Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-01681/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-01681-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Davis S. Paulson,

Plaintiff

-vsRyan Thornell, et al.,

Defendants.

CV-24-1681-PHX-JAT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petition - Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

San Luis, Arizona, commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 9, 2024 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts 

he is illegally imprisoned pursuant to the Supremacy Clause (Ground One), the United 

Nations Charter (Ground Two), and various regulations (Ground Three). (Order 8/8/24, 

Doc. 7 at 1.)

Response - On September 17, 2024, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 11). 

Respondents argue the Petition is untimely and the claims are procedurally defaulted. 

Reply – On September 27, 2024 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 12). Petitioner 

argues his illegal imprisonment is an ongoing violation and thus his Petition is not 

untimely. He argues any untimeliness was the result of inadequate legal resources. He 

argues that the exhaustion requirement does not apply because there is an absence of 

available state corrective process resulting from: (a) the state’s practice of viewing facts 

in the light favorable to upholding his conviction; (b) the state’s inability to exercise 

appellate power over his claims, or prosecute federal crimes; (c) the state’s procedural 

rules resulting in his procedural default bar his claims; and (d) he is serving a life sentence 

and thus exhaustion to the Arizona Court of Appeals does not apply. 

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Report & Recommendation – The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for 

consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of 

fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 

72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The undersigned concludes the petition must be dismissed with prejudice as 

untimely and because the asserted claims are procedurally defaulted.

II. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals described the factual background 

as follows:

¶2 ...In the early morning hours of June 20, 2008, 

seventeen-year-old Paulson and his sixteen-year-old girlfriend, 

Maeghan Rice, were riding together in her father's pickup truck. 

Paulson earlier in the night had told a friend he was mad at the victim, 

Rice's recent ex-boyfriend, and wanted to stab him. Rice agreed to 

help Paulson with his plan to kill the victim.

¶3 She drove to the victim's house and picked him up 

while Paulson hid beneath a blanket in the backseat. When she later 

drove past Paulson's house, she mentioned this fact, thereby signaling 

to Paulson to come out from his hiding spot. Paulson then stabbed the 

victim numerous times. The victim fled from the truck and was later 

found dead due to loss of blood from his wounds. 

¶4 After the attack, Paulson abandoned the truck at an 

electrical substation, covering the vehicle's bloody interior with a 

blanket. Rice removed items from inside the truck, including the 

victim's brass knuckles and an "iPod" she did not recognize. She then 

spoke to her brother and a friend about the incident and asked them 

to lie about it for her. That same day, Paulson took a prearranged 

flight to Utah, where he was arrested.

(Exh. G, Mem. Dec. 10/31/12 at ¶¶ 2-4.)1 

Petitioner was indicted in Pinal County Superior Court on charges of first-degree, 

premeditated murder. He argued at trial that he was the intended victim of a plot between 

the victim and Rice, and he stabbed the victim in self-defense. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Petitioner was 

1 The state court represented that this summary was based on a view of the facts “in the 

light most favorable to upholding the verdict." (Ex. G, Mem. Dec. 10/31/12 at ¶ 2.) The 

undersigned does not adopt this as findings of fact herein, but provides it only as 

background. 

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found guilty by the jury of first degree murder and was sentenced to life, with a minimum 

of 25 years before any early release. (Id. See also Exh. A, M.E. 8/12/11; and Exh. B, 

Sentence 9/12/11.)

Petitioner filed through counsel a direct appeal raising claims of evidentiary and 

instructional error, that the sentence was cruel and unusual punishment, prosecutorial 

misconduct in closing arguments, and cumulative error. (Exh. D, Op. Brf.) On October 

31, 201 the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming his conviction and 

sentence. (Exh. G, Mem. Dec. 10/31/12 at ¶ 34.) Petitioner did not seek further review 

or reconsideration, and on March 29, 2013 the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its 

Mandate (Exh. H). 

On July 2, 2013 Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exh. I). 

