Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04150/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Ulllttcl States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BRAD BANGERTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

OREM CITY CORPORATION, 

a Utah Municipal Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

JAN 11 1995 

PATRICK FISHER -- Clerk 

No. 92-4150 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-224) 

Robert B. Denton, Legal Center for People with Disabilities, Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff/Appellant. 

Jody K. Burnett of Williams & Hunt, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Defendant/Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, McWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Brad Bangerter ("Bangerter"), a mentally 

disabled adult, alleges that zoning actions taken by DefendantAppellee, Orem City, Utah ("Orem"), violated the Fair Housing Act, 

Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 1 
codified as amended by the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 

( 11 FHAA 11 ) at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seg. In particular, Bangerter 

claims that conditions placed by Orem on zoning approval for a 

group home for the mentally retarded in which Bangerter lived, and 

the Utah statute and local ordinance pursuant to which those 

conditions were imposed, discriminated against Bangerter because 

of his handicap in violation of the FHAA. The district court 

dismissed Bangerter's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), 

and he now appeals. We hold that the district court prematurely 

dismissed this action and incorrectly applied an equal protection 

analysis to Bangerter's statutory claims under the FHAA. 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In late December 1989, Utah mental health officials 

discharged Bangerter from the Utah State Developmental Center to a 

group home in an Orem residential neighborhood zoned R-1-8, single 

family residential. Although technically designated as 11 single 

family,n Orem allows a number of uses in its R-1-8 zone category, 

including nurses' homes, foster family care homes, convents, 

monasteries, rectories, and, pursuant to state law, group homes 

for the elderly. Appellee Supp. App. at 15-16, 19-21. In 

addition, Orem allows group homes for the mentally or physically 

handicapped to be located in areas zoned R-1-8 provided that the 

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homes obtain a conditional use permit.1 Utah law expressly 

outlines special conditions that localities can impose on the 

granting of zoning permits for group homes for the handicapped. 

1 The record before us suggests that the conditions that 

Bangerter complains of (i.e. the 24-hour supervision and the 

citizen's advisory committee) are not conditions that could be 

imposed on at least some of these other multiple uses. Compare 

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-2.5 (2) & (3) (1953) with 

§ 10-9-2.6(2) (a) & (3) (1953). (We note that these statutes, 

while in effect during the events which gave rise to this lawsuit, 

have since been repealed and replaced by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-

601-604 and § 10-9-501-504 respectively. However, the new 

statutes largely resemble their predecessors.) Thus, the bare 

record before us suggests that group homes for the handicapped are 

treated differently in these regards from other group home uses in 

R-1-8 zones. 

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Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-2.5.2 The group home into which Bangerter 

2 Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-2.5 (1953) provides in relevant part: 

(2) Each municipality shall adopt ordinances which 

establish that a residential facility for handicapped 

persons is a permitted use in any area where residential 

dwellings are allowed, except an area zoned to permit 

exclusively single-family dwellings. Those ordinances 

shall establish a permit process which may require only 

that: 

(a)the facility meet all municipal building, 

safety, and health ordinances applicable to similar 

dwellings; 

(b) the operator of the facility provide assurances 

that the residents of the facility will be properly 

supervised on a 24-hour basis; 

(c) the operator of the facility establish a 

community advisory committee through which all 

complaints and concerns of neighbors may be 

addressed; 

(d) the operator of the facility provide adequate 

off-street parking space; 

(e) the facility be capable of use as a residential 

facility for handicapped persons without structural 

or landscaping alterations that would change the 

structure's residential character; 

(f) no residential facility for handicapped persons 

be established or maintained within three-quarter 

mile of another residential facility for 

handicapped persons; 

(g) no person being treated for alcoholism or drug 

abuse be placed in a residential facility for 

handicapped persons; 

(h) no person who is violent be placed in a 

residential facility for handicapped persons; and 

(i) placement in a residential facility for 

handicapped persons be on a strictly voluntary 

basis and not a part of, or in lieu of, 

confinement, rehabilitation, or treatment in a 

correctional facility. 

Upon application for a permit to establish a 

residential facility for handicapped persons in any area 

where residential dwellings are allowed, except an area 

zoned to permit exclusively single-family dwellings, a 

facility that conforms to ordinances adopted by the 

municipality pursuant to this subsection shall be 

granted a permit. 

The municipality may decide only whether the 

residential facility for handicapped persons conforms to 

those ordinances. If the municipality determines that 

the residential facility for handicapped persons is in 

(continued on next page) 

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was placed was established pursuant to a contract between the 

(continued from prior page) compliance with those ordinances, it shall grant the 

requested permit to that facility. 

If a municipality had not adopted ordinances in 

accordance with this subsection at the time an 

application for a permit to establish a residential 

facility for handicapped persons is made under the terms 

of this subsection, the municipality shall grant the 

permit if it is established that the criteria set forth 

in this subsection have been met by the facility. 

(3) Subject to the granting of a conditional use permit, 

a residential facility for handicapped persons shall be 

allowed in any municipal zoning district which is zoned 

to permit exclusively single-family dwelling use, if 

that facility: 

(a) conforms to all applicable health, safety, and 

building codes; 

(b) is capable of use as a residential facility for 

handicapped persons without structural or 

landscaping alterations that would change the 

structure's residential character; and 

(c) conforms to the municipality's criteria, 

adopted by ordinance, governing residential 

facilities for handicapped persons in areas zoned 

to permit exclusively single-family dwellings. 

A municipality may, by ordinance, provide that no 

residential facility for handicapped persons be 

established or maintained within three-quarters mile of 

another existing residential facility for handicapped 

persons. 

