Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02767/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02767-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL AARON JAYNE, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

TOM BOSENKO, et al., 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 2:08-cv-02767-MSB

ORDER

This case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. (Dkt. # 13). Plaintiff Michael

Aaron Jayne, who is currently confined in the Klamath County Jail, has filed a pro se civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. #s 1, 17). After reviewing Jayne’s

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Trust Account Statement (Dkt. #s 2, 9), the

Court will grant Jayne’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. In addition, after reviewing

the docket and record, the Court will deny Jayne’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt.

#8) and Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. #12) as moot. Finally, after

screening Jayne’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, to the extent discussed below,

the Court will order Defendants Abney, Anderson, Ashman, Bosenko, Champagne, Gonzalez,

Heyde, Johnson, Joiner, Meek, Mitchell, Penland, and Van Buskirk to answer Jayne’s

Complaint as discussed in this order. The Court will dismiss the remaining defendants

without prejudice.

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I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis & Filing Fee

Jayne requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

(Dkt. #2). Jayne has made the showing required by § 1915(a)(1),(2) and his request to

proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. (Dkt. #s 2, 9). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1), Jayne is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. An

initial partial filing fee will not be assessed (due to Jayne’s negative balance). Jayne is

required to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income

credited to his account. By separate order, the Court will direct the California Department

of Corrections to collect these payments and forward them to the Clerk of the Court each

time the amount in Jayne’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28

U.S.C. 1915(b).

II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Months before this case was reassigned to me, Jayne filed a motion for preliminary

injunction, requesting that the Court order Defendant Bosenko to end Jayne’s “disciplinary

diet” and to provide Jayne access to counsel (Dkt. #8), and an emergency motion for

preliminary injunction, requesting that the Court “instruct Sheriff Tom Bosenko to

immediately house Plaintiff in the [Shasta County] Jail until his trial [set for February 10,

2009.” (Dkt. #12). Jayne has since, however, filed a notice of change of address, reflecting

that he is now housed in the Klamath County Jail in Klamath Falls, Oregon. (Dkt. #s 15, 17).

Thus, as it appears that Jayne’s requested relief is no longer available, his motion for

preliminary injunction and emergency motion for preliminary injunction are denied as moot.

III. Motion for Appointment of Counsel / 90-Day Extension

In both this case and an unrelated case assigned to Judge Lawrence K. Karlton, Case

No. 2:07-cv-02522-LLK (GGH), Jayne has filed a motion to appoint counsel or in the

alternative for an “emergency temporary injunction” or an extension of time to file a

response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. #18). In support of his

motion, Jayne states that he has been temporarily denied access to the law library at the

Coffee Creek Correctional Facility in Wilsonville, Oregon during “intake” and thus will be

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unable to timely respond to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. There is no

pending motion for summary judgment in this case. Nor does Jayne appear to request that

counsel be appointed to represent him in this case. Therefore, the Court will deny Jayne’s

motion as it is more appropriately directed to Judge Karlton in Case No. 2:07-cv-02522-LLK

(GGH). 

IV. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

V. Background

Jayne is currently housed at the Klamath County Jail in Klamath Falls, Oregon. (Dkt.

#15). From October 2007 until at least November 2008, when he filed his complaint, Jayne

was a pre-trial detainee at the Shasta County Jail in Redding, California, where the events

Jayne complains of allegedly occurred. (Dkt #1 at 3). In sum, Jayne claims that he was

subjected to “extreme methods of punishment” and denied access to counsel in violation of

his civil rights. (Id.).

Jayne alleges that he was placed in “a safety isolation cell on numerous occasions for

up to 12 hours.” (Id.). In addition, Jayne alleges that Defendant Ashman prohibited

visitation with his family (id. at 3, 8) and confiscated his clothing as punishment. (Id. at 4).

