Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05645/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05645-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES KEEN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

AMY NOBLE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04-5645 AWI WMW P

ORDER REGARDING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION

TO DISMISS 

(Doc. 37)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a federal inmate and is proceeding in this action against United States Bureau

of Prisons (“BOP”) officials for conduct that occurred while Plaintiff was housed at the United

States Penitentiary at Atwater (“Atwater”). Plaintiff claims that Defendants prohibited him from

the free exercise of his religious belief in violation of the First Amendment, the Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(“RFRA”). Plaintiff also claims that Defendants’ conduct violated his equal protection rights

under the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ actions violated the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

On April 4, 2007, the Magistrate Judge filed Findings and Recommendations that

recommended Defendants’ motion to dismiss the RLUIPA claim and First Amendment claim be

granted on qualified immunity grounds and the motion to dismiss the Equal Protection claim be

granted for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed objections to the Findings and

Recommendations. Defendants filed a reply to the objections.

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and RFRA. 

Specifically, Defendants denied Plaintiff of personal possession of runestones (a collection of 24

stones made from wood, which have the Celtic alphabet painted on them) and permission to

construct a hof (a type of wooden enclosed shelter). The Magistrate Judge found that the

undisputed facts indicate Plaintiff was never denied the use of the worship area or the chapel and

that Plaintiff was not denied the use of runes in the chapel area. Plaintiff was only denied the

personal possession of runestones and the construction of a hof, which the Magistrate Judge

found conflicted with prison security. The Magistrate Judge found that there was no clear law

that any of the Defendants were aware of in 2002 that mandated the allowance of such items. 

The Magistrate Judge thus concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the

First Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim. The Magistrate Judge also found the complaint

fails to state a claim for an equal protection violation. Plaintiff objects to these findings. In

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73-305, this court

has conducted a de novo review of this case. 

A. First Amendment Claim and Civil Rights Claim – Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the court find Defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim. 

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from

liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The test to determine whether a law enforcement officer is entitled

to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis. Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 638 (9 Cir. th

2005) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). First, the court must determine

whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the officer's

conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638;

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Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 701 (9 Cir. 2005). If the court finds that the th

officer violated the plaintiff’s' constitutional rights, the court next determines whether that right

was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201;

Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638; Prison Legal News, 397 F.3d at 701. “The contours of the right must

have been clear enough that a reasonable officer would have understood that what he or she was

doing violated that right.” Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640 (1987)). The defendant bears the burden of establishing qualified immunity. 

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 586- 87 (1998). When evaluating a claim of qualified

immunity on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, the court must assume that the version

of events offered by the nonmoving party is correct. See Prison Legal News, 397 F.3d at 703;

Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 951 (9 Cir.2003). Thus, on this motion, the court

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must consider the undisputed facts and on all disputed facts assume the facts provided by

Plaintiff are true. 

The first step in determining whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is

whether, taking Plaintiff’s evidence as true, Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff

claims that Defendants’ conduct violated both his First Amendment rights and RLUIPA rights. 

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no

law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S.

Const., amend. I. While prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,”

including the free exercise of religion, “‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary

withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations

underlying our penal system.’” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, (1987)

(quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). “In order to establish a free exercise

violation, [a prisoner] must show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion, by

preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th

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 Defendants make the argument that RLUIPA does not apply to the Federal Bureau of 1

Prisons. The court finds this argument disingenuous. Defendants cite no law for this assertion. 

In the leading Supreme Court case regarding RLUIPA, the Supreme Court considered the

constitutionality of RLUIPA as applied to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See Cutter v.

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).

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Cir. 1997). Under this standard, “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional

rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). First, “there must be a valid, rational connection

between the prison regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it,”

and “the governmental objective must itself be a legitimate and neutral one.” Id. A second

consideration is “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to

prison inmates.” Id. at 90 (internal quotations and citation omitted). A third consideration is

“the impact accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards and other inmates, and on

the allocation of prison resources generally.” Id. “Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is

evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.” Id.

RLUIPA also disallows burdens on a prisoner’s religious exercise unless a compelling

governmental interest is at stake. RLUIPA provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that defendants

substantially burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d

989, 994-95 (9 Cir. 2005). If plaintiff meets his burden, defendants must demonstrate that “any th

substantial burden of [plaintiff’s] exercise of his religious beliefs is both in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). “RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor

of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Id.1

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1. Runestones

Both the First Amendment and RLUIPA require Plaintiff to show some interference or

burden on his religion in being denied runestones. Defendants provide evidence that their

research revealed that Plaintiff’s Asatru religious practice did not require his personal possession

of runestones. Defendants provide evidence that possession of rune cards, along with access to

runestones during ceremonies, is sufficient. Plaintiff has countered this evidence with evidence

that actual possession of runestones is necessary. Thus, at this time, there is a disputed issue on

the burden to Plaintiff’s religion of not being allowed runestones. On this motion concerning

qualified immunity, the court must assume the facts in Plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, for this

motion, the court must presume that Defendants’ refusal to provide Plaintiff with runestones has

interfered with or burdened Plaintiff’s his religion.

