Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00164/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00164-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

 The factual background provided here is construed in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff. 

2

 In various pleadings filed with this Court, the date of the incident is given alternatively

as March 16, 2004, and March 17, 2004. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERRY HAMILTON,

Plaintiff, 

CV No. 06-164-KD-C

v. 

CITY OF JACKSON, et al., 

Defendants. 

ORDER

Before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff’s

Response, the Defendants’ Reply, and all evidentiary materials offered in support thereof. (Docs.

30, 31, 32, 33, 38, 40, 41, 43). For the reasons given below, the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED IN PART.

I. Factual Background1

 & Procedural History

Plaintiff Terry Hamilton (“Hamilton”) filed this suit against officers of the Jackson Police

Department, the Chief of the Jackson Police Department, and the City of Jackson as a result of an

incident that occurred on or about March 17, 2004, at the Jackson Police Department.2

 (Doc. 1). 

In sum, the Complaint and response to summary judgment allege that Hamilton met his

stepdaughter, Renita Greer (“Greer”), at the Jackson Police Department to discuss an altercation

between Greer’s son, Blake Hartley, and another young man. (Docs. 1, 40). Both Greer and

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3

 Though originally named as a Defendant in the Plaintiff’s Complaint, Officer Gary

Garrett has been dismissed from this litigation pursuant to the Plaintiff’s Motion (doc. 37) and

this Court’s Order of June, 11, 2007. (Doc. 47). 

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Hamilton were dissatisfied with the police department’s decision not to arrest or charge the other

man involved in the altercation. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 2-4). When the pair met at the Jackson Police

Department Building, they initially met with Defendant Barry Fowler (“Fowler”), an officer with

the Jackson Police Department. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 3-4). They were escorted into a supervisor’s

office, and were followed by Defendants Aaron Carpenter (“Carpenter), Daryl Jackson

(“Jackson”), and Gary Garrett3

 (“Garrett”), all of whom are officers with the Jackson Police

Department. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 4-7). Once in the supervisor’s office Fowler sat behind a desk

and Hamilton and Greer sat together on the opposite side of the desk. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 4-7). 

Officers Jackson, Garrett, and Carpenter stood in varying positions between Hamilton and Greer

and the doorway. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 6-7). 

During the conversation with Fowler, Hamilton and Greer “eventually felt they were

getting nowhere.” (Doc. 40). Hamilton then suggested to Greer that they go talk to the Mayor of

Jackson and stood to leave. (Docs. 40; 41-2 at 8-9 ). Greer got up to follow Hamilton and then

Officer Fowler came from his side of the desk, pushed Greer out of the way, and “grabbed

Hamilton with one hand, pressed him up against the door . . . and then grabbed Hamilton by the

throat with the other hand.” (Docs. 40 at 2; see 41-2 at 9-11). “Hamilton was then grabbed on

each arm by [Officers] Carpenter and Jackson. Fowler had his hand on both sides of Hamilton’s

throat.” (Docs. 40 at 2; see 41-2 at 9-11). Fowler held Hamilton by the throat and squeezed for

30-40 seconds “almost causing Hamilton to blackout and lose consciousness.” (Docs. 40; see 41-

2 at 9-11, 15-17). “While Fowler was choking Hamilton, Fowler said, ‘Terry Hamilton, you are

Case 1:06-cv-00164-KD-C Document 48 Filed 06/13/07 Page 2 of 20
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not going to threaten me. I will lock you up in a cell.’” (Docs. 40 at 2, see 41-2 at 11-12). Officer

Fowler eventually released his grip and told Hamilton to sit in the chair. (Docs. 40 at 2; 41-2 at

11). Hamilton complied and requested some water, which he received. (Docs. 40 at 2; 41-2 at 8-

11). Fowler continued his statement that he would not be threatened. (Docs. 40 at 2; 41-2 at 8-

11). Eventually, after 8-10 minutes, Hamilton was allowed to leave the Jackson Police

Department. (Docs. 40 at 2; 41-2 at 14). 

The Chief of the Jackson Police Department, Charles Burge (“Burge”), arrived at the

Police Department after the incident occurred. (Doc. 32-7 at 11). The Plaintiff was not present

when Burge arrived. (Doc. 32-7 at 10). Officer Fowler informed Chief Burge that Mr. Hamilton

had become irate and had to be restrained during a conversation at the police station regarding an

incident involving his (step) grandson. (Doc. 32-7 at 9). Chief Burge instructed the officers to

write statements of what they had observed. (Docs. 32-7 at 9; 41-13; 41-14). Burge reviewed the

statements provided by the officers and concluded that no policy or procedural general order had

been violated by any member of the police department. (Doc. 32-7 at 4-6). 

