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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

PABLO RAEL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Coun of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

OCT 2 9 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. 

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) 

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) 

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) 

) 

) 

No. 89-2049 

GEORGE SULLIVAN, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. Civ. 87-0227 JB) 

Stephen P. McCue, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for petitioner-appellant. 

Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General (Hal Stratton, 

Attorney General, with her on the brief), Santa Fe, New Mexico, for 

respondent-appellee. 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District 

Judge.* 

BROWN, District Judge. 

* Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United states District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2049 Document: 01019311063 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 1 
.. Appellant challenges the district court's dismissal of his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus (28 u.s.c. § 2254). Appellant 

was convicted by a jury in Socorro County District Court on three 

counts of extortion and one count of telephone harassment. He 

alleges that the convictions on the extortion counts were obtained 

in violation of the right to due process of law contained in the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. s. Constitution. We have 

examined the record before us, including tape recordings of 

appellant's trial, and we find no constitutional violations. We 

therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 

The facts underlying appellant's extortion convictions were 

as follows: In October of 1979, Mr. Rael was arrested on an 

assault charge involving his father. Patsy Reinard, an attorney 

in Socorro, New Mexico, was appointed to represent appellant. 

Ms. Reinard requested a psychological evaluation of Mr. Rael by 

Margie Trujillo of the Southwest Community Mental Health Services. 

An evaluation of Mr. Rael was performed under the supervision of 

Ms. Trujillo. The assault charge against Mr. Rael was ultimately 

disposed of when he agreed to voluntarily commit himself for 

alcohol treatment at the New Mexico State Hospital at Ft. Bayard. 

In February of 1980, Mr. Rael apparently requested to see the 

results of the evaluations performed on him. Ms. Trujillo 

disclosed the results of the evaluations to Mr. Rael in her office. 

Mr. Rael became angry upon reading the reports. He threw the file 

in Ms. Trujillo's office and stormed out, slamming doors behind 

him. During 1981 and 1982, Mr. Rael contacted Ms. Trujillo and 

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Appellate Case: 89-2049 Document: 01019311063 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 2 
Ms. Reinard on several occasions in an attempt to obtain and review 

copies of the paperwork relating to his evaluation and commitment. 

Ms. Trujillo made a professional judgment that she ought not to 

give Mr. Rael copies of the reports in light of his apparent mental 

state. She did give copies of the evaluations to Pedro Rael, Esq., 

who was appellant's attorney. 

Appellant subsequently wrote several letters to Ms. Trujillo. 

In the letters, appellant indicated to Ms. Trujillo that he would 

"kick your ass" unless she sent him copies of the evaluations. 

These letters formed the basis of the extortion charges against 

appellant. 

Mr. Rael was charged with extortion under N.M.S.A. § 30-16-9 

(1978), which provided in part: 

Extortion consists of the communication 

or transmission of any threat to another by any 

means whatsoever with intent thereby to 

wrongfully obtain anything of value or to 

wrongfully compel the person threatened to do 

or refrain from doing any act against his will. 

Any of the following acts shall be 

sufficient to constitute a threat under this 

section: 

A. a threat to do any unlawful injury to 

the person or property of the person or of 

another .. 

The jury deciding Mr. Rael's case was instructed in pertinent part 

as follows on each of the extortion charges: 

For you to find the defendant guilty of 

extortion . . . , the State must prove to your 

satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of 

the following elements of the crime: 

1. The defendant threatened to injure the 

person or property of Margie Trujillo by the 

use of physical violence, intending to compel 

Margie Trujillo to so something she would not 

have done. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2049 Document: 01019311063 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 3 
Appellant contends that this instruction led to a violation 

of due process. The basis of his argument is that the trial court 

failed to instruct the jury that it must find that appellant 

intended to wrongfully compel Ms. Trujillo to do something she 

would not have done. Appellant points out that he had a right to 

obtain copies of his evaluations, a fact which the State concedes, 

and argues that his attempts to compel Ms. Trujillo to give him the 

reports were therefore not "to wrongfully compel" within the 

meaning of the statute. Citing United States v. Enmons, 410 u.s. 

396, 93 s.ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973) (Under the definition of 

extortion in the Hobbs Act, the use of force or violence was not 

"wrongful" unless the alleged extortionist had no lawful claim to 

the property.) Appellant argues that the instructions therefore 

omitted an essential element of extortion, meaning his convictions 

were obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause, which 

"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 

a reasonable doubt of every act necessary to constitute the crime 

with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 u.s. 358, 90 s.ct. 

1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The State responds by arguing that 

the threat of violence to compel any act against the victim's will 

is wrongful and is prohibited by the extortion statute. The State 

contends that the jury was instructed on all of the essential 

elements of extortion. 

We agree with those cases cited by appellant holding that a 

complete failure to instruct on an essential element of an offense 

violates the right to due process. See ~' Cole v. Young, 817 

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Appellate Case: 89-2049 Document: 01019311063 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 4 
F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir. 1987). Such decisions are but a logical 

application of the rule of In re Winship, supra, requiring proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of all acts necessary to constitute the 

offense. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 

2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) (Prosecution must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of 

the offense). In the instant case, however, we find no violation 

of due process because the jury was instructed on all the elements 

of extortion under New Mexico law. 

The substantive elements of the crime of extortion must be 

determined by reference to the law of New Mexico. See Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 u.s. 307, 324 n.16, 99 s.ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 

(1979) ("[T]he standard must be applied with explicit reference to 

the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by 

state law."). Moreover, the interpretations given the extortion 

statute by New Mexico's state courts are binding on this court. 

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 

(1975) ("This Court . has repeatedly held that state courts are 

the ultimate expositors of state law • • . and that we are bound 

by their constructions except in extreme circumstances not present 

here."). 

