Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-02596/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-02596-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TASHION WILLIAMS,

 

 Petitioner,

Case No. 04cv2596-J (AJB)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING R&R;

(2) DENYING PETITIONER'S

SECTION 2254 PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

(3) DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION TO AMEND; and

(4) DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION FOR STAY AND

ABEYANCE

v.

S J RYAN, Warden, et al.

 Respondents.

Before the Court is Petitioner Tashion William’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] Magistrate Judge

Anthony J. Battaglia has filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) advising this Court to

deny Petitioner’s Petition. [Doc. No. 16.] Petitioner has filed Objections to the R&R. [Doc.

No. 24.] After a supplemental briefing schedule set by this Court, Petitioner filed a Motion

to Amend his Petition and a Motion for a Stay and Abeyance. [Doc. Nos. 27, 35.] The

Government has filed an Opposition to that Motion. [Doc. No. 30.] For the reasons set forth

below, this Court (1) ADOPTS the R&R, (2) DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, (3) DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Amend, and (4) DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for

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a Stay and Abeyance. 

Background

On December 10, 1995, Eddie Hamilton was stabbed to death. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No.

5 at 3.) After the homicide, police recovered a knife from Petitioner’s residence, but Petitioner

was not charged with a crime. (See id. at 2-3.) 

Four years later, on November 30, 1999, Petitioner was arrested on misdemeanor

warrants, and police officers interviewed him (“first interview”) about the murder of Mr.

Hamilton. (See Govt’s Lodg’t No. 5 at 4.) After waiving his Miranda rights, Petitioner denied

responsibility for the murder of Mr. Hamilton. (See id.) During the interview, Petitioner told

officers he would be discussing the misdemeanor warrants with his attorney. (See Gov’t’s

Lodg’t No. 2 at 17.) At the end of the interview, Petitioner asked detectives whether there was

“anything I need to give my lawyer or tell my lawyer or anything like that, ah, you know.” (Id.

at 57.)

Two months later, on January 27, 2000, police officers conducted another interview

with Petitioner regarding Mr. Hamilton’s death (“second interview”). (See Govt’s Lodg’t No.

5 at 4.) After waiving his Miranda rights, Petitioner admitted to stabbing Mr. Hamilton, but

claimed he acted in self-defense. (See id; see Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 2 at 108.) During the

interview, Petitioner mentioned that he had spoken with an attorney, stating, “Yeah, talked to

everybody in family [sic]. I talked to a lawyer about the whole thing because I, my mom’s

friend, you know he’s a lawyer, such fourth [sic] or whatever and . . .” (Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 2

at 60.) 

On February 9, 2001, a jury in the Superior Court of San Diego County found Petitioner

guilty of Mr. Hamilton’s murder. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 12 at 559.) Petitioner was sentenced

to life in prison without the possibility of parole. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 5 at 5-6.) Petitioner

appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal; that court affirmed the conviction.

(See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 5.) Petitioner then appealed to the California Supreme Court, which

denied his Petition for Review on March 26, 2003. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 9.)

Almost a year later, on February 20, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

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corpus in the California Supreme Court. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 10.) In his state petition,

Petitioner claimed his statement to police during the second interview should have been

suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 10.) Petitioner also argued that he had received ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (See id.) On

December 15, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied his petition without comment or

citation. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 11.)

On December 30, 2004, Petitioner filed his Petition in this Court. [Doc. No. 1.]

Petitioner raised four grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner’s statement to police during his second

interview was obtained in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966); (2) Petitioner’s statement to police during

his second interview was involuntary and therefore obtained in violation of Petitioner’s due

process rights; (3) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in violation of the

Sixth Amendment; and (4) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel also

in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 17-19.) 

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

any of the four grounds, and recommended that this Court deny the Petition. (See R&R at 1.)

Thereafter, Petitioner filed Objections to the R&R, wherein he re-asserted all four grounds for

relief. (See Pet’r’s Objs. at 22-24.) 

However, in his Objections, Petitioner asserted a ground in support of his claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which he had not included in either his federal

Petition or his California Supreme Court petition. (See id. at 8-10; see generally Pet’r’s Pet;

Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 10.) Specifically, Petitioner asserted for the first time that “the trial court

abused its discretion when it allowed the readback of transcripts and audio tapes of the

defendant in the jury room without giving admonishments to cure any possible prejudice.”

