Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01310/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01310-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:504 Copyright Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino,

a French Trust, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Beseder Inc. (d/b/a Rima Fine Art), an

Arizona Corporation, et al., 

Defendants. _________________________________

and Related Actions

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No. CV 03-1310-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court are the following post-trial Motions: (1) Plaintiff Societe

Civile Succession Richard Guino, a French Trust’s (“Plaintiff”), Motion for Judgment Under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), or in the Alternative, for a New Trial under Rule 59 (Dkt.#550); (2)

Plaintiff’s Application for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs (Dkt.#551); (3) Defendants

Beseder, Inc., d/b/a/ Rima Fine Art, Dror Darel and Tracy Penwell’s (“the Rima

Defendants”) Renewed Motion for Sanctions (Dkt.#555); (4) the Rima Defendants’ Motion

for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to the Lanham Act (Dkt.#557); (5) Defendants Jean Emmanuel

Renoir (“Defendant Renoir”) and Louise Hernandez Renoir’s (“Defendant Hernandez”)

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt.#563); and (6) Defendants Renoir and Hernandez’s

Renewed Motion for Sanctions against Plaintiff (Dkt.#580). After reviewing the pleadings,

the Court issues the following Order. 

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I. Brief Background

Because the Court has recited the factual background underlying this litigation on

several prior occasions, it will not do so again, except with respect to the pending Motions.

The pending Motions derive primarily out of the jury’s verdict on November 2, 2006, and

the Amended Judgment filed on March 16, 2007. The jury’s November 2, 2006 verdict

awarded copyright infringement damages in favor of Plaintiff against the Rima Defendants

in the amount of $5,000 for each of the ten Renoir-Guino works at issue; and $7,500 each

for the same works against Defendant Renoir pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). (Dkt.#514).

Additionally, the jury found in favor of Defendant Renoir on his counterclaim of false

advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), against Plaintiff and awarded

him $90,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in lost profits. On March 15, 2007, the

Court, in its discretion pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 1117(a), increased the lost profits award from

$30,000 to $45,000 as well as imposed injunctive relief against Plaintiff which required

Plaintiff to identify the works of art subject to Defendant Renoir’s counterclaim to be

identified as unauthentic and/or unauthorized duplicates of the original Renoir-Guino works.

(Dkt.#547). During trial, the Court directed a verdict pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 50(a)

in favor of the Rima Defendants and Defendants Hernandez and Renoir on Plaintiff’s False

Designation and False Description of Sponsorship Lanham Act claim and directed a verdict

in favor of Defendant Hernandez on Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims against her.

Judgment was thus entered accordingly and the above-mentioned Motions were filed

thereafter. (Dkt.#548).

I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in Alternative for New

Trial

A. Background 

Plaintiff takes issue with the jury’s verdict in favor of Defendant Renoir’s false

advertising Lanham Act counterclaim against Plaintiff. In doing so, Plaintiff renews its

previously rejected motion for judgment as a matter of law with the instant Motion for

judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), or in the alternative, Motion for

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new trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Plaintiff specifically contends that Defendant Renoir: (1)

failed to prove the elements of his false advertising counterclaim and (2) failed to supply

evidence on which to ground a money damages award against Plaintiff even if the claim was

valid. 

B. Standard

Rule 50(b) provides in pertinent part:

If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at

[the close of all the evidence], the court is considered to have submitted the

action to the jury subject to the court’s later deciding the legal questions raised

by the motion. The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of

law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment . . . . The

movant may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial

under Rule 59. In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may:

(1) if a verdict was returned:

(A) allow the judgment to stand,

(B) order a new trial, or

(C) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(B)

Judgment as a matter of law may be granted “[i]f during a trial by jury a party has

been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a

reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue . . .” Juhnke v. EIG Corp., 444 F.2d 1323,

1325 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting that directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict “are measured by the same standards as the latter is merely a renewal of the

former.”). In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), “the

court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not

make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Therefore, the Court’s role is not to substitute its

view of the evidence for that of the jury. Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Electronics Components,

274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001). When two possible sets of inferences are supported by

the record, “the inferences that support the jury’s verdict of course win the day.” Id. at 1287.

Under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court “may grant a new

trial if ‘the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence

which is false, or to prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial court, a miscarriage of

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justice.’” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir.

2001) (quoting United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

C. Analysis

(1) Elements of Plaintiff’s False Advertising Claim 

As generally agreed to by Plaintiff and Defendant Renoir, the elements of a false

advertising claim under the Lanham Act are: 

(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement

about its own or another’s product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has

the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception

is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the

defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the

plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the false statement,

either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a lessening of

goodwill associated with its products. 

Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations

omitted). 

The Lanham Act provides for both injunctive and monetary relief. 15 U.S.C. § 1117.

Plaintiff argues, with respect to Defendant Renoir’s obligation to meet the elements

of his false advertising claim, that Defendant Renoir failed to meet his burden in showing:

(1) Plaintiff was in commercial competition with Defendant Renoir or that Plaintiff

advertised; and (2) the existence of actual harm or damage to Defendant Renoir to support

the jury’s monetary award.

(2) Commercial Competition

The inquiry into whether there is an actionable commercial statement under the

Lanham Act can be addressed with four sub-elements: (1) a commercial statement; (2) by a

defendant who is in commercial competition with the plaintiff; (3) for the purpose of

influencing consumers to buy defendant’s product; (4) that is disseminated sufficiently to the

relevant public. Of these elements, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Renoir failed to show that

Defendant Renoir was in commercial competition with Plaintiff. In addition, Plaintiff

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1

In Plaintiff’s Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) motion at the close of Defendant Renoir’s case,

Plaintiff requested judgment as a matter of law, in part, because of its assertion that

Defendant Renoir and Plaintiff “operate in different marketing channels.” (Dkt.#500, p.12).

The Court finds this sufficient to preserve the argument set forth now as to a lack of

commercial competition to preserve it for a Rule 50(b) motion. 

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contends that Defendant Renoir failed to produce any evidence that Plaintiff advertised a

commercial statement.1

 

In reviewing the trial record, the Court finds that these arguments fail, as there was

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict in this respect. For instance, contrary to

Plaintiff’s assertion, the jury did hear evidence describing Defendant Renoir’s involvement

in the art industry. Defendant Renoir testified that he has been actively dealing in art for a

major portion of his life, has actively been dealing in Renoir sculptures since approximately

1989, and estimated that he had participated as a buyer, seller, or broker in over 2,000 art

deals since 1983. The jury also heard evidence regarding Plaintiff’s involvement in the art

industry. Michael Guino, Plaintiff’s representative, testified that the function of Plaintiff

Societe, a French Trust, is to protect the artwork of Richard Guino “and the exportation for

the sculpture he made with Renoir.” (October 24, 2006 Transcript. Dkt.#538, p. 6, ll.13-14).

Further, the jury heard evidence connecting Plaintiff with the exhibition of Renoir-Guino

works at the Ostrovsky Gallery in Scottsdale, Arizona in 2005. Emmanuel Javogue,

Plaintiff’s former representative in the United States, testified throughout his deposition that

his job was to promote the Renoir-Guino works and that Plaintiff was directly involved in

the planning of the Ostrovsky Exhibition to exhibit such works. (October 31, 2006

Transcript, Dkt.#541, pp. 73-75 ll. 15-17). The jury was also aware that Plaintiff was suing

Defendant Renoir for copyright infringement based on Defendant Renoir’s wrongful conduct

with respect to the Renoir-Guino works. Considering such evidence, there is ample evidence

to support a finding that Plaintiff and Defendant were in commercial competition with one

another in the promotion, buying, selling and brokering of art, and that Plaintiff was aware

of Defendant Renoir’s activities.

