Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00456/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00456-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL MANRIQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

HUCHINS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-00456-LJO-BAM PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF Nos. 191, 192, 193, 194, 206, 209, 210, 211,

212, 218, 227, 228)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Findings and Recommendations on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Daniel Manriquez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on the 

second amended complaint filed November 11, 2011, against Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and

Omos for excessive force in pepper spraying Plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

Defendants Hutchins, Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson for ordering that Plaintiff’s property be

removed from his cell and that Plaintiff be placed back into a contaminated cell without means to

decontaminate from the pepper spray; and Defendants Morse and Paz for placing Plaintiff in the

contaminated cell. (ECF No. 180.) 

On April 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, statement of undisputed

facts, declaration in support of his motion, and request for judicial notice. (ECF Nos. 191-194.) On

June 14, 2012, Defendants filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, declaration of

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Defendant Hacker, statement of disputed facts, response to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts,

and objections to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 202-206.) On June 27,

2012, Defendants filed an amended opposition to the motion for summary judgment, amended

declaration of Defendant Hacker, amended statement of disputed facts, and amended response to

Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 1

209-212.) 

On July 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed evidentiary objections to Defendants’ evidence submitted in

support of the opposition to the motion for summary judgment, declaration in support of his motion,

and opposition to Defendants’ objections to evidence submitted in support of the motion for

summary judgment. (ECF No. 216-218.) On July 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion to file a

supplemental exhibit in support of his motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 229.) On July 31,

2012, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants’ opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and

objections to the amended evidence submitted in support of Defendants’ opposition. (ECF No. 227,

228.) Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to file a supplemental exhibit on August

24, 2012, and Plaintiff filed a reply on September 10, 2012. (ECF Nos. 233, 236.) 

II. Relevant Second Amended Complaint Allegations

On February 28, 2007, while housed in the Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”),

Plaintiff and other inmates engaged in a protest against prison officials. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 9, ECF

No. 174.) Plaintiff covered his cell window with paper, refused to relinquish his food tray, and

refused to cuff up. (Id. at ¶ 10.) The inmates informed prison officials that the protest would not

turn violent if the officials would agree to address their complaints. (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

Defendants Huchins and Reynoso refused to address the inmates’ complaints and ordered

that the X10 Barricade Removal Device be used to extract inmates from their cells. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

Defendants Hutchins, Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson ordered an extraction team to extract the

inmates from their cells, and that inmates be housed back in the contaminated cells. (Id. at ¶ 15.) 

An order issued striking Defendants’ opposition to the motion for summary judgment, declaration of

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Defendant Hacker, statement of disputed facts, response to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts, and Plaintiff’

evidentiary objections and declaration in support on November 2, 2012. (ECF No. 244.)

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Defendants Munoz, Paz, Morse, Omos, and Clausing, and officers Daley and Perez

approached Plaintiff’s cell. Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Omos sprayed a seven to eight second

burst of pepper spray into Plaintiff’s cell rather than the one to three second burst that was

administered to most inmates. (Id. at ¶ 18.) As the pepper spray entered the cell, Plaintiff began

gagging and choking, and experienced lung and chest pain. Plaintiff then uncovered his cell window

and removed his clothing so he could be searched and decontaminated. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 

Plaintiff was removed from his cell and turned over to the decontamination team, Defendants

Paz and Morse, and Officers Henrichsen, and Lanlger. Defendants Paz and Morse decontaminated

Plaintiff by rinsing him with water for several minutes. (Id. at ¶ 26-27.) While Plaintiff was being

decontaminated, Defendants Munoz, Omos, and Clausing, and Officers Perez, and Daley followed

the order of Defendants Huchins, Reynoso, Hacker, and Robertson to remove all property from

Plaintiff’s cell. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Defendants Paz and Morse placed Plaintiff back in the contaminated

cell. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Defendants Reynoso, Hacker, Roberson, and Hutchins stood by and allowed

Plaintiff to be placed back in the contaminated cell. Plaintiff was left in the contaminated cell for

ten days causing pain from being exposed to the chemicals. (Id. at ¶ 38.) 

III. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when

it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact, and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment must be entered, “after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that partywill bearthe burden

of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). However, the court is to

liberally construe the filings and motions of pro se litigants. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150

(9th Cir. 2010). The “party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586 n.11. 

The parties bear the burden of supporting their motions and oppositions with the papers they

wish the Court to consider and/or by specifically referencing any other portions of the record for

consideration. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Court will not undertake to mine the record for triable issues of fact. Simmons v. Navajo

County, Arizona, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

IV. Evidentiary Objections

Defendants bring seventy two objections to Plaintiff’s evidence in support of the motion for

summary judgment and Plaintiff responds with thirty nine objections to Defendants evidence in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 206, 216.) Many of the objections

brought by both parties address evidence that is irrelevant in deciding the disputed issues here. 

Accordingly, the Court will only address the objections to the relevant evidence considered by the

Court in deciding Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 

A. Inmate Declarations

In support of his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff submits the declaration of inmates

David Vasquez, Jack Morris, Mark Torres, and Cesar Molina regarding their experience of being

pepper sprayed or involved in a peaceful protests and the actions taken by prison officials in

response. Defendants object to the declarations of these witnesses on the grounds they are not

qualified to provide expert testimony. None of these inmates were involved in the incident that is

at issue here. They were not eye or ear witnesses, and the witnesses have set forth their opinion of

the proper procedures to be used byCDCR officials to deal with situations such as are at issue here. 

There are two types of opinion testimony, laywitness testimony or expert witness testimony. 

