Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02472/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02472-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0501 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOPHIA & CHLOE, INC., a California 

Corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES, INC., a

California Corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.: 12-CV-2472-AJB-KSC

ORDER DENYING BRIGHTON 

COLLECTIBLES, INC.’S MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Doc. No. 222)

Presently before the Court is Defendant Brighton Collectibles, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) 

motion for reconsideration, (Doc. No. 222), of the Court’s remittitur, which permitted 

Plaintiff to elect wrongful profits1after the Court concluded the jury’s award of statutory 

damages was excessive, (Doc. No. 218 at 11–17). Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 

228.) The Court finds the matter suitable for decision on the papers, without oral argument, 

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES

Defendant’s motion.

 

1 This order refers to both “wrongful profits” and “actual damages.” These concepts are 

interchangeable.

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BACKGROUND

This dispute arose from Defendant’s willful infringement of Plaintiff’s jewelry.

2

Beginning November 10, 2015, the Court presided over a four-day jury trial on Plaintiff’s 

copyright infringement claim. (Doc. No. 148.) On November 18, 2015, the jury returned a 

special verdict. (Doc. Nos. 156, 161.) Out of six of Defendant’s designs, the jury found one 

design, the Toledo Statement Earrings, infringed two of Plaintiff’s thirteen copyrights 

protecting two versions of the Buddha’s Kiss Earrings. (Doc. No. 161.) The jury found 

Defendant’s infringement was willful. (Id. at 7.) The jury awarded Plaintiff $176,890 in 

Defendant’s wrongful profits and $203,571 in statutory damages. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff elected 

to receive statutory damages, and the Court entered judgment. (Doc. No. 162.)

Amongst a slew of post-trial motions, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of 

law, or, alternatively, a new trial. (Doc. No. 175.) As relevant to its instant motion, 

Defendant argued that the jury’s statutory damages award was excessive because only one 

work had been infringed, notwithstanding the two copyrights. (Id. at 24–25.) In its order 

ruling on the post-trial motions, the Court agreed with Defendant that only one of Plaintiff’s 

works was infringed and that the statutory damages award was thus excessive. (Doc. No. 

218 at 15–16.) In light of that finding, the Court gave Plaintiff a choice: accept a remittitur 

to the jury’s award of wrongful profits in the amount of $176,890 or retry its damages case. 

(Id. at 16–17.) Plaintiff opted for the former. (Doc. No. 220.) Following this election, the 

judgment was amended on April 6, 2016, to reflect judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the 

amout of $176,890. (Doc. No. 221.)

On May 4, 2016, Defendant filed the instant motion, seeking reconsideration of 

Plaintiff’s reelection of wrongful profits and to amend the judgment. (Doc. No. 222.) 

Plaintiff filed an opposition, (Doc. No. 228), and Defendant replied, (Doc. No. 229). The 

 

2 The Court has summarized this case’s background in prior orders. (See Doc. Nos. 86, 

218.) The Court assumes familiarity with those orders and accordingly will recite here only 

those facts necessary to understand the case’s posture with respect to the instant motion.

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Court took the matter under submission on July 28, 2016. (Doc. No. 232.) This order 

follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 provides that, after entry of 

judgment, a court may alter or amend the judgment.4“[T]he district court enjoys 

considerable discretion in granting or denying [a Rule 59(e)] motion.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 

1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam)). However, because “the rule offers 

an extraordinary remedy, [it should] be used sparingly in the interests of finality and 

conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 

890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As such, a Rule 59(e) 

motion generally should not be granted absent highly unusual circumstances, 389 Orange 

St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999), such as an intervening change in 

controlling law, the availability of newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, 

or the need to correct a clear error or prevent a manifest injustice, Allstate Ins. Co., 634 

F.3d at 1111; see also McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1255 n.4 (finding no abuse of discretion 

“merely because the underlying order is erroneous, rather than clearly erroneous”).

