Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00321/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00321-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES WILLIAM BAILEY, IV )

AIS # 200587 )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:11cv321-WHA-TFM

) (WO)

TONY PATTERSON, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Alabama inmate James William Bailey, IV (“Bailey” or “Petitioner”).

I. BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2008, a jury in Houston County, Alabama, found Bailey guilty of

trafficking in methamphetamine, a violation of § 13A-12-231(6), Ala. Code 1975; unlawful

manufacturing of a controlled substance in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-12-218, Ala.

Code 1975; and possession of precursor materials, a violation of § 13A-20-2-190, Ala. Code

1975. On June 17, 2008, the trial court sentenced Bailey as a habitual offender to concurrent

sentences of life imprisonment for trafficking in methamphetamine and manufacturing a

controlled substance and a consecutive sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment for

possessing precursor materials.

Bailey appealed, raising the following claims:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and violated

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 1 of 21
Bailey’s Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment

Constitutional Rights and his rights under Article I, §§ 5 & 6 of

the Constitution of Alabama 1901, by denying his Motion to

Suppress where the evidence presented at the pre-trial hearing

clearly showed that due process protections were not afforded

to him when the warrant was obtained or executed and that the

evidence seized as a result of the search was fruit of the

poisonous tree.

2. Whether Bailey was denied his Sixth Amendment Constitutional

Rights and his rights under Article I, § 6 of the Constitution of

Alabama 1901 to a speedy trial where he had preserved the

right, demanded a trial of his cases, and had not been brought to

trial for nearly four years and had been housed in Holman Prison

for the majority of time prior to his trial.

3. Whether Bailey was denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment

Constitutional rights and his rights under the Constitution of

Alabama 1901, Article I, Section 6 to a fair trial when the trial

court denied admission into evidence the document of Bailey’s

revocation proceeding which contained exculpatory evidence

taken under oath, although purportedly hearsay.

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying Bailey’s Motions for

Judgment of Acquittal and/or Motion for New Trial because

there was insufficient evidence to establish the criminal

knowledge or intent necessary for conviction where the District

Attorney failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his guilt.

(Doc. No. 8-1, Respondent’s Ex. A, Appellant’s Br., pp. 13-14).

On August 7, 2009, by unpublished memorandum opinion, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed Bailey’s convictions and sentence. (Doc. No. 8-3, Respondent’s

Exh. C). The appellate court overruled Bailey’s application for rehearing on September 25,

2009. On October 9, 2009, Bailey petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari

review (Doc. No. 8-4; Respondent’s Ex. D). The Alabama Supreme Court granted his

2

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 2 of 21
request for certiorari review with respect to his first ground. (Doc. No. 8-5, Respondent’s

Ex. E). In his brief, Bailey asserted the following issue for review:

Whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming

Bailey’s conviction when the trial court violated Bailey’s

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional Rights

and his rights under Article I, §§ 5 and 6 of the Constitution of

Alabama 1901, by denying Bailey’s Motion to Suppress where

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing clearly

showed that due process protections were not afforded Bailey

when the warrant used to search the residence was obtained

and/or executed without being sworn to; where the judge who

issued the warrant failed to act as an independent magistrate;

where the deputies who obtained and executed the warrant could

not have relied upon it as being valid warrant and where the

evidence seized as a result of said invalid warrant was an illegal

search and the evidence obtained was fruit of the poisonous tree

and where the search of the house was, in essence a warrantless

search without probable cause plus exigent circumstances and

the evidence from the search was illegally obtained.

(Doc. No. 8-6, Appellant’s Br., p. 8). On January 14, 2011, the Alabama Supreme Court

issued a certificate of judgment. (Doc. No. 8-8, Respondent’s Ex. H).

On December 19, 2011, Bailey filed with the Houston County Circuit Court a postconviction petition pursuant to Ala.R.Crim.P. 32, asserting the following claims:

1. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence

from his parole revocation hearing. Specifically, he argues the

testimony given by Heather Lynn Brown was an exculpatory

statement against penal interest and should have been admitted

during his trial.

