Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-15297/USCOURTS-ca9-07-15297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RITA CAMACHO, on behalf of 

herself and all others similarly No. 07-15297 situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.  CV-04-00478-

v. CRB/MEJ

BRIDGEPORT FINANCIAL, INC.; RAY OPINION LEWIS; CHRISTINA HARBRIDGE,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 13, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed April 22, 2008

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Melvin Brunetti, and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Brunetti

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COUNSEL

Richard M. Pearl, Law Offices of Richard M. Pearl, Berkeley,

California; O. Randolph Bragg, Horwitz, Horwitz & Associates, Chicago, Illinois; Irving L. Berg, The Berg Law

Group, Corte Madera, California; and Richard J. Rubin, Santa

Fe, New Mexico, for the plaintiff-appellant. 

Mark E. Ellis and June D. Coleman, Ellis, Coleman, Poirier,

La Voie & Steinheimer, LLP, Sacramento, California, for the

defendants-appellees.

OPINION

BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge: 

Rita Camacho (Camacho) appeals the district court’s order

awarding her $77,069.36 in merits fees, costs, and fees-onfees. The district court determined Camacho’s award by multiplying the number of hours worked by each of her three

attorneys by an hourly rate of $200, by compensating Camacho for costs, and by awarding Camacho a “flat award” of

$500. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

vacate and remand. 

I. Facts and Proceedings Below 

In the underlying action, Camacho, a debtor, sued Bridgeport Financial, Inc. (Bridgeport Financial), a debt collector, in

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a putative class action alleging violations of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g,

1692e. Camacho alleged that Bridgeport Financial misrepresented the rights of consumers in its initial collection letter by

requiring her to dispute her debt in writing. Bridgeport Financial filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that section 1692g(a)(3)

implicitly requires disputes to be made in writing. The district

court denied Bridgeport Financial’s motion to dismiss, certified the issue for interlocutory appeal, and we affirmed in a

published opinion. See 430 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 (9th Cir.

2005). We held that the district court correctly denied Bridgeport Financial’s motion to dismiss because there is no writing

requirement implicit in section 1692g(a)(3), and that Bridgeport Financial violated that section insofar as it stated that disputes must be made in writing. Id. at 1082. 

On remand, the litigation focused on class certification,

Bridgeport Financial’s net worth, and the class remedy. After

the district court approved a statewide class, consisting of

more than 7,000 members, the parties settled. Pursuant to the

parties’ Class Action Settlement Agreement, the court ordered

Bridgeport Financial to pay a cy pres award of $341.50 to

Legal Services of Northern California for use in consumer

education or representation, and $1,000 in actual and statutory

damages to Camacho. Bridgeport Financial also agreed to pay

reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs, to be

determined by the court absent an agreement by the parties.

The parties did not reach an agreement and Camacho filed her

Motion for an Award of Costs and Attorney Fees. 

During the course of this litigation, three attorneys represented Camacho, Irving L. Berg (Berg), O. Randolph Bragg

(Bragg), and Richard J. Rubin (Rubin). Berg and Bragg represented Camacho during proceedings in the district court, and

Camacho retained Rubin to handle the interlocutory appeal. 

In her motion, Camacho sought to recover fees and costs

totaling $167,434.36. This total included $56,142.50 (132.1

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hours x $425/hour) in fees and $192.41 in costs for Berg;

$72,772.50 (156.5 hours x $465/hour) in fees and $5,823.71

in costs for Bragg; $1,495.00 (13 hours x $115/hour) in fees

for Bragg’s law clerk/associate; $115.00 (1 hour x $115/hour)

for the services of Bragg’s paralegal; and $30,100.00 (60.2

hours x $500/hour) in fees and $793.24 in costs for Rubin.

Included in the attorneys’ requests were hours spent pursuing

fees. Berg, Bragg, and Rubin each provided a declaration supporting their respective fee/costs requests, and Camacho also

filed declarations from two additional attorneys in support of

her motion. Bridgeport Financial filed an opposition to Camacho’s motion which included numerous exhibits and declarations from two more attorneys. 

Camacho also explained in her motion that her attorneys

would submit a supplemental declaration detailing additional

time and costs expended. Bragg ultimately did so, filing a

supplemental declaration wherein he sought an additional

$12,373.00: $7,533.00 (16.2 hours x $465/hour) in fees for his

services, and $4,840.00 (24.2 hours x $200/hour) in fees for

his law clerk/associate’s services. Although Bridgeport Financial objected to portions of Camacho’s three attorneys’ declarations, and objected to the two additional attorneys’

declarations and Bragg’s supplemental declaration in their

entirety, the district court never ruled on these objections and

Bridgeport Financial never requested a ruling. 

