Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, BUILDING

INDUSTRY LEGAL DEFENSE

FOUNDATION, CALIFORNIA

BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, and

GREENHORN GRANGE,

NO. CIV. S-05-0629 WBS-GGH

Plaintiffs,

and

CITY OF SUISUN, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

and

TSAKOPOULOS INVESTMENTS, 

TSAKOPOULOS FAMILY TRUST, 

DROSOULA TSAKOPOULOS, and 

GEORGE TSAKOPOULOS,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

v.

UNITED STATES FISH AND

WILDLIFE SERVICE; H. DALE

HALL, Director of the United

States Fish and Wildlife

Service; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR; and

GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of

the United States Department

of Interior,

Case 2:05-cv-00629-WBS -KJM Document 189 Filed 01/24/07 Page 1 of 24
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2

Defendants,

and

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, BUTTE 

ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL, AND 

CALIFORNIA NATIVE PLANT 

SOCIETY,

Defendant-Intervenors.

 

BUTTE ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL, 

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 

CALIFORNIA NATIVE PLANT 

SOCIETY, SAN JOAQUIN RAPTOR AND 

WILDLIFE RESCUE CENTER, SIERRA 

FOOTHILLS AUDUBON SOCIETY, and 

VERNALPOOLS.ORG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of 

the Interior, and U.S. FISH 

AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,

Defendants.

 

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to the

Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.; the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et

seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§

701 et seq. Plaintiffs challenge the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service’s (“FWS”) critical habitat designation of over

800,000 acres of land in California and Oregon for fifteen vernal

pool species. Currently pending before the court are two motions

for reconsideration, clarification, or amendment of this court’s

November 2, 2006, order, filed by plaintiff, Home Builders

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The significant factual and procedural history of this 1

case are described in greater detail in this court’s prior order,

which parties now seek the court to reconsider. (Nov. 2, 2006

Order.) For the purposes of this motion, the following relevant

facts are sufficient.

3

Association of Northern California, et al. (“Home Builders”) and

plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors, Butte Environmental

Council, et al. (“Environmental Groups”). Also pending before

the court is a motion to intervene as a defendant, filed by the

Regents of the University of California (“Regents”). 

I. Factual and Procedural History1

Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, the FWS listed

as endangered fifteen species of plants and animals that live in

vernal pool environments. See 43 Fed. Reg. 44,810 (Sept. 28,

1978); 57 Fed. Reg. 24,192 (June 8, 1992); 59 Fed. Reg. 48,136

(Sept. 19, 1994); 62 Fed. Reg. 14,338 (Mar. 26, 1997); 62 Fed.

Reg. 33,029 (June 18, 1997); 16 U.S.C. § 1533. The fifteen

species are four crustaceans and eleven plants, distributed in

vernal pool complexes located throughout southern Oregon, parts

of California, and parts of northern Mexico. 70 Fed. Reg. 46,925

(Aug. 11, 2005).

In September, 1994, when the FWS listed the four

species of fairy shrimp as endangered, it determined that

critical habitat designation for the fairy shrimp was nonetheless

“not prudent” because “such designation likely would increase the

degree of threat from vandalism or other human activities.” 59

Fed. Reg. at 48,151. In February, 2001, this court joined other

courts’ findings in determining that the FWS’ deviation from its

statutory mandate to designate critical habitat, concurrently

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with the listing of a species as endangered, violated the APA. 

Butte Envtl. Council v. White, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (E.D.

Cal. 2001).

Accordingly, pursuant to an order by this court, the

FWS published a proposed rule to designate 1,662,762 acres of

critical habitat for the fifteen vernal pool species on September

24, 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 59,884. The FWS subsequently issued an

“initial” final critical habitat designation on August 6, 2003,

that diminished the amount of critical habitat by more than one

million acres. 68 Fed. Reg. 46,684; see Butte Envtl. Council,

No. 04-0096 at 4. In January, 2004, Environmental Groups

challenged these exclusions from the critical habitat designation

in this court. Butte Envtl. Council, No. 04-0096, at 4. The

court remanded for reconsideration, but did not set aside the

critical habitat designation in the interim. 

