Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-20-03020/USCOURTS-ca10-20-03020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

RICHARD TORGERSON; ROBERT 

HALL; SHELLEY GORDON; BYRON 

HUGHES; MOSES BOYE-DOE, on behalf 

of themselves and all others similarly 

situated; DARRELL AGEE; SAUD 

HADEED; RUSSELL MOLT; SCOTT 

BAKER; JASON ERNST; LONELL 

RICHARDSON; RODNEY MARTIN; 

JOHN ROBERT GLAVES; SAIF 

ABDULMOHSON; SCOTT OLIVER; 

CHAQUATA STIGLER; IBRAHIM 

KIMUTAI; CHRISTOPHER J. 

WINSLOW; JOYCE KELLEY; DISHIRE 

VILLEGAS; GORDON SNOW; 

MARILYN TOOLEY; LEAH WILSON; 

TERRI L. COLLINS; MARK SANG; 

MOHAMMED ALBADRAWI; BRYANT 

JONES; MARK WHITFIELD; MICHAEL 

SWARAY; DARRELL JESTER; 

ROBERT NICHOLS, JR.; JEFFREY S. 

SHAFER; AMY OLIPHANT; MARVIN 

JONES; MARY NAVEJAR; FRIDOLIN 

LUCHIDIO, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

LCC INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Virginia 

corporation, 

 Defendant - Appellant,

and

KENNY YOUNG; BRIAN DUNN; 

REBECCA STAHL; DAN MOSS, 

 Defendants.

No. 20-3020

(D.C. No. 2:16-CV-02495-DDC-TJJ)

(D. Kan.)

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

March 17, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before HARTZ, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Appellant LCC International, Inc. seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

refusing to vacate an order entered in arbitration that denied LCC’s motion to decertify 

collective arbitration. This court issued a jurisdictional show cause order, directing LCC 

to file a written response addressing any basis in law for the court to exercise jurisdiction 

over this appeal and, on receipt of LCC’s response, likewise directed appellees to file a 

written response addressing this court’s jurisdiction.

This matter is now before the court on the parties’ responses to the jurisdictional 

show cause order. Upon consideration of the responses, the district court docket in both 

the case underlying this appeal, Torgerson v. LCC International, Inc., No. 16-2495-DDCTJJ (D. Kan.), and the related case of LCC International, Inc. v. Torgerson, No. 17-2508-

DDC-TJJ (D. Kan.), the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and the applicable 

law, the court dismisses this appeal for the reasons set forth below.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiffs Richard Torgerson, Robert Hall, Shelley Gordon, Bryon Hughes, and 

Moses Boye-Doe worked for LCC as Migration Analysts. On February 3, 2016, acting on 

behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, they filed a lawsuit in the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, alleging that LCC violated the 

Fair Labor Standards Act by classifying all of its Migration Analysts as employees 

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exempt from FLSA’s overtime requirements. On LCC’s motion for improper venue, the 

Western District of Missouri transferred the action to the United States District Court for 

the District of Kansas. Additional employees and former employees filed consents to join 

the action.

As a condition of their employment with LCC, each plaintiff signed an Employee 

Agreement (“Agreement”) that contained the following arbitration provision:

5.4 Arbitration: Any controversy or claim arising ou[t] of or 

relating to this Agreement, the breach or interpretation thereof or 

Employee’s employment with LCC shall be settled by arbitration in 

Arlington, Virginia in accordance with the then prevailing rules of 

the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award 

shall be final, conclusive and binding. All costs of arbitration shall

be borne by the losing party, unless the arbitrators decide such costs 

should be allocated between the parties in particular proportions.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, LCC shall be entitled to seek 

injunctive or other equitable relief pursuant to the provisions of 

Section 5.1 hereof in any federal or state court having jurisdiction.

[ECF No. 106, Ex. 2 at 5].

