Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01347/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01347-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

UnitA.Ki StatR-.:.: C,nri; oi Apper..ls 

"l' ....... t'I- ~i~--nit. 

CURTIS EUGENE BOROFF, ) 

APR 2 31991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

PAUL L. ROSE, JR.' ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

MAIL-WELL ENVELOPE COMPANY, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER ARD JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-1347 

(D. Colorado) 

(D.C. No. 90-Z-1078) 

Before .AHDERSOH, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff, Curtis Eugene Boroff, appeals a district court 

order granting defendant, Mail-Well Envelope Company's ("MailWell") motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1347 Document: 010110034339 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 1 
1 Mr. Boroff was employed by Mail-Well from March 27, 1975, to 

June 10, 1988. He was injured on the job in April 1988. He then 

filed a worker's compensation claim and engaged attorneys to 

represent him. Mail-Well terminated Boroff's employment on June 

10, 1988, citing Boroff's fight with another employee as its 

reason. On May 25, 1990, Boroff sued Mail-Well in Colorado state 

district court for breach of contract and wrongful termination 

alleging that he was fired in violation of Mail-Well's employment 

policies and in retaliation for his worker's compensation claim. 

Mail-Well removed the case to the United States District Court for 

the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1441. 

Separately, Boroff pursued a worker's compensation claim 

before the Colorado State Industrial Commission, seeking posttermination disability benefits. Those proceedings included a 

full hearing at which Boroff was represented by counsel and 

presented evidence on his own behalf. The cause of his termination from Mail-Well was an issue since, under Colorado law, an 

employee is precluded from post-termination disability benefits if 

the termination occurs through the fault of the employee. On June 

18, 1990, a Colorado Administrative Law Judge, Bruce C. Friend, 

ruled that Boroff was not entitled to disability benefits because 

"the claimant's employment was terminated when he got into a fight 

with a fellow employee. The claimant was at fault for the 

termination." R. Vol. I, tab 17, Ex. A at 4. 

Subsequently, Mail-Well amended its answer in the federal 

court proceedings and raised the affirmative defense of collateral 

estoppel, claiming that as a result of the Colorado administrative 

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Appellate Case: 90-1347 Document: 010110034339 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 2 
' proceedings Boroff was estopped to further litigate the reason for 

his termination from Mail-Well. Based on that defense Mail-Well 

filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court 

granted. 

On appeal, Boroff contends that the state administrative 

proceeding cannot be given preclusive effect in his federal court 

lawsuit against Mail-Well ~nd, in any event, the issue before the 

state industrial commission was not the cause of his termination 

but whether he was entitled to permanent partial disability 

benefits. 

We review de novo an order granting or denying summary judgment, applying the same standards as the district court. Osgood 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 

1988). We are obliged to examine the record to "determine whether 

any genuine issue of material fact pertinent to the ruling 

remains, and if not, whether the substantive law was correctly 

applied." Florum v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir. 

1989) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In 

determining whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, the 

record must be construed liberally in favor of the party opposing 

summary judgment." Setliff v. Memorial Hosp., 850 F.2d 1384, 

1391-92 (10th Cir. 1988); ~ also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

Since this is a diversity case we must examine Colorado law 

to determine whether Colorado courts would give preclusive effect 

to an administrative law judge's decision in a worker's 

compensation proceeding. See Atchison v. Wyoming, 763 F.2d 388, 

391 (10th Cir. 1985); Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th 

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Appellate Case: 90-1347 Document: 010110034339 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 3 
• Cir. 1975). There is abundant Colorado authority for the 

proposition that administrative decisions are given preclusive 

effect in later administrative proceedings if "the administrative 

body that made the initial determination had subject matter 

jurisdiction." Wilson v. Avon, 749 P.2d 990, 993 (Colo. App. 

1987); ~ also Whelden v. Board of County Comm'rs, 782 P.2d 853, 

856 (Colo. App. 1989); City of Colo. Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 

720 P.2d 601, 602 (Colo. App. 1985); Mabry v. Industrial Comm'n, 

692 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Colo. App. 1984)). Of course, "[t]he applicability of this doctrine may also be limited by statute." 

City of Colo. Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d at 602 

(discussing Colorado Employment Security Act). Research has 

disclosed no Colorado case discussing whether Colorado courts will 

give preclusive effect to administrative agency proceedings. 

However, in Smith v. Pinner, 891 F.2d 784, 787 n.4 (10th Cir. 

1989), we concluded that Colorado courts would accord preclusive 

effect to administrative findings. 

In Smith this court estopped a plaintiff from denying the 

"existence of his ridesharing arrangement," which the parties had 

stipulated in the worker's compensation hearing before the 

Colorado Industrial Commission. Smith v. Pinner, 891 F.2d at 787. 

The stipulated fact had been one reason for denying benefits. Id. 

The opinion states: 

We do not consider the initial administrative 

context of plaintiff's stipulation an impediment to 

invocation of this rule of judicial estoppel, since it 

is well-established in Colorado that the closely related 

principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata also 

apply to administrative decisions, so long as the 

tribunal in question possesses subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

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• 

I 

Smith v. Pinner, 891 F.2d at 787 n.4. 

Prior to Smith we held in McCulloch Interstate Gas Corp. v. 

Federal Power Comm'n, 536 F.2d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 1976) that 

"[a]n agency's determination of facts underlying its conclusion 

that jurisdiction was lacking must by given [collateral estoppel] 

effect in subsequent litigation." Likewise, in Rodriguez v. Bar-S 

Food Co., 567 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (D. Colo. 1983), the federal 

district court in Colorado, following Umberfield v. School Dist. 