(See id. at 8.) As a result, this Court set a briefing schedule to allow Petitioner an opportunity

to request leave to amend his federal Petition and to request a stay and abeyance. (See Order

Setting Brief. Sched. at 1-2.) In response, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend the Petition and

a Motion for a Stay and Abeyance. [Doc. No. 35.] The Government filed an Opposition.

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1

 Petitioner presents four grounds for relief in his form Petition, but in his accompanying

memorandum of points and authorities in support of his Petition, he raises the same arguments by

grouping them into five claims. (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 6-9; 22-24.) Although the R&R refers to the four

claims in Petitioner’s form Petition, this Court will address all five claims in Petitioner’s memorandum

of points and authorities in support of his Petition. 

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[Doc. No. 30.] 

Legal Standard

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set

forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). When

no objections are filed, the Court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s

findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law. See Campbell v. United States

Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974). Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit

has held that “a failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give de

novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.” Barilla

v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds

by Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996).

Discussion

In his federal Petition, Petitioner contends that the following constitutional rights were

violated: (1) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (2) his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and Miranda; (3) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; (4) his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel; and (5) his Sixth Amendment right

to effective assistance of appellate counsel.1

 (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 17-19.) In the R&R,

Magistrate Judge Battaglia concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of these

grounds. (See R&R at 6-16.) After a de novo review of the factual findings relevant to

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Petitioner’s objections, and a de novo review of the conclusions of law, this Court ADOPTS

the R&R in its entirety, DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Amend, DENIES Petitioner’s Motion

for a Stay and Abeyance, and DENIES Petitioner’s Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

I. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Petitioner contends that the statements he made during his second interview with police

were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 17-

18.) Petitioner asserts two arguments in support of his claim: (1) the adversarial process

began when “the citizen is read his/her Miranda rights” and, thus, he was entitled to counsel

during this process; (2) and his arrest on misdemeanor charges prior to his first interview,

created a right to counsel that attached to his second interview with police. (See id.) For the

reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES both of these arguments for ineffective assistance

of counsel.

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.

“[T]he ‘core purpose’ of the counsel guarantee is to assure aid at trial, ‘when the accused [is]

confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.’ ”

United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188-89 (1984) (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.

300, 309 (1973)). 

However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only attaches when “a prosecution is

commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings–whether by way

of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Texas v.

Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68 (2001). Furthermore, the “filing [of a] complaint for an arrest

warrant [is] not a prosecutorial act [because] the complaint is functus officio on petitioner’s

arrest.” Anderson v. Alameida, 397 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Gouveia, 467

U.S. at 190 (finding that the right to counsel does not attach at the time of arrest). 

Additionally the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific, with no

“exception for crimes that are ‘factually related’ to a charged offense.” Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168.

As to those “other crimes . . . to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached,

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[incriminating statements] are, of course, admissible at a trial on those offenses.” Maine v.

Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.5 (1985); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176

(1991). 

In his first allegation, Petitioner contends that for purposes of Sixth Amendment

adjudication, the “adversarial process is established the moment the citizen is read his/her

Miranda rights.” (Pet’r’s Objs. at 2.) Therefore, Petitioner argues that once he was read his

Miranda rights during his second interview with police, the Sixth Amendment requires that

Petitioner’s counsel be present for the remainder of the interview. (See id. at 3.) Petitioner

argues his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he did not have counsel present for

the remainder of the second interview. (See id.) 

However, Petitioner’s argument fails because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is

not established “the moment the citizen is read his/her Miranda rights.” (See Pet’r’s Objs. at

2.) Rather, the Sixth Amendment right only attaches when adversarial criminal judicial

proceedings are commenced. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 167-68. Prior to the second interview on

January 27, 2000, no adversarial judicial proceedings concerning the murder had been initiated

against Petitioner. Although a police officer filed a complaint and obtained a warrant for

Petitioner’s arrest on January 20, 2000, the issuance of the arrest warrant does not trigger

Petitioner’s right to counsel. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t at 13); see Anderson, 397 F.3d at 1180;

Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 190. The adversarial proceeding did not begin until his arraignment on

January 31, 2000, which was four days after his second interview. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No.

1.) See Cobb, 532, U.S. at 167-168. Therefore, the Court FINDS that because adversarial

proceedings had not been initiated against Petitioner at the time of his second interview,

Petitioner had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the interview. 

