Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00556/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00556-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:1801 Farmworker Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA G. MORENO, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

CASTLEROCK FARMING AND 

TRANSPORT INC., et al.

Defendants.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00556-JLT-CDB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

(Doc. 148)

14-day Deadline

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Maria G. Moreno, Esther Lopez, Francisco Orozco, 

and Israel Lopez (“Plaintiffs”) motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. 148), 

the responses of Defendants Castlerock Farming and Transport, Inc. (“Castlerock”), Albert L. 

Good’s, and Padilla & Sons Labor Service, Inc. (“Padilla”) (Docs. 160, 162), and Plaintiff’s reply 

(Doc. 163). For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiffs’ motion to file a second amended 

complaint shall be granted.

Background

On November 9, 2005, a wage-and-hour putative class action was initiated against 

Defendant Castlerock and several other table grape growers. (Doe, et al. v. D.M. Camp & Sons, 

et al., No. 1:05-cv-01417-AWI-SMS, Doc. 2). On March 31, 2009, the Court broke that case up 

into individual actions against the various growers. (Doe, et al., Docs. 237-42). In response, 

Case 1:12-cv-00556-JLT-CDB Document 168 Filed 11/06/24 Page 1 of 16
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Silvestre Soto and Olga Galvan filed a wage-and hour putative class action against Defendant 

Castlerock. (Soto, et al. v. Castlerock Farming, et al., No. 1:09-cv-00701-AWI-JLT, Doc. 1). 

Initially, the Soto plaintiffs sought to represent a class comprising of “All persons who are 

employed or have been employed or jointly employed be Castlerock in the State of California, 

who within four (4) years of the filing of the [c]omplaint in this case, have worked as non-exempt 

hourly and/or piece-rate employees.” Id. at ¶ 22. On July 6, 2011, the Soto plaintiffs filed a 

motion for leave to amend their complaint. (Soto, Doc. 54). The Soto plaintiffs sought to add an 

additional class representative, Javier Garcia (“Garcia”). Id. at 2. The Soto plaintiffs asserted:

“Garcia is currently a member of the proposed class and worked directly for Castlerock. 

Garcia was also directly or jointly employed by Castlerock and at least two farm labor 

contractors (“FLCs”) during the class period, Golden Gran and [Padilla]. Plaintiffs seek 

leave of court to amend the Complaint to add Garcia to address Defendant’s concern that 

the current named Plaintiffs cannot represent a class of workers employed directly by 

Castlerock or jointly by Castlerock and an FLC other than Golden Grain, as Plaintiffs 

employment at Castlerock was through Golden Grain and the practices purportedly varied 

by FLC.”

Id. On August 9, 2011, the Court denied the Soto plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. (Soto, 

Doc. 71). The Court found the Soto plaintiffs had filed five pleadings since the initiation of 

litigation in 2005, engaged in undue delay, and that amendment would cause undue prejudice to 

the Soto defendants. Id.

On April 10, 2012, Plaintiffs, Garcia, Abraham Ortiz (“Ortiz”), and Florencia Gutierrez 

(“Gutierrez”) initiated this wage-and hour putative class action with the filing of a complaint 

against Defendants Castlerock, Padilla, and Melba Nunez Contracting (“Melba”). (Doc. 1). That 

same day, the Court set an initial scheduling conference for July 25, 2012. (Doc. 4). 

On June 5, 2012, Defendants Castlerock, Padilla, and Melba filed a motion to dismiss, or 

in the alternative to stay, asserting that “this action is duplicative” of Soto, “in which the Court 

previously refused to permit plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add additional named 

plaintiffs.” (Doc. 8. at 2). Plaintiffs, Garcia, Ortiz, and Gutierrez filed an opposition on July 2, 

2012, in which they asserted “[t]he appropriate remedy in this case is consolidation because...the 

related Moreno and Soto actions have common questions of fact and law.” (Doc. 10 at 8). 

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Plaintiffs, Garcia, Ortiz, and Gutierrez also filed a “counter motion” requesting that the Court 

consolidate Moreno and Soto. Id. at 19. In response to the pleadings, the scheduling conference 

was continued until the parties’ motions were resolved. (Docs. 7, 15, 25-28). 