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a cognizable of

juror discrimination regarding Batson v. Kentucky. This

deficiency deprived petitioner of a fair trial under the Sixth

3

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 3 of 21
Amendment to the United States Constitution and deprived

Petitioner of due process and equal protection of the law under

the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(Doc. No. 19-1, Petitioner’s Brief). On January 30, 2012, the trial court entered a written

order denying Bailey’s state post-conviction petition. (Doc. No. 19-2). Bailey appealed,

asserting the following claims:

1. It was a denial of due process of law for the court to fail to state

the basis for its decision to grant the State’s request for summary

disposition.

2. It was an abuse of the court’s discretion to summarily dismiss

the Rule 32 post-conviction’s claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

3. The Circuit Court should have granted him an evidentiary

hearing pursuant to Rule 32.9(a), Ala.R.Crim.P. rather than

granting the State’s request for summary disposition pursuant to

Rule 32.7(d).

(Doc. No. 19-3, Appellant’s Br., p. 2).

On November 30, 2012, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered a

memorandum opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of Bailey’s Rule 32 petition. (Doc.

No. 19-5, Respondents’ Exh. M). On August 16, 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court denied

his petition for certiorari review. (Doc. No. 19-6, Respondents’ Ex. N). A certificate of

judgment was issued on August 16, 2013. (Doc. No. 19-7, Respondents’ Exh. O).

Baily filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief on April 17, 2011.

(Doc. No. 1). In his petition, Bailey asserts the following claims:

4

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 4 of 21
1. The trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence based on allegations of an invalid search warrant and

invalid search warrant affidavit.

2. The trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence based on his allegation that the police officer obtaining

the warrant knew he was supposed to be placed under oath.

3. The trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence based on the judge issuing the search warrant without

placing the affiant under oath and in violation of criminal

procedural rules.

4. The trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence based on the issuing judge not recording the

conversation between the judge and the affiant.

5. The trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence based on a lack of sufficient probable cause known by

the affiant.

6. The trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence based on a finding of good faith that he contends was

not reasonable because the officer should have known he did not

have a valid warrant and the warrant lacked probable cause

because it was not sworn.

7. The trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence based on allegations that the police officer obtaining

the warrant “intentionally and deliberately disregarded”

provisions of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure by not

being sworn by the issuing judge although the officer knew he

was supposed to be.

(Id.). On June 6, 2011, the respondents filed an answer to Bailey’s petition. On June 23,

2011, Bailey filed a response, in which he asserts that the claims in his federal petition

include assertions that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law

5

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 5 of 21
were violated and that the state court proceedings were a miscarriage of justice. (Doc. No.

10, Petititioners’ Response). On October 03, 2013, Bailey filed an Amendment to the

Petition, in which he asserts that trial counsel was ineffective during the suppression hearing

for failing to argue that a prior hearsay statement made by a co-defendant should have been

admitted as a statement against penal interest. (Doc. No. 13, Petitioner’s Motion to Amend

Habeas Corpus Petition). On November 19, 2013, the respondents filed a Second

Supplemental Answer. (Doc. No. 19). Following a careful review of Bailey’s petition and

the parties’ submissions, the undersigned finds, for the reasons set forth below, that Bailey

is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of any of his claims and that his petition should

be denied without an evidentiary hearing. Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

in United States District Courts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Claimed Fourth Amendment Violations

In Counts One through Seven of the original petition (Doc. No. 1), Bailey challenges

the trial court’s failure to grant his Motion to Suppress the evidence based on the

insufficiency and/or invalidity of the search warrant and affidavit. The respondents argue

that, under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the claims are not subject to federal habeas

review because the state courts provided Bailey an opportunity for full and fair litigation of

the Fourth Amendment issue.

Under Stone v. Powell, supra, “where the State has provided an opportunity for full

6

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 6 of 21
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state

prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an

unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” This rule applies to all claims

arising under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571, 572

1

(1986). Bailey was afforded an evidentiary hearing in the trial court on his motion to

suppress, after which the trial court entered an order containing findings of fact and

conclusions of law and denying Bailey’s motion. On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals rejected Bailey’s claim that his motion to suppress should have been

granted, finding in pertinent part as follows:

Bailey first contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant that

was determined by the court to be invalid. Specifically, Bailey contends that

the search of his house pursuant to an invalid warrant amounted to a

warrantless search without probable cause or exigent circumstances and thus

violated his constitutional rights.

