Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02317/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02317-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Duran, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-2317-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff brought this action seeking judicial review of the Social Security

Administration’s decision that he is not eligible for disability benefits. The court now has

before it plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 19), and defendant’s response and

cross-motion for summary judgment (doc. 22). No other briefs were filed. For the reasons

set forth below, we affirm the Commissioner’s ruling. 

Plaintiff applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income on August

4, 2004, alleging a disability onset date of July 20, 2004, due to vertebral fracture, disc

disease, and bulging, causing chronic neck and back pain. The Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) denied the application for benefits. Tr. 17. This decision became the final decision

of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review.

Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

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An ALJ’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Under this standard,

an ALJ’s findings must be upheld “if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record,” even where “evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation.”

Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

The ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled, finding that he retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, including lifting or carrying 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sitting, standing or walking up to six hours per day;

and bending, crouching, crawling, kneeling, and climbing only occasionally. He further

concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing the requirements of his past relevant work

as a semi-skilled cashier, and alternatively, that plaintiff has transferable skills from his past

work as a mechanic that are transferable to a position as a small parts assembler. Tr. at 23.

The ALJ relied primarily on the opinion of medical expert Vincent Russo, M.D., who

concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing the exertional activities of light work. Tr.

at 241. The ALJ also relied on the opinion of a state agency physician who also concluded

that, despite his back pain, plaintiff is capable of performing a light work. Tr. at 192. 

Plaintiff now challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination because it did not include a

sit/stand limitation. Neither Dr. Russo, nor the state agency physician prescribed a sit/stand

option. Tr. 241, 187, 192. Instead, both doctors concluded that plaintiff was capable of

performing a full range of light work. However, during the hearing before the ALJ, Dr.

Russo testified that “it would be appropriate” for plaintiff to “stretch, walk around for three,

four minutes . . . every hour or two.” Tr. at 282. Plaintiff now contends that this statement

was tantamount to Dr. Russo prescribing a sit/stand option, which then should have been

included in the ALJ’s RFC assessment and hypothetical question presented to the vocational

expert. We disagree. Dr. Russo consistently opined that plaintiff was capable of a full range

of light work. He did not include in his medical assessment that plaintiff needed a sit/stand

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option. Tr. at 241. His agreement with plaintiff’s counsel that it would be “appropriate” for

plaintiff to stretch or walk around for three or four minutes every hour or two is not the same

as imposing a sit/stand option. Moreover, the ALJ posited to the vocational expert a

hypothetical that involved a claimant who required the “ability to stand up and stretch” every

hour or two. The vocational expert stated that, even with this limitation, the claimant could

perform all of plaintiff’s past relevant work. Tr. at 286-87. The ALJ properly included, in

both the RFC assessment and the hypothetical question, all the functional limitations that he

found to be supported by substantial evidence. 

Moreover, even if a sit/stand option was appropriate, we nevertheless conclude that

the ALJ’s decision that plaintiff is not disabled is based on substantial evidence in the record.

First, the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as a

cashier, which he performed at a semi-skilled level. That conclusion is supported by the

vocational expert’s testimony that a claimant with plaintiff’s RFC could perform the duties

of a semi-skilled cashier, and if that claimant needed a sit/stand option, he could perform the

duties of a cashier at an unskilled level. Tr. at 286.

Because the ALJ determined that plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant

work at step four, he was not required to determine at step five whether plaintiff can perform

other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(g). Nevertheless, the ALJ alternatively determined that, based on the testimony

of the vocational expert, plaintiff has skills from his past work that are transferable to other

positions that are available in significant numbers in the national economy. The vocational

expert testified that plaintiff’s past work as a small engine mechanic involved mechanical

skills in assembling small products in a manufacturing environment, that are transferable to

other positions, such as bearing ring assembler and bench assembler. Tr. at 288-89. This

evidence is sufficient to support the ALJ’s step five determination.

Finally, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in discounting his subjective complaints

of pain. The ALJ found that plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that plaintiff’s statements

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concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

credible to the extent alleged. The ALJ noted that plaintiff’s credibility is diminished by the

fact that the medical evidence does not support his allegations regarding the severity of his

pain. The ALJ found significant that plaintiff’s own treating physician reported that his

alleged pain was “out of proportion” to the results of the physical exam. Tr. at 201. The

state agency physician also opined that the severity or duration of the symptoms is

disproportionate to plaintiff’s medically determinable impairment. Tr. at 191. A physical

therapist reported “fair prognosis for return to full function given the fact that subjective

complaints do not correlate with objective findings.” Tr. at 182. The ALJ also found

significant the fact that plaintiff experiences no negative side effects from his pain

medication, and that he can perform daily activities including caring for his four-year old

daughter three days a week. These specific findings are sufficient to support the ALJ’s

decision to discount plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff is not

disabled, and therefore not eligible for benefits, is supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (doc. 22) and DENYING plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 19).

DATED this 28th day of January, 2009.

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