Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-05537/USCOURTS-caDC-08-05537-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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pniieb $infee 0,louri of appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

Argued September 24,2009 Decided June 28,2010 

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., 

APPELLEES 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(NO. 1 :04-CV-0 1 166-RJL) 

Mark C. Fleming argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs were Stephen H. Oleskey, Robert C. Kirsch, 

Joshua D. Jacobson, Allyson J. Portney, Seth P. Waxman, 

Paul R. Wolfson, Robert J. McKeehan, Douglas F. Curtis, and 

Paul M. Winke. 

Sharon Swingle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were 

Michael F. Hertz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and 

Douglas N. Letter, Thomas M. Bondy, and Robert M. Loeb, 

Attorneys. Ronald J. Wiltsie 11, Attorney, entered an 

appearance. 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 1 of 17
Before: GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Belkacem Bensayah 

petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus in 

order to challenge his detention at the Naval Station at 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The district court denied his 

petition, holding the Government had shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Bensayah was being held 

lawfully pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military 

Force (AUMF), Pub. L. 107-40, 5 2(a), 1 15 Stat 224, 224 

(2001), because he had provided "support" to a1 Qaeda. 

Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (2008). On 

appeal the Government has eschewed reliance upon certain 

evidence the district court had considered and has abandoned 

its position that Bensayah's detention is lawful because of the 

support he rendered to a1 Qaeda; instead it argues only that his 

detention is lawful because he was "part of' that organization 

- a contention the district court did not reach. 

We agree with the Government that its authority under 

the AUMF extends to the detention of individuals who are 

functionally part of a1 Qaeda. The evidence upon which the 

district court relied in concluding Bensayah supported a1 

Qaeda is insufficient, however, to show he was part of that 

organization. We therefore remand this case for the district 

court to determine whether, considering all reliable evidence, 

Bensayah was functionally part of a1 Qaeda. 

I. Background 

Bensayah, an Algerian citizen, was arrested by the 

Bosnian police on immigration charges in late 2001. He was 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 2 of 17
later told that he and five other Algerian men arrested in 

Bosnia were suspected of plotting to attack the United States 

Embassy in Sarajevo. Because the ensuing three-month 

investigation failed to uncover evidence sufficient to continue 

the detention of the six men, the Supreme Court of the 

Federation of Bosnia and Herzogovina ordered that they be 

released. The men were then turned over to the United States 

Government and transported to the U.S. Naval Station at 

Guantanamo Bay, where they have been detained since 

January 2002. 

In 2004 Bensayah and the five other detainees petitioned 

the district court for writs of habeas corpus. Although their 

petitions were originally dismissed, Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. 

Supp. 2d 3 1 1, 3 14 (D.D.C. 2005), they were reinstated after 

the Supreme Court held that detainees at Guantanamo Bay are 

constitutionally "entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to 

challenge the legality of their detention," Boumediene v. 

Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229,2262 (2008). 

In August 2008 the district court entered a case 

management order (CMO) establishing the procedures that 

would govern this case. See CMO, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 

04-1 166 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008). The CMO placed 

upon the Government the burden of establishing, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, the lawfulness of the 

petitioner's detention. The Government was required to 

submit a return stating the factual and legal bases for 

detaining that prisoner, who was then required to file a 

traverse stating the relevant facts in support of his petition and 

a rebuttal of the Government's legal justification for his 

detention. The CMO allowed discovery only "by leave of the 

Court for good cause shown," and required that requests for 

discovery 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 3 of 17
(I) be narrowly tailored; (2) specify why the request 

is likely to produce evidence both relevant and 

material to the petitioner's case; (3) specify the 

nature of the request ...; and (4) explain why the 

burden on the Government to produce such evidence 

is neither unfairly disruptive nor unduly burdensome. 

It also required the Government to provide to the petitioner 

any exculpatory evidence "contained in the material reviewed 

in developing the return for the petitioner[] and in preparation 

for the hearing for the petitioner." 

The Government claimed authority to detain the six men 

pursuant both to the AUMF and to the President's inherent 

powers as Commander in Chief. It argued each of the six 

men was lawfully detained as an "enemy combatant," which 

the district court had in an earlier order defined as 

an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban 

or a1 Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are 

engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 

coalition partners. This includes any person who has 

committed a belligerent act or has directly supported 

hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. 

Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (2008). The 

Government contended all six men were lawfully detained 

because they had planned to travel to Afghanistan in late 2001 

in order to take up arms against the United States and allied 

forces. It also contended Bensayah's detention was lawful 

because he was a member of and a travel facilitator for a1 

Qaeda. The only direct evidence the Government offered in 

sumort of its contentions about Bensavah was contained in a 

unnamed source and in certain other pieces of evidence it 

claimed corroborated that document. 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 4 of 17
The district court granted habeas to each petitioner other 

than Bensayah, holding the Government had failed to show by 

a preponderance of the evidence that they had planned to 

travel to Afghanistan to fight against the United States. 

Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 197-98. Because the 

Government did not sufficiently establish the reliability of the 

allegations in the classified document about those petitioners, 

the court refused to credit those allegations. 

The district court denied Bensayah's petition because it 

determined "the Government has met its burden by providing 

additional evidence that sufficiently corroborates its 

allegations from this unnamed source that Bensayah is an alQaida facilitator." Id. at 198. The corroborative evidence 

provided by the Government is of three sorts: (1) evidence 

linking Bensayah to a1 Qaeda, and specifically to a "senior alQaida fa~ilitator'~; (2) evidence of Bensayah's history of 

travel "between and among countries using false passports in 

multiple names"; and (3) evidence creating "sufficient doubt 

as to Bensayah's credibility." Id. 

Having deemed the allegations about Bensayah in the 

classified document reliable, the district court held "the 

Government has established by a preponderance of the 

evidence that it is more likely than not .. . Bensayah not only 

planned to take up arms against the United States but also 

[planned to] facilitate the travel of unnamed others to do the 

same." Id. The court further held such planning and 

facilitating "amounts to 'support' within the meaning of the 

'enemy combatant' definition governing this case." Id. 

Because it held Bensayah's detention was lawful based upon 

his support of a1 Qaeda, the court did not go on to consider 

whether he was a "member" of a1 Qaeda or whether his 

detention was lawful on the alternative ground that he was 

"part of' that organization. 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 5 of 17
There have been three developments since the district 

court's decision. First, the Government has eschewed 

reliance upon a portion of the evidence that the "senior alQaida facilitator" with whom Bensayah allegedly had contact 

was in fact a senior a1 Qaeda facilitator. Second, the 

Government has changed its position concerning the source 

and scope of its authority to detain Bensayah. Whereas the 

Government had previously claimed authority to detain 

Bensayah based upon both the AUMF and the President's 

constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, it now relies 

solely upon the AUMF.* Third, the Government has 

abandoned its argument that Bensayah is being detained 

lawfully because of the support he rendered to a1 Qaeda - 

the sole basis upon which the district court denied Bensayah's 

petition. The Government now contends that Bensayah's 

detention is lawful only because he was "part of' a1 Qaeda. 

11. Analysis 

Some but not all Bensayah's many arguments on appeal 

were mooted when the Government abandoned its theory that 

Bensayah's detention is lawful because he rendered support to 

a1 Qaeda. As for matters of procedure, Bensayah still 

challenges the district court's (1) reliance upon the 

preponderance of the evidence standard, (2) refusal to require 

the Government to search for reasonably available 

exculpatory evidence in its possession, (3) denial of his 

* The Government has also abandoned the term "enemy combatant" 

in reference to the scope of its detention authority and now claims 

the authority to detain individuals who "were part of, or 

substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated 

forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 

coalition partners, including any person who has committed a 

belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such 

eneniy armed forces." 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 6 of 17
discovery requests, and (4) admission of the Government's 

"rebuttal" evidence. As for matters of substance, Bensayah 

still argues the district court erred in (1) adopting an 

overbroad definition of the Executive's detention authority, 

and (2) crediting "inadequately corroborated raw 

intelligence." Even if that evidence is credited, he argues (3) 

it is insufficient to establish his detention is lawful. 

We review de novo the district court's conclusions of 

law, including its ultimate denial of a writ of habeas corpus. 

Saunders v. Senkowski, 587 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2009). We 

review its factual determinations for clear error, id., and its 

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, A1 Odah v. United 

States, 559 F.3d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Whether a 

detainee was "part of' a1 Qaeda is a mixed question of law 

and fact. Awad v. Obama, No. 09-535 1, slip op. at 17 (June 2, 

2010). "That is, whether a detainee's alleged conduct ... justifies his detention under the AUMF is a legal question. 

The question whether the [Glovernment has proven that 

conduct ... is a factual question that we review for clear 

error." Barhoumi v. Obama, No. 09-5383, slip op. at 12-13 

(June 1 1, 20 10) (internal citation deleted). 

