Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01071/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01071-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY ECONOMUS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01071-HSG 

ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE 

MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL

Re: Dkt. No. 39

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Anthony Economus’s administrative motion to file 

under seal Exhibit A to the Declaration of Patrick Buelna in support of Plaintiff’s motion for leave 

to file Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 39 (“Mot.”). For the reasons 

articulated below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal 

documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana 

v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from 

the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 

records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in 

favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To 

overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a 

dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that 

outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the 

public interest in understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–

79 (quotations omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have 

become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, 

promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 

(quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the 

production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further 

litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.

The Court must “balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to 

keep certain judicial records secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal 

certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual 

basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5 

supplements the compelling reasons standard set forth in Kamakana: the party seeking to file a 

document or portions of it under seal must “establish[] that the document, or portions thereof, are 

privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . The 

request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b). 

Records attached to nondispositive motions, however, are not subject to the strong 

presumption of access. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Because such records “are often 

unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action,” parties moving to seal 

must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Id. at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This requires only a “particularized showing” that “specific 

prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. 

Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 

“Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will 

not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotations

omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

Because these records are attached to a nondispositive motion, the Court will apply the 

lower good cause standard. Plaintiff seeks to file under seal Exhibit A, copies of incident reports 

from the San Francisco Police Department related to the underlying collision in this action. See 

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Mot. at 2. The only basis Plaintiff proffers for sealing is that “Defendant [ ] has designated the 

incident reports prepared in connection with Plaintiff’s civil right injuries as ‘CONFIDENTIAL.’” 

Id. Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the motion similarly states that because Defendant alerted 

Plaintiff that the “police reports were designated in their entirety as ‘CONFIDENTIAL,’” they 

therefore “should be re-filed under seal.” Dkt. No. 39-2 ¶ 2. Plaintiff seeks to withhold Exhibit A 

in its entirety. Defendants did not file a declaration establishing that Exhibit A was sealable. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s cursory justification does not adequately plead a 

“particularized showing” of “specific prejudice or harm.” See Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210–11 

(citation and quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The fact that Exhibit A is 

designated as “Confidential” is not sufficient to establish that a document is sealable. Civ. L. R. 

79-5(d)(1)(A). “Confidential” is merely the parties’ initial designation of confidentiality to 

establish coverage under the stipulated protective order. See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa 

Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (“But 

good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the document is subject to a protective 

order or by stating in general terms that the material is considered to be confidential’”) (quoting 

Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL 482767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s motion does not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(d)(1)(A). Withholding 

Exhibit A in its entirety also does not appear “narrowly tailored” to seal only sealable material, as

required by Civil Local Rule 79-5. In addition, as the designating party for the materials in 

Exhibit A, Defendants did not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1), because it did not file a 

Declaration within four days of Plaintiff’s motion. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1). 

The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5(f)(2), 

Plaintiff may file an unredacted version of Exhibit A or a new motion to seal within seven days of 

this Order according to the requirements discussed above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

3/27/2019

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