On March 8, 2005, the FWS confirmed its non-economic

exclusion determinations in the August 6, 2003, final rule. 70

Fed. Reg. 11,140 (Mar. 8, 2005). Subsequently, on August 11,

2005, the FWS published its final rule designating approximately

858,846 acres of critical habitat in 34 California counties and

one county in southern Oregon. 70 Fed. Reg. 46,924 (Aug. 11,

2005). This final rule excluded the 20 census tracts that would

suffer the greatest economic impact, along with three for which

the economic benefits of exclusion outweighed the benefits of

inclusion. Id. at 46,931-32, 46,948-52. 

On March 30, 2005, Home Builders filed a complaint

under the ESA, NEPA, and APA, challenging FWS’s critical habitat

designation, (Compl.) and on November 2, 2006, this court ruled

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on five cross-motions for summary judgment. (Nov. 2, 2006

Order.) The court found that the FWS’s reasoning regarding its

exclusions from critical habitat designation failed to adequately

consider the recovery standard under the ESA, pursuant to Gifford

Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 378 F.3d

1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). (Id. at 70.) The court additionally

held that the exclusion of two particular tracts from the

critical habitat designation (Highway 99 in Tehama County and

land being developed for the University of California at Merced)

was arbitrary and capricious, because the FWS failed to

adequately explain its reasoning. (Id.) Accordingly, the court

remanded the matter back to the FWS, with instructions to submit

a new final rule within 120 days, consistent with the order. 

(Id. at 70-71.)

On November 16, 2006, the Environmental Groups filed a

motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), and on

November 17, 2006, Home Builders filed a similar motion. In

addition, on December 11, 2006, the Regents filed a motion to

intervene, claiming that this court’s remand of the exclusion of

the tract at Merced has violated a significant protectable

interest.

II. Discussion

A. Motion for Reconsideration

A district court may reconsider an order under either

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (motion to alter or amend

judgment) or Rule 60(b) (relief from judgment or order). 

Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985). Both

the Environmental Groups and Home Builders frame their motions as

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Rule 59(e) states that “[a]ny motion to alter or amend 2

a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of

the judgment.” Rule 54 defines “judgment” as “a decree and any

order from which an appeal lies.” 

6

being brought under Rule 59, however both motions were filed more

than ten days after entry of the summary judgment order for which

they seek reconsideration. The court therefore construes both 2

motions as being brought pursuant to Rule 60(b). Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b) (“[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court

may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding . . . .”); see Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954

F.2d 1441, 1463 n.35 (9th Cir. 1992) (a motion for

reconsideration brought later than ten days after entry of

judgment is construed as a motion brought under Rule 60(b)). 

Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used

sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of

judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229

F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). A motion for reconsideration

“should not merely present arguments previously raised, or which

could have been raised in the initial summary judgment motion.” 

United States v. Wetlands Water Dist. 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1130

(E.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Backlund, 778 F.2d at 138). 

Rule 60(b) “provides for reconsideration only upon a

showing of (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a

satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ which would justify relief.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 5

F.3d at 1263; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Under Rule 60(b),

reconsideration is generally only appropriate where the district

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The court notes that analysis under Rule 59(e) would 3

result in the same outcome. Under Rule 59(e), reconsideration is

appropriate only if the “district court (1) is presented with

newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the

initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an

intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J,

Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.

1993) (limiting the use of reconsideration to “highly unusual”

circumstances). 

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court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2)

committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly

unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling

law. See Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.3

1. Environmental Groups’ Motion

The Environmental Groups argue that this court’s

conclusion that the FWS failed to adequately consider the

recovery standard in specifying its exclusions cannot be squared

with the relief granted, asserting that the non-economic

exclusions must also be remanded for reconsideration by the FWS. 

