Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01391/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01391-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTONIO J. BARRAGAN, 

CDCR #BA-2038, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

CAPTAIN D. FLYNN, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:16-cv-1391-MMA-JMA 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[Doc. No. 25] 

 

 Plaintiff Antonio J. Barragan, previously detained at San Diego County Jail and 

proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging Defendant San Diego Sheriff’s Department Captain D. Flynn1

 denied him proper 

medical attention by “ignoring” his pain and need for shoulder surgery in violation of the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Doc. No. 1. Defendant Flynn moves for 

summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim. See Doc. No. 25. To date, Plaintiff has not 

                                               

1

 Plaintiff also names an “unidentified medical officer” in his complaint. This doe defendant has not 

been named or served. 

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filed a response to Defendant’s motion. The Court took the motion under submission on 

the moving papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 

BACKGROUND2

 Plaintiff claims that on April 26, 2015, he was involved in a physical altercation 

with a fellow inmate at San Diego County Jail. See Doc. No. 1-2 at 6.3

 Plaintiff suffered 

injuries during the altercation. Id. Plaintiff testified that he was taken to the jail medical 

unit after the altercation, where he was treated for cuts and abrasions, and examined for a 

possible concussion. See Doc. No. 25-3 at 2. Several days later, Plaintiff requested 

medical attention due to pain in his shoulders. See Doc. No. 25-4 at 11-12. Plaintiff was 

offered pain medication, but at various times he declined to take the recommended 

medication. Id. at 27. Plaintiff saw a doctor, who placed Plaintiff on the “ortho list” 

based on a suspected torn rotator cuff. Id. at 16. Plaintiff received cortisone injections 

and physical therapy several times. Id. Six or seven months later, Plaintiff saw a surgeon 

who ordered an MRI scan of Plaintiff’s shoulder. Id. at 20. Plaintiff ultimately advised 

the surgeon that a previously administered steroid injection was not sufficient for the 

pain, and surgery was necessary. Id. Plaintiff’s surgery was scheduled, however, 

Plaintiff was transferred to another institution and he never received the surgery. Id. 

During his time at San Diego County Jail, Plaintiff’s only contact with Defendant Flynn 

was when he asked Flynn a question about something unrelated to his injuries. Id. at 10. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 “A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or 

the part of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought. The court 

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

                                               

2

 These facts are taken primarily from Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which the Court cross-referenced 

with the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s unverified complaint. 

3

 Citations refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system. 

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any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A dispute about a 

material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a 

verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the 

basis of its motion and of identifying the portions of the declarations, pleadings, and 

discovery that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party does not bear the burden of 

proof at trial, he may discharge his burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact 

remains by demonstrating that “there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party’s case.” Id. at 325. The burden then shifts to the opposing party to provide 

admissible evidence beyond the pleadings to show that summary judgment is not 

appropriate. Id. at 324. The party opposing summary judgment cannot “rest upon the 

mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading but must instead produce evidence that sets 

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Estate of Tucker v. 

Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 827 (2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

In applying the standard set forth under Rule 56, district courts must “construe 

liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and . . . avoid applying 

summary judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 

2010). A court must consider as evidence in opposition to summary judgment all 

contentions “offered in motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on 

personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and where 

[the party appearing pro se] attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the 

motions or pleadings are true and correct.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 

2004). However, neither an unverified complaint nor unsworn statements made in the 

parties’ briefs can be considered as evidence at this stage. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 

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759 & n. 16 (9th Cir. 2006) (unverified complaint cannot be considered as evidence on 

motion for summary judgment). 

DISCUSSION

Defendant Flynn moves for summary judgment based on the lack of any evidence 

to demonstrate that he personally participated in the allegedly unlawful acts at issue in 

this case. As such, Defendant argues that no reasonable trier of fact could find that he 

was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs in violation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. 

To succeed on a claim for deficient medical care, a plaintiff must show “deliberate 

indifference” to his or her “serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976) (setting forth legal standard under the Eighth Amendment).4

 This includes “both 

an objective standard – that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment – and a subjective standard – deliberate indifference.” Snow v. 

McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (overruled in part on other grounds by

Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Deliberate indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay or 

intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which 

prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 

(9th Cir. 1988). A prison official is deliberately indifferent whenever the official “knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1187 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires more than mere 

misdiagnosis, medical malpractice, or even gross negligence. Wood v. Housewright, 900 

F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). 

                                               

4

 Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time in question, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant 

Flynn arises under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause. See Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra 

Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242-44 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference standard applies. Id. at 1244. 

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a) Serious Medical Need 

Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he suffered some serious injury to at 

least one of his shoulders while incarcerated at San Diego County Jail. Defendant Flynn 

offers no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff had a 

serious medical need. 

b) Deliberate Indifference 

Plaintiff claims generally that he received deficient medical care for his shoulder 

during his period of incarceration at San Diego County Jail. Plaintiff’s sole specific 

allegation against Defendant Flynn is that he “ignored” the surgeon’s recommendation 

that Plaintiff needed surgery to repair Plaintiff’s shoulder injury. Doc. No. 1-2 at 1. 

Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony contradicts this allegation. First, Plaintiff 

testified that his only contact with Defendant Flynn was when he asked Flynn a question 

about something unrelated to his injuries. See Doc. No. 25-4 at 10. There is no evidence 

in the record to suggest that Defendant knew of Plaintiff’s medical condition, or was 

personally involved with Plaintiff’s medical treatment. Moreover, absent any personal 

participation, Defendant Flynn may not be held liable for the actions of subordinate 

correctional or medical personnel. See Maxwell v. Cty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 

1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)) (“A 

supervisor is liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s constitutional violations ‘if the 

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed 

to act to prevent them.’”). 

Second, Plaintiff testified that after he informed the surgeon that surgery was 

necessary, the surgery was in fact scheduled. See Doc. No. 25-4 at 16. Plaintiff did not 

undergo surgery because he was transferred to another institution. Id. There is no 

evidence in the record to suggest that any correctional or medical personnel at San Diego 

County Jail “ignored” Plaintiff’s need for surgery, much less that Defendant Flynn had 

any personal involvement in these events. To the contrary, Plaintiff testified that he 

received ongoing medical treatment while housed at the jail. Any disagreement with the 

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prescribed treatment and medication is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. 

See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding “[a] difference of 

opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment 

does not give rise to a § 1983 claim”). 

Finally, Plaintiff claims that the medical treatment for his shoulders was 

unreasonably delayed. A delay in providing medical care may manifest deliberate 

indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. Here, a period of months passed before a

surgeon examined Plaintiff, an MRI was performed, and surgery was scheduled. 

However, there are no facts in the record to suggest that Defendant Flynn had any 

involvement in the timing or scheduling of Plaintiff’s medical appointments. The initial 

misdiagnosis of a torn rotator cuff likely contributed to the delay. But even if grossly 

negligent, the misdiagnosis is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference, particularly 

against Defendant Flynn, who appears to have played no role in Plaintiff’s medical care. 

Id. at 106. 

In sum, Defendant Flynn has met his burden of showing a complete “absence of 

evidence to support” Plaintiff’s claim against him. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. As 

such, no reasonable trier of fact could find Defendant liable for Plaintiff’s injuries, and 

judgment in Defendant’s favor is appropriate. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims in this action. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter 

judgment in favor of Defendant, and close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: November 3, 2017 _______________________________________

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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