Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00261/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00261-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY DEPUTY 

SHERIFFS ASSOCIATION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

KAREN MITCHOFF, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 15-cv-00261-TEH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

 

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

January 20, 2015 Complaint. The Court has carefully considered the arguments of the 

Parties in the papers submitted, and finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral 

argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby 

GRANTED, for the reasons set forth below. 

BACKGROUND 

 Contra Costa County Deputy Sheriff’s Association (“Plaintiff” or “DSA”) is a 

recognized employee organization under California Government Code section 3501(b), 

representing sworn and unsworn County employees who work for the Office of the Sheriff 

in Contra Costa County. Compl. ¶ 8 (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff brought this action on 

behalf of its members, in its representative capacity. Id. The Complaint alleges that 

Contra Costa County and four members of the County Board of Supervisors (collectively 

“Defendants”) violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by making threats in retaliation 

for Plaintiff’s participation in a petition drive to overturn a Supervisor salary increase 

passed by the Board of Supervisors. Id. ¶¶ 20-37. The Complaint also alleges a violation 

of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (“MMBA”), codified as California Government Code 

section 3500 et seq., which obligates Defendants to negotiate in good faith with employee 

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groups regarding wages, hours, and other terms of employment. Id. ¶¶ 15-19, 38-44; Cal. 

Gov. Code § 3505. 

 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Piepho, a County Supervisor, 

threatened the former president of the DSA as a result of the Association’s involvement in 

the petition drive, stating that Plaintiff had “made a bad decision and it is not going to end 

well for you guys.” Compl. ¶ 21. Piepho also allegedly told Plaintiff’s representative that 

its members’ working conditions were something that Defendants “can always make 

worse.” Id. The Complaint further alleges that during two public meeting of the Board of 

Supervisors, Piepho mentioned bringing “Chuck Reed type pension reform” to the County, 

which Defendants understood as “an alteration in pension and retirement benefits provided 

to most California public employees, including members of the Association, characterized 

by substantial reductions in the value of such benefits.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 28. Additionally, 

Defendant Mitchoff, also a County Supervisor, allegedly alluded to the possibility of 

“Chuck Reed type pension reform” on two occasions: once to members of the United 

Professional Firefighters Local 1230 Union, and later during a telephone call with a 

business agent hired by Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27. During that phone call, Mitchoff allegedly 

remarked that “human nature says there will be negative ramifications” for Plaintiff, and 

that “the county supervisors were all on board” with her and “would not change their 

minds.” Id. ¶ 27. Mitchoff also allegedly said Plaintiff was “stupid” if they thought the 

petition drive would turn out well for them; that although the Board of Supervisors had 

previously intended to increase the compensation of Plaintiff’s members, this would no 

longer happen due to the petition; and that she had nothing to lose by “coming after” 

Plaintiff, explaining: “I’m only going to be around for the next four or eight years. But the 

DSA is going to suffer for many years to come.” Id. Other similar allegations are made 

elsewhere in the Complaint. See id. ¶¶ 20-30. 

 Plaintiff brought this Complaint on January 20, 2015. Defendants filed the instant 

motion to dismiss on February 17, 2015. (Docket No. 15). Plaintiff timely responded, and 

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Defendants replied. (Docket Nos. 18, 19). The hearing on this motion was previously set 

for March 30, 2015. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires dismissal when a complaint fails 

“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a 

motion to dismiss under this Rule, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). Plausibility does not mean probability, but it does require “more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is also proper where there 

is a “lack of a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 

699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact 

as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts are not, 

however, “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court may consider the pleadings, along with any exhibits 

properly attached thereto. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1555, n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). Additionally, on a motion to dismiss a court may 

properly look beyond the complaint to matters judicially noticed “without converting the 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 

F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 “[I]f a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, leave to amend may be denied . . . if amendment of the complaint would be 

futile.” Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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DISCUSSION 

I. Judicial Notice 

 Defendants seek the judicial notice of eight documents, designated Exhibits A-H in 

their Request for Judicial Notice. (Docket No. 16). These documents include a County 

Budget Report (Ex. A), Memoranda of Understanding between the County and the DSA 

(Exs. B, C), the County Board of Supervisors’ Meeting Agenda and Minutes regarding the 

introduction of the contested salary increase (Ex. D), a similar document regarding the 

ordinance that repealed this salary increase (Ex. E), and three documents regarding outside 

legal proceedings (Exs. F, G, H). In their Request for Judicial Notice, Defendants do not 

explain the relevance of these documents or provide any substantive argument why the 

Court should take judicial notice of them. 

