Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00757/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00757-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAY STEWART MILLER,

NO. CIV. S-00-757 LKK/GGH P

Petitioner,

v.

O R D E R

CAL TERHUNE, et al,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, has

filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local

General Order No. 262. 

This action proceeds from petitioner’s second amended petition

filed May 21, 2002. The second amended petition raised two claims:

jury instruction error and ineffective assistance of counsel

(“IAC”) based on the failure to present evidence of voluntary

intoxication. On April 16, 2003 the magistrate judge assigned to

this case recommended that the petition be denied. On September

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10, 2003, this court declined to adopt the findings and

recommendations with respect to petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim and remanded the matter for an evidentiary

hearing. See September 10, 2003 Order.

An evidentiary hearing was held on November 8, 2004 and

November 23, 2004. On November 7, 2006, the magistrate judge filed

findings and recommendations which were served on the parties. The

magistrate judge recommended that the petition be denied.

Petitioner filed timely objections. 

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C)

and Local Rule 72-304, the court has conducted a de novo review of

this case. Having carefully reviewed the file, the court declines

to adopt the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and

makes the following determination based on the record.

I.

BACKGROUND 

A. Facts of the Case

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in the 1997

shooting death of his friend, Steven Faddis. The court adopts the

factual summary as set forth in the opinion of the California Court

of Appeal:

The defendant and Steven Faddis were long time friends. On

September 25, 1996, the defendant hosted a gathering at his

house, celebrating Faddis’ release from prison. In attendance

were Faddis, the defendant, and others. Kassy Goold, Faddis’

girlfriend arrived around 4 p.m. She and Faddis were in the

process of breaking off their relationship. Everyone was

drinking. Everyone except Goold, Faddis, and the defendant

left around 8 p.m. 

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Later that night, Goold and the defendant were in the

livingroom discussing Goold’s breakup with Faddis. Goold told

the defendant she was breaking up with Faddis because her

family, in particular her brother, disapproved of the

relationship. Faddis threatened to kill Goold’s brother. He

shoved Goold onto the couch with his finger, then grabbed her

by the hair and slammed her through the glass coffee table.

The defendant intervened. During the defendant’s trial

testimony, he claimed Faddis punched him and then left the

premises through the front door.

According to the defendant’s testimony, he grabbed the rifle

and some ammunition and followed Faddis out the front door.

Although the defendant did not see or hear anyone other than

Faddis outside, he believed Goold was outside because he saw

something underneath the truck. In fact, Goold was hiding

inside the house.

The defendant walked down the steps of his porch and yelled

at Faddis to get off his property. Faddis yelled and came

towards him. The defendant fired a shot at Faddis’ shoulder

but missed. Faddis continued to walk toward the defendant and

threatened him. The defendant then aimed at the left side of

Faddis’ chest and shot again. The defendant claimed he was

only trying to disable Faddis, but was not trying to kill

him. After shooting Faddis, the defendant called 911 and

began administering CPR until medical personnel arrived.

The defense theory was self-defense. Evidence was presented

that Faddis was exceptionally muscular and violent and had a

history of abusing women. His ex-wife testified he had given

her broken ribs, a collapsed lung, and head injuries during

the course of their relationship.

Answer, Ex. B, pp. 2-3. The parties do not dispute that

petitioner’s trial counsel stipulated that his blood alcohol level

was .30 approximately three hours after the shooting. Reporter’s

Transcript (“RT”) 217. The jury was instructed on both second

degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. A jury instruction on

the lessor included offense of involuntary manslaughter was not

given. Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and his

conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal for the

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1

 The summary of the evidence is adopted from the parties’

papers and after careful review of the record. 

2

 Respondent did not present an expert on petitioner’s state

of intoxication. Accordingly, this court adopts the finding of the

magistrate judge that “in matters of medical expertise . . .the

expert’s testimony will be the factual finding of the court.”

Findings and Recommendations at 13: 6-8.

4

Third District on August 24, 1999 (Blease, J., dissenting). 

The only claim before the court is petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim. Petitioner argues that his

trial counsel performed unreasonably and prejudicially in failing

to investigate and develop evidence of petitioner’s extreme

intoxication in order to persuade the jury that he did not have the

requisite intent to murder Steve Faddis. 

Petitioner first raised his failure to investigate allegations

in his habeas petition to the California Supreme Court, see

Respondent’s Answer, Exh. E, at 10-11, which was rejected by

postcard denial on April 17, 2002. See Resp'ts Answer, Exh. F.

B. Summary of Evidentiary Hearing 

An evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s IAC claim was held on

November 8, 2004 and November 23, 2004. What follows is a brief

overview of the evidence presented.1

1. Dr. Gregory Sokolov 2

Dr. Gregory Sokolov, M.D., testified as an expert as to

alcohol’s effect on the brain and related mental states. Dr.

Sokolov testified that a blood alcohol level (“BAC”) of .30 is

clinically significant. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript (“EH”) at

20. With this BAC, it is physiologically possible for a person to

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be walking and talking, yet suffer significant cognitive

impairment. EH 21. A person’s ability to reason, choose a course

of action, and formulate a plan would be affected in significant

ways. EH 24. A person’s ability to reason – including

understanding cause and effect, the ability to draw inferences from

facts, and anticipation of likely consequences of actions – would

also be significantly affected. EH 24. These are all executive

brain functions. EH 24-25.

Dr. Sokolov testified that petitioner’s BAC of .30 at 2:25

a.m. indicated a likely BAC between .33 and .34 at the time of the

shooting. EH 31. This qualified as “extreme alcohol

intoxication,” approaching the level at which coma and death can

occur. EH 32-33. Dr. Sokolov also testified that there is not

always a correlation between the degree of physical impairment and

the degree of mental impairment. EH 26. In a person who is highly

alcohol tolerant, there may be a disconnect between the degree of

visible physical impairments and the degree of mental impairment.

EH 30. 

As applied to petitioner, Dr. Sokolov testified that although

petitioner was able to speak, walk and physically function, it does

not follow that his mental functioning was similarly intact. EH 33,

72. Petitioner’s level of intoxication significantly affected his

perceptions of sights and sounds, his ability to interpret data,

and his general ability to accurately understand what was going on

around him. EH 33-35. Dr. Sokolov also testified that

petitioner’s ability to weigh choices and anticipate the

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consequences of his actions was also significantly impaired. EH

34. 

