Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00351/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

---

WO IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

RONALD ARGENTO, et al, )

)

 Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

SYLVANIA LIGHTING SERVICES CORP., )

) No. 2:13-cv-0351-HRH

 Defendant. )

__________________________________________) 

O R D E R

Motion for Summary Judgment as to Claims Alleged by 

Plaintiffs Clifton Anthony, Hector Daza-Frias, Juan Forrellat. and Craig Zuchelkowski

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the claims alleged by plaintiffs Clifton

Anthony, Hector Daza-Frias, Juan Forrellat, and Craig Zuchelkowski.

1 This motion is

opposed.2 Oral argument was requested by defendants. However, the issues before the

court are largely legal in nature and have been well researched and briefed. Oral argument

would not be helpful.3

1Docket No. 178. 

2Docket No. 188. 

3A district court may decide amotionfor summaryjudgment “without oral argument

(continued...)

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 1 of 21
Facts

Plaintiffs Clifton Anthony, Hector Daza-Frias, Juan Forrellat, and Craig

Zuchelkowski4 worked for defendant Sylvania Lighting Services Corporation on a lighting

service project for the Clark County School District (CCSD) in Nevada. The CCSD project

began in July 2011 and ended in January of 2012. Plaintiffs allege that they worked more

than 40 hours per week while working on the CCSD project but that they were only paid

for 40 hours of work per week no matter how many hours they actually worked. 

On February 24, 2012, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant for unpaid

overtime with the Nevada Labor Commission. The claims were referred to CCSD for

investigation, which made a series of determinations, to which plaintiffs were allowed to

object.5 A pre-hearing conference was held in March 2013, after which discovery was taken,

and then a Final Hearing was held on January 22, 2014.6 On May 5, 2014, a Final Order was

3

(...continued)

if the parties can submit their papers to the court.” Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

4Any reference to “plaintiffs” herein is limited to these four plaintiffs. 

5

Final Order at 1, Exhibit 1, Defendant’s Request forJudicial Notice [etc.], Docket No.

178-2. Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice of the final order of the Nevada

Labor Commission. Plaintiffs do not oppose the court taking judicial notice of the Final

Order. See Plaintiffs’ Response [etc.] at 1, Docket No. 188. The court will take judicial notice

of the Final Order. 

6

Final Order at 1, Exhibit 1, Defendant’s Request forJudicial Notice [etc.], Docket No.

(continued...)

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 2 of 21
filed. The ALJ determined that plaintiffs were due overtime that they had not been paid.7

Zuchelkowski was awarded $12,041.87 in back overtime wages; Anthony was awarded

$10,292.16; Diaz-Frias was awarded $5,978.90; and Forrellat was awarded $6,119.52.8 The

ALJ declined to assess any forfeitures against defendant, which are available under Nevada

law “against a contractor where the worker is not paid the applicable prevailing wage rate

for work performed on a prevailing wage project.”9 The ALJ declined to assess any

forfeitures because they would have been retained by CCSD and the ALJ felt that such an

assessment would be a windfall for CCSD “given [its] failure to meet [its] statutory

responsibilities under NRS 338.070.”10 The ALJ also declined to assess any administrative

fines or penalties against defendant, even though plaintiffs’ counsel argued that “such fines

should be assessed because Sylvania took this matter to hearing thereby costing each of the

parties involved thousands of dollars in costs.”11 Because the determinations that CCSD

6

(...continued)

178-2. 

7

Id. at 8-9. 

8

Id. at 13. 

9

Id. at 10. 

10

Id.

11

Id.