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2

Plaintiff raised this issue regarding the absence of evidence indicating damage to

Defendant Renoir in Plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict at trial. (Dkt.#500, p.6). Thus,

the issue was properly preserved by Plaintiff. 

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The Court also finds unpersuasive Plaintiff’s argument that there was no evidence

suggesting that Plaintiff was involved in any advertisement of a commercial statement. Mr.

Javogue testified that Plaintiff was directly involved in the promotion of art in the United

States and directly participated in the planning of the Ostrovsky Exhibition to show the

Renoir-Guino works to the public. (Id.). Moreover, trial exhibit 634, which was stipulated

to by the parties and produced to the jury, advertised the Ostrovsky Exhibition and identified

Plaintiff as a sponsor of the event. Such evidence supports the idea that Plaintiff was

involved in the commercial advertisement of the art at issue. 

Thus, the Court finds there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the existence

of commercial competition between Plaintiff and Defendant Renoir, and that Plaintiff

participated in the promotion or advertisement of the art works at issue.

(3) Evidence of Damages to Defendant Renoir

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Renoir’s monetary award from the jury of $90,000

in actual damages and $30,000 in lost profits must fail because of the lack of any credible

evidence of actual damage supporting his false advertising counterclaim.2

 As an initial

matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s challenge to the jury’s lost profits award on the basis

of the absence of actual damage is misplaced. Notably, the jury was instructed as to possible

awards based on Defendant Renoir’s actual damages incurred from Plaintiff’s activities, as

well as lost profits based on Plaintiff’s profits from any infringing activities. Because

Plaintiff only contests the existence of actual damage to support the jury’s award, Plaintiff’s

argument is appropriately directed at the compensatory damages of $90,000 awarded to

Defendant Renoir and not the lost profits award based on Plaintiff’s profits. See Int’l Star

Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996)

(holding that absence of actual damages does not preclude a recovery of the infringing

party’s profits); X-It Products, LLC v. Walter Kiddie Portable Equip., Inc., 227 F.Supp.2d

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3

 Notably, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides that a plaintiff is entitled, subject to the

principles of equity, to recover “(1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the

plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.”

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494, (E.D.Va. 2002) (stating that lost profits award need not be based upon actual damages).

Accordingly, the Court will review Plaintiff’s evidentiary challenge only in the context of

the jury’s $90,000 actual damages award.3

 

A review of the law regarding the evidence necessary to sustain a monetary award

based upon actual damages under the Lanham Act guides the Court’s inquiry. In Harper

House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., the Ninth Circuit instructed that “[i]n a suit for damages

under section 43(a) . . . actual evidence of some injury resulting from the deception is an

essential element of the plaintiff’s case.” 889 F.2d 197, 210 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in

original). Subsequent to the holding in Harper House, the Ninth Circuit, in Lindy Pen Co.,

Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., a trademark infringement case, stated that “an inability to show actual

damages does not alone preclude a recovery under section 1117,” but rather is more

appropriately fashioned “based on the totality of the circumstances.” 982 F.2d 1400, 1411

(9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit again referenced the “totality of the circumstances”

analysis in Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., where it reversed the district court’s

grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s false advertising claim because of lack of

causation and injury. 108 F.3d at 1145-46. The Ninth Circuit held that no injury need be

shown where injunctive relief is sought under the Lanham Act, and stated that “when . . . a

§ 43(a) claim involves false advertising . . . courts have been more willing to allow monetary

damages even without a showing of actual consumer confusion.” Id. at 1146. This recent

Ninth Circuit authority suggests that the issue of damages may be evaluated under the

“totality of the circumstances” in Lanham Act cases; however, evidence of some damage or

harm to a Lanham Act plaintiff is still required to justify such an award. See Eastman Kodac

Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927) (“Damages are not rendered

uncertain because they cannot be calculated with absolute exactness,” but there must be a

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reasonable basis for the computation); Lindy Pen, 982 F.2d at 1407 (when seeking damages,

“[a] plaintiff must prove both the fact and the amount of damage.”). 

In this case, Defendant Renoir’s false advertising claim, which is based on the noncomparative false representations by Plaintiff regarding certain works of art, requires that

Defendant Renoir offer evidence that he was damaged by Plaintiff’s false representations.

Unlike Southland Sod, where the Ninth Circuit stated that “[p]ublication of deliberately false

comparative claims gives rise to a presumption of actual deception and reliance,” 108 F.3d

at 1146 (citations omitted) (emphasis added), this case does not involve comparative

advertising, which in the Court’s view, is significant. For instance, the Eighth Circuit warned

that, “[i]n a suit for money damages where a defendant misrepresented its own product but

did not specifically target a competing product, plaintiff may be only one of many

competitors, and without proof of causation and specific injury each competitor might

receive a windfall unrelated to its own damage.” Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d

1329, 1335-36 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Harper House, 889 F.2d at 209 n.8); see also CKE

Restaurant v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 494 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1146 (C.D.Cal. 2007) (“The injury

in cases involving non-comparative statements ‘accrue[] equally to all competitors . . . . Thus

[courts] require[] some indication of actual injury and causation to satisfy Lanham Act

standing requirements and to ensure a plaintiff’s injury was not speculative.’”) (quoting

McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988)). Further,

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides that a monetary award “shall constitute compensation and not

a penalty.” Id. at 1336. Accordingly, based on Plaintiff’s actionable non-comparative

advertising that is the subject of Defendant Renoir’s counterclaim, Defendant Renoir was

required to present evidence at trial that demonstrated that he had been personally injured by

Plaintiff’s non-comparative statements in order to support a compensatory or actual damages

award.

Defendant Renoir asserts that sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support

the compensatory damages award. Defendant Renoir states that evidence was presented

suggesting that his reputation or goodwill resulting from Plaintiff’s conduct was damaged.

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(Defendant Renoir’s Response, p.8). Notably, “loss of goodwill and injury to business

reputation . . . is a compensable form of harm or injury for which damages may be awarded

in false advertising cases.” (Id.). To support this position, Defendant Renoir cites the Court

to Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Porous II”).

In Porous II, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff corporation produced sufficient

evidence of damage to its goodwill to support the jury’s monetary damages award on

plaintiff’s false advertising claim. Id. at 1122. Such evidence included testimony at trial

describing: (1) the importance of plaintiff’s business reputation and the extent to which

plaintiff relied on that reputation; (2) how plaintiff’s reputation had been damaged by

defendant; and (3) the particular types of reputational injuries suffered by plaintiff, including

testimony regarding the amount of reputational damage. Id.

The Court agrees with Defendant Renoir that damage to reputation or goodwill is

compensable under the Lanham Act; however, in this case Defendant Renoir fell short of

introducing sufficient evidence suggesting that his reputation or goodwill had been damaged.

Unlike the evidence presented in Porous II, Defendant Renoir did not offer any specific or

detailed testimony regarding how his reputation or goodwill had been damaged. Defendant

Renoir did broadly testify that he believed his reputation had been personally damaged by

Plaintiff’s sale or exhibition of unauthentic or misrepresented works. However, other than

this conclusory statement, he offered no further testimony to support his contention.

Importantly, Defendant Renoir stated that to his knowledge, he had not lost any clients as a

result of Plaintiff’s false advertising. Finally, the only specific instance of harm identified

by Defendant Renoir was his inability to produce a certificate of authenticity at an exhibition

in Florida for works that were identified as Renoir-Guino works. (Id.). However, Defendant

Renoir again offered no explanation as to how he was personally damaged as a result of this

instance, which apparently did not result in the loss of any clients. (Id.). In this Court’s view

something more is required with respect to supporting any type of compensatory damage

award under the Lanham Act. 

