Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03802/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03802-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WRI WEST GATE SOUTH, L.P.,

Plaintiff,

v.

RELIANCE MEDIAWORKS (USA) INC., 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03802-JD (JSC)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE: RELIANCE MEDIAWORKS LTD.’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 

FOR INSUFFICIENT PROCESS AND 

FOR LACK OF PERSONAL

JURISDICTION

Re: Dkt. No. 68

This action involves the alleged breach of a commercial lease and guaranty between 

Plaintiff WRI West Gate South, L.P. (“WRI”) and Defendants Reliance Mediaworks, Ltd. 

(“Reliance”) and its wholly owned subsidiary Reliance Mediaworks (USA) Inc., d/b/a Big 

Cinemas (“Big Cinemas”). Now pending before the Court is Reliance‟s Motion to Dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient process and under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The motion was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. 

(Dkt. No. 80.) Oral argument on the motion was scheduled for October 8, 2015; however, 

Reliance failed to appear. After carefully considering the parties‟ pleadings, the Court 

recommends that Reliance‟s Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

WRI is a Texas limited partnership with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. 

(Dkt. No. 81 ¶ 3.) Big Cinemas is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in 

Iselin, New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 6.) Reliance, the parent company for Big Cinemas, is an Indian public 

limited company with its principal place of business in Mumbai, India. (Id. ¶ 7.) 

WRI entered into a commercial lease agreement with Big Cinemas on December 15, 2009, 

for real property in Fremont, California. (Dkt. No. 81 ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 81-1 at 2-18.) Under this 

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 1 of 12
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

lease, WRI as landlord would lease the property to Big Cinemas for a five-year term from January 

29, 2010, to January 31, 2015. (Dkt. No. 81 ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 81-1 at 2 ¶ 5.) For further security and 

consideration, Reliance executed a Guaranty with WRI for Big Cinemas‟s lease on December 10, 

2009. (Dkt. No. 81 ¶ 16; Dkt. No. 81-1 at 24-26.) In the Guaranty, Reliance “absolutely and 

unconditionally guarantee[d] the full performance and observance of all the covenants, duties and 

obligations (including, without limitation, the obligation to pay all rent and other sums) therein 

provided to be performed and observed by Tenant” and made itself “fully liable for such 

performance.” (Dkt. No. 81-1 at 24 ¶ 1.) The Guaranty specifies that “all matters relating to th[e] 

Guaranty and the covenants, duties and obligations of Guarantor under th[e] Guaranty shall be 

governed by the laws of the State of California.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Additionally, the Guaranty requires 

Reliance to “acknowledge[] and agree[] that th[e] Guaranty may reasonably be expected to 

benefit, directly or indirectly,” Reliance. (Id. ¶ 10.) Reliance also “waived and released . . . 

without limitation,” certain defenses under California law. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

Big Cinemas grew tardy in its rent and other payments under the Lease before ceasing all 

payments entirely in February 2014. (Dkt. No. 81 ¶ 20.) WRI subsequently undertook procedures 

to evict Big Cinemas and repossess the property, which it did on July 9, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 21-25.) 

WRI then filed a complaint on August 21, 2014, and a First Amended Complaint1(“FAC”) on 

September 17, 2015, in the Northern District of California, for breach of contract against Big 

Cinemas and breach of guaranty against Reliance. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 81.) WRI served Big 

Cinemas in September 2014, but was unable to serve Reliance in India until April 2015 as it was 

required to do so in accordance with the Hague Convention. (See Dkt. Nos. 8, 45.) Reliance then 

filed its motion to dismiss on July 30, 2015, but has not otherwise appeared or filed a responsive 

pleading in this matter. (Dkt. No. 68 at 2.) 

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process

The Court lacks jurisdiction over defendants who have not been properly served in 

 

1 Although the First Amended Complaint was filed after the completion of briefing, per the district 

court, the motion is to be treated as applying to the First Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 80.) 

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 2 of 12
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(5) permits a court to dismiss an action for insufficient service 

of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). Rule 12(b)(5) allows the defendant to attack the manner in 

which service was, or was not, attempted. Id. When the validity of service is contested, the 

burden is on the plaintiff to prove that service was valid under Rule 4. Brockmeyer v. May, 383 

F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff does not satisfy this burden, the Court has the 

discretion to either dismiss the action or retain the action and quash the service of process. Stevens 

v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 538 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1976). 

