Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05531/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05531-29/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAVON JONES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC,

Defendant. /

No. C 03-05531 JSW

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Bayer

Healthcare LLC (“Bayer”). Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the relevant

legal authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings suit against Bayer alleging race discrimination under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)(2) (claim one); retaliation in

violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a) (claim two); race discrimination – termination – in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (claim three); retaliation – race – in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981

(claim four); race discrimination – promotion – in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (claim five);

race discrimination – termination - in violation of California Government Code § 12940(a)

(claim six); retaliation in violation of California Government Code § 12940(h)(1) (claim seven);

and violation of public policy in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution

and California Government Code §§ 12920 & 12940(a) (claim eight).

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Plaintiff was employed by Bayer in its Berkeley facility for approximately five years as

a general worker and mechanic. The main pharmaceutical product manufactured at Bayer’s

Berkeley facility is Kogenate FS, a clotting agent principally used by hemophiliacs to help clot

their blood. (See Declaration of Peter Kramer at ¶ 3.) Bayer must follow rigorous internal

operating procedures as well as follow the mandates of Federal Regulations and subject itself to

regulatory audits. (See id. at ¶ 5.) 

On his application materials, Plaintiff misrepresented the name of the high school he

attended and misrepresented that he spent a year in college. (Declaration of Jerome

Schreibstein “Schreibstein Decl.”) at Ex. B at JON0525; Declaration of Lavon Jones (“Jones

Decl.”) at ¶ 3.) Bayer’s employment application, signed and acknowledged by Plaintiff,

contained a provision that regardless of when a misrepresentation in the application materials

was discovered, it would be grounds for disciplinary action, up to and including termination. 

(Schreibstein Decl., Ex. B at JON0441.) As a heavily regulated manufacturer of pharmaceutical

products, Bayer has a zero tolerance policy for document falsification applicable in the

personnel context. It is settled policy at Bayer that misrepresentation in the employment

application process is sufficient grounds for termination. (Declaration of Sherri O’Driscoll at ¶

3; Declaration of Joseph M. Gallagher at ¶ 3.) 

Plaintiff was employed by Bayer as a General Worker starting in February 1997 and

continued in various positions, as a janitor and an Equipment Sterilizer Washer. (See

Shreibstein Decl., Ex. A at 29, 46-51.) In September 2000, without any previous work

experience in the field, Plaintiff completed a course on climate control and refrigeration which

was the only refrigeration training he had completed. (See id. at 55-59.) Shortly after receiving

the certificate, Plaintiff applied for a position as a C-level mechanic in Bayer’s HVAC (heating,

ventilation and air conditioning systems) department. (See id. at 82-83.) After the position was

offered to a Caucasian applicant, Plaintiff contested the selection by complaining to the Union

and filing a grievance with Bayer’s Human Resources Department. (See Jones Decl. at ¶ 11.) 

Due to his Union seniority and his related technical training, Plaintiff was given the position

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beginning February 2001. (See Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at 119; Declaration of Ron Roberts

(“Roberts Decl.”) at ¶ 4.) 

Plaintiff contends that during his tenure in the HVAC Department, he was treated

differently from other, non-African American employees because of a delay in ordering his

uniform, the failure timely to provide him with tools and failing to give him a two-way radio. 

(See Jones Decl. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff also contends that he was assigned to work with someone

who was moody and hard to work with and he was therefore unable to learn more on the job. 

(See id. at ¶ 13.) During his probationary period, Plaintiff’s supervisor reported that several

fellow mechanics had complained about Plaintiff’s performance, his lack of concentration on

instructions, excessive use of cell phones and beepers for personal use, and lengthy

disappearances from the work site. The supervisor suggested classes to help with Plaintiff’s

interpersonal skills, but Plaintiff insisted upon a group meeting during which he felt criticized

by his fellow employees. (See Roberts Decl. at ¶¶ 9-10; Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at 122-30.) 

Plaintiff felt that the criticisms of his performance were the product of discriminatory motive,

but proffers no evidence to support his subjective perception. (See Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at

128-130.) 

