Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01981/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01981-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Julian Wyatt,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-01981-TUC-JGZ (EJM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

Petitioner Julian Wyatt filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“PWHC”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 19, 2014.1 (Doc. 1). Petitioner raises 

four grounds for relief: (1) actual innocence; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (3) 

abuse of discretion by the trial court; and (4) prosecutorial misconduct. Respondents filed 

an Answer contending that the PWHC is untimely, and further that all of Petitioner’s 

claims are either procedurally defaulted or not cognizable on federal habeas review. 

(Doc. 19). 

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Markovich for a Report and Recommendation. The 

undersigned finds that Petitioner’s PWHC is untimely, and that Petitioner has not shown 

that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends 

 

1 Although the Petition was docketed by the Clerk on March 24, 2014, the Court assumes that Petitioner deposited his PWHC in the prison mailing system on March 19, 

2014, as indicated by Petitioner’s signature on his Petition. (Doc. 1 at 11). 

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that the District Court deny the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial, Sentencing, and Appeal

 A Pima County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder. 

On August 4, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of 

release in 25 years. (Doc. 19 Ex. B). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals (“COA”) summarized the facts of the case as 

follows: 

Early in the morning on January 3, 2006, M.’s husband, R., 

told M. he believed someone was trying to break into their 

home and went to investigate. M. heard a gunshot, and R. 

instructed her to “call 911 and put the children onto the 

floor,” after which approximately twenty-one shots were fired 

at the home. Officers discovered bullet holes in the front 

windows and door of the home and found R., who ultimately 

died of a gunshot wound, lying on the living room floor. The 

weapon (an AK-47) matching the shell casings found at the murder scene was found “wrapped in a leather jacket” inside 

a broken-down vehicle in the backyard of the home of Wyatt’s childhood friend, Adrian, and Adrian’s brother, 

Jacob, where Wyatt frequently stayed.2

Jacob testified that he, Adrian, and Wyatt had discussed plans 

for Jacob and Wyatt to rob a particular home to obtain drugs 

and money. Wyatt and Jacob drove to R.’s home. Wearing a 

mask and gloves and armed with Adrian’s AK-47, Wyatt tried to knock down the front door of R.’s home without 

success. After hearing a “clicking noise” from inside the 

house, Wyatt shot at the front door and continued shooting as 

he and Jacob drove away. Wyatt was overheard the day after 

the incident saying that he had “heard a body drop” and that 

he had “unloaded a whole clip” from the AK-47. Jacob was 

arrested soon after the incident; Wyatt turned himself in to the 

police eight months later. Wyatt’s former girlfriend, Rochelle, 

told the police that Wyatt had told her “we did something . . . 

really bad that night. [W]e did a jack3 and it went bad and the 

guy shot at us through the door . . . [we] shot and then [we] 

ran. [We] think the guy died . . . .” 

(Doc. 19 Ex. F at ¶¶ 2–3). 

 

2

 Jacob pled guilty to manslaughter. 

3

 Rochelle explained that a “jack” means to steal something. 

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Following his conviction, Petitioner sought review in the Arizona COA. 

Appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating that he had searched the record and found 

no errors or arguable questions of law, and asked the court to review the record for 

reversible error. (Doc. 19 Ex. D). Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental brief on April 24, 

2009 and alleged prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of discretion by the trial court. 

(Doc. 19 Ex. E).4

 On July 28, 2009, the COA found no reversible error and affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 19 Ex. F). 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court on October 

20, 2009. (Doc. 19 Ex. G). In addition to the claims Petitioner raised in his pro se brief on 

direct appeal, Petitioner also raised a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

and stated that he did not intend to appeal pro se and thought that his brief would be a 

supplement to the brief he believed counsel was going to file. The Arizona Supreme 

Court denied review on January 26, 2010. (Doc. 19 Ex. H). Petitioner did not file a 

petition for review with the United States Supreme Court. 

B. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

On October 8, 2009, Petitioner initiated proceedings in Pima County Superior 

Court for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 19 Ex. J). Appointed counsel filed a Rule 

32 petition on August 6, 2010, raising two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

and challenging the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 19 Ex. M). The court 

then granted Petitioner’s pro se motion to withdraw appointed counsel and granted 

Petitioner leave to file a pro se Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 19 Ex. N). Petitioner raised claims 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 19 Ex. O). 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied PCR on April 5, 2011. 

(Doc. 19 Exs. P, Q). Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona COA on 

 

4 While the brief is date stamped as filed by the court on April 27, 2009, the Court will assume that Petitioner deposited his brief in the prison mailing system on the date 

indicated by his signature, April 24, 2009. In order to give Petitioner the benefit of the 

earliest date calculations, the Court makes this same assumption for all other documents 

filed by the Petitioner and included in the record for the present matter. 

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August 25, 2011, and on February 8, 2012 the COA issued its decision granting review 

and denying relief. (Doc. 19 Exs. R, S). The COA also denied Petitioner’s subsequent 

motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 19 EX. T). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review 

on June 6, 2012. (Doc. 19 Ex. U). Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the 

United States Supreme Court. The COA issued its mandate on October 15, 2012. (Doc. 

19 Ex. V). 

C. Special Action Proceedings 

On September 1, 2011 Petitioner filed a petition for special action in the Arizona 

COA. (Doc. 19 Ex. NN). Petitioner argued that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it denied his request to amend his Rule 32 petition. On September 5, 2011, Petitioner 

filed a second petition for special action in the Arizona COA. (Doc. 19 Ex. MM). In the 

second petition, Petitioner raised claims of abuse of discretion by the trial court and 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

The COA declined to accept jurisdiction of the petitions, (Doc. 19 Exs. OO, PP), 

and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review (Doc. 19 Exs. QQ, RR). 

D. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

On April 23, 2012, Petitioner simultaneously filed a second notice of PCR and a 

pro se Rule 32 petition in Pima County Superior Court. (Doc. 19 Exs. W, X). Petitioner’s 

notice stated that he was alleging a claim pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (d), (e), (f), 

(g) or (h), specifically that there were newly discovered material facts that would 

probably have changed the verdict or sentence. (Doc. 19 Ex. W). Petitioner argued that 

the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Petitioner to complete his 

investigation before ruling on his first Rule 32 petition, and suggested that if the 

investigator had been appointed earlier, Petitioner could have discovered the new 

evidence before the evidentiary hearing and timely amended his first Rule 32 petition. 

(Doc. 19 Ex. X). The new evidence consisted of information discovered by the 

investigator that trial counsel’s investigator was being investigated for fraudulent billing 

practices, which Petitioner alleged resulted in the failure to call a defense witness 

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(Hannah Priore) at trial. 

On July 3, 2012, the trial court issued its order denying the second PCR petition. 

(Doc. 19 Ex. Y). The court cited Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), which provides that a 

defendant is precluded from obtaining PCR on any ground waived at trial, on appeal, or 

in any previous collateral proceeding, unless the claim is expressly excepted from the 

preclusion rule. The court further noted that IAC claims “will be deemed waived and 

precluded not only when they previously were raised, but also when they could have been 

raised in a prior Rule 32 proceeding.” (Doc. 19 Ex. Y) (internal quotations and citation 

omitted). The court stated that while Petitioner argued his IAC claim was not precluded 

based on the newly discovered evidence of alleged fraudulent billing practices by trial 

counsel’s investigator, Petitioner failed to explain how this evidence was relevant to 

counsel’s failure to call Hannah as a witness. The court also stated that it was unclear 

why Petitioner did not include the failure to call Hannah in his first PCR petition, where 

he did allege IAC for failure to call Adrian V., Adrian A., and Iris as witnesses. The court 

concluded that Petitioner’s alleged new evidence did not meet the requirements of Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2 that there be a “specific exception and meritorious reasons” for failing to 

raise the IAC claim “in the previous petition or in a timely manner.” The court further 

concluded that even if the claim was not precluded, Petitioner failed to satisfy Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) to establish a claim of IAC. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona COA on July 31, 2012. 

