Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01054/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01054-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN DAVID O’NEAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. PETERSON, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 13-cv-1054 KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

(ECF No. 33.) Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies and on the merits of plaintiff’s claims.

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion be 

granted.

On January 23, 2015, defendants filed a request that the declaration of C. Amrein in 

support of their motion for summary judgment be deemed timely filed. (ECF No. 35.) Good 

cause appearing, C. Amrein’s declaration attached to defendants’ January 23, 2015 request, is 

deemed timely filed. 

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Legal Standard: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Proper exhaustion of available remedies is mandatory, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,

741 (2001), and “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The Supreme Court has 

also cautioned against reading futility or other exceptions into the statutory exhaustion 

requirement. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6. Moreover, because proper exhaustion is necessary, 

a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise 

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93. 

“[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners ‘must complete the administrative 

review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,’ [] - rules that are defined not 

by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 

(2007) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). See also Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 

(9th Cir. 2009) (“The California prison system’s requirements ‘define the boundaries of proper 

exhaustion.’”) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218). 

In California, prisoners may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission 

by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material 

adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). 

On January 28, 2011, California prison regulations governing inmate grievances were revised. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Now, inmates in California proceed through three levels of 

appeal to exhaust the appeal process: (1) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal 

form, (2) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (3) third level appeal to the 

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Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. Under specific circumstances, the first level review may be bypassed. Id. 

The third level of review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR and exhausts a 

prisoner’s administrative remedies. See id. § 3084.7(d)(3). Since 2008, medical appeals have 

been processed at the third level by the Office of Third Level Appeals for the California 

Correctional Health Care Services. A California prisoner is required to submit an inmate appeal 

at the appropriate level and proceed to the highest level of review available to him. Butler v. 

Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 

2002). Since the 2011 revision, in submitting a grievance, an inmate is required to “list all staff 

members involved and shall describe their involvement in the issue.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.2(3). Further, the inmate must “state all facts known and available to him/her regarding 

the issue being appealed at the time,” and he or she must “describe the specific issue under appeal 

and the relief requested.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.2(a)(4). An inmate has thirty calendar 

days to submit his or her appeal from the occurrence of the event or decision being appealed, or 

“upon first having knowledge of the action or decision being appealed.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.8(b). 

Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Bock, 

549 U.S. at 204, 216. In Albino, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the underlying panel’s decision1

“that the burdens outlined in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996),] 

should provide the template for the burdens here.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc). A defendant need only show “that there was an available administrative remedy, 

and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. Once the 

defense meets its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the administrative

remedies were unavailable. See Albino, 697 F.3d at 1030-31. 

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1

 See Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2012). The three judge panel noted that “[a] 

defendant’s burden of establishing an inmate’s failure to exhaust is very low.” Id. at 1031. 

Relevant evidence includes statutes, regulations, and other official directives that explain the 

scope of the administrative review process. Id. at 1032.

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A prisoner may be excused from complying with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement if 

he establishes that the existing administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172-73. When an inmate’s administrative grievance is improperly rejected 

on procedural grounds, exhaustion may be excused as effectively unavailable. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 

623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 

2010) (warden’s mistake rendered prisoner’s administrative remedies “effectively unavailable”); 

Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (exhaustion excused where futile); Brown 

v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff not required to proceed to third level where 

appeal granted at second level and no further relief was available).

Where a prison system’s grievance procedures do not specify the requisite level of detail 

for inmate appeals, Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824, a grievance satisfies the administrative exhaustion 

requirement if it “alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Griffin 

v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). “A grievance need not include legal terminology 

or legal theories unless they are in some way needed to provide notice of the harm being grieved. 

A grievance also need not contain every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal 

claim. The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem and facilitate its 

resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120.

If under the Rule 56 summary judgment standard, the court concludes that plaintiff has 

failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 

747 F.3d 1162. 

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set forth in 

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 56 is met. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

 Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

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portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting then-numbered Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving 

party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s 

case.” Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.), 

627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56 advisory committee’s notes to 2010 amendments (recognizing that “a party who does not have 

the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden 

cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact”). Indeed, summary 

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party 

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 

U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 

Consequently, if the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 

establish the existence of such a factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 

allegations or denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a 

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party 

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 

(9th Cir. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 

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1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 

amendments).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be 

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences 

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. 

