Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02432/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02432-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICO TOMAZ,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2432 MCE GGH P

vs.

YOLO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment (MSJ), filed on

July 25, 2007. On August 22, 2007, with no opposition yet filed in the court’s docket,

defendants filed a document noting plaintiff’s failure to file any opposition, contending that

plaintiff had thus waived any opposition and asking the court to grant the motion. See

defendants’ reply to plaintiff’s non-opposition to MSJ. However, in a document file-stamped

August 27, 2007, plaintiff did file an opposition. The proof of service attached to the document

indicates, under penalty of perjury, that plaintiff served his opposition on August 22, 2007. As

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 Pursuant to Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988), pro

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se prisoner filing is dated from the date prisoner delivers it to prison authorities.

 Plaintiff also named “Assaulting Officer,” as a defendant, but the court is unable to 2

direct service upon an unnamed individual. 

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an incarcerated pro se litigant, plaintiff is entitled to application of the mailbox rule. 

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Subsequently, defendants filed, on September 4, 2007, their reply to the opposition. The court

will deem plaintiff’s opposition timely filed.

Complaint

This matter is proceeding on the original complaint, filed on December 2, 2005, as

modified by Order, filed on September 18, 2006, wherein the district judge adopted the Findings

and Recommendations, filed on June 29, 2006, and dismissed from this action the City of West

Sacramento’s insurance carrier as a separate and individually named defendant. The remaining

defendants are the Yolo County Sheriff’s Department (Dept.); the City of West Sacramento; and

the West Sacramento Police Dept. Form Complaint, pp. 1-3. 2

According to plaintiff, on November 17, 2004, he was lying on his stomach while

he was being arrested and handcuffed by an unnamed Yolo County Sheriff’s Deputy. Another

unnamed individual who was a West Sacramento Police Officer, while driving past the scene of

the arrest with a prisoner in his vehicle to be transported to jail, stopped his vehicle and jumped

out “hollering racial slurs toward Indians.” The West Sacramento policeman proceeded to where

plaintiff lay handcuffed on his stomach and began beating plaintiff with his baton until plaintiff’s

right hand was broken. This occurred in front of two other witnesses, whom plaintiff does not

identify. The West Sacramento officer “then abruptly jumped back into his unit” to transport his

prisoner to the county jail. Id., at 2. 

Plaintiff seeks money damages, as well as injunctive relief, asking for continued

therapy for his damaged right hand and knee. Id.

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Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for “total/partial summary judgment,” on the ground that

“plaintiff cannot point to a single policy or custom which resulted in a deprivation of his

constitutional rights under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658 (1978).” Notice of Motion, p. 1. 

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive

issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at

2553.

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct.

at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

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 Puzzlingly, within the Answer, defendants refer, inter alia, to allegations on (non- 3

existent) pages 4 and 5 of a three-page complaint. See Answer, p. 2. 

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obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).

On June 29, 2006, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir.

1988).

Undisputed Facts

Defendants’ undisputed facts are entirely unaddressed, and thus herein deemed

undisputed, by plaintiff. DUF 1. Plaintiff filed a form complaint entitled “Form to be Used by a

Prisoner Filing a Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (1. Complaint.) 

DUF 2. On June 29, 2006, the Court ordered service on the Yolo County Sheriff’s Department,

the City of West Sacramento, and the West Sacramento Police Department. (2. Official Court

Docket, Entry No. 13.) DUF 3. The Court dismissed GAB Robins Insurance from this lawsuit

on September 18, 2006 because plaintiff failed to show that GAB had a legal duty toward

plaintiff. (3. Court Docket Entry Nos. 14 & 20). DUF 4. The Yolo County Sheriff’s

Department, the City of West Sacramento, and the West Sacramento Police Department filed

their answer on September 18, 2006. (4. Answer. ) DUF 5. On March 26, 2007, defendants 3

served plaintiff with special interrogatories requesting he identify the specific policies and/or

customs of Yolo County, the City of West Sacramento, and the West Sacramento Police

Department that plaintiff believed supported each of the allegations in his Complaint. (5. 

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 Where defendants have mis-identified or mis-typed the letter of the exhibit supporting 4

some of the undisputed facts attached to the DeNardo Dec., the court has made the appropriate

correction. 

 The Scheduling Order expressly set forth that discovery could be conducted until May 5

25, 2007, with any motions to compel discovery to be filed by that date. Discovery requests were

therein required to be served not later than sixty days prior to May 25, 2007, i.e., as defendants

correctly infer, by March 26, 2007.

 Paragraph 5 of the DeNardo Dec. mis-identifies plaintiff’s May 9, 2007, discovery 6

requests as Exhibit C, but they are attached as Exhibit B. 

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Exhibit A to the Declaration of Susan A. DeNardo ¶ 3). DUF 6. Plaintiff then served both the

County of Yolo and the City of West Sacramento with Public Records Act Requests. 6. Exhibit

C to the Declaration of Susan A. DeNardo. DUF 7. The County of Yolo and the City of West

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Sacramento sent plaintiff policies responsive to plaintiff’s Public Records Act requests. (7.