 A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact “that is not subject to 

reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. Noticeable facts include “matters of 

public record outside the pleadings,” as well as proceedings in other courts that “have a 

direct relation to matters at issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens 

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. 

Weisman, 803 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). Where a party requests notice of filings 

made in other courts, notice may only be taken “for the limited purpose of recognizing the 

‘judicial act’ that the order [or filing] represents,” not for the truth of the matters asserted 

in those filings. Wheeler v. City of Oakland, No. 05-0647-SBA, 2006 WL 1140992, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2006) (citing United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 

1994); San Luis v. Badgley, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (a court “may 

take judicial notice of a document filed in another court not for the truth of the matters 

asserted in the litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related 

filings”)). Finally, judicial notice should not be taken for irrelevant matters. Ruiz v. City 

of Santa Monica, 160 F.3d 543, 548, n. 13 (9th Cir. 1998). A matter is relevant if “it has 

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any tendency to make a fact more or less probable,” and “the fact is of consequence in 

determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. 

 In their Request for Judicial Notice, Defendants fail to explain why these 

documents should be judicially noticed. The Court has neither the time nor the inclination 

to discern and assess every possible reason that Defendants might be seeking judicial 

notice of the documents submitted. Nonetheless, the Court will briefly consider each 

document in turn. 

 Exhibit A is not mentioned in Defendants’ Motion, and it is not immediately clear 

why Defendants request that it be judicially noticed. As a result, the Court DENIES 

Defendants’ request as to Exhibit A. 

 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exhibits B and C to 

the extent that they establish the fact that contract negotiations between the Parties will not 

occur for another 16 months. See Mot. at 3 (citing these exhibits to show that “[t]he 

contract is closed for another 16 months and the parties have not begun to negotiate.”). 

This fact is relevant to the disposition of Defendants’ motion, as is explained below, and 

the Memoranda are matters of public record. See Ruiz, 160 F.3d at 548, n. 13 (allowing 

notice of relevant facts); MGIC Indem. Corp., 803 F.3d at 504 (allowing notice of matters 

of public record). Insofar as Defendants seek judicial notice of other portions of these 

documents, such a request is DENIED. 

 Exhibits D and E are not relevant, as the facts they contain are not in dispute, and 

the existence of the salary ordinance, as well as the ordinance repealing it, are not “fact[s] 

of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Accordingly, Defendants’ 

request for judicial notice of Exhibits D and E is DENIED. 

 It is not clear why Defendants seek judicial notice of the court filings provided in 

Exhibits F, G, and H. Plaintiff’s Opposition speculates that Defendants might be seeking 

notice of these proceedings in order to demonstrate that the County cannot withdraw from 

the county retirement system through a voter initiative process, supporting Defendants’ 

claim that they cannot easily impose pension reform on the DSA’s membership. Opp’n at 

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21. As an initial matter, the Court cannot notice the truth of the matters asserted within 

these court filings. See Wheeler, 2006 WL 1140992, at *5. Assuming Defendants seek 

notice of the filings’ existence for the reasons offered by Plaintiff, the Court finds such 

notice unnecessary. The fact that Defendants cannot easily impose pension reform on 

Plaintiff’s membership is independently established by the fact that pension matters in 

Contra Costa County are governed by the County Employees’ Retirement Law of 1937.

See Mot. at 6; Opp’n at 11 (citing Traub v. Board of Retirement, 34 Cal.3d 793 (1983)). 

Consequently, these documents are of only minimal, if any, relevance. The Court sees no 

reason to impute Plaintiff’s explanation for why Defendants seek to have these documents 

judicially noticed, especially where such notice has no impact on the substantive motion. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Exhibits F, G, and H is DENIED. 

II. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim 

“In order to state a claim against a government employer for violation of the First 

Amendment, an employee must show (1) that he or she engaged in protected speech; (2) 

that the employer took ‘adverse employment action’; and (3) that his or her speech was a 

‘substantial or motivating factor’ for the adverse employment action.” Coszalter v. City of 

Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). An adverse employment action is one that is 

“reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” Id. at 976. 

While an adverse employment action can take many forms, it is the law of this circuit that 

“[m]ere threats and harsh words are insufficient.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 

867, 875 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In Nunez, a police officer brought a First Amendment claim alleging that his 

supervisors scolded him and threatened to transfer or dismiss him in retaliation for 

comments he made regarding the LAPD’s practice of promoting unqualified applicants. 

