Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01349/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01349-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19-1349

DIXON O’BRIEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

VILLAGE OF LINCOLNSHIRE,

a Municipal Corporation, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:18-cv-01310 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 4, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 7, 2020

Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Dixon O’Brien, John Cook, and the

unions to which they belong sued the Village of Lincolnshire

and the Illinois Municipal League claiming violations of their

rights under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as violations of

Case: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
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state law. The district court dismissed their federal claims

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their remaining state

law claims. We affirm.

I.

In reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss, we are required

to assume that the facts alleged in the complaint are true.

Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409, 411–12 (7th Cir. 2020). At the

time they filed their Complaint, both O’Brien and Cook were

residents of Lincolnshire.1 Both paid a variety of municipal

taxes including property and sales taxes to the Village. O’Brien

is a member of the International Union of Operating Engineers,

Local 150, AFL-CIO. Cook is a member of Carpenters Local

250, an affiliate of the Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters,

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. We

will refer to them collectively as the Unions. The Unions

represent members who reside in, work in, and pay taxes to

Lincolnshire. 

Under Illinois law:

The corporate authorities of each municipality

may provide for joining the municipality in

membership in the Illinois Municipal League, an

unincorporated, nonprofit, nonpolitical associa1

 The operative complaint for the purposes of the appeal is the plaintiffs’

Third Amended Complaint, which we will refer to as the “Complaint.”

R. 40. O’Brien later moved out of Lincolnshire and concedes that he no

longer has standing for the purposes of injunctive relief, but continues to

seek money damages.

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No. 19-1349 3

tion of Illinois cities, villages and incorporated

towns and may provide for the payment of

annual membership dues and fees. The member

cities, villages and incorporated towns acting by,

through and in the name of such instrumentality

may provide and disseminate information and

research services, and may do all other acts for

the purpose of improving local government.

65 ILCS 5/1-8-1. Lincolnshire is one of more than a thousand

dues-paying members of the Illinois Municipal League

(“League” or “IML”). Lincolnshire uses tax revenue to pay

those dues, specifically, money from the Village’s General

Fund. The General Fund, in turn, comes from utility, sales and

income taxes, among other things. Over a five year period

extending from 2013 to 2018, Lincolnshire paid at least $5,051

in voluntary dues and fees to the League.

Consistent with the statutory description of the League, the

organization’s Bylaws provide that the League:

shall be an instrumentality of its member cities,

villages and incorporated towns. Its purpose

shall be to cooperate with its member municipalities in the development and improvement of

their governments and to promote efficient

municipal administration. The League shall

furnish such service to municipalities as may be

determined by the Board of Directors and

through the Executive Director.

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R. 40, Ex. A, at A-3.2 According to the Bylaws, the Board of

Directors is comprised of elected officers, each of whom must

be the chief elected official in his or her respective municipality. The Board consists of a President, a First Vice President, a

Second Vice President, thirty-six Vice Presidents, and any Past

Presidents who are still the chief elected officials of their

municipalities. The Executive Director is appointed by the

Board of Directors, and manages the affairs of the League

“under the general direction of the Board[.]” R. 40, Ex. A, at

A-5, A-7. The Executive Director is expressly “responsible for

League legislative and legal activities under the general

supervision of the Board of Directors.” R. 40, Ex. A, at A-8.

Only municipalities, cities, villages and incorporated towns

may join the League. 

The plaintiffs allege that the League is a “private, nonpublic

organization” that, contrary to the statutory description of the

League as nonpolitical, engages in political activity including

lobbying and contributing to candidates.3

 According to the

2

 The plaintiffs attached the League’s Bylaws to the Complaint, and refer

to that document throughout the Complaint. We may therefore refer to the

Bylaws in addressing the appeal of the district court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir.

2013). The plaintiffs also attached to the Complaint two advertisements

from the League’s website promoting the League’s participation in Illinois’

Lobby Day activities in 2017 and 2018, and we may consider those

documents as well.

3

 The plaintiffs cited to the Illinois State Board of Elections website in

support of the allegation that the League contributed to political candidates.

The defendants concede that, for some period of time, the League contrib-

(continued...)

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No. 19-1349 5

plaintiffs, in March 2015, the League issued two emails to its

members promoting the so-called “Turnaround Agenda” of

then-Governor Bruce Rauner. The plaintiffs alleged that, on

March 4, the League sent an email “lobbying Illinois units of

government, urging them to adopt Illinois Governor Bruce

Rauner’s ‘Turnaround Agenda[.]’” R. 40, at 4. On March 23, the

League, “per Governor Rauner’s request, emailed Illinois units

of government a draft of ‘Governor Rauner’s Turnaround

Agenda Resolution.’” R. 40, at 5.

