Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01947/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01947-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD A. BRISTOW, for

himself and a class of 

others similarly situated,

NO. CIV. S-06-1947 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v.

LYCOMING ENGINES, a O R D E R

Division of Avco Corporation;

AVCO CORPORATION,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff Richard Bristow brings suit against defendants

Lycoming Engines and AVCO Corporation for injuries associated with

an allegedly faulty airplane crankshaft. Pending before the court

is plaintiff’s motion for class certification. While most of the

requirements of class certification are met, plaintiff’s

corporation, rather than plaintiff, holds title to the plane. The

court resolves the motion upon the parties’ papers and after oral

argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies

plaintiff’s motion but grants leave to amend to substitute a new

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 The general facts of this case were set forth in the court’s 1

April 10, 2007 order, which denied defendants’ motion to transfer

and motion to dismiss. For convenience, the court incorporates

relevant portions here.

2

plaintiff, who may then pursue the Unfair Competition Law claim.

The court denies the motion with respect to the Consumers Legal

Remedies Act Subclass.

I. Facts1

A. General Background

Plaintiff seeks to recover costs associated with the

replacement of an allegedly faulty airplane crankshaft on behalf

of himself and other similarly situated California consumers. 

The defendants in this action are Lycoming Engines and AVCO

Corporation. Lycoming, an operating division within AVCO, is

alleged to manufacture the crankshaft. Plaintiff has brought

claims based upon California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”),

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and California’s Consumers Legal

Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750.

A crankshaft is the part of the airplane engine that

translates the piston motion into rotation and turns the

propeller. When crankshafts fail, power loss, engine failure,

and damage to the airplane result. First Amended Compl. (“FAC”)

¶ 2. An engine overhaul is required after a specific amount of

time. During an overhaul, the crankcase is separated and

specified parts are inspected or replaced. FAC ¶ 3. Unlike

other parts of the engine, a crankshaft is typically not

replaced, and can last the life of the plane with regular

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maintenance. FAC ¶ 3.

In 2006, Lycoming issued Mandatory Service Bulletin 569 and

569A (collectively, “MSB 569A”), which instituted an “early

retirement” program for certain Lycoming crankshafts. Under the

program, Lycoming directed aircraft owners to replace their

crankshafts the next time the crankcase was split or at the next

scheduled overhaul, but not later than February 21, 2009. FAC ¶

4. Later in 2006, the FAA issued a corresponding Airworthiness

Directive (“AD”). 71 Fed. Reg. 57412 (Sept. 29, 2006). The AD

differs from MSB 569A in that it extends the maximum compliance

time from three to twelve years. MSBs are not legally binding

on aircraft owners but ADs, as mandatory regulations promulgated

by the FAA, are. Crigler v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 830 F.2d 169,

171 (11th Cir. 1987).

If owners decide to replace their crankshafts prior to

2009, and have their engines overhauled at Lycoming, they will

not be charged for the cost of a new crankshaft. Freight

charges, however, are not covered. If owners opt to have their

engines overhauled prior to 2009 at a non-Lycoming facility,

they will be charged $2,000 for the crankshaft, which is

discounted from the $16,000 retail cost of a new crankshaft. If

owners opt to have their crankshafts replaced after 2009, they

will bear the full $16,000 cost.

B. Plaintiff

Plaintiff, Richard Bristow, does not own a plane. Bristow

is, however, the president of Romeo Bravo, Inc., which holds

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 While these facts might well justify piercing the corporate 2

form of Romeo Bravo were it a defendant, Bristow cites no authority

that the corporate form may be disregarded in the present context.

The plaintiff's desire to have his cake and eat it too is subject

to the usual practical difficulties such conflicting desires

usually present.

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title to a Mooney M20J plane. Decl. of Richard A. Bristow

(“Bristow Decl.”) ¶ 3. Romeo Bravo is not presently a party to

this action. 

