Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00379/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00379-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Petitioner was also indicted on one count of Aggravated Robbery which, upon motion

of the State, was dismissed with prejudice. (See Answer, Ex. E, p.2 (Doc. No. 7-2, p.39))

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Griffith Hoover, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-379-TUC-DCB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc.No.1). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court,

this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. For the following reasons the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss the Petition as untimely.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Proceedings

In 1986, Petitioner was indicted on one count of First Degree Murder, one count of

Kidnapping, one count of Armed Robbery, and one count of Theft By Control.1

 (Answer,

p.2 (Doc.No. 7)) The state alleged that Petitioner had prior convictions and had committed

the instant felony while released on bail or on his own recognizance. (Answer, p.7 & Ex. B)

The state also filed allegations of the dangerous nature of the offense charged. (Answer, Ex.

B) On December 24, 1986, a jury convicted Petitioner on all counts. (Id.) In February 1987,

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the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for

at least 25 years on the murder count; and Petitioner received concurrent aggravated prison

terms for the remaining counts, the longest of which was 21 years, with those sentences to

be served consecutively with the term of imprisonment on the murder count. (Answer, p.7,

Ex. B) 

Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court. On August 22, 1989, the Arizona

Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Answer, Ex. A) On

December 19, 1989, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration. (Answer, Ex. C) The mandate issued on December 22, 1989. (Answer, Ex.

D)

On October 28, 2002, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Answer,

Ex. E) On May 13, 2004, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief wherein Petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id.) The trial court

denied relief without a hearing. (Answer, Ex. F (Doc. No. 7-3, p.5)) Thereafter, the appellate

court granted Petitioner’s pro se petition for review and denied relief. (Answer, Ex. F) The

mandate issued on December 29, 2005. (Id. (Doc.No. 7-3, p.2))

On April 5, 2005, Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a second Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief wherein he argued that his sentences were excessive under Blakely v. Washington, 542

U.S. 296 (2004). (Answer, Ex. G) The trial court summarily denied relief. (Answer, p.3; see

also Answer, Ex. H) On January 19, 2007, the appellate court granted review and denied

relief concluding that Blakely did not apply retroactively to Petitioner’s case. (Answer, Ex.

I) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on May 3, 2007, and the mandate issued on

May 31, 2007. (Answer, Ex. I, J)

B. Federal Proceeding

The instant pro se Petition for federal habeas relief was signed by Petitioner on July

27, 2007 and filed-stamped by the Clerk of the Court on August 6, 2007. A federal habeas

petition is deemed filed when handed by the inmate to a prison official for mailing. See

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-271 (1988); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245

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n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Under the prison mailbox rule...a pro se petitioner's petition is deemed

constructively filed at the moment it is delivered to prison officials to be forwarded to the

court clerk.") The Court deems the Petition commencing this action as filed on July 27,

2007. See id. 

Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief:

1. “6th and 14th Amendment violations of right to a jury at sentencing for

aggravated consecutive sentences” citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); and Cunningham v.

California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (Ground I); and 

2. the trial court’s imposition of a “‘mixed’ indeterminate and determinate

sentence, in violation of Arizona’s own ‘same time-same crime’ sentencing

statute in effect at the time was an abuse of discretion, was double jeopardy,

violates Petitioner’s due process rights and amounts to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments.” (Ground II)

 (Petition, pp.5-c, 6).

On October 3, 2007, Respondents filed their Answer. Petitioner did not file a Reply.

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Petition is time-barred under the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). 

Because Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was filed after the AEDPA’s effective

date of April 24, 1996, “the provisions of the [AEDPA] apply to this case.” Patterson, 251

F.3d at 1245 (citing Smith v. Robbins 528 U.S. 259, 268 n.3 (2000)). The AEDPA "imposes

a one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal

court." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)) Pursuant to section 2244, the limitations period

shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

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of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Additionally, as discussed infra, the statute of limitations

may be statutorily or equitably tolled. Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2002).

A. Commencement of limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)

The record herein is clear that Petitioner’s conviction became final in 1987. See

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999)(in determining when a judgment becomes

final “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review,” in cases where the petitioner has raised a federal question, the Ninth Circuit includes

in the time for seeking direct review “the ninety-day period within which [the petitioner]

could have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.”);

(see also Answer, Ex. B (Doc. No. 7-2, pp.26); Petition, p.1) “State prisoners, like

[Petitioner herein], whose convictions became final prior to AEDPA’s enactment, had a oneyear grace period [–until April 24, 1997–] in which to file their petitions.” Patterson, 251

F.3d at 1245-1246. (citations omitted) 

Because Petitioner initiated this action on July 27, 2007, more than ten years after the

AEDPA limitations period expired, his Petition is untimely filed unless 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(B),(C), or (D) operates to delay commencement of the statute of limitations or

tolling applies.

