Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00031/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00031-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Negotiable Instrument

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FIDELITY BANK, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0031-WS-M

 )

KEY HOTELS OF BREWTON, LLC, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Notice of Continuing Default (doc. 55) 

and Motion to Establish Sale Procedures (doc. 48).

I. Nature and Procedural History of this Action.

Plaintiff, Fidelity Bank, brought this action against defendants, Key Hotels of Brewton, 

LLC and Anand Patel, to enforce a loan agreement and security interest in a hotel and other 

property. The First Amended Complaint alleged the following pertinent facts, among others: (i)

Key Hotels and Patel executed a Loan Agreement in favor of Fidelity Bank on or about 

December 9, 2011, along with a Note in the amount of $2,010,000 (doc. 5, ¶¶ 7-8); (ii) to secure 

repayment of the Loan Agreement and Note, Key Hotels and Patel also executed a Security 

Agreement and a “Mortgage and Security Agreement” in favor of Fidelity for a hotel property 

and personal property located at 1115 Douglas Avenue, Brewton, Alabama (id., ¶¶ 9-10); (iii) 

defendants defaulted on their repayment obligations to Fidelity Bank under the Loan Agreement 

and Note in October 2014, and likewise failed to maintain the collateral (i.e., the hotel property) 

in the manner required by the subject agreements (id., ¶ 12); and (iv) after notice, defendants 

failed to cure the defaults, resulting in a balance due on the Loan Agreement and Note of 

$1,885,032.54 in principal and interest as of January 13, 2015 (id., ¶ 13).

Based on these and other well-pleaded factual allegations, Fidelity Bank asserted statelaw causes of action against defendants for breach of the Note, detinue, and appointment of a 

receiver to take possession and control of the hotel and personal property. The Amended 

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Complaint demanded relief in the form of a money judgment in the amount of $1,885,032.54, 

plus attorney’s fees, interest and costs; possession of the personal property; and equitable relief 

in the form of appointment of a receiver to manage, control and ultimately dispose of the 

property and other assets.1

Initially, defendants appeared in this action by and through counsel, at which time they 

filed an Answer (doc. 20) and generally appeared responsive to their legal obligations in this 

litigation. In March 2015, defendants prevailed upon the undersigned to refrain from appointing

a receiver for the hotel property on an expedited basis. In particular, defendant Patel submitted a 

sworn Affidavit (doc. 21-1) dated March 27, 2015, in which he represented to the Court that he 

was in negotiations with Hilton to enter into a new franchise agreement that would transform the 

hotel into a Hampton Inn, that he had applied for a loan with multiple banks to renovate the 

hotel, and that a decision on the franchise agreement was expected within 30 days. On that basis, 

the undersigned entered an Order (doc. 24) on April 13, 2015, affording defendants a limited 

amount of time to explore such a “win-win” proposition to maximize the hotel property’s value 

and pay off the existing lender (Fidelity Bank), without imposing the draconian and disfavored 

remedy of receivership. The status quo was maintained a bit longer when defendants represented 

to the Court on May 11, 2015, that issuance of Hilton’s letter of approval was expected “at any 

time.” (Doc. 25, at 2.) In a status report filed on June 17, 2015, defendants continued to portray 

everything as being on track for Hilton approval of the new franchise agreement, with a loan and 

accompanying payoff of the Fidelity Bank Note to follow shortly thereafter. (See doc. 31.)

On July 29, 2015, however, defendants abruptly dropped a bombshell on this Court by 

announcing that the Hilton proposal had been scrapped altogether because defendants had 

concluded that the construction / renovation plans for the property “were not economical.” (Doc. 

38, at 1.) On that basis, defendants indicated that they had embarked on franchise discussions 

with a different hotel chain (Wyndham Hotel Group) for a different hotel with different 

construction plans and different funding requirements. In the more than four months since 

 1 Notwithstanding the purely state-law nature of the claims asserted by Fidelity 

Bank in this action, federal subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 

inasmuch as the well-pleaded allegations of the First Amended Complaint confirm that there is 

complete diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and defendants, and that the amount in 

controversy greatly exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold.

