Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01463/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01463-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD JONES,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, Director of

California Department of

Corrections,

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 03cv1463 J(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENYING THIRD AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[DOC. NO. 51] AND ORDER

DENYING MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY

HEARING [DOC. NOS. 59, 72]

On July 21, 2003, Petitioner Edward Jones, a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus [doc. nos. 1, 4]. In his Third Amended Petition,

filed on June 15, 2006, Jones raises nine claims for relief: (1)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate

his alibi defense and fingerprint evidence (Ground One); (2)

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to impeach a critical

prosecution witness (Ground One-A); (3) ineffective assistance of

counsel for failure to properly advise Jones of the consequences of

rejecting a plea offer (Ground Two); (4) a violation of due process

for the trial court’s error in advising Petitioner of the possible

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sentencing consequences of rejecting a plea offer (Ground Two); (5)

insufficient evidence to support three of his convictions for

attempted robbery (Ground Three); (6) insufficient evidence to

support the sentence enhancements for use of a firearm (Ground

Four); (7) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object

to, or seek to suppress, evidence of a separate conviction (Ground

Five); (8) a violation of due process by the introduction of

irrelevant evidence of a separate conviction (Ground Six); (9) a

violation of due process for the trial court’s failure to give a

limiting instruction regarding the use of the separate conviction

evidence (Grounds Seven and Eight). (Third Am. Pet. 6-13.) 

Petitioner also claims that cumulative error resulted in a

fundamentally unfair trial. (Id. at 13-14, 48.) On October 25,

2006, Respondent filed an Answer [doc. no. 66]. Jones filed a

Traverse [doc. no. 69] on November 6, 2006.

After reviewing the Third Amended Petition, Respondent’s

Answer, the Lodgments, and Petitioner’s Traverse, this Court finds

that Jones is not entitled to the relief requested in his Third

Amended Petition and recommends that his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be DENIED for the reasons outlined below.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 9:30 a.m. on June 26, 1999, Roy French was

browsing in the showroom of Symbolic Motors, an exotic car

dealership in La Jolla, California, when he saw two men enter the

showroom. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 105-07, Nov. 2,

2000.) One of the men appeared to be talking on a cell phone. 

(Id. at 106.) The men approached French and Roger Phillips, a

Symbolic sales representative, pushed them and ordered them to the

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back of the showroom. (Id. at 107-08.) When Phillips protested,

the taller of the two men pulled out a gun. (Id. at 108.) 

The customoer, employee, and two men went to the back of the

showroom, and the shorter of the two men demanded French’s wallet

and took approximately one hundred dollars out of it. (Id. at

109.) He moved French into an office and told him to lie on the

floor. (Id.) Phillips was also moved into the office. (Id.) 

The taller man asked Phillips where the safe was. (Id. at

109-10.) Phillips replied that he did not know, and the man

slapped him. (Id. at 110.) During this time, the taller man

continued to talk on the cell phone, seemingly getting

instructions. (Id.) He then told the shorter man to “put one in

the back of his [Phillips] head” and see if Phillips could then

open the safe. (Id. at 111.) French looked up at the shorter man,

who was pointing a gun at him. (Id.) The two robbers then heard a

noise and left the office to investigate. (Id. at 112.)

Ramon Bazaldua arrived at Symbolic where he was employed as a

car detailer. (Id. at 155.) When he entered the showroom, the

taller robber approached him and asked, “Are you the big guy?” 

(Id. at 156.) Bazaldua said he was only the detailer and continued

walking across the showroom. (Id.) The man put a gun to

Bazaldua’s head and ordered him into the office where Phillips and

French had been taken. (Id.)

The shorter robber bound the hands of all three men with duct

tape and forced them to lie on the floor. (Id. at 112, 156.) When

French looked up, the taller man put his foot in French’s back,

stating “I think you’re trying to eyeball me, boy,” and threatened

to shoot him. (Id. at 112.) He asked who owned the Jaguar in the

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parking lot, and French replied that it belonged to him. (Id. at

114.) The shorter man then took the car keys out of French’s

pocket. (Id.) 

Shortly thereafter, Sean Hughes arrived for work at Symbolic

accompanied by his two daughters, ages six and eight. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 320-21, Nov. 6, 2000.) The taller man,

who Hughes later identified as Anthony Penton, approached Hughes in

the showroom and asked if he was the owner of the dealership. (Id.

at 321-22.) Hughes replied that he was not. (Id. at 322.) Penton

ordered Hughes to the back of the showroom. (Id. at 323.) Hughes

could tell from Penton’s tone that something was wrong and asked if

his daughters could wait outside in his car, but Penton said “No.” 

(Id.) 

Penton led Hughes and his daughters to the back, where they

encountered the shorter man, who Hughes later identified as Jones. 

(Id.) Penton and Jones took Hughes and his daughters to an

upstairs office where the company’s safes were located. (Id. at

324.) The men asked Hughes if he had a key to the office, and

Hughes showed them that his keys would not open the door. (Id. at

324-25.) 

Penton and Petitioner made Hughes and his daughters lie facedown on the floor. (Id. at 325.) Jones took two guns and a roll

of duct tape out of a plastic bag and taped Hughes’s hands behind

his back. (Id.) While Hughes was on the floor, Penton got a call

on his cell phone. (Id. at 326.) Petitioner handed one of the

guns to Penton, and Penton went downstairs. (Id.) Jones stayed

with Hughes and his daughters. (Id.) While playing with the gun

he was holding, Petitioner asked Hughes what he had in his pockets. 

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(Id. at 326-27.) Hughes replied that he had ten dollars and a cell

phone. Jones said he did not want the money, but he took the cell

phone and turned it off. (Id. at 328.)

About one-half hour later, Hughes heard someone yell, “He’s

running.” (Id.) Petitioner ran downstairs and did not return. 

(Id.) Hughes stayed upstairs until he heard police officers on a

bullhorn, at which point he broke free from the duct tape, locked

his daughters and himself in another upstairs office, and called 9-

1-1. (Id. at 329-31.) 

Meanwhile, Shannon Williams arrived at work around 10:15 a.m. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 43-44.) She entered the

showroom and saw Penton talking on a cell phone. (Id. at 44-45.) 

When she asked him if he needed any help, Penton pulled a gun from

his belt and told her to follow him. (Id. at 45-47.) 

Robert Kueber arrived at work shortly after Williams. (Id. at

130.) Penton showed his gun to Kueber and ordered Kueber and

Williams to go into Williams’s office. (Id. at 47, 131.) As they

crossed the showroom, Kueber turned and ran out of the building and

across the street to a gas station and called the police. (Id. at

137-38.) Penton ordered Williams into her office and told her that

if she moved he would shoot her. (Id. at 47.) Penton ran after

Kueber; Jones came down the stairs holding a gun and ran after

Penton and Kueber. (Id. at 49-50.)

Williams called the police; then she removed the duct tape

from French’s, Bazaldua’s, and Phillips’s hands. (Id. at 51-52.) 

The police arrived and, during their subsequent investigation,

recovered a plastic bag from an upstairs area of Symbolic. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 246.) The bag was later

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examined, and a fingerprint belonging to Jones was found on the

bag. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 177, 182-84.)

On June 29, 1999, three days after the robbery, Police Officer

Andrew Spear saw Petitioner speeding in a tan rental car. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 265.) When Officer Spear

approached the car, Jones sped up and turned down an alley. (Id.) 

Officer Spear turned on his lights and pursued Jones. (Id.) As he

chased Petitioner in his police car, Officer Spear saw him toss a

loaded semiautomatic handgun out of the window. (Id. at 266.) 

Jones eventually stopped and was arrested. (Id. at 264.) A

search of the car uncovered a holster that fit the gun he had

thrown out of the car. (Id. at 267.) The police learned that the

car Petitioner was driving had been rented by Penton approximately

three weeks earlier. (Id. at 310.)

Police later determined that two cell phones linked to Penton

were used to send and receive thirty-two phone calls to and from

the La Jolla area on the morning of the robbery. (See id. at 283-

92.) Upon searching Penton’s home, police found one of the phone

numbers Penton called on the morning of the robbery written on a

tablecloth. (Id. at 304.) Officers also found .45 caliber

ammunition and an Enterprise Rental Car key chain listing the make,

model, and license plate number of the car Petitioner was driving

when he was arrested. (Id. at 305-06, 310.)

During the subsequent police investigation, Williams and

Hughes identified both Penton and Jones as their attackers; Kueber

identified only Penton; and French and Bazaldua were unable to

identify either man. (Id. at 321, 323 (Hughes); Lodgment No. 2,

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Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 46, 50-51 (Williams), 115-18 (French), 148-50,

152 (Kueber), 167-68 (Bazaldua).)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The San Diego District Attorney filed an information on

September 11, 2000, charging Jones and his codefendant, Anthony

Penton, with two counts of robbery, see Cal. Penal Code § 211 (West

1999), four counts of attempted robbery, see Cal. Penal Code §§

211, 664 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007), and two counts of false

imprisonment, see Cal. Penal Code §§ 236, 237(a) (West Supp. 2007). 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 1-4, Sept. 11, 2000.) The

information also alleged that Petitioner had served four prior

prison terms and, in each of the counts, that codefendant Penton

personally used a firearm, see Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b) (West

Supp. 2007). (Id. at 6-7.) 

Prior to trial, the judge recommended that Jones plead guilty

to all charges in the information in exchange for receiving a

twelve-year sentence. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 4-5,

Nov. 1, 2000.) Petitioner rejected the offer. (Id.) Immediately

afterwards, the District Attorney filed an amended information

which added allegations that Jones personally used a firearm in the

commission of the crimes listed in each count. (Id. at 5-6;

Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 24-28, Nov. 1, 2000.) The

information was also amended to change one robbery charge to

attempted robbery. (Id. at 25.) 

Jones and Penton were tried jointly in a jury trial. The jury

convicted Petitioner of all charges and found that each of the

firearm-use allegations were true. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

vol. 2, 266-72, Nov. 8, 2000.) The prosecutor moved to dismiss two

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of the prior prison term allegations, and the motion was granted. 

(Id. at 257; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 513, Nov. 8, 2000.) 

Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on the remaining prison

priors and admitted they were true. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 2, 504-05, Nov. 7, 2000.) 

Jones subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, claiming

that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 140-41, May 18, 2001.) After

a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2, 281, June 18, 2001; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 3, 686, June 18, 2001.) Petitioner was sentenced to thirtyseven years in prison, comprised of the middle term of three years

for the robbery, ten years for the firearm enhancement, eight

months for each of the five attempted robbery counts, three years

and four months for the firearm enhancement on each of those

counts, eight months for each of the two false imprisonment counts,

and enhancements of one year and four months for each of the two

counts. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 238-39, June 26,

2001; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 701-02, June 20, 2001.) 

The judge also imposed one-year enhancements for each of the prison

priors, which were stayed pursuant to California Penal Code section

654. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 238; Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 702.) 

Jones appealed his conviction and sentence to the California

Court of Appeal by filing a direct appeal and a petition for writ

of habeas corpus. (Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Br., People

v. Jones, No. D038250 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2002; Lodgment No. 4,

Pet. for Habeas Corpus, In re Jones, No. D039422 (Cal. Ct. App.

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Oct. 2, 2002).) Jones argued, among other things, that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and during plea

negotiations and that there was insufficient evidence to convict

him on certain counts of attempted robbery and certain gun

allegations. (See Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Br. at 13-

55, People v. Jones, No. D038250; Lodgment No. 4, Pet. for Habeas

Corpus at 8-13, In re Jones, No. D039422.) 

On October 2, 2002, after consolidating Petitioner’s appeal

and habeas petition, the appellate court affirmed Jones’s

conviction. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Jones, No. D038250, slip

op. at 31 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2002).) Jones then filed a

petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No.

6, Pet. for Review, People v. Jones, No. S111271 (Cal. Jan. 21,

2003).) The petition was denied without citation. (Lodgment No.

7, People v. Jones, No. S111271, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Jan. 21,

2003).) 

On April 10, 2003, Petitioner filed his first habeas petition

in the California Supreme Court, which he later withdrew. 

(Lodgment No. 8, Pet. for Habeas Corpus, Jones v. Calderon, No.

S114976 (Cal. July 25, 2003); Lodgment No. 9, In re Jones, No.

S114976, order at 1 (Cal. July 25, 2003).) On July 21, 2003,

Petitioner filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

this Court [doc. no. 1]. Jones then filed a second habeas petition

with the California Supreme Court on July 31, 2003. (Lodgment No.

10, Pet. for Habeas Corpus, Jones v. Calderon, No. S117839 (Cal.

Apr. 14, 2004).) 

Soon thereafter, he filed a First Amended Petition in this

Court deleting his unexhausted claims and seeking a stay of the

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amended petition [doc. nos. 5, 7]. On September 4, 2003, the Court

granted Jones’s request while he exhausted certain claims in state

court [doc. no. 8]. The Court subsequently granted two extensions

of the stay [doc. nos. 15, 20]. 

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s second habeas

petition on April 14, 2004. (Lodgment No. 11, In re Jones, No.

S117839, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Apr. 14, 2004).) Jones then filed an

Amended Petition in this Court [doc. no. 21]. Respondent filed an

Answer [doc. no. 29] and Memorandum of Points and Authorities [doc.

no. 30] on September 29, 2004. Petitioner then filed a Traverse

[doc. no. 32].

This Court issued a Report and Recommendation Re Denial of

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 33] on March 4, 2005. 

