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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 6, 2013 Decided December 27, 2013 

No. 13-5071 

IN RE: NAVY CHAPLAINCY, 

CHAPLAINCY OF FULL GOSPEL CHURCHES, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

UNITED STATES NAVY, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-mc-00269) 

Arthur A. Schulcz Sr., argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellants. 

Sushma Soni, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were 

Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Marleigh D. Dover, Attorney.

Before: TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs, whom we’ll 

call simply the chaplains, are a group of current and former 

officers in the Navy Chaplain Corps who identify themselves 

as non-liturgical Christians, plus two chaplain-endorsing 

agencies. They sued in district court, claiming (among other 

things) that several of the Navy’s policies for promoting 

chaplains prefer Catholics and liturgical Protestants at the 

expense of various non-liturgical denominations. The basic 

argument is that the policies amount to disparate treatment of 

the non-liturgical chaplains, violating the equal protection 

component of the Fifth Amendment and the Establishment 

Clause of the First Amendment. 

The case has already been before this court several times. 

See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 

In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 

290 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The judgment now on review is that of 

the district court denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 

injunction against the Navy’s use of the challenged practices. 

In re Navy Chaplaincy, 928 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2013). 

The district court reviewed the statistical evidence offered by 

the plaintiffs to show inter-denominational discrimination, and 

found it wanting. We affirm. 

* * * 

The Navy uses “selection boards” to choose officers for 

promotion. See 10 U.S.C. § 611(a). By law, such boards 

must have at least five members. 10 U.S.C. § 612(a)(1). 

Except in certain circumstances not at issue here, at least one 

member of a selection board for a competitive category—

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here, the Chaplain Corps—must be from that competitive 

category. 10 U.S.C. § 612(a)(2)(A). Selection boards for 

chaplains before fiscal year 2003 consisted of five or more 

members, at least one of whom was not a chaplain. Under a 

change in Navy regulation, boards for fiscal year 2003 and 

thereafter are composed of seven officers, two of whom are 

chaplains “nominated without regard to religious affiliation.” 

SECNAVINST 1401.3A, Encl. (1), ¶ 1.c.(1)(f). Either the 

Chief of Chaplains or one of his two deputies serves as 

selection board president. According to a Defense 

Department Inspector General report cited by plaintiffs, 

“sleeves” hide the board members’ hands as they depress 

buttons reflecting their votes, making them secret ballots. 

According to the chaplains, the boards take an initial secret 

vote and then the board president recommends two score cutoffs: candidates above the higher score are treated as clearly 

deserving promotion, and ones below the lower score are 

treated as deserving no further consideration. Candidates who 

fall between the two are re-evaluated for the remaining 

available promotions. 

The chaplains asked the district court to enjoin three 

current Navy selection board policies—(1) staffing the sevenmember selection boards with two chaplains, (2) enabling 

members to keep their votes secret via the “sleeves,” and (3) 

allowing the Chief of Chaplains or his deputy to serve as the 

selection board president—that they claim result in disparate 

treatment of the non-liturgical candidates. Plaintiffs’ (July 22, 

2011) Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 1. The disparate 

treatment, they say, is shown by various statistical data, which 

we’ll consider shortly. 

The chaplains’ theory is that a candidate is more likely to 

be promoted if he or she shares a religious denomination with 

one of the chaplains on the selection board, or with the Chief 

of Chaplains. The bottom line is an advantage in promotion 

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rates for Catholics and liturgical Protestants over nonliturgical Christians. The chaplains posit that the small board 

size, combined with secret votes, enables each board’s 

chaplains to ensure that a particular candidate will not be 

promoted, thus increasing the odds for their preferred (and 

discriminatory) results. 

Pending resolution of their summary judgment motion, 

the chaplains asked the district court for a preliminary 

injunction halting the challenged policies. The district court 

denied the request, but we vacated the denial and remanded 

for the district court to clarify its reasoning on the chaplains’ 

likelihood of success on the merits; we were unsure whether 

the district court viewed the insufficiency of the chaplains’ 

claims to be legal or factual. See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 

F.3d at 1180. On remand, the district court concluded that the 

chaplains were unlikely to succeed on the merits of either 

claim because the statistics they offered failed to show any 

discriminatory intent behind the challenged policies or the 

resulting outcomes. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 928 F. Supp. 2d 

at 36-37. 

The chaplains appeal to us again, claiming that the court 

erred in requiring a showing of intent to prove either an equal 

protection or establishment clause violation. We find that the 

chaplains’ equal protection attack on the Navy’s facially 

neutral policy could prevail only if they showed a likelihood 

of success in proving an intent to discriminate (which they 

have not shown) or the lack of a rational basis for the policies 

(which they have not claimed). As to the Establishment 

Clause, the chaplains have not shown a likelihood of success 

under any test that they have asked the court to apply. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the preliminary 

injunction. 

