Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00433/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00433-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Corey Lamont Holleman, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Keith Hartsuck, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV10-0433-TUC-JGZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Corey Lamont Holleman’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the 

Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Holleman’s conviction, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows: 

In late 2006, officers of the Tucson Police Department investigated a 

suspected drug house in midtown Tucson occupied by Holleman and 

several others, culminating in a search of the residence pursuant to a 

warrant. In the master bedroom used by Holleman, they found two 

small digital scales, several small packages of powder cocaine, and a 

locked safe containing more than eighty-seven grams of crack cocaine, 

approximately one thousand dollars in cash, and several documents 

bearing Holleman’s name, including a vehicle title, a notebook 

containing records of financial transactions, and an invoice for the 

purchase of the safe. Based on the items found, Holleman was charged 

with a single count of possession of a narcotic drug for sale. 

 Testimony at trial established that the safe had been used by 

Holleman and a business partner who had a key. There was conflicting 

evidence about whether the safe had also been accessible to the other 

occupants of the house; although Holleman’s partner testified he kept 

the key next to the safe, the police did not find it during their search. 

Over Holleman’s objection, the court instructed the jury on accomplice 

liability, and during closing argument, the state referred to this 

instruction, telling the jury that “even if you believe that [Holleman] 

never touched these drugs . . . and that he was letting people use the 

safe, then he’s guilty.” The jury found Holleman guilty of the charged 

offense and found for sentencing purposes that the amount of cocaine 

base he had possessed was 750 milligrams or more, pursuant to A.R.S. 

§§ 13-3401(36)(C) and 13-3408(D). After finding Holleman had four 

prior felony convictions and was on probation at the time of the 

offense, the court sentenced him to an enhanced, presumptive prison 

term of 15.75 years. 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 2. 

 Holleman raised four claims on direct appeal. He asserted that: (1) his right to 

be present at a critical stage of the case was violated when he was not present during 

jury selection; (2) his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s accomplice 

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liability instruction; (3) the accomplice liability instruction impermissibly shifted the 

burden of proof; and (4) the trial court’s finding the existence of prior convictions by 

a preponderance of the evidence was structural error requiring reversal. Id., Ex. H, p. 

ii. By Memorandum Decision filed August 26, 2008, the Arizona court of Appeals 

rejected Holleman’s claims. Id., Ex. A. Holleman then sought review of the decision 

by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review by order dated January 6, 2009. 

Id., Ex. B. 

 On March 5, 2009, Holleman filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and in 

August 2009 he filed the supporting petition. Id., Exs. C & D. Holleman raised 

several ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, contending that his trial 

counsel was ineffective because he did not: (1) honor Holleman’s request to testify at 

trial; (2) move to preclude evidence that guns and ammunition were found during the 

search; (3) request a “mere presence” instruction; (4) request a lesser –included 

instruction of simple possession; and (5) did not thoroughly investigate the case. Id., 

Ex. D, p. 7. 

 In a ruling dated March 19, 2008, the trial court denied Holleman’s PCR 

claims on the merits. Id., Ex. E. Holleman then sought review of his post-conviction 

petition in the Arizona Court of Appeals, and by Memorandum Decision filed June 

25, 2010, the Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. Id., Ex. F. 

 In the instant petition, Holleman raises four claims. In Ground One he asserts 

that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was not present during 

jury selection. In Ground Two, Holleman argues that the trial court’s accomplice 

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liability instruction violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

In Ground Three, Holleman contends that the trial court’s jury instruction improperly 

shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. Ground Four alleges 

that the trial court violated the rule of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), 

by finding the existence of prior convictions using a standard of proof below the 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. Exhaustion/Preclusion 

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion 

occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing that a claim has been 

procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been 

“fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories 

on which the claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. 

Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). The operative facts must be presented in 

the appropriate context to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation 

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requirement is not satisfied, for example, when a claim is presented in state court in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered in the absence of special 

circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. An exact correlation of the claims in both 

state and federal court is not required. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. The substance of the 

federal claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts. Chacon v. Wood, 

36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 

 A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court 

found his claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims 

in any forum, that no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 

693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in 

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack 

his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen 

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then present his claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

 1. Ground Two 

 Respondents assert that Holleman did not exhaust a portion of Ground Two of 

the Petition. In that claim, Holleman asserts that he was not indicted under 

accomplice liability, but with possession, and that the prosecution changed the 

charges during trial despite no evidence to support the change. Petition, p. 7. 

