Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02277/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN R. ZIMMER, Civil No. 08cv2277 BTM (NLS) 

 Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. No. 1]

vs.

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, WARDEN,

 Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Steven Richard Zimmer is a California prisoner serving a 26 years to life term for firstdegree murder committed in 1984. Zimmer has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the Board of Parole Hearings’ (“Board”) June 21, 2007

parole denial. Zimmer’s Petition puts forth three grounds for habeas relief regarding alleged

violations of his due process rights. Zimmer alleges that the Board’s decision to deny him parole

violates his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because (1) the Board relied on irrelevant

and unreliable pre and post-conviction evidence, as well as the circumstances of his commitment

offense, to determine that he poses a current danger to society and is thus unsuitable for parole; (2)

the Board failed to set a release date; and (3) the Board’s parole denial decision relied, in part, on

Zimmer’s failure to fully avail himself of rehabilitative programming. 

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Respondent asserts that Zimmer has neither shown that the state courts unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law, nor shown that the state court decisions were based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, Respondent requests that this court deny

Zimmer’s Petition.

This Court has reviewed the Petition (“Pet.”), Respondent’s Answer, the Reply to the

Answer, the Supplemental Brief, the Reply to the Supplemental Brief, and all supporting

documents. After a thorough review of the record, the Court concludes Zimmer is not entitled to

the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 15, 1984, Zimmer shot and killed John Cassanelli over a drug debt. (Pet. 

Appendix 1 at 1.) In 1985, the trial court convicted Zimmer of first-degree murder and sentenced

him to 16 years to life. (Pet. at 2.)

On June 21, 2007, the Board found Zimmer unsuitable for parole following a parole

consideration hearing. (Pet. Appendix 1 at 1.) In articulating its reason for denial, the Board

identified the circumstances of the 1984 murder, Zimmer’s non-violent prior offenses, his

extensive history as a drug dealer, his failure to participate in any self-help programming, and a

negative psychological report. (Id. at 2.) The Board determined that Zimmer posed a current

threat to public safety because of the cruel and callous nature of the commitment offense coupled

with numerous negative pre and post-incarceration factors. (Id. at 1-3.) Also, the Board denied

Zimmer parole for two years because of the commitment offense, Zimmer’s need for further selfhelp programming, and his negative psychological report. (Id. at 2.)

Following the Board’s denial, Zimmer filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the

Superior Court of California on February 13, 2008. (Id. at 1.) The Superior Court concluded that

the Board properly relied on the factual circumstances of the 1984 murder, as well as the

numerous, negative pre and post-conviction factors, to satisfy the “some evidence” standard

required to deny parole. (Id.) Subsequently, on July 15, 2008, the California Court of Appeal,

Second District, denied Zimmer’s petition without comment. (Pet. Appendix 2 at 1.) On

September 17, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied review of Zimmer’s petition. (Pet.

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Appendix 3 at 1.)

On December 8, 2008, having exhausted his state court remedies, Zimmer filed his Petition

with the United States District Court, Southern District of California. (Pet. 1 at 1.) Respondent

filed an Answer on March 18, 2009. On June 17, 2009, this Court stayed this case pending a

decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2008) rehearing en banc granted 527

F.3d 797 (9th Cir. May 16, 2008). After the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Hayward, this Court lifted the

stay. Respondent filed a Supplemental Brief and Zimmer filed a Supplemental Traverse. (Doc.

Nos. 14 & 15.)

III. RELEVANT FACTS 

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Regarding the commitment offense, the state court noted: 

The record reflects that on January 15, 1984, the Petitioner and his accomplice went

to the home of the victim, John Cassanelli, in order to confront him about a drug

debt owed to them. They handcuffed Mr. Cassanelli and forced him and his

girlfriend, Deborah Stalder, into their car at gunpoint. As they drove, Mr. Cassanelli

repeatedly pled for his life. When he refused to be quiet, the Petitioner’s

accomplice stated that he was “not suffering enough” and shot him in the leg. After

some time, the Petitioner, who was driving the vehicle, pulled over by the side of

the road. The Petitioner and his accomplice then forced Mr. Cassanelli out of the

car and forced him to disrobe and sit on a nearby rock. Once Mr. Cassanelli

complied, the Petitioner’s accomplice shot him in the head. The Petitioner and his

accomplice then discussed how to dispose of the vehicle and whether they should

allow Ms. Stalder to live. Ms. Stalder was able to convince them that she should be

allowed to live by promising to sell drugs for them.

