Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-04086/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-04086-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Defendant advises that it was erroneously sued as “San Jose State

University.”

2 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-3(c), defendant’s reply was due no later than

March 6, 2007. However, the reply was not filed until a week later on March 13, 2007. 

Additionally, Civil Local Rule 7-3(a) contemplates that all grounds upon which an

opposition is based should be presented to the court in a single filing. Here, after filing an

opposition brief, plaintiff subsequently filed two “Supplemental Declarations,” as well as a

“reply” brief, which were not specifically authorized under the court’s Civil Local Rules. 

This court has accepted and considered all of the papers filed by the parties. However, it

does not condone the failure to comply with the court’s local rules and warns the parties

against future non-compliance.

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PIOTR J. GARDIAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant. /

No. C04-04086 HRL

Consolidated With: C04-04768 HRL

C05-01242 HRL

C05-01833 HRL

C06-04695 HRL

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

“MOTION TO ENFORCE

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT”

[Re: Docket No. 146]

On March 20, 2007, this court heard the “Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement”

filed by defendant California State University.1

 Plaintiff Piotr Gardias, proceeding pro se,

opposed the motion. Upon consideration of the papers presented,2

 as well as the arguments

presented at the motion hearing, the court DENIES the motion.

Case 5:04-cv-04086-HRL Document 161 Filed 03/20/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

I. BACKGROUND

This is a consolidated action for alleged employment discrimination filed pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Plaintiff is employed by San Jose State University. He claims that defendant

(a) failed to promote him on the basis of his age and national origin; (b) retaliated against him

for filing employment complaints; and (c) discriminated against him on the basis of an alleged

disability.

On February 7, 2006, this court held a status conference. At that time, the court

suggested to plaintiff that he avail himself of the court's Assisted Settlement Conference

Program, under which a volunteer attorney would be appointed to represent him solely for a

settlement conference. He agreed, and the court ordered it.

On August 25, 2006, the parties (including plaintiff’s appointed Assisted Settlement

Counsel) participated in a court-supervised settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Vadas. 

The court’s docket indicates that a settlement was reached and placed on the record. Defendant

subsequently prepared a written “Settlement Agreement and General Release” and sent it to

plaintiff. However, plaintiff evidently changed his mind; and, on August 28, 2006 (apparently

prior to his receipt of defendant’s proposed written settlement agreement), he filed a letter

requesting that the agreement be “cancel[ed].” (See Cain Simon Decl., Ex. 2). He asserted that

“[t]his agreement is not good at all to Plaintiff.” (See id.). On August 29, 2006, plaintiff’s

appointed Assisted Settlement Counsel was released from any further obligation to plaintiff. A

few days later, plaintiff filed another letter with the court confirming that he “will not change

his mind and does not want to go forward with the settlement.” (See id.).

The court held a further status conference on September 12, 2006. At that conference,

defendant took the position that the August 25, 2006 settlement was enforceable; plaintiff

vehemently disagreed. Defendant stated that it would, within thirty days of the conference, file

a motion to enforce that settlement. This court refrained from setting a case management

schedule pending resolution of defendant’s anticipated motion. Several months passed,

however, and no motion was filed. Accordingly, the court held another conference on January

9, 2007, at which time the court proceeded to set case management deadlines and trial.

Case 5:04-cv-04086-HRL Document 161 Filed 03/20/07 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3 Title 29 United States Code Section 626(f)(1)(G) provides that, in connection

with an agreement between an individual and his employer, the individual will not be

deemed to have knowingly and voluntarily waived any right or claim under the ADEA

unless, among other things, “the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days

following the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the

agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired.” 

29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(G).

3

On February 7, 2007, defendant filed the instant motion. It argues that the August 25,

2006 settlement is a valid and enforceable agreement. Plaintiff contends that no final binding

agreement was ever reached.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement in a case pending before it. See

Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is well settled that a district court has the

equitable power to enforce summarily an agreement to settle a case pending before it”); see also

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (jurisdiction over settlement

enforcement issues may be established by express retention of jurisdiction, or by incorporating

the terms of the agreement in a dismissal order).

To be enforceable, a settlement must meet two requirements. First, it must be a

completed agreement. Callie, 829 F.2d at 890-91. Second, both parties must have either agreed

to the terms of the settlement or authorized their respective counsel to settle the dispute. 

Harrop v. Western Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 1977).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the settlement terms that were recited in open court on August 25,

2006 comprise a complete and final agreement. It says that under those terms, defendant is

obliged to pay plaintiff $22,377.00 in exchange for a full and final settlement of all of plaintiff’s

claims against it. Further, it contends that the so-called “cooling off period” required under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)3

 either does not apply or was waived. For

his part, plaintiff makes numerous assertions as to why the August 25, 2006 settlement should

not be enforced. In essence, he asserts that he understood that only an executed written

agreement would be deemed final and binding.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 4 Although the transcript does not identify most speakers by name, the colloquy

indicates that it was defense counsel who orally recited the terms of settlement.

