Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01335/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01335-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHARILYN CHHANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

WEST COAST USA PROPERTIES LLC, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01335-SAB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(ECF Nos. 49, 52, 53)

I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 3, 2024, the Court issued an order (“Order”) granting Defendant Housing 

Authority of the City of Madera’s (“HACM”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint

without leave to amend. (ECF No. 47.) On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed an “application for 

reconsideration of denial of leave to amend” under Rules 15, 16, and 60 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and Local Rule 230(j). The Court construes Plaintiff’s application as a motion 

for reconsideration of its Order denying leave to amend. (ECF No. 49.) The Court finds this 

matter suitable for decision without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set 

forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 1:23-cv-01335-SAB Document 56 Filed 07/09/24 Page 1 of 13
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II.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On February 5, 2024, HACM filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The first amended complaint alleged Defendant Sergio 

Madrigal, a private landlord, failed to make reasonable accommodations and engaged in 

discriminatory conduct against Plaintiff. HACM argued it was an improper party because the 

FAC failed to adequately allege HACM owed Plaintiff a duty to act or any statutory basis for 

direct liability against HACM for Madrigal’s actions. (ECF No. 32-1 at 5.) Plaintiff argued that 

HACM—which did not own, operate, or manage the property or itself commit a discriminatory

housing practice—was liable under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (“FEHA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation 

Act for its “failure to intervene” to prevent Madrigal’s alleged discriminatory conduct. (FAC ¶¶ 

20, 44; ECF No. 37 at 12; see also Transcript (“Tr.”), ECF No. 51 at 4:16-18.) Thus, the 

question before the Court was whether a PHA that administers the Section 8 program but does not 

otherwise own, operate, or manage the property or engage in the alleged discriminatory conduct, 

owes a duty to the Section 8 tenant to affirmatively take corrective action against a private owner for 

his alleged discriminatory acts. 

The Court found the Housing Assistance Payments (“HAP”) contract, Annual 

Contributions Contract (“ACC”), and various proffered statutes and interpreting regulations did 

not impose a duty on HACM to intervene in Madrigal’s allegedly discriminatory conduct. 

Plaintiff also failed to provide any caselaw confirming the existence of such a duty, and the 

Court did not independently find such support. (See ECF No. 37 generally; Tr. 14:12-13.) 

Accordingly, the Court found Plaintiff failed to assert a legal theory cognizable as a matter of 

law against HACM and granted HACM’s motion to dismiss. 

In her opposition to HACM’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requested leave to amend to 

present additional factual allegations. (ECF No. 37 at 14.) However, Plaintiff did not offer what 

additional facts not already alleged in the FAC would cure her claims against HACM. At the 

hearing held on April 3, 2024, the Court asked Plaintiff four times for a factual proffer to support 

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a finding that granting leave to amend would not be futile.1 In response, counsel for Plaintiff 

informed the Court that Plaintiff had stated facts sufficient to state a claim. (Tr. 26:22-23; 27:11-

14.) Finding the complaint failed as a matter of law, the Court granted HACM’s motion to 

dismiss without leave to amend. 

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the Order 

denying Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint. (ECF No. 49-1.) Plaintiff’s motion 

“aims to augment the allegations in her first amended complaint by adding 25 supplemental 

allegations.” (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff contends that “[e]ach propose allegation is based on 

information obtained by Chhang after the first amended complaint was filed, cures an ambiguity 

in the first amended complaint, or responds to the Court’s interpretation of the first amended 

complaint as stated in its dismissal order.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff’s twenty-five proposed allegations 

that support Plaintiff’s FHA, FEHA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims against HACM are as 

follows: 

1. HACM controlled material aspects of the rental relationship 

between Madrigal and Chhang pursuant to the terms and 

conditions of the Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) Contract 

between HACM and Sergio Madrigal:

This is a HAP contract between the PHA and the owner. 

The HAP contract is entered to provide assistance for the 

family under the Section 8 voucher program (see HUD 

program regulations at 24 Code of Federal Regulations 

Part 982). The HAP contract only applies to the 

household and contract unit specified in Part A of the 

HAP contract. (ECF 32-2 at 21.)

