Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00319/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00319-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 423
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Withdrawal 28 USC 157
Cause of Action: 28:0157 Motion for Withdrawal of Reference

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In re: 

Don's Making Money, LLP, Tropical

Beaches, Inc., New Strategies, LLLP,

Dolphin Media, LLLP, National Reminder

Service, LLLP,

_________________________________

Charles L. Riley, Jr., Chapter 7 Trustee, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

The Estate of Joseph A. Deihl and Sari

Deihl, et. Al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-319-PHX-MHM

ORDER

At present, this case has four pending motions. The motions are as follows.

Defendants have filed a Motion to Withdraw the Reference of this case to the United States

Bankruptcy Court (Doc. 2). Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Compel Disclosure and Motion

for Sanctions (Doc. 4). Both of these Motions are fully briefed. Also pending are Plaintiff's

Motion to Accelerate the Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Withdraw the Reference (Doc.

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9) and Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 10). After considering the

papers submitted, the Court issues the following Order.

BACKGROUND

Defendants, the Estate of Joseph A. Deihl, Sari Deihl, Universal Business Strategies,

Inc. ("UBS"), Mayor Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., Karemore International, Inc.,

Vitamist, Inc., Regency Medical Group, Ltd. ("Regency"), Liberty Group International, Ltd.,

Creative Personnel Resources, Inc., Left Field Productions, Inc., Spoiled Brat, Ltd.

("Defendants") have filed a Motion to Withdraw the Reference to the Bankruptcy Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157. Plaintiff Charles L. Riley, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), opposes Defendants'

Motion. 

The relevant facts of this case are as follows. In the early 1990s, Don Lapre started

an infomercial business called "Don's Making Money." In 1991, "Don's Making Money"

filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Through the bankruptcy proceeding, Regency

Medical Group, Ltd. ("Regency") purchased the "Don's Making Money" infomercial

business. The purchase agreement provided for Regency to pay $750,000 in cash and

additional payments of $2 million. The sale was approved by the Bankruptcy Court and the

assets, including an account of $1,719,075.91, were transferred to Regency. Regency made

the initial payment of $750,000 but failed to make any other payments. 

Regency was owned and controlled by Defendants Joseph Deihl and Sari Deihl. In

2001, the rights and obligations of Regency, including the assets of "Don's Making Money,"

were assigned to UBS, another entity owned and controlled by Defendants Mr. and Mrs.

Deihl. UBS filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2003. In relation to UBS's bankruptcy

proceeding, Plaintiff, the bankruptcy trustee for "Don's Making Money," obtained a judgment

against UBS for $2,320,000 plus interest. In an effort to collect the judgment, Plaintiff filed

the instant complaint on or about November 2, 2005. 

The instant case is an adversary proceeding initiated in Bankruptcy Court. Federal

jurisdiction in this case is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1334, the statute vesting in federal district

courts jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases and related proceedings. In his Complaint, Plaintiff

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has asserted seven causes of action. The causes of action are as follows: alter ego/piercing

the corporate veil (Count I); fraudulent transfer (Count II); common law fraud (Count III);

negligent misrepresentation (Count IV); Arizona RICO claim pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

2414.04 (Count V); violation of corporate trust fund doctrine (Count VI); and unjust

enrichment (Count VII). 

In Defendants' instant Motion to Withdraw the Reference to the Bankruptcy Court,

Defendants assert that the pending adversary proceeding involves the assertion of non-core

claims. Defendants claim that the case requires mandatory withdrawal to this Court because

of Defendants' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and that withdrawing the reference

would aid judicial efficiency and no prejudice would result. 

Plaintiff opposes Defendants' Motion to Withdraw the Reference. Plaintiff assert that

Defendants' Motion to Withdraw is untimely and not warranted because this case involves

non-core claims. Plaintiff further asserts that the bankruptcy judge must determine whether

the claims are core or non-core before a withdrawal of reference motion is appropriate in this

Court. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Title 28 of the United States Code, § 157 explains the procedure for returning a case

to District Court:

The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding

referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any

party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so

withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding

requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States

regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.

28 U.S.C. § 157(d). This language "contains two distinct provisions: the first sentence [for

cause shown] allows permissive withdrawal, while the second sentence [U.S. laws affecting

interstate commerce] requires mandatory withdrawal in certain situations." In re

Coe-Truman Technologies, Inc., 214 B.R. 183, 185 (N.D.Ill.1997). The movant has the

burden of persuasion as to both mandatory and discretionary withdrawal. Hawaiian Airlines,

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Inc. v. Nesa Air Group, Inc., 355 B.R. 214 (D.Haw. 2006). Any motion to withdraw must

be timely. FTC v. First Alliance Mortg. Co., 282 B.R. 894, 902 n.6 (C.D.Cal. 2001). 

