Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05195/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05195-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 25, 2015 Decided September 6, 2016

No. 14-5195

SCENIC AMERICA, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00093)

Daniel H. Lutz argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs was Hope M. Babcock. Thomas M. 

Gremillion entered an appearance.

William D. Brinton was on the brief for amici curiae The 

American Planning Association, et al. in support of petitioner. 

Jeffrey E. Sandberg, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for federal appellees. With him on 

the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney at the 

time the brief was filed, and Mark R. Freeman, Attorney.

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Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for 

intervenor-appellee Outdoor Advertising Association of 

America, Inc. With him on the brief was Allison B. Jones.

Before: PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: The Highway Beautification 

Act (“HBA”), 23 U.S.C. § 131, requires the Federal Highway 

Administration (“FHWA”) and each state to develop and 

implement individual federal-state agreements (“FSAs”), 

detailing, among other things, “size, lighting and spacing” 

standards for the billboards now found towering over many of 

our country’s interstate highways. One of those adopted 

standards, included in most states’ FSAs, prohibits those 

states from erecting any billboard with “flashing, intermittent 

or moving” lights (the “FSA lighting standards”). 

Plaintiff-Appellant Scenic America is a non-profit 

organization which “seeks to preserve and improve the visual 

character of America’s communities and countryside.” 

Compl. ¶ 7, J.A. 10. It challenges a guidance memorandum 

issued by the FHWA in 2007, which interpreted that 

prohibition on “flashing, intermittent or moving” lights to 

permit state approval of those digital billboards that met 

certain timing and brightness requirements. Scenic argues 

that the guidance memorandum must be invalidated because it 

(1) was not promulgated using notice-and-comment 

procedures, and (2) violates the HBA, and was therefore 

promulgated “contrary to law” in violation of § 706 of the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et 

seq.

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We hold that we lack jurisdiction to hear Scenic’s 

notice-and-comment claim because Scenic has failed to 

demonstrate that it has standing to bring that challenge, and 

deny its § 706 claim on the merits. 

I.

A.

In 1965, Congress enacted the Highway Beautification 

Act to control “the erection and maintenance of outdoor 

advertising signs, displays, and devices in areas adjacent to 

the Interstate System . . . in order to protect the public 

investment in such highways, to promote the safety and 

recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural 

beauty.” 23 U.S.C. § 131(a). The HBA penalizes those 

states that fail to maintain “effective control” over their 

advertising signs by permitting the Secretary of 

Transportation to reduce their federal highway funds by ten 

percent. Id. § 131(b). 

To maintain effective control, each state is required to, 

among other things, negotiate an FSA with the Secretary that 

establishes standards for the “size, lighting and spacing” of 

billboards that come within 660 feet of the Interstate. Id.

§ 131(d). The HBA requires that those standards be 

“consistent with customary use.” Id. All fifty states 

entered into such FSAs, most of which were written in the 

1960s and 1970s. See Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Transp. (Scenic II), 49 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2014). 

FHWA regulations, promulgated under the HBA, require that 

states “[d]evelop laws, regulations, and procedures” that 

implement the standards contained in each state’s FSA. 23 

C.F.R. § 750.705(h). States must submit these laws, 

regulations, and procedures to the FHWA’s regional offices, 

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known as Division Offices, for approval. Id. § 750.705(j). 

The FHWA has one Division Office located in each state.

Although each of the FSAs was individually negotiated, 

most contain similar terms. Nearly all of the FSAs contain a 

prohibition against “flashing,” “intermittent,” and “moving” 

lights. See, e.g., J.A. 120 (New York FSA); J.A. 131 

(Colorado FSA); J.A. 139 (North Carolina FSA). 

As billboard technology changed, states began 

considering or passing laws that permitted digital billboards to 

be displayed along the Interstate. See, e.g., J.A. 422-23 

(letter from Indiana Department of Transportation to Indiana 

FHWA Division Office informing the Division Office that 

Indiana had passed a law permitting certain digital 

billboards); J.A. 424 (letter from the Indiana FHWA Division 

Office to the Indiana Department of Transportation 

acknowledging the letter and agreeing that the digital 

billboards discussed in Indiana’s previous letter “do[] not 

constitute flashing, intermittent or moving lights”); J.A. 437 

(letter from Arkansas Highway Commission to Arkansas 

FHWA Division Office noting new regulations permitting 

digital billboards); J.A. 183 (United States Department of 

Transportation memorandum discussing digital billboard in 

Nebraska). These billboards, sometimes referred to as 

“commercial electronic variable message signs” (“CEVMS”), 

typically use LED lights to display a static advertisement that 

remains on the screen for a specified period of time before 

quickly transitioning to a different static advertisement. 

Advertisements typically remain visible for around ten 

seconds, and usually take approximately two seconds to 

transition to the next ad. 