It was Dr. Sokolov’s opinion that petitioner’s intoxication

precluded him from forming an intent to kill. EH 39. Dr. Sokolov

reasoned that with petitioner’s BAC, petitioner was unable to

accurately perceive whether his life or Ms. Goold’s life was in

danger and was also unable to cognitively process that a shot to

the chest could be lethal. EH 37. He also concluded that

petitioner’s ability to appreciate the cause and effect

relationship (between shooting and killing) was significantly

impaired. EH 38. Dr. Sokolov believed that petitioner’s statement

that he hadn’t meant to kill Faddis was consistent with his state

of inebriation. EH 39. 

Dr. Sokolov testified in detail about how the cognitive

effects of intoxication explain, medically, how petitioner could

not have intended to kill despite circumstances which would support

an inference of such intent in a sober person. EH 39-41.

Accordingly, it is credible that petitioner could have taken

actions facially suggestive of specific intent to kill, without

actually intending anything more than to "stop" a situation out of

control. Id.

Dr. Sokolov also testified that had he been contacted by

petitioner’s trial counsel and had reviewed the same material

(police reports, petitioner’s statements, blood alcohol test

results, etc.), he would have opined that petitioner acted without

specific intent to kill, without realizing that his actions could

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kill Faddis, and with the subjective belief that he was acting to

save his own life and/or that of Ms. Goold. EH 47-47. 

2. Testimony of Mark Cibula, Esq. 

Mr. Cibula represented petitioner at trial. At the time, he

had been a lawyer for less than two years and had never represented

a client charged with murder. EH 85-88. He had also never used

an expert on the issue of intent or mental state. EH 88. He had

handled several drunk driving cases, and was familiar with the type

of blood alcohol evidence typically at issue in that context. EH

98-99.

Mr. Cibula remembered that petitioner confessed to the

shooting and that he stated that he had not meant to kill Faddis.

EH 95. He also remembered that petitioner asserted that he was

acting in self-defense and that petitioner was intoxicated. EH 96-

97. Mr. Cibula recalls receiving a toxicology report which showed

petitioner’s BAC. EH 97. 

Petitioner informed his attorneys that he wanted to pursue a

theory of self-defense. EH 102. Petitioner was adamant that he

had not intended to kill Faddis. EH 103. Mr. Cibula wrote the

motion to set aside the charges pursuant to California Penal Code

§ 995, based on the preliminary hearing testimony. EH 104-015.

In addition to self-defense, the following theories were asserted

in the motion: sudden quarrel or heat of passion; provocation;

imperfect self-defense; and intoxication. Id. Mr. Cibula did not

recall when he and his co-counsel decided to abandon the voluntary

intoxication defense. EH 106. They did not request a jury

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instruction on voluntary intoxication. EH 109.

Prior to trial, Mr. Cibula and his co-counsel met with a

psychologist, Dr. Marilyn Wooley. EH 119. Cibula did not recall

any of the conversation, but assumes that they would have discussed

blood alcohol issues. EH 110, 123-124. Dr. Wooley did not

identify any mental state issues. EH 121. Mr. Cibula did not ask

Dr. Wooley for a referral to someone who specialized in alcoholrelated issues, EH 134, and did not utilize available DUI-related

resources to locate an alcohol expert. Id. The only expert witness

presented by the defense at trial was a pathologist, Dr. Sharon Van

Meter, who testified regarding bullet trajectory issues. RT

390-421.

Mr. Cibula testified that he did not recall the specific

reasons that he had for not presenting evidence of petitioner’s

blood alcohol level. EH 131. He did recall clearly that

petitioner was adamant about having acted in self-defense. EH 101,

126, 127, 129, 131. Mr. Cibula also recalls feeling that

emphasizing petitioner’s intoxication may have been inconsistent

with a theory of self-defense. EH 145-146.

3. Testimony of Ronald McIver, Esq.

Mr. McIver was co-counsel with Mr. Cibula at petitioner’s

trial. He had tried three prior homicide cases, one of which was

a capital case. EH 174. He had never retained an expert on how

blood alcohol levels affect a client’s state of mind. EH 175.

Although Mr. McIver was more experienced than Mr. Cibula, he did

not consider himself to be “senior” or “lead” counsel. EH 175-176.

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Mr. McIver would have recognized that at the time of the

petitioner’s case, a .30 BAC was a "high blood alcohol level." EH

180. He was aware of petitioner's BAC test results. Id. Mr. McIver

did not recall when or why he and Mr. Cibula decided to not pursue

a defense of voluntary intoxication. EH 184. He also did not

recall stipulating to the petitioner’s blood alcohol level, or

discussing with Mr. Cibula the pros and cons of such a stipulation.

EH 193-194. 

He also remembered consulting Dr. Wooley, but cannot remember

the substance of their discussion. He assumes they discussed the

issue of intoxication. EH 184. Mr. McIver did not recall thinking

about, or discussing with Mr. Cibula, how evidence of intoxication

might affect the jury’s reasoning as to malice and intent. EH 186.

He also did not remember discussing how the jury might use

intoxication evidence in assessing reasonablesnss in the selfdefense context. EH 187. 

Mr. McIver did not consult a medical doctor or forensic

toxicologist regarding the effects of alcohol on petitioner. EH

185. Nor did either counsel consult any mental health professional

whose expertise was in the area of alcohol abuse or intoxication.

Id. Nor was any expert consulted on the question of whether a

person's blood alcohol level would necessarily affect physical and

cognitive functioning to the same degree. EH 206-207. Finally,

counsel never consulted any scientific literature, practice

materials or other sources of information on the issue of alcohol’s

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3 The parties stipulated that Dr. Wooley’s declaration would

be accepted as testimony. Dr. Wooley’s declaration was filed on

November 8, 2004.

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effect on the formation of intent. EH 207-208.

4. Testimony of Dr. Marilyn Wooley3

Dr. Wooley has no memory of consulting on this case. She has

no files or materials related to the case. Dr. Wooley's areas of

expertise are child sexual and physical abuse, spousal abuse, child

custody, eating disorders and trauma-related stress management.

In her declaration she stated: 

I was not a substance abuse specialist at the time of the

[case] meeting. As among clinical psychologists and

comparable mental health professionals, I was not at the time

an expert in the particular effects of alcohol on the brain

and its functioning. 

II.

Standard of Review 

Petitioner’s federal petition was filed after the effective

date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), and accordingly, the standard of review set forth in the

AEDPA applies in the instant case. Generally, the AEDPA mandates

that federal courts defer to the “state court's determination of

the federal issues unless that determination is contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citations omitted).

