Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00327/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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09cv327

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MRC GOLF, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HIPPO GOLF COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil No. 09cv327-L(RBB)

ORDER 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR EX PARTE

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER, SEIZURE, AND OTHER

RELIEF; AND

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO RETAIN PLEADINGS

UNDER SEAL

Plaintiff, an exclusive distributor in the United States of Mitsubishi Rayon golf shafts,

filed a complaint alleging that Defendant, a golf club distributor, is selling in the United States

certain golf clubs falsely representing that their shafts were manufactured by Mitsubishi Rayon

or with Mitsubishi Rayon materials. Plaintiff alleges trademark infringement under federal, state

and common law, and violations of California Business and Professions Code Sections 17200,

17500 and 17535. On February 24, 2009 Plaintiff submitted for filing a motion to order seizure

of allegedly infringing products under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) and a temporary restraining order

under section 1116(d) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). Plaintiff has not served

Defendant with the motion or its supporting papers. Instead, pursuant to section 1116(d), it

requests that its motion and supporting papers be sealed, and that relief issue without notice to

Defendant. Because the court finds that Plaintiff does not meet the requirements of section

1116(d) or Rule 65(b)(1) for ex parte relief, the motions are DENIED.

Case 3:09-cv-00327-L-RBB Document 7 Filed 02/26/09 Page 1 of 6
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Under certain “narrow, extraordinary circumstances, and subject to compliance with a

series of detailed requirements” (Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Ex Parte TRO at 6), section

1116(d) allows for the “extraordinary measure” of an “ex parte seizure order in civil actions

alleging a trademark infringement that involves the use of a counterfeit mark.” In re Lorillard

Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff fails to meet the narrow, extraordinary circumstances because its action is not

arising out of use of counterfeit marks as that term is defined in section 1116(d)(1)(B), and in the

alternative because it does not meet all the requirements of section 1116(d)(4)(B).

As used in subsection 1116(d), the term “counterfeit mark” is defined as follows:

(i) a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in the United

States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for

sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether or not the person against whom relief

is sought knew such mark was so registered; or 

(ii) a spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable

from, a designation as to which the remedies of this chapter are made available by

reason of section 220506 of Title 36.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B). Plaintiff’s parent company has registered four word marks:

BASSARA, DIAMANA, JAVLNFX, and FUBUKI. (Decl. of Chris Elson dated Feb. 13, 2009,

Ex. 1-4.) Plaintiff does not maintain, and the record does not reflect, that the allegedly

infringing products display any of these word marks. Instead, Plaintiff’s complaint is that

Defendant is using the Mistubishi Rayon trade name. (Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Ex Parte

TRO dated Feb. 18, 2009 at 3; Decl. of Hikaru Shiraishi dated Feb. 11, 2009 at 1.) However,

Plaintiff has not asserted, and has not presented any evidence, that the Mitsubishi Rayon trade

name is registered. Accordingly, the definition of counterfeit mark provided in section

1116(d)(1)(B)(i) is not met. The definition provided in subsection (ii) also does not apply. It

applies to violations of 36 U.S.C. § 220506, which Plaintiff does not allege.

Plaintiff contends that the marks on Defendant’s golf club shafts are counterfeit as

defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Like section 1116(b), section 1127 refers to registered marks, and

therefore lends no support to Plaintiff’s contention that its case arises out of the use of

counterfeit marks. Because Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that Defendant used a

Case 3:09-cv-00327-L-RBB Document 7 Filed 02/26/09 Page 2 of 6
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“counterfeit mark,” its motion for an ex parte seizure order and temporary restraining order

under section 1116(d)(1)(A) and motion to seal the motion pleadings under section 1116(d)(8)

are denied.

The motions are denied on the alternative ground that Plaintiff has not met all the

requirements of section 1116(d)(4)(B). It provides in pertinent part:

The court shall not grant such an application unless . . . [¶] the court finds that it

clearly appears from specific facts that– 

. . .

(vii) the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or persons acting in

concert with such person, would destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such

matter inaccessible to the court, if the applicant were to proceed on notice to such

person.

This provision serves the purpose of the seizure order, which is “to preserve the evidence

necessary to bring trademark counterfeiters to justice.” Lorillard Tobacco, 370 F.3d at 987; see

also id. (“seizure simply protects the integrity of the evidence in pending civil action”). 

Contrary to the purpose of remedies for trademark infringement, its purpose is not to keep the

allegedly infringing products off the market. See id. 

