Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00234/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00234-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WENDELL W. CUMMINS, Case No. 07-cv-00234 TAG

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL

vs. FROM ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO 

Commissioner of Social Security, ENTER JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 

WENDELL W. CUMMINS AND AGAINST

Defendant. DEFENDANT MICHAEL J. ASTRUE

AND TO CLOSE THIS CASE

 

 /

Plaintiff Wendell W. Cummins (“Plaintiff” or “Claimant”) seeks judicial review of an

administrative decision denying his claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. Pending

before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (“Commissioner”). Plaintiff filed his complaint on February 28, 2007 (Doc. 1), and his

opening brief on October 25, 2007. (Doc. 20). The Commissioner filed his opposition to the appeal

on November 15, 2007. (Doc. 22). On December 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed his reply brief. (Doc. 23).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, the parties consented

to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge, and, by an order dated April 3, 2007, this action

was assigned to the United States Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings. (Doc. 14). 

JURISDICTION

On June 4, 2003, Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB and SSI, alleging an onset date of June 4,

1999. (AR 420). On June 10, 2003, Plaintiff filed separate applications for DIB and SSI

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 It appears that Plaintiff signed part or all of his DIB application on June 2, 2003, and the state agency received 1

and filed it on June 10, 2003. (AR 67, 70). In his DIB application, Plaintiff alleged an onset date of November 2001. 

(AR 67). 

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(collectively, “the applications”), which were treated as concurrent cases. (AR 67-70, 421-424; see

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e.g., AR 34, 425). Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (AR 23-41,

42-45, 48-52, 425, 426).

After timely requesting a hearing, Plaintiff, his mother, and his counsel appeared before

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) James P. Berry on March 21, 2006. (AR 53, 427-452). On May

25, 2006, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 10-55). The

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on December 29, 2006. (AR 5-7). The

Appeals Council’s decision, therefore, became the final decision of the Commissioner, which is

appealable to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The initiation of an appeal in the

district court must be commenced within sixty (60) days of the Appeal Council’s decision. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On March 7, 2006, Plaintiff timely filed this action. (Doc. 1).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts have been presented in the administrative hearing transcript, the ALJ’s decision, 

and the briefs filed by Plaintiff and the Commissioner, and, therefore, will only be summarized here. 

In his DIB and SSI applications, Plaintiff alleged that he could not work because he suffered from

epileptic grand mal seizures and an enlarged heart. (AR 67, 421). 

At the March 21, 2006 hearing, Plaintiff testified that he was born in 1956, making him

49 years old at the time of the hearing and 50 years old when the ALJ issued his decision. (AR 430-

431). Plaintiff testified that he completed a class in vocational mechanics after graduating from high

school, but has not worked as a mechanic. (AR 431-432). Plaintiff testified that he received Social

Security disability benefits for epilepsy from 1980 to 1998, but did not remember why he stopped

receiving such benefits. (AR 433). He testified that he lived with his parents and had no current

source of income. (AR 430-431). 

Regarding his work history, Plaintiff testified that he has held two jobs in the last fifteen

years. (AR 433). He testified that his last job was a full-time security guard, which he held for nine

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 Although Quinine Sulfate is prescribed to treat and prevent nocturnal recumbency leg cramps, the FDA has

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not approved its use for this purpose. The medication is approved as an alternative treatment for malaria. See

http://www.drugs.com/ppa/quinine-sulfate.html, visited on September 10, 2008. 

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months from approximately March to November 2000. (AR 432). Plaintiff’ described his security

duties as driving to approximately ten leases, “checking on them and making sure that there was

nobody present that wasn’t supposed to be there.” (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he was terminated

because he lost his drivers’ license after overdosing on his medication. (Id.). Plaintiff also testified

that prior to his position as a security guard, he obtained a job through a friend in a rental tool

company, where he operated pipe cleaning equipment. (AR 432-433). According to Plaintiff, he

lost his job at the rental tool company after his friend’s job there was terminated. (AR 433). 

Regarding his medical impairments, Plaintiff testified that he could not work because he

suffers from epileptic seizures, arthritic pain in his back, hips, knees, joints, toes, elbows, shoulders,

and fingers, and failing memory. (AR 434). He added he was diagnosed as suffering from carpal

tunnel syndrome and advised to see a primary care physician. (AR 435). Plaintiff testified that he

has a congenital hole in his heart, which prevents sufficient oxygen from reaching his heart, prevents

him from exercising “like a normal person,” and causes him to turn blue and feel dizzy. (AR 435-

436). Plaintiff further testified that he has a stent in one of his cardiac arteries, cannot walk sixty feet

without becoming short of breath, suffers from acid reflux disease, and has daily headaches. (AR

436-438). 

