Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01235/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01235-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY BRYANT BOWMAN, II,

Petitioner,

v.

SUSAN PERRY, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 15-cv-01235-BAS(KSC)

ORDER:

(1)GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS [ECF No. 23]; AND

(2)DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AS MOOT

[ECF No. 33]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Jerry Bryant Bowman, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenges his 2010 conviction 

in San Diego Superior Court case no. SCS227759. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 9.) The Court has 

read and considered the Petition [ECF No. 9], the Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of 

Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 23], Petitioner’s 

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 31], the lodgments and other documents 

filed in this case, and the legal arguments presented by both parties. For the reasons 

discussed below, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 23], and 

DENIES Bowman’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF no. 33] as moot.

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bowman was convicted of robbery and false imprisonment in San Diego County 

Superior Court case no. SCS227759 in 2010. (See Lodgment No. 10 at 1; People v. 

Bowman, 202 Cal. App. 4th 353 (2011).) He was sentenced to 16 years in prison. Bowman, 

202 Cal. App. 4th at 356. 

Bowman appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth 

Appellate District, which affirmed the conviction in a published opinion. Bowman, 202 

Cal. App. 4th 353. Bowman filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, 

which the Court denied on March 14, 2012, without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 

1.)

Bowman then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of 

Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District on November 20, 2012. (Lodgment No. 2.) That 

Court denied the petition on November 30, 2012. (Id.)

Next, Bowman constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court on January 10, 2013. (Lodgment No. 3.)1 That Court denied 

the petition without citation of authority on June 12, 2013. (Lodgment No. 4.) 

Bowman then constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District on September 16, 2014. 

(Lodgment No. 5.) That Court denied the petition in a written opinion on September 30, 

2014. (Lodgment No. 6.)

Thereafter, Bowman constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court October 17, 2014. (Lodgment No. 7.) The Court denied that 

petition on April 1, 2015, citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1988), and In re Clark, 

5 Cal. 4th 750, 767-69 (1993). (Lodgment No. 8.) 

 

1 A notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed at the moment the prisoner delivers it to prison 

authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the court. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). The Ninth 

Circuit has held that for purposes of calculating the AEDPA limitation period, the Houston mailbox rule 

applies to both the prisoner’s federal habeas petition and the state court habeas petitions that began the 

period of tolling. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Next, Bowman constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District on May 26, 2015. (Lodgment 

No. 9.) That Court denied the petition in a written opinion on June 11, 2015. (Lodgment 

No. 10.) 

Bowman constructively filed his final state court habeas corpus petition in the 

California Supreme Court on June 28, 2015. (Lodgment No. 11.) That Court denied the 

petition without citation of authority on October 21, 2015. (Lodgment No. 12.)

Bowman constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on May 22, 2015 [ECF No. 1], and an Amended Petition on 

July 22, 2015 [ECF No. 9]. An Order granting Bowman leave to amend his petition was 

filed on December 3, 2015 [ECF No. 18], but Bowman never filed a second amended 

petition. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on March 18, 2016 [ECF No. 23]. Bowman 

filed an opposition to the motion on May 25, 2016 [ECF No. 31]. Bowman subsequently 

filed supplemental documents in support of his petition and medical records in support of 

his petition [ECF Nos. 34, 35].2

III. DISCUSSION

Although it is difficult to discern the exact nature of Bowman’s claims from his 

filings, as best the Court can determine Bowman alleges his sentence was improper, his 

trial attorney was ineffective for failing to attack his sentence, his appellate attorney was 

ineffective for failing to raise the improper sentence and ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims, and the state court’s denial of his request to be resentenced under Proposition 47 

was improper. (See Am. Pet. at 6-10, 38.) Respondent contends Bowman’s claims

regarding his sentence and conviction are time barred, and that his Proposition 47 claim is 

meritless. (Mot. to Dismiss at 4-8.) 

/ / /

 

2 Although Bowman was granted in forma pauperis status on September 3, 2015, ECF No. 12, he filed a 

second motion to proceed in forma pauperis on July 14, 2016 [ECF No. 33].

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A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under 

AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the 

merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. 

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court 

is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, 

the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state 

court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 

(2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a petitioner has one year from the date his or her 

conviction is final to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The statute of limitations, however, is subject to 

both statutory and equitable tolling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Calderon v. United States 

Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The date the statute of limitations began to run for Bowman’s claims attacking the 

validity of his conviction and sentence is different from the date the statute of limitations 

began to run for his Proposition 47 claims. See Butler v. Long, 752 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012) and stating

that “AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1) applies to each claim in a 

habeas application on an individual basis”). Accordingly, the Court will address the 

timeliness of the claims separately.

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Commencement of the One-Year Statute of Limitations

Bowman was convicted in San Diego Superior Court case no. SCS227759 of 

robbery and false imprisonment. He appealed his conviction to the California Court of 

Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One. People v. Bowman, 202 Cal. App. 

4th 353 (2011). That Court upheld his conviction in a published opinion. Id. Bowman 

then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court; the State Supreme Court 

denied the petition on March 14, 2012. (Lodgment No. 1.) Bowman did not file a petition 

for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Thus, Bowman’s conviction 

became final ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied his petition. 

