Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02251/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02251-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PABLO PINA,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE McGRATH,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-2251 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

INTRODUCTION

Pablo Pina, a prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the court for consideration of

respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The court finds that the petition -- filed

two decades after the crimes and 16 years after the conviction became final -- was not filed by

the deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The motion to dismiss will be granted and the petition

dismissed. 

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in Santa Clara County Superior Court in 1986, Pablo Pina was

convicted of murder and first degree burglary with the use of a firearm. He was sentenced in April

1986 to a term of 38 years to life in prison. Pina appealed. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of conviction in 1988. Pina did not petition for review in the California

Supreme Court.

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Pina filed several motions and habeas petitions in state courts relating to his conviction.

One of the main themes of Pina's opposition to the pending motion to dismiss is that any delay in

getting to federal court was due to the fact that he has been trying for years to obtain copies of

tapes of interviews with witnesses and police reports in his case so he could prepare a proper

habeas petition. This requires an exploration of the particular motions and petitions he filed in

state court. 

On February 21, 1991, Pina filed a "motion for transcripts" in his criminal case in the Santa

Clara County Superior Court. The motion did not ask for a copy the tapes or police reports or

evidence but instead asked for a copy of the "reporter's transcripts, clerk's transcripts and judgment

roll" from his criminal case. See Resp. Exh. 2, p. 2. The motion was denied on March 8, 1991

because Pina had not made a particularized showing of a need for the transcripts. 

On October 11, 1994, Pina filed in the Santa Clara County Superior Court a document that

consisted of a habeas petition cover sheet and a 2-page "motion for records and transcripts for

habeas corpus proceedings." See Resp. Exh. 4; Opposition, Exh. B, pp. 36-38. The petition was

denied as untimely on December 27, 1994. Like the 1991 motion, the 1994 filing asked for a

copy of the "report's [sic] transcripts, clerks transcripts and judgment roll" and did not request a

copy of evidence including tapes of interviews and police reports. Id. at 37.

On March 2, 1995, Pina filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. The

petition was denied on the merits and for lack of diligence on March 30, 1995. Resp. Exh. 6.

The first hint that Pina was trying to obtain police reports and perhaps other evidence is

found in a March 25, 1999 letter Pina allegedly wrote to the public defender's office. See

Opposition, p. 42. That letter did mention that Pina had tried to obtain the evidence in 1990-1991

from the public defender's office, although it doesn't explain what he had been doing in the eight

intervening years between the earlier request and the current letter. 

In May 1999, Pina filed a habeas petition in the Santa Clara County Superior Court. The

petition was denied on May 25, 1999, because "[t]he alleged 'new evidence' is not new nor is there

a substantial reason why the evidence was not brought forth sooner. The alleged 'new evidence'

that petitioner refers to are interrogation and witness tapes that petitioner alleges were made near

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the time of the original criminal investigation. Even the petitioner acknowledges that both the

petitioner's attorney and the prosecution were well aware of the tapes at that time." Resp. Exh. 7,

pp. 1-2.

On November 6, 2000, Pina filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal. The

petition was denied on January 22, 2001. Resp. Exh. 8.

On February 2, 2001, Pina filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. The petition was denied on June 27, 2001. Resp. Exh. 9.

In 2003, Pina filed another habeas petition in Santa Clara County Superior Court. The

petition was denied on October 10, 2003 because it was an attempt to file claims in a piecemeal

fashion without adequate justification. Resp. Exh. 10. The court explained that Pina's reliance on

the recent passage of California Penal Code § 1054.9 regarding post-conviction discovery did not

aid him because that provision only applied to prisoners sentenced to death or life without parole,

which Pina was not. Id. at p. 2.

On July 7, 2003, Pina filed a another habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. The

petition was denied on March 30, 2004. 

Pina's federal habeas petition was stamped "Filed" on June 8, 2004. The proof of service

for the petition states that it was mailed on June 1, 2004, and bears a June 2, 2004 postmark on

the envelope in which it arrived at the court. For statute of limitations purposes, the petition is

deemed filed on June 1, 2004, the date on which the unrepresented prisoner put the petition in the

prison mail. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262,

1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se prisoner's federal habeas petition is deemed filed when prisoner

delivers petition to prison authorities for mailing), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey

v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002). Pina's earlier federal petition, Pina v. Terhune,

No. C99-3525 SI, was filed in 1999 and dismissed within a month of filing because it was not

exhausted. 

Pina's current federal petition for writ of habeas corpus contains three claims: (1) the

prosecutor knowingly used fabricated testimony, i.e., testimony shown to be false by the taped

statements and police reports, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel failed to

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challenge Pina's arrest and failed to present tape recordings of prior witness statements to impeach

the witnesses, and (3) the failure of the courts and his attorney to provide him with the evidence

to support his claim violated his right to due process.

