Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-01629/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-01629-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY LUCHETTI,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE HERSHEY COMPANY, a Delaware

corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-1629 SI

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REMAND

Plaintiff has filed a motion to remand this action to state court where it was filed. The motion

is scheduled for a hearing on June 6, 2008. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines

that the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing. For

reasons set out below, the motion to remand is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Defendant The Hershey Corporation, a corporation incorporated in Delaware and headquartered

in Pennsylvania, employed plaintiff Larry Luchetti as a production supervisor at its San Francisco plant,

and then moved plaintiff to its Berkeley operations. Defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment on

May 11, 2007.

On January 24, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against defendant in Alameda

County Superior Court, alleging wrongful termination in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5.

On February 7, 2008, plaintiff’s counsel Daniel Bartley sent a letter dated February 6, 2008 to

defendant’s in-house counsel Christopher Scalia. The letter was sent via certified mail and was

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Except where otherwise indicated, all further code references are to the California Code of Civil

Procedure.

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accompanied by a summons, a verified copy of the complaint and two copies of a Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

§ 415.301 “Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons–Civil” Judicial Council form

(“§ 415.30 Notice and Acknowledgment”) with a pre-paid return envelope, among other documents

(“February 7, 2008 correspondence”). Scalia Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. C. The cover letter stated, “I am

hoping you are willing to accept service and toward that end will execute and return the enclosed Notice

and Acknowledgment of Receipt.” Id. In pertinent part, the § 415.30 Notice and Acknowledgment

stated that defendant was “being served pursuant to section 415.30 of the California Code of Civil

Procedure” and that “failure to complete [the] form and return it within 20 days from the date of

mailing...may subject [defendant] to liability for the payment of any expenses incurred in serving a

summons...in any other manner permitted by law.” Id. Ex. D.

Bartley also emailed Scalia copies of the February 7, 2008 correspondence. Scalia informed

Bartley that the Miller Law Group would be plaintiff’s “point of contact going forward.” Bartley Decl.,

Pl.’s Reply Ex. A.

On February 26, 2008, Lisa C. Hamasaki of Miller Law Group executed the § 415.30 Notice and

Acknowledgment for defendant and returned it to Bartley, completing service under § 415.30. Miller

Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. A.

On March 17, Bartley sent an email to Miller stating, “I do not believe I have yet heard from

you” regarding the February 7, 2008 correspondence and specifically referencing the § 415.30 Notice

and Acknowledgment (“Judicial Council ‘request for acknowledgment of receipt’ form”). Id. Ex. B.

Bartley further wrote,

Even though this makes the cost of any subsequent personal service your client’s

responsibility, I would prefer to enable your client to avoid incurring the expense of

personal service... Accordingly, please let me know if we can stipulate to a date by

which Defendant’s responsive pleading is due.

Id. In reply, Miller emailed a copy of the executed § 415.30 Notice and Acknowledgment executed by

Hamasaki and returned to Bartley on February 26, 2008. Id. Ex. C.

On March 26, 2008, defendant filed notice of removal of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332

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diversity jurisdiction. Def.’s Notice of Removal at ¶¶ 4-8. In its filing, defendant stated that formal

service of process was completed as of Hamasaki’s February 26, 2008 execution and return of the

§ 415.30 Notice and Acknowledgment, so that fewer than 30 days had elapsed prior to the filing of the

removal notice, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3.

In an April 2, 2008 email to defendant’s counsel, Bartley stated that though Hamasaki’s February

26, 2008 execution and return of the § 415.30 Notice and Acknowledgment perfected service under

§ 415.30, such perfection of service is not a necessary prerequisite to effect service under the alternate

mail service provisions of § 415.40. Bartley Decl., Pl.’s Motion Ex. D. Under § 415.40, service is

deemed complete on the 10th day after a copy of the summons and complaint are sent “to the person

to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt.” In the April 2, 2008 email,

Bartley wrote that, under § 415.40, defendant was served “exactly ten (10) days” after Bartley sent the

February 7, 2008 correspondence, meaning defendant’s 30 days for U.S.C. § 1446(b) removal expired

on March 18, 2008. As defendant filed its notice of removal on March 26, 2008, Bartley asserted that

such removal was untimely and asked defendant to “stipulate to a remand.” Bartley Decl., Pl.’s Motion

Ex. D.

On April 25, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion to remand on the grounds that defendant’s March 26,

2008 removal was untimely and improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Defendant opposes the remand

motion and seeks sanctions for plaintiff’s “disingenuous” motion.

