Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01786/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01786-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERESA A. WELLS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Civil Action No.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN ) 2:13-CV-1786-MHH

Acting Commissioner of the )

Social Security Administration, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Claimant Teresa A. Wells brings this action pursuant to Title II of 

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act. Ms. Wells seeks judicial review 

of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration.

1

The Commissioner affirmed the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who denied Ms. Wells’s claim for a 

period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and widow’s disability 

 

1 Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 

14, 2013. Therefore, she should be substituted for Commissioner Michael J. Astrue as 

defendant in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“An action does not abate when a 

public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to 

hold office while the action is pending . . . Later proceedings should be in the substituted 

party’s name, but any misnomer not affecting the parties’ substantial rights must be 

disregarded.”).

FILED

 2015 Mar-30 PM 02:30

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-01786-MHH Document 12 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 17
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benefits. (Doc. 9, p. 1). After careful review, the Court finds that 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, and the Court affirms the 

Commissioner’s ruling. 

II. Standard of Review

The scope of review in this matter is limited. “When, as in this case, 

the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review,” the Court 

“review[s] the ALJ’s ‘factual findings with deference’ and her ‘legal 

conclusions with close scrutiny.’” Riggs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 522 Fed. 

Appx. 509, 510–11 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 

1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)).

The Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support the ALJ’s findings. “Substantial evidence is more than a 

scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). In making this evaluation, the Court 

may not “reweigh the evidence or decide the facts anew,” and the Court 

must “defer to the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence 

even if the evidence may preponderate against it.” Gaskin v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 533 Fed. Appx. 929, 930 (11th Cir. 2013).

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With respect to the ALJ’s legal conclusions, the Court must determine 

whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. If the Court finds an 

error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the Court finds that the ALJ 

failed to provide sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that the ALJ conducted 

a proper legal analysis, then the Court must reverse the ALJ’s decision. 

Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145–46 (11th Cir. 1991).

III. Procedural and Factual Background

On July 28, 2010, Ms. Wells applied for widow’s disability benefits, a 

period of disability, and disability insurance benefits. (Doc. 6-6, pp. 25–26). 

The Social Security Administration denied Ms. Wells’s application for 

disability benefits on October 29, 2010 and denied her application for 

disabled widow’s benefits on November 1, 2010. (Doc. 6-5, pp. 2, 9). At 

Ms. Wells’s request, on April 12, 2012, an Administrative Law Judge 

conducted a hearing concerning Ms. Wells’s application. (Doc. 6-3, pp. 89–

119). Ms. Wells and an impartial vocational expert testified at the hearing. 

(Id.). At the time of her hearing, Ms. Wells was 55 years old.

2

 Ms. Wells

has a high school education and completed some college. (Doc. 9, p. 4; Doc. 

6-3, p. 95). Her past relevant work experience is as an inventory clerk, an 

 

2 At 55 years of age, 20 C.F.R. §§404.1563(e) and 416.963(e) designate Ms. Wells as a 

“person of advanced age.” (See Doc. 6-3, p. 95; Doc. 9, p. 4).

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administrative clerk, a receptionist, a data entry clerk, and an employment 

manager. (Doc. 9, p. 4; Doc. 6-3, pp. 114–15; Doc. 6-6, pp. 2–3).

 On April 20, 2012, the ALJ denied Ms. Wells’s request for disability 

benefits, concluding that Ms. Wells did not have an impairment or a 

combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, the 

Regulations. (Doc. 6-3, p. 55). A week later, on April 27, 2012, the ALJ 

denied Ms. Wells’s request for disabled widow’s benefits, based on the 

conclusion that Ms. Well did not have an impairment or a combination of 

impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, the Regulations.3

(Doc. 6-3, p. 28). In his two-part decision,4the ALJ described the “five-step 

sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is 

disabled” and explained that “[i]f it is determined that the claimant is or is 

not disabled at a step of the evaluation process, the evaluation will not go on 

to the next step.” (Doc. 6-3, pp. 32, 48). 

The ALJ found that Ms. Wells had not “engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since November 11, 2009, the alleged onset date” in her claim for 

 

3

For the purposes of this opinion, the Court will treat the two ALJ decisions as a two-part 

decision that addresses the same issue—whether Ms. Wells is disabled. The ALJ 

indicated that the decisions should be treated as a “two-parter” with “two claims” in his 

decision notes. (Doc. 6-3, p. 27). 