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition as untimely. Pina opposes the motion, urging

that the AEDPA does not apply to his case because he was convicted a decade before the AEDPA

became law. Pina further urges that, if the AEDPA does apply, his petition is not untimely because

he has been trying for about 15 years to obtain the evidence to support his claims. Pina does not

connect his alleged hunt for evidence to a particular legal theory to show how it matters in the

statute of limitations analysis. It appears that the alleged hunt for evidence could be the

springboard for four legal arguments: (1) a delayed start of the one-year limitations period due

to the existence of an impediment to filing the petition caused by unconstitutional/unlawful state

action, (2) a delayed start of the one-year limitations period until Pina discovered the factual

predicate of the claims, (3) statutory tolling for the time during which Pina's state court petitions

were pending, and (4) equitable tolling of the limitations period due to an extraordinary

circumstance beyond Pina's control. Each of the arguments will be considered, but all ultimately

fail.

A. The AEDPA Applies To Pina's Petition

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") became law on

April 24, 1996, and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The AEDPA applies to petitions filed

after its effective date. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 207 (2003). The fact that Pina

was convicted ten years before the AEDPA became law does not matter for purposes of

determining that the AEDPA applies, because the determinative fact is the date of the filing of the

federal petition. The AEDPA applies because Pina's federal petition was filed in 2004, six years

after the AEDPA became law.

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B. Timeliness of Petition

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must

be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the

conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to

filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court,

if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral

review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

1. The Limitations Period Began For Pina On April 24, 1996

Normally, the limitations period will begin for a petitioner on the date on which his

judgment became final by conclusion of direct review. However, the AEDPA's one-year time limit

did not begin to run against any state prisoner before the date of the Act's enactment. Calderon

v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing §

2244(d)'s limitation period to commence before AEDPA's enactment would have an

impermissible retroactive effect), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061

(1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly),

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999). A prisoner with a

state conviction finalized before April 24, 1996 therefore had until April 24, 1997 to file a federal

habeas petition on time. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 978 (2001). Pina is entitled to the grace period following the enactment of the AEDPA

and would have a presumptive deadline of April 24, 1997 to file his federal petition under normal

conditions because his conviction became final in 1988. 

Pina's assertion that he has been hunting for evidence for 15 years requires the court to

consider whether an alternative starting date for the limitations period should be used. Under §

2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year limitation period starts on the date on which "the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

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1A California court refused to treat the evidence as new evidence in 1999. See Resp. Exh.

7, pp. 1-2 (rejecting argument that there was new evidence and explaining that the evidence was

known to defense counsel and prosecutor at time of trial). 

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diligence." The time begins "'when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the

important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.'" Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150, 1154-55 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir.

2000)) (remanding case to district court for further factual findings concerning determination of

when, with exercise of due diligence, petitioner could have discovered facts to support prejudice

prong of IAC claim). Pina has known the important facts since the time of his trial. 1 Pina has

repeatedly argued that he told his trial attorney to use the tapes to show that witnesses lied but his

attorney refused to do so at the trial. See, e.g., Opposition, p. 4 ("Petitioner knows that his trial

counsel intentionally deprived him of his right to a fair trial by telling Petitioner that they could

not use the tape recorded evidence in trial, even though they showed that the witnesses were lying

now and completely changed statements at the preliminary hearing"); id. at 11 (defense counsel

and district attorney refused to call as a witness a man who made helpful statements on one of the

tapes); id. at 20-21 (Pina asked counsel to present at trial the statements made to the police after

the shooting and the taped statements). Pina not only knew of the existence of the tapes, he knew

the contents of them as well as the police reports. See Opposition, pp. 10-11 (describing contents

of tapes and police reports); id. at 11 ("This is only some of what was on the tape and what counsel

told petitioner"); Petition, p. 5 ("I listened to the tapes and asked my attorney why he don't use

them in trial to show the witnesses are lying. He said the judge wouldn't allow it.") 

Pina thus knew in 1986 that (1) the tapes and reports had information that he believed

helpful to his defense, (2) he asked defense counsel to use them and defense counsel refused to

use them for impeachment, (3) the prosecution presented evidence that allegedly was contradicted

by those tapes, and (4) neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor had called John Ballisteri (who

allegedly had helpful information) to testify. To allow Pina to wait for almost two decades to file

his federal petition even though he knew of these facts in before he was even convicted in 1986

would improperly confuse Pina's knowledge of the factual predicate of his claims with the time

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permitted for gathering evidence in support of the claims: "Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not

convey a statutory right to an extended delay . . . while a habeas petitioner gathers every possible

scrap of evidence that might . . . support his claim[s]." Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198-99

(5th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 2255

petition) (even though petitioner did not have access to trial transcripts, the facts supporting

claims which occurred at the time of his conviction could have been discovered if he “at least

consult[ed] his own memory of the trial proceedings;” because he did not do so, he did not

exercise due diligence and was not entitled to a delayed start of the limitations period under §

2255(4)). In fact, if Pina's failure to obtain the tapes and police reports were sufficient for §

2244(d)(1)(D) delayed start, the limitations period would not have started as of today -- 19 years

after the conviction -- because he still does not have that evidence. Pina's alleged hunt for

evidence does not require the use of the § 2244(d)(1)(D) starting date because he knew of the

factual predicate for his claims in 1986. 

