Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06661/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06661-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

STATE FARM INSURANCE )

COMPANIES, et. al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

 )

1:04cv6661 DLB

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF

FROM FAILURE TO FILE A TIMELY JURY

DEMAND

(Document 17)

 

ORDER STRIKING JURY DEMAND

(Document 18)

On April 28, 2005, Plaintiff Michael Rodriguez filed the instant motion for Relief from

Failure to File a Timely Jury Demand. Defendant State Farm Insurance Companies filed its

Opposition on May 10, 2005. The hearing was held on May 26, 2005 before the undersigned. 

Attorney Edward Lee appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Attorneys Daniel Cravens and Barrett

Green appeared on behalf of Defendant.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this wrongful termination on October 1, 2004 in the Kern County Superior

Court. Defendant filed a Notice of Removal on December 6, 2004. A Scheduling Conference

was held on March 21, 2005 wherein Judge Wanger informed Plaintiff’s counsel that Plaintiff

had failed to include a jury demand in the Complaint. The Court ordered Plaintiff to seek relief

on or before April 29, 2005. This motion followed.

Case 1:04-cv-06661-DLB Document 23 Filed 05/27/05 Page 1 of 6
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Plaintiff argues that the Court has discretion to grant relief pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 39(b). Plaintiff acknowledges the split in the circuits regarding the Court’s

ability to grant such relief, including the authority in the Ninth Circuit holding that “relief cannot

be granted where the untimely demand resulted from oversight, inadvertence or lack of

familiarity with the Federal Rules.” Pacific Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas & Gen Ins, Ltd, 239

F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff urges the Court to follow the circuits that allow such

relief. See Daniel Int’l Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990);

Parrot v. Wilson,707F.2d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff argues that counsel immediately

sought relief after being informed of the defect. Plaintiff also contends that this case involves

issues of disability harassment discrimination and wrongful termination for which a jury would

be better suited to determine damages. Plaintiff asserts that there is no prejudice to Defendant in

that only a few months have passed since removal. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests relief

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) based on counsel’s inadvertent omission of

the jury demand. 

Defendant opposes the motion and points out that the law is well settled in the Ninth

Circuit that mere inadvertence is not a proper basis for granting a late filed request for jury trial. 

See Pacific Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas & Gen Ins., supra. Defendant notes that the Ninth

Circuit has affirmed this rule as recently as April 8 of this year. See Lutz v. Glendale Union High

School, 403 F.3d 1061, n4 (9th Cir. 2005) and further that Plaintiff may not rely on the Court’s

discretion to grant relief under Rule 6(b)(2) for excusable neglect. See Russ v. Standard Ins. Co.,

120 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1997).

DISCUSSION

A. Court’s Discretion to Excuse Failure to File Jury Demand Under Rule 39(b).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) states:

Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury 

by (1) serving upon the other parties a demand thereof in writing at any time after

the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the

last pleading directed to such issue, and (2) filing the demand as required by Rule

5(d). Such demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party.

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 See eg., Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556-57 (9th Cir.1983) (finding discretion granted district court by Rule

39(b) to be narrow and not permitting the grant of motion where waiver occurred due to oversight or inadvertence); Noonan v.

Cunnard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir.1967) (noting trend of district court decisions limiting discretion "to determining

whether the moving party's showing beyond mere inadvertence is sufficient to justify relief"); General Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 197 (4th Cir.) (suggesting that exceptional circumstances may be required for district court to exercise its

discretion to grant a Rule 39(b) motion), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1964); cf. Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194,

199-200 (1st Cir.1987) (adopting view that discretion afforded district court to either grant or deny Rule 39(b) motion very

broad); Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Schs., 825 F.2d 1004, 1013 (6th Cir.1987) (finding under broad discretion granted district

courts by Rule 39(b), untimely request for jury trial should not be denied absent strong and compelling reasons); AMF

Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir.1965) (holding that absent strong and compelling reasons to the

contrary, a district court should exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b) and grant a jury trial); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d

406, 409 (5th Cir.1964) (finding Rule 39(b) motion should be granted "in the absence of strong and compelling reasons to the

contrary"), cert. denied 379 U.S. 962 (1965); EEOC v. Britrail Travel Int'l Corp., 129 F.R.D. 116, 117 (D.N.J.1989) (untimely

jury demand resulting from inadvertence should be granted if no prejudice or severe docket disruption would result); Ford v.

Breier, 71 F.R.D. 195, 197 (E.D.Wis.1976) (stating court should grant relief from apparent waiver absent overriding

circumstances to the contrary). 

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d) provides that the failure of a party to

serve and file a demand as required by Rule 38 constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury. 

Fed.R.Civ.P 38(d).

Rule 38 applies to removed actions pursuant to Rule 81(c). Rule 81(c), in relevant part,

provides as follows:

If at the time of removal all necessary pleadings have been served, a party entitled

to trial by jury under Rule 38 shall be accorded it, if the party’s demand therefor is

served within 10 days after the petition for removal is filed if the party is the

petitioner, or if not the petitioner within 10 days after service on the party of the

notice of filing the petition. A party who, prior to removal, has made an express

demand for trial by jury in accordance with state law, need not make a demand

after removal...The failure of a party to make demand as directed constitutes a

waiver by that party of trial by jury.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(c). In certain situations, the failure of a party to file a timely jury demand may

be excused at the discretion of the court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) states:

Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall

be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to

demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have

been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may

order a trial by a jury of any or all issues.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(b).