DISCUSSION

The parties’ respective positions are straightforward. Defendant argues that 

permitting Plaintiff to change its election from statutory damages to wrongful profits was 

 

3 All subsequent references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4 Under Rule 59(e), a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be brought no later than 

28 days after the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A motion for reconsideration 

brought within this time period is construed as a Rule 59(e) motion regardless of the label 

affixed to it by the moving party. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. 

Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2001). A motion for reconsideration brought after 

the expiration of 28 days is construed as a motion under Rule 60(b). See id. In this case,

the amended judgment was entered on April 6, 2016. (Doc. No. 221.) Defendant filed the 

instant motion on May 4, 2016. (Doc. No. 222.) Because the motion was filed 28 days after 

entry of judgment, it is properly analyzed under Rule 59(e).

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clearly erroneous because once an election has been made, the plaintiff cannot reelect.

5

(Doc. No. 222 at 8–10.) As such, Defendant concludes the award of $176,890 is excessive 

given the Court’s finding that only one work was infringed, (see Doc. No. 218 at 15–16),

and that 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) limits statutory damages to $150,000 per work infringed,

(Doc. No. 222 at 10–13). Plaintiff counters that no grounds for reconsideration are present 

to justify disturbing the Court’s decision. (Doc. No. 228 at 3–4.) Plaintiff further argues 

that even when considering the merits of Defendant’s position, the reelection occurred prior 

to entry of final judgment and was thus proper under § 504(c)(2).6(Id. at 5–6.)

Having reviewed the parties’ arguments in light of the unique circumstances of this 

case, the Court concludes that the extraordinary remedy of granting reconsideration is not 

warranted. Defendant first relies on the plain language of the Copyright Act as supporting 

 

5 The Court notes that Defendant’s position shifts slightly between its motion and reply.

Defendant originally cabins its position to arguing that a plaintiff who has elected the form 

of damages it seeks prior to entry of judgment may not change that election following entry 

of judgment. (Doc. No. 222 at 9–10.) Such an argument would necessarily turn on whether 

the judgment entered November 20, 2015, (Doc. No. 162), constitutes a “final judgment” 

if it is attacked by a party’s post-trial motions. In its reply, Defendant changes course and 

argues that once a plaintiff has made an election, it may not reelect at any time, whether 

reelection occurs pre- or post-entry of judgment. (Doc. No. 229 at 4.) Because Defendant’s 

latter argument is more robust and necessarily encompasses its former position, the Court 

will address only the merits of the latter.

6 Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s motion is procedurally improper because it is 

untimely under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i)(2) and is not accompanied by an affidavit as 

required by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i)(1). (Doc. No. 228 at 3–4.) The Court finds neither 

argument persuasive. Rule 7.1(i)(2) expressly exempts from its time limit motions, such as 

Defendant’s, brought under Rules 59 and 60. While it is true Defendant’s motion is not 

accompanied by an affidavit as required by Rule 7.1(i)(1), it should be clear to Plaintiff, as 

it is to the Court, what ruling Defendant seeks reconsideration of, as well as the 

circumstances surrounding that ruling and Defendant’s motion. As such, the Court finds 

the failure to include the affidavit is not a sufficient ground to summarily deny the instant 

motion. Similarly unpersuasive is Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant waived any right to 

challenge the remittitur based on defense counsel’s comment at the hearing that he was 

“not aware of any authority one way or the other” on the issue of remitting to the jury’s 

award of wrongful profits. (Id. at 5; see Doc. No. 219 at 21.)

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its interpretation. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) permits the copyright owner to “elect, at any time 

before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an 

award of statutory damages . . . .” Defendant reads this section as unequivocally providing 

that a copyright owner may not reelect the form of damages once an election has been 

made. (See Doc. No. 222 at 10; Doc. No. 229 at 7.) However, nothing on the statute’s face 

suggests a reelection may never occur under any circumstances.