Petitioner next contends his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had asked

for counsel during the first interview and that right attached to the second interview.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he invoked his right to counsel by asking detectives at the

end of the first interview, “anything I need to give my lawyer or tell my lawyer or anything

like that, ah, you know.” (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 2 at 57; Pet’r’s Pet. at 27.) Petitioner argues

that because he had invoked his right to counsel in the first interview, that right attached to his

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second interview on January 27, 2000 and it was violated when he did not have counsel

present. (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 22-24; see also Pet’r’s Objs. at 3.)

This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Petitioner’s right to

counsel as to the murder charge did not attach merely because Petitioner referred to an attorney

during the first interview. (See R&R at 8.) The right to counsel is “offense specific.” See

Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168 (“a defendant's statements regarding offenses for which he had not been

charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel on other charged offenses”). As the Magistrate Judge reasoned in the R&R, although

the murder of Eddie Hamilton was discussed in the first interview, at the time of the interview,

Petitioner had not been charged with or arrested for murder. (R&R at 8.) Therefore, even if

adversarial proceedings had begun as to Petitioner’s misdemeanor charges, Petitioner’s right

to counsel did not attach to the subsequent murder charge. Thus, the Court FINDS that

Petitioner’s references to a lawyer during the first interview had no bearing on his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel as to the murder case.

II. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination and Miranda 

Petitioner also contends that the statements he made in the second interview were

obtained in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. (See Pet’r’s Pet.

at 27.) Petitioner argues that he had invoked his Miranda rights during his first interview with

police on November 30, 1999, which therefore prevented officers from questioning him when

he did not have counsel present during his second interview on January 27, 2000. (See id.)

For the reasons set forth below, this Court FINDS that police officers did not violate

Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment or Miranda rights.

A suspect who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised of his or her federal

constitutional right to remain silent and his or her right to have an attorney present during

questioning. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68. A suspect who invokes his or her Miranda

rights after arrest is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been

made available, unless the accused (1) initiates further communication, exchanges, or

conversations with police, and (2) knowingly and intelligently waives the right previously

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invoked. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981), see also Shedelbower v.

Estelle, 885 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, a suspect’s invocation of the right

must be sufficiently unambiguous such that “a reasonable police officer in the circumstances

would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512

U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 

This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that in both interviews, Petitioner

waived his Miranda rights and never attempted to re-invoke those rights. (See R&R at 10-11.)

During the first interview, Petitioner did not invoke his Miranda rights because he admits that

prior to commencement of the interview, he was advised his Miranda rights and “waived his

rights.” (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 19.) Petitioner did not subsequently reinvoke those rights because

merely mentioning to police that he would be discussing the details of the misdemeanor charge

with a lawyer does not constitute an unambiguous request for an attorney as to the murder

charge. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (holding that a “suspect must unambiguously request

counsel” to invoke his or her Miranda rights). Further, at no point during the interview did

Petitioner indicate any desire to end questioning and speak with an attorney. (See Gov’t’s

Lodg’t No. 2 at 18-20, 57.) Thus, Petitioner’s statements in the first interview were not

obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment or Miranda. 

Petitioner also waived his Miranda rights at the beginning of his second interview and

never re-invoked those rights. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 2 at 60.) According to the transcript

of that interview, after the interviewing officer advised Petitioner of his Miranda rights, the

officer asked Petitioner if he still wanted to talk to officers. (See id.) Petitioner answered,

“yeah.” (See id.) During the interview Petitioner did reference an attorney at one point,

stating, “Yeah, talked to everybody in family [sic]. I talked to a lawyer about the whole thing

because, I, my mom’s friend, you know he’s a lawyer, such fourth [sic] or whatever.” (Id. at

117.) However, merely referencing an attorney cannot “reasonably be construed to be an

expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,

184 (1991). Because Petitioner’s statement does not constitute an unambiguous request for

an attorney or an intention to end questioning, Petitioner did not invoke his Fifth Amendment

or Miranda rights in the second interview. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 

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2

 A federal court is permitted to deny a habeas claim that is not a colorable federal claim on

the merits even if the petitioner failed to fully exhaust state judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)

(1996) (“an application for writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State”); see also Cassett

v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a court may deny an unexhausted petition

on the merits if the petitioner does not raise a colorable federal claim). Because this Court FINDS

that Petitioner did not make a colorable federal claim of coercion, this Court need not address whether

Petitioner exhausted this particular claim in state court. 