The next step in either a First Amendment claim or a RLUIPA claim is to ascertain the

governmental interest used to justify the restriction and balance this interest with the interference

on Plaintiff’s religion. In a First Amendment claim, prison officials must “put forward” a

legitimate governmental interest to justify their regulation, Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, and must

provide evidence that the policy is based on legitimate penological justifications. Swift v.

Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9 Cir.1990). It is on this factor that Defendants’ motion must be th

denied as to the runestones. Both Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts and Defendants’

evidence shows that Defendants denied Plaintiff of runestones based on PS5360.08, Religious

Beliefs and Practices and/or their determination that possession of runestones was not required

by Plaintiff’s Asatru religion. Missing from Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts is actual

evidence, as opposed to Defendants’ attorney’s opinion, that the reason to deny Plaintiff

runestones and/or the reason behind the regulation Defendants relied upon to deny the runestones

is a penological justification. While the court can imagine that institutional safety might provide

a reason to disallow inmates to have 24 hard objects in their continual possession, Defendants

have provided so little information about runestones, such as their size, shape, and storage

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container, that the potential safety concern is not obvious. Absent evidence of a penological

purpose, the court must find both a constitutional violation and violation of RLUIPA for the

purposes of a qualified immunity analysis. 

If the court finds a violation of a plaintiff’s' constitutional rights, the court must determine

whether that right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201; Moreno, 431 F.3d at 638; Prison Legal News, 397 F.3d at 701. Here,

Defendants provide evidence that Asatru is not a common religion within the BOP. In addition,

during the time the events at issue in this lawsuit occurred, Atwater had recently opened, Atwater

was continually inundated with new inmates, Atwater had staff supervision and programming

constraints, and all worship areas had not yet been completed. The defense of qualified

immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This

standard “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229

(1991) (per curium). Given Defendants lack of knowledge about Asatru and Atwater’s recent

opening, the facts of this case appear at first glance to be the type in which Defendants would be

entitled to qualified immunity. 

 In deciding qualified immunity, the court must undertake its evaluation of whether a

right was clearly established “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. In essence, the question is whether the official could

have reasonably but erroneously believed that his conduct did not violate the plaintiff's rights. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9

th

Cir. 2001). Here, the law governing a prison official's responsibilities toward a prisoner’s First

Amendment rights and RLUIPA rights was clearly established. Both required Defendants to not

infringe on Plaintiff’s religion absent a penological purpose. Yet, there is no competent

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 The court makes this finding based on Defendants’ failure to carry their burden on this 2

motion because Defendants provided insufficient information. As such, this finding is for the

purposes of this motion only. 

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evidence before the court that Defendants have pointed to which shows Defendants acted

pursuant to a penological purpose. All evidence indicates that Defendants denied Plaintiff the

runestones based on a regulation and/or their belief rune cards were sufficient. In 2002 

Defendants should have known that they could not deny Plaintiff runestones without a

penological purpose. Thus, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity regarding

Plaintiff’s claims about the denial of runestones. 

In making the finding that there is no evidence that Defendants had a penological purpose

to deny runestones, the court does recognize that the declarations of some Defendants include the

broad statement that they never violated Plaintiff’s rights and all of Plaintiffs’ requests were

denied for security reasons. These general, conclusory statements are insufficient evidence in

light of the specific evidence as to the reason Defendants denied the runestones. For example,

when explaining why the use of a hof was denied, Defendants set forth specific evidence that

such a structure was denied for security reasons. Considering that the burden is on Defendants,

the court finds general assertions that all defendants actions were done for correctional security

reasons is insufficient to find a penological purpose for the denial of runestones. 

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2. Hof

The other basis for Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim is Defendants’

denial of a hof On this claim, the court agrees with the reasoning of the Magistrate Judge. 

Defendants have provided evidence that the hof was denied based on the safety concern raised by

an inclosed, wooden structure and that Plaintiff was given access to another worship area. Even

if Defendants did not properly balance Plaintiff’s religious need for the hof against safety

concerns, Defendants would not have reasonably known they were violated Plaintiff’s rights. 