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defendants had appeared in this case, the July 29 filing marked the first time they ever intimated

to this Court that approval and finalization of the Hilton plan and accompanying refinancing loan 

were not imminent.2

Things deteriorated quickly thereafter. A judicial directive that the parties work together 

in good faith to explore a potential business resolution to their dispute proved futile, as plaintiff 

reported that “[n]o material progress has been made” in defendants’ efforts to obtain a new 

franchise agreement, and that defendants “were either unwilling or unable to make any offer 

whatsoever to Fidelity” to resolve this dispute. (Doc. 41, at 2.) On September 10, 2015, 

defendants’ counsel sought leave to withdraw from the representation on the ground that 

“Defendants have failed to cooperate with counsel.” (Doc. 46.) A September 17 Order granted 

counsel’s request to withdraw and ordered defendants to notify the Court in writing as to the 

identity of their new counsel (or, in defendant Patel’s case, whether he intended to proceed pro 

se) on or before October 8, 2015. (Doc. 49.) That Order included a stern admonition in bold 

type, as follows: “Defendants are cautioned that failure to comply with this Order in a 

timely manner may result in entry of default or other sanctions against them upon motion 

by plaintiff.” (Id. at 3.) When defendants failed to respond to the September 17 Order, at 

plaintiff’s request, the undersigned entered another Order (doc. 54) on October 26, 2015, stating 

that “Defendants are ordered, on or before November 9, 2015, to show cause why default 

judgment should not be entered against them for their willful noncompliance with the September 

17 Order.” (Doc. 54, at 2.)3 Once again, defendants chose to do nothing. They have remained 

silent. They have disregarded yet another court order and another deadline in this case.

 2 The unfortunate fact of the matter is that, notwithstanding defendants’ grandiose 

pronouncements and predictions of imminent franchise agreements and loans that would allow 

them to reconfigure and reopen the hotel property while paying off the Note to Fidelity Bank, 

defendants appear no closer to remediating the hotel property today than they were back in 

January 2015 when this lawsuit commenced. There are many possible explanations for this state 

of affairs (e.g., deliberate misstatements as to defendants’ prospects for renovating the hotel 

property, unreasonable optimism by defendants as to such prospects), none of which portray

defendants in a particularly favorable light or suggest that they were reasonably forthcoming 

with the Court as to the true status of their efforts to rebrand, repair, and reopen the hotel while 

fulfilling their financial obligations to Fidelity Bank.

3 To make absolutely certain that defendants would not be confused by any legal 

jargon, the October 26 Order translated this requirement into plain English as follows: “Unless 

(Continued)

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II. Entry of Default as Appropriate Sanction Against Defendants.

The law is clear in this Circuit that “[a] district court need not tolerate defiance of 

reasonable orders.” Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. v. Florida Mowing and Landscape Service, 

Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009). “A court may impose sanctions for litigation 

misconduct under its inherent power” upon a finding of bad faith. Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC 

v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Martin v. Automobili 

Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Courts have the inherent 

authority to control the proceedings before them, which includes the authority to impose 

‘reasonable and appropriate’ sanctions.”). “A party demonstrates bad faith by delaying or 

disrupting the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order.” In re Sunshine Jr. Stores, 

Inc., 456 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal marks omitted). That is 

precisely what has occurred here. Despite being duly cautioned about the importance of timely 

compliance and the dire consequences of noncompliance, Key Hotels and Patel disregarded

unambiguous court orders dated September 17, 2015 and October 26, 2015. Prior to defying 

such judicial directives, defendants displayed a propensity for uncooperativeness (i.e., failing to 

work with their own lawyers, refusing to engage in good-faith negotiations with plaintiff to 

explore business resolutions to this dispute) and contumacious foot-dragging (i.e., a series of 

assurances to the Court that approval of a new franchise agreement and loan for hotel were 

imminent, followed by a jarring, sudden about-face that defendants were unilaterally abandoning 

the project because they deemed it “not economical”).

