Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00470/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00470-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSHUA CHAVEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF HAYWARD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00470-DMR 

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

COUNTERCLAIM

Re: Dkt. No. 50

Before the court is Defendant City of Hayward’s motion for leave to file counterclaims. 

[Docket No. 50.] The court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing the 

viability of Defendant’s proposed counterclaims, which the parties timely filed. [Docket Nos. 57, 

58 (Def.’s Suppl. Brief), 61 (Pl.’s Suppl. Brief), 62 (Def.’s Suppl. Reply).] The court has 

determined that his matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. 

L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is denied. 

I. Factual Background

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

This lawsuit arises from a January 2013 response to a 911 call at Plaintiff Joshua Chavez’s 

Hayward home. Following an alleged report of a possible domestic disturbance in the apartment 

Plaintiff shared with his girlfriend, three Hayward police officers were dispatched to the scene. 

(Compl. ¶ 16.) Upon their arrival, Defendant Officers Manuel Troche, Richard McLeod, and 

Michael Miller allegedly could hear Plaintiff and his girlfriend arguing inside the apartment. 

(Compl. ¶ 17.) Officer Troche kicked down the door and the three officers entered. (Compl. ¶ 

18.) According to Plaintiff, the officers then threw Plaintiff to the ground, struck him repeatedly, 

and broke his left arm, fracturing his left elbow and humerus. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-26.) 

Plaintiff filed this action in January 2014 against Defendant City of Hayward (“the City”

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or “Hayward”) and three Hayward police officers, Manuel Troche, Richard McLeod, and Michael 

Miller (collectively, “the officers”), bringing a § 1983 claim against the officers for excessive 

force and a § 1983 claim against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of 

New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), as well as various state law claims. 

B. Defendant’s Proposed Counterclaims

The City seeks leave to file counterclaims for quantum meruit and violation of California’s 

Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1, based upon Chavez’s alleged actions prior to the 

confrontation with the officers. The City alleges that at all relevant times Plaintiff lived with his 

girlfriend, Alexandra Apfeltzweig, in Hayward, California. On January 19, 2013, Plaintiff was at 

home waiting for Apfeltzweig to return after a job interview and evening out with a friend in San 

Francisco. She did not return until after 3:00 a.m., and the City alleges that Plaintiff was “jealous 

and enraged.” (Proposed Counterclaims ¶¶ 6, 7.) Plaintiff and Apfeltzweig began to argue, and 

the City alleges the argument became “heated and physical.” (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 8.) 

According to the City, Plaintiff pinned Apfeltzweig down, forcibly covering her mouth to silence 

her screams and prevent her from calling for help, and threw her against the wall. The City also 

alleges upon belief that Plaintiff repeatedly struck Apfeltzweig in the face. (Proposed 

Counterclaims ¶ 8.) The struggle lasted between 20-30 minutes, and Plaintiff’s neighbor called 

911 twice “reporting that she could hear a woman getting bounced off the walls, crying, and 

begging a male to stop hitting her and to get off of her.” (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 9.)

The officers responded to the scene in response to the 911 calls. They heard Apfeltzweig’s 

statement “get off of me” along with “sounds of a violent struggle.” After knocking and 

announcing their presence, there was no response, but the officers heard the assault continue, and 

“[f]earing for the victim’s safety,” breached the door. (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 11.) According 

to the City, Plaintiff attempted to attack an officer and after a brief struggle in which he resisted 

arrest, the officers took Plaintiff into custody. (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 11.) Apfeltzweig had 

visible signs of injury, including a swollen forehead, cheek, and lips, as well as blood on her lip. 

The City’s fire department rendered aid on the scene. (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 12.) The City

alleges that although Apfeltzweig was thankful to have Plaintiff arrested, she refused to testify in 

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his criminal prosecution.1 (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 13.)

The City’s quantum meruit claim is based upon its allegation that it was foreseeable that 

Plaintiff’s conduct in battering Apfeltzweig would cause the City’s police and fire departments to 

respond to the scene. (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 15.) Both departments did respond and 

provided services, the value of which exceeds $6,000, and Plaintiff has not paid Hayward for the 

services rendered in response to the “Domestic Violence Incident that he caused.” (Proposed 

Counterclaims ¶¶ 17-19.) The City further alleges that Plaintiff “intentionally interfered with” 

Apfeltzweig’s civil rights by threats, intimidation, and coercion, thus violating the Bane Act, and 

that the City is entitled to an award of statutory damages and attorney’s fees under section 52.1. 

