Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_03-cv-01083/USCOURTS-alnd-7_03-cv-01083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

ANTONIO FERNANDO WALKER, ]

]

Petitioner, ]

]

v. ] CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-RRA-1083-W

]

WARDEN BILLY MITCHEM, et al., ]

]

Respondents. ]

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a person in custody under a

judgment of a court of the State of Alabama. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner, Antonio

Fernando Walker, was convicted on September 28, 1999, in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa

County, on his guilty to three counts of first degree robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent

term of imprisonment for twenty-one years on each count. The Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences in a memorandum opinion released on March

24, 2000. Walker’s application for rehearing was overruled on April 14, 2000. On August

18, 2000, his petition for a writ of certiorari was denied and a certificate of judgment was

entered. 

In June of 2002, Walker filed Rule 32 petitions in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa

County. The trial court summarily dismissed the petitions on July 29, 2002. The Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of his petitions on November 15, 2002. A

certificate of judgment was entered on March 28, 2003. 

FILED

 2005 Oct-19 PM 12:12

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:03-cv-01083-WMA Document 17 Filed 10/19/05 Page 1 of 7
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Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court on May 9, 2003. In

response to the court’s order to show cause, the respondents have filed an answer in which

they assert that the petition is due to be dismissed because it is barred by the one-year statute

of limitations enacted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

The parties were advised that the respondents’ answer would be treated as a motion for

summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. In

response, the petitioner filed a traverse. 

The AEDPA, effective April 24, 1996, amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to read in part, as

follows:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of — 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

Case 7:03-cv-01083-WMA Document 17 Filed 10/19/05 Page 2 of 7
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claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection.

Walker’s conviction became final on August 18, 2000, when the certificate of

judgment was issued in his direct appeal. Thus, the one-year limitations period began to run

on August 18, 2000, and expired on August 17, 2001. Walker did not file a petition in this

court until May 9, 2003. Therefore, the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) does not help the petitioner. That section provides that

“[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” Walker’s Rule 32 petition

was not filed until June, 2002, almost one year after the limitations period expired on August

17, 2001. The fact that the petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition after the expiration of the oneyear period for filing in federal court did not start the running of the limitations periods

anew:

Section 2244(d)(2) does not state that the AEDPA’s one-year statute begins to

run anew after decision on a state collateral attack; such an interpretation

would allow an inmate to avoid the effect of the AEDPA’s one-year state of

limitations by bringing a belated state collateral attack. See, e.g., Hamilton v.

Miller, No. 98 CV 5669, 1999 WL 438472 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1999);

DeVeaux v. Schriver, slip op. at 8; Varsos v. Portuondo, slip op. at 4; Smith v.

McGinnis, No. CV 98-1034, 1999 WL 312121 at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. March 17,

1999); Cromwell v. Keane, 33 F. Supp. 2d 282, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Rakoff,

D.J. & Peck, M.J.).

Rather, § 2244(d)(2) merely excludes the time a collateral attack is

under submission from the calculation of the one-year statute of limitations.

See, e.g., Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 199 n. 1 (5th Cir.1998) ( “Under

the plain language of the statute, any time that passed between the time that

[petitioner’s] conviction became final and the time that his state application for

habeas corpus was properly filed must be counted against the one year period

of limitation.”); DeVeaux v. Schriver, slip op. at 8; Broom v. Garvin, 99 Civ.

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1083, 1999 WL 246753 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1999) (“[T]he filing of a

collateral attack in the state court tolls the AEDPA statute of limitations during

the period that it is pending, but it does not commence a new limitations

period.”); Hamilton v. Miller, 1999 WL 438472 at *3; Smith v. McGinnis,

1999 WL 312121 at *3-4; Varsos v. Portuondo, slip op. at 4-5; Brooks v. Artuz,

98 Civ. 4449, 1999 WL 138926 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 1999) (“The

tolling provision [in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2) ] does not . . . ‘revive’ the limitations

period (i.e., restart the clock at zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has

not yet fully run.”) (quoting Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259

(S.D.N.Y.1998)); Cowart v. Goord, 97 Civ. 3864, 1998 WL 65985 at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1998) (Sotomayor, D.J.) (“the filing of a proper state

collateral petition does serve to toll (but not start anew) the AEDPA statute of

limitations”); Hughes v. Irvin, 967 F. Supp. 775, 778 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)

(petitioner’s statute of limitations period was suspended only during the period

state collateral motions were pending, and began to run again, but not anew,

when the state collateral motions were decided).

Torres v. Miller, No. 99 Civ. 0580 MBM, 1999 WL 714349, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. August 27,

1999). See also Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004)(“A state court filing

after the federal habeas filing deadline does not revive it.”); Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377,

1381 (11th Cir. 2003) (“While a ‘properly filed’ application for post-conviction relief tolls

the statute of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of limitations once the

limitations period has expired. In other words, the tolling provision does not operate to

revive the one-year limitations period if such period has expired.”); Webster v. Moore, 199

F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)(“A state-court petition like [the petitioner’s] that is filed

following the expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because there is no

period remaining to be tolled.”); Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 472 (5 Cir. th

1999)(tolling lasts “only as long as the state court takes to resolve the pending application

because any lapse of time before a state application is properly filed will be counted against

the one-year limitation period”); Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y.

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1998)(“Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to

avoid the statute of limitations.”).

Walker argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled or he would

suffer a blatant miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court has never addressed whether the

miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default rules is available to overcome the

procedural bar of the one-year statute of limitations established by the AEDPA. However,

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “the factual issue of whether the

petitioner can make a showing of actual innocence should be first addressed, before

addressing the constitutional issue of whether the Suspension Clause requires such an

exception for actual innocence.” Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213,

1218 (11th Cir. 2000). 

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), the Supreme Court elaborated on the

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception and the necessity of showing innocence. To

meet this exception, the petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513

U.S. at 327. The standard focuses on the actual innocence of the petitioner. As the Supreme

Court explained:

Instead, the emphasis on “actual innocence” allows the reviewing tribunal also

to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was either excluded

or unavailable at trial. Indeed, with respect to this aspect of the Carrier

standard, we believe that Judge Friendly’s description of the inquiry is

appropriate: the habeas court must make its determination concerning the

petitioner’s innocence “in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to

have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and

evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongfully excluded or to have become

available only after trial.”

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Id. at 327. (Quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Judgment, 38

U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). To be credible, a claim of actual innocence must be based

on reliable evidence not presented at trial. Fortenberry v. Haley, 297 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th

Cir. 2002).

Walker makes no claim that he is actually innocent. Therefore, he cannot establish

that he would suffer a fundamental miscarriage of justice if the court finds his petition is

barred by the statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommends that the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus be DISMISSED because it is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Any party may file specific written objections to this report within fifteen (15) days of

the date it is filed in the office of the Clerk. Any objections filed must specifically identify the

findings in the magistrate judge’s recommendation to which the objections pertain. Frivolous,

conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. Failure to file

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge’s

report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues

covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the

report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or

manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). A copy of the

objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.

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The Clerk is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon

the petitioner and counsel for the respondents.

DONE this 19 day of October, 2005. th

 

ROBERT R. ARMSTRONG, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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