Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00080/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY ALAN LOBRETTO, )

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

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D. K. SISTO, Warden, et al., )

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Respondents. )

____________________________________)

1:08-cv-00080-LJO-TAG HC

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR STAY OF

PROCEEDINGS ON PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(Doc. 6)

ORDER FOR PETITIONER TO FILE

AMENDED MOTION FOR STAY WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed the instant petition on January 15, 2008. (Doc. 1). On

January 24, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to stay proceedings to allow exhaustion of state remedies. 

(Doc. 6). In that motion, Petitioner’s counsel alleges that when he commenced his representation of

Petitioner, he believed that all issues had been exhausted; however, a subsequent review of

additional documents indicates that several issues, while raised in the California Court of Appeal,

had never been raised in the California Supreme Court. (Id.). Petitioner requests a stay in order to

fully exhaust those additional issues.

DISCUSSION

Traditionally, a district court has had the discretion to stay a petition which it may validly

consider on the merits. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-988 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997). However, the Ninth Circuit

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The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1244(d). 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 2

has held that Taylor in no way granted “district courts carte blanche to stay even fully exhausted

habeas petitions.” Taylor, 134 F.3d at 988 n. 11. Granting a stay is appropriate where there is no

intention on the part of the Petitioner to delay or harass and in order to avoid piecemeal litigation. 

Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that it is proper for a district court, in its discretion, to

hold a petition containing only exhausted claims in abeyance in order to permit the petitioner to

return to state court to exhaust his state remedies. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2003), overruled in part by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1148-1149 (9th Cir. 2007)(overruling

Kelly as to whether a district court is required sua sponte to consider whether to stay and abey a

“mixed” habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims); Ford v. Hubbard, 305

F.3d 875, 882-883 (9th Cir. 2002); James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2001);

Taylor, 134 F.3d 981. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, until recently, federal case law continued to require that the

Court dismiss “mixed” petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982). However, on March 30, 2005, the United States Supreme

Court decided Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005). Recognizing that “[a]s a

result of the interplay between AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitation and Lundy’s dismissal 1

requirement, petitioners who come to federal court with ‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever

losing their opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted claims,” the Supreme Court held

that federal courts may now issue “stay and abey” orders under appropriate circumstances to permit

petitioners to exhaust unexhausted claims before proceeding with their federal petitions. Rhines,

544 U.S. at 276-277. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that the procedure should be “available

only in limited circumstances.” 544 U.S. at 277. Specifically, the Court said it was appropriate only

when (1) good cause exists for petitioner’s failure to exhaust; (2) petitioner’s unexhausted claims are

not “plainly meritless” and (3) there is no indication that petitioner engaged in “abusive litigation

tactics or intentional delay.” Id. at 277-278; Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d at 1149. When a petitioner

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 3

has met these requirements, his interest in obtaining federal review of his claims outweighs the

competing interests in finality and speedy resolution of federal petitions. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. 

Here, it appears that the grounds presently presented in the petition are fully exhausted and

that therefore the petition is not mixed. However, Petitioner’s counsel has alleged that Petitioner

wishes to exhaust additional grounds in state court. Applying the Rhines standards, the Court

concludes that it must, at this juncture, deny Petitioner’s motion for stay without prejudice to

Petitioner filing an amended motion for stay within thirty days. 

As mentioned, the motion for stay was filed nine days after the petition. Moreover, it appears

that Petitioner filed his petition within the one-year limitation period imposed by the AEDPA. Thus,

nothing in the record suggests that Petitioner intends to harass or delay the proceedings nor does it

appear that Petitioner is engaging in dilatory conduct. However, in his motion, Petitioner’s counsel

has not listed the specific grounds he intends to exhaust in state court; therefore, the Court cannot

determine whether or not those grounds are “plainly meritless” under Rhines. 544 U.S. at 277-278. 

Instead, counsel merely refers in his declaration to certain unspecified “important state remedies”

that he wishes to exhaust. (Doc. 6-2, p. 1). Because Petitioner may have inadvertently failed to

explain to the Court the nature of the claims he wishes to exhaust, and thereby precluding the Court

from conducting the necessary analysis to determine whether a stay is proper, the Court will permit

Petitioner to file an amended motion for stay within thirty days in order to permit the Court to make

a proper determination under Rhines as to whether Petitioner is entitled to a stay of proceedings. 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant proceedings on his habeas petition (Doc. 6), is

DENIED without prejudice; 

2. Petitioner is granted thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order within which to

file an amended motion for stay of proceedings that sets forth in detail the claims he wishes

to exhaust in state court; and 

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 4

3. If Petitioner does not file an amended motion for stay within the required thirty-day

period, the Court will issue an order to Respondent to file a response to the instant petition as

presently filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:08-cv-00080-LJO-JLT Document 7 Filed 02/07/08 Page 4 of 4