Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00448/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00448-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NATHANIEL HEARN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-00448 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On or about March 6, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 15) on October 10, 2008.

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer on February 10, 2009.

See Docket No. 18.

I Procedural History

In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner challenges

his conviction in Maricopa County Superior Court docket number

CR2004-006251. On January 23, 2004, Petitioner was charged by

an indictment with one count of misdemeanor shoplifting, one

felony count of armed robbery, and one felony count of unlawful

flight from a law enforcement vehicle. See Answer, Exh. A. The

indictment was amended to allege prior felony convictions and

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that Petitioner committed the crimes while on supervised

release. Id., Exh. A. 

The state later alleged further aggravating

circumstances, inter alia, the threat of injury and possession

of a weapon. Id., Exh. A. The state further alleged the

aggravating circumstances of multiple victims, evasion of law

enforcement, and a lengthy criminal history. Id., Exh. A. Prior

to trial the state dismissed the shoplifting charge. See id.,

Exh. A. 

Petitioner chose to represent himself in his criminal

proceedings on or about April 12, 2004, and the trial court

appointed advisory counsel. Id., Exh. A. 

On the third day of Petitioner’s jury trial the jury

received its instructions and court was recessed for the jury to

begin deliberations. Id., Exh. K. At the end of the day the

jury informed the trial court that it would resume deliberations

the following morning. Id., Exh. A. The following day the jury

resumed deliberations at 9:35 a.m. Id., Exh. A. At 10:55 a.m.

the jury sent the trial court a note stating: “Can not agree on

armed robbery. Need assistance!” Id., Exh. A at 122 & 135. A

minute entry indicates that the trial court consulted with the

prosecutor and Petitioner’s advisory counsel regarding the note;

Petitioner was not present at the conference. Id., Exh. A. 

At 11:30 a.m., the trial court responded to the jury:

I need a lot more guidance from you on the

basis of the impasse. The instructions are

clear as to how you should deliberate on both

counts and in the event there’s an impasse.

Moreover, your note says nothing about the

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offense of unlawful flight or the lesser

included offense of robbery.

Id., Exh. A at 122.

Approximately twenty minutes later the jury sent a note

to the trial court stating: “Agreement on flight & robbery

(lesser offense). Disagreement on credibility of witnesses

regarding the existence of weapon. What further assistance can

you provide?” Id., Exh. A at 121. 

Petitioner was not present for the ensuing discussion

between the trial court, Petitioner’s advisory counsel, and the

prosecutor, regarding this jury note. Id., Exh. A at 135. The

trial court responded to the jury’s second note: 

Based on your response, you’ve reached a

verdict on the unlawful flight charge as well

as the lesser included offense of robbery.

Because you disagree on armed robbery given

your perception of the witness’ credibility,

you can find the lesser included offense of

robbery without having to reach a verdict on

armed robbery. A verdict form will be

modified to be consistent with the jury

instruction on the lesser included offense of

robbery. 

Id., Exh. A at 121. The judge sent this response to the jury at

1:28 p.m. Id., Exh. B.

The parties, i.e., the prosecutor and Petitioner’s

advisory counsel, did not request a court reporter be present

for the in-chamber proceedings regarding the jury’s

communications. Id., Exh. B at 17. The trial court went back

on the record at 1:50 p.m. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner, his

advisory counsel, and the state were all present when the trial

court went back on the record. Id., Exh. L. At that time the

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trial court addressed Petitioner and noted that Petitioner had

been “kept abreast” of the proceedings by his advisory counsel.

Id., Exh. L at 4. 

The trial judge informed Petitioner that the jury had

submitted two questions. The trial court told Petitioner there

was “nothing” said in response to the jury’s questions “other

than what was in the instructions.” Id., Exh. L at 4. The

trial judge informed Petitioner that he believed the jury had

reached a verdict on the lesser included offense of robbery

because they could not reach a verdict on the offense of armed

robbery. The trial court further told Petitioner that the jury

had been provided a form of verdict allowing for a hung jury on

the charge of armed robbery. Id., Exh. L at 3-4.

