Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02236/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-02236-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MD Helicopters Incorporated,

Plaintiff,

v. 

United States of America, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-02236-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

UNDER SEAL

Plaintiff MD Helicopters, Inc. (“MDHI”) alleges that Defendants the United States 

of America, the United States Department of the Army, and the Secretaries of Defense and

the Army in their official capacities (collectively, “the Army”), violated the Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”) by giving arbitrary and capricious reasons for not selecting MDHI

to participate in the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft Competitive Prototype (“FARA 

CP”) program. (Doc. 135 at 1–2). It seeks to compel “the Army to advance MDHI’s 

proposal” to Phase 1 of the FARA CP program. (Doc. 1 at 5). The parties have filed crossmotions for summary judgment on this claim. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background: Other Transaction Authority

At the dawn of the space race, the Soviet Union successfully launched the Sputnik

satellite into Earth’s orbit, prompting a growing national concern that the United States had 

fallen behind its rivals technologically. Heidi M. Peters, Cong. Research Serv., R45521,

Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and 

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Issues for Congress 1 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45521. In 

response, Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which 

established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”). Id. To enable

NASA to pursue its mission without encountering unnecessary delay, Congress 

empowered it with authority to “enter into and perform contracts, leases, cooperative 

agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of its work and on 

such terms as it may deem appropriate.” National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub.

L. No. 85-568, § 203(5), 72 Stat. 426, 430 (1958) (emphasis added). Congress has since 

extended the authority to enter into “other transactions” (“OTs”) to several other executive 

agencies, including the Department of Defense (“DoD”). Peters, supra, at 1. As the Army 

puts it, OTs have several benefits in this context, including:

(a) attracting non-traditional defense contractors to propose 

prototype projects; (b) encouraging traditional defense 

contractors to use new and innovative techniques and 

processes to accelerate development of technologies that are 

relevant to both defense and commercial markets; and (c) using 

flexible business arrangements to accelerate development and 

transition to production.

(Doc. 70 at 6).

Two statutes currently govern DoD’s authority to enter into OTs. The first 

authorizes the “Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of each military department” to 

“enter into transactions (other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants) . . . in 

carrying out basic, applied, and advanced research projects.” 10 U.S.C. § 2371(a). The 

second authorizes OTs for “carry[ing] out prototype projects that are directly relevant to 

enhancing the mission effectiveness of military personnel and the supporting platforms, 

systems, components, or materials proposed to be acquired or developed by [DoD], or to 

improvement of platforms, systems, components, or materials in use by the armed forces.” 

10 U.S.C. § 2371b(a)(1). This second statute also authorizes the government to enter into 

an OT for follow-on production, which may be awarded without using competitive 

procedures if certain conditions are met. 10 U.S.C. § 2371b(f).

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B. Factual Background: The FARA CP Program and MDHI’s Proposal

In October of 2018, the U.S. Army Contracting Command–Redstone issued 

Solicitation No. W911W6-19-R-0001 (“the Solicitation”) for proposals for the FARA CP. 

(Docs. 1 at 2; 71 at 3; 136 at 2). Because the Army identified the need to act quickly with 

respect to updating its helicopter fleet, (see Doc. 42 at 3), it structured the FARA CP 

program “as a phased approach with aggressive deadlines,” (Doc. 136 at 2). In particular, 

the Army elected to use OTs for prototype projects under 10 U.S.C. § 2371b to award 

funding to the selected participants. (Doc. 36-3 at 3–5, 9; see also Doc. 80 at 1, 5).

As the Solicitation outlined, the FARA CP program will progressively down-select 

among candidates until potentially only one entity remains. That process would begin with 

prospective bidders submitting proposals to the Army. (Doc. 36-3 at 3). From these, the 

Army would select several entities for the award of OT agreements. (Id. at 4–5). The Army 

would then advance the recipients of the OT agreements (“Performers”) to Phase 1, giving

them “nine months to develop preliminary designs and provide the [Army] team with the 

data and insight required for the [Army] to down-select to two (or possibly more based on 

funding available) Performers for Phase 2.” (Id. at 4–5). The Solicitation estimated that, 

under the OT agreements, “[e]ach Phase 1 Performer [would] receive approximately $15 

[million] between” fiscal years (“FYs”) 2019-20. (Id. at 9). In later phases, Performers 

would design, build, and test their proposed aircraft before providing them to the Army for 

further evaluation. (Id. at 5–6). “If executed,” the final phase of the FARA CP program 

contemplates the potential award of a follow-on production OT to a Performer for entry 

into subsequent full system integration, qualification, and production efforts. (Id. at 6).