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 3 of 21
made afterits investigation favored defendant, the ALJ concluded that “[p]enalties will not

be assessed against Sylvania simply because they elected to accept CCSD’s findings.”12

Although plaintiffs could have sought judicial review of the Final Order, no appeal

was taken. Rather, plaintiffs signed release forms “in order to receive payment of the

award....”13 The release provided that plaintiffs were discharging the “State of Nevada, the

Department of Business & Industry, and the Office of the Labor Commissioner, ... and all

other state and local agencies” from any claims “arising out of, or by reason of, the

investigation of the allegations raised in this matter and other matters relating thereto.”14

Plaintiffs “waive[d] all rights to file any additional such claims, actions, etc, relating to such

wage claim[s].”15 

While the Nevada administrative proceedings were ongoing, this action was

commenced. On December 20, 2013, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in which they

assert a single FLSA overtime claim. Plaintiffs allege that “they worked more than forty

12

Id. 

13Declaration of Plaintiff Clifton Anthony at ¶ 2, Exhibit A; Declaration of Plaintiff

Craig Zuchelkowski at ¶ 3, Exhibit B; Declaration of Plaintiff Hector Daza-Frias at ¶ 2,

Exhibit C; and Forrellat Release at 1, Exhibit D; Plaintiffs’ Response [etc.], Docket No. 188. 

14

Forrellat Release at 1, Exhibit D, Plaintiffs’ Response [etc.], Docket No. 188. 

15

Id.

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 4 of 21
hours in a workweek” and that defendant failed to pay them overtime.16 More specifically,

plaintiffs allege that “[t]hey worked an average of ten (10) to twelve (12) hours per

workday.”17 Although not specifically alleged, these overtime claims appearto be based on

pre- and post-shift work. And, plaintiffs Anthony and Zuchelkowski allege that from late

August or early September 2011, “they worked between eleven (11) to fourteen (14) hours

per day” because they became “designated drivers on the CCSD Project....”18 Plaintiffs also

generally alleged that they were required to work during their unpaid meals breaks at

times.19 Plaintiffs seek the overtime they contend they are due and liquidated damages in

an amount equal to their unpaid overtime. 

Defendant now moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ FLSA claims on the

grounds that these claims are barred by res judicata because of the Final Order in the

Nevada administrative proceedings. Defendant contends that allowing plaintiffs to pursue

their FLSA claims could result in plaintiffs obtaining a double recovery. 

16

First Amended Complaint at 2, ¶ 1, Docket No. 39. 

17

Id. at 9, ¶ 67. 

18

Id. at ¶ 68. 

19

Id. at 10, ¶ 72. There are also some allegations in the amended complaint of

employees not being paid fortravel time, but these plaintiffs’ FLSA overtime claims are not

based on allegations of unpaid travel time. 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 5 of 21
Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

initial burden is on the moving party to show that there is an absence of genuine issues of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets

its initial burden, then the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In

deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence of the non-movant

in the light most favorable to that party, and all justifiable inferences are also to be drawn

in its favor. Id. at 255. “[T]he court’s ultimate inquiry is to determine whether the ‘specific

facts’ set forth by the nonmoving party, coupled with undisputed background or contextual

facts, are such that a rational or reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor based on

that evidence.” T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631

(9th Cir. 1987). 

“The concept of res judicata embraces two doctrines, claim preclusion and issue

preclusion (or collateral estoppel), that bar, respectively, a subsequent action or the

subsequent litigation of a particular issue because of the adjudication of a prior action. 

McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted). Claim

preclusion treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 6 of 21
between the same parties on the same claim or cause of action.” Id. (footnote and citation

omitted).

The threshold issue here is whether an unreviewed orderfrom a state administrative

agency or commission can be given preclusive effect in a FLSA case. “Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738

requires that [courts] give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments as they would

be given in the state in which they were rendered.” Miller v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d

1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 1994). However, “Section 1738 does not govern cases involving

unreviewed decisions of a state administrative hearing board or commission.” Id. 

“Nonetheless, as a matter of federal common law, federal courts give preclusive effect to the

findings of state administrative tribunals in subsequent actions under § 1983.” Id. However,

federal courts do not give unreviewed administrative determinations preclusive effect for

Title VII claims. Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796 (1986). But, this is not a §

1983 action, nor is it a Title VII case. This case involves only FLSA claims, and the Ninth

Circuit has never considered whether preclusive effect should be given to unreviewed

decisions of a state administrative commission or agency in a subsequent FLSA case. 