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted).

By contemporaneous notice provided on July 30, 2014, (ECF No. 22-2), plaintiff was 

advised of the requirements for opposing a motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); 

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff’s Claims

This action is proceeding on the second amended complaint filed April 28, 2014, as to 

defendants Williams, Peddicord and Gamberg. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff alleges that on March 20, 

2012, he was attacked by his cellmate, inmate Finister. (Id. at 4.) At that time, plaintiff and 

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inmate Finister were housed at the California Correctional Institution (“CCI”). (Id.) After 

plaintiff was moved out of the cell, inmate Finister attacked his next cellmate. (Id.) On August 

15, 2012, plaintiff was transferred to High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). (Id.) On October 24, 

2012, plaintiff told defendants Williams, Peddicord and Gamberg about the attack by inmate 

Finister and his resulting safety concerns. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to properly 

document plaintiff’s safety concerns. (Id.) As a result of defendants’ failure to document the 

information regarding inmate Finister, both inmate Finister and plaintiff were housed on the same 

yard at HDSP. (Id.) On February 21, 2013, inmate Finister attacked plaintiff, striking him 

several times in the face and causing plaintiff to suffer pain and suffering. (Id.) 

Background re: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The undersigned herein summarizes the three relevant administrative grievances filed by 

plaintiff. 

On or around July 19, 2012, plaintiff filed grievance CCI-12-1289 while he was housed at 

CCI. (ECF No. 1 at 62.) In this grievance, plaintiff requested single cell status because he had 

safety and security concerns regarding in-cell violence. (Id.) In support of this request, plaintiff 

claimed that on March 20, 2012, he was attacked by his cellmate, inmate Finister. (Id.) Plaintiff

also cited two other incidents allegedly involving other cellmates on August 31, 2008, and April 

29, 2008. (Id. at 63.)

On August 9, 2012, grievance CCI-12-1289 was denied at the second level of review. (Id.

at 64.) The response stated, in part, that plaintiff’s current central file contained no 

documentation indicating that he had been the victim of any assaults or batteries since his 

incarceration in August 2011. (Id. at 65.) The response also stated that inmate Finister’s central 

file contained no documentation indicating that he had ever been involved in any altercation with 

plaintiff. (Id.)

On December 11, 2012, grievance CCI-12-1289 was denied at the Third Level. (Id. at 

78.) The Third Level decision stated that plaintiff was requesting single cell status. (Id.) 

On September 10, 2012, following his transfer to HDSP, plaintiff filed grievance HDSP 

2951. (ECF No. 33-6 at 5.) In this grievance, plaintiff alleged that he went before the 

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Classification Committee on August 21, 2012, and that the Classification Committee elected to 

double cell him despite his safety concerns and history of cell violence. (Id.) Plaintiff requested 

single cell status. (Id.) On October 8, 2012, defendant Peddicord partially granted this appeal. 

(Id. at 14-15.) Defendant Peddicord ordered a classification hearing for plaintiff because it was 

unclear whether the Unit Classification Committee, who plaintiff appeared before following his 

transfer to HDSP, considered plaintiff’s prior single cell status when considering his housing 

status. (Id.)

On November 5, 2012, plaintiff resubmitted HDSP 12-2951 for a second level review. 

(Id. at 11.) In this grievance, plaintiff alleged that on or about October 20, 2012, he appeared 

before the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”). (Id.) Plaintiff complained that the 

ICC elected to retain him on double cell housing “despite my history of cell violence, prior single 

cell status, the recent assault on me by Shaun Finister on or about March 21, 2012, at the 

California Correctional Institution...” (Id.)

On December 17, 2012, Chief Deputy Warden Foulk denied plaintiff’s second level 

grievance. (Id. at 16-17.) The response stated that plaintiff was appealing the Classification 

Committee decision to double cell him despite his safety and security concerns. (Id. at 16.) 

After summarizing the first level response, Chief Deputy Warden Foulk wrote:

Your claim that the committee is suggesting that you have to be 

attacked, assaulted or injured by your cellmate or become engaged 

in some other form of disciplinary disruptive, fighting activity in 

order to be considered for single cell status is without merit. It is 

the departmental policy and the expectation that all inmates will be 

approved for double cell housing unless a classification committee 

determines otherwise.

