Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05240/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05240-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 8, 2011 Decided May 6, 2011

No. 10-5240

AMADOR COUNTY, CALIFORNIA,

APPELLANT

v.

KENNETH LEE SALAZAR, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-00658)

Dennis J. Whittlesey argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant.

Katherine W. Hazard, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief 

was Kathryn E. Kovacs, Attorney. Susan L. Pacholski, 

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

entered appearances.

Mark C. Tilden and Padraic McCoy were on the briefs of 

amicus curiae Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians in 

support of appellees. 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 1 of 20
2

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, 

and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Pursuant to the Indian Gaming 

Regulatory Act, the Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk 

Indians entered into a compact with the state of California to 

engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the 

Secretary of the Interior for approval of that compact. Under 

the Act, “[i]f the Secretary does not approve or disapprove a 

compact . . . [within] 45 days . . . the compact shall be 

considered to have been approved by the Secretary, but only 

to the extent the compact is consistent with the provisions of”

the Act. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C). In this case, the Secretary 

took no action within forty-five days, thus allowing the 

compact to become effective. Amador County, in which the 

Buena Vista Tribe’s land is located, challenged the 

Secretary’s “no-action” approval, claiming that the land fails 

to qualify as “Indian Land”—a statutory requirement for 

gaming. Although the district court rejected the Secretary’s 

argument that Amador County lacked standing, it dismissed 

the suit, finding the Secretary’s inaction unreviewable under 

several provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 

Amador County now appeals. We agree with the district court 

that the County has standing, but because we conclude that 

the Secretary’s inaction is in fact reviewable, we reverse and 

remand for the district court to consider the merits in the first 

instance.

I.

Since at least 1817, the Buena Vista Rancheria of MeWuk Indians of California (the “Tribe”) has been located in 

the vicinity of what is now Amador County, about forty miles 

southeast of Sacramento. In 1927, pursuant to a series of 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 2 of 20
3

appropriations bills intended to fund the purchase of land for 

“Indians in California now residing on reservations which do 

not contain land suitable for cultivations, and for Indians who 

are not now upon reservations in said State,” the United States 

purchased 67.5 acres of land in the County and held it in trust 

for the Tribe’s use. Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 

325, 333; Act of April 30, 1908, ch. 153, 35 Stat. 70, 76; Act 

of Aug. 1, 1914, ch. 222, 38 Stat. 582, 589. The current status 

of that land (the “Rancheria”) is the central issue in this case.

In 1958, in keeping with the then-popular policy of 

assimilating Native Americans into American society, 

Congress enacted the California Rancheria Act, which 

authorized the Secretary to terminate the federal trust 

relationship with several California tribes, including the MeWuk Tribe, and to transfer tribal lands from federal trust 

ownership to individual fee ownership. Act of Aug. 18, 1958, 

Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619. Pursuant to that statute, title 

to the Rancheria was transferred to two tribe members, Louis 

and Annie Oliver, as joint tenants. Some twenty years later, 

however, other members of the Tribe joined with members of 

sixteen other California Rancherias and filed a class action 

lawsuit to undo the effects of the California Rancheria Act. 

Specifically, they sought an injunction requiring the Secretary 

to “ ‘unterminate’ each of the subject Rancherias” and to 

“treat all of the subject Rancherias as Indian reservations in

all respects[.]” Complaint at 27, Hardwick v. United States, 

No. C-79-1710 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (quoted in Letter from Penny 

J. Coleman, National Indian Gaming Commission Acting 

General Counsel, to Judith Kammins Albietz, Tribal Attorney, 

at 3 (June 30, 2005) (included at J.A. 17) [hereinafter “Indian 

Lands Determination”] (alteration in original)).

The lawsuit ended in a settlement between the tribes and 

the federal government and, subsequently, in a series of 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 3 of 20
4

separate stipulated judgments between the individual tribes 

and the counties in which the tribes’ land lay. In the first 

settlement, the Secretary agreed to restore “any of the benefits 

or services provided or performed by the United States for 

Indians because of their status as Indians” and to “recognize 

the Indian Tribes, Bands, Communities or groups of the 

seventeen rancherias . . . as Indian entities with the same 

status as they possessed prior to distribution of the assets of 

these Rancherias under the California Rancheria Act.” 