Id. at 870, 874. The Ninth Circuit held that Nunez failed to allege an adverse employment 

action, which requires “the loss of a valuable governmental benefit or privilege,” and must 

amount to more than “mere threats and harsh words.” Id. at 874-75 (internal quotation 

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marks omitted). While Coszalter broadened the scope of conduct that can constitute an 

adverse employment action, such that “the relevant inquiry is whether the state had taken 

action designed to retaliate against and chill political expression,” the holding of Nunez - 

that the retaliatory conduct must be something more than threatening speech and 

badmouthing - remains good law. See Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 975; Nunez, 147 F.3d at 875 

(“It would be the height of irony, indeed, if mere speech, in response to speech, could 

constitute a First Amendment violation.”). 

In this case, the Complaint alleges that Defendants have engaged in nothing more 

than threatening speech. The County Board of Supervisors has not formally proposed any 

legislation or undertaken any vote that might negatively impact Plaintiff’s members. 

Furthermore, negotiations between the Parties regarding future labor contracts have not yet 

begun. Instead, according to the Complaint, two members of the Board have made threats 

regarding future contract negotiations, and issued harsh, but ultimately hollow, words 

regarding pension reform. Until the Ninth Circuit invalidates Nunez in its entirety, these 

allegations are insufficient to meet the adverse employment action requirement for a First 

Amendment claim brought by public employees against their employer. 

Plaintiff attempts to avoid the adverse employment action requirement by asserting 

that it is not an employee of Defendants, and that it brings this lawsuit in its organizational, 

rather than representative, capacity. Opp’n at 5-6. This argument, however, is belied by 

the language of the Complaint, which states: “The ASSOCIATION is the exclusive 

representative in matters relating to its members’ wages, hours and other terms and 

conditions of employment and brings this action in its representative capacity.” Compl. 

¶ 8 (emphasis added). An association only has standing to bring suit on behalf of its 

members in a representative capacity when, among other things, its members would 

otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. 

Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Plaintiff’s members are indisputably employed by 

Defendants, and therefore would need to allege an adverse employment action to bring this 

suit in their own right. Because Defendants have not engaged in any adverse employment 

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actions, members of the DSA cannot assert a First Amendment claim against them. It 

follows that Plaintiff’s representative action must therefore fail as well. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. 

III. Sufficiency of Complaint Regarding Defendants Gioia and Glover 

To state a claim against Defendants Gioia and Glover, Plaintiff must allege in its 

complaint that these individuals “through [their] own individual actions,” personally 

participated in the deprivation of its members’ rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 

(2009). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 

relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

It is undisputed that Defendants Gioia and Glover did not personally participate in 

any of the conversations at issue in this case. Instead, Plaintiff predicates their liability 

upon a theory of conspiracy. However, Plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding the 

conspiratorial conduct between Defendants Gioia and Glover and Defendants Piepho and 

Mitchoff amount to nothing more than the terms used in the latter’s threats: “we,” “Board 

of Supervisors,” “supervisors,” “county supervisors,” and “all on board.” Compl. ¶ 21, 24, 

27. Such allegations are “merely consistent” with a claim of liability, and therefore stop 

short of the “line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” See Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, the lack of factual allegations against Defendants Gioia and 

Glover makes it more plausible that Defendants Piepho and Mitchoff misled the DSA 

regarding Gioia and Glover’s support in order to add weight to their threats. See Cole v. 

Sunnyvale, No. 08-5017-RMW, 2010 WL 532428, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (“Where 

the facts, taken as true, are consistent with the possibility of wrongdoing, but where more 

likely explanations also arise from those same facts, the allegations do not ‘plausibly 

suggest an entitlement to relief’ and are appropriately subject to dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6).”). Given the lack of factual support, the Court is reluctant to drag individuals 

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into court simply because others claimed their involvement while engaging in prohibited 

behavior. 

Plaintiff’s reliance upon Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012), is 

misplaced. Opp’n at 8. In Lacey, the allegations of conspiracy were sufficient post-Iqbal

because the complaint alleged specific actions undertaken by each member of the 

conspiracy. See Lacy, 693 F.3d at 935-36 (alleging, for example, “[Thomas] recused 

himself and appointed Wilenchik.”). Moreover, the court actually found that the 

allegations of conspiracy were insufficient for some purposes, lacking necessary details as 

to the timing of the conspiracy. Id. at 937. Here, the Complaint alleges no specific actions 

on the part of Defendants Gioia and Glover, only that Defendants Piepho and Mitchoff 

acted with their knowledge and consent. See Compl. ¶ 14. This is insufficient in light of 

the pleading standard articulated by Twombly and Iqbal. 

