Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01735/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01735-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE L. MCKENNEY, JR., Civil No. 07cv1735-L (POR)

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT (1) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS BE GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART; AND (2)

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE

BE DENIED

[Doc. No. 10]

v.

R. HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 31, 2007, Plaintiff Joe L. McKenney, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed

a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five employees of Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility: Robert J. Hernandez, Warden; M.F. Stout, Visiting Lieutenant; L.V. Tillman,

Visiting Sergeant; G.S. Gasgonia, Visiting Correctional Officer; and Richard G. Ramirez, Visiting

Correctional Officer (“Defendants”). (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff sues Defendants in both their

individual and official capacities. (Id.) Plaintiff claims violations of his Eight Amendment rights,

his due process rights, and his right of access to the courts. (Compl. at 3-5.) In support of these

claims, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Gasgonia and Ramirez assaulted him for 30 minutes, and

that Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman neglected their duties to completely investigate

Plaintiff’s assault claims. (Id.) He further contends that he was denied yard recreation, double cell

occupancy, and access to the law library while he was in administrative segregation. (Id.)

Defendants brought a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and Strike Plaintiff’s Request

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

for Injunctive Relief pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(6) and 12(f) on the grounds

that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. (Doc. No. 10.) Specifically,

Defendants argue in their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss

and Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief (“Defs.’ Mot.”) that (1) Defendants are entitled to

sovereign immunity when sued in their official capacities; (2) there is no liability based on a failure

to investigate assault claims; (3) denial of outdoor recreation and double cell occupancy does not

rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim; (4) Plaintiff fails to describe a cause of action that

was frustrated as a result of the denial of access to the law library; (5) Plaintiff does not have a due

process right to an inmate grievance procedure; and (6) Plaintiff fails to show that injunctive relief is

required due to a threat of serious injury. (Doc. No. 11.)

After thorough review of the parties’ motions and all supporting documents, this Court

recommends that (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART and (2) that Defendants’ Motion to Strike be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2007, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendants. (Compl. at 2.) In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on August 28, 2005 he

was visiting with his wife when Defendant Ramirez handcuffed him and informed him that he

“could not sit towards/straddle [his] wife.” (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that he asked to speak

with Defendant Stout, and Defendant Ramirez left to make a phone call. (Id.) When Defendant

Ramirez returned, Defendant Gasgonia “attacked [Plaintiff] from behind” then “grabbed [Plaintiff’s]

left leg and lifted it upwards, throwing [him] forward” and causing him to “land hard on [his] face.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that both Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia assaulted him with their

“hands, feet and batons in front of [his] wife, other visitors and inmates.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims

Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia dragged him away, put leg irons on his legs, and assaulted him in

a van for thirty minutes. (Id.) Plaintiff contends Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia assaulted him

“willfully, with intent to commit great bodily injury.” (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff also claims that

Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman neglected their duties by failing to “completely

investigate” Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.)

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in administrative segregation from August 28, 2005

through February 24, 2006, during which time he was “denied recreation, double cell occupancy,

and [...] access to the law library.” (Compl. at 4.) He claims he was denied access to the law library

by the law librarian, and as a result he “could not prepare an adequate defense.” (Id.) He further

claims that he “tried to exhaust all forms of relief but was denied,” and consequently “the relief [he

sought] has been jeopardized, violating [his] due process rights.” (Compl. at 5.)

Plaintiff requests damages and an injunction preventing Defendants from retaliating towards

Plaintiff. (Compl. at 7.)

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants seek dismissal on the grounds that (1) Defendants are entitled to sovereign

immunity when sued in their official capacities; (2) there is no liability based on a failure to

investigate assault claims; (3) denial of outdoor recreation and double cell occupancy does not rise

to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim; (4) Plaintiff fails to describe a cause of action that was

frustrated as a result of the denial of access to the law library; and (5) Plaintiff does not have a due

process right to an inmate grievance procedure.

A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. A claim can only be dismissed if it “appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1974). The court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable

inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of

Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[U]nder Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), [the Court must] accept[] all

facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff,”) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 The court looks not at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the claimant

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

Dismissal is not warranted unless it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. 

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must construe the

pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving

liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not “supply essential

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (conclusory

allegations unsupported by facts are insufficient to state a claim under section 1983). “The plaintiff

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint unless it is

“absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, before a pro se civil rights complaint may be

dismissed, the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. 

Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24.

B. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants in their official capacity because as state

officials they are protected by sovereign immunity. Under the Eleventh Amendment, states are

immune from suits for damages brought in federal court. Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512,

517 (9th Cir. 1997). This protection extends to state officials acting in their official capacity. 

Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). While the Eleventh

Amendment bars a prisoner’s section 1983 claims against state actors sued in their official

capacities, Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989), it does not bar damage actions against state

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

officials in their personal or individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1992). Defendants correctly argue that as state officials

they are immune from suit in their official capacity. (Defs.’ Mot. at 6.) However, Plaintiff sues

Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. (Compl. at 2.) Accordingly, the Court

recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss claims against the Defendants be GRANTED

without leave to amend, only to the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief against them in their official

capacities.