Counsel was appointed and filed a PCR Petition (Exh. J) raising claims of ineffective 

assistance of appellate and trial counsel. Following briefing and an evidentiary hearing 

(See Exh. K, PCR Response; Exh. L, PCR Reply; Exh. M, M.E. 11/6/15), the PCR court 

denied the petition, conclusorily finding it asserted precluded or untimely claims or 

asserted no colorable claims. (Exh. N, Order 12/17/15.) Petitioner did not file a petition 

for review, and on May 23, 2016 the trial court issued an order “affirming” its earlier order 

denying the PCR petition. (Exh. O, Order 5/23/16.) 

B. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. A 1-year statute of 

limitations applies to all petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations period are barred and must be 

dismissed. Id.

Coram Nobis - Petitioner argues that his Petition is a Petition for writ of coram 

nobis, and thus the habeas limitations period does not apply. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) 

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Petitioner’s Petition, by its own terms, seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Moreover, Petitioner could not seek relief under coram nobis for two reasons.

First, coram nobis is a continuation of a criminal proceeding in the court rendering 

the judgment. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987). See 

also 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 178 (October 2024 update). Here, this Court did 

not convict or sentence Petitioner. Rather, the courts of the State of Arizona did so. 

Second, the writ of error coram nobis affords a remedy to attack a conviction when 

the petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer in custody. United States v. Kwan, 

407 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005), abrog’d on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356 (2010). See also 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 181, 183 (October 2024 

update). Here, Petitioner remains in custody. 

Petitioner cites to Kwan to support his assertion of coram nobis jurisdiction. But 

Kwan involved a federal defendant’s challenge to his federal conviction after he was 

released from prison. Thus, it met both requirements for a coram nobis proceeding. 

Petitioner meets neither.

Ongoing Violations - Petitioner argues that the constitutional violations of which 

he complains are ongoing and therefore no limitations period should apply. 

The limitations period applies to “an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). No 

exception is made for “on going violations.” 

Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest his custody is not “pursuant to a judgment of 

a state court.” At most, Petitioner complains that for various reasons the custody is 

wrongful. 

In Ground 1, Petitioner effectively complains that the state court lacked jurisdiction, 

and therefore his imprisonment is a violation of the federal constitution. That fails to show 

his custody has not resulted from his state conviction and sentence.

In Ground 2, Petitioner effectively alleges his incarceration stemmed from his 

“freely expressing my will,” and thus his prosecution was a violation of the United Nations 

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Charter, Article 73 to 91 (establishing a trusteeship on member nations who are 

administering areas not subject to self-government). Petitioner alleges no facts to show his 

incarceration stems from anything other than his criminal conviction. His unadorned 

reference to “freely expressing my will” can only be interpreted as a reference to his 

conduct leading to his conviction. That fails to show his custody has not resulted from his 

state conviction and sentence.

In Ground 3, Petitioner effectively alleges that his imprisonment “for something 

I’ve done” is a violation of 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b), which governs the President’s wartime 

power to regulate financial transactions. While the connection Petitioner makes between 

that statute and his incarceration is inscrutable, it is plain he is attacking the state’s ability 

to sentence him for his actions. This fails to show his custody has not resulted from his 

state conviction and sentence.

Thus Petitioner’s petition is subject to the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

a. Conviction Final 

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).2 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending at least through October 31, 

2012, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his appeal. (Exh. G, Mem. Dec. 

10/31/12.) Thereafter, Petitioner had 30 days to seek review by the Arizona Supreme 

Court. Moreover, at the time, Arizona applied Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3 to 

extend “the time to file an appeal by five days when the order appealed from has been 

mailed to the interested party and commences to run on the date the clerk mails the order.” 

2 Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly recognized 

constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no argument that 

any of these apply.

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State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (1990).3 Here, there is no indication 

that the Memorandum Decision was delivered to Petitioner or his counsel by any means 

other than mailing. Accordingly, Petitioner’s time to seek review by the Arizona Supreme 

Court expired 35 days after the appellate court decision, or on Wednesday, December 5, 

2012.

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244, “direct review" includes the period within which 

a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, 

whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 

134, 150 (2012). The Supreme Court “can review, however, only judgments of a ‘state 

court of last resort’ or of a lower state court if the ‘state court of last resort’ has denied 

discretionary review.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 154 (2012) (citing U.S. Sup.Ct. 