Officer Fowler has been employed as a Police Officer for the City of Jackson for 24

years. (Doc. 32-5 at 3). Jackson has been employed with the Jackson Police Department for five

years. (Doc. 32-6 at 3). Officers Carpenter, Fowler, and Jackson have completed the minimum

standard training required by the State of Alabama for sworn law enforcement officers. (Docs.

32-8 at 2-3; 41-10; 41-11; 41-12). All members of the Jackson Police Department have

continued to meet their state mandated training requirements each year. (Doc. 32-7 at 12). No

meritorious claims of excessive force have been filed with the Jackson Police Department against

Officers Fowler, Carpenter, or Jackson. (Doc. 32-8 at 3). 

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4

 A review of Count Five of the complaint, reveals at best only an ambiguous Section

1983 claim against the City of Jackson. However, as explained infra, a suit against the officers

in their official capacity is the functional equivalent of a suit against the City. Moreover, in the

pre-trial document the parties have agreed that a triable issue is whether the City is liable under

Section 1983. (Doc. 46 at 4). Thus, the court has liberally construed the complaint to include a

Section 1983 claim against the City. 

5

 Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that summary judgment

shall be granted:

[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts five counts. Count One asserts that the City of Jackson,

Alabama (“the City”) and Burge as the Chief of the Jackson Police Department, negligently

failed to properly train and/or supervise officers Fowler, Carpenter, Garrett and Jackson. (Doc. 1

at 4). Count Two asserts a battery claim against Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson. (Doc. 1

at 5). Count Three alleges false imprisonment against Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson.

Court Four alleges outrage against Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson. (Doc. 1 at 6). Lastly,

Count Five alleges violation of Title 21, United States Code Section 1983 against all defendants.4

(Doc. 1 at 7). 

II. Applicable Standard

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact and

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).5

 The party

seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to

materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” 

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The party seeking summary

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judgment always bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). 

If the nonmoving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her

case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,” the moving party is entitled to summary

judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317. “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its

burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determination

of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d

994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992)(internal citations and quotations omitted), cert denied, 507 U.S. 911,

113 S.Ct. 1259, 122 L.Ed. 2d 657 (1993) . Thus, the court’s role at the summary judgment stage

is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine only

whether a genuine issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106

S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of any factual dispute, however, will not

automatically necessitate denial of a motion for summary judgment; rather, only factual disputes

that are material preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children

and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1081, 125 S.Ct.

869, 160 L.Ed.2d 825 (2005).

III. Analysis 

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations against the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (“Section 1983"). Actions brought in federal court to address and remedy a violation of the

Constitution by a state actor are enabled through Section 1983, which provides as follows: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any

Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order "[t]o sustain a cause of action based on section 1983, [a plaintiff]

must establish two elements: (1) that [he] suffered a deprivation of rights, privileges or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the act or

omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law."

Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir.1987) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). 

“To state a Section 1983 claim the plaintiff must establish that the conduct complained of

was committed by a person acting under color of state law and that this conduct deprived the

plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3,

99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). However, “[s]ection 1983 ‘is not itself a source of

substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.

at 144). Thus, the first step in analyzing any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional

right allegedly violated by the defendant. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. at 271. Once the particular

constitutional right is determined, the court must then apply the standard applicable to that

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particular constitutional provision to determine whether a constitutional violation has actually

occurred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In addition, plaintiff must establish a

causal connection between the defendant’s actions, customs, policies, or statutorily imposed

duties and the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional right in order to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986); Williams

v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir.), cert. den., 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335, 78 L.Ed.2d

305 (1983). 

The Plaintiff has alleged the Defendants violated his rights to be secure in his person and

free of excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 6-8). The

Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,

papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. In

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), the Supreme Court determined that the Fourth

Amendment applies to all claims alleging a police officer used excessive force in the course of an

arrest, investigatory stop or other “seizure” of a free citizen. In that case, the Court stated: 

Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or an

investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking

the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be

secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizrures’ of the person. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 394. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim of unreasonable or excessive

force must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. 

The Fourth Amendment standard for analyzing an excessive force claim requires a

“careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests’ against countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85

Case 1:06-cv-00164-KD-C Document 48 Filed 06/13/07 Page 7 of 20
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L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). The court must look to see whether the actions of the individual officer are

“objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officer at that

time. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 397. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use the force

must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20

vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d

1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). Indeed, “‘not every push or shove, even if it may later seem

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,’ violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).