The bailiff then interrupted the proceeding to notify

the court that the jury had reached a verdict. Id., Exh. L at

4. At that time Petitioner stated that he had not been notified

of the second jury question or of the trial court’s second

response. Id., Exh. L at 5. Petitioner asked if the trial

court intended to further instruct the jury on the armed robbery

charge notwithstanding that the jury had reached a verdict.

Id., Exh. L at 8.

The trial court advised Petitioner, and the prosecutor

allowed, that Petitioner’s acquiescence to the entry of a

verdict on the lesser charge, i.e., robbery, would preclude a

retrial on the greater offense, i.e., armed robbery. Id., Exh.

L at 6-7. They noted that the alternative, requiring the jury

to deliberate further, might result in the jury’s finding that

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they were unable to reach a verdict on armed robbery, allowing

for Petitioner to be retried and possibly convicted of the

greater offense. Id., Exh. L at 8–10. Petitioner then

acquiesced to the trial court’s taking of the verdict at that

time, i.e., without further instruction to the jury. Id., Exh.

L at 10. 

Accordingly, on September 30, 2004, the jury returned

a verdict of guilty of the lesser-included offense of robbery,

rather than armed robbery, and guilty of unlawful flight. Id.,

Exh. A. After aggravation proceedings, conducted that same day,

the jury concluded Petitioner committed the offenses while on

release and also found Petitioner had prior convictions. Id.,

Exh. A.

Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial. In that

motion Petitioner argued that the trial court violated his right

to due process by failing to have him present during a critical

stage of the proceedings, citing Snyder v. Massachusetts and

Faretta v. California. Id., Exh. A at 138. 

In denying the motion, the trial court concluded: 

[T]he defendant’s presence in answering the

jury’s question during deliberations was not

necessary for 2 reasons. First, both the

prosecution and defendant’s liaison counsel

were present. In light of the response the

Court indicated it was going to make to the

jury’s question, neither counsel nor the

Court felt that the defendant’s presence was

required. Second, the court did not answer

the question, but, rather, simply directed

the jury to rely on the evidence presented in

reaching the ultimate determination of the

issue.

Id., Exh. A at 148.

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On March 22, 2005, in Maricopa County docket number

CR2004-006251, Petitioner was sentenced to a twelve-year term

of imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for robbery and a

concurrent six-year term of imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction on the charge of unlawful flight from a law

enforcement vehicle. Id., Exh. A. Both sentences were ordered

to run consecutively to sentences of incarceration imposed in

2002 and 2003 in separate criminal proceedings. Id., Exh. A.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner was represented by

appointed counsel in his direct appeal. Id., Exh. B. In his

direct appeal Petitioner asserted the trial court denied

Petitioner’s right to due process and his right to

self-representation when it convened with the prosecutor and

advisory counsel, in Petitioner’s absence, to consider the jury

notes. Petitioner also alleged the trial court erred by failing

to credit Petitioner for an additional 133 days of pre-sentence

incarceration. Id., Exh. B.

On October 24, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions, although it modified his

presentence incarceration credit. Id., Exh. C. Citing state

law and Faretta v. California, the Arizona Court of Appeals

stated “Erroneous denial of self-representation in a criminal

case is structural error.” Id., Exh. C. Citing McKaskle v.

Wiggins, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded Petitioner’s

constitutional rights were not violated. Id., Exh. C. The

court noted “when a self-representing defendant allows standby

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counsel to directly participate in a particular proceeding

without objection, the defendant retains no right to claim he

was not allowed to direct his defense.” Id., Exh. C. The Court

of Appeals concluded the McKaskle standard was satisfied

because Petitioner had 

an opportunity to see and object to the form

or make other objections ... Hearn later

informed the court he understood the

appropriateness of the jury instruction, the

process the jury had gone through to make a

decision, and that he was prepared for the

jury to be called. Hearn was given ample

opportunity to present his own position to

the court.

