Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_24-cv-00427/USCOURTS-ared-4_24-cv-00427-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

KATHERINE SEWARD GIBBY PETITIONER 

v. NO. 4:24-cv-00427-KGB-PSH 

DEXTER PAYNE RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

INSTRUCTIONS 

 The following Recommendation has been sent to United States 

District Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written objections to all or 

part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) 

specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this 

Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal 

questions of fact. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 1 of 20
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DISPOSITION 

Introduction. In this case, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, petitioner 

Katherine Seward Gibby (“Gibby”) challenges the 2021 and 2024 

revocations of her probation. She maintains that her constitutional rights 

to due process and equal protection were violated in those proceedings in 

the following respects: (1) the state trial court in the 2021 revocation 

proceeding recognized she suffers from a mental impairment but denied 

her the right to participate in a recommended alternative sentencing 

program; (2) the court in the 2021 revocation proceeding failed to consider 

a prior judicial finding that she suffers from a mental impairment; (3) her 

probation was improperly revoked in 2024 because she was participating in 

a recovery program at the time; (4) the court in the 2024 revocation 

proceeding failed to consider the prosecution’s refusal to comply with her 

discovery requests; and (5) the court in the 2024 revocation proceeding 

failed to consider her substance abuse problems. It is recommended that 

this case be dismissed because Gibby’s claims are time barred, are 

procedurally barred from federal court review, or are otherwise without 

merit. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 2 of 20
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Pleadings. Respondent Dexter Payne (“Payne”) summarized the state 

court proceedings culminating in Gibby’s current incarceration, and Gibby 

adopted the summary “word for word save the arguments.” See Docket 

Entry 8 at CM/ECF 2. The undersigned adopts the summary as well, as it is 

supported by the record. The summary is as follows: 

On April 4, 2018, ... Gibby, in Lawrence County Circuit 

Court, pleaded guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia and 

was sentenced to 48 months of supervised probation, a fine of 

$500, and court costs. ... Gibby’s guilty plea was preceded by 

her execution of a guilty-plea statement in connection with 

that charge—attested to by her defense counsel—which 

included, inter alia, the following declarations: 

18. I believe that I am of sound mind and fully 

understand what I am doing. I am not under the 

influence of drugs, alcohol, medicine, or any other 

substance which could influence my judgment. 

19. I do not suffer from any mental disease or 

defect. 

... 

On March 29, 2021, the State filed a petition seeking to 

revoke Gibby’s probation ... On June 1, 2021, Gibby pleaded 

guilty to having violated her probation, and, again, Gibby 

received a sentence of 48 months of supervised probation. ... 

As before, her guilty plea was preceded by the execution of a 

second guilty-plea statement—attested to by her present 

defense counsel—which included, inter alia, the following 

declarations: 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 3 of 20
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18. I believe that I am of sound mind and fully 

understand what I am doing. I am not under the 

influence of drugs, alcohol, medicine, or any other 

substance which could influence my judgement. 

19. I do not suffer from any mental disease or 

defect. 

... 

On August 1, 2022, the State filed a second petition 

alleging Gibby had violated her probation. ... On October 30, 

2023, the State filed an amended petition for revocation ... 

Gibby filed a motion to dismiss the State’s amended petition on 

November 16, 2023, claiming that another court had “approved 

an Order directing Defendant participate in a program of 

rehabilitation in lieu of participating in drug court because of 

her mental disability.” ... 

The circuit court held a revocation hearing on January 2, 

2024. ... At the revocation hearing, the circuit court found that 

Gibby, at the time of her guilty plea in 2021, indicated that she 

was of sound mind, and did not suffer from a mental disease or 

defect, when, represented by defense counsel, she pleaded 

guilty to violating her probation. ... The circuit court also found 

the Gibby had violated the conditions of her probation and 

sentenced her to five years in a community correction center. 

The circuit court’s sentencing order was entered on January 3, 

2024. ... 