2. HACM mandated that the terms and conditions of the HAP

contract between HACM and Madrigal superseded the terms and 

conditions of the rental contract between Chhang and Madrigal:

In case of any conflict between the provisions of the 

tenancy addendum as required by HUD, and any other 

provisions of the lease or any other agreement between 

the owner and the tenant, the requirements of the HUDrequired tenancy addendum shall control.

3. HACM also forbade Madrigal from making any changes to his 

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“[I]f I am to grant this, what new facts would you assert that you need an amendment?” (Tr. 26:14-15); “You do 

not proffer whatsoever what those facts are as to why I would give leave to amend....What are those?” (Tr. 26:18-

21); “But what facts?” (Tr. 27:3); “What facts would you proffer if I was to give you leave to amend?” (Tr. 27:9-

10).

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rental relationship with Chhang, even if those changes were not 

covered in the HAP contract, unless Madrigal [a] obtained 

Chhang’s consent, [b] reduced the change to writing, and [c] 

provided HACM with a copy of the written change:

The tenant and the owner may not make any change in the 

tenancy addendum. However, if the tenant and the owner 

agree to any other changes in the lease, such changes 

must be in writing, and the owner must immediately give 

the PHA a copy of such changes. The lease, including any 

changes, must be in accordance with the requirements of 

the tenancy addendum. (ECF 32-2 at 30.)

4. HACM also required – as an express condition of its rental

payments on behalf of HUD for housing Chhang – that Madrigal 

must treat Chhang in accordance with civil rights laws, regulations, 

and orders: 

[Madrigal] must not discriminate against any person 

because of . . .disability in connection with the HAP 

contract. 

. . . .

In accordance with applicable nondiscrimination and 

equal opportunity laws, statutes, Executive Orders, and 

regulations, [Madrigal] must not discriminate against any 

person because of . . disability in connection with the 

lease. (ECF 32-2 at 23, 30.)

5. HACM also required – as an express condition of its rental 

payments on behalf of HUD for housing Chhang – that Madrigal 

must cooperate with HACM in response to a discrimination 

complaint by Chhang: 

[Madrigal] must cooperate with [HACM] and HUD in conducting 

equal opportunity compliance reviews and complaint 

investigations in connection with the HAP contract.

6. HACM also required – as an express condition of its rental

payments on behalf of HUD for housing Chhang – that Madrigal 

must take corrective action to resolve discrimination complaint by 

Chhang:

[Madrigal] is a breach of the HAP contract . . . [i]f [Madrigal] has 

violated any obligation under the HAP contract.

. . . .

If [HACM] determines that a breach has occurred, [HACM] . . . 

shall notify [Madrigal] of such determination . . . and may require 

[Madrigal] to take corrective action, as verified or determined by 

[HACM], by deadline prescribed in the notice. (ECF 32-2 at 23.)

7. HACM also mandated – as an express condition of its rental 

payments on behalf of HUD for housing Chhang – that Madrigal 

acknowledge the powers, rights, and remedies conferred on 

HACM under the HAP contract:

[HACM’s] rights and remedies for [Madrigal’s] breach of 

the HAP contract include recovery of overpayments, 

suspension of housing assistance payments, abatement or 

other reduction of housing assistance payments, 

termination of housing assistance payments, and 

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termination of the HAP contract. [HACM] may seek and 

obtain additional relief by judicial order or action, 

including specific performance, other injunctive relief or 

order for damages.

8. But for HACM’s payments to Madrigal on behalf of HUD for

housing Chhang, Chhang could not have rented from Madrigal and 

would not have been injured by Madrigal’s refusal to make a 

reasonable accommodation.

9. On October 21, 2022, Chhang contacted the Fair Housing 

Council of Central California (FHCCC), the nonprofit fair housing 

agency serving Fresno and Madera counties, reporting that 

Madrigal had violated her fair housing rights by denying her 

request for a reasonable accommodation. Chhang executed an 

authorization for the release of information to FHCCC in 

connection with her complaint, which FHCCC provided to HACM.

10. On October 25, Madrigal provided a letter to Chhang and

HACM stating:

In response to your request to have a Pit Bull on our 

property as a service animal, our Insurance Carrier have 

informed us that if we were to accommodate this request 

for you, they would no longer provide coverage to us.

