Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02438/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02438-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael David Sebba, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, 

Respondent.

No. CV-13-2438-PHX-JJT (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Michael David Sebba filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 

27, 2013, challenging his convictions and sentences in Maricopa County Superior Court 

for stalking and aggravated harassment. Respondent contends that the arguments raised 

in the Petition are unexhausted and procedurally barred. For the reasons below, the Court 

recommends that Sebba’s Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 At the conclusion of a four-day trial in Maricopa County Superior Court, a jury 

found Sebba guilty of one count of stalking and one count of aggravated harassment, both 

class five felonies. (Doc. 9, Ex. J) The jury further found that Sebba had been on pretrial 

release for the crime of stalking at the time that he committed the crime of aggravated 

harassment. (Id.) Finally, the jury found unanimously that the aggravated circumstance 

of causing physical, emotional, or financial harm to the victim had been proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (Id.) 

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 Sebba moved for a new trial. (Doc. 9, Ex. K) After the motion was fully briefed, 

the Superior Court denied it and sentenced Sebba to two years of prison to be followed by 

a term of community supervision.1

 (Doc. 9, Exs. N, O) 

 On appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Sebba argued that the trial court (1) 

abused its discretion by refusing to give his requested jury instruction on the aggravated 

harassment charge, (2) should not have denied his motions for judgements of acquittal 

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, (3) abused its discretion by admitting a 

piece of evidence, (4) abused its discretion in denying his request for a special verdict 

form on the aggravated harassment charge, and (5) abused its discretion by failing to 

adopt his requested jury instruction on emotional or financial harm. (Doc. 9, Ex. P) 

After the appeal was fully briefed, the Court of Appeals affirmed Sebba’s convictions and 

sentences. (Doc. 9, Exs. Q, R, S) Sebba petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court to review 

his argument that the jury should have received a different instruction on the aggravated 

harassment charge. (Doc. 9, Ex. T) The Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition. 

(Doc. 9, Exs. U, V) 

 Sebba’s petition to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari raised two 

arguments. (Doc. 9, Ex. W). He first argued that Arizona’s harassment statutes, as 

applied to Sebba, in combination with an overly broad injunction, constituted an unlawful 

prior restraint. (Id.) Next, he argued that these harassment statutes and Sebba’s 

protective order, as applied, were impermissibly overbroad and vague. (Id.) The U.S. 

Supreme Court denied his petition. (Doc. 9, Exs. W, X, Y) Sebba did not file for postconviction relief. (Doc. 1 at 2) 

 Sebba timely filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, arguing, as he 

did in his petition for certiorari, that he was subject to an unlawful prior restraint on his 

speech and that the injunction against harassment was impermissibly vague. (Doc. 1) 

Respondent argues that these arguments were not fairly presented to the Arizona courts 

 

1

 Although Sebba has completed his regular term, he has not completed his term of community supervision, and he is subject to an immigration detainer. (Doc. 16) 

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and are now procedurally barred. (Doc. 9) In his traverse, Sebba claims that his 

argument to the Arizona Court of Appeals about the aggravated harassment jury 

instruction is “inextricably intertwined with federal law” and that no procedural bar exists 

“because Arizona appellate courts have routinely permitted appellants to raise First 

Amendment constitutional and vagueness/overbreadth arguments for the first time on 

appeal.” (Doc. 12 at 2:20-21 and 5:4-6) The Court agrees that Sebba’s arguments were 

not exhausted and are now subject to a procedural bar. 

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100.

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 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 

152, 167-68 (1982). 

SEBBA’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED 

 Sebba did not exhaust either of the claims in his habeas petition and an implied 

procedural bar now exists to prevent him from doing so. Accordingly, the Court cannot 

review his claims. 

 Sebba claims that he presented both grounds in his Petition to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals and so he has met the exhaustion requirement. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 14, 18) However, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of either argument. Instead, it had 

noted that Sebba “raise[d] additional arguments in his reply brief that interpreting 

[Arizona’s harassment statute] to criminalize communications with a third party not 

specifically named in the underlying injunction would render the statute 

unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as applied and an invalid prior restraint on free 

speech.” (Doc. 9, Ex. S at ¶ 19) It declined to address the merits of either argument, 

concluding that “[b]ecause the arguments were not raised in his opening brief, they are 

waived.”2

 (Id.) 

 

2

 In a footnote, the Arizona Court of Appeals pointed out that the merits of Sebba’s First Amendment arguments had been addressed (and rejected) in State v. 

Brown, 85 P.3d 109, 114 (Ariz. App. 2004). This does not mean that the Court reached 

the merits of Sebba’s argument. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264, n. 10 (1989). 

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 Because the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that these arguments were 

waived, they were not fairly presented for purposes of habeas review by this Court. 

Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Submitting a new claim to the 

[Arizona Court of Appeals] in a procedural context in which its merits will not be 

considered absent special circumstances does not constitute fair presentation.”) (citing 

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)). Thus, his claims were not properly 

exhausted. 

 In addition, Sebba’s claims are now subject to an implied procedural bar because 

his claims were not fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain available 

to him. Because his claims were waived on appeal, Sebba is precluded from postconviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3). In addition, he is 

now time-barred from initiating post-conviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.4(a). See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735, n. 1 (1991). 

 Finally, Sebba has not demonstrated either cause for the default and actual 

prejudice to excuse the default, or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court 

cannot reach the merits of the arguments in his Petition. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Michael David Sebba’s petition 

for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

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the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 29th day of May, 2015. 

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