Stipulation and Order, Hardwick v. United States, No. C-79-

1710 (Dec. 22, 1983) (quoted in Indian Lands Determination,

at 4 (included at J.A 17-18)). In the stipulated judgment 

between Amador County and the Tribe (the “Hardwick 

Judgment”), the parties settled a number of issues related to 

the levy of property taxes, and the County agreed to the 

following terms:

[1] The plaintiff Rancheria and the 

Plaintiffs were never and are not now lawfully 

terminated under the California Rancheria 

Act . . .

[2] The original boundaries of the plaintiff 

Rancheria . . . are hereby restored, and all land 

within these restored boundaries of the plaintiff 

Rancheria is declared “Indian Country.”

[3] The plaintiff Rancheria shall be treated 

by the County of Amador and the United States 

of America, as any other federally recognized 

Indian Reservation, and all of the laws of the 

United States that pertain to federally 

recognized Indian Tribes and Indians shall apply 

to the Plaintiff Rancheria and the Plaintiffs.

Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, Hardwick v. United States,

No. C-79-1710, at 4 (Apr. 21, 1987) (included at J.A. 51).

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 4 of 20
5

In the late 1990s, the Tribe began planning a gaming 

operation and initiated the process of acquiring requisite state 

and federal approval pursuant to the Indian Gaming 

Regulatory Act (IGRA). Enacted in 1988, IGRA created a 

regulatory framework for tribal gaming intended to balance 

state, federal, and tribal interests. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 

2702. The Act divides gaming into three classes, only one of 

which—Class III, which includes most casino games such as 

blackjack and roulette as well as slot machines—is at issue in 

this case. See id. § 2703(8). Before commencing Class III 

gaming, a tribe must satisfy three conditions. First, the 

gaming must be authorized by a tribal ordinance or resolution 

that has been approved by the National Indian Gaming 

Commission, a regulatory body created by IGRA with 

rulemaking and enforcement authority. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A), 

(2)(C). Second, the Indian lands where the gaming will take 

place must be located within a state that permits gaming “for 

any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.” Id. § 

2710(d)(1)(B). And third, the gaming must be conducted in 

conformance with a tribal-state compact that has been 

approved by the Secretary. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C). In addition, 

and critical to this case, IGRA provides for gaming only on 

“Indian lands.” Id. § 2710(d)(1) (“Class III gaming activities 

shall be lawful on Indian Lands . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Once a tribe has submitted a tribal-state compact for 

approval, the Secretary has three choices. He may approve the 

compact, id. § 2710(d)(8)(A); he may disapprove the 

compact, but only if it violates IGRA or other federal law or 

trust obligations, id. § 2710(d)(8)(B); or he may choose to do 

nothing, in which case the compact is deemed approved after 

forty-five days “but only to the extent the compact is 

consistent with the provisions” of IGRA, id. § 2710(d)(8)(C). 

The compact takes effect once the Secretary publishes notice 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 5 of 20
6

of approval in the Federal Register. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(D), 

(3)(B).

In 1999, the Me-Wuk Tribe completed an initial round of 

negotiations with the State of California, and shortly 

thereafter the Secretary approved the resulting compact. In 

2004, the Tribe began a second round of negotiations to 

amend the compact in order to provide for “expanded gaming 

at a prospective casino.” Appellees’ Br. 15. The compact 

amendment also expanded revenue sharing between the Tribe 

and the State and directed the Tribe to make arrangements 

with Amador County to mitigate any potential impacts on the 

County. When the Tribe submitted the compact amendment to 

the Secretary, he chose to do nothing, meaning that pursuant 

to subsection (d)(8)(C) the amendment was deemed approved 

after forty-five days. The Secretary published a notice of 

approval in the Federal Register on December 20, 2004. 69 

Fed. Reg. 76,004.

Amador County then sued the Secretary in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging 

that the Rancheria fails to satisfy IGRA’s “Indian lands” 

requirement. The County sought declaratory and injunctive 

relief including an order requiring the Secretary to withdraw 

approval and affirmatively reject the compact. Although the 

County also alleged that the Secretary’s approval was void ab 

initio due to a technicality in California law, First Amended 

Complaint ¶¶ 57–60, it does not press this argument on 

appeal.

The Secretary moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), alleging that Amador County lacked 

standing, and under Rule 12(b)(6), alleging that the “claims 

[were] not subject to review under the Administrative 

Procedure Act [APA].” Although the district court found that 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 6 of 20
7

Amador County had standing, it dismissed the complaint, 

agreeing with the Secretary that the approval via inaction was 

unreviewable for several reasons. Amador Cty., Cal. v. 