Id., Exh. C.

The Court of Appeals also concluded that Petitioner’s

due process right to be present at critical stages of his

criminal proceedings was not violated. The Court of Appeals

noted that, absent fundamental error, a defendant could waive

the right to be present by failing to object. The appellate

court concluded “Hearn did not object to his absence when given

an opportunity to do so.” Id., Exh. C. The Court of Appeals

concluded Petitioner had waived any objection to his absence

from the chambers conferences and that, additionally, “he

ratified the decisions made in consultation with his advisory

counsel.” Id., Exh. C. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held

that any error was not reversible because Petitioner was not

prejudiced by the court’s communication with the jury. Id.,

Exh. C.

On April 12, 2007, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily

denied review of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Id., Exh. D.

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Petitioner initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, which was initially dismissed for failure to

prosecute. See id., Exh. E. The action was re-opened and again

dismissed, because the time limit for filing a brief stating

Petitioner’s claims for relief passed and Petitioner failed to

file such a pleading. See id., Exh. G, Exh. H, Exh. I.

In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner asserts his

federal constitutional right to self-representation and his

right to be present were violated when the trial court conferred

with Petitioner’s advisory counsel, but not Petitioner,

regarding two questions posed by the deliberating jury.

Petitioner also asserts his sentences were illegal because his

crime did not involve a threat of violence and because the state

violated his right to due process by presenting aggravating

circumstances to a jury. Additionally, Petitioner maintains he

is entitled to habeas relief because, he alleges, jail

authorities abridged his right to access the courts during his

criminal proceedings.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion 

The District Court may not grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which was not exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

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opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence). 

B. Procedural default

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2009). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-92, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

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claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92-93, 126 S. Ct.

at 2387. Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona courts. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.

856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state

rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims

raised in attacks on criminal convictions are adequate and

independent state grounds for affirming a conviction and denying

federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz

v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

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124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

C. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2009); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239-40, 125 S.

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Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340,

123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003) (holding the court must presume

that state court’s factual findings are correct and may not

reverse a state court’s factual finding “absent clear and

convincing evidence” that the finding is “objectively

unreasonable.”); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008); Anderson v. Terhune,

467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d

922, 926 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The state court’s factual findings

are entitled to a presumption of correctness unless the

petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing

evidence.”). The “presumption of correctness is equally

applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a state

trial court, makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455

U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304-05 (1982). 

The “contrary to federal law” test

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133,

141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). For

example, a state court’s decision is considered “contrary to

federal law” if the state court erroneously applied the wrong

standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles

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v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (stating the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding a habeas petitioner

entitled to relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

because the Ninth Circuit should not have reversed the state

court based on its failure to apply a “nothing to lose” test to

a claim properly analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington);

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47

(2008). See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir.

2008) (en banc); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th

Cir. 2009). 

The “unreasonable application” test

“A state determination may be set aside under this

standard if, under clearly established federal law, the state

court was unreasonable in refusing to extend the governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529

U.S. at 409, 120 S. Ct. at 1521;. An unreasonable application

of law is different from an incorrect one. See Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2002); Cooks v.

Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, only

United States Supreme Court holdings, and not dicta or

concurring opinions, at the time of the state court’s decision

are the source of “clearly established federal law” for the

purpose of the “unreasonable application” prong of federal

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1 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: “A state

court’s decision may be an ‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law

if it ‘extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal

principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.’

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).” Cook v.

Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.

1033 (2009).

2

The federal appellate courts have split on

whether Faretta, which establishes a Sixth

Amendment right to self-representation, implies

a right of the pro se defendant to have access to

a law library.[]. That question cannot be

resolved here, however, as it is clear that

Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid

that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant.