Jayne also alleges that Ashman forced him to eat a “disciplinary loaf only twice a

day” for approximately one month by the time of his complaint, and that Ashman ordered

that Jayne remain on a disciplinary diet for several more months. (Id.). Jayne states that he

is provided “well below the national standard of a 2500-3000 calorie intake” and has lost

twenty-three pounds of weight as a result of this disciplinary diet. (Id. at 9). Jayne admits,

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however, that this disciplinary measure was taken “as punishment for rule violations.” (Id.

at 4).

Jayne contends that several conditions of his confinement at the Shasta County Jail

constituted “torture” and “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. (Id. at 1). He alleges that Ashman and Defendant Van Buskirk kept him

confined to his cell “everyday for over 13 months . . . only coming out of his cell 30 minutes

every other day.” (Id. at 4). He also alleges that Bosenko kept “a bright light on in his cell

24 [hours] a day.” (Id. at 7). And although he admits that the light has a “low” setting, he

alleges that it is still so bright that sleeping for 8 hours is impossible.” (Id. at 7-8). Jayne

then alleges that Van Buskirk created “nothing less than torture” by covering jail windows

to block out natural light and create “sensory deprivation.” (Id. at 7). Plus, Jayne alleges that

Bosenko, Ashman, and Van Buskirk forced him to wear “jail jap flaps,” which are

“comparable to walking bare footed,” causing pain in his lower back and feet. (Id. at 10).

Jayne further alleges that Bosenko and Defendants Barnes and Johnson have been indifferent

to his medical needs by refusing to provide his normal prescription of “Ativan” to treat his

“chronic anxiety, including mood disorder and depression and intermitent [sic] explosive

disorder.” (Id. at 7). Moreover, Jayne alleges that Bosenko and Defendant “Barbara,” the

Jail Medical Director, have been indifferent to his medical needs by requiring him to pay for

an eye exam. (Id. at 8).

Jayne further alleges that defendants have restricted his access to courts in several

ways. He alleges that Ashman and Van Buskirk denied him telephonic access to his

attorney, except during “his 30 minute time out every other day which normally is at night.”

(Id. at 4). Jayne also alleges that Ashman read through and delayed the delivery of his

outgoing legal mail. (Id. at 5). Jayne further contends that Bosenko and Ashman have

implemented “draconian policies” by charging Plaintiff for legal supplies. (Id. at 9). In

addition, Jayne alleges that Bosenko, Ashman, Van Buskirk, and Defendants Meek,

Champagne, Gonzalez, Penland, Heyde, Mitchell, Joiner, Abney, Anderson, and Global Tel

Link engaged in recording and monitoring his calls to his attorney. (Id. at 5). This call

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monitoring allegedly resulted in administrative discipline and referrals for criminal

prosecution. (Id.). Champagne, Van Buskirk, Ashman, Meek, Abney, Anderson, Mitchell,

Gonzalez, and Defendant User then allegedly conspired to “cover up and erase all recorded

calls.” (Id. at 6). Moreover, Jayne alleges a second conspiracy involving Anderson,

Ashman, Van Buskirk, and Abney to transfer Jayne to the High Desert State Prison, where

Jayne would have “no access to his counsel.” (Id.).

Finally, Jayne makes several miscellaneous claims: He alleges that Defendants Rogers

and Church “physically assaulted [him] by pushing him” (id. at 9), that Bosenko and Van

Buskirk engaged in “price gouging” by charging him high rates for collect calls (id. at 6), and

that Defendant Zufall “stole all of [Jayne’s] family photographs and 2 books.” (Id. at 5).

VI. Discussion

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state

law who have violated rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See Buckley v.

City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139,

1146 (9th Cir. 1984). To state a valid claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

that he suffered a specific injury as a result of a defendant’s specific conduct and show an

affirmative link between the injury and that defendant’s conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

A. Pleading Standard

Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hains v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21

(1972). Nonetheless, a pro se plaintiff must satisfy the pleading standard set forth in the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). In

addition,“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

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B. “All Defendants”

Several of Jayne’s claims are made against “all defendants.” For example, Jayne

alleges that “all defendants are in and have been in a [sic] active conspiracy.” (Dkt. #1 at 3).