There are cases from otherjurisdictions that have considered the question of whether

an unreviewed decision of a state administrative agency or commission should be given

preclusive effect in a subsequent FLSA case. In Akwesi v. Uptown Lube & C/W, Inc., No.

07 Civ. 335(NRB), 2007 WL 4326732, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007), the plaintiffs filed a 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 7 of 21
complaint on June 14, 2005 with the New York State Department of Labor “claiming that

Uptown Lube failed to pay its employees proper overtime wages.” The Department of

Labor issued a Final Report of its investigation on March 10, 2006, in which it “determined

that Uptown Lube had paid overtime’, but had ‘failed to pay spread of hours forthe period

10/03-11/05.’” Id. “‘Spread of hours’ is a species of overtime payment required by New

York state labor regulations, but not by federal law.” Id. Basically, it requires that “[i]n

addition to overtime at one and one half times the regular rate, an employer must pay an

employee one extra hour’s worth of wages for every day the employee’s workday extends

beyond ten hours.” Id. The Department of Labor awarded the plaintiffs back overtime pay

and Uptown Lube paid each plaintiff the back “spread of hours” overtime pay he or she was

due. Id. at *2. On January 16, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court against

Uptown Lube, alleging a FLSA overtime claim and other state law claims. Id. Uptown

Lube moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. Id. The court rejected the “defendant’s

first argument ... that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), because any case or controversy has been rendered

moot by the NYS DOL findings and subsequent payments.” Id. at *3. The court found that

it did not 

need [to] even address the question of whether the NYS DOL

findings-the judicially unreviewed findings of a state administrative agency-are entitled to preclusive effect in this Court, for

it is clear that Uptown Lube remained in business for a period

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 8 of 21
of time after the conclusion of the NYS DOL investigation, and

therefore this Court would retain jurisdiction over at least a

portion of plaintiffs’ claims even if we were to give preclusive

effect to the NYS DOL findings. 

Id. However, the court did “note that it will be unlikely that defendant can assert preclusion

on the basis of the NYS DOL investigation. While unreviewed factual determinations of

state agencies may be given preclusive effect in federal court, this is not so in all circumstances, and appears to not be so in suits brought under the FLSA.” Id. (internal citation

omitted). The court also noted that “the broad remedial purpose underlying the FLSA

seems antithetical to common law doctrines of preclusion.” Id. at *3 n.12. 

The Akwesi court cited to Solimino v. Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association,

901 F.2d 1148 (2nd Cir. 1990), as the authority supporting the proposition that preclusive

effect should not be given to unreviewed state agency decisions in FLSA cases. Solimino

involved the question of whether preclusive effect should be given to an unreviewed state

agency decision in a subsequent ADEA case. Id. at 1149. The plaintiffs argued that the court

should look to Title VII cases for guidance and the defendant suggested that the court

should look to FLSA cases instead. The court observed that 

assuming arguendo that we should look to the FLSA instead of

Title VII for guidance as to the preclusion issue in this ADEA

suit, Astoria fails to cite any part of the FLSA or its interpretive

caselaw that indicates Congress intended in the FLSA to give

preclusive effect to the judicially unreviewed fact-finding of a

state administrative agency. 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 9 of 21
Id. at 1152. 

In Thakkar v. Balasuriya, Case No. H-09-0841, 2009 WL 2996727, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept.

9, 2009), the defendants argued that Thakkar’s FLSA claims were barred by an earlier

unreviewed state agency decision. The court “conclude[d] that Thakkar’s FLSA claims are

not exempt from common law preclusion and that the FLSA claims that Thakkar has

asserted in this action are barred by collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).” Id. at *4. The

court explained that 

Thakkar has failed ... to show that Congress intended the

FLSA’s administrative scheme to exempt FLSA claims from

common law principles of preclusion. Absent a showing of

Congressional intent to the contrary, the court concludes that

the FLSA claims at issue in this case are not exempt from

common law principles of preclusion.