The ... court below therefore erred in holding,

based on Faretta, that a violation of a law

library access right is a basis for federal

habeas relief.

Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10-11, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408-09

(2005).

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habeas review. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S. Ct. at 1523;

Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, 127 S. Ct. at 653. Unless United States

Supreme Court precedent has clearly established a rule of law,

the writ will not issue based on a claimed violation of that

rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001),

because federal courts are “without the power” to extend the law

beyond Supreme Court precedent. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480,

485 (9th Cir. 2000).1 

Accordingly, if the Supreme Court has not addressed a

specific issue in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication

of the issue cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881, citing

Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408

(2006).2 Stated another way, if the issue raised by the

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3

Our cases provide no categorical answer to this

question, and for that matter the several

proceedings in this case hardly point toward one.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held counsel’s

performance by speaker phone to be

constitutionally effective; neither the

Magistrate Judge, the District Court, nor the

Seventh Circuit disputed this conclusion; and the

Seventh Circuit itself stated that “[u]nder

Strickland, it seems clear Van Patten would have

no viable claim.” Deppisch, 434 F.3d, at 1042.

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008).

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petitioner “is an open question in the Supreme Court’s

jurisprudence,” the District Court may not issue a writ of

habeas corpus on the basis that the state court unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law by rejecting the precise

claim presented by the petitioner. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d

1000, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1033

(2009); Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007),

cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008). The United States Supreme

Court “has held on numerous occasions that it is not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for

a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has

not been squarely established by this Court.” Knowles, 129 S.

Ct. at 1419, citing Wright, 128 S. Ct. at 746.3

“For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), clearly

established law as determined by this Court ‘refers to the

holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’” Yarborough,

541 U.S. at 660-61, 124 S. Ct. at 2147, quoting Williams, 529

U.S. at 412, 120 S. Ct. at 1523.

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The holdings of the Circuit Courts of Appeal are

relevant to resolution of a petitioner’s habeas claims only to

the extent they are useful in deciding whether the law has

clearly been established or that the state court decision is an

“unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court

precedent, and not with regard to what constitutes a violation

of constitutional rights. See Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 870

(9th Cir. 2009); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.

2003) (“While circuit law may be persuasive authority for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law ... only the

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and

only those holdings need be reasonably applied.” (citations

omitted)); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“Because [the] AEDPA limits habeas relief to state

decisions that offend ‘clearly established’ federal law as set

by the Supreme Court, a state court decision may not be

overturned simply because of a conflict with circuit law.”).

Compare Smith v. Dinwiddie, 510 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir.

2007).

 Accordingly, a state court decision may be contrary to

a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding without being an

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent. See Kessee v. Mendoza Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 679 (9th

Cir. 2009) (holding it could not find a state court decision

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent where the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the

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4

If the Court’s decisions do provide a

“controlling legal standard,” Panetti, 127 S. Ct.

at 2858, that is applicable to the claims raised

by a habeas petitioner without “tailoring or

modification” of the standard, the question is

then whether the application of that standard was

objectively unreasonable, even if the facts of

the case at issue are not identical to the

Supreme Court precedent.

Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009).

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issue and Ninth Circuit precedent differed from that of the

other Circuit Courts of Appeal on the issue). The Ninth Circuit

recently held that when a Supreme Court decision does not

“squarely address” the issue presented by the habeas petitioner,

or if the Supreme Court principle does not “clearly extend” to

the context of the situation presented by the petitioner, “it

cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is ‘clearly established’

Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue.” Moses v. Payne,

555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009).4 

If the Court finds that the state court’s decision was

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, habeas

relief is not automatically warranted. In that situation the

Court must determine whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights

were violated without the deference to the state court’s

decision that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551

U.S. 930, 952-53, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59 (2007); Rompilla v.

Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2467-68 (2005). See

also Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 171 (2008).

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D. Petitioner’s claims for relief.