On May 2, 2005, after Jones had filed Objections to the Report and

Recommendation [doc. no. 34], Petitioner filed another request for

stay and abeyance [doc. no. 35] so he could return to state court

to exhaust four new claims. This Court issued a second Report and

Recommendation Re: Denial of Motion to Amend and Request for Stay

and Abeyance [doc. no. 40]. On March 29, 2006, United States

District Judge Napoleon A. Jones, Jr. issued an Order [doc. no. 50]

granting Petitioner’s request to hold his Second Amended Petition

in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust his new

claims. (Order Granting Mot. to Amend 12.) Correspondingly, the

district court rejected the two Reports and Recommendations under

submission. (Id.)

During this time, Jones filed his third state habeas petition

on May 9, 2005, which he withdrew. (Pet’r’s Response to Opp’n to

Mot. to Amend [doc. no. 39] Ex. A 3-6; In re Jones, No. S133747,

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docket (Cal.) available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov

(search for case number “S133747," then follow “docket”

hyperlink).)

Petitioner subsequently filed his fourth habeas state

petition, which the California Supreme Court denied on May 24,

2006. (Supp. Lodgment No. 1, Pet. for Habeas Corpus at 4-7, In re

Jones, No. S135905 (Cal. May 24, 2006); Supp. Lodgment No. 2, In re

Jones, No. S135905, slip op. at 1 (Cal. May 24, 2006).)

Petitioner filed a Third Amended Petition [doc. no. 51] in

this Court on June 15, 2006. Respondent filed an Answer [doc. no.

66] on October 25, 2006. Jones then filed a Traverse [doc. no.

69]. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006), applies to all federal habeas

petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538

U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326

(1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Because Jones’s Petition was filed on July 21, 2003,

AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204.

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In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 

 To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See

28 U.S.C.A § 2254(a). Petitioner must allege that the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. See Reed, 512 U.S. at

347; Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885

(9th Cir. 1990).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

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Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to the level of a constitutional violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added). Section

2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court

decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for

example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” 

Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state

court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, ‘an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court.’” 

Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir.

1996); Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997);

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996).

[A] state court decision is “contrary to [the Supreme

Court’s] clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court

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confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from . . . 

precedent.”

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000)) (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A

state court unreasonably applies federal law if its application is

“objectively unreasonable,” which is “more than [being] incorrect

or erroneous.” Id. at 75.

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006).

IV. DISCUSSION

In the eight grounds for relief contained in Jones’s Third

Amended Petition, he makes ten claims that Petitioner argues

entitle him to habeas relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial

counsel for failure to investigate his alibi defense and

fingerprint evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for

failure to impeach a critical prosecution witness; (3) ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to properly advise Jones of the

consequences of rejecting a plea offer; (4) a violation of due

process for the trial court’s error in advising Petitioner of the

possible sentencing consequences of rejecting a plea offer; (5)

insufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted

robbery; (6) insufficient evidence to support the sentence

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enhancements for use of a firearm; (7) ineffective assistance of

counsel for failure to object to, or seek to suppress, evidence of

a separate conviction; (8) a violation of due process by the

introduction of irrelevant evidence of a separate conviction; (9) a

violation of due process for the trial court’s failure to give a

limiting instruction regarding the use of the separate conviction

evidence; and (10) cumulative error resulting in a fundamentally

unfair trial. (Third Am. Pet. 6-13.) 

Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to relief

on claims one through six because the state court’s decision

denying those claims was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, federal law. (Resp’t’s Mem. of P. & A. 6-15.) She

also argues that claims contained in Jones’s fifth through eighth

grounds for relief are procedurally barred and were filed after the

expiration of the statute of limitations. (Id. at 15-21.)

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Jones alleges in grounds one and two of his Third Amended

Petition that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel

when his attorney (1) failed to investigate his alibi defense,

consult a fingerprint expert, and interview potential witnesses;

(2) failed to impeach a critical prosecution witness; and (3)

failed to properly advise Petitioner of the consequences of

rejecting an offered plea agreement. (Third Am. Pet. 6-8, 17-36.) 

In deciding a § 2254 habeas petition, this Court reviews the

“last reasoned” state court decision. Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d

872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). The California Supreme Court summarily

denied Jones’s petition for review and his second and fourth habeas

petitions, which Jones filed after withdrawing his first and third

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petitions. (Lodgment No. 7, Jones, No. S111271, slip op. at 1;

Lodgment No. 11, Jones, No. S117839, slip op. at 1; Supp. Lodgment

No. 2, Jones, No. S135905, slip op. at 1.) Therefore, this Court

“looks through” those denials to the California Court of Appeal’s

reasoned opinion on Petitioner’s direct appeal. Medina, 386 F.3d

at 877.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel. Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 484 (9th Cir.

2000); see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)

(stating “the right to counsel is the right to the effective

assistance of counsel.”). In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), the Supreme Court set the federal standard for

resolving ineffective assistance of counsel claims. These claims

have two prongs that must both be satisfied. First, counsel’s

performance must have been deficient in that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Id. at 687-88. Second, “the defendant must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense”; in other words, “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 687, 694. 

Courts need not address both prongs if the petitioner alleging

ineffective assistance makes an insufficient showing on one. Id.

at 697. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on

the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will

often be so, that course should be followed.” Id.

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“A lawyer generally is presumed competent, and it is the

burden of the accused to overcome this presumption.” Dows, 211

F.3d at 485 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658

(1984)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Additionally,

courts will presume that a defendant has suffered prejudice “when

counsel was either totally absent or prevented from assisting the

accused during a critical stage of the proceedings, or if counsel

entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful

adversarial testing.” Hays v. Alabama, 85 F.3d 1492, 1496-97 (11th

Cir. 1996) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662); see also Dows, 211

F.3d at 485. Otherwise, “the defendant must point to specific

errors made by defense counsel that undermine confidence in the

outcome of the trial.” United States v. LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815,

823 (6th Cir. 2003); see Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.26 (citations

omitted); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-96. 

1. Counsel’s Failure to Investigate an Alibi Defense and

Obtain Favorable Evidence

In his first claim for relief, Jones alleges his trial counsel

failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, present witnesses in

support of an alibi defense, and consult an expert regarding

fingerprint evidence. (Third Am. Pet. 6.) Respondent asserts that

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim because

the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, the Supreme Court’s holding in Strickland. 

(Resp’t’s Mem. of P. & A. 9.) 

In rejecting Jones’s claim, the California Court of Appeal

applied Strickland and concluded that Jones failed to meet the

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prejudice prong of the Strickland test. (Lodgment No. 5, People v.

Jones, No. D038250, slip op. at 13.) The court stated:

The evidence of Jones’s guilt was overwhelming. 

This included the undisputed fingerprint evidence on the

bag carrying the guns and tape, the eyewitness

identifications, and Jones’s capture after fleeing police

in Penton’s rental car and throwing a gun out the window

of the car. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that but

for counsel’s alleged deficiencies Jones would have

received a more favorable result, and the court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s motion for a new

trial.

(Id. at 13-14.) Because it determined Jones failed to satisfy the

prejudice prong of Strickland, the state appellate court did not

decide whether Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was deficient. 

(Id. at 13.) 

Under § 2254(d), this Court’s review is limited to considering

whether the appellate court’s determination was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, Strickland. The state court set forth

the appropriate standard for evaluating prejudice under Strickland. 

Furthermore, it correctly observed that a court need not address

the deficiency prong if the defendant fails to make a showing of

prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. The California Court of

Appeal found that Jones could not establish he had been prejudiced

by the alleged deficiencies of his trial counsel. (Lodgment No. 5,

Jones, No. D038250, slip op. at 13.) Consequently, he did not

prove that counsel rendered ineffective assistance entitling Jones

to a new trial. (Id. at 12-14.) 

The Court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

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considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Counsel’s conduct is examined in light of all the circumstances

present at the time. Id. at 690. 

[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to

the extent that reasonable professional judgments support

the limitations on investigation. In other words,

counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or

to make a reasonable decision that makes particular

investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case,

a particular decision not to investigate must be directly

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,

applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.

Id. at 690-91. 

a. Failure to Investigate and Present an Alibi Defense

Jones alleges that he had a “viable alibi” defense that was

not presented at his trial. (Third Am. Pet. 6.) He claims that he

told his attorney about four potential alibi witnesses, but his

attorney did not interview them. (Id.)

An attorney’s choice not to call witnesses to testify at trial

must be informed by an adequate investigation in order to be a

reasonable, tactical decision that will be upheld under Strickland. 

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456-57 (9th Cir. 1994). 

“Ineffectiveness is generally clear in the context of complete

failure to investigate because counsel can hardly be said to have

made a strategic choice when [he] has not yet obtained the facts on

which such a decision could be made.” United States v. Gray, 878

F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Sanders, 21 F.3d at 1457.

Petitioner alleges that four alibi witnesses would have

testified “he was at his home at around the time of the alleged

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crimes.” (Third Am. Pet. 6.) The witnesses were Petitioner’s

wife, his mother-in-law, a neighbor, and his children’s babysitter. 

(Id. at 18.) During the hearing on Jones’s motion for a new trial,

the court heard testimony from Jones and six witnesses. (See

Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 599-683.) Three of the

witnesses –- Loretta Bradley (the neighbor), Latania Jones (the

wife), and Joyce Thomas (the mother-in-law) –- supported

Petitioner’s alibi defense by testifying about his whereabouts on

the day of the robbery. (Id. at 601-02, 612-17, 642-43.) All

three witnesses stated that Jones was at home fixing breakfast and

doing laundry when the crimes were committed. (Id.) 

Latania Jones, Petitioner’s wife, testified that she told

Michael Taggart, Petitioner’s trial counsel, that she wanted to

testify about Jones’s alibi, but he told her “it wouldn’t be a good

thing to get on the stand and say that.” (Id. at 609-11, 626.) 

Latania also stated that she told Taggart the identities of three

other potential alibi witnesses. (Id. at 611-12.) Joyce Thomas

(Petitioner’s mother-in-law) and Loretta Bradley (the neighbor)

both testified that Taggart never interviewed them, even though

they would have testified at trial that Jones was at home when the

robbery was committed. (Id. at 601-03, 642-44.) 

The state court also heard testimony from Michael Taggart,

Jones’s trial counsel, about his investigation of the alibi defense

and his decision not to present the defense at trial. (Id. at 657-

60, 666-76.) Taggart testified that he was only aware of Latania

and the Jones’s babysitter as potential alibi witnesses. (Id. at

669.) He stated that neither Petitioner nor Latania ever gave him

the name or contact information for the babysitter, so he could not

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contact her. (Id. at 670-71.) Taggart did not interview any

witnesses regarding an alibi defense, aside from conversations he

had with Jones’s wife. (See id. at 658-60, 667.)

Taggart did not call any witnesses to testify in Petitioner’s

defense. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 400, 411.) After

the prosecution and Jones’s codefendant finished presenting their

witnesses, Taggart indicated that he had planned to call

Petitioner’s wife to testify, but she had left the courthouse. 

(Id. at 398-99.) Counsel told the trial judge that Latania would

testify as to Jones’s alibi, and her testimony would be the only

evidence he presented in his case-in-chief. (Id. at 400.) The

next morning, when it was time for Taggart to begin his case,

however, he rested without calling Latania to testify. (Id. at

411.)

Taggart had concerns about presenting the alibi defense at

trial because he doubted its credibility. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 3, 670.) In particular, he was troubled by the

credibility of alibi testimony because Jones and his wife told

Taggart they had a babysitter who would testify for Petitioner, but

Jones never gave him the babysitter’s name, address, or phone

number so that Taggart could speak to her. (Id. at 659-60, 670,

674.) 

Counsel’s concerns about the credibility of Petitioner’s alibi

witnesses and the viability of the defense is a strategic reason

for not presenting the defense at trial. Although Taggart did not

speak to the babysitter before Jones’s trial, he did speak with

Latania and Jones; and from their representations, he doubted the

credibility of the defense. “[F]ew decisions a lawyer makes draw

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so heavily on professional judgment as whether or not to proffer a

witness at trial . . . .” Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 871

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th

Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to overcome the

presumption that Taggart’s decision not to present an alibi defense

was a reasonable, tactical decision. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689; see also Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1998) (finding counsel’s performance to be based on a reasonable

tactical decision when, after hiring an expert and investigating a

possible defense, counsel determined it was not credible enough to

present to the jury).

Jones has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by

Taggart’s decision not to present an alibi defense. The state

trial court found the testimony of Petitioner’s alibi witnesses

(all of whom were family members or friends of Jones) had “very

little, if any, merit.” (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 699-

700.) The court determined that much of the testimony was

internally inconsistent. (Id. at 699.) This Court defers to these

credibility determinations. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936

(9th Cir. 1998); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)

(“Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license

to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been

observed by the state trial court, but not by them.”)

Jones points the Court’s attention to Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d

1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999), where the Ninth Circuit found the

petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to present three

potential alibi witnesses. (Third Am. Pet. 22; Traverse 5.) That

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case is distinguishable from Petitioner’s. In Lord, the alibi

witnesses were unrelated to the defendant; thus, they did not have

any motive to lie. Lord, 184 F.3d at 1095. Here, the alibi

witnesses are all family members or friends of Jones, so they lack

the inherent credibility of the disinterested witnesses in Lord.

Because the alibi witnesses were not credible, there is no

reasonable probability that the alibi testimony would have altered

the outcome of the trial. Petitioner has failed to show a

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different

if his attorney had pursued an alibi defense. 

b. Failure to Investigate Fingerprint Evidence

Jones also complains that Taggart failed to hire an expert to

perform a fingerprint analysis of the physical evidence. (Third

Am. Pet. 6.) Petitioner asserts that Taggart should have hired a

fingerprint expert to analyze the fingerprint found on the plastic

bag that the prosecution’s expert found matched Jones’s print and

have the defense expert examine the duct tape used to bind the

victim’s hands for fingerprints. (Id. at 20-22.)

