Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01373/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01373-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kellissa M. Strand, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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CIV-06-1373-PHX-MHB

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Kellissa M. Strand’s appeal from the Social

Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claim for disability insurance benefits

and supplemental security income. After reviewing the administrative record and the

arguments of the parties, the Court now issues the following ruling.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the

Social Security Act on September 19, 2001, alleging a disability onset date of January 1,

2000. (Transcript of Administrative Record (“Tr.”) at 83-85.) The claim was denied initially

and on reconsideration. (Tr. at 45-54.) She again filed for disability insurance benefits on

August 20, 2002, alleging disability since January 1, 2001. (Tr. at 86-88.) The claim was

denied initially. (Tr. at 55-57.) Plaintiff filed another application for disability insurance

benefits on April 11, 2003, alleging disability since July 1, 2001. (Tr. at 89-92.) The claim

was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. at 58-70.) Plaintiff then filed an application

for supplemental security income pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act on

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October 10, 2003. (Tr. at 98-101.) On November 4, 2003, Plaintiff requested a hearing on

the denial of the Title II disability insurance benefits claim. (Tr. at 71-72.) The Title XVI

supplemental security income claim was subsequently consolidated with the Title II claim.

On February 9, 2005, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Joan G. Knight held a

hearing at which Plaintiff testified, represented by attorney Mark Caldwell. (Tr. at 1099-

1122.) At the hearing, Counsel amended the alleged disability onset date to January 1, 2001.

(Tr. at 1101.) Mark Kelman, a vocational expert, also testified.

On March 23, 2005, after taking the matter under advisement, the ALJ denied

Plaintiff’s claims. (Tr. at 27-36.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled from January

1, 2001 through February 28, 2003, but that alcohol abuse was a contributing factor material

to her disability, thereby precluding her receipt of benefits under Public Law 104-121. (Tr.

at 32, 34-36.) The ALJ further found that as of March 1, 2003, Plaintiff’s mental

impairments were no longer severe, absent the effects of alcohol abuse. (Tr. at 32, 34-36.)

Therefore, the ALJ determined Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. at 34-36.) The Appeals Council

subsequently denied review, thereby rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. (Tr. at 10-12.)

Plaintiff then commenced the instant action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). On October 5, 2006, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. (Doc. #12.)

Defendant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment on November 7, 2006. (Doc. #16.) On June 1, 2007, the Court

entered a stay in this matter pursuant to Plaintiff’s request. (Doc. #30.) The stay was

continued on December 26, 2007. (Doc. #32.) The Court has since been advised by the

parties that this matter be submitted for decision. (Doc. #33.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must affirm the ALJ’s findings if the findings are supported by substantial

evidence and are free from reversible legal error. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720

(9th Cir. 1998); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence

means “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

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accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); see Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720.

In determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court considers

the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. “The ALJ

is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for

resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). “If the evidence can reasonably

support either affirming or reversing the [Commissioner’s] conclusion, the court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21.

III. THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In order to be eligible for disability insurance benefits or supplemental security

income, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An ALJ determines a

claimant’s eligibility for benefits by following a five-step sequential evaluation:

(1) determine whether the applicant is engaged in “substantial gainful

activity”;

(2) determine whether the applicant has a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments;

(3) determine whether the applicant’s impairment equals one of a number of

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges as so severe as to

preclude the applicant from engaging in substantial gainful activity;

(4) if the applicant’s impairment does not equal one of the listed impairments,

determine whether the applicant is capable of performing his or her past

relevant work;

(5) if the applicant is not capable of performing his or her past relevant work,

determine whether the applicant is able to perform other work in the national

economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.

See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). At the

fifth stage, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can

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perform other substantial gainful work. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.

1993).

When substance abuse is involved, however, this five-step process may not be enough

to resolve the disability claim. In 1996, specific amendments were added to the Social

Security Act providing that “[a]n individual shall not be considered to be disabled ... if

alcoholism or drug addiction would ... be a contributing factor material to the

Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C).

Thus, even if the ALJ finds that all of the claimant’s limitations are disabling, if there is

medical evidence of substance abuse, the ALJ must next determine whether the substance

abuse was a contributing factor material to the disability determination. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1535(a). In substance abuse cases, therefore, a finding of “disabled” under the five-step

sequential process does not automatically result in an award of benefits. See Bustamante v.

Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a finding of disability as to all

impairments is a prerequisite to evaluating the materiality of the claimant’s substance abuse).

After finding the claimant disabled when considering all impairments, the ALJ must

then determine which of the claimant’s “current physical and mental limitations” would

remain if she “stopped using drugs or alcohol.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(2). The Ninth

Circuit has described this step as “separating out the impact” of the substance abuse. See

Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 955. As with any other aspect of her decision, the ALJ’s finding

must be supported by substantial evidence. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954.

If the ALJ is able to separate out the impact of substance abuse, the ALJ must then

determine whether the claimant’s remaining limitations would be disabling. See Bustamante,

262 F.3d at 955. To make this determination, the ALJ repeats the five-step sequential

process described above but only analyzes the claimant’s non-substance-abuse-related

limitations when doing so. See id. If the non-substance-abuse-related limitations would be

disabling, then the claimant is entitled to benefits. If the non-substance-abuse-related

limitations would not be disabling, then the claimant’s substance abuse is a contributing

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factor material to the disability determination, and the claimant is not entitled to receive

benefits. See id.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in “substantial gainful activity” since

the alleged amended onset date. (Tr. at 35.) The ALJ determined that from January 1, 2001

through February 28, 2003, Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and

alcohol abuse were considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth in the

Regulations 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). (Tr. at 35.) The ALJ stated that these

medically determinable impairments met one or more of the listed impairments in Appendix

1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. at 35.) Accordingly, when considering Plaintiff’s drug

addiction and/or alcoholism (“DA&A”) from January 1, 2001 through February 28, 2003,

the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was “disabled.” (Tr. at 35.)

Absent Plaintiff’s DA&A during this time period, however, Plaintiff did not have any

impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limited her ability to perform

basic work-related activities. (Tr. at 35.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not

have “severe” impairment, and that from January 1, 2001 through February 28, 2003,

Plaintiff’s DA&A was a contributing factor material to the determination of her disability.

(Tr. at 35.)

The ALJ also stated that since Plaintiff’s DA&A has been in remission (March 1,

2003), Plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of any “severe” impairment under the

Regulations. (Tr. at 35.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not been under

a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act at any time through the date of her

decision. (Tr. at 35.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred by concluding that alcoholism was a factor

material to a finding of disability. Next, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by (1) finding

Plaintiff’s impairments not “severe” within the meaning of the regulations after March 2003;

(2) rejecting the treating psychiatrist’s assessment; and (3) relying on assessments of nontestifying non-examining State agency physicians. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred

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by finding that Plaintiff’s “subjective complaints and allegations are embellished and

exaggerated and, therefore, not credible” without providing clear and convincing reasons.

A. Whether the ALJ erred by concluding that alcoholism was a factor

material to a finding of disability

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that alcoholism was a factor

material to a finding of disability. Plaintiff appears to challenge the ALJ’s finding that she

had a disability for over a two year period based on alcoholism. Plaintiff seems to contend

that by erroneously finding her impairments not severe since March 2003, the ALJ

necessarily erred by finding alcoholism material to her disability prior to March 2003.

As previously set forth, when a claimant’s substance abuse is a contributing factor

material to the determination of disability, that claimant is ineligible for benefits. See 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). This issue only arises when, as in this case, the ALJ first determines

that the claimant is disabled and there is evidence of substance abuse. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1535(a). The key to making the materiality determination is whether the claimant would

remain disabled if she stopped using drugs or alcohol. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b). The

claimant bears the burden of proving that substance abuse is not a contributing factor

material to the disability determination. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir.

2007).

The ALJ, after consideration of the entire record, concluded that:

In summary, from January 1, 2001 through February 28, 2003, the claimant

was “disabled” based on a combination of her mental impairments, including

DA&A. During this same period, however, absent the claimant’s DA&A, the

claimant’s mental impairments were no longer severe. Thus, her alcohol abuse

was a contributing factor material to the determination of her disability for this

part of the adjudicatory period. Since the claimant’s DA&A has been in

remission (March 1, 2003), the claimant has failed to establish the existence

of any “severe” impairment under the Regulations. A finding of “not

disabled” is therefore appropriate under the Social Security Act. 

(Tr. at 34.)