The use granted and permitted by this subsection is 

nontransferable and terminates if the structure is 

devoted to a use other than as a residential facility 

for handicapped persons or, if the structure fails to 

comply with applicable health, safety, and building 

codes. 

For purposes of this subsection, placement in a 

residential facility for handicapped persons shall be on 

a strictly voluntary basis and may not be a part of, or 

in lieu of confinement, rehabilitation, or treatment in 

a correctional institution. 

(4) Municipal ordinances shall prohibit 

discrimination against handicapped persons and against 

residential facilities for handicapped persons. The 

decision of a municipality regarding application for a 

permit by a residential facility for handicapped persons 

(continued on next page) 

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home's operator, RLO, Inc. ("RLO") ,3 and the Division of Services 

for People With Disabilities of the Utah State Department of Human 

(continued from prior page) 

must be based on legitimate land use criteria, and may 

not be based on the handicapping conditions of the 

facility's residents. 

As noted in footnote 1, this statute, has since been repealed and 

replaced by Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9.601-604. However, the new 

statute largely resembles its predecessor. 

3 RLO was purchased by Chrysalis Enterprises ("Chrysalis") in 

February 1991 and Chrysalis became the operator of the group home. 

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Services ("Division") .4 However, RLO had not obtained a 

conditional use permit, as required by an Orem ordinance 

4 The Division has authority to plan, develop, and manage 

services, including facilitating the least restrictive, most 

enabling residential environment, for mentally retarded persons. 

Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-5-103, 62A-5-102(2). Under Utah law, 

residential facilities for handicapped persons must conform "to 

all applicable standards and requirements of the Department of 

Social Services ("DSS"), and [are] operated by or operated under 

contract with the department." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-2.5(1) (b). 

Bangerter does not challenge the DSS's authority to regulate 

residential facilities for the handicapped. Therefore, we do not 

decide whether the DSS's criteria for group homes for the disabled 

violates the FHAA. 

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promulgated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-2.5,5 when Bangerter 

moved to the group home to live with three other mentally retarded 

men. At Orem's insistence, RLO subsequently applied for the 

permit, which the Orem City Council granted, subject to conditions 

permitted under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-2.5, after reviewing the 

application during public hearings held in February and March 

1990. 

In granting the permit on March 13, 1990, the Council imposed 

two conditions on the group home that Bangerter alleges violate 

the FHAA: 

[1] [the group home operator] had to ensure the City 

that the residents were properly supervised on a twenty-fourhour basis; [and] 

[2] [the group home operator] had to establish a 

community advisory committee through which all complaints and 

concerns of the neighbors could be addressed. 

Appellant App. at 7, Complaint 11 26.6 

5 Neither party included a copy of the Orem City ordinance for 

our review. Because § 10-9-2.5 allows municipalities to apply the 

provisions of the statute without having passed an ordinance 

adopting the statute's provisions, we review the conditions 

imposed on the group home in light of the statute. The parties 

assume that the Orem ordinance follows the Utah statute. We note 

that Bangerter is not challenging the Utah statute but rather is 

challenging only the Orem ordinance as applied to him. 

6 Bangerter's complaint lists a third condition that was 

imposed on the group home: that RLO certify to the City, from a 

state-licensed psychologist or board-certified psychologist or 

psychiatrist, that the residents of the home were not violent or a 

direct threat to the community. Whether this condition violates 

the FHAA is not before us, however, because its enforcement was 

held in abeyance pending a Department of Housing and Urban 

Development investigation into Orem's alleged violations of the 

FHAA, and there is no suggestion in the record that it was ever 

implemented. Appellant App. at 7-8, Complaint 11 27. 

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On March 15, 1991, Bangerter was transferred to a different 

group horne in Provo, and he has not since lived at the RLOChrysalis group horne in question in the instant action. Bangerter 

filed this action on March 13, 1992 in federal district court 

asking for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief based on 

the following two alleged causes of action: (1) that the 

conditions allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-2.5 and imposed by the 

Orern City Council in granting the conditional use permit were 

preempted by and in violation of the FHAA;7 and (2) that the 

conditional use permit application process violated the FHAA 

because the public hearings held by the Council subjected 

Bangerter to threats and disparaging personal remarks and required 

him and the other residents of the group horne unlike residents 

of a group horne without mental retardation -- to ask the City's 

permission to live together, Appellant App. at 11-12, Complaint 

,,,, 38-43.8 

In response to Bangerter's complaint, Orern filed a motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), and the court 

7 Specifically, Bangerter alleged that the conditions severely 

and intentionally discriminated against him because of his 

handicap, invaded his privacy, restricted his ability to enjoy an 

independent and normal living setting, restricted his ability to 

live in the residence of his choice because of his handicap, 

placed conditions on his living arrangement that are not imposed 

on non-handicapped persons, and did not comply with the reasonable 

accommodation provision of the FHAA. Appellant App. at 9-11, 

Complaint ,,,, 31-37. 

8 Bangerter also included a claim in his complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The court dismissed Bangerter's § 1983 claim due 

to his failure to allege underlying facts sufficient to support 

his conclusory charges and because Bangerter's counsel conceded 

that no constitutional violations had taken place. Bangerter, 797 

F. Supp. at 921-22. Bangerter does not appeal that decision. 

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dismissed both of Bangerter's causes of action. The court first 

addressed the issue of standing and concluded that Bangerter 

possessed standing to challenge the imposition of the 24-hour 

supervision requirement because Bangerter belongs to a protected 

class under the FHAA and alleged an actual injury in the form of 

the 24-hour supervision requirement's interference with his 

ability to live independently and his right of privacy. Bangerter 

v. Orem City Corp., 797 F. Supp. 918, 921 (D.Utah 1992). The 

court held that Bangerter lacked standing to challenge the 

imposition of the community advisory committee requirement, 

however, because that condition only affected the group home 

operator and did not present any threatened or actual injury to 

Bangerter. Id. 

