Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00719/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00719-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:427 Social Security Benenfits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAREN B. WEISS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-719 CAB (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE: (1) DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (2)

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security

Defendant.

I. 

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Karen B.

Weiss brings her motion under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)1

,

seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) final decision

denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. Plaintiff asks

the Court to grant her motion for summary judgment, reversing the Commissioner’s decision, which

1

 “Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made afer

a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain judicial review of such decision by a civil action .

. . brought in the district court of the United States . . . . The court shall have the power to enter, upon

the pleadings and transcripts of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The

findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be

conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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Plaintiff argues fails to assign the proper weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and examining

physicians. The Commissioner concurrently seeks summary judgment to affirm the ALJ’s decision.

The Court finds the motions appropriate for submission on the papers and without oral

argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After careful review of the moving and opposition papers,

the administrative record, the facts, and the law, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s cross motion to affirm the ALJ decision be

GRANTED. 

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 25, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance

Benefits alleging disability on June 3, 2003. See Administrative Record (“AR”) at 23. Her

application was denied initially and also on reconsideration. AR at 23. On November 4, 2009, a

request for a hearing was timely filed. AR at 23. Plaintiff testified at a hearing held on June 23, 2010.

Id. Also appearing at the hearing were impartial medical expert Arthur Lorber, M.D. and impartial

vocational expert Sandra M. Fioretti. Id. The ALJ submitted his decision on August 17, 2010, finding

the claimant was not entitled to disability insurance benefits. AR at 33. The decision of the Social

Security Administration became final when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. 

AR at 1-4.

On March 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint pursuant to §405(g) of the Act in order

to obtain judicial review of a “final decision” from the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits [“DIB”].

Defendant filed an answer to the complaint on July 26, 2012. [ECF Nos. 1, 12.]

On August 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 17.] 

Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment (hereinafter “DM”) on October 5, 2012. [ECF

No. 20.] Both motions were found suitable for decision without oral argument and taken under

submission. 

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III.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

A claimant is entitled to disability benefits if, considering her age, education and work

experience, she is unable to perform the work she previously performed and also the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months...” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act further provides that an individual:

shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment

or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work

but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of

whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific

job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential

evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If she is,

disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If she is not, the decision maker

proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments. That determination is governed by the “severity regulation” which

provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly

limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you

do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider

your age, education, and work experience. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 c), 416.920 c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to

do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521 (b), 416.921 (b). Such abilities and aptitudes include

“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying,

or handling”; “[c]apacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and

remembering simple instructions”; [u]se of judgment”; “[r]esponding appropriately to supervision,

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co-workers, and usual work situations”; and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.” Id. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the

disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step,

which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments the

Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520 (d), 416.920 (d); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P. If the impairment meets or

exceeds one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the

impairment is not one that is conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the

fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing work

she has performed in the past. If the claimant is able to perform her previous work, she is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (e), 416.920 (e). If the claimant cannot perform her previous work,

the fifth and final step of the process determines whether she is able to perform other work in the

national economy in view of her age, education, and work experience. The claimant is entitled to

disability benefits only if she is not able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (f), 416.920

(f). 

Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final

agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited. 

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial

evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432,

433 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a preponderance. 

Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “[I]t is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record as a

whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions.

Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1985)). If the evidence supports more than one rational

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interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.

1984). When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the

testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir.

1982).

Even if the reviewing court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, the

court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the

evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the

Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to

the Social Security Administrator for further proceedings. Id. 

2. The ALJ’s Decision

After considering testimony and the evidence from the administrative record, the ALJ

determined Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to “perform light work as defined in 20

CFR 404.1567(b) except: the claimant can stand and walk for a maximum of two hours in an 8-hour

workday for 30 minutes at a time; she can sit for six hours in an 8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a

time with the ability to change her position; she can lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and 10 pounds

occasionally; she can push and pull with the lower extremities on an occasional basis; she can

occasionally climb, bend, stoop, kneel, crouch, or squat; she cannot crawl; she cannot climb ladders,

ropes or scaffolds; she cannot work at heights or with moving machinery; she cannot balance; she

cannot work with vibration; and she should avoid extreme exposure to cold and heat.” [AR at 11] 

A residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is not a medical determination but an administrative

finding reserved to the Commissioner based on consideration of all relevant evidence. See Social

Security Ruling 96-5p; 20 C.F.R. section1527(e). When determining the residual functional capacity,

the ALJ must consider medical evidence, the testimony of lay witnesses and effects of symptoms. 