R. 13.1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)). Here, Petitioner did not seek direct review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. Accordingly, the time for seeking a writ of certiorari with the 

U.S. Supreme Court cannot be considered in determining when Petitioner's judgment 

became final. Id.

b. Newly Discovered Claims

Petitioner asserts that he was only recently able to discover his claims due to 

deficiencies in the legal resources provided to him. (Petitioner provides no details about 

when his discovery occurred.) Although the conclusion of direct review normally marks 

the beginning of the statutory one year, § 2244(d)(1)(D) does provide an alternative of 

“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Thus, where despite the exercise of 

due diligence a petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate of his claim, the 

statute does not commence running on that claim until the earlier of such discovery or the 

elimination of the disability which prevented discovery. “Time begins when the prisoner 

3 Respondents do not address the effect of Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 1.3 and thus calculate 

the finality date as November 30, 2012. 

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knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner 

recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n. 3 (9th Cir. 

2001). Here, Petitioner does not suggest he was unaware of the factual underpinnings of 

his claims, only the legal underpinnings. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not apply. 

c. Conclusion re Commencement

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s conviction became final on December 5, 2012, 

upon expiration of his time to file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running on December 6, 2012, and without any 

tolling expired on December 5, 2013.

4

 

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) was filed on July 9, 2024. 

However, the Petition contains a declaration that it was placed in the prison mailing 

system on July 8, 2024. (Doc. 1 at “11.”) “In determining when a pro se state or federal 

petition is filed, the ‘mailbox’ rule applies. A petition is considered to be filed on the date 

a prisoner hands the petition to prison officials for mailing.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). The undersigned finds that the Petition was delivered to prison 

officials for mailing on the earlier date, and concludes it must be deemed “filed” as of that 

date, July 8, 2024.

As determined in subsection (1) above, without any tolling Petitioner’s one year 

habeas limitations period expired no later than December 5, 2013, making his July 8, 2024

Petition over ten years delinquent.

4 For purposes of counting time for a federal statute of limitations, the standards in Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) apply. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 

2001). Rule 6(a)(1)(A) directs that the “the day of the event that triggers the period” is 

excluded. Thus, the one year commenced the day after Petitioner’s conviction became 

final, or on ______ (day one), and the last day was 364 days later, on ____. See Patterson 

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying “anniversary method” under Rule 

6(a) to find that one year grace period from adoption of AEDPA statute of limitations, on 

April 24, 1996, commenced on April 25, 1996 and expired one year later on the 

anniversary of such adoption, April 24, 1997). 

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4. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Properly Filed - Statutory tolling of the habeas limitations period only results from 

state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never “properly 

filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). 

On the other hand, the fact that the application may contain procedurally barred claims 

does not mean it is not “properly filed.” “[T]he question whether an application has been 

‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the 

application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 

(2000). 

Here, the state court may have alternatively rejected Petitioner’s PCR proceeding 

as untimely, ruling: 

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that all matters contained in the 

Petition for Post Conviction Relief are precluded as having been 

previously ruled upon or untimely filed or the Petition lacks 

sufficient basis in law and fact to warrant further proceedings herein 

and no useful purpose would be served by further proceedings

(Exh. N, Order 12/16/15.) Even if the state court provides alternative grounds for 

disposing of the state application, a ruling that the application was untimely precludes it 

from being “properly filed” and tolling the limitations period. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 

214, 225-26 (2002). 

Here, the state court’s decision was not a clear application of Arizona’s time bars.

If the state court summarily disposes of a state application without identifying if it was on 

timeliness grounds, or otherwise fails to give a clear indication whether it has deemed the 

application timely or untimely, the federal habeas court “must itself examine the delay in 

each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.” 

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Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006).

Arizona’s Rule 32.4 requires that petitions for post-conviction relief (other than 

those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and 

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct 

appeal, whichever is the later.” Ariz. R. Crim. Proced. 32.4(a) (2013). See State v. Pruett, 

185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995). Here, the mandate in Petitioner’s direct appeal 

was issued on March 29, 2013, making Petitioner’s PCR notice due within 90 days, or by 

no earlier than Thursday, June 27, 2013. However, the Mandate was forwarded to 

Petitioner’s counsel (Schaus) by mail. (Exh. H, Mandate at 2.) Petitioner would have 

been entitled to an additional five days under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.35

based on the mailing of the mandate, giving him until Tuesday, July 2, 2013. Even without 

considering Arizona’s application of its prison mailbox rule,6 Petitioner filed his PCR 

Notice no later than July 2, 2013. Thus, it was timely. 