****

Further review of our C-File did not result in any information 

regarding you having been the victim of an assault during your 

current term, specifically on or about March 21, 2012. 

Additionally, your C-File contains a California Correctional 

Institution (CCI) Second Level Appeal response (Log # CCI-0-12-

01289 see attached) regarding our single cell status. This appeal 

also indicates that ICC reviewed your case factors and determined 

that you do not meet the criteria for single cell housing. This 

appeal documents that a review of Inmate Finister’s (the inmate you 

claim assaulted you) C-File was reviewed and contained no 

documentation indicating that he had ever been involved in any 

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altercation with you. Your claim that you and your current cellmate 

are not compatible is something you should address with your 

housing unit staff to facilitate a bed move with someone you feel 

you are more compatible with. Records indicate that since filing 

this appeal you received a new cellmate, effective November 18, 

2012.

Based on this information your appeal was denied. You have not 

presented any documentation that would warrant further review of 

your housing status. You will continue to be double celled.

(Id. at 17.)

On January 11, 2013, plaintiff submitted HDSP 12-2951 to the third level of review. (Id.

at 11.) Plaintiff again complained that prison staff disregarded his safety concerns by double 

celling him. (Id.) Apparently referring to his October 20, 2012 ICC hearing, plaintiff also wrote 

that the ICC improperly found that his safety concerns were unfounded because the majority of 

the cell violence he experienced occurred under his former CDC number. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff 

also wrote, “This type of analysis of this volatile situation only serves to promote cell violence 

and ICC’s desire to see me injured by inmates, staff and prosecuted for defending myself from 

harm.” (Id.) 

On May 20, 2013, plaintiff’s Third Level Appeal of grievance 12-2951 was denied. (Id. at 

18.) This response stated, in relevant part,

The examiner has reviewed the CDC Form 128-G, Classification 

Chrono dated October 24, 2012, and finds that the High Desert 

State Prison (HDSP) ICC acted in accordance with the mandates of 

the CCR in determining the appellant’s double cell status. After 

considering the evidence and arguments herein, it has been 

determined that staff acted appropriately on the appellant’s request. 

There shall be no relief afforded to the appellant at the TLR.

The appellant has added new issues and requests to his appeal. The 

additional requested action is not addressed herein as it is not 

appropriate to expand the appeal beyond the initial problem and the 

initially requested action (CDC Form 602, Inmate/Parolee Appeal 

Form, Sections A and B). 

(Id. at 19.)

On March 7, 2013, plaintiff filed grievance HDSP 13-717. (ECF No. 33-6 at 21.) In this

grievance, plaintiff alleged that on February 21, 2013, he was improperly placed on the same yard 

as an enemy, i.e., inmate Finister, who then hit plaintiff in the head. (Id.) On August 8, 2013, 

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this grievance was denied at the Third Level of Review. (ECF No. 33-4 at 8-9.)

Discussion: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue that plaintiff filed two administrative grievances related to the claims 

raised in the second amended complaint, i.e., grievance nos. HDSP 13-717 and HDSP 12-2951, 

but that neither grievance exhausted plaintiff’s administrative remedies. In his opposition, 

plaintiff argues that grievance nos. CCI 12-1289 and HDSP 12-2951 exhausted his administrative 

remedies. 

HDSP 13-717

Defendants state HDSP 13-717, which raised the claims brought in the instant action, did 

not exhaust administrative remedies because it was completed after plaintiff filed this action. See 

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (administrative exhaustion must be 

complete prior to the filing of a civil rights action). 

