Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-02850/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-02850-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WILLIE LOUIS THOMPSON, 

 

 Petitioner, 

 

 v. 

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden,1

 Respondent. 

 

No. C 12-2850 CW (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

 Petitioner Willie Louis Thompson, a state prisoner proceeding 

pro se, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state criminal conviction. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the petition and 

a certificate of appealability. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural Background 

 In a joint information filed on February 17, 2006, Petitioner 

and his codefendant, Lavar Coleman, were charged with the first 

degree murders of Dante Wallace (count 1) and Ronnell Hodge (count 

2). It was additionally alleged that during the murder of Hodge, 

Petitioner and Coleman personally used and intentionally 

discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death to 

Hodge; and during the murder of Wallace, Petitioner personally 

used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily 

injury and death to Wallace, and Coleman was “a principal” and 

armed with a firearm. Petitioner and Coleman were each also 

 1 In accordance with Habeas Rule 2(a) and Rule 25(d)(1) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Clerk of the Court is 

directed to substitute Warden Eric Arnold as Respondent because he 

is Petitioner’s current custodian. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 1 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

charged with possession of a firearm by a felon (counts three and 

four). A multiple-murder special circumstance pursuant to 

California Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3),2 was 

alleged against Petitioner. Finally, it was alleged that 

Petitioner had two prior serious felony convictions under section 

667(e)(2)(A) and section 667(a), and one prior separate prison 

term under section 667.5(b). 4 Clerk’s Transcript (CT) 919-926. 

 On November 3, 2006, the special circumstance allegation 

against Coleman was stricken. Augmented CT (November 3, 2006) 32-

33. 

 On November 1, 2007, following a joint jury trial from 

September through October of 2007, the jury found Petitioner and 

Coleman guilty on all counts, and affixed the murder as first 

degree. The jury found the multiple-murder special circumstance 

to be true. The jury found all of the firearm enhancements true, 

with the exception that as to count two, it found true only that 

Petitioner discharged a firearm at Hodge. 5CT 1164-1170, 13 

Reporter’s Transcript (RT) 2609. 

 Also, on November 5, 2007, after Petitioner had waived jury 

trial as to the prior conviction allegations, the sentencing court 

found the allegations true. 5CT 1175-1176, 14RT 2623. 

 On January 23, 2008, the court sentenced Petitioner on one 

count of first-degree murder (Wallace) to life in state prison 

without the possibility of parole with a mandatory consecutive 

twenty-five-years-to-life term for the gun use enhancement. The 

 2 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references 

are to the California Penal Code. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 2 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

court assessed an additional consecutive twenty-five-years-to-life 

term with a mandatory twenty-five-years-to life term for the 

firearm enhancement on the second count of first-degree murder 

(Hodge). The court sentenced Petitioner to an additional twentyfive-years-to-life term under the “three strikes” law on count 

three (possession of a firearm by a felon). The court assessed 

five-year terms for each of the two prior serious felony 

conviction enhancements. The court “stayed” the one-year term for 

the prior prison term enhancement. The total unstayed term was 

life without possibility of parole, plus 100 years to life, plus 

ten years in state prison. 14RT 2645, et seq. On January 24, 

2008 and February 8, 2008 respectively, Petitioner and Coleman 

filed their notices of appeal. 5CT 1183, 3CT 577. 

 On January 29, 2009, Petitioner filed his opening brief in 

the California Court of Appeal. Ex. A.3 

 On September 25, 2009, the State filed its Respondent’s 

Brief. Ex. B. 

 On September 29, 2010, the California Court of Appeal filed 

its opinion affirming the conviction with minor sentencing 

modifications. Ex. C, People v. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138 (Cal. 

Ct. App.) (unpublished). 

 On November 1, 2010, Petitioner filed his petition for review 

in the California Supreme Court. Ex. D. According to the state 

supreme court’s online database, the California Supreme Court 

 3 In this Order, the Court refers to the arguments made by 

Petitioner on direct appeal because his federal petition merely 

lists his claims, which are more clearly explained in his state 

appellate attorney’s opening brief. See Ex. A at 22-109. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 3 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

denied review on January 26, 2011. See People v. Thompson, Case 

No. S187673 (Jan. 26, 2011). 

 On June 4, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas 

petition. Doc. no. 1. On December 3, 2012, the Court directed 

Respondent to answer the petition. Doc. no. 3. Respondent has 

filed an answer; Petitioner has filed a traverse as well as a 

memorandum in support of his traverse. Doc. nos. 7, 12, 14. 

II. Statement of Facts 

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of this 

case as follows: 

In the early morning of April 25, 2004, Wallace and Hodge 

were the victims of a shooting incident on 65th Avenue 

between 14th Street (International Boulevard) and Eastlawn 

Street in an area of Oakland referred to as “The Village.” 

At that time the residential area was known for “a lot of 

dope traffic,” and gunfire was heard in the area “a lot,” at 

least three or four times a week. 

Thompson (known as WL), Coleman (known as Moonie), Wallace 

(known as DT), Hodge (known as Nell), and Matthew Cobbs, had 

grown up together and were supposedly friends. By the time 

of the 2004 shooting, the men were in their late twenties and 

mid-thirties. Both defendants were still friends with 

Wallace but Coleman was no longer talking to Hodge. Cobbs 

considered Hodge to be his best friend. None of the men 

still lived in The Village but Wallace’s parents lived in an 

apartment located on Eastlawn Street in The Village. During 

the six months preceding the shooting incident, Thompson, 

Coleman, and Cobbs continued to hang out in The Village on a 

daily basis, but it had been two or three years since Wallace 

and Hodge had been seen in The Village on a regular basis. 

Wallace and Hodge returned periodically. Wallace was seen 

mostly on weekends and Hodge was seen “every now and then.” 

Cobbs was the only witness to the shooting incident who 

testified at the trial. He arrived in The Village at about 

1:30 a.m. He had his .357–caliber revolver concealed in his 

waistband.[FN3] At the time Cobbs drank liquor on a daily 

basis. Earlier in the evening he had consumed about two or 

three 40–ounce beers, but he had a high tolerance for alcohol 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 4 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and his intoxication level was low. Cobbs saw defendants and 

other people drinking on 65th Avenue. According to Cobbs, 

Thompson was “not very much” intoxicated, and both defendants 

were “normal,” in that apparently they had had a “couple [of] 

drinks,” but were not “too drunk” or “too intoxicated.” 

Thompson liked to drink probably more than Cobbs, and Coleman 

drank probably less than Cobbs. 

[FN3:] Cobbs explained that he carried a gun in The Village 

for his own protection (he had been shot in 2003) and because 

it was necessary to be armed when he sold drugs. At the time 

of the shooting, he also owned a .22–caliber rifle and a 

small assault weapon. About ten days before the shooting, 

his girlfriend gave his rifle to Coleman to hold for Cobbs. 

He also hid guns around The Village so guns would not be 

found on his person if he was stopped and searched by the 

police. He had also seen both defendants armed in The 

Village on numerous occasions, and had seen both stash guns 

around The Village. He presumed that people who hung out in 

The Village had guns to protect themselves. 

Cobbs asked Coleman for a ride to a liquor store. During the 

drive in Coleman’s light gray two-door car, Cobbs was in the 

back seat and Coleman and Thompson were in the front seat. 

Cobbs was not sure if Coleman or Thompson drove the car. The 

three men bought the largest bottle of gin they could find to 

share with the people back at The Village. Cobbs began 

drinking in the car as they returned to The Village, but he 

could not recall if defendants had any drinks at that time. 

During the ride back to The Village, Cobbs again sat in the 

back seat and either Coleman or Thompson drove the car. 

On the trip to and from the liquor store, Coleman and 

Thompson started talking mostly about Hodge and Wallace. 

Cobbs could not recall Coleman specifically talking about 

Wallace. Coleman said Hodge was “not cool,” and asked Cobbs 

why he still “mess[ed] around” with Hodge. Cobbs replied 

Hodge was cool to him, and Coleman, in a serious voice, 

repeated Hodge “just ain’t cool.” Thompson then asked, 

“what’s up with DT,” referring to Wallace. Cobbs replied 

Wallace was cool too, but both Thompson and Coleman responded 

“they not cool.” Coleman asked Cobbs why he still dealt with 

Wallace and Hodge. Coleman also asked Cobbs to call Hodge 

and ask him to come out that night if he was a “homeboy,” but 

Cobbs refused to call Hodge. During the conversation, 

defendants were not joking, and they seemed angry based on 

the tone of their voices and how they were speaking. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 5 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

When the men arrived back at 65th Avenue, Cobbs saw Hodge on 

the sidewalk. Coleman said, “Ooh.” Wallace was also on the 

sidewalk, a few feet away from Hodge, kneeling and talking to 

someone in a car. The driver of Coleman’s car drove past 

Hodge, made a U-turn, and parked on the same side of the 

street a few feet behind Hodge. Defendants got out of the 

car “fast” and headed in separate directions. Coleman went 

into a nearby parking lot behind his parked car, and Thompson 

crossed the street and went into some bushes. Cobbs believed 

defendants were retrieving stashed weapons based on the way 

they had been talking in the car and their conduct after they 

left the car. 

“Right after” defendants left the car and walked away, Cobbs 

left the car, and approached Hodge, shaking his hand and 

hugging Hodge. As he broke off the hug, Cobbs gave his .357–

caliber revolver to Hodge. Cobbs attempted to conceal the 

gun by the way he was standing near Hodge, and how he shook 

hands and hugged him. Defendants had already “walked off.” 

Hodge put the gun in his waistband. Cobbs said, “What’s up? 

What you doing out here? These niggas tripping.” Hodge 

replied, “I know.” Cobbs was trying to convey a warning to 

Hodge that defendants were “tripping off” that Hodge was out 

there, and Hodge should leave. Cobbs asked Hodge where his 

car was so they could leave before things escalated. Cobbs 

told Hodge he should leave, and the two men started walking 

towards Hodge’s car, which was parked on Eastlawn Street. 

Cobbs was about two feet behind Hodge, and Wallace was 

walking about 8 to 10 feet in front of Cobbs and Hodge. 

Cobbs saw Thompson walk diagonally from the bushes into the 

middle of the street in front of him and Hodge; Thompson had 

his hands in his pockets. Cobbs turned around and saw 

Coleman a few feet behind him on the sidewalk. Cobbs saw 

that Coleman had Cobbs’s .22–caliber rifle under his arm. As 

the men walked down the street, Cobbs tried to stay between 

Coleman and Hodge and between Coleman and Thompson so that 

nothing would happen to Hodge. Wallace and Thompson were 

arguing and cussing at each other, loudly, with Thompson 

doing most of the cussing.[FN4] Coleman did not participate 

in the argument between Thompson and Wallace. However, on 

two or three occasions, Coleman pulled and lightly shoved 

Cobbs’s right shoulder backwards, telling Cobbs to get out of 

the way. Cobbs replied, “No,” because he did not want 

anything to happen to Hodge. Cobbs finally got out of the 

way when the group reached Eastlawn Street. Although the men 

were walking “real slow,” none of them was having difficulty 

walking because of potential alcohol impairment. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 6 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

[FN4:] Cobbs did not see Thompson leave the street and shove 

or bump into either Wallace or Hodge. Nor did Cobbs hear 

either Wallace or Hodge say they did not want any trouble. 

However, another witness Khadijah Shahid, who lived on 65th 

Avenue near East 14th Street, testified that just before the 

gunfire, she heard loud talking from the sidewalk outside her 

second-floor living room window. She saw Thompson walking 

with two men on the sidewalk underneath her window. Thompson 

did not say anything, but he repeatedly bumped his chest into 

the shoulder of one of the men, then jumped back and put his 

hands up. In response to the repeated bumping, one of the 

men repeatedly said, “Man, we don’t want no problems. We 

don’t want no trouble.” As the men continued walking towards 

Eastlawn Street, the two men continued to beg to be left 

alone. Shahid called 911 and told the operator “someone was 

fixing to get killed,” and then hung up. Almost immediately 

thereafter, Shahid heard more than five gunshots that sounded 

all the same from the direction of Eastlawn. When the 911 

operator called back, Shahid said, “it was too late. They 

were dead.” As she was talking to the 911 operator, Shahid 

saw two men “run out the side parking lot and jump in a white 

car.” Shahid could not identify the men. 

At some point, Hodge was on a little walkway about 20 feet 

from the sidewalk. Cobbs stayed on the sidewalk, and Wallace 

went out into the street within two or three feet of 

Thompson. Wallace, a large man, weighing 250 to 300 

pounds,[FN5] said something like “Let’s get them up, let’s 

fight,” and, “I’m done. Let’s just do this.” Wallace did 

not raise his fists or have any weapons. Thompson’s 

immediate reaction was to pull a handgun from his pocket and 

fire five or six shots at Wallace from two to three feet 

away. Cobbs saw Wallace’s head “ducking forward” while 

Wallace was “bending at the waist,” but Cobbs did not see 

Wallace actually fall to the street. As Thompson walked 

around Wallace in a half circle firing his gun, Cobbs 

believed the gunfire was now coming in his direction and he 

crouched behind a car. Cobbs then heard more gunshots coming 

from behind him. Out of his peripheral vision, Cobbs saw 

Coleman aim his .22–caliber rifle and begin firing in the 

direction in which Cobbs last saw Hodge in the walkway. 

Cobbs heard the rifle expend its entire capacity all in one 

sequence. After the rifle started to discharge, Cobbs heard 

the gunfire of six rounds from his .357–caliber revolver, 

which he had earlier given to Hodge. There was a point when 

both the rifle and the .357 revolver were “going off” at the 

same time, but the rifle had been shot first. Cobbs thought 

the first 10 shots were from Thompson’s gun, which sounded 

like a .9 millimeter pistol. Cobbs thought the .9 millimeter 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 7 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

pistol (Thompson’s gun) was fired at the same time as the .22 

caliber rifle (Coleman’s gun), right before the .357–caliber 

revolver (Hodge’s gun). After Thompson stopped shooting at 

Wallace, Thompson walked to the sidewalk and fired up the 

walkway in the direction in which Cobbs had last seen Hodge. 

The .357 caliber revolver was fired before Thompson moved to 

the sidewalk and started firing in Hodge’s direction. Cobbs 

heard Thompson fire his gun first, and the last gun he heard 

was the .357 caliber revolver. Coleman left one or two 

seconds before Thompson fired his last shot, and then 

Thompson took off. Wallace was then lying in the street. 

Hodge left a blood trail going from the walkway around the 

corner to Eastlawn Street in front of Wallace’s parents’ 

apartment. 

[FN5:] Cobbs estimated Wallace weighed at least 300 pounds at 

the time of the shooting. Wallace died about ten days after 

the shooting. His autopsy report indicated his height was 6 

feet and one and one-half inches, and he then weighed 250 

pounds. 

Wallace’s parents testified regarding their knowledge of the 

incident. Inside their second-floor apartment, they heard 

the gunfire in the street. Wallace’s father recalled he 

heard at least 15 to 20 gunshots “right after each other”; 

which lasted one to two minutes. The gunshots sounded like 

they came from at least two different guns. The first 

gunshots “sounded heavier” or “louder,” than the later 

gunshots, which “weren’t completely as loud as the first.” 

He did not recall if he heard more of the louder gunshots 

later, but he was sure he heard different caliber guns going 

off at the same time with no significant pauses. He heard 

gunshots that might have been fired from a .9–millimeter 

pistol or revolver, and more gunshots that could have been 

from a .22–caliber rifle, which came after the other louder 

noises. He was sure the quieter gun was the last gun he 

heard fired, although the guns were fired “right behind each 

other.”[FN6] Wallace’s mother heard “a whole bunch” of “real 

loud” gunshots, in rapid succession, for fifteen seconds or a 

minute or two, with no delays or breaks. About ten or 

fifteen minutes later, while he was still in his second-story 

apartment, Wallace’s father heard Hodge calling to him from 

some bushes directly below one of the bedroom windows. Hodge 

said, “Help me, . . . . They got me,” and “call my mother.” 

While still in the apartment, Wallace’s mother heard Hodge 

say, “They got me, they got me, Moonie got me,” and “call my 

mom.” When Wallace’s father was at Hodge’s side, Hodge said, 

“I’m dying,” “They got me,” and he had been shot. Hodge also 

said he was sorry “for bringing all this stuff round to your 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 8 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

house.” Around the corner from his parents’ apartment, 

Wallace was found lying on 65th Avenue. He appeared to have 

a gunshot wound to his head and other gunshot wounds to his 

upper body. From an area of around 75 feet where Wallace was 

found, the police recovered eight .22–caliber shell casings, 

and fifteen .9–millimeter casings. 

[FN6:] A police firearms expert testified a gunshot from a 

.22–caliber rifle sounds like a “pop,”, and not particularly 

loud, a gunshot from a .9–millimeter pistol would be loud but 

sound like a crack breaking the sound barrier, and a gunshot 

from a .357–caliber revolver would be the “heaviest” of the 

three gunshots and would sound like a boom instead of a crack 

sound. Cobbs also testified that of the three guns, the 

.357–caliber revolver was the “loudest gun.” 

Hodge died of his wounds that morning. An autopsy report 

indicated Hodge sustained four bullet wounds. Hodge died due 

to a loss of blood from a gunshot wound caused by a .22 

caliber bullet found in his abdomen. Wallace survived the 

shooting, sustaining multiple gunshot wounds to the arms, 

shoulder, and back, and a graze injury caused by a bullet 

plowing through the top left side of his head just above the 

ear. Bullets perforated his right lower lung and hit the 

right side of his liver. No bullets were recovered from 

Wallace’s body. Wallace had no wounds from directly in front 

of him, but if he were bending over, the shooter could have 

been in front of him. Also, the graze injury on the scalp 

could have been caused by the firing of a firearm in front of 

Wallace’s head and just to his left. About ten days after 

the shooting, while Wallace was in the hospital recovering 

from his wounds, he died within minutes when a blood clot 

traveled from his leg to his lung. His cause of death was 

determined to be “pulmonary thromboembolism,” and 

“complicating multiple gunshot wounds of the torso and 

extremities.” The autopsy pathologist was of the opinion 

that the gunshot wounds set in motion a series of events 

resulting in the pulmonary thromboembolism; in other words, 

“but for those gunshot wounds, the blood clot would not have 

occurred.” 

On April 27, 2004, the police stopped a vehicle in The 

Village. The front seat passenger discarded a bag as he fled 

and avoided capture by the police. The police identified the 

man who fled as someone who hung out in The Village. Inside 

the bag, the police found a .9–millimeter pistol and a .22–

caliber rifle, both with clips. Cobbs identified the rifle 

as his. The guns matched both the revolver casings and rifle 

casings found after the shootings and the rifle bullet found 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 9 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

inside Hodge. A few weeks after the shooting, Cobbs’s .357 

caliber revolver containing six expended cartridges was found 

on the roof of the apartment building where Wallace’s parents 

lived on Eastlawn Street. Cobbs denied tossing his .357–

caliber revolver on the roof. 

Defendants presented no witnesses; they offered into evidence 

several photographic exhibits depicting evidence found at the 

crime scene, including the bullet casings, a diagram of the 

crime scene on which a crime scene evidence technician had 

marked the location of the bullet casings found in the 

street, and a diagram of the crime scene on which Cobbs had 

marked the location of both defendants, both victims, and 

himself at the time “right before the shots go off.” 

Defendants’ primary defense was that credible evidence would 

support findings that defendants’ “trash talk” about the 

victims was not evidence of a conspiracy or intent to kill 

the victims. Defendants had armed themselves with guns only 

after they saw Cobbs hand his .357–caliber revolver to Hodge. 

Although defendants followed the victims as they walked on 

65th Avenue towards Eastlawn Street, where Thompson had a 

verbal altercation with Wallace, Hodge overreacted to the 

situation by firing the .357–caliber revolver first. 

Defendants argued they were therefore entitled to respond in 

justifiable self-defense. 

The jury returned verdicts against both defendants of first 

degree murder of both victims and possession of a firearm by 

a felon. The jury also found that (a) during the murder of 

Wallace, Thompson personally used and intentionally 

discharged his firearm, which caused great bodily injury and 

the death of Wallace, and Coleman was armed with a firearm; 

and (b) during the murder of Hodge, Coleman personally used 

and intentionally discharged his firearm, which proximately 

caused great bodily injury and the death of Hodge, and 

although Thompson personally used and discharged his firearm, 

the discharge did not proximately cause great bodily injury 

or the death of Hodge. The jury also found Thompson had 

committed more than one murder within the meaning of section 

190.2, subdivision (a)(3) (multiple-murder special 

circumstance). 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *2-5 (footnotes in original). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state 

prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 10 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a district court may not grant habeas 

relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

 A federal court on habeas review may not issue a writ “simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the 

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting 

the writ. Id. at 409. The factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless there is “clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

340 (2003). 

 If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted 

only if the error had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 638 (1993)). 

 When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state 

court to consider a petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the 

last reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 11 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

state judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).4 In the present 

case, the California Court of Appeal is the highest court that 

addressed Petitioner’s claims in a reasoned opinion. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Claims 

A. Substantial Evidence Challenges 

 Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the finding that he premeditated the murders of Hodge and 

Wallace. Petitioner also argues that insufficient evidence 

supported the multiple murder special circumstance because there 

was insufficient evidence to show that he intended to kill Hodge. 

In addition, the Court will address in this section Petitioner’s 

related claim that the trial court erred by failing to instruct 

the jury that in order for the multiple murder special 

circumstance to apply to him, he had actually to kill or intend to 

kill both victims. 

 The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against 

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who 

alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction 

cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

states a constitutional claim, which, if proven, entitles him to 

 4 The one exception here is Petitioner's Wheeler/Batson 

claims, to which the Court applies de novo review, as discussed 

below. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 12 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

federal habeas relief. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321, 

324 (1979). 

 A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court 

conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the 

evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. 

Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). Nor does a federal 

habeas court in general question a jury’s credibility 

determinations, which are entitled to near-total deference. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. If confronted by a record that supports 

conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court “must presume -- 

even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record -- that the 

trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the 

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. The federal 

court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found 

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may the writ be granted. 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

 The Supreme Court has emphasized that “Jackson claims face a 

high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to 

two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 

2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam). In reviewing habeas petitions, “a 

federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal 

court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead 

may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 13 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 

(2010)). Thus, after AEDPA, a federal habeas court applies the 

standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference. Juan 

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). To grant 

relief, a federal habeas court must conclude that “the state 

court’s determination that a rational jury could have found that 

there was sufficient evidence of guilt, i.e., that each required 

element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was objectively 

unreasonable.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 

2011). 

 Sufficiency of the evidence claims are reviewed with 

reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as 

defined by the state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. 

1. Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation (Murder) 

a. Additional Background Facts 

 In closing argument, neither defense counsel disputed the 

identities of the five major players: Petitioner, Coleman, the two 

victims, and Cobbs. Coleman’s counsel admitted that Coleman fired 

the rifle. 12RT 2510-2511. Similarly, Petitioner’s counsel did 

not ask the jury to find Petitioner was not present; rather he 

argued that Petitioner fired in self-defense. 12RT 2454, 2474-

2476. Petitioner’s counsel had to accept that the identification 

testimony of Shahid was unimpeachable. Similarly, Coleman’s 

counsel recognized the credibility of the dying declaration of 

Hodge, in which he stated that “Moonie” (Coleman) shot him. 8RT 

16. Further, the defense’s closing arguments showed that, despite 

attempts to impeach Cobbs with his lifestyle and his lack of 

sobriety, his testimony was likely to be believed by the jury. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 14 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Cobbs testified that on the day of the incident, he traveled with 

Petitioner and Coleman to the liquor store and back. Despite the 

defense’s attempts to pry the testimony apart, Cobbs testified 

that in the car both Petitioner and Coleman expressed hostility 

toward both Wallace and Hodge. Cobbs recalled: Coleman said that 

Hodge was “not cool”; the tone of the discussion was “serious”; 

and Petitioner followed up by asking Cobbs what was up with 

Wallace. 9RT 1889. The exchange continued: 

Q. And WL [Petitioner] say anything else after you told him 

that DT [Wallace] was cool, too? 

A. They just both said they not cool. 

Q. They both said that they not cool. Who is “they” that 

said “they not cool?” 

A. Moonie [Coleman] and WL. 

Q. And you took that as them referring to Ronnell [Hodge] and 

DT? 

A. Yeah. 

9RT 1891 (brackets added). 

 Cobbs’s lay opinion on the seriousness of these discussions 

was substantiated when the car pulled up and Petitioner spotted 

Hodge on the street. When Coleman spotted Hodge, Coleman reacted 

by making the sound “Ooh,” “Happy, like. . . .” 9RT 1899-1900. 

Cobbs immediately told Hodge that Petitioner and Coleman were 

“tripping,” and handed him Cobbs’s .357-caliber revolver. 

Next, when Coleman and Petitioner got out of the car, Coleman 

walked across a parking lot, and Petitioner crossed to some 

bushes. Cobbs’s belief that Petitioner was retrieving a stashed 

gun was confirmed when he saw Coleman return carrying the rifle 

under his arm. Cobbs, convinced that Petitioner intended to do 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 15 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

16 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

harm to the victims, told the victims that they had to leave, and 

started walking them toward their car. 

 As the five men walked down 65th Avenue, Shahid witnessed 

their interactions. Shahid testified, just as she had told the 

911 operator, that someone was “fixing to get killed . . . .” 9RT 

1770. Shahid based her belief on several factors. First, she 

stated that she knew “somebody was going to get killed, you know. 

Because I -- Like I said, I haven’t been Muslim all my life, and I 

grew up with folks that . . . did some stuff . . . that it wasn’t 

good.” 9RT 1770. Shahid heard the tones of voices of the victims 

and Petitioner, and knew that the victims “were begging . . . for 

their lives. It was plain. And this is why I dialed 911 . . . .” 

9RT 1754. Shahid identified Petitioner, whom she knew, as the 

individual who was repeatedly bumping up against Wallace, while 

Wallace was attempting merely to escape the situation. 

b. State Court Opinion 

 The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim of 

insufficiency of evidence of first degree murder as follows: 

Thompson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his convictions for first degree murder of Wallace 

and Hodge. He specifically argues the evidence was 

insufficient to establish he actually premeditated and 

deliberately murdered either Wallace or Hodge -- as the 

actual killer, an accomplice, or a conspirator. He also 

argues it is an “unfair stretch” to infer that a premeditated 

killing of either victim was a natural and probable result of 

anything he aided and abetted or conspired to commit with 

Coleman. Accordingly, Thompson argues the murder convictions 

against him should be reduced to second-degree murder. We 

disagree. 

In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, as an appellate 

court, we “must examine the whole record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses 

substantial evidence -- evidence that is reasonable, credible 

and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact 

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 16 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

17 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

[Citation.] [We presume] in support of the judgment the 

existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce 

from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 978, 

1053.) “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier 

of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that 

the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 

contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal. 

4th 489, 514.) “We need not be convinced beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the murders were premeditated. Our inquiry on 

appeal ‘in light of the whole record [is] whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 

[Citations.]” (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal. 4th 1, 31–32 

(Sanchez), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin 

(2009) 45 Cal. 4th 390, 421 & fn. 22 (Doolin).) 

Concededly, “‘[a] verdict of deliberate and premeditated 

first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to 

kill. [Citation.] “Deliberation” refers to careful weighing 

of considerations in forming a course of action; 

“premeditation” means thought over in advance. [Citations.] 

[However,] “[t]he process of premeditation . . . does not 

require any extended period of time. ‘The true test is not 

the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the 

reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great 

rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at 

quickly . . . .’ [Citations.]”’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 379, 419 (Halvorsen).) “In 

People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal. 2d 15, 26–27 

([Anderson]), . . ., [our Supreme Court] . . . developed 

guidelines to aid reviewing courts in assessing the 

sufficiency of evidence to sustain findings of premeditation 

and deliberation. [Citation.] [The Court] described three 

categories of evidence recurring in those cases: planning, 

motive, and manner of killing. [Citations.]” (Halvorsen, 

supra, 42 Cal. 4th at pp. 419–420.) “[I]t is not necessary 

that the Anderson ‘factors be present in some special 

combination or that they be accorded a particular weight.’ 

[Citation.]” (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal. 4th at pp. 32–33.) 

“Nonetheless, we are guided by the factors in our 

determination whether the murder[s] occurred as a result of 

‘preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash 

impulse.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

Contrary to Thompson’s contentions, the jury could have 

accepted portions of the testimony of the prosecution’s 

witnesses and the forensic evidence, and reasonably have 

drawn the inference that, before the shootings both 

defendants had exhibited a certain animus toward both 

victims, thereby establishing “the prior relationship from 

which the jury reasonably could infer a motive for the 

killings.” (People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 233, 245 

(Cruz).) Defendants’ actions immediately before the killings 

of securing loaded weapons “can be characterized as 

‘planning’ activity.” (Ibid.; see People v. Wharton (1991) 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 17 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

18 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

53 Cal. 3d 522, 547.) Finally, the number of shots that were 

apparently fired (police found eight .22–caliber rifle 

casings and fifteen .9–millimeter pistol casings in the area 

of the shootings), would permit the jury to find defendants 

were intent on killing the victims “according to a 

preconceived design and for a reason.” (Cruz, supra, at p. 

245.) Contrary to Thompson’s contention, the jury could have 

discounted any evidence of his intoxication after reasonably 

finding “it was not possible to determine the extent of [his] 

drunkenness at the time of the killings.” (Id. at p. 248.) 

Thompson’s reliance on the court’s instructions regarding 

accident or excuse is misplaced. Whether Thompson acted in 

justifiable self-defense, imperfect self-defense, or 

accidentally hit Wallace after Hodge shot his gun first, were 

questions resolved by the jurors, who apparently did not 

believe Thompson fired his gun in response to Hodge firing 

his gun first. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, we conclude a rational trier of 

fact could have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt 

“that the killing[s] [were] the result of preexisting 

reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere 

unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.]” (People v. Perez 

(1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1117, 1125.) 

Thompson’s argument ignores the applicable law on aiding and 

abetting. “A person may aid and abet a criminal offense 

without having agreed to do so prior to the act. 

[Citations.] In fact, it is not necessary that the primary 

actor expressly communicate his criminal purpose to the 

defendant since that purpose may be apparent from the 

circumstances. [Citations.] Aiding and abetting may be 

committed ‘on the spur of the moment,’ that is, as 

instantaneously as the criminal act itself. [Citation.] 

Since . . . any person concerned in the commission of a 

crime, however slight that concern may be, is liable as a 

principal in the crime [citations], it follows that an aider 

and abettor will be responsible for a collateral offense if 

at any time that he does something that directly or 

indirectly aids or encourages the primary actor in the 

commission of a crime, it is reasonably foreseeable that a 

collateral offense may result.” (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 

Cal. App. 4th 518, 531–532.) Thus, “[i]n order to hold the 

accused as an aider and abettor the test is whether the 

accused in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the 

perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by words or gestures. 

In People v. Luna [(1956)] 140 Cal. App. 2d 662 [(Luna)], the 

defendant was held to have aided and abetted his codefendant 

in making an assault on the prosecuting witness where he 

entered into an altercation which reasonably could lead to 

trouble, stood by while his codefendant committed the 

assault, prepared to enter the fight if necessary, and 

finally entered the fight. The [appellate] court pointed out 

that while one who merely stands by watching an assault is 

not guilty of aiding and abetting, and while the defendant 

was acquitted of the charge of assault on the person with 

whom he fought, the evidence sustained his conviction for 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 18 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

19 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

aiding and abetting his companion’s assault.” (People v. 

Villa (1957) 156 Cal. App. 2d 128, 134–135.) 

We similarly find unavailing Coleman’s argument that the 

verdict against him of first-degree murder of Wallace must be 

reversed -- or reduced to a verdict of second degree murder 

because there was no evidence from which the jury could 

reasonably find he foresaw Thompson’s deliberate and 

premeditated shooting of Wallace. Concededly, there was no 

evidence Coleman attempted to or shot at Wallace. 

Nevertheless, “whether, as a matter of fact,” defendants were 

joint participants “was for the jury to decide.” (Luna, 

supra, 140 Cal. App. 2d at p. 664.) Contrary to Coleman’s 

contention, the jury could have accepted portions of the 

testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses and the forensic 

evidence, and drawn the following reasonable inferences: 

Before the shootings both Thompson and Coleman had exhibited 

some animus against both Hodge and Wallace. Even assuming 

Coleman saw Cobbs hand a gun to Hodge, Coleman did not leave 

the area but prepared for a confrontation by retrieving a 

loaded firearm. Coleman told Cobbs to stay out of the way, 

and physically attempted to move Cobbs away, in order to 

protect Thompson against Wallace if need be. When the 

opportunity arose, Coleman joined in the altercation by 

firing his gun at Hodge, who returned gunfire. “In brief, 

[Coleman] voluntarily entered into an alteration which would 

probably lead to trouble, stood by prepared to take a hand in 

the fight and aggressively entered it when he thought the 

proper time had arrived. The two [defendants] stood together 

and fought together. There was concert of action and purpose 

which clearly proved [Coleman] to have been a participant in 

the entire fight” against both victims. (Id. at p. 665.) 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *5-7. 

c. Analysis 

 Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state appellate 

court’s determination was an unreasonable application of Supreme 

Court authority. The state appellate court correctly noted that 

there was an abundance of evidence to establish that Petitioner 

“premeditated and deliberately murdered either Wallace or Hodge -- 

as the actual killer, an accomplice or a conspirator.” Id. at *5. 

Before the shootings Petitioner and Coleman had exhibited animus 

against both victims. Petitioner and Coleman secured loaded 

weapons immediately prior to the killings. Finally, the evidence 

displayed they were intent on killing the victims based on the 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 19 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

20 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

number of shots that were apparently fired. Looking at all of 

this evidence, a rational juror could have found that Petitioner’s 

actions were deliberate and premeditated. It also follows that a 

rational juror could have chosen not to believe that Petitioner 

fired his gun in response to Hodge firing his gun first, thus 

resolving that Petitioner did not act in self-defense. 

 The state appellate court further found unavailing 

Petitioner’s argument that it was an “unfair stretch” to infer 

that a premeditated killing of either victim was a natural and 

probable result of anything he aided and abetted or conspired to 

commit with Coleman. As explained by the California Court of 

Appeal, an aider and abettor will be responsible for the 

collateral offense (in Petitioner’s case, Coleman’s killing of 

Hodge) “if at any time that he does something that directly or 

indirectly aids or encourages the primary actor in the commission 

of a crime, it is reasonably foreseeable that a collateral offense 

may result.” Id. at *7 (quoting Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 531-

32). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, it is clear that a rational trier of fact could have 

found that Petitioner foresaw Coleman’s deliberate and 

premeditated shooting of Hodge. As mentioned above, both 

Petitioner and Coleman exhibited animus against the victims and 

armed themselves with loaded weapons. Cobbs testified that he saw 

Petitioner shoot Wallace first, and that Cobbs later saw Coleman 

fire his rifle in the direction in which he last saw Hodge. Cobbs 

heard the rifle expend its entire capacity at once. Cobbs 

testified that after Petitioner stopped shooting at Wallace, 

Petitioner fired his gun in Hodge’s direction. Coleman left a few 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 20 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

21 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

seconds before Petitioner fired his last shot, and then Petitioner 

took off soon afterwards. Because Petitioner directly aided 

Coleman in the murder of Hodge by shooting in Hodge’s direction, a 

reasonable juror could conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable 

that Coleman’s killing of Hodge would result. Petitioner and 

Coleman “stood together and fought together.” Id. at *7 (quoting 

Luna, 140 Cal. App. 2d at 665). 

 In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, Petitioner has failed to show that no rational 

trier of fact could have found proof that he actually premeditated 

and deliberately murdered either Wallace or Hodge beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

 The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

due process claim alleging insufficient evidence supporting his 

first degree murder convictions was not objectively unreasonable. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled 

to habeas relief on this claim. 

2. Evidence of Multiple–Murder Special Circumstance 

Allegation and Related Instructional Error 

 The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim of 

insufficiency of the evidence as to the multiple–murder special 

circumstance allegation and the related instructional error as 

follows: 

Thompson argues the jury’s true finding that he committed 

multiple murders should be set aside because “absent clearer 

evidence” that he killed or intended to kill both victims, he 

should not be subjected to the multiple murder special 

circumstance. We disagree. Whether the evidence was 

sufficient to subject Thompson to multiple murder special 

circumstance was a question to be resolved by the jury. 

Contrary to Thompson’s contentions, the jury could have 

reasonably found Thompson was the actual killer of Wallace, 

and Thompson’s firing his gun at Hodge, which occurred after 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 21 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

22 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Coleman fired his rifle at Hodge and Hodge returned gunfire, 

aided and abetted Coleman’s killing of Hodge. Thompson’s 

argument that Cobbs’s testimony is “dubious at best” is 

misplaced. “Although an appellate court will not uphold a 

judgment or verdict based upon evidence inherently 

improbable, testimony which merely discloses unusual 

circumstances does not come within that category. 

[Citation.] To warrant the rejection of the statements given 

by a witness who has been believed by a [trier of fact], 

there must exist either a physical impossibility that they 

are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting 

to inferences or deductions. [Citations.] Conflicts and 

even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do 

not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the 

exclusive province of the [trier of fact] to determine the 

credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the 

facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]” 

(People v. Huston (1943) 21 Cal. 2d 690, 693, overruled on 

another ground in People v. Burton (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 328, 

352.) “Because the circumstances reasonably justify the 

jury’s findings, we may not reverse the judgment simply 

because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled 

with defendant’s alternate theories. [Citations.]” (People 

v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 107, 144 (Farnam).) 

We also reject Thompson’s argument that the court 

prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury that in 

order for the multiple murder special circumstance to apply 

to him he had to actually kill or intend to kill both 

victims. Without objection or request for modification, the 

court instructed the jury using language in CALJIC Nos. 

8.80.1 and 8.81.3, as follows: “If you find defendant Willie 

Thompson in this case guilty of murder in the first degree, 

you must then determine if one or more of the following 

special circumstances: is or are true or not true: that 

defendant Thompson has in this proceeding been convicted of 

more than one offense of murder. [¶] The People have the 

burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance. If 

you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special 

circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true. [¶] 

If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a 

human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the 

defendant was the actual killer or an aider and abettor, you 

cannot find the special circumstance to be true as to that 

defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 

that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, 

counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or 

assisted any actor in the commission of the murder in the 

first degree. [¶] . . . [¶] To find that the special 

circumstance referred to in these instructions as multiple 

murder convictions is true, it must be proved: [¶] That 

defendant Thompson has in this case been convicted of at 

least one crime of murder of the first degree and one or more 

crimes of murder of the first or second degree.” 

Thompson argues the instructions were legally incorrect 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 22 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

23 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

because the court failed to instruct the jury that in order 

for the multiple murder special circumstance to apply to him 

he had to actually kill or intend to kill both victims, and 

the language in CALJIC 8.80.1 strongly suggested killing or 

intending to kill one victim was enough. We see no merit to 

the arguments. Consistent with case law interpreting the 

statutory requirements for a multiple murder special 

circumstances allegation (see § 190.2; People v. Anderson 

(1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1149–1150[FN7]), the jury here was 

properly instructed that if it was not clear Thompson was the 

actual killer of “a” human being -- meaning either Wallace or 

Hodge -- the jury had to find Thompson acted with the intent 

to kill by assisting any actor in the commission of “the 

murder in the first degree” of that victim. There is no 

“reasonable likelihood” the jury interpreted the instructions 

as suggested by Thompson. (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal. 

4th 58, 67–68 (Cross).) 

[FN 7:] Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), provides that a 

defendant who is found guilty of murder in first degree may 

be imprisoned in the state prison for life without parole if 

he is found, in the same proceeding, to have been convicted 

of more than one offense of murder in the first or second 

degree. Subdivision (b) of section 190.2 provides that 

“[u]nless an intent to kill is specifically required under 

subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated 

therein, an actual killer, as to whom the special 

circumstance has been found to be true . . . need not have 

had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the 

offense which is the basis of the special circumstance in 

order to suffer . . . confinement in the state prison for 

life without the possibility of parole.” Subdivision (c) of 

section 190.2 provides that “[e]very person, not the actual 

killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, 

commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor 

in the commission of murder in the first degree,” shall be 

punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life 

without the possibility of parole “if one or more of the 

special circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been 

found to be true . . . .” As explained by our Supreme Court 

in People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal. 3d at pp. 1149–1150, 

“the language of . . . [section] 190.2[, subd.] (b) strongly 

supports the reading that intent to kill is not required 

unless the defendant is an aider and abetter rather than the 

actual killer.” The Court “adopt[ed] the following reading 

of the relevant statutory provision [ ]: intent to kill is 

not an element of the multiple-murder special circumstance; 

but when the defendant is an aider and abetter rather than 

the actual killer, intent must be proved.” 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *8-9 (footnote in original). 

 The state appellate court reasonably rejected Petitioner’s 

claim relating to the sufficiency of evidence of the multiple–

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 23 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

24 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

murder special circumstance allegation. Viewing the record in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, there was ample evidence 

upon which to make a true finding that Petitioner committed 

multiple murders. There was testimonial evidence from Cobbs and 

Shahid showing that Petitioner murdered Wallace. There was also 

evidence that, with intent to kill, Petitioner aided and abetted 

Coleman’s murder of Hodge because Cobbs testified that Petitioner 

shot in Hodge’s direction after Coleman fired his rifle at Hodge. 

 Furthermore, the state appellate court was objectively 

reasonable in finding no merit to Petitioner’s arguments that: 

(1) the trial court failed to instruct the jury in order for the 

multiple murder special circumstance to apply to him he had to 

actually kill or intend to kill both victims; and (2) CALJIC No. 

8.80.1 strongly suggested killing or intending to kill one victim 

was enough. First, as part of its evaluation of Petitioner’s 

instructional error claim, the California Court of Appeal 

implicitly determined that the challenged instructions -– CALJIC 

Nos. 8.80.1 and 8.81.3 -- were correct as a matter of state law. 

See id. at *9. A state court’s interpretation of state law, 

including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged 

conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. See 

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 

U.S. 624, 629 (1988). Therefore, the state appellate court’s 

ruling -- that the challenged instructions were correct as a 

matter of state law -– is binding on this Court. See id. The 

state appellate court also concluded that there was no “reasonable 

likelihood” the jury interpreted CALJIC Nos. 8.80.1 and 8.81.3 as 

suggested by Petitioner. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *9. The 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 24 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

25 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

instructions stated that for the jury to find true the multiplemurder circumstance, the jury would have to determine “that 

[Petitioner] has in this proceeding been convicted of more than 

one offense of murder.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added). Moreover, 

the jury was further instructed that if it was not clear that 

Petitioner was the actual killer of “a” human being (i.e., either 

Wallace or Hodge), the jury had to find Petitioner “with the 

intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 

solicited, requested or assisted any actor in the commission of 

the murder in the first degree.” Id. 

 In sum, given the aforementioned evidence, and the doubly 

deferential standard of review, the state appellate court 

reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claim of insufficiency of 

evidence of the multiple–murder special circumstance allegation. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Furthermore, Petitioner’s claim of 

instructional error fails because the state appellate court found 

that the instructions were wholly sufficient under state law, and 

that court’s ruling is binding on this Court. The state appellate 

court further concluded that there was no “reasonable likelihood” 

the jury interpreted the challenged instructions as suggested by 

Petitioner. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief on these claims. 

B. Denial of Motion to Sever or Bifurcate 

 Petitioner alleges the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to sever or bifurcate the counts in the information 

accusing Petitioner and Coleman of being felons in possession of a 

firearm under California Penal Code section 12021. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 25 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

26 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1. Additional Background Facts 

Petitioner joined Coleman’s pre-trial motion to sever counts 

three and four, the charges against each of them respectively for 

being a felon in possession of a firearm under California Penal 

Code section 12021. 2RT 32-33. Counsel additionally argued that 

if severance was denied, bifurcation would be appropriate. 2RT 

34-35. The trial court considered the motion and the arguments, 

and denied both requests, stating as follows: 

It does appear that it’s appropriate to have this Count as to 

each defendant joined with and heard by the jury in the casein-chief. The Courts have recognized, and it appears to be 

the logical recommendation, to not have the particulars of 

the prior in front of the jury by simply having the defense 

stipulate to the fact that there was this prior conviction. 

And pursuant to CALJIC [No.] 12.44, the jury is informed that 

this element of the prior conviction of a felony has been 

already established by stipulation, so that no further proof 

of that fact is required, and that they must accept as true 

the existence of that prior felony conviction. 

The Courts are very concerned about the particulars of a 

prior conviction being in front of the jury. So is this 

Court. So this seems to be an appropriate recommendation. 

The limitation of that information would be only to that 

Count. That element has been satisfied, so clearly the 

severance is not necessary. And, of course, the bifurcation 

would be as far as when economics of the trials is 

considered, that’s one of the considerations. 

Ms. Beles [Coleman’s attorney] is right, it doesn’t require 

an entirely new jury, but it’s consistent with the 9545

 to 

have this be part of the trial of the case-in-chief of the 

prosecution, so I’m not going to bifurcate it as well. As I 

indicated, there’s a ready solution by the stipulation by 

counsel given what kind of prove-up is necessary. It doesn’t 

 5 California Penal Code section 954 is the joinder statute, 

which reads, in relevant part: “An accusatory pleading may charge 

two or more different offenses connected together in their 

commission, . . . or two or more different offenses of the same 

class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts . . . ; 

provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the 

interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its 

discretion order that the different offenses . . . be tried 

separately . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 954. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 26 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

27 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

seem to be an onerous requirement to expect the defense to 

seriously consider the admission in order to keep that from 

the jury. 

2RT 35-36 (brackets and footnote added). 

 As to the events that took place after the trial court denied 

the motion to sever or bifurcate, the Court of Appeal summarized 

the facts relating to this claim as follows: 

. . . After the court denied defendants’ motions, both 

defendants agreed to stipulate they were convicted felons so 

the jury would hear only the fact of their felon status, but 

not the nature of the felony convictions. 

During voir dire, both the court and defense counsel 

questioned prospective jurors concerning their ability to 

consider the fact of defendants’ prior felon status only on 

the firearm possession offenses, and to treat the murder 

charges separately. The trial court dismissed for cause 

prospective jurors who indicated that, among other things, 

they would not be able to consider the charges separately. 

