Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01036/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01036-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PENNY DENTON, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 

) No. CIV 05-1036 PHX RCB

vs. ) 

) O R D E R

TOWN OF WICKENBURG, ) 

)

Defendant. ) )

In this employment discrimination action, Plaintiff alleges

violations of the Arizona Civil Rights Act ("ACRA") and the

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and asserts claims for

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Third Am. Compl. (doc. # 36) 

¶¶ 21-29. Currently pending before the Court are Defendant's

motion for summary judgment (doc. # 20) and motion to strike (doc.

# 27), both of which have been fully briefed. Having carefully

considered the arguments raised, the Court now rules.

. . .

Case 2:05-cv-01036-RCB Document 42 Filed 09/15/06 Page 1 of 18
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1

 The words "police aid" have recently been added to the title

of the position, reflecting the addition of clerical functions to the

ACO's essential duties. PSOF ¶¶ 7-8.

2

 According to Plaintiff, the ACO would regularly use a police

radio to call for assistance with large animals such as deer, which

would require more than one individual to move. See PSOF, Ex. 1 ¶ 7.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Undisputed Facts

The Town of Wickenberg ("Defendant") has only one animal

control officer ("ACO") position, which requires the individual to

be out in the field essentially full-time in a forty-hour week. 

Def.'s Statement of Facts (doc. # 21) ("DSOF") ¶¶ 3-4. The written

job description indicates that the "essential duties and

responsibilities" include "[p]atrol[ing] streets to locate stray

animals and promptly capture animals and transport them to an

animal shelter."1 Pl.'s Statement of Facts (doc. # 25) ("PSOF"),

Ex. 3 at 1. When there is no ACO available to secure animals, that

duty is performed by the town's police officers.2 DSOF ¶ 16.

On March 6, 1992, Defendant hired Plaintiff Penny Denton as a

part-time ACO. DSOF ¶ 1; PSOF ¶ 1. Plaintiff's status was changed

to full-time ACO on July 1, 1999. DSOF ¶ 2; PSOF ¶ 1.

On May 30, 2001, while pursuing stray dogs, Plaintiff got

caught on a fence, and sprained her left ankle. DSOF ¶ 7. 

Plaintiff underwent four separate surgeries for her ankle, and

commenced industrial leave on July 10, 2001. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. 

Although she was scheduled to return on July 23, 2001, Plaintiff's

treating physician, Gustavo J. Armendariz, M.D., did not release

her to light duty status until September 4, 2001. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. 

Thereafter, in May of 2002, Plaintiff came under the care of

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Stanley C. Graves, M.D., who performed the second of Plaintiff's

four ankle surgeries on June 11, 2002. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Dr. Graves

released Plaintiff to work in October of 2002, subject to the

following work restrictions: (1) no lifting or carrying of more

than twenty-five pounds and (2) no walking on uneven ground. Id.

¶ 14. Plaintiff was subsequently placed on light-duty status. Id.

¶ 15; PSOF ¶ 34.

In his treatment notes of January 2, 2003, Dr. Graves

indicated that Plaintiff continued to struggle on light-duty

status, and that she "will always have an abnormal ankle. She will

always have an impairment and . . . it is unlikely that she will

ever return to significant walking and standing." DSOF ¶ 17. Dr.

Graves also reported the following restrictions:

[Plaintiff] will always have permanent

restrictions even with a solid fusion or ankle

replacement. These will not change even after

surgery. These would require approximately 3

hours standing in an entire shift at most. She

would not be able to lift more than 20 lbs. 

She could not squat, stoop or climb ladders. 

She would have to remain on even surfaces.

Id. Plaintiff then underwent additional surgeries on April 23,

2003 and November 5, 2003. Id. ¶ 19. On May 11, 2004, an

independent medical examination ("IME") was performed by Dr.