In response to the Solicitation, MDHI submitted a proposal (“the Proposal”) to

participate in the FARA CP program. (Doc. 1 ¶ 7). After evaluating the Proposal, the Army

notified MDHI that it was not selecting MDHI to participate in the FARA CP program

because “MDHI’s proposed design purportedly did not meet the Solicitation’s 

requirements.” (Id. ¶ 8). Shortly thereafter, MDHI filed a “bid protest objecting to the 

Army’s . . . action with the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”).” (Id. ¶ 9). The 

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GAO dismissed the protest, reasoning that while it had jurisdiction to review “a timely preaward protest that an agency is improperly using its [OT] authority to procure goods or 

services,” the GAO was not statutorily authorized to review OTs because they are not 

“procurement contracts.” (Doc. 13-1 at 3); see also 4 C.F.R. § 21.5(m) (“GAO generally 

does not review protests of awards, or solicitations for awards, of agreements other than 

procurement contracts . . . .”). MDHI then filed a complaint in this Court, alleging that the 

Army “failed to properly evaluate the Proposal” and “arbitrarily and capriciously ignored 

or misunderstood important aspects of the Proposal.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 15).

II. JURISDICTION

Before reaching the merits, this Court must first address the question whether it has

subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. See Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Mkt.

Place, L.L.C., 350 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, notwithstanding the fact 

that no party contested jurisdiction, “inquiring whether the court has jurisdiction is a federal 

judge’s first duty in every case”). The parties agree that this Court possesses subject-matter 

jurisdiction to review the Army’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702.

(Docs. 66 & 70). Intervenors to this action have, however, argued that this Court lacks 

jurisdiction for two independent reasons. Citing Cooper v. Haase, 750 F. App’x 600, 601 

(9th Cir. 2019) and Gabriel v. General Services Administration, 547 F. App’x 829, 831 

(9th Cir. 2013), intervenors assert that “district courts lack jurisdiction over APA claims 

challenging the award of . . . contracts.” (Doc. 43 at 8). Separately, citing this Court’s ruling 

in Fire-Trol Holdings L.L.C. v. United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service, 

No. CV-03-2039-PHX-JAT, 2004 WL 5066232, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2004), 

intervenors argue that the sunset provision of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 

of 1996 (“ADRA”) eliminated district courts’ jurisdiction to hear the kind of “bid protest” 

cases that they formerly could under their “Scanwell jurisdiction.” (Doc. 43 at 8). 

In response, MDHI claims that, unlike Cooper and Gabriel, this Court may properly 

exercise jurisdiction because MDHI has not asserted a contract with the government. (Doc. 

66 at 3). The parties argue further that Plaintiff’s claim is not procurement-related because 

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OTs are “not procurement contracts” and the ADRA’s sunset provision terminated district 

court jurisdiction only over procurement matters. (Docs. 66 at 2–3; 70 at 10–12). 

a. Legal Standard

“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only 

function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” 

Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). “‘Federal courts are courts of 

limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.’”

Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Because a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction also 

lacks the power to decide a case, courts “have an independent obligation to determine 

whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any 

party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “The United States, as 

sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents . . . .” United States v. Sherwood, 312 

U.S. 584, 586 (1941); see also Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 

641, 644 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A] suit against the United States must start from the . . . 

assumption that no relief is available.”). Therefore, when a plaintiff sues the Federal 

Government, Congress’s consent to suit is a necessary “prerequisite for jurisdiction.”