“For claims for which no adjudication on the merits in state

court was possible . . . AEDPA's standard of review does not

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apply.” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002).

This includes claims such as petitioner’s IAC claim, in which the

“state courts could not have made a proper determination on the

merits” because the evidence upon which adjudication must be based

was adduced for the first time at a federal evidentiary hearing.

Id. Here, as in Killen, there is no state court factual finding

to which deference might apply under 28 U.S.S. §§ 2254 (d)(2) or

(e)(1). 

There is also no state court decision addressing questions of

law, which would subject the claim to a reasonblness review

pursuant to section 2253(d)(1) of AEDPA. Kesser v. Cambra, 392

F.3d 327, 334-35 (9th Cir. 2004) (revered on other grounds by

Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2006). In short, none of

the limitations on relief set forth in § 2254 apply to this court’s

review of petitioner’s IAC claim regarding the failure to

investigate and develop evidence of intoxication. 

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion 

As a threshold matter, the magistrate judge concluded that

during the evidentiary hearing and in post-hearing briefing,

“petitioner raised a new ineffective assistance of counsel claim

that is not exhausted.” See Findings and Recommendations (“F&Rs”)

filed November 2, 2006 at 6:16. As this court reads the second

amended petition, as well as the F&Rs issued on April 16, 2003, and

this court’s remand order, petitioner is not seeking to raise new,

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4 It is common for an IAC claim to have several components.

Prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed

cumulatively. See Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438-39 (9th Cir.

1995).

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unexhausted claims, rather, he is making new arguments with respect

to his original IAC claim. 

 As previously mentioned, petitioner first raised this IAC

claim in his habeas petition to the California Supreme Court, see

Respondent’s Answer, Exh. E, at 10-11, which was rejected by

postcard denial. See Respondent’s Answer, Exh. F. He asserted a

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel on the grounds that his counsel failed to investigate,

develop and present voluntary intoxication evidence. The

petitioner is not now alleging new claims, rather, he is presenting

additional theories encompassed within his original IAC claim.

Moreover, both the magistrate judge and this court have, on

previous occasions, recognized the scope of petitioner’s IAC claim.

In the first findings and recommendations, filed on April 16,

2003, the magistrate judge discussed the two claims presented by

petitioner, the jury instruction error claim and the IAC claim.

As explained by the magistrate judge, the essence of the IAC claim

involved several allegations, namely, that counsel was ineffective

for failing to investigate, develop and present evidence of

intoxication on the issue of intent. The magistrate judge did not

treat the separate allegations as separate claims.4 Instead, the

magistrate judge discussed the various components of the IAC claim,

such as the failure to request an involuntary manslaughter

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instruction, and the failure to investigate and present a defense

of voluntary intoxication. See F&Rs filed April 16, 2003 at 15.

The magistrate judge did not parse out each allegation and classify

them as separate claims. There is no reason to do so now. 

This court’s remand order also recognized that the IAC claim

contained several allegations. The remand order provided in part,

“[p]etitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective for, inter

alia, failing to investigate and present a defense based on

voluntary intoxication.” September 10, 2003 Order at 2:8-10

(emphasis added). The use of the words “inter alia” suggests that

there were several allegations within the IAC claim. In remanding

the case for an evidentiary hearing, this court did not intend for

its order to be read as limiting the arguments that petitioner

could raise regarding potential uses of intoxication evidence.

Rather, the court’s remand order specifically called for an

evidentiary hearing so that new facts could be ascertained. The

court’s remand order provided: 

[B]y claiming that trial counsel failed to investigate the

effects of petitioner’s high blood alcohol level, petitioner

raises the possibility that there are facts not in the record

that might show that a voluntary intoxication defense was

viable – perhaps even more viable than an ordinary selfdefense theory.

September 10, 2003 Order at 3:16-21. The matter was referred back

with the express purpose allowing petitioner to “develop . . .

facts not present in the record.” Id. at 4:7. By allowing

petitioner the opportunity to develop new facts, it follows that

the court was also allowing petitioner the opportunity to develop

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new arguments based on those facts. 

In short, the court finds that the magistrate judge has

misconstrued the scope of petitioner’s IAC claim. Petitioner

raised the same IAC claim before the state court and this court,

namely, that counsel acted unreasonably and prejudicially in

failing to investigate, develop and present intoxication evidence.

Nothing in the evidentiary hearing and related briefing suggests

that petitioner is now trying to impermissibly expand that claim

to encompass other claims for relief. Rather, petitioner used the

facts obtained at the evidentiary hearing to raise additional

arguments to support his IAC claim. Petitioner’s supplemental

arguments about the possible use of intoxication evidence are new

theories about the evidence and are not new theories of

constitutional injury. 

It is well settled that new factual allegations do not render

a claim unexhausted unless they "fundamentally alter the legal

claim already considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. Hillery,

474 U.S. 254, 258-260 (1986)(finding that supplemental extra-record

evidence does not require further exhaustion when alleged

constitutional violation is unchanged). Here, petitioner’s core

IAC claim has not changed. Accordingly, there is no exhaustion

problem.

B. The Merits of Petitioner’s IAC claim

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right

to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance

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of counsel, petitioner must show: 1) his attorney's performance

was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards; and 2)

there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the results would have been different. Id.

at 692. Strickland defines a reasonable probability as ‘a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ”

Id. For the reasons discussed herein, the court declines to adopt

the recommendation that petitioner’s IAC claim be denied. 

1. The “Unconsciousness Defense” 

As an initial matter, the magistrate judge limits his

discussion of the IAC claim to the “unconsciousness defense.” As

the magistrate judge explains, “to succeed on [his IAC] claim,

petitioner must demonstrate that counsel acted unreasonably in

failing to pursue the unconsciousness defense.” Nov. 2, 2006 F&

Rs at 11:14-15. The magistrate judge concludes that petitioner’s

level of impairment did not rise to the level of unconsciousness

and therefore, it was reasonable for trial counsel to not argue

intoxication. “The total picture simply does not permit a finding

of legal unconsciousness.” Id. at 21:22-23. This conclusion

misconstrues both the law with respect to intoxication and the

evidence ascertained at the evidentiary hearing. 

