Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02290/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jorge Herberto Moreno,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-11-2290-PHX-SRB (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Winslow, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on November 21, 2011 (Doc. 1). On February 8, 2012, Respondents filed their 

Answer (Doc. 11). Petitioner filed a Reply on March 12, 2012 (Doc. 17). Respondents 

supplemented the record on August 31, 2012 (Doc. 19).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On August 19, 1999, Petitioner and Co-Defendant Abigail Gutierrez were 

indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court on charges of murder and child abuse 

arising from the death of the minor, Joseph Gutierrez. In addition, Petitioner was 

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charged with one count of unlawful flight. (Exhibit A, Item 1, Indictment.) (Exhibits to 

the Answer, Doc. 11, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.” Individual exhibits in 

conglomerated Exhibits A and B are referenced by exhibit and the item numbers 

stamped on the first page of the document.)1 The State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek 

the Death Penalty (Exhibit A, Item 20), and an Allegation of Offenses Committed While 

Released (id. at Item 36).

Eventually, on June 5, 2001, on the day set for trial, Petitioner entered into a 

written Plea Agreement (id. at Item 139), wherein Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one 

count of murder in the first degree, with no agreements as to sentencing. The death 

penalty, allegation of release, and remaining counts were dismissed, and it was agreed 

that any sentence upon revocation of probation in a prior case would run concurrent to 

the sentence.2 Petitioner entered a change of plea on June 7, 2001. (Exhibit B, Item 140, 

M.E. 6/5/01.)

Thereafter, new counsel, John Mustafa, appeared (Exhibit A, Item 165), and filed 

a Motion to Withdraw Change of Plea (id., Item 173), arguing that the factual basis did 

not support the offenses, and that the plea was not intelligently made. The motion was 

granted on the basis that the plea was based, in part, on the inclusion of a domestic 

violence provision in the plea whose applicable version did not apply to the facts because 

of the lack of any familial relationship. (Exhibit B, Item 181, M.E. 10/2/01.) However, 

the state moved for reconsideration on the basis that the referenced provision was 

 

1 Respondents have included some 20 separate exhibits under their Exhibit A labeled 

“Photostatted Instruments,” and some 13 separate exhibits under their Exhibit B labeled 

“Minute Entries.” No index to the individual documents is provided. The use of such 

conglomerated exhibits greatly impedes the review and referencing of the record and is 

strongly discouraged. For example, distinguishing primary exhibits to the Answer from 

exhibits to the exhibits becomes an exercise in detective work. Moreover, the 

conglomeration results in the presentation of the exhibits in a non-chronological order. 

Respondents can facilitate review by insuring each exhibit is separately labeled, and 

separately identified in the Answer’s index of exhibits, and to the extent possible 

organized in a chronological or process based fashion.

2 Co-Defendant had previously entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to 

manslaughter and one count of attempted child abuse, along with a cooperation 

agreement. (Reply, Doc. 17, Exhibit B.) 

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unnecessary for the pled to offense, and thus was superfluous. The court agreed, and 

reinstated the plea. (Exhibit B, Item 193, M.E. 11/20/01.)

On March 22, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole 

after 35 years, concurrent with a probation sentence in a prior case. (Exhibit B, Item 

215, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

As a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to, see Summers v. Schriro, 481 

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007), and did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding - Five days after sentencing, on March 27, 2002, 

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit A, Item 222). Appointed 

counsel filed a Request for Transcripts (id., Item 225), and eventually filed a motion 

seeking an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro se petition because the inability 

to find a tenable issue for review (id., Item 233). 

On March 5, 2003, Petitioner filed his first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 

(Exhibit A, Item 239.) He filed an Amended Petition (id., Item 243) on June 4, 2003, 

listing a host of grounds for relief, but asserting no particulars and no facts in support of 

any of the claims. The PCR court found Petitioner had “not raised a valid claim for 

relief” and dismissed the Petition. (Exhibit B, Item 247, M.E. 10/23/03.) Petitioner filed 

a Motion for Reconsideration (Exhibit A, Item 250), arguing his pro se status and lack of 

legal experience and resources. The motion was denied. (Exhibit B, Item 270, M.E. 

