Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00674/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00674-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS JUAREZ CORTEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

D.L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-674 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

CarlosJuarezCortez,aCalifornia prisoner incarcerated at High Desert State Prison, filed

this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now

before the courtfor consideration ofthemerits of the habeas petition. For the reasons discussed

below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

A. The Crime

Cortez and his girlfriend Carmen Bautista had a tumultuous relationship. Cortez for years

had accusedBautista ofseeing othermen and they had many arguments based on hisjealousy.

Cortez andBautista argued theweek of her killing regarding Cortez’sjealousy andBautista’s

decision tomove out. Two days before the killing, Bautista packed some bags, and was planning

tomove outthe nextweek. Cortez approached Bautista as she was waiting for a ride to work on

the morning of the killing. Cortez told police he wanted to see if the man he believed she was

meetingwasthere. When Cortez did not see the man, he asked Bautista why she was moving out.

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Cortez told police that,during the course of their discussion, Bautista slapped him, shook him, and

threatened to throwhisthings onto the street. Cortez then stabbed Bautista thirteen times and fled

the scene. 

TheCaliforniaCourt ofAppeal described in greater detail the evidence of the crime leading

to Cortez’s murder conviction: 

On August 31, 2000, between 3:40 and 4:00 a.m., defendant stabbed to death his 32-

year-old live-in girlfriend Carmen Bautista while she was waiting outside their apartment

to be picked up to go to work. At trial, the defense claimed the incident was a sudden

quarrel out of heat of passion because defendant believed Bautista was having an affair with

anotherman. Defendant, 30 years older than Bautista, started a relationship with her years

earlierinMexicowhich resulted in the birth oftheirson,atthe time oftrial, 14 years old.

Defendant had a wife living in another town in Mexico. Defendant spent a lot of time with

Bautista, her daughter Alma, and his son, although he did not live with them. Alma testified

thatshe recalled defendant being drunk most of the time and frequently accusing her

mother ofseeing othermen. Alma stated Bautista moved to Chicago in 1999 to get away

from defendant.

In July 2000, Bautista and defendant reunited and rented a room in the Gilroy

apartment ofVictoriaRobles and her boyfriend Gilberto Hernandez. By the end of July,

Robles noticed that defendantwas jealous and that he and Bautista would argue a lot about

his jealousy. She also testified that defendant always drank and smelled of alcohol. 

According toRobles,Bautista leftthe house around 3:30 a.m.to be picked up to go

towork. Sometimes defendant accompanied her outside. Bautista’s “ride,” Pedro Huerta,

would blow the horn. She would go out and defendant would follow her. Huerta and

Bautistaworked in different departments at a sheet metal company. Huerta testified that

he regularly picked up four other employees and broughtthemtowork in the mornings.

When Bautista,who had been on the 6:00 a.m.shiftstarted the 4:00 a.m.shift,he agreed

to pick her up too. Huerta stated he and Bautista were not romantically involved.

Towardsthe end ofJuly,Robles heard defendant start to accuse Bautista of going

outwith the guy who gave her a ride and that the guy who gave her a ridewas herlover.

RoblesstatedBautista “wouldn’tlet himget awaywith it, and she would defend herself

from the things that he would tell her.”

On theSaturday beforeBautista died, defendant claimed that he saw a man meet her

while she was waiting for work. Bautista reached up and kissed him. That evening,

defendant and Bautista and Robles and Hernandez went to a bar. Bautista refused

defendant’sinvitation to dance,but dancedwith another man. Defendant thought he might

be the man who met Bautista in the morning. Robles and Bautista and the man were dancing

“not close together,separately,and [defendant] came and dumped a beer on her head.”

Defendant grabbed her arm and pulled her towards the table to sit down. Bautista was angry.

Robles had also seen defendant pushBautista,whowasfourfeetten inchestall and 110

pounds, once before. 

