Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01471/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01471-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL MOORING,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-01471-MCE-KJN 

ORDER

Through this action, Plaintiff Darrell Mooring (“Plaintiff”) seeks to recover 

monetary damages from Defendants California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation and the State of California (collectively “CDCR”) and Warden Brian Duffy 

for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), § 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before 

the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). For the following 

reasons, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of 

Action under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Third 

Cause of Action under § 1983.

1

 

 1 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

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BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff, an amputee who was also a CDCR inmate at the California Medical 

Facility (“CMF”) from June 2012 to January 2014, relies on either a prosthetic leg or a 

wheelchair to ambulate and was medically prescribed a wheelchair for use outside his 

cell. On May 1, 2012, Plaintiff’s doctor verified that he required an “ADA accommodation 

for bathing,” and this information was placed in Plaintiff’s CMF Central File. When 

Plaintiff arrived at CMF the following month, a screening nurse assessed his medical 

needs, and he was placed in the J-3 Housing Unit (“J-3 Unit”). 

The J-3 Unit’s showers lacked grab bars. On one occasion, Plaintiff slipped and 

nearly fell while showering. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff informed his doctor that the 

showers were not equipped for someone with his disability. His doctor, in turn, notified 

the sergeant in charge of the J-3 Unit of Plaintiff’s concern. Plaintiff was then moved to 

the J-2 Housing Unit (“J-2 Unit”). 

Unfortunately, the J-2 Unit’s shower facility also lacked grab bars. Plaintiff 

immediately notified a correctional officer of that oversight, and that officer, in turn, called 

his supervisor. The supervisor advised that Plaintiff should “be patient and wait.” In the 

meantime, in order to shower in the J-2 Unit, which did not contain wheelchair accessible 

shower stalls, Plaintiff was forced to leave his chair and to hop on one foot to shower. 

Moreover, once Plaintiff made it inside the shower, he either had to hold onto the 

showerhead for support or sit in a plastic folding chair that would be provided to him 

upon his request. When finished, Plaintiff was apparently expected to hop on one leg 

back to his wheelchair. 

Not surprisingly, on August 21, 2012, while attempting to hop his way out of the 

shower, Plaintiff slipped and fell, injuring his back, buttocks and his amputated leg. 

Rather than risk another fall, Plaintiff thereafter chose to wash himself in the bathroom 

sink until he was transferred over a week later to a housing unit where the showers were 

 2 The following background facts are undisputed. See generally ECF No. 24-2; ECF No. 27-1. 

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equipped with grab bars. Defendants subsequently had grab bars installed in the Unit J2 showers. 

Plaintiff then initiated this action seeking to recover for his injuries the ADA, the 

Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983. By way of their instant Motion, Defendants contend they 

are entitled to judgment on all causes of action as a matter of law. 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to 

dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 

portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial 

responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine 

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual 

dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in 

the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The 

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

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might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and 

Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also 

demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question 

before the evidence is left to the jury of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but 

whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the 

party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 

(quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). 

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under 

Rule [56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore, 

“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. 87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 

be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn.

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

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ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action under the Rehabilitation

Act and Title II of the ADA

Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action allege that CDCR discriminated 

against him based on his disability by failing to provide him with accessible shower 

facilities. Because Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages pursuant to these 

claims, he must show that: (1) he is disabled; (2) he was denied the benefits of a public 

entity’s service, program or activity, or otherwise discriminated against because of his 

disability; and (3) that the denial or discrimination was intentional. Duvall v. Cnty. of 

Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135-38 (9th Cir. 2001).

3

 CDCR argues that there is no genuine 

issue of triable fact regarding the intentional discrimination element of Plaintiff’s claims. 

ECF No. 24-1 at 7. CDCR further argues that Plaintiff’s disability was reasonably 

accommodated by provision of a plastic folding chair and that there is no evidence that 

Plaintiff was discriminated against or denied access to the showers because of his 

disability. ECF No. 24-1 at 10; ECF No. 27 at 4. Each of these arguments is rejected. 

1. Intentional Discrimination

A plaintiff can establish intentional discrimination by showing that the defendant 

was deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a particular decision would result in a 

violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected rights. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138. To make a 

showing of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the defendant 

had knowledge that harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely; and 

(2) that the defendant failed to act upon that likelihood. Id. at 1139. “When the plaintiff 

has alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for 

accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity is on 

notice that an accommodation is required, and the public has satisfied the knowledge 

 3 A cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act essentially parallels an ADA cause of action. See

Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 590-91 (1999); Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135, 1138. 

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element of the deliberate indifference test.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff easily satisfies the deliberate indifference test for purposes of 

opposing a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff made multiple complaints to CMF 

correctional officers and doctors about his difficulty using the J-3 and J-2 Units’ shower 

facilities. ECF No. 27-1 at Facts 24, 26. Furthermore, Plaintiff is an amputee. The fact 

that Plaintiff has only one leg, and therefore requires an accommodation in the shower, 

is obvious. 