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Because Petitioner admitted to waiving his Miranda rights at the outset of both the first

and second interviews, and did not invoke his Miranda rights at any subsequent point in the

interviews, this Court FINDS that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the Fifth

Amendment or Miranda. 

III. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process

Petitioner contends that his statements admitting to the stabbing of Mr. Hamilton in the

second interview were involuntarily given and therefore were obtained in violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (See Pet’r’s Pet. 29-31.) In addition, in his

Objections to the R&R, Petitioner contends that in his first interview, the detectives “coerce[d]

and compell[ed]” Petitioner into making incriminating statements in violation of his due

process rights.2

 (See Pet’r’s Objs. at 4-7.) For the reasons set forth below, this Court FINDS

that police officers constitutionally obtained the statements in both interviews. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[no State shall]

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. In interpreting the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has held

that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not

‘voluntary.’ ” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Furthermore, the Supreme

Court “has made it clear that a confession is only involuntary . . . if the police use coercive

activity to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise free will.” Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d

813, 818 (9th Cir. 1990). 

However, a high level of police coercion is necessary to render a confession

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 involuntary. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978) (finding a confession

involuntary where defendant, while hospitalized and sedated in intensive care, was interrogated

for four hours); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1968) (finding a confession

involuntary where a medicated defendant was questioned for over eighteen hours and was

deprived of food and sleep). Moreover, to determine the “voluntariness” of Petitioner’s

statement, a “finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course

of police conduct with respect to the suspect.” United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1440

(9th Cir. 1985).

Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause does not require

“sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries

quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State.” Connelly,

479 U.S. at 166-67. Indeed, the Due Process Clause “is not concerned ‘with moral and

psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’ ” Id.

at 170 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)). 

Contrary to Petitioner’s claim that his statements in the second interview were made

involuntarily, neither Petitioner nor the record provides any evidence of police coercion. (See

Pet’r’s Pet. at 25-26; see generally Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 2 at 77-78, 100-16.) At no point during

the interview did the detectives threaten Petitioner. (See generally Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 2 at 77-

78, 100-16.) Rather, as the Magistrate Judge noted in the R&R, the general tone of the

interview was professional and non-confrontational. (See id.) Moreover, the transcript of the

interview reveals that Petitioner remained in control of his responses. Thus, there is no

indication that Petitioner’s “ability to exercise free will” was ever compromised by police

coercion. See Derrick, 924 F.2d at 8182. 

Petitioner also erroneously argues that during the first interview, detectives capitalized

on Petitioner’s fear from having previously witnessed a police officer kill his cousin. (See

Pet’r’s Objs. at 7.) Petitioner’s only support for this contention is that the officers utilized a

serious tone during the interview, along with knowledge of his fear, in order to “coerce and

compel” Petitioner into making incriminating statements. (See id.) However, Petitioner does

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not argue, and the transcripts of the interview do not indicate, that the detectives even

mentioned the death of Petitioner’s cousin in the interview. (See generally Gov’t’s Lodg’t No.

2 at 16-57.) Because the Due Process Clause does not require “sweeping inquiries into the

state of mind of a criminal defendant,” the fear that Petitioner may have had as a result of

witnessing his cousin’s death is irrelevant in an assessment of whether his due process rights

were violated. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67. Further, there is no evidence that police used

coercive activities such as deprivation of food or sleep, or medicating Petitioner prior to the

first interview. See Derrick, 924 F.2d at 818; see also Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401-02; Greenwald,

390 U.S. at 520-21. Accordingly, this Court FINDS that Petitioner is not entitled to relief for

his due process claim.

IV. Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when his counsel

failed to move to suppress Petitioner’s statements during his second interview admitting to Mr.

Hamilton’s murder. (See Pet’r’s Pet. at 18, 24.) Petitioner argues that his counsel should have

suppressed those statements because they were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment

right to counsel. For the reasons set forth below, this Court FINDS that Petitioner is not

entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), established

the test courts use to analyze claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on such

a claim, first, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.” Id. Second, defendant must also show “any deficiencies in

counsel’s performance [were] prejudicial to the defense.” Id. at 692. To prove prejudice,

“[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

The Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to file a motion will

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless the trial court would have granted the

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motion. See Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). The court also cautioned that

there exists “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. 

Here, Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress

Petitioner’s second interview statements based on the Sixth Amendment fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness or that counsel’s omission prejudiced his case. Counsel

acted reasonably because although he did not file a motion to suppress based on the Sixth

Amendment, he did move to suppress Petitioner’s statement on the basis that it was obtained

in violation of Miranda and California state law. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 12 at 496-502.)