In order to bring a viable claim against Defendants Gioia and Glover, Plaintiff will 

need to do more than make conclusory allegations loosely supported by third party threats. 

The Court recognizes the difficulty of such an undertaking before access to discovery. 

Nonetheless, this is the burden imposed upon all plaintiffs by Twombly and Iqbal. 

Therefore, in addition to the general insufficiency of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim as 

provided above, the suit against Defendants Gioia and Glover is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE on these grounds. 

IV. Immunity 

A. Legislative Immunity 

State and local legislators enjoy absolute immunity for their legislative acts. Bogan v. 

Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998). Whether legislative immunity applies depends upon 

whether the official is engaged in legislative activity. See, e.g., id. at 55 (city council 

member who introduced budget eliminating plaintiff’s employment position and mayor 

who signed bill into law protected by absolute immunity); Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers 

Union of the U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980) (state judges’ promulgation of attorney 

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professional responsibility rules was protected by absolute immunity). The determination 

of an act’s legislative character “turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or 

intent of the official performing it.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. When evaluating whether an 

act by members of a legislative body is entitled to legislative immunity, courts consider 

“(1) whether the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the formulation of policy; (2) 

whether the act applies to a few individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act is 

formally legislative in character; and (4) whether it bears all the hallmarks of traditional 

legislation.” Schmidt v. Contra Costa Cnty., 693 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Defendants allege legislative immunity both for the threat of pension reforms and the 

threat of taking a hard line in future contract negotiations regarding employee pay and 

benefits. Mot. at 13-15. The Court finds legislative immunity does not attach to the threat 

of pension reform, but does attach to the threats regarding contract negotiations. 

1. Legislative Immunity Does Not Protect Defendants’ Pension Reform 

Threats. 

When the named Defendants threatened “Chuck Reed type pension reform,” they 

were not engaged in a legislative act, as is required to claim the protection of legislative 

immunity. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55. The Parties agree that pension matters in Contra Costa 

County are governed by the County Employees’ Retirement Law of 1937, California 

Government Code sections 31450, et seq. Mot. at 6; Opp’n at 11 (citing Traub v. Board of 

Retirement, 34 Cal.3d 793 (1983)). It follows that as a matter of state law, Defendants do 

not have the ability to amend the provisions of that act to bring about the threatened 

pension reforms. Unlike a prosecutor’s threat to prosecute, or a judge’s threat to hold a 

litigant in contempt, Defendants’ threats were necessarily empty ones. Indeed, it sounds in 

reason that such threats cannot be part of a legislative act where there is no possibility of 

legislation. The fact that these threats were made by legislators is without consequence, as 

the act of making those statements cannot fairly be described as legitimate legislative 

activity. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. This conclusion is supported by the rationale behind 

legislative immunity, which allows legislators to exercise “legislative discretion” without 

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being “inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability.” Id.

at 52. Logically, the law should not be concerned with inhibiting a legislator from 

threatening to take actions that she clearly has no authority to take. 

The Court is similarly unconvinced by Defendants’ argument that they should be 

immune because they might later endorse or advocate statewide pension reform. Mot. at 

13; Reply at 9. There is no indication that Defendants were engaged in statewide pension 

reform advocacy when these threats were made, and absent such evidence, the immunity 

provided to legislative advocacy does not apply. 

2. Legislative Immunity Protects Defendants’ Negotiation-Related 

Threats. 

 Conversely, negotiating the terms of DSA members’ employment is within the 

authority of the Board of Supervisors. When considering the four Schmidt factors 

provided above, stating a potential policy position on public employee contract 

negotiations that affect a large yet discrete group of people satisfies the first and second 

factors, supporting an application of legislative immunity. Schmidt, 693 F.3d at 1136. 

This assessment is not changed by the fact that Defendants’ actions targeted County 

employees instead of the entire population. See id. (“An act need not affect a city’s entire 

population in order to be considered legislative. It is sufficient that the act affects a 

discrete group of people or places.”). 

The third Schmidt factor, which considers whether the act is formally legislative in 

character, also weighs in favor of finding legislative immunity for these statements. See 

id. at 1137. Under California law, collective bargaining agreements covering County 

employees must be approved by the Board of Supervisors in order to take effect. Cal. 