On March 29, 2013, the Court issued an order granting Defendants Castlerock, Padilla, 

and Melba’s motion to stay as an alternative to dismissal. (Doc. 29). The Court found a 

determination whether Moreno was duplicative of Soto could “not yet be made” and a stay 

“would appear to be the equitable solution.” Id. at 4. The Court found consolidation of the two 

cases would act as a collateral method to overturn the Court’s order in Soto denying leave to 

amend. Id. The Court noted it would “not allow that order to be circumvented by other means.” 

Id. (citation omitted).

On January 16, 2014, the Court issued an order denying a motion for class certification in 

Soto. (Soto, Doc. 173). In light of the resolution of the motion for class certification in Soto, 

Plaintiffs, Garcia, Ortiz, and Gutierrez filed a motion to lift the stay on March 27, 2014. (Doc. 

31), which the Court granted on May 6, 2014. (Doc. 36). 

In advance of a scheduling conference, on June 10, 2014, the parties filed a joint status 

report. (Doc. 39). Plaintiffs, Garcia, Ortiz, and Gutierrez noted they intended to file a motion to 

amend their complaint and proposed a discovery and trial schedule. Id. at 2, 5, 7. In contrast, 

Defendants Castlerock, Padilla, and Melba asked the Court to set a briefing schedule for motions 

for summary adjudication and summary judgment. Id. On June 17, 2014, the Court held a status 

conference in light of the parties’ joint status report. (Docs. 40, 67). The Court did not schedule 

the case, finding “it’d make most sense to proceed as the defendants have suggested, to settle the 

pleadings and to get to summary adjudication or summary judgment based upon the nature of the 

pleadings.” (Doc. 67 at 4-5, 11).

On July 11, 2014, the Court granted the parties’ stipulated request to permit the filing of a 

first amended complaint. (Docs. 43, 44). On July 14, 2014, Plaintiffs, Garcia, Ortiz, and 

Gutierrez filed a first amended complaint adding Defendant Albert L. Good (“Good”) to this 

action and claims under California’s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”). (Doc. 45). On 

September 29, 2014, Defendants Castlerock and Good filed a motion to dismiss the first amended 

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complaint, joined by Defendants Melba and Padilla. (Docs. 54-55, 62, 64). Additionally, 

Defendant Padilla filed a separate motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims. (Doc. 63). The 

motions were fully briefed in December 2014. (Docs. 65-66, 68-71).

On April 5, 2021, Gutierrez passed away. (Docs. 105; 120-3 at ¶ 3). On March 28, 2022, 

the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Doc. 80). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel Ernest I. Herrera (“Herrera”), an attorney at the Mexican American Legal 

Defense and Educational Fund (“MALDEF”), declared “[i]mmediately following the Court’s 

order...Plaintiffs’ counsel began to attempt to contact all Plaintiffs regarding the status of the 

case.” (Doc. 154 at ¶ 3). Thereafter, Defendants filed answers to Plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint. (Docs. 83, 87, 91). 

On April 12, 2022, the Court set a scheduling conference for May 12, 2022, and ordered 

the parties to file a joint scheduling report one week prior to the conference. (Doc. 84). On May 

5, 2022, the parties filed a joint scheduling report in response to the Court’s April 12, 2022, order. 

(Doc. 90). In the report, Plaintiffs did “not currently contemplate adding additional parties” and 

did “not anticipate any further amendments of their pleadings.” Id. at 9. Further, Defendant 

Castlerock indicated it “would want to depose the plaintiffs, to ascertain their individual claims 

and evidence concerning the alleged joint employment.” Id. at 10. 

At the scheduling conference conducted on May 12, 2022, the parties agreed to delay the 

scheduling of the case in the interest of undertaking certain identified discovery, including 

discovery related to Defendant Castlerock’s anticipated joint employer motion for summary 

judgment. (Docs. 92, 93). 

