Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02286/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:427 Social Security Benefits

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Patricia Ann Simmons, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02286-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Patricia Ann Simmons’s Application for 

Disability Insurance Benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the 

Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court 

seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court now considers Plaintiff’s Opening 

Brief (Doc. 15, “Pl.’s Br.”), and Defendant Social Security Administration 

Commissioner’s Opposition (Doc. 16, “Def.’s Br.”). 

I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff filed an Application for a Period of Disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits under Titles II and XVIII of the Act on August 10, 2011, for a Period of 

Disability beginning January 28, 2011. (Docs. 12-13, R. at 168-69.) The parties do not 

dispute that Plaintiff’s Last Date Insured for purposes of determining benefits under the 

Act is June 30, 2016. (R. at 22.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on December 14, 

2011, (R. at 114), and on reconsideration on July 18, 2012, (R. at 122). Plaintiff testified 

at a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on February 20, 2014. 

(R. at 35-80.) On April 18, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claim. 

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(R. at 22-29.) The Appeals Council upheld the ALJ’s decision on August 28, 2014. (R. at 

1-6.) The present appeal followed. 

A. Medical Evidence

1. Medical Treatment

 On February 21, 2011, Plaintiff went for a new patient visit to a cardiologist, 

Dr. Monica Escarzaga. (R. at 404.) Dr. Escarzaga noted Plaintiff’s history of coronary 

artery disease and a 2009 stent placement. (R. at 404.) In her last stress echocardiogram, 

in 2010, Plaintiff had excellent exercise tolerance and no angina—chest pain caused by 

inadequate blood supply to the heart. (R. at 404.) Dr. Escarzaga “strongly advised” 

Plaintiff to quit smoking because of the increased risk of heart attack and stroke. (R. at 

407.) On March 21, 2011, Plaintiff underwent another stress echocardiogram, and the 

results were normal with no evidence of infarction. (R. at 378.) 

 On May 8, 2011, upon experiencing chest pain, Plaintiff went to the emergency 

room of Banner Thunderbird Medical Center. (R. at 332-34.) The examining physician 

noted that Plaintiff has a “known history of coronary artery disease, but she continues to 

smoke.” (R. at 332.) The physician also noted Plaintiff’s history of diabetes mellitus and 

hypertension. (R. at 332.) The results of the electrocardiogram were normal. (R. at 332.) 

On May 10, 2011, Plaintiff underwent a CT scan of her chest, and no evidence of 

pulmonary embolism was found. (R. at 331.) The physician recommended that Plaintiff 

follow-up with a cardiologist. (R. at 331.) 

 Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Escarzaga, on May 12, 2011. (R. at 394.) 

Dr. Escarzaga noted Plaintiff’s recent visit to the hospital and Plaintiff’s reports of neck 

and shoulder discomfort and occasional spasms. (R. at 394.) She also noted that the CT 

scan of Plaintiff’s chest revealed a lung nodule and prominent lymph nodes. (R. at 394.) 

Dr. Escarzaga noted that Plaintiff’s recent episode of chest discomfort occurred after she 

fell in the bathtub and concluded that it appeared to be musculoskeletal. (R. at 396.) She 

found Plaintiff’s heart was functioning normally, treated Plaintiff with medication and 

strongly advised her to quit smoking. (R. at 396.) 

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 On June 4, 2011, Plaintiff visited Arizona Pain Specialists (APS) for a 

consultation. (R. at 422.) She reported pain in her neck radiating to her right shoulder and 

upper right arm with numbness, tingling, and occasional weakness in her right hand. 

(R. at 422.) She had previously visited APS in January 2010, when APS ordered medial 

branch blocks but Plaintiff did not complete them. (R. at 422.) A 2009 MRI of the 

cervical spine revealed mild disc bulging at C5-C6 and C6-C7, and a 2009 EMG study 

revealed mild carpal tunnel syndrome. (R. at 422.) Plaintiff reported that the pain in her 

neck and shoulder began five years ago and is improved with hot/cold packs and 

medications. (R. at 422.) The APS nurse practitioner ordered an MRI, x-rays, physical 

therapy and epidural steroid injections. (R. at 424.) 

