Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00799/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00799-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARAMONDO SAMUEL CORDOVA,

Petitioner,

v.

DOMINGO URIBE, JR., Warden,

Respondent. 

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Civil No.10cv799 LAB(AJB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

On April 13, 2010, Petitioner, Aramondo Samuel Cordova, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On 

June 15, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer and on November 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a Traverse 

After a thorough review, this Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and

RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED for the

reasons outlined below.

Procedural Background

A. Conviction and Sentence

On March 14, 2007, a jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of second degree murder in

violation of California Penal Code section 187(a), one count of attempted murder in violation of

California Penal Code sections 664, 187(a); one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter in violation

of California Penal Code sections 664, 192(a); and two counts of assault with a firearm in violation of

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California Penal Code section 245(a)(2). (Notice of Lodgment (“Lodgment”) 2 at 461.) On July 11,

2007, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 107 years to life plus ten years in state prison. (Id. at 463-

64.)

B. Direct Appeal

Petitioner, through appointed appellate counsel, filed a timely direct appeal with the California

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment 3.) On November 3, 2008, the

Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. (Lodgment 6.) On December 8, 2008, Petitioner filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 7.) On January 14, 2009, the California

Supreme Court denied the petition for review without comment. (Lodgment 8.) 

C. Instant Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition on April 13, 2010 challenging his conviction and

sentence. On June 15, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer and on November 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a

Traverse.

Factual Background

The following factual background is taken from the Court of Appeal opinion in People v. 

Cordova, unpublished opinion (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1, November 3, 2008). The Court

presumes these factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

A. Prosecution Evidence

In May 2004, Cordova was living in Chula Vista with two of his friends, Kris

Ebbert and Aliso Moriarty. On May 29, 2004, they held a party in honor of

Ebbert’s birthday. 

Cordova was consuming alcohol at the party. He appeared increasingly agitated

and belligerent as the night progressed. For example, he was angered when a

woman to whom he was attracted ignored him and, when he saw her talking to an

African-American man, Cordova uttered, “fucking nigger.” In another instance,

Jenna Carlson was talking to another partygoer when Cordova approached from

behind and kicked Carlson in the buttocks, and when she demanded to know why,

Cordova replied, “Because I had to.” Cordova was also angered when Ebbert

broke Cordova’s marijuana pipe, and Cordova told Ebbert he would make Ebbert

pay for the damaged pipe. Around 2:00 a.m., when Cordova and Jessica McIntire

went to a store to purchase more beer for the party, Cordova was “kind of a jerk

to the clerk” at the store. 

Toward the end of the night, Cordova appeared “pretty drunk” and was acting

“aggravated” and “stupid and loud.” He began breaking things and punching

walls while cursing, and appeared “real angry.” At one point, while sitting in a

chair, Cordova “flipped out,” yelled something, and hit the bottom part of a

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Damian Resendez had attended the party and had been in an earlier confrontation with another

partygoer over an alleged theft. Cordova had told Resendez at that time, “Stop acting like a bitch.” 

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window with his hand, shattering the bottom portion of the glass. When McIntire

asked if he was all right, Cordova stated, “This is my fucking house and I can do

what the fuck I want.” A moment later, a friend (Adam Paxton) entered the room

and threw a glass or beer bottle above Cordova’s head, shattering the remaining

part of the glass window Cordova had just broken. Cordova was very upset and

confronted Paxton, and stated Paxton owed him money for the window. Paxton

replied that it “was already broken so I really don’t owe you anything.” Cordova

began ripping the curtains from the windows, and Paxton left the room. Shortly

thereafter, Ebbert walked into the room and Cordova (for no apparent reason) told

him to “fuck off.” Ebbert told Cordova that, if he had a problem with Ebbert,

they could “go handle this outside.” However, that confrontation cooled off, and

Cordova and Ebbert went to their respective bedrooms.

Most of the guests left after the window-breaking incident, but several remained. 

Moriarty and Paxton were outside on the porch, and Ebbert was in the front yard

talking to his cousin (Mel Ordonez), when Moriarty saw Cordova in the dining

area. Cordova was standing approximately 20 feet from Moriarty and was

holding a silver revolver and pointing it at Moriarty. Moriarty told Paxton they

should leave and, when Ebbert and Ordonez started to go toward the house,

Moriarty warned them that Cordova was inside with a gun and there was a

problem. Ebbert replied he was not afraid of Cordova. Ebbert and Ordonez then

went inside and went into Ebbert’s bedroom.

Moriarty then heard Cordova and Ebbert talking in the living room and overheard

Cordova say “hold it” and then say, in an angry tone, that Ebbert had made

Cordova “feel like a coward in [my] own house.” Ebbert then stated, “It looks

like you are not playing around anymore. What are you going to do with that

thing?” and then Moriarty heard a shot fired. Cordova had switched weapons and

used a .12 gauge pump action shotgun, loaded with slug ammunition, to commit

the offenses. 

