Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01855/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01855-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carol Riggs, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Bank of America, N.A., 

Defendant. 

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Bank of America, N.A.,

Counterclaimant,

vs.

Carol Riggs,

Counterdefendant.

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No. CV-07-1855-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (doc. 101) and

memorandum in support (doc. 105), and defendant’s response (doc. 107). We also have

defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees (doc. 102) and memorandum in support (doc. 106),

plaintiff’s response (doc. 108), and defendant’s reply (doc. 111). Finally, we have plaintiff’s

motion for an evidentiary hearing (doc. 109) and defendant’s response (doc. 112). 

Riggs is a former employee of Bank of America (“BofA”). In 1999, she filed a

constructive discharge claim against BofA that resulted in a 2002 settlement agreement that

Case 2:07-cv-01855-FJM Document 113 Filed 02/18/10 Page 1 of 3
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provided for, among other things, Riggs’ eligibility for continued health care benefits under

BofA’s health benefits plan (the “Plan”). Since 2002, the parties have been contesting

whether Riggs is entitled to the same health benefits as an active employee or is entitled to

supplemental Medicare benefits only. 

In August 2007, Riggs commenced this action in state court, alleging breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On September 27, 2007, BofA removed the

action to this court and filed a declaratory judgment counterclaim seeking a declaration that

it was not obligated to provide Riggs with active employee benefits. At about the same time,

BofA’s fiduciary, charged with discretionary authority to construe the terms of the Plan, filed

an action in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County, seeking a declaration that

Riggs was not eligible for active employee benefits. On November 28, 2008, the Superior

Court ruled that, according to the clear language of the settlement agreement, Riggs is

entitled to active employee benefits. 

On January 29, 2009, we held that the state court’s decision was res judicata to

BofA’s counterclaim and accordingly held that Riggs is entitled to active employee benefits

(doc. 83). Accordingly, we entered judgment in favor of Riggs on the counterclaim. We also

granted in part and denied in part BofA’s motion for summary judgment on Riggs’ claim for

breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. With respect to damages, we concluded

that no special relationship existed between Riggs and BofA to support tort damages. We

denied the motion with respect to liability, however, concluding that issues of fact remained

as to whether BofA’s denial of Riggs’ benefits was based on an improper or unfair motive.

The parties ultimately settled the liability issue and judgment was entered in favor of Riggs

on the counterclaim and in favor of BofA on the bad faith claim. 

Both parties now seek attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which

authorizes the court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the “successful party” in a

contested action arising out of contract. Two primary issues were presented in this case:

first, whether BofA’s refusal to provide Riggs with active employee benefits was a breach

of its duty of good faith and fair dealing. We held that there were issues of fact on the bad

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faith claim. However, we also held that while Riggs would be entitled to contract damages

for any breach, she would not be entitled to tort damages because no special relationship

existed to support a tort claim. Because her contract damages were the same as her already

paid insurance, the parties stipulated to judgment in favor of BofA on the bad faith claim. 

The second issue was whether Riggs is entitled to receive active employee health

benefits. That issue was conclusively decided in Riggs’ favor. Although BofA now attempts

to characterize this claim as an insignificant or secondary issue in this litigation, it has been

the central issue underlying the parties’ dispute since the settlement agreement was entered

into in 2002, and which the parties have been litigating since 2006. 

While recognizing Riggs’ clear success on the ultimate issue in this ongoing litigation,

we conclude that because neither party prevailed on their respective claims for relief in this

action, neither party is the successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Therefore, we decline

to award either party attorney’s fees. See Bank One, Ariz. v. Rouse, 181 Ariz. 36, 41, 887

P.2d 566, 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (doc. 101) and

DENYING defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees (doc. 102). IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED DENYING plaintiff’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (doc. 109). 

DATED this 18th day of February, 2010.

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