Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_07-cv-00036/USCOURTS-ared-2_07-cv-00036-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405 Review of HHS Decision

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Michael J. Astrue was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on February 12, 2007.

He is therefore substituted for Jo Anne B. Barnhart pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EASTERN DIVISION

TAMMY R. WHITE PLAINTIFF

v. NO. 2:07cv00036 SWW-JWC

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration1 DEFENDANT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States District Judge

Susan Webber Wright. The parties may file specific objections to these findings and

recommendations and must provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. The

objections must be filed with the Clerk no later than eleven (11) days from the date of the

findings and recommendations. A copy must be served on the opposing party. The

District Judge, even in the absence of objections, may reject these proposed findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Tammy R. White, has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of

the Social Security Administration to deny her claims for Disability Insurance benefits and

Supplemental Security Income, based on disability. Both parties have submitted appeal

briefs and the case is ready for decision.

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision

is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and free of legal error. Long

v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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The ALJ noted that there was no medical evidence to support the allegation of anxiety and

there was no mention of it during the hearing. (Tr. 12.)

 3The Hon. Everet Dail Stiles.

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support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v.

Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).

In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider evidence

that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it; the

Court may not, however, reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial

evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857,

863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or mental impairment" is "an

impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities

which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff alleged disability due to anxiety2 and seizures. (Tr. 85.) The Commissioner

found that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The only

issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Act is supported by substantial record evidence.

After conducting an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge3

 (ALJ)

concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social

Security Act at any time through August 8, 2006, the date of his decision. (Tr. 17.) On

February 13, 2007, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for a review of the ALJ's

decision, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 4-6.)

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Plaintiff then filed her complaint initiating this appeal (docket entry #2).

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds that the decision of the

Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff was 36 years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 191.) She is a high school

graduate with additional vocational training. (Tr. 90, 191-92.) She has past relevant work

as a cashier, assembly line worker and nursing home assistant. (Tr. 15, 86-87, 92-95.)

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the required five-step

sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4) (2006). He

found that she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date.

(Tr. 12.) He found that she had “severe” impairments, carpal tunnel syndrome, syncope,

headaches and left lower extremity pain, but that she did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or equaled a Listing. (Tr. 12-13.) He judged that

Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her

symptoms were not entirely credible. (Tr. 14.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity for light work

with the further restrictions that she could perform no rapid, repetitive work with her right

(dominant) hand, she could not use foot controls with her left lower extremity and could not

work at unprotected heights, around hazardous machinery or drive as part of her work. (Tr.

13.) He determined that she was unable to perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr. 15-

16.) Based on the testimony of a vocational expert witness in response to a hypothetical

question, the ALJ found that there were a significant number of jobs in the economy which

Plaintiff could perform, notwithstanding her limitations, for example, hotel desk clerk and

sales clerk. (Tr. 16.) Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr.

17.)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not adequately discuss the reasons that he found

her to be less than fully credible. (Br. 9-11.) The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective

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The ALJ also cited Social Security Ruling 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929. (Tr.

14.) That Ruling tracks Polaski and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3) and elaborates

on them.

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complaints in light of Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984).4 (Tr. 13-15.)

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports the degree of

severity of subjective complaints alleged is just one factor to be considered

in evaluating the credibility of the testimony and complaints. The adjudicator

must give full consideration to all of the evidence presented relating to

subjective complaints, including the claimant's prior work record, and

observations by third parties and treating and examining physicians relating

to such matters as:

1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;

5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the claimant's subjective

complaints solely on the basis of personal observations. Subjective

complaints may be discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as

a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

There is little objective support in the record for Plaintiff's claim of disability. No

evaluations showed medical conditions that were disabling. Furthermore, inconsistencies

between the medical evidence and Plaintiff's subjective complaints gave reason to discount

those complaints. Richmond v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1141, 1443 (8th Cir. 1994). 

Given the lack of medical evidence in support of Plaintiff's allegations of disability,

the type of medication taken and its effectiveness, the lack of more treatment, Plaintiff's

daily activities, her poor work record, her functional capabilities and the lack of restriction

placed on Plaintiff by her physicians, the ALJ could rightly discount Plaintiff's subjective

complaints. See, e.g., Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may

discount subjective complaints if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole);

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Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ may discount complaints

inconsistent with the evidence as a whole); Dodson v. Chater, 101 F.3d 533, 534 (8th Cir.

1996) (after full consideration of all evidence relating to subjective complaints, ALJ may

discount complaints if there are inconsistencies in evidence as a whole). 

The ALJ is not required to discuss each Polaski factor as long as the analytical

framework is recognized and considered. Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 578 (8th Cir.

2006); Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ's credibility analysis

was proper. He made express credibility findings and gave his reasons for discrediting

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. E.g., Shelton v. Chater, 87 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1996);

Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 258 (8th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220, 224 (8th

Cir. 1995). His credibility findings are entitled to deference as long as they are supported

by good reasons and substantial evidence. Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir.

2003). 

Next, Plaintiff contends that the hypothetical question to the vocational expert did

not include all of her limitations supported by the record. (Br. 11-13.) Plaintiff’s attorney

was present at the administrative hearing. He had the opportunity to request that the ALJ

restate the hypothetical question or to cross-examine the vocational expert himself, but did

not do so. (Tr. 216.) Such a failure to raise the argument at the administrative level

ordinarily prevents a party from raising it in judicial proceedings. Weikert v. Sullivan, 977

F.2d 1249, 1254 (8th Cir. 1992); accord, Riggins v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir.

1999).

Further, the ALJ did include all limitations supported by the record. Plaintiff

contends that the frequency and effects of seizures and headaches should have been

included in the hypothetical question. (Br. 12.) The ALJ included seizure precautions.

“This individual also would need to avoid hazards such as heights, vibration, and

dangerous machinery including driving equipment or automobiles.” (Tr. 215.) Plaintiff

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testified that her medication helped her headaches. (Tr. 199-200.) She also testified that

she had a sciatic nerve disorder. (Tr. 201.) When asked what the main thing was that kept

her from working, she indicated that it was her seizures and her nerve disorder. (Tr. 209-

10.) No physician issued any headache related restrictions. There is no medical evidence

that these headaches imposed any restrictions on Plaintiff's functional capabilities. The

ALJ properly included in his question the impairments and functional restrictions that are

supported by the record, which is all that is required. Haynes v. Shalala, 26 F.3d 812, 815

(8th Cir. 1994).

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make an independent

decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in the

record which contradicts his findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence on

the record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. E.g., Mapes v. Chater, 82

F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).

The Court has reviewed the entire record, including the briefs, the ALJ’s decision,

the transcript of the hearing and the medical and other evidence. There is ample evidence

on the record as a whole that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

[the] conclusion" of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see also

Reutter ex rel. Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner's

decision is not based on legal error.

Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the decision of the Commissioner

be affirmed and that judgment be entered for Defendant dismissing this action with

prejudice.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2008.

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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