(Lodg. 2 at 1-3.)

During Zimmer’s 2007 parole hearing, the Board reviewed Zimmer’s pre-commitment

record. (Pet. Exh. B at 18-19.) The Board discussed Zimmer’s prior criminal history including

three arrests for car theft; two charges were dismissed, and one was reduced to attempted

possession of stolen property. (Id.) The car theft charge that was reduced to attempted possession

of stolen property resulted from a misunderstanding when Zimmer attempted to purchase a car

with cocaine. (Id. at 19.) Also, the police had arrested Zimmer for drug possession two months

before they arrested him for his present offense. (Id. at 19-20.) The prosecutor dismissed the drug

charge in furtherance of justice for the present offense. (Id.) Nevertheless, the Board concluded

that Zimmer’s previous record showed an escalating pattern of criminal conduct. (Id. at 91.) 

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The Board also reviewed Zimmer’s personal history. (Id. at 20.) Zimmer grew up in a

middle class family and initially attended community college but ended up becoming an auto

mechanic apprentice for a Volkswagen dealership. (Id. at 21-22.) Upon completion of the

apprenticeship, Zimmer and a partner opened their own auto repair business. (Id. at 22.) Although

the business succeeded, the partnership became strained, and Zimmer sold his portion of the

business to his partner. (Id. at 23.) Zimmer took the proceeds of the sale and invested in the illicit

drug business. (Id.) Zimmer maintains that he has cut ties with all his former affiliates in the drug

trade. (Id. at 26.) 

The Board also reviewed Zimmer’s post-conviction history. (Id. at 27.) Since incarceration,

Zimmer has received three rule violation reports, the most recent report dated October 13, 1994.

(Id. at 28.) The Board noted that Zimmer has not engaged in any self-help activities since 1997.

(Id. at 31.) Zimmer claims that he does not participate in “AA” or “NA” because he does not have

a drug problem; Zimmer freely admits to selling drugs, but denies consuming drugs or alcohol

since he was a youth. (Id.) Zimmer also takes issue with “AA” and “NA” because they are

Christian based programs. (Id.) However, Zimmer is aware that he could utilize other self-help

programs besides “AA” and “NA”. (Id. at 32-33.) The Board informed Zimmer that he could even

find his own self-help reading and report this independent programming to the Board. (Id. at 31-

32.) Also, the Board strongly encouraged Zimmer to engage in substance abuse programming

because the Board was concerned about Zimmer re-entering the drug trade if released. (Id. at 32.) 

The Board next addressed Zimmer’s psychological reports. (Id. at 38.) The most recent

report stated, “[Zimmer] attempts to portray himself in an overly favorable light. In this evaluation,

he appeared to downplay his part in criminal activities and the instant offense. He did admit that he

knew his crime partner was going to shoot the victim and did nothing to stop it. His attitude tends

to be grandiose. He gives convincing explanations for the criminal behavior and a review of the

records suggests a readiness to lie and rework his account of the facts.” (Id. at 42.) Also, the

psychologist found that Zimmer lacks insight into his crime and expresses negative attitudes, but

does not participate in self-help programming. (Id. at 43-44.) Zimmer took exception to the

psychologists use of the “static 99 tool.” (Id. at 44-45.) Psychologists typically use this tool to

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 In his Supplemental Brief, Respondent asserts that there is no established federal liberty

interest in a parole decision that is supported by some evidence. The Court does not expressly address

Respodent’s argument because this Court is bound by Ninth law which has foreclosed the issue. See

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561-64, Pearson, 606 F.3d at 608-09, and Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1213.

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determine reconviction potential for adult males convicted of sexual offenses. (Id. at 44.) 

Although Zimmer was charged with forced oral copulation of a female victim in conjunction with

the commitment offense, the jury found him not guilty. (Id. at 45.) One Board member

characterized this psychological report as “one of the more negative reports I’ve seen.” (Id. at 53.) 

Regarding mitigating factors, the Board found that Zimmer received very good reviews

from his work supervisors and found that Zimmer has reasonable plans for release, including

marketable job skills. (Id. at 92-93.) However, the Board ultimately concluded that Zimmer

continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others because of the negative psychological report

and his failure to engage self-help programming despite numerous requests by the Board and

encouragement from the psychologist. (Id. at 93-94.)