“Dismissals for defects in the form of summons are generally disfavored.” U.S.A. 

Nutrasource, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2001). “Technical 

defects in a summons do not justify dismissal unless a party is able to demonstrate actual 

prejudice.” Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, 39 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). “Rule 4 is a flexible 

rule that should be liberally construed.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha 

Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted). 

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the 

burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. See Schwarzenegger v. 

Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). “Where, as here, a motion to dismiss 

is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a 

prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Love v. Assoc. Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 608 

(9th Cir. 2010). The Court then “only inquire[s] into whether [the plaintiff‟s] pleadings and 

affidavits make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical 

Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995). A prima facie showing means that “the plaintiff need 

only demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant.” Doe v. Unocal 

Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). “Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be 

taken as true, and conflicts over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiff‟s] 

favor.” Love, 611 F.3d at 608. 

When no applicable federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, California law applies. 

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 3 of 12
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. California‟s long-arm jurisdictional statute and federal due 

process requirements are coextensive; accordingly, “the jurisdictional analyses under state law and 

federal due process are the same.” Id. at 800-01. The Due Process Clause requires that 

nonresident defendants have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l 

Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)

(internal quotation marks omitted). A court may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction 

over a nonresident defendant. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 

DISCUSSION

Reliance moves to dismiss the FAC on two grounds: (1) WRI improperly served Reliance 

under Northern California Civil Local Rule 4-2 by failing to include certain Supplementary 

Materials when it served the complaint, and (2) even if Reliance was properly served, the Court 

lacks personal jurisdiction over Reliance because it did not have systematic, continuous contacts 

with California, as required by the California Long-Arm Statute. As discussed below, Reliance‟s 

arguments regarding service are specious at best. With respect to jurisdiction, the Court concludes

that it may exercise specific jurisdiction over Reliance because by signing the Guaranty, Reliance 

interjected itself in its subsidiary‟s transaction with a California company, in a Guaranty subject to 

California law, in order to benefit itself and its subsidiary. Having found specific jurisdiction, the 

Court declines to reach the question of general jurisdiction.

A. Service

Reliance argues that because WRI did not properly serve it with certain supplemental 

materials required under Civil Local Rule (“Civ. L.R.”) 4-2, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. 

Pursuant to Rule 4(f)(1), an individual “may be served at a place not within any judicial district of 

the United States: (1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated 

to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of 

Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). Civ. L.R. 4-2 further requires that 

“[a]long with the complaint and the summons or request for waiver of service, a party subject to 

Civ. L.R. 16-2(a), (b), or (c) must serve the following Supplementary Material”:

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 4 of 12
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(a) A copy of the Order Setting Initial Case Management 

Conference with ADR deadlines issued pursuant to Civil L.R. 16-

2(a), (b) or (c);

(b) Any pertinent Standing Orders of the assigned Judge; 

(c) A copy of the assigned judge‟s order and instructions for the 

preparation of a Case Management Statement or, if none, the 

Court‟s form found at cand.uscourts.gov, pursuant to Civil L.R. 16-

10; and 

(d) Except in cases assigned at the time of filing to a Magistrate 

Judge, a copy of the form allowing a party to consent to assignment 

of the case to a Magistrate Judge.

Civ. L.R. 4-2. 

Reliance does not dispute that service was proper under Rule 4(f)(1) and concedes that it 

received the Hague Convention Forms, the Summons, and the Complaint. Instead, Reliance 

contends it did not receive any of the following: the Order Setting Initial Case Management 

Conference and ADR deadlines, the standing orders of the assigned judge, a court form for a CMC 

statement and a copy allowing Reliance to consent to a Magistrate Judge, as required by Civ. L.R. 

4-2. (Dkt. No. 68 at 5.) On this basis, Reliance argues WRI‟s service is invalid. (Id.) 

Reliance‟s argument appears factually erroneous. WRI‟s Certificate of Service indicates 

that WRI sent a total of nine documents, including the summons, complaint, and the very 

“supplemental materials” Reliance argues it never received, through the Hague Convention for 

service in India. (See Dkt. No. 45 at 1; Dkt. No. 74 at 8.) The Certificate of Service also includes 

a letter dated January 31, 2015, indicating “the documents [were] duly served on the subject 

party.” (Dkt. No. 45 at 5.) Further, the bailiff‟s sworn statement shows that he delivered “one set 

of enclosed document[s]” along with the Summons. (Dkt. No. 45 at 8-9.) Reliance did not rebut 

or respond to these facts in its reply, nor did it provide evidence to the contrary. (See Dkt. No. 

