Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-01142/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-01142-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EUGENIA W. HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

FIDELITY WARRANTY SERVICES, 

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:15-cv-01142-SGC

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Eugenia W. Hamilton, commenced this action by filing a 

Complaint in the Circuit Court of Shelby County on May 22, 2015, naming 

Fidelity Warranty Services (“Defendant”) as the sole defendant. (Doc. 1 at 14-15). 

Defendant timely removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 

1441, and 1446. (Doc. 1 at 1-4). The parties consented to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) on August 31, 2015. (Doc. 12). 

Presently pending is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s 

complaint. (Doc. 4). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is due to be 

granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must plead 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

FILED

 2016 Aug-09 AM 10:30

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-01142-SGC Document 22 Filed 08/09/16 Page 1 of 6
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relief” and “a demand for the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). As explained 

by the Supreme Court, “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

does not need detailed factual allegations,” but must include more than “labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion to 

dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Whether a complaint states a 

plausible claim for relief is a fact-specific determination for the court, drawing on 

judicial experience as well as common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Twombly

instructs courts faced with a motion to dismiss to accept the complaint’s purely 

factual allegations as true and determine whether those facts state a claim. 

In complaints alleging fraud, however, Rule 9(b) holds the plaintiff to a

higher pleading standard requiring the plaintiff to allege fraud “with particularity.” 

Fowler v. Goodman Mfg. Co. LP, No. 14-0968, 2014 WL 7048581, at *8 (N.D. 

Ala. Dec. 12, 2014). In order to allege fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must set 

forth “(1) precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral 

representations or what omissions were made, (2) the time and place of each such 

statement and the person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not 

making) same, (3) the content of such statements and the manner in which they 

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misled the plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the 

fraud.” Id. (quoting Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1191, 1202 (11th Cir. 

2001) (internal quotation omitted)). 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s fraud claim is due to be dismissed on two distinct grounds: first, 

Plaintiff has failed to meet the heightened pleading standard required in Rule 9(b) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and second, Plaintiff’s claim is barred by 

the statute of limitations. 

A. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

Due to the higher pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b), Plaintiff must 

allege fraud with particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). In order to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s 

particularity standard, Plaintiff must first state the precise statements made to her 

by Defendant. W. Coast Roofing & Waterproofing, Inc. v. Johns Manville, Inc., 

No. 07-13421, 2008 WL 2845215, at *3 (11th Cir. July 24, 2008); see also Fowler, 

2014 WL 7048581, at *8 (“alleging fraud with particularity requires a plaintiff to 

set forth ‘(1) precisely what statements were made ... .’” (quoting Ziemba, 256 

F.3d at 1202)). In her complaint, Plaintiff stated precisely what statements were 

made to her by the unknown representative of Defendant, i.e., the warranty at issue 

“would be the best way to cover any and all necessary repairs that may be required 

for the vehicle, other than those caused by accident.” (Doc. 1 at 15). Second, 

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Plaintiff must state the time and place the statements were made, in addition to the 

person(s) responsible for such statements. W. Coast Roofing & Waterproofing Co., 

2008 WL 2845215, at *3. Plaintiff stated the allegedly fraudulent statements were 

made to her on or about July 2, 2011, in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 1 at 15). 

However, Birmingham, Alabama is not a specific location; a “specific location” 

would be, for example, the dealership at which Plaintiff purchased the vehicle and 

warranty at issue. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to state with particularity the place the 

allegedly fraudulent statements were made to her. Plaintiff also failed to state the 

person responsible for making the statements, naming instead an unknown 

“representative.” Id. 

The third requirement for pleading fraud with particularity is for Plaintiff to 

state the manner in which the statements misled her. W. Coast Roofing & 

Waterproofing Co., 2008 WL 2845215, at *3. Plaintiff failed to state specifically 

the way in which Defendant’s statements misled her. (See Doc. 1 at 15). She 

stated she “would not have made the purchase” but does not specify whether she 

was referring to the vehicle, the warranty, or both. Id. Plaintiff did state with 

particularity the way in which she was harmed but failed to meet the final 

requirement of pleading fraud with particularity by stating specifically what 

Defendant gained through the alleged fraud. W. Coast Roofing & Waterproofing 

Co., 2008 WL 2845215, at *3; (Doc. 1 at 15). It may be reasonable to infer 

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Defendant gained money from Plaintiff’s purchase of the vehicle and warranty as a 

“package.” However, Plaintiff still has not fulfilled the other requirements of Rule 

9(b), as discussed above. Because Plaintiff failed to allege fraud “with 

particularity,” she has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 

4) is due to be granted. 

B. Statute of Limitations

“The statute of limitations for fraud actions generally allows two years for 

filing a claim.” ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l) (1975); Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. 

Parker, 703 So. 2d 307, 308 (Ala. 1997). This two-year period begins to run when 

a plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts capable of putting a reasonable person “on 

notice of the fraud.” Parker, 703 So. 2d at 308; see also ALA. CODE § 6-2-3 

(1975). As a matter of law, fraud is discoverable when a person receives 

documents capable of putting her “on such notice that the fraud reasonably should 

be discovered.” Parker, 703 So. 2d at 308 (quoting Kelly v. Connecticut Mutual 

Life Ins. Co., 628 So. 2d 454, 458 (Ala. 1993)). According to the Supreme Court 

of Alabama, fraud is “deemed to have been discovered when it ought to have been 

discovered,” meaning, “at the time of the discovery of facts which would provoke 

inquiry by a person of ordinary prudence and which, if followed up, would have 

led to the discovery of the fraud.” Papastefan v. B & L Construction Co., Inc. of 

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Mobile, 385 So. 2d 966, 967 (citing Johnson v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 281 So. 

2d 636 (Ala. 1973)). Additionally, the Alabama Supreme Court has held the date 

when “documents were received was the date the fraud was or should have been

discovered.” Colafrancesco v. Crown Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 485 So. 2d 1131, 1134 

(Ala. 1986) (emphasis in original) (citing Gonzalez v. U-J Chevrolet Co., 451 So. 

2d 244 (Ala. 1984)). Therefore, Plaintiff, a licensed attorney in the State of 

Alabama, was put on notice of any potentially fraudulent statements made by 

Defendant when she received the contract for the warranty she purchased in 

relation to her vehicle in July 2011. (See Doc. 1 at 14; see also Doc. 4 at 1). A 

reasonable person would have read the contract for the warranty before signing her 

name and, therefore, would have known exactly what was covered under the 

particular warranty she purchased. The statute of limitations for her fraud claim 

began to run in July 2011, and expired in July 2013, two full years before Plaintiff 

filed her complaint. (Doc. 1 at 14-15). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is due to be granted. A separate order will be entered.

DONE this 9th day of August, 2016.

 ______________________________

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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