Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_19-cv-00013/USCOURTS-alnd-7_19-cv-00013-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

WESTERN DIVISION 

ABBIEGEAL BAILEY, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS 

INC. et al., 

 Defendant. 

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 7:19-cv-00013-LSC 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

 Plaintiff Abbiegeal Bailey brings the present action on behalf of herself and all 

others similarly situated, alleging that Defendants, Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC 

(“Pinnacle”) and Diversified Consultants, Inc. (“DCI”) (collectively 

“Defendants”), violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 

U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., through a debt collection letter she received from Defendant 

DCI on behalf of Defendant Pinnacle. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to 

Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. (Doc. 23.) For the reasons set forth 

below, Defendants’ motion is due to be granted. 

FILED

 2020 Mar-04 PM 03:19

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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I. Background 

On October 10, 2007, Plaintiff opened an account with Verizon subject to the 

Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement Terms & Conditions (“Customer 

Agreement”). According to Erica Wooley, a Consultant for Billing Solutions for 

Verizon, Plaintiff accepted the Customer Agreement when she accepted services 

through Verizon and utilized Verizon’s services from October 10, 2007, to February 

24, 2012. (Doc. 23 Wooley Decl. at 2.) 

The Customer Agreement includes an arbitration provision. The first page of 

the Customer Agreement notes: “By accepting this agreement, you’re bound by its 

conditions. It covers important topics such as . . . settlement of disputes by 

arbitration instead of in court.” (Doc. 23 Ex. A at 1.) In a later section entitled 

“Dispute Resolution and Mandatory Arbitration,” the Custom Agreement states 

the following: 

WE EACH AGREE TO SETTLE DISPUTES (EXCEPT CERTAIN 

SMALL CLAIMS) ONLY BY ARBITRATION. THERE’S NO 

JUDGE OR JURY IN ARBITRATION, AND REVIEW IS LIMITED, 

BUT AN ARBITRATOR CAN AWARD THE SAME DAMAGES 

AND RELIEF, AND MUST HONOR THE SAME LIMITATIONS 

IN THIS AGREEMENT, AS A COURT WOULD. IF AN 

APPLICABLE STATUTE PROVIDES FOR AN AWARD OF 

ATTORNEY’S FEES, AN ARBITRATOR CAN AWARD THEM 

TOO. WE ALSO EACH AGREE, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT 

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PERMITTED BY LAW, THAT: 

(1) THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT APPLIES TO THIS 

AGREEMENT. EXCEPT FOR QUALIFYING SMALL CLAIMS 

COURT CASES, ANY CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING 

OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT . . . WILL BE 

SETTLED BY ONE OR MORE NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS 

BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 

(“AAA”) OR BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU (“BBB”). 

(Id. at 6.) 

The Customer Agreement permitted Verizon to “assign all or part of this 

agreement or your debts to us without notice.” (Id. at 7.) On June 18, 2014, Verizon 

sold all right, title, and interest in Plaintiff’s account and the Customer Agreement 

to Defendant Pinnacle. (Doc. 23 Wooley Decl. at 2.)1

II. Standard 

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, this Court applies a standard 

similar to review of a motion for summary judgment. See In re Checking Account 

Overdraft Litig., 754 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2014) (describing an order compelling 

arbitration as “summary-judgment-like” because it is “in effect a summary 

 

1

 Plaintiff does not expressly stipulate to the existence of an arbitration agreement between 

herself and Verizon. She notes, only in passing, that “[a]lthough Plaintiff never actually signed the 

Agreement, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff entered into the Arbitration Agreement when she 

accepted and utilized Verizon’s services.” (Doc. 27 at 2–3.) However, Plaintiff has presented no 

argument or evidence to rebut Defendants’ evidence that such an agreement existed between 

Plaintiff and Verizon. 

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disposition of the issue of whether or not there has been a meeting of the minds on 

the agreement to arbitrate” (quoting Magnolia Capital Advisors, Inc. v. Bear Stearns 

& Co., 272 F. App’x 782, 785 (11th Cir. 2008)). A motion for summary judgment is 

due to be granted upon a showing that “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” 

remains to be decided in the action and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is material “if, under the applicable 

substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Hickson Corp. v. N. 

Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). A genuine dispute as to a 

material fact exists where “the nonmoving party has produced evidence such that a 

reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Waddell v. Valley Forge 

Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). 

The parties appear to agree that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 

U.S.C. § 1 et seq., governs any arbitration agreement between them. “The FAA 

makes enforceable a written arbitration provision in ‘a contract evidencing a 

transaction involving commerce.’” Jenkins v. First. Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 

400 F.3d 868, 874 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). It promotes a “liberal 

federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” and “questions of arbitrability must 

be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Moses 

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H. Cone Mem’l v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 

III. Discussion 

A. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement Between the Parties 

“[W]hile doubts concerning the scope of an arbitration clause should be 

resolved in favor of arbitration, the presumption does not apply to disputes 

concerning whether an agreement to arbitrate has been made.” Dasher v. RBC Bank 

(USA), 745 F.3d 1111, 1116 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Applied Energetics, Inc. v. 