According to Plaintiff, the medications prescribed for his seizures are Tegretol, Keppra, and

Dilantin, which were prescribed by his treating physician, Dr. Panata. (AR 437). Plaintiff also

testified that he takes Quinine Sulfate for his arm and leg cramps, which occur when he stands or 2

uses his arms for a long time. (AR 434-435). He explained that he frequently uses an Albuteral

inhaler to alleviate his shortness of breath. (AR 436). Plaintiff’s doctor told him to take one aspirin

daily, but he can take more when he has a headache. (AR 437-438). Plaintiff reported that, although

he takes his medicine as prescribed, he had a seizure as recently as four weeks earlier. (AR 437,

443). Plaintiff further testified that he does not presently take any pain medicine, but recently saw a

doctor and hoped the doctor would prescribe said medication at his follow-up appointment. (AR

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434). When questioned about the side-effects of his medications, Plaintiff reported that his

prescribed seizure medications cause him to feel dizzy and tired. (AR 437). He added that his loss

of memory and the feeling that his “head just doesn’t feel right” started when he began taking his

medications. (AR 438). Plaintiff complained that, at the same time, he began to feel as though he

was losing his balance when walking. (AR 439). Overall, he stated that his condition had worsened

in the past two years due to the increase in his medications. (AR 442-443).

As to Plaintiff’s exertional capabilities, although it is not clear to what extent his limitations

stem from the side effects of his medications, cannot walk sixty feet without becoming short of

breath cannot walk sixty feet without becoming short of breath (AR 439). He stated that he cannot

walk very far due to his shortness of breath and his medicine-related loss of balance. (Id. ). Plaintiff

further testified that he cannot sit for more than thirty minutes due to his back pain. (AR 440). In

addition, he has problems gripping with both hands that severely affects his ability to hold anything. 

(Id.). Plaintiff testified that he is unable to lift more than five pounds because his hips start to hurt. 

(Id.). He added that he cannot bend over to pick up or put down objects, but can carry the objects

when he is standing. (Id.). Plaintiff reported that he is uncomfortable in any position and does not

sleep well. (AR 441). 

With respect to Plaintiff’s daily activities, he testified that, if he needs to go anywhere, he

takes the bus. (AR 441). Plaintiff further testified that he generally stays at home and watches

television shows. (Id.). When questioned further about how he spends his time, Plaintiff testified

that he tries to read to pass the time, but forgets a lot of what he reads. (AR 442). Plaintiff stated

that he tries to help his mother with household chores, such as vacuuming, and mows the lawn once

in a while, but then explained that he “ha[sn]’t done it for quite a while” because he has “been really

busy and [his] legs have been hurting.” (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he has no hobbies and, since he

moved in with his parents, he no longer has friends with whom he can socialize. (Id.).

Clara Cummins (“Ms. Cummins”), Plaintiff’s mother, testified that Plaintiff had lived with

her for ten years. (AR 444). Ms. Cummins added that Plaintiff had seizures, and she witnessed his

last one about four weeks before the hearing. (AR 444-445). Ms. Cummins testified that Plaintiff

suffers light seizures “maybe once every two months” and that he during a seizure, he often stumbles

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but does not often fall. (AR 445-446). Ms. Cummins testified that Plaintiff takes his medication as

prescribed, but has also forgotten to take his medication “once in a while.” (AR 446). Ms. Cummins

testified that she thinks Plaintiff’s medicine causes him to have blurred vision because he shakes his

head while reading, stating that his eyes are not focusing or he has blurred vision. (AR 446-447). 

Ms. Cummins testified that Plaintiff suffers headaches and has a heart condition. (AR 447). She

testified that when Plaintiff was fifteen years old, he was involved in a car accident during which he

hit his head and remained unconscious for twenty-one days. (AR 447-448). According to Ms.

Cummins, Plaintiff then underwent therapy to learn to talk, eat, and move, and has had ongoing

problems with his hands as a result of the accident. (AR 448). Ms. Cummins opined that Plaintiff’s

condition has worsened over the years. (AR 449). 

