Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55518/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55518-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRIS KOHLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-56814

D.C. NO.

3:10-cv-00730-

IEG-NLS

CHRIS KOHLER,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-55518

D.C. NO.

3:10-cv-00730-

IEG-NLS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Irma E. Gonzalez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 3, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed March 6, 2015

 

 

 

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2 KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC.

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit 

Judges and J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge.

∗

Opinion by Judge Motz

SUMMARY**

Americans with Disabilities Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment and its denial of attorneys’ fees in an 

action under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act.

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in 

favor of the defendant, the panel held that a dressing room 

bench longer than forty-eight inches complied with the 

1991 version of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines even 

though the arrangement of the bench prevented the plaintiff 

from making a diagonal transfer onto the bench from his 

wheelchair. The panel held that the bench did not comply 

with the ADAAG’s mandate but nonetheless qualified as an 

“equivalent facilitation” because the plaintiff could make a 

 

∗ The Honorable J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge for the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC. 3

parallel transfer. Because the bench thus complied with the 

1991 standards and had not been altered since March 15, 

2012, it fell within a safe harbor and was not required to 

comply with the newer ADAAG standards promulgated in 

2010.

The panel also affirmed the district court’s denial of 

defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the ADA and 

28 U.S.C. § 1927.

COUNSEL

Scottlyn J. Hubbard IV (argued), Law Offices of Lynn 

Hubbard, Chico, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant/CrossAppellee.

David Warren Peters (argued), California Justice Alliance, 

APC, San Diego, California, for DefendantAppellee/Cross-Appellant.

OPINION

MOTZ, Senior District Judge:

Chris Kohler appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to defendant Flava Enterprises Inc. 

(“Flava”), on Kohler’s claim under Title III of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Kohler appeals 

only the district court’s conclusion that a dressing room 

bench longer than forty-eight inches complies with the 

Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines 

(“ADAAG”). We affirm. Flava cross-appeals the district 

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4 KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC.

court’s denial of Flava’s motion for attorneys’ fees. We 

affirm the district court’s ruling on attorneys’ fees.

I.

Kohler is disabled and uses a wheelchair. In February 

2010 he visited Flava’s retail clothing store “House of 

Flava” to browse and try on clothing. While doing so, he 

allegedly encountered various barriers that interfered with 

his ability to use and enjoy “House of Flava.” The barrier 

he encountered that is relevant to this appeal was a bench in 

the dressing room that was longer than forty-eight inches 

and ran along the entire length of the dressing room wall. 

This arrangement prevented Kohler from making a 

diagonal transfer onto the bench from his wheelchair.

Kohler filed suit against Flava alleging violations of 

Title III of the ADA; the California Disabled Persons Act 

(“DPA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 54; the Unruh Civil Rights Act, 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51; and the California Health and Safety 

Code. The parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment. The district court granted Flava’s motion for 

summary judgment on all of Kohler’s ADA claims, and 

declined to exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims. 

Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (S.D. 

Cal. 2011). Flava timely appealed only the district court’s

ruling with respect to the bench length.

Following the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, Flava filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, litigation 

expenses, and costs under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205; 

Section 1927, 28 U.S.C. § 1927; and the “inherent power of 

the court.” Flava argued that Kohler’s lawsuit was 

frivolous. The district court denied Flava’s motion and 

Flava timely cross-appealed that decision.

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KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC. 5

II.

We review the granting of summary judgment de novo. 

Curley v. City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 631 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A district court’s decision to deny a motion for 

attorneys’ fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Skaff v. 

Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 837 

(9th Cir. 2007).

III.

Title III of the ADA requires public accommodations to 

provide equal access to disabled patrons. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(a). To clarify what constitutes “equal access” in 

specific circumstances, the Department of Justice has 

promulgated the Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) that 

specify precise structural requirements. See, e.g., Chapman 

v. Pier I Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 

2011) (en banc). Regarding dressing room benches, the 

1991 ADAAG standards require that:

[E]very accessible dressing room shall have 

a 24 in by 48 in . . . bench fixed to the wall 

along the longer dimension. . . . Clear floor 

space shall be provided alongside the bench 

to allow a person using a wheelchair to make 

a parallel transfer onto the bench.

28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.35.4 (emphasis added).

The 1991 ADAAG also contain an “equivalent 

facilitation” provision. See id. Pt. 36, App. D § 2.2. This 

allows “[d]epartures from particular technical and scoping 

requirements” of the ADAAG, if those variations “provide 

substantially equivalent or greater access to and usability of 

the facility.” Id. Pt. 36, App. A § 2.2.

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6 KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC.

The parties stipulate that the bench is longer than the 

required forty-eight inches. Given the ADAAG’s use of 

the word “shall,” it is clear that the bench does not comply 

with the guideline’s mandate. The issue is then whether the 

bench qualifies as an “equivalent facilitation” under the 

ADAAG. We conclude that it does.

The key fact is that Kohler admitted he could perform a 

parallel transfer onto the bench in Flava’s store. See 

Kohler, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (citing Kohler’s 

deposition). The guidelines only require that a person 

“using a wheelchair” be able “to make a parallel transfer 

onto the bench.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.35.4. Given 

Kohler’s ability to do so, the bench at Flava “provide[s] 

substantially equivalent or greater access” to him. Id. Pt. 

36, App. A, § 2.2. Accordingly, it qualifies as an 

equivalent facilitation.