Plaintiff claims that he created the corporation, which is

named based on his initials (“R.B.”), solely to hold title to

the plane. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. He claims that he did this, like other

aircraft owners, in order to protect his privacy against sales

people using the FAA registry to solicit business. Id. ¶ 3. 

Bristow paid for the plane out of his personal funds. Id. He

also states that Romeo Bravo does not have any corporate minutes

or corporate meetings, and holds no other assets, accounts, or

credit cards. Id. 2

The plane at issue has a Lycoming engine covered by MSB

569A. Id. ¶ 12. Bristow also uses the plane almost exclusively

for personal trips. Id. ¶ 14. He intends to replace the

crankshaft before the next regularly scheduled engine overhaul

(which is recommended at 2000 flying hours). Id. ¶ 13. 

Presumably, plaintiff will obtain the $2,000 parts kit from

Lycoming.

C. Proposed Classes

In his pending motion, plaintiff seeks to certify two

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 Plaintiff states that, as a practical matter, the major 3

difference between the two classes is that businesses would be

captured by the UCL Class but not the CLRA Consumer Subclass.

Employees, officers, directors, legal representatives, 4

heirs, successors, and assignees of defendants are excluded from

both classes.

 Defendants argue that this narrowing creates a moving 5

target, but the change from the complaint to the motion is fairly

minor, and it resolves the problem of double recovery by both

aircraft owners and lessees. A court may modify the scope of a

class prior to judgment. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474

F.d 1214, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2007).

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classes: a “UCL Class” and a “CLRA Consumer Subclass.”3

Specifically, the UCL Class would include:

All persons and entities residing in California who: (1)

before February 21, 2006 purchased an aircraft that is or

was subject to Lycoming Mandatory Service Bulletin 569A;

(2) either currently own that aircraft or sold that

aircraft on or after February 21, 2006.

Pl.’s Mot. at 8. The CLRA Subclass would include: 

All persons and entities residing in California who:

(1) before February 21, 2006 purchased an aircraft

which is used primarily for personal, family or

household purposes that is or was subject to Lycoming

Mandatory Service Bulletin 569A; (2) either currently

own that aircraft or sold that aircraft on or after

February 21, 2006.

 

Id. The proposed class definitions in plaintiff’s motion are 4

somewhat narrower than those described in the complaint in that

they do not include lessees, and the court resolves the motion

based on the narrower class definitions.5

II. Standard

A party seeking to certify a class must demonstrate that it

has met all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of

the requirements of Rule 23(b). Zinser v. Accufix Research

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Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 23(a)

allows a class to be certified

only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of

all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions

of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or

defenses of the representative parties are typical of

the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the

representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In other words, the class must satisfy

the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and

adequacy.

Rule 23(b) provides for three types of class actions. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(b). Here, plaintiff seeks to certify the class

under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows for a class to be certified if

“the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the

members of the class predominate over any question affecting

only individual members, and that a class action is superior to

other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication

of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

The matters pertinent to the findings include:

(A) the interest of members of the class in

individually controlling the prosecution or defense of

separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any

litigation concerning the controversy already

commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the

desirability or undesirability of concentrating the

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the

management of a class action.

Id.

The court must conduct a "rigorous analysis" of the moving

party's claims to examine whether the requirements are

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satisfied, Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161

(1982). The allegations in the complaint must be taken as true

for the purposes of class certification. Blackie v. Barrack,

524 F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975). The court may not

consider whether the party seeking class certification has

stated a cause of action or is likely to prevail on the merits. 

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). 

Nevertheless, the court is “at liberty to consider evidence

which goes to the requirements of Rule 23 even though the

evidence may also relate to the underlying merits of the case.” 

Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 509 (9th Cir. 1992)

(internal quotation marks omitted). If the court concludes that

the moving party has met its burden of proof, the court has

broad discretion to certify the class. Zinser, 253 F.3d at

1186. 