Vocational expert Kenneth Ferra (“VE”) also testified at the administrative hearing. (AR

449-451). The ALJ asked the VE two hypothetical questions. His first question was whether a 49-

year-old individual with a 12th grade education and past relevant experience as a pipe cleaner and a

security guard, who had multiple severe impairments and a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

lift and carry twenty (20) pounds occasionally; ten (10) pounds frequently; stand, walk, and sit for six

(6) hours; and must avoid exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery, could

perform either of Plaintiff’s past work. (AR 450) The VE responded that the individual would be

able to perform the security guard job, which was light and semi-skilled work. (Id.). The VE added

that, if the ALJ considered the security guard’s required driving as “exposure to dangerous moving

machinery,” the individual would not be capable of performing the job, adding that he did not

categorize the driving as involving that exposure. (AR 450-451). 

The ALJ’s second hypothetical question to the VE was whether an individual with the same

age, education, combination of impairments, and past relevant work history, who had the RFC to lift

and carry five (5) pounds; stand, walk, and sit less than two (2) hours; had problems bending,

gripping, and grasping; became dizzy after taking his medications; and found it difficulty to

remember recent and remote facts, could perform either of Plaintiff’s ’s past jobs. (AR 451). The

VE testified that, with these limitations, the individual would not be able to perform Plaintiff’s past

relevant work or any other job. (Id.). 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s decision. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits, made

through an ALJ, when the decision is based on the proper legal standards and is supported by

substantial evidence. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is

more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-

602 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Webb, 433 F.3d at 686, citing Richardson v. Perales,

402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971). Moreover, such “inferences and conclusions as the

[Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence” are accorded the same consideration as is

substantial evidence as defined above. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On

review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of

the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation and citation

omitted).

It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson,

402 U.S. at 400, 91 S.Ct. at 1426-1427. If the evidence supports more than one rational

interpretation, the Court must uphold the decision of the ALJ. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579

(9th Cir. 1984). Moreover, if there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or

if there is conflicting evidence that would support a finding of either disability or non-disability, the

Commissioner’s decision is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir.

1987). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal

standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary

of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987).

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides

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that a Plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if her impairments are of such

severity that the Plaintiff is not only unable to perform her previous work but cannot, considering

Plaintiff’s age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

Sequential Evaluation Process

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining

whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines if he is engaged

in substantial gainful activities. If he is, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). 

If he is not, the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether Plaintiff has a

medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).

If the Plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the

disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step,

which compares Plaintiff’s impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the

Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),

416.920(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed

impairments, the Plaintiff is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one

conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines

whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing work performed in the past. If the

claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),

416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform this work, the fifth and final step in the process

determines whether he is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age,

education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482

U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 2287 (1987).

The initial burden of proof rests upon a claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement

to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971). In terms of the fivestep sequential evaluation process, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he burden of proof is on the

claimant as to steps one to four,” while at the same time noting that an ALJ’s “affirmative duty to

assist a claimant to develop the record . . . complicates the allocation of burdens” such that “the ALJ

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 AR 97-4(9) was adopted in response to Chavez v. Brown, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988), and explains how the 3

holding in Chavez is to be applied, noting that it is applicable only to 9th Circuit cases. See AR 97-4(9), 1997 WL

742748. Acquiescence Rulings “are binding on all components of the Social Security Administration,” and accorded

deference by a reviewing court. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b); McNabb v. Barnhart 340 F.3d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 2003).

 The ALJ also determined that, based on Claimant’s earnings, he was insured through March 31, 2005. 4

 A diagnosis of cardiomyopathy is used to describe a disease of the myocardium (the middle layer of the heart 5

consisting of cardiac muscle) of unknown etiology. 

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shares the burden at each step.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (italics

in original). The initial burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental

impairment prevents him from engaging in his previous occupation. The burden then shifts to the

Commissioner to show (1) that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful activity and

(2) that a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” which claimant can perform. 

Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984).

ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS

As an initial matter, ALJ Berry noted that Plaintiff previously collected disability benefits but

did not adjudicate the agency’s decision to stop paying him benefits. (AR 12). Accordingly,

Acquiescence Ruling (“AR”) 97-4(9) applied, which required the ALJ to apply a presumption of 3

continuing non-disability from February 21, 1999 through the date of his decision unless Plaintiff 

rebutted the presumption with evidence of “changed circumstances.” (AR 12-13). Because

Plaintiff’s age category changed, and he produced evidence that altered his RFC, the ALJ concluded

that Plaintiff rebutted the presumption of non-disability. (AR 12-13); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 4

and 416.963. 