The March 23, 2015 IML email acknowledged

ongoing correspondence between the IML and

the Governor’s office, stating, “[t]he Governor’s

office has asked that we follow-up with mayors

and managers on the Turnaround Agenda

information and provide a resolution ... that is

supportive of his administration’s effort to

address collective bargaining, unfunded mandates, prevailing wage requirements, workers’

compensation costs and legal empowerment

zones, among other things noted in the attachment ... [i]f you do adopt it locally, please send

me a copy electronically ... and mail me a copy

to the Governor’s office ...”

3

 (...continued)

uted to political candidates of both major parties in Illinois but, citing that

same website on which the plaintiffs rely, note that the last such contribution was made in 2011, outside the two-year statute of limitations for a

section 1983 claim based on those contributions. The plaintiffs have not

disputed as a factual matter the timing of those payments or that they

occurred outside the statute of limitations. 

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R. 40, at 54 (all punctuation as it appears in ¶ 32 of the Complaint). The plaintiffs also alleged that the League urged its

members to adopt local ordinances creating “right to work”

zones as part of the Turnaround Agenda. Lincolnshire was the

only unit of local government in Illinois to adopt a “right to

work” ordinance.5

The plaintiffs complain that, as tax-paying residents of

Lincolnshire, some of their money goes to support the Village’s

payment of dues to the League, thereby subsidizing private

speech with which the plaintiffs disagree. O’Brien demanded

a refund of the portion of his tax money that went to fund

Lincolnshire’s dues in the League, a demand that has gone

unanswered by the Village. Citing these allegations, the first

count of the Complaint asserted that Lincolnshire violated the

First Amendment rights of O’Brien and Cook by compelling

them to support private speech with which they disagreed. The

second count pled that Lincolnshire violated the First Amendment rights of O’Brien, Cook and the members of their

respective Unions who reside in the Village by compelling

4

 The March 23 email was sent by the League's Executive Director. R. 68,

at 4.

5

 We invalidated that ordinance in International Union of Operating Engineers

Local 399 v. Village of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2018). That decision

was subsequently vacated by a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court,

which issued an order directing this court to remand the case to the district

court with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. See Village of Lincolnshire,

Ill. v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692

(2019), and International Union of Operating Engineers Local 399 v. Village of

Lincolnshire, 773 Fed. Appx. 314 (7th Cir. 2019).

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them to associate with the League. The third count asserted

that the Village violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment by compelling all of the plaintiffs to

support political activities with which they disagreed while

allowing some unnamed others to refuse to do so. For each of

these federal counts, the plaintiffs sought an injunction

preventing the Village from using tax revenue to fund the

League’s private speech, a declaration that Lincolnshire’s use

of taxpayer money to pay dues to the League violates the

federal rights of Cook and O’Brien, an order requiring

Lincolnshire to refund to Cook and O’Brien the portion of their

taxes used to fund the League, and other relief. The remaining

counts pled state law causes of actions against the Village and

the League which we need not address.

On the defendants’ motion, the district court dismissed the

federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court rejected the defendants’ assertion that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring

their claims, finding that they adequately alleged an injury-infact as municipal taxpayers. See Hinrichs v. Speaker of House of

Representatives of Indiana General Assembly, 506 F.3d 584, 600 n.9

(7th Cir. 2007) (municipal taxpayer challenges to municipal

action are not subject to the same stringent standing requirements as state and federal taxpayers seeking to challenge state

and federal actions, respectively); Clay v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 76 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1996) (municipal taxpayers have standing when they object to a disbursement of funds

occasioned solely by the alleged unconstitutional conduct). But

the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment

claims failed as a matter of law because the challenged

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communications constituted government speech that is not

subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The court also found that

the Equal Protection claim failed as a matter of law because it

depended on the validity of the First Amendment claims. The

court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and the state

law claims without prejudice. The plaintiffs appeal.

II.

On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district court

erred in dismissing their First Amendment claims for violation

of their speech and association rights as well as the Equal

Protection claim because Lincolnshire compelled them to

subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public

concern. They also contend that the district court abused its

discretion in dismissing the Complaint with prejudice. Finally,

they contend that the district court abused its discretion by

denying their post-judgment Rule 59(e) motion to convert the

dismissal to one without prejudice in order to allow them to

file a fourth amended complaint against Lincolnshire and the

League. 

A.

We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss

claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting as true all

well-pleaded facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in

favor of the non-moving party. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634,

645 (7th Cir. 2018); Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636,

642–43 (7th Cir. 2014). In addition to the allegations set forth in

the Complaint itself, we may consider “documents that are

attached to the complaint, documents that are central to the

complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is

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properly subject to judicial notice.” Williamson, 714 F.3d at 436.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). 

