Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00943/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00943-32/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Defendants also move to strike the declaration of Marvin Miller in support of plaintiffs’ motion for

class certification. As this order does not rely on Miller’s declaration, defendants’ motion need not be

addressed.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERNARD PAUL PARRISH, HERBERT

ANTHONY ADDERLEY, and WALTER

ROBERTS III,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

PLAYERS ASSOCIATION and NATIONAL

FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS

INCORPORATED d/b/a PLAYERS INC,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-00943 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

In this action for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs move for

class certification of two classes: (1) all retired National Football Players who signed licensing

agreements with defendants and (2) all retired NFL players who joined the National Football

League Players Association. For the reasons stated below, certification of the former class is

GRANTED and certification for the latter class is DENIED.

1

STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Bernard Paul Parrish and Herbert Anthony Adderley are retired National

Football League players. Parrish resides in Florida and Adderley resides in New Jersey (Third

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Amd. Compl. ¶ 4–5). They purport to bring this action on behalf of all retired NFL football

players. 

Defendant NFLPA is a Virginia corporation that acts as the labor union for players in

the NFL. Allegedly, nearly all active NFL players give the NFLPA the right to market their

names and images pursuant to the NFLPA’s collective bargaining agreement (id. at ¶ 7). 

National Football League Players Incorporated, doing business as Players Inc., is a subsidiary of

the NFLPA that is responsible for marketing and licensing (id. at ¶ 10). Players Inc. purports to

market active and retired players by licensing their images for purposes such as trading cards,

video games, television and radio programming, personal appearances, autograph signings,

internet sites, and events (ibid.). The NFLPA owns approximately 79% of Players Inc. (id. at ¶

10, Exh. A). 

Allegedly, the NFLPA solicits retired NFL players to join a “Retired Players Group

licensing Program,” in which the NFLPA offers third parties the right to license the images,

likeness, and names of retired players in groups of six or more (id. at ¶ 13). To participate in

the program, former NFL players are given the opportunity to sign group licensing agreements,

or GLAs, with the NFLPA. Adderley signed at least two such agreements (ibid., Exhbs. B and

C). Adderley’s GLA stated in its entirety (Naylor Exh. N) (with italics used for passages of

intent):

The undersigned hereby authorizes the National Football

League Players Association (“NFLPA”) and its licensing

affiliates the non-exclusive right to use his name signature,

facsimile, voice, picture, photograph, likeness and/or

biographical information (collectively “image”) in the

NFLPA Retired Player Group Licensing Program.

Group licensing programs are defined as programs in

which a licensee utilized a total of six (6) or more present

or former NFL players images in conjunction with or on

products that are sold at retail or used as promotional or

premium items.

The undersigned player retains the right to grant the use of

his image to another entity for use in a group of five (5) or

less present or former players in conjunction with or on

products sold at retail or used as promotional or premium

items.

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If the undersigned player’s inclusion in a particular NFLPA

program will conflict with an individual exclusive

endorsement agreement, and the player provides the

NFLPA with timely notice of that conflict, the NFLPA

agrees to exclude the player from that particular program.

It is further understood that the moneys generated by such

licensing of retired player group rights will be divided

between the player and an escrow account for all eligible

NFLPA members who have signed a group licensing

authorization form. Any group licensing contract entered

into with an individual company by the NFLPA shall

exclude players who are committed by contract

individually for the competitive products or services.

The NFLPA then grants the rights it receives from the GLAs to Players Inc., who in turn

licenses the rights to third parties. 

The GLA is a masterpiece of obfuscation and raises more questions than it answers, like

what “escrow account” is the one referenced? How are retired players payments to be

determined? When are licensing distributions actually made? Which retired players are

entitled to a distribution? Even though many have signed up, very few have received anything

under the GLAs, it now appears.

In other words, with rare exception, the retired NFL players who signed GLAs have

received no revenue from the licensing of their names, images, and biographies. Plaintiffs

further allege that the NFLPA breached a fiduciary duty owed to its retired-player members by

withholding information about benefits to which such members could have been entitled to and

by failing to pursue licensing opportunities on their behalf even though the NFLPA held itself

out to represent its members in such a capacity.

