Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01312/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01312-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 196
Nature of Suit: Franchise
Cause of Action: 28:1331bc Fed. Question: Breach of Contract

---

1 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TESORO REFINING AND 

MARKETING COMPANY, 

 Plaintiff,

v. 

CALIFORNIA FINEST OIL, et al., 

 Defendants.

 Case No.: 12-CV-1312-WVG 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO ENFORCE 

SETTLEMENT; GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

[DOC. NO. 101] 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company’s 

(“Plaintiff”) Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (“Motion”). (Doc. No. 101.) 

Plaintiff seeks an order: (1) compelling Defendants1

 to pay $75,000.00 immediately per 

the parties’ Settlement Agreement; (2) entering judgment, jointly and severally, against 

each of the Defendants for the outstanding amount, $75,000.00, pursuant to California 

Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6 which is made applicable pursuant to Section 16 of 

the Settlement Agreement; and (3) ordering Defendants to pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees 

 

1 The named Defendants in this lawsuit are California Finest Oil, Raad Attisha, Hossom 

Theweny, and Nazar Theweny.

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 1 of 14
2 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

associated with preparing and filing this Motion, pursuant to Section 17 of the Settlement 

Agreement, or, as an alternative basis for recovering its attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff asks the 

Court to issue monetary sanctions under its inherent authority in the total amount of 

Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees associated with this Motion. Plaintiff also asks that this Court 

extend its jurisdiction over the settlement in this case for another year to ensure that the 

settlement is performed. (Doc. No. 101 at 2.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and 

ORDERS the Clerk of this Court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of 

$83,714.00 (the outstanding amount of $75,000.00 plus reasonable attorneys’ fees of 

$8,714.00). 

II. BACKGROUND 

According to Plaintiff, the instant litigation arises from the wrongful premature 

termination and breach by Defendants of various agreements, including, but not limited to 

a Retail Sales Agreement (“RSA”) which was entered by and between Plaintiff and 

Defendant California Finest Oil on November 15, 2009. The RSA obligated Defendant 

California Finest Oil to purchase fuel from Plaintiff for sale to consumers at a motor fuel 

dispensing station, located in San Diego, California (the “Station”), which Defendant 

California Finest Oil agreed to operate under the Shell brand for ten years. 

On or about November 17, 2009, Defendants Raad Attisha and Nazar Theweny each 

executed an Unconditional Guaranty for the benefit of Plaintiff in connection with any debt 

or obligation owed by Defendant California Finest Oil to Plaintiff. On or about November 

19, 2009, Defendant Hossom Theweny executed an Unconditional Guaranty for the benefit 

of Plaintiff in connection with any debt or obligation owed by Defendant California Finest 

Oil to Plaintiff. 

Also according to Plaintiff, on March 22, 2012, Defendants intentionally breached 

the RSA and Unconditional Guaranty by, among other things, (i) failing to purchase their 

minimum fuel requirements from Plaintiff; (ii) partially de-branding the Station; and (iii) 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 2 of 14
3 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

continuing to use Shell trademarks without proper authorization or license. As a result, 

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against Defendants on May 31, 2012. 

On January 16, 2014, the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement to settle all 

claims related to this lawsuit. Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants agreed to pay 

Plaintiff the total sum of $225,000.00 over the course of three years, beginning in 2014 and 

ending in 2016, in three annual payments of $75,000.00 per payment. (Doc. No. 101-1 at 

6; See Settlement Agreement at Section 3, attached as Exhibit A to Declaration of Jeffrey 

M. Hamerling (“Hamerling Decl.”).) The Settlement Agreement was signed by all parties 

and their counsel on February 10-13, 2014. Id. at 11–13. 

The first payment of $75,000.00 was to be remitted on or before May 1, 2014. (See 

Settlement Agreement at Section 3.) The second payment of $75,000.00 was to be remitted 

on or before May 1, 2015, and the third and final payment of $75,000.00 was to be remitted 

on or before May 1, 2016. Id. Under the Settlement Agreement, settlement payments are 

to be delivered to the law firm of Archer Norris, Plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm, to the 

attention of Jeffrey M. Hamerling. Id. 

III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 

Defendants failed to timely remit the first payment under the Agreement, causing 

Plaintiff to prepare and file a motion to compel enforcement of the Settlement Agreement 

on May 30, 2014. (Doc. No. 98.) Defendants eventually made that payment and Plaintiff 

withdrew its motion to enforce the Agreement on June 20, 2014. (Doc. No. 99.) 

