Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01600/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01600-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The court also directed service by the United States Marshal service on defendant 1

Myers; however, it does not appear that defendant Myers was ever served as no waiver was

executed and the summons for defendant Myer has not been returned unexecuted. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS CLINTON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1600 LKK CMK P

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil rights

action against various employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR). This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local

Rule 72-302(b)(21) on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Arbini, Barnes, Barrientos,

Cooper, Deforest, Desantis, Dixon, Hickman, Marshall, Mullin, Pomazal, Prosper, Rice, Riley,

Sherer, Tripp, Wilson, and Woodford. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b). 1

///

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I. Background

At all times relevant to the events described in this complaint, plaintiff was an

inmate at California Correctional Center (CCC) in Susanville, California. Plaintiff alleges that

he was sexually assaulted by another inmate on November 24, 2004. He states that he reported

the assault. After the assault, plaintiff was removed from CCC and placed in administrative

segregation for his own protection. Plaintiff states that a confidential memorandum containing

details of the assault was released into the general prison population, further endangering his

safety and further necessitating housing in administrative segregation. Plaintiff was later

transferred to the California Mens Colony in San Luis Obispo. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical care after the alleged assault and

alleges that he was retaliated against for reporting the assault. He claims that correctional staff

should have allowed him to continue to receive two-for-one credits even after being removed

from his prison job. He claims that the denial of these credits resulted in him being incarcerated

nine months longer than he otherwise would have been. 

II. Discussion

Defendants Arbini, Barnes, Barrientos, Cooper, Deforest, Desantis, Dixon,

Hickman, Marshall, Mullin, Pomazal, Prosper, Rice, Riley, Sherer, Tripp, Wilson, and Woodford

move for dismissal of this action on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to some of the causes of action in his complaint and because plaintiff

fails to state a cognizable claim against defendants Sherer, Tripp, Mullin, Prosper, Mashall,

Arbini, Wilson, Barrientos, Deforest, Woodford, and Hickman. 

A. Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies

By the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), enacted on April 26,

1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

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remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

The exhaustion of prison administrative procedures is mandated “regardless of the

relief offered through [such] procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); see also,

Woodford v. Ngo, __U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006). In order to exhaust administrative

remedies, the prisoner must comply with all of the prison system’s procedural rules and that

partial compliance is not enough. See Woodford, ___U.S. at__, 126 S.Ct. at 2385-88. The

United States Supreme Court has cautioned that it “will not read futility or other exceptions into

statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided otherwise.” Booth at 741 n.6. 

The Court has also ruled that the exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison

life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). An individual

named as a defendant does not necessarily need to be named in the grievance process for

exhaustion to be considered adequate because the applicable procedural rules that a prisoner must

follow are defined by the particular grievance process, not by the PLRA, and the PLRA does not

require dismissal of the entire complaint if only some, but not all, claims are unexhausted. See 

Jones v. Bock, __ U.S.__, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007).

In California, the state regulations that govern grievance procedures in state jails

and prisons provide that inmates “may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or

policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). An administrative appeal may progress from an informal review

through three formal levels of review. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5. A decision at the

third formal level, which is also referred to as the director’s level, is not appealable and concludes

a prisoner’s departmental administrative remedy. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a) and

3084.5(e)(2). Departmental appeals coordinators may summarily deny a prisoner’s untimely

administrative appeal. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.3(c)(6) and 3084.6(c). To comply with

the PLRA exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner in California must file an inmate appeal on

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each claim concerning prison conditions or events and must proceed to the highest level of

 administrative review available to him before he seeks judicial relief, regardless of the relief

desired by the prisoner. A court is required to dismiss , without prejudice, an action involving

prison conditions where the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit,

even if he was in the process of doing so when the suit was filed. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Ninth Circuit has long held, and the Supreme Court of the United States has

recently stated, that lack of exhaustion is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and

proved by the defendants. See Jones v. Bock, __ U.S.__, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007); Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 n.9 & 1119 n.13 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 2003).

