Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00148-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY M. COSTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

J.K. YU, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS

ORDER 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO AMEND; AND

(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

MODIFY THE DISCOVERY AND 

SCHEDULING ORDER

(ECF Nos. 31, 34)

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 8.) Pending now is 

Plaintiff‟s motion to amend the Second Amended Complaint. Defendant opposes this 

motion. Defendant also moves to modify the April 19, 2016, Discovery and Scheduling 

Order (“DSO”). Plaintiff has not filed an opposition or statement of non-opposition to this 

motion.

Case 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS Document 35 Filed 01/17/17 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. Procedural Background 

Plaintiff initiated this action on January 27, 2014, by filing a complaint against the 

following Defendants related to the provision of medical care at Corcoran State Prison 

(“CSP”) in Corcoran, California: (1) Dr. Clark, (2) Dr. McCabe, (3) Dr. Wang, CSP Chief 

Medical Executive, (4) Dr. Macias, CSP Chief Executive Officer, and (5) Zamora, MD –

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Chief Health Care 

Services.

On February 19, 2014, the complaint was screened and dismissed with leave to 

amend for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 7.) Specifically, the undersigned determined 

that Plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim against any 

of the Defendants, failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Dr. Clark, 

and failed to state a due process claim regarding the processing of Plaintiff‟s appeal.

On April 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint naming Dr. J.K. Yu, 

Dr. Clark, Dr. Wang, Dr. Macias, and Zamora as Defendants. (ECF No. 12.) This 

pleading was screened and dismissed on March 31, 2015, for failure to state a claim. 

(ECF No. 14.) The Court noted that Plaintiff failed to correct any of the deficiencies 

identified in the February 19, 2014, Screening Order with respect to his Eighth 

Amendment medical indifference claim as to Zamora, Wang, Macias, and Clark, and 

leave to amend as to these Defendants was denied. Plaintiff‟s due process claim against 

Defendants Wang, Macias, and Zamora, was also dismissed without leave to amend. 

Plaintiff was granted leave to amend as to his Eighth Amendment medical indifference 

claim against Dr. Yu only.

On May 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed the operative pleading, the Second Amended 

Complaint, which was screened on May 22, 2015, and found to state an Eighth 

Amendment medical indifference claim against Defendant Dr. J.K. Yu. (See ECF Nos. 

16, 18.) Plaintiff accuses Dr. Yu of refusing to treat Plaintiff, based on his appearance, in 

May and June 2012. As a result, Plaintiff‟s medical condition worsened, and he suffered 

Case 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS Document 35 Filed 01/17/17 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

extreme pain. Service was ordered on Dr. Yu, who filed an answer on April 13, 2016. 

(ECF Nos. 20, 21.)

The April 19, 2016, DSO set the deadline to amend pleadings for October 19, 

2016; the deadline to conduct discovery,r December 19, 2016; and the deadline to file 

dispositive motions, February 27, 2017. (ECF No. 23.)

On October 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint. Defendant 

moved to strike the pleading on October 31, 2016, for Plaintiff‟s failure to accompany it

with a motion, for lack of good cause, or for his failure to obtain leave of court. (ECF Nos. 

27-28.) On November 16, 2016, the Third Amended Complaint was stricken because 

Plaintiff did not seek leave of Court or obtain Defendant‟s consent before filing the 

pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); E.D. Cal. Local Rules 137(c) and 220; Sapiro v. 

Encompass Inc., 221 F.R.D. 513, 517 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

On November 17, 2016, Plaintiff re-filed the proposed Third Amended Complaint 

with an accompanying motion for leave to amend. (ECF No. 31.) Defendant opposes the 

motion. (ECF No. 33.)

On December 12, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to modify the DSO. (ECF No. 

34.) Plaintiff has not filed an opposition or otherwise responded to this motion. 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend

Plaintiff seeks to file a Third Amended Complaint asserting new claims and 

Defendants. This motion is untimely, having been filed nearly one month after the DSO‟s 

October 19, 2016, deadline for filing such motions, and Plaintiff fails to show good cause 

now to change that deadline. See DSO ¶ 9 (“A request for an extension of a deadline set 

in this order must be filed on or before the expiration of the deadline in question and will 

only be granted on a showing of good cause.”)

But even assuming Plaintiff can show good cause to modify the DSO, his motion 

will be denied for the reasons set forth infra. 

Case 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS Document 35 Filed 01/17/17 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

“Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend „shall be freely given when justice 

so requires.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). However, courts “need not grant leave to 

amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad 

faith; (3) produces an undue delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen 

Corp., 465 F.3d at 951.

A. Prior Amendments

The “court's discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the 

court has already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.” Fidelity 

Financial Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th 

Cir. 1986). In this instance, the Court has previously permitted Plaintiff leave to amend 

his complaint twice, and therefore this factor weighs in favor of denial of Plaintiff's motion 

to amend.

B. Undue Delay

By itself, undue delay is insufficient to prevent the Court from granting leave to 

amend pleadings. Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1973); DCD 

Programs v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1986). However, in combination with 

other factors, delay may be sufficient to deny amendment. See Hurn v. Ret. Fund Trust 

of Plumbing, 648 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1981). An important factor is whether 

“permitting an amendment would ... produce an undue delay in litigation.” Jackson v. 

Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff‟s Third Amended Complaint seeks to add several new defendants 

regarding the provision of medical care at CSP. This action has been pending for almost 

three years and the current discovery deadline has already passed. Given the age and 

procedural posture of this case, allowing Plaintiff to file a Third Amended Complaint 

would cause a significant delay in the action. Any new defendants would need to be 

located, served and provided an opportunity to conduct discovery. 