The FHWA’s Division Offices differed on whether 

digital billboards complied with the FSA lighting standards. 

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Compare, e.g., J.A. 424 (Indiana Division Office agreeing 

that digital billboards “do[] not constitute flashing, 

intermittent or moving lights”), with, e.g., J.A. 263 (Texas

Division Office stating that “[w]hile the technology for LED 

displays did not exist at the time of the [FSA], the wording in 

the [FSA] clearly prohibits such signs”). In 2007, the 

national FHWA office weighed in. It issued to its Division 

Offices a memorandum entitled “Guidance on Off-Premise 

Changeable Message Signs” (the “Guidance” or “2007 

Guidance”), a portion of which stated as follows: 

Proposed laws, regulations, and procedures that would 

allow permitting CEVMS subject to acceptable criteria 

(as described below) do not violate a prohibition against 

“intermittent” or “flashing” or “moving” lights as those 

terms are used in the various FSAs that have been 

entered into during the 1960s and 1970s.

J.A. 535. The FHWA went on to identify those “acceptable 

criteria” based on “certain ranges of acceptability that have 

been adopted in those States that do allow CEVMS.” J.A.

534, 537 (recommending, among other things, that each 

display generally remain static for between four and ten 

seconds, and transition to a new display in one to four

seconds). 

According to a survey the FHWA distributed to states 

shortly before issuing the 2007 Guidance, many states with 

FSAs that included a ban on intermittent, flashing, or moving 

lights permitted digital billboards before the FHWA issued 

the Guidance. J.A. 531-32. The Division Office for at 

least two states, Texas and Kentucky, did not permit digital 

billboards prior to the 2007 Guidance. See Scenic Am., Inc. 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (Scenic I), 983 F. Supp. 2d 170, 

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179-80 (D.D.C. 2013). After the Guidance, Texas began to 

permit the use of digital billboards. Lloyd Decl. ¶ 9, J.A. 41.

B.

Scenic brought this suit against the United States 

Department of Transportation, the federal executive 

department responsible for implementation of the HBA; the 

FHWA, which promulgated the 2007 Guidance; Ray LaHood, 

the Secretary of Transportation at the time; and Victor 

Mendez, the Administrator of FHWA at the time. Scenic did 

not include any of the FHWA’s Division Offices in this suit. 

Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc. (“OAAA”)

intervened as a defendant shortly after Scenic brought suit.

Scenic’s suit alleges two claims relevant to this appeal: 

(1) the 2007 Guidance constitutes a legislative, not 

interpretive rule, thus violating § 553 of the APA, because it 

was not promulgated using notice-and-comment procedures; 

and (2) the Guidance violates § 706 of the APA because it 

creates a new lighting standard that is not “consistent with 

customary use,” as required by the HBA.1

 Compl. ¶¶ 48-53, 

57-62, J.A. 17-19. 

The FHWA and the OAAA (collectively “Defendants”)

moved to dismiss, contending that Scenic lacked standing, 

and that the court lacked jurisdiction over the Guidance 

 1 Scenic abandoned a third claim on appeal – that the Guidance 

improperly creates new lighting standards, in contravention of the 

procedures for creating new standards set forth in the HBA. See 

Br. for Defendants-Appellees [hereinafter “FHWA Br.”], Scenic 

Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., No. 14-5195 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 

2015), Doc. No. 1538780, at 16 & n.7.

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because it did not constitute final agency action under the 

APA. Scenic I, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 172-73. The District 

Court denied Defendants’ motion as to both claims. Id.

Relevant to our decision here, the District Court held, at 

the motion to dismiss stage, that Scenic’s requested relief 

would redress its harm because “vacating the Guidance would 

return the FHWA to agnosticism on the question [of 

permitting digital billboards], leaving Division Offices free to 

draw their own conclusions.” Id. at 181. According to the 

District Court, this would prevent Scenic from “hav[ing] to 

police as intensively new digital-billboard construction 

around the country.” Id.

Defendants later moved for summary judgment, and the 

District Court granted the motions, finding that the Guidance 

was not subject to notice-and-comment requirements because 

it was an interpretive, not legislative rule, and that it did not 

violate the “consistent with customary use” provision of the 

HBA. Scenic II, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 59-71. Defendants, in 

their summary judgment briefing below, did not again 

challenge Scenic’s standing, and the District Court did not 

discuss Scenic’s standing in its written Opinion granting 

Defendants’ summary judgment motions. 

II.

We begin, as we must, by addressing our jurisdiction to 

review Scenic’s appeal. Because Scenic must demonstrate its 

standing separately as to each of the two claims it brings on 

appeal, see Catholic Soc. Serv. v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1123, 1125 

(D.C. Cir. 1994), we find that, although Scenic has standing to 

bring its claim concerning FHWA’s alleged § 706 violation, 

Scenic has failed to demonstrate it has standing to bring its 

notice-and-comment claim. 

