Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00395/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00395-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARYL LOWRY, Civil No. 15cv0395 DMS (NLS)

Petitioner,

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION, AND

DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO STAY AND ABEY;

AND 

NOTICE REGARDING POSSIBLE

DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR

FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE

COURT REMEDIES

v.

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

Petitioner Daryl Lowry, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the operative first amended petition

(“Petition”), he asserted two claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and two due

process claims based on the events leading up to his guilty plea in state court. Petitioner

pleaded guilty to intent to commit great bodily injury, and was sentenced to four years

in custody.

The Petition was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes for

a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil

Local Rule 72.1(d). Upon review of the Petition, Judge Stormes made a preliminary

determination that Petitioner’s second claim was not exhausted. On March 18, 2015, she

issued a Notice Regarding Possible Dismissal of Petition for Failure to Exhaust State

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Court Remedies, notifying Petitioner that at least one of his claims was not exhausted,

and providing him with four options for further proceedings. On April 2, 2015, Petitioner

timely exercised one of his options by filing a motion to stay and abey proceedings in this

Court while he exhausts his state court remedies. Respondent filed an opposition.1

 On

May 27, 2015, upon review of the record, Judge Stormes issued an R&R recommending

to deny Petitioner’s motion, because he still had eleven months before the expiration of

the statute of limitations to return to state court and exhaust his unexhausted claim. In

addition, Petitioner did not make the requisite showing of good cause for his failure to

previously exhaust the claim, that the claim was potentially meritorious, and that he did

not engage in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. (R&R at 3, citing Rhines v. Weber,

544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005).) Petitioner has not filed an objection to the R&R, but

submitted a letter to Judge Stormes asserting that he did not commit the crime to which

he had pleaded guilty. 

A district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition" on

a dispositive matter prepared by a magistrate judge proceeding without the consent of the

parties for all purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "The court shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to

which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When no objections are filed, as here,

de novo review is waived. The "statute makes it clear that the district judge must review

the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but

not otherwise." United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc) (emphasis in original); see Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-26

& n.5 (D. Ariz. 2003) (applying Reyna-Tapia to habeas review). 

Even if the Court construes Petitioner’s letter as an objection, the objection is

unavailing, as Petitioner has made no showing why he cannot exhaust his unexhausted

claim within the time remaining before the expiration of the statute of limitations.

1 Judge Stormes considered Respondent’s unitmely opposition. Even if she had rejected 

it, her recommendation would remain sound, because the defects in Petitioner’s motion, as noted in the

R&R, were apparent form the face of his pleadings.

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Petitioner also has not made a showing on any other requirements to stay and abey, such

as, for example, good cause for his failure to previously exhaust the claim. See Rhines,

544 U.S. at 278. 

Accordingly, the R&R is adopted. Petitioner’s motion to stay and abey is denied.

Petitioner is hereby given three options. To avoid the Court dismissing the Petition,

Petitioner must exercise one of the below three options by filing an appropriate notice or

motion no later than August 18, 2015:

Option 1: File a Motion for Withdrawal and Abeyance: Withdrawal and abeyance

is a method of staying a timely federal petition while a petitioner returns to state court to

exhaust unexhausted claims. King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2009).

Unlike the “stay and abeyance” procedure, a petitioner seeking to use the “withdrawal

and abeyance” procedure need not show good cause for his failure to exhaust. Id. at 1140.

Under the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure, a petitioner may withdraw the

unexhausted claims from his federal petition, return to state court and exhaust those

claims while the federal court holds the fully exhausted claims in abeyance, then seek to

amend the timely, stayed federal petition with the newly exhausted claims. Id. The newly

exhausted claims, however, must either themselves be timely under the statute of

limitations or they must “relate back” to the claims in the fully-exhausted petition. That

is, they must share a “common core of operative facts” with the previously exhausted

claims. Id. at 1141 (quoting Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659, 662-64 (2005)). If

Petitioner cannot show that the claims are timely or that they relate back to any exhausted

claim, he cannot litigate those claims in this Court.

Option 2: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition: Petitioner may move to voluntarily

dismiss his entire federal petition and return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted

claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition containing only exhausted claims.

See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (stating that when a mixed petition is

dismissed, a petitioner may “return[] to state court to exhaust his claims”). Petitioner is

cautioned, however, that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration of the

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one-year statute of limitations and in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The statute of

limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); but see

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’

when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings.”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended

439 F.3d 993 (holding that a state habeas petition that was dismissed as untimely was

neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while under consideration by the state court and

therefore did not toll the statute of limitations). Absent some other basis for tolling, the

statute of limitations continues to run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001).

Option 3: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claims: Petitioner may formally

abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his exhausted ones. See Rose, 455 U.S.

at 510, 520 (stating that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may resubmit the habeas

petition to present only exhausted claims). Petitioner is cautioned that once he abandons

his unexhausted claims, he may lose the ability to ever raise them in federal court. See

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486-87 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 16, 2015

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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