Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-14-01518/USCOURTS-ca1-14-01518-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

Nos. 14-1334, 14-1518 

ÁNGEL EDGARDO RODRÍGUEZ-MIRANDA, 

Plaintiff, Appellee, 

v. 

MALIK BENIN; COQUICO, INC.; 18 DEGREES NORTH, LLC; 

ACQUANETTA M. BENIN, 

Defendants, Appellants. 

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson, 

Circuit Judges. 

Eddi Z. Zyko for appellants. 

Jane A. Becker Whitaker for appellee. 

July 13, 2016 

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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This appeal represents yet 

another installment in the protracted employment dispute between 

two former colleagues — plaintiff-appellee Ángel Edgardo 

Rodríguez-Miranda (Rodríguez) and defendant-appellant Malik Benin 

(Benin). Here, we must contend with the apparent efforts of Benin 

to avoid paying a judgment entered against his company, Coquico, 

Inc. (Coquico), in favor of Rodríguez for $348,821.23. Benin 

evidently sought to avoid the judgment by transferring Coquico's 

assets to his mother, Acquanetta M. Benin (Acquanetta), and to a 

new company, 18 Degrees North, LLC (18 Degrees North). The 

principal issue on appeal is, in essence, whether the district 

court erred in using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c) to hold 

Coquico, Benin, Acquanetta, and 18 Degrees North (collectively, 

appellants) liable for the judgment originally entered against 

Coquico only. Benin also challenges the district court order 

finding him in civil contempt and imposing a $5,000 sanction. 

After careful consideration of appellants' arguments, we affirm. 

I. HOW WE GOT HERE 

This case has an unusual, somewhat circuitous history; 

therefore, it is necessary for us to go into some detail in laying 

out its factual and procedural background. 

The saga began in 2000 when Rodríguez left his position 

in the Puerto Rico Federal Affairs office in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, and was subsequently recruited by Benin to join 

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Benin's Pennsylvania-based1 start-up venture — Coquico. 

Coquico manufactures and distributes plush-toy animals, 

including a line of toys designed to resemble a small brown tree 

frog that is adored in Puerto Rico — the coquí. Because the 

company was a start-up, Rodríguez, who oversaw the company's growth 

in Puerto Rico while Benin supervised from afar in Philadelphia, 

initially agreed to lend the company money (the record does not 

make clear what these loans were for) and to forego salary and 

incentive payments until the business got on its feet. 

A. The Relationship Sours: A Tale of Two Lawsuits 

Rodríguez worked for Coquico for four years, but became 

disgruntled when Benin continued to withhold compensation and loan 

repayments from him even as the company began making money. 

Eventually, Rodríguez left Coquico and filed a collection claim 

against the company in San Juan Superior Court for money owed.2 

And that's not all. After filing suit, Rodríguez approached 

Coquico's suppliers and began to distribute apparently similar 

plush-toy coquís himself in Puerto Rico through his own company, 

Identiko, Inc. (Identiko). In response to this upstart venture, 

Coquico sued Identiko and Rodríguez in federal court in Puerto 

 1 Coquico is a Pennsylvania corporation with a registered 

office in Wayne, Pennsylvania. Benin is its Chief Executive 

Officer and principal shareholder. 

2 Rodríguez alleged that Coquico owed him $165,000 in salary 

and expenses, $119,000 in commissions, and $99,402 in unpaid loans. 

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Rico for, among other things, copyright infringement, alleging 

that Rodríguez and Identiko had infringed Coquico's copyrights for 

the coquí plush-toys (more on this later). For the reader's ease, 

we refer to this as the "copyright action" from here on out. 

After a preliminary injunction hearing in the copyright 

action, the district court entered an order enjoining Rodríguez 

and Identiko from continuing to market the plush-toy coquís.3 

Coquico then sought contempt sanctions and damages before the 

district court. 

In turn, Rodríguez dismissed, without prejudice, his 

collection claim, which had still been pending in San Juan Superior 

Court, and re-filed the action in federal court in Puerto Rico 

against Coquico, Benin, and Benin's wife, Phillipa Ashby, seeking 

payment of his promised wages and loan money.4 It is this 

"collection action" that is the case at issue here. 

 3 Rodríguez and Identiko filed an interlocutory appeal 

challenging the injunction, and this court affirmed. See Coquico, 

Inc. v. Rodríguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir. 2009). 

4 Rodríguez initially sought to pursue these claims as a 

counterclaim against Coquico in the copyright action, but the 

district court denied his request to amend his answer. In his 

complaint in the collection action, Rodríguez initially included 

a claim for defamation, alleging that Benin had knowingly and 

falsely accused Rodríguez of using his political influence (as a 

member of the Puerto Rico House of Representatives since 2008) to 

gain an advantage in the copyright litigation. Rodríguez later 

voluntarily dismissed his defamation claim. 

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Both cases moved forward in parallel proceedings before 

different district judges.5 In the copyright infringement action, 

the district court found that "Identiko and Rodríguez infringed 

[Coquico's] copyrights and that [Coquico was] therefore entitled 

to recover damages." Coquico, Inc. v. Rodríguez-Miranda, No. 07-

1432 JP, 2010 WL 3372388, at *3 (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010). But 

Coquico "elected to seek statutory damages in lieu of actual 

damages," and, on August 24, 2010, the district court awarded 

Coquico $15,000 based on the evidence presented at the bench trial. 

Id. at *2-3. 

As for the collection action, it went to trial, and, on 

July 27, 2011, a jury found for Rodríguez against Coquico only6 in 

the amount of $348,821.23.7 Coquico did not appeal, and, on 

September 19, 2011, the district court issued a writ of execution 

of judgment. 

B. Post-Judgment Shenanigans 

Nearly a year later, on August 21, 2012, Rodríguez, who 

 5 Judge Jaime Pieras, Jr. presided over the copyright action, 

but after final judgment was entered, the case was later assigned 

to Judge Fusté for limited post-trial matters. 