Moreover, as discussed above, counsel’s failure to object based on the Sixth Amendment was

not erroneous becuase the Court would not have suppressed Petitioner’s second interview

statements based on the Sixth Amendment. Further, absent other evidence, this Court must

indulge a strong presumption that Petitioner’s counsel acted within the range of reasonable

professional assistance, and that counsel’s actions were based on tactical or strategic decisions.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Accordingly, this Court FINDS that Petitioner is not entitled

to relief under an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 

V. Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

In this federal Petition, Petitioner asserts a vague claim that his appellate counsel failed

to “effectively review the record” and failed to raise and preserve all appealable issues.

(Pet’r’s Pet. at 24.) The Court DENIES Petitioner’s orginal claim for ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel because as the R&R correctly concludes, his claim is an unsupported

conclusory allegation. (See R&R at 15) (citing Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir.

1995) (conclusory allegations do not warrant habeas relief).)

Although Petitioner asserted a vague claim for ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel in his original federal Petition, Petitioner provided a ground in support of his claim in

his Objections to the R&R. (Compare Pet’r’s Pet. at 24 with Pet’r’s Objs. at 8-10.) After the

R&R was issued, Plaintiff stated the following ground in support of his ineffective assistance

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of appellate counsel claim, which he did not include in his federal Petition: his appellate

counsel failed to assert on appeal that “the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the

readback of transcripts and audio tapes of the defendant in the jury room without giving

admonishments to cure any possible prejudice.” (Pet’r’s Objs. at 8.) However, this Court

cannot consider this ground unless it grants Petitioner leave to amend his federal Petition and

also grants a stay and abeyance so that Petitioner may exhaust this unexhausted claim in state

court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request to amend his

petition, and DENIES Petitioner’s request for a stay and abeyance. 

A. Legal Standard

As stated above, because Petitioner brings a ground in support of his ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim for the first time in his Objections to the R&R, Petitioner

must surmount two barriers before this Court may consider his newly detailed claim. First,

Petitioner must obtain leave from this Court to include the new claim in an amended federal

Petition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). To obtain leave to amend, Petitioner also must show that

his new ground is within the statute of limitations because it either relates back to the original

federal Petition, or it is saved by equitable tolling. See Mayle v. Felix, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 2569-

70 (2005). Second, Petitioner must obtain a stay and abeyance from the Court so that he can

go back to state court to exhaust his newly asserted claim. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,

275 (2005). To obtain a stay and abeyance, Petitioner must make the following three showings

(“Rhines factors”): (1) good cause as to why he did not exhaust the available state remedies

for that ground; (2) his claim is potentially meritorious; and (3) he did not engage in

intentionally dilatory tactics. See id. at 277. 

B. Application

1. Petitioner’s Motion to Amend the Petition

Petitioner has requested leave to amend his federal habeas Petition in order to include

the new ground for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (See Pet’r’s Mot. to Amend at

1.) Although Petitioner only provides reasons why he could not amend his state petition and

does not provide any argument as to why he could not timely amend his federal Petition, the

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Court will construe Petitioner’s arguments to also apply to his federal Petition. See United

States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 463 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Due to the liberal construction of pro

se motions, the Court has an obligation to construe a pro se motion petition to the petitioner’s

advantage”).

Petitioner states in his Motion to Amend that he intended to include the newly asserted

ground in his original Petition to state court, but did not do so because cell searches and a

lockdown caused “things [to] g[e]t mixed up.” (See id. at 2.) Petitioner also argues the delay

was the result of him not being able to consult with his “jailhouse lawyer (who helped [him]

do the Petition) to make sure everything was in place.” (See id.) Despite this confusion,

Petitioner asserts that he submitted his Petition, out of “concern with mak[ing] the court’s

deadline so [Petitioner] wouldn’t be time barred.” (Id.) Petitioner also makes a contradictory

argument that he did not realize that the ground was not included in his Petition. (See id.)

Petitioner contends that had he realized the absence of this argument, he “would not have

mailed it off . . . knowing that [Petitioner] still had time to do so ([Petitioner’s] time restraint

had not yet run out).” (Id.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s

Motion to Amend.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), after a responsive pleading is served,

a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the

adverse party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Supreme Court held in Forman v. Davis that in

deciding whether to grant a request to amend a federal Petition, courts should consider the

following factors (“Forman factors”): (1) prejudice to the opposing party; (2) undue delay; (3)

bad faith or dilatory motive; (4) previous opportunities to amend; and (5) futility of

amendment. See Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). However, absent prejudice or

a strong showing of any of the other Forman factors, there exists a strong presumption under

Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend. See id.