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The testimony of a lay witness “opinion is limited to one that is: a) rationally based on the witness’s

perception; b) helpful to clearly understanding the witnesses testimony or to determining a fact in

issue; and c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of

Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Lay witness testimony generally summarizes first-hand sensory

observations and “is not to provide specialized explanations or observations that an untrained layman

could not make if perceiving the same acts or events.” United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 554

(7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir. 2001)); see Hanger

Prosthetics &Orthopedics, Inc. v. Capstone, Orthopedic, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-02879-GEB-KJM, 2008

WL 2441067, at *2 (E.D.Cal. June 13, 2008) (“The distinction between lay and expert witness

testimony is that lay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while

expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in

the field.”) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). Since the testimony of these witnesses is

not based on a first hand knowledge of the facts of this case, but is applying the facts to specialized

knowledge that a lay person would not possess, the Court concludes that the testimony does not

qualify as lay opinion testimony. Conn, 297 F.3d at 554.

An opinion regarding the proper prison procedures to be followed in dealing with inmates

that are refusing to comply with orders, in decontaminating a prison cell following chemical

extraction, and the manner in which discipline is imposed and personal belongings are distributed

to the inmates following the extraction is beyond that of the lay witness. The opinion testimony

requires “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education. Fed. R. Evid. 702. While these inmates state they have personal experience due to their

individual experiences while incarcerated, such testimony is insufficient to qualify them as an expert

in prison administration or pepperspray. Accordingly, Defendants’ objections are sustained and the

declarations of inmates David Vasquez, Jack Morris, Mark Torres, and Cesar Molina shall be

disregarded.

B. Incident Reports

Defendants object to the crime incident reports prepared by correctional officers on the

grounds that the contents of the reports are inadmissible hearsay. “Hearsay is inadmissible on

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summary judgment to the same extent it would be at trial, as is testimony not based on the affiant’s

personal knowledge of the events detailed in the declaration.” Tracchia v. Tilton, No. CIV S-06-

2916 GEB KJM P, 2009 WL 3055222, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 21, 2009). “An objection based on

hearsay inherently is bound to the context in which the allegedly objectionable evidence is offered.”

Sanchez v. Penner, No. CIV S-07-0542 MCE EFB P, 2009 WL 3088331, * 5 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 22,

2009). 

Hearsay is an out of court statement that a party offers for the truth of the matter asserted. 

Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). A statement made by a party that is offered by the opposing party is not

hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). The contents of the reports prepared by Defendants Hacker,

Roberson, Munoz, Paz, Morse, Omos, and Clausing are not hearsay, and Defendants’ objection is

overruled on this ground. 

C. Operating Instructions and Material Safety Data Sheet

Defendants object to the operating instructions for the X10 extension device (Exhibit II),

Novus material safety data sheet, (Exhibit JJ), and Sabre material safety data sheets (Exhibits KK

and LL) on the grounds that the documents are hearsay. Plaintiff submits these exhibits with a

declaration stating they were turned over by Defendants during discovery. Plaintiff also argues that

these documents are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). 

Plaintiff is attempting to submit these documents for the truth of the matter asserted and they

fall within the hearsay rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) makes an exception for documents that

are made at or near the time of the incident, are kept in the regular course of business, making the

record is a regular practice of the activity, and these conditions are shown by the testimony of a

qualifying witness. The documents Plaintiff is attempting to introduce do not meet the exception. 

These are not documents created and kept by prison officials in the regular course of business, but

documents obtained from outside sources. The documents are hearsay and Plaintiff has failed to

show that any exception to the hearsay rule would apply. Defendants objection to Exhibits II, JJ,

KK, and LL is sustained. 

. D. Defendants’ Responsive Pleadings

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ pleadings on the ground that they are not signed. (Plaintiff’s

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Evidentiary Objections 20, ECF No. 228.) A review of the pleadings shows that defense counsel

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signed the documents with an electronic signature. To the extent that Plaintiff objects to the

electronic signature of Defendant Hacker being used on the document, Local Rule 131(f) provides

for the use of an electronic signature and Plaintiff’s objection is overruled. 

Plaintiff further objects that Defendants’ amended pleadings were not timelyfiled. (ECF No.

228 at 19-20.) Defendant’s original pleadings were timely filed on June 14, 2012. The amended

documents, filed less than two weeks later on June 27, 2012, identify the specific changes that were

made to the documents. The Court finds that since Defendants opposition was timely filed, Plaintiff

did not suffer any prejudice by the filing of the amended documents and Plaintiff’s objection is

overruled.

E. Declaration of Defendant Hacker

Plaintiff objects to the declaration of Defendant Hacker on the ground that it lacks

foundation, contains hearsay, contains facts that were not supplemented during the discovery

process, and is a sham declaration. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hacker’s declaration lacks foundation because it is not based

on personal knowledge. “A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient

to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove

personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. Defendant

Hacker states that he supervised the extraction teams on the date in question. (Hacker Dec. ¶ 3.) 

Defendant Hacker attempted to contact the inmates that were refusing to comply with orders and

received no response. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) Defendant Hacker personally stood outside the cell doors and

requested the non-compliant inmates, including Plaintiff, to follow the orders of the correctional

officers and observed the cell extractions. (Id. at ¶ 9-11.) Defendant Hacker has sufficiently shown

that he has personal knowledge of the events addressed in the declarations and Plaintiff’s objection

due to lack of foundation is overruled. 

All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners

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via the CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

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Plaintiff objects to Defendant Hackers’ declaration on the basis that it was stated on

information and belief. Defendant Hacker states that prior to the cell extractions a social worker

requested that each inmate comply with correctional officers. This appears to be made on

information and belief because Defendant Hacker did not attend the cell extraction of every inmate

as there were two extraction teams. However, it is clear that he observed the cell extractions of some

of the inmates and this statement was based on his personal knowledge. However, those portions

of the declaration that involve the decontamination of Plaintiff and his cell, and the issuance of

necessities following the cell extraction do not appear to be made on personal knowledge and

Plaintiff’s objection shall be sustained to those sections of paragraphs 16, 26, and 27 that are asserted

on information or belief. 