In the instant Motion, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have failed to pay the third 

settlement payment of $75,000.00 to either Archer Norris or Plaintiff. On June 1, 2016, 

Plaintiff’s in-house counsel sent a meet-and-confer letter to Defense counsel, demanding 

payment of the third settlement installment by June 15, 2016, or confirmation that the 

payment was sent with proof of mailing and/or delivery of the payment. 

To date, Defendants have failed to respond to Plaintiff’s meet-and-confer 

correspondence and have failed to pay the third settlement payment. Defendants were to 

pay $75,000.00 to Plaintiff by May 1, 2016, pursuant to the terms of the Settlement 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 3 of 14
4 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Agreement. However, Defendants failed to remit all settlement payments as required, and 

currently owe Plaintiff $75,000.00 under the terms of the Agreement. 

 On June 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. (Doc. No. 101.) On July 11, 

2016, this Court issued a briefing schedule and ordered Defendants to file a response to 

Plaintiff’s Motion by July 22, 2016. (Doc. No. 102.) The Court set a hearing on Plaintiff’s 

Motion to be held on July 28, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., in Courtroom 2A of the above-entitled 

Court. Id. at 2. The Court explicitly ordered counsel for all parties to be present for the 

hearing. Id. 

Defendants failed to file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion, as ordered by the Court. 

Defendants failed to appear before this Court for the motion hearing, also as ordered by the 

Court. On July 28, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., the Court went on the record for the motion hearing. 

Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. David Marchiano, participated telephonically in the hearing, with 

the advance permission of the Court. On the record, the Court noted that it was after 9:00 

a.m., the start time for the hearing, no Defendant was present, and Defense counsel also 

had failed to appear, failed to file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion, and had not contacted 

the Court to provide an explanation. 

While on the record, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that his firm sent a letter to Defense 

counsel on June 1, 2016, seeking payment of the $75,000.00 owed under the Settlement 

Agreement. Plaintiff’s counsel represented to the Court that he did not receive a response 

from Defense counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel also stated that, on July 5, 2016, he left a 

voicemail for Defense counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel represented to the Court that he did not 

receive a response from Defense counsel. The Court remained on the record until 9:11 

a.m. Neither Defendants nor Defense counsel appeared or called the Court to provide an 

explanation. To date, Defendants have not filed the Court-ordered response to Plaintiff’s 

Motion. 

On July 29, 2016, the Court issued an Order Following Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion 

to Enforce Settlement; Ordering Defendants to Respond to Plaintiff’s Motion by August 

12, 2016. (Doc. No. 104.) The Court stated that it was prepared to issue an order granting 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 4 of 14
5 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s Motion, but noted that it would hold the order in abeyance and allow Defendants 

one final opportunity to file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion. (Doc. No. 104 at 3.) 

Defendants were ordered to file a response to Plaintiff’s Motion by August 12, 2016. Id. 

The Court stated that, should Defendants fail to file a response by the deadline, the Court 

was prepared to issue an Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the Settlement on 

August 15, 2016. Id. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

“It is well settled that a district court has the equitable power to enforce summarily 

an agreement to settle a case pending before it.” Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU, Inc., 2008 

WL 8820476, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Jun. 25, 2008) (quoting Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 

(9th Cir. 1987)). “Once a settlement has been reached in a pending action, any party to the 

agreement may bring a motion to enforce it.” Id. (citing Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 

1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[T]he court’s enforcement powers include the inherent 

authority to order a party’s specific performance of acts required by the settlement 

agreement and to award damages or other sanctions for noncompliance.” Id. at 3 (citing 

TNT Mktg., Inc. v. Agresti, 796 F.2d 276, 278 9th Cir. 1986)); Makua v. Panetta, 2012 

WL 2370620, at *2 (D.Hawai’i Feb.28, 2012) (“A breach or violation of a settlement 

agreement entitles the non-breaching party to specific performance or an award of 

unliquidated damages, as appropriate.”). 

“The construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by 

principles of local law which apply to interpretation of contracts generally.” Jeff D. v. 

Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1990). As applicable here, “California has a strong 

policy in favor of enforcing settlement agreements.” Facebook, 2008 WL 8820476, at *4 

(citing Osumi v. Sutton, 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1357, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 (2007)). 

California law provides: 

If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties 

outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of 

the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant 

to the terms of the settlement. 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 5 of 14
6 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Facebook, 2008 WL 8820476, at *3 (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 664.6). See Scott v. 

Napolitano, 2012 WL 2836186 (S.D.Cal. Jul. 10, 2010) (enforcing signed settlement 

agreement as complete and binding under California law); Bryant v. Amtrak, 2011 WL 

291233 (S.D.Cal. Jan.26, 2011) (same). 