In the first two federal counts of the Complaint, the

plaintiffs alleged that the Village violated their First Amendment rights by using their tax dollars to join the League,

thereby compelling them to subsidize the private speech of the

League and to associate with the League. In each instance, they

emphasized that the League is a private organization that

issued private speech with which they disagree. As we detailed

above, the objectionable speech consisted of emails from the

League to its own members purportedly encouraging them to

adopt then-Governor Rauner’s “Turnaround Agenda.” The

plaintiffs rely heavily on Janus v. American Federation of State,

County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448

(2018), and other cases addressing compelled or subsidized

speech for the proposition that the government may not force

a citizen to subsidize private speech with which the citizen

disagrees. But Janus and the cases prohibiting the government

from compelling subsidies in support of private speech are a

poor fit for the federal counts alleged by the plaintiffs.

In Janus, the Supreme Court considered an Illinois law that

forced public employees to subsidize a union, even if they

chose not to join the union and strongly objected to the

positions that the union took in collective bargaining. 138 S. Ct.

at 2459–60. The Court concluded that the arrangement

“violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling

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them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial

public concern.” Id. The Court noted that the First Amendment

protects both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain

from speaking. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463. Likewise, the freedom

to associate encompasses the freedom not to associate. Id.

Although most free speech cases involve restrictions on what

could be said, “measures compelling speech are at least as

threatening.” Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2464. Moreover, “[c]ompelling

a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers raises

similar First Amendment concerns.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464

(emphasis in original). The Court ultimately concluded that

none of the interests set forth for compelling non-consenting

employees to subsidize the union could outweigh the First

Amendment rights of those employees. As is apparent from

this review of Janus, the plaintiff there was forced to subsidize

a private speaker, namely, the union, whose speech was controlled by that private speaker and not by the government.

Janus did not address the difference between private speech

and government speech. It simply was not an issue in the case. 

The plaintiffs relied on Janus to contend that they were

wrongfully compelled to support, through mandatory taxes

paid to Lincolnshire, the speech of the League, which they

characterized on appeal as a “private, third-party entity that

engaged in lobbying efforts that were initiated by other third

parties.” Brief of Appellants, at 17–18. They also cited Johanns

v. Livestock Marketing Association, 544 U.S. 550 (2005), and other

cases in arguing that the “government can violate the First

Amendment when it compels individuals to subsidize the

speech of a private party.” Brief of Appellants at 17. Johanns is

relevant to determining the outcome here, but not in the

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manner that the plaintiffs urge. Rather, Johanns demonstrates

that the speech at issue in the Complaint is not private speech

but rather is government speech that is not subject to First

Amendment scrutiny. 

In Johanns, the Court considered a First Amendment

challenge to the Beef Promotion and Research Act (“Beef Act”),

as implemented by the Secretary of Agriculture (“Secretary”)

through a Beef Promotion and Research Order (“Beef Order”).

The Beef Act announced a federal policy of promoting the

marketing and consumption of beef, using funds raised by an

assessment on cattle sales and importation. The statute

directed the Secretary to implement the Beef Order by appointing a Beef Board consisting of beef producers and importers,

and imposing a $1 per head assessment on all sales or importation of cattle. The Beef Board, in turn, created an Operating

Committee consisting of ten Beef Board members and ten

representatives named by a federation of state beef councils.

Although only half of the members of the Operating Committee were appointed by the Secretary, all were subject to

removal by the Secretary. The Operating Committee was

charged with designing promotional campaigns for beef

products, subject to the approval of the Secretary. Johanns, 544

U.S. at 553–54.

More than a billion dollars was collected through the

assessment and a large portion went to advertising promotions

such as the “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.” campaign. Associations of beef producers who were required to pay the assessment sued the Secretary, objecting on First Amendment

grounds to the compelled subsidy of speech with which they

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did not agree.6 The Court noted that “[i]n all of the cases

invalidating exactions to subsidize speech, the speech was, or

was presumed to be, that of an entity other than the government itself.” Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559. And each of those

compelled subsidy cases respected the principle that compelled support of a private association is fundamentally

different from compelled support of government. Johanns, 544

U.S. at 559 (citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.

209, 259 n.13 (1977)). But:

“Compelled support of government”—even

those programs of government one does not

approve—is of course perfectly constitutional, as

every taxpayer must attest. And some government programs involve, or entirely consist of,

advocating a position. “The government, as a

general rule, may support valid programs and

policies by taxes or other exactions binding on

protesting parties. Within this broader principle

it seems inevitable that funds raised by the

government will be spent for speech and other

expression to advocate and defend its own

policies.” 

Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559 (quoting Board of Regents of University

of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)).

Prior to Johanns, the Court had assumed, though not yet held,

6

 Apparently, the beef producers objected to the promotion of beef as a

generic commodity, which they contended impeded their ability to promote

the superiority of particular kinds of beef, such as American beef, grain-fed

beef, or certified Angus or Hereford beef. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 556.

