Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00728/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00728-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT GRAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. BJORNSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-0728 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Defendants removed this action 

from state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The original complaint presents a federal question on its 

face based on plaintiff’s fourth claim that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 

failing to protect him from harm. (ECF No. 1-1 at 11.) This proceeding was referred to this court 

by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). As set forth below, plaintiff’s complaint is 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

II. Screening Standards 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 

facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 

(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

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III. Discussion

Here, plaintiff appears to attempt to raise claims based on two separate incidents; first, an 

alleged failure to protect him from an inmate assault on September 18, 2014; and second, an 

alleged retaliatory cell search on May 3, 2014. The complaint is difficult to parse because 

plaintiff included facts concerning both violations within the same claim on his state court form. 

Because plaintiff initially filed his pleading in state court, it may be that he did not intend to raise 

a First Amendment claim based on alleged retaliation. Thus, plaintiff is granted leave to amend 

so that he may clearly identify the constitutional claims he intends to raise, as well as identify the 

supplemental state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 that plaintiff wishes to pursue in this court. 

As defendants, plaintiff names Correctional Officers B. Bjornsen, T. Ng, and S. J. Sangmaster, 

and Sgt. Rose. Plaintiff also names the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”), and Does 1 to 50. The court addresses his claims and the named defendants below.

A. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that on September 18, 2014, defendants Bjornsen, Ng, Sangmaster, Rose, 

and Does 1 to 10, knew “or are presumed to know” that plaintiff’s safety was about to be 

breached, yet they conspired to carry out the specific assault of plaintiff’s person by and through 

the use of inmate manipulation. (ECF No. 1-1 at 8.) Plaintiff claims that these defendants then 

deliberately covered up their violation. (ECF No. 1-1 at 9.) As a result, plaintiff alleges that he 

suffered a broken nose, psychological and emotional harm, upper and lower back pain, and 

anxiety attacks. Plaintiff seeks money damages. 

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee 

the safety of prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, prison 

officials have an affirmative duty to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other inmates. 

See id. at 833. The failure of a prison official to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or 

from dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment only when two 

requirements are met: (1) the objective component -- the deprivation alleged must be sufficiently 

serious, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)); and (2)

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the subjective component -- the prison official must possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind. 

See id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

In determining whether a deprivation is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective 

component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a court must consider the circumstances, nature, and 

duration of the deprivation. Id. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). With respect to the 

subjective component, the requisite state of mind depends on the nature of the claim. In prison 

conditions cases, the necessary state of mind is one of “deliberate indifference.” See, e.g., Allen 

v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (outdoor exercise); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (inmate 

safety); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (inmate health); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03 

(general conditions of confinement).

“Deliberate indifference” has both subjective and objective components. A prison official 

must “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists and . . . must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Liability may 

follow only if a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and 

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847.

Deliberate indifference describes a more blameworthy state of mind than negligence. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Negligence is not enough to amount to 

an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Deliberate indifference is not shown 

by merely stating that a defendant should have known of a risk, but requires an actual perception 

of a risk that does not exist merely because a reasonable person should have perceived a risk. Id.

at 836.

Here, plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment claim. Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts as to each defendant, specifically 

explaining how his or her act or omission constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. Detailed 

factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 

662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Plaintiff must set forth 

sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 

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566 U.S. at 677-68, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678. Based on the lack of factual allegations, 

the court cannot determine whether each named defendant was personally involved in the alleged 

violation, or whether plaintiff is attempting to raise claims based on a defendant’s supervisorial 

role.1 In addition, the court cannot determine whether each defendant acted with a culpable state 

of mind such that plaintiff can demonstrate deliberate indifference. 

Moreover, it is unclear whether plaintiff contends that this incident is somehow related to 

the May 3, 2014 alleged cell-search incident. Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all 

against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Unrelated claims against different defendants 

must be pursued in multiple lawsuits. 

The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party 

asserting a claim . . . may join, [] as independent or as alternate 

claims, as many claims . . . as the party has against an opposing 

party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but 

Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated 

Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different 

defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of 

morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but 

also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees-for the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous 

suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of 

the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

 

1

 Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinate 

employees based on respondeat superior, or vicarious liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 

967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 

1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 

banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow v. 

McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 

726 F.3d at 1074-75(“A prison official in a supervisory position may be held liable under § 

1983... ‘if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient 

causal connection exists between the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional 

violation.’”) (quoting Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003)); Lacey, 693 

F.3d at 915-16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal 

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional 

violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

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George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (joinder of 

defendants not permitted unless commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied).

To the extent that plaintiff attempts to raise a cover-up claim, such allegation appears to 

be premature. Allegations that officials engaged in a cover-up state a constitutional claim only if 

the cover-up deprived plaintiff of his right of access to courts by causing him to fail to obtain 

redress for the constitutional violation that was the subject of the cover-up. See Karim-Panahi v. 

Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1988) (cover-up “allegations may state a 

federally cognizable claim provided that defendants’ actions can be causally connected to a 

failure to succeed in the present lawsuit.”); Rose v. City of Los Angeles, 814 F.Supp. 878, 881 

(C.D. Cal. 1993). A cover-up claim is premature when, as here, plaintiff’s action seeking redress 

for the underlying constitutional violations remains pending. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 625 

(claim alleging police cover-up of misconduct was premature when action challenging 

misconduct was pending); Rose, 814 F.Supp. at 881 (“Because the ultimate resolution of the 

present suit remains in doubt, [p]laintiff’s cover-up claim is not ripe for judicial consideration.”)

B. First Amendment

In addition, plaintiff alleges that defendants T. Ng and B. Bjornsen, both correctional 

officers, failed to ensure that plaintiff’s cell door was secure after plaintiff’s exit on six separate 

occasions. On May 3, 2014, plaintiff allegedly told defendant Ng that plaintiff would be filing a 

grievance based on their repeated breach of security. When defendant Bjornsen returned, plaintiff 

also advised Bjornsen, and immediately thereafter, Bjornsen ordered plaintiff to exit his cell, and 

then both Bjornsen and Ng searched plaintiff’s cell “as a punitive measure,” destroying his 

personal property, and leaving his cell in “total destruction.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 7.) Plaintiff 

informed defendant Rose about the punitive search. After inspecting plaintiff’s cell, plaintiff 

alleges that Rose stated, “I don’t think that Bjornsen and Ng did enough damage and they should 

tear up your cell some more,” thus acquiescing in the conduct of his subordinates. (ECF No. 1-1 

at 7.) 

“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to 

be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) 

Case 2:16-cv-00728-KJN Document 4 Filed 06/06/16 Page 6 of 16
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(citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). A viable retaliation claim in the 

prison context has five elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.

2005). 

Plaintiff’s allegations state potentially cognizable retaliation claims against defendants 

Bjornsen and Ng. Plaintiff’s allegations as to defendant Rose, however, do not. Pursuant to Starr 

v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011), a supervisory official may be liable for their own 

acquiescence or culpable indifference toward constitutional violations committed by others. 

However, here, defendant Rose’s statement was made after the alleged injury was incurred; 

plaintiff alleges no facts demonstrating that defendant Rose acquiesced in the actions of 

defendants Bjornsen and Ng before or during the search. Although plaintiff claims that Rose was 

in the M-1 office during the allegedly punitive search, plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that 

Rose knew Bjornsen and Ng were engaged in a punitive search. Moreover, Rose’s verbal 

statement occurred after the alleged retaliatory cell search took place; thus, such statement, 

standing alone, is insufficient to show Rose was aware that defendants were engaged in a punitive 

search, or acquiesced in a punitive search. Because plaintiff may be able to allege facts showing 

defendant Rose’s involvement, plaintiff is granted leave to amend his claim for relief against 

defendant Rose. Plaintiff should renew his retaliation claims against defendants Bjornsen and 

Ng.

C. State Law Claims

Plaintiff is informed that violation of state tort law, state regulations, rules and policies of 

the CDCR, or other state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. To state a 

claim under § 1983, there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976) (“Violation of local law does not 

necessarily mean that federal rights have been invaded.”). Although the court may exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for 

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relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

In his complaint, plaintiff asserts various state law claims against the defendants. Plaintiff 

filed a government tort claim on December 18, 2014, which was rejected on March 19, 2015. 

(ECF No. 1-1 at 14-15.) The undersigned addresses plaintiff’s state law claims below. 

i. Negligence

A public employee is liable for injury “proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful 

act or omission.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 844.6(d). Under California law, the elements of negligence 

claims are: (1) A legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the breach was a legal 

or proximate cause of the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the breach 

of the duty of care. See Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 572 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); 

Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 534, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801 (2009).

Thus, plaintiff must show the defendant’s act or omission (breach of duty) was a cause of 

the plaintiff’s injury. Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 16 Cal. App. 4th 1830, 1846 (1993). 

The element of causation generally consists of two components. Id. at 1847. The plaintiff must 

show (1) the defendant’s act or omission was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury, and (2) the 

defendant should be held responsible for negligently causing the plaintiff’s injury. Id. The 

second component evaluates whether the defendant should owe the plaintiff a legal duty of 

reasonable care under the circumstances of the case.

