Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00661/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00661-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STACY LEE TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06 CV 0661 JM (LSP)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND 

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

vs.

VINCENT J. IARIA, Chief, San Diego

County Probation,

Respondent.

On March 24, 2006, Petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges, on due process grounds, her September 24, 2004

conviction for violations of California Vehicle Code § 2800.2(a) (driving with wanton disregard to

the safety of others while fleeing a police officer), California Penal Code § 273a(b) (endangering a

child), and California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (resisting a peace officer). Pending before the court is

the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of the Honorable Leo S. Papas, United States Magistrate

Judge, recommending that the petition be denied. See Docket No. 11. Petitioner filed timely

objections, and Respondent filed a timely reply. For the reasons set forth below, the court wholly

ADOPTS the conclusions and findings contained in the R&R, incorporated by reference herein.

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth in

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636. The district court “shall make

a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made. A judge of the

/ / / 

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court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). 

The court will now conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which Petitioner

objects. First, Petitioner objects to the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner’s due process rights were not

violated when the prosecutor charged her with violating California Vehicle Code § 2800.2(a), but

during trial argued to the jury, and the trial judge subsequently instructed, that the jury could rely on

§ 2800.2(b) as a possible basis for conviction. Section 2800.2 provides as follows:

§ 2800.2. Driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety of persons or property while

fleeing from pursuing police officer; penalties

(a) If a person flees or attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section

2800.1 and the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety

of persons or property, the person driving the vehicle, upon conviction, shall be

punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or by confinement in the county jail for

not less than six months nor more than one year. The court may also impose a fine of

not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars

($10,000), or may impose both that imprisonment or confinement and fine.

(b) For purposes of this section, a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons

or property includes, but is not limited to, driving while fleeing or attempting to elude

a pursuing peace officer during which time either three or more violations that are

assigned a traffic violation point count under Section 12810 occur, or damage to

property occurs.

Cal.Vehicle Code § 2800.2. 

As the R&R correctly concluded, the failure to charge Petitioner with § 2800.2(b) does not

offend principles of due process. Subpart (b) does not provide for an offense separate from that

defined in subpart (a), but merely defines one way in which wantonness for purposes of subpart (a)

can be established. This conclusion is supported not only by the R&R’s sound and detailed reasoning

which will not be repeated here, R&R at 8-20, but it is also supported by the statutory text of § 2800.2

itself. Subpart (b) begins “[f]or purposes of this section”, indicating that it is definitional in nature,

and contain the words “but is not limited to”, indicating that it is merely a non-exhaustive illustration

of wantonness for purposes of subpart (a). Therefore, charging Petitioner with subpart (a) only, which

includes “willful or wanton disregard” as an element of the crime, gave Petitioner adequate notice that

the prosecutor would seek to prove wantonness at trial, regardless of whether subpart (b) was

mentioned in the charging instrument or not. 

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1 It is unclear from the record whether Petitioner complains about the failure to instruct the jury on the

meaning of the word “elude”, which is the actual word used in § 2800.2, or the word “evade”, which does not

appear in § 2800.2 but is discussed in Petitioner’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Her

Petition for Habeas Corpus, or both. See Mem. at 14. Regardless, the trial judge’s failure to issue such a

special instruction was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law for

the reasons stated in the R&R and this order. § 2254(d).

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Petitioner contends in a conclusory fashion that subpart (b) represents a separate offense that

must be charged because “Section 2800.2 provides two very different ways to prove the element (i.e.

the fact) of wantonness: either the mental state of reckless disregard or simply the commission of three

traffic infractions involving safe operation of a vehicle.” Petitioner’s Objections at 4. This is an

unreasonable construction of the statute. Rather, for the reasons stated above, it is clear that subpart

(b)’s specific definition of wantonness is fully subsumed within, and not “very different” from, subpart

(a)’s general reference to “willful or wanton disregard.” Therefore, Petitioner’s first objection lacks

merit.

Second, Petitioner objects to the R&R’s conclusion regarding the trial judge’s failure to

instruct the jury on the meaning of “elude” or “evade”1 for purposes of § 2800.2 on the ground that

such failure deprived Petitioner of her right to argue her theory of the case. This is because, according

to Petitioner, her defense theory was that § 2800.2 requires proof that Petitioner was eluding the police

for the purpose of avoiding detention, rather than for the purpose of driving to a safe place to stop.

Id. at 7. Petitioner, however, concedes that her proffered instruction–that “evade” means “to elude

by dexterity or stratagem” and elude means “to escape the perception, understanding, or grasp of”,

Lodgement 1 at 446-449, Lodgment 9 at 10-11–“was formalistic and tied to a dictionary definition[.]”

Petitioner’s Objections at 8. The trial court has discretion, confined within the protections of due

process, to refrain from giving jury instructions which may have the effect of confusing the jury.

People v. Saddler, 24 Cal. 3d 671, 681 (1979). Here, the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s request to

define “evade” and “elude” did not violate due process because, as Petitioner acknowledges, she was

still permitted to argue her theory to the jury and the trial judge reasonably found that the requested

instructions would confuse the jury. Petitioner’s Objections at 8; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,

146 (1973) (holding that a jury instruction given in a criminal case that witnesses are presumed to

testify truthfully did not violate the defendant’s due process right to a presumption of innocence).

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2 Section 273a(b) provides,

Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily

harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical

pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the

person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a

situation where his or her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Cal. Pen. Code § 273a(b).

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Petitioner distinguishes Cupp, on which the R&R relies, R&R at 22, on the ground that “[t]he error

[in Petitioner’s case] went to the element of the offense and the defense entitlement to her defense

theory being given the jury.” Petitioner’s Objections at 8. While Cupp may be distinguished in this

manner, doing so actually hurts Petitioner’s position more than helps it. If, in Cupp, the controversy

involved the right to a presumption of innocence within the context of an instruction given that

allegedly impinged the defendant’s due process rights, Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147-48, here the controversy

is of decidedly less constitutional concern. In Petitioner’s case, the trial judge reasonably exercised

his discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the meaning of “evade” or “elude”, words which from

the record do not appear to have any technical definition. 

With respect to Petitioner’s third set of objections, made in connection with the R&R’s

conclusion that the failure to require the jury to unanimously agree on the specific acts that constitute

the offenses charged under § 2800.2 and California Penal Code § 237a(b)2 did not violate due process,

Petitioner renews arguments she made before the magistrate and which are properly disposed of in the

R&R. R&R at 23-27. Therefore, these objections lack merit.

Lastly, Petitioner objects to the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner’s due process rights were

not violated when the trial judge excluded evidence showing the arresting officer, Officer Shockley,

had previously used excessive force in a separate case involving a different female arrestee. Putting

aside Petitioner’s objection as to whether this proffered evidence actually involved an incident

between Shockley and another female “arrestee’s drunken, persistent, physical resistance to a blood

sample during which she kicked two police officers,” Petitioner’s Objections at 10, the heart of

Petitioner’s argument is that she was foreclosed from presenting evidence “to corroborate her defense

that [Shockley] acted violently and irrationally at the second as well as the final stop.” Id. As

Petitioner acknowledges, however, other defense evidence was admitted on this particular defense

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theory. Id. Petitioner has a right to present relevant evidence, but she does not have the right to

present all relevant evidence. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (plurality opinion); see

Fed. R. Evid. 403. For the reasons stated in the R&R, the trial judge properly excluded this evidence

as cumulative and a waste of time. R&R at 29. 

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s objections are overruled in their entirety. The court

ADOPTS in whole the findings and conclusion contained in the R&R. The petition is therefore

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 7, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Leo S. Papas 

All Parties 

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