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A.

As has been expressed time and time again, “[f]ederal

courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only 

the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution 

and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” 

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 

(1986). As Chief Justice Marshall observed, “[i]f the 

judicial power extended to every question under the 

constitution it would involve almost every subject proper for 

legislative discussion and decision [and] if to every question 

under the laws and treaties of the United States it would 

involve almost every subject on which the executive could 

act.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341

(2006) (quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95 (C. Cullen 

ed. 1984)) (emphases omitted). Thus, without studious 

adherence to the metes and bounds of our jurisdiction as 

imposed by Article III, Chief Justice Marshall warned that 

“the other departments [of the government] would be 

swallowed up by the judiciary.” Id. The standing 

requirements of Article III are therefore grounded in respect 

for the separation of powers tenets that are the foundation of

our system of government, Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 

Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 

464, 471-74 (1982), and they help “prevent the judicial 

process from being used to usurp the powers of the political 

branches,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 

1146 (2013). Observing our Article III limitations is 

therefore always important, and particularly so in a case such 

as this, where we are asked to invalidate an action of the 

Executive branch.

The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” 

requires that a plaintiff demonstrate three elements: (1) injury 

in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defs.

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of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “The party 

invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing 

these elements”; “each element must be supported in the same 

way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the 

burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence 

required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. at 

561. 

Thus, the plaintiff must meet this burden at the outset of 

each phase. “At the pleading stage, general factual 

allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct 

may suffice . . . .” Id. And a court’s determination that a 

plaintiff has established standing at the motion to dismiss 

stage by alleging sufficient facts in her pleadings is only the 

first step, because that finding does not obviate the court’s 

responsibility to ensure that the plaintiff can actually prove

those allegations when one or both parties seek summary 

judgment. So even where the court denies a motion to 

dismiss based on lack of standing, “[i]n response to a 

summary judgment motion, . . . the plaintiff can no longer 

rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit 

or other evidence specific facts [establishing standing].” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

2 If, upon review of the 

 2 Our treatment of standing in cases that come to us directly on 

administrative review is instructive. Because these petitions for 

administrative review bypass the district court and come to us 

directly, we treat them as a district court would in deciding a 

motion for summary judgment. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 

895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In Sierra Club, we held, “mindful of 

our independent obligation to be sure of our jurisdiction,” that the 

petitioner there had failed to establish its burden as to standing. 

Id. at 898, 902. We explained that “[t]he petitioner’s burden of 

production in the court of appeals is . . . the same as that of a 

plaintiff moving for summary judgment in the district court: it must 

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evidence, the court determines that the plaintiff has not 

introduced sufficient evidence into the record to at least raise 

a disputed issue of fact as to each element of standing, the 

court has no power to proceed and must dismiss the case. 

See, e.g., Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148-49 (dismissing case 

where plaintiff did not raise an issue of fact as to standing at 

summary judgment). 

In addition, “every federal appellate court has a special 

obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but 

also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.’” 

Bender, 475 U.S. at 541 (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 

U.S. 237, 244 (1934)). If we determine that the District 

Court was without jurisdiction, then “we have jurisdiction on 

appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of 

correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the 

suit.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 

95 (1998) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 

520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997)).

We review the District Court’s decision (or lack thereof) 

as to standing de novo, Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. 

Automated Printing Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 

2003), and hold that Scenic has not met its burden of 

 

support each element of its claim to standing ‘by affidavit or other 

evidence.’” Id. at 899 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561). 

Just as we must ensure our jurisdiction over petitions brought to us 

directly, so too must the district court assure itself of its jurisdiction 

before assessing a summary judgment motion on the merits. 

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establishing its standing to bring its notice-and-comment 

claim.

3

 3 The FHWA challenged Scenic America’s standing at the motion 

to dismiss stage, and though the District Court held in favor of 

Scenic, it noted that the issue “presents difficult and close 

questions.” Scenic I, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 172. When the FHWA

later moved for summary judgment, therefore, Scenic was already 

on notice that its standing might be questioned on appeal, at which 

time the record would be closed. Scenic therefore cannot claim to 

have been deprived of a fair and “full opportunity to make a record 

of [its] standing in the district court.” Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. 

Jewell, 790 F.3d 235, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Scenic should have 

accompanied its summary judgment materials with evidence of its 

standing. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 897

(1990) (“[A] litigant’s failure to buttress its position because of 

confidence in the strength of that position is always indulged in at 

the litigant’s own risk.”).

Because the plaintiff has the burden to establish the evidentiary 

basis for its standing at the summary judgment stage in every case, 

just as it has the burden to plead sufficient facts at the motion to 

dismiss stage in every case, the District Court may wish to consider 

amending its local rules to provide that the plaintiff include its 

evidentiary basis for standing in the statement of material facts that 

every party is required to file either in support of, or in opposition 

to, a motion for summary judgment. See Civil Local Rule 7(h)(1). 