 A June 7, 2011 x-ray of the lumbar spine revealed “slight hypertrophic bony 

changes” but “[disc] spaces and body heights maintained” and lumbar spine “otherwise 

intact.” (R. at 426.) A June 10, 2011 x-ray and MRI of the cervical spine revealed mild 

arthropathy at several disc levels but no disc herniation present and otherwise 

unremarkable and unchanged from the previous x-ray. (R. at 427, 429.) Plaintiff went to 

APS for epidural injections in her back on August 9 and 18, and September 20, 2011. 

(R. at 419-21.) 

 On account of her history of coronary artery disease, the prior stent placement, and 

her reports of prolonged episodes of chest discomfort, Plaintiff underwent a cardiac 

catheterization on June 16, 2011. (R. at 300-02.) Plaintiff exhibited “mild-to-moderate 

coronary artery disease in all of the lesions” but “no flow-limiting lesion.” (R. at 302.) 

The examining physician concluded that “it is likely that her nonexertional prolonged 

chest discomfort is nonanginal.” (R. at 302.) 

 Upon a report of stress urinary incontinence, Plaintiff underwent a pelvic exam 

and cystoscopy—an examination of the inside of the bladder—on July 20, 2011. (R. at 

317-18.) The exam did not indicate any serious injury or condition. (R. at 318.) 

 On August 24, 2011, Plaintiff returned to the emergency room of Banner 

Thunderbird Medical Center, reporting chest pain, shortness of breath, palpitations and 

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lightheadedness. (R. at 358.) In addition to noting Plaintiff’s history of Type 2 diabetes, 

hypertension, coronary artery disease, hyperlipidemia, sleep apnea and exogenous 

obesity, the physician noted that Plaintiff was “undergoing a short sale of her home and 

she feels very stressed and has been going about frequently and having muscle spasms in 

the musculature of her upper back and shoulders, as well as the neck.” (R. at 358-59.) 

The physician also stated that Plaintiff “says for the past 20 years each night if she has 

been busy, she gets pain in her back and legs, but this has not changed.” (R. at 358.) The 

physician’s initial clinical impression was “atypical chest pain, probably pleurisy”—

inflammation of the lung membrane—or a musculoskeletal problem. (R. at 359.) After 

admission to the hospital, an examination revealed Plaintiff’s heart was functioning 

normally. (R. at 365, 371.) Plaintiff’s chest pain was relieved by pain medications and, 

upon release, Plaintiff was instructed to follow-up with her physician. (R. at 362-64, 

374.) 

 Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Escarzaga on September 12, 2011. (R. at 380.) 

Dr. Escarzaga reported that Plaintiff takes pain medication as needed, “is doing well and 

is not having any more episodes of chest or neck discomfort,” and “is trying to quit 

smoking.” (R. at 380.) Dr. Escarzaga noted Plaintiff’s previously mentioned medical 

history and again strongly advised Plaintiff to stop smoking. (R. at 382.) Dr. Escarzaga 

ordered Plaintiff to try yoga or acupuncture for her neck and shoulder pain and to followup in six months. (R. at 383-84.) 

 On September 14, 2011, Plaintiff saw a neurologist, Dr. Mark Winograd. (R. at 

414-16.) Dr. Winograd concluded that, “neurologically she appears to be intact with one 

exception,” “she probably had mild carpal tunnel [syndrome].” (R. at 415.) For Plaintiff’s 

reports of shoulder pain, Dr. Winograd concluded she likely has “impingement or 

inflammation” at one of the deltoid muscles and was going to try epidural injections. 

(R. at 416.) With regard to Plaintiff’s reports of pain all over, Dr. Winograd stated he 

would “defer to the rheumatologist in the management of the inflammatory 

polyarthropathy.” (R. at 416.) 