III. Analysis

A. Rule 23(a)

1. Numerosity

First, Rule 23(a) allows a class to be certified only if

the “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). It is undisputed

that the proposed class satisfies the requirement of numerosity,

as it includes at least 215 aircraft owners in California. 

Decl. of Nicole E. Reyes ¶ 2. This is sufficient to make

joinder impracticable.

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 Defendants argue that if a person acquired his or her 6

aircraft after the crankshaft was replaced, any alleged

misrepresentation by Lycoming would be immaterial. These

individuals, however, are excluded from the class because they do

not own a plane that is currently “subject to Lycoming Mandatory

Service Bulletin 569A.” 

8

2. Common Issue of Law or Fact

Second, the commonality requirement is met if “plaintiffs'

grievances share a common question of law or of fact.” 

Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001). It is

well-established that “all questions of fact and law need not be

common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal

issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a

common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal

remedies within the class.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d

1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, “[t]he commonality

test is qualitative rather than quantitative -- one significant

issue common to the class may be sufficient to warrant

certification.” Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1225. 

Here, there are several common issues. For example,

plaintiff alleges that (1) Lycoming Crankshafts are unsafe, (2)

defendants knew of the unsafe nature of the crankshafts and

their substandard testing, but omitted or failed to disclose

this despite a duty to do so, (3) the omissions were material,6

and (4) defendant engaged in conduct prohibited by the UCL. 

These are clearly common issues of law and fact that will be

raised for all members of the class.

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3. Typicality

Third, Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses

of the representative parties are typical of the claims or

defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The test of

typicality "is whether other members have the same or similar

injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not

unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members

have been injured by the same course of conduct." Hanon, 976

F.2d at 508. The typicality requirement is “satisfied when each

class member's claim arises from the same course of events, and

each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the

defendant's liability.” Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 868 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the typicality requirement

may be satisfied if “all the members of the purported class

would be benefitted by the suit plaintiffs seek to bring.” 

Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, Cal., 404 F. Supp.

391, 396 (N.D. Cal. 1975).

Here, the fact that Romeo Bravo rather than plaintiff holds

title to the plane is relevant. The injury to the proposed

class materializes in one of two forms: either owners will

suffer diminished resale value if they opt to sell their planes

prior to replacing the crankshaft, or they will bear the extra

costs associated with replacing the crankshaft as part of their

compliance with the AD. Richard Bristow as an individual,

however, has no legal right to sell the plane, because only

Romeo Bravo or its agent can do so; accordingly, Bristow will

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 Although Richard Bristow may have a present intention to pay 7

for the repairs from his personal funds, he would be acting as a

volunteer for Romeo Bravo. Accordingly, this intention may change

in light of the court’s present holding.

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suffer no injury in the event the plane is sold. Likewise, the

only entity legally obligated to comply with the AD and pay for

the replacement is Romeo Bravo. 

7

Plaintiff has not provided a sufficient legal basis for

ignoring corporate formalities. He maintains that he is a

“beneficial owner,” and cites as support the practice in

securities class actions of allowing individuals to sue in their

individual capacities, even though the underlying securities are

actually held by banks or brokers. See, e.g., In re Franklin

Nat’l Bank Sec. Litig., 574 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1978); see also

Silber v. Mabon, 957 F.2d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Under

common industry practice, most publicly traded stock is held in

the ‘street name’ of brokerage houses for the benefit of their

customers. Only brokerage houses or other ‘record owners’

appear on official transfer records.”). This is not, however, a

securities case, and the need to accommodate the peculiarities

of stock ownership is absent here. Accordingly, the court finds

that Bristow has not satisfied the required element of

typicality.

Plaintiff has indicated that if the court finds that he

lacks standing to bring suit, Romeo Bravo could be substituted

as a plaintiff. Doing so would cure the present defects

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 Defendants argue that even if Romeo Bravo were substituted 8

as a plaintiff, it would not have suffered monetary damages, and

its claims would therefore be atypical of class members who paid

to have their crankshafts replaced. Although Romeo Bravo may not

have expended corporate funds to purchase the plane, assuming that

Bristow decides not to pay for the repairs out of personal funds,

Romeo Bravo will spend money in the course of replacing the

crankshaft. Similarly, any decrease in resale value would also be

felt by Romeo Bravo.

