Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00098/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00098-89/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD ALVARADO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,

Defendant. /

No. C 04-0098 SI

ORDER RESOLVING DEFENDANT’S

RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

AS A MATTER OF LAW AND MOTION

FOR NEW TRIAL 

RE: CHARLOTTE BOSWELL

A jury trial was held from April 2 - 11, 2007. The jury found in favor of plaintiff Charlotte

Boswell on her claims for sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge, and awarded

compensatory damages in the amount of $550,000 ($300,000 in lost earnings and $250,000 in other

damages, including mental or emotional pain and suffering), and punitive damages in the amount of

$2,450,000. The Court entered final judgment on May 21, 2007. Now before the Court is defendant’s

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, as well as defendant’s motion for a new trial, or

alternatively a motion for amendment of the judgment. Defendant also alternatively requests remittitur

of the damages award.

I. Renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law

In reviewing defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. See

Josephs v. Pacific Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). “The test applied is whether the evidence

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 1 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Court notes that defendant did not include any citations to the trial transcripts in its

motion. Instead, defendant simply makes representations regarding the evidence at trial; the Court has

reviewed the trial transcripts and found that, at least some of those representations are inaccurate. For

example, defendant misleadingly asserts that at most plaintiff only complained to Stites about him

kissing and hugging her, and that she never complained to anyone else about Stites’ behavior. However,

plaintiff testified that plaintiff and Ingram met with Stites’ supervisor, Bob Montez, and that Ingram

complained to Montez about Stites’ behavior on behalf of both women. See Boswell testimony at 169-

70; Ingram testimony at 550. 

2

 The motion was filed a week before trial. The trial date was subsequently rescheduled several

times due to a variety of reasons not relevant here. 

2

permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Id.

1

 

As a general matter, defendant contends that all of plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as a

matter of law based on her failure to plead the claims in the complaint. Defendant argues that plaintiff

did not specifically plead in the complaint that her supervisor Norman Stites sexually harassed her, that

she was retaliated against after she complained of the sexual harassment, and that she was constructively

discharged due to the retaliation and sexual harassment. As a result, defendant contends that “FedEx

was forced into trial, without consent and over its objection, without notice of the specific claims at

issue or whether both federal and state law would apply.” Motion for Renewed Judgment as a Matter

of Law at 3.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that defendant first raised these arguments in a “motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or alternatively for judgment on the pleadings, or

alternatively a second motion for summary judgment,” which was filed on the eve of trial.2

 In that

motion, defendant contended that plaintiff’s sexual harassment (and related) claims had not been plead

in the complaint, and thus that defendant was entitled to judgment on the pleadings or summary

judgment. Defendant also asserted that the Court lacked jurisdiction over these claims because

plaintiff’s DFEH complaint did not specifically mention “sexual harassment,” and thus plaintiff did not

exhaust her administrative remedies.

The Court denied defendant’s motion, and defendant’s subsequent motion for reconsideration,

on two grounds. First, the Court found that plaintiff had exhausted her administrative remedies on her

sexual harassment claims because plaintiff’s DFEH complaint stated that she had been “harassed,”

“forced to quit” and “retaliated” against, on account of “sex” by two individuals, including her manager

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 2 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Indeed, the Court notes that defendant’s present arguments regarding plaintiff’s sexual

harassment, retaliation and constructive discharge claims appear to be largely cut and pasted from the

summary judgment motion. Compare Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 215) at 12-17 with

Renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 4-10.

3

Norman Stites. Second, the Court found the balance of defendant’s arguments untimely. The Court

noted that the deadline for filing dispositive motions was September 2, 2005, and that defendant had

previously filed a motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff, which, inter alia, specifically addressed

the merits of plaintiff’s sexual harassment, retaliation and constructive discharge claims.3

 The Court

found that defendant could have raised all of the eve-of-trial arguments in a timely manner, and the

Court refused to excuse defendant’s failure to do so. 

The Court reiterates these earlier holdings, and further holds that while plaintiff undoubtedly

could have plead her claims more specifically, the complaint did allege that defendant engaged in

“gender-based . . . discriminatory employment practices intended to harass plaintiff,” and that

“defendant’s persistent pattern of harassment and discrimination had finally become intolerable for

plaintiff.” First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 83, 96. Moreover, defendant’s assertion that it “did not have

notice” of plaintiff’s claims is belied by the extensive record in this case. Both plaintiff and Stites

testified at length during their depositions about the events giving rise to plaintiff’s sexual harassment,

retaliation and constructive discharge claims, and these claims were litigated on summary judgment.