75.) Thus, WRI satisfied Civ. L.R. 4-2‟s requirements and properly served Reliance. See, e.g.,

Abouelhassan v. Chase Bank, No. C 07-03951, 2007 WL 4351022 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2007)

(denying plaintiff‟s motions for sanctions when defendant‟s proof of service indicated defendant 

served each of the required documents on plaintiff). The cases cited by Reliance do not suggest 

otherwise. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1987)

(service insufficient where plaintiff served parties that, under the applicable federal statute, could 

not receive service); United States v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878, 880-81 (Fed. Cir. 

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 5 of 12
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1997) (service of process insufficient where government served U.S.-based attorney that was not 

authorized to receive service of process for defendant); Verde Media Corp. v. Levi, No. 14-cv00891 YGR, 2014 WL 3372081, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2014) (service insufficient where 

plaintiff attempted substitute service at erroneous business address and through individual unable 

to accept service). 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Reliance‟s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(5) be DENIED.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 

Defendant Reliance moves to dismiss WRI‟s FAC for lack of personal jurisdiction under 

Rule 12(b)(2), contending that Reliance has no presence in California and did not direct any 

activity toward California residents, and therefore has insufficient contact with the state to support 

the Court‟s exercise of specific jurisdiction. The Court disagrees.

“A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if his or her less 

substantial contacts with the forum give rise to the cause of action before the court. The question 

is whether the cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection with that activity.” Doe 

v. Unocal, 248 F.3d at 923 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has 

articulated a three-part test to determine whether a party has sufficient minimum contacts to be 

susceptible to specific personal jurisdiction: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or 

perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws; 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant‟s forum-related activities; and 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the first two prongs; if 

it does so, the defendant must demonstrate that the court‟s exercise of personal jurisdiction would 

be unreasonable. Id. “If any of the three requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum 

would deprive the defendant of due process of law.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 

1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 6 of 12
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

a. Purposeful Availment

Under the first prong of the Ninth Circuit‟s test, the court engages in either a “purposeful 

direction” or a “purposeful availment” analysis. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. 

Purposeful availment is generally employed in contract cases. Id. Under that analysis:

[A] showing that a defendant purposefully availed himself of the 

privilege of doing business in a forum state typically consists of 

evidence of the defendant‟s actions in the forum, such as executing 

or performing a contact there. By taking such actions, a defendant 

“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 

its laws.” In return for these “benefits and protections,” a defendant 

must—as a quid pro quo—“submit to the burdens of litigation in 

that forum.”

Id. at 802. “A showing that a defendant purposefully directed his conduct toward a forum state, 

by contrast, usually consists of evidence of the defendant‟s actions outside the forum state that are 

directed at the forum, such as the distribution in the forum state of goods originating elsewhere.” 

Id. at 803. As this action sounds in contract, the Court will apply the purposeful availment test.

Reliance argues that its “single cont[act] as a guarantor for its‟ [sic] subsidiary” is not 

sufficient contact to establish specific jurisdiction. Reliance is incorrect: the Ninth Circuit‟s 

decision in Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1978) establishes that such contact is 

sufficient.

2

 In Forsythe, the plaintiffs purchased a property in Oregon from D.H. Overmyer, Inc. 

(Oregon) (“D.H. Oregon”), an Oregon corporation and subsidiary of D.H. Overmyer, Inc. (Ohio) 

(“D.H. Ohio”), an Ohio corporation. 576 F.2d at 781. The plaintiffs agreed to lease the property 

back to D.H. Oregon after purchasing it, but plaintiffs first required a personal guarantee from the 

chairman of the board and sole stockholder of D.H. Ohio: D.H. Overmyer, a New York resident. 

Id. Overmyer executed the guaranty. The lease, but not the guaranty, contained a California 

forum selection and choice of law clause. Id. Eventually, D.H. Oregon failed to meet its 

 

2 While Forsythe is dispositive, it is not the only case to find a personal guarantee enough for 

specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. See, e.g., DuBois v. All Am. Transp., Inc., No. 