Id. at *5. 

Similarly, the court in Jones v. Hamic, 875 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1349 (M.D. Ala. 2012),

concluded “that unreviewed state agency findings can be given collateral estoppel effect in

a FLSA suit.” The court explained: 

In Elliott, the Supreme Court implied strongly that there exists

a presumption in favor of preclusion, and that the party

challenging the preclusive effect of an unreviewed state agency

decision bears the heavy burden of showing that Congress

intended to rebut the presumption. Indeed, Congress knows

about federal preclusion law when it legislates, and absent a

strong showing that it intended to override firmly entrenched

preclusion law by enacting FLSA, this Court will give the

ADIR’s findings collateral estoppel effect to the extent that an

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 10 of 21
Alabama court would. Doing so furthers the principles of

federalism, comity, efficiency, and repose underlying the

collateral estoppel doctrine. Here, Jones has failed to offer up

an argument about whether Congress intended FLSA to

override federal preclusion law.

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Here, plaintiffs argue that preclusive effect to unreviewed state agency decisions

should not be given in FLSA cases because FLSA is a remedial statute. See Lambert v.

Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999) (“the FLSA is a remedial statute”). Plaintiffs also

suggest that the Ninth Circuit recognizes similarities between Title VII, the ADEA, and the

FLSA, implying that because preclusive effect is not given for Title VII and ADEA claims,

it then follows that preclusive effect should not be given to unreviewed decisions by state

agencies in FLSA cases. Plaintiffs also point out that “[w]hile the Ninth Circuit has not

specifically addressed the question of whether FLSA claims may only be settled and

resolved intwo ways, district courts intheNinthCircuit have followed Lynn’s Food Stores.” 

McKeen v. Chaplin v. Franklin American Mortg. Co., Case No. C 10–5243 SBA, 2012 WL

6629608, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012). In Lynn’s Food Stores, the court stated: 

There are only two ways in which back wage claims arising

under the FLSA can be settled or compromised by employees.

First, under section 216(c), the Secretary of Labor is authorized

to supervise payment to employees of unpaid wages owed to

them. An employee who accepts such a payment supervised by

the Secretary thereby waives his right to bring suit for both the

unpaid wages and for liquidated damages, provided the

employer pays in full the back wages. 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 11 of 21
The only other route for compromise of FLSA claims is provided in the context of suits brought directly by employees

against their employer under section 216(b) to recover back

wages for FLSA violations. 

Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States ex rel. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352-53

(11th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted). Plaintiffs argue that because there are only two ways in

which to resolve a FLSA claim, eitherthrough the Department of Labor orthrough a lawsuit

brought under Section 216(b),thatmeans thatunreviewed decisions of a state agency should

not be given preclusive effect. Thus, plaintiffs urge the court to follow Akwesi and Solimino

and conclude that preclusive effect should not be given to unreviewed decisions of a state

agency in FLSA cases.

The court finds Akwesi unpersuasive. As for Solimino, all the court stated there was

that the defendant had not pointed to anything that suggested that Congress intended that

unreviewed state court decisions would have preclusive effect as to FLSA claims. But, the

contrary is true as well. There is nothing in the FLSA that indicates that Congress did not

intend that the usual presumption of preclusion should apply. The fact that the FLSA is a

remedial statute does not mean that the usual presumption of preclusion should not apply. 

As for plaintiffs’ reliance as Lynn’s Foods, that case concerned the ways in which FLSA

wage claims could be settled and did not deal with the question of whether preclusive effect

should be given to unreviewed decisions of a state agency or commission. 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 12 of 21
As to that question, the court finds Gorney v. Arizona Board of Regents, 43 F. Supp.