(Envtl. Groups Mot. for Recons. 3-7.) The Environmental Groups

also seek clarification of two aspects of this court’s previous

order, requesting this court: 1) to instruct the FWS that it may

not engage in “coextensive” economic impact analysis of

exclusions to the critical habitat designation on remand; and 2)

to vacate all exclusions. (Id. at 7-9.)

This court’s November 2, 2006, order found fault with

the FWS’s exclusions to its critical habitat designation, as

analyzed under Section 4(b)(2) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §

1533(b)(2), based on its failure to adequately analyze the

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“Recovery benefits” refers to the requirement that the 4

promulgated Rule adequately address not only the mere survival of

the endangered species, but also its recovery.

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recovery benefits conferred by a critical habitat designation.4

(Nov. 2, 2006 Order 63.) (“This court is . . . unconvinced that

the FWS actually considered the recovery benefits of critical

habitat designation.”) With regard to the ultimate relief

granted, the court therefore remanded the exclusions to the FWS

for reconsideration consistent with the order. (Id. at 70.)

(“The FWS’s exclusions of critical habitat pursuant to § 4(b)(2)

. . . and accompanying economic analysis, must be remanded to the

FWS. . . .”)

The Environmental Groups, however, point to language in

this court’s prior order which they assert is incongruous with

the court’s ultimate conclusion regarding consideration of the

recovery standard. (Envtl. Groups Mot. for Recons. 5.) (“[T]he

Court cannot hold that FWS failed to consider the recovery

benefits while simultaneously concluding that its balancing of

benefits used to justify its exclusions is reasonable.”) (citing

Nov. 22, 2006 Order 64 (“[T]he court cannot find that the FWS

abused its discretion with regard to its consideration of

benefits.”)) The Environmental Groups are of course correct--the

paragraph beginning on page 63 of this court’s November 22, 2006,

order was included in error and is inconsistent with the

preceding ten pages of discussion. Accordingly, the court will

amend its prior order, withdrawing this contradictory paragraph. 

As reasoned on pages 53 through 63 of this court’s prior order,

the FWS’s economic analysis did not adequately consider the

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recovery benefits of critical habitat designation in designating

its exclusions.

a. Non-Economic Exclusions

The question still remains regarding what significance

that holding has for the non-economic exclusions. The

Environmental Groups contend that, because the FWS’s economic

analysis failed to adequately consider the recovery standard when

balancing the benefits of exclusion with the benefits of

designation as critical habitat, the non-economic exclusions were

also invalid as a matter of law. The court reviews the FWS’s

decision to exclude areas pursuant to Section 4(b)(2) “for abuse

of discretion.” Bennett v. Spear, 250 U.S. 154, 172 (1997). 

As explained in great detail, this court’s previous

order held that the FWS’s engaged in improper economic analysis

with regard to the exclusions from critical habitat because it

neglected to consider the recovery of the species. As the Ninth

Circuit made clear in Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Service, 378 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004), the

definitions of “jeopardize” and “destruction or adverse

modification” were sufficiently similar, so that a Section 7

consultation would be triggered, under either definition, only

when a species’ survival is threatened. Accordingly, Gifford

invalidated the regulation’s definition of “adverse

modification,” as inconsistent with the ESA’s recovery goal.

This court’s inquiry in its November 22, 2006, order

focused on a section of the Service’s final rule wherein it

indicated that “[t]his section allows the Secretary to exclude

areas from critical habitat for economic reasons if she

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16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(2) does not specify exactly how an 5

agency is to analyze exclusions, merely that it determine whether

the “benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of

specifying such area as part of the critical habitat.”

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determines that the benefits of such exclusion exceed the

benefits of designating the area as critical habitat.” 70 Fed.

Reg. 46,948. In an effort to demonstrate compliance with

Gifford, this section of the Rule professed an allegiance to the

Ninth Circuit’s guidance. 70 Fed. Reg. 46,948 (“[O]ur current

methodological approach to conducting economic analyses of our

critical habitat designations is to consider all

conservation-related costs.”). 