4

The ALJ wrote a two-part decision because Ms. Wells applied for both spousal benefits 

and disability benefits. The ALJ referred to the opinion as a –two parter because the 

reasons for denying Ms. Wells’s application for benefits were the similar in each opinion. 

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disability benefits, and that Ms. Wells had not “engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since March 7, 2007, the alleged onset date” for her disabled 

widow’s benefits.5(Doc. 6-3, pp. 33, 49). Ms. Wells met the non-disability 

requirements for the disabled widow’s benefits claim. (Doc. 6-3, p. 33). In

addition, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Wells had “the following severe 

impairments: degenerative disc disease, cervical spondylosis, [and] 

rheumatoid arthritis.” (Doc. 6-3, pp. 33, 49). The ALJ found the 

impairments to be severe. (Doc. 6-3, pp. 34, 49).6 Still, the ALJ opined that 

“the medical evidence does not establish the existence of [the listed spinal 

disorders]. . . . Furthermore, there is no evidence that [Ms. Wells’s] back 

disorder has resulted in the inability to ambulate effectively as defined [in 

the Regulations].” (Doc. 6-3, pp. 34, 50). The ALJ concluded that Ms. 

Wells’s cervical spondylosis did not meet the requirements for listing 1.02, 

because “evidence does not demonstrate that [Ms. Wells] has sufficient 

difficulty in performing fine and gross movements.” (Doc. 6-3, pp. 34, 50). 

The ALJ did not find sufficient evidence that suffered “an inability to 

 

5

The Court reviewed both the ALJ’s decision and Ms. Wells’s medical records. The 

Court found that the ALJ’s description of Ms. Wells’s medical evaluations is accurate. In 

a number of instances in this opinion, the Court has provided citations not only to the 

ALJ’s decision but also to the underlying records to illustrate that there is no discrepancy 

between the two. 

6

In contrast, the ALJ found that Ms. Wells’s mental impairment of depression and 

medical impairments of hypertension, diverticulosis, and hemorrhoids were non-severe. 

(Doc. 6-3, pp. 34, 50).

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ambulate or perform fine and gross movements,” and therefore her 

rheumatoid arthritis did not meet listing 14.09. (Doc. 6-3, pp. 34–35, 50–

51).

Based on these factual findings, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Wells

had the “residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work; . . . except 

that she could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, occasionally climb 

ramps or stairs, and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, or engage in 

activities requiring balance. She should avoid concentrated exposure to 

extreme vibration.” (Doc. 6-3, pp. 35, 51). 

The ALJ considered a report from Dr. W. Curry McEvoy, a physician 

who conducted a consultative examination on Ms. Wells. Dr. McEvoy’s 

notes state that Ms. Wells, had a normal gait and range of motion, used a 

cane “intermittently but [it was] not a necessity,” had no apparent 

coordination problems, 4/5 strength in her lower extremities, and a normal 

affect and normal mood.” (Doc. 6-3, p. 36; see Doc. 6-8, pp. 25–26). Dr. 

McEvoy advised that Ms. Wells “could stand or walk for fro[m] 6 [to] 8 

hours” in an 8-hour day with “frequent breaks.” (Doc. 6-8, p. 26). The 

notes state Ms. Wells had “no limitations in the amount of time that [Ms. 

Wells] can sit in an 8 hour day.” (Id.). Dr. McEvoy also noted that Ms. 

Wells could not likely lift more than twenty pounds and that she was limited 

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in her ability to stoop, crouch, or kneel. (Doc. 6-8, p. 26); see also (Doc. 6-

3, pp. 36–37). Because Dr. McEvoy’s examination of Ms. Wells was 

“valuable and largely consistent with the objective evidence” the ALJ gave 

his opinions moderate weight. (Doc. 6-3, pp. 37, 53). The ALJ added that,

“given [Ms. Wells]’s testimony at [the] hearing, and giving her some benefit 

of the doubt, the weight of the evidence indicates that she is more limited 

than [Dr. McEvoy] determined at his examination.” (Doc. 6-3, p. 37). 