6/29/05.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals 

(Exhibit A, Item 251), arguing that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion for 

reconsideration on the withdrawal of the plea. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily 

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denied review on November 10, 2005. (Exhibit D, Order 11/10/05.)

Petitioner was granted an extension through January 13, 2006 to see review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Exhibit E, Order 12/02/05.) On December 21, 2005, 

Petitioner filed his Petition for Review (Exhibit F), which was summarily denied by the 

Arizona Supreme Court on June 6, 2006 (Exhibit G). 

Second PCR Proceeding – On April 12, 2005, during the pendency of his 

Petition for Review on his first PCR petition, Petitioner filed a second Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit A, Item 262). The PCR court summarily dismissed the notice 

as untimely. (Exhibit B, Item 268, M.E. 6/10/05.)

Third PCR Proceeding – On July 10, 2006, following the Arizona Supreme 

Court’s denial of his Petition for Review on his first PCR proceeding, Petitioner filed a 

third Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Exhibit A, Item 276.) The PCR court found 

the claim of ineffective assistance time barred, and while the claim of significant change 

in the law ordinarily would excuse an untimely filing, the change relied upon by 

Petitioner did not apply to his case. Accordingly, the Notice was dismissed on July 17, 

2006. (Exhibit B, Item 280, M.E. 7/17/06.) Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing 

(Exhibit A, Item 281), which was ultimately denied (Exhibit B, Item 284, M.E. 9/1/6). 

Petitioner was granted an extension of time to seek review, (Exhibit B, Item 292, 

M.E. 11/16/06), and filed his Petition for Review on January 17, 2007. (Exhibit H, 

Docket Case 1CA-CR 07-0045 PRPC.) Ultimately, his Petition for Review was 

summarily denied on October 22, 2007 (Exhibit I).

Fourth PCR Proceeding – On December 15, 2008, Petitioner filed his fourth 

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Supp. Exh. Doc. 19.) On January 23, 2009, the PCR 

court dismissed the Notice as untimely. (Id. at ME. 1/23/09.) The PCR court rejected 

each basis to avoid the time limitation, including finding that Petitioner failed to 

“provide any newly discovered facts.” (Id. at 1.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, which 

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was summarily denied on March 29, 2010. (Exhibit K, Order 3/29/10.) Petitioner then 

sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on October 

21, 2010. (Exhibit L, Order 10/21/10.)

E. PRIOR FEDERAL PROCEEDING

On October 7, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Certificate of Appealability 

with this Court, seeking a certificate of appealability to file a habeas petition. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at physical page 39; CV-11-1967-PHX-SRB-JRI, Doc. 1) That Petition was 

denied on October 25, 2011 as premature, and unnecessary to the filing of a habeas 

petition. (Petition, Doc. 1 at physical page 35; CV-11-1967-PHX-SRB-JRI, Doc. 3.)

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 21, 2011 (Doc. 1). The 

Petition is dated November 2, 2011. Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four 

grounds for relief:

(1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal in 

violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights;

(2) that there was an insufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea based on 

accomplice liability in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights;

(3) that he was found guilty of an offense in violation of the Ex Post Facto clause 

of the Constitution; and

(4) that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when 

aggravating factors were found by the trial court rather than a jury.

Petitioner argues that any delinquency in filing his federal petition should be 

excused because he received incorrect advice from a prison paralegal that he was 

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required to seek a Certificate of Appealability from the District Court prior to submitting 

a habeas petition. (Petition, Doc. 1 at “11”, physical page 31.) 

Response – On February 8, 2012, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 11). 

Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely, the claims procedurally defaulted or 

procedurally barred, the claims are waived by Petitioner guilty plea, and Ground 4 is 

barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (new constitutional rules of criminal 

procedure generally not applicable to cases final by conclusion of direct review before 

new rules are announced).

Reply - On March 12, 2012 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 17). Petitioner argues, 

inter alia, that the habeas statute of limitations was triggered with the October 21, 2010 

decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. His delay of one month thereafter was not his 

fault (as explained in his Petition), and Petitioner has been proceeding with limited legal 

knowledge and resources, and his arguments are made in good faith. (Doc. 17 at 2.) 