(Proposed Counterclaims ¶¶ 21-25.)

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), once a responsive pleading has been 

filed, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the 

court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Amendments to add counterclaims are controlled by 

Rule 15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, advisory committee notes to 2009 Amendments (“Rule 15 [is] the 

sole rule governing amendment of a pleading to add a counterclaim.”). The court should “freely 

give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), and “[t]his policy is to be 

applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 

(9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). In the absence of an “apparent reason,” such as undue delay, 

bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice to defendants, futility of the amendments, or repeated failure 

to cure deficiencies in the complaint by prior amendment, it is an abuse of discretion for a district 

court to refuse to grant leave to amend a complaint. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); 

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir.1999). These 

factors do not “merit equal weight,” and “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party 

 

1

Plaintiff was arrested for violating California Penal Code section 273.5, described in Defendant 

Troche’s police report as “Assault-Domestic Violence/Inflicting Corporal Injury (Spouse or 

Cohabitant Abuse),” and resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer pursuant to California Penal 

Code section 148. (Carlson Decl., March 3, 2015, ¶ 2, Ex. A.) He was ultimately charged with 

one count of violating section 148, and the charge was eventually dismissed. (Carlson Decl. ¶ 9.)

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that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. “Granting leave to amend 

does not necessarily mean that the underlying allegations ultimately have merit.” FlatWorld 

Interactives LLC v. Apple Inc., 12-CV-01956-WHO, 2013 WL 6406437, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 

2013). “Rather, ‘[a]bsent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [ ] factors, there 

exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.’” Id. (quoting 

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052). 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff opposes the City’s motion, arguing that the proposed counterclaims are untimely

and will cause undue prejudice to Plaintiff. He also argues that the counterclaims are futile. The 

court will address each argument in turn.

A. Timeliness of Amendment & Prejudice to Plaintiff

Plaintiff argues that leave to amend should be denied due to the City’s undue delay. 

According to Plaintiff, the City’s proposed counterclaims arose over two years ago on January 19, 

2013, the date of the incident at issue in Plaintiff’s complaint. The police reports by Defendants 

Troche, McLeod, and Miller each indicate that the officers responded to a call of a domestic 

disturbance, and each claim that they observed visible injuries on Apfelzweig. (Carlson Decl., 

March 3, 2015, ¶¶ 2-4, Exs. A-C.) Further, another Hayward employee, Officer J. Rubalcava, 

prepared a police report on or around January 22, 2013 related to the incident along with a citation 

issued to Plaintiff for violation of California Penal Code section 148. Rubalcava’s report contains 

details of the statement Plaintiff made to the police in the hospital following the incident, in which 

Plaintiff describes the argument he had with Apfelzweig before the police arrived. (Carlson Decl., 

¶ 5, Ex. D.) Therefore, Plaintiff argues that to the extent that the City has viable counterclaims, it 

was aware of the facts supporting the claims as of January 2013, and its two-year delay in bringing 

the claims is unjustified. Plaintiff also argues that no new supporting evidence has come to light. 

Defendants deposed Apfelzweig on January 13, 2015, and Plaintiff argues that her testimony was 

in conformity with the interview she gave to the police officers on the day of the incident.2

 

2

Plaintiff does not cite to any particular portions of Apfelzweig’s deposition supporting this 

argument.

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Plaintiff also argues that he will be prejudiced if the court grants the City leave to bring the 

proposed counterclaims because fact discovery closed on April 24, 2015. [See Docket No. 39 

(Case Management and Pretrial Order for Jury Trial).] According to Plaintiff, the counterclaims 

“radically shift” the focus of the litigation from the officers’ alleged excessive force to Plaintiff’s 

alleged misconduct prior to the officers’ arrival on scene. Plaintiff argues that he will likely have 

to re-depose the officers and conduct additional written discovery relevant to the new 

counterclaims. In addition, he argues that since he was never charged with domestic violence after 

the incident, he did not have to gather evidence to defend himself, and claims that “evidence has 

gone stale, witness’ [sic] memory has faded, and potential exculpatory evidence has been lost or 

destroyed,” prejudicing his ability to defend against these claims. Specifically, Plaintiff contends 

that photographs of Apfelzweig’s alleged injuries “have been lost, stolen, or inadvertently 

destroyed,” and that an audio recording of one of two interviews of Apfelzweig shortly after the 

incident is also missing. (Carlson Decl. ¶¶ 6, Ex. E (Troche Dep. 132-33), 7.) 