Based on the arbitration provision in the Agreement, LCC filed a motion to 

dismiss the case or, in the alternative, to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. On 

August 10, 2016, the district court granted LCC’s request to stay the case and ordered the 

parties to arbitrate their dispute, but: (a) denied that portion of LCC’s motion asking the 

court to decide whether the operative employee agreements permitted collective 

arbitration because, the district court ruled, that decision was for the arbitrator; and 

(b) declined to decide plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification of their FLSA class 

claims without prejudice to their right to present that request to an arbitrator. [ECF 

No. 62]; see also DISH Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2018) 

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(holding that “incorporation of the AAA Rules [in an arbitration agreement] provides 

clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to delegate matters of 

arbitrability to the arbitrator” including whether the agreement authorizes classwide 

arbitration).

In accord with the district court’s order, Mr. Torgerson submitted a Demand for 

Arbitration to the American Arbitration Association (AAA), seeking to assert a collective 

action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Six months later, LCC filed a 

“Motion for Clause Construction” in the arbitration, asking the arbitrator to dismiss the 

collective action claims. The arbitrator entered an “Order on Threshold Matters and on 

Respondent’s Motion for Clause Construction Clause”: (1) holding that the arbitration 

provision in the Agreement was valid and enforceable and that plaintiffs’ FLSA claims 

fell within its scope; and (2) concluding that the arbitration provision authorized plaintiffs 

to proceed on a collective basis. [ECF No. 106, Ex. 8]. The arbitrator denied LCC’s 

“Motion for a Final Clause Construction Award”, stating:

This Order is a non-final decision, and it does not pertain to 

class action. It pertains to opt-in collective action under the FLSA. 

AAA rules do not provide for the issuance of a “final” award 

pertaining to whether an arbitration may proceed on an opt-in 

collective basis under the FLSA, as opposed to an opt-out “class 

action.” Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 320, 327 

(S.D.N.Y. 2016), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over 

interim arbitration decision, Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., No. 16-

1731-CV, 2017 WL 2377837, at *1 (2d Cir. June 1, 2017).

Nor do the AAA rules require a stay of these proceedings to 

permit a party to seek judicial review of this Order, since this Order 

is not a final class arbitration determination. AAA Supplementary 

Rule for Class Actions 5(d); Jock, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 327-28.

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[Id. at 12].

LCC filed a petition with the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of Virginia (the situs of the arbitration), seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s “Final Clause 

Construction Award.” See LCC Int’l, Inc. v. Torgerson, No. 17-00860 (E.D. Va. July 28, 

2017) [ECF No. 1]. The parties jointly stipulated to transfer that petition to the District of 

Kansas, which docketed the action as a new case, assigning it Case No. 17-2508-DDCTJJ and noting that the case underlying this appeal is a related case. The district court 

then: (1) cited Supplementary Rule 3 of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class 

Arbitrations and predicted that this court would “conclude that a district court has 

jurisdiction to review an arbitrator’s order holding that the parties’ arbitration agreement 

allows a claimant to assert FLSA claims on a collective basis;” and (2) denied the petition 

to vacate, holding that the arbitrator had not exceeded his authority when he concluded 

the Agreement authorized collective arbitration of plaintiffs’ FLSA claims. See LCC 

Int’l, Inc. v. Torgerson, No. 17-2508-DDC-TJJ, 2018 WL 558141, at *10-11 (D. Kan. 

Jan. 25, 2018). LCC did not appeal that order.

Returning to arbitration, the arbitrator issued an Order on March 6, 2018 on 

“Claimants’ Motion for Conditional Certification of Collective Claims and Proposed 

Notice,” which order: (1) conditionally certified a class consisting of all Migration 

Analysts or Senior Migration Analysts LCC employed since February 3, 2013; and 

(2) certified claimants and their counsel to act as class representatives and class counsel. 

[ECF No. 107, Ex. E]. On January 18, 2019, the arbitrator—on LCC’s motion—

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dismissed seven of the opt-in claimants, leaving 29 claimants in the arbitration. 

[ECF No. 107, Ex. F].

