Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02150/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02150-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order – Page 1 of 12

United States District Court

Eastern District of California

SUTTER NGUYEN,

Petitioner,

v.

DWIGHT W. NEVEN, Warden,

Respondent.

CIV S-08-2150 TJH

Order

In June, 2003, Lamson Trong Pham (“Lamson”) and Bruce Huy Phan (“Bruce”)

were charged with the murder of Alan Khamphoumy (“Khamphoumy”), with the

personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death and the attempted

murder of T.T. and V.D. with the same firearm allegations. In August, 2003, Sutter

Nguyen (“Petitioner”) was charged with the same offenses. 

On the night of October 26, 2002, a Laotian family held a birthday party in and

around the garage of their Sacramento residence. Some of the attendees were in LGC,

a Laotian street gang and some of the attendees were in JVP, a Vietnamese street gang.

All the defendants are Vietnamese. Prosecution evidence indicated that, in 1998, the

police confirmed Petitioner was a JVP gang member. 

The testimonies of witnesses who attended the party presented conflicting

evidence as to what occurred on that night. One witness testified that the party was not

Case 2:08-cv-02150-TJH Document 28 Filed 12/26/12 Page 1 of 12
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Order – Page 2 of 12

an LGC party, even though he and Lamson indicated to each other their rival gang

affiliations. Other partygoers testified, however, that when the two groups faced each

other across the driveway, LGC members taunted JVP members by asking “Where you

all from?” After the members claimed their gang affiliations, JVP members pulled out

their guns and started shooting. T.T. testified that he was shot and injured. V.D., a

seventeen year-old girl, was, also, shot and injured. Khamphoumy was shot and killed.

There was, also, conflicting testimony between co-defendants Lamson and Bruce

and John D. (“John”), who testified that he was given use immunity and awaiting trial

for an unrelated murder. 

Lamson testified that he was told by Petitioner that Petitioner used to be JVP, but

was no longer a member. Lamson, also, stated he saw Petitioner at the party but did

not remember seeing him during the shooting.

Bruce testified that he was unsure of the sequence of events. He first testified

that Petitioner pulled a gun and began to shoot, along with other JVP gang members,

John and Trung Nguyen (“Boy”), but later testified that he did not know whether

Petitioner actually shot or not.

Finally, John testified that he and Petitioner were not JVP members and

maintained that Petitioner did not have a gun. John testified that it was Tan who fired

the pistol which Tan later used to commit suicide. John later admitted, however, that

he lied to the police due to his fear of being charged with the shooting.

When police stopped Lamson and Bruce on the same street as the party, two guns

were found in the vehicle. Both guns were connected to casings found at the crime

scene. There was gun shot residue on Bruce’s palms and Bruce’s fingerprints were on

the gun that matched the bullet that killed Alan. Petitioner was arrested months later

when police stopped him and Boy in a vehicle. When the driver of the vehicle emerged

from the car, Boy killed himself with a shot to the head. 

The trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion to join cases and denied

Petitioner’s motion for severance. The prosecution’s theory was that the defendants

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Order – Page 3 of 12

were involved in a Vietnamese street gang and went looking for a confrontations with

rival Laotian gang members and shot at unarmed people. Lamson and Bruce claimed

self-defense. Evidence was adduced that John’s trial testimony partially conflicted with

his statements in a police interview, a videotape of which was played to the jury.

Petitioner did not testify, but maintained that no evidence showed he was present at the

party or involved with the crimes, except evidence provided by the uncorroborated

testimony of “accomplices” Lamson, Bruce and John.

The jury convicted Petitioner of second degree murder and two counts of

attempted murder. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen years to life for

murder and a consecutive term of nine years and four months for the attempted

murders. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction and the California Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court, which was denied. Petitioner did not file any petitions for writ of

habeas corpus in state court, however, Respondent admits that Petitioner exhausted his

claims for relief. Petitioner, in pro se, filed this federal writ for habeas relief. 

Petitioner claims that:

1. The trial court improperly admitted evidence of his ties to JVP, a Vietnamese

street gang, to show he was involved in the offences; 

2. The trial court erred by not instructing that John, Lamson and Bruce were

accomplices as a matter of law and that their testimonies needed to be

corroborated;

3. The trial court erred by giving instructions that invited the jury to convict him

on the basis of motive;

4. The trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the flight instruction did

not apply to him;

5. There was insufficient evidence to convict him of any crime; 

6. The trial court denied him a fair trial by refusing to sever his trial from the

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Order – Page 4 of 12

trial of Bruce and Lamson, his co-defendants; 

7. In closing argument, the prosecution commented that he did not testify in

violation of his constitutional rights;

8. The trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after John’s testimony

that Petitioner had been “on the run” for “murder” was inadvertently admitted;

9. Petitioner joins in the claim raised by his co-defendants which may benefit

him. 