On July 7, 2022, the Court convened for a status conference to address class certification 

discovery and briefing schedules for the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs’ class certification 

motion; (2) Castlerock’s joint employer summary judgment motion; and (3) Good’s safe harbor 

summary judgment motion. (Doc. 98). The Court set deadlines for Castlerock and Good’s 

summary judgment motions and noted “Defendants anticipate completing depositions of the 

named plaintiffs in advance of filing any summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs will be permitted 

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to conduct necessary depositions prior to filing any opposition to the motions for summary 

judgment.” Id.

Following the July 7, 2022, conference, Counsel for Defendants Castlerock and Good 

(James M. Hanlon, Jr. [“Hanlon”]) asserts he asked Plaintiffs’ counsel for dates to depose the 

named Plaintiffs. (Doc. 160-1 at ¶ 2). Counsel Hanlon represents “[d]espite [his] office’s 

repeated efforts and inquires to schedule these depositions, no plaintiff appeared for a deposition 

in 2022.” Id. Counsel Herrera represents that “[b]y August of 2022, Plaintiffs’ counsel had been 

unable to contact several of the Plaintiffs by telephone” and “sent an update letter by mail to all 

Plaintiffs[.]” (Doc. 154-3 at ¶ 2). 

On December 14, 2022, the parties filed a stipulated request for an order regarding the 

summary judgment briefing schedule. (Doc. 102). The parties requested an extension of 

Castlerock’s joint employer summary judgment motion deadlines to facilitate the completion of 

Plaintiffs’ depositions. Id. The Court extended Castlerock’s joint employer summary judgment 

motion briefing schedule on December 16, 2022. (Doc. 103).

In January 2023, after multiple attempts to contact Gutierrez and three other Plaintiffs, 

Counsel Herrera asserts he “instructed our staff to employ an investigator on January 24, 2023, to 

find the current residence of and contact information for these Plaintiffs.” (Doc. 154-3 at ¶ 4). 

The following day, Counsel Herrera learned from the investigator that Gutierrez had passed away. 

Id. Counsel Herrera informed Counsel Hanlon of Gutierrez’s passing on February 1, 2023. Id.

On March 2, 2023, Defendants filed a statement noting the death of Gutierrez. (Doc. 105). In 

late-March 2023, MALDEF contacted the Law Offices of Mallison & Martinez (“Mallison & 

Martinez”) to ask if they knew of any potential Padilla class members. (Doc. 154-3 at ¶ 8). 

 In May 2023, the parties reported to the Court that Garcia had worked entirely outside the 

limitations period of this action and that Ortiz would be dismissed as a lead plaintiff. (Docs. 112 

at 2-3; 114 at 2-3). Plaintiffs noted they needed time to identify a substitute Plaintiff or Plaintiffs 

for the Padilla class. (Doc. 114 at 3). At a status conference on May 18, 2023, the Court ordered 

the parties to file stipulated dismissals as to Ortiz and Garcia and for Defendants to file any joint 

employer summary judgment motion no later than July 28, 2023. (Docs. 115, 116). Further, the 

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Court ordered Counsel for Plaintiffs to make any Plaintiff properly substituted for Gutierrez 

available for noticed depositions no later than July 14, 2023. Id. On May 24, 2023, Plaintiffs 

filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice as to Garcia and a stipulation of voluntary 

dismissal without prejudice as to Ortiz. (Docs. 117-18).

On June 21, 2023, Defendants Castlerock and Good filed a motion to dismiss Gutierrez 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a). (Doc. 120). On July 5, 2023, the Court 

granted Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for a 14-day extension of time to respond to Defendant’s 

motion. (Docs. 125, 126). On July 18, 2023, the parties filed a joint request for a status 

conference. (Doc. 129). In their filing, Plaintiffs noted they conducted a search for an additional 

named plaintiff from the proposed putative Padilla class action but required additional time. Id. at 

2. Plaintiffs asserted they had been unable to contact anyone from Gutierrez’s estate. Id. In light 

of Plaintiffs’ failure to meet the Court’s deadline to produce a substituted Plaintiff for deposition, 

Defendants proposed “to pivot to summary judgment of a different legal issue that would [] 

advance the case” relating to this Court’s decision in Fowler Packing Co., Inc. v. Lanier, 647 F. 

