Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02219/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02219-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE LUIS LEON,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Respondent.

Civil No. 09cv2219-LAB (WMc)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: (1)

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS [DOC. NO. 6]; AND 

(2) PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

STAY [DOC. NO. 10 ]

I.

INTRODUCTION

Jose Leon (“Petitioner”), a state inmate represented by counsel, filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) on October 7, 2009, challenging his

murder conviction. Matthew Cate (“Respondent”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) on

January 22, 2010, arguing the Petition is a “mixed petition” containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims. ( Doc. No. 6.) Petitioner filed an Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss (“Opposition”) in conjunction with a separate Motion to Stay on March 10, 2010 . (Doc.

Nos. 9 and 10.) Respondent did not file a Reply brief in support of the motion to dismiss.

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This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Court Judge Larry

A. Burns, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. After reviewing the Petition, Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss, Petitioner’s Opposition and Motion for Stay, and all supporting documents submitted

by the parties, the Court recommends GRANTING IN PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

and DENYING Petitioner’s Motion to Stay for the reasons stated below. 

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State Court

On March 23, 2006, a jury convicted Jose Luis Leon (“Petitioner”) of one count of second

degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)), determined Petitioner was a principal in the

commission of the offence (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d) and (e)(1)), and determined

Petitioner committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code §

186.22(b)(1)). (Lodgement No. 1 at 1-2.) Additionally, the jury found Petitioner guilty of one

count of making a criminal threat (Cal Penal Code § 422), determined Petitioner used a firearm

in commission of the offense (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5), and found Petitioner committed the

offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)). (Lodgment

No. 1 at 1-2.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 40 years to life in prison. (Lodgment No. 1

at 5.)

Petitioner appealed and on March 25, 2008, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division

One, affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing in consideration of

sentencing in a separate case involving Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 1 at 38-39.) At resentencing,

the trial court stayed Petitioner’s criminal threat conviction and Petitioner received a consecutive

10-year 4-month sentence in the separate case. (Lodgment No. 2 at 6.)

On July 9, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition seeking review

of: (1) whether substantial evidence is required to prove Petitioner developed the knowledge and

intent required for an aider and abettor; (2) whether substantial evidence supports the second

degree murder verdict; and (3) whether a juror’s statements to the court indicating there had been

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no deliberations on enhancement constituted substantial evidence of juror misconduct when a

true finding of a gang enhancement had already been entered. (Lodgment No. 2 at 2; Lodgment

3.)

B. Federal Court

On October 7, 2009, Petitioner filed for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

(Doc. No. 1.) On January 1, 2010, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 6.) 

Respondent contends Petitioner reasserts claims two and three presented to the California

Supreme Court in the federal Petition’s claim one and two, and the remaining ineffective

assistance of counsel claims (claims three and four) are unexhausted. (Doc. No. 6 at 10-11; Doc.

No. 6 at 2.) Petitioner concedes his two ineffective assistance of counsel claims are

unexhausted. (Doc. No. 9 at 5:17-20.) As a result, Respondent argues the Petition must be

dismissed without prejudice, and Petitioner may pursue the unexhausted claims in state court. 

(Doc. No. 6 at 6:4-5.) On March 10, 2010, Petitioner filed an Opposition brief in conjunction

with a Motion for Stay and Abeyance. (Doc. Nos. 9 and 10.) Respondent has not filed an

opposition in response to Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abeyance or a reply in support of his

motion to dismiss.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion Requirement

The court must first address whether Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is exhausted or is a

mixed petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 510 (1982). The Supreme Court designed the exhaustion requirement to “encourage state

prisoners to seek full relief first from state courts, thus giving those courts first opportunity to

review all claims of constitutional error.” Id. at 518-19. Courts generally consider a habeas

petition exhausted when the state has the opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim raised in the petitioner’s federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). The Petitioner

holds the burden to show his or her federal habeas petition satisfies the exhaustion requirement. 

Rose, 455 U.S. at 519.