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The Court also finds unpersuasive Defendant Renoir’s argument that damages are

available solely because the statements of fact or representations by Plaintiff were literally

false. According to Defendant Renoir, because the statements are literally false “damages

are available without proof of actual deception or confusion.” (Defendant Renoir’s

Response, p.9). See Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Institute v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d

302, 314 (1st Cir. 2002) (“If the advertisement is literally false, the court may grant relief

without considering evidence of consumer reaction. In the absence of such literal falsity, an

additional burden is placed upon plaintiff to show that the advertisement . . . conveys a

misleading message to the viewing public.”) (citations omitted); see also PPX Enterprises,

818 F.2d 266, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that if an advertising statement is actually false,

monetary relief can be awarded even without reference to consumer confusion). While a

finding of literal falsity does support a presumption of actual confusion among consumers,

this presumption does not somehow demonstrate that Defendant Renoir was damaged by

such confusion in this case. For instance, in Harper House, another non-comparative false

advertising case involving literally false statements, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district

court’s denial of the Lanham Act defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict where the plaintiff “presented no evidence of any injury causally related to the

defendant’s deception.” 889 F.2d at 210. The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]f, in fact,

consumers were deceived, the deception likely had little or no causal connection with any

damage [the plaintiff] might have suffered from defendants’ advertising . . . .” Id. The

instant case is analogous to the circumstances in Harper House, because while Defendant

Renoir may have established that the non-comparative statements by Plaintiff were literally

false, Defendant Renoir has made no specific showing indicating that he has been damaged

by such statements. As a result, there is no basis on which to find that Defendant Renoir has

been damaged by Plaintiff’s non-comparative statements. Under such circumstances, a

compensatory or actual damages award under the Lanham Act must fail. 

(D) Summary

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4

 The Court previously denied the Rima Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s

motion for attorneys’ fees based upon non-compliance with LRCiv. 54.2 finding that the fact

that Plaintiff filed its Motion and Memorandum of points and authorities contemporaneously

on March 23, 2007, did not demonstrate non-compliance under LRCiv.54.2(b). (Dkt.#632).

That order did not address any of the other arguments advanced by Defendant Renoir or the

Rima Defendants. 

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The Court finds that Defendant Renoir failed to introduce sufficient evidence at trial

suggesting he was damaged by Plaintiff’s non-comparative commercial statements. As such,

the Court will set aside the jury’s compensatory damage award. In making this determination,

it is important to note that the Court’s finding does not impact the injunction imposed or the

lost profits award. The absence of evidence of damage does not preclude injunctive relief

sought by a commercial competitor or the recovery of the infringing party’s profits. See

Harper House, 889 F.2d at 210 (“[B]ecause of the possibility that a competitor may suffer

future injury, as well as the additional rationale underlying section 43(a) - consumer

protection - a competitor need not prove injury when suing to enjoin conduct that violates

section 43(a).”); see also International Star, 80 F.3d at 753.

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs

Plaintiff moves this Court for attorneys’ fees and non-taxable costs pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and LRCiv. 54.2. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to recover $343,464.50

in attorneys’ fees and $22,106.87 in non-taxable costs. (Dkt.#551). Plaintiff seeks such

recovery against Defendant Renoir and the Rima Defendants pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505 of

the Copyright Act, which provides the following:

In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the

recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or

an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may

also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the

costs.

Both Defendant Renoir and the Rima Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s request on several

bases, including Plaintiff’s non-compliance with LRCiv. 54.2. The Court will address that

argument first. 4

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In general, the memorandum of points and authorities submitted in support of a

motion for attorneys’ fees must include a discussion of the following matters with

corresponding headings in the order listed below: (1) eligibility, (2) entitlement and (3)

reasonableness of requested award. LRCiv. 54.2(c)(1)-(3). In addition, pursuant to LRCiv.

54.2(d), the following documents shall be attached to the memorandum: (1) a statement of

consultation, (2) a copy of the fee agreement, (3) a task-based itemized statement of fees and

expenses, in chronological order, (4) an affidavit of moving counsel and (5) any other

affidavits or evidentiary matter deemed appropriate or required by law. LRCiv. 54.2(d).

These requirements are not advisory, but are mandatory to support an award of attorneys’

fees and non-taxable costs. 

In reviewing Plaintiff’s submission, the Court finds material flaws. First, Plaintiff did

not timely submit several aspects of its request to support a motion for attorneys’ fees under

LRCiv. 54.2. Plaintiff’s March 23, 2007, Memorandum of points and authorities supporting

its Motion for attorneys’ fees and non-taxable costs did not include a statement of

consultation as required under LRCiv. 54.2(d)(1). (Dkt.#551). Notably, LRCiv. 54.2(d)(1)

provides the following:

No motion for award of attorneys’ fees will be considered unless a separate

statement of the moving counsel is attached to the supporting memorandum

certifying that, after personal consultation and good faith efforts to do so, the

parties have been unable to satisfactorily resolve all disputed issues relating to

attorneys’ fees or that the moving counsel has made a good faith effort, but has

been unable, to arrange such a conference. The statement of consultation shall

set for the date of the consultation, the names of the participating attorneys and

the specific results or shall describe the efforts made to arrange such

conference and explain the reasons why such conference did not occur. 

It was not until April 5, 2007, that Plaintiff submitted such a statement of consultation

in a pleading styled as “Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Application for Attorneys’

Fees Under 17 U.S.C. § 505.” (Dkt.#576). Perhaps most troubling is that Plaintiff’s

Supplemental Memorandum evidences that Plaintiff did not consult or attempt to consult

with Defendants prior to filing the March 23, 2007 Memorandum in support of its Motion

for attorneys’ fees. Rather, it appears that March 30, 2007, one week after the filing of its

Memorandum, is the first time Plaintiff attempted to discuss its attorneys’ fees requests with

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the other Parties. (Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum, Exhibit 1). Such after the fact

communication or consultation is clearly contrary to the both the letter and the spirit of the

Rule which requires the statement of consultation to be attached to the supporting

memorandum certifying that a good faith effort was made to resolve the disputed issues. 

Second, Plaintiff’s memorandum is also deficient in that Plaintiff’s itemized statement

of attorneys’ fees and related non-taxable costs is not in chronological order as is required

under LRCiv. 54.2(e)(1). Plaintiff submits 32 pages of time records that jump from month

and year throughout, which, as noted by Defendant Renoir, imposes an additional burden in

validating or reviewing such entries. 

In addition to the procedure flaws noted above, the Court also notes that Defendants

have filed appeals with the Ninth Circuit challenging the merits of Plaintiff’s copyright

infringement judgment. (Dkt.#560, 570). Importantly, as discussed at length in Judge

Carroll’s January 30, 2006 order, Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims raise questions

as to the current status of Ninth Circuit copyright law. (Dkt.#350). Judge Carroll stated

“that there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding the existence of

copyright protection for the sculptures” and certified the matter for interlocutory appeal (Id.

p.12, 13). While the Ninth Circuit declined to entertain the issue presented upon

interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit will be given such an opportunity with the benefit of

Defendants’ current appeals. The outcome of Defendants’ appeals will bear significant light

upon whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees as the “prevailing party” under 17 U.S.C.

§ 505. 

Thus, the Court will deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for attorneys’ fees.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities is procedurally

deficient pursuant to LRCiv. 54.2. In addition, considering the debatable issues raised on

appeal by Defendants, the Ninth Circuit’s decision will provide guidance as to whether

Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees based upon its copyright infringement claims.

III. Defendants’ Motions for Sanctions

A. Background

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Defendants Hernandez and Renoir, and the Rima Defendants, seek sanctions against

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, Richard Morris. These Defendants seek sanctions because

of alleged misconduct during discovery with respect to the depositions of Gilles Guino and

Michel Guino that were scheduled to take place in Paris, France on May 18 and 19, 2005.

Defendants previously asserted these motions on June 1, 2005, and June 17, 2005,

respectively. (Dkt.#234, 252). On August 3, 2005, Judge Carroll held a hearing to address

the motions, and ultimately denied the motions “without prejudice to the reurguing at the

close of proceedings in this case.” (Dkt.#277). After the Court’s March 16, 2007 judgment,

the Rima Defendants, pursuant to Judge Carroll’s leave, reasserted their motion on March

28, 2007, and Defendants Hernandez and Renoir reasserted their motion on April 6, 2007.

