Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-04848/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-04848-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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Case No.: 5:18-cv-04848-EJD

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

DEBRA SWEENEY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 5:18-cv-04848-EJD 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 

(I) COMPEL ARBITRATION AND (II) 

DISMISS ACTION, OR 

ALTERNATIVELY DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF'S CLASS ACTION CLAIMS 

AND STAY CASE 

Re: Dkt. No. 13 

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss filed by 

Defendant Tractor Supply Company (“TSC”). Plaintiff Debra Sweeney filed a class action 

complaint against TSC, her former employer, in Santa Clara Superior Court, and TSC 

subsequently removed the litigation to federal court. Sweeney seeks to represent a class of 

similarly situated individuals harmed by TSC’s alleged failure include their nondiscretionary 

bonuses in its calculation of their overtime pay. Under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds 

this motion suitable for consideration without oral argument. Having considered the Parties’ 

papers, the Court grants the motion to compel, and grants in part and denies in part the motion to 

dismiss. The action is stayed pending the arbitration. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Sweeney worked as an hourly, non-exempt employee at a TSC store in Santa Clara County 

from around early April 2017 until late June 2018. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. TSC is a retailer of farm and 

ranch equipment, livestock and pet products, home improvement tools, and sporting goods. 

Compl. ¶ 10. She, like other non-exempt employees, routinely received nondiscretionary 

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remuneration, including Store Bonuses, in addition to her hourly wage. Compl. ¶ 24. She alleges 

that her overtime rate of pay did not include her Store Bonuses with her hourly wage in its 

calculations, and that her wage statements inaccurately identified her overtime pay rate, and gross 

and net wages. Id. The omission of the Store Bonuses, she alleges, deprived her of the actual rate 

of overtime pay due to her. Id. She further alleges that when her employment ended, TSC failed 

to pay her overtime wage that it owed her. Id. 

When Sweeney began working at TSC, she completed its onboarding process, which 

included filling out and executing a number of forms through a computerized, interactive system. 

See Dkt. 15 (“Williamson Decl.”) ¶¶ 4, 7. Sweeney, like other new hires, was able to pause the 

onboarding process by logging out and then logging back in to resume the process at a later time. 

Id. ¶ 10. This process included reviewing and agreeing to TSC’s California Arbitration 

Agreement. Id. ¶ 4; Williamson Decl. Ex. D (the “Agreement”). The interactive system presented 

the Agreement to Sweeney in a text box with a bar to scroll through its 17 paragraphs. 

Williamson Decl. ¶ 8. At the bottom of the text box, she was presented with the following: “By 

clicking ‘I Agree’ below and entering the last 4 digits of my Social Security Number, and clicking 

‘Submit,’ I am electronically signing and agreeing to the Arbitration Agreement, and agree that 

my electronic signature is as valid as my hand-written signature.” Id. The Agreement was “a 

mandatory term of continued employment,” i.e., she had to accept the Agreement to work for 

TSC. Agreement ¶ 16. The onboarding system did not allow prospective employees, like 

Sweeney, to comment on or negotiate the terms of the Agreement. Williamson Decl. Ex. C. On 

March 11, 2017, Sweeney assented to the Agreement by clicking “I Agree,” and entering her 

name, the last four digits of her Social Security Number and the date. Williamson Decl. ¶ 9. 

Sweeney does not dispute that she executed the Agreement. 

The Agreement provides that “any and all claims or disputes” between TSC and its 

employees are subject to arbitration. Agreement ¶ 1. It specifically covers “claims for wages, 

overtime, bonuses, or other compensation due.” Id. Arbitration under the Agreement will be 

administered by an agency agreed upon by the parties, or, if they cannot agree, then by National 

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Arbitration and Mediation (“NAM”), and it will be governed by NAM’s Employment Rules and 

Procedures. Id. ¶ 3. The agreement later states that “[a]propriate limitations on discovery and any 

rights to additional discovery shall be governed by the Rules of JAMS or the rules of the 

administering agency selected by the parties.” Id. ¶ 8. It specifically provides that parties may 

subpoena witnesses and documents. Id. ¶ 10. 

