Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00302/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Terry Patterson,

Plaintiff,

v.

Village Care, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 19-cv-0302-AJB-AGS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO FILE IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AS MOOT AND 

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

(Doc. No. 2)

The Court reviews Plaintiff Terry Patterson’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

as required when a plaintiff files a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 

1, 2.) Under this mandatory screening, the Court finds that Patterson’s complaint does not 

sufficiently state a claim for relief. Thus, the Court DENIES as moot Patterson’s IFP 

motion., (Doc. No. 2), and DISMISSES Patterson’s complaint with leave to amend. 

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Patterson moves to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. All parties instituting any 

civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application 

for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action 

may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is 

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granted leave to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 

1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). All actions sought to be filed IFP under § 1915 must be 

accompanied by an affidavit, signed by the applicant under penalty of perjury, that includes 

a statement of all assets which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security. Civ. L.R.

3.2.a.

Here, Patterson states in her declaration that she is currently unemployed. (Doc. No. 

2 at 2.) Patterson declares she received $308.64 per week from May 3, 2017, until 

December 13, 2018, from Worker’s Compensation. (Id.) Patterson further declares that for 

a period of 225 weeks starting from December 14, 2018, she received $185.18 per week 

from Worker’s Compensation. (Id.) Patterson declares she has $358 in her checking 

account and $42,300 held in other account(s). (Id.) Patterson fails to specify in what type 

of account(s) the foregoing funds are held and therefore, the Court is unable to determine 

Patterson’s ability to pay. However, the Court need not determine Patterson’s IFP financial 

status at this time because the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Patterson must 

refile for IFP status at that time. Thus, the Court DENIES Patterson’s IFP motion as moot. 

II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), when reviewing an IFP motion, the Court must rule 

on its own motion to dismiss before the complaint is served. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, 

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from 

a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 

F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is “not limited 

to prisoners”); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (“[§] 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district 

court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim”). Accordingly, the Court 

“may dismiss as frivolous complaints reciting bare legal conclusions with no suggestion of 

supporting facts . . . .” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal 

quotation omitted). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

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(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A complaint 

is facially plausible when the facts alleged allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Also, pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers” because pro se litigants are more prone to making errors in pleading 

than litigants represented by counsel. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal 

quotations omitted); see Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded 

by statute on other grounds, Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–30 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, the Supreme 

Court has stated that federal courts should liberally construe the “‘inartful pleading’ of pro 

se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Boag v. 

MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)); see, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that pro se pleadings are liberally construed).

III. DISCUSSION

Patterson contends that Village Care violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) by failing to reasonably accommodate her disability and by terminating her 

because of that disability. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity 

shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. 

. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title I of the ADA insures full opportunities for people with 

disabilities in the workplace by requiring reasonable accommodation of employees' 

disabilities by their employers. Under the ADA, the term “discriminate” is defined as 

including “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or 

employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would 

impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To prevail on a claim of unlawful discharge under the ADA, the 

plaintiff must establish that he is a qualified individual with a disability and that the 

employer terminated him because of his disability. Cooper v. Neiman Marcus Group, 125 

F.3d 786, 790 (9th Cir. 1997). The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” 

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as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 

perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 

desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). A “disability” is “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(2)(a).

Here, Patterson alleges generally she has a disability, but fails to plead sufficient 

facts to establish she is a “qualified individual with a disability” protected under the ADA. 

Therefore, Patterson has failed to establish a prima facie case as to the first element of an 

unlawful discharge claim under the ADA. 

Moreover, Patterson fails to plead sufficient facts that Village Care terminated 

Patterson because of a qualified disability protected under the ADA. Rather, Patterson 

alleges only that from February 6, 2017 to August 4, 2017 “Village Care failed to engage 

in an interactive process . . . to begin discussing the accommodation request” and that

Patterson was terminated effective August 4, 2017. The allegations do not make clear what 

accommodations Village Care was obligated to make and whether Patterson was 

terminated because of a qualifying disability protected under the ADA.

Therefore, Patterson has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the plaintiff can correct 

the complaint’s deficiency. Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 701. The “rule favoring liberality in 

amendments to pleadings is particularly important for the pro se litigant. Presumably 

unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to make errors in pleading than 

the person who benefits from the representation of counsel.” Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448; see 

Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Bazrowx v. Scott, 

136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Generally a district court errs in dismissing a pro se 

complaint for failure to state a claim . . . without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to 

amend.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Patterson leave to amend her complaint.

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES as moot Patterson’s IFP motion, (Doc. No. 2), and DISMISSES

Patterson’s complaint with leave to amend, (Doc. No. 1). Patterson must file both (1) a 

renewed IFP motion and (2) an amended complaint by June 7, 2019, or risk having this 

case dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 10, 2019

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