Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00958/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00958-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Ronald Lemas v. State of California, et al., Case No. CV 061983.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD LEMAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JILL BROWN, et al., 

Defendants. /

No. C 07-00958 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 

BROWN’S MOTION TO DISMISS

On August 17, 2007, the Court heard argument on defendant Jill Brown’s motion to dismiss.

Having considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, and for good cause shown,

the Court DENIES defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

On May 9, 2006, plaintiff Ronald Lemas, then a prisoner at Avenal State Prison, filed a civil

action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Marin.1

 On February 15, 2007,

defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

 Lemas’s claims arise out of two separate events that occurred while he was incarcerated at San

Quentin State Prison. The first event was a fall suffered by Lemas on the way to a hearing within the

prison. On or about April 18, 2005, Does 1-30, guards at San Quentin, escorted Lemas from his cell to

another location for a hearing. Before taking Lemas to the hearing, Does 1-30 handcuffed his hands

behind his back. During the walk to the hearing, while handcuffed, Lemas fell down a flight of stairs.

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Lemas alleges that the fall resulted in severe injuries to his back and other parts of his body. The

remainder of Lemas’s claims arise out of an alleged denial of “good time” credits. Lemas claims that

Does 31-50 wrongfully denied him these credits, resulting in an extra 90 days of incarceration.

After conducting a screening review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court dismissed several of

plaintiff’s claims against various defendants. Defendant Jill Brown has now moved to dismiss the

remainder of plaintiff’s claims for failure to fully exhaust his administrative remedies.

LEGAL STANDARD

A prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a matter in abatement. Defendants

have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion, and may do so by way of an

unenumerated Rule12(b) motion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). “In deciding

a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20, citing Ritza v. Int'l Longshoremen's &

Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1988). The court can decide factual issues in a

jurisdictional or related type of motion because there is no right to a jury trial as to that portion of the

case, unlike the merits of the case (where there is a right to a jury trial). See id. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant Brown requests that the Court dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims because he failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by Federal law. For the following reasons, the Court

DENIES defendant’s request.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), provides in pertinent part: “No action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as

are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The State of California provides its inmates and

parolees the right to “appeal” administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy

perceived by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” See 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must

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proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC

602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level

appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. See id. § 3084.5; Ngo v. Woodford,

126 S. Ct. 2378, 2383 (2006); Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997).

Exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 524 (2002). All available remedies must be exhausted; those remedies “need not meet federal

standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Id. (citation omitted). Even when the

prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to suit. Id.; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 534 U.S. at

532. The PLRA exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” of available administrative

remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006).

In this case, plaintiff first argues that because he is no longer incarcerated, the PLRA exhaustion

requirements do not apply to him. The Ninth Circuit, however, in Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140

(9th Cir. 2000), held that “individuals who, at the time they seek to file their civil actions, are detained

as a result of being accused of, convicted of, or sentenced for criminal offenses are ‘prisoners’ within

the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e and 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” (emphasis added). Plaintiff here was

detained for a criminal offense at the time he filed this action, and the PLRA exhaustion requirements

therefore apply to him.

 Plaintiff next argues that he is not suing over prison “conditions,” and therefore the PLRA

exhaustion requirements do not apply. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected such an argument in

Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. In Porter, the Supreme Court expressly held that the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances

or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Id. at 532.

Plaintiff offers no authority supporting a contrary position. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent,

his claims are based on prison conditions and governed by the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.

Plaintiff’s third argument is that no “administrative remedies” were “available” to him. As

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mentioned above, the PLRA requires exhaustion of “such administrative remedies as are available.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court addressed the issue of what constitutes an “available”

“remedy” in Booth, 532 U.S. at 731. Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed “whether an inmate

seeking only money damages must complete a prison administrative process that could provide some

sort of relief on the complaint stated, but no money.” 532 U.S. at 734. The Court answered in the

affirmative, holding that while “some redress for a wrong is presupposed by the statute's requirement

of an ‘available’ ‘remedy,’” id. at 736, “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless

of the relief offered through administrative procedures,” id. at 741. 