6 The record does not make clear why the other parties — Benin 

and his wife, Phillipa Ashby — were not also listed on the 

judgment. 

7 The jury awarded $71,554.23 for outstanding loan payments, 

$187,832 in salary, $32,085 in commission payments, and $57,350 in 

reimbursements for expenses. 

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had been unable to recover one dime on his judgment, electronically 

filed a motion asking the district court to order the sale of 

Coquico's assets to satisfy the judgment.8 Accordingly, on 

September 11, 2012, the district court approved the seizure and 

sale of Coquico's copyrights and trademarks to satisfy the debt.9 

In June 2013, Coquico received notice from the district 

court that the sale of its intellectual property had been scheduled 

for July 11, 2013. On July 8, 2013, three days before the scheduled 

sale, Benin's mother, Acquanetta, who was not represented by 

counsel, sought to intervene in the collection action and to stay 

execution, claiming that she was the record owner of the property 

set for sale having previously purchased the relevant intellectual 

property from Coquico years before. Notably, in support of her 

motion to intervene, Acquanetta filed notarized transfer documents 

 8 When motions are filed electronically using the CM/ECF 

system, notifications are automatically sent to all parties in the 

case who have provided an e-mail address. According to district 

court rules, the court sends pro se litigants who are not 

registered to use the CM/ECF system paper copies of all documents 

filed in their case. 

9 The district court approved the sale of the same copyrights 

and trademarks that had been at issue in the copyright action, 

namely: (1) "Comun by Coquico" Copyright number VA0001075653; 

(2) "Coquico: We Sing" Copyright numbers TX0005550274, 

TX0005535397; (3) "Musical plush toy frog named 'Comun' A 

commissioned work for Coquico, Inc. by Michael Tian" Copyright 

number V3473D525; (4) "Rufus/by Coquico, Inc." Copyright number 

VA0001138519; (5) "Tata/by Coquico, Inc." Copyright number 

VA0001138520; and (6) Trademarks: Reg. Nos. 2,534,754; 2,560,104; 

2,541,228. For clarity, we will refer to the copyrights and 

trademarks collectively as "intellectual property." 

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that seemed to show that Benin, acting as "CEO & Founder" of 

Coquico, had assigned the intellectual property to her in 200610 — 

over a year before Coquico filed its copyright action against 

Rodríguez and Identiko. To complicate matters further, 

Acquanetta's filings indicated that the copyright assignment had 

not been recorded with the United States Copyright Office until 

June 4, 2012 — more than six years after it was ostensibly assigned 

to her and, important for our purposes today, a year after 

Rodríguez obtained judgment against Coquico in the collection 

action. 

In tandem with his mother's filing in the collection 

action, Benin moved pro se11 to likewise stay the sale12 of the 

 10 The text of the purported copyright assignment actually 

contains no date but the second page of the document, which 

contains the signatures, includes a notary public signature dated 

January 23, 2006. 

11 According to the district court docket, Coquico's and 

Benin's trial attorney was terminated as of October 3, 2011, a few 

weeks after the writ of execution of judgment was entered. No 

other attorney entered an appearance on their behalf. Both Benin's 

and Acquanetta's motions to stay were identified as being pro se 

motions. Rodríguez pointed out to the district court, however, 

that Benin's motion to vacate appeared to have been written and 

signed by an attorney. In a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, 

discussed in more detail below, Benin acknowledged that the motions 

were in fact prepared by Coquico's bankruptcy attorney, Kahiga A. 

Tiagha, and mailed for filing from his law office in Philadelphia. 

In re Coquico, Inc., 508 B.R. 929, 935 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014). 

The bankruptcy court mused that these attorney filings in pro se 

clothing may have constituted "fraud on the court." 

12 Unlike Acquanetta, Benin, if you recall, was already a 

party to the action and did not need to move to intervene. To 

review, although the judgment was entered against Coquico only, 

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intellectual property, arguing, for the first time, that 

Acquanetta was an "indispensable party to the action" because she, 

not Coquico, owned the property.13 In short, despite Benin's prior, 

consistent representations, not only in his copyright action but 

also in the collection action, that Coquico — not Acquanetta — was 

the owner of the copyrights, Benin now asserted that his mother 

had "purchased" the intellectual property back in 2006. Therefore, 

he claimed that she was a necessary party to the collection action 

with "an interest relating to the subject of the action," Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B), who had been improperly excluded. 

The district court denied both Acquanetta's motion to 

intervene and Benin's motion to stay by paper order, explaining 

that it would "not allow intervention on a matter concluded by 

judgment a long time ago," especially when the public auction for 

the sale of the intellectual property was set for the next day. 

At the time it docketed this order, on July 9, 2013, the 

district court was not aware that just that day Coquico, 

represented by counsel, had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 

of Title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., 

 

Coquico, Benin, and Benin's wife, Phillipa Ashby, had all been 

parties to the collection action. 

13 Benin also argued that Rodríguez had failed to properly 

serve the defendants — Benin, his wife, and Coquico — with 

Rodríguez's motion requesting the sale of Coquico's intellectual 

property. But Rodríguez's motion was filed electronically using 

the CM/ECF system. 

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in the bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

Upon learning of the filing, the district court stayed the case 

pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding. 

C. A Detour to Bankruptcy Court 

In its bankruptcy filings, Coquico, through Benin, 

claimed to have little to no assets. As for creditors, aside from 

the judgment owed to Rodríguez, the majority of Coquico's purported 

creditors were Benin's own friends and family. And, consistent 

with Benin's and Acquanetta's motions to stay filed in the 

collection action, Coquico professed in its filings to own no 

intellectual property, claiming instead that all intellectual 

property was "subject to a claim of Acquanetta Benin." 

