Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02831/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02831-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cr4522-LAB-1 and

16cv2831-LAB

ORDER DENYING MOTION

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

vs.

DORIAN SHAREEF FOWLER,

Defendant.

Defendant Dorian Shareef Fowler was convicted at trial of one count of importing

cocaine. He took a direct appeal, which was denied on October 18, 2013, and the Ninth

Circuit’s mandate issued on November 13, 2013. He did not file a petition for writ of

certiorari. Judgment therefore became final 90 days after October 18, 2013, on January 16,

2014. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987); United States v. Garcia, 210

F.3d 1058, 1061 and n.6 (9th Cir. 2000).

On April 7, 2015, Fowler filed a pro se motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) for reduction

of his sentence. The Court denied his claims on November 4, 2016.1 Then on November

17, 2016, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On December 1, 2016, Fowler

appealed the denial of his § 3582(c) motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s denial

of Fowler’s § 3582(c) motion and the mandate was spread on January 9, 2018. 

1 The Court summarily denied his motion without prejudice under General Order 642.

Fowler’s claims were then refiled by counsel. The Court then denied the renewed claims.

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The Court now turns to Fowler’s pending § 2255 motion. Under § 2255(f), claims are

subject to a one-year limitations period. Here, that period began to run on the date Fowler’s

conviction became final, i.e., on January 16, 2014. The one-year limitations period expired

a year later. But he did not file his 2255 motion until another year and ten months had

elapsed. Unless he is entitled to tolling for some reason, his claims are therefore timebarred.

Fowler’s filing of his § 3582(c) motion did not prevent his judgment from becoming

final so as to delay the onset of the one-year limitations period. See United States v.

Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)) (holding that

neither a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 motion nor a § 3582(c) motion prevents a conviction from

becoming final for § 2255 purposes). Nor did the pendency of his § 3582(c) motion toll the

limitations period. See id. at 1224 (holding that petitioner was not entitled to tolling of

§ 2255's limitations period).

Furthermore, Fowler cannot establish that he was pursuing his rights diligently but that

some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing a timely § 2255 motion. See

United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014). The fact that he was

able to file of his own pro se § 3582(c) motion on April 7, 2015 makes this clear. See

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that he was

unable to prepare and file a habeas petition, because the record showed he could and did

file other substantial motions during the same time period).

Because the claims Fowler raises in his § 2255 motion are all time-barred by nearly

two years, his motion is DENIED.

Even assuming Fowler’s claims were not time-barred, they would be denied for other

reasons. Except for his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (which lack merit),2all of

his claims could have been raised on direct appeal, and are therefore defaulted. See

2 Fowler’s motion identifies numerous “errors” that in fact were either not errors at all,

were beyond his counsel’s control, were not reasonably likely to have prejudiced him, or

amounted to mere differences of opinion about trial strategy. See Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

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Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,

621 (1998). By way of excusing his default, Fowler claims his counsel failed to consult with

him about what claims to raise on appeal. But, as the Supreme Court has recently

reiterated, “appellate counsel should not raise every nonfrivolous argument on appeal, but

rather only those arguments most likely to succeed.” Davila v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2067

(2017). The arguments Fowler points to are not more meritorious than the ones he actually

raised on direct appeal. The fact that he disagrees with his counsel’s reasonable decisions

about which issues to raise on appeal does not excuse the default. See Reed v. Ross, 468

U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (“[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, a defendant is bound by the tactical

decisions of competent counsel.”); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) (appellate

counsel has no duty to raise every colorable claim a defendant suggests). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 18, 2018

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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