In response, the City contends that it has not delayed in bringing these counterclaims, 

arguing that counterclaims only accrue when a party is sued—here, in January 2014, when 

Plaintiff brought his complaint, and Plaintiff did not complete service on Defendants until May 

2014. [See Docket No. 27 (proof of service on Def. McLeod).] It also asserts that it has been 

diligent, and that prior to seeking leave to bring the proposed counterclaims, it needed to develop 

facts regarding what happened at Plaintiff’s apartment prior to the officers’ arrival. The City 

asserts that Plaintiff refused to produce Apfelzweig’s current address in his initial disclosures and 

Plaintiff’s counsel represented Apfelzweig at her deposition; therefore, the City contends that it 

was unable to interview Apfelzweig until her January 2015 deposition.3 It also argues that it 

learned at Apfelzweig’s deposition that “the incident was not the innocent event” that Chavez had 

 

3 Hayward attaches a copy of Plaintiff’s initial disclosures, in which Apfelzweig’s address is listed 

as the apartment where the January 2013 incident took place. (Brick Decl., March 9, 2015, ¶ 2 

Ex. D.) It also claims that Apfelzweig is currently living with Plaintiff’s brother, generally citing 

to her deposition. (Brick Decl. ¶ 3 Ex. E.)

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described to police.4

The court finds that the City did not unreasonably delay in bringing its counterclaims. The 

City did not answer until June 2014, and it appears that it was unable to interview or depose 

Apfelzweig until January 2015. Although the parties dispute the meaning and significance of 

Apfelzweig’s testimony at deposition (see Def.’s Reply 9), Hayward needed her testimony in 

order to evaluate its claims, and Plaintiff has not shown that Hayward did not act diligently in 

pursuing this evidence. 

As to Plaintiff’s argument that the proposed counterclaims “radically shift” the focus of the 

litigation, some evidence of Plaintiff’s actions towards Apfelzweig before the officers arrived is 

relevant to the factual inquiry into the reasonableness of the officers’ use of force for Plaintiff’s 

excessive force claim. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (the proper application 

of the “reasonableness standard” in excessive force claims “requires careful attention to the facts 

and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively 

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”); see also Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 

433, 450 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting “[w]e have observed that ‘[t]he volatility of situations involving 

domestic violence’ makes them particularly dangerous” in the context of looking at the totality of 

the circumstances for excessive force claims). Moreover, Plaintiff has been on notice since June 

2014 that his allegedly abusive conduct would be at issue, since Hayward pleaded self-defense, 

defense of others, and justification in its affirmative defenses. It also pleaded affirmative defenses 

that Plaintiff was guilty of the offenses for which he was arrested, and any related offenses, and 

that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a felony. (Answer 9, 10, 14.) The court thus

finds that Plaintiff will not be unduly prejudiced if it grants the City leave to bring the 

counterclaims. 

B. Futility of Proposed Counterclaims

1. Statute of Limitations

 

4 Hayward does not cite to any particular portions of Apfelzweig’s deposition in support of this 

assertion.

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Plaintiff argues that the counterclaims are futile because they are barred by the applicable

statute of limitations. The statute of limitations governing quantum meruit and Bane Act claims is 

two years. See Maglica v. Maglica, 66 Cal. App. 4th 442, 452 (1998) (noting statute of limitations 

for quantum meruit claims is two years, citing California Code of Civil Procedure section 339); 

Fenters v. Yosemite Chevron, 761 F. Supp. 2d 957, 995-96 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Bane Act 

claim subject to two year statute of limitations provided by California Code of Civil Procedure 

section 335.1). According to Plaintiff, the incident forming the basis for the counterclaims took 

place on January 19, 2013, but the City did not seek a stipulation to file its counterclaims until 

January 28, 2015, over two years after the incident. Plaintiff also argues that the proposed 

counterclaims do not relate back “to any previous filings” in the case “as the Defendant has not 

previously asserted claims.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 7.) 

