Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07964/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07964-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARLEEM SWEETS, AKA STEVEN H. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS; SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT OF

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY; DEPUTY WELCH;

DEPUTIES JOHN DOE,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-07964 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Shawn Welch, the remaining Defendant in this case, has filed a

motion for summary judgment. Pro se Plaintiff Harleem Sweets (also

known as Steven H. Jones) opposes the motion. In an order dated

December 21, 2007, the Court ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss

and Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel and deferred

ruling on this motion to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to respond

to Defendant's discovery requests, to seek additional evidence to

support his opposition and to file an amended opposition to

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Defendant's motion. Plaintiff did not file an amended opposition.

The motion was decided on the papers. Having considered all of the

papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion

for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

As discussed in the Court's order on Defendant's motion to

dismiss, Plaintiff alleges that on August 13, 2006, while being

held in the Martinez detention facility, he rang the buzzer in his

cell to request medical attention for high blood pressure and bad

nerves exacerbated by the recent death of his mother. Complaint at

¶ 4. In response to Plaintiff's request for medical attention,

Welch entered Plaintiff's cell, handcuffed him with excessive

force, and assaulted him for asking for medical attention and

"because he was black." Complaint at ¶ 5, 6, 10. Welch hit

Plaintiff in the head, ribs, arms and legs with a billy club,

breaking his ribs. Complaint at ¶ 4, 5. Welch also ignored

Plaintiff's requests for medical attention, "banged" Plaintiff's

head against a wall and hit Plaintiff in the head with his fists. 

Id. Plaintiff was not provided with medical attention until the

assault was over. Complaint at ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that the

assault was filmed by security cameras and witnessed by at least

fifty other inmates and other deputies. Complaint at ¶ 4-6. 

Plaintiff claims that Welch "is a racist and doesn't like

blacks." Complaint at ¶ 5. Plaintiff also alleges that Welch

attempted to cover up his assault on Plaintiff by charging him with

"resisting arrest and disobeying an order" on the grounds that

Plaintiff's excessive ringing of the medical bell was disturbing

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the inmate dorm. Complaint at ¶ 6, 7. Welch then conspired with

the Hearing Officer and the other deputies at Plaintiff's

disciplinary hearing to prevent Plaintiff from calling any of the

other inmates who witnessed the assault to testify or presenting

evidence from the jail security cameras. Complaint at ¶ 6.

In an order dated February 15, 2007, the Court dismissed

Plaintiff's claims against the Contra Costa County Board of

Supervisors and the Sheriff's Department of Contra Costa County

with leave to amend and dismissed all of the claims against Welch

except the claim for use of excessive force, also with leave to

amend. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint. 

In a subsequent order dated December 21, 2007, the Court

denied Welch's motion to dismiss the remaining claim against him

based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies

available to him and denied Plaintiff's motion for appointment of

counsel. The December 21, 2007 order also deferred ruling on

Defendant's alternative motion for summary judgment in order to

allow Plaintiff to seek specific discovery and to respond to

Welch's request for admissions. In particular, Plaintiff claimed

that there existed a videotape recording of Welch beating him with

a billy club. The Court ordered County Counsel to produce any such

videotape or to file a certification that such tape does not exist. 

In addition, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to Welch's

requests for admissions and informed him that failure to do so

would result in the Court deeming the statements in that request

admitted. Finally, the Court allowed Plaintiff thirty days to file

an amended opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 

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On December 27, 2007, County Counsel filed the declaration of

Steve Simpkins, a Lieutenant in the Custody Services Bureau of the

Contra Costa Sheriff's Office. Simpkins declared, "As of August

13, 2006, and present to today, there are not security cameras

located within the cell block of Q module, which would have

captured or documented the incident between Harleem Sweets and

Deputy Shawn Welch." Simpkins Decl. ¶ 3. On February 6, 2008,

counsel for Welch filed a declaration stating that, on January 4,

2008, Plaintiff requested an additional copy of the Request for

Admissions and, on January 9, 2008, an additional copy was served

on him. Rettig Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. On February 11, 2008, more than

thirty days after the Court's previous order, Plaintiff filed a

declaration responding to Welch's request for admissions and

production of documents. Plaintiff did not file an amended

opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In the interest of

justice, the Court will consider the declaration even though it was

not timely filed. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment

because Plaintiff cannot prove a violation of his constitutional

rights. Further, Defendant argues that, even if there was such a

violation, Plaintiff's claim would be precluded by qualified

immunity. Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

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Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

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absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

A. Proof of Violation

To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must

prove two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

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1As stated in the Court's order granting the application to

proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing the claim in part,

Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was incarcerated pursuant to

a conviction or detained post-arraignment and therefore whether the

Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendment should apply to his claim. 

