Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01608/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01608-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Serrano's Mexican Restaurants, LLC, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-02-1608-PHX-FJM

ORDER

On February 14, 2007 we granted defendant's "Second Motion to Reconsider and

Vacate the Court's Order Granting the Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial" ("Defendant's

Second Motion for Reconsideration") (doc. 253). See February 14, 2007 Order (doc. 259).

The court has before it plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of that order (doc. 262) and

defendant's response (doc. 265). For the reasons stated below, we deny plaintiff's motion.

I.

Plaintiff first argues that we should reconsider our order to the extent that it was

influenced by "an erroneous view of the scope of the Ninth Circuit's power." Plaintiff's

Motion for Reconsideration at 6. Specifically, plaintiff argues that our statement that

"[i]nterlocutory review would have been fruitless unless both issues [upon which the order

granting new trial rested] had been certified," February 14, 2007 Order at 3, justifies

reconsideration because it implies that the Ninth Circuit could not have reviewed the

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uncertified issue. See Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 2. This is a red herring. We

did not comment on the Ninth Circuit's power to review. In merely reciting the procedural

history of the case we drew into question the wisdom of certifying an issue at all if it was not

going to affect the outcome. What is the point of certifying a non-dispositive issue? Even

if the circuit reversed on the "verdict" issue, the trial court had stated another and quite

independent basis for granting a new trial. Our comment simply noted how "fruitless" it

would have been to certify one but not both issues. The Ninth Circuit asked the trial judge

what was being certified. Once he told them, the circuit denied review. We simply

acknowledged the near inevitability of this result when one certifies fewer than all the

dispositive issues. Our comment has nothing to do with the authority of the court of appeals

to review. Our comment reflected a practical understanding of the procedural posture of the

case–an understanding that plaintiff misses altogether. 

Finally, our passing comment had no effect on our resolution of the case. Our

February 14, 2007 Order reconsidered the order granting new trial, and reinstated the jury's

verdict, because (1) we had authority to reconsider the original judge's order, (2) the

interrogatory responses were neither internally inconsistent nor was either inconsistent with

the general verdict, and (3) the jury's verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence.

See February 14, 2007 Order. None of these conclusions had anything to do with the aborted

attempt at interlocutory review. 

II.

Next, plaintiff contends that reconsideration is appropriate because we improperly

substituted our judgment for that of the presiding trial court judge. Plaintiff's Motion for

Reconsideration at 2. In particular, plaintiff argues that a judge to whom a case is reassigned

may not reconsider a discretionary court ruling without "carefully scrutinizing the entire trial

transcript and all of the documentary evidence that the jury had before it" and that our order

"gives no indication that [we] engaged in such a full and searching review of the record."

Id. at 3. However, plaintiff does not cite to any authority in support of this proposition.

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Instead, it notes that a trial judge has discretion to grant a new trial after a jury renders a

verdict. See id. at 7. 

The fact that a trial judge has authority to grant a new trial has no bearing on our

authority to reconsider an order in this case. Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P is clear that any order

"is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and

all the rights and liabilities of all the parties" so long as final judgment on that order has not

entered. Both the law of the case doctrine and the standard governing motions for

reconsideration give us authority to revisit an order that is clearly erroneous. See Sch. Dist.

No. 1J., 5 F.3d at 1263 (stating that clear error justifies reconsideration) and Arizona v.

California, 460 U.S. 605, 619, 103 S. Ct. 1382, 1391 n.8 (1983) (stating that pursuant to the

law of the case doctrine, "it is not improper for a court to depart from a prior holding if

convinced that it is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice"). In granting

defendant's motion, we acted pursuant to Rule 54(b). Because our order concluded that the

original judge's decision was erroneous, we had reason to reconsider that judge's prior order.

Moreover, in our adversary system, the responsibility to point out material portions

of the record falls on the parties. We examined everything the plaintiff brought to our

attention. 

III.

Third, plaintiff argues that we should reconsider our earlier order because "given the

appellate standard of review as a guiding point," it was "simply incorrect" for us to review

the original judge's order applying the standard governing motions for reconsideration

instead of the appellate abuse of discretion standard. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

at 3. Yet plaintiff does not cite to any precedent that suggests that our Rule 54(b) authority

is circumscribed by standards of appellate review. 

IV.

Finally, plaintiff alleges that reconsideration is appropriate because "the undisputed

trial evidence demonstrates that the jury's answer to Interrogatory #2 was against the clear

weight of the evidence." Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 9. Specifically, plaintiff

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1

 We quoted directly from plaintiff's brief. See February 14, 2007 Order at 10

(quoting Plaintiff's Response at 11) ("A transfer of Ms. Naeve would have been a reasonable

accommodation.").

