Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00004/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00004-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981cv Civil Rights

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CHASE HAYES, Case No.: 3:17-cv-00004-BEN-WVG

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER:

13 v.

(1) GRANTING SECOND MOTION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS;

14 NASSCO,

15 Defendant.

16 (2) DENYING SECOND MOTION

FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL;

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19 (3) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM 20

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22 On January 30, 2017, PlaintiffChase Hayes filed his second Motions to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and for Appointment ofCounsel, along with his proposed First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”).1 (Docket No. 7.) For the reasons stated below, the

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l On January 24, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion to proceed IFP for failing to

demonstrate an inability to pay the filing fee, denied Plaintiffs motion for appointment of

counsel for failing to demonstrate a likelihood ofsuccess on the merits of his claim, and

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second Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED, the second Motion for Appointment of

Counsel is DENIED, and the proposed First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED

without prejudice.

Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action in a district court must pay a filing fee. 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to prepay the entire

fee only ifthe plaintiffis granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),

any court ofthe United States may authorize the

commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or

proceeding ... without prepayment offees or security therefor,

by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement

of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to

pay such fees or give security therefor.

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Plaintiffs second Motion to Proceed IFP indicates he receives $168.80 per week in

disability benefits, and $170.00 a month in the form offood stamps. (Docket No. 7 at 1.)

Plaintifffurther indicates his expenses total approximately $800.00 per month. (Id.)

The Court finds Plaintiffhas sufficiently stated that he cannot afford to pay the filing fee.

Therefore, the Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs proposed First Amended Complaint

(docket no. 7) shall be deemed filed nuncpro tunc to the date ofthis Order.

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff also filed a second Motion for Appointment ofCounsel, in which he

asserts he has “no ability to articulate his claim in a legal manner” due to “the complexity

ofthe legal issues involved in Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Law, et al.”

(Docket No. 7 at 2.)

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20 II.

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27 dismissed without prejudice his initial Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which

reliefmay be granted. (Docket No. 6.) 28

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As the Court stated in its January 24, 2017 Order (docket no. 6), courts have

discretion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (1996), to appoint counsel for indigent

civil litigants upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. “A finding of exceptional

circumstances requires an evaluation ofboth the likelihood ofsuccess on the merits and

the ability ofthe petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light ofthe complexity ofthe

legal issues involved.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal

citations omitted). “Neither ofthese factors is dispositive and both must be viewed

together before reaching a decision.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The Court cannot say there is any likelihood ofsuccess on the merits ofPlaintiffs

claims because, as will be explained in further detail below, Plaintiffs First Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted. In addition, Plaintiff

does not demonstrate an inability to represent himself beyond the ordinary burdens

encountered by plaintiffs representing themselves pro se, or that he has even attempted to

obtain counsel to represent him. See Garcia v. Smith, No. 10-cv-l 187, 2012 WL

2499003, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (“Merely alleging indigence is insufficient to

entitle him to appointed counsel; he must also demonstrate that he made a good faith

effort, but was unable, to obtain counsel.”). Therefore, the Court finds that the

exceptional circumstances required for the appointment of counsel are not present.2

Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED.

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2 The Court emphasizes that courts are directed to construepro se pleadings liberally, and

that use oflayman’s language, on its own, will not prevent Plaintifffrom proceeding with

his claim. See Hebbe, supra, 627 F.3d at 342 (pro se plaintiffs complaint “must be held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”) (internal citations

omitted).

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1 Section 1915 Screening

A. Legal Standard

Under section 1915(e) oftitle 28 ofthe United States Code, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious,

fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)). “[T]he provisions ofsection 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679; see Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that section 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language ofFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility ofmisconduct” falls short ofmeeting this

plausibility standard. Id.', see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009).

III.

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While a plaintiffs factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doelv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have an

obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler,

627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l

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(9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents ofthe Univ. ofAlaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Discussion

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) must be dismissed for failing to state

a claim upon which reliefmay be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges “NASSCO (Paul Goyette) laid Plaintiff off due to

Plaintiffinjuries [sic],” even though Paul Goyette had allegedly promised him that “the

only way Plaintiffwould be laid offis seniority ifPlaintiff accept a light duty job [sic].”

(Docket No. 7 at 2.) However, Plaintiff does not identify who Paul Goyette is with

respect to Defendant NASSCO, Plaintiffs injuries, the date he became injured, or the

date he was laid off. Plaintifffurther alleges he felt he was discriminated against under

Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), but does explain how Defendant discriminated against him.

Plaintiff also asserts Defendant “is well aware ofmy race and disabilities which I can

only try to explain my meeting with them in layman’s terms.” However, Plaintiff does

not identify what his disabilities are, when Defendant became aware ofthose disabilities,

or the events that transpired in the referenced meeting.

In sum, even after construing the documents liberally, the Court finds Plaintiffhas

failed to state a claim for discrimination under either the Civil Rights Act or the ADA.

Plaintiffs FAC has not met the requirement to include “a short and plain statement ofthe

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Moreover, a plaintifflitigating a Title VII claim in a federal district court is

required to exhaust his administrative remedies. Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 832

(1976)). This includes regulatory and judicially imposed exhaustion requirements. Id.

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27 Plaintiffrefers to, but did not attach, a “Right to Sue letter” which purportedly “show[s]

the statue(s) [sic] which [he] felt [he] was discriminated under.” (Docket No. 7 at 2.)

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The procedural requirements for Title VII actions are “neither interpreted too technically

nor applied too mechanically.” Id. (citing Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir.

1981) (internal citations omitted).

Generally, a Title VII complainant must file a complaint with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within one hundred and eight (180)

days ofthe alleged violation. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(1). If a complainant’s charges arise

in a jurisdiction that has a FEP agency, alternative procedures may apply. 29 C.F.R. §

1601.13(a)(3). An FEP agency is “a State or local agency which the Commission has

determined satisfies the criteria stated in section 706(c) oftitle VII.” 29 C.F.R. §

1601.3(a).

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11 Plaintiffs FAC indicates Plaintiffis suing his former employer for alleged

discriminatory conduct. (Docket No. 7 at 2.) Plaintiff did not state when the

discriminatory conduct occurred, or that Plaintifffiled a complaint with the EEOC within

one hundred and eighty (180) days of each ofthe alleged violations. 29 C.F.R. §

1601.13(a)(1). As a result, Plaintiffhas failed to state a claim because he failed to

establish that he exhausted all ofher administrative remedies, which is a prerequisite to

his title VII claims. Greenlaw, supra, 59 F.3d at 997 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, the FAC is DISMISSED. However, the Court grants Plaintiffleave

to file a Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies noted above.4

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion for

Appointment ofCounsel is DENIED. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is deemed

filed nunc pro tunc to the date ofthis Order, and is concurrently DISMISSED without

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26 4 The Court reminds Plaintiffthat all that is required is a short and plain statement of

27 facts to establish his claim and an explanation ofwhy he is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2). 28

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prejudice for failing to state a claim. Plaintiffis granted thirty (30) days from the date

ofthis Order to file a second amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified

above. IfPlaintiff does not timely file a second amended complaint, this action shall

remain closed without further Order ofthe Court.

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5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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7 DATED: February//, 2017

_ BENfte

United States District Judge

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