At step one, the ALJ found that, during the time relevant to his decision, Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity. (AR 15). At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

suffered from a seizure disorder and cardiomyopathy, which were severe impairments. (Id.). 5

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that were among those acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to

preclude substantial gainful activity, and, therefore, he did not meet or equal a listing under

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Id.). 

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ALJ Berry determined that there was no medical indication that Claimant’s seizures resulted

from “factors beyond his control or to noncompliance with prescribed therapy.” (Id.). The ALJ

further found that the medical evidence showed that Claimant’s heart-related problems did not

preclude him from engaging in physical activity and that his chest pain appeared to be the result of

esophagitis due to gastroesophageal reflux disease rather than to his heart condition. (Id.). 

The ALJ ascertained that Claimant retained the RFC to lift and carry twenty pounds

occasionally and ten pounds frequently and to sit, stand, and/or walk for six hours daily, but that he

must avoid exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery. (AR 17). ALJ Berry 

found that Claimant’s impairments could cause the symptoms to which he testified, but that the

record is inconsistent with Claimant’s allegations regarding the intensity, limitations, and duration of

the symptoms. (AR 17-18). The ALJ further noted that Claimant’s daily activities as set forth in

written reports indicate that his symptoms were not as limiting as he alleged. (AR 18; see AR 97-

101). ALJ Berry stated that he afforded great weight to the opinion of Claimant’s treating physician,

who reported that Claimant could work with some restrictions, and controlling weight to the opinion

of the state agency medical consultants, who opined that Claimant was able to work with seizurerelated precautions. (AR 18). 

At step four, ALJ Berry, relying on the testimony of VE Ferra, found that Claimant could

return to his past relevant work as a security guard. (AR 18). The ALJ noted that, according to the

Dictionary of Occupation Titles (“DOT”), this job is considered semi-skilled, light work, which,

given Claimant’s RFC, he could perform. (AR 18-19). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that

Claimant was not disabled and, thus, not eligible for benefits under Title II or Title XVI of the Act. 

(AR 19).

ISSUES

 Plaintiff’s opening brief presents a single issue: whether the ALJ properly assessed the

evidence regarding Plaintiff’s orthopedic complaints. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly assess his testimony and the medical evidence 

regarding his orthopedic complaints, including arthritic pain in his back, hips, knees, joints, toes,

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elbows, shoulder, and fingers, arm cramps, balance difficulties, and difficulties bending, gripping,

and lifting, and instead addressed only Plaintiff’s seizure and cardiac disorders. (Doc. 20, pp. 3-6). 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in discounting his testimony regarding the pain and limitations

he suffered, despite objective medical evidence proving that he had underlying impairments that

could cause pain and prevent him from working. (Doc. 20, pp. 4-6; Doc. 23, p. 5). Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ ignored his treating physicians’ notes reporting Plaintiff’s complaints and/or

history of low back pain, degenerative joint disease, arthritis pain, headaches, spinal stenosis, and

carpal tunnel syndrome. (Doc. 20, pp. 4-6). He argues that his subjective complaints should not 

have been ignored or discounted because they are supported by objective medical evidence, 

including CT scans of the lumbar spine and brain, a pulmonary function test, and an EEG and nerve

conduction study. (Doc. 20, pp. 5-6). Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed, as a matter of law, to

provide a “clear and convincing rationale” that explained why he discounted the testimony regarding

his orthopedic impairments, which were supported by the medical record, and, accordingly, a remand

was required for the payment of benefits or a new hearing. (Id. at 6; Doc. 23 at 5-6). 

A. Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred when he rejected Plaintiff’s testimony about his symptoms

and subjective limitations. 

A two step analysis applies at the administrative level when considering a claimant’s

credibility. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). First, the claimant must produce

objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some

degree of the symptom or pain alleged. Id. at 1281-1282. If the claimant satisfies the first step and

there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding the

severity of his symptoms only if he makes specific findings that include clear and convincing reasons

for doing so. Id. at 1281. The ALJ must “state which testimony is not credible and what evidence

suggests the complaints are not credible.” Mersman v. Halter, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1086 (N.D.

Cal. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). (“The lack of specific, clear, and convincing reasons

why Plaintiff’s testimony is not credible renders it impossible for [the] Court to determine whether

the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence”); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p

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(ALJ’s decision “must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and reasons for that

weight”).