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 On October 13, 2011, Plaintiff saw a rheumatologist, Dr. Sheetal Chhaya, 

reporting chronic pain. (R. at 443-45.) Dr. Chhaya ordered blood tests and prescribed 

medication, concluding that the “clinical picture [was] more toward fibromyalgia.” (R. at 

445.) 

 On October 17, 2011, Plaintiff had an MRI of her lumbar spine, and the results 

were normal. (R. at 478.) Plaintiff then saw Dr. Bryan Wall at the Core Institute on 

November 2, 2011, still reporting neck pain. (R. at 481.) Dr. Wall noted that Plaintiff 

reported having the pain for more than ten years and that it was the result of several car 

accidents. (R. at 481.) After examining Plaintiff, Dr. Wall concluded that there was “no 

obvious explanation for the pain” and that “there isn’t much that [he] can do for this 

patient,” but that “the pain is closer to the spine and may be related to the patient’s 

recently diagnosed fibromyalgia.” (R. at 485.) 

 On November 3, 2011, Plaintiff visited Dr. Escarzaga for a follow-up. (R. at 491.) 

Dr. Escarzaga reported Plaintiff continued to smoke and made no new observations. 

(R. at 492.) 

 On December 13, 2011, Plaintiff visited another rheumatologist, Dr. Viji 

Mahadevan, reporting the previous diagnoses of fibromyalgia and Sjogren’s syndrome, 

which is characterized by dry eyes and mouth. (R. at 547.) Dr. Mahadevan noted that 

Dr. Chhaya had prescribed medication in the previous visit but Plaintiff never started it. 

(R. at 547.) Dr. Mahadevan ordered treatment of Plaintiff for fibromyalgia, including a 

regular exercise program and medication. (R. at 550.) 

 On December 28, 2011, Plaintiff visited APS again, reporting neck pain. (R. at 

519.) APS recommended additional branch blocks in the cervical spine, which had 

relieved Plaintiff’s pain in the past, and disc decompression by way of physical therapy. 

(R. at 521.) On December 30, 2011, Plaintiff went to Banner Health Center for an office 

visit regarding her diabetes. (R. at 526.) The physician concluded that Plaintiff’s diabetes 

mellitus type 2 was well controlled and continued her present management. (R. at 527.) 

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 Plaintiff saw her primary care physician, Dr. Christine Harter, throughout 2011 

and early 2012. (R. at 556-600.) On January 16, 2012, among Plaintiff’s conditions, 

Dr. Harter noted that Plaintiff said the fibromyalgia medication made her feel better but 

that aquatic exercise made her feel worse. (R. at 562.) Dr. Harter recommended physical 

therapy. (R. at 564.) Plaintiff saw another primary care physician, Dr. Usma Ahmad, on 

February 27, 2012, and the report of Plaintiff’s conditions was unchanged apart from a 

new report of urinary hesitancy. (R. at 556-58.) 

 A two-year gap in care by Plaintiffs’ physicians ensued because Plaintiff “ran out 

of her insurance,” but she went to Maricopa County Clinic. (R. at 628, 642, 659-792.) On 

January 7, 2014, Dr. Ahmad examined Plaintiff again and made no new observations, 

generally observing that Plaintiff was stable. (R. at 624-26.) On January 9, 2014, 

Dr. Mahadevan examined Plaintiff again. (R. at 627-29.) He found Plaintiff had 

tenderness in seven trigger points. (R. at 629.) As he had in Plaintiff’s previous visit, 

Dr. Mahadevan prescribed medication for fibromyalgia and recommended Plaintiff begin 

regular exercise. (R. at 629.) 

2. Medical Examinations

 On June 15, 2012, a nurse practitioner, Alina Stanca, completed a Fibromyalgia 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) Questionnaire. (R. at 601-03.) In checklist form, 

Ms. Stanca concluded that Plaintiff had multiple tender points, numbness and tingling of 

upper extremities, severe fatigue, morning stiffness, depression and anxiety. (R. at 601.) 