Thus, the court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on this issue, and the First

Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim, to the extent they are premised on the denial of a hof, will

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be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. 

B. First Amendment Claim and RLUIPA Claim – Injunctive Relief

Defendants contend, and the Magistrate Judge found, that Plaintiff’s claims concerning an

injunction to allow runestones was moot because BOP regulations have changed and Plaintiff

may now have runestones in his possession. Plaintiff claims this change in policy still does not

adequately address his religious need because the new BOP policy permits only plastic

runestones. Plaintiff has provided evidence that runestones must be natural. 

There appears to remain a disputed issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiff’s claims

concerning the runestones are now moot by a change in BOP policy. This finding is bolstered

by the fact that much of the argument and evidence concerning the current BOP policy and

Plaintiff’s current ability to have runestones is contained in the parties’ briefs filed in response to

the Findings and Recommendations. New evidence and arguments should not be raised in

objections to Findings and Recommendations. See Greenhow v. Secretary of HHS, 863 F.2d

633, 638-39 (9 Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d th

1347 (9 Cir.1992). Accordingly, the court declines to adopt the recommendation finding that th

Plaintiff’s injunctive request concerning the runestones is now moot.

C. First Amendment Claim – Supervisor Defendants

Defendants contend that they should be dismissed from the First Amendment claim

because they are not adequately linked to the alleged civil rights violations. In the motion,

Defendants contend that no First Amendment claim is available against Defendant Hawk Sawyer

and Defendant Haro because Plaintiff’s theory of liability against them is impermissibly based on

respondeat superior liability. The Magistrate Judge did not address this claim because he

recommended all Defendants be dismissed from the First Amendment claim based on qualified

immunity. 

In a civil rights claim, liability may not be established through a respondeat superior

theory. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9 Cir.2002) (1983 case against state officials); th

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Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Bivens case against federal

officials). To show a supervisor’s liability, the plaintiff must show (1) the supervisor’s personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895,

915 (9 Cir.2001). Supervisors can be held liable if they play an affirmative part in the alleged th

deprivation of constitutional rights by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the

supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitutional

injury. Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 848 (9 Cir.2003) (citations omitted)

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(quoting Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1563 (9 Cir.1995); Larez v. City of LA, 946 F.2d 630, th

646 (9 Cir.1991)). “Supervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official in his th

individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control

of his subordinates, for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the

complaint is made, or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of

others.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9 Cir. 2005) (quoting Larez v. City th

of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9 Cir.1991)). th

Defendant Haro contends that he cannot be liable because Plaintiff’s regional office

appeals regarding the runestones were signed by other individuals. Defendant Haro contends

that because he did not personally sign the appeals, he cannot be liable. The court would agree

with Defendant Haro if his position was that his employees reviewed and denied the appeals and

he did not specifically know about his employees’ actions. However, Defendant Haro provides

evidence that those who signed the appeals were delegated to sign on his behalf in an acting

capacity when Defendant Haro was unavailable. Based on Defendant Haro’s own evidence, it

appears that by delegating to others the authority to sign on his behalf, Defendant Haro

acquiesced to the alleged constitutional deprivations of his employees. Thus, the court finds

Defendant Haro is not entitled to be dismissal or summary judgment on the First Amendment

claim.

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 It is possible the evidence will reveal that Defendant Hawk Sawyer’s policy was not the 3

legal cause for the other Defendants’ actions and the legal cause was only the other Defendants’

misinterpretation of her policy. However, this is not an argument to be resolved on this motion. 

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Defendant Hawk Sawyer contends that respondeat superior is the only basis for the

allegations against her. While Defendant Hawk Sawyer’s specific argument is not stated in the

motion to dismiss, from her declaration, it appears that Defendant Hawk Sawyer takes the

position that she had nothing to do with how program statements concerning religious property

were implemented at Atwater. Defendant Hawk Sawyer cites to Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983

F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1993), in which the District of Colombia Circuit found that claims against

the United States Attorney General and BOP Director were entitled to be dismissed because the

claims against them had essentially been based on the bare assumption that policy decisions

made in Washington might have affected the Plaintiff’s treatment in federal prison. Id. at 258. 