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). For Plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity, the ALJ used the findings of both the state medical consultant, Dr. H. Han, and state medical

expert, Dr. Arthur Lorber, to create “a blend of the two opinions.” [AR at 30] Specifically, the ALJ

found the “time restraints and the limitations pertaining to the lower extremities described by Dr.

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Lorber are appropriate given the claimant’s radiculopathy, her weight, and her symptoms associated

with the diabetes mellitus.” [AR at 30] Dr. Lorber’s opinion with respect to Plaintiff’s lower

extremities were: “she can stand and walk for two hours in an 8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a

time; she can sit for six hours in an 8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a time after which she could

stand at her workstation and move around or stand and walk....” [AR at 30] The ALJ found the

“lifting limitations identified by Dr. Han are most appropriate given the ongoing back symptoms.” 

Dr. Han’s opinion with respect to Plaintiff’s lifting limitations were: “the claimant can occasionally

and frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds.” [AR at 30] 

In the ALJ’s recitation of the various evidence considered in crafting Plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity and the weights assigned to it, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s prescription drug

seeking behavior and exaggerated complaints of pain detracted from the credibility of her allegations

of pain and limitations. [AR 29] The ALJ also articulated the reasons supporting his decision to give

more weight to the opinions of the state medical consultant and state medical expert than to the

opinions of Plaintiff’s examining physicians, Dr. Jackson and Dr. Grossman, as well as her treating

physician, Dr. Spoonamore. Specifically, the ALJ afforded some weight to the opinion of Dr. Thomas

Jackson, an Agreed Medical Examiner in Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim, because Dr.

Jackson’s report was dated December 29, 2008, just two days before December 31, 2008, which was

Plaintiff’s “date last insured” for purposes of disability insurance benefits. [AR 23, 29] However, the

ALJ only allotted some weight to Dr. Jackson’s report because it was prepared in the context of

Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim with rules and definitions that are not interchangeable with

those used in Social Security cases. [AR 29] 

Similarly, limited weight was given to the report of Dr. Grossman, Plaintiff’s qualified medical

examiner for worker’s compensation purposes, because in addition to being prepared with worker’s

compensation criteria in mind, the report conflicted with the residual functional capacities

recommended by the state consultant and state medical expert. [AR 31] For example, Dr. Grossman

indicated Plaintiff could “stand and/or walk for less than four-hours in an 8 hour workday” while the

state medical expert, Dr. Lorber, opined Plaintiff could stand and walk for two hours in an 8-hour

workday for 30 minutes at a time. Dr. Grossman also opined Plaintiff could “lift and carry 20 pounds

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occasionally and 10 pounds frequently” while the state consultant, Dr. Han, recommended a limit of

“occasionally and frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds.” [AR 31]

Finally, very little weight was given to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr.

Spoonamore, who opined Plaintiff “could not sit for more than 15 minutes at a time or stand for longer

than 10 minutes” because the limitations were contradicted by other sources occurring after Dr.

Spoonamore’s evaluation. In addition, his limitations were intended to be temporary for worker’s

compensation purposes. [AR 31] 

After considering all the evidence, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform past

relevant work as a general duty nurse, private nurse or office nurse because Plaintiff did not have the

residual functional capacity to perform the full range of unskilled light work. [AR 32-33] 

Accordingly, at step five of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was able

to make an adjustment to other work in the economy, namely representative unskilled, sedentary

occupations such as charge account clerk, button assembler and order clerk for food and beverage. 

