Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05418/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05418-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer to the petition.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 ALLEN WAYNE McDANIEL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JULIO VALDEZ, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

CV F 03 5418 SMS HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. #1]

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties having voluntarily consented to exercise of Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), by order dated August 13, 2003, this case was

assigned to the undersigned for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kings, entered on September 5, 1995,

following his conviction by jury trial of sale of heroin in violation of Cal. Health and Safety Code

§ 11352(a) and sale of cocaine base in violation of Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11352(a). See

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People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996).

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

Exhibit A, Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Answer”). The allegations

that Petitioner had suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code

§ 667(b)-(I) were found to be true. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive indeterminate

terms of 25 years to life. Id.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”). On June 26, 1997, the 5th DCA issued an unpublished

opinion rejecting Petitioner’s contentions; however, the 5th DCA denied the claim that the trial court

erred in believing it did not have the discretion to strike the prior convictions without prejudice to

Petitioner raising the claim to the trial court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id.

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kings County Superior Court.

On August 9, 2000, the trial court granted the petition and held a Romero2 hearing. On September

18, 2000, the trial court declined to strike Petitioner’s prior convictions or set aside the sentence. See

Exhibit B, Answer. 

Petitioner filed a second appeal to the 5th DCA. On December 19, 2001, in an unpublished

opinion the 5th DCA affirmed the judgment. See Exhibit C, Answer.

On January 30, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court. See Exhibit D, Answer. On March 13, 2002, the petition was summarily denied without

comment or citation to authority. See Exhibit E, Answer. 

On March 14, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. By order of the Court

dated April 10, 2003, the matter was transferred to the Fresno Division and received in this Court.

Petitioner raises three purported grounds for relief: (1) “Counsel at Romero hearing was ineffective -

made no meaningful argument in favor of leniency”; (2) “Court’s denial of petitioner’s Romero

motion to strike the strikes as to at least one count was abuse of discretion”; and (3) “Petitioner’s

fifty years to life sentence was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment.” See pp. 5-6,

Petition.

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U.S . District Court

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On July 10, 2003, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. 

Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court hereby adopts the facts as summarized by the 5th DCA in its opinions dated June

26, 1997, and December 19, 2001:

In November and December 1994, an informant, Bobby Evans, was working with the

Kings County Narcotics Task Force (Task Force). During this time period, Evans met

defendant while walking on the street in Hanford and defendant told Evans he could provide

him drugs. Based on this statement, Evans reapproached defendant on a street in Hanford, on

December 16, 1994. At the time, Evans was wearing a small radio transmitter and

microphone commonly referred to as a “wire,” and had $60 which had been given to him by

officers in the Task Force to purchase drugs. Task Force officers were monitoring the

transmissions from Evans’s “wire” and simultaneously recording them. Evans told defendant

he wished to purchase some heroin, and defendant made a telephone call to someone he

believed could provide it.

As a result of the telephone call, a car containing two females came to the street

corner where defendant and Evans were waiting and defendant approached the car with $40

Evans had given him. He returned with three small bindles and $10 in change. He gave the

change and two of the bindles to Evans, and kept the third for himself. Subsequent analysis

disclosed the two bindles received by Evans contained a total of .06 grams of heroin.

Although Evans’s entire transaction with defendant was recorded, problems with the

equipment, outside noise sources, and interference from other transmissions, rendered much

of the recording unintelligible. To the extent possible, a transcript of the recording was made

and offered into evidence by defendant. 

On the evening of December 22, 1994, Evans was again on the street in Hanford

attempting to buy drugs for the Task Force. As before, he wore a wire that was being

monitored by Task Force officers, and was in the process of attempting to purchase some

drugs from an unidentified individual when he was approached by defendant. Evans told

defendant he was trying purchase some cocaine base, commonly referred to as “crack” or

“rock.” Defendant offered to assist Evans and told him they should go to another area he

referred to as the “gardens.” Evans and defendant then got into Evans’s car and began

driving. During this time, Take Force officers lost contact with Evans and the transmissions

from his wire. As they were driving, Evans would state street names out loud in the hope that

the officers monitoring his transmissions could follow him. At some point during the drive,

the Task Force officers once again began to receive transmissions from Evans’s wire.