The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing indicated the

following pertinent facts. In December 2004, Officer Scott Langley, who at

that time was a deputy with the Houston County Sheriff’s Department,

requested a search warrant for a residence based on information received from

other investigators and an informant that Bailey and a female were in

possession of methamphetamine and chemicals used in manufacturing

methamphetamine. Further, Allen Hendrickson, an investigator with the

Henry County Sheriff’s Department, advised Officer Langley that he had

The rule in Stone is applicable despite legal or factual error in the state court, and does not 1

require a federal court to review the state court’s factfinding or its application of Fourth Amendment

law. See Willett v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1265, 1272-73 (8 Cir. 1994) (federal courts “are not to th

consider whether full and fair litigation of the claims in fact occurred in the state courts, but only

whether the state provided an opportunity for such litigation.”).

7

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 7 of 21
smelled a strong chemical odor associated with the manufacture of

methamphetamine at the residence while he was conducting an interview with

Bailey and the female. After compiling the above evidence in an affidavit

form, Officer Langley telephoned Judge C. Lawson Little to secure a warrant.

Officer Langley testified that he based his request for the warrant on reliable

information and that he had filed the warrant in good faith. According to

Officer Langley, Judge Little did not swear him in before hearing the evidence

in support of the search-warrant request. Officer Langley explained that he

appeared before Judge Little when he made the return on the search warrant

and that Judge Little signed the warrant at that time.

Judge Little had no independent recollection of issuing the search

warrant. Judge Little acknowledged that he authorized warrants by telephone.

Judge Little explained that he usually made the officer requesting the warrant

tell him the basis of the affidavit for the search warrant and he would then

determine if the basis offered was sufficient. Judge Little testified that he did

not always swear in the affiant and that he could not remember whether he did

in this case.

Based on the evidence received at the suppression hearing, the circuit

court held that the search warrant was invalid. However, the circuit court

concluded that the evidence seized upon execution of the search warrant was

admissible under the good-faith exception under the exclusionary rule. “The

good faith exception provides that when officers acting in good faith, that is,

objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral, detached

magistrate, conduct a search and the warrant is found to be invalid, the

evidence need not be excluded.” Rivers v. State, 695 So. 2d 260, 262 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1997).

In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), a case relied on by the

circuit court, the United States Supreme Court recognized four circumstances

in which the good-faith exception was inapplicable: (1) when the magistrate

or judge relies on information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or

would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2)

when the magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a

neutral and detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an affidavit so

lacking an indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that the

executing officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.

8

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 8 of 21
Bailey argues on appeal that Judge Little’s conduct and the conduct of

Officer Langley do not support the application of the good-faith exception in

the instant case. Bailey argues that Judge Little abandoned his judicial role

and failed to act in a neutral and detached manner. However, the evidence

presented at the suppression hearing establishes that none of the circumstances

set forth in Leon were present in this case to negate the good-faith exception.

Judge Little required Officer Langley to set forth the specific evidence upon

which he was basing the request for the search warrant. Only after hearing that

evidence did Judge Little agree to issue the search warrant. Judge Little’s

failure to swear in Officer Langley before issuing the search warrant does not,

in and of itself, evidence an abandonment of a judicial role and a lack of

neutrality. The evidence does not support a conclusion that Judge Little

wholly abandoned his judicial role. See Leon, supra. Therefore, the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to suppress.

(Doc. No. 8-3, Respondents’ Ex. C, pp. 2-6).

Here, for purposes of Stone, Bailey clearly had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate

his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts. He was afforded an evidentiary hearing in

the trial court on his motion to suppress, followed by a direct appeal to the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals and an application for discretionary review by the Alabama Supreme

Court. The trial court’s order denying Bailey’s motion to suppress and the appellate opinion

by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals make plain that both the trial court and the

appellate court fully and fairly considered the Fourth Amendment claims raised by Bailey.

Under the principle set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell, this

court is precluded from reviewing the state court’s determination. See Peoples v. Campbell,

2

Bailey argues that his challenge to the search of his property also includes an assertion of a

2

violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law. Bailey’s

claims, despite his effort to redefine them, arise from the Fourth Amendment’s protection “against

(continued...)