William Leonetti, M.D., who advised as follows:

I believe that based on her motion limitations,

[Plaintiff] should avoid standing any time

longer than four hours per 8-hour shift. She

should avoid working on any unlevel ground

surfaces. She should avoid any climbing,

excessive use of stairs or ladder use. Her

lifting should be limited to 45 pounds. She

should avoid pushing and pulling over 50

pounds. She should avoid any impaction type

activities. These work restrictions will be

permanent.

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Id. ¶¶ 26-27.

On June 25, 2004, Plaintiff received notice that her

employment would be terminated effective July 1, 2004, citing her

inability to perform the duties of ACO on account of her permanent

work restrictions. DSOF, Ex. O.

In a handwritten note dated July 9, 2004, Dr. Graves released

Plaintiff to full-duty for the ACO position. DSOF ¶¶ 30-31. 

However, in his March 3, 2005 testimony before the Industrial

Commission of Arizona, Dr. Graves stated that no one with an ankle

fusion would be able to stand for 90% of an eight-hour shift, run

occasionally, or traverse uneven ground while restraining or

retaining animals. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Dr. Leonetti similarly testified

that Plaintiff could not perform those duties, noting that the

"difficulty will be running and/or walking or moving on uneven

surfaces," and explaining that a person with a fused ankle joint

would have a "considerable loss of balance." Id. ¶¶ 34-35. 

However, Dr. Leonetti also testified that it would be an "excellent

idea" for Plaintiff to receive a supportive care award for an ankle

brace, "especially if she is going to try and be physically

active." PSOF, Ex. 11 at 10-11.

B. Disputed Facts

Based on Plaintiff's testimony before the Industrial

Commission of Arizona, Defendant contends that the ACO spends over

ninety percent of the workday on her feet, and is required to walk

on uneven surfaces and run occasionally. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. In an effort

to clarify that testimony, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit

explaining that she understood the phrase, "up on your feet," as

distinguishing between the time spent at her desk and the time

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spent on patrol outside the office. PSOF ¶ 28. Plaintiff states

that the majority of her patrols as the ACO were conducted from a

patrol vehicle, not on foot, and that she rarely ran or jogged on

the job to pursue or capture animals. Id. ¶¶ 31-32.

During her time on light-duty status, the chief of police

would regularly instruct Plaintiff to radio for assistance if she

could not lift an animal. PSOF ¶ 34. The parties disagree as to

whether, in light of this assistance, Plaintiff was performing all

of the ACO's essential duties. See DSOF ¶ 15; PSOF ¶ 34.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate "when there is no genuine

issue of material fact" such that "the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In determining

whether to grant summary judgment, a district court must view the

underlying facts and the inferences to be drawn from those facts in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita

Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

If a party will bear the burden of proof at trial as to an

element essential to its claim, and fails to adduce evidence

establishing a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the

existence of that element, then summary judgment is appropriate. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Not

every factual dispute is capable of defeating a properly supported

motion for summary judgment. Rather, the party opposing the motion

must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A

factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a rational

trier of fact could resolve the dispute in favor of the nonmoving

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party. Id. at 248. A fact is material if determination of the

issue might affect the outcome of the case under the governing

substantive law. Id. Thus, a party opposing a motion for summary

judgment cannot rest upon bare allegations or denials in the

pleadings, but must set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue for trial. See id. at 250. If the nonmoving party's

evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, a

court may grant summary judgment. See id. at 249; see also Cal.

Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d

1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint alleges violation of the

ACRA (Count 1), wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

(Count 2), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 3),

and violation of the ADA (Count 4). Third Am. Compl. (doc. # 36)

¶¶ 21-29. In her response to Defendant's motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff states that she does not oppose dismissal of

her state law claims for wrongful discharge and intentional

infliction of emotional distress (Counts 2 and 3). Accordingly,

the Court will grant Defendant's motion with respect to Counts 2

and 3, and resolve the motion with respect to the remaining ADA and

ACRA claims (Counts 1 and 4) below. See Resp. (doc. # 24) at 15.

A. Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit

Before addressing Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the

Court turns to Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's affidavit. 

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's affidavit is a self-serving

"sham" that is contradictory to Plaintiff's prior sworn statements. 