I begin by noting that the issue for the jury was not whether

petitioner was “unconscious,” but whether he harbored malice and/or

intended to kill. Under California law, evidence that a defendant

was unconscious is sufficient but not necessary to negate intent:

The critical factor in distinguishing the degrees of a

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 The Ray decision was overruled in 2000 by People v.

Blakeley, 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 (2000). However, Ray was the law at

the time of petitioner’s trial. 

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homicide is thus the perpetrator's mental state. If a

diminished capacity renders him incapable of entertaining

either malice or an intent to kill, then his offense is

mitigated to a lesser crime. Although a finding that the

perpetrator was unconscious would establish the ultimate

facts that the perpetrator lacked both the ability to

entertain malice and an intent to kill, the absence of either

or both of such may nevertheless be found even though the

perpetrator's mental state had not deteriorated into

unconsciousness. 

People v. Ray, 14 Cal.3d 20, 28 (1975).5 At the time of

petitioner’s trial, neither the statute governing voluntary

intoxication evidence nor the CALJIC jury instructions suggest that

a defendant must be rendered “unconscious” in order to negate

intent. Voluntary intoxication is not a true defense. Rather,

intoxication is a species of mental state evidence which, in a

homicide case, can show that the defendant "did not in fact form

the intent unlawfully to kill (i.e., did not have malice

aforethought)." People v. Saille, 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1117

(1991)(emphasis in original) (citation omitted) . 

The magistrate judge relies on People v. Ochoa, in which the

California Supreme Court stated that “when a person renders himself

or herself unconscious through voluntary intoxication and kills in

that state, the killing is attributed to his or her negligence in

self-intoxicating to that point, and is treated as involuntary

manslaughter.” People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal.4th 353, 423 (1998). The

case does not, however, hold that establishing unconsciousness is

a necessary prerequisite to negating intent. Whether or not

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petitioner was unconscious has no bearing on the likely success of

a defense based on intoxication. Complete impairment is not needed

for alcohol to render a person incapable of forming the requisite

mens rea. 

Second, Dr. Sokolov, petitioner’s expert on the effects of

intoxication, testified that petitioner’s ability to physically

function did not therefore mean that his cognitive abilities were

similarly intact. See EH 33, 72. As petitioner explains: 

The diverging levels of physical and cognitive impairment

that Mr. Miller exhibited on the night of the shooting are to

some degree, petitioner acknowledges, counter-intuitive. That

is precisely why expert testimony was needed at the trial.

Without education about the effects of alcohol on the brain,

the jury was all too willing to follow the prosecutor's lead

in attributing to Mr. Miller the cognitive processes of a

sober person.

Pet'rs post-hearing br. at 41. As discussed infra, Dr. Sokolov

testified extensively about how the state of petitioner’s memory

was not inconsistent with intoxication. It cannot be said that

simply because petitioner could recollect certain parts of the

night, that he was sober enough to form intent. Similarly, just

because petitioner was able to physically function does not also

mean that petitioner was able to cognitively function. As

petitioner suggests, these inconsistencies are exactly why expert

testimony would have been helpful. 

For these reasons, the court cannot adopt the recommendation

that since petitioner’s level of impairment did not rise to the

level of unconsciousness, it was reasonable for trial counsel to

not investigate petitioner’s level of intoxication. 

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6

 To be clear, the jury was instructed on murder in the

second degree, and voluntary manslaughter. A jury instruction on

the lessor included offense of involuntary manslaughter was not

given. 

7

 Involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing under

circumstances which make it nonetheless unlawful. CALJIC 8.45 (6th

ed. 1996) (unlawful killing without malice and without intent to

kill is involuntary manslaughter).

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2. Relevant California Law at Time of Petitioner’s Trial

The magistrate judge concluded that “counsel could not have

been ineffective for not urging voluntary intoxication as a form

of voluntary manslaughter because at the time of his conviction

such was not legally possible.” F&Rs filed Nov. 2, 2006 at 7:16-

18. The magistrate judge explained that: “voluntary intoxication

could not reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter, as both require

an intent to kill at the time; but if intoxication could negate

that state of mind, the resulting crime would be, at most,

involuntary manslaughter.” Id. at 8:17-20 (citing to People v.

Saille, 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1116 (1991)). I cannot agree.

Petitioner is not arguing that the only cognizable theory of

IAC is one predicated on the possibility of an involuntary

manslaughter conviction.6 Petitioner concedes that involuntary

manslaughter should have been the primary theory at trial.

Evidence of intoxication could have negated malice and resulted in

a verdict no greater than involuntary manslaughter.7

Petitioner argues that as to acquittal, California law at the

time of his conviction was clear: “if this evidence [of

intoxication sufficient to negate malice] is believed, the only

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8 The court notes that the People v. Blakeley, 23 Cal. 4th

82 (2000), discussed at length by the magistrate judge, was decided

well after petitioner was convicted and thus, is not pertinent.

It is well established that an IAC claim must be evaluated in light

of the state of the law at the time of the petitioner’s trial.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. An attorney is only charged with

knowing the law as it existed at the time the action or inaction

was taken. Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994).

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supportable verdict would be involuntary manslaughter or an

acquittal.” Sallie, 54 Cal. 3d at 1116-1117 (emphasis added).

The Sallie court explained:

A defendant . . . is . . . free to show that because of his

mental illness or voluntary intoxication, he did not in fact

form the intent unlawfully to kill (i.e., did not have malice

aforethought). In a murder case, if this evidence is

believed, the only supportable verdict would be involuntary

manslaughter or an acquittal. If such a showing gives rise

to a reasonable doubt, the killing (assuming there is no

implied malice) can be no greater than involuntary

manslaughter. 

Saille, 54 Cal.3d at 1117 (internal citations omitted). 

In short, the law at the time of petitioner’s trial was

settled: evidence of voluntary intoxication in a homicide case

could be admitted to show that the defendant did not form the

intent to kill. Sallie, at 1117.8 

Moreover, evidence of intoxication would also be relevant to

a defense theory of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect selfdefense. Even if the jury did not find that petitioner’s

intoxication negated the formation of intent, the evidence of

cognitive impairment could have lead to a finding that petitioner

genuinely perceived Faddis to pose an imminent life-threatening

danger. To be exculpated on a theory of imperfect self-defense,

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9

 Voluntary manslaughter encompasses intentional killing,

under circumstances which nonetheless negate malice. People v.

Rios, 23 Cal.4th 450, 454 (2000) (intentional but non-malicious

killing is voluntary manslaughter); CALJIC 8.40 (6th ed. 1996)

(every person who unlawfully kills without malice but with intent

to kill is guilty of voluntary manslaughter).