Here, defendants assert that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies with respect to his second, third, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth,

sixteenth, seventeenth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-sixth causes of action. 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that defendant DeSantis prevented him

from receiving medical care by failing to inform medical personnel that plaintiff had alleged he

was the victim of a sexual assault. Defendants have presented evidence that plaintiff never filed

an administrative appeal regarding this issue. 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that defendant Barnes denied him adequate

medical care by falsifying a CDCR 7219 form and not summoning a doctor to perform a rape

examination. Defendants have presented evidence that plaintiff never filed an administrative

appeal regarding this issue. 

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is that defendant Riley denied him medical care by

failing to ensure that plaintiff received medical attention despite knowing that plaintiff required

such. Defendants have presented evidence that plaintiff never filed an administrative appeal

regarding this issue.

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action alleges that defendant Mullin denied him

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medical care and endorsed defendant Tripp’s retaliatory action. Those include a denial of

plaintiff’s two-for-one credits and denial of heat or protection from cold in his cell. Defendants

have presented evidence that plaintiff never filed an administrative appeal regarding this issue.

Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action alleges that defendant Dixon retaliated against

him by refusing to allow him to move to a warmer cell, deliberately leaving a door open to allow

cold air into plaintiff’s cell, deliberately generating inaccurate documentation about the alleged

rape, publicizing the alleged rape, and not preserving evidence of the rape. Defendants have

presented evidence showing that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on this

issue.

Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action alleges, among other things, that defendant Prosper

retaliated against plaintiff by refusing to summon medical care for him. Defendants have

presented evidence showing that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on this

issue. 

Plaintiff’s thirteenth cause of action alleges that defendant Cooper withheld

plaintiff’s legal materials. Plaintiff claims to have filed a grievance regarding this issue, however

defendants have shown that there is no record of this appeal being filed or exhausted. Plaintiff

also alleges that defendant Cooper refused to comply with a doctor’s order to give plaintiff an

extra blanket and tennis shoes. Defendants have presented evidence that plaintiff never filed an

administrative grievance regarding the blanket or tennis shoes. 

Plaintiff’s fourteenth cause of action alleges that defendant Rice retaliated against 

plaintiff by depriving him of pain killer, denying him thermal clothing as protection against the

cold, denying him a thicker mattress, and refusing to investigate the whereabouts of his x-rays. 

Defendants have presented evidence that plaintiff never filed an administrative grievance

regarding these issues. 

Plaintiff’s sixteenth cause of action states that defendant Pomazal retaliated against

him by depriving him of pain killers, denying him thermal clothing as protection against the cold,

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denying him a thicker mattress, and refusing to investigate the whereabouts of his x-rays. 

Defendants have provided evidence that plaintiff never filed an administrative grievance

regarding these issues. 

Plaintiff’s seventeenth cause of action asserts that defendant DeForest retaliated

against him by writing a false CDCR form 1030 to discredit plaintiff, not giving him notice of an

adverse action at his February 2, 2005 classification hearing, and not informing medical personnel

that plaintiff needed medical attention. Plaintiff claims that defendant DeForest’s actions were

motivated by bias against plaintiff due to his sexual orientation. Defendants have presented

evidence showing that plaintiff did not file an administrative grievance regarding this issue. 

Plaintiff’s twenty-fifth cause of action alleges that defendants Woodford and

Hickman retaliated against him by ignoring communications from him indicating that he was

being retaliated against by other correctional personnel. Defendants have provided evidence

which shows that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative grievances regarding that issue. 

Defendants have proved that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies

as to the above listed claims by providing a declaration from the Correctional Case Records

Administrator, Marilyn Ouye and from the Inmate Appeals Coordinator at California Mens

Colony, D. Engler. (Doc. 60, Attch 1&2.) See Jones, __ U.S. at __, 127 S.Ct. 910; Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1117 n.9 & 1119 n.13. Defendants have also provided a copy of plaintiff’s filed prison

grievances. (Doc. 60, Attchs. 2 & 3.) 