The Agreement states in bold text, “The parties hereto acknowledge that, by entering into 

this Agreement, they are waiving their rights to a judicial forum for the determination of any 

covered Claims or disputes.” Agreement. ¶ 17. Under the Agreement, “[t]he Arbitrator shall be 

an attorney or former judge with substantial experience in deciding employment disputes.” Id.

¶ 4. The arbitrator has “the sole and exclusive authority to resolve all Claims between Employer 

and Employee.” Id. ¶ 5. Substantively, arbitrations will be governed by the state and/or federal 

law that would apply to a judicial action in same state where the arbitration takes place. Id. The 

arbitrator is able to award any type of legal or equitable relief that would be available in court, 

including punitive damages if/when appropriate. Id. The arbitrator is required to provide a 

“reasoned, written decision and award” that includes the findings and conclusions providing the 

bases for the award. Id. ¶ 14. The decision and award are subject to “confirmation, correction, or 

vacation” as per the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Id. 

TSC agrees to pay the costs of the arbitration. Id. ¶ 15. TSC may “modif[y] or 

terminate[]” the Agreement “upon thirty (30) days written notice to Employee.” Id. ¶ 16. “Any 

modifications or termination shall be prospective only and shall not apply to any claims that have 

accrued, are pending in arbitration, or of which the Employer has been given notice by Employee 

prior to the effective date of the modification or termination.” Id. 

II. Motion to Compel Arbitration 

Sweeney does not contest that she signed the Agreement or that her claims lay within the 

scope of the Agreement. Rather, she challenges the Agreement itself, contending that (1) it is not 

valid because TSC did not sign it, (2) that it is procedurally unconscionable, and (3) that it is 

substantively unconscionable because it is ambiguous as to the rules that govern discovery, it does 

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not provide for sufficient discovery and it is not bilateral. 

a. Legal Standard 

The FAA provides that “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of 

another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States 

district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction . . . for an order directing 

that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. The 

FAA “sets forth a policy favoring arbitration agreements and establishes that a written arbitration 

agreement is ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.’” Heredia v. Sunrise Senior Living LLC, 2018 

WL 5734617, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). “By its terms, the Act 

‘leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district 

courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration 

agreement has been signed.’” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)). “The 

court’s role under the Act is therefore limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to 

arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. If the 

response is affirmative on both counts, then the Act requires the court to enforce the arbitration 

agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. 

When assessing whether an arbitration agreement is valid, “generally applicable contract 

defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied . . . without contravening 

§ 2.” Heredia v. Sunrise Senior Living LLC, 2018 WL 5734617, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018) 

(citing Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). Thus, the “state-law 

principles that govern the formation of contracts” apply to this analysis. Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 

601 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “In a motion to compel arbitration, the 

party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement by a 

preponderance of the evidence, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence any defense, such as unconscionability.” Serafin v. Balco 

Properties Ltd., LLC, 235 Cal. App. 4th 165, 172-73 (2015). Further, the FAA allows a court to 

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strike or limit an arbitration agreement where “such grounds exist at law or in equity for the 

revocation of any contract.” Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(citing 9 USC § 2). 

b. TSC Did Not Sign the Agreement 

The Court finds that Sweeney’s first argument, that the Agreement is not enforceable 

because TSC did not sign it, lacks merit. Chico v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc., 2014 WL 5088240, at 

*7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014). She contends that the Agreement only provided space for her to sign, 

and that TSC has not indicated its intent to be bound. Thus, her argument goes, if she sought to 

sue TSC, TSC could argue that it is not bound by the Agreement. Sweeney provides no legal 

authority supporting her position. The Agreement sufficiently indicates TSC’s intent to be bound. 

The Agreement is provided to job applicants through an email from the address “Tractor Supply 

Company Talent Acquisition.” Ex. B; see Williamson Decl. ¶ 6. The Agreement is part of the 

onboarding process for TSC’s new employees. See Ex. B; Williamson Decl. ¶ 6, see generally 

Agreement. And the Agreement itself explicitly states that it applies to both TSC and its 

employees. The first sentence of the Agreement states: “Tractor Supply Company . . . and the 

employee . . . agree as follows.” Agreement at p. 1. The first sentence of the first substantive 

paragraph provides, “Employer and Employee mutually consent to the final resolution by binding 

arbitration of any and all claims or disputes Employer may have against or with the Employee, 

and/or Employee may have against or with Employer.” Agreement ¶ 1. Courts that have 

considered similar arbitration contracts have found that the lack of the employer’s written 

signature does not render the contract unenforceable. See, e.g., Chico, 2014 WL 5088240 at *7; 

