Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-21-55881/USCOURTS-ca9-21-55881-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PUNCHBOWL, INC., a Delaware 

corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v. 

AJ PRESS, LLC, a Delaware limited 

liability company, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No.21-55881 

D.C. No. 

2:21-cv-03010-

SVW-MAR 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 2, 2023

Las Vegas, Nevada

Filed January 12, 2024

Before: John B. Owens and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit 

Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bress

* The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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2 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

SUMMARY**

Lanham Act

The panel reversed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the defendant in a trademark 

infringement suit involving two companies that used the 

word “Punchbowl” in their marks and remanded for further 

proceedings. 

Applying Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products 

LLC, 599 U.S. 140 (2023), the panel held that the 

defendant’s use of the Punchbowl mark was not outside the 

scope of the Lanham Act under the “Rogers test.” Under this 

test, a trademark dispute concerning an expressive work 

protected by the First Amendment does not fall within the 

Lanham Act unless the defendant’s use of the mark was not 

artistically relevant to the work or explicitly misled 

consumers as to the source or the content of the work. Jack 

Daniel’s held that the Rogers test does not apply when the 

accused infringer has used a trademark to designate the 

source of its own goods. The panel concluded that, following 

Jack Daniel’s, the Ninth Circuit’s prior precedents were no 

longer good law insofar as they held that Rogers applied 

when an expressive mark was used as a mark, and that the 

only threshold for applying Rogers was an attempt to apply 

the Lanham Act to something expressive. 

The panel held that Rogers did not apply here because 

the defendant was using the Punchbowl mark to identify and 

distinguish its news products. The panel instructed that, on 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 3

remand, the district court should proceed to a likelihood-ofconfusion analysis under the Lanham Act.

COUNSEL

Peter J. Willsey (argued) and Vincent Badolato, Brown 

Rudnick LLP, Washington, D.C.; Rececca M. Lecaroz and 

Melanie D. Burke, Brown Rudnick LLP, Boston, 

Massachusetts; David Stein, Brown Rudnick LLP, Irvine, 

California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ian C. Ballon (argued) Nina D. Boyajian, and Rebekah S. 

Guyon, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Los Angeles, California, 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Cara L. Gagliano and Corynne McSherry, Electronic 

Frontier Foundation, San Francisco, California, Amici 

Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation. 

Eugene Volokh, UCLA First Amendment Clinic, UCLA 

School of Law, Los Angeles, California, Amici Curiae Law 

Professors.

OPINION

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

This case requires us to apply the Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP 

Products LLC, 599 U.S. 140 (2023), to a trademark 

infringement dispute involving two companies that use the 

word “Punchbowl” in their marks. Prior to Jack Daniel’s, 

and bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, we held that under the

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4 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

“Rogers test,” see Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 

1989), the defendant’s use of the term “Punchbowl” was 

expressive in nature and not explicitly misleading as to its 

source, which meant it fell outside the Lanham Act as a 

matter of law. See Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC

(Punchbowl I), 52 F.4th 1091 (9th Cir. 2022), opinion 

withdrawn, 78 F.4th 1158 (9th Cir. 2023). With the benefit 

of Jack Daniel’s, we now hold that Rogers does not apply

because the defendant is using the mark to identify its 

products. Although it does not follow that the plaintiff will 

ultimately prevail or even survive a future dispositive 

motion, it does mean that the defendant’s use of its mark is 

not immune from the traditional likelihood-of-confusion 

inquiry.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I

A

The following facts come verbatim from our initial

opinion in this case. See Punchbowl I, 52 F.4th at 1094–96.

Punchbowl, Inc. (Punchbowl), is a self-described 

“technology company that develops online communications 

solutions for consumers,” with a “focus on celebrations, 

holidays, events and memory-making.” Punchbowl 

provides “online event and celebration invitations and 

greetings cards” and “custom sponsorships and branded 

invitations,” as part of a subscription-based service. 

Punchbowl also works with companies such as The Walt 

Disney Company, Chuck E. Cheese, and Dave & Busters to 

help them promote their brands through online invitations.

Punchbowl has used the mark Punchbowl® (the Mark) 

since at least 2006. It registered the Mark with the United 

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 5

States Patent & Trademark Office in 2013. The Mark was 

registered primarily in connection with the “[t]ransmission 

of invitations, documents, electronic mail, announcements, 

photographs and greetings”; “[p]arty planning”; and 

“[p]reparation of electronic invitations, namely, providing 

. . . software that enables users to . . . customize electronic 

invitations.”