 

As part of the court’s closing instructions, the jury was 

told the elements of the crime of possession of firearm by a 

felon, and that, “In this case, the previous felony 

conviction has already been established by stipulation so 

that no further proof of that fact is required. You must 

accept as true, the existence of this previous felony 

conviction.” The court also told the jury, “There is a 

stipulation by the parties that each defendant was previously 

convicted of a felony. A prior conviction of a felony is an 

essential element of the crime charged, which the prosecution 

is otherwise required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Do 

not speculate as to the nature of the prior conviction. That 

is a matter which is irrelevant and should not enter into 

your deliberations. You must not be prejudiced against a 

defendant because of a prior conviction. You must not 

consider that evidence for any purpose other than for 

establishing a necessary element of the crime charged.” 

Finally, the jury was told, “A person previously convicted of 

a felony does not violate [the law] by being in possession of 

a firearm if: [¶] 1. He as a reasonable person had grounds 

for believing and did believe that he was or others were in 

imminent peril of great bodily harm; and [¶] 2. Without 

preconceived design on his part, a firearm was made available 

to him; [¶] 3. His possession of such firearm was temporary 

and for a period of time no longer than that in which the 

necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense 

continued; and [¶] 4. The use of the firearm was reasonable 

under the circumstances and was resorted to only if no 

alternative means of avoiding the danger was available.” 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *9. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 27 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

28 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2. State Court Opinion 

The Court of Appeal denied this claim, as follows: 

Defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion in 

refusing to sever or bifurcate the trial of the firearm 

possession offenses from the murder offenses because “a 

substantial danger of prejudice” existed at the time the 

motion was heard, requiring the firearm possession offenses 

to be tried separately or tried after the jury considered the 

murder offenses. We disagree with defendants’ contention. 

 

“When the joinder statute (§ 954) would otherwise permit 

consolidation of charges, a trial court should, if requested, 

carefully exercise its discretion whether to try an ex-felon 

count separately ‘in the interests of justice.’ Insofar as 

the particular facts are known pretrial, the court must 

balance the legitimate benefits, judicial and prosecutorial, 

of a consolidated trial against the likelihood that 

disclosure of ex-felon status in a joint trial will affect 

the jury’s verdict on charges to which that status is 

irrelevant.” (People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 170, 

179–180, fn. 3 (Valentine).) Nevertheless, “the burden is on 

the party seeking severance to establish clearly that a 

substantial danger of prejudice exists requiring that the 

charges be tried separately. [Citation.]” (People v. 

Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 926, 985 (Cunningham).) 

“[R]efusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where 

‘(1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be 

cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the 

charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the 

defendant; (3) a “weak” case has been joined with a “strong” 

case, or with another “weak” case, so that the “spillover” 

effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well 

alter the outcome of some or all; and (4) any one of the 

charges carries the death penalty.’ [Citation.]” (Frank v. 

Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 632, 639.) “The first 

criterion is most significant because, if evidence on each of 

the joined charges would have been admissible in a separate 

trial on the other, ‘“any inference of prejudice is 

dispelled.”’ [Citations.]” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal. 4th 

at p. 985.) 

 

We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of the 

motion for a severance. “Because complete crossadmissibility is not necessary to justify the joinder of 

counts [citation], in the present case the cross-admissible 

evidence concerning the [possession of firearms] would 

justify such joinder. [Citation.] The count alleging that 

defendant[s] possessed a firearm as an ex-felon is not 

unusually inflammatory or prejudicial. [Citation.] Nor did 

the joinder append a weak case to a strong one, or combine 

two noncapital cases into a capital case. [Citations.]” 

(Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at pp. 985–986.) “In light 

of the cross-admissibility of the evidence about whether a 

gun was used and by whom in the [murder] charge[s], the 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 28 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

29 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

personal gun-use enhancement[s] and the charge[s] of ex-felon 

in possession of a gun, there is no abuse of discretion shown 

in the trial court’s ruling.” (People v. Gomez (1994) 24 

Cal. App. 4th 22, 28; see People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 

306, 321–322.) 

 

Similarly, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s 

refusal to bifurcate the trial of the firearm possession 

offenses from the murder offenses. As the trial court 

correctly ruled in this case, it had “only two options when a 

prior conviction is a substantive element of a current 

charge: Either the prosecution proves each element of the 

offense to the jury, or the defendant stipulates to the 

conviction and the court ‘sanitizes’ the prior by telling the 

jury that the defendant has a prior felony conviction, 

without specifying the nature of the felony committed.” 

(People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 240, 262.) These two 

option were offered to defendants in this case. Accordingly, 

there was no error. (Ibid; see Valentine, supra, 42 Cal. 3d 

at pp. 179–180, fn. 3.) 

 

Even assuming the court’s ruling was correct when made, 

defendants argue reversal is required because the joint trial 

of the charges “‘actually resulted in “gross unfairness” 

amounting to a denial of due process [,]’ [citation]” and a 

fair trial. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 130, 162.) 

We conclude the argument fails. In the absence of a showing 

it is “reasonably probable” the joinder of the offenses 

affected the jury’s verdict, reversal is not required. 

(People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 919, 940.) Assuming the 

jury accepted the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses, 

there was strong direct and circumstantial evidence linking 

defendants to the murders of Wallace and Hodge. We further 

conclude, for the same reasons discussed in section V., 

infra, that the prosecutor’s closing remarks, when read in 

context, did not so exploit the admission into evidence of 

defendants’ felon status as to require reversal. Finally, a 

strong indication the jury was not influenced by any possible 

spillover affect [sic] of joinder is that during 

deliberations the jury asked for copies of certain exhibits 

relating to both murders, and the jury acquitted Thompson of 

causing Hodge’s death, thereby demonstrating the jury 

apparently viewed and evaluated the evidence on each count 

and sentence enhancement separately as required by the jury 

instructions. (See People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 1041, 

1075.) 

Id. at *10-11 (footnote omitted). 

3. Applicable Federal Law 

 A joinder, or denial of severance, of co-defendants or counts 

may prejudice a defendant sufficiently to render his trial 

fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. Grisby v. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 29 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

30 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997). A federal court 

reviewing a state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not 

concern itself with state law governing severance or joinder in 

state trials. Id. Its inquiry is limited to the petitioner’s 

right to a fair trial under the United States Constitution. Id. 

To prevail, therefore, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 

state court’s joinder or denial of his severance motion resulted 

in prejudice great enough to render his trial fundamentally 

unfair. Id. In addition, the impermissible joinder must have had 

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

 There is a “high risk of undue prejudice whenever . . . 

joinder of counts allows evidence of other crimes to be introduced 

in a trial of charges with respect to which the evidence would 

otherwise be inadmissible.” United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 

1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1986). This risk is especially great when 

the prosecutor encourages the jury to consider the two sets of 

charges in concert, e.g., as reflecting a modus operandi even 

though the evidence is not cross admissible, and when the evidence 

of one crime is substantially weaker than the evidence of the 

other crime. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 

1998). But joinder generally does not result in prejudice if the 

evidence of each crime is simple and distinct (even if the 

evidence is not cross admissible), and the jury is properly 

instructed so that it may compartmentalize the evidence. Id. at 

1085-86; see, e.g., Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638-39 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (denial of motion to sever trial of capital and 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 30 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

31 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

noncapital charges based on separate incidents not a violation of 

due process because evidence was cross-admissible, the weight of 

evidence with respect to each incident was roughly equal, the 

evidence as to each incident was distinct, and the jury was 

properly instructed). Similarly, joinder generally does not 

result in prejudice if the jury did not convict on all counts 

because it presumably was able to compartmentalize the evidence. 

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000). 

4. Analysis 

The state appellate court’s denial of this claim was not 

objectively unreasonable. First, as noted by the state appellate 

court, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

denial of the motion for a severance because: (1) the crossadmissible evidence concerning the possession of firearms would 

justify such joinder; (2) the count alleging that Petitioner 

possessed a firearm as an ex-felon “is not unusually inflammatory 

or prejudicial”; and (3) the joinder neither appended a weak case 

to a strong one, nor combined two noncapital cases into a capital 

case. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *10. Second, the state 

appellate court was also reasonable in finding no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s refusal to bifurcate the trial of 

the firearm possession offenses from the murder offenses. It 

determined that the trial court did not err in presenting two 

options to Petitioner when a prior conviction is a substantive 

element of a current charge: (1) “the prosecution proves each 

element of the offense to the jury”; or (2) “the defendant 

stipulates to the conviction and the court ‘sanitizes’ the prior 

by telling the jury that the defendant has a prior felony 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 31 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

32 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

conviction, without specifying the nature of the felony 

committed.” Id. (citing Sapp, 31 Cal. 4th at 262.) 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s denial of his 

motion to sever or bifurcate resulted in prejudice great enough to 

render his trial fundamentally unfair or that the impermissible 

joinder had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict. See Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370. The 

evidence was brief, strictly limited, relatively mild, and easy to 

compartmentalize. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that the prejudicial effect of the 

admission of the prior was exacerbated by the prosecutor’s misuse 

of that evidence. The record shows that the prosecutor argued 

that the jury had heard Cobbs say that he, and both defendants, 

had routinely stashed guns in “The Village.” 12RT 2414. The 

prosecutor added: “They were both convicted felons, so presumably 

they didn’t want to get pulled over in a car with guns.” 12RT 

2414. The prosecutor’s aforementioned argument violated the trial 

court’s instruction, above, limiting the prior conviction evidence 

to the California Penal Code section 12021 charge. However, the 

state appellate court noted that there were no objections in the 

record to the prosecutor’s statement; therefore, the issue was 

procedurally defaulted and the challenge was forfeited for review. 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *17 (citing People v. Stanley, 39 

Cal. 4th 913, 936 (2006). In any event, the state court found no 

prosecutorial misconduct, which finding was objectively 

reasonable, as discussed below in the section relating to 

Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct. See infra 

Discussion I.D.3. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 32 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

33 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Accordingly, the state appellate court’s adjudication of 

Petitioner’s claim relating to the denial of his motion to sever 

or bifurcate did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled 

to relief on this claim. 

C. Batson Claim 

Petitioner (an African-American) claims that the trial court 

violated his rights to Equal Protection by allowing the prosecutor 

to exclude six prospective jurors, who described themselves as 

Black and/or African–American. 

1. Background Facts 

The parties do not dispute the California Court of Appeal’s 

description of the relevant trial court proceedings, as follows: 

Defendants made a joint motion challenging the prosecutor’s 

use of peremptory challenges against prospective Black and/or 

African–American jurors pursuant to People v. Wheeler (1978) 

22 Cal. 3d 258 (Wheeler) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 

U.S. 79 (Batson). At that point in the voir dire, the 

prosecutor had used 14 of 30 peremptory challenges, and he 

had excused six jurors who self-described themselves as Black 

and/or African–American. There was one self-described Black 

prospective juror who had been passed by all parties and was 

ultimately empanelled on the jury, and there were “a fair 

number of [B]lack jurors that remain[ed] in this jury panel” 

to be questioned by the court and counsel.[FN9] 

[FN9:] Ultimately the jury included two self-described Black 

and/or African–American jurors. 

Outside the presence of the venire panel the court heard 

argument on defendants’ motion. Over the prosecution’s 

objection, the court found defendants had demonstrated a 

prima facie showing giving rise to an inference of 

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecutor 

regarding the six excused jurors who self-described 

themselves as Black and/or African American.[FN10] 

[FN10:] Because the Attorney General does not challenge the 

court’s finding of a prima facie showing of discriminatory 

intent, we do not address the matter on this appeal. We 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 33 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

34 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

express no opinion on whether defendants met their initial 

burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of group bias on 

the part of the prosecutor. 

 

The prosecutor explained his reasons for striking the six 

prospective jurors, as follows: “Juror Number 61 indicated 

that she was unable to follow the rule that the testimony of 

a single witness, if believed, is sufficient to prove any 

fact. In her questionnaire, she indicated that she could not 

follow that rule; that she would need more proof and more 

witnesses. She was given an opportunity, after hearing the 

Court expand upon that rule, to come down from that position, 

and, frankly, she did not. She maintained during oral voir 

dire that she could not accept the testimony of a single 

witness as sufficient to prove a fact. And on that basis, I 

exercised a peremptory challenge of her.[FN11] [¶] Juror 

Number 15 indicated to me in response to a question in oral 

voir dire as to whether or not she could disregard 

consideration of penalty or punishment if selected to serve, 

and she said, quite ambiguously, no. And that in light of 

what I thought was a bizarre explanation of her understanding 

of what it meant to be a thug, that thugs were either demons 

or angels. And her description of a fictional character from 

the Harry Potter series as a person who she greatly admires 

caused me great concern that she might be someone, according 

to her word, who would be plagued by notions of punishment 

and, accordingly, unable to give the prosecution a fair trial 

in this case. [¶] Juror Number 29, I think it was clear, 

and in particular from oral voir dire, he had . . . negative 

views toward police officers, in part based on his personal 

experience, and more specifically, a negative view towards 

Oakland [p]olice officers, based on the illustration he gave 

of his interaction with the police when he reported . . . 

[being] . . . robbed by the Lake. But it was clear that in 

general, he had a very negative view of the Oakland Police 

Department. He, also, called into question the motive of the 

District Attorney’s Office in filing [section] 12021 Counts 

in this case against each Defendant, and seemed to suggest it 

was the product of some trickery or some gamesmanship, and, 

accordingly, he could not give the People in this case a fair 

trial. [¶] Juror Number 25 sat a few days because I wasn’t 

quite certain what I was going to do with her, but what 

troubled me were three things: First, in her questionnaire, 

she indicated she had been fired by Home Depot. And the 

Court asked her to explain why she was fired. And she 

indicated that she was fired over something to do with money. 

And I wasn’t satisfied with her explanation when she tried 

to, I think, show that it wasn’t related to some concern that 

she had stolen. I found her response, frankly, to be 

confusing, and I’m concerned anytime that somebody has been 

terminated from a job. That, in and of itself, is not 

necessarily a problem, but someone who has been terminated 

based on mishandling of money is suggestive of someone who 

may be less than completely honest and somebody I don’t feel 

would be a fair and impartial juror to the prosecution in 

this case. [¶] I, also, am concerned that she had applied 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 34 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

35 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

for work with the Sheriff’s Department in Alameda County and, 

apparently, been rejected. In my experience, people who have 

sought employment in law enforcement only to be rejected 

oftentimes develop an anti-law enforcement bias which derives 

from that rejection. [¶] I, also, as a third point on her, 

it’s one thing to seek a job in corrections because it’s a 

government job and pays good benefits and pays good wages and 

has a good retirement. I think it’s a little unusual when 

someone is drawn to the profession of working with prisoners 

to the extent they make it their college major, and she has a 

degree, I believe, from a university, I believe in Oklahoma, 

in corrections. And to me, that demonstrates a fascination 

with criminals that I find to be troubling, and accordingly, 

I did not feel she would be a fair and impartial juror for 

the prosecution in this case. [¶] As to Juror Number 78, 

two concerns that I have with her. In her questionnaire, she 

said she could not pass judgment; that that was only 

something that God was empowered to do. And although she 

attempted to distinguish, after some questioning by the Court 

and myself, between the notion of finding someone guilty or 

not guilty and notions of passing judgment, I did not find 

her answers to be satisfactory, which is why in questioning 

her, I incorporated the Court’s colloquy with [another 

prospective juror] . . . [who] had been excused previously 

from that seat. She did not satisfy me, in other words, in 

her responses that she truly understood the distinction, or 

that it was a distinction that would have any meaning for 

her. [¶] More importantly, I’m always troubled when someone 

has been prosecuted by the Office that I represent, and in 

this case, Juror Number 78 was prosecuted for welfare fraud 

by the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office and 

sustained a conviction as result of that prosecution. And, 

in my experience, people who have been prosecuted by my 

Office tend to have a negative view of my Office, and 

accordingly, I did not believe she would be a fair and 

impartial juror in this case. [¶] Finally, Juror Number 4 

had serious issues with police officers that derived from a 

few things; one being her relationship, apparently, with an 

Oakland [p]olice officer who, during the course of that 

relationship, albeit in the past, would tell her about all of 

the various and sundry improper and illegal things that he 

did. It would be my concern that she would impute that kind 

of behavior, if she believed him, to the department as a 

whole and would, accordingly, not give a fair hearing to the 

testimony of the Oakland Police Department. [¶] Further, 

she made mention on a number of occasions of the Riders case 

and the opinions she’s formed about the Oakland Police 

Department as a result of the Riders prosecution . . . . I 

find that when people fill out the questionnaire, they have a 

tendency to be a bit more honest about their true feelings 

than they do when they’re responding to oral voir dire in 

open court in front of a large number of strangers. And so 

her attitude, clear attitude, toward police officers, which I 

would describe as a bias against police officers, suggested 

to me she would not be a fair and impartial juror for the 

prosecution in this case.” After the trial court mentioned 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 35 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

36 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

certain comments made by Juror Number 4, the prosecutor also 

added that those comments describing the juror’s description 

of the arrest of her son at Juvenile Hall and “her belief 

that it was somehow improper to arrest him at his job site as 

simply another element tending to indicate a general bias 

against police officers.” Because the prosecutor did not 

take notes of everything said by every prospective juror, the 

prosecutor incorporated into his argument the questionnaires 

and portions of the transcript concerning the oral voir dire 

of each of the challenged jurors. 

[FN11:] Coleman’s appellate counsel could find nothing in the 

reporter’s transcript of the voir dire supporting the 

prosecutor’s rationale for dismissing Juror Number 61. 

Thompson’s appellate counsel makes a similar comment. 

However, it appears that appellate counsel could not locate 

Juror Number 61’s contrary responses because the court 

reporter apparently referred to Juror Number 61 as Juror 

Number 31 at transcript pages 444–448. Based on the juror’s 

responses to questions asked by the court and the prosecutor 

at those pages of the reporter’s transcript, and a review of 

Juror Number 61’s written questionnaire, we are reasonably 

certain that both the prosecutor and the court questioned 

Juror Number 61 about her ability to follow the single 

witness rule after she had initially indicated she could 

follow the rule. 

Coleman’s counsel did not take issue with incorporating the 

record of both the oral voir dire and the questionnaires. 

Nor did counsel raise any challenge to the prosecutor’s 

reasons for excusing the jurors, but noted only she was 

unclear as to how long Juror Number 25 had been sitting 

before her removal. Thompson’s counsel had “next to nothing 

to say,” other than he did not think the credibility of 

police officers would ultimately play any part in the trial 

because the police officers’ testimony would be “rather 

noncontroversial.” 

 

The court denied defendants’ Wheeler/Batson motion after 

finding the prosecutor’s explanations for striking the 

challenged jurors were factually based, legally appropriate, 

and were the actual basis for the challenges. In so ruling, 

the court explained: “As to Juror 61, I did have the same 

concerns with her with regards to following the testimony of 

a single witness rule, and her explanations weren’t 

necessarily satisfactory. And I can see how [the prosecutor] 

had an issue with that juror, particularly given the fact 

that, apparently, this case is going to rest greatly on the 

testimony of a single witness . . . . [¶] As to Juror 15, 

she was a very different sort of personality, and I was 

trying to understand why, in my mind, even though [the 

prosecutor] didn’t indicate it, some of her responses were 

either preceded by, or included, or followed with kind of an 

inappropriate almost laughter, or an attitude that seemed to 

indicate she was somehow minimizing what was going on. And 

that’s what made it more difficult, for instance, to 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 36 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

37 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

understand, and was consistent with some of her explanations 

about thugs, for instance, being demons or angels. It was 

difficult to understand her state of mind. [¶] And, also, 

consistent with the Albus Dumbledore reference of one or two 

people she respects or admires the most, and that, therefore, 

made it more difficult to, also, understand how she viewed 

penalty and punishment, and whether or not she could truly 

disregard that rule that the jury may not consider . . . . 

[¶] Juror 29 was a very strong-willed individual as a labor 

rep, and I believed that . . . although he was clearly 

unhappy about what happened to him with regards to being 

robbed at gunpoint at the Lake, and not necessarily what 

happened that the Oakland Police Department, how they handled 

the case, the real concern that surfaced later was his belief 

that the DA had inappropriately charged Counts Three and 

Four. I spent a long time talking about it, in part because 

I misunderstood one of the key words . . . . But he was 

clearly questioning the motives of the District Attorney’s 

Office in filing the charge, and he was very strong 

about . . . how he was questioning these motives. And as a 

result, I understand how [the prosecutor] had some concerns 

about the state of mind of Juror . . . 29 questioning the 

DA’s motives . . . . [¶] As to Juror 25, . . . I did have 

some serious concerns about her honesty . . . as a result of 

what she was willing to admit about why she was fired by Home 

Depot at two levels: One, it showed there was a clear moral 

turpitude issue of theft from Home Depot; and secondly, it 

appeared she wasn’t being forthcoming about what the real 

issue was. But . . . she wasn’t really honest and open about 

what happened, and that gave me concerns as well on two 

levels. So I can agree with [the prosecutor] as to the fact 

that she wouldn’t be a fair and impartial juror for those 

reasons . . . .[FN12] [¶] Juror 78, . . . [T]he two 

concerns that [the prosecutor] indicated that she did state, 

that she couldn’t pass judgment, and . . . she indicated from 

her questionnaire, her answer to the question is, do you hold 

religious beliefs that might affect your ability or 

willingness to serve in a criminal case, she marked the box 

yes, and explained by saying, ‘Choose not to pass judgment on 

any individual. That is God’s duty.’ And that despite her 

explanation, it was not necessarily a religious belief[, i]t 

may have been based in part on a religious belief, but she, 

actually did not want to. It was her choice rather than a 

feeling there was a religious compulsion not to, even though 

that may have been the original foundation. [¶] And 

clearly, the fact she had been prosecuted by the Alameda 

County DA’s Office for welfare fraud . . . . [¶] Juror 

Number 4[,] . . . the real concern that I had, that I agree 

with [the prosecutor], is the way she views Oakland Police 

Department and officers in general. And, of course, as I 

indicate, our criminal justice system is designed to have 

police officers work with the DA’s office, and I described 

how they investigate [and] submit a police report to the DA’s 

Office. Of course, they become witnesses for the DA in 

attempting to prosecute the case. [¶] And her incredibly 

negative opinion of this individual who worked as a police 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 37 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

38 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

officer, even after she described he committed criminal 

conduct against her, but, also, how he had described not only 

his behavior on the job while on the street, but also, that 

of other Oakland [p]olice officers that he worked with and 

witnessed, and that seemed to be consistent with what she 

indicated was brainwashing, even though she did correct 

it . . . , but she had very, very strong feelings about the 

Oakland Police Department that were completely negative. [¶] 

And she did indicate an inappropriate arrest of her son at 

the job site, which was, of course, connected to law 

enforcement and the DA’s Office filing charges. . . .” 

[FN12:] The trial court did not necessarily accept the 

prosecutor’s additional reasons for striking Juror Number 25, 

namely, that the juror’s college degree in corrections showed 

a “troubling” fascination with criminals, and the rejection 

of her application to work with the Alameda County Sheriff’s 

Department showed she might have an anti-law bias. Because 

the trial court did not base its ruling on those reasons 

given by the prosecutor, “we need not discuss whether th[ose] 

reason[s] for [excusal] [were] genuine.” (People v. Avila 

(2006) 38 Cal. 4th 491, 545, fn. 36 (Avila).) 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *11-13 (footnotes in original). 