The ALJ considered the medical records of several doctors who 

examined Ms. Wells after the alleged onset date of her disability. (Doc. 6-3, 

p. 36). Dr. Charles H. Clark found that Ms. Wells showed mild scoliosis,

but he found that there was “no clear-cut stenosis or nerve root 

encroachment,” and Ms. Wells appeared “alert, oriented, and in no acute 

distress.” (Doc. 6-3, p. 36; Doc. 6-8, p. 7). The ALJ found that Dr. Jeremy 

Barlow performed an epidural injection on Ms. Wells due to her complaints 

about back pain. (Doc. 6-3, p. 36; Doc. 6-8, pp. 2–6). The ALJ also noted 

that Dr. Nop Unnopet recorded in his treatment notes that Ms. Wells was 

“doing well” on her medication, her rheumatoid arthritis was “stable.” (Doc. 

6-3, p. 36; Doc. 6-8, p. 41). Ms. Wells told Dr. Unnopet that she had 

discontinued Yoga and some other activities out of fear that they might 

aggravate her conditions. (Doc. 6-8, p. 44). But Dr. Unnopet told Ms. Wells 

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that her conditions “should not inhibit her from doing her daily activities,” 

and that Ms. Wells should continue doing Yoga. (Id.). The ALJ thus 

concluded that Ms. Wells appeared to be “in no acute distress.” (Doc. 6-3, 

p. 36). 

Next, the ALJ considered the examination of Dr. Douglas Moore. 

(Doc. 6-3, p. 36). Dr. Moore found that Ms. Wells had a “diminished rangeof-motion in her back, a negative straight-leg raise test result on her right 

[leg], and positive [straight-leg raise test] result on her left [leg].” (Doc. 6-9, 

p. 5). As a result, Dr. Moore “considered and rejected possible surgery.”

(Doc. 6-3, p. 36; Doc. 6-9, p. 3). The ALJ reviewed the treatment notes of 

Dr. Thomas A. Staner. Dr. Staner reported that although he was unable to 

“elicit a tremor,” he “suspect[ed] [Ms. Wells] has essential tremor” but noted 

that it is “lessened when [Ms. Wells] takes Xanax.” (Doc. 6-3, p. 36; Doc. 

6-14, p. 20). 

The ALJ also took into account Dr. Keith Langford’s medical record 

review. Dr. Langford, a state agency consultant, found that Ms. Wells was

“able to stand or walk for 6 [to] 8 hours in an 8 [hour] workday with 

frequent breaks[,] and [had no] limitation[s] on sitting in an 8 [hour] day.” 

(Doc. 6-8, p. 33). The ALJ interpreted these notes as an indication that Ms. 

Wells is capable of medium work. (Doc. 6-3, p. 37). Dr. Langford also 

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suggested Dr. McEvoy’s finding of work limitations was based solely on 

Ms. Wells’s age. (Doc. 6-8, p. 37). The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. 

Langford’s findings about Ms. Wells’s physical limitations because the 

findings were “inconsistent with the weight of the evidence.” (Doc. 6-3, p. 

37). 

The ALJ reviewed the results of Dr. Jack Zaremba’s examination

conducted at the referral of Ms. Wells’s attorney. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38). The 

record indicates that Ms. Wells does not have an “extensive treatment 

history” with Dr. Zaremba. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38). The ALJ found Dr. 

Zaremba’s examination results to be inconsistent with other treatment 

records. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38). The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Zaremba

concluded that [Ms. Wells] had a substantially limited ability to 

stand and walk, required an assistive device, (while, somewhat 

confusingly, noting that she did not bring her cane with her to 

the examination), and [] that her pain was ‘present to such an 

extent to be distracting to adequate performance of daily 

activities or work.’

(Doc. 6-3, p. 38; Doc. 6-14, pp. 8–15). The ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. 

Zaremba’s opinion because his report was largely based on Ms. Well’s 

“subjective complaints of pain” and because the ALJ determined that Dr. 

Zaremba’s opinions were inconsistent with Ms. Wells’s reports of pain to 

other physicians and objective evidence of Ms. Wells’s functional 

capabilities. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38).

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The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of a chiropractor, John 

Sparks, DC. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38). Ms. Wells sought treatment from Mr. 

Sparks for a brief period of time. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38; Doc. 6-8, pp. 58–85). 

Mr. Sparks discharged Ms. Wells when her pain began to “plateau,” though 

she had experienced increased pain when sitting. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38). The 

ALJ determined that Mr. Sparks’s recommendations for sitting “were 

inconsistent with the weight of the evidence,” and he was not a “credible 

medical source.” (Id.). Thus, the ALJ afforded the opinions of Mr. Sparks 

little weight. (Id.). The ALJ also considered a vocational expert’s opinion 

offered at Ms. Wells’s April 12, 2012 hearing. The VE testified that a 

person of Ms. Wells’s age, education, work experience, and RFC would be 

capable of performing past work, such as: “inventory clerk, administrative 

clerk, receptionist, data entry [] clerk, [and] employment agency manager.”

