Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02252/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02252-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Brenton Hendricks,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-2252-PHX-JAT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Tucson, 

Arizona, filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 on April 7, 2014 (Doc. 9). On July 16, 2014 Respondents filed their 

Response (Doc. 13). Petitioner has not filed a reply. On October 20, 2014, Respondents 

filed a supplement to the record (Doc. 15).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner fired four shots at the victim’s vehicle, as they drove down the freeway, 

striking and injuring the victim. When arrested, Petitioner was found with marijuana, 

methamphetamine, and various paraphernalia. (Exhibit A, Pre-Sentence Investigation at 

1.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 13, are referenced herein as “Exhibit [A-Q]” Exhibits 

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R and S are attached to Respondent’s Supplement, Doc. 15.) 

Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on charges of 

aggravated assault, weapons misconduct, endangerment, drive by shooting, discharge of 

a firearm, possession of dangerous drugs, and marijuana possession. (Exhibit C, 

Indictment.) The state filed allegations of two prior convictions. (Exhibit Q.) 

Petitioner, who was represented by counsel, eventually entered into a written Plea 

Agreement (Exhibit D), agreeing to plead guilty to one count of drive by shooting, and 

one count of possession of dangerous drugs, with a stipulated sentence of 8 to 12 years in 

prison on the shooting charge, and probation on the drugs charge. 

On December 21, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 12 

years on the shooting charge, and a consecutive term of 3 years probation on the drugs 

charge. (Exhibit E, Sentence.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (2nd Amend. Petition, Doc. 9 at 2.)

Moreover, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 

616 (1995).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding – On March 6, 2012, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief. (Exhibit F, Notice.) Counsel was appointed. (Id. at ME 3/12/12.) 

On September 7, 2012, counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Review (id. at Not. 

Completion), evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. 

In response, on September 27, 2012, Petitioner filed a second Notice of PostConviction Relief (id. at PCR Not.). Petitioner raised claims of ineffective assistance 

based on failure to present Petitioner’s mental disability at sentencing, and failure to 

object to the use of Petitioner’s priors at sentencing. 

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On January 18, 2013, the PCR Court denied the petition. (Exhibit G, M.E. 

1/18/13.) 

On February 19, 2013, Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing (Exhibit H).

Although the document bears a filing stamp with the date of October 30, 2013, the PCR 

court’s minute entry reflects that the request was filed February 19, 2013, but was 

apparently lost in the court. The court denied the request to avoid disrupting the then 

pending petition for review. (Exhibit I, ME 10/1/13.)

In the interim, on September 11, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Notice of Appeal” 

asserting that reliance on his prior conviction was a violation of double jeopardy. 

(Exhibit J). On December 2, 2013, the notice was dismissed for failure to identify the 

order or judgment appealed from, and that any appeal from the sentence was untimely. 

(Exhibit K Order 12/2/13.)

Second PCR Proceeding - On October 30, 2013, while his Notice of Appeal” 

was pending, Petitioner commenced his second PCR proceeding by filing a Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit L), listing claims of ineffective assistance, double 

jeopardy, newly discovered evidence, use of an unconstitutional prior conviction, and 

improper sentence.

Counsel was again appointed, but on January 15, 2014, counsel filed a Notice of 

Completion (Exhibit M) evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. Petitioner 

was granted leave to file a pro per petition by March 17, 2014. (Exhibit N, M.E. 

1/30/14.) On March 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and a 

form Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, again listing claims of ineffective assistance, 

double jeopardy, newly discovered evidence, detention after expiration of his sentence, 

and use of an unconstitutional prior conviction. On September 4, 2014, the PCR court 

entered an order construing the Petition as asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of 

PCR counsel for failing to raise his substantive claims in the first PCR proceeding. The 

court found each of the underlying substantive claims to be without merit, thus an 

absence of ineffective assistance, and summarily dismissed the petition and proceeding. 

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(Exhibit S, Order 9/4/14.) 

Petitioner has not sought further review.

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 4, 2013 (Doc. 1). He filed the 

same document again on December 4, 2013 (Doc. 3). The Court dismissed the original 

Petition (Docs. 1 and 3) without prejudice and with leave to amend because of failure to 

utilize the approved form. 

On January 16, 2014, Petitioner filed his first Amended Petition (Doc. 6), which 

the Court dismissed with leave to amend based upon Petitioner’s failure to specify a 

claim founded upon a constitutional right, but simply asserted a double jeopardy 

violation. (Order 3/20/14, Doc. 8.) 

On April 7, 2014, Petitioner filed his Second Amended Petition (Doc. 8) 

(hereinafter “Petition”). Petitioner’s Petition asserts two grounds for relief: “In Ground 

One, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because 

he received an aggravated sentence due to ‘a prior felony that was to[o] old.’ In Ground 

Two, Petitioner alleges that his sentence was ‘[a] clear violation of [his] 5th Amendment 

rights, Double Jeopardy Clause.’ ” (Order 6/13/14, Doc. 10 at 2.) 

Response - On July 26, 2014, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 13). Respondents argue that both claims are procedurally defaulted.

Reply – Petitioner has not filed a reply, and the time to do so expired on 

Thursday, August 28, 2014. (See Order 6/13/14, Doc. 10 at 4.)