Such a rule would ensure that the plaintiff is on notice of its 

obligation to present such evidence, make the District Court’s job 

much easier (as well as ours), and function similarly to our Circuit 

Rule 28(a)(7), which we adopted after our ruling in Sierra Club.

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B.

1.

Scenic’s notice-and-comment claim turns on the 

redressability prong of Article III standing. Scenic asserts 

that the 2007 Guidance forced certain FHWA Division 

Offices to reinterpret the FSA lighting standards – that 

billboards may not contain “flashing, intermittent or moving” 

lights – so that those offices would thereafter find the FSA 

language to permit, rather than bar, digital billboards. 

Scenic claims that this alleged change of position made it 

easier for states to erect digital billboards, because they no 

longer had to worry about being prevented from doing so by 

the Division Offices. As a result, Scenic allegedly has to 

work harder, and thus spend greater resources, to fight these 

billboards – its injury in fact. Scenic claims that vacating the 

Guidance will redress that injury.

In this way, Scenic asserts injuries that stem not directly 

from the FHWA’s issuance of the 2007 Guidance, but from 

third parties not directly before the court – the Division Offices 

and the states. When “[t]he existence of one or more of the 

essential elements of standing” – in this case redressability –

“‘depends on the unfettered choices made by independent 

actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and 

legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to 

control or to predict,’” it becomes “‘substantially more 

difficult’ to establish” standing. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 

562 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 

(1989); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)); accord 

Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 

938 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “[M]ere ‘unadorned speculation’ as to 

the existence of a relationship between the challenged 

government action and the third-party conduct ‘will not suffice 

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to invoke the federal judicial power.’” Nat’l Wrestling, 366 

F.3d at 938 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 

U.S. 26, 44 (1976)).

Scenic’s complaint makes only two arguments concerning

the redressability of its notice-and-comment claim. First, it 

argues that if we vacate the 2007 Guidance, “Scenic America 

and its affiliate members would spend fewer resources 

combating new digital billboards.” Compl. ¶ 21, J.A. 12. 

This speaks to Scenic’s alleged organizational standing. See 

PETA v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (organizational standing “requires [an organizational 

plaintiff], like an individual plaintiff, to show actual or 

threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged 

illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable court 

decision” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, 

Scenic contends that if we vacate the 2007 Guidance, “digital 

billboards that injure Scenic America members would be 

subject to removal or an order to cease operating in a manner 

that violates the regulatory prohibition against intermittent 

lighting in billboard advertisements.” Compl. ¶ 21, J.A. 12. 

This speaks to Scenic’s representational standing. See Hunt v. 

Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) 

(recognizing “that an association has standing to bring suit on 

behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise 

have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks 

to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) 

neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 

participation of individual members in the lawsuit”). 

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2.

a.

Scenic has failed to demonstrate that our vacatur of the 

Guidance would redress its alleged organizational injury – that 

it is forced to expend greater resources fighting digital 

billboards because the 2007 Guidance makes it easier for states 

to erect such billboards. 

States are required to seek permission from the FHWA 

Division Offices before they permit the use of digital 

billboards. See 23 C.F.R. § 750.705(j). Prior to the FHWA’s 

issuance of the Guidance, those Offices could, and often did,

authorize that use, finding that it accorded with a given state’s 

FSA. Scenic has introduced no evidence into the record – as it 

must at summary judgment – establishing that if we were to 

vacate the Guidance, any Division Office would respond by 

preventing the state it oversees from erecting digital billboards; 

nor has Scenic submitted evidence establishing that states 

would successfully erect, or even seek to erect, fewer 

billboards. Without providing any indication that our vacatur 

of the Guidance will diminish the number of billboards Scenic 

has to fight, Scenic has failed to demonstrate that its requested 

remedy would prevent Scenic from having to expend the same 

amount of resources fighting these billboards.

A brief look at some of our previous decisions in this area 

reinforces the point. In National Wrestling, we assessed the 

standing of several associations representing men’s wrestling 

teams, some of whom had been cut from college athletic 

programs. 366 F.3d at 933. Department of Education

regulations, promulgated under Title IX, required college 

athletic programs to ensure that they provided equal athletic 

opportunities to both sexes, based in part on the resources that 

are devoted to various programs. Id. at 934-35. Plaintiffs did 

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not challenge those regulations. Instead, plaintiffs challenged 

a Department of Education interpretation of those regulations, 

which they claimed caused several athletic programs to 

eliminate their wrestling teams. Id. We held that plaintiffs 

lacked standing because they were unable to show that a 

favorable decision would redress their injuries. Id. at 938.

