Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-02079/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-02079-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant petition was filed on November 25, 2012.

1

 A preliminary review of the petition, 

however, reveals that the petition may be untimely and should therefore be dismissed.

 

1

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner’s notice of appeal is deemed 

filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the actual date of its receipt by the court 

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner’s 

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of “prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might 

be adverse to his.” Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1990); see Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. The Ninth Circuit 

has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the AEDPA. 

Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9th Cir. 2000); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The date the petition is signed may be considered the earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison 

LEONARD BRYCE THOMAS,

 Petitioner,

v.

V. SINGH,

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:12-cv-02079-JLT

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE PETITION 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR VIOLATION 

OF THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF 

LIMITATIONS

ORDER DIRECTING THAT RESPONSE BE 

FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Case 1:12-cv-02079-AWI-JLT Document 6 Filed 01/04/13 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition 

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after 

an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a 

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate 

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing this 

Order to Show Cause, the Court is affording Petitioner the notice required by the Ninth Circuit in 

Herbst.

B. Limitation Period For Filing Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997). 

The instant petition was filed on November 25, 2012, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the 

AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) 

reads: 

 

authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, 

for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the 

petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing 

date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for calculating the running of the statute of limitation. 

Petitioner signed the instant petition on November 25, 2012. (Doc. 1, p. 55). 

Case 1:12-cv-02079-AWI-JLT Document 6 Filed 01/04/13 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending 

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder on March 27, 1998, 

in the Kern County Superior Court and sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years to life. (Doc. 1, p. 

1). 

Petitioner filed a petition for review that was denied by the California Supreme Court on 

September 12, 2001 in case no. S098875. (Doc. 1, p. 59). Thus, direct review would have concluded 

on December 11, 2001, when the ninety day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme 

Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Petitioner would then have one year 

from the following day, December 12, 2001, or until December 11, 2002, absent applicable tolling, 

within which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As mentioned, the instant petition was filed on November 25, 2012, almost ten years after the 

date the one-year period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or 

equitable tolling, the instant petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

Case 1:12-cv-02079-AWI-JLT Document 6 Filed 01/04/13 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules 

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California 

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable delay 

in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized 

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold, 

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is allowed. 

For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an appeal and 

the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court, because no 

state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007; Raspberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the 

period between finality of an appeal and the filing of a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the 

limitation period is not tolled during the time that a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. 

Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 

1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16, 2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to 

statutory tolling where the limitation period has already run prior to filing a state habeas petition. 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit the 

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. 

White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner is not entitled to continuous tolling 

when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 

Case 1:12-cv-02079-AWI-JLT Document 6 Filed 01/04/13 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, it appears that Petitioner filed the following state habeas petitions: (1) petition filed in the 

California Supreme Court on September 5, 2002, and denied on January 15, 2003, in case no. 

S109606; (2) filed in the California Supreme Court on August 11, 2003, and denied on May 12, 2004,

in case no. S118106; and (3) filed in the California Supreme Court on April 20, 2012, and denied on 

July 11, 2012, in case no. S201908.2 

From the foregoing chronology, it is abundantly clear that, following the California Supreme 

Court’s denial of Petitioner’s third state habeas petition on May 12, 2004, Petitioner did not again file 

a state habeas petition entitled to statutory tolling under the AEDPA until he filed his fourth state 

petition on April 20, 2012, almost eight years later. Even without conducting a detailed analysis of the 

potential tolling from the commencement of the one-year period on December 11, 2001, until the third 

petition was denied on May 12, 2004, and even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner was entitled to 

statutory tolling during that entire period of time, a premise that is undoubtedly overly generous to 

Petitioner, Petitioner would still have to have accrued either statutory or equitable tolling sufficient to 

toll the ensuing eight years prior to the filing of his fourth petition on April 20, 2012. If Petitioner is 

unable to meet that onerous burden, the petition is untimely and must be dismissed. 

D. Equitable Tolling.

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, __U.S.__, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2561 (2010); Calderon 

v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997). The limitation period is subject to 

equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to 

file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal 

 

2These dates were determined by accessing the California state courts’ electronic website, of which the Court takes judicial 

notice. The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th 

Cir. 1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial

notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. 

Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. 

Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 

1980). As such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for filings in the Court 

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, are subject to judicial notice.

Case 1:12-cv-02079-AWI-JLT Document 6 Filed 01/04/13 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of 

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations 

may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant 

seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing 

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Holland, 130 

S.Ct. at 2652; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold 

necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted). As a consequence, 

“equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at 1107. 

Here, Petitioner has made no express claim of entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on the 

record now before the Court, the Court sees no basis for such a claim. Accordingly, the Court makes a 

preliminary finding that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

Although it appears at this juncture that the petition is untimely and that Petitioner cannot 

possibly account for the eight years during which he failed to pursue his federal habeas remedies in a 

timely manner, the Court will, nonetheless, as required by the Ninth Circuit, provide Petitioner with an 

opportunity to respond to this Order to Show Cause prior to dismissing his petition as untimely. If 

Petitioner has additional evidence entitling him to statutory or equitable tolling, he should provide that 

evidence in his response. As always, however, the burden of demonstrating that the AEDPA’s oneyear limitation period was sufficiently tolled, whether statutorily or equitable, rests with the petitioner. 

See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th

Cir. 2005); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 

1065 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of 

service of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year 

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Case 1:12-cv-02079-AWI-JLT Document 6 Filed 01/04/13 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a 

Recommendation that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2013 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

9j7khijed

Case 1:12-cv-02079-AWI-JLT Document 6 Filed 01/04/13 Page 7 of 7