The nextmorning,Bautista’sfriend Tere arrived to take hertoMass. Defendant

tried to stop themby lying againstthe hood ofTere’s car with his arms outstretched. When

he refused tomove,Tere called the police,but defendantstillwould notmove. Bautista

and Tere left defendant on the car and walked to church. Defendant got into the car and lay

down on the back seat. After a short while, he got out and went into his room. Fifteen

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“Later in his statement, defendant said the man was there on Wednesday, and ‘as she was

approaching him, he stretched forward his hands and hugged her and she did the same, she

didn’t..[sic] he didn’t hug herfromthe neck,....no,but he grabbed herfrombelow the waist and

he put her against him and she also put her hands around hisshoulders and theywere there for

about . . .some time, possibly for about half...half aminute kissing.[¶]Well,that’s when I got

mad,no,and Isaid to her,look,you knowwhat, come here and let’s talk, but since her ride arrived

at that time,she ran and left,she got in, and I couldn’t . . . he stayed on the otherside ofthe [¶] .

. . [¶] [H]e turned like this and he went back to the dark area next to the house.’” 

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minuteslater,Robles could hear something being sharpened. Looking through the keyhole,

she sawdefendant “sharpening something like a knife.” She could not see exactly what it

was, but defendant had a knife with a blade that pulled out that he used to cut lemons,

onions, or peppers.

On Monday morning, defendant went outside before Bautista left for work to look

fortheman. Defendant told police that when he opened the door, he saw the man facing

him, but when the man saw defendant come out, he lay down on top of the cab of a

neighbor’s truck that was parked there. Defendant went back inside and told Bautista,

“there’sthe man again the one that alwaysisthere when you go out, butIdidn’ttell her

anything else,like why do you kiss himorwhy,no ...can I accompany you,Isaid to her.

Iwouldn’twant himto grab you or to be tempted,no.[¶]No,she said,don’tworry about

me,she said,well,Istayed, but looking through the window towards where she went, they

were in the dark away fromthe light ofthe apartment door,hewasthere in the dark, and

when he heard again the door opening then he noticed her, . . . . [S]he would talk to him and

hewould talk to her,andwhat he did is,shewould reach to him and always, she would reach

himand kiss him,orthey kissed,Ishould say,butshe didn’t hug himand he didn’t hug her,

they just kissed,and theman after he did that,hewould go in the dark there [¶] . . . [¶] near

that house, he goes there and he gets lost there, I never followed him, I never talked to him,

Inever did anything[.] [T]hat happened on Monday, Tuesday, he didn’t go, Wednesday,

whichwas yesterday,hewent,to my surprise, . . . the man was not there1...Iturned around

and I went inside, or he was in the dark, who knows . . . .”

Monday evening Bautista told Roblesshe was moving out of the apartment on

August 31 the coming Thursday. Monday night, Robles, Bautista, and defendant were

talking aboutBautista’sleaving and defendantsaid thatshewould not leave through the

front door. He said that he was not going to leave and that he would not let her leave either.

Robles said she told defendant “if she leaves you get out.” Defendant was angry. “[H]e was

even willing to give me four months in advance but . . . he would not leave.”

Tuesday,Bautista packed her bags. Robles stated defendant could see her packing

themand shewould tell him“‘I’mleaving’ And he didn’t believe it.” That night, Bautista,

Robles,and defendanttalked aboutBautista’sleaving and defendant, upset, said in a loud

voice that she was not leaving. Roblestold defendant not to yell at her and that when

Bautista left, he would have to go too. On Wednesday morning,Bautista and the man

hugged and kissed again.

On themorning of Thursday, August 31, defendant went to see if the man was there

but he was not. Defendant and Bautista argued outside in the parking lot. Defendant

insisted Bautista tell him a “motive” for leaving (“there was to be a motive”). Defendant

tried to hug and kiss her because “I would always hug her, I would kiss her, when she would

go orIwould go towork... .” This time Bautista slapped defendant’s cheek and grabbed

at hisshirt and shook him. She told him she would throw his things onto the street if he

was not gone by the time she came home. At this point, defendant “felt bad, because she

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didn’ttellmewith good words, but mistreating me, and that’s the reason I lost my head.”