After Plaintiff’s promotion to B level mechanic, complaints about his work continued. 

Such complaints included a confrontational altercation with another mechanic, repeated

complaints about Plaintiff’s poor attitude and work performance from co-workers, Plaintiff’s

failure to follow strict company policy on equipment release and lockout/tagout procedures, his

missing days of work and failing to show up for a particular, time-sensitive work assignment. 

(See, e.g., Declaration of Richard Smith (“Smith Decl.”) at ¶¶ 6-8; Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at

165-68.) 

On June 24, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint before the United States Equal Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) alleging discrimination on account of his race. (See Schreibstein Decl.,

Ex. C at JON0060.) In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was denied access to tools,

training and the internet. (See id.) On December 16, 2002, the EEOC dismissed the charges

based on lack of evidence. (See id., Ex. D at JON0057.) On the same day, Plaintiff submitted

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additional materials before the EEOC, but as the deadline for submission had passed, the EEOC

treated the submission as a request for reconsideration, which was denied as insufficient in

January 2003. (See id. at Ex. A at 389-390, 392-93.)

When, in January 2003, Plaintiff inquired about possible promotion, his supervisor

evaluated Plaintiff’s performance on the changing of a fan unit filter. His supervisor

determined that Plaintiff had completed the paperwork indicating the filters had been changed,

but could not account for the fact that, upon visual inspection, it appeared that there remained

dirty filters in the unit. (See Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at 203-209, 223-24, Ex. B at JON1715-

16, JON1717; Smith Decl. at ¶¶ 14-15.)

Based on Plaintiff’s past disciplinary problems, including interpersonal issues and work

performance, his abandonment of the job when called upon for special assignment, and the

possible serious document violation relative to the filter maintenance, Plaintiff was terminated

from employment effective January 27, 2003. (Smith Decl. at ¶ 15, Ex. E at JON0625-26.) 

Although Plaintiff maintains that the unfulfilled promotion request and termination were

racially motivated, Plaintiff was unable to identify at deposition any statement, comments, or

particular actions that would indicate racial animus. (Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at 128-130,

220-221, 228-235.) Further, Plaintiff was unable to proffer any evidence of retaliatory motive

on Bayer’s part. (See id. at 358-376.) 

The Court will address the additional specific facts as required in the analysis. 

ANALYSIS

A. Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment.

 A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light

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most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1997).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. An issue of fact is “genuine” only if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the

outcome of the case. Id. at 248. If the party moving for summary judgment does not have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, that party must produce evidence which either negates an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claims or that party must show that the non-moving

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.

2000). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond

the pleadings and, by its own evidence, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

In order to make this showing, the non-moving party must “identify with reasonable

particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

1279 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the party seeking to establish a genuine issue of material fact

must take care adequately to point a court to the evidence precluding summary judgment

because a court is “‘not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for

summary judgment.’” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418

(9th Cir. 1988)). If the non-moving party fails to point to evidence precluding summary

judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

B. Plaintiff’s Claims for Race Discrimination Do Not Survive Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff brings his first, third, fifth and sixth claims for race discrimination and contends

that Bayer failed to promote him and terminated him based on his membership in a protected

class. In order to make a claim for discrimination, Plaintiff must establish that he suffered an

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adverse employment action that was motivated by intentional discriminatory animus. See, e.g.,

Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 353-58 (2000). The proper legal framework for

determining whether Plaintiff’s claim should survive summary judgment is the familiar burdenshifting scheme set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

First, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See id.; Guz, 24 Cal.

4th at 351-54. Whether Plaintiff can meet his burden to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination is a matter of law to be determined by the court. Caldwell v. Paramount Unified

School District, 41 Cal. App. 4th 189, 201 (1995). If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

burden then shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

employment decision. Then, in order to prevail, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s

alleged reason for the adverse employment decision was a pretext for another, discriminatory

motive. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 351-54; see also Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d

1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by

demonstrating that (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he applied for and was

qualified for an available position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4)

similarly situated individuals not in the protected class were treated more favorably. St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). The only significant difference in the FEHA

analysis is that in order to establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must, in addition to the first

three elements, demonstrate some other circumstances that suggests discriminatory motive. 