Moriarty then saw Cordova, holding a shotgun, standing just inside the house near

the open front door. Cordova said, “Hey Damian” and then shot Paxton in the

chest.1

 Moriarty began running away, and when he turned to look back at

Cordova, he saw Cordova raising the gun. Moriarty heard another shot being

fired and felt something hit him in the back, but he was not struck by the shotgun

slug. At some point one of the shots fired by Cordova also struck Mr. Ordonez. 

After Moriarty found a hiding place, he looked back and saw Cordova reenter the

house. He then saw Cordova reemerge, still holding the shotgun, and begin

running in the opposite direction. Moriarty went back inside the house and found

Ebbert on the living room floor with a chest wound. Moriarty and his girlfriend,

who had been in the bathroom, then left and called police. 

Chula Vista Police Officer Szymczak was on duty in the area when he heard four

shots being fired. He immediately began running toward the sounds, and observed a person (later identified as Damian Resendez) running toward him. 

Szymczak ordered Resendez to the ground, and Resendez complied. A few

seconds later, Szymczak saw another person also fleeing the scene, but that

person (who was not apparently armed) did not comply with Szymczak’s order to

stop. 

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Dr. Saddick, a neuropsychologist who extensively tested Cordova, testified for the defense that

Cordova had a mild organic brain dysfunction in his frontal lobe. A frontal lobe dysfunction can impair

a person’s ability to plan and reason, and can cause a person to act impulsively without proper

judgment, and the dysfunction is exacerbated by chronic and heavy alcohol use. 

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At the same time, Officer Uribe was driving near the area of the shootings. He

saw two men, one of whom was carrying a two-foot-long black object, standing

on the corner of 1st Avenue and I Street. When Uribe shone his spotlight on

them, the man carrying the object fled and jumped over a fence. Uribe radioed

police and a perimeter was set up to contain the suspect and find him. 

Approximately 45 minutes later, Uribe heard sounds from the side of a residence

near the corner of 1st and I, and another officer (Officer Padilla) yelled out

“police.” Padilla saw Cordova emerge from behind a fence and ordered him to

stop but Cordova ran back through the gate. Officer Chavez, approaching the

area from a different direction, saw Cordova jump over a fence, and ordered him

to stop. Cordova eventually complied, and police arrested him. During his

transport to the police station, Cordova was acting “obnoxious” and made weird

statements, including telling Chavez she was “the hottest detective [he’s] ever

seen” but later calling her a “bitch” and a “whore.” He also stated “one slug

[was] all it took,” and claimed he had a blueprint of the police station. A blood

alcohol test taken from Cordova approximately five hours after the shootings

showed he had a blood alcohol level of .16 percent. 

The following morning, police searched the area around Cordova’s arrest. They

found a pump action .12 gauge shotgun with a pistol grip, and ballistics tests

confirmed the shotgun matched the expended casings found at the site of the

shootings. 

Ebbert and Paxton died from shotgun wounds. Ordonez suffered “massive” soft

tissue damage and other injuries. 

B. Defense Evidence

Several of Cordova’s friends testified Cordova drank often and was a heavy

drinker. Cordova was drinking heavily, and also ingested cocaine, the night of

the party. He became increasingly intoxicated, was acting bizarre, and made

numerous illogical statements. 

Dr. Smith, a psychiatrist, estimated Cordova’s blood alcohol level at the time of

the shooting was around .24 percent. Dr. Smith testified that some people would

be rendered unconscious with a blood alcohol level of .16 percent. He stated that

even extreme alcoholics with a blood alcohol level of .24 would be severely

impaired or confused and could suffer memory loss. Dr. Smith also stated

Cordova suffered from paranoia, organic brain syndrome with learning disability,

a psychotic disorder caused by alcohol, and posttraumatic stress disorder resulting

from prior life events.2

 Dr. Smith believed, considering Cordova’s prior mental

deficiencies and extreme alcohol ingestion, Cordova’s reported inability to recall

the events of that night was consistent with his having acted in an alcoholic

blackout. 

Cordova testified he had suffered from alcohol blackouts in the past. He had been

drinking heavily throughout the party, did not recall most of the events of the

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Short testified that, after they wrestled, Cordova became upset, went upstairs to his room,

returned with a shotgun and pointed it at Short. Short ran from the house. As Short was driving away,

Cordova came outside wielding a knife. 

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party, and had no memory whatsoever of the shootings. He had no reason to kill

his very good friends. 

