Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02000/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02000-77/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., a

Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

O2 MICRO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a

Cayman Island corporation,

Defendant. /

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

 /

O2 MICRO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a

Cayman Island corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., a

Delaware corporation, et al., 

Defendants. /

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS AND CROSSCLAIMS.

 /

No. C 04-2000 CW

(consolidated with

No. C 06-2929 CW)

ORDER ON CLAIM

CONSTRUCTION AND

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 1 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

On October 11, 2006, the Court signed O2 Micro's stipulated

dismissal with prejudice of its claim concerning the '129 patent. 

Thus, this patent is no longer at issue.

2

Plaintiff O2 Micro International Limited and Defendants

Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (MPS), Michael Hsing, Advanced

Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd. (ASMC), ASUSTeK Computer,

Inc., and Compal Electronics, Inc. (collectively, Defendants)

dispute the meaning of terms and phrases used in 02 Micro's U.S.

Patent No. 6,259,615 (the '615 patent), its U.S. Patent No.

6,396,722 (the '722 patent) and its U.S. Patent No. 6,804,129 (the

'129 patent).1 02 Micro requests that the Court adopts the claim

constructions previously adopted by this Court and by the Eastern

District of Texas court. Defendants ask the Court to adopt their

proposed construction of two disputed phrases. In addition, O2

Micro moves for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. 

Defendants oppose the motion and cross-move for summary judgment. 

O2 Micro opposes their motion for summary judgment. The matters

were heard on October 27, 2006. Having considered the parties'

papers, the evidence cited therein and oral argument, the Court

construes the disputed terms and phrases as set forth below. In

addition, the Court denies O2 Micro's motion for summary judgment

and grants in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment and

denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

I. Patents at issue 

The '615, '722 and '129 patents are all entitled: "HighEfficiency Adaptive DC/AC Converter." They are related to the same

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 2 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

technology: the '129 patent is a continuation of the '722 patent,

which is a continuation of the '615 patent. All three patents

share the same specification. And all three have been asserted in

prior litigation. The patents claim a direct current (DC) to

alternating current (AC) power converter circuit, more

specifically, a high efficiency controller circuit that regulates

power delivered to a load using a zero-voltage-switching technique. 

II. This Action

In May, 2004, MPS filed the 04-2000 suit in this district

against O2 Micro for a declaratory judgment finding O2 Micro's '722

patent invalid and not infringed. O2 Micro counterclaimed and

added ASMC as a counterdefendant. 

Five months after MPS filed suit in this district, O2 Micro

filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas, accusing MPS of

infringing O2 Micro's '129 patent. O2 Micro amended its complaint,

asserting that ASMC infringed the '129 patent and that ASUSTeK and

Compal infringed the '129 patent, the '722 patent and O2 Micro's

'615 patent. Various cross-claims and counterclaims were filed,

and new parties were added. The Texas action was transferred to

this Court, and assigned Case No. 06-2929. After the case was

transferred, the Court found the 06-2929 case to be related to the

04-2000 case and consolidated the cases.

III. The Sumida Litigation

In January, 2003, two weeks after MPS had agreed to indemnify

its customer Taiwan Sumida Electronics, Inc. (Sumida) from certain

patent infringement actions brought by O2 Micro, O2 Micro brought

suit against Sumida in the Eastern District of Texas for infringing

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 3 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

its '615 and '722 patents. See O2 Micro International v. Taiwan

Sumida Electronics, Inc., Case No. 2:03-cv-007 TJW (E.D. Tex.) (the

Sumida litigation). Under the indemnity agreement, MPS agreed to

pay any and all losses, damages, demands, liability and expenses,

including attorneys' fees and court costs, and final judgment

entered against Sumida, or any settlement amount. The agreement

also provided that MPS would have sole control over any action

against Sumida or settlement negotiations concerning that action. 

After O2 Micro sued Sumida, MPS, as agreed, took over the defense

of Sumida. Two weeks before trial, however, MPS terminated the

agreement. MPS then brought an action in this district against

Sumida for breach of the indemnity agreement. 

On November 17, 2005, a jury in Texas found that claims 1, 2,

9, 12 and 18 of the '722 patent are valid and that Sumida's use of

MPS chips infringed claims 1, 2, 9, 12 and 18 of that patent. 

Sumida has appealed the final judgment in that action. O2 Micro

contends that MPS is estopped from litigating the issues of

validity and infringement that were determined on the merits in the

Sumida litigation.