Whether the phrase "to wrongfully compel" refers to the manner 

in which the defendant compels an act or instead refers to the 

legitimacy of the defendant's objective is a question of statutory 

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Appellate Case: 89-2049 Document: 01019311063 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 5 
interpretation. 1 Although appellant's argument for the latter 

construction is not without some merit, it is not the 

interpretation adopted by the courts of New Mexico. The 

1 We note that there are different opinions as to the proper 

scope of extortion statutes. Among early decisions, for example, 

there was a split of authority as to whether a creditor's threats 

to a debtor constituted extortion when the creditor was attempting 

to collect what he believed to be a valid claim. See Annotation 

135 A.L.R. 728. The weight of authority held that such threats 

could amount to extortion even though the creditor's objective (to 

collect a lawful claim) was legitimate. Id. One court stated that 

the term "wrongful" as used in an extortion statute "has no 

reference whatever to the question of the justness of the ultimate 

result sought, but relates solely to the methods used to obtain 

such results." In re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130 N.W. 761 (1911). 

Thus, "one can extort that to which he is rightfully entitled, as 

well as that to which he is not entitled." Id. See also State v. 

Phillips, 115 P.2d 418 (Idaho 1941). 

Others have taken the view that the gravamen of a "wrongful" 

taking or use of force is obtaining property to which one has no 

lawful claim. See United States v. Enmons, 410 u.s. 396, 93 S.Ct. 

1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973). The Model Penal Code, which categorizes extortion as a theft crime, states: "[S)tatutes dealing 

with improper acquisitive behavior should be inapplicable to cases 

where the actor's method of obtaining property is objectionable but 

his objective is not." Model Penal Code Commentary §223.4 (Am.Law 

Inst.). 

Section 49 of 31A Am.Jur.2d on Extortion states: "Under the 

common law and most recent statutory codes and proposals, extortion 

by a private person, or blackmail, is limited to obtaining property 

by threatening to inflict harm. Separate treatment is often 

provided in the statutes for those threats which do not involve the 

obtaining of property. Thus, under most recent statutory codes, 

a threat constitutes an offense independent from that of extortion 

or blackmail, and is punishable even if the defendant does not make 

the threat for the purpose of obtaining money, property, or other 

pecuniary advantage." The accompanying notes to this section add, 

however, that "a few recent codes and proposals adopt a comprehensive provision covering both threats used to obtain property 

(extortion or blackmail) and threats used to restrict another's 

freedom of action (threatening, coercion, intimidation, and the 

like)." The note cites the Michigan statute on extortion, M.C.L. 

§ 750.213, which prohibits threatening with the intent to extort 

money and threatening with the intent to compel the person 

threatened to do or refrain from doing any act against his or her 

will. 

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instruction given by the trial court in this case was substantially 

similar to New Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction 16. 32. This uniform 

instruction setting forth the essential elements of extortion was 

adopted by order of the New Mexico Supreme Court and its use has 

been upheld on appeal. See state v. Barber, 606 P.2d 192, 194 

(N.M.App. 1979) 2 , cert. denied, 614 P.2d 545. The instruction 

clearly interprets the phrase "wrongfully compel" as referring to 

the means used to compel an act. The instruction labels as 

extortion any threat to injure a person done with the intention of 

compelling the person to do something against their will. Cf. 

State v. Wheeler, 622 P.2d 283, 286 (N.M.App. 1980) (In assessing 

whether certain acts were committed during the course of an 

extortion, the court stated: "The crime of extortion is complete 

when a person makes the threat, intending to compel the victim to 

do something he would not have done."). Given the adoption and use 

of this instruction by the courts of New Mexico, we are not at 

2 In Barber, the defendant was a landlord who accused a tenant 

of skipping out on his rental obligations. The defendant 

threatened to injure the tenant unless the tenant signed an 

agreement transferring title to five mopeds from the tenant's store 

to the defendant in exchange for a release of his rental obligations. The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant was 

guilty of the crime of extortion if he "threatened to injure [the 

victim], intending to obtain a thing of value, title to five 

mopeds, from [the victim]." The New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld 

the use of U.J.I. 16.32 and rejected the defendant's challenges to 

the sufficiency of the evidence, including his assertion that the 

circumstances amounted to a purely civil matter. The court 

apparently attached no significance to the issue of whether the 

defendant's claim against the tenant was legitimate. 606 P.2d at 

194-95 ("Our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to 

support the verdict on the charge actually submitted to the jury--

not whether the evidence supports other crimes or legal 

remedies."). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2049 Document: 01019311063 Date Filed: 10/29/1990 Page: 7 
liberty to find that the elements of extortion are different than 

those set forth by that state's courts. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 

u.s. 684, 95 s.ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (State courts are the 

ultimate expositors of state law.) Nor is the argument that the 

New Mexico courts have misinterpreted the extortion statute a basis 

for granting petitioner's request for habeas relief. Id. See also 

Engle v. Isaac, 456 u.s. 107, 121 n.21, 102 s.ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 

783 (1982} ("We have long recognized that a 'mere error of state 

law• is not a denial of due process."). 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals' recent decision in State v. 

Ashley, 772 P.2d 377 (N.M.App. 1989), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 1240, 

does not lead us to conclude that New Mexico courts now interpret 

the term "wrongfully" in a different manner. Although the Ashley 

court toyed with the idea of adopting the interpretation of 

wrongful found in United states v. Enmons, the court ultimately 

decided to base its opinion on other grounds. Ashley, 772 P.2d at 

380. Cf. Ashley, 772 P.2d 381-82 (Apodaca, J., concurring). In 

the absence of any indication to the contrary, we cannot assume 

that the elements of extortion are different than those set forth 

in the instructions approved by New Mexico's courts. 

Appellant has failed to show that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, 

the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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