McMonagle v. Meyer, 802 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2015); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Ninety days after March 14, 2012, is June 12, 2012.3 The statute 

of limitations began running the next day, June 13, 2012. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 6(a). Absent 

statutory or equitable tolling, Bowman’s federal habeas corpus petition was due June 13, 

2013.

1. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not be 

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Bowman filed his first state habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal for 

the Fifth Appellate District on November 20, 2012. (Lodgment No. 1.) By that time, a 

period of 159 days had passed, leaving 206 days of the statute of limitations remaining. 

The state appellate court denied the petition on November 30, 2012, without citation of 

authority. (Lodgment No. 2.) Bowman then constructively filed a petition for writ of

/ / /

/ / /

 

3 Respondent states Bowman’s conviction became final on June 10, 2012, but there are only 88 days 

between those dates. (See Answer at 5.)

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habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on January 10, 2013, which that Court

denied on June 12, 2013. (Lodgment Nos. 3-4.)4 

The Supreme Court has stated that “an application is pending as long as the ordinary 

state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’—i.e., ‘until the completion of’ that 

process.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002). This includes the time during 

which a petition is being considered by a state court and, generally speaking, the time 

between filings (gap tolling), unless the petitions filed in the state courts were untimely or

successive. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Evans v. 

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 199-200 (2006). The Supreme Court has noted that a reasonable 

time period between state filings is 30 to 60 days. Evans, 546 U.S. at 199-201 (citing 

Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-23). Bowman filed his habeas corpus petition in the California 

Supreme Court within 60 days of the state appellate court’s denial, and the California 

Supreme Court did not deny the petition as untimely or successive. Bowman is therefore 

entitled to statutory tolling for the entire period his habeas corpus petitions were pending 

before California courts, from November 20, 2012, when he filed his habeas corpus petition

in the California appellate court, until the California Supreme Court denied his petition on 

June 12, 2013. 

On June 12, 2013, when the California Supreme Court denied his petition, Bowman 

had 206 remaining of the 365-day statute of limitations within which to file his federal 

habeas corpus petition. His federal petition was therefore due by January 6, 2014.

5

Bowman did not file another state habeas corpus petition until September 16, 2014. 

(Lodgment No. 5.) By then, the statute of limitations had run out. Accordingly, Bowman 

is not entitled to any additional statutory tolling for the state habeas corpus petitions he 

 

4 The petition is signed January 10, 2013, and there is a proof of service and letter attached to the petition 

that is dated December 21, 2012. It is not clear which of these dates should be used as the date the petition 

was handed to prison authorities for mailing under Houston. Since Bowman is entitled to “gap” tolling, 

however, the Court need not decide the issue.

5

206 days from June 12, 2013 is Saturday, January 4, 2016, and thus Bowman would have had to file his 

petition the following Monday, January 6, 2014.

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filed. Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). His petition is therefore untimely 

unless he is entitled to sufficient equitable tolling to render it timely.

2. Equitable tolling

“To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been 

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 

way’ and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007) 

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Equitable tolling is unavailable 

in most cases, and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that mental impairment may constitute a sufficient 

“extraordinary circumstance” to warrant equitable tolling. In Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 

(9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit articulated a two-part test to make this determination:

The impairment must have (1) been “so severe that the petitioner was 

unable personally . . . to understand the need to timely file . . . a habeas 

petition,’ and (2) “made it impossible under the totality of the 

circumstances to meet the filing deadline despite petitioner’s diligence.”

Id. at 1093. This is not “a mechanical rule”; rather, equitable tolling 

determinations require “a flexibl[e], case-by-case approach.” Id. at 1096 

(quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 650, 130 S. Ct. 2549) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2014).

Bowman has submitted extensive medical records documenting his mental health 

treatment while in prison, dating back to at least 2004. The relevant time period in

Bowman’s case, however, is between June 12, 2013, when the California Supreme Court 

denied his habeas corpus petition, and January 6, 2014, when the statute of limitations ran 

out. In April of 2013, psychiatric notes indicate Bowman was suffering from 

schizoaffective disorder. He was “currently stable and functioning adequately.” (Pet’rs 

Med. Records, ECF No. 35 at 100.) The notes further state that Bowman was “grossly 

exaggerating his symptoms.” (Id. at 104.) In July of 2013, prison psychiatrists stated he 

had been free of psychiatric symptoms for the preceding 6 months. (Pet’rs Med. Records, 

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ECF 35-1 at 72.) A Mental Health Treatment Plan from July of 2013 also notes: 

IMP [inmate/patient] has an extensive history of feigning and/or 

exaggerating sxs [symptoms] for secondary gain. IMP has a history of 

being evasive, vague, and inconsistent in his reports of his mental health 

sxs. IMP has a history of stating he wants to be EOP [Enhanced Outpatient 

Program] and when informed that he does not meet criteria, stating he wants 

to be removed from CCCMS [Correctional Clinical Case Management 

Services]. IMP has self-reported hx [history] of SI/SA [suicidal 

ideation/suicide attempt] in which his self-reported self-injurious behaviors 

prior to admission to CDCR [California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation] cannot be independently verified . . . IMP currently denies 

any overt mental health sxs, has presented as stable and functioning 

adequately, has maintained a job as porter, and custody reports that IMP is 

stable. IDTT [Interdisciplinary Treatment Team] determined that IMP is no 

longer appropriate for placement in MHSDS [Mental Health Services 

Delivery System].