In Ground I of his Petition, Petitioner asserts that his sentences were imposed in

violation of the Constitution in light of Apprendi and its progeny. Approximately thirteen

years after Petitioner’s conviction, the United States Supreme Court held in Apprendi that

any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increased the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond

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Petitioner does not cite Apprendi and its progeny in Ground II of his Petition.

However, he does assert that “[t]he trial court used the facts enumerated and found by the

judge to aggravate and impose the maximum sentences.” (Petition, p.6) To any extent that

Petitioner’s Ground II can be construed to include an Apprendi-Blakely type claim, this same

analysis applies to Ground II.

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a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). In 2004, the United

States Supreme Court modified Apprendi by holding that: 

the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a

judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict

or admitted by the defendant...In other words, the relevant "statutory

maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding

additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional

findings.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Petitioner argues that Apprendi and its progeny apply retroactively to his case, thus

rendering his Petition timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). However, it is well-settled

that Apprendi and its progeny do not apply retroactively to collateral review of a conviction,

like Petitioner’s, that was final before the Apprendi and Blakely decisions were announced.

Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. SanchezCervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002)) (Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on

collateral review where the conviction, like Petitioner’s, was final before issuance of that

decision); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Blakely does not

apply retroactively to cases on collateral review). Therefore, section 2244(d)(1)(C) of the

AEDPA is inapplicable.2

Nor does the record support application of sections 2244(d)(1)(B) or (D) to either

Ground I or Ground II. Petitioner has not alleged any unconstitutional, State-created

impediment that prevented him from seeking habeas relief earlier. See 2244(d)(1)(B). Nor

can he assert that the factual predicate of his claims could not have been discovered earlier.

The record is clear that at the time of his sentencing, Petitioner was aware of the factual

predicate of his claims herein. To the extent that Apprendi and Blakely prompted Petitioner

to seek federal habeas relief, those decisions serve as the legal predicate for Petitioner's

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claims, not the factual predicate or evidence, relevant to his guilt or sentence. See Hasan v.

Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (AEDPA statute of limitations begins to run

when the petitioner knows the important facts, not when the petitioner recognizes their legal

significance.) 

On this record, sections 2244(d)(1)(B) through (D) do not affect the AEDPA statute

of limitations calculation. Consequently, pursuant to section 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner had

until April 24, 1997 to seek federal habeas relief unless he establishes that he is entitled to

statutory or equitable tolling.

 B. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA limitations period is statutorily tolled when a "properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending...." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondents are correct that “[b]ecause Petitioner had no post-conviction petition

pending in any Arizona court on the relevant dates from April 25, 1996, until April 24, 1997,

the statutory tolling provision does not apply to him.” (Answer, pp. 4-5) Petitioner did not

file his first Notice of Post-Conviction Relief until October 28, 2002 which was more than

five years after expiration of the April 24, 1997 AEDPA statute of limitations. Moreover,

Petitioner’s First PCR proceeding can neither revive the limitations period nor toll the

already-expired period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended

before the state petition was filed."); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001)

(where petitioner filed his state post-conviction relief proceeding "after the AEDPA statute

of limitations ended...[t]hat delay resulted in an absolute time bar..."); Rashid v. Khulmann,

991 F.Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Once the limitations period is expired, collateral

petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitations.") Likewise, Petitioner’s

Second PCR proceeding filed in April 2005 did not restart the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations period. Id. Consequently, the AEDPA statute of limitations is not subject to

statutory tolling on this record. 

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The Second Circuit case referred to is Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 153-154 (2nd Cir.

2008), cert. den., __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 168 (2008), wherein the court stated: 

[I]t would be an unwarranted extension of Bowles to think that the Court was

impliedly rendering equitable tolling inapplicable to limitations periods just because

they are set forth in statutes. Since a statute of limitations is a defense, see

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c), it has not been regarded as jurisdictional, see Day v. McDonough,

547 U.S. 198, 205... (2006) (AEDPA limitations period), and has been subject to

equitable tolling, see Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96...