In considering whether Plaintiff would remain disabled if she stopped using drugs or

alcohol, the ALJ first addressed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and allegations and found

them embellished, exaggerated and, therefore, not credible. (Tr. at 33.) The ALJ concluded

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that Plaintiff had undergone multiple attempts at detoxification for alcoholism and, yet, she

had not been entirely truthful regarding her drinking problem. (Tr. at 33.) For example, the

ALJ stated that “on April 1, 2003, [Plaintiff] told her counselor at Value Options that she had

not been drinking for 45 days (exhibit 45F/45). Yet, she told another team member at Value

Options, on March 15, 2003, that she drank a bottle of wine that very morning.” (Tr. at 33.)

“This counselor reported that [Plaintiff] was using alcohol frequently and was ‘not making

any progress towards any goals’ (exhibit 45F/50).” (Tr. at 33.) The ALJ again found

documented evidence of relapse in September 2003, even though Plaintiff testified that she

had been sober since March 2003, and also found evidence of Plaintiff not complying with

her medication regimen which further undermined Plaintiff’s credibility. (Tr. at 33-34.)

The ALJ determined, however, that after being incarcerated in 2003, Plaintiff was

placed on a 60-day work release program and was required to undergo substance abuse

counseling and perform community service for four hours a day. (Tr. at 33.) The ALJ stated

that this work activity occurred 2-3 days a week and lasted for two years, indicating that

when sober Plaintiff can sustain a work routine. (Tr. at 33.) The ALJ noted that “with her

DA&A in remission, [Plaintiff’s] [Global Assessment of Functioning] has consistently been

estimated to be 50 or higher (exhibit 53F).” (Tr. at 34.)

The ALJ also considered findings made by the State agency reviewing physicians and

consultants (Tr. at 434-447; 448-465; 556-559; 574-578; 643-660; 1005-1008; 1009-1022)

regarding the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s impairments. (Tr. at 34.) Specifically, the

ALJ stated that in February and October of 2002, State agency psychologist Jane George,

Ph.D., determined that unless sobriety is attained, Plaintiff will not be competitively

functional. (Tr. at 34.) The ALJ found that this same consultant concluded that if Plaintiff

were sober, she could complete a 40-hour work week satisfactorily. (Tr. at 34.) The record

contains a report submitted by a second medical consultant (signature not legible) who

reviewed Dr. George’s October 2002 psychiatric review technique form evaluation. (Tr. at

574-578.) The reviewer agreed with Dr. George’s overall opinion. (Tr. at 577.)

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The ALJ also examined the findings of State agency psychiatrist Wayne F. Winn,

M.D. (Tr. at 34.) Dr. Winn found that Plaintiff’s affective disorder met the criteria for

sections 12.04 and 12.09 of the Listing of Impairments. (Tr. at 34.) Dr. Winn opined,

however, that “[t]here is no evidence to support a disabling mental impairment in a sober

state.” (Tr. at 446.) Likewise, State agency psychologist Larry Waldman, Ph.D., (Tr. at 643-

660), concluded in June of 2003, that Plaintiff was disabled, but that the disability was

“definitely” due to alcohol addiction. (Tr. at 659.)

In October of 2003, approximately seven months after Plaintiff’s sobriety, State

agency psychologist Francis A. Enos, Ph.D., opined that Plaintiff had no or only “mild”

limitations in work-related mental activities. (Tr. at 34.)

With respect to the opinions and assessments of each State agency consultant, the ALJ

determined that “[t]aken together, these opinions are assigned substantial weight because

they are consistent with the general weight of the medical evidence and findings [set forth

in her decision].” (Tr. at 34.)

The ALJ makes several references to Plaintiff’s hospital records, which consistent

with the State agency reviewing physicians and consultants, illustrate a history of alcohol

abuse (Tr. at 532, 854, 862, 873, 962, 975) and support the inference of non-disabling

limitations if Plaintiff stopped drinking. For example, the ALJ stated:

The medical evidence of record shows [that Plaintiff] was admitted to the

hospital on December 31, 2000. She was diagnosed with alcohol dependency

syndrome and bipolar disorder. [Plaintiff] also was dehydrated and had

alcoholic lever disease. Her Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) was

estimated to be 35-45 (exhibit 11F). Since this time and March 2003,

[Plaintiff] had multiple hospital admissions for alcohol abuse/dependence. Her

medical record during this period also references numerous diagnoses of

bipolar disorder/depression (i.e. exhibit 17F). However, there is no evidence

of any severe mental impairment when [Plaintiff] is sober (See exhibit 48F).