DISCUSSION

I. Claim Construction

The construction of a patent is a matter of law for the Court.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 

As O2 Micro notes, several orders from multiple courts have

construed various terms and phrases of its '615 and '722 patents. 

This Court, in Case No. 00-4071 (consolidated with Case No. 01-

3995), issued a claim construction order concerning the '615

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 4 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

patent. Judge Ward, in the Eastern District of Texas, issued a

claim construction order in the Sumida litigation concerning the

'615 and '722 patents, as well as claim construction orders in

other actions concerning the '615, '722 and '129 patents. The 

orders have maintained consistent constructions for the terms and

phrases of the patents at issue.

O2 Micro contends that, in light of these past claim

construction orders, there is no need to construe any additional

terms or phrases; instead, the Court should use the terms and

phrases as they have been defined in previous litigation. It

suggests that, to the extent the parties dispute constructions

provided in these orders, the parties should reserve their rights

to maintain those disputes on appeal. 

Defendants do not contend that additional terms or phrases

need to be defined; they agree with O2 Micro's suggestion of

reserving their rights to maintain disputes on appeal. 

Nonetheless, they challenge two phrases: "only if," which appears

in the '615 patent and which was previously defined by this Court,

and "first state/second state," which appears in the '722 patent

and which was previously defined by Judge Ward. They contend that

these phrases are limited to DC/AC converters and related methods

employing both closed-loop and fixed, open-loop power regulation. 

The Court previously construed "'only if' to modify

'controlling,' meaning that the second pulse signal controls the

conduction state of the second plurality of switches only if the

feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold." December 27,

2002 Order Construing Disputed Claims and Terms (Consolidated Cases

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 5 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

No. 00-4071 CW and 01-3995 CW). Judge Ward adopted this Court's

claim construction in the Sumida litigation. Judge Ward construed

the "first state/second state" limitation as follows: "in a first 

state, or mode, the second pulse signal overlaps the first pulse

signal to deliver an amount of power to the load determined by the

feedback signal. In a second state, or mode, the second pulse

signal overlaps the first pulse signal by a predetermined minimum

amount to deliver a predetermined minimum power to the load." 

Chang Dec., Ex. 3. Defendants provide no good cause to alter the

construction of these phrases at this date. These two phrases

shall be construed as they were previously construed by this Court

and Judge Ward. 

II. Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 6 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party's claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 7 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

produce "specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of

production by either method, the non-moving party is under no

obligation to offer any evidence in support of its opposition. Id.

This is true even though the non-moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1107.

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

forth specific facts controverting the moving party's prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party's

"burden of contradicting [the moving party's] evidence is not

negligible." Id. This standard does not change merely because

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 8 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2O2 Micro notes that, because it maintained at the Sumida

trial that the Sumida inverter modules were different than the MPS

reference design, it does not seek an order precluding MPS from

challenging infringement of claim 12 of the '722 patent. 

9

resolution of the relevant issue is "highly fact specific." Id.

B. O2 Micro's Motion for Summary Judgment Based on

Collateral Estoppel

Based on the verdict in the Sumida litigation, O2 Micro seeks

summary adjudication that MPS is not permitted to litigate the

issue of validity of claims 1, 2, 9, 12 and 18 of the '722 patent

or the issue of infringement of claims 1, 2, 9 and 18 of that

patent.2 According to O2 Micro, MPS is collaterally estopped from

relitigating these issues that were previously decided in the

Sumida litigation. O2 Micro further argues that the finding that

the '722 patent is valid and that the '722 patent claims are

infringed by the MPS inverter controllers also applies to ASMC,

ASUSTeK and Compal.

The Ninth Circuit explains, “'We have in this nation a

deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own

day in court,' and we accordingly presume that 'a judgment or

decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them,

but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those

proceedings.'" Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 995-96 (9th Cir.

2005) (quoting Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047,

1050 (9th Cir. 2005)). Nonetheless, a court will sometimes apply

collateral estoppel to non-parties to prevent "relitigation of

issues actually litigated and necessarily decided, after a full and

fair opportunity for litigation, in a prior proceeding." Id. 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 9 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

Whether to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel "is left to

the district court's discretion." United States v. Geophysical

Corp. of Alaska, 732 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1984).

A federal court decision has preclusive effect where "(1) the

issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical

to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first

proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the

party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or

in privity with a party at the first proceeding." Kourtis, 419

F.3d at 994. With respect to the third prong, the Ninth Circuit

instructs:

Because the concept of privity extends the reach of a judicial

decision to nonparties and thereby deprives them of their own

day in court, due process considerations make adequacy of

representation a prerequisite to privity. Indeed, the Supreme

Court has repeatedly emphasized that it would violate the Due

Process Clause . . . to bind litigants to a judgment rendered

in an earlier litigation to which they were not parties and in

which they were not adequately represented. 

