Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03508/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03508-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FARUK CENAP YETEK DDS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE DENTAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,

et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

SHIYU WANG,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE DENTAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,

et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-3702 CRB

and related case:

No. C 09-3508 CRB

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

Shiyu Wang and Frank Cenap Yetek, both dentists, have sued various California

institutions and officers for harms flowing from an allegedly baseless Medi-Cal fraud

prosecution. The State Defendants and Stanislaus County have moved to dismiss. For the

reasons below, the motions are GRANTED. First, suits against state agencies, such as the

California Dental Board, are barred by the 11th Amendment. It is beyond question that a suit 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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for damages against a state is untenable. Second, for similar reasons, suits against California

officers acting in their official capacity are barred. Third, the prosecuting authorities sued in

their individual capacities are protected individually by the absolute immunity afforded to

prosecutors. Fourth, the state’s expect, Susan Jane Quon DDS, is entitled to qualified

immunity. Fifth, and finally, the complaint in Yetek fails to allege any facts supporting a

cause of action against the County of Stanislaus. 

If Plaintiffs seek to maintain actions against these defendants, they must address

conduct that is not covered by these immunities.

BACKGROUND

The complaints in these two cases are largely identical. This order will address them

together using joint citations to paragraph numbers, and will note the few instances of

material differences. 

Plaintiffs are dentists who worked for a time for Hatch Dental in Modesto California. 

The owner of Hatch Dental, Kyon Tao, in addition to plaintiffs and 18 other individuals, was

prosecuted for “fraudulently billing Denti-Cal, a state agency.” Yetek Complaint ¶ 17; Wang

Complaint ¶ 16. Plaintiffs contend that these prosecutions were “wrongful and

unsupported,” in part because “Defendants could not, and were never able to provide a

detailed explanation of [Plaintiffs’] wrongful acts, or accusations supported by evidence,

between the dates of Plaintiff’s arrest and the date the Court dismissed the action against

Plaintiff . . . .” Wang Complaint ¶ 20; cf. Yetek Complaint ¶ 22-23. Both plaintiffs allege

that “[t]he courts ordered Defendants to provide Plaintiff with all discovery. The defendants

claims they could not do so. This was false . . . .” Wang Complaint ¶ 22; Yetek Complaint

¶ 25. Plaintiffs also allege that a state’s expert, Susan Jane Quon, made assertions despite

having an insufficient factual basis. Wang Complaint ¶ 25; Yetek Complaint ¶ 26. They

further allege that the expert “was married to an attorney in defendants’ office,” and “was

dismissed because of the . . . conflict of interest on the Defendants part involving that

expert.” Yetek Complaint ¶ 26; Wang Complaint ¶ 23. The criminal case was dismissed on

August 13, 2008. Yetek Complaint ¶ 29; Wang Complaint ¶ 26.

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Apparently Plaintiffs were also subjected to a parallel administrative proceeding

arising out of these allegations. The complaints, however, do not clearly distinguish between

the actions and there is therefore scant elaboration regarding the nature of these

administrative actions. Plaintiff Yetek refers to such proceedings as “the Dental Board

Proceedings,” but does not provide independent factual allegations concerning how they

were conducted. However, he does allege that the proceedings were “dismissed for lack of

Evidence sufficient to warrant their prosecution.” Yetek Complaint ¶ 34. Wang’s complaint

is even more vague, and does not specifically refer to an administrative proceeding. 

Nevertheless, the complaint does name the Dental Board as a defendant. 

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard 

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a cause of action which fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Wyler-Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., 135

F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint

must state a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009). A claim has “facial plausibility” when the pleaded factual allegations “allow

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. Moreover, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Despite the requirement that factual

allegations in the complaint be taken as true, a legal conclusion “couched as a factual

allegation” need not be accepted. Id. 

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally required to grant the

plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to amend the pleadings was made, unless

amendment would be futile. Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc.,

911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment would be futile,

the court examines whether the complaint could be amended to cure the defect “without

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contradicting any of [the] original complaint.” Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291,

296 (9th Cir. 1990). Leave to amend should be liberally granted. Id. at 296-97.

