Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02490/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02490-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael D. Mott, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-2490 PHX SMM (VAM)

)

Dora B. Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Michael D. Mott ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner

raises five grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 1 at pp. 5-

9). Respondents filed an answer opposing the granting of habeas

relief. (Doc. 13).

I. BACKGROUND

On May 8, 1984, petitioner pleaded guilty in CR 138698 to

kidnaping, a Class 2 felony, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,

400 U.S. 25 (1970). (Doc. 13 at Exhibit F). Petitioner

subsequently moved to withdraw citing a lie detector examination,

but the trial court denied the motion on June 21, 1984. (Id. at

Exhibit G). Petitioner was given a suspended sentence of 7 years'

probation and 1 year in the county jail. (Id.). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals set aside petitioner's guilty

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plea on direct appeal. See State v. Mott, 722 P.2d 366

(Ariz.Ct.App. 1986). However, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated

that decision and affirmed petitioner's conviction. See State v.

Mott, 722 P.2d 247 (Ariz. 1986).

On January 10, 1985, the State petitioned to have

petitioner's probation revoked alleging he committed the crime of

escape. (Doc. 13 at Exhibit J). The Court determined that the

allegations were proved by a preponderance of the evidence and

revoked probation and on March 8, 1985, sentenced petitioner to an

aggravated sentence of 14 years in prison. (Id. at Exhibits K,

L). Just a few days later, on March 11, 1985, petitioner was

sentenced to two consecutive terms of 10 years in prison in

another case, CR 140943. (Doc. 13 at Exhibit M). These sentences

were to begin upon petitioner's completion of his 14-year sentence

in the case at bar, CR 138698. (Doc. 13, Exhibit M at p. 5). In

a memorandum decision filed on January 29, 1987, the Arizona Court

of Appeals affirmed the revocation of petitioner's probation in CR

138698 and the 14-year sentence of imprisonment. (Id. at Exhibit

N). Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

On May 12, 1986, petitioner filed a state habeas corpus

petition in the trial court challenging his conviction in CR

138698 (the kidnaping conviction). (Doc. 13 at Exhibit O). 

Petitioner argued that his imprisonment was unlawful because a lie

detector test showed he was innocent. (See id.). 

The trial court treated the petition as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and denied

relief in an order filed on September 9, 1986, finding:

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 The matter which [petitioner] now raises in his

Petition for Post Conviction Relief could have been

raised on direct appeal. Furthermore, inasmuch as

polygraph results are inadmissible, and because

[petitioner] has been found to have knowingly,

voluntarily and intelligently entered a plea of guilty,

nothing which [he] seeks to establish at the evidentiary

hearing, even if taken as true, would establish results

which would have been different .....

 Accordingly,

 IT IS ORDERED summarily denying the matters

presently before this Court ..., and denying

Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing.

(Doc. 13, Exhibit P at p. 2). 

Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition on December

2, 1986, raising the same claim presented in his first proceeding. 

(See Doc. 13, Exhibit Q at pp. 3-4). The trial court summarily

denied the petition on December 8, 1986. (Id. at Exhibit R). 

Petitioner re-filed the petition on January 5, 1987. (Doc. 13 at

Exhibit S). The trial court summarily denied the petition on

January 9, 1987. (Id. at Exhibit T). 

On September 8, 1987, petitioner filed another state habeas

petition raising the same lie detector test argument. (Doc. 13 at

Exhibit U). That same day, the trial court issued an order

denying the petition, noting "the issues raised by this claim were

considered and rejected [by the Arizona Court of Appeals] in State

v. Mott ..." (Doc. 13 at Exhibit V). Petitioner filed a fifth

state habeas petition and for the fifth time, the trial court

denied the petition on January 2, 1990. (Doc. 13 at Exhibits Y

and Z).