We noted that the “direct causes of appellants’ asserted 

injuries – loss of collegiate-level wrestling opportunities for 

male student-athletes – are the independent decisions of 

educational institutions.” Id. at 936-37. Even if we vacated 

the Department of Education’s interpretation, there was no 

indication that it would alter those institutions’ independent 

decisions to eliminate their wrestling teams. Id. at 939. 

Nothing in the Department’s interpretation required schools to 

eliminate their wrestling teams; schools did so in an attempt to 

ensure that they were distributing athletic resources equally – a 

requirement of Title IX more generally, irrespective of the 

interpretation that plaintiffs challenged. See id. at 939-40 

(asserting that “nothing but speculation suggest[ed] that 

schools would act any differently” if the court vacated the 

interpretation). We noted that plaintiffs would only meet 

standing requirements if they “took the position that 

gender-conscious elimination of men’s sports teams would be 

illegal in the absence of the challenged” interpretation, but that 

plaintiffs made no such claim. Id. at 941. Finally, we 

explained that the “possibility” that wrestling teams would 

have “better odds” if we vacated the Department’s 

interpretation “falls far short of the mark.” Id. at 942

(emphasis omitted).

We held similarly in Renal Physicians Ass’n v. United 

States Department of Health and Human Services. 489 F.3d 

1267 (D.C. Cir. 2007). That case involved the Stark Law, 

which limited the ability of a physician to refer a Medicare 

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patient to clinical laboratories with which the physician had a 

“financial relationship,” but permitted referrals where the 

physician’s only financial interest was the receipt of 

compensation at “fair market value.” Id. at 1269. The 

Department of Health and Human Services, which was 

authorized to promulgate regulations under the Law, created a 

“safe harbor” provision, describing two methods for 

demonstrating that a physician’s hourly rate was at fair market 

value. Id. at 1270. The Department also noted, however,

that the safe harbor was voluntary, and that health care 

providers could continue to establish fair market value through 

other methods. Id. at 1269-71. 

After a physicians’ association challenged the safe harbor 

provision under the APA, we held that plaintiff lacked 

standing because it failed to show that vacating the safe 

harbor provision would redress its members’ alleged injuries

– namely that the safe harbor provision caused them to be 

paid less for their services than would otherwise be the case. 

Id. at 1276-78. Because the safe harbor was merely one way 

that hospitals could determine “fair market value,” we noted 

that “it is ‘speculative,’ rather than ‘likely,’ that invalidating 

the safe harbor will somehow cause these facilities to pay 

more,” and that “[t]he effect (if any) of the safe harbor cannot 

be simply undone.” Id. at 1277. 

As in Renal Physicians, the FHWA created what is, in 

essence, a safe harbor provision regarding digital billboards. 

The 2007 Guidance made it clear that state laws and 

regulations regarding digital billboards meeting the 

specifications listed in the Guidance would not be rejected for 

violating the FSA lighting standards. Yet even after the 

Guidance, Division Offices can still approve state laws and 

regulations permitting billboards that fall outside those 

specifications, and they can still reject laws and regulations

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allowing billboards that meet those specifications, but that 

violate state FSAs for other reasons. The safe harbor created 

by the Guidance is voluntary in the same way as the safe 

harbor in Renal Physicians; Division Offices can rely on it to 

find certain billboards permissible, but those Offices can find 

those billboards permissible for other reasons as well. It is 

“speculative,” rather than “likely,” that invalidating the 

Guidance would stop any particular billboard from being 

constructed. Indeed, many states with FSAs that included a 

ban on intermittent, flashing, or moving lights permitted 

digital billboards prior to the 2007 Guidance. 

In sum, we cannot assume, without more, that vacating 

the Guidance would eliminate or lessen the construction of 

digital billboards. 

Scenic contends that because the Texas Division Office 

barred Texas from constructing digital billboards prior to the 

Guidance, vacating the Guidance would redress Scenic’s 

injuries, at least with respect to Texas. However, Scenic has 

introduced no evidence suggesting that Texas, or the Texas 

Division Office, would behave any differently in the absence 

of the 2007 Guidance. Scenic simply assumes, without any 

proof, that Texas will revert to its pre-Guidance position as 

soon as the Guidance is invalidated. 

Scenic’s assumption is nothing more than “unadorned 

speculation.” Simon, 426 U.S. at 44. Several other 

possibilities seem just as likely, were we to vacate the 2007 

Guidance. The Guidance may have focused the Texas 

Division Office on the fact that a majority of states had 

already determined that the FSA lighting standards permitted 

digital billboards. Knowing as much, Texas’s Division 

Office might be more inclined to “jump on the bandwagon” 

and permit such billboards going forward, even absent the 

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2007 Guidance. Or the Division Office might be persuaded 

to continue allowing digital billboards now that Texas has 

already issued permits for at least 150 of them, Lloyd Decl. 

¶ 9, J.A. 41. See Renal Physicians, 489 F.3d at 1278 (“[T]he 

word is already out, and therefore it is too late to reverse 

course. . . . [T]he undoing of the governmental action will 

not undo the harm, because the new status quo is held in place 

by other forces.”).