The other possible delayed starting date for the limitations period is "the date on which the

impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action,"

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). The few cases applying § 2244(d)(1)(B) have "dealt almost entirely

with the conduct of state prison officials who interfere with inmates’ ability to prepare and to file

habeas petitions," and "comport with the plain meaning of the provision, which applies when a

petitioner has been impeded from filing a habeas petition.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083,

1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim that unfavorable state appellate opinion was an

“impediment” to petitioner’s filing a habeas petition); see Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146,

1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The alleged lack of evidence that might support the petition was

not an impediment created by unconstitutional or unlawful state action to Pina filing his habeas

petition – he could and did file habeas petitions without the evidence. Moreover, the evidence in

question is physical evidence (e.g., tapes and police reports), the contents of which Pina has known

and been able to describe since 1986. The delayed starting date under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)

does not apply because Pina was not prevented from filing an application created by State action

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in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States.

2. No Statutory Tolling Is Available For Pina

Having determined that the one-year limitations period began on April 24, 1996, that the

presumptive deadline for filing the federal petition was April 24, 1997, and that Pina missed the

deadline by years, the next step is to determine whether the limitations period should be statutorily

tolled. The one-year limitations period can be tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the "time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Pina is not entitled to any

statutory tolling because the state habeas petitions that could toll the limitations period were not

filed until 1999. Pina's state court filings in 1991, 1994 and 1995 do not toll the limitations

period.

An application for collateral review is "pending" in state court "as long as the ordinary state

collateral review process is 'in continuance' – i.e., 'until the completion of' that process.” In other

words, until the application has achieved final resolution through the State's post-conviction

procedures, by definition it remains "pending." Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002).

In California, this means that the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas

petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner's final collateral

challenge, as long as the petitioner did not "unreasonably delay" in seeking review. Id. at 221-23;

see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (an application for collateral review is

"pending" in state court for "all of the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through

proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular

post-conviction application.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1104 (2000). "When a

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, 'that [is] the end of the matter' for the purposes

of § 2244(d)(2)." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005) (quoting Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)). In Pace, the Supreme Court held that "time limits, no matter their

form, are 'filing’ conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner's [postconviction]

petition as untimely, it was not 'properly filed,' and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under

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2The recently revised opinion in Gaston v. Palmer, No. 01-56367, slip op. 8969 (9th Cir.

Aug. 2, 2005), is factually distinguishable and does not alter the analysis. In Gaston, the petitioner

had filed six state collateral challenges. The second through fifth of the challenges were denied

without comment and the first and sixth challenges were dismissed for curable defects; therefore,

all were "properly filed" under § 2244(d)(2). See Gaston, slip op. at 8984-86. Unlike Gaston's

petitions, Pina's pre-1997 petitions were denied for the non-curable defect of being untimely and

therefore were not properly filed. 

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§2244(d)(2)." Pace, 125 S. Ct. at 1814. 

Pina's pre-1999 filings did not start the statutory tolling period. His 1991 filing was a

motion for transcripts in his state criminal case. It did not challenge the conviction or sentence

but only sought to obtain documents – documents that were not the evidence he now claims he

needed. Pina's 1994 habeas petition filed in the Santa Clara County Superior Court was denied as

untimely; it therefore was not "properly filed" for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) and is not entitled to

statutory tolling. See Pace, 125 S. Ct. at 1812. Pina's 1995 habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court was denied on the merits and for lack of diligence; it therefore was not properly

filed under the reasoning of Pace and is not entitled to statutory tolling. See id. at 1812, 1814

(holding that "time limits, no matter their form, are 'filing' conditions"). Under California's

system, a petitioner sometimes is entitled to statutory tolling even during the gaps between his

various state court collateral challenges; however, only a "properly filed" state collateral challenge

can start the statutory tolling period that might last over the course of several rounds of state

habeas filings. Because the pre-AEDPA filings by Pina were not "properly filed" within the

meaning of § 2244(d)(2), they did not start the statutory tolling period. The earliest petition Pina

filed that could have started the statutory tolling period – assuming arguendo that a petition filed

after an earlier petition was denied as untimely could be considered properly filed – was not filed

until 1999, but that was more than a year after the limitations period had ended on April 24, 1997.2

The 1999 filing by Pina could not restart the limitations period that expired on April 24, 1997.