[AR at 33] As a result, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled during the time of her alleged onset

date - June 3, 2003 until December 31, 2008 - the date she was last insured. [AR at 33]

3. Analysis 

a. Plaintiff’s Contentions

Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of her examining and treating

physicians. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not properly weigh the opinions of: (1)

examining physician Dr. Thomas Jackson who stated Plaintiff could not engage in prolonged standing

or sitting [ECF No. 17-1 at 3:5-7]; (2) examining physician Dr. Brian Grossman who opined Plaintiff

could stand and walk up to 4 hours in an 8-hour work day and sit up to 4 hours in an 8-hour work day

[ECF No. 17-1 at 6:8-12]; and (3) treating physician Dr. Mark Spoonamore who restricted Plaintiff

to sitting no more than 15 minutes and standing no more than 10 minutes without lying down in

addition to a lifting limitation of no more than 5 pounds. [ECF No. 17-1 at 10:6-11.] Plaintiff asks the

Court to reverse the ALJ’s decision and award benefits. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests remand

so that the ALJ may apply different weights to the opinions of her examining and treating physicians.

B. Defendant’s Opposition

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Defendant argues substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity

Determination. Specifically, Defendant contends the ALJ applied the proper weight and

consideration to the opinions of Plaintiff’s examining and treating physicians and rejected

contradictory limitations where appropriate. [ECF No. 20-1 at pp. 6-9] 

C. Weight of Treating Physician’s Opinion 2

1. Dr. Jackson (Examining Physician) 

The opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a

nonexamining physician.” See Lester v. Chater, 81 F. 3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly,

Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of one of Plaintiff’s examining

physicians for the opinions of the state medical consultant and state medical expert, by determining

Plaintiff “can sit for six hours in an 8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a time with the ability to change

her position.” [ECF No. 17-1 at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly determined

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity to include six hours of sitting when Plaintiff’s examining

physician, Dr. Jackson, stated Plaintiff should be precluded from “prolonged” sitting or standing. [AR

1172] Plaintiff advises the Court that Social Security Ruling 83-12 construes six hours of standing,

sitting or walking to be prolonged. 

In opposition, Defendant argues Dr. Jackson’s report did not define the word “prolonged” or

provide a numerical equivalent for the word, and therefore urges the Court to refrain from importing

a Social Security definition into material intended for use in a worker’s compensation context. [ECF

No. 20-1 at p.6.] 

Terminology used in California worker’s compensation claims is not equivalent to terminology

used in Social Security disability cases. See Booth v. Barnhart, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104 (C.D. Cal.

2002)(citing Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1996); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health &

Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). For example, in Desrosiers, the Ninth Circuit

found error where the ALJ improperly equated the worker’s compensation preclusion from heavy

2

Title II distinguishes among the opinions of certain physicians and assigns less weight to those doctors

that do not treat or examine the claimant at issue: “(1) those who treat the clamaint (treating physicians); (2)

those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine

nor treat the clamant (nonexamining physicians).”Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

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work with a Social Security preclusion from heavy lifting, explaining that the categories of work under

Social Security “are measured quite differently” from those in the worker’s compensation system. 

Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 576. Here, the term “prolonged” as used by Dr. Jackson must be given its

common meaning; “to lengthen in time.” See Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 941 (9th ed.

1983). The Ninth Circuit has made it clear that a term of art used in the worker’s compensation

system is not interchangeable with a seemingly similar term used in the Social Security context. The

ALJ had no obligation to attempt to translate the word “prolonged” into the language of Social

Security. See Booth, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 ([T]he ALJ’s decision need not contain an explicit

‘translation’....”). Moreover, because Dr. Jackson’s report was written for worker’s compensation

purposes, there is no evidence to suggest Dr. Jackson knew about or intended to impose a 6-hour

limitation on Plaintiff’s sitting and standing in accordance with Social Security Ruling 83-12. A

review of Dr. Jackson’s report reveals he made no time-limit recommendations in his December 29,

2008 report.

The ALJ explained in his decision that “Dr. Jackson opined the claimant could do work above

the light exertion level and would be precluded from prolonged sitting and prolonged stationary

standing” [AR 29] As a result, he afforded some weight to this opinion. The ALJ’s consideration

of Dr. Jackson’s opinion is reflected in the exception to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity which

states: “she can sit for six hours in an 8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a time with the ability to

change her position.” [AR 11] See Booth, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (“The ALJ must evaluate medical

opinions couched in state worker’s compensation terminology just as he or she would evaluate any

other medical opinion.”) The lower extremity exception to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity also

incorporates the opinion of state medical expert, Dr. Arthur Lorber, who found Plaintiff “can stand

and walk for two hours in an 8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a time; she can sit for six hours in an

