Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01730/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01730-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RONALD BEHAGEN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

AMATEUR BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION OF THE ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and WILLIAM WALL, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

. FIL!.¥t) Urnted Statt;i; t~111H 1:i{ At,tpwls ·remh C::i::.1 1 i". . 

AUG ~ (: 1Qgg 

ROB.ERTL HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1730 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 82-K-410) 

Matthew J. Iverson (Edward F. Ruberry, of Burditt, Bowles, Radzuis 

& Ruberry, Ltd., of Chicago, Illinois; Franklin E. Lynch, of Kruse 

& Lynch, P.C., of Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Lee R. Wills and 

Mary E. Walta, of Wills and Gorsuch Kirgis, of Colorado Springs, 

Colorado, with him on the briefs), of Burditt, Bowles, Radzuis & 

Ruberry, Ltd., of Chicago, Illinois, for the DefendantsAppellants. 

Steven M. Schneebaum (Charles E. Talisman and Rachel A. Shub, of 

Patton, Boggs & Blow, of Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), 

of Patton, Boggs & Blow, of Washington, D.C., for the PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before LOGAN, SETH, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-1730 Document: 01019835794 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from a jury trial awarding the plaintiff, 

Ronald Behagen, treble damages under the federal antitrust laws as 

well as damages for the deprivation of liberty or property 

interests without due process of law. The defendants contend on 

various grounds that the jury verdicts should be overturned as a 

matter of law. We hold that the antitrust claim is barred by the 

express intent of Congress and that the due process claim is 

barred by a lack of governmental action. We reverse. 

I. 

The Federation Internationale de Basketball Amateur (FIBA) is 

the international organization that governs amateur basketball in 

its member countries. The Amateur Basketball Association of the 

United States of America (ABA/USA) is the FIBA member organization 

from the United States. In order for an American to play 

basketball in amateur competition outside the United States, the 

player is required to qualify as an amateur by receiving an ABA/ 

USA travel permit and a FIBA license. 

For an American who has played professional basketball, the 

amateur qualification process is known as reinstatement or 

reintegration. A reinstated player's eligibility is still 

limited, however, in that the player may not qualify for a 

national team and therefore may not participate in competition 

such as the Olympic Games. During the time relevant to this case, 

FIBA published the following grounds for reinstatement: (1) the 

player had signed with a professional club prior to reaching age 

twenty-one and had withdrawn within the subsequent twelve-month 

period; (2) the player had withdrawn from professional competition 

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in order to follow a recognized professional occupation and had 

been engaged in that occupation for at least one full year: or (3) 

the player suffered from a serious illness or was the victim of an 

incapacitating accident. In addition, FIBA had interpreted its 

regulations to forbid more than one reinstatement for any one 

player, although the parties here dispute the extent to which this 

no-second-reinstatement rule was known outside FIBA at that time. 

The plaintiff, Ronald Behagen is a former collegiate AllAmerican .basketball player who went on to play professional 

basketball for several teams in the National Basketball 

Association. In the fall of 1979, Behagen joined a basketball 

team in Siena, Italy. The Italian league in which Behagen played 

is considered by FIBA to be an amateur league, and Behagen was 

therefore required to obtain amateur qualification. 1 Behagen 

never applied to the ABA/USA for a travel permit, but was 

nevertheless issued a license by FIBA. After completion of the 

1979-1980 season, Behagen returned home to Atlanta where he 

attended an Atlanta Hawks-Washington Bullets basketball game. 

Behagen was subsequently approached about playing the season's few 

remaining games for the Bullets, and he signed a contract to play 

in those games. 

1 Although the Italian league was considered to be an amateur 

league, its players were paid for playing on its teams. Because 

of their amateur status, however, the Italian players did not lose 

eligibility for Olympic competition. This situation exists 

throughout Europe. Consequently, it is best to treat "amateur" 

and "professional'' in this case as merely technical terms denoting 

a status for purposes of the international amateur athletic 

organizations. 

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After concluding the season with the Bullets, Behagen 

retu_rned to Italy and negotiated a contract with the Siena team 

for the 1980-1981 season. Although he played in a few preseason 

and exhibition games, again he failed to take action towards 

obtaining reinstatement by the ABA/USA. William Wall, the 

executive director of the ABA/USA, informed FIBA that Behagen had 

once again played professional basketball in the United States. 