Exhibit C to the Declaration of Susan A. DeNardo.) DUF 8. Plaintiff then produced the

documents given to him pursuant to his Public Records Act Request and typed his excerpts of

these documents to Defendants in response to their special interrogatories. (8. Exhibit C to the

Declaration of Susan A. DeNardo.) DUF 9. The Court issued a Scheduling Order on February 9,

2007, mandating that all discovery be served not later than March 26, 2007. (9. Court Docket

No. 24. ) DUF 10. On May 9, 2007, plaintiff served defendants with discovery requests, namely 5

special interrogatories. (10. Exhibit B to Declaration of Susan A. DeNardo ¶ 5.) DUF 11. At

least in part, these interrogatories requested defendants’ use of force policies and arrest

procedures. (11. Exhibit B to the Declaration of Susan A. DeNardo.) DUF 12. Despite the

tardiness of plaintiff’s request, defendants responded with much of the same material that was

already produced to plaintiff in response to the Public Records Act. 12. Declaration of Susan A.

DeNardo ¶ 5.6

Discussion

Under Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018,

2037-2038:

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[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as

an entity is responsible under § 1983. 

Police officers making an arrest are authorized, under the Fourth Amendment, “to 

use only an amount of force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing

them.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9 Cir. 2007). In the instant case,

th

plaintiff seeks to hold the defendants liable for the actions of an unnamed officer who allegedly

inflicted an injury upon him, using excessive force, as plaintiff was being arrested, while another

unnamed officer did not act to stop this alleged action. 

A city may be held liable for the excessive force of arresting officers under § 1983

“if its deliberate policy caused the constitutional violation alleged.” Blankenhorn, at 484, citing

Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d

611 (1978); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir.2001).” In Blankenhorn, the

plaintiff complained of the defendant City’s failure to train a police officer. The Ninth Circuit

stated that to support such a claim, the plaintiff “must show that (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right, (2) the City had a training policy that “ ‘amounts to deliberate indifference to

the [constitutional] rights of the persons’ with whom [its police officers] are likely to come into

contact”; and (3) his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the City properly trained

those officers.” Id., citing Lee, 250 F.3d at 681 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). However, because plaintiff therein only

produced evidence regarding the failure to train as to a single officer, which the court found to be

“insufficient to establish a municipality’s deliberate policy,” he did not thereby meet his burden

to withstand the defendants’ summary judgment motion. Blankenhorn, supra, at 484-485. 

In this case, as defendants aver, plaintiff does not identify any policy or procedure

of the defendants which he claims violated his constitutional rights; he does not even name the

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 Plaintiff also points out that defendants mistakenly identify the City of Susanville as a 7

defendant in the closing page of their supporting memorandum (MSJ, p. 6). Opp., p. 6. 

However, defendants subsequently filed, on Dec. 28, 2007, a notice of errata, indicating that

everywhere else in their moving papers and in their reply the defendants were correctly named

and the one instance was a typograpical error. 

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officer that he claims inflicted his injury. In his opposition (Opp.), plaintiff goes so far as to

assert that “defendants blatantly violated their own policies, rules and customs....” Opp., p. 2. 

As defendants note, this allegation is an implicit concession of the constitutionality of those

policies and customs. Reply, pp. 3-4. 

Plaintiff seeks to impugn defendants for a putative failure to name the officer who

committed the assault upon him and to provide him with information as to whether that officer

had prior assaults, reprimands, or complaints of excessive force in his record. Opp., p. 2. He

contends that he has sustained permanent injuries due to the misconduct of the unnamed officer

and that no official is above the law or has the right to violate official policies. Plaintiff claims

that there are medical reports/records, eyewitness accounts, police reports that substantiate his

allegations and that these will be brought out at trial. Opp., pp. 2-7. However, plaintiff 7

produces none of this material in opposition to the motion. 

The court’s review of plaintiff’s discovery requests to defendants reveals that

nowhere did plaintiff ask the defendants to provide the name of either the alleged assaulting

officer (the unnamed West Sacramento Police Officer) or that of the unidentified Yolo County

Sheriff’s Deputy who handcuffed and arrested him. Nor does plaintiff state in his opposition that

he sought the identity of either of these individuals, merely contending that “his name will

eventually come forth during trial.” Opp., p. 5. The only reference that the court can find in

plaintiff’s discovery requests related to the officer that plaintiff avers injured him states as

follows: “Interrogatory No. 6. Identify any officer, specifically the officer involved in the assault

had recently or ever been in the United States military with duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, and if so

has that officer been treated for post stress syndrome or anger related issues, or any citizens

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complaint filed.” MSJ, Exhibit B to Denardo Dec. Although awkwardly phrased, plaintiff seems

to be seeking information as to whether or not the officer at issue might be suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder, but plaintiff does not make a straightforward request for the officer’s

name. In fact, almost the exclusive focus of plaintiff’s discovery requests is on defendants’

hiring and arrest policies and procedures. 

As defendants accurately note, plaintiff has had adequate time to learn the name of

the officer who caused him any injury following the November 17, 2004, incident, nor did

plaintiff complain of defendants’ discovery responses or bring a motion to compel at the

appropriate time. Reply, pp. 4-5. In this case, plaintiff has wholly failed to meet his burden with

respect to the defendants who have been named. He does not identify or implicate as

unconstitutional any policy or procedure of the defendants or ascribe his injury to any such

policy. As noted above, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery

and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) See id. at

322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, filed on July 25, 2007 (#28), be granted, and this case be closed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 02/21/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

toma2432.msj

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