Mot. (doc. # 27) at 4-5. Rule 12(f) permits the court to strike

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3

 The motion is denied only on the technical basis that

Defendant has requested an unnecessary form of relief, when the

matter could have been adequately briefed in Defendant's reply in

support of the underlying motion for summary judgment (doc. # 20) and

a sur-reply by Plaintiff, if requested. As such, in resolving the

motion for summary judgment (doc. # 20), the Court will still

consider the substance of Defendant's arguments, and Plaintiff's

response, regarding whether Plaintiff's affidavit is truly a "sham"

that fails to create a genuine issue of material fact.

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"from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(f) (emphasis added). By its terms, Rule 12(f) applies to

pleadings and not affidavits. See id.; Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983); Charles Alan Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, 5C Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380 (3d ed.

2005) (Rule 12(f) is "neither an authorized nor a proper way . . .

to strike an opponent's affidavits.").

Defendant does not argue in terms of Rule 12(f), which is the

proper basis for striking matters from pleadings, but, instead,

reminds the Court "that a party cannot 'create' an issue of fact by

an affidavit contradicting her prior testimony" in order to survive

summary judgment. Mot. (doc. # 27) at 4 (citing Kennedy v. Allied

Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991)). The Ninth

Circuit's rule in Kennedy establishes the weight to be accorded

evidence by a court in considering a motion for summary judgment,

and does not require the court to actually strike the alleged

"sham" affidavit proffered by the non-moving party. See Kennedy,

952 F.2d at 266-67. Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant's

motion to strike (doc. # 27).3

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate with

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respect to Plaintiff's ACRA and ADA claims (Counts 1 and 4),

because (1) Plaintiff cannot show that she was a "qualified

individual with a disability," 42 U.S.C. § 1211(8), Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 41-1461(8) (West 2004), at the time of the adverse

employment action, and (2) Plaintiff cannot show any evidence of

pretext to overcome Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for terminating her employment. Mot. (doc. # 20) at 4-8.

1. Qualified Individual with a Disability

Both the ADA and ACRA prohibit an employer from discriminating

against an individual with a disability by terminating the person's

employment because of that disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 41-1463(B)(1) (West 2004). In addition, both acts

make it unlawful for an employer to fail to make reasonable

accommodations to the known physical limitations of an otherwise

qualified individual, unless the employer can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(A); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1463(F)(4) (West 2004). To

prevail on her ADA and ACRA claims, Plaintiff must first prove that

she is a "qualified individual with a disability," i.e., that she

was "an individual with a disability who, with or without

reasonable accommodation," could perform all of the essential

functions of the job of ACO. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211(8); 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(m); Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d

1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1461(8)

(West 2004).

In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff's ADA and ACRA claims fail as a matter of law, because

she could not perform the essential functions of the job of ACO,

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4

 Because the ACRA was modeled after the federal employment

discrimination laws of Title VII, Arizona courts apply federal case

law in applying the ACRA. See Francini v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.,

188 Ariz. 576, 937 P.2d 1382, 1388 (Ct. App. 1996).

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and, therefore, was not a "qualified individual with a disability." 

Mot. (doc. 20) at 4-6. In particular, Defendant asserts that the

position's essential functions of patrolling the town and

responding to calls of animals at large require the ability to run

and walk on uneven surfaces-- activities which Plaintiff, with or

without reasonable accommodation, could not perform due to the

condition of her ankle. See id. Plaintiff contends that summary

judgment is inappropriate, because there are genuine issues of

material fact as to (1) whether running and traversing uneven

terrain are essential functions of the job of ACO and (2), even if

they were, whether she could perform those essential functions with

or without reasonable accommodations. Resp. (doc. # 24) at 7-14.

a. Essential Functions

"The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties

of the employment position the individual with a disability holds

or desires." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). The essential functions of

a given position are determined on a case by case basis, taking

into consideration such factors as written job descriptions, the

work experience of past incumbents in the job, the number of

employees available to perform the function, and the employer's

judgment as to which functions are essential.4 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(n); see also Rent A Ctr. v. Indus. Comm'n, 191 Ariz. 406,