2. State Court Opinion 

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant law and 

denied this claim, finding that the trial court did not err when 

it determined that Petitioner failed to prove purposeful 

discrimination in his Batson/Wheeler motion: 

“Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of 

peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on 

race . . . . [Citations.] Such a use of peremptories by the 

prosecution ‘violates the right of a criminal defendant to 

trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of 

the community under article I, section 16 of the California 

Constitution. [Citations.] Such a practice also violates 

the defendant’s right to equal protection under the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 313, 341 

(Bonilla).) 

 

The procedure to evaluate claims of discriminatory use of 

peremptory challenges is the same under both the state and 

federal Constitutions. (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal. 4th at p. 

341.) “There is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory 

challenge is being exercised properly, and the burden is on 

the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible 

discrimination. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) When a defendant 

objects to a prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge, the 

procedure “is settled: ‘First, the defendant must make out a 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 38 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

39 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

prima facie case by “showing that the totality of the 

relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 

purpose.” [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made 

out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to 

explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering 

permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. 

[Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is 

tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the 

opponent of the [peremptory challenge] has proved purposeful 

racial discrimination.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People 

v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 50, 74 (Lancaster), quoting 

Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168.) At issue on 

this appeal is the third step of the analysis. 

 

We initially see no relevance to defendants’ comments that 

some of the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing jurors are “far 

fetched to say the least,” an “overstatement,” “simply 

puzzling,” “unpersuasive,” or “dubious.” At the third stage 

of the analysis, “‘[t]he proper focus . . . is on the 

subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for 

the peremptory challenge, not on the objective reasonableness 

of those reasons.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Adanandus (2007) 

157 Cal. App. 4th 496, 506 (Adanandus).) “‘The party seeking 

to justify a suspect excusal need only offer a genuine, 

reasonably specific, race- or group-neutral explanation 

related to the particular case being tried. [Citations.] 

The justification need not support a challenge for cause, and 

even a “trivial” reason, if genuine and neutral, will 

suffice. [Citations.]’” (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 

48, 74–75.) “‘A reason that makes no sense is nonetheless 

“sincere and legitimate” as long as it does not deny equal 

protection. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stanley 

(2006) 39 Cal. 4th 913, 936 (Stanley).) 

 

We also reject defendants’ related contentions that the court 

failed to make adequate findings regarding the true factors 

motivating the prosecutor’s challenges, a remand for adequate 

findings is required, and de novo review is appropriate 

because the trial court did not conduct a complete and 

thorough analysis. Following the procedure outlined by our 

Supreme Court in People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 602 

(Lenix), the trial court here “considered the prosecutor’s 

reasons for the peremptory challenges at issue and found them 

to be race-neutral; . . . those reasons were consistent with 

the court’s observations of what occurred, in terms of the 

panelist’s statements as well as any pertinent nonverbal 

behavior; and . . . the court made a credibility finding that 

the prosecutor was truthful in giving race-neutral reasons 

for the peremptory challenges.” (Id. at p. 625; see People 

v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 641, 680, fn. 7 (Ledesma).) 

Consequently, “[w]e review the trial court’s ruling on the 

question of purposeful racial discrimination for substantial 

evidence. [Citation.]” (Avila, supra, 38 Cal. 4th at p. 

541.) “As a reviewing court, we presume the [prosecutor] 

use[d] peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner, and 

defer to the trial court’s ability ‘to distinguish bona fide 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 39 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

40 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly 

contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.’ 

[Citation.]” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal. 4th at p. 626.) “So 

long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort 

to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its 

conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.” (People v. 

Burgener (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 833, 864.) As we now discuss, 

defendants’ contentions that there is insufficient evidence 

to support the trial court’s ruling are unavailing. 

 

Specifically, we see no merit to defendants’ arguments that 

the prosecutor’s exclusion of jurors who had negative 

experiences with the criminal justice system was evidence of 

discrimination because police misconduct was not at issue and 

the testimony of the police officers was relatively 

unimportant. (See Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal. 4th at p. 77 

[“no inference of discrimination arises from the removal of a 

prospective juror whose brother had a recent negative 

experience with the criminal justice system”]; Farnam, supra, 

28 Cal. 4th at p. 138 [“close relative’s adversary contact 

with the criminal justice system” is one ground on which the 

prosecutor might reasonably have challenged prospective 

juror]; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 137, 171 (Turner) 

[courts have “repeatedly upheld peremptory challenges made on 

the basis of a prospective juror’s negative experience with 

law enforcement”], overruled on other grounds in People v. 

Griffin (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 536, 555, fn. 5; Wheeler, supra, 

22 Cal. 3d at p. 277, fn. 18 [prospective juror’s disclosure 

of his own conviction or relative’s conviction of a crime and 

current incarceration “has often been deemed to give rise to 

a significant potential for bias against the prosecution”]). 

 

Nor are we persuaded by defendants’ contentions that some of 

the challenged jurors indicated by their responses they would 

be appropriate pro-prosecution jurors. A prospective juror’s 

expression of an ability to put aside personal opinions and 

follow the law does “not signify ... the prosecutor was bound 

to accept [the juror] if reasons apart from group bias 

supported his challenge . . . .” (People v. Cornwell (2005) 

37 Cal. 4th 50, 72, disapproved on another ground in Doolin, 

supra, 45 Cal. 4th at p. 421 & fn. 22; see People v. Watson 

(2008) 43 Cal. 4th 652, 679–680; Avila, supra, 38 Cal. 4th at 

pp. 554–555.) 

 

Also unavailing is defendants’ challenge to the court’s 

ruling based on a comparative analysis of the excused jurors 

and jurors that were ultimately empanelled. Although 

“evidence of comparative juror analysis must be 

considered . . . even for the first time on appeal if relied 

upon by defendant and the record is adequate to permit the 

urged comparisons,” such an analysis “on a cold appellate 

record has inherent limitations.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal. 4th 

at p. 622.) “When a comparative juror analysis is undertaken 

for the first time on appeal, the prosecutor is never given 

the opportunity to explain the differences he perceived in 

jurors who seemingly gave similar answers. [¶] Moreover, 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 40 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

41 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the selection of a jury is a fluid process, with challenges 

for cause and peremptory strikes continually changing the 

composition of the jury before it is finally 

empanelled . . . . ‘The particular combination or mix of 

jurors which a lawyer seeks may, and often does, change as 

certain jurors are removed or seated in the jury box. It may 

be acceptable, for example, to have one juror with a 

particular point of view but unacceptable to have more than 

one with that view. If the panel as seated appears to 

contain a sufficient number of jurors who appear strongwilled and favorable to a lawyer’s position, the lawyer might 

be satisfied with a jury that includes one or more passive or 

timid appearing jurors. However, if one or more of the 

supposed favorable or strong jurors is excused either for 

cause or [by] peremptory challenge and the replacement jurors 

appear to be passive or timid types, it would not be unusual 

or unreasonable for the lawyer to peremptorily challenge one 

of these apparently less favorable jurors even though other 

similar types remain. These same considerations apply when 

considering the age, education, training, employment, prior 

jury service, and experience of the prospective jurors.’ 

[Citation.] [¶] . . . Two panelists might give a similar 

answer on a given point. Yet the risk posed by one panelist 

might be offset by other answers, behavior, attitudes or 

experiences that make one juror, on balance, more or less 

desirable. These realities, and the complexity of human 

nature, make a formulaic comparison of isolated responses an 

exceptionally poor medium to overturn a trial court’s factual 

finding.” (Id. at pp. 623–624.) Because the issue is raised 

for the first time on appeal in this case, our review is 

necessarily circumscribed. We review the trial court’s 

finding “on the record as it stands at the time the 

Wheeler/Batson ruling is made.” (Id. at p. 624.) We see no 

reason to question the trial court’s findings in this case as 

the “examples of ‘comparative’ jurors cited by defendant[s] 

are not truly comparable to those whom the prosecutor 

excused.” (Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal. 4th at p. 679; see also 

Avila, supra, 38 Cal. 4th at p. 547 [a single similarity 

between jurors does not mean the jurors are similarly 

situated for purposes of comparative analysis]; Turner, 

supra, 8 Cal. 4th at pp. 169–170 [court rejected defendants’ 

argument that prosecutor’s justifications for excusing 

prospective jurors should be rejected to the extent other 

non-Black jurors apparently exhibiting the same limitations 

were not excused].) 

Id. at *14-16. 

3. Applicable Federal Law 

The use of peremptory challenges by either the prosecution or 

defense to exclude cognizable groups from a jury may violate the 

Equal Protection Clause. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 41 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

42 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

55-56 (1992). The Supreme Court has held that the Equal 

Protection Clause forbids the challenging of potential jurors 

solely on account of their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 

79, 89 (1986).6 Batson permits prompt rulings on objections to 

peremptory challenges under a three-step process: 

First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case that 

the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of 

race “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives 

rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Batson, 476 U.S. 

at 93-94. 

Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden 

shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation 

for striking the jurors in question. Id. at 97; Wade v. Terhune, 

202 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant 

has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; Wade, 202 F.3d at 1195. To fulfill its 

duty, “the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor’s proffered 

reasons and credibility under ‘the totality of the relevant 

facts,’ using all the available tools including its own 

observations and the assistance of counsel.” Mitleider v. Hall, 

391 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 

831 (9th Cir. 2003). “As part of its evaluation of the 

prosecutor’s reasoning, the court must conduct a comparative juror 

analysis . . . ,” particularly when the state court declined to do 

 6 The California counterpart to Batson is People v. Wheeler, 

22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978). 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 42 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

43 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

so. Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Specifically, where the state court has failed in its duty to 

conduct a comparative juror analysis, such an analysis should be 

undertaken de novo, rather than by remanding the case to the state 

courts to do so. Green v. Lamarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005)). 

Once the federal court has undertaken the comparative juror 

analysis, then the court must reevaluate the state decision in 

light of such analysis and any other evidence pointing toward 

purposeful discrimination in order to determine whether the state 

was unreasonable in finding the prosecutor’s race-neutral 

explanations to be genuine. Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137, 

1148-51 (9th Cir. 2014). 

In evaluating the race-neutrality explanation, the court must 

keep in mind that proof of discriminatory intent or purpose is 

required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See 

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355-62 (1991) (no 

discriminatory intent where Latino jurors dismissed because of 

possible difficulty in accepting translator’s rendition of Spanish 

language testimony). It should also keep in mind that a finding 

of discriminatory intent turns largely on the trial court’s 

evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility. See Rice v. Collins, 

546 U.S. 333, 340-41 (2006); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 830. Because 

determinations of credibility and demeanor of the prosecutor and 

jurors lie “‘peculiarly within [the] trial judge’s province,’” the 

trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent is 

entitled to great deference and must be sustained unless clearly 

erroneous. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-82 (2008) 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 43 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

44 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)); see 

Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 596-98 (2011) (per curiam) 

(reversing Ninth Circuit’s “inexplicable” and “unexplained” 

finding that proffered race-neutral explanations for peremptory 

strikes were insufficient to outweigh evidence of purposeful 

discrimination). 

A federal habeas court need not dwell on the first step of 

the Batson analysis if the matter has proceeded to the second or 

third step. “Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral 

explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has 

ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the 

preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie 

showing becomes moot.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. Once a 

district court has found intentional discrimination (the third 

Batson step), it cannot “reevaluate” that finding based simply on 

a reassessment of the strength of the initial prima facie case. 

United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 897, 906-07 (9th Cir. 

2005) (applying Hernandez and a case upon which it relied, U.S. 

Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 

(1983)). 

The findings of the state trial court on the issue of 

discriminatory intent are findings of fact entitled to the 

presumption of correctness in federal habeas review. See Purkett 

v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995). So are the findings of the 

state appellate court. See Mitleider, 391 F.3d at 1050. Under 

AEDPA, this means that where a challenge to the state court’s 

factual determination is based on extrinsic evidence or evidence 

presented for the first time in federal court, under 28 U.S.C. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 44 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

45 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

§ 2254(e)(1) the state court’s findings of discriminatory intent 

are presumed sound unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by 

clear and convincing evidence. Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d. 351, 

368 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, where review of the state 

court’s factual determination is based entirely on information 

that was contained in the state court record, under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2) the federal court must defer to the state court’s 

conclusion that there was no discrimination unless that finding 

was “‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Cook, 

593 F.3d 816 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)) (even though 

prosecutor gave both persuasive and unpersuasive justifications 

for strikes, court could not conclude state court’s finding of no 

discrimination was objectively unreasonable where review of voir 

dire transcript and juror questionnaires showed the most 

significant justifications in each case were entirely sound); 

Kesser, 465 F.3d at 368 (finding California Court of Appeal’s 

conclusion that a strike was not racially based was unreasonable 

determination under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and “even satisfies 

the more demanding standard” of § 2254(e)(1)). Therefore, a 

federal habeas court can only grant habeas relief “if it was 

unreasonable to credit the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations 

for the Batson challenge.” Rice, 546 U.S. at 338. “[I]n 

evaluating habeas petitions premised on a Batson violation, ‘our 

standard is doubly deferential: unless the state appellate court 

was objectively unreasonable in concluding that a trial court’s 

credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, 

we must uphold it.’” Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1225 (citing Briggs v. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 45 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

46 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012)). The standard is 

demanding, but not insatiable. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240. A 

federal habeas court will not be bound by state court factual 

findings unsupported in the record or refuted by it, for example. 

See e.g., Castellanos, 766 F.3d at 1149-50 (concluding that 

prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons were pretextual after conducting 

comparative analysis and looking at totality of relevant 

circumstances); Kesser, 465 F.3d at 358 (granting writ based upon 

a finding that the California court in “failing to consider 

comparative evidence in the record before it that undeniably 

contradicted the prosecutor’s purported motivations, unreasonably 

accepted his nonracial motives as genuine”). 

4. Analysis 

Because the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of 

intentional discrimination, this Court begins its federal habeas 

review at the second Batson step as to each of the six prospective 

jurors. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. The Court notes that the 

prosecutor offered the above-referenced race-neutral reasons for 

using his peremptory strikes of the six prospective jurors. The 

Court therefore turns to the third Batson step and evaluates 

whether the state appellate court was objectively unreasonable in 

concluding that the trial court’s credibility determination was 

supported by substantial evidence, Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1225, and 

whether there is evidence of purposeful discrimination, see 

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355–62. While the trial court and 

California Court of Appeal only informally reached the third step 

of the Batson analysis, this Court will look further into the 

third step and conduct a comparative juror analysis, and as 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 46 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

47 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

discussed below, it is clear there was no constitutional violation 

and there were proper race-neutral reasons for excusing the six 

prospective jurors.7

a. Prospective Juror Number 61 

 The prosecutor indicated that his reason for a peremptory 

strike as to juror number 61 (an African-American female) was that 

“she was unable to follow the rule that the testimony of a single 

witness, if believed, is sufficient to prove any fact.” 6RT 1071. 

As the prosecutor pointed out, the juror answered the “single 

witness rule question” by writing “no.” 6RT 1071. She further 

added “we would need more prove and witness [sic].” 2 

Supplemental Clerk’s Transcript (“SCT”) 266. The prosecutor 

stated that during oral voir dire, she heard the court expand on 

that rule, and was given the opportunity to “come down from that 

position, and, frankly, she did not.” 6RT 1071. 

 The trial court concurred, stating “I did have the same 

concerns with her, . . . and her explanations weren’t necessarily 

satisfactory.” 6RT 1077. The court stated that it understood how 

the prosecutor would have an issue with the juror, particularly 

“given the fact that, apparently, this case is going to rest 

greatly on the testimony of a single witness.” 6RT 1077. The 

court concluded that the explanation was “factually based and 

legally appropriate . . . .” 6RT 1077. 

 7 Petitioner does not argue that the state courts used an 

improper legal standard. Therefore, the California Court of 

Appeal opinion is entitled to AEDPA deference. See Johnson v. 

Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 47 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

48 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Petitioner does not contest that juror number 61’s inability 

to follow instructions is a valid reason for a challenge, but 

instead he argues that the record does not support the 

prosecutor’s conclusion. Petitioner claims that juror number 61 

answered in the affirmative -- stating “Yeah” -- when asked in 

oral voir dire whether she could accept the testimony of a single 

witness. 2RT 317-318. 

 The record shows that the prosecutor consistently stated: “I 

find that when people fill out the questionnaire, they have a 

tendency to be a bit more honest about their true feelings than 

they do when they are responding to oral voir dire in open court 

in front of a large number of strangers . . . .” 6RT 1075; see 

Collins, 546 U.S. at 341 (prosecutor may reject statements made by 

juror in oral voir dire). The prosecutor and the trial court had 

the first hand opportunity to observe the demeanor and tone of 

juror number 61, and both concluded that the juror’s response did 

not “come down” from the previous “no” answer she gave to the 

question on the written questionnaire. 

After carefully reviewing the record, the Court concludes 

that the state appellate court was not objectively unreasonable in 

concluding that the trial court’s credibility determination was 

supported by substantial evidence. Here, the prosecutor offered 

specific reasons for his challenges, which the trial court found 

credible. The trial court’s credibility determination was 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, and Petitioner 

has not presented clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. These factual findings by the state 

court are therefore presumed correct. Id. Thus, presuming that 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 48 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

49 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenge in a raceneutral manner, the Court finds that there is no evidence of 

discriminatory intent or purpose. 

Furthermore, a comparative juror analysis supports the 

finding that the challenge to juror number 61 was race-neutral and 

the prosecutor’s reason was not pretextual. The prosecutor did 

not use a challenge for another self-described African-American, 

juror number 16, who also answered “no” to the “single witness” 

question. 2SCT 356. When the trial court asked her about the 

“single witness” rule, she stated that she could follow the law. 

2RT 373. She further discussed her answer to the question, which 

included allusions to space aliens. 2RT 373. Nevertheless, when 

he had the chance, the prosecutor did not use a peremptory 

challenge on juror number 16. See 3RT 509 et seq. The juror was 

eventually excused by the court for hardship. 3RT 606. The 

prosecutor’s decision to not use a challenge for juror number 16 

supports the argument that his decision to strike juror number 61 

was race-neutral, and he was not attempting to remove AfricanAmerican jurors. The state appellate court was not objectively 

unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s argument on direct appeal 

that comparative analysis showed a racial motive for the 

prosecutor’s decision to strike juror number 61. 

Petitioner has failed to show purposeful discrimination and 

that the state court opinion was an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, there has been no violation 

of the Equal Protection Clause as to the prosecutor’s use of a 

peremptory strike on juror number 61. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 49 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

50 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

b. Prospective Juror Number 15 

 The prosecutor was concerned that juror number 15 (an 

African-American female) stated unambiguously that she could not 

disregard consideration of penalty or punishment. 6RT 1071. 

Contributing to the fear on the part of the prosecutor were two 

other factors: (1) that she believed “thugs were either demons or 

angels” and (2) that she greatly admired Albus Dumbledore from the 

Harry Potter book series. 6RT 1071. The prosecutor felt the 

aforementioned contributed to the impression that juror number 15 

would be “plagued by notions of punishment,” and unable to give 

the prosecution a fair trial. 6RT 1071. 

 The trial court agreed, noting that all the aforementioned 

factors contributed to an impression that the juror could not 

follow the rule to disregard punishment. 6RT 1078. Thus, the 

court concluded that the prosecutor’s explanations were factually 

based, legally appropriate, and the actual basis for the 

challenge. 6RT 1078. 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner conceded that the prosecutor 

adequately rebutted the inference of group bias as to juror number 

15. Ex. A at 57. Furthermore, Petitioner made no attempt to 

argue that a comparative analysis rebuts the trial court’s factual 

finding that the prosecutor’s explanation was the true basis for 

the challenge and that the challenge was race-neutral. 

 In sum, the juror unambiguously stated she could not 

disregard punishment, and made statements which reasonably gave 

rise in the prosecutor’s mind to the feeling that the juror would 

impose her own standards. Substantial evidence supported the 

court’s ruling that the prosecutor’s reasons were honest, 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 50 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

51 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

factually based and race-neutral. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

Batson claim as to juror number 15 fails to raise an equal 

protection violation based on race. 

c. Prospective Juror Number 29 

 The prosecutor began by questioning juror number 29 (an 

African-American male) regarding the statement in his 

questionnaire about having been arrested and serving probation as 

a young man. 4RT 763-765. Juror number 29 explained that the 

offense happened in rural Georgia, where he believed the police 

and prosecutors were unethical and prejudiced against outsiders. 

4RT 764 et seq. The prosecutor then discussed juror number 29’s 

experiences with police after having been robbed recently in 

Oakland. 4RT 766. Juror number 29 stated, “I have some problems 

with Oakland police.” 4RT 766. He described how a “white cop” 

seemed callous, although a “Latino lady cop” showed a little more 

compassion. 4RT 766-767. Specifically, “the white cop” seemed to 

take it lightly, laughed about the fact that three other people in 

the neighborhood had been robbed within the hour, and said “it was 

funny to him.” 4RT 766. When the prosecutor asked whether that 

experience would affect the juror’s ability to weigh the evidence 

of a police officer, the juror referred to certain questionable 

actions by the police that he had heard about, and concluded, “I 

think it makes it hard for police, to try to believe them 

sometime.” 4RT 767. The juror added, “Some officers I don’t 

think have done right by the community.” 4RT 767. When asked by 

the prosecutor whether that makes it hard for some people to 

believe them, the juror stated “That’s correct.” 4RT 767. When 

asked whether an Oakland police officer testifying would be at a 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 51 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

52 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

disadvantage, the juror stated “I think they may, probably 

would . . . .” 4RT 768. Finally, juror number 29 displayed a 

negative attitude toward the prosecution by stating that he 

believed that the charging of the gun offenses, in addition to the 

murder offenses, was an “unfair” move by the prosecution. 4RT 

780-786. The trial court attempted several times to explain to 

the juror that charging decisions should not be taken into 

account, and that the prosecution may have had good reasons for 

charging the gun offenses. 4RT 780-786. Juror number 29 

eventually concluded that the prosecutor’s charging the gun 

offenses was an invitation to the jury to compromise, and that he 

believed that the trial therefore may well turn out to be “unfair 

because of what the DA did.” 4RT 786. 

 As mentioned above, the prosecutor explained that he 

exercised his peremptory challenge as to juror number 29 because 

of his negative view towards the Oakland Police Department, which 

was the department that handled Petitioner’s case. 6RT 1072. The 

prosecutor also noted that juror number 29 called into question 

the prosecutor’s motive for filing the felon with a gun counts. 

6RT 1072. The trial court concluded that the prosecutor’s 

explanation was the true basis for the challenge and that the 

challenge was factually based and race-neutral. 6RT 1078-1079. 

 Under California law, doubts about the veracity of police 

officers, stemming from personal experience, justify a peremptory 

challenge. People v. Avila, 38 Cal.4th 491, 546-47 (2006). 

Negative experiences with police alone is also a race-neutral 

explanation sufficient to withstand a Batson challenge. See Cook 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 52 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

53 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2010) (prior negative 

experiences with law enforcement). 

