Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-18-07172/USCOURTS-caDC-18-07172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2019 Decided January 28, 2020

No. 18-7141

ALLIANCE OF ARTISTS AND RECORDING COMPANIES, INC., ON 

BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

APPELLANT

v.

DENSO INTERNATIONAL AMERICA, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 18-7172

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-01271)

Richard B. Dagen argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs was Russell Steinthal. Daniel K. Oakes

entered an appearance.

Andrew Grimm was on the brief for amicus curiae Digital 

Justice Foundation, Inc. in support of plaintiff-appellant and 

reversal. 

Scott A. Keller argued the cause for appellees. With him 

on the brief were Paul J. Reilly, Benjamin A. Geslison, Steven 

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J. Routh, Melanie L. Bostwick, Annette L. Hurst, Andrew 

Phillip Bridges, David Hayes, Armen Nercessian, Seth David 

Greenstein, Robert S. Schwartz, David D. Golden, Jessica L. 

Ellsworth, Kirti Datla, William D. Coston, Megan S. 

Woodworth, and Frank C. Cimino, Jr. E. Desmond Hogan

entered an appearance. 

Jonathan Band was on the brief for amici curiae The 

Computer & Communications Industry Association, et al. in 

support of affirmance. 

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: This case involves 

actions filed by Appellant Alliance of Artists and Recording 

Companies, Inc. (“AARC” or “Appellant”) pursuant to the

Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (“Act” or “AHRA”), 17 

U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010. On July 25, 2014, AARC filed a lawsuit 

against General Motors LLC, DENSO International America, 

Inc., Ford Motor Company, and Clarion Corporation of 

America (“GM/Ford action”) for alleged violations of the Act. 

A second, substantially similar lawsuit was filed by AARC on 

November 14, 2014, against FCA US LLC and Mitsubishi 

Electric Automotive America, Inc. (“FCA action”). On 

February 9, 2015, the District Court consolidated the cases. 

In each case, AARC claimed that in-vehicle audio 

recording devices that copy music from CDs onto hard drives

within the devices, allowing the music to be played back inside 

the vehicle even without the CDs, are “digital audio recording 

device[s]” under the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3). Based on this 

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assertion, AARC alleged that the three suppliers of the devices 

(DENSO, Clarion, and Mitsubishi), along with the three 

automobile manufacturers that sold vehicles containing the

recording devices (General Motors, Ford, and FCA)

(collectively “Appellees”) had violated the Act by failing to 

pay royalties and adopt the required copying control 

technology with respect to the devices.

On March 23, 2018, after several years of litigation, see 

All. of Artists & Recording Cos., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Co.

(AARC I), 162 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2016); All. of Artists & 

Recording Cos., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Co. (AARC II), 306 F. 

Supp. 3d 413 (D.D.C. 2016); All. of Artists & Recording Cos., 

Inc. v. Gen. Motors Co. (AARC III), 306 F. Supp. 3d 422 

(D.D.C. 2018), the District Court granted Appellees’ joint 

motion for summary judgment, see AARC III, 306 F. Supp. 3d 

at 441. On the same date, the District Court entered an Order

confirming its judgments. This Order resolved all the claims in 

the FCA action and all but the claims based on GM’s flashdrive devices in the GM/Ford action. On September 18, 2018, 

AARC filed a notice of appeal in the FCA action. On October 

23, 2018, the District Court granted AARC’s unopposed Rule 

54(b) motion to enter final judgment as to the hard-drive claims 

in the GM/Ford action. However, the court reserved judgment 

on the flash-drive claims and those claims remain pending 

before the District Court. AARC then filed a timely notice of 

appeal in the GM/Ford action, and this court consolidated the 

appeals.

This appeal raises challenging issues regarding the 

coverage of the AHRA. The Act was passed to address 

important questions emanating from the advent of digital audio 

tape (“DAT”) recordings in the late 1980s. As digital audio 

recorders became more common, the prospect of “home 

copying” loomed as a major issue. Both the companies that 

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produced the devices and the consumers who used them faced 

uncertain liabilities under prevailing copyright law. And 

musicians and record companies, for their part, were concerned

that high-quality digital copies would cause serious drops in 

authorized sales of music recordings. The enactment of the 

AHRA embodied “a historic compromise” intended to address 

these issues. S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 33 (1992).

The AHRA exempts the manufacture and use of certain 

digital audio recorders from copyright infringement actions,

thereby dispelling legal uncertainties and ensuring that 

consumers will have access to the technology. In exchange, the 

AHRA imposes royalties on certain digital audio recorders and 

media. The Act also requires covered digital audio recorders to 

include systems that prevent them from making secondgeneration copies (i.e., copies of copies), thereby offering some 

protection to the rights of copyright holders.

In this case, Appellant contends that the “AHRA covers all 

consumer devices that (1) are capable of digitally reproducing 

recorded music, and (2) the recording functions of which are 

designed or marketed for the primary purpose of doing so.” Br. 

for Appellant at 10. Appellant contends that the District Court 

erred in holding “that the output of Defendants’ recording 

devices must contain ‘only sounds’ and material ‘incidental’ to 

such sounds” to be subject to the proscriptions of the Act. Id. 

at 2. Finally, Appellant argues that, in any event, “Defendants’ 

devices met the district court’s test because they stored music 

to hard drive partitions, which function essentially as separate 

hard drives, that met this purported ‘only sounds’

requirement.” Id. The District Court rejected Appellant’s 

claims. AARC III, 306 F. Supp. 3d 422. We do as well.

As a preliminary matter, Appellees argue that AARC’s 

appeal of the District Court’s judgment in the FCA action is 

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untimely because it was filed 179 days after the District Court’s 

Order issued on March 23, 2018. As we explain below, there is 

no reason for us to address this issue. Our jurisdiction over 

AARC’s appeal in the GM/Ford action is clear. Therefore, we 

have jurisdiction in a “companion case” that presents the same 

merits questions as the FCA action, and this permits us to 

“decline[] to decide th[e] jurisdictional question” in the FCA 

action. Emory v. United Air Lines, Inc., 720 F.3d 915, 920 

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 98 (1998)).