Supplement – In an Order filed October 17, 2014, the Court observed that 

Petitioner had, at the time of the Answer, ongoing post-conviction relief proceedings 

pending in the state courts. Respondents were directed to supplement the record with 

new ruling or filings in that proceeding. On October 20, 2014, Respondents filed their 

Supplement (“Response to Court Order”) (Doc. 15), providing two recent orders by the 

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PCR Court (Exhibits R and S).

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims were never fairly presented to the state 

courts, his state remedies were not properly exhausted and are now procedurally 

defaulted, and thus his claims are barred from federal habeas review.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

/ /

/ /

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2. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner asserts that his claims in Grounds One and Two were presented to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal. However, as noted hereinabove, 

Petitioner neither filed a direct appeal, nor was he entitled to do so.

Moreover, Petitioner’s only foray to the Arizona Court of Appeals was a failed 

filing following his first PCR proceeding, his “Notice of Appeal” (Exhibit J). Even 

assuming such filing presented Petitioner’s current federal claims, it was not fair 

presentation because Petitioner failed to timely seek a direct appeal from the sentence or 

to specify what other order he sought to have reviewed. (See Exhibit K, Order 12/2/13.) 

"A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying 

the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim." 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner’s belated and 

non-specific “Notice of Appeal” was not the proper vehicle to seek review of his PCR 

proceeding.

Moreover, his “Notice of Appeal” failed to identify any federal basis for his 

claim. Petitioner simply asserted that his sentence was “unconstitutional and in violation 

of my Double Jeopardy rights.” (Exhibit J at 3.) Failure to alert the state court to the 

constitutional nature of the claim will amount to failure to exhaust state remedies. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. at 366. While the petitioner need not recite “book and verse 

on the federal constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971) (quoting 

Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that all the 

facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a 

“somewhat similar state law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 

(1982)(per curiam). “In this circuit, the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by specifying particular provisions of the federal Constitution or 

statutes, or by citing to federal case law.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 

(9th Cir. 2005). See also Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Full and 

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fair presentation additionally requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to 

the state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee “).

Petitioner’s broad reference to his sentence being “unconstitutional” was not 

adequate to identify a federal claim. "Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, 

detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory." Castillo v. 

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005). For example, "it is not enough to make 

a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the 

‘substance’ of such a claim to a state court." Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 

(1996). 

Nor was Petitioner’s unadorned referenced to a double jeopardy violation 

sufficient to fairly present a federal claim. The Arizona constitution also provides that a 

person shall not be “twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” See Ariz. Const. art. II, 

§ 10. “[R]aising a state claim that is merely similar to a federal claim does not exhaust 

state remedies.” Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005). 

It is true that the Arizona courts of appeal have a history of summarizing the 

Arizona double jeopardy protections to be “coextensive” with the federal protections. 

See e.g. Brodsky v. State, 218 Ariz. 508, 510, n.1, 189 P.3d 1081, 1083, n.1 (Ct.App. 

2008). However, that conclusion appears to rest upon a more limited statement by the 

Arizona Supreme Court that the Arizona Constitutions’ double jeopardy provision 

provides the same protection against multiple prosecutions as the federal Fifth 

Amendment. See State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 437, 55 P.3d 774, 780 (2002). That 

limited language would not cover other double jeopardy protections under the Fifth 

Amendment. The federal Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates three separate 

guarantees: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, 

against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against multiple 

punishments for the same offense." Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 

U.S. 294, 306- 07 (1984). See e.g. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 398 (1995)

(discussing and rejecting Double Jeopardy claim based upon consideration at sentencing 

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of activity considered at sentencing for a separate crime). Petitioner proffers no authority 

to show that the Arizona and federal protections are coextensive with regard to multiple 

punishments for the same offense, which is the heart of the claim he now asserts.

“[W]e cannot assume federal claims were impliedly brought by virtue of the fact 

that they may be ‘essentially the same’ as state law claims. If a petitioner fails to alert the 

state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is 

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 914 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, Petitioner bears 

the burden of showing an identity between the state and federal claims. Id. And, the 

burden of proof of such identity is high. “In the absence of an affirmative statement by 

the [state supreme court] that it considers a particular state and federal constitutional 

claim to be identical, rather than analogous ... Petitioner was required to raise his federal 

claims affirmatively; we will not infer that federal claims have been exhausted.” Fields 

v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, no such statement has been 

made by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Thus, both because Petitioner’s “Notice of Appeal” was procedurally deficient, 

and because it failed to identify the federal nature of his claims, it was not sufficient to 

fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Thus Petitioner has not 

properly exhausted his state remedies on his federal claims.

3. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

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Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely exclusively upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out 

in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a). (Answer, Doc. 13 at 8-9.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ' 'knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 

2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme 

Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, 

and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as 

among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

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“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

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state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts 

in this proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims are all 

now procedurally defaulted.

B. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner proffers no cause to excuse his procedural default. The undersigned 

finds no basis a finding of such cause.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

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although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or any purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE AS CAUSE

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner makes no assertion of his actual innocence. Accordingly his 

procedurally defaulted claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

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Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. The undersigned 

finds that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the district court was 

correct in its procedural ruling.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Second Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April 7, 2014 (Doc. 9) be DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

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and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: January 20, 2015

13-2252r RR 14 09 18 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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