See, e.g., Guz, 24 Cal.4th at 355. 

If Plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden of production then

shifts to Bayer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s

employment. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If Bayer does so, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that Bayer’s articulated reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination by “‘either

directly persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or

indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’”

Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Texas Dep’t of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). Plaintiff’s evidence must be both specific

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1 As Plaintiff conceded at oral argument on this motion, because Plaintiff was

terminated at the time he applied for a promotion, the claims for discrimination in failing to

promote him collapse under the same rubric as his termination claims.

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and substantial to overcome the legitimate reasons set forth by the employer. Aragon v.

Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2002). 

1. Prima Facie Case.

At summary judgment, the degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case is

“minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26

F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). Although the burden for establishing a prima facie case is an

easy one to satisfy, Plaintiff has failed to do so. Although Plaintiff’s race makes him a member

of a protected class and his failure to be promoted and termination qualify as adverse

employment actions,1

 he fails to satisfy the other two prongs of the test; that is, to demonstrate

that he was qualified for the position and that other, similarly situated individuals not in the

protected class were treated more favorably.

a. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was qualified for the

position.

There is simply no evidence in the record that Plaintiff was qualified for the position of

Level A mechanic. Plaintiff’s disciplinary record indicates that, due to his performance record

and disciplinary actions, he was not qualified for promotion. In addition, the record

demonstrates that there were numerous times when Plaintiff’s performance on the job was

unsatisfactory. The record is replete with instances of complaints about Plaintiff’s work from

fellow employees and supervisors. (See, e.g., Roberts Decl. at ¶¶ 9-10; Schreibstein Decl., Ex.

A at 122-30.) There were complaints about a confrontational altercation with another

mechanic, repeated complaints about Plaintiff’s poor attitude and work performance from coworkers, Plaintiff’s failure to follow strict company policy on equipment release and

lockout/tagout procedures, his missing days of work and failing to show up for a particular,

time-sensitive work assignment. (See, e.g.,Smith Decl. at ¶¶ 6-8; Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at

165-68.) In addition, just prior to his termination, Plaintiff’s supervisor determined that

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2

 To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to rehabilitate his former testimony by

submitting a declaration in connection with opposing the motion for summary judgment in

which he unequivocably attests that he changed the filters (Jones Decl. at ¶ 26), such

testimony is self-serving and contradicts his former sworn testimony in which he stated it

was highly unlikely that he would not have changed the filters (Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at

224). A party cannot create a triable issue of fact, and thus survive summary judgment, by

contradicting his own deposition testimony with a later declaration. Disc Golf Ass’n v.

Champion Discs, 158 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, Defendant’s objections to

those portions of Plaintiff’s declaration that contradict his previous sworn testimony is

sustained. Regardless of the filters incident, however, there is ample other evidence in the

record indicating that Plaintiff was not performing within the qualifications required of his

job.

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Plaintiff had completed the paperwork indicating some filters had been changed, but could not

account for the fact that, upon visual inspection, it appeared that the there remained dirty filters

in the unit. (See Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at 203-209, 223-24, Ex. B at JON1715-16,

JON1717; Smith Decl. at ¶¶ 14-15.)2

Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there

is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his qualifications. Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on demonstrating

Plaintiff was qualified for the position. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506.

b. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that other, similarly situated

individuals were treated more favorably.

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to raise a dispute of fact regarding whether other

employees outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. In this regard, Plaintiff

contends that during his tenure in the HVAC Department, he was treated differently from other,

non-African American employees because of a delay in ordering his uniform, the failure timely

to provide him with tools and failing to give him a two-way radio. (See Jones Decl. at ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff also contends that he was assigned to work with someone who was moody and hard to

work with and he was therefore unable to learn more on the job. (See id. at ¶ 13.) Also, in his

complaint before the EEOC, Plaintiff contended that he was denied access to tools, training and

the internet. (See Schreibstein Decl., Ex. C at JON0060.) 