This court found, however, that despite the FWS’s

assertions that they considered recovery in their economic

analysis, the few references to the recovery standard in this

section of the rule merely constituted last minute additions of

language, in a hollow attempt to satisfy Gifford. (Nov. 2, 2006

Order 60-63.) The economic analysis used to designate these

twenty three exclusions was improper, and accordingly these

exclusions were remanded back to the FWS. 

The various non-economic exclusions, however, did not

employ the same such balancing of economic benefits and costs--

indeed, by definition, these exclusions were based on noneconomic factors. Of course, regardless of the type of analysis 5

used to exclude areas from the critical habitat designation, the

FWS continues to have an obligation to consider the recovery

goals of the ESA. To this end, this court conducted a separate

inquiry into the FWS’s analysis of the non-economic exclusions. 

(Nov. 2, 2006 Order 64-70.) After lengthy analysis, this court

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The rule indicates that FWS’s analysis considered 6

recovery for: 1) Carrizzo Plain National Monument by noting that

“Goals and Implementation Guidelines of the CPRMP include

management for the long-term conservation and recovery of listed

plants and animals,” 70 Fed. Reg. 46,947; 2) national wildlife

refuges and the Coleman National Fish Hatchery complex by noting

that exclusion will not appreciably increase the likelihood of

activities that would “diminish the value of the habitat for

conservation of the species,” 70 Fed. Reg. 11,151; 3) lands

governed by HCP’s, by noting that “[t]he purpose of such an HCP

is to describe and ensure . . . that the action does not

appreciably reduce the survival and recovery of the species,” 70

Fed. Reg. 11,151; and 4) Department of Defense lands by noting

that they were excluded pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(3)(B),

prohibiting designation of critical habitat for lands subject to

integrated natural resource management plans (INRMPs), 70 Fed.

Reg. 11,153-54.

11

found that FWS had reasonably concluded that the non-economic

exclusions were governed by alternative land management plans

which already adequately incorporated the ESA’s recovery goals. 

(Id. at 65 (affirming exclusion of Carrizzo Plain National

Monument); id. at 67 (affirming exclusion of national wildlife

refuges and the Coleman National Fish Hatchery complex); id. at

67-68 (affirming exclusion of lands with Habitat Conservation

Plans (“HCPs”)); id. at 69 (affirming exclusion of two areas of

land belonging to the Department of Defense). Thus, while the 6

twenty three economic exclusions were remanded for consideration

of the recovery goals, this court found that the non-economic

exclusions sufficiently followed Gifford’s reasoning and were not

an abuse of discretion requiring remand.

b. Coextensive Economic Analysis

The Environmental Groups also seek clarification from

this court, requiring express instruction that the FWS may not

consider coextensive costs in its analysis on remand. In order

to understand the impact of this court’s previous order with

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The ESA mandates that an endangered species listing 7

determination be based “solely on the basis of the best

scientific and commercial data available.” 16 U.S.C. §

1533(b)(1)(A). Economic analysis is not a factor in the

analysis.

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regard to coextensive analysis, it is necessary to briefly

recount the court’s reasoning parsing two relevant cases, New

Mexico Cattle Growers v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 248 F.3d

1277 (10th Cir. 2001), and Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d 1059.

The Cattle Growers case rejected a “baseline” approach

to analyzing the economic impact of critical habitat designation,

in favor of a “coextensive” approach. Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d

1285. A baseline approach uses a “but for” method of determining

what economic impacts flow from a critical habitat designation. 

By contrast, a coextensive approach to analyzing economic impact

allows an agency, in considering the impact of a critical habitat

designation (whose purpose is ensuring the survival and recovery

of the species), to also consider the economic impact of listing

the species as endangered (whose sole purpose is ensuring the

survival of the species). 