Scenic has introduced no evidence that would make any 

one of these possibilities more likely than another. 

Particularly given the difficulty of establishing standing based 

on the actions of third parties not before the Court, see Defs.

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562, Scenic’s lack of any evidentiary 

basis for its redressability contentions requires us to reject its 

standing as to its notice-and-comment claim.

As a final argument, Scenic relies on Village of Arlington 

Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 

U.S. 252 (1977), and contends that vacating the 2007 

Guidance would remove one of several barriers to Scenic’s 

anti-digital billboard efforts, and that this is sufficient for 

redressability purposes. However, Arlington Heights is 

inapposite here. 

As an initial matter, Arlington Heights involved a party 

directly harmed by the challenged action, not one harmed by 

the actions of a third party not before the Court. See id. at 

254. Moreover, Arlington Heights involved a developer’s 

challenge to a zoning ordinance that prevented it from 

building low-income housing. Id. at 255-58. The Supreme 

Court characterized the zoning ordinance as an “absolute 

barrier.” Id. at 261. Although the developer still needed to 

secure financing and qualify for federal subsidies, the 

challenged zoning ordinance ensured that the developer could 

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not proceed with its goal of constructing low-income housing. 

Id. at 261-62. A court decision to remove that barrier would 

redress the developer’s injury because a major impediment to 

the developer’s efforts would be eliminated.

Scenic has introduced no evidence showing that vacating 

the 2007 Guidance would remove an “absolute barrier” to its 

efforts. As we have already stated above, absent the 2007 

Guidance, states remain free to pursue digital billboard 

construction, and Division Offices remain free to permit such 

construction. Thus, Scenic has not established that 

invalidating the Guidance would improve or ease Scenic’s 

efforts in any way.4 

b.

Scenic’s representational standing claim fares no better. 

Scenic argues that vacating the 2007 Guidance will redress its 

members’ injuries because it will cause the digital billboards 

allegedly injuring those members to be removed. Compl. 

¶ 21, J.A. 12. Scenic came dangerously close to forfeiting this 

argument. See Huron v. Cobert, 809 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 

(D.C. Cir. 2016).

Presumably because the District Court had upheld 

Scenic’s standing at the motion to dismiss stage, and 

Defendants had not contested Scenic’s standing before the 

 4 Scenic did not argue that the FHWA’s failure to undertake notice 

and comment before promulgating the Guidance constitutes a 

procedural injury, and we express no opinion on such an argument. 

Although a party cannot forfeit a claim that we lack jurisdiction, it 

can forfeit a claim that we possess jurisdiction. See Huron v. 

Cobert, 809 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

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District Court at the summary judgment stage, Scenic did not 

address its standing in its opening brief on appeal. In their 

responding brief, however, the FHWA challenged anew 

Scenic’s standing. The FHWA contended that Scenic had 

offered “no basis for expecting that vacating the Guidance 

would cause any existing digital billboards to be dismantled.” 

See FHWA Br. 29. In reply, Scenic appeared to abandon the 

allegation. It repeated the FHWA’s contention and responded 

that “Plaintiff need only show that vacatur would reduce 

Plaintiff’s continuing injury of diverting limited resources to 

counteract billboard approvals.” Reply Br. for Appellant 10. 

Nonetheless, Scenic appears to have preserved its 

representational standing argument by painting it in a 

somewhat different light. It argues that the alleged injuries of 

one of its members – Nikki Laliberte – are “traceable to the 

Guidance” because the Guidance prohibits the Division 

Office in Minnesota, where Laliberte lives, from considering 

whether digital billboards violate the FSA lighting standards. 

See Reply Br. for Appellant 12. Scenic’s implication seems 

to be that vacating the Guidance might cause Minnesota’s 

Division Office to remove some digital billboards. Although 

Scenic’s argument is couched in terms of causation, 

“causation and redressability are closely related, and can be 

viewed as two facets of a single requirement.” Newdow v. 

Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1012 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, Scenic’s assertion is 

sufficient to preserve its representational standing claim. 

As we noted above, however, Scenic has introduced no 

evidence demonstrating that our vacatur of the Guidance 

would cause Division Offices or states to prohibit the 

construction of new digital billboards. See supra Part 

II.B.2.a. It is even less plausible, given Scenic’s complete 

lack of any evidentiary showing on the matter, that Division 

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Offices or states would require extant billboards to be 

dismantled. 

By neglecting to “set forth by affidavit or other evidence 

specific facts” establishing its representational standing, Defs.

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), Scenic has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate 

its representational standing to bring its notice-and-comment 

claim.

3.

Scenic does fare better, however – at least as to standing –

on its claim that the Guidance violated § 706, although barely.

a.