She summarized Plaintiff’s pain as “moderately severe” that could “frequently” interfere 

with attention and concentration and “constantly” result in failure to complete tasks in a 

timely manner. (R. at 603.) 

 On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff underwent a psychological examination by Dr. Greg 

Peetoom. (R. at 604-09.) Dr. Peetoom noted that Plaintiff drove to her appointment and 

regularly drives short distances, independently showers and changes clothing, does light 

housework, shops for groceries weekly, watches television, spends time on the computer, 

and manages her own finances. (R. at 604-05.) Plaintiff stated her chief complaint was 

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her physical issues. (R. at 604.) She reported that she was in three or four “whiplashtype” car accidents and she suffers from neck and shoulder pain, which her doctors say is 

fibromyalgia. (R. at 605.) Plaintiff felt her pain began to interfere with her work in 2008. 

(R. at 605.) She was diagnosed with depression some 12 years before, but she felt better 

with her medication. (R. at 605.) Plaintiff still smoked one pack of cigarettes per day but 

was trying to stop. (R. at 606.) Plaintiff scored 29 out of 30 on the mini-mental state 

examination and was generally able to complete the other tests administered. (R. at 606-

07.) Dr. Peetoom noted Plaintiff was preoccupied with her medical issues. (R. at 606.) In 

sum, Dr. Peetoom found Plaintiff to be of average intelligence and gave her a 

psychological prognosis of “fair,” noting that her psychological symptoms were well 

managed with medication and she can maintain normal activities of daily living. (R. at 

607.) 

 On January 10, 2014, Dr. Ahmad completed a Pain Functional Capacity 

Questionnaire. (R. at 636-37.) In checklist form, Dr. Ahmad concluded that Plaintiff has 

moderate to moderately severe pain that would frequently interfere with attention and 

concentration and frequently result in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. (R. at 

636-37.) On January 14, 2014, Dr. Ahmad completed a Medical Assessment of Ability to 

Do Work Related Physical Activities Questionnaire. (R. at 638-40.) In checklist form, 

Dr. Ahmad concluded that Plaintiff could occasionally lift or carry less than ten pounds, 

stand and/or walk less than two hours in an eight hour day, sit for only two hours in an 

eight hour day, never crouch or crawl and occasionally climb, balance, stoop or kneel, 

and either never or only occasionally use her hands for various purposes. (R. at 638-39.) 

3. Non-Examining Physicians

On August 10, 2011, at the time of filing a claim for disability benefits, the 

interviewer found that Plaintiff was a hypochondriac based on Plaintiff’s report of 

numerous disabilities and that she saw many doctors only once because she did not have 

time or was too busy to go back for follow-up appointments. (R. at 201.) On 

December 12, 2011, Dr. Terry Ostrowski noted Plaintiff’s medical history and that 

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Plaintiff worked as an accountant until January 2011, when her assignment came to an 

end. (R. at 82-92.) Dr. Ostrowski noted the doctors’ observations that Plaintiff does her 

own housework, fixes meals, shops, drives a car and manages her finances and that 

medical treatment improved many of Plaintiff’s symptoms. (R. at 82-92.) Dr. Ostrowski 

stated, “Medical records show that [Plaintiff experiences] some difficulty and 

discomfort” but that she is “not significantly restricted in [her] ability to get about and 

perform ordinary daily activities.” (R. at 92.) Upon his examination of the medical 

evidence, he concluded that Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds 

frequently, stand about six hours in an eight-hour workday and sit for the same amount of 

time. (R. at 89.) He did not find that Plaintiff had other significant limitations, and he 

concluded that Plaintiff was able to perform her past work as an accountant and was 

therefore not disabled. (R. at 89-92.) 