Defendants contend that sanctions are appropriate against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s

counsel because of improper and unfounded interference with the stipulated and scheduled

depositions of Gilles and Michel Guino in Paris, France. That interference did not develop

until the eve of the depositions, after Defendants’ counsel - and at Defendants’ expense, a

translator, videographer, and stenographer - had already traveled to Paris. According to

Defendants, an issue regarding the propriety of the depositions did not arise until the night

before the depositions, when Plaintiff’s French counsel, Marie Rueff, sent a letter, in French,

demanding compliance with the Hague Convention’s provisions on discovery. (Defendant

Renoir’s Motion, Dkt.#580, Exhibit G to Paul Steiner Affidavit). Upon receipt of Ms.

Rueff’s letter, Defendant Hernandez and Renoir’s counsel, Mr. Steiner, sent a letter to Mr.

Morris disputing Ms. Rueff’s reliance on the Hague Convention. (Id., Exhibit I).

Defendants’ counsel, Mr. Guino, and Plaintiff’s French counsel then met for the depositions

as previously scheduled, put the dispute on record, and the depositions went no further.

Defendants then moved for sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, and on August

3, 2005, Judge Carroll held oral argument and decided, “given all th[e] issues . . . present[ed],

. . . to deny . . . without prejudice to reurging . . . at the time at the end of the proceedings as

to who should or shouldn’t be responsible for th[ese] matters.” (Dkt.#295, p. 20, ll. 20-23).

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In September 2005, after agreement between the Parties, Gilles and Michel Guino were

deposed in London, England. 

Plaintiff opposes any notion of misconduct or any basis for sanctions. According to

Plaintiff, the objection based on Defendants’ failure to properly execute procedural

formalities required by the Hague Convention prior to attempting to depose Gilles and

Michel Guino, was well founded and necessary under the circumstances. Plaintiff asserts

that such formalities for executing depositions on foreign soil are well known and easily

accessible, and that Defendants should have accounted for them. Plaintiff asserts that to

allow the depositions to go forward without compliance with the Hague Convention carried

significant consequences, including criminal penalties, for Plaintiff as well as Plaintiff’s

French counsel, Ms. Rueff. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Hernandez and

Renoir’s renewed motion for sanctions before this Court is untimely and should be denied

on that basis. 

B. Analysis

(1) Propriety of this Court’s Jurisdiction to Consider Defendant

Hernandez and Renoir’s Motion.

With respect to Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants Hernandez and Renoir’s Motion

for sanctions based upon timeliness, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument.

First, as mentioned above, Judge Carroll expressly granted leave to Defendant Renoir and

the other Defendants to reurge the instant Motion “at the close of proceedings in this case.”

(Dkt.#277). As such, Plaintiff’s argument that any such motion should or had to have been

filed at the close of the trial is misplaced. In addition, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant

Renoir’s Motion is untimely under Rule 59 and Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure is also not compelling. Notably, Defendant Renoir does not seek to alter or amend

the Court’s judgment under Rule 59(e) or seek relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).

Rather, with the leave previously granted by Judge Carroll, Defendant Renoir seeks monetary

sanctions under the authority of Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel.

Also, the fact that Defendant Renoir filed a notice of appeal prior to the instant motion does

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not somehow deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider the motion. See Masalosalo by

Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a district

court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys fees during the pendency of an appeal); Alward

v. Burrelle’s Information Services, 2001 WL 1708779, at *7 - *11 (D.Ariz. 2001)

(evaluating, awarding, and denying certain motions for sanctions filed by the parties where

notice of appeal had been filed previously, based on the district court’s retained jurisdiction

to award attorneys fees during the pendency of the appeal with respect to matters unrelated

to the appeal); see also Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Industries, 212 F.R.D. 341,

342-43 (E.D.Ky. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff’s filing of notice of appeal did not divest

the district court of jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s motion for discovery sanctions).

Thus, the Court finds that Defendant Renoir’s Motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

37 is within this Court’s jurisdiction to consider. 

(2) Sanctionable Conduct Analysis

Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:

If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party . . . fails (1) to

appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with

a proper notice . . . the court in which the action is pending on motion may

make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may

take any action authorized under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of

subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. . . . In lieu of any order or in addition thereto,

the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney advising that party

or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by

the failure unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or

that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

In the instant case, the depositions that were scheduled in Paris for May 18 and 19,

2005, did not go forward because of Plaintiff’s 11th hour assertion regarding the applicability

of the Hague Convention to Defendants efforts to depose Gilles and Michel Guino. As such,

the Court is faced with whether Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct warrants the

imposition of sanctions. 

As an initial matter, the Court does not find compelling Plaintiff’s substantial reliance

on the Hague Convention with respect to preventing or stopping the execution of the

depositions in Paris, France. The Court does not see the need to make a specific finding as

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to whether Plaintiff’s reliance on the Hague Convention and reading of Societe Nationale

Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), is meritorious. The

Court’s primary concern is the timing of Plaintiff’s counsel’s objection to these depositions.

Notably, it was Plaintiff’s counsel who advised Defendants that the Guinos, as

representatives or directors of Plaintiff, would not be available for any type of deposition in

the United States, despite the fact that Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit in this District of the

United States. (Rima Defendants’ Motion, Exhibit 2); see Slade v. Transatlantic Financing

Corp., 21 F.R.D. 146, 146-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (“The rule is well settled that a non-resident

plaintiff who chooses this forum makes himself available to examination here in the absence

of a showing of unreasonable hardship or the presence of special circumstances.”) (citations

omitted). In addition, it was Plaintiff’s counsel who proposed the dates in May 2005 for the

subject depositions. (Id., Exhibit 3). The dates were finalized by the Parties’ stipulation

through correspondence in early March 2005, and were ultimately noticed on April 11, and

May 2, 2005, to which Plaintiff did not object. (Id. Exhibits 4-5). Despite these arrangements

and exchange of prior written discovery between the Parties, there was never any discussion

or implication that the depositions could be stalled or prevented by application of the Hague

Convention. In fact, it was not until Defendants’ counsel and associated personnel arrived

in Paris for the depositions that Plaintiff’s French counsel, Ms. Rueff, who is not counsel in

the instant case, asserted an objection based on Defendants’ non-compliance with the Hague

Convention. (Id. Exhibit 8). Such timing begs the question of why this issue was not raised

previously. In the Court’s review of the record, the answer to that question is that the

relevance and applicability of the Hague Convention was never at issue between the

attorneys of record or Parties in this case, until the very eve of the depositions. Undoubtedly,

this issue should have been raised and addressed much earlier than on the eve of the

deposition, which had been discussed and stipulated to months prior to the actual deposition

dates. Had Plaintiff’s counsel raised the issue earlier, such as in a timely motion for a

protective order, Defendants probably would not have incurred the fees and costs associated

with their travel to Paris for the depositions. Also, had the issue been raised earlier, and

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assuming that the Parties were not able to resolve the issue, the Court would then have

evaluated the relevance and applicability of the Hague Convention. While some minor

blame may be laid on Defendants for failing to ensure the absence of any issues regarding

the depositions in Paris, France, the majority of the blame lies with Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s

counsel. It is Plaintiff, a French Trust, that invoked this Court’s jurisdiction by bringing this

lawsuit in the United States. Defendants were not obligated to depose the Guinos in France,

and such an arrangement was made based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s recommendation, and for

the convenience of the Guinos. The timing of Plaintiff’s objection unnecessarily caused a

waste of time and resources. 