Kempthorne, 592 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2009). First, 

believing that the statute imposes no limit on the Secretary’s 

authority to approve a compact and thus “lacks a standard to 

guide judicial review of the Secretary’s decision,” the court 

concluded that the “decision is committed to agency 

discretion.” Id. at 106; 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Second, the court

held that the statute precludes judicial review of approval by 

inaction because Congress had “limited the Secretary’s 

approval by inaction to apply only to those portions of a 

compact that are lawful under the statute . . . . Thus, the 

Secretary’s approval by inaction can never violate the 

statute.” Amador Cty., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 107; 5 U.S.C. § 

701(a)(2).

Arguing that the district court erred in finding no-action 

approvals unreviewable, Amador County now appeals. The 

Secretary continues to challenge the County’s standing. We 

review both the standing determination and the Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal de novo. Affum v. United States, 566 F.3d 1150, 

1158 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We review de novo the District 

Court’s decision on standing.”); Holy Land Found. for Relief 

& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 161–62 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 

(“We review the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 

claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.”).

II.

We begin with the Secretary’s argument that Amador 

County lacks constitutional standing to maintain this suit. In 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court described 

the elements of the three-part constitutional standing test—

injury in fact, causation, and redressability—and explained 

that to establish injury a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 7 of 20
8

a “legally protected interest.” 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 

According to the Secretary, because Amador County agreed 

to the Hardwick Judgment, in which it promised to treat the 

Rancheria as Indian land, the County has no legally 

cognizable interest in the land being treated as anything other 

than that. We disagree. Amador County may well be bound 

by the Hardwick Judgment, in which case it will lose on the 

merits, but for the purposes of standing, “we assume the 

merits” in favor of the plaintiff. Parker v. District of 

Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 377–78 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding 

that whether the plaintiff actually had a Second Amendment 

right to bear arms was irrelevant to whether he had standing 

to challenge a law impeding that right). Indeed, interpreting 

Lujan, which involved a challenge under the Endangered 

Species Act, we explained that the Supreme Court had 

considered only whether “plaintiffs had a ‘cognizable interest’ 

in observing animal species without considering whether the 

plaintiffs had a legal right to do so.” Id. (citing Lujan, 502 

U.S. at 562–63). Accordingly, in order to establish injury in 

fact, Amador County need demonstrate only that it will be 

injured by the planned gaming and thus has a cognizable 

interest in prohibiting it. To this end, the County has alleged, 

among other things, that the planned gaming would increase 

the County’s infrastructure costs and impact the character of 

the community. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 26–27. The 

district court accepted these allegations as true, as must we, 

see Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1969), and 

the Secretary nowhere challenges them on appeal. We agree 

with the district court that the County’s allegations are more 

than sufficient to establish “concrete and particularized” 

harm. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

The County also easily satisfies the requirements of 

causation and redressability. Because the Tribe may proceed 

with gaming only with secretarial approval of the compact, 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 8 of 20
9

there is a direct causal connection between the Secretary’s noaction approval and the alleged harm. The injury is also 

redressable because if the County succeeds on the merits and 

obtains a declaration that the Rancheria does not qualify as 

Indian land, the Secretary would have to reject the compact. 

See id. at 560–61 (describing causation and redressability

requirements); see also Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 704

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding all Article III standing requirements 

met in a challenge by a neighboring landowner to the 

Secretary’s decision to take tribal land into trust, thereby 

allowing the tribe to proceed with plans to construct a 

gambling facility); Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 

Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490, 495–502 (7th Cir. 

2005) (holding that plaintiffs, another tribe also challenging 

approval by inaction, had satisfied Article III standing 

requirements).

We next address the Secretary’s argument that the 

County fails to satisfy the requirements of prudential standing

because it falls outside “the zone of interests to be protected” 

by IGRA. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 

397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Considering circumstances similar 

to this case, we recently reiterated in Patchak v. Salazar the 

oft-repeated rule that the zone-of-interests test is “not 

especially demanding.” Patchak, 632 F.3d at 705 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In that case, a neighboring private 

landowner argued that the Secretary’s decision to take land 

into trust, thus making it eligible for gaming under IGRA, had 

violated another statute—the Indian Reorganization Act. 