Case 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS Document 35 Filed 01/17/17 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of denying Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to 

amend. 

C. Bad Faith

There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that Plaintiff acted in bad faith. 

Thus, this factor has no bearing on whether the Court should grant Plaintiff leave to 

amend. 

D. Futility of Amendment / Law of the Case

“The „law of the case‟ rule ordinarily precludes a court from re-examining an issue 

previously decided by the same court, or a higher appellate court, in the same case.” 

Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 1982), citing IB Moore‟s 

Federal Practice, 0.404(1), at 404-09 (2d ed. 1980); In re Staff Mortgage & Investment 

Corp., 625 F.2d 281, 282-83 (9th Cir. 1980); Adamian v. Lombardi, 608 F.2d 1224, 1228 

(9th Cir. 1979). “Although the law of the case rules does not bind a court as absolutely 

as res judicata, and should not be applied „woodenly‟ when doing so would be 

inconsistent with „considerations of substantial justice,‟ the discretion of a court to review 

earlier decisions should be exercised sparingly so as not to undermine the salutary 

policy of finality that underlies the rule.” Moore, 682 F.2d at 833-34, citing Lathan v. 

Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 691 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 156 

F.2d 756, 757 (9th Cir. 1946). 

Here, the law of the case doctrine weighs against granting Plaintiff‟s motion to 

amend as he seeks to reintroduce claims and Defendants that have already been 

addressed in the Court‟s prior screening order. To this end, Plaintiff‟s Third Amended 

Complaint seeks relief against Defendants Dr. Clark, Dr. McCabe, Dr. Wang, Dr. Macias, 

and Zamora. Plaintiff was previously informed that his claims against these Defendants 

were insufficient to proceed, and he was specifically denied leave to amend as to them. 

Now over two years after he was originally informed of the deficiencies in his claims as 

to them and one year after the operative pleading was filed, Plaintiff seeks to reassert 

Case 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS Document 35 Filed 01/17/17 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Eighth Amendment and due process claims that were screened out from the original and 

First Amended complaints for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff provides no reason to 

disturb the Court‟s screening orders, nor does he point to any intervening change in the 

law. 

Plaintiff has also named three new Defendants for conduct that occurred in 

November 2015, nearly two years after Plaintiff initiated this action. Plaintiff accuses Drs. 

M. Rahimifar and Ahmed Mushtaq, outside neurosurgeon specialists who contract with 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and a John or Jane Doe, of 

discharging Plaintiff following November 2015 spinal procedures without proper 

discharge instructions. These claims are separate and distinct from the claim asserted 

against Dr. Yu, and would therefore be subject to dismissal for misjoinder pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2)(B). Plaintiff‟s attempt to add these new 

Defendants would be barred and therefore futile. 

E. Prejudice to Opposing Party

Prejudice is the most critical factor in determine whether leave to amend should 

be granted. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2003). The burden of showing prejudice is on the party opposing an amendment to the 

complaint. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187. 

Extending the discovery period has been found to prejudice existing defendants. 

See, e.g., Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 

2002) (observing “[t]he requirement of additional discovery would have prejudiced [the 

defendant]” if leave to amend a complaint was granted); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 

Network Solutions Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[a] need to reopen discovery 

and therefore delay the proceedings supports a district court‟s finding of prejudice”). 

The Court finds that Defendant would be prejudiced if Plaintiff is allowed to add 

several new Defendants in this action almost three years after the action was filed and 

where discovery is now completed. See DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187; Becherer v. 

Case 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS Document 35 Filed 01/17/17 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 F.3d 1054, 1069 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, 

given the likely prejudice to Defendant, this factor weighs in favor of denying Plaintiff‟s 

motion to amend.

For these reasons, Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to amend will be denied.

III. Defendant’s Motion to Modify the DSO

Defendant moves to extend the discovery and dispositive motion deadlines by 60 

days because of the delay caused by Plaintiff‟s late-filed motion. Defendant claims that 

Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to amend rendered “the scope of discovery, including 

Plaintiff‟s deposition, ... unknown.” Def.‟s Mot. Modify DSO at 3. Defendant does not 

explain why Plaintiff‟s late-filed motion to amend so impaired Defendant‟s ability to 

conduct discovery, including deposing Plaintiff, on the single Eighth Amendment claim 

asserted against him, which was the same claim asserted in the proposed Third 

Amended Complaint. 

Additionally, the Court notes that the discovery period in this case was eight 

months long (the DSO issued on April 19, 2016, and the discovery deadline was 

December 19, 2016). Defendant has not shown why he could not conduct the relevant 

discovery earlier as opposed to the last month of this lengthy period. As to this, the DSO 

set a 45-day deadline for responding to written discovery requests, and “discovery 

requests and deposition notices must be served sufficiently in advance of the discovery 

deadline to permit time for a response and time to prepare and file a motion to compel.” 

DSO ¶ 7. It does not appear that Defendant complied with these directives before 

Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to amend was filed. 

The Court thus finds that Defendant has not demonstrated good cause for a 

modification of the DSO. His motion will also be denied.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

A. Plaintiff‟s November 17, 2016, motion to amend (ECF No. 31) is DENIED; and

Case 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS Document 35 Filed 01/17/17 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

B. Defendant‟s December 12, 2016, motion to modify the DSO (ECF No. 34) is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2017 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00148-AWI-MJS Document 35 Filed 01/17/17 Page 8 of 8