Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00271/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-00271-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COLTON JAMES ROOD,

Plaintiff,

v.

ISAAC LOCKWOOD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-00271-CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a 

declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 

initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 

Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 

the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 

exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

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I. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 

U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

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II. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff, along with two other named county jail inmates, filed this civil rights action 

against eight individual deputies at the Shasta County Detention Facility.1 The complaint 

generally alleges that “each plaintiff was beat without cause by one or more of the defendants 

named...” on unspecified dates. ECF No. 1 at 5. In claim two of the complaint, plaintiffs 

contend that they have been sexually assaulted and harassed by these same deputies. ECF No. 1 

at 6. Plaintiffs further assert in claim three that “[e]ach defendant has conspired within their 

professional capacity... to harass, intimidate, and assault the plaintiffs...” by filing false rule 

violation reports against plaintiffs and destroying their personal property. ECF No. 1 at 8. By 

way of relief, plaintiffs request compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 9. 

III. Legal Standards

A. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 

Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional 

right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 

deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

1 As a pro se litigant, plaintiff is prohibited from bringing his claims as a class action. See Russell 

v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating that “[a] litigant appearing in propria 

persona has no authority to represent anyone other than himself.”); Axtle v. Cty. of Alameda, 

Case No. C 12-6404 YGR (PR), 2013 WL 5979201, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013) (emphasizing 

that “pro se plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives able to fairly represent and adequately 

protect the interests of the class.”). Therefore, plaintiff is cautioned that if he chooses to file an 

amended complaint, he may only bring claims on his own behalf.

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B. Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. “[T]he unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth 

Amendment.” Whitely v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “The Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition 

de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2010) (quoting Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, (1992)) (internal quotations omitted).

However, not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of 

action. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). In 

determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, courts may evaluate the extent 

of the prisoner’s injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and 

the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any 

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth 

Amendment inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of 

force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 

(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is the use of force rather than 

the resulting injury which ultimately counts. Id. at 1178.

C. Sexual Assault and Harassment

Prisoner sexual assault claims fall within the same legal framework as excessive force 

claims. While “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that sexual harassment may constitute a 

cognizable claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, the Court has specifically differentiated 

between sexual harassment that involves verbal abuse and that which involves allegations of 

physical assault, finding the lat[t]er to be in violation of the constitution.” Minifield v. Butikofer, 

298 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citation omitted). 

D. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need 

Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 

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violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000).

In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 

plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 

condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 

at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60.

Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 

“must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 

showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 

difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 

a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 

treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 

(9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 

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medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 

indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 

prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 

known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

E. Retaliation

Prison officials generally cannot retaliate against inmates for exercising First Amendment 

rights. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). Because a prisoner’s First 

Amendment rights are necessarily curtailed, however, a successful retaliation claim requires a 

finding that “the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the 

correctional institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Id. at 532. 

The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional 

goals for the conduct of which he complains. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995).

Also, in order to state a claim for retaliation, plaintiff must point to facts indicating a causal 

connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). 

IV. Analysis

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is 

unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. 

Further, the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair 

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. 

Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 

particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. Id. Here, 

plaintiff does not set forth a “short and plain statement” of his claims to demonstrate individual 

defendants were directly and personally involved in inflicting the alleged injury. See Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676. Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed based on plaintiff’s failure to comply 

with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The court will, however, grant plaintiff leave to 

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file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 

specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

V. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order

Also pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and 

temporary restraining order. ECF No. 4. In his motion, plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining 

order preventing defendants from performing “a cell extraction, search, or in applying any 

mechanical or other restraintive [sic] application/device without video surveillance documenting 

the event with a continuously unobstructed view....” ECF No. 4 at 1. He also seeks an order 

preventing the named defendants from “provoking an inmate with words or actions; falsifying 

[sic] reports..., involving or informing non-medical staff of an inmates’ personal healthcare 

information..., searching the cell of a pretrial detainee..., or seizing an inmates [sic] property 

without first providing a receipt.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff also specifically requests that defendants be 

ordered not to come within 30 feet of him or the other named plaintiffs in this action. Id. at 3. 

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court 

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may impose without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the 

movant “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The 

purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a fuller 

hearing. The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is essentially the same as that for 

issuing a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 

839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary 

injunctions is “substantially identical”).

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [(1)] that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, [(2)] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, [(3)] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [(4)] that an injunction is 

in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations 

omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that “ ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance 

of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary 

injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and 

that the injunction is in the public interest,” even if the moving party cannot show that he is likely 

to succeed on the merits. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2011). However, under either formulation of the principles, preliminary injunctive relief should 

be denied if the probability of success on the merits is low. Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of 

Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (“‘[E]ven if the balance of hardships tips 

decidedly in favor of the moving party, it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there is 

a fair chance of success on the merits.’” (quoting Martin v. Int'l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 

675 (9th Cir. 1984))).

In this case, plaintiff cannot show that he has a likelihood of success on the merits because 

the complaint is being dismissed with leave to amend. Nor does plaintiff demonstrate that he is 

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary restraining order. Plaintiff is 

further advised that a request for a preliminary injunction is also premature insofar as no 

defendant has been served. Zepeda v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 

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F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal 

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to 

determine the rights of persons not before the court.”). For all these reasons, plaintiff’s motion 

for a preliminary injunction is denied.

VI. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party

The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 

intended as legal advice. 

The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and concluded that you do not 

link any of the alleged constitutional violations to the individual defendants or provide sufficient 

facts to state a constitutional violation. This problem may be fixable so you are being given the 

chance to file an amended complaint within 30 days from the date of this order if you so choose.

If you do file an amended complaint, you can only bring claims own behalf, not on behalf of 

other prisoners. In addition, because there is no cognizable claim in the complaint, your motion 

for a preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order is being denied.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Sheriff of Shasta County

filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order (ECF No. 4) 

is denied. 

4. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

5. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 

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number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 

be dismissed.

Dated: April 22, 2020

12/rood0271.screening+TRO.docx

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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