Defendant further relies on two out-of-circuit decisions to support its position. In 

Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd., the district court, 

following an evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages, awarded the plaintiff (“TPP”) 

$120,000 in statutory damages or $125,000 in actual damages. 996 F.2d 1366, 1371 (2d 

Cir. 1993). TPP exercised its right to elect statutory damages against the defendant (“PIL”), 

presumably because TPP determined it was the award most likely to withstand appellate 

review. Id. at 1380. On appeal, the parties disputed issues relating to both statutory and 

actual damages; however, the Second Circuit found any issues relating to actual damages 

mooted by TPP’s election of statutory damages. Id. at 1380, 1382. The Second Circuit 

noted,

We do not think the election [between statutory and actual damages] continues 

into the appellate stage. Once a plaintiff has elected statutory damages, it has 

given up the right to seek actual damages and may not renew that right on 

appeal by cross-appealing to seek an increase in the actual damages.

Id. at 1380. Relying on Twin Peaks, the Eleventh Circuit held similarly in Jordan v. Time, 

Inc. There, the jury awarded the plaintiff (“Jordan”) actual damages. 111 F.3d 102, 104 

(11th Cir. 1997). Apparently unsatisfied with that award, Jordan timely elected—after the 

jury verdict but before final entry of judgment—to recover statutory damages. Id. On 

appeal, Jordan sought to challenge certain instructions given by the trial court to the jury 

that related to actual damages. Id. Relying on Twin Peaks, the Eleventh Circuit held that 

Jordan’s challenge to the jury instruction was mooted by his election of statutory damages:

A plaintiff is precluded from electing statutory damages and then appealing 

the award of actual damages; plaintiff does not get two bites of the apple. The 

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language of the statute is clear and precise: “the copyright owner may elect, 

at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual 

damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements 

involved in the action....” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Under this option, a plaintiff 

may proceed as Jordan did, but once a timely election is made to receive 

statutory damages all questions regarding actual and other damages are 

rendered moot.

Id.

Plaintiff would have the Court read Twin Peaks and Jordan narrowly as simply 

holding that a plaintiff may not litigate issues on appeal related to the form of damages not

elected at the trial level. (Doc. No. 228 at 6–7.) Meanwhile, Defendant would have the 

Court read these decisions broadly to foreclose reelection at any time following a plaintiff’s 

election. (Doc. No. 229 at 5–7.) While the Court does not necessarily agree with Plaintiff’s 

position that Twin Peaks and Jordan should be cabined to circumstances where a plaintiff 

seeks to reelect damages at the appellate level, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s 

position that a plaintiff may never, under any circumstances, reelect between statutory 

damages and wrongful profits. Instead, the Court finds the correct interpretation lies 

somewhere in between.

The Court acknowledges that there is support for Defendant’s position. See, e.g.,

Marano v. Aaboe, No. 05 Civ. 9375 (BSJ)(RLE), 2010 WL 6350785, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. 

Oct. 20, 2010) (recommending that plaintiff’s application for actual damages be denied in 

light of his prior election of statutory damages because allowing otherwise would prejudice 

defendants); Homkow v. Musika Records, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 3587(KMW)(THK), 2008 WL 

508597, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2008) (holding plaintiff could not seek actual damages 

because he elected statutory damages as early as his amended complaint); Getaped.Com,

Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[I]n its Proposed Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted after the damages proceeding, Getaped elected 

recovery of statutory damages. This election is binding on Getaped for the damages inquest 

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and all future proceedings.”)