(Tr. at 32.) The record also contains evidence that Plaintiff was not consistently compliant

with her psychiatric treatment and that, at least at times, her not being compliant with her

medications was associated with drinking. (Tr. at 279, 470, 497, 520, 524.) For instance,

a December 2000 hospital record stated, “[c]onsequences from alcohol abuse include

difficulty with compliance with bipolar medication,” and that Plaintiff felt so well on her

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medications that she stopped taking them. (Tr. at 279.) When her symptoms flared up, she

began drinking. (Tr. at 279.) An October 2004 report indicated that Plaintiff had a “history

of sporadic compliance with her medications and clinical appointments. Her alcohol abuse

has been a factor as well.” (Tr. at 1050.)

These examples demonstrate that Plaintiff’s alcohol abuse exacerbated her mental

symptoms. As exemplified on one occasion in September 2002, Plaintiff’s discharge

notations indicated “decrease in depressed [symptoms][,] no longer intoxicated[,] completed

detox[,] petition dropped[.]” (Tr. at 522.)

In sum, while the Court accepts that Plaintiff had limitations, she has not demonstrated

that her limitations would be disabling in the absence of alcohol use. To the contrary, the

evidence indicates that if Plaintiff stopped using alcohol her mental deficits would not be

disabling. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that alcohol use is a material

contributing factor is supported substantial evidence.

B. Whether the ALJ erred by: (1) finding Plaintiff’s impairments not

“severe” within the meaning of the regulations after March 2003; (2) rejecting

the treating psychiatrist’s assessment; and (3) relying on assessments of nontestifying non-examining State agency physicians

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in finding that she suffered no severe impairments

in the absence of alcoholism – a finding reached only by improperly rejecting her treating

psychiatrist’s assessment and relying the opinions of the State agency reviewing physicians

and consultants.

“The Social Security Regulations and Rulings, as well as case law applying them,

discuss the ... severity determination in terms of what is ‘not severe.’” Smolen v. Chater, 80

F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a)). Consistent

with the Commissioner’s own ruling, SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 (1985), “courts have

imposed a narrow construction upon the severity regulation ... .” Yuckert v. Bowen, 841

F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). “An impairment or combination of

impairments may be found ‘not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality

that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.’” Webb v.

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Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290) (emphasis

original); see Yuckert, 841 F.2d at 306.

Plaintiff points to the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Sonia Godbole, M.D., to

show that she had limitations that “far exceed[ed] the de minimis test of step two.”

It is well established in this Circuit that a treating physician’s opinions are entitled to

special weight, because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity

to know and observe the patient as an individual. See McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599,

602 (9th Cir. 1989). “The treating physician’s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive

as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d

at 751. The weight given a treating physician’s opinion depends on whether it is supported

by sufficient medical data and is consistent with other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1527(d)(2). If the treating physician’s opinion is uncontroverted by another doctor,

it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). Where, as

here, the treating physician’s opinion is controverted, it may be rejected only if the ALJ

makes findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are based on the substantial

evidence of record. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647

(9th Cir. 1987).

The ALJ noted that Dr. Godbole provided a medical source statement dated February

3, 2005, and that she had been seeing Plaintiff once a month for 15 months primarily for

medication refills. (Tr. at 34.) In her assessment, Dr. Godbole found that Plaintiff had

“moderate” impairment in deterioration of personal habits; understanding, carrying out, and

remembering instructions; responding appropriately to supervision; and performing simple

or repetitive tasks. (Tr. at 1097-1098.) Dr. Godbole also found that Plaintiff suffered

“moderately severe” limitation in abilities to relate to other people; restriction of daily

activities; constriction of interests; ability to respond appropriately to co-workers; ability to

respond to customary work pressures; and ability to perform complex or varied tasks. (Tr.

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at 1097-1098.) As set forth by the ALJ, Dr. Godbole opined that Plaintiff was having trouble

maintaining employment due to her mental impairments. (Tr. at 34.)

The ALJ concluded, however, that Dr. Godbole based her assessments on Plaintiff’s

own statements of symptoms related to her alcohol abuse – not on her own professional

observations of Plaintiff’s behavior and general medical condition. (Tr. at 34.) As an

example, Dr. Godbole’s writes in her notes that “[Plaintiff] states she has anxiety, vomiting

[and] headaches when working” and “states she was sleeping 12 hrs/night [and] keeping to

herself when did work briefly.” (Tr. at 1098) (Emphasis added.)