See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed,” even if the

state petition was timely filed), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 924 (2003). In sum, the potential tolling

event of the pendency of arguably properly filed state petitions did not start until 1999 -- a couple

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of years after the one-year period ended on April 24, 1997. Unless Pina is able to bridge the gap

between 1997 and 1999 by showing entitlement to equitable tolling for the period before the 1999

state habeas petition was filed, the state habeas petitions filed in and after 1999 were too late to

matter.

3. No Equitable Tolling Is Available For Pina

Equitable tolling of the limitation period is available upon a showing of extraordinary

circumstances beyond a petitioner's control which prevented him from timely filing the petition.

See, e.g., Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288. "When external

forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim,

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of

time should be granted only if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The prisoner must show that “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause

of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

There are several reasons equitable tolling is not warranted here. First, the record before

this court does not show a 15-year quest for evidence. Although Pina asserts he has been trying

for 15 years to obtain evidence to prepare a better petition, the evidence does not support his

assertion. Pina's 1991 and 1994 filings in state court sought production of the reporter's

transcripts, clerk's transcripts and judgment roll from his criminal case and did not request a copy

of the tapes or police reports. In the record before this court, the first hint that Pina was trying

to obtain police reports and perhaps other evidence is found in a March 25, 1999 letter Pina

allegedly wrote to the public defender's office. See Opposition, p. 42. But even that document

suggests a lack of diligence because it mentions that Pina had tried to obtain the evidence in 1991,

eight years earlier, and had not received any answer. 

Second, even assuming arguendo that Pina has been trying to get the evidence for the last

15 years, the record does not disclose diligence on his part. There are long gaps between his

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3The gaps between Pina's efforts to attack his criminal conviction are even less excusable

because Pina was actively litigating on other fronts in 1994-2000. He filed several civil rights

actions in this court (Case Nos. C94-2124 SI, C94-2464 SI, C94-4161 SI, C95-2123 SI, C99-397

SI, and C99-1097 SI), and several of those cases continued for several years. In Pina v. Gomez,

Case No. C94-2464 SI, he was pursuing claims for himself and other inmates and complained

about prison officials' interference with his activity as a writ writer aiding other inmates. Pina's

choice to spend his time doing legal work for other inmates rather than attacking his own

conviction does not show diligence with regard to the latter.

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efforts that are far more suggestive of a lack of diligence. The record indicates that Pina

occasionally would take a run at obtaining relief and then abandon his efforts for a few years and

then take another run at it. 3 After Pina's motion was denied in 1991, he waited until 1994 to do

his next court filing; after his 1995 petition was denied by the California Supreme Court, he waited

until 1999 to do his next court filing; and after a series of petitions in 1999-2001 that ended with

failure on the denial of the petition by the California Supreme Court on June 27, 2001, he waited

a couple of more years until 2003 to begin another series of court filings. "Under longestablished principles, petitioner's lack of diligence precludes equity's operation.” Pace, 125 S.

Ct. at 1815; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d at 1107 (external forces, rather than lack of diligence, must

account for the untimely filing). 

Third, even assuming arguendo that Pina has been trying to obtain the evidence for 15 years,

he has known of the existence and contents of that evidence since 1986 during his trial. The lack

of the physical evidence itself simply cannot be realistically viewed as an "extraordinary

circumstance." To the contrary, it is a rare case where the inmate does have possession of the

physical evidence that he alleges proves the merit of his claim. For example, if a petitioner wanted

to claim that an alleged murder weapon was incapable of firing, the failure to deliver to him that

gun would not give him an open-ended excuse on the limitations period. Pina's failure to obtain

the physical evidence was not an extraordinary circumstance. 

Fourth, assuming arguendo that Pina's inability to obtain the evidence was an extraordinary

circumstance, it did not make it impossible for Pina to file his petition on time. Pina has filed

numerous petitions in state court and two in federal court, all without having possession of the

evidence he claims is necessary to prove the truth of his claims. As noted earlier, Pina still does

not have the evidence, but he has been able to file habeas petitions here and in state court. 

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Finally, the equitable tolling principle allows for tolling when an event or circumstance

makes the filing of a timely petition; it does not allow for tolling while a prisoner goes in search

of evidence to improve the quality of the petition that he can and does file. Pina does not persuade

with his argument that the evidence was necessary for him to prepare a "better" petition. If all a

prisoner had to do to obtain tolling was to say he was in search of physical evidence to make his

petition better or more persuasive -- notwithstanding his knowledge of the existence and contents

of that evidence -- the statute of limitations would be eviscerated as almost any petitioner could

make that argument to avoid the time limitation that Congress imposed. 

Pina is not entitled to any equitable tolling of the limitations period. His federal habeas

petition, filed on June 1, 2004, was untimely and therefore must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d). 

CONCLUSION

Respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket # 8.) The petition for writ of

habeas corpus is DISMISSED because it was not timely filed. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August _8__, 2005 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PABLO PINA,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE McGRATH,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 04-2251 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

INTRODUCTION

Pablo Pina, a prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the court for consideration of

respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The court finds that the petition -- filed

two decades after the crimes and 16 years after the conviction became final -- was not filed by

the deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The motion to dismiss will be granted and the petition

dismissed. 