Petitioner never properly exhausted any specific claims

for relief in a properly filed action for state post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Accordingly, the only federal habeas claim properly exhausted in

the state courts was any claim presented to the Arizona Court of

Appeals in Petitioner’s direct appeal. Therefore, the only

claim in the federal habeas petition which was properly

exhausted by Petitioner is his claim that the trial court denied

Petitioner’s right to due process and the right to

self-representation when it convened with the prosecutor and

advisory counsel, but in Petitioner’s absence, in order to

consider communications from the deliberating jury. 

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas relief

because the trial court violated his constitutional rights when

it convened with the prosecutor and advisory counsel, in

Petitioner’s absence, in order to consider communications from

the deliberating jury. Petitioner asserts that proceeding in

his absence violated his right to due process of law pursuant to

the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Ground 1), and that

this event constituted a “Faretta” violation, i.e., a violation

of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation (Ground 2).

 The undersigned will address the claims in the reverse order.

1. Petitioner contends he was denied his federal

constitutional right to self-representation.

A defendant has a federal constitutional right to

represent himself at his criminal proceedings. See Faretta v.

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California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975). A defendant’s

federal constitutional rights are not violated, however, by the

appointment of standby, or advisory, counsel. The distinction

between the “permissible” and “impermissible” participation of

a pro se defendant’s standby or advisory counsel was established

by McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173-74, 104 S. Ct. 944,

948-50 (1984). In McKaskle the Supreme Court held that a

criminal defendant’s federal constitutional right to

self-representation is not equivalent to an “absolute bar on

standby counsel’s unsolicited participation” in the defendant’s

criminal proceedings. Id., 465 U.S. at 176, 104 S. Ct. at 950.

When determining whether a defendant’s right to

self-representation during his criminal proceedings was

violated, “the primary focus must be on whether the defendant

had a fair chance to present his case in his own way.” Id., 465

U.S. at 177, 104 S. Ct. at 950. The defendant’s rights are not

violated if he makes his “voice heard” by preserving “actual

control over the case he chooses to present to the jury.” Id.,

465 U.S. at 178, 104 S. Ct. at 951. Accordingly, participation

by the defendant’s standby counsel should not be “allowed to

destroy the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing

himself.” Id.

 In McKaskle the United States Supreme Court noted that

“the appearance of a pro se defendant’s self-representation will

not be unacceptably undermined by counsel’s participation

outside the presence of the jury.” Id., 465 U.S. at 179, 104 S.

Ct. at 951 (emphasis added). Accordingly, a defendant’s

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constitutional rights are not violated by their exclusion from

an in-chambers proceeding unless the proceeding involved a

significant tactical decision or a “matter of importance.” Id.,

465 at 178, 104 S. Ct. at 951. 

 The Supreme Court further held:

Thus, Faretta rights are adequately

vindicated in proceedings outside the

presence of the jury if the pro se defendant

is allowed to address the court freely on his

own behalf and if disagreements between

counsel and the pro se defendant are resolved

in the defendant’s favor whenever the matter

is one that would normally be left to the

discretion of counsel.

Id.

In denying Petitioner’s claim that his right to selfrepresentation was denied, the Arizona Court of Appeals

correctly found Faretta and McKaskle to be the controlling

federal law and noted that the denial of the right to selfrepresentation is structural error. See Answer, Exh. C.

Accordingly, the Arizona state court’s decision was not clearly

contrary to established federal law.

The appellate court concluded the right was adequately

protected because Petitioner was given the opportunity to be

heard regarding the jury notes and the receiving of the verdict

and advisory counsel’s position did not ultimately prevail over

Petitioner’s position. The appellate court also concluded

Petitioner was not deprived of the opportunity to direct his own

defense. See id., Exh. C at 6–7. The Arizona Court of Appeals

found that Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present his

position with regard to the jury questions to the trial court

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and to make the decision to go forward with entering the jury’s

verdict.