NewOak Capital Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011)). “The threshold 

question of whether an arbitration agreement exists at all is ‘simply a matter of 

contract.’” Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 

2016) (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)). 

Absent such an agreement, “a court cannot compel the parties to settle their dispute 

in an arbitral forum.” Klay v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1200 (11th Cir. 2004). 

As previously noted, there is no genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff 

entered into an arbitration agreement with Verizon. Defendants have presented 

unrebutted evidence indicating that Plaintiff accepted the terms Verizon’s Customer 

Agreement, including its arbitration provision, when she accepted and utilized 

Verizon’s services. The Customer Agreement expressly permitted Verizon to 

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“assign all or part of this agreement . . . without notice.” (Doc. 23 Ex. A at 7.) 

Defendants have not provided the Court with any Bill of Sale regarding the 

assignment of rights under the Customer Agreement by Verizon. However, they 

have presented a declaration from a Verizon official representing that “[o]n June 18, 

2014, Verizon sold all right, title, and interest in [Plaintiff’s] account and the 

Customer Agreement to Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC.” (Doc. 23 Wooley’s Decl. 

at 2.) 

Plaintiff disputes that Verizon assigned the right to invoke arbitration to 

Defendants on June 18, 2014. On the contrary, she asserts that Defendants’ attached 

exhibits “only support a position through affidavit that Verizon sold [her] account to 

Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC.” (Doc. 27 at 4) (emphasis added). Plaintiff relies on 

Lance v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 375 F. Supp. 3d 604 (E.D. Pa. 2019), for the 

proposition that the assignment of rights to an account does not necessarily convey 

the right to demand arbitration. In Lance, a Bill of Sale confirmed the assignment of 

the plaintiff’s “Account” to the defendant, but the defendant produced no 

documents from which the court could define “Account.” Id. at 613–14. As a result, 

the court could not find that the word “Account” in the Bill of Sale “automatically 

include[d] all ‘rights and duties’ under the Agreement,” and it therefore denied the 

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defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.2 Relying on Lance, Plaintiff argues that 

“the current acquisition rights are unclear” and that Defendants have thus failed to 

meet their burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between 

the parties. (Doc. 27 at 5.) 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the language of the attached declaration of 

Erica Wooley makes clear that Defendant Pinnacle has been assigned the right to 

invoke arbitration. Her declaration states that Defendant Pinnacle received “all 

right, title, and interest in [Plaintiff’s] account and the Customer Agreement.” (Doc. 

23 Wooley’s Decl. at 2) (emphasis added). As noted above, the Customer 

Agreement contains the arbitration provision at issue in the instant case. Based on 

the language of Wooley’s declaration, the assignment of rights from Verizon to 

Defendant Pinnacle is sufficiently broad to include the whole Customer Agreement, 

including its arbitration provision. Thus, the facts of Lance—where the evidence did 

not clearly show an assignment of arbitration rights—are inapposite here. Despite 

the absence of the Bill of Sale, the evidence indicates that Defendant Pinnacle is the 

 

2

 Notably, the same court granted the defendant’s Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration 

two months later, after the defendant debt collector “presented its purchase agreement evidencing 

its purchase of all right to the account, including the right to arbitration.” Lance v. Midland Credit 

Mgmt., Inc., No. 18-4933, 2019 WL 2143362, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2019). 

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assignee of Verizon’s arbitration rights. 

Defendants have not presented evidence that Defendant DCI is an assignee of 

the Customer Agreement, but Defendant DCI may still benefit from its provisions 

as Defendant Pinnacle’s agent. The Customer Agreement states that it “isn’t for the 

benefit of any third party except our parents, affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, and 

predecessors and successors in interest.” (Doc. 23 Ex. A at 7) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant DCI acted as Defendant Pinnacle’s agent 

when it contacted her about her debts. As a result, the assignment of arbitration 

rights to Defendant Pinnacle also permits Defendant DCI to compel arbitration of 

Plaintiff’s claims in this action. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that an arbitration agreement exists between 

Plaintiff and Defendants. 

B. Scope of the Arbitration Agreement 

The Customer Agreement states that “any controversy arising out of or 

relating to [the Customer Agreement]” shall be settled through arbitration. (Doc. 23 

Ex. A at 7.) Plaintiff argues that her FDCPA claims fall outside the scope of this 

arbitration provision. “[T]he party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving 

that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. 

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Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000). Under the FAA, “any doubts concerning the scope 

of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l 

Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. 