Kourtis, 419 F.3d at 994 (citations and quotations omitted;

alteration in original). 

Sumida did not adequately represent MPS' interest in the

Sumida litigation. O2 Micro's arguments otherwise are unavailing. 

As MPS points out, MPS and O2 Micro are competitors. Sumida is not

a competitor of O2 Micro; rather, it is O2 Micro's customer. While

O2 Micro's action against Sumida was pending, Sumida presented O2

Micro with the "Best Value Partner" award "given to companies that

provide advanced technology to customers, helping them meet their

request of time to market with delivery that is always on time, and

excellent technical support." Brigham Dec., Ex. 48. Sumida owns

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 10 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

60,000 shares of O2 Micro's stock. MPS currently has an action

pending before this Court against Sumida, accusing it of breaching

the agreement under which MPS was supposed to have control over O2

Micro's suit against Sumida. 

Furthermore, as explained in Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.

Geoffrey & Assoc., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16932 (D. S.C.),

"preclusion should be denied in cases where the plaintiff could

have easily joined the parties in an earlier action." Here, O2

Micro could have joined MPS in its Texas suit against Sumida, but

it chose not to do so. 

Because there was no adequate representation and because O2

Micro could have easily joined MPS in the Sumida action, the

decision in the Sumida litigation has no preclusive effect on MPS. 

MPS is not collaterally estopped from litigating the validity of

claims 1, 2, 9, 12 and 18 and infringement of claims 1, 2, 9 and 18

of the '722 patent. Nor are ASMC, ASUSTeK and Compal liable for

infringing claims 1, 2, 9 and 18 of the '722 patent based on the

jury's verdict in the Sumida litigation. 

C. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment

Defendants bring numerous motions for summary judgment. Some

are brought by all Defendants, others are brought only by one or

two Defendants: all Defendants move for summary judgment based on

their proposed claim constructions concerning open-loop control; 

all Defendants move for summary judgment that claims 12 and 14 of

the '722 patent are not infringed and that claim 12 is not valid;

all Defendants move for summary judgment that O2 Micro has no 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 11 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

evidence of damages; ASUSTeK and Compal move for summary judgment

that O2 Micro is collaterally estopped from asserting the '615

patent and that claim 24 of the '129 patent is invalid; ASMC moves

for summary judgment that it does not contributorily infringe; and

ASMC, ASUSTeK and Compal move for summary judgment of no collateral

estoppel concerning the '722 patent. 

1. Open-loop control 

Defendants contend that O2 Micro presents no evidence of openloop control in Defendants' accused products and, therefore, that

they do not infringe. They further contend that, if the Court

rejects their proposed claim construction, requiring closed-loop

and open-loop control, O2 Micro's claims are, as a matter of law,

invalid.

a. Infringement

The Federal Circuit instructs, "An infringement analysis is a

two-step process in which the court first determines, as a matter

of law, the correct claim scope, and then compares the

properly-construed claim to the accused device to determine, as a

matter of fact, whether all of the claim limitations are present,

either literally or by a substantial equivalent, in the accused

device." Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d

985, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The basis of Defendants' noninfringement position is that their accused products do not

incorporate a control network that provides both open-loop and

closed-loop control. As discussed above, however, the Court

rejected Defendants' proposed claim construction. Therefore, the 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 12 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

Court cannot rule, as a matter of law, that Defendants' products do

not infringe because the products lack an open-control loop. 

b. Doctrine of Equivalents

Defendants assert that O2 Micro is estopped from asserting

that they infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Under

prosecution history estoppel, where an amendment is made to secure

a patent and the amendment narrows the scope of the patent, a

presumption arises that infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents is no longer available for the amended element. Festo

Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, 535 U.S. 722, 736

(2002). The presumption can be overcome if the equivalent was

unforeseeable at the time of the application, the rationale

underlying the amendment bears no more than a tangential relation

to the equivalent in question, or there was some other reason

suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to

have described the "'insubstantial substitute'" in question. 

Ranbaxy Pharm. Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235, 1241 (Fed. Cir.

2003) (quoting Festo Corp., 525 U.S. at 740-41). 