The Ninth Circuit has stated in dictum that mandatory withdrawal of the reference

hinges "on the presence of substantial and material questions of federal law." Security Farms

v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, 124 F.3d 999,

1008 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997). To date, no Ninth Circuit case that has dealt directly with the

mandatory withdrawal standard. The "substantial and material consideration" standard has

received criticism because of the obvious ambiguity of what constitutes "substantial and

material consideration." In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 296 B.R. 673, 678 (E.D.Va. 2003).

Ambiguity notwithstanding, "[o]verwhelmingly courts and commentators agree that

the mandatory withdrawal provision cannot be given its broadest literal reading, for sending

every proceeding that required passing 'consideration' of non-bankruptcy law back to the

district court would 'eviscerate much of the work of the bankruptcy courts,' From a litigant's

perspective, such a reading would also create an 'escape hatch' by which bankruptcy matters

could easily be removed to the district court." In re Vicars Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 F.3d 949,

952 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). 

With regard to permissive withdrawal, "[t]here is no statutory definition of what

constitutes 'cause shown' under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d)." In re Lars, Inc., 290 B.R. 467, 469

(D.P.R. 2003). Typically, courts will first consider whether the proceeding is core or

non-core. Further, the Ninth Circuit counsels that "a district court should consider the

efficient use of judicial resources, delay and costs to the parties, uniformity of bankruptcy

administration, the prevention of forum shopping, and other related factors." Security Farms,

124 F.3d at 1008 (internal citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION

I. TIMELINESS OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE REFERENCE

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' Motion to Withdraw the Reference should be denied

as untimely. 

Section 157(d) of Title 28 states as follows: 

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The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding

referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any

party, for cause shown. The district court shall on timely motion of a party, so

withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding

requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States

regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce [emphasis

added]. 

A motion to withdraw is timely "if it was made as promptly as possible in light of the

developments in the bankruptcy proceedings." Security Farms, 124 F.3d at 1007 n.3

(quoting In re Baldwin-United Corp., 57 B.R. 751, 754 (S.D.Ohio 1985)). 

Defendants contend that Security Farms, 124 F.3d at 1007, n.3, further states that

section 157 is designed not to be a bright line rule but, rather, to be flexible in the context of

the totality of the facts, circumstances, and developments of the each case. Therefore,

Defendants assert that their Motion to Withdraw the Reference is timely because Plaintiff

was on notice as Defendants included a jury demand in their Answer. Moreover, Defendants'

assert that the Motion to Remand is timely because Plaintiff does not assert that Defendants'

Motion causes him any prejudiced. See In re TPI Intern. Airways, 222 B.R. 663, 667

(S.D.Ga. 1998) ("Defendants do not argue that this motion has caused them any prejudice,

so the Court concludes that Catchpole's motion is timely."). 

A district court may withdraw the reference at any time. In re Hall, Bayoutree

Associates, Ltd., 939 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1991). See also In re H & W Motor Express Co., 343

B.R. 208 (N.D.Iowa 2006) ("The court holds that the test for timeliness is ultimately one of

reasonableness under the circumstances."); In re Kaplan, 146 B.R. 500, 503 (D.Mass. 1992)

(finding that timeliness is determined based on a review of the facts of the specific situation).

In light of the circumstances involved in this case, including Defendants' demand for a jury

trial, Defendants' Motion to Withdraw the Reference is timely. 

II. MANDATORY WITHDRAWAL 

Defendants assert that withdrawal of the reference is mandatory because Plaintiff's

claims are non-core state law claims and because Defendants have demanded a jury trial in

this Court. The mandatory withdrawal provision only deals with "consideration of both title

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11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting

interstate commerce." 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). Consideration of state laws does not give rise to

mandatory withdrawal. See e.g., In re Com 21, 2005 WL 1606357, *11 (N.D.Cal. 2005);

Diagnostic In'l, Inc. v. Aerobic Life Prods. Co., 257 B.R. 511, 513 (Bankr.D.Ariz. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff alleges state law claims. None of Plaintiff's claims deal with "title 11 or other

laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate

commerce." Thus, the nature of Plaintiff's claims does not warrant a finding that withdrawal

is mandatory. 