2. Analysis

A. Defendants Dental Board of California and California Department of 

Justice

Under the Eleventh Amendment, “agencies of a state are immune from private

damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.” Aguon v.

Commonwealth Ports Auth., 316 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2003). Ninth Circuit cases have

established a multi-factor test for determining whether a governmental agency is an arm of

the state. The factors are “whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds,

whether the entity performs central governmental functions, whether the entity may sue or be

sued, whether the entity has the power to take property in its own name or only the name of

the state, and the corporate status of the entity.” Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community

College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988). The California Department of Justice is

clearly a state agency. As for the Dental Board, the allegations in the complaint are quite

thin. However, all allegations are consistent with the conclusion that the Dental Board is a

prototypical state agency. In fact, the complaints themselves refer to the Dental Board as an

“existing California Agenc[y].” Wang Complaint ¶ 4. In order to survive a motion to

dismiss, plaintiffs must allege some fact suggesting that the Dental Board is something other

than a state agency protected by the 11th Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that it is inappropriate

to rely on the 11th Amendment at the pleading stage, but there is no authority for this. 

Plaintiffs have alleged that the Dental Board is a state agency, but if they nevertheless

contend that the agency is not shielded by the 11th Amendment by virtue of the factors

outlined in Mitchell, they must allege facts to support such a conclusion.

The claims as to the California Department of Justice are dismissed WITH

PREJUDICE, while the claims as to the Dental Board are dismissed WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

B. Suits against individual defendants in their official capacities

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Both plaintiffs purport to sue “each and all Defendants (except the State Agencies) in

both their individual and official capacities.” Yetek Complaint ¶ 14; Wang Complaint ¶ 13. 

Plaintiffs do not seek any injunctive relief, and ask instead only for an award of money

damages. However, the Eleventh Amendment also bars damages actions against state

officials in their official capacity. Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007);

Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the

claims against employees of the Department of Justice in their official capacities are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

C. Suits against individual defendants in their individual capacities

While the complaints are by no means clear as to the identity of all named defendants,

nor the roles they played in the prosecution, the individual defendants appear to fall into two

categories: (1) prosecutors, and (2) witnesses. These will be addressed separately.

i. Suits against prosecutors

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suits relating to their performance of

prosecutorial functions. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). The complaints here are therefore barred. Both Plaintiffs

complain that they never should have been prosecuted, that Defendants failed to turn over

certain evidence, and that Defendants knew that the charges were baseless. Even if true,

such allegations are precisely the sorts of claims that are barred by absolute prosecutorial

immunity. While Plaintiffs are quite right the prosecutors performing investigatory functions

are not absolutely immune, there are no allegations in the complaint of any such investigative

actions. Instead, the complaints allege that the prosecutors persisted in the criminal action

despite the absence of sufficient evidence. This is a prototypical prosecutorial decision. 

The complaints also suggest that the administrative actions taken against plaintiffs

give rise to liability. While the complaints fail to allege any specific facts regarding these

administrative actions, it appears that these actions were initiated in order to revoke

plaintiffs’ dental licenses. As an initial matter, the complaints fail to list any individual

member of the Dental Board who was responsible for initiating or conducting the

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administrative proceeding. The Dental Board itself, as noted above, is immune under the

Eleventh Amendment. The only individual members of the Board named as defendants are

Susan Quon and Norton Rosenberg. Quon, however, was a witness in the underlying

criminal action, and there are no allegations that she was involved in initiating or conducting

the administrative proceeding. As for Rosenberg, the complaints are devoid of factual

allegations as to his role in the proceeding.

Even if plaintiffs had named an individual on the dental board responsible for the

administrative action, that individual is likely protected by absolute immunity. The only

circuit authority identified by the parties holds that the individuals responsible for bringing

such administrative actions are similarly shielded by absolute immunity. See Horwitz v.