Reasoning that because the latter statute imposes a limit on 

the Secretary’s trust authority, we held that “[w]hen that 

limitation blocks Indian gaming, as [the litigant] claim[ed] it 

should have . . . , the interests of those in the surrounding 

community—or at least those who would suffer from living 

near a gambling operation—are arguably protected. And 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 9 of 20
10

because of their interests, they are proper parties to enforce 

the [Act’s] restrictions.” Id. at 706. So too here. Those in the 

surrounding community who are impacted by gambling fall 

within IGRA’s zone of interest. Accordingly, the County, 

whose alleged injury flows from its proximity to the gambling 

operation, is “arguably protected” and is thus a proper party to 

enforce the limitations IGRA imposes on the Secretary.

The Secretary nonetheless insists that the concerns of the 

County, a political subdivision of the State, fall outside 

IGRA’s zone of interest because the statute directly protects 

only states and tribes. According to the Secretary, the 

County’s interests have been fully protected by its 

participation in the political process through which the 

compact was formed, and it would be “inconsistent with the 

purpose of IGRA to allow a political subdivision of the State, 

through an action in federal court, to invalidate the agreement 

negotiated by the State and Tribe.” Appellees’ Br. 34. The 

Secretary points out that in prior cases, including Patchak, 

where we have allowed community groups and neighbors to 

sue under IGRA, those groups were challenging the 

Secretary’s decision to take land into trust rather than the 

Secretary’s approval of a tribal-state compact. A suit in the 

latter situation is, the Secretary argues, essentially a challenge 

to an action of the State. Again, we disagree. In both 

instances, the Secretary has independent obligations imposed 

by federal law, and the County, just like other community 

groups and residents, is affected by whether or not the 

Secretary fulfills those obligations. For this particular 

purpose—enforcing the obligations of the Secretary—we see 

no good reason to treat Amador County differently from any 

other neighbor of a planned gaming facility.

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 10 of 20
11

III.

Relying on three separate provisions of the APA, the 

Secretary contends that where a compact is deemed approved 

because he failed to act within the forty-five day limit, the 

approval is unreviewable. In particular, the Secretary relies on 

(1) section 701(a)(1), prohibiting review where it is otherwise 

barred by statute; (2) section 701(a)(2), barring review of 

agency actions “committed to agency discretion”; and (3) 

section 704, allowing review only of “agency action.” We 

consider each argument in light of “the strong presumption 

that Congress intends judicial review of administrative 

action.” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.

667, 670 (1986). Accordingly, each category of nonreviewability must be construed narrowly. See Abbott Labs. v. 

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).

We start with the Secretary’s argument that IGRA 

precludes judicial review because it, unlike either the “final 

agency action” requirement or the “committed to agency 

discretion” limitation, is jurisdictional. Compare Block v. 

Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 353 n.4 (1984) 

(“[C]ongressional preclusion of judicial review is in effect 

jurisdictional.”), and Assoc. of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. 

Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 283 F.3d 339, 341 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (treating a statutory limitation on judicial review as 

jurisdictional), with Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 524–

26 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (clarifying that the committed to agency 

discretion limitation and the final agency action requirement 

are “not . . . jurisdictional bar[s]”). To overcome the strong 

presumption that Congress intends agency action to be 

reviewable, we must find “clear and convincing evidence of a 

contrary legislative intent.” Bowen, 476 U.S. at 671–72 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Absent an express 

statutory prohibition on judicial review, courts have been 

extremely hesitant to find such a bar. See id. at 673 & n.4.

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 11 of 20
12

The district court concluded that subsection (d)(8)(C) 

precludes judicial review because it creates an alternate 

mechanism to ensure compliance with the law. In other 

words, by that provision’s plain language—that compacts are 

deemed approved “only to the extent the compact is 

consistent with the provisions of [IGRA]”—only legal 

compact terms go into effect, meaning that, according to the 

district court, compacts approved by inaction must be legal.

Amador Cty., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 107 (“[T]he Secretary’s

approval of a compact by inaction can never violate the 

statute.”). But nothing in subsection (d)(8)(C) actually creates 

an alternative mechanism for compliance with the law. To be 

sure, it provides that only lawful compacts can become 

effective, but someone—i.e., the courts—must decide whether 

those provisions are in fact lawful. Cf. Lac Du Flambeau 

Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 422 F.3d at 501 

(explaining that 42 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) only prevents 

“offending provisions from becoming effective in some 

academic sense”). Indeed, as we explain below, subsection 

(d)(8)(C)’s caveat invites judicial review by setting out a clear 

standard for reviewing courts to apply.

