Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00112/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00112-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE SPITTAL, No. CIV.S-05-0112 MCE DAD PS

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

JERRY HOUSEMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

This matter is before the court on (1) the motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. no. 16) filed on behalf of defendants

Jerry Houseman, Roy Grimes, Karen Young, Manny Hernandez, Rick

Jennings, Dawn McCoy, Miguel Navarette, Angelle Murry, Francine

Dorrough, Candice Ingle and Cindy Wray; and (2) plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment (Doc. no. 18). Having considered all written

materials submitted in connection with the motions, for the reasons

explained below, the undersigned will recommend that defendants’

motion to dismiss be granted and plaintiff’s motion for summary

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judgment be denied. The undersigned will further recommend that

plaintiff’s amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice and this

action be closed.

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. Applicable Legal Standards

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that

would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept

as true the allegations of the complaint. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex

Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). Furthermore, the court

must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). In a case where the

plaintiff is pro se, the court has an obligation to construe the

pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th

Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal interpretation of

a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of a claim that

are not pled. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992);

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982).

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1 See Spittal v. Shubb, No. CIV.S-05-0749 FCD DAD PS, Findings

and Recommendations filed November 2, 2005; and Spittal v. Schenirer,

No. CIV.S-04-1198 GEB DAD PS, Findings and Recommendations filed

November 8, 2005.

2 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC

Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United

States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). The undersigned

hereby takes judicial notice of these court files. 

3

B. Analysis

As previously observed by the undersigned in findings and

recommendations recently filed in two of plaintiff’s other lawsuits,1

this is one of eight actions plaintiff has initiated in this court

over the last five years. (See No. CIV.S-00-1287 WBS PAN PS; No.

CIV.S-00-1766 LKK GGH PS; No. CIV.S-01-00036 GEB JFM PS; No. CIV.S04-1198 GEB DAD PS; No. CIV.S-05-0112 MCE DAD PS; No. CIV.S-05-0749

FCD DAD PS; No. CIV.S-05-1157 MCE KJM PS; No. CIV.S-05-2042 FCD GGH

PS.2) All of the actions arise out of plaintiff’s employment as a

substitute teacher with the Sacramento City Unified School District

(“District”). All of the actions involve allegations that the

District and its employees have retaliated against plaintiff for

speaking out against District policies regarding classroom

management, particularly those policies which plaintiff perceives as

being motivated by race, socio-economic factors, or circumstances

related to students’ behavior. Some of the actions additionally name

as defendants the lawyers who have defended the District and its

employees against plaintiff’s numerous legal actions as well as the

judges who have been assigned to preside over those cases. In this

regard, plaintiff typically accuses defense counsel and the judges of

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3 Such accusations appear to be routine for plaintiff, a former

lawyer whom the Supreme Court of Ohio has permanently disbarred from

the practice of law in that state. In 1990, the Supreme Court of

Ohio found “the flagrant disrespect that [Mr. Spittal] has

demonstrated toward the entire judicial system deserving of the legal

profession’s most severe sanction.” Akron Bar Ass’n v. Spittal, 51

Ohio St. 3d 121, 122, 554 N.E. 2d 1338, 1339 (1990). In disbarring

plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Ohio relied on evidence presented to

a disciplinary panel which

established that [Mr. Spittal] routinely, and

without justification, referred to the decisions

made by federal and Ohio judges as being the

product of dishonesty, partiality, ignorance, and

incompetence. The evidence further established

that [Mr. Spittal] routinely, and without

justification, accused judges and attorneys alike

of lying. Indeed, the record manifests that [Mr.

Spittal] made these remarks simply because he

disagreed with a judge’s decision or an

attorney’s argument.