 The plane owned by Romeo Bravo may be used by Richard 9

Bristow for “personal purposes” -- and was probably even

contemplated for such use at the time of its purchase -- but the

language of the statute clearly contemplates that the “personal

purposes” be held by the purchaser, not merely some future user.

Otherwise, a corporation who owned aircraft but rented them out for

recreational use, for example, would similarly have standing to sue

under the CLRA.

11

associated with the UCL Class. Nevertheless, it would not cure 8

the defects associated with the CLRA Consumer Subclass. Under

the CLRA, a consumer is defined as “an individual who seeks or

acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for

personal, family, or household purposes.” Cal. Civ. Code §

1761(d). A corporation, however, cannot seek or acquire a plane

for “personal, family, or household purposes,” and the language

of the statute clearly envisions a person as the “individual”

permitted to bring suit. Cf. Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of 9

America, 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 217 (1994) (finding that trade

group of grocers was not a consumer of services for “personal,

family, or household purposes”).

Plaintiff relies on Schauer v. Mandarin Gems of Cal., Inc.,

125 Cal. App. 4th 949 (2005) for the proposition that the legal

owner of a good may not be the appropriate party to sue under

the CLRA. In Schauer, the court found that a woman whose exCase 2:06-cv-01947-LKK -GGH Document 83 Filed 06/15/07 Page 11 of 17
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 If plaintiff opts to substitute Romeo Bravo, the 10

requirement of typicality (with respect to the UCL Class) would be

satisfied. Romeo Bravo’s injury, like that of the class members,

relates to the replacement of the crankshaft, and this injury arose

as a result of the same course of conduct as that experienced by

other class members (i.e., defendants’ allegedly unfair business

practices). Furthermore, although individual damages will vary

depending on when and where a class member has the crankshaft

replaced, “[t]he amount of damages is invariably an individual

question and does not defeat class action treatment.” Blackie, 524

F.2d at 905.

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husband had purchased an allegedly overvalued engagement ring

could not sue under the CLRA, even though she “owned” the ring

as a result of the divorce settlement. Rather, the court found

that the ex-husband “was the consumer because it was he who

purchased the ring,” whereas “[p]laintiff's ownership of the

ring was not acquired as a result of her own consumer

transaction with defendant.” Id. at 960. The difference here,

however, is that Richard Bristow is not, and has never been, the

legal owner of the plane; rather, the first and only owner of

the plane has been Romeo Bravo.

Under the circumstances, plaintiff's motion must be denied;

nevertheless, the court will grant plaintiff leave to amend the

complaint in order to substitute Romeo Bravo or another suitable

party for Richard Bristow. In the interests of judicial 10

economy, the court assumes for the remainder of the order that

Romeo Bravo is the actual plaintiff.

4. Adequacy of Representation

The fourth and final Rule 23(a) requirement -- adequacy --

requires: (1) that the class representative and class counsel

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 Presumably, the same would be true even if Romeo Bravo were 11

substituted as plaintiff, because any conflict would have already

existed due to Richard Bristow’s role as the president of the

corporation.

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not have conflicts of interest with the class and (2) that the

class be represented by qualified counsel who will vigorously

prosecute the case on behalf of the class. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at

1020. In appointing class counsel, the court must consider the

work counsel has done, counsel's experience in handling class

actions, counsel's knowledge of the applicable law, and the

resources that counsel will commit to representing the class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(i).

With respect to the first prong, neither party has alerted

the court as to any potential conflict of interest between

plaintiff and other class members. With respect to the second 11

prong, the court finds that, notwithstanding the ownership issue

raised above, the law firms representing plaintiff and the class

appear competent. They possess experience handling class

actions and other complex litigation, have expended significant

effort investigating potential claims and developing legal

theories to support those claims, and appear familiar with the

applicable laws. Accordingly, so long as the substituted

plaintiff does not possess any conflicts of interest, the court

finds that the adequacy of representation requirement to be

satisfied.