10. Petitioner attaches an argument, challenging the prosecutor’s use of

peremptory challenges; and

11. The cumulative impact of the claimed errors deprived him of due process

and a fair trial. 

A writ of habeas corpus may only be granted if the petitioner’s state court

judgment was in violation of “clearly established federal law, as decided by the

Supreme Court” or was based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” based

on the evidence before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2). Factual decisions

made by that state court are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden

of proof to show the state court made a factual mistake by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Petitioner claims that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Petitioner’s

ties to JVP. The trial court ruled that because gang evidence may be relevant to

motive, it would allow some gang evidence but it would be severely limited. An expert

was allowed to testify to the confrontational meaning of the greeting, “Where you

from?” and whether the JVP and LGC gangs are rivals. Evidence was not allowed

regarding Petitioner’s involvement with JVP. The court excluded evidence that violence

enhances reputation in gang culture.

Federal courts do not review questions of state evidence law. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385, 396 (1991). In relation to

federal habeas review, federal courts may only consider whether a petitioner’s

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Order – Page 5 of 12

conviction violated constitutional norms. Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919

(9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the relevant inquiry is whether the admission of the

evidence “so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.”

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. As a result, only if the jury can draw no permissible

inferences from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Jammal, 926 F.2d

at 920. Even then, however, the evidence must “be of such quality as necessarily

prevents a fair trial.” Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1994).

The gang evidence was relevant to provide context to the conduct that occurred

at the time of the incident. In particular, the gang evidence was relevant for the jury

to understand that the question, “Where you all from?”, was a challenge to fight.

Without such evidence, there would be no explanation as to why the shooting occurred

after what appeared to be a simple question. Accordingly, gang membership as a

motive was essential to understanding the charged offenses and without the gang

evidence, the prosecution would have been prejudiced. Because gang membership as

a motive is a permissible inference that the jury may draw from the evidence, the

admission of such evidence was not objectively unreasonable as to render the trial

fundamentally unfair. Petitioner’s claim fails. 

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that John,

Lamson, and Bruce were accomplices as a matter of law and that their testimonies

needed to be corroborated. Unlike California’s accomplice corroboration rule, federal

constitutional law does not require an accomplice’s testimony to be corroborated.

Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2000). To the contrary, an

accomplice’s uncorroborated testimony is enough to sustain a conviction unless the

testimony is incredible or unsubstantial on its face. United States v. Lopez, 803 F.2d

969, 973 (9th Cir. 1986).

The testimonies of John, Lamson and Bruce do not require corroboration.

Furthermore, their testimonies were neither incredible nor unsubstantial. Their

testimonies placed Petitioner at the scene of the crime, which was substantial evidence.

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Order – Page 6 of 12

Although Petitioner claims that John lied in his testimony and that his co-defendant had

a great deal to gain by placing Petitioner at the scene of the crime, this Court finds that

there was nothing incredible about their testimonies because the co-defendants did not

blame Petitioner for the shooting nor identify Petitioner as a JVP gang member, and

they further admitted to firing guns. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish that

the trial court’s decision was objectively unreasonable and, therefore, this claim fails.

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by giving instructions that invited the

jury to convict him on the basis of motive. Specifically, the trial court gave the jury a

special instruction, which provided that testimony related to gang behavior and possible

gang membership may be considered for determining motive. The trial court further

instructed the jury that presence of motive may tend to establish guilt, but that motive

is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown.

A claim for instructional error under state law is not a basis for federal habeas

relief. Federal courts do not grant relief simply because the instruction may have been

deficient. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71. Instead, the only question for federal review is

“whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71. Additionally, it has been

established that the instruction “may not be judged in artificial isolation,” but must be

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Estelle,

502 U.S. at 72. 

Petitioner did not advance any controlling federal authority to establish that the

jury’s consideration of motive in a case violates a federal constitutional right to due

process. Moreover, the jury instruction did not invite the jury to convict Petitioner on

the basis of motive. Rather, the trial court instructed the jury that motive may be

considered to establish guilt, but motive is not an element of the crime charged and need

not be shown. Also, the jury instruction provided that an absence of motive may tend

to establish innocence. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish that the trial court’s

decision was objectively unreasonable, and this claim fails.

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Order – Page 7 of 12

Additionally, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s instruction regarding flight:

“The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, is not sufficient

in itself to establish his guilt but us a fact which if proved, may be considered by you

in the light of all other proved facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not

guilty. The weight to which this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide.”

The trial court, also, instructed the jury: “Whether some instructions apply will depend

upon what you find to be the facts determined by you to exist. Do not conclude that

because an instruction has been given I am expressing an opinion as to the facts.”

As discussed above, a claim for instructional error under state law is not a basis

for federal habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71. Further, California Jury Instruction

(“CALJIC”) Number 2.52, the flight instruction, has withstood constitutional challenge.

McMillan v Gomex, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). Because Petitioner did not cite

any controlling federal authority to establish that the flight instruction violated his

federal constitutional right to due process, his claim fails. Even so, when evidence was

shown that the perpetrators fled the crime scene and identified Petitioner as one of the

perpetrators, it was for the jury to decide whether Petitioner took flight and whether this

was a factor showing his guilt. Thus, the trial court’s flight instruction did not result

in a fundamentally unfair trial. 

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of any crime.

Sufficiency of the evidence claims raised in habeas proceedings must be measured with

reference to substantive requirements as defined by state law. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 324, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 577 (1979). In cases where

the evidence is unclear or would support conflicting inferences, “the federal court ‘must

presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact

resolves any such conflict in the favor of the prosecution and must defer to that

resolution.’” Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335,338 (9th Cir. 1992). Whether a federal

court “would agree with the finding is irrelevant,” it is strictly whether any reasonable

fact-finder could have found that the evidence supports the elements. Woratzeck v.

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Order – Page 8 of 12

Lewis, 863 F. Supp. 1079, 1091 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff’d 97 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1996).

Accordingly, a federal court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by

determining whether in “viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt”. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781, 110 S. Ct.

3092, 3102-3, 111 L. Ed. 2d 606, 624 (1990). 

 Petitioner is challenging his conviction based on California’s rule that accomplice

testimony must be corroborated. There is no federal requirement that accomplice

testimony must be independently corroborated. Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979. Petitioner’s

argument depends on his conclusion that John was an accomplice. Whether John was

an accomplice was for the jury to decide. The Court must presume that the trier of fact

resolved the conflict of whether John was an accomplice in favor of the prosecution and

must, also, defer to that resolution, regardless of whether this Court agrees with the

jury’s finding. In viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the

Court finds that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to sustain

Petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner has not shown the trial court’s decision was

objectively unreasonable and, therefore, this claim must be denied. 

Petitioner contends that the trial court denied him a fair trial by refusing to sever

his trial from his co-defendants. A trial court’s ruling on a severance motion is

reviewed for abuse of discretion on the basis of the facts known to the trial court at the

time of its ruling. People v. Box, 23 Cal. 4th 1153, 1195, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 99

(2000). However, if the ruling denying severance was correct when made, a judgment

may still be reversed on a showing that joinder actually resulted in gross unfairness

amounting to a denial of due process. People v. Mendoza, 24 Cal. 4th 130, 162, 99

Cal. Rptr. 2d 485, 505 (2000). Reversal is appropriate only if a gross unfairness

resulted from the consolidation. People v. Greenberger, 58 Cal. App. 4th 298, 343,

68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 61,70 (1997). Even where there are mutually antagonistic defenses,

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Order – Page 9 of 12

denial of severance does not necessarily deny a fair trial. Zafiro v. United States, 506

U.S. 534, 538, 113 S. Ct. 933, 937, 122 L. Ed. 2d 317, 324 (1993). Further, even

improper joinder does not violate the Constitution unless it results in prejudice so great

as to deny a defendant his right to a fair trial. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438,

446, 106 S. Ct. 725, 730, 88 L. Ed. 2d 814, 823 (1986).

Under California law, joint trials are the rule and severance is the exception.

Controlling federal law does not dictate a different result. Accordingly, this Court finds

that the trial court was well within its discretion to order a joint trial for Petitioner and

his co-defendants. Further, under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

“a district court should only grant a severance if there is a serous risk that a joint trial

would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury

from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Such a risk might occur

when evidence that the jury should not consider against a defendant and that would not

be admissible if a defendant were tried alone is admitted against a co-defendant.”

Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. Here, notwithstanding the conflicting defenses of codefendants, the joint trial did not raise such a risk that would either compromise a

specific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about

Petitioner’s guilt or innocence. Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish any basis for his

claims that the joint trial deprived him of due process or that the trial court’s decision

was objectively unreasonable. 

Petitioner claims that his constitutional freedom from self-incrimination was

violated when the prosecution commented that he did not testify. It is improper for a

prosecutor to ask the jury to treat a defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt. Griffin v.

California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106,110 (1965).

