Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02967/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02967-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY O. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER GOMEZ,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 15-2967 NC (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Docket No. 20

 On June 25, 2015, Plaintiff Timothy O. Williams filed a pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Officer Gomez (“Defendant”) at Salinas Valley

State Prison (“SVSP”), where Plaintiff is incarcerated. After screening the complaint, the

Court found that Plaintiff stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim that Defendant used

excessive force against him. 

Now before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has

filed an opposition, and Gomez has filed a reply. For the reasons given below, the motion is

granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and are

undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

On September 4, 2014, Defendant was working as a floor officer in Facility C,

Building 8, at SVSP. (Gomez Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant, along with Correctional Officer C.

Rebeterano and Correctional Officer D. Murphy, were conducting the pill-line release. (Id. ¶

4.) During pill-line release, inmates are systematically called out of the cells pod by pod. 

(Id.) Control Booth Officer D. Ear electronically opens cell doors for the inmates who are to

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receive medications. (Id.) At one point, Ear opened up Plaintiff and Inmate Robins’ cell. 

(Id. ¶ 5.) 

Both inmates exited their cells, but Plaintiff refused to participate in the pill-line, and

Inmate Robins demanded a shower. (Id.) Rebeterano ordered both inmates to return to their

cells because Rebeterano and the other officers were still conducting the pill line release. 

(Rebeterano Decl. ¶ 5.) Neither inmate complied with Rebeterano’s order to return to the

cell. (Id. ¶ 6; Gomez Decl. ¶ 6.) Instead, Inmate Robins became aggressive, and he insisted

that he be allowed to shower. (Gomez Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff put his arm around Inmate

Robins and encouraged Inmate Robins to “lock it up,” and return to their cell. (Id.)

Unfortunately, Inmate Robins continued to approach the officers. (Id. ¶ 7.) Murphy

ordered both inmates to “lock it up,” but neither complied. (Id.) Inmate Robins yelled,

“Fuck you,” and took a “bladed stance,” and then struck Murphy in the face. (Id.) At that

point, the alarm sounded. (Id.) 

When the alarm sounds, inmates are required to stop what they are doing, sit down,

and wait for instructions. (Id.) Neither inmate complied. (Id.) Inmate Robins continued his

assault on Murphy, even after Murphy used his pepper spray in an attempt to stop the fight. 

(Id.) Soon after the fight began, Plaintiff also took a “bladed stance,” and began to approach

the fight. (Id. ¶ 8. ) Defendant ordered Plaintiff to get on the floor, but Plaintiff did not

comply. (Id.) Defendant then sprayed Plaintiff with the pepper spray. (Id.) Plaintiff

continued to advance, so Defendant and Rebeterano tried to restrain Plaintiff. (Id.) 

Rebeterano grabbed the back of Plaintiff’s arm, but Rebeterano slipped and fell. (Id.). 

Plaintiff continued to resist, and Defendant used his body weight to force Plaintiff on the

ground. (Id.) 

Thereafter, Inmate Robins was issued a Rule Violation, and found guilty of battery of

a peace officer. (Id. ¶ 15; Stegeman Decl, Ex. B.) Plaintiff was also issued a Rule Violation,

and found guilty of willfully resisting an officer. (Gomez Decl. ¶ 15; Stegeman Decl. Ex. B.)

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Plaintiff has filed this federal civil rights complaint, alleging that Defendant pepper

sprayed him, and slammed him onto the ground “for no reason.” Both parties have

consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show

there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the

outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.

A court shall grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial[,] . . . since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving

party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving

party to “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” See id. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

For purposes of summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party

conflicts with evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the Court must assume the truth of

the evidence submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152,

1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make

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credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material

fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987).

B. Evidence Considered

A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773

(9th Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff has not verified his complaint nor his opposition to

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. That is, Plaintiff did not sign either document

under penalty of perjury. Neither an unverified complaint nor unsworn statements made in

the parties’ briefs can be considered as evidence at this stage. See Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d

748, 759 & n.16 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that an unverified complaint cannot be considered as

evidence on motion for summary judgment); British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d

946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[L]egal memoranda . . . are not evidence[.]”). Here, because

Plaintiff’s pleadings were not signed “under penalty of perjury,” they cannot be considered

as evidence for purposes of deciding this motion. 

In a similar vein, although Defendant has submitted purported portions of Plaintiff’s

deposition transcript, the transcript is uncertified. (Stegeman Decl., Ex. A.) Defense counsel

has averred that Exhibit A is a “true and correct copy of the relevant portions of the

transcript,” however, the declaration is insufficient without more to lay an adequate

foundation for Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. See Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Services, Inc.,

854 F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dibble, 429 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir.

1970) (“A writing is not authenticated simply by attaching it to an affidavit, even if the

writing appears on its face to have originated from some governmental agency. . . . The

foundation is laid for receiving a document in evidence by the testimony of a witness with

personal knowledge of the facts who attests to the identity and due execution of the

document and, where appropriate, its delivery.”); Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical

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Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1963) (“an uncertified copy of testimony is inadmissible

in a summary judgment proceeding”).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint and opposition, and Defendant’s submission of

portions of Plaintiff’s deposition transcript will not be considered as evidence in the

disposition of this motion.