3d 946, 1204 (D. Ariz. 2014), persuasive. There, the plaintiff alleged that he had been

wrongfully terminated from the University of Arizona. Id. at 949. The plaintiff requested

and was granted a post-termination hearing. Id. at 950. The review panel issued a Hearing

Decision upholding the plaintiff’s termination, which was accepted by the University’s

Senior Vice-President and affirmed on reconsideration. Id. The plaintiff was advised that

he could appeal the termination decision to the Arizona Superior Court, but he did not take

such an appeal. Id. at 950-51. Instead, he filed suit in federal district court, asserting, among

other claims, a FLSA overtime claim and a FLSA retaliation claim. Id. at 949-50. The

defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, “arguing, among

other things, that [the p]laintiff failed to appeal from the University’s decision discharging

him from employment by filing an action in Superior Court under the Administrative

Review Act, and that this failure precludes him from filing the claims raised in the FAC.”

Id. at 950 (internal citations omitted). The court considered whether claim preclusion could

be applied in this situation and concluded that it could under the criteria set forth in United

States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).20 Id. at 953-55.

20The Ninth Circuit has “held that the federal common law rules of preclusion

described in Elliott extend to state administrative adjudications of legal as well as factual

issues, even if unreviewed, so long as the state proceeding satisfies the requirements of

fairness outlined in Utah Construction, 384 U.S. at 422[.]” Guild Wineries and Distilleries

v. Whitehall Co., 853 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 13 of 21
“The fairness requirements of Utah Construction are: (1) that the administrative

agency act in a judicial capacity, (2) that the agency resolve disputed issues of fact properly

before it, and (3) that the parties have an adequate opportunity to litigate.” Miller, 39 F.3d

at 1033. Here, the fairness requirements are plainly met. 

The Nevada Labor Commission ALJ was acting in a judicial capacity. “[O]ne of the

factors indicating that the administrative agency had actedinthe ‘judicial capacity’ required

by Utah Construction [is] that the [plaintiff] had both the right to seek a rehearing before the

agency and the right to petition for review in superior court.” Wehrli v. County of Orange,

175 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs had such rights. In addition,

the ALJ heard motions, conducted a hearing, and awarded plaintiffs a monetary judgment,

all of which indicates that the ALJ was acting in a judicial capacity. The ALJ also resolved

issues of fact properly before him. And, plaintiffs had an adequate opportunity to litigate

their overtime claims in the Nevada proceedings. They engaged in motion practice,

participated in evidentiary hearings, were represented by counsel, and introduced witness

testimony.

Because the fairness requirements of Utah Construction are met, the court concludes

that preclusive effect can be given an unreviewed decision by a state administrative

commission or agency in a FLSA case. The next question then is whether the Final Order

should be given preclusive effect. 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 14 of 21
To determine what the preclusive effect of the Final Order would be, the court looks

to Nevada law. Olson v. Morris, 188 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999). Nevada has “adopted

the doctrine of administrative res judicata....” Campbell v. Nev., Dep’t of Taxation, 827 P.2d

833, 835 (Nev. 1992). For res judicata to apply the 1) “the issue decided in the prior

adjudication” must be “identical to the issue presented in the action in question;” 2) there

must be “a final judgment on the merits;” and 3) “the party against whom the judgment is

asserted” must have been “a party, or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” 

Britton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 799 P.2d 568, 570 (Nev. 1990). These three factors apply to

both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 194 P.3d 709,

713 (Nev. 2008). Issue preclusion requires consideration of a fourth factor as well, which is

whether “the issue was actually and necessarily litigated.” Id. Under Nevada law, “claim

preclusion may apply in a suit to preclude both claims that were or could have been raised

in a prior suit, while issue preclusion would not preclude those issues not raised in the prior

suit.” Id. at 714. 

identical claim or issue

“For the purposes of defining a ‘claim’ under Nevada law, ‘[t]he authorities agree

that when the same evidence supports both the present and the former cause of action, the

two causes of action are identical.’” Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Round Hill Gen. ImprovementDist. v. B–Neva, Inc., 606 P.2d 176, 178 (Nev. 1980)). 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 15 of 21
In addition, if the claims in both cases are “based on the same set of facts and circumstances”, then the claims are identical. Five Star Capital Corp., 194 P.3d at 714. Claim

preclusion applies to all grounds of recovery that were or could have been brought in the

first case. Holcombe, 477 F.3d at 1098. 