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* * * 

 In order to determine whether to issue a preliminary 

injunction, the district court applies four familiar criteria: (1) 

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) 

lack of substantial injury to other parties; and (4) furthering 

the public interest. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 

F.3d at 297. We have already found an absence of any error 

in the district court’s analysis of the last three factors, and 

have made clear that the only unresolved issue is whether the 

chaplains have shown a likelihood of success on the merits. 

In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d at 1179. The chaplains in 

effect argue that the district court used improper legal 

standards on that issue. But the record and the district court’s 

findings allow us to resolve the question of likelihood of 

success on the merits on our own, and we accordingly do so. 

See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 

(legal conclusions upon which denial of preliminary 

injunction relies are reviewable de novo). 

Equal protection. The chaplains argue that the three 

challenged policies result in disparate treatment of nonliturgical chaplains. But none of the challenged practices on 

its face prefers any religious denomination. The regulation 

behind the practice of staffing boards with two chaplains 

explicitly requires denominational neutrality. “Chaplain 

Corps board members shall be nominated without regard to 

religious affiliation.” SECNAVINST 1401.3A Encl. (1), 

¶ 1.c.(1)(f) (Dec. 20, 2005). Thus, even if one of the 

chaplains always serves as board president (as the chaplains 

allege), the board president, necessarily a board member, must 

be a person chosen for the board without regard to religious 

affiliation. Finally, the practice of secret voting is neutral on 

its face. All three policies together, then, are facially neutral 

with respect to denomination. 

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The chaplains nonetheless claim that the policies either 

were adopted with discriminatory intent or have been applied 

in such a manner as to favor denominations other than the 

non-liturgical ones. As the district court found, the chaplains 

have presented no evidence of discriminatory intent in the 

policies’ enactment. Nor have they shown a current pattern of 

disparate outcomes from which unconstitutional 

discriminatory intent could be inferred under the prevailing 

understanding of equal protection. For such claims, “Absent a 

pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone 

is not determinative.” Village of Arlington Heights v. 

Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 

(1977) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); 

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). The district court 

found, at best, only a 10% advantage in promotion rates for 

officers of the same denomination as the Chief of Chaplains 

(the difference between a 73.3% promotion rate for candidates 

of different denominations and an 83.3% rate for candidates 

of the same denomination). In re Navy Chaplaincy, 928 F. 

Supp. 2d at 37. 

There is some internal contradiction in the chaplains’ 

position on these figures. Their brief states that they cover 

promotions in the period 2003-2012, when the current 

procedures were in place (Appellants’ Br. at 15), but it cites 

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 1107, an affidavit that situates the 

data in 1981-2000, before the proportion of chaplains on the 

selection boards was decreased. Giving the chaplains the 

benefit of the doubt, we assume the data apply to the later 

period, the one governed by the rules they seek to enjoin. The 

chaplains’ only efforts to show a larger disparity rely on data 

for selections occurring before the 2003 changes. 

The district court correctly noted that the disparity 

between 73.3% and 83.3% does not remotely approach the 

stark character of the disparities in Gomillion or Yick Wo. Id. 

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For reinforcement, plaintiffs cite their expert’s opinion 

that this disparity is statistically significant. The record does 

not explain the reasoning behind the choice of one set of 

statistical tests for significance over another (e.g., a “simple 

binomial” test versus a standard test of the differences in 

proportions), or demonstrate the actual calculations. See, e.g., 

Appellants’ Br. at 15. But assuming arguendo that the 

methodology for determining statistical significance is 

reasonable, the finding does little for our analysis. 

“Correlation is not causation.” Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 

861 F.2d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 1988). Statistical significance, 

assuming it has been shown, indicates only a low probability 

for one possible cause of the alleged disparities—random 

chance. The chaplains have made no attempt to control for 

potential confounding factors, such as promotion ratings, 

education, or time in service. (That statement must be 

qualified by recognition that time in service is broadly 

reflected in occasional references to whether the candidates 

were “in zone” (i.e., were within a group of a predetermined 

number of the most senior officers who had not previously 

been considered for promotion to a given grade) or “above 

zone” (i.e., had previously been considered for promotion to a 

given grade). See, e.g., J.A. 1468-70 (chaplains’ tables noting 

comparisons of in zone candidates, and of in zone and above 

zone candidates); J.A. 1289-92 (Navy employee affidavit 

describing the zone compositions).) Thus the label 

“statistically significant” does nothing to elevate plaintiffs’ 

figures into the realm of Yick Wo or Gomillion. 

Given facially neutral policies and no showing of intent 

to discriminate, the chaplains’ equal protection attack on the 

Navy’s specific policies could succeed only with an argument 

that the policies lack a rational basis. See Washington v. 

Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); United States v. Thompson, 

27 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The chaplains attempt no 

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such argument. So we agree with the district court that they 

have not shown the requisite likelihood of success. 