However, there is no evidence in the record that the delay in ordering a uniform or the

alleged delay in providing tools or failure to provide a two-way radio or access to the internet

impeded Plaintiff’s performance on the job. In fact, Plaintiff so testified. (See Schreibstein

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Decl., Ex. A at 268-69, 281.) Further, during his testimony, Plaintiff was unable to identify

anyone else, similarly situated, who was treated more favorably with respect to the provision of

a uniform, training or tools, discipline, or the level at which others were hired and promoted in

the HVAC department. (See id. at 237-38, 240-43, 244-48, 271-75; 195; 304-311, 313, 317.) 

Because there is no evidence that other, similarly situated individuals were treated more

favorably based upon their race, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to

demonstrate the existence of a prima facie case of race discrimination based on this factor. 

Therefore, summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim is properly granted. 

However, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of

race discrimination, summary judgment is still warranted because Bayer has asserted a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination, and Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate the reason is merely pretext.

2. Bayer Has Demonstrated Legitimate Business Reasons for Terminating

Plaintiff.

Even if Plaintiff could successfully establish a prima facie case of race discrimination,

the undisputed facts demonstrate that Bayer had legitimate business reasons for failing to

promote him and instead terminating him. First, Plaintiff has proffered no evidence to

demonstrate that he was qualified for promotion to level A mechanic. Second, Plaintiff’s record

of disciplinary problems is sufficient to establish a legitimate business reason for the

determination that he should be terminated. The articulated reasons for Bayer’s failure to

advance and instead to terminate Plaintiff were based on the application of objective, lawful

criteria and were not related to Plaintiff’s race.

3. Plaintiff Fails to Raise an Issue of Disputed Fact Regarding Pretext.

Because Defendant presents evidence demonstrating a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for the failure to promote and termination, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating

that Defendant’s articulated reason is pretextual. Plaintiff may do so “either [1] directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or [2]

indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 

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3

 Bayer’s brief makes a passing reference to a comment that Plaintiff believed

intimated race discrimination. (See Motion at 3-4.) First, the specific comment Plaintiff

complains of regarding his failure to maintain eye contact does not indicate any racial

animus. However, even assuming there was some racial content to the comment, it

constituted a mere stray remark. See Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400 F.3d 1207, 1213

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that stray remarks not acted upon or communicated to a decision

maker are insufficient to establish pretext); see also Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d

1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1990) (same).

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Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal cites and

quotations omitted). 

The Court has already determined that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that

Plaintiff failed to perform his duties in compliance with Bayer’s expectations and explicit

standard operating procedures. Plaintiff fails to refute Bayer’s legitimate non-discriminatory

reasons for termination and himself admits numerous times that he has no direct evidence that a

discriminatory reason motivated his employer. (See, e.g., Schreibstein Decl., Ex. A at 220-21,

229-235, 283-93.)3

Plaintiff also contends that he may infer race discrimination from the fact that he was the

only African-American in the HVAC department. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s

argument that the Court should infer racial animus because the group fails to constitute a

statistical sample. The Ninth Circuit has held that a sampling of such a small universe detracts

from the value of statistical evidence. See Morita v. Southern California Permanente Medical

Group, 541 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1976) (“statistical evidence derived from an extremely small

universe ... has little predictive value and must be disregarded.”) (citations and internal

quotations omitted); see also Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.

1986) (finding that a department of 28 employees was too small for statistical analysis of race

under Title VII); but see Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that

considerations of small sample size may detract from the value of such evidence, but such

statistical evidence may be probative). 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to set forth any direct or indirect

evidence to persuade the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer

or any indirect evidence tending to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered explanation is

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 Plaintiff’s ninth claim for violation of public policy in violation of Article I, Section

8 of the California Constitution fails. To state a claim for termination in violation of public

policy, an employee must allege (1) an employer-employee relationship; (2) termination of

employment; (3) the termination was a violation of public policy; (4) the termination was the

legal cause of the plaintiff’s damages; and (5) damages. Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27

Cal. 3d 167, 172 (1980). Because Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination fail, there is no basis

for alleging a violation of public policy.

