Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00066/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1252(a)(2) Injunction for Deportation

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WO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Linden Winston Graham, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., 

Defendant. 

 No. CV 12-00066-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

 

 

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 43), 

Plaintiff’s motion requesting to register on PACER (Doc. 46), Plaintiff’s motion to vacate 

the Court’s order (Doc. 47), Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 70), and 

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s supplement to Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (Doc. 74). The Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 

70) and denies the remaining motions for the following reasons. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In removal proceedings before an immigration judge, Plaintiff claimed he is a 

United States citizen by birth in the United States Virgin Islands. The Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”), however, alleged Plaintiff was also known as Winston 

George Graham and was a citizen of Jamaica. On November 16, 2004, the immigration 

judge found Plaintiff failed to establish he is a native and citizen of the United States and 

that DHS met its burden of showing Plaintiff was not born in the United States, but in 

Jamaica, and the judge ordered him removed. On April 28, 2005, the Board of 

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Immigration Appeals (“Board”) found the immigration judge’s determination was not 

clearly erroneous, and it therefore dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal. Plaintiff subsequently 

filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 

but his petition was dismissed for failure to prosecute on September 13, 2006. Following 

reinstatement of the petition before the Court of Appeals and the appointment of pro bono 

counsel, Plaintiff, who was removed to Jamaica in 2006, submitted new evidence in 

support of his contention that he was not Winston George Graham or a citizen of Jamaica. 

See (Doc. 1 at 3). On January 9, 2012, after briefing and oral argument, the Court of 

Appeals concluded there was a material issue of fact with regard to Plaintiff’s nationality 

and transferred his case to this Court for a de novo determination of his nationality 

pursuant to section 242(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(b)(5). See (id. at 1-4). 

 On March 22, 2012, Plaintiff requested that his counsel no longer represent him. 

(Docs. 18 & 19). Plaintiff then requested that the Court grant Plaintiff new counsel. 

(Doc. 20). On April 23, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiff’s requests and appointed pro 

bono counsel for Plaintiff. (Doc. 24). On January 22, 2013, Plaintiff again requested that 

his counsel be removed from the case and he be allowed to proceed pro se. (Doc. 37). 

That Court granted Plaintiff’s latest request to remove counsel and following discovery, 

on July 8, 2013, Defendant filed the pending motion for summary judgment (Doc. 70) 

before the Court and a statement of facts in support of the motion (Doc. 71). Plaintiff 

filed a response (Doc. 73) and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. 77). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals transferred Plaintiff’s citizenship claim to this 

Court for “a new hearing on the nationality claim as if an action had been brought in the 

district court under section 2201 of Title 28 [the provision for declaratory judgment].” 

INA § 242(b)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). Accordingly, in a de novo hearing on 

citizenship, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment finding that he is a United States 

Citizen. Sanchez-Martinez v. INS, 714 F.2d 72, 74 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff therefore 

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has the burden of proving his citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence in order to 

prevail. 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Sanchez-Martinez, 714 F.2d at 74 n.1; Yee Tung Gay v. Rusk, 

290 F.2d 630, 631 (9th Cir. 1961) (plaintiffs seeking declaration of citizenship had burden 

of establishing their citizenship by a “fair preponderance of the evidence”); see MondacaVega v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 

572 F.3d 736, 737 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting, inter alia, “[e]vidence of foreign birth [in 

removal proceedings] gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alienage”)). Given the 

multiple pending motions, the sole issue the Court need determine is whether Plaintiff is 

able to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s United 

States citizenship. 

A. Summary Judgment Standard 

 Defendant argues that there is no issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s claim 

of United States citizenship by birth because there is no evidence demonstrating Plaintiff 

was born in the United State Virgin Islands or anywhere else in the United States. (Doc. 

70 at 3). Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record,” or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

the fact.” Id. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party 

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

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more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). In the summary judgment context, the 

Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is 

that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 247-48 (1986). A material fact is any factual issue that might affect the outcome of 

the case under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A material fact is “genuine” if 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 

Id. 

 At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s function is to determine whether 

there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient 

evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 

249-250. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, the judge 

may grant summary judgment. Id. 

 In this case, Plaintiff has failed to file a controverting statement of facts and abide 

by Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) 56.1(b). This rule requires the party 

opposing the motion for summary judgment, the non-movant, to file a controverting 

statement of facts in addition to their response to the motion for summary judgment. 

LRCiv 56.1(b). In the controverting statement of facts the non-movant must address 

every one of the material facts that the moving party put forth. Id. Further, the rule 

requires that any additional facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact that the 

non-movant proffers must “be set forth in [ ] separately numbered paragraph[s] and must 

refer to [ ] specific admissible portion[s] of the record where the fact[s] find[ ] support.” 

Id. “Failure of the non-moving party to comply with LRCiv 56.1(b) is ground for the 

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Court to disregard a controverting statement of facts and deem as true the moving party’s 

separate statement of facts in support of the motion for summary judgment.” Breeser v. 

