Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLY LOUEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO; BRIAN TWEDT,

Defendants.

1:04-CV-06556 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

1. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Holly Louen (“Louen”) moves for reconsideration of

a June 21, 2007 Order denying her motion for summary judgment on

collateral estoppel grounds. In the alternative Louen moves the

court to certify its ruling. Defendants oppose the motion. 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Louen filed her complaint on November 15, 2004. (Doc. 1,

Complaint.) On November 16, 2006 Louen filed a motion for

summary judgment. (Doc. 166, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.) On December 4, 2006 the City of Fresno and Officer

Twedt opposed Louen’s motion. (Doc. 177, City of Fresno’s

Opposition to Motion; Doc. 185, Twedt’s Opposition.) Louen filed

her reply on March 20, 2007. (Doc. 202, Reply to Opposition.) 

The court issued an order on June 21, 2007 denying Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 220, Order Denying

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment). 

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On June 22, 2007, Louen filed a motion for reconsideration

for the court’s June 21 order. (Doc. 223, Motion for

Reconsideration.) On July 6, 2007 The City of Fresno and Officer

Twedt filed oppositions to Louen’s motion. (Doc. 225, City of

Fresno’s Opposition; Doc. 226, Officer Twedt’s Opposition.) 

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arises from Louen’s complaint alleging a

violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by the City of

Fresno and Police Officer Brian Twedt (“Twedt”). 

Prior to the initiation of this action, the California

Superior Court, County of Fresno issued an order on June 30, 2004

granting Louen injunctive relief under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

527.6 against Officer Twedt. The Superior Court issued the

following findings: 

1. The incidents in February and March of 2003 as 

alleged indicate specific attempts to annoy the 

plaintiff by interfering in the movement of her 

vehicle. 

2. The incidents of March 7, 2004 as alleged 

indicates an attempt by the defendant to harass or

annoy the plaintiff by following her and passing 

her in a one lane area on a police motorcycle. 

3. An incident on March 16, 2004 as alleged indicates

the defendant tried to annoy plaintiff by shining

his police motorcycle lights in the direction of 

the petitioner and her mother at approximately

11:00 p.m. for several minutes. 

4. An incident on March 26, 2004 as alleged 

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indicates that the defendant impeded plaintiff’s 

husband in a nearby intersection by sitting 

through an entire green signal speeding through 

the yellow signal preventing Mr. Louen from 

proceeding. 

5. An incident on April 27, 2004 as alleged indicates

that defendant impeded plaintiff’s travel entry 

into their neighborhood. 

6. The incident on April 30, 2004 as alleged 

indicates that defendant impeded Louen at an

intersection by sitting through an entire green 

signal and speeding off through the yellow signal 

preventing plaintiff from entering the 

intersection on the green signal, though 

petitioner apparently honked to advise the signal 

was green. 

7. Further, within minutes thereafter the defendant 

harassed plaintiff at the gated entrance to the 

housing complex as petitioner drove up to enter. 

As plaintiff drove behind the defendant, defendant

exited his vehicle and walked quickly and 

aggressively towards plaintiff’s vehicle and 

yelled loudly something to the effect, “You bitch.

Get a life,” and other foul language. 

8. This incident was documented when Louen 

snapped a picture of the defendant as he stood 

outside her vehicle. 

9. She then proceeded to drive around him into the 

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complex, the gate apparently being open. 

10. Each party drove to their respective residence. 

11. Plaintiff closed her garage door as she believed 

defendant was coming across the street to approach

her. 

12. Mr. Twedt thereafter called the Clovis Police 

Department to report plaintiff had bumped him, and

plaintiff called minutes later to report defendant

had assaulted her. 

13. Plaintiff denied hitting defendant’s vehicle, and 

no damage was found on either car. 

14. The court found that though most of the incidents 

if standing alone would lack sufficient strength 

to suggest a continuing trend of harassment, 

together they indicate a knowing, willful course 

of conduct and entails a pattern or series of acts

over a period of time evidencing a continuity of 

purpose. 

15. The court further found that the acts were 

directed at the specific person of Louen or 

family. 

16. The defendant annoyed or harassed Louen in that 

these actions or acts have served no legitimate 

purpose. 

17. In addition, the court finds that the severe 

emotional distress of plaintiff was caused by 

defendant’s acts, and that a reasonable person 

under similar circumstances might suffer such 

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distress. 

18. The court further found that the defendants’ acts 

taken as a whole are not constitutionally 

protected activity; therefore, the court found by 

the standard of clear and convincing evidence that

there is substantial evidence to sustain the 

petition for injunctive relief on behalf of 

petitioner pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

Section 527.6(b)(3). 