Regarding mandatory withdrawal due to the preserved right to a jury trial, Defendants

cite Larry's Apartment L.L.C. v. Galam, 210 B.R. 469, 472 (D.Ariz. 1997), to aver that

"because bankruptcy courts cannot conduct jury trials on noncore matters, withdrawal is

mandated if the litigant is entitled to a jury trial on such matters." However, the district court

case of Larry's Apartment, in turn, cites the precedential Ninth Circuit case of In re

Cinematronics, Inc., 916 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990), which states that "where a jury trial

is required and the parties refuse to consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction, withdrawal of the case

to the district court is appropriate." (emphasis added.) The Court finds that withdrawal of

the reference may be appropriate, however, the Court is not convinced that withdrawal is

mandatory. 

III. VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWAL

A. CORE VERSUS NON-CORE CLAIMS

1. THIS COURT'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE A CORE / NON-CORE 

DETERMINATION 

Plaintiff relies on 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) to argue that a determination as to whether

a claim is core or non-core shall be made by the bankruptcy court before the district court

may withdraw the reference. However, Congress has vested jurisdiction of bankruptcy

matters in the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1334. 

While section 157(b)(3) provides that a bankruptcy judge shall determine whether a

claim is a core or a non-core claim, that provision relates to the scope of authority for

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bankruptcy courts under section 157 once federal jurisdiction is found to exist under section

1334. See In re Gruntz, 202 F3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2000). However, it does not prohibit

the district court from determining whether a proceeding is core or non-core where, as here,

there has been no prior determination. Id. Indeed, district courts routinely engage in such

analysis. See, e.g., Williams v. Shell Oil Co., 169 BR 684, 692 (S.D.Cal. 1994); In re Kold

Kist Brands, Inc, 158 BR 175, 178 (C.D.Cal. 1993). Thus, this Court does have authority to

determine, if necessary, whether the claims are core or non-core. 

2. DISCUSSION OF CORE VERSUS NON-CORE CLAIMS 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of core proceedings. The

claims Plaintiff has alleged in this lawsuit are not among the itemized claims in 157(b)(2).

"Courts attempting to analyze the status of a particular claim that is not listed in section

157(b)(2) have considered factors such as whether the rights involved exist independent of

title 11, depend on state law for their resolution, existed prior to the filing of a bankruptcy

petition, or were significantly affected by the filing of the bankruptcy case." In re

Cinematronics, Inc., 916 F.2d at 1450 n.6. 

"In noncore matters, the bankruptcy court acts as an adjunct to the district court, in a

fashion similar to that of a magistrate or special master. In noncore matters, the bankruptcy

court may not enter final judgments without the consent of the parties, and its findings of fact

and conclusions of law in noncore matters are subject to de novo review by the district court.

. . . In contrast to the bankruptcy court's authority in noncore cases, the bankruptcy court may

enter final judgments in so-called core cases, which are appealable to the district court."

Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Properties (In re Castlerock Properties), 781 F.2d 159, 161 (9th

Cir. 1986), (internal citation omitted). 

The distinction between core and non-core claims is important because it determines

how the claims must be treated. 

In non-core matters, the bankruptcy court acts as an adjunct to the district

court, in a fashion similar to that of a magistrate or special master. In noncore

matters, the bankruptcy court may not enter final judgments without the

consent of the parties, and its findings of fact and conclusions of law in

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noncore matters are subject to de novo review by the district court. . . . In

contrast to the bankruptcy court's authority in noncore cases, the bankruptcy

court may enter final judgments in so-called core cases, which are appealable

to the district court.

Piombo Corp., 781 F.2d at 161 (internal citation omitted). 

"Despite the importance of the core designation to bankruptcy adjudication, no exact

definition of the term exists in the bankruptcy code. Rather, as stated above, section

157(b)(2) contains a laundry list of core proceedings along with the admonition that core

proceedings include, but are not limited to, the items listed." In re Cinematronics, Inc., 916

F.2d at 1449-50. This definitional shortcoming notwithstanding, courts are not without

guidance in this area.

"Courts attempting to analyze the status of a particular claim that is not listed in

section 157(b)(2) have considered factors such as whether the rights involved exist

independent of title 11, depend on state law for their resolution, existed prior to the filing of

a bankruptcy petition, or were significantly affected by the filing of the bankruptcy case."

Id. at 1450 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). Claims that arise under or in Title 11 are deemed to be "core"

proceedings, while claims that are related to Title 11 are "non-core" proceedings. See e.g.

