Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05489/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05489-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICOTORINO LEMOS MEIJA, )

)

)

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

SYLVIA GARCIA, )

)

)

Respondent. )

)

)

No. CV-F-03-5489 REC/DLB HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDING AND

RECOMMENDATION AS AMENDED

(Doc. 29), GRANTING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN

PART AND DENYING IT IN PART,

AND DIRECTING STATE TO

INFORM THE COURT WITHIN 90

DAYS WHETHER IT WILL RETRY

PETITIONER ON FIVE COUNTS OF

RAPE BY FORCE OR FEAR 

On February 14, 2006, the United States Magistrate Judge

recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied

on all grounds except with regard to the instructional error

alleged in Claim Four. The Magistrate Judge recommended in

pertinent part:

Petitioner contends that the trial court

erroneously instructed the jury with a

version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 that was in use

prior to the 1999 revision. 

CALJIC No. 2.50.01, as read and given to the

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jury in this case, stated the following:

Evidence has been introduced for

the purpose of showing that the

defendant engaged in a sexual

offense on one or more occasions

other than that charged in this

case.

Sexual offense means a crime under

the laws of the state or of the

United States that involve any of

the following: Any conduct made

criminal by the Penal Code Section

288 or 261(a)(2). The elements of

these crimes are set forth

elsewhere in these instructions.

If you find that the defendant

committed a prior sexual offense,

you may but are not required to

infer that the defendant had a

disposition to commit the same or

similar type sexual offenses. If

you find that the defendant had

this disposition, you may but are

not required to infer that he was

likely to commit and did commit the

crime or crimes of which he is

accused. You must not consider

this evidence for any other

purpose.

...

CALJIC No. 2.50.1, which was given following

the above instruction, provides:

Within the meaning of the preceding

section, the prosecution has the

burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that

a defendant committed a sexual

offense other than those for which

he is on trial.

You must not consider this evidence

for any purpose unless you find by

a preponderance of the evidence

that a defendant committed the

other sexual offense[s].

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...

In Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9 Cir. th

2004), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

ruled that the pre-1999 version of CALJIC

2.50.01, coupled with CALJIC 2.50.1,

impermissibly lessened the standard of proof

required to convict on the ‘sexual offenses’

which were similar to the uncharged ‘sexual

offenses.’ In its supplemental briefing,

Respondent concedes that the version of

CALJIC 2.50.01 used in the instant case is

the same version disapproved of in Gibson and

there is no way to materially distinguish it. 

Thus, Respondent submits that the instant

petition for writ of habeas corpus must be

granted with respect to Petitioner’s

convictions of five counts of rape. Applying

the rationale set forth by the Ninth Circuit

in Gibson, the trial court’s use of jury

instructions CALJIC 2.50.01 and 2.50.1

allowed the jury to find Petitioner guilty of

the charged offenses by relying on facts

found only by a preponderance of the

evidence. This lessened the burden of proof

under In re Winship, 397 F.3d 358 (1970),

which requires the prosecution to prove every

element charged in a criminal offense beyond

a reasonable doubt, thereby depriving

Petitioner of a ‘jury verdict within the

meaning of the Sixth Amendment.’ Sullivan v.

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993). In

light of this ruling, this Court is compelled

to conclude that the state court’s decision

to use jury instructions CALJIC 2.50.01 and

2.50.1, and the state appellate court’s

affirmation of that decision, were contrary

to clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States. Because the evidence used to convict

Petitioner of the rape charges is the same

evidence used to convict Petitioner of the

assault and kidnaping charges, and the

evidence and incidents were so intertwined,

the petition for writ of habeas corpus should

be granted with respect to all of the

convictions, i.e., five counts of rape, two

counts of kidnaping, two counts of assault

with a firearm and one count of assault with

a deadly weapon.

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4

Respondent timely filed objections to the recommendation,

contending that the writ of habeas corpus should be granted only

with respect to the five counts of rape by force or fear.

Petitioner did not file any objections to the recommendation

or reply to respondent’s objections. 

The court has reviewed the record herein de novo. The court

agrees with respondent’s objections and amends the recommendation

for the reasons set forth herein. In all other respects, the

court concurs with the recommendation that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be denied. 