(Doc. 19 Ex. Z). Petitioner argued that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness led to the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent, that the trial court erred in ruling that Hannah’s 

testimony would not undermine confidence in the outcome at trial, and that the trial court 

erred in ruling that the fraudulent billing practices evidence was unrelated to Petitioner’s 

IAC claims. On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its order granting review and 

denying relief. (Doc. 19 Ex. AA). The court stated that the trial court correctly ruled that 

Petitioner had not established why he should be permitted to file a successive PCR 

petition, and that in any event, the IAC claim was precluded and without merit. 

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Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, and the 

COA issued its mandate on March 27, 2013. (Doc. 19 Ex. BB). 

E. Third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

On April 14, 2013, Petitioner simultaneously filed a third notice of PCR and a pro 

se Rule 32 petition in Pima County Superior Court. (Doc. 19 Exs. CC, DD). Petitioner’s 

notice stated that he was alleging a claim pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (d), (e), (f), 

(g) or (h), specifically that there had been a significant change in the law that would 

probably overturn his conviction and sentence. (Doc. 19 Ex. CC). In support of his claim, 

Petitioner stated that the recent United States Supreme Court case of Missouri v. Frye, 

132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012), held that defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel 

during plea negotiations. Id. In his petition, Petitioner raised claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel based on counsel’s alleged failure to spend sufficient time with him, 

review disclosure, and explain the state’s case and Petitioner’s defense. (Doc. 19 Ex. 

DD). Petitioner claimed that he could not make an informed decision on the plea without 

a proper understanding of the accusations against him. 

On May 1, 2013, the trial court issued its order denying the third PCR petition. 

(Doc. 19 Ex. EE). The court noted that Petitioner had previously raised claims of IAC in 

his first two PCR petitions, and now raised a new claim of IAC based on the amount of 

time counsel spent meeting with Petitioner. The court found that Petitioner did not argue 

any newly discovered facts under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) that would exempt the 

claim from preclusion and warrant a ruling on the merits. The court also noted that the 

exhibits attached to the petition undermined Petitioner’s claim because they showed that 

trial counsel’s investigator visited Petitioner once a week to review disclosure. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona COA on May 29, 2013. 

(Doc. 19 Ex. FF). Petitioner argued that the trial court unreasonably applied Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) because Petitioner was arguing a significant change in the law, not 

newly discovered evidence. Petitioner also alleged that the trial court improperly relied 

on the investigator’s visit records, which Petitioner contends are unreliable. On 

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November 19, 2013, the COA issued its order granting review and denying relief. (Doc. 

19 Ex. GG). The court noted that while Petitioner was correct in stating that two recent 

Supreme Court cases had recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel in plea 

bargains, this has long been the law in Arizona. The COA found that the trial court did 

not err when it summarily denied relief because Petitioner’s claims were precluded. 

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on April 17, 2014. (Doc. 19 Ex. HH). 

Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the United States Supreme Court, and the 

COA issued its mandate on May 14, 2014. (Doc. 19 Ex. II). 

F. Fourth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

On June 20, 2014, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition, which the trial court 

construed as a fourth Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 19 Ex. JJ). Petitioner alleged claims of 

newly discovered material facts pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e) and actual 

innocence pursuant to Rule 32.1(h); specifically, abuse of discretion by the trial court, 

IAC, and prosecutorial misconduct. 

On July 15, 2014, the trial court issued its ruling finding all claims precluded and 

dismissing the fourth PCR petition under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(c). (Doc. 19 Ex. KK). 

The court found that the petition was untimely filed more than four years after the COA 

issued its mandate on Petitioner’s direct appeal, and noted that while claims made 

pursuant to Rule 32.1(e) and 32.1(h) are exempt from the timeliness and preclusion rules, 

“Petitioner may not avoid preclusion merely by invoking these provisions.” The court 

found that while Petitioner alleged newly discovered evidence, he presented no new facts, 

and his claim under Rule 32.1(e) was a successive claim of IAC and therefore precluded. 

