Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01820/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01820-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN JORDAN, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-1820 LKK KJM P

vs.

CAL A. TERHUNE, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 22, 2005, he filed a motion for a restraining order and preliminary

injunction. He asks the court to direct named defendants to release him from administrative

segregation, submit his case for non-emergency transfer, place him on single-cell status pending

the transfer, repair his television, return all of his personal papers and drawings and to cease

 intefering with his mail, witholding food, preparing false rules violations reports, and attempting 

to put a “snitch-jacket” on him.

The purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo

pending a fuller hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a

temporary restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the

hearing on a preliminary injunction. It is apparent however, that requests for temporary

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restraining orders which are ex parte and without notice are governed by the same general

standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.

Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.); Los Angeles Unified Sch.

Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting);

Century Time Ltd. v. Interchron Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In many cases the

emphasis of the court is directed to irreparable harm and the balance of hardships because the

merits of a controversy are often difficult to ascertain and adjudicate on short notice.

The legal principles applicable to a request for injunctive relief are well

established. To prevail, the moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits

and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122

F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374,

1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal

point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. “Under

any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury.” Id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm, the

court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

When a party seeks an injunction against a state agency, “a strong factual record is

necessary.” Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover,

when a party seeks an injunction that would require affirmative conduct, the facts and law must

clearly favor the moving party before relief is warranted. Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals

Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993); Cupolo v. Bay Area Rapid Transit, 5 F.Supp.2d 1078,

1085 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any

preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the 

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harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

Plaintiff has submitted over a hundred pages of pleadings and attachments, many

of which are simply copies of letters he has sent to named defendants and of documents

generated in response to various Rules Violation Reports submitted against him. He has

supported his motion with his declaration, but its many conclusions (i.e., “Lt.S. Peck suborned

Lt. J.L. Bishop to have me placed into administrative segregation. . . . ) are unsupported by

anything but plaintiff’s speculation. The numerous additional exhibits do not provide the “strong

factual” support plaintiff needs in support of these requests. Accordingly, he has not shown that

the facts and law clearly favor his position. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s August 22, 2005 request for a

temporary restraining order is denied. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s August 22, 2005 request for a

preliminary injunction be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 8, 2005.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 jord1820.56

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