“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers

are often forced to make split-second judgment – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Relying on Graham, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned as follows:

In making an excessive force inquiry, we are not to view the matter as judges from the

comfort and safety of our chambers, fearful of nothing more threatening than the

occasional paper cut as we read a cold record accounting of what turned out to be the

facts. We must see the situation through the eyes of the officer on the scene who is

hampered by incomplete information and forced to make a split-second decision

between action and inaction in circumstances where inaction could prove fatal.

Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004).

This framework for the analysis of a Section 1983 claim based on an alleged Fourth

Amendment violation allows for a review of the reasonableness of the law enforcement official’s

actions based on the particular circumstances in each case. In the context of an excessive force

claim during an investigatory stop or interrogation, a constitutional violation may occur “when a

suspect ‘poses no threat to [the officers’] safety or that of others and [the suspect] does not

otherwise initiate action which would indicate to a reasonably prudent police officer that the use

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6

 The complaint cannot be reasonably construed as asserting a Section 1983 individual

capacity claim against defendant Burge. 

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of force is justified.” Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Ware v Reed, 709

F.2d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 1983)). On the other hand, police are entitled to take “reasonable action,

based upon the circumstances, to protect themselves during investigative detentions.” United

States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Kapperman,

764 F.2d 786 (11th Cir. 1985) and United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984, 988 (11th Cir. 1983)). 

i. Individual Capacity of Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson

The individual defendants, Officers Fowler, Carpenter and Jackson, assert a defense of

qualified immunity as to the claim brought pursuant to Section 1983.6

 “Qualified immunity

offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their

conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.

2002) quoting Harlow v.Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992)).

To be entitled to qualified immunity, an individual defendant must first show that he was a public

official acting within his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.

Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 877(11th Cir. 2003). The defendants have met their burden to

establish that they were acting within their discretionary authority when the incident occurred. 

Next in the qualified immunity analysis, the court must consider whether a constitutional

violation occurred. “The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity

analysis is whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.” Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 73 (2002). In other words, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff

has even alleged a constitutional violation at all prior to addressing the question of whether the

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constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If the court determines, looking at the facts in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff, that a constitutional right would have been violated, the

second step is to ask whether that particular right was clearly established at the time. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim

unless every reasonable officer would conclude the force was unlawful. Slicker v. Jackson, 215

F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005).

Assuming, as the Plaintiff claims, that the officers grabbed and choked him merely

because he attempted to leave to see the Mayor of Jackson, the Plaintiff’s Consitutional right to

be free from excessive force has been violated. Moreover, there is no question that this right is

clearly established. Thus, the officers in their individual capacities are not entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.

ii. Official Capacity of Officers

The Plaintiff has also asserted a cause of action against Burge, Fowler, Carpenter and

Jackson in their official capacities as officers for the City of Jackson Police Department based

upon 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The court finds that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the

individual Defendants in their official capacities are redundant and, therefore, due to be

dismissed. When an officer is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official capacity, the suit is

simply “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). “Such suits

against municipal officers are therefore, in actuality, suits directly against the city that the officer

represents.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, this

Court finds that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants Chief of Police Burge and

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7 See fn. 4,

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Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson in their official capacities are due to be DISMISSED

because Plaintiff also has brought his Section 1983 claims against the City.7

 See Roberts v. City

of Geneva, 114 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1210 (M.D. Ala. 2000).

iii. City of Jackson

To the extent the Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is asserted against the City of Jackson,

Defendants argue that the City is also entitled to summary judgment. Under Section 1983, there

is no respondeat superior liability. Thus, a municipality may not be sued under Section 1983 for

the acts of others but, rather, only for its own acts. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S.

658, 691-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) In order to state a claim under Section 1983

against the City of Jackson, the Plaintiff must show that he suffered a constitutional injury, and

that his injury was caused by “a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

The governmental custom or policy involved must be the “moving force” behind the

alleged constitutional violation and respondeat superior is not an appropriate vehicle to hold a

municipality liable. See Monell, 436 U.S. At 691, 694. Thus, in the instant case, the Plaintiff

must show either that the alleged violation in question was “caused by an existing

unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policy maker” or

that the alleged violation is attributable to “inadequate police training.” Schmelz v. Monroe

County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1992); Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, Florida, 971 F.2d

708, 713 (11th Cir. 1992).