A. Standard of Proof 

In Boumediene the Supreme Court held detainees at 

Guantanamo Bay are entitled to "the fundamental procedural 

protections of habeas corpus," 128 S. Ct. at 2277, but did not 

expand upon which procedural protections are "fundamental." 

It left open, for instance, the standard of proof the 

Government must meet in order to defeat a petition for habeas 

corpus. Id. at 2271 ("The extent of the showing required of 

the Government in these cases is a matter to be determined"). 

Bensayah argues that because he is liable to be held "for the 

duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more," 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 7 of 17
requiring the Government to prove the lawfulness of his 

detention by a mere preponderance of the evidence is 

inappropriate. He contends the district court should have 

required the Government to prove its case beyond a 

reasonable doubt, or at least by clear and convincing 

evidence. This argument has been overtaken by events, for 

we have recently held a standard of proof higher than a 

preponderance of the evidence is not a "fundamental 

procedural protection" of habeas required by Boumediene. 

Awad, slip op. at 18 ("A preponderance of the evidence 

standard satisfies constitutional requirements in considering a 

habeas petition from a detainee held pursuant to the AUMF"); 

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (2010) ("Our narrow 

charge is to determine whether a preponderance standard is 

unconstitutional. Absent more specific and relevant guidance, 

we find no indication that it is."). 

B. Challenges to the Discovery Process 

The CMO requires the Government to 

provide on an ongoing basis any evidence contained 

in the material [it] reviewed in developing the return 

for the petitioner, and in preparation for the hearing 

for the petitioner, that tends materially to undermine 

the Government's theory as to the lawfulness of the 

petitioner's detention. 

Bensayah argues the district court abused its discretion by 

imposing upon the Government an impermissibly narrow 

obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. He maintains the 

Government must search all "reasonably available" 

information and disclose not only information that "tends 

materially to undermine the Government's theory as to the 

lawfulness of the petitioner's detention" but also information 

that "undermines the reliability of other purportedly 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 8 of 17
inculpatory evidence" or "names potential witnesses capable 

of providing material evidence." 

Bensayah does not contend the disclosure requirement 

imposed by the district court is in any way unconstitutional. 

Nor has he shown that broader disclosure is required by any 

opinion of the Supreme Court or of this court. He cites 

Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 138-39 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 

for the proposition that the Government must search all 

"reasonably available" information, but that decision was 

compelled by the terms of a statutory scheme not at issue 

here. He cites A1 Odah, 559 F.3d at 546, for the proposition 

that evidence may be material even if it is not directly 

exculpatory. The CMO is not, however, in tension with A1 

Odah. Information that undermines the reliability of other 

materials, e.g., inculpatory evidence, see id. at 546, also tends 

"materially to undermine the Government's theory as to the 

lawfulness of the petitioner's detention" and hence must be 

disclosed by the Government. We therefore agree with the 

Government that the standard for disclosure ordered by the 

district court, coupled with the opportunity to make specific 

discovery requests, is consistent with the Supreme Court's 

directive in Boumediene that a detainee be provided with the 

opportunity to challenge "the sufficiency of the Government's 

evidence" and to "supplement the record on review" with 

additional "exculpatory evidence." 128 S. Ct. at 2270,2274. 

Bensayah's primary concern seems to be that the 

disclosure requirement allows the Government to withhold 

exculpatory evidence because personnel from other agencies 

will pass only inculpatory evidence on to the attorneys 

actually "developing the return" and "preparing for the 

hearing." That practice is not permissible, however, under the 

current disclosure requirement. Any information that has 

been strategically filtered out of the record in order to 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 9 of 17
withhold exculpatory evidence is plainly "material reviewed 

in developing the return" -- and hence subject to the 

disclosure requirement - even if the individual doing the 

filtering works for a Government agency other than the 

Department of Justice. 

Bensayah next argues that the district court erred by 

placing upon him the burden of explaining why each of his 

discovery requests would be neither "unfairly disruptive [nor] 

unduly burdensome to the Government." The district court 

did not abuse its discretion in structuring discovery this way. 