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by Title 28, United States Code, § 2254, as amended by the 1996

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077,

1080 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (provisions of AEDPA apply when a state prisoner challenges the

constitutionality of a state administrative decision, such as denial of parole). Because Zimmer

filed his petition after AEDPA’s effective date, the Court may not grant relief unless the state

court’s adjudication of this claim “resulted in a decision that was either (1) contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th

Cir. 2010) citing Doody v. Schriro, 596 F.3d 620, 634 (9th Cir. 2010). 

California’s parole system creates a federally enforceable liberty interest protected by the

due process clause.1

 See Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1213, citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal &

Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979); Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 2010). A

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federal court reviewing a California prisoner’s habeas petition must look to California law to

determine the scope of the federally enforceable liberty interest. Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1213. 

Under California law, the primary consideration for the Board or the Governor in

determining whether to grant or deny an inmate parole is whether the inmate poses a current threat

to public safety. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1210-11 (2008). A reviewing court must

determine whether “some evidence” supports the Board or Governor’s decision that an inmate is a

current threat to society. Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214, citing In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212-13;

see also Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63. Under such review, although the Board or Governor may

consider the commitment offense as one of the factors justifying a finding of current

dangerousness, they must not rely on the crime or its circumstances alone to justify such a finding. 

Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214, citing In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1214. Rather, in order to find

current dangerousness based on the commitment offense, the Board or Governor must find

something in the prisoner’s pre or post-incarceration history, or the prisoner’s current mental state

or demeanor, indicating that the dangerousness exhibited by the prisoner in the commission of the

original crime remains probative of the prisoner’s current dangerousness. See Cooke, 606 F.3d at

1216, citing In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1214. 

Federal courts reviewing a California prisoner’s parole denial, “need only decide whether

the California judicial decision approving the [G]overnor’s [or Board’s] decision rejecting parole

was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some evidence’” requirement, or was “based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 1: Reliance on Irrelevant and Unreliable Evidence.

Zimmer alleges that the Board’s decision to deny him parole violates his fourteenth

amendment due process rights because the Board relied on irrelevant and unreliable pre and postconviction evidence, as well as the circumstances of his commitment offense, to determine that he

poses a current danger to society and is thus unsuitable for parole. In short, Zimmer alleges that

the Board and the state courts unreasonably applied the California “some evidence” standard and

unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence.

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If the state supreme court silently denies a petitioner’s appeal with a summary dismissal,

the reviewing federal habeas court must look through to the last reasoned state court opinion in

making a decision. See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the decision

from the Los Angeles Superior Court denying Zimmer’s habeas petition is the last reasoned state

court decision. (Lodg. 2.)

The Los Angeles Superior Court denied Zimmer’s Habeas Petition based on the following

facts:

The Board found the Petitioner unsuitable for parole after a parole consideration

hearing held on June 21, 2007. The Petitioner was denied parole for two years. The

Board concluded that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society and a threat to public safety. The Board

based its decision on several factors, including his commitment offense.

The Court finds that there is some evidence to support the Board’s findings that the

commitment offense involved multiple victims; that it was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner; that the victim was abused during the offense;

and that the offense demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2402, subds. (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), and

(c)(1)(D). The Petitioner and his accomplice armed themselves and kidnapped the

two victims, with the intent of shooting Mr. Cassanelli to death. Mr. Cassanelli,

who was not armed, was shot in the head, in an execution-style manner. These

actions were planned, deliberate, dispassionate and calculated. Additionally, the

victims were abused. The Petitioner and his accomplice intentionally made Mr.

Cassanelli and Ms. Stalder fear for their lives for an extended period of time, as

they were kidnapped at gunpoint. Further, the Petitioner’s accomplice shot Mr.

Cassanelli in the leg, in order to make him suffer more. Finally, Mr. Cassanelli was

humiliated and forced to disrobe and sit on a rock before he was shot to death. This

abuse also demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for Mr. Cassanelli’s

suffering.

The Court also finds that there is some evidence that the motive was very trivial in

relation to the offense. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2402, subd. (c)(1)(E). The

Petitioner admits that he was motivated solely by the money Mr. Cassanelli owed

him and that he knew that he and his accomplice would murder him that day. The

drug money Mr. Cassanelli owed the Petitioner was a very trivial motive for

abusing, torturing and murdering him.