As Defendants note, here, O2 Micro originally sought broad

claims covering full-bridge inverters that provided power

regulation based upon feedback from a load. The patent examiner

rejected those claims. Rather than argue for allowance of its

original claims, O2 Micro amended its claims. Therefore,

Defendants argue that the prosecution history estoppel doctrine

prevents O2 Micro from asserting infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents.

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 13 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

O2 Micro responds that Defendants speak in generalities. It

notes that Defendants point to no particular claim limitation that

was amended to narrow its scope to overcome a prior art rejection. 

Although Defendants discuss the "only if" limitation in other

sections of their motion, they do not show that the "only if"

limitation was added to narrow any claim in response to the patent

examiner's objection and to secure the patent. O2 Micro further

argues that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether it can

overcome the Festo presumption, noting that in O2 Micro

International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology, Case No. 2:04-

cv-32 TJW (E.D. Tex.), the court ruled that the claim amendment

relating to the "only if" limitation was only tangentially related

to that equivalent and that O2 Micro was not precluded from

asserting the doctrine of equivalents to cover that equivalent.

Defendants fail to address any of the points O2 Micro raises. 

Instead, in their reply, they note that O2 Micro does not dispute

that it originally submitted broad claims, which were rejected, and

that it added the "only if" and "first state/second state"

limitations to its claim to overcome the patent examiner's

rejections. But, as O2 Micro points out, Defendants did not

clearly state in their moving papers that they were seeking to bar

O2 Micro from asserting infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents with respect to the "only if" and "first state/second

state" limitations. Furthermore, there is a disputed issue of fact

as to whether O2 Micro's amendment bears only a tangential

relationship to the equivalents at issue. Therefore, the Court

denies summary judgment that O2 Micro is precluded from asserting

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 14 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

the doctrine of equivalents. 

c. Invalidity

Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, the claims

containing "only if" and "first state/second state" limitations are

invalid, unless they are construed as Defendants propose. A patent

is presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. Therefore, the party

alleging that a patent is invalid bears the burden of proof, id.,

and must overcome this statutory presumption of validity by proving

invalidity through clear and convincing evidence. Ultra-Tex

Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed.

Cir. 2000). 

“A patent is invalid for anticipation when the same device or

method, having all of the elements contained in the claim

limitations, is described in single prior art reference.” Crown

Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed.

Cir. 2002); see also Scripps Clinic & Research Fdn. v. Genentech,

Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Invalidity for

anticipation requires that all of the elements and limitations of

the claim are found within a single prior art reference."). “An

anticipating reference must describe the patented subject matter

with sufficient clarity and detail to establish that the subject

matter existed in the prior art and that such existence would be

recognized by persons of ordinary skill in the field of invention.” 

Crown Operations, 289 F.3d at 1375. 

A patent is invalid for obviousness if the differences between

it and the prior art “are such that the subject matter as a whole

would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 15 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 16

person having ordinary skill in the art.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). To

determine if a patent is invalid for obviousness, the court must

consider the scope and content of the prior art, the difference

between the patented invention and the prior art, and the level of

skill in the art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966);

see also Crown Operations, 289 F.3d at 1375. “Determinations of

obviousness cannot be based on the hindsight combination of

components selectively culled from the prior art to fit the

parameters of the patented invention.” ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc.,

159 F.3d 534, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

Defendants contend that, if O2 Micro successfully argues that

its claims reciting the "only if" limitation cover any full-bridge

inverter that provides open-lamp protection based upon feedback

received from a CCFL load, then those claims would be invalid in

view of U.S. Patent No. 5,420,799 (the Payne '799 patent) and other

prior art references. They further contend that, if the "first

state/second state" limitation is construed in a manner allowing

coverage of inverters providing open-lamp protection based upon

detected lamp current, then those claims are not valid. Defendants

do not, however, explain how the claims are invalid, nor do they

address any of the claim language at issue; they merely cite to

their invalidity claim charts. 

The Court finds that Defendants have not made an adequate

showing or met their burden of proving invalidity, as a matter of

law, by clear and convincing evidence. There are disputed issues

of fact regarding the validity of the claims and, therefore, the

Court denies summary judgment that the claims are invalid.

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 16 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Claim 12 requires, in part, "a feedback control loop circuit

receiving a feedback signal indicative of power being supplied to

said load and adapted to generate a second pulse signal for

controlling the conduction state of a different one of said first

pair of switches, said second pulse signal having a phase overlap

with said first pulse signal to deliver power to said load only if

said feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold." Claim 14

is dependant upon claim 12 and consists of "[a]n inverter as

claimed in claim 12, wherein if said feedback signal is below said

predetermined threshold, said feedback loop generating said second

pulse signal to have a minimum phase overlap with said first pulse

signal to reduce power delivered to said load to a predetermined

minimum amount." 

