noble Energy Mediterranean, Ltd. The subpoena was issued on

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Thursday, June 9, 2016, three days before the deadline for completion of all discovery

on June 12, 2016. The subpoena commanded Noble Energy, Inc. and Noble Energy

Mediterranean, Ltd. to produce documents by June 28, 2016, after the discovery

cutoff. CSA asserts that the subpoena is an end-run around the discovery cutoff, and

many of the documents sought could have been requested from CSA during the

discovery period. Further, Noble Energy, Inc. and Noble Energy Mediterranean, Ltd.

served objections to the subpoenas based on the subpoenas being served on June 14,

2016, over breadth, undue burden, invalid place of compliance,6insufficient time to

comply, confidential or proprietary information, attorney-client privilege and work

product protection, international discovery issues, and invalid service of Noble

EnergyMediterranean by service of the subpoena on Noble Energy (an entity separate

from Noble Energy Mediterranean). 

A Rule 45 subpoena is subject to any discovery deadlines. See Abrams v. Ciba

Specialty Chems. Corp., 265 F.R.D. 585, 588-89 (S.D.Ala. 2010). A party cannot use

a Rule 45 subpoena “as a means to engage in discovery after the discovery deadline

has passed.” Pushko v. Klebener, 2007 WL 2671263, at *3 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 7, 2007). 

6 The subpoenas were issued by this court, served on Noble Energy and Noble Energy

Mediterranean in Houston, Texas, and commanded production in Huntsville, Alabama. Counsel for

ERS stated he would allow production in Houston and he would determine how to get the documents

to Huntsville. Noble Energy and Noble Energy Mediterranean state that many of the documents

responsive to the subpoena are maintained in Israel or on wells located in the Mediterranean Sea. 

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If a party fails to comply with the discovery deadline, its subpoena is untimely and

is due to be quashed. See McDonald v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 WL

1138026, at *6 (M.D.Ala. Mar. 13, 2015) (quashing subpoena served one week after

the discovery deadline); Dees v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 2008 WL 821061,

at *1 (M.D.Ala. Mar. 25, 2008) (quashing subpoena served after the discovery

deadline). A subpoena is untimely even when a party issuesthe subpoena prior to the

discovery deadline if the party uses the subpoena to make an end-run around the

discovery deadline. See Marvin Lumber &Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 177 F.R.D.

443, 445 (D.Minn. 1997) (prohibiting the defendant from serving, or enforcing, a

subpoena with a return date after the discovery deadline). Mr. Baxter, counsel for

ERS, candidly admitted that he appeared late in the proceedings

Rule 45(c)(2)(A), Fed.R.Civ.P., states “[a] subpoena may command . . .

production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things at a

place within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly

transacts business in person. . . .” Rule 45(d)(3)(A) states “[o]n timely motion, the

court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena

that: (i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply

beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of

privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects

a person to undue burden.” A court also may quash or modify a subpoena if it

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requires “disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or

commercial information.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(3)(B)(i). 

In this case, it is clear that the subpoenas to Noble Energy and Noble Energy

Mediterranean are due to be quashed on several bases. First, the subpoenas were

issued too late to allow compliance before the discovery deadline. Second, they were

issued in the Northern District of Alabama but commanded production in Houston,

which clearly is more than 100 miles from the boundaries of the Northern District of

Alabama. Third, any subpoena to Noble Energy Mediterranean was not validly

served on Noble Energy.

7 Fourth, the subpoena is overly broad in scope. While ERS

offered at the hearing to narrow the scope of the subpoena to documents reflecting

the composition of the brine pool around the Leviathan 2 wellhead, the other reasons

for quashing the subpoenas make such an offer of no consequence. Accordingly, it

is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Quash Subpoenasto Noble Energy, Inc. and

Noble Energy Mediterranean, Ltd. be GRANTED.

7 Noble Energy Mediterranean is a subsidiary of Noble Energy, located in the Cayman

Islands. Generally, service on a parent company is not effective service on a subsidiary; the

parent-subsidiary corporate relationship alone is not ordinarily enough to establish agency for the

purpose of service. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-37, 45 S.Ct.

250, 251-52, 69 L.Ed. 634 (1925). The party seeking to prove proper service must at least show that

the parent corporation exercises such control and domination over the subsidiary that it operates

merelyas a department of the parent corporation. Bank of America Corp. v. Edwards, 881 So.2d 403

(Ala. 2003); see In re Curenton, 205 B.R. 967 (Bankr. M.D.Ala. 1995). ERS has made no such

showing.

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

Any party who objectsto the findings and conclusions contained in this report

and recommendation must, within fourteen (14) days of the date on which it is

entered, file specific written objections with the clerk of this court. Any objections

to the failure of the magistrate judge to address any contention raised in the petition

also must be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the

factual findings of the magistrate judge, except for plain error. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111

(1986); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013).

To challenge the findings of the magistrate judge, a party must file with the

clerk of the court written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of

the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the

specific basis for objection. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through

which to make new allegations or present additional evidence. Furthermore, it is not

necessary for a party to repeat legal arguments in objections. A copy of the

objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.

On receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a

United States District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of

the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection ismade and may

accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

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by the magistrate judge. The district judge, however, need conduct a hearing only in

his discretion or if required by law, and may consider the record developed before the

magistrate judge, making his own determination on the basis of that record. The

district judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the

matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Objections not meeting the

foregoing specificity requirement will not be considered by a district judge.

A party may not appeal a magistrate judge’s recommendation directly to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only

from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a district judge.

DONE this 4th day of August, 2016.

 

HARWELL G. DAVIS, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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