United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 

192 (1996) (“A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be 

unequivocally expressed in statutory text . . . .” (citations omitted)) (emphasis added); Dunn 

& Black, P.S. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that, 

typically, “[o]nly Congress enjoys the power to waive the United States’ sovereign 

immunity” (citing Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 734 (1982)); 

Brazil v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 35 F. Supp. 3d. 1101, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“[A]n agency 

cannot waive sovereign immunity and thus alter federal court jurisdiction.” (citing Carlyle 

Towers Condo. Ass’n v. FDIC, 170 F.3d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Although not itself a grant of jurisdiction, the APA waives sovereign immunity for 

certain claims brought under the aegis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d 

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at 645. This limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to claims that are not for money 

damages, do not seek relief expressly or impliedly forbidden by another statue, and for 

which no adequate remedy is otherwise available. Id.

b. MDHI’s Requested Relief is Impliedly Forbidden by the Tucker Act

“[T]he Tucker Act ‘impliedly forbids’ declaratory and injunctive relief and 

precludes [an APA-based] waiver of sovereign immunity in suits on government 

contracts.” N. Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1985); see also 

Price v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 894 F.2d 323, 324 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, if the claim is 

“contractually-based, there is no jurisdiction.” Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 646. This 

is true even if the action is brought under the APA. Price, 894 F.2d at 324. To determine 

whether a claim is contractually-based, courts look to “the source of rights upon which the 

plaintiff bases its claims, and . . . the type of relief sought (or appropriate).” Gabriel, 547 

F. App’x at 831 (quoting Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

MDHI attempts to distinguish the case at bar from Gabriel, but the facts are virtually 

identical. There, the plaintiff submitted an unsuccessful bid to purchase several lighthouses

and subsequently sued for equitable relief against the General Services Administration 

(“GSA”). 547 F. App’x at 831. The Ninth Circuit explained that the plaintiff’s “source of 

rights stem[med] from a potential contract with the GSA” because an injunction would 

have required the GSA to accept his bid and sell him the lighthouses. Id. Thus, the relief 

requested was “just another name for specific performance” and “the natural inference 

follow[ed] that a contractual remedy indicate[d] a contractually-based set of claims.” Id.

MDHI seeks an order directing the Army to advance it to Phase 1 of the FARA CP 

program. (Doc. 1 at 5). As noted, under the Solicitation, the right of an entity to even 

participate in Phase 1—and thus to receive the accompanying funding award and prototype 

evaluation—turns on whether the Army awarded that entity an OT agreement. Therefore, 

if the OT agreement is a contract, then the conclusion seems inescapable that MDHI seeks 

to force the Army to award it a contract and to obtain rights flowing from an accepted bid—

the kind of relief that the Tucker Act impliedly forbids before the district court. 

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MDHI argues that its “claim is not based on the Tucker Act or any express or 

implied contract” meaning “Cooper and Gabriel are irrelevant.” (Doc. 66 at 3). To the 

extent that MDHI argues that the relief requested is not impliedly forbidden by the Tucker 

Act simply because MDHI invokes the APA, its argument is misplaced. Price, 894 F.2d at 

324; see also Doe, 329 F.3d at 1141 (“The label that is attached to a claim is not conclusive, 

however.”); Henderson v. U.S. Air Force, DMAFB, No. CIV 06-323-TUC-FRZ, 2007 WL 

2081481, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2007) (“The substance of the Complaint and not 

Plaintiff’s characterization, defines this Court’s jurisdictional review . . . .”). To the extent 

that MDHI argues that OTs are not contracts, however, its argument carries some 

persuasive force given that OTs are statutorily defined as transactions that are “other than 

contracts.” 10 U.S.C. § 2371(a). 

Nonetheless, this position is undermined by the fact that DoD guidance and the 

Congressional Research Service—in documents the Army itself relied on—take the 

position that the word “contracts” in 10 U.S.C. § 2371(a) means “procurement contracts.”

See Other Transactions Guide at 38; Peters, supra, at 2 (“Other transactions are legally 

binding contracts . . . .”).1Indeed, DoD’s guidance states: “OT agreements are not 

procurement contracts, but they are legally valid contracts. They have all six legal elements 

for a contract . . . and will be signed by someone who has the authority to bind the [F]ederal 

[G]overnment . . . . The terms and conditions can be enforced by and against either party.”