In its Second Amended Order, the district court noted that

Camacho sought to recover $6,809.36 in litigation expenses

and $160,625.00 in fees. This total reflects the amount

requested in Camacho’s initial motion, but does not account

for the amount requested in Bragg’s supplemental declaration.

The court went on to explain that:

Here, the Court is satisfied that the number of hours

spent upon this case by [Camacho’s] three attorneys

. . . is reasonable. The attorneys spent their time on

motions brought by [Bridgeport Financial] and

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defending the case against an appeal brought by

[Bridgeport Financial]. While the Court acknowledges that [Camacho’s] three attorneys were already

exceedingly well-versed on the narrow legal question presented in the case, the Court nonetheless

finds that the hours spent on the matter were reasonable. The Court holds, however, that it would be

unreasonable on the facts of this case to award the

full amount requested by these attorneys. Rather than

awarding the full hourly rate suggested by [Camacho], the Court finds, in rough accord with numerous

other courts that have considered the issue in published and unpublished opinions, that a reasonable

rate for fees for an action brought for the violation

of a mandatory provision of the FDCPA is $200.00

per hour. 

(Footnote omitted.) Therefore, the court awarded Berg

$26,420.00 (132.1 hours x $200/hour), Bragg $31,300.00

(156.5 hours x $200/hour), and Rubin $12,040.00 (60.2 hours

x $200) in fees. The court also awarded Berg $192.41, Bragg

$5,823.71, and Rubin $793.24, their requested costs. The

court then held that the fees submitted by Bragg on behalf of

his law clerk/associate ($1,495.00) and paralegal ($115.00)

were reasonable, but did not account for these amounts in its

ultimate award. To this point, the court awarded Camacho

$6,809.36 in costs, and $69,760.00 in fees. 

Finally, the court found that while Camacho indicated an

intent to seek a supplemental award of costs, expenses, and

fees, a substantial award of fees-on-fees would be inappropriate in this case. The court explained that:

Here, [Camacho’s] counsel regularly represent litigants in FDCPA cases, and they are therefore experienced with the law governing awards of attorneys’

fees and the process for recouping them. Indeed, as

[Bridgeport Financial] points out, the materials subCAMACHO v. BRIDGEPORT FINANCIAL 4245

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mitted by [Camacho’s] attorneys in support of the

motion for costs and attorneys’ fees in this case are

virtually identical to the materials that these attorneys have submitted in other cases. 

The court concluded that “[w]here . . . the attorneys seeking

fees support their motion with materials that are substantially

unchanged from those filed by them in numerous other cases

. . . it would be inappropriate to award fees on fees on an

hourly basis,” and instead, the court awarded a “flat award”

of $500. In the end, the district court awarded Camacho a

total of $77,069.36 in fees and costs ($69,760.00 in fees,

$6,809.36 in costs, and a $500 “flat award”). Camacho

appealed.

II. Standard of Review 

“We review the factual determinations underlying an award

of attorneys’ fees for clear error and the legal premises a district court uses to determine an award de novo.” Ferland v.

Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001)

(per curiam) (citations omitted). “If we conclude that the district court applied the proper legal principles and did not

clearly err in any factual determination, then we review the

award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at

1148. 

III. Discussion 

[1] “Generally, litigants in the United States pay their own

attorneys’ fees, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings.”

Stanton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003).

However, “[i]n order to encourage private enforcement of the

law . . . Congress has legislated that in certain cases prevailing

parties may recover their attorneys’ fees from the opposing

side. When a statute provides for such fees, it is termed a ‘fee

shifting’ statute.” Id. The FDCPA is one such statute, providing that any debt collector who fails to comply with its provi4246 CAMACHO v. BRIDGEPORT FINANCIAL

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sions is liable “in the case of any successful action . . . [for]

the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s

fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). The

FDCPA’s statutory language makes an award of fees mandatory. Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1995).

“The reason for mandatory fees is that congress chose a ‘private attorney general’ approach to assume enforcement of the

FDCPA.” Id.; see also Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107,

113 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the FDCPA “mandates an

award of attorney’s fees as a means of fulfilling Congress’s

intent that the Act should be enforced by debtors acting as private attorneys general”). Here, pursuant to the Settlement

Agreement, Bridgeport Financial agreed to pay reasonable

and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs. 