Supp. 3d 851 (E.D. Cal. 2023). Id. at 3-4.

On July 19, 2023, the Court ordered that “Plaintiffs [shall] move to substitute plaintiff for 

Florencia Gutierrez and produce that person for deposition no later than September 1, 2023” and 

“[i]f the parties cannot agree on the implication of Fowler Packing on this litigation, the defense 

[shall] file its motion for summary judgment no later than September 28, 2023.” (Doc. 130). 

Plaintiffs made no filing before that deadline to request an extension or seek any related relief. 

On September 28, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in compliance with the 

Court’s order. (Doc. 131).

On February 9, 2024, the Court issued an order granting Defendants Castlerock and 

Good’s motion to dismiss Gutierrez. (Doc. 139). On April 16, 2024, Defendants Castlerock and 

Good filed a motion for summary adjudication on Padilla’s joint employment claims. (Doc. 140). 

Defendants Castlerock and Good argued no remaining named plaintiffs could maintain a claim 

against Padilla or a joint employment claim against Padilla and Castlerock. Id. at 4.

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On April 16, 2024, Plaintiffs’ Counsel Fernando Nunez (“Nunez”) called Counsel Hanlon 

to gauge whether Defendants were interested in discussing settlement. (Doc. 154-2 at ¶ 3). On 

April 23, 2024, Counsel Nunez met with Counsel Hanlon to determine whether mediation would 

be fruitful. Id. at ¶ 4. Counsel Nunez represents that counsel “agreed that Defendants would turn 

over certain documents to facilitate case valuation and that we would extend the deadline for 

Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment so that [he] had time to 

review the documents.” Id.; see (Doc. 151-1 at ¶ 7) (“Plaintiffs asked Defendants to agree to 

extend their opposition deadlines for the summary judgment motion...ostensibly so that the 

parties could discuss settlement.”).

On April 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a stipulated motion for administrative relief in the form 

of an extension of Plaintiff’s deadline to file an opposition to Defendants Castlerock and Good’s

motion for summary adjudication. (Doc. 142). In the stipulated motion, the parties reported they

were “currently discussing potential settlement of all claims—including those at issue in 

Defendants’ motion.” Id. at 1. The parties represented that the requested extension was solely for 

the purpose of facilitating settlement discussions – not for any other purpose, including to 

facilitate Plaintiffs’ search for candidates to substitute into the action or for Plaintiffs’ preparation 

of a motion to amend the complaint. On April 29, 2024, the Court granted the request and 

ordered Plaintiffs to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion for summary 

adjudication by June 11, 2024. (Doc. 143). Counsel Herrera represents that in late-April 2024, 

Mallison & Martinez informed MALDEF that it knew several individuals who could potentially 

serve as class representatives against Padilla. (Doc. 154-3 at ¶ 8).

On May 8, 2024, Counsel Hanlon electronically shared a 2,975-page document with 

Counsel Nunez for the purposes of settlement. (Doc. 154-2 at ¶ 5). Counsel Nunez represents 

that “after reviewing the documents, I informed Defendants’ counsel [on May 28, 2024] that 

mediation would not be fruitful.” Id. Counsel Hanlon asserts “[t]here were...no meaningful 

settlement discussions. Plaintiffs never made a settlement offer, and refused to participate in 

mediation. Defendants kept trying to engage, but Plaintiffs cut off the discussion by email on 

May 28, 2024.” (Doc. 151-1 at ¶ 8). Counsel Herrera declares “[a]fter unsuccessful settlement 

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discussions with counsel for Defendants Good and Castlerock, MALDEF and Mallison & 

Martinez began the effort to amend Plaintiffs’ complaint in order to add Padilla class 

representatives in May of 2024.” (Doc. 154-3 at ¶ 10).