05-1765-JE, 2006 WL 2054640 (D. Or. July 24, 2006) (finding specific jurisdiction under more 

exacting Oregon law standards over business and owner with no offices, employees, agents or 

subsidiaries in Oregon, and that had never solicited business in Oregon, based on business owner‟s 

personal guarantee of business‟s contract with Oregon entity).

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 7 of 12
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

obligations under the lease and, along with D.H. Ohio and several other of its subsidiaries, filed 

for Chapter XI bankruptcy. Id. The plaintiffs sued Overmyer on the guarantee in California, and 

after Overmyer lost his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the case went trial. The 

court entered judgment against Overmyer, and he appealed the judgment to the Ninth Circuit to 

challenge the district court‟s jurisdiction. Id.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding of specific jurisdiction based on the following: (i) 

plaintiffs and D.H. Oregon negotiated the lease contract in California; (ii) the lease contained 

California forum selection and choice of law clauses; (iii) plaintiffs requested the guaranty as a 

condition to entering into the agreement; (iv) Overmyer, though not a party to the contract, had 

guaranteed its subsidiary‟s obligations under it; and (v) in signing the guaranty, Overmyer 

personally participated “to secure a benefit for his corporation and, indirectly, himself,” and 

“interjected himself into the transaction by assuming personal liability.” Forsythe, 576 F.2d at 

783. Overmyer had previously made similar guarantees to at least ten other California residents. 

Id. at 783 n.6.

The facts of this case do not differ materially from Forsythe. WRI and Big Cinemas

entered into a lease contract for California real estate. The lease contained a California choice of 

law provision. WRI requested a guaranty from Big Cinemas‟s parent company, Reliance, as a 

condition for WRI‟s assent to enter into the lease with Big Cinemas. (Dkt. No. 81 ¶ 16; Dkt. No. 

81-1 at 15 § 25.05.) Reliance signed the Guaranty. The differences from Forsythe only lend 

further support to a finding of purposeful availment: the Guaranty here contained its own 

California choice of law provision and through the Guaranty, Reliance expressly “acknowledge[d] 

and agree[d] that th[e] Guaranty may reasonably be expected to benefit [Reliance], directly or 

indirectly,” and waived several defenses, including some under California Law. (Dkt. No. 81-1 at 

24 ¶¶ 5, 10; Dkt. No. 74 at 7.) And unlike Overmyer, a New York resident with limited contact 

with California, Reliance has been shown to have its own business and relationships with 

California outside of the contract. (Dkt. No. 74-3 at 16 (describing clients in Burbank); Dkt. No. 

74-4 at 13, 20 (describing an array of U.S. companies in California with which Reliance does 

business).) 

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 8 of 12
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Reliance argues that Forsythe is inapplicable because here a corporate parent guaranteed 

the contract of a subsidiary while in Forsythe, an officer executed a personal guaranty. (See Dkt. 

No. 75 at 5-6.) Reliance cites no cases in support of this distinction, which is unsurprising as the 

argument makes no sense. See United Van Lines, LLC v. Plains Med. Ctr., No. CV10-8212-PCT, 

2011 WL 3684516, at *3-6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2011) (finding specific jurisdiction in Arizona over 

corporate employer incorporated in Missouri, but with local offices in Arizona, where that 

employer personally guaranteed payment for employee‟s move).

Reliance‟s citation to In re W. States Wholesale Nat’l Gas Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. 

Nev. 2009), and Pac. Atl. Trading Co., Inc. v. M/V Main Exp., 758 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1985), is 

similarly unavailing. In In re W. States, specific jurisdiction did not exist over a nonresident 

parent company that signed a guaranty for a subsidiary‟s contract because the claim at issue did 

not arise out of that contract. 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. Here, the claims arise from the very 

contract that Reliance guaranteed. 

Pacific Atlantic is similarly distinguishable. There, a West German common carrier 

transported a shipment of goods to Malaysia for a San Francisco company. 758 F.2d at 1326. 