Here, the same evidence required to prove plaintiffs’ overtime claims under Nevada

law would be used to prove plaintiffs’ FLSA overtime claims. In addition, this case and the

Nevada state administrative proceedings both involve the same set of facts and the claims

in both cases are based on the same grounds of recovery, namely overtime. It does not

matter that plaintiffs could not have brought their FLSA claims in the Nevada administrative proceedings. As the court noted in Holcombe, “[a]lthough Holcombe argues that she

was not able to assert First Amendment retaliation at her administration hearing, that is not

the test for a claim under Nevada law.” Id. at 1099. Rather, the test is whether the claims

involve the same evidence or facts. Id. at 1098. Plaintiffs’ state-law overtime claims and

their FLSA claims involve the same facts and circumstances, and thus these claims are

identical.

Defendant also argues that plaintiffs’ claim for FLSA liquidated damages is identical

to plaintiffs’ request for administrative penalties under Nevada law because each claim

involves the same evidence and facts. Plaintiffs argue, however, that their claim for

liquidated damages is not identical to their claim for administrative penalties under Nevada

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 16 of 21
law because liquidated damages under the FLSA are not penalties. See Local 246 Utility

Workers Union of Amer. v. S. Calif. Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 297 (9th Cir. 1996) (FLSA

“liquidated damages represent compensation, and not a penalty”). Moreover, plaintiffs

point out that liquidated damages are mandatory unless the court makes a determination

that the employer objectively and subjectively acted in good faith. Id. Plaintiffs argue that

there is no indication in the Final Order that the ALJ made any determination regarding

defendant’s subjective or objective goodfaith, although the ALJ did suggest that defendant’s

conduct was intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiffs’ rights when he observed that

[a]n employer cannot absolve themselves of theirresponsibility

to pay overtime by saying at the onset of a project that it will

not be granted, then simply looking the other way as they reap

the benefits of the hours of additional, unpaid work performed. 

For CCSD and Sylvania to ignore this reality defies logic.[21

]

Plaintiffs argue that ifthe ALJ had considered the applicable law underthe FLSA regarding

liquidated damages, the Final Order strongly suggests that he would have had no choice but

to award liquidated damages.

Theproblem with the parties’ liquidated damages’ arguments is that FLSAliquidated

damages are not a “claim”, but rather a remedy. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). If plaintiffs’ FLSA

overtime claims are precluded, the court cannot separately consider whether any of

plaintiffs’ possible remedies underthe FLSA are also precluded. If plaintiffs are barred from

21

Final Order at 9, Exhibit 1. Defendant’sRequest forJudicial Notice [etc.], Docket No.

178-2. 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 17 of 21
pursuing their FLSA claims, then the issue of what damages or remedies they might be

entitled to under the FLSA is not before the court. 

final judgment

Although an order by an ALJ may be considered a final judgment on the merits,

Roberts v. Las Vegas Valley Water Dist., 849 F. Supp. 1393, 1400 (D. Nev. 1994), plaintiffs

argue that there was no final judgment on the merits because there was no judicial review

of the Final Order. Plaintiffs contend that they entered into an agreement in which they

waived their rights to appeal in order to receive the monetary award provided in the Final

Order, but that they did so with the understanding that this would not in any way affect

their right to pursue their FLSA claims. Plaintiffs have all averred that it was their

understanding that waiving their right to appeal would not have any affect on their ability

to pursue their FLSA claims in this case.22

The Final Order was a final judgment on the merits. As for plaintiffs’ contention that

they did not intend to give up their right to pursue their FLSA claims, plaintiffs expressly

“waiv[ed] all rights to to file any additional such claims, actions, etc. relating to such wage

22Anthony Declaration at 2, ¶ 4, Exhibit A; ZuchelkowskiDeclaration at 2, ¶ 4, Exhibit

B; Daza-Frias Declaration at 2, ¶ 4, Exhibit C; Forrellat Release at 1, Exhibit D; Plaintiffs’

Response [etc.], Docket No. 188. 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 18 of 21
claim[s].”23 Plainly plaintiffs gave up not only the right to seek review of the administrative

decision but also the right to file an action such as this one before the court.

same parties

There is no dispute that plaintiffs and defendant were parties to the Nevada

administrative hearing. 