A divergence of opinion exists among the Circuits as to when a court should grant relief

from a failure to timely demand a jury trial under Rule 39(b). While some courts take a

restrictive view of the circumstances justifying relief under Rule 39(b), others find the discretion

granted to be very broad.1 

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 Courts which have taken a restrictive view of the scope of 39(b) have reasoned that the rule was not intended to serve

as a device to circumvent or bypass the positive action that must be taken under Rule 38 to obtain a jury trial.

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The Ninth Circuit has held that the court’s discretion under Rule 39(b) is “‘narrow’ and

‘does not permit a court to grant relief when the failure to make a timely demand results from an

oversight or inadvertence.’” Pacific Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & General Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d

1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001); Kletzelman v. Capistrano Unified School Dist., 91 F.3d 68, 71 (9th

Cir. 1996) quoting Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied,

474 U.S. 865 (1985), Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. 

denied 513 U.S. 875 (1994)(discretion is narrow and does not permit a court to grant relief where

the untimely demand resulted from oversight, inadvertence or lack of familiarity with the Federal

Rules).2 “An untimely request for a jury trial must be denied unless some cause beyond mere

inadvertence is shown.” Pacific Fisheries, 239 F.3d at 1002; see also Zivkovic v. Southern

California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2002); Lutz v. Glendale Union High

School District No. 205, 403 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In support of the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel submits a declaration stating, “Upon drafting

Plaintiff’s Complaint for Damages in this matter, I inadvertently omitted plaintiff’s Demand for

Jury Trial.” Declaration of Edward Lee ¶ 3. While he has attempted to remedy the mistake

quickly and it may not have caused substantial prejudice to Defendant, the Court is bound by

Ninth Circuit precedent. As explained, “[a]n untimely request for a jury trial must be denied

unless some cause beyond mere inadvertence is shown.” Pacific Fisheries, 239 F.3d at 1002

(emphasis added). Under these circumstances, granting Plaintiff’s request would be an abuse of

discretion. See Lutz v. Glendale Union High School District, 403 F.3d 1061, 1065, n4 (9th Cir.

2005)[Had the district judge ordered a jury trial under Rule 39(b) where no explanation other

than inadvertence for untimely jury request, he would have abused his discretion.] 

B. Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time under Rule 6(b)(2)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) allows the Court to enlarge time limits found

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elsewhere in the Federal Rules. Pursuant to Rule 6(b), where the motion to enlarge time is made

after the expiration of the specified time period, the moving party must show that the failure to

act was the result of excusable neglect. See also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,

896-97 (1990). Plaintiff’s motion to enlarge time is made after the time for filing a jury demand

expired and is therefore subject to the excusable neglect standard.

Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that he inadvertently omitted the jury demand in the complaint. 

Although excusable neglect is an equitable, flexible concept, “inadvertence, ignorance of the

rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect.” Kyle v.

Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Serv. v. Brunswick

Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380 (1993)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that an

attorney’s failure to read or understand the rules is a mistake of law that does not rise to the level

of excusable neglect. In Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., the Ninth Circuit held that an attorney’s

mistaken reliance upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) was not excusable neglect. The

Court determined that the attorney’s “misconstruction of nonambiguous rules” was not a “basis

for deviating from the general rule that a mistake of law does not constitute excusable neglect.” 

Id. at 931-932. 

Similarly, in Speiser, Krause & Madole P.C. v. Ortiz, 271 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001), the

Ninth Circuit determined that an attorney’s failure to read and understand Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 81(c) did not constitute excusable neglect. The Court found that Rule 81(c), which

sets for the time for answering a complaint in a removed action, was “clear” and does not provide

a basis “for the federal courts to excuse such professional neglect.” Speiser, 271 F.3d at 886. 

“While an attorney’s egregious failure to read and follow clear and unambiguous rules might

sometimes be excusable neglect, ‘mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute

excusable neglect.’” Speiser, 271 F.3d at 886 (quoting Pioneer Inv. Serv. v. Brunswick Assoc.

Ltd., 507 U.S. 380 (1993)); Comm. for Idaho’s High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 825 (9th

Cir. 1996) (holding that counsel’s ignorance of amendment to procedural rule did not constitute

excusable neglect, and reasoning that “[I]f misconstruction of a nonambiguous rule cannot, under

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Ninth Circuit precedent, constitute excusable neglect to justify an extension of time, it clearly

would have been abuse of discretion for the district court in this case to hold that ignorance of an

amendment to a rule could constitute excusable neglect.”). 

In the instant case, counsel admits that he inadvertently failed to include the jury demand

in the complaint. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 81(c), which govern the time for filing

a jury demand, are clear and unambiguous. Counsel’s failure to read and/or understand these

rules does not constitute excusable neglect under Ninth Circuit precedent. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated cause beyond “mere inadvertence,” and his

request for the Court to exercise its discretion under Rules 39 and 6(b)(2) must be denied. 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Failure to File a Timely Jury Demand is therefore DENIED

and the Demand for Trial by Jury filed on April 28, 2005 is HEREBY STRICKEN. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 26, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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