(1990). We think it remains so after Bowles.

The Supreme Court's recent decision is [sic] John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.

United States, U.S. , 128 S.Ct. 750...(2008), confirms our view. The Court

there noted that most limitations periods are non-jurisdictional affirmative defenses

and are subject to equitable tolling, see id. at 753-54, and viewed the limitations

period governing suits against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims as

jurisdictional only because a long line of prior decisions had so held and were

entitled to adherence under principles of state [sic] decisis, see id. at 756.

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C. Equitable Tolling

Respondents argue that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Bowles v.

Russell, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007), the AEDPA is not subject to equitable tolling.

(Answer, p.7)

The Bowles Court held that the timely filing of an appeal in a civil case is a

jurisdictional requirement. Bowles, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. at 2366. The Court reasoned that

because federal statutes specified the time limits for filing a notice of appeal and for

extending the notice-of-appeal period, Congress intended to preclude the courts from

exercising jurisdiction over otherwise legitimate cases after a certain period of time has

elapsed after final judgment. Id. at 2366-2367. 

As discussed above, the AEDPA establishes time limits regarding the timely filing of

a petition for habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1). This District Court has noted that 

[t]he Supreme Court has twice denied certiorari on the issue of whether these

limits are jurisdictional. See David v. Hall, 540 U.S. 815...(2003); Flanders v.

Graves, 537 U.S. 1236...(2003). The Supreme Court has noted that it has never

squarely addressed whether equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA's statute

of limitations. Lawrence v. Florida,__ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085...(2007).

Accordingly, whether the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling remains an

open question. However, several recent decisions in the District of Arizona

have followed the Second Circuit[3] in holding that Bowles does not apply to

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Bomar, 2008 WL 4183382 *7 (quoting Diaz, 515 F.3d at 153-54).

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the AEDPA. See, Perea v. Schriro, No. 07-2028-PHX-ROS, 2008 WL

2039404, *1 (D.Ariz. May 12, 2008); Hernandez v. Arpaio, CV-07-1712-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 370900, * 2 (D.Ariz., Feb.11, 2008) (citing

Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 153-54 (2nd Cir.2008)).

Bomar v. Schriro, CV-08-769-PHX-ROS, 2008 WL 4183382 (D.Ariz. Sept. 11, 2008)

(following “these District of Arizona cases in concurring with the Second Circuit’s analysis

in Diaz and holding that Bowles does not apply to the AEDPA.”). See also Faulkner v.

Schriro, CV-07-1822-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 4138120 *8 (D.Ariz. Sept. 3, 2008) (“Although

the Court is inclined to...hold that Bowles does not apply to the AEDPA, the Court need not

resolve that issue because even assuming equitable tolling remains viable after Bowles, as

Respondents alternatively argue, Petitioner does not satisfy the requirements for such

tolling.”); Lopez v. Bock, CV 07-1192-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 2545073 *3 (D.Ariz. June 23,

2008) (rejecting magistrate judge’s recommendation “that equitable tolling is...not available”

in light of Bowles and noting that “the Ninth Circuit has continued to apply equitable tolling

to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations post-Bowles.” ) (citing Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d

1051, 1054, n.4 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. den., __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 397 (2008)). 

However, the Court need not resolve this issue “because even assuming equitable

tolling remains viable after Bowles, as Respondents alternatively argue, Petitioner does not

satisfy the requirements for such tolling.” Faulkner, 2008 WL 4138120 *8. 

"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way." Pace v. DiGulglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Harris,

515 F.3d at 1054. Petitioner must also establish a "causal connection" between the

extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition. Bryant v. Arizona

Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.2007). Further, a petitioner's "lack of legal

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling."

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Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Fisher v. Johnson, 174

F.3d 710, 714-716 (5th Cir. 1999) ("ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se

petitioner, generally does not" warrant equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations).

Respondents correctly point out that Petitioner has not asserted a basis for equitable

tolling. (Answer, p.5) Petitioner raised no grounds for equitable tolling in his petition and

he did not file a reply and no grounds justifying equitable tolling are discernible from the

record. Because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he diligently pursued his rights and

that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely federal habeas petition,

the AEDPA statute of limitations is not subject to equitable tolling in Petitioner's case.

Consequently, the instant Petition must be dismissed as untimely. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No.1) as untimely.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 07-379-TUC-DCB.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003).

DATED this 11th day of December, 2008.

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