Defendant told the detectives, “she humiliated me more than enough and she . . . she

humiliatedme and she abusedme,and she toldme that I was going to find my things thrown

there.” “[S]he would abuse me, she was always kicking me out, get out of here, very

humiliating things,butIwas putting upwith all that, I was putting up . . .[¶] but she didn’t see

the pain, I know because she grabbed me from the skin, the chest, the neck, and she shook

me and she wanted to hit me,slap me then, no? [¶] ...[¶] I lost the head,I lost the head.”

Defendant pulled an opened knife out of his pocket and stabbed her. 

Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 1-5.

Bautista died within minutes of the stabbing. Cortez was arrested later that morning.

Cortez did nottestify attrial. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that Cortez “lost his

senses and did kill her in a heat of passion. . . .” Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 5. 

The knife used by Cortez was a buck knife with a 4-inch folding blade. Cortez stabbed

Bautista a total ofthirteen times(including the defensive wounds to her hands), only one of which

was a fatalwound. Robles testified that other than the incident four days prior to the killing, she

had never heard Cortez sharpen his knife.

B. Case History

Following a jury trialinSantaClaraCountySuperiorCourt,Cortez was convicted of first

degree murder. Cortez was sentenced to 25 years to life for the murder plus one year for an

arming enhancement. 

Cortez unsuccessfully appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of

conviction and deniedCortez’s petition forwrit of habeas corpus. The California Supreme Court

denied the petition for review. 

Cortez’s federal habeas petition raised two claims: First,Cortez claimed that the trial

court’sfailure to issue adequate clarifying jury instructions on premeditation and deliberation

violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Second, he claimed that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel by failing to object to the trial court’s failure to issue adequate

clarifying jury instructions. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition should

not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and petitioner filed a traverse. The matter is now ready

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for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court hassubjectmatterjurisdiction overthis habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged conviction

occurred in Santa Clara County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings

eitherthe fact orlength oftheir confinement are required firstto exhauststate judicial remedies,

either on direct appeal orthrough collateral proceedings, by presenting the higheststate court

availablewith a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claimthey seek to raise

in federal court. See 28U.S.C.§ 2254(b),(c). The parties do not dispute that state court remedies

were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties oftheUnitedStates." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petitionmay not be granted with respectto any claimthatwas adjudicated on themeritsin state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Underthe ‘contrary to’ clause,a federal habeas courtmay grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to thatreached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

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2Respondent contends that this claim is procedurally barred based on defense counsel’s

approval ofthe court’sresponsesto the jury’sinquiries. The record is not adequate for this court

to honor the procedural bar. The trial court responded, and memorialized its response, to the

second jury question outside counsel’s presence,so it cannot be said with certainty that counsel

had the opportunity to objectifthe agreed-upon responsewas notthatwhichwas actually given.

Moreover, the state court of appeal’s decision is ambiguous as to whether the bar was imposed or

the barside-stepped because the ineffectiveness claimrequired thatthe merits of the instructional

error claim be considered. See Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 6-7. 

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indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

 “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifiesthe correct governing legal principle from[the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably appliesthat principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

orincorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id.at 411. A federal habeas

court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application

of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.

DISCUSSION

A. Jury Instructions

Cortez contendsthat the trial court erred in failing to properly clarify jury instructions

regarding premeditation and deliberation following two jury questions. The jury submitted two

questions,both ofwhich were answered by the court following consultation with the attorneys.

Cortez claimsthese two questionsindicated a “fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning of

premeditation and deliberation. The jurors were obviously struggling over what, if any, distinction

existed between intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation, and were ignoring the

requirement of premeditation.” Petitioner’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, filed Feb.

18, 2004, p. 1. The court's responses to the inquiries allegedly violated Cortez's right to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 

To obtain federal habeasrelieffor errorsin the jury charge, the petitioner must show that

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"the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process."Estelle v.McGuire,502U.S.62,72 (1991)(internal quotes omitted). The instruction

may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions

as awhole and the trialrecord. Id. at 72. In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, the court must

inquire whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See id. at 72 & n.4. 