On June 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for leave to file a second amended 

complaint. (Doc. 148). The proposed second amended complaint (“SAC”) seeks to add three 

proposed Plaintiffs – Marcela Lopez, Ofelina Pena, and Elvis Perez – who worked for Padilla 

during the relevant class period. Id. at 3, 5. Additionally, the proposed SAC seeks to clear up 

claims and plaintiffs that were dismissed. (Doc. 148-1 at ¶ 5). That same day, Plaintiffs filed an 

ex parte application for an extension of time to respond to Defendants Castlerock and Good’s

motion for summary adjudication. (Doc. 149). Defendants Castlerock and Good filed an 

opposition to Plaintiffs’ ex parte application on June 11, 2024. (Doc. 151). On June 13, 2024, 

the Court issued an order denying Plaintiffs’ ex parte application finding the request was 

procedurally improper, unwarranted, and an abuse of the remedy. (Doc. 153).

On June 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a belated opposition to Defendants Castlerock and 

Good’s motion for summary adjudication. (Doc. 154). On July 3, 2024, Defendants Castlerock 

and Good filed a reply in support of their motion for summary adjudication and opposition to 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. (Docs. 159-60). On July 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a reply 

in support of their motion for leave to amend. (Doc. 163).

The Applicable Legal Standard

The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs’ motion to amend is governed by Rule 16 or Rule 

15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A. Rule 16 Does Not Apply Absent Entry of a Rule 16 Scheduling Order

Defendants Castlerock and Good argue Plaintiffs’ motion is governed by Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 16(b) because the Court issued scheduling orders and set deadlines for 

amendment. (Doc. 160 at 6). Under Rule 16(b), a scheduling order “may be modified only for 

good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Green Aire for Air 

Conditioning W.L.L. v. Salem, No. 1:18-cv-00873-LJO-SKO, 2020 WL 58279, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 6, 2020); see Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (the 

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“good cause” standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.”). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that the good cause standard of Rule 16(b) applies to a motion 

for leave to amend a complaint when the scheduling order sets a deadline for amendment. See 

Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Johnson, 975 F.2d at 

607-09); see also Beech v. San Joaquin Cnty., No. 2:15-cv-00268-TLN-CKD, 2019 WL 5566250, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2019) (“When a court issues a pretrial scheduling order that establishes a 

timetable to amend the complaint, Rule 16 governs any amendments to the complaint.”); 

Moriarty v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 17-cv-1154-LAB (AGS), 2019 WL 4643602, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 

Sept. 24, 2019) (“Ordinarily, leave to amend is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)’s standard. 

Here, however, amendment would also require amending the scheduling order, implicating Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 16.”).

The argument of Defendants Castlerock and Good that “the Court has set, and Plaintiffs 

have missed, a series of deadlines to amend the pleadings” is unavailing. (Doc. 160 at 7). While 

the Court has set deadlines and even convened for scheduling and status conferences, the Court 

has never entered a Rule 16 scheduling order in this action specifying a deadline to amend 

pleadings.

Defendants Castlerock and Good argue the Court’s order setting a deadline for Castlerock 

to file summary judgment motions and directing Plaintiffs to pursue class certification discovery 

(Doc. 98), “obviously barred further amendment of the pleadings or additional parties.” (Doc.

160 at 7). But the Court did not expressly enter a deadline to amend pleadings at the implied 

urging of Defendants. Specifically, the Court declined to set case management dates as requested 

by Plaintiffs at the initial scheduling conference in favor of Defendants’ request that the parties 

file dispositive motions instead of scheduling the case. See (Docs. 90, 93, 98); see (Soto, Doc. 71 

at 4) (“Likely due to the reports of the parties that no amendments were anticipated and the 

extensive amendments made thus far, in this case, the scheduling order did not set a deadline for 

pleading amendments”); Staley v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 19-cv-02573-EMC, 2021 WL 5906049, 

at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2021) (“The Court holds that Rule 15 applies. The Court’s scheduling 

orders from May 2020, December 2020, and May 2021 [] do not specify a deadline to join other 

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parties or amend pleadings.”); cf. Infmetry LLC v. Message in a Bottle, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-01075-

DJC-JDP, 2024 WL 3470345, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2024) (“The scheduling order set June 30, 

2023, as the deadline for leave to amend...Because this deadline passed, the Rule 16 good cause 

standard applies. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)–(4).”); Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Window 

Corp., No. SACV 03-00608 JVS, 2008 WL 11340360, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2008) (“This 

Court’s June 1, 2007 Scheduling Order requires that all motions to amend and add parties be filed 

within 60 days of the date of the Order ... Because this motion [to amend] is brought nearly nine 

months after that deadline, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) governs [plaintiff’s] request.”). 