Commencement of Tolling - For purposes of calculating tolling under § 2244(d), 

the federal prisoner “mailbox rule” applies. Under this rule, a prisoner’s state filings are 

deemed “filed” (and tolling thus commenced) when they are delivered to prison officials 

for mailing. In Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit noted: 

5 As part of a general restyling and restructuring of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, effective January 1, 2018, it appears that Rule 1.3 was amended to exclude 

from the five-days-after-mail rule “the clerk’s distribution of notices, minute entries, or 

other court-generated documents.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a)(5). In addition, Rule 1.3(c) 

was added to clarify that a “court order is entered when the clerk files it,” see also Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 31.1(c)(6) (defining “entry”), and the rules on appeals, petitions for review, 

motions for reconsideration, etc. were revised to reference “entry” of the order being 

appealed, see e.g. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.2(a)(2)(B), 31.20 (c), 31.21(b)(2)(A), 32.9(a), and 

32.9(c)(1)(A). See Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-17-002, available at https://www.azcourts.gov/

Portals/20/2017%20Rules/17-0002.pdf, last accessed 4/19/19. It appears this may make 

precedent applying the extension to orders and judgments no longer applicable when the 

order/judgment was entered after January 1, 2018. In any event, the effective date was 

after the relevant dates in this case.

6 Although a state may direct that the prison mailbox rule does not apply to filings in its 

court, see Orpiada v. McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 2014), Arizona has applied 

the rule to a variety of its state proceedings. See e.g. Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 245, 

908 P.2d 56, 59 (App.1995) (notice of direct appeal); State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 

987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.1999) (PCR notice); State v. Goracke, 210 Ariz. 20, 23, 106 P.3d 

1035, 1038 (App. 2005) (petition for review to Arizona Supreme Court).

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[I]n Saffold v. Newland, 224 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.2000), we squarely 

held that the mailbox rule applies with equal force to the filing of state 

as well as federal petitions, because "[a]t both times, the conditions 

that led to the adoption of the mailbox rule are present; the prisoner 

is powerless and unable to control the time of delivery of documents 

to the court." Id. at 1091. 

Id. at 575. Here, Petitioner’s PCR notice was dated June 25, 2013 and reflected mailing 

on that date. Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned assumes arguendo 

(in Petitioner’s favor) that his mailing was by delivery to prison officials on that date, and 

thus the prison mailbox rule renders his PCR proceeding commenced on June 25, 2013

Conclusion of Tolling – As discussed above, Petitioner’s limitations period 

commenced running on December 6, 2013. Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was commenced 

no earlier than June 25, 2013, before his limitations period began running. It remained 

pending until at least December 17, 2015 when the PCR court denied the Petition (Exhibit 

N.) 

Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned assumes arguendo (in 

Petitioner’s favor), that the Superior Court’s order affirming its decision on May 23, 2016 

(Exh. O) amounted to a new ruling on his PCR Petition, and that his PCR Petition remained 

pending at least through that time. 

A post-conviction application remains pending until the expiration of time allowed 

to seek further review, even if such review is not sought. Melville v. Shinn, 68 F.4th 1154, 

1160 (9th Cir. 2023). Pursuant to former Rule 32.9(c), Paulson had thirty days within 

which to file his petition for review in the court of appeals. Assuming a May 23, 2016 final 

decision, and mailing of that decision, Petitioner would have had through Monday, June 

27, 2016 to file his petition for review.7

Petitioner did not seek further review, and consequently his tolling ended on June 

27, 2016.

Expiration of Limitations Period – Thus, Petitioner’s one year commenced 

7 Respondents calculate a termination of pendency on December 16, 2015. (Answer, Doc. 

11 at 5.) That determination does not take account of Arizona’s Rule 1.3 for mailing, and 

does not make assumption regarding the subsequent order “affirming” the denial.

