Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02192/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02192-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNDROW VINEYARDS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

WINE MARKETING GROUP, LLC, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-02192-CRB 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER AND 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 

DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

FILE UNDER SEAL

Defendant and Counterclaimant Wine Marketing Group, LLC, also known as Wines 

‘Til Sold Out (“WTSO”) has moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a 

preliminary injunction to enjoin Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Johndrow Vineyards, 

LLC (“Plaintiff”) “from communicating, by any means, to third-parties regarding or 

related to WTSO (including its principals, employees, agents), WTSO’s business practices, 

or any facts or matters related the transaction and dispute presently before this Court.” 

Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. (Dkt. 31). Defendant also filed a Motion to File Documents 

Under Seal in Support of its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 

Injunction (Dkt. 32). With the leave of the Court, Scheduling Order (Dkt. 33), Plaintiff has 

opposed both motions (Dkts. 35, 36). The Court now DENIES both motions.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a dispute between a winemaker, Plaintiff, and IWLC, a wine 

distributor, and WTSO, a “flash sale site” which “offers wine to retail customers at 

discount prices.” Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10. The Complaint alleges that Defendants contracted to 

purchase over 10,000 bottles of wine from Plaintiff, but that Defendants failed to pay for 

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some of that wine. Id. ¶ 11-19. Plaintiffs bring claims for breach of contract and 

conversion. Id. ¶¶ 20-32.

In the instant motions, WTSO alleges that, since this action has been filed, Plaintiff 

sent emails to other people working in the wine business “disparaging WTSO with the 

intent of harming WTSO’s business reputation and/or harming its business relations with 

vendor.” Mem. of Points and Authorities in Support of Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. At 3

(Dkt. 31-1). These emails, Plaintiff now contends, were false and defamatory and amount 

to tortious interference with WTSO’s relationship with vendors that Plaintiff contacted. Id.

at 5. WTSO thus seeks an order enjoining Plaintiff or its “servants, employees and 

attorneys and all those in active concert or participation with [WTSO]” from 

“communicating, by any means, to third-parties regarding or related to WTSO (including 

its principals, employees, agents), WTSO’s business practices, or any facts or matters 

related the transaction and dispute presently before this court.” Mot. for a TRO and Prelim. 

Inj. Prop. Order (Dkt. 31-6). 

II. MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The 

same standard applies to motions for TROs. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 

Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

When the injunction sought is, as here, an injunction against certain types of speech, 

see Mot. for a TRO and Prelim. Inj. Prop. Order, the Ninth Circuit has further cautioned 

that “an injunction issued ‘before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the 

First Amendment’ presents the ‘special vice of a prior restraint.’” Overstreet v. United 

Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1218 (9th 

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Cir. 2005) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 

U.S. 376, 390 (1973)). Further, a “‘heavy presumption’ exists against finding such prior 

restraints constitutionally permissible.” Id. (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 

U.S. 58, 70 (1961)).

WTSO fails on the first prong of the Winter test. WTSO alleges that the emails that 

Plaintiff sent to the other wine merchants “created interference” between WTSO and the 

other wine merchants with which it works because, in WTSO’s view, those emails 

“included false factual assertions that WTSO engages in improper or fraudulent business 

practices, and insinuating/recommending that the recipients of the e-mail avoid doing 

business with WTSO.” Mem. of Points and Authorities at 5. This, WTSO states, cause 

WTSO “irreparable harm” because, in full: 

Johndrow’s perfidious e-mail campaign was a concerted effort 

to convince or dissuade wineries and distributors from 

conducting business with WTSO. As a wine marketing 

company, WTSO’s business is founded on its relations with the 

vendors that Johndrow targeted with its emails. Johndrow is 

sending e-mails to WTSO-critical vendors, in a calculated, 

unwarranted, and improper effort to paralyze WTSO’s ability to 

conduct business.

Id. at 7.

Even taking on face that this conclusory allegation is sufficient as to Plaintiff’s 

motivations, Plaintiff has failed to show that it will suffer irreparable harm that would 

necessitate a TRO. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. WTSO merely asserts, without citation to 

any record evidence, that Plaintiff was attempting to injure WTSO’s business interests. See

Mem. of Points and Authorities at 7. Even if true—and the Court takes no view on 

Plaintiff’s intent—that is a far cry from demonstrating that WTSO actually suffered any 

injury, let alone an irreparable one. Especially given the “heavy presumption” against prior 

restraints on speech, see Sullivan, 372 U.S. at 70, WTSO’s unsupported statement that it 

suffered an irreparable injury is wholly inadequate to satisfy the first prong of Winter, 555 

U.S. at 20.

Because WTSO has failed to show that it will suffer irreparable harm, the Motion 

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for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

III. MOTION TO FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL

In support of its Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction, WTSO also filed an Administrative Motion to File Documents Under Seal. 

Specifically, it wishes to file under seal the two emails from Plaintiff to third-party 

vineyards that formed the basis for its above-discussed motion. Id. at 2.

There is “a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.” Foltz v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 

Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016). To overcome this presumption, 

the Ninth Circuit has articulated two standards, the “good cause” exception and the higher 

“compelling reasons” standard, to determine whether a document may be filed under seal. 

Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097. The parties dispute whether this Motion should be 

evaluated under the lower “good cause” standard, Opp. to Mot. to File Under Seal at 1-2, 

or the higher “compelling reasons” standard, Mot. to File Under Seal at 2. However, given 

that WTSO cannot meet even the lower “good cause” standard, the Court need not resolve 

this dispute.

“For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing 

specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. 

Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). Then, 

“[i]f a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the 

public, then it balances the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order 

is necessary.” Id.

WTSO has not demonstrated that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the 

motion is denied. See id. It states only that:

(1) Johndrow sent the May 21, 2019 and June 5, 2019 e-mails to 

wine importers and distributors; and (2) that those e-mails 

contain false and libelous statement[s] regarding WTSO’s 

business practices; and (3) that Johndrow sought to persuade 

recipients of the May 21, 2019 and June 5, 2019 e-mails against 

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