The Board also considered the Petitioner’s non-violent prior offenses, his extensive

history as a drug dealer and his failure to participate in any self-help programming

for substance abuse. The Board also considered his psychological report, which

indicated that Petitioner minimized his role in the offense, lied to make himself

sound better, refused to participate in necessary self-help and was a moderate risk

of future violence. The Board noted, however, that previous psychological reports

were not as negative. While these factors, alone, may not justify a finding of

unsuitability, the Board may properly consider them as relevant to a determination

of whether the Petitioner is suitable for parole. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §2402(b).

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The Board also considered the Petitioner’s post-conviction gains, however, they

still concluded that the Petitioner would pose an unreasonable threat to public

safety. Penal Code §3041(b). The Court finds that there is some evidence to support

this determination because of the nature of the commitment offense as well as his

failure to participate in some kind of self-help programming, as the Board has

repeatedly recommended.

The Court finds that the Board did not err in denying the Petitioner parole for two

years. The Board must articulate reasons that justify postponement, but those

reasons need not be completely different from those justifying the denial of parole.

See In re Jackson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 464, 479. The Board indicated that the

Petitioner was denied parole for two years because of his commitment offense, his

need for further self-help programming and his negative psychological report.

Although the report appears to be in conflict with previous reports, it does

constitute some evidence of unsuitability, in that it has not been discredited, or

successfully appealed. The reasons cited by the Board were sufficient to justify a

two-year denial. 

(Lodg. 2 at 1-3.)

When determining whether “some evidence” exists in the record to support the Board’s

decision, the relevant inquiry is whether “any evidence ...could support the conclusion reached by

the disciplinary board.” Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006),

overruled on other grounds; Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 455-56 (1985)). The Board must rely on evidence that has a “sufficient indicia of reliability.”

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds; Hayward, 603

F.3d at 555 (citations omitted). However, the “some evidence” standard does not require the

reviewing court to examine the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or re-weigh

the evidence. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985).

This Court concludes that the Superior Court reasonably applied the California “some

evidence” requirement when it approved the Board’s rejection of Zimmer’s parole suitability

because the Board based its decision on: (1) Zimmer’s escalating criminal history (evidenced by

his prior criminal offenses and extensive history as a drug dealer), and (2) his current mental state

(evidenced by his negative psychological report and failure to seek rehabilitative programming).

(Exh. B at 91.) Based on these factors the Board reasonably concluded that Zimmer’s cruel and

callous commitment offense remains probative to determining whether he continues to pose a

current threat to public safety. Because Zimmer has not complied with the Board’s and the

psychologist’s recommendation for continued programming, he has failed to mitigate the

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psychologist’s report which concluded that he poses a moderate threat level for violence if

released due to his unpredictable nature and psychopathic qualities. (Exh. B at 92-94). Therefore,

based on the sufficiently reliable evidence cited by the Board, this Court cannot conclude that the

State’s judicial approval of Board’s determination was an unreasonable application of the “some

evidence” requirement. See Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563.

Nor can this Court conclude that state judicial decision was “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” Id. Zimmer has failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the Board relied on irrelevant and unreliable evidence to conclude that he

poses a current threat to public safety. See § 2254(e)(1). Zimmer’s admissions at his Parole Board

Hearing foreclose his initial contention that his prior criminal history has no bearing on his current

suitability for parole. Indeed, Zimmer admitted to the following facts: (1) he sold a legitimate

business in order to become a drug dealer, (2) initially he bought and sold pounds of marijuana,

but later on he began trafficking pounds of cocaine, (3) he dealt drugs for seven years, (4) his

commitment offense involved the torture and execution-style murder of a man over a drug debt,

and (5) he and his accomplice considered, but ultimately decided against, murdering a female

victim also abducted at the time of the murder, because they could continue to use her to sell

drugs. (Exh. B at 48-51, 66-67, 92.) Consequently, the Board expressed concern that, despite

legitimate post-incarceration job prospects, Zimmer might be inclined to re-enter the lucrative drug

trade. (Id. at 32.) This Court concludes that Superior Court did not base its decision on “an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” because Zimmer himself provided

the relevant criminal history, and the Board reasonably inferred that Zimmer’s criminal history, up

to and including the commitment offense, is relevant to a determination of his suitability for

parole. See Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563.