Gov. Code § 3505.1. Courts have consistently found that legislative votes affecting the 

positions and salaries of city employees are legislative acts. See Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F. 

Supp. 543, 547 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also Schmidt, 693 F.3d at 1137 (“The act of voting 

on and passing ordinances and resolutions pursuant to correct legislative procedures is 

‘formally and indisputably legislative.’”) Accordingly, pre-negotiation policy positioning 

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is legislative in nature in the same way that threats of prosecution are prosecutorial in 

nature. See Guttman v. G.T.S. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1034 (10th Cir. 2006) (prosecutor’s 

“threat to file a revocation action unless [plaintiff] responded within the deadline” was 

protected by absolute immunity). 

Finally, these actions bear the hallmarks of traditional legislation under the Schmidt 

test’s fourth factor. “The hallmarks of traditional legislation include the use of discretion, 

the making of policy that implicates budgetary priorities and the provision of services, and 

prospective implications that reach beyond the particular persons immediately impacted.” 

Schmidt, 693 F.3d at 1137. As in Schmidt, the negotiation of a collective bargaining 

agreement, and to a greater extent the act of pre-negotiation policy positioning, is 

discretionary, and “implicates budgetary priorities and the provision of services” within the 

County. Id. Consequently, comments that position the Board of Supervisors even before 

formal negotiations begin are protected by legislative immunity. 

B. Immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause 

The Court is not convinced that Defendants’ statements regarding pension reform are 

protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. The Speech and Debate Clause provides 

immunity for legislators acting within “the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” 

Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1951). The Clause does not, however, 

provide a blanket protection of everything said or done within a legislative forum. “Only 

acts generally done in the course of the process of enacting legislation [are] protected” by 

the Speech and Debate clause. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 514 (1972). 

The pension reform comments made during Board meetings were not made “in the 

process of enacting legislation.” See id. As is explained above, the fact that the Board has 

no authority to enact pension reform disqualifies such threats from being within “the 

sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372-73. Furthermore, there 

is no evidence that Defendants were engaged in legislative advocacy for pension reform 

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when such threats were made. Accordingly, those threats are not protected by the Speech 

and Debate Clause. 

C. Immunity under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 

“The Noerr-Pennington doctrine ensures that those who petition the government for 

redress of grievances remain immune from liability for statutory violations, 

notwithstanding the fact that their activity might otherwise be proscribed by the statute 

involved.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000). “While the NoerrPennington doctrine originally arose in the antitrust context, it is based on and implements 

the First Amendment right to petition and therefore, with one exception . . . applies equally 

in all contexts.” Id. 

As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that the Noerr-Pennington 

Doctrine can apply outside the context of antitrust matters. Mot. at 16; Reply at 10; 

White, 227 F.3d at 1231. However, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s application of 

the Doctrine to the facts of this case. 

The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine operates to protect the right to petition one’s 

government, and otherwise engage in legislative advocacy. Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of 

Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000). As already discussed, the Board does not 

have the authority to enact pension reform, so the individual Board members could not 

have been lobbying each other for the passage of such reform measures. There is also no 

evidence that Defendants were lobbying their constituents or the state legislature to enact 

pension reform. Therefore, an immunity doctrine that protects public officials’ attempts to 

“intercede, lobby, and generate publicity to advance their constituents’ goals” is 

inapplicable given the facts presently before the Court. See id. Defendants’ argument here 

is anticipatory: it looks to the possibility that Defendants might lobby for pension reform in 

the future and asks the Court to find immunity for past behavior as a result. See Mot. at 

17. The Court declines to do so, as it must determine the application of immunity to what 

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Defendants have already done, not what they might do at some later date. The NoerrPennington Doctrine is therefore inapplicable. 

V. The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act Claim 

The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (“MMBA”) governs labor-management relations in 

California’s local governments. Cal. Gov. Code. § 3500, 3501(c). The Act provides “a 

reasonable method of resolving disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and 

conditions of employment.” Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Ass’n v. Woodside, 7 Cal. 

4th 525, 536 (1994). Of particular relevance, the Act “imposes on local public entities a 

duty to meet and confer in good faith with representatives of recognized employee 

organizations, in order to reach binding agreements governing wages, hours, and working 

conditions of the agencies’ employees.” Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control 

Dist. v. California Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal. 4th 1072, 1083 (2005). 