Punchbowl promotes itself as “The Gold Standard in 

Online Invitations & Greeting Cards,” as reflected in this 

record excerpt from Punchbowl’s website:

A larger example of Punchbowl’s Mark and logo (a punch 

ladle) is shown here:

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6 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

But this is not the only Punchbowl. Journalists Jake 

Sherman and Anna Palmer are the co-founders of AJ Press, 

LLC, a company that “provides curated, non-partisan 

commentary, opinions, and critiques.” In 2021, Palmer and 

Sherman co-founded Punchbowl News with reporter John 

Bresnahan. Punchbowl Newsis a subscription-based online 

news publication that covers topics in American government 

and politics. AJ Press owns and operates Punchbowl News, 

choosing which topics to cover and how to address them. AJ 

Press concentrates its reporting on the “insiders” who make 

decisions in Washington, D.C., (i.e., politicians, aides, and 

lobbyists), and on events and news that affect American 

political dynamics and elections. 

Given the publication’s focus on Beltway politics, AJ 

Press wanted a name that evoked its subject matter. It chose 

“Punchbowl” because that is the nickname the Secret 

Service uses to refer to the U.S. Capitol. The title 

Punchbowl News was thus selected to “elicit the theme and 

geographic location” of the publication. AJ Press has filed 

trademark applications to register the marks “Punchbowl 

News” and “Punchbowl Press.”

Punchbowl News often uses a slogan—“Power. People. 

Politics.”—in connection with its name and logo. Like its 

name, AJ Press chose its slogan to reflect the subject matter 

and theme of the Punchbowl News publication. Similarly, 

AJ Press selected a logo to allude to the publication’s focus 

on insider news and political commentary. The logo depicts 

an overturned U.S. Capitol filled with bright pink/purple 

punch—an apparently playful homage to a blend of the 

traditional red and blue associated with America’s leading 

political parties that emphasizes the publication’s 

nonpartisan stance. This is an example from the record of 

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 7

Punchbowl News’s logo in conjunction with its slogan, as it 

appears on its website:

Punchbowl News frequently promotes its connection to 

its founders. Its website depicts a large image of Sherman, 

Palmer, and Bresnahan accompanied by text stating that 

Punchbowl News was “founded by journalists and bestselling authors Jake Sherman and Anna Palmer, and cofounded by veteran Capitol Hill reporter John Bresnahan.” 

Punchbowl News’s publications state at the top, near the 

name “Punchbowl News,” that they are “by John Bresnahan, 

Anna Palmer, and Jake Sherman.”

B

The parties’ coinciding uses of “Punchbowl” led to this 

lawsuit. Punchbowl sued AJ Press, alleging violations of the 

Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair 

competition. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Punchbowl also 

brought related state law claims.

The district court converted AJ Press’s motion to dismiss 

into a motion for summary judgment. The court then granted 

summary judgment to AJ Press, concluding that its use of the 

name “Punchbowl” did not give rise to liability under the 

Rogers test because it constituted protected expression and 

was not explicitly misleading as to its source. The district 

court also denied Punchbowl’s request for a continuance 

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8 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to conduct 

additional discovery.

In November 2022, we affirmed. See Punchbowl I, 52 

F.4th at 1094. Applying circuit precedent, including this 

court’s decision in VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s 

Properties, Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 599 

U.S. 140 (2023), we held that AJ Press’s use of the Mark was 

expressive in nature and outside the scope of the Lanham Act 

under the Rogers test. See Punchbowl I, 52 F.4th at 1097–

1104. That was so even though AJ Press used the Mark to 

identify its commercial brand. Id. at 1099–1100.

The week after we issued our opinion in Punchbowl I, 

the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jack Daniel’s, a case 

in which our court applied Rogers to hold that a dog chew 

toy resembling a bottle of Jack Daniel’s whiskey was 

protected First Amendment expression, to which the 

Lanham Act did not apply. Because our opinion in 

Punchbowl I relied on both our court’s decision in Jack 

Daniel’s and a body of Ninth Circuit precedent applying 

Rogers, we promptly stayed the mandate in Punchbowl I to 

await the Supreme Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s. In 

June 2023, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jack 

Daniel’s, reversing this court.

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision, we withdrew 

our opinion in Punchbowl I. See 78 F.4th 1158. We then 

ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs and heard reargument. Our review here is de novo. Miranda v. City of 

Casa Grande, 15 F.4th 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2021).