 On July 16, 2012, after a review of additional records of Plaintiff’s medical care, 

Dr. Erika Wavak reached essentially the same conclusions as Dr. Ostrowski. (R. at 94-

112). Dr. Wavak found that Plaintiff’s conditions resulted in some limitations but they 

were not severe enough to prevent Plaintiff from performing her past work as an 

accountant. (R. at 112.) 

B. Hearing Testimony

 At the hearing held on February 20, 2014, in response to the ALJ’s questions, 

Plaintiff testified that she is 58 years old, stands five feet three inches tall, and weighs 

189 pounds. (R. at 42, 55.) She no longer works other than helping her daughter, a 

beautician, about once a month by sweeping hair off the floor in her work area. (R. at 43.) 

She last worked as an accountant through a temporary agency until January 28, 2011—

the alleged onset date. (R. at 44-45.) She had quit her prior full-time job with Xerox a 

month before in the hope that the new temporary position would become full-time, but 

the project she was working on changed in scope and she was no longer needed. (R. at 

45-48.) She testified that, had the new position been the job she had been told about, she 

would have taken a full-time position because, at the time, she hoped she could continue 

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working. (R. at 48-49.) She applied for and received unemployment compensation for the 

whole year of 2011 and three quarters of 2012. (R. at 50.) She interviewed for several 

jobs during that period but did not get any offers. (R. at 51.) 

 Plaintiff testified that she drives a car at least once a week for shopping, doctor 

appointments and the like. (R. at 53-54.) She does the few household chores that are 

required, such as cooking, dishes and laundry, and she dresses and bathes herself. (R. at 

54-56.) She is overweight, particularly on account of the medication she takes and her 

less active lifestyle. (R. at 55.) On a typical day, she spends time outside smoking, on the 

internet, and watching movies on television. (R. at 56, 58-59.) She, her daughters and her 

sister visit each other regularly and her grandchildren visit her. (R. at 59-62.) She 

travelled to Flagstaff in December 2012 for her son’s graduation. (R. at 63.) She smokes 

three-quarters of a pack to a full pack of cigarettes a day and drinks alcohol occasionally. 

(R. at 63-64.) She and her children go out for dinner about twice a month. (R. at 64.) She 

manages her own finances and pays her bills online. (R. at 66.) 

 With regard to pain, Plaintiff testified that, on and off, she has a sharp pain in her 

shoulder or upper shoulder blade. (R. at 67-68.) She has fibromyalgia with pain that 

“could be anywhere,” including the big toe, knee, neck, shoulder and hip, and she takes 

medication. (R. at 68-69.) She has pain in her feet from neuropathy that might be caused 

by diabetes, for which she also takes medication. (R. at 69.) Her hands fall asleep, which 

might be from carpal tunnel syndrome but for which she has not had surgery. (R. at 71.) 

She has “trigger finger” in one thumb, for which she gets cortisone shots. (R. at 71.) 

Sometimes she can walk for half an hour at a time, and other times she can walk for five 

minutes. (R. at 73.) She can grocery shop for about an hour at a time with the help of a 

cart. (R. at 74.) 

 The ALJ also examined Shirley Ripp, a Vocational Expert (VE), at the hearing. 

The VE testified that Plaintiff’s previous work as an accountant was sedentary. (R. at 75.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE if Plaintiff could do her past work as an accountant with 

the limitations identified by Dr. Ahmad in her functional assessment of Plaintiff, and the 

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VE answered, “No.” (R. at 77.) The ALJ pointed out that Dr. Ahmad had found Plaintiff 

to be less than sedentary such that, if Dr. Ahmad’s findings were supported by the record, 

Plaintiff would be ruled disabled. (R. at 77.) 