 After reviewing the record and the analysis of the state 

courts, it is evident that the prosecution’s reasons for striking 

juror number 29 were not pretextual. Petitioner has not shown 

clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the 

trial court’s determination was correct. A comparative juror 

analysis further supports this conclusion. Petitioner has not 

presented any statements from seated jurors that are truly 

comparable to those of juror number 29. Ex. A at 57-58. Instead, 

the record shows a comparative juror analysis involving seated 

juror numbers 4 and 6 supports the finding that the challenge to 

juror number 29 was race-neutral. First, the written statement in 

the juror questionnaire by seated juror number 4 that she would 

not automatically believe the testimony of a law enforcement 

officer, with the parenthetical “(Mark Furman),” and her statement 

that she had a negative experience in getting two speeding tickets 

in the last ten years, are remarks that do not compare to the 

magnitude of those of prospective juror number 29. 1SCT at 54, 

57. Meanwhile, while seated juror number 6 stated in his 

questionnaire that prosecutors “occasionally go over the line, 

especially if they have political aspirations, e.g. Elliot 

Spitzer,” 1SCT 87, in oral voir dire, that prospective juror 

emphasized that this opinion would not affect his ability to be a 

fair and impartial juror, and that he had no general negative 

feelings about prosecutors. 6RT 1188-1189. This contrasted 

starkly with the responses of juror number 29, who never relented 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 53 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

54 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

in his belief that the prosecutor in this very case was being 

unfair. 

 Accordingly, the prosecutor proffered race-neutral reasons 

for excusing juror number 29, and there is no evidence of 

discrimination after looking to the seated jurors who gave 

arguably similar answers. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate any unreasonable application of established Supreme 

Court authority, and his Batson claim is denied as to juror number 

29. 

d. Prospective Juror Number 25 

 The prosecutor had three concerns about juror number 25 (an 

African-American female); the first was that she had been fired 

from Home Depot for mishandling a cash transaction. 3RT 635; 6RT 

1072. The prosecutor found juror number 25’s explanation 

“confusing,” and stated that he was “concerned” because it 

suggested someone who was not completely honest and who could not 

be fair to the prosecution. 6RT 1071-1073. The prosecutor’s 

belief that the juror may have been dishonest, both at her job and 

in her explanation to the prosecutor, made it difficult for the 

prosecutor to trust the juror’s other answers, justifying the 

challenge. See Cook, 593 F.3d at 823 (preemptory used to strike 

juror who misrepresented salient facts of criminal experience to 

court; stated reason was not pretext, and race was not substantial 

or motivating factor for strike). 

 Second, the prosecutor was concerned about the juror’s 

written statement that she had applied for law enforcement jobs, 

including at the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, but had been 

rejected. 3RT 637; 6RT 1073. The prosecutor stated that those 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 54 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

55 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

who have such an experience “oftentimes develop an anti-law 

enforcement bias which derives from that rejection.” 6RT 1073. 

Hostility toward law enforcement or the prosecution that 

reasonably might flow from a job rejection is a valid race-neutral 

reason for a challenge. 

 Finally, the prosecutor noted that juror number 25’s 

university degree in corrections, pursuit of a job in corrections, 

and “fascination with criminals” was “troubling” and he “did not 

feel she would be a fair and impartial juror for the prosecution 

in this case.” 3RT 638-639; 6RT 1073. However, 

the state appellate court chose not to discuss whether these 

reasons for recusal were genuine because the trial court did not 

base its ruling on such reasons. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at 

*13 n.12. 

 Petitioner again fails to rebut the trial court’s factual 

finding that the prosecutor’s explanation was the true basis for 

the challenge and that the challenge was race-neutral. 

Accordingly, there has been no violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause as to Petitioner’s Batson claim relating to juror number 

25. 

e. Prospective Juror Number 78 

 The prosecutor noted two problems with juror number 78 (an 

African-American female): (1) in her written questionnaire she 

stated that could not pass judgment on any individual because that 

is “God’s duty”; and (2) she had been prosecuted for welfare 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 55 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

56 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

fraud8 by the prosecutor’s own district attorney’s office. 6RT 

1073-1074. The trial court affirmed the prosecutor’s impression 

that juror number 78 had not disavowed her original statement of 

unwillingness to pass judgment, and acknowledged the prosecutor’s 

reasonable unease with his office’s having prosecuted the juror. 

6RT 1080. Here, Petitioner has not shown clear and convincing 

evidence to rebut the presumption that the trial court’s 

determination was correct, or shown why this Court should favor 

Petitioner’s interpretation of the record over the trial court’s 

credibility determination. See Mitleider, 391 F.3d at 1048–49 

(reluctance to serve on jury is legitimate reason to strike 

juror); United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(perceived hostility toward government is a valid factor). 

 A comparative juror analysis further does not raise an 

inference of discrimination. The record supports a finding that 

none of the seated jurors was similarly situated to the juror 

number 78. On direct appeal, Petitioner attempted to challenge 

the prosecutor’s reasons with comparative analysis, but apparently 

could find no similar statement of ambiguous unwillingness to 

judge by any other juror on the panel. Ex. A at 59. The Court 

therefore focuses on Petitioner’s challenge to the second reason 

given by the prosecutor, in which he claimed on direct appeal that 

certain seated jurors had similar experience with the District 

Attorney’s Office. Id. For example, seated juror number 11 

 8 On being asked about her criminal conviction, juror number 

78 stated that she was prosecuted for welfare fraud in Alameda 

County, and received a misdemeanor conviction as a result of a 

plea bargain, which resulted in a two-week jail term, restitution, 

and a term of probation. 5RT 957-958. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 56 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

57 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(initially prospective juror number 73 and a self-described 

“Mexican” male) stated that he spent three days in jail after he 

pleaded no contest to a domestic violence charge. 2RT 382, 1SCT 

151, 159. The fact that seated juror number 11 had this 

experience is not conclusive evidence that the only factor 

differentiating him from the challenged juror number 78 was race. 

Numerous other factors are present. First, unlike juror number 

78, seated juror number 11 did not have any other disqualifying 

factors, and in particular did not state in his questionnaire that 

he held any religious beliefs that might affect his ability to 

serve as a juror. 1SCT 155. Next, seated juror number 11’s 

prosecution was initiated by his ex-wife, not by the police or an 

outside government agency as was the case with juror number 78. 

1SCT 159; 2RT 382-383. Seated juror number 11 expressly blamed 

his defense attorney who “wasn’t prepared,” but said “everyone 

treated [him] fairly.” 2RT 383. Juror number 78 also did not 

have the mitigating factor present in seated juror number 11’s 

history of having been the victim of a violent crime in Oakland, 

i.e., seated juror number 11 had been carjacked at gunpoint three 

years prior. 2RT 380-382. Seated juror number 11 stated that he 

reported the incident to the police, they investigated it, and, 

while they did not catch the carjacker, they found the car the 

following day. 2RT 381. Seated juror number 11 claimed that 

nothing about the carjacking incident affected his ability to be 

fair and impartial. 2RT 381. The prosecutor may have judged that 

such an experience would outweigh any previous resentment of the 

police the juror might have felt from being arrested for the 

domestic violence charge. See 2RT 380-382. For all of these 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 57 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

58 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

reasons, the experiences of the two jurors were not comparable. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s attempt to use comparative analysis to 

challenge the prosecutor’s second reason as to seated juror number 

11 is, at best, inconclusive, not clear and convincing as required 

by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner further attempted to challenge 

the prosecutor’s second reason by stating that juror number 78’s 

conviction for welfare fraud is “nothing short of pedestrian among 

these panelists and their family members” and cited certain 

portions of the record. Ex. A at 59. Petitioner cited “2RT 250-

258,” and only one juror (juror number 57) in those pages 

indicated any negative experience with the Oakland Police 

Department, and that juror was immediately excused for cause. 2RT 

258. Next, Petitioner cited the voir dire of juror numbers 65, 

21, 7, 49, and 10, but because these were not seated jurors, any 

comparison is unconvincing; it is not clear that the prosecutor 

would not have challenged them had it been necessary to do so. 

See 2RT 408, 438; 3RT 515-520; 4RT 728; 4RT 751-752; 5RT 998; see 

People v. Lenix, 44 Cal. 4th 602, 631 (2008); see also Cook v. 

Lamarque, 593 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2010) (comparative analysis 

requires “side-by-side comparisons” of the minority panelists who 

were struck and the white panelists who were allowed to serve). 

Meanwhile, certain seated jurors or their family members were 

either cited or arrested: (1) seated juror number 8 was cited for 

discharging a firearm in a restricted area and successfully 

defended himself in federal court, 3RT 548-552; (2) seated juror 

number 1 received a citation for holding a beer in public twentyfive years ago, 4RT 834; and (3) the son of alternate juror number 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 58 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

59 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 was arrested due to a “drug problem,” 1SCT 219. However, all 

the aforementioned instances are distinguishable from the 

prosecutor’s uneasiness with the prosecution of juror number 78 by 

his own office. 

 Taking all the aforementioned into account, the Court 

concludes that Petitioner has not shown that his constitutional 

rights were violated, and that the state appellate court’s 

decision was “plainly not unreasonable.” Felkner, 562 U.S. at 

598. At a minimum, Petitioner’s Batson claim relating to juror 

number 78 is denied because he has failed to show that there was 

“no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). That is, 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

f. Prospective Juror Number 4 

 The prosecutor stated that juror number 4 (an African 

American female) had “serious issues with police officers,” which 

stemmed from being in a relationship with an Oakland police 

officer who apparently participated in “improper and illegal” 

acts. 6RT 1074. The prosecutor further noted that juror number 4 

made a reference to the “Riders” cases,9 and to the opinions she 

has formed about Oakland Police Department. 6RT 1074. The 

 9 Delphine Allen, et al. v. City of Oakland, et al., 

consolidated case number C00-4599 TEH (JL) is known as the 

“Riders” cases, which dealt with a suit against four police 

officers who worked the night shift in West Oakland (the selfnamed “Riders”) and allegedly abused their authority by using 

unlawful force, planting evidence and fabricating police reports. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 59 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

60 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

prosecutor noted that, while she tried to back away from the 

implications of the “Riders” cases in oral voir dire, he tended to 

believe her bias against police officers in her written 

questionnaire. 6RT 1075. The prosecutor also noted juror number 

4’s belief that her son was improperly arrested at his jobsite. 

6RT 1075-1076. The trial court stated that it agreed with the 

prosecutor’s opinion that juror number 4’s views about the Oakland 

Police Department were a serious concern. 6RT 1080. The court 

noted the juror’s “incredibly negative opinion” of the Oakland 

police officer with whom she had had a relationship, who committed 

crimes against her, and who described the misbehavior of his 

fellow officers and himself on the job. 6RT 1081. The court 

further noted that these experiences showed that she had “very, 

very strong feelings about the Oakland Police Department that were 

completely negative.” 6RT 1080-1081. 

 These concerns were borne out by juror number 4’s voir dire. 

She stated she believed there was a lot of corruption in the 

Oakland Police Department, and referred to the “Riders” cases. 

See 5RT 982-984, 4SCT 989. The Oakland Police Officer she was in a 

relationship with pulled a gun on her and told her to take her 

clothes off, and that incident ended their relationship. 5RT 967. 

Twenty years later, juror number 4 came to believe that same 

officer had been involved with the murder of a woman. 5RT 967-

968. She stated that police officers were “brainwashed,” meaning 

they believe that “[e]verybody is guilty until proven 

innocent . . . .” 5RT 966. Finally, juror number 4 claimed that 

her son was arrested and falsely accused, and the charges were 

dropped for “insufficient cause.” 5RT 977-980. Juror number 4 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 60 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

61 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

believed her son was “treated unfair[ly]” by the criminal justice 

system. 5RT 979. All of this negative experience with law 

enforcement was an acceptable reason to strike juror number 4. 

See Mitleider, 391 F.3d at 1048–49. Furthermore, that a potential 

juror has a relative who has been convicted of a crime and is 

dissatisfied with how that relative has been treated are raceneutral reasons for striking that juror. See, e.g., id. at 1048 

(brother’s conviction for cocaine possession was facially neutral 

reason for challenging juror); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 

443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987) (“reasonable” to challenge black juror 

whose brother was in prison for armed robbery), overruled on other 

grounds by Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 

The state court found that the prosecutor’s statement of reasons 

was race-neutral and was “the actual basis for the challenge.” 

6RT 1081. 

 There is no merit to Petitioner’s argument that the 

prosecution was motivated by race because seated juror numbers 4 

and 6 also had negative experiences with law enforcement, and 

other retained jurors had family or friends who had been arrested 

or convicted of a crime. See Ex. A at 59-60. As to seated juror 

numbers 4 and 6, the Court has discussed above how these seated 

jurors’ mild negative experiences with law enforcement and 

prosecutors contrasted with the responses of juror number 29, who 

believed the prosecutor in Petitioner’s case was being unfair. 

Here, there is an even starker contrast between prospective juror 

number 4’s “completely negative” experiences with the Oakland 

Police Department and seated juror numbers 4 and 6’s experiences. 

Similarly, the Court has found unavailing Petitioner’s comparative 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 61 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

62 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

juror analysis argument relating to juror number 78’s conviction 

for welfare fraud; for the same reasons, it finds unavailing 

Petitioner’s argument that “the prosecutor’s assertion of [juror 

number 4’s] son’s bare arrest on an unfounded accusation as 

indicative of bias is dubious for the reasons set forth in 

connection with Juror No. 78.” See Ex. A at 60. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his Batson claim 

relating to prospective juror number 4. 

 In sum, the state appellate court was not unreasonable in 

finding that the prosecution’s reasons for striking prospective 

juror numbers 61, 15, 29, 25, 78 and 4 were not pretextual. The 

Court concludes that the state appellate court’s rejection of 

Petitioner’s Batson claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor 

was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

 Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct 

based on the following three allegedly improper and prejudicial 

arguments: (1) characterizing Petitioner and Coleman as pack 

animals stalking their prey; (2) referring to their status as 

convicted felons; and (3) appealing to the jury’s passions and 

prejudices. 

1. Applicable Federal Law 

 Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus. The appropriate standard of review is the narrow one of 

due process, not a broad exercise of supervisory power. Darden v. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 62 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

63 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). A defendant’s due process 

rights are violated when a prosecutor’s misconduct renders a trial 

“fundamentally unfair.” Id. Under Darden, the first issue is 

whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper; if so, the next 

question is whether such conduct infected the trial with 

unfairness. Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005); 

see also Deck v. Jenkins, 768 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(recognizing that Darden is the clearly established federal law 

regarding a prosecutor’s improper comments for AEDPA review 

purposes). The court decides a prosecutorial misconduct claim “on 

the merits, examining the entire proceedings to determine whether 

the prosecutor’s remarks so infected the trial with unfairness as 

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995). In 

determining whether the misconduct violated due process, a court 

may take into account the weight of the evidence of guilt, whether 

the misconduct relates to a critical part of the case, whether the 

prosecutor’s comment misstates or manipulates the evidence, and 

whether the defense invited the error. United States v. Young, 

470 U.S. 1, 19 (1985). Another factor in determining if 

misconduct amounted to a violation of due process is whether the 

trial court issued a curative instruction. When a curative 

instruction is issued, a court presumes that the jury has 

disregarded inadmissible evidence and that no due process 

violation occurred. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 

(1987). This presumption may be overcome if there is an 

“overwhelming probability” that the jury would be unable to 

disregard evidence and a strong likelihood that the effect of the 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 63 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

64 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

misconduct would be “devastating” to the defendant. See id. 

 In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct warrants 

habeas relief, the reviewing federal court should examine whether 

the error had a substantial and injurious influence upon the 

jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

2. Comparison of Petitioner and Co-Defendant’s 

Behavior to Animals 

a. Background Facts 

Petitioner first cites comments by the prosecutor comparing 

Petitioner’s and Coleman’s herding and stalking of the victims to 

the hunting behavior of animals: 

And [the victims] don’t get far because the armed WL 

[Petitioner] and Moon[ie] [Coleman] begin to pursue them -- 

the way lionesses pursue their prey, the way wolves stalk 

caribou -- working as a team, WL on the flank, Moon[ie] 

coming up from behind. Not solitary predators like tigers, 

but pack animals hunting as a team – aiding and abetting each 

other, strength in numbers, employing a group strategy to 

achieve a common goal. 

12RT 2415. 

Defense counsel for Petitioner and Coleman told the jury in 

closing argument that such remarks accused Petitioner and Coleman 

of being animals, and both pointed out that neither Petitioner nor 

Coleman was an animal. See 12RT 2447 (Petitioner’s counsel), 12RT 

2477-2479 (Coleman’s counsel). The prosecutor responded in his 

closing with indignation, pointing out that he had not called them 

animals, stating: “They are not [animals]. They are men. You 

see, animals are not responsible in our criminal justice system 

for doing what nature dictates, as animals, that they do.” 12RT 

2544. The prosecutor continued that the hunting analogy was 

“absolutely appropriate because it describes their behavior. But 

as men, not as animals, they are accountable for their behavior.” 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 64 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

65 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Ibid. 

b. State Court Opinion 

The California Court of Appeal rejected the claim as follows: 

Defendants argue the prosecutor committed prejudicial 

misconduct by “repeatedly characteriz[ing] [defendants] as 

pack ‘animals’ stalking their prey up the street.” However, 

defendants’ failure to object to the comments forfeits any 

challenge on appeal. “‘[A] defendant may not complain on 

appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion 

-- and on the same ground -- the defendant made an assignment 

of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to 

disregard the impropriety. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(Stanley, supra, 39 Cal. 4th at p. 952.) In any event, we 

see no prejudicial misconduct. 

 “‘“[C]ounsel during summation may state matters . . . which 

are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common 

experience, history or literature.” [Citation.] “A 

prosecutor may ‘vigorously argue his case and is not limited 

to “Chesterfieldian politeness” [citation], and he may ‘use 

appropriate epithets . . . .’”’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Williams (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 153, 221.) Here, the 

prosecutor’s analogizing defendants’ conduct to the behavior 

of animals hunting prey was consistent with the People’s 

theory -- that defendants armed themselves with loaded 

firearms and followed the victims as they were attempting to 

leave The Village to avoid trouble with defendants. (See 

People v. Jones (1970) 7 Cal. App. 3d 358, 362 [prosecutor’s 

remarks that defendant had “animalistic tendencies” and 

“felonious tendencies” were within bounds of legitimate 

argument and not misconduct as the attack on the victim was 

“indeed felonious and consistent with animalistic tendencies, 

i.e., pursuit and vicious attack without provocation”]; see 

also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 614, 665–666 

[court found nonprejudicial prosecutor’s use of numerous 

epithets and derogatory language in closing argument, 

including references to defendant as “that animal”].) 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *17. 

c. Analysis 

 Respondent contends that Petitioner’s first claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct is procedurally defaulted because at 

trial neither an objection to the alleged misconduct, nor a 

request for an admonition, was made. Doc. no. 7 at 47. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 65 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

66 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner makes no response to the procedural bar asserted by 

Respondent. 

 A federal court, as a matter of comity and federalism, will 

not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if 

the decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent 

of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. See 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). In cases in 

which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state 

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural 

rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the 

prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or 

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750. The Ninth 

Circuit has held that a federal court cannot review a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct if the petitioner has procedurally 

defaulted the claim by failing to make a contemporaneous objection 

in the trial court. See Jackson v. Giurbino, 364 F.3d 1002, 1006–

07 (9th Cir. 2004). Because this is precisely what happened here, 

and because Petitioner has not attempted to show cause and 

prejudice or that failure to consider his prosecutorial misconduct 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, this 

Court is barred from considering Petitioner’s first claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

 Even if Petitioner’s claim were not procedurally defaulted, 

it would fail on the merits. As noted above, the state appellate 

court found that Petitioner had failed to preserve his first 

prosecutorial misconduct claim for appeal, but went on to reject 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 66 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

67 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the claim on its merits. The prosecutor’s challenged argument 

here was not of the type that necessarily infects a trial with 

such unfairness that a resulting conviction violates due process, 

because it was a description of the concerted actions by 

Petitioner and Coleman, related to the evidence admitted at trial, 

and did not manipulate or misstate the evidence. See Darden, 477 

U.S. at 182. Thus, the state appellate court reasonably rejected 

Petitioner’s first prosecutorial misconduct claim, consistent with 

applicable Supreme Court precedent, and no relief is available. 

Finally, any error was harmless under Brecht. 

3. Reference to Petitioner’s and Coleman’s Status as 

Felons 

a. Background Facts 

 As mentioned above with respect to Petitioner’s claim that 

the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever or bifurcate, 

Petitioner takes issue with the prosecutor’s misuse of the prior 

conviction evidence. See supra Discussion I.B. The exact 

argument made by the prosecutor was as follows: 

You heard Matthew [Cobbs] talk about stashing guns in the 

village, he had seen WL [Petitioner] and Moon[ie] [Coleman] 

stash guns before. They were both convicted felons, so 

presumably they didn’t want to get pulled over in a car with 

guns. Matthew saw no guns in the car, he certainly would 

have seen that rifle. 

12RT 2414. 

b. State Court Opinion 

As with Petitioner’s first prosecutorial misconduct claim, 

the state appellate court determined that both defense counsel’s 

failure to object to the aforementioned argument procedurally 

defaulted the second prosecutorial misconduct claim relating to 

the prosecutor’s reference to Petitioner’s status as a convicted 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 67 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

68 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

felon. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *18. Even so, the court 

still found no due process violation, stating: 

Both defense counsel listened to the prosecutor’s closing 

remarks and did not object to the remarks, which suggests 

“‘“the potential for [prejudice] argued now was not apparent 

to one on the spot.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Young (2005) 

34 Cal. 4th 1149, 1203 (Young).) Additionally, the court 

instructed the jurors to consider the evidence of defendants’ 

felon status for a limited purpose, and any statements made 

by counsel that conflicted with the court’s instructions must 

be disregarded. In the absence of any indication to the 

contrary, we presume the jury followed the court’s 

instruction to consider defendants’ status as convicted 

felons only on the issue of whether they were guilty of 

possessing firearms as felons. 

Id. at *17. 

c. Analysis 

 On the whole, the prosecutor’s comment that Petitioner and 

Coleman were felons cannot be said to have “so infect[ed] the 

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial 

of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. The fact that 

Petitioner and Coleman were felons had little impact on the case. 

The testimony of Cobbs, one of the primary prosecution witnesses, 

revealed that The Village was a high-crime neighborhood where he 

needed to protect himself from “people coming there [and] 

shooting.” 9RT 1850. Cobbs himself admitted to having multiple 

felony convictions. 9RT 1842-1843. Cobbs further testified that 

he habitually hid guns in The Village because he was often stopped 

by the police and frisked, and he did not want to have a gun in 

his possession when he was frisked. 9RT 1851-1852. Further, 

Cobbs testified that he had seen both Petitioner and Coleman stash 

guns in The Village. 9RT 1881. The prosecutor’s comment that 

Petitioner and Coleman were convicted felons, who did not want to 

be pulled over in a car with guns, helped to explain why they 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 68 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

69 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

chose to stash their guns in the bushes in The Village. 

Accordingly, the fact that the prosecutor mentioned that 

Petitioner and Coleman had been convicted of some undated, 

unspecified felony would not have inflamed the jury against them. 

Further, the comment was never again highlighted or brought to the 

jury’s attention. 

 As mentioned above, the jury was eventually instructed on the 

elements of the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm 

under California Penal Code section 12021, and as part of those 

instructions, the jury was told of Petitioner’s stipulation that 

he “has suffered a prior conviction as alleged” in the 

information. 12RT 2594-2595. The trial court instructed the jury 

that the previous felony conviction, having been established by 

stipulation, was proved, and that the jury must accept it. 12RT 

2594. As part of those instructions, the court also instructed 

the jury: 

Do not speculate as to the nature of the prior conviction. 