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a trier of fact must find that the defendant killed another person

because the defendant actually -- but unreasonably -- believed he

was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. People v.

Flannel, 25 Cal.3d 668, 674 (1979). The defendant is deemed to

have acted without malice and thus can be convicted of no crime

greater than voluntary manslaughter.9 In re Christian S., 7

Cal.4th 768, 872 (1994). 

In sum, at the time of petitioner’s trial, evidence of

intoxication would have been admissible and relevant to defense

theories based both on involuntary and voluntary manslaughter. 

3. Whether Trial Counsel’s Performance was Deficient

The central issue before the court is whether petitioner’s

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when they failed to

investigate and present evidence as to how petitioner’s level of

intoxication likely affected his perceptions, intentions and

actions on the night of the shooting.

Under Strickland, the court determines first whether trial

counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;

Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). A counsel's

performance is deficient if, considering all the circumstances, it

falls below an objective standard of reasonableness measured under

prevailing professional norms. Id. Even if counsel’s decision

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“could be considered one of strategy, that does not render it

immune from attack - it must be a reasonable strategy.” Jones v.

Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 1997).

a. Failure to Investigate & Develop Evidence of Intoxication

While there is a “strong presumption that counsel's conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,”

and “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly

deferential,” Strickland at 689, defense counsel must, “at a

minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to make

informed decisions about how best to represent his client,” Sanders

v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in

original). Before a decision can be considered strategic under

Strickland, counsel must conduct a “thorough investigation.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000). 

With respect to counsel’s failure to investigate, the 

magistrate judge concluded: 

Counsel had at least explored the possibility of presenting

an intoxication theory to the jury by visiting a mental

status expert [Dr. Wooley]. While not a forensic alcohol

expert herself, this person certainly knew enough about

alcohol impairment to direct counsel to other witnesses if

she thought the facts required.

F&Rs filed Nov. 2, 2006 at 22. While it may be that bad facts are

bad facts, the record from the evidentiary hearing does not support

the conclusion that the trial counsel investigated the facts

surrounding petitioner’s intoxication. 

At the evidentiary hearing, both of petitioner’s trial

attorneys testified that they were aware of the fact that

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petitioner’s blood alcohol level was .30 three hours after the

shooting occurred. Nonetheless, as discussed supra, neither

counsel consulted a medical doctor or forensic toxicologist

regarding the effects of alcohol on petitioner. EH 185. Counsel

did not consult any mental health professional whose expertise was

in the area of alcohol abuse or intoxication. Id. Nor was any

expert consulted on the question whether a person's blood alcohol

level would necessarily affect physical and cognitive functioning

to the same degree. EH 206-207. Finally, counsel never consulted

any scientific literature, practice material or other sources on

the issue of alcohol’s effect on the formation of intent. EH 207-

208. This testimony is undisputed by respondent. 

Contrary to the finding of the magistrate judge, counsel’s

consultation with Dr. Wooley does not constitute “investigation”

as required by Strickland and related case law. It is undisputed

that Dr. Wooley was consulted for a casual, one-hour brain storming

session on possible psychological issues in the case. EH 119, PX

663, 664. Mr. Cibula testified that he did not recall any of the

substance of the conversation, but assumes that they would have

discussed the case broadly, including blood alcohol issues. He did

not recall anything that Dr. Wooley might have said specifically

about intoxication. EH 122. Dr. Wooley was also unable to recall

any opinion she rendered in the case. She stated in her

declaration that she has no specialized training in the effects of

alcohol on cognitive processes. At the time, Dr. Wooley's areas

of expertise were child sexual and physical abuse, spousal abuse,

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child custody, eating disorders and trauma-related stress

management. 

In light of this testimony, the court cannot agree with the

magistrate judge that the consultation with Dr. Wooley constitutes

exploring the possibility of presenting an intoxication defense.

Neither counsel nor Dr. Wooley remember what issues were discussed,

and Dr. Wooley conceded that she was not an expert on how alcohol

affects the brain, nor an expert on substance abuse. Accordingly,

counsel’s “consultation” with Dr. Wooley – who admits she is not

qualified to render an opinion on intoxication – cannot be

considered investigation upon which to rest a strategic decision.

See Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1999)

(finding that counsel performed unreasonably in failing to

investigate impact of brain damage due to pesticide exposure,

having consulted a medical doctor, psychiatrist, and psychologist

about the case but not a neurologist or toxicologist).

Nor can counsel’s consultation with Dr. Van Meter be

considered investigation into petitioner’s blood alcohol level.

Dr. Van Meter’s testimony was limited to bullet trajectory evidence

and counsel did not question Dr. Van Meter, either before trial or

on the stand, about intoxication. RT 390-425, EH 191. 

In sum, the record reflects that counsel failed to investigate

the effects of intoxication on petitioner. Accordingly, counsel

was in no position to make a reasoned or strategic decision

regarding the use of intoxication evidence. It is well settled

that under Strickland, “attorneys have considerable latitude to

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make strategic decisions about what investigations to conduct once

they have gathered sufficient evidence upon which to base their

tactical choices.” Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th

Cir. 2002). In the instant case, there is simply no indication

that defense counsel gathered any evidence upon which to base their

decision to not investigate or present evidence of intoxication.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 369(counsel must conduct a “thorough

investigation” before decision can be considered strategic under

Strickland); Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1457(citing United States v. Gray,

878 F.2d 702, 711 (3rd Cir. 1989)(finding that “...[c]ounsel can

hardly be said to have made strategic choice when he has not

obtained the facts on which a decision could be made.”).

The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provide guidance as to

the obligations of criminal defense attorneys in conducting an

investigation. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Williams,

529 U.S. at 396. The standards in effect at the time of

petitioner’s trial clearly described the defense lawyer's duty to

investigate:

(a) Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of

the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading

to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty

in the event of conviction. The investigation should include

efforts to secure information in the possession of the

prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to

investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or

statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or

the accused's stated desire to plead guilty. 

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Functions, Standard

4-4.1 (3d Ed.).

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When trial counsel is on notice that his client may have a

particular mental impairment relevant to the case, the Ninth

Circuit has repeatedly held that failure to investigate the mental

state constitutes deficient performance under Strickland. See,

e.g., Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir.