In effect, then, Key Hotels and Patel have stalled all meaningful progress in this case for 

nearly ten months. They have failed and refused to work with their own attorneys. They have 

disregarded multiple court orders, despite clear warning as to the consequences of such a course 

of action. They have, at a minimum, been less than candid in court filings about their intentions 

 

defendants submit written filings [on] or before the deadline that (i) provide a satisfactory 

explanation for their failure to comply with the September 17 Order in a timely manner, (ii) 

comply with that Order in full, and (iii) evince an intent to participate in this matter in a 

conscientious and diligent manner henceforth, the Court will exercise its inherent power to enter 

a default against them .... If defendants wish to be heard and to defend their interests in this 

litigation, the time is now. Defendants should expect no further lenience based on their 

unrepresented status.” (Doc. 54, at 2.)

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and business prospects for the hotel property. Taken in the aggregate, these circumstances 

overwhelmingly support a finding of bad faith, so as to unlock the Court’s inherent power to 

sanction. See Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The key to unlocking a

court’s inherent power is a finding of bad faith.”) (citation omitted). The only remaining 

question is what form the sanction should take.

The Court understands, of course, that default judgments are disfavored. See, e.g., In re 

Worldwide Web Systems, Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (“there is a strong policy of 

determining cases on their merits and we therefore view defaults with disfavor”); Wahl v. 

McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985) (opining that default judgment “is too harsh except 

in extreme circumstances” and that “we must respect the usual preference that cases be heard on 

the merits rather than resorting to sanctions that deprive a litigant of his day in court”) (citations 

omitted). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has opined that “[t]he severe sanction of a dismissal or 

default judgment is appropriate only as a last resort, when less drastic sanctions would not ensure 

compliance with the court’s orders.” Sunshine Jr., 456 F.3d at 1306 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding its disfavored status in the law, the sanction of 

default judgment may be appropriate “when the adversary process has been halted because of an 

essentially unresponsive party.” Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Ellison, 506 F. Supp.2d 1022, 

1025-26 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (citation omitted).4

Upon careful consideration, the Court makes specific findings that Key Hotels and Patel 

have conducted themselves in bad faith via their pattern of unreasonable delay, contumacious 

conduct, and defiance of reasonable court orders. Despite being given multiple opportunities to 

 4 See also Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(recognizing that Rule 55(a) mandates entry of default so that “the adversary process [will not] 

be halted because of an essentially unresponsive party”) (citation omitted); In re Knight, 833 

F.2d 1515, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Where a party offers no good reason for the late filing of its 

answer, entry of default judgment against that party is appropriate.”); Bonanza Int’l, Inc. v. 

Corceller, 480 F.2d 613, 614 (5th Cir. 1973) (“There is evidence, moreover, that defendant 

refused to obey the Court’s orders, and such action constitutes sufficient grounds for a default 

judgment.”); Carpenters Labor–Management Pension Fund v. Freeman–Carder LLC, 498 

F.Supp.2d 237, 240 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[a] court has the power to enter default judgment when a 

defendant fails to defend its case appropriately or otherwise engages in dilatory tactics,” such as 

where “the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party”) 

(citations omitted).

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bring themselves into compliance, and despite being cautioned in layman’s terms about the 

consequences of failing to do so, defendants have elected to continue disregarding court orders. 

In light of these circumstances, the Court concludes that defendants’ disobedience has been 

willful and in bad faith, and that lesser sanctions will not suffice. Accordingly, the undersigned 

exercises his inherent authority to impose the sanction of entering default judgment against 

defendants.

III. Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Sale Procedures.