Lara v. Onsite Health, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 831, 844 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Cruise v. Kroger Co., 233 

Cal. App. 4th 390, 398-99 (2015). The Court finds that the Agreement is not invalid on these 

grounds. 

c. Unconscionability 

Sweeney contends that the Agreement is not enforceable because it is unconscionable 

under California law. “[U]nconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element, the 

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former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly 

harsh or one-sided results.” Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 

114 (2000) (quotations and alterations omitted). “Procedural unconscionability concerns the 

manner in which the contract was negotiated and the respective circumstances of the parties at that 

time, focusing on the level of oppression and surprise involved in the agreement.” Prasad v. 

Pinnacle Prop. Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 2018 WL 4599645, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018) (quoting 

Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2013)). “Substantive 

unconscionability addresses the fairness of the term in dispute.” Id. (quoting Pokorny, Inc., 601 

F.3d at 997). “The focus of the inquiry is whether the term is one-sided and will have an overly 

harsh effect on the disadvantaged party,” so the mutuality of the contract is of “paramount 

consideration.” Id. Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be “present in order 

for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of 

unconscionability.” Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114. But they need not be present at equal levels. 

Rather, “the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural 

unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice 

versa.” Id. The Court finds that the Agreement has a low degree of procedural unconscionability 

and that a single clause that is substantively unconscionable. This clause, though, is easily severed 

from the remainder of the Agreement. The Court, therefore, finds that the Agreement is not so 

unconscionable as to make it unenforceable. 

i. Procedural Unconscionability 

Sweeney argues that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it is an 

adhesion contract, presented to her as a condition of employment and on a take-it-or-leave it basis. 

The onboarding process did not give her the opportunity to comment on the Agreement or to 

negotiate any changes. Contracts of adhesion “contain a degree of procedural unconscionability 

even without any notable surprises, and bear within them the clear danger of oppression and 

overreaching.” Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th 1237, 1244 (2016). The California 

Supreme Court has instructed courts to be “particularly attuned to this danger in the employment 

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setting, where economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees 

may be particularly acute.” Id. Nonetheless, adhesion contracts “are indispensable facts of 

modern life that are generally enforced.” Id. 

When TSC emailed Sweeney the link to access the onboarding process, including the 

Agreement, the body of the email stated: “The next step in the process is to complete your 

onboarding forms. This is a time sensitive process, and any delay in completion may result in a 

delayed start date.” Williamson Decl. Ex. B. Sweeney contends that this statement supports her 

position. But, this statement did not impose any hard limits on how long Sweeney could review 

the Agreement prior to signing it. She was still able to pause the onboarding process and to 

review the Agreement for as long as she liked. The Court finds that this statement, at most, 

exhibits a slight indicium of procedural unconscionability. 

To the extent Sweeney argues that the Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because 

it did not attach copies of the arbitration rules that it incorporates by reference, the Court is not 

persuaded. Opp’n at 9-10 n.1. While a failure to attach incorporated rules to an arbitration 

agreement may be a factor supporting a finding of unconscionability, it is insufficient to support a 

finding of unconscionability on its own. Lane v. Francis Capital Mgmt. LLC, 224 Cal. App. 4th 

676, 690 (2014). Such an omission is unconscionable when “the failure would result in surprise to 

the party opposing arbitration.” Id. at 690-91 (collecting cases and distinguishing Harper v. 

Ultimo, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1402 (2003)). Sweeney does not contend that she was surprised by the 

selected arbitration rules. Moreover, as was the case in Lane, the arbitration rules incorporated 

here are easily found on the internet. Id. The NAM rules are linked in the text of the Agreement 

itself, and Sweeney’s opposition brief provides links to both the NAM rules and the JAMS rules. 

Agreement ¶ 3; Opp’n at 10 nn.2-3. 