C. The ALJ’s Opinion

 In his opinion, for the period from the alleged onset date of January 28, 2011 

onward, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

and had impairments of “fibromyalgia, osteoarthritis, coronary artery disease post stent 

placement in 2009 and heart catheterization in 2011, basilar atelectasis/asthma with 

tobacco dependence, and obesity,” which in combination caused “more than minimal 

impact on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities” but did not equal any 

listing under the pertinent regulations. (R. at 25.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had 

the RFC to perform light work except only occasionally climb, kneel or crawl; never 

climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; frequently stoop and crouch; and avoid extreme 

temperatures and hazards. (R. at 26.) 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments could reasonably be expected to cause 

the alleged symptoms, but that her statements regarding the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely credible because (1) Plaintiff 

stopped working on the alleged onset date because her job came to an end, not because 

she was unable to work; (2) she interviewed for other jobs and collected unemployment 

for almost two years after the alleged onset date; (3) her activity level—including helping 

her daughter at work, regularly driving a car, using a computer for e-mails, games and 

bill-paying, cooking, doing the dishes, doing the laundry, cleaning, making her bed, 

visiting and hosting her family, and traveling—was inconsistent with her allegations of 

disability; and (4) treatment records showed that the coronary artery disease and diabetes 

were under control, only mild musculoskeletal problems were present, her fibromyalgia 

symptoms were not disabling, and her condition was exacerbated by obesity and smoking 

but not to the point of precluding work activities altogether. (R. at 27.) 

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 The ALJ gave great weight to the assessment of state examining physician 

Dr. Wavak and significant weight to the assessment of Dr. Ostrowski, because they were 

consistent with the medical treatment records and Plaintiff’s ability to perform the 

activities of daily living. (R. at 28.) The ALJ gave little weight to the assessment of 

treating physician Dr. Ahmad because it was in checklist form with little supporting 

objective evidence; indeed, it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s treatment records, which 

did not suggest significant limitations in functional capacity, and Plaintiff scored 29 out 

of 30 in the Mini Mental Status examination. (R. at 28.) Likewise, the ALJ gave little 

weight to the fibromyalgia assessment of Ms. Stanca, because she is a nurse practitioner. 

(R. at 28-29.) Moreover, the assessment was in checklist form and inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities and the examining psychologist’s findings of 

Plaintiff’s ability to maintain attention and concentration. (R. at 28.) 

 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act from the alleged 

onset date to the date of the ALJ’s opinion because, considering Plaintiff’s RFC, Plaintiff 

could perform her past relevant work as an accounting clerk, which requires only 

sedentary exertion and has no postural requirements. (R. at 29.) 

II. ANALYSIS 

 The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ's decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner's disability determination only if the determination is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 

630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id.

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be 

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upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ 

determines whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id.

At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the 

claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether 

the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, 

the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and 

determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. 

Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the 

claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant's 

RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

A. The ALJ Assigned Proper Weight to the Assessments of Plaintiff’s 

Treating Physicians and Properly Considered the Record as a Whole

 Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s findings at step four of the five-step process, 

specifically, that when considering the combination of Plaintiff’s impairments, Plaintiff’s 

RFC allowed her to perform her past relevant work. Plaintiff’s first argument is that the 

ALJ committed reversible error by assigning inadequate weight to the assessments of 

Plaintiff’s medical care providers. (Pl.’s Br. at 12-18.) Defendant argues that the ALJ 

properly weighed the treating professionals’ assessments, giving specific and legitimate 

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reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for giving little weight to certain 

assessments. (Def.’s Br. at 4-15.) 

 An ALJ “may only reject a treating or examining physician’s uncontradicted 

medical opinion based on ‘clear and convincing reasons.’” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F. 3d 821, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996)). “Where such an opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Id. 

In this instance, the ALJ found that the assessments of one of Plaintiff’s treating 

physicians, Dr. Ahmad, and of a treating nurse practitioner, Ms. Stanca, are contradicted 

by the assessments of Drs. Wavak and Ostrowski. (R. at 28-29.) The ALJ first found that 

the assessments were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s treatment records, citing the 

cardiologist’s reports that Plaintiff’s coronary artery disease had been treated and did not 

result in significant physical limitations, evidence that Plaintiff’s diabetes was under 

control, mental test results indicating no significant limitations, evidence that Plaintiff’s 

posture and gait did not indicate disabling pain, and evidence that, while Plaintiff’s 

obesity exacerbated her condition, it did not preclude physical activity. (R. at 27-28.) 