On January 11, 2024, Gibby filed a “Motion to Reconsider” 

in the circuit court. ... The circuit court neither granted nor 

denied the motion within 30 days, i.e., by February 10, 2024. 

Consequently, a notice of appeal was due on or before March 

11, 2024. ... Gibby did not appeal. Instead, on February 4, 

2024, Gibby tendered a pleading in the Arkansas Supreme Court 

styled “Petition for Writ of Certiorari and/or Writ of Habeas 

Corpus” that was filed by the Arkansas Supreme Court on March 

7, 2024. ... 

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In its response to Gibby’s certiorari/habeas petition, the 

State pointed out that it was well settled in Arkansas law that 

the extraordinary writs of certiorari and habeas corpus were 

not substitutes for the direct appeal of a conviction. ...On April 

18, 2024, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued an order denying 

Gibby’s petition. ... 

See Docket Entry 6 at CM/ECF 1-4. The Arkansas Supreme Court gave no 

reason, though, for denying Gibby’s petition for a writ of certiorari and/or 

writ of habeas corpus. 

 Gibby then began this case by filing the petition at bar in May of 2024. 

In the petition, she maintained that her rights to due process and equal 

protection were violated during the revocations proceedings. In claim one, 

she alleged that the state trial court recognized she suffers from a mental 

impairment but denied her the right to participate in a recommended 

alternative sentencing program. In claim two, Gibby alleged that the court 

failed to consider a prior judicial finding that she suffers from a mental 

impairment. In claim three, she alleged that her probation was improperly 

revoked because she was participating in a recovery program at John 3:16 

Ministry at the time. In claim four, Gibby alleged that the court failed to 

consider the prosecution’s refusal to comply with her discovery requests. 

In claim five, she alleged that the court failed to consider her mental illness 

associated with, or exacerbated by, her substance abuse problems. 

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Payne filed a response to the petition and construed the petition to 

be Gibby’s challenge to both the 2021 and 2024 revocations of her 

probation. Specifically, Payne understood Gibby’s first and second claims 

to have arisen from the 2021 revocation proceeding, and her third, fourth, 

and fifth claims to have arisen from the 2024 revocation proceeding. Payne 

maintained that Gibby’s petition should be dismissed for two reasons. First, 

Payne maintained that Gibby had until July of 2022 to file a timely petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 in which she raised claims one and two. Gibby 

did not file the petition at bar, though, until May of 2024, and her first two 

claims are therefore time barred. Second, Payne maintained that Gibby’s 

remaining three claims—claims arising from the 2024 revocation—are 

procedurally barred from federal court review because she failed to 

properly present them to the state courts of Arkansas. 

Gibby filed a reply to Payne’s response. With respect to Payne’s 

assertion of limitations, Gibby appeared to maintain that her mental 

impairment and substance abuse problems prevented her from filing a 

timely petition which raised claims one and two. With respect to Payne’s 

assertion of procedural bar, Gibby appeared to maintain that her mental

impairment and substance abuse problems prevented her from properly 

presenting claims three, four, and five to the state courts of Arkansas. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 6 of 20
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The undersigned began reviewing the pleadings in this case and 

observed that Gibby’s petition was not a model of clarity, in part, because 

it was difficult to determine if she was challenging both the 2021 and 2024 

revocations of her probation, or if she was instead simply challenging the 

2024 revocation of her probation. Payne understood Gibby to be 

challenging both the 2021 and 2024 revocations of her probation, 

construing claims one and two to have arisen from the 2021 revocation 

proceeding, and claims three, four, and five to have arisen from the 2024 

revocation proceeding. The undersigned found Payne’s construction 

reasonable and adopted it. 