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate pursuant to

the Court’s authority under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. Thus, the Court will impose sanctions on

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel in the form of 85% of Defendants’ costs, including travel and

lodging, and the fees incurred for the translator, videographer, and stenographer, associated

with the scheduled depositions on May 18 and 19, 2005. Plaintiff’s counsel shall bear 55%

of the costs, and Plaintiff shall bear 30% of the costs. See Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d

1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The district court has great latitude in imposing sanctions under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37.”).

IV. The Rima Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

On March 30, 2007, the Rima Defendants filed their instant Motion for attorneys’ fees

pursuant to LRCiv.54.2 and under the broader authority of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1117(a). The Rima Defendants contend that they are entitled to their attorneys’ fees because

Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim asserted against them was groundless and unreasonable. The

Rima Defendants seek to recover the fees of Phil Fleming of the law firm of Yen Pilch

Komodina & Fleming, P.C. (the “Yen law firm”) and Joshua Kaufman of the law firm of

Venable Baetjer Howard & Civilette, LLP (the “Venable law firm”).

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides that for causes of action asserted under the Lanham Act,

“[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable fees to the prevailing party.” The

Ninth Circuit has interpreted and applied “exceptional circumstances” to mean where “the

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case is either ‘groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.’” Cairns v.

Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (citations

omitted). In support of the Rima Defendants’ argument as to entitlement to attorneys’ fees

under § 1117(a), they rely primarily on the fact that this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Lanham

Act claim upon the Rima Defendants’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) motion at trial before the claim

ever reached the jury. The Rima Defendants’ argue that this fact, created by the complete

lack of evidence introduced at trial by Plaintiff, evidences that Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim

was groundless and unreasonable. The Rima Defendants cite the Court to Designing Health,

Inc. v. Erasmus, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26512, at *58-65 (C.D. Cal. 2003), where the district

court awarded reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing Lanham Act defendant under §

1117(a) based, in part, upon the district’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim upon

Rule 50(a) motion due to lack of evidentiary support. The district court stated that such fees

were appropriate due to the fact that “[p]laintiffs unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied

the proceedings by continuing to maintain these baseless grounds for their Lanham Act

claim.” Id., at * 65. 

In response to the Rima Defendants’ argument regarding entitlement, Plaintiff argues

that this case does not fall within the umbrella of an “exceptional case” under 15 U.S.C. §

1117(a). Plaintiff asserts that the Rima Defendants make no meaningful attempt to

demonstrate that this case is an “exceptional case,” as evidenced by the lack of cited

authority. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the absence of any basis for such fees is

evidenced by the fact that the Rima Defendants never moved prior to trial for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim, thus impliedly evidencing that the claim had a

basis in the record. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the Rima Defendants have made a

false statement to the Court regarding certain evidence introduced at trial, thus warranting

a denial of the Rima Defendants’ instant Motion. 

In considering the arguments advanced, the Court finds that the Rima Defendants have

demonstrated that this is an “exceptional case” under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), warranting an

award of attorneys’ fees to the Rima Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s Lanham Act

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claim. As determined by the Court at trial, Plaintiff introduced virtually no evidence to

support this claim, but rather focused on the damages issue associated with its accompanying

copyright infringement claims. (October 27, 2006 Transcript, Dkt.#540, pp.20-22, ll.12-1).

Also, the fact that the Rima Defendants’ did not move for summary judgment on this claim

sooner does not somehow excuse the groundless and unreasonable nature of Plaintiff’s claim.

The focus of Plaintiff’s case at trial was its copyright infringement claim, which it was

successful on with respect to liability at the summary judgment stage. However, this focus

on the copyright infringement claim undoubtedly caused the Rima Defendants unnecessary

time and resources in preparation of a defense of Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims. Under these

circumstances, the Court finds that an attorney fee award is justified, as the Rima Defendants

are the prevailing party in an “exceptional [Lanham Act] case[].” See Cairns v. Franklin

Mint Co., 115 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (C.D.Cal. 2000) (awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing

Lanham Act defendant where “[a]t no time . . . did plaintiffs present evidence to cast doubt

on the veracity of the advertising statements . . . . [and] [t]he claim . . . should have either not

[been] brought . . . in the first instance, or voluntarily dismissed . . . when it was clear that

there was no evidence to support it.”). 

Lastly, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the Court does not find that the Rima

Defendants’ statement in its Memorandum in support of its attorneys’ fees request - that the

Rima Defendants received an assurance from the copyright office that they were not violating

copyright law - to be an unfounded misstatement. As stated by the Rima Defendants, Tracy

Penwell expressly testified at trial that she spoke to the copyright office before purchasing

certain copies of works at issue in this litigation. (Rima Defendants’ Reply, p.3, Exhibit 1).

In finding that the Rima Defendants’ are entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing

party in this “exceptional case” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), the Court must determine

an appropriate attorneys’ fees award. The Rima Defendants’ Memorandum and

accompanying documents demonstrate that the Rima Defendants seek a one-third allocation

of the total amount of attorneys’ fees expended in this matter, representing the time

attributable to the defense of Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim. As an initial matter, the Court

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5

 In determining an appropriate rate, the Court must consider the prevailing rate in the

community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and

reputation. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210.

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employs the lodestar method in determining an appropriate award, which is based on the

reasonable number of hours expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See, e.g., Intel

Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993) (“When [the court] sets a fee, [it]

. . . must first determine the presumptive lodestar figure by multiplying the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate.”). In calculating the

lodestar, the Court also considers some of the factors listed in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild,

Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976). These factors include:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3)

the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) time

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (7) the amount involved and the

results obtained; (8) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (9) the nature and

length of the professional relationship with the client; and (10) awards in similar cases. Id.

at 70. “The Court need not consider all . . . factors, but only those called into question by the

case at hand and necessary to support the reasonableness of the fee award.” Kessler v.

Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Hawaii, Inc., 639 F.2d 498, 500 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981). To the extent

that any of these factors are not considered in the calculation of the lodestar, they may be

considered in determining whether a fee award should be adjusted upward or downward,

once the lodestar has been calculated. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1212

(9th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied, amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In looking at the hourly rates submitted by Mr. Fleming and Mr. Kaufman, the Court

finds both rates to be reasonable.5

 Mr. Fleming submits an hourly rate of $200 per hour,

which is reasonable based on Mr. Fleming’s experience, the prevailing market rate, and the

novelty of certain issues presented. Morever, Mr. Kaufman submits an hourly rate of $300

per hour, which is also reasonable in taking into account his thirty plus years of practice in

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the area of intellectual property law, the prevailing market rate, and the novelty of certain

issues presented. Notably, Mr. Kaufman’s affidavit omits any specific discussion of the

other attorneys’ or paralegals rates at the Venable law firm that performed work on this case.

However, a review of the itemized statement of fees and costs submitted evidences that

certain other attorneys and paralegals at the Venable law firm worked on this case. Because

of the absence of any discussion as to the reasonableness of these other attorneys’ fees, the

Court will adjust their rates down to a uniform rate of $125. 

In addition, the Court finds that the number of hours reasonably expended in

defending Plaintiff’s Lanham Act is reasonably presented by the Rima Defendants. In

making this determination, the Court takes into account Plaintiff’s objections. For instance,

Plaintiff contends that the bills submitted by the Rima Defendants fail to meet the

requirements for any type of award in this case because “[the fees] lack any connection to

Lanham Act defense work.” (Plaintiff’s Opposition, p.10). Specifically, Plaintiff contends

that the Rima Defendants’ Memorandum and associated affidavits “fail[] to identify the hours

spent defending the Lanham Act claim.” (Id.). However, the Court finds no flaw in the onethird allocation estimated by the Rima Defendants in defending Plaintiff’s Lanham Act

claim. Because of the assertion of Plaintiff’s copyright infringement and conversion claims

there was undoubtedly some overlap making an exact estimation difficult. Moreover, the

itemized statements submitted evidence that significant work was performed on defending

Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim. 

