Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04277/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04277-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOI NGO,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-04277-JCS 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND VACATING 

MOTION HEARING

Re: Dkt. No. 14

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ngo filed this action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of 

Alameda, asserting state law employment discrimination claims against his former employer, 

United Airlines (“United”), and two of his former supervisors, Mohammed Buksh and Yvonne 

Pierce. United removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, arguing that 

although Defendants Buksh and Pierce are citizens of California – as is Ngo – there is diversity of 

citizenship because Buksh and Pierce were fraudulently joined in this action. In its November 15, 

2019 Order (“the November 15 Order”), the Court found that Buksh and Pierce were not sham 

defendants and remanded the case to State court on the basis that there was no subject matter 

jurisdiction over the action. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“Motion”). The Court finds that the Motion is suitable for 

determination without oral argument and therefore vacates the hearing set for January 10, 2020 

Case 3:19-cv-04277-JCS Document 36 Filed 12/27/19 Page 1 of 5
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pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.

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II. BACKGROUND

Ngo asks the Court to award $75,836.00 in fees and $64.50 in costs that he contends were 

incurred as a result of United’s improper removal of this action to federal court. He argues that an 

award of fees is warranted because United lacked an “objectively reasonable basis for seeking 

removal.’” Motion at 3 (citing Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 552 

(9th Cir. 2018)); Reply at 2. This amount includes fees incurred in drafting the instant Motion and 

responding to United’s Opposition, as well as fees for other work on the case while it was in 

federal court. Ngo has supplied declarations of his attorneys, Katharine Chao and Xinying 

Valerian, documenting the time billed and rates charged by counsel. 

United opposes the motion, arguing that removal was not objectively unreasonable as the 

operative pleading at the time of removal did not assert a harassment claim against Buksh and 

Pierce and the conduct alleged as to those defendants was not actionable as harassment as it arose 

out of necessary personnel management duties. United further asserts that if the Court awards fees 

and costs it should reduce the amount because: 1) some of the fees Ngo requests were not incurred 

as a result of the removal; 2) Ngo has not adequately documented the hours billed or has billed for 

improper tasks; and 3) because the hourly rates Ngo requests are excessive. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Governing Award of Attorneys’ Fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of 

just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Supreme Court has held that, “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may 

award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively 

reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, 

 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). Further, because the award of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is collateral 

to the decision to remand, the Court may award attorneys’ fees under that section even though the 

case has already been remanded to state court. See Moore v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 981 

F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1992).

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fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141, 126 S.Ct. 704, 163 

L.Ed.2d 547 (2005). The Court in Martin explained that “district courts retain discretion to 

consider whether unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case.” Id. In 

Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., the Ninth Circuit cautioned that “removal is not objectively 

unreasonable solely because the removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else attorney’s fees 

would always be awarded whenever remand is granted.” 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).

Rather, the objective reasonableness of the removal depends on the clarity of the applicable law 

and whether such law “clearly foreclosed” the defendant’s arguments for removal. Id. at 1066–67.

B. Whether an Award of Attorneys’ Fees is Warranted 

Although the Court considered the allegations in Ngo’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

in determining whether there was a “a possibility” that Ngo’s original complaint stated a cause of 

action against Buksh and Pierce, it is undisputed that the FAC had not yet been served at the time 

of removal and therefore, that the operative complaint for the purposes of determining whether 

removal was objectively unreasonable was the original complaint filed in state court. See 

Noorazar v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 18-CV-02472 W (JLB), 2019 WL 442477, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 

Feb. 5, 2019) (“The Central and Northern Districts have consistently held that an amended 

complaint supersedes the original only when served on the opposing party.”). Therefore, in 

determining whether removal was objectively unreasonable, the Court looks to the original 

complaint in this case. While this question presents a close call, the Court concludes that removal 

was not objectively unreasonable.

As the Court noted in its November 15 Order, “‘[a] defendant invoking federal court 

diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a “heavy burden” since there is a 

“general presumption against finding fraudulent joinder.”’” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower ex rel. 

Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Hunter v. Philip 

Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009)). Thus, “[a] court may find fraudulent joinder 

only if the claim against the non-diverse defendant is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” 

Grancare, LLC v. Thrower ex rel. Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation and 

citation omitted). Further, the California Supreme Court found in Roby that under some 

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circumstances personnel management actions can be evidence of harassment. Roby v. McKesson 

Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 709 (2009), modified, Feb. 10, 2010). Moreover, even “[a] single incident 

of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work 

environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work 

performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” Cal. Gov’t 

Code section 12923(b) (effective January 1, 2019). Applying these standards, the Court 

concluded that Ngo was required only to demonstrate only that there was a possibility that a state 

court would find that one of his claims against Buksh and Pierce was adequately alleged. The 

Court further found that Ngo’s allegations “easily” met that standard based on his claims for 

harassment.

Notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion that remand was warranted, it also recognizes that

there is some ambiguity in California case law regarding the degree to which official personnel 

actions can form the basis for a hostile work environment claim against a supervisor. Even in

Roby, the California Supreme Court reiterated the principle that “the exercise of personnel 

management authority properly delegated by an employer to a supervisory employee might result 

in discrimination, but not harassment.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 707-708 

(2009). Further, while the Court in this case concluded that there was at least one incident alleged 

in both the original complaint and the FAC that fell outside the ambit of an official personnel 

action (the request by Buksh that the police perform a welfare check even though he had no basis 

for believing that one was warranted, allegedly to harass and intimidate Ngo), it is true that the 

vast majority of the specific conduct alleged in the original complaint on the part of Buksh and 

Pierce clearly arose out of their supervisorial positions (e.g., determining whether Ngo was 

authorized to return to work). Therefore, the Court does not find the case law on this question to 

be so well-established that it was objectively unreasonable for United to remove the case to federal 

court. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to 

award attorneys’ fees.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2019

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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