Plaintiff’s objections based upon hearsay appear to be directed to the information that was

provided to Defendant Hacker regarding the inmates that were refusing to comply. This information

was not presented for the truth of the matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2). The statements

to which Plaintiff is objecting are offered to show Defendant Hacker’s state of mind in making

decisions regarding the cell extractions and subsequent action taken by Defendant Hacker. See Fed.

R. Evid. 803(3). Plaintiff’s objection based upon hearsay is overruled. 

Plaintiff objects to Defendant Hacker’s declaration on the basis that it offers impermissible

lay opinion. Defendant Hacker’s statements regarding the use of the X10 BRD cell extraction

device, inmate decontamination by cool running water over the course of several minutes, etc. are

not a matter of opinion, but are statements of fact. Plaintiff’s objection based on impermissible lay

opinion is overruled. 

Plaintiff objects to the declaration on the grounds that the declaration contains factual

statementsthat were not disclosed during discoveryand Defendant did not supplement his responses.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hacker has submitted a sham declaration to create triable issues of

fact. Affidavits or declarations used in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment

“must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show

that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 

The sham affidavit rule arises when the declarant’s declaration contradicts earlier deposition

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testimony. Nelson v. City of Davis, 571 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2009); see Kennedy v. Allied Mut.

Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding a court may discount a “sham” declaration

that “flatly contradicts” prior deposition testimony, and has been provided for the sole purpose of

creating a genuine issue of material fact.) The underlying rationale of the sham affidavit rule is that

a party may not “manufacture a bogus dispute with himself to defeat summary judgment.” Davis,

571 F.3d at 928 (emphasis in original). 

In this instance, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hacker has previously stated that he lacks

recollection and after reasonable inquiry has been unable to obtain sufficient information to respond

to Plaintiff’s requests for admissions or interrogatories and now is asserting, on information and

belief, that Plaintiff’s cell was decontaminated and he was issued personal items pursuant to policy. 

While Plaintiff argues that Defendants have admitted that his cell was not decontaminated, a review

of the documents submitted in support of his declaration show no such admission. 

Specificallyin regards to Defendant Hacker, Plaintiff requested that DefendantHacker admit 

that he “failed to order officers and the extraction team to clean and decontaminate the cell of the

chemical agent.” (ECF No. 191 at 55, Defendant Hacker’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for

Admissions, Set One, Request for Admission No. 65.) Defendant responded in relevant part,

“Admit. I do not make orders for specific post-cell extraction procedures.” (Id.) Similarly, Plaintiff

requested Defendant Hacker to “[a]dmit that under your supervision and direction plaintiff was

placed back into the contaminated cell.” (Id., Request for Admission No. 66.) Defendant Hacker

responded in relevant part, “Deny. I do not make orders for specific post-cell extraction procedures.”

(Id.) Plaintiff received a similar response to his requests for admissions regarding being provided

supplies following the cell extraction. (See Id. at 56, Request for Admission No. 74 and 75.) A

review of the discovery documents reflects similar requests and responses from the additional

defendants. 

Defendant Hacker’s admission that he does not make orders for specific post extraction

procedures does not contradict his statement that on information and belief the post extraction

procedures were followed, Plaintiff’s cell was decontaminated and he was provided supplies in

compliance with the procedure. The Court does not find that the affidavit submitted by Defendant

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Hacker is a sham affidavit and Plaintiff’s objection on that ground is overruled.

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff objects because Defendants did not supplement their

discovery responses, Plaintiff has failed to show that any response from Defendant Hacker needed

to be supplemented. While Plaintiff appears to complain because Defendant Hacker did not identify

the individuals that would have decontaminated his cell or provided him with supplies, the Court has

reviewed the discovery requests submitted in support of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

and Plaintiff never propounded any interrogatory requesting this information to any defendant.

While Plaintiff requested that Defendant Roberson respond to where the supplies were kept

and who took the supplies to the ASU, the response was that the supplies are stored in various

locations at the facility and Defendant did not recall who took the supplies to the ASU on any given

day during the period in question. (ECF No. 191-1 at 31-32, Defendant Roberson’s Supplemental

Responses to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories, Set Two, Nos. 2 and 3.) To the extent that Plaintiff wanted

Defendants to identifywho decontaminated his cell or who provided him with supplies, Plaintiff has

not provided any discovery request showing that he propounded such an interrogatory to any

defendant. Plaintiff’s objection to Defendant Hacker’s declaration based on failure to supplement

discovery responses is overruled.

Plaintiff argues that defense counsel has admitted the fact that the cell was not

decontaminated, however argument in the pleadings filed in response to Plaintiff’s motions for

sanctions is not evidence to support the motion for summary judgment. To the extent defense

counsel has created a conflict due to his argument, the Court does not condone defense counsel’s

conduct, but Plaintiff’s objection on this ground is overruled.

Finally, Plaintiff objects to the policy submitted as an exhibit on the grounds of lack of

authentication and failure to provide the document during discovery. Since Defendant’s reliance on

this policy shall not be considered, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s objections. 

V. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests that Court take judicial notice of the lethal effects of the chemical agent as

stated in Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979), Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of

Humbolt, 240 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2000), and Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 1996),

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and two newspaper articles. (Request for Judicial Notice 1, ECF No. 194.) Defendants object that

while the Court may take judicial notice of the legal principals, it may not take judicial notice of the

facts contained in court documents. (Defendants’ Amended Response to Plaintiff’s Separate

Statement of Undisputed Facts 4, ECF No. 212.)