Rodríguez, who appeared in the bankruptcy action as a 

creditor of Coquico's, moved to dismiss the bankruptcy petition 

for lack of good faith pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707, arguing "that 

the sole reason for the [bankruptcy] filing was to prevent the 

Judicial Sale [of Coquico's intellectual property]." Rodríguez 

noted that the notarized transfer documents — which supposedly 

showed that the intellectual property had been assigned to 

Acquanetta — didn't even appear to be genuine. For example, 

Rodríguez pointed out that, although Benin claimed he had assigned 

the copyright for another of Coquico's products, the "Vejigante 

Bear," to his mother on January 23, 2006, the "Vejigante Bear" 

copyright was not registered with the United States Copyright 

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Office until February 24, 2006. So, Benin could not have assigned 

it to his mother, Acquanetta, a month before the copyright even 

existed.14 In addition, Rodríguez argued that Coquico had 

intentionally "diverted [its] business and operations . . . to a 

new entity to attempt to avoid payment to Rodríguez." 

Responding to Rodríguez's motion to dismiss, the 

bankruptcy court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on December 2, 

2013, and January 13, 2014. Noteworthy here, during the 

evidentiary hearing, Benin explained that he was operating a newly 

surfaced Pennsylvania limited liability company — 18 Degrees 

North — which he had registered with Pennsylvania's Department of 

State Corporation Bureau in March 2010. Somewhat remarkably, Benin 

admitted at the evidentiary hearing that 18 Degrees North was 

essentially the same business as Coquico, "minus [Rodríguez's] 

judgment." And, in fact, the similarities are considerable: 

 Benin is the Chief Executive Officer, President, and 

principal shareholder of 18 Degrees North, as with 

Coquico; 

 14 At the two-day evidentiary hearing in the bankruptcy court, 

Benin attempted to explain the discrepancy by admitting that he 

had altered the notarized documents submitted to the copyright and 

trademark offices, submitting "amended" transfer documents but 

using the same signature page. Benin explained that he thought 

this was appropriate because the original was simply a 

"placeholder." The bankruptcy court later speculated that Benin’s 

conduct, altering a notarized document, may have amounted to "a 

first-degree misdemeanor." 

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 18 Degrees North has the same mailing address as 

Coquico and manufactures and sells the same plush toys 

as Coquico; 

 Acquanetta licensed her intellectual property 

exclusively to Coquico until 2016, and then (somehow) 

also licensed it to 18 Degrees North, effective August 

31, 2009; 

 18 Degrees North's bank account and Pennsylvania 

registration are under the name "18 Degrees North, 

LLC, d/b/a Coquico;" 

 18 Degrees North's customers overlap with Coquico's 

customers and were derived from Coquico's customer 

lists; 

 Orders made at Coquico's website are filled by 18 

Degrees North, and Benin testified that "the frontend of [Coquico's] website [is] essentially the brand 

Coquico, but the transactions and the inventory [are] 

associated with 18 Degrees North;" 

 In a single year Coquico transferred approximately 

$45,000 to 18 Degrees North. 

At the conclusion of the two-day evidentiary hearing, 

the bankruptcy court granted Rodríguez's motion to dismiss Benin's 

bankruptcy petition, finding it was filed in bad faith. See In re 

Coquico, Inc., 508 B.R. 929, 933 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014). The 

bankruptcy court determined that Coquico's bankruptcy schedules 

"contain[ed] so many material falsehoods, inaccuracies, and 

omissions" that it was "shocking." Highlighting that Coquico's 

bank accounts "reflected the commingling of funds," "the payment 

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of personal expenses,[15] prepetition defalcations, [and] postpetition unauthorized transactions," the bankruptcy court found 

that "virtually every bad faith criteria [was] met . . . without 

question." See also In re Coquico, Inc., 508 B.R. at 944 (noting 

that "[t]he evidence established that Benin looted Coquico both 

prepetition and postpetition, and that he lied in multiple court 

filings as to Coquico's assets"). 

The bankruptcy court further noted that 98 percent of 

Coquico's debt was held by Benin's family members — his wife, his 

father, and, of course, his mother, Acquanetta. What's more, the 

bankruptcy court found Benin's testimony to be "extremely evasive, 

not credible, contrived and, frankly, coached." 

Finally, the bankruptcy court found the timing of the 

filing suspicious, especially given Benin's own (striking) 

testimony "that the purpose of the bankruptcy filing was to stop 

the judicial sale." The bankruptcy court concluded that Coquico's 

bankruptcy filing was "nothing more . . . than an attempt to 

relitigate the copyright lawsuit and the collection lawsuit," and 

to "spirit away the only valuable asset . . . the copyrights . . . 

[t]aking the customers, the products, everything and . . . 

transitioning them . . . into 18 [D]egrees [N]orth simply to attain 

 15 Benin had readily admitted to the bankruptcy court that 

Coquico paid basically all of his personal expenses, as well as 

his family's personal expenses, including, for example, charges to 

Nordstrom Rack and DirecTV services in his wife's name. 

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relief from a judgment creditor." See also In re Coquico, Inc., 

508 B.R. at 943-44 (noting that "Benin's own testimony from the 

Dismissal Motion hearing made crystal clear that it was his 

ultimate intention to spirit away the business and assets of 

Coquico in order to leave Coquico judgment proof and his plush toy 

business insulated from the Rodr[í]guez judgment"). 

D. Another Attempt to Collect the Judgment 

After the bankruptcy case was dismissed, on January 29, 

2014, Rodríguez filed yet another motion in the district court in 

Puerto Rico in the collection action seeking to compel payment of 

the judgment. The miscellaneous motion — titled "Motion Asking 

This Court To Order Defendant And Respondents To Pay the Judgment 

In This Case On Penalty Of Contempt" — invoked concepts of 

successor liability, veil piercing, and fraud and sought to join 

Benin, Acquanetta, and 18 Degrees North to the action and to hold 

them jointly and severally liable for the judgment. Rodríguez 

attached Coquico's bankruptcy schedules, the bankruptcy hearing 

transcript, and the bankruptcy judge's oral decision to the motion. 