See Docket Nos. 215, 278, 289 & 295. Defendant also cited the nature of plaintiff’s claims – “Unlike

other Plaintiffs, Boswell’s claims arise [out] of the alleged harassment by one Operations Manager,

Norman Stites” – as one ground for severing plaintiff and the remaining plaintiffs’ claims for separate

trials. See Docket No. 372. It was only after defendant’s summary judgment motion was unsuccessful

as to those claims, in the third year of litigating this case and on the eve of trial, and now with new

lawyers, that defendant first raised the argument that the sexual harassment claims were not part of this

case. 

A. Sexual harassment 

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to show that

Stites sexually harassed her. Boswell testified that at weekly work meetings Stites hugged and

tried to kiss her, on several occasions did kiss her, repeatedly asked her questions of a personal nature

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 3 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Plaintiff’s evidence showed that other employees kept the same days but had their start times

changed by an hour or so, but that plaintiff was the only person who was required to work different

days; that Stites was aware that the shift change would pose a hardship for plaintiff; that Stites was

involved in the schedule change; and that after plaintiff resigned, another employee was offered, and

worked, plaintiff’s prior shift, therefore calling into question the reason for changing plaintiff’s shift.

4

including questions about whether she was dating anyone and whether she intended to get married.

Boswell and another co-worker, Deborah Ingram, testified that Stites hugged, kissed and/or attempted

to kiss numerous women he managed, and that those who did not object to his actions were favored in

the workplace by being allowed to record unearned hours, working as much overtime as they wanted,

being assigned preferential shifts, and having their leave requests honored. In contrast, Boswell testified

that after she rebuffed Stites’ advances, he denied her request for a day off to attend a funeral and

repeatedly allowed other co-workers to yell at her in the workplace without reprimand. Boswell also

testified that she began having problems with her paycheck, and that Stites delayed in remedying the

problem. Finally, Boswell testified that toward the end of 2001, her shift was unexpectedly changed

to include weekends, a shift reserved for more junior employees. Boswell was the only employee whose

schedule changed in any significant way4

, and Boswell testified that the schedule change imposed a

hardship on her because of her child care needs. Boswell also testified that Stites was aware that the

new schedule would post a hardship for her because she had previously declined working that shift due

to child care needs. Both Boswell and Ingram testified that Stites was responsible for the schedule

change, and the documentary evidence regarding the schedule change indicated that Stites was, at the

very least, involved in the schedule change. A reasonable jury could conclude that Boswell was

subjected to a hostile work environment. See Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1108-09

(9th Cir. 1998). 

FedEx also argues that Boswell’s claim fails because she received high performance evaluations

and was not disciplined. However, courts employ a totality of the circumstances test in analyzing hostile

work environment claims, and whether allegedly abusive conduct interferes with a plaintiff’s work

performance is only one of the factors to be considered. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters. Corp., 256

F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law

because she did not avail herself of FedEx’s internal complaint processes. However, Boswell and

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 4 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Ingram both testified that they met with Stites and complained about his behavior, and that they

complained about Stites to Stites’ manager, Bob Montez, and that no action was taken. Boswell also

testified that she had complained to Montez about other problems with Stites and that Montez’s response

had been, “Do you really want to do this? Because you’re going to get Norman Stites in trouble.”

Boswell testimony at 106. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could reject FedEx’s affirmative

defense under Faragher-Ellerth.

B. Retaliation

 Boswell testified that after she and Ingram complained to Stites and Montez, and after she

rejected Stites’ advances, she was retaliated against in numerous ways as described supra. To establish

a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2)

the employer subjected her to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the

protected activity and the adverse action. See Manatt v. Bank of America NA, 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th

Cir. 2003). FedEx argues that Boswell failed to show any of the three elements. 