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that compelled funding of government speech does not raise

First Amendment concerns. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559. The issue

was thus whether the beef promotion advertising was government speech.

The plaintiffs asserted that, because the content of the

speech was effectively controlled by a nongovernmental

entity—the Operating Committee—the advertisements could

not be considered government speech. The Court rejected the

premise of the argument and declined to consider whether the

Operating Committee was “governmental” or “nongovernmental.” 544 U.S. at 560 n.4. Instead, the Court concluded that

the message of the promotional campaigns was effectively

controlled by the government itself. Congress and the Secretary “set out the overarching message and some of its elements, and they have left the development of the remaining

details to an entity whose members are answerable to the

Secretary (and in some cases appointed by him as well).” 544

U.S. at 561. Moreover, the Secretary exercised final approval

authority over the wording of the promotional campaign. All

of the messages were reviewed by government officials both

for substance and wording, and some were rewritten or

rejected. Government officials also attended and participated

in the meetings where proposals were developed. Further: 

[w]hen, as here, the government sets the overall

message to be communicated and approves

every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech

doctrine merely because it solicits assistance

from nongovernmental sources in developing

specific messages.

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Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562. 

The Court also rejected a contention that the beef program

did not qualify as government speech because it was funded

by a targeted assessment rather than by general revenues,

which, the plaintiffs argued, had the dual effect of giving

control not to politically accountable legislators but to a narrow

interest group, and also creating a perception that the advertisements speak for all beef producers. 

Citizens may challenge compelled support of

private speech, but have no First Amendment

right not to fund government speech. And that

is no less true when the funding is achieved

through targeted assessments devoted exclusively to the program to which the assessed

citizens object.

Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562. It was enough that a federal statute

authorized the program and prescribed the basic message, 

and specific requirements for the promotions’

content are imposed by federal regulations

promulgated after notice and comment. The

Secretary of Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the program, appoints and

dismisses the key personnel, and retains absolute veto power over the advertisements’ content, right down to the wording. And Congress,

of course, retains oversight authority, not to

mention the ability to reform the program at any

time. No more is required.

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Johanns, 544 U.S. at 563–64.

Following Johanns, the Court reiterated that the First

Amendment does not regulate government speech. See e.g.,

Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135

S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015); Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,

555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). “A government entity has the right to

‘speak for itself.’” Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 467 (quoting

Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229). A government may say what it

wishes and select the viewpoints that it wants to express.

Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 467–68. See also Walker, 135 S.Ct. at

2245 (when the government speaks, it is not barred by the First

Amendment from determining the content of what it says).

Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom. If

every citizen were to have a right to insist that

no one paid by public funds express a view with

which he disagreed, debate over issues of great

concern to the public would be limited to those

in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed.

Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 468 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). See also Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246 (noting that

a city government must have the freedom to choose its

message in order to promote its preferred programs such as

recycling). Echoing Johanns, the Court said that a “government

entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views

when it receives assistance from private sources for the

purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.”

Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 468. Government speech is not

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limitless; it must comport, for example, with the Establishment

Clause. And it is subject to the check of political process, where

objecting citizens may hold public officials to account through

the ballot box. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 468–69. “But, as a

general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to

promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position.

In doing so, it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties

on their behalf.” Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the salient facts

alleged in the Complaint as supplemented by the documents

that are attached to the complaint. Lincolnshire is the only

defendant named in the three federal counts, and relief is

sought from Lincolnshire alone. The only bad act alleged is the

Village’s statutorily authorized voluntary use of taxpayer

funds to join the League, a purportedly private organization,

which in turn issued the speech that offended the plaintiffs.

The central question is whether, in joining the League, the

Village has compelled the plaintiffs to subsidize private speech

or that of the government itself.7

7

 Although the Complaint alleged that the offending speech came in the

form of emails issued by the League itself, in briefing on appeal, the

plaintiffs added that other, private third parties controlled the message.

During oral argument, the plaintiffs identified the private third parties as

the League’s Executive Director who sent the emails, then-Governor Rauner

and an outside consultant. None of this purportedly third-party control of

the League’s speech was alleged in the Complaint. As the district court

found, the Complaint alleged no private control over the message. The

Complaint instead asserted only that the League is a private organization,

which is not a decisive factor under Johanns as we discuss infra. 

