Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01225/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01225-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLTON HILLMON,

Petitioner,

v.

K. MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-1225 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 10]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is represented to Richard Pfeiffer, Esq.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is serving a sentence of fifteen years to life in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation based on his 1988 conviction of murder. 

In the instant petition, Petitioner contends that Governor Davis improperly revoked his

grant of parole and the Board of Parole Hearings subsequently denied him parole upon the same

evidence used to previously grant parole. 

On June 12, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, and for failure to state a claim. (Court Doc. 10.) After the grant of an

extension of time, Petitioner filed an opposition on September 21, 2006. (Court Doc. 19.)

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

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Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review th

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a

motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and

Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after the statute's

enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed

by its provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state

court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction,

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28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the

threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. White v. Lambert,

370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004). th

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. In certain cases,

a state law may create a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. In examining questions of

procedural due process, federal courts employ a two-step inquiry: 1) whether there exists a liberty

or property interest which has been interfered with by the State, and 2) whether the procedures

attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. Sass v. California Board of

Prison Terms, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 2506393 *3 (9 Cir. Aug. 31, 2006) (citing Kentucky Dept. th

of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989).) 

The United States Supreme Court has expressly denied entitlement to a protected liberty

interest in parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.

1, 7 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) ("There is no constitutional or inherent right of a

convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence."). 

"Nevertheless, early release statutes can create a 'liberty interest protected by due process

guarantees.'" Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam), quoting

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Moreover, "[a]

state may create a constitutionally protected liberty interest by establishing regulatory measures

that impose substantive limitations on the exercise of official discretion." Bermudez, 936 F.2d at

1067, citing Baumann v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 844 (9 Cir.1985). th

However, no protected entitlement to release exists unless a state scheme includes a formula

which mandates release after the occurrence of specified events. Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844

(stating that the unique "shall/unless" formula was decisive in Greenholtz). If there exists

mandatory language in a parole statute, then Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in parole

release. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12. If, however, the state merely holds out the possibility of

parole, then such a hope is not protected by due process. Id.; Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844.

Therefore, the Court must look to the California parole statutes to determine whether the unique

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structure and language of those statutes creates an entitlement to parole release or a presumption

of expectation of parole release.

In Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, ruled

that the District Court in Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 376 F.Supp.2d 976 (E.D. Cal.

2005) erred by finding that the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal.4th 1061 (2005), held that section 3041(b) does not use mandatory language. Sass v.

California Board of Prison Terms, 2006 WL 2506393, at *3-4. 

In Sass, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition finding

the state courts’ decisions upholding the petitioner’s parole denials were not contrary to, and did

not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the

United States Supreme Court. Sass, 2006 WL 2506393, at *1. The Court stated that the

Dannenberg Court never held California law did not provide a liberty interest in parole. Id. at *3. 

Rather, the California Supreme Court proceeded to the second step of the analysis in determining

whether the procedures utilized were constitutionally sufficient. Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit

reasoned that the California Supreme Court would not have proceeded to this analysis if there

was, in fact, no liberty interest. Id. (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 490 U.S. at 460.) Accordingly,

based on the reasoning in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s opinion in Sass, Petitioner

continues to have a protected liberty interest in parole, and the instant petition is therefore not

subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

C. Merits of Claims

Respondent contends that even if there is a liberty interest in parole, this action should

nonetheless be dismissed because Petitioner does not contest that he received all the process due

under clearly established federal law. 

As previously stated, Petitioner contends that his incarceration is illegal because his due

process rights were violated when Governor Davis reversed the grant of parole, and the Board of

Parole Hearings subsequently denied Petitioner parole based on the same evidence used to

previously grant parole. (Petition, at 5, 6-6K.) 

Rescission of a prisoner’s parole comports with due process as long as “some evidence

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supports the decision.” Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832 (9 Cir. 2004) (citing McQuillion, th

306 F.3d at 904, quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d

356 (1985) (emphasis in original)). Because Petitioner has alleged that the Governor’s decision

to rescind his parole date was not based on “some evidence,” the petition states a claim for relief. 

Respondent is correct in Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held that a parole procedure satisfies due

process when 1) the procedure "affords an opportunity to be heard,” and 2) the inmate is

informed “in what respects he falls short of qualifying for parole." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. 

However, the requirements of due process are satisfied only if "some evidence" supports the

decision. Sass v. California Bd. Of Prison Terms, __ F.3d __; 2006 WL 2506393 *4 (9 Cir. th

Aug. 31, 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (9 Cir.2003); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 th

F.3d 895, 904 (9 Cir.2002); Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir.1987) th

(adopting the "some evidence" standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985)). "Additionally, the evidence

underlying the board's decision must have some indicia of reliability." Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

In Sass, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument that the “some

evidence” standard was not clearly established law in the parole context, citing Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Sass, 2006 WL 2506393 *4. 

Based on the foregoing established law, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims that the

Governor’s decision to rescind the grant of parole and the Board of Parole’s 2004 denial of

parole based on the same evidence used to previously grant parole state a cognizable due process

claim via § 2254, and Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be denied. 

Respondent further contends that Petitioner’s allegation that his denial of parole amounts

to a violation of his plea bargain, should be dismissed as it fails to state a constitutional violation. 

In his petition, Petitioner contends that he has “performed his part of the plea agreement by

staying disciplinary free, having a clear psychological report, completing the required number of

years in confinement, and most importantly was found ‘suitable’ for parole. By completing these

requirements Petitioner has a liberty interest in parole, guaranteed by the United States Supreme

Court Law and with California’s parole scheme under Penal Code § 3041(b) which ‘parole shall

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normally be set....” (Petition, at 6-F.) 

Although the Court finds it highly unlikely that the terms of Petitioner’s plea agreement

established a liberty interest in parole, the Court cannot determine whether Petitioner’s claim has

merit without a review of the record in this case. As Respondent points out any promise of a

favorable parole outcome as part of the plea bargain would likely have been illegal, since the

prosecutor was without power to usurp the prerogative of the parole authority. See United States

v. Anderson, 970 F.2d 602, 608 (9 Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of rehearing, 990 F.2d th

1163 (9 Cir. 1993) (“The agreement seemingly contemplates either limiting the information th

made available to the parole board or dictating the action to be taken by the parole board in a

particular case. Either course frustrates the Parole Commission’s duty to determine when release

is appropriate for a particular defendant.”) However, in an abundance of caution, the Court

cannot determine, without a review of the entire record in this case, whether Petitioner states a

cognizable claim regarding the alleged violation of his plea agreement. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure

to state a claim for relief be DENIED; and

2. The matter be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a further

scheduling order. 

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

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may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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