The Arizona state court’s decision was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

precedent at the time the decision was issued. At the time the

state court reached its decision, no United States Supreme Court

opinion had extended Faretta and McKaskle to a self-representing

defendant’s right to be present during an in-chambers

consideration of a jury note. The state court’s application of

McKaskle to Petitioner’s case was not unreasonable because the

state court properly weighed the elements of the McKaskle test.

The state court evaluated whether Petitioner had been allowed to

present his own case to the jury and noted standby counsel’s

presence during the exchange of notes between the jury.

The Supreme Court’s emphasis in McKasle was the

defendant’s right to have the jury perceive that he was

controlling his own defense. Pursuant to McKaskle, the

likelihood that a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to

self-representation would be violated by their absence from an

in-chambers proceeding was necessarily less than their absence

from a jury proceeding. See 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S. Ct. at 951.

Notably, McKaskle left open the question as to what type of inchambers proceeding might require the presence of a pro se

defendant rather than just his advisory counsel. Because the

error asserted in this matter involved standby counsel’s

participation outside the presence of the jury, the state

court’s decision was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable

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5

In Kane the Supreme Court concluded that the state court’s

decision was not clearly contrary to federal law because “it [was]

clear that Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the

State owes a pro se criminal defendant”. Similarly, in this matter,

the Supreme Court has not indicated that a pro se criminal defendant’s

rights are violated if they are not present at an in-chambers

conference regarding a jury note which does not involve a substantive

question regarding the evidence.

6

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Petitioner’s

case was issued in October of 2006. Initial oral argument was heard

and the appeal in Frantz was submitted to a three-judge panel of the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the briefs also in October of 2006.

The panel opinion or entry of decision in Frantz does not appear in

the Ninth Circuit docket of the matter, or in the Arizona District

Court CM/ECF docket (4:04 CV 135), or on Westlaw. On December 29,

2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a rehearing en banc.

See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Docket No. 05-16024; 472 F.3d 679.

The matter was submitted to the en banc panel in March of 2007, and

the resulting opinion was issued in 2008. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533

F.3d 724, 740 (9th Cir.) (“even if [standby counsel] accurately

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application of the standard stated in Faretta and McKaskle.5

The state court’s decision was not objectively

unreasonable because it “failed” to extend McKaskle. The state

court did not fail to extend McKaskle in a way that was

objectively unreasonable because, at the time the Arizona Court

of Appeals decided the issue presented in Petitioner’s habeas

action in 2006, the United States Supreme Court had not issued

an opinion stating that a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation was violated by the appearance of only his

advisory counsel at an in-chambers conference regarding a

communication from a deliberating jury. Additionally, at the

time the Arizona Court of Appeals decided Petitioner’s Faretta

claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had not resolved a

District Court judge’s decision denying habeas relief on a

similar Faretta claim in Frantz v. Hazey.6 The petition for a

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portrayed [defendant’s] wishes, unconsented-to exclusion from the

conference would so substantially reduce [defendant’s] ability to

shape and communicate his own defense as to violate his Faretta

rights”). 

7Additionally, the holding in Frantz is that the state court

erred by applying harmless error to the Faretta claim when such an

error is structural. In this matter the issue is whether the state

court’s decision was an unreasonable application of federal law and

not whether the state decision was clearly contrary to federal law.

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rehearing en banc in Frantz was ordered on December 29, 2006,

oral argument was heard in March of 2007; both indications of

how the Ninth Circuit might rule on the question were not

available to the Arizona state court at the time Petitioner’s

direct appeal was decided.7 At the time the state appellate

court reached its decision, United States Supreme Court and

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent supported the state

court’s denial of relief.

Even if the state court’s decision in Petitioner’s case

was erroneous, the state court’s decision was not objectively

unreasonable. The decision was reasonable because there was no

published legal opinion to the contrary and the state court

properly worked through the elements of the correct legal test.

See Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 642, 123 S. Ct. 1848, 1854-

55 (2003); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793, 121 S. Ct. 1910,

1918 (2001). 