(Doc. 166, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C).

The day after filing her complaint in federal court, Louen

moved for summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds. Louen

argued that the federal court should give preclusive effect to

the state court findings based on collateral estoppel and find in

her favor. On June 21, 2007, Louen’s motion for summary judgment

was denied. She now moves for reconsideration of the June 21

order. 

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 60(b) permits reconsideration of a judgment or order of

the district court on grounds of: 1) mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) newly discovered evidence that

supports grounds for a new trial under Rule 59; 3) fraud of an

adverse party; 4) judgment is void; 5) judgment has been

satisfied, released or discharged; or 6) any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(b).

Rule 60 reconsideration is generally appropriate in three

instances: 1) when there has been an intervening change of

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 Local Rule 78-230(k) permits reconsideration of: 1

any motion [that] has been granted or denied in whole or

in part, . . . [upon motion] setting forth the material

facts and circumstances surrounding each motion for which

reconsideration is sought, including: 

(1) when and to what Judge the prior motion was made,

(2) what ruling, decision or order was made thereon, and

(3) what new or different facts or circumstances are

claimed to exist which did not exist or were not

shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds

exist for the motion.

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controlling law, 2) new evidence has come to light, or 3) when

necessary to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.

School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1236, 114 S.Ct. 2742, 129 L.Ed.2d

861 (1994); see also L.R. 78-230(k), Local Rules of the Eastern

District. "A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to 1

reargue a motion or to present evidence which should have been

raised before." Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of America, 820 F.

Supp. 834, 856 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3rd Cir.

1994). "A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a

disagreement with the Court's decision. . . . [R]ecapitulation

of the cases and arguments considered by the Court before

rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's

burden." Id. To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of

a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its

prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of

Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part

and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214

(1988).

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“Clause 60(b)(6) is residual and must be read as being

exclusive of the preceding clauses.” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes,

S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Rule 60(b)(6) “is

reserved for <extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. Motions to

reconsider under Rule 60(b) are committed to the discretion of

the trial court. Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir.

1983)(en banc).

Louen argues that the court committed clear error in its

July 21, 2007 order denying her motion for summary judgment. She

requests reconsideration of the order. 

5. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

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the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Louen moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of

collateral estoppel. In order for Louen to succeed, she must

make a showing that establishes as a matter of law, the existence

of the elements essential to collateral estoppel and on which she

will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

B. Collateral Estoppel

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, state judicial proceedings “shall

have the same full faith and credit in every court within the

United States... as they have by law or usage in the courts of

such state... from which they are taken. Marrese v. American

Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). This

statute directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of

the state in which judgment was rendered. Id.; see also, Diruzza

v. County of Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and

decided in prior proceedings. Id. A party who asserts the bar

of collateral estoppel bears the burden of demonstrating each of

its elements. Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 138 Cal. App. 4th

593, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006.) An earlier ruling will be given

collateral estoppel effect when (1) the issue is identical to

that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue was actually

litigated and (3) necessarily decided; (4) the doctrine is

asserted against a party to the former action or one who was in

privity with such a party; and (5) the former decision is final

and was made on the merits. Id. Under California law, a

judgment is not final during the pendency of and until the

resolution of an appeal. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923,

928 (9th Cir. 2006); Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434,

1439 (9th Cir. 1985).

i. The Issues in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not identical,

were not actually litigated, or necessarily decided by

the § 527.6 proceeding in state court. 

In her motion for reconsideration, Louen argues that the

June 21 order “seems to be based on two completely erroneous

premises: (1) that the state court appeal proceedings remain

pending; and (2) that proceedings under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §

527.6 are not entitled to preclusive effect because they are

subject to modification at any time.” However, Louen fails to

address in any of the pleadings how the issues in the § 527.6

state proceeding were identical to those now brought in this

action, whether they were actually litigated, and necessarily

decided by the Superior Court. 

Louen brings an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a

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violation of her First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights

as well as for violations of Substantive and Procedural Due

Process and Equal Protection. Louen also requests declaratory

relief and asserts various state causes of action including

intentional infliction of emotional distress and a state civil

rights violation under California Civil Code § 52.1. In its June

21 order, the court erroneously stated that the issues Louen

seeks to preclude are identical to those established in the state

court’s findings of fact. 

The issues in the Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 527.6 proceeding

involve a showing by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff

has been harassed so as to be entitled to injunctive relief. 