Having concluded that no “intent to preclude judicial 

review is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme,” Block, 

467 U.S. at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted), and thus 

that we have jurisdiction, we turn to the Secretary’s argument 

that compact approval by inaction is unreviewable because 

approval is “committed to agency discretion.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 701(a)(2). In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 

the Supreme Court explained that this is “a very narrow 

exception” to judicial review that should be invoked only 

where there is “no law to apply.” 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 

For our part, we have observed that “section 701(a)(2)

encodes the principle that an agency cannot abuse its 

discretion, and thus violate section 706(2)(A), where its 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 12 of 20
13

governing statute confers such broad discretion as to 

essentially rule out the possibility of abuse.” Drake v. FAA, 

291 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2002). According to the Secretary, 

this is just such a case given that IGRA does not require 

disapproval. In support, the Secretary points out that under the 

statute he “may disapprove a compact . . . only if such 

compact violates—(i) any provision of this chapter, (ii) any 

other provision of Federal law . . . , or (iii) the trust 

obligations of the United States to Indians.” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 2710(d)(8)(B) (emphasis added). Because Congress used 

“may” instead of “shall,” the Secretary argues, he is never 

obligated to disapprove a compact and thus approval—either 

affirmative approval pursuant to subsection (d)(8)(A) or, by 

extension, no-action approval pursuant to subsection 

(d)(8)(C)—falls solely within his discretion.

We rejected a similar argument in Dickson v. Secretary of 

Defense, 68 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995). There, we considered 

whether a statute directing that the Army Board for 

Correction of Military Records “may excuse a failure to file 

[if it is in] the interest of justice” committed the decision to 

agency discretion. Id. at 1399. We found it implausible that 

Congress intended “may” to confer such complete discretion 

because taking that argument to its extreme would mean that 

“even if the Board expressly found in a particular case that it 

was in ‘the interest of justice’ to grant a waiver, it could still 

decline to do so.” Id. at 1402 & n.7 (citing two other cases in 

which courts, relying on statutory context, have read “may” to 

mean “shall”). Following this reasoning, we believe that 

subsection (d)(8)(B)’s use of “may” is best read to limit the 

circumstances in which disapproval is allowed. The Secretary 

must, however, disapprove a compact if it would violate any 

of the three limitations in that subsection, and those 

limitations provide the “law to apply.” In any event, as the 

County points out, even if disapproval were otherwise 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 13 of 20
14

discretionary, subsection (d)(8)(A) authorizes approval only 

of compacts “governing gaming on Indian lands,” suggesting 

that disapproval is obligatory where that particular 

requirement is unsatisfied.

Moreover, subsection (d)(8)(C), which governs approval

by inaction, includes no exemption from this obligation to 

disapprove illegal compacts. Like subsection (d)(8)(B)’s list 

of conditions that require disapproval, subsection (d)(8)(C)’s 

caveat—that the compact is deemed approved “but only to the 

extent the compact is consistent with the provisions of 

[IGRA]”—provides “law to apply.” And just as the Secretary 

has no authority to affirmatively approve a compact that 

violates any of subsection (d)(8)(B)’s criteria for disapproval, 

he may not allow a compact that violates subsection

(d)(8)(C)’s caveat to go into effect by operation of law.

The Secretary nonetheless presses this argument, 

claiming to find support for it in subsection (d)(8)(C)’s fortyfive-day time frame. That short time period, the Secretary 

insists, suggests that Congress was concerned that the 

Secretary would act too slowly, and thus “Congress’s intent 

was not to embroil the Secretary in lengthy investigations into 

whether the compact violated federal law, IGRA, or trust 

obligations.” Appellees’ Br. 45. While this may be correct as 

to compliance with other federal law and trust obligations, the 

caveat demonstrates that Congress had no intention of trading

compliance with IGRA’s requirements for efficiency in 

agency proceedings.

Lastly, the Secretary claims to draw support from 

sections 2710(d)(7)(A) and 2714, which provide for judicial 

review of National Indian Gaming Commission decisions. 