Defendant first directed Evans to a house where he believed they could get some

crack. However, it turned out the occupants did not have any. They then continued to drive

toward the “gardens.” When they arrived in that area, they saw two people in the street, one

of whom was on a bicycle. Evans testified that when defendant saw the individuals he said,

“let’s stop right here and see what they got.” Evans stated that as they approached the

individual, he recognized the man on the bicycle as Willie Johnson, someone from whom he

had previously purchased drugs. Evans had a conversation with Johnson and gave him $20,

and in return received a piece of white substance. At defendant’s request, Evans broke off a

piece of the substance and gave it to defendant. Subsequent analysis revealed that the white

substance Evans received contained .27 grams of cocaine base.

As was the case with respect to the December 16th tape, there were numerous gaps

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U.S . District Court

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and inaudible portions in the recording of the December 22d transaction. To the extent

possible, a transcript was prepared, including the name of the individuals who were speaking

when their voices could be identified. The audio tape and transcript were offered into

evidence and provided to the jury.

See pp. 2-4, Exhibit A, Answer.

McDaniel’s Romero Hearing

At the beginning of McDaniel’s Romero Hearing, the court stated that it had reviewed

the probation report, the letters attached to it, the information, and the jury verdicts. It then

stated that McDaniel’s case did not appear to be an appropriate case for striking any of

McDaniel’s prior convictions but that [] it was inviting comments from counsel before

making a final decision.

In responding to the court’s comments defense counsel, in pertinent part, stated,

. . . All I can really offer is that we have two relatively benign convictions in

this case, and I say ‘relatively benign,’ because I think relatively they’re convictions

for sales and being involved in drug sales. And it would seem to me that the sentence

of two 25 years to life terms based on those two counts would be disproportionate to

the conduct involved, and we would argue that . . . .

In arguing against the court exercising discretion pursuant to section 1385, the

prosecutor noted that McDaniel’s criminal record stretched back to 1976 and that he had been

unable to curb his criminal behavior. At one point he referred to McDaniel as a “poster child”

for the three strikes law.

In refusing to strike any of McDaniel’s prior convictions , the court stated, 

The defendant has been found guilty by the jury [of] prior convictions that

come within the provisions of Section 667, Subsections B and D, and [section]

1170.12 . . . that his life has been one of continued criminality throughout his adult

life culminating in the offenses that resulted in the present convictions for the sale of

heroin and the sale of cocaine base. The defendant’s pattern of behavior shown in his

probation report indicates that the defendant is clearly a career criminal and addicted

to heroin and showing - - at least at the time of sentencing showing no interest or

desire to change his lifestyle and obviously more involved in recruiting others through

his sales than to mending his own behavior.

The Court agrees that Mr. McDaniel is the epitome of the precipitous for

whom the statute was enacted, and in the Court’s view the indication of relief under

1385 . . . would be a gross miscarriage of justice. So in the interest of justice, I’m

going to decline to extend relief under [section] 1385, and the sentencing orders that

were entered September 21, 1995, will stand as announced at that time.

See pp. 3-4, Exhibit C, Answer.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

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U.S . District Court

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the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kings County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

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U.S . District Court

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of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

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U.S . District Court

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III. Review of Petitioner’s Claim

A. Ground One

In his first ground for relief, Petitioner claims his defense counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to make a meaningful argument in favor of leniency at the Romero hearing. 

Petitioner does not expound on his claim; however, assuming by “leniency” Petitioner is making the

same arguments as he did in state court, Petitioner asserts defense counsel was ineffective in the

following manner: (1) Failing to argue, in accord with the principles enunciated in People v. Garcia,

20 Cal.4th 490 (1999), that the court should have struck the prior conviction allegations as to one of

his current offenses; (2) Failing to argue the mitigating effect of certain circumstances; (3) Failing to

argue Petitioner’s alcoholism as a mitigating factor; 4) Failing to correct the court’s erroneous

assumption that Petitioner was involved in “recruiting” others to drug use; (5) Failing to argue the

basis for his statement that petitioner’s sentence was disproportionate to his conduct; and (6) Failing

to object to the prosecutor’s characterization of Petitioner as the “poster child” for California’s Three

Strikes law.