Admittedly, some courts have criticized the reasoning

of Cattle Growers, because the coextensive analysis permits an

agency to consider the economic impact of listing a species in

contravention of the ESA’s intent. Cape Hatteras Access Pres. 7

Alliance v. U.S. DOI, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 130 (D.D.C. 2004)

(“The Service, however, must not allow the costs below the

baseline to influence its decision to designate or not designate

areas as critical habitat. That would be inconsistent with the

ESA’s prohibition on considering economic impacts during the

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species listing process.”); see also Ctr. for Biological

Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1152

(N.D. Cal. 2004). However, in Cattle Growers, the court was

given the choice between possibly ruling contrary to the ESA’s

intent (via coextensive analysis), or explicitly violating the

ESA’s provision that a critical habitat designation be made upon

consideration of the “economic impact.” As discussed supra, this

was because the definition of “adverse modification” effectively

conflated the survival and recovery goals of the species, thereby

subsuming and rendering null any beneficial impact of critical

habitat designation, analyzed in comparison to the impact

benefits conferred by listing a species. See Cattle Growers, 248

F.3d at 1284-85. 

However, courts and agencies are no longer “hamstrung

by [their] inability to consider the validity of 50 C.F.R. §

402.02,” Cape Hatteras, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 129-30, because the

court in Gifford explicitly invalidated that provision. 378 F.3d

at 1071. Thus, an agency is no longer prevented from engaging in

a meaningful analysis of the economic impact of a critical

habitat designation, above and beyond the impact of listing a

species. While this does undercut the reasoning that the Cattle

Growers court used to invalidate the baseline approach, it does

not require the conclusion that a coextensive analysis is legally

improper.

The ESA mandates that the FWS consider various impacts

(economic and other) “of specifying any particular area as

critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(2). It does not, however,

mandate that in its analysis of those impacts, the FWS be

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It is of course possible that an agency conducting a 8

coextensive analysis pursuant to Cattle Growers might also be

continuing to follow the invalidated regulatory definition of

adverse modification in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, and thus would fail

to adequately consider the recovery standard as required by

Gifford Pinchot. It is for this reason that the court’s previous

order noted that “[t]o the extent that the FWS relied on Cattle

Growers and neglected to consider the effects of the critical

habitat designation on species’ recovery, pursuant to Gifford

Pinchot, the critical habitat designation is not consistent with

applicable Ninth Circuit precedent. (Nov. 2, 2006 Order 57

n.22.)

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precluded from also considering the impact of listing the species

as endangered. Indeed, the statute’s language appears to

anticipate a broad inquiry regarding any potential impacts of the

critical habitat designation. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(2) (mandating

consideration of “and any other relevant impact”). In this

respect, Cattle Growers and Gifford Pinchot are not mutually

exclusive--as long as the recovery goals of the ESA are given

appropriate consideration.8

In its final rule, the FWS indicated that in

“conducting economic analyses, we are guided by the 10th Circuit

Court of Appeal’s [sic] ruling in New Mexico Cattle Growers v.

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001),

which directed us to consider all impacts, ‘regardless of whether

those impacts are attributable co-extensively to other causes.’”

70 Fed. Reg. 46,948. As explained in the November 22, 2006,

order, the FWS additionally retained the CRA International

consulting firm, who projected the economic impacts of the

critical habitat designation above and beyond the baseline

regulatory burden. (Nov. 2, 2006 Order 47 (citing Admin R., Vol.

2, Doc. 358 45-46.) CRA International also analyzed the

administrative costs associated with Section 7 consultations for

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The court also notes the questionable nature of the 9

Environmental Groups’ request. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12,

16 (2002) (“Generally speaking, a court . . . should remand a

case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place

primarily in agency hands.”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Idaho Power

Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952) (“[T]he guiding principle . . . is

that the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of

law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the

[agency] for reconsideration.”).

15

listing a species, as well as the designation of a critical

habitat. (Id. (citing Admin R., Vol. 2, Doc. 358 10.) 

To the extent that the FWS’s coextensive inquiry may

have insufficiently considered the recovery standard, by focusing

solely on those costs which are coextensive with listing, this

court’s remand of the twenty three exclusions addresses that

deficiency. However, it is not the coextensive analysis which is

faulty, but the lack of sufficient consideration of the ESA’s

recovery standard. Accordingly, this court declines to instruct

the FWS on remand that it may not conduct a coextensive

analysis.9

c. Vacatur of Exclusions

Finally, the Environmental Groups seek vacatur of all

of the exclusions remanded back to the FWS. Indeed, the general

rule is for a court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency

action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance

with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). While the court did find that

the FWS’s exclusions were improper, and thus deserving of remand,

this does mandate vacatur.