Taggart testified at the hearing on the new trial motion that

he was aware of the fingerprint and duct tape evidence, but he did

not hire an investigator or expert prior to trial to test the

evidence. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 662-64.) 

Additionally, Taggart was given the opportunity during trial to

hire an expert. When he complained that the prosecutor was

introducing fingerprint evidence Taggart had not analyzed, the

judge adjourned the trial so counsel could hire an expert to

examine the evidence. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 191-95.) 

Even though he was given a recess specifically for this purpose,

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Taggart did not make any attempts to contact an expert. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 664-65.) He did not hire a fingerprint

expert because he did not have sufficient funding. (Id. at 663-

65.) 

After Petitioner was convicted, he retained attorney Pamela

Lacher to file a motion for a new trial. Lacher hired Lisa Di Meo,

a forensic expert, to perform a fingerprint analysis of certain

physical evidence. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 650.) 

Di Meo analyzed several pieces of duct tape used to bind Sean

Hughes’s hands during the robbery. (Id. at 652.) The tape was

never analyzed prior to Petitioner’s trial. 

The pieces of tape were adhered together in layers. (Id. at

652-53.) Di Meo found three latent fingerprints on the adhesive

side of the tape between the second and third layers. (Id. at

654.) After comparing the latent prints with Jones’s prints, she

concluded that the fingerprints on the duct tape did not belong to

Petitioner. (Id.) She did, however, match Jones’s fingerprint to

a print on the plastic bag found at the scene. (Id. at 655.) 

The trial judge denied Jones’s motion for a new trial. He

found Petitioner’s trial counsel could not have “committed some

kind of egregious error under the circumstances” because there was

“insurmountable” evidence against Jones. (Id. at 686-87.) The

court’s ruling was premised on the following factual findings: (1)

the victims identified Jones; (2) Jones’s fingerprint was found on

the bag containing the guns and the duct tape; (3) Jones was

arrested three days after the robbery driving a car leased to

Penton and trying to evade the police; and (4) Jones possessed a

gun matching the description of a gun used in the robbery. (Id. at

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687.) The judge referred to this evidence as “totally irrefuted.” 

(Id.)

In denying the motion for new a trial, the trial judge did not

mention the newly-discovered fingerprint evidence presented at the

hearing. Lisa Di Meo’s testimony that Petitioner’s fingerprints

did not match the fingerprints on the duct tape undermined Hughes’s

testimony that Jones was the person who bound the victim’s hands

with the tape. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 350.) 

Just as the trial judge failed to mention this evidence in his

ruling on the new trial motion, the state appellate court similarly

disregarded this potentially exculpatory evidence because “[t]he

evidence of Jones’s guilt was overwhelming.” (Lodgment No. 5,

Jones, No. D038250, slip op. at 13.) In support of its conclusion,

the appellate court pointed to the same four pieces of evidence

that were described by the trial court as “totally irrefuted.” 

(Id.)

Jones is entitled to habeas relief if the state court ruling

was either based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence or on an unreasonable application of

Strickland. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2). A state court decision

involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it

to the facts of the particular prisoner’s case.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A state court makes an

unreasonable determination of the facts when it fails to consider

and weigh relevant evidence that was properly presented to it. 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). “[T]he

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state-court fact-finding process is undermined where the state

court has before it, yet apparently ignores, evidence that supports

petitioner’s claim.” Id. (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 346 (2003)).

1. The Determination of the Facts

Here, Jones’s challenge requires an intrinsic review of the

record, which in turn demands deference to the state courts. Id.

at 999-1000. The state court’s fact-finding does not survive

intrinsic review if the federal court is “satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be

unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding process

was adequate.” Id. at 1000.

A state fact finder is not required to address every “every

jot and tittle of proof suggested,” but it must not overlook

relevant probative evidence. Id. at 1001 (citing Miller-El, 537

U.S. at 347). 

To fatally undermine the state fact-finding process, and

render the resulting finding unreasonable, the overlooked

or ignored evidence must be highly probative and central

to petitioner’s claim. In other words, the evidence in

question must be sufficient to support petitioner’s claim

when considered in the context of the full record bearing

on the issue presented in the habeas petition.

Id. (emphasis added).

Here, both the trial court and the state appellate court

overlooked the duct tape. Neither court mentioned that the

fingerprints found on the duct tape did not belong to Jones. In

finding that the evidence of Jones’s guilt was “totally irrefuted”

and “overwhelming,” both courts neglected to consider evidence that

someone other than Petitioner left fingerprints on the adhesive

side of the duct tape, between two of the layers of tape, that was

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wrapped around Hughes’s hands. This evidence points to the

conclusion that someone other than Jones bound the victim’s hands. 

If presented at trial, this fingerprint evidence could have

discredited Hughes’s identification and supported Petitioner’s

defense that the “person that did the tying up was that second

person, and it wasn’t Mr. Jones.” (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

3, 684.) To determine the probative value of the fingerprint

evidence, this Court must consider all the evidence against Jones. 

(a) Fingerprint Evidence

In spite of the duct tape, there was fingerprint evidence

against Petitioner. At trial, a latent print examiner, Mary

Widner-Brown, testified that she obtained a latent fingerprint from

a black plastic bag brought to her for examination. (Lodgment No.

2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 170, 176-79.) She compared the latent

fingerprint with a known print from Jones and was “absolutely

positive” that the print belonged to Jones. (Id. at 188.) 

Although other prints were on the bag, the examiner found only one

fingerprint that was usable for comparison purposes. (Id. vol. 2,

241.) Officer Dale Flamand collected the duct tape that had been

used to bind the victims and the plastic bag that was left upstairs

by the office. (Id. at 244, 246.) Hughes testified that the black

plastic bag was left upstairs in the hallway where they were all

sitting. (Id. at 331.) During the trial, the fingerprint expert

made no reference to the duct tape. But in his closing argument,

counsel for Jones argued: “[W]e’ve got five different victims,

each one being bound except for Miss Williams. . . . Now, on all

of this duct tape, there are no prints found on any of this duct

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tape. Pretty interesting that there would be no fingerprints on

any of this duct tape.” (Id. at 477.)

(b) The Identification Testimony

Jones was identified on multiple occasions, by different

victims, and with varying degrees of certainty. On August 30,

1999, Shannon Williams was shown two photographic lineups. From

one, she identified the codefendant Anthony Penton as one of the

robbers. (Id. at 300.) She said: “Him. I’m sure of it. He’s

the one that was talking on the cell phone.” (Id.) She also

identified Jones in the other photographic lineup. “That’s the

second guy, I’m positive.” (Id.) Williams attended a jail lineup

on August 30, 2000. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 64.) She

was able to identify Penton. (Id. at 65.) In the second jail

lineup, Williams tentatively identified an individual (not Jones),

but a few hours later, she called the prosecutor and said that she

had identified the wrong person. (Id. at 65-67.) The preliminary

hearing occurred on September 11, 2000, and Williams identified

Penton and had “no problem” identifying Jones, whose hair length

and beard was different at the August 30, 2000, lineup. (Id. at

70-71, 102.) At the trial, Williams identified Penton as the

robber who pointed a gun at her and Jones as the robber who was

running down the stairs with a black handgun in his hand. (Id. at

46, 50.) She had no doubt Penton and Jones were the two robbers. 

(Id. at 71.) 

Roy French, another robbery victim, was shown the same

photographic lineups. He pointed to Jones, stating that he was

“the closest of all of the photos to the shorter, heavier-set

suspect.” (Id. at 301). French noted that he was “only fifteen to

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twenty per cent sure it was the right suspect.” (Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 117.) He was not able to identify the other

robber in the other photo lineup. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

2, 301.) At the jail lineup and at trial, French was unable to

identify either Jones or Penton as the robbers. (Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 117-18.) 

Victim Sean Hughes identified Penton and a second individual

in the first set of photographs, but number five (Penton) “appeared

closer.” (Id. at 302-03.) In lineup number two, Hughes pointed to

the photo of Jones and said, “That’s him. This is the one that was

upstairs with me. This is him.” (Id. at 303.) At the time of the

lineup, there was “no doubt” that the person he identified (Jones)

was the individual that held him at gunpoint. (Id. at 338.)

Approximately one year later, on August 30, 2000, two live

lineups were conducted at San Diego County Jail, one with Penton

and one with Jones. (Id. at 318, 338-39.) Hughes identified 

Penton and tentatively identified Jones, stating that Jones “did a

good job of changing his appearance. He appeared to have lost some

weight and grew his hair out and shaved really clean.” (Id. at

339.) At the preliminary hearing in September of 2000, Hughes had

no problem identifying Penton or identifying Jones, who had shorter

hair and a goatee. (Id. at 342-43.) On that date, Jones’s

appearance was similar to his appearance at the time of the

robbery. (Id. at 342.) At trial, Hughes had no doubt that Jones

and Penton were the two that held him at gunpoint in June of 1999. 

(Id. at 343.)

During the trial, Hughes testified that Jones and Penton led

him and his two daughters to the offices upstairs. (Id. at 323-

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24.) Jones was holding a plastic bag, removed duct tape from the

bag, and bound Hughes’s arms behind his back in duct tape. (Id. at

325.) Jones then pulled two guns from the bag, one for himself and

one for Penton. (Id.) Penton went downstairs, and Hughes asked

Jones to release his daughters. (Id. at 326.) Hughes was with

Jones for thirty to forty-five minutes before Jones ran downstairs. 

(Id. at 328.) During their time together, Hughes “got a good look”

at Jones. (Id. at 329.)

Robert Kueber, another victim, provided little useful

identification testimony. Three or four months after the incident,

he tentatively identified Penton from a photographic lineup, but at

a live lineup in August of 2000, he was unable to identify Penton;

in court, he said that Penton looked similar to one of the

perpetrators. (Id. at 139-40, 150-51.) Kueber was never able to

identify Jones because on the day of the robbery, he did not see a

second robber. (Id. at 152-53.) 

(c) Evading Arrest in Penton’s Car

On June 29, 1999, Jones was arrested by Officer Andrew Spear

after being pursued on residential streets at speeds up to seventy

miles an hour. (Id. at 264-66.) During the chase, Jones threw a

black, fully loaded semiautomatic pistol out of the window of the

car he was driving. (Id. at 266, 268.) On June 4, 1999, the

codefendant Anthony Penton rented a Chevrolet Monte Carlo with

license number 4ELF799. (Id. at 259, 262-63.) This was the

vehicle driven by Jones on the day of his arrest. (Id. at 265.)

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(d) The Probative Value of the Overlooked

Evidence

Without the presentation of the duct tape fingerprint

evidence, the jurors had no reason to doubt Hughes’s identification

of Jones as the robber who bound him. “While [the fingerprint

evidence] is perhaps not conclusive, it is certainly highly

probative. A rational fact-finder might discount it . . . but no

rational fact-finder would simply ignore it.” Taylor, 366 F.3d at

1006.

“In making findings, a judge must acknowledge significant

portions of the record, particularly where they are inconsistent

with the judge’s findings.” Id. at 1007. Because the state courts

failed to consider, or even mention the existence of, the

fingerprint evidence presented at the hearing on Jones’s new trial

motion, the state’s fact-finding process was incomplete; the

question is whether it was fatally defective. See Miller-El, 537

U.S. at 346; Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1008. 

“How serious the defect, of course, depends on what bearing

the omitted evidence has on the record as a whole.” Taylor, 366

F.3d at 1008. The multiple identifications of Jones and Penton;

Jones’s fingerprint on the plastic bag left on the premises, which

contained the guns and duct tape; and Jones’s arrest after

attempting to evade police while driving a car leased to Penton all

diminish the significance of the duct tape evidence. Furthermore,

Jones’s counsel already argued that no fingerprints were found on

the duct tape.

The state court’s fact-finding process was not unreasonable,

and the findings of the California Court of Appeal on Jones’s

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ineffective assistance of counsel claim are entitled to a

presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Taylor,

id. at 1001-01; see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. Petitioner

should not be granted habeas relief based on a claim that the state

courts made an unreasonable determination of the facts underlying

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

2. The Application of Strickland

Next, the Court must decide whether there has been an

unreasonable application of clearly established law. Under

Strickland, counsel renders deficient performance when his “acts or

omissions [are] outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. A decision not to

investigate is only reasonable if it is based on a strategic choice

by counsel that makes the particular investigation unnecessary. 

Id. at 690-91. Here, attorney Taggart did not make a strategic

decision. He testified at the new-trial motion hearing that he did

not hire a fingerprint expert “first and foremost” because he did

not have the funding to do so. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3,

662-65.) When asked if he knew that he could get funding from the

county to hire an expert, Taggart replied, “I don’t know,” but he

had not pursued obtaining a fingerprint expert. (Id. at 664.) 

Failing to hire, or even attempt to hire, an expert to analyze

the physical evidence is not a reasoned, tactical decision when it

is based on a perceived lack of funding rather than a sound trial

strategy. See Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 1997)

(finding deficient performance where the physical evidence, if

tested, would have strengthened the defense and undermined the

prosecution’s case); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580 (6th Cir.

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1992) (finding deficient performance where counsel failed to have a

quilt tested for gun powder residue when the evidence, if tested,

would have provided the defense with a theory of the case that fit

with the defendant’s version of events). Thus, Taggart rendered

deficient performance because the decision not to investigate was

unreasonable.

The California Court of Appeal, however, did not address

deficient performance. Instead, it held:

Here, even assuming Jones could show ineffective

assistance of counsel, he cannot meet the second prong of

the Strickland test: that there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s errors a determination

more favorable to Jones would have resulted. Therefore,

we need not even consider whether Jones’s counsel’s

performance was deficient.