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151

F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998). In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that

counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he

or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of

reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v.

Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is

highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Sanders v. Ratelle, 21

F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994).

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Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive

defendant of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must

also evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356,

1461 (9th Cir. 1994). To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have

been different but for counsel’s error, may grant the petitioner a windfall to which the law does not

entitle him. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). Thus, if the court finds that

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, the court must then ask

whether despite the errors and prejudice the trial was fundamentally fair and reliable. Id. 

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697. Since it is necessary to prove prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must

necessarily fail. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058,

1062 (2000). 

1. Failure to argue the Garcia principles

Petitioner first claims defense counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the court should

strike one of the prior conviction allegations in accordance with the principles announced in People

v. Garcia, 20 Cal.4th 490 (1999).

California Penal Code § 1385(a) provides, in pertinent part:

The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application

of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The

reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.

In People v. Garcia, the defendant was convicted of two counts of burglary. At sentencing,

the trial court exercised its discretion pursuant to § 1385(a) and struck one of the prior conviction

allegations. The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s exercise of discretion and

reiterated the principles set forth in People v. Williams, 17 Cal.4th 148 (1998): 

[In Williams] [w]e said that the trial court could give ‘no weight whatsoever . . . to

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factors extrinsic to the [Three Strikes] scheme.’ On the other hand, the court must accord

‘preponderant weight . . . to factors intrinsic to the scheme, such as the nature and

circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony

convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects.’ Ultimately, a

court must determine whether ‘the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in

whole or in part.’

Garcia, 20 Cal.4th at 498-99 (Citations omitted).

In determining that the trial court’s exercise of discretion was proper, the California Supreme

Court noted the defendant’s prior convictions all arose from “a single period of aberrant behavior for

which he served a single prison term.” Id. at 503. In addition, the defendant “cooperated with police,

his crimes were related to drug addiction, and his criminal history does not include any actual

violence.” Id. 

In this case, Petitioner suffered two prior convictions for robberies which were counted as

strikes. These convictions did not stem from a single period of aberrant behavior; one occurred eight

years later than the other, and Petitioner went to prison separately on each. See Exhibit C, Answer.

The trial court found Petitioner’s life to be “one of continued criminality . . . culminating in the

offenses that resulted in the present convictions for the sale of heroin and the sale of cocaine base.”

Id. This finding is borne out by the fact that Petitioner had also sustained additional convictions: 1) a

prior felony conviction for possession of a fraudulent check/money order; 2) a prior felony

conviction for petty theft with a prior; 3) two misdemeanor convictions for creating a public

disturbance; 4) one misdemeanor conviction for disorderly conduct; 5) one misdemeanor conviction

for disobeying a court order; 6) one misdemeanor conviction for being under the influence of a

controlled substance; and 7) several traffic violations which included reckless driving, driving under

the influence, driving without a license, and resisting arrest. Id. The trial court further stated that

Petitioner’s “pattern of behavior shown in his probation report indicates that [he] is clearly a career

criminal and addicted to heroin . . . showing no interest or desire to change that lifestyle and

obviously more involved in recruiting others through his sales than to mending his own behavior.”

Id. This finding is demonstrated by the fact that Petitioner had served time on 11 separate occasions

and had probation revoked on 4 occasions. Id. The trial court agreed that Petitioner “is the epitome

of the precipitous for whom the statute was enacted, and in the Court’s view the indication of relief

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under 1385 . . . would be a gross miscarriage of justice.” Id.