Menta Grp., Inc., NFP, CV 10-1592-PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 1177651, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 

21, 2013) (citing Szaley v. Pima Cnty., 371 Fed. Appx. 734, 735 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

 Even if the Court were to consider the additional facts Plaintiff has raised in his 

response, see e.g., (Doc. 73 at 3) (alleging he voted in California); (id.) (alleging he was 

part of the witness protection program); (id.) (alleging the Government fraudulently 

redacted any information regarding Plaintiff’s United States citizenship); (id. at 5) 

(alleging the Government stated Plaintiff’s father died in the United States), he has failed 

to support these alleged facts by reference to specific admissible portions of the record in 

compliance with LRCiv 56.1(b). Essentially, Plaintiff has offered no proof of the factual 

allegations he has made. Further, Plaintiff has failed to set forth controverting and 

additional facts in numbered paragraphs pursuant to LRCiv 56.1(b). “A district court does 

not have a duty to search for evidence that would create a factual dispute.” Breeser, 2013 

WL 1177651 at *3 (citing Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007)). “The 

Court’s scrutiny of material statements of facts applies equally to the party seeking 

summary judgment and the party opposing it. Where a party offers a legal conclusion or 

statement of fact without proper evidentiary support, the Court will not consider that 

statement.” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Quality Terminal Servs., LLC, 855 F.Supp.2d 764, 

771 (N.D. Ill. 2012)). 

 The Court will consider Plaintiff’s arguments but the Court will not consider 

Plaintiff’s factual assertions that are not supported anywhere in the record. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). 

B. Citizenship 

 “There are ‘two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization[.]’” 

Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 

U.S. 649, 702 (1898)). Plaintiff contends he was born in the United States Virgin Islands 

in 1959 and that his father was a United States citizen. (Doc. 73 at 3); (Doc. 70-1 at 3); 

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see INA § 101(a)(38), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(38) (the term “United States” generally 

includes the “Virgin Islands of the United States”); INA § 301(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (“a 

person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” shall be a national 

and citizen of the United States at birth”). He does not contend that he has been 

naturalized. Thus, to demonstrate he is a United States citizen, Plaintiff must establish by 

a preponderance of the evidence that is a citizen by birth. 

 Plaintiff can prove citizenship by birth by showing either that he was born in the 

United States, Miller, 523 U.S. at 424, or citizenship by acquisition1

, see 8 U.S.C. § 

1401(g). Citizenship by acquisition concerns a person born outside the United States to a 

citizen of the United States. “The applicable law for transmitting citizenship to a child 

born abroad when one parent is a U.S. citizen is the statute that was in effect at the time of 

the child’s birth.” Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1990)). The citizenship law in effect at the 

time of Plaintiff’s alleged birth in 1959 was the one enacted by § 301 of the INA of 1952, 

Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163, 236, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1952). That 

section (“Former § 1401(a)(7)”) conferred U.S. citizenship at birth on any 

person born outside the geographical limits of the United 

States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is 

an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, 

prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the 

United States or its outlying possessions for a period or 

periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which 

were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That 

any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the 

United States by such citizen parent may be included in 

computing the physical presence requirements of this 

paragraph. 

 1. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Citizenship by Acquisition 

 

1

 With regard to citizenship by birth, “the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 

guarantees that every person ‘born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 

thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.’ 169 

U.S., at 702, 18 S.Ct., at 477. Persons not born in the United States acquire citizenship 

by birth only as provided by Acts of Congress. Id., at 703, 18 S.Ct., at 477–478.” 

Miller, 523 U.S. at 423-24. 

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 In this case former section 1401(a)(7) is inapplicable because Plaintiff claims he 

was born in the United States Virgin Islands and not born abroad. Further, even if this 

section were applicable, Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that his father was ever a 

United States citizen, let alone that he was a citizen before Plaintiff’s birth who was 

physically present in the United States for at least ten years, at least five of which were 

after the age of fourteen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1952). Consequently, Plaintiff has 

failed to establish a material issue of fact over whether he is entitled to citizenship by 

acquisition. 

 Rather, the evidence offered by Defendant shows Plaintiff’s father was born in 

Belize, and visited the United States on various occasions, but never resided in this 

country. (Doc. 71 at 4 ¶ 22); (Doc. 77-1 at 1); (Doc. 77-2 at 1-2); (Doc. 77-3 at 1). 

Plaintiff has offered no evidence to create an issue of fact showing his father was born in 

the United States Virgin Islands. Nor has Plaintiff offered any evidence showing his 

father was ever present in the United States prior to Plaintiff’s birth, let alone physically 

present for the duration of time required to transmit citizenship. Finally, Plaintiff has not 

alleged that his mother was ever a United States citizen, nor would the facts support such 

a claim. See (Doc. 71 at 3 ¶¶ 12, 13, 17) (Plaintiff’s mother was born in Belize, she was a 

citizen of British Honduras, and she never travelled outside Belize). 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff has made no legal or factual argument that he is a United 

States citizen by birth under former section 1401(a)(7) or any other subsection of former 

section 1401. 

