Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00140/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-00140-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ALLISON DETHOLOFF, PATRICIA

BREIDENBAUGH, BARBARA

PALMER a.k.a. BARBARA AGUILERA,

LYNN SORCE, BARBARA VINCENT,

and RUTH SAUERS,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

G.C. “BUCK” BUCHANAN, Yavapai

County Sheriff, YAVAPAI COUNTY

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, and YAVAPAI

COUNTY,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-140-PCT-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendants G.C. “Buck” Buchanan, Yavapai County

Sheriff, Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, and Yavapai County’s (collectively “Defendants”)

motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. #76). Also before the Court is Defendants’ motion to

strike portions of Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts. (Dkt. #90). After reviewing the pleadings,

and determining that oral argument is unnecessary, the Court issues the following Order. 

I. BACKGROUND

This action was removed from Yavapai County Superior Court on January 12, 2005.

(Dkt. #1). At that time, Plaintiffs asserted claims against Defendants under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 42, 29 U.S.C. 623(e) ("ADEA"); Title VII

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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII"); the Fair Labor Standards

Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.; the Arizona Employment Protection Act

(“AEPA”), A.R.S. § 23-1501; and the Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 41-1461

(“ACRA”). (First Amended Complaint, ¶1). 

On March 31, 2008, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under the FLSA for failure

to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).

(Dkt. #20). The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII, the AEPA, and the

ACRA for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01A.

(Dkt. #20). In addition, on August 11, 2006, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s ADEA claim

upon motion for reconsideration and granted Plaintiffs leave to file a second amended

complaint to state a claim under the FLSA. (Dkt. #31). Plaintiffs filed a second amended

complaint on August 21, 2006, alleging that Defendants violated the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”),

29 U.S.C. § 206(d), by paying Plaintiffs, all of whom are female, “less than their similarlysituated male colleagues.” (Second Amended Complaint (“Comp.”), ¶13). Plaintiffs, all of

whom are women, allege that they were hired in 2004 as “Detention Support Specialists” in

the Yavapai County Jail as part of a "bait and switch" scheme that Defendants concocted to

satisfy an order by the Department of Justice to enhance the safekeeping of inmates in

Yavapai County. (Compl. ¶12; Dkt. #87). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they Defendants

only hired women to serve as Detention Support Specialists rather than Detention Officers

so that Defendants could pay them less than men serving in essentially the same functions.

(Dkt. #87, pp. 2-3).

Defendants again sought to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6),

but the Court held that the complaint satisfied the liberal standard employed in Rule 12(b)(6)

challenges because “[w]hile Plaintiffs have not alleged many facts to support their claim that

male employees performed equal work and were paid higher wages, Plaintiffs do describe

the nature of the work that Plaintiffs performed and, presumably, could demonstrate that

male employees performed substantially equal work and were paid higher wages.” (Dkt.

#36). Defendants now seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ EPA claim and move to strike

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portions of Plaintiffs’ statement of facts in support of their response to Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. (Dkt. #s 76, 90).

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

“It is well settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court

in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Serv., Inc., 854 F.2d

1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988). In support or opposition to summary judgment, “affidavits shall

be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters

stated therein.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Conclusory and speculative testimony in affidavits and

moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and to defeat summary judgment.

Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). However, “[a]t

the summary judgment stage, [courts] do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s

form. [Courts] instead focus on the admissibility of its contents.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342

F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ entire Statement of Facts, or in the alternative,

portions of Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts. (Dkt. #90). Specifically, Defendants contends that

the affidavits attached to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts contradict Plaintiffs’ sworn answers

to interrogatories and deposition testimony. (Dkt #90, ¶2). First, the Court notes

Defendants’ motion to strike violates Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(m), which clearly

states that “[a]n objection to the admission of evidence offered in support of or opposition

to a motion must be presented in the objecting party’s responsive or reply memorandum (or,

if the underlying motion is a motion for summary judgment, in the party’s response to

another party’s separate statement of material facts) and not in a separate motion to strike

or other separate filing.” L.R.Civ. 7.2(m)(2) (emphasis added). Second, Defendants

contends that Plaintiffs’ affidavits directly contradict Plaintiffs’ prior sworn information

because although each of Plaintiffs’ affidavits states that “[i]n my May 2007 Interrogatory

Responses I identified similarly-situated male employees by name, title and duty” (Dkt. #88,

Ex. B-G), Plaintiffs in fact stated in their May 2007 Interrogatories that “Plaintiff is not

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aware of any particular name of a similarly situated male.” (Dkt. #90, ¶2). Although

Plaintiffs object to Defendants’ motion to strike, their response simply reiterates the

substantive arguments contained in their response to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment; Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants’ specific evidentiary objections. (Dkt.