6

(Pet’rs Med. Records, ECF No. 35-3 at 8.)

In October of 2013, the records indicate Bowman was placed in Administrative 

Segregation due to safety concerns and possible suicide watch. (Pet’rs Med. Records, ECF 

35-3 at 5, ECF No. 35-1 at 135.) At that time, Bowman denied having any mental health 

concerns or issues. A prison psychiatrist noted that he appeared to have some mental health 

problems but was not suffering from psychosis. Bowman denied having suicidal or 

homicidal ideation. (Pet’rs Med. Records, ECF 35 at 94-100.) In November of 2013, he 

had a medication review. (Pet’rs Med. Records, ECF 35-1 at 64.) From October through 

December, 2013, he displayed no signs of psychiatric impairment according to the progress 

notes. (Id. at 126-34.)

Notes from May and June of 2014 indicate Bowman was evaluated and found to be 

“alert and appropriately oriented to time, place, person, and situation.” (Id. at 124.) The 

notes also indicate “[h]e displayed speech which assertive, timely, to-the-point, clear, 

 

6 All abbreviations are taken from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation website, 

located at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/.

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linear, organized, alert and appropriately oriented to time, place, person, and situation” and 

that “[h]e displayed speech which assertive, timely, to-the-point, clear, linear, organized,

directed, and void of extraneous content.” (Id.) The most recent notes are from March of 

2016. In those notes, Bowman indicated he was depressed and feared for his safety in 

prison. (Id. at 114-17.) The psychiatric notes indicate he had no thoughts of self-harm or 

harming others, and was oriented to time and place, was clean and well spoken. (Id. 115.) 

It is clear from the medical records Bowman has submitted that he suffers from 

mental health issues, and has suffered from these problems for some time. But his 

impairment was not so severe that he was “unable to rationally or factually personally 

understand the need to timely file,” or that his “mental state rendered him unable personally 

to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1099-1100. 

Further, Bowman cannot establish that he was “diligen[t] in pursuing the claims to the 

extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to 

meet the filing deadline under the totality of circumstances, including reasonably available 

access to assistance.” Id. Accordingly, he is not entitled to any equitable tolling, and the 

claims in his petition relating to his conviction and sentence are untimely.

3. Proposition 47 Claim

Bowman claims he is entitled to be resentenced under Proposition 47 and that the 

state court’s denial of this claims was incorrect. (Am. Pet. at 10.) Proposition 47, passed 

by California voters on November 4, 2014, became effective November 5, 2014. Cal. Penal 

Code § 1170.18 (West 2014). It provides, in part, as follows:

(a) A person currently serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by 

trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a 

misdemeanor under the act that added this section (“this act”) had this act 

been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence 

before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her 

case to request resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 

11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 

496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have been amended or 

added by this act.

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Cal. Penal Code § 1170.18.

The statute of limitations for Bowman’s Proposition 47 claim began to run on the 

effective date of the legislation, November 5, 2014. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(D) (stating

the limitations period runs from the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence).

Bowman had until November 6, 2015, to file his federal habeas corpus petition. He 

constructively filed his original petition in this Court on May 22, 2015, and his amended 

petition on July 22, 2015. His Proposition 47 claim is therefore timely.

As Respondent points out, however, the claim is meritless. Bowman was convicted 

of robbery, a violation of California Penal Code § 211, and false imprisonment, a violation 

of California Penal Code § 236. Bowman, 202 Cal. App. 4th at 355. Neither of those code 

sections are included in California Penal Code § 1170.18. To the extent Bowman is seeking 

to apply Proposition 47 to his prior convictions which were used to enhance his sentence, 

Proposition 47 applies only to crimes for which a defendant is currently serving a sentence. 

Cal. Penal Code § 1170.18. Even if Proposition 47 applied to prior convictions, Bowman’s 

prior convictions are for California Penal Code § 211 and California Health and Safety 

Code § 11360, neither of which is included in California Penal Code § 1170.18. (See

Lodgment No. 5 at 45-48.) Thus, Bowman is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss

[ECF No. 23]. Bowman’s claims relating to his conviction and sentence are untimely 

because, even with statutory tolling, they were filed beyond the one-year statute of 

limitations provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Bowman’s Proposition 47 claim is timely 

but meritless. The Court DENIES Bowman’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, filed 

on July 14, 2016 [ECF No. 33] as moot.

Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. § 2254 require the District Court to “issue 

or deny a certificate of appealability [COA] when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.” Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (West Supp. 2013). A COA will issue when 

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the petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253; Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). A “substantial 

showing” requires a demonstration that “‘reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 984 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, the 

Court concludes Bowman has not made the required showing, and therefore a certificate 

of appealability is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 27, 2016

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