51 Ohio St. 3d at 122, 554 N.E. 2d at 1339.

4

lying, contempt, conspiracy and the like in connection with the

litigation of plaintiff’s claims.3

The named defendants in the instant amended complaint are

District Board of Trustees members Jerry Houseman, Roy Grimes, Karen

Young, Manny Hernandez, Rick Jennings, Dawn McCoy and Miguel

Navarette. District employees Angelle Murry, Francine Dorrough,

Candice Ingle and Cindy Wray, all of whom are employed at the

District’s Marian Anderson Children’s Center (“Center”), also are

named as defendants. The amended complaint alleges that defendants

retaliated against plaintiff after he informed a District co-worker

of a previous incident in which a child allegedly was slapped by a

teacher at the Center. The amended complaint alleges that defendants

retaliated against plaintiff by distributing a letter “that

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4 The pages of the amended complaint are not numbered. This

citation refers to the sixth and seventh pages of the amended

complaint, with the first page being the cover page. The undersigned

cites to other pages of the amended complaint herein in a similar

fashion.

5

instructed parents of the children under Mr. Spittal’s care to

communicate with [defendant head teacher Angelle Murry] if they had

any concerns” regarding plaintiff. (Am. Compl. at 6-7.)4 According

to the amended complaint, that letter and its innuendo stigmatized

plaintiff by “steering the parents away from discussing their

concerns with plaintiff ....” (Id. at 7.) The amended complaint

also asserts in a conclusory fashion that plaintiff was subjected to

“racially motivated verbal assaults” and that his teaching assignment

was ended based on his race. (Id. at 7-8.) Finally, the amended

complaint alleges that plaintiff spoke out against that

discrimination only to be further stigmatized and retaliated against,

in addition to being denied an investigation, a fair hearing process

and so on.

The amended complaint, like the pleadings in plaintiff’s

other actions, contains several general references to the First and

Fourteenth Amendments. Liberally construed, the amended complaint

alleges violations of plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free

speech and his substantive due process rights. The amended complaint

prays for damages and injunctive relief, namely that the District

Board of Trustees be directed to “establish a meaningful enforcement

mechanism for it’s [sic] policy and regulations that proscribe a

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retaliatory act being taken against an employee who reports an act of

unlawful discrimination.” (Id. at 14.)

As an initial matter, it must be noted that plaintiff’s

amended complaint is unfocussed, full of conclusory allegations and 

difficult to decipher. It does not contain “a short and plain

statement” of a claim showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This alone warrants dismissal. See

Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984). Nonetheless, even considering the merits of plaintiff’s

claims, the undersigned concludes that this entire action should be

dismissed with prejudice as to all named defendants for failure to

state a cognizable claim.

More specifically, the undersigned will recommend the

motion to dismiss be granted because the moving defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. Whether a defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity involves a two-step inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 200 (2001). The first step is to ask whether the alleged

facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If this question is answered in the

negative, then "there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity." Id. If the question is answered in

the affirmative, the next step is “to ask whether the right was

clearly established." Id. A constitutional right is clearly

established when "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

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conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202. 

See also Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2002).

With respect to plaintiff’s attempt to state claims based

upon the First Amendment, the alleged facts do not demonstrate that

defendants’ conduct violated plaintiff’s right to free speech. This

is because the allegations of the amended complaint indicate that

plaintiff’s speech as a public employee does not amount to speech

upon “a matter of public concern." See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.

138, 143-46 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563,

568 (1968); Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.

2004). Rather, the alleged speech encompassed by the amended

complaint is simply part of a larger, ongoing internal dispute

between plaintiff and the District and its employees regarding

administrative matters within the District. More specifically,

central to this lawsuit is plaintiff’s complaint that defendants

distributed a letter inviting the parents of students to contact the

school directly, rather than plaintiff, should they have any concerns

about their children and/or plaintiff. Plaintiff obviously has taken

exception to this perceived end-around to his contact with the

parents of students and attempts to blame it on his discussion of the

alleged slapping incident. However, the allegations of the amended

complaint as whole, as well as the content of the documents on file

in plaintiff’s other actions, belie plaintiff’s contention in this

regard. Plaintiff’s concern with defendants obviously amounts to an

individual personnel dispute that clearly is “of no relevance to the

public’s evaluation of the performance of” the District. See

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Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1173. See also Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320

F.3d 968, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]peech that deals with

‘individual personnel disputes and grievances’ and that would be of

‘no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of

governmental agencies’ is generally not of ‘public concern’”). 

Accordingly, accepting the allegations of the amended complaint as

true, the court finds that plaintiff’s speech did not regard a matter

of public concern and defendants did not violate plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights.