The undersigned then observed that claims one and two are likely 

time-barred, as Gibby knew, or should have known, of the claims by no 

later than June of 2021 but did not file the petition at bar until May of 

2024. With respect to claims three, four, and five, the undersigned was 

troubled by the way she presented them to the state courts. Although she 

raised the claims in a state trial court motion to reconsider, she did not 

appeal the denial of the motion. She raised the claims again in a state 

Supreme Court petition for writ of certiorari and/or writ of habeas corpus, 

which was summarily denied, and it was unclear if the claims were properly 

presented for purposes of the procedural bar analysis. 

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Because the answer to the procedural bar question was unclear, the 

parties were directed to file short, simultaneous briefs on the question. 

The parties were asked to address, inter alia, if the state Supreme Court 

could have reviewed claims three, four, and five, given how they were 

presented in a petition for writ of certiorari and/or writ of habeas corpus; 

how the undersigned should construe the state Supreme Court’s summary 

denial of the petition; and if the undersigned could supply a reason or 

justification for, or otherwise read one into, the denial of the petition.1

The parties have now filed their briefs addressing the procedural bar 

question. The undersigned will not summarize the briefs but does note the 

following assertion made by Payne in his brief: 

It is not clear why Gibby did not seek direct review in the 

Arkansas appellate courts after the circuit court revoked her 

probation. Appeals in such cases are commonplace. ... State 

courts should have the first opportunity to review the rulings of 

lower state courts and correct any federal constitutional errors. 

... The claims must be presented in a timely and procedurally 

correct manner so as to allow review on the merits, and failure 

to do so results in a procedural default. ... Moreover, the denial 

of an application for an extraordinary writ by a state appellate 

court does not serve to exhaust state remedies where, like 

here, the denial cannot be fairly taken as an adjudication of 

the merits of the claims presented and where normal channels 

for review are available. ... 

1

 Payne was also directed, as a part of his brief, to respond more fully to claims 

three, four, and five. 

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Here, Gibby had an available remedy available to her: 

direct appeal. Her federal habeas petition should be dismissed 

for failure to exhaust that remedy, resulting in a clear 

procedural default of her claims. 

See Docket Entry 10 at CM/ECF 3-4. 

 Claims One and Two. A state prisoner has one year during which she 

may file a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. If she does not file her 

petition within that one-year period, excluding any applicable periods of 

tolling, the petition is forever barred. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) provides that the 

one-year limitations period begins from the latest of one of four dates or 

events. 

Payne maintains that the limitations period for Gibby to have 

challenged the 2021 revocation of her probation is found at 28 U.S.C. 

2244(d)(1)(A), which provides that the one-year limitations period begins 

on the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Applying 28 

U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) to the facts of this case, Payne maintains that the 

limitations period began in July of 2021, or thirty days after Gibby pleaded 

guilty to having violated her probation, and she had until July of 2022 to 

file a timely petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 in which she raised claims 

one and two. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 9 of 20
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Payne’s position has merit and is adopted. The limitations period 

here is that found at 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), and Gibby had until July of 

2022 to file a timely petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 in which she raised 

claims one and two. She did not raise the claims in a petition pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. 2254, though, until May of 2024. As a result, they are untimely. 

The only question is whether there is a reason for tolling the limitations 

period or otherwise excusing the untimely raising of the claims. 

28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly 

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is 

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitations. 28 U.S.C. 

2244(d)(2), though, is of no benefit to Gibby as she never filed an 

application for state post-conviction relief or other collateral review. 

Although 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2) affords Gibby no benefit, the one-year 

limitations period for filing a timely petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 

can be equitably tolled. See Gordon v. Arkansas, 823 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 