Rodríguez filed the motion electronically and also sent 

copies of the motion by regular mail to Coquico, 18 Degrees North, 

Benin, and Acquanetta. Upon receiving and reviewing Rodríguez's 

motion, the district court issued an electronic order setting the 

motion for hearing on February 28, 2014. The district court also 

ordered Rodríguez to "notify all parties in interest" of the 

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hearing and that failure to appear would result in sanctions. 

Accordingly, Rodríguez engaged a process server, who personally 

served Acquanetta with Rodríguez's motion and with the district 

court's order. And, although Benin avoided personal service, he 

ultimately acknowledged that he had also received the motion and 

the district court's order. 

Shortly before the hearing on Rodríguez's motion, Benin 

filed a letter, "as an officer of Coquico," informing the district 

court that he did not have the resources to hire an attorney and 

that he would not be able to attend the hearing. Aside from 

perfunctorily mentioning that the judgment had been entered 

against Coquico "and no other parties," Benin did not respond to 

the substance of Rodríguez's motion. Rodríguez replied to Benin's 

letter, informing the district court that Benin had, in fact, been 

able to hire two attorneys to represent him in the bankruptcy case. 

The district court denied Benin's motion (such as it was) and the 

hearing continued as scheduled. 

Despite having been noticed and ordered to appear, 

Benin, Acquanetta, 18 Degrees North, and Coquico all failed to 

attend the district court hearing or to oppose Rodríguez's motion. 

But the hearing proceeded, and Rodríguez entered into evidence the 

transcript from the bankruptcy hearing, including Benin's 

testimony, and the bankruptcy court's findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. 

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On March 6, 2014, the district court entered an order 

that joined Benin, Acquanetta, and 18 Degrees North to the action 

pursuant to Rule 25(c) and held them liable for the judgment. The 

district court determined that all three were joinable under Rule 

25(c), specifically concluding "that 18 Degrees North [] is a 

successor corporation and alter ego of Coquico" and, therefore, 

"is liable for [Coquico's] debts, including the judgment, costs, 

and interest award," and that Benin and Acquanetta are alter egos 

of both Coquico and 18 Degrees North and, consequently, are also 

liable for the judgment. 

The district court also held Coquico, Benin, Acquanetta, 

and 18 Degrees North in civil contempt for failure to appear at 

the hearing and ordered Benin to pay $5,000, "[g]iven the magnitude 

and the variety of the offenses" he committed to avoid paying the 

judgment. The district court did not sanction Acquanetta but 

indicated that if she continued to violate the district court's 

orders it would do so. 

Benin paid the contempt sanction, and appellants timely 

appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, appellants challenge, in essence, (1) the 

district court's use of Rule 25(c) to join Benin, Acquanetta, and 

18 Degrees North to the judgment and (2) the district court's order 

finding Benin in civil contempt and imposing a $5,000 sanction. 

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A. Rule 25(c) 

1. Notice: Clearing the Underbrush 

The heart of appellants' argument on appeal, is that the 

district court erred in using Rule 25(c) to hold them liable for 

the judgment entered in favor of Rodríguez.16 But before tackling 

appellants' primary Rule 25(c) arguments, we must first address a 

threshold issue. Appellants seem ("seem" because their positions 

are often hard to tease out) to argue that, although Rodríguez's 

motion sought to join them as parties and hold them liable for the 

judgment, Rodríguez's motion was insufficient because it did not 

cite Rule 25(c) as the procedural vehicle for doing so. Appellants 

point to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1) for the 

proposition that motions must "state the relief sought." Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(C). The implication being, it seems, that because 

Rodríguez's motion did not specifically mention Rule 25(c), it did 

not state with sufficient particularity the relief Rodriquez was 

seeking. Thus, appellants argue, the district court "essentially 

grant[ed] summary judgment on a theory not raised in the motion 

papers and without advance notice." 

 16 Appellants also argue that the district court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over them. Although we would typically 

address jurisdictional questions first, because our conclusions 

with regard to the district court's application of Rule 25(c) 

resolve any jurisdictional issues, we will address appellants' 

jurisdictional arguments in due course. 

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But the relevant Rule 7 question is whether appellants 

were "prejudiced by a lack of particularity" and whether the 

district court could "comprehend the basis for the motion and deal 

with it fairly." Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 

752, 760 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Registration Control Sys., 

Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805, 807-08 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); 

see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1192 

(3d ed.) ("[T]he niceties of specifying the relief or order sought 

by the motion are unimportant in some situations and can be 

disregarded by the court."). 

Rodríguez's motion clearly seeks to join Benin, 

Acquanetta, and 18 Degrees North as parties to the action and to 

hold them liable for the judgment entered against Coquico. In 

support of his request, Rodríguez's motion described, in detail, 

how Benin and Acquanetta attempted to shield Coquico from 

Rodríguez's judgment by fraudulently transferring Coquico's 

intellectual property to Acquanetta, and ultimately shifted those 

assets to 18 Degrees North in an effort to continue Coquico's 

business free from liability. The motion likewise detailed how 

Benin and Acquanetta allegedly raided both corporations' reserves 

for their own personal use, rendering their personal assets and 

the corporate assets indistinguishable. Moreover, as described in 

some detail above, there is no question that appellants received 

a copy of Rodríguez's motion along with the text of the district 

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court order setting the hearing. Therefore, Rodríguez's motion 

unmistakably afforded appellants notice of the grounds and relief 

sought, if not the procedural mechanism for getting there.17 And 

so, appellants' assertions of error are without merit. 