The plaintiff has failed to point to any policy or custom of the City was the moving force

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behind any alleged constitutional violation. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to

support the contention that any official policy or custom of the City of Jackson was the impetus

behind any alleged unconstitutional actions of the individual officers. In addition to the fact that

the Plaintiff has failed to identify any unconstitutional policy of the City of Jackson, there has

also been no showing that the Plaintiff’s claims can be tied to any policy attributable to a final

policy maker for the City of Jackson.

In the absence of an unconstitutional policy, inadequate police training may establish

Section 1983 liability. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).The Supreme Court has

stated that there are only “limited circumstances” in which an allegation of a failure to train or

supervise can be the basis for liability under Section 1983. Canton 489 U.S. at 387. These

“limited circumstances”occur only where the municipality inadequately trains or supervises its

employees, this failure to train or supervise is a city policy, and that city policy results in the

employees violating a citizen’s constitutional rights. It is only when the failure to train amounts

to “deliberate indifference” that it can properly be characterized as a “policy” or “custom”

necessary for Section 1983 liability to attach. Canton 489 U.S. at 389. To establish a “deliberate

or conscious choice” or such “deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must present some evidence that

the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and the municipality

made a deliberate choice not to take any action. Board of County Commissioners of Bryan

County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-09 (1997). 

There is insufficent evidence in the record to support a claim that the City of Jackson was

deliberately indifferent to the need to train in the officers in the use of excessive force. The

defendant has presented the sworn affidavit of Chief Burge which indicates Fowler, Carpenter

and Jackson have completed and maintained the State of Alabama mandatory training for law

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enforcement officers. (Doc. 32, Exh. 7) Moreover, Chief Burge avers that there have been no

past meritorious claims of excessive force against the individual officers. Id. 

In response, the plaintiff summarily states that the City of Jackson was negligent in the

training of the officers and then states that the “training record of each officer reveals that no

training occurred.” (Doc. 40 at 5) However, the plaintiff fails to cite to any evidence in support or

elaborate on his argument. Instead the plaintiff has filed numerous training records of the

officers and apparently expects the court to sort them and interpret them in his favor. A party

may not, by the simple expedient of dumping a mass of evidentiary material into the record, shift

to the Court the burden of identifying evidence supporting its position. See, e.g., Adler v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The district court has discretion to go

beyond the referenced portions of these [summary judgment] materials, but is not required to do

so.”); accord Jones v. Sheehan, Young & Culp, P.C., 82 F.3d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1996); Street

v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989); Lawson v. Sheriff of

Tippecanoe County, 725 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984); Karlozian v. Clovis Unified School

District, 2001 WL 488880 at *1 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Local Rule 7.2. Accordingly, this

Court’s review is limited to those specific portions of the submitted evidentiary materials to

which the parties have expressly drawn the Court’s attention. Similarly, “[t]here is no burden

upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the

materials before it on summary judgment.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d

587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). In this instance, the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence 

to support a claim that the City of Jackson knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular

area and then made a deliberate choice not to take any action. Accordingly, summary judgment

is due to be GRANTED on this claim. 

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B. State Law Claims

i. Negligent Training & Supervision

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants City of Jackson and Police Chief Burge negligently

hired, trained, and/or supervised Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson. (Doc. 1 at 4). 

With regard to the claim against Police Chief Burge, the Defendants respond that discretionary

function and statutory immunity preclude his liability and, in turn, any extension of liability to

the City of Jackson. (Doc. 31 at 26-27). 

As it concerns the claims asserted under Alabama law, by statute, a municipality may

only be held liable for injuries caused by the negligence of its agents or employees. Code of

Alabama § 11-47-190 (“Section 11-47-190") provides as follows:

No city or town shall be liable for damages for injury done to or wrong suffered by

any person or corporation, unless such injury or wrong was done or suffered through

the neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of the

municipality engaged in work therefore and while acting in the line of his or her

duty...

Municipal liability under Section 11-47-190 is based on the doctrine of respondeat

superior. Ott v. City of Mobile, 169 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1314 (S.D. Ala. 2001). Thus, “[f]or the

employer to be liable under that doctrine, the employee must first be a liable for a tort.” Id. “If

the agent is not liable for any tort, the principal is also absolved.” Id. (citing Latham v. Redding,

628 So.2d 490, 495 (Ala. 1993)). Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff

must show that Alabama law recognizes a cause of action against a supervisory employee for the

negligent training or supervision of a subordinate. 