Other Transactions Guide at 38. In reality, these sources explain, 10 U.S.C. § 2371(a) 

refers to OTs as “other than contracts” to indicate that they are not subject to regulations, 

such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation, that usually govern the acquisition process.

Other Transactions Guide at 38; Peters, supra, at 4. Even the Army’s supplemental brief 

addressing jurisdiction implicitly recognizes that OTs are contracts, citing Protect Lake 

Pleasant LLC v. McDonald, 609 F. Supp. 2d 895 (D. Ariz. 2009) for the proposition that 

district courts retain jurisdiction under the ADRA’s sunset provision in non-procurement 

 

1 The Other Transactions Guide is part of this Court’s record, attached to the declaration 

of General Walter T. Rugen. (Doc. 42-1).

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contract cases. (Doc. 70 at 8).2

Despite the broad language used in these sources, this Court need not determine 

whether all OTs are contracts. Instead, this Court must look to the OT agreement at issue

in this case. It is in examining the terms of the OT agreement—appended to the 

Solicitation—that it becomes clear that MDHI seeks the award of a contract and to obtain 

the benefits flowing from that contract.

The OT agreement governs virtually every aspect of the business relationship 

between the parties but, at its most basic level, it awards funds to the Phase 1 Performer.

(Doc. 36-3 at 49). In exchange for those funds, the Phase 1 Performer “shall be responsible 

for performance of the work set forth in this Agreement at Attachment 1.” (Id. at 51). 

Attachment 1 lists the Army’s objectives for the FARA CP program and requires the 

Performer to:

• Define, design, build and test prototype aircraft that meet 

mandatory attributes and other performance requirements as 

described in System Performance Specification and Initial 

Capability Refinement Document . . . .

• Collaboration with the [Army] on developing cost models, 

physics-based engineering models and systems engineering 

models.

• Ground testing, flight envelope expansion and vehicle 

characterization testing necessary to develop data required to 

demonstrate the FARA CP capabilities and requirements.

• Data to support airworthiness and acquisition planning (e.g. 

manufacturing readiness level, supportability, suitability) for 

anticipated subsequent full system qualification and 

production activities.

(Id. at 83). Moreover, as indicated by the Solicitation, the award is a “[f]ixed amount OT,” 

defined in the OT agreement as an arrangement in “which the awardee agrees to complete 

a prototype project for an agreed upon total price and where payments are not based on 

 

2

Importantly, Protect Lake Pleasant LLC’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ claim that Maricopa 

County violated the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 is 

distinguishable from MDHI’s case because the plaintiffs sought only to prevent the 

construction of a marina and yacht club, not an order requiring the government to accept 

its bid. 609 F. Supp. 2d. at 904–15.

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amounts generated from the awardee’s financial or cost records.” (Id. at 53). The OT 

agreement goes on to state that, in the event “estimated total program costs are projected 

to exceed the total amount of this Agreement,” the Performer need not continue 

performance “unless[] and until the [Army] notifies the Performer in writing that the 

amount allotted by the [Army] has been increased and specifies an increased amount, 

which shall then constitute the total amount allotted by the [Army] to this Agreement.” (Id. 

at 64). The OT agreement even establishes dispute resolution procedures in the event of a 

disagreement between the Army and the Performer. (See id. at 65–66).