Respondents contend that Holleman did not present the “no evidence” portion of the 

argument to the trial court and made only passing reference to the claim in the 

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“Statement of the Issues” section of his Opening Brief on direct appeal. Answer, pp. 

6-7. In reply, Holleman contends that the claim was presented at both trial and on 

appeal, but that the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to decide the issue. Reply, p. 3. 

 Looking first at Holleman’s Opening Brief on direct appeal, the claim, as 

Respondents acknowledge, is implicated in paragraph 2 of Holleman’s “Statement of 

the Issues.” Answer, Ex. H, p. i. Additionally, in the argument associated with the 

claim, Holleman notes that his trial counsel objected to the accomplice liability 

instruction on the ground that “there was no evidence at trial to support that theory, 

but the trial court gave the instruction without making a ruling on the objection.” Id., 

Ex. H, p. 12. However, the remainder of the argument addresses only the propriety 

of the accomplice liability instruction in general and ignores any development of the 

argument that the evidence did not support the instruction. Recognizing this 

shortcoming, the Court of Appeals noted that: 

 Although Holleman’s statement of the issues asserts that he was 

“denied his right to due process when the trial court gave an 

accomplice liability instruction without ruling on [his] objection to the 

instruction that the evidence did not support the instruction,” he fails to 

develop this argument. We therefore do not consider it. See State v. 

Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298, 896 P.2d 830, 838 (1995). 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 7 n. 2. 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that a “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee, 

such as due process, is insufficient to satisfy fair presentation requirements.” 

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 

518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996). “Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, 

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detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. 

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, “mere similarity between 

a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway, 

223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted). Under these standards, the “no evidence” 

portion of Ground 2 is not exhausted. As the Arizona Court of Appeals noted, the 

record shows that Holleman raised the claim only briefly but never developed any 

argument to support it. He does not cite, much less explain or apply, any federal 

authority-- he has not even offered “drive-by” citations. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 

(“It is not enough to make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as 

due process to present the ‘substance of such a claim to a state court.”). As such, that 

part of Ground 2 is unexhausted. 

 2. The claim is procedurally barred 

 Respondents contend, and Holleman does not contradict, that Holleman is 

procedurally barred from now raising this claim in State court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under [Rule 32] based upon 

any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding.”) Because Holleman did not properly present this claim to the Arizona 

courts, the claim is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2002). As such, the merits of the claim need not be addressed unless Holleman 

establishes cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has 

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occurred. Holleman has not attempted to do so, and the Court recommends that 

Holleman’s non-exhausted claim be denied. 

B. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Ground One 

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 Holleman contends that his right to be present at all critical stages of the trial 

was violated because he was not in the courtroom during jury selection and did not 

voluntarily waive his presence. At the start of jury selection during Holleman’s trial, 

but before the potential jurors entered the courtroom, the trial judge noted “a problem 

with [Holleman’s] clothes” and indicated that they were trying to “work that out” so 

Holleman could appear in civilian clothes. Answer, Ex. I, p. 3. In light of the 

problem in obtaining the civilian clothes, the trial judge inquired of Holleman 

“whether we can start picking the jury without you being here and that’s up to you 

and your attorney to decide.” Id. After consulting with Holleman, his counsel told 

the judge that it would be fine to begin selection in Holleman’s absence. Id. The 

judge then noted on the record that Holleman’s counsel had consulted with him, 

explained the issue about obtaining the civilian clothes, and then asked Holleman if 

he had an adequate chance to discuss the issue with his counsel, to which Holleman 

responded, “Yeah.” Id. After more explanation, the judge reconfirmed with 

Holleman his approval that selection of the jury occur in his absence. Id. at p. 4. 