As such, the Court did not “obviously bar” further amendment in 2022.

The related arguments by Defendants Castlerock and Good that the Court set two 

deadlines governed by Rule 16(b) following the suggestion of death of Gutierrez also is 

unpersuasive. (Doc. 160 at 7-8). First, Defendants Castlerock and Good argue the Court’s May 

18, 2023, order set a deadline for pleading amendments. Id. The May 18, 2023, order expressly 

provides: “Counsel for Plaintiffs shall make any Plaintiff properly substituted for deceased 

Plaintiff Florencia Gutierrez (see Doc. 105 & Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)) available for noticed 

deposition no later than July 14, 2023.” (Doc. 116) (emphasis added). The Court used the word 

“substitute,” cited to Defendants’ statement noting the death of Gutierrez, and the requirements of 

substitution of parties under the Federal Rules. Id. Indeed, the language from Defendants

Castlerock and Good’s June 21, 2023, motion to dismiss makes clear that they understood the 

Court’s May 18, 2023, “deadline” related to Plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely motion for 

substitution. (Doc. 120-1 at 3). In short, by directing that any properly substituted plaintiff be

available “for noticed depositions” by July 14, 2023, the Court neither directly nor indirectly set 

that same date as the deadline for amendment of pleadings.

Likewise, Defendants Castlerock and Good’s argument that the Court’s July 19, 2023, 

order set a deadline for the amendment of pleadings fails for the same reasons. (Doc. 160 at 8). 

That order expressly provides: “Plaintiffs SHALL move to substitute plaintiff for Florencia 

Gutierrez and produce that person for deposition no later than September 1, 2023.” (Doc. 130) 

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(emphasis added). As with its order of July 14, 2023 (discussed supra), the Court did not specify 

that the September 1, 2023, deadline would close the amendment of pleadings.

Therefore, because a specific deadline for amending pleadings was never set in this action, 

the standards of Rule 15 govern Plaintiffs’ motion, and Rule 16(b) is inapplicable.

B. Rule 15 – Applicable Standard

Rule 15 provides that a plaintiff may amend the complaint only by leave of the court or by 

written consent of the adverse party if the amendment is sought more than 21 days after the filing 

of a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Rule 15(a) is very liberal” 

and a court should freely give leave to amend when “justice so requires.” AmerisourceBergen 

Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006); see Chodos v. W. Publ. Co., 292 

F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“it is generally our policy to permit amendment with ‘extreme 

liberality’”) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th 

Cir.1990)).

Granting or denying leave to amend a complaint under Rule 15 is within the discretion of 

the court. Swanson v. United States Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). “In 

exercising this discretion, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to 

facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” United States v. 

Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir, 1981); Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should 

have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”).

A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 

bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 

whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 

808 (9th Cir. 2004). The factors are not weighed equally. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 

(9th Cir. 1995); see Atkins v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1335607, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 7, 2011) (the five 

factors “need not all be considered in each case”). Undue delay, “by itself...is insufficient to 

justify denying a motion to amend.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999). On the 

other hand, futility of amendment and prejudice to the opposing party can, by themselves, justify 

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the denial of a motion for leave to amend. Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845; see Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 

party carries the greatest weight).

In conducting this five-factor analysis, the court generally grants all inferences in favor of 

permitting amendment. Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Moreover, the court must be mindful that, for each of these factors, the party opposing 

amendment has the burden of showing that amendment is not warranted. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987).

