Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00254/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00254-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHANIEL WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JENNIFER L. THUSTON, COLETTE 

HUMPHREY, DAVID ZULFA, DONNY 

YOUNGBLOOD,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00254-HBK

ORDER TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A

DISTRICT JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE 

THURSTON

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS CASE AS FRIVOLOUS1

(Doc. No. 1)

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Pending before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is Plaintiff Nathaniel 

Washington’s Complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). For the 

reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss the Complaint as 

frivolous and lacking an arguable basis in fact or law.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

A plaintiff who commences an action while in prison is subject to the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen a complaint that seeks relief 

against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon any 

defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the court to identify any cognizable claims and 

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2023). 

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dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v.

Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). A complaint is 

“factual[ly] frivolous [ ]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly 

incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” 

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1992). Section 1915 gives courts “the unusual power 

to pierce the veil” of a Complaint like Plaintiff's and to “dismiss those claims whose factual 

contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Clearly baseless 

factual allegations include those “that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Denton, 504

U.S. at 32-33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327, 328).

At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, 

construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 

2003). The Court’s review is limited to the complaint, exhibits attached, materials incorporated 

into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Petrie v.

Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). A court 

does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted 

deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Critical 

to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual basis. See 

Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint include “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not 

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sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not 

required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required 

to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 

2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant 

is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 

245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the court to advise a pro se litigant on how 

to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial 

decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 

n.13. Furthermore, the court in its discretion may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad 

faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

amendments previously allowed . . . .” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 

(9th Cir. 2010). 

BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action by 

filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). It is not clear where the 

events in the Complaint took place. (See generally id.). The Complaint identifies the following 

individuals as Defendants: (1) United States District Judge Jennifer Thurston; (2) Kern County 

Superior Court Judge Colette Humphrey; (3) Kern County Superior Court Judge David Zulfa; (4) 

Kern County Sheriff Donny Youngblood; (5) NSA Agent Steven (Last Name Unknown); (6) 

Cynthia Zimmer, Prosecuting Attorney, Kern County District Attorney’s Office; (7) Valerie 

Skidmore, Public Defender, Kern County Public Defender’s Office; (8) Felicia Nagle, 

Prosecuting Attorney, Kern County District Attorney’s Office; (9) Julio Martinez, Probation 

Officer, Kern County Probation Office; (10) Destry Jackson; (11) Nick Lackie, Prosecuting 

Attorney, Kern County District Attorney’s Office; and (12) Erik Levig, Sheriff Deputy, Kern 

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County Sheriff’s Office. (Id. at 3-4). The Complaint alleges claims of “utilization of false 

statutes” “conspiracy against rights,” retaliation, and “withholding exculpatory information.” 

(See id. at 5-8). The following facts are presumed to be true at this stage of the screening process.

On an unspecified date, Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that 

he was “conspired against by the superior court in case number: 1:24-cv-00035-JLT-SKO2.” (Id. 

at 5). Judge Thurston dismissed the petition “with what [Plaintiff] believe[s] to be false federal 

statutes.” (Id.). The Complaint further alleges that Judge Thurston “informally communicated 

with other co-conspirators and allowed her judgment to be influenced by those who tamper with 

witnesses and conspire against Defendants all-the-time.” (Id.). Under the injury section, Plaintiff 

states, “I was raped in custody while I was unconscious” but does not allege any facts to indicate 

this injury is related to any actions taken by Defendant Thurston. (Id.).

In a second claim, the Complaint asserts that Defendant Humphrey and other unspecified 

co-conspirators “may have contacted Judge Thurston to influence her to dismiss a torture 

conspiracy.” (Id. at 6). Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges a conspiracy involving 

Defendants Thurston, Humphrey, and unspecified co-conspirators. Plaintiff checks the box next 

to “Retaliation” but does not set forth any facts indicating that any Defendant retaliated against 

him. Plaintiff also indicates under the Administrative Remedies for Claim 2 that he did not 

attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies and that none were available, adding, “No way I 

can report a federal crime to anyone from here.” (Id.).

In a third claim, the Complaint asserts:

Thurston knew of the conspiracy before her dismissal. She knows 

2 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Washington v. Youngblood, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:24-cv00035-JLT-SKO, a federal habeas petition filed by Plaintiff, was dismissed on February 14, 2024 based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his state court remedies. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take 

judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute” because they are either “generally 

known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction,” or they “can be accurately and readily determined 

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court may 

take judicial notice on its own or at the request of any party. Id. 201(c). Courts judicially notice other 

court proceedings “if those proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue.” United States ex. 

Rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Counsel v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted); Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2011). However, 

a court may not take judicial notice of findings of facts from another case. Walker v. Woodford, 454 F. 

Supp. 2d 1007, 1022 (S.D. Cal. 2006).

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it’s a false imprisonment and torture conspiracy and a hate crime. 