 As it was a critical stage of the proceeding, Holleman had the right to be 

present during jury selection. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 (1983). However, 

a defendant may consent to exclusion even at a critical stage, e.g. Campbell v. Wood, 

18 F.3d 662, 670-72 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1095 

(9th Cir. 2007) (“A defendant . . . may waive his or her constitutional right to be 

present at all critical stages of the proceedings ‘provided such waiver is voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent.’”). The Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that the trial 

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court allowed Holleman to discuss his absence with his counsel and “inquired 

whether . . . Holleman would agree to the process going forward in his absence until 

his civilian clothing arrived.” Answer, Ex. I, p. 5. Nevertheless, in the Petition, 

Holleman asserts that he “did not have true freedom of choice and had not 

meaningful alternatives” to waiving his presence. Petition, p. 9. However, nothing 

in the record suggests that he could not have merely declined to allow jury selection 

to go forward without his presence. In fact, there is nothing in the Petition or the 

record that would compel this Court to find that the state court’s treatment of this 

claim was objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

 2. Ground Two 

 Holleman contends that his due process rights were violated because the 

indictment did not allege accomplice liability, yet an instruction on those grounds 

was provided to the jury. Petition, 10. In addressing this argument, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals explained that: 

 Holleman confuses notice of the specific charges against him 

with “notice of how his responsibility for those offenses was to be 

proved.” State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 538, 633 P.2d 335, 347 (1981). 

And although he correctly asserts a right to the former, see State v. 

Johnson, 198 245, 8 P.3d 1159, 1162 (App. 2000), the state’s use of an 

accomplice liability theory does not generally implicate this right 

because “[u]nder Arizona law, an accused is a principal regardless of 

whether he directly commits the illegal act or aids or abets in its 

commission.” State v. McInelly, 146 Ariz. 161, 162-63, 704 P.2d 291, 

292-93 (App. 1985). 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 7-8. 

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 To be entitled to habeas relief in a jury instruction context, a petitioner must 

show a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that 

violated the Constitution. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). Holleman’s 

theory is that the Constitution was violated because allegations of accomplice 

liability were not contained in the indictment. However, as the Arizona Court of 

Appeals explained, under Arizona law, the accused is a principal whether he 

commits the alleged crime directly or as an accomplice. Answer, Ex. A, p. 8. The 

Court of Appeals concluded that: 

Here, Holleman was both charged and convicted of possession of a 

narcotic drug for sale, and regardless of whether the conviction was 

based on Holleman’s own possession or his aiding others to possess by 

permitting them to use his safe for that purpose, the offense was clearly 

contemplated by the indictment. 

Id., Ex. A, p. 9. 

 Holleman does not cite, nor can the Court locate, any clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent prohibiting Arizona from taking this approach to 

accomplice liability. Accordingly, this Court cannot find that the state court’s denial 

of his jury instruction claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Supreme Court law. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (stating 

that “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be contrary 

to clearly established federal law). 

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 3. Ground Three 

 Holleman’s next claim is that the trial court’s jury instructions diluted the 

burden on the prosecution and violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Petition, p. 8. 

As the Court of Appeals described the issue: 

a written instruction added the word “alone” to an oral instruction 

given by the trial court so that it read: “The number of witnesses 

testifying on one side or the other is not alone the test of a witness[‘]s 

c[r]edibility or the weight of the evidence.” In addition, the court 

instructed the jury that “the ‘credibility of a witness’ means the 

truthfulness of the witness.” Holleman asserts that, taken together, 

these instructions shifted the burden of proof. First, he contends the 

inconsistent written instruction permitted the jury to consider the 

number of witnesses offered by each side, including his exercise of the 

right not to testify in his own defense, and thus “diluted the 

presumption of innocence.” And, second, he suggests the instruction on 

credibility was “confusing’ and thus created “a real danger that the 

presumption of innocence m[ight] be prejudiced.” 

 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 10. 

 Jury instructions that shift the burden of proof to a defendant or vitiate the 

requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are of course 

unconstitutional. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520 (1979); In re 

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). However, “the Constitution does not require that 

any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden 

of proof. Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions must correctly convey the 

concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed the reviewing habeas court to 

“determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the 

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instruction to allow a conviction predicated on proof that was insufficient to meet the 

requirements of due process.” Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 In this case, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ analysis on this point is convincing 

that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of 

reasonable doubt and were sufficient to satisfy due process: 

The instructions at issue here addressed how the jury should evaluate 

the evidence, not the burden of proof. And, the jurors were also 

instructed that “if warranted by the evidence, [they might] believe one 

witness against a number of witnesses testifying differently” and in 

assessing witness credibility they should consider “how truthful is a 

witness, and how convincing is his/her evidence, and which witness 

and which evidence appears to you to be most accurate and otherwise 

trustworthy in light of all the evidence and circumstances shown.” 