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim that defense counsel failed to adequately argue the Garcia

principles fails. First, Petitioner has not shown counsel’s actions to be erroneous. Counsel did argue

that the current convictions were “relatively benign” in that they involved drugs. Id. Counsel further

argued that the sentence was disproportionate to the conduct involved. Id. Based on the stark contrast

of the defendant’s criminal history in Garcia to Petitioner’s, additional argument on this point by

counsel would have been pointless. In addition, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. No matter

how strongly defense counsel would have argued the point, there is little or no chance the argument

would have swayed the trial court. In fact, as noted above, the trial court found that based on his

criminal history, granting Petitioner relief by striking a prior would have been a “gross miscarriage

of justice.” Id. 

2. Failure to argue the mitigating effect of certain circumstances

Petitioner also faults counsel for failing to argue as mitigating circumstances that: 1) the

current offenses were closely connected in time; 2) they resulted from a continuing effort by

informant Evans to have Petitioner arrested; 3) neither sale was initiated by Petitioner; and 4) neither

sale was indicative of serious drug dealing by Petitioner.

Nevertheless, as found by the 5th DCA, the trial court was aware of the above factors by way

of the probation report. The trial court, however, viewed the circumstances differently. The multiple

sales, Petitioner’s criminal history, and Petitioner’s willingness to supply Evans with drugs

demonstrated a pattern of ongoing criminal conduct. 

Therefore, counsel’s failure to argue these mitigating circumstances was not erroneous, and

in any case, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice. There is no chance additional argument would

have swayed the court.

3. Failure to argue Petitioner’s alcoholism as a mitigating circumstance

Petitioner alleges trial counsel failed to argue his addiction to alcohol as a mitigating

circumstance.

As noted by the 5th DCA and argued by Respondent, in California, alcoholism can be

regarded as an aggravated factor and not a mitigating factor when the problem is long-term and the

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defendant makes no effort to pursue treatment. People v. Gaston, 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 322 (1999);

People v. Martinez, 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1511 (1999). And in fact, the trial court did view

Petitioner’s dependency as an aggravating factor. Therefore, counsel’s decision not to argue the point

was not unreasonable.

4. Failure to correct the court’s erroneous assumption that Petitioner was involved in 

“recruiting” others to drug use

Petitioner claims the trial court erroneously assumed that Petitioner recruited others to drug

use. Petitioner alleges that defense counsel should have pointed out and corrected the trial court’s

error.

The record shows that in both instances, Petitioner willingly procured drugs for informant

Evans by calling for others to supply the drugs and negotiating the drug deal. Petitioner would

obtain a portion of the drugs for himself in exchange for his services. Based on these facts, the trial

court’s assumption that Petitioner “recruited” others was reasonable. And so, defense counsel’s

failure to correct this assumption was not error.

5. Failure to argue the basis for his statement that petitioner’s sentence was disproportionate 

to his conduct

Petitioner argues next that defense counsel failed to argue the basis for his statement that

Petitioner’s sentence was disproportionate to his conduct. 

As discussed below, Petitioner’s sentence was not disproportionate to his conduct. Therefore,

defense counsel’s failure to expound on his argument has not been shown to be error. In addition, the

outcome would not have been different but for defense counsel’s alleged failure. Thus, Petitioner has

also failed to demonstrate prejudice.

6. Failure to object to the prosecutor’s characterization of Petitioner as the “poster child” for 

California’s Three Strikes law

Lastly, Petitioner alleges defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the

prosecutor’s comment that Petitioner was the “poster child” for the Three Strikes law.

The 5th DCA summed up McDaniel’s criminal history as follows:

In addition to the two robbery convictions which were counted as strikes, defendant

had a prior felony conviction for possession of a fraudulent check/money order; a prior felony

conviction for petty theft with a prior; two misdemeanor convictions for creating a public

disturbance; one misdemeanor conviction for disorderly conduct; one misdemeanor

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conviction for disobeying a court order; one misdemeanor conviction for being under the

influence of a controlled substance; and numerous traffic violations including reckless

driving, driving under the influence, driving without a license and resisting arrest. As a result

of these offenses, he served time in jail on 11 occasions and had his probation revoked at

least 4 times. When he committed the present offenses, defendant was on probation for

driving under the influence and resisting arrest.