#93). As such, the Court will strike the third paragraph in each of Plaintiffs’ affidavits, as

attached to Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

However, the Court will not strike Plaintiffs’ entire Statement of Facts. Although

Plaintiffs did not state in their depositions that there were “similarly situated” male

employees that carried the same job title as Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs did identify male employees

with different job titles that they contend are “similarly situated” for purposes of the EPA.

Whether those identified employees are in fact “similarly situated” is a question reserved for

summary judgment. In addition, to the extent that Defendants’ object to certain statements

in Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts as conclusory or unsupported by Plaintiffs’ affidavits, the

Court takes note of those objections and will consider them in ruling on the pending motion

for summary judgment, to which the Court now turns.

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Equal Pay Act claim, arguing

that Plaintiffs’s have failed to establish that they were paid less than any “similarly situated”

male employees. (Dkt. #76). In response, Plaintiffs, all of whom are women and were

formerly employed by Defendants as “Detention Support Specialists,” contend that they have

identified male “Detention Officers” who performed essentially the same functions as

Plaintiffs, and thus should be considered “similarly situated” male employees for purposes

of the EPA. (Dkt. #87).

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of

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establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact; the moving party must present

the basis for its summary judgment motion and identify those portions of the record that it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).

A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the case under governing law.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact

must also be “genuine,” such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving

party. Id.; Anheuser -Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distrib., 69 F.3d 337, 345 (9th Cir.

1995). 

In determining whether the moving party has met its burden, the Court views the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d

1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh

conflicting evidence. Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9thCir. 1990). Furthermore,

the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Gibson v. County

of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). 

If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion for summary

judgment, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts that show

there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushia Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmovant may not rest on bare allegations or denials

in his pleading, but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by

Rule 56, demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 447 U.S. at

248-49. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In sum, the question on motion for summary judgment is whether the evidence

“presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 447 U.S. at 521-52. A

district court is not required to probe the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.

Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmovant has the burden of

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identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id.;

see Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001)

(even if there is evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact, a district

court may grant summary judgment if the opposing party’s papers do not include or

conveniently refer to that evidence). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence supporting

the nonmovant’s petition is insufficient; there must be evidence from which a trier of fact

could reasonably find for the non-movant. Id. at 252.

B. Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), “embodies the principle that

employees doing equal work should be paid equal wages, regardless of sex.” Forsberg v.

Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1988). As such, the

EPA prohibits an employer from discriminating 

between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at

a rate less than the rate at which [the employer] pays wages to employees of

the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires

equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar

working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to . . . a

differential based on any other factor other than sex . . . . 

To recover under the EPA, “a plaintiff must prove that an employer is paying different wages

to employees of the opposite sex for equal work.” Hein v. Oregon College of Education, 718

F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1983); see Forsberg, 840 F.2d at 1414 (“[U]nder the EPA, a plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing that he or she did not receive equal pay for equal work.”).

In order to establish a prima facie case under the EPA, a plaintiff must show (1) that

the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex, (2) that the employees

perform jobs that are substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and (3) that the jobs

compared are performed under similar working conditions. Forsberg, 840 F.2d at 1414

(“[T]he EPA defines what constitutes equal work by specifying that jobs are equal if their

performance requires ‘equal skill, effort, and responsibility’ and they are performed under

‘similar working conditions.’”) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)); see Schultz v. Wheaton Glass

Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (a plaintiff must prove that the

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“skill, effort, and responsibility” required in the performance of the compared jobs are

“substantially similar”). The jobs being compared need not be identical; instead, “a court

should rely on actual job performance and content rather than job descriptions, titles, or

classifications.” Forsberg, 840 F.2d at 1414; see EEOC v. Maricopa County Community

College, 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1984) (“To be ‘substantially equal,’ the jobs need not

be identical, but must require similar skills, effort and responsibility performed under similar

conditions; it is actual job performance requirements, rather than job classifications or titles,

that is determinative.”); see also Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164,

1175-76 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[D]ifferences in responsibility between two jobs can be offset by

competing differences in the skill required so as to make the two jobs equal.”).