On the merits, the court held that Bangerter alleged a prima 

facie case that Orem's housing ordinance violates the FHAA because 

it treats handicapped individuals differently from non-handicapped 

residents. Id. at 922.9 Nonetheless, the court concluded that 

the challenged ordinance and the 24-hour supervision requirement 

did not violate the FHAA because they were rationally related to 

the legitimate government interest of integrating the handicapped 

"into normal surroundings." Id. at 922-23.10 The court also held 

that Orem could not be held liable for any statements made at the 

9 The court characterized the differential treatment as a 

discriminatory "effect" and stated that Bangerter did not allege 

that Orem possessed a discriminatory motive in adopting the 

challenged ordinance. Bangerter, 797 F. Supp at 922. 

10 The court prefaced this ruling by concluding that the Fair 

Housing Act did not "preempt" state or local regulations, like 

those in Utah and Orem, that establish standards for facilities 

for the mentally ill. Bangerter, 797 F. Supp. at 922. 

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public hearings, and thus dismissed Bangerter's second cause of 

action. Id. at 923. 

Bangerter does not appeal the district court's dismissal of 

his second claim, and thus we do not address it on appeal. 

However, as to Bangerter's appeal of the court's dismissal of his 

first cause of action, we hold that the district court incorrectly 

evaluated the challenged conduct under the FHAA and impermissibly 

relied on factual findings in dismissing Bangerter's complaint. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We first address the issue of standing and then proceed to 

the merits of Bangerter's claims to assess whether Bangerter has 

stated a legally sufficient claim upon which relief could be 

granted. 

A. Standing 

Orem has not appealed the district court's finding that 

Bangerter had standing to bring this action with respect to the 

24-hour supervision requirement. Nevertheless, we must address 

the issue sua sponte because standing involves a constitutional 

limitation on a federal court's jurisdiction. Alexander v. 

Anheuser-Busch Cos .. Inc., 990 F.2d 536, 538 (lOth Cir. 1993). We 

also review the district court's ruling, which Bangerter did 

timely appeal, that Bangerter did not have standing to challenge 

the condition that RLO establish a neighborhood advisory 

committee. We further review Bangerter's somewhat oblique claim 

that he was injured by the conditional permitting scheme in 

general apart from the public hearings which Bangerter did not 

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challenge on appea1.11 We hold that Bangerter has adequately 

alleged standing to challenge the 24-hour supervision requirement 

and the neighborhood advisory committee requirement, but that he 

has not alleged standing to challenge the permitting process 

generally. On remand, the district court should conduct a factual 

inquiry to determine whether Bangerter can prove his allegations 

of personal injury. 

Standing under the Fair Housing Act extends "to the full 

limits of Art. III." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 

363, 372 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 

Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979)); Housing Authority of the 

Kaw Tribe of Indians v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183, 1193 

(lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1945 (1992). Courts 

thus lack authority to erect prudential barriers to restrict the 

standing of plaintiffs bringing suit under the FHAA beyond the 

constitutional parameters erected by Article III. Havens, 455 

U.S. at 372. The Constitution requires three elements for 

standing: (1) actual or threatened injury; (2) a causal 

connection to the conduct complained of; and (3) redressability of 

the injury by the requested relief. Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) .12 We review de novo the 

11 This third claimed injury was not directly addressed by the 

district court. 

12 Bangerter must also show actual or imminent personal injury 

to possess statutory standing under the FHAA. The FHAA vests 

"aggrieved persons" with a civil cause of action. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3613(a) (1) (A). An "aggrieved person" is defined as any person 

who "(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing 

practice; or {2) believes that such person will be injured by a 

discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur." 42 

(continued on next page) 

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district court's decision regarding Bangerter's standing under 

Article III. Hackford v. Babbit, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (lOth Cir. 

1994) . 

As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court 

correctly found that Bangerter, a mentally retarded adult, is 

within the class of persons protected by the FHAA. In amending 

the Fair Housing Act, or Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1968, in 1988, one of Congress's explicit motivations was to 

extend federal protections against housing discrimination to 

individuals with physical or mental handicaps. See 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 3602 & 3604. 

Furthermore, the FHAA's prohibitions clearly extend to 

discriminatory zoning practices. The House Committee Report 

accompanying the FHAA states that the FHAA "is intended to 

prohibit the application of special requirements through land-use 

regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or special use 

permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of [the 

handicapped] to live in the residence of their choice in the 

community." H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 24 

(1988). Prohibited practices include not only those that make the 

(continued from prior page) 

U.S.C. § 3602(i). After a claimant has established that he or she 

has been aggrieved, the FHAA provides that remedies for 

discriminatory housing practices include "actual and punitive 

damages, and subject to subsection (d) of this section [regarding 

bona fide transactions consummated without notice that a 

discrimination complaint has been filed] , . . . as the court deems 

appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary 

restraining order, or other order (including an order enjoining 

the defendant from engaging in such practice or ordering such 

affirmative action as may be appropriate)." 42 u.s.c. 

§ 3613 (c) (1). 