Additionally, to the extent Frantz held the conclusion

in that case was self-evident from McKaskle, the fact pattern in

Frantz is distinguishable from the situation presented in

Petitioner’s criminal proceedings. In Frantz the federal

appellate court interpreted, or expanded, McKaskle to include a

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self-defending defendant’s right to represent himself during an

in-chambers conference regarding a jury note seeking to review

non-admitted evidence, unless there was evidence that the

defendant had agreed to allow standby counsel to represent him

at the conference. In Petitioner’s case the jury note was not

regarding evidence and the state court found Petitioner

acquiesced, albeit after the fact, to standby counsel’s

representation. Petitioner also had the opportunity to object

to the trial court’s decision regarding the jury note and to

object to the trial court taking a verdict based on its response

to the jury note. The District Court is bound by the state

court’s conclusion that Petitioner acquiesced to standby

counsel’s participation in the in-chambers conferences, absent

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, removing it from

the rubric of Frantz, in which the Ninth Circuit remanded the

matter for an evidentiary hearing on this question.

The primary holding of Frantz, for which it is

regularly cited, is that the state court erred by applying

harmless error review to the petitioner’s Faretta claim when

such error is structural. The Ninth Circuit, applying de novo

review, stated in dicta that a defendant’s right of

self-representation included the right to be present at chambers

conference regarding jury questions about evidence during

deliberations. 

However, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that a

defendant’s consent to standby counsel’s solo participation in

a chambers conference would preclude a Sixth Amendment

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8

In such proceedings, therefore, the defendant’s

right to self-representation is satisfied “if the

pro se defendant is allowed to address the court

freely on his own behalf and if disagreements

between counsel and the pro se defendant are

resolved in the defendant’s favor whenever the

matter is one that would normally be left to the

discretion of counsel.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Because Jones’s sentencing and all relevant

pre-sentencing proceedings took place outside the

presence of a jury, Jones’s right to

self-representation is limited accordingly.

United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243, 248-49 (6th Cir. 2007).

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violation. Frantz, 533 F.3d at 743-44. The undersigned notes

that, in this matter, the state courts concluded as a matter of

fact that Petitioner consented to standby counsel’s solo

participation in the chambers conference regarding at least the

first jury question. Petitioner also consented, albeit after

the fact, to standby counsel’s participation in the chambers

conference regarding the second jury note. Petitioner has not

presented “clear and convincing” evidence that he did not

consent to his counsel’s participation in chambers conferences

regarding jury notes.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief based on the assertion that the state court

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by

rejecting the Petitioner’s Faretta claim. See DeWeaver v.

Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th Cir. 2009); Cook, 538 F.3d at

1016; Crater, 491 F.3d at 1123; United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d

243, 248-49 (6th Cir. 2007).8 Compare Torres v. Uttecht, 545 F.

Supp. 2d 1141, 1146 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (holding that the state

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representing defendant and the failure to translate a jury note

was a violation of the defendant’s Faretta rights).

2. Petitioner’s right to be present during his criminal

proceedings.

A criminal defendant’s federal constitutional right to

be present at their criminal proceedings derives from both the

Sixth Amendment’s right to confront witnesses against the

defendant and the defendant’s right to due process of law

pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g.,

Conner v. McBride, 375 F.3d 643, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2004). The

defendant’s right to due process is implicated by the occurrence

of critical criminal proceedings, such as a trial, without the

defendant present as both an observer and a participant. See

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332

(1934). The right to be present is not absolute, but is

implicated when the defendant’s “presence has a relation,

reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to

defend against the charge.” Id., 291 U.S. at 105-06, 54 S. Ct.

at 332. A “critical stage” is one at which “substantial rights

of the accused may be affected.” Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,

134, 88 S. Ct. 254, 256-57 (1967).