Discussion

The Court addresses the relevant Nunes factors below:

1. Bad Faith

A motion to amend is made in bad faith where there is “evidence in the record which 

would indicate a wrongful motive” on the part of the litigant requesting leave to amend. DCD 

Programs, 833 F.2d at 187; Wizards of the Coast LLC v. Cryptozoic Entm’t LLC, 309 F.R.D. 645, 

651 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (“In the context of a motion for leave to amend, ‘bad faith’ means acting 

with intent to deceive, harass, mislead, delay, or disrupt.”) (citing Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 

F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006)). Here, there is insufficient information before the Court to 

conclude that Plaintiffs’ harbor a wrongful motive in requesting leave to amend. To the contrary, 

although their efforts have been significantly delayed, it appears Plaintiffs are attempting to move 

this litigation forward by amending their complaint to add plaintiffs after Garcia’s voluntary 

dismissal and Gutierrez’s passing. E.g., (Doc. 148-1 at ¶¶ 3-4) (representation by Plaintiffs’ 

counsel that proposed plaintiffs to be substituted or added contacted counsel only after settlement 

discussions failed, Defendants filed their motion for summary adjudication, and counsel 

undertook efforts to seek amendment). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of amendment.

2. Undue Delay

By itself, a showing of undue delay is insufficient to deny leave to amend pleadings. 

Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1973); DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. 

However, in combination with other factors, delay may be sufficient to deny amendment. Webb, 

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655 F.2d at 979-80. In assessing whether there exists undue delay, a court shall consider if “the 

moving party knew or should have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the 

original pleading.” Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted). The mere fact that a party fails to offer a reason for not moving to amend earlier does 

not in itself constitute an adequate basis for denying leave to amend. Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190-

91. Whether there has been “undue delay” should be considered in the context of (1) the length 

of the delay measured from the time the moving party obtained relevant facts; (2) whether 

discovery has closed; and (3) proximity to the trial date. Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 

798-99 (9th Cir. 1991).

Defendants Castlerock and Good contend Plaintiffs were aware they were missing a 

Padilla class representative well over a year ago. Indeed, Plaintiffs were provided ample time by 

the Court to address Gutierrez’s passing and Garcia’s voluntary dismissal. (Docs. 116, 130). 

Further, Plaintiffs bear some if not most of any blame for causing delay in the prosecution of this 

action. For instance, they requested an extension of time to respond to Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss Gutierrez (Doc. 126) but ultimately filed no response. Plaintiffs also were granted an 

extension of time to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication for the purpose of 

facilitating settlement discussions (Doc. 143); yet the parties’ pleadings reflect that Plaintiffs did 

not engage in any meaningful settlement discussion. While the Court acknowledges that 

identifying a Padilla class representative “was not an easy task” See (Doc. 154 at 9; 154-3 at ¶ 10 

(“I attribute Plaintiffs’ counsel’s inability to locate Padilla class representatives to these workers’ 

typical residential circumstances.”), the record can be construed as evidencing that Plaintiffs 

proceeded with less than perfect diligence and obtained the benefit of an expanded period of time 

within which to locate or make contact with an adequate class representative.

However, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit measures the “delay between the time of 

obtaining a relevant fact and seeking [] leave to amend... ” AmerisourceBergen Corp., 465 F.3d 

at 952 (citing Texaco, 939 F.2d at 799). Plaintiffs contend there has been no undue delay 

because “[a]s soon as Plaintiffs’ counsel encountered the Proposed Plaintiffs and evaluated their 

claims, [they] sought to amend their complaint to add the Proposed Plaintiffs without delay by 

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filing the instant Motion.” (Doc. 148 at 7). The Court agrees. It appears Plaintiffs filed the 

instant motion approximately two months after being informed of individuals who could 

potentially serve as class representatives against Padilla. (Docs. 148; 154-3 at ¶ 8). Therefore, 

Plaintiffs did not engage in undue delay, within the relevant time period, and this factor weighs in 

favor of amendment.

3. Futility of Amendment

A court may deny leave to amend if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject 

to dismissal. Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). An 

amendment is futile if the complaint clearly could not be saved by amendment. United States v. 

Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). However, denial of leave to amend on 

futility grounds is “rare.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. of Illinois v. VForce Inc., No. 2:18-cv-02066-TLNCKD, 2020 WL 2732046, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2020) (citing Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 

212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). “Ordinarily, ‘courts will defer consideration of 

challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and 

the amended pleading is filed.”’ Id.