Interpreting Booth, the Ninth Circuit held in Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2004), that

“the statutory language does not require exhaustion when no pertinent relief can be obtained through

the internal process.” Id. at 935 (emphasis in original). “The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies

persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, and

because failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, “a defendant must demonstrate that pertinent relief

remained available.” Id. at 936-37. The court continued:

Relevant evidence in so demonstrating would include statutes, regulations, and other

official directives that explain the scope of the administrative review process;

documentary or testimonial evidence from prison officials who administer the review

process; and information provided to the prisoner concerning the operation of the

grievance procedure in this case, such as in the response memoranda in these cases.

With regard to the latter category of evidence, information provided the prisoner is

pertinent because it informs our determination of whether relief was, as a practical

matter, “available.” 

Id. at 937 (citing case). 

The Ninth Circuit then applied its interpretation of Booth to the cases of two California prisoners

before it. In the first case, the plaintiff proceeded only through the second of three possible levels of

formal appeal provided by California’s Department of Corrections. See id. at 929-30. Consequently,

the defendants argued that he had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit

held: “While [defendant] argues that an appeal to the [third] level might have netted additional relief

to [plaintiff], he produced no evidence . . . that it could have.” Id. at 939.

The evidence [defendant] submitted consisted of a declaration from the Chief of the

Inmate Appeals Branch confirming that [plaintiff] did not file an appeal relating to this

case at the third level and an appeal [plaintiff] did file at the third level regarding an

entirely separate incident, involving a different corrections officer. This evidence does

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Furthermore, the Court is skeptical that mere investigation, without potential consequences,

constitutes a “remedy.” 

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not demonstrate that the appeals process could have, or did, yield any relief under

circumstances similar to those here.

Id. 

In lieu of evidence, [defendant] now proffers that, “one can easily imagine actions that

[the Department] could have taken to provide relief to [plaintiff]. For example, the

[Department] could have transferred [defendant] to a different post, transferred [plaintiff]

to a different cell or prison, or modified its policies and procedures concerning the use

of pepper spray. At a minimum, CDC could have afforded Brown another opportunity

to be heard.” (Emphasis added.) Establishing, as an affirmative defense, the existence

of further “available” administrative remedies requires evidence, not imagination.

Id. at 939-40. 

The Court finds that in this case, as in Brown, defendant has provided no evidence to

“demonstrate that the appeals process could have, or did, yield any relief under circumstances similar

to those here,” id. at 939. With respect to the staircase incident, defendant states only: “If Plaintiff had

filed an inmate appeal, prison officials could have investigated the allegation, providing an

administrative record of the incident.” Reply at 3:24-26; see also Mot. at 5:18-19 (“Had plaintiff filed

an administrative grievance in this case, an investigation could have been conducted, and any parties

involved could now be easily identified.”). Defendant cites no evidence in support of these statements.2

Similarly, with respect to plaintiff’s denial of “good time” credits claim, defendant states, with no

evidentiary support: “Had Plaintiff raised this issue in an administrative appeal, prison officials could

have investigated the incident, and if the allegations proved to be true, released Plaintiff from custody.”

Reply at 3:27-4:1. As the Ninth Circuit stated, “[e]stablishing, as an affirmative defense, the existence

of further ‘available’ administrative remedies requires evidence, not imagination.” Brown, 422 F.3d at

940. Defendant has thus not met her burden of establishing this affirmative defense. 

In addition to the foregoing, the Court is troubled by plaintiff’s assertion that when he explicitly

asked prison officials what he needed to do before filing a lawsuit, he was told that he needed to file a

claim with the State of California Government Claims Board. He was never told, he asserts, that he

needed to file a CDC 602 form. See Lemas Decl. ¶¶ 5-7. Defendant provides no evidence to contradict

plaintiff’s testimony, but instead argues that “[p]laintiff has admitted in his declaration that he is familiar

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with the grievance system, and therefore his argument that he did not know he had to file an inmate

appeal must fail.” Reply at 4:20-22. Were the procedures and purpose of the grievance system clear,

the Court might agree with defendant. However, California’s grievance procedures, as reflected in the

CDC 602 form, do not clearly and obviously apply to plaintiff’s situation. The instructions printed on

the 602 form, which is labeled “Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form,” state in pertinent part: “You may appeal

any policy, action or decision which has a significant adverse affect upon you.” Pl.’s Ex. 2; see also 15

Cal. Code. Reg. § 3084.1(a) (“Any inmate or parolee under the department's jurisdiction may appeal any

departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse

effect upon their welfare.”). 