[2] “District courts must calculate awards for attorneys’

fees using the ‘lodestar’ method,” Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1149

n.4, and the amount of that fee must be determined on the

facts of each case, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429

(1983). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ferland, 244 F.3d at

1149 n.4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a

reasonable fee award, the district court may, if circumstances

warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for other factors which

are not subsumed within it.” Id.

Here, the district court first found that Camacho’s three

attorneys spent a reasonable number of hours on this case,

specifically noting that they spent their time on motions

brought by the defendant and successfully defending against

an interlocutory appeal. The court made this finding after recognizing that the attorneys were exceedingly well-versed on

the narrow legal question presented. Bridgeport Financial

does not challenge this reasonableness finding. 

The district court then decided that $200 was a reasonable

hourly rate for the attorneys’ services, holding that on the

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facts of this case it would be unreasonable to compensate

Camacho’s three attorneys at their requested hourly rates of

$425, $465, and $500. The court did not specifically identify

which facts made the attorneys’ requested hourly rates unreasonable. Instead, in a single footnote, the court cited eleven

cases to support its finding that $200 was in “rough accord”

with numerous other courts—all but one located in other

communities—that had considered the issue in published and

unpublished opinions. 

We acknowledge that the “district court has a great deal of

discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee,” and

that, as a general rule, we defer to its determination. Gates v.

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). This discretion is “appropriate in view of the district court’s superior

understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding

frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Here, however, the district

court erred by not identifying the relevant community, and by

not explaining what was the prevailing hourly rate in that

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skill, experience and reputation, as well as by

awarding a “flat award” of $500 for fees-on-fees. 

A. Relevant community 

[3] Camacho argues that the district court applied the

wrong legal standard when determining a reasonable hourly

rate because it did not consider rates in the relevant community. Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate,

the relevant community is the forum in which the district

court sits. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir.

1997). “[R]ates outside the forum may be used if local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling or

unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience,

expertise, or specialization required to handle properly the

case.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Neither party contends that an exception to the general rule

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applies in this case; therefore, the relevant community is the

Northern District of California (the Northern District). 

[4] Bridgeport Financial argues that the district court “expressly stated [that its] decision was based on the facts of the

case,” and so implicitly identified the Northern District as the

relevant legal community. There is no indication in the record

that the district court actually did so. We review the adequacy

of the district court’s own articulated reasoning, not the afterthe-fact rationalizations offered by counsel. The district court

cited eleven cases in its order, ten of which were decided outside the Northern District. So far as we can tell, the court

relied almost exclusively on cases decided in the Southern

District of Ohio, the District of Oregon, the Eastern District

of New York, the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District

of Florida, and the Southern District of New York, none of

which is the relevant community for determining Camacho’s

fee award. While the court’s order includes one case from the

Northern District, there is no indication that the court considered this case to be any more relevant to its analysis than the

ten cases from outside the relevant community. We also note

that the district court made no mention of a case decided in

the Northern District, and cited by Bragg in his declaration,

awarding Bragg fees at an hourly rate of $435. See Defenbaugh v. JBC & Assocs., Inc., No. C-03-0651 JCS, 2004 WL

1874978, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004), aff’d by unpublished mem., No. 04-16866, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 19930

(9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2006). 

[5] Therefore, we remand for the district court to make a

determination of the reasonable hourly rate on the basis of the

prevailing rates in the Northern District, or a community

shown to be comparable to the Northern District. 

B. Prevailing market rate 

[6] While “[w]e . . . recognize that determining an appropriate ‘market rate’ for the services of a lawyer is inherently

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difficult,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984), the

established standard when determining a reasonable hourly

rate is the “rate prevailing in the community for similar work

performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and

reputation.” Barjon, 132 F.3d at 502 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Here, the district court failed to assess or determine

the prevailing hourly rate in the Northern District for the work

performed by Camacho’s attorneys. 

“To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory

evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that

the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S.

at 895 n.11. As we have noted, “[a]ffidavits of the plaintiffs’

attorney[s] and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the

community, and rate determinations in other cases . . . are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403,

407 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Here, in addition to filing declarations from her three attorneys, Camacho also submitted declarations from two other

attorneys. One of these attorneys declared that Berg, Bragg,

and Rubin’s requested rates of $425, $465, and $500 were

within the range of prevailing market rates for attorneys with

similar experience and abilities in the Northern District. Similarly, the second attorney declared that the hourly rates

charged by Camacho’s three attorneys were consistent with,

if not slightly lower than, the prevailing market rates for attorneys with comparable skill, qualifications, experience, and

reputations. 