In connection with the alleged retaliatory cell search claim, plaintiff names defendants 

Bjornsen, Ng, Sangmaster, Rose, the CDCR, and Does 1 to 50. However, with the exception of 

defendants Bjornsen and Ng, plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that each of these 

defendants breached their duty to plaintiff, or that such breach was the cause of his injury. Thus, 

plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint to allege facts as to each named defendant, 

taking care to address each element of his negligence claim.

 ii. Intentional Tort

In the intentional tort portion of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he has a right to be 

free from violence and the threat of violence pursuant to California Civil Code 51.7, and refers to 

the “Ralph” and “Bane” Acts. (ECF No. 1-1 at 8.) This claim is based on his allegation that 

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defendants owed plaintiff a duty to protect him from harm, but because defendants knew, or 

should have known, that plaintiff’s safety was about to be breached, and all of the defendants 

allegedly conspired to carry out the assault on plaintiff by using inmate manipulation, defendants

breached their duty to plaintiff resulting in his physical injuries.

California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of 

this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national 

origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, 

advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 

whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 2015) (emphasis added). However, the undersigned is 

unaware of any court holding that a prison is a business establishment; to the contrary, numerous 

district courts have held that jails and prison are not business establishments and, as a result, are

not subject to suit under § 51. Taormina v. California Dept. of Corr., 946 F.Supp. 829, 834 (S.D.

Cal. 1996); Huffman v. Parmo, 2013 WL 3795618, at *11 (S.D. Cal. 2013); Rocha v. Cnty. of 

Tulare, 2013 WL 4046373, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. 2013); Wilkins-Jones v. Cnty. of Alameda, 2010 

WL 4780291, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting county summary judgment on Unruh claim); cf. 

Wilkins-Jones v. Cnty. of Alameda, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1048-49 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding 

Unruh Act covers private business acting within a prison and denying private business’ motion to 

dismiss claim). Thus, plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Unruh Act. Plaintiff should not 

include this claim in any amended complaint.

Second, plaintiff also fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim under Civil Code 

§ 51.7, also known as the Ralph Civil Rights Act. Civil Code § 51.7 “creates the right to be free 

from any violence, or threat of violence, because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 

political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor dispute[.]” Gatto 

v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 758 n.10 (2002). Plaintiff alleges no facts plausibly 

suggesting that any defendant used violence or a threat of violence against plaintiff based on one 

of the protected characteristics enumerated in that statute. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim under 

Civil Code § 51.7 is dismissed and should not be included in an amendment. 

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Third, plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim under California 

Civil Code § 52.1, also known as the Bane Act. Civil Code § 52, “which applies to both access to 

accommodation claims under § 51 and civil actions for denial of constitutional rights under 

§52.1,” creates liability for actual and statutory damages and any attorney’s fees determined by 

the court. Gatto, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 752-53. Civil Code § 52.1 “authorizes an action at law, a 

suit in equity, or both, against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats, intimidation, or 

coercion, with an individual’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by federal or state law.” 

Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 331 (1998); see Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 

1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the Bane Act is “a California statute that provides a cause 

of action for persons deprived of federal or state constitutional rights by ‘threat, intimidation, or 

coercion.’”) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b)).

Under the Bane Act, “[a] plaintiff must show (1) intentional interference or attempted 

interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or 

attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 

234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67 (2015). “[A] wrongful arrest or detention, without more, does not 

satisfy both elements of section 52.1.” Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 67; see Lyall, 804 F.3d at 

1196 (“Numerous California decisions make clear that a plaintiff in a search-and-seizure case 

must allege threats or coercion beyond the coercion inherent in a detention or search in order to 

recover under the Bane Act.”) (citing Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 67; Quezada v. City of Los 

Angeles, 222 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1008 (2014); Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal.App. 

4th 947, 959-960 (2012)). “[C]onclusory allegations of ‘forcible’ and ‘coercive’ interference 

with plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are inadequate to state a cause of action for a violation of 

section 52.1.” Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 69. In addition, “speech alone is not sufficient to 

support an action” under the Bane Act “except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens 

violence against a specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of persons against 

whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be 

committed against them or their property and that the person threatening violence had the 

apparent ability to carry out the threat.” Allen, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 66 (citing Cal. Civ. Code 

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§ 52.1, subd. (j)).

As set forth above in addressing the potential Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, 

plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to determine whether he can state a plausible 

claim under the Bane Act. It appears more likely that plaintiff may be able to allege facts stating 

an Eighth Amendment claim only against those defendants personally involved in the incident, 

rather than a claim under the Bane Act. However, in an abundance of caution, plaintiff is granted 

leave to amend in the event he can allege facts demonstrating a Bane Act violation.

iii. Training

Finally, plaintiff alleges that multiple defendants failed to properly train employees or 

officers. (ECF No. 1-1 at 10.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants “provide training from a separate 

manual,” “not accessible to the public,” “which promotes the unnecessary use of force,” and that 

“promotes a ‘Code of Silence’ among its members.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 10.) Plaintiff argues that 

defendant CDCR failed to ensure that defendants met the training requirements set forth in the 

California Constitution, and the California Business and Professions Code, Code of Regulations, 

Penal Code, Civil Code, Government Code, and Health and Safety Code. (ECF No. 1-1 at 10.) 