8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a time after which she could stand at her workstation and move

around or stand and walk....” [AR at 30] In according greater weight to Dr. Lorber, the ALJ explained

that “time restraints and the limitations pertaining to the lower extremities described by Dr. Lorber

are appropriate given the claimant’s radiculopathy, her weight, and her symptoms associated with the

diabetes mellitus.” [AR at 30, AR 44-45, AR 1162-66, 1172] Although the contrary opinion of a non-

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examining medical expert does not by itself constitute a specific legitimate reason for rejecting an

examining physician’s opinion, it may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other

independent evidence in the record. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). IT IS

THEREFORE RECOMMENDED the Court find the ALJ provided legitimate reasons supported

by substantial evidence in the record to afford some weight to the opinion of Dr. Jackson, an

examining physician of Plaintiff.

2. Dr. Grossman (Examining physician)

Plaintiff argues that, although the ALJ provided an explanation for assigning less weight to

the opinion of Dr. Grossman, the reasons given are neither specific nor legitimate because the ALJ

used the phrase “[f]or the reasons discussed above” in his written decision. Plaintiff further argues

the ALJ described Dr. Grossman’s opinion as excessive when Dr. Grossman’s opinion is both more

and less restrictive than the opinions of the state medical expert, Dr. Lorber, and the state medical

consultant, Dr. Han. [17-1 at p. 7.] Defendant argues the ALJ has the authority to discount the opinion

of an examining physician where the opinion is contradicted by the record. Specifically, Defendant

argues the ALJ’s decision as to Plaintiff’s sitting capacity, which states she can sit for six hours in an

8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a time with the ability to change her position, is consistent with the

medical evidence and therefore must be upheld. [20-1 at p.8.] 

If an examining physician’s opinion is contradicted by another physician’s opinion, an ALJ

must provide specific and legitimate reasons to reject it. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th

Cir. 2005). In the ALJ’s written decision he explained that he gave limited weight to the report of Dr.

Grossman, Plaintiff’s qualified medical examiner for worker’s compensation purposes, because the

report conflicted with the residual functional capacities recommended by the state consultant and state

medical expert. [AR 31] For example, Dr. Grossman indicated Plaintiff could “stand and/or walk for

less than four-hours in an 8 hour workday” while the state medical expert, Dr. Lorber, opined Plaintiff

could stand and walk for two hours in an 8-hour workday for 30 minutes at a time. Dr. Grossman also

opined Plaintiff could “lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently” while the state

consultant, Dr. Han, recommended a limit of “occasionally and frequently lift and/or carry 10

pounds.” [AR 31] After a comparison of the standing/walking and lifting capacities, it is clear why

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the ALJ described Dr. Grossman’s opinion as excessive: the upper limits of the standing/walking and

lifting capacities Dr. Grossman recommended exceed those of the state medical expert and the state

medical consultant. Nevertheless, the opinions of non-examining physicians like Drs. Lorber and Han

cannot by themselves constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of an

examining physician unless the opinions are consistent with and supported by other independent

evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169

F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the ALJ explained that he “struck a balance between the opinions of the State agent and

the medical expert” because the medical record indicates the “time restraints and the limitations

pertaining to the lower extremities described by Dr. Lorber are appropriate given the claimant’s

radiculopathy, her weight, and her symptoms associated with the diabetes mellitus.” [AR at 30, 31;

see also AR 942-50, AR 1289, 161-62, 1284-85] Similarly, the ALJ found the “lifting limitations

identified by Dr. Han are most appropriate given the ongoing back symptoms” documented in the

medical record. [AR 30; see also AR 1242, 1251, 1258, 1266, 1346-50, 1379-71, 1446, 1672-77] The

ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical evidence and the ALJ’s reasonable

interpretation of the evidence must not be second-guessed. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). IT IS THEREFORE

RECOMMENDED that the Court find the ALJ properly applied less weight to the opinion of Dr.

Grossman for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence.

3. Dr. Spoonamore (Treating Physician)

The opinions of treating physicians are generally given greater weight than those of other

physicians because of the treating physicians' intimate knowledge of the claimant's condition. 

Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, in order to reject the opinion

of a treating physician, the ALJ is required to show specific and legitimate reasons based on

substantial evidence in the record. Id.; see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

If the opinion is uncontroverted, the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting such

testimony. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285,

Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989). However, where the ALJ fails to provide

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adequate reasons for rejecting the treating physician's opinion, the court will credit the treating

physician's opinion as a matter of law. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).