11. On October 25, 2022, FHCCC completed a Housing 

Discrimination Intake Questionnaire form, recording information 

related to Chhang’s complaint against Madrigal. During that 

intake, Chhang identified HACM’s Janet Moreno as a person with 

knowledge of Madrigal’s denial of Chhang’s request for a 

reasonable accommodation. [screenshot omitted]

12. Chhang personally notified HACM of her discrimination 

complaint against Madrigal. On November 8, Moreno recorded in 

HACM’s Notes/Tasks log system that “Chhang had filed a claim 

due to discrimination.”

13. Between November 2 and November 9, Madrigal issued 

several conflicting notices terminating Chhang’s tenancy. Chhang 

received some of those notices; HACM received others. Chhang 

received a Sixty-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy, dated 

November 5, 2022, which stated no reason for Chhang’s 

termination. HACM received a Thirty-Day Notice of Termination 

of Tenancy, dated November 8, 2022, which stated no reason for 

Chhang’s termination. Chhang did not receive that notice; 

however, Moreno emailed Chhang on November 8:

I was inform[ed] you[r] Landlord issued you a 30 Day 

Notice, due to a cause. I honestly don’t know what the 

cause falls into. I offered you a transfer appointment due 

to the 30 day notice expiring 12/08/2022.

14. Later, also on November 8, HACM received another notice

from Madrigal to Chhang, entitled, Notice of Termination of

Tenancy Due to Owner Move-in; this notice stated, “Your current 

fixed term lease is not being renewed. The lease expires on

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December 8, 2022.” Chhang did not receive that notice.

15. The last termination notice issued by Madrigal was emailed to

HACM on November 9 and received by Chhang thereafter. It was

dated November 8 and entitled Notice of Termination of Tenancy

Due to Owner Move-in. It stated, “Your current fixed term lease is

not being renewed. The lease expires on February 8, 2023,” which

contradicts the “Initial Lease Term” on the face of the HAP 

contract executed by Madrigal and HACM. Christina Quijano, 

Madrigal’s property manager, emailed a copy of that notice to 

Moreno and Jacqueline Velazquez, another HACM employee.

Quijano’s cover email stated:

We were advised to serve her a 90 day notice. She filed a

complaint with HUD, they called us and explained that 

we need to serve her the 90 day. We sent it out to her 

yesterday by certified mail. Attached is the copy of what 

we sent to Ms. Chhang. She will need to vacate the unit 

by February 8, 2023. (Emphasis omitted.)

16. Based on Madrigal’s conflicting termination notices, HACM

knew or should have known that Madrigal engaged in

discrimination, interference or retaliation against Chhang and that

the final reason for his termination of Chhang’s tenancy breached

an express term of the HAP contract executed by Madrigal and 

HACM.

17. On November 14, Moreno recorded in HACM’s Notes/Tasks 

log system that MJ Borelli, FHCCC’s executive director, had 

called Moreno regarding Chhang’s discrimination complaint.

18. HACM voluntarily agreed and certified that it must administer

its Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program in 

accordance with “HUD requirements,” as set forth in the Annual 

Contributions Contract (HUD-53012 (ACC) executed by HUD and 

HACM. 

The [HACM] shall use Program Receipts to provide 

decent, safe, and sanitary housing for eligible families in 

compliance with the Act and all HUD requirements. 

[HACM] must comply with the following “HUD 

Requirements,” including . . . Regulations issued by HUD 

at Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations; Other 

federal (including appropriations acts), executive orders 

and regulatory requirements. (ECF 32-2 at 5.) (Emphasis 

omitted.)

