Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02214/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02214-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO KM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Maria Pena-Nunez, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 08-2214-PHX-GMS (MHB)

No. CR 08-682-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Movant Maria Pena-Nunez, who is confined in the Corrections Corporation of

America facility in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On

December 10, 2008, the Court dismissed the Motion with leave to amend. On December

24, 2008, Movant filed an Amended Motion (Doc. #4 in CV 08-2214). The Court will

summarily dismiss the Amended Motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Illegal Re-Entry After

Deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. On September 15, 2008, the Court

sentenced Movant to a 13-month term of imprisonment followed by 3 years on supervised

release.

Movant seeks a reduction of her sentence. She argues that her rights are being

violated because as a deportable alien, she is ineligible for a one-year sentence reduction

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In addition, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected Movant’s equal protection argument

in McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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for attending a drug treatment program during incarceration and for early release to a

half-way house.

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly

appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that

the moving party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255

Proceedings for the United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither

a hearing nor a response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States,

772 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir.

1982).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted

because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.1

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to her sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” 

United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is

impermissible to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every

reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United

States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver

was clear, express, and unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally

be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory

right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the length of her sentence. United States v.

Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014

(9th Cir. 1992). The only claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself

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was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. 

See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea

agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is

unenforceable with respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges

the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea

agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead

guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining

to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the

waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (declining to decide whether waiver of

all statutory rights included claims implicating the voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States,

396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and

Tenth Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily

and knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to

attack, in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel during sentencing.”).

As part of her plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

The defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable

cause determinations, and objections which the defendant

could assert to the information or indictment, or to the petition

to revoke, or to the Court’s entry of judgment against the

defendant and imposition of sentence upon the defendant

providing the sentence is consistent with this agreement. The

defendant further waives: (1) any right to appeal the Court’s

entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any right to appeal

the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18,

United States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3)

any right to collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and

sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255,

or any other collateral attack. The defendant

acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the dismissal

of any appeal or collateral attack the defendant might file

challenging his/her conviction or sentence in this case.

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(Doc. #20) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in her plea agreement that she had

discussed the terms with her attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into

the plea voluntarily. (Doc. #20).

Movant’s assertions in her amended § 2255 motion all pertain to sentencing and do

not pertain to the voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding

the imposition of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The

Court accepted her plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant

waived the sentencing issues raised in her amended § 2255 motion. Thus, the Court will

summarily dismiss the amended motion. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. #4 in CV 08-2214-PHX-GMS (MHB)) is

denied and that the civil action opened in connection with this Motion (CV 08-2214-

PHX-GMS (MHB)) is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court must also

terminate Doc. # 23 in CR 08-682-PHX-GMS. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2009.

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