As explained above, in order to reject the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ is required

to show specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence from the record. Here, the ALJ

explained his reasoning as follows:“At another time, ... [Dr. Spoonamore] stated the claimant could

not sit for more than 15 minutes at a time or stand for longer than 10 minutes....These restrictions are

contradicted by other sources. In addition, the opinion is also made before the claimant was

permanent and stationary and was intended as temporary limitations for workers’ compensation

purposes. Therefore the opinion is given very little weight.”

While acknowledging that contradicted treating sources are not entitled to controlling weight,

Plaintiff nevertheless argues the ALJ should not have afforded “very little weight” to the February 7,

2007 report of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Spoonamore. Specifically, Plaintiff contends Dr.

Spoonamore’s report was not meant to be temporary in nature and instead indicates Plaintiff’s

permanent disability status. [ECF No. 17-1 at p. 11.] Defendant argues Plaintiff’s interpretation of Dr.

Spoonamore’s report is flawed in that Dr. Spoonamore’s opinion clearly states Plaintiff’s disability

status as “temporarily totally disabled.” In addition, Defendant notes Dr. Spoonamore’s opinion is

contradicted by Plaintiff’s own examining physicians in medical reports issued both before and after

the February 7, 2007 report. [ECF No. 20-1 at pp. 8-9.] 

The Court has reviewed Dr. Spoonamore’s evaluation and confirmed that the February 7, 2007

report clearly states Plaintiff’s disability status as “total temporary disability for two months.” [AR

902] By its own language, Dr. Spoonamore’s report was only intended to cover a temporary twomonth period. The ALJ explained this view in his decision stating: “The term “temporarily totally

disabled’ is used in worker’s compensation law to indicate a worker is unable to return to work at a

certain moment or period in time; or that the employer is unable to accommodate the claimant’s ability

to perform modified work....” [AR 31] (italics added). Moreover, despite the ALJ’s erroneous

assertion in his decision that Dr. Spoonamore’s report was issued before Plaintiff was considered

“permanent and stationary” for purposes of worker’s compensation, it is clear from the entire decision

that the ALJ also considered the medical opinions of Plaintiff’s own examining physicians which are

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dated before and after Dr. Spoonamore’s February 7, 2007 report and the ALJ decided those opinions

were a more accurate assessment of Plaintiff’s overall capabilities. See Magallanes v. Bown, 881 F.2d

747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (The treating physician’s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as

to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.”) 

Specifically, the ALJ referred to the capacities cited in Dr. Grossman’s May 4, 2006 report

[AR 948] and Dr. Jackson’s December 29, 2008 report [AR 1172] in his decision, both of which

indicate Plaintiff had the capacity to stand and sit for much longer than the brief 10-15 minute period

recommended by Dr. Spoonamore.3

 The weight given a treating physician’s opinion depends on

whether it is supported by sufficient medical data and is consistent with other evidence in the record. 

See 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(2). Contrary opinions of examining physicians may serve as additional

specific and legitimate reasons for assigning a lower weight to the opinion of a treating physician. See

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff further argues the ALJ should have considered others factors in addition to

contradictory medical sources before assigning very little weight to Dr. Spoonamore’s opinion as

instructed by 20 C.F.R. section 404.1527(d)(2). Other factors the ALJ could have considered include:

supportability of the opinion, consistency with the record as a whole, and the nature and extent of the

treatment relationship. 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(3)-(6). In fact, the ALJ did consider these additional

factors as noted in his written decision when he explained the 10-to-15 minute limitation was not

supported by the record as a whole, was intended for worker’s compensation purposes and reflected

a temporary treatment option. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court find the ALJ

provided specific reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record to apply very little weight

to the temporary opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Spoonamore.

///

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3

Dr. Grossman indicated Plaintiff could “stand and/or walk for less than four-hours in an 8

hour workday” [AR 948] Dr. Jackson stated Plaintiff should be precluded from “prolonged” sitting

or standing. [AR 1172]

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IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons explained above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court DENY

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and GRANT the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary

judgment.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 21, 2012, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the court

and served on all parties no later than December 5, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may result in waiver of the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 7, 2012

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court

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