C. Excessive Force by Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia used excessive force against him in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Compl. at 3.) In an excessive force claim against a prison

official, the “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain

or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 7 (1992). Courts examine (1) the need for application of force; (2) the relationship between the

need and the amount of force used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of threat to the

safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of facts

known to them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id.

Plaintiff’s allegations support an excessive force claim against Defendants Ramirez and

Gasgonia. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia, apparently in

response to Plaintiff sitting towards or straddling his wife, assaulted Plaintiff in front of his wife as

she screamed. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia took

him to a van and continued to assault him for thirty minutes. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff adequately

alleges the force applied by Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia was not “applied in a good-faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline,” but rather to “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 

See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations state a valid claim of excessive force, and

the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss excessive force claims against

Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia be DENIED.

D. Excessive Force by Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman

Plaintiff additionally brings an excessive force claim against Defendants Hernandez, Stout,

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

and Tillman. Supervisors can only be held liable for excessive force by their subordinates if they

“participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Vague [...] allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v.

Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants

Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman physically assaulted him in any way. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff only

alleges that Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman failed to investigate the incident of assault;

there are no direct allegations that they were involved before the assault, with the opportunity to

prevent it.

Despite Plaintiff’s assertions that he asked to “talk with Lieutenant Stout” and that Defendant

Ramirez “went to the phone and placed a call,” Plaintiff’s assertions of Defendant Stout’s

participation are vague and insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. (Compl. at 3.) See Ivey,

673 F.2d at 268. Therefore, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim against Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman be GRANTED with leave

to amend.

E. Deprivation of Yard Recreation

Plaintiff alleges that his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment was violated when he was denied yard recreation for the six months that he was kept in

administrative segregation. (Compl. at 4.)

“Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates, ... the full protections of the eighth

amendment most certainly remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect persons

convicted of crimes.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). 

The Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires neither that

prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find desirable. Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” which

includes those sanctions that are “so totally without penological justification that it results in the

gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976); see also

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. This includes not only

physical torture, but any punishment incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that

mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

Outdoor exercise is considered “extremely important to the psychological and physical well

being of the inmates.” Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. If the deprivation of outdoor exercise is “long-term,”

then it amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation even if there were no adverse medical effects

resulting from the deprivation. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1133 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000). To assert

an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of confinement, a prisoner must

satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen v. Sakai,

48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).

“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an

inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. This objective component is

satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing,

shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246; Farmer, 511

U.S. at 833; Wright v. Rushen, 642 f.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981).

The subjective requirement, relating to the defendants’ state of mind, requires “deliberate

indifference.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. “Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Finally, the Court must analyze

each claimed violation in light of these requirements, for Eighth Amendment violations may not be

based on the “totality of conditions” at a prison. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 246-47; Wright, 642 F.2d at

1132.

Plaintiff’s claim satisfies the objective requirement. The six months of deprivation alleged in

the complaint are more “long-term” than the six-and-one-half weeks of deprivation in Lopez, and,

therefore, the conditions alleged here objectively amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. See

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133 n.15.

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

However, Plaintiff’s claim fails to satisfy the subjective requirement. Not only does Plaintiff

fail to allege that any of the defendants were aware of the substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health, he

fails to name any of the defendants in connection with the denial of outdoor exercise. (Compl. at 4.) 

Plaintiff’s complaint fails because he did not “set forth specific facts as to each individual

defendant's deliberate indifference.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim based on

denial of yard recreation be GRANTED with leave to amend.

F. Denial of Double Cell Occupancy

Plaintiff further alleges that his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment was violated when he was denied “double cell occupancy.” (Compl. at 4.) No

precedent supports the claim that denying a double cell amounts to a deprivation of “the minimal

civilized measure of life's necessities.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087 (citations omitted). Such a denial is

thus not an Eighth Amendment violation. Moreover, Plaintiff again fails to “set forth specific facts

as to each individual defendant's deliberate indifference,” this time with regard to the denial of a

double cell, and thus fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. 

Therefore, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim based on

denial of double cell occupancy be GRANTED without leave to amend.

G. Access to the Courts

Plaintiff alleges that his right to have access to the courts was violated when the law librarian

denied access to the prison’s law library during the six months that Plaintiff was held in

administrative segregation. (Compl. at 4.) A prisoner’s access-to-the-courts right is violated when

he does not have access to an adequate law library and when he can show he suffered an “actual

injury” as a result, that his efforts to pursue some claim were hindered. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 351 (1996). A plaintiff must adequately describe the claim that was hindered and allege facts

that show it was actually hindered in some way. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). 

The analysis in Christopher describes two kinds of hindered claims: “forward-looking” claims that

are currently being impeded, and “backward-looking” claims that are now impossible to file. Id. at

412-14.

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

It is unclear from the complaint which claim Plaintiff alleges has been hindered; he claims

that as a result of the denial of access to the law library, he was unable to “prepare an adequate

defense” and could not “notify the proper authorities.” (Compl. at 4.) A plausible interpretation is

that he is referring to his excessive force claim against Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia, which is

in fact the only adequately alleged claim in the complaint.