A. Court Decisions

Plaintiff is asking the Court to take judicial notice of the “lethal effects of the chemical

agent.” Under the Federal Rules a court may take judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Judicial notice may be taken “of court filings and

other matters of public record.” Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc. 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6

(9th Cir. 2006); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). While a court may

properly take notice of a doctrine or rule of law from a prior case, “a court may not take judicial

notice of proceedings or records in another case so as to supply, without the presentation of evidence,

facts essential to support a contention in a cause then before it.” M/V American Queen v. San Diego

Marine Const. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Therefore, while the Court may take judicial notice of the existence of unrelated court

documents, it will not take judicial notice of the truth of the matters that are asserted in those

documents. This is a matter which the Court finds is not appropriate for judicial notice and

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice should be denied. 

B. Newspaper Articles

Plaintiff also requests the Court to take judicial notice of a newspaper article published in the

Prison Legal News and an article from the Hanford Sentinel to show the lethal effects of the

chemical agent. (ECF No. 194 at 1.) The facts contained within these articles are not “either (1)

generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.

Evid. 201(b). Further, Plaintiff submits these articles for the truth of the matter asserted, and

therefore, they are hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice of the

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newspaper articles should be denied.

VI. Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Supplemental Exhibit

Plaintiff requests to supplement his motion for summary judgment with the video of his cell

extraction. Plaintiff alleges that the video demonstrates that Defendants are attempting to perpetuate

a fraud on the Court by submitting the declaration of Defendant Hacker. (ECF No. 229.) 3

Defendants oppose the motion to supplement the motion for summary judgment as Plaintiff is

continuing to make unsubstantiated accusations against defense counsel and the evidence was

available to Plaintiff at the time he filed his motion and the submission is untimely. (ECF No. 236.) 

Plaintiff replies that Defendants’ opposition is untimely and unsigned and should therefore not be

considered. (ECF No. 236.)

In the interest of judicial economy and due to the discovery issues that have been raised in

this action, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s request to supplement his motion for summary judgment

and the video shall be considered in deciding Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The video

shows the attempts of a female and Defendant Hacker to contact Plaintiff and his refusal to respond.

Following Plaintiff’s failure to respond, the extraction team approached Plaintiff’s cell and inserted

the cell extraction device through the food port. Based on the sound, Plaintiff’s cell was

administered an approximate five second blast of the pepperspray. After Plaintiff is removed from

his cell, the video shows Plaintiff being decontaminated in the shower. Once Plaintiff is rehoused

in the cell the video ends. The video does not show what occurred in Plaintiff’s cell following his

extraction and while he was being decontaminated, and it does not contain any events that occurred

after Plaintiff was rehoused in his cell.

///

///

In his reply, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have agreed that his cell was not decontaminated. The Court

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has reviewed all the exhibits submitted by Plaintiff with his motion for summary judgment and, while the individual

defendants have admitted they did not decontaminate Plaintiff’s cell and the supervisory defendants stated that they

did not get involved in post extraction procedures, no defendant has stated that Plaintiff’s cell was not

decontaminated or that he was not provided with supplies following the extraction. To the extent that Plaintiff is

claiming that no other prison officials were involved in post extraction procedures, there is no evidence supporting

such a claim before the Court.

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VII. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Statement of Undisputed Facts4

1. On February 28, 2007, Plaintiff was housed at the California Substance Abuse Treat

Facility’s (“CSATF”) Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”). 

2. On this date, Plaintiff and 43 inmates engaged in peaceful, non violent protest to bring

attention to the abuses of prison officials and inhumane conditions.

3. All inmates, including Plaintiff were secured in small six by nine cells. 

4. The protestors covered up their cell door “windows” with paper and refused to relinquish

their plastic food trays. 

5. There were other unobstructed views into Plaintiff’s cell. 

6. Defendant Reynoso informed Defendant Hutchins of the situation and obtained her

authorization to conduct preplanned cell extractions.

7. Defendants Hacker and Roberson then summonedDefendants Munoz, Clausing, Omos, Paz,

and Morse, and Officer Daley to the ASU, to conduct extractions of all inmates, including

Plaintiff. 

8. It is the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations (“CDCR”) practice and

policy, for supervisory officials to address inmate complaints, and to “verbally” resolve

protests, instead of authorizing the “use of force.”

9. Defendants Hutchins and Reynoso authorized and ordered their subordinates to use force to

quell the protest and retrieve the food trays. 

10. Defendants Hutchins, Hacker, Roberson, and Reynoso authorized and ordered their

subordinates to use the “X10 Barracade Removal Devise” (“X10BRD”).

11. Plaintiffs vent was turned off before the extraction. 

12. At 10:30 or 11:00 am, Defendants Hutchins, Reynoso, Hacker, Roberson, Munoz, Paz,

Morse, Clausing, and Omos, and Officers Perez, and Daley assembled outside the ASU and

were given their assignments by Defendants Hutchins, Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson. 

The facts which Plaintiff included in his undisputed facts, but which are disputed by Defendants, are not

4

included in the statement of undisputed facts.

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13. Defendant Munoz was assigned as “team leader,” Defendants Paz and Morse to

“decontamination and escorts,” Defendant Omosto “sheild,”Defendant Clausing to “baton,”

Officer Daley to “handcuffs,” and Officer Perez to “leg irons.”

14. Defendants Hutchins, Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson had an obligation to assign someone

to decontaminate the cells, and provide life’s basic necessities. 

15. Every inmate (including “Zayas” who volunteered his tray, uncovered his window, and was

not extracted) had their basic necessities removed from their cells. 

16. At about 4:52 p.m., Defendants Munoz, Paz, Morse, Omos, and Clausing, and Officers

Daley, and Perez, and their supervisors; Defendants Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson

approached Plaintiff’s cell(wearing chemical protective suits)to perform the final extraction. 

Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson ordered their subordinates to extract Plaintiff.

17. Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Omos inserted the X10BRD into Plaintiff’s cell and

discharged it. 

18. Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Omos are trained on the use of “X10BRD” and the use

of force policies. The use of force policy was read to them hours before Plaintiff’s

extraction. 

19. Plaintiff was not doing anything different than the other inmates. 

20. Defendants Reynoso, Hacker, Roberson, Paz, and Morse and Officers Daley, and Perez were

present when the pepper spray was administered. 

21. The chemicals hit Plaintiff and drenched his cell.

22. Plaintiff instantly began choking gagging and experiencing unbearable lung and chest pain

and an overwhelming burning sensation to his eyes, skin and genitals. 

23. Plaintiff immediately uncovered his cell door window and voluntarily removed his clothing,

so he could be immediately searched, restrained, and removed. Plaintiff was in obvious pain.

24. Defendants Reynoso, Hacker, Roberson, Paz, and Morse, and Officer Perez stood by and did

not intervene. 

25. Although Plaintiff was in pain, choking and gagging, he complied and offered to be cuffed

and removed.

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26. Next Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Omos, and Officer Daley asked that Plaintiff show

them his genitals, underarms and feet slowly, even though Plaintiff’s unclothed bodywas “in

plain sight.”

27. Plaintiff was then asked to show them the bottom of his feet. Plaintiff picked up his left foot,

but Defendant Munoz said, “No, I said right foot not left foot.” 

28. Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Omos, and Officer Daley knew that it made no difference

which foot Plaintiff lifted first because both feet were in plain sight.

29. Prison policies establish that there is no order, nor does it make a difference which foot an

inmate lifts first, during an unclothed body inspection. 

30. Once Officer Daley finally applied “cuffs” on Plaintiff, he was removed from the cell. 

31. As leg irons were applied, Defendants Reynoso, Hacker, Roberson, Paz, and Morse stood

by but did not intervene. 

32. Plaintiff was wearing contaminated underwear and was turned over to the decontamination

team, Defendants Paz and Morse. 

33. Defendants Paz and Morse ran water over Plaintiff’s head for a few minutes.

34. Defendants Reynoso, Hacker, Roberson, Paz, Morse, Munoz, Clausing, and Omos receive

training on the use and effects of chemical agents.

35. Defendants knew they had an obligation to have Plaintiff decontaminated and examined

following chemical inhalation and exposure. 

36 While Plaintiff knelt in front of Officers Langer and Henrichsen – Defendants Munoz, Omos,

and Clausing, and Officers Perez, and Daley followed Defendants Hutchins, Reynoso,

Hacker, and Roberson’s previous order and removed Plaintiff’s toothbrush, toothpaste,

hygiene (soap, shampoo), toilet paper, all clothing, towels, bedding, mattress, sheets, socks,

shoes, sandals and cleaning supplies (“life’s basic necessities”) from Plaintiff’s cell. 

37. Defendants Reynoso, Hutchins, Hacker, and Roberson had their subordinates remove all of

life’s basic necessities from all the protestor’s cells, including one inmate who had stopped

protesting and complied with orders. 

38. After Plaintiff was placed back in his cell, he began choking, gagging and experiencing

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overwhelming pain to his skin, genitals, eyes, chest and lungs. 

39. Defendants Hutchins,Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson were the supervisors on the scene, and

were responsible for (A) Plaintiff health and safety and (B) they were in charge of the ASU. 

B. Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff argues that the objective component of the Eighth Amendment violation is

established because the chemical caused him to choke, gag, and experience overwhelming pain to

his chest, lungs, skin, eyes, and genitals, and the warning labels on the chemicals show they can

cause intense pain and even death. (Motion for Summary Judgment 11, ECF No. 191.) Defendants 5

Munoz, Clausing, and Olmos used a seven to eight second blast of pepperspray to extract him from

his cell causing him pain. (Id. at 12.) The amount of chemical used was greater than necessary and

therefore was used for the sole purpose of causing pain. The other inmates were only subjected to 6

a one to three second burst of pepper spray, but Plaintiff was subjected to a seven to eight second

burst which far exceeded the amount needed or recommended by the manufacturer. (Id. at 13.) 

Plaintiff argues the use of force could have been tempered by subjecting him to a one to three second

burst of pepper spray and then allowing him an opportunity to comply before subjecting him to

additional pepper spray. (Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiff suffered overwhelming pain to his eyes, skin,

genitals, chest and lungs and may have been permanently injured. Plaintiff argues there are no

material issues of fact and summary judgment must be entered. (Id. at 14.) 

Plaintiff argues that after the seven to eight second blast of pepper spray, his cell was not

Plaintiff continues to argue that the decision to use pepper spray was excessive use of force because the

5

inmates were involved in a peaceful protest and there was no threat of violence. The parties do not dispute that 44

inmates had covered the windows of their cells, were refusing to return their food trays, and were refusing to come

out of their cells. Although Plaintiff claims this was a peaceful protest, the inmates were refusing to comply with the

orders of correctional officers. The right to peaceful protest does not extend to a right to refuse to comply with the

lawful orders of correctional officials. In this instance, the decision to use pepper spray to address the situation

confronting Defendants does not state a claim for excessive force and has been dismissed from this action. The sole

issue for the excessive force claim is whether Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Olmos used an excessive amount of

pepper spray in extracting Plaintiff from his cell. All other arguments set forth by Plaintiff shall be disregarded.

To the extent that Plaintiff submits his own testimony regarding the pepper spray, cell extraction device,

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and procedures for decontamination, Plaintiff is not qualified as an expert in these areas; and his arguments contain

nonadmissible hearsay. Fed. R. Civ. P. 801(c). Affidavits or declarations used in support of or opposition to a

motion for summary judgment “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in

evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(4).