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in Santa Clara County Superior Court in 1986, Pablo Pina was

convicted of murder and first degree burglary with the use of a firearm. He was sentenced in April

1986 to a term of 38 years to life in prison. Pina appealed. The California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of conviction in 1988. Pina did not petition for review in the California

Supreme Court.

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Pina filed several motions and habeas petitions in state courts relating to his conviction.

One of the main themes of Pina's opposition to the pending motion to dismiss is that any delay in

getting to federal court was due to the fact that he has been trying for years to obtain copies of

tapes of interviews with witnesses and police reports in his case so he could prepare a proper

habeas petition. This requires an exploration of the particular motions and petitions he filed in

state court. 

On February 21, 1991, Pina filed a "motion for transcripts" in his criminal case in the Santa

Clara County Superior Court. The motion did not ask for a copy the tapes or police reports or

evidence but instead asked for a copy of the "reporter's transcripts, clerk's transcripts and judgment

roll" from his criminal case. See Resp. Exh. 2, p. 2. The motion was denied on March 8, 1991

because Pina had not made a particularized showing of a need for the transcripts. 

On October 11, 1994, Pina filed in the Santa Clara County Superior Court a document that

consisted of a habeas petition cover sheet and a 2-page "motion for records and transcripts for

habeas corpus proceedings." See Resp. Exh. 4; Opposition, Exh. B, pp. 36-38. The petition was

denied as untimely on December 27, 1994. Like the 1991 motion, the 1994 filing asked for a

copy of the "report's [sic] transcripts, clerks transcripts and judgment roll" and did not request a

copy of evidence including tapes of interviews and police reports. Id. at 37.

On March 2, 1995, Pina filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. The

petition was denied on the merits and for lack of diligence on March 30, 1995. Resp. Exh. 6.

The first hint that Pina was trying to obtain police reports and perhaps other evidence is

found in a March 25, 1999 letter Pina allegedly wrote to the public defender's office. See

Opposition, p. 42. That letter did mention that Pina had tried to obtain the evidence in 1990-1991

from the public defender's office, although it doesn't explain what he had been doing in the eight

intervening years between the earlier request and the current letter. 

In May 1999, Pina filed a habeas petition in the Santa Clara County Superior Court. The

petition was denied on May 25, 1999, because "[t]he alleged 'new evidence' is not new nor is there

a substantial reason why the evidence was not brought forth sooner. The alleged 'new evidence'

that petitioner refers to are interrogation and witness tapes that petitioner alleges were made near

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the time of the original criminal investigation. Even the petitioner acknowledges that both the

petitioner's attorney and the prosecution were well aware of the tapes at that time." Resp. Exh. 7,

pp. 1-2.

On November 6, 2000, Pina filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal. The

petition was denied on January 22, 2001. Resp. Exh. 8.

On February 2, 2001, Pina filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. The petition was denied on June 27, 2001. Resp. Exh. 9.

In 2003, Pina filed another habeas petition in Santa Clara County Superior Court. The

petition was denied on October 10, 2003 because it was an attempt to file claims in a piecemeal

fashion without adequate justification. Resp. Exh. 10. The court explained that Pina's reliance on

the recent passage of California Penal Code § 1054.9 regarding post-conviction discovery did not

aid him because that provision only applied to prisoners sentenced to death or life without parole,

which Pina was not. Id. at p. 2.

On July 7, 2003, Pina filed a another habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. The

petition was denied on March 30, 2004. 

Pina's federal habeas petition was stamped "Filed" on June 8, 2004. The proof of service

for the petition states that it was mailed on June 1, 2004, and bears a June 2, 2004 postmark on

the envelope in which it arrived at the court. For statute of limitations purposes, the petition is

deemed filed on June 1, 2004, the date on which the unrepresented prisoner put the petition in the

prison mail. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262,

1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se prisoner's federal habeas petition is deemed filed when prisoner

delivers petition to prison authorities for mailing), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey

v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002). Pina's earlier federal petition, Pina v. Terhune,

No. C99-3525 SI, was filed in 1999 and dismissed within a month of filing because it was not

exhausted. 

Pina's current federal petition for writ of habeas corpus contains three claims: (1) the

prosecutor knowingly used fabricated testimony, i.e., testimony shown to be false by the taped

statements and police reports, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel failed to

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challenge Pina's arrest and failed to present tape recordings of prior witness statements to impeach

the witnesses, and (3) the failure of the courts and his attorney to provide him with the evidence

to support his claim violated his right to due process.