Even assuming plaintiff has spoken upon a matter of public

concern, as opposed to a matter only of personal interest, the court

further finds that the District’s interest as an employer in

promoting efficiency of the public services it performs through its

employees outweighs plaintiff’s interest in that speech. See

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Gillbrook v. City of Westminster, 177

F.3d 839, 867 (9th Cir. 1999). In weighing whether the government’s

interest in promoting an effective workplace outweighs an employee’s

First Amendment rights, courts may consider “whether the speech (i)

impairs discipline or control by superiors, (ii) disrupts co-worker

relations, (iii) erodes a close working relationship premised on

personal loyalty and confidentiality, (iv) interferes with the

speaker’s performance of her or his duties, or (v) obstructs the

routine operation of the office.” Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129,

1139 (9th Cir. 1992)(citations omitted). Here, the District’s

interest in maintaining discipline and control in its schools,

communicating with parents, promoting co-worker relations and

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fostering an educational environment outweighs plaintiff’s interest

in spreading information to co-workers regarding the alleged slapping

incident. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 589-90 (1975)(Powell, J.,

dissenting); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School

District, 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)(“[T]he Court has repeatedly

emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the

States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental

constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the

schools.”). For this reason as well, the undersigned finds that

plaintiff’s speech as alleged in the amended complaint is not

protected by the First Amendment. 

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

on plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. The undersigned therefore

will recommend that defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted.

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims also must be

dismissed. As set forth above, the allegations of the amended

complaint, like the allegations in plaintiff’s other actions, boil

down to the assertion that plaintiff is being retaliated against for

speaking out against perceived inequities within District schools. 

As such, plaintiff’s claims must be addressed under the First

Amendment, not substantive due process. This is because "[w]here a

particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government

behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

"substantive due process," must be the guide for analyzing these

claims.’" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting

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Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). As discussed above, the

moving defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s

First Amendment claims. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss 

must be granted with respect to plaintiff’s substantive due process

claims as well.

It also remains clear that plaintiff is attempting to hold

the Board of Trustees defendants liable for the actions of others

under a respondeat superior theory of liability. However, defendants

are not liable for the actions of District employees under such a

theory. More specifically, supervisory personnel generally are not

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of their employees

under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisory position the causal link between the

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th

Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). 

“A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his

subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)(citing

Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81

(9th Cir. 1984)). Vague and conclusory allegations such as those set

forth in the amended complaint concerning the involvement of official

personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v.

Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The undersigned

noted this deficiency the order issued April 15, 2005, dismissing

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plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff has failed to 

cure that deficiency in his amended complaint. For this reason as

well, the motion to dismiss must be granted.

Finally, in the earlier order dismissing plaintiff’s

complaint with leave to amend, the undersigned also observed that

plaintiff had failed to allege facts sufficient to establish

municipal liability arising from any policy of the Board of Trustees. 

See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). 

Again, plaintiff has failed to cure the noted deficiency. In this

regard, the amended complaint contains insufficient allegations

regarding any policy or custom of the Board of Trustees resulting in

a deprivation of constitutional rights; any decision by an official

with final policy-making authority which resulted in a violation of

plaintiff’s rights; or any such official’s ratification of an

unconstitutional decision by a subordinate. See Gillette v. Delmore,

979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992).

For all of the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s amended

complaint is fatally deficient. Moreover, the arguments presented by

plaintiff in the motions brought before the court in this and his

other cases are frivolous. Finally, whatever his intentions, through

the numerous lawsuits filed in this court involving essentially the

same subject or plaintiff’s displeasure with the results obtained in

prior litigation with respect thereto, plaintiff has engaged in

conduct that has harassed the named defendants. For all these

reasons, it appears clear that plaintiff cannot cure the defects in

his amended complaint. Granting leave to amend under these

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circumstances would be futile. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912

F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo

Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“When a case may be

classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by definition, no

merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to

amend.”) Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend that this

action be dismissed with prejudice.

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having determined that the amended complaint fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned will

recommend that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. no. 16) be granted;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. no. 18) be

denied; and

3. Plaintiff’s amended complaint be dismissed with

prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. 

Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

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Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s

order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 16, 2005.

DAD:th

DDad1\orders.prose\spittal0112.f&r.dism

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