19. Under the ACC, HACM voluntarily agreed and certified that it

“shall comply with all statutory, regulatory, and executive order 

requirements pertaining to civil rights, equal opportunity, and 

nondiscrimination, as those requirements now exist, or as they may 

be enacted, promulgated, or amended from time to time. These 

requirements include, but shall not be limited to, compliance with 

at least the following authorities: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d; 24 CFR part 1); the Fair Housing Act 

(42 U.S.C. 3601-3619; 24 CFR part 100); section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794; 24 CFR part 8); (the 

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Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101¬6107; 24 CFR 

part 146); the Americans with Disabilities Act (Pub. L. 101-336, 

approved July 26, 1990; 28 CFR part 35); Executive Order 11063 

on Equal Opportunity in Housing (24 CFR part 107); Executive 

Order 11246 on Equal Employment Opportunity, as amended by 

Executive Order 11375 (41 CFR part 60); and Executive Order 

12892 on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing.” (ECF 32-2 at 

15.) (Emphasis omitted.)

20. HACM must operate its Section 8 HCV program “in 

compliance with all equal opportunity requirements imposed by 

contract or federal law, including the authorities cited at 24 C.F.R. 

§ 5.105(a) and title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 

U.S.C. 12101 et seq.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.53(a). It must certify that it 

“will administer the program in conformity with the Fair Housing 

Act, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title II of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act. 24 C.F.R. § 982.53(b)(1).

21. HACM must “affirmatively further fair housing in the 

administration of [its Section 8 HCV] program.” 24 C.F.R. § 

982.53(b)(2). The duty to “affirmatively further fair housing” 

means that HACM’s administration must take “meaningful action, 

in addition to combating discrimination, that . . . foster inclusive 

communities free from barriers that restrict access to opportunity 

based on protected characteristics.” 24 C.F.R. § 5.151. The Fair 

Housing Act requires landlords to make reasonable 

accommodations to foster the inclusion of persons with disabilities 

by removing barriers that restrict access to housing opportunities 

[sic] based on disability. U.S. House of Representatives, 

Committee on the Judiciary, Report 100-711: the Fair Housing 

Amendments Act of 1988 at 18, 100th Cong. (1988).

22. HACM was obligated under the ACC and civil rights laws, 

regulations, and orders to exercise its power under the HAP 

contract to take meaningful action in response to Chhang’s 

complaint to “combat[] discrimination” and so that Chhang was 

not “den[ied] . . . the opportunity to participate in, or benefit from, 

the housing, aid, benefit, or service” pursuant to its HAP contract 

with Madrigal, 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(1)(i); see also 24 C.F.R. § 

8.4(b)(1)(ii), (iii), (viii).

23. Even though the ACC and HAP contract, Part B, conferred no 

enforceable rights on Chhang, those agreements – coupled with 

HACM’s statutory and regulatory obligations – barred HACM 

from aid[ing] . . . discrimination against [Chhang] by providing 

significant assistance to [Madrigal who] discriminate[d] on the 

basis of handicap.” 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(1)(v). HACM provided that 

“significant assistance” to Madrigal’s discriminatory housing 

practice by failing or refusing to exercise its power, right, or 

remedies under the HAP contract. Instead, it engaged in “action 

that penalize[d] or harm[ed Chhang],” facilitating her eviction 

from her Section 8 dwelling based on a patently invalid basis. 24 

C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(2).

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24. Since at least 2001, HACM has received PIH Notices issued by

HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing stating HACM’s 

obligation to monitor compliance by dwelling owners with the 

terms of their HAP contracts, its obligation to enforce the HAP

terms against dwelling owners, and its obligation to administer its

Section 8 HCV program to affirmatively further the fair housing

rights of Section 8 tenants, like Chhang.

25. On information and belief, Chhang further alleges that HACM

administered its Section 8 HCV program in violation of the

following relevant, regulatory requirements:

a. Failing to provide Chhang with “information on 

Federal, State, and local equal opportunity laws, the 

contact information for the Section 504 coordinator, a 

copy of the housing discrimination complaint form, and 

information on how to request a reasonable

accommodation or modification (including information 

on requesting exception payment standards as a 

reasonable accommodation) under Section 504, the Fair 

Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act,” 

once her voucher was ported to HACM from a Fresno 

public housing authority, 24 C.F.R. § 982.301(b)(10);

b. Failing to address HACM’s policy in its administrative 

plan regarding HACM’s assistance to “a family that 

claims that illegal discrimination has prevented the family 

from leasing a suitable unit,” 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(d)(6); 

and,

c. Failing to provide Chhang “information on how to fill 

out and file a housing discrimination complaint” in 

response to her complaint against Madrigal. 24 C.F.R. § 

982.304.