First, “[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy . . . under section 1983, the plaintiff must state

specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King,

883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). Jayne does not allege facts supporting an overarching

conspiracy. Thus, Jayne’s claim for conspiracy is dismissed without prejudice. Second,

“[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).

Thus, the defendants–Abernathy, Baker, Craig, Global Tel Link, Marlar, Miller, Millis, and

Viser–who are not specifically alleged to have caused one of the constitutional deprivations

discussed below are dismissed without prejudice. 

C. Pretrial Detainees

Pre-trial detainees “are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause, as well as specific substantive guarantees of the federal Constitution, such as the First

and Eighth Amendments.” Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under the Due Process Clause, “detainees have a substantive due process right against

restrictions that amount to punishment.” Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “For a particular

governmental action to constitute punishment, (1) that action must cause the detainee to

suffer some harm or ‘disability,’ and (2) the purpose of the governmental action must be to

punish the detainee.” Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). In the first step of this inquiry, “the harm or disability

. . . must either significantly exceed, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of

confinement.” Id. at 1030 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 537). To determine punitive intent, courts

“first examine whether the restriction is based upon an express intent to inflict punishment.”

Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1045 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746). Courts “next consider whether

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punitive intent can be inferred from the nature of the restriction. This determination . . . will

generally turn upon ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally

be connected is assignable for it, and whether [the restriction] appears excessive in relation

to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’” Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 539) (brackets in

original).

D. Express Punishment

Jayne has alleged that certain defendants expressly intended to punish him for reasons

other than prison rule violations. For instance, Jayne alleges that Ashman “ordered [Jayne’s]

clothes to be restricted forever as punishment . . . [to] prevent him from recreating [sic]

exercising [sic] outside in inclement weather where he will freeze with no shirt.” (Dkt. #1

at 4). Taken in the light most favorable to him, Jayne sufficiently alleges a harm greater than

any restriction on clothing inherent in confinement and an express intent to punish.

Jayne fails, however, to allege express punishment in his placement in a safety

isolation cell or on 24-hour lockdown. Jayne alleges only that he has been intermittently

placed in a safety isolation cell and on 24 hour lockdown for over 13 months. Jayne does not

allege specific conduct by any specific defendant that resulted in his placement in isolation

or on lockdown. Thus, Jayne fails to state a claim with regard to express punishment through

isolation or lockdown.

E. Conditions of Confinement

A district court may infer punitive intent from a detainee’s conditions of

confinement, and in doing so may look to the standards developed under the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Frost v.

Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Because pretrial detainees’ rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment,

. . . we apply the same standards.”). In fact, a violation of the Eighth Amendment “will

always violate substantive due process.” Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1121

n.11 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, “the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment provide a

minimum standard of care for determining [detainees’] rights.” Id. at 1120.

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To state a claim against a prison official under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner

must satisfy two requirements: (1) an objective requirement that “the deprivation alleged .

. . be sufficiently serious,” and (2) a subjective requirement that the “prison official [ ]

have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)

(quotation omitted). 

The objective requirement is met where the prison official’s act or omission results

in “the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). “Prison officials have a duty to ensure

that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)). “The circumstances, nature, and duration of a

deprivation of these necessities must be considered in determining whether a

constitutional violation has occurred. ‘The more basic the need, the shorter the time it can

be withheld.’” Id.

The subjective requirement is met where the prison official acts with “‘deliberate

indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference

when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at

837. In other words, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Id.

In his complaint, Jayne alleges facts sufficient to support claims for violations of

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments with regard to inadequate food, constant lighting,

inadequate clothing, and medical indifference to his mental health. He fails, however, to

state claims with respect to outdoor exercise, isolation, sensory deprivation, and fees for

medical care.

i. Inadequate Food

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“Adequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Ray, 682 F.2d at 1246),

amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). “While prison food need not be ‘tasty or

aesthetically pleasing,’ it must be ‘adequate to maintain health.’” Id. (quoting LeMaire v.

Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (1993)). The Supreme Court has stated that a disciplinary

diet providing less than 1,000 calories per day “might be tolerable for a few days and

intolerably cruel for weeks or months.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); see

also Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an allegation

that 16 meals had been withheld over 23 days, leading to weight loss and dizziness was

sufficient to state a claim).

In his complaint, Jayne alleges that Ashman forced him to eat a “disciplinary loaf

only twice a day” for approximately one month and ordered that he remain on the diet for

several more. (Dkt. #1 at 4). Jayne also alleges that the diet provided insufficient

nutrition and resulted in “rapid weight loss.” (Id. at 9). Those allegations are sufficient to

state a claim against Ashman under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for a lack of

adequate food.

ii. Constant Lighting

“Adequate lighting is one of the fundamental attributes of ‘adequate shelter’

required by the Eighth Amendment.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090 (citing Hoptowit v.

Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985)). “Moreover, there is no legitimate

penological justification for requiring inmates to suffer physical and psychological harm

by living in constant illumination. This practice is unconstitutional.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and brackets omitted).

In his complaint, Jayne alleges that Bosenko kept “a bright light on in his cell 24

[hours] a day,” which, even on its “low” setting, was “so bright that sleeping for 8 hours

is impossible.” (Dkt. #1 at 7-8). Those allegations are sufficient to state a claim against

Bosenko under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for inadequate lighting in Jayne’s

cell.

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iii. Clothing

“The denial of adequate clothing can inflict pain under the Eighth Amendment.” 

Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Ray, 682 F.2d at 1246). 

The Ninth Circuit has “suggested that depriving an inmate of a jacket could violate the

Eighth Amendment under some weather conditions.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 732 (citing

Walker, 14 F.3d at 1421). Factors relevant to determining when a constitutional violation

occurs include the weather conditions at the time, any pain inflicted by the clothing

restriction, and the clothing that is in fact available to the inmate at the time. Walker, 14

F.3d at 1421.

Jayne alleges that Ashman restricted his clothing such that he was unable to

exercise “outside in inclement weather where he will freeze with no shirt.” (Dkt. #1 at 4). 

Jayne also alleges that Ashman, Bosenko, and Van Buskirk “forced [him] to wear”

footwear that caused him lower back and foot pain. (Id. at 10). These allegations are

sufficient to state a claim against Ashman, Bosenko, and Van Buskirk for inadequate

clothing.

iv. Indifference to Mental Health

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when the official acts with

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “These requirements apply to physical, dental and mental health.” 

Ray, 682 F.2d at 1253. The medical need alleged “must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 303 (1991)). Factors indicating a serious medical need include: (1) whether a

reasonable doctor would consider the condition “worthy of comment or treatment,” (2)

whether the condition “significantly affects an individual’s daily activities,” and (3)

whether the condition involves “chronic and substantial pain.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131.

To demonstrate deliberate medical indifference, a plaintiff must show both “a

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and . . .

harm caused by the indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006)

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(citation omitted). “Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious

medical needs when they ‘deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment.’” 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131.

In his complaint, Jayne alleges that he suffers from “chronic anxiety, including

mood disorder and depression and intermittent explosive disorder.” (Dkt. #1 at 7). He

also alleges that he is normally prescribed Ativan to treat this condition, but Barnes,

Bosenko, and Johnson refused to provide him with “this type of medication.” (Id.). 

Although Jayne does not allege that he has been denied all types of medication, drawing

all inferences in his favor at this stage Jayne’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim

against Barnes, Bosenko, and Johnson under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for

inadequate medical care.

v. Confinement and Outdoor Exercise

“[E]xercise has been determined to be one of the basic human necessities protected

by the Eighth Amendment, and a long-term deprivation of outdoor exercise for inmates is

unconstitutional.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); see Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492-93

(9th Cir. 1984) (finding “a substantial constitutional question” where inmates were

confined to cells for up to 23 1⁄2 hours a day for over one year). “[O]ther [circuits] have

held that detainees . . . are ordinarily entitled to daily exercise, or five to seven hours of

exercise per week, outside their cells.” Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1212 (citing Campbell v.

Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 1980); Housley v. Dodson, 41 F.3d 597, 599 (10th

Cir. 1994)).

Here, Jayne alleges that he has been subject to a lockdown for “over 13 months . . .

only coming out of his cell 30 minutes every other day.” (Dkt. #1 at 3). Although the

Ninth Circuit has not identified “a specific minimum amount of weekly exercise that must

be afforded to detainees,” Jayne’s allegation that he receives less than three hours of

exercise per week certainly “does not give meaningful protection to this basic human

necessity.” Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1212. Jayne therefore states a claim under the Eight and

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Fourteenth Amendments for denial of adequate exercise. Because he fails to allege

specific conduct by any defendant and injunctive relief is no longer available, however,

the Court will dismiss the claim without prejudice but with leave to amend to name a

responsible defendant or defendants. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Jayne may, within fortyfive (45) days, submit an amended complaint on the form provided with this Order. He

must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First Amended

Complaint.” The amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety on the

form provided with this Order and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint

by reference. An amended complaint entirely supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). After amendment, the Court will treat

an original complaint as nonexistent. Id. Any cause of action that was raised in the

original complaint is waived if not raised in a first amended complaint. King v. Atiyeh,

814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

vi. Isolation

“Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to

scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.” Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685. At the same time,

“punitive isolation is not necessarily unconstitutional, but it may be, depending on the

duration of the confinement and the conditions thereof.” Id. at 685-86 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

In his complaint, Jayne alleges that he has been placed in a “safety isolation cell . .

. on numerous occasions for up to 12 hours.” (Dkt. #1 at 3). Jayne does not allege,

however, that he was kept in an isolation cell for prolonged periods of time or that

particular conditions of the cell(s) he was kept in subjected him to harm exceeding the

inherent discomforts of confinement. Moreover, Jayne fails to allege specific conduct by

any defendant that resulted in his isolation. Therefore, Jayne fails to state a claim under

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments with respect to his intermittent confinement in a

“safety isolation cell.”

vii. Sensory Deprivation and Natural Sunlight

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“Sensory deprivation or excessive limitation of activity may constitute an Eighth

Amendment violation.” Baumann v. Ariz. Dept. of Corr., 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir.

1985) (citation omitted). Here, Jayne’s only allegation in support of his claim that he has

been subjected to “sensory deprivation” is that Bosenko and Van Buskirk ordered that

Jayne’s jail windows be covered, preventing natural sunlight from entering his cell. (Dkt.

#1 at 7). Jayne does not allege the complete denial of light or any other aspect of sensory

deprivation that would exceed the inherent discomforts of confinement. Thus, Jayne fails

to state a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for “sensory deprivation.”

viii. Fees for Medical Care

Charging prisoners for medical services does not constitute deliberate indifference

unless the fees charged are prohibitively high. Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs., 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). In his complaint, Jayne

alleges that Bosenko and “Barbara” required that he pay for an eye exam and for glasses. 

(Dkt. #1 at 8). Jayne does not allege that this charge prevented him from pursuing

medical care, nor does he allege that the fees negatively impacted his medical care. Thus,

Jayne fails to state a claim against Bosenko or “Barbara” under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments for inadequate medical care.