In his direct appeal Petitioner argued to the Arizona

Court of Appeals that he was denied the right to be present for

all important stages of his trial because he was not present for

the in-chambers conferences regarding the jury notes. Answer,

Exh. B. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the claim on three

separate bases. The state appellate court concluded Petitioner

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waived this claim by failing to timely object to any alleged

error. The Court of Appeals also concluded the alleged error

was harmless because Petitioner’s constitutional right to be

present did not extend to an in-chambers discussion outside of

the presence of the jury. The Court of Appeals also held that

the asserted error did not warrant relief because the

communication between the trial court and the jury consisted of

a repetition of the jury instructions. Id., Exh. C.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was not clearly

contrary to federal law nor an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. At the time of the Arizona

Court of Appeals’ decision in 2006 there was no United States

Supreme Court opinion in furtherance of Snyder holding that an

in-chambers discussion regarding a jury note resulting in redirecting the jury to its instructions was a “critical stage” of

criminal proceedings. 

Therefore, the state court’s decision denying relief on

this claim was not clearly contrary to established federal law

nor an unreasonable application of federal law and Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim.

3. Petitioner maintains that the sentences imposed were

illegal because there was no threat of violence and because the

state violated his right to due process by presenting

aggravating circumstances to a jury.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim by

fairly presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals either in

Petitioner’s direct appeal or in a properly filed state action

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for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted this claim.

In reply to the Answer to his petition, Petitioner

contends “This case is a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

The jail took all of my legal documents and would not allow me

to even have pencil and paper. When the trial court was

informed of it they did nothing.” Docket No. 18 at 2.

Petitioner further asserts he was denied the services of a

court-ordered paralegal during his criminal proceedings and, as

a result, he was unable to “challenge the grand jury.” Id.

Petitioner further asserts the unreasonableness of his sentence

of 10 years imprisonment for robbery which, he contends, should

have been charged as shoplifting. Petitioner alleges he was

charged “with armed robbery because of the color of my skin.”

Id. Petitioner asserts his rights were violated because his

advisory counsel did not inform the trial judge that Petitioner

wanted a mistrial after the jury asked questions after the

beginning of deliberations. Id. at 2-3. Petitioner contends

his right to be present and for his attorney, i.e., himself, to

be present at all phases of his criminal proceedings was

violated by the trial court’s actions in addressing questions

raised by the jury. 

Petitioner has not asserted cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his federal habeas claim

that his sentence was excessive. Petitioner has not properly

alleged that, absent review of the merits of this claim, a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur. Petitioner does

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not contend that he is factually innocent, but instead asserts

he was mis-charged and, accordingly, mis-sentenced. 

4. Petitioner alleges that jail authorities abridged

his right to access the courts during his criminal proceedings.

Petitioner did not properly exhaust this claim by

fairly presenting it to the Arizona Court of Appeals either in

Petitioner’s direct appeal or in a properly filed state action

for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, Petitioner has

procedurally defaulted this claim.

Petitioner has not shown cause for his failure to

present this claim in his direct appeal or in a state action for

post-conviction relief. Additionally, Petitioner has not

established prejudice arising from the failure to previously

present this claim. Petitioner has not shown that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice will occur absent a review of the merits

of his claim that his right to access the courts was violated.

Therefore, relief may not be granted on the merits of the claim.

III Conclusion

Petitioner never asserted any specific claims for state

post-conviction relief in a properly filed action pursuant to

Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the

only federal habeas claim properly exhausted in the state courts

was any claim presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in

Petitioner’s direct appeal. The only claim properly exhausted

by Petitioner in the state courts was his claim regarding his

self-representation and his Sixth Amendment claim. The state

court did not err in denying relief on these claims. Petitioner

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procedurally defaulted his other federal habeas claims in the

state courts and he has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of the claims. Neither has

Petitioner established that a fundamental miscarriage of justice

will occur if the Court does not consider the merits of the

claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Hearn’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

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a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 8th day of October, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-00448-DGC Document 19 Filed 10/13/09 Page 31 of 31