In sum, the Court finds that Agreement contains a low degree of procedural 

unconscionability. Cf. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 783-84 (9th 

Cir. 2002). But, where, “as here, there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, the degree 

of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low and the agreement will be 

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enforceable unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high.” Sepra v. California 

Surety Investigations, Inc., 215 Cal. App. 4th 695, 704 (2013) (citations omitted); see also 

Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court now turns to

whether the Agreement is substantively unconscionable. 

ii. Substantive Unconscionability 

Sweeney raises three arguments that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable: (1) 

that the Agreement is ambiguous as to the rules that govern discovery, (2) that it does not provide 

for adequate discovery, and (3) that it is not bilateral. The Court first considers her arguments 

regarding discovery. She contends that the Agreement contradicts itself because it provides in one 

paragraph that the “arbitration shall be administered by National Arbitration and Mediation 

(NAM) and shall be governed by NAM’s Employment Rules and Procedures, unless those Rules 

conflict with the terms of this Agreement, in which case the terms of this Agreement shall 

control.” Agreement ¶ 3. But, later it provides that “[a]ppropriate limitations on discovery and 

any rights to additional discovery shall be governed by the Rules of JAMS or the rules of the 

administering agency selected by the parties.” Id. ¶ 8. Sweeney says that the JAMS discovery 

rules allow for each side to take a single deposition of the opposing party, but the NAM rules 

allow for three depositions. Compare JAMS Rule 17(b) with NAM Employment Rules & 

Procedures No. 11(B)(ii). She contends that this purported ambiguity is analogous to Harper, 

where the California Court of Appeal considered an arbitration agreement that selected a set of 

arbitration rules that were subject to change, and “it [was] unclear whether an arbitration would be 

conducted under the [selected] rules as of the time of contracting, or at the time of arbitration.” 

113 Cal. App. 4th at 1407. The Harper Court found that this ambiguity supported a finding of 

unconscionability because “[b]efore the main battle commenced in arbitration, there would be a 

preliminary fight over which set of arbitration rules governed—something which, at the very least, 

would add to the customer’s legal expense.” Id. 

But Harper is off point. There, the California Court of Appeal found the arbitration 

contract to be procedurally unconscionable. Id. Moreover, Sweeney does not argue that the NAM 

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and JAMS rules are inconstant as was the case in Harper. Rather, she says that the Agreement 

itself is ambiguous as to which rules control. But the Agreement is not ambiguous. Paragraph 3 

provides that the arbitration shall be “administered by an administering agency agreed upon by the 

parties.” Agreement ¶ 3. This provision aligns with Paragraph 8 which notes that the parties may 

“select[]” the agency to administer the arbitration and then apply the discovery rules of that 

agency. Id. ¶ 8. Only if the parties fail to agree on an administering agency will NAM administer 

the arbitration and apply the NAM Employment Rules and Procedures—“unless those Rules 

conflict with the terms of [the] Agreement, in which case the terms of [the] Agreement shall 

control.” Agreement ¶ 3. By the terms of Paragraph 8, the Agreement selects the JAMS rules for 

discovery. Thus, Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 8 do not conflict, so there is no ambiguity. The 

Court finds that the Agreement is not substantively unconscionable for this reason. 

Sweeney further argues that the JAMS Rule 17(b) is substantively unconscionable for 

failing to provide adequate discovery. The Rule provides: “Each Party may take one deposition of 

an opposing Party or of one individual under the control of the opposing Party. . . . The necessity 

of additional depositions shall be determined by the Arbitrator based upon the reasonable need for 

the requested information, the availability of other discovery options and the burdensomeness of 

the request on the opposing Parties and the witness.” JAMS Rule 17(b). Sweeney argues that this 

unconscionably restricts her to a single deposition even though TSC, as her employer, will have 

more information regarding its policies and procedures than she. However, this Court, like other 

courts that have considered JAMS Rule 17(b) finds that it does not limit her to one deposition. 

Rather, it provides that each party may take at least one deposition while allowing the arbitrator to 

order additional depositions. Sanchez v. Gruma Corp., 2019 WL 1545186, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 

9, 2019); Pope v. Sonatype, Inc., 2015 WL 2174033, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2015). Accordingly, 

the Court finds that Rule 17(b) provides for sufficient discovery under California law and is not 

unconscionable. Sanchez, 2019 WL 1545186, at *8; Pope, 2015 WL 2174033, at *5. 