2. Application of Rule 25(c) 

Having disposed of appellants' notice arguments, we now 

turn to the merits of their Rule 25(c) challenge. Construed 

generously, appellants raise two Rule 25(c) arguments — one more 

substantive than the other. First, appellants seem to suggest 

that Rule 25(c) can only be invoked when a transfer of interest 

occurs during the pendency of the litigation, not after judgment 

has been entered. Next, they argue that the district court 

improperly relied on Rule 25(c) as a vehicle for joining them 

because the Rule 25(c) inquiry cannot include veil piercing and 

alter ego theories, which alter the parties' substantive rights. 

Any such alteration, they say, must be presented in an independent 

action. 

 17 Appellants also seem to argue that Rodríguez's motion 

sought only to hold Benin, Acquanetta, and 18 Degrees North in 

contempt for failure to pay the judgment without first making them 

liable for the judgment itself. This proposition is belied by the 

record. A review of Rodríguez's motion easily shows that he moved 

to hold appellants liable to pay the judgment, specifically 

requesting that the district court hold them "jointly and severally 

liable" for the judgment entered against Coquico. 

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a) Clarifying the Standard of Review 

In his opening salvo, Rodríguez argues that appellants 

waived any and all arguments by failing to raise them below. See 

Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003) 

(noting that "it is a virtually ironclad rule that a party may not 

advance [a new argument] for the first time on appeal"). We are 

inclined to agree. As discussed above, Coquico, Benin, Acquanetta, 

and 18 Degrees North had ample notice that the district court was 

considering joining them to the action and holding them "jointly 

and severally liable to pay the judgment." They likewise had full 

opportunity to appear in the district court and to contest any 

aspect of Rodríguez's motion, yet they filed no written opposition, 

declined to attend the motion hearing, and raised not a single 

argument below that the district court should refrain from holding 

them liable for the judgment entered in favor of Rodríguez. As a 

result, they likely waived, or, at the very least, forfeited, their 

Rule 25(c) arguments. See United States v. Eisom, 585 F.3d 552, 

556 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that "waiver implies an intention 

to forgo a known right, whereas forfeiture implies something less 

deliberate — say, oversight, inadvertence, or neglect in asserting 

a potential right"). 

In response to Rodríguez's assertions of waiver, 

appellants simply rehash their notice argument, contending that 

they could not have raised a challenge to the district court's use 

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of Rule 25(c) because "Rodríguez's motion below never recited [the 

rule]." But, as discussed above, appellants did know that 

Rodríguez's motion sought to join them to the action and to hold 

them liable for the judgment and they made no argument — Rule 25(c) 

related or otherwise — challenging the district court's authority 

to grant their joinder. But even so, say appellants, waiver should 

not be a "straightjacket," and they urge us to relax the rule. 

Ultimately, however, we need not decide whether appellants' 

arguments were waived because even assuming, favorably to 

appellants, that their Rule 25(c) challenges were merely 

forfeited, appellants' arguments falter under plain error review. 

See Eisom, 585 F.3d at 556 (noting that "a waived claim is dead 

and buried," but that a forfeited claim may "be resurrected on 

appeal" under plain error review). 

b) Rule 25(c) Primer 

Rule 25(c), which governs the substitution of parties, 

provides, in relevant part: 

Rule 25. Substitution of Parties . . . 

(c) Transfer of Interest. If an interest is 

transferred, the action may be continued by or 

against the original party unless the court, on 

motion, orders the transferee to be substituted in 

the action or joined with the original party. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c). In other words, the rule serves as a 

procedural mechanism to bring a successor in interest into court 

when "it has come to own the property in issue." Negrón-Almeda v. 

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Santiago, 579 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Maysonet–

Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2003)). For example, 

as is the case here, the rule may be "invoked to substitute a 

successor in interest who . . . obtained the assets of the 

corporation against whom judgment had been rendered." Id. 

(omission in original) (quoting Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam 

Enters. Corp., 817 F.2d 894, 906 (1st Cir. 1987)). Be that as it 

may, "[t]he merits of the case and the disposition of the property 

are still determined vis-a-vis the originally named parties." 

Maysonet-Robles, 323 F.3d at 49 (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. 

v. Eco Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 

c) Appellants' Rule 25(c) Timing Argument 

Disposing first of appellants' suggestion — also 

referenced at oral argument — that Rule 25(c) is not available 

when the transfer occurs after judgment has been entered, we 

conclude that there was no error, much less plain error. See 

United States v. Jimenez, 512 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Plainerror review places a burden on an appellant to show (i) that an 

error occurred, (ii) which was clear and obvious, (iii) which 

affected his substantial rights, and (iv) which seriously impaired 

the fairness, integrity, or public perception of the 

proceeding."). 

Rule 25(c) applies to actions that are "pending," but 

this does not preclude substitution during subsequent proceedings 

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brought to enforce a judgment. See Negrón-Almeda, 579 F.3d at 52 

("Rule 25(c) governs substitution where a party to a lawsuit 

transfers an interest during the pendency of the lawsuit or after 

judgment has been rendered."); Explosives Corp. of Am., 817 F.2d 

at 907 ("Substitution may be ordered after judgment has been 

rendered in the district court for the purpose of subsequent 

proceedings to enforce judgment."); Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. 

Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 23 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing 3B Moore's 

Federal Practice P 25.03(1), at 25-101 (2d ed. 1977)) (explaining 

that Rule 25 applies in subsequent proceeding to enforce a 

judgment). A proceeding to enforce a judgment is "pending again, 

and Rule 25 applies." Panther Pumps, 566 F.2d at 23. 