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According to the Complaint, the Bylaws attached to the

Complaint, and Illinois law, the League itself is an unincorporated association whose membership is composed entirely of

cities, villages and incorporated towns of Illinois.8 In other

words, it is composed entirely of local governments. Its Bylaws

establish that it is run by a Board of Directors that consists

entirely of the highest elected officials of member governments. Illinois law provides that local governments may join

the League if they wish and pay the applicable dues and fees,

and so it is a voluntary association. 65 ILCS 5/1-8-1. That same

statute provides that the “member cities, villages and incorporated towns acting by, through and in the name of such instrumentality may provide and disseminate information and research

services, and may do all other acts for the purpose of improving local government.” As a member, Lincolnshire thus acts by

and through the League in issuing messages for the purpose of

8

 Illinois law provides that a “voluntary unincorporated association may

sue and be sued in its own name, and may complain and defend in all

actions. For the purposes of this Code, ‘voluntary unincorporated association’ means any organization of 2 or more individuals formed for a

common purpose, excluding a partnership or corporation.” 735 ILCS 5/2-

209.1. Illinois case law indicates that the bylaws of a voluntary association

create a contract between the association and its members. Lo v. Provena

Covenant Medical Center, 826 N.E.2d 592, 598 (Ill. App. 2005). That same case,

citing Black’s Law Dictionary, likened a voluntary association to an

unincorporated business organization that is not a legal entity separate from

the persons who compose it. Id. See also Pecoraro v. Balkonis, 891 N.E.2d 484,

492 (Ill. App. 2008) (noting that “nonprofit association” means an unincorporated organization consisting of two or more members by mutual consent

for a common, nonprofit purpose, and concluding that individual members

may not be held liable in tort for acts of the association unless they

participated in or ratified the actions that caused injury).

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improving local government. The decision to join – to associate

with – the League is controlled entirely by the Village, and

membership both allows Village control over the League’s

messages and signals a willingness to speak through the

League. Under Johanns, Walker, and Pleasant Grove, plaintiffs’

taxpayer funds thus supported Lincolnshire’s action and

Lincolnshire’s speech. 

Although the parties dispute whether the League may be

characterized as a private or governmental organization, such

a designation is not determinative of whether the plaintiffs

have been compelled to subsidize private speech.9 Johanns, 544

U.S. at 560 & n.4 (declining to consider whether the Operating

Committee was “governmental” or “nongovernmental” and

instead turning to whether the message of the promotional

campaigns was effectively controlled by the government itself).

Based on the plaintiffs’ own allegations, the conduct of joining

the League and the message at issue here are ultimately

controlled by the government of Lincolnshire itself and also by

the League’s other governmental members. That the Village

9

 In its answer to an earlier version of the complaint, Lincolnshire admitted

that the League is a private organization. Although it subsequently sought

to distance itself from that admission by contending without authority that

its admission was somehow superceded by the filing of a subsequent

complaint, the Village never withdrew its concession in the district court.

Lincolnshire’s admission is not binding on the League, which made no

similar admission and characterizes itself as a “quasi-governmental”

association. We need not decide whether the League is private, governmental, or “quasi-governmental” because the determinative factor is not the

nature of the League but whether the government ultimately controlled the

speech.

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and other municipal members used the League (or any third

party) to craft a particular message does not deprive the speech

of its government ownership. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562;

Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 468. By the plaintiffs’ own allegations, both the statute authorizing membership and the Bylaws

provide that the League is an instrumentality of local governments which may act through the League to disseminate

information and engage in acts to improve local government.

65 ILCS 5/1-8-1; Bylaws, R. 40-1, at 2. 

Lincolnshire itself, which the plaintiffs agree (as they must)

has the right to speak for itself and also a right to associate,

voluntarily joined the League as it is authorized to do by

statute. As a member, Lincolnshire could adopt the speech of

the League if it wished or could denounce the speech or leave

the League at any time if it disagreed with the message issued.

But as the plaintiffs pled, Lincolnshire was unique in Illinois in

its whole-hearted adoption of the League’s promotion of the

Governor’s Turnaround Agenda. It was the only unit of local

government to adopt an ordinance legalizing local “right to

work zones,” as promoted in the Turnaround Agenda. Although the plaintiffs vehemently disagree with the Turnaround Agenda, they cannot plausibly claim that

Lincolnshire—by itself or through an association of local

governments—lacked the right to speak and to take a position

on that Agenda.

Indeed, the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that if the

League had acted as described in the statute, the speech at

issue would properly be characterized as government speech

that is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The problem,

they assert, is that the League exceeded the scope of its

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20 No. 19-1349

authority by engaging in “political” lobbying activity when the

statute described the League as a “nonpolitical” association,

and also that the League did not operate according to its

Bylaws but was instead subject to the outside influence of

private third parties. Although the plaintiffs did not allege this

interference in the Complaint, they now assert that, contrary to

the Bylaws, the Board did not control the Executive Director,

and that the Executive Director was acting in concert with the

Governor and an outside consultant in lobbying members to

adopt the Governor’s agenda. 