II

The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., “creates a 

comprehensive framework for regulating the use of 

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 9

trademarks and protecting them against infringement, 

dilution, and unfair competition.” Gordon v. Drape 

Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 263 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand 

Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

Traditionally, courts apply a likelihood-of-confusion test to 

claims brought under the Lanham Act. See id. at 264. Under 

this test, we ask “whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’

in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of 

the good or service bearing one of the marks.” Dreamwerks 

Prod. Grp. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 

1998) (citation omitted); see also Lodestar Anstalt v. 

Bacardi & Co., 31 F.4th 1228, 1252 (9th Cir. 2022). That 

analysis requires consideration of the eight “Sleekcraft” 

factors: “(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; 

(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; 

(5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the 

degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) 

defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood 

of expansion of the product lines.” AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft 

Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other 

grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 

F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). Under Rogers, however, 

we have held that background First Amendment concerns

sometimes require a heightened showing for a trademark 

infringement claim to proceed. 

The question in this case is whether Punchbowl’s claims 

against AJ Press fall under Rogers. In Punchbowl I, we said 

“yes.” But that was before Jack Daniel’s. We now hold that 

Rogers does not apply to this case. To explain why Jack 

Daniel’s dictates a different result than we reached 

previously, we first provide an overview of our circuit’s preJack Daniel’s case law applying Rogers, as well as our prior 

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10 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

decision in Punchbowl I. We then examine the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s. Finally, we explain why

Jack Daniel’s limitation of the Rogers test governs this case. 

The upshot is that Punchbowl’s claims against AJ Press are 

not excluded from the Lanham Act under Rogers, even as

additional questions remain as to whether this lawsuit can 

proceed further or ultimately succeed.

A

We begin with Rogers. Our precedents applying Rogers 

were borne of the idea that some trademarks have expressive 

value and that in those situations, trademark law’s traditional 

likelihood-of-confusion test “fails to account for the full 

weight of the public’s interest in free expression.” Mattel, 

Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). 

To “avoid conflict” between the First Amendment and the 

Lanham Act, Gordon, 909 F.3d at 264, we adopted the 

approach of the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi to 

frame the inquiry into when the Lanham Act applies to a 

trademark dispute. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.

Under the Rogers test, and prior to Jack Daniel’s, the 

defendant must first “make a threshold legal showing that its 

allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work 

protected by the First Amendment.” Gordon, 909 F.3d at 

264. If the defendant meets this burden, the Lanham Act 

does not apply unless “the defendant’s use of the mark (1) is 

not artistically relevant to the work or (2) explicitly misleads 

consumers as to the source or the content of the work.” Id.

(citing Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902). “Neither of these prongs is 

easy to meet.” Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix LLC, 

983 F.3d 443, 462 (9th Cir. 2020). “Artistic relevance” in 

Rogers’s first prong means artistic relevance “merely . . . 

above zero,” such that a trademark infringement plaintiff can

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 11

avoid Rogers only if the use of the mark has “no artistic 

relevance to the underlying work whatsoever.” E.S.S. Ent. 

2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099–

1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902). And 

to be “explicitly misleading” under Rogers’s second prong,

there must be “‘an explicit indication, overt claim, or explicit 

misstatement’ about the source of the work.” Dr. Seuss 

Enters., L.P., 983 F.3d at 462 (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts, 

Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013)). When the Rogers 

test applies, it often precludes claims of trademark 

infringement. See Gordon, 909 F.3d at 261.

Our precedents have applied Rogers to a range of 

expressive works. For example, the Rogers test applied to a 

suit by Mattel, the manufacturer of Barbie dolls, against a

European band that produced the song “Barbie Girl.” 

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901. We held that the song, which 

featured lyrics such as “I’m a blond bimbo girl, in a fantasy 

world,” used the Barbie mark in a way that was artistically 

relevant to the work’s satirical commentary on the “Barbie” 

lifestyle. Id. at 902. The work was also not “explicitly 

misleading” under Rogers’s second prong because it only 

used the name “Barbie” in the song and title and “d[id] not, 

explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by 

Mattel.” Id. In addition to Mattel, we have applied Rogers

to various other expressive works. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss 

Enters., L.P., 983 F.3d at 461 (applying Rogers to the use of 

“Seussian font” and “Seussian style of illustration” in a 

comic book); E.S.S. Ent. 2000, 547 F.3d at 1100 (applying 

Rogers where the defendant distributed a video game that 

parodied the plaintiff’s strip club); Walking Mountain 

Prods., 353 F.3d at 807 (applying Rogers to the use of the 

Barbie mark in titles of photographs).