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sale or rental of housing unavailable, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f} (1),13 

but also those that impose discriminatory 

terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 

dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 

in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap 

of 

(A} that person; or 

(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in 

that dwelling after it is so sold or rented, or made 

available; or 

(C) any person associated with that person. 

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (2). Thus, Bangerter may bring suit under the 

FHAA to challenge the restrictions placed on the operation of his 

group horne even though the horne was issued a conditional use 

permit. 

Nevertheless, Bangerter must still allege specific personal 

injuries resulting from Orern's purportedly discriminatory housing 

practices to have standing to bring this action under Article III 

and under the FHAA. We look to his complaint to assess whether he 

has asserted a redressable injury. It is important to note that 

because Bangerter no longer lives in the group horne and did not 

when he brought this lawsuit -- and because he does not allege a 

likelihood of moving back into the horne, the only relief available 

13 Section 3604(f) (1) states that it shall be unlawful: 

[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise 

make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or 

renter because of a handicap of -- (A) that buyer or renter; 

(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in 

that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made 

available; or 

(C) any person associated with that buyer or 

renter. 

42 u.s.c. § 3604 (f) (1). 

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to him is money damages for the past harm that he has suffered.14 

As to that past harm, Bangerter alleges several injuries. 

First, Bangerter alleges that the 24-hour supervision 

requirement imposed by Orern on his group horne constituted 

intentional discrimination against mentally handicapped persons, 

invaded his privacy, restricted his ability to enjoy an 

independent and normal living setting, and restricted his ability 

to live in the residence of his choice in a manner to which others 

without disabilities are not subjected, all in violation of his 

rights under the FHAA. Appellant App. at 9-11, Complaint ,,,, 31-

37. We conclude that these allegations sufficiently state a 

concrete personal injury so as to satisfy the standing 

requirements of Article III. However, at the motion to dismiss 

stage, we do not know to what extent or in what manner Orern 

imposed the 24-hour supervision requirement. Therefore, we 

express no opinion on the ability of Bangerter to prove the 

existence of the alleged injuries; that question is properly 

reserved for the district court on remand. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 

115 n.31 ("Although standing generally is a matter dealt with at 

the earliest stages of litigation, . . . it sometimes remains to 

be seen whether the factual allegations of the complaint necessary 

for standing will be supported adequately by the evidence adduced 

at trial."). 

14 It is well settled that declaratory and injunctive relief -- both requested in this case -- are inappropriate where there is no 

allegation that the plaintiff will confront the challenged conduct 

again in the future. Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (lOth Cir. 

1991) . 

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Second, Bangerter alleges that he was injured by Orem's 

condition that RLO establish a community advisory committee 

through which all complaints and concerns of the neighbors could 

be addressed. It is unclear exactly how this requirement injured 

Bangerter, because the requirement was imposed on the operator of 

the group home and not on the residents of the home -- a point 

highlighted by the district court. Unlike the 24-hour supervision 

requirement, for example, the citizen's committee would not seem 

to restrict directly Bangerter's lifestyle as a resident of the 

group home. On appeal, Bangerter claims that the committee would 

likely talk about Bangerter's personal affairs, intrude on his 

privacy, stigmatize him, and isolate him in the community. 

However, neither on appeal nor in his complaint has Bangerter 

explicitly alleged that the committee was formed while he lived in 

the home, actually talked about him, or caused or threatened to 

cause any of these injuries in fact. Nevertheless, because 

Bangerter has alleged that this provision has "severely restricted 

[his] ability ... to enjoy an independent and normal living 

setting, and. invaded his privacy," Appellant App. at 9, 

Complaint at ,, 33, we cannot conclude that he has failed to plead 

a legally cognizable injury. However, whether Bangerter can 

actually demonstrate the existence of this injury is an entirely 

different matter. It is not self-evident that a citizens advisory 

committee, even if one had been formed and did render input, 

necessarily would cause Bangerter the kind of concrete, 

demonstrable injury that would sustain standing for him to 

complain under the FHAA. On remand the district court should 

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carefully evaluate whether Bangerter can show that he was injured 

in a personal and concrete way by the committee. 

Finally, Bangerter claims injury from having to go through 

the process of obtaining a conditional use permit. This claim is 

not based on any statements made at the public hearings, which the 

district court held could not be the basis of liability for Orem 

-- a ruling which Bangerter did not appeal. Furthermore, 

Bangerter alleges no tangible injury to himself from Orem's 

permitting process, and he cannot merely allege a general injury 

suffered by RLO as a result of this process. (It should be kept 

in mind that RLO and not Bangerter obtained the permit.) 

Moreover, the permitting process did not keep Bangerter from 

obtaining housing since the permit was issued, and Bangerter has 

not alleged that the requirement that RLO obtain a conditional use 

permit significantly delayed his housing or increased the price of 

that housing. Thus, Bangerter is left arguing that the mere fact 

that RLO had to go through a special permitting process somehow 

invaded his rights. This is insufficient to allege any personal 

injury from the general permitting process, and Bangerter thus 

fails to state sufficient allegations to maintain standing to 

bring that claim. 

Having concluded that Bangerter adequately alleged standing 

to challenge the 24-hour supervision requirement and the citizen's 

committee requirement, we proceed to address the merits of those 

claims. Because we have held that Bangerter did not allege a 

discrete personal injury related to his generalized attack on the 

requirement that a permit is required for handicapped group 

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housing, we do not rule on the validity of Orem's general 

permitting scheme. 