The Supreme Court specifically recognized the district court's 

discretion to accommodate the Government's legitimate 

interest in protecting sources and intelligence-gathering 

methods, acknowledging that "[clertain accommodations can 

be made to reduce the burden habeas corpus proceedings will 

place on the military without impermissibly diluting the 

protections of the writ." Bournediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276. It is 

not necessary to address Bensayah's specific discovery 

requests relating to because, as explained below, 

we hold this exhibit may not be relied upon by the district 

court on remand in the absence of additional corroborative 

evidence. Any discovery requests pertaining to new 

corroborative evidence should be decided by the district court 

in the first instance. Finally, we find no merit in Bensayah's 

claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his 

request for discovery into the treatment of or in 

allowing the Government to present "rebuttal" evidence. 

C. Standard of Detention 

The Government asserts the authority to detain Bensayah 

pursuant to the AUMF, in which the Congress authorized the 

President 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 10 of 17
to use all necessary and appropriate force against 

those nations, organizations, or persons he 

determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 

2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in 

order to prevent any future acts of international 

terrorism against the United States by such nations, 

organizations or persons. 

As mentioned before, the Government contends it may 

lawfully detain an individual if he is "part of' a1 Qaeda. 

Bensayah objects to this formulation, but we have made clear 

elsewhere that the AUMF authorizes the Executive to detain, 

at the least, any individual who is functionally part of a1 

Qaeda. Barhoumi, slip op. at 29 (detainee "was 'part of an 

al-Qaida-associated force and therefore properly detained 

pursuant to the AUMF"); Awad, slip op. at 19 ("Once [a 

petitioner is shown to be] 'part of a1 Qaeda ... the 

requirements of the AUMF [are] satisfied"); Al-Bihani, 590 

F.3d at 872-74. 

Although it is clear a1 Qaeda has, or at least at one time 

had, a particular organizational structure, see The 911 1 

Commission Report: Final Report of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 56 

(2004) ("[Al Qaeda's] structure included as its operating arms 

an intelligence component, a military committee, a financial 

committee, a political committee, and a committee in charge 

of media affairs and propaganda"), the details of its structure 

are generally unknown, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, 

Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: A1 

Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict (2003) ("There is a great deal 

that remains unknown or debatable about the specific nature, 

size, structure and reach of [a1 Qaeda]"), but it is thought to be 

somewhat amorphous, Kenneth Katzman, Congressional 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 11 of 17
Research Service Report for Congress: A1 Qaeda: Profile and 

Threat Assessment (2005) ("A1 Qaeda has always been more 

a coalition of different groups than a unified structure, many 

argue, and it has been this diversity that gives A1 Qaeda 

global reach"). As a result, it is impossible to provide an 

exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an 

individual is "part of' a1 Qaeda. That determination must be 

made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than 

a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the 

individual in relation to the organization. That an individual 

operates within a1 Qaeda's forrnal command structure is 

surely sufficient but is not necessary to show he is "part of' 

the organization; there may be other indicia that a particular 

individual is sufficiently involved with the organization to be 

deemed part of it, see Awad, slip op. at 19 ("there are ways 

other than making a 'command structure' showing to prove 

that a detainee is 'part of a1 Qaeda"), but the purely 

independent conduct of a freelancer is not enough. 

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

As the district court noted, a 1- 

is the only evidence directly 

REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVAULATED 

contains a number of allegations about 

Bensayah. It states: 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 12 of 17
The district court, quoting Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 

847 (D.C. Cir. 2008), correctly stated that it must "evaluate 

the raw evidence, finding it to be sufficiently reliable and 

sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted 

proposition with the requisite degree of certainty." See 

Barhoumi, slip op. at 21 ("we agree ... Parhat sets the 

guideposts for our inquiry into the reliability of the ... 

evidence [in a detainee's habeas case]"). Although the district 

about the source of the document and about how the 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 13 of 17
information therein was gathered led the court to conclude 

is not by itself reliable. 

In Parhat we made clear that the reliability of evidence 

can be determined not only by looking at the evidence alone 

but, alternatively, by considering "sufficient additional 

information ... permit[ting the factfinder] to assess its 

reliability." 532 F.3d at 849. Here the district court, after 

looking at additional information, concluded "there is 

sufficient corroborating evidence in the record to credit and 

rely upon the[] assertions made in about 

Bensayah." The evidence in question is of three sorts: (1) 

evidence linking Bensayah to a1 Qaeda, and specifically to 

, allegedly a "senior al-Qaida operative and 

facilitator"; (2) evidence of Bensayah's travel plans and travel 

history; and (3) evidence raising "questions . . . about 

Bensayah's whereabouts in the early 1990s," which evidence 

created "sufficient doubt as to Bensayah's credibility." 