Retired NFL players may also become members of the NFLPA by paying annual dues of

fifty dollars. Parrish allegedly paid such membership fees as late as 2005 with his membership

expiring in April 2006 (id. at ¶ 58).

Parrish and Adderley first filed this action on February 14, 2007. After extensive

motion practice, Adderley’s only remaining claims are for breach of contract and breach of

fiduciary duty. Parrish’ only claim is that the NFLPA breached a fiduciary duty.

Plaintiffs now move to certify two classes. Adderley purports to represent a class

consisting of all retired NFL players who signed GLAs with defendants that were in effect

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 Unless otherwise stated, all internal citations are omitted from this order. 

4

during the statute of limitations period (the GLA class). Parrish purports to represent a class

consisting of all retired NFL players who became members of the NFLPA and whose

membership was in effect during the statute of limitations period (the retired-member class). 

Both classes are alleged to have over 3000 members.

ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARD FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION.

In determining whether class certification is appropriate, “the question is not whether

the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather,

whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,

177–178 (1974). Although a district judge may not investigate the likelihood of prevailing on

the merits, he or she is at liberty to consider evidence relating to the merits if such evidence also

goes to the requirements of Rule 23. The party seeking class certification bears the burden of

showing that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the requirements of

Rule 23(b) are met. See Hanon v. Data Products Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508-509 (9th Cir.

1992).2

For a named plaintiff to obtain class certification, the district court must find: (1)

numerosity of the class; (2) common questions of law or fact predominate; (3) the named

plaintiff’s claims and defenses are typical; and (4) the named plaintiff can adequately protect

the interests of the class. In addition, in the instant case, plaintiffs seek to certify both classes

under Rule 23(b)(3). Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that a district court find “that

questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods

for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”

2. THE GLA CLASS PROVISIONALLY MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS 

FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION.

The GLA class is deserving of class certification, at least subject to the important

proviso below. Despite the varying celebrity of retired players, the proposed class as a whole

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has a common interest in determining what, if any, rights they have under the GLAs. Only on

two occasions has any distribution been made to any retired players and even then it was only to

a tiny number. Retired players have a common interest in establishing an entitlement to

something more than the whim of defendants. Accordingly, class certification for a GLA class

is provisionally GRANTED as defined below.

A. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity.

The numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied when joinder of individual

plaintiffs would be impracticable. While plaintiffs need not allege the exact number or identity

of class members, mere speculation of the number of class members involved does not satisfy

the requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 637

(N.D. Cal. 2007). Defendants have produced over 3000 GLAs signed by various retired NFL

football players during the statute of limitations period (Naylor Decl. Exh. Z). Defendants also

seem to concede the GLA class meets the numerosity requirement. This order finds that

plaintiffs have satisfied their burden required by Rule 23(a)(1).

B. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality and 23(b)(3): Predominance.

A class has sufficient commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) if “there are questions of law or

fact which are common to the class.” Rule 23(a)(2) does not require each member in a class to

have identical factual and legal issues surrounding their claim. “The existence of shared legal

issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient” to meet the requirements of Rule

23(a)(2).” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998)

The analysis under Rule 23(b)(3) “presumes that the existence of common issues of fact

or law have been established pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2).” In contrast to the less stringent

standard of Rule 23(a)(2), class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is proper when common

questions present a significant portion of the case and can be resolved for all members of the

class in a single adjudication. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019–22 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Defendants contend that certification for the GLA class should be denied because: (1)

individualized issues of fact regarding injury and damages predominate and (2) individualized

legal issues will have to be applied on a member-by-member basis.

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(1) Injury and Damages.

The GLA defined the group licensing program as “programs in which a licensee utilizes

a total of six (6) or more present or former NFL players images in conjunction with or on

products that are sold at retail or used as promotional or premium items” (emphasis added). 