See Exhibit C, Answer.

In light of this criminal history, the prosecutor’s comments were fairly supported. Any

objection by defense counsel would certainly have been overruled. In addition, Petitioner

demonstrates no prejudice resulting from the comment.

7. Conclusion

In sum, Petitioner has not shown constitutional error as a result of any of defense counsel’s

alleged failures. Even if constitutional error can be shown, Petitioner has not shown the state court

rejection of the claim to be an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or a decision based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim

must be denied. 

B. Ground Two

In his second ground for relief, Petitioner contends the trial court’s denial of his Romero

motion pursuant to Section 1385 to strike one of Petitioner’s prior convictions was an abuse of

discretion. Respondent argues the claim should be dismissed as it does not raise a federal question.

The basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section 2241 of

Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless

he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). See also, Rule 1 to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Court. The Supreme Court has held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a

person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484

(1973).

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Furthermore, in order to succeed in a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must

demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim in state court

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2). 

In the instant case, Petitioner fails to state a cognizable federal claim. Petitioner does not

allege a violation of the Constitution or federal law. The instant claim only involves state law, and

generally, issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

67, (1991) ("We have stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of

state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333,

348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level

of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d

520, 530 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991) (“incorrect” evidentiary rulings are not

the basis for federal habeas relief); Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989) (Federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state

law). 

Therefore, Respondent is correct in arguing the instant claim fails to raise a federal question.

The claim must be dismissed.

C. Ground Three

In his last ground for relief, Petitioner claims his sentence of fifty years to life pursuant to

California’s Three Strikes law is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution.

A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime for which a defendant is convicted

may indeed violate the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court recently decided two cases which

discuss the clearly established federal law applicable to Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual

punishment claims. See Ewing v. California, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct.

1166 (2003). 

In Andrade, the Supreme Court discussed the current state of Eighth Amendment

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3As expressed in his concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991), citing Solem v.

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).

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proportionality review and held that the only clearly established governing legal principle is that a

“gross disproportionality” review applies to criminal sentences for a term of years. Id. at 1173. 

Citing extensively to its past cases dealing with criminal sentencing and proportionality under the

Eighth Amendment, the Court acknowledged that it has “not established a clear and consistent path

for courts to follow.” Id. 

The Supreme Court held that “the only relevant clearly established law amenable to the

‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ frame work is the gross disproportionality principle,

the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’

case.” Id. The Court analyzed Andrade’s sentence under Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980),

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), and held that

the state court “did not confron[t] a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of this Court and nevertheless arrive at a result different from our precedent.” Id. at 1173-1174. 

Using section 2254(d)(1)’s “unreasonable application” clause, the Court also held that it was not

objectively unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that the contours of the

gross disproportionality principle permitted an affirmance of Andrade’s Three Strikes sentence. Id.

at 1175. 

In Ewing, the Supreme Court again reviewed the constitutionality of a sentence of 25 years to

life for stealing three golf clubs. After reviewing the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the

Court chose to adopt Justice Kennedy’s view 3 that:

[There are] four principles of proportionality review-- the primacy of the legislature;

the variety of legitimate penological schemes; the nature of our federal system; and,

the requirement that proportionality be guided by objective factors– that inform the

final one: The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between the

crime and the sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly

disproportionate’ to the crime. 

Ewing, at 1186-1187. 

In conducting a proportionality review of Ewing’s sentence, the Court stated, “[i]n weighing

the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his

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long history of felony recidivism.” Id. at 1189-1190. The Court noted that “any other approach

would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature’s

choice of sanctions.” Id. at 1190. The Court recognized the state’s interest in dealing “in a harsher

manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of

conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law.” Id., citing Rummel v. Estelle,

445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980). Accordingly, proportionality review must take this interest into account. 

Id. The Court held that Ewing’s sentence of 25 years to life was justified by the State’s public-safety

interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons, and amply supported by Ewing’s long,

serious criminal record. Id. 