It is true that the statute describes the League as “nonpolitical,” but the entire purpose of the League is to act as an

instrumentality of its governmental members in order to

“provide and disseminate information and research services,

and ... do all other acts for the purpose of improving local

government,” all of which can be described as political acts in

the sense that they are related to government and governing.10

See Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University

Press, Eleventh Edition (2004) (defining “political” as “relating

to the government or public affairs of a country”). It is difficult

to see how the League could accomplish its purpose as

described by statute unless it could lobby its own members

and the state legislature on issues related to improving local

government. To adopt the plaintiffs’ definition of the word

10 In context, the word “nonpolitical” likely means nonpartisan, a definition

that would be consistent with and give effect to the other provisions of the

statute. Nonprofit organizations such as the League may not engage in

partisan activities. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). We emphasize again that, to the

extent the League engaged in partisan donations to candidates, it indisputably did so outside the statute of limitations. 

Case: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
No. 19-1349 21

“nonpolitical” would render the remainder of the Illinois

statute nonsensical and inert. As the Supreme Court held,

“when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a

program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so,

it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties on their

behalf.” Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246. The government is entitled

to select the viewpoints that it wants to express. Pleasant Grove,

555 U.S. at 467–68. The same is no less true when a municipality voluntarily joins an association of local governments, which

were doing nothing more than speaking among themselves

and taking actions that local governments have a right to take.

As the Supreme Court also noted, it is difficult to see how local

governments could operate unless they were allowed to

discuss, either directly or through a surrogate, ideas related to

municipal government, regardless of where those ideas

originated. 

As for the new allegations that the Board did not actually

control the message but allowed the Executive Director to craft

the message with the influence of third parties, the plaintiffs do

not dispute that, had the Executive Director engaged in rogue

actions beyond his authority or with which the Board disagreed, the Board was entitled to remove him, and all members were within their rights to denounce the message and

withdraw from the voluntary association.11 Lincolnshire did

not denounce the message or terminate its membership in the

11 Under the Bylaws of the League, the Executive Director is responsible for

legislative and legal activities under the supervision of the Board of

Directors. The Executive Director’s actions are subject to the control of the

Board, which may remove the Executive Director at any time. 

Case: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
22 No. 19-1349

League; according to the plaintiffs’ own allegations, it was the

one unit of local government in Illinois that endorsed the

offending message fully. In essence, as alleged in the Complaint, Lincolnshire adopted the message, as it is entitled to do.

Any input from the Executive Director, the Governor or any

other third party could not change the nature of the speech

because Lincolnshire retained ultimate control over the

message itself. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 468 (a “government

entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views

when it receives assistance from private sources for the

purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.”). 

In short, the facts alleged here bear no resemblance to Janus,

where the plaintiffs alleged that they were compelled to

support private speech issued by unions and not controlled by

the government. The plaintiffs here pled themselves out of

court when they alleged that Lincolnshire did nothing more

than join the League, a voluntary association of local governments, an act it has every right to do, and that the League

issued speech to its own members, under Bylaws that expressly gave the League’s governmental members ultimate

control over the association’s message. The plaintiffs failed to

allege private control of the speech; they instead pled facts that

conclusively demonstrated that the conduct and messages at

issue were governmental speech and association not subject to

First Amendment scrutiny. 

The viability of the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim

depends on the validity of the First Amendment claims.

Because Lincolnshire did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights under

the First Amendment, the Equal Protection claim fails as well.

Case: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
No. 19-1349 23

And the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

B.

The plaintiffs next argue that the court erred by dismissing

the federal claims with prejudice, and by denying their Rule

59(e) motion to reconsider in order to allow them to seek leave

to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. In particular, the plaintiffs contend that they should have been allowed an opportunity to amend because the Complaint that the court dismissed

was the first one to include the League as a defendant. We

review a district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for

reconsideration and denial of a motion for leave to amend for

abuse of discretion. NewSpin Sports, LLC v. Arrow Electronics,

Inc., 910 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2018). Ordinarily, after an

original complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a court

should allow at least one opportunity to amend the complaint

before dismissing the entire action. NewSpin Sports, 910 F.3d at

310; Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago. &

Northwest Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015). On a plaintiff’s

request to amend, the court should “freely give leave when

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

In the absence of any apparent or declared

reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant,

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to

the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the

leave sought should, as the rules require, be

Case: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
24 No. 19-1349

‘freely given.’ Of course, the grant or denial of

an opportunity to amend is within the discretion

of the District Court, but outright refusal to

grant the leave without any justifying reason

appearing for the denial is not an exercise of

discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion

and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal

Rules.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

However, once a district court has entered final judgment

dismissing a case, the plaintiff may not amend under Rule

15(a) unless the judgment is modified, either by the district

court under Rule 59(e) or 60(b), or on appeal. NewSpin Sports,

910 F.3d at 310; Runnion, 786 F.3d at 521. Although Rules 59(e)

and 60(b) provide extraordinary remedies for exceptional

circumstances, we review post-judgment motions for leave to

amend according to the Rule 15 standard when a district court

enters judgment at the same time it first dismisses a case.