 Accordingly, in employing the lodestar method, the Rima Defendants on behalf of Mr.

Fleming of the Yen law firm are entitled to fees of $111,422 (557.11 hours * $200 per hour).

In addition, on behalf of Mr. Kaufman and the Venable law firm, the Rima Defendants are

entitled to fees of $55,600 (185.33 hours (556 hours * 1/3) * $300 per hour [Mr. Kaufman])

and $18,600 (148.8 hours (446.4 * 1/3) * $125 per hour [other attorneys and paralegals]) in

attorneys’ fees. 

The Court also will address Plaintiff’s remaining objections to the Rima Defendants’

request. For instance, with respect to the attorneys’ fees sought by the Venable law firm,

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Plaintiff argues that Mr. Kaufman failed to explain the “billing judgment” associated with

the fee request, as well as failed to provide an adequate description of the services rendered

with respect to the Lanham Act claim pursuant to LRCiv. 54.2(e)(2). In reviewing Plaintiff’s

objection, the Court finds that the argument is valid. While LRCiv. 54.2(e)(2) is sensitive

to disclosures touching on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, the Rule

requires the moving party to “furnish an adequate nonprivileged description of the services

in question.” For example, a number of the entries are conclusory and prevent a sufficient

review by this Court. For instance, multiple entries indicate only “work on” or “look at”

Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim. (Mr. Kaufman Affidavit, Exhibit 2, pp. 58, 63). A review of

the invoices as a whole indicates that there are multiple such conclusory statements. (Id.

Exhibit 2). Under such circumstances, the Court finds that a reduction in the requested fees

is appropriate. See LRCiv. 54.2(e)(2) (“If the time descriptions are incomplete, or is such

descriptions fail to adequately describe the service rendered, the court may reduce the award

accordingly.”). Thus, the Court will adjust downward the requested fee by 10%. Thus, the

lodestar fee on behalf of Venable law firm of $74,200 will be reduced to $66,780.

Plaintiff also argues that the submission by Mr. Fleming and the Yen law firm is

deficient in several respects. For instance, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Fleming seeks fees for

work on an unrelated lawsuit involving Victor Ostrovsky, and that Mr. Fleming failed to

adequately explain the time devoted to aspects of Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim. However,

Plaintiff’s argument as to the reference to Victor Ostrovsky is not compelling. Notably, the

full reference states “review email clients re suing Victor in state court.” (Mr. Fleming

Affidavit, Exhibit 2, p. 15). Importantly, Mr. Ostrovsky was listed as a witness in the instant

case. In addition, as addressed above, Plaintiff’s argument as to an over-allocation of the

fees to the Lanham Act claim is unpersuasive. Given that the Lanham Act claim was one of

the major claims asserted by Plaintiff, the Court finds that the one-third percentage allocation

is reasonable.

V. Defendant Renoir and Hernandez’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

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Defendants Hernandez and Renoir seek to recover their attorneys’ fees incurred in this

matter on multiple bases. Defendant Hernandez, the mother of Defendant Renoir, seeks to

recover attorneys’ fees as the “prevailing party” in Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims

against her pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. In addition, she seeks such fees as the successful

defending party in response to Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim against her pursuant to 15

U.S.C. § 1117(a). Defendant Renoir seeks attorneys’ fees as both the prevailing defendant

in Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim and the prevailing plaintiff in his false advertising Lanham

Act counterclaim against Plaintiff. Defendants Hernandez and Renoir also request, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, that any excess fees not charged to Plaintiff be charged to Plaintiff’s

counsel, Richard Morris and the Morris Law Firm, in the form of sanctions. In opposition,

Plaintiff firmly opposes any award of attorneys fees under the authority cited by Defendants

Hernandez and Renoir, and claims that it is Defendants’ counsel that has engaged in

sanctionable conduct in this litigation. The Court will first address the issues of eligibility

and entitlement.

A. Defendants Hernandez and Renoir as Lanham Act Defendants

For similar reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim supports such a

fee award because of the “exceptional” circumstances created by Plaintiff’s groundless and

unreasonable Lanham Act claim against Defendants Hernandez and Renoir. 15 U.S.C. §

1117(a). For instance, with respect to Defendant Hernandez, Plaintiff expressly

acknowledged at trial, upon Defendant Hernandez’s motion for directed verdict, that there

was no evidence introduced against her. (Transcript 10/27/06, Dkt.#540, p12, ll.18-19).

Such a concession at the trial itself begs the question as to why Defendant Hernandez was

named and included in such a claim in the first place. Second, as to Defendant Renoir,

Plaintiff made the same minimal effort to assert any relevant evidence against Defendant

Renoir suggesting that he violated the Lanham Act. Rather, in keeping with its theme of

focusing on the copyright damages, Plaintiff afforded no time or effort to suggest that

Defendant Renoir could be held accountable under Plaintiff’s Lanham Act theory. While

Judge Carroll denied Defendants Hernandez and Renoir’s motion for judgment on the

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pleadings on this claim on November 10, 2005, the Court does not find that the previous

finding on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) review excuses Plaintiff’s failure to introduce any evidence

to support such a claim at trial, which undoubtedly caused a waste of time and resources by

these Defendants in preparation for trial. In such situations, where the claim is groundless

or unreasonable, an award of fees is appropriate because it qualifies as an “exceptional case.”

Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1156. Moreover, Plaintiff’s arguments that the Lanham Act claim was

necessary “as an option” or “just in case the need arose,”and to avoid legal malpractice, are

not persuasive to justify the assertion of the Lanham Act claim. (Plaintiff’s Response,

Dkt.#585). Plaintiff’s decision to assert such a claim as an option to the copyright

infringement claims does not excuse the subsequent abandonment of the Lanham Act claim

at trial after significant expense by the opposing parties. Entertainment Research Group, Inc.

v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211,1229 (9th Cir. 1997) (awarding attorneys fees

and rejecting non-moving party’s argument that to not pursue such a claim would have been

malpractice where there were was no evidence to support the claim despite three years of

litigation). Thus, under such circumstances, the Court finds that Defendants Hernandez and

Renoir are entitled to a portion of their attorneys’ fees as prevailing defendants in this

“exceptional” Lanham Act case.

B. Defendant Hernandez as Copyright Infringement Plaintiff 

Similarly, the Court finds that Defendant Hernandez is entitled to fees incurred in

defending against Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim against her pursuant to 17 U.S.C.

§ 505. As acknowledged by Plaintiff in its papers, “Plaintiff opted not to press for a trial

verdict” against Defendant Hernandez. (Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt.#585, p.4). However,

Plaintiff’s apparent decision to alleviate Defendant Hernandez from copyright liability does

not somehow excuse the time and resources needed to prepare for such claims at trial by

Defendant Hernandez. Clearly, Plaintiff had the opportunity to release Defendant Hernandez

long before any trial and well before the Court directed a verdict in her favor. Moreover,

relevant factors identified by the Supreme Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., and its progeny,

support an attorneys’ fee award in Defendant Hernandez’s favor in defending against

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Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims. 510 U.S. 517, 535 n. 19 (1994) (recognizing

factors of: (1) frivolousness; (2) motivation; (3) objective unreasonableness of losing party’s

factual and legal basis; and (4) the need, in particular circumstances, to advance

considerations of compensation and deterrence). 

The degree of success obtained by Defendant Hernandez was significant as she was

dismissed from this case based on the Court’s Rule 50(a) order, and in part, on Plaintiff’s

apparent decision to “opt[] not to press a trial verdict . . .” against her. (Plaintiff’s Response,

p.4). Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 1996) (identifying “degree of

success obtained” as a relevant factor to be used when exercising “equitable discretion”). 