That is a matter which is irrelevant and should not enter 

into your deliberations. You must not be prejudiced against 

a defendant because of a prior conviction. You must not 

consider that evidence for any purpose other than for 

establishing a necessary element of the crime charged. 

12RT 2595. 

 The state appellate court acknowledged that the trial court 

had given the instructions that the jurors consider the evidence 

of defendants’ felon status for a limited purpose and that any 

statements made by counsel that conflicted with the court’s 

instructions must be disregarded. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at 

*17. The state appellate court then presumed that the jury 

followed the court’s instructions, and thus rejected this claim. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 69 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

70 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his 

prosecutorial misconduct claim relating to the comment on his 

status as a felon because the state appellate court’s rejection of 

this claim cannot be said to have been objectively unreasonable. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

4. Appeals to Jurors to Do Justice 

a. Background Facts 

Finally, Petitioner points to the prosecutor’s argument that 

the jury had a responsibility to do justice. As shown in the 

excerpt below, the argument elicited objections from both defense 

counsel, an admonition from the trial court, and a response by the 

prosecutor: 

MR. LAMIERO: . . . And I ask you for justice. Not 

necessarily for Dante Wallace or Ronnell Hodge, I don’t know 

what justice would matter to them. You know, we are not in 

the metaphysical realm, we’re here with our feet on the 

ground, so I don’t even begin to even understand what justice 

could mean to them or to their memory. 

But you know a lot of decent people live in that very 

troubled village, some of them came in and you had an 

opportunity to meet them –- Ms. Shahid, the Wallaces -– 

people that work hard, do the right thing, and live in a 

community plagued by criminals, plagued by gunfire, plagued 

by killing. And you have learned that in this trial about 

the Village, you learned about the frequency of the gunshots, 

you learned about the shootings and the aftermath of the 

shootings. 

Well, who is it that gets to decide the quality of life in a 

given community? Is it people like WL [Petitioner] and 

Moon[ie] [Coleman]? Do they get to decide what kind of a 

community people are going to live in, where they have people 

being gunned down outside their windows in the middle of the 

night, where they see their children dying in the street, is 

that who gets to decide? And is that the kind of society we 

want to have where communities are just sort of left to the 

plague of gun violence? 

See, I ask you for justice in and of itself. Justice is an 

appropriate and a laudable goal. But think about those folks 

who will go home to the Village tonight. I ask you for 

justice as representatives of a community, which is what you 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 70 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

71 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

are, you’re representatives of this community. 

You don’t live in the Village, but you are drawn from the 

broader community, and you have a responsibility. And the 

responsibility is to make a decision in this case that is 

just and appropriate. It’s based on the evidence presented, 

and you have an opportunity to make the right decision and to 

communicate through that decision a message to not only these 

men but the community that they and those like them have so 

terribly plagued. 

MR. COLE: Your Honor, I have to object. 

MS. BELES: I object. 

MR. COLE: This is an appeal to passion and prejudice about 

sending messages to people -- 

MS. BELES: Join. 

MR. COLE: -- it has nothing to do with the law. 

THE COURT: As I told you before, you are the judges of the 

facts, and it’s your decision as to what the facts are as 

they may apply to the elements of the offenses. 

And go ahead, Mr. Lamiero. 

MR. LAMIERO: It has everything to do with your responsibility 

as representatives of the community. So I ask you for, I ask 

you for justice in this case. And with that, I thank you. 

12RT 2419-2421. 

Defense counsel for Petitioner and Coleman did not request 

the trial court to further admonish the jury to disregard the 

prosecutor’s comments, and instead counsel each rebutted these 

comments in their arguments, Petitioner’s counsel stated as 

follows: 

The system produces justice. It is not anybody’s role and 

not your role to decide, oh, well, we’re going to do justice 

here. What you are supposed to do is decide what the facts 

are and apply the law. 

Once anybody in this courtroom decides that they are going to 

administer justice, they are engaging in a -– they are doing 

something that could take the whole system off track. 

And so this is not about you sending messages or me or the 

Court or anybody else sending messages to anybody. This is 

not about the situation out in this community. This is about 

these two men and whether this district attorney has 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 71 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

72 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

presented enough evidence to persuade you beyond a reasonable 

doubt that these two men committed the crimes that they are 

accused of. 

That’s what everybody’s role is, nobody here is Western 

Union. There used to be -– I forget what the context was –- 

you want to send a message, talk to Western Union. This is 

not about sending messages or curing the ills of this 

society. This is about whether these two guys have been 

proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Now, that is what’s going on. 

12RT 2423. 

Coleman’s counsel responded similarly, stating in part: 

This case is not about cleaning up Oakland, it’s not about 

cleaning up a neighborhood, it’s not about sending a message. 

It’s trying to figure out to the best of our ability whether 

we can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was 

committed. 

12RT 2469. 

Finally, the prosecutor responded in his rebuttal closing 

argument by admitting that he “always hate[s] it when, you know, 

in a murder case [he] gets up and [he] talk[s] about the 

responsibilities of a jury as representatives of that community.” 

12RT 2550. He then also pointed out that defense counsel “hate 

that.” 12RT 2550. He then concluded by stating: 

. . . Well, you know, it’s kind of just the way it is, it’s 

true. That’s our system of justice. And, yes, I do ask you 

for justice, because in this case justice is holding these 

men accountable for their transgressions in our community. 

And so I ask you to find these defendants guilty not only 

because that is what the evidence has shown, but because of 

the fact that the evidence has shown that makes only guilty 

verdicts a just and appropriate outcome in this trial. 

So I thank you. 

12RT 2550-2551. 

The trial court further instructed the jury in its main 

charge as follows: 

You must accept and follow the law as I state it to you 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 72 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

73 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

regardless of whether you agree with it. If anything 

concerning the law said by the attorneys in their arguments 

or at any other time during the trial conflicts with my 

instructions on the law, you must follow my instructions. 

You must not be influenced by pity for or prejudice 

against a defendant. You must not be biased against a 

defendant because he’s been arrested for this offense, 

charged with a crime, or brought to trial. None of these 

circumstances is evidence of guilt, and you must not infer or 

assume from any or all of them that a defendant is more 

likely to be guilty than not guilty. 

You must not be influenced by sentiment, conjecture, 

sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public 

feeling. Both the people and the defendant have a right to 

expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the 

evidence, apply the law, and reach a just verdict regardless 

of the consequences. 

12RT 2553. The trial court also instructed the jury to “decide 

all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in 

this trial and not from any other source.” 12RT 2555. 

b. State Court Opinion 

The Court of Appeal rejected this claim, stating: 

. . . [T]he language used by the prosecutor in this case was 

similar to the nonprejudicial comments made by the prosecutor 

in Adanandus, supra, 157 Cal. App. 4th 496. In that case, 

the police responded to a shooting on 65th Avenue in Oakland. 

(Id. at p. 499.) Multiple shots were fired from a passing 

minivan into a station wagon parked in a driveway. (Ibid.) 

There were three men in the station wagon; one man was killed 

and another man was shot in the arm. (Ibid.) Defendant, who 

was later identified as the shooter, was charged with first 

degree murder and first degree attempted murder, as well as a 

driveby special allegation, and an allegation of personal and 

intentional use of a firearm causing great bodily injury. 

(Ibid.) In his closing remarks, the prosecutor initially 

told the jury, “‘With your verdicts in this case, I’m not 

asking you to bring [the victim] back to his mother; that’s 

not possible. But what you can do with your verdicts in this 

case is you can restore order. The sense of order, the sense 

of law, the 2500 block of 65th Avenue in the City of Oakland, 

because it certainly wasn’t there on April 19, 2005, when 

[defendant] was, to use his own words, “going down the line,” 

he was going to leave more bodies on the map.’ The 

prosecutor returned to his law and order theme as he 

concluded his argument: ‘Ladies and gentlemen, the 2500 block 

of 65th Avenue . . . had no concept of law and order. None 

whatsoever . . . . [¶] What you can do [by your verdicts] 

is restore justice to that street. That street on that day 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 73 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

74 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

was without justice . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] You, as jurors 

in this case, have taken an obligation and oath to uphold the 

law. Believe in the law. Restore the law to the 2500 block 

of 65th Avenue, those are the only true and correct verdicts 

in this case, and I am confident and believe that you’ll 

return those verdicts.’” (Id. at pp. 511–512.) In ruling 

the prosecutor’s quoted comments did not constitute 

misconduct, this court stated: “[I]t ‘is permissible to 

comment on the serious and increasing menace of criminal 

conduct and the necessity of a strong sense of duty on the 

part of jurors. [Citation.] The prosecution may properly 

urge his points vigorously as long as he does not act 

unfairly.’ [Citation.] The prosecution’s references to the 

idea of restoring law and order to the community were an 

appeal for the jury to take its duty seriously, rather than 

efforts to incite the jury against defendant. Thus, [the 

remarks] were not misconduct. (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal. 

4th 215, 261–262 [no misconduct where prosecutor urged ‘jury 

“to make a statement,” to do “the right thing,” and to 

restore “confidence” in the criminal justice system by 

returning a verdict of death’]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal. 

3d 991, 1041 [prosecutor’s remarks that ‘if you want to have 

a voice in your community and an effect upon the law in the 

community, this is your opportunity’ (italics omitted) not 

improper because ‘[n]o reasonable juror would have construed 

the remarks as urging the jurors to follow community 

sentiment rather than their own judgment’].)” (Adanandus, 

157 Cal. App. 4th at p. 513; see People v. Carpenter (1997) 

15 Cal. 4th 312, 397 [prosecutor’s references to the “measure 

of a society” did not inject issues broader than defendant’s 

guilt and invite the jury to render a verdict based on public 

opinion].) 

 

Even if the prosecutor’s arguments in this case might be 

interpreted as an improper appeal to the jury’s passions and 

prejudices, they could not, by themselves, have unduly 

persuaded the jury. The prosecutor’s comments about the 

nature of the community in which the shootings took place 

were based on the evidence presented at trial. When defense 

counsel objected to the prosecutor’s comment that the jury 

should send a message, the court informed the jurors they 

were “the judges of the facts, and it’s your decision as to 

what the facts are as they may apply to the elements of the 

offenses.” The prosecutor’s remarks following this 

admonition did not repeat the challenged argument. Both 

defense counsel expressly and forcibly responded to the 

prosecutor’s comments in their closing arguments. Before 

deliberations the court instructed the jury it “must not be 

influenced by pity for or prejudice against a defendant,” or 

“by sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, 

public opinion or public feeling.” “[W]e presume the jury 

relied on the instructions, not the arguments, in convicting 

defendant[s].” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 34, 47.) 

Nothing in the record indicates the jurors did anything other 

than focus on the evidence and the court’s instructions in 

reaching their verdicts. Viewing the prosecutor’s comments 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 74 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

75 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

in context, and in their entirety, we do not believe “there 

is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied 

any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable 

fashion.” (Id. at p. 44.)[FN 13] 

[FN13:] “Because any possible misconduct was harmless on this 

record, [defendants’] claim[s] of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel lack [] merit.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow 

(2004) 34 Cal. 4th 1, 95 (Coffman and Marlow).) “[C]ompetent 

counsel may often choose to forgo even a valid objection. 

‘[I]n the heat of a trial, defense counsel is best able to 

determine proper tactics in the light of the jury’s apparent 

reaction to the proceedings. The choice of when to object is 

inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily 

reviewable on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Riel (2000) 

22 Cal. 4th 1153, 1197.) 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *18-19 (footnote in original). 

c. Analysis 

 A prosecutor’s exhortation to the jury to join in the war 

against crime may constitute prejudicial misconduct. See United 

States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 

Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 950 (11th Cir. 1983)). However, an appeal 

to the jury to be the “conscience of the community” is not 

impermissible unless it is specifically designed to inflame the 

jury. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1444 (9th Cir. 

1994), rev’d on other grounds by 518 U.S. 81 (1996). No 

prejudicial error will be found where the comment is isolated and 

the court instructs the jury that its function is to determine 

guilt or innocence based on the evidence of the case, and that the 

statements of counsel are not evidence. See id. 

 In the present case, the prosecutor made an appeal to the 

jury, asking them for “justice as representatives of the 

community.” 12RT 2420. However, such an appeal was permissible 

because it was not designed to inflame the jury and instead seemed 

more geared toward urging the jury to take its duty seriously. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 75 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

76 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

See Koon, 34 F.3d at 1444. Moreover, the trial court instructed 

the jury that the facts must be determined only from the evidence 

presented at trial, and that the attorneys’ comments were not 

evidence. 12RT 2553, 2555. There is an “almost invariable 

assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions,” 

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987), and nothing 

suggests that the jurors here did otherwise. On this record, the 

prosecutor did not appeal to the jury to convict Petitioner other 

than on the evidence presented at trial. But even if the remark 

is deemed improper, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief 

because he has not shown that it rendered his trial fundamentally 

unfair. It is not enough that a prosecutor’s remarks were 

undesirable or even universally condemned. See Darden, 477 U.S. 

at 181. Rather, Petitioner must show that they so infected the 

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial 

of due process. See id. He has failed to do so. 

 Accordingly, the state appellate court reasonably applied 

controlling law in ruling that Petitioner was not denied a fair 

trial by the prosecutor’s statements appealing to the jurors to do 

justice. Finally, any error had no substantial or injurious 

effect on the verdict. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on his third prosecutorial misconduct claim. 

E. Jury Instruction Claims 

 Petitioner raises the following claims of instructional error 

due to the trial court’s: (1) failure to instruct the jury that in 

order for the multiple murder special circumstance to apply to him 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 76 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

77 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

he had actually to kill or intend to kill both victims10; 

(2) erroneous instructions on self-defense and unreasonable selfdefense; (3) erroneous instruction on accomplice liability and the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine; (4) erroneous 

instruction on conspiracy liability in that there was no evidence 

of any conspiracy; (5) erroneous instruction on voluntary 

intoxication; and (6) erroneous instruction relating to impeached 

witnesses.11

1. Applicable Federal Law 

A determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that 

the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that 

violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has 

occurred. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). 

The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, 

but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a 

whole and the trial record. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 

(1991); Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Due process requires that “‘criminal defendants be afforded a 

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Clark v. 

Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting California v. 

 10 The Court has found above that Petitioner is not entitled 

relief based on his instructional error claim relating to the 

multiple murder special circumstance. See supra Discussion I.A.2. 

Therefore, the Court need not repeat its analysis here. 

11 On direct appeal, Petitioner also claimed the trial court 

erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of “due caution 

and circumspection” using language in CALJIC No. 8.46, which was 

rejected by the state appellate court. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, 

at *27. However, the Court need not address this claim because 

Petitioner did not include it in the instant federal petition. 

Dkt. 1. at 11-12. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 77 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

78 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). Therefore, a criminal 

defendant is entitled to adequate instructions on the defense 

theory of the case. Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 

2000). However, due process does not require that an instruction 

be given unless the evidence supports it. Hopper v. Evans, 456 

U.S. 605, 611 (1982); Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 

(9th Cir. 2005). The defendant is not entitled to have jury 

instructions raised in his or her precise terms where the given 

instructions adequately embody the defense theory. United States 

v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“Even if there is some ‘ambiguity, inconsistency or 

deficiency’ in [a jury] instruction, such an error does not 

necessarily constitute a due process violation.” Waddington v. 

Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009) (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 

541 U.S. 433, 437 (1977)). “Rather, the defendant must show both 

that the instruction was ambiguous and that there was “‘a 

reasonable likelihood’” that the jury applied the instruction in a 

way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 190-91 (quoting 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 

416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“‘[I]t must be established not merely 

that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even 

“universally condemned,” but that it violated some [constitutional 

right].’”). 

The omission of an instruction is less likely to be 

prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Walker v. Endell, 850 

F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 78 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

79 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim 

involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an 

“‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 

616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155). 

If an error is found, the court also must determine that the 

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict, see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 

before granting relief in habeas proceedings. Calderon, 525 U.S. 

at 146-47. Under AEDPA, a federal habeas court need not determine 

whether the state court’s harmlessness determination on direct 

review, which is governed by the “harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt” test set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 

(1967), was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-20 

(2007); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (on collateral review, the Chapman 

“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of prejudice must 

give way to the less onerous standard of whether the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict). However, no case forbids use of the Chapman 

test, and a number of Ninth Circuit cases have used it. See, 

e.g., Ponce v. Felker, 606 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding 

no prejudice under Chapman and Brecht); Medina v. Hornung, 386 

F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2004) (in applying the “unreasonable 

application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), habeas court may determine 

whether state court’s harmless error analysis under Chapman was 

objectively unreasonable). 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 79 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

80 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2. Instructions on Self-Defense and Unreasonable SelfDefense 

 Petitioner attacks two instructions given to the jury on 

self-defense, and claims that they were erroneously given. 

Specifically, Petitioner argues that CALJIC No. 5.17 (unreasonable 

self-defense) and CALJIC No. 5.55 (plea of self-defense may not be 

contrived) did not include an escalation exception allowing for 

self-defense if a victim responds to a simple assault with deadly 

force. Ex. A at 75. 

a. Background Facts 

The state appellate court described the factual background on 

this claim as follows: 

Without objection or request for modification, the court 

advised the jury on defendants’ right to self-defense using 

language in CALJIC Nos. 5.50 (self-defense -- assailed person 

need not retreat), 5.54 (self-defense by an aggressor), and 

5.55 (plea of self-defense may not be contrived). The jury 

was told, in pertinent part: “A person threatened with an 

attack that justifies the exercise of the right of selfdefense need not retreat. In the exercise of his right of 

self-defense a person may stand his ground and defend himself 

by the use of all force and means which would appear to be 

necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and 

with similar knowledge; and a person may pursue his assailant 

until he has secured himself from danger if that course 

likewise appears reasonably necessary. This law applies even 

though the assailed person might more easily have gained 

safety by flight or by withdrawing from the scene” (CALJIC 

No. 5.50); “[i]f the victim of simple assault responds in a 

sudden and deadly counterassault, the original aggressor need 

not attempt to withdraw and may use reasonably necessary 

force in self-defense” (CALJIC No. 5.54); and “[t]he right of 

self-defense is not available to a person who seeks a quarrel 

with the intent to create a real or apparent necessity of 

exercising self-defense” (CALJIC No. 5.55). On the issue of 

unreasonable self-defense, the court advised the jury using 

language in CALJIC No. 5.17 (actual but unreasonable belief 

in necessity to defend -- manslaughter), as follows: “A 

person who kills another person in the actual but 

unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against 

imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills 

unlawfully but does not harbor malice aforethought and is not 

guilty of murder. This would be so even though a reasonable 

person in the same situation seeing and knowing the same 

facts would not have had the same belief. Such an actual but 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 80 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

81 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

unreasonable belief is not a defense to the crime of 

voluntary manslaughter. [¶] As used in this instruction, an 

‘imminent’ peril or danger means one that is apparent, 

present, immediate and must be instantly dealt with, or must 

so appear at the time to the slayer. [¶] However, this 

principle is not available, and malice aforethought is not 

negated, if the defendant by his unlawful or wrongful conduct 

created the circumstances which legally justified his 

adversary’s use of force or attack. [¶] This principle 

applies equally to a person who kills in purported selfdefense or purported defense of another person.” 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *19. 

b. State Court Opinion 

 The state appellate court rejected this claim, stating: 

The court’s instructions using language in CALJIC Nos. 5.17 

and 5.55 are correct statements of the law. CALJIC No. 5.17 

derives from In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 768, 773, 

fn. 1 (see also People v. Hardin (2000) 85 Cal. App. 4th 625, 

630 & fn. 2, 634), and CALJIC No. 5.55 derives from People v. 

Hinshaw (1924) 194 Cal. 1, 26.) 

 

We reject defendants’ contention that the challenged 

instructions were legally incorrect because they failed to 

include “the exception for cases in which a victim (here, 

[Hodge] with the .357) escalates an assault by responding in 

deadly fashion.” The jury in this case was advised that 

“[i]f the victim of simple assault responds in a sudden and 

deadly counterassault, the original aggressor need not 

attempt to withdraw and may use reasonably necessary force in 

self-defense.” (CALJIC No. 5.54.) “‘[T]he fact that the 

necessary elements of a jury charge are to be found in two 

instructions rather than in one instruction does not, in 

itself, make the charge prejudicial.’ [Citation.] ‘The 

absence of an essential element in one instruction may be 

supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as 

a whole.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal. 

3d 505, 538–539, disapproved on another ground in People v. 

Reyes (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 743, 756.) 

 

To the extent defendants contend the instructions failed to 

clarify the type of “quarrel” (CALJIC No. 5.55) or “wrongful 

conduct” (CALJIC No. 5.17) that would forfeit a defendant’s 

right of self-defense, the issue is forfeited “because 

defendant[s] did not request such clarification” at the 

trial. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 900, 1020 

(Jenkins); see People v. Miceli (1951) 101 Cal. App. 2d 643, 

648–649 [defendant asserting self-defense claim must request 

amplification where defense is based on “sudden and perilous” 

counter assault].) 

 

Defendants’ additional contention that there was no evidence 

supporting an instruction that their right of self-defense 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 81 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

82 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

may not be contrived (CALJIC No. 5.55) is without merit. The 

evidence demonstrated defendants were not seeking just “an 

argument or fist-fight” with the victims. Even if defendants 

saw Cobbs give a gun to Hodge, such conduct did not entitle 

defendants to arm themselves and provoke a deadly 

confrontation as the victims attempted to leave the area to 

avoid trouble. On these facts, the court reasonably 

determined an instruction using language in CALJIC No. 5.55 

was appropriate. “A trial judge’s superior ability to 

evaluate the evidence renders it highly inappropriate for an 

appellate court to lightly question his determination to 

submit an issue to the jury. A reviewing court certainly 

cannot do so where, as here, the trial court’s determination 

was agreeable to both the defense and the prosecution.” 

(People v. McKelvy (1987) 194 Cal. App. 3d 694, 705.) 

 

Even if the instruction using language in CALJIC No. 5.55 

should not have been given, we find no prejudice. The 

challenged language was just a portion of eighteen 

instructions on self-defense and unreasonable self-defense, 

“some of which were mutually exclusive. It was obvious to 

anyone that not all of those instructions could apply to the 

case . . . .” (People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal. App. 4th 

1355, 1381.) The jurors were specifically instructed, “Some 

of these instructions may not apply, depending on your 

findings about the facts of the case . . . . After you have 

decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that do 

apply to the facts as you find them.” We presume the jurors 

followed the court’s instructions to disregard those 

instructions that did not apply to the facts found by the 

jurors. 

Id. at *20. 

c. Analysis 

 This federal claim of instructional error is procedurally 

barred. As mentioned above, the procedural default doctrine 

forecloses federal review of a state prisoner’s federal habeas 

claims if those claims were defaulted in state court pursuant to 

an independent and adequate state procedural rule. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 729-30. The Ninth Circuit has recognized and applied the 

California contemporaneous objection rule in affirming denial of a 

federal petition for procedural default where there was a complete 

failure to object at trial. See e.g., Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 

1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (barring review of jury instruction 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 82 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

83 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

error claim because no contemporaneous objection). Petitioner’s 

failure to object to the use of CALJIC Nos. 3.17 and 3.55 at trial 

bars his claim that their use violated his right to due process. 

However, even if the Court overlooked the procedural default, the 

claim fails on the merits as discussed next. 

