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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United Statft ~,f ~f Appnls T~tl, C!~'"'•1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

GRANT L. DORAN, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

HAL STRATTON, ELOY MONDRAGON, ) 

) 

Respondents~Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

FEB 2 a ,ea, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-2210 

(D.C. No. 87-705-JP) 

(D. N.M.) 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Petitioner Grant L. Doran appeals from the district court's 

denial of his writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 

S 2254. We affirm the district court in all respects. 1 

Background 

A grand jury indicted Doran on seven charges arising out of 

three different robberies at the Snowheights Walgreen's drugstore 

in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The store was robbed on August 11, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for pu~oses of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-2210 Document: 010110031042 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 1 
September 17, and September 21, 1983. Doran went to trial on all 

of the charges. However, the two counts related to the August 11 

incident were dismissed on motion for directed verdict. A jury 

convicted Doran on the remainder of the charges. After exhausting 

all available remedies in the New Mexico state courts, Doran filed 

this petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Grant Doran was employed as an assistant manager at the 

Snowheights Walgreen's store. In July 1983 he took his annual 

vacation but did not return. Walgreen's management had the locks 

to the exterior doors changed on August 8 because Doran left with 

a full set of keys. The first robbery occurred three days later. 

The August 11 break-in showed no signs of forced entry, thus 

making store management suspicious that someone with keys to the 

store perpetrated the crime. The September robberies were forced 

entry crimes. 

At trial, the prosecution's main witness was Roger Robinson, 

a friend of Doran's and his alleged accomplice in the robberies. 

On September 27, 1983, Robinson gave police a detailed statement 

which implicated both men in all three crimes. However, Robinson 

has long-term memory problems which severely impair his ability to 

recall events occurring in the past. He has had brain surgery 

twice to remove tumors. At trial, Robinson was unable to recall 

much of what was contained in his statement. However, he did 

state with certainty that he and Doran were involved in the 

crimes. 

In his habeas petition, Doran raised four arguments. They 

included: 1) that the presentation of false testimony to the grand 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2210 Document: 010110031042 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 2 
jury rendered both the indictment and convictions invalid, 2) that 

false statements in a search warrant affidavit invalidated the 

search, thus requiring suppression of the evidence obtained, 3) 

that the state court erred in failing to grant a new trial after 

Roger Robinson recanted his trial testimony, and 4) that Doran was 

denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed 

to present an alibi defense. We will address each argument in 

turn. 

Discussion 

A. Falsification of grand jury testimony 

During the grand jury proceedings, Mr. Kenneth Berlint, the 

manager of the Walgreen's store, testified that the exterior locks 

were not changed until after the August 11 break-in. This 

testimony contradicted undisputed documents produced before trial 

indicating that the locks were changed on August 8. The 

implication of Mr. Berlint's testimony was that Grant Doran 

perpetrated the robbery by opening the front door to the store 

with the keys he obtained as assistant manager. As stated 

previously, the August 11 burglary did not involve a forced entry. 

Petitioner asserts this "false" testimony requires that the 

indictment be quashed and the convictions overturned. "Under some 

circumstances, where a state has chosen to provide grand juries, 

it must ensure that their selection and operation 'hew to federal 

constitutional criteria.'" Talamante v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784, 789 

(10th Cir. 1980)(quoting Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 

(1970)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877 (1980). To this extent, Doran 

argues that his fifth amendment due process rights, applicable via 

3 

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., 

the fourteenth amendment, apply in this habeas proceeding and 

require that the indictment be quashed. 2 We disagree. 

In support, Doran relies on United States v. Basurto, 497 

F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974). In that case, the Ninth Circuit 

identified several criteria for determining when an indictment 

based partially on perjured testimony must be quashed. The court 

stated, "[w]e hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment is violated when a defendant has to stand trial on an 

indictment which the government knows is based partially on 

perjured testimony, when the perjured testimony is material, and 

when jeopardy has not attached." Id. at 785. (Emphasis added.) 

Even assuming, without deciding, that the Basurto test 

applies, Doran's argument must fail. First, it is undisputed that 

neither the prosecution nor Mr. Berlint were aware this testimony 

was false at the time it was given. The discrepancy in the dates 

did not become apparent until after the grand jury returned the 

indictment. At trial, counsel for Doran had every opportunity to 

cross-examine and impeach Mr. Berlint on this issue. Where, as 

here, a petit jury has knowledge of the misstatement, it is 

unlikely that any error was prejudicial. See United States v. 

Page, 808 F.2d 723, 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 

(1987). 

2 This circuit has not decided this issue. See Talamante, 620 

F.2d at 789-90 and n.6. 

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Moreover, Mr. Berlint's misstatement was not material. 3 The 

charges to which it applied were dismissed after the prosecution 

presented its case. Petitioner's argument that the misstatement 

somehow infected the rest of the trial is not persuasive. This 

court will dismiss an indictment following conviction only in rare 

circumstances. See id. This case does not present one of those 

circumstances. Consequently, we affirm the district court on this 

issue. 

