Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04103/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04103-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1132 E.R.I.S.A.

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUDY DITCHEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MECHANICS BANK, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04103-JSC 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 22

Plaintiff Judy Ditchey filed this Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

(“ERISA”) action against her employer Defendant Mechanics Bank (“the Bank”) seeking 

severance benefits in accordance with Defendant Mechanics Bank Change in Control Plan (“the 

Plan”). Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on her claim for reimbursement of 

reasonable legal fees and expenses under the Plan. (Dkt. No. 22.) Having considered the parties’

briefs, including their supplemental filings, and having had the benefit of oral argument on 

January 7, 2016, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. The Plan’s unambiguous language

requires the Bank to reimburse Plaintiff’s legal fees regardless of the outcome of any claim for 

Plan benefits.

1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the Executive Vice President and Director of Human Resources for the Bank.2 

 

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 8, 17.)

2 As Plaintiff filed this motion for partial summary judgment prior to the exchange of any 

discovery, the factual record in this case is quite limited. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration 

attaching a copy of the Plan (Dkt. Nos. 22-1 & 22-3) and her counsel has submitted a declaration 

attaching a copy of Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the Plan (Dkt. No. 22-5). Following the 

hearing on this motion, the Bank produced the plans for the five other executives and Plaintiff 

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(Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 1.) The Bank established the at-issue Change in Control Plan in 2008 and 

amended it in 2014. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 22-3 (“The Plan”).) Plaintiff acknowledged and 

agreed to the Plan on June 5, 2014. (Dkt. No. 22-3 at 10.3) Five other key executives had Change 

in Control Plans with the Bank as of April 2015 when Ford Financial Fund II purchased a 

controlling interest in the Bank. (Dkt. No. 22-1 at ¶ 3.) 

Plaintiff contends, and the Bank does not dispute, that the purchase constituted a “Change 

in Control” under the terms of the Plan and triggered a “Change in Control Period” commencing 

on April 30, 2015, and running for two years, until April 30, 2017. (Complaint ¶ 9.) The Plan 

provides Severance Benefits in the event of an “Involuntary Termination” during the “Change in 

Control Period.” (Dkt. No. 22-3 at 2.) The Severance Benefits include (a) severance pay equal to 

200% of total compensation; (b) a prorated short-term incentive award; (c) reimbursement of 

COBRA premiums; (d) complete vesting of certain benefits; and (e) executive outplacement 

services. (Id. at 2-3.) The Severance Benefits available under the Plans of the other five key 

executives provide nearly identical benefits.

4

(Dkt. Nos. 42-3-42-7.) To receive these benefits, 

the participant must execute a general release and deliver it to the Bank within 30 days of 

Termination. (Dkt. No. 22-3 at 2.) Failure to do so results in forfeiture of the Severance Benefits. 

(Id.)

Under the Plan, six different circumstances give rise to an “Involuntary Termination”:

(i) any material diminution of the scope of your responsibilities, 

duties or authority or any material change in your title, position or 

reporting relationship, in any case, as in effect immediately prior to 

such Change in Control; (ii) a material reduction by the Bank in 

your base compensation or annual incentive opportunity, in each 

case, as in effect immediately prior to such reduction; (iii) any 

purported Termination of you by the Bank (other than a voluntary 

 

attached them to her supplemental brief. (Dkt. Nos. 42-3-42-7.) The Bank does not dispute the 

authenticity of these documents.

3 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

4

The only differences are that one plan authorizes twice the amount of executive outplacement 

services and provides for payment of the premiums of the life insurance policy sponsored by the 

Bank (Dkt. No. 42-7 at 3), and another offers a $100,000 incentive award to be paid in the first 

quarter of 2015 (Dkt. No. 42-5 at 3). These benefits are in addition to the other uniform benefits 

under the plans. 

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resignation initiated by you, except for a voluntary Termination 

initiated by you for the reasons described in this paragraph) which is 

not effected for Disability or for Cause; (iv) relocation of your 

principal place of employment by more than twenty-five (25) miles; 

(v) the failure of any successor entity to the Bank to expressly 

assume in writing the terms of this Letter or your employment 

agreement; and (vi) any material breach by the Bank of any material 

provision of your employment agreement with the Bank or any other 

agreement between you and the Bank.