 In Ott v. City of Mobile, the District Court examined this very issue and held that under

Alabama law, no cause of action exists against a supervisory employee for the negligent training

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8

 Defendants raised the affirmative defenses of qualified immunity, common law

discretionary immunity, statutory law enforcement discretionary function immunity. (Doc. 7 at

5). 

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or supervision of a subordinate. 169 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1314-16 (S.D. Ala. 2001)(“Because . . .

Alabama recognizes no such cause of action against [the supervisory employee], he cannot be

liable for negligence and the City cannot be vicariously liable for his negligence.”). This claim

was addressed again in Styron v. City of Foley, 2005 WL 3098926 (S.D. Ala. 2005). In Styron,

the District Court, citing Ott, held that “Alabama does not recognize an action against a

municipality for negligent hiring, supervising, or training”. Id. at *5 (citing Ott, 169 F. Supp. 2d

at 1315). Accordingly, Police Chief Burge cannot be liable for negligent training or supervision

because no such cause of action exists under Alabama law. Moreover, this claim must also fail

against the City of Jackson since itsliability, if any, flows derivatively from its employee. Here,

the employee is without liability ergo the City of Jackson is also without liability. 

Alternatively, assuming arguendo that a claim for negligent supervision, hiring, and

training exists under Alabama law, the Plaintiff has failed to present evidence regarding the City

of Jackson’s constructive awareness of the Officers’ incompetency. The defendant has cited to

unrebutted evidence that the Officers had completed and maintained the State’s mandatory

training standards and that no meritorious claims of excessive force had been previously filed

against these Officers. 

Summary judgment is also due to be granted because Chief Burge and the City are

entitled to immunity.8

 In Vaughn v. City of Athens, 176 Fed. App’x 974. 978 (11thCir. 2006)

(unpublished opinion), the Eleventh Circuit addressed plaintiff’s argument that the defendants

were not entitled to discretionary function immunity on negligent training and supervision claims

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without mention as to whether negligent training and supervision was a viable claim under

Alabama law. Instead the court in Vaughn discussed the application of discretionary function

immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a) wherein peace officers are granted statutory immunity

from tort liability when acting within the line and scope of their law enforcement duties. The

section provides as follows:

Every peace officer, except constables, who is employed or appointed pursuant to the

Constitution or statutes of this state, whether appointed or employed as such peace

officer by the state or a county or municipality thereof, or by an agency or institution,

corporate or otherwise, created pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state and

authorized by the Constitution or laws to appoint or employ police officers or other

peace officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by the lawful terms of their

employment or appointment, include the enforcement of, or the investigation and

reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of this state, and who is empowered by

the laws of this state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take into custody persons

who violate, or who are lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other lawful

process, with violations of, the criminal laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed

to be officers of this state, and as such shall have immunity from tort liability arising

out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line

and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.

Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a). Paragraph (b) states that “[t]his section is intended to extend

immunity only to peace officers and governmental units or agencies authorized to appoint peace

officers.” Ala.Code § 6-5-338(b). In Ex parte City of Gadsden, 781 So.2d 936, 940 (Ala. 2000),

the Alabama Supreme Court construed subsection (b) as extending discretionary-function

immunity to a city.

Also, in Vaughn, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the burden upon plaintiff when

defendants assert the defense of immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a). In order to deny

immunity, plaintiff must show that the defendants “‘acted in bad faith, with malice or

willfulness[.]’” Vaughn, 176 Fed. App’x at 978 (quoting Sheth v. Webster, 145 F. 3d 1231, 1238

(11th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff alleged in Count One of the complaint that the defendants conduct

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was willful, gross and oppressive, however, the record is void of any evidence of such conduct.

Therefore, even should Alabama recognize negligent failure to train and supervise as a tort, Chief

Burge would be entitled to immunity from tort liability for his performance of this discretionary

function and the City would also be entitled to immunity. 

ii. Battery & False Imprisonment

Counts Two and Three, respectively, of the Complaint allege battery and false

imprisonment against Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson. (Doc. 1 at 5). The Complaint

alleges that the Defendants acted intentionally, wantonly, recklessly, and/or maliciously in

attacking Hamilton. (Doc. 1 at 5). In order to establish a battery under state law the plaintiff : (1)

that the defendant touched the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant intended to touch the plaintiff; and

(3) that the touching was conducted in a harmful or offensive manner. Ex parte Atmore Cmty.

Hosp., 719 So.2d 1190 (Ala. 1998). 