Indeed, “when equity demands, the regulation can be

left in place while the agency follows the necessary procedures.” 

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Idaho Farm Bureau Fed. v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing W. Oil and Gas v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir.

1980)). Factors to be considered in deciding whether to vacate

or not include: (1) the purposes of the substantive statute under

which the agency was acting, (2) the consequences of invalidating

the agency action, and (3) and potential prejudice to those who

will be affected by maintaining the status quo. Weinberger v.

Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 

Significant is the fact that, while the FWS has

committed error requiring remand, that error is minor in the

grand scheme of its analysis. For this reason, the court found

the need to only grant the FWS 120 days in which to correct its

analysis. Moreover, given the slight nature of the agency’s

error, there is a legitimate possibility that the agency will be

able to substantiate its rule without altering the ultimate

substance. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. F.C.C., 280 F.3d

1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Allied-Signal, Inc. v. United

States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51(D.C. Cir.

1993) (“The decision whether to vacate depends on the seriousness

of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether

the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an

interim change that may itself be changed.”). 

Finally, the court notes its interest in intervening as

little as possible into an already incredibly complex

environmental regulation. W. Oil, 633 F.2d at 813 (“We are also

influenced by the possibility of undesirable consequences which

we cannot now predict that might result from invalidation of the

designations. Our intervention into the process of environmental

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regulation, a process of great complexity, should be accomplished

with as little intrusiveness as feasible. Under the unusual

circumstances of this case and guided by authorities that

recognize that a reviewing court has discretion to shape an

equitable remedy, we leave the challenged designations in

effect.”) In this court’s prior order, it reasoned that the

balance of equity counsels in favor of leaving the rule in place,

and the Environmental Groups have not presented any reasoning as

to why this finding must be disturbed. Accordingly, the

exclusions to the FWS’s critical habitat designation will not be

vacated.

2. Home Builders’ Motion

Home Builders seeks reconsideration of this court’s

prior order in two respects. First, Home Builders asserts that

this court’s decision to invalidate two of the twenty three

economic exclusions as arbitrary and capricious effectively

granted relief that no party sought. (Home Builders’ Mot. for

Recons. 1-2.) Secondly, Home Builders argues that this court’s

order did not adequately dispose of their argument that the FWS’s

improperly employed a standard of qualifying an area as a

critical habitat designation as long as it contained one primary

constituent element. (Id. 2-3.)

a. Exclusion of UC Merced and Tehama County 

Tracts

Home Builders contends that their motion for summary

judgment did not seek invalidation of any of the existing

economic exclusions, and thus this court’s relief remanding two

existing economic exclusions (Highway 99 in Tehama County and the

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development of the University of California at Merced) was

improper. To the extent that Home Builders argues that this

court granted relief sought by no party, this contention is

incorrect. Specifically, the Environmental Groups’ motion for

summary judgment sought exactly such relief. (Environmental

Groups Mot. for Summ. J. 25-28.) (“The elimination of these

twenty three census tracts should be set aside . . . .”) The

fact that the Environmental Groups chose to object to the

exclusions en masse does not mean that this court is limited to

only finding fault with all, or none, of the exclusions. Both

Home Builders and the Environmental Groups called into question

the validity of the FWS’s exclusion analysis, and the court found

fault with only a particular portion of such analysis. 

Accordingly, the relief granted was not improper.