Upon learning of Behagen's professional play, FIBA informed the 

Siena team th~t Behagen was ineligible under FIBA regulations. 

The team then informed Behagen that they would not honor his 

contract for the 1980-1981 season. 

Behagen then contacted the ABA/USA and FIBA about his 

eligibility and was informed that FIBA had a policy against 

granting any player a second reinstatement. He was told that his 

only hope for an appeal was to contact Dr. Borislav Stankovic, the 

Secretary General of FIBA. Behagen met briefly with Stankovic in 

Rome, but the no-second-reinstatement rule was not changed. 

Behagen brought suit against FIBA, the ABA/USA, and William 

Wall, seeking the following relief: 1) treble damages for 

violations of the federal antitrust laws; 2) damages for tortious 

interference with contract; and 3) damages for the deprivation of 

liberty or property interests without due process of law. The 

federal district court dismissed FIBA as a party, granting summary 

judgment on a motion based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The 

Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that there were 

factual disputes material to the personal jurisdiction issue. 

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Behagen Y..!. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the United States, 744 F.2d 

731, 735 (10th Cir. -1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 (1985). 

Behagen and FIBA subsequently settled, but the remaining 

defendants proceeded to a jury trial. The jury rendered its 

verdict in favor of the defendants on the tortious interference 

with contract count, but in favor of the plaintiff on the 

antitrust and due process counts. The district court awarded 

attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiff and denied the 

defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in 

the alternative, for a new trial. The defendants then appealed 

the adverse judgment to this court. 

II. 

' 

When a trial in federal court is a trial to the jury, our 

review of the evidence is "limited to the inquiry as to whether 

the record contains substantial evidence to support the jury's 

• conclusion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party." Kitchens v. Bryan County Nat'l Bank, 

825 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 1987). The trial court's legal 

conclus1ons, however, are subject to de novo review, see United 

States Y..!. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 526 

(1961); United States~ rel. Bergen Y..!. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502, 

1505 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 528 (1988), and 

therefore "[t]he appellate court is not bound by the trial court's 

conclusions of law," State Distributors, Inc. v. Glenmore 

Distilleries Co., 738 F.2d 405, 412 (10th Cir. 1984). This 

court's power to correct errors of law encompasses "those [errors] 

that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a 

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finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the 

governing rule of law. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United 

States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984). 

III. 

The defendants first contend that the district court erred in 

permitting the antitrust issue to go to the jury. The plaintiff 

alleged that the defendants violated section 1 of the Sherman 

Antitrust Act (Sherman Act), 15 u.s.c. § 1, 2 by being "key 

participants in an illegal group boycott by FIBA, its member 

organizations, and the leagues governed thereby, of players who 

have played in the American professional basketball leagues more 

than once." The jury found that there was a combination, 

agreement, or conspiracy among the defendants and alleged 

coconspirators resulting in an unlawful restraint of trade or 

commerce. The jury further found that the plaintiff was injured 

in his business and property as a proximate result of the 

defendants' illegal acts, and that he sustained damages that were 

capable of reasonable ascertainment and not speculative or 

conjectural. 

We agree with the defendants that the antitrust issue should 

not have gone to the jury. The defendant's actions in this case 

were clearly within the scope of activity directed by Congress, 

and were necessary to implement Congress' intent with regard to 

the governance of amateur athletics. We therefore hold that the 

2 Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in relevant part: "Every 

contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 

conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 

States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal 0 •• ·" 15 u.s.c. § 1. 

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defendants' allegedly violative actions here are exempt from the 

coverage of the federal antitrust laws. 

We begin our analysis by examining congressional action 

concerning, and the current governing structures for, American 

involvement in international amateur sports. 3 Central to these 

governing structures is the organizing of competition under the 

auspices of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The IOC 

possesses the rights to, and governs the operation of, the Olympic 

Games. Michels Y.!. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 156 

(7th Cir. 1984). Each nation must· be represented by a national 

Olympic committee that is recognized by the IOC, and the national 

committees in turn recognize a national governing body (NGB) for 

each Olympic sport. Id. 