It is also worth noting that in this case it is unclear 

when the relevant transfer of interest even occurred. To hear 

appellants tell it, the intellectual property was transferred to 

Acquanetta almost four and a half years before Rodríguez instituted 

the collection action (query then why Coquico was simultaneously 

pursuing the copyright action), and Acquanetta granted 18 Degrees 

North a license to use the intellectual property (breaching 

Coquico's supposed exclusive license) nearly a year before 

Rodríguez filed the collection action. So, it would be 

disingenuous, to say the least, for appellants to argue now that 

the district court erred in its application of Rule 25(c) because 

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the transfer of interest occurred after judgment had been entered. 

Regardless, the district court did not err. 

d) Appellants' Veil Piercing and Alter Ego Arguments 

Appellants' main argument — that the district court 

improperly relied on Rule 25(c) to alter the parties' substantive 

rights by invoking the doctrines of veil piercing and alter 

ego - presents a more substantial question. After careful 

consideration, however, we cannot say that the district court's 

application of Rule 25(c) amounted to an error that was so "clear 

or obvious," United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 

2001), that the district court should have "act[ed] even without 

an objection." Bielunas v. F/V Misty Dawn, Inc., 621 F.3d 72, 78 

(1st Cir. 2010). 

As a reminder, the district court joined 18 Degrees North 

under Rule 25(c) as "a successor corporation and alter ego of 

Coquico," and joined Benin and Acquanetta as alter egos of both 

Coquico and 18 Degrees North. And appellants do not appear to be 

challenging 18 Degrees North's joinder to the extent that it was 

only joined as "a successor corporation" of Coquico. In fact, in 

their briefing, appellants concede that a successor theory — as 

opposed to veil piercing or alter ego theories — is properly 

"within the ambit" of Rule 25(c), arguing only that "[w]here there 

is no successor corporation . . . substitution and liability . . . 

is not authorized by [the rule]." (emphasis added). Instead, 

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appellants seem to argue only that the district court erred when 

it used Rule 25(c) to join 18 Degrees North, Benin, and Acquanetta 

as alter egos of Coquico. 

The distinction, at least as appellants interpret it, is 

the scope of their liability. They contend that under a successorin-interest analysis, which they concede is appropriate under Rule 

25(c), a party's joinder should be limited to reaching the 

"interest only." In other words, they argue that under a proper 

application of Rule 25(c) the district court may join parties who 

have come to own or control a corporation's assets (i.e., the 

transferred interest), but only up to the value of those 

transferred assets. Here, because the district court also 

concluded that Coquico, 18 Degrees North, Benin, and Acquanetta 

are all alter egos of each other — and therefore legally a single 

entity — the district court did not limit their liability to the 

value of Coquico's transferred assets, but found them jointly and 

severally liable to Rodríguez for the entire $348,821.23 judgment 

(plus costs and interest). Appellants view this as, essentially, 

a substantive determination that is well beyond the scope of Rule 

25(c). 

Although not elegantly briefed, this is a thoughtprovoking argument. Unfortunately for appellants, "[p]lain error 

is one hard test to meet, particularly in civil litigation," 

Bielunas, 621 F.3d at 78, and appellants cite no cases, in this 

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circuit or otherwise, that expressly limit Rule 25(c) joinder to 

the amount of the transferred assets. To the contrary, several 

other circuits have applied Rule 25(c) in almost exactly the same 

manner as the district court did here. See, e.g., Panther Pumps, 

566 F.2d at 27-28 (allowing the substitution of a corporation's 

president under Rule 25(c) and holding him personally liable for 

the full judgment where he had fraudulently attempted to avoid the 

judgment by transferring the defendant-corporation's assets to a 

new corporation); Explosives Corp. of Am., 817 F.2d at 907 

(allowing substitution of a parent corporation under Rule 25(c) 

and holding them "liable for the full amount of the judgment" as 

"the real party in interest" because the parent "owned all of the 

outstanding stock" and financed and controlled the litigation). 

Of particular relevance, perhaps, is Minnesota Mining & 

Manufacturing Company. In that case, the plaintiff, Minnesota 

Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M), obtained a default judgment 

against Eco Chem, Inc. (ECI) for patent infringement. 757 F.2d at 

1258. After the suit against ECI was instituted, ECI's president, 

Stephanie Rynne, and her husband, George Rynne, who served as ECI's 

secretary-treasurer, set up a new corporation, EcoChem Limited 

(ECL), and transferred all of ECI's assets to the new company. 

Id. at 1258-59. They exchanged their ECI shares for ECL shares, 

"converted all of ECI's assets to ECL, including the formulae, 

customer lists, trademarks and inventory," deposited ECI's checks 

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into ECL's accounts, and "informed their customers that ECL had 

succeeded ECI." Id. (footnote omitted). 3M then moved to add 

the Rynnes and ECL as parties to their infringement action pursuant 

to Rule 25(c). Id. at 1259. After a hearing, the district court 

granted 3M's motion and joined "the Rynnes and ECL 'as successors 

in interest and alter egos' of ECI" and held them liable for the 

full damages and attorney's fees. Id. On appeal, the Rynnes and 

ECL challenged their joinder — mainly on jurisdictional grounds — 

but the Federal Circuit affirmed and held "that the district court 

reached the right result in rejecting [the Rynnes'] efforts at 

avoidance or evasion . . . ." Id. at 1258. 

What this means for us is: when we have never expressly 

limited Rule 25(c) joinder to the amount of the transferred assets, 

and other circuits, especially on such similar facts, have 

sanctioned the use of Rule 25(c) to join parties as alter egos and 

hold them liable for the full judgment, "any error cannot be plain 

or obvious." United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 96 (1st Cir. 

2002). As such, we cannot say that the district court plainly 

erred in its application of the rule. 

Application aside, appellants do not appear to challenge 

the district court's conclusion that Benin, 18 Degrees North, and 

Coquico "are all alter egos of one another." However, they do 

seem to argue — in a single parenthetical — that the district court 

erred in concluding that Acquanetta was "the alter ego of a party." 

