Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01448/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-01448-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

AMY BRANNON ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 

5:13-CV-01448--LSC

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

The plaintiff, Amy Brannon Rogers, appeals from the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her

applications for a period of disability, Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Rogers timelypursued and exhausted her

administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

Ms. Rogers was 41 years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s

(“ALJ’s”) decision, and she has completed the twelfth grade. (Tr. at 32, 140.) Her

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FILED

 2014 Jul-23 AM 10:20

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-01448-LSC Document 10 Filed 07/23/14 Page 1 of 8
past work experiences include employment as a home health aide and a sewing

machine operator. (Tr. at 32, 51, 53.) Ms. Rogers claims that she became disabled on

February 16, 2010 due to back and arm problems, Bells palsy and high blood pressure.

(Tr. at 21, 112, 114, 43-44, 139.)

When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the

regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The

first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the

claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the

Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments

combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments

must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be

found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.

See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments

are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether

the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20

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C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within this category, he or she

will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a

determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made

and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s

impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past

relevant work, the claimantis not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id.If the claimant

cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five

requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age,

education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other

work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other

work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.

Applying the sequential evaluation process,theALJ found that Ms. Rogers does

not meet the nondisability requirements for a period of disability. (Tr. at 23, Finding

1.) The ALJ further determined that Ms. Rogers has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the alleged onset of her disability, February 16, 2010. (Id., Finding 2.) 

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The ALJ found at step two that Plaintiff had severe impairments of degenerative disk

disease and status post anterior and posterior lumbar fusion. (Id., Finding 3.) 

However, he found that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of

the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr. at 28,

Finding 4 .) The ALJ did not find Ms. Rogers’s allegations to be totally credible, and

he determined that she has the following residual functional capacity: light work as

defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b); she would need the option to sit

and stand during the workday for 1 to 2 minutes every hour or so, and she can sit for

no more than 1 hour at one time before needing to get up, stand for 45 minutes at one

time before needing to sit down or walk around, and she can sit, stand, and walk for

at least 6 hours total in 8-hour working day with normal breaks in the morning, lunch,

and afternoon; she can frequently balance and perform fine fingering and gross

handling with her upper right extremity, and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl,

and climb ramps and stairs; she is limited to performing occupations that do not

require climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; and she can never be around unprotected

heights. (Tr. at 28, Finding 5.)

According to the ALJ, Ms. Rogers is unable to perform any of her past relevant

work, she is a “younger individual,” and “at least a high school education” as those

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terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 32, Findings 6, 7 and 8.) He determined

that the transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that

the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job

skills.” (See Social Security Ruling 82-41 and 20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).”

(Tr. at 32, Finding 9.) Considering Ms. Rogers’ age, education, work experience and

residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that she can perform, such as cashier, ticket seller,

and storage rental clerk, (Tr. at 33, Finding 10.) The ALJ concluded his findings by

stating that Plaintiff “was not under a ‘disability,’ as defined in the Social Security

Act, from February 16, 2010, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.120(g)

and 416.920(g).” (Tr. at 33-34, Finding 11.) 

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is

substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,

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1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the Commissioner

with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater,

84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence,

or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The substantial evidence

standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and

‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not

prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial

evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J.,

dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed,

even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s

decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential

standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in

its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v.Bowen,

815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal

standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir.

1984).

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III. Discussion

Ms. Rogers filed the instant action for judicial review in this Court on August 6,

2013. (Doc. 1.) See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She claims the ALJ’s adverse decision is “not

based upon substantial evidence and that improper legal standards were applied.”

(Doc. 1, p. 2.) Ms. Rogers, however, failed to submit any brief, argument, list of

authorities, or statement in support of her claims. The Commissioner submitted a brief

(Doc. 9), and Ms. Rogers did not submit a reply. Deadlines for submissions have

passed, and the issues in this case are now ripe for decision. Ms. Rogers has failed to

point to any errors in the ALJ’s opinion despite the fact that she has had three

opportunities to do so:(1) her complaint, (2) an initial brief in support of her claim, and

(3) a reply to the Commissioner’s brief.

Nonetheless,this Court has thoroughly reviewed both theALJ’sopinion and the

entire evidentiary record. Based upon that evaluation, the Court concludes that the

ALJ’s decision applies the proper legal standards and is supported by substantial

evidence. The ALJ did not err when he concluded that Ms. Rogers is not disabled.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Rogers’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial

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evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.

Done this 23 day of July 2014. rd

 

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

[160704]

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