956 P.2d 533, 536 (Ct. App. 1998). In the instant case, the

relevant factors demonstrate that the activities of running and

traversing uneven terrain are part and parcel of the ACO's

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5

 Plaintiff's arguments suggest that if the balance of time

spent pursuing and capturing animals is outweighed by time spent

performing desk duties or patrolling the streets in her vehicle, then

the capture of animals is no longer an essential function. This

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essential functions, and there is no evidence from which a rational

trier of fact could conclude otherwise.

(i). Written Job Description

The written job description indicates that the ACO's

"essential duties and responsibilities" include "[p]atrol[ing]

streets to locate stray animals and promptly capture animals and

transport them to an animal shelter." PSOF, Ex. 3 at 1.

Plaintiff claims that the position has "morphed" into a

clerical job, because the words "police aid" have been added to, or

substituted for, the title of "animal control officer." Resp.

(doc. # 24) at 11. Plaintiff's primary basis for this claim arises

from Police Chief Anthony Melendez's deposition testimony and a

letter from Police Commander Gary Newton. See PSOF ¶¶ 7-8. 

However, this evidence is hardly colorable, and not significantly

probative on the point Plaintiff seeks to establish. Chief

Melendez's testimony merely indicates that the change in title

reflected the addition of clerical duties to the job

responsibilities. PSOF, Ex. 4 at 6-7. In other words, the police

aid/ACO is still expected to control animals, which as before,

entails patrolling the streets to capture and transport the

animals. Even if the majority of time on the job is spent

performing desk duties, that does not demonstrate, as Plaintiff now

suggests, that the pursuit and capture of animals are no longer

essential functions of the position. Indeed, the position seems to

exist for the performance of those very functions.5 Moreover,

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reasoning is flawed, because it places inordinate value on how time

is spent without considering the relative significance of the duties

performed in that time. Under this logic, a town would have to be

significantly overpopulated with animals before the ACO would be

expected to control animals. Until then, capturing animals would

only be an incidental duty as compared to the seemingly more

essential functions of doing desk work and cruising the streets.

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Commander Newton's letter, although referring to the position as

"police aid" rather than "police aid/animal control officer," says

nothing about job duties to substantiate Plaintiff's apparent

belief that the animal control duties have suddenly become

incidental or optional. PSOF, Ex. 12. As such, the Court finds

that this evidence does not establish a genuine issue of material

fact as to the ACO's essential functions. See Cal. Architectural

Bldg. Prods., Inc., 818 F.2d at 1468. On balance, the written job

description for the position shows that the ACO's primary duties

include patrolling the streets to locate, capture, and transport

animals.

(ii). Experience of Past Incumbent in the Job

In discussing her work experience as a past incumbent in the

job, Plaintiff testified before the Industrial Commission of

Arizona that the ACO position required her to be in the field

essentially full-time, spending over ninety percent of that time on

her feet, and that the job required her to walk on uneven surfaces

and occasionally run. DSOF, Ex. D at 18-19.

Plaintiff now argues that her prior testimony before the

Industrial Commission of Arizona should not be construed as

implying that she was literally "out in the field" or "up on [her]

feet" running for ninety percent of the day. See Resp. (doc. 

# 24)at 10-11. Rather, Plaintiff maintains that she intended to

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6

 In its motion to strike, Defendant hastens to characterize

Plaintiff's attempt to clarify her prior testimony as a "sham"

affidavit that should be disregarded. See Mot. (doc. # 27) at 4-5.

The Court disagrees. Although self-serving affidavits rarely create

genuine issues of material fact, the Ninth Circuit has expressly

cautioned that district courts are not to discount every seemingly

"contradictory affidavit" that is introduced to explain earlier

testimony. Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 266-67. Rather, the district court

must make a determination that the seemingly contradictory affidavit

actually is a "sham." Id. at 267.