In reviewing Petitioner’s claim, this Court will begin with a brief overview of the Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence and the proportionality standard which existed at the time of Petitioner’s

sentencing. In Rummel, the Court upheld a life sentence imposed under a Texas recidivist statute for

a defendant convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, an offense normally punishable by

imprisonment for two to ten years. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266. However, because he had two prior

felony convictions (for fraudulent use of a credit card and passing a forged check), and had served

two prior prison terms, the prosecution chose to proceed under the state’s recidivist statute, which

carried a life sentence. Id. The Supreme Court held that Rummel’s sentence of life imprisonment

with the possibility of parole did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 265-266 (emphasis

added). The Court noted that Rummel had suffered two separate convictions and terms of

imprisonment for each prior, that he would be eligible for parole in twelve years, and that under the

Texas recidivist statute, prosecutors retained the discretion not to invoke the statute for “petty”

offenders. Id. at 278-81.

Three years later, the Supreme Court set forth the criteria for finding a sentence to be cruel

and unusual punishment under the Federal Constitution and affirmed a decision of the Eighth Circuit

holding unconstitutional a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a

seven-time nonviolent felony recidivist. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Defining a three-part

proportionality criteria, the Court concluded that Solem’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to

his crime of uttering a “no account” check for $100.00, even in light of his prior six nonviolent

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felony convictions: three for third degree burglary, one for obtaining money under false pretenses,

one for grand larceny, and one for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 279-81. The Court emphasized

that Solem’s life sentence was far more severe than the sentence it had considered in Rummel,

because Rummel was likely to be eligible for parole in twelve years, while Solem was given no

possibility of parole at all. Id. 

In Harmelin, the defendant received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the

possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine, his first felony offense. 501

U.S. 957 (1991)(emphasis added). The Supreme Court upheld the sentence, with five justices

agreeing, for varying reasons, that the sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Although the

Court did not produce a majority opinion, seven justices favored some manner of proportionality

review. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, stated that a noncapital sentence

could violate the Eighth Amendment if it was “grossly disproportionate” to the crime, but concluded

that courts need not examine the second and third factors of intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional

reviews discussed in Solem, unless “a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence

imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. at 1005. 

The majority of the justices in the Harmelin Court agreed that outside capital punishment,

deeming a sentence cruel and unusual punishment is “exceedingly rare” due to the lack of objective

guidelines for terms of imprisonment. 501 U.S. at 964. The threshold for such an inference of

disproportionality is high. See id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Generally, so long as the

sentence imposed by the state court does not exceed statutory maximums, the sentence will not be

considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. United States v.

McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The Harmelin Court concluded that the defendant’s sentence did not meet the threshold

factor of “gross disproportionality.” Justice Kennedy stressed the serious nature of Harmelin’s

offense, stating that the offense “threatened to cause grave harm to society” unlike “the relatively

minor, nonviolent crime at issue in Solem.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002. Justice Kennedy further

noted that the “possession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent ‘one of the greatest

problems affecting the health and welfare of our population.’” and that the quantity of cocaine

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possessed by Harmelin had a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. Id. 

Petitioner’s sentence of 50 years to life does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality

to his crimes. Petitioner received his total sentence for conducting two sales of controlled

substances. In Harmelin, Justice Kennedy noted that the “possession, use, and distribution of illegal

drugs represent ‘one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population.’” Id.

In addition, Petitioner received his lengthy sentence not just for the instant crimes, but also for his

extensive criminal history. As already discussed, Petitioner’s criminal history included felony

convictions for robbery with use of a firearm, robbery, possession of a fraudulent check/money

order, and petty theft with a prior. In addition, Petitioner sustained multiple misdemeanor

convictions for creating a public disturbance, disorderly conduct, disobeying a court order, being

under the influence of a controlled substance, reckless driving, driving under the influence, driving

without a license, and resisting arrest. 

In light of the instant drug offenses and Petitioner’s extensive criminal history, Petitioner’s

sentence does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality. The state court rejection of this

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor did the state court resolution result in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The claim must be denied. 

ORDER

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 3, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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