On August 8, 2013, HDSP 13-717 was denied at the third level of review. (ECF No. 33-4 

at 8-9.) Pursuant to the mailbox rule, plaintiff filed this action on May 15, 2013. (ECF No. 1 at 

84.) See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed at the time the prisoner delivers it to 

prison authorities for forwarding to the court). Thus, HDSP 13-717 did not exhaust plaintiff’s 

administrative remedies because it was not exhausted before plaintiff filed this action.2 

HDSP 12-2951

In the summary judgment motion, defendants make several arguments regarding why 

HDSP 12-2951 did not exhaust plaintiff’s administrative remedies. The undersigned need not 

address these arguments, some of which are unmeritorious, because HDSP 12-2951 did not 

exhaust plaintiff’s administrative remedies for one clear reason: plaintiff did not exhaust HDSP 

12-2951 prior to bringing this action.3 As noted above, pursuant to the mailbox rule, plaintiff 

 

2

 In Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit found that new 

claims added to a lawsuit via amendment that are exhausted prior to the amendment comply with 

the exhaustion requirement. Cano is inapplicable because plaintiff raised his failure to protect 

claims against defendants in the original complaint, i.e., these are not “new” claims. 

3

 Defendants argue, in part, that grievance HDSP 12-2951 did not exhaust plaintiff’s

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filed this action on May 15, 2013. (ECF No. 1 at 84.) The third level decision denying HDSP 

12-2951 was issued on May 20, 2013. (ECF No. 33-6 at 18.) Thus, plaintiff filed this action 

before he exhausted HDSP 12-2951.

CCI-12-1289

Plaintiff argues that CCI-12-1289 exhausted his administrative remedies. As discussed 

above, in this grievance plaintiff requested single cell status. In support of this request, plaintiff 

stated that he had been attacked by inmate Finister in March 2012. 

On January 28, 2011, CDCR regulations were amended to state that administrative 

remedies are not exhausted as to any person later named by the appellant who was not included in 

the original grievance: “Administrative remedies shall not be considered exhausted relative to 

any new issue, information, or person later named by the appellant that was not included in the 

originally submitted [appeal] and addressed through all required levels of administrative review 

up to and including the third level.” Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). Plaintiff filed his first 

level grievance in CCI-12-1289 in 2012. (ECF No. 33-10 at 10-12.) Thus, CCI-12-1289 was 

subject to these amended regulations. 

CCI 12-1289 was denied at the third level on December 11, 2012, i.e., before this action 

was filed. (ECF No. 33-10 at 4.) While CCI-12-1289 raised plaintiff’s security concerns 

regarding inmate Finister, it did not name defendants Peddicord, Gamberg and Williams as 

plaintiff had not yet been transferred to HDSP. Therefore, because CCI-12-1289 did not name

these defendants, this grievance did not exhaust plaintiff’s claims.

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administrative remedies because the issue raised in that grievance was plaintiff’s request to be 

single celled, and not to be placed on the same yard as inmate Finister. While the focus of HDSP 

12-2951 was plaintiff’s request to be single celled, in this grievance plaintiff raised his security 

concerns regarding inmate Finister based on the alleged prior attack. In fact, the second level 

response in HDSP 12-2951 specifically referenced inmate Finister and plaintiff’s security 

concerns. Plaintiff’s claims in grievance HDSP 12-2951 were sufficient to put defendants on 

notice that plaintiff not only did not want to be celled with inmate Finister, but did not want to be 

placed on the same yard as inmate Finister. See Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 

2010) (a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is 

sought). 

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Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that plaintiff failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies. On this ground, defendants’ summary judgment motion should be 

granted.

Discussion: Eighth Amendment

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on grounds that they 

did not violate plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, plaintiff suffered no injury, and on grounds 

that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Legal Standard for Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment imposes on prison 

officials, among other things, a duty to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the 

inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1991) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 

517, 526–27 (1984)). “‘[P]rison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the 

hands of other prisoners.’” Id. at 833. “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when 

two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently 

serious[.]’ For a claim ... based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is 

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834. 

Second, “[t]o violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must 

have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ ... [T]hat state of mind is one of ‘deliberate 

indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. The prison official will be liable only if “the official 

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the officials must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

Legal Standard for Qualified Immunity

In analyzing a claim of qualified immunity, a court must examine (1) whether the facts as 

alleged, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, show that the defendant’s conduct violated a 

constitutional right, and (2) if a constitutional right was violated, whether, “in light of the specific 

context of the case,” the constitutional right was so clearly established that a reasonable official 

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would understand that what he or she was doing violated that right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 201–02 (2001). If no constitutional right was violated, the inquiry ends and the defendant 

prevails. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

To meet the “clearly established” requirement, “[t]he contours of the right must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 

right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). This requires defining the right 

allegedly violated in a “particularized” sense that is “relevant” to the actual facts alleged. Id.

“Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, 

reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Brosseau v. 

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).

Courts are not required to address the two inquiries in any particular order. Rather, courts 

may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 

immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at 

hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009).

Undisputed Facts

Defendants’ summary judgment motion contains a statement of undisputed facts. 

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion did not reproduce defendants’ statement of undisputed 

facts, and address them by admitting those facts that are undisputed and denying those that are 

disputed, as required by Local Rule 260(b). Instead, plaintiff filed a pleading titled “Statement of 

Disputed Facts.” With some modification, the undersigned herein adopts defendants’ statement 

of undisputed facts, to the extent that they are not disputed by admissible evidence submitted by 

plaintiff.

Plaintiff was housed at the California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) from August 2011 

to August 2012, and housed at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) from August 2012 to April 

2014. (ECF No. 33-7 at 6-7.) At all relevant times, defendant Gamberg was employed as a 

Correctional Lieutenant at HDSP. (ECF No. 33-5 at 1.) At all relevant times, defendant 

Williams was employed as a Correctional Counselor II at HDSP. (ECF No. 33-9 at 1.) At all 

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relevant times, defendant Peddicord worked as an Associate Warden at HDSP. (ECF No. 33-8 at 

1.)

Defendants’ job duties included participating in classification committee hearings for the 

placements of inmates at HDSP. (ECF No. 33-5 at 1; ECF No. ECF No. 33-8 at 1; ECF No. 33-9 

at 1.) 

Inmate Finister is an inmate incarcerated within the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (ECF No. 35 at 5.) Plaintiff and inmate Finister were cellmates 

at CCI for approximately three days beginning on or around March 18, 2012. (ECF No. 33-7 at 

9-11.) Both plaintiff and Finister agreed to this arrangement verbally and by signed writing, 

including an acknowledgment of their compatability. (Id. at 9-11, 26.) 

Inmate Finister was housed at HDSP from December 19, 2012, to September 18, 2013. 

(ECF No. 35 at 5-6.) Plaintiff and inmate Finister were never cellmates at HDSP. (Id. at 6.) 

On or around October 24, 2012, plaintiff received the classification committee hearing 

ordered by defendant Peddicord in response to grievance HDSP 12-2951. (ECF No. 33-5.) 

Defendants Peddicord, Gamberg and Williams were members of the committee who conducted 

this hearing. (Id.) The classification committee recommended that plaintiff be double-celled. 

(Id.) 

There is no reference in the central file of either plaintiff or inmate Finister that they were 

enemies or had ever been involved in an altercation together at any time prior to October 24, 

2012. (ECF No. 35 at 6.) Neither inmate was on the other’s confidential or non-confidential 

enemy lists during this time. (Id.) There are no records of Crime/Incident Reports, Rules 

Violation Reports or Administrative Segregation Placement forms that pertain to any incident or 

altercation between these inmates during this time. (Id.) 

On February 21, 2013, plaintiff and inmate Finister were involved in an altercation at the 

HDSP prison yard. (ECF No. 33-7 at 11-12; 27.) Plaintiff was examined by a nurse after the 

incident. (Id. at 28.)

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Analysis: Eighth Amendment Claim

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on both the objective and 

subjective components of deliberate indifference. In support of this argument, defendants refer to 

their declarations submitted in support of their summary judgment motions. In relevant part, 

defendants Gamberg, Williams and Peddicord all state,

4. Based on my review of the Chrono, I am aware that the subject 

hearing was conducted for the purpose of reviewing inmate 

O’Neal’s cell status, and specifically was required because the prior 

Initial Review of inmate O’Neal by the Unit Classification 

Committee approved him for double cell status but did not address 

his previous single cell status. The subject of the hearing was not 

conducted for the purpose of addressing safety concerns to inmate 

O’Neal based on threats posed by any particular inmate, including 

inmate S. Finister. The sole purpose of the hearing was to review 

and address inmate O’Neal’s cell status as double celled or single 

celled.