Plaintiff in this case sought to complain and seek redress for being allowed to fall down a flight

of stairs while handcuffed. He was not “appealing” this action. On its face, therefore, it is not obvious

that California’s grievance procedure, which is repeatedly framed as an “appeals” process, covered

plaintiff’s grievance. The myriad cases dealing with exhaustion in the California prison system make

apparent that prison officials, the courts, and many prisoners treat form 602 as the appropriate starting

point for any sort of grievance, and not just “appeals.” See, e.g., Brown, 422 F.3d at 929 (“California’s

Department of Corrections provides a four-step grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an

administrative decision or perceived mistreatment.”) (emphasis added). However, it is reasonable that

in light of the nature of his grievance, after inquiring about the prerequisites for filing a lawsuit and

hearing no mention of the form 602, even a prisoner such as plaintiff, who is generally familiar with the

prison system and form 602, would not understand form 602 to be appropriate, much less mandatory.

See Lemas Decl. ¶ 6 (“I did not believe I was supposed to fill out a CDC 602 form . . . . I was not

appealing a ‘policy, action or decision’ . . . .”).

The parties do not cite, and the Court has not found, any case dealing with exhaustion where a

prisoner, in good-faith, reasonably believed that the ordinary administrative remedies were not

appropriate. The Second Circuit, however, has provided a useful framework for analyzing such a

situation. In Hemphill v. State of New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2004), the court stated:

a three-part inquiry is appropriate in cases where a prisoner plaintiff plausibly seeks to

counter defendants’ contention that the prisoner has failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. Depending on the inmate's

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explanation for the alleged failure to exhaust, the court must ask whether administrative

remedies were in fact “available” to the prisoner. The court should also inquire as to

whether . . . the defendants’ own actions inhibiting the inmate's exhaustion of remedies

may estop one or more of the defendants from raising the plaintiff's failure to exhaust as

a defense. If the court finds that administrative remedies were available to the plaintiff,

and that the defendants are not estopped and have not forfeited their non-exhaustion

defense, but that the plaintiff nevertheless did not exhaust available remedies, the court

should consider whether “special circumstances” have been plausibly alleged that justify

“the prisoner's failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements.”

Id. at 686 (internal citations omitted). Applying that framework to the case of a prisoner who had

allegedly been assaulted by prison guards and threatened with further violence if he reported the assault,

the Second Circuit remanded to determine: (1) “whether some seemingly available remedies were

rendered unavailable by the threats [the prisoner] received,” id. at 688; and (2) whether “threats should

estop the defendants from presenting an affirmative defense of non-exhaustion,” id. With respect to the

third inquiry, whether “special circumstances” justify non-compliance with available remedies, the

Second Circuit stated that a prisoner’s erroneous but “reasonable interpretation” of grievance procedures

may constitute such a special circumstance. Id. at 689. 

Applying the Second Circuit’s three-part inquiry to this case would cast significant doubt on

defendant’s exhaustion defense. If, in fact, prison officials told plaintiff only that he needed to file a

claim with the State of California Government Claims Board prior to filing a suit, equitable estoppel

might be appropriate. Similarly, plaintiff’s reliance on the prison officials’ instructions, coupled with

his reasonable interpretation of the function of 602 “appeals” form, may constitute “special

circumstances” excusing non-compliance with California’s grievance procedures. The Court need not

reach these decisions, however, having already found that, under Ninth Circuit law, defendant has not

met her burden of establishing the existence of “available” remedies. See Brown, 422 F.3d at 926.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby denies defendant’s motion

to dismiss. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4 , 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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