Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06130/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06130-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

CHRISTINA WILKERSON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-6130

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Christina Wilkerson, appealed to this Court from the denial of her application

for social security disability benefits, by the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner")(Doc. #1). On October 25, 2005, the undersigned

remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further consideration (Doc. #8 & 9). 

Plaintiff's attorney, James W. Stanley, Jr., filed a Motion For Attorney’s Fees pursuant

to the EAJA (the Equal Access to Justice Act, hereinafter the "EAJA"), on November 2, 2005

(Doc. #10). On November 7, 2005, the Commissioner filed her Response (Doc. #11). This

matter is now ready for consideration. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that the Court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The Commissioner has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits

was substantially justified. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986).

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner does not oppose the

award of a reasonable attorney’s fee under the EAJA or the hourly rate requested (Doc. #10). 

The Court construes this lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable fee as an admission that

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the government's decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified." However, the

undersigned notes that the Commissioner does object to the number of hours for which

compensation is sought.

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the

conclusion of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. 

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing

Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government

action. Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the Court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill

required to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the

benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the

contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen

v. Heckler, 588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

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However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe

firsthand counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v.

Secretary of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359,

361 (8th Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request,

even in the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d

456, 459 (8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties

requires an accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2

412(d)(2)(A). The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award

accordingly. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff's attorney requests an award under the EAJA at $152.00 per hour, for the 9.70

hours which he asserts he devoted to the representation of plaintiff in this Court. Plaintiff’s

counsel seeks $152.00 per hour based upon an increase in the cost of living (Doc. #10, Exhibit

A). 

The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the claimed fees are

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reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 437. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) provides:

“fees and other expenses” includes....reasonable attorney fees (The amount of

fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates

for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that....(ii) attorney fees

shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that

an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited

availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher

fee.)

Plaintiff’s counsel attached a summary of the April 2005 Consumer Price Index as an

attachment to his Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. #10, Exhibit A), and thus, has presented

sufficient evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, his argument for increased

attorney fees, based on a cost of living increase, has merit. The Commissioner has no objection

to the hourly rate requested, $152.00 per hour.

However, we conclude that awarding an enhanced fee in the amount of $148.00 per

hour would not only allow a cost of living increase, but would also promote consistency in the

EAJA awards in the judicial districts of Arkansas. See Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505

(8th Cir.1990). Thus, upon consideration of the above factors, we find that an appropriate

hourly rate for the award of attorney's fees in this case is $148.00 per hour. 

Further, as has been noted, the defendant objects to the number of hours for which

counsel seeks a fee award (Doc. #10). As always, we have carefully reviewed the time records

submitted in plaintiff’s counsel’s itemization (Doc. #10, p. 2). Specifically, the Commissioner

objects to compensation for the 1.50 hours documented on September 16, 2004 (open file;

consult with Plaintiff concerning judicial review; review decision by Appeals Council and

other documentation) (Doc. #10, p. 2). Plaintiff’s district court case was not filed until

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September 27, 2004 (Doc. #1). Plaintiff’s counsel did not begin work on preparation of the

complaint until September 25, 2004 (Doc. #10, p.2). Thus, we find that the Commissioner’s

objection has merit and counsel is not entitled to compensation for the time requested on

September 16, 2005, as it was not performed in representation of the plaintiff in the district

court. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir.1984); see also, Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993); Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989) (An attorney is entitled

to EAJA fees for services rendered at the district court level). Accordingly, the 1.50 hours,

alleged for services not performed before the District Court, must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel. We find the remainder of the time asserted to be spent

in representation of the plaintiff before the district court, to be reasonable.

Thus, we find that plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to compensation for 8.20 hours spent in

the representation of this plaintiff before the district court. at the rate of $148.00 per hour, and

reimbursement for $10.00 in copy expense, for a total attorney's fee award of $1,223.60 under

the EAJA.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into

account at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to

prevent double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of November, 2005.

/s/Bobby E. Shepherd 

Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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