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running no later than June 28, 2016, and expired no later than one year later, on Tuesday, 

June 27, 2017. 

Consequently, Petitioner’s habeas petition, deemed filed as of July 8, 2024 was 

over seven years delinquent.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available 

in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control 

make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were 

the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition on 

time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable 

tolling. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute 

of limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”).

Petitioner does not explicitly proffer any grounds for equitable tolling. He does, 

however, complain about the constraints on his access to legal materials and lack of 

paralegal assistance. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 2.) 

“[A] pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary 

circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006). “[I]gnorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally 

does not excuse prompt filing.” Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir.1999)

However, this circuit has found that a lack of access to legal resources may be an 

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extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See, e.g., Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 

233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that unavailability of a copy of the 

AEDPA in a prison law library could be grounds for equitable tolling). However, in cases 

where courts have found that an extraordinary circumstance might exist, the petitioner 

always pointed to specific materials to which he did not have access. See, e.g., Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of access to AEDPA 

materials and Oregon law books may be an extraordinary circumstance); Mendoza v. 

Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of access to Spanish language legal 

materials or assistance could entitle habeas petitioner to equitable tolling). 

Here, however, Petitioner does not point to any specific materials that he lacked 

which resulted in his untimeliness. He simply complains the resources were generally 

inadequate. That is not sufficient.

Moreover, Petitioner fails to proffer anything to show that he was diligent despite 

the limitations he faced in the prison. For example, he does not suggest that he sought 

legal material from outside the prison, e.g. county law libraries, public libraries, etc. Even 

if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing for a time, equitable tolling 

will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue filing afterwards. “If the person 

seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file after 

the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation between the extraordinary 

circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and the extraordinary circumstances 

therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 

2000). 

Nor does Petitioner explain when his lack of legal materials terminated, at which 

point tolling would have ceased.

In sum, Petitioner fails to bear his burden of showing his entitlement to equitable 

tolling sufficient to render his Petition timely. 

/ /

/ /

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6. Actual Innocence 

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 

383 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner “’must show 

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the 

light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 399 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). 

This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies “only when a petition presents 

‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of 

the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 

constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 400 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). “To be credible, such 

a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new 

reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial. Because such 

evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence 

are rarely successful.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

Petitioner makes no claim of actual innocence let alone such a claim based on new 

credible evidence. 

7. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the maximum possible statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one-year 

habeas limitations period commenced running no later than on June 28, 2016, and expired 

no later than one year later on Tuesday, June 27, 2017. Petitioner has shown no basis for 

additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable tolling or actual innocence to avoid 

the effects of his delay. As a result, this Court must conclude his July 8, 2024 Petition was 

untimely. Consequently, the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice.

/ /

/ /

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C. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims were procedurally defaulted because of 

his failure to timely and appropriately raise them to the state courts. Petitioner makes no 

assertion that his claims asserted herein were fairly presented. Instead, Petitioner asserts 

in his Petition that his claims were not presented to the state courts because: Ground 1 was 

a matter of federal law; in Ground 2, the state court viewed the facts in the light favorable 

to upholding the verdict; in Ground 3, the state had no appellate power. (Pet. Doc. 1 at 6-

8.) In his Reply, Petitioner argues: that the procedural bars amounted to an absence of 

available state processes and thus excuse exhaustion; the state’s favorable view of the facts 

made review futile; only federal law controls criminal cases; remand is the appropriate 

remedy; and his life sentence eliminates a requirement for presentation to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals.

1. Claims Procedurally Defaulted

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) 

(per curiam). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 

F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner 

must have fairly presented his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and 

fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion 

requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper 

vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” 

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

Petitioner makes no assertion that he fairly presented his claims in Grounds 1, 2 

and 3 to the state courts. The undersigned finds he did not. 