Congress chartered the United States Olympic Commitee (USOC) 

as a "private corporation[] established under Federal law," 36 

u.s.c. § 1101. See San Francisco Arts~ Athletics, Inc. Y.!. United 

States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (1987); Michels, 741 

F.2d at 157; 36 u.s.c. §§ 371, 383. The USOC was recognized by 

the IOC as the national Olympic committee of the United States. 

Michels, 741 F.2d 156. Congress later enacted the Amateur Sports 

Act of 1978, 36 u.s.c. §§ 371-382b, 391-396, to rectify the 

3 In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court 

formulated "thestate action doctrine [which] allowed state 

legislatures to formally command that certain areas of commerce be 

exempt from the provisions of the Sherman Act." Lease Lights, 

Inc. v. Public Serv. Co., 849 F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1988), 

cert.denied, 109 S. Ct. 817 (1989). Although the present parties 

have averted to the application of the state action doctrine, such 

an analysis is plainly inapplicable here as there is no 

conceivable element of action by a state. We therefore focus upon 

congressional intention of exempting the defendants' activity from 

the federal antitrust laws. 

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factional nature of amateur sports organizations in this country 

at that time. See San Francisco Arts! Athletics, 107 s. Ct. at 

2985. 

Under the Amateur Sports Act, NGB's play a major role in the 

governance of international amateur athletic competition. See 36 

U.S.C. §§ 391-396. "For any sport which is included on the 

program of the Olympic Games or the Pan-American Games, the [USOC] 

is authorized to recognize as a national governing body an amateur 

sports organization which files an application and is eligible for 

such recognition ••• " Id. § 39l(a). Furthermore, "[t]he 

[USOC] shall recognize only one national governing body for each 

sport for which an application is made and approved." Id. The 

NGB must satisfy a number of requirements, including the ability 

to "demonstrate[] that it is autonomous in the governance of its 

sport, in that it independently determines and controls all 

matters central to such governance, does not delegate such 

determination and control, and is free from outside restraint." 

Id.§ 39l(b)(4). 

Congress has also. established the relationship between an NGB 

and the international organization governing a particular amateur 

sport. The Act authorizes an NGB to "represent the United States 

in the appropriate international sports federation," id. § 393(1), 

and provides that an NGB may "not have eligibility criteria 

relating to amateur status which are more restrictive than those 

of the appropriate international sports federation," id. 

§ 39l(b)(l2). In keeping with the Congress' schema of monolithic 

control for each sport, the Act provides that an NGB must 

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"demonstrate[] that it is a member of no more than one 

international sports federation which governs a sport included on 

the program of the Olympic Games or the Pan-American Games." Id. 

§ 39l(b)(4). The Act also authorizes an NGB to "designate 

individuals and teams to represent the United States in 

international amateur athletic competition (other than the Olympic 

Games and the Pan-American Games) and certify, in accordance with 

applicable international rules, the amateur eligibility of such 

individuals and teams." Id. § 393(7). 

The Act provides for ongoing review of the NGB by the USOC in 

order to ensure compliance with the Act. Id. § 394. In the event 

that an .NGB is alleged to be not in compliance, the Act provides 

for a hearing mechanism by which cetain persons or organizations 

can seek to compel an NGB to comply with the requirements of the 

Act, and for penalties of probation, revocation of recognition, or 

replacement of the NGB if the USOC finds that the NGB is not 

complying adequately with the statutory requirements. Id. § 395. 

Here, Behagen has alleged antitrust violations by the ABA/USA 

the NGB for basketball -- and by its executive director. 

Although an NGB is a private actor, 4 the monolithic control 

exerted by an NGB over its amateur sport is a direct result of the 

congressional intent expressed in the Amateur Sports Act. In such 

a situation, we follow the Supreme Court's analysis in Silver v. 

4 We reach this conclusion based on our analysis of San 

Francisco Acts~ Athletics, Inc. Y.!. United States Olymprc-comm., 

107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987). See id. at 2984-87 (holding that USOC is 

not governmental actor and thatconduct and coordination of 

amateur sports not traditional governmental function). Our 

rationale for rejecting ABA/USA as a governmental actor is 

developed in greater detail in our due process discussion infra. 

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New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), and focus on the degree 

to which the private action was necessary to implement the intent 

of Congress. 