A local government entity may be held liable for a failure to train its employees only if 

“the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons” impacted by the 

inaction. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Gausvik v. Perez, 239 F. 

Supp. 2d 1047, 1053-54 (E.D. Wash. 2002) (deliberate indifference a required element of a § 

1983 claim for failure to train). In order to state a claim for failure to train, plaintiff must allege 

facts demonstrating that “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need 

for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation 

of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been 

deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id. at 390. In other words, “for liability to attach . . . [,] the 

identified deficiency in [the] training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury. Thus 

. . ., [a plaintiff] must still prove that the deficiency in training actually caused the . . . officers’

indifference” to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See id. at 391.

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Here, however, plaintiff alleges no facts to support his broad failure to train allegations. 

The complaint “does not identify what the training . . . practices were, how the training . . . 

practices were deficient, or how the training . . . practices caused [plaintiff’s] harm.” See Young 

v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also Gausvik, 239 F. Supp. 

23 1053-54 (emphasizing the importance of establishing that the alleged deficiency in training 

actually caused the injury). More importantly, plaintiff has failed to plead any “factual content” 

from which the court could reasonably infer that defendants’ purported failure to train evidenced 

a “deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389, 391. Therefore, the allegations of the complaint are insufficient 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against defendants based on any alleged failure 

to train. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (legal conclusions must be supported by factual 

allegations); Dugherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that 

plaintiff’s conclusory allegations “lack any factual allegations that would separate them from the 

‘formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements’ deemed insufficient by Twombly.”). 

Conclusory assertions that supervisory defendants failed to properly train staff will not support a 

cognizable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977, Lemire, 726 F.3d 

at 1074-75; see also Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(allegations of an isolated instance of a constitutional violation are insufficient to support a 

“failure to train” theory).

D. CDCR

The claims pled against the CDCR are unavailing because the CDCR is immune from suit 

under the Eleventh Amendment. The CDCR is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See Brown v. California Dep’t. of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The district 

court correctly held that the California Department of Corrections and the California Board of 

Prison Terms were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 

945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (“State agencies . . . are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983, and 

are therefore not amenable to suit under that statute.”). The Eleventh Amendment has been 

interpreted to preclude suits brought by citizens against their own state as well. Pennhurst State 

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Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). It also bars a federal 

district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought against a state based 

on state law. Id. at 120-21 (“[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may 

override the Eleventh Amendment.”). Although the Eleventh Amendment is not jurisdictional, 

the court may raise the defect on its own. Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 

U.S. 381, 389 (1998); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974). 

The Eleventh Amendment erects a general bar against federal lawsuits brought against the 

state and there is no exception present here. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citing Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003)) (quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, plaintiff should refrain from naming the CDCR as a defendant in connection with 

such claims in his amended complaint.

E. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff names Doe Defendants 1 to 50 in his complaint. Plaintiff is advised that 

unidentified, or “Doe” defendants must be named or otherwise identified before service of 

process can go forward. “As a general rule, the use of ‘John [or Jane] Doe’ to identify a 

defendant is not favored.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). John Doe or 

Jane Doe defendants cannot be served by the United States Marshal until plaintiff identifies them 

as actual individuals and amended his pleading to substitute names for John Doe or Jane Doe. 

For service to be successful, the Marshal must be able to identify and locate defendants.

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that where a defendant’s identity is unknown prior to 

the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to 

identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities 

or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 

1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). 

Here, plaintiff does not identify each defendant doe and his or her alleged act committed 

which plaintiff contends violated his constitutional rights. This is insufficient to put prospective 

defendants on notice of their alleged actions or omissions that plaintiff claims violate his rights. 

In order to link these doe defendants to the alleged acts or omissions that demonstrate a violation 

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of plaintiff’s rights, plaintiff is granted leave to amend, to either name the defendants involved, or 

list the doe defendants involved. If plaintiff can only list these defendants as John Doe, plaintiff 

must identify the John Doe as best as possible, and allege specific acts that each doe defendant 

did, such as “John Doe 1 did X” and “John Doe 2 and 3 did Y.” Plaintiff “must allege facts, not 

simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his 

civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

IV. Leave to Amend

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that it is 

unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The 

court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required 

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a 

complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones 

v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least 

some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. 

Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the 

complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each 

named defendant is involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is 

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Id.; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. 

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Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original 

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged.

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

2. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of 

this action.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the form for filing a civil rights 

complaint by a prisoner.

Dated: June 6, 2016

/gray0728.14

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT GRAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. BJORNSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-0728 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court’s order

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

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