“When a jury makes explicit its difficulties, a trial judge should clear them away with

concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach v.UnitedStates,326U.S. 607,612-13 (1946). The trial judge

has a duty to respond to the jury’srequestfor clarificationwith sufficientspecificity to eliminate

the jury’s confusion. See Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2004)

(harmless due process violation occurredwhen,in responding to requestfor clarification, court

refused to give clarification and informed jury that no clarifying instructions would be given);

UnitedStates v.Frega,179F.3d793,808-11.(9thCir. 1999) (trial judge’s confusing response

to jury’s questionsraised possibility that verdict was based on conduct legally inadequate to

support conviction). However, the trial judge has wide discretion in charging the jury, a discretion

which carries overto the judge’sresponse to a question from the jury. Arizona v.Johnson,351

F.3d988,994 (9th Cir. 2003). Under California law, when the original instructions are full and

complete,the trial court has discretion to determinewhat additional explanations are sufficient

to satisfy the jury’srequestforinformation. (Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 7) “‘Indeed, comments

diverging fromthe standard are often risky.’[Citation]” (Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 11). Where the

originalinstructionwas correct and the judge directed the jury to a precise paragraph that answered

the question clearly,thiswassufficientto pass constitutional muster.Weeks v.Angelone, 528

U.S. 225, 234 (2000). Also, just as a jury is presumed to follow its instructions, it is presumed

to understand a judge’s answer to a question. Id. at 234. 

1. First Jury Question

In the first question, the jury asked the court,“Can you clarify the difference ‘having in

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3CALJIC8.20 as given to the jury provided: “All murder which is perpetrated by any kind

ofwillfull,deliberate and premeditated killingwith express malice aforethought is murder of the

first degree.[¶]Theword ‘willfull,’ as used in thisinstruction,meansintentional.[¶] The word

‘deliberate’ meansformed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and

weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action. The word

‘premeditated’means considered beforehand.[¶]If you find that the killing was preceded and

accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result

of deliberation and premeditation,so thatitmust have been formed upon pre-existing reflection

and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it

ismurder ofthe first degree.[¶]The lawdoes not undertake tomeasure in units of time the length

ofthe period duringwhich the thoughtmust be pondered before it can ripen into an intentto kill

which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under

varying circumstances.[¶] The true test is not the duration of time, butrather the extent of the

reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time,

but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not

deliberation and premeditation aswillfix an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree. To

constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question

of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, [he]

decides to and does kill.” Cal. Ct. App. Opinion pp. 7-8 (errors in original).

4CALJIC8.30as given to the jury provided: “Murder ofthe second degree is the unlawful

killing of a human being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill

a human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation. Cal. Ct.

App. Opinion p. 8 

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mind the consequences,he decidesto and does kill’ and insufficient to prove deliberation and

premeditation?”CT1. Following a request by the judge to clarify the question, the jury added

“CALJIC No. 8.20 vs. CALJIC No. 8.30." RT 898. The court responded:

CALJIC8.20,which is yourinstruction number 33,contains definitions of deliberate and

premeditated murder and some guidance on how that is defined. [¶] CALJIC 8.30 is

directive in nature,and it’sintended to tell you that if you have an issue between first and

second degree murder, then you should give the defendantthe benefit of the doubt and

convict him ofsecond degree murder. If you unanimously find the elements of second

degree murder,as has been defined for you elsewhere in the instructions. [¶] So that is,

I think, the answer to the question. I’m getting some vague looks from the jury.

RT 899.

The originaljury instructionsCALJIC8.203andCALJIC 8.304 are accurate statements of

the law. The trial court appropriately pointed the jury to CALJIC 8.20 noting that it contained a

definition of and guidance regarding premeditation and deliberation. The explanation of CALJIC

8.30 was also accurate and appropriate. 

The clarification was not confusing, and a reasonable jury would understand the distinction

between premeditation and deliberation, as well as the function of CALJIC 8.20 and CALJIC 8.30.

The “vague looks from the jury” do not necessarily indicate that the jurors were not able to

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 The Court of Appeal felt the first jury question wasirrelevant because one juror was

removed and an alternatewassubstituted in,thus creating a “new” jury and an instruction by the

trial courtto start deliberations anew. This court disagrees. Had there been a misstatement of the

lawin response to the first question,it could have impacted the reconstituted jury’s deliberations;

this court does notsee the first exchange as wholly irrelevant. This point need not be further

explored because there was no error in the response to the first question.