Of these five factors, prejudice to the opposing party is the consideration that carries

the most weight. See Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir.

2003). Examples of prejudice include amendments that would necessitate further discovery,

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see Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398-99 (9th Cir.

1986); amendments that add new claims late in the adversarial process, see United States v.

Twin, 806 F.2d 862, 876 (9th Cir. 1986); and amendments that add new allegations which

change the basis of the action, see M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Const. Corp.,

708 F.2d 1483, 1492 (9th Cir. 1983). Amendments that assert new theories are “not reviewed

favorably when the facts and the theory have been known to the party seeking amendment

since the inception of the cause of action.” Acri, 781 F.2d at 1398. 

a. Prejudice to the Opposing Party

Allowing Petitioner to amend the Petition would be prejudicial for two reasons. First,

it would add an entirely new ground in support of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel late in the adversarial process. See Acri, 781 F.2d at 1398. Petitioner is

asking for leave to add a new ground two years after his submission of the first state petition.

(See id.) It is notable that he did not present his new ground to this Court until after the

Magistrate Judge filed an R&R recommending denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel for being vague and conclusory. As the Ninth Circuit held in Greenhow v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 863 F.2d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1988), allowing parties to litigate

their cases fully before the magistrate, and then if unsuccessful, to change their strategy and

present a different theory to district court would frustrate the purpose of the Magistrate Act.

Second, it would be prejudicial to allow additoin of a new ground to the Petition that Petitioner

admits that he knew about when he first filed his Petition. See Acri, 781 F.2d at 1398.

Petitioner states in his Motion to Amend:

Petitioner has always attempted to set this forth in his original pleadings.

Because the claim of “ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,” And

#1 of the grounds to support this claim (“The trial court abused it’s

discretion when it allowed read back of transcripts and audio tapes of the

defendant in the jury room without giving admonishments to cure any

possible prejudice.) is what strengthen the original habeas petition. And

was the original cause for filing ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

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(Pet’r’s Mot. to Amend at 2.) Accordingly, the Court FINDS the prejudice factor weighs

against Petitioner. 

b. Undue Delay

The Government also has made a strong showing of undue delay. (See Gov’t’s Opp’n

at 3.) Petitioner’s argument that cell searches and a lockdown in prison made it difficult for

him to organize and mail his Petition explains difficulties he had in reviewing his Petition

immediately before filing. However, his argument does not explain why he could not organize

his Petition in the ten months he waited after the denial of his petition in California Supreme

Court to file his Petition in federal court. Moreover, Petitioner does not explain why he could

not amend his Petition after its initial filing in federal court, but prior to issuance of the R&R

recommending denial of his Petition. (See Pet’r’s Mot. to Amend at 2.) As the Government

notes, six months elapsed from the time Petitioner filed his federal Petition until the

Government answered Petitioner’s federal Petition. (See id.) Thus, Petitioner had six months

in which he could have amended without leave from the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“A

party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a

responsive pleading is served.”) In addition to those six months, Petitioner also had at least

three opportunities to review his Petition for errors: (1) when he submitted his Petition to the

California Supreme Court, (2) when he filed his Petition in this Court, and (3) when Petitioner

submitted his Traverse in support of his federal Petition. Furthermore, contrary to Petitioner’s

assertion, Petitioner did review his Petition because he added additional information, not

relevant to this excluded claim, to his Traverse. (See Pet’r’s Trav. at 15.) Therefore, despite

the conditions in prison affecting the filing of his Petition, Petitioner had a number of

opportunities to review his Petition for errors or omissions and to amend it accordingly. 

Absent other evidence or explanation, Petitioner’s arguments that cell searches and a

lockdown caused the oversight is insufficient to overcome the Forman factor of undue delay.

Accordingly, the Court FINDS that the factor of undue delay weighs strongly against

Petitioner.