7

; Latin Am. Music Co. v. Spanish Broadcast. Sys., Inc., 866 

F. Supp. 780, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“although the election [between actual and statutory 

damages] may be made at any time before final judgment is rendered, once a plaintiff elects 

statutory damages he may no longer seek actual damages”).8

However, that courts in other circuits are in agreement over this issue does not render 

this Court’s decision clearly erroneous.9It goes without saying that none of these decisions 

are binding on the district courts of the Ninth Circuit. See In re Clorox Consumer Litig., 

No. 12-00280 SC, 2013 WL 3967334, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2013) (“the Eleventh 

Circuit decisions cited by Clorox . . . are not binding here since this Court sits in the Ninth 

Circuit”); In re Etherton, 88 F. Supp. 874, 876 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (noting “the obvious 

principle that a decision by even so highly respected a court as the Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit is not binding on us”). 

Furthermore, these decisions are of little persuasive value. The appellate decisions 

themselves speak only in terms of prohibiting reelection following entry of final judgment, 

notably in the context of reelection or relitigation on appeal. Jordan, 111 F.3d at 104; Twin 

Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1380. The extension of this doctrine by the lower courts does not require 

a contrary reading. Latin American Music Co., the oldest of the above-cited district court 

 

7 Getaped lends only trivial support to Defendant’s position. The court in Getaped

attributed to Twin Peaks a quotation that appears nowhere in the appellate decision but 

rather derives from Latin American Music Co. The court went on to predicate its entire,

cursory analysis on that misquotation.

8 There is also some support for Plaintiff’s. The magistrate judge in Marano v. Aaboe noted

that under Twin Peaks and Jordan, “[i]t is well-settled that copyright holders are precluded 

from changing their election of statutory damages on appeal following a final judgment.” 

2010 WL 6350785, at *3. However, this support is only lukewarm because the magistrate 

judge went on to note that the “prohibition against changing from an election of statutory 

damages is not limited [] to cases in which there has been a final judgment on appeal,” 

relying on the other district court decisions from the Southern District of New York cited 

herein as support for this proposition. Id.

9

It should come as no surprise that district courts in the Second Circuit are in agreement 

given that the Second Circuit has already, to an extent, addressed the issue in Twin Peaks.

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decisions, and the one upon which the three other district court decisions rely,10 was 

decided in the context of the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s jury demand. 866 

F. Supp. at 781. Although discovery had closed nearly three years prior to the order, the 

plaintiff had proffered no evidence of actual damages “and the case [was] supposed to be 

ready for trial.” Id. at 783. As such, the court determined that the plaintiff “elected, by 

default, to seek statutory damages . . . .” Id. at 782. Under these circumstances, there was 

no occasion for the court to proclaim, as it did, that “once a plaintiff elects statutory 

damages he may no longer seek actual damages.” Id.11

Marano, Homkow, and Getaped are similarly unpersuasive. All three decisions were 

rendered in the context of default judgments where the defendants appeared only to litigate 

the issue of damages. In Getaped, following entry of default against the defendants, the 

magistrate judge took proofs from Getaped on the issue of damages and heard objections 

from the defendants. 188 F. Supp. 2d at 400. The magistrate judge found Getaped was 

entitled to $1050 in actual damages. Id. On review, the district court found this to be 

erroneous. Id. The district court determined Getaped was entitled to $30,000 in statutory 

damages. Id. Following its discussion of actual and statutory damages, the district court 

noted that while “Getaped originally sought actual damages or, in the alternative, statutory 

damages,” it later elected, after the damages proceedings, to recover statutory damages. Id.

at 406. The district court noted that “[t]his election is binding on Getaped for the damages 

inquest and all future proceedings.” Id. However, it is not clear from the opinion whether 

 

10 Neither Homkow nor Getaped explicitly cite Latin American Music Co. However, as 

noted previously, Getaped attributes to Twin Peaks a quote that is actually derived from 

Latin American Music Co. See supra note 6. Homkow then quotes Getaped’s misquotation.

11 The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit’s notation in Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters 

Television International, Ltd. suggests that it would disagree with Latin American Music 

Co. In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit stated that the plaintiff was not precluded from 

appealing the district court’s ruling regarding actual damages because it never had the 

opportunity to elect between statutory and actual damages in light of the district court 

finding it failed “to meet its burden of proving [actual] damages, so, at most it is entitled 

to statutory damages.” 149 F.3d 987, 995, n.8 (9th Cir. 1998).