Some four months later, LCC filed a “Motion to Decertify FLSA Collective 

Arbitration,” this time citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. 

Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). The arbitrator denied the motion, holding that Lamps 

Plus applies only to ambiguous arbitration provisions and the arbitration provision at 

issue here unambiguously established the parties’ agreement to arbitrate on a collective 

basis. [ECF No. 106, Ex. 13].

LCC again applied to the District of Kansas for relief—this time from the 

arbitrator’s order denying its motion to decertify the collective claims in arbitration—and 

asked that the district court direct the parties to arbitrate on an individual and not 

collective basis. The district court denied LCC’s motion for vacatur of the arbitrator’s 

order. See Torgerson v. LCC Int’l, Inc., No. 16-2495-DDC-TJJ, 2020 WL 108706 

(D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2020). LCC appeals. 

The court notes that, while the district court has stayed the action underlying this 

appeal, it has not dismissed it and has repeatedly ordered the parties to file status reports 

regarding the pendency of the arbitration, which the parties have faithfully done. [See, 

e.g., ECF Nos. 62, 70, 71, 73, 83, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 109, 111].

II. Legal Analysis

Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act governs this court’s review of arbitration 

orders. See 9 U.S.C. § 16. In response to this court’s jurisdictional show cause order, 

LCC invokes § 16(a)(3) as the primary basis for this court’s jurisdiction and invokes 

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§§ 16(a)(1)(C) and 16(a)(1)(D) as alternative bases. None of these subsections authorize 

this court’s interlocutory review of the arbitrator’s refusal to decertify the FLSA 

collective arbitration.

A. FAA § 16(a)(3) does not provide a basis for this court’s 

jurisdiction.

Section 16(a)(3) provides for an immediate appeal of “a final decision with respect 

to an arbitration that is subject to this title.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). “[T]he Supreme Court 

[has] held that the term ‘final decision’ as used in § 16(a)(3) means ‘a decision that ends 

the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the 

judgment.’” Comanche Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. 49, L.L.C., 391 F.3d 1129, 1132 

(10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.—Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 

(2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). A district court order is only 

final within the meaning of § 16(a)(3) if it compels arbitration and dismisses the case 

before it. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 87, n.2 (noting that, “[h]ad the District Court 

entered a stay instead of a dismissal in this case, that order would not be appealable”). 

In 2016, the district court stayed the case underlying this appeal pending 

arbitration. The district court’s order here does not lift that stay and does not dismiss the 

claims before it. Thus, the order LCC seeks to appeal is not final within the meaning of 

§ 16(a)(3), and the court cannot exercise jurisdiction on that basis. See id.; Comanche 

Indian Tribe, 391 F.3d at 1131 (holding that district court order staying the case before it 

and compelling arbitration was not immediately appealable); see also 9 U.S.C. 

§ 16(b)(1)-(3) (prohibiting appeal from “an interlocutory order” that either “grant[s] a 

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stay of any action under section 3 of this title,” “direct[s] arbitration to proceed under 

section 4 of this title,” or “compel[s] arbitration under section 206 of this title”).

LCC relies largely on Lamps Plus in support of its argument that “an order 

compelling class arbitration is a final decision immediately appealable under 

Section 16(a)(3) of the FAA.” [See LCC’s Response to Juris. SCO at 10-13]. LCC’s 

argument misstates the scope of the district court order it seeks to appeal. The district 

court here did not “compel class arbitration”: it compelled arbitration, but left for the 

arbitrator to decide whether plaintiffs could proceed collectively. And, the district court 

here stayed the case before it, whereas the district court in Lamps Plus directed the parties 

to arbitrate their disputes and dismissed the claims before it. See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. 

at 1413-14; cf. Comanche Indian Tribe, 391 F.3d at 1133. 

