Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02804/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02804-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRENCE BROWNLEE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2804 GEB GGH P

vs.

ARTHUR VAN COURT, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis who seeks

relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s original complaint was dismissed by Order, filed

on April 12, 2007, but plaintiff was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff has filed an amended

complaint but has failed to cure the defects of the original filing. 

As plaintiff has been previously informed, the court is required to screen

complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint

or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that

fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing

a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint consists of approximately twelve pages of

allegations and more than 230 pages of exhibits. Plaintiff seeks money damages for claims of

false imprisonment, emotional distress and breach of contract against the members of his 1995

Board of Prison Terms (now referred to as the Board of Parole Hearings, hereafter referred to as

“Board”) panel, the members of his 1997 Board panel and the members of his 2002 Board panel,

on the ground that he was denied parole by all three respective panels without the panel members

having had his 1980 plea transcript before them, wherein he took a plea on the basis that he

would serve a 15-year prison term. Amended Complaint, pp. 3-5, 9-12. Defendant panel

members: from 1995 are Arthur Van Court, Steve Baker, Joe Pliler; from 1997 are Manuel

Guaderrama, Carol Bentley, Kenneth Bybee; and from 2002 are Dave Hepburn, Dennis Smith. 

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As framed, his claims are claims of violations of state tort law, rather than claims

of a deprivation of his federal constitutional rights. Moreover, plaintiff includes as an exhibit a

petition denial from the state supreme court. Plaintiff’s claims are solely for money damages. 

To the extent that plaintiff can be construed as having brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of

a violation of due process with respect to the decisions of the parole panels, plaintiff’s claims

appear to be barred. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), an Indiana

state prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983 for damages. Claiming that state and

county officials violated his constitutional rights, he sought damages for improprieties in the

investigation leading to his arrest, for the destruction of evidence, and for conduct during his trial

(“illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure”). Convicted on voluntary manslaughter

charges, and serving a fifteen year term, plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief or release from

custody. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the

complaint and held that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not

been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court expressly held that a cause of action for

damages under § 1983 concerning a criminal conviction or sentence cannot exist unless the

conviction or sentence has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. Id. 

Whether predicated on a claim that his parole denial or denials were improper

because of procedural defects or improper on the merits, his claims are Heck-barred, where he is

unable to show that his parole denial or denials have been reversed or invalidated. Butterfield v.

Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9 Cir. 1997)(“[f]ew things implicate the validity of continued th

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confinement more directly than the allegedly improper denial of parole”). 

In addition, plaintiff names as a defendant, Don Penner. Plaintiff was previously

cautioned as to defendant Penner, a district attorney:

[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages

under § 1983 which challenge activities related to the initiation and

presentation of criminal prosecutions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976). Determining whether a

prosecutor’s actions are immunized requires a functional analysis. 

The classification of the challenged acts, not the motivation

underlying them, determines whether absolute immunity applies. 

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986)(en banc). The

prosecutor’s quasi-judicial functions, rather than administrative or

investigative functions, are absolutely immune. Thus, even

charges of malicious prosecution, falsification of evidence,

coercion of perjured testimony and concealment of exculpatory

evidence will be dismissed on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. 

See Stevens v. Rifkin, 608 F.Supp. 710, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 

Plaintiff appears to associate his claim against defendant Penner

only with the 1997 parole denial but does not otherwise provide

any information as to his basis for suing this defendant, or in any

way demonstrate that Penner is not entitled to immunity, and

defendant Penner will be dismissed, but plaintiff will be granted

leave to amend.

See Order, filed on 4/12/06, p. 3. 

Plaintiff’s amended filing does not adequately clarify the basis of his claim or

sufficiently show that this defendant is not entitled to immunity.

As to defendants Van Court, Baker, Pliler; Guaderrama, Bentley, Bybee, Hepburn

and Smith, plaintiff was also previously informed that:

[T]he Ninth Circuit has stated:

The Supreme Court has reserved deciding whether members of

state parole boards have absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their

official actions. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 n. 11,

100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). We have held, however,

that parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity when

they perform “quasi-judicial” functions. Anderson [v. Boyd], 714

F.2d [906] at 909-10 [9th Cir. 1983]. Thus, parole board officials

of the BPT are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for

decisions “to grant, deny, or revoke parole” because these tasks are

“functionally comparable” to tasks performed by judges. Sellars [v.

Procunier], 641 F.2d [1295] at 1303 [9th Cir. 1981]; Bermudez v.

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Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1991) (holding Sellars

immunity encompasses actions “taken when processing parole

applications”). Absolute immunity has also been extended to

parole officials for the “imposition of parole conditions” and the

“execution of parole revocation procedures,” tasks integrally

related to an official’s decision to grant or revoke parole.

Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909.

Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2004). 

See Order, filed 4/12/06, pp. 3-4.

Noting that plaintiff evidently sought to implicate these defendants only for parole

decisions they rendered regarding plaintiff, that is, only for a decision each rendered for which

each appears to be entitled to absolute immunity in this suit for money damages, the undersigned

dismissed these defendants but granted plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff has not cured the

defects previously identified. 

 By his amended filing, plaintiff has made it patently evident that he is unable to

cure the defects of his complaint. The court will now recommend dismissal of this action. 

Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 799 (9 Cir. 2001), quoting Bowles v. th

Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir.1999) (Liberality in granting a plaintiff leave to amend “is

subject to the qualification that the amendment not cause undue prejudice to the defendant, is not

sought in bad faith, and is not futile.”) “Under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only

required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to

grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129

(9th Cir. 2000). See also, Smith v. Pacific Properties and Development Corp., 358 F.3d 1097,

1106 (9th Cir. 2004), citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497(9th Cir.1995) (“a district

court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it

determines that the pleading could not be cured by the allegation of other facts.”) 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed with

prejudice for failure to state a claim.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 10/23/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

brow2804.fr

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