17

2. Claims 12 and 14 of the '722 patent

Defendants argue that claims 12 and 14 of the '722 patent are

not infringed and, furthermore, that claim 12 is invalid in view of

Frank Goodenough's article entitled DC-to-AC Invert Ups CCFL Lumens

Per Watt, published in July, 1995.3

a. Infringement

Defendants contend that O2 Micro's expert, Dr. V. Thomas

Rhyne, acknowledged that Defendants' accused products do not employ

phase-modulation and do not adjust the "phase overlap" of any

pulse; therefore, Defendants' products cannot literally infringe

claims 12 and 14 of the '722 patent. Defendants further contend

that they cannot infringe claim 12 by the doctrine of equivalents

due to prosecution history estoppel. 

O2 Micro notes, however, the term "phase-modulation" does not

appear in the final transcript of Dr. Rhyne's deposition testimony. 

It accuses Defendants of citing Dr. Rhyne's deposition out of

context, contending that he is talking about "phase shifting," not

"phase overlap." O2 Micro notes that, although Defendants state

that O2 Micro is not entitled to prove infringement by the doctrine

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 17 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 18

of equivalents, they fail to identify any amendment that narrowed

the scope of a claim in response to the patent examiner's

objection.

The Court finds that there is a disputed issue of fact as to

whether Dr. Rhyne's testimony at issue concerned phase shifting or

phase overlap. Therefore, summary judgment that claims 12 and 14

of the '722 patent are not infringed is not warranted; nor is O2

Micro, as a matter of law, barred from showing that Defendants

infringe based on the doctrine of equivalents. 

b. Invalidity

Defendants contend that O2 Micro, in its responses to their

request for admissions (RFA), admitted that the Goodenough

reference discloses each of the elements of claim 12. O2 Micro

disagrees, arguing that its responses do not mirror the elements of

claim 12. It notes that RFA 88 omits a limitation of the element

it purportedly mirrors. Specifically, it omits the portion of the

element requiring the claimed feedback signal to be "indicative of

power being supplied to said load." RFA 88 uses the term "a

feedback signal," instead of "said feedback signal," and thereby

omits the requirement tying the "only if" and "predetermined

threshold" limitations to the claimed feedback signal. 

Defendants respond that O2 Micro quibbles with the language of

the admissions, but fails to come forth with any evidence in its

opposition. O2 Micro, however, is not required to submit evidence. 

Instead, it can point out that Defendants fail to meet their

initial burden; that is what O2 Micro does. Therefore, summary

judgment of invalidity of claim 12 is not appropriate. 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 18 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 19

3. O2 Micro's evidence of damage

Defendants contend that the report by O2 Micro's damages

expert, Walter Bratic, is not "the product of reliable principles

and methods" and would not serve to "assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," and,

therefore, the Court should preclude O2 Micro from presenting any

testimony from Mr. Bratic. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-94 (1993). Because O2 Micro's

damages case is based entirely upon Mr. Bratic's report, Defendants

argue that they are entitled to summary adjudication that O2 Micro

has no evidence of damages. 

A reasonable royalty analysis, like the one Mr. Bratic

provides, "necessarily involves an element of approximation and

uncertainty." Unisplay S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512,

517 (Fed. Cir. 1995). An expert determines a reasonable royalty

based upon hypothetical negotiations and numerous factors, some of

which are prescribed in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States

Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified

and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). Nonetheless, an expert

report on damages, including a reasonable royalty analysis, may not

rely on unreasonable inferences or resort to “mere speculation or

guess.” Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573,

1576 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The patent owner bears the burden of

proving the amount of its damages, whether a reasonable royalty or

lost profits. Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1029 (Fed.

Cir. 1996).

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 19 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 20

Mr. Bratic's report states that the appropriate reasonable

royalty rate for MPS' alleged infringement is a percentage "of the

average retail price of a notebook computer." Using this approach,

Mr. Bratic found that the appropriate reasonable royalty is $149

million, even though MPS' total sales of accused products is $77.9

million and not all of the accused products are used in notebook

computers. This approach has several flaws.

First, as noted above, it ignores that not all of MPS'

allegedly infringing chips are used in notebook computers; some are

used in LCD monitors and others are used in handheld personal data

assistants. O2 Micro responds that MPS has neither cited nor

produced any records that would allow Mr. Bratic to calculate a

reasonable royalty for non-notebook uses of the infringing chips. 