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Regardless, the district court did not err in finding any of the 

appellants to be alter egos of one another. Indeed, 18 Degrees 

North is, by nearly every measure, a mere continuation of Coquico.18 

See Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enters. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 

364, 368 (D.P.R. 1985) (quoting Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co. 

(Pexto), 739 F.2d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 1984)) (describing key 

elements of continuation). It is registered under the name "18 

Degrees North, LLC, d/b/a Coquico." The companies share an 

address, a bank account, and a website. They have the same 

inventory and clients — due, in part, to Acquanetta's apparent 

willingness to grant both companies an "exclusive" license to use 

her intellectual property. An order placed with Coquico is filled 

by 18 Degrees North and Coquico regularly transfers money to cover 

 18 In reaching this conclusion, the district court applied 

Puerto Rico law. Appellants argue that the district court should 

have applied Pennsylvania law. In this unusual case, the 

application of Pennsylvania versus Puerto Rico law may be a 

distinction without a difference. Compare Lumax Indus., Inc. v. 

Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995) with Explosives Corp. of 

Am., 615 F. Supp. at 368. That said, we find that the district 

court did not plainly err in applying Puerto Rico law. Applying 

Puerto Rico's choice of law rules, the district court reasonably 

determined that Puerto Rico had the "most significant contacts" 

with the action. "Among the contacts to consider are the parties' 

place of incorporation and of business, the place where the 

injurious conduct occurred, the place where the injury 

materialized, and the place where the relationship between the 

parties is centered." Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue-Casal, 982 F. 

Supp. 103, 107 (D.P.R. 1997). Here, the majority of Coquico's 

sales were in Puerto Rico, the parties' relationships were centered 

in Puerto Rico, and the injury occurred there. As such, the 

district court did not err in applying Puerto Rico law. 

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18 Degrees North's financial obligations. Benin is the principal 

shareholder and chief executive of both companies, and, 

astonishingly, he admitted under oath in the bankruptcy proceeding 

that 18 Degrees North was essentially the same business as Coquico, 

"minus [Rodríguez's] judgment." Consequently, it was no great 

leap for the district court to conclude that Benin employed 18 

Degrees North as a mechanism to continue Coquico's business absent 

the specter of Rodríguez's judgment. 

Likewise, the district court did not err in concluding 

that Benin and Acquanetta are alter egos of Coquico and 18 Degrees 

North. See United States v. JG-24, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 14, 63 

(D.P.R. 2004), aff'd, 478 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007) (listing factors 

courts should consider to determine whether to disregard the 

corporate form). Benin, as the sole shareholder and principal of 

Coquico, exercised total control over Coquico (and then 18 Degrees 

North) and did not maintain Coquico's corporate form, comingling 

Coquico's funds with his own accounts. Coquico regularly paid 

Benin and Acquanetta's personal expenses, despite the fact that 

Acquanetta was not even an employee of the company. And, in myriad 

other ways, the record demonstrates that Benin and his family 

routinely treated Coquico's coffers as their own, charging 

personal expenses and shopping trips to the company. Accordingly, 

the district court did not err in concluding that Coquico, 18 

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Degrees North, Benin, and Acquanetta "are all alter egos of each 

other."19 

In any event, even if the district court had erred, under 

plain error review, "we need not intervene unless the error . . . 

seriously impugn[ed] the 'fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Bielunas, 621 F.3d at 78 

(quoting United States v. Roy, 506 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir.2007)). 

Given appellants' conduct, we cannot conclude that the district 

court's application of the rule — using it to hold appellants 

jointly and severally liable for Rodríguez's judgment — impugns 

the fairness of these proceedings. If anything, the opposite may 

be true as the record supports the district court's conclusion 

that Benin and Acquanetta engaged in the fraudulent transfer of 

Coquico's intellectual property from Coquico to Acquanetta — and 

from Acquanetta to 18 Degrees North — for the sole purpose of 

making Coquico judgment proof.20 To effectuate this fraudulent 

 19 Given our conclusion that the district court did not plainly 

err in its application of Rule 25(c) we will not consider whether 

any such error affected appellants' "substantial rights." 

20 If Coquico's copyright infringement action against 

Rodríguez was honestly pursued after Coquico's transfer, through 

Benin, of its intellectual property to Acquanetta, that may amount 

to a fraud on the court. See Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 

1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989) ("A 'fraud on the court' occurs where 

it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has 

sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to 

interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to 

adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly 

hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or 

defense."). Alternatively, if Coquico did not transfer its 

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transfer, Benin and Acquanetta altered notarized documents and 

appear to have submitted fraudulent assignment papers to the 

Copyright Office, the district court, and the bankruptcy court. 

Moreover, the transfer of assets from Coquico to Acquanetta did 

not end the shenanigans. Even as appellants tell it, Benin and 

Acquanetta breached Coquico's so-called "exclusive" licensing 

agreement by also licensing 18 Degrees North to use Acquanetta's 

intellectual property. This breach of Coquico's licensing 

agreement also seemed to serve no other purpose than to further 

effectuate the transfer of Coquico's corporate assets, including 

its inventory and customers, to Benin's other company. Nor, we 

note, does it appear that 18 Degrees North paid Coquico for the 

use of its name, website, and customer lists. 

Under these extraordinary circumstances, we cannot say 

that the district court plainly erred in joining 18 Degrees North, 

Benin, and Acquanetta to the action and holding them jointly and 

severally liable for the judgment pursuant to Rule 25(c). Further, 

as noted above, even if an error occurred, because it did not 

"seriously impair[] the fairness, integrity, or public perception 

of the proceeding," Jimenez, 512 F.3d at 3, the district court did 

not plainly err, see United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 

 

intellectual property before pressings its copyright infringement 

claim, Benin's and Acquanetta's actions here may amount to the 

same. 