Rule 15(c) provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the 

original pleading when . . . the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows 

relation back.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A); see also Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 

857-58 (9th Cir. 2011) (“the purpose of Rule 15(c) is to defeat the bar of statutes of limitations . . 

.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). In California, “the commencement of an 

action tolls the statute of limitations as to a defendant’s then unbarred cause of action against the 

plaintiff, relating to or depending upon the contract, transaction, matter, happening or accident 

upon which the action is brought.” Trindade v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 857, 860 (1973) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Turtle v. Castle Records Inc., No. 03-3922 MMC, 

2005 WL 1159419, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2005) (“Under California law, a counterclaim relates 

back to the filing of the original complaint,” citing Trindade). It is undisputed that the City’s 

claims relate to Plaintiff’s underlying suit, as they are connected to the events leading up to 

Plaintiff’s encounter with the officer Defendants. Therefore, since the City’s proposed claims 

were timely as of the date Plaintiff filed his complaint (January 31, 2014), the claims are not 

barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. 5 See Luna Records Corp., Inc. v. Alvarado, 232 

 

5

Plaintiff also argues that the proposed counterclaims “are barred by Rule 13(a) as compulsory 

counterclaims that [Hayward] was required to bring in the answer,” citing only Federal Rule of 

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Cal. App. 3d 1023, 1027 (the rule in California “has often been stated” as “[t]he filing of the 

complaint suspend[s] the running of the statute of limitations as to the matters arising out of the 

transaction set forth therein.” (citing Perkins v. W. Coast Lumber Co., 120 Cal. 27, 28 (1898))).

2. Failure to State a Claim

The parties did not address the viability of the proposed counterclaims on any other 

grounds; however, the court was unable to find any quantum meruit or Bane Act claims asserted

under similar circumstances. The court therefore ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing 

addressing 1) the basis and support for the City’s proposed quantum meruit claim against Plaintiff 

for the cost of police and fire services “as requested by Plaintiff’s reprehensible conduct” and 

“rendered in response to the Domestic Violence Incident that he caused”; and 2) the basis and 

support for its proposed Bane Act claim based on Plaintiff’s conduct towards the alleged victim of 

domestic abuse.

To determine whether an amended claim is futile, the proper test is identical to the one 

used when considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). A motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See 

Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). When reviewing a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all of the factual 

allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) 

(citation omitted), and may dismiss the case where there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter 

to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 

F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has facial 

plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

 

Civil Procedure 13(a) in support. However, nothing in that rule provides that the failure to bring a 

compulsory counterclaim in the original answer bars a party from later moving under Rule 

15(a)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13, advisory committee notes to 2009 Amendments (“An 

amendment to add a counterclaim will be governed by Rule 15 . . . relation back is governed by 

the tests that apply to all other pleading amendments.”).

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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 

omitted). 

a. Quantum Meruit

The City’s proposed quantum meruit claim seeks the reasonable value of the police and 

fire services rendered in responding to the “Domestic Violence Incident” that Plaintiff caused. 

(Proposed Counterclaims ¶¶ 16-19.) The City alleges that Plaintiff “battered” Apfelzweig, 

foreseeably causing her “to cry out in pain and in hopes of intervention,” and that it was 

foreseeable that Plaintiff’s conduct would cause Hayward’s police and fire departments to 

respond. (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 15.) It further alleges that “[i]t is only fair that Plaintiff pay 

the City the cost of the police and fire services rendered in response to the Domestic Violence 

Incident that he caused.” (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 19.)

“Quantum meruit refers to the well-established principle that the law implies a promise to 

pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously 

rendered. To recover in quantum meruit, a party need not prove the existence of a contract, but it 

must show the circumstances were such that the services were rendered under some understanding 

or expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to be made.” Olsen v. Harbison, 

191 Cal. App. 4th 325, 330 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Huskinson & Brown, LLP v. Wolf, 32 Cal. 4th 453, 458 (2004)). “The underlying idea behind 

quantum meruit is the law’s distaste for unjust enrichment. If one has received a benefit which 

one may not justly retain, one should restore the aggrieved party to his [or her] former position by 

return of the thing or its equivalent in money.” E.J. Franks Constr., Inc. v. Sahota, 226 Cal. App. 