Finally, the Court considers Sweeney’s argument that the Agreement is substantively 

unconscionable because it is not bilateral. Under California law, an arbitration agreement must 

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exhibit a “modicum of bilaterality” so that it is not “unfairly one sided.” Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th 

at 116. Sweeney challenges the amendment provision, which states that the Agreement “may be 

modified or terminated by Employer upon thirty (30) days written notice to Employee. Any 

modifications or termination shall be prospective only and shall not apply to any claims that have 

accrued, are pending in arbitration, or of which the Employer has been given notice by Employee 

prior to the effective date of the modification or termination.” Agreement ¶ 16. This provision of 

unilateral power to the employer is analogous to the modification provision at issue in Ingle v. 

Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit found that provision to 

be substantively unconscionable, reasoning that “[a]lthough the agreement requires [the 

defendant] to provide exiguous notice to its employees of termination or any modification, such 

notice is trivial when there is no meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms of the 

agreement. . . . [The defendant] proscribes an employee’s ability to consider and negotiate the 

terms of her contract.” Id. at 1179. The same reasoning applies here where TSC is obligated to 

provide its employees with notice of a modification, but its employees are powerless to halt or 

influence such a modification. The Court finds the modification provision of the Agreement to be 

unconscionable. See Prasad, 2018 WL 4599645, at *7. 

But, that does not mean that the entire Agreement is unenforceable. Rather, under 

California law, a court “may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 

contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any 

unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” Prasad, 2018 WL 4599645, at *11 

(quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a)). “A court may ‘refuse to enforce the entire agreement’ only 

when it is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.” Poublon, 846 F.3d at 1272 (quoting Armendariz, 24 

Cal. 4th at 122). The Agreement is not permeated with unconscionability. This Court will sever 

this unconscionable provision concerning modification and enforce the remainder of the 

Agreement. See Prasad, 2018 WL 4599645, at *12. 

III. Motion to Dismiss 

The Court first considers whether Sweeney’s class claims should be dismissed. TSC 

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moves the Court to dismiss Sweeney’s class claims because the Agreement provides that “neither 

[party] will pursue representative, class or collective claims on behalf of other persons or entities, 

including but not limited to current or former employees.” Agreement ¶ 5. Such class action 

waivers are enforceable under the FAA. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1631, (2018); 

Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 366 (2014). Sweeney does 

not contest this argument. The Court finds the class action waiver to be valid, and compels 

Sweeney to arbitrate her claims on an individual basis. 

The Court now turns to whether to dismiss all of her claims under Rule 12(b)(1) because 

her claims are subject to the arbitration under the Agreement. The FAA provides that, when a 

party’s claims are subject to an arbitration agreement, the court “shall on application of one of the 

parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had.” 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis 

added). In the Ninth Circuit, “notwithstanding the language of § 3, a district court may . . . 

dismiss [an action] outright when, as here, the court determines that all of the claims raised in the 

action are subject to arbitration.” Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1074 

(9th Cir. 2014). TSC requests that the Court—at minimum—stay this action, and also moves the 

Court to dismiss Sweeney’s individual claims under Rule 12(b)(1). While TSC persuasively 

argues that the Court could dismiss the individual claims, TSC does not show why the Court 

should. The Court sees no reason to depart from the plain language of the FAA. Magana v. 

DoorDash, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The Court denies TSC’s motion to 

dismiss all of Sweeney’s claims and stays the action pending arbitration instead. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court orders as follows: 

 TSC’s motion to dismiss Sweeney’s class claims is granted. 

 TSC’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. Sweeney shall arbitrate her claims 

on an individual basis. 

 The modification provision of the Agreement is severed from the Agreement 

because it is unconscionable. 

Case 5:18-cv-04848-EJD Document 32 Filed 06/05/19 Page 11 of 12
Case No.: 5:18-cv-04848-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 

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 TSC’s motion to dismiss Sweeney’s remaining claims is denied. 

 The action is stayed pending resolution of the arbitration. The Parties shall file 

with this Court a Joint Status Report within seven days of the resolution of 

arbitration or every 120 days, whichever is sooner. 

The clerk shall administratively close this file. This is an internal administrative procedure 

that does not affect the rights of the parties. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 5, 2019 

______________________________________ 

EDWARD J. DAVILA 

United States District Judge 

Case 5:18-cv-04848-EJD Document 32 Filed 06/05/19 Page 12 of 12