There are myriad other aspects of the business relationship controlled by the OT 

agreement, including patent rights to inventions conceived during the FARA CP program,

(id. at 66–70), the amount of access foreign firms or institutions may have to any of the 

findings and technology developed, (id. 73–75), disclosure of information, (id. at 79–80), 

and disposition of property acquired during the FARA CP program, (id. at 76–79). The OT 

agreement additionally indicates that, a Performer signing or accepting funds under it, also 

agrees to comply with a panoply of federal laws and regulations. (Id. at 79). But the Court 

need not rehearse all aspects of the lengthy OT agreement; rather, given that all the features

of a contract are present, the Court has little difficulty concluding that the OT agreement 

that MDHI seeks is a contract. The right to even have the Army evaluate a prototype 

project, and to receive the associated funding, stems from that potential contract. Because, 

just like the plaintiff in Gabriel, MDHI’s source of rights stems from a potential contract 

with the government, the APA does not waive sovereign immunity with respect to its claim 

for injunctive relief in this Court.

c. The ADRA Precludes Jurisdiction

Having concluded that the limited waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the 

APA does not apply, this Court could normally stop its analysis and dismiss this action for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on that basis. In seeming contradiction to the relief 

requested in its complaint, however, MDHI’s motion for summary judgment asks this 

Court to issue an order to “re-open the evaluation process to provide MDHI with a proper 

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Phase 1 evaluation.” (Doc. 135 at 16). Given that this new request is somewhat ambiguous 

as to whether it seeks advancement to Phase 1, or a reevaluation of the Proposal, this Court 

will also address whether the ADRA’s sunset provision deprives it of jurisdiction here. 

Although there is a relative lack of authority addressing the interplay between statutes 

authorizing OTs and the ADRA, this Court concludes that this action falls within the terms 

of the ADRA’s sunset provision, meaning that this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction. 

The ADRA states in pertinent part that

both the Unite[d] States Court of Federal Claims and the 

district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to 

render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting 

to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a 

proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a 

contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in 

connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(b). Federal district court jurisdiction over the actions described in this 

section sunset on January 1, 2001. As this and several other courts have found, if an action 

falls within the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive 

jurisdiction even when the plaintiff invokes the APA. See, e.g., Vero Tech. Support, Inc. v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Def., 437 F. App’x 766, 768 (11th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that “the Tucker Act 

. . . forbid[s] relief that would otherwise be available under the APA, mainly the ability to 

resolve an APA claim that falls within the scope of the Tucker Act . . . in a federal district 

court”); Sigmatech, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1205–06 (N.D. Ala. 

2019); Validata Chem. Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 169 F. Supp. 3d 69, 75 (D.D.C. 

2016); Fire-Trol Holdings LLC, 2004 WL 5066232, at *4; see also Space Exp. Techs. v. 

United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 433, 439 (2019) (analyzing jurisdiction under the ADRA).

It is indisputable that MDHI is objecting to “a solicitation by a Federal agency for 

bids or proposals for a proposed contract,” given that its allegations relate entirely to the 

Army’s rejection of the Proposal. Although such an allegation might appear to place this 

case squarely within the text of the ADRA, the Federal Circuit has explained that the 

ADRA “speaks ‘exclusively’ to ‘procurement solicitations and contracts.’” Hymas v. 

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United States, 810 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Res. Conservation Grp., LLC 

v. United States, 597 F.3d 1238, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (emphasis omitted).

3

Indeed, in its 

review of the ADRA’s legislative history, the Federal Circuit observed that the statute’s 

sponsors clearly “sought to channel the entirety of judicial government contract 

procurement protest jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims.” Emery Worldwide

Airlines v. United States, 264 F.3d 1071, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, while it is true that 

“a narrow application of [the ADRA] does not comport with the statue’s broad grant of 

jurisdiction over objections to the procurement process,” Sys. Application & Techs., Inc. v. 

United States, 691 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the Federal Circuit has reasoned that 

the types of governmental actions reviewable under the ADRA are limited to procurement 

decisions, Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(citing Distributed Sols, Inc. v. United States., 539 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Res.

Conservation Grp., LLC, 597 F.3d at 1245 (“[R]elief under [28 U.S.C. §] 1491(b)(1) is 

unavailable outside the procurement context.”).

As used in the ADRA, “procurement” refers to “all stages of the process of acquiring 

property or services, beginning with the process for determining a need for property or 

services and ending with contract completion and closeout.” Distributed Sols., Inc., 539 

F.3d at 1345 (emphasis and quotation omitted); see also 41 U.S.C. § 111. Therefore, the 

Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over a case when “the government [has] 

at least initiated a procurement[] or initiated ‘the process for determining a need’ for 

acquisition.’” AgustaWestland N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 880 F.3d 1326, 1330 (Fed. 