B. False statements made in application for search warrant 

In a habeas proceeding, a petitioner may not be granted 

relief on fourth amendment grounds if he was given an opportunity 

for full and fair consideration of the issue in state proceedings. 

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); Gamble v. Oklahoma, 

583 F.2d 1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 1978). 

"'Opportunity for full and fair consideration' includes, 

but is not limited to, the procedural opportunity to 

raise or otherwise present a Fourth Amendment claim. It 

also includes the full and fair evidentiary hearing 

contemplated by [Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)]. 

Furthermore, it contemplates recognition and at least 

colorable application of the correct Fourth Amendment 

constitutional standards." 

Gamble, 583 F.2d at 1165 (footnote omitted). Because Doran's 

argument with respect to the search warrant affidavit implicates 

the fourth amendment, the Stone v. Powell prohibition applies. 

3 In United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1977), 

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1978), the Ninth Circuit revisited the 

same issues addressed in Basurto. In Bracy, the court stressed 

that the materiality of the testimony is the factor which must be 

addressed in determining whether an indictment should be quashed. 

566 F.2d at 655. The court held that the language in Basurto 

requiring the prosecution to inunediately inform the grand jury of 

false testimony, irrespective of materiality, was dicta, and in 

any event, no longer valid in light of United States v. Agurs, 427 

U.S. 97 (1976). Id. 

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Here, petitioner had ample opportunity to raise this claim at 

trial. There is nothing in the record to suggest the state court 

failed to afford Doran procedural avenues for objecting to the 

introduction of the evidence seized pursuant to the allegedly 

faulty warrant. Doran filed a motion to suppress which was denied 

after a hearing. Moreover, contrary to petitioner's suggestion, 

there is nothing in the record supporting the argument that the 

state court failed tq apply the correct legal standards to 

introduction of this evidence. Accordingly, the rule of Stone v. 

Powell bars further review in this court. 

C. Failure to grant a new trial after Roger Robinson recanted his 

testimony 

Following the trial in this case, Doran's counsel interviewed 

Roger Robinson. During that interview, Robinson said his trial 

testimony was potentially "inaccurate." Based on this "new" 

evidence, Doran filed a motion for new trial. The state court 

denied this request. Doran asserts this failure constitutes 

grounds for granting habeas relief. 

This court has set the following standard for granting a new 

trial where testimony is allegedly recanted: 

The newly discovered evidence must be more than 

impeaching or cumulative; it must be material to the 

issues involved; it must be such as would probably 

produce an acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted 

by evidence which, with reasonable diligence, could have 

been discovered and produced at trial. 

United States v. Ramsey, 726 F.2d 601, 604 (10th Cir. 1984) 

(quoting United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 403 (10th Cir.), 

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Appellate Case: 89-2210 Document: 010110031042 Date Filed: 02/28/1991 Page: 6 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977)). Here, the "new" evidence is 

cumulative. 

The statement Robinson made after trial was entirely 

consistent with his testimony at trial. Robinson stated 

repeatedly that he had no recollection of many of the details he 

described in his statement. He told the court his memory was 

faulty regarding events which occurred in the fall of 1983. This 

testimony, and his statement after trial, are consistent with his 

long-term memory problems. 

It is clear from Robinson's testimony that he cannot remember 

with clarity anything requiring use of his long-term memory. 

Therefore, there is nothing "new" about Robinson's statement that 

his trial testimony was inaccurate. It is not a recantation of 

prior testimony. Petitioner's counsel had extensive opportunity 

to cross-examine Robinson about his inability to recall statements 

he made previously. We uphold the district court's decision 

denying relief on this claim. 

D. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

Finally, Doran asserts his counsel was ineffective in failing 

to present his parents as alibi witnesses. He states they would 

have testified he was with them on the night of September 21, 

1983. In order to prevail on this claim, Doran must show 1) that 

his counsel's performance was professionally unreasonable and, 2) 

that but for the failure to present these witnesses, he would have 

been acquitted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984). 

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Normally, the decision whether to call a witness rests within 

the discretion of trial counsel. United States v. Snyder, 787 

F.2d 1429, 1432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 836 (1986). 

Here, counsel's decision not to present these witnesses was within 

the wide range of professional judgment available to attorneys. 

Given the other evidence in this case pointing to Doran's guilt, 

it was within counsel's judgment not to present this testimony, 

which could appear fab~icated or self serving. See Diggs v. 

Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 

979 (1988). Trial counsel was not ineffective. 

disturb the district court's ruling on appeal. 

Conclusion 

We will not 

Petitioner's motion for issuance of a certificate of probable 

cause is GRANTED. The judgment of the United States District 

Court for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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