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12 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

But our precedents also rejected the theory that “the 

Rogers test includes a threshold requirement that a mark 

have attained a meaning beyond its source-identifying 

function.” Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire 

Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017). Instead, 

this was “merely a consideration under the first prong of the 

Rogers test.” Id. The result was that “the only threshold 

requirement for the Rogers test [wa]s an attempt to apply the 

Lanham Act to First Amendment expression.” Id. at 1198. 

We thus held in Twentieth Century Fox that the use of the 

“Empire” mark as an umbrella brand did not take the case 

outside of Rogers. Id. at 1196–97.

Our decision in Jack Daniel’s emerged from this line of 

cases. There, VIP Products sold a “Bad Spaniels Silly 

Squeaker” rubber dog chew toy that, with humorous dogthemed alterations, resembled the distinctive bottle of Jack 

Daniel’s Old No. 7 Black Label Tennessee Whiskey. 953 

F.3d at 1172. We held that the Rogers test barred Lanham 

Act liability for the Bad Spaniels Silly Squeaker. Id. Rogers 

applied because “the Bad Spaniels dog toy, although surely 

not the equivalent of the Mona Lisa, is an expressive work.” 

Id. at 1175.

This was the state of the law when we decided 

Punchbowl I. In that first iteration of this appeal, we held 

that Punchbowl’s trademark infringement claim against AJ 

Press failed as a matter of law because Rogers and its 

progeny insulated AJ Press from liability under the Lanham 

Act. We first rejected Punchbowl’s argument that this case 

“lies outside of Rogers’s domain” because Rogers “does not 

extend to the brand name of a commercial enterprise.” 

Punchbowl I, 52 F.4th at 1097 (brackets and quotation marks 

omitted). We disagreed with that proposition because under 

circuit precedent, “[t]he only threshold requirement for the 

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 13

Rogers test is an attempt to apply the Lanham Act to First

Amendment expression,” meaning that “whether ‘a mark has 

attained a meaning beyond its source-identifying function’ 

is not a threshold requirement for applying Rogers.” Id. at 

1097, 1099 (brackets omitted) (quoting Twentieth Century 

Fox, 875 F.3d at 1198). AJ Press used the word 

“Punchbowl” to convey a “D.C. insider perspective” and a 

“gossipy” political theme. Id. at 1098. Relying on our 

court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s, we observed that “[i]f a 

rubber dog toy is expressive under Rogers, we have little 

doubt that AJ Press’s use of the Punchbowl Mark is as well.” 

Id. (citation omitted).

Turning to the two prongs of the Rogers test, we held that 

AJ Press’s use of the mark was artistically relevant to its 

publications and that AJ Press did not explicitly mislead 

consumers as to the source or content of its work. Id. at 

1100–03. Although AJ Press used the same core word in its 

mark (“Punchbowl”), under our case law “the mere use of a 

trademark alone cannot suffice to make such use explicitly 

misleading.” Id. at 1100 (quoting E.S.S. Ent., 547 F.3d at 

1100). Because AJ Press was using the mark in a different 

context than Punchbowl (the former for political news and 

the latter for online greeting cards), and because AJ Press 

had added its own expressive content, such as a slogan and 

logo, AJ Press’s use of the Mark was not explicitly 

misleading. Id. at 1101–03. Thus, Rogers applied, and AJ 

Press was not subject to trademark liability for its use of the 

Mark.

B

Enter the Supreme Court in Jack Daniel’s. The Court in 

Jack Daniel’s was careful to note that it was not opining on 

the broader validity of the Rogers test. See 599 U.S. at 145 

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14 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

(“[W]e do not decide whether the threshold inquiry applied 

in the Court of Appeals is ever warranted.”); id. at 163 (“We 

do not decide whether the Rogers test is ever appropriate . . 

. .”). At the same time, Jack Daniel’s held that the Rogers 

threshold inquiry “is not appropriate when the accused 

infringer has used a trademark to designate the source of its 

own goods—in other words, has used a trademark as a 

trademark. That kind of use falls within the heartland of 

trademark law, and does not receive special First 

Amendment protection.” Id. at 145.