9

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 9 of 21
377 F.3d 1208, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004); Huynh v. King, 95 F.3d 1052, 1057–58 (11th Cir.

1996); Morgan v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 934, 940 (5th Cir. 1979).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his Amendment to the § 2254 Petition, Bailey asserts that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to argue that a prior hearsay statement made by a co-defendant should

have been admitted as a statement against penal interest. Bailey also raised this claim in his

Rule 32 petition to the state court. In its written order denying Bailey’s Rule 32 petition, the

Houston County Circuit Court summarily granted the State’s Motion for Summary

Disposition. (Doc. No. 19-2, January 30, 2012 Order). On November 30, 2012, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals entered a memorandum opinion affirming the trial court’s denial

of Bailey’s Rule 32 petition.

 (...continued) 2

unreasonable searches and seizures.” His effort to restyle his claims as substantive due process and

equal protection claims are to no avail as they are clearly based on the specific text of the Fourth

Amendment and are therefore precluded under Stone, supra. 

To the extent Bailey argues that Stone deprives him of his First Amendment right to petition

for redress and is therefore an unconstitutional denial of his access to court, he is entitled to no relief

in this 2254 proceeding. This argument does not affect the validity of his confinement and therefore

provides no basis for habeas relief. Moreover, Bailey’s right to access to the courts was clearly

invoked and satisfied through the state court proceedings where he had a opportunity to present his

constitutional claims in full. 

In addition, Baileygenerallyasserts that the application of Stone to his claims is a miscarriage

of justice. he fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to defaulted claims in habeas corpus

proceedings involves assertions of actual innocence. “[T]he miscarriage of justice exception is

concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.” Calderon v. Thompson, 532 U.S. 538, 559

(1998). Consequently, he is entitled to no relief with respect to these claims in this habeas

proceeding.

10

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 10 of 21
“A habeas petitioner whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court is not

entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”

Price, 538 U.S. 634, 638, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852; Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1518. Under the requisite provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with respect to a claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court, federal habeas relief from a state court judgment may

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

In Williams, the Supreme Court held:

Under the “contrary to” clause a federal court may grant the writ

if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached

by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application”

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner’s case.

529 U.S. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523.

The Court subsequently explained that habeas relief is appropriate when a petitioner

demonstrates “that a decision by a state court is ‘contrary to’ ... clearly established [Supreme

Court] law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme

11

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 11 of 21
Court’s] cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme

Court] precedent.’ Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed. 2d

389 (2000).” Price, 538 U.S. at 640, 123 S.Ct. at 1853. Additionally, federal review in a

habeas action “is limited to whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable

in the light of clearly established federal law. Williams, [529 U.S. at 409],120 S.Ct. at 1521.”

Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11 Cir. 2003); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831,

th

835 (11 Cir. 2001), citing Williams, supra (“[F]ederal habeas relief [is] available under the

th

‘unreasonable application’ standard only if the state court’s application of clearly established

federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”). Thus, a federal court is not to decide “the

correctness per se ... of the state court decision” but only the “objective reasonableness” of

such decision. Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11 Cir. 2001). Moreover, “an

th

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal

law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 (emphasis in original). “Under §

2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a federal habeas court may not issue the

writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522.

Federal district courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court based

its findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

12

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 12 of 21
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s determinations of

fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). However, even when the state court addresses a question of law, this court is not

authorized “to evaluate [a petitioner’s] claim de novo rather than through the lens of §

2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. at 639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852. The Supreme Court admonishes that

such de novo evaluation “exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)....” 538 U.S. at 636, 123 S.Ct. at 1851. As is clear from the foregoing, a federal

“district court’s review ... [of claims decided by the state courts] is greatly circumscribed and

highly deferential to the state courts.” Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11 Cir.

th

2007). The AEDPA “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,

694 (2002).