The court further found that Petitioner failed to identify any exculpatory evidence to 

support his claim of actual innocence under Rule 32.1(h): Petitioner’s claim that the 

indictment was duplicitous did not fall within any of the timeliness or preclusion 

exceptions and could have been raised on direct appeal, and his claim that the state 

mischaracterized evidence was raised on direct appeal and was therefore precluded. The 

court dismissed the petition under Rule 32.6(c), which permits a court to dismiss a 

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petition for PCR after identifying all of the claims and determining “that no remaining 

claim presents a material issue of fact or law which would entitle the defendant to relief.”

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona COA on August 25, 2014.5

On October 22, 2014, the COA issued its order dismissing the petition. The docket entry 

states: “It appearing to the Court that appeal having been from judgment filed July 15, 

2014, petition for review filed August 25, 2014, was not timely filed within the thirty (30) 

day time limit in accordance with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9.” The COA issued its mandate 

on January 13, 2015. 

G. First Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings 

On December 9, 2013, Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay of Habeas Proceedings in 

case number CV 13-2177-JGZ-JR. (Doc. 19 Ex. SS). This Court denied the petition and 

dismissed the action without prejudice, noting that Petitioner had not filed a habeas 

corpus petition or paid the filing fee or filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. 

(Doc. 19 Ex. TT). 

H. Habeas Petition

Petitioner deposited his PWHC in the prison mailing system on March 19, 2014. 

(Doc. 1). In Ground One, Petitioner alleges actual innocence, noting that there was no 

physical evidence linking him to the murder and suggesting that a stronger defense at trial 

could have resulted in an acquittal. In Ground Two, Petitioner argues his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate investigation, failing to interview and 

call witnesses for the defense, failing to consult with Petitioner, failing to preserve issues 

for appeal, and failing to review evidence the state relied on. In Ground Three, Petitioner 

alleges abuse of discretion by the trial court for allowing the state to introduce evidence 

of other crimes not listed in the indictment to convict Petitioner of felony murder, making 

the indictment duplicitous. In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges prosecutorial misconduct

based on the state presenting misleading evidence to the jury. 

 

5 See Arizona Court of Appeals Division Two case information search, available at https://www.appeals2.az.gov/ODSPlus/caseInfo.cfm 

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 Respondents contend that the PWHC is untimely and that Petitioner has not shown 

that he is entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. 19). Respondents further contend that 

Ground One is not cognizable as a freestanding constitutional claim and that Grounds 

Three and Four are unexhausted because they were not presented to the state courts as 

specifically federal claims. Respondents also argue that while some of Petitioner’s IAC 

claims in Ground Two are properly exhausted, the Court should still dismiss the petition 

based on untimeliness. 

For the reasons stated below, the undersigned finds that the PWHC is untimely 

and thus not properly before this Court for review. Accordingly, the undersigned 

recommends that the District Court deny and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

A. Timeliness 

As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner’s PWHC is 

barred by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 

2002). The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for habeas corpus are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to applications for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 

2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period shall run from the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The other subsections being inapplicable here, Petitioner must have filed his 

habeas petition within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by 

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1929 (2013). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that when an Arizona defendant does not file a petition for 

review in the Arizona Supreme Court on direct review, his “direct appeal was final. . . 

[on] the date that he allowed his time for seeking review in the [Arizona] Supreme Court 

to expire.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073‒74 (9th Cir. 2007); Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 656 (2012). If the petitioner does seek direct review from the 

state’s highest court but does not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court, the conviction becomes final when the time for filing such a 

petition elapses. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 1999) (“the period of 

‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner 

can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether 

or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.”); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 

113, 120–21 (2009); McMonagle v. Meyer, 766 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Here, Petitioner was sentenced on August 4, 2008 and timely filed a direct appeal. 