Jack Daniel’s was clear on this point. Said the Court: 

“Without deciding whether Rogers has merit in other 

contexts, we hold that it does not when an alleged infringer 

uses a trademark in the way the Lanham Act most cares 

about: as a designation of source for the infringer’s own 

goods.” Id. at 153; see also, e.g., id. at 156 (the Rogers test 

does not “insulate[] from ordinary trademark scrutiny the use 

of trademarks as trademarks, ‘to identify or brand a 

defendant’s goods or services.’” (alterations omitted)); id. at 

163 (“Rogers does not apply when the challenged use of a 

mark is as a mark.”). This rule applies, the Court went on, 

even if “the use of a mark has other expressive content—i.e., 

because it conveys some message on top of source.” Id. at 

157. In the Supreme Court’s view, because “trademarks are 

often expressive,” applying Rogers whenever a trademark 

has expressive connotations would allow Rogers to “take 

over much of the world.” Id. at 158.

The Court located its “use of a mark as a mark” carveout

from Rogers in both the Lanham Act itself and the body of 

lower court precedent applying Rogers. From the 

perspective of the Lanham Act, “whether the use of a mark 

is serving a source-designation function” is “crucial” for the 

Act’s objective of “ensur[ing] that consumers can tell where 

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 15

goods come from.” Id. at 163. And, Jack Daniel’s 

explained, lower courts applying Rogers had similarly

“confined it” to cases “in which a trademark is used not to 

designate a work’s source, but solely to perform some other 

expressive function.” Id. at 154. The Court cited as an 

example our decision in the Mattel case, which, as discussed 

above, held that Rogers applied to the song “Barbie Girl.” 

Id. In Mattel, “the band’s use of the Barbie name was ‘not 

as a source identifier’” because “[t]he use did not ‘speak to 

the song’s origin.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Mattel, 

296 F.3d at 900, 902). 

Jack Daniel’s explained that when a mark is not used as 

a mark, lower courts had found that the risk of consumer 

confusion about the source of a work was “slight” and 

“unlikely,” providing greater justification for Rogers’s

threshold test. Id. at 153, 155 (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). This “cabined” understanding of Rogers more 

properly aligned with the Lanham Act, the purpose of which

is to ensure that consumers are not confused about source. 

Id. at 155, 157. That confusion “is most likely to arise when 

someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark—meaning 

again, as a source identifier—rather than for some other 

expressive function.” Id. at 157. In the Supreme Court’s 

view, when “a mark is used as a mark,” the traditional 

likelihood-of-confusion test “does enough work to account 

for the interest in free expression.” Id. at 159.

From these principles, the Supreme Court had little 

difficulty concluding that Rogersshould not apply to the Bad 

Spaniels dog toy. VIP Products had conceded that it used 

the Bad Spaniels trademark as a source identifier. Id. at 160. 

And that was how VIP Products used the mark in operation. 

Id. Thus, there could be “no threshold test working to kick 

out” the claims of Jack Daniel’s, and “the only question in 

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16 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

this suit going forward is whether the Bad Spaniels marks 

are likely to cause confusion.” Id. at 161. The Supreme 

Court remanded the case for further development on this 

point.

Of note, however, the Supreme Court recognized that the 

Bad Spaniels expressive message could still be relevant to 

the likelihood-of-confusion analysis. The Court specifically 

flagged that “a trademark’s expressive message—

particularly a parodic one, as VIP asserts—may properly 

figure in assessing the likelihood of confusion.” Id. Indeed, 

the Court reasoned, “although VIP’s effort to ridicule Jack 

Daniel’s does not justify use of the Rogers test, it may make 

a difference in the standard trademark analysis.” Id. These 

observations were consistent with the Supreme Court’s 

acknowledgment that in some instances, a plaintiff may fail 

to plausibly allege likelihood of confusion at the Rule 

12(b)(6) stage. Id. at 157 n.2.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Jack 

Daniel’s altered the law that governed us when we decided 

Punchbowl I. To the point that our precedents previously

held that Rogers applies when an expressive mark is used as 

a mark—and that the only threshold for applying Rogers was 

an attempt to apply the Lanham Act to something 

expressive—the Supreme Court has now made clear that this 

is incorrect. In that specific respect, our prior precedents are 

no longer good law. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 

893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds 

by Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 141 S.Ct. 1809 (2021) (holding that 

a three-judge panel does not follow circuit precedent when 

“the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is 

clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of 

intervening higher authority”). At the same time, however, 

because the Supreme Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s was 

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 17

confined to a “narrow” point of law, 599 U.S. at 163, that 

Rogers does not apply when a mark is used as a mark, 

preexisting Ninth Circuit precedent adopting and applying 

Rogers otherwise remains intact and binding on three-judge 

panels. Cf. id. at 165 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[W]e 

necessarily leave much about Rogers unaddressed.”).