Having reviewed the hearing transcript, the Court finds that

Plaintiff's clarification of potential ambiguities in her earlier

testimony is reasonable. Indeed, her understanding of "out in the

field" as meaning that she was simply away from her desk patrolling

the streets in a vehicle, as is customary in modern times, seems more

plausible than Defendant's view that she was literally on her feet

for ninety percent of the day. Therefore, the Court will not

discredit Plaintiff's affidavit as a pure "sham."

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convey that she spent most of her day away from her desk,

patrolling the streets in the patrol vehicle.6 See PSOF, Ex. 1 

¶¶ 13-17. However, Plaintiff does not contend that she never ran

or traversed uneven surfaces to capture an animal. See id. ¶¶ 18-

20. Even if Plaintiff spent most of her time in her patrol

vehicle, or was able to capture most animals without a significant

chase, the brevity of time spent on foot-- possibly running,

possibly crossing uneven terrain-- does not rule out those

activities from the ACO's essential function of capturing animals. 

Plaintiff's belief that running would tend to "spook" the animals,

making their capture more difficult, may be well supported in her

experience, yet even Plaintiff seems to accept that it is sometimes

necessary to run in order to capture an animal. See id. ¶ 18. 

Therefore, Plaintiff's testimony about her experience as an

incumbent in the job, even as clarified in her recent affidavit,

tends to show that running and traversing uneven terrain are

essential functions of the job.

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(iii). Number of Employees Available to Perform Function; and

 Employer's Judgment as to Which Functions are Essential

The fact that there is only one ACO makes it imperative that

the person selected for the position be able to run and cross

uneven terrain in the pursuit of animals, and Defendant's judgment

as to the essential functions is evidently the same. See DSOF ¶ 3;

DSOF, Ex. O. Although the original job description does not

expressly state that running and traversing uneven terrain are

essential functions, it is apparent that these activities are the

natural concomitants of the position's essential function of

patrolling the streets to locate, capture, and transport animals. 

See PSOF, Ex. 3 at 1, 3.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest

upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but

instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue

for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Here, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue for trial regarding the essential functions of the

position of ACO. Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477

U.S. at 322. Based on the undisputed facts, reasonable jurors

could not differ as to the conclusion that running and traversing

uneven terrain are essential functions of the position of ACO. 

Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on the issue of

essential functions.

. . .

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b. Reasonable Accommodations

"[T]he employee bears the burden of proving the existence of

specific reasonable accommodations that the employer failed to

provide." Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th

Cir. 2002). The term "reasonable accommodation" means

"[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the

manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is

customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a

disability to perform the essential functions of that position." 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). Reasonable accommodations under the

ACRA and ADA may include the "acquisition or modifications of

equipment or devices." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1461(9)(b) (West

2004); accord 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). However, an employer

is generally not expected, in making a reasonable accommodation, to

assign the essential functions of one position to employees in

other positions. See, e.g., Rent A Ctr., 956 P.2d at 536 (citing

Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of N.C., 859 F. Supp. 963

(E.D.N.C. 1994)).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff could not, with or without

reasonable accommodations, perform the essential functions of

running and traversing uneven terrain, and, therefore, was not a

"qualified individual with a disability" under either the ADA or

ACRA. Mot. (doc. 20) at 4-6. Plaintiff responds that, whatever

the essential functions of the job are determined to be, there were

reasonable accommodations that would have permitted her to perform

those functions. Resp. (doc. # 24) at 12. Specifically, Plaintiff

contends that (1) a vehicle to patrol the streets, (2) a radio to

call police officers for assistance with animals she could not lift

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alone due to her physical limitations, and (3) an ankle brace to

assist her in being physically active would constitute reasonable

accommodations enabling her to perform the essential functions of

the job. Id. at 12-13.