An ALJ can consider many factors when assessing the claimant’s credibility. See Light v. Soc.

Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). The ALJ can consider the claimant’s reputation for 

truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements concerning his symptoms, other testimony by the claimant

that appears less than candid, unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment, failure

to follow a prescribed course of treatment, claimant’s daily activities, claimant’s work record, or the

observations of treating and examining physicians. Smolen, 80 F. 3d at 1284; Orn v. Astrue, 495

F.3d 625, 638 (2007). 

The first step in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints is to determine whether Plaintiff’s

condition could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Lingenfelter

v. Astrue, 504 F. 3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.2007). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had two severe

impairments, i.e., seizure disorder and cardiomyopathy. (AR 15). When making his finding as to

Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that “[Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that the [Plaintiff’s] statements

concerning the intensity, duration and limiting effect of these symptoms are not entirely credible.” 

(AR 17). This finding satisfied step one of the credibility analysis. Smolen, 80 F. 3d at 1281-1282. 

Because the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff was malingering, he was required to provide clear

and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Smolen, 80 F. 3d at 1283-1284; Lester v.

Chater, 81 F. 3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996)(as amended). When there is evidence of an underlying

medical impairment, the ALJ may not discredit the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his

symptoms solely because they are unsupported by medical evidence. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F. 2d

341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991); SSR 96-7. Moreover, it is not sufficient for the ALJ to make general

findings; he must state which testimony is not credible and what evidence in the record leads to that

conclusion. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F. 3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993); Bunnell, 947 F. 2d at 345-346.

In this case, the ALJ made five credibility findings. The first one is found in the eighth

paragraph of section 4 of the ALJ’s decision, and states:

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“I find that the claimant’s testimony in regard to the frequency and severity of his seizure

activity was not entirely credible.” (AR 16) 

The second credibility finding is in the fourth paragraph of section five of the decision, and states: 

“After considering the evidence of record, I find that claimant’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged

symptoms, but that the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, duration and 

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible. (AR 17). 

The ALJ’s third reference to credibility is found in the sixth paragraph of section five of the decision, 

and states:

“Overall, the type, duration, frequency and sequelae of the claimant’s alleged 

convulsive disorder, does not appear to be corroborated to the degree alleged.” (AR18). 

The ALJ’s fourth and fifth references to credibility are found in the seventh paragraph of section five

of the decision, which begins with a discussion of Plaintiff’s history of cardiomyopathy and states: 

“However, Claimant’s claim of total disability appears overstated.” (AR 18).

The ALJ’s fifth reference states: 

“Furthermore, the claimant’s activities of daily living indicate he is more functional

than alleged” and “[a]lthough these activities are not extensive, they indicate he is not

as dysfunctional as alleged.” (AR 18).

1. The first credibility finding 

The ALJ’s first credibility finding provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

Plaintiff’s testimony. The ALJ specified which symptom testimony is not credible and he identified

what facts in the records led to that conclusion. (AR 16-17). The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s

first credibility finding. 

2. The second credibility finding

 The ALJ’s second credibility is not as specific as his first one. The second finding alludes to

“the alleged symptoms” and refers to “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, duration

and limiting effects of these symptoms.” (AR 17). The ALJ failed to specify what symptoms and

statements he did not fully credit. In an effort to determine what those symptoms and statements

might be, the Court considers the balance of the ALJ’s credibility analysis. 

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Section five of the decision contains nine paragraphs. The first three paragraphs refer to “all

symptoms” and mention epilepsy, a heart condition, a stent placement, shortness of breath, seizure

medications, seizures, and “limited activity.” (AR 17). The fourth paragraph is the ALJ”s second

credibility finding. The fifth paragraph discusses Plaintiff’s daily activities and medications. (AR

18). The sixth paragraph discusses Plaintiff’s alleged convulsive disorder, seizure history, and

questionable medical compliance. As discussed supra, the sixth paragraph begins with the statement

that “[o]verall, the type, duration, frequency and sequelae of the claimant’s alleged convulsive

disorder, do not appear to be corroborated to the degree alleged.” (AR 18). It also states that “[a]s

noted above,” claimant has an unclear medical history of seizures, there is no corroboration of any

recent seizure other than the testimony of Plaintiff’s mother, and Plaintiff’s medication compliance

was questionable. (AR 18). The Court interprets the “as noted above” language to refer to the ALJ’s

discussion of the evidence supporting his first credibility finding. 