Although Plaintiff concedes that “Defendant’s activities are not necessarily fly-by-night

operations” (Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Ex Parte TRO at 2), it argues that “any notice

served on Defendant will trigger an immediate all-out effort to destroy, move, hide, sell or

otherwise make the counterfeit product inaccessible to the Court (id. at 9, see also id. at 2-3). 

However, the evidence does not support these assertions. According to Plaintiff’s affidavits, a

cease and desist letter was delivered to Defendant in September 3, 2008, however, instead of

ceasing the sale of allegedly infringing products, Defendant continued to sell them and reduced

their price. (Decl. of Mark Gunther dated Feb. 11, 2009 at 2-3; Decl. of David S. Bristol dated

Feb. 18, 2009 at 2-4.) Plaintiff cites to no case law for the implied proposition that continued

infringement itself constitutes destruction of evidence for purposes of section 1116(d) seizures. 

Based on the foregoing, the court cannot conclude “that it clearly appears from specific

facts” that evidence will be destroyed unless a seizure order issues without notice. Far from

/ / / / /

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describing an extraordinary circumstance, the evidence depicts a typical fact pattern in

trademark infringement cases. 

The § 1116(d) order is an extraordinary mechanism for pre-notice seizure of

allegedly infringing goods. The statute sets out specific standards. If the applicant

cannot meet those standards, immediate seizure is foreclosed but the ultimate

remedy is preserved. We do not take lightly the concern that evidence may

evaporate upon notice to a party. But notice is the norm in our courts. The district

court has other vehicles available to address disappearing evidence, including

sanctions for spoliation of evidence. 

Lorillard Tobacco, 370 F.3d at 989. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for an ex parte seizure

order and temporary restraining order under section 1116(d)(1)(A) and motion to seal under

section 1116(d)(8) are denied on this alternative ground.

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order without notice to Defendant is based

on an alternative and independent ground provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1). 

It permits a temporary restraining order

without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: 

(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before

the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and 

(B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and

the reasons why it should not be required. 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(b)(1). Circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte temporary

restraining order are extremely limited because 

our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken before

reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted to both sides of

a dispute. 

Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006), quoting Granny

Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). In cases such as this, where it is

possible to find and serve the adverse party, courts have recognized 

a very narrow band of cases in which ex parte orders are proper because notice to

the defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action. In the

trademark arena, such cases include situations where an alleged infringer is likely

to dispose of the infringing goods before the hearing. To justify an ex parte

proceeding on this latter ground, the applicant must do more than assert that the

adverse party would dispose of evidence if given notice. Plaintiffs must show that

defendants would have disregarded a direct court order and disposed of the goods

within the time it would take for a hearing and must support such assertions by

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showing that the adverse party has a history of disposing of evidence or violating

court orders or that persons similar to the adverse party have such a history.

Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1131 (internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citations

omitted). Plaintiff’s affidavits, discussed above in the context of its motion for an ex parte

seizure order, fall short of making the requisite showing. Plaintiff does not contend that failure

to issue a temporary restraining order without notice would render further proceedings in this

case futile, that Defendant is likely to disregard a court order, or that it has a history of spoliation

of evidence. Instead, Plaintiff’s argument is based, without articulation or citation to legal

authority, on an implied premise that continued sale of allegedly infringing products equals

destruction of evidence. Plaintiff fails to make the showing necessary before a temporary

restraining order can be issued ex parte pursuant to Rule 65(b)(1).

Based on the foregoing:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Ex parte Temporary Restraining Order, Seizure Order, and

Other Relief is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s motion styled as Motion to Retain Pleadings Under Seal Related to Seizure

Order and Supporting Documents is DENIED.

3. The court notes that in its 14-page memorandum Plaintiff does not cite to a single

binding case law authority. All the cases cited are from District Courts outside the Ninth Circuit

and from Circuits other than the Ninth or the Federal Circuit. In any future filings Plaintiff shall

cite to pertinent Ninth Circuit, Federal Circuit or Supreme Court authority. Only upon counsel’s

certification that a diligent search was performed and no binding case law on point existed, may

Plaintiff cite to non-binding case law. Failure to comply with this order, or with any other order

of this court, civil local rule of this District or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure may result in

sanctions being imposed against Plaintiff’s counsel. See Civ. Loc. R. 83.1(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 26, 2009

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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COPY TO: 

HON. RUBEN B. BROOKS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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