Establishment. The chaplains say that under Larson v. 

Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), we must subject the challenged 

selection methods to strict scrutiny on the ground that they 

“grant[] a denominational preference,” id. at 246, or, failing 

that, find that they run afoul of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 

602 (1971), notably the element of Lemon now generally 

described as the “endorsement” test. 

 The chaplains’ proposed analytical sequence matches the 

structure laid down by the Supreme Court for measures 

assailed as denominational preferences. “Larson teaches that, 

when it is claimed that a denominational preference exists, the 

initial inquiry is whether the law facially differentiates among 

religions. If no such facial preference exists, we proceed to 

apply the customary three-pronged Establishment Clause 

inquiry derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 

(1971).” Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 

680, 695 (1989). As the challenged policies are facially 

neutral, Larson doesn’t trigger strict scrutiny, and we proceed 

to Lemon. 

Lemon presents us again with a multipart test: “In order to 

pass constitutional muster under the Lemon test, laws and 

government practices involving religion must: (1) have a 

secular legislative purpose; (2) have a principal or primary 

effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not 

result in excessive entanglement with religion or religious 

institutions.” Bonham v. D.C. Library Admin., 989 F.2d 1242, 

1244 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). 

The chaplains naturally do not challenge the chaplaincy 

program as a whole; the Second Circuit has found it 

compatible with the Establishment Clause, in an opinion that 

does not precisely track Lemon. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 

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223 (2d Cir. 1985). Nor do the chaplains claim that the first 

or third element of Lemon cuts against the disputed selection 

procedures. 

Rather they claim that the challenged policies have the 

“effect” of advancing particular denominations, which at least 

in this context entails application of the “endorsement” test. 

Bonham, 989 F.2d at 1245. That in turn takes us to the 

question of whether the selection policies appear to endorse 

religion in the eyes of a “reasonable observer,” who “‘must be 

deemed aware’ of the ‘history and context’ underlying a 

challenged program.” Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 

639, 655 (2002) (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Central 

School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001)). As the policies themselves are 

facially neutral, the chaplains under this theory argue in effect 

that a reasonable observer, contemplating the results of the 

policies (as gathered in the chaplains’ statistical evidence), 

would infer that the government had as a practical matter 

endorsed the liturgical denominations. 

Assuming arguendo that it is proper to see the 

“reasonable observer” as a hypothetical person reviewing an 

array of statistics (the observer is already a judicial construct 

rather than a human being), the figures in this case would not 

lead him to perceive endorsement. Here the plaintiffs’ 

statistics fail to show government endorsement of particular 

religions under the reasonable observer test for the same 

reason that, in the equal protection context, they failed to 

show intentional discrimination paralleling that of Gomillion

or Yick Wo. The only new wrinkle, perhaps, is that we must 

impute to the reasonable observer either enough grasp of 

statistics not to be misled by the assertion of “statistical 

significance,” or at least the modesty not to leap to a 

conclusion about the data without making an elementary 

inquiry on the subject. We feel confident that when 

reasonable observers find that the term means only that there 

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is little likelihood that the “discrepancy” is due to chance, they 

are most unlikely to believe that the policies convey a 

message of government endorsement. 

Plaintiffs cite Title VII cases in which we found that 

statistically significant “disparities” in such matters as hiring 

and pay were enough to support district court findings of 

racial discrimination. See, e.g., Berger v. Iron Workers 

Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395 (D.C. Cir. 

1988); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1277-79, 1286-87 

(D.C. Cir. 1984). But in these cases the court found liability 

only after being satisfied that the statistical evidence properly 

controlled for confounding variables. See, e.g., Berger, 843 

F.2d at 1413-21 (reviewing potential non-discriminatory 

explanations); id. at 1419 (reasoning that the “entire notion of 

employing statistical proof is to eliminate non-discriminatory 

causes” of the disparities); Segar, 738 F.2d at 1274-77. Here, 

as we observed in the equal protection analysis, the chaplains 

point to no serious effort at such controls for any of their 

statistical comparisons. Accordingly, even assuming that a 

court could properly impute a belief in denominational 

favoritism to the reasonable observer simply on the basis of 

statistics that might satisfy a plaintiff’s Title VII burden, the 

chaplains’ data fail to meet that standard and thus fail to show 

a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Finally, the chaplains point to our observation in Bonham

that there is no “de minimis exception to traditional 

Establishment Clause analysis.” 989 F.2d at 1245. But the de 

minimis defense that we rejected there was a notion that state 

actions could be excused, even though a reasonable observer 

would have regarded them as endorsing religion, so long as 

the action in question had only a trivial impact, for example, 

an action affecting “only a single day of the year.” It was, 

obviously, not a suggestion that the “reasonable observer” 

should be deemed to spot “endorsement” on a bare surmise. 

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The district court’s order denying the chaplains’ motion 

for preliminary injunction is therefore 

 Affirmed.

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