As respondent contends, the uncharged sexual misconduct by

petitioner against his daughter and the charged acts of kidnaping

and assault are not similar. The evidence does not show that

petitioner ever unlawfully took his daughter anywhere or took her

to a place against her will. The charged crimes alleged that

petitioner took his wife and her sister to an orange grove at

gunpoint to rape them. There is no evidence that petitioner

assaulted his daughter with a deadly weapon. Rather, petitioner

placed a gun under his head or pillow before raping his daughter. 

This evidence is dissimilar to the charged crimes where

petitioner pointed deadly weapons at his two victims to

facilitate the rapes. Furthermore, no one suggested at closing

argument that the evidence of uncharged sexual offenses against

his daughter should be used to prove the truth of the charged

kidnaping or assaults. As respondent argues, the language of the

jury instructions at issue:

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[T]he language of the jury instruction itself

states only that the enumerated sexual

offenses are to be considered as propensity

evidence. If the jurors find the evidence to

be true, the only permissible inference is

that the defendant has a propensity to commit

the same or similar type of sexual offenses,

and then the jury is permitted to infer that

the defendant was ‘likely to commit and did

commit the crimes of which he is accused.’

Although Respondent concedes in his objections that the

instructions at issue could possibly be read in a way the

supports the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. However, as 

Respondent contends:

The jury instruction only allowed the jurors

to find that Petitioner had committed

uncharged acts of oral copulation and

forcible rape. The instruction then

permitted the jurors to infer that Petitioner

had the propensity to commit the same or

similar crimes, and that he had committed the

charged crimes. It is unreasonable to

conclude that the jury would focus on

uncharged sexual offenses of oral copulation

and forcible rape, conclude that Petitioner

had the propensity to commit similar sexual

offenses, and then use that belief to find

him guilty of kidnaping and assault with a

deadly weapon. The unreasonable nature of

this conclusion is especially pronounced

given the dissimilar ways in which he raped

his daughter in the uncharged acts, and the

way he raped to two victims in the charged

acts, and the absence of any argument tying

the uncharged misconduct to the kidnaping and

assaults. 

Furthermore, regardless of the wording of CALJIC 2.50.01 and

CALJIC No. 2.50.1, the jury was instructed that it must find the

elements of the kidnaping and the assaults and that petitioner

was the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In Gibson, the defendant had been charged with corporal

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injury to a spouse as well with counts of forcible oral

copulation and genital penetration of a child. The Ninth Circuit

noted that, in addition to being given CALJIC 2.50.01 and CALJIC

2.50.1, the jury also received CALJIC 2.50.02, which the Ninth

Circuit stated “is identical in all aspects to No. 2.50.01,

except that it addresses prior acts of domestic violence.” 387

F.3d at 817 n.4. Because CALJIC No. 2.50.02 shared the same

language as CALJIC No. 2.50.01, it is inferrable that the Ninth

Circuit reversed the conviction of corporal injury to a spouse

for the same reason that it reversed the sexual offense

convictions. Here, as argued by Respondent, the jury was

separately instructed on the charges of kidnaping and assault

with a deadly weapon. Furthermore, as argued by Respondent, the

uncharged sexual offenses evidence did not involve assault or

kidnaping. In Acosta v. Lewis, 146 Fed.Appx. 219 (9 Cir.2005), th

the district court denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 wherein petitioner challenged his

convictions for threats to commit a crime resulting in death or

great bodily injury, possession of a firearm by a felon,

possession of ammunition by a felon and resisting a peace officer

in the performance of his duties. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

held that petitioner’s conviction of threats to commit a crime

resulting in death or great bodily injury was contrary to clearly

established federal law pursuant to Gibson v. Ortiz because the

jury was given CALJIC Nos. 2.50.02 and 2.50.1 and remanded to the

district court to grant a conditional writ of mandate with

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respect to that count. However, the Ninth Circuit further ruled:

Because the constitutionally infirm jury

instructions in this case pertain only to

domestic violence offenses, the district

court’s denial of habeas relief for the

convictions for Counts Two, Three and Four is

affirmed. 

ACCORDINGLY:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED with

respect to petitioner’s convictions of five counts of rape by

force or fear based on the trial court’s use of jury instructions

CALJIC 2.50.01 and 2.50.1, subject to the State’s right to retry

Petitioner;

2. The remaining claims in the petition for writ of habeas

corpus are DENIED;

3. The State must, within ninety (90) days from the date of

service of this Order, inform the court whether it will retry

Petitioner on the five counts of rape by force or fear.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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