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition as untimely. Pina opposes the motion, urging

that the AEDPA does not apply to his case because he was convicted a decade before the AEDPA

became law. Pina further urges that, if the AEDPA does apply, his petition is not untimely because

he has been trying for about 15 years to obtain the evidence to support his claims. Pina does not

connect his alleged hunt for evidence to a particular legal theory to show how it matters in the

statute of limitations analysis. It appears that the alleged hunt for evidence could be the

springboard for four legal arguments: (1) a delayed start of the one-year limitations period due

to the existence of an impediment to filing the petition caused by unconstitutional/unlawful state

action, (2) a delayed start of the one-year limitations period until Pina discovered the factual

predicate of the claims, (3) statutory tolling for the time during which Pina's state court petitions

were pending, and (4) equitable tolling of the limitations period due to an extraordinary

circumstance beyond Pina's control. Each of the arguments will be considered, but all ultimately

fail.

A. The AEDPA Applies To Pina's Petition

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") became law on

April 24, 1996, and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The AEDPA applies to petitions filed

after its effective date. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 207 (2003). The fact that Pina

was convicted ten years before the AEDPA became law does not matter for purposes of

determining that the AEDPA applies, because the determinative fact is the date of the filing of the

federal petition. The AEDPA applies because Pina's federal petition was filed in 2004, six years

after the AEDPA became law.

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B. Timeliness of Petition

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must

be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the

conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to

filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court,

if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral

review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

1. The Limitations Period Began For Pina On April 24, 1996

Normally, the limitations period will begin for a petitioner on the date on which his

judgment became final by conclusion of direct review. However, the AEDPA's one-year time limit

did not begin to run against any state prisoner before the date of the Act's enactment. Calderon

v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing §

2244(d)'s limitation period to commence before AEDPA's enactment would have an

impermissible retroactive effect), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061

(1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly),

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999). A prisoner with a

state conviction finalized before April 24, 1996 therefore had until April 24, 1997 to file a federal

habeas petition on time. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 978 (2001). Pina is entitled to the grace period following the enactment of the AEDPA

and would have a presumptive deadline of April 24, 1997 to file his federal petition under normal

conditions because his conviction became final in 1988. 

Pina's assertion that he has been hunting for evidence for 15 years requires the court to

consider whether an alternative starting date for the limitations period should be used. Under §

2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year limitation period starts on the date on which "the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

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1A California court refused to treat the evidence as new evidence in 1999. See Resp. Exh.

7, pp. 1-2 (rejecting argument that there was new evidence and explaining that the evidence was

known to defense counsel and prosecutor at time of trial). 

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diligence." The time begins "'when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the

important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.'" Hasan v. Galaza, 254

F.3d 1150, 1154-55 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir.

2000)) (remanding case to district court for further factual findings concerning determination of

when, with exercise of due diligence, petitioner could have discovered facts to support prejudice

prong of IAC claim). Pina has known the important facts since the time of his trial. 1 Pina has

repeatedly argued that he told his trial attorney to use the tapes to show that witnesses lied but his

attorney refused to do so at the trial. See, e.g., Opposition, p. 4 ("Petitioner knows that his trial

counsel intentionally deprived him of his right to a fair trial by telling Petitioner that they could

not use the tape recorded evidence in trial, even though they showed that the witnesses were lying

now and completely changed statements at the preliminary hearing"); id. at 11 (defense counsel

and district attorney refused to call as a witness a man who made helpful statements on one of the

tapes); id. at 20-21 (Pina asked counsel to present at trial the statements made to the police after

the shooting and the taped statements). Pina not only knew of the existence of the tapes, he knew

the contents of them as well as the police reports. See Opposition, pp. 10-11 (describing contents

of tapes and police reports); id. at 11 ("This is only some of what was on the tape and what counsel

told petitioner"); Petition, p. 5 ("I listened to the tapes and asked my attorney why he don't use

them in trial to show the witnesses are lying. He said the judge wouldn't allow it.") 

Pina thus knew in 1986 that (1) the tapes and reports had information that he believed

helpful to his defense, (2) he asked defense counsel to use them and defense counsel refused to

use them for impeachment, (3) the prosecution presented evidence that allegedly was contradicted

by those tapes, and (4) neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor had called John Ballisteri (who

allegedly had helpful information) to testify. To allow Pina to wait for almost two decades to file

his federal petition even though he knew of these facts in before he was even convicted in 1986

would improperly confuse Pina's knowledge of the factual predicate of his claims with the time

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permitted for gathering evidence in support of the claims: "Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not

convey a statutory right to an extended delay . . . while a habeas petitioner gathers every possible

scrap of evidence that might . . . support his claim[s]." Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198-99

(5th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 2255

petition) (even though petitioner did not have access to trial transcripts, the facts supporting

claims which occurred at the time of his conviction could have been discovered if he “at least

consult[ed] his own memory of the trial proceedings;” because he did not do so, he did not

exercise due diligence and was not entitled to a delayed start of the limitations period under §

2255(4)). In fact, if Pina's failure to obtain the tapes and police reports were sufficient for §

2244(d)(1)(D) delayed start, the limitations period would not have started as of today -- 19 years

after the conviction -- because he still does not have that evidence. Pina's alleged hunt for

evidence does not require the use of the § 2244(d)(1)(D) starting date because he knew of the

factual predicate for his claims in 1986. 