4th 1123, 1128 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The measure of recovery in 

quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the services rendered provided they were of direct 

benefit to the defendant. In other words, quantum meruit is equitable payment for services already 

rendered.” Id. (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). 

“To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under a quantum meruit theory, 

a plaintiff must establish both that he or she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied 

request for services from the defendant and that the services rendered were intended to and did 

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benefit the defendant.” Ochs v. PacifiCare of Cal., 115 Cal. App. 4th 782, 794 (2004); see also 

Arrison v. Info. Resources, Inc., No. C95-3554[TEH], 1999 WL 551232, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 

1999) (“the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the plaintiff has rendered services that benefitted the 

defendant, and (2) the defendant would be unjustly enriched if the plaintiff was not compensated 

(citing In re De Laurentiis Entm’t Grp., 963 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1992)).

The City’s proposed quantum meruit claim fails as a matter of law. The City does not 

allege that Plaintiff made an “express or implied request for services” from Hayward’s police and 

fire departments. See Ochs, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 794; see also CACI 371, Common Count: Goods 

and Services Rendered (plaintiff must prove that defendant “requested, by words or conduct,” that 

plaintiff “[perform services/deliver goods] for the benefit of” defendant.”). Nor does it allege that 

its services “benefitted” Plaintiff, for the City itself asserts that Plaintiff “struggle[d]” with the

officers and “was taken into custody,” and Plaintiff alleges that the officers assaulted him and 

broke his arm. (Proposed Counterclaims ¶ 11; Compl. ¶¶ 22-24, 26.) In other words, in the 

absence of any benefit or “enrichment” to Plaintiff, Defendant cannot show that its services 

unjustly enriched Plaintiff.6

The City also argues that California has a statutory scheme which allows public entities to 

recover the cost of police and fire services in certain circumstances. However, none of the 

Government Code provisions it cites apply in this case. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 53150-53152

 

6

The City argues that California law does not require an expectation of compensation in order to 

prove a quantum meruit claim, and that the only limitation is that the services cannot have been 

“intended to be gratuitous.” (Def.’s Suppl. Brief 6-7 (quoting De Laurentiis, 963 F.2d at 1273).) 

However, this argument misapprehends the proposed quantum meruit claim’s deficiencies, and is 

a mis-reading of De Laurentiis. In De Laurentiis, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff is not 

required to “expect compensation from the defendant himself in order to prove a quantum meruit 

claim” under California law. 963 F.2d at 1273 (emphasis in original). Instead, a plaintiff may 

recover under a quantum meruit theory even when he or she expected payment or compensation 

from a different party, and not from the defendant. See id.; see also Kossian v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 

254 Cal. App. 2d 647, 649-50 (1967) (allowing recovery under quantum meruit where no implied 

contract existed and the plaintiff did not expect compensation from the current defendant, but from 

a third-party). Under California law, the party seeking recovery “must show the circumstances 

were such that the services were rendered under some understanding or expectation of both parties 

that compensation therefor was to be made.” Olsen, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 330 (quotation marks 

and citations omitted). Here, the City does not (and cannot) allege that Hayward and Plaintiff both 

expected that Hayward would be compensated by Plaintiff or someone else (other than taxpayers) 

for responding to the incident.

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(liability for expenses of emergency response resulting from negligent operation of motor vehicle, 

boat or vessel, and civil aircraft); 53153.5 (liability for expenses of emergency response to false 

police report); 53159 (liability for expenses of emergency response resulting from entering into 

closed areas or drives on flooded streets with barricades). The City argues that recovery by public

entities is not limited to the instances specified in the Government Code provisions, but instead, 

agencies “are free to pursue recovery costs for all types of emergency responses.” (Def.’s Suppl. 