On July 28, 2009, the COA found no reversible error and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction 

and sentence. (Doc. 19 Ex. F). Petitioner had 30 days from that date to seek review in the 

Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Petitioner filed a petition for 

review with the Arizona Supreme Court on October 20, 2009.6 (Doc. 19 Ex. G). The 

 

6 Petitioner signed and dated his petition on September 26, 2009. The petition is date stamped as filed on October 20, 2009. While either filing date would be beyond the 

30 day limit, a docket search on the Arizona Court of Appeals website indicates that 

Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review on September 14, 2009. Thus, the Court presumes that the petition for review was timely filed. 

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Arizona Supreme Court denied review on January 26, 2010. (Doc. 19 Ex. H). Petitioner 

had 90 days from that date to seek a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. 

See Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159. Because no petition for certiorari was filed in the United 

States Supreme Court, Petitioner’s judgment became final on April 26, 2010 within the 

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, absent any tolling, the one-year limitations 

period would have commenced on April 27, 2010 and expired on April 27, 2011. See 

Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159 (“when a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the 

United States Supreme Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on 

the date the ninety-day period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires.”).

B. Statutory Tolling 

The one-year limitation period under AEDPA is statutorily tolled during the time 

in “which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review 

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see 

also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An application for State postconviction relief is ‘“properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance 

with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 

(2000). If a state court rejects a petitioner’s PCR petition as untimely, it cannot be 

“properly filed” and the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Statutory tolling of the limitations period ends 

“[a]fter the State’s highest court has issued its mandate or denied review, [because] no 

other state avenues for relief remain open.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 

(2007). 

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction 

relief is filed, even though the petition is not filed until later. Isley v. Arizona Department 

of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

(“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). An application for state post-conviction relief 

remains pending “until it has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction 

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procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). State law determines the 

conclusion of collateral review and thus, state law also determines the conclusion of 

statutory tolling under the AEDPA. See Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1077. “[W]hen the 

Arizona Court of Appeals grants review of the trial court’s decision on a petition for postconviction relief but denies relief, and the petitioner does not seek further review, the 

post-conviction proceeding is pending until the date the appellate court issues its 

mandate.” Wells v. Ryan, 2015 WL 9918159, at *9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2015), report and 

recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 319529 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27, 2016) (collecting cases 

and citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.23 and 32.9(g)); Ramon v. Ryan, 2010 WL 3564819, *6 

(D. Ariz. July 23, 2010) (same). However, where the petitioner does file a petition for 

review with the Arizona Supreme Court, “the collateral proceeding ‘[is] determined’ . . . 

when the Arizona Supreme Court denie[s] [the] petition for review” and the statute of 

limitations begins to run again on the date that the court denies review. Hemmerle, 495 

F.3d at 1077 (noting that after the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, “[t]here was 

nothing left for [the court] to do” and “nothing remained ‘pending’ for purposes of § 

2244(d)(2).”). 

 Here, Petitioner timely filed his first notice of PCR on October 8, 2009.

7 This PCR 

notice was properly filed and therefore tolled AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 

The trial court denied PCR on April 5, 2011. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the 

Arizona COA, and on February 8, 2012 the COA issued its decision granting review and 

denying relief. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on June 6, 2012. Thus, 

Petitioner’s properly filed PCR application remained pending until June 6, 2012, when 

the Arizona Supreme Court denied review.8 See Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1077; Lawrence, 

 

7 Petitioner signed and dated his notice on October 8, 2009. The notice is date 

stamped as filed on February 4, 2010. This discrepancy is not material to the Court’s decision in this matter because in either case, the notice of PCR was filed before 

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period commenced on April 27, 2010. 

8

 Respondents present an alternative argument considering whether Petitioner’s 

PCR proceedings remained pending until the Arizona COA issued its mandate. (Doc. 19 

at 9). “Under the Arizona rules, [however,] there is no requirement for a mandate to issue 

from a denial of review. Under such circumstances, review is final when denied. There is 

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549 U.S. at 332. Petitioner had one year from that date to file his federal habeas petition. 

Accordingly, absent equitable tolling, the statute of limitations expired on June 7, 2013, 

making Petitioner’s May 19, 2014 PWHC untimely. 