 In its complaint, Scenic alleges that FHWA’s actions, in 

promulgating the Guidance, are “arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, in 

violation of the APA.” Compl. ¶ 62, J.A. 19. That language 

appears to be taken from § 706(2)(A) of the APA, which sets 

forth the well-known “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and 

which would likely provide an effective cause of action for 

Scenic to challenge the FHWA’s alleged failure to comport 

with the HBA. Confusingly, however, Scenic does not cite 

§ 706 as part of its second claim, but rather cites § 553, the 

provision that concerns notice-and-comment rulemaking. See

id. ¶¶ 57-62, J.A. 18-19.

Construing the complaint liberally, as is sometimes 

appropriate, but cf. Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 

1098, 1104, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that although 

“the complaint – particularly a complaint filed by a pro se 

prisoner – should be construed liberally,” “the rule of liberal 

construction of complaints applies to factual allegations,” and 

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refusing to liberally construe a counseled plaintiff’s complaint 

so as to include new defendants (quoting Fletcher v. District of 

Columbia, 370 F.3d 1223, 1227 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2004))), it might 

be possible to construe Scenic’s complaint as having relied 

upon § 706 rather than, or in addition to, § 553. At oral 

argument, however, counsel for Scenic was specifically asked 

whether its second claim included a § 706 challenge to 

FHWA’s promulgation of the guidance, and Scenic’s counsel 

replied “no, we did not present that.” Counsel went on to state 

that to the extent it brought anything resembling an 

arbitrary-and-capricious challenge it did it through the 

“backdoor” of its notice-and-comment claim, specifically 

highlighting its argument that that the Guidance is a legislative 

rule because it is 180 degrees counter to the FSA text it alleged 

to be interpreting. Thus, it appears that Scenic disclaimed any 

arbitrary-and-capricious challenge to FHWA’s alleged failure 

to comport with the HBA. 

Nonetheless, during that same colloquy at oral argument, 

Scenic did state, with respect to its § 706 claim, that it “focused 

solely on the customary use provision, finding that it was 

contrary to law.” Giving Scenic the benefit of the doubt, 

Scenic’s papers and statements at oral argument are sufficient 

for us to eke out a § 706 claim. 

b.

Scenic has standing to bring such a § 706 claim. First, 

Scenic has offered sufficient evidence that it has suffered a 

representational injury in fact. The record at summary 

judgment demonstrates that at least one of its members, Nikki 

Laliberte, has suffered a concrete injury because a digital 

billboard near her home “generates a bright flash when its 

display transitions from one advertisement to another.” 

Laliberte Decl. ¶ 4, J.A. 52. She asserts that the billboard “has 

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marred the view from [her] home[],” and that she is “concerned 

that the billboard has negatively affected the value of [her] 

property.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 9, J.A. 52-53. This sort of harm to an 

individual’s property is sufficient to constitute a concrete 

injury in fact. See Idaho, By & Through Idaho Pub. Utils.

Comm’n v. ICC, 35 F.3d 585, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that 

a private landowner “suffers concrete injury if [her] property is 

despoiled”).

The causation and redressability prongs of our standing 

analysis are equally clear here. Scenic’s § 706 claim is that 

the Guidance runs afoul of the statute’s “customary use” 

requirement as that requirement has been interpreted in the 

FSAs. If we were to find for Scenic on the merits of its claim, 

a point we must assume for standing purposes, see LaRoque v. 

Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2011), we could only do 

so by effectively repudiating the FHWA’s interpretation of the 

FSAs. Repudiation would provide much more robust relief 

than vacatur. Not only would it prohibit the agency from 

relying on that interpretation in any future rulemakings, it 

would also require the agency to subject extant billboards to 

either removal or an order requiring those billboards to operate 

in a manner that does not violate the FSAs, for instance by 

keeping the image displayed by the billboard constant and 

unchanging. Scenic’s injury, clearly caused by the Guidance, 

is therefore redressable. See Renal Physicians, 489 F.3d at 

1278 (holding that “the only way to prevent” a finding that 

redressability is lacking in the third-party context is “for a court 

not only to invalidate [the contested agency action] but also to 

repudiate” it). 

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III.

FHWA argues that the Guidance is not a final agency 

action and is therefore not reviewable under the APA. We 

disagree.

An agency action will be deemed final if it “mark[s] the 

consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and is 

an action “by which rights or obligations have been 

determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” 

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “The most important factor” in 

determining whether an agency action is one “from which legal 

consequences will flow” “concerns the actual legal effect (or 

lack thereof) of the agency action in question on regulated 

entities.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 252 

(D.C. Cir. 2014).