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decontaminated prior to him being rehoused in the cell with the ventilation system turned off and

without any means to decontaminate the cell. As a result of the fumes and vapors Plaintiff suffered 7

overwhelming pain and burning to his chest, lungs, eyes, skin, and genitals and may have been

permanently injured. (Id. at 15.) Defendants Hutchins, Hacker, Reynoso, and Roberson were the

supervisors responsible for assigning someone to decontaminate his cell and provide him with basic

necessities and they intentionally failed to do so. (Id. at 15-16.) Defendants are regularly trained on

the harmful effects of the chemical agents, knew that the cell was not decontaminated and placed

Plaintiff back in the cell without any way to decontaminate the cell or himself. (Id. at 16.) The

officers used protective suits to protect themselves from the effects of the chemicals and that

establishes that Plaintiff would be subjected to pain and injured once rehoused in the cell. 

Defendants were aware that Plaintiff was suffering when he returned to his cell because they had

seen him gagging and choking from the effects of the chemical. (Id. at 17.) Defendants Hutchins,

Hacker, Reynoso, and Roberson were responsible for Plaintiff’s health and safety and had an

obligation to ensure that the chemical agents were disposed of and ensure Plaintiff was housed in

safe and sanitary conditions. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff argues that it would be obvious to Defendants

Hutchins, Reynoso, Hacker, and Roberson that he would need a change of clothing, hygiene

supplies, and supplies for cleaning his cell to rid it of the chemicals. (Id. at 21.) 

C. Defendants’ Position

Defendants argue that because Plaintiff was refusing to comply with orders, administering

a single blast of pepper spray during Plaintiff’s cell extraction was within the policy and procedure

guideline of the CDCR. Following his cell extraction, Plaintiff was decontaminated in the showers

and was issued a fresh pair of boxers and returned to his decontaminated cell. (Am. Opp. to Motion

for Summary Judgment 10, ECF No. 209.) Plaintiff was medically cleared and was found to be

experiencing the normal effects of exposure to pepperspray. The decontamination of Plaintiff’s cell

Plaintiff argues that he was housed in the cell without being provided with any necessities for ten days

7

following this incident, however Plaintiff failed to link any defendant to this ten day period and this claim is not

proceeding in this action. The claim proceeding here is that Defendants Hutchins, Hacker, Reynoso, and Roberson

ordered all Plaintiff’s property be removed from his cell and that he be placed back in the contaminated cell without

any means of decontaminating the cell. All arguments regarding the claims not proceeding in this action shall be

disregarded.

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was not videotaped, but standard procedure was followed by terminating the video recording

following the removal of the inmate from the cell. (Id. at 11.) 

Defendants argue that the administration of the single dose of pepper spray was necessary

because Plaintiff refused to comply with the orders to return his meal tray and clear the obstruction

to the windows of his cell. The administration of the pepper spray was within CDCR policy and

Defendants took appropriate action to restore order in the housing unit. A triable issue exists as to

whether the single dose of pepper spray was excessive. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that the pepper spray was applied sadistically and maliciously for the very purpose of

causing harm. (Id. at 13.) In this instance, Defendants used controlled force as part of a controlled

force plan which was within the rules of conduct for correctional officers. The motion for summary

judgment on the excessive force claim should be denied. 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he had a serious medical

need that was not adequately addressed by prison officials. Whether Plaintiff suffered harmful

effects from the pepper spray, inadequacy of cell ventilation, availability of showers and medical

care are issues that must be decided by the trier of fact. (Id. at 15.) Further, whether Defendants

followed the policies, rules, and regulations is a mixed issue of law and fact that is not proper for

summary judgment. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff has failed to show that there was an Eighth Amendment

violation based upon prison policies. (Id. at 17.)

Finally, Defendants argue that a resolution of the factual issues in this action may relieve

Defendants from liability as they would be entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 18.) 

D. Plaintiff’s Reply

Plaintiff replies that the fact that Defendant Hacker was not aware of the reason that the

inmates were protesting does not establish that Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Olmos were not

aware of the reason. Further, Plaintiff asserts that the failure of Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and

Olmos to file a declaration compels an adverse ruling against them. Plaintiff admits that were

Defendant Hacker’s contention that only a single burst of pepper spray was used true, there would

be no dispute. (Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Opposition and Amended Opposition 7, ECF No.

227.) However, Plaintiff contends that the video establishes that Plaintiff’s cell was administered

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a nine second blast of pepper spray. (Id. at 7-8.)

Plaintiff argues that his lack of injuries is irrelevant because the fact that he was

decontaminated after the incident was rendered useless once he was rehoused in the contaminated

cell. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants cannot rely on the use of force plan because

that plan was not in existence at the time of the incident. (Id. at 9.) 

Plaintiff continues to argue that Defendant Hacker’s declaration is a sham affidavit that

should not be considered in resolving the motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 11-13.) Plaintiff

argues that the undisputed evidence shows that he was returned to a contaminated cell and was not

provided with any needed items to decontaminate himself or his cell. (Id. at 14.) Defendants were

in charge at the time of the incident and had a duty to ensure that all chemicals were disposed of and

Plaintiff was provided with necessities on the night of the incident. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff argues the

failure to follow their own policies cannot be deemed anything but deliberate indifference. (Id. at 8

17.) 

E. Discussion

This action is proceeding on the claims that Defendants used excessive force and subjected

Plaintiff to conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Liability under section

1983 exists where a defendant “acting under the color of law” has deprived the plaintiff “of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 574

(9th Cir. 2000). To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). In order to be held liable each defendant must have personally

participated in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

///

Plaintiff further argues that Defendants are time barred from arguing qualified immunity and the court has

8

previously decided this matter so it is barred by res judicata. The denial of qualified immunity was due to the factual

allegations made by Plaintiff at the pleading stage. (ECF Nol 36 at 11:6-12:19.) Due to the factual disputes

qualified immunity was not granted, however should those factual disputes resolve in Defendants favor, the issue of

qualified immunity for those claims that survive summary judgment could be appropriately addressed in this action.