Further, “a settlement agreement ‘must be interpreted as to give effect to the mutual 

intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting.’” Facebook, 2008 WL 

8820476, at *4 (quoting Roden v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 107 Cal.App.4th 620, 625, 132 

Cal.Rptr.2d 549 (2003)); see also Cal. Civ.Code, § 1636. “When the agreement is in 

writing, ‘the intention ... is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible.’” Id. 

(quoting Brinton v. Bankers Pension Serv., Inc., 76 Cal.App.4th 550, 559, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 

469 (1999); see Cal. Civ.Code § 1639. Though “[a] settlement agreement, like any other 

contract, is unenforceable if the parties fail to agree on a material term or if a material term 

is not reasonably certain,” Id. (quoting Lindsay v. Lewandowski, 139 Cal.App.4th 1618, 

1622, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 (2006)), “courts will not set aside contracts for mere subjective 

misinterpretation.” Id. (quoting Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., 

41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1421, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 (1996)). 

In the Ninth Circuit, courts can retain ancillary jurisdiction over settlement 

agreements in cases dismissed with prejudice, provided that the parties consent and the 

retention of jurisdiction is in the order of dismissal. See K.C. Torlakson, 762 F.3d 963, 

967 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Here, Defendants, by and through counsel, acknowledged that they fully understood 

the terms of the Settlement Agreement and agreed to be bound by those terms. Defendants 

raise no objection to the Agreement’s existence or terms. Of course any objection raised 

now would be highly dubious given Defendants’ initial compliance with the agreement by 

making the first two of three annual payments. Moreover, Defendants have not asserted 

duress, fraud, or any other challenge to the Agreement’s validity or enforceability. Rather, 

Defendants have simply failed to perform by making the third and final payment. 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 6 of 14
7 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On February 14, 2014, the District Judge dismissed this case with prejudice. (Doc. 

No. 96.) On April 2, 2014, the District Judge ordered this Court to retain jurisdiction over 

the settlement until June 30, 2016. (Doc. No. 97.) The Order of Consent was signed by 

all parties and all counsel. Id. Plaintiff filed its Motion to Enforce the Settlement on June 

30, 2016. (Doc. No. 101.) Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiff’s 

Motion. 

V. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

In its Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendants to pay Plaintiff’s 

attorneys’ fees associated with preparing and filing the Motion, pursuant to Section 17 of 

the Settlement Agreement. (Doc. No. 101 at 2.) As an alternative basis for recovering its 

attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue monetary sanctions under its inherent 

authority in the total amount of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees associated with the Motion. 

 On July 29, 2016, after the hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court ordered 

Plaintiff’s counsel to lodge an itemized computation of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred 

to enforce the Agreement by August 10, 2016. (Doc. No. 104 at 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel 

was ordered to include a declaration, along with time sheets, a statement of costs, and an 

explanation of all work performed. Id. 

A. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, SECTION 17

Pursuant to the express terms of the Settlement Agreement (Section 17), the 

prevailing party shall be entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with 

enforcing the Agreement. Specifically, the Agreement provides: 

Should suit be brought to enforce or interpret any part of this AGREEMENT, 

the “prevailing party” shall be entitled to recover as an element of costs of suit 

and not as damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees to be fixed by the Court, The 

“prevailing party” shall be the party entitled to recover his/her/its costs of suit, 

regardless of whether such suit proceeds to final judgment. 

(Doc. No. 101-1 at 10.) 

// 

// 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 7 of 14
8 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. COURT’S INHERENT AUTHORITY

 A trial court has the discretion to impose a wide array of sanctions under its inherent 

authority, and “assessment of attorney’s fees is undoubtedly within a court’s inherent 

powers.” Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 

(1991). A district court may award sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees against a party 

or counsel who acts “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” 

Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing a 

sanction against an attorney). Before awarding such sanctions, the court must make an 

express finding that the sanctioned party’s behavior “constituted or was tantamount to bad 

faith.” Id. A party “demonstrates bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or 

hampering enforcement of a court order.” Id. at 649. The bad faith requirement ensures 

that the district court’s exercise of its broad power is properly restrained, and “preserves a 

balance between protecting the court’s integrity and encouraging meritorious arguments.” 

Id. Additionally, the amount of monetary sanctions must be “reasonable.” Brown v. Baden 

(In re Yagman), 796 F.2d 1165, 1184 (9th Cir. 1986), as amended by 803 F.2d 1085 (1986) 

(reviewing a Rule 11 sanction but announcing a standard applicable to other sanctions as 

well). 

