Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00043/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00043-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHARYN WATERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-00043-KAW 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dkt. No. 28

On November 4, 2013, Plaintiff Sharyn Waters filed this action against Defendant Kohl’s 

Department Stores, Inc. alleging that she was injured in a slip and fall incident at Defendant’s 

Hayward, California store. On August 26, 2014, Defendant filed its motion for summary 

judgment. (Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 28.)

On November 6, 2014, the Court held a hearing, and after careful consideration of the 

parties’ arguments, moving papers, and supplemental briefing submitted by the parties, and for the 

reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2011, Plaintiff Sharyn Waters allegedly tripped and fell at Defendant 

Kohl’s Department Store, Inc.’s Hayward, California store. (Compl., Dkt. 1, Ex. A.) She claims to 

have fallen as a result of “(1) narrowly spaced clothing racks, and (2) litter [] remain[ing] on the 

floor . . . [which caused] her to smash her head on the floor with violent force resulting in severe, 

permanent, and substantial injuries and permanent bodily and mental damage.” (Compl. at 4.) 

Plaintiff’s fall was witnessed by her son Robert McQueen. The parties now agree that the only 

potentially dangerous condition present that could have caused Plaintiff’s fall was a sales tag. 

(Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ISO of Mot. for Summary 

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Judgment, “Pl.’s Resp.,” Dkt. No. 35-3.) The parties dispute whether the tag shown in the video 

footage (Def.’s Mot., Ex. D) is the tag on which Plaintiff allegedly slipped. (Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 5; Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 11:1-5.)

On November 4, 2013, Plaintiff and John Philip Waters filed this action in Alameda 

County Superior Court, which Defendant subsequently removed to federal court. Thereafter, John 

Philip Waters dismissed his claims against Defendant with prejudice. 

Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on August 26, 2014. Plaintiff filed her 

opposition on September 10, 2014.1(Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 35.) Defendant filed its reply on 

September 16, 2014. (Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 37.)

On November 6, 2014, the Court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment and 

ordered supplemental briefing on the alleged spoliation of evidence. (Minute Entry, Dkt. No. 45.) 

On November 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief. (Pl.’s Brief, Dkt. No. 52.) On 

December 2, 2014, Defendant filed its supplemental brief. (Def.’s Brief, Dkt. No. 54.) Also on 

December 2, 2014, Defendant filed objections to the evidence in Plaintiff’s supplemental brief on 

the grounds that it was not properly authenticated. (Dkt. No. 55.) On December 5, 2014, Plaintiff, 

without leave of court, filed a declaration in support of the evidence cited in the supplemental 

brief. (Decl. of K. Walter Johnson, Dkt. No. 56.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or defense” or “part of... a claim or 

defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when, after adequate 

discovery, there is no genuine issue as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 

 

1

In its reply, Defendant contends that its motion should be granted because Plaintiff filed her 

opposition one day late. (Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 37 at 1.) Defendant, however, filed Exhibit D, 

the video recording, on August 27, 2014. (Dkt. No. 32.) Thus, Defendant’s motion was not filed 

in full until August 27, and Plaintiff’s opposition is timely.

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A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the 

basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses 

that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where 

the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no 

reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Southern Calif. Gas. Co. v. City 

of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003).

On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, it may 

discharge its burden of production by either (1) by “produc[ing] evidence negating an essential 

element of the nonmoving party's case” or (2) after suitable discovery “show[ing] that the 

nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to 

discharge its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Fritz 

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. 324-25. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth 

specific facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “A party opposing summary judgment may not 

simply question the credibility of the movant to foreclose summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 254. “Instead, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence set 

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 

247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). The non-moving party must 

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the 

dispute exists.” Bhan v. NMS Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). Conclusory or 

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact to defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics 

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011).

///

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III.DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s failure to serve timely responses to Defendant’s Requests for Admission

Defendant seeks to have its motion for summary judgment granted based on Plaintiff’s 

failure to serve timely responses to its requests for admission. (See Def.’s Mot. at 8-9; Def.’s 

Reply at 4.) A party’s failure to timely respond to requests for admission results in the automatic 

admission of the matters requested. Fed. R. Civ. P 36(a)(3). 