Supplements – Upon reviewing the record, the Court noted incomplete and 

missing exhibits, and ordered a supplement. (Order 8/30/12.) On August 31, 2012, 

Respondents supplemented the record with a complete copy of their Exhibit F, and 

referenced but omitted Photostated Instruments 303 (Notice of Postconviction Relief, 

filed 12/15/08) and 305 (Minute Entry filed 1/23/09). 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

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must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Finality - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins 

to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

For Arizona pleading defendants, their opportunity for direct review is an Arizona 

Rule 32 of-right post conviction relief proceeding. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 

(9th Cir. 2007). “Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is 

a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. 

Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 

32, a plea-convicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 

days of conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a 

Petition for Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Moreover, it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244, “direct review" includes the period within which a petition for a writ of certiorari 

from the United States Supreme Court is pending or could be sought. See Bowen v. Roe, 

188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). Under U.S. Supreme Court Rule 13, Petitioner had 

90 days after entry of a judgment by the Arizona Supreme Court to file a petition for writ 

of certiorari. 

Petitioner filed his first PCR proceeding on March 27, 2002 (Exhibit A, Item 

222), well within 20 days of his March 22, 2002 sentence. As a pleading defendant, that 

constituted an “of-right” proceeding, and thus was a form of direct review. 

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review in that proceeding on June 6, 2006 

(Exhibit G). Thus, that proceeding remained “pending” until 90 days later, on Tuesday, 

September 5, 2006, when the time to seek certiorari review with the U.S. Supreme Court 

expired. Accordingly, absent statutory or equitable tolling, his Petition filed in 

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November, 2011 was untimely by more than five years.

Change in the Law – While the finality of the conviction is the normal 

commencement date for the habeas limitations period, the statute does provide an 

exception for changes in the law. Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the period can run 

from “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the 

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Petitioner’s Ground 4 arguably 

asserts a change in the law based upon the decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 

296 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Here, Petitioner’s sentence was entered on March 22, 2002, at least before the 

decision in Blakely. However, as discussed above, Petitioner’s conviction and sentence 

did not become final until September 5, 2006, long after both Apprendi and Blakely.

Moreover, the later date for changes in the law would apply only if Apprendi

and/or Blakely has been “made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). In Rees v. Hill, 286 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that Apprendi was not retroactively applicable on habeas review, 

under the retroactivity standards established by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 310 

(1989) (decisions establishing new rules of criminal procedure are not to be applied 

retroactively on habeas review, absent certain circumstances). Similarly, in Cook v. U.S., 

386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit drew upon its decision in Rees to 

conclude that Blakely was not retroactively applicable on habeas. Accordingly, the 

decisions in Apprendi and Blakely do not delay the commencement of Petitioner’s one 

year limitations period.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

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judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Such tolling only results from 

state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 

(2005).

Third PCR Proceeding - Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding was commenced on 

July 10, 2006 on the filing of his third Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit A, Item 

276).3 See Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 

9/13/04) ("The language and structure of the Arizona postconviction rules demonstrate 

that the proceedings begin with the filing of the Notice.") At that time, the limitations 

period had not yet commenced running, although it did commence shortly thereafter, on 

September 5, 2006. That proceeding remained pending until his Petition for Review was 

denied on October 22, 2007 (Exhibit I).

Although a portion of his notice was dismissed as untimely, and thus would not 

have been “properly filed,” his claim of a change in the law (albeit fatally flawed 

because the change was inapplicable to Petitioner), did qualify under for delayed 

presentation. See Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.1(g) (“change in the law that if determined to 

apply...would probably overturn”) and 32.4(a) (“notice not timely filed may only raise 

claims pursuant to Rule 32.1...(g)”) Thus, the PCR court’s rejection of it must be 

deemed to have been on its merits, not because the claim itself was barred. 

Thereafter, Petitioner’s one year commenced running on October 23, 2007, and 

barring further tolling, expired on October 22, 2008.

Fourth PCR Proceeding - Petitioner’s Fourth PCR proceeding was not 

commenced until some 54 days after the one year expired, when his Fourth Notice of 

Post-Conviction Relief (Supp. Exh, Doc. 19) was filed on December 15, 2008. Once the 

 

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Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was commenced on April 12, 2005, during 

the pendency of his Petition for Review on his first PCR petition, and was summarily 

dismissed the notice as untimely on June 10, 2005, while the first proceeding remained 

pending. The limitations period had not yet commenced running at that time, and 

accordingly, no tolling resulted. In any event, the proceeding was dismissed as untimely, 

and therefore was not “properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. 408. 