Plaintiff alleges no facts to show that he has a “backward-looking” claim -- one that

can no longer be filed. He suggests that “the relief [he] seek[s] has been jeopardized,” but

does not allege facts to support that conclusion. (Compl. at 5.) Such conclusory

suggestions are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Ivey v. Board of Regents,

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). He does claim that he “tried to exhaust all forms of

relief but was denied.” (Compl. at 5.) If he means that he did not succeed in exhausting all

forms of relief, then that might preclude filing the claim, and he would effectively be

alleging facts that show he is not able to file the claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84

(2006) (describing the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement). However,

contrary to that interpretation, Plaintiff later describes in detail in the complaint his success

in exhausting administrative remedies. (Compl. at 6.) Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege

facts to show that he has a claim that can no longer be filed.

Likewise, Plaintiff alleges no facts to show that he has a “forward-looking” claim --

one that is currently being impeded. The complaint indicates that Plaintiff was only unable

to access the law library during the six months of administrative segregation; he does not

allege that he currently has no access to the law library. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff fails to

allege facts indicating he currently has a claim being impeded. Furthermore, assuming the

claim he refers to is the excessive force claim, he has successfully filed the claim, and

nothing indicates it has been impeded. Rather than “spending time and money to establish

facts constituting denial of access,” the denial of access claim should be dismissed and

Plaintiff can “litigat[e] a simpler case without the denial-of-access element.” Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).

Because Plaintiff alleges no facts to support the existence of either a “forwardCase 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Based on the facts of Plaintiff’s allegation, it appears he is alleging a due process violation even

though he describes the facts of his allegation on a different page from where he lists “due process” as

one of his civil rights that has been violated. Therefore, the Court construes this allegation as a due

process claim.

- 10 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

looking” or a “backward-looking” claim, the Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s access-to-the-courts claim be GRANTED with leave to amend.

H. Due Process - Investigation and Grievance Procedures

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process in the course of attempting to

exhaust his administrative remedies when Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman failed

to “completely investigate” his claims of brutality.1 (Compl. at 2, 5.) He further claims that

the “extreme blown time constraints” of the appeal process jeopardized those remedies. 

(Compl. at 5.)

“The Supreme Court has held that to obtain a protectable right an individual must

have ‘a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.

1, 7, (1979); see also Allen v. Board of Pardons, 792 F.2d 1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd,

482 U.S. 369 (1987)). “[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific

prison grievance procedure,” such as the processing of one’s appeal. Ramirez v. Galaza,

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988)).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the prison’s grievance procedure do not

constitute a due process violation. The alleged delays in the grievance process and

incomplete investigation by Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman do not amount to a

deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Therefore, the Court recommends that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim be GRANTED without leave

to amend.

///

///

///

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Defendants bring a motion to strike Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief pursuant

to Rule 12(f). (Defs.’ Mot. at 1.) In Plaintiff's complaint, he specifically requests an

injunction preventing Defendants "from acting in a retaliatory manner and that [Plaintiff] be

given a contact person at C.D.C.R.'s head office if [Plaintiff] believe[s] retaliatory measures

are underway." (Compl. at 7.) Defendants construe Plaintiff's request as a motion for

preliminary injunction and argue against the request based on the preliminary injunction

standard. (Defs.’ Mot. at 12.) However, it does not appear that Plaintiff intended his

request for an injunction to be a motion for a preliminary injunction. He neither expressly

requests a preliminary injunction nor presents any arguments in support of a preliminary

injunction motion. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 725 F.2d 521,

523 (9th Cir. 1984) ("To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show either (1) a

likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the

existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tipping in its

favor."). Since Plaintiff has not presented a motion for preliminary injunction to the Court,

Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction is moot.

Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief constitutes one of three types of relief he seeks

in his complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must

contain: ... a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or

different types of relief.”) The pre-discovery period is not the appropriate time to decide

whether Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction since permanent injunctions are only

granted or denied “after a full adjudication of the parties’ rights.” Schwarzer et al., CAL.

PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, 9TH CIRCUIT EDITION (Rutter

Group 2008) ¶ 13:11, p. 13-5.

Based on the aforementioned reasons, this Court recommends Defendants' motion to

strike Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief be DENIED.

///

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

IV. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this case and based on the foregoing, the

Court hereby recommends that:

1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their

official capacities be GRANTED without leave to amend.

2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force

claims against Defendants Ramirez and Gasgonia be DENIED.

3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force

claims against Defendants Hernandez, Stout, and Tillman be GRANTED with leave

to amend.

4) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim based on

denial of yard recreation be GRANTED with leave to amend.

5) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim based on

denial of double cell occupancy be GRANTED without leave to amend.

6) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s access to courts claim be GRANTED

with leave to amend.

7) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim be GRANTED

without leave to amend.

8) Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief be

DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted

to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1994).

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District

Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before

August 11, 2008. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” 

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 - 07cv1735-L (POR)

Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before August 21, 2008. 

The parties are advised that no extensions of time will be granted for purposes of filing

objections. The parties are further advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 9, 2008

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable M. James Lorenz

all parties

Case 3:07-cv-01735-CAB-DHB Document 14 Filed 07/10/08 Page 13 of 13