 Here, the Court finds monetary sanctions to be appropriate under the Court’s 

inherent authority due to the evidence presented which demonstrates that Defendants have 

failed to fulfill their express obligation under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The 

Court finds that Defendants’ wilful disregard of its obligation, failure to comply with two 

Court Orders requiring a response to Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. Nos. 102, 104), and failure 

to appear at a Motion hearing as ordered by the Court, have resulted in prejudice to 

Plaintiff, unnecessarily expended Court resources, and “constituted or was tantamount to 

bad faith.” Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 

488 (1980). 

// 

// 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 8 of 14
9 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Ninth Circuit has suggested twelve factors which should be considered by the 

district court in awarding attorney’s fees. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 526 F.2d 67, 70 

(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976); see also 

General Signal Corp. v. Donalico, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1986). These factors 

were developed by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 

714, 717–19 (5th Cir.1974) and approved by the Ninth Circuit in Kerr. The Johnson–Kerr 

factors include the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved in a case, the skill required 

to litigate those issues, the preclusion of other employment, the customary fee, relevant 

time constraints, the amount at stake and the results obtained, the experience, reputation, 

and ability of the attorneys, the nature and length of their professional relationship with the 

client, the “undesirability” of a case, and awards in similar suits. United Steelworkers v. 

Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 406 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 An application for an award of fees and expenses should disclose the nature of the 

services rendered, the amount of attorney time spent, and the rates at which the time was 

billed to the client. Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 1993). A fee 

award may be based on the affidavits of counsel so long as they are sufficiently detailed to 

enable to court to consider all factors necessary in setting fees. Id. 

 “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the 

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly 

rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). In calculating a reasonable number 

of hours, the Court “should exclude . . . hours that were not ‘reasonably expended.’ . . . 

Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee 

request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in 

private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. In other words, “[h]ours that are not properly billed to one’s 

client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Id. 

 The Court must also determine whether the requested hourly rates are reasonable. 

“Fee applicants have the burden of producing evidence that their requested fees are in line 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 9 of 14
10 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 

1096, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2014). To determine the prevailing market rates, courts should 

consider “the fees that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to that of 

prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal work of similar complexity.” Davis 

v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on 

other grounds on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993). The relevant legal 

community is “the forum in which the district court sits.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 

729 F.3d 1196, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 

608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 “Importantly, the fee applicant has the burden of producing ‘satisfactory evidence’ 

that the rates he requests meet these standards.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1206. The applicant 

meets this burden by “produc[ing] satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own 

affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for 

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” 

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984); see also Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1110–11 

(“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney[s] and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in 

the community . . . are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.”) Once the 

applicant carries his burden of providing satisfactory evidence, the burden then shifts to 

the opposing party to rebut such evidence. See id. 

 The Ninth Circuit has agreed with the approach of other circuits that have held that 

judges are justified in relying on their own knowledge of customary rates and their 

experience concerning reasonable and proper fees. See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 

928 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion either by relying, in part, on its own knowledge and experience...”) 

// 

// 

// 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 10 of 14
11 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. DISCUSSION REGARDING REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

 On August 3, 2016, Plaintiff’s counsel lodged an itemized computation of attorneys’ 

fees, along with a declaration of Mr. Marchiano, Plaintiff’s counsel. In his declaration, Mr. 

Marchiano states that Plaintiff seeks an award of $8,714.00 in attorneys’ fees for 27.60 

hours expended by attorneys Jeffrey M. Hamerling, Matthew S. Covington, and Mr. 

Marchiano. Mr. Marchiano lodged the attorneys’ time sheets for June, July, and August 

2016, which include details about all work performed in connection with their attempts to 

enforce the Settlement Agreement. 

Mr. Marchiano declares that the attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with his work 

enforcing the Settlement Agreement total $6,608.00, which is $295.00 multiplied by 22.40 

hours. Mr. Marchiano is a Senior Associate at Archer Norris in Walnut Creek, California. 

He has been practicing law for nearly seven years. His hourly rate for this matter is 

$295.00, which he declares to be customary and reasonable in light of his experience and 

the prevailing rates charged by attorneys in his community. Mr. Marchiano billed a total 

of 22.40 hours for time expended on this case to enforce the Settlement Agreement. 

Mr. Marchiano declares that the attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with Mr. 

Hamerling’s work enforcing the Settlement Agreement total $202.50, which is $405.00 

multiplied by 0.50 hours. Mr. Hamerling is a partner at Archer Norris in Walnut Creek, 

California. He has been practicing law for more than 35 years. His hourly rate for this 

matter is $405.00, which Mr. Marchiano declares is customary and reasonable in light of 

Mr. Hamerling’s experience and the prevailing rates charged by attorneys in his 

community. Mr. Hamerling billed a total of 0.50 hours for time expended on this case to 

enforce the Settlement Agreement. 