On September 13, 1993, petitioner filed a NOTICE OF POSTCONVICTION RELIEF pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. (Doc. 13 at

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Exhibit AA). Eventually, on August 2, 1994, the trial court

dismissed the proceeding because petitioner did not follow-up his

notice by filing a petition. (See id. at Exhibit CC). Nothing in

the record indicates petitioner sought review of this dismissal or

any of the earlier dismissals in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Over the next several years petitioner sent letters to the trial

court but filed nothing. (See Doc. 13 at Exhibits DD and EE).

On October 7, 2003, petitioner filed another NOTICE OF POSTCONVICTION RELIEF again challenging his conviction in CR 138698. 

(Doc. 13 at Exhibit FF). The trial court dismissed the proceeding

on October 10, 2003, noting previous proceeding had been dismissed

in September, 1986 and August, 1994, and finding that petitioner

"has not provided the court with any specifics as to how he might

come within one of these exceptions [permitting late-filed or

successive petitions], ..." (Doc. 13 at Exhibit GG). Nothing in

the record indicates petitioner sought review of the trial court's

dismissal of this proceeding in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

On April 12, 2004, petitioner filed another NOTICE OF POSTCONVICTION RELIEF pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 raising several

claims for relief. (Doc. 13 at Exhibit HH). The trial court

dismissed the notice "because these claims either were or should

have been raised in the direct appeal or the prior Rule 32

proceedings." (Id. at Exhibit II). A motion to reconsider was

denied on May 6, 2004. (Id. at Exhibit LL). Petitioner filed for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals but the court denied the

petition without comment on June 17, 2005. (Id. at Exhibit KK).

On August 17, 2005, petitioner filed for federal habeas

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corpus relief raising the following grounds:

GROUND I: 6th Amendment

Vindictive prosecution - Perjured Testimony -

.....

GROUND II: 6th Amendment

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - 

.....

GROUND III: 6th Amendment

Denial of Change of Attorney - 

.....

GROUND IV: 6th Amendment

Denial to withdraw from Plea - 

.....

GROUND V: 6th Amendment

Kidnapping - ... Petitioner was forced to plead to the

wrong class felony ...

.....

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5-9).

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents first contend that petitioner's claims are barred

by the statute of limitations. Alternatively, respondents contend

that petitioner's claims were not properly exhausted in state

court and are now procedurally defaulted.

A. Statute of Limitations

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations period

contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that prior

to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered

discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas petition" and

that "delays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a

prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

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 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to the counting

provisions outlined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, the one-year limitations

period for all habeas petitioner's challenging convictions or

sentences finalized prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of

the AEDPA is April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

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his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of limitations

"did not begin to run against any state prisoner prior to the

statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d

at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims concerning state

court judgments finalized prior to April 24, 1996, had to be filed

by April 23, 1997,1 or they were barred by the statute of

limitations absent a showing the circumstances surrounding the

filing of the petition fell into one of the categories listed in §

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Id.

at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time." 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United

States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

B. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

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Petitioner had nothing pending in state court at the time the

one-year limitations period codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) went

into effect on April 24, 1996 (his last post-conviction proceeding

ended in August, 1994, when the trial court dismissed that

proceeding). (See Doc. 13 at Exhibits CC and MM). As a result,

petitioner had one year from April 24, 1996, or until April 24,

1997, to file a timely habeas petition challenging his kidnapping

conviction in CR 138698. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

petition until August 17, 2005, more than eight years after the

deadline passed. Although petitioner did file subsequent Rule 32

petitions in state court in 2003 and 2004, (see Doc. 13 at

Exhibits FF and HH), these petitions did not toll the limitations

period because the limitations period had already expired. See

Ferguson v Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.) ("we hold that

section 2244(d) does not permit re-initiation of the limitations

period that has ended before the state petition was filed."),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 924 (2003). 

 Petitioner has presented no colorable basis for tolling of

the limitations period and none is apparent from the record. As a

result all claims raised by petitioner are time-barred. Because

petitioner's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the

Court need not address respondents further contention that the

claims are procedurally defaulted.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied because all claims are barred by the

statute of limitations.

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This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 24th day of April, 2006.

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