No. 11, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974), concluded that Colorado state 

courts would give preclusive effect to an arbitration award in a 

subsequent judicial proceeding. See also Terrones v. Allen, 680 

F. Supp. 1483, 1485-87 (D. Colo. 1988). 

These cases are consistent with the general rule. Recently, 

in University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986), the 

Supreme Court stated: 

[W]hen a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity 

••• resolves disputed issues of fact properly before 

it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to 

litigate," Utah Construction & Mining Co., [384 U.S.] at 

422, federal courts must give the agency's factfinding 

the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled 

in the State's courts. 

Id. at 799 (footnote omitted). 1 Similarly in Long v. United 

States Dept. of Air Force, 751 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1984), 

this court, following United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 

1 Title VII claims are exceptions to the application of the 

collateral estoppel doctrine to administrative findings later 

raised in a federal court. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 

U.S. at 796. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1347 Document: 010110034339 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 5 
' 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966), 2 applied res judicata, a doctrine 

related to collateral estoppel, to a prior administrative 

proceeding. 

In summary, then, we hold that Colorado courts would give 

preclusive effect to matters involved in worker's compensation 

proceedings before the Colorado Industrial Commission, provided, 

of course, that the particular issue or claim sought to be 

precluded passes muster under rules applying to preclusion 

generally. 

In Colorado the doctrine of collateral estoppel "bars 

relitigation of an issue actually litigated in a previous case" 

if: 

(1) the issue precluded is identical to an issue actually litigated and necessarily adjudicated in the prior 

proceeding; 

(2) the party against whom estoppel is sought was a 

party to or was in privity with a party to the prior 

proceeding; 

(3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the 

prior proceeding; and 

(4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had 

a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the 

prior proceeding. 

2 The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Utah 

Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) applied the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel in a contract dispute between the government 

and a private contractor when both the contract dispute clause and 

the Wunderlich Act "state[d] that administrative findings on 

factual issues relevant to questions arising under the contract 

shall be final and conclusive on the parties." Id. at 419 (footnote omitted). The "administrative findings [in question) .•. 

were appropriately made and obviously relevant to another claim 

within the jurisdiction of the board." Id. The Court then 

stated: "Although the decision here rests upon the agreement of 

the parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act, we note that the 

result we reach is harmonious with general principles of 

collateral estoppel." Id. at 421 (footnote omitted). 

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t, 

Industrial Comm'n v. Moffat, 732 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Colo. 1987) 

(footnote omitted) (citing People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302, 312 

(Colo. 1982); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo. 1973)). 

Here, the issue sought to be precluded is the cause of Boroff's 

termination. 

As to that issue we find, first, that the cause of termination is a question identical to both proceedings and was necessary 

to Judge Friend's ruling. In his objection to Mail-Well's motion 

for summary judgment, Boroff argued that "the only issue 

determined or to be determined [in the administrative hearing] was 

whether the plaintiff was entitled to permanent partial disability 

benefits .. [N]o other issues were necessarily determined by 

Judge Friend." R. Vol. I, tab 23 at 3-5. On the contrary, as 

Mail-Well argued in its Reply Brief concerning its summary 

judgment motion, it asserted at the hearing that Boroff "was not 

entitled to any benefits after his termination from employment 

with Mail-Well because, among other reasons, the termination was 

his own fault and he was therefore precluded from benefits under 

Monfort of Colo. v. Husson, 725 P.2d 67 (Colo. App. 1986)." R. 

Vol. I, tab 28, Affidavit of Pamela Musgrave. In Monfort of Colo. 

v. Husson, 725 P.2d at 69, the Colorado Court of Appeals stated 

that "[w]here a temporarily disabled employee is determined to be 

at fault for his termination, subsequent wage loss is caused not 

by the injury, but rather by the employee's act which led to the 

termination." Therefore, "the issue of fault with reference to 

the termination is the dispositive consideration." Id. 

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• 

I The parties do not dispute the second element. With respect 

to the third element, we do not agree with Boroff that his appeal 

of Judge Friend's decision makes it not final for the application 

of collateral estoppel. R. Vol. I, tab 23 at 5. In Colorado, the 

"pending appeal of [a] prior administrative ruling does not 

prevent application of [the] doctrine of collateral estoppel in 

[a] subsequent administrative proceedin[g]." Bunnett v. 

Smallwood, 768 P.2d 736, 740 (Colo. App. 1988) (citing Jefferson 

County School Dist. v. Industrial Comm'n, 698 P.2d 1350 (Colo. 

App. 1984)); ~ also Miller v. Lunnon, 703 P.2d 640, 643 (Colo. 

App. 1985) ("a judgment otherwise final remains so despite the 

taking of an appeal unless what is called an appeal actually 

consists of a trial de JlQYQ." (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Judgments S 13 comment f (1982)). Common sense tells us that as 

between an administrative proceeding and a subsequent court 

proceeding that is not the review of the first, the same principle 

would apply. 

Finally, Boroff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 

the reason for his employment termination. This reason was 

central to Judge Friend's decision to deny benefits to him. 

Boroff was represented by counsel, testified, and had the 

opportunity both to present evidence and cross examine witnesses. 

In conclusion, we find that the Colorado state courts would 

have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude 

Boroff from relitigating the reasons for his employment termination. Therefore, the district court correctly applied the 

Colorado doctrine of collateral estoppel to the case below. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1347 Document: 010110034339 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 8 
Consequently, no issues of material fact remain to be determined 

by a jury. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary 

judgment on all issues. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-1347 Document: 010110034339 Date Filed: 04/23/1991 Page: 9