2003)(citing Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073. 1078 (9th Cir. 1998)

(holding that “[t]rial counsel has a duty to investigate a

defendant's mental state if there is evidence to suggest that the

defendant is impaired.”); see also Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247,

1254 (9th Cir. 2002); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043

(9th Cir. 1995)). In such circumstances, counsel must undertake

at least “a minimal investigation in order to make an informed

decision regarding the possibility of a defense based on mental

health.” Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1998)

A preliminary psychological assessment does not constitute

investigation into mental state defenses sufficient to support a

reasonable decision not to pursue the possible defense further.

Jennings, 290 F.3d at 1013. In Jennings, the petitioner took

methamphetamine and consumed alcohol on the night of the murder.

The court concluded that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to investigate mental health and drug abuse issues: 

Because Mr. Jennings' alibi defense was weak and

uncorroborated, and given the wealth of mental health and

drug abuse evidence at the ready, effective counsel almost

certainly would have made an effort to raise reasonable doubt

as to Mr. Jennings' intent and his ability to undertake a

“willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” and his

ability to act with “malice.”

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Jennings, 290 F.3d at 1019.

In the instant case, petitioner’s trial counsel failed to even

obtain a preliminary psychological assessment much less conduct a

more meaningful investigation into petitioner’s intoxication the

night of the crime. See also Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796 (9th Cir.

2002) (finding ineffective assistance where counsel made choice of

defense theories based on police reports and one psychological

report, without investigating whether there was factual basis for

alternative theory); People v. Mozingo, 34 Cal.3d 926 (1983)

(noting that a possible conflict between mental state defense and

alibi defense does not excuse counsel’s failure to initially

investigate the potential strengths of a mental state defense). 

 Respondent’s strongest argument, one which the magistrate

judge agreed with, is that trial counsel, faced with pursuing two

seemingly inconsistent theories of defense, made a strategic

decision to not present evidence of intoxication. See F&Rs filed

November 2, 2006 at 22:11-15. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr.

Cibula testified that he was worried about “making two different

sorts of arguments to the jury.” EH 124. Mr. Cibula was concerned

that a voluntary intoxication theory would have been inconsistent

with a theory of self-defense. Id. Based on this testimony, the

magistrate judge concluded that trial counsel had to choose “one

of two problematic defenses,” and that “bad facts are bad facts.”

F&Rs filed November 2, 2006 at 22:11-15. While initially

appealing, respondent’s argument is ultimately without merit.

First, even if there were two inconsistent theories of

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defense, a matter far from clear, the choice between the two

theories was made without adequate investigation. That there were

two possibly conflicting theories does not excuse the failure to

investigate. As previously discussed, choosing a defense strategy

without prior investigation into the alternative theories

constitutes unreasonable performance on the part of the trial

attorneys. See Jennings, 290 F.3d 1015-1016 (ineffective

assistance where counsel chose an alibi defense without first

investigating mental health and drug use effects on intent); Rios,

299 F.3d at 796.

Second, presenting evidence of intoxication at trial would

operate to negate malice and there is nothing inconsistent in

arguing that petitioner lacked the requisite malice and that he was

acting in self-defense. It is undisputed that petitioner’s BAC was

extremely high and that he had told police responding to the scene

that he hadn’t meant to kill Faddis. Presenting evidence of

intoxication would have provided context for the jury to understand

how petitioner may have not had the requisite intent and/or falsely

believed that he needed to defend himself. Expert testimony would

have helped explain how someone with a blood alcohol level of .30

would respond in a situation in which they felt threatened. While

petitioner’s physical abilities may not have been impaired, as Dr.

Sokolov testified, it is possible that petitioner’s cognitive

abilities were impaired and thus, negated his intent to kill. 

In support of its position, respondent relies on Turk v.

White, in which the court rejected a failure to investigate claim.

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116 F.3d 1264, (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1125

(1998). The court explained that defense counsel does not have an

obligation to pursue an alternative, conflicting defense once he

reasonably selects the defense to present at trial. Turk, at 1267.

The key point in Turk, and what makes it inapplicable to the case

at bar, is that counsel reasonably selected the self-defense theory

before making the decision to not investigate an alternative

theory. Here, the decision to not investigate petitioner’s

intoxication was unreasonable precisely because counsel failed to

conduct any preliminary investigation. See Phillips v. Woodford,

267 F.3d 966, 980 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “defense counsel

did not reasonably select the alibi defense used at trial . .

.[because it] was not selected on the basis of a reasonable

investigation or strategic decision.”)

Third, respondent also argues that counsel’s decision to not

investigate intoxication was reasonable in light of petitioner’s

adamant desire about wanting to present a self-defense theory. EH

101-102. According to trial counsel, petitioner was not interested

in a theory of defense that would reduce his culpability to

manslaughter, “he wanted a perfect self-defense.” EH 148. It is

well established that “going against the wishes” of a client is an

“unreasonable basis not to investigate . . .” Avila v. Galaza, 297

F.3d 911, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). Even when a defendant insists that

he is innocent, counsel has a duty to investigate possible mental

state defenses. See Jennings, 290 F.3d at 1011. 

Finally, respondent contends that the evidence available to

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counsel indicated that petitioner was acting in ways inconsistent

with being intoxicated. For example, petitioner performed CPR on

Faddis, called 911, and directed officers at the scene. It is

respondent’s position that “[a]ll these facts which must have been

known to counsel at the very early stages of their investigation

were wholly inconsistent with someone who is so intoxicated that

they did not actually intend to kill.” Resp’t Br. at 16. As

discussed supra, had counsel actually investigated the effects of

intoxication on petitioner, they would have found that these

actions were not necessarily inconsistent with petitioner being

intoxicated. Every fact that respondent cites in this regard was

addressed by Dr. Sokolov, who explained that in light of

petitioner’s intoxication, these actions would be consistent with

a lack of intent. Moreover, counsel’s failure to investigate

renders any argument based on strategy inapposite. See Jennings,

290 F.3d at 1018-18. See also Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070

(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[a] lawyer who fails adequately to

investigate, and to introduce into evidence, [information] that

demonstrate[s] his client's factual innocence, or that raise[s]

sufficient doubt as to that question to undermine confidence in the

verdict, renders deficient performance.”).