4

The transcript of the August 25, 2006 proceedings in open court indicate that the terms

of the settlement, as recited by defense counsel,4

 were as follows:

As I understand [unintelligible], your honor, we’ve agreed with

Mr. [Gardias] to a dismissal with prejudice of all his lawsuit. In addition,

Mr. Guardias [sic] will provide us with a general release reflecting a full

and final settlement of any and all claims he may have, whether

administrative, whether filed with the EEOC, or remaining unfilled, uh,

and whether CSU is aware of them or not. This would be a full and final

settlement of any and all claims he may have. Uh, we further understand

that Mr. Guardias [sic] has agreed to separate from employment with

CSU, to retire effective no later than September 1, 2006, that he agrees

not to seek reinstatement or re-employment anywhere within CSU or its

affiliates, and that CSU will pay to Mr. Guardias [sic] a lump sum of

$22,377. And while we understand that he wishes to use this amount to

purchase additional service credit, uh, that money will be paid to him; it

will be his money to use as he sees fit. If he changes his mind, he can do

so; there are no strings attached to that money . . . and those are the terms

of the agreement as I understand them.

(Cain-Simon Decl., Ex. 1 at pp. 2-3). Additionally, it was agreed that plaintiff “would retire as

an employee [in good standing] with the assistance of . . . human resources . . ..” and that the

sum to be paid by defendant was sufficient to purchase two years’ retirement credits. (Id. at pp.

3-4). The court accepted the terms; and, when asked whether he agreed to be bound by the

terms, plaintiff stated, “Uh, yes.” (Id. at p. 5). These terms do appear to be encompassed by the

written agreement prepared by defendant. (See id., Ex. 3).

Nevertheless, on the record presented, this court cannot conclude that the settlement

terms placed on the record on August 25, 2006 represents a completed agreement. Defense

counsel confirmed that, as reflected in the August 25, 2006 transcript, she stated that defendant

“would also make this settlement contingent on the execution of a document, which would

satisfy the requirements of section 1542 of the California Civil Code . . ..” (See Cain-Simon

Decl., Ex. 1 at p. 4) (emphasis added). Additionally, defense counsel confirmed that, in the

August 25, 2006 open-court proceedings, Donald Newman, one of the University’s

representatives, confirmed that the settlement “is subject to a – a final written settlement that

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5

contains all the terms, uh, required under State and Federal law to effectuate the general

release.” (See id.) (emphasis added).

At oral argument, defense counsel seemed to suggest that these statements were meant

to convey that the execution of a final written agreement was merely a formality. However, her

assertions only lend further support to the conclusion that the August 25, 2006 settlement was

neither complete nor final. Here, counsel explained that defendant was to provide a written

agreement which “fleshed out” the settlement terms. She adds that the “only contingency” was

that defendant would not pay any money to plaintiff without an executed written settlement

agreement. Insofar as the record shows that there was never any signed written agreement, even

under defendant’s interpretation of events, it would appear that settlement was still contingent

and not final.

Further, this court finds it unnecessary to determine whether the ADEA “cooling off”

period applies or was waived. Although defendant now contends that no “cooling off” period is

required, its proposed written agreement, in fact, expressly gives plaintiff the right of revocation

and further provides that the agreement would not be effective until the revocation period had

expired. It states, in relevant part:

3.13 Effective Date of Agreement

Gardias may revoke this Agreement at any time during the period

of seven (7) days immediately following the date on which he executes this

Agreement. This Agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until

the expiration of this 7-day period and upon the execution of the Agreement

by all parties.

(See Cain-Simon Decl., Ex. 3 at p. 5). Thus, even assuming that plaintiff did not revoke the

settlement when he did, and assuming further that defendant’s proposed agreement was

executed, the record before this court shows that plaintiff would retain the right to change his

mind, and the agreement would not go into effect or become enforceable, for up to seven days

after he signed it.

Defendant argues that this court is obliged to enforce the oral terms of the settlement as

read in open court and urges this court to follow Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1140

(9th Cir. 2002) and Manning v. New York Univ., 299 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 2002) in which the

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oral terms of court-supervised settlements were upheld on appeal. However, both cases are

readily distinguishable from the situation under consideration. In Doi, the Ninth Circuit

concluded that “[a]ny question as to [plaintiff’s] intent to be bound was answered when she

appeared in open court, listened to the terms of the agreement placed on the record, and when

pressed to answer as to whether she agreed with the terms, said ‘yeah.’” Doi, 276 F.3d at 1138. 

Similarly, in Manning, the Second Circuit upheld the enforcement of an oral settlement

agreement read in open court, noting, “‘[i]t is beyond a district court’s discretion to alter the

terms of or to refuse to enforce a settlement agreement[], absent special circumstances, such as

a material breach of the agreement.’” Manning, 299 F.3d at 164 (quoting In re Air Crash

Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int’l Airport on June 24, 1975, 687 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 1982)). 

Indeed, it is true that “[a] settlement agreement may be binding in some circumstances, even if

it is an oral one.” Harrop, 550 F.2d at 1145. However, unlike the instant case, in Doi and

Manning there apparently was no indication in the open-court proceedings that a binding

settlement would be contingent upon the execution of a written agreement.

Accordingly, upon the record presented, this court concludes that there was no complete

or final agreement between the parties on August 25, 2006.

IV. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT defendant’s “Motion to Enforce

Settlement Agreement” is DENIED.

Dated: ________________________________

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

March 20, 2007

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A copy of this document will be mailed to:

Piotr J. Gardias 

72 Floyd St. 

San Jose, CA 95110

Pro Se Plaintiff

Mary Susan Cain-Simon 

CA State Attorney General's Office 

1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor 

P. O. Box 70550

Oakland, CA 94612-0550

Counsel for Defendant

Dated: ______________________________

Chambers of Magistrate Judge Lloyd

3/20/07 /s/

Case 5:04-cv-04086-HRL Document 161 Filed 03/20/07 Page 7 of 7