State Bd. of Medical Examiners of State of Colo., 822 F.2d 1508, 1514-15 (10th Cir. 1987)

(“[D]efendant Board [of Medical Examiners] members, who performed statutory functions

both adjudicatory and prosecutorial in nature, are entitled to absolute immunity from

damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There exists a strong need to insure that

individual Board members perform their functions for the public good without harassment or

intimidation.”); see also Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269, 278 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that

physician’s suit against members of the State Medical Licensing Board sued individually for

damages in connection with Board’s suspension of his license are protected by quasi-judicial

immunity); Wang v. New Hampshire Bd. of Registration in Medicine, 55 F.3d 698, 701 (1st

Cir. 1995). Given this background, the complaints fail to allege any specific facts to cast

doubt on the propriety of absolute immunity here.

These claims are therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Plaintiffs wish

to file an amended complaint, they must include facts relating either to the investigative

conduct of the prosecutors, or relating to whether the Dental Board is in fact an arm of the

state.

ii. Witnesses

Both plaintiffs have also named and served Dr. Susan Jane Quon as a defendant. Quon

is alleged to have been hired as a dental expert whose assertions “were the basis of the case

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 If Quon actually testified at a hearing, she is entitled to absolute immunity for such testimony.

Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1691, 1696 (1999). There are no such allegations in the complaints, but

again, they are exceedingly vague.

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against Plaintiff, were contrary to standard of practice and commonly accepted professional

principles, practices, and publications, and the evidence in this case.” Yetek Complaint ¶ 26;

Wang Complaint ¶ 23.

In substance, the complaints allege that Dr. Quon’s “testimony” formed the basis of

the State Defendants’ decision to prosecute. The Supreme Court has held an advocate’s

participation in investigatory functions is shielded only by qualified immunity. However, the

complaint is not entirely clear as to whether Dr. Quon was, in fact, an “advocate.” In fact,

the complaints suggest that Dr. Quon was not actually a regular employee of the Dental

Board. They allege that the Defendants “hired a second dental expert, a prosthodontist,

Susan Jane Quon . . . who was married to an attorney in defendants’ office, and was

personally treating Defendants employees.” Wang Complaint ¶ 23. This suggests that Dr.

Quon was simply hired as an expert witness, not that she made any decision to prosecute

plaintiffs. Furthermore, it suggests that her conduct is not that of a state agent, but rather a

private party who offered her expert opinion. Unless the state were somehow involved in

influencing the content of that opinion, there is no basis for alleging that those contents were

the result of state action. The complaints’ conclusory assertions that she acted as “an agent,

servant employee or representative of state agency [sic]” cannot control in light of the more

specific factual allegations that she was not, in fact, an agent of the state. 

Even if Quon is, in fact, a state agent, she is protected by qualified immunity.1

 This

means that Quon can only be held liability if her conduct violated a clearly established

constitutional right. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). As currently drafted,

the complaint fails to identify a constitutional right that Dr. Quon infringed. The complaints

allege that she made assertions that “were contrary to standard of practice and commonly

accepted professional principles, practices, and publications, and the evidence in the case.” 

Wang Complaint ¶ 23. Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority for the proposition that a

government agent’s failure to adhere to a “standard of practice” is a constitutional violation. 

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G:\CRBALL\2009\3508\Order on mot to dismiss.wpd 8

The gravamen of this action concerns allegations of a fraudulent prosecution. However, the

complaint does not allege that Quon played any role in the decision to initiate that

prosecution. She merely made assertions that plaintiffs disagree with. Those assertions led

to the other defendants’ decision to prosecute plaintiff, but there is no factual allegation as to

how Quon’s conduct itself violated a right. Plaintiff Yetek in his opposition cites to Keko v.

Hingle, 318 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2003), but that case involved allegations of an

unconstitutional search warrant. There is no similar allegation here, and indeed plaintiffs fail

to identify a constitutional right infringed by Quon’s conduct. 

Plaintiffs’ claims against Quon are therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

D. Stanislaus County

Finally, Plaintiff Yetek also names Stanislaus County as a defendant. However, the

complaint makes no factual allegation as to the County’s role. On the contrary, all the

factual allegations suggest the prosecution was initiated by the State, not the County. Claims

as to Stanislaus County are therefore DISSMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiffs are

granted leave to amend only as set forth above. .

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 22, 2010 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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