B. The Merits 

Bangerter attempts to show that Orem has violated the FHAA by 

intentionally discriminating against him as a handicapped person, 

taking actions that produced discriminatory effects against him, 

and failing to provide reasonable accommodations in its zoning 

policies. The district court stated that Bangerter did not allege 

that Orem acted with a discriminatory motive, and thus could not 

state a claim for discriminatory intent.15 Bangerter, 797 F. Supp 

15 Before reaching the substance of Bangerter's claims, the 

district court analyzed whether the FHAA preempted state and local 

regulation of group homes for the handicapped. The court 

concluded that the FHAA does not preempt the Utah statute at issue 

because "Congress did not intend to abrogate a state's power to 

determine how facilities for the mentally ill must meet licensing 

standards." Bangerter, 797 F. Supp. at 922 (quoting Familystyle 

of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul. Minn., 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 

1991)). The court was certainly correct in concluding that the 

FHAA does not completely preempt all state and local regulation of 

housing for the disabled. However, the Utah statute and Orem 

ordinance are preempted to the extent that they violate the Fair 

Housing Act. See Home Mortgage Bank v. Ryan, 986 F.2d 372, 375 

(lOth Cir. 1993). The FHAA expressly provides that: 

[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to 

invalidate or limit any law of a State or political 

subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in 

which this subchapter shall be effective, that grants, 

guarantees, or protects the same rights as are granted 

by this subchapter; but any law of a State, a political 

subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to 

require or permit any action that would be a 

discriminatory housing practice under this subchapter 

shall to that extent be invalid. 

42 U.S.C. § 3615. Thus, the law of a state or municipality is 

expressly preempted by the Fair Housing Act if it is a 

"discriminatory housing practice" under the Act. See Potomac 

Group Home v. Montgomery County, Md., 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1299 

(D.Md. 1993). As such, the question of whether the Orem 

provisions challenged in this action are preempted by federal law 

(continued on next page) 

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at 922-23. The court concluded that Bangerter made out a prima 

facie case of discrimination because the challenged statute and 

ordinance treat the handicapped differently on their face. Id. at 

922. Nonetheless, the court concluded that no cause of action 

could be stated against Orem based on its permitting ordinance 

because the permitting process was rationally related to the 

legitimate governmental interest of ensuring integrated housing 

for the disabled. Id. at 922-23. However, this conclusion must 

have been based on the district court's own perceptions of 

evidence outside of the record. Nothing in Bangerter's complaint 

would warrant such a factual conclusion, which, of necessity, 

requires a balancing analysis involving evidence yet to be 

presented by Orem. Thus, even if the district court applied the 

correct legal standard, we would have to reverse, because the 

court improperly went beyond the pleadings in granting the motion 

to dismiss. However, we also conclude that the district court 

utilized the wrong legal standard in applying the FHAA, and that 

also requires us to reverse and remand for reconsideration under 

the proper standard. 

We first consider the nature of Bangerter's claims under the 

FHAA and conclude that Bangerter's action should be construed only 

as one for intentional discrimination. Next we outline the 

elements of an intentional discrimination claim and hold that 

Bangerter has made allegations sufficient to state a claim of 

(continued from prior page) 

does not guide our inquiry as it does not present a distinct issue 

from whether Bangerter has stated a valid claim that Orem has 

violated the FHAA. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 19 
intentional discrimination under the FHAA and to withstand a 

motion to dismiss. Finally, we outline the legal standard the 

district court should apply to review Bangerter's claims and 

Orem's possible defenses on remand. 

1. Characterization of the Claim as One for 

Intentional Discrimination 

We hold, contrary to the district court, that Bangerter's 

claims are properly characterized as claims of intentional 

discrimination and should be analyzed in the established framework 

for such claims. Here, the Act and the Orem ordinance facially 

single out the handicapped and apply different rules to them. 

Thus, the discriminatory intent and purpose of the Act and 

Ordinance are apparent on their face. Whether such discrimination 

is legal or illegal remains to be determined, but there can be no 

doubt that the Act and Ordinance are discriminatory.16 As the 

Supreme Court has stated in the Title VII context, "Whether an 

employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit 

facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer 

discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the 

discrimination." International Union. United Auto .. Aerospace & 

Agric. Implement Workers v. Johnson Controls. Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 

199 (1991). Moreover, "the absence of a malevolent motive does 

not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy 

16 There is no need to probe for a potentially discriminatory 

motive circumstantially, or to apply the burden-shifting approach 

outlined in McDonnell Douglas Co£Q. v. Green, 411 u.s. 792 (1973), 

as the statute discriminates on its face by allowing conditions to 

be imposed on group housing for the handicapped which would not be 

permitted for non-handicapped group housing. See Reidt v. County 

of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining 

this distinction as to Title VII actions) . 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 20 
with a discriminatory effect." Id. Specifically with regard to 

housing discrimination, a plaintiff need not prove the malice or 

discriminatory animus of a defendant to make out a case of 

intentional discrimination where the defendant expressly treats 

someone protected by the FHAA in a different manner than others. 

See Potomac Group Home, 823 F. Supp at 1295 ("To prove 

discriminatory intent, a plaintiff need only show that the 

handicap of the potential residents [of a group home] . . . was in 

some part the basis for the policy being challenged.") (quotation 

omitted); Horizon House Dev. Servs .. Inc. v. Township of Upper 

Southampton, 804 F. Supp 683, 694, 696 (W.D.Pa. 1992), aff'd, 995 

F.2d 217 (1993); Stewart B. McKinney Found .. Inc. v. Town Plan and 

Zoning Comm'n of Fairfield, 790 F. Supp 1197, 1211 (D.Conn. 