The other possible delayed starting date for the limitations period is "the date on which the

impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action,"

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). The few cases applying § 2244(d)(1)(B) have "dealt almost entirely

with the conduct of state prison officials who interfere with inmates’ ability to prepare and to file

habeas petitions," and "comport with the plain meaning of the provision, which applies when a

petitioner has been impeded from filing a habeas petition.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083,

1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim that unfavorable state appellate opinion was an

“impediment” to petitioner’s filing a habeas petition); see Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146,

1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The alleged lack of evidence that might support the petition was

not an impediment created by unconstitutional or unlawful state action to Pina filing his habeas

petition – he could and did file habeas petitions without the evidence. Moreover, the evidence in

question is physical evidence (e.g., tapes and police reports), the contents of which Pina has known

and been able to describe since 1986. The delayed starting date under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)

does not apply because Pina was not prevented from filing an application created by State action

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in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States.

2. No Statutory Tolling Is Available For Pina

Having determined that the one-year limitations period began on April 24, 1996, that the

presumptive deadline for filing the federal petition was April 24, 1997, and that Pina missed the

deadline by years, the next step is to determine whether the limitations period should be statutorily

tolled. The one-year limitations period can be tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the "time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Pina is not entitled to any

statutory tolling because the state habeas petitions that could toll the limitations period were not

filed until 1999. Pina's state court filings in 1991, 1994 and 1995 do not toll the limitations

period.

An application for collateral review is "pending" in state court "as long as the ordinary state

collateral review process is 'in continuance' – i.e., 'until the completion of' that process.” In other

words, until the application has achieved final resolution through the State's post-conviction

procedures, by definition it remains "pending." Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002).

In California, this means that the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas

petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner's final collateral

challenge, as long as the petitioner did not "unreasonably delay" in seeking review. Id. at 221-23;

see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (an application for collateral review is

"pending" in state court for "all of the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through

proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular

post-conviction application.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1104 (2000). "When a

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, 'that [is] the end of the matter' for the purposes

of § 2244(d)(2)." Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005) (quoting Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)). In Pace, the Supreme Court held that "time limits, no matter their

form, are 'filing’ conditions. Because the state court rejected petitioner's [postconviction]

petition as untimely, it was not 'properly filed,' and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under

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2The recently revised opinion in Gaston v. Palmer, No. 01-56367, slip op. 8969 (9th Cir.

Aug. 2, 2005), is factually distinguishable and does not alter the analysis. In Gaston, the petitioner

had filed six state collateral challenges. The second through fifth of the challenges were denied

without comment and the first and sixth challenges were dismissed for curable defects; therefore,

all were "properly filed" under § 2244(d)(2). See Gaston, slip op. at 8984-86. Unlike Gaston's

petitions, Pina's pre-1997 petitions were denied for the non-curable defect of being untimely and

therefore were not properly filed. 

9

§2244(d)(2)." Pace, 125 S. Ct. at 1814. 

Pina's pre-1999 filings did not start the statutory tolling period. His 1991 filing was a

motion for transcripts in his state criminal case. It did not challenge the conviction or sentence

but only sought to obtain documents – documents that were not the evidence he now claims he

needed. Pina's 1994 habeas petition filed in the Santa Clara County Superior Court was denied as

untimely; it therefore was not "properly filed" for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) and is not entitled to

statutory tolling. See Pace, 125 S. Ct. at 1812. Pina's 1995 habeas petition in the California

Supreme Court was denied on the merits and for lack of diligence; it therefore was not properly

filed under the reasoning of Pace and is not entitled to statutory tolling. See id. at 1812, 1814

(holding that "time limits, no matter their form, are 'filing' conditions"). Under California's

system, a petitioner sometimes is entitled to statutory tolling even during the gaps between his

various state court collateral challenges; however, only a "properly filed" state collateral challenge

can start the statutory tolling period that might last over the course of several rounds of state

habeas filings. Because the pre-AEDPA filings by Pina were not "properly filed" within the

meaning of § 2244(d)(2), they did not start the statutory tolling period. The earliest petition Pina

filed that could have started the statutory tolling period – assuming arguendo that a petition filed

after an earlier petition was denied as untimely could be considered properly filed – was not filed

until 1999, but that was more than a year after the limitations period had ended on April 24, 1997.2

The 1999 filing by Pina could not restart the limitations period that expired on April 24, 1997.