2016). Equitable tolling asks whether the federal courts may excuse a 

petitioner’s failure to comply with federal timing rules, an inquiry that 

does not implicate state law. See Id. Equitable tolling is warranted if the 

petitioner has been pursuing his rights diligently and some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way and prevented a timely filing. See Id. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 10 of 20
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Here, equitable tolling is not warranted for two reasons. First, Gibby 

has not been pursuing her rights diligently. After the 2021 revocation of 

her probation, she did nothing to challenge the revocation or raise claims 

one and two. Second, she has failed to show that an extraordinary 

circumstance prevented her from filing a timely petition. Although she 

appears to maintain that her mental impairment and substance abuse 

problems prevented her from filing a timely petition, she represented in 

the 2021 proceeding that she was of sound mind; fully understood the 

nature of the proceeding; was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, 

medicine, or any other substance; and did not suffer from any mental 

disease or defect. Her assertion now to the contrary is unavailing. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a showing of actual innocence can 

excuse the untimely filing of a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. See 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013). Here, though, the actual 

innocence gateway affords Gibby no benefit. She has offered no new 

evidence establishing, or otherwise suggesting, that she is innocent of the 

violations alleged in the 2021 petition to revoke her probation. See Story 

v. Kelley, No. 4:17-cv-00853-KGB, 2018 WL 3193807 (E.D. Ark. 2018) 

(petitioner must show that in light of new evidence, no factfinder, acting 

reasonably, would have convicted her). 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 11 of 20
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In short, Gibby did not present claims one and two in a timely petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, and there is no reason for tolling the one-year 

limitations period or otherwise excusing the untimely presentation of the 

claims in federal court. Claims one and two are therefore time barred. 

Claims Three, Four, and Five. A federal court cannot consider a claim 

if the petitioner failed to first present it to the state courts in accordance 

with the state’s procedural rules. See Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 

(2022). A claim not so presented may nevertheless be considered if the 

petitioner can show cause for her procedural default and resulting 

prejudice, or, alternatively, that the failure to consider the claim will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, that is, a constitutional 

violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See 

Burford v. Payne, No. 4:20-cv-00398-KGB-JJV, 2020 WL 8299805 (E.D. Ark. 

July 15, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:20-cv-00398-

KGB, 2021 WL 280880 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 27, 2021). 

Gibby raised claims three, four, and five for the first time in a motion 

to reconsider the 2024 revocation of her probation. See Docket Entry 6, 

Exhibit 12. The state trial court never addressed the motion, and the 

motion was deemed denied after thirty days by operation of Arkansas Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 33.3(c). 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 12 of 20
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Gibby did not appeal the 2024 revocation of her probation. Instead, 

she filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and/or writ of habeas corpus in 

the state Supreme Court and raised claims three, four, and five. See Docket 

Entry 6, Exhibit 13. The state Supreme Court denied the petition but did 

not give a reason for doing so. See Docket Entry 6, Exhibit 15. 

Given the foregoing, can it be said that Gibby properly presented 

claims three, four, and five to the state courts of Arkansas in accordance 

with the State’s procedural rules? The undersigned thinks not because of 

the manner in which she presented the claims to the state Supreme Court. 

A state court is presumed to have adjudicated a claim on the merits 

if the petitioner presented the claim to the state court and the court 

denied relief. See Dansby v. Payne, 47 F.4th 647 (8th Cir. 2022). “This 

presumption applies even when the state court's opinion does not expressly 

address the claim.” See Id. at 655. 

Here, the state Supreme Court issued a summary ruling denying 

Gibby’s petition for a writ of certiorari and/or writ of habeas corpus. In the 

typical case, the undersigned would apply the above presumption, find that 

the state Supreme Court, in summarily denying the petition, adjudicated 

claims three, four, and five on the merits, and reach the merits of the 

claims. This case, though, is not the typical case. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 13 of 20
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Payne represents, and the undersigned agrees, that in the State of 

Arkansas, writs of certiorari and habeas corpus are extraordinary remedies. 

See Docket Entry 6 at CM/ECF 11 (citing State v. Torres, 2021 Ark. 22, 617 

S.W.3d 232 (2021) (certiorari); Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 

364 (2014) (habeas corpus)).2 The writs are not substitutes for direct 

appeals. See Conner v. Simes, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476 (2003) 

(certiorari); Watkins v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 215, 549 S.W.3d 908 (2018) 

(habeas corpus). 