(Doc. 6-3, pp. 39, 114–17). 

Ultimately, the ALJ found that Ms. Wells “is capable of performing 

past relevant work as a inventory clerk, administrative clerk, data entry 

clerk, [or] employment agency manager.” (Doc. 6-3, p. 39). The ALJ 

reasoned that: “comparing [Ms. Wells]’s residual functional capacity with 

the physical and mental demands of this work, the undersigned finds that 

[Ms. Wells] is able to perform it as actually and generally performed.” (Id.). 

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Consequently, the ALJ decided that Ms. Wells is not disabled. (Doc. 6-3, 

pp. 39, 55). 

The Commissioner’s decision became final when the Appeals Council 

refused to review the ALJ’s two-part decision. (Doc. 6-3, pp. 2, 8). Having 

exhausted all administrative remedies, Ms. Wells filed this action for judicial 

review pursuant to §205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §405(g). 

IV. Analysis

To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must be 

disabled. Gaskin, 533 Fed. Appx. at 930. “A claimant is disabled if he is 

unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a medicallydeterminable impairment that can be expected to result in death or which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 

months.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A claimant must prove 

that he is disabled. Id. (citing Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 

(11th Cir. 2003)). To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ

applies a sequential, five-step evaluation: 

This process includes a determination of whether the claimant 

(1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a 

severe and medically-determinable physical or mental 

impairment; (3) has such an impairment that meets or equals a 

Listing and meets the duration requirements; (4) can perform 

his past relevant work, in the light of his residual functional 

capacity; and (5) can make an adjustment to other work, in the 

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light of his residual functional capacity, age, education, and 

work experience. 

Gaskin, 533 Fed. Appx. at 930 (citation omitted). “The claimant’s residual 

functional capacity is an assessment, based upon all relevant evidence, of the 

claimant’s ability to do work despite his impairments.” Id. (citing Lewis v. 

Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a)(1)). 

The ALJ found that Ms. Wells’s degenerative disc disease, cervical 

spondylosis, and rheumatoid arthritis constitute severe physical impairments 

that “cause more than a minimal harmful limitation on [Ms. Wells]’s ability 

to do basic work activities.” (Doc. 6-3, pp. 33–34). Nevertheless, the ALJ 

concluded that Ms. Wells is not disabled because she is able to perform her

past relevant work as an inventory clerk, administrative clerk, receptionist, 

data entry clerk, or employment agency manager despite her impairments. 

(Doc. 6-3, p. 39). The ALJ relied heavily on the following evidence: 

 Dr. McEvoy’s opinion that Ms. Wells had a normal gait, normal 

coordination, had normal range of motion in her joints, no apparent 

coordination problems, 4/5 strength in her lower extremities, and a 

normal affect and mood, and “used a cane intermittently.” (Doc. 6-

8, p. 26).

 Dr. Unnoppet’s finding that Ms. Wells was “doing well” on her 

medication and her rheumatoid arthritis was “stable.” (Doc. 6-8, p. 

41).

 Dr. Moore’s rejection of possible surgery. (Doc. 6-9, p. 3)

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 the vocational expert’s opinion that a person of Ms. Wells’s age, 

education, work experience, and RFC “would be capable of 

performing work such as [Ms. Wells]’s past relevant work as an 

inventory clerk, administrative clerk, receptionist, data entry clerk, 

or employment agency manager.” (Doc. 6-3, pp. 39, 114–17). 

 

Ms. Wells argues that despite this evidence, she is entitled to relief 

from the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ did not give sufficient weight to 

the opinions of Ms. Wells’s treating chiropractor, Mr. Sparks, and Ms. 

Wells’s examining physician, Dr. Zaremba. (Doc. 9, pp. 8, 12). The Court 

disagrees.

“The opinion of a treating physician ‘must be given substantial or 

considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary.’” Davis v. 

Astrue, 287 Fed. Appx. 748, 753 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240) (11th Cir. 2004)). Good cause exists when 

evidence in the record fails to bolster a doctor’s opinion, supports a contrary 

finding, or when the doctor’s opinions are inconsistent with the doctor’s own 

medical records. Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. The ALJ establishes good cause 

by: (1) clearly articulating adequate reasons for assigning less weight and (2) 

specifically identifying substantial evidence in the record that supports the 

finding. See Mills v. Astrue, 226 Fed. Appx. 926, 931 (11th Cir. 2007);

Miller v. Barnhart, 182 Fed. Appx. 959, 964 (11th Cir. 2006); Beck v. 