Cordova acknowledged he had several prior confrontations with people that

involved alcohol. In one instance, he threw a beer bottle at a friend and, after

they were separated, grabbed a kitchen knife and went after the friend, but others

intervened and took the knife from him. In another incident, a friend (Galen

Short) refused to leave Cordova’s house and Cordova “came to him.” They

wrestled to the ground, and Cordova ultimately grabbed a knife and chased Short

out of the house.3 In another incident, Cordova climbed onto the roof of his house

carrying a shotgun after receiving a telephone call from someone claiming they

were coming to his house with a truckload of illegal immigrants. 

C. Rebuttal

A prosecution neuropsychologist, Dr. Delis, testified Cordova showed no consistent evidence of frontal lobe dysfunction, and Cordova was exaggerating or

amplifying his psychiatric symptoms. He also stated Cordova was not suffering

from posttraumatic stress disorder. 

(Lodgment 6.) 

Discussion

Petitioner raises one claim in his petition arguing that the trial court erroneously instructed the

jury on a revised version of the defense of unconsciousness during jury deliberations. 

A. Scope of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain

an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As amended, the AEDPA now reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

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To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The threshold question is whether the rule of law was

clearly established at the time petitioner’s state court conviction became final. Id. at 406. Clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States “refers to the holdings,

as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id.

at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). However, Ninth Circuit case law may be

“persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an

‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly

established.’” Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000). Only after the clearly

established Federal law is identified can the court determine whether the state court’s application of that

law “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” that clearly

established Federal law. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. 

A state court decision is “contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a

result different from our precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406. “A state-court decision involves

an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s

case” or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new

context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Id. at 407. Under Williams, an application of federal law is unreasonable only

if it is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Further, a state court’s decision results in a “decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State court

proceeding” if it “is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

In making such a determination under AEDPA, the court looks to the state’s last reasoned

decision. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where there is no reasoned decision from

the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v.

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Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state

court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. 

B. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the defense of unconsciousness during jury deliberations violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

(Pet. at 6.) Specifically, he contends that the original given instruction of CALCRIM No. 3425 was

correct while the modified version, given during jury deliberations, was an incorrect statement of the

law and undermined his defense of unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication. (Pet., Attach. A at 3-

4.) Respondent argues that there was no jury instruction error. 

In Cupp v. Naughten, the United States Supreme Court presented the standard for jury instruction error in habeas cases. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). The only question for a federal

habeas court is whether, “under the circumstances as a whole and given the evidence in the case, the

failure to give the requested instruction rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal

due process.” Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 746 (1995) (citing Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). A single

jury instruction “may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the

overall charge.” Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47. “An omission ... is less likely to be prejudicial than a

misstatement of the law” and the petitioner bears an “especially heavy” burden. Henderson v. Kibbe,

431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977).

In the instant case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review in an

order containing no reasoning for its decision. (Lodgment 8.) Therefore, this Court must look to the

last reasoned state court decision and presume that the unexplained opinion rests upon the same ground. 

See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. The last reasoned state court decision was issued by the Court of Appeal on

November 3, 2008. (Lodgment 6.) 

In considering the entirety of the instructional charge to the jury and the closing arguments by

both parties, the court of appeal concluded that the jury understood and properly applied the applicable

law embodied in the instructions. (Id. at 13.) The new instruction distinguished unconsciousness

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caused by organic brain dysfunction and/or Posttraumatic stress disorder from voluntary intoxication

and clarified that involuntary unconsciousness was a defense to the crimes of murder and attempted

murder while voluntary intoxication unconsciousness was not a defense to murder and attempted

murder. (Id. at 14.) The trial court also coupled the modified instruction with CALCRIM No. 626

which discussed how unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is a mitigating factor that would

make Petitioner guilty of involuntary manslaughter. (Id.) In conclusion, the court of appeal held that

the jury was adequately instructed. (Id. at 15.) 

At the conclusion of closing arguments, on March 8, 2007, the trial court instructed the jury on

the following: CALCRIM Nos. 625 (voluntary intoxication: effects on homicide crimes), 626 (voluntary

intoxication causing unconsciousness: effects on homicide crimes), 627 (auditory hallucinations: effect

on premeditation), 3425 (unconsciousness), 3426 (voluntary intoxication), 3428 (mental impairment;

defense to specific intent or mental state). (Lodgment 2 at 246-48, 262-64; Lodgment 1, 13 RT at 1877-

79; 1890-92.) 

CALCRIM No. 3425 that was originally given to the jury stated:

The defendant is not guilty of any murder or attempted murder if he acted while legally

unconscious. Someone is legally unconscious when he or she is not conscious of his

actions. Someone may be unconscious even though able to move. 

Unconsciousness may be caused by a blackout or a combination of factors, such as

alcoholic blackout, alcoholic hallucinations, organic brain dysfunction, learning

disabilities, post traumatic stress disorder, or any mental defect.

The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was conscious

when he acted. If there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted as if

he were conscious, you should conclude that he was conscious. If, however, based on all

the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that he was conscious, you must find him not

guilty. 