She is withholding corruption information from the Eastern District 

by engaging in this conspiracy. Essentially, District Judge Jennifer 

Thurston is conspiring to cover-up several conspiracies at once with 

her dismissal of what may involve treason and sedition by county 

employees and federal employees.

Id. at 7. Plaintiff again notes in the Administrative Remedies section that he did not attempt to 

exhaust his administrative remedies and contends that none were available. (Id.).

As relief, Plaintiff seeks a grand jury, for “co-conspirators [to be] federally prosecuted for 

this conspiracy,” appointment of a “lawful district judge” and for his fees to be waived. (Id. at 8).

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Judicial Immunity

Judges enjoy immunity for “judicial acts” performed in the course of their work. Lund v. 

Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2021), cert denied, 142 S.Ct. 900 (2022). As such, they cannot 

be subject to liability for action taken within the jurisdiction of their courts. Schucker v. 

Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Otherwise, “[s]ubjecting judges to 

liability for the grievances of litigants would destroy that independence without which no 

judiciary can be either respectable or useful.” Lund, 5 F.4th at 971 (citation omitted). To 

determine whether an act is judicial, a court must consider whether “‘(1) the precise act is a 

normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy 

centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly 

and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity.’” Id. 

(quoting Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Here, Judge Thurston is protected by judicial immunity because Plaintiff challenges 

conduct that constitutes a “judicial act.” Each of the three claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint centers

on Judge Thurston’s February 14, 2024 order dismissing his federal habeas petition. (See 

generally Doc. No. 1; see Doc. No. 6, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:24-cv-00035-JLT-SKO). As the 

district judge presiding over this matter, she performed a “normal judicial function”—one that is 

required by law—when she ruled on a Findings and Recommendations by the assigned magistrate 

judge, recommending dismissal of the petition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (requiring magistrate 

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judge to submit findings and recommendations on certain matters to the district judge) and 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (permitting “The Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court [to] entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

. . .”). Because Plaintiff’s claims against Thurston arise out of her “normal judicial functions” of 

reviewing habeas corpus petitions, the Court concludes that judicial immunity bars Plaintiff's 

§ 1983 claims against her.

B. Conspiracy

A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons who, by some concerted 

action, intend to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another, which 

results in damage. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). To prove 

a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must show that the conspiring parties reached a unity of purpose 

or common design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful agreement. Id.

Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are not sufficient to support a § 1983 conspiracy 

claim. Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Although an 

“agreement or meeting of minds to violate [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights must be 

shown,” Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989), “[d]irect evidence 

of improper motive or an agreement to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights will only rarely be 

available. Instead, it will almost always be necessary to infer such agreements from 

circumstantial evidence or the existence of joint action.” Mendocino Environmental Center v.

Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1302 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, “an agreement need not be overt, 

and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the 

defendants.” Id at 1301.

Here, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims are wholly speculative, conclusory, facially irrational 

and incredible. The Complaint is devoid of any facts supporting a claim of conspiracy, but rather 

consists of Plaintiff’s conjecture and speculation: “I have reason to believe Judge Thurston . . . 

may have acted in conspiracy with the other Defendants . . . I think she informally communicated 

with other co-conspirators” (Doc. No. 1 at 5) (emphasis added); “Humphrey . . . along with other 

co-conspirators . . . may have contacted Judge Thurston to influence her . . . I believe Thurston 

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allowed herself to be sucked in a conspiracy.” (Id. at 6) (emphasis added). Indeed, such 

allegations, in addition to being wholly conclusory and insufficient to support a § 1983 claim, are 

completely frivolous. See Bonilla v. Unknown, 2019 WL 4849159, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019)

(dismissing as frivolous Plaintiff's attempt to invoke federal jurisdiction pursuant to three criminal 

statutes in an effort to “challenge the validity of his Alameda County criminal judgment and death 

sentence, on grounds that he has been the subject of a criminal conspiracy among various judges 

to “frame [him] for a crime that [he] never committed.”). 

C. Claims Against Remaining Defendants

Of the remaining Defendants listed in Plaintiff’s Complaint, only one, Judge Colette 

Murphy, is even mentioned in the body of the Complaint. As to her, she is mentioned only in 

passing, stating, “Humphrey (Judge Colette Humphrey) along with other co-conspirators,--they 

may have contacted Judge Thurston to influence her to dismiss a torture conspiracy.” (Doc. No. 1 

at 6). For reasons noted above, the torture conspiracy claim against Humphrey and others fails to 

state a claim and is frivolous. See Suess v. Obama, 2017 WL 1371289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10,

2017) (finding complaint frivolous that alleged conspiracy between President, CIA, and FBI to 

torment plaintiff over six year period); Sierra v. Moon, 2012 WL 423483, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8,

2012)(dismissing complaint as frivolous that alleged conspiracy by various defendants and exmilitary and CIA to defraud plaintiffs' interests and murder him).