However, notwithstanding this fact, the court now takes

the opportunity on this motion to reevaluate its reasoning with

regard to the two tracts, and upon reconsideration, finds that it

was in error. As noted in the November 2, 2006, order, an agency

“is obligated to ‘articulate[] a rational connection between the

facts found and the choices made.’” Pac. Coast Fed’n of

Fishermen’s Assocs. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082,

1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting NRDC v. Dep’t of Interior, 113,

F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997)). At that point, it appeared to

the court that, while the FWS had indicated high costs for the

Merced and Tehama tracts, it had made no “relative comparison

amongst all tracts.” (Nov. 2, 2006 Order 51.) The FWS had given

“no indication that these two tracts are among the twenty-two

most impacted tracts,” and at oral argument the Federal Defenders

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were unable to articulate why this might be the case. (Id.)

Upon reconsideration of the record, in particular the

June 30, 2005, Proposed Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,739, and August 11,

2005, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 46,924, it now appears that the

FWS did sufficiently explain why the two tracts in question were

included. In the Proposed Rule, the FWS indicated that it was

considering excluding the twenty highest cost areas, as

calculated in their draft economic analysis, and sought comments

explaining why any of these twenty should not be excluded, or

additional tracts should be excluded. 70 Fed. Reg. 37,740. As

affirmed by this court’s previous order, the FWS rationally

concluded that because “approximately 80 percent of the total

costs are represented by 25 percent of the critical habitat” in

these twenty tracts, exclusion was reasonable. (Nov. 2, 2006

Order 49-50; 70 Fed. Reg. 37,740.) 

However, as a result of the public notice and comment

period, the FWS learned of “additional costs” previously not

factored into its economic analysis, in the amount of

“$10,000,000 for UC Merced and $6,093,965 for Highway 99.” 70

Fed. Reg. 46,950. After adjusting their draft economic analysis

to account for this new information, the new estimated economic

costs of designating as critical habitat UC Merced and Highway 99

in Tehama became $15,759,870 and $11,453,799, respectively. 70

Fed. Reg. 46,949 (Table 2). It is now clear that economic costs

of this magnitude do in fact place these two tracts well within

the “twenty-two most impacted tracts,” and squarely within the

reasoning previously approved of. Accordingly, the court will

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The court wishes to make clear that, while these two 10

particular tracts are no longer singled out and remanded based on

arbitrary economic analysis, (Nov. 2, 2006 Order 51), it remains

true, as discussed above, that all twenty-three tracts, including

these two, are remanded to the FWS for reconsideration consistent

with this court’s order and the recovery standard in Gifford.

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amend its prior order.10

b. Standard for Designating Critical Habitat

Home Builders’ second request for clarification asserts

that this court failed to address their principal argument that

the Service violated the ESA by evaluating whether areas could be

designated as critical habitat based on whether they contain “one

or more of the species [Primary Constituent Elements (“PCEs”)].” 

(Home Builders’ Mot. for Recons. 2.) Home Builders presently

argues, as they previously did in their motion for summary

judgment, that every area designated as critical habitat must

contain all PCEs. (Id.)

Home Builders’ contention that this court neglected to

address their argument is without merit. On page 35 of the

November 2, 2006, order, the court made clear in a lengthy

footnote that the particular nature of vernal pools, and their

need to be “fed by upland areas,” means that a particular area

“may not be occupied by the species, and may not contain a vernal

pool . . . . Regardless of whether they contain a vernal pool, or

other PCEs, they are still essential to the conservation of the

15 vernal pool species.” (Nov. 2, 2006 Order 35 n.7.)

A motion for reconsideration “should not merely present

arguments previously raised.” Wetlands Water, 134 F. Supp. 2d at

1130 (citing Backlund, 778 F.2d at 138). It is a “extraordinary

remedy,” reserved for situations where the court has erred, or

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“[The lack of a desire to intervene] changed, however, 11

with the Court’s SJ Order, which for the first time singled out

the UC Merced Project, analyzed it separately from the remaining

twenty-one Census tracts whose exclusion the court affirmed, and

concluded that the Service’s analysis for excluding just the UC

Merced Project was insufficient.” (Regents’ Mot. to Intervene

1.)

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new relevant information has come to light. Kona, 229 F.3d at

890. It is not a forum for a party to attempt to reargue matters

already decided by the court. Home Builders has already briefed

and argued this point, and the court has already ruled. Other

than simply rehashing previous arguments, Home Builders has not

demonstrated why reconsideration is proper. Accordingly, the

court declines to revisit the issue.