C. Discussion

Plaintiffs are females; they were hired by Defendants as Detention Support Specialists

in the Yavapai County Jail. Plaintiffs contend that they were paid less than male Detention

Officers, a position that Plaintiffs assert is similarly situated to their position as Detention

Support Specialists. Indeed, Plaintiffs state that Defendants, under order of the Department

of Justice to enhance the safekeeping of inmates in Yavapai County, “implemented an

invidious artifice to bring the Yavapai County Detention system into compliance” by creating

the Detention Support Specialist position and hiring only women for that position so that they

could pay them less than men “serving in essentially the same functions.” (Dkt. #87, p.3).

Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Plaintiffs can not establish a prima facie case of

wage disparity based on gender under the EPA. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not

even shown that “the pay differential complained of is [ ] based on differing wages to

employees of the ‘opposite sex’,” let alone that Detention Officer and Detention Support

Specialist positions require substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, or are

performed under substantially similar circumstances. (Dkt. #76, p.13). The main dispute is

whether Detention Support Specialists and Detention Officers are “similarly situated” for

purposes of the EPA.

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The first problem with Plaintiffs’ EPA claim is that although only females were hired

as Detention Support Specialists, there are both male and female Detention Officers. As

such, Plaintiffs can not “prove that [Defendants are] paying different wages to employees of

the opposite sex for equal work.” Hein, 718 F.2d at 913. Instead, Plaintiffs seem to merely

contend that they should have been paid the same wages as Detention Officers because as

Detention Support Specialists, they allegedly performed the same basic duties as Detention

Officers. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants paid different wages to employees of both sexes

for allegedly equal work; but that is not an actionable claim under the EPA. 

However, Plaintiffs also seem to assert that Defendants created the Detention Support

Specialist position merely so that they could hire females for the position, have them perform

the same duties as Detention Officers, and pay them less than Detention Officers. Indeed,

the Court can envision a scenario where an EPA claim might be actionable if Plaintiffs could

show that the Detention Officers were primarily male, those that were female were merely

a smokescreen, and the Detention Support Specialist position was created to intentionally

funnel females into the position so that Defendants could pay them less than males.

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs offer no evidence to prove that such an “invidious” scheme existed.

Plaintiffs do not respond to the existence of both male and female Detention Officers; their

EPA claim fails on that basis, as Plaintiffs are unable to establish that Defendants pay

different wages to employees of the opposite sex.

In addition, Plaintiffs do nothing more in their response to Defendants motion for

summary judgment than to state that their jobs as Detention Support Specialists “[were] in

all respects the very same job had by male [D]etention [O]fficers.” (Dkt. #87, p.3).

Plaintiffs, however, do not state how their jobs were “similar in all respects” to those held

by Detention Officers. However, in their Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs highlight the

qualifications and responsibilities of Detention Support Specialists and Detention Officers.

Plaintiffs state that the minimum qualifications for a Detention Support Specialist include (1)

two years prior experience as a detention records clerk or equivalent clerical experience from

prior employment and (2) a valid driver’s license; the minimum qualifications for a Detention

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Officer include (1) possession of a high school diploma or GED, (2) completion of a six

month probationary period, (3) completion of a 240 hour Basic Detention Academy program,

(4) possession of a valid driver’s license, and (5) successful completion of a polygraph,

psychological, and physical fitness examination.” (Dkt. #88, Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement

of Facts (“PSOF”), ¶¶ 9, 10). 