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understand the clarification. And the comment by the trial court judge “[s]o that is, I think, the

answer to the question” in no way suggests that the jury was precluded from asking further

questions.Cf.Beardslee, 358 F.3d at 575 (asserting a jury was precluded from asking further

questions by the admonition thatthere “is and can be no explanation of the instructions” and the

command to “do the bestthat you can”). Had the court’s explanation not been helpful to the jury,

the jurors could have requested further clarification. 

Following the submission of thisfirst question the jury deliberated for approximately

fifteenminutesfurther before ending deliberationsforthat day. At the end of the day, one juror

was excused.5

2. Second Jury Question

The nextmorning,an alternate juror was called to take the place of the dismissed juror. The

reconstituted jurywasinstructed to disregard earlier deliberations and begin anewso that each

jurorwould have equal participation. The jury deliberated for approximately an hour and fifteen

minutes before sending a note stating: “I need help defining rash impulse. Would rash impulse be?

-- example:CarlosstabbingCarmen once and thought what did I do and continued stabbing her to

leave her dead? Would that be rash impulse to prove deliberation? If his only thought was -- I

started stabbing herIbetter kill her--isthat calculated judgment or rash impulse?” CT 2 (errors

in original). The judge’s actual response was not transcribed, but after he responded he described

for the record what had occurred: 

I called the attorneysin and met with the attorneys, and we agreed upon the following

answer,in three parts: One, the phrase “rash impulse” does not have a special or technical

meaning or definition. It means what your collective common sense thinks it means. [¶]

Two,I amconcerned aboutthe portion of your question that reads: ‘Would that be rash

impulse to prove deliberation.’ As we have defined deliberate for you in your instruction

[n]umber 33,which isCALJICS 8.20, it is not synonymous with rash impulse. Indeed, the

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word deliberation and rash impulse have substantially differentmeanings. [¶] Three, I

cannottell you ‘if his only thoughtwas‘well,Istarted stabbing herso I better kill her,’is

that calculated judgement or rash impulse’ That question is entirely for you to decide.

Based on our previousstipulations and the continued agreement of the attorneys, I entered

the jury room and read them that response. There was no other communication between

the Court and the jury, and I just wanted to memorialize what we just did. The jury

continues to deliberate.

 RT 903-04.

Cortez contendsthatthe trial court should have clearly defined the difference between rash

impulse and deliberation,ratherthan directing the jury to the definitions contained inCALJIC

8.20. Cortez also interprets the jury question to mean that the jury equated rash impulse with

deliberation and that the jury had forgotten about the requirement of premeditation. He also

contends the hypothetical question in the note evidenced at least one juror’s belief that the

stabbing was not premeditated or deliberate. Cortez’s arguments are not persuasive. 

The court’sstatementswere legally correct clarificationsto the legally correct original

instructions. Even if the jury had mistakenly equated rash impulse and deliberation, any confusion

wasresolvedwhen the court clarified the lawby clearly stating that rash impulse was not the same

as deliberation. The court adequately told the jury to use its “collective common sense” to

determine themeaning of "rash impulse." The court also adequately addressed the meaning of

“deliberation” by referring the jury to CALJIC 8.20, which included a clear definition of

“deliberate.” Furthermore, the court appropriately refused to answer the hypothetical question

posed by the jury note. SeeArizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d at 994 (collecting cases noting danger

of courtinvading jury'sfact-finding provincewhen it answers hypothetical questions, especially

with yes/no answers). Had the court answered the hypothetical question with a yes or no answer,

it could have led some jurors astray by unduly suggesting thatwasthe factualscenario the trial

judge personally thought had occurred. Seeid. Also, had the trial judge answered the hypothetical

question,Cortez probably would be challenging the propriety of him doing so regardless of

whether he answered yes or no. 