3. The third credibility finding

In paragraph six, the ALJ discounts “overall” the type, duration, frequency, and sequelae of

Plaintiff’s convulsive disorder as not corroborated “to the degree alleged.” (AR 18). In contrast, the

first credibility finding discounted only Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the frequency and severity of

his seizures. It is difficult to ascertain which testimony the ALJ discounted by including “type” and

“sequelae” in the second credibility finding. Plaintiff did not testify regarding the pathological origin

of his seizures. More importantly, the ALJ failed to specify what symptom testimony was discounted

in the third finding, even with the “as noted above” reference. (AR 18). This lack of specificity

makes it impossible to determine whether the ALJ discredited all or only some of Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints. If the ALJ rejected or discounted only some of Plaintiff’s testimony, he must

specify what portions of the testimony were rejected or discounted. In either event, the ALJ is

required to specify what facts in the record led him to the conclusion that Plaintiff’s testimony was

not credible. Smolen, 80 F. 3d at 1284. The decision fails to provide that information. 

4. The fourth and fifth credibility findings

The ALJ’s decision includes two additional credibility references, which are tantamount to

credibility findings. The first one is found in the seventh paragraph of section five of the decision. 

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(AR 18). The paragraph begins with an acknowledgment that Plaintiff has a history of

cardiomyopathy. The second sentence states: “[h]owever, Claimant’s claim of total disability

appears overstated.” (AR 18). The ALJ explained his reasoning, noting that none of Plaintiff’s

treating physicians opined that Plaintiff was disabled due to a heart condition, and Plaintiff made a

poor effort in an exercise test. (Id.). The ALJ also concluded that “claimant’s activities of daily

living indicate he is more functional than alleged.” (Id.). He noted that Plaintiff is able to do selfcare, take the bus, do household chores and some yard work, and could drive a car when he felt well. 

(Id.). The ALJ concluded the analysis by noting that “[a]lthough these activities are not extensive,

they indicate [claimant] is not as dysfunctional as alleged.” (Id.). 

Again, it is impossible to determine from the ALJ’s decision precisely which symptom

testimony is not fully credible because the ALJ did not reference any portions of Plaintiff’s testimony

when he rejected the claim of total disability as overstated, or when he concluded that Plaintiff was

more functional than alleged. 

B. Conclusion

The ALJ’s decision fails to specify which portions of Plaintiff’s testimony were not credible

and what evidence undermined Plaintiff’s subjective complaints in four of five credibility findings. 

This lack of specificity makes it impossible to determine whether and why the ALJ rejected all or

only portions of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including those related to his documented history

of orthopedic and arthritic impairments, degenerative joint disease, headaches, spinal stenosis, and

carpal tunnel syndrome. 

As Plaintiff alleges, the ALJ’s decision fails to acknowledge that Plaintiff suffers from any of

the foregoing impairments or that Plaintiff complained of pain and other symptoms associated with

them, despite the fact that there is evidence of each of them in the medical records and that Plaintiff’s

complaints of pain and other subjective symptoms relating to them were the subject of his testimony. 

The ALJ’s failure to address or even acknowledge Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding these

ailments suggests that the ALJ may have failed to consider them at all as unsupported by medically

determinable impairments, or as a non-severe impairments. An ALJ is required to consider all of the

limitations imposed by Plaintiff’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe. SSR 96-

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8p. Here, it is impossible to determine whether and to what extent Plaintiff’s impairments were

considered because not all of them were addressed in the ALJ’s decision. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision was not

supported by substantial evidence in the record and was not based upon the proper legal standards.

In this case, further development is necessary for a proper determination to be made. Specifically,

proper application of the two step analysis applicable to consideration of a claimant’s credibility

must be performed by the ALJ, as noted above. 

ORDER

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that: 

1. Plaintiff’s social security complaint is GRANTED; 

2. The matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further

development of the record and further consideration, consistent with this decision, of Plaintiff’s

status as disabled, including whether his impairments are so severe as to preclude gainful activity,

whether Plaintiff is capable of performing work he has performed in the past, and if required,

whether on the basis of Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,

Plaintiff can perform any other gainful and substantial work in the economy; and 

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED TO ENTER JUDGMENT for Plaintiff Wendell W.

Cummins and against Defendant Michael J. Astrue and to close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 10, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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