Grant v. Clampitt, 56 Cal. App. 4th 586, 591 (Cal Ct. App. 

1997). Harassment is defined as a “knowing and willful course of

conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms,

annoys, or harasses the person and which serves no legitimate

purpose.” Id.; see also, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 527.6 (b). 

Louen fails to provide any argument or authority that the issues

established in a § 527.6 proceeding are identical to the elements

of claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which involve violation of

rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution or some federal law

under the color of law that resulted in damage. 

a. Louen’s First Amendment Claim

Louen’s first claim is for a violation of her First

Amendment right to be free from retaliation for speaking out

against a government official. (Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 13, Filed

November 15, 2004.) To demonstrate retaliation in violation of

the First Amendment, Louen must first prove that Defendant took

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action that “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness

from future First Amendment activities.” Skoog v. County of

Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1231-1232 (9th Cir. 2006). Second,

Louen must prove causation. Id. She must ultimately show that

Officer Twedt’s intent to cause the chilling effect was a but for

cause of his action. Id. 

For collateral estoppel purposes, Louen provides no evidence

that any of the issues in her First Amendment claim were

presented to, decided, or are identical to the harassment issues

already decided by the state court as to Twedt in the § 527.6; or

that the First Amendment § 1983 issues were actually litigated

and necessarily decided. The § 527.6 proceeding involved a

different inquiry with different legal issues from issues

presented by a First Amendment § 1983 claim. The state court

proceeding established the following: 

1. That though most of the incidents if standing

alone would lack sufficient strength to suggest a

continuing trend of harassment, together they

indicate a knowing, willful course of conduct and

entails a pattern or series of acts over a period

of time evidencing a continuity of purpose. 

2. That the acts were directed at the specific person

of Louen or family. 

3. The defendant annoyed or harassed Louen in that

these actions or acts have served no legitimate

purpose. 

4. That the severe emotional distress of plaintiff

was caused by defendant’s acts, and that a

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reasonable person under similar circumstances

might suffer such distress. 

5. That the defendants’ acts taken as a whole are not

constitutionally protected activity; therefore, by

clear and convincing evidence that there is

substantial evidence to sustain the petition for

injunctive relief on behalf of petitioner pursuant

to Code of Civil Procedure Section 527.6(b)(3). 

(Doc. 166, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C).

Plaintiff does not provide the state court record to show

that any of Louen’s First Amendment claim issues were addressed

in any way in the state court proceeding. Louen fails to provide

any legal analysis or law showing that collateral estoppel

applies to her present § 1983 claims. The state court did not

address any allegation that Officer Twedt’s harassment was

motivated by a desire to cause a chilling effect to Louen’s

speech. Louen also fails to show that the issue of causation and

damages were addressed in the § 526.7 proceeding. Her complaint

does not allege that Officer Twedt intended to cause a chilling

effect on her freedom of expression. 

The motion for reconsideration of the June 21st order for

Louen’s First Amendment claim is DENIED. 

b. Louen’s Substantive Due Process Claim

Louen asserts a violation of her substantive due process

rights by Officer Twedt. The issues raised by the necessary

elements of a substantive due process claim are that Louen must

first show a deprivation of her liberty and, second, that Officer

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 Examples of Ninth Circuit cases that shock the conscience 2

are: Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 2001)(police

officer’s conduct was found to “shock the conscience” because

officers sexually assaulted the Plaintiff); United States v.

Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991)(outrageous government

conduct found where the government engineered and directed the

criminal enterprise from start to finish); United States v.

Bogard, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986)(outrageous government

conduct found where police have been brutal in employing physical

or psychological coercion against the defendant.). Twedt’s

actions in this case although not trivial, reflect a personal

controversy and do not per se rise, as a matter of law, to the

level of “conscience shocking” behavior, nor did the state court

so find.

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Twedt’s behavior “shocked the conscience.” Brittain v. Hansen,

451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Louen neither alleges nor has evidence to prove that the §

527.6 proceeding addressed whether she was deprived of her

liberty as a result of Officer Twedt’s actions and whether such

actions were so egregious that they “shock the conscience.” In 2

her complaint, Louen alleges several instances of Defendant

interfering with the movement of her vehicle. The state court

findings issued on June 30, 2004 found that Officer Twedt

attempted to annoy Louen, impede her travel into her

neighborhood, and engage in a pattern of these acts for the

purposes of harassing her. (Doc. 166, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Exhibit C). This, however, does not establish

that Officer Twedt’s actions were committed to deprive Louen of

her liberty, for substantive due process purposes, or that his

actions were so egregious that they “shocked the conscience.” 