The absence of theword premeditation in the jury question did notsuggest that the jury

forgotthat premeditationwas a requirement ofmurderin the first degree. Rather, the absence of

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 The original jury charge included several other instructions pertaining to the killing. The

jury wasinstructed with CALJIC 8.00, homicide defined; 8.10, murder defined; 8.11,malice

aforethought defined; 8.20, deliberate and premeditated murder; 8.30, unpremeditated murder of

the second degree; 8.31,second degree murder--killing resulting from unlawful act dangerous to

life; 8.40, voluntary manslaughter defined; 8.42, sudden quarrel or heat of passion and provocation

explained; 8.43, murder or manslaughter--cooling period; 8.44, no specific emotion alone

constitutes heat of passion; 8.50,murder andmanslaughter distinguished; 8.55, homicide--cause

defined; 8.70, duty of jury asto degree of murder; 8.71, doubt whether first orsecond degree

murder; 8.72,doubtwhethermurder or manslaughter; 8.74, unanimous agreement as to offense--

first or second degree murder or manslaughter; and 8.75, jury may return partial verdict, homicide.

Cal. Ct. App. Opinion pp. 7-8.

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the word more likely indicated that the jury needed no further clarification on the subject of

premeditation. The premeditation requirement for first degree murder was reinforced by the

direction that the jury reviewCALJIC8.20,which included a definition of premeditation and

clearly indicated that it was required.

For Cortez’s second argument, that the hypothetical question in the note evidenced at least

one juror’s belief that the stabbing was not premeditated or deliberate, he notesthat only one

wound was fatal, and it is unknown when in the sequence of the stabbing the fatal stabbing

occurred. Even if the hypothetical reflected confusion by a juror, the court’s response, followed

by further (albeit quick) deliberation, allowed time for resolution of the confusion after the court

directed the jury to CALJIC 8.20 which, when followed, would not allow a conviction if the

requisite mental state did not arise until after the fatal wound.

The state court<s determination that there was no instructional error was not contrary to or

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The jury was correctly instructed

under California law about the requirements of premeditation and deliberation to commit murder

in the first degree.6 The court used the California pattern instructions CALJIC 8.20 on deliberate

and premeditated murder and CALJIC 8.30 on unpremeditated murder of the second degree. The

court'sstatements to the jury were legally correct clarifications to the legally correct original

instructions. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions and the

court’sresponse to its notesin away that violated theConstitution. The trial court's statements

were not confusing. A reasonable jury would understand the necessity for premeditation and

deliberation on the basis ofthe instructionsfor a first degree murder conviction. Cortez’s various

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arguments aboutwhatthe court could have said in response to the jury questions do not show that

whatthe court actually did dowas constitutionally deficient. Because there was no error, the court

does not consider whether the error was harmless.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Cortez contends that his counsel’s acquiescence in the court’s responses to the jury

questions deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. As noted earlier, before the court

responded to both questions the court consulted with counsel. Neither the prosecution nor

defense counsel objected to the court’s responses to the questions. The Sixth Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance, of counsel. See

Strickland v.Washington,466U.S.668,686 (1984). The purpose of the right is to ensure a fair

trial, and the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness is "whether counsel's conduct so

undermined the properfunctioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as

having produced a just result." Id. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a

habeas petitioner must show that (1) counsel's performance was "deficient," i.e., his

"representation fell belowan objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional

norms, id. at 687-88, and (2) prejudice flowed from counsel's performance, i.e., that there is a

reasonable probability that,butfor counsel's errors,the result ofthe proceedings would have been

different. See id. at 691-94. 

Cortez’s claimfailsfor a lack of showing of deficient performance and lack of showing of

prejudice. As explained earlier, there is no merit to Cortez’s claim of instructional error. Counsel

thus did not engage in deficient performance and no prejudice resulted from counsel’s failure to

make a futile objection to the court’sresponsesto the jury question. SeeRupe v.Wood,93F.3d

1434, 1445 (9thCir.1996),cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997)(failure to take futile action can

never be deficient performance). The trial court’s clarification following the jury’s questions was

correct;therewas no error asto which counselshould have objected. The California Court of

Appeal’s rejection of the ineffective assistance claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

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application of clearly established federal law. Cortez is not entitled to the writ on this claim.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June__20_, 2005 S/Susan Illston 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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