CDCR nonetheless argues that, because Plaintiff’s Central File only mentioned 

the need for a “bathing accommodation,” rather than specifically denoting that he

needed grab bars, Plaintiff was required to submit several forms to request anything 

other than the shower chair he was provided. ECF No. 24-1 at 8:19-20. This is 

nonsensical. Not only is it ludicrous to require a person to hop on one foot in a wet 

shower because he purportedly did not submit the correct form, but nothing in the 

Rehabilitation Act or the ADA required Plaintiff to alert officials of his accommodation 

needs by filling out specific forms.

4

 See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1140-41 (holding that the 

plaintiff’s oral notification of defendants of his need for accommodations was sufficient to 

create a triable issue of fact on the issue of deliberate indifference). Accordingly, there is 

at the very least a triable issue of fact as to CDCR’s deliberate indifference toward 

Plaintiff. 

2. Reasonable Accommodation

When a public entity becomes aware that an accommodation is required, it must 

conduct a fact-specific investigation that considers the particular individual’s needs and 

offer a reasonable accommodation based on the results of that individualized 

investigation. Id. at 1139. “Accordingly, a public entity does not ‘act’ by proffering just 

any accommodation[,]” particularly when the accommodation is based on stereotyped 

 4 CDCR further argues that it could not have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s need for an

accommodation because it installed grab bars shortly after Plaintiff was injured and filed an administrative 

grievance. See ECF No. 24-1 at 9. Because Plaintiff orally notified CDCR of his need for accommodation 

well before he was injured and forced to file an administrative grievance, CDCR’s belated installation of 

grab bars does not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. 

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assumptions about the person’s disability. Id. at n. 14. 

CDCR’s assertion that the provision of a shower chair satisfied its legal obligation 

to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability thus proves too much. Providing a onesize-fits-all accommodation does not substitute for an individualized investigation. 

Indeed, CDCR’s failure to even mention such an investigation in their Motion makes 

summary judgment on this ground inappropriate. 

Moreover, even if CDCR had arrived at the shower chair accommodation after 

conducting an investigation into Plaintiff’s particular needs, however, its solution was

inadequate. Plaintiff’s injury was not caused by the fact that he was forced to stand up 

in the shower and hold onto the showerhead. Defendant was injured because he was 

forced to hop on one leg from the shower back to his wheelchair. ECF No. 27-1 at 3. 

Nothing in the record demonstrates that the provision of a plastic folding chair could

have fully accommodated Plaintiff’s disability by making it safe for Plaintiff to use the J-2 

Unit’s shower facility. 

3. Discrimination “Because of” Disability

CDCR’s final argument is that nothing in the record supports Plaintiff’s claim that 

he was discriminated against “because of his disability.” By this argument, CDCR thus 

attempts to characterize Plaintiff’s claim as nothing more than “a slip and fall case.” 

CDCR’s characterization is fundamentally misguided. 

Certainly, Defendants’ only authority is inapposite. In Shaw v. TDCJ-CID, 540 F. 

Supp. 2d 834, 838 (S.D. Tex. 2008), a legally blind inmate alleged that prison officials 

violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because they failed to install non-stick 

flooring in all showers and their failure to do so resulted in Shaw falling and breaking his 

hand. Id. at 835. In that case, there was no indication that the non-slip floors would 

have been an accommodation for the plaintiff’s blindness. Accordingly, that plaintiff 

failed to identify how he was discriminated against based on his his disability, which

rendered his action a garden-variety slip-and-fall case, not actionable under the ADA 

and the Rehabilitation Act. 

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This case is different. Plaintiff specifically alleges that CDCR’s indifference to his 

need for shower accommodations forced him to bathe in the sink. ECF No. 17 at ¶ 35. 

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff washed himself in the sink rather than risking 

another fall, ECF No. 27-1 at 3, and there is no question that Plaintiff could have safely 

showered in the existing facilities if he had two legs. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 

established a genuine issue of triable fact regarding whether CDCR denied him the 

ability to shower because of his disability. Defendants’ Motion is therefore DENIED as to 

Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action. 

B. Third Cause of Action under § 1983

Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action against Warden Duffy does not fare so well. 

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to enforce rights contained in the United States 

Constitution and defined by federal law. Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th 

Cir. 2002). “An alleged violation of federal law may not be vindicated under § 1983, 

however, where . . . Congress has foreclosed citizen enforcement in the enactment itself 

. . . by imbuing it with its own comprehensive remedial scheme.” Id. The Ninth Circuit 

has held that individuals cannot be sued under § 1983 for violations of Title II of the ADA 

or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because those statutes have a comprehensive 

remedial scheme. Id. at 1156. 

Here, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is effectively based on the above ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act violations. See ECF No. 17 at ¶¶ 44-49. Plaintiff is thus limited to the 

seeking relief under the comprehensive remedial scheme provided by those statutes 

rather than under a § 1983 claim. See Vinson, 288 F.3d at 1156. The Court therefore 

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is DENIED as to 

Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action; 

2. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action; and 

3. Defendant Duffy is DISMISSED from this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2015

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