The provision in the GLA that Adderley alleges was breached stated (Naylor Decl. Exh. A):

The money generated by such licensing of retired player

group rights will be divided between the player and an

escrow amount for all eligible NFLPA members who have

signed a group licensing authorization form.

The GLA did not describe how the money would be divided or whether everyone who signed a

GLA was entitled to any licensing distribution even if their image or likeness was not used. It

is even unclear what “escrow account” the GLA referred to or whether the escrow account was

ever even created by defendants. And, it turns out, the Joe Montanas of the world exploit their

celebrity through separate “ad hoc” agreements with defendants and others, leaving the

question how everyone including the lesser lights are to be compensated under the GLAs. 

Again, only twice has any licensing revenue been distributed to retired NFL players

pursuant to a GLA. Although the retired players who were a part of those distributions received

varying amounts, defense counsel could give no explanation for how such revenues were

divided — except at the “discretion” of defendants. Other than these two distributions, no

retired NFL player has received any licensing revenue from a GLA. Thousands have signed up

but without receiving a penny.

Defendants’ licensing agreement with third parties layer on more need for clairification. 

For example, a license agreement with the Topps Company stated (Naylor Exh. N): 

NFLPA represents that the NFLPA has been duly

appointed and is acting on behalf of the active and retired

football players of the National Football League

(hereinafter “NFL”) who have entered into a Group

Licensing Assignment.

Other licensing agreements entered into by the NFLPA contain similar language. How, exactly,

has the NFLPA acting on behalf of retired football players? Significantly, the group licensing

revenue for active NFL players were distributed equally among the players despite the varying

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 Under the agreement governing the licensing arrangement for active NFL players, the

NFLPA/Players Inc. agreement, active players equally split sixty percent of all gross licensing revenue (Naylor

Decl. Exh. K). This equal-share royalty scheme was confirmed by Doug Allen, who negotiated the

NFLPA/Players Inc. agreement (Allen Dep. 120–121). 

7

celebrity among such players.3 This order need not validate or reach plaintiffs’ theory that the

same rule should apply to the GLAs.

Given that the GLAs have thus far proven to be an empty promise, all retired players

have a common interest in determining their GLA rights. Under defendants’ own depiction of

the group-licensing program, retired NFL players are at the complete mercy and whim of the

NFLPA. The retired players have a common interest in establishing that the GLAs mean more

than that even if they may part company on the contingent issue of what formula should apply if

they even succeed in debunking defendants’ position.

(2) Nationwide Class Under California Law.

Plaintiffs purport to bring breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims on

behalf of a nationwide class of retired NFL football players. Normally, variations in local law

from state to state would create an obstacle to class. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.

797, 821–22 (1985). Here, however, there is a solution. 

All conflict issues could be remedied if plaintiffs stipulated to applying defendants’ own

choice of law. At the hearing, defense counsel stated that the law of Virginia or the law of the

District of Columbia would apply. If plaintiffs acquiesce in this view then the multiplicity of

different state laws would evaporate.

In this regard, plaintiffs have not shown that defendants have the necessary contacts to

warrant application of California law to plaintiffs’ claims. Significantly, both defendants are

Virginia corporations with principal places of business in Washington, D.C. (TAC ¶¶ 7 and

10). The putative class members consists of retired NFL players presumably residing in all fifty

states across the United States. Adderley is a resident of New Jersey. He has no contact with

California. (Parrish is a resident of Florida.) These are fatal obstacles to class-wide application

of California law.

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While the NFLPA has an office in San Francisco and derives substantial revenue from

licensing agreements with California corporations, this is not enough. First, the NFLPA office

in San Francisco is not even used by the NFLPA for its primary business. It is instead subleased to a third party (Berthelsen Decl. ¶¶ 2–3). Second, it is likely that defendants derive

substantial revenue from many states across the nation. Third, in light of the wide varying

residency of the proposed class members — including Adderley — it is difficult to see why

California would be the proper choice. California is connected to this case only because

counsel practices here. California law does not govern this dispute.

