Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00067/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00067-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brian K. Stallings, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-67-PHX-RCB (MEA) 

 O R D E R 

Plaintiff Brian K. Stallings, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexLewis in Buckeye, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The 

Court will order Defendants Ryan and Martin to answer Counts One and Two of the 

Complaint, respectively, and will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants without 

prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $2.06. The remainder of the fee will 

be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a 

separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the 

fees according to the statutory formula. 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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III. Complaint 

 In his four-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Arizona 

Department of Corrections (ADOC) Director Charles Ryan, Dr. Thomas A. Bell, Nurse 

Martin, and Wexford Health (Wexford). 

 In each count, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights relating 

to his medical care. In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, monetary 

damages, and his costs of suit. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that as part of a lawsuit settlement agreement, 

Defendant Ryan and others agreed that ADOC would treat, test, and medicate his feet 

(which had received third-degree burns) at no charge. Plaintiff contends that although he 

needs continual care and pain medication for his feet, he has not received the necessary 

medical care. He asserts that Defendant Ryan has acted with deliberate indifference and 

has ignored this issue. Plaintiff also claims Defendant Wexford has stopped virtually all 

medical care, treatment, outside testing, and medications; is not interested in treating 

inmates; and is only concerned with making money. Plaintiff contends that Defendant 

Ryan was aware of deficient medical care prior to Defendant Wexford taking over the 

provision of medical care for inmates, and is aware of Defendant Wexford’s actions, but 

has done nothing about Defendant Wexford’s actions. Plaintiff asserts that he suffers 

continuing severe pain, nerve damage, and swelling of his lower legs. 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Martin ignores his health needs 

request forms seeking to see a doctor, but nevertheless charges Plaintiff a co-pay, in 

violation of the settlement agreement. He claims that denying and delaying his ability to 

see a doctor demonstrates deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and that, as 

a result, he continues to suffer pain and nerve damage in his feet. 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Bell prescribed a medication to 

which Plaintiff was allergic and told Plaintiff that he could also take the medication for 

his feet. Plaintiff contends that when Defendant Bell was confronted with various 

complaints about inmate medical care, he responded that “they are only prisoners.” 

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Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wexford has stopped “all or most medications” and, 

therefore, Plaintiff “probably would not be given anything if he could see a doctor who 

cares.” Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Ryan has a duty to see that inmates are given 

adequate medical care, yet entered into a contract with Defendant Wexford Health 

despite knowing Defendant Wexford’s “poor track record.” Additionally, Plaintiff 

contends that Defendants have violated a medical policy that inmates receive medical 

care that meets the community standard. 

 In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that he injured his right shoulder, it took three days 

to see medical personnel, and Defendant Bell prescribed a medication to which Plaintiff 

is allergic. Plaintiff contends that he was eventually taken for a magnetic resonance 

imaging test, which showed that he had a shoulder separation. Plaintiff claims that 

nothing more has been done for his injury. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Wexford 

has cancelled “most” outside consultations, tests, and treatments and that Defendant 

Bell’s statement that “they are only inmates” reflects both Defendant Bell’s and 

Defendant Wexford’s feelings and explains why very few inmates are receiving proper 

medical care. Plaintiff contends this is “absolute proof of deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.” Plaintiff contends that the failure to treat his shoulder 

injury causes him pain, limits his movement, and will result in a lifelong, permanent 

injury. 

IV. Discussion

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

 To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

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371-72, 377 (1976). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, 

through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676. 

 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter 

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

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does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

 A. Defendant Ryan 

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a deliberate indifference claim in Count 

One regarding Defendant Ryan’s failure to ensure that Plaintiff receives continued care 

and pain medication for his feet. The Court will require Defendant Ryan to answer this 

portion of Count One. 

 However, as to Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Ryan has done nothing about 

Defendant Wexford’s actions, entered into a contract with Defendant Wexford despite 

knowing of Defendant Wexford’s “track record,” and violated a policy that inmates 

receive medical care that meets the community standard, these allegations are vague, 

conclusory, and generic. They do not state a claim of deliberate indifference regarding 

Plaintiff’s medical needs. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s 

allegations against Defendant Ryan regarding Defendant Wexford. 

 B. Defendant Martin

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a deliberate indifference claim in Count 

Two against Defendant Martin. The Court will require Defendant Martin to answer 

Count Two. 

C. Defendant Bell

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Bell suggest, at best, that Defendant Bell 

may have been negligent or committed medical malpractice, but do not rise to the level of 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Thus, the Court will dismiss 

without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bell. 

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D. Defendant Wexford 

 Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wexford Health has stopped virtually all 

medical care and “all or most medications” and has cancelled “most” outside medical 

care, he does not allege that Defendant Wexford has stopped Plaintiff’s medical care or 

acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff’s 

allegations against Defendant Wexford are too vague, conclusory, and generic to state a 

claim. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendant Wexford Health. 

V. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing 

fee of $2.06. 

(3) Counts Three and Four are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (4) Defendants Wexford Health and Bell are dismissed without prejudice.

 (5) Defendants Ryan and Martin must answer Counts One and Two, 

respectively. 

 (6) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for 

Defendants Ryan and Martin. 

 (7) Plaintiff must complete1

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (8) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the 

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, 

 1

If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections, Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or 

employee works. Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central 

Office of the Arizona Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works 

there. 

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the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); 

LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (9) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (10) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of 

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court. 

 (11) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and 

Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not 

the Plaintiff.

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 (12) Defendants must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by 

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (13) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (14) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 DATED this 19th day of April, 2013. 

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