(Lodgment No. 5, People v. Jones, D038250, slip op. at 13 (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).) Courts need not address both

deficient performance and prejudice when analyzing an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Indeed,

if prejudice has not been shown, the claim should be disposed of on

that ground. Id.

On the other hand, “if counsel entirely fails to subject the

prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there

has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the

adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.” United States

v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Taggart’s performance did not fall to

this level. Counsel’s failure to consult a fingerprint expert does

not “undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” See United

States v. La Rouche, 896 F2d at 823. Contrary to Jones’s

contention (Pet. 24), this case is not one where prejudice should

be presumed.

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Here, Taggart’s performance did not prejudice Jones’s trial. 

Although evidence indicating that someone other than Petitioner

bound Hughes’s hands with duct tape conflicts with Hughes’s

identification of Jones, the evidence does not seriously draw into

question Jones’s participation in the robbery. There is no

reasonable probability that this evidence would have caused the

jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about Jones’s guilt. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 

The state appellate court’s conclusion that Jones was not

prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to investigate the duct tape

evidence and present it at trial was not an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Accordingly, ground one in Jones’s

Third Amended Petition does not entitle him to habeas relief.

2. Failure to Impeach a Critical Prosecution Witness

Jones next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to impeach prosecution witness Sean Hughes with evidence of

his prior convictions and prior inconsistent statements. (Third

Am. Pet. 7.) According to Petitioner, “Hughes was the only witness

to consistently claim petitioner was one of the robbers,” so

Jones’s attorney was ineffective for failing to test Hughes’s

credibility by impeachment. (Id. at 29.)

Petitioner raised this claim in his second petition for habeas

corpus relief filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No.

10, Pet. at 3, Jones, No. S117839.) The petition was denied

without a written opinion; instead, the court cited In re Swain, 34

Cal. 2d 300, 304, 209 P.2d 793, 796 (1949); People v. Duvall, 9

Cal. 4th 464, 474, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 265

(1995); In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 397 P.2d 1001, 42 Cal.

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Rptr. 9 (1965); and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513

(1953). (Lodgment No. 11, In re Jones, No. S117839, slip op. at

1.) Citation to these cases indicates that the state court

declined to reach the merits of Jones’s claims because they were

procedurally barred. See La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704-05

(9th Cir. 2001). 

Respondent does not argue that this claim should not be

addressed on its merits. Because there is no state court decision

on the merits of this claim, this Court reviews it de novo. Pirtle

v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court must

independently determine whether counsel’s failure to impeach Hughes

with prior convictions and inconsistent statements amounted to

ineffective assistance under Strickland. 

Jones asserts that defense counsel informed him that Hughes,

one of the victims who identified Petitioner as one of the robbers,

had a “rap sheet,” yet Jones’s attorney failed to impeach Hughes

during cross-examination with his prior conviction. (Third Am.

Pet. 29.) Petitioner claims that “Hughes’ prior record would have

made it difficult for Hughes or the prosecutor to explain why the

jury should believe any of Hughes’ statements.” (Id.) 

Jones provides no specific information about Hughes’s

convictions, so the Court has no basis to determine whether the

evidence would have been admissible under California law. In any

event, “[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James

v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Boehme v. Maxwell,

423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970)). 

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Assuming Hughes had a criminal record that could have been

introduced as impeachment evidence, this Court cannot say that

failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Jones cannot overcome “the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound

trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Murtishaw

v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir. 2001). Jurors were likely

sympathetic to Hughes, given that he and his two young daughters

were victims of this crime. For that reason, cross-examining

Hughes about his prior, unrelated, criminal history could risk

alienating the jurors who might view it as an unfair attack on the

victim. This would be a sound strategic reason for not bringing up

Hughes’s alleged prior conviction.

Jones has also failed to show he was prejudiced. In Hoots v.

Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1986), the Fourth Circuit was

presented with the same claim Jones makes here. Id. at 1221. The

court rejected the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance for

failure to impeach a prosecution witness with evidence of the

witness’s criminal record, finding there was no reasonable

probability the outcome of the trial would have been different:

Given the vagaries of attempts to impeach with

matters collateral to testimonial trustworthiness, we

simply are not able to declare that the failure to

impeach by that means here gives rise to the reasonable

probability that had it been done Hoots would not have

been convicted. . . . It is of course possible that

impeachment might sufficiently have shaken [the

witness’s] credibility to tip the reasonable doubt

balance. It is at least equally possible, however, that

the attempt to impeach by this collateral means would

have been viewed by the jury as an unwarranted, desperate

effort to discredit a witness whose testimony was

intrinsically and by demeanor wholly credible.

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Id. The court concluded that prejudice had not been established

because a mere possibility of a different outcome is not enough to

satisfy the Strickland standard. Id. Similarly, Petitioner has

shown no more than a mere possibility that impeaching Hughes’s

testimony with evidence of his alleged criminal record would have

changed the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, Jones has failed to

show that prejudice resulted from his attorney’s performance.

Petitioner also contends that counsel did not cross-examine

Hughes at trial about inconsistent statements he made concerning

the certainty of his identification and his opportunity to observe

the perpetrators. (Third Am. Pet. 7, 29.) Jones asserts that

“Hughes[‘s] prior statements were inconsistent with his trial

testimony. During trial he altered the level of certainty of his

identification and increased the amount of time he allegedly viewed

the subject.” (Id. at 7.) 

The record undermines Jones’s contentions. His counsel did

cross-examine Hughes about his identification of Jones and the

length of time he observed the robbers. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 2, 350-53.) The attorney emphasized that Hughes only

tentatively identified Petitioner in a photo lineup. (Id. at 355.) 

He also pointed out that at the preliminary hearing Hughes

testified he observed Jones for fifteen to thirty minutes, while at

trial he testified it was thirty to forty-five minutes. (Id. at

353.) Counsel also emphasized that Hughes was lying face-down on

the ground for some of the time he was with Petitioner. (Id. at

350-51.) The record shows that Jones’s attorney effectively crossexamined Hughes by drawing attention to the inconsistencies between

his trial and preliminary hearing testimony and by highlighting the

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tentative nature of his original identification. This does not

constitute deficient performance. Petitioner has failed to show

prejudice and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance under Strickland. Therefore, this claim for relief

should be denied.

3. Failure to Properly Advise Jones of the Consequences of

Rejecting a Proposed Plea Bargain

In ground two, Jones claims that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel when his attorney gave him erroneous advice

regarding a proffered plea bargain that Petitioner chose to reject. 

(Third Am. Pet. 8.) Petitioner also asserts that the trial judge

made inaccurate statements concerning his maximum sentencing

exposure which contributed to the error. (See id. at 8, 30.) 

Jones raised this claim in his habeas petition to the

California Court of Appeal, where he alleged that counsel failed to

“adequately advise petitioner regarding the maximum potential

sentence.” (Lodgment No. 4, Pet. at 11, In re Jones, No. D039422.) 

His claim was denied in a reasoned decision. (Lodgment No. 5,

People v. Jones, No. D038250, slip op. at 30.) Jones then brought

the claim in his petition for review to the California Supreme

Court. There, he modified the claim to add that counsel was aware

an amended information was going to be filed but never informed

Jones of the correct maximum term he was facing. (Lodgment No. 6,

Pet. for Review at 23-25, 28-29, People v. Jones, No. S111271.) 

The state court denied the petition without citation. (Lodgment

No. 7, People v. Jones, No. S111271, slip op. at 1.) 

Because there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, this Court must “look through” the California Supreme

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Court’s denial of this claim to the decision of the California

Court of Appeal -- the last reasoned state court opinion –- to

determine whether it is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06;

Williams, 519 U.S. at 412-13.

The state appellate court denied Jones’s claim because it

found that Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for

habeas relief. (Lodgment No. 5, Jones, No. D039422, slip op. at

30.) Specifically, the court noted that when Jones rejected the

plea offer he was charged with two counts of robbery, four counts

of attempted robbery, and two counts of false imprisonment, which

gave him a potential exposure of twenty-four years. (Id.) This is

exactly what his attorney advised him. (Id.) He chose to reject

the offer, and subsequently an amended information was filed which

changed his exposure to thirty-seven years. (Id.) Thus, the state

court found Jones’s attorney did not advise him incorrectly because

he was not facing thirty-seven years until after he rejected the

plea. (Id.)

The decision to reject an offered plea bargain and go to trial

marks a critical stage in the proceedings. Strickland’s two-prong

test therefore applies to ineffective assistance claims arising

from the plea bargain process. See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d

851, 879 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-

58 (1985)). In plea situations, the first “inquiry is whether

counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Next, the Court must ask whether, “but for

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counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would have pleaded guilty and

would not have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 879.

Courts have found that counsel’s failure to communicate the

prosecution’s plea offer constitutes deficient performance and

satisfies the first prong of Strickland. See United States v.

Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit,

however, has observed that the question is “more difficult

where . . . the client has been informed of the plea . . . offer.” 

Turner, 281 F.3d at 880. In this situation, “the question [was

described] as not whether ‘counsel’s advice [was] right or wrong,

but . . . whether that advice was within the range of competence

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Id. (quoting McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970)). For Jones to establish

ineffective assistance of counsel, he “must demonstrate gross error

on the part of counsel . . . .” Id. (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at

771). 

a. Counsel’s Failure to Advise Jones an Amended

Information Would Be Filed

Petitioner states that when discussing the proposed plea,

counsel told him his exposure was twenty-four years. (See Third

Am. Pet. 30; Third Am. Pet. Ex. A ¶ 3.) Jones claims his attorney

failed to inform him the prosecutor was going to file an amended

information which would increase Petitioner’s exposure to thirtyseven years. (Third Am. Pet. 30.) He alleges that “[e]ither

before or after coming to court, the record reflects counsel

received a copy of a proposed amended information” which would

increase Petitioner’s maximum exposure. (Id. (emphasis omitted).) 

According to Jones, his attorney’s failure to inform him of the

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amended information was ineffective assistance, because he would

have accepted the plea bargain if he had known of the pending

amendment. (Id. at 8, 31-32.) 

This failure to advise of the amended information aspect of

Jones’s ineffective assistance claim was presented for the first

time in his petition to the California Supreme Court, and the claim

was rejected in a summary order. (Lodgment No. 6, Pet. at 23-30,

People v. Jones, No. S111271; Lodgment No. 7, Jones, No. S111271,

order at 1.) When the state court does not supply its reasoning, a

federal habeas court conducts an independent review of the record

to decide whether the state court’s decision was objectively

reasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

see also Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d at 960-61. Independent review is

not de novo review. Deference to any relevant state court factual

findings is still required. See Delgado v. Lewis, 181 F.3d 1087,

1091-92 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“[A] defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed

decision whether to accept a plea offer.” Turner v. Calderon, 281

F.3d at 880 (quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir.

1992)). Counsel’s performance is deficient when “the advice . . .

[the defendant] received was so incorrect and so insufficient that

it undermined his ability to make an intelligent decision about

whether to accept the [plea] offer.” Id. (quoting Day, 969 F.3d at

43). Knowing the difference between the sentence exposure under a

proposed plea agreement and the sentence exposure if the plea is

rejected “will often be crucial to the decision whether to plead

guilty.” Day, 969 F.2d at 43. 

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1

 Jones repeatedly states that under the amended information his maximum

exposure was thirty-seven years. (See Third Am. Pet. 8, 30.) This is not

accurate. Although Petitioner was actually sentenced to thirty-seven years, his

sentence consisted of the middle term on count one, one-third of the middle term

on counts two through eight, and one-third of the firearm allegation for counts

two through eight. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 701-02.) Thus, Jones’s

total potential exposure under the amended information, if the upper-term

sentences had been imposed, was much higher.

42 03cv1463 J (RBB)

Prior to November 1, 2000, the day trial was set to begin, the

court suggested a twelve-year disposition. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 1, 3-4.) After discussing the offer with his attorney,

Jones told the trial judge that he rejected the offer and elected

to go to trial. (Id. at 3-5.) Thereafter, the prosecutor filed an

amended information. (Id. at 5-6; Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol.

1, 24-31.) The amended information changed one robbery count to

attempted robbery and added allegations that Jones personally used

a firearm in the commission of each of the charged offenses. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 5-6; see Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 24-25.) With the new firearm allegations,

Jones’s maximum exposure increased to an excess of thirty-seven

years.1 After the amended information was filed, in limine motions

were argued and the jury was selected. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

Tr. vol. 2, 248-49.) Testimony began the next day. (Id. at 250.)

While discussing Jones’s related claim, the court of appeal

found that “[i]t was only after [Jones] rejected the plea offer

that the People amended the information . . . .” (Lodgment No. 5,

Jones, No. D038250, slip op. at 30.) This factual finding is

presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1), and Petitioner has the burden

of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 

Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). He has

not rebutted the presumption. The record does not show, as Jones

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would have the Court believe, that Petitioner’s attorney received a

copy of the proposed amended information before Jones rejected the

twelve-year offer. (See Third Am. Pet. 8.) Instead, the record

shows that Taggart received a copy of the amended information for

the first time on the morning that Jones rejected the plea offer. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 5.) This occurred after the

trial court recommended a twelve-year disposition; Taggart

discussed the plea with Petitioner; and Jones decided to reject the

offer. (See id. at 3-5.) 

Jones also claims counsel was “overly optimistic” in

suggesting that his chances at trial were “50-50.” (Third Am. Pet.

Ex. A at 1.) “Counsel cannot be required to accurately predict

what the jury or court might find, but he can be required to give

the defendant the tools he needs to make an intelligent decision.” 