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals applied Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and determined that Bailey failed to meet his burden of

proof on this claim. The appellate court found:

Bailey contended in his Rule 32 petition that his trial counsel was

ineffective because, he said, his trial counsel “completely missed the

opportunity to present the correct hearsay exception to the [circuit] court ion

his efforts to convice that court to allow the admission of Heather Brown’s

testimony given at [Bailey’s] parole court hearing.” To support his claim,

Bailey attached to his Rule 32 petition a document from the Board of Pardons

13

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 13 of 21
and Paroles that states the following:

“Heather Brown, witness for parolee, testified that she

and Bailey were having some financial problems and that Bailey

had decided to go live with his mother for awhile. Brown

testified that a friend of hers came up with a solution for her to

make some money. Brown testified that she gave him a place to

manufacture meth and that she (Brown) sold it. Brown testified

that as soon as Bailey found out about the lab, he advised her to

get rid of it and told her he could not be with a ‘crack whore’

and that he was not going back to jail for her. Brown testified

that Bailey had been trying to do right.”

(C. 134.) Bailey contended that his trial counsel should have argued that

Brown’s testimony at Bailey’s parole hearing is admissible as “a statement

against penal interest to the extent that it exculpated Bailey of the offenses of

possession of precursor chemicals, manufacturing methamphetamine, and

trafficking and inculpated Brown in the offenses.” (C. 18.) Thus, it appears

that Bailey alleges that another person – Brown – committed the offense for

which he was charged.

Initially, we question whether Bailey satisfied his burden of pleading

on this claim. With regard to the burden of pleading in Rule 32 this Court has

held:

“Rule 32.3 states that ‘[t]he petitioner shall have the

burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the

evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.’

Rule 32.6(b) states that ‘[t]he petition must contain a clear and

specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought,

including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds.

A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated

and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant

any further proceedings.’ As this Court noted in Boyd v. State,

913 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003):

“‘”Rule 32.6(b) required that the petition itself

disclose the facts relied upon in seeking relief.”

Boyd v. State, 746 So., 2d 364, 406 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1999). In other words, it is not the pleading

14

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 14 of 21
of a conclusion “which, if true, entitle[s] the

petitioner to relief.” Lancaster v. State, 638 So.

2d 1370, 1373 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). It is the

allegation of facts in pleading which, if true,

entitle[s] a petitioner to relief. After facts are

pleaded, which, if true, entitle the petitioner to

relief, the petitioner is then entitled to an

opportunity, as provided in Rule 32.9, Ala. R.

Crim. P., to present evidence proving those

alleged facts.’”

“913 So. 2d at 1125. The burden of pleading under Rule 32.3

and Rule 32.6(b) is a heavy one. Conclusions unsupported by

specific facts will not satisfy the requirements of Rule 32.3 and

Rule 32.6(b). The full factual basis for the claim must be

included in the petition itself. If, assuming every factual

allegation in a Rule 32 petition to be true, a court cannot

determine whether petitioner is entitled to relief, the petitioner

has not satisfied the burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and

Rule 32.6(b). See Bracknell v. State, 883 So. 2d 724 (Ala. Crim

App. 2003).”

Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 356-57 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (emphasis in

original).

Rule 804(b)(3), Ala. R. Evid., states:

“(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the

hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

“. . . .

“(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was

at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary

or proprietary interest that a reasonable person in the declarant’s

position would not have made the statement unless believing it

to be true.”

Thus, Bailey had to plead sufficient facts to show that Brown was unavailable

and that the statement that she made was against her “pecuniary or proprietary

15

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 15 of 21
interest.”

Here, although Bailey claimed in his petition that “Brown had fled

prosecution,” he did not plead facts that would establish Brown’s

unavailability under Rule 804(a), Ala. R. Evid., which states as follows:

“(a) Grounds of Unavailability. ‘Unavailability as a witness’

includes situations in which the declarant –

“(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of

privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the

declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so; or

“(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter

of the declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do

so; or

“(3) now possesses a lack of memory of the subject matter of the

declarant’s statement; or

“(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because

of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity;

or

“(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the

statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance

(or in the case of a hearsay exception under subsection (b)(2),

(3) or (4), the declarant’s attendance or testimony) by process or

other reasonable means.”

