Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05322/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2012 Decided December 14, 2012 

No. 11-5322 

MARILYN VANN, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:03-cv-01711) 

Alvin Dunn argued the cause for appellants. With him on 

the briefs were Jack McKay, Thomas G. Allen, Cynthia Cook 

Robertson, and Jonathan Velie. 

Ethan G. Shenkman, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for Federal Appellees. On the brief 

were William B. Lazarus, Aaron P. Avila, and Kurt G. 

Kastorf, Attorneys. 

Jonathan P. Guy argued the cause for appellees Cherokee 

Nation, et al. With him on the brief were Mark S. Davies and 

Christopher M. O'Connell. 

USCA Case #11-5322 Document #1410104 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 1 of 6
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Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Before the Civil War, 

members of the Cherokee Nation had slaves. Those slaves 

were freed in 1866 pursuant to a treaty negotiated between the 

United States and the Cherokee Nation. The Treaty 

guaranteed the former Cherokee slaves and their descendants 

– known as the Freedmen – “all the rights of native 

Cherokees” in perpetuity. See Treaty with the Cherokee, art. 

9, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799. Those rights included the right 

to tribal membership and the right to vote in tribal elections. 

At some point, the Cherokee Nation decided that the 

Freedmen were no longer members of the tribe and could no 

longer vote in tribal elections. A group of Freedmen 

eventually sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia, claiming that the Cherokee Nation had violated the 

1866 Treaty. 

Because the Cherokee Nation is a sovereign entity, it is 

entitled to sovereign immunity and may not be sued without 

its consent. See Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band 

Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509 

(1991); Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 746 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). To avoid the sovereign immunity bar, the Freedmen 

plaintiffs sued not only the Cherokee Nation itself but also the 

relevant executive official, the Principal Chief, in his official 

capacity. Under Supreme Court precedent, that is the 

standard approach by which a party may obtain declaratory or 

injunctive relief with respect to a sovereign entity 

notwithstanding sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Young, 

USCA Case #11-5322 Document #1410104 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 2 of 6
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209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & 

Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949); Shields v. 

Utah Idaho Central Railroad Co., 305 U.S. 177 (1938). 

In opposition to the suit, the Cherokee Nation pointed out 

that it was entitled to sovereign immunity, but also that it was 

a required party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 19 and that the Principal Chief could not 

adequately represent the Cherokee Nation’s interests.1

 

Therefore, according to the Cherokee Nation, the suit had to 

be dismissed. 

 The District Court agreed with the Cherokee Nation. The 

District Court concluded that the Cherokee Nation was a 

required party for purposes of Rule 19, that the Cherokee 

Nation’s interests could not be adequately represented by the 

Principal Chief, and that the case could not go forward. See 

Vann v. Salazar, 2011 WL 4953030, at *3-6, 9 (D.D.C. 2011). 

 1

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 provides in relevant part: 

(a) PERSONS REQUIRED TO BE JOINED IF FEASIBLE. 

(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of 

process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of 

subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: 

(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord 

complete relief among existing parties; or 

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the 

subject of the action and is so situated that disposing 

of the action in the person’s absence may: 

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the 

person’s ability to protect the interest; or 

(ii) leave an existing party subject to a 

substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 

otherwise inconsistent obligations because of 

the interest. 

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We reverse. Applying the precedents that permit suits 

against government officials in their official capacities, we 

conclude that this suit may proceed against the Principal 

Chief in his official capacity, without the Cherokee Nation 

itself as a party. 

 The Freedmen have sued the Principal Chief in his 

official capacity under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 

U.S. 123. The Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits for 

declaratory and injunctive relief against government officials 

in their official capacities – notwithstanding the sovereign 

immunity possessed by the government itself. The Ex parte 

Young doctrine applies to Indian tribes as well. Cf. Oklahoma 

Tax Commission, 498 U.S. at 514; see generally Larson, 337 

U.S. at 689-92; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER 

& DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 958-60 (5th ed. 2003). 

The Ex parte Young doctrine is based on a “fiction” – 

namely, that “when a federal court commands a state official 

to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he 

is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes.” Virginia 

Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 

1638 (2011); see Larson, 337 U.S. 682; Davis v. Gray, 83 

U.S. 203 (1872); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 

738 (1824); FALLON ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 

FEDERAL SYSTEM 958-60. The doctrine is called a fiction 

because the suit in effect binds the government entity just as 

would a suit against the government entity itself. In such 

suits, the government in question stands behind the official 

“as the real party in interest.” Davis, 83 U.S. at 220. Indeed, 

an injunction entered against an officer in his official capacity 

is binding on the officer’s successors. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

65(d); Acheson v. Albert, 195 F.2d 573, 576 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 

1952) (“The judgment entered in the present case would no 

USCA Case #11-5322 Document #1410104 Filed: 12/14/2012 Page 4 of 6
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doubt be res judicata on the law and facts as against the 

Secretary’s successors in office.”); 11A CHARLES ALAN 

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2956 (2d. ed. 1995) (“A decree 

binding a public official generally is valid against that 

official’s successors in office.”). 

As a practical matter, therefore, the Cherokee Nation and 

the Principal Chief in his official capacity are one and the 

same in an Ex parte Young suit for declaratory and injunctive 

relief. As a result, the Principal Chief can adequately 

represent the Cherokee Nation in this suit, meaning that the 

Cherokee Nation itself is not a required party for purposes of 

Rule 19. By contrast, if we accepted the Cherokee Nation’s 

position, official-action suits against government officials 

would have to be routinely dismissed, at least absent some 

statutory exception to Rule 19, because the government entity 

in question would be a required party yet would be immune 

from suit and so could not be joined. But that is not how the 

Ex parte Young doctrine and Rule 19 case law has developed. 

Nor is there any basis for distinguishing this case 

involving an American Indian tribe from a run-of-the-mill Ex 

parte Young action. Here, the named defendant – the 

Principal Chief – is the head of the executive branch of the 

Cherokee Nation. See CHEROKEE CONST., art. VII, § 1 (“The 

executive power shall be vested in a Principal Chief....”); id.

art. VII, § 9 (“The Principal Chief shall cause the laws of the 

Cherokee Nation to be faithfully executed, and shall conduct 

in person” all “communications and business of the Cherokee 

Nation.”). The claim here is that the Principal Chief – and 

through him, the sovereign tribe – is violating federal law. 

The defense is that the Principal Chief – and hence the 

sovereign tribe – is not violating federal law. This case 

presents a typical Ex parte Young scenario. 

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 Our analysis is consistent, moreover, with the precedents 

of other courts of appeals. In line with the basic Ex parte 

Young principles, the Ninth Circuit and Tenth Circuit have 

similarly concluded that a tribe is not a required party under 

Rule 19 in suits naming a tribal official in his official 

capacity. In Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and 

Power District v. Lee, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Navajo 

officials responsible for enforcing a challenged tribal law 

“adequately represent the Navajo Nation’s interests.” 672 

F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2012). The court added that there 

was “no suggestion that the officials’ attempt to enforce the 

statute here is antithetical to the tribe’s interests” and “no 

reason to believe the Navajo official defendants cannot or will 

not make any reasonable argument that the tribe would make 

if it were a party.” Id. at 1180. In Kansas v. United States, 

the Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion, noting that 

“the potential for prejudice to the Miami Tribe is largely 

nonexistent due to the presence in this suit of” the “tribal 

officials.” 249 F.3d 1213, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001). 

In light of our disposition, we need not reach the 

Freedmen’s argument that the Cherokee Nation waived its 

sovereign immunity by filing a related suit in Oklahoma. We 

reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

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