F. Other Restrictions

i. Excessive Force

“[T]he Fourth Amendment sets the ‘applicable constitutional limitations’ for

considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76

F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996)). “[D]etermining whether a defendant officer’s use of

force was ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment ‘requires a careful balancing of the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against

the countervailing government interests at stake.’” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197 (quoting 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “Not every push or shove, even if it may

later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth

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Amendment.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)

Jayne alleges that Church and Rogers “physically assaulted [him] by pushing

him,” causing Jayne continuing physical pain. (Dkt. #1 at 9). Jayne, however, does not

allege any facts concerning the circumstances surrounding this incident. Nor does Jayne

allege that this alleged use of force was unreasonable. Accordingly, Jayne fails to state a

claim against Church or Rogers under the Fourth Amendment for excessive use of force.

ii. Visitation

Pre-trial detainees do not have a right to unfettered visitation. See Block v.

Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 585-89 (1984) (upholding a blanket prohibition on contact

visitation for pre-trial detainees as reasonably related to a legitimate government interest

in security). “[T]here is no constitutional right of ‘access to a particular visitor.’” 

Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460-61

(1989)).

In his complaint, Jayne alleges that Ashman “has forced [him] to have no visitation

with his family.” (Dkt. #1 at 3). Jayne does not allege that he has been denied visitation

altogether, or that this restriction was accompanied by an express intent to punish. Thus,

Jayne fails to state a claim against Ashman under the Fourteenth Amendment for a

restriction on visitation.

iii. Collect Call Rates

“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access, subject to reasonable

security limitations.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1092 (citing Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791

F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986)). They do not, however, have a right to a specific rate for

their telephone calls. See Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2000) (per

curiam).

Here, Jayne alleges that Bosenko and Global Tel Link engaged in “price gouging”

on his collect calls. (Dkt #1 at 6). He does not, however, allege that this resulted in

prices so high that he has been denied telephone access. Thus, Jayne fails to state a claim

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against Bosenko and Global Tel Link under the First Amendment for denial of telephone

access.

iv. Deprivation of Property

“An unauthorized intentional deprivation of property does not give rise to a

violation of the Due Process Clause if the state provides an adequate postdeprivation

remedy.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 n.14 (1983). Here, Jayne alleges that

Zufall stole his personal property from his cell. (Dkt. #1 at 5). As in Hudson, the state

provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy in the form of common-law causes of action

that can provide compensation for his property loss. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813,

816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for

any property deprivations.”) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). Additionally, Jayne

indicates that the jail had a grievance procedure, and he does not allege any deficiency in

this remedy. (Id., p.2). Nor does Jayne allege that Zufall acted “pursuant to some

established procedure.” Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir.

2001). Thus, Jayne fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation

of personal property.

v. Legal Call Monitoring

Jayne alleges that Abney, Anderson, Ashman, Bosenko, Champagne, Gonzalez,

Heyde, Joiner, Meek, Mitchell, Penland, and Van Buskirk recorded and monitored his

calls to his attorney. (Dkt. #1 at 5). The Fourth Amendment is not triggered unless the

state intrudes into an area “in which there is a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable

expectation of privacy.’” United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986)). Prisoners generally have “no

expectation of privacy in [telephone] calls.” U.S. v. Monghur, 576 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th

Cir. 2009) (citing Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 291 (“[A]ny expectation of privacy in outbound

calls from prison is not objectively reasonable and . . . the Fourth Amendment is therefore

not triggered by the routine taping of such calls.”)); U.S. v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221 (10th

Cir. 2006) (“It is generally accepted that a prisoner who places a call from an institutional

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phone with knowledge that the call is subject to being recorded has impliedly consented

to the recording.”) (citations omitted).

A prisoner may, however, have an expectation of privacy in a properly made call

to his attorney. See Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 291 n.9 (stating that the court’s analysis “does

not apply to ‘properly placed’ telephone calls between a defendant and his attorney”). In

addition, the recording of Jayne’s calls to his attorney may violate the Federal Wiretap

Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22. See id., 77 F.3d at 291. Accordingly, Jayne’s allegations are

sufficient at this time to state a claim against the above defendants for the monitoring and

recording of his calls.

