Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-04833/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-04833-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

IN RE TOWNSHEND PATENT

LITIGATION,

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AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS

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Case No.: C 02-4833 JF (PVT)

And Consolidated Cases 

ORDER DENYING ESS TECHNOLOGY,

INC.’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

(RE CHAN DEPOSITION)

On October 11, 2005 the parties appeared before Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull

for hearing on a motion by ESS Technology, Inc. (“ESS”) for a protective order regarding the

deposition of Fred S.L. Chan (“Chan”).1 Based on the briefs and arguments submitted, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that ESS’ motion is DENIED. 

Upon a showing of “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”

by a party resisting a deposition, a federal court may issue a protective order limiting or

prohibiting the deposition. See FED.R.CIV.P. 26(c). However, a strong showing is required

before a court will preclude a deposition entirely. See Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d

418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (district court erred in granting protective order precluding deposition of

defendant Herald-Examiner's publisher where plaintiff suggested possible information publisher

Case 5:02-cv-04833-JF Document 550 Filed 10/13/05 Page 1 of 2
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might have that others did not).

Because of the potential for abuse by plaintiffs, courts do sometimes protect high-level

corporate officers from depositions when the officer has no first-hand knowledge of relevant

facts or where the testimony would be repetitive. See Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649 (5th

Cir. 1979); see also, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 (1992). But where

a corporate officer has first hand knowledge of relevant facts, a deposition is generally allowed. 

See Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429; see also, Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 1090, 1092-93

(9th Cir. 1976) (approving denial of Howard Hughes’ motion for protective order because he

“probably had some knowledge” regarding substance of plaintiffs’ claims); and Six West Retail

Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 203 F.R.D. 98, 102-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

(compelling deposition of Sony’s CEO when plaintiff “presented sufficient evidence to infer that

[CEO] had some unique knowledge on several issues related to its claims”). Further, a claimed

lack of knowledge or recollection is not sufficient grounds for a protective order, since the

opposing party is entitled to test that lack of knowledge or recollection. See Amherst Leasing

Corp. v. Emhart Corp., 65 F.R.D. 121, 122 (D. Conn. 1974); and Travelers Rental Co., Inc., 116

F.R.D. 140, 143 (D. Mass. 1987).

In the present case, Townshend has submitted evidence suggesting that Chan has at least

some firsthand knowledge of relevant facts. And ESS has not carried its burden of showing that

the deposition of Chan would impose any undue burden on either ESS or Chan. Chan’s

declaration provides no information regarding his current workload, travel schedule or other

information which would support a finding of undue burden. As noted above, a claimed lack of

knowledge in not sufficient grounds for a protective order. Thus, Townshend is entitled to take

Chan’s deposition. See FED.R.CIV.P. 26(c).

Dated: 10/13/05

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:02-cv-04833-JF Document 550 Filed 10/13/05 Page 2 of 2