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1. Excessive Force

a. Legal Standard

When a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the

cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, the question turns on whether the

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In determining whether the use of force was

wanton and unnecessary, it is proper to consider factors such as the need for application of force, the

relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the

responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Hudson,

503 U.S. at 7. 

A prison official’s use of force to maliciously and sadistically cause harm violates the

contemporary standards of decency. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010). However,

“[n]ot ‘everymalevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Gaddy, 130

S. Ct. at 1179 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Factors that can be considered are “the need for the

application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, [and]

the extent of injury inflicted.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 692

(9th Cir. 2003). Although the extent of the injury is relevant, the inmate does not need to sustain

serious injury. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178-79. The Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition

de minimus uses of physical force. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10. 

b. Need for Application of Force

While Plaintiff argues that there was no need for the use of force, it is clear that some

measure of force was required given the circumstances confronting prison officials. A total of 44

inmates in the ASU, including Plaintiff, had covered their cell door “windows” with paper and

refused to relinquish food trays. (UF 1, 2, 4.) The inmates refused to comply with the orders of the

correctional officers. (ECF No. 210 at ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff argues that he was not a threat and therefore it was not necessary to use force to

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extract him from his cell. Plaintiff claims that officers could have determined this by observing him

through the roof top window in his cell. However, prison officials are not required to climb up on

the roof of the building and look through the roof windows to ensure that inmates are not engaged

in any wrongful activity. Prison administrators are charged with the responsibility of maintaining

the safety of correctional and administrative staff and visitors as well as an obligation to take

reasonable measures to protect the safety of inmates. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. In this regard, prison

officials are “accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and

practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve the internal order and discipline and to

maintain institutional security.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22 (quotingBell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

547 (1979)). Requiring inmates to keep their cell windows uncovered and return their food trays

clearly falls within this wide ranging discretion. 

Further, Plaintiff’s argument that no force was necessary because the protest was peaceful

and the inmates would not become violent if prison officials had addressed their demands is not

persuasive. Correctional officials are not required to concede to the demands of inmates or wait

them out in order to avoid the use of force. Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984)

(“experience and common sense establish that a prison cannot be operated in such a way”). In this

instance, some use of force was required to gain compliance of the inmates and restore the security

of the institution. 

c. Efforts to Temper Severity of Forceful Response

Prison officials attempted to gain compliance of Plaintiff prior to using force. A clinical

social worker approached Plaintiff’s cell and attempted to make contact with him through the cell

door. (ECF No. 210 at ¶ 8; Video of Cell Extraction, ECF No. 229.) After the social worker

received no response, Defendant Hacker approached Plaintiff’s cell and ordered him to comply with

the correctional officers and warned him that force wold be used if he failed to comply. (ECF No.

210 at ¶¶ 9, 11; Video of Cell Extraction 5:56:58-57:52.) 

Prison officials made reasonable efforts to obtain Plaintiff’s compliance prior to using any

force on Plaintiff. It was only after Plaintiff refused to comply with the orders of correctional

officers, did not respond to the requests of the social worker, and failed to respond to Defendant

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Hacker’s warning that the pepper spray was administered. Given that Plaintiff had essentially

barricaded himself in his cell, the other option would be for correctional officers to physically enter

Plaintiff’s cell to extract him, which would have resulted in a physical confrontation with Plaintiff,

and could have resulted in serious physical injury to Plaintiff or the officers. When compared to

other forms of force, the decision to use pepper spray to extract Plaintiff from his cell was a

tempered use of force. Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2000).

Further, Defendants made efforts to temper the use of pepper spray in that Plaintiff was

immediatelytaken to be decontaminated and was placed in the shower with runningwaterfor several

minutes. Following the decontamination, Plaintiff was evaluated by medical personnel.

d. Relationship Between Need and Amount of Force Used

Having found that force was necessary, the real issue here is whether an excessive amount

of pepper spray was used to extract Plaintiff from his cell. When Plaintiff refused to comply with

the orders to remove the paper from the cell window and return his tray, the cell extraction device

was inserted through the food port and a single burst of pepper spray was administered. (ECF No.

210 at ¶ 12; ECF No. 229.) 

After giving warning that pepper spray would be used, the use of a small amount of pepper

spray to control a recalcitrant inmates has been found not to violate the Eighth Amendment. See 

Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903-4 (9th Cir. 2002) (two five second bursts of pepper spray to

break up inmate fight not excessive force in violation of Eighth Amendment); Spain v. Procunier,

600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (use of small amounts of tear gas after adequate warning may be

a necessary prison technique where an inmate refuses to move from a cell); Jones, 207 F.3d at 496

(holding correctional officer’s use of pepper spray was tempered response when used to subdue a

recalcitrant prisoner who was refusing to work and disobeying orders); Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d

1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding use of mace to obtain compliance of recalcitrant inmate was

reasonable response whetherthe inmate is locked in a cell or not); Robins v. Lamarque, No. 3:03-cv00797-JSW (PR), No. 5:03-cv-007970-JSW (PR), 2011 WL 6181435, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 13,

2011) (two blasts of pepper spray and smoke grenades used to extract inmates from cell did not

violate Eighth Amendment). 