See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed,” even if the

state petition was timely filed), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 924 (2003). In sum, the potential tolling

event of the pendency of arguably properly filed state petitions did not start until 1999 -- a couple

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of years after the one-year period ended on April 24, 1997. Unless Pina is able to bridge the gap

between 1997 and 1999 by showing entitlement to equitable tolling for the period before the 1999

state habeas petition was filed, the state habeas petitions filed in and after 1999 were too late to

matter.

3. No Equitable Tolling Is Available For Pina

Equitable tolling of the limitation period is available upon a showing of extraordinary

circumstances beyond a petitioner's control which prevented him from timely filing the petition.

See, e.g., Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288. "When external

forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim,

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of

time should be granted only if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The prisoner must show that “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause

of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

There are several reasons equitable tolling is not warranted here. First, the record before

this court does not show a 15-year quest for evidence. Although Pina asserts he has been trying

for 15 years to obtain evidence to prepare a better petition, the evidence does not support his

assertion. Pina's 1991 and 1994 filings in state court sought production of the reporter's

transcripts, clerk's transcripts and judgment roll from his criminal case and did not request a copy

of the tapes or police reports. In the record before this court, the first hint that Pina was trying

to obtain police reports and perhaps other evidence is found in a March 25, 1999 letter Pina

allegedly wrote to the public defender's office. See Opposition, p. 42. But even that document

suggests a lack of diligence because it mentions that Pina had tried to obtain the evidence in 1991,

eight years earlier, and had not received any answer. 

Second, even assuming arguendo that Pina has been trying to get the evidence for the last

15 years, the record does not disclose diligence on his part. There are long gaps between his

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3The gaps between Pina's efforts to attack his criminal conviction are even less excusable

because Pina was actively litigating on other fronts in 1994-2000. He filed several civil rights

actions in this court (Case Nos. C94-2124 SI, C94-2464 SI, C94-4161 SI, C95-2123 SI, C99-397

SI, and C99-1097 SI), and several of those cases continued for several years. In Pina v. Gomez,

Case No. C94-2464 SI, he was pursuing claims for himself and other inmates and complained

about prison officials' interference with his activity as a writ writer aiding other inmates. Pina's

choice to spend his time doing legal work for other inmates rather than attacking his own

conviction does not show diligence with regard to the latter.

11

efforts that are far more suggestive of a lack of diligence. The record indicates that Pina

occasionally would take a run at obtaining relief and then abandon his efforts for a few years and

then take another run at it. 3 After Pina's motion was denied in 1991, he waited until 1994 to do

his next court filing; after his 1995 petition was denied by the California Supreme Court, he waited

until 1999 to do his next court filing; and after a series of petitions in 1999-2001 that ended with

failure on the denial of the petition by the California Supreme Court on June 27, 2001, he waited

a couple of more years until 2003 to begin another series of court filings. "Under longestablished principles, petitioner's lack of diligence precludes equity's operation.” Pace, 125 S.

Ct. at 1815; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d at 1107 (external forces, rather than lack of diligence, must

account for the untimely filing). 

Third, even assuming arguendo that Pina has been trying to obtain the evidence for 15 years,

he has known of the existence and contents of that evidence since 1986 during his trial. The lack

of the physical evidence itself simply cannot be realistically viewed as an "extraordinary

circumstance." To the contrary, it is a rare case where the inmate does have possession of the

physical evidence that he alleges proves the merit of his claim. For example, if a petitioner wanted

to claim that an alleged murder weapon was incapable of firing, the failure to deliver to him that

gun would not give him an open-ended excuse on the limitations period. Pina's failure to obtain

the physical evidence was not an extraordinary circumstance. 

Fourth, assuming arguendo that Pina's inability to obtain the evidence was an extraordinary

circumstance, it did not make it impossible for Pina to file his petition on time. Pina has filed

numerous petitions in state court and two in federal court, all without having possession of the

evidence he claims is necessary to prove the truth of his claims. As noted earlier, Pina still does

not have the evidence, but he has been able to file habeas petitions here and in state court. 

Case 3:04-cv-02251-SI Document 14 Filed 08/09/05 Page 23 of 24
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Finally, the equitable tolling principle allows for tolling when an event or circumstance

makes the filing of a timely petition; it does not allow for tolling while a prisoner goes in search

of evidence to improve the quality of the petition that he can and does file. Pina does not persuade

with his argument that the evidence was necessary for him to prepare a "better" petition. If all a

prisoner had to do to obtain tolling was to say he was in search of physical evidence to make his

petition better or more persuasive -- notwithstanding his knowledge of the existence and contents

of that evidence -- the statute of limitations would be eviscerated as almost any petitioner could

make that argument to avoid the time limitation that Congress imposed. 

Pina is not entitled to any equitable tolling of the limitations period. His federal habeas

petition, filed on June 1, 2004, was untimely and therefore must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d). 

CONCLUSION

Respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket # 8.) The petition for writ of

habeas corpus is DISMISSED because it was not timely filed. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August _8__, 2005 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-02251-SI Document 14 Filed 08/09/05 Page 24 of 24