Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01193/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01193-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY C. NELSON, NO. 2:05-cv-01193-MCE-KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF DAVIS; JAMES HYDE,

individually and in his 

official capacity as Chief

of Police for the CITY OF

DAVIS; CALVIN HANDY,

SERGEANT MICHAEL MASON,

OFFICER JAVIER BARRAGAN,

OFFICER BRANDON JONES,

OFFICER CALVIN CHANG,

OFFICER M. GARCIA,

individually and

DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Timothy C. Nelson (“Plaintiff”) seeks damages as

result of injuries he sustained during law enforcement activities

necessitated by a disturbance at an apartment complex in Davis,

California. Defendants include the City of Davis, Davis Chief of

Police James Hyde, and Davis Police Sergeant John Wilson. 

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2

In addition, because University of California, Davis (“U.C.

Davis”) police personnel assisted the City of Davis Police

Department in quelling the disturbance, Plaintiff has sued U.C.

Davis Officers Calvin Handy, Javier Barragan, and Mary Garcia. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional

rights by subjecting him to unreasonable seizure in violation of

both the United States and California Constitutions. Plaintiff

further asserts constitutional equal protection claims, as well

as additional common law and statutory claims sounding under

California law. 

Presently before the Court are three motions for summary

judgment, or alternatively partial summary judgment of certain

issues. The motions are brought on behalf of 1) the City of

Davis Defendants (Davis, Hyde and Wilson); 2) the U.C. Davis

Defendants with the exception of Calvin Chang (Handy, Barragan

and Garcia) and 3) Defendant Calvin Chang, individually. For the

reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions will be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On the evening of April 16, 2004, following the annual

Picnic Day festivities held at U.C. Davis, as many as a thousand

young people gathered at the Sterling Apartment complex on

Cantrill Drive in Davis. One resident of the complex described

the gathering as “the biggest party in history”. The Plaintiff,

a 20-year old college student, was in attendance.

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3

The City of Davis police became aware of the party after

noticing virtually gridlocked traffic along Cantrill Drive, and

upon observation of illegally parked cars on both sides of the

street for virtually its entire length. The police station

itself was located near the apartments at the corner of Cantrill

and Fifth Streets, and the sergeant on duty, Defendant Wilson,

dispatched police officers to begin issuing parking citations to

clear the improperly parked vehicles. The police also checked

the party itself, which Sergeant Wilson described as both

unusually large and loud. Underage alcohol violations were

observed, and Wilson claims he observed individuals trying to

vandalize vehicles by rocking them back and forth. One resident

described a chair being thrown from an upper story window. After

apprising an agent for the complex owner of the situation,

Sergeant Wilson was asked shortly before midnight to request that

all non-residents leave the premises under penalty of trespass.

The crowd did not respond to the police’s initial request to

disperse. Sergeant Wilson ordered two of the officers, who had

been on foot, to go back to the nearby station and return with

their patrol vehicles for an additional police presence. As one

of the vehicles drove through the complex (a group of several

story buildings situated on a rectangular lot), Wilson observed

partygoers surround the vehicle and begin throwing bottles. 

Although the patrol vehicle activated its emergency lights and

siren, Wilson states that it was unable to exit the complex

absent rescue intervention from both himself and other officers. 

Wilson then called for backup as both he and the officers

retreated back to the driveway at entrance to the complex.

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4

About forty officers arrived at the Davis Police station in

response to Defendant Wilson’s request, including Lieutenant

Darren Patel, who upon arrival assumed the role of incident

commander. U.C. Davis police officers, including Defendants

Chang, Barragan and Garcia, were among those who responded. 

Unlike their City counterparts, the U.C. Davis officers had

pepperball launchers in their arsenal for crowd dispersal. 

Pepperball launchers are dual purpose weapons that shoot round

plastic balls filled with Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) powder, a

substance similar to pepperspray. The launchers combine the

shock of kinetic impact (similar to paintballs) with the sensory

discomfort associated with pepperspray. They are designed to

break apart and disperse the OC powder upon impact.

Pepperball use is considered appropriate as long as the

projectiles are not aimed directly at sensitive body parts (such

as the face and groin) at distances of more than thirty feet. In

addition, pepperballs may properly be launched at hard building

surfaces like walls, ceilings, doors and windows within a hundred

foot radius for effective dispersal, or “area saturation”, of the

OC to the surrounding vicinity. Within these parameters,

pepperball use in crowd control and riot situations meets Peace

Officer Standards Training (“POST”) guidelines, and further was

authorized by U.C. Davis Police Department policy.

Following the officers’ initial retreat, the evidence shows

that the Sterling party careened further out of control. 