Cir. 2018) (quoting Distributed Sols., Inc., 539 F.3d at 1346).

In considering whether an objection to an OT is made “in connection with a 

procurement,” this Court fortunately does not write on a blank slate. The Court of Federal 

Claims faced just such an issue in Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. United States. 

There, SpaceX challenged the government’s “evaluation and portfolio award decisions for 

 

3 This Court is “especially interested in the Federal Circuit’s views on” the ADRA because 

that court has “exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases filed on or after January 1, 

2001.” See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 290 F.3d 734, 737 (4th Cir. 2002).

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a request for proposals to provide space launch services for national security missions.” 

144 Fed. Cl. at 435. SpaceX made its objection in the overarching context of the “National 

Security Space Launch program,” which “is charged with procuring launch services to 

meet the government’s national security space launch needs.” Id. at 436. To accomplish 

this goal, the government initiated a multi-phase strategy in FY 2013 that will be completed 

by FY 2027. Id. at 436–37. The program’s first phase involved “a competition for the 

development of space launch vehicles,” during which the government sought to develop a 

prototype that could comply with national security requirements while also providing 

domestic commercial launch services. Id. at 437. The awardees of the competition would 

receive government funding for further prototype development and testing. Id. There, as 

here, the solicitation and resulting awards were issued under DoD’s authority to enter into 

other transactions. Id. at 438. 

In a separate and distinct part of the government’s strategy, it anticipated “awarding 

two requirements contracts for launch services, delivering multiple national security space 

missions with annual ordering periods from FY 2020 through FY 2024.” Id. at 437. This 

“Phase 2 Procurement” would be held open to “all interested offerors,” meaning that even 

those that had not received funding awards during the competition could seek to submit a 

bid for the procurement. Id. at 438.

Addressing SpaceX’s contention that jurisdiction was proper under the ADRA, the 

Court of Federal Claims first looked to the awards issued as a result of the competition. Id. 

at 442. Although those awards did not themselves support ADRA-based jurisdiction, the 

court nonetheless examined whether the awards were sufficiently “in connection with” the 

Phase 2 Procurement to support exercising jurisdiction over the action. Id. at 443. The court 

reasoned that they were not because: (1) the competition and the Phase 2 Procurement 

“involve[d] separate and distinct solicitations;” (2) the competition and the Phase 2 

Procurement “involve[d] different acquisition strategies,” including the legal requirements 

that governed each solicitation; (3) the competition “did not involve the procurement of

any goods or services . . . the [government] will not purchase or own these prototypes;” 

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and (4) despite the fact that competition winners would receive federal funding, placing 

them in an advantageous position for the Phase 2 Procurement, the competition awards 

would not be outcome-determinative for the Phase 2 Procurement which remained a “fully 

open competition” and would not be limited to competition award recipients. Id. at 443–

45. Acknowledging that the question before it was “a close one,” the court found that the 

competition awards were simply too attenuated to the Phase 2 Procurement to confer 

jurisdiction. Id. at 445; see also Protect Lake Pleasant LLC, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 898–915 

(explaining that a challenge to a solicitation for a concession agreement was not made in 

connection with a procurement even though the solicitation was authorized by an 

agreement that amounted to at least a partial procurement). 

The facts surrounding the Army’s decision to reject the Proposal at issue here 

demonstrate that the present objection relates far more directly to an eventual procurement 

than the solicitation at issue in Space Exploration Technologies. The very reason the Army 

embarked upon the FARA CP program was an identified lack of aircraft with “the ability 

to conduct armed reconnaissance, light attack, and security with improved stand-off and 

lethal and non-lethal capabilities with a platform sized to hide in radar clutter and for the 

urban canyons of mega cities.” (Doc. 36-3 at 3). Thus, the entire purpose of the Army’s 

“prototyping and testing effort” is to “support a decision to enter into a formal program of 

record for full system integration, qualification and production as a rapid acquisition.” (Id.). 