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On appeal, Petitioner raised the following two claims before the California Supreme Court

in his Petition for Review: (1) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient for Petitioner’s

second degree murder conviction based on an aiding and abetting theory, and (2) the trial court

incorrectly denied Petitioner a new trial after the jurors informed the court they had not

deliberated on the gang enhancement count (juror misconduct). (Lodgment No. 2 at 7, 9, and

27-28.) Petitioner’s habeas petition contains the above two claims. (Doc. No. 1 at 5 and 7.) 

Petitioner raises, and concedes, that the habeas petition contains two additional unexhausted

claims: (1) “[P]etitioner was denied the right to effective assistance of trial counsel,” and (2)

“[P]etitioner was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.” (Doc. No. 1 at 8 and 10.) 

Thus, it is recommended the Court find the record demonstrates Petitioner’s habeas petition is

mixed.

B. Motion for Stay and Abeyance as an Alternative

Respondent contends Petitioner failed to fully exhaust all claims within his habeas corpus

petition and urges dismissal of the petition in its entirety. (Doc. No. 6.) In response, Petitioner

argues he can demonstrate the good cause necessary to warrant a stay and abeyance. (Doc. No.

10.)

There are two approaches for analyzing a stay and abeyance motion, depending on whether

the petition is mixed or fully exhausted. Jackson v. Roe, 524 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005). If

the petitioner files a stay and abeyance motion under a mixed petition, the request is analyzed

under the Supreme Court standard set forth in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). See

Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. When the petition is fully exhausted, the request for stay and

abeyance is analyzed under the standard set forth in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.

2003). See Jackson, 425 F.3d at 661. 

Under the total exhaustion requirement set forth in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 and the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitation,

petitioners with mixed petitions “run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal

review of their unexhausted claims.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 269-70. The limited options facing a

mixed petition create this risk. If a petitioner elects to abandon his or her unexhausted claims

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and proceed with the exhausted claims, once the exhausted claimsare decided on the merits, the

petitioner may not include any newly exhausted claims in a subsequent petition due to the strict

limitations AEDPA places on successive motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). If a petitioner elects to

dismiss the mixed petition, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations will likely run before a

petitioner can exhaust state court remedies and return to federal court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. 

Due to these potential risks, a federal district court has discretion to stay a mixed habeas petition. 

Id. at 278. When a court stays a mixed petition, the petitioner may present his or her

unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance, and then return to federal court for

review of the “perfected” petition. Id. at 279. A petitioner must “show good cause for his

failure to exhaust, demonstrate the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious,” and show no

indication of “intentional[] dilatory litigation tactics” in order for the court to stay a mixed

petition. Id. at 270. If the court finds a stay and abeyance inappropriate, the court may allow a

petitioner to dismiss the unexhausted claims and proceed with the exhausted claims if dismissal

of the entire petition would “unreasonably impair” the petitioner’s right to obtain federal relief. 

Id.

1. Good Cause

Petitioner contends he has demonstrated good cause for failure to exhaust because he did

not have the background files necessary to support his ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claim, his trial counsel has been unable as of yet to locate Petitioner’s file, and his appellate

counsel failed to raise ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. (Doc. No. 10 at 6:3-25.) 

a. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel

Petitioner bases his underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on trial

counsel’s: (1) failure to object to Maria Mendoza’s testimony that her deceased son told her

Petitioner wanted to have Juan Mendoza (the victim) killed and (2) failure to request a limiting

instruction about the statement despite trial counsel’s motion to exclude the statement as hearsay.

(Doc. No. 1 at 9.) Petitioner also asserts trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the case

prior to trial. (Doc. No. 1 at 9.) Additionally, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel because appellate counsel failed to raise the trial court’s failure to inquire into

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alleged juror misconduct. (Lodgment No. 1 at 37-38; Doc. No. 1 at 11.)

Petitioner’s family obtained current counsel, Attorney John Lanahan, in April 2009 to

review the state court proceedings and identify issues for presentation in a federal habeas corpus

petition (Doc. No.10, Ex. B, ¶¶ 2- 4.) Although Petitioner’s new counsel identified potential

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel issues from a review of court filings, he did

not include these potential claims in the federal petition because they had not been presented to

the state court and Petitioner’s former counsel could not locate his files. (Doc. No. 10 at 6.) 