With regard to Ms. Stanca, the ALJ also properly considered the fact that she is a nurse 

practitioner and thus not the “most qualified health professional.” (R. at 29.) Under the 

relevant regulations, a nurse practitioner does not qualify as an “acceptable treating 

source” but is instead defined as an “other source,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1), and, as 

such, an ALJ may if justified give less weight to the opinion of a nurse practitioner, 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 The ALJ also found that the medical professionals’ assessments were inconsistent 

with Plaintiff’s ability to exert herself to do her household work, drive and shop. (R. at 

28.) While a claimant need not be “utterly incapacitated” to be considered disabled under 

the Act, Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005), Plaintiff’s testimony 

supports the conclusion that she had the functional capacity to regularly clean, cook, use 

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a computer, watch television, help her daughter at work, visit family, and occasionally 

travel. This testimony is inconsistent with, for example, the significant physical 

limitations Dr. Ahmad attributed to Plaintiff. Considering the record as a whole, the 

Court finds the ALJ’s reasons for assigning little weight to the functional capacity 

assessments of Dr. Ahmad and Ms. Stanca were specific, legitimate, and supported by 

substantial evidence. 

B. The ALJ Properly Weighed Plaintiff’s Testimony

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at 18-22.) In response, Defendant contends that the ALJ gave 

Plaintiff’s testimony the proper weight because some of her testimony was not supported 

by objective medical evidence, Plaintiff was successful in controlling her symptoms with 

medication and other treatment, Plaintiff engaged in physical activity despite her claimed 

limitations, Plaintiff’s last job ended not because of a disability but for business reasons, 

and Plaintiff collected unemployment and searched for another job for almost two years 

of the claimed disability period. (Def.’s Br. at 17-23.) 

 While credibility is the province of the ALJ, an adverse credibility determination 

requires the ALJ to provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the 

claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the claimant’s symptoms.” Treichler v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ generally credited Plaintiff’s testimony that 

she could help her daughter in the beauty salon, work on her computer for an hour at a 

time with breaks, do housework, watch television, and visit with family. (See R. at 53-

66.) However, the ALJ disagreed with certain statements of Plaintiff regarding the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her conditions and her conclusion that she 

was “less than sedentary.” (R. at 27, 41.) 

 In the instances in which the ALJ assigned little value to Plaintiff’s statements, the 

Court finds the ALJ gave sufficient justification. For example, the ALJ pointed out that 

Plaintiff applied and interviewed for other jobs during the alleged period of disability, 

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which does not disqualify Plaintiff from seeking disability benefits but is at least 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statement that she was incapable of working. (See R. at 27.) 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s testimony as to the limiting effects of her conditions was 

inconsistent with her medical treatment, in which doctors either found no physical 

limitations or, when Plaintiff went to a follow-up checkup, that her condition improved 

with medication and other treatment. (See R. at 27.) In addition, as the Court has already 

discussed, Plaintiff’s claim that she was “less than sedentary” is inconsistent with her 

own testimony regarding her ability to perform daily activities, work on the computer, or 

visit family and travel. (See R. at 27.) For all these reasons, the Court finds the ALJ 

properly weighed Plaintiff’s testimony as to her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(3); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008); Warre 

ex rel. E.T. IV v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 

III. CONCLUSION

 Plaintiff raises no error on the part of the ALJ, and the SSA’s decision denying 

Plaintiff’s Application for a Period of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits under 

the Act was supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the April 18, 2014, decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge, (R. at 22-29), as upheld by the Appeals Council on August 

28, 2014 (R. at 1-6). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case. 

 Dated this 4th day of March, 2016. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

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