B. Regents’ Motion to Intervene

The Regents are the true owners of the land being

developed as part of the University of California at Merced,

which was originally excluded from the critical habitat

designation in the FWS’s August 11, 2005, final rule. The

Regents have invested significant time and money into the

development of UC Merced Project, and the designation of their

land as critical habitat would no doubt interfere with their

development plans. (Regents’ Mot. to Intervene 1.) However, as

indicated in their motion, while they have closely monitored the

litigation, until now they have decided not to intervene because

the issues raised by the parties demonstrated that their

interests were adequately represented. (Id.)

Subsequent to this court’s November 2, 2006, order, the

Regents sought to intervene based wholly on this court’s singling

out of the UC Merced tract. They seek to intervene in order to 11

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protect their interests in the UC Merced Project, because they

contend it is substantially and individually affected by this

court’s previous order. However, as explained in Section

II(A)(2)(a), supra, this court will now be amending its prior

order, withdrawing any reference to the reasoning the Regents

found objectionable. Therefore, the Regents’ justification for

intervening is now moot. 

Indeed, a cursory analysis of the standards for

intervention as a matter of right and permissive intervention

supports this conclusion. Rule 24 allows intervention as a

matter of right under various circumstances “unless the

applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing

parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Because the tract at UC Merced

is no longer singled out for individual treatment, as the Regents

themselves confess, their interests are sufficiently represented

by the parties already involved in the case. (Regents’ Mot. to

Intervene 1.) 

Permissive intervention is allowed when an applicant’s

“claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or

fact in common.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). In this case, the

Regents’ unique claims have become moot--the reasoning in this

courts previous order to which they are objecting will be

withdrawn pursuant to this order. (Regents’ Mot. to Intervene

17) (“Regents’ claims and defenses . . . are in direct response

to determinations made by the Court[‘s November 2, 2006 order] in

this action.”) Accordingly, the court will decline to grant the

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As this court indicated to the Regents at oral 12

argument, however, if it becomes necessary for the Regents to

intervene at a later date (for example, to represent unique

interests upon appeal) it may do so at that time.

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Regents’ motion.12

C. Timing on Remand

In this court’s previous order, it reasoned that

because the necessary changes were “simply an amendment to a

prior final designation . . . a 120 day deadline is more than

reasonable for this purpose.” (Nov. 2, 2006 Order 71 n.27)

(citing Butte Environ. Council v. White, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1180,

1185 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (allowing six months for the FWS to

complete a final critical habitat designation and noting that

many courts have allowed only 120 days for the same action)). 

While this court is granting, in part, both motions for

reconsideration of the previous order, the substantive changes

are not great, and thus the issues on remand are similarly minor. 

However, in light of the uncertainty created by both motions, the

court will grant the FWS 120 days from the issuance of this order

within which to complete the new critical habitat rule.

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Environmental Groups’

motion for clarification, reconsideration, or amendment be, and

the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART. The entire paragraph

beginning on page 63 of this court’s November 2, 2006, order, is

hereby WITHDRAWN. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Home Builders’ motion for

clarification, reconsideration, or amendment be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED IN PART. The two paragraphs on pages 50 and

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51, as well the first paragraph on page 70, of this court’s

November 2, 2006, order, regarding the remand specifically of the

exclusions of UC Merced and Tehama County, are hereby WITHDRAWN.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

(1) in all other respects, Environmental Groups’ and

Home Builders’ motions for reconsideration be, and the same

hereby are, DENIED;

(2) the Regents’ motion to intervene be, and the same

hereby is, DENIED;

(3) this matter be, and the same hereby is, REMANDED to

the FWS for further action and consideration consistent with this

order, as well as the portions of this court’s November 2, 2006

order not withdrawn above. The FWS shall submit a new final

critical habitat rule to the Federal Register for publication

therein within 120 days of the date of this order.

DATED: January 23, 2007

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