Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02884/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02884-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 FILED

2 JAN 3 2017

3 CLERK US DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BY / DEPUTY 4

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 RICO ANTIONE WELCH,

Inmate Booking No. 16164431

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02884-BEN-BGS

12 ORDER: Plaintiff,

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(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

and

v. 14

UCSD HOSPITAL,

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Defendant.

16 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

17 FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

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19 Rico Antione Welch (“Plaintiff’), currently housed at the George Bailey Detention

Center (“GBDC”) in San Diego, California, and proceedingpro se, has filed a civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffdid not prepay the civil

filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.)

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1 I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe

United States must satisfy a filing fee requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action

may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to prepay the entire fee only ifhe is granted

leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,

1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, ifthe plaintiffis a prisoner, even ifhe is granted leave to

proceed IFP he remains obligated to pay the full entire fee in “increments,” see Williams

v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182,1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless ofwhether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy ofthe

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the ... six-month period

immediately preceding the filing ofthe complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v.

King, 398 F.3d 1113,1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement,

the Court assesses an initial payment of 20 percent of(a) the average monthly deposits in

the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for

the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody ofthe

prisoner collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20 percent ofthe preceding month’s

income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards those

payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

In support ofhis IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted an inmate certificate attesting

to his trust account balance and activity for the six-month period prior to the filing ofhis

Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CivLR 3.2. This certificate

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26 In addition to the $350 statutory fee for this action, civil litigants must pay an additional

administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of

Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014)). The additional $50

administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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shows that Plaintiff has had no average monthly balance, and had no available funds to

his credit at the time offiling. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to

Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner

be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial

partial filing fee.”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP

case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack offunds available to him when

payment is ordered.”) However, the entire $350 balance for this case must be forwarded

to the Clerk ofthe Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

“The Court shall review, before docketing, iffeasible or, in any event, as soon as

practicable after docketing,” complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP, and by those

who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions ofparole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009),

citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Determining whether

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a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]... a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

The “mere possibility ofmisconduct” falls short ofmeeting the Iqbal plausibility

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U. S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“Under § 1983, when determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must

accept as true all allegations ofmaterial fact and must construe those facts in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language ofFederal Rule ofCivil

Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while the court has an “obligation ... where the

petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally

and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,342

(9th Cir. 2010), citingBretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l (9th Cir. 1985) (en

banc), it may not, in so doing, “supply essential elements ofthe claim that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents ofthe Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982).

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“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color ofstate law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiffmust show both

(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws ofthe United States, and

(2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color ofstate law.” Tsao

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

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1 Plaintiffs Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that on June 18, 2016, he was transported to UCSD Hospital from

the East Mesa Detention Facility due to a broken jaw. (See Compl. at 3.) After he was

admitted, Plaintiff alleges he was “sedated and had surgery.” (Id.) He later discovered

that he had “metal medical wires” in his mouth. (Id.) Sometime shortly after his surgery,

he was given medication and transported to GBDC where he was housed in the “medical

dorm.” (Id.) Plaintiffwas also placed on a liquid food diet. (Id.) On July 15, 2016,

Plaintiffwas removed from the liquid food diet and was transported back to UCSD

Hospital to have the wires removed from his mouth. (Id.) He was again admitted and

sedated. (Id.) He claims that when he awoke from sedation he discovered that the wires

had been removed. (Id.) Approximately two weeks later, on July 29, 2016, Plaintiff

claims he purchased apples from the canteen. (Id.) Plaintiffnoticed that his gums were

bleeding and he found that he still had wires in his mouth that had not been removed.

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that this has caused him “excruciating” pain. (Id. at 4.)

He alleges violations of his “right to medical care, access to courts, due process,

freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and malpractice.”2 (Id. at 3.) He is seeking

both punitive and compensatory damages. (Id. at 7.)