The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments (Docs. 148-2; 148-3) and finds 

the proposed amendments are not futile. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of amendment.

4. Prejudice to the Opposing Party

The most critical factor in determining whether to grant leave to amend is prejudice to the 

opposing party. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. The burden of showing prejudice is on the 

party opposing an amendment to the complaint. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187. Prejudice 

must be substantial to justify the denial of leave to amend. Rose, 893 F.2d at 1079. There is a 

presumption in favor of granting leave to amend where prejudice is not shown under Rule 15(a). 

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

Defendants Castlerock and Good claim they will “be substantially prejudiced were this 

motion granted” because Plaintiffs’ lack of diligence “has [] wasted two years in a case that is 

more than a decade old.” (Doc. 160 at 6, 10, n.4). Further, Defendants Castlerock and Good

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contend Plaintiffs’ lack of diligence has caused them to spend time and resources filing a motion 

for summary adjudication based on Plaintiffs’ failure to replace Gutierrez. Id.

The Court finds Defendants Castlerock and Good’s argument unavailing. As Defendants

have not deposed a named Plaintiff for the Padilla class, allowing the naming of new class 

representatives would not force Defendants to engage in redundant discovery. Cf. (Soto Doc. 71 

at 10) (“allowing the naming of a new class representative would unduly prejudice Defendant, 

because Defendant has been preparing arguments and defenses based upon the identity of the 

class representatives who have been named since 2009.”); Fodera v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., No. 

19-cv-05072-WHO, 2021 WL 1164799, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021) (“The proposed 

amendments do not appear likely to require substantially different discovery than what would 

already be likely to occur on the basis of the allegations in the SAC.”).

While the Court acknowledges that this litigation has been delayed by Gutierrez’s passing

and Plaintiffs’ inability to find adequate Padilla class representatives, the resources and time 

Defendants Castlerock and Good spent on filing a motion for summary adjudication do not 

amount to undue prejudice. Instead, the Court finds amendment would allow the Court to address 

the question of class-wide certification on its merits, rather than on a technicality. Countenancing 

Defendants Castlerock and Good’s suggestion that any putative class members could bring their 

individual claims in a separate suit would not promote judicial economy. (Docs. 160 at 11; 163 at 

7). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend.

5. Prior Amendments

The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is “particularly broad” where a party has 

previously amended the pleading. Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Here, the present amendments sought by Plaintiffs would constitute the second amendment to the 

pleadings (Doc. 45), and as discussed above (supra 2), the procedural history of this case 

indicates multiple amendments have been filed throughout this litigation. However, the Court 

finds Plaintiffs’ past amendments throughout this litigation do not outweigh the other Rule 15 

factors that weigh in favor of granting leave to amend.

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Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Nunez factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit weigh in favor of 

allowing Plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint and, therefore, the Court will exercise its 

discretion to grant Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Swanson, 87 

F.3d at 343. With the addition of the three proposed Plaintiffs (Marcela Lopez, Ofelina Pena, and 

Elvis Perez), the Court will order the parties to meet and confer regarding the scheduling of 

depositions and provide a status report within 14 days from the date of this order to minimize any 

further delays in this action. In light of the Court’s grant of Plaintiffs’ motion to amend, the 

parties also will be ordered to meet and confer and report to the Court their respective views as to 

whether Defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment (Doc. 140) is moot and should be 

withdrawn or terminated.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. 148) is GRANTED;

2. Within five days of entry of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file a second amended complaint 

electronically as a standalone docket entry in this case;

3. Upon its filing, the second amended complaint shall become the operative complaint in 

this action;

4. Defendants shall have 45 days to file their responses to the second amended complaint

following service thereof; and

5. Within 14 days from the date of this order, the parties shall meet and confer and provide a 

status report addressing (1) the scheduling of depositions of the newly added plaintiffs, 

and (2) whether Defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment (Doc. 140) is moot 

and should be withdrawn or terminated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 6, 2024 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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