Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01205/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01205-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 150
Nature of Suit: Overpayments &amp; Enforcement of Judgments
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODNEY G. ANDERSON, No. 2:07-cv-01205-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

AKAL SECURITY, INC., UNITED

STATES MARSHALS SERVICE,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff Rodney Anderson (“Plaintiff”) brought this action

against AKAL Security, Inc. (“AKAL”), and the United States

Marshals Service (“USMS”) seeking damages and declaratory relief

based on a breach of contract claim related to Plaintiff’s

termination as a Court Security Officer (“CSO”) in the Eastern

District of California Courthouse in Fresno, California. 

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Case 2:07-cv-01205-MCE -GGH Document 36 Filed 01/15/08 Page 1 of 6
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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Defendant USMS moves to dismiss the Second Cause of Action in

Plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis of lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and sovereign immunity. 

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant USMS’ Motion to

Dismiss is granted.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by AKAL beginning September 25, 2000,

and ending November 30, 2005, when Plaintiff was terminated

because he failed to meet the medical qualifications required for

his position. AKAL contracts with the USMS to provide CSOs to

the Eastern District of California courthouse in Fresno,

California. Plaintiff was employed as a CSO and his contract

required him to meet the qualifications of all United States

Marshals working as CSOs in the district court. The agreement

requires that a CSO undergo annual medical evaluations and meet

minimum standards in order to continue employment as a CSO the

following year. 

Plaintiff underwent the annual medical evaluation for fiscal

year 2005 on October 6, 2004, during which he was required to

provide supplemental medical information and documentation. 

Plaintiff alleges he submitted the necessary information and

received no further requests for additional documentation. 

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3

Plaintiff alleges he incurred substantial costs from the

evaluations necessary to obtain the additional information and

that he has not been reimbursed for those expenses. 

Plaintiff further alleges that AKAL failed to forward the

requested medical information and documentation to the USMS as

was necessary to continue employment as a CSO. As to the USMS,

Plaintiff alleges that the USMS unreasonably delayed requesting

additional medical information, improperly refused to process

Plaintiff’s medical documentation for 2005, and improperly

removed Plaintiff from his position.

 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a cause of action for

injunctive and declaratory relief against the USMS. The USMS now

moves to dismiss that cause of action.

STANDARD

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a “facial attack” on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject-matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis (“factual attack”). Thornhill

Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733

(9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549

F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion constitutes a facial

attack, the Court must consider the factual allegations of the

complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412

(5th Cir. 1981); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. 

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4

If the motion constitutes a factual attack, however, “no

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

If the Court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Generally, leave to

amend should be denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies

of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Broughton v.

Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

ANALYSIS

The district courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain

suits against the United States except where Congress has waived

sovereign immunity. Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. United States,

272 U.S. 533, 536 (1926). The Tucker Act gives the United States

Court of Claims jurisdiction over “any claim against the United

States founded...upon any express or implied contract with the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). The Court of Claims has

concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts for actions

claiming less than $10,000. Id. The Tucker Act is a limited

waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing limited remedies in

actions on government contracts. North Side Lumber Co. v. Block,

753 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1985). 

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5

The Tucker Act permits the Court of Claims and the district

courts to grant monetary damages against the government in

contract actions but does not permit a grant of equitable relief. 

United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969). Declaratory relief is

not an available remedy under the act. North Side Lumber Co.,

753 F.2d at 1485. The Tucker Act also expressly provides that

the district courts lack jurisdiction over claims, such as

negligence which “sound in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2); Miller

v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 195, 199 (Ct. Cl. 2005). 

Plaintiff’s complaint is based upon his employment contract

with Defendant AKAL, and the obligations of Defendant United

States Marshals Service in its contract with AKAL. However,

Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action is the only action seeking

relief from the United States Marshals Service. In the Second

Cause of Action, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief from the

United States Marshals Service, namely that its handling of

Plaintiff’s medical documentation and evaluation was contrary to

the CSO contract, and that Plaintiff should not have been

removed. The United States Marshals Service is an agency of the

United States government, and therefore has sovereign immunity

unless that immunity is waived. Under the Tucker Act, such a

waiver is limited to actions seeking monetary relief. The Tucker

Act does not waive sovereign immunity for actions seeking

declaratory relief, and therefore, this Court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim against the United

States Marshals Service. 

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6

Based on the facts as pleaded in the Complaint, the Court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim for

declaratory relief and it is therefore dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1). However, because it is not clear that the deficiencies

of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the claim is

dismissed with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant United States Marshals

Service’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action is

GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend, and the proposed

Second Amended Complaint filed on September 11, 2007 (see Exhibit

1 to the Opposition to this Motion) is deemed properly filed as

of the date of this Order. Defendant is ordered to respond to

the Second Amended Complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Eastern District of

California.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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