As to the remaining 10 Defendants, several would likely be entitled to either judicial or 

prosecutorial immunity, and one does not appear to be a state actor. In any event, none of them 

are mentioned anywhere in the Complaint. To be plausible and survive screening, a complaint 

must include sufficient factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Complaint simply 

fails to allege any facts as to any of these 10 Defendants to support a constitutional claim against 

them. Thus, the Court finds no claim stated as to these eleven Defendants.

D. Plaintiff’s Requested Relief

As relief, Plaintiff asks this Court to impanel a grand jury and order “co-conspirators 

federally prosecuted for this conspiracy.” (Doc. No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff does not cite any authority 

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for his request that the Court impanel a grand jury. The impaneling of grand juries by federal 

courts is governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331 and 3332. The later provision states:

It shall be the duty of each such grand jury impaneled within any 

judicial district to inquire into offenses against the criminal laws of 

the United States alleged to have been committed within that district. 

Such alleged offenses may be brought to the attention of the grand 

jury by the court or by any attorney appearing on behalf of the United 

States for the presentation of evidence. Any such attorney receiving 

information concerning such an alleged offense from any other 

person shall, if requested by such other person, inform the grand jury 

of such alleged offense, the identity of such other person, and such 

attorney’s action or recommendation.

18 U.S.C. 3332(a). Prosecutorial decisions and presentment of evidence to a grand jury lies with 

the United States Attorney’s Office and not with the courts. See Brown v. Gomez, 2001 WL 

985623, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 

impanel a grand jury or by failing to present Brown’s proposed complaint to a grand jury, because 

pursuit of indictments and prosecutions is within the exclusive discretion of the United States 

Attorney.”). No private right of action is available under § 3332(a) that would authorize the relief 

sought in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Id.; see also Norman v. U.S. Atty Gen. for W.D. Tex., 2024 WL 

64769, 2 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024) (affirming rejection of mandamus relief under § 3332 because “a 

private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of 

another”); Morales v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 580 F. App’x 881, 886 (11th Cir. 2014); Mowish v. Gentry, 

156 F.3d 1231, *2 (6th Cir. July 31, 1998) (unpublished table opinion); Hantzis v. Grantland, 772 

F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D. D.C. 2009) (“no private right of action is available” under § 3332(a)); Lundy 

v. United States, 2007 WL 4556702, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2007), corrected on other grounds, 

2008 WL 2510172 (C.D. Ill. June 19, 2008) (“§ 3332(a) does not confer a private right of 

action”); Bryant v. Fienberg, 2006 WL 2924744, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2006) (the “plaintiff 

does not have a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a), the Special Grand Jury 

statute”); Arnett v. Unknown, 2011 WL 4346329, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (“Section 

3332(a) contains no ‘clear and unambiguous’ statement conferring a private right of action on an 

individual to present evidence to a special grand jury or to compel a United States Attorney to do 

so”); In re Schleeper, 1997 WL 811797, *1 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (§ 3332 “contains no provision 

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requiring the district court to refer a private complaint to the grand jury”); Huber Heights 

Veterans Club v. Bowman, 2022 WL 11736539, *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2022) (same).

Claims that do not provide a private right of action may be considered frivolous. See 

Taylor v. Kolbaba, 909 F.2d 1489, *2 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table opinion) (deciding that 

the entirety of a pro se plaintiff’s original complaint which included claims that provided no 

private right of action was frivolous and could not be cured by amendment); Self v. Chase Bank, 

N.A., 2011 WL 3813106, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011) (holding that a pro se plaintiff’s claims 

that provided no private right of action were frivolous when “precedent clearly forecloses private 

rights of action on such claims.”); Gilbert v. U.S. Atty for the State of Calif., 2018 WL 11252687, 

*2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2018) (denying in forma pauperis application and dismissing complaint 

brought under criminal statute with no private right of action as frivolous).

Based on the case law discussed above, including that conferring judicial immunity on 

Defendant Thurston, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint is based on indisputably meritless 

legal theories and lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. 

Consequently, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed without prejudice.

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend shall be freely 

given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court is mindful that it must 

liberally construe the inartful pleading of pro se litigants. In this instance, the Court finds no 

amendment could cure the deficiencies and frivolous nature of Plaintiff’s petition and therefore, 

less drastic alternatives to dismissal are unnecessary. See Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 

(9th Cir. 2004); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(because plaintiff’s claims are frivolous , “there is by definition no merit to the underlying action 

and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that granting leave to 

amend would be futile and recommends this action be dismissed without prejudice and without 

leave to amend.

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED:

The Clerk of Court randomly assign this case to a district judge other than Judge Jennifer 

L. Thurston for consideration of these Findings and Recommendations.

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It is further RECOMMENDED:

The Complaint (Doc. No. 1) be dismissed under § 1915A as frivolous and for failing to 

state a claim and further leave be denied. 

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The assigned District Judge 

will review these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). A party’s 

failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Dated: April 19, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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