Summary judgment is not appropriate on the battery claim as the record before the Court

indicates that genuine issues of material fact exist. For example, there is a factual dispute

regarding whether Officer Fowler placed his hand on Hamilton’s throat and choked him. Officer

Fowler maintains that he did not (doc. 41-4 at 21); Hamilton avers that Officer Fowler did (doc.

41-2 at 9-12). Additionally, there is considerable conflict regarding whether the Hamilton was

acting in a menacing way, i.e., approaching the officers with “fists balled up, slinging his arms”

and in a hostile manner. (Doc. 40 at 3; 41-7 at 10-13). All of the Officers admit that they grabbed

or touched Hamilton on various parts of his body because Hamilton was loud, boisterous, and

disorderly and they were attempting to restore order. (Docs. 41-4 at 3-6; 41-6 at 13-15; 41-7 at

11). 

Alabama law defines false imprisonment as the “unlawful detention of the person of

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another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty.” Crown Cent.

Petroleum Corp. v. Williams, 679 So.2d 651, 653 (Ala. 1996). There must be some direct

restraint of the person in order for a false imprisonment to occur, but it is not necessary that there

be a confinement in a jail or a prison. Id. “Any exercise of force, or the express or implied threat

of force, by which in the other person is deprived of his liberty, compelled to remain where he

does not wish to remain, or to go where he does not wish to go, is an imprisonment.” Id. at 653-

54. Again, genuine issues of material fact are in dispute. In addition to the above cited factual

disputes, discrepancies exist with regard to whether the officers forcibly placed Hamilton in the

chair after the “scuffle” had ended or if Hamilton sat pursuant to his own volition. (Docs. 41-4 at

3-6; 41-6 at 13-15; 41-7 at 11). Additionally, the location of the “scuffle” is disputed by the

testimony of the various officers; there is testimony that it occurred in the hallway and also

contradictory testimony that is occurred in the office. (Docs. 41-4 at 3-6; 41-6 at 13-15; 41-7 at

11). 

iii. Outrage

Count Four of the Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts the tort of outrage against Defendants

Officers Fowler, Carpenter, and Jackson. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff states that the officers’ behavior

“was egregious, extreme, outrageous, and was designed to inflict emotional distress....” (Doc. 1 at

6). In order for the Plaintiff to prevail under the tort of outrage, he must prove the following: (1)

that the Defendant either intended to inflict emotional distress, or knew or should of known that

emotional distress was likely to result from his conduct; (2) that the Defendant’s conduct was

extreme and outrageous, and (3) that the Defendant’s conduct caused emotional distress so severe

that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Callens v. Jefferson County Nursing

Home, 769 So.2d 273, 281 (Ala. 2000). The Supreme Court of Alabama has recognized the tort

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of outrage in only three areas: wrongful conduct within the context of family burial; an

insurance agent coercing an insured into settling an insurance claim; and egregious sexual

harassment. Id. (citing Thomas v. BSE Indus. Contractors, Inc., 624 So.2d 1041 (Ala. 1993). The

tort of outrage is limited to egregious circumstances. Id. Therefore, the elements of the

tort of outrage are only found in rare circumstances. Barton v. American Red Cross, 829 F.Supp.

1290 (M.D. Ala. 1993). In this case, the Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence that he has

suffered emotional distress so severe that a reasonable person could not be expected to endure it.

The Defendants’ conduct could not be described as so outrageous in character and so extreme in

degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as “atrocious and

utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” See Thomas v. BSE Industrial Contractors, Inc., 624

So.2d 1041 (Ala. 1993), citing American Road Service Company v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361 (Ala.

1981). Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in favor or the Defendants on

the Plaintiff’s outrage claim. 

V. Conclusion

For all of the reasons discussed herein, the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgement is 

due to be granted in part. Therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 

(1) Summary Judgment on all claims brought against Defendants Officers Fowler,

Carpenter, and Jackson in their official capacities is GRANTED in favor of the

Defendants.

(2) Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of the Defendant sCity of Jackson and 

Police Chief Burge, in his official and individual capacities, for Count One

Negligent Training and Supervision.

(3) Summary Judgement is DENIED against Defendants Fowler, Carpenter, and

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Jackson for Count Two Battery.

(4) Summary Judgment is DENIED against Defendants Fowler, Carpenter, and

Jackson for Count Three False Imprisonment. 

(5) Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants Fowler, Carpenter, and

Jackson for Count Four Outrage. 

(6) Summary Judgment is DENIED against Defendants Officers Fowler, Carpenter,

and Jackson in their individual capacities in Count Five 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 13th day of June, 2007. 

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose 

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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