Specifically, Bailey did not plead facts that would establish that Brown would

not attend Bailey’s trial and testify in his behalf, that Brown did not remember

the subject matter of her statement, that Brown would refuse a court order to

testify, that Brown was unable to testify because of “death or then existing

physical or mental illness or infirmity,” or that Brown would have been

“exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege.” Although we

recognize that the subject matter of Brown’s testimony would have been

subject to the privilege against self-incrimination, “there would have had to

have been evidence that [Brown] would have invoked the Fifth Amendment

to show [her] actual unavailability.” Flowers v. State, 586 So. 2d 978, 986 n.3

16

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 16 of 21
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991).

Thus, Bailey failed to plead that Brown was, in fact, unavailable;

therefore, Bailey did not sufficiently plead the underlying premise of his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Accordingly, the circuit court did not

abuse its discretion when it summarily dismissed this claim.

(Doc. No. 19-5, Respondents’ Ex. M, pp. 6-9). Thus, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals adopted the trial court’s findings as part of its opinion and applied Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in determining that the Houston County Circuit Court

correctly denied Bailey relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

argue that Ms. Brown’s statement should have been admitted as a statement against penal

interest. (Doc. No. 19-5, Respondents’ Exh. M). Strickland sets forth the clearly established

federal law on this issue.

With respect to Bailey’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the court

decided this claim adversely to Bailey on the merits. Id. at 3. Thus, this court will determine

whether rejection of Bailey’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by the state courts

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”).

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists to protect the fundamental right to a fair

trial. The petitioner must satisfy the requirements of a two-pronged test to prevail on his

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the petitioner must establish that the

performances of his attorneys “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”

17

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 17 of 21
Strickland 466 U.S. at 688. “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. Once this threshold test is met, the

petitioner must then show that the deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced his

defense. Id. at 687. To establish prejudice, the petitioner is required to show that there is “a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Unreliability or unfairness does not

result if counsel’s ineffectiveness does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or

procedural right to which the law entitles him. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 393 n. 17

(2000). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and

adequate and great deference is shown to choices dictated by reasonable trial strategy.

Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11 Cir. 1994). Any review of an ineffective assistance

th

of counsel claim is conducted from the perspective of defense counsel based on facts “as they

were known to counsel at the time of the representation.” United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d

1525, 1535 (11 Cir. 1992).

th

This court must first resolve whether the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal’s

decision to reject the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims was an unreasonable

application of the Strickland standard.

In determining whether the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of the law set out in [applicable]

Supreme Court decisions, we need not decide whether we would

have reached the same result as the state court if we had been

deciding the issue in the first instance. Instead, we decide only

whether the state court’s decision of the issue is objectively

18

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 18 of 21
unreasonably. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120

S.Ct. 1495, 1522, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Under §

2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, then, a federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.”); Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, [1313] (11

th

Cir. 2001)(“It is the objective reasonableness, not the

correctness per se, of the state court decision that we are to

decide.”).

Wright v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections, 278 F.3d 1245, 1256 (11 Cir. 2002).

th

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals applied Strickland in its review of Bailey’s

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that a prior hearsay statement

made by a co-defendant should have been admitted as a statement against penal interest.

Upon thorough review of the evidentiary materials submitted in this case, it is clear that the

rejection of Bailey’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims by the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals was objectively reasonable as Bailey failed to show that the performance

of counsel fell below a subjective standard of reasonableness. The state court likewise did

not decide Bailey’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel “differently than [the

Supreme] Court has [in a case based] on a set a of materially indistinguishable facts” nor did

the state court apply a rule that contradicts governing federal law. Williams, 362 U.S. at 412.

Consequently, the state appellate court’s rejection of these claims was not contrary to actual

Supreme Court decisions or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

In addition, the decisions issued by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on Bailey’s

19

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 19 of 21
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel constituted a reasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented by the parties. Habeas relief is therefore unwarranted

on Bailey’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it isthe RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petition

for habeas corpus relief filed by Bailey be denied and that this case be dismissed with

prejudice. It is further

ORDERED that on or before September 26, 2012,] the parties shall file objections

to the said Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in

the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are

advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

th

33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en

th th

20

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 20 of 21
banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 11 day September, 2014.

th

/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

21

Case 1:11-cv-00321-WHA-TFM Document 22 Filed 09/11/14 Page 21 of 21