1992) .17 Thus, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of 

intentional discrimination under the FHAA merely by showing that a 

protected group has been subjected to explicitly differential --

i.e. discriminatory -- treatment. 

In applying a discriminatory intent analysis to this case, we 

do not imply that FHAA claims cannot also be based on the 

discriminatory effect of a facially neutral policy. It is widely 

accepted that an FHAA violation can be demonstrated by either 

17 That is not to say that a government can never justify any 

intentional differential treatment of the handicapped. Some 

differential treatment may be objectively legitimate. In the 

Title VII context, for example, facially discriminatory treatment 

is permitted if it represents a bona fide occupational 

qualification ("BFOQ"} that is reasonably necessary to an 

employer's operations. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2{e); Johnson Controls, 

499 u.s. at 200-01. We address the issue of potential 

justifications for discriminatory treatment under the Fair Housing 

Act below. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 21 
disparate treatment or disparate impact. See, e.g., Doe v. City 

of Butler. Pa., 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989); Huntington 

Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d 

Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam); Resident Advisory 

Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 

435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of 

Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack. 

Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 

u.s. 1042 (1975). We also do not suggest that the differential 

treatment in this case has not caused a "disparate impact" on the 

handicapped in an everyday sense -- as probably all intentional 

discriminatory treatment does. However, the legal framework for 

discriminatory effects, or disparate impact, claims remains 

inappropriate for this case. "A disparate impact analysis 

examines a facially-neutral policy or practice, such as a hiring 

test or zoning law, for its differential impact or effect on a 

particular group. Disparate treatment analysis, on the other 

hand, involves differential treatment of similarly situated 

persons or groups." Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 933 (internal 

citations omitted); see also Reidt, 975 F.2d at 1340 (explaining 

the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact 

cases in the Title VII context) . Because Bangerter challenges 

facially discriminatory actions and not the effects of facially 

neutral actions, we conclude that his claim is one of disparate 

treatment and not disparate impact. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 22 
We also conclude that Bangerter has not stated a valid claim 

that Orem's refusal to waive the 24-hour supervision and community 

advisory committee requirements constitutes a refusal by Orem to 

make a reasonable accommodation for the handicapped in its zoning 

policies. Under the FHAA, discrimination on the basis of handicap 

includes a "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, 

policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be 

necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy 

a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (3). However, the thrust of a 

reasonable accommodation claim is that a defendant must make an 

affirmative change in an otherwise valid law or policy. By one 

court's definition, a "reasonable accommodation" involves 

"changing some rule that is generally applicable so as to make its 

burden less onerous on the handicapped individual." Oxford House, 

Inc. v. Township of Cher~ Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 462 n.25 

(D.N.J. 1992). Here, Bangerter does not challenge an ordinance 

that is generally applicable, since it is specifically directed at 

group homes for the handicapped. Under these facts, we conclude 

that the claim for "reasonable accommodation" is simply 

inappropriate and the district court correctly dismissed that 

claim. 

2. Dismissal Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) 

Applying a discriminatory treatment framework, we hold that 

the district court improperly dismissed Bangerter's action. A 

court faced with a 12(b) (6) motion must "accept all the wellpleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Williams v. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 23 
Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (lOth Cir. 1991). Because "[g) ranting 

defendant's motion to dismiss is a harsh remedy which must be 

cautiously studied ... to protect the interests of justice," 

Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (lOth Cir. 1986), a 

court should grant such a motion "only if it appears beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 

claim that would entitle him to relief." Grider v. Texas Oil & 

Gas Co~., 868 F.2d 1147, 1148 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 493 u.s. 

820 (1989). We review de novo a district court's dismissal for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Morgan, 792 F.2d at 978. 

We agree with the district court's initial conclusion that 

Bangerter made out a prima facie case of discrimination under the 

FHAA. Bangerter, 797 F. Supp. at 922. "The ultimate question in 

a disparate treatment case is whether the defendant intentionally 

discriminated against plaintiff." Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 

1088 (lOth Cir. 1993). Here, the imposition of special conditions 

on the permit granted for Bangerter's group home, and the 

ordinance and statute pursuant to which the conditions were 

authorized, expressly apply only to group homes for the 

handicapped. In particular, it was alleged that the 24-hour 

supervision condition regulated the lives of Bangerter and the 

other handicapped residents of the group horne in a way not 

suffered by non-handicapped residents of other group homes. Thus, 

Bangerter's complaint states a direct claim of facially 

discriminatory treatment of handicapped persons. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 24 
Nonetheless, the district court dismissed Bangerter's action 

because the court concluded that the challenged restrictions were 

"rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." 

Bangerter, 797 F. Supp. at 922 (quotations omitted). However, 

there was no basis in this record to conclude -- at least not on a 

12 (b) (6) motion what legitimate government purposes were 

involved or how these restrictions related to those purposes. 

Orem's justifications for its actions certainly cannot be found 

within the confines of Bangerter's complaint. Focussing solely on 

Bangerter's pleadings, we conclude that Bangerter states a legally 

sufficient claim of discrimination under the FHAA and reverse the 

district court's dismissal. 