LEGAL STANDARDS

1. Removal jurisdiction

A defendant may remove any civil action brought in a state court over which the district court

has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original federal jurisdiction embraces an action founded

on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States (federal question

jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or an action between citizens of two different states and with a matter

in controversy exceeding $75,000 (diversity jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),

(b). Federal law expressly provides that a district court shall remand any action in which subject-matter

jurisdiction is lacking. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

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Because of the “Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on

removal,” courts must strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. Duncan v.

Stuezle, 76 F. 3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. V. Sheets, 313 U.S.

100, 108 (1941)); see Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir 1988); see also Petrie v. Pacific Stock

Exchange, Inc., 982 F.Supp 1390, 1393 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“the court must reject federal jurisdiction if

there is any doubt as to whether removal was proper”). The burden of establishing grounds for federal

jurisdiction rests on the removing party. Emrich v. Touche-Ross & Co., 846 F. 2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.

1988) (citations omitted); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F. 2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“the ‘strong

presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of

establishing that removal is proper”).

2. Timeliness of removal

For a removal to be timely, a defendant wishing to remove a case from state court to federal

court must file a notice of removal within 30 days of receiving “through service or otherwise [a] copy

of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief...” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). “The statutory time limit

for removal petitions is merely a formal and modal requirement and is not jurisdictional.” Fristoe v.

Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir.). “Although the time limit is mandatory and a

timely objection to a late petition will defeat removal, a party may waive the defect or be estopped from

objecting to the untimeliness by sitting on his rights.” Id.

Formal service of process, measured from the service date according to state law, is a

prerequisite for triggering the 30-day removal period because it “assures defendants adequate time to

decide whether to remove an action to federal court.” See Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Mitchetti Pipe

Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48, 352-54 (“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not

obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by

formal process”).

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DISCUSSION

1. Timeliness of removal

A. Defendant’s March 26, 2008 removal was timely because defendant’s 30-day period

for removal was triggered by completion of formal service under § 415.30 on

February 26, 2008.

Under § 415.30, a plaintiff may validly serve process on a defendant by mail where the mailing

includes a copy of the summons and complaint together with two copies of the notice and

acknowledgment form approved by the Judicial Council of California and a pre-paid return envelope

addressed to sender. Service is complete under this section on the date the form is executed provided

that it is returned to the sender. In the case of service on a corporation, a person authorized to receive

such service must execute the form in a representative capacity. If the recipient of service does not

execute within 20 days of the mailing, the recipient may be liable for the costs of the sender employing

an alternate method of service. 

Here, plaintiff’s February 7, 2008 correspondence expressly invoked certified mail service under

§ 415.30 and complied with its provisions for formal service of process. See Scalia Decl., Def.’s Opp’n

Ex. C; see § 415.30. The February 7, 2008 correspondence served defendant with a copy of the

summons and complaint together with two copies of the Notice and Acknowledgment form and a prepaid return envelope addressed to the plaintiff’s counsel Bartley. See id. Bartley’s cover letter to the

February 7, 2008 correspondence expressly asked defendant to consent to service under § 415.30. See

Scalia Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. C (Bartley wrote, “I am hoping you are willing to accept service and

toward that end will execute and return the enclosed Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt.”). The

Notice and Acknowledgment form enclosed in the February 7, 2008 correspondence specifically advised

defendant that (1) the summons and complaint were being served “pursuant to section 415.30 of the

California Code of Civil Procedure,” (2) defendant’s failure to execute and return the form within 20

days would subject it to liability for the costs of plaintiff employing an alternate method of service and

(3) service would be deemed complete on the day defendant executed the Notice and Acknowledgment

form. See Scalia Decl., Def.’s Opp’n Ex. D. Based on Bartley’s cover letter and the contents of the

Notice and Acknowledgment form, plaintiff expressly informed defendant that it was being served under

§ 415.30 and that its execution and return of the § 415.30 Notice and Acknowledgment form would

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complete such service. See Def.’s Opp’n at 2-3, 7. 

On February 26, 2008, 19 days after plaintiff mailed service, defendant’s outside counsel

Hamasaki executed and returned the Notice and Acknowledgment form on behalf of defendant

corporation. See Scalia Decl., Def. Opp’n Ex. E. Hamasaki’s execution completed plaintiff’s formal

service of process under § 415.30 and triggered defendant’s 30-day period to file notice of removal. See

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and Murphy, 526 U.S. at 347-48, 354. Defendant filed timely notice of removal

in the Court 29 days later on March 26, 2008. See id.