Robertson v. Isomedix, Inc. (In re Int'l Nutronics), 28 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[c]ore

proceedings are matters concerning the administration of the estate and rights created by title

11.") (internal quotation omitted). "Actions that do not depend on bankruptcy laws for their

existence and that could proceed in another court are considered non-core." Security Farms,

124 F.3d at 1008. 

Plaintiff has asserted seven causes of action in his Complaint. The causes of action

are as follows: alter ego/piercing the corporate veil (Count I); fraudulent transfer (Count II);

common law fraud (Count III); negligent misrepresentation (Count IV); Arizona RICO claim

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-2414.04 (Count V); violation of corporate trust fund doctrine (Count

VI); and unjust enrichment (Count VII). 

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Defendants assert that because all counts in Plaintiff's Complaint are based on State

law, none of Plaintiff's claims are core claims. In their Reply, Defendants cite In re

Chemetco, Inc. 308 B.R. 339 (Bkrtcy. S.D.Ill. 2004) to contend that Plaintiff is silent as to

Defendants' assertion that all counts are noncore. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff's

silence denotes concession that all claims are noncore.

Contrary to Defendants' contentions, Plaintiff's Response is not silent regarding

whether the counts in the Complaint are core or noncore. In fact, Plaintiff cites In re Mankin,

823 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987) and In re Building by Jamie, Inc., 230 B.R. 36, 44-45 (D.N.J.

1998) to assert that at least his alter ego/piercing the corporate veil and fraudulent transfer

claims are core claims. See In re Mankin, 823 F.2d 1296 (fraudulent conveyance claim

based upon state law was core claim); In re Building by Jamie, 230 B.R. at 44-45 (Chapter

7 trustee's alter ego claim, seeking to pierce the corporate veil of corporate debtor, was a core

proceeding).

It is true that Plaintiff has not alleged causes of action that are created or determined

by a statutory provision of the bankruptcy laws. In fact, each of Plaintiff's claims is based

on state law. However, Plaintiff has submitted evidence to show that at least one count is a

core claim, with a strong assertion that other claims may be as well. In fact, here, as in In re

Mankin, the fraudulent transfer claim "directly relates to the restructuring of debtor-creditor

relations and is not merely an action to bring property into the estate." In re Mankin, 823

F.2d at 1307. Furthermore, it is possible that Plaintiff's alter ego/piercing the corporate veil

claim is a core claim as well. For these reasons, the Court is not willing to find that Plaintiff's

Complaint contains only noncore claims as Defendants assert. 

Moreover, "[a] matter is related to the bankruptcy when the outcome of that

proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in

bankruptcy." Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (internal citation

omitted). "An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights,

liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any

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way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate." Walker v. Cadle

Co. (In re Walker), 51 F3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). 

The essence of this adversary proceeding is Plaintiff's attempt to collect a judgment

of $2,320,000 plus interest from the bankruptcy estate, arising out of a sale that was approved

by the Bankruptcy Court. Plaintiff also has asserted claims that the bankruptcy estate has not

been handled appropriately. Therefore, regardless of whether Plaintiff's claims ultimately

are determined to be core or noncore, at the very least, Plaintiff's claims are related to the

Don's Making Money bankruptcy proceeding. 

B. IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF REFERENCE BASED ON A SEVENTH

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN THIS COURT

Defendants assert that withdrawal of the reference is appropriate because Defendants

have asserted and have retained the right to a jury trial in an Article III court. The Court will

consider whether such a right warrants immediate withdrawal.

Courts uniformly acknowledge the relevance of a party's right to a jury trial in district

court when deciding whether to withdraw reference to the bankruptcy court, however, a

number of courts have denied a party's request for immediate withdrawal of reference where

the basis of the request is a party's entitlement to a jury trial. See, e.g., Barlow & Peek, Inc.

v. Manke Truck Lines, Inc., 163 B.R. 177, 179 (D.Nev. 1993) ("The filing of a jury demand

in a non core proceeding which is related to a bankruptcy case should not result in the

District Judge on a knee jerk basis withdrawing the order of reference."); In re

Apponline.Com., Inc., 303 B.R. 723, 727 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("A rule that would require a

district court to withdraw a reference simply because a party is entitled to a jury trial,

regardless of how far along toward trial a case may be, runs counter to the policy favoring

judicial economy that underlies the statutory scheme.") quoting Kanai Corp v. National

Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Kenai Corp.), 136 B.R. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)); In re Commercial

Financial Services, Inc., 239 B.R. 586, 597 (Bankr. N.D.Okla. 1999) (same); In re Hardesty,

190 B.R. 653, 656 (D.Kan. 1995) ("Even if a jury trial may constitute cause for withdrawal,

the district court may decline to withdraw the reference until the case is ready for trial.").

