Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03955/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03955-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, ABBOTT MOLECULAR INC., and

ABBOTT LABORATORIES INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DAKOCYTOMATION CALIFORNIA, INC.,

Defendant. 

No. C 05-03955 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Amendment of Basis for

Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiffs The Regents of the University of California (“UC Regents”), Abbott Molecular

Inc., and Abbott Laboratories Inc. (collectively, “Abbott”) brought this patent infringement action

against defendant DakoCytomation California, Inc. (“Dako”), alleging infringement of two United

States patents related to in situ DNA hybridization. On March 10, 2006 the court denied Abbott’s

motion for a preliminary injunction. Abbott appealed the denial on March 30. The parties then

appeared before the court for a status conference on April 17.

At the April 17 status conference, Abbott pointed out a potential defect in one section of the

court’s order denying the preliminary injunction. Specifically, Abbott takes issue with the following

passage:

The claims of the ‘479 patent have a further problem vis-á-vis the accused kit in that

they are limited to the use of “a heterogeneous mixture of labeled unique sequence

Case 3:05-cv-03955-MHP Document 110 Filed 05/17/06 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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nucleic acid fragments.” ‘479 patent at 16:9–10. Dako argues that this limitation

excludes processes which employ probes corresponding to repetitive sequences. 

Plaintiffs argue that the phrase should be construed to mean “a heterogeneous mixture

of labeled nucleic acid fragments that includes unique sequences,” but may also

contain repetitive sequences.

Plaintiffs’ proposed construction is difficult to accept in light of the claims of the

‘841 patent, which is prior art to the ‘479 patent under 35 U.S.C. section 102(b). 

Claim 1 of the ‘479 patent explains that the “unique sequence nucleic acid fragments”

are “substantially complementary to nucleic acid segments within the interphase

chromosomal DNA for which detection is desired.” Id. at 16:10–13 (emphasis

added). Likewise, the claims of the ‘841 patent require the use of “labeled nucleic

acid that comprises fragments which are substantially complementary to nucleic acid

segments within the chromosomal DNA for which detection is desired”—the very

same phrase used in the ‘479 patent. ‘841 patent at 17:6–12 (emphasis added). 

Claim 1 of the ‘841 patent further requires “blocking nucleic acid that comprises

fragments which are substantially complementary to repetitive segments in the

labeled nucleic acid.” Id. Plaintiffs’ proposed construction suggests that the ‘479

patent, like the ‘841 patent, contemplates the use of both unique and repetitive

probes. If this is true, plaintiffs’ proposed construction appears to eliminate much of

the difference between the inventions claimed in the two patents.

Regents of the Univ. of California v. DakoCytomation California, Inc., No. C 05-03955, 2006 WL

618769, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2006) (Patel, J.) (bold formatting added). According to Abbott,

the bolded passage is an incorrect statement of the law because the ‘479 patent issued from a

divisional of the same parent application that led to the ‘841 patent. Thus the claims of the ‘479

patent would be invalid in light of the ‘841 patent, if at all, under the court-created doctrines of

obviousness-type (“nonstatutory”) double patenting. See generally Geneva Pharms., Inc. v.

Glaxosmithkline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing the origin of double patenting

law). As Abbott notes, certain patents issued from divisional applications receive special protection

from double patenting challenges under 35 U.S.C. section 121. When the PTO imposes restriction

requirements limiting the scope of the invention claimed on an application, the resulting applications

and patents “shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the

courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on

either of them.” 35 U.S.C. § 121.

Although sections 102 and 103 do not provide the proper framework for analyzing the

differences between the claims of the ‘479 and ‘841 patents, double patenting law requires that

divisional applications claim “independent and distinct inventions,” a standard which is similar to

the standards for anticipation or obviousness. Geneva Pharms., 349 F.3d at 1377–78. Indeed, the

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standard for nonstatutory double patenting is stricter in some ways than the standard for obviousness

under section 103: “Obviousness requires inquiry into a motivation to modify the prior art;

nonstatutory double patenting does not; . . . Obviousness requires inquiry into objective criteria

suggesting non-obviousness; nonstatutory double patenting does not.” Id. at 1377 n.1. Moreover,

the protection afforded under section 121 is limited and strictly construed:

[T]his court applies a strict test for application of § 121. Specifically, § 121 only

applies to a restriction requirement that is documented by the PTO in enough clarity

and detail to show consonance. The restriction documentation must identify the

scope of the distinct inventions that the PTO has restricted, and must do so with

sufficient clarity to show that a particular claim falls within the scope of the distinct

inventions.

Id. at 1382. The burden is on the patent holder to prove that section 121 applies. Id.

The court therefore amends its previous order to the extent that it improperly cites 35 U.S.C.

section 102 as the basis for questioning the validity of the claims of the ‘479 patent in light of the

earlier-issued claims of the ‘841 patent. Instead, the court questions the validity of the later-issued

claims based on the doctrine of nonstatutory double patenting.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 17, 2006 ________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Judge

Northern District of California

Case 3:05-cv-03955-MHP Document 110 Filed 05/17/06 Page 3 of 3