Here, Plaintiff served her responses on June 6, 2014, which was more than a month after 

they were due. (Def.’s Reply at 4.) Pursuant to Rule 36, “[a] matter admitted under this rule is 

conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or 

amended.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). The rationale is that the federal rules prefer adjudication on the 

merits. At the hearing, the Court informed Plaintiff that she had not moved to amend or withdraw

her responses, and Plaintiff stated that she would immediately file an administrative motion for 

relief to withdraw or amend her responses. On December 1, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff’s 

motion to withdraw, and deemed her amended responses, dated August 5, 2014, the operative 

responses.

Accordingly, the Court declines to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment due to 

Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve discovery responses.

B. Merits of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Kohl’s seeks summary judgment as to all remaining claims on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff 

cannot establish that a dangerous condition caused her to fall, and, even if she did, that (2) she 

cannot establish that Kohl’s had constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. (Def.’s 

Mot. at 3-5.) 

1. Whether the clothing tag could be a dangerous condition

Defendant claims that the “[s]urveillance video of the incident shows that the tag on which 

plaintiff and [Robert] McQueen claim plaintiff slipped was nowhere near plaintiff when the 

incident occurred.” Id. at 4. Mr. McQueen’s deposition testimony, however, does not conclusively 

state that the tag shown in the video is the tag he believes his mother slipped on. (See Dep. of 

Robert McQueen, Def.’s Mot., Ex. C.) As Plaintiff argues in her opposition, other tags could 

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easily exist that were not captured by the surveillance video. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 11.)

Upon review of the surveillance video showing part of Plaintiff’s fall, there could be a 

clothing tag off-screen that Plaintiff slipped on, and to which Mr. McQueen was referring during 

his deposition. Mr. McQueen did not identify the tag seen in the video as the tag upon which 

Plaintiff slipped. Indeed, the surveillance video does not show Plaintiff until she is already falling. 

The area from which she fell cannot be seen in the video. Rather, the video shows that there was a 

tag on the floor near the exit where Plaintiff landed her fall. 

a. Spoliation

At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that her fall was captured on a second surveillance camera, 

whose footage was not retained, and Defendant’s destruction of that footage constituted spoliation 

of evidence. Spoliation “refers to the destruction or material alteration of evidence or to the 

failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable 

litigation.” Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing West v. 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)). Evidence of spoliation may be 

grounds for sanctions, which may include an adverse inference instruction. Apple Inc. v. Samsung 

Electronics Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Akiona v. United States, 938 

F.2d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

While the Ninth Circuit has not set forth the standard for when an adverse inference 

instruction is appropriate, courts in this district have adopted the Second Circuit’s three-part test, 

which provides that “a party seeking an adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of 

evidence must establish[:] (1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to 

preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed ‘with a culpable state 

of mind’; and (3) that the evidence was ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.” Residential Funding 

Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Byrnie v. Town of 

Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107-12 (2d Cir. 2001)); see, e.g., Io Grp. Inc. v. GLBT Ltd., No. C-10-

1282 MMC DMR, 2011 WL 4974337, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011); Vieste, LLC v. Hill 

Redwood Dev., 2011 WL 2198257, at *2 (N.D.Cal. June 6, 2011); World Courier v. Barone, No. 

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C 06–3072 TEH, 2007 WL 1119196, at *1 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 

Hummer Winblad Venture Partners (In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig.), 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 

1078 (N.D.Cal. 2006); Hamilton v. Signature Flight Support Corp., No. C 05–0490 CW(MEJ), 

2005 WL 3481423, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2005); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 888 

F. Supp. 2d 976, 989-90 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

i. Duty to Preserve Relevant Evidence

Kohl’s argues that while it had control over the surveillance footage, it had no duty to 

preserve any video evidence because “litigation was not contemplated at the time of the incident, 

or during its three week video retention period after the incident.” (Def.’s Brief at 6.) This 

includes the footage that was preserved and ultimately produced, because “[t]he video retained . . . 

clearly established that the tag did not cause plaintiff’s fall and there was nothing at the scene on 

which plaintiff could have possibly tripped, based on the sole percipient witness’s testimony.” Id.

at 6. Litigants have a duty to preserve “what [they know], or should know, is relevant in the 

action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably 

likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request.” 