The court in Cameron found that absent allegations specifying the United States Attorney

General’s or BOP Director’s involvement, the claims against them were based on nothing more

than a theory of respondeat superior. Id. Unlike this case, the plaintiff in Cameron did not allege

these defendants had approved a policy that related to the case. Id. Here, Defendant Hawk

Sawyer is not being sued merely because she is the BOP Director and it is possible some abstract

policy from her office impacted what happened to Plaintiff. At issue in this action is an actual

BOP policy and Program Statements that Defendant Hawk Sawyer signed. Plaintiff’s theory

against Defendant Hawk Sawyer is based on the fact she allegedly created a policy that set in

motion a series of acts by others that Defendant Hawk Sawyer knew or reasonably should have

known would cause other BOP officials to violate Plaintiff’s rights. Because the allegations

against Defendant Hawk Sawyer are not based solely on a respondeat superior theory, she is not

entitled to dismissal or summary judgment for Plaintiff’s failure to link her to the constitutional

violations.

3

//

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D. First Amendment Claim – Official Capacity

The court recognizes that Defendants moved to dismiss the civil rights claims against

them based on their official capacity. The Magistrate Judge did not address this argument

because he recommended all Defendants be dismissed based on qualified immunity. 

In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court explained the difference between individual

and official capacity suits: Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official capacity suits, in

contrast, “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-55; Kreines v. United States, 33 F.3d 1105,

1107 (9 Cir. 1994). An official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as

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a suit against the entity because the entity is the real party in interest. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-

55; Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9 Cir. 1999); Lewis v. th

Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 446 (9 Cir. 1996). “A Bivens action can be maintained th

against a defendant in his or her individual capacity only, and not in his or her official capacity.” 

Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. U.S., 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9 Cir. 2007) th

(quoting Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9 Cir.1987)). Thus, Defendants are th

entitled to be dismissed from the First Amendment claim to the extent they are being sued in the

official capacity.

E. Equal Protection Claim

The complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights. 

Defendants contend that the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations of an equal

protection violation. The Magistrate Judge agreed and recommended dismissal. In the

objections, Plaintiff contends that inmates in other religions were allowed religious stones and

beads that are similar to runestones.

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated

alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal

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protection claim may be established in two ways. First, a plaintiff may establish an equal

protection violation by showing that a defendant has intentionally discriminated on the basis of

the plaintiff's membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d

668, 686 (9 Cir. 2001) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9 Cir.1998)). th th

Second, if the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff establishes

an equal protection claim by showing similarly situated individuals are treated differently without

a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Squaw Valley Development Co. v.

Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9 Cir. 2004) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. th

562, 564 (2000)). 

The complaint alleges that Defendants’ denial of runestones violated Plaintiff’s equal

protection rights because Plaintiff “was denied privileges similar to those accorded to inmates of

other religious faiths.” To survive this motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must satisfy the minimal notice

pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2)

requires the complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint fails to meet this standard as

to the equal protection claim. The complaint fails to allege how inmates of other religious were

similarly situated to Plaintiff. While the complaint does state in a conclusory fashion that

Plaintiff’s equal protection rights were violated, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v.

Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents,

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673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). The court cannot “assume the truth of legal conclusions

merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family

Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9 Cir. 2003); Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d th

618, 624 (9 Cir.1981). Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim for an equal protection th

violation.

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The court notes that Plaintiff is proceeding with a first amended complaint filed by

Plaintiff pursuant to his right to file one amended pleading as a matter of course under Rule 15 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaint in this action has never been screened by

the court nor previously reviewed on a motion to dismiss. Prior to dismissal of a claim for

failure to state a claim, the court is required to give pro se prisoners notice of the complaint’s

pleading deficiencies and the opportunity to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. th

2000) (if court determines that complaint fails to state claim, leave to amend may be granted to

extent that complaint’s deficiencies can be cured); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th

Cir. 1987) (prisoner must be given notice of deficiencies and opportunity to amend prior to

dismissing for failure to state a claim). In this action, the court has never given Plaintiff notice

of the complaint’s pleading deficiencies. Thus, the court finds this claim must be dismissed

with leave to amend.

F. RFRA Claim

The complaint contains a claim under RFRA. Defendants move to dismiss this claim. It

is unclear why this argument was not addressed by the Magistrate Judge. 

RFRA provides that the government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of

religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government

demonstrates a compelling governmental interest and uses the least restrictive means of

furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507

(1997), the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states. Id. at 514-16. 

However, RFRA is still constitutional as applied to the federal government. Navajo Nation v.

U.S. Forest Service, 479 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9 Cir. 2007); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, th

1220-21 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Defendants contend that money damages are not available to Plaintiff under RFRA. 

RFRA states that "[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this

section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain

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treated as a suit against the entity or, in this case, the United States. See Graham, 473 U.S. at

165-55; Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9 Cir. 1999) th

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appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). Before the United States can

be sued, the United States must consent to suit. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212

(1983). The federal government may waive its sovereign immunity by statute, but that waiver

“must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text.” Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). 