In Silver, the Court considered whether the New York Stock 

Exchange (Exchange) could be held liable under the Sherman Act for 

its directive to certain Exchange members, issued without notice 

or hearing, requiring that they remove private wire connections 

with a nonmember broker-dealer. Id. at 342-44. In holding that 

the Exchange's action was within the scope of the antitrust laws, 

the Court examined the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Act 

under which the Exchange regulated its members' transactions and 

relationships with nonmembers, stating: 

The Securities Exchange Act contains no express 

exemption from the antitrust laws or, for that matter, 

from any other statute. This means that any repealer of 

the antitrust laws must be discerned as a matter of 

implication, and "[i]t is a cardinal principle of 

construction that repeals by implication are not 

favored." United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 

198, 60 s.ct. 182, 188, 84 L.Ed. 181; see Georgia v. 

Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-457, 65 S.Ct. 

716, 725-726, 89 L.Ed. 1051; California v. Federal Power 

Comm., 369 U.S. 482, 485, 82 s.ct. 901, 903, 8 L.Ed.2d 

54. Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if 

necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and 

even then only to the minimum extent necessary. 

Silver, 373 U.S. at 357. The Silver Court therefore considered 

both the policies behind the antitrust laws and the policy of 

exchange self-regulation embodied in the 1934 Act, concluding that 

congressional intent to exempt action from the federal antitrust 

laws should be implied only when necessary to implement the clear 

intent of Congress. See id. at 357, 361; see also Gordon v. New 

York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975) (repeal of 

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antitrust provisions implied only when plain repugnancy exists 

between antitrust and regulatory provisions). 

Here, the Amateur Sports Act provides definite proof of a 

congressi6nal intent to authoriie the USOC to recognize one and 

only one NGB at any given time for any one sport. See 36 u.s.c. 

§ 39l(a). The Act also makes clear that Congress intended an NGB 

to exercise monolithic control over its particular amateur sport, 

including coordinating with the appropriate international sports 

federation and controlling amateur eligibility for Americans that 

participate in that sport. See id.§§ 39l(b)(4), 39l(b)(l2), 

393(1), 393(7). Although the Amateur Sports Act does not contain 

an explicit statement exempting action taken under its direction 

from the federal antitrust laws, compare id. §§ 371-382b, 391-396 

with 15 u.s.c. §§ 1291-1295 (express exemption of agreements 

covering telecasting of professional sports), we find that the 

directives of the Act make the intent of Congress sufficiently 

clear. 5 As the Supreme Court has stated, "The Amateur Sports Act 

5 Reliance upon congressional intent to exempt from antitrust 

qCtivity has been utilized in another context involving private 

action, athletics, and antitrust. The Supreme Court has long held 

that professional baseball enjoys an exemption from federal 

antitrust liability. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 269-74, 285 

(1972); Toolson v. New York Yankee's;'rnc., 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 

(1953); Federal Base BallCiub, Inc., v. National League of 

Professional Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922). This 

exemption does not extend to other professional sports. See 

Haywood .Y...!. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 

(Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971) (basketball); Radovich v. National 

Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957) (football);United 

States .Y...!. International Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 242 

(1955). The baseball exemption has persisted, however, in the 

face of considerable judicial consternation, see Flood, 407 U.S. 

at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that Federal Base Ball 

"is a derelict in the stream of the law"); Radovich, 352u.S-:---at' 

452 (implying that Federal Base Ball and Toolson are "unrealistic, 

(Footnote Continued on Following Page) 

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was enacted 'to correct the disorganization and the serious 

factional disputes that seemed to plague amateur sports in the 

United States.'" San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. at 

2985 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1627, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 

reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7478, 7482). 

Behagen complains of exactly that action which the Act 

directs -- the monolithic control of an amateur sport by the NGB 

for that sport and by the appropriate international sports 

federation of which the NGB is a member. This truth is 

underscored by the fact that the ABA/USA could not be authorized 

under the Act unless it maintained exactly that degree of control 

over its sport that Behagen here alleges as an antitrust 

violation. See 36 U.S.C. § 39l(b)(4). We hold that the 

defendants' actions were necessary to implement the clear intent 

of Congress, and therefore are exempt from the federal antitrust 

laws. Consequently, we reverse the district court's judgment on 

the antitrust issue. 

IV. 

The defendants also contend that the district court erred in 

permitting the plaintiff's due process claim to go to the jury. 