2

 In State v. Torres, 617 S.W.3d at 234, the state Supreme Court observed, in part, 

the following: 

A writ of certiorari is extraordinary relief. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n 

v. Herndon, 365 Ark. 180, 226 S.W.3d 776 (2006). There are two 

requirements that must be satisfied for this court to grant a writ of 

certiorari. Zimmerman v. Cir. Ct. of Miller Cty., 2018 Ark. 264, 555 S.W.3d 

406. First, there can be no other adequate remedy but for the writ of 

certiorari. Pedraza v. Cir. Ct. of Drew Cty., 2013 Ark. 116, 426 S.W.3d 

441. Second, a writ of certiorari lies only when (1) it is apparent on the 

face of the record that there has been a plain, manifest, clear, and gross 

abuse of discretion, or (2) there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess 

of jurisdiction on the face of the record, or the proceedings are erroneous 

on the face of the record. Id. ... 

 In Hobbs v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d at 368, the state Supreme Court observed, in 

part, the following: 

Our case law interpreting the habeas statutes provides: “[A] writ of 

habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its 

face or when a circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the cause.” Davis v. 

Reed, 316 Ark. 575, 577, 873 S.W.2d 524, 525 (1994). Unless a petitioner 

can show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment 

was invalid on its face, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas 

corpus should issue. Birchett v. State, 303 Ark. 220, 795 S.W.2d 53 (1990). 

... 

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In this instance, Gibby did not present claims three, four, and five to 

the state Supreme Court in a manner that the appellate court could have 

granted the extraordinary relief she sought. Specifically, a writ of 

certiorari could not have been granted on the claims because it was not 

apparent on the face of the record that there was a plain, manifest, clear, 

and gross abuse of discretion; that there was a lack jurisdiction; that there 

was an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of the record; or that the 

revocation proceeding was erroneous on the face of the record. A writ of 

habeas corpus could not have been granted on the claims because there is 

nothing to suggest that the judgment of conviction is invalid on its face or 

that the state trial court lacked jurisdiction. A procedural default has 

therefore occurred with respect to claims three, four, and five, and the 

only question is whether the default can now be excused. 

Gibby appears to offer her mental impairment and substance abuse 

problems as cause for her procedural default. The undersigned accepts that 

a mental impairment and/or substance abuse problems might excuse a 

procedural default, and Gibby has experienced some type of mental 

impairment and/or substance abuse problems. Those difficulties, though, 

cannot excuse her default in this instance. 

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Gibby was represented by counsel during the 2024 revocation 

proceeding and subsequent appeal period. Counsel filed a petition for a 

writ of certiorari and/or writ of habeas corpus on Gibby’s behalf with the 

state Supreme Court and raised claims three, four, and five. The claims 

were raised, though, in a manner that prevented the appellate court from 

addressing them. Gibby’s mental impairment and substance abuse 

problems had nothing to do with the claims not being properly presented. 

It is true that ineffective assistance of counsel can establish cause 

for a procedural default. Ineffective assistance of counsel, though, must 

first be presented to the state courts as an independent Sixth Amendment 

claim. See Lane v. Kelley, No. 5:16-cv-00355-DPM-JTR, 2017 WL 5473925 

(E.D. Ark. Nov. 14, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:16-

cv-00355-DPM, 2017 WL 6542748 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 21, 2017). Gibby never 

presented an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the state courts as 

an independent Sixth Amendment claim.3

3

 In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held 

that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can excuse the procedural default 

of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Martinez v. Ryan 

exception is of no benefit to Gibby for at least two reasons. First, the exception only 

applies if a petitioner initiated a state collateral review proceeding by filing a Rule 37 

petition. See Lane v. Kelley, 5:16-cv-00355-DPM-JTR, 2017 WL 5473925, 4 (E.D. Ark. 