Louen provides no fact or law to establish otherwise. 

Motion for reconsideration of the June 21 order for Louen’s

substantive due process claim is DENIED. 

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c. Louen’s Procedural Due Process Claim

Louen also brings a § 1983 claim for a violation of her

procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Fourteenth Amendment protects one from deprivations of

property or liberty without procedural due process. Lebbos v.

Judges of Superior Court, 883 F.2d 810, 818 (1989). Due process

requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner. Id. 

There is no evidence in the record that this issue was

presented to the state court or that the state court addressed

the issues of whether Louen’s procedural due process rights were

violated by Officer Twedt so as to cause § 1983 damages. 

Further, Louen does not specify what constitutional liberty

interest she was deprived of, nor does she allege that she did

not have an opportunity to be heard. 

The motion for reconsideration of the June 21 order for

Louen’s procedural due process claim is DENIED. 

d. Equal Protection

Louen’s final claim is for violation of her equal protection

rights. To state such a claim, Louen must show that Officer

Twedt intentionally discriminated against her based on her

membership in a protected class. See Barren v. Harrington, 152

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Louen has not provided evidence that she is a member of a

protected class. She has entirely failed to show that the issue

of her status as a member of a protected class was at issue in

the state court proceeding, that it was actually litigated, and

decided. 

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 There is no dispute that Officer Twedt was a party to the 3

§ 527.6 action or that the same party requirement for collateral

estoppel is met as to Officer Twedt. 

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The motion for reconsideration of the June 21 order for

Louen’s Equal Protection claim is DENIED. 

ii. The City of Fresno Was Not a Party to the § 527.6

Proceeding

It is unclear whether Louen seeks reconsideration of the

denial of summary judgment as to the City of Fresno. It was

equally unclear from Louen’s pleadings in her motion for summary

judgment whether she was asserting that collateral estoppel

applied to the City of Fresno or only to Officer Twedt,

individually. 

The fourth requirement for application of collateral

estoppel is that the doctrine only operates against a party to

the former action or one who was in privity with such a party

with the same incentive to litigate. See Jenkins, 138 Cal. App.

4th at 617. Louen does not address this requirement in her

motion for reconsideration. The City of Fresno was not a party

to the § 527.6 proceeding and had no opportunity to fully

litigate the issues. Further, as stated in the June 21 order,

there is a factual dispute as to whether the City of Fresno and

Officer Twedt were in privity when the alleged unlawful acts

occurred and whether Officer Twedt was acting in the course and

scope of his public employment. None of these issues were heard

or decided by the state court. 

To the extent that Louen seeks reconsideration of the June

21 order denying summary judgment against the City of Fresno, the

motion is DENIED.3

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 There is no dispute that Officer Twedt was the only 4

defendant in the state court proceeding. 

 “The Acts of legislature of any State, Territory, or 5

Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be

authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or

Possession thereto.

The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any

such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be

proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and

its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk

and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a

certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is

in proper form.

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iii. Final Decision on the Merits

Louen’s only argument for applying the doctrine of

collateral estoppel to this case is that the state court

injunctive proceeding is a final judgment on the merits. At the

time that Louen requested summary judgment on collateral estoppel

grounds, Officer Twedt’s request for an appeal was pending. 

However, Louen incorrectly argues that the June 21 order was

issued on only two grounds: 1) that the state court appeal

proceedings remain pending and (2) that proceedings under

California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6 are not entitled to

preclusive effect because they are subject to modification at any

time. The June 21 order was issued based on Louen’s failure to

meet her burden of demonstrating each collateral estoppel

element. 

Louen first argues that the state court decision is final

since Twedt’s appeal was denied. This, in no way establishes

that the issues in both proceedings are identical, that the

issues were actually litigated, and necessarily decided.4

Louen next argues that the state court proceedings are

entitled to preclusive effect under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Under 28 5

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Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies

thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and

credit in every court within the United States and its

Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the

courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are

taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2007).

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U.S.C. § 1738, an injunction issued by one state court is

entitled to full faith and credit by another court. However,

Louen does not seek a § 527.6 injunction against Defendants in

this civil rights action, nor does she seek to have this court

give the state preclusive effect. Louen instead argues that the

state court’s factual and legal findings to support the issuance

of the injunction against Officer Twedt, necessarily requires a

finding that Twedt violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This argument is

legally incorrect. The state court never made a finding that

Twedt was acting under color of state law in the course and scope

of his employment. 