Back on September 10, 2015, Fidelity Bank filed and served on defendants’ then-counsel 

a Motion to Establish Sale Procedures (doc. 48). In that Motion, Fidelity Bank proposed that this 

Court approve a private auctioneer of plaintiff’s choosing to conduct a public auction of the hotel 

property at issue in this litigation. Defendants were on notice of that Motion, not only through 

service of it on their then-attorney of record but also through the October 26 Order, which 

notified defendants that if they failed to show cause why default judgment should not be entered, 

this Court would “proceed to take up plaintiff’s motion to have the hotel property auctioned.” 

(Doc. 54, at 2.) Through their non-responsiveness, as documented supra, defendants have 

chosen not to be heard as to that Motion to Establish Sale Procedures.

Because defendants’ default is effectively an admission of all well-pleaded factual 

allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court readily finds that Fidelity Bank possesses 

a contractual right to have the hotel property sold at auction. Again, the First Amended 

Complaint pleads (and defendants, via their default, have admitted) that Key Hotels and Patel 

executed a “Mortgage and Security Agreement” in favor of Fidelity Bank for the hotel property 

located at 1115 Douglas Avenue in Brewton, Alabama (the “Hotel Property”). (Doc. 5, ¶ 10.) 

That Mortgage and Security Agreement – a copy of which is appended to the First Amended 

Complaint – reflects that defendants’ nonpayment of amounts due under the Note constituted a 

default, and that in the event of default Fidelity Bank “may elect to cause the Mortgaged 

Property or any part thereof to be sold as follows: ... At the foreclosure sale of the Mortgaged 

Property which is real property, the Mortgaged Property ... shall be sold at public auction to the 

highest bidder ....” (Doc. 5, Exh. D, at §§ C.1(a), C.2(d)(iii).) Simply put, then, defendants 

entered into an agreement that gave Fidelity Bank the contractual right to sell the Hotel Property 

at a public auction if defendants defaulted on their repayment obligations under the Note and 

failed to cure. The well-pleaded factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint, taken as 

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true in the wake of defendants’ default in this litigation, confirm that this is exactly what 

happened here. As such, Fidelity Bank is acting within its contractual rights by seeking public 

auction of the Hotel Property.

In terms of the mechanics of the proposed auction, the applicable federal statute confers 

considerable discretion upon district courts.

5

 In accordance with the procedures proposed by 

Fidelity Bank, which are fair, reasonable and comport with the terms of the Mortgage and 

Security Agreement and governing law, the Court hereby establishes the following method and 

procedure for conducting the judicial sale of the Hotel Property:

1. The Court approves the retention of Rowell Auctions, Inc. as auctioneer. Rowell 

will be paid a 10% buyer’s premium commission for its services, plus 

reimbursement of actual expenses. The terms of retention are reflected in the 

“Real Estate Auction Services Listing Agreement” attached as Exhibit A to 

document 48 in the court file. The Court approves the Listing Agreement and 

payment of Rowell out of the proceeds of sale; however, in the event of conflict 

or inconsistency between the terms of the Listing Agreement and this Order, the 

Order controls. The Court retains jurisdiction to resolve any disputes between the 

parties and/or Rowell.

2. The auction will cover the Hotel Property located at 1115 Douglas Avenue, 

Brewton, Alabama 36426, whose legal description is set forth below, together 

with all fixtures, furnishings and equipment at that location:

Commencing at a point where the West right-of-way line on 

Douglas Avenue (U.S. Highway #31) Intersects the South line of 

the Northwest Quarter of Section 21, Township 2 North, Range 10 

East; Thence run North along the West line of Douglas Avenue a 

distance of 475 feet, More or less, and to a point which is the 

Northeast corner of the certain property once owned by W.K. Holt 

and wife, Nell R. Holt; Thence continue North and along Douglas 

Avenue a distance of 120 feet to make or form a starting point; 

 5 Indeed, the relevant statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny realty or interest 

therein sold under any order or decree of any court of the United States shall be sold ... at public 

sale at the courthouse of the county, parish, or city in which the greater part of the property is 

located, or upon the premises or some parcel thereof located therein, as the court directs. Such 

sale shall be upon such terms and conditions as the court directs.” 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a) 

(emphasis added).