On the merits, we affirm the judgments of the District 

Court. First, we hold that a digital audio recorder is covered by 

the AHRA only if it can make a “digital audio copied 

recording” that is also a “digital musical recording” as that term 

is defined by the Act. Second, we hold that, because it is 

undisputed that the hard drives in Appellees’ devices do not 

contain “only sounds,” they do not qualify as “digital musical 

recording[s]” and, therefore, the devices do not qualify as 

“digital audio recording device[s]” subject to the Act. Third,

we reject AARC’s partition theory. We hold that, at least where 

a device fixes a reproduction of a digital musical recording in 

a single, multi-purpose hard drive, the entire disk, and not any 

logical partition of that disk, is the “material object” that must

satisfy the definition of a “digital musical recording” for the

recording device to qualify under the Act. These matters are 

explained in detail in the succeeding sections of the opinion.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992

1. The Historical Context

Advances in digital recording technology, together with

lingering questions about the legal status of home recording,

set the stage for the disagreements and compromises that 

produced the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 

102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010). 

The Technology. In the mid-1980s, consumer electronics 

manufacturers introduced digital audio recorders to the U.S. 

market that made it possible for consumers without any special 

technical expertise to make digital copies of music recordings. 

These recorders, which eventually included DAT recorders,

compact disc (“CD”) recorders, digital compact cassette 

recorders, and mini-disc recorders, represented a significant 

departure from the status quo because they could produce 

copies (and copies of those copies) without introducing the 

hisses, pops, or other distortions that were characteristic of 

analog audio recorders. As a result, digital audio recorders 

diminished the incentive of consumers to purchase authorized 

copies of music recordings. The music industry feared that 

high-quality digital copies would displace authorized sales of 

music recordings. See S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 34-35.

The Law. In the 1980s, a “legal cloud . . . hovered over 

home taping of sound recordings.” 137 CONG. REC. S11,846 

(daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The 

status of home copying under copyright law had been in doubt 

since Congress first granted copyrights in sound recordings in 

the early 1970s. In 1981, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit issued its decision in the so-called Betamax case, 

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Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 

(9th Cir. 1981), holding that the noncommercial private video 

taping of broadcast television shows constituted copyright 

infringement. However, in 1984, the Supreme Court reversed 

this decision, holding that private home taping of television 

broadcasts for the purposes of “time-shifting” constituted a fair 

use of the copyrighted programming. The Court’s decision 

“emboldened DAT manufacturers to claim immunity” for 

home audio taping. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 

NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8B.01[B] (2019) [hereinafter 2 

NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (discussing Sony Corp. of Am. v. 

Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 

The dispute over taping continued, however:

The electronics industry . . . maintained that the 

Betamax decision applied to virtually all home taping 

while songwriters, music publishers, performers, and 

recording companies . . . insisted that the decision 

applie[d] to a very limited set of facts, i.e. home video 

taping for time-shifting purposes. Consequently the 

controversy . . . continued and in fact [was]

exacerbated by the increasing refinement of audio 

recording technology.

S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 31; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-780, pt. 

1, at 18 (1992).

The Compromise. Ultimately, these competing forces

pushed the principal stakeholders to the negotiating table. By

1991, the music industry and the consumer electronics industry 

reached an agreement that set the groundwork for the AHRA. 

See S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 33; H.R. REP. NO. 102-780, pt. 1, 

at 19. The compromise agreement consisted of three basic

parts: First, manufacturers would be required to ensure that

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their digital audio recorders included copy-control systems –

the “Serial Copy Management System” or an equivalent – to 

prevent second-generation copying. Second, manufacturers 

and distributers of covered digital audio recorders (and covered 

recording media, like blank tapes) would pay modest but 

certain royalties to a fund established by the Act. Third, both 

manufacturers and consumers would enjoy immunity from 

copyright infringement actions based on the noncommercial 

use of covered digital audio recorders. Thus, the overall 

compromise was designed to “create[] an atmosphere of [legal] 

certainty” for the consumer electronics industry, S. REP. NO.

102-294, at 51, “compensate copyright owners and creators for 

sales displaced by home taping of copyrighted music,” id. at 

32, and thereby “ensure the right of consumers to make . . . 

digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, 

noncommercial use,” id. at 30.

The Computer Industry. One last point on historical

context is critical. As Congress refined the proposed legislation

to adequately capture the contours of the “historic 

compromise,” it was simultaneously attuned to the interests 

and concerns of third-party stakeholders – and to the concerns 

of the computer industry in particular. As we explain below, 

the legislative history of the AHRA indicates that at least two 

features of the enacted legislation were meant to ensure that 

personal computers and computer storage media generally 

would not be subject to the Act. See, e.g., Recording Indus.

Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 

1078 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting the computer industry’s view 

that, had computers not been excluded from the AHRA, “the 

computer industry would have vigorously opposed passage of 

the Act”).

First, the definition of “digital audio recording device”

includes a “primary purpose” requirement. See 17 U.S.C. 

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§ 1001(3). As a result, personal computers, though often 

capable of functioning as digital audio recorders in the relevant 

sense – think, for instance, of personal computers with CD 

recorders – generally are not subject to the Act because their 

“recording function is designed and marketed primarily for the 

recording of data and computer program[s].” S. REP. NO. 102-

294, at 48 (contrasting a personal computer with a peripheral 

device dedicated to digital audio recording); H.R. REP. NO.

102-780, pt. 1, at 27 (“Also, [the AHRA] does not cover 

general purpose computers because the primary purpose of 

their recording function is not to make digital audio copied 

recordings.”).

Second, Congress opted to replace the term “phonorecord” 

in several key provisions of the Act “[a]fter consultation with 

the computer and telecommunications industries,” because “it 

became apparent that the term ‘phonorecord’ and its attendant 

definitions might be overly broad” and might “inadvertently 

encompass some form of technology that was not intended.” S.

REP. NO. 102-294, at 35. In its place, Congress inserted a 

specialized term – “digital musical recording” – that was

substantially narrower. A “phonorecord” is, in relevant part, a 

“material object[] in which sounds . . . are fixed.” 17 U.S.C. 

§ 101. In contrast, a “digital musical recording” is a “material 

object . . . in which are fixed, in a digital recording format, only 

sounds” and no “computer programs.” Id. § 1001(5)(A)(i), 

(B)(ii). In adopting this narrower term, Congress “intended to 

cover those objects commonly understood to embody sound 

recordings,” S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 36, like “recorded 

compact discs, digital audio tapes, . . . digital compact 

cassettes, and mini-discs,” id. at 36 n.36, and to exclude any 

objects that “contain[] computer programs or data bases,” id. at 

46.

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2. The Text of the Act

The AHRA as finally enacted included three principal 

parts: First, a series of nested definitions of the covered 

technologies, “carefully tailored so as to limit the effect of the 

[AHRA] to audio recording,” S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 45, while 

also aiming to remain “technologically neutral” to 

accommodate future technological developments in digital 

audio recording, id. at 35. Second, a series of provisions 

specifying the substantive terms of the Act. And, third, a 

provision governing the remedial authority of federal district 

courts. 

The Controlling Statutory Definitions. As noted above, 

the Act does not regulate digital audio recording as such. 

Rather, “the Act places restrictions only upon a specific type of 

recording device,” Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1075 – i.e., a type that

qualifies as a “digital audio recording device” under the 

AHRA. Section 1001(3) defines a “digital audio recording 

device” as: 

any machine or device of a type commonly distributed 

to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not 

included with or as part of some other machine or 

device, the digital recording function of which is 

designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and 

that is capable of, making a digital audio copied 

recording for private use . . . .

17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (emphasis added). In other words, a digital 

audio recorder is covered by the AHRA only if it satisfies both 

a “primary purpose” and a “capability” test. The Act proceeds 

to make an explicit exception for “professional model 

products,” id. § 1001(3)(A), as well as for “audio recording 

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equipment that is designed and marketed primarily for the 

creation of sound recordings resulting from the fixation of 

nonmusical sounds,” like dictation machines or answering 

machines, id. at § 1001(3)(B). 

Next, the Act defines the “digital audio copied recording” 

that an audio recorder must be “capable of . . . making” in order 

to count as a digital audio recording device: 

A “digital audio copied recording” is a reproduction 

in a digital recording format of a digital musical 

recording, whether that reproduction is made directly 

from another digital musical recording or indirectly 

from a transmission.

Id. § 1001(1) (emphasis added).

Finally, the Act defines the term “digital musical 

recording” that figures in the definition of a “digital audio 

copied recording” and in other provisions of the AHRA.

Section 1001(5)(A) states that a “‘digital musical recording’ is 

a material object—”

(i) in which are fixed, in a digital recording format, 

only sounds, and material, statements, or instructions 

incidental to those fixed sounds, if any, and

(ii) from which the sounds and material can be 

perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 

either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.

Id. § 1001(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). Section 1001(5)(B) 

clarifies that a “‘digital musical recording’ does not include a 

material object—”

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(i) in which the fixed sounds consist entirely of 

spoken word recordings, or

(ii) in which one or more computer programs are 

fixed, except that a digital musical recording may 

contain statements or instructions constituting the 

fixed sounds and incidental material, and statements 

or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in order 

to bring about the perception, reproduction, or 

communication of the fixed sounds and incidental 

material.

Id. § 1001(5)(B)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). 

As explained above, Congress, in consultation with the 

computer industry, adopted this complex definition to replace 

the reference to “phonorecord.” The most critical change was

the requirement that a digital musical recording contain “only 

sounds” and material incidental to those sounds – a 

requirement underscored by the exclusion of any object that 

contains “one or more computer programs” other than 

programs that bring about “the fixed sounds.” In adopting this 

term, Congress sought to capture “those objects commonly 

understood to embody sound recordings.” S.REP. NO. 102-294, 

at 36. 

The Substantive Terms of the Act. There are several 

important points to be made about the provisions of the AHRA

that give effect to the substantive terms of the “historic 

compromise.”

First, the Act states that “[n]o person shall import, 

manufacture, or distribute any digital audio recording device 

. . . that does not conform to . . . the Serial Copy Management 

System” or does not include a comparable copy-control system

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to prevent second-generation copying. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a).

Similarly, the Act prohibits anyone from encoding digital 

musical recordings with incorrect copyright or copy-generation 

information or from otherwise circumventing a device’s copycontrol system. Id. § 1002(c)-(d). 

Second, the Act provides that “[n]o person shall import 

into and distribute, or manufacture and distribute, any digital 

audio recording device . . . unless such person” files notice with 

the Register of Copyrights, submits regular statements of 

account, and pays royalties according to a schedule set out in 

the Act. Id. § 1003; see also id. §§ 1004-1007 (detailing the 

process by which royalties are calculated, paid, and then 

collected by interested copyright holders); 37 C.F.R. 

§§ 201.27-.31 (2019) (further detailing these processes). 

Third, the Act grants immunities from certain copyright 

infringement actions. Section 1008 provides that:

No action may be brought under this title alleging 

infringement of copyright based on the manufacture, 

importation, or distribution of a digital audio 

recording device, a digital audio recording medium, 

an analog recording device, or an analog recording 

medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a 

consumer of such a device or medium for making 

digital musical recordings or analog musical 

recordings.

Id. § 1008. In short, sections 1002 to 1008 of the AHRA set out

the substantive benefits and burdens that Appellees would be 

subject to if their devices fit within the Act’s definitions.

Remedies for Infringements of the Act. Finally, the Act 

contains a civil remedies section, which empowers “interested 

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copyright part[ies]” injured by violations of the copy-control 

and royalties provisions to “bring a civil action in an 

appropriate United States district court against any person for 

such violation[s].” Id. § 1009(a). The courts may, as

appropriate, award injunctive relief, actual or statutory 

damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. 

See id. § 1009(c)-(d). In addition, a court may order any digital 

audio recording devices or digital musical recordings involved 

in violations of § 1002 to be impounded or modified under 

certain conditions. See § 1009(f) (“[T]he court may order the 

impounding, on such terms as it deems reasonable, of any 

digital audio recording device, digital musical recording, or 

device specified in section 1002(c) that is in the custody or 

control of the alleged violator . . . .”); id. § 1009(g)(1)-(2)

(“[T]he court may, as part of a final judgment or decree finding 

a violation of section 1002, order the remedial modification or 

the destruction of any digital audio recording device, digital 

musical recording, or device specified in section 1002(c) that 

. . . does not comply with, or was involved in a violation of, 

section 1002, and . . . is in the custody or control of the violator 

or has been impounded under subsection (f).”).

B. Procedural History

On July 25, 2014, AARC filed a lawsuit against GM and 

Ford and their suppliers DENSO and Clarion (“GM/Ford 

action”) alleging failure to comply with the AHRA’s 

requirements. On November 14, 2014, AARC filed a second, 

substantially similar lawsuit against FCA and its supplier

Mitsubishi (“FCA action”). In both lawsuits, AARC’s central 

allegation was that Appellees manufactured or distributed incar entertainment systems that enabled consumers to copy 

audio CDs to on-board hard disk drives (and, in the case of 

some GM models, solid-state “flash” drives) for later playback.

In AARC’s view, this feature made Appellees’ in-car systems 

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“digital audio recording device[s]” under the Act and, thus,

made Appellees subject to the Act’s registration, royalty, and 

copy-control requirements. On February 9, 2015, the District 

Court ordered these actions consolidated pursuant to Rule 42 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In February 2016, the District Court denied Appellees’ 

motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for judgment 

on the pleadings. In doing so, however, the court adopted 

Appellees’ preferred interpretation of the term “digital audio 

copied recording.” Specifically, the District Court held that a 

“digital audio copied recording” – the “output” of a covered 

recording process – must also be a “digital musical recording” 

under the Act. AARC I, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 8-22. In the District

Court’s view, “the most revealing textual clue” is the word 

“another” in the definition of “digital audio copied recording.”

Id. at 18. The District Court concluded that “the only plausible 

reason that Congress would specify that a [digital audio copied 

recording] made via direct copy would be from another [digital 

musical recording] is if the [digital audio copied recording] 

itself is also a [digital musical recording].” Id. The District 

Court found that this interpretation was reinforced by the Act’s

immunity and remedy provisions and was consistent with the 

Act’s history and purpose. See id. at 18-20. The court then 

concluded that, although typical computer hard drives would 

not qualify as “digital musical recording[s],” AARC’s 

complaint sufficed to make it plausible that at least some of 

Appellees’ challenged devices might qualify. See id. at 22-23.

The District Court denied AARC’s motion for reconsideration 

but granted its motion for clarification, noting that AARC I did 

not preclude AARC from raising its partition theory in 

subsequent proceedings. See AARC II, 306 F. Supp. 3d. at 418-

20.

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The parties then embarked on an initial phase of discovery

to determine whether Appellees’ hard drives contain

disqualifying computer programs or data. (A second phase,

focused on GM’s flash drives, is pending.) In short, the 

undisputed evidence in the record shows that Appellees’

devices fix digital reproductions of audio CDs in single-platter

hard disk drives that also contain programs and data not 

incidental to those sounds. For example, the Clarion devices 

supplied to Ford “contain[] software and data, including 

software for displaying vehicle climate information; software 

for playing satellite radio, AM/FM radio, and sound files from 

DVDs, audio CDs and data CDs; software for displaying video 

from the rear view camera; software for uploading 

photographs, and also data for maps . . . .” AARC III, 306 F. 

Supp. 3d at 431 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) 

(quoting Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 1(d), 

reprinted in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 310-11). The evidence 

produced in discovery also indicates that Appellees’ devices

copy CDs to specific hard drive partitions – to subdivisions of 

the drives, defined by software, that can function as 

independent drives – and that these partitions arguably contain 

“only sounds” and materials incidental to those sounds.

On March 23, 2018, the District Court granted Appellees’ 

joint motion for summary judgment. AARC III, 306 F. Supp. 3d 

422. First, the District Court affirmed its position that an audio 

recorder is a “digital audio recording device” only if it is 

capable of making a “digital audio copied recording” that is

itself a “digital musical recording” under the Act. Id. at 425-26.

Second, the court found that, “based on the evidence presented, 

. . . the hard drives in Defendants’ devices contain all sorts of 

programs and other materials, such that they do not qualify as 

[digital musical recordings], and as a result, the devices 

themselves are not [digital audio recording devices] subject to 

the AHRA.” Id. at 428-29. Finally, the District Court rejected 

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AARC’s alternative theory that Appellees’ devices are digital 

audio recording devices because they copy music to hard drive 

partitions that contain “only sounds” and therefore qualify as

“digital musical recording[s].” The District Court ruled that a 

hard drive partition is not a “material object” for purposes of 

§ 1001(5), because it lacks a “distinct physical identity such 

that it can be considered a ‘material object’ apart from the hard 

drive on which it exists.” Id. at 432. The District Court also 

held that, even if partitions were “material object[s],” “AARC 

has failed to establish that the AHRA’s statutory definitions 

require consideration of a smaller unit of output than the hard 

drive as a whole.” Id. at 429. In fact, the court reasoned, 

AARC’s theory is fundamentally at odds with Congress’s 

choice to make an object’s status as a “digital musical 

recording” depend on what else besides music is fixed in it. See 

id. at 440.

On March 23, 2018, the District Court issued a 

Memorandum Opinion. The court also issued a separate Order

with the following clauses:

For the reasons stated in the accompanying 

Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that 

Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment is 

GRANTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as 

to GM and Denso, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment as to Ford and Clarion, and 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as 

to FCA and Mitsubishi, are DENIED.

J.A. 583 (citations to the docket omitted). This Order resolved 

all the claims in the FCA action, and all but the flash-drive 

claims in the GM/Ford action. 

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On September 18, 2018, AARC filed a notice of appeal in 

the FCA action. The timeliness of that notice is addressed 

below. On October 23, 2018, the District Court granted 

AARC’s unopposed Rule 54(b) motion to enter final judgment 

as to the hard-drive claims in the GM/Ford action. However, 

the court reserved judgment on the flash-drive claims, which 

remain pending in the District Court. AARC then filed a timely 

notice of appeal in the GM/Ford action, and this court 

consolidated the appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review 

We review de novo the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment and its underlying interpretation of the AHRA.

Bartko v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 898 F.3d 51, 63 (D.C. Cir. 

2018) (“This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo.”); United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 

1098 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“We review questions of 

statutory interpretation de novo.”). Summary judgment for 

Appellees is appropriate only if, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to AARC, Arrington v. United States, 473 

F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006), there is “no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and [Appellees are] entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law,” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

B. Jurisdiction

In response to our order to the parties to address this 

court’s jurisdiction over AARC’s appeal in the FCA action,

Appellees now argue that we lack jurisdiction because AARC

filed its notice of that appeal out of time. In general, “[t]he time 

limits established by Rule 4(a) [of the Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure] are ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’” Kidd 

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v. District of Columbia, 206 F.3d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Moore v. South Carolina Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 

163 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). Rule 4(a) says that a party 

must file notice of appeal “within 30 days after entry of the 

judgment.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). And that 30-day clock 

starts when judgment is entered in the civil docket and (1) that 

judgment is also set out in a “separate document” or (2) 150 

days pass – whichever is earlier. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a), (c); FED.

R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).

AARC filed a notice of appeal in the FCA action 179 days 

after the District Court entered its summary judgment order in 

the docket. Therefore, AARC’s notice was in time if the 

document containing the District Court’s final judgment did 

not satisfy Rule 58’s “separate document” requirement, in 

which case AARC had 180 days to file. Appellees contend that 

the District Court’s Order – a document containing the ordering 

clauses reprinted above – is a “separate document” for 

purposes of Rule 58 because it is separate from the court’s 

Memorandum Opinion and “omits legal reasoning.” Br. for 

Appellees at 23 (citing Kidd, 206 F.3d at 39). AARC, for its 

part, argues that the District Court’s final judgment in the FCA 

action must also be separate from the court’s merely 

interlocutory order in the consolidated GM/Ford action, given 

the Supreme Court’s instruction that cases consolidated 

pursuant to Rule 42 “retain their ‘independent character’” and,

thus, require “separate decrees or judgments.” Br. for 

Appellant at 13-14 (quoting Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1125, 

1128 (2018)).

It is unnecessary for us to determine the proper application 

of Rule 58’s “separate document” requirement to the facts of 

this case. In general, of course, we must assure ourselves of our 

jurisdiction before addressing the merits. Ruhrgas AG v. 

Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). But there are 

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several narrow exceptions to that rule, and this case falls in one. 

“[W]here ‘the merits question [is] decided in a companion 

case, with the consequence that the jurisdictional question 

could have no effect on the outcome,’ courts are free to 

‘decline[ ] to decide th[e] jurisdictional question.’” Emory v. 

United Air Lines, Inc., 720 F.3d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Steel 

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 98 (1998)); see 

also Sherrod v. Breitbart, 720 F.3d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(explaining that a court may assume jurisdiction when the 

merits decision is “foreordained” by another of the court’s 

decisions). 

Here, crucially, there is no doubt about our jurisdiction 

over AARC’s appeal in the GM/Ford action. Therefore, we 

have jurisdiction in a “companion case” that presents the same

merits questions as the FCA action, and our decision in the

companion case will effectively “foreordain” our decision in 

the FCA action. As a result, our disposition of the matter before 

us will not “carr[y] th[is] court[] beyond the bounds of 

authorized judicial action,” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94, because 

we will not be using “the pretermission of the jurisdictional 

question as a device for reaching a question of law that 

otherwise would have gone unaddressed,” id. at 98. We 

therefore turn to the merits issues common to both appeals 

without regard to whether we have jurisdiction over AARC’s 

appeal in the FCA action.

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C. The Issues Regarding the Meaning of the Audio Home 

Recording Act of 1992

1. A “Digital Audio Copied Recording” Must Also Be a 

“Digital Musical Recording” Under the AHRA

The first merits question in this case concerns the proper 

interpretation of the AHRA’s definition of “digital audio 

copied recording.” This statutory term is critical because a 

digital recording technology, including any of Appellees’ CDcopying devices, is covered by the Act only if it is “capable of 

. . . making a digital audio copied recording.” 17 U.S.C. 

§ 1001(3). The parties are at odds over whether the Act’s

definition of the term “digital audio copied recording” implies 

that digital audio copied recordings must also be “digital 

musical recording[s]” under the Act. 

The District Court offered the following diagram to 

illustrate the relationship between the relevant statutory terms:

AARC I, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 12. The central question in this case 

is whether the “outputs” on the righthand side must be “digital 

musical recording[s]” under the Act. We hold that they must 

be. That is, Appellees’ devices are subject to the restrictions of 

the AHRA only if they are capable of making reproductions of 

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digital musical recordings, which reproductions are themselves 

digital musical recordings.

Our reading of the Act is compelled by the word “another” 

in the definition of “digital audio copied recording.” A digital 

audio copied recording is a “reproduction . . . of a digital 

musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly 

from another digital musical recording or indirectly from a 

transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (emphasis added). The 

ordinary meaning of “another” in this context is “one more in 

addition to one or a number of the same kind.” WEBSTER’S 

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 89 (1993); see also 1 

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 1989) (“A second, 

further, additional.”). As the District Court correctly noted, the 

most plausible reason that Congress would say that a 

reproduction “made directly” would be from another digital 

musical recording is if the reproduction itself is also a digital 

musical recording. 

Other provisions in the AHRA reinforce this interpretation

of “digital audio copied recording.” Most important, the Act 

provides immunity from suit “based on the noncommercial use 

by a consumer of [digital audio recording devices or digital 

audio recording media] for making digital musical 

recordings.” 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (emphasis added). This 

provision makes no mention of immunity for making digital 

audio copied recordings, but instead digital musical recordings.

That silence suggests that Congress intended that digital audio 

copied recordings be digital musical recordings. In addition, 

the Act empowers courts to impound or order the modification

of “any digital audio recording device, digital musical 

recording, or [device designed to bypass the copy-control 

system of a digital audio recording device]” that meets certain 

further conditions. Id. § 1009(f)-(g). Once again, no reference 

to digital audio copied recordings.

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If, as AARC contends, the Act’s definitions include digital 

audio copied recordings that are not digital musical recordings, 

then the Act’s immunity and remedial provisions would not 

make much sense. Under AARC’s view, the Act would afford 

immunity only when consumers make one kind of digital audio 

copied recording rather than another. And the Act would give

the courts certain remedial authority only when they confront 

one kind of digital audio copied recording rather than another. 

There is no indication that Congress intended such a curious 

result. If, on the other hand, a digital audio copied recording 

simply is a special kind of digital musical recording (viz., one 

that is the output of a covered digital copying process), then

Congress’s failure to make special provision for digital audio 

copied recordings is no surprise. By covering digital musical 

recordings, it covers digital audio copied recordings as well.

Because the text of § 1001(1) is clear, “there is no reason 

to resort to legislative history.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 

U.S. 1, 6 (1997). Still, it is worth emphasizing that our

interpretation of “digital audio copied recording” is consistent

with the Act’s history and purpose. As explained above, the 

AHRA was intended to encompass a specific kind of recording 

technology. It is notable, then, that the digital audio recorders 

that Congress treated as models for the AHRA’s definitions –

principally DAT and CD recorders – typically produced copies 

of digital musical recordings that were themselves digital 

musical recordings. For example, a CD recorder is typically

capable of making “another digital musical recording.” As a 

result, the legislative history is (at the very least) consistent 

with the claim that, in giving effect to the underlying 

compromise, Congress expected that current and future digital 

audio recording devices would operate by making “another 

digital musical recording.”

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AARC argues that this interpretation of the Act is 

“hypertechnical” and inconsistent with the AHRA’s text, 

history, and purpose. We find no merit in these arguments, 

which rest on equivocal legislative history and AARC’s sense 

of sound policy. After all, “[e]ven for those of us who make use 

of legislative history, ambiguous legislative history cannot 

trump clear statutory language.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t 

of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 634 n.9 (2018) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 

572 (2011)). And in general, “[t]he best evidence of [a law’s] 

purpose is the statutory text,” W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. 

Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991), and most certainly when that 

text is the result of carefully negotiated compromise among the 

stakeholders who will be directly affected by the legislation.

It is quite clear here that AARC’s textual arguments are 

meritless. For AARC’s theory to prevail – for the definition of 

“digital audio copied recording” to encompass both digital 

musical recordings and other digital copies – we would have to 

ignore the word “another” in the phrase “another digital 

musical recording.” But there is nothing in the text of § 1001(1) 

or anywhere else in the text of the AHRA to support AARC’s 

proposed revision.

AARC points out that an earlier, unenacted version of the 

AHRA defined a “digital audio copied recording” as

a reproduction of a phonorecord in a digital recording 

format, whether that reproduction is made directly 

from another phonorecord or indirectly from a 

transmission.

Br. for Appellant at 35 (quoting earlier proposed legislation in 

both the House and Senate). Because a “phonorecord” is an 

object in which sounds – but not necessarily “only sounds,” 17 

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U.S.C. § 101 – are fixed, a reproduction of a phonorecord 

would typically qualify as a phonorecord, even if the output 

had other data fixed in it, so the word “another” did not impose 

meaningful limits on the output side. As AARC puts it, “the 

result would have been identical had [the definition] referred to 

a reproduction made directly from . . . ‘a phonorecord.’” Br. for 

Appellant at 35. This is an interesting point, but it is irrelevant.

The problem with AARC’s argument is that Congress deleted 

the reference to phonorecord in the enacted version of the Act. 

When Congress substituted the term “digital musical 

recording” in the enacted legislation, the phrase “another 

digital musical recording” was decidedly not interchangeable 

with the phrase “a digital musical recording.” The first phrase 

clearly imposes the “only sounds” requirement on the output 

side, the second does not. 

AARC maintains that the late change in the legislation was 

not a “closely consider[ed]” choice to restrict both the inputs 

and outputs of the copying process. Id. Rather, according to 

AARC, it was an effort by Congress to restrict the input side 

alone, and Congress simply failed to appreciate the effect of 

leaving the word “another” in place. In AARC’s view, a clue 

that Congress did not mean to restrict the outputs – and, thus,

that it meant to delete “another” in favor of a less restrictive 

term – is that Congress left the phrase “in a digital recording 

format” in the definition of a “digital audio copied recording.”

This phrase would be redundant, AARC points out, if digital 

audio copied recordings were themselves digital musical 

recordings, because digital musical recordings are “in a digital 

recording format” by definition. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(A)(i).

We find it far more straightforward to read “in a digital 

recording format” as surplusage than to read “another” out of 

the AHRA entirely. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 

U.S. 91, 106 (2011) (“[T]he canon against superfluity assists 

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only where a competing interpretation gives effect to every 

clause and word of a statute.” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). It is simple enough to explain why the 

redundant phrase “in a digital recording format” might have 

been overlooked in the drafting process. For one thing, the 

change merely confirmed that outputs of the copying process

would be digital. For another, the revised text that created the 

surplusage was embedded in the complex, multi-part definition 

of “digital musical recording.” In contrast, we find no 

comparably strong evidence that the word “another” can be 

explained as a simple drafting error. On the contrary, that term 

was in the AHRA from the start, which suggests that Congress 

always envisioned that inputs and outputs would be of the same 

general kind. And this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that 

Congress shaped the text to fit digital audio recorders whose 

outputs were typically digital musical recordings.

We could go on, but it would be pointless. AARC’s 

fundamental problem is that it seeks to rely on ambiguous 

legislative history that cannot possibly trump clear statutory 

language.

We understand that time and technological change may 

have rendered the AHRA’s compromise less palatable to 

AARC and its constituents. Some commenters have observed 

that the increased role of computers in digital audio recording 

has made the AHRA’s role more marginal than its proponents 

envisioned. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8B.02[A][1][a][ii] 

(“[T]he failure of [DAT recorders and other technologies at the 

heart of the Act] to ever make much penetration into the 

consumer marketplace renders the AHRA’s focus, in hindsight, 

misguided.”). It is certainly likely that the disputes before 

Congress would have been conducted on different terms in 

2002 than they were in 1992, given the rise of computer-based 

audio recording technologies during that ten-year stretch. See 

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Aaron L. Melville, The Future of the Audio Home Recording 

Act of 1992: Has It Survived the Millennium Bug?, 7 B.U. J.

SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 383-86, 388-96 (2001) (explaining, from 

the perspective of 2001, how the rise of MP3s and the Ninth 

Circuit’s decision in Diamond made the AHRA “rapidly . . . 

outdated,” id. at 374). Still, we cannot enforce the law that 

AARC thinks Congress should have written rather than the 

carefully negotiated text that Congress adopted. Ultimately, if 

AARC and its supporters “have persuasive arguments in 

support of the change of law they advocate, it is Congress they 

should persuade.” Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 

F.3d 649, 664 (2d Cir. 2018). 

2. Appellees’ Hard Disk Drives Are Not “Digital Musical 

Recording[s]” and, Therefore, Their Devices Are Not

“Digital Audio Recording Device[s]” Under the 

AHRA

We turn next to the in-car CD-copying devices at issue in 

this case. We hold that Appellees’ devices are not “digital 

audio recording device[s]” subject to the Act because the

undisputed evidence shows that the hard drives to which their 

devices reproduce audio CDs are not themselves digital 

musical recordings under the Act. As a result, Appellees’

devices are not “capable . . . of making digital audio copied 

recording[s]” and, therefore, they fall outside the Act’s 

carefully negotiated definitions. 

To start, it is well-established that typical computer hard 

drives are not “digital musical recording[s]” under the AHRA 

because they fall in § 1005(B)(ii)’s explicit exception for 

objects that contain “one or more computer programs.” The 

Ninth Circuit adopted this position in Recording Industry Ass’n

of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 

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1072 (9th Cir. 1999), and its understanding of the AHRA has

proved influential. As the Ninth Circuit wrote: 

The typical computer hard drive . . . is, of course, a 

material object. However, hard drives ordinarily 

contain much more than “only sounds, and material, 

statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed 

sounds.” Indeed, almost all hard drives contain 

numerous programs (e.g., for word processing, 

scheduling appointments, etc.) and databases that are 

not incidental to any sound files that may be stored on 

the hard drive. 

Id. at 1076 (citation omitted). As a result, the court reasoned, 

the typical computer hard drive is not a digital musical 

recording under the Act. Id.; see also id. at 1077 (“There are 

simply no grounds in either the plain language of the definition 

or in the legislative history for interpreting the term ‘digital 

musical recording’ to include songs fixed on computer hard 

drives.”); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 

1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Audio Home Recording Act does 

not cover the downloading of MP3 files to computer hard 

drives,” in part because “computers do not make ‘digital 

music[al] recordings’ as defined by [the Act].”). 

To be sure, the Ninth Circuit confronted this question in a 

context that differs from the situation in this case. There, a hard 

drive served as the input to the copying process and, thus, the

question was whether a digital copy created from a hard drive 

counted as “a reproduction . . . of a digital musical recording.” 

But this difference does not make the Ninth Circuit’s 

interpretation of the statutory term “digital musical recording” 

any less persuasive, and we adopt its interpretation here. No

material object can count as a digital musical recording if it 

contains “one or more computer programs” that are not 

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incidental to any sounds fixed in that object, and that includes 

typical hard disk drives. 

The critical question in discovery during the proceedings 

before the District Court was whether the hard disk drives in 

Appellees’ CD-copying devices were “typical computer hard 

drives” in these key respects. The undisputed answer is “yes.” 

As the District Court explained: 

Based on the evidence and information gathered 

during the discovery period in this case, it is clear that 

the hard drives in Defendants’ multimedia devices 

are, indeed, “full of non-music data and computer 

programs,” as Defendants previously maintained. 

Indeed, each of the hard drives in Defendants’ devices 

“includes computer programs, data, or other material” 

that are not incidental to the fixed sounds, and though 

the exact contents vary based on device, the in-vehicle 

systems include such things as navigation software, 

DVD players, displays of album art and information, 

and AM/FM and satellite radio functions. 

AARC III, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 430-31 (citations omitted); see 

also id. at 431 (summarizing the contents of several of 

Appellees’ systems in more detail); J.A. 327-34 (documenting 

the undisputed facts about Appellees’ devices). Therefore, we 

agree with the District Court that, even interpreting the 

evidence in the light most favorable to AARC, Appellees’ CDrecording devices are not capable of making reproductions of 

digital musical recordings that are themselves digital musical 

recordings. As a result, Appellees are entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law because their devices are not “digital audio 

recording device[s]” subject to the AHRA.

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AARC concedes that if a “digital audio copied recording” 

must be a “digital musical recording,” and if Appellees’ devices 

qualify only if their entire hard disk drives are “digital audio 

copied recording[s],” then Appellees’ devices are not “digital 

audio recording device[s]” subject to the AHRA. But AARC 

disputes the truth of the second condition. (The first, too, of 

course, but we have already rejected that view.) Specifically, 

AARC argues that Appellees’ in-car CD-copying devices can 

be covered by the Act if they reproduce digital musical 

recordings to specific hard drive partitions that qualify as 

digital musical recordings under the Act. We reject AARC’s 

partition theory as incompatible with the proper, contextsensitive interpretation of the statutory text. 

A hard drive partition is a subdivision of the storage disk 

that can function as a separate drive. Hard drives are typically 

partitioned to make it easier to organize files, or to back up or 

protect data, or to improve performance. To create partitions, a 

computer is programmed, using a “partition table,” to treat 

ranges of “logical block addresses” as distinct storage drives. 

J.A. 339. These addresses correspond to locations or regions of 

the physical storage disk. Id. For example, though every 

storage drive must contain at least one partition, id. at 338,

some disk drives are further partitioned into address blocks that 

correspond to concentric circles on the physical disk. The 

following image offers a simple example of a partitioned drive:

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See, e.g., id. at 375 (using a similar diagram to illustrate one 

possible set of partitions). There is nothing in the concept of a 

hard drive partition that requires the address blocks to 

correspond to contiguous regions of single disks, however. A

computer could be programmed to treat locations at different 

parts of one disk – or even locations scattered across different 

disks – as a functionally unified storage drive. Id. at 339.

The evidence appears to indicate that Appellees’ devices 

contain hard drive partitions dedicated to music storage, see id. 

at 376-430 (partially under seal), and that is what we shall 

assume here. AARC says that, although some properties of 

hard drive partitions depend on “the perspective of the 

[computer’s] operating system and applications,” Br. for 

Appellant at 44, partitions “are not abstractions,” id. at 43.

Rather, according to AARC, partitions are “tangible, welldefined regions of a hard drive’s ‘platter,’ the metes and 

bounds of which could be traced on the platter, such that one 

could physically touch one partition or another.” Id. at 43-44. 

Given its view of partitions, AARC contends that hard drive 

partitions are “material object[s]” within the ordinary meaning 

of those words. AARC thus concludes that if partitions are 

material objects, then they can also be “digital musical 

recording[s]” so long as they satisfy the rest of the requirements 

set out in § 1001(5). Id. at 43. 

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Metaphysically speaking, AARC’s position is interesting. 

It fails, however, pursuant to the norms of statutory 

interpretation that govern our review of this matter. We can 

grant that, at least in some contexts, the physical region 

corresponding to a hard drive partition is a “material object” in 

ordinary English. But that does not settle the question of 

whether Appellees’ hard drive partitions are the “material 

object[s]” that matter when applying the AHRA to devices that 

copy music to single-platter, multi-purpose hard drives. To 

answer that question, we must read the phrase “material object” 

in § 1001(5) in the proper context. See, e.g., Yates v. United 

States, 574 U.S. 528, 532 (2015) (plurality opinion) 

(interpreting “tangible object” to exclude a fish, given the 

Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s focus on objects involved in 

recordkeeping). And we know that, in enacting the AHRA,

Congress had a particular kind of “material object” in mind,

exemplified by the objects involved in digital audio recording 

at the time, like digital audio tapes, compact discs, and minidiscs. That understanding must guide our application of the 

term “material object” under § 1001(5). 

In the case before us, we have no trouble concluding that 

the storage disks contained in typical hard drives, like the 

recordable tapes and discs that lawmakers considered in 1992,

are the sorts of “material object[s]” that the AHRA 

contemplates serving as “digital musical recording[s]” if they 

otherwise satisfy the Act’s terms. See S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 

46 (“The intention is for the term ‘[digital musical recording]’ 

to cover objects commonly understood to embody sound 

recordings and their underlying works, such as recorded

compact discs (CD’s) . . . [and] digital audio tapes 

(DAT’s) . . . .”); id. at 49 (listing “magnetic digital audio tape 

cassettes, optical discs, and magneto-optical discs” as 

examples of the kinds of “digital audio recording media” that 

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Congress expected consumers to use in “making digital audio 

copied recordings”). We also have no trouble concluding that 

the drive partitions at issue in this case are not subject to the 

strictures of the Act. We therefore hold that, at least where a 

device fixes a reproduction of a digital musical recording in a 

single-platter hard drive disk, the entire disk, and not any 

logical partition of that disk, is the “material object” that must 

satisfy the definition of a “digital musical recording” for the 

recording device to qualify under the Act.

Our commonsense, context-sensitive reading of the 

AHRA is confirmed by the fact that AARC’s proposed 

alternative has no clear limiting principle. At bottom, AARC’s 

strategy in this case is to zero in on the area of a material object 

where sounds are fixed and then apply § 1001(5)’s “only 

sounds” test. But this idea, taken to its limits, would imply that 

any material object containing sounds is a material object that 

can pass the “only sounds” test. All one need do is focus on the 

part of the object where music files are fixed and ignore the 

data fixed in other regions of the object. The problem, of 

course, is that this divide-and-apply strategy risks collapsing 

the distinction between “phonorecords” and “digital musical 

recording[s]” that Congress was careful to erect. AARC 

responds that we “do[] not need to determine the outer bounds 

of Congress’s definition in this case,” because partitions are 

“far more similar to drives (which even the district court agrees 

are material objects) than are individual digital music files.” Br. 

for Appellant at 52. But this response simply dodges the 

question. As the District Court aptly noted, it is only by 

considering all the relevant logical implications – and not just 

the convenient ones – that we can decide whether a reading of 

the statutory text adequately captures Congress’s intent. See

AARC III, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 440. The problem with AARC’s 

proposed stopping point is that it shifts the focus from 

Congress’s explicit instruction to look at whether sounds are 

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fixed in an object of a certain sort to an inquiry into whether 

sounds are fixed in something that arguably functions like such 

an object.

AARC’s other arguments are similarly misplaced. AARC 

points to decisions of other courts that a “portion of” or 

“segment of” or “location on” a hard drive can constitute a 

“phonorecord” – and hence a “material object,” 17 U.S.C. 

§ 101 – for purposes of copyright law. Br. for Appellant at 49 

(citing Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 657 

(2d Cir. 2018) and London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. 

Supp. 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008)). AARC argues that our 

position is inconsistent with these decisions. We disagree. 

Our view is not that a hard drive partition could never be 

a “material object” as that term is used in Title 17. We take no 

position on that. Our view is only that a partition is not the 

object that should be subjected to the § 1001(5) analysis under 

the AHRA when (as here) a device makes digital copies on a 

typical single-disk hard drive. The definitions of 

“phonorecord” and “digital musical recording” both use the 

term “material object,” but the term arises in different contexts,

serves different purposes, and (thus) makes different kinds of 

objects salient. We find AARC’s arguments based on the in 

pari materia canon unconvincing for similar reasons. See 

Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 315-16 (2006)

(reasoning that “location” means something different in 

provisions governing venue and subject-matter jurisdiction, 

despite the in pari materia presumption, because those “are not 

concepts of the same order”).

D. Matters Not Decided

In closing, we underscore, first, that we leave many 

important questions about the AHRA unaddressed. Thus, we 

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do not pass judgment on Appellant’s alternative theory that a 

device qualifies as a “digital audio recording device” only if its 

copied outputs “are separate from a recording device.” Br. for 

Appellee at 51. And, although we agree with Diamond about 

the meaning and application of the term “digital musical 

recording” to typical computer hard drives, we take no position 

on Diamond’s conclusion that the device at issue in that case 

was not subject to the AHRA because, in copying music from 

a typical hard drive, it did not make “a reproduction . . . of a 

digital musical recording” either “directly” or “indirectly from 

a transmission.” See 180 F.3d at 1076-81 (discussing 17 U.S.C. 

§ 1001(1)).

Second, although our analysis may have implications in 

other cases, “[w]e cannot now answer more precisely how the 

[AHRA] or other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to 

technologies not before us.” Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 

573 U.S. 431, 450 (2014). Any such questions “should await a 

case in which they are squarely presented.” Id. at 451 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Third, we note that, in holding that Appellees’ devices fall 

outside the scope of the AHRA, we do not hold (or even 

suggest) that Appellees fall outside the reach of copyright law 

entirely. We understand that Appellees may be subject to the 

liabilities and defenses otherwise provided in Title 17 (or other 

laws), as may be applicable. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. 

Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 

Napster could not invoke § 1008 as a defense to copyright 

infringement claims because its technology did not fit within 

the AHRA’s definitions). 

Finally, we again note that, to the extent that AARC and 

its supporters are “concerned with the relationship between the 

development and use of [digital audio recording] technologies 

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and the [AHRA], they are of course free to seek action from 

Congress.” Aereo, 573 U.S. at 451.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgments 

of the District Court.

So ordered.

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