The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff’s description of her symptoms after March 1,

2003, was not consistent with her own counselor’s notes indicating that Plaintiff was ready

for employment and ready to live independently in June/July 2003. (Tr. at 34.) The ALJ

cites specifically to a report issued by Plaintiff’s case manager, Susan Tingley, who found

that although “[Plaintiff] was frustrated about the process she must go through to obtain

housing ... [s]he was presenting well and is ready to get a job and her own place. She has

never lived by herself before and is nervous at the thought of it but still excited. ... [Plaintiff]

will be released 7/2/03 from jail and begin[s] looking for a job at that time.” (Tr. at 702.)

The record contains several reports from Ms. Tingley in mid-July of 2003 stating, “[Plaintiff]

was in a good mood and presenting well. She had applied for a job earlier in the day and had

an interview. ... [Plaintiff] is still looking for a job independently. She has not drank for

several months. ... [Plaintiff] has actively been looking for a job. She has had several

interviews and a couple second interviews.” (Tr. at 678-679.)

In evaluating and ultimately rejecting Dr. Bodbole’s opinion, the ALJ also relied on

the assessments of the State agency consultants. Plaintiff complains that the ALJ erred by

relying on the assessments of the State agency consultants because they did not testify at the

hearing, they did not offer explanations for their conclusions, and they did not articulate a

review of all the evidence of record. Plaintiff, however, ignores the Commissioner’s

regulations, which specifically acknowledge the expertise and importance of the State agency

consultants’ assessments. See 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1527(f)(2)(i) (State agency psychological

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consultants are highly qualified physicians who are experts in Social Security disability). As

set forth previously in this decision, a psychiatrist (Dr. Winn) and three psychologists (Drs.

George, Waldman, and Enos), as well as a fifth reviewing medical consultant, all essentially

reached the same conclusion – that Plaintiff was disabled due primarily to alcoholism and

that, if sober, she could work. (Tr. at 34.)

For example, and as previously illustrated, the ALJ noted that State agency

psychologist Dr. Enos opined in October 2003, after several months of Plaintiff’s sobriety,

that Plaintiff had only “mild” limitations. (Tr. at 34, 1009-1022.) Dr. Enos stated that

“[Plaintiff] has worked as secretary [and] still retains intellectual [and] social skills necessary

for similar work. She can do personal planning[,] interact with peers[,] public[,] [and]

supervisors [and] work within a routine work week[.]” (Tr. at 1007.)

The opinions and assessments of the State agency reviewing physicians and

consultants were supported by other evidence. Not only did the ALJ find that Plaintiff was

“presenting well” and “ready to get a job” in June 2003, according to the Value Options case

manager’s note (Tr. at 32, 702), but Plaintiff was taking classes as part of her treatment (Tr.

at 1083) and indicated that she wanted to further her education and career; she was looking

at the highest paying positions. (Tr. at 1054, 1055.) There is also evidence that Plaintiff was

able to take care of daily living activities; she cooked, cleaned, shopped, and at times, cared

for her mother who was ill. (Tr. at 1053, 1054.) A counselor even indicated that Plaintiff

was capable of accessing services; “[i]f she does not feel she is being heard she has contacted

customer service to deal with any issues. She is aware of her rights as a consumer and has

utilized the grievance and appeals process in more than one system.” (Tr. at 1053.)

In addition, since stopping alcohol, many of Plaintiff’s mental status examinations and

appearance/presentation were intact, despite some persisting symptoms. (Tr. at 678-679,

707, 712, 715, 1045, 1064, 1083, 1086.) Not only did Ms. Tingley report that Plaintiff was

“in a good mood and presenting well” (Tr. at 679), but in May 2004, Plaintiff’s appearance

was good, she was alert, oriented, and cooperative with intact memory and judgment. (Tr.

at 1064.) Despite a depressed mood and blunted affect, her speech and motor activities were

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normal, and she denied psychotic symptoms. (Tr. at 1064.) In December 2004, Plaintiff’s

appearance was good, she was alert and cooperative, and her speech and activities were

normal. (Tr. at 1045.) Her affect was appropriate, her memory and judgment were intact,

and she denied psychotic symptoms. (Tr. at 1045.)

The Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s impairments were not

“severe” within the meaning of the Regulations and case law of this Circuit after March 2003

was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons

for rejecting Dr. Godbole’s assessment and properly relied on the opinions of the State

agency consultants as well as the other evidence of record. The ALJ’s finding, as one

reasonable interpretation, must be upheld. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th

Cir. 2001).

C. Whether the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff’s “subjective complaints

and allegations are embellished and exaggerated and, therefore, not credible”

without providing clear and convincing reasons

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in finding that her subjective complaints were not

credible. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not support her findings by providing clear and

convincing reasons.

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750.

When deciding whether to accept the subjective testimony of a claimant, the ALJ must

perform a two-part analysis. In the first part, the claimant must (1) produce objective

medical evidence of one or more impairments; and (2) show that the impairment or

combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of

symptom. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. The claimant is not required to produce objective

medical evidence of the symptom itself, the severity of the symptom, or the causal

relationship between the medically determinable impairment and the symptom. See id. at

1282. Rather, the claimant is only required to show that the impairment could reasonably

have caused some degree of the symptom. See id.

In the second stage of the analysis, the ALJ must assess the credibility of the

claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the symptoms. If there is no affirmative

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evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony only if the ALJ makes

specific findings, stating clear and convincing reasons for the rejection. See id. at 1283-84.

To determine whether the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her

symptoms is credible, the ALJ may consider, for example: (1) ordinary

techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying,

prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony

by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately

explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of

treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. In evaluating the credibility

of the symptom testimony, the ALJ must also consider the factors set out in

SSR 88-13. 

Id. (internal citations omitted).

“Where ... the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an

allegation ... and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role

is not to second-guess that decision.” Morgan v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169

F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

In concluding that Plaintiff’s “subjective complaints and allegations [were]

embellished and exaggerated and, therefore, not credible,” the ALJ observed inconsistencies

between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, her own testimony, and the greater objective

record. (Tr. at 33-34.)

As stated previously, the ALJ noted that on April 1, 2003, Plaintiff told a Value

Options provider that she had quit drinking 45 days ago, but that on March 15, 2003, she

admitted to drinking a bottle of wine that morning. (Tr. at 33, 715, 719-720.) The ALJ also

found that Plaintiff was not consistently compliant with her medications. (Tr. at 34, 470,

497, 524, 771.) The Value Options evaluation dated October 2004 indicated that Plaintiff

had a history of sporadic compliance with medication and clinical appointments. (Tr. at

1050.) On the other hand, Plaintiff also admittedly demonstrated drug seeking behavior with

several trips to the emergency department and obtained prescriptions for narcotics from

different doctors. (Tr. at 1050, 669.)

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was able to attend to her daily activities

independently. (Tr. at 33, 1053-1054, 1059.) She was able to cook, clean, shop, pay her

bills, help her mother, attend church, and had looked for work and attended classes. (Tr. at

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664, 678-679, 702, 1053-1054, 1059, 1064, 1083.) Plaintiff had also worked at a food bank

four hours a day, 2-3 days a week “[o]ff and on for two years.” (Tr. at 33, 1114.)

Plaintiff argues that the factors noted by the ALJ do not detract from her credibility.

Evidence that Plaintiff has been untruthful and/or not compliant with treatment, however, is

directly relevant to credibility. Plaintiff also argues that she “admitted” her daily activities

and indicated that said activities are limited. Here, Plaintiff testified that she slept 3-4 hours

during the day, that she spent “a lot of time in bed,” and that she can only be out of the house

a certain amount of time before she almost got psychotic. (Tr. at 1106, 1113, 1116.)

Evidence of Plaintiff’s food bank work, her ability to do house chores, shop, attend church,

help her mother, and attend job interviews conflicts with Plaintiff’s testimony.

In summary, the ALJ provided a sufficient basis to find Plaintiff’s allegations not

credible, including: evidence of Plaintiff’s daily activities and inconsistencies between

Plaintiff's subjective complaints, her own testimony, and the greater objective record. While

perhaps the individual factors, viewed in isolation, are not sufficient to uphold the ALJ’s

decision to discredit Plaintiff’s allegations, each factor is relevant to the ALJ’s overall

analysis, and it was the cumulative effect of all the factors that led to the ALJ’s decision.

The Court concludes that the ALJ has supported her decision to discredit Plaintiff’s

allegations with specific, clear and convincing reasons and, therefore, the Court finds no

error.

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CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. Based

upon the foregoing discussion,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #12) is

DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. #16) is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2008.

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