5. Based on my review of the Chrono, I am aware that the only 

decision made at the subject hearing was to continue O’Neal as 

double cell approved. In doing so, the ICC noted inmate O’Neal’s 

second level appeal log number CCI-12-1289 requesting single cell 

status, which was denied. In doing so, the ICC reviewed inmate 

O’Neal’s enemy list documentation.

(ECF No. 33-5 at 2; ECF No. 33-8 at 2; ECF No. 33-9 at 2.)

In his declaration, defendant Gamberg additionally states:

6. If during a classification committee hearing such as the one 

conducted for inmate O’Neal on October 24, 2012, the reviewee 

inmate claims that another inmate is his enemy, then the matter is 

investigated to determine whether there are records documenting 

the reviewee inmate’s claims. If there are no records or other 

documentary evidence to support the reviewee inmate’s claims, 

then under applicable policies and procedures the other inmate 

identified by the reviewee inmate is not listed as an enemy on the 

reviewee inmate’s Nonconfidential Enemies CDC Form 812 

(enemy list).

(ECF No. 33-5 at 2.)

Defendants first argue that plaintiff did not meet the objective component of deliberate 

indifference because at the time of the October 24, 2012 hearing, inmate Finister was not at 

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HDSP.4 Thus, defendants argue, plaintiff did not face a substantial risk of harm from being 

attacked by inmate Finister on October 24, 2012. In essence, defendants argue that the threat 

posed by inmate Finister to plaintiff was not sufficiently imminent because inmate Finister was 

not housed at HDSP in October 2012. However, the fact that defendants reviewed plaintiff’s 

enemy list and grievance CCI 12-1289 in October 2012 in response to his claim that inmate 

Finister attacked him in March 2012 demonstrates that plaintiff’s security concerns were 

sufficiently imminent if they were substantiated.5Thus, even though inmate Finister was not 

housed at HDSP in October 2012, defendants perceived a threat to plaintiff. Defendants do not 

claim that the risk to plaintiff from being celled with inmate Finister was substantially different 

from the risk plaintiff faced were he and inmate Finister placed on the same yard. For these 

reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiff met the objective component of the test for deliberate 

indifference.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to the subjective 

component of deliberate indifference for three reasons: 1) the only issue purpose of the October 

2012 hearing was to address plaintiff’s safety concerns caused by cellmates; 2) at the October 

2012 hearing, plaintiff raised the issue of his safety concerns regarding inmate Finister in the 

context of his request for single cell status; and 3) defendants adequately investigated plaintiff’s 

safety concerns regarding inmate Finister at the October 2012 hearing insofar as they concerned 

plaintiff’s request for single cell status.

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4

 Defendants do not argue that inmate Finister did not attack plaintiff in March 2012. At his 

deposition, plaintiff testified in detail regarding the alleged March 2012 attack. (See plaintiff’s 

deposition transcript at 30-36.) Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the 

undersigned finds that inmate Finister attacked plaintiff in March 2012.

 

5

 The undersigned also notes that in Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1995), the 

Fifth Circuit held that, for an Eighth Amendment claim, a court must consider whether society 

considers the risk “to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose 

anyone unwillingly to such a risk. [The court] must consider the Eighth Amendment is intended 

to protect both present and future dangers to inmates. Prison authorities must protect not only 

against current threats, but also guard against sufficiently imminent dangers that are likely to 

cause harm in the next week, or month or year.” 

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For the following reasons, the undersigned is not persuaded by defendants’ argument that 

they are not liable for inmate Finister’s attack on plaintiff in the yard in February 2013 because 

plaintiff raised his security concerns regarding inmate Finister at a hearing addressing plaintiff’s 

request for single cell status. 

As discussed above, a prison official will be liable only if “the official knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

At the October 2012 hearing, plaintiff told defendants that he had been previously 

attacked by inmate Finister. 6 Based on this information, defendants drew the inference that 

plaintiff would face a serious risk of harm were he to be celled with inmate Finister if the March 

2012 attack could be substantiated, as evidenced by their review of grievance CCI 12-1289 and 

plaintiff’s enemy list. If defendants drew the inference that it would be dangerous for plaintiff to 

be celled with inmate Finister were there evidence of the previous attack, it is unclear why they 

would not go on to draw the inference that plaintiff faced a similar risk of harm were he and 

inmate Finister to be housed on the same yard. 