The Court disagrees. The Court has previously found that Boswell’s complaint to Stites and

Montez about Stites’ behavior constitutes protected activity. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234,

1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that making informal complaints to a supervisor is protected activity under

Title VII). Similarly, a jury could conclude that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Here,

Boswell’s evidence showed that she was assigned a weekend shift that was normally reserved for junior

employees, that she was the only person whose shift changed, and that the change imposed a known

hardship on her because of her child care situation; that she was denied a one day funeral leave; that

Stites allowed her co-workers to yell at and belittle her with impunity; and that Stites did not help her

address a problem with her paycheck. Finally, a jury could reasonably conclude that there was a causal

link between Boswell’s protected activity and the adverse actions she experienced, both due to temporal

proximity and the fact that these actions directly or indirectly involved Stites. 

C. Constructive Discharge

Under California law, the test for constructive discharge is whether conditions were so

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 5 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

“intolerable or aggravated” that a reasonable employee would have resigned, and whether the employer

knew about the conditions and their effect on the employee and could have remedied them but did not.

See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1245 (1994). For all of the same reasons set forth

above, the Court concludes that a jury could reasonably conclude based on the evidence at trial that

conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would have resigned. Further, Boswell

testified that management was aware of Stites’ behavior and that they failed to take any action. 

D. Damages

Defendant contends that plaintiff’s claim for lost earnings should be dismissed as a matter of law

because plaintiff did not mitigate her damages. However, plaintiff testified that she worked at a flea

market after she left FedEx, and she later found employment at a legal office. In addition, Stanley

Stephenson, an economist and plaintiff’s damages expert, testified about plaintiff’s lost earnings. Thus,

there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s lost earnings award.

Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s punitive damages claim should be dismissed as a matter

of law because there was no evidence of intentional discrimination. This contention lacks merit. The

jury found that Stites sexually harassed plaintiff, retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity,

constructively discharged her, and that plaintiff’s complained about Stites to no avail; such intentional

conduct could support a punitive damages award. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526,

536 (1999) (holding an employer may be liable for punitive damages in any case where it

“discriminate[s] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law.”).

The Court addresses defendant’s contentions regarding the Title VII damages cap infra.

II. Motion for new trial, or alternatively for amended judgment

Defendant moves for a new trial, or in the alternative for an order amending the judgment and

dismissing all claims against FedEx. Defendant also argues for remittitur of the damages award.

Defendant argues that the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Defendant also argues

that the Court erred by admitting certain testimony, improperly instructing the jury, and by preventing

defendant from interviewing Satchell class members as part of its trial preparation. 

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 6 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states, “A new trial may be granted . . . in an action in

which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been

granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit

has noted, “Rule 59 does not specify the grounds on which a motion for a new trial may be granted.”

Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, the court is “bound by

those grounds that have been historically recognized.” Id. “Historically recognized grounds include,

but are not limited to, claims ‘that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are

excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.’” Molski v. M.J. Cable,

Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251

(1940)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is

contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent

a miscarriage of justice.” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15

(9th Cir. 2000). 

A. Insufficiency of evidence/remittitur

In reviewing a Rule 59 motion based on insufficiency of the evidence, the Court must evaluate

the evidence and assess for itself the credibility of witnesses. See Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914

F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the Court may not grant a Rule 59 motion “merely because

it might have come to a different result from that reached by the jury.” Wilhelm v. Assoc. Container

Transp. (Australia) Ltd., 648 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Here, for the reasons set forth above in Section I supra, the Court finds that the jury’s verdict

is not contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. The Court also notes that the jury had the

opportunity to hear all of the parties’ testimony and assess the credibility of Boswell and defendants’

witnesses. The jury found against defendant on all of plaintiff’s claims, and in doing so, implicitly

found at least some of defendant’s witnesses incredible. The Court cannot fault that assessment.

Further, the Court finds that plaintiff was articulate, possessed a forthright demeanor, and that her

testimony was persuasive. 

Defendant alternatively seeks remittitur of the damages awarded by the jury. Defendant

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 7 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

contends that the compensatory and punitive damages awards are grossly excessive and unsupported

by the evidence. The Ninth Circuit has held that a jury’s finding on the amount of damages should be

reversed only if the amount is “grossly excessive or monstrous,” Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1040 (internal

quotation marks omitted), or if the amount is “clearly unsupported by the evidence” or “shocking to the

conscience.” Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1557 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In making this determination, the Court must focus on evidence of the qualitative harm suffered by

plaintiff. “The severity or pervasiveness of the conduct is relevant insofar as it provides probative

evidence from which a jury may infer the nature and degree of emotional injury suffered, but direct

evidence of the injury is still the primary proof.” Velez v. Roche, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1038 (N.D. Cal.