 As part of its evaluation of Petitioner’s instructional error 

claim, the California Court of Appeal implicitly determined that 

the self-defense instructions -– CALJIC Nos. 5.17 and 5.55 -- were 

correct as a matter of state law. See id. A state court’s 

interpretation of state law binds a federal court sitting in 

habeas corpus. See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76); Hicks, 485 U.S. at 

629. Therefore, the state appellate court’s ruling -- that the 

challenged self-defense instructions were correct as a matter of 

state law -– is binding on this Court. See id. A challenge to a 

jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state 

a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. To obtain federal collateral relief 

for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that “‘the 

ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.’” Id. at 72 (quoting 

Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). The instruction may 

not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in 

the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. 

Id. Petitioner also must show actual prejudice from the error, 

i.e., that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict, before the court may 

grant federal habeas relief. Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146 (citing 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 83 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

84 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 1) CALJIC No. 5.17 

 Petitioner specifically contends that CALJIC No. 5.17: 

(1) failed to include an “escalation exception”; and (2) the 

language excluding self-defense for “wrongful conduct” creating 

“circumstances” justifying a response is “overbroad, ambiguous, 

and misleading.” Ex. A. at 78. He claims that the instructional 

error denied him the fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process 

Clause. 

 First, Petitioner’s challenge to CALJIC No. 5.17 has no 

reasonable basis because the quoted language from this particular 

instruction does not embody an “escalation exception.” When 

combined with other instructions given, this instruction informed 

the jury that if Petitioner created the need for the victims to 

respond with non-deadly force, and the victims responded with 

deadly force, the victims’ response was not “legally justified,” 

and did not rule out Petitioner’s use of deadly force in 

appropriate self-defense. If this were not clear from the wording 

of CALJIC No. 5.17, it was made express in the immediately 

following instructions which defined the force the victims were 

legally justified in using. See 5CT 1116. CALJIC Nos. 5.31 and 

5.32 made express that the victims could use only such force as 

was necessary to repel Petitioner’s attack, and that deadly force 

could not be used to respond to non-deadly force. See id.; 12RT 

2574-2575. Accordingly, the instructions, when logically read 

together, expressed to the jury that if Hodge responded to 

Petitioner’s non-deadly physical and verbal threats to Wallace by 

pulling out a gun and shooting at Petitioner, then Petitioner was 

justified in responding with deadly force. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 84 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

85 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Next, Petitioner’s second contention –- that the terms 

“wrongful conduct” and “circumstances” as used in the third 

paragraph of the instruction were overbroad, ambiguous, and 

misleading -– was found by the state appellate court to be 

“forfeited ‘because defendant[s] did not request such 

clarification’ at the trial.” Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *20. 

 In sum, the Court finds Petitioner’s arguments challenging 

CALJIC No. 5.17 unavailing because the precise defense urged here 

was that Hodge shot first and that Petitioner and Coleman were 

justified in self-defense. Thus, any arguments about perceptions 

or application of non-deadly force are irrelevant to this case. 

CALJIC No. 5.17 had no real application in the consideration of 

those arguments. Finally, any error would have been harmless 

under Brecht. The state appellate court pointed out that the jury 

was also instructed with CALJIC No. 5.54, as explained above. 

This instruction advised the jury, “If the victim of simple 

assault responds in a sudden and deadly counterassault, the 

original aggressor need not attempt to withdraw and may use 

reasonably necessary force in self-defense.” Id. at *20 (quoting 

CALJIC No. 5.54). Therefore, this Court finds reasonable the 

state appellate court’s conclusion that the fact that “the 

necessary elements of a jury charge are to be found in two 

instructions rather than in one instruction does not, in itself, 

make the charge prejudicial.” Id. Petitioner has not shown that 

an instructional error was committed, let alone that any such 

error so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violated due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his instructional error 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 85 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

86 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

claim relating to CALJIC No. 5.17. 

 2) CALJIC No. 5.55 

 As mentioned above, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 

5.55, which stated, “The right of self-defense is not available to 

a person who seeks a quarrel with the intent to create a real or 

apparent necessity of exercising self-defense.” 5CT 1117. 

Petitioner claims that CALJIC No. 5.55 “was erroneously given 

because there was no evidence of an intentional ruse.” Ex. A at 

76. In essence, Petitioner argues that “courts should not 

instruct contrived self-defense as a limitation on self-defense 

unless the evidence supports it.” Id. at 76-77. Petitioner also 

argues this instruction failed to include the “escalation 

exception,” mentioned above under his challenge to CALJIC No. 

5.17. Id. at 77. And finally, Petitioner argues that CALJIC No. 

5.55 is overbroad. Id. at 78. 

 Petitioner’s final argument was deemed “forfeited” by the 

state appellate court. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *20. 

Therefore, the Court will only address his first two arguments. 

 The state appellate court held that the evidence, outlined 

above, supported the giving of CALJIC No. 5.55, and that even if 

an error had occurred it was harmless. Id. This Court finds 

reasonable the appellate court’s harmless error analysis. As 

mentioned above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the 

instructional error “had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See Brecht, 507 

U.S. at 637. The proper question in assessing harm in a habeas 

case is, “‘Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially 

influenced the jury’s decision?’” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 86 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

87 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

432, 436 (1995). If the court is convinced that the error did not 

influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and 

the judgment should stand. Id. at 437. If, on the other hand, 

the court is not fairly assured that there was no effect on the 

verdict, the conviction cannot stand. Id. at 437-48. 

 First, no possible error or prejudice is shown. Neither the 

prosecutor nor either defense counsel argued that Petitioner was 

precluded from shooting at Hodge, if Hodge began shooting at 

Petitioner first, merely because Petitioner had incited a 

fistfight with Wallace. Rather, the defense theory was pure selfdefense, asserting that, without provocation, Hodge pulled his gun 

and began firing first, and that Petitioner responded. The 

prosecutor argued that the evidence showed that Petitioner and 

Coleman produced and began firing their guns before Hodge acted. 

See 12RT 2545, 2549. Therefore, there is no reasonable likelihood 

that the jury believed that Hodge produced and fired his gun 

first, but that self-defense was ruled out on the part of the 

Petitioner and Coleman because they incited a fistfight in the 

first place. 

 Next, reading the instruction literally, as suggested by 

Petitioner, eliminates the possibility the jury relied on the 

instruction. The only person who was arguably shown by the 

evidence to have sought a quarrel was Petitioner. Thus, the 

instruction would not have applied to Coleman. Petitioner points 

to nothing in the instructions precluding Coleman from meeting 

deadly force with deadly force. Nevertheless, the jury found 

Coleman guilty of murder of Hodge as well as Wallace. This shows 

that the jury simply did not believe the self-defense theory that 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 87 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

88 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Hodge shot first. It was not the instruction that eliminated 

self-defense by Petitioner; rather, the jury found the evidence 

did so. Therefore, the instruction was irrelevant and harmless. 

Similarly, while Petitioner may arguably have sought a quarrel 

with Wallace, there is no evidence he sought one with Hodge, who 

was some distance away from him. Once again, the instruction 

would not have applied to Petitioner’s shooting at Hodge even had 

the jury found Hodge pulled his gun first and began shooting. The 

guilty verdict on the charge that Petitioner shot Hodge showed the 

jury did not rely on CALJIC No. 5.55. The jury demonstrably 

rejected the defense theory that Hodge shot first. No prejudice 

could have flowed from the instruction. 

 In sum, one argument on this issue was waived, and there was 

no reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted CALJIC No. 5.55 

in isolation, yielding the misinterpretation suggested by 

Petitioner. At any rate, the evidence shows that the jury 

disregarded the self-defense theory independent of issues relating 

to CALJIC No. 5.55. Therefore, this Court finds reasonable the 

appellate court’s conclusion neither error nor prejudice was 

shown. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *20. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his instructional error 

claim relating to CALJIC No. 5.55. 

3. Accomplice Liability Instructions 

 Petitioner argues his constitutional rights were violated 

when “[t]he court gave largely bare-bones CALJIC instructions for 

aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability, both tied to the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . .” Ex. A at 81. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 88 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

89 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Petitioner’s arguments turn on the contention that he was not 

involved in killing of Hodge, only the killing of Wallace. 

a. Background Facts 

The state appellate court described the factual background on 

this claim as follows: 

Without objection or request for modification, the court 

instructed the jury on accomplice liability and the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine using language in CALJIC 

Nos. 3.00 (principals -- defined, § 31), 3.01 (aiding and 

abetting -- defined), 3.02 (principals -- liability for 

natural and probable consequences). The instructions given 

in this case have been held to be correct statements of law 

generally. (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 959, 

1022 [discussing language in CALJIC No. 3.02]; Coffman and 

Marlow, supra, 34 Cal. 4th at pp. 106–107 [discussing 

language in CALJIC Nos. 3.01 and 3.02]; People v. Samaniego 

(2009) 172 Cal. App. 4th 1148, 1165 (Samaniego) [discussing 

language in CALCRIM 400 that corresponds to language in 

CALJIC No. 3.00]; People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 

1039, 1046–1047, 1055–1056 [court properly rejected 

engrafting concepts of conspiracy liability on aiding and 

abetting instructions]; but cf. People v. Nero (2010) 181 

Cal. App. 4th 504, 518 (Nero) [even in unexceptional 

circumstances language in CALJIC No. 3.00 can be 

misleading].) 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *21. 

b. State Court Opinion 

 The state appellate court rejected his claim, stating: 

We conclude defendants’ challenges to the instructions are 

not properly before us as there was no objection or request 

for modification by defense counsel at trial. (Jenkins, 

supra, 22 Cal. 4th at p. 1020; Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal. 

App. 4th at p. 1163.) In any event, as we now discuss, the 

given instructions do not require reversal. 

Using language in CALJIC No. 3.00, the court specifically 

advised the jury that, “Persons who are involved in 

committing a crime are referred to as principals in that 

crime. Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of 

participation, is equally guilty. Principals include: [¶] 

1. Those who directly and actively commit the act 

constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet the 

commission of the crime” (CALJIC No. 3.00). Defendants argue 

the court’s use of the “equally guilty” language was 

erroneous because it implies “a nonkiller is automatically 

guilty of first-degree murder as long as the killer 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 89 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

90 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

premeditates.” We disagree. The “equally guilty” language 

in CALJIC No. 3.00 addresses the basic, introductory concept 

of principal liability in that both an actual perpetrator of 

a crime and a person who aids and abets the perpetrator’s 

commission of a crime are deemed to be principals. (§ 31.) 

The sentence using the “equally guilty” language does not 

tell the jury that, in effect, the actual perpetrator and the 

aider and abettor are or must be found guilty of the same 

offense, and given the other instructions, no juror would 

reasonably so interpret the language as defendants 

suggest.[FN15] 

[FN 15:] Since the trial in this case, CALJIC No. 3.00 has 

been modified by incorporating language reflected in People 

v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 1111 (McCoy), and Samaniego, 

supra, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1148. (See Use Note to CALJIC No. 

3.00 (Spring 2010 Revision) (Spring 2010 ed.) p. 113.) 

CALJIC now directs a court to instruct a jury, in relevant 

part: “When the crime charged is . . . [murder] . . . , the 

aider and abettor’s guilt is determined by the combined acts 

of all the participants as well as that person[’s] own mental 

state. If the aider and abettor’s mental state is more 

culpable than that of the actual perpetrator, that person’s 

guilt may be greater than that of the actual perpetrator. 

Similarly, the aider and abettor’s guilt may be less than the 

perpetrator’s, if the aider and abettor has a less culpable 

mental state.” (CALJIC No. 3.00 (Principals—Defined (Spring 

2010 Revision) (Spring 2010 ed.) p. 112.) 

Using language in CALJIC Nos. 3.01 and 3.02, the court also 

specifically advised the jury that, “A person aids and abets 

the commission of a crime when he or she: [¶] (1) With 

knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶] 

(2) With the intent or purposes of committing or encouraging 

or facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) By 

act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the 

commission of the crime. [¶] Mere presence at the scene of 

a crime which does not itself assist the commission of the 

crime does not amount to aiding and abetting. [¶] Mere 

knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to 

prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting. [¶] One 

who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime or 

crimes is not only guilty of that crime or those crimes, but 

also is guilty of any other crime committed by a principal 

which is a natural and probable consequence of the crimes 

originally aided and abetted. [¶] In order to find the 

defendant guilty of the crimes as charges in Counts 1 [first 

degree murder of Wallace] & 2 [first degree murder of Hodge], 

you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: [¶] 

1. The crime or crimes of Murder was or were committed; [¶] 

2. That the defendant aided and abetted that or those crimes; 

[¶] 3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the crimes 

of Murder; and [¶] 4. The crimes of Murder was or were a 

natural and probable consequence of the commission of the 

crimes of Murder. [¶] In determining whether a consequence 

is ‘natural and probable,’ you must apply an objective test, 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 90 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

91 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

based not on what the defendant actually intended, but on 

what a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence would have 

expected likely to occur. The issue is to be decided in 

light of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. 

A ‘natural’ consequence is one which is within the normal 

range of outcomes that may be reasonably expected to occur if 

nothing unusual has intervened. ‘Probable’ means likely to 

happen. [¶] You are not required to unanimously agree as to 

which originally contemplated crime the defendant aided and 

abetted, so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 

doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant aided and 

abetted the commission of an identified and defined target 

crime and that the crime of Murder was a natural and probable 

consequence of the commission of that target crime.” 

Defendants argue the use of language in CALJIC Nos. 3.01 and 

3.02 was prejudicial because everything in the instructions 

“implies a nonkiller is automatically liable for first-degree 

murder as long as the actual killer” acts with premeditation; 

and the instructions failed “to explain the actual killer’s 

premeditation (not just any second-degree murder) must be 

foreseeable to a nonkiller.” However, “if the instructions 

were susceptible of the interpretation defendant[s] now 

assert[], counsel likely would have objected at trial on this 

basis.” (Young, supra, 34 Cal. 4th at p. 1203.) 

Additionally, the given instructions using the language in 

CALJIC Nos. 3.01 and 3.02 could not reasonably be interpreted 

as defendants suggest. CALJIC No. 3.01 focused the jury’s 

attention on and held defendants accountable for their own 

mental states with regard to the victims’ murders. (McCoy, 

supra, 25 Cal. 4th at pp. 1120, 1122.) The jury instructions 

given on first degree murder (CALJIC Nos. 8.00, 8.10, 8.11, 

8.20), second degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.30), and voluntary 

manslaughter (CALJIC No. 8.40), made it clear that defendants 

could not be found guilty of those offenses without 

possessing the required mental state. The jury was to 

consider separately whether either defendant was guilty of 

first degree murder, second degree murder, or voluntary 

manslaughter (CALJIC Nos. 8.50, 8.70, 8.71, 8.72, 8.74, 

8.75), and specify the crimes committed by each defendant, if 

any, in the verdict sheet (CALJIC No. 8.70, 17.00, 17.02). 

Any doubt as [to] a defendant’s liability for murder in the 

first degree, murder in second degree, or manslaughter, had 

to be resolved in that defendant’s favor (CALJIC Nos. 8.71, 

8.72), and there had to be unanimous agreement as to whether 

a defendant was guilty of first degree murder, second degree 

murder or manslaughter (CALJIC No. 8.74). As part of its 

duty “to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not 

guilty of murder in the first degree or of any lesser crime 

thereto,” the jury was told it had the “discretion to choose 

the order in which [it] evaluate[d] each crime and 

consider[ed] the evidence pertaining to it.” There is no 

reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood the 

instructions, when considered as a whole. 

. . . . 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 91 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

92 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

. . . . As recognized by our Supreme Court, and applicable 

to the circumstances of this case, “the dividing line between 

the actual perpetrator and the aider and abettor is often 

blurred. It is often an oversimplification to describe one 

person as the actual perpetrator and the other as the aider 

and abettor. When two or more persons commit a crime 

together, both may act in part as the actual perpetrator and 

in part as the aider and abettor of the other, who also acts 

in part as an actual perpetrator . . . . The aider and 

abettor doctrine merely makes aiders and abettors liable for 

their accomplices’ actions as well as their own. It obviates 

the necessity to decide who was the aider and abettor and who 

the direct perpetrator or to what extent each played which 

role.” (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at p. 1120.) 

Even if we assume the trial court’s instructions did not 

adequately instruct the jury on the matter of accomplice 

liability, reversal is not required. The evidence 

established each “defendant ‘weigh[ed] and consider[ed] the 

question of killing’ before deciding” to actually commit or 

aid and abet the other in committing first-degree murders of 

Wallace and Hodge. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 226, 

253 (Prieto).) Before the incident, both defendants 

discussed their animus against Hodge and Wallace. When Hodge 

was seen on the street, the car was stopped and defendants 

quickly secured loaded weapons. Both defendants then 

followed both victims as the victims attempted to leave The 

Village. When the opportunity arose (Wallace said, “Let’s 

fight”), Thompson responded by firing his gun at Wallace, and 

then firing his gun at Hodge. At about the same time, 

Coleman fired his rifle at Hodge. In light of this evidence, 

there is no reasonable doubt the jury found that each 

defendant personally acted with willfulness, deliberation, 

and premeditation, once it rejected defendants’ principal 

claim that Hodge was the first person who fired a gun causing 

defendants to respond in justifiable self-defense. 

“Accordingly, any omission in the instructions, even if 

erroneous, was harmless under both Chapman v. California 

(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, and [People v.] Watson [(1956)] 46 

Cal .2d [818, 836 (Watson)].” 

Id. at *21-23 (footnote in original). 

c. Analysis 

 This claim is procedurally defaulted; the state appellate 

court found the issue waived due to the lack of objection or 

request for modification at trial. See Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1092-

93. In addition, the Court of Appeal reasonably applied 

controlling law. The state appellate court’s rulings based on 

state law are binding here. See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. In any 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 92 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

93 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

event, the state appellate court found that the given instructions 

on accomplice liability did not require reversal, as explained 

below. 

 Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated 

by the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that an aider 

and abetter can be convicted of a lesser offense than the 

perpetrator. The state appeal court rejected the claim upon 

finding that the instructions given had been held to be “correct 

statements of law generally.” Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *21 

(citing People v. Richardson, 43 Cal. 4th 959 (2008)). The 

California Supreme Court has approved of CALJIC No. 3.02 as an 

adequate explication of the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine. Richardson, 43 Cal. 4th at 1022. 

 Petitioner’s argument for an instruction on a lesser included 

offense is based on People v. Woods, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1570 (1992), 

which, as the state appellate court explained, holds: 

when the evidence raises a question whether the greater 

offense is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act 

aided and abetted but establishes that a lesser offense is 

such a consequence, the jury would be provided with an 

unwarranted all-or-nothing choice with respect to the aider 

and abettor. . . . [A] jury may be reluctant to acquit of 

the greater crimes if left without the alternative of a 

guilty verdict for petty theft. [citations omitted]. Either 

result (acquittal of the aider and abettor although the 

evidence establishes guilt of a lesser offense, or conviction 

for the greater offense because the jury has no option of 

finding the defendant liable for the lesser crime) is unjust 

and unacceptable. 

8 Cal. App. 4th at 1589. 

 The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s argument 

after finding the jury instructions given apprised the jury that 

he could be found guilty of a lesser offense. The instructions to 

which the state appellate court referred were CALJIC Nos. 3.01 and 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 93 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

94 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3.02, which have been quoted in full above. The state appellate 

court examined other instructions given at trial and concluded, 

“There is no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood the 

instructions, when considered as a whole.” Thompson, 2010 WL 

3789138, at *22. 

 The jurors were elsewhere instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 

8.70, that it was their duty to determine the degree of murder, 

and specify the crimes committed by each defendant, if any, in the 

verdict sheet (CALJIC No. 8.70, 17.00, 17.02). Id. They were 

provided with instructions on first degree murder (CALJIC Nos. 

8.00, 8.10, 8.11, 8.20), second degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.30), 

and voluntary manslaughter (CALJIC No. 8.40), and these 

instructions “made it clear that defendants could not be found 

guilty of those offenses without possessing the required mental 

state.” Id. Any doubt as to a defendant's liability for murder 

in the first degree, murder in second degree, or manslaughter, had 

to be resolved in that defendant’s favor (CALJIC Nos. 8.71, 8.72), 

and there had to be unanimous agreement as to whether a defendant 

was guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder or 

manslaughter (CALJIC No. 8.74). Id. The state appellate court 

thus concluded that, when viewed as a whole, the instructions 

provided sufficient guidance to jurors. Id. 

 The state appellate court further distinguished Woods, 

stating: “Unlike the situation in Woods, the jurors in this case 

were not ‘given an unwarranted, all-or-nothing choice’ of either 

convicting both defendants of the same crime or of acquitting the 

aider and abetter of any liability for the killing.” Id. at *23 

(citing Woods, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 1588, 1590). 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 94 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

95 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 For the reasons set out by the state appellate court, there 

was no reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the 

accomplice liability instructions in light of the other 

instructions given at trial. In any event, the state appellate 

court convincingly showed that no error could have had a 

substantial or injurious effect. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his 

claim of instructional error relating to the accomplice liability 

instructions. 

4. Conspiracy Liability 

 Petitioner claims that the trial court’s “late decision to 

instruct on conspiracy to commit murder (beyond aiding and 

abetting) as a theory of liability -- over defense objections 

there was no evidence of any such conspiracy -- was error.” Ex. A 

at 92. Thus, Petitioner argues that the “erroneous instruction on 

an unsupported theory of guilt denied [him] due process by 

reducing the prosecution’s burden to prove the supported theories 

of guilt, and by denying him his right to a jury determination[] 

on all elements essential for murder liability.” Id. at 93. 

a. Background Facts 

 The state appellate court described the factual background on 

this claim as follows: 

Although defendants were not charged with the crime of 

conspiracy, the prosecutor requested instructions on 

conspiracy as one of the theories of liability for first 

degree murder of both victims on the ground the evidence 

supported an inference that an agreement existed between 

defendants to confront and kill the victims. Alternatively, 

the prosecutor argued that even if the jury concluded there 

was only a conspiracy to kill Hodge, and Wallace was not the 

subject of the original conspiracy, his murder was something 

that occurred during the furtherance of the conspiracy and as 

a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy to kill 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 95 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

96 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Hodge. Over objections by both defense counsel, the court 

granted the prosecutor’s request that the jury be instructed 

on conspiracy using language in CALJIC Nos. 6.10.5 

(conspiracy and overt act -- defined -- not pleaded as a 

crime charged), 6.11 (conspiracy -- joint responsibility), 

and 6.12 (conspiracy -- proof of express agreement not 

necessary). The court found a theory of liability based on 

conspiracy was supported by the facts heard by the jury. 

When the court indicated it would instruct the jury on 

conspiracy over defense objections, Thompson made no 

objection to the instructions requested by the prosecutor. 

The court granted Coleman’s request to give additional 

instructions using language in CALJIC Nos. 6.13 (association 

alone does not prove membership in conspiracy), 6.16 (when 

conspirators not liable for act or declaration of coconspirator), 6.18 (commission of act in furtherance of a 

conspiracy does not itself prove membership in conspiracy), 

6.20 (withdrawal from conspiracy), and 6.21 (liability for 

acts committed after termination of conspiracy). 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *24. 

b. State Court Opinion 

 The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim upon 

finding that his challenges to the conspiracy instructions did not 

require reversal, stating: 

“It is long and firmly established that an uncharged 

conspiracy may properly be used to prove criminal liability 

for acts of a coconspirator. [Citations.] ‘Failure to 

charge conspiracy as a separate offense does not preclude the 

People from proving that those substantive offenses which are 

charged were committed in furtherance of a criminal 

conspiracy [citation]; nor, it follows, does it preclude the 

giving of jury instructions based on a conspiracy theory 

[citations].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 

Cal. 3d 744, 788–789, disapproved on another ground in 

Doolin, supra, 45 Cal. 4th at p. 421 & fn. 22.) 