Mr. Marchiano declares that the attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with Mr. 

Covington’s work enforcing the Settlement Agreement total $1,903.50, which is $405.00 

multiplied by 4.70 hours. Mr. Covington is a partner at Archer Norris in San Francisco, 

California. He has been practicing law for more than 24 years. His hourly rate for this 

matter is $405.00, which Mr. Marchiano declares is customary and reasonable in light of 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 11 of 14
12 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Mr. Covington’s experience and the prevailing rates charged by attorneys in his 

community. Mr. Covington billed a total of 4.70 hours for time expended on this case to 

enforce the Settlement Agreement. 

In his declaration, Mr. Marchiano notes that the attorneys’ fees sought are more than 

Plaintiff initially estimated at the time of filing Plaintiff’s Motion. However, Mr. 

Marchiano states that the time billed reflects an accurate account of the time spent 

enforcing the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff’s initial estimate of fees incurred did not 

account for time spent by any attorney after approximately 10:00 a.m. on June 30, 2016. 

It also did not include time spent working on certain components of the Motion, such as 

two declarations filed in support of the Motion and the Judgment and Order. The initial 

estimate did not include the time spent preparing for the hearing or drafting Mr. 

Marchiano’s declaration. Further, the initial estimate of fees incurred was computed using 

an hourly rate for Mr. Marchiano of $285.00 per hour instead of his actual rate of $295.00 

per hour for this matter. 

The Court has conducted a thorough review of Plaintiff’s counsel’s Declaration and 

the corresponding billing statements. Defendants have not filed an objection or opposition 

to Plaintiff’s request. Given the overwhelming evidence presented to the Court to 

demonstrate that Defendants have failed to fulfill their obligations under the Settlement 

Agreement, and the efforts undertaken by Plaintiff’s counsel to recoup payment under the 

terms of the Agreement, the Court finds that all of Plaintiff’s requested fees are reasonable 

and appropriate. 

Defendant seeks reimbursement for attorney’s fees at the rate of $405.00 per hour 

for partner Jeffrey Hamerling, $405.00 per hour for partner Matthew Covington, and 

$295.00 per hour for senior associate David Marchiano. In his Declaration, Mr. Marchiano 

states that he is informed and believes that these hourly rates are customary and reasonable 

for the Walnut Creek and San Francisco communities in light of the experience of the 

attorneys. 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 12 of 14
13 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Mr. Marchiano was admitted to practice law on December 1, 2009. His practice 

with Archer Norris, A Professional Law Corporation, focuses on civil litigation. This 

Court relies on Mr. Marchiano’s declaration, as well as the Court’s own knowledge of 

customary rates and its experience concerning reasonable and proper fees, and determines 

that Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested hourly rates of $405.00 and $295.00 are in line with the 

prevailing market rates in the San Francisco area for attorneys of comparable skill, level, 

and experience for work on matters of similar complexity. See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1206; 

see also Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). It is also notable that 

Defendants do not dispute the reasonableness of the stated hourly rates of Plaintiff’s 

counsel. 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s billing entries are reasonable for the work performed, 

and that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are likewise reasonable. At a rate of $405.00 and 

$295.00 per hour, Plaintiff’s counsel’s reasonable attorney’s fees for this matter total 

$8,714.00. The Court hereby AWARDS Plaintiff the amount of $8,714.00 in attorney’s 

fees pursuant to this Court’s inherent authority, and in accordance with Section 17 of the 

Settlement Agreement. Defendants shall submit payment of the awarded attorneys’ fees 

to Plaintiff’s counsel no later than August 22, 2016. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

This Court finds the Settlement Agreement to be complete and binding, finds that 

Defendants have failed to perform as promised pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, 

and finds that Defendants have failed to assert any basis for denying enforcement. The 

Court hereby GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, 

and enters the following orders: 

1. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for the Court to retain jurisdiction over 

the Settlement Agreement for an additional year. 

2. The Clerk of this Court shall ENTER JUDGMENT, jointly and severally, 

against each of the Defendants for the outstanding amount of $83,714.00. 

// 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 13 of 14
14 

12-CV-1312-WVG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Defendants are ORDERED to immediately pay the following amount to 

Plaintiff: 

a. Damages due to Plaintiff: $75,000.00 

b. Attorneys’ fees: $8,714.00 

i. TOTAL: $83,714.00 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 15, 2016 

Case 3:12-cv-01312-WVG Document 105 Filed 08/15/16 Page 14 of 14