 In addition, the “frivolousness” of Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims against

Defendant Hernandez is also evidenced by Plaintiff’s failure to include Defendant Hernandez

as part of its case at trial, thus resulting in the Court’s directed verdict. The “motivation”

behind Plaintiff’s suit against Defendant Hernandez also supports an award of fees in her

favor. As evidenced by Plaintiff’s decision not to pursue any infringement claims against

Defendant Hernandez at trial, it appears that she, as the mother of Defendant Renoir, was

named as a Defendant for leverage purposes. That such intent carried all the way through

to a directed verdict at trial after more than three years of litigation is not justified. See

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 896 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming

district court’s attorney fee award under 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and stating “the district court

certainly had a basis to infer that the litigation was undertaken and prosecuted in a fashion

that would multiply the fees and encourage nuisance settlement.”). The objective

unreasonableness of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Hernandez also justifies an award

of fees. Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim, while surviving challenge by Defendant

Hernandez on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) review, appears to have been abandoned at trial. While the

claim may have been reasonable at one point in time, Plaintiff completely failed to pursue

the claim at trial. Under such circumstances, a finding of objective unreasonableness is

warranted. See Entertainment Research, 122 F.3d at 1229 (“[B]ecause the evidence in the

record reveals that [the plaintiff] never had any evidence to support its . . . claims, the district

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court properly found that it was objectively unreasonable for [the plaintiff] to have

maintained these claims.”). Lastly, considerations of compensation and deterrence also

support an award of attorneys’ fees. Defendant Hernandez was forced to expend a

significant amount of resources to defend against claims that were either unsupported or

simply abandoned. It would be unfair for Defendant Hernandez to bear the brunt of such

fees. In addition, an award of fees deters the inclusion of defendants for leverage purposes

only. See Baker v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 431 F.Supp.2d 351, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[A]n

award of costs and fees is crucial . . . so as to deter this plaintiff, and other similarly situated

plaintiffs, from bringing unreasonable claims based on cost/benefit analysis that tells such

plaintiffs that they can score big if they win and that there will be no adverse consequences

if they lose.”). 

Thus, in view of this Court’s discretion under 17 U.S.C. § 505, and in reviewing the

Fogerty factors, the Court finds that Defendant Hernandez is entitled to her attorneys’ fees

in defending against Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim..

C. Defendant Renoir as Lanham Act Plaintiff 

The Court also finds that Defendant Renoir is entitled to recover his attorneys’ fees

attributable to the prosecution of his counterclaim of false advertising under the Lanham Act

against Plaintiff. The Court finds that the facts of this case support the finding that this is an

“exceptional case” for purposes of 15 U.S.C. 1117(a). For infringement purposes, an

“exceptional case” arises when the “infringement is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or

willful.” Lindy Pen, 982 F.2d at 1409. The Court finds that evidence of fraudulent,

deliberate, and willful infringement is present in this case, and thus supports such an award.

Notably, the jury, on special interrogatory, determined that Plaintiff “willfully acted in a

manner to deceive the public by engaging in false advertising in violation of the Lanham

Act.” (Dkt.#514). While the Court, as stated above, finds that Defendant Renoir failed to

introduce sufficient evidence that he was personally injured as a competitor with Plaintiff,

Defendant Renoir is still entitled to the injunctive and lost profits relief imposed. In addition,

the lack of actual injury to Defendant Renoir does not make Plaintiff’s conduct, which

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includes falsely misrepresenting the authenticity of certain Renoir-Guino works and falsely

altering certain works, to be any less deliberate or willful. Under such circumstances,

Defendant Renoir, the prevailing party on the false advertising counterclaim, qualifies to

recover certain fees attributable to the prosecution of his false advertising counterclaim. 

D. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

With respect to the reasonableness of the fees requested by Defendants Hernandez and

Renoir, the Court begins with a defect in a certain aspect of the fee application submitted by

Defendants Hernandez and Renoir. These Defendants seek a total of $28,247.53 for services

rendered at the outset of this litigation by Larry Washor of the law firm of Washor and

Associates. (Affidavit of Jean Emmanuel Renoir, Dkt.#556). However, in an apparent

attempt to comply with LRCiv. 54.2(d)(4), Defendant Renoir himself has submitted an

affidavit explaining the services rendered and the fees incurred by him and Defendant

Hernandez for Mr. Washor’s services. Notably, LRCiv. 54.2(d) and (d)(4) provide in

pertinent part:

[T]he following documentation shall be attached to each memorandum of

points and authorities filed in support of a motion for attorneys’ fees and

related non-taxable expenses: 

(4) The supporting memorandum must be accompanied by an affidavit of

moving counsel which, at a minimum, sets forth the following:

. . .

(B) A brief discussion of the terms of the written or oral fee

agreement, if any . . . . As appropriate, this section also should

discuss the method by which the customary charges were

established, the comparable prevailing community rate or other

indicia of value of the services rendered for each attorney for

whom fees are claimed.

(C) In this section the affiant must state that the affiant has reviewed

and has approved the time and charges set forth in the taskbased itemized statement and that the time spent and expenses

incurred were reasonable and necessary under the

circumstances. This section also must demonstrate that the

affiant exercised “billing judgment.” 

This affidavit is not submitted by Mr. Washor, who billed the legal services on behalf

of these Defendants, but rather is submitted by Defendant Renoir himself, which runs afoul

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 The Court also finds that the average rate of $75 per hour for time expended by legal

assistants is a reasonable fee. Notably, the Steiner law firm provides no discussion of any

analogous fees incurred. Thus, the Court will not address such fees. 

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of LRCiv. 54.2(d), which calls for such an affidavit from “moving counsel.” In addition, it

is Defendant Renoir who gives his own estimate as to the amount of time allocated for Mr.

Washor’s defense of Plaintiff’s claims against he and Defendant Hernandez. Defendant

Renoir also gives no explanation, which he would not likely be qualified to render, as to the

prevailing market rate of the services rendered by Mr. Washor. Finally, Defendant Renoir

gives no explanation or foundation as to how he would be qualified to exercise the required

“billing judgment” to decipher the fees. Because such elements are requirements under

LRCiv. 54.2, the Court will deny Defendants Hernandez and Renoir’s request for attorneys’

fees incurred by Mr. Washor and the law firm of Washor and Associates. 

Next, the Court, as discussed above, must use the lodestar method to first determine

the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees requested for the representation of Ray Harris and

the law firm of Fennemore Craig (“Fennemore Craig”), and David Paul Steiner and the law

firm of David Steiner & Associates (the “Steiner law firm”). See Intel Corp 6 F.3d at 622

(9th Cir. 1993). 

First, the Court must determine a reasonable hourly rate. Based on Mr. Harris’

significant experience in intellectual property cases, the prevailing market rate and the

novelty of certain issues presented, the Court finds that his average fee of $300 is reasonable.

In addition, in reviewing the two associates who assisted Mr. Harris, the Court finds that an

average rate of $205 is appropriate based on the same considerations.6

 Further, based on Mr.

Steiner’s experience in such cases, the prevailing market rate, and the novelty of certain

issues presented, it appears that an hourly rate of $350 is a reasonable fee. While

Defendants seek a fee of $425 per hour for Mr. Steiner’s services, the Court is not persuaded

in considering the relevant factors, that such a fee is reasonable for purposes of this litigation.

See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that courts apply the

market rate of attorneys practicing in the forum community, not the rates of out-of-state

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 $94,360 (269.60 hrs * $350) + $36,666 (162.96 hrs.* $225).

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counsel). Similarly, the Court finds that a reasonable fee for the hours expended by

associates of the Steiner law firm is $225 per hour. 

Second, the Court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended relevant

to the lodestar method. In reviewing Defendants’ submission, the Court finds that the hours

apportioned by the Steiner law firm and Fennemore Craig are reasonable. Mr. Steiner and

Mr. Harris estimate in their affidavits that 75% of the total fees expended by the respective

firms were used in defending Defendant Hernandez and Renoir against Plaintiff’s claims.

