Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00307/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00307-26/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Currently before the Court is a discovery dispute that the parties have agreed to submit to the 

Court for adjudication through the Court’s informal discovery dispute procedure.

Background

Plaintiffs Ingrid Crawford Smith, as well as minors A.C. and A.J.C. by and through their 

guardians ad litem, assert civil rights claims on behalf of themselves and as successors in interest 

against the City of Bakersfield and Bakersfield Police Department (“BPD”) officer Warren Martin 

arising from the officer-involved shooting and death of Augustus Joshua Crawford (the “Decedent”) 

on November 7, 2017. Plaintiffs commenced separate actions that were consolidated with this firstfiled action of a since-dismissed plaintiff. 

The operative scheduling order in this case issued on June 10, 2021. (Doc. 87). Fact discovery 

closed in on March 11, 2022. (Doc. 101). On June 28, 2022, Defendants timely filed a motion for 

JAMES RAYMOND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WARREN MARTIN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00307-KES-CDB

ORDER RE REQUEST FOR RESOLUTION 

OF DISCOVERY DISPUTE

(Doc. 143)

Case 1:18-cv-00307-KES-CDB Document 146 Filed 01/13/25 Page 1 of 5
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partial summary judgment. (Doc. 105). The Court convened for oral argument on the motion on 

March 20, 2024 (Doc. 127). On April 2, 2024, the Court entered an order granting Defendants’ 

motion for partial summary judgment dismissing certain of Plaintiffs’ claims, including Plaintiffs’

municipal liability claims against the City of Bakersfield. (Doc. 128).

At the Court’s direction, on August 6, 2024, the parties filed a joint report in which they 

confirmed discovery was complete and set forth their respective preferred dates to convene for pretrial 

conference and trial. (Doc. 131). In their report, Plaintiffs proposed convening for pretrial conference 

in either December 2024 or January 2025, and commencing trial in either February 2025 or April 

2025. Id. at 3. Defendants represented they were unavailable to commence trial as soon as Plaintiffs 

and requested trial commencement in October 2025. Id. Accordingly, the assigned district scheduled 

trial to commence in October 2025. (Doc. 133). Shortly thereafter, on the parties’ stipulated request 

for continuance, trial was continued (and is currently set) for November 12, 2025. (Docs. 136, 137).

On November 15, 2024, Plaintiffs file a motion pursuant to Rule 16 seeking a modification to 

the scheduling order to permit reopened discovery for the limited purpose of deposing Evan 

Demestihas. (Doc. 140). The motion was denied without prejudice as Plaintiffs failed to comply with 

the operative scheduling order and its requirement that parties seek informal discovery dispute 

resolution prior to filing any motion seeking discovery relief. (Doc. 141) (citing Doc. 87 at 3-4; Local 

Rule 302(c)(1)). Plaintiffs thereafter properly scheduled an informal discovery dispute conference and 

the parties filed a joint brief. (Docs. 142, 143).

The Parties’ Discovery Dispute

Plaintiffs seek to depose former BPD Chief Assistant Demestihas on the grounds that he 

possesses relevant knowledge concerning the investigation by the office of the California Attorney 

General into BPD’s alleged civil rights violations, including in connection with the death of Decedent. 

According to Plaintiffs, Demestihas received information from the Attorney General’s office that 

prompted a reexamination of Decedent’s death. Plaintiffs argue they only “recently” discovered 

Demestihas’ identity due to Defendants’ alleged failure to disclose his identity. Plaintiffs assert 

Demestihas’ testimony would be “crucial” for trial preparation. Defendants oppose reopening 

discovery, arguing among other things that Plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence in making their 

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request.

November 26, 2024, the Court convened with the parties off the record to address the 

discovery disputes. (Doc. 144). Attorney Araksya Boyadzyan appeared for Plaintiffs and Attorney

Heather Cohen appeared for Defendants. At the beginning of the conference, the parties agreed to 

resolution of the identified discovery dispute outside the Local Rule 251 formal parameters, agreed to 

proceed without record, and agreed to abide by an anticipated order of the Court resolving the disputes

to the exclusion of seeking relief through either a motion to compel or for protective order.

Governing Legal Standard

District courts enter scheduling orders in actions to “limit the time to join other parties, amend 

the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). Once entered, a 

scheduling order “controls the course of the action unless the court modifies it.” Fed. R Civ. P. 16(d). 

Scheduling orders are intended to alleviate case management problems. Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), a scheduling order “may be modified only for 

good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). See Wong v. Regents of Univ. of 

Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers 

the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. If the moving party is 

unable to reasonably meet a deadline despite acting diligently, the scheduling order may be modified. 

Id. If, however, the moving party “‘was not diligent, the inquiry should end’ and the motion to modify 

should not be granted.” Zivkovic v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609).

Discussion

First, Plaintiffs’ charge that Defendants violated Rule 26 by failing to disclose the identity of 

Demestihas is without merit. Under the 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules, the initial disclosure 

obligation under Rule 26(a) was “narrowed to identification of witnesses and documents that the 

disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses. ... A Party is no longer obligated to 

disclose witnesses or documents, whether favorable or unfavorable, that it does not intend to use.” In 

other words, Rule 26’s witness disclosure provision “only requires the disclosure of witnesses that ‘the 

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disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses’” – which is narrower than a requirement to 

identify any witness who may have discoverable information. Nyerges v. Hillstone Rest. Grp. Inc., 

No. CV-19-02376-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 3299625, at *10 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2021) (emphasis in 

original). Defendants clarified during the discovery dispute conference that they do not intend to rely 

on Demestihas in support of their defenses and, thus, Defendants neither had nor have now a duty to 

disclose his identity.

Second, Plaintiffs’ request to reopen discovery is untimely. Although they represent generally 

that they only learned of Demestihas’ identity “recently” in advance of the discovery dispute 

conference (Doc. 143 at 1), they clarified during the conference that they learned of his identity in 

March 2024. That is consistent with Defendants’ unrefuted assertion in the parties’ joint discovery 

dispute brief that Plaintiffs discussed their desire or intent to seek to reopen discovery with the 

formerly assigned district judge approximately eight months prior to the discovery dispute conference. 

Id. at 6-7.

Third, Plaintiffs’ characterization that Demestihas’ testimony is “crucial” is belied by the 

procedural background of the case. Thus, in August 2024 (when, as set forth above, Plaintiffs already 

knew Demestihas may have useful knowledge), the parties filed a joint report in which Plaintiffs 

requested to commence trial in either February 2025 or April 2025. It was not until trial was set and 

then continued to November 2025 that Plaintiffs sought an order from the Court reopening discovery. 

If Plaintiffs considered Demestihas a crucial witness, it was incumbent upon them to timely seek 

relief. This they did not do.

Plaintiffs assert that “[c]ourts have consistently found that failure to disclose relevant witnesses 

is grounds for reopening discovery,” citing only R&R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 673 F.3d 1240 

(9th Cir. 2012). (Doc. 143 at 4). But that case involves neither a party’s nondisclosure of witnesses 

nor the reopening of discovery – it involved a court’s imposition of evidentiary sanctions upon a party 

for its failure to produce certain documents.

In short, because Plaintiffs have not established that Defendants violated a discovery duty and 

otherwise have not demonstrated that they diligently sought the discovery relief they seek now, the 

Court will deny Plaintiffs’ request to reopen discovery. Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1087.

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Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED, Plaintiffs’ request to reopen discovery (Doc. 143) is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 13, 2025 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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