Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00740/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00740-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARTHUR DAVID AHMED, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 05-00740-CG-B

RALPH HOOKS, et al., :

Respondent. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Arthur David Ahmed, a state prisoner currently in the custody

 of Respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The petition has

been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a report and

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 8

(b)(1). The undersigned has conducted a careful review of the

record and finds that no evidentiary hearing is required to resolve

this case. Following a complete review of this action, the

undersigned recommends that the petition should be dismissed as

barred by the statute of limitations. 

On November 1, 1972, Petitioner pled guilty to burglary,

possession of marijuana, possession of methadone, possession of

chloral hydrate, and possession of barbituates, and received

concurrent sentences of three years imprisonment for each

conviction. (Doc. 1). Petitioner did not appeal his convictions.

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On November 25, 2002, Petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition in

the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama. The petition was

denied on April 18, 2003 (Doc. 7-2), and Petitioner appealed. The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s

decision, finding that Petitioner’s claims were non-jurisdictional

and thus precluded by the statute of limitation and other procedural

bars contained in Rule 32.2 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure. (Doc. 7-2). The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the

petition for writ of certiorari, and on August 15, 2003, the court

of criminal appeals issued a certificate of judgment. (Doc. 7-3).

Petitioner filed a second Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court

of Mobile County, Alabama, on October 15, 2003, and a third Rule 32

petition on June 30, 2004. The circuit court denied both petitions.

Petitioner then appealed the circuit court’s decision as to his

third petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. (Doc. 7-5).

Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus relief on

December 27, 2005. (Doc. 1). For the reasons set forth herein, the

undersigned recommends that the petition be dismissed as barred by

the one-year statute of limitations.

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by the April 24,

1996, enactment of The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996, § 101(Supp. II 1997) (“AEDPA”), a state prisoner

seeking a federal habeas corpus remedy must file his federal

petition within one year of the "conclusion of direct review or the

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expiration of the time for seeking such review". The Act provides

that: 

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgement of a State court. The limitations period shall run from

the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)

For individuals convicted prior to the enactment of the AEDPA,

the statute of limitations is considered to run from the Act's

effective date of April 24, 1996. Drew v. Department of Corrections,

297 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). Calculated this way, AEDPA’s

one-year statute of limitations expired on April 23, 1997, for

habeas petitions filed by those inmates convicted prior to AEDPA’s

enactment date. Id. Because Petitioner’s conviction became final

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prior to enactment of the AEDPA, his petition for habeas corpus

relief should have been filed no later than April 23, 1997.

Petitioner, however, filed his habeas petition on December 20,

2005, approximately eight years after expiration of the statutory

deadline. Thus, unless Petitioner can demonstrate that he has

triggered the tolling provisions of the AEDPA, Petitioner’s habeas

petition must be dismissed as untimely.

§ 2244(d)(2) of the AEDPA provides for the tolling of the

limitations period pending state court review of a properly filed

application for post-conviction relief. See In Re Hill, 437 F.3d

1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006). A state court filing initiated after

the federal habeas deadline, however, does not revive the deadline.

Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004)(While a

properly filed application for post-conviction relief tolls the

statute of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of

limitations once the limitations period has expired.)Id.

Petitioner filed his first application for post-conviction

relief in 2002, his second application in 2003, and his third

application in 2004. While the limitations period may have been

tolled if Petitioner had filed any of his post-conviction relief

applications prior to the April 23, 1997, expiration of the

limitations period, all of Petitioner’s Rule 32 petitions were filed

after the time for filing a habeas petition had expired. A properly

filed application for post-conviction relief can toll the statute

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of limitations, but cannot reset or restart the statute of

limitations once the limitations period has expired. Sibley, supra.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s applications for post-conviction relief

did not toll the habeas limitations period, as they were filed after

expiration of the limitations period. 

Before recommending dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for

habeas relief as untimely, the undersigned must determine whether

Petitioner has pled extraordinary circumstances which require a

contrary conclusion. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that: 

Section 2244 is a statute of limitations, not a

jurisdictional bar. Therefore, it permits equitable

tolling “when a movant untimely files because of

extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his

control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik v.

United States, 177 F.3d 1269[, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999)].

Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is

typically applied sparingly. See Irwin v. Dept. Of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112

L.Ed.2d 435 (1990).

Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). See also

Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616,

618-19 (3rd Cir. 1998)(“equitable tolling is proper only when the

‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a

limitation period] unfair.’... [g]enerally, this will occur when

the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way...been prevented from

asserting his or her rights.’...[t]he petitioner must show that he

or she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and

bringing [the] claims.’... [m]ere excusable neglect is not

sufficient.”). Moreover, in the Eleventh Circuit, as a general

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Petitioner’s Motion for Permission to File Default Judgment (Doc. 9) is

DENIED as Respondent’s Answer was timely filed (Doc. 7).

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rule, “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard applied in this

circuit focuses on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of

the federal habeas petition, rather than the circumstances

surrounding the underlying conviction.” Helton v. Secretary of

Dept. of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,

535 U.S. 1080, 122 S.Ct. 1965 (2002); Drew v. Department of

Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2002).

In Petitioner’s Traverse to the Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 8),

Petitioner admits that his habeas petition is untimely but contends

that the petition should not be dismissed because it contains

jurisdictional claims that can be raised at any time. Petitioner’s

response merely reasserts arguments repeatedly rejected by the

Alabama state courts. It does not provide any explanation of the

reason for the untimely filing of Petitioner’s habeas petition, nor

does it provide any support for the equitable tolling of the AEDPA

limitations period. Where Respondent has asserted the defense of

statute of limitations and Petitioner has failed to meet his burden

of establishing extraordinary circumstances which would justify the

equitable tolling of § 2244's one year statute of limitations, the

undersigned must recommend that this case be dismissed as timebarred1.

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III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, it is the opinion of the

Magistrate Judge that Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief

be DENIED. It is so recommended.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to this recommendation. 

DONE this 17th day of July 2006. 

/S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on

appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a

“Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is

established by order. The statement of objection shall

specify those portions of the recommendation to which

objection is made and the basis for the objection. The

objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at

the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth

the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different

disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a

copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate

judge, although a copy of the original brief may be

submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief

in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief

in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment

of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate

judge finds that the tapes and original records in this action are

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adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to

this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is

advised that a judicial determination that transcription is

necessary is required before the United States will pay the cost of

the transcript.

/S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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