2004); see also Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 513-14 (9th Cir.

2000) (focusing on evidence of harm suffered by the plaintiff, such as anxiety and rashes).

As discussed infra, the Court applies the Title VII damages cap to plaintiff’s punitive damages

award, thus reducing the overall damages to $850,000 (that is, $300,000 lost earnings, $250,000

emotional distress and $300,000 punitive damages). The Court finds that there was sufficient evidence

to support such damages, and will not further reduce the damages award.

B. Barring defendant from questioning plaintiff about the failure to specifically plead

sexual harassment in the complaint

Defendant contends that the Court erred by not allowing defense counsel to “fully question”

plaintiff on the absence of sexual harassment allegations in the First Amended Complaint. Defendant

also contends that the Court erred by not taking “judicial notice” of the absence of such allegations as

requested by defendant at the beginning of trial. 

Defendant’s contentions lack merit. As the trial transcript demonstrates, defense counsel was

afforded ample opportunity to question plaintiff about various statements that she made about why she

left FedEx, and plaintiff’s failure to specifically mention sexual harassment in those statements. See,

e.g., Boswell cross-examination at 202-06 (questioning plaintiff about absence of “sexual harassment”

allegations in statement she filed with state agency for unemployment, e-mails plaintiff sent while at

FedEx, and plaintiff’s DFEH charge). Thus, defendant made the point that it now claims it was

precluded from making: that plaintiff did not complain about sexual harassment by Stites. The Court

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 8 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Again, because defendant did not include citations to the trial transcript in its motion, the Court

can only guess as to which portions of the witnesses’ testimony is at issue.

6

 Defendant also argues that the Court improperly overruled a hearsay objection to Ms. Thomas’

testimony. The transcript reflects that the Court sustained defendant’s hearsay objection, overruled a

non-specific objection to a question that did not clearly call for hearsay, and that defense counsel failed

to make a further hearsay objection. See Thomas testimony at 612:17-613:23.

9

finds no error in its decision to bar defense counsel from questioning plaintiff about what was not

included in the First Amended Complaint, as that pleading was drafted by her lawyer, and was not

verified by plaintiff. Under those circumstances, it is inappropriate to question plaintiff about the

decision not to include certain allegations in the complaint. 

C. Testimony by Deborah Ingram and Jennifer Thomas

Defendant contends that the Court erred in admitting certain testimony5

 by two of plaintiff’s coworkers, Deborah Ingram and Jennifer Thomas, about their experiences with Norman Stites. For

example, Ms. Ingram testified, inter alia, that Stites hugged and kissed and/or attempted to kiss the

female employees he supervised, including both Ingram and plaintiff, that Stites’ conduct was

unwelcome, and that “if you played the kissing game with Norman Stites, you got to do what you

wanted to do. You got a golden ticket. And if you didn’t play the kissing game, your life was hell.

Period.” Ingram testimony at 561. Ms. Ingram also testified that she and plaintiff met with Stites and

told him that they did not want him to hug and kiss them, and Ingram also told Stites’ supervisor, Bob

Montez, about Stites behavior. Ms. Thomas, whose direct testimony spans three pages in the trial

transcript, see Thomas testimony at 610:24-613:23, testified that Stites sent her e-mails that she found

inappropriate and that Stites asked her out on a date.6

The testimony of Ms. Ingram and Ms. Thomas was probative of plaintiff’s claim that she was

subjected to a sexually hostile workplace. In addition, Ms. Ingram’s testimony was also proof that

FedEx management had notice of Stites’ conduct but failed to take remedial action. As defendant’s

motion concedes, the “trial court enjoys considerable discretion in determining whether to exclude

evidence under Rule 403 for unfair prejudice.” Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., 244 F.3d 684, 690

(9th Cir. 2001) (in sexual harassment case, affirming district court’s exclusion of certain evidence

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 9 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

because evidence would have amounted to “mini trial,” and noting that court had allowed “significant

amount of more recent evidence regarding other co-workers, including Fernandez, Amato and three

other women.”). The Court finds no error in allowing the testimony of Ms. Ingram or Ms. Thomas.