However, declarations filed by the fee applicant do not conclusively establish the prevailing market rate. “The party

opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that

requires submission of evidence to the district court challeng4250 CAMACHO v. BRIDGEPORT FINANCIAL

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ing the accuracy and reasonableness of the . . . facts asserted

by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates, 987

F.2d at 1397-98. In support of its opposition to Camacho’s

motion, Bridgeport Financial filed the declarations of two

attorneys from the law firm representing it in this case. One

attorney declared that the reasonable market rate for the services provided by Camacho’s three attorneys was in the $200

to $250 range, or perhaps even less. The other attorney’s declaration (which was made in another case), indicated that the

reasonable market rate for the services provided to the plaintiff in that case was in the $200 to $250 an hour range, or perhaps even less. 

[7] However, when the district court held that it would be

unreasonable on the facts of this case to award the full hourly

rates requested by Camacho’s attorneys, the court did not

identify which facts led to this conclusion, nor did the court

indicate why an hourly rate of $200 was “in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers

of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”

Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. The district court did not discuss

the declarations filed by either party, nor did the court distinguish between Camacho’s three attorneys, though they each

sought different hourly rates. We recognize that cases decided

in the Northern District offer a wide spectrum of reasonable

hourly rates, even for work performed by the same attorney.

Compare Defenbaugh, 2004 WL 1874978, at *7 ($435 a reasonable hourly rate for Bragg’s services), with Johnson v.

Credit Int’l, Inc., No. C-03-100 SC, 2005 WL 2401890, at *4

(N.D. Cal. July 28, 2005) ($250 a reasonable hourly rate for

Bragg’s services), aff’d in part and vacated and remanded in

part by unpublished mem., 05-16696, 2007 WL 3332813, at

*2 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2007). In light of the above, we remand

to the district court with instructions to determine the proper

amount of fees applying the legal standard set forth above,

and specifically by determining the prevailing hourly rate in

the Northern District for work that is similar to that performed

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in this case, by attorneys with the skill, experience and reputation comparable to that of Camacho’s attorneys. 

We also note that in determining the prevailing market rate

a district court abuses its discretion to the extent it relies on

cases decided years before the attorneys actually rendered

their services. Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 869

(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion to

apply market rates in effect more than two years before the

work was performed). Each of Camacho’s attorneys began

their services at different points in time, Berg in December

2003, Bragg in April 2004, and Rubin in January 2005. It is

clear, therefore, that on remand the district court should not

treat as dispositive the cases decided in 1998, 2000, and early

in 2001 when determining the prevailing market rate for any

of Camacho’s attorneys, as it did in its Second Amended

Order. 

Camacho also argues that the district court erred by relying

solely on FDCPA cases in determining the prevailing market

rate. Camacho is correct that “[i]n order to encourage able

counsel to undertake FDCPA cases, as congress intended, it

is necessary that counsel be awarded fees commensurate with

those which they could obtain by taking other types of cases.”

Tolentino, 46 F.3d at 652; see also Semar v. Platte Valley

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1986)

(explaining that reasonable hourly rate must be based on “customary fees in cases of like difficulty”). The record contradicts Camacho’s assertion, however, that the court considered

solely FDCPA cases, as the court included a trademark

infringement case in its eleven-case footnote. See Yahoo!, Inc.

v. Net Games, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

Again, however, the district court did not explain how this

non-FDCPA case factored into its determination of the prevailing market rate, or whether the court limited its analysis

primarily to FDCPA cases. Therefore, we simply note that on

remand the district court should not restrict its analysis to

FDCPA cases, or assume, as it apparently did, that Camacho’s

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particular FDCPA case was like the typical “action brought

for the violation of a mandatory provision of the FDCPA” in

terms of the complexity and difficulty of her attorneys’ services, particularly given their successful defense of Bridgeport Financial’s interlocutory appeal. 

C. Fees-on-fees 

[8] Camacho also argues that the district court abused its

discretion by awarding a “flat award” of $500 for fees-on-fees

rather than applying the lodestar method to determine a reasonable fee. “In statutory fee cases, federal courts, including

our own, have uniformly held that time spent in establishing

the entitlement to and amount of the fee is compensable.” In

re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 659-660 (9th Cir.

1985). This is so because it would be inconsistent to dilute a

fees award by refusing to compensate attorneys for the time

they reasonably spent in establishing their rightful claim to

the fee. Id. at 660; Kinney v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 939

F.2d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1991). However, “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation,”

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; and “[f]or rather obvious practical

reasons we are loath to disturb a ruling by a district judge on

a request for second-round attorneys’ fees.” Muscare v.