In conclusion, it is apparent that trial counsel never

investigated the effects of alcohol on petitioner’s perception,

cognition, or ability to form the requisite intent. Nor did

counsel consult any expert who could have educated the jury as to

the effects of alcohol. Instead, counsel acted on their own

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assumptions about intoxication evidence. Accordingly, their choice

of strategy was not based on any investigation and was unreasonable

under Strickland.

b. Failure to Present Evidence 

Counsel also performed unreasonably when they failed to retain

an expert on the effects of intoxication and failed to present such

evidence to the jury. This evidence would have directly supported

petitioner’s claim that he had been intending to only stop Faddis,

and had not intended to kill him. 

Neither of petitioner’s trial attorneys could recall at which

point it was decided to abandon a defense based on voluntary

intoxication. It is undisputed that an intoxication theory was “on

the table” as of November 1996, and that subsequently a decision

was made to abandon it. See EH 27-38. 

Trial counsels’ stated justifications for why they did not

present evidence of intoxication are without merit. First, trial

counsel testified that they pursued a theory of “perfect selfdefense” because that is the theory petitioner wanted to pursue.

Putting aside the problem of counsel’s obligation to make an

independent judgment, see discussion supra, the facts of the case

demonstrate that a perfect self-defense theory would be very

difficult to establish. Petitioner was charged with murder on the

basis of a shooting that he subjectively believed to be justified,

even though the facts were difficult to reconcile. Petitioner was

armed, Faddis was not. The beatings of Goold was over and she was

safe inside the house, though petitioner thought she was underneath

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the truck. Finally, petitioner was approaching Faddis when he

fired the shots. These facts do not support a theory of perfect

self-defense. Most importantly, the “reasonable person” standard

is impossible to reconcile with a defendant who has been drinking

all day and has a BAC of at least .30. In light of these facts,

it was not reasonable for counsel to defer to petitioner’s desire

to pursue a perfect-self defense theory. 

Second, trial counsel did not present evidence of intoxication

because they believed that evidence of intoxication would have

contradicted their self-defense theory. See EH 124-125, 145-146.

As previously discussed, just the opposite was true. In order to

argue perfect self-defense, the jury would have had to conclude

that a person with a stipulated .30 BAC was acting as a “reasonable

person.” Evidence regarding petitioner’s alcohol-related

impairments would have explained how he could have genuinely, even

if unreasonably, believed himself to be in life-threatening danger.

As testified to by Dr. Sokolov, the effects of intoxication

explain how petitioner could have not intended to kill despite

facts which would support an inference of such intent in a sober

person. For example, the prosecutor argued that the fact that

petitioner shot a gun directly at Faddis's chest meant he must have

deliberately shot to kill. This reasoning assumes that the person

shooting is able to appreciate the likely result of his actions,

understand cause and effect, and make rational decisions in light

of risks. As Dr. Sokolov explains, none of these assumptions hold

true when considering petitioner’s high BAC. See EH 39-41.

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Petitioner argues that it is credible that he “could have taken

actions facially suggestive of specific intent to kill, without

actually intending anything more than to ‘stop’ a situation out of

control.” Pet'rs Closing Post-Hrg. Br. at 14.

Respondent relies on White v. Singletary, in which the

Eleventh Circuit found no unreasonable performance in counsel’s

failure to present an intoxication defense because “it was

inconsistent with the deliberateness of White's actions during the

shootings.” 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 1992). White is

clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. First, the facts are

inapposite. The defendant in White drove to a grocery store,

entered with a gun, and shot two customers in the back of the head.

Here, the shooting was, as petitioner puts it, “a spontaneous

response to dramatic interpersonal conflict fueled by alcohol.”

Pet'rs Closing Post-Hrg. Br. at 15. Second, in White, petitioner

tendered no expert testimony regarding the intoxication defense

which could have been presented in his case. In contract,

petitioner in the instant case has presented expert medical

testimony on the relationship between intoxication and the

formation of malice as applied to the facts of the case. For these

reasons, White is inapplicable.

Because counsel failed to investigate and present evidence on

the effects intoxication on petitioner’s ability to form the

requisite intent, the court holds that counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient under Strickland. 

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4. Whether Counsel’s Deficient Performance Prejudiced

Petitioner 

Having determined that trial counsel acted unreasonably in

failing to investigate and present evidence of petitioner’s

intoxication, the court turns next to the question of whether

petitioner was prejudiced by his counsels’ unreasonable

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To show prejudice under

Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. The focus of the prejudice

test is on “whether counsel's deficient performance renders the

result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally

unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). As the

Ninth Circuit explained: 

A reasonable probability does not mean that we must determine

that the jury more likely than not would have returned a

verdict for something beside first degree murder, but only

that Mr. Jennings has shown “a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Jennings, 290 F.3d at 1016. For the reasons discussed herein, the

court concludes that this standard is satisfied.

a. Intoxication Could Negate Express & Implied Malice

Petitioner was charged with second degree murder, which is

the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.

Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 189. Malice may be either express or

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10 California Penal Code § 22(b) (rev. 1995) provides:

Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely

on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually

formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with

murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated,

or harbored express malice aforethought.

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implied. Express malice is the deliberate intention to kill. Cal.

Penal Code § 188. Malice may be implied “when [the] defendant does

an act with a high probability that it will result in death and

does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard

for life.” People v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290, 300 (1981) (citations

omitted). A finding of implied malice thus "depends on a

determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk

involved, i.e., a subjective standard.” Watson, 30 Cal.3d at

296-297.

At the time of petitioner’s trial, it was well settled under

California law that evidence of intoxication, like that of mental

illness, could be considered in assessing a defendant’s subjective

state of mind related to the presence or absence of malice. This

includes the factual question of whether a defendant unreasonably

believed that he faced life-threatening danger. People v. Wells,

33 Cal.2d 330 (1949). Because the prosecutor’s theory focused on

express malice, evidence of voluntary intoxication would have also

been admissible under California Penal Code § 22(b).10

The prosecutor argued to the jury that petitioner’s denial of

intent to kill was inconsistent with the facts. RT 907. For

example, the prosecutor deemed “incredible” petitioner’s perception

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that Faddis, who was drunk himself, presented a real danger and

that petitioner truly wanted to only stop Faddis, not kill him.

Id. Dr. Sokolov established, however, that petitioner’s brain

functioning was impaired and accordingly, assumptions about intent

that might apply to a sober person, did not apply to petitioner.

If a sober person pointed a gun directly at a person and shot, a

jury may well be justified in concluding that the shooter, a

rational person, was making an intentional decision. The same

cannot be said with someone who has a BAC of .30. 