On the other hand, all GLA class members executed a GLA with similar if not identical

language with the same Virginia-based corporation whose primary place of business is

Washington, D.C. Defendants themselves have already advocated that Virginia law or District

of Columbia law be applied to plaintiffs’ claims. If plaintiffs agree to apply Virginia or District

of Columbia law then this obstacle will evaporate. The class notice would clearly advise that

either Virginia or District of Columbia law will apply, the precise law to be determined through

litigation, and anyone who wishes to opt out may do so. Plaintiffs shall have until MAY 8,

2008, AT NOON to file a statement agreeing that the certified claims will be governed by

Virginia or District of Columbia law, which to be decided later.

C. Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality.

The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied when “the claims or defenses of

the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” A plaintiff’s claims

are typical if they “are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need

not be substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. 

In the instant action, Adderley’s claims are typical of the class. As his GLA contains

similar or identical language to the rest of the GLAs signed by retired NFL players, Adderley’s

claims are identical to the proposed class members. Plaintiffs have sustained the burden

required by Rule 23(a)(3).

D. Rule 23(a)(4): Adequacy.

 The last hurdle of Rule 23(a) is that “the representative parties will fairly and

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adequately protect the interests of the class.” Determining whether the representative parties

adequately represent a class involves two inquiries: (1) does the named plaintiff and their

counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiff

and her counsel act vigorously on behalf of the class? See Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures,

Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to

uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent. “[A]

class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same

injury’ as the class members.” East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.

395, 403 (1977).

Defendants argue that certification for the GLA class should be denied because the class

would have conflicting interests. In addition, defendants contend that Adderley is an

inadequate representative.

Defendants assert that plaintiffs’ equal-royalty theory of damages presents

insurmountable conflicts of interest among class members. According to defendants, while

players in low demand — e.g., the special-teams player — would supports plaintiffs’ proposed

theory of damages, star athletes — e.g., Joe Montana — would not. Significantly, the

overwhelming majority of putative class members have received nothing at all under the GLAs. 

It is in the interest of each GLA class member to determine if they are entitled to anything at all

beyond the whim and discretion of defendants.

It is also important to note that the GLAs only cover group licensing — i.e., licensing of

six or more players at once. Individual retired players (and groups of five or less) can still

license their image and likeness independently under their own “ad hoc” agreements. For

instance, Adderley received over $12,000 in licensing revenues from Players Inc. over roughly

four years under such ad hoc agreements (Greenspan Decl. Exh. 36). During that same period,

other more famed retired players such as Archie Manning, Roger Craig, and Randall

Cunningham received $450,000, $190,000, and $175,000, respectively under their own ad hoc

agreements (id. at Exhbs. 37–45). The star athletes of the class would thus still be able to 

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license their celebrity on an individual basis for whatever amount they choose. Such licensing

would have no effect on the class. What is at stake here is the group license.

Defendants next contend that Adderley is an inadequate representative of the class. 

Defendants primarily rely on Adderley’s own deposition testimony where he repeatedly gave

conflicting and peculiar answers in response to questioning relating to this suit. Such evidence

is unavailing. In Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), the Supreme Court

reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss a derivative action because the plaintiff was not

a proper party to a law suit. The plaintiff, Surowitz, was “a Polish immigrant with a very

limited English vocabulary and practically no formal education.” Id. at 368. After being

subjected to an oral examination at the district court Surowitz (Id. at 366): 

showed in her answers to questions that she did not

understand the complaint at all, that she could not explain

the statements made in the complaint, that she had a very

small degree of knowledge as to what the lawsuit was

about, that she did not know any of the defendants by

name, that she did not know the nature of their alleged

misconduct, and in fact that in signing the verification she

had merely relied on what her son-in-law had explained to

her about the facts in the case.

The district court then dismissed the complaint and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. 

After finding that the complaint had been filed in good faith, the Supreme Court rejected the

court of appeal’s analysis because it “indicate[d] in several places that a woman like Mrs.

Surowitz, who is uneducated generally and illiterate in economic matters, could never under any

circumstances be a plaintiff in a derivative suit brought in the federal courts to protect her stock

interests.” Id. at 372.