Because the Ninth Circuit applies Eighth Amendment standards to

both, the Court will consider Plaintiff's excessive force claim

under that constitutional provision.

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under the color of State law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988).

The treatment that a prisoner receives in prison and the

conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under

the Eighth Amendment.1

 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31

(1993). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment whenever: 

(1) the alleged deprivation is, objectively, sufficiently serious,

and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state

of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 297, 298 (1991). 

"After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment

forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 319 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670

(1977)). When prison officials stand accused of using excessive

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the deliberate

indifference standard is inappropriate. Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 6 (1992). Instead, the core judicial inquiry is whether

force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Id. at

6-7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. 

The Eighth Amendment does not require a specific intent to

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punish a specific individual. Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436,

1439 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the correct standard for determining

whether excessive force has been used in violation of the Eighth

Amendment "is whether the defendants applied force 'maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,' -- that is any

harm." Id. at 1441 (emphasis in original).

While the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one of the

factors to be considered in determining whether the use of force is

wanton and unnecessary, the absence of serious injury does not end

the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Whether the

alleged wrongdoing is objectively "harmful enough" to establish a

constitutional violation, see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991), is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of

decency. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). 

Such standards are always violated when prison officials

maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm whether or not

significant injury is evident. Id. at 8; see also Felix v.

McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1991) (it is not degree of

injury which makes out violation of Eighth Amendment but use of

official force or authority that is intentional, unjustified,

brutal and offensive to human dignity) (quoting Meredith v.

Arizona, 523 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1975)), cert. denied, 502 U.S.

1093 (1992). 

However, every malevolent touch by a prison guard does not

give rise to a federal cause of action. The Eighth Amendment's

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes

from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force. 

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Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10. The circuits are split regarding whether

a prisoner must prove that he suffered more than a de minimis

injury in order to prevail on an excessive force claim. Compare

Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that

"absence of objective proof of non-de minimis injury does not alone

warrant dismissal.") and Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th

Cir. 1993) ("No actual injury needs to be proven to state a viable

Eighth Amendment claim.") with Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924

(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that "a prisoner must have suffered from

the excessive force a more than de minimis injury") and Norman v.

Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (absent most

extraordinary circumstances plaintiff cannot prevail if his inury

is de minimis), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1114 (1995). The Ninth

Circuit has not addressed directly this issue. However, it has

suggested that a prisoner need not demonstrate more than de minimis

injury to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Oliver v Keller,

289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir 2002) (clarifying that adoption of the

physical injury standard under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) does not

require that "the injury must be more than de minimis").

Defendant argues that "[b]ecause the force used to restrain

Sweets was not applied maliciously and sadistically to purposely

cause harm, but instead was applied only in an effort to prevent

him from injuring Deputy Welch himself, Sweets cannot establish a

violation under the Eighth Amendment." Motion at 12. However,

this argument relies on Defendant's version of the facts. 

According to Plaintiff's declaration, Defendant grabbed Plaintiff

and hit him "in the face with his fist and . . . in the ribs with

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his Billy club numerous times" after Plaintiff asked him why he

wanted Plaintiff to stand up and be handcuffed. See Sweets Decl.,

Ex. E at ¶¶ 16-17. Further, Sweets declares that he did not resist

Welch. Id. at ¶ 21. Therefore, the Court finds that there is a

triable question of fact whether Defendant's use of force violated

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendant next argues that, even if Plaintiff is able to prove

a constitutional violation, Defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity. Again, this argument relies on Defendant's version of

the facts, including a finding that Plaintiff's "behavior indicated

an intent to fight with [Defendant] and also created a danger of

injury to [Defendant] and to [Plaintiff.]" Motion at 14. As

discussed above, Plaintiff's declaration describing the incident

clearly states that he did not resist Defendant. This is at direct

odds with Defendant's position. Therefore, the Court finds that

there remain triable questions with respect to Defendant's

qualified immunity defense.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion

for summary judgment (Docket No. 12). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 3/17/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARLEEM SWEETS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-07964 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 17, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Harleem Sweets

9305 Oscar Ave. #2

Oakland, CA 94603

Silvano Bruno Marchesi

Steven Patrick Rettig

Contra Costa County Counsel

651 Pine Street, 9th Floor

Martinez, CA 94553

Dated: March 17, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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