D. Denial of defendant’s motions in limine

(1) Motion in limine to exclude Stanley Stephenson from testifying

Defendant contends that the Court erred when it denied defendant’s motion in limine to exclude

plaintiff’s economics expert, Stanley Stephenson, from testifying. As defendant argued in the motion

in limine, defendant contends that Stephenson’s December 2005 expert report consisted solely of

preliminary findings. As the Court held in denying defendant’s motion in limine, “The December 2005

report contains a specific damages range for plaintiff Boswell, and explains the experts’ methodology

in reaching that number. Although defendant emphasizes language in that report stating that the

economic loss analysis may be revised based upon additional information, plaintiff states that, in fact,

the experts have not conducted any additional research and thus that they will be limiting their testimony

to the opinions set forth in the December 2005 report. As so limited, the foundational issues go to the

weight of the expert’s testimony, not its admissibility.” The Court finds no error in this ruling.

(2) Motion in limine to exclude evidence of plaintiff’s child’s illness and/or

disability

Defendant argues that the Court erred by denying defendant’s motion in limine to exclude as

irrelevant evidence of plaintiff’s child’s illness and/or disability. The Court denied defendant’s motion,

finding that such evidence would be admissible if relevant and material to issues in the case. At trial,

plaintiff testified that she was unable to work the new shift because she had a sick child and the shift

posed childcare issues. Thus, the testimony was relevant. The Court also notes that there was very little

testimony about plaintiff’s daughter’s health, and all such testimony was in the context of plaintiff’s

work schedule.

Further, defendant’s assertion that FedEx was “not put on proper notice” of this issue lacks

merit. The First Amended Complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff’s daughter suffered from severe

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 10 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

asthma, FAC ¶ 91, and that plaintiff could not work during the new shift because of childcare issues.

Id. ¶ 96. Plaintiff testified about these matters during her May 2005 deposition, and the issue was

briefed in defendant’s summary judgment motion. If defendant believed that further discovery on that

issue was necessary, defendant could have conducted such discovery.

(3) Motion in limine to exclude evidence of telephone call 

Defendant argues that the Court erred by denying defendant’s motion in limine to exclude as

irrelevant evidence of a telephone call between Peggy Reardon, Lou Vigiletti and plaintiff that took

place after plaintiff left her employment with FedEx. The Court denied this motion, ruling “if the

content of the phone call includes otherwise admissible relevant information it will not be excluded

based on FRE 403.” Pretrial Order at 5 (Docket No. 579). At trial, when plaintiff was questioned about

this phone call, defense counsel objected solely on hearsay grounds, and did not challenge the relevance

of this testimony. See Boswell testimony at 129. In any event, defendant has not identified any

prejudice flowing from this testimony, which was brief.

(4) Motion in limine to exclude plaintiff’s witnesses and exhibits

Defendant moved to exclude all of plaintiff’s witnesses and exhibits on the ground that plaintiff

filed her pretrial witness and exhibit lists late. However, as stated in plaintiff’s opposition to that

motion, and as reflected in the docket, plaintiff filed her witness and exhibit lists on September 26, 2006,

the same date that defendant filed its pretrial conference statement containing defendant’s witness and

exhibit lists. Both defendant’s motion in limine and the present motion generally assert that defendant

has been “prejudiced” by plaintiff’s failure to comply with court deadlines. Defendant has not

demonstrated how it was prejudiced by plaintiff’s filing of the witness and exhibit lists on the same day

that it filed its own lists. 

E. Objections to Stites’ testimony

Defendant generally contends the Court erred in overruling defendant’s objections to Stites’

videotaped depositions for the reasons set forth in defendant’s pretrial evidentiary objections (Docket

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 11 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 Again, defendant did not provide a citation to the record and the Court was required to review

the record to find the testimony at issue.

8

 Defendant concedes that the Title VII damages cap does not apply to the jury’s $300,000

award for lost earnings.

9

 The Court dismissed plaintiff’s § 1981 claim prior to trial.

12

No. 739) as well as defendant’s motion in limine No. 3 (Docket No. 515). The Court hereby

incorporates the Order ruling on defendant’s objections (Docket No. 743), and the pretrial order ruling

on motion in limine No. 3 (Docket No. 579). The only particular testimony that defendant identifies in

the motion7 is testimony regarding a warning letter that Stites received in 1995 regarding a sexually

inappropriate hand gesture that Stites made towards a male employee, and any lawsuit that may have

been filed as a result. Stites testimony at 125-131, 136, 183-84. The Court sustained defendant’s

objection to some of this testimony, but allowed some of the testimony because it was probative of

Stites’ understanding of what constitutes sexual harassment and of FedEx’s sexual harassment policy,

as well as FedEx management’s notice of Stites’ conduct. The Court finds no error in these rulings.