In his opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff argues that “[CDCR]

staff deliberately did not allow plaintiff his administrative grievance system...” (Opp’n (Doc. 62-

1) at *2.) Plaintiff concedes that the PLRA is a “needed tool to provide prisoners the right to

appeal adverse actions.” However, he objects to the Supreme Court’s holding in Ngo, which

requires prisoners to properly exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. 62-1

at * 2-3.) He points out that while Ngo requires prisoners to comply with the PLRA, the case’s

holding does not address the times when prison staff fail to follow their own regulations and

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deliberately sabotage a prisoner’s appeals process. Plaintiff also argues that he “cannot be held

accountable for not knowing his rights” and that it was up to prison officials to inform plaintiff of

his rights and/or provide him with appeals forms if he did not know his rights or have such forms. 

(Doc. 62-1 at * 9-10, 15.) 

The court is sympathetic to plaintiff’s arguments, however, the Supreme Court was

very clear in Ngo about what proper exhaustion means. In Ngo, the respondent, who was an

incarcerated prisoner, argued that §1997e(a) meant “that a prisoner may not bring suit in federal

court until administrative remedies were no longer available.” Ngo, 126 S.Ct. at 2384. 

Petitioners, the state of California, argued that a prisoner “must complete the administrative

review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a

precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Id. The Supreme Court stated that respondent’s

interpretation of §1997e(a) would make the PLRA exhaustion requirements “wholly ineffective.”

Id. at 2388. The Court concluded that “[t]he benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the

prison grievance system is given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance. The prison

grievance system will not have such an opportunity unless the grievant complies with the

system’s critical procedural rules.” Id. 

To comply with the PLRA exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner in California

must file an inmate appeal on each claim concerning prison conditions or events and must

proceed to the highest level of administrative review available to him before he seeks judicial

relief, regardless of the relief desired by the prisoner. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In

other words, a critical procedural rule in California’s state prison grievance system is the filing of

an inmate appeal. 

Here, defendants have met their burden of showing that plaintiff failed to file an

administrative grievance with respect to his second, third, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, thirteenth,

fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-sixth causes of action. A review of

plaintiff’s central file reveals that plaintiff did not file any grievances which contained facts

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relating to the above listed causes of action. (Doc. 60, Attach. 3.) Instead, most of plaintiff’s

grievances concern his two-for-one credits. This court is bound by the Supreme Court’s decision

in Ngo, to dismiss claims which were not properly exhausted in the prison grievance system. 

Additionally, the court is not persuaded by plaintiff’s arguments that prison staff prevented him

from exhausting his administrative remedies because they did not advise plaintiff that he could

file a grievance and because staff did not provide him with grievance forms. 

The court finds that plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies, as

required under the PLRA, with respect to his second, third, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, thirteenth,

fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-sixth causes of action. Accordingly,

the court recommends that these causes of action be dismissed. 

B. Failure To State A Claim

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that

would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In considering a motion to dismiss under this

standard, the court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and must construe them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425

U.S. 738, 740 (1976); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 

All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

To determine whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,

the court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper

v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir.

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1994). The court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or

attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454;

(2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily

lies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice,

see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994), except prison regulations, see Anderson

v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

Finally, leave to amend a deficient complaint must be granted “. . . [u]nless it is

absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defects.” See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66

F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc).

In the instant action, plaintiff alleges that defendants Sherer, Tripp, Mullin,

Prosper, Marshall, Arbini, Wilson, Barrientos, Woodford, and Hickman violated his civil rights

by not giving him the two-for-one credits he had been earning before the alleged sexual assault of

November 24, 2004. Worktime credits are governed by California Penal Code section 2933. 