RFRA's reference to “appropriate relief” is not the sort of unequivocal waiver necessary because

this broad term is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Webman v. Federal Bureau of

Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal cites and quotes omitted). “Appropriate

relief” might include damages, but another possible reading is that “appropriate relief” only

covers equitable relief. Given Congress's awareness of the importance of sovereign immunity

and its silence in the statute on the subject of damages, RFRA does not waive the United States'

sovereign immunity from claims for damages. Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d

1022, 1025-26 (D.C.Cir. 2006); Lepp v. Gonzales,2005 WL 1867723, *8 (N.D.Cal. 2005); Jama

v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 343 F Supp 2d 338, 73-374

(D.N.J.2004); Tinsley v. Pittari, 952 F.Supp. 384, 389 (N.D.Tex.1996); Meyer v. Federal Bureau

of Prisons, 929 F.Supp. 10, 13-14 (D.D.C.1996). Accordingly, any money damage claims

against the United States and individuals sued in their official capacity are barred.4

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s rights under RFRA were not violated. To

establish a prima facie claim of a RFRA violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the federal

government's actions work a substantial burden on his ability to practice religion freely. 

Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1222; see also United States v. Israel, 317 F.3d 768, 771 (7 Cir. 2003) th

("[U]nder RFRA, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation if he can demonstrate that the

government's action was a(1) substantial burden on a(2) sincere (3) exercise of religion."). If

there is a substantial burden, the government does not violate RFRA if the government’s actions

serve a compelling government interest in the least restrictive manner possible. Guerrero, 290

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F.3d at 1222. Because RFRA, like RLUIPA, requires the government to not substantially

burden the practice of religion absent a compelling government interest, Plaintiff’s RFRA claim

should be resolved the same way as Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim addressed above and in the

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s RFRA claim

concerning the hof is dismissed because the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Plaintiff’s RFRA claim concerning the runestones will proceed against Defendants in their

individual capacity. 

Finally, Defendants contend that any RFRA claim is moot. As discussed above, there is

a disputed issue of fact on whether Plaintiff currently may possess runestones. Thus, this claim

is not moot.

G. APA Claim

The complaint contains a claim for a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 

Defendants move to dismiss this claim for failure to state a claim. It is unclear why this

argument was not addressed by the Magistrate Judge. 

The Administrative Procedure Act concerns an agency’s rule making function. It

requires each agency to separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the

guidance of the public the following:

(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established places at

which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed service, the members) from

whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information, make

submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;

(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are

channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal

and informal procedures available;

(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which

forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers,

reports, or examinations;

(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and

statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated

and adopted by the agency; and

(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.

5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(1). The APA requires an agency to give notice of any proposed new rules. 

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5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b). After notice, the agency must give interested persons an opportunity to

participate in the rule making process. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c). 

In his opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff clarifies that his APA claim is based on

Defendants’ actions when they denied him runestones at every level of the administrative appeals

process. Plaintiff appears to assert Defendants repeated denials were not done pursuant to the

APA. This allegation cannot serve as the basis of an APA claim. Plaintiff is not claiming that

the BOP instituted a rule or policy without following the APA. Rather, Plaintiff is attempting to

challenging the BOP’s actions against him. Because the basis of Plaintiff’s APA claim is not the

type of action that can be raised under the APA, this claim must be dismissed. 

The court recognizes that ordinarily a pro se prisoner must be given at least one

opportunity to amend a claim. Leave to amend need not be granted, however, if the court

determines that the pleading can not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Bly-Magee

v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9 Cir.2001); Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9 Cir. th th

(9 Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff is not alleging that the BOP enacted any BOP rule or policy in th

violation of the APA, it would be impossible for Plaintiff to state an APA claim. Accordingly,

this claim will be dismissed without leave to amend. 

ORDER

Accordingly, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations issued by the Magistrate Judge on April 4,

2007, are adopted in part; 

2. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, without prejudice,

as follows:

a. Defendants are GRANTED qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment claim, RLUIPA claim, and RFRA claim concerning the hof

and the First Amendment claim, RLUIPA claim, and RFRA claim

concerning the hof are DISMISSED;

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b. Defendants’ motion for qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim, RLUIPA claim, and RFRA claim concerning the

runestones is DENIED and these claims will proceed on that basis;

c. Defendants are DISMISSED from the First Amendment claim to the

extent they are sued in their official capacity;

d. The equal protection claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure

to state a claim;

e. To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants in their

official capacity, Defendants are DISMISSED from the RFRA claim;

f. The APA claim is DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure to state

a claim. 

3. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within thirty days of this order’s date of

service. 

4. This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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