However, O2 Micro, as the patent holder, bears the burden of

proving its damages. If MPS refused to produce information that

Mr. Bratic required to determine the reasonable royalty, then O2

Micro needed to get that information, if necessary through a motion

to compel. O2 Micro fails to show any effort it took to get all

the information necessary for its expert to provide a reasonable

royalty calculation that does not rely on unreasonable inferences

or speculation.

Second, O2 Micro's reasonable royalty calculation is based on 

Mr. Bratic's determination that $3.04, the premium that Dell

allegedly paid for O2 Micro's OZ960A inverter controller in 1999,

represents a starting point in determining the royalty rate. In

his report, Mr. Bratic acknowledges that this controller did not 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 20 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 21

utilize the patented technology. Defendants note that, under a

reasonable royalty theory, the hypothetical licensee would pay only

for the value of the patented invention. Riles v. Shell

Exploration and Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

02 Micro responds that the alleged price paid for its OZ960A

inverter controller is relevant because that inverter controller,

like the patented technology, included open lamp protection. It

explains that O2 Micro's other inverter controller, the OZ962

product, lacked the open lamp protection. Therefore, O2 Micro

argues that the price paid for its OZ960A inverter controller

reflects the value of the open lamp protection. 

The cited evidence, however, in particular Dr. Yung-Lin Lin's

deposition testimony does not support O2 Micro's response or Mr.

Bratic's report. Dr. Lin testifies, as O2 Micro's Rule 30(b)(6)

witness, that both the OZ962 and the OZ960A controllers had

internal open-lamp and short-circuit protection: "I want to clarify

this. I say that internal open-lamp and short-circuit protection

in OZ962, that function is very similar to OZ962A's internal

circuit design." Brigham Supp. Dec., Ex. 2, 96:11-13. He

testified that he doubted that the OZ962 product was ever offered

to Dell. O2 Micro's sales records show that from June 1 to

November 30, 1998, the average sales price, $1.89, for the alleged

"inferior" OZ962 product was fourteen cents more than the average

sales prices for the "superior" OZ960A product.

Third, as Defendants point out, Mr. Bratic's report does not

account for the law of supply and demand. Mr. Bratic hypothesizes 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 21 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 22

a royalty that would triple the average selling price for MPS' 

accused products, but he makes no allowance for the impact that

increased prices would have had on demand. The Federal Circuit

states, "All markets must respect the law of demand. According to

the law of demand, consumers will almost always purchase fewer

units of a product at a higher price than at a lower price,

possibly substituting other products." Crystal Semiconductor Corp.

v. TriTech Microelectronics Intern., Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1359

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Paul A. Samuelson, Economics 53-55 (11th

ed. 1980)). O2 Micro attempts to distinguish this case, noting

that the plaintiff there sought lost profits, not a reasonable

royalty. That difference, however, is inconsequential. 

O2 Micro complains that Defendants' motion is a Daubert

motion, couched as a motion for summary judgment. It cites Sharp

Corp. v. AU Optronics Corp., 2005 WL 1457747 (N.D. Cal.), where the

court denied summary judgment, concluding that "defendants have

failed to offer evidence, from an economist or otherwise, to

support their argument that the methodology employed by plaintiff's

expert . . . is not reliable." See also Monster Cable Products,

Inc. v. Quest Group, 2005 WL 1875466, n.3 (N.D. Cal.) (concluding

that unsupported Daubert challenge was "not appropriate on a motion

for summary judgment"). Defendants' motion is a Daubert motion,

but their motion is not unsupported, as were the Daubert challenges

in Sharp Corp. and Monster Cable Products. Defendants have not

offered evidence from an economist or other expert, but they do

point to flaws in Mr. Bratic's report that, when combined, are 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 22 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 23

serious enough to render it unreliable and inadmissible. As a 

result, O2 Micro has not met its burden of proving damages. The

Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants that O2 Micro

has presented no evidence of damages. 

4. Collateral estoppel and the '615 patent

ASUSTeK and Compal argue that they are entitled to summary

judgment of non-infringement of the '615 patent based on this

Court's previous finding, in Case No. 00-4071 (consolidated with

Case No. 01-3995), that MPS' inverter controller, incorporated into

ASUSTeK and Compal products, does not infringe the '615 patent. 