Turner, 281 F.3d at 881. In this case, defense counsel correctly

informed Jones that he faced twenty-four years in prison if

convicted on all charges alleged in the September 11, 2000,

information. Although Petitioner claims defense counsel suggested

his sentence would likely be lighter than twenty-four years,

Taggart warned Jones that victory at trial was not assured. (Third

Am. Pet. Ex. A at 1.) Petitioner was given sufficient information

to allow him to make an intelligent decision. Because there was no

“gross error on the part of counsel,” Jones cannot succeed on his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See McMann, 397 U.S. at

772.

Petitioner’s self-serving claim that if he had known his

exposure would increase to thirty-seven years, he would have

accepted the twelve-year plea offer, is not sufficient to establish

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that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance. Turner v.

Calderon, 281 F.3d at 881 (citing United States v. Allen, 153 F.3d

1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

If the rule were otherwise, every rejection of a plea

offer, viewed perhaps with more clarity in the light of

an unfavorable verdict, could be relitigated upon the

defendant’s later claim that had his counsel better

advised him, he would have accepted the offer. 

Id. Additionally, Jones cannot establish prejudice. A habeas

petitioner must show some objective evidence other than his

assertions to establish that he suffered prejudice. Pham v. United

States, 317 F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.

Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1998)). 

Jones consistently indicated he wanted to go to trial. In his

sworn Declaration in support of his Third Amended Petition, Jones

claims he told Taggart that he was innocent of the charges; he did

not know his codefendant; and he had witnesses that would testify

in support of his alibi. (Third Am. Pet. Ex. A at 1.) These

statements undermine Petitioner’s claim that he wanted to plead

guilty. During the hearing on his motion for a new trial, Jones

testified at length about the investigation he wanted Taggart to do

to prepare for trial, the evidence he wanted Taggart to present,

and the independent research he was doing in the jail’s law library

regarding possible pretrial motions and the admissibility of

evidence. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 677-680.) At no

time during his testimony did Jones indicate that he had wanted to

plead guilty rather than proceed to trial. Petitioner cannot show,

by objective evidence, that he would not have rejected the plea

offer if he had known the amended information would subsequently be

filed. This claim does not entitle Jones to habeas relief.

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b. Trial Court’s Incorrect Sentence Calculation

Jones claims the trial judge erroneously indicated that the

amended information reduced rather than increased Petitioner’s

maximum exposure, and this misstatement was a factor in his

decision to reject the plea offer. (Third Am. Pet. 8, 30, Ex. A at

1.) Jones made this claim in his state habeas petition,

complaining that he rejected the plea offer based upon incorrect

information given him by the court. (Lodgment No. 4, Pet. for

Habeas Corpus at 12, In re Jones, No. D039422.) In its

consolidated opinion on his petition and appeal, the California

Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner rejected the plea offer

before an amended information was filed which increased his

potential sentence to over thirty-seven years. (Lodgment No. 5,

Jones, No. D038250, slip op. at 30.) Nevertheless, the trial court

did give Jones inaccurate information. After the amended

information was filed, the trial judge incorrectly indicated the

amended information changed Jones’s maximum exposure “very

insignificantly” by reducing the exposure by two months. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 6.) The court failed to include the new

firearm-use allegations in its calculation, which increased Jones’s

exposure to over thirty-seven years. (See Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

Tr. vol. 1, 24-28; see also Lodgment No. 5, Jones, No. D038250,

slip op. at 30.)

The trial court misadvised Petitioner that his sentence under

the amended information appeared to be the same as under the

original information. Still, the filing of the amended information

and the lower court’s statement followed Jones’s rejection of the

twelve-year offer. (Lodgment No. 5, Jones, No. D038250, slip. op.

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at 30; see also Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 6.) Thus,

neither the trial judge’s statements nor counsel’s failure to

correct them could have had an effect on Petitioner’s decision to

reject the plea. Jones’s case is not one where “misadvice by [a]

trial judge regarding [the] plea bargain was prejudicial enough to

grant the defendant [the] opportunity to retender [a] guilty plea.” 

United States v. Day, 969 F.2d at 44 n.7 (citing State v. Kraus,

397 N.W.2d 671, 675-76 (Iowa 1986)).

The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts, and it was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established law.

c. Counsel’s Failure to Give a Ten-Year Counter Offer

Finally, Jones alleges that he “instructed counsel to make a

10 year counter offer, which counsel failed to do.” (Third Am.

Pet. 8; Third Am. Pet. Ex. A at 1.) This ground for relief was not

expressly addressed by the state courts. Consequently, the Court

will review the contention de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d at

1073. In deciding whether Jones’s claim entitles him to habeas

relief, the Court is confined to the record as it exists. AEDPA

limits a federal habeas court’s ability to hold evidentiary

hearings. Section 2254(e)(2) provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual

basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court

shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless

the applicant shows that -– 

(A) The claim relies on -- 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law . . . or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not

have been previously discovered through the

exercise of due diligence; and

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(B) the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence

that but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (West 2006). The factual predicate of

this claim was known at the time of the hearing on Jones’s motion

for a new trial, June 18, 2001. Thus, Petitioner’s argument that a

better plea bargain could have been obtained by his attorney is

without any evidentiary support. 

Even assuming that the failure to make Petitioner’s offer

constituted deficient performance under Strickland, Jones cannot

demonstrate prejudice. There is nothing in the record to establish

that the trial judge, who suggested Petitioner “plea to the sheet”

for a twelve-year sentence, was willing to negotiate a deal or that

the prosecutor would agree to it. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol.

1, 3-5.) Jones’s claim rests on speculation, and he fails to

establish a “reasonable probability that the outcome would have

been different.” See United States v. Boone, 62 F.3d 323, 327

(10th Cir. 1995) (finding no prejudice under Strickland for

counsel’s failure to negotiate a plea because there was no showing

the prosecutor was willing to enter plea negotiations or that any

suggested plea would have been acceptable to the court). This

claim, like the others contained in ground two of Jones’s Third

Amended Petition, should be denied. 

B. Insufficient Evidence

Grounds three and four in Jones’s Petition allege there was

insufficient evidence to support his convictions for the attempted

robbery of Bazaldua, Kueber, and Williams, and insufficient

evidence to impose the firearm-use enhancement. (Third Am. Pet. 9-

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10, 37-47.) Petitioner raised these claims in the California Court

of Appeal, and that court rejected them in an unpublished opinion. 

(See Lodgment No. 5, Jones, No. D038250, slip op. at 16-20.) Jones

then raised the claims in his second habeas petition to the

California Supreme Court, which denied the petition with a citation

to In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 304, 209 P.2d 793, 796 (1949); People v.

Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d

259, 265 (1995); In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 397 P.2d 1001, 42

Cal. Rptr. 9 (1965); and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513

(1953). (Lodgment No. 11, Jones, No. S117839, slip op. at 1.)

Respondent argues these claims must be denied as procedurally

defaulted. (Resp’t’s Mem. of P. & A. 13.) In the alternative, she

asserts that Jones’s claims fail on the merits. (Id. at 14-15.)

1. Procedural Default

Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal court “‘will

not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if

the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment.’” Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126,

1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729 (1991)); see also Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 789 (9th Cir.

2003); LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001); Park

v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal habeas

review of that claim is precluded unless the petitioner “can

demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice as a result of the

alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see also High v. Ignacio, 408

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F.3d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750);

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The respondent has the burden of pleading an adequate and

independent procedural bar as an affirmative defense. See Bennett

v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden of proof

then shifts to the petitioner to place that defense in issue, for

example, by asserting factual allegations demonstrating the

inadequacy of the state procedure, including citations to case

authority that demonstrate inconsistent application of the state

rule. Id. at 586. If the factual allegations are made, the burden

shifts back to the respondent to demonstrate the bar is applicable. 

Id. Here, Respondent properly asserted the procedural bar as an

affirmative defense to Jones’s claims of insufficient evidence. 

(Answer Third Am. Pet. 2.) She argues that Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted due to Jones’s failure to present them to

the California Supreme Court in a petition for review of the court

of appeal’s decision; instead, he raised them in a state habeas

petition. (Resp’t’s Mem. of P. & A. 13.)

A state procedural rule is “adequate” when the rule is “firmly

established and regularly followed” at the time of the purported

default. Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citations and quotations omitted) overruled on other grounds by

Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 583 (citing Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573,

577 (9th Cir. 1999)). The state procedural rule must also be clear

and consistently applied at the time of petitioner’s default. 

Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations

omitted). 

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“For a state procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state

law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal

law.” LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

1032, 1040-41 (1989)); see also Park, 202 F.3d at 1152. “‘A state

law ground is so interwoven if the state has made application of

the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law

[such as] the determination of whether federal constitutional error

has been committed.’” Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581 (quoting Park, 202

F.3d at 1152); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). 

In Waltreus, the California Supreme Court stated that “habeas

corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal.” Waltreus, 62

Cal. 2d at 225, 397 P.2d at 1005, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (citing In re

Winchester, 53 Cal. 2d 528, 532 (1960)). Since the decision, a

Waltreus citation has stood for the principle that “‘any issue that

was actually raised and rejected on appeal cannot be renewed in a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.’” Forrest v. Vasquez, 75

F.3d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 

Respondent argues that a Waltreus citation is an independent

and adequate state procedural bar. (Resp’t’s Mem. P. & A. 13.) 

This argument ignores Ninth Circuit authority which has

specifically found that the Waltreus rule is not sufficient to bar

federal habeas relief. Hill, 321 F.3d at 789 (stating “[t]he

California Supreme Court’s reliance on In re Waltreus does

not . . . bar federal court review”); LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 705

n.11 (stating that “[i]nvocation of the Waltreus rule by a state

court . . . does not bar federal review”); Bean, 96 F.3d at 1131;

Forrest, 75 F.3d at 564 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

805 (1991)) (stating “a Waltreus denial on state habeas has no

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bearing on [a petitioner’s] ability to raise a claim in federal

court”). Waltreus does not constitute a bar to federal habeas

review. 

The California Supreme Court denied Jones’s second habeas

petition with citations to Waltreus, Dixon, Swain, and Duvall. 

(Lodgment No. 11, In re Jones, No. S1117839, slip op. at 1.) It is

unclear which of the five claims raised in the state petition were

denied because of Waltreus and which were denied because of Dixon,

Swain, or Duvall. 

The Court need not consider whether Dixon, Swain, and Duvall

are independent and adequate because the California Supreme Court’s

order is ambiguous. The state court’s opinion summarily denies

multiple claims with a citation to more than one procedural bar,

and it is impossible to know which bar was applied to each claim. 

When presented with this kind of ambiguous opinion from a state

court, the Ninth Circuit has held that the petitioner’s claims are

not procedurally barred. See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742,

774-75 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at

735) (finding that “[b]y failing to specify which claims were

barred for which reasons, the Nevada Supreme Court ‘did not clearly

and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state

ground[]’”); Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir.

2001) (stating that “[b]y invoking two contradictory arguments, the

state court failed to make a clear finding of procedural default

and federal review is not barred[]”); Washington v. Cambra, 208

F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of habeas

petition because California Supreme Court invoked two state

procedural rules without specifying which rule applied to which

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claim and one rule was not independent of federal law); Ceja v.

Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that by

adopting mixed arguments, state court “did not clearly base its

decision on independent and adequate state law grounds[]”); Bean,

96 F.3d at 1131 (stating an ambiguous order that does not specify

which claims were rejected under which rule does not preclude

federal collateral review). 

Thus, because the California Supreme Court did not specify

which of Petitioner’s claims were denied because of Waltreus and

which were denied because of Dixon, Swain, and Duvall, there is no

procedural bar to federal review of Jones’s sufficiency of the

evidence claims.

2. Merits of Jones’s Sufficiency of Evidence Claims

Jones argues that his due process rights were violated because

there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the attempted

robbery of Shannon Williams, Robert Kueber, and Ramon Bazaldua, and

he claims there was insufficient evidence to find the firearm-use

allegations true. (Third Am. Pet. 9-10, 37-47.) Because there is

no reasoned decision from the California Supreme Court concerning

either of Jones’s sufficiency of the evidence claims, this Court

must “look through” that court’s summary opinion to the reasoned

opinion of the California Court of Appeal. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-

06. 

The Due Process Clause protects a criminal defendant from

conviction “except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” 

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When challenging a

conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, the constitutional

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standard established by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia is

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Smith

v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 

The state court explained the standard it applied as follows: 

On an appeal contending there is insufficient

evidence to support a verdict, we review the evidence in

the light most favorable to the judgment and, in so

doing, determine whether there is substantial evidence

such that a rational trier of fact could find the

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Lodgment No. 5, Jones, No. D038250, slip op. at 17.) This is in

line with the federal standard established in Jackson. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 (holding that evidence is insufficient to

support a conviction when, based on the record viewed in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could

have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Therefore, the state

appellate court correctly identified the governing law as set forth

by the Supreme Court.

“Our task under AEDPA, then, is to determine whether the

decision of the California Court of Appeal, holding that the

evidence was sufficient to convict [Jones], was an unreasonable

application of Jackson.” Smith, 437 F.3d at 889 (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir.

2005)). “The Jackson inquiry does not focus on whether the trier

of fact made the correct guilt or innocence determination, but

rather whether it made a rational decision to convict or acquit.” 

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993). 

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a. Attempted Robbery Convictions

In his third ground for relief, Jones contends there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of attempting to rob Bazaldua,

Kueber, and Williams. (Third Am. Pet. 9.) Specifically, he

asserts that these individuals, all Symbolic Motors employees, were

never asked if they had access to the business’s safe. (Id. at 38-

39.) Petitioner concedes that the evidence shows an intent to rob

Hughes, Phillips, and French, because these three individuals were

asked about the location of the safe, and Hughes was forced to use

his keys to try to access the safe. (Id. at 37.) Jones claims,

however, that there is no evidence the robbers tried to access the

safe through Bazaldua, Kueber, or Williams. (Id. at 38-39.) 