Unlike the 2009 notice, Petitioner’s second, third, and fourth notices of PCR were 

not “properly filed” and did not statutorily toll the one-year limitations period. “[A]n 

application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with 

the applicable laws and rules governing filings,” including “the time limits upon its 

delivery . . .” Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8. If a petitioner files an application after the generally 

applicable state time limit, the application may nonetheless be considered “properly 

filed” if it fits within any exception to that limit. Pace, 544 U.S. at 413. However, the 

existence of exceptions to the state’s timely filing requirements does not prevent a late 

application from being deemed improperly filed when the application does not fit within 

any exceptions to the time limit. Id. at 408. “When a post-conviction petition is untimely 

under state law, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414 

(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). 

In Arizona, notices for PCR (other than in “of-right” or capital proceedings) “must 

be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days 

after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). In the event that a notice is not timely filed, Rule 32.2(b) of the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth conditions for filing, which if met, 

exclude the claims contained in the untimely notice from preclusion. See Pace, 544 U.S. 

at 413–14 (comparing conditions of filing with conditions of relief). This rule may permit 

an untimely or successive petition if a petitioner can establish that (1) he “is being held in 

custody after the sentence imposed has expired,” (2) “[n]ewly discovered material facts 

 nothing more for the reviewing court to do.” Ramon v. Ryan, 2010 WL 3564819, *7 

(Dist. Ariz. July 23, 2010). Further, pursuant to Lawrence, “an application for state postconviction review no longer exists” upon the state supreme court’s denial of review. 

549 U.S. at 332. Thus, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s PCR proceedings 

concluded for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) when the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, and did not continue to remain pending until the Arizona COA issued its mandate. 

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probably exist and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence,” (3) 

his “failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief of-right or notice of appeal within the 

prescribed time was without fault on the defendant’s part,” (4) “[t]here has been a 

significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant’s case would 

probably overturn the defendant’s conviction or sentence,” or (5) “[t]he defendant 

demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would 

be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty 

of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d–h). 

“[T]he notice of post-conviction relief must set forth the substance of the specific 

exception and the reasons for not raising the claim in the previous petition or in a timely 

manner.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). 

In the instant case, Petitioner’s second notice of PCR was untimely filed. 

Petitioner filed his second notice on April 23, 2012—more than two years after the direct 

appeal mandate issued on February 11, 2010—well beyond the 30-day limitation period. 

Furthermore, the record does not reflect that Petitioner complied with Rule 32.2(b) when 

he submitted his untimely notice. While Petitioner alleged newly discovered material 

facts—that trial counsel’s investigator was being investigated for fraudulent billing 

practices—Petitioner failed to explain how not having this information previously 

prevented him from alleging the IAC claim based on counsel’s failure to call Hannah as a 

defense witness in his first PCR petition. Therefore, under state law, the second notice for 

post-conviction relief was untimely and was not “properly filed” for purposes of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), and the time period during which Petitioner pursued his untimely 

second PCR petition through the state courts it not subject to statutory tolling. Banjo v. 

Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An untimely petition . . . is not ‘properly filed’ 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and so it does not toll the statute of limitations.”).9

 

 

9 “Only the time period during which a round of habeas review is pending tolls the statute of limitation; periods between different rounds of collateral attack are not tolled.” 

Banjo, 614 F.3d at 968. The Ninth Circuit “employ[s] a two-part test to determine whether the period between the denial of one petition and the filing of a second petition 

should be tolled. First, we ask whether the petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to 

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This conclusion is further supported by the trial court’s ruling denying the second 

PCR petition. (Doc. 19 Ex. Y). In addressing preclusion, the court found that 

“Petitioner’s alleged fraudulent billing practices does not meet the requirement that there 

be a ‘specific exception and meritorious reasons,’ for failure to raise ineffective 

assistance of counsel with respect to Ms. Priore, ‘substantiating the claim and indicating 

why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or in a timely manner.’” (Doc. 19 

Ex. Y at 3) (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2). In so ruling, the court necessarily found that 

the second PCR petition was untimely because Petitioner’s claim did not satisfy any 

exception to the time limit for filing. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) (“If the specific 

exception and meritorious reasons do not appear substantiating the claim and indicating 

why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or in a timely manner, the notice 

shall be summarily dismissed.”). Accordingly, because the second notice was filed after 

the time limit, and did not fit within any exceptions to that limit, it was not “properly 

filed” and does not toll the limitations period under § 2244(d)(2). See Pace, 544 U.S. at 

414 (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the 

matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir.