Similarly, Adderley’s testimony only shows that he was confused and probably thrown

off by the rigor of a deposition. In light of his age and unfamiliarity with the legal process,

Adderley’s responses are not alarming. It would be unfair to deny someone in Adderley’s

position access to our courts merely because he is unable to articulately respond to questions

from attorneys. 

Therefore, this order provisionally certifies the contract claim and the fiduciary duty

claim (but only insofar as it arises out of the contracts) for class treatment, the class to be

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defined as “[a]ll retired NFL players who signed GLAs with the NFLPA that were in effect

between February 14, 2003, and February 12, 2007.”

3. THE RETIRED-MEMBER CLASS.

With respect to the retired-member class, Parrish is an inadequate representative. This

is dispositive. Parrish purports to represent retired NFL football players who paid fifty dollar

membership dues to the NFLPA. Plaintiffs allege the NFLPA beached their fiduciary duties

owed to such members by failing to provide them with accurate and complete information about

benefits to which they may have been entitled to.

“The district court must ensure that the representative plaintiff fulfills his fiduciary duty

toward the absent class members.” Diaz v. Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, 876 F.2d 1401,

1408 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff’s vindictiveness towards the defendants in a class action is one

factor a district court may consider in determining whether a named plaintiff is an adequate

representative of the class. See Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990). “The

reason [a district court] consider[s] vindictiveness as a factor in evaluating adequacy of

representation is to render ineligible individuals who possess animus that would preclude the

possibility of a suitable settlement.” Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1464 (9th Cir.

1995). 

Parrish’s conduct and behavior leading up to and during this litigation demonstrate that

he would be unable to meet his fiduciary duty owed to the putative class. To start, Parrish has

made or adopted numerous extreme remarks directed at Gene Upshaw, executive director of the

NFLPA (Parrish Dep. 271–272):

Q: Okay. Well, let me ask you this. It says in the next

paragraph: ‘Many tyrants with the untouchable label like

Caesar, Napolean, Idi Amin, Hitler, Stalin, Milosevic,

Saddam, have been touched and are gone.’ Do you

remember writing something like that about Mr. Upshaw?

A: I don’t — I don’t remember. But, I wish I had if I

didn’t.

Q: Okay. Sir, you would agree, it is your view that Mr.

Upshaw should be compared to people like Caesar,

Napoleon, Idi Amin, Hitler, Stalin, Milosevic, and Saddam,

correct, that’s your view?

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A: In my opinion, yes. Absolutely, yes.

Parrish, a Caucasian, has also publicly made many racially charged comments on an internet

blog regarding the NFLPA and Upshaw (an African American) (Greenspan Decl. Exh. 12):

Upshaw has signed a deal . . . to sell Super Bowl tickets in

a partnership with the BET, Black Entertainment Network. 

It is part of the Upshaw/Vincent/Condon campaign to

marry the NFLPA to the gangster rap and hip hop industry,

a marriage that sets up an unprecedented opportunity for

money laundering from Washington, D.C./Baltimore drug

rings, through gangster rap, hip hop industry contacts

through the NFLPA and NFL players who are expected to

throw around lots of cash. . . . I’m sure that Upshaw hip

hop/gangsta rap fraternity will keep [Coach Bill Parcels]

busy sorting through a quality pool of dog fighting, gun

toting, dui driving, strip club shooting, ass showing team,

that only gambles on dog fights and don’t take steroids or

HGH.

In a submission to the Department of Justice, Parrish stated (id. at Exh. 13):

[NFLPA President Troy] Vincent’s comments smack of

reverse discrimination. Baseball’s white Donald Fehr Exec

Director makes $1 mil a year and negotiated 5.5% of total

salaries for employer contributions while Upshaw

negotiated only 2.2%. The white President Bush makes

$398,000 a year. Gene Upshaw has never had a real job in

his life . . . I’m white and Troy you can’t do anything two

or three times as well as I can. . . . The retired player

retirement benefits issue is tainted with vindictive Upshaw

and Vincent motives to get back at the white pioneer era

players for how the white NFL management and owners

treated blacks in the earlier days of the NFL.