Nov. 14, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 5:16-cv-00355-DPM, 2017 WL 

6542748 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 21, 2017). Gibby never initiated a state collateral review 

proceeding by filing a Rule 37 petition. Second, claims three, four, and five are not 

challenges to trial counsel’s representation. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 16 of 20
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, a showing of actual innocence can 

excuse a procedural default. The petitioner must show that a constitutional 

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Gibby has failed to make 

that showing, as she has not offered “new evidence that affirmatively 

demonstrates that [she] is innocent of the crime[s] for which [she] was 

convicted.” See Abdi v. Hatch, 450 F.3d 334, 338 (2006). 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, this case might be an instance in 

which the Dansby v. Payne presumption is applicable. Specifically, it might 

be an instance in which the state Supreme Court should be presumed to 

have adjudicated claims three, four, and five on the merits, given its 

summary denial of Gibby’s petition for a writ of certiorari and/or writ of 

habeas corpus. Even applying that presumption, though, the claims do not 

warrant relief for the reasons that follow. 

In claim three, Gibby alleges that her probation was improperly 

revoked in 2024 because she was participating in a recovery program at 

John 3:16 Ministry at the time. In support of the claim, she appears to 

maintain that she had been given permission to participate in a 

rehabilitation program and revoking her probation prevented her from 

completing the program. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 17 of 20
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Claim three warrants no relief. As Payne correctly notes, “Gibby does 

not explain or offer any authority for the proposition that because she was 

enrolled in a ministry at the time of her revocation, she is somehow 

immune from having her probation revoked when the circuit court found 

that she violated that probation.” See Docket Entry 10 at CM/ECF 6. 

In claim four, Gibby alleges that the state trial court in 2024 failed 

to consider the prosecution’s refusal to comply with her discovery 

requests. She represents that she sent Requests for Admission and Requests 

for the Production of Documents to the prosecution, the prosecution 

ignored them, and the court refused to consider the prosecution’s inaction. 

Claim four warrants no relief for at least two reasons. First, the 

discovery requests were not introduced during the revocation proceeding, 

see Docket Entry 6, Exhibit 10 at CM/ECF 18-23, so the undersigned has no 

idea what information was sought. Second, setting aside the possibility that 

this claim involves merely an error of state law, the prosecution stated in 

open court that “everything [was] open to [Gibby],” and the prosecution 

did not “introduce anything that wasn’t included in the petition for 

revocation. See Docket Entry 6, Exhibit 10 at CM/ECF 20-21. Gibby did not 

challenge the prosecution’s representation or show that it was mistaken, 

and she cannot now maintain that her due process rights were violated. 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 18 of 20
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In claim five, Gibby alleges that the state trial court in 2024 failed to 

consider her mental illness associated with, or exacerbated by, her 

substance abuse problems. In support of the claim, she maintains that she 

meets the “diagnostic criteria for methamphetamine-related mental 

health disorders, addiction to methamphetamine, and cannabis,” see 

Docket Entry 1 at CM/ECF 17, and the state trial court in an earlier case 

denied her the right to participate in a drug court because of her mental 

health disorder. 

The undersigned accepts that Gibby suffers from some type of 

methamphetamine-related mental health disorder and has used cannabis 

extensively. Claim five nevertheless warrants no relief. Setting aside the 

possibility that this claim also involves merely an error of state law, 

evidence of her mental health disorder was introduced during the 

revocation proceeding, see Docket Entry 6, Exhibit 10 at CM/ECF 46-146, 

and the state trial court is presumed to have considered the evidence in 

revoking her probation. 

Recommendation. Accordingly, it is recommended that this case be 

dismissed. Claims one and two are time barred, and claims three, four, and 

five are procedurally barred from federal court review or are otherwise 

without merit. All requested relief should be denied, and judgment should 

Case 4:24-cv-00427-KGB Document 12 Filed 12/09/24 Page 19 of 20
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be entered for Payne. In accordance with Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, a certificate of 

appealability should be denied. Gibby cannot make a “substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). 

DATED this 9th day of December, 2024. 

 _______________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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