Petitioner argues the evidence was only sufficient to prove an

intent to rob Symbolic Motors but not sufficient to prove an intent

to rob the individual victims. (Id. at 38.)

To determine whether the state court’s application of Jackson

was unreasonable, the Court must look to state law to determine the

substantive elements of the crime necessary to support a

conviction. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Davis v. Woodford, 333

F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2003). Under California law, robbery is

the “taking of personal property in the possession of another, from

his person or immediate presence, and against his will,

accomplished by means of force or fear.” Cal. Penal Code § 211

(West 1999). An attempted robbery occurs when there is “specific

intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done

toward its commission.” Cal. Penal Code. § 21a (West 1999). 

“California follows the long-standing rule that the employees

of a business constructively possess the business owner’s property

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during a robbery.” People v. Jones, 82 Cal. App. 4th 485, 490, 98

Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 331 (Ct. App. 2000). “Robbery is an offense

against the person; thus a store employee may be the victim of a

robbery even though he is not its owner and not at the moment in

immediate control of the stolen property.” People v. Johnson, 38

Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (Ct. App. 1974)

(citation omitted). 

California courts have held that store employees may be

victims of a robbery even if they did not have specific

responsibility for handling the business’s money. See, e.g.,

People v. Gilbeaux, 111 Cal. App. 4th 515, 521-23, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d

835, 839-41 (Ct. App. 2003) (discussing the robbery of janitors who

had no responsibility for handling cash but were among the workers

in charge of the premises when the robbery took place); Jones, 82

Cal. App. 4th at 491-92, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332 (affirming

conviction for attempted robbery of employees who were “subjected

to force or fear during appellant’s attempt to steal their

employer’s property” even though none had the business’s money in

their immediate control or possession). Under California law,

employees Bazaldua, Kueber, and Williams could be victims of

attempted robbery when Jones attempted to steal money from Symbolic

Motors, regardless of whether these employees had access to the

business’s safe.

Petitioner seems to argue that because neither he nor Penton

specifically asked Bazaldua, Kueber, or Williams where the money

was, if they could open the safe (as done with Phillips and

Hughes), or demand they turn over any personal property (as done

with French), there could be no attempted robbery of these

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individuals. (Third Am. Pet. 9.) This construes the facts too

narrowly. 

First, Penton held a gun to Bazaldua and asked “Are you the

big guy” -- presumably to determine if he was an owner or manager

who would have access to the safe. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 1, 156.) Jones tied Bazaldua’s hands with duct tape. (Id. at

158.) As the car detailer, Bazaldua did not have access to the

safe, but Petitioner used force to secure Bazaldua until someone

with access to the safe arrived. This is sufficient to convict

Jones of attempted robbery of Bazaldua. See Gilbeaux, 111 Cal.

App. 4th at 521-23, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 839-41.

Next, although Williams (an employee) only saw Jones for a few

seconds, and Kueber (another employee) never saw Jones, Petitioner

is liable for Penton’s acts under California’s accomplice law. 

“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime . . . whether

they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and

abet in its commission . . . are principals in any crime so

committed.” Cal. Penal Code § 31 (West 1999). A person aids and

abets the commission of a crime when he (1) has knowledge of the

unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (2) has the intent or purpose

of committing, facilitating, or encouraging commission of the

crime, and (3) aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates commission

of the crime. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 1158, 1164, 811 P.2d

742, 747, 282 Cal. Rptr. 450, 455 (1991) (citation omitted). 

Penton pointed a gun at Williams and forced her into an

office. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 43, 46-47.) She then

saw Jones come down the stairs with a gun. (Id. at 50-51.) Penton

also displayed his gun to Kueber and demanded that he come to the

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office where Penton was holding Williams. (Id. at 130-32.) He

told Kueber not to try to run because they had two children

upstairs. (Id. at 132.) The children and Hughes were being

detained by Jones. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 325-

29.)

Petitioner asserts there was insufficient evidence to find

that he aided and abetted any attempt to rob Bazaldua, Williams, or

Kueber. (Third Am. Pet. 41.) He argues that he could not have

shared Penton’s specific intent to detain and rob Williams and

Kueber because he did not have contact with them, and he did not

even know they were present. (Third Am. Pet. 42.) The evidence,

however, shows that Jones acted with the purpose of committing the

robbery. Petitioner bound Hughes and detained him and his

daughters upstairs while Penton detained the others downstairs. 

This action aided and promoted the attempted robberies. Jones knew

that Penton was holding employees in the office while they waited

for someone to arrive who had access to the safe. (See Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 156-59 (Bazaldua’s testimony that Jones

was in the office where Bazaldua, Phillips, and French were bound

on the floor).) This is sufficient evidence to support

Petitioner’s convictions for attempted robbery of Bazaldua, Kueber,

and Williams. Cf. People v. Phan, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1453, 1462-63,

18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 369 (Ct. App. 1993) (upholding robbery

conviction where defendant was present when his associate robbed

the victim, even though defendant did not actively encourage or

assist the taking of property).

In light of the evidence presented at trial, a rational juror

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones attempted to

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rob Bazaldua, Kueber, and Williams. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

As a result, the state court’s decision denying this claim did not

involve an unreasonable application of clearly established law. 

Ground three in Jones’s Third Amended Petition should be denied. 

b. Firearm Enhancements

In ground four, Jones argues there was insufficient evidence

to support the firearm-use allegations as to Bazaldua, Williams,

and Kueber. (Third Am. Pet. 10.) Petitioner contends that because

Bazaldua and Kueber never saw him with a gun, and Williams only saw

him with a gun as he ran down the stairs to the showroom, the gunuse allegations as to these three individuals were improper. (Id.

at 44.)

California Penal Code section 12022.53(b) provides that “any

person who is convicted of a felony specified in subdivision (a),

and who in the commission of that felony personally used a firearm,

shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of 10 years in the

state prison.” Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b) (West Supp. 2007). 

Robbery is one of the felonies to which the enhancement applies. 

Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(a)(4) (West Supp. 2007).

In denying Jones’s claim, the state appellate court noted that

under state law, “a gun may be used ‘in the commission’ of a given

crime even if the use is directed toward someone other than the

victim of the crime.” (Lodgment No. 5, Jones, No. D038250, slip

op. at 20 (citing People v. Granado, 49 Cal. App. 4th 317, 329-30,

56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636, 644 (1996)).) When a gun is employed “to

neutralize the victim’s companions, bystanders, or other persons

who might otherwise interfere with the successful completion of the

crime[,]” the elements of section 12022.53(a) are met. Id.

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For the firearm enhancement to be imposed, the defendant must

be found to have actually used a firearm in committing the crime,

as opposed to merely possessing a gun. See Alvarado v. Superior

Court, 146 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1000, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 421 (Ct.

App. 2007) (distinguishing the firearm-use enhancement under §

12022.5(a) from the sentence enhancement under § 12022(a)(1) for

being armed during commission of a felony). In People v. Granado,

49 Cal. App. 4th 317, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636, the appellate court

defined firearm use as “gun-related conduct coupled with

facilitative intent . . . .” Granado, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 329, 56

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644. The test for distinguishing use of a firearm

from mere possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime

focuses on the actor’s conduct: “[D]id the defendant take some

action with the gun in furtherance of the commission of the crime?” 

Id. at 324 n.7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641 n.7 (emphasis added). 

The sentence enhancement is only appropriate where the

defendant actively uses a gun to assist in the commission of the

crime, as opposed to conduct that is “purely incidental to the

crime.” Id. at 324, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641 (discussing People v.

Hays, 147 Cal. App. 3d 534, 195 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1983)). The term

“use” is broadly construed in the context of each case and in

accordance with the statute’s purpose of deterring gun use during

the commission of crimes. Id. at 322, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639;

Alvarado, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1002, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 422. “[A]

gun ‘use’ finding is precluded if the defendant’s conduct with

respect to the weapon is merely a passive or inadvertent exposure

of the gun.” Alvarado, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1003, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d

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at 423 (citing Granado, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 324-35, 56 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 641). 

Williams testified at trial that Penton pointed a gun at her

and forced her into an office where Bazaldua, Phillips, and French

were bound and on the floor. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1,

46-48.) After Penton left the room to run after Kueber, Petitioner

came down the stairs holding a gun. (Id. at 49-50.) Jones ran

past the office where Williams and the others were and out into the

showroom. (Id. at 50.) Williams testified that Petitioner made

eye contact with her, but she did not say that Jones made any

threats or gestured with the gun in any way. (See id. at 91.) Her

testimony simply stated that he went down the stairs quickly while

holding a gun. 

Bazaldua testified that Penton shoved a gun into his back and

made him go into an office where Petitioner bound his hands, but he

never saw Jones with a gun. (See id. at 156-59.) Kueber, who ran

out of the showroom before the robbers could force him into the

back office, never saw Petitioner at all. (Id. at 152.) 

Jones argues that, at most, this evidence shows gun

possession, but not gun use. (See Third Am. Pet. 44.) This

contention is contrary to California law. 

In a simultaneous robbery of multiple victims by multiple

perpetrators, use of a firearm against at least one

victim satisfies the personal use requirement such that a

gun use finding attaches to every crime for which the

defendant is responsible during the transaction,

including crimes for which the defendant is only

vicariously liable.

Ballard v. Estelle, 937 F.2d 453, 457-58 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d 605, 635, 765 P.2d 70, 87, 253 Cal.

Rptr. 863, 880 (1988)). Thus, Jones’s sentence can be enhanced

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based on personal gun use for each victim of a multiple-victim

robbery, even if Jones did not use a gun against each individual

robbery victim. 

In Ballard, the habeas petitioner challenged the imposition of

California’s gun-use enhancement because “even if the personal use

finding [could] be sustained in one or two [of the eighteen

robbery] counts, there was insufficient evidence of personal use in

every other count.” Id. at 457. This is the same claim Jones is

making here. (See Third Am. Pet. 10.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed

the district court’s denial of Ballard’s petition because there was

evidence that he personally used a gun against some of the robbery

victims: 

It would be inconsistent with [People v.]Walker and with

the nature of robberies involving multiple perpetrators

and victims, to say a gun use finding as to Mr. Ballard

applies only against those victims who challenged him and

thereby elicited his menacing behavior. He personally

used his gun in the course of simultaneously robbing

multiple victims, and a threat to one victim was a threat

to all. His personal gun use during the course of the

robberies was inextricably related to the robbery of each

victim and cannot be separated from any of the robbery

counts, including those in which his codefendants were

the principal actors.

Ballard, 937 F.2d at 459. 

Here, there was evidence Petitioner used his gun to control

French, Phillips, and Hughes. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1,

111; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 325, 327.) This

testimonial evidence is sufficient to support the imposition of the

gun-use enhancement for all six victims, not just the three who

testified that Jones pointed the gun at them. 

Given the California courts’ interpretation of section

12022.53, a rational juror could have found the gun enhancement

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2 Although Jones’s Third Amended Petition added four new grounds for

relief (grounds five, six, seven, and eight), grounds seven and eight are

duplicative. Both claims allege that Petitioner’s due process rights were

violated when the trial court failed to give a jury instruction limiting the

purposes for which evidence of the separate conviction could be introduced. 

(See Third Am. Pet. 13-14.) The Court construes these two grounds for relief as

a single claim. 

62 03cv1463 J (RBB)

allegations for victims Bazaldua, Kueber, and Williams to be true

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

Consequently, the appellate court’s decision was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. Ground four should be denied.

C. Claims Five Through Eight Are Procedurally Barred.

Petitioner’s Third Amended Petition included new claims that

were not presented in his earlier federal petitions. (See Third

Am. Pet. 11-14; see also Order Rejecting R & R 12.) These new

claims are (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure

to seek to suppress evidence of a separate crime (ground five); (2)

a due process violation for introduction of irrelevant evidence of

a separate crime (ground six); and (3) a due process violation for

the trial court’s refusal to give a jury instruction limiting the

jury’s use of evidence of the separate crime (grounds seven and

eight).2 (Third Am. Pet. 11-14.) Respondent alleges these newlyadded claims are procedurally barred because they were denied by

the state court on adequate and independent state law grounds. 

(Resp’t’s Mem. of P. & A. 16.) 

These claims were presented to the California Supreme Court in

Jones’s fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Supp.

Lodgment No. 1, Pet. at 4-7, Jones, No. S135905.) The court denied

the petition with a citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770,

780, 959 P.2d 311, 317, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 159-60 (1998); In re

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3 The Court notes that Petitioner’s fifth claim cannot be barred by Dixon

because the Dixon rule is never applied to claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 814 n.34, 959 P.2d at 340 n.34, 77 Cal.

Rptr. 2d at 182 n.34.

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Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993);

In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304, 209 P.2d 793, 796 (1949); People

v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258, 37 Cal. Rptr.

2d 259, 265 (1995); and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513

(1953). (Supp. Lodgment No. 2, In re Jones, No. S135905, slip op.

at 1.)

A federal habeas court is barred from reviewing a federal

claim that was decided by a state court if the state court’s

decision rested on adequate and independent state law grounds. 