NewSpin Sports, 910 F.3d at 310; Runnion, 786 F.3d at 521;

Gonzalez- Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2015).

Thus, when the “district court has taken the unusual step of

entering judgment at the same time it dismisses the complaint,

the court need not find other extraordinary circumstances and

must still apply the liberal standard for amending pleadings

under Rule 15(a)(2).” Runnion, 786 F.3d at 521. 

In this case, the district court used the higher standard of

Rule 59(e) when deciding the motions to alter or amend the

judgment and for leave to amend the complaint. The court

should have applied the more generous Rule 15(a) standard

Case: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
No. 19-1349 25

but it is apparent from the court’s order and from the record

that, ultimately, the court did not abuse its discretion. A review

of the history of the proceedings makes this clear. 

O’Brien and his union filed the first complaint against

Lincolnshire on February 21, 2018, raising the same federal

claims that are at issue here. A week later, prior to the filing of

an answer, O’Brien and his union filed an amended complaint

containing additional factual allegations and further explanation of the legal basis of the constitutional claims. In March

2018, Lincolnshire answered the amended complaint, and in

May, the plaintiffs moved for leave to file a second amended

complaint in order to add Cook and his union as plaintiffs. The

court granted that motion, and two weeks later, on May 21,

2018, Lincolnshire moved to dismiss the second amended

complaint. In that motion, the Village challenged the plaintiffs’

standing and also argued that the payment of dues to the

League and the adoption of the League’s speech constituted

government speech and association that was not subject to

First Amendment review. 

The day after Lincolnshire filed its motion to dismiss, the

district court advised the plaintiffs to review the court’s

Standing Order regarding motions to dismiss, and elect either

to amend their most recent complaint or proceed with briefing

on the motion to dismiss:

When a motion to dismiss is filed, the

non-moving party has a right to amend its

pleading once within 21 days. Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(1)(B). If the non-moving party elects not to

amend its pleading to address the purported

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26 No. 19-1349

deficiencies raised by the motion (or seek leave

to amend its pleading again), then the motion to

dismiss will proceed in its normal course and, if

the moving party prevails, the Court may dismiss the case with prejudice and not provide

further opportunity to amend the pleading

absent extraordinary circumstances. If the

non-moving party amends its pleading, then the

moving party (unless ordered otherwise by the

Court) shall file within 21 days of the amended

pleading either: (1) an answer or (2) a new

motion to dismiss. 

Standing Order of Judge John Robert Blakey,

https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?RxIItJ+3ldN9

9GnKt+Q4wg== (last visited March 19, 2020). Part of this

Standing Order was problematic. “A district court does not

have the discretion to remove the liberal amendment standard

by standing order or other mechanisms requiring plaintiffs to

propose amendments before the court rules on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion on pain of forfeiture of the right to amend.” Runnion,

786 F.3d at 523 n.3. But the Standing Order helpfully alerted

the plaintiffs of their right to amend under Rule 15.

The plaintiffs elected to amend and filed their Third

Amended Complaint (the Complaint at issue in this appeal) on

June 19, 2018. The Complaint contained new factual allegations

related to standing, and added two state law counts. One of

those new counts was filed against the League, the first time

the League was named as a defendant in the case. On August

3, the defendants moved jointly to dismiss the Complaint. In

that motion, they argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to

Case: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
No. 19-1349 27

bring the First Amendment claims. They also again contended

that the First Amendment does not regulate the Village’s

speech through the League or its association with the League.

Citing Johanns, Pleasant Grove and other cases, they argued that

the speech at issue was the Village’s own government speech.

They noted Lincolnshire’s right to voluntarily associate with

the League and to adopt particular viewpoints with which

some citizens might disagree. They urged the court to reject

any argument that the League was a private organization,

noting that it was an association that consisted entirely of local

governments, and that the association was not a legal entity

separate from its members. But they also urged the court not

to assign conclusive importance to the claim that the League

was a private organization because Lincolnshire had voluntarily joined the association knowing the League’s purpose,

mission and message, and could leave it any time. Its choice to

be a member was thus an exercise of Lincolnshire’s own First

Amendment expressive association rights regardless of the

private character of any group it joined. Arguing that the

Supreme Court had at least thrice found that speech designed

by private parties was government speech under analogous

circumstances, the defendants contended that the Village’s

voluntary membership in the League was itself government

speech that was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. R. 51,

Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Dismiss, at 9–10.