Kohler attempts to avoid this conclusion with two 

arguments. First, he claims that he did not receive adequate 

notice because Flava did not properly plead equivalent 

facilitation as an affirmative defense. The district court 

rejected this argument, and we agree. Flava pleaded in its 

answer that its store was compliant due to its use of 

“alternative methods” of accessibility. This term does stem 

from a distinct portion of the ADA apart from the 

equivalent facilitation. Compare 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(v) (alternative methods) with 28 C.F.R. 

Pt. 36, App. A § 2.2 (equivalent facilitation). Nonetheless, 

the “fair notice” required by the pleading standards only 

requires describing the defense in “general terms.” 

5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 1274 (3d ed. 1998). We will not 

disturb the district court’s finding that Kohler received 

sufficient notice.

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KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC. 7

Second, Kohler argues that because the bench is not 

exactly forty-eight inches, it does not comply with the 1991 

ADAAG and must comply with the newer ADAAG 

guidelines promulgated in 2010. The 2010 guidelines

require that “seats [] are 42 inches [] long minimum,” and 

that a minimum of “30 inches . . . by 48 inches” of clear 

space is provided at the end of the bench. 36 C.F.R. Pt. 

1191, App. D §§ 305, 903. Clear space at the end of the 

bench allows disabled persons the ability to make a distinct 

maneuver, known as a diagonal transfer, onto the bench.

Kohler’s argument misinterprets the statutory scheme. 

The 2010 guidelines went into effect on March 15, 2012. 

See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(2)(ii)(B). The guidelines 

explicitly contain a “safe harbor” provision, however, 

which provides that accommodations, which have not been 

altered in existing facilities on or after March 15, 2012, and 

that complied with the 1991 guidelines, are not required to 

be modified to conform to the 2010 standards. 28 C.F.R. 

§ 36.304(d)(2)(i).

Kohler’s argument then must be that if the bench is an 

“equivalent facilitation” under the 1991 standards, it is noncompliant, and as a result, it is required to comply with the 

2010 standards. But Kohler has not cited any authority 

which indicates that an “equivalent facilitation” is noncompliant. By definition, an equivalent facilitation 

provides “equal or greater access” to disabled patrons—it 

cannot provide less access. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 2.2. 

To say that such a facilitation is non-compliant would 

undermine Congress’s objective in including the 

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8 KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC.

“equivalent facilitation” provision in the ADA.1 We thus 

hold that a longer bench that permits patrons to complete a 

parallel transfer is an equivalent facilitation under the 1991 

ADAAG. For accommodations that have not been altered 

since March 15, 2012, the facilities are not required to be 

equipped to allow a diagonal transfer. This ruling makes 

explicit what a panel of this court suggested in an 

unpublished decision in 2014. See Martinez v. Columbia 

Sportswear USA Corp., 553 F. App’x 760, 762 (9th Cir. 

2014).2

 

1 Holding that an equivalent facilitation was non-compliant and 

required to adhere to the 2010 guidelines would also lead to 

incongruent results. Counsel for Kohler admitted as much at oral 

argument when he conceded that a bench forty-eight inches in length 

and surrounded by walls on three sides would not allow a disabled 

person to complete a diagonal transfer, but would be compliant under 

the 1991 ADAAG. A bench that is governed by the 1991 ADAAG, in 

Kohler’s logic, only has to be constructed to permit a diagonal transfer 

when it is longer than forty-eight inches.

2 Kohler relies on two district court decisions that denied defendants’ 

motions for summary judgment on the bench issue. See Rush v. Hyun 

Suk Kim, 908 F.Supp.2d 1117 (C.D. Cal 2012); Strong v. Horton Plaza, 

LP, et al., Case No. 3:09–cv–2901–JM (NLSx), Doc. No. 82, at 4–5

(S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2010). These decisions were decided prior to 

Martinez. Furthermore, they did not hold that a bench longer than 48 

inches was non-compliant, only that the determination if a bench were 

compliant was a factual issue to be resolved at trial. This opinion 

makes explicit that a bench longer than forty-eight inches that allows 

for a person to make a parallel transfer is an equivalent facilitation 

under the 1991 ADAAG.

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KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC. 9

IV.

We affirm the district court’s denial of Flava’s motion 

for attorneys’ fees. Flava seeks attorneys’ fees under the 

ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205. We have held that civil 

defendants can be awarded fees under this statute only in 

exceptional circumstances. Summers v. Teichert, 127 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997). Such circumstances include 

complaints that are “frivolous, unreasonable, or without 

foundation.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Kohler’s claims were not frivolous. The claims 

resulted in us interpreting a provision of the ADA for the 

first time in a published opinion and clarifying a question 

with split district court decisions. Kohler was entitled to 

bring this suit to seek resolution of this question.

Flava also seeks fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This 

statute requires proving that the opposing party acted with

“subjective bad faith.” New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. 

Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 

Estate of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(“Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or 

recklessly raises a frivolous argument . . . or argues a 

meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent

. . . .”) (internal citations omitted).

Flava makes allegations of subjective bad faith but 

there is no evidence in the record to support its claims. 

Moreover, nothing in the record would substantiate 

sanctions under the court’s inherent power. Accordingly, 

the district court’s ruling on the fees is affirmed.

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10 KOHLER V. FLAVA ENTERPRISES, INC.

V.

The district court did not err in granting summary 

judgment to Flava and in denying Flava’s motion for 

attorneys’ fees.

AFFIRMED.

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