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contends that any transfer defendant offered "would not have resolved the conflict" between

Naeve and the Code because (1) the offered transfer was not unconditional and (2) the

offered transfer required Naeve to "abandon a part of her sincerely held religious beliefs."

Id. at 12, 13. 

The jury answered "yes" to the second interrogatory, which asked "[h]as Serrano's

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it offered Ms. Naeve an accommodation that

would have eliminated any conflict between the practice of her sincerely held religious belief

and the Management Code of Conduct?" Verdict and Jury Interrogatories (doc. 202). We

concluded that this answer was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and therefore,

the second ground upon which a new trial was granted was erroneous. See February 14,

2007 Order at 11. In so holding, we noted plaintiff's concession that one of the

accommodations defendant discussed with Naeve would have constituted a reasonable

accommodation. Id. at 10 (citing Plaintiff's Response (doc. 258) at 11).1

 We also

acknowledged plaintiff's argument that the manner in which defendant communicated the

possibility of an offer rendered it insufficient to qualify as an actual offer. Id. at 10; see

Plaintiff's Response at 11 ("At issue is whether [Ric Serrano's testimony regarding the

transfer] is sufficient without more to constitute an 'offer.' "). 

Here, plaintiff argues that we manipulated its response to defendant's Second Motion

for Reconsideration, and failed to cite to the sentence "immediately prior" to the one on

which we relied. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 10 (quoting Plaintiff's Response

at 11) ("Defendant never satisfied its duty to accommodate Ms. Naeve because it never

offered her an accommodation that would have resolved the . . . workplace conflict and

permitted her to continue in her lay ministry, thereby observing her religious beliefs.")

(emphasis added in Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration). Plaintiff now contends that the

dispositive issue is the nature of the offers made to Naeve, and that the only offer that would

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have "resolved the conflict" was an "unconditional" transfer offer that did not require Naeve

to guarantee that "she would not permit employees at a new location to attend her Church or

Bible study group that she led." Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff alleges that because the evidence at

trial established that this kind of offer was never made, the jury's finding that a reasonable

accommodation was made was against the clear weight of the evidence. Id. at 12. 

We reject this argument for several reasons. First, plaintiff offers no citation to the

trial transcript to support its contention that defendant's transfer offer was conditioned upon

Naeve abandoning her religious beliefs. Defendant does cite to some evidence regarding a

guarantee attached to the transfer offer, but that evidence does not support plaintiff's

argument. Instead, it suggests that Naeve rejected the transfer offer because Naeve herself

stated that she could not guarantee that the same issue would not reoccur at another Serrano's

restaurant. Defendant's Response at 6 (citing Tr. at 657, 684, 687). The evidence is unclear

as to what "issue" Naeve was unable to prevent. However, that ambiguous evidence does not

on its own establish that defendant's transfer offer included a requirement that Naeve

abandon her religious beliefs. Similarly, it does not support plaintiff's argument that the

jury's finding regarding reasonable accommodation was against the clear weight of the

evidence. 

We also reject plaintiff's argument to the extent that the issue Naeve referred to was

Naeve's ability to recruit subordinate employees at the restaurant to which she would have

been transferred. See Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 4 (arguing that a reasonable

accommodation would allow Naeve "to act" on her beliefs). Naeve's religious beliefs did not

require her to recruit subordinates to join her Bible study. See id. at 11 (stating that Naeve's

beliefs required her to "teach an introductory Bible study to anyone who 'wanted to attend,

who wanted to come, who wanted to learn, who wanted to pray,' " and that turning anyone

away from a Bible study group would have violated her beliefs) (citation omitted).

Therefore, defendant was not required to accommodate Naeve's desire to recruit. See Tiano

v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 139 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Title VII does not protect secular

preferences."). Given plaintiff's insistence that Naeve be permitted to continue her "lay

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ministry," Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 10, it is important to note that defendant

was entitled to restrict workplace proselytizing. Even if active recruitment was a tenet of

Naeve's religious beliefs, defendant would not have been required to allow Naeve to impose

her beliefs upon her co-workers. See Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 607

(9th Cir. 2004). The EEOC's views on this issue distort the law and raise very substantial

First Amendment issues.

Finally, plaintiff cannot argue against the jury's finding by stating that "only an

unconditional transfer would be an accommodation." Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

at 12 (emphasis in original). An unconditional transfer might have been Naeve's preferred

form of accommodation. However, if an employer reasonably accommodates an employee's

religious needs, it is not required to also consider an employee's proposed alternative

accommodations. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68, 107 S. Ct. 367,

372 (1986). Arguing that one kind of offer was not made does not establish that no

reasonable accommodation was made. Similarly, it does not support the conclusion that the

jury's finding that a reasonable accommodation was made was against the clear weight of the

evidence. 

THEREFORE, it is ORDERED DENYING plaintiff's motion for reconsideration

(doc. 262).

DATED this 5th day of April, 2007.

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