Sergeant Wilson could hear individuals shouting “fuck the police”

as the officers regrouped at the station. 

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 The fact that Plaintiff admittedly heard and understood 1

the dispersal orders being given, and went inside the complex as

a result, renders moot any claim that the orders were

insufficient to place him on notice of the police directive. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims that amplification was not

utilized and that exit routes were inadequate is immaterial.

5

At about 1:00 a.m., after meeting together to form a

dispersal plan, between 30 and 40 officers proceeded on foot to

the southwest corner of the apartment complex in full riot gear

(helmets, shields and batons). Four U.C. Davis officers,

including Officers Chang, Garcia and Barragan, carried pepperball

launchers. Crowd dispersal orders were given.

After observing the police, Plaintiff testified that he

retreated inside one of the complex buildings to a friend’s

apartment. Both officers and partygoers attest to the fact that

bottles and other objects were being thrown at the police from

various vantage points at this juncture, including upper story

balconies. At least one officer was injured by a thrown bottle,

and several others reported only narrowly being missed on

numerous occasions. When Plaintiff came downstairs and attempted

to exit the building, he admits that he heard crowd dispersal

orders issued by the police to “leave and go inside”. He 1

thereafter retreated inside the hallway where he remained about

fifteen minutes.

There is no dispute that the officer’s initial sweep through

the complex in riot gear failed to adequately disperse the

partygoers. Bottles and other debris continued to be thrown at

the police from multiple directions. The second sweep was

thereafter ordered and began from the southwest corner of the

complex in front of a breezeway. 

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6

During that second sweep, officers observed a group of between

fifteen and twenty individuals congregated at the back of an

apartment breezeway. Bottles were being thrown from the rear of

that group. According to Officer Wilson, after twice ordering

those present in the breezeway to disperse without success, he

ordered the U.C. Davis officers (Chang, Barragan and Garcia) to

launch pepperballs. The officers aimed both at hard surfaces

adjacent to the breezeway (the doors, ceiling and walls) and at

individuals who they observed throwing bottles (from below the

shoulders). 

Despite Plaintiff’s admission that he both heard and

understood the dispersal orders and observed the police in riot

gear, he nonetheless elected, contrary to the explicit directive

he had been given to remain inside the apartment, to exit a set

of double doors leading into the breezeway. As he exited, he

testified being immediately aware of the presence of stinging

pepperspray. He heard the sound of “mace bullets” hitting the

windows, doors and at points overhead. (Pl.’s Dep., 104:22-

105:15, 107:4-108:9). He was thereafter almost simultaneously

struck in the eye by a pepperspray bullet and allegedly sustained

permanent injuries to his left eye. As Plaintiff’s police

procedures expert admitted, Plaintiff walked into the line of

fire once he exited the hallway. Plaintiff does not know who

launched the pepperball that struck him. He denies ever throwing

anything at the police.

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7

The aftermath of the disturbance confirmed that vehicles and

apartments were vandalized during its course, and that at least

one swarm robbery occurred. One resident described the Sterling

complex as having been “trashed”.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for

summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

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 Because the instant federal constitutional protections 2

parallel those afforded by state constitution in this regard, 

(continued...)

8

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56

by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting

the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Genuine factual issues must exist that

“can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-631 (9th Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

ANALYSIS

A. Unreasonable Seizure under the Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff’s First and Fourth Claims for Relief assert his

right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 13 of the California Constitution, respectively. 

2

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(...continued) 2

the discussion that follows relies upon Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916,

928 (9th Cir. 2006). 

9

The Court must necessarily initially determine whether any

“seizure” has occurred giving rise to constitutional protection.

“A seizure triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections

occurs only when government actors have, by means of physical

force or show of authority, in some way restrained the liberty of

a citizen.” Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). 

The Supreme Court has further recognized that any constitutional

violation in this regard “requires an intentional acquisition of

physical control.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596

(1989). As the Brower court explained:

“[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever

there is a governmentally caused termination of an

individual’s freedom of movement (the innocent

passerby), or even whenever there is a governmentally

caused and governmentally desired termination of an

individual’s freedom of movement (the fleeing felon),

but only when there is a governmental termination of

freedom of movement through means intentionally

applied.”

Id.

To constitute a seizure, “the taking or detention itself

must be willful. This is implicit in the word ‘seizure,’ which

can hardly be applied to an unknowing act.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted).

Although the Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed the

issue of whether the rationale of Brower should be extended to

instances where a bystander is inadvertently shot by police, the

weight of authority elsewhere supports that proposition. 