Of this 75%, they estimate that approximately 37% of the time was used to prepare a defense

for Defendant Hernandez in response to Plaintiff’s claims. Mr. Steiner and Mr. Harris also

estimate that 13% of the defense fees were used to prepare a defense for Defendant Renoir

in response to Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim. Lastly, Mr. Steiner and Mr. Harris estimate that

25% of the total time was used to prepare and prosecute Defendant Renoir’s successful

counterclaim against Plaintiff. In light of the history of this litigation and the claims and

issues presented, the Court finds that these estimates are reasonable evaluations of the total

time expended in defending and prosecuting the aforementioned claims. 

Accordingly, with respect to the number of reasonable hours expended by Mr. Steiner

and the Steiner law firm, the Court finds the following hours to be appropriate multipliers for

the relevant time invested:

 Hernandez Renoir- Lanham Def. Renoir - Lanham Pla.

Mr. Steiner 269.60 hrs 

(728.66 hrs. x 37%) 

 94.73 hrs. 

(728.66 hrs. x 13%) 

 242.89 hrs

(971.55 hrs. x 25%)

Associates of Steiner

Law Firm 

 162.96 hrs

(440.43 hrs. x. 37%)

 57.26 hrs

(440.43 hrs. x 13%)

146.81 hrs 

(587.25 hrs. x 25%)

Thus, based on the lodestar method, Defendant Hernandez is entitled to attorneys’ fees

of $131,0267

 based on Mr. Steiner and the Steiner law firm’s representation and defense of

Plaintiff’s copyright infringement and Lanham Act claims. Additionally, Defendant Renoir

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$33,155.50 (94.73 hrs * $350) + 12,883.50 (57.26 hrs. * $225) + $85,011.50 (242.89

hrs. * $350) + $33,032.25 (146.81 hrs. * $225). 

9

 $33,876 (112.92 hrs. * $300) + $1,980.30 (9.66 hrs. * $205) + $726 (9.68 hrs. *

$75). 

10 $11,901 (39.67 hrs. * $300) + $694.95 (3.39 hrs. * $205) + $255 (3.40 hrs. * $75)

+ $30,519 (101.73 hrs. * $300) + $1,783.50 (8.70 hrs. * $205) + $654.75 (8.73 hrs. * 75). 

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is entitled to attorneys’ fees of $164,082.758 based on Mr. Steiner and the Steiner law firm’s

representation in Defendant Renoir’s defense and prosecution of the Lanham Act claims. 

Further, based on the same allocation provided by Mr. Harris’ affidavit and

attachments, the Court finds the following to be an accurate representation of the number of

reasonable hours expended on behalf of Defendants Hernandez and Renoir by Fennemore

Craig:

 Hernandez Renoir- Lanham Def. Renoir - Lanham Pla.

Mr. Harris 112.92 hrs

(305.18 hrs x 37%)

39.67 hrs

(305.18 hrs. x 13%)

101.73 hrs

(406.90 hrs. x 25%)

Associates 9.66 hrs

(26.10 hrs. x. 37%)

3.39 hrs

(26.10 hrs. x 13%)

8.70 hrs

(34.80 hrs. x 25%)

Legal Assistants 9.68 hrs

(26.18 hrs. x 37%)

3.40 hrs

(26.18 hrs. x 13%)

8.73 hrs

(34.9 hrs. x 25%)

Thus, based on the lodestar method, Defendant Hernandez is entitled to attorneys’ fees

of $36,582.309

 for the defense afforded by Mr. Harris and Fennemore Craig. In addition,

Defendant Renoir is entitled to attorneys’ fees of $45,808.2010 for the defense of Plaintiff’s

Lanham Act claim and the prosecution of Defendant Renoir’s Lanham Act counterclaim. 

Lastly, the Court finds no reason to increase or decrease these lodestar amounts. 

E. Sanctions: 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Finally, the Court will deny Defendants Hernandez and Renoir’s request for the

imposition of monetary sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Morris, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1927, which provides that “[a]ny attorney . . . admitted to conduct cases in any court

of the United States . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and

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vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and

attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” “Sanctions pursuant to section

1927 must be supported by a finding of subjective bad faith.” New Alaska Development

Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989). Based on the record before this

Court, there is an insufficient basis to support such an award against Plaintiff’s counsel.

Clearly, this litigation has been contentious, as evidenced by the numerous motions for

sanctions in the record and the Parties inability to communicate or effectively meet and

confer; however, while such conduct frustrates these proceedings, the Court is unable to

make a finding of “subjective bad faith” to support Defendants Hernandez and Renoir’s

request for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 

VI. Summary 

The Court grants in part Plaintiff’s Motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), with respect to the compensatory damages award of Defendant

Renoir’s Lanham Act counterclaim against Plaintiff. Because Defendant Renoir failed to

introduce any evidentiary basis to support his injury at trial, this award will be set aside.

However, the Court’s finding does not impact the injunctive or lost profits relief afforded

under the Lanham Act. The Court also finds that monetary sanctions are necessary and

justified against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel based on the events surrounding the

previously stipulated and scheduled depositions of Gilles and Michel Guino. Upon reurging,

the Court is persuaded that any issue surrounding such depositions should have been raised

by Plaintiff long before Defendants’ counsel arrived in Paris, France for the depositions. The

Court will also deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C.

§ 505 of the Copyright Act pending the outcome of Defendants’ appeal to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Should Plaintiff prevail on appeal, it is granted leave to reuge such a

motion in compliance with LRCiv. 54.2. Based on the Rima Defendants’ successful defense

of Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim, the Court finds that attorneys’ fees are warranted with

respect to the defense of such claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Similarly, the Court finds

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that both Defendants Hernandez and Renoir are entitled to recover certain portions of their

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505 and 15 U.S.C. §1117(a).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), or in the Alternative for a New Trial under Rule 59. (Dkt.#550). The

Motion is granted to the extent Defendant Renoir’s monetary judgment pursuant to his

Lanham Act claim of $90,000 in actual damages is vacated. However, the lost profits award

and the Court’s previously imposed injunctive relief stands.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s Application for

Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505. (Dkt.#551). Plaintiff is granted

leave to reurge the motion, if appropriate, on conclusion of the Ninth Circuit proceedings.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the Rima Defendants’ Renewed Motion for

Sanctions. (Dkt.#555). Plaintiff’s counsel will bear 55% of the Rima Defendants’ costs

associated with the May 18 and 19, 2005 depositions in Paris, France, and Plaintiff will bear

30% of the costs. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant Hernandez and Renoir’s Renewed

Motion for Sanctions against Plaintiff. (Dkt.#580). Plaintiff’s counsel will bear 55% of the

these Defendants’ costs associated with the May 18 and 19, 2005 depositions in Paris,

France, and Plaintiff will bear 30% of the costs. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the Rima Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’

Fees Pursuant to the Lanham Act. (Dkt.#557). The Rima Defendants are entitled to an award

of $66,780 for the fees expended by the law firm of Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti,

LLP; and $111,422 for the fees of the law firm of Yen, Pilch, Komadina & Flemming, P.C.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part Defendants Hernandez and Renoir’s

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Dkt.#563). Defendant Hernandez is awarded fees of $131,026

based on the representation and defense of Mr. Steiner and the Steiner law firm. Defendant

Hernandez is also awarded fees of $36,582.30 for the defense afforded by Mr. Harris and

Fennemore Craig. Defendant Renoir is awarded fees of $164,082.75 based on Mr. Steiner

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and the Steiner law firm’s representation in Defendant Renoir’s defense and prosecution of

certain claims. Defendant Renoir is also awarded fees of $45,808.20 based on Mr. Harris and

Fennemore Craig’s representation. Defendants Hernandez and Renoir are also awarded

$6,176 in non-taxable costs incurred by Fennemore Craig.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to amend the

Amended Judgment consistent with this Order. 

DATED this 30th day of October, 2007.

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