G. Access to Courts

To state a denial of access to the courts claim, a prisoner “must identify a

‘nonfrivolous,’ ‘arguable’ underlying claim” that the prisoner has been or will be unable

to pursue properly because the defendant’s actions have denied the prisoner meaningful

access to the courts. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (quoting Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996)). Here, Jayne alleges facts sufficient to state a claim

for a violation of his constitutional rights with regard to restrictions placed on his calls to

his attorney and his retaliatory transfer. He fails to state a claim, however, with regard to

inspection of his legal mail, fees for legal supplies, and the monitoring and recording of

his calls.

i. Restricted Telephone Access

Jayne alleges that Ashman and Van Buskirk denied him telephonic access to his

attorney, except during “his 30 minute time out every other day which normally is at

night.” (Dkt. #1 at 4). The Ninth Circuit has “recognized detainees’ and prisoners’ first

amendment right to telephone access . . . . subject to rational limitations in the face of

legitimate security interests fo the penal institution.” Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791

F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Barnett v.

Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (indicating that a prisoner may be deprived of

access to the courts because he was denied telephone access to his attorney). In addition,

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“a prisoner’s right of access to the courts includes contact visitation with his counsel.” 

Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Viewed in the light

most favorable to him, Jayne alleges that Ashman and Van Buskirk have largely denied

him access to his attorney, telephonic or otherwise. That allegation is sufficient to state a

claim against Ashman and Van Buskirk under the First Amendment for denial of access

to the courts.

ii. Legal Mail Inspection

Jayne alleges that Ashman read through and delayed the delivery of his outgoing

mail “to the courts . . . . to [ ] public officials and individual judges . . . .” (Dkt. #1 at 5). 

“The Supreme Court ha[s] held that [legal] mail may be opened in the presence of

the addressee and that prison officials [can] require both that the letters be specially

marked with the name and address of the attorney and that the attorney communicate first

with prison officials.” Sherman v. MacDougall, 656 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-77 (1974)). “It is an open question in the Ninth

Circuit whether reading legal mail outside of the prisoner’s presence is clearly established

law.” Sherman, 656 F.2d at 528 (emphasis added); but see Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d

1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an isolated instance or occasional opening of

legal mail outside of an inmate’s presence does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation). In any event, “[m]ail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s

lawyer, is not legal mail.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094 (citation omitted). Jayne does not

allege that Ashman opened any mail from his attorney outside of his presence. Nor does

he allege any actual injury related to any delays in the delivery of his mail to the courts. 

See id. (“[T]o state an access to the courts claim that concerns neither the inadequacies of

the law library nor the lack of assistance of a person trained in law, an inmate must

demonstrate ‘actual injury,’ i.e., ‘some specific instance in which an inmate was actually

denied access to the courts.’”) (quoting Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.

1989)). Accordingly, Jayne fails to state a claim against Ashman for denial of access to

the court relating to either the opening of his mail or any delay in the delivery of his mail.

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iii. Fees for Legal Supplies

Jayne alleges that Ashman and Bosenko have implemented “draconian policies”

by charging Plaintiff for legal supplies. (Dkt. #1 at 9). He does not, however, allege an

actual injury related to the fees charged for legal supplies, as he does not allege that they

denied him access to the courts. Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094. Therefore, Jayne fails to state

a claim against Ashman and Bosenko for denial of access to the courts relating to legal

supplies.

iv. Retaliatory Transfer

Prisoners may not be transferred in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment

rights. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527,

531 (9th Cir. 1985). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse

action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such

action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, Jayne alleges that Abney, Anderson, Ashman, and Van

Buskirk (1) “maliciously transferr[ed] him to [the] High Desert State Prison for almost 2

months,” (2) because Jayne (3) had attempted to exercise his First Amendment right to

contact visitation and telephonic access to his counsel, and that (4) the transfer resulted in

“no access to his counsel.” (Dkt. #1 at 6). There is no indication, as yet, whether the

transfer reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal. All told, Jayne’s allegations are

sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Abney, Anderson, Ashman,

and Van Buskirk.