According to the Secretary, these provisions protect his 

discretion by insulating his decisions from review. It is well 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 14 of 20
15

established, however, that the existence of a judicial review 

provision covering certain actions under a statute does not 

preclude judicial review of other actions under the same 

statute. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997).

Moving on to the Secretary’s contention that the APA’s 

agency action requirement, 5 U.S.C. § 704, is unsatisfied here 

because approval came via inaction, we begin by pointing out 

that the APA defines “agency action” as including “failure to 

act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Of course, as the Secretary reminds 

us, the Supreme Court held in Norton v. Southern Utah 

Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”) that inaction qualifies as 

“failure to act” only where it is “discrete.” 542 U.S. 55, 62–64 

(2004). For example, although plaintiffs may challenge an 

agency’s failure to promulgate a rule, they may not raise a 

“broad programmatic attack,” such as the challenge to

Interior’s failure to manage off-road vehicle use in federal 

wilderness study areas brought in SUWA itself. Id. at 63–64.

Arguing that his approval of the Me-Wuk compact 

through inaction fails this discreteness requirement, the 

Secretary relies on Sprint Nextel Corp. v. FCC, 508 F.3d 1129

(D.C. Cir. 2007), in which we considered the reviewability of 

an approval by operation of law under the 

Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pursuant to that Act, 

regulated parties may petition the FCC “to refrain—to 

forbear—from applying several regulatory requirements.” Id.

at 1131. The FCC may grant the petition if certain 

requirements are met; it may deny the petition; or, if it fails to 

act within a certain time period, the petition is “deemed 

granted.” 47 U.S.C. § 160(c). In Sprint Nextel, the FCC failed 

to act in response to a forbearance petition, and we found no 

agency action to review because the FCC had “not engage[d] 

in any ‘circumscribed, discrete’ act.” Sprint Nextel Corp., 508 

F.3d at 1131 (quoting SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62). 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 15 of 20
16

Although IGRA, like the Telecommunications Act, 

allows requests to be granted by operation of law, we see an 

essential difference, namely, subsection (d)(8)(C)’s caveat 

that compacts deemed approved through secretarial inaction 

become effective “only to the extent the compact is consistent 

with the provisions of [IGRA.]” The Telecommunications Act 

contains no parallel provision. In other words, in enacting the 

Telecommunications Act, Congress provided that if the FCC 

failed to act, a forbearance request would be granted by 

operation of law without limitation. By contrast, in enacting 

subsection (d)(8)(C), Congress limited the extent to which a 

compact could be approved by operation of law, thus 

imposing an obligation on the Secretary to affirmatively 

disapprove any compact exceeding that limit. Accordingly, 

where, as here, the plaintiff challenges a compact on the 

grounds that it conflicts with another provision of IGRA, we 

have a discrete agency inaction to review—the Secretary’s 

failure to disapprove the compact despite its inconsistency 

with the Act.

Sprint Nextel is distinguishable for another reason. In that 

case, we emphasized that “in administrative law, we do not 

sustain a right-result, wrong-reason decision of an agency,” 

and, therefore, we need “more than a result; we need the 

agency’s reasoning for that result.” 508 F.3d at 1132–33

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because 

the FCC commissioners had dead-locked, none of their 

statements constituted the agency’s reasoning for taking no 

action on the forbearance request. Accordingly, unable to 

determine if the outcome was justified, we declined to review

it. Id. In this case, however, Amador County alleges not that 

the Secretary’s decision was unreasoned but that his decision 

was “contrary to law.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 18. Because of 

the nature of this particular challenge, we need no agency 

reasoning. Either the compact meets the requirements of 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 16 of 20
17

IGRA, in which case we must reject the challenge, or it does 

not, in which case we must direct the Secretary to disapprove 

the compact.

Finally, relying again on SUWA, in which, in addition to 

imposing a discreteness requirement, the Supreme Court held 

that courts may compel agency action only where that action

was “legally required,” the Secretary argues that his inaction 

is unreviewable because action (either by approving or by 

disapproving the compact) “is not demanded by law.” SUWA, 

542 U.S. at 63–65. According to the County, whether or not 

the Secretary had an obligation to act is irrelevant because the 

Supreme Court drew this requirement from 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) 

(allowing courts to “compel agency action unlawfully 

withheld or unreasonably delayed”), not from the provision at 

issue in this case, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (allowing courts to 

“hold unlawful . . . agency action . . . found to be arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law”). Because we have already found this 

second SUWA requirement satisfied in this case, see supra 

12–14 (holding that IGRA imposes duty to disapprove where 

subsection (d)(8)(C)’s caveat is violated), we need not 

consider whether the obligatory action requirement relates 

only to section 706(1).

