Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00793/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00793-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,

successor in interest to JP Morgan Chase

Bank, as Trustee for the Registered Holders

of Novastar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series

2004-3 Novastar home equity loan assetbacked certificates, Series 2004-3,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv793 - IEG (DHB)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

AND

[Doc. No. 2]

(2) REMANDING ACTION TO

STATE COURT

vs.

TONY COLLIN HOOK; EMILY ANN

HOOK; LESLIE DIANTONIO; and DOES 1

through 5, inclusive,

Defendants.

On April 2, 2012, Defendant Leslie Diantonio (“Diantonio”) removed an unlawful detainer

action from state superior court to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). [Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal.] Along with her notice of

removal, Defendant Diantonio submitted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Doc.

No. 2.] For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Diantonio’s motion to proceed IFP, but

REMANDS the action back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court whether by

original process, removal or otherwise, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a

filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, an action may proceed despite failure to

pay the filing fee if the party is granted in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. See Rodriguez v. Cook,

169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court may grant IFP status to any party who

demonstrates that he or she is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a).

In the present case, having reviewed Defendant Diantonio’s motion and declaration in

support of the motion, the Court finds that Diantonio has made a sufficient showing of inability to

pay the required filing fees. See Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1177. Accordingly, good cause appearing,

the Court GRANTS Defendant Diantonio leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

II. INITIAL SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

After granting IFP status, the Court must dismiss the case if the complaint “fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails

to state a claim).

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over

matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511

U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court only

if the district court could have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

“Removal statutes are strictly construed against removal.” Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans

Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). There is a “strong presumption” against

removal jurisdiction, and the party seeking removal always has the burden of establishing that

removal is proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). If there is any doubt as

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to the propriety of removal, federal jurisdiction must be rejected. Id. at 567. If at any time before

the entry of final judgment it appears that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case

removed from state court, it must remand the action to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Int’l

Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991). 

Defendant Diantonio’s notice of removal alleges that this court has federal question

jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. [Notice of Removal ¶¶ 5-14.] Under 28

U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under” federal law. 

Removal based on § 1331 is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under the rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a

federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id. Therefore,

there is no federal question jurisdiction simply because there is a federal defense to the claim. Id.

A review of the complaint shows that Plaintiff is only bringing a cause of action against the

Defendants for unlawful detainer pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1161a. [Doc.

No. 1, Compl.] This is a purely state law cause of action, and the Court does not have federal

question jurisdiction over the matter based on this claim. See Southland Homes Real Estate & Inv.,

LLC v. Lam, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25472, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2011); Galileo Fin. v. Park,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94996, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) (“Here, the complaint only asserts

a claim for unlawful detainer, a cause of action that is purely a matter of state law. Thus, from the

face of the complaint, it is clear that no basis for federal question jurisdiction exists.”). In the

notice of removal, Defendant Diantonio asserts that federal question exists based on the Protecting

Tenants at Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”). [Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal ¶ 6.] However, the face of

the complaint shows that Plaintiff is not bringing a cause of action under the PTFA and is only

bringing a cause of action for unlawful detainer. [See Doc No. 1, Compl.] Based on the allegations

in the notice of removal, Defendant at most can raise the PTFA as a defense to Plaintiff’s unlawful

detainer action. However, a federal defense by itself is insufficient to establish federal question

jurisdiction. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; Fannie Mae v. Brooks, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

30627, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012) (rejecting defendant’s contention that a defense under the

PTFA is sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction and remanding the action for lack of

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jurisdiction).

In addition, the face of the complaint clearly shows that this Court also does not possess

diversity jurisdiction over the matter. For a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, there

must be “complete diversity” between the parties and the amount in controversy requirement of

$75,000 must be met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267

(1806). “[W]hen a state-court complaint affirmatively alleges that the amount in controversy is less

than the jurisdictional threshold, the ‘party seeking removal must prove with legal certainty that

[the] jurisdictional amount is met.’” Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 2007).

The complaint states that Plaintiff is seeking under $10,000 in damages, [Doc. No. 1,

Compl.], but Defendant has made no attempt in her notice of removal to prove with a legal certainty

that the amount in controversy is over $75,000. Therefore, Defendant has not met her burden of

establishing that this Court has diversity jurisdiction, see Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699, and

diversity jurisdiction is lacking. See, e.g., Southland Homes, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25472, at *3

(remanding unlawful detainer action where plaintiff’s complaint stated that the damages sought

were less than $10,000). Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Diantonio’s motion to proceed IFP,

but REMANDS the action back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 6, 2012 _________________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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