B. Rule 23(b)

In addition to the requirements set forth in Rule 23(a), 

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plaintiff must also satisfy one of the requirements set forth in

Rule 23(b). Here, plaintiff seeks certification pursuant Rule

23(b)(3), which requires that common questions of law or fact

“predominate over any question affecting only individual

members” and that a class action be “superior to other available

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

1. Predominance of Common Questions of Law or Fact

The predominance requirement “tests whether proposed

classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by

representation." Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The inquiry “presumes that the existence of

common issues of fact or law have been established pursuant to

Rule 23(a)(2).” Id. Common issues will predominate when they

“present a significant aspect of the case and they can be

resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication.” 

Id. (quoting 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §

1778 (2d ed. 1986)).

As discussed above, there are questions of fact and law

common to the class. These include whether the crankshafts are

unsafe, whether defendants had a duty to disclose information

regarding the allegedly unsafe nature and substandard testing of

the crankshafts, whether the information was material, and

whether defendant engaged in unfair or unlawful practices. 

Apart from the issue of individual damages -- which does not

defeat class certification -- it is plain that these issues

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present a significant (if not the central) aspect of the case

and could be resolved in a single adjudication.

Defendant responds that the class is comprised of

individuals who own aircraft for disparate purposes (e.g.,

personal use, air transport, law enforcement), but, as plaintiff

points out, no one -- whether an individual or governmental

entity -- wants unsafe crankshafts. Furthermore, materiality is

judged by the effect on a reasonable consumer. Consumer

Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1351,

1360 (2003). Accordingly, the court finds that common issues

predominate over individual issues. 

2. Superiority of Class Action

Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that a class action be

“superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

The four factors pertinent to the superiority determination

include (1) the interest in class members individually

controlling the prosecution of separate actions, (2) the extent

and nature of ongoing litigation by class members, (3) the

desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation

in the particular forum, and (4) difficulties of managing the

class action. Id. 

a. Class members’ interest in individually controlling

the prosecution of separate actions

First, with regard to the interest of class members in

individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions,

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“[w]here damages suffered by each putative class member are not

large, this factor weighs in favor of certifying a class

action.” Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1190. Here, the amount in

controversy for each class member is likely to be small in

relation to the costs associated with litigating a defective

products case. Cf. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 102 (“In most cases,

litigation costs would dwarf potential recovery.”). While there

could be some class members who would have an interest in

individually controlling the prosecution of an action because

they own multiple aircraft subject to MSB 569A, class treatment

would still be a superior method of adjudication for the

remainder of the class.

b. Litigation already commenced

Second, although there is a case pending in Illinois state

court that seeks to represent California aircraft owners, this

action is at a more advanced stage. There do not appear to be

any other cases seeking to represent California aircraft owners.

c. Desirability of concentrating litigation in this

forum

Third, defendants do not dispute the desirability of

litigating the action in this forum. Furthermore, the

desirability of determining the California class members’ claims

in this forum has been previously adjudicated in the context of

defendant’s motion to transfer.

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d. Likely difficulties in the management of the class

action

Finally, management of the class action is not likely to

raise such difficulties that individual actions would be a

superior method of resolving the case. Plaintiff has provided

the court with a proposed notice and trial plan demonstrating

the manageability of the class action. Accordingly, for the

foregoing reasons, the court finds that a class action is

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this controversy.

IV. Conclusion

1. The court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for class

certification with respect to the Unfair Competition

Law Class, and DENIES the motion with respect to the

Consumers Legal Remedies Act Subclass.

2. The court GRANTS plaintiff 30 days to amend the

complaint in order to substitute the named class

representative.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 14, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-01947-LKK -GGH Document 83 Filed 06/15/07 Page 17 of 17