Article III of the United States Constitution provides federal courts with jurisdiction 

over “concrete and particularized,” “actual and imminent” claims. Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The courts are prohibited from issuing advisory 

opinions or declaring rights based on hypothetical situations. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal 

Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “A claim is not ripe for 

adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or 

indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiff’s MMBA claim is not ripe, as the Act only requires Defendants to meet and 

confer in good faith regarding the creation of binding employment agreements, and the 

time for negotiations between Plaintiff and Defendants has not yet arrived. See Coachella 

Valley Mosquito, 35 Cal. 4th at 1083. Until Defendants make a unilateral change to the 

employment conditions specified in the current labor contract between the Parties, or fail 

to meet and confer in good faith regarding a future labor contract, there is no “actual and 

imminent” MMBA violation. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Cal. Gov. Code. §§ 3500, 

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3505.2, 3505.5. The fact that Board members’ positions regarding future collective 

bargaining are presently hostile does not guarantee that they will fail to negotiate in good 

faith when called upon to do so at some later date. Because the alleged harm is contingent 

on future events, it is not ripe for adjudication by this Court. See Texas, 523 U.S. at 300. 

The Court is also not convinced that Plaintiff has been prevented from representing 

its members, or that it is otherwise impossible for Defendants to engage in good faith 

future negotiations as a result of the alleged threats. See Opp’n at 14-17. Such claims are 

highly speculative and fall far short of the “concrete and particularized” standard required 

for ripeness. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The “good faith” nature of Defendants’ behavior 

must be assessed at the time that negotiations actually take place, not prematurely 

determined based upon a few statements made by two members of the Board of 

Supervisors months before the Parties are set to meet and confer. See Nat’l Labor 

Relations Bd. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 155 (1956) (“The previous relations of the 

parties, antecedent events explaining behavior at the bargaining table, and the course of 

negotiations constitute the raw facts for reaching [a finding of bad faith].”). Further, 

Plaintiff fails to explain why it can no longer represent its members, even assuming that 

such a claim is cognizable given the representative status of this suit. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Meyers-Milias-Brown Act claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE, allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to allege some present or immediate, noncontingent violation of the Act in an amended complaint. 

VI. Relief Sought 

A. Declaratory Relief 

In its prayer for relief, Plaintiff requests “a declaration that the individually named 

Defendant Board members’ conduct violated” Plaintiff’s rights under the Constitution and 

the MMBA. Compl. at 10:15-18. Declaratory relief is governed under the Declaratory 

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. “[T]he question in each case is whether the facts 

alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between 

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parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 

issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 

U.S. 270, 273 (1941). 

As previously explained, there is no immediate controversy. Defendants cannot 

unilaterally enact pension reform, and the Court has been provided no evidence that the 

Parties are set to meet and confer about DSA members’ employment conditions in the 

immediate future. If contract negotiations were in progress and Defendants continued to 

issue the threats alleged, then declaratory relief might be more appropriate. These are the 

not the factual circumstances before the Court. Further, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory 

relief specifically seeks a declaration that Defendants’ past conduct was a violation of 

Plaintiff’s rights. Compl. at 10:15-18. As explained above, this is incorrect. Accordingly, 

declaratory relief is not available under the current Complaint. 

B. Injunctive Relief 

 To be entitled to injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they face 

irreparable injury that is real, immediate, and direct - not “abstract,” “conjectural,” or 

“hypothetical.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102 (1983). Because the 

Complaint fails to allege that Defendants have taken any adverse employment action, or 

that Plaintiff faces any immediate and direct threat of irreparable harm absent the 

intervention of this Court, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief on the present facts. 

As explained by Defendants, Indio Police Command Unit Ass’n v. City of Indio is 

inapposite, as the defendant in that case had already violated its meet and confer 

obligations under the MMBA. 230 Cal. App. 4th 521, 539-40 (2014). Here, Defendants 

have not yet violated their duty to negotiate in good faith, and there is no direct and 

immediate threat of such violation where negotiations will not take place for more than one 

year. 

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CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons articulated above, the Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment and MMBA claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Additionally, 

all claims against Defendants Gioia and Glover are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. Finally, the Court takes judicial notice of the facts contained within 

Exhibits B and C that describe the timeline for contract negotiations between the Parties. 

Accordingly, the hearing on this matter currently set for March 30, 2015, is hereby 

VACATED. 

 Plaintiff is granted leave to amend, and shall file an amended complaint on or 

before April 14, 2015. Failure to file a timely amended complaint shall result in dismissal 

with prejudice of all causes of action and termination of this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 03/24/15 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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