Importantly, and quite unlike the solicitation at issue in Space Exploration Technologies, 

at each progressive stage of the FARA CP program the Army will down-select among the 

Performers who participated at the previous stage. (Doc. 36-3 at 4–6). Thus, a decision 

excluding a Performer (or, in MDHI’s case, a would-be Performer) from any phase of the 

FARA CP program would be outcome-determinative because only entities that are

“selected for the preceding phase of the FARA CP program shall be eligible for any 

subsequent phases,” and thus any eventual procurement. (Doc. 36-3 at 4) Further unlike 

Space Exploration Technologies, the FARA CP program does not involve two distinct 

solicitations. Indeed, the Solicitation anticipates possibly awarding a “follow-on 

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production contract or transaction without the use of competitive procedures” under 10 

U.S.C. § 2371b(f) to Performers who successfully complete the prototype project. (Doc. 

36-3 at 6) (emphasis added).

As its final argument in favor of jurisdiction, the Army asserts that “[i]t is legally 

presumed that Congress would not have used the term ‘other transactions’ if it had meant 

‘procurements’ within the meaning of the Tucker Act, FGCAA, and CICA.” (Doc. 70 at 

12). It is generally true that “Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of 

the law and a newly-enacted statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and 

judicial concepts.” Aectra Ref. & Mktg. v. United States, 565 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 

2009). But what should be clear by now, and what this and the parties’ other arguments 

have glossed over, is that the ADRA’s applicability does not depend on the present 

existence of an actual procurement contract so long as the challenged action bears a 

sufficient connection to a procurement. Because the Court’s resolution of this issue does 

not depend on any characterization of the OT agreement as a “procurement,” there is no 

disharmony between the ADRA and the other laws that the Army identifies.

To be sure, the Solicitation employs contingent language regarding Phase 4 of the 

FARA CP program, the point at which any procurement will occur. It is nonetheless clear 

that the Army’s decision to issue the Solicitation, to reject the Proposal, and to award OTs 

to other Performers, all took place within the procurement process. As indicated, the main 

purpose of the FARA CP program is to develop data to support a decision to integrate the 

next generation of light attack helicopter into the armed forces. Thus, the actions that 

MDHI objects to took place within the “process of determining a need for acquisition” of 

advanced helicopters such that the objection falls within the plain language of the ADRA.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction under the ADRA’s sunset 

provision.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that this case is dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of 

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jurisdiction in this Court. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 15 days after the date 

of this Order unless, prior thereto, a party moves for reconsideration (see L.R. Civ. 7.2(g)) 

or to transfer this case to another court.4

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment (filed at 

Docs. 135, 136 and lodged at Docs. 132 and 134) are denied without prejudice for lack of 

jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because, for purposes of this Order, the Court 

did not consider any sealed materials, the Motions to Seal are denied as moot (Docs. 131, 

133, 137, 139, 144, and 145); however, all the related documents (Docs. 132, 134, 138, 

140, 143, and 146) shall remain lodged and sealed.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file this Order under 

seal. The parties must, within 14 days of the date of this Order, file a motion to seal this 

Order which must attach a proposed redacted version of this Order to be filed in the public 

record. Any motion to seal must identify why the information sought to be redacted 

satisfies the “compelling reasons” standard articulated in Kamakana v. City & County of 

Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court retains discretion to accept or 

reject each redaction proposed by the parties. If no motion to seal is filed within 14 days, 

the Clerk of the Court shall unseal this Order.5 The motion at Doc. 149 is GRANTED to 

the limited extent specified herein.

Dated this 24th day of January, 2020.

 

4This Order creates no presumption that transfer is appropriate. Thus, any motion to 

transfer must cite and apply the controlling legal authority on transfer.

5 Because the Court did not rely on any sealed information in this Order, the Court does 

not anticipate a motion to seal. The Court has included this provision out of an abundance 

of caution.

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COPIES TO ONLY:

Brett William Johnson

Colin Patrick Ahler

Derek Conor Flint

Eric Harmon Spencer

Anne Elizabeth Nelson

James Mackey Ives

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