 2. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Citizenship by Birth in the United 

 States 

 The only other way for Plaintiff to show citizenship by birth is to show he was born 

in the United States. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 423-24. Plaintiff alleges he was born in the 

United States Virgin Islands. (Doc. 73 at 3); (Doc. 70-1 at 3). However, Plaintiff has 

offered no evidence of any kind that he has ever been to the United States Virgin Islands 

or that he was born there. In spite of discovery requests by Defendant, Plaintiff has not 

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produced any birth certificate, medical records, or school records establishing his birth or 

presence in the United States Virgin Islands at any time. In response to discovery 

requests, Plaintiff declared he did not possess, nor could he obtain, any documents: (1) 

relating to his legalized birth certificate; (2) relating to his parents’ birth, residence, or 

death; (3) showing he was the child of his parents; or (4) relating to his medical records 

during his first year of life. (Doc. 70-1 at 7-8, 10). Indeed, Plaintiff admitted he “did not 

request[ ] a birth certificate or ma[k]e an effort to obtain a birth certificate.” (Id. at 12). 

He also did not produce any documents in response to Defendant’s request for documents 

relating to his parents’ entry into and/or presence in the United States between 1955 and 

1965. (Id. at 7, 10). Significantly, although he claims he applied for a social security 

number in 1986, and that he applied for a United States passport in 1986, (id. at 4-5, 12), 

Plaintiff failed to produce any documentation supporting these claims. Instead of 

producing evidence of his birthplace, Plaintiff made vague, unsubstantiated assertions 

claiming to have been born on a plantation in West Christiansted, St. Croix, United States 

Virgin Islands. (Id. at 3). As he can have no personal recollection of the circumstances of 

his own birth, Plaintiff’s assertion is based solely on his claim that he was told of the date 

and place of his birth by his father. (Id. at 3, 5). However, Plaintiff failed to substantiate 

his claim with any evidence. He proffered no statement from his father to that effect, nor 

any evidence concerning his father. Further, Defendant has presented evidence showing 

the United States Virgin Islands’ Bureau of Vital Statistics, at its separate locations in 

both St. Croix and St. John, has no records relating to Plaintiff. (Doc. 71 at 11 ¶ 83). In 

sum, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence—documentary, testimonial, or 

otherwise—supporting his claim of birth in the United States Virgin Islands, and he has 

therefore failed to establish his claim of United States citizenship by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; see Rassano v. INS, 377 F.2d 971, 973 (7th 

Cir. 1967) (noting lack of documentary evidence to support allegations of citizenship in 

finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding claim of citizenship). 

Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 

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 While Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support his claim, Defendant has 

presented substantial evidence showing Plaintiff was in fact born in Belize. Plaintiff has 

acknowledged that he was born on August 31, 1959, and that his mother was named 

Phyllis McCoy. (Doc. 71 at 1-2 ¶¶ 1, 6). Defendant has presented Plaintiff’s birth 

certificate under the name “Linsden Winston Graham,” and indicating a date of birth of 

August 31, 1959, obtained from the Belizean Bureau of Vital Statistics. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 84). 

Defendant has presented a criminal record for Plaintiff in Belize, which included 

Plaintiff’s matching fingerprints and indicated he was born in Belize. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27, 28, 

30). Defendant has offered evidence establishing that Plaintiff’s father is Ernest McCoy, 

and that Plaintiff’s parents, Ernest McCoy and Phyllis Graham were married on 

September 15, 1962, three years after Plaintiff was born. (Doc. 70 at 10). Evidence 

shows both of Plaintiff’s parents were natives and citizens of British Honduras, which 

later became the independent nation of Belize. (Id. at 11). Evidence also shows that 

Ernest and Phyllis McCoy had three children in addition to Plaintiff and that Phyllis 

Graham has at least three living siblings. (Id.). Further, evidence shows Plaintiff has used 

numerous names during his life and that his aunt, Geraldine Graham (“Geraldine”), 

referred to Plaintiff as both “Linden” and “Linsden.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s younger sister 

Brenda Leslie, two of his maternal aunts, Geraldine and Rachel Jones, and his maternal 

uncle Phillip Graham, all identified photographs of Plaintiff as being their relative, 

Linsden Graham, and stated he was born in Belize. (Id. at 12-13). 

 Accordingly, Defendant has offered substantial evidence showing Plaintiff’s given 

name is Linsden Winston Graham, that he was born in Belize on August 31, 1959, and 

that neither of his parents were United States Citizens. Plaintiff has failed to meet his 

burden to show that there is a genuine dispute regarding these facts. Therefore, Defendant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

// 

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70) is 

granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

(Doc. 43) is denied, that Plaintiff’s motion requesting to register on PACER (Doc. 46) is 

denied, that Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the Court’s order (Doc. 47) is denied, and that 

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s supplement to Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (Doc. 74) is denied, as all these motions are deemed moot. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in 

favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case. 

 Dated this 27th day of September, 2013. 

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