F. Jury instructions

Defendant generally contends that the Court erred by failing to give fifteen instructions proposed

by defendant. The Court rejected these instructions as unnecessary, confusing and/or argumentative.

With the exception of the punitive damages instruction, addressed infra, the Court finds no error in the

failure to give the instructions at issue.

Somewhat confusingly, defendant contends that the Court erred by not giving certain California

law instructions and also that only federal law governs plaintiff’s claims. In support of the argument

that only federal law governs plaintiff’s claims – and thus that the Title VII cap of $300,000 should

apply to plaintiff’s punitive and emotional distress damages awards8

 – defendant asserts that in its

motion for summary judgment, “FedEx analyzed the sexual harassment claims only under federal law.”

Motion for a New Trial at 18. In fact, however, while it is true that defendant’s motion for summary

judgment analyzed the sexual harassment claims under federal law, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment correctly noted that plaintiff’s claims were brought under Title VII, § 19819 and FEHA, see

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 12 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Defendant contends that the Court erred by not giving defendant’s proposed FEHA instruction

on “adverse employment action.” Defendant is correct that the California courts have interpreted

“adverse employment action” as an action that “materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment,” Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1051 (2005), while the Ninth Circuit

has interpreted “adverse employment action” more broadly to also include an action “reasonably likely

to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th

Cir. 2000). Here, the Court’s failure to give a separate “adverse employment instruction” based on state

law was harmless error, as at least some of the challenged adverse employment actions, such as

changing plaintiff’s shift and the delay in processing plaintiff’s paycheck, materially altered the terms,

conditions or privileges of her employment.

13

Motion for Summary Judgment at 1; and argued that plaintiff’s state law claims were untimely under

state law. See id. at 8. The First Amended Complaint alleges claims under federal and state law, and

the jury was instructed that plaintiff brought her claims under federal and state law. 

However, because the Court finds that plaintiff’s claims were brought under federal and state

law, the Court agrees that the punitive damages instruction was incorrect as to the state law standard of

proof for punitive damages. Plaintiff concedes that the standard for punitive damages under state law

is “clear and convincing,” while the standard under federal law is the lower “preponderance of the

evidence.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a); see also Hawkins v. Merchants Nat.

Bank, 127 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1997); Erdmann v. Tranquility, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167 (N.D.

Cal. 2001). Plaintiff has not cited any authority for the proposition that the “preponderance of the

evidence” standard governs a punitive damages award on a FEHA claim brought in federal court, nor

could the Court locate any such authority. The Court cannot assume, as plaintiff argues, that the jury

would have awarded $2,450,000 in punitive damages under the more stringent state law standard.

Accordingly, the Court finds that it must apply the Title VII cap to the jury’s punitive damages

award, thus reducing the punitive damages award to $300,000. Because the standards for liability under

FEHA and Title VII are effectively the same,10 the jury’s awards of $300,000 in lost earnings and

$250,000 in emotional distress damages are unaffected. 

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 13 of 14
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

D. Interviewing class members in Satchell case

Defendant argues it is entitled to a new trial because the Court denied defendant’s request to

interview class members in the Satchell case. After the close of discovery in this action, defendant

sought to conduct “confidential interviews” of 14 FedEx employees who were also class members in

Satchell et al. v. FedEx Express, C 03-2659 SI. The Court denied defendant’s request on the ground

that fact discovery had closed. The Court finds no error in this ruling. Defendant was well aware of

the 14 individuals’ identities prior to the close of discovery, and could have deposed these individuals

within the discovery period. 

 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, because the punitive damages instruction incorporated the Title VII

burden of proof, the Court applies the Title VII cap of $300,000 to the punitive damages award.

Plaintiff’s compensatory damages award of $550,000 is unaffected; the jury’s award of $300,000 for

lost earnings is not subject to the Title VII cap, and the award of $250,000 in emotional distress damages

is pursuant to state law. This order resolves defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of

law and defendant’s motion for a new trial. (Docket Nos. 845 & 846). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2008 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-00098-SI Document 1037 Filed 03/18/08 Page 14 of 14