Bensayah argues the district court clearly erred by 

aI. 

finding 

categorically insufficient 

upon which the district court relied were 

reliable. He contends 

to corroborate - the - 

We disagree with 

~Gsa~ah's broad contention that two pieces of evidence, 

each unreliable when viewed alone, cannot ever corroborate 

each other. Cf: United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 100-03 

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (relying upon one informant's hearsay 

statement to corroborate another informant's hearsay 

statement even though neither was reliable standing alone). 

We agree, however, with his alternative argument that even if 

the additional evidence relied upon by the district court in this 

case is itself reliable, it is not sufficiently corroborative to 

support reliance upon the statements concerning Bensayah in 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 14 of 17
1. Evidence Linking Bensayah to A1 Qaeda 

were corroborated 

The district court found 

by Bensayah's "connections" to 

fl 

a1 Qaeda, 

viz., (1) Bensayah was directly linked to -, 

allegedly a "senior al-Qaida operative and facilitator," and (2) 

put forth more than sufficient credible evidence that 

was a senior al-Qaida operative and facilitator." 

Since the district court's decision, however, the Govemment 

has eschewed reliance upon much of that evidence; it now 

maintains the other evidence upon which the district court 

relied is sufficient to link to a1 Qaeda. In an 

order denying a Rule 60(b) motion filed by Bensayah, the 

was 

district court indicated it would have concluded 

sufficiently corroborated to be relied upon, even "putting 

- - aside completely any evidence linking Bensayah to 

was connected to 

Assuming, 

and 

as the 

a1 

a1 

Qaeda, the evidence linking Bensayah to 

Qaeda 

Govemment 

does not, 

contends, 

by itself 

- 

or together 

USCA Case #08-5537 Document #1253012 Filed: 07/01/2010 Page 15 of 17
with the other evidence discussed below, corroborate 

sufficiently so that it can be relied upon. The 

Government presented no direct evidence of actual 

communication between Bensayah and any a1 Qaeda member, 

much less evidence suggesting Bensayah communicated with 

or anyone else in order to facilitate travel by 

an a1 Qaeda member. Indeed, the district court determined the 

record did not support the allegations in 

concerning the only individuals named therein whose travel 

- 

Bensayah allegedly planned to facilitate. 

2. Travel History and Travel Plans 

The district court found the assertions in 

were corroborated by evidence that Bensayah 1 (1) 

, and (2) had "experience 

in obtaining and traveling in and out of numerous countries on 

fraudulent passports." Bensayah admits to having used 

multiple travel documents, "some of which were in an 

assumed name," but maintains he traveled under fraudulent 

documents in order to avoid being sent back to Algeria, 

"where he reasonably feared persecution." He presented 

"unrebutted declarations" that "mere possession and use of 

false travel documents is neither proof of involvement with 

terrorism nor evidence of facilitation of travel by others." We 

amee. That Bensavah had ex~erience with fraudulent travel 

Qaeda or anyone else. As noted in the prior paragraph, the 

district court determined the Government had failed to show 

that Bensayah's co-petitioners planned to travel to 

Afghanistan in order to engage U.S. forces. Therefore, 

Bensayah could not have been facilitating their travel for that 

purpose. 

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3.Evidence Calling into Question Bensayah's 

Credibility 

The district court found "serious questions [had] been 

raised about Bensayah's whereabouts in the early 1990s." 

This finding af-most undermines Bensayah's own credibility; 

no account of his whereabouts ties him to a1 Qaeda or 

suggests he facilitated anyone's travel during that time. These 

"questions" in no way demonstrate that Bensayah had ties to 

and facilitated travel for a1 Qaeda in 200 1. 

Because the evidence, viewed in isolation or together, is 

insufficiently corroborative of , the district court 

on remand may not, in the absence of additional corroborative 

evidence not already considered, rely upon that exhibit in 

determining whether Bensayah was part of a1 Qaeda. 

111. Conclusion 

The Government argues it is authorized by the AUMF to 

detain Bensayah solely on the ground he was functionally a 

member or "part of' a1 Qaeda. The evidence upon which the 

district court relied in concluding Bensayah "supported" a1 

Qaeda is insufficient, however, to show he was part of that 

organization. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 

district court and remand the case for the district court to hear 

such evidence as the parties may submit and to decide in the 

first instance whether Bensayah was functionally part of a1 

Qaeda. 

So ordered. 

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