Petitioner’s ability to walk and talk similarly does not

indicate that petitioner also had the ability to form intent. As

Dr. Sokolov testified, in an alcohol-tolerant individual,

significant impairment to executive functioning may coexist with

largely intact speech and motor skills. See EH 49-50. This

includes CPR, which petitioner performed on Faddis. Petitioner was

a certified EMT, RT 636, who had been trained to perform CPR, id.

at 660. According to Dr. Sokolov, an experienced EMT such as

petitioner would not need much executive functioning to perform

CPR. EH 50, 81. Likewise, loading and firing a gun can be rote

behavior for a person experienced with guns, such as petitioner.

EH 73. Petitioner used his shotgun regularly to shoot squirrels,

woodpeckers, and other small animals on his rural property.

Faddis’ father testified that petitioner was a "good shot" with the

gun. RT 126-128. Accordingly, petitioner’s ability to handle a

gun while extremely intoxicated does not necessarily indicate that

he was thinking rationally. Because petitioner’s levels of

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physical and cognitive impairments were arguably divergent (for

example, he could perform CPR and shoot a gun, yet still be

mentally impaired), expert testimony was needed to explain the

effects of alcohol on the brain. 

It was incumbent upon petitioner’s trial counsel to raise

reasonable doubt as to malice. The medical evidence, illustrated

by Dr. Sokolov’s testimony, raises sufficient doubt as to

petitioner’s intent. Dr. Sokolov opined that with petitioner’s

BAC, petitioner was unable to accurately perceive whether his life

or Ms. Goold’s life was in danger and was also unable to

cognitively process that a shot to the chest could be lethal. EH

37. He also concluded that petitioner’s ability to appreciate the

cause and effect relationship (between shooting and killing) was

significantly impaired. EH 38. It was Dr. Sokolov’s opinion that

petitioner’s intoxication precluded him from forming an intent to

kill. EH 39. Dr. Sokolov explained that the formation of intent

to kill depends on executive functions performed by the frontal

lobe. EH 37. Intoxication, however, impaired petitioner’s ability

to understand cause and effect, to think ahead and to identify a

specific desired outcome. EH 38-39.

At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Sokolov testified that had he

been contacted by petitioner’s trial counsel and had reviewed the

same material he would have concluded that petitioner acted without

specific intent to kill, without realizing that his actions could

kill Faddis, and with the subjective belief that he was acting to

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11 It is important to note that Dr. Sokolov would not have

been permitted to testify at trial as to whether he believed

petitioner harbored malice. Pursuant to California Penal Code §

29, “in the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert testifying

about a defendant's mental illness, mental disorder, or mental

defect shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not

have the required mental states . . . The question as to whether

the defendant had or did not have the required mental states shall

be decided by the trier of fact.” Cal. Penal Code § 29. However,

the opinions expressed at the evidentiary hearing would have been

provided to counsel and could have formed the basis for a defense

theory that accounted for petitioner’s level of intoxication. At

trial, counsel could have presented physiological and bio-chemical

expert testimony, asked hypothetical questions based on the facts

of the case, and then invited the jury to draw the ultimate

conclusion as to intent. 

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save his own life and/or that of Ms. Goold. ED 47-47.11 

For all these reasons, evidence of intoxication would have

likely created a reasonable doubt about petitioner’s intent to

“undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 at 649. A

jury informed as to the effects of intoxication would have found

that petitioner did not appreciate the risk of death and the likely

result would have been acquittal or a involuntary manslaughter

conviction. Sallie, 54 Cal.3d at 1116-17.

b. Imperfect Self-Defense 

Even if the jury did not conclude that intoxication negated

malice, evidence of petitioner’s cognitive impairment could have

lead to a finding that he genuinely perceived Faddis to pose an

imminent life-threatening danger. That conclusion would have

resulted in a voluntary manslaughter verdict under People v.

Flannel, 5 Cal.3d 669 (1979). The California Supreme court

explained the central premise of “imperfect self-defense”: 

////

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12 This approach would not fall within the scope of Penal Code

§ 22 and instead would be governed by the standards for imperfect

self-defense, which allows for evidence of intoxication. See

Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th at 783.

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When the trier of fact finds that a defendant killed another

person because the defendant actually but unreasonably

believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily

injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice

and cannot be convicted of murder.

In re Christian S., 7 Cal.4th 768, 783 (1994).12

Dr. Sokolov’s testimony supports a finding of imperfect selfdefense. As previously discussed, Dr. Sokolov testified that

alcohol significantly impaired petitioner’s perceptions and his

ability to reasonably evaluate the degree of danger posed by

Faddis. EH 45-46, 52-53. The facts are consistent, Dr. Sokolov

explained, with petitioner subjectively believing that his actions

were necessary to protect himself. Medical evidence about

intoxication would have explained, for example, petitioner’s

statements to the police that he believed he and Ms. Goold were in

immediate danger when he shot. 

“[W]hether the defendant actually held the required belief is

to be determined by the trier of fact based on all the relevant

facts.” In re Christian S., 7 Cal.4th at 783. Dr. Sokolov

explained that an evaluation of petitioner’s actual state of mind

was not possible without specific consideration of his

intoxication. For these reasons, even if the jury did not return

a verdict of involuntary manslaughter on the basis of intoxication,

it is reasonablely likely that, in the alternative, they would have

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found petitioner liable of no more than voluntary manslaughter

based on imperfect self-defense. 

Clearly, intoxication evidence would have been relevant in

undercutting the prosecution’s theory about intent in three

different ways. The jury could have acquitted or convicted

petitioner of involuntary manslaughter on the grounds that

petitioner was too intoxicated to have the requisite mens rea for

a murder conviction. In the alternative, the jury could have

convicted petitioner of voluntary manslaughter on the theory of

imperfect self-defense. For these reasons, the court concludes

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, at 694. 

IV.

Conclusion 

After careful review of the record, particularly the facts of

the crime and the evidence concerning petitioner’s intoxication on

the night of the crime, the court finds there is a reasonable

probability that, absent the deficiencies, the outcome of the trial

might well have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.

Because petitioner’s level of intoxication was clearly relevant to

create reasonable doubt as to the mens rea element of the offense,

confidence in the outcome is seriously undermined by trial

counsel’s failure to investigate and present that evidence. 

Accordingly, the application for a writ of habeas corpus is

GRANTED. Petitioner shall be released from custody unless a new

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charging document is filed within sixty [60] days of the date of

this order and petitioner is tried on that document in due course.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 16, 2007.

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