When the issue of whether a Griffin error occurred during the closing arguments

was raised during the trial, the trial court ruled: 

While it may to some extent constitute Griffin error, I’m going to find

that this is what constitutes an indirect, mild reference. Because at the point

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Order – Page 10 of 12

in time [the prosecutor] made that comment, he didn’t suggest in any manner

that the jury can infer that Mr. Nguyen was guilty based on his failure to ...

testify. Um, I am gonna admonish the jury to disregard that. And, furthermore, um, I don’t think that through this trial that [the prosecutor] has

engaged in a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infected the trial or

infected [Petitioner] or anyone else’s trial with such unfairness as to makemake it so that any of these defendant were denied due process. 

The prosecutor has the right to comment on the state of the evidence or on the

defendant’s failure to introduce material evidence. United States v. Robinson, 485

U.S. 25, 32, 108 S. Ct. 864, 869, 99 L. Ed. 2d 23, 31 (1988). When the

prosecutor, on his own initiative, asks the jury to draw an adverse inference from

a defendant’s silence, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated.

Robinson, 485 U.S. at 32. On the other hand, when the prosecutor’s reference to

the defendant’s opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made by the

defense, there is no violation. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 32.

Under controlling federal law, there is no violation of the privilege against

self-incrimination if a prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s opportunity to testify

is a fair response to a defense claim. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 31. Here, the defense

argued that John’s statement that the group went to the party for gang purposes was

not supported by any of the participants. As a result, the prosecutor, after

commenting about the co-defendants, stated that he could not call Petitioner to the

stand. The prosecutor’s statement was a fair response to the defense’s claim and the

prosecutor did not suggest the jury should infer guilt from the failure to testify.

Thus, this Court finds that no error occurred. 

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial

after the jury was inadvertently given evidence of John stating that Petitioner had

been “on the run” for “murder”. Specifically, during the trial, a transcript of John’s

videotaped police interview was given to the jurors, and, during John’s testimony,

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Order – Page 11 of 12

portions of the videotape were played for the jury. During cross-examination of

John, Bruce’s lawyers asked if Boy told John that he (Boy) was “on the run for a

murder.” John said, “Yes”. Petitioner’s attorney moved for a mistrial, arguing that

the jury had been given an unredacted transcript of John’s police interview which

included John’s statement. The failure to redact violated the court’s in limine ruling

that there would be no mention of Petitioner being on the run or being on parole.

The trial court denied the mistrial motion but said that it “agree(d) that the jury

heard evidence the Court ruled as inadmissible” and would admonish the jury. The

trial court, then, ordered redaction of the tape and transcript and admonished the

jury.

The state appellate court’s reliance on a procedural rule operates as a

procedural bar to federal review of this claim. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594, 115 L. Ed. 2d 706, 716 (1991). The Ninth Circuit has

held that California’s “contemporaneous objection rule” is an adequate procedural

bar. Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, federal

courts cannot consider whether a state court properly applied its default rule to the

Petitioner’s facts. Further, federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless Petitioner is able to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or

cause and actual prejudice to excuse his default of the claim. Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 748, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2564, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640, 668 (1991).

Petitioner has not made this showing. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim fails. 

Petitioner, further, claims that the trial court should have granted a mistrial

because of the admission of John’s statements. As outlined above, federal courts do

not review questions of state law. Furthermore, juries are presumed to follow

instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S. Ct. 727, 733, 145 L.

Ed. 2d 727, 738 (2000). Although the jury did receive the unredacted transcript of

John’s police interview, the trial court admonished the jury not to consider the

portion of the interview with the statement that Petitioner was on parole or

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Order – Page 12 of 12

probation. Accordingly, this Court presumes that the jury followed the trial court’s

admonishment not to consider the inadmissible evidence. Moreover, because John’s

actual testimony was that Boy, not Petitioner, was “on the run for murder” the

admission of John’s statements did not fatally infect the proceedings, as to deprive

Petitioner of a fair trial. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish that the trial

court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. 

Petitioner challenges the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges on the

impermissible basis of race and gender. Specifically, Petitioner claims that the

prosecutor systematically exercised peremptory challenges to remove minority

prospective jurors. Because Petitioner did not raise the claim relating to peremptory

challenges on direct appeal, he did not exhaust this claim. The exhaustion of

available state judicial remedies is, ordinarily, a prerequisite to obtaining federal

habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 509, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438, 438 (1971). Regardless, Petitioner’s

claim did not establish that the trial court erred. Accordingly, this claim must be

denied. 

After reviewing all of Petitioner’s contentions, this Court concludes there is

no cumulative error warranting federal habeas relief. 

It is Ordered that the petition be, and hereby is, Denied.

Date: December 20, 2012

_________________________________

Terry J. Hatter, Jr.

Senior United States District Judge

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