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly 

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exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no 

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989), Petitioner asserts dismissal 

is not appropriate, and instead the case should be remanded. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 5.) Peoples 

does not provide for remand rather than dismissal of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Instead, the Peoples court remanded for a resolution whether the claims were procedurally 

defaulted.8

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to 

the state courts and that they are now procedurally defaulted. Respondents rely upon 

Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out 

in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 9.) Except as discussed hereinafter, 

Petitioner offers no argument that these Rules would not bar him from returning to the 

state court to assert his claims. For the reasons stated in the Answer (Doc. 11 at 9-10), the 

undersigned concludes the claims would be barred under both Arizona’s preclusion and 

8

In Peoples, the habeas petitioner had presented his claims not on appeal or in a postconviction relief proceeding, but in a “petition for allocatur” which was a means of 

discretionary review, which was summarily denied. The Court held that the summary 

denial did not imply a decision of the claim on its merits, and that “the presentation of 

claims to a State's highest court on discretionary review, without more, [does not satisfy] 

the exhaustion requirements.” Id. at 349. Thus, the Court concluded the petition for 

allocatur was not proper exhaustion, and thus the Court of Appeals should not have found 

the habeas claims properly exhausted. The Court went on to observe: “The requisite 

exhaustion may nonetheless exist, of course, if it is clear that respondent's claims are now 

procedurally barred under Pennsylvania law.” Id. at 351. The Court then cited cases on 

procedural default i.e “waiver”, id. at 351-352, including Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 

125–126, n. 28, (1982) and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–298 (1989). Thus, Castille

remanded to the Court of Appeals. That court was left to resolve whether the claims were 

simply unexhausted (and thus dismissal without prejudice to allow exhaustion was 

appropriate) or it was procedurally defaulted (requiring dismissal with prejudice). On 

remand, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined one claim potentially procedurally 

defaulted and the other not clearly procedurally defaulted and thus potentially 

unexhausted. Thus the case was remanded to the trial court to either allow the petitioner 

the option to either delete the unexhausted claim or to dismiss the mixed petition. Peoples 

v. Fulcomer, 882 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1989).

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time bars, and the claims are thus now procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner asserts a variety of theories to avoid a conclusion of procedural default. 

As discussed hereinafter, none have merit.

2. Absence of Available Process

There is an exception to the exhaustion requirement where “there is an absence of 

available State corrective process.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i). Petitioner fails to show 

such an absence.

Federal Law - Petitioner argues Ground 1 was not presented to the state courts 

because it involves federal law which only federal courts can address. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

6.) In Ground 3 he argues the state court lacked appellate power. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.)

Petitioner repeats this argument in his Reply, presumably applying it to all his claims. 

(Reply, Doc. 12 at 3-4.) 

Petitioner’s argument is fundamentally illogical. Federal habeas petitions under § 

2254 can only be based on claims that the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If only the 

federal courts could review such claims, there would be no point to the next clause, which 

generally mandates that the “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 

Moreover, the Supreme Court has regularly recognized “the separate authority of 

the several States—to interpret federal law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 

(2000).” It is true that Congress can restrict certain claims under federal law to decision in 

the federal courts. See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Ct. of Del. In & For New 

Castle Cnty., 366 U.S. 656 (1961). But Congress has not done so with regard to 

Petitioner’s habeas claims. Indeed, “state courts are the principal forum for asserting 

constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 

(2011). 

To support his contention, Petitioner misquotes the Supreme Court:

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"Laws of the United States alone control disposition of criminal 

cases, and states are powerless to place any limitation or restriction 

on that control." U S. v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 55 S.Ct. 610, 79 L.Ed. 

1267, 1935 U.S. LEXIS 1086 (1935).

(Reply, Doc. 12 at 3-4 (emphasis added).) What the Supreme Court actually said was:

The laws of the United States alone control the disposition of title to 

its lands. The states are powerless to place any limitation or 

restriction on that control. 

United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1935) (emphasis added). Indeed, that 

case did not deal with any questions of criminal law, only the construction of grants of 

title to land by the United States. 

Petitioner’s other citations (Reply, Doc. 12 at 3) are not to the contrary, and deal 

with limits on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, rather than limiting the jurisdiction of 

the state courts. In Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 119 (1847) the Court recognized the 

limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. In Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 264 (1868), 

the Court recognized Congress’s ability to regulate the Supreme Court’s exercise of its 

appellate jurisdiction. Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307 (1810) reached similar 

conclusions. 