Further, LCC does not seek to appeal the order compelling arbitration [ECF 

No. 62]. Nor does LCC seek to appeal the district court’s order denying vacatur of the 

arbitrator’s order allowing collective arbitration. See LCC Int’l, Inc., 2018 WL 558141, 

at *10-11. Instead, LCC seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying LCC’s motion 

to vacate the arbitrator’s refusal to decertify collective arbitration of plaintiffs’ FLSA 

claims. See Torgerson, 2020 WL 108706 [ECF No. 110].

Because the district court case remains open pending arbitration, the district 

court’s order is not immediately appealable under § 16(a)(3). See Comanche Indian 

Tribe, 391 F.3d at 1131, 1133.

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B. FAA § 16(a)(1)(C) does not provide a basis for this court’s 

jurisdiction.

Section 16(a)(1)(C) provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from an order 

denying an application . . . to compel arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C). LCC suggests 

that this subsection provides a basis for this court’s jurisdiction because “the relief LCC 

sought from the District Court was an order requiring the parties to arbitrate on an 

individual basis,” whereas the district court—in an order LCC contends is “materially 

indistinguishable” from Lamps Plus—rejected that relief and instead compelled 

arbitration on a classwide basis. LCC again misstates the substance of the order it seeks 

to appeal: the order on appeal refuses to vacate an arbitration order denying LCC’s 

request to decertify collective arbitration of plaintiffs’ FLSA claims; it does not in any 

way deny an application to compel arbitration. [See ECF No. 110].

Further, to the extent LCC cites to Lamps Plus to support this court’s jurisdiction 

under § 16(a)(1)(C), that citation is misplaced. The Supreme Court in Lamps Plus did not 

cite to § 16(a)(1)(C) except in dissent, and then only to illustrate the point that “the 

appellate scheme of the FAA reflects Congress’ policy decision that, if a district court 

determines that arbitration of a claim is called for, there should be no appellate 

interference with the arbitral process unless and until that process has run its course.” 

Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Section 16(a)(1)(C) does not provide a basis for this court to exercise jurisdiction 

over this appeal.

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C. Finally, FAA § 16(a)(1)(D) does not provide a basis for this 

court’s jurisdiction.

Section 16(a)(1)(D) provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from an order 

confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award.” 9 U.S.C. 

§ 16(a)(1)(D). LCC argues that Rule 5 of the AAA Supplementary Rules for Class 

Arbitrations provides that the arbitrator’s order refusing to decertify the collective 

arbitration is a “reasoned, partial final award” that is immediately appealable under 

§ 16(a)(1)(D). Appellees argue that § 16(a)(1)(D) only allows for appeal of a district 

court order reducing an arbitration award to judgment.

The court need not decide whether it would have had jurisdiction under 

§ 16(a)(1)(D) to review the district court’s order refusing to vacate the arbitrator’s Clause 

Construction Award: LCC did not appeal that order. Rather, LCC appeals the district 

court’s order denying LCC’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s order refusing to decertify

the collective arbitration. 

As the district court recognized, LCC’s Motion to Vacate Class Determination 

Award [ECF No. 105] is essentially an untimely motion to reconsider the district court’s 

previous order denying LCC’s Petition to Vacate the Arbitrator’s Final Clause 

Construction Award. Compare LCC Int’l, 2018 WL 558141, at *10-11 (holding that the 

arbitrator did not exceed his authority by denying LCC’s Motion for Clause Construction 

and ruling that the Agreement allows plaintiffs to arbitrate their FLSA claims on a 

collective basis) with Torgerson, 2020 WL 108706, at *1 (“Here we are again. More than 

two years after the court ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute, [LCC] again applies 

for relief from the court’s earlier decision compelling the parties to arbitrate the dispute 

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whether their arbitration agreement authorizes collective arbitration. And, LCC again 

asks the court to vacate the arbitrator’s decision that plaintiffs can assert [FLSA] 

collective action claims on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated in an 

arbitration proceeding against LCC.”); id. at *6-8 (holding that the arbitrator did not 

exceed his authority by ruling that the Agreement allows plaintiffs to arbitrate their FLSA 

claims on a collective basis). And, likewