Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01705/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01705-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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the Court will use the page numbers assigned by the electronic case

filing system.

1 09CV1705 IEG (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN G. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

Colleen Noll, Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 09CV1705 IEG (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS [DOC. NO. 11]

Petitioner Steven G. Williams, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 5, 2009 [doc. no.

1].1

 Petitioner claims that the terms of his 1984 plea agreement

in an unrelated criminal case precluded the subsequent use of that

conviction to enhance his sentence in subsequent cases. (Pet. 6-

13.)

On December 18, 2009, Respondent, Warden Colleen Noll, filed a

Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities and filed a Notice of

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 It is undisputed that Williams had two prior serious felony

convictions under California Penal Code section 1192.7 and two

prior strikes under California Penal Code section 667(b)(1). 

(Lodgment 1, People v. Williams, Case No. D029994, slip op. at 1-2

(Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 1999); Pet. 2; Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 1; Opp’n Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2.)

2 09CV1705 IEG (RBB)

Lodgments shortly thereafter [doc. nos. 11, 20]. Noll alleges that

Petitioner’s claim is time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-7.) Petitioner submitted

an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss with a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities, which was filed nunc pro tunc to January 25, 2010

[doc. no. 19].

I. BACKGROUND

On August 22, 1984, Williams pleaded guilty to one count of

robbery in violation of California Penal Code section 211 and one

count of grand theft in violation of California Penal Code section

487.2; he was to receive a sentence of five years in state prison. 

(Pet. Attach. #1 Ex. E at 32, 38-40.)2

Over ten years later, on February 27, 1995, Petitioner was

convicted of one count of robbery in the second degree in violation

of California Penal Code section 211 with an enhancement for

infliction of great bodily injury pursuant to California Penal Code

section 12022.7(a). (Id. Attach. #1 Ex. B at 8.) The jury also

found that under California Penal Code section 667(a)(1), Petitioner

had two prior serious felony convictions, and under California Penal

Code section 667.5(b), he served two prior prison terms. (Id.) The

court sentenced Williams to a prison term of twenty-five years to

life, based on his conviction for robbery with the infliction of

great bodily injury. (Id.) It did not increase the sentence

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because of the prior serious felony conviction and prior prison term

enhancements. (Id.)

On May 6, 1996, Williams sought direct review of the 1995

judgment and concurrently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

(Williams I) in the California Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment No.

9, Notice and Request for Ruling, Williams v. Kramer (Williams V),

Case No. HC19295 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 3, 2008) (App. #2, Ex.

C, Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v. Williams, Case No. D02360,

followed by, In re Williams (Williams IV), Case No. [D028203]

(petition for writ of habeas corpus)).) On April 10, 1997, the

court of appeal affirmed his conviction, denied the habeas petition,

and remanded the case for resentencing because the trial court

“assumed it lacked discretion to strike prior conviction allegations

and made inconsistent remarks regarding how it would exercise such

discretion.” (Lodgment No. 3, Williams v. Garcia (Williams IV),

Case No. EHC179 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 22, 1998) (App. A,

People v. Williams, Case No. D023604, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Ct. App.

filed Apr. 10, 1997).) The trial court resentenced Williams to

thirty-five years to life. (Pet. Attach. #1 Ex. D at 30.) The new

sentence included Williams’s previous sentence of twenty-five years

to life for robbery and ten additional years for the prior serious

felony convictions and prior prison term enhancements. (Id.)

On July 24, 1998, Williams filed his next of several habeas

corpus petitions in the San Diego County Superior Court, which was

denied on July 27, 1998. (See Lodgment No. 3, Williams v. Garcia

(Williams IV), Case No. EHC179 (petition for writ of habeas corpus

App. A-5, In re Williams (Williams II), Case No. EHC170, slip op. at

5 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 27, 1998)).) Williams filed a third

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petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 13, 1998 (Williams

III), which was denied on August 14, 1998. (See Lodgment No. 4, In

re Williams (Williams IV), Case No. EHC179, slip op. at 2 (Cal.

Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 1998).) He filed his fourth petition on October

22, 1998. (Lodgment No. 3, Williams v. Garcia (Williams IV), Case

No. EHC179 (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The superior

court denied this petition on November 12, 1998. (Lodgment No. 4,

In re Williams (Williams IV), Case No. EHC179, slip op. at 2.)

Petitioner also appealed the judgment of the San Diego County

Superior Court after the remand from the California Court of Appeal. 

(See Lodgment No. 3, Williams v. Garcia (Williams IV), Case No.

EHC179 (petition for writ of habeas corpus App. A-6, Appellant’s

Opening Brief, People v. Williams, Case No. D029994).) On May 13,

1999, the conviction was affirmed with directions to modify the

judgment to reflect a strike rather than a stay of the prior prison

term, and the case was again remanded to the trial court to correct

Williams’s credit for time served. (Lodgment No. 1, People v.

Williams, Case No. D029994, slip op. at 7-8.)

On June 22, 1999, Williams filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court seeking discretionary review of the

appellate court’s May 13, 1999 opinion. (Lodgment No. 5, People v.

Williams, Case No. S079912 (Cal. filed June 24, 1999) (petition for

review).) The supreme court denied his petition on July 28, 1999. 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Williams, Case No. S079912, slip op. at 1

(Cal. July 28, 1999).)

Almost three years later, on May 15, 2002, Petitioner submitted

another petition for writ of habeas corpus to the San Diego County

Superior Court. (See Lodgment No. 7, Williams v. Butler (Williams

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V), Case No. S109703 (Cal. filed Sept. 9, 2002) (motion in support

of habeas petition Attach. Successive Petition Re “Actual

Innocence,” Williams v. Butler (Williams V), Case No. EHC359 (Cal.

Super. Ct. filed May 15, 2002)).) The superior court denied his

petition on June 12, 2002, finding it untimely and citing In re

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 765, 855 P.2d 729, 738, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509,

518 (1993). (See Id. App. 3, Ex. E, In re Williams (Williams V),

Case No. EHC359, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 12, 2002).) 

The superior court also denied the petition because the grounds

raised were ruled upon in a prior petition, and there had been no

change in existing facts or law. (Id. at 5-6.)

Williams submitted a motion and petition for writ of habeas

corpus to the California Supreme Court that it received on September

9, 2002. (Lodgment No. 7, Williams v. Butler (Williams V), Case No.

S109703.) The supreme court denied his petition on April 16, 2003,

citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 765, 855 P.2d at 738, 21 Cal.

Rptr. 2d at 518, and In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780, 959 P.2d

311, 317-18, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 159-60 (1998), which indicates

the court found it untimely. (Lodgment No. 8, In re Williams

(Williams V), Case No. S109703, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Apr. 16, 2003).)

Almost five years later, on March 24, 2008, Williams filed a

sixth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County

Superior Court; this petition was denied on May 20, 2008, both on

the merits and because it was untimely. (See Lodgment No. 2, In re

Williams (Williams VI), Case No. HC19295, slip op. at 2-3.)

On December 11, 2008, Williams filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal and reasserted the

claim rejected by the lower court and complained of the superior

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court’s denial of habeas relief. (Lodgment No. 11, In re Williams

(Williams VI), Case No. D054256 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Dec. 11, 2008)

(petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The appellate court denied

his petition on January 29, 2009, also citing In re Clark. 

(Lodgment No. 12, In re Williams (Williams VI), Case No. D054256,

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=

41&doc_id=1382666&doc_no=D054256; Lodgment No. 15, In re Williams

(Williams VI), Case No. D054256, slip op at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. [Jan.

29, 2009]).)

Petitioner turned to the California Supreme Court and filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 18, 2009. (Lodgment

No. 13, In re Williams (Williams VI), Case No. S170612 (Cal. filed

Feb. 18, 2009) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The supreme

court denied this petition on July 22, 2009, again citing In re

Clark and In re Robbins. (Lodgment No. 16, In re Williams (Williams

VI), Case No. S170612, slip op. at 1 (Cal. July 22, 2009).)

Williams filed his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in this Court on August 5, 2009 [doc. no 1]. Respondent Noll filed

a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December

18, 2009 [doc. no. 11]. Petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss was filed nunc pro tunc to January 25, 2010 [doc. no 10].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Williams is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996 because he filed his Petition after

April 24, 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006); Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S.

339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir.

1991).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation).

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In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Claderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) –- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

“explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court decision may

not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for example, because of

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a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. 

“[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is ‘contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative

decision of the Supreme Court.” Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson,

103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d

1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325

(9th Cir. 1996).)

With respect to the factual findings of the trial court, AEDPA

provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

Respondent raises one issue in her Motion to Dismiss. She

contends that Williams has not filed his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus within the statute of limitations; thus, it should be

dismissed with prejudice. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

2.) This is the only argument presently before the Court.

The statute of limitations for habeas corpus petitions is set

forth in AEDPA. As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

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(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1). Williams has not asserted that

subsections (B)-(D) of § 2244(d)(1) apply to his Petition. Under

the facts of his case, § 2244(d)(1)(A) provides the applicable

standard for when the statute of limitations began to run.

On May 6, 1996, Williams filed a timely appeal of his

conviction to the California Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment No. 9,

Notice and Request for Ruling, Williams v. Kramer (Williams V),

Case No. HC19295 (App. #2, Ex. C, Appellant’s Opening Brief, People

v. Williams, Case No. D023604.) After the initial appeal of his

conviction and subsequent remand for resentencing, Williams filed a

second appeal to the California Court of Appeal on May 13, 1999.

(Lodgment No. 1, People v. Williams, Case No. D029994, slip op. at

1.) Next, he sought relief from the California Supreme Court, but

his petition for review was denied on July 28, 1999. (Lodgment No.

5, People v. Williams, Case No. S079912 (petition for review);

Lodgment No. 6, People v. Williams, Case No. S079912, slip op. at

1.)

United States Supreme Court Rule 13.1 states that a petition

for certiorari must be filed within ninety days of the entry of a

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judgment or an order denying discretionary review by the state

supreme court. See S. Ct. R. 13.1. In Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157

(9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that when a habeas

petitioner sought direct review of his conviction by the state’s

highest court, but did not file a petition for writ of certiorari

in the United States Supreme Court, AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations began to run when the time to petition the United

States Supreme Court expired. Id. at 1158-59.

Here, that time expired on October 26, 1999, ninety days after

the California Supreme Court denied Williams’s petition for review. 

The statute of limitations for Williams’s federal habeas corpus

petition began to run the next day, October 27, 1999. Absent any

statutory or equitable tolling, it would have expired on October

26, 2000. See Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir.

2009); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)) (“In computing any amount of time

prescribed or allowed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of

the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time

runs shall not be included.”).

Williams filed this federal Petition almost nine years later,

on August 5, 2009 [doc. no. 1]. Unless Petitioner is entitled to

sufficient statutory or equitable tolling, this action is barred by

AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

1. Statutory Tolling

Under AEDPA, the limitations period is tolled during periods

when a petitioner has a properly filed application for collateral

review pending in a state court. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2) states: “The time during which a properly filed

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application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2); see also Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005). “[A]n application is

‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance

with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v.

Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (explaining that typical filing

requirements include “the form of the document, the time limits

upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged,

and the requisite filing fee[]”). “When a postconviction petition

is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Pace, 544 U.S. at 414 (quoting Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)); see also Zepeda v. Walker, 581

F.3d at 1018.

But the interval between the disposition of one state petition

and the filing of another may be tolled under “interval tolling.” 

Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. “[T]he AEDPA statute of limitations is

tolled for ‘all of the time during which a state prisoner is

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to

exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular postconviction application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lamaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th

Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-22. The statute of

limitations is tolled from the time a petitioner’s first state

habeas petition is filed until state collateral review is

concluded, but it is not tolled before the first state collateral

challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir.

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2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006). “[AEDPA’s tolling

provision] modifies the 1-year filing rule (a rule that prevents

prisoners from delaying their federal filing) in order to give

States the opportunity to complete one full round of review, free

of federal interference.” Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222. 

Williams filed multiple habeas corpus petitions, one in the

California Court of Appeal and three in the San Diego County

Superior Court, before the California Supreme Court had concluded

direct review of his conviction on July 28, 1999, by denying his

petition for review. On May 6, 1996, he filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal (Williams I)

concurrently with his first direct appeal of his conviction. (See

Lodgment No. 9, Notice and Request for Ruling, Williams v. Kramer

(Williams VI), Case No. HC19295 (App. #2, Ex. C, Appellant’s

Opening Brief, People v. Williams, Case No. D023604, followed by In

re Williams (Williams IV), Case No. [D028203] (petition for writ of

habeas corpus)).) In a single unpublished opinion, filed on April

10, 1997, the court of appeal decided the appeal and ruled on the

petition for habeas corpus. (See Lodgment No. 3, Williams v.

Garcia (Williams IV), Case No. EHC179 (App. A, People v. Williams,

Case No. D023604, slip op. at 3.) 

On July 24, August 13, and October 22, 1998, Williams filed

habeas petitions in the San Diego County Superior Court. (See

Lodgment No. 3, Williams v. Garcia (Williams IV), Case No. EHC179

(petition for writ of habeas corpus); id. App. A-5, In re Williams

(Williams II), Case No. EHC170, slip op. at 5; see also Lodgment

No. 4, In re Williams (Williams IV), Case No. EHC179, slip op. at

2.) The superior court denied all three petitions. (See Lodgment

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No. 4, In re Williams (Williams IV), Case No. EHC179, slip op. at

1-2.)

The first petition to the superior court was denied because

many of the issues had been raised and rejected in Williams’s first

direct appeal; others should have been raised on direct appeal. 

(See Lodgment No. 3, Williams v. Garcia (Williams IV), Case No.

EHC179 (petition for writ of habeas corpus App. A-5, In re Williams

(Williams II), Case No. EHC170, slip op. at 4-5).) The superior

court denied the next two successive petitions, stating that they

were substantially similar to the July 24, 1998 habeas corpus

petition previously filed, but there had been no change in law or

facts to necessitate review. (Lodgment No. 4, In re Williams

(Williams IV), Case No. EHC179, slip op. at 2.)

Because the San Diego County Superior Court and the California

Court of Appeal denied habeas petitions in Williams I, II, III, IV,

before AEDPA’s statute of limitations began to run on October 27,

1999, they do not toll its limitations period. Petitioner returned

to the San Diego Superior Court nearly three years later, and on

May 15, 2002, he filed his next habeas petition, which was denied

on June 12, 2002, for “fail[ing] to point to particular

circumstances sufficient to justify the substantial delay in

filing.” (See Lodgment No. 7, Williams v. Butler (Williams V),

Case No. S109703 (motion in support of habeas petition App. 3, Ex.

E, In re Williams (Williams V), Case No. EHC359, slip op. at 4,

6).)

A subsequently filed petition for state collateral relief

cannot revive an expired statute of limitations. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 417; see also Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

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478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2000). Because the limitations period had already run by May

15, 2002, the date Williams filed his fifth habeas petition seeking

state collateral review, statutory tolling will not save his

federal Petition.

2. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate

when “‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make

it impossible’” to file a timely petition. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d

1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319

F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A] litigant seeking equitable

tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. at 418 (citations omitted); see also Lawrence v. Florida,

549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007); Rouse v. U.S. Dept. of State, 548 F.3d

871, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2008); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005).

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). 

The failure to file a timely petition must be the result of

external forces, not the result of the petitioner’s lack of

diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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specific inquiry.’” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (quoting Frye v.

Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).

a. Plea Agreement

Petitioner argues that the February 28, 1995 bifurcated trial

to determine his prior convictions and enhance his 1995 sentence

“violated the expressed terms of [his] 1984 plea agreement.” (Pet.

10.) He contends that in 1984, the trial court assured him that

pleading guilty would preclude any subsequent trial:

In order to plead guilty you have to give up your

right to a jury trial and the rights you would have

gotten at that trial because if you plead guilty this

afternoon, that means there isn’t going to be a trial of

any kind today or at any other time in the future.

(Id.) Petitioner claims he understood this to mean that “there

would not be a trial of any kind then or in the future if he

plead[ed] guilty to Counts I and II in case number A089741.” (Id.

at 11.) Williams asserts that the terms of the plea agreement are

clear and played a crucial role in his decision to plead guilty,

and the failure to interpret those terms as he understood them was

a breach of contract. (Id. at 11-12.) Petitioner argues that the

bifurcated trial was illegitimate and violated state contract law. 

(Id. at 17-18.) He asks the Court to order specific performance of

the plea bargain, remand the 1995 case for resentencing, and strike

the 1984 case from the record for enhancement purposes. (Id. at

13.)

In his Petition, Williams states that he “did not receive the

legible, certified duplicate record of the 1984 reporter’s

transcript until after March 13, 2007,” following two written

requests made on February 19 and May 21, 2006. (Pet. 11; Pet.

Attach. #1 Ex. F at 45; id. Ex. G at 47; id. Ex. H at 49.) He

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believes that the transcript of the 1984 agreement was essential to

show that the plea bargain was not ambiguous and was breached when

the prosecution used a bifurcated jury trial in 1995 to establish

Williams’s 1984 conviction, which resulted in an enhanced sentence. 

(See Pet. 18.)

i. Delay in Receiving the Transcript

Petitioner claims he did not receive a transcript of the

guilty plea until March 13, 2007, and was unwilling to challenge

the enhanced sentence until he had the “verbatim language pursuant

to the 1984 plea agreement” is his possession. (Opp’n Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 9.) Williams, however, was in court for his 1984

guilty plea. He knew what was said. Furthermore, in his federal

Petition, Williams admits raising the scope of his 1984 plea

agreement in the direct appeal of his 1995 conviction. In its

opinion, the appellate court stated:

Williams also argues when he pled guilty to the

earlier charge he was advised only of the maximum

immediate period of incarceration, not of future

consequences which could arise out of his plea. We

reject this argument.

The sentence under the three strikes law by virtue

of Williams’s prior convictions was an indirect,

collateral consequence of his guilty plea in the earlier

case. There is no requirement a defendant be advised of

collateral consequences before pleading guilty. “The

trial court should not be required even before imposing

sentence for one crime to inform the defendant what the

sentence may be for committing another crime.”

(Lodgment No. 3, Williams v. Garcia, Case No. EHC179 App. A, People

v. Williams, Case No. D023604, slip op. at 18 n.6 (citations

omitted); see Pet. 12.)

A petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling where there

is a delay in obtaining transcripts of a guilty plea if the

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individual was present during those proceedings. A petitioner does

not need transcripts to raise his claims. Boyd v. Ward, 2001 WL

533221, at *4 (E.D. La. May 15, 2001) (guilty plea and sentencing);

see Brown v. Cain, 112 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (E.D. La. 2000)

(holding that equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year limitation

period did not apply to a petitioner awaiting transcripts who

“experienced all the pretrial proceedings and the full trial”),

aff’d, 239 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2000); Richardson v. Johnson, 2001 WL

869644, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2001) (concluding that equitable

tolling of AEDPA’s limitation period does not apply where

petitioner delayed four months before requesting copies of the

tapes to the parole revocation hearing he attended); Brisbon v.

Cain, 2000 WL 45872, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2000) (finding that

although the petitioner alleged a delay in obtaining a transcript

of his plea proceeding, he participated in the plea colloquy, so

the transcript was not necessary to file his habeas petition); see

also Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 806-07 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating

that delays in obtaining transcripts is not an extraordinary

circumstance and does not equitably toll AEDPA’s one-year

limitation period).

Williams was present and participated in the plea proceedings. 

Therefore, he was capable of filing a timely federal petition that

raised his plea bargain claims before he received a copy of the

transcript.

ii. Diligence in Seeking the Transcript

Williams has not shown that he was diligent in attempting to

obtain a copy of the plea transcript. He does not state when he

first requested the transcript. But he has provided the Court with

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a letter requesting his “plea bargain transcript,” dated February

19, 2006. (Pet. Attach. #1 Ex. F at 45.) Another request is dated

May 21, 2006. (Id. Attach. #1 Ex. G at 47.) Williams has not

described any other attempts to obtain a transcript, and he does

not explain why he did not seek the transcript sooner. Without an

explanation for the delay between his sentencing in 1984 and his

February 19, 2006 request for his transcript, the Court cannot find

that Williams was diligent.

iii. Prevented from Filing

Petitioner also contends that equitable tolling should apply

because he was actively exhausting his state court remedies, and he

was unable to file a federal petition because he was “wait[ing] for

the appeal process to be completed since [c]ounsel refused to

provide the transcript or even consider petitioner’s request for

that plea agreement from 1984.” (Opp’n Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

12.) Williams claims, “[T]he state created impediment was created

by the appeal process provided by the state on direct appeal.” 

(Id. at 7-8.) He continues, “At the time . . . a petitioner is

proceeding under that appellate process he has no control of

retaining documents or other instruments, unless counsel seeks to

obtain them in regard to the current case. Even though petitioner

requested the documents, petitioner had to wait until he could

obtain them himself.” (Id. at 8.)

In Lee v. Portuondo, 2003 WL 22173078 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,

2003), petitioner made a similar claim and argued for equitable

tolling, stating that his former counsel lost Lee’s criminal court

records. Id. at *2. He offered no proof of any causal connection

between the lost papers and the late filing. Id. The court

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concluded that petitioner failed to act diligently because he only

made three attempts to obtain his files from his former counsel

during the one-year limitations period, then waited two more years

before taking additional steps to obtain his records. (Id.)

 Williams has not shown any attempts to obtain his transcript

during the one-year statute of limitations between October 27, 1999

and October 26, 2000. Nor has he shown any attempts prior to

February 19, 2006. Petitioner has provided insufficient evidence

that he was prevented from filing his federal Petition within the

limitations period. 

The word “prevent” requires the petitioner to demonstrate

a causal relationship between the extraordinary

circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling

rests and the lateness of his filing, a demonstration

that cannot be made if the petitioner, acting with

reasonable diligence, could have filed on time

notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances.

Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). Contrary to

his claim, not having a copy of the transcript of his guilty plea

colloquy was not an impediment -- state created or otherwise -- to

filing a timely Petition. Whether his counsel neglected to provide

Williams with a transcript of his 1984 plea colloquy or the state

court delayed in delivering it, Petitioner has not shown

exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify equitable tolling. 

He has failed to establish that he was prevented from filing his

Petition on time. See Grayson v. Grayson, 185 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751

(E.D. Mich. 2002).

iv. Insufficient Equitable Tolling

Assuming AEDPA’s statute of limitations period was equitably

tolled until March 13, 2007, the date Williams received his plea

transcript, it would have expired on March 12, 2008. The current

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federal Petition was not filed until August 5, 2009, almost five

months later. Williams also did not have any state petition

pending between March 13, 2007, and March 12, 2008, to justify

additional statutory tolling. It was not until March 24, 2008,

twelve days after any limitations period extended by any equitable

tolling, that Williams filed his sixth state habeas corpus

petition. (Lodgment No. 2, In re Williams (Williams VI), Case No.

HC19295, slip op. at 2). Thus, even with the equitable tolling

Williams seeks, his federal Petition is untimely.

b. Challenging a Sentence as a Breach of Contract

In his Opposition, Petitioner contends that he does not

challenge his conviction, but merely challenges his sentence. 

(Opp’n Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-8.) He maintains that a sentence

“may be challenged at any time if it is found to be violative [sic]

of petitioner’s constitutional rights to a contract between

parties.” (Id. at 7.) Petitioner also asserts that “[a] sentence

may be challenged at any time pursuant to Fed. Rules of Crim.

Procedure, Rule 35, 18 U.S.C.A.” (Id. at 9.)

Williams is wrong on two fronts. First, the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not help him. They do not apply to his §

2254 Petition. See Kirk v. Dutton, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28709, at

*3 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not

apply to his [§ 2254] case, and any alleged violation of federal

procedure is irrelevant.”); Sowell v. Quarterman, 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 126597, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2009) (same). He is wrong

in contending that under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure he can challenge his sentence at any time. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 35(a), (b) (within fourteen days or upon the government’s

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motion). Second, a claimed violation of California law is equally

unavailing. See e.g., Zakouto v. Vare, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

37493, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 18, 2008) (“Instead of challenging the

Court’s determination on constitutional law, Petitioner argues that

the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination violates Nevada Law and

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, both of which are

inapplicable in a habeas petition that challenges a judgment of

conviction in state court.”) Enforcing a plea agreement in a

habeas proceeding is a matter of due process. See Mabry v.

Johnston, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984); Womack v. Kane, 271 F. App’x

650, 660 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.

257, 261-62 (1971).

“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or

duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a

determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a

speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is

a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500

(1973). If a habeas petition challenges a sentence as a due

process violation resulting from the failure to follow a plea

agreement, the claim is subject to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

See Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 960-62 (9th Cir. 2006)

(applying AEDPA to a habeas petition based on breach of a plea

agreement); Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006)

(finding AEDPA applies to a petition for writ of habeas corpus

challenging a sentence based on an ambiguous plea agreement); see

also Martinez v. Evans, 2009 WL 3497735, at **1-2 (9th Cir. Oct.

30, 2009) (holding that petitioner was not entitled to relief under

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AEDPA where the state appellate court applied state contract law to

interpret the plea agreement). 

Williams has challenged the length of his sentence, so his

exclusive remedy is pursuant to a petition for writ of habeas

corpus. He cannot avoid the limitation requirements of AEDPA by

arguing that his sentence is a breach of state contract law. 

Williams’s federal Petition is subject to AEDPA’s statute of

limitations and is untimely. Unlike Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d

1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), cited by Williams, the reasons for his

delayed filing are before the Court, and they are insufficient to

save his late Petition.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, neither statutory nor

equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is

available to rescue Williams’s untimely federal Petition. 

Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 11] should be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and Serve a copy on all parties on or

before June 14, 2010. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed on or before June 28, 2010. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

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may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: May 14, 2010 _____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Gonzalez

All parties of record

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