Barred Claims – Petitioner argues that state processes are unavailable because of 

the procedural bars on which Respondents rely to assert procedural default. This is 

antithetical to the well-established law on procedural default. The Supreme Court has 

summarized:

Thus, if state-court remedies are no longer available because the 

prisoner failed to comply with the deadline for seeking state-court 

review or for taking an appeal, those remedies are technically 

exhausted, ibid., but exhaustion in this sense does not automatically 

entitle the habeas petitioner to litigate his or her claims in federal 

court. Instead, if the petitioner procedurally defaulted those claims, 

the prisoner generally is barred from asserting those claims in a 

federal habeas proceeding.

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). Justice Stevens has explained in greater detail:

In order to protect the integrity of our exhaustion rule, we have 

also crafted a separate waiver rule, or-as it is now commonly knownthe procedural default doctrine. The purpose of this doctrine is to 

ensure that state prisoners not only become ineligible for state relief 

before raising their claims in federal court, but also that they give 

state courts a sufficient opportunity to decide those claims before 

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doing so. If we allowed state prisoners to obtain federal review 

simply by letting the time run on adequate and accessible state 

remedies and then rushing into the federal system, the comity 

interests that animate the exhaustion rule could easily be thwarted. 

We therefore ask in federal habeas cases not only whether an 

applicant has exhausted his state remedies; we also ask how he has 

done so. This second inquiry forms the basis for our procedural 

default doctrine: A habeas petitioner who has concededly exhausted 

his state remedies must also have properly done so by giving the State 

a fair “opportunity to pass upon [his claims].” When a prisoner has 

deprived the state courts of such an opportunity, he has procedurally 

defaulted his claims and is ineligible for federal habeas relief save a 

showing of “cause and prejudice,”, or “ ‘a fundamental miscarriage 

of justice’.” 

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 853–54 (1999) (citations omitted) (Stevens, J., 

dissenting). The majority in O’Sullivan voiced agreement with this analysis. Id. at 848. 

Effect of Life Sentence – Petitioner argues that his life sentence eliminated his 

need to fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals, referencing an exception 

for “cases in which life sentence or the death penalty has been imposed.” (Reply, Doc. 12 

at 5.)9 The language referenced by Petitioner arises in cases resolving whether (to meet 

the requirement of presentation to “the highest court”) an Arizona prisoner must present 

his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court, or whether presentation to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals suffices. See e.g. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)

(presentation to Arizona Supreme Court required only for life and death sentences); and 

Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931–33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (post-Swoopes changes 

in statute eliminated need for presentation to Arizona Supreme Court in life sentence 

cases). None of these cases eliminate the requirement for exhaustion in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. 

3. Ineffectiveness of Process

There is also an exception to the exhaustion requirement where “circumstances 

9

In support of this argument Petitioner cites Leroy v. Marshall, 757 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 

1985). That case did not deal with issues of exhaustion or procedural default, but rather 

with the bar on second or successive petitions, which at the time allowed such petitions in 

the discretion of the court. The court found discretion appropriate in that case given the 

defendant’s life sentence. But see Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 9 (2004) 

(eliminating district court discretion and requiring order from court of appeals). 

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exist that render [an available state] process ineffective to protect the rights of the 

applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii). Petitioner argues that review of his claims in 

the state courts would have been ineffective because review would have been only under 

a view of the facts favorable to the verdict. 

Indeed, on direct appeal the Arizona court summarized the facts in the light most 

favorable to sustaining the verdict. (Exh. G, Mem. Dec. 10/31/12 at ¶ 2.) Moreover, the 

Arizona courts appear to regularly do so. See e.g. State v. Chappell, 225 Ariz. 229, 233, 

n. 1, 236 P.3d 1176, 1180 (2010); State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, 61, n. 1, 163 P.3d 1006, 

1011 (2007); and State v. Tucker, 205 Ariz. 157, 160, 68 P.3d 110, 113 (2003). The 

practice appears to stem from decisions in which the state court adopted such a view of 

facts to “review[ ] the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 9, 870 