C. Analysis

Defendant moves for summary judgment on three grounds. First, Defendant argues

that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). Second, Defendant asserts that there is no genuine issue of

material fact and he is entitled to summary judgment on the merits. Third, Defendant alleges

that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Having reviewed the record and relevant pleadings,

the Court agrees that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, and grants Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on that basis. As a matter of efficiency, therefore, the Court

will not address Defendant’s first two arguments. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A court considering a claim of qualified immunity

must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional

right and whether such right was clearly established such that it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling the sequence of the two-part test that

required determination of a deprivation first and then whether such right was clearly

established, as required by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)).

A court determining whether a right was clearly established looks to “Supreme Court

and Ninth Circuit law existing at the time of the alleged act.” Community House, Inc. v.

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Bieter, 623 F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010). In the absence of binding precedent, the Court

may look to all available decisional law, including the law of other circuits and district

courts. See id. Unpublished district court decisions may also “inform” the Court’s analysis. 

See Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2004).

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain .

. . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley

v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and citation

omitted). But whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation

of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21; Jeffers

v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying “malicious and sadistic” standard

to claim that prison guards used excessive force when attempting to quell a prison riot). In

determining whether the use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring

discipline, or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate

the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force

used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See Hudson,

503 U.S. at 7. 

The qualified immunity analysis is separate from the Eighth Amendment excessive

force analysis. See Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, a guard

can do an act which would violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment right but still be entitled

to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in his position would have believed that his

response was a good faith effort to restore discipline. See id. at 692-93. 

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According to Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendant sprayed him and slammed him to the

ground “for no reason.” However, Plaintiff’s statements in his complaint are not evidence,

and therefore, they cannot create a triable issue of material fact. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 773

(concluding that inadmissible evidence “do not present a triable issue of material fact”). 

Plaintiff does not provide any other admissible evidence to dispute Defendant’s evidence. 

The record shows that after the alarm rang, Inmate Robins and Plaintiff failed to comply with

the requirement to stop what they are doing, sit down, and wait for instruction. (Gomez

Decl. ¶ 7; Rebeterano Decl. ¶ 7.) Instead, Plaintiff began to approach the fight between

Inmate Robins and Murphy. (Gomez Decl. ¶ 8; Rebeterano Decl. ¶ 8.) Defendant ordered

Plaintiff to stop and get down on the floor, but Plaintiff did not comply. (Gomez Decl. ¶ 8.) 

Defendant used his pepper spray on Plaintiff. (Id.; Rebeterano Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff

continued toward Defendant, and Rebeterano and Defendant grabbed Plaintiff to restrain

him. (Gomez Decl. ¶ 8; Rebeterano Decl. ¶ 8.) Rebeterano slipped and fell, but Defendant

kept his grip on Plaintiff and forced Plaintiff to the ground. (Gomez Decl. ¶ 8; Rebeterano

Decl. ¶ 8.) Based on the undisputed evidence, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant

pepper sprayed Plaintiff and ultimately re-injured Plaintiff’s pre-existing back condition

“maliciously and sadistically” for the “purpose of causing harm.” Clement v. Gomez, 298

F.3d 898, 903-04 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, Defendant did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Even assuming Defendant’s actions violated the Eighth Amendment, based on the

evidence, a reasonable officer in Defendant’s position would have believed that his response

was made in a good faith effort to restore discipline. See Marquez, 322 F.3d at 692-93; see,

e.g., Clement, 298 F.3d at 903-04 (finding no excessive force when officers dispensed a

small amount of pepper spray several times into a cell to quell fighting between inmates);

Howard v. Nunley, No. 10-17493, 2012 WL 35396, at **1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2012) (affirming

grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity when inmate was pepper sprayed

after disobeying orders to stop pounding on his cell, and had received a warning that he could

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be pepper sprayed) (unpublished memorandum disposition); Stewart v. Stewart, No. 01-

17540, 2003 WL 463443, at **1 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2003) (affirming dismissal for failure to

state a claim and stating, “The administrators’ alleged policy of spraying prisoners with

pepper spray for refusing to follow directions falls within the wide-ranging zone of deference

accorded to prison officials in shaping “prophylactic or preventive measures intended to

reduce the incidence of . . . breaches of prison discipline.”) (unpublished memorandum

disposition); Jennings v. Hays, No. CV 10-8004-PCT-JAT (JRI), 2011 WL 1480038, at *9

(D. Az. April 19, 2011) (granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity and

stating, “[t]he law is unclear regarding the parameters of the permissible use of pepper spray

to address inmates who disobey orders or interfere with officers in the performance of their

duties.”); cf. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (where, “after adequate

warning,” a prisoner acts in such a way to present “a reasonable possibility that slight force

will be required,” use of chemical spray “may be a legitimate means for preventing small

disturbances from becoming dangerous”).

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, and his motion for summary

judgment is granted on this ground.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to

enter judgment for Defendant and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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