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thence run West a distance of 245 feet to a point; thence run South 

a distance of 120 feet to a point; thence run West a distance of 100 

feet to a point; thence run North a distance of 407.7 feet, more or 

less, to a point on the South Boundary line of Smith lane; thence 

run East a distance of 345 feet, more or less along the South 

Boundary of Smith Lane to the West right-of-way of Douglas 

Avenue; thence run South a distance of 287.7 feet to the Point of 

Beginning.

Less and except the following described property:

Commence at the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the 

Northwest quarter (SE Cor. of SW1/4 of NW1/4) of Section (21), 

Township Two (2) North, Range Ten (Ten) East, Escambia 

County, Alabama, Said Corner Being the Point of intersection of 

the South line of the Northwest quarter (NW 1/4) of said section 

Twenty-one (21) with the West right-of-way of U.S. Highway 31 

(66’ R/W); thence run North 01’11’23” west along said right-ofway line for 475.00 feet; Thence run South 89’27’22” West for 

245.00 feet for the Point of Beginning; thence continue the last 

course run South 89’27’22” West for 96.46 feet; thence run South 

00’28’20” East for 1.02 feet to a fence line; thence run South 

89’12’09” East along said fence line for 96.52 feet; Thence run 

North 01’11’23” West for 3.28 feet to the Point of Beginning.

3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2002, notice of the sale must be published once a week 

for four consecutive weeks prior to the sale in a newspaper of general circulation 

in Escambia County, Alabama, the location of the Hotel Property. Fidelity Bank 

shall be responsible for publication of such notice and shall bear the expense of 

publication. The sale shall be “where is, as is.” As part of the sale process, 

Rowell Auctions must post appropriate signage promoting the sale, circulate 

marketing materials to prospective buyers, post the sale on its website, assist 

potential buyers with inspections of the Hotel Property, and take other reasonable 

appropriate steps to market and promote the auction. Such auction will be 

absolute with no reserves. However, Fidelity Bank retains the right to credit bid, 

and any credit bid made by Fidelity Bank shall include a sufficient cash 

component to cover Rowell’s fees and expenses. The property may be offered 

first in parcels and then en masse. The sale must be conducted according to 

customary and commercially reasonable practices; however, subject to those 

constraints, Rowell shall have discretion in selecting the manner of conducting the 

auction. Rowell may, in its discretion, solicit and accept electronic bids over the 

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Internet. To the extent that Key Hotels or Patel may bid on the property, Rowell 

may require cash deposits in an amount reasonably deemed appropriate to provide 

adequate assurances of that bidder’s ability to close. In order to allow sufficient 

time for the marketing and advertising process, at least 60 days will be required 

from the date of this order approving sale procedures. Upon completion of the 

sale, Rowell shall file a report of sale with the Clerk of Court.

4. The form of notice of the auction must be approved by the Court prior to 

advertisement. The Court approves the form “Notice of Auction Sale” attached as 

Exhibit B to document 48, with the following modifications: (i) the first 

paragraph must list a more complete, precise location of the auction than “1115 

Douglas Avenue;” and (ii) the reference to Lawrence B. Voit on page 2 must be 

deleted, given that Attorney Voit no longer represents defendants in this action, 

and replaced with the name and address of defendant Patel. This Notice shall be 

in addition to the marketing efforts of Rowell.

