Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01755/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01755-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Francisco Leon,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-01755-PHX-DLR (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Francisco Leon’s (“Petitioner”) Amended Petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Amended Petition”) (Doc. 7). 

Respondents have filed their Answer (Doc. 13). Petitioner has not replied. The matter is 

deemed ripe for consideration. 

Petitioner raises three grounds for habeas relief in the Amended Petition. The 

undersigned finds that the Amended Petition is time-barred under the one-year statute of 

limitations set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214.1

 It is therefore recommended that the Amended Petition be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

1 The one-year statute of limitations for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Convictions and Sentences

On December 20, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of attempted 

molestation of a child in violation of Arizona law.2

 (Doc. 13-1 at 11). The trial court 

accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas. (Id. at 17). On January 25, 2008, the trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to a ten-year term of incarceration for the first count of attempted 

molestation of a child and lifetime probation for each of the remaining two counts. (Id. at 

21-22). 

B. Post-Conviction Relief

On May 20, 2008,3 more than ninety days after the entry of judgment and 

sentencing, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”) (the “First PCR 

Notice”). (Id. at 26). On June 19, 2008, the trial court dismissed the First PCR Notice 

because Petitioner “failed to provide meritorious reasons to allow the untimely filing, as 

is required by Rule 32.2(b) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (Id. at 34). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review. (Id. at 37, 63). 

Petitioner filed a second PCR petition in July 2012 (the “Second PCR Petition”). 

(Id. at 68). The trial court dismissed the Second PCR Petition, ruling that Petitioner

failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding. 

(Id. at 76). Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. (Id. at 78). 

On November 29, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. 

(Id. at 84). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Id. at 89, 93). 

On August 5, 2014,4 Petitioner filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ 

2 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1401, 1410, 3821, 610, 604.01, 702, 702.01, 801, 1001.

3 Although the First PCR Notice was filed-stamped by the Clerk of Court on May 27, 2008, Petitioner dated it May 20, 2008. (Doc. 13-1 at 28). Because it does not affect 

the outcome, the undersigned has given Petitioner the benefit of the prison mailbox rule and has used May 20, 2008 as the filing date. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“A petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.”).

4 The Original Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on August 6, 2014. Although Petitioner did not complete the certificate of service in the Original Petition, 

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of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) (the “Original Petition”). The 

Court dismissed the Original Petition with leave to amend for failure to allege the 

particular federal constitutional right violated in each ground for relief (Doc. 6 at 2-3). 

On October 27, 2014,5 Petitioner filed the Amended Petition, which the Court required 

Respondents to answer (Doc. 9). The undersigned finds that the claims in the Amended 

Petition relate back to the claims in the Original Petition. Accordingly, the undersigned 

has used the August 5, 2014 filing date of the Original Petition instead of the later filing 

date of the Amended Petition for purposes of determining whether this federal habeas 

action is timely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005).

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within 

one year of the latest of: 

A. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

B. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

C. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

D. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

Petitioner dated it August 5, 2015. (Doc. 1 at 11). The Original Petition was also post- marked August 5, 2015. (Doc. 1-1). Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the undersigned has used August 5, 2014 as the filing date.

5 The Amended Petition was docketed by the Clerk of Court on October 29, 2014. The Amended Petition contains a certificate of service indicating that Petitioner placed the Amended Petition in the prison mailing system on October 27, 2014 (Doc. 7 at 11). 

Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the undersigned has used October 27, 2014 as the 

filing date.

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presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hammerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, 

the limitations period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled while the state 

prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state court and state post-conviction remedies 

are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDED PETITION

In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”6

 28 U.S.C. § 

6 To the extent Petitioner may be arguing that he is entitled to a later start date of 

the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) due to the Supreme Court 

decisions Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) and Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376

(2012), the claim fails. Those decisions did not create a newly recognized right that has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Buenrostro v. United 

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2244(d)(1)(A). Typically “direct review” means a defendant’s direct appeal following 

his or her convictions and sentencing. But under Arizona law, a defendant in a noncapital case who pleads guilty waives his or her right to a direct appeal. See ARIZ. REV.

STAT. § 13–4033(B). A plea-convicted defendant, however, is entitled to a Rule 32 ofright proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4. 