The Supreme Court has held that an arbitration provision covering claims and 

controversy “arising out of or relating to” an agreement is a “broad arbitration 

clause.” Id. at 5. Furthermore, district courts have found the scope of arbitration to 

be broad when analyzing Verizon agreements identical or substantially similar to the 

language in this case. Those courts have generally concluded that such language is 

broad enough to cover most claims, including claims arising out of violations of 

consumer protection laws. Magno v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. C17-5478, 2018 

WL 2984979, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 14, 2018) (finding that a dispute concerning 

allegedly improper credit reporting following the plaintiff’s cancellation of a renewal 

contract “plainly arises out of” the Verizon Customer Agreement that the plaintiff 

had accepted through use); Asa v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No.: 1:17-cv-256, 2017 WL 

5894543, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 29, 2017) (finding that the “expansive language” 

allowed the court to “easily conclude” that a plaintiff’s claim under the Tennessee 

Consumer Protection Act arose from the “equipment, products, and services” he 

received from Verizon). 

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Conceding that the arbitration clause’s language is broad, Plaintiff argues that 

its scope does not extend to claims alleging debt collection practices under the 

FDCPA. In support of this proposition, she relies on the reasoning in Bazemore v. 

Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC, No. CV 314-115, 2015 WL 2220057 (S.D. Ga. May 11, 

2015). In Bazemore, the court found that an arbitration agreement that covered any 

claim or controversy arising out of a credit card account did not mandate arbitration 

of the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims. Id. at *2, *7. The court noted that, under the FAA, 

the court would otherwise “broadly read the delegation clause, with its use of the 

terms ‘arising from’ and ‘relating to’ [the plaintiff’s] account, to favor arbitration.” 

Id. at *7. However, the court reasoned that it must balance the federal policy in favor 

of arbitration with the “federal interest in its consumer advocacy laws, the principal 

purpose of which is to protect consumers from unfair, abusive and deceptive debt 

collection practices.” Id. The court further reasoned that a consumer cannot “sign 

away her right to seek relief in federal court under consumer protection laws absent 

a clear and unmistakable intent to do so.” Id. Because such an intent was not clear 

even in the broad language of the arbitration clause in that case, the court concluded 

that the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims fell outside the scope of arbitration. Id.

The Court finds the reasoning of Bazemore unpersuasive in this case. Notably, 

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the court there cited no authority to support the proposition that the federal policy 

in favor of arbitration could give way to a conflicting policy in favor of consumer 

advocacy. If such authority exists, it is likely inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 

holding in Randolph. 531 U.S. at 79. There, the Supreme Court noted that “even 

claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be 

arbitrated because ‘so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his 

or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,’ the statute serves its 

functions.” Id. at 90. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 

28 (1991)). Thus, this Court need only consider whether the “important social 

policies” of the FDCPA could be effectively vindicated in arbitration. Plaintiff has 

presented no evidence that arbitration would hinder the FDCPA’s protections in 

this case. As a result, Plaintiff’s reliance on Bazemore is misplaced. 

More persuasive is the holding in Raynor v. Verizon Wireless (VAW), LLC, No. 

15-5914, 2016 WL 1626020 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2016). In Raynor, a plaintiff brought a 

claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, 

asserting that Verizon’s debt collection practices violated the act. Id. at *1. The 

plaintiff argued that her claim fell outside of an arbitration clause which used 

language substantially similar to the agreement in this case. Id. at *2. The court 

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disagreed, reasoning that “although the current suit concerns [Verizon’s] alleged 

debt collection practices, [Verizon’s] attempts to contact Plaintiff arose out of 

Plaintiff’s use of [Verizon’s] services and the outstanding payments on her bills, 

which Plaintiff was contractually obligated to make.” Id. at *5. The findings in 

Raynor are instructive in the instant case. To be sure, this case does not involve 

claims under the TCPA. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has, as in Raynor, alleged unlawful 

debt collection practices relating to Verizon’s services and the outstanding payment 

of Plaintiff’s wireless bills. As in Raynor, the debt collection practices undertaken by 

Defendant arise, in part, from Plaintiff’s use of Verizon’s wireless services pursuant 

to the Customer Agreement. 

Given the broad language of the arbitration provision and the nature of 

Plaintiff’s claims, she has not met her burden of proving that the claims at issue are 

unsuitable for arbitration. Even if the connection between Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims 

and the Customer Agreement is attenuated, federal policy dictates that any doubt 

must be decided in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–

25. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the 

arbitration agreement. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and 

Stay Proceedings (doc. 23) is due to be granted. An Order consistent with this 

opinion will be entered contemporaneously herewith. 

DONE and ORDERED on March 4, 2020. 

_____________________________ 

L. Scott Coogler 

United States District Judge 

199455 

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