To sum up, then, we hold that where, as here, a plaintiff 

alleges that a compact violates IGRA, thus requiring the 

Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the APA 

precludes judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action 

approval. 

IV.

Having found that Amador County has standing and that 

the Secretary’s approval by inaction is reviewable, we turn to 

the merits. The parties agree both that the sole question at 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 17 of 20
18

issue is whether the Rancheria qualifies as “Indian land” and

that, if it does, the Secretary had authority to approve the 

compact. IGRA defines “Indian land” as 

[1] all lands within the limits of any Indian 

reservation; and 

[2] any lands title to which is either held in 

trust by the United States for the benefit of any 

Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian 

tribe or individual subject to restriction by the 

United States against alienation and over which 

an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.

25 U.S.C. § 2703(4). As to subparagraph 2, nothing in either 

the record or the briefs forecloses the possibility that the land 

is held subject to restrictions on alienation, nor do we do so 

here. But because the parties agree that the Rancheria is 

owned in fee by the Tribe rather than held in trust by the 

United States, it appears that the land can qualify as “Indian 

land” only if it is an “Indian Reservation”—a question that 

turns, and again the parties agree about this, on the effect the 

Hardwick Judgment had on the California Rancheria Act.

As noted above, although the California Rancheria Act 

stripped the land of its reservation status, the County agreed 

in the Hardwick Judgment that the “plaintiff Rancheria and 

the Plaintiffs were never and are not now lawfully terminated 

under the California Rancheria Act,” that the “original 

boundaries of the plaintiff Rancheria . . . are hereby restored,” 

that all the land within these restored boundaries of the 

plaintiff Rancheria is declared “Indian Country,” that the 

“plaintiff Rancheria shall be treated by the County of Amador 

and the United States of America, as any other federally 

recognized Indian Reservation, and [that] all of the laws of 

the United States that pertain to federally recognized Indian 

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 18 of 20
19

Tribes and Indians shall apply to the Plaintiff Rancheria and 

the Plaintiffs.” Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, Hardwick v. 

United States, No. C-79-1710, at 4 (Apr. 21, 1987) (included 

at J.A. 51). These provisions, the Secretary argues, 

preclusively establish that the Rancheria qualifies as “Indian 

land.” Disagreeing, the County contends that these sweeping 

provisions must “be construed and interpreted in light of the 

issue[] being litigated”—“the County’s ability to assess 

property taxes on the former Rancheria lands.” Appellant’s 

Reply Br. 8, 16. The Hardwick Judgment, the County insists, 

is therefore “of no consequence in the context of this litigation 

challenging the Secretary’s approval of the [compact].” Id. at 

8–9.

Generally, “when an issue of fact or law is actually 

litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and 

the determination is essential to the judgment, the 

determination is conclusive in a subsequent action . . . 

whether on the same or a different claim.” Restatement 

(Second) of Judgments § 27; see also Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. 

United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Here, of 

course, we have a stipulated judgment, and issues dealt with 

in such judgments are not “actually litigated” for the purpose 

of issue preclusion. Otherson v. Dep’t of Justice, INS, 711 

F.2d 267, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, “[p]reclusion is 

appropriate when the stipulation clearly manifests the parties’ 

intent to be bound in future actions.” Id. at 274 n.6; see also 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. e; Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & 

Procedure § 4443, n.36 (citing numerous cases supporting 

this proposition). Accordingly, “the scope of preclusion by 

settlement arises from contract,” and we “measur[e] intent by 

ordinary contract principles.” Wright & Miller, Federal 

Practice & Procedure § 4443, n.21; see also Otherson, 711 

F.2d at 274 n.6.

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 19 of 20
20

Having dispensed with this case on APA grounds, the 

district court never considered the scope of the County’s 

intent to be bound by the Hardwick Judgment. Because intent 

is a question of fact that may turn not only on the language of 

the agreement, but also on extrinsic evidence not yet in the 

record, we shall, as the parties request, remand to give the 

district court an opportunity to assess the merits in the first 

instance.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #10-5240 Document #1306587 Filed: 05/06/2011 Page 20 of 20