In addition, Plaintiff state that the essential functions of a Detention Support Specialist

are to assist with inmate booking and release, sorting and analyzing information received

from the courts, compilation of statistical data, information verification, general clerical

work, interface with the public and local agencies, and file maintenance. (PSOF ¶ 11). The

essential functions of a Detention Officer are to observe, control, and supervise inmate

activities, maintain detention records, collect and distribute inmate mail, maintain safety and

security within the jail facility, physically escort inmates within and outside the jail facility,

supervise inmate visitation, perform physical searches of inmates and the jail facility, and

conduct inventory of detention facility supplies. (PSOF ¶ 12). In fact, Plaintiffs specifically

state that 

[u]nlike Detention Support Specialists, uniformed Detention Officers receive

extensive training which allows the Yavapai County Sheriff to deploy those

officers to any relevant jail duty which can include, but is not necessarily

limited to, inmate booking, inmate transportation outside of the facility,

supervision of inmate visitation, inmate transportation within the facility,

searches of inmates and their living spaces, direct interface with inmates

during visitation to medical or during mealtimes, direct observation and

control of inmates in their living spaces, and emergency response to various

inmate medical and/or security issues. 

(PSOF ¶ 15). These facts are undisputed; and understandably so, because these clearly

establish the differences between Detention Support Specialists and Detention Officers.

Plaintiffs acknowledge the many differences between Detention Support Specialists

and Detention Officers in their Statement of Facts, but then also point to the fact that

Detention Officers sometimes performed functions that Detention Support Specialists

performed, such as inmate booking. However, the overlap of a few duties does not somehow

establish that the compared positions are similarly situated. See Doria v. Cramer Rosenthal

McGlynn, Inc., 942 F.Supp. 937, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“When the additional tasks of one

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job in comparison to another job are substantial, the jobs are not congruent and the work is

not equal.”). Here, the positions at issue differed significantly, a fact that Plaintiffs

acknowledge in their Statement of Facts and acknowledged in their individual depositions.

See PSOF ¶¶ 23, 27-31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 43-46, 48-52, 54. As was the case in Ruffin

v. Los Angeles County, Plaintiffs “wholly ignore[] many uncontroverted factual differences

between the [Detention Officer] and [Detention Support Specialist] positions, differences

which defeat . . . [Plaintiffs] argument that female [Detention Support Specialists] are

‘similar,’ for . . . Equal Pay Act purposes, to [Detention Officers].” 607 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th

Cir. 1979) (finding sufficient differences between corrections officer and deputy sheriff

positions to preclude an EPA claim where deputy sheriffs were required to meet more

rigorous physical requirements, complete a training program, receive assignments outside

of the Custody Division, and were vested with greater authority than corrections officers

outside the jailhouse gates). 

Additionally, although Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts asserts that like Detention

Officers, each Plaintiff “had extensive contact with inmates” (PSOF ¶ 16), that contact was

very limited compared to that of Detention Officers – Plaintiffs “confirmed that ‘99%’ of

[their] job duties were performed in the confined space known as the ‘intake area’,” and that

unlike Detention Officers, Plaintiffs did not “supervis[e] suicidal inmates, [transport]

inmates, [do] health and welfare checks of any kind, [pass] out food trays, [assist] medical

staff, [do] headcounts, or engag[e] in routine, direct inmate searches” (PSOF ¶¶ 28, 30, 36-

38, 41, 43-44, 46, 49-50). Further, Plaintiffs’ citations do nothing to support their contention

that Detention Officers and Detention Support Specialists should be considered “similarly

situated”; Plaintiffs point to nothing in particular in the cited cases and draw no comparisons

or distinctions to the present case other than to conclusory state that there are material facts

in dispute, which there are not, as discussed above.

The Court will not belabor this point. In addition to failing to address the fact that

there are both male and female Detention Officers, Plaintiffs fail to establish that Detention

Officers were “similarly situated” to Detention Support Specialists for purposes of the Equal

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Pay Act. In fact, Plaintiffs’ own Statement of Facts and depositions establish otherwise.

Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

fail to establish a prima facie case under the EPA; there is no evidence from which a trier of

fact could reasonably find for Plaintiffs. As such, because the Court will grant Defendants’

motion for summary judgment, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiffs also failed

to properly disclose any Equal Pay Act damages during discovery.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED IN

PART to the extent discussed in this order. (Dkt. #90).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. (Dkt. #76).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 15th day of September, 2008.

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