See also Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 481; Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562;

and Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2251. The defendants maintained that

the Equal Protection claim failed for multiple reasons, including because it was tied to the legitimacy of the First AmendCase: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
28 No. 19-1349

ment claims. Finally, the defendants asked the court to decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

The plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend the Complaint

again but instead responded to the motion to dismiss. In that

response, the plaintiffs asked only that the court deny the

motion; they did not request in the alternative for leave to

amend the Complaint. The court heard oral argument on the

motion to dismiss on September 13 and took the motion under

advisement. At the same time, discovery proceeded and the

plaintiffs gathered additional information about the League

through documents and depositions, including the deposition

of the League’s Executive Director. Discovery was set to close

on December 5, 2018. On November 29, the court held a

hearing related to discovery issues. At that hearing, “Plaintiffs’

counsel admitted that nothing in the discovery would change

how they drafted the [Complaint], and thus it would fall or

stand on its allegations at that time.” R. 93, at 6–7 (Memorandum Opinion and Order, Jan. 24, 2019). On December 7, 2018,

the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the

Complaint with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The plaintiffs then

filed a Rule 59(e) motion seeking to convert the dismissal to

one without prejudice based upon newly discovered evidence.

In the motion, the plaintiffs indicated their intention to request

leave to file a fourth amended complaint if the court granted

the Rule 59(e) motion. They also sought clarification that the

state law counts had been dismissed without prejudice.

In its ruling on those motions, the district court clarified

that the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice.

Although the court erroneously applied the Rule 59(e) stanCase: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
No. 19-1349 29

dard to both the motion to alter or amend the judgment and

the motion for leave to amend the Complaint, the reasoning

demonstrates that the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motions. The court found that the so-called newly

discovered evidence had in fact been in the plaintiffs’ possession for more than three weeks before the court ruled on the

motion to dismiss. Importantly, the plaintiffs possessed all of

this information before counsel assured the court that nothing

in the discovery would cause them to amend the Complaint

and that the plaintiffs’ claims would fall or stand on the

allegations at that time. Although the plaintiffs now dispute

the court’s characterization of what counsel said at the November 29 hearing, the plaintiffs have failed to place the transcript

of that hearing in the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2) (“If

the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or

conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the

evidence, the appellant must include in the record a transcript

of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.”). We

therefore have no reason to question the court’s characterization of that hearing. We take the court at its word that the

plaintiffs expressed an intention for their Complaint to fall or

stand on the allegations as drafted. Dupree v. Hardy, 859 F.3d

458, 463 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that we cannot meaningfully

review a decision where the appellant has not provided a

transcript of the hearing in which the court explained its

reasons for denying the motion); Morisch v. United States, 653

F.3d 522, 529 (7th Cir. 2011) (a violation of Rule 10(b)(2) is

grounds for forfeiture and dismissal). The court also rejected

as irrelevant the plaintiffs’ assertion that they intended to file

a motion for summary judgment before the court’s deadline for

Case: 19-1349 Document: 38 Filed: 04/07/2020 Pages: 31
30 No. 19-1349

dispositive motions (December 14, 2018) rather than seeking

leave to amend the Complaint. The court found that this was

a procedural failing based on a strategic choice that could not

justify the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion. 

In discussing the new evidence and allegations that the

plaintiffs wished to add to a fourth amended complaint, the

court repeatedly noted that the plaintiffs had not explained

how any of this evidence was relevant to the government

speech doctrine. Although the court did not use the word

“futile” in describing the proposed additions to the Complaint,

it is clear that the court found that none of the new allegations

would alter the outcome of its ruling on the motion to dismiss

because none of the new evidence affected the government

speech analysis. In other words, the proposed amendments

would be futile.

The Complaint that the court dismissed was the fourth

complaint that the plaintiffs lodged against Lincolnshire, but

the first complaint filed against the League. But the only count

against the League was a state law claim that the court dismissed without prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over both state law claims. As is apparent from this

record, this is not an instance where a plaintiff lacked an

opportunity to amend. The plaintiffs had already been granted

leave to amend the federal counts asserted against Lincolnshire

(the only counts dismissed with prejudice here) after the first

motion to dismiss. The second motion to dismiss largely

echoed the first, and so the plaintiffs were fully aware of the

import of the government speech doctrine when they filed the

Third Amended Complaint, the one at issue in this appeal.

None of the amendments in the proposed Fourth Amended

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No. 19-1349 31

Complaint would cure the defects that led to dismissal of the

Third Amended Complaint. Moreover, when the defendants

filed their September 3 joint motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs

asked the court only to deny the motion, and did not request

in the alternative for leave to amend the Complaint again. They

also assured the court at the November 29 discovery hearing

that they had no intention of seeking leave to amend based on

any of the evidence they uncovered in discovery. Although

they now assert that the defendants raised new issues that they

did not anticipate regarding the public nature of the League

and the League’s own right to issue its own government

speech, all of this was apparent by November 29, and none of

it could change the outcome of the motion to dismiss. In this

context, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing the federal counts with prejudice, and

denying both the Rule 59(e) motion and the motion for leave to

amend the Complaint.

AFFIRMED.

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