Attorney Lanahan asserts that without the client files he had no documentation of what trial

counsel knew, and therefore, could not present a prima facie ineffective counsel case. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); (Doc. No. 10, Ex. B, ¶¶ 4-6.) Petitioner

also argues he had good cause for failure to exhaust the ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claim because appellate counsel could not have presented such a claim on direct appeal,

and Petitioner needed to have another counsel review the record to discover any habeas corpus

issues. (Doc. No. 10 at 7.) 

Good cause for failure to exhaust may be attributable to “procedural default.” Hernandez,

379 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-07 (the showing for “good cause” under procedural default is analogous

to the “good cause” test established in Rhines v. Weber.) Procedural default is established when

the failure to exhaust state remedies “resulted from an objective factor external to the petitioner

which cannot fairly be attributed to him or her.” Id. (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

753(1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478.(2005)). 

After consideration of the facts presented in the declarations of Petitioner and Attorney

Lanahan, it is recommended the Court find no good cause exists for Petitioner’s failure to

exhaust his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. Here, there has been no

showing that Petitioner’s unavailable client file impeded him from bringing his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in state court. Petitioner’s claim as to the conduct of trial counsel

arise from facts known to him at the time of trial. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated “the

reasonableness of counsel’s actions [in analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim] may

be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions [because]

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[c]ounsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the

defendant and information supplied by the defendant.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

691. Moreover, the trial record contains what occurred during Maria Mendoza’s testimony. One

missing client file does not establish good cause for failure to raise an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim where Defendant is available to speak to his new counsel regarding his interaction

with trial counsel, and the trial transcript, court filings and guidelines detailing the prevailing

norms of practice, such as the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice, are accessible for

consultation. Id. at 688. As to Petitioner’s ability to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claim, the same reasoning also applied. In this case, the California Supreme Court

denied the petition on July 9, 2008. The appellate record and court filings were thereafter

available for review. Petitioner had ample time and opportunity to analyze and present his

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims to the state court in the five months

remaining in 2008 or at anytime in 2009 and no impediment was shown to exist within that

generous time frame which prevented Petitioner from making the preparations necessary to raise

these issues in state court before the federal petition was filed in October of 2009. Thus, it is

recommended the Court find Petitioner has not demonstrated the good cause required under

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) to warrant a stay of the exhausted claims while Petitioner

returns to state court to exhaust two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Accordingly, it is

further recommended the Court DENY Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and GRANT IN PART

Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

C. Petitioner Should Choose From One of the Following Two Options

To avoid the Court dismissing the mixed petition on its own accord, it is recommended

Petitioner choose one of the following options:

i) First Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition

Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to state

court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition

containing only exhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 520-21 (a petitioner

who files a mixed petition may dismiss his petition to “return[] to state court to exhaust his

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1. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any

period of limitation under this subsection.

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claims”). 

Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration of the

one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from the date his conviction

became final to file his federal petition unless he can show statutory or equitable tolling applies. 

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).1/ The statute of limitations

does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (“an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the

appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable

laws and rules governing filings.”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding that a state application for post-conviction relief which is ultimately dismissed as

untimely was neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while it was under consideration by the

state court, and therefore does not toll the statute of limitations), as amended, 439 F.3d 993. 

However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations continues to run while a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82.

ii) Second Option: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claim(s)

Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claim(s) and proceed with his exhausted

one(s). See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (a petitioner who files a mixed petition may

“resubmit[] the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims”).

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2. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application

 under § 2254 shall be dismissed unless: 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the

exercise of due diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

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Petitioner is cautioned that, once he abandons his unexhausted claim(s), he may lose the

ability to ever raise it/them in federal court. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 488 (2000) (a

court’s ruling on the merits of claims presented in a first § 2254 petition renders any later

petition successive); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).2/

III.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order:

(1) DENYING Petitioner’s Motion for Stay, (2) GRANTING IN PART Defendant’s motion to

dismiss and (3) directing Petitioner to choose from one of the above listed options to prevent the

Court from dismissing the petition on the Court’s own accord.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 23, 2010 any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than June 30, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see

also Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 9, 2010

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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