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habeas statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not 

reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

Under the prison mailbox rule, filings are deemed “filed” at the time they are 

delivered to prison officials for mailing. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199 (9th 

Cir. 2003). However, even if it is presumed that Petitioner delivered his fourth PCR 

notice to prison officials on the date it is dated, December 11, 2008 (Supp. Exh, Doc. 19, 

PCR Not. at 3), and it is deemed filed as of that date, it was still “filed” after the 

limitations period was expired.

Moreover, that proceeding was terminated when the Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied review on October 21, 2010. (Exhibit L, Order 10/21/10.) Petitioner 

did not commence the instant proceeding until over a year later, when he filed the instant 

federal habeas Petition on November 11, 2011. (Doc. 1.) Even if the prison mailbox rule 

were deemed to apply to the Petitioner, and it were deemed delivered to prison officials 

and thus “filed” as of its date, November 2, 2011 (id. at 11, physical page 31), it was still 

delinquent by more than three years after his one year expired.

Finally, statutory tolling only applies to “state proceedings,” see Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001), and thus Petitioner’s Petition for Certificate of 

Appealability to this court would not have resulted in any statutory tolling.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown adequate statutory tolling to make his 

Petition timely. 

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

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2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.). 

Bad Advice on Certificate of Appealability - In his Petition, Petitioner argues 

that his delay should be excused because he had been misadvised to seek a certificate of 

appealability from the District Court before filing his habeas petition. That Petition for 

Certificate was dated September 22, 2011. All of the documents Petitioner provides 

surrounding that petition were from September, 2011. Petitioner offers nothing to 

suggest that he had been misadvised at any time significantly earlier than September, 

2011. At that date, Petitioner’s one year had already been expired for almost two years. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s simple reliance on bad advice is not an extraordinary 

circumstance beyond petitioner’s control. In Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. - - - , 130 

S.Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010), the Court reiterated that “a garden variety claim” of even 

attorney negligence would not justify equitable tolling. Here, Petitioner was not relying 

upon counsel, but upon a non-attorney. And, he offers nothing to show that the 

erroneous advice was anything other than a “garden variety” error or negligence.

In addition, equitable tolling will delay the expiration of the statute of limitations, 

but it will not start it running anew. See Benge v. U.S., 17 F.3d 1286, 1289 (10th Cir. 

1994). Petitioner’s limitations period had already expired at the time of his misadventure 

with the certificate of appealability.

Pro Se Status - Finally, Petitioner’s Reply points to his pro se status and lack of 

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legal training and resources as cause for equitable tolling. A prisoner's pro se status is 

not an extraordinary circumstance. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000). 

And, "ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not 

excuse prompt filing." Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir.1999). Nor does 

Petitioner show that his disabilities have precluded a timely filing. Despite those 

disabilities, Petitioner has prosecuted on his own some four separate PCR proceedings, 

as well as the instant habeas proceeding. There is nothing to suggest that those 

disabilities had anything to do with the years which have elapsed without a federal filing 

by Petitioner.

The undersigned finds no basis for equitable tolling.

5. Actual Innocence

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the statute of limitations is subject to an 

exception for claims of actual innocence. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Petitioner makes no such claim in this proceeding.

6. Summary

Petitioner’s conviction became final on conclusion of direct review on September 

5, 2006, on the expiration of his time to seek certiorari review in his “of-right” PCR 

proceeding. The limitations period was statutorily tolled from that time until October 23, 

2007 by his third PCR proceeding. It expired one year later, on October 23, 2008. 

Petitioner’s state and federal proceedings after its expiration do not revive the expired 

period, nor do his assertions of equitable tolling show any circumstance existing during 

the limitations period that would have precluded a timely filing, or any circumstance that 

would constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling.

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Petition is 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

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B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents argue procedural default, procedural bar, waiver, and Teague. 

Because the undersigned finds the Petition plainly barred by the statute of limitations, 

these defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 

requires that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are 

required in cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or 

in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or 

sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

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its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth 

herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the 

extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed November 21, 2011 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

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328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: September 5, 2012

11-2290r RR 12 08 28 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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