P.2d 1097, 1105 (1994) (as cited in Tucker). See also State v. Hassman, 101 Ariz. 583, 

583, 422 P.2d 699, 699 (1967); and State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 263, 408 P.2d 400, 404 

(1965) (cited by Hassman) (referencing sufficiency of evidence claim). Indeed, that is the 

proper view for claims of sufficiency of the evidence. See Gallegos, supra; and Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). Indeed, some Arizona courts seem to recognize 

the limited applicability of such a view. See e.g. State v. Avila, 2021 WL 389347, at *1 

(Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2, Feb. 3, 2021) (“In an appeal of this nature,” referencing insufficient 

evidence claim).

Such a favorable view of the evidence is not the proper view for addressing all 

claims. For example, in addressing a failure to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), a court must evaluate the materiality of the evidence 

not based on a favorable view of the prosecution’s case, but based upon whether there is a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 

(1985).

In any event, however, Petitioner fails to show how such a view of the evidence 

would have made ineffective the state processes on the claims he seeks to raise in his 

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habeas petition. Petitioner’s claims do not appear to rely at all upon any evidentiary 

considerations. Rather, they focus on pure questions of law, i.e. the Supremacy Clause, 

the United Nations Charter, and federal regulations. 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to point to any instance where this habit by the state 

courts has resulted in the improper rejection of a claim. As the undersigned has done in 

this case, courts routinely provide a summary of the evidence in a case solely to provide 

context. In many such instances, a balanced view of the evidence introduces complexities 

in summarizing and would be unnecessary to address the claims made. Petitioner fails to 

explain how doing so renders such review ineffective.10

4. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal 

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse 

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13). The 

Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily turn on some 

objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner proffers no cause for his failure to properly exhaust his state remedies on 

10 Perhaps the state courts could avoid what to a defendant may appear to be an improper 

tipping of the scales by simply acknowledging (as the undersigned has done hereinabove) 

when their favorable review of the evidence is offered only to provide context.

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his claims, and the undersigned finds none. 

In addressing the statute of limitations, Petitioner does complain of constraints on 

his access to legal materials and lack of paralegal assistance. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 2.) But 

the claims Petitioner raises in this habeas proceeding would have been properly raised on 

direct appeal, and Petitioner was represented by counsel in that proceeding, making his 

access to legal materials and paralegal assistance irrelevant. 

Petitioner might argue appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise such 

claims. Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly 

exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, “[t]o constitute cause for procedural default of a 

federal habeas claim, the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must first 

have been presented to the state courts as an independent claim.” Cockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 

938, 943 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A]n ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause 

for the procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted.” Edwards 

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000). Here, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted any 

such claims of ineffectiveness for two reasons. 

First, his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel raised in his PCR 

petition did not include assertions that appellate counsel failed to raise the claims raised in 

this habeas proceeding. Ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but must each be 

specifically argued. See Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982)

(presentation of “additional facts of attorney incompetence” transformed claim into one 

not presented to state court); and Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992)

(rejecting argument that presentation of any claim of ineffectiveness results in fair 

presentation of all claims of ineffective assistance).

Second, Petitioner failed to seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals in his 

PCR proceeding, and thus he failed to exhaust his state remedies on any claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his PCR proceeding. 

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5. Actual Innocence

Failure to establish cause for a failure to properly exhaust may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). A 

petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). Not 

just any evidence of innocence will do; the petitioner must present “new reliable 

evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, 

or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

Petitioner makes no assertion of such new reliable evidence of his actual innocence. 

Accordingly his procedurally defaulted claims must be dismissed with prejudice. 

D. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s Petition is untimely and his claims are procedurally defaulted. 

Accordingly, the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice. 

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is whether the 

applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the 

merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching 

the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner 

shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a 

valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

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debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. “If the court 

issues a certificate, the court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). See also Rules Governing § 

2254 Cases, Rule 11(a). 

Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the district court’s 

judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the reasoning set forth 

herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the district court was correct 

in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as 

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

(A) Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

(B) To the extent the foregoing findings and recommendations are adopted in the District 

Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED .

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

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party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: November 26, 2024

24-1681r RR 24 11 18 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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