Brief 7 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 53158 (“It is not the intent of the Legislature, in enacting this 

article, to occupy the field of recovery of the expense of an emergency response by a public 

agency”).) However, the City points to no other state or municipal authority that provides for 

recovery of the expenses it seeks in this proposed counterclaim, nor does it cite any case 

supporting its claim for recovery of emergency expenses under a quantum meruit theory involving 

similar facts. 

Accordingly, since the court finds that the City’s proposed quantum meruit claim would be 

futile, leave to amend to add the proposed quantum meruit claim is denied. 

b. Bane Act 

The City’s proposed Bane Act counterclaim is based upon Plaintiff’s alleged actions 

towards Apfelzweig on the night in question. The City alleges that Plaintiff “intentionally 

interfered with the Victim’s civil rights by threats, intimidation, and coercion,” and “acted 

violently against the victim, assaulted her, battered her, and prevented her from exercising her 

right to speak, her right to freely move, and her right to be free from physical violence,” thus 

“violat[ing] the victim’s statutory and constitutional rights.”7 (Proposed Counterclaims ¶¶ 21, 22.) 

The Bane Act authorizes an action for damages, injunctive relief, and other “appropriate 

equitable relief” against a person or persons who, “whether or not acting under color of law, 

interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or 

 

7

The City’s proposed counterclaim does not specify which statutory and constitutional rights 

Plaintiff allegedly violated. In its supplemental briefing, the City clarifies the basis for its Bane 

Act claim, asserting that Plaintiff’s alleged abuse of Apfelzweig violated her rights to be free from 

bodily harm and violence on account of her sex, and her right to pursue and obtain safety and 

enjoy life and liberty, rights secured by California Civil Code sections 43, 51.7, 52.4, 1708.6, and 

article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.

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coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured” by the 

federal or state law and the United States or California constitutions. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a), 

(b). A Bane Act claim may be brought by “any district attorney or city attorney” seeking 

“injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of 

California,” as well as civil penalties. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). “The word ‘interferes’ as used in 

the Bane Act means ‘violates.’” Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 

883 (2007) (citing Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 (1998)). “The essence of a Bane 

Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or 

coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do 

under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under 

the law.” Id. 

Here, the only parties to this lawsuit are Plaintiff, the City, and the three officer 

Defendants. Although Hayward’s City Attorney represents all of the defendants, the City 

Attorney himself is not a party, nor is Hayward’s District Attorney. Further, it appears the City 

seeks to bring the proposed Bane Act claim on behalf of itself; it does not bring the claim “in the 

name of the people of the State of California.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). Therefore, the 

proposed counterclaim neither satisfies the plain requirements of the Bane Act nor qualifies as a 

proper “counterclaim,” since it is not a claim for relief that any of the defendants are authorized to 

bring. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1) (“[a] pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—at

the time of its service—the pleader has against an opposing party . . .” (emphasis added)).

Moreover, to the extent Hayward is attempting to add the Hayward City Attorney or 

District Attorney as a third party to this action, such an action would be procedurally improper. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) governs when a defending party—here, the City—may 

bring in a third party, and provides that “a defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a 

summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim 

against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). “[A] third-party claim may be asserted only when [1] the 

third party’s liability is in some way dependant [sic] on the outcome of the main claim and [2] the 

third party’s liability is secondary or derivative.” United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 

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F.2d 444, 452 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Mercedes”). In other words, a defendant bringing a third-party 

claim must be “attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him 

by the original plaintiff.” Stewart v. Am. Int’l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(citation omitted). Any Bane Act claim by the Hayward City Attorney or District Attorney against 

Plaintiff does not satisfy Rule 14(a)(1) because it is a separate, independent claim that does not 

implicate the City’s liability for Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims and is not “derivatively based on” 

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims. See Mercedes, 708 F.2d at 452 (third-party claim “must be 

derivatively based on the original plaintiff’s claim”).

Therefore, since the City’s proposed Bane Act claim is not a proper counterclaim, the court 

finds that it is futile and denies leave to amend to add the proposed claim.8

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the City of Hayward’s motion for leave to file 

counterclaims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2015

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

 

8

Since the court finds that the City of Hayward’s proposed Bane Act counterclaim is futile, it 

need not reach the parties’ arguments regarding whether a private actor like Plaintiff can be sued 

under the Bane Act.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

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