As discussed above, a federal court decision has preclusive

effect where "(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous

proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be

relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final judgment

on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel

is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first

proceeding." Kourtis, 419 F.3d at 994. Unlike O2 Micro's motion

for summary judgment based on estoppel, discussed above, here, the

third-prong is not disputed: O2 Micro was a party to the prior

litigation involving the '615 patent. What is disputed is whether

there was a final judgment on the merits and whether it would be

inequitable to preclude O2 Micro from bringing its claims against

ASUSTeK and Compal. 

In Case No. 00-4071, the Court granted MPS' motion for summary

judgment of non-infringement of the '615 patent because O2 Micro

did not meet its burden of producing evidence that MPS met the 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 23 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 24

"only if" limitations of the '615 patent. O2 Micro contends that 

collateral estoppel should not attach to this prior summary

judgment because O2 Micro was precluded from a substantive ruling

on the merits of its allegations and, therefore, there was no final

judgment on the identical issue of whether MPS' products infringed

the asserted '615 patent claims. According to O2 Micro, the

Court's decision rested on a procedural basis which was tantamount

to a discovery sanction: the Court did not allow O2 Micro belatedly

to supplement its infringement contentions. But, as noted above,

the Court's decision was based on failure of proof. The Federal

Circuit recently affirmed this decision. 02 Micro Int'l, Ltd. v.

Monolithic Power Sys., 467 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

O2 Micro cites Jumpsport Inc. v. Hedstrom Corp., 2004 WL

2203556 (N.D. Cal.), and, as noted above, argues that fairness and

equity would not be served by applying collateral estoppel here. 

But its reliance on Jumpsport is unavailing. Jumpsport held that

res judicata did not bar a patentee from asserting a new claim

involving different accused products. Here, the same products are

involved. O2 Micro's reliance on fairness and equity is similarly

unavailing. It had a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of

MPS' infringement of the '615 patent, and it lost. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that ASUSTeK and Compal are

entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the '615 patent

as a result of this Court's previous finding that the MPS product

they use does not infringe the '615 patent. 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 24 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4Section 271(c) provides:

Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or

imports into the United States a component of a patented

machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a

material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented

process, constituting a material part of the invention,

knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted

for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple

article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial

noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory

infringer.

25

5. Claim 24 of the '129 patent

ASUSTeK and Compal argue that claim 24 of the '129 patent is

invalid because it is not supported by the patent's specification. 

O2 Micro responds that this motion should be denied as moot. It

notes that it has dismissed with prejudice the first count of its

third amended complaint for infringement of the '129 patent and, as

a result, the '129 patent is no longer at issue. ASUSTeK and

Compal do not address the mootness issue. 

The Court concludes that this issue is now moot and,

therefore, denies ASUSTeK and Compal's motion for summary judgment

of invalidity of claim 24 of the '129 patent. 

6. Contributory infringement

O2 Micro's claim against ASMC is for contributory infringement. 

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).4 ASMC contends that this claim fails, as a

matter of law, because it lacks the requisite knowledge.

To succeed on its claim of contributory infringement against

ASMC, O2 Micro, in addition to showing an act of direct

infringement, must show that ASMC “'knew that the combination for

which its components were especially made was both patented and

infringing.'” Cross Med. Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 25 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 26

Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Golden

Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1061 (Fed.

Cir. 2004)); see also Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs.

Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("the 'knowing'

requirement is explicit in Section 271(c), such that actual

knowledge of the patent and the infringement is requisite to a

claim of contributory infringement"). As explained in Dynamis,

Inc. v. Leepoxy Plastics, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 651, 655 (N.D. Ind.

1993), "the focus in a contributory infringement claim is on

whether the accused infringer knows that the intended use of the

product will infringe a known patent."

ASMC explains that it is a foundry that contracts with

semiconductor companies, such as MPS, to manufacture semiconductor

wafers to be used in a wide assortment of products. It fabricates

semiconductor wafers for MPS in accordance with design and process

specifications that are provided by MPS. Like other foundries,

ASMC does not know the end-products for the wafers it makes; it

manufactures semiconductor wafers for MPS without knowledge of the

MPS product into which its wafers will ultimately be incorporated. 

Thus, ASMC contends that it does not have the requisite knowledge,

because it does not know that the combination for which its

components were especially made was both patented and infringing.

O2 Micro does not proffer evidence that ASMC had actual

knowledge of the patents and potential infringement prior to being

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 26 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

In a footnote, O2 Micro argues that the evidence shows that

ASMC knew or should have known of the patents as early as November,

2001. Constructive notice of the patents and infringement can be

sufficient to satisfy the knowledge element of section 271(c). See

Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., Ltd., 411 F.