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this election was made was prior to or after the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

However, it is reasonable to infer that Getaped made its election following the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation that Getaped be awarded actual damages.12 At any rate, the 

opinion makes no mention of the parties placing Getaped’s election at issue, so it is curious 

why the district court found the need to comment on the binding nature of Getaped’s 

election at all.

In Homkow, the district court concluded Homkow could not recover actual damages 

based on his earlier decision to pursue statutory damages. 2008 WL 508597, at *3–4. After 

entry of default against the defendants, the distrct court referred the issue of damages to 

the magistrate judge, who ordered Homkow to submit proposed findings regarding the 

damages being sought. Id. at *1. In response, Homkow indicated he sought statutory 

damages for his copyright infringement claim, which echoed the request for relief 

contained in the complaint. Id. at *4. On the basis of these requests, and in light of the 

Second Circuit’s conclusion that a plaintiff may not reelect damages and Rule 54(c)’s 

requirement that a default judgment must not differ in kind from the damages demanded 

in the pleadings, the district court concluded Homkow could not recover actual damages.

Id. at *3–4.

Most recently, in Marano, discovery was conducted on the issue of damages, at the 

end of which Marano elected to receive statutory damages. 2010 WL 6350785 at *2. In 

response, the defendants argued Marano was not entitled to statutory damages because he 

failed to register the copyrighted image at issue within three months of its first publication. 

Id. Marano replied by conceding this point and seeking to reelect actual damages. Id. The 

magistrate judge recommended that Marano’s request be denied. Id. at *4. The magistrate 

 

12 While the opinion does not explicitly state the magistrate judge’s recommendation was 

for actual damages, the district court does note that the magistrate judge recommended 

statutory damages be denied and Getaped instead receive 3% of the full cost of creating its 

website, which was estimated at $35,000, or $1050 total. Getaped, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 401, 

405–06. 

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judge found that to do otherwise would prejudice the defendants, who would have been 

“forced to submit a new brief responding to this claim, without the benefit of discovery.” 

Id.

As the foregoing discussion highlights, the district courts that have extended the 

doctrine enunciated in Twin Peaks and Jordan to prohibit plaintiffs from ever reelecting 

damages are of little persuasive value. Either the court had no occasion to comment on the 

issue of reelection (Latin American Music and Getaped), the circumstances under which 

reelection arose necessitated denying the plaintiff’s request because holding otherwise 

would prejudice the defendants (Marano), or there was an alternative vehicle for requiring 

the plaintiff to adhere to its election (Homkow).

This case stands in stark contrast to those discussed above. It was not until after the 

case was litigated through trial and the jury awarded Plaintiff both wrongful profits and 

statutory damages that Plaintiff made its election. Plaintiff, presumably on the basis of 

electing the higher damages award, elected statutory damages. However, unbeknownst to 

Plaintiff, that award was predicated upon the jury’s incorrect conclusion that two of 

Plaintiff’s works were infringed and was thus excessive under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Under 

these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Court allowed Plaintiff to elect the 

only legally established damages amount found by the jury in lieu of relitigating its 

damages case. Based on the law that controls in this circuit, this decision was not clear 

error. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

To be clear, the Court does not hold that a plaintiff may infinitely reelect damages 

with impunity. Such a holding would prejudice defendants, as the court in Marano found. 

Rather, the Court simply holds that where, as here, a plaintiff has elected damages based 

upon a jury award that is later deemed legally erroneous, the plaintiff is entitled to reelect 

the alternate award. To hold otherwise would work an inequity against plaintiffs while 

permitting defendants a second opportunity to defend against the only remaining damages 

option. That would be an unjust result indeed. For all these reasons, the Court DENIES

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Defendant Brighton Collectibles, Inc.’s motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 222.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2016

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