3. Issues for Remand 

On remand, Bangerter will have to introduce evidence to 

support his allegations of discrimination. Besides proving 

sufficient concrete personal injury to maintain standing, 

Bangerter must support his basic claim that his group home was 

subjected to conditions not imposed on other group homes in Orem 

that were permitted in areas zoned R-1-8 for single family 

residences. If Bangerter cannot show that group homes for the 

non-handicapped are permitted in Orem without requirements like 

the 24-hour supervision or neighborhood advisory committee 

requirements, he will have failed to show that he has suffered 

differential treatment when compared to a similarly situated 

group, and his claims will fail under the FHAA.18 

18 The "reasonable accommodation" provision of § 3604(f) (3) 

provides an additional definition of discrimination that does not 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 25 
In addition, on remand the district court will have to 

consider Orem's justifications for its discriminatory treatment of 

Bangerter and its proffered reasons for imposing the challenged 

conditions. At least two potential justifications seem relevant 

for inquiry here: (1) public safety; and (2) benign 

discrimination.19 However, first we address the district court's 

use of the rational relationship test to review Orem's challenged 

actions. 

The district court analyzed Orem's actions pursuant to the 

rational relationship test borrowed from Equal Protection Clause 

jurisprudence, and the court stated that the challenged 

restrictions should be upheld if "rationally related to a 

legitimate governmental purpose." Bangerter, 797 F. Supp at 922 

(quoting Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 94). The district court relied 

principally on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Familystyle, which 

held that government policies that discriminate against the 

handicapped should not receive heightened scrutiny because the 

handicapped are not a "suspect class." 923 F.2d at 94 (citing 

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 

(1975)). However, the use of an Equal Protection analysis is 

(continued from prior page) 

require proof of differential treatment, but as noted previously 

in this opinion, the facts of this case do not raise a "reasonable 

acconunodation" claim. 

19 Because of the preliminary record, we do not preclude the 

possibility that additional justifications for Orem's actions 

might be developed once evidence is taken. Further, as observed 

previously, this action does not present any challenge to the 

criteria established for group homes for the disabled by the Utah 

Department of Social Services, and thus we do not address that 

matter in this opinion. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 26 
misplaced here because this case involves a federal statute and 

not the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Tenth Circuit has said, a 

plaintiff's 11 inability to properly assert a right under the 

Fourteenth Amendment is not of concern when examining [the 

plaintiff's] claims brought pursuant to the Fair Housing Act. 11 

Ponca City, 952 F.2d at 1193. Moreover, the FHAA specifically 

makes the handicapped a protected class for purposes of a 

statutory claim -- they are the direct object of the statutory 

protection -- even if they are not a protected class for 

constitutional purposes.20 

The proper approach is to look to the language of the FHAA 

itself, and to the manner in which analogous provisions of Title 

VII have been interpreted, in order to determine what 

justifications are available to sustain intentional discrimination 

against the handicapped. First, the FHAA expressly allows 

discrimination rooted in public safety concerns when it provides 

that 11 [n]othing in this subsection requires that a dwelling be 

made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a 

direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or 

whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the 

property of others. 11 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (9). We read section 

3604(f) (9) as permitting reasonable restrictions on the terms or 

20 Moreover, even if this case had been brought as an equal 

protection claim, there is no evidence that the zoning 

restrictions were rationally related to legitimate government 

concerns and not based on unsubstantiated fears or irrational 

prejudices. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-49. Under the analysis in 

Cleburne, Orem would fail the rational relationship test on this 

state of the record even if an equal protection analysis were 

used. 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 27 
conditions of housing when justified by public safety concerns, 

given that housing can be denied altogether for those same 

reasons. However, the exceptions to the FHAA's prohibitions on 

discrimination should be narrowly construed. Elliott v. City of 

Athens, Ga., 960 F.2d 975, 978-79 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 

S. Ct. 376 (1992). 

Restrictions predicated on public safety cannot be based on 

blanket stereotypes about the handicapped, but must be tailored to 

particularized concerns about individual residents. As the FHAA's 

legislative history declares, the FHAA "repudiates the use of 

stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons with 

handicaps be considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions 

about disabilities and unfounded speculations about threats to 

safety are specifically rejected as grounds to justify exclusion." 

H.R. Rep. No. 100-711 at 18. Any special requirements placed on 

housing for the handicapped based on concerns for the protection 

of the disabled themselves or the community must be 

"individualiz[ed] ... to the needs or abilities of particular 

kinds of developmental disabilities," Mabrunak, Inc. v. City of 

Stow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir. 1992), and must have a 

"necessary correlation to the actual abilities of the persons upon 

whom it is imposed," Potomac Group Home, 823 F. Supp. at 1300. 

Here, there is no showing that the Orem restrictions were 

individualized to the residents of the RLO-Chrysalis home. For 

example, there is no evidence or pleadings here to support a 

conclusion that the residents of this particular home were so 

mentally disabled that they needed 24-hour supervision or that 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 28 
they had any tendencies that would support the need for a 

neighborhood advisory committee.21 However, on remand the court 

should explore the public safety aspect of these requirements. 

For example, the supervision requirement was simply that the 

operator had to ensure Orem that the residents were "properly 

supervised on a twenty-four hour basis." We cannot tell on this 

record whether that required on-site supervision the entire time, 

or whether off-site supervision might have been used to some 

extent, and we cannot tell the nature of the supervision or how 

oppressive or benign it might have been. Thus, we cannot 

determine whether this restriction could be justified under 

§ 3604(f) (9) without more facts in this record. 

Second, the FHAA should not be interpreted to preclude 

special restrictions upon the disabled that are really beneficial 

to, rather than discriminatory against, the handicapped.22 In 

this regard we are guided by employment discrimination cases and 

Title VII jurisprudence to inform our reading of the Fair Housing 

Act. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1088; Morgan v. HUD, 985 F.2d 1451, 1456 

n.4 (lOth Cir. 1993); Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 934-

35. 