(Id. at 12.) A participant must provide the Bank with written notice of the particular 

condition which triggers an “Involuntary Termination” within 90 days of the occurrence of the 

triggering condition. (Id.) Once such notice is provided, the Bank has 30 days to cure the 

condition, and if it is not cured within the 30 day period, the participant is “deemed Terminated.” 

(Id.)

The Plan also includes the following:

[t]he Bank agrees to pay as incurred, at any time from the date of a 

Change in Control through your remaining lifetime (or, if longer, 

through the 20th anniversary of a Change in Control), to the full 

extent permitted by law, all legal fees and expenses that you may 

reasonably incur as a result of any contest (regardless of the 

outcome thereof) by the Bank, you or others of the validity or 

enforceability of, or liability under, any provision of this Letter or 

any guarantee of performance thereof (including as a result of any 

contest by you about the amount of any payment pursuant to this 

Letter), plus in each case interest on any delayed payment at the 

applicable federal rate provided for in Section 7872(f)(2) of the 

Code based on the rate in effect at the time such payment is first due 

to the applicable service provider.

(Id. at 8.) This provision, as well as the provisions regarding Involuntary Termination, notice, and 

cure, is identical among the six executives’ plans. (Dkt. Nos. 22-3, 42-3-42-7.)

On July 27, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Bank seeking severance benefits under 

the Plan on the grounds that there had been a material diminution in the scope of her 

responsibility, duties or authority following the “Change in Control” which had resulted in her 

Involuntary Termination. (Dkt. No. 22-5.) The Bank never provided a written response to her

July 27 letter (although its counsel confirmed that it had until August 27 to do so), but the Bank’s

counsel orally denied liability for her benefits claim. (Complaint at ¶ 17; Dkt. No. 22-2 at ¶ 5.) 

Nearly two weeks after the 30-day response period ran, Plaintiff filed this action alleging a 

single cause of action under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking to recover 

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Plan benefits, including reimbursement of reasonable legal fees and expenses. Since filing suit, 

Plaintiff has submitted two sets of invoices for her legal fees to the Bank, but has not received a 

response. (Dkt. No. 22-2 at ¶ 6.) In response to the Complaint, the Bank filed a motion to 

dismiss. (Dkt. No. 19.) The following day, Plaintiff filed the underlying motion for partial 

summary judgment seeking reimbursement of her attorneys’ fees and costs associated with her 

benefits claim. (Dkt. Nos. 19 & 22.) The Court heard argument regarding both these motions on 

January 7, 2016. The motion to dismiss was denied and the parties were ordered to submit 

supplemental briefing regarding the motion for partial summary judgment; specifically, to address 

whether the Plan is an ERISA plan. (Dkt. Nos. 30 & 31.) The parties have since done so. (Dkt. 

Nos. 42, 46 & 47.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 

56(a). The Court must draw “all reasonable inferences [and] resolve all factual conflicts in favor 

of the non-moving party.” Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and an issue 

is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). There can be “no genuine issue as to any material 

fact” when the moving party shows “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 

of the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving 

party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where 

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by 

pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25.

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific 

facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most 

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favorable to the nonmoving party. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 

2004). The non-moving party’s evidence must be such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a 

verdict in their favor, Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995), 

and the Court “is not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for 

summary judgment,” Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the Bank is liable under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) for reimbursement of 

her reasonable legal fees and expenses incurred as a result of the Bank’s dispute of her right to 

Plan benefits. Because the Plan’s plain language requires reimbursement of legal fees regardless 

of the outcome of any dispute, Plaintiff argues that this issue is ripe for determination so long as 

she states a colorable claim for relief under ERISA. The first issue is whether the Plan is an 

ERISA plan. 

A. The Plan is covered by ERISA 

ERISA applies to “employee welfare benefit plans” which may include a severance plan. 

29 U.S.C. § 1002(1); Velarde v. PACE Membership Warehouse, Inc., 105 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (“the definition of ‘employee benefit plan’ can include severance benefits”); Delaye v. 

Agripac, Inc., 39 F.3d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Provisions for severance pay may constitute an 

employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA.”); Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 

1319 (9th Cir. 1992) (severance pay considered “employee welfare benefit plan” under ERISA). 

Courts employ “a relatively simple test [] to determine whether a plan is covered by ERISA: does 

the benefit package implicate an ongoing administrative scheme?” Delaye, 39 F.3d at 237.

