Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00325/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00325-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark E. Dixon, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Pinal County, a political subdivision; James 

Walsh, Pinal County Attorney, in his 

official capacity; and Paul Babeu, Pinal 

County Sheriff, in his official capacity, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-10-325-PHX-DGC 

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff Mark Dixon claims to be the sole and lawful owner of an Australian 

shepherd named Shiloh. He alleges that Pinal County sheriff deputies wrongfully seized 

Shiloh and turned the dog over to his ex-wife. He has brought suit against the County 

itself, County Attorney James Walsh, and Sheriff Paul Babeu for allegedly having failed 

to investigate, prosecute, and make arrests in the matter. Doc. 1. The amended 

complaint purports to assert eight separate counts (Doc. 60 ¶¶ 11-18), but those “counts” 

consist of the “statement of facts” (id. at 3 & ¶ 19) supporting unspecified civil rights 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id. ¶ 5). Liberally construed, the complaint asserts 

constitutional violations of due process and equal protection of the law. Plaintiff seeks 

declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 1, 6-8. 

 The parties have filed motions for summary judgment. Docs. 98, 107. The 

motions are fully briefed. Docs. 103, 106, 112. Oral argument has not been requested. 

For reasons stated below, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants. 

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I. Summary Judgment Standard.

 A principal purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of factually or legally 

unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A party 

seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court 

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Summary 

judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only 

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of 

summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). 

II. Discussion.

 Plaintiff contends that the following undisputed facts entitle him to summary 

judgment: that deputies seized Shiloh and gave the dog to a third-party without lawful 

authority and while acting under color of state law, that the County received a notice of 

claim detailing the facts alleged by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff has the constitutional right to 

not be deprived of property without due process and to not be denied equal protection 

under the law, and that the County Attorney and Sheriff have a sworn duty to protect 

constitutional rights. Docs. 98 at 2, 106 ¶¶ 1-6, 108 at 2. Defendants argue, correctly, 

that Plaintiff has no constitutional right to require the County Attorney or the Sheriff to 

investigate a particular matter, to prosecute or arrest any individual, or to even discipline 

subordinates for alleged misconduct. Doc. 103 at 4. Because Defendants have been sued 

in their official capacities (Doc. 60 at 1), liability will lie under § 1983 only if Plaintiff 

shows that his alleged constitutional injury “was caused by employees acting pursuant to 

an official policy or ‘longstanding practice or custom,’ or that the injury was caused or 

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ratified by an individual with ‘final policy-making authority.’” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. 

Ctr. of S. Nev., --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2276774, at *6 (9th Cir. June 9, 2011) (quoting 

Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008)); see Monell 

v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 385 (1989). 

 Plaintiff can show neither. He has identified no policy or custom of Defendants as 

the “moving force” behind his alleged constitutional injuries. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; 

see Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); Polk County v. Dodson, 

454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981); Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). Nor 

has he presented evidence showing that Defendants ratified the alleged misconduct on the 

part of the deputies. 

 Defendants’ inaction, standing alone, is not enough to create a triable issue. 

Ratification is used as a theory of § 1983 liability where “an unconstitutional policy is 

established by the post hoc ratification of prior actions.” Lancaster v. Carey, No. CIV S08-0051 LKK GGH P, 2011 WL 2198313, at *14 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2011) (emphasis in 

original). Stated differently, “ratification simply makes clear that the policy was in effect 

at the time of the incident and was the ‘moving force’ for the unconstitutional act.” Id. 

The ratification theory cannot be so stretched to a situation where, as in this case, 

“no policy is at issue, but simply a one-time event that had been completed at the time the 

complaint was made.” Id.; see Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(making clear that to hold municipalities liable under § 1983 for failing to overrule the 

unconstitutional acts of subordinates “would simply smuggle respondeat superior

liability into [§] 1983 law” resulting in an impermissible “end run around Monell”); 

Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that a “single act or 

isolated incidents are normally insufficient to establish supervisory inaction upon which 

to predicate § 1983 liability”); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 848 

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(5th Cir. 2009) (noting that the theory of ratification is limited in § 1983 cases to 

“extreme factual circumstances”). 

 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have provided him no “post deprivation relief as 

required by their respective oaths of office and statutory duties, thereby denying [him] 

his Constitutional right to Due Process and Equal Protection of the law.” Doc. 60 ¶ 13. 

Defendants argue, correctly, that because Arizona law provides adequate post-deprivation 

remedies (including tort actions for replevin and trespass to chattels), no § 1983 claim 

will lie. Docs. 103 at 6, 112 at 1-2; see Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) 

(“an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not 

constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is 

available”); Brogan v. San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990) (“When 

state remedies are adequate to protect an individual’s procedural due process rights, a 

section 1983 action alleging a violation of those rights will not stand.”). 

III. Conclusion.

 In summary, Plaintiff has identified no specific policy or custom that arguably 

violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Polk, 454 U.S. at 326. Nor has 

he produced evidence of “affirmative or deliberate conduct by [Defendants] that may be 

said to have ratified” the actions taken by the deputies. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1348. 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ purported failure to support and defend the Constitution 

and otherwise uphold his civil rights “constitutes [an] unconstitutional custom or policy 

by the County” (Doc. 110 at 9), but the mere failure to protect an individual’s 

constitutional rights is not sufficient to establish municipal liability under § 1983. See 

Myers v. City of Madera, No. 1:10-CV-01398 AWI JLT, 2011 WL 2361628, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. June 9, 2011) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)). The 

Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. See Jackim v. City of 

Brooklyn, No. 1:05 cv 1678, 2007 WL 893868, at *20 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007) 

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(granting summary judgment on § 1983 claims where a police officer engaged in a 

“single incident of wrongdoing” and mere inaction on the part of the city was not enough 

to establish municipal liability); Ostroski v. Town of Southold, 443 F. Supp. 2d 325, 346 

(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting summary judgment on municipal liability claim where the 

plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that the alleged unconstitutional acts committed by 

the police officers “were connected to any policy, custom or practice beyond mere 

speculation and conjecture”). 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 98) is denied. 

 2. Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is granted. 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 7th day of July, 2011. 

 

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