(Id. at 3-12.)

Plaintiff explains she believed in good faith that the FAC alleged sufficient facts to state 

claims against HACM under the FHA, ADA, FEHA, and Rehabilitation Act. (Id. at 13.) 

However, Plaintiff avers the Order draws conclusions and inferences she “could not have 

reasonably anticipated.” (Id. at 14.) Thus, to the extent that the Court’s conclusions or

inferences stem from ambiguity or incompleteness in the text of the FAC, Plaintiff’s proposed 

twenty-five allegations aim to fix the deficiencies. (Id. at 15-16.) Plaintiff concedes that the 

Court may ultimately determine she fails to state a claim, but requests that determination be 

based on an amended complaint containing the twenty-five proposed allegations. (Id. at 16.)

B. HACM’s Opposition

On May 31, 2024, HACM filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 

(ECF No. 52.) HACM argues Plaintiff’s evidence is not “new” as required for reconsideration, 

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given each proposed allegation was known to Plaintiff at the time she filed her opposition to 

HACM’s motion to dismiss and prior to the April 3, 2024 hearing. Specifically, HACM avers 

proposed allegations one through eight are based on the HAP contract, which Plaintiff was aware of 

at the time she filed the FAC, and which was relied upon in the motion to dismiss. (Id. at 4.) HACM 

further avers proposed allegations nine and eleven are based on documents obtained from the Fair 

Housing Council of Central California, which Plaintiff herself contacted in October 2022, well before 

filing the FAC. (Id.) HACM argues proposed allegations ten and twelve through seventeen are 

within Plaintiff’s own knowledge or based upon documents provided by HACM in its initial 

disclosures prior to Plaintiff’s opposition to her motion to dismiss and the April 3, 2024 hearing or

are simply conclusory arguments. (Id.) HACM points out proposed allegations eighteen through 

twenty-five are not facts; rather, they are either a recitation of the terms of the ACC or conclusory 

recitations of the law. (Id. at 5.)

HACM also argues Plaintiff’s proposed allegations would not alter the Court’s ruling that 

HACM has no legal obligation to take affirmative action towards Madrigal. (Id.) HACM avers 

Plaintiff has therefore failed to meet her burden to show the proposed allegations are of such 

magnitude that this Court’s ruling would have been changed. (Id.)

C. Plaintiff’s Reply

Plaintiff contends HACM misunderstands the purpose of her motion for reconsideration. 

(ECF No. 53 at 3.) Plaintiff states the Court’s Order—not the twenty-five proposed 

allegations—is the “newly discovered” information that requires reconsideration. (Id. at 2.) 

Plaintiff therefore argues its motion is proper because “[t]he clock measuring whether this 

motion is timely did not start to run when HACM disclosed documents after its motion; it started 

to run once Chhang reviewed the dismissal order.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff avers reconsideration 

would clarify the record by providing a proffer of allegations that she could allege in response to 

the Order. (Id. at 6.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

“It is a basic principle of federal practice that ‘courts generally . . . refuse to reopen what 

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has been decided. . . .” Magnesystems, Inc. v. Nikken, Inc., 933 F.Supp. 944, 948 (C.D. Cal. 

1996) (quoting Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)). Reconsideration is an 

“extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of 

judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). “A motion for 

reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district 

court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 

intervening change in controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., v. Mucos Pharma GmbH &

Co. (“Marlyn”), 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted).

“A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the court's 

decision, and recapitulation...of that which was already considered by the court in rendering its 

decision.” U.S. v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). “In the 

absence of new evidence or a change in the law, a party may not use a motion for reconsideration 

to raise arguments or present new evidence for the first time when it could reasonably have been 

raised earlier in the litigation.” Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty. v.

California (“Cachil”), 649 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Carroll, 342 F.3d at

945). To succeed in a motion for reconsideration, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly 

convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See Kern-Tulare Water Dist.

v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 646, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), affirmed in part and reversed in 

part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). The decision whether to grant a motion for 

reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the court. Navajo Nation v. Confederated 

Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003).