(Footnote Continued from Previous Page) 

inconsistent, or illogical"), and that persistence is based on a 

theory that Congress has allowed the Court's antitrust exemption 

for baseball to continue despite the Court's repeated statements 

that, if the baseball exemption is to be overruled, it is the 

place of Congress to do it. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84; 

Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. 

When, as here, we find a clear indication of the intent of 

Congress from the statute itself, rather than from Congress' 

acquiesence through inaction in the face of judicial construction, 

we find an even stronger case for inferring an antitrust 

exemption. 

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The crux of the plaintiff's allegation was that the defendants 

"had denied him the right to earn a living in his chosen 

occupation without any form of adequate hearing, based on rules 

and standards that had no rational basis, that were not published, 

and that were selectively and inconsistently applied." The jury 

found that the defendants' acts constituted "state action,'' that 

the defendants' acts or failure to act as required caused the 

plaintiff to be denied a "property right" or a "liberty right," 

and that the plaintiff was deprived of such a right without "due 

process of law." 

The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that 

"[n]o person shall ••• be deprived of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. It 

is axiomatic that the fifth amendment applies to and restricts 

"only the Federal Government and not private persons." Public 

Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952). Accordingly, 

in situations of purely private conduct, the Constitution provides 

no due process protection, "no matter how unfair that conduct may 

be." National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n Y..!. Tarkanian, 109 s. Ct. 

454, 461 (1988) (applying due process clause of the fourteenth 

amendment). However, as this court has noted: 

The Supreme Court has approached the concept of 

governmental action flexibly. It has pragmatically 

examined ostensibly private activities to determine if 

they constitute governmental action. In this regard, 

the Court has inquired whether a private party is 

performing a "public function," see Terry Y..!. Adams, 345 

U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953); Marsh v. 

Alabama, 326 u.s. 501, 66 s.ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 

(1946), or acting under "state compulsion," see Adickes 

v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 u.s. 144, 90 s.ct. 1598, 26 

E:°Ed~l42 (1970), whether there is a "nexus," see 

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,~ 

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s.ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); Burton .Y...=.. Wilmington 

Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 s.ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 

45 (1961), or "joint action" between the private party 

and the government, Lugar .Y...=.. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 

922, 102 s.ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); Flagg 

Brothers v. Brooks, 436 u.s. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 

L.Ed.2d 185(1978). 

These cases, taken together, impart at least two 

important principles. First, they recognize that power 

entrusted to the government by the people can ultimately 

be exercised through nominally private entities, be it 

through the government's delegation, compulsion, 

concerted action, or acquiescence. Second, they provide 

that when these nominally private parties exercise 

governmental power, they shall not exercise it insulated 

from constitutional constraints. 

The problem remains in distinguishing the exercise 

of governmental power from benign or tangential 

governmental involvement. This problem is resolved by 

"sifting facts arid weighing circumstances" in each case. 

Burton .Y...=.. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 

122, 81 s.ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed~2d 45 (1961). 

Gilmore Y.!. Salt Lake Community Action Program, 710 F.2d 632, 635-

36 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Defendant ABA/USA is at least a nominally private party. It 

is further removed from congressional action under the Amateur 

Sports Act than is the USOC. ABA/USA operates as an NGB only 

because of its recognition by the USOC. The Supreme Court, 

furthermore, has declared that "[t]he USOC is a 'private 

corporatio[n] established under Federal law.'" San Francisco Arts 

& Athletics, 107 s. Ct. at 2984 (quoting 36 u.s.c. § 1101(46)). 

Behagen, however, contends that ABA/USA is a governmental 

actor because it undertakes to be the exclusive licensing 

authority for a particular profession -- a function that Behagen 

claims is a traditional governmental function -- and because 

Congress, by operation of the Amateur Sports Act, has bestowed 

upon the ABA/USA exclusive powers as an NGB. 

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Our analysis here is simplified by the pronouncements of the 

Supreme Court in San Francisco Arts~ Athletics, which presented 

the Court with the issue of whether the USOC was a governmental 

actor under the Amateur Sports Act. See 107 s. Ct. at 2984-87. 