Toppan Photomasks, Inc. v. Park, No. 13-CV-03323-MMC, 2014 WL 2567914, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

May 29, 2014) (quoting Io Grp., 2011 WL 4974337, at *5). This may arise before litigation is 

formally commenced. See World Courier, 2007 WL 1119196, at *1.

Although the Ninth Circuit has not precisely defined when the duty to preserve is 

triggered, courts in this district generally agree that, “[a]s soon as a potential claim is identified, a 

litigant is under a duty to preserve evidence which it knows or reasonably should know is relevant 

to the action.” In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; Apple Inc. v. Samsung 

Electronics Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 

At her deposition, former employee Mariela Banu testified that Plaintiff’s fall “looked 

really bad.” (Dep. of Mariela Banu, “Banu Dep.,” Dkt. No. 52, Ex. 2 at 43:24-44:3.) The Court, 

however, cannot consider this evidence, because Plaintiff did not authenticate Ms. Banu’s 

deposition testimony by both failing to file it attached to a declaration and failing to provide the 

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reporter’s certification that the transcript is true and correct.2 Nonetheless, based on the video 

footage retained, which showed Plaintiff seriously falling and hitting her head, the Court finds that 

Kohl’s should have contemplated litigation at the time of Plaintiff’s fall, thereby triggering its duty 

to preserve.

ii. Defendant’s Requisite State of Mind

Defendant argues that it “did not destroy any video of Plaintiff’s fall.” (Def.’s Brief at 5.)

At the hearing, Defendant acknowledged that video existed that captured other vantage points up 

to and following Plaintiff’s fall, but that video was not retained. In its supplemental brief, 

Defendant claims that its employees reviewed all relevant video of the incident and “determined 

that the video produced to plaintiff was the only video that captured plaintiff’s fall.” (Def.’s Brief 

at 5.) This misstates Defendant’s obligation to preserve, because “[a] party’s destruction of 

evidence qualifies as willful spoliation if the party has ‘some notice that the documents were 

potentially relevant to the litigation before they were destroyed.’” Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 

F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting United States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 

1001 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

As a result, Defendant’s failure to retain additional footage requires the Court to take 

Defendant’s word that such footage did not capture Plaintiff’s fall or any other evidence relevant 

to her claims, such as the condition of the area from which she fell. Evidence of the condition

would include obstructions or other tags or items that may have caused Plaintiff’s fall. To decide 

that the tag collected and shown in the surveillance footage had to be the only tag, based on 

witness testimony, is careless at best when the employees have the benefit of multiple vantage 

points from multiple surveillance cameras. That Kohl’s employees perhaps unintentionally 

destroyed potentially relevant evidence may be of no consequence, because Plaintiff may be 

entitled to an adverse inference instruction even in the absence of a finding of bad faith. Apple, 

888 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (citing Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d

 

2 As discussed below, Plaintiff later filed a supporting declaration in support of the deposition 

transcript, but again omitted the reporter’s certification, rendering the exhibit unauthenticated. See 

discussion infra Part III.C.

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363, 368 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (A 

court may exercise its broad discretionary power to issue an adverse inference instruction based on 

potential relevance to the litigation without a finding of bad faith.). Moreover, there is no dispute 

that Kohl’s destruction of the evidence was willful, even if not in bad faith.

iii. Relevance

Relevancy is a very broad standard. As discussed both above and below, even if the 

footage from the second surveillance camera and extended footage from the stationary camera that 

was produced did not show Plaintiff’s fall, it is relevant to show the condition of the premises for 

liability purposes, specifically that Kohl’s failed to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the 

premises. See discussions supra Part III.B.1.a.ii and infra Part III.B.2.