 

Defendants argue there was no evidence of any conspiracy, 

noting that “Cobbs did not report one single word suggestive 

of an agreement to murder anyone,” and inferring a coherent 

conspiracy to murder the victims based on “general trash 

talking, prearming in a dangerous area, and confronting 

erstwhile friends during a chance late night encounter is 

sheer speculation.” We conclude defendants’ argument is 

without merit. 

 

“‘The existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from the 

conduct, relationship, interests, and activities of the 

alleged conspirators before and during the alleged 

conspiracy. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 1135.) Thus, to establish 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 96 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

97 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the existence of a conspiracy, “it is not necessary to prove 

that the parties met and actually agreed to perform the 

unlawful act or that they had previously arranged a detailed 

plan for its execution.” (People v. Lipinski (1976) 65 Cal. 

App. 3d 566, 575.) Nor is it necessary for the People to 

establish defendants as conspirators “personally participated 

in each of several overt acts [because] members of a 

conspiracy are bound by all acts of all members committed in 

furtherance of the conspiracy.” (People v. Cooks (1983) 141 

Cal. App. 3d 224, 312.) Contrary to defendants’ contention, 

the evidence was far from speculative. Rather, it permitted 

the jury to reasonably infer both defendants had some animus 

against both victims. As soon as defendants spotted the 

victims, they stopped the car and immediately armed 

themselves with loaded guns that had been stashed in the 

neighborhood. Defendants then proceeded to follow the 

victims as the victims attempted to leave the area to avoid 

any confrontation with defendants. When the opportunity 

arose, Thompson and Coleman fired their guns at the victims. 

Defendants’ immediate flight after the shootings was evidence 

of their consciousness of guilt. Having reviewed the record, 

we are satisfied the trial court properly instructed on the 

principles of conspiracy over defense counsels’ objections. 

 

The conspiracy instructions were correct statements of the 

law. (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal. 4th at pp. 249–250.) Our 

Supreme Court has specifically rejected defendants’ 

contention that the language in CALJIC Nos. 6.11 and 6.16 

misstates conspiracy liability. (Prieto, supra, at pp. 249–

250.) Because we are bound by the Supreme Court’s ruling 

(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 

450, 455), we do not further address the issue. 

Id. at *24-25. 

c. Analysis 

 The state appellate court addressed this claim by concluding 

that the California Supreme Court has rejected the contention that 

the language in CALJIC Nos. 6.11 and 6.16 misstates conspiracy 

liability. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *25. CALJIC 6.11 

(conspiracy -- joint responsibility) states that the jury “could 

not find defendant guilty under conspiracy theory if [the] charged 

crime was not [the] natural and probable consequence of 

conspiracy.” Meanwhile, CALJIC No. 6.16 states: “Where a 

conspirator commits an act which is neither in furtherance of the 

object of the conspiracy nor the natural and probable consequence 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 97 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

98 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of an attempt to attain that object, he alone is responsible for 

and is bound by that act, and no responsibility therefore attaches 

to any of his confederates.” 

 Given the correct statement of the law in CALJIC Nos. 6.11 

and 6.16, there was not a reasonable likelihood that these 

instructions relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove the 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Waddington, 555 U.S. at 190-91 (standard). 

 Furthermore, the state appellate court reasonably applied 

controlling law. The court’s rulings based on state law are 

binding here. See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. In any event, the 

state appellate court found that the given instructions on 

conspiracy liability did not require reversal. Moreover, the 

court properly rejected Petitioner’s equal protection claims. The 

claims are without basis in the record, and Petitioner fails to 

acknowledge that conspirators are not similarly situated to aiders 

and abettors. See People v. Morante, 20 Cal. 4th 403, 417 (1999), 

fn. 5 (citing Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 594 (1961). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim relating to the instructions on 

conspiracy liability are without merit, and he is not entitled to 

relief on this claim. 

5. Voluntary Intoxication 

 Petitioner argues the trial court’s instruction on voluntary 

intoxication, CALJIC No. 4.21.1, was erroneous because it did not 

“appraise the jurors they ‘must,’ not ‘should’ or ‘may,’ consider 

all the evidence regarding intoxication.” Ex. A at 95. He adds 

that the “incorrect language lightens the prosecution’s burden of 

proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 98 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

99 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

thereby depriving [P]etitioner of due process and a fair trial.” 

Id. at 96. Petitioner further argues the “instructions on 

intoxication also failed to include the late-added conspiracy 

theory.” Id. 

a. Background Facts 

 The state appellate court described the factual background 

on this claim as follows: 

Without objection or request for modification by defense 

counsel, the court instructed the jury on the issue of 

voluntary intoxication using language in CALJIC No. 4.21.1. 

The jury was specifically told: “It is the general rule that 

no act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary 

intoxication is less criminal by reason of that condition. 

[¶] Thus, in the crimes of possession of firearm by a felon 

charged in Counts 3 & 4, the fact that the defendant was 

voluntarily intoxicated is not a defense and does not relieve 

defendant of responsibility for the crime. This rule applies 

in this case only to the crimes of possession of firearm by a 

felon. [¶] However, there is an exception to this general 

rule, namely, where a specific intent is an essential element 

of a crime. In that event, you should consider the 

defendant’s voluntary intoxication in deciding whether the 

defendant possessed the required specific intent at the time 

of the commission of the alleged crime. [¶] Thus, in the 

crimes of First Degree Murder, charged in Counts 1 & 2, or 

the lesser crimes of Second Degree Murder and Voluntary 

Manslaughter, or the allegations of intentional discharge of 

a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury and 

death, intentional discharge of a firearm, or personal use of 

a firearm, a necessary element is the existence in the mind 

of the defendant of certain specific intents which is 

included in the definition of the crimes set forth elsewhere 

in these instructions. [¶] If the evidence shows that a 

defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, 

you should consider that fact in deciding whether or not that 

defendant had the required specific intent. [¶] If from all 

the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether a defendant 

had the required specific intent, you must find that 

defendant did not have that specific intent. [¶] In 

deciding whether a defendant is guilty as an aider and 

abettor, you may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication 

in determining whether a defendant tried as an aider and 

abettor had the required mental state. However, intoxication 

evidence is irrelevant on the question whether a charged 

crime was a natural and probable consequence of the 

originally contemplated crime.” 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *25. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 99 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

100 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

b. State Court Opinion 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, stating: 

Defendants contend the quoted instructions were legally 

incorrect because the intoxication instructions needed to 

apprise jurors they “must,” not “should” or “may,” consider 

all the evidence regarding intoxication. We disagree. The 

challenged language must be considered in the context of the 

intoxication instruction as a whole, as well as the other 

instructions. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal. 4th 774, 

831.) The jury was first advised of the statement of the 

general rule that voluntary intoxication does not make an act 

less criminal, and the rule only applied to the crimes of 

possession of a firearm by a felon as charged in counts three 

and four of the information. (People v. Aguirre (1995) 31 

Cal. App. 4th 391, 401.) The jury was then told “there is an 

exception to this general rule, namely, where a specific 

intent is an essential element of a crime. In that event, 

you should consider the defendant’s voluntary intoxication in 

deciding whether the defendant possessed the required 

specific intent at the time of the commission of the alleged 

crime.” The instruction advises the jury of the specific 

offenses and allegations to which the exception to the 

general rule applied, and, “If the evidence shows that a 

defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, 

you should consider that fact in deciding whether or not that 

defendant had the required specific intent. [¶] If from all 

the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether a defendant 

had the required specific intent, you must find that 

defendant did not have that specific intent.” Thus, when 

read as a whole, the instructions did not “‘withh[o]ld from 

the jury the mandatory duty to consider all of the evidence 

as it related to [defendants’] mental capacity.’” (People v. 

Yoder (1979) 100 Cal. App. 3d 333, 338.) There is no 

reasonable likelihood the jurors would view the use of the 

words “should” or “may” as authorizing them to arbitrarily 

ignore evidence of defendants’ voluntary intoxication on the 

issue of specific intent crimes as suggested by defendants. 

Defendants also argue the intoxication instruction was 

legally incorrect because it failed to expressly mention the 

conspiracy theory. According to defendants, “[t]he pointed 

exclusion of conspiracy (unlike aiding and abetting) 

seriously skewed these instructions; any juror would take 

these more specific instructions to mean intoxication was 

only relevant on aiding and abetting, not conspiracy.” We 

disagree. “‘Intoxication is . . . relevant only to the 

extent that it bears on the question of whether the defendant 

actually had the requisite specific mental state.’ 

[Citation.] An instruction relating intoxication to any 

mental state is therefore ‘. . . more like the “pinpoint” 

instructions’ that ‘are not required to be given sua sponte.’ 

[Citation.] . . . [Thus], the court did not have a sua 

sponte duty to give any instruction on the relevance of 

intoxication, any more than it had to instruct on the 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 100 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

101 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

relevance of other evidence. In the absence of instructions, 

defense counsel could simply argue that defendant did not 

actually have the necessary mental state due to his 

intoxication, just as counsel could argue any other 

inferences from the evidence.” (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 

Cal. 4th 1009, 1014.) In this case, the jurors were not 

given a pinpoint instruction advising them to consider 

evidence of intoxication in determining whether a defendant 

had the requisite mental state of a conspirator. However, 

the jury was directed to consider each defendant’s voluntary 

intoxication in determining whether a defendant had the 

requisite mental states for the crimes of “First Degree 

Murder, charged in Counts 1 & 2, or the lesser crimes of 

Second Degree Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter.” 

Additionally, the jurors were specifically instructed that 

liability as a conspirator required that each defendant act 

“with the specific intent to agree to commit the crime of 

[m]urder, and with the further specific intent to commit that 

crime.” Thus, the failure to mention conspiracy in the 

voluntary intoxication instructions did not preclude the 

jury’s use of any evidence of intoxication in evaluating 

whether defendants conspired with each other. (People v. 

Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 99, 187 (Letner and 

Tobin).) We also reject defendants’ contention that the omission of 

the conspiracy theory from the intoxication instruction was 

“quite unfair since conspiracy turned out to be a major 

theory and intoxication went a long way to rebutting any 

coherent conspiracy to commit murder here.” Although Cobbs 

testified both defendants appeared to be intoxicated before 

the murders, there was no evidence of the amount of alcohol, 

if any, either defendant had consumed before the murders. 

Nor was there any evidence from which the jury could 

reasonably infer defendants’ alleged intoxication “so reduced 

or impaired” their mental capacity “as to negate the required 

criminal intent” to convict them of murder in the first 

degree on a conspiracy theory. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 

Cal. 4th 799, 848.) The prosecutor did not argue the jury 

could not consider voluntary intoxication in determining 

whether a defendant was a conspirator. Neither defendant 

actually argued the jury should acquit based on their 

voluntary intoxication. “For these reasons, any error in the 

instructions did not preclude the jury’s consideration of 

defense evidence, nor is it reasonably probable that 

different instructions would have resulted in a verdict more 

favorable to defendants.” (Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal. 

4th at p. 187.) 

Id. at *25-26. 

c. Analysis 

 The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not 

unreasonable. The California Supreme Court has upheld this 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 101 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

102 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

instruction and found that a jury may, but is not required to, 

consider evidence of voluntary intoxication. People v. Mendoza, 

18 Cal. 4th 1114, 1133-34 (1998). Thus, to the extent the state 

appellate court was interpreting California law, its rulings are 

not reviewable here. See Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76. In addition, 

Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted by lack of objection 

or request for modification at trial. See Paulino, 371 F.3d at 

1092-93. Nor has Petitioner shown that the inclusion of this 

instruction violated due process. Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief on this claim. 

6. Impeached Witnesses 

Petitioner contends the trial court reduced the prosecution’s 

burden of proof by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.21.2, 

which relates to impeached witnesses and provides: “A witness, who 

is willfully false in one material part of his or her testimony, 

is to be distrusted in others. You may reject the whole testimony 

of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as to a material 

point, unless, from all the evidence, you believe the probability 

of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars.” Ex. A 

at 100 (citing 5CT 1110 (emphasis added)). Petitioner argues that 

this instruction somehow would allow the jury to consider 

testimony made by “key impeached prosecution witness Mr. Cobb[s]” 

and resolve dispositive credibility questions based on a 

“preponderance standard” rather than by proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. at 100-01. 

The state appellate court reasonably rejected the claim, 

pointing to settled California law and stating: 

. . . our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this specific 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 102 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

103 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

argument and approved the use of the quoted language in 

CALJIC No. 2.21.2, finding no constitutional error. (See 

People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 174, 220–221; People 

v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 705, 714; People v. Maury 

(2003) 30 Cal. 4th 342, 428–429.) Because we are bound by 

the Supreme Court’s rulings (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. 

Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal. 2d at p. 455), we do not 

further address the issue. 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *27. 

The Ninth Circuit has rejected a similar challenge to CALJIC 

No. 2.21.2. See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 865-66 (9th 

Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit found the instruction 

constitutional “because the jury ‘remained free to exercise its 

collective judgment to reject what it did not find trustworthy or 

plausible.’” Id. at 866 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 

149 (1973)). This Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit's holding 

in Turner. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on 

this claim. 

F. Cumulative Error 

Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of the errors 

described above deprived him of his right to a fair trial. 

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently 

prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several 

errors may still prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction 

must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 

(9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where multiple 

constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to challenge 

every important element of proof offered by prosecution). 

Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when the 

government’s case is weak. See id. 

The state appellate court denied Petitioner’s claim of 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 103 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

104 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

cumulative error, stating: “Even if some improprieties occurred, 

any errors were harmless, considered individually or collectively, 

and did not deny defendants a fair trial or reliable verdicts.” 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *28. 

Under the circumstances, it simply cannot be said that the 

state appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s cumulative error 

claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence implicating Petitioner 

in the murder and refuting his claim of self-defense. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief 

on his claim of cumulative error. 

G. Sentencing Claims12

1. Consecutive Term for Possession of Firearm By Felon 

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s imposition of a 

consecutive term of twenty-five years to life for his conviction 

of being a felon in possession of a firearm violates California 

Penal Code section 654 because his possession of the firearm was 

incidental to his use of the firearm during the murders. Ex. A at 

104. He argues that the trial court should have stayed the 

sentence pursuant to section 654. Id. Under section 654, a 

 12 In the instant petition, Petitioner raises as his arguments 

labeled “XII” and “XIII,” sentencing claims challenging the prior 

prison term sentence enhancement and parole revocation restitution 

fine, respectively. Dkt. 1 at 12. The state appellate court 

resolved these in his favor and modified the judgment accordingly, 

on the People’s concessions. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *30. 

Accordingly, these claims for relief are DENIED as moot. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 104 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

105 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

single course of conduct cannot be divided up and punished 

separately if each offense is “incidental to one objective.” 

People v. Liu, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1134 (1996); see also Cal. 

Penal Code § 654. The crime of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm in California “is complete once the intent to possess is 

perfected by possession. What the ex-felon does with the weapon 

later is another separate and distinct transaction undertaken with 

an additional intent which necessarily is something more than the 

mere intent to possess the proscribed weapon.” People v. 

Ratcliff, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1401, 1414 (1990). 

The Court of Appeal rejected this claim as follows: 

Section 654 bars multiple punishment for offenses committed 

in one course of conduct when those offenses arise from a 

single intent and objective on the defendant’s part. (Neal 

v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal. 2d 11, 18–21; People v. 

Jones (2002) 103 Cal. App. 4th 1139, 1143 (Jones).) However, 

“[w]here a defendant entertains multiple criminal objectives 

independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he 

may be punished for more than one crime even though the 

violations share common acts or are parts of an otherwise 

indivisible course of conduct. [Citation.]” (People v. 

Blake (1998) 68 Cal. App. 4th 509, 512 (Blake).) The 

applicability of section 654 is a question of fact for the 

trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making 

its determination. (People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal. App. 

4th 1308, 1312.) By imposing consecutive terms, the court 

impliedly found Thompson “harbored a separate intent and 

objective for each offense.” (Blake, supra, 68 Cal. App. 4th 

at p. 512.) The court’s finding will not be reversed on 

appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support it. 

(Ibid.) 

 

“‘Whether a violation of section 12021, forbidding persons 

convicted of felonies from possessing firearms . . . 

constitutes a divisible transaction from the offense in which 

[a defendant] employs the weapon depends upon the facts and 

evidence of each individual case.’” (People v. Bradford 

(1976) 17 Cal. 3d 8, 22, quoting People v. Venegas (1970) 10 

Cal. App. 3d 814, 821.) “[M]ultiple punishment is improper 

where the evidence ‘demonstrates at most that fortuitous 

circumstances put the firearm in the defendant’s hand only at 

the instant of committing another offense . . . .’ 

[Citation.]” (Jones, supra, 103 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1144; 

see People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal. App. 3d 1401, 1412 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 105 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

106 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Ratcliff).) Alternatively, “section 654 is inapplicable 

when the evidence shows that the defendant arrived at the 

scene of his or her primary crime already in possession of 

the firearm.” (Jones, supra, 103 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1145.) 

Thompson argues “there is no fair basis here for an implied 

finding [he] possessed the gun separate from [the murder] 

offenses.” We disagree. “A violation of section 12021, 

subdivision (a) is a relatively simple crime to commit: an 

ex-felon who owns, possesses, or has custody or control of a 

firearm commits a felony. Implicitly, the crime is committed 

the instant the felon in any way has a firearm within his 

control.” (Ratcliff, supra, 223 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1410, fn. 

omitted.) “Commission of a crime under section 12021 is 

complete once the intent to possess is perfected by 

possession. What the ex-felon does with the weapon later is 

another separate and distinct transaction undertaken with an 

additional intent which necessarily is something more than 

the mere intent to possess the proscribed weapon. 

[Citations.]” (Ratcliff, supra, 223 Cal. App. 3d at p. 

1414.) 

 

In this case there was no evidence “‘fortuitous circumstances 

put the firearm in [Thompson’s] hand only at the instant of 

committing another offense . . . .’” (Jones, supra, 103 Cal. 

App. 4th at p. 1144.) Based upon the circumstances leading 

to the gunfight and Thompson’s conduct of pulling a firearm 

from his pocket, the trial court could reasonably find that 

Thompson committed the crime of possessing a firearm by a 

felon by possessing it before the shooting. (Id. at p. 

1147.) Thompson then committed the separate crimes of first 

degree murder, either as a principal, aider and abettor, or 

conspirator, when he shot his gun first at Wallace and then 

at Hodge. Because substantial evidence supports the court’s 

implicit finding that section 654 did not apply, the 

imposition of a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the 

conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon must be 

upheld. 

Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *28-29. 

 First, Petitioner’s allegation that the imposition of 

consecutive sentencing violated California Penal Code section 654 

is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout 

v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011) (reaffirming that federal 

habeas writ is unavailable for violations of state law or for 

alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law); 

Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (“it is only 

noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 106 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

107 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal 

courts.”). 

 Second, even if it was a cognizable claim, the state 

appellate court’s rejection of such a claim was objectively 

reasonable. The state appellate court determined that the trial 

court could reasonably find that Petitioner completed the act of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm prior to the shooting of 

either Hodge or Wallace. Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *29. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) requires this Court to presume 

correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state 

court. Thus, the two convictions were not part of a single course 

of criminal conduct, and the state appellate court reasonably 

found that section 654 did not apply. Id. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

2. Consecutive Terms of Imprisonment and Restitution 

Order 

Petitioner asserts his consecutive unstayed terms of 

imprisonment and substantial victim restitution order are barred 

by Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), as well as its 

predecessors, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 446 (2000), and 

Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296 (2004). Ex. A at 107. 

The state appellate court found no reason to address this 

claim because it is “contrary to both federal and state cases 

which [the court is] bound to follow (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. 

Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal. 2d at p. 455) or otherwise find 

persuasive.” Thompson, 2010 WL 3789138, at *29 (citations 

omitted). 

The state appellate court’s decision is objectively 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 107 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

108 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

reasonable. Petitioner’s argument that the consecutive sentencing 

and restitution order violated Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham 

is foreclosed because clearly established law provides that 

consecutive sentences are decisions not typically reserved for the 

jury, and thus, do not implicate the Sixth Amendment. See Oregon 

v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168-69 (2009) (declining to extend Apprendi 

to a state’s sentencing system that gives judges discretion to 

determine facts allowing imposition of consecutive or concurrent 

sentences for multiple offenses, noting that determination of 

consecutive versus concurrent sentences is traditionally not 

within the function of the jury). Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

H. Incorporation of Coleman’s Arguments 

 As his final claim, Petitioner purports to “join and 

incorporate by reference all arguments raised or to be raised, by 

[Coleman] in this case and any related writs and appeals, to the 

extent those arguments inure to his benefit.” Ex. A at 108 

(citing Cal. R. of Ct. 8.200(a)(5)). 

 By joining in and adopting “all” arguments that might be 

beneficial to him, Petitioner fails to articulate a claim, and 

underlying supporting facts, specific to himself. Further, 

Petitioner tasks the Court with picking and choosing from another 

party’s state court brief which claims might be beneficial to him 

in his federal habeas petition. Such a claim does not meet the 

minimal pleading requirements for pro se prisoners seeking federal 

habeas relief. 

 Pleadings from a pro se prisoner are meant to be liberally 

construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 108 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

109 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(9th Cir. 1988). Despite this liberal construction, pro se 

petitioners “must follow the same rules of procedure that govern 

other [civil] litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th 

Cir. 1987). Further, this more relaxed pleading standard does not 

require federal courts to construct legal arguments for pro se 

petitioners. See, e.g., Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417–18 

(7th Cir. 1993). At a most basic level, federal habeas 

petitioners must allege facts in their petitions that sufficiently 

point to a “real possibility of constitutional error.” Blackledge 

v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977) (quoting Advisory Committee 

Note to Rule 4, Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (1976)). 

 Here, based on the face of the petition, there is no 

possibility of constitutional error as to this claim. In the 

instant petition, no discernable allegations are stated and no 

federal law is cited in conjunction with this claim. Rather, 

Petitioner states: “XV. Joinder in Arguments of Coappellant.” 

Dkt. 1 at 13. As mentioned above, in his brief on direct appeal, 

Petitioner made a general reference to arguments previously 

asserted or “to be raised” by Coleman, and provides a citation to 

a provision of the California Rules of Court allowing this type of 

incorporation by reference by petitioners seeking habeas relief in 

California courts. Ex. A at 108. Again, Petitioner does not 

elaborate as to which of Coleman’s claims he wishes to 

incorporate. In his traverse, Petitioner still makes no reference 

to which of Coleman’s arguments he intends to join. 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 109 of 110
United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

110 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Accordingly, Petitioner’s final claim fails to state facts 

sufficient to allege a federal constitutional violation. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED as to all claims. 

No certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. 

See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254 (requiring district court to rule on certificate of 

appealability in same order that denies petition). Petitioner has 

failed to make a substantial showing that any of his claims 

amounted to a denial of his constitutional rights or demonstrate 

that a reasonable jurist would find this Court’s denial of his 

claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000). 

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the 

file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 8, 2016 

__________________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

Case 4:12-cv-02850-CW Document 19 Filed 01/08/16 Page 110 of 110