Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-02060/USCOURTS-casd-3_02-cv-02060-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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28 02CV2060-B (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim-defendant,

v.

GATEWAY, INC. and GATEWAY

COUNTRY STORES LLC, GATEWAY

COMPANIES, INC., GATEWAY

MANUFACTURING LLC and

COWABUNGA ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendants and Counter-claimants,

and

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Intervenor and Counter-claimant,

_____________________________________

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim-defendant,

v.

LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.,

Defendant and Counter-claimant

_____________________________________

LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC., 

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL, INC.,

Defendant.

_____________________________________

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Civil No: 02CV2060-B(CAB)

consolidated with

Civil No: 03CV0699-B (CAB) and

Civil No: 03CV1108-B (CAB)

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND

DENYING-IN-PART LUCENT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ON U.S. PATENT NO. 4,439,759.

Case 3:02-cv-02060-B-MDD Document 1794 Filed 05/15/07 Page 1 of 9
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1

 Lucent has not accused Microsoft of infringing this patent.

2

Lucent moves the Court for summary judgment on Dell and Gateway’s invalidity

defenses, affirmative defenses and counterclaims concerning U.S. Patent No. 4,439,759

(“the ‘759 patent”). Dell and Gateway only oppose the motion as it concerns invalidity for

lack of written description and the affirmative defense of laches.

I. BACKGROUND

The ‘759 patent is directed to apparatus and methods for a digital image color

display system. The patent describes a terminal independent color memory system to

address the compatibility between digital display systems in providing color images. The

application for the ‘759 patent was filed on May 19, 1981. The claims were amended

during prosecution in response to rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 and 103. The

patent issued on March 27, 1984. 

Lucent is now asserting the patent against Dell and Gateway (collectively,

“Defendants”)1

 on every computer system with a Windows operating system, made, used

sold, offered for sale in the United States, or imported into the United States between 1998

and May 19, 2001 (the expiration date of the ‘759 patent).

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is

appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In

considering the motion, the court must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). If

the Court is unable to render summary judgment upon an entire case and finds that a trial is

necessary, it shall if practicable grant summary adjudication for any issues as to which,

standing alone, summary judgment would be appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

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2

 Dell contends it is not asserting these affirmative defenses against the ‘759 patent. However,

in its Answer to Lucent's Second Amended Complaint, these defenses appear in paragraph 111

without reference or specificity as to which patents they apply. Therefore, to the extent Dell has pled

these defenses (even if it is no longer asserting them), Lucent's motion is granted.

3

When the moving party does not bear the burden of proof, summary judgment is

warranted by demonstration of an absence of facts to support the non-moving party’s case.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Summary judgment must be granted if

the party responding to the motion fails “to make a sufficient showing on an essential

element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id. at 323.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Unopposed Issues

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if an adverse party does not respond to

a motion for summary adjudication, the Court may enter judgment against the adverse party

if it is appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (West 2006). Here, Defendants have stated that

for purposes of judicial economy and streamlining the instant case, they do not oppose a

number of issues presented by Lucent. The Court therefore GRANTS summary

adjudication in Lucent’s favor on the following:

1. Claims 1-4 are not invalid for failure to disclose best mode

2. No estoppel based on Defendants’ standards defense

3. No fraud 

4. No negligent misrepresentation

5. No breach of contract/breach of contract- third party beneficiary

6. No unfair trade practices

7. No monopolization/attempted monopolization

8. No unclean hands

9. No implied license/waiver exhaustion as to Dell2

10. No patent misuse as to Gateway

11. No prior settlements as to Gateway

B. Written Description

Lucent argues that Defendants have failed to adduce any evidence that the ‘759

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28 4

patent is invalid for lack of written description. Lucent’s sole argument focuses on the

failure of Defendants to provide any expert opinion to support their contentions of

invalidity. Defendants argue that the patent itself proves its own invalidity, no expert

opinion is necessary.

The written description requirement, along with enablement and best mode

requirements are set out in 35 U.S.C. § 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the

manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact

terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it

is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best

mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

The purpose of the written description requirement is “to ensure that the scope of the right

to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor's

contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.” Reiffin v.

Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 -1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The specification satisfies

the written description requirement if it demonstrates that “the applicant was in possession

of the claimed invention, including all of the elements and limitations” at the time the

application was filed. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 926

(Fed. Cir. 2004).

Although invalidity for lack of written description is a question of fact, expert

testimony is not always required to prove invalidity. In some cases, the patent itself may

evidence invalidity such that no reasonable jury could find that the claim (or a particular

claim element) was adequately described in the specification. Id. at 927. For instance, in

Univ. of Rochester, although the patent claimed a method of inhibiting the PGHS-2 protein

using chemical compounds, the patent did not describe any such compounds, nor how to

make such a compound that would satisfy the claims. Id. at 919. It also was undisputed

that no such compound was known in the art at the time of filing the patent. Id. at 930. 

The circumstances here, however, do not directly mirror those of Univ. Of

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3

 This point is reinforced by the parties’ arguments heard on May 11, 2007. Defendants were

unable to articulate in a manner understandable to the Court why Lucent’s interpretation of the claims

was not supported by the patent specification.

5

Rochester. The focus of Defendants’ contentions is not that the claims themselves go

beyond the specification but instead, that Lucent and its expert interpret the claim as

broader than the specification allows. Namely, Defendants contend that the interpretation

of the claims must include two purportedly key limitations: (1) intersystem compatibility;

and (2) all three modes of access, including the first mode, must access the terminal

independent color memory. Defendants argue that Lucent’s expert Mr. Richter opined that

in the storage of color data values, the color memory may or may not be used in the first

mode of access. (Dec. Plies Supp. Gateway’s Opp. Ex. 4 at 38-39.)

Written description is “judged from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art

as of the relevant filing date.” Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed.

Cir. 2006). In the instant case, written description queries whether one of ordinary skill in

the art would have understood the ‘759 specification to include the breadth of the claims as

Lucent’s expert asserts. This inquiry takes into account the knowledge in the art in

assessing whether the written description is adequate. Unlike Univ. of Rochester, where it

was acknowledged that there was no availing knowledge in the prior art, such assertions

have not been made here. Defendants have not shown any evidence that one of ordinary

skill in the art would not have understood the specification to include the asserted breadth

of the claims. Lacking an expert, Defendants have no other evidence on which to base the

knowledge of one of skill in the art; the patent itself does not suffice. Moreover, the Court

finds that the ‘759 patent is not a simple technology and the specification is not readily

accessible to interpretation by the average layman juror. Defendants’ assertion that the

patent alone without expert testimony will evidence invalidity under a clear and convincing

burden is unrealistic.3

Finally, Defendants’ arguments that the prosecution history somehow evidences the

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4

 Defendants offered an incomplete prosecution history as an exhibit to their opposition brief

(Dec. Plies Ex. 2) and did not offer any further information at the hearing on May 11, 2007 that would

shed any further information on this query.

6

lack of written description is unavailing. First, the submitted (incomplete) prosecution

history, although showing the amended claims and stating that amendments were made to

overcome a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, does not offer any enlightenment as to why

the claims were amended. It does not evidence which part of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was the basis

for the rejection of the claims (written description, indefiniteness, enablement and/or best

mode), let alone whether the rejections had anything to do with the issues Defendants have

raised here.4

In sum, Defendants have failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether one of

ordinary skill in the art would find that the ‘759 patent specification lacks written

description to support the breadth of the claims as asserted. Therefore, Lucent’s motion as

to no invalidity for lack of written description is GRANTED.

C. Laches

Laches is an equitable defense. Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U.S. 412, 417 (1894); A.C.

Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir.1992). For

laches to apply, a defendant must prove that plaintiff unreasonably delayed in filing suit

from the time plaintiff knew or should have known of the infringement and that there was

resulting prejudice to the defendant. Id. The resulting prejudice may be evidentiary,

affecting the defendant’s ability to put on a full and fair defense, or the prejudice may be

economic. Id. at 1033. For economic prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate damages

or monetary loss that would not have been incurred if the plaintiff had not delayed filing

suit; “[s]uch damages or monetary losses are not merely those attributable to a finding of

liability for infringement.” Id.