The Court there held that the USOC was not "a governmental actor 

to whom the prohibitions of the Constitution apply." Id. at 2984, 

2986-87. In so holding, the Court rejected as bases for 

governmental action the congressionally-granted charter of the 

USOC, the regulation of the USOC by Congress, the granting to the 

USOC of the exclusive use of_the word "Olympic," and any attempts 

on the part of Congress to help the USOC receive funding. See id. 

at 2985. Turning to arguments that the USOC became a governmental 

actor by fulfilling a traditional governmental function, the Court 

rejected that contention as well. See id. "The fact '[t]hat a 

private entity performs a function which serves the public does 

not make its acts [governmental] action, "' id. ( quoting RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)). The Court concluded 

that the Amateur Sports Act "merely authorized the USOC to 

coordinate activities that always have been performed by private 

entities," id., for "[n]either the conduct nor the coordination of 

amateur sports has been a traditional governmental function," id. 

Proceeding from this certain ground that the USOC is not a 

governmental actor, it follows a fortiori that the ABA/USA is also 

not a governmental actor. Congress has conferred no authority 

upon the ABA/USA except that authorized because of its recognition 

as an NGB. Such recognition by statute must come through the 

USOC. If the Amateur Sports Act has not created a governmental 

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actor in the USOC, it most certainly has not done so in the ABA/ 

USA, and, as we have observed, the Supreme Court has rejected 

governmental chartering, regulation, grants, or subsidies as bases 

for governmental action by the USOC. See id. 

San Francisco Arts & Athletics also removes any grounds for 

finding the ABA/USA to be a governmental actor under a traditional 

governmental function rationale. Even if European basketball 

leagues persist in labeling their paid-for-play basketball teams 

as "amateur," that does not negate the fact that the ABA/USA has 

licensing power over play in those leagues by Americans only 

because Congress desired a monolithic control of amateur sports, 

and directed that amateur eligibility be governed by the NGB's, 

which operate under the aegis of the USOC. Further, as we have 

noted, the Supreme Court has held that such coordination and 

control of amateur sports is not a "traditional governmental 

function." Id. We hold that the ABA/USA is not a governmental 

actor to whom the due process prohibitions of the Constitution 

apply. Consequently, as a matter of law we reject the jury 

finding of "state action" in this case, and we conclude that the 

due process issue should never have gone to the jury. We 

therefore reverse the district court's judgment on the due process 

issue. 

Finally, we note that our analysis here was not unanticipated 

by Congress and appears to be clearly within its intent. Congress 

debated provisions intended to ensure a federal cause of action 

for due process violations involving institutions under the 

Amateur Sports Act, and Congress rejected any such provisions. 

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This court has previously noted the following observations of the 

Seventh Circuit: 

"The legislative history of the [Amateur Sports] 

Act clearly reveals that Congress intended not to create 

a private cause of action under the Act. The Act as 

originally proposed contained an 'Amateur Athlete's Bill 

of Rights,' which included a civil cause of action in 

federal district court for any athlete against an NGB, 

educational institution, or other sports organization 

that threatened to deny the athlete's right to 

participate in certain events. See S. 2036, 94th Cong., 

1st Sess. § 304(a) (1977). As the Senate Report . explains, this bill of rights provision 'met with strong 

resistance by the high school and college communities. 

Ulti~ately, the. compromise reached was that certain 

substantive provisions on athletes' rights would be 

included in the USOC Constitution, and not in the bill.' 

S.Rep. No. 770, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1978). 

Congress omitted the bill of rights provision in the 

Act's final version. Congress thus considered and 

rejected a cause of action for athletes to enforce the 

Act's provisions." 

Martinez~ United States Olympic Comm., 802 F.2d 1275, 1281 (10th 

Cir. 1986) (quoting Michels, 741 F.2d at 157-58). It is not 

without reason that the coordination and control of amateur sports 

has not been a traditional governmental function. See Michels, 

741 F.2d at 159 (Posner, J., concurring) ("Any doubt on this score 

can be dispelled by the reflection that there can be few less 

suitable bodies than the federal courts for determining the 

eligibility, or the procedures for determining the eligibility, of 

athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.") 

IV. 

We reverse the judgment of the district court on the 

antitrust issue because of the clear intent of Congress to exempt 

the defendants' actions here from the federal antitrust laws. We 

reverse the district court's judgment on the due process issue, 

for want of the requisite governmental action. REVERSED. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1730 Document: 01019835794 Date Filed: 08/28/1989 Page: 17 
ppg