Quinn, 680 F.2d 42, 44 (7th Cir. 1982). 

Here, the district court found that a substantial award of

fees-on-fees would be inappropriate because Camacho’s attorneys regularly represent litigants in FDCPA cases, they are

experienced with the law governing fees and the process for

recouping them, and the materials submitted in this case were

virtually identical to those submitted by the attorneys in other

cases. Therefore, the court concluded, it would be inappropriate to award fees-on-fees on an hourly basis; and instead, the

court awarded a “flat award” of $500. 

Despite a district court’s discretion in determining the

amount of a fee award, it “must calculate awards for attorCAMACHO v. BRIDGEPORT FINANCIAL 4253

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neys’ fees using the ‘lodestar’ method.” Ferland, 244 F.3d at

1149 n.4. While in most cases the lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable, “in rare cases, a district court may make

upward or downward adjustments to the presumptively reasonable lodestar on the basis of those factors set out in Kerr

v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526, F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir.

1975), that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1402 (internal citations omitted).1

[9] Here, however, rather than calculating the lodestar, the

district court concluded that “it would be inappropriate to

award fees on fees on an hourly basis” and awarded Camacho

a “flat award” of $500 without discussing, or even mentioning, Bragg’s supplemental declaration. The court offered no

authority to support its conclusion that the lodestar method

could be abandoned in favor of a “flat award,” Bridgeport

Financial does not cite any, and we have found none. Nor did

the district court articulate any reasons why the lodestar

method could not adequately account for its specific concerns

in this case. 

[10] Citing Ferland, Bridgeport Financial notes that a district court may reduce attorneys’ fees by a percentage, so long

as the court sets forth clear and concise reasons for adopting

this approach. See Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1151 (explaining that

the district court must both “explain adequately the decision

to cut the lodestar hours . . . by the across-the-board method”

and “provide . . . some explanation for the precise reduction

chosen”); Gates, 987 F.2d at 1400 (recognizing that “percentages indeed are acceptable, and perhaps necessary, tools for

district courts fashioning reasonable fee awards”). However,

1The relevant factors include, for example, the preclusion of other

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; the amount involved and the

results obtained; the “undesirability” of the case; the nature and length of

the professional relationship with the client; and awards in similar cases.

See Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. 

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the district court did not make a percentage reduction after

calculating the lodestar; instead, the district court abandoned

the lodestar method in favor of a $500 “flat award.” While we

recognize a district court’s discretion to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure, the fact remains that “[t]he

most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley,

461 U.S. at 433. “This circuit requires a district court to calculate an award of attorneys’ fees by first calculating the ‘lodestar’ ” before departing from it. Caudle v. Bristow Optical

Co., Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis

added). Therefore, the district court erred by awarding a “flat

award,” and on remand the court should calculate the lodestar

to determine a presumptively reasonable fees-on-fees award

before assessing whether upward or downward adjustments

are warranted. 

Furthermore, while it is undisputed that Camacho’s initial

motion for costs and fees included time spent pursuing fees,

the district court failed to explain why it applied the lodestar

method (albeit with the errors identified above) to these feeson-fees requests, but refused to do so for any supplemental

requests. In the first part of its order, after acknowledging that

the attorneys were “already exceedingly well-versed on the

narrow legal question presented” the district court found all of

the attorneys’ hours in Camacho’s initial motion to be reasonable and computed their fee awards accordingly. However, in

the second part of its order, the court changed course, abandoned the lodestar method, and awarded a $500 “flat award”

because the attorneys supported their motion with substantially unchanged materials. The court offered no explanation

as to why it determined Camacho’s fees-on-fees award in part

using the lodestar method, and in part by awarding a $500

“flat award,” when the court’s concerns appear to focus on

hours included in Camacho’s initial application, which the

court found reasonable. This apparent internal inconsistency

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is itself sufficient to remand for a redetermination of the feeson-fees award employing the proper legal standard. 

Finally, as far as we can tell, despite the court’s finding that

the $1,495.00 in fees requested by Camacho for Bragg’s law

clerk/associate’s work and the $115.00 requested for the services rendered by Bragg’s paralegal were reasonable, the

court did not include these amounts in its final award. Therefore, on remand if it concludes again that Camacho is not entitled to fees for these services, the court shall explain the legal

basis for that conclusion.

VACATED and REMANDED.

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