These comments are particularly disturbing considering many of the putative class members

that Parrish is seeking to represent are African American. This would be true even if Parrish

were himself not white.

Parrish’s views of the NFLPA demonstrate that he would be unwilling to make any

settlement in this case, even if it were ultimately beneficial to any certified class. In an email to

another retired NFL player, Parrish said (id. at Exh. 1):

They know I’ll never make a deal with them and any offer

they attempt will be on the front page of the NY Times too.

. . . I am going to finish this fight no matter how dirty it

gets or what it takes or where it goes. I am not in it to

make any deal. Upshaw is a rotten bastard and he is going

down so is Condon and Vincent and Berthelson and those

who took off and Goodell knows it and he will probably go

too.

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At his deposition, Parrish confirmed his position (Parrish Dep. 102):

Q: And do you recall writing that you’d never make a deal

with Upshaw and his cronies?

A: Yes. Certainly, yes.

Q: And do you recall saying that any offer they attempt will

be on the front page of the New York Times, too?

A: Yes. Yes, I think I wrote this.

Parrish’s personal vendetta against Upshaw and the NFLPA would be a roadblock to any

favorable settlement. It would seem to skew the litigation strategy pursued on behalf of any

class. Any judgment would forever be in doubt by reason of unfit representation. Parrish is not

fit to serve in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of all other retired players.

Parrish’s previous track record representing retired NFL players raises another red flag. 

Parrish and Adderley co-founded the Retired Professional Football Players for Justice in an

effort to represent retired NFL players. After soliciting roughly $5,500 from retired NFL

players, the organization became inactive with all funds depleted (RPFPJ Dep. 73–75). The

RPFPJ’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness (Parrish’s sister) could not identify how the funds were spent or

whether they were spent in furtherance of the goals of the organization despite the fact that she

was RPFPJ’s secretary and treasurer (id. at 98–107). Significantly, Adderley testified that

Parrish regularly signed his name on documents sent to retired NFL players in conjunction with

the RPFPJ without Adderley’s permission (Adderley Dep. 63–64):

Q: And after you read it, did you call Mr. Parrish about

putting your name on this?

A: Yes.

Q: What did you tell him?

A: I emailed him and asked him to stop putting my name

on documents without my permission, without me seeing it.

Q: How many times did you have to ask Mr. Parrish that?

A: At least three or four.

Adderley further testified that he really had no knowledge regarding the operations of the

RPFPJ even though his signature regularly appeared on RPFPJ documents and he was a coCase 3:07-cv-00943-WHA Document 275 Filed 04/29/08 Page 13 of 14
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president of the enterprise (id. at 278–280). Parrish’s reckless management of the RPFPJ is

hardly befitting of a class representative.

It rarely happens that certification is denied solely because its representative is

inadequate, especially when counsel is able, as here. This, however, is such a rare case. 

Excellent counsel cannot overcome the shortfalls here. We must always remember that the

class representative has the responsibility to control and manage the litigation. Counsel works

for the class representative, not the other way around. Parrish’s vindictive remarks aimed at

defendants, the racial slurs in several of his statements, his stated unwillingness to ever settle

this case, and his blemished track record of representing retired NFL players — all demonstrate

that he cannot be trusted to fulfill his fiduciary duty to the proposed class.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The following class is hereby certified subject to the condition

that plaintiffs file a statement acquiescing in the application of Virginia or District of Columbia

law to all certified claims by MAY 8, 2008, AT NOON:

All retired NFL players who signed GLAs with the NFLPA

that were in effect between February 14, 2003, and

February 14, 2007.

The claims being certified are only the breach of contract claim and breach of fiduciary duty

claim but only insofar as the latter claim arises out of the GLAs between the NFLPA and retired

players. All counsel shall propose a form of class notice by MAY 15, 2008. Also, counsel are

required to submit a joint proposal for dissemination of notice. The above definition shall apply

for all purposes, including settlement. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 29, 2008. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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