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c. Bad Faith or Dilatory Motive

Although Petitioner’s assertion of his new argument for ineffective assistance of

counsel after issuance of the R&R recommending denial is suspect, it does not rise to the level

of bad faith or a dilatory motive. (See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 3.) Rather than bad faith, Petitioner’s

delay is due to his negligence. Petitioner argues that his untimeliness was due to a “mix[] up”

about what was included in his Petition and that he did not notice the omission until much later

when he met with his jailhouse lawyer. (Pet’r’s Mot. to Amend at 2.) Accordingly, the Court

FINDS that the bad faith and dilatory motive does not weigh against Petitioner.

d. Previous Opportunities to Amend

As previously stated, Petitioner had numerous opportunities to amend his Petition, but

did not take advantage of those opportunities until after the R&R had been filed. Accordingly,

this Court FINDS that Petitioner had previous opportunities to amend his Petition. 

e. Futility of Amendment

As to the final Forman factor, the Government in its Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion

to Amend contends that the amendment would be futile because “Petitioner’s claim is plainly

meritless.” (See Gov’t’s Opp’n to Mot. to Amend at 3.) While the Court previously found

Petitioner’s claim to be “potentially meritorious,” this Court is partially persuaded by the

Government’s argument. (See Order Setting Brief. Sched. at 9-10.) On further review of the

record, this Court has determined that while one of Petitioner’s assertions is meritless, his

second assertion is still potentially meritorious. 

Petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel failed to raise the argument that “trial court

abuse its discretion when it allowed the readback of transcripts and [video] tapes of the

defendants in the jury room without giving admonishments to cure any possible prejudice from

continued playback, replay, or verbal infliction.” (Pet’r’s Objs. at 8.) This Court previously

found that Petitioner’s claim potentially had merit because the record shows that the trial judge

did not take precautionary measures prior to commencing the readback of trial testimony

requested by the jury. (See Order Setting Brief. Sched. at 9-10) (citing United States v.

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Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that before a jury is permitted to

reread or rehear testimony, certain precautions must be taken to avoid undue emphasis of

particular testimony).) However, on further review, the record shows that the jury changed its

mind, and that no readback of any trial testimony occurred. (See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 12 at

1026-27.) Consequently, the trial judge did not need to take any precautionary measures

regarding the readback. Thus, Petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel should have raised

a claim regarding readback of trial testimony is meritless. 

However, Petitioner’s remaining contention that the jury should not have received the

transcripts and videotapes of Petitioner’s first and second police interviews without

admonishment from the trial judge may have merit. (See Pet’r’s Objs. at 8-9.) The Ninth

Circuit has not established a “per se rule against replaying videotaped testimony” in the jury

room. United States v. Sacco, 869 F.2d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1989) Rather, the decision to allow

playback of the testimony is to be exercised by the trial judge on a case-by case basis. See id.

The trial judge’s decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion by considering the circumstances

surrounding the replay, including whether the videotapes were played in entirety, in the

presence of counsel and Petitioner, or in open court. See id. 

Here, the record shows that the jury did request and receive the video tapes and

corresponding transcripts of Petitioner’s first and second interviews during jury deliberations.

(See Gov’t’s Lodg’t No. 2 at 360.) However, the record does not indicate whether the trial

judge admonished the jury or took any other precautionary measures to avoid undue emphasis

of particular evidence, prior to giving the transcripts and videotapes of the interview to the jury

during deliberations. See Hernandez, 27 F.3d at 1408-09 (holding that certain precautionary

measures must be taken to avoid undue emphasis of particular testimony). The record also

does not indicate the circumstances surrounding the replay of the tapes. Accordingly, this

Court FINDS that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is potentially

meritorious. 

In summary, because the Government has made a strong showing of three out of the

five Forman factors, including prejudice, undue delay, and opportunities to amend, his Court

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3 Because Petitioner has not made a showing sufficient to obtain leave to amend his

Petition, the Court need not address if the new claim is within the statute of limitations. 

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DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Amend.3 

2. Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay and Abeyance

Even if Petitioner were allowed to amend his federal Petition, he also must obtain a stay

and abeyance of his Petition so that he can return to state court to exhaust remedies as to his

new ground in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. For the

reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay and Abeyance. 

Because the AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations within which a petitioner

must file a federal petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), “petitioners who come to federal court

with ‘mixed’ petitions [of exhausted and unexhausted claims] run the risk of forever losing

their opportunity for any federal review of their exhausted claims.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269, 275 (2005). To prevent AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations from barring federal

review, a district court may “stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner

returns to state court to exhaust his previously unexhausted claims.” Id. at 275. “Once the

petitioner exhausts his state remedies, the district court will lift the stay and allow the petitioner

to proceed in federal court.” Id. at 276. 

