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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STl'JI.ITES COURT OF APPEALS FIL -- J 

= United States Coμrt (?f Appeah 

LARRY JAMES GAMBLE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FRED PARKE; TULSA POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth C1~mt 

DEC 10 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-5084 

(N.D. Okla., No. 91-C-136-B) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge.** 

This is a direct appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma. On April 16, 1990, the 

appellant was arrested on a charge of accessory to first degree 

murder by Tulsa Policeman Fred Parke. Parke made the arrest on 

the basis of a warrant that he prepared under the direct 

supervision of the appellees, Tulsa County District Attorneys Tom 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-5084 Document: 010110151594 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 1 
Gillert and Fred Morgan. At the appellant's preliminary hearing, 

the charges against him were dropped based on the judge's 

conclusion that the charges were barred by the Oklahoma statute of 

limitations. 

The appellant subsequently filed a complaint against the 

appellees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging false arrest, 

malicious prosecution, negligent research, and a denial of his 

1 right to equal protection of the law. The district court 

dismissed the appellant's complaint on summary judgment, 

concluding that the appellees were entitled to absolute 

prosecutorial immunity. The appellant filed a motion for 

reconsideration which the district court denied. The appellant 

now appeals both the district court's original order granting 

summary judgment and its subsequent order denying the appellant's 

motion for reconsideration. We find that we are without 

jurisdiction to review the district court's original order 

granting summary judgment, and we affirm the district court's 

denial of the appellant's motion for reconsideration. 

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), a party must 

file a notice of appeal "within 30 days after the date of entry of 

the judgment or order appealed from." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). In 

this case, the appellant did not file a notice of appeal within 30 

2 days of the district court's summary judgment order. Thus, we 

1 The appellant also filed a complaint against 

Police Department charging false imprisonment, 

prosecution and cruel and unusual punishment. 

not at issue in this appeal. 

Parke and the Tulsa 

malicious 

These claims are 

2 The district court's summary judgment order was entered October 

18, 1991. The appellant did not file a notice of appeal with 

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Appellate Case: 92-5084 Document: 010110151594 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 2 
may only review this order if the appellant's motion for 

reconsideration properly preserved this decision for appeal. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly 

recognize a motion for reconsideration. Van Skiver v. United 

States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). However, such a 

motion may be considered either as a motion to alter or amend the 

judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or as a motion seeking relief from 

the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Id. Which rule applies 

depends on when the motion for reconsideration is served. 

"Motions served within 10 days of judgment ordinarily will fall 

under Rule 59(e) while motions served later will fall under Rule 

60(b) ." Campbell v. Bartlett, Nos. 88-2711 & 88-2854, 1992 U.S. 

App. LEXIS 24918, at *13 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 1992). A motion 

under Rule 60(b) preserves for appeal only the order denying 

reconsideration and not the district court's original order. 

Bartlett, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24918 at *13; Van Skiver, 952 F.2d 

at 1243. 

Since the appellant served his motion for reconsideration 

more than ten days after the district court entered its summary 

judgment order, the appellant's motion must be construed as a 

motion under Rule 60(b) .

3 Thus, we are without jurisdiction to 

review the district court's grant of summary judgment. All we may 

consider on appeal is whether the district court properly denied 

the appellant's motion for reconsideration. 

respect to this order until April 15, 1992. 

3 The appellant filed his motion for reconsideration on November 

8, 1991. 

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Appellate Case: 92-5084 Document: 010110151594 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 3 
We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration under 

Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion. Bartlett, 1992 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 24918 at *13. Rule 60(b) permits the district court to 

reconsider a verdict on only a few specified grounds: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 

diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 

for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 

party; (4) the judgment is void, (5) the judgment has 

been satisfied, released, discharged, or a prior 

judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 

judgment should have prospective application; (6) any 

other reason justifying relief. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

In this case, the basis for the appellant's motion for 

reconsideration was that the appellees were liable under an 

alternative legal theory not originally presented to the district 

4 court. This rationale does not fit within any of the grounds for 

reconsideration permitted by Rule 60(b). While this rule does 

contain a catchall provision permitting reconsideration for "any 

other reason justifying relief", this catchall provision applies 

only in "extraordinary situations" where reconsideration is 

necessary to "accomplish justice." Colorado Interstate Gas v. 

Natural Gas Pipeline, 962 F.2d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992) 

4 In his original complaint, the appellant argued that the 

appellees were liable for false arrest and malicious prosecution 

on the ground that they sanctioned his arrest knowing that the 

offense for which he was arrested was barred by the statute of 

limitations. In his motion for reconsideration, the appellant 

argued that the appellees were also liable because they failed to 

present any evidence indicating that the appellant committed or 

aided and abetted the commission of the crime for which he was 

arrested. 

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Appellate Case: 92-5084 Document: 010110151594 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 4 
(citation omitted). We do not believe the appellant's motion for 

reconsideration presents such an extraordinary situation. Thus, 

we find that the district court properly denied this motion. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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