5. Under the circumstances, the Court concludes that it is appropriate for the auction 

to be free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, with any such liens or claims to 

attach to the sale proceeds.6 No later than the first publication of Notice of 

Auction Sale, Fidelity Bank shall furnish notice of the sale to any lienholders of 

record and shall serve upon each such lienholder (via first-class U.S. Mail, 

postage prepaid) copies of the Notice of Auction Sale, the Motion to Establish 

Sale Procedures, and this Order. If the Internal Revenue Service is a lienholder, 

then Fidelity Bank must provide notice to that agency in a time and manner that 

comports with all applicable laws. Fidelity Bank must file certificates of service 

with the Clerk of Court reflecting the time, manner and method of service upon 

any and all lienholders of record. Based on the information before the Court at 

this time, Fidelity Bank appears to be in a first priority position, and no excess 

sale proceeds are anticipated to be available to pay liens of any other creditors that 

 6 The Court notes that a recent title report for the Hotel Property reflects that the 

only encumbrances of record on such property are Fidelity Bank’s first mortgage and the current 

ad valorem taxes due. (Doc. 52, Exh. A.) 

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might exist. To provide adequate protection to unknown lienholders, the Court 

finds that approval of the auction free and clear of liens is in the best interests of 

all parties, inasmuch as a sale on such terms will encourage bidders to offer the 

highest and best price while protecting any potential lienholders by ordering that 

their claims will attach to the sale proceeds, pending further determination by the 

Court.

6. Defendants are ordered to cooperate with Rowell Auctions and to execute such 

deeds, bills of sale or other documents as may be required to effectuate an auction 

sale. Should defendants fail or refuse to execute any such documents of 

conveyance required to complete the auction, the Clerk of Court is authorized to 

so act upon request of Rowell Auctions.

7. Upon closing of the sale, which should take no more than 45 days following the 

auction, Rowell shall file a report of sale with the Clerk of Court. The net 

proceeds of sale shall be deposited with the Clerk of Court, pending order of 

disbursement by this Court. Upon the filing of a report of sale and deposit of sale 

proceeds, the Court will schedule a show cause hearing and set deadlines for the 

filing of objections to disbursement of such net proceeds of sale to Fidelity Bank. 

If no objections are timely filed, the Court may cancel the hearing and enter an 

order of disbursement based solely on the written record.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Based on the litigation misconduct detailed herein, the Court exercises its inherent 

powers to impose the sanction of default against defendants, Key Hotels of 

Brewton, LLC and Anand Patel. “A defendant, by his default, admits the 

plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the 

judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.” 

Eagle Hosp., 561 F.3d at 1307 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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2. Notwithstanding the default by Key Hotels and Patel, the issue of damages 

remains unresolved.

7

 Plaintiff is ordered, on or before December 7, 2015, to file 

such affidavits, exhibits and other materials, together with a legal memorandum, 

that it deems sufficient both to document and to explain the amount and character 

of the damages sought, so as to prevent the requested damages award from being 

either uncertain or speculative. Plaintiff must serve a complete copy of these 

damages submissions on defendants at their address of record. Defendants will be 

allowed until December 21, 2015 to be heard (solely as to plaintiff’s evidentiary 

showing on damages, inasmuch as the default precludes them from contesting the 

merits of plaintiffs’ claims), after which the issue of damages will be taken under 

submission. Default judgment will be entered against Key Hotels of Brewton, 

LLC and Anand Patel at such time as damages determinations have been made on 

the record thus established.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Establish Sale Procedures (doc. 48), as amended (doc. 52), is 

granted. Sale procedures for the forthcoming public auction of the Hotel 

Property are as set forth herein.

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to each defendant at 

his or its address of record.

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of November, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 7 See, e.g., PNCEF, LLC v. Hendricks Bldg. Supply LLC, 740 F. Supp.2d 1287, 

1292 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (“While well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted, 

plaintiffs’ allegations relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; 

rather, the court must determine both the amount and character of damages.”) (citation omitted). 

A judicial determination of damages may be made without a hearing “when the district court 

already has a wealth of evidence ... such that any additional evidence would be truly 

unnecessary to a fully formed determination of damages.” Id. at 1292 n.9.

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