In sum, plaintiffs’ FLSA overtime claims are barred by claim preclusion.24 Plaintiffs’

FLSA claims are identical to plaintiffs’ state-law overtime claims. The Final Order is a final

judgment. And, both plaintiffs and defendant were parties to the Nevada administrative

proceedings. Because plaintiffs’ FLSA claims are barred by claim preclusion, the issue of

whether they are entitled to any damages under the FLSA, such as liquidated damages, is

also barred. 

As a final matter, defendant contends that plaintiffs have not brought any claims for

unpaid meal times. “FLSA does not require compensation for an employee’s lunch period,

but an employee cannot be docked forlunch breaks during which he is required to continue

with any duties related to his work.” Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 713 F.3d 525,

531 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted), overuled on other grounds by, Integrity Staffing

23

Forrellat Release at 1, Exhibit D, Plaintiffs’ Response [etc.], Docket No. 188

(emphasis added). 

24Because claim preclusion applies here, the court need not consider defendant’s

argument that the issue of whether plaintiffs are entitled to overtime was actually and

necessarily litigated in the Nevada administrative proceedings. 

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Case 2:13-cv-00351-HRH Document 211 Filed 09/01/15 Page 19 of 21
Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014). Defendant contends that it provided meal

breaks to plaintiffs without requiring them to perform any substantial duties during these

breaks. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that they generally were given a 30-minute lunch break each

day. But, they contend that there is also evidence that sometimes their lunch breaks were

interrupted with work duties. Zuchelkowskitestified that he was sometimes “toldto go and

pick something up, drop it off at the schoolyard that is over by The Palms hotel” during his

lunch break and that this may have happened 3-4 or maybe more times.25 Daza-Frias

testified that he did not take a full 30-minute lunch every day because sometimes he was

told “to do something else” or he was “pulled” back to work before his lunch time ended.26

Clifton testified that he was not always provided with a 30-minute lunch break.27 Plaintiffs

argue that this testimony is sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact as to whether

there were times that they worked through part of their lunch break. 

“As a general rule, employees cannot recover for otherwise compensable time if it is

de minimis.” Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1984). “An important

25Deposition of Craig Zuchelkowski at 44:24-46:15, Exhibit E, Plaintiffs’ Response

[etc.], Docket No. 188. 

26Deposition of Hector Daza-Frias at 42:10-45:21, Exhibit F, Plaintiffs’ Response [etc.],

Docket No. 188. 

27Deposition of Anthony Clifton at 55:7-10, Exhibit G, Plaintiffs’ Response [etc.],

Docket No. 188. 

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factorin determining whether a claim is de minimis is the amount of daily time spent on the

additional work.” Id. “There is no precise amount of time that may be denied compensation as de minimis. No rigid rule can be applied with mathematical certainty.” Id. “Rather,

common sense must be applied to the facts of each case.” Id.

The evidence suggests that whatever time might be involved here was de minimis. 

But, more importantly, if plaintiffs had overtime claims based on unpaid meal breaks, they

could have raised those claims in the state administrative proceedings, rather than only

claiming overtime based on pre- and post-shift work. In addition, in return for the

immediate payment of the Nevada award, plaintiffs agreed to not file any further wage

actions. Any overtime claims plaintiffs may have had based on unpaid meal breaks are

barred by claim preclusion. 

Conclusion

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment28as to the claims alleged by plaintiffs

Clifton Anthony, Hector Daza-Frias, Juan Forrellat, and Craig Zuchelkowski is granted. 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 1st day of September, 2015. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

28Docket No. 178. 

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