When the recipients, two Malaysian companies, did not have the proper bills of lading to pay for 

the goods, the West German carrier refused to turn over the shipment. The Malaysian companies 

then co-signed a letter of guarantee to indemnify the carrier against any losses from the delivery 

and took the goods. Id. The San Francisco company later sued the carrier for conversion of the 

goods, and the carrier filed a third-party complaint against the Malaysian entities under the 

guarantee. Id. A district court entered default judgment against the Malaysian entities, finding 

“the execution of the indemnity agreement constituted a purposeful availment of the benefits and 

protections of California laws.” Id. at 1328. The Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the 

district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Malaysian entities. Distinguishing those facts 

from Forsythe, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the carrier‟s indemnity agreement with the 

Malaysian entities “was executed as a separate transaction in Malaysia, and played no part in the 

negotiation of the agreement” between the San Francisco company and Malaysian entities. The 

agreement could therefore not serve as the source for jurisdiction over the Malaysian entities. Id. 

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 9 of 12
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

at 1328-29. Here, in contrast, the Guaranty and the underlying contract are linked and arose from 

a single transaction: Reliance signed the Guaranty specifically to induce WRI to enter into a lease 

with Reliance‟s subsidiary, Big Cinemas, in California. 

The Court thus concludes that Reliance purposefully availed itself of the California forum. 

b. Claim Arising Out of Reliance’s Activities in the Forum

The second prong for specific jurisdiction is a “but-for” test that requires the “contacts 

constituting purposeful availment . . . be the ones that give rise to the current suit.” Bancroft, 223 

F.3d at 1088 (citing Ziegler v. Indian River Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995)). As discussed 

above, this requirement is satisfied. WRI‟s alleged harm arises from Big Cinemas‟s breach of the 

lease agreement that Reliance guaranteed. WRI sought Reliance‟s guarantee as a condition to 

WRI‟s willingness to lease the Fremont property to Big Cinemas. (Dkt. No. 81 ¶¶ 16, 18-19; Dkt. 

No. 81-1 at 24 ¶ 1.) 

c. Reasonableness 

The final prong for specific jurisdiction asks whether the exercise of jurisdiction is 

reasonable. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088. Where the first two prongs are satisfied, the burden shifts 

to the defendant to put on a “compelling case” demonstrating the unreasonableness of finding 

jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 

U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Because the Court concludes that WRI has satisfied the first two factors, 

the burden shifts to Reliance to demonstrate reasonableness. Courts consider several factors to 

determine reasonableness: (1) the extent of the defendant‟s purposeful interjection into the forum 

state, (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum, (3) the extent of the conflict with 

the sovereignty of the defendant's state, (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, 

(5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy, (6) the importance of the forum to the 

plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief, and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.

In its Motion, Reliance makes the bare assertion that “given the local context of WRI‟s 

claims,” the Court‟s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Reliance would be “both unreasonable 

and unfair.” (Dkt. No. 68 at 7.) This is not a “compelling case” for unreasonableness. See 

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 10 of 12
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Richmond Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Solutions, No. 11-CV-02460-LHK, 2011 WL 2607158, at 

*7 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (“[T]o satisfy their burden to present a „compelling case‟ against 

jurisdiction, Defendants must do more than simply claim, without elaboration, that litigation in a 

distant country presents an unreasonable burden.”). Reliance has failed to present any specific 

allegations as to the unreasonableness of litigation proceeding in this district. Further, Reliance 

has not alleged that India or another state would have a greater interest in the litigation or present a 

more efficient forum for the resolution of this dispute. See id. (Defendants had “not alleged that 

litigation in California would present a serious financial or physical hardship, nor have they 

suggested that India or some other state has a greater interest in the litigation or would provide a 

more efficient forum for resolving the dispute.”) To the contrary, Reliance retains U.S. legal 

counsel; it has an award winning team in its Burbank, California office; and it entered into a 

Guaranty that contained a California choice of law provision and waived certain California 

defenses in order to induce WRI to lease a California property to Reliance‟s subsidiary. (Dkt. No. 

74-2 at 2; Dkt. No. 74-4 at 30; Dkt. No. 81-1 at 24 ¶ 6.) In light of these facts, and the absence of 

any contrary showing by Reliance, Reliance has not satisfied its burden to make a compelling case 

against the exercise of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that WRI has made a prima facie showing that Reliance 

is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court such that Reliance‟s motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction should be denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that Reliance‟s Motion to Dismiss 

WRI‟s FAC for insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction be DENIED. 

(Dkt. No. 68.)

Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district court 

judge within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive 

the right to appeal the district court‟s ultimate Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 11 of 12
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Dated: October 9, 2015

______________________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:14-cv-03802-JD Document 90 Filed 10/09/15 Page 12 of 12