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Here, Plaintiff had notice, not only by the efforts of correctional officers to contact him, but

by the cell extractions that proceeded in the housing unit during the several hours prior to Plaintiff’s

cell extraction. Plaintiff asserts that a seven to nine second burst of pepper spray was administered

which was more than twice that used to extract the other inmates. Plaintiff concedes that if only a

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single blast was used the defendants would not have used excessive force, but argues that this

exceeds the single blast that would be recommended. However, nowhere in the record is a single

blast defined as a specific period of time. Defendants assert that Plaintiff was administered the 10

same single blast of pepper spray that was administered to other inmates. The video of the cell

extraction shows that the cell extraction device was inserted into Plaintiff’s cell thorough the food

port and, based upon the time stamp on the video, from the sound of the spray it appears an

approximate five second blast of pepper spray was administered to Plaintiff’s cell. (Video of Cell

Extraction 5:58:29-5:58-40.) A factual dispute exists as to whetherthe amount of pepperspray used

to extract Plaintiff was an excessive use of force. 

e. Malicious or Sadistic or To Restore Order

Finally, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Omos

administered the pepper spray for any purpose other than to restore order. Plaintiff argues that

Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Omos knew that the inmates were protesting and complaining

about the abuses of prison officials and inhumane conditions. Even if the Defendants were aware

of the reason the inmates had covered their windows and were refusing to return their trays, that is

insufficient to conclude the use of pepper spray was applied maliciously and sadistically to inflict

pain. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had refused to uncover the window of his cell or return his dinner

tray and did not respond to the numerous requests of prison officials to comply with orders. 

///

Plaintiff’s assertion that the amount of pepper spray administered far exceeded the lethal dose is belied by

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the fact that he is still alive. (ECF No. 191 at 13.)

While Plaintiff states that the manufacturer recommends administering a one second burst, to the extent

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that Plaintiff would be able to lay a foundation and admit the manufacturers instructions, the manual states “[t]he

length of the spray should be determined by the officer depending on standard operating procedures.” (ECF No.

191-1 at 110.)

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f. Conclusion

A genuine issue of material fact does exist as to whether the amount of pepperspray used by

Defendants Munoz, Clausing, and Omos was applied sadistically or maliciously to cause harm or

for the purpose of restoring order . Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s motion for summaryadjudication on the excessive force claimagainst Defendants Munoz,

Clausing, and Omos should be denied.

2. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citingFarmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (quotation marks

omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must

not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citingRhodes,

452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate

penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a

maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and

citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food,

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in

prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). 

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807,

812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. Agnos, 152

F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). A prisoner’s claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in

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doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296

F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). 

Deliberate indifference requires a showing that prison officials were aware of a “substantial

risk of serious harm” to an inmate’s health or safety and that there was no “reasonable justification

for the deprivation, in spite of that risk.” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

844. The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in determining whether

the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment

claim.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. 

Plaintiff alleges that, prior to rehousing him in his cell, Defendants did not decontaminate

his cell. Plaintiff was placed back in the cell within five minutes of the pepper spray being used. 

Plaintiff states the chemicals remained in his cell and rained down upon him causing him to begin

choking, gagging, and experiencing overwhelming pain to his skin, genitals, eyes, chest, and lungs. 

(Plaintiff’s Dec. ¶ 30, ECF No. 193.) The chemicals eventually dried to a dust and he continued to

experience difficulty breathing and extreme pain for ten days. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-36.) 

Plaintiff claims that the video of the cell extraction proves that the defendants were

deliberately indifferent because it does not show any cleaning supplies by his cell; it does not sound

like the cell was being decontaminated; and the video catches a glimpse of the floor of the cell which

was smeared with the chemical agent. The video does not contain any images of Plaintiff’s cell from

the time that he was removed until he was rehoused in the cell. While Plaintiff is in the shower

being decontamined, the sound of the shower masks any sound of what was occurring in the housing

unit. (Video of Cell Extraction 6:01:04-6:01:56.) Once Plaintiff is removed from the shower, there

are sounds of unidentifiable activity within the housing unit. 

After the medical team addresses Plaintiff, Plaintiff is kept kneeling on the floor while the

escorting officers observe activitydown the hallwaytoward Plaintiff’s cell. (Id. at 6:03:36-6:04:38.) 

The officer escorting Plaintiff acknowledges that it is time to move; and Plaintiff is stood up as they

begin to move toward his cell. (Id. at 6:04:39-40.) While it is unclear what was occurring in

Plaintiff’s cell, it is clear from the video that the officers were waiting to take Plaintiff back to his

cell until his cell was ready for him to be rehoused in it. 

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When Plaintiff is placed back in the cell, the interior of the cell is not visible. (Id. at 6:04:43-

6:05:08.) Although Plaintiff claims that the video shows that the floor of the cell was smeared with

chemical agent, the brief glimpse of the doorway of the cell does not clearly show anything

identifiable on the floor of the cell. The video creates ambiguity as to whether Plaintiff’s cell was

decontaminated prior to Plaintiff being rehoused in the cell and raises triable issues of fact. It is for

a jury to decide, based upon a review of the video coupled with appropriate testimony, whether

plaintiff’s cell was decontaminated prior to him being rehoused in the cell.

Plaintiff argues that the video of the cell extraction proves that no one gave him a fresh

change of clothing or any supplies to decontaminate the cell or himself. (ECF No. 229 at 4.) 

However, the video of the cell extraction stops once Plaintiff is placed back in his cell and there is

no record of what occurred thereafter. In the background of the sequence in which Plaintiff is being

placed back in his cell, the video depicts a prison official with a cart that appears to contain supplies 

in the hallway just down from Plaintiff’s cell. (Video of Cell Extraction 6:04:49-6:05:09.) This is

sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff received any supplies following the cell

extraction. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether

Plaintiff’s cell was decontaminated and if he received any supplies following the cell extraction. The

Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. 

VIII. Conclusion and Recommendation

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice be DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s request to supplement his motion for summary judgment be GRANTED;

and

3. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written

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objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 19, 2012 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe 

10c20k UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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