2011) (“An untimely state petition is not ‘properly filed’ and does not trigger statutory 

 an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition. If the petitions are not related, then the subsequent petition constitutes a new round of collateral attack, and 

the time between them is not tolled. If the successive petition was attempting to correct 

deficiencies of a prior petition, however, then the prisoner is still making proper use of state court procedures, and habeas review is still pending. Second, if the successive 

petition was not timely filed, the period between the petitions is not tolled.” Id. at 968–69 

(internal quotations and citations omitted) (noting that because the court concluded the 

petition was untimely under the second prong of King, the court “need not determine 

whether the petition was a continuation of the first or the start of a second round.”); see 

also Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1075 (explaining that when the court construes the new petition as part of the first round of collateral review, tolling applies if the petition was 

denied on the merits but not if the petition was deemed untimely). If a new claim is 

asserted in the second petition, then the second petition is considered a “new round,” 

even if the second petition corrects deficiencies in the first petition. Stancle v. Clay, 692 

F.3d 948, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that because the petitioner “did not limit his 

second petition to an elaboration of the facts and his second petition started a ‘new round,’ he is not entitled to statutory gap tolling for the [] days between his first and second superior court petitions.”). Here, because the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s second, third, and fourth notices of PCR were untimely, Petitioner is not entitled to 

tolling for the periods between the petitions. 

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tolling under AEDPA.”).10

 Furthermore, while a petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling during the entire time 

he is seeking “one full round” of collateral review in state court, Carey, 536 U.S. at 222, 

successive post-conviction relief petitions do not toll the limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2) (tolling limitations period during the time “which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.”); Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.4(a) (successive petition for post-conviction relief is limited to 

certain claims); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 7 (2000); see also Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 

729, 734 (9th Cir. 2008); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). Where, as here,

each of the subsequent petitions were untimely and not exempt from the preclusion rules, 

the petitions were not properly filed, and Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for 

the time that his second, third, and fourth PCR proceedings were pending. In denying 

Petitioner’s second PCR petition, the trial court found that Petitioner’s alleged new 

evidence did not meet the requirements of Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 to explain why 

Petitioner had not timely raised the IAC claim in his first petition. On review, the Arizona 

COA found that the trial court correctly ruled that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate 

why he should be permitted to file a successive PCR petition, and that in any event, the 

IAC claim was precluded and without merit. In denying Petitioner’s third PCR petition, 

the trial court found that Petitioner did not argue any newly discovered facts under Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) that would exempt the claim from preclusion and warrant a ruling 

on the merits. On review, the COA found that the trial court did not err when it 

summarily denied relief because Petitioner’s IAC claim was precluded. Finally, in 

dismissing Petitioner’s fourth PCR petition under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(c), the trial court 

found that all of Petitioner’s claims were precluded, and that the petition was untimely 

filed more than four years after the COA issued its mandate on Petitioner’s direct appeal.

 

10 The fact that the trial court also found that even if the claim was not precluded, Petitioner failed to satisfy Strickland v. Washington, is irrelevant. See Carey, 536 U.S. at 

225–26 (holding that state court alternative rulings did not make petition timely and thus “properly filed.”). 

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The court further noted that noted that while claims made pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.1(e) and 32.1(h) are exempt from the timeliness and preclusion rules, a defendant 

cannot “avoid preclusion merely by invoking these provisions.” (Doc. 19 Ex. KK). 