Subdivision (b) of that section states “[w]orktime credit is a privilege, not a right.” It also states

that worktime credits must be earned. The Ninth Circuit has held that section 2933 does not

create a liberty interest in worktime credits that is cognizable under the Due Process Clause. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1986). In light of Toussaint, the court

finds that plaintiff has no due process right to his two-for-one credits. Because plaintiff has no

due process rights to his good time credits, his complaint amounts to a criticism of the manner in

which state officials have applied state law. Under the Eleventh Amendment, the federal courts

have no jurisdiction to hear such claims. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,

456 U.S. 89, 117 (1984). 

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for

deprivation of his two-for-one credits. 

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In plaintiff’s first cause of action, he alleges that his rights were violated when

Defendant Sherer allegedly ordered him to sign a chrono stating that he and another inmate were

not enemies, threatening to remove plaintiff from camp if he did not do so. Plaintiff signed the

chrono, but alleges he was removed from camp and retaliated against anyway. However,

nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff allege that defendant Sherer removed him from the camp

or retaliated against him, nor does he allege that the allegedly false chrono was relied upon by

other staff members in deciding whether to remove plaintiff from camp. 

A plaintiff must connect the named defendants clearly with the claimed denial of

his rights. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 843 (1994) (official’s liability for deliberate

indifference to assault requires that official know of and disregard an “excessive risk”); Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“liability under section 1983 arises only upon a

showing of personal participation by the defendant (citation omitted) . . . [t]here is no respondeat

superior liability under section 1983.”); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.3d 740, 743-44 (9 Cir. 1978) th

(discussing “requisite causal connection” in section 1983 cases between named defendant and

claimed injury); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 1154 (1999) ("A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an

individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights."). 

Here, the court cannot determine what role, if any, defendant Sherer played in the

alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. Accordingly, the court recommends that plaintiff’s first

cause of action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

Plaintiff’s seventeenth cause of action states that defendant DeForest violated his

due process rights by not giving him prior notice of an adverse action by February 2

classification; however, plaintiff does not specify the nature of the adverse action, nor does he

allege the invasion of a liberty interest. To the extent that plaintiff is challenging a classification,

he fails to state a cognizable claim. An inmate does not have a constitutional right to any

particular classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Hernandez v. Johnston,

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833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987). Alleged deprivations of rights arising from prison officials’

housing and classification decisions do not give rise to a federal constitutional claim encompassed

by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). 

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff’s seventeenth cause of action regarding his February 2

classification fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action alleges that defendant Prosper retaliated against

him by falsifying the date on an administrative appeal log and falsely stating in her decision of

that appeal that she had throughly reviewed the matter. Generally, the falsification of disciplinary

reports or documents will not state a claim under the civil rights act if the inmate receives a

hearing and is able to challenge the reports. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d

Cir.2002). However, if the falsification interferes with the hearing process itself, the use of such

documents may state a claim under the civil rights act. See Id. at 653-54 n. 10. A review of

plaintiff’s ninth cause of action reveals that he alleges that defendant Prosper violated his civil

rights by allegedly falsifying the date that a 602 appeal was returned to plaintiff because he, and

his central file, were transferred. Accordingly, there is no indication that the alleged falsification

interfered with the appeals process, and the court finds that plaintiff fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. 

To the extent that plaintiff argues that defendant Prosper failed to throughly review

his appeal, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Ninth Circuit has stated

that inmates have no legitimate claim of entitlement to a prison grievance procedure. See Mann

v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

III. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. The motion to dismiss (doc. 60) filed by defendants Arbini, Barnes, Barrientos,

Cooper, Deforest, Desantis, Dixon, Hickman, Marshall, Mullin, Pomazal, Prosper, Rice, Riley,

Sherer, Tripp, Wilson, and Woodford be granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

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Other causes of action in plaintiff’s complaint were dismissed during the screening 2

process for failure to state a claim. (Docs. 36 & 49). 

12

and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

2. This action be dismissed in its entirety as to the above mentioned defendants

only. 

2

3. This action shall proceed as to the causes of action against defendant Myers. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 7, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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