Under Ninth Circuit case law, an Arizona defendant’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See 

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit 

explained that “treating the Rule 32 of-right proceeding as a form of direct review helps 

make the Arizona Constitution’s guarantee of ‘the right to appeal in all cases’ a 

functioning reality rather than a mere form of words.” Summers, 481 F.3d at 717. 

Therefore, when an Arizona petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding is of-right, AEDPA’s statute 

of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of review or the expiration of the 

time for seeking such review. See id.

A. The Statute of Limitations Began Running on April 25, 2008

Here, Petitioner was originally sentenced on January 25, 2008. (Doc. 13-1 at 21-

22). Petitioner had 90 days, or until April 24, 2008, to file an of-right PCR petition. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. Petitioner did not file the of-right First PCR Notice until May 20, 

2008. (Id. at 26). The trial court dismissed the First PCR Notice because it was 

untimely. (Id. at 34). Therefore, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences became final on 

April 24, 2008 and the one-year statute of limitations began running on April 25, 2008. 

Summers, 481 F.3d at 717; see Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012) (AEDPA’s 

States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because the Court in Frye and Lafler

repeatedly noted its application of an established rule to the underlying facts, these cases 

did not break new ground or impose a new obligation on the State or Federal 

Government.”). Even if the decisions did entitle Petitioner to a later start date of the 

limitations period, the Original Petition would still be untimely as it was filed more than 

one year after the decisions were issued on March 21, 2012. As the Arizona state court 

deemed the Second PCR Petition filed in July 2012 untimely, it was not “properly filed” and would have no statutory tolling effect. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. 

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statute of limitations commences upon the expiration of the time for seeking review of 

petitioner’s judgment in a state’s highest court); Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 

1050, 1054-57 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that petitioner’s conviction became final upon 

expiration of time for seeking direct review and not upon the date the appellate court 

dismissed the direct appeal as untimely); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (“Excluding the day on which Patterson’s petition was denied by the Supreme 

Court [June 19, 1997], as required by Rule 6(a)'s “anniversary method,” the one-year 

[AEDPA] grace period began to run on June 20, 1997 and expired one year later, on June 

19, 1998”). Consequently, unless statutory or equitable tolling applies, Petitioner’s oneyear deadline to file a habeas petition expired on April 24, 2009. 

1. Statutory Tolling Does Not Apply

In July 2012, Petitioner filed the Second PCR Petition. (Doc. 13-1 at 68). The 

statute of limitations, however, had expired on April 24, 2009. Once the statute of 

limitations has run, subsequent collateral review petitions do not “restart” the clock. 

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 

823 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the Arizona state court ruled that the Second PCR 

Petition was untimely. (Doc. 13-1 at 76). Therefore, the Second PCR Petition was not 

properly filed and had no tolling effect even if the statute of limitations had not yet 

expired at the time of filing. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. 

2. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply

It is a petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted. Pace, 

544 U.S. at 418; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our 

precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations on habeas 

petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is 

appropriate.”). As mentioned, a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish that: 

(i) he or she has been pursuing his or her rights diligently and (ii) that some extraordinary 

circumstances stood in his or her way. A petitioner must also show that the 

“extraordinary circumstances” were the “but-for and proximate cause of his [or her] 

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untimeliness.” Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); see also 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). A petitioner’s pro se status, on its 

own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 544 

U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (“[W]e have never accepted pro se representation alone or 

procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute's clear policy 

calls for promptness.”). Petitioner does not allege that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

Nor does the Amended Petition set forth grounds that would justify equitable tolling. As 

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances made it 

impossible for him to file a timely federal petition, equitable tolling is therefore 

unavailable.

3. As the Statute of Limitations Expired on April 24, 2009, this 

Federal Habeas Proceeding Initiated on August 5, 2014 is Untimely

To summarize the preceding sections, Petitioner’s convictions and sentence 

became final on April 24, 2008 and AEDPA’s statute of limitations began running on 

April 25, 2009. Neither statutory nor equitable tolling applies. Accordingly, the statute 

of limitations expired on April 24, 2009, which means that the Original Petition filed on 

August 5, 2014 is years late. Petitioner makes no claim that the Court should apply the 

“actual innocence gateway” to excuse the untimeliness of the Original Petition.7

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

and dismiss with prejudice the Amended Petition (Doc. 7) on the basis that it is timebarred.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition (Doc. 7) be DENIED and 

7 In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway” is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.”

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DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated this 16th day of September, 2015. 

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