In sum, the undersigned finds that Petitioner was only entitled to statutory tolling 

of ADEPA’s one-year statute of limitations until he completed one full round of 

collateral review in the state courts. That first round of collateral review concluded on 

June 6, 2012, and Petitioner had one year from that date to file his federal habeas petition. 

Petitioner’s successive and untimely PCR petitions did not toll, pause, or re-start the 

statute of limitations. Accordingly, absent equitable tolling, the statute of limitations 

expired on June 7, 2013, making Petitioner’s May 19, 2014 PWHC untimely. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

In certain limited circumstances, AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline may be 

equitably tolled. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). A petitioner is entitled 

to equitable tolling if he can demonstrate “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” to prevent 

him from timely filing a petition. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 

544 U.S. at 418). An extraordinary circumstance is one that is “beyond a prisoner’s 

control [that] make[s] it impossible to file a petition on time.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). And, to justify equitable tolling, the extra 

ordinary circumstance must be attributable to “external forces [] rather than a petitioner’s 

lack of diligence[.]” Id. Further, a petitioner must establish a “causal connection” 

between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. See 

Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). “‘[T]he 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.’” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Here, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden. Petitioner contends that he is 

entitled to equitable tolling because he has been pursuing his rights diligently but that the 

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trial court’s denial of his motion to amend his first PCR petition stood in his way and 

prevented him from properly and timely filing his claims. (Doc. 20). Petitioner states that 

he had to file multiple state petitions in order to fairly present and properly exhaust his 

claims, and therefore argues that the statute of limitations for his habeas petition should 

be equitably tolled. However, while the Court recognizes that Petitioner has been filing 

multiple petitions for relief in the state courts since his conviction, Petitioner does not 

demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from timely filing his 

federal habeas petition. Petitioner was entitled to one full round of collateral review in the 

state courts, and once that review concluded on June 6, 2012 when the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied review of his first Rule 32 petition, Petitioner had one year to file his 

federal habeas petition. The statute of limitations expired on June 7, 2013, but Petitioner 

did not file his PWHC until May 19, 2014, nearly two years after his collateral review 

proceedings concluded. As the Court explained above, Petitioner’s second, third, and 

fourth notices of PCR did not toll the statute of limitations, and these successive PCR 

petitions do not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” that prevented Petitioner from 

timely filing his federal habeas petition. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 n. 2

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A petitioner must be careful to timely file in federal court after he 

concludes his first full round of state collateral review, lest he run afoul of the statute of 

limitations. To avoid that circumstance, a petitioner like Biggs could have timely filed a 

federal petition for habeas corpus after his first round was completed, then requested the 

district court to exercise its discretion to stay the petition until he fully exhausted his 

Round Two claims.”) (citing James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2001)).

And, in any event, Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, 

ignorance of the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not 

constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 789 

(9th Cir. 2009) (“A petitioner’s misunderstanding of accurate information cannot merit 

relief, as equitable tolling requires a petitioner to show that some extraordinary 

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circumstance[ ] beyond [his] control caused his late petition, and this standard has never

been satisfied by a petitioner’s confusion or ignorance of the law alone.”) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted) (citing Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 

1011 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To apply the doctrine in extraordinary circumstances necessarily 

suggests the doctrine’s rarity, and the requirement that extraordinary circumstances stood 

in his way suggests that an external force must cause the untimeliness, rather than . . .

merely oversight, miscalculation or negligence on the petitioner’s part . . . .”) (internal 

quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable 

tolling and the PWHC is untimely. 

III. CONCLUSION 

In sum, AEDPA’s statute of limitations began to run when Petitioner’s first round 

of collateral review ended on June 6, 2012, and ran uninterrupted until June 7, 2013. 

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition until March 19, 2014, approximately 

nine months after the limitations period expired. Therefore, based on the above analysis, 

the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s PWHC is barred by the statute of limitations.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the procedural 

ruling debatable. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

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R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District 

Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-14-

1981-TUC-JGZ

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court shall 

send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties. 

 Dated this 5th day of December, 2016. 

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