Also, Louen argues that this court should apply the

preclusive effect that state courts, not federal courts, would

give to the § 527.6 judgment. The June 21 order was based on

Louen’s failure to meet her burdens of collateral estoppel under

state law as delineated by Jenkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 617. 

Louen fails to meet all the elements of the collateral estoppel

doctrine required by state law. 

Finally, Louen argues that the § 527.6 injunction against

Officer Twedt is a final judgment on the merits because his

appeal was denied. However, a preliminary injunction is a

provisional remedy, and the trial court “possesses the inherent

power to modify its preliminary injunction which is of a

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 28 U.S.C. provides: 6

“When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable under this section,

shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal from the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he

shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of

such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an

appeal to be taken from such order, if application is

made to it within ten days after the entry of the

order: Provided, however, that application for an

appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the

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continuing or executory nature.” Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc.

v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th

1228, 1248-1249 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §

532; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997). “There is no

inflexible rule as to the effect of the granting or denial of a

preliminary injunction on subsequent litigation, unless it

appears that the court intended a final adjudication of the issue

involved, a decision on an application for a preliminary

injunction does not amount to a decision on the ultimate rights

in controversy.” Id. The record reveals no such intention by

the court. No evidence is provided that final judgment has been

entered in the state court, only a preliminary injunction. Louen

does not establish that the preliminary injunction is a final

judgment finally deciding the ultimate rights in controversy

under the federal civil rights act. 

6. MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION

In the alternative, Louen moves that the court certify its

ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). There are three factors 6

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district court unless the district judge or the Court

of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.

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that must be met under §1292(b) before the court can certify a

decision for immediate interlocutory appeal. Louen must

demonstrate that (1) there is a controlling question of law, (2)

that there be substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and

(3) that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation. In re Cement Antitrust

Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). 

A. There is No Controlling Question of Law 

Louen has failed to establish that there is a controlling

question of law in this case. For a question of law to be

“controlling” Louen must show that resolution of these issues on

appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation. Id.

at 1026. Louen instead argues that a denial of both

reconsideration and certification “would present a realistic

prospect of multiple month long trials in a non-catastrophic

damages case.” (Doc. 223, Motion for Reconsideration.) She

further argues that it is in the interest of justice “to correct

and resolve these disputed legal issues before proceeding to

trial.” (Id.)

Even, arguendo, if all the state injunction findings were

given preclusive effect, none of them address or decide the

essential elements of the civil rights claims advanced in this

case. The resolution of these issues could not alter the outcome

of this litigation as they do not constitute findings on required

elements to be decided in this case. 

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B. There is No Substantial Grounds for Difference of Opinion. 

Louen has not articulated what rule of law she believes was

wrongly applied and how other courts have substantially differed

in that application. Plaintiff erroneously relies on Ritchie v.

Conrad, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) in support of

her argument that “restraining order proceedings in California

are generally accorded the same preclusive effect as any other

civil judgments.” The issue in Ritchie was whether a restrained

party could relitigate the underlying facts of a restraining

order, in the family law/domestic violence context, when the

protected party applies for an extension of the restraining

order. As defendant’s supplemental brief correctly asserts,

Ritchie, does not address finality and the preclusive effect of a

preliminary injunction. 

In Ritchie, “the court was looking at the exact same

situation, the same order, the same case, the same courtroom,

nothing was new.” Here, the primary rights involved are

completely different. In the restraining order context, the

primary right is to be free from harassing behavior, the primary

rights in this case are civil rights protected by the federal and

state constitution. In this case, plaintiff does not attempt to

renew the restraining order, but rather seeks damages for

violation of her civil rights. A different legal standard

applies in these two distinctly different situations.

Louen cannot succeed on her reconsideration or underlying

issue preclusion claims. 

//

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C. Immediate Appeal Would Not Materially Advance the Ultimate 

Termination of the Litigation

Louen has not shown how an appeal of the denial of her

motion for summary judgment would advance ultimate termination of

this litigation. To allow an appeal could result in another

continuance of the trial date, after the case has been previously

continued to accommodate the issue raised by Plainiff’s counsel. 

Trial in this matter is set for September 5, 2007. All discovery

was closed on October 20, 2006 pursuant to a Stipulation and

Order to Extend Dates filed on September 20, 2006. (Doc. 151.) 

This action was filed on November 15, 2004 and must go to trial

without further delay. 

7. CONCLUSION

For the reason’s stated above: 

Louen’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

Louen’s motion for certification for interlocutory appeal is

also DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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