Astrue, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217–18 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 

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The ALJ is not required to give considerable weight to the opinions of 

chiropractors, because chiropractors are not “acceptable medical sources.” 

Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1160. Therefore, the ALJ “has no duty to give 

significant or controlling weight to a chiropractor’s views because . . . a 

chiropractor is not a ‘medical source’ who can offer medical opinions.” 

Miles v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 469 Fed. Appx. 743, 745 (11th Cir.

2012). Although a chiropractor is not a ‘medical source,’ a claimant may 

present evidence from a chiropractor to illustrate the severity of impairment 

or how the impairment affects a claimant’s ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1513(d). 

The ALJ clearly articulated his reasons for affording Mr. Sparks’s 

opinion little weight. The ALJ expressly found that Mr. Sparks is not a 

credible medical source. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38). In accordance with 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1513(a) and (d)(1), the ALJ is not required to give any weight to the 

opinions proffered by Mr. Sparks about whether Ms. Wells was disabled. 

Even if the ALJ had done so, Mr. Sparks’s treatment records do not 

necessarily support a finding of disability. The ALJ found that Mr. Sparks’s 

records show that he discharged Ms. Wells after her pain began to “plateau,” 

and that Ms. Wells experienced pain when sitting. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38). 

Indeed, a review of Mr. Sparks’s records indicates that Ms. Wells’s back 

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pain improved with treatment, and over the course of her last few visits to 

Mr. Sparks in the spring of 2011, Ms. Wells consistently reported that her 

back pain was a 5 on a 10-point scale. (Doc. 6-8, pp. 73–85). Mr. Sparks’s

opinion regarding Ms. Wells’s sitting limitation was inconsistent with the 

weight of the evidence. (Id.). The ALJ properly afforded little weight to the 

opinions of Mr. Sparks. (Id.). 

Ms. Wells also argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the 

medical opinions of Dr. Zaremba, her examining physician. Ms. Wells was 

referred to Dr. Zaremba by her attorney. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38; Doc. 11, p. 11). 

Dr. Zaremba was a one-time consultative physician who did not have an 

ongoing treatment relationship with Ms. Wells. (Id.). As the ALJ found, 

medical evidence contradicted Dr. Zaremba’s opinion that Ms. Wells had 

limited ability to stand and walk, required an assistive device, and had pain 

sufficient to distract her from adequately performing daily activities or work. 

(Doc. 6-3, p. 38). For example, in a letter to Dr. Moore, Dr. Unnoppet 

explained that he encouraged Ms. Wells to maintain her daily activities and 

to return to the yoga classes that she had stopped taking for fear of 

aggravating her back pain. (Doc. 6-8, pp. 44–45). Despite Dr. Zaremba’s 

opinion that Ms. Wells required an assistive device and experienced pain on 

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“10/10” scale with activity, Ms. Wells did not bring a cane with her to her 

examination with Dr. Zaremba. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38, Doc. 6-14, p. 8). 

The ALJ noted that Dr. Zaremba relied substantially on Ms. Wells’s 

subjective complaints of pain. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38). For example, while Dr. 

Zaremba determined that Ms. Wells’s pain levels would distract her from 

adequate performance of daily work activities, Ms. Wells did not report 

“significant distress” at medical visits with treating physicians or at the 

review hearing. (Id.). In fact, at the hearing in this matter, Ms. Wells 

testified that when she takes her prescription medication, her pain is a 4 on a 

10-point scale. (Doc. 6-3, p. 100). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that 

Dr. Zaremba’s opinions were “inconsistent with the weight of the evidence.” 

(Doc. 6-3, p. 38); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

The ALJ did not err in assigning little weight to Dr. Zaremba’s 

opinion. (Doc. 6-3, p. 38); Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159-61 (finding that 

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discredit the opinions 

of the claimant’s treating physicians where those physicians’ opinions 

regarding the claimant’s disability were inconsistent with the physicians’ 

treatment notes and unsupported by the medical evidence).

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V. Conclusion

The Court concludes the ALJ’s decision was based upon substantial 

evidence and consistent with applicable legal standards. Accordingly, the 

decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Court will enter a 

separate final judgment.

DONE and ORDERED this March 30, 2015.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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