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The caselaw Plaintiff cites is otherwise distinguishable 3

from the circumstances of the case at bar. While Jensen v. City

of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) did find that a Fourth

Amendment seizure occurred, that case involved the “friendly

fire” killing of a police officer where the evidence showed that

the decedent was targeted deliberately despite a mistake as to

his identity. Additionally, while the victim shot by police in

Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000) was only

the passenger in a car that attempted to strike two people

standing, there was no question that the police officer intended

to shoot at the vehicle in which the victim was riding. 

10

In Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir.

1990), the First Circuit found that no Fourth Amendment seizure

occurred because the plaintiff in that case was inadvertently

shot during the police pursuit of a robbery suspect and hence was

not intentionally seized by the police bullet that struck him. 

Similarly, in Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 280 (4th

Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit ruled that a seizure within the

Fourth Amendment could not be demonstrated where the victim, an

innocent bystander, was not the “intended object” of law

enforcement activity but instead was shot and killed by police

officers attempting to apprehend a fleeing criminal. Caselaw

from other circuits is also in accord. See, e.g., Childress v.

City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 2000); Medeiros

v. O’Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1998); Claybrook v.

Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff argues that this “bystander” line of cases is

inapplicable on grounds that the testimony of some witnesses

suggests that Plaintiff may have been in the breezeway at the

time the police began launching the pepperball projectiles, and

consequently was within the intended scope of the officers’ fire.3

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11

Any inference in that regard that may be drawn from the

equivocal testimony of others, however, is nullified by

Plaintiff’s own clear version of what transpired during the

period immediately surrounding his injury. Plaintiff testified

at deposition that he went inside an apartment building after

hearing a dispersal order to that effect from the officers. 

He went inside a set of double doors, but after remaining inside

for between ten and fifteen minutes decided to go back outside

despite his admission that he had been told otherwise. He states

1) that he heard the impact of shots being fired against the

doors, and over his head, as he exited; and 2) that he felt the

sting of pepperspray before something impacted his eye as he went

out the double doors. Pl.’s Dep., 104:18-23, 107:4-109:13. 

Plaintiff also testified that he was shot virtually

instantaneously with his exit back into the outside breezeway.

As a whole, Plaintiff’s testimony establishes that the

police officers began shooting before Plaintiff had exited back

outside through the doors into the breezeway, since Plaintiff

could not have heard the impact of pepperspray bullets and felt

the sensation of a chemical irritant unless the volley had

already been launched before he went outside. Plaintiff cannot

avoid summary judgment by citing testimony allegedly inconsistent

with his own testimony, as he attempts to do in arguing that

other witnesses offer confusing accounts of his whereabouts at

the time he was struck. 

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 Because no seizure occurred in the first place, it is not 4

necessary to consider here whether a seizure, had it occurred,

would have been deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

12

Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1995); see

also Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th

cir. 1991) (Plaintiff cannot create an issue of fact by an

affidavit contradicting his own prior deposition testimony). 

Moreover, as indicated above, even Plaintiff’s own police

practices expert concedes that Plaintiff walked into the line of

fire from a position in the hallway. Dep. of Roger Clark, 102:4-7.

Plaintiff’s own version of events mandate the applicability

of the bystander cases. Given his own admissions, he cannot

argue that he was an intended object of the police barrage

against the group in the hallway whose members were throwing

bottles at the police. Hence no seizure within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment occurred, and summary adjudication as to the

First and Fourth Claims for Relief will be granted.4

B. Due Process Claims

In addition to claims under the Fourth Amendment as

discussed above, Plaintiff argues, in his Second and Fifth Claims

for Relief, that his substantive due process rights were also

violated by Defendants’ use of force, citing the Fourth Amendment

of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7(a) of the

California Constitution.

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13

The concept of substantive due process protects against

arbitrary governmental action lacking “any reasonable

justification in the service of a legitimate governmental

objective.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846

(1998). As the Supreme Court explains, “only the most egregious

official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the

constitutional sense” on due process grounds. Id. 

Even negligently inflicted conduct fails to satisfy this high

threshold; rather, only conduct “so egregious, so outrageous that

it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience” may

suffice. Id. at 847.

As a preliminary matter, the fact that Plaintiff was not an

intended target of the pepperspray bullets launched into the

crowd in the breezeway (because he exited the double doors

leading onto the breezeway after the shooting started), would

appear dispositive of Plaintiff’s due process claims just as it

prevents him from stating a cognizable claim under the Fourth

Amendment as discussed above. In Moreland v. Las Vegas

Metropolitan Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1998), the

police, upon responding to a reported parking lot fight,

encountered a male firing a semiautomatic weapon at individuals

who were returning his fire. When the male failed to heed their

order to stop firing, the police opened fire and, in the process,

accidentally killed a bystander, Douglas, who was one of between

fifty and a hundred individuals trapped in the parking lot. 