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"The Court has the option of withdrawing the entire adversary matter, or withdrawing

only the trial portion, leaving the pre-trial and discovery matters to be handled by the

bankruptcy judge." In re Lars, 290 B.R. at 469. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged such

procedure in dicta: "[T]he Fourth Circuit has concluded that a bankruptcy court may

postpone withdrawal of the reference where a party asserts a right to a jury trial in the district

court. In such an instance, a bankruptcy court may perform pretrial functions short of jury

selection and trial, and presumably could dismiss a party's action for failure to comply with

any pretrial order. Here, however, the Northern District of California's local bankruptcy rules

dictate that the withdrawal of the reference is 'automatic' . . ." Dunmore v. United States, 258

F.3d 1107, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004), citing Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v.

Schwartzman, 13 F.3d 122, 128 (4th Cir. 1993). The District of Arizona, unlike the Northern

District of California, does not have a local rule barring the procedure outlined by the circuit

courts. 

Even where the presence of non-core claims and a jury demand dictate that the

reference to the bankruptcy court ultimately may have to be withdrawn, a district court may

exercise its discretion not to withdraw the reference immediately where, for example, the

bankruptcy court already is familiar with the relevant facts and issues, and the issues triable

by a jury are not yet ripe for trial. See, e.g., Barlow & Peek, 163 B.R. at 179; In re Orion

Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1101-1102 (2nd Cir. 1993). Courts should strictly construe the

section 157(d) factors "so that it does not provide an 'escape hatch' out of bankruptcy court."

CIS Corp. v. Citicorp North America, Inc. (In re CIS Corp.), 188 B.R. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

(quoting In re White Motor Corp., 42 B.R. 693, 704 (N.D.Ohio 1984).

"Courts have also recognized that it serves the interests of judicial economy and

efficiency to keep an action in Bankruptcy Court for the resolution of pre-trial, managerial

matters, even if the action will ultimately be transferred to a district court for trial." In re

Enron Corp., 295 B.R. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). "The decision whether or not to withdraw

the referral immediately is frequently more a pragmatic question of efficient case

administration than a strictly legal decision. While the bankruptcy court may be uniquely

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1

 Plaintiff recently filed his Third Motion to Compel, which he filed with this Court

on February 20, 2007.

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qualified to conduct pre-trial matters in some core proceedings, in other cases such a referral

would be a futile detour, requiring substantial duplication of judicial effort." Schwartzman,

13 F.3d at 128 (internal citation omitted).

Defendants argue that reference to bankruptcy court ultimately will be withdrawn

because Defendants have preserved their right to a jury trial in this Court. Defendants

contend that now is a good time to withdraw the reference because the parties are at the

initial stages of discovery, having just begun written discovery requests. 

Plaintiff claims that discovery in this case has been ongoing since before the case was

filed in November 2005 and has continued ever since. Plaintiff asserts that the Bankruptcy

Court is thoroughly familiar with this case, the parties, and the discovery performed to date.

In fact, Plaintiff states that the Bankruptcy Court was the court that approved the sale and

purchase in question. 

As determined above, regardless of whether Plaintiff's claims are core or non-core,

clearly the claims are at the very least "related to" the bankruptcy proceedings. Discovery

officially has been ongoing for at least a year. In fact, Plaintiff filed his first motion to

compel discovery on May 11, 2006.1

 Since that time, the Bankruptcy Court has granted two

motions to compel and two motions for sanctions in Plaintiff's favor. Thus, it is clear that

the Bankruptcy Court is familiar with the facts of this case. Therefore, without making a

determination as to whether Defendants have, in fact, preserved their right to a jury trial, an

issue Plaintiff does not seem to contend, the Court finds that it is more judicially efficient for

the bankruptcy court to continue to oversee this case through the discovery process. 

CONCLUSION

In the interest of judicial economy, minimizing delay and costs to the parties,

uniformity of bankruptcy administration, and reasonableness under the circumstances, the

Court finds it more appropriate to deny without prejudice Defendants' Motion to Withdraw

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the Reference. The Bankruptcy Court shall continue oversight of this case. Defendants may

reassert their Motion at the appropriate time before trial. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Accelerate Ruling on Defendants' Motion

to Withdraw the Reference (Doc. 9) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Withdraw the Reference

(Doc. 2) is denied without prejudice to be reasserted at the appropriate time before trial.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Third Motion to Compel Disclosure

(Doc. 4) is denied as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (Doc. 10) is denied as moot.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2007.

Case 2:07-cv-00319-MHM Document 13 Filed 05/03/07 Page 13 of 13