In Bogue, the Ninth Circuit considered whether ERISA governed a severance plan which 

provided benefits to certain executives if the company/employer was sold, and neither the 

employer nor the buyer offered the executive substantially equivalent” employment and the 

executive’s employment was terminated. 976 F.2d at 1321. The court held that such a plan was 

an ERISA employee benefit plan because it offered more than “[t]he theoretical possibility of a 

one-time obligation in the future.” Id. at 1322. The court reasoned: 

[T]he program’s administrator [] remained obligated to decide 

whether a complaining employee’s job was “substantially 

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equivalent” to his pre-acquisition job. Although the program . . . was 

triggered by a single event, that event would occur more than once, 

at a different time for each employee. There was no way to carry out 

that obligation with the unthinking, one-time, nondiscretionary 

application of the plan administrators in Fort Halifax and Wells. 

Although its application was uncertain, its term was short, and the 

number of its participants was small, the program’s administration 

required a case-by-case, discretionary application of its terms. 

Whether or not [the employer] ever thought it would have to 

administer an ERISA plan does not matter; there was no way to 

administer the program without an administrative scheme. 

Id. at 1323. The same reasoning applies here. The Plan (or a nearly identical version of it) applies 

to multiple key executives providing each with nearly identical severance benefits. The Plan

requires the Bank to determine whether an executive has been involuntarily terminated because 

she has experienced “a material diminution in the scope of [her] responsibilities, duties or 

authority or any material change in [her] title, position or reporting relationship,” or a material 

reduction in the executive’s base compensation, or a material breach by the Bank of the 

executive’s employment agreement, among other triggering conditions. (Dkt. No. 22-3 at 12.) 

Just as in Bogue, these events may occur at different times for each covered employee. “There is 

no way to carry out that obligation with [an] unthinking, one-time, nondiscretionary application.” 

Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323; see also Velarde, 105 F.3d at 1317 (noting that “the key to our holding 

in Bogue was that there was ‘enough ongoing, particularized, administrative discretionary 

analysis,’” and “not that the agreement simply required some modicum of discretion.”).

Defendants’ reliance on Fontenot v. NL Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1992), for the 

contrary conclusion is unpersuasive. The Bogue test —that the plan “requires an administrative 

scheme because the circumstances of each employee’s termination” must be “analyzed in light of 

certain criteria”—derives from Fontenot. Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323. There, the Fifth Circuit 

considered a “golden parachute” severance plan which provided that “if an executive was 

terminated within two years of a change of control, the company would pay the executive a lump 

sum cash payment of three times his highest annual compensation for the preceding three years, as 

well as a three year continuation of certain benefits.” Id. at 961. In concluding that this was not 

an ERISA plan, the court focused on the plan’s requirement of “a one-time lump sum payment 

triggered by a single event” which does not require “any administrative scheme whatsoever to 

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meet the employer’s obligation.” Id. at 962 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The 

court specifically distinguished the plan before it from that at issue in Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 

F.Supp. 168 (D.N.J. 1987), aff’d, 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1989), on the grounds that under the Pane

plan “the circumstances of each employee’s termination [had to be] analyzed in light of [certain] 

criteria.” Id. at 963 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Just as the plans at issue in 

Pane and Bogue, the Plan here requires the Bank to determine whether the particular 

circumstances of a Plan participant meet various criteria.

The Plan is thus governed by ERISA. 

B. The Plan Requires Reimbursement of Legal Fees 

Plaintiff contends that the Plan’s fee provision requires the Bank to pay her reasonable 

legal fees regardless of the outcome of any dispute regarding Plan benefits. The Bank counters

that Plaintiff is ineligible to receive Plan benefits because she failed to satisfy a condition 

precedent to the receipt of benefits, and lacks standing to pursue a benefits claim for the same 

reason. Both of the Bank’s arguments turn on their assertion that Plaintiff’s claims are barred 

because she failed to provide a general release within 30 days of her “Termination”—an argument 

the Court rejected in denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 31.) On the motion to 

dismiss, however, the question was whether the Bank had shown as a matter of law that the failure 

to submit the release defeated Plaintiff’s claim. It had not. 

On Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment her burden is to show that her failure to 

submit the release does not defeat or at least create a dispute to her claim for attorneys’ fees. She 

has met this burden. Although the Bank refers to the Plan’s requirement of a general release as a 

condition precedent to the receipt of attorney fees, there is no such limitation in the Plan. Section 

12 of the Plan states that “the Bank agrees to pay as incurred” “to the full extent permitted by law, 

all legal fees and expenses that you may reasonably incur as a result of any contest (regardless of 

the outcome thereof) by the Bank, you or others.” (Dkt. No. 22-3 at 8.) The Bank is correct that 

the payment of Severance Benefits is contingent upon delivery of a general release within 30 days 

of Plaintiff’s “Termination.” And, Section 2, entitled “Severance Benefits” states that failure to 

meet this 30 day deadline “will cause you to forfeit the Severance Benefits under this Letter.” 

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(Id.) The reimbursement of legal fees, however, is not one of the delineated “Severance Benefits” 

that can be forfeited; instead, it appears in a separate Plan section. Compare id. at 2-3 (listing 

benefits as (a) 200% of total compensation; (b) a prorated short-term incentive award; (c) 

reimbursement of COBRA premiums; (d) complete vesting of certain benefits; and (e) executive 

outplacement services) with id. at 7-8 (requiring reimbursement of legal fees and expenses under 

Section 12 entitled “Full Settlement”).

The cases cited by the Bank do not suggest a contrary conclusion as Plaintiff has not 

argued that the Bank was prohibited from conditioning her receipt of Severance Benefits on 

submission of the general release. See, e.g., Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 894 (1996)

(concluding that a requirement for a release of claims was an acceptable condition to place on an 

employee’s receipt of benefits under an ERISA plan); Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 677 F. 

Supp. 1021, 1026-27 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (concluding that the plan permissibly conditioned the 

receipt of specified benefits under the plan on execution of a release of claims). Rather, Plaintiff 

contends, and indeed, the Plan language unambiguously provides, that the release condition only 

applies to the receipt of Severance Benefits and Severance Benefits do not include the at-issue 

reimbursement of legal fees and expenses.

The Bank next argues that Plaintiff is not a Plan participant and therefore lacks standing. 

An ERISA participant is “any employee or former employee of an employer ... who is or may 

become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers 

employees of such employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). An individual may become eligible for 

benefits if she has “a colorable claim that (1) he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2) 

eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in the future.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 

U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989).

Plaintiff is a current employee with a colorable claim for benefits and is therefore a Plan 

participant with standing. The Bank’s insistence that her claim is not colorable because she failed 

to execute and submit the general release within 30 days of her Termination conflates the question 

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of eligibility for benefits with entitlement to benefits.5 That Plaintiff’s claim may ultimately be 

unsuccessful because she failed to submit said release is a merits question regarding her 

entitlement to relief which is independent of the question of whether she has a colorable claim for 

relief. “[D]etermining what constitutes a colorable claim to benefits is not the same as 

determining whether a plaintiff might recover under any cause of action. The relevant issue is 

whether a plaintiff might recover under an ERISA claim.” Miller v. Rite Aid Corp., 504 F.3d 

1102, 1107 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). Here, if Plaintiff’s theory regarding the timing 

of submission of the release is successful she might prevail on her benefits claim. This is 

sufficient to establish standing. Moon v. Rush, No. 2:11-CV-03102-GEB, 2013 WL 4012828, at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) (noting the “the low threshold for colorable ERISA claims”). That 

her benefits claim is colorable is further demonstrated by the Court’s denial of the Bank’s motion 

to dismiss. Plaintiff thus has standing to pursue her ERISA claim. 

C. The Bank Has not met its Rule 56(d) Burden

The Bank’s insistence that it requires discovery before the Court rules on Plaintiff’s partial 

motion for summary judgment is unavailing. When seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(d), “[t]he requesting party must show: (1) it has set forth in affidavit form the 

specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3) the 

sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary judgment.” Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. 

Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008). The “[f]ailure to comply with 

these requirements is a proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to summary 

judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 

5 Defendants’ reliance on Sallee v. Rexnord Corp., 985 F.2d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 1993), and Wolf v. 

Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2000), illustrates this misconception as both 

address whether a participant stated a colorable claim for relief based on their ability to meet the 

eligibility requirements of the plans at issue. Sallee, 985 F.2d at 929 (concluding that the plaintiffs 

did not have a colorable claim for benefits because “[b]oth employees voluntarily elected to leave 

employment knowing that severance benefits did not vest unless they were terminated” and thus 

were not participants.); Wolf, 200 F.3d at 1342 (affirming the district court’s determination that the 

plaintiff had failed to raise an issue of material fact with respect to her eligibility for benefits under 

the plan as she was a leased, temporary employee and the plan only covered regular employees 

who were specifically defined as non-temporary employees). 

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While the Bank has submitted the required affidavit, it falls far short of satisfying Rule 

56(d). First, as to whether the Plan is covered by ERISA, the Bank merely baldly states that 

“Defendant needs to conduct discovery to determine whether the Plan qualifies as an ERISA 

plan.” (Dkt. No. 26-1 ¶ 2.) The Bank also insists that discovery “will uncover extrinsic evidence 

of the circumstances of the Plan’s formation, negotiation, and Plaintiff’s intentions and 

understandings of the negotiated terms in the event the Court finds the Plan to be ambiguous.” But 

the Bank has not argued that the fee provision at issue on Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment is ambiguous, and absent an ambiguity, the Court must give effect to the plain meaning 

of the Plan. 6 See Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 301 (2009)

(“ERISA forecloses any justification for enquiries into nice expressions of intent, in favor of the 

virtues of adhering to an uncomplicated rule: simple administration, avoiding double liability, and 

ensuring that beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly, without the folderol essential under lesscertain rules.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). While discovery is certainly 

required before the Court can rule whether Plaintiff suffered an “Involuntary Termination” within 

the meaning of the Plan, the Bank has not identified any discovery that is relevant to the question 

presently before the Court given that the Plan unambiguously provides for the payment of 

Plaintiff’s legal fees regardless of her ultimate success on her claim. 

D. Certification Under Rule 54(b) is not Warranted

In their supplemental brief, the Bank asks the Court to certify its Order for immediate 

appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) if the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for 

partial summary judgment. Defendants’ request is both procedurally and substantively improper. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that 

When an action presents more than one claim for relief... the court 

may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer 

than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that 

 

6 Defendants have likewise failed to show why they “need[] to depose Plaintiff and issue written 

discovery requests on the issues regarding formation of the Plan and Plaintiff’s execution thereof, 

such as whether Plaintiff wrote it and what her intentions might have been in writing it, what 

Plaintiff understood when she signed it, why she did and has not submitted a release, and whether 

the Plaintiff qualifies as an ERISA Plan.” (Dkt. No. 26-1 ¶ 2.) These questions are not probative 

of the pending motion for summary judgment.

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there is no just reason for delay. 

Plaintiff’s complaint here includes only one claim for relief. Thus, Rule 54(b) does not apply. See 

Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Miller, 938 F.2d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 1991)

(dismissing an appeal under Rule 54(b) based on the rule that “a complaint asserting only one 

legal right, even if seeking multiple remedies for the alleged violation of that right, states a single 

claim for relief.”) (internal citations omitted). In Miller, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a “count 

for punitive damages is not ‘separate and distinct’ from the remainder of the counts in the 

complaint, but is based on a single set of facts giving rise to a legal right of recovery under several 

different remedies.” Id. Further, the point of the final judgment rule is “not merely to prevent an 

appeal on an issue concerning which the trial court has not yet made up its mind beyond 

possibility of change but also to eliminate the need for separate appellate consideration of different 

elements of a single claim.” Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S. A., 482 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1973). 

Here, as Plaintiff correctly points out, review of the attorneys’ fee provision would necessarily 

involve review of the same Plan documents and facts that the Court will be reviewing in 

considering the merits of Plaintiff’s claim for relief. Defendants’ request for entry of judgment 

under Rule 54(b) is therefore denied. 

The Bank’s alternative request that the Court stay any payment of fees under the at-issue 

provision until final judgment is likewise without any legal support and contradicts the Plan’s 

language. The plain language of the attorneys’ fees provision states that “[a]ny reimbursement of 

legal fees paid to you pursuant to this Section 12 shall be paid within ten (10) days following the 

Bank’s receipt of an invoice from you and in no event later than the end of your taxable year next 

following your taxable year in which the related expense is incurred.” (Dkt. No. 22-3 at 8.) 

//

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 

22) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2016

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:15-cv-04103-JSC Document 50 Filed 02/24/16 Page 12 of 12