Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00544/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00544-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRANCE VICKERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN RICK HILL et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-0544 DAD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 

U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

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holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

In his amended complaint, plaintiff has identified Folsom State prison officials Olstrom, 

Darnell, and Snyder as the defendants. Therein plaintiff alleges that defendant Snyder falsely 

stated in a rules violation report that plaintiff was in constructive possession of pornographic 

material even though prison officials had discovered the material belonged to plaintiff’s fellow 

inmate, Durham. Plaintiff further alleges that prison officials conducted a hearing on the 

disciplinary charge brought against him for possession of pornographic material, but did not 

allow him to use Durham’s declaration in his defense at that hearing. According to plaintiff, 

Durham admits in his declaration that he was the sole person in possession of the pornographic 

material. Plaintiff claims the defendants violated his right to due process and retaliated against 

him. (Am. Compl. at 3-4.)

DISCUSSION

The allegations of plaintiff’s amended complaint remain so vague and conclusory that the 

court is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for 

relief. The amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must 

give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim 

plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants 

engaged in that support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the 

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the amended complaint must be dismissed. In the interest 

of justice, the court will grant plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.

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If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he must allege facts 

demonstrating how the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal 

constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). In addition, 

plaintiff must allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation 

of plaintiff’s rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As an initial matter, plaintiff is advised that his allegations that defendant Snyder issued a 

false rules violation report against him fails to state a cognizable claim for a due process 

violation. Judges of this court have previously held that a prisoner has no constitutional right to 

be free from a false prison disciplinary report in and of itself. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hodges, No. 

2:13-cv-2526 KJN P, 2014 WL 295047 at *6 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014) (“A prisoner has no 

constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being wrongly or falsely accused of conduct which 

may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”); Millner v. Biter, No. 1:13-cv-2029 

SAB (PC), 2014 WL 3778289 at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 31, 2014) (same); Lee v. Whitten No. 2:12-

cv-2104 GEB KJN P, 2012 WL 4468420 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012) (same). 

There are two ways that allegations concerning false disciplinary action may give rise to a 

cognizable claim. First, plaintiff may be able to state a First Amendment claim if he alleges that 

the false disciplinary report was written in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutionally 

protected right. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1997). In plaintiff’s amended 

complaint, he appears to be trying to assert such a retaliation claim. The court cannot, however, 

decipher the factual basis of his claim. The Ninth Circuit has made clear: 

Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled 

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the 

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action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.

Id. at 567-68. See also Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (a 

retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, “after 

this, therefore because of this.”). In any second amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, he will 

need to allege facts clarifying which defendant(s) he believes retaliated against him, describe their 

alleged retaliatory conduct, and explain why he believes their conduct was motivated by, or 

because of, plaintiff’s engagement in protected activities. 

Second, plaintiff may be able to state a procedural due process claim if he alleges that he 

did not receive the proper procedural protections during his disciplinary hearing on the alleged 

false prison disciplinary charge. In plaintiff’s amended complaint he appears to be trying to 

assert such a procedural due process claim. Again, however, the court cannot decipher the factual 

basis of plaintiff’s claim. An inmate has a right to a hearing at which he may “call witnesses and 

present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly 

hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 

(1974). In any second amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, he will need to specify which 

defendant(s) did not allow him to present Durham’s declaration, which purportedly would have 

exonerated plaintiff of the disciplinary charge.

Plaintiff is reminded that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to make his 

second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th 

Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the prior pleading no longer serves 

any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended complaint, as in an original complaint, 

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 8) is dismissed;

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2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second 

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the 

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; failure 

to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation 

that this action be dismissed without prejudice; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a civil 

rights action.

Dated: October 1, 2014

DAD:9

vick0544.14am

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