Recently, the United States Supreme Court declared that the stay and abeyance

procedure is available only in limited circumstances. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. The

Supreme Court articulated three factors (“Rhines factors”) that must be demonstrated in order

for a stay and abeyance to be proper. See id. Specifically, the Court must determine the

following before it may grant a stay and abeyance: (1) “there was good cause for [Petitioner’s]

failure to exhaust his [claim] first in state court”; (2) Petitioner’s unexhausted claim is

“potentially meritorious”; and (3) there is “no indication that [Petitioner] engaged in

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. 

a. Petitioner Does Not Show Good Cause

Petitioner states that he intended to include the factual support behind his claim of

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ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his state petition. (See Pet’r’s Mot. for Stay at

2.) However, he claims he did not notice the absence of this support in the mailed Petition

until he filed his Objections to the R&R because of the following reasons: (1) his lack of

education and resulting difficulty in navigating the legal system, (2) prison conditions, and (3)

his inability to correspond with his jailhouse lawyer. (See id. at 2-3.) For the reasons stated

below, this Court FINDS that Petitioner does not show good cause as to why he did not

exhaust his new claim in state court. 

The Supreme Court has held that “[b]ecause granting a stay effectively excuses a

petitioner’s failure to present his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only

appropriate when the district court determines that there [is] good cause for the petitioner’s

failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. Although the Court

in Rhines did not define what constitutes “good cause” sufficient to permit application of the

stay and abeyance procedure, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a

petitioner need not demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” to show good cause. Jackson

v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion

in Rhines, stated that the good cause requirement “is not intended to impose the sort of strict

and inflexible requirement that would ‘trap the unwary pro se prisoner.’ ” Rhines, 544 U.S. at

279 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982)). Finally, the United States District

Court for the District of Nevada has stated:

[T]he good cause standard . . . requires the petitioner to show that he was

prevented from raising the claim, either by his own ignorance or confusion

about the law or the status of his case, or by circumstances over which he

had little or no control, such as the actions of counsel either in

contravention of the petitioner’s clearly expressed desire to raise the claim

or when petitioner had no knowledge of the claim’s existence.

Riner v. Crawford, 415 F.Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (D. Nev. 2006). 

Petitioner has not shown good cause as to why he could not exhaust his claim in state

court. Petitioner argues that he lacks the education to navigate the legal system, and as a result

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did not notice the absence of this claim; however, his assertion is not supported by his prior

conduct. Petitioner has shown that he is able to review his Petition and include additional

arguments because in his Traverse, he added new arguments (not relevant to this excluded

claim) to support his Petition. (See Pet’r’s Trav at 15.) Petitioner also was not confused about

the law or his claims because he admits that he knew about the ground in support of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to filing his state petition. (See Pet’r’s Mot. to

Amend at 2.) 

Petitioner also fails in arguing that cell searches and a lockdown caused him to not be

able to include the ground in his petition. As explained in the prior section, the prison

conditions complained of do not explain why Petitioner did not take advantage of the

numerous other opportunities he had to review and add the ground to his petition.

In addition, Petitioner’s argument that his delay was caused by “jailhouse lawyers” is

not sufficient to show good cause. Although an error by legal counsel in filing a petition may

constitute good cause, this rule only applies to legal counsel’s actions. Unfortunately, errors

by other prisoners, even “jailhouse lawyers,” do not fall within this good cause exception. See

Riner v. Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (D. Nev. 2006). Accordingly, this Court

FINDS that Petitioner has not shown good cause. 

b. Petitioner’s Claim is Potentially Meritorious

As discussed in the mirror section on leave to amend, this Court FINDS Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is potentially meritorious.

c. Petitioner Engaged in Intentionally Dilatory Tactics

As discussed above, even though the timing of Petitioner’s assertion of his new ground

after filing of the R&R is suspect, there is no evidence that Petitioner intentionally engaged in

dilatory tactics. Rather, Petitioner was negligent in not reviewing his petition and including

the ground in his state petition. Accordingly, this Court FINDS that Petitioner did not engage

in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. 

In light of this Court’s finding that Petitioner has not met the good cause showing

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required by Rhines, this Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay and Abeyance. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, this Court (1) ADOPTS the R&R, (2) DENIES

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (3) DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Amend,

and (4) DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for a Stay and Abeyance.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 10, 2006

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Anthony J. Battaglia 

 All Parties 

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