The Guidance marks the consummation of FHWA’s 

decision-making process. It comes to a definitive conclusion: 

the FSA’s prohibition on “flashing, intermittent or moving” 

lights does not prevent states from permitting digital 

billboards, so long as they meet certain prescribed 

requirements. Although the Guidance does state that the 

FHWA “may provide further guidance in the future as a result 

of additional information” FHWA might receive, J.A. 535, 

such a statement is fairly read as a “boilerplate” indication that 

the agency may issue further interpretations in the future. See 

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022-23 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000). The fact that a regulation might be interpreted 

again at some point in the indeterminate future cannot, by 

itself, prevent the initial interpretation from being final.

The Guidance is also an action “from which legal 

consequences will flow.” It creates a safe harbor such that 

Division Offices and states may not deny a digital billboard 

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permit for violating the FSA lighting standards where that

billboard meets the timing and other requirements set forth in 

the Guidance. In this way, the Guidance withdraws some of 

the discretion concerning billboard permitting the Division 

Offices and states previously held. See NRDC v. EPA, 643 

F.3d 311, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that where agency 

action withdraws an entity’s previously-held discretion, that 

action “alter[s] the legal regime,” “binds” the entity, “and thus 

qualifies as final agency action”). That safe harbor has a clear 

legal effect on the regulated entities here – the Division Offices 

and the states – and the Guidance is therefore a final agency 

action. 

IV.

Having concluded that Scenic has standing to bring its 

§ 706 claim, and that the Guidance constitutes final agency 

action, we now review the merits of the claim de novo, see 

Khan v. Parsons Glob. Servs., Ltd., 428 F.3d 1079, 1082 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005), and find them lacking. 

Scenic argues that the Guidance is invalid because it fails 

to comport with the HBA’s “customary use” provision. That 

provision states that “signs, displays, and devices whose size, 

lighting and spacing, consistent with customary use is to be 

determined by agreement between the several States and the 

Secretary, may be erected” within 660 feet of the Interstate. 

23 U.S.C. § 131(d) (emphasis added). Scenic contends that 

the FHWA, in issuing the Guidance, changed the FSA lighting 

standards to such an extent that those standards are no longer 

“consistent with customary use.” According to Scenic

“[a]nything outside the scope of what an FSA meant at the time 

it was created cannot be ‘customary use.’” Opening Br. for 

Appellant 36. 

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In Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC, we 

clarified that

[a]ny agreement that must be filed and approved by 

an agency loses its status as a strictly private contract 

and takes on a public interest gloss. That means that 

when the agency reconciles ambiguity in such a 

contract it is expected to do so by drawing upon its 

view of the public interest. And, therefore, the 

agency to which Congress entrusted the protection 

and discharge of the public interest is entitled to just 

as much benefit of the doubt in interpreting such an 

agreement as it would in interpreting its own orders, 

its regulations, or its authorizing statute.

924 F.2d 1132, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal citations 

omitted); see also Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811 

F.2d 1563, 1569-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (treating an agency 

interpretation of a settlement agreement as entitled to 

deference similar to that owed under Chevron where the 

settlement agreement had to be approved by the agency). The 

FSAs, as agreements between the FHWA and individual states, 

see 23 U.S.C. § 131(d), were thus approved by the FHWA as 

described in Cajun Electric.

Further, as the District Court explained, “[b]oth 

Defendants and Scenic America recognize . . . that all FSA 

lighting provisions were established consistent with customary 

use.” Scenic II, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 71 (quoting or citing both 

parties’ briefing) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

Opening Br. for Appellant 36; FHWA Br. 51-52. Thus, so 

long as the FHWA has merely interpreted in a reasonable 

fashion, rather than amended, those lighting standards, that 

interpretation must itself be “consistent with customary use,”

whether or not it is precisely the interpretation that would have 

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been given to the standards at the time the FHWA and states 

first agreed upon them. Cf. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface 

Transp. Bd., 162 F.3d 101, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Our 

deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its 

governing statute ‘is a product both of an awareness of the 

practical expertise which an agency normally develops, and of 

a willingness to accord some measure of flexibility to such an 

agency as it encounters new and unforeseen problems over 

time.’” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 

551, 566 n.20 (1979))). 

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the 

FHWA’s interpretation of the FSA lighting standards is not

one that “‘runs 180 degrees counter to the plain meaning of 

the’ FSAs,” and that it therefore “construes, rather than 

contradicts” the FSAs. Scenic II, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 62-63, 70

(quoting Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. 

Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Although it 

might be possible to read the FSA lighting standards to prohibit 

digital billboards, those standards do not foreclose other 

interpretations, including the FHWA’s here. Because the 

FHWA’s interpretation of the FSA lighting provision was 

reasonable, the interpretation cannot be “contrary to customary 

use.” Accordingly, Scenic’s claim that the Guidance violates 

§ 706 must fail.

***

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s 

grant of summary judgment as to Scenic’s § 706 claim, vacate 

its judgment as to Scenic’s notice-and-comment claim, and 

remand with instructions to dismiss Scenic’s 

notice-and-comment claim.

So ordered.

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