In the employment discrimination context, the Supreme Court 

has held that Title VII's bar on all discrimination on the basis 

of race should not be read literally. United Steelworkers of 

21 We do note, however, that one individual in the RLO-Chrysalis 

home had been previously incarcerated for a notorious crime in 

Orem. 

22 Section 3604(f) (2), for example, only makes it illegal "to 

discriminate against any [handicapped persons]." (emphasis 

added) . 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 29 
America. AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-08 (1979). 

Instead, the statute should be interpreted "against the background 

of the legislative history of Title VII and the historical context 

from which the Act arose," id. at 201, and should not be construed 

to prohibit race-conscious affirmative action that promotes "the 

ultimate statutory goals" of expanding employment opportunities 

for minorities, id. at 203, 207. 

The underlying objective of the FHAA is to "extend[] the 

principle of equal housing opportunity to handicapped persons," 

H.R. Rep. No. 100-711 at 13, and end discrimination against the 

handicapped in the provision of housing based on prejudice, 

stereotypes, and ignorance, id. at 18. Removing discrimination in 

housing promotes "the goal of independent living" and is part of 

Congress's larger "commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of 

persons with handicaps from the American mainstream." Id. 

We should be chary about accepting the justification that a 

particular restriction upon the handicapped really advances their 

housing opportunities rather than discriminates against them in 

housing. Restrictions that are based upon unsupported stereotypes 

or upon prejudice and fear stemming from ignorance or 

generalizations, for example, would not pass muster. However, 

restrictions that are narrowly tailored to the particular 

individuals affected could be acceptable under the FHAA if the 

benefit to the handicapped in their housing opportunities clearly 

outweigh whatever burden may result to them. In the context of 

facially neutral government actions that have a discriminatory 

impact on the handicapped or other groups protected by the Fair 

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Housing Act, courts have uniformly allowed defendants to justify 

their conduct despite the discriminatory impact if they can prove 

that they "furthered, in theory and in practice, a legitimate, 

bona fide governmental interest and that no alternative would 

serve that interest with less discriminatory effect." Huntington 

Branch. NAACP, 844 F.2d at 936 (citing Resident Advisory Bd., 564 

F.2d at 148-49). 

A similar approach has been suggested in the context of 

intentional race-based discrimination under the FHAA. For 

example, in South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. 

of Realtors, the Seventh Circuit upheld selective marketing 

activities designed to interest white buyers in purchasing houses 

in traditionally black neighborhoods, even though such efforts of 

necessity diminished the likelihood that such homes would be 

available for black buyers. 935 F.2d 868, 882-84 (7th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992). In Otero v. New York City 

Hous. Auth., the Second Circuit allowed a housing authority to 

seek to justify under Title VIII a change in leasing policy in 

order to facilitate white participation in a housing project that 

was otherwise faced with the prospect of becoming predominantly 

black and segregated. 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973) 

("Congress' desire in providing fair housing throughout the United 

States was ... to promote open, integrated housing, even though 

the effect in some instances might be to prevent some members of a 

racial minority from residing in publicly assisted housing in a 

particular location."). Even those courts that have invalidated 

particular race-conscious policies have left some room for other 

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Appellate Case: 92-4150 Document: 01019290283 Date Filed: 01/11/1995 Page: 31 
policies that restrict minorities in limited ways in order to 

foster integration and the overarching policies of the Fair 

Housing Act. In United States v. Starrett City Assocs., for 

example, the Second Circuit acknowledged that race-conscious plans 

burdening a minority might be upheld if they are temporary, 

flexible in nature, and designed ultimately to achieve the FHAA's 

goal of integration. 840 F.2d 1096, 1101-03 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988). Similarly, in United States v. 

Charlottesville Redev. and Hous. Auth., the court explained that 

"[a] race-conscious preferential policy could survive legal 

scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored, remedial in character, and 

temporary in duration." 718 F. Supp. 461, 469 (W.D.Va. 1989). 

These courts all recognize the importance of leaving room for 

flexible solutions to address the complex problem of 

discrimination and to realize the goals established by Congress in 

the Fair Housing Act. However, once again, such an analysis 

cannot be performed on the pleadings alone. For example, with 

regard to the neighborhood advisory committee, it would be helpful 

for the court to explore how such a committee operated, what 

burdens it imposed upon the handicapped residents of the RLOChrysalis home, what benefits such a comnittee provided to the 

handicapped residents, and what the motivations and intentions 

were of the City of Orem in imposing such a restriction.23 It 

could be that the evidence will show that such a neighborhood 

23 We do not suggest that Bangerter must prove that Orem acted 

with bad animus to make out a case of intentional discrimination. 

Nevertheless, a limited inquiry into Orem's intentions might shed 

light on whether the justifications offered for its actions are 

bona fide. 

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advisory committee might prove to be beneficial to the 

handicapped, increasing their access to, and acceptability in, the 

neighborhood.24 Only after a record has been developed can the 

district court, and ultimately our Court, determine whether these 

restrictions violate of the FHAA. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, we REVERSE and REMAND to the 

district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

24 We note that the Utah statute under which Orem's ordinance is 

authorized does attempt to guide municipalities and limit 

regulation of housing for the handicapped. The statute 

affirmatively prohibits basing zoning decisions regarding housing 

for the handicapped on illegitimate criteria. Utah Code Ann. 

§ 10-9-2.5(4). It also applies only to those persons who need 

special services or assistance "to allow the person to function in 

and contribute to, a residential neighborhood." Utah Code Ann. 

§ 10-9-2.5 (1) (a). 

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