Aside from claiming that his prior criminal history has no bearing on his current suitability

for parole, Zimmer has failed to specify what other evidence was irrelevant and unreliable, and

why. The Superior Court noted that although the negative psychological “report appears to be in

conflict with previous reports, it does constitute some evidence of unsuitability, in that it has not

been discredited, or successfully appealed.” (Pet. Appendix 1 at 2-3.) Consequently, absent clear

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 The “some evidence” standard articulated in Hill is applicable to the parole context. See

e.g., Jancseky v. Or. Bd of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987).

10 08cv2277

and convincing evidence discrediting the negative psychological report, this Court concludes that

the Superior Court reasonably determined that the report is probative of Zimmer’s suitability for

parole.

Moreover, Zimmer has provided this Court with no basis to overlook or re-weigh the

evidence presented to the Board and reviewed by the Superior Court. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455

(1985).2

 Therefore, pursuant to section 2254(e)(1), this Court presumes the factual issues

determined by the Superior Court to be correct, and this Court concludes that the Superior Court

reasonably applied the “some evidence” standard. Accordingly, Zimmer’s first ground for habeas

relief lacks merit. 

B. Claim 2: Failure to Set a Release Date.

Zimmer’s second ground for habeas relief alleges that the Board’s failure to set a release

date violated his due process rights. The California Penal Code requires that the Board set a

release date “unless it determines that the gravity of current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(b). 

Where the Board finds a prisoner suitable for parole, the Board “shall normally” set a

future parole release date. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1079-80 (2005); Cal. Pen.

Code § 3041(a). The Board must set a release date unless it determines that “the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense

or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” 

Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(b) (Italics added.) However, in the case of a convicted murderer serving an

indeterminate life sentence, the Board must first determine if the prisoner is suitable for parole,

and then, if the prisoner is found suitable, the Board shall set a release date. See In re

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Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1079-80.

Here, the Board found Zimmer unsuitable for parole, in part because of the gravity of the

commitment offense. Thus, absent the predicate finding of suitability, the Board did not set a

parole release date because California law does not require the Board to set a release date for a

convicted murderer serving an indeterminate life sentence and currently deemed a present threat to

public safety. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1079-80, 1091. Accordingly, Zimmer’s second

ground for habeas relief lacks merit.

C. Claim 3: Alleged Failure to Participate In Rehabilitation Activities.

Finally, Zimmer alleges that the Board violated his due process rights because its parole

decision relied, in part, on his failure to avail himself fully of rehabilitative programming.

Zimmer’s allegation fails because the Board may consider the inmate’s current demeanor and

mental state when determining if there is “some evidence” of current dangerousness. Cooke, 606

F.3d at 1214; Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562; In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1221. Thus, a Board may

properly consider an inmate’s failure to avail himself of rehabilitative programming, especially

where that inmate has received a negative psychological report and has a history of criminal

activity. (Exh. B at 31, 91.) The key inquiry here is not whether Zimmer did or did not participate

in the programming, but rather how does his participation or non-participation factor into an

overall assessment of his current dangerousness. See Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1215. To this end, the

Board cited the following passage from the 2007 psychologist report: “[Zimmer] poses a moderate

likelihood to become involved in future violence if released. Additionally, he presents as defensive

with an antisocial attitude with tendency toward the grandiose. He still exhibits psychopathic

qualities.” (Exb. B at 92-93.) 

The Court concludes that the Board reasonably connected Zimmer’s cruel and callous

commitment offense, his pre-incarceration criminal history, his most recent (and negative)

psychological report, and his failure to participate in programming, to demonstrate that he poses a

current threat to public safety and is in need of further rehabilitative programming. Additionally,

because Zimmer has not cited, nor has this Court found, any California or Federal authority to

support his third ground for relief, this Court concludes his argument lacks merit.

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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

 Because the Board identified “some evidence” to support their denial of parole, and

because the Board reasonably concluded that Zimmer poses a current threat to public safety based

on pre and post-incarceration evidence coupled with the circumstances of the commitment offense,

the state court reasonably applied the “some evidence” standard, and reasonably determined the

facts in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); See Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-63. The

Court RECOMMENDS that Zimmer’s petition be DENIED. 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Judge

assigned to this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 22, 2010 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than November 2, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 30, 2010

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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