Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-00384/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-00384-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Danny Lee Jones, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-01-00384-PHX-SRB

DEATH PENALTY CASE 

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Respondents’ Motion to Strike Juror Declarations (Doc. 251). 

This case is before the Court on remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for 

reconsideration, pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Dickens v. 

Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), of Jones’ claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Jones filed his supplemental Martinez brief on December 17, 2015. (Doc. 

246.) Respondents filed a response and Jones filed a reply. (Docs. 247, 250.) 

 Jones attached two exhibits to his reply brief. They are declarations from jurors 

from Jones’ 1993 trial.1

 Exhibit 26 is a declaration by juror Gwendelyn Munro, dated 

August 22, 2002. (Doc. 250-1.) She states that she “never agreed with the conclusions of 

the jury in the case,” “never believed [] Jones murdered the little girl,” “had many doubts 

 

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 Jones was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted first-degree murder. Jones killed his friend Robert Weaver with a baseball bat; 

attacked Weaver’s grandmother with the bat (she died from her injuries after trial); and killed Weaver’s seven-year-old daughter, Tisha, dragging her out from under her bed, striking her with the bat, and strangling or suffocating her. State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 

477–78, 917 P.2d 200, 206–07 (1996). The trial judge sentenced Jones to death. 

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about whether or not [] Jones was responsible for the death of the grandmother,” believed 

Jones murdered Robert Weaver but “never thought he should be found guilty of First 

Degree Murder for Mr. Weaver’s death,” did not believe Weaver’s death warranted the 

death penalty, and “felt pressured by other members to change my vote because the 

verdict had to be unanimous.” (Id. at 1–2.) 

 Exhibit 27 is a declaration by juror Mary Lou Herridge, dated August 20, 2002. 

(Doc. 250-2.) She states that she would not have sentenced Jones to death for Robert 

Weaver’s murder and if she had heard additional evidence regarding Frank Sperlazzo she 

would not have voted to convict Jones of Tisha Weaver’s murder.2

 (Id. at 1–2.) 

 Respondents contend that common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit 

the Court from considering the declarations. The Court agrees. Juror testimony cannot be 

used to impeach a verdict unless “extrinsic influence or relationships have tainted the 

deliberations.” Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987). Similarly, Rule 

606(b)(1) prohibits juror testimony “about any statement made or incident that occurred 

during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s 

vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.” Fed. R. Evid. 

606(b)(1). The Rule states that “[t]he court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence 

of a juror’s statement on these matters.” Id. The only exceptions to the Rule concern 

questions of whether “extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 

jury’s attention”; “outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror”; or 

“a mistake was in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2). 

 Jones cites the juror declarations in his reply, arguing that “at least two jurors 

would have sentenced Jones to life.” (Doc. 250 at 20.) He contends that the Court may 

consider the declarations because they do not challenge the verdict within the meaning of 

Rule 606(b) but are offered in response to Respondents’ argument that a death sentence 

was a foregone conclusion in Jones’ case. (Doc. 252 at 2.) 

 

2

 The additional evidence purportedly would have supported Jones’ testimony at trial that Sperlazzo killed Tisha. 

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 As Respondents note, courts have rejected the argument that juror affidavits may 

be considered under Rule 606(b) in support of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 

See Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) (juror’s affidavit, 

swearing that additional mitigation evidence gathered during the postconviction process 

might have had an impact on the jury’s penalty phase deliberations, was not competent 

evidence); Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (juror’s affidavit 

stating that the defendant’s lack of emotion was a factor in voting to recommend the 

death penalty was properly excluded from consideration); Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 

626, 636 (5th Cir. 1994) (district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony 

from jurors as to whether their deliberations would have been different if they had been 

presented with additional mitigating evidence); Coleman v. Sisto, No. 2:09-CV-0020-

DAD, 2012 WL 6020095, at *23 n.13 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (“Under [Rule 606(b)], 

these post-verdict juror affidavits cannot be considered as evidence in support of 

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”). 

 The proffered declarations concern the jurors’ deliberative process and the 

potential effect of evidence of their votes. Therefore, they may not be considered under 

Rule 606(b). See, e.g., Smith v. Schriro, No. CV-03-1810-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 726913, 

at *22–23 (D.Ariz. Mar. 21, 2006). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED granting Respondents’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 251). Exhibits 

26 and 27 to Jones’s reply brief (Doc. 250) are stricken from the record. 

 Dated this 15th day of June, 2016. 

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