(i) Patrol Vehicle

Plaintiff claims that the ACO's patrol vehicle is a reasonable

accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential

functions of the job. See Resp. (doc. # 24) at 12. It is hard to

imagine the patrol vehicle as a reasonable accommodation when it is

listed in the job description among the equipment that the ACO is

expected to use. See PSOF, Ex. 3 at 3. More importantly, although

the vehicle may assist the ACO in patrolling the town's streets,

there is no indication of how it would eliminate the need for

Plaintiff to run or cross uneven terrain when pursuing animals. 

See PSOF, Ex. 1 ¶ 18. Absent some special accoutrements that have

not been brought to the Court's attention, it is unfathomable that

the patrol vehicle would assist Plaintiff in such a way that she

would never have to disembark her vehicle to capture an animal. 

Accordingly, the Court finds no triable issue as to whether the

patrol vehicle is a reasonable accommodation in this case.

(ii) Police Radio

As another reasonable accommodation, Plaintiff suggests that

she would be "free to radio for assistance in the event she

encountered an animal that any physical limitations prevented her

from capturing or picking up." See Resp. (doc. # 24) at 12

(emphasis added). In support, Plaintiff states (1) that she "was

never disciplined for radioing for assistance and frequently was

reminded to radio for assistance," and (2) that "[a]fter [her]

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injury, when [she] was placed on light duty status, the Chief of

Police would regularly instruct [her] to radio for assistance if

[she] could not lift an animal." PSOF, Ex. 1 ¶ 8.

Plaintiff's argument obfuscates the distinction between

reasonable accommodations and the essential functions of the ACO

position. For instance, her assertion that "[t]he Town's police

officers often perform the duties of the Animal Control Officer and

assist the Animal Control Officer when she is on duty," Resp. (doc.

# 24) at 12, purports to acknowledge that there are duties

belonging to the ACO, while simultaneously sloughing off those

responsibilities to the town's police officers. If the police

officers were always required to provide the same level of

assistance provided during the ACO's light-duty7 status, the

essential functions of the ACO would have to be reassigned to the

police officers. This is not a reasonable accommodation. See Rent

A Ctr., 956 P.2d at 536.

(iii) Ankle Brace

Finally, Plaintiff claims that an ankle brace might constitute

a reasonable accommodation, because Dr. Leonetti believed that she

was entitled to a supportive care award for an ankle brace. Resp.

(doc. # 24) at 12-13. In his testimony before the Industrial

Commission of Arizona, Dr. Leonetti indicated that it would be an

"excellent idea" for Plaintiff to receive a supportive care award

for an ankle brace, "especially if she is going to try and be

physically active." PSOF, Ex. 11 at 10-11. It will take far more

than a reasonable inference to divine what Dr. Leonetti had in mind

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in terms of being "physically active." Evidence that is merely

colorable or not significantly probative does not create a genuine

issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Cal.

Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc., 818 F.2d at 1468. Because no

reasonable juror could find that Plaintiff could actually run or

traverse uneven terrain using an ankle brace, based on Dr.

Leonetti's ambiguous reference to being "physically active,"

Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether

an ankle brace would constitute a reasonable accommodation. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to set forth

specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial regarding

whether she could, with or without reasonable accommodation,

perform the essential functions of the position of ACO. Summary

judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. 

Based on the undisputed facts, reasonable jurors could not differ

as to the conclusion that Plaintiff was not a "qualified individual

with a disability." See 42 U.S.C. § 1211(8); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1630.2(m); Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1225; accord Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 41-1461(8) (West 2004). Therefore, summary judgment is

appropriate on Plaintiff's ACRA and ADA claims.

2. Non-Discriminatory Reason for Adverse Employment Action

Defendant contends that summary judgment is also appropriate

with respect to Plaintiff's ACRA and ADA claims, because Plaintiff

cannot produce any evidence of pretext to discredit Defendant's

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legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating her

employment. Mot. (doc. # 20) at 6-8. Because summary judgment is

appropriate on the basis that Plaintiff was not a "qualified

individual with a disability," the Court need not address this

argument.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike

Plaintiff's Affidavit (doc. # 27) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. # 20) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter

judgment in favor of Defendant and terminate this case.

DATED this 13th day of September, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

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