C

We now re-examine this case under Jack Daniel’s and

hold that Rogers does not apply. The reason is 

straightforward: AJ Press is using the Mark to “designate the 

source of its own goods—in other words, has used a 

trademark as a trademark.” Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. at 145. 

The Mark is used to “identify and distinguish” AJ Press’s 

news products. Id. at 160 (citations and quotation marks

omitted). Indeed, AJ Press has filed trademark applications 

to register the marks “Punchbowl News” and “Punchbowl 

Press.” Under the clear holding of Jack Daniel’s, Rogers

does not apply to the use of a mark as a mark (the addition 

of the more generic terms “News” and “Press” does not take 

away from AJ Press’s use of “Punchbowl” in its mark, as a 

mark). It is true that as used by AJ Press, the Punchbowl

Mark has expressive qualities. But that was true in Jack 

Daniel’s as well. It did not change matters there, and it 

cannot do so here. See id. at 157 (“Nor does th[e] result 

change because the use of a mark has other expressive 

content—i.e., because it conveys some message on top of its 

source.”).

AJ Press nonetheless contends that we should read Jack 

Daniel’s more narrowly, so that Rogers should still apply 

here. AJ Press notes that, in Jack Daniel’s, it was undisputed 

that the defendant’s Bad Spaniels mark was a deliberate 

variation of the Jack Daniel’s mark. Here, AJ Press 

Case: 21-55881, 01/12/2024, ID: 12847106, DktEntry: 70-1, Page 17 of 19
18 PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

emphasizes, it is not using the Punchbowl Mark to parody or 

refer to Punchbowl, Inc., the greeting card company. In AJ 

Press’s view, when two companies in different markets use 

the same common English word to identify their brand, the 

Rogers test still applies.

We cannot accept this argument given the Supreme 

Court’s reasoning in Jack Daniel’s. The Court was

unequivocal in holding that “Rogers does not apply when the 

challenged use of the mark is as a mark.” 599 U.S. at 163. 

Jack Daniel’s was not limited to direct references or 

parodies. Quite the opposite: the Supreme Court held that 

Rogers did not apply notwithstanding the parodic use of the 

mark, and notwithstanding that the Bad Spaniels toy 

explicitly disclaimed any affiliation with Jack Daniel’s the 

whiskey company. Id. at 150, 161. The fact that the 

Punchbowl Mark involves a common English word does not 

exempt AJ Press from the rule that “Rogers does not apply 

when the challenged use of the mark is as a mark.” Id. at 

163. We have no basis to carve out exceptions for the use of 

common words in trademarks when the Supreme Court 

created no exception for parodies. Nor, as a general matter,

do we apply a different analysis simply because AJ Press is 

a media company. As in Jack Daniel’s, AJ Press must thus 

“meet [the] infringement claim on the usual battleground of 

‘likelihood of confusion.’” Id. at 156 (citation omitted).

To be clear, however, the expressive nature of AJ Press’s 

use of the Punchbowl Mark and the fact that “punchbowl” is 

a common word will certainly be relevant in the likelihoodof-confusion analysis. As we noted above, the Supreme 

Court made the same point in Jack Daniel’s in the context of 

parodies. See id. at 161. A similar point holds true here. 

When companies operating in different spaces use the same 

common words as trademarks with different expressive 

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PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC 19

connotations, it reduces the likelihood of confusion. Cf. id.

(“[A] parody is not often likely to create confusion.”). And 

although AJ Press emphasizes that it uses “Punchbowl” in 

connection with “Punchbowl News” and “Punchbowl 

Press,” this likewise doesnot show that Rogers applies, even 

though it will be a relevant consideration in assessing the 

likelihood of confusion.1

On remand, the district court should proceed to a 

likelihood-of-confusion analysis. The court may, in its 

sound discretion, consider whether this analysis can be 

conducted on the present record. See Jack Daniel’s, 599 

U.S. at 157 n.2 (noting that not “every infringement case 

involving a source-identifying use requires full-scale 

litigation” and that some cases can be resolved at the Rule 

12(b)(6) stage).

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1

In Jack Daniel’s, the Supreme Court allowed that there might 

“potentially” be “rare situations” in which, although a mark is used as a 

mark, the likelihood-of-confusion test does not sufficiently protect First 

Amendment interests. 599 U.S. at 159. AJ Press does not argue that it 

meets any such “rare” exception.

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