Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01950/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01950-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA,

CDCR #J-48500,

Plaintiff,

v.

JUDGE ANTHONY J. BATTAGLIA,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01950-BAS-AGS

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [ECF No. 5];

 AND

(2) DISMISSING ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at San 

Quentin State Prison, filed a civil action on October 2, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has 

not prepaid the $400 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil action; 

instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a) (ECF No. 5) and a separate miscellaneous document entitled “Response to Court 

Ruling.”1

 (ECF No. 4.) The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and 

DISMISSES the action without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee.

 1 In this document, which Plaintiff claims is a response “to the court’s many rulings,” alleges that “there 

can be no subject matter jurisdiction” because “the prosecution committed fraud . . . by falsely claiming 

that the evidence was obtained pursuant to a federal grand jury subpoena” that did not exist. (See ECF 

No. 4.) It is unclear to what Plaintiff is responding, as this Court has yet to issue any rulings.

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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face 

... additional hurdle[s].” Id. Specifically, in addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the 

full amount of a filing fee” in monthly installments or increments as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended § 1915 to preclude the ability to proceed IFP

if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective 

of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation 

in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 

1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both before and after 

the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim.” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted). Such complaints are 

dismissed for purposes of § 1915(g) “even if the district court styles such dismissal as a 

denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing 

fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a 

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dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the dismissal or the 

procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether the dismissal 

‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. 

Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 

615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 

of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051–

52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation 

that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”).

B. Discussion

As a required preliminary matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s pleading and 

finds it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger 

of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, “in some instances, the district 

court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the 

criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119–

1120. That is the case here.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records. See Molus v. Swan, Case No. 

3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United 

States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)). It also “‘may take notice 

of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212,

1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 

971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

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Based on the records and court proceedings available on PACER, this Court finds 

that Plaintiff, while incarcerated, has filed dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals 

dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, 

including the dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 

2011 alone, which were dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not 

state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are 

DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted: Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; 

Bonilla v. Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California 

Supreme Court, C 12-0026; Bonilla v. Cullen, C 1200027; Bonilla v. California Supreme 

Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis 

in any civil rights action.”) (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), 

Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19.)).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has accumulated far more than three “strikes” 

pursuant to § 1915(g) and fails to make any “plausible allegation” that he faced imminent 

danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this case, he is not entitled to the 

privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 

(noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; 

it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to 

abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 

(9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not 

right.”).

II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons explained, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 5) as barred by 28 

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U.S.C. § 1915(g);

2) DISMISSES this civil action without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to 

pay the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a);

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 17, 2019

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