Supp. 2d 479, 483 (D. Del. 2006). But, even drawing all inferences

in its favor, O2 Micro fails to show that ASMC learned of the

patents through other sources or that it had constructive

knowledge. 

27

served on December 6, 2004.5 Relying on Cybiotronics, O2 Micro

contends, however, that summary judgment should be denied because

ASMC has been on notice since that date and yet it continues to

produce the infringing products. In Cybiotronics, the court found

that, absent proof of earlier knowledge, actual knowledge of a

patent accrues on the date when the defendant was served. 130 F.

Supp. 2d at 1166. But, as ASMC notes, the court granted the

defendant's summary judgment motion in part, holding that no

liability could accrue based on any conduct that occurred before

December 22, 1999, the day that the plaintiff was served and, thus,

had actual knowledge. Id. at 1166, 1177. It was not disputed

that, after it was served with the complaint, the defendant had

actual knowledge that the combination for which its components were

especially made was both patented and infringing. Summary judgment

was denied for that period.

ASMC contends that it cannot be liable, even after being

served with O2 Micro's complaint, because, although it now knows of

the patent, it still lacks the requisite knowledge that it

contributes to infringement. It asserts that it does not

manufacture wafers "knowing the same to be especially made or

especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent," as

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 27 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 28

required by section 271(c). Its sales manager states, "ASMC still

does not know the actual product or the product numbers for the

specific MPS products that ultimately incorporate these wafers,

including whether these processed wafers are used by MPS in the

manufacture of inverter controllers." Zhou Jiangyun Dec., ¶ 18.

MPS' employees remain the only people who know which ASMC wafers

relate to the accused inverter controllers. According to ASMC,

this is not, as O2 Micro contends, "feigned ignorance"; rather,

this is the way that foundries operate. 

 Although ASMC does not know exactly which wafer is especially

made for use in a product that allegedly infringes O2 Micro's

patents, it has known, since it was served, that at least some

wafers that it makes for MPS are made for use in an allegedly

infringing product. That knowledge is sufficient to hold it liable

under section 271(c). ASMC knows that the combination for which

its components are especially made is allegedly both patented and

infringing. Therefore, the Court grants ASMC's motion in part,

finding that, as a matter of law, ASMC cannot be liable for any

conduct that occurred before December 6, 2004; ASMC, however, may

be liable for conduct occurring after that date. 

7. Collateral estoppel and the '722 patent

In addition to opposing O2 Micro's motion for summary

judgment, ASMC, ASUSTeK and Compal affirmatively move for summary

judgment that they are not collaterally estopped from challenging

the infringement and validity of the '722 patent. O2 Micro

responds that Defendants misread its motion for summary judgment 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 28 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 29

because it does not assert collateral estoppel against ASMC,

ASUSTeK and Compal; instead, its motion against these Defendants is

based on joint and several liability for MPS' infringement. O2

Micro does not dispute that collateral estoppel cannot prevent

these Defendants from defending themselves against O2 Micro's 

claims. Therefore, the Court grants ASMC, ASUSTeK and Compal

summary judgment that they are not collaterally estopped from

challenging the infringement and validity of the '722 patent. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court construes the disputed

terms and phrases as they have previously been construed. The

Court DENIES O2 Micro's Motion for Summary Judgment Based on

Collateral Estoppel (Docket No. 316). Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment (Docket No. 363) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART. Specifically, the Court DENIES summary judgment that any

claim at issue is not infringed or is not invalid and GRANTS

summary judgment in favor of Defendants that O2 Micro has presented

no evidence of damages. ASUSTeK and Compal's motion for summary

judgment of invalidity of claim 24 of the '129 patent is DENIED as

moot; their motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of the

'615 patent, however, is GRANTED. The Court concludes that, as a

matter of law, ASMC cannot be liable for conduct that occurred

before December 6, 2004; ASMC, however, may be liable for conduct

occurring after that date. In addition, the Court GRANTS ASMC,

ASUSTeK and Compal summary judgment that they are not collaterally 

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 29 of 30
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

O2 Micro's motion for leave to file a supplemental brief in

opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docket

No. 630) is DENIED. All parties submitted objections to other

parties' evidence. To the extent that the Court relied upon

evidence to which there is an objection, the parties' objections

are overruled. To the extent that the Court did not rely on such

evidence, the parties' objections are overruled as moot. The Court

has not relied on any inadmissible evidence in deciding this

motion. 

30

estopped from challenging the infringement and validity of the '722

patent.6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/8/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 741 Filed 02/08/07 Page 30 of 30