(Lodgment 1, 13 RT at 1891) (emphasis added).

On March 9, 2007, the jury, while in deliberations, presented the court with a question, “Can a

person in an alcoholic blackout [be] considered conscious or unconscious by law?” (Lodgment 2 at

281.) The court heard arguments from both parties and in response to the jurors question, the Court

wrote to the jurors to “Please review the following instructions: 3425, 3426, 3428, 625, 626, and 627.” 

(Id. at 282.) 

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On March 12, 2007, the People filed a motion to remove the previously given CALCRIM No.

3425 and arguments were heard. (Lodgment 1, 13 RT at 1930-1196.) After hearing oral argument on

the issue, the trial court withdrew the previously stated jury instruction CALCRIM No. 3425 and

provided a new version. The court explained that the new version distinguished all other forms of

blackout from alcoholic blackouts. (Id. at 1971-72.) In the new version, the court changed the language

in the second paragraph to: “[u]nconsciousness may be caused by a blackout (other than an alcoholic

blackout) or by a combination of organic brain dysfunction and post traumatic stress disorder.” (Id. at

1997.) 

The trial court gave the following revised instruction on CALCRIM No. 3425:

The defendant is not guilty of any murder or attempted murder if he acted while legally

unconscious. Someone is legally unconscious when he or she is not conscious of his

actions. Someone may be unconscious even though able to move. 

Unconsciousness may be caused by a blackout (other than an alcoholic blackout) or by

a combination of organic brain dysfunction and post traumatic stress disorder. 

The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was conscious

when he acted. If there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted as if

he were conscious, you should conclude that he was conscious. If, however, based on all

the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that he was conscious, you must find him not

guilty. 

(Lodgment 1 at 13 RT 1997) (emphasis added). The trial court also told the jury to consider the new

version of CALCRIM No. 3425 in conjunction with CALCRIM No. 626 and read:

Voluntary intoxication may cause a person to be unconscious of his or her actions. A

very intoxicated person may still be capable of physical movement but may not be aware

of his or her actions or the nature of those actions. A person is voluntarily intoxicated if

he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other

substance knowing that it could produce an intoxicating effect or willingly assuming the

risk of that effect. When a person voluntarily causes his or her own intoxication to the

point of unconsciousness, the person assumes the risk that while unconscious, he or she

will commit acts inherently dangerous to human life. If someone dies as a result of the

actions of a person who was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is

involuntary manslaughter.

Involuntary manslaughter has been proved if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt that,

one, the defendant killed without legal justification or excuse. Two, the defendant did

not act with the intent to kill. Three, the defendant did not act with a conscious disregard

for human life. And four, as a result of voluntary intoxication, the defendant was not

conscious of his actions or the nature of those actions.

 

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was

not unconscious. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not

guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter.

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(Id. at 1997-98.) 

Petitioner argues that the original instruction of CALCRIM No. 3425 was correct while the

modified version was an incorrect statement of the law and undermined his defense of unconsciousness

due to voluntary intoxication. (Pet., Attachment A at 3-4.) However, Petitioner’s defense was not

undermined as the trial court clarified the instructions to comply with the law and the court also

instructed on the effects of voluntary intoxication in a homicide. 

Under California law, unconsciousness is a complete defense to a criminal charge. Cal. Penal

Code section 26; People v. Rogers, 39 Cal. 4th 826, 887 (2006). However, unconsciousness caused by

voluntary intoxication is not a complete defense and can only negate specific intent. Cal. Penal Code

section 22; People v. Abilez, 41 Cal. 4th 472, 516 (2007). The original instruction suggested that

unconsciousness caused by an alcoholic blackout or voluntary intoxication, could result in a complete

defense. Therefore, the new revised instruction merely clarified the original instruction in order to

highlight the distinction between unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication and all other causes

of unconsciousness. The recitation of CALCRIM No. 626 with CALCRIM No. 3425 highlighted to the

jury that unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication was a mitigating element making Petitioner

guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and not murder or attempted murder. Further, the other jury

instructions, CALCRIM Nos. 625, 2426, 3428, also provided the jury guidance regarding the relevance

of unconsciousness to the charged offenses and the distinction between unconsciousness caused by

voluntary intoxication and other causes of unconsciousness. Looking at the instructions as a whole, the

Court concludes that the revised instruction did not render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate

federal due process. See Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the

claim for jury instruction error be DENIED. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED. This report and recommendation is submitted by the

undersigned Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of Title 28, United States Code, section 636(b)(1).

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K:\COMMON\BATTAGLI\CASES\2 Orders to be filed\10cv799.cordova.rr.wpd 11 08cv651

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 11, 2011, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than January 25, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 7, 2010

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:10-cv-00799-LAB-MDD Document 20 Filed 12/08/10 Page 11 of 11