B. As only after defendant’s removal did plaintiff contend that he served defendant

under the alternate provisions of § 415.40, plaintiff is estopped from asserting

defendant’s removal was untimely 

Plaintiff seeks remand on the basis that, despite his representation to the contrary in the

correspondence he sent defendant, he really meant to serve defendant under the alternate provisions of

§ 415.40. Had he done so, service would have been effective ten days after his February 7, 2008

correspondence, on February 17, 2008, rendering defendant’s March 26, 2008 removal untimely. See

Pl.’s Motion at 1-2 and Bartley Decl. in Opp’n to Def.’s Motion for Sanctions ¶ 2-4. 

It was only after defendant’s removal that plaintiff made this contention. Def.’s Opp’n at 1, 4-6.

In Fristoe, the 9th Circuit held that although the time limit for removal is mandatory, it is a formal, not

jurisdictional, requirement such that a party, based on its conduct, may be estopped from later objecting

to the untimeliness of defendant’s removal to federal court. Fristoe, 615 F.2d at 1212-13; see Transport

Idemnity Co. v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 405, 417 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (noting that a plaintiff may be

estopped from arguing untimely removal where the plaintiff’s “affirmative conduct or unequivocal

assent . . . would render it offensive to fundamental principles of fairness to remand”) (quoting

Maybruck v. Haim, 290 F. Supp. 721, 723-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); and Staples v. Morton, 444 F. Supp.

1312, 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that plaintiff’s claim of untimely removal may be waived or

barred by estoppel where defendant’s reliance on plaintiff’s representations caused a delay in its filing

of removal). 

Here, plaintiff does not deny that he properly served defendant under § 415.30. Likewise, he

does not deny that he represented to defendant that he was seeking to effect service under that provision

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or that defendant relied on that representation in consenting to such service and subsequently filing its

notice of removal. Instead, plaintiff argues that he hoped the February 7, 2008 correspondence would

constitute valid service under § 415.40, but was uncertain enough about what was lawful service that

he actually served defendant under both sections as a way of ensuring that there would be no disputes

over service. See Pl.’s Motion at 1-2; Bartley Decl. in Opp’n to Def.’s Motion for Sanctions ¶ 2-4.

Plaintiff only “felt it necessary” to conduct legal research into the minutiae of service after defendant’s

removal, at which time plaintiff learned of the possibility that he had effected service under the alternate

provisions of § 415.40. See id. 

The problem is, of course, that plaintiff’s conduct and prior express representations to defendant

were contrary to this new-found, double-barreled approach. Not only did the February 7 correspondence

represent that service was being effected under § 415.30, but plaintiff’s follow-up March 17, 2008 email

to defendant’s outside counsel Miller repeated the representation. See Miller Decl., Def. Opp’n Ex. B.

In the email, plaintiff inquired about whether Miller had received the “Judicial Council ‘request for

acknowledgment of receipt’ form” for § 415.30 service and urged Miller to return it promptly to enable

defendant to “avoid incurring the expense of personal service” as provided by § 415.30. See id. 

Only after defendant’s removal did plaintiff claim that service was actually effected under

§ 415.40 at an earlier date (February 17, 2008), making defendant’s removal untimely. See Miller Decl.,

Def. Opp’n Ex. D. Plaintiff’s conduct here offends “fundamental principles of fairness” and is the sort

that precludes a plaintiff from later objecting to the untimeliness of defendant’s removal. See Transport,

339 F. Supp. at 417 (quoting Maybruck, 290 F. Supp. at 723-24); Fristoe, 615 F.2d at 1212-13.

Defendant was entitled to rely on plaintiff’s express representations of service under § 415.30 and to

base its removal on the timeline set out in that code section.

C. The Court need not reach the issue of whether plaintiff effected service under

§ 415.40.

Plaintiff contends and defendant disputes that plaintiff effected service under § 415.40 by

substantially complying with that section, thereby triggering defendant’s 30-day removal period on

February 17, 2008 and making untimely defendant’s removal. See Pl.’s Reply at 1-9. Even if plaintiff

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did substantially comply with § 415.40, plaintiff is estopped from making such an argument, per the

above analysis. Therefore, the Court need not reach this issue.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s

motion for remand and retains jurisdiction over the case. The Court DENIES defendant’s request for

sanctions, although it is a close question.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 4, 2008

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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