As noted above, defendants do not claim and offer no evidence that the risk of harm 

plaintiff faced were he placed on the same yard as inmate Finister was substantially different from 

the risk of harm he faced were he and inmate Finister celled together. Without further 

explanation, the undersigned cannot find that defendants were entitled to disregard all of the other 

security issues reasonably implicated by plaintiff’s claim that he was previously attacked by 

inmate Finister, simply because plaintiff informed defendants of the previous attack and raised his 

safety concerns in the context of a hearing addressing his request for single cell status.

Defendants next argue that the properly reviewed plaintiff’s security concerns regarding 

inmate Finister in the context of the hearing in which they were raised. As discussed above, 

defendants have not demonstrated that they were entitled to disregard the security issues

 

6

 At his deposition, plaintiff testified that at the October 2012 classification hearing, he told 

defendants that “I reiterated that I had – was attacked.” (Plaintiff’s deposition at 73.) 

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reasonably implicated by plaintiff’s claim that he was previously attacked by inmate Finister. 

Moreover, defendants seem to suggest that had plaintiff raised his security concerns 

regarding inmate Finister in a different type of classification hearing, they would have been 

reviewed more thoroughly. In their declarations, defendants’ state that their review of plaintiff’s 

security concerns was limited to the context of plaintiff’s request for single cell housing, 

suggesting that they would have conducted a different review had he raised these concerns at a 

different hearing. However, defendant Gamberg also states that when an inmate raises enemy 

concerns at the classification hearing like the one conducted on October 22, 2012, those concerns 

are investigated. Without further clarification regarding the scope of the review defendants

would have conducted had plaintiff raised his security concerns in a different type of 

classification hearing, the undersigned cannot find that defendants did not act with deliberate 

indifference. 

While defendants should not be granted summary judgment with respect to their 

arguments that plaintiff did not meet the objective or subjective components for an Eighth 

Amendment claim, defendants are entitled to summary judgment for another reason. In order to 

prevail, plaintiff must establish that defendants’ deliberate indifference was the “actual and 

proximate cause of the deprivation of [his] Eighth Amendment right.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 

628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Actual cause is established if the plaintiff’s injury would not have 

occurred “but for” the defendants’ conduct. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir. 1990). 

To satisfy the “but for” test, the defendants’ conduct must be at least one of the causes of 

plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 1506.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendants’ conduct at the October 2012 classification 

committee hearing was one of the causes of inmate Finister’s attack on him in January 2013. It is 

undisputed that there is no reference in the central file of either plaintiff or inmate Finister that 

they were enemies or had ever been involved in an altercation together at any time prior to 

October 24, 2012. It is undisputed that neither inmate was on the other’s confidential or nonconfidential enemy lists during this time. 

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Plaintiff suggests that documentation existed in CDCR records to support his claim that 

inmate Finister attacked him in March 2012. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to support this 

claim. Most importantly, at his deposition, plaintiff testified he did not report the March 20, 2012 

attack by inmate Finister. Plaintiff testified that after the March 20, 2012 attack, a responding 

officer asked him if he (the officer) would have to do any paperwork. (Plaintiff’s deposition at 

38.) Plaintiff told him “no,” because plaintiff was trying to program and get out of the segregated 

housing unit. (Id. at 38-39.) Therefore, the only references in CDCR records to the alleged attack 

were plaintiff’s self-serving claims in his administrative grievances filed after the attack. Thus, 

even if defendants had conducted a more thorough review of the record, they would have 

uncovered no actual evidence of the March 2012 attack. 

Plaintiff’s failure to report the attack caused him to be housed on the same yard with 

inmate Finister rather than any alleged inadequate review of the record by defendants. For that 

reason, the undersigned finds that defendants should be granted summary judgment as to the 

merits of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. Because the undersigned finds that plaintiff has 

failed to establish causation, there is no need to further address the issue of qualified immunity. 

Cognizable Injury

Defendants also move for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff suffered no 

cognizable injury. The undersigned does not address this argument because defendants should be 

granted summary judgment on the grounds discussed above.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to assign 

a district judge to this action; and 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ summary judgment motion (ECF 

No. 33) be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

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objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 13, 2015

On1054.sj

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