Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_20-cv-00462/USCOURTS-cand-4_20-cv-00462-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

PETER KING, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, and DOES 1-

10, 

 Defendants. 

Case No: C 20-00462 SBA 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

Dkt. 7 

Plaintiff Peter King (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Contra Costa County 

(“Defendant” or “the County”) violated his constitutional rights by failing to timely release 

him from county jail in accordance with his state court sentence. The parties are presently 

before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion is unopposed. Having read and 

considered the papers filed in connection with the motion, the Court GRANTS the motion 

and dismisses the action without leave to amend. The Court, in its discretion, adjudicates 

the instant motion without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

I. BACKGROUND 

In April 2018, Plaintiff was sentenced on various felony criminal charges by the 

Contra Costa County Superior Court. Compl. ¶ 8, Dkt. 1; Def.’s Req. for Jud. Notice 

(“RJN”) Ex. A, Dkt. 7. According to Plaintiff, his release date was set for July 7, 2018, but 

he was not released until October 28, 2018. Compl. ¶ 9. Although Plaintiff complained to 

unspecified persons that he should have been released on July 7, his complaints and 

subsequent internal grievances were ignored. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. 

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On June 24, 2019, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed the instant action in Contra Costa 

County Superior Court. The Complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) civil rights 

violation against the Doe Defendants for keeping Plaintiff in prison beyond his release date 

and against the County pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 

(1978); (2) false imprisonment; (3) negligence; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional 

distress (“NIED”). On January 22, 2020, the County removed the action to this Court on 

the basis of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

On January 28, 2020, the County filed the instant motion to dismiss along with a 

supporting request for judicial notice (“RJN”). Dkt. 6, 7. Attached to the RJN are three 

felony Abstracts of Judgment (“Judgment”) rendered by the Contra Costa County Superior 

Court. According to the County, the Judgments demonstrate that Plaintiff was not 

incarcerated beyond his scheduled release date. In addition, the County contends that each 

of Plaintiff’s claims is substantively and factually deficient. 

Based on the filing date of the County’s motion, Plaintiff’s opposition was due by 

February 11, 2020. Civ. L.R. 7-3(a). To date, no opposition has been filed by Plaintiff. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint 

either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a 

cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). “Rule 

12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires not only ‘fair notice of the 

nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.’” Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 

F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting in part Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 556 n.3 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, “courts must consider the complaint in 

its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) 

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motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, 

and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 

2007). Where a complaint or claim is dismissed, leave to amend generally is granted, 

unless further amendment would be futile. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 

656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. FAILURE TO OPPOSE

Civil Local Rule 7-3(a) provides that “[an] opposition must be filed and served not 

more than 14 days after the motion was filed.” The County filed its motion to dismiss on 

January 28, 2020. Dkt. 9. As such, Plaintiff’s opposition should have been filed by no later 

than February 11, 2010, but none was filed. Civ. L.R. 7-3(a). On February 18, 2020, the 

County filed its reply, notifying the Court that no opposition had been filed and therefore its 

motion to dismiss should be granted as unopposed. Dkt. 9. Although the County’s reply 

clearly alerted Plaintiff to the fact that his opposition was overdue, Plaintiff has not filed 

any opposition or other paper with the Court. 

The failure to oppose a motion to dismiss constitutes an abandonment of the claims 

for which dismissal is being sought. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 

876, 888 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff who makes a claim . . . in his complaint, but fails to 

raise the issue in response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss . . . , has effectively 

abandoned his claim, and cannot raise it on appeal.”); see also Gwaduri v. I.N.S., 362 F.3d 

1144, 1147 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Courts have consistently exercised their discretion to grant 

motions on collateral issues, on the basis that, in failing to respond, the opposing party has 

consented to such action by the court.”); see also SBA Standing Order No. 6 (“The failure 

of the opposing party to file a timely response to any motion or request may be construed as 

consent to the granting of the relief sought in the motion or request.”). Thus, the Court 

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finds that Plaintiff’s failure to oppose the Motion to Dismiss, standing alone, justifies 

granting said motion and dismissing the Complaint. 

B. MERITS

Separate and apart from Plaintiff’s failure to oppose the County’s motion, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff has failed to state any plausible claims against the County. 

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

To maintain a claim pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal 

law, (2) by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 

48 (1988); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). Section 1983 is not 

itself a source of substantive rights, but a jurisdictional vehicle for vindicating federal rights 

elsewhere conferred. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff asserts that he was illegally detained in the county jail from July 7, 2018 to 

October 28, 2018. Confinement beyond the end of an inmate’s sentence gives rise to 

§ 1983 liability under the Eighth Amendment only if the inmate’s continued detention was 

the result of “deliberate indifference” by state actors. See Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison 

official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. 

at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails on multiple levels. First, the Court takes judicial notice 

of the Judgments associated with Plaintiff’s underlying state court conviction, which 

indicate that he did not overserve his sentence.1 On or about April 3, 2018, the court 

imposed a sentence of three years and eight months, with two years suspended. RJN Ex. C. 