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unworthy of credence. See Merrick, 892 F.2d at 1437. Having failed to raise a disputed fact

demonstrating that Bayer’s articulated reason for termination is pretextual, either directly or

indirectly, the Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first, third, fifth and sixth claims

for race discrimination.4

C. Plaintiff’s Claims for Retaliation Do Not Survive Summary Judgment.

In his second and seventh causes of action, Plaintiff also makes claims for relief for

retaliation. Similar to elements of establishing discrimination, the elements of a retaliation

claim “require that (1) the plaintiff establish a prima facie case of retaliation, (2) the defendant

articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for its acts, and (3) the plaintiff show that the

defendant’s proffered explanation is merely a pretext for the illegal [action].” Flait v. North

American Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 476 (1992). In order to establish a prima facie

case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) his

employer subjected him to adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between

the protected activity and the employer’s action. Id.; see also Akers v. County of San Diego, 95

Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1453 (2002) (same).

Plaintiff maintains that he engaged in protected activity when he filed an internal

complaint and EEOC charges. (See Schreibstein Decl., Ex. C at JON0060.) Plaintiff’s

complaint was originally filed on June 24, 2002. (See id.) The EEOC initially dismissed the

charges based on lack of evidence in December 2002. (See id., Ex. D at JON0057.) After

consideration of late-filed submissions interpreted as a request for reconsideration, the EEOC

denied Plaintiff’s request as insufficient in January 2003. (See id. at Ex. A at 389-390, 392-93.)

To the extent Plaintiff claims that his complaints and alleged protected activity

ultimately caused his termination, the long passage of time between the alleged protected acts

(the filing of the original EEOC complaint in June 2002) and the termination in January 2003

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preclude a finding of causal nexus. See, e.g., Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792, 802

(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that nine-month period of time between protected activity and alleged

retaliatory action was too long to create an inference of retaliation); see also Clark County Sch.

Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (noting that a court may not infer

causation from temporal proximity unless the time between an employer's knowledge of

protected activity and an adverse employment action is “very close” and citing cases for the

proposition that a three-month and four-month time lapse is insufficient to infer causation).

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. 

However, even if Plaintiff were able to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the

Court finds that Bayer has articulated a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for its acts, and

Plaintiff cannot show that Bayer’s proffered explanation is merely a pretext for illegal action. 

Bayer has articulated a legitimate basis for terminating Plaintiff due to his disciplinary and

performance record. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Bayer’s proffered reason is mere

pretext for unlawful discriminatory or retaliatory motive for the same reasons he has failed to so

demonstrate for his claims of race discrimination and because he lacks even temporal proximity

to create an inference of retaliatory motive. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s second and seventh claims for retaliation.

D. The After-Acquired Evidence Rule as Independent Basis for Summary Judgment.

The after-acquired evidence rule serves as a complete or partial defense to an

employee’s claim of wrongful discharge. It comes into play when, after an employee’s

termination, the employer learns of the employee’s wrongdoing that would have resulted in the

employee’s discharge in any event. Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 35 Cal. App.

4th 520, 632 (1995). To invoke this doctrine, the employer must establish that the wrongdoing

was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds

alone if the employer had known of it. The employer must show that such a firing would have

occurred as a matter of settled company policy. Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc., 65 Cal. App.

4th 833, 845-46 (1998), citing Waag v. Thomas Pontiac Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393,

408 (D. Minn. 1996). 

Case 3:03-cv-05531-JSW Document 195 Filed 03/21/07 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

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Bayer has submitted a declaration from the manager of Human Resources indicating that

Plaintiff would have been fired according to settled policy had the company known that he had

misrepresented his qualifications on his job application. (See O’Driscoll Decl. at ¶ 3.) 

Plaintiff’s admitted falsifications on his application materials would have, according to settled

Bayer policy, been grounds for immediate termination. Therefore, the Court finds that, on this

independent basis, Bayer is entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Bayer’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:03-cv-05531-JSW Document 195 Filed 03/21/07 Page 13 of 13