Requests for reconsideration are also governed by Local Rule 230(j) which provides that 

a party seeking reconsideration must set forth the material facts and circumstances surrounding 

the motion for reconsideration, including “what new or different facts or circumstances are 

claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other 

grounds exist for the motion” and explain “why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the 

time of the prior motion.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(j)(3)-(4).

/ / /

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III.

DISCUSSION

The Court finds reconsideration of its Order unwarranted. A Court order granting a 

motion to dismiss is not “newly discovered information” nor evidence upon which 

reconsideration of the same order can be triggered. The plain language of Rule 60(b) and Local 

Rule 230(j) requiring “newly discovered evidence” or “new or different facts or circumstances” 

precludes Plaintiff’s clock from beginning to run only when she reads an order and realizes she 

could have argued differently based upon facts and evidence already in her possession. 

Reconsideration shall therefore be denied. 

In her reply brief, Plaintiff confirms she moves for reconsideration to present arguments, 

legal authority, and factual allegations for the first time that could reasonably have been raised 

earlier: 

At the hearing on HACM’s motion, the Court asked Christopher 

Brancart, counsel for plaintiff Pharilyn Chhang, “What facts would

you proffer if I was to give you leave to amend,” and Brancart

answered, “I think that we stated the facts – sufficient to state the 

claim.” (ECF 51 at 27). If that same question were asked of 

Brancart after he had reviewed the Court’s dismissal order (ECF

47), Brancart would have answered, “the facts set forth in the 

motion for reconsideration at pages 3-12 (ECF 49-1).”

(ECF No. 53 at 1-2.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the content within the “the facts set forth in 

the motion for reconsideration at pages 3-12 (ECF 49-1)” was available and could have been 

presented to the Court in her opposition requesting leave to amend or in response to the four 

times the Court requested additional information to support her claims against HACM. 

However, Plaintiff now assures the Court that if given a sixth opportunity to proffer additional 

facts2, she would provide allegations that were known to her prior to filing her opposition. A 

motion for reconsideration is an improper vehicle for such request. 

As noted by HACM, the Court found the FAC asserted a legal theory that is not 

2 The Court agrees with HACM that some of Plaintiff’s proposed allegations are not facts, but summaries of 

contracts previously considered by the Court or statutes and interpreting regulations that were created or codified 

years prior to the filing of the FAC. (See ECF No. 49 (allegations 1-7; 18-25).) See Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.

Supp. 2d at 1131 (“A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the court's decision, 

and recapitulation...of that which was already considered by the court in rendering its decision.”)

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cognizable as a matter of law against HACM. Even if Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was 

not presented as a vehicle to present evidence which should—and concededly could—have been 

previously raised, the Court notes none of the twenty-five proposed allegations state that HACM 

owns, operates, or manages the property or that HACM committed a discriminatory act. 

Amendment therefore remains futile as Plaintiff fails to assert a legal theory against HACM that 

is cognizable as a matter of law.

In her reply brief, Plaintiff also appears to suggest that the Court erred in failing to apply 

“the substantive law” to the FAC under “the appropriate standard of review under Rule 

12(b)(6).” (ECF No. 53 at 3 (“[t]he sole question is whether the dismissal order comports with 

those basic building blocks”).) However, Plaintiff’s only argument regarding the “sole question” 

is that Plaintiff “could not have reasonably anticipated” the Court’s “conclusions and inferences 

in the dismissal order.” (Id.) 

In its Order, the Court discussed each contract, statute, and interpreting regulation that 

was argued by Plaintiff as establishing HACM’s legal duty or obligation for failure to intervene. 

In the instant motion, Plaintiff proffers a list of “conclusions and inferences” wherein the Court 

noted Plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting Plaintiff’s legal theory under each proffered 

authority. (ECF No. 49-1 at 15-16.) While accepting the factual allegations contained in the 

FAC as true and construing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court concluded 

Plaintiff failed to support her legal theory that HACM is liable for failure to intervene in 

Madrigal’s allegedly discriminatory acts. Plaintiff otherwise fails to set forth facts or law of a

strongly convincing nature that the Court committed clear error such that reconsideration is 

warranted. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 49) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 9, 2024 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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