 Furthermore, the contested instructions were given after the trial 

court had concluded its discussion of reasonable doubt, during which it 

clearly stated that “[t]he State has the burden [of] proving the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court had also instructed the 

jury to “consider all of the instructions,” to “start with the presumption 

that the defendant is innocent,” and not to “conclude that the defendant 

is likely to be guilty because of his choices” in testifying or calling 

witnesses. Viewed in their entirety, therefore, the jury instructions 

adequately reflected the law and made it clear that the state was 

required to prove Holleman guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 10-11. Not only was the Arizona Court of Appeals conclusion 

not objectively unreasonable, it is entirely convincing that the instructions, taken as a 

whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. Victor, 511 

U.S. at 5. Accordingly, Holleman is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 4. Ground Four

 Holleman’s final claim is that the trial court committed fundamental error by 

applying a preponderance of the evidence standard in finding he had four prior 

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convictions for purposes of sentence enhancement. Petition, p. 9. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals agreed and concluded that under the Arizona Constitution, prior 

convictions had to be established by clear and convincing evidence before they could 

be used for the purpose of sentence enhancement. Answer, Ex. A, p. 12. However, 

the outcome is different when Holleman’s claim is analyzed under federal authority. 

 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the United States Supreme 

Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires any 

fact other than a prior conviction that “increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 

prescribed statutory maximum” to be “submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 

(2004), the Supreme Court decided that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to 

have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that increases the statutory 

maximum sentence, unless the fact was admitted by the defendant or was based on a 

prior conviction. The Blakely decision did not affect the Supreme Court’s earlier 

decision in Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239–47 (1998), where 

the Court held that the fact of a prior conviction need not be determined by a jury 

before a sentencing court may use the prior conviction as the basis for a sentencing 

enhancement. Rather, the Supreme Court concluded, prior convictions may be found 

by the sentencing judge based on a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 239–47. See 

also Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 2008) (“that the fact of a prior 

conviction need not be pleaded in an indictment or proved to a jury beyond a 

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reasonable doubt . . . [is] the narrow Almendarez–Torres exception to the fact-finding 

requirements established in the Apprendi line of cases”). 

 Under this line of cases, the evaluation of Holleman’s claim differs from that 

conducted by the Arizona Court of Appeals. While the Arizona Court of Appeals 

found error because Arizona law requires that the fact of a prior conviction be 

established by clear and convincing evidence, that is not the case under federal law. 

Under federal authority, only a preponderance of evidence is required to support the 

consideration of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes. It is undisputed that the 

trial court applied that standard in this case and, therefore, there is no error under 

federal law. 

 Moreover, the Arizona Court of Appeals, after finding that fundamental error 

occurred under the Arizona Constitution, nevertheless denied relief after finding the 

error harmless. Id., p. 13. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that: 

in this case, Holleman’s probation officer identified him in court, stated 

she was supervising him pursuant to two prior felony convictions in 

CR-64000 and CR-20031170, and confirmed that his full name, date of 

birth, and social security number matched those on the sentencing 

minute entries for two other felony convictions in CR-63059 and CR63903. The state also introduced, without objection, copies of the 

convictions in all four cases. Although Holleman contends on appeal 

that the state failed to prove the prior convictions, “neither party 

challenges the authenticity of these copies, and thus evidence 

conclusively proving his prior convictions is . . . in the record.” State v. 

Morales, 215 Ariz. 59, ¶ 13, 157 P.3d 479, 482 (2007). Therefore, 

Holleman has not shown that a reasonable judge, applying the 

appropriate standard of proof, “could have reached a different result.” 

See [State v.] Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 27, 115 P.3d at 609 

[(2005)]. Because he has failed to make such a showing, we find no 

reversible error. 

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Answer, Ex. A, p. 13. This analysis applies with equal force here. See Washington v. 

Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2006) (sentencing errors are subject to harmless 

error review). Thus, even if the trial court had violated the United States 

Constitution, which as discussed above it did not, the error was nevertheless harmless 

based on the reasons identified by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Thus, Holleman is 

not entitled to relief on this claim. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Holleman’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 10-433-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 11th day of February, 2013. 

 

 

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