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F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that a no-plain-error 

holding does not constitute a "ruling on the merits"). 

3. The Remaining Jurisdictional Argument 

Finally, here, appellants argue that the district court 

lacked personal jurisdiction over them because "they were not 

parties to the original judgment" and have insufficient contacts 

with the forum. But once personal jurisdiction is established 

over the original party, it "is retained over Rule 25(c) successors 

in interest," Maysonet-Robles, 323 F.3d at 49, as long as "the 

substituted party had an opportunity to challenge its joinder or 

substitution." Explosives Corp. of Am., 817 F.2d at 906 (citing 

Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 757 F.2d at 1262–63 and 7C C. Wright, A. 

Miller & M. Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1958 at 559–60 (2d ed. 

1986)). "Were this not so, the owners of the property could merely 

transfer legal ownership of the assets from one shell corporation 

to another in a different jurisdiction, putting a party whose 

initial suit satisfied the jurisdictional requirements to the 

immense burden of chasing the involved assets from courtroom to 

courtroom." Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 757 F.2d at 1263. As we 

explained, appellants here had notice that Rodríguez sought to 

hold them liable for the judgment entered against Coquico and an 

opportunity to challenge their joinder before the district court. 

Accordingly, personal jurisdiction was properly acquired over 

appellants as Rule 25(c) successors in interest. 

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B. The Contempt Issue 

Benin also argues that the district court erred in 

finding him in civil contempt and imposing a $5,000 sanction for 

failure to attend the hearing on Rodríguez's joinder motion. 

Specifically, Benin argues that although the district court 

categorized the contempt finding as "civil," it was actually 

criminal in nature and, therefore, he was entitled to additional 

due process protections. "Mindful that the district court enjoys 

wide latitude in its choice of sanctions," AngioDynamics, Inc. v. 

Biolitec AG, 780 F.3d 420, 426 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 

S. Ct. 535 (2015), we conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion here.21 See Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 

F.2d 11, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining that the district 

court's "ultimate finding on contempt is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion," while the district court's fact finding is reviewed 

for clear error, and legal questions and mixed questions of fact 

and law are reviewed de novo). 

To determine whether the imposition of contempt 

sanctions is civil or criminal, we must "look to the purpose and 

character of the sanctions imposed, rather than to the label given 

to the proceeding by the court below." In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 

351 (1st Cir. 1985). "The purpose of a criminal contempt 

 21 Rodríguez does not argue that appellants waived their 

contempt arguments. 

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proceeding is the vindication of the court's authority by punishing 

for a past violation of a court order," while "civil contempt is 

imposed to coerce present or future compliance with an order of 

the court." Id. (emphasis omitted). But "[t]here is no 

dichotomous split between coercion and punishment . . . and a civil 

contempt sanction may evidence a punitive flavor." AngioDynamics, 

780 F.3d at 426. 

Here, although Benin is correct that the contempt order 

was not reparative and that he was not given the opportunity to 

bring himself into compliance with the district court's order, 

both of which suggest a punitive purpose, the sanction imposed 

also seemed intended to coerce his future compliance with the 

district court's orders. To wit, the district court found Benin 

in contempt of its order to appear, but also explained that it was 

imposing the sanction because of Benin's continued "efforts to 

avoid the judgment in this case," suggesting that the district 

court may have sought to coerce Benin's future compliance with its 

efforts to enforce the judgment. 

Indeed, in explaining its decision not to impose a 

sanction on Acquanetta, the district court stated that if 

Acquanetta continued to violate the district court's orders that 

she too could face sanctions in the future. The implication being, 

of course, that Acquanetta and Benin would face additional 

sanctions for continued noncompliance. This suggests that the 

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district court was less concerned with punishment and more 

concerned with coercing Benin's and Acquanetta's future compliance 

with its orders. See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. 

Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994) ("A contempt fine . . . is 

considered civil and remedial if it . . . 'coerce[s] the defendant 

into compliance with the court's order . . . .'" (citation 

omitted)). After careful consideration of the purpose and 

character of the sanction imposed in this case, therefore, we are 

satisfied that the district court acted within its discretion in 

imposing civil, not criminal, sanctions on Benin. 

As we read appellants' arguments, that ends the matter. 

They do not seem to challenge the district court's contempt finding 

beyond contesting the nature of the sanctions imposed. However, 

for the sake of completeness, to the extent that appellants do 

seek to challenge the merits of the district court's civil contempt 

finding, we will review in brief. 

To prove civil contempt, the moving party — Rodríguez — 

must show by clear and convincing evidence that: "(1) the alleged 

contemnor had notice of the order, (2) 'the order was clear and 

unambiguous,' (3) the alleged contemnor 'had the ability to comply 

with the order,' and (4) the alleged contemnor violated the order." 

Hawkins v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. for N.H., Comm'r, 665 

F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Saccoccia, 

433 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2005)). Here, appellants received notice 

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of Rodríguez's motion to hold them liable for the judgment "on 

penalty of contempt" and of the district court's order setting the 

hearing and mandating that "[f]ailure to appear [would] result in 

sanctions." The order to appear was clear and unambiguous. 

Appellants argued below that they did not have the means to comply 

with the order, but the record adequately supports the district 

court's conclusion that appellants had the wherewithal to attend 

and that their "protestations of penury" were not credible given 

their ability to hire an attorney in the bankruptcy proceeding 

that had taken place only days before. For these reasons, we 

determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding appellants in civil contempt. 

III. CONCLUSION 

In sum, we conclude that the district court did not 

plainly err in joining Benin, Acquanetta, and 18 Degrees North 

under Rule 25(c) as alter egos of Coquico and holding them liable 

for the judgment entered in favor of Rodríguez. We likewise affirm 

the district court's order finding appellants in civil contempt 

and imposing a $5,000 sanction on Benin. Costs to Rodríguez. 

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