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20 2 Even though Plaintiffrefers to a number of different constitutional claims, his

allegations only involve his claims relating to his medical care. The Supreme Court has

held that “[i]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision ...

the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not

under the rubric ofsubstantive due process.” County ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

833, 843 (1998) (internal quotation omitted); accordAlbright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

272-73 (1994) (noting that when a broad “due process” violation is alleged, but a

particular amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection”

against a particular sort of government behavior, “that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing the[]

claims.” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the Court will analyze his claims as Eighth

Amendment inadequate medical care claims.

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1 C. Individual Defendants

Plaintiffs only named Defendant is a hospital and he fails to identify any specific

individual whom he claims was responsible for the alleged violations of his constitutional

rights. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintifffails to state a claim upon which § 1983

relief can be granted because he sets forth no individualized allegations ofwrongdoing by

a specific individual.

Plaintiffs Complaint contains no factual allegations describing what any

individual knew, did, or failed to do, with regard to Plaintiffs medical needs. Estate of

Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of course, a

required element of a § 1983 claim.”) “The inquiry into causation must be individualized

and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg

v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986).

Thus, without some specific “factual content” that might allow the Court to “draw

the reasonable inference” that a specific individual may be held personally liable for any

unconstitutional conduct directed at Plaintiff, the Court finds his Complaint, as currently

pleaded, contains allegations which Iqbal makes clear fail to “state a claim to reliefthat is

plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 568.

D. Inadequate medical care

Plaintiffhas also failed to state a claim based on a delay or denial ofmedical care.

Only “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs ofprisoners constitutes the

unnecessary and wanton infliction ofpain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A

determination of ‘deliberate indifference’ involves an examination oftwo elements: the

seriousness ofthe prisoner’s medical need and the nature ofthe defendant’s response to

that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

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1 Plaintiffs allegations regarding his injury are sufficient to plead the existence of an

objectively serious medical need. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60 (“The existence of an

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s

daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of

indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.”) However, his

Complaint fails to include any further “factual content” to show that any specific

Defendant acted with “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.” Jett v.

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006), quoting Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104.

The Complaint lacks any specific allegations that any individuals acted with

deliberate indifference to his plight by “knowing of and disregarding an excessive risk to

his health and safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557. In fact, the allegations include negligence and medical malpractice, but a

§ 1983 claim cannot sound merely in negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (holding that

a mere negligent failure to protect an inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983);

Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.”),

quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. “Deliberate indifference,” on the other hand, “is a

high legal standard,” and claims ofmedical malpractice or negligence are insufficient to

establish a constitutional deprivation. Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019, citing Toguchi, 391

F.3d at 1060.

IfPlaintiffwishes to proceed with a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs based on a lack of adequate medical care, he must identify the individuals

who he alleges knew of and deliberately disregarded his serious medical need medical

care, as well as how they became aware ofthat knowledge. Therefore, while the Court

finds Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it will

provide him a chance to fix the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order, ifhe can.

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See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

E. State Law Claims

To the extent Plaintiffseeks to include state law claims based on the alleged

violation ofstate law, the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss Plaintiffs pendent state

law claims without prejudice because Plaintiffhas not identified a violation of a federal

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over [state law claims] that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form part ofthe same case or controversy ... if

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United

Mine Workers ofAmerica v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[I]fthe federal claims are

dismissed before trial,... the state claims should be dismissed as well.”)

III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

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DIRECTS the Watch Commander for the GBDC, or his designee, to collect

from Plaintiffs prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) ofthe

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk ofthe Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

DIRECTS the Clerk ofthe Court to serve a copy ofthis Order on Watch

Commander, George Bailey Detention Center, 446 Alta Road, Suite 5300, San Diego,

CA 92158.

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4. DISMISSES Plaintiffs Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which

reliefmay be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS

him forty-five (45) days leave from the date ofthis Order in which to file an Amended

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies ofpleading noted. Plaintiffs Amended

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1 Complaint must be complete in itselfwithout reference to his original pleading.

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. RichardFeiner

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542,1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading

may be “considered waived ifnot repled.”)

5. DIRECTS the Clerk ofCourt to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a

blank copy ofthe Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

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DATED: January / , 2017 12

HON,

United States District Judge 13 T. benite:

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