1. Dell

Lucent contends that Dell lacks evidence to demonstrate unreasonable delay. Dell,

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in response, contends that Lucent knew or should have known of the alleged infringement

before February 20, 1997, and that a presumption of laches should apply. See id. at 1028

(presumption of laches arises where the delay was more than 6 years from the time the

patentee knew or should have known of the alleged infringement). 

Dell argues that Lucent’s infringement contentions as they originally stood in the

instant case were based upon Dell’s sale of VGA compatible computers. VGA is a

standard that was first introduced in 1987 and became adopted by the industry. Dell argues

that its sale of computers was open and notorious from at least 1990. Lucent itself bought

Dell computers sometime in 1995 or 1996 (Dep. Garrana, Dec. Blackburn Supp. Dell Opp.

Ex. H at 220-21.) Moreover, Dell argues that Lucent’s predecessor (AT&T; Lucent was

created in 1996) was itself involved in the industry including selling VGA compatible

computers. AT&T asserted the ‘759 patent against other competitors using the VGA

standard. Thus, Dell argues that Lucent/AT&T should have known that Dell was a direct

competitor on this technology as well.

While Lucent attempts to counter Dell’s assertions, these attempts are insufficient at

least to the extent that they do not abolish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

As the Federal Circuit set out in Wanlass v. Fedders Corp., 145 F.3d 1461, 1469 (Fed. Cir.

1998), a patentee has a duty to police its intellectual property. When “circumstances

include ‘pervasive, open, and notorious activities’ that a reasonable patentee would suspect

were infringing, the patentee has a duty to investigate. Id. ; see also Wanlass v. General

Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Lucent’s arguments that its intellectual

property department did not begin any investigation of Dell’s activities until January 1998

and/or that it actively engaged in licensing discussion with Dell from this time do not

extinguish the issues of fact regarding whether Lucent/AT&T should have known of Dell’s

activities.

Finally, although Lucent contends that Dell lacks any evidence of any prejudice

resulting from any delay in filing suit, Dell has offered evidence of evidentiary and

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economic prejudice sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact on this element of its

laches defense. This evidence includes the loss of at least one potential witness involved in

AT&T’s development efforts on the ‘759 patent, the failing memory of the patent’s three

inventors and economic prejudice including a large capital investment of millions of dollars

in its business. Therefore, Lucent’s motion for summary adjudication of no laches as to

Dell is DENIED.

2. Gateway

The arguments presented by Gateway are similar to those of Dell. Gateway

contends that it was selling its VGA-compatible computers that included Windows GDI

since 1990 or 1992. It sold this technology openly and notoriously, including

advertisements that mentioned a VGA compatible system. Gateway points to the activities

of Lucent’s predecessor, AT&T, in the VGA-compatible computer industry and its

approach to other competitors concerning the infringement of the ‘759 patent. This

evidence includes a letter to Compaq in 1995 stating that the ‘759 patent covered the use of

VGA on all computers. (Dec. Plies Ex. 29.) Finally, Gateway points to the large

investment made in the technology that might have been avoided if Lucent had filed suit

earlier. In sum, like Dell, Gateway too has raised genuine issues of fact that preclude

summary judgment; Lucent’s motion as to Gateway also is DENIED..

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein, the Court DENIES summary adjudication as to no laches.

For the reasons herein, the Court GRANTS summary adjudication on the following

issues:

1. No invalidity for lack of written description

2. Claims 1-4 are not invalid for failure to disclose best mode

3. No estoppel based on Defendants’ standards defense

4. No fraud 

5. No negligent misrepresentation

6. No breach of contract/breach of contract- third party beneficiary

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7. No unfair trade practices

8. No monopolization/attempted monopolization

9. No unclean hands

10. No implied license/waiver exhaustion as to Dell

11. No patent misuse as to Gateway

12. No prior settlements as to Gateway

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: May 15, 2007

Hon. Rudi M. Brewster

United States Senior District Court Judge

cc: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo

 United States Magistrate Judge

 All Counsel of Record

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