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s fall triggered Kohl’s duty to preserve all relevant video 

evidence, rather than only the video that showed her fall, so an adverse inference instruction may 

be appropriate to explain the absence of additional surveillance video. Therefore, since all 

evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all inferences 

must be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant’s motion must be denied, because Plaintiff may 

have slipped on a different clothing tag or other dangerous condition.

2. Whether Plaintiff can establish that Defendant had constructive notice of any 

alleged dangerous condition or failed to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the 

premises

Even if Plaintiff could establish that she slipped and fell on a clothing tag, Defendant 

contends that she cannot establish that it was on the floor for an unreasonable length of time. 

(Def.’s Mot. at 5.) Plaintiff does not address this argument in her opposition. Rather, Plaintiff 

simply restates the elements of premises liability. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 11.) At the hearing, Plaintiff 

argued that the additional video, which was subject to the alleged spoliation, would have shown 

that Kohl’s had constructive notice. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff need only show that Kohl’s failed to exercise ordinary care in the 

maintenance of the premises. In its motion, Defendant states that its employees are trained “to 

constantly monitor the store for dangerous conditions, including possible trip or slip hazards on 

the floor.” (Def.’s Mot. at 6.) Defendant further contends that its “numerous employees and 

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supervisors” on duty at the time would have “been on the lookout for possible dangerous 

conditions and all of them would have picked the clothing tag up if they had seen it on the floor.” 

Id. This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. 

First, Defendant failed to submit evidence that any such monitoring or maintenance took 

place on the day of Plaintiff’s fall. So, while the evidence may show that its employees are 

trained, it does not show that the employees acted consistent with their training on the date of the 

incident. The motion must be supported by admissible evidence that shows that there are no 

material facts in dispute. What employees on duty at the time of the accident “would have” done 

is not evidence. At the hearing, Defendant conceded that it did not have maintenance records, and 

was instructed by the Court to address the lack of records in its supplemental brief. (See Minute 

Entry, Dkt. No. 45.) Despite this instruction, Defendant failed to address the lack of maintenance 

records in the supplemental brief, and instead focused solely on Plaintiff’s spoliation argument.

Second, the limited surveillance video shows a clothing tag on the floor for an unknown 

amount of time until another shopper entered the store after Plaintiff fell and picked it up. Id. 

Since Defendant failed to retain surveillance video that may have shown other tags or show how 

long that tag remained on the floor, the Court may give an adverse inference instruction to explain 

the lack of evidence. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.a. Additionally, in the absence of 

surveillance footage to provide evidence of when the tag fell on the floor, the Court assumes that 

the tag shown was there for some amount of time before the incident. Viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, the existence of the visible tag for an unknown period of time 

would provide a reasonable juror with a possible basis to believe that Kohl’s may have failed to 

exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises, because it should have been cleaned up by an 

employee prior to Plaintiff’s fall.

Accordingly, Kohl’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

C. Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Exhibits

Defendant objects to all three of Plaintiff’s exhibits attached to her supplemental brief on 

the grounds that the exhibits are not authenticated. (Def.’s Opp’n to Evid., Dkt. No. 55 at 1.) 

Plaintiff attached three pieces of evidence to the supplemental brief: (1) medical records; (2) Ms. 

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Banu’s deposition transcript; and (3) Selina Gill’s deposition transcript. (See Pl.’s Brief, Exs. 1-3.) 

Plaintiff did not, however, file a supporting declaration to authenticate the three exhibits. (Def.’s 

Opp’n to Evid. at 2.) In addition, Plaintiff failed to attach the reporter’s certification to 

authenticate the two deposition transcripts. Id. Upon receipt of the objections, Plaintiff’s counsel 

filed a supporting declaration and attached the exhibits. (Decl. of K. Walter Johnson, Dkt. No. 56.) 

Counsel did not, however, include the reporter’s certification to authenticate the deposition 

transcripts. Id. So while the Court will consider the medical records to be properly authenticated, 

the deposition transcripts are not authenticated and are, therefore, not admissible for the purposes 

of this motion. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s objection to the two deposition transcripts is sustained, and the 

objection to the medical records is overruled.

IV.CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Defendant Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc.’s motion for summary 

judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2015

______________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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