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d at 580 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at

729; LaCrosse, 244 F.3d at 704). “In order to constitute adequate

and independent grounds sufficient to support a finding of

procedural default, a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner’s

purported default.” Wells, 28 F.3d at 1010. An ambiguous opinion

from a state court that invokes multiple procedural bars and does

not specify which rule applies to which claim will not bar federal

habeas review unless each procedural bar is adequate and

independent. See Washington, 208 F.3d at 834. Thus, because the

state court did not identify which rule was used to deny each

claim, Jones’s claims will only be procedurally defaulted if all of

the procedural bars cited by the California Supreme Court are

adequate to support the judgment and independent of federal law.3

See id.

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1. Independence of the State Court Rules

a. The Robbins/Clark Timeliness Bar

The state court denied Jones’s fourth habeas petition by

invoking the timeliness bar of Robbins and Clark. (Supp. Lodgment

No. 2, Jones, No. S135905, slip op. at 1); see Thorson v. Palmer,

479 F.3d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that a citation to page

780 of Robbins is a clear indication the state court applied the

timeliness rule to bar review); King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 966

(9th Cir. 2006) (discussing California’s timeliness bar); Bennett,

322 F.3d at 579 (same). This rule bars habeas petitions that were

filed after “substantial delay” without significant justification. 

King, 464 F.3d at 966. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the timeliness bar of Clark

and Robbins is not interwoven with federal law, and thus it is an

independent state procedural ground. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581.

b. The Dixon Bar

The California Court of Appeal also denied Jones’s habeas

petition with a citation to In re Dixon. (Supp. Lodgment No. 2,

Jones, No. S135905, slip op. at 1). Dixon stands for the

proposition that “a convicted defendant desiring to bring claims in

a state habeas petition must, if possible, have pursued the claims

on direct appeal from his conviction.” Park v. California, 202

F.3d at 1151; see also Washington, 208 F.3d at 833-34. 

Prior the California Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in In re

Robbins, a state’s invocation of the Dixon bar was necessarily 

interwoven with federal law because it required a state court to

determine if there was fundamental constitutional error that would

excuse the petitioner’s default. Protsman v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp.

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2d 1004, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Park, 202 F.3d at 1152). In

Robbins, the supreme court made it clear that in future cases,

California courts would find claims to be procedurally defaulted

under Dixon based solely on state law grounds. Id. at 1007-08; cf.

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581-82. Accordingly, the Dixon bar now rests

on state law grounds that are independent of federal law. 

Protsman, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.

c. The Swain/Duvall Bar

Additionally, the court of appeal denied Jones’s petition with

a citation to Swain and Duvall. (Supp. Lodgment No. 2, Jones, No.

S135905, slip op. at 1.) “The Swain rule is commonly referred to

as the ‘untimeliness’ bar[]” and requires the petitioner to explain

the delay in making a collateral attack. Washington v. Cambra, 208

F.3d at 833. The Ninth Circuit also has interpreted a citation to

Swain and Duvall to mean that the petitioner failed to “allege with

sufficient particularity the facts warranting habeas relief . . .

.” King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); see Duvall, 9

Cal. 4th at 474, 886 P.2d at 1258, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. A

state habeas petitioner whose claims are denied with a citation to

Duvall and Swain is given leave to amend his petition to comply

with the specificity requirement. King v. Roe, 340 F.3d at 823. A

denial under Swain and Duvall is, “in effect, a grant of a demurrer

with leave to refile.” Gaston v. Palmer (Gaston I), 417 F.3d 1030,

1039 (9th Cir. 2005), amended on other grounds, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th

Cir. 2006). Thus, a citation to Swain and Duvall is a denial on

procedural grounds that is independent of the federal

constitutional issue. See also in re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 814

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n.34, 959 P.2d 311, 340 n.34, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 182 n.34 (1998)

(discussing “the bar of untimeliness”). 

2. Adequacy of the State Procedural Rules

To properly invoke the adequate and independent grounds

doctrine, the respondent must plead procedural default as an

affirmative defense. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 585. The burden then

shifts to the petitioner to show that the rule is inadequate to

support the state court’s opinion because the rule is ambiguous or

inconsistently applied. Id. at 586. This may be done by pointing

to factual allegations and case authority demonstrating

inconsistent application of the rule. Id. But where the Ninth

Circuit has previously found that a state procedural rule is not

consistently applied, and is thus inadequate, the federal habeas

petitioner can meet his burden simply by challenging the adequacy

of the procedural rule. King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d at 967-68. The

burden then shifts back to the respondent, who bears the ultimate

burden of establishing adequacy. Id. 

Respondent pled procedural default as an affirmative defense. 

(Resp’t’s Mem. of P. & A. 15-17.) To satisfy his burden of placing

the state procedural rules in issue, Jones makes a blanket

assertion that “there is no procedural[] bar to federal review” of

his claims. (Traverse 8.) But under Bennett, Petitioner must show

that the state rules are inadequate to bar federal review because

they are ambiguous or not consistently applied.

To challenge the adequacy of the procedural bars, Jones’s

burden is “quite modest: at most, Petitioner need only assert

allegations; he does not need to prove anything.” Dennis v. Brown,

361 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Bennett, 322

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F.3d at 585-86). In King v. Marquette, 464 F.3d at 967, the Ninth

Circuit explored a petitioner’s burden when challenging the

adequacy of a state procedural bar: “Is simply contesting the

adequacy of a state rule sufficient to meet the petitioner’s burden

under Bennett if we have previously found the rule to be too

ambiguous to bar federal review during the applicable time period? 

We hold it is.” Yet, Jones has failed to meet even this burden.

Petitioner has not pointed to any factual allegations or cited

any authority that would show that any of the procedural rules have

not been consistently applied. (See Traverse 8.) Jones did not

identify any specific rule as inadequate to support the state

court’s judgment. (See id.) Because Petitioner has failed to meet

his burden to contest the California procedural bars, the Court

finds that the state rules are independent and adequate grounds to

preclude federal review. See Protsman v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp. 2d

at 1014 (making a finding of procedural default where the

petitioner failed to challenge adequacy of state procedural rules).

Nevertheless, Jones argues that the California Supreme Court’s

decision denying his state habeas petition was ambiguous, which

permits a review on the merits. (Traverse 8 (citing Valerio v.

Crawford, 306 F.3d at 774-75.) This may be true when an ambiguous

order cites multiple procedural rules for denying review, some

which preclude federal review and some which do not. Calderon, 96

F.3d at 1131. But the procedural bar does apply if all the

procedural rules are adequate and independent state law grounds for

denying relief.

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3. Cause and Prejudice

For the Court to review the merits of Jones’s defaulted

claims, he must demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default:

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his

federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent

and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review

of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as

a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S.

446, 451 (2000).

Petitioner has not demonstrated cause for his default or

prejudice resulting from it. He points to no facts or

circumstances that made him unable to comply with California’s

procedural rules. (See Traverse 8.) Jones also makes no attempt

to show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the

federal court does not review his defaulted claims. Accordingly,

the Court need not consider grounds five through eight of the Third

Amended Petition on the merits. They are procedurally defaulted.

D. Claims Five Through Eight Are Barred by the Statute of

Limitations.

Respondent asserts that Jones’s fifth, sixth, seventh, and

eighth claims should be dismissed because they were filed after the

expiration of the statute of limitations. (Resp’t’s Mem. of P. &

A. 18.) The statute of limitations for habeas corpus petitions is

set forth in AEDPA. As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)

provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –-

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(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing

an application created by State action in violation

of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of

the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1) (West 2006). Petitioner has not asserted

that subsections (B)-(D) of § 2244(d)(1) apply to his case, so §

2244(d)(1)(A) provides the applicable date on which the limitations

period began to run. 

The California Supreme Court denied Jones’s petition for

review on January 15, 2003. (Lodgment No. 7, Jones, No. S111271,

slip op. at 1.) The state court’s judgment became final on April

15, 2003, when Petitioner’s ninety-day period in which to file a

petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court expired. 

See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Under §

2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations on Jones’s federal petition

began to run the next day, April 16, 2003. See Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining the

application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) to the

calculation of the limitations period under AEDPA). Absent

statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) or equitable tolling, April

15, 2004, was the last day on which Petitioner could file a timely

federal habeas petition. Id.

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Jones filed his federal habeas petition on July 21, 2003,

which is within the applicable statute of limitations. This

matter, however, was stayed from September 4, 2003, through August

2, 2004, to allow Jones to return to state court to assert

previously unexhausted claims [doc. nos. 8, 15, 20]. On August 20,

2004, this Court ordered the Respondent to address the merits of

Jones’s Petition [doc. no. 28]. On May 2, 2005, Jones renewed his

request for a stay and abeyance [doc. no. 35], which was ultimately

granted through September 27, 2006 [doc. no. 50].

Petitioner filed his Third Amended Petition asserting grounds

five through eight on June 15, 2006, over two years after the

limitations period expired for federal habeas review. In the

absence of tolling, these newly asserted claims may be barred by

the statute of limitations unless they relate back to the filing of

the Petition.

1. Statutory Tolling

Under AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during

periods when a petitioner has a properly filed application for

collateral review pending in state court. Specifically, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2) states: 

The time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2) (West 2006). 

In addition, the interval between the disposition of one state

petition and the filing of another may be tolled under “interval

tolling.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). “[T]he

AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of the time during

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which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state

court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a

particular post-conviction application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d

1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-22. 

An application for state collateral review is pending “as long as

the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’–-

i.e., ‘until the completion of’ that process. In other words,

until the application has achieved final resolution through the

State’s post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains

‘pending.’” Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-20. 

A state habeas petition must be “properly filed” to toll the

statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “‘Properly filed’

means the petition’s ‘delivery and acceptance are in compliance

with the applicable laws and rules governing filings’ in that

state.” Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005),

amended, 439 F.3d. 993 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 132

(2006) (quoting Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)). A

petition that is dismissed by the state court as untimely is not

“properly filed” under AEDPA, and accordingly, it will not toll the

statute of limitations. Id. at 1149; see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S.

189, 198 (2006).

The California Supreme Court denied Jones’s petition for

review of his direct appeal on January 15, 2003. (Lodgment No. 7,

Jones, No. S111271, slip op. at 1.) On April 10, 2003, before the

judgment even became final, Petitioner filed his first state habeas

petition with the California Supreme Court raising five claims: 

(1) ineffective assistance for failure to investigate; (2)

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4

 Respondent’s Answer does not address, or even mention, Jones’s habeas

petition in case number S133747, filed in the California Supreme Court on May 9,

2005. Respondent also failed to lodge with the Court a copy of this petition

and the state court’s disposition.

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ineffective assistance for incorrect advice during plea

negotiations; (3) insufficient evidence for three counts of

attempted robbery; (4) insufficient evidence of firearm use; and

(5) ineffective assistance for failure to impeach a critical

witness. (Lodgment No. 8, Pet. at 3-7, Jones, No. S114976.) Jones

then requested that the petition be withdrawn because it contained

grounds “already exhausted” in state court. (Lodgment No. 9,

Jones, No. S114976, slip op. attach.) 

On July 31, 2003, six days after the petition was withdrawn,

Jones filed a second petition in the California Supreme Court

raising three claims: (1) ineffective assistance for failure to

impeach a critical witness; (2) insufficient evidence of attempted

robbery; and (3) insufficient evidence of firearm use. (Lodgment

No. 10, Pet. at 3-5, Jones, No. S117839.) The petition was denied

on April 14, 2004. (Lodgment No. 11, Jones, No. S117839, slip op.

at 1.) 

Over one year later, on May 9, 2005, and after the one-year

statute of limitations expired, Petitioner filed a third state

habeas petition, alleging entirely new claims: (1) ineffective

assistance for failure to move to suppress other crime evidence;

(2) violation of due process for the trial court’s failure to give

a limiting instruction; (3) due process violation by introduction

of irrelevant evidence; and (4) ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel.4 (Pet’r’s Response to Opp’n to Mot. to Amend [doc. no.

39] Ex. A 3-6.) Jones requested that this Court hold his federal

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petition in abeyance while he pursued his third state habeas

petition raising these claims. (See Request for Stay [doc. no.

35]; Pet’r’s Response to Opp’n to Mot. to Amend.) Before the

district court ruled on Petitioner’s Motion to Amend and Motion for

Stay, Jones withdrew the state petition. In re Jones, No. S133747,

docket, available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (search

for case number “S133747", then follow “docket” hyperlink). Nine

days later, on July 28, 2005, Petitioner filed a fourth state

petition raising the same four claims. (Supp. Lodgment No. 1, Pet.

at 4-7, Jones, No. S135905.) 

AEDPA anticipates that a petitioner must pursue one full round

of review in state court before presenting his claims in a federal

habeas petition. Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.

2003) (citing Carey, 536 U.S. at 222). When a petitioner stops

pursuing state review of his original claims, he has abandoned his

first full round of review and any subsequent habeas petitions

asserting different claims form a separate “application” for

collateral review. Id. Here, Petitioner’s third and fourth

petitions raised entirely different claims from those raised in the

first two petitions. His abandonment of the original claims and

pursuit of separate claims constituted a second round of review. 

The time between the denial of his second habeas petition on April

14, 2004, and the filing of his third petition on May 9, 2005, will

not be tolled because there was no application “pending” during

that period. 

Furthermore, the statute of limitations was not tolled while

Petitioner’s final state petition was pending. Jones’s fourth

state habeas petition was denied with a citation to Clark and

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Robbins, which indicates that the state court deemed the petition

to be untimely. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 579. Petitioner’s final

state habeas petition was never “properly filed” and will not toll

the statute of limitations. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414

(2005) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state

law, that [is] the end of the matter for purposes of §

2244(d)(2).”); Thorson, 479 F.3d at 645; Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1149;

Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1151 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Carey, 536 U.S. at 226). 

The statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas

petition expired on April 15, 2005, one year after Jones’s state

court judgment became final and after the denial of his second

state habeas petition. Under rule 8.532(b)(2)(C) of the California

Rules of Court, and its prior version, rule 29.4(b)(2)(C), a

California Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for a writ is final

upon filing. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.532(b)(2)(C) (2007). The Ninth

Circuit has held that statutory tolling runs until the denial

becomes final. See Allen v. Lewis, 295 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Jones is entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d) during the

pendency of his first and second habeas petitions to the California

Supreme Court. But he “is not entitled to interval tolling if he

abandons all of his claims in his first application and his [later]

application sets forth new and different claims.” Gaston v. Palmer

(Gaston I), 417 F.3d at 1043; see also Gaston v. Palmer (Gaston

II), 447 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that petitioner

was not entitled to “gap” tolling for delays of ten months and

greater between state habeas petitions).

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Petitioner did not file his Third Amended Petition in this

Court until June 15, 2006. Grounds five through eight of the Third

Amended Petition, not contained in Jones’s first two state habeas

petitions, are untimely unless they relate back to the filing of

the original federal Petition or unless Jones is entitled to

equitable tolling.

2. Relation Back

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2) provides in part that

an amended pleading may relate back to the date of the original

pleading when “the claim or defense asserted in the amended

pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set

forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “are

applicable to proceedings for . . . habeas corpus . . . to the

extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in

statutes of the United States [or] the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2); see also Henry v.

Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, 28

U.S.C. § 2242 states that an application for a writ of habeas

corpus “may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of

procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West

2006). 

An amended pleading that adds a new claim will relate back to

the date of the original pleading if it arises out of the same

conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the claims in the original

pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). It is not sufficient that a new

claim relates to the same trial, conviction, or sentence that was

challenged in the original habeas petition. Mayle v. Felix, 545

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U.S. 644, 662 (2005). But “[s]o long as the original and amended

petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative

facts, relation back will be in order.” Id. at 664.

In Mayle, Justice Ginsburg gave two examples of where relation

back is appropriate. Id. at 664 n.7. In one, the original habeas

petition alleged a Brady violation, and the amended petition

alleged the prosecution failed to disclose a particular report. 

Id. (citing Mandacina v. United States, 328 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (8th

Cir. 2003). In the second example, “the original petition

challenged the trial court’s admission of recanted statements,

while the amended petition challenged the court’s refusal to allow

the defendant to show that the statements had been recanted.” Id.

at 644 n.7 (citing Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th

Cir. 2001)). Mayle also notes that “relation back [is] ordinarily

allowed ‘when the new claim is based on the same facts as the

original pleading and only changes the legal theory.’” Id. at 644

n.7 (citing 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §

15.19 [2], at 15-82 (3d ed. 2004).

Petitioner’s Third Amended Petition added four entirely new

claims, which were not presented in his original Petition or either

of the previous two amendments: (1) He received ineffective

assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to move to

suppress evidence of a separate conviction (ground five); (2) due

process was violated when the court allowed admission of evidence

of a separate conviction (ground six); and (3) the trial court did

not give a jury instruction limiting use of the prior conviction

evidence (grounds seven and eight). (See Third Am. Pet. 11-14.) 

Although these claims arise from the same trial and conviction that

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Petitioner challenged in his previously asserted claims, they do

not arise from the same operative facts asserted in Jones’s

Petition, First Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition. See

Martin v. Hubbard, No. 05-15524, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 18848, at *3-

4 (9th Cir. July 26, 2006) (requiring the original petition to

contain the “essential factual predicates of the later claims[]”). 

Jones’s new claims involve different errors and different times

from those previously alleged. Accordingly, these newly-asserted

claims do not relate back to the filing of the earlier federal

petitions. See Preston v. Harris, No. 05-15807, 2006 U.S. App.

LEXIS 463, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2007) (denying relation back

where claims involve different errors, actors, and times).

3. Equitable Tolling

In some cases, a Petitioner may be able to toll the

limitations period by demonstrating a basis for equitable tolling. 

Equitable tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible’” for the petitioner

to file a timely petition. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1202

(9th Cir. 2003)); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th

Cir. 2003); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted). “When external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may

be appropriate.” Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107 (citations omitted). 

Jones has the burden to establish extraordinary circumstances that

warrant equitable tolling. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065

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(9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213,

1218 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Petitioner claims that extraordinary circumstances exist to

warrant equitable tolling while he was awaiting the resolution of

his final state habeas petition. (Traverse 9.) Specifically,

Jones asserts that the district court’s Order Granting Petitioner’s

Motion to Amend Petition and Request for Stay and Abeyance [doc.

no. 50] found extraordinary circumstances that made it impossible

for Jones to assert grounds five through eight within the statute

of limitations. (Id.) Petitioner misreads the district court’s

order. The district court found that Jones did not act in bad

faith or with undue delay in seeking to amend his federal petition

to assert newly-discovered claims. (Order Granting Mot. to Amend

6.) This does not mean that Petitioner proved the existence of

extraordinary circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling. 

See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2005)

(distinguishing between “extraordinary circumstances” and “good

cause” standards).

“[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066 (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212

F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). Jones does not specify any facts

that constitute extraordinary circumstances. Petitioner only

points to Judge Jones’s Order, which listed Petitioner’s

justifications for delay in seeking to amend his petition: (1) The

prison did not provide adequate legal assistance; (2) Jones was

only able to attend the law library for two hours per week; and (3)

the prison was locked down for periods between December 26, 2003,

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and June 29, 2005, which limited his use of the library and access

to his “jailhouse legal assistance.” (Order Granting Mot. to Amend

6.) 

Courts have found that ignorance of the law is no excuse for

the late filing of a habeas petition. See Marsh v. Soares, 223

F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Although deficient prison

library resources may in certain circumstances be appropriate

grounds for equitable tolling, the deficiencies Jones alleges here

do not rise to that level. In Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964 (9th

Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Belleque v. Kephart, ___ U.S.

___, 127 S.Ct. 1880 (2007), the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to

the district court for an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling

where the petitioner alleged facts indicating the prison law

library did not have a copy of AEDPA or other related materials,

and the petitioner was unaware of AEDPA’s limitations period. Id.

at 974-75; see also Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th

Cir. 2000) (finding that unavailability of AEDPA in prison library

could constitute grounds for equitable tolling). Jones does not

allege facts approaching that level of inadequate access to library

materials, especially considering that Jones was able to timely

file pleadings in this action in addition to his first and second

state habeas petition.

Other examples of circumstances that may entitle a petitioner

to equitable tolling include language barriers that prevent timely

filing, denial of access to legal materials for a significant time,

or mental incompetence during the limitations period. See, e.g.,

Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Cobas

v. Burgess, 306 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 2002)); Laws v. Lamarque,

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351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

924 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, Jones has not alleged any facts that

would constitute extraordinary circumstances for his failure to

present grounds five through eight to the Court within the statute

of limitations. Accordingly, equitable tolling is not appropriate. 

Grounds five, six, seven, and eight in the Third Amended Petition

were filed after the expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations,

and these grounds for relief should be dismissed.

E. Jones’s Cumulative Error Claim

Petitioner asserts that “there were several substantial

errors” during his trial, and the cumulative effect of those errors

resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. (Third Am. Pet. 48;

Traverse 20.) 

In cases where there are a number of trial errors, the Court

may look at “the overall effect of all the errors in the context of

the evidence introduced at trial against the defendant.” United

States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

“In other words, ‘errors that might not be so prejudicial as to

amount to a deprivation of due process when considered alone, may

cumulatively produce a trial setting that is fundamentally

unfair.’” Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 883 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

In conducting a cumulative error analysis, the Court must look

at the combined effect of each error that occurred during

Petitioner’s trial. The Court has found the trial error alleged in

ground one of his Third Amended Petition did not prejudice Jones. 

Nevertheless, because the Court found no other trial errors, a

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cumulative error analysis is not appropriate. Jones’s cumulative

error claim fails.

F. Jones’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing

On September 14, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion for an

Evidentiary Hearing Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) [doc. no.

59]. Jones requests that the Court conduct an evidentiary hearing

on each of the grounds for relief claimed in his Third Amended

Petition. (See Pet’r’s Mot. 2-10; see also Third Am. Pet. 6-14.) 

Respondent’s Answer does not address Jones’s request.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), as amended by AEDPA, a district

court presented with a request for an evidentiary hearing must

first determine whether the petitioner failed to develop the

factual basis of his claims in state court. Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 420, 430 (2000). “[A] failure to develop the factual

basis of a claim is not established unless there is a lack of

diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or

the prisoner’s counsel.” Id. at 432. 

If a petitioner failed to develop the factual basis of a claim

in the state courts, this Court does not have discretion to conduct

an evidentiary hearing unless Petitioner shows that the following

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) are met:

(A) the claim relies on --

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by

the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not

have been previously discovered through the

exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence

that but for constitutional error, no reasonable

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factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2)(A)-(B) (West 2006).

If a petitioner developed the record in state court, the

federal habeas court examines whether an evidentiary hearing is

appropriate or required under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293

(1963). There are six Townsend factors to consider:

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved

in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination

is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the

fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was

not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there

is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at

the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears

that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas

applicant a full and fair fact hearing.

Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313). When a Petitioner has developed the

factual basis of his claim in state court and meets one of the

Townsend factors, “‘[a]n evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus

petition is required whenever petitioner’s allegations, if proved,

would entitle him to relief.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 63

F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir. 1995)). To meet this standard, “[t]he

petitioner’s allegations need only amount to a colorable claim.” 

Id. (citing Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 993 (9th Cir. 2002);

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2254(e)(2) to require a

petitioner who failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

state court to establish both that any efforts to discover the

facts would have been in vain and that he has a “convincing claim

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of innocence.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435 (citing 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) and § 2254(e)(2)(B)).

Jones does not allege that the factual bases of his claims

were not developed in state court. Instead, Petitioner repeatedly

asserts that an evidentiary hearing should be held on each of his

claims because the state court’s findings were erroneous,

unreasonable, and not supported by the record. (See Pet’r’s Mot.

3-10.) “Bald assertions and conclusory allegations” are not

sufficient grounds for an evidentiary hearing. Wacht v. Cardwell,

604 F.2d 1245, 1246 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979).

The factual basis of the ineffective assistance of counsel

claim alleged in ground one of Jones’s Third Amended Petition was

developed at the June 18, 2001, hearing on Petitioner’s motion for

a new trial. (See Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 599-686.) 

Jones, his trial attorney, and other witnesses testified at the

hearing, a transcript of which was a part of the appellate record. 

(Id.) An evidentiary hearing is not necessary on this claim

because the record was sufficiently developed in the state court,

and none of the Townsend factors weigh in favor of an evidentiary

hearing.

Jones did not receive a hearing in state court on any of the

other grounds presented in his Third Amended Petition. In his

petition to the California Supreme Court, filed July 31, 2003,

Petitioner requested that the court hold an evidentiary hearing on

his claims. (Lodgment No. 10, Pet. for Habeas Corpus at 7, Jones,

No. S117839.) The claims presented in that petition were: (1)

ineffective assistance for failure to impeach Hughes (ground one-A

of the present Third Amended Petition); (2) insufficient evidence

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of attempted robbery (ground three); and (3) insufficient evidence

of firearm use (ground four). (Id. at 3-5.)

Jones failed to develop the factual record on the “failure to

impeach” aspect of his ineffective assistance claim, which could

have been pursued during the hearing on his motion for a new trial. 

Likewise, Petitioner could have raised his claims of insufficient

evidence while seeking a new trial. Finally, Jones did not request

an evidentiary hearing in connection with the state habeas

petitions that contained his remaining claims. Even if Jones’s

lack of diligence is overlooked, an evidentiary hearing is not

required for those claims that can be resolved by reference to the

state court record. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir.

1994). Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claims come within

this rule.

“Under AEDPA, ‘a failure to develop the factual basis of a

claim is not established unless there is a lack of diligence, or

some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s

counsel.’” Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670 (quoting Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000)). With the exception of ground

one, Jones failed to develop the record within the meaning of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e) because neither he nor his attorney attempted to

pursue these claims during the evidentiary hearing held in

connection with his motion for a new trial. (See Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 599-686.)

Nevertheless, Jones is not entitled a federal evidentiary

hearing. Assuming Petitioner could meet one of the Townsend

factors for each of these claims, a hearing is only required where

“petitioner’s allegations, if proved, would entitle him to

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relief.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 815 (9th

Cir. 1995)). As discussed above, even if the facts are as Jones

alleges, he is not entitled to habeas relief on grounds one-A (the

failure to impeach Hughes), three (insufficient evidence or

attempted robbery), and four (insufficient evidence of firearm

use), which were raised in Jones’s state habeas petition with a

request for an evidentiary hearing. 

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the

remainder of his claims. Jones did not request an evidentiary

hearing on these claims in any of his state habeas petitions;

accordingly, he is at fault for failing to develop the factual

bases of those claims in the state courts. These claims do not

contain “colorable allegations that, if proved at an evidentiary

hearing, would entitle him to habeas relief.” Insyxiengmay, 403

F.3d at 670. Petitioner would not be entitled to habeas relief on

these claims even if all the facts are as he alleges. 

Jones’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED. In light

of this Order, Petitioner’s “Request for the Honorable Magistrates

[sic] Judge to Rule on Motion for Evidentiary Hearing” [doc. no.

72], which Jones filed on December 20, 2006, is also DENIED AS

MOOT.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Jones’s Third Amended Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED. In addition, Petitioner’s

Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\JONES1463\R&R03.wpd 86 03cv1463 J (RBB)

objections with the district court and serve a copy on all parties

on or before July 30, 2007. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before August 17, 2007. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2007 _____________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Jones

All parties of record

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