VI. Relief Requested

When an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief concerning conditions at a

particular prison where he is housed, his claims for such relief become moot when he is no

longer subjected to those conditions. Nelson v. Heiss, 277 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001).

Jayne is no longer housed at the Shasta County Jail. (Dkt. #s 15, 17). Thus, Jayne’s requests

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for injunctive relief are denied as moot. This action shall proceed as one for monetary

damages only.

VII. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Jayne must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 83-

182(f) and 83-183(b) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Jayne must not include a motion

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal

of this action.

B. Copies

Jayne must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv

5-133(d)(2). Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice

to Jayne.

C. Possible Dismissal

If Jayne fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

(2) Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). All fees must be collected and paid in accordance with

this Court’s order to the California Department of Corrections, which will be filed

concurrently with this Order.

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. #8) is denied as moot.

(4) Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. #12) is denied

as moot.

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(5) Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel and Motion for 90-Day Extension (Dkt.

#18) is denied without prejudice.

(5) Plaintiff’s isolation, confinement, outdoor exercise, sensory deprivation,

medical fees, excessive force, visitation, collect call rate, deprivation of property, legal mail

inspection, legal supply fees, and legal call monitoring claims are dismissed without

prejudice. Defendants Abernathy, Baker, Craig, Global Tel Link, Marlar, Miller, Millis, and

Viser are also dismissed without prejudice. 

(6) Defendant Bosenko shall answer Plaintiff’s claims regarding medical

indifference, inadequate lighting, inadequate clothing, and the recording and monitoring of

Plaintiff’s telephone calls to his attorney. Defendant Ashman shall answer Plaintiff’s claims

regarding inadequate food, inadequate clothing, denial of access to counsel, retaliatory

transfer claims, and the recording and monitoring of his telephone calls to his attorney.

Defendant Van Buskirk shall answer Plaintiff’s claims regarding inadequate clothing, denial

of access to counsel, retaliatory transfer claims, and the recording and monitoring of

Plaintiff’s calls to his attorney. Defendants Barnes and Johnson shall answer Plaintiff’s

medical indifference claim. Defendants Abney and Anderson shall answer Plaintiff’s claims

regarding retaliatory transfer and the recording and monitoring of Plaintiff’s calls to his

attorney. Defendants Champagne, Gonzalez, Heyde, Joiner, Meek, Mitchell, and Penland

shall answer Plaintiff’s claims regarding the recording and monitoring of Plaintiff’s calls to

his attorney.

(7) Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to state claim for denial of

adequate exercise against a particular defendant or defendants. Within forty-five (45) days

of the date of this Order, Plaintiff may submit an amended complaint on the form provided

with this Order. Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the

“First Amended Complaint.” The amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its

entirety on the form provided with this Order and may not incorporate any part of the original

Complaint by reference. An amended complaint entirely supersedes the original complaint.

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(8) The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a Prisoner Complaint form along

with this order.

(8) The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Dkt. #1), this Order, a Notice of Submission of Documents form, an instruction

sheet, and copies of summons and USM-285 forms for each Defendant listed above in

number 2.

(9) Within 30 days of the date of filing of this Order, Plaintiff shall complete and

return to the Clerk of the Court the Notice of Submission of Documents. Plaintiff shall

submit with the Notice of Submission of Documents: a copy of the Complaint, a copy of this

Order, a completed summons, and a completed USM-285 for each Defendant listed above

in number 2. 

(10) Plaintiff shall not attempt service on Defendants and must not request waiver

of service. Once the Clerk of the Court has received the Notice of Submission of Documents

and the required documents, the Court will direct the United States Marshal to seek waiver

of service from each Defendant or serve each Defendant.

(11) If Plaintiff fails to return the Notice of Submission of Documents and the

required documents within 30 days of the date of filing of this Order, the Clerk of the

Court shall, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action without

prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

DATED this 20th day of November, 2009.

 /s/ Marsha S. Berzon 

 MARSHA S. BERZON

 United States Circuit Judge, sitting by designation

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