Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00447/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00447-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE R. ZAIZA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

D. TAMPLEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-0447-KJM-EFB P 

ORDER GRANTING IFP AND SCREENING 

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to filing a complaint, he has filed an application to proceed in forma 

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

 Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 

Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 

and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) and (2). 

II. Screening Requirement and Standards 

 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 

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of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 

 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 

its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. 

 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

III. Screening Order 

For the limited purposes of § 1915A screening and liberally construed, the complaint, 

which is 24 pages, single-spaced, and names over 30 defendants, states the following potentially 

cognizable claims: (1) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against 

defendants Robertson and Davis (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 24-28), Gonzales (id. ¶¶ 29-30), Fleming (id. ¶¶ 

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34-36), and Arana (id. ¶¶ 39-42); and (2) First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants 

Holmes (id. ¶ 61) and Shriver (id. ¶¶ 76-77, ¶ 83). However, the remaining allegations are not 

sufficient to state a proper claim for relief under the applicable standards, discussed below. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the 

facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal 

connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. 

See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 

(9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable 

for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 

(2009). Plaintiff must identify the particular person or persons who violated his rights. He must 

also plead facts showing how that particular person was involved in the alleged violation.1 

“When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they violate the inmates’ 

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 

F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to establish a claim for the use of excessive force in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that prison officials applied force 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). In making this determination, the court 

may evaluate (1) the need for application of force, (2) the relationship between that need and the 

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 Plaintiff’s use of Doe defendants is problematic, see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 

642 (9th Cir. 1980), and ultimately unnecessary. Should plaintiff learn the identities of parties he 

wishes to serve, he must promptly move pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure to file an amended complaint to add them as defendants. See Brass v. County of Los 

Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2003). If the timing of his amended complaint raises 

questions as to the statute of limitations, plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of Rule 15(c), 

which is the controlling procedure for adding defendants whose identities were discovered after 

commencement of the action. Additionally, unknown persons cannot be served with process until 

they are identified by their real names and the court will not investigate the names and identities 

of unnamed defendants. 

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amount of force used, (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and (4) any 

efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. at 7; see also id. at 9-10 (“The 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from 

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not 

of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted)). 

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). To show a violation of the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 

support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to 

the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement 

claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). A mere threat of physical harm is not a constitutional wrong. See Gaut v 

Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Likewise, verbal harassment alone does not violate the 

Eighth Amendment. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim predicated on the denial of medical care, a 

plaintiff must establish that he had a serious medical need and that the defendant’s response to 

that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see 

also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A serious medical need exists if the failure to 

treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, 

delay or intentional interference with medical treatment or by the way in which medical care is 

provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if 

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he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing 

to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. A physician need not fail to treat an inmate 

altogether in order to violate that inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 

884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, 

even if some treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. 

Id. 

It is important to differentiate common law negligence claims of malpractice from claims 

predicated on violations of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 

In asserting the latter, “[m]ere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not 

support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 

1980) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). 

To state a claim for violation of the right to procedural due process, plaintiff must allege 

facts showing: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and 

(2) a denial of adequate procedural protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 

2003). State regulations may create a liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of 

confinement if those conditions “present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the 

inmate’s] sentence.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). In the context of a 

disciplinary proceeding where a liberty interest is at stake, due process requires that “some 

evidence” support the disciplinary decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 

The inmate must also receive: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an 

opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and 

present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the 

evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Id. at 454 (citing Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). 

“To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must 

show that he was treated in a manner inconsistent with others similarly situated, and that the 

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon 

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membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). 

There are no constitutional requirements regarding how a grievance system is operated. 

See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that prisoner’s claimed loss of 

a liberty interest in the processing of his appeals does not violate due process because prisoners 

lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance system). Thus, plaintiff 

may not impose liability on a defendant simply because he played a role in processing plaintiff’s 

inmate appeals. See Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (an administrative 

“grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the 

inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural 

protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment. . . . Thus, defendants’ failure to process any 

of Buckley’s grievances, without more, is not actionable under section 1983.” (internal quotations 

omitted)). 

Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail and to petition the 

government for redress of grievances. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); O’Keefe 

v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 

1995). However, a prison may adopt regulations that impinge on an inmate’s constitutional rights 

if the regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Witherow, 52 F.3d at 265. Regulations impacting outgoing mail must more 

closely fit their purposes than those impacting incoming mail, but in neither instance must the 

regulation be the least restrictive means of achieving its purpose. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 412; 

Witherow, 52 F.3d at 265. Prison officials may open and inspect, but not read, a prisoner’s legal 

mail. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014). “Legal mail” in the context of the First 

Amendment generally applies to correspondence between a prisoner and his attorney or mail sent 

from a prisoner to a court. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-76 (1974); Keenan v. Hall, 

83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996). An isolated incident of mail interference or tampering is 

usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d 

Cir. 2003); see also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (temporary delay or 

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isolated incident of delay of mail does not violate a prisoner’s First Amendment rights); Witherow 

v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 266 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (First Amendment not violated where 

prison’s mail regulation related to a legitimate penological interest). 

Plaintiff fails to properly allege a state tort claim because the complaint does not allege 

compliance with the California Torts Claims Act (Government Claims Act or “GCA”), which 

requires that a party seeking to recover money damages from a public entity or its employees 

submit a claim to the entity before filing suit in court, generally no later than six months after the 

cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945, 950.2 (emphasis added). Timely 

claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement of the GCA but is an element of a 

plaintiff’s cause of action. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 209 (2007). Thus, 

when a plaintiff asserts a claim subject to the GCA, he must affirmatively allege compliance with 

the claim presentation procedure, or circumstances excusing such compliance, in his complaint. 

Id. The requirement that a plaintiff asserting claims subject to the GCA must affirmatively allege 

compliance with the claims filing requirement applies in federal court as well. Karim-Panahi v. 

Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, any purported state law 

claims must be dismissed with leave to amend for failure to allege compliance with the GCA. 

Thus, plaintiff may either proceed only on the First and Eighth Amendment claims 

identified above against defendants Robertson, Davis, Gonzales, Fleming, Arana, Holmes, and 

Shriver, or he may amend his complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified herein. 

Plaintiff is not obligated to amend his complaint. 

Any amended complaint must cure the deficiencies identified above and also adhere to the 

following requirements: 

Any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally 

participated in a substantial way in depriving him of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is 

legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 

///// 

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It must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself 

without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 

complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 

earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 

being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967)). 

The court cautions plaintiff that failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, or any court order may result in this action being dismissed. 

See Local Rule 110. 

IV. Summary of Order 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 

2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected 

in accordance with the notice to the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 

3. The allegations in the pleading are sufficient at least to state the following 

potentially cognizable claims: (a) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to 

medical needs claims against defendants Robertson and Davis (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 24-

28), Gonzales (id. ¶¶ 29-30), Fleming (id. ¶¶ 34-36), and Arana (id. ¶¶ 39-42); and 

(b) First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Holmes (id. ¶ 61) and 

Shriver (id. ¶¶ 76-77, ¶ 83). All other claims and defendants are dismissed with 

leave to amend within 30 days of service of this order. Plaintiff is not obligated to 

amend his complaint. 

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4. With this order the Clerk of the Court shall provide to plaintiff a blank summons, a 

copy of the February 26, 2015 complaint (ECF No. 1), seven USM-285 forms and 

instructions for service of process on defendants Robertson, Davis, Gonzales, 

Fleming, Arana, Holmes, and Shriver. Within 30 days of service of this order 

plaintiff may return the attached Notice of Submission of Documents with the 

completed summons, the completed USM-285 forms, and eight copies of the 

endorsed complaint. The court will transmit them to the United States Marshal for 

service of process pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Defendants will be required to respond to plaintiff’s allegations within the 

deadlines stated in Rule 12(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

5. Failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that this action 

be dismissed. 

DATED: May 19, 2016. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE R. ZAIZA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

D. TAMPLEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-447-KJM-EFB P 

 

NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF 

DOCUMENTS 

 

Plaintiff hereby submits the following documents in compliance with the court’s 

Screening Order: 

 1 completed summons form 

 7 completed forms USM-285 

 8 copies of the endorsed February 26, 2015 complaint 

Dated: ____________________________ 

 Plaintiff

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