1 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of court 

records. See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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Thus, Plaintiff’s effective sentence was twenty months. The Judgment indicates that 

Plaintiff had 400 days credit (for time served and good time credits), leaving him with 208 

days left to serve on his sentence. Two hundred and eight days from the Judgment date of 

April 3, 2018, falls or October 28, 2018, which is when he was released. Plaintiff does not 

refute this calculation or the County’s contention that he did not overserve his sentence.2 

Second, Plaintiff fails to identify any state actors who allegedly miscalculated his 

sentence. See Compl. ¶ 17 (alleging that “Doe defendants, including supervisors” are 

responsible for keeping Plaintiff incarcerated beyond his release date). That aside, the facts 

alleged in the pleadings do not demonstrate the requisite deliberate indifference. See 

Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1354. There is no allegation that the Doe defendants were aware of 

Plaintiff’s release date and deliberately failed to ensure that he was released on time. 

Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that they failed to “properly investigate [his] correct release 

date.” Compl. ¶ 17. At most, Plaintiff has alleged that the Doe defendants acted 

negligently, which is not actionable under § 1983. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060 (“[E]ven 

gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”). 

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim against the County must fail. There is no respondeat 

superior liability under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. A government entity may not be 

held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be 

shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights. Id. at 694. “In 

order to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff must prove 

‘(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that 

the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 

plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the 

constitutional violation.’” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(alterations in original). 

2 The County calculates Plaintiff’s release date as approximately May 17, 2019. 

Dkt. 6 at 6. In making that calculation, it appears that the County took into account 200 

days of credit for time served. It is not clear from the County’s motion why it did not take 

into account the 200 days of good time credits. 

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The Complaint fails to allege a viable § 1983 claim against the County. Since 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983 against the Doe defendants, his claim 

against the County fails as well. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(holding that municipal defendants cannot be held liable under Monell in the absence of an 

underlying constitutional violation). Nor has Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that a policy, 

custom or practice of the County caused the alleged constitutional violation. The pleadings 

state only that the County has a custom and practice of failing to timely investigate inmate 

appeals, which “can and does lead to [] constitutional violations of the rights of inmates 

who are kept beyond their correct release dates.” Compl. ¶ 18. No facts are alleged to 

support these conclusory assertions. Fact-barren claims are subject to dismissal. See Moss 

v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a complaint to 

survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable 

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff 

to relief.”). 

C. FALSE IMPRISONMENT

The pleadings allege that Plaintiff’s prison overstay amounts to false imprisonment. 

“The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual, 

intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable 

period of time, however brief.” Lyons v. Fire Ins. Exch., 161 Cal. App. 4th 880, 888 

(2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted). As discussed above, the County 

contends, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that his state court judgment establishes that he 

was not incarcerated beyond his release date. Plaintiff’s second cause of action for false 

imprisonment is therefore dismissed. 

D. NEGLIGENCE

By statute, public entities are “liable for injury proximately caused by an act or 

omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act 

or omission would ... have given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” Cal. Gov't 

Code § 815.2(a). However, a public entity is not liable for an injury except as provided by 

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statute. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a). Thus, to state a negligence claim against a public entity, 

the plaintiff must plead with specificity the statutory basis upon which he asserts his 

negligence claim against a public entity. See Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist., 177 

Cal. App. 3d 792, 802 (1986) (noting that a plaintiff must plead with particularity the 

existence of a statutory duty before asserting a negligence claim against a public entity). 

Plaintiff has failed to set forth the statutory basis for liability. The Court therefore 

dismisses the third cause of action for negligence. 

E. NIED 

There is no independent cause of action for NIED. Behr v. Redmond, 193 Cal. App. 

4th 517, 532 (2011), as modified (Mar. 25, 2011) (“Negligent infliction of emotional 

distress is not an independent tort; the tort is negligence.”) (citing Potter v. Firestone Tire & 

Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993)). Accordingly, the fourth cause of action for 

NIED is dismissed. 

F. LEAVE TO AMEND

Typically, leave to amend is appropriate where the factual allegations are deficient. 

However, as noted, Plaintiff has abandoned his claims by failing to file an opposition in 

response to the County’s Motion to Dismiss. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 888. In view of 

Plaintiff’s lack of opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are dismissed 

without leave to amend. See Qureshi v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. C 09-4198 

SBA, 2010 WL 841669, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010) (dismissing claims without 

leave to amend where the plaintiff failed to respond to the defendant’s arguments for 

dismissal) (citing Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the County’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 

All claims alleged in the Complaint are dismissed without leave to amend. The Clerk shall 

close the file. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 02/28/2020 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

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