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14

In analyzing the due process rights inuring to Douglas’

family members, the Ninth Circuit identified the “controlling

question” as “whether [the officer] acted with a purpose to harm

Douglas that was unrelated to his attempt to stop the male in the

parking lot from endangering others.” Id. at 373. 

The circumstances here show that Defendants could not have

acted with a purpose to harm Plaintiff since he was not even

among the crowd of individuals in the breezeway when they opened

fire; instead, by the admission of both Plaintiff and his police

practices expert, Plaintiff simply walked into Defendants’ line

of fire. Even apart from the fact that Plaintiff was not an

intended target, however, Defendants’ conduct cannot be deemed

egregious and/or outrageous in any event, as it must in order to

trigger due process liability. Where, as here, police officers

are called in to restore order in a rapidly evolving, tense

environment fraught with potential danger, any due process

violation turns on “whether force was applied in a good faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, supra, 523 U.S. at 853. Even “precipitate

recklessness” does not suffice to “spark the shock” required to

state a viable due process excessive force claim. Id. 

Plaintiff argues that the officers’ conduct in attempting to

disperse the crowd was deliberately indifferent. He alleges that

“firing indiscriminately into a crowd was outrageous”, and that

the police had time to consider other means available at their

disposal before resorting to the use of pepperball bullets. 

Pl.’s Opp., p. 18. 

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15

Plaintiff’s position that this equates into egregious

behavior sufficient to shock the conscience simply cannot be

maintained under the circumstances. 

Specific and explicit verbal requests for dispersal went

unheeded, and the size of the crowd, violence in the form of

throwing objects and vandalizing property, and threats against

the police officers (chants of “fuck the cops”) made it necessary

for the police to regroup before returning in force and in riot

gear to quell what was rapidly devolving into full-blown riot

conditions. Pepperball launchers were utilized only where groups

still refused to disperse, were still throwing objects at

officers, and failed to accede to final warnings before the

capsules were dispersed. This behavior on the part of the police

simply does not amount to the egregious indifference needed to

state a due process claim. Consequently Plaintiff’s claim under

the Fourteenth Amendment must fail. In addition, because the

California Supreme Court has held that damages claims cannot be

stated for violations of Article I, § 7(a) of the California

Constitution, Plaintiff’s due process claim founded on the state

constitution is also unavailing. Katzberg v. Regents, 29 Cal.4th

300, 324 (2002). Hence the Second and Fifth Claims for Relief

will be adjudicated in favor of the defense.

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16

C. Violation of Equal Protection Rights

Plaintiff’s Third and Sixth Claims for Relief are asserted

on equal protection grounds, also pursuant to the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7(a)

of the California Constitution. This claim is based on

Plaintiff’s contention that the police shot him in the eye with a

pepperball “due to the fact that he was a University student.” 

(See Defendant Chang’s Undisputed FactSee No. 47).

No viable equal protection claim can be asserted in this

case. In order to prevail on such a claim, Plaintiff must first

establish that Defendants classified and singled out a group of

which he was a member. There is absolutely no evidence, however,

that the police engaged in any such classification either on

grounds that the partygoers were university students or on any

other basis. Additionally, even if the police had been able to

identify university students, an unlikely scenario since

individuals cannot be so classified based on observation alone

(unlike other suspect classification like race), Plaintiff would

still need to show that other non-university students in similar

circumstances were treated unequally. See Silveira v. Lockyer,

312 F.3d 1052, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). Again, there is no evidence

of any such distinction having been made that would provide the

requisite control group for a valid equal protection argument.

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Even were Plaintiff able to identify a control group and

establish that university students were treated differently than

members of the control group, his equal protection claim would

still fail. Because students are not considered a “suspect

class” (see KDM ex rel. WJM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d

1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999)), scrutiny of their treatment by the

state is under the rational basis test, and survives

constitutional scrutiny if “rationally related to a conceivable

and legitimate state interest.” Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S.

53, 77 (2001). Here, there is no question that the police were

pursuing a legitimate government interest by suppressing a

violent disturbance and restoring the peace.

Plaintiff’s federally-based equal protection claim is

accordingly without basis. In addition, because the California

and federal claim tests for assessing equal protection are

substantially the same, there is no viable argument that

Plaintiff’s claim substantively fares any better under state law.

See Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 15 (1971). Moreover,

and as indicated above, California law does not support damages

claims under Article I, § 7(a) in any event. See Katzberg v.

Regents, supra, 29 Cal. 3d at 324. 

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D. Viability of Other Federally-Based Claims/Defenses

The Court concludes, consistent with its discussion above,

that Plaintiff has established no cognizable claim sounding

either in the protections afforded by the Fourth or Fourteenth

Amendments, or in corresponding unreasonable seizure/due process

provisions contained within the California Constitution. The

Court has further rejected Plaintiff’s constitutional equal

protection claims. Absent any such underlying constitutional

violations, Plaintiff cannot state claims premised on Defendants’

alleged official policies in facilitating such violations, or

supervisory/ratification claims against other police personnel

for constitutional violations that did not occur. See, e.g.,

City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 810-11 (1986) no

government liability for official policy or custom pursuant to

Monell v. Dept. Of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) absent

foundational constitutional violation). Moreover, without any

constitutional violation subject to potential immunity it is also

unnecessary to consider the defense claims for both qualified

immunity and absolute judicial immunity, and the Court declines

to do so. See, e.g., Moreland v. Las Vegas, supra, 159 F.3d at

371 n.4 (approach in resolving cases in which defense of

qualified immunity is raised should first be to determine whether

plaintiff has sustained a constitutional injury at all, citing

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, supra, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5.). 

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E. Causes of Action Premised Upon State Law

Pendent state claims asserted by Plaintiff include claims

for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, negligence and violation of the Bane Act, California

Code of Civil Procedure § 52.1.

Turning first to assault and battery, it is clear that an

assault and battery claim against a police officer requires that

unreasonable force be established. Edison v. City of Anaheim, 63

Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272 (1998); Finley v. City of Oakland, 2006

WL 269950, *14 (N.D. Cal. 2006). As an initial matter, because

the same standards apply to both state law assault and battery

and section 1983 claims premised on constitutionally prohibited

excessive force, the fact that Plaintiff’s constitutional claims

fail also disposes of the assault and battery claims. See, e.g.,

Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1412-13

(2002) (“[i]t appears unsound to distinguish between section 1983

and state law claims arising from the same alleged misconduct);

Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1999)

(treating section 1983 and state law battery claim as

synonymous).

An examination as to the reasonableness of the force

employed does not change the conclusion that Plaintiff’s assault

and battery claim is unavailing. Here, the evidence

unequivocally demonstrates that the officers were confronted with

a hostile crowd that refused to leave, even after the police made

one pass through and gave numerous orders to disperse. 

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In addition, before firing into the crowd at the end of the

breezeway, Officer Wilson testified he gave a dispersal order

that included a warning that shots would be fired if his request

went unheeded. Officer Wilson further testified that he waited

between 30 and 45 seconds before actually ordering the officers

equipped with pepperball launchers to fire. Finally, Plaintiff

walked into the line of fire despite admitting that he heard

orders to go inside, and despite hearing shots before he exited

outside. There is no evidence that anyone walked though the door

before Plaintiff walked through. These circumstances do not

demonstrate unreasonable force. 

Second, under California law, the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress requires Defendants to have

engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of

causing severe emotional distress. Potter v. Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993). Plaintiff has no

evidence that he was the intended target of any of the Defendant

officers, and consequently cannot show that any of the officers

intended to cause him emotional distress, as he must do to state

a viable claim. Additionally, where, as here, summary

adjudication is granted as to federally-based section 1983 claims

based on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims,

summary judgment is also appropriate with respect to any state

law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See

Finley v. City of Oakland, supra, 2006 WL 269950 at *14.

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Plaintiff’s negligence claim does require an assessment of

whether the officers used reasonable care in quelling the

disturbance at issue. Miller v. Kennedy, 196 Cal. App. 3d 141,

144 (1987). Given the police response as detailed above, and

Plaintiff’s decision to go outside (and into the line of fire) in

spite of the fact that he acknowledges being told to go inside,

there can be no breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care. 

In addition, because there is no evidence that the University of

California, Davis officers were inadequately trained, supervised

or subject to discipline with respect to pepperball launcher use,

there can be no supervisory liability for negligence on behalf of

UCD Police Chief Calvin Handy.

Plaintiff’s final state law claim, for violation of Section

52.1, fare no better. Section 52.1 itself provides no

substantive protections; instead, it simply enables individuals

to sue for damages as a result of constitutional violations. 

Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170-71 (9th 

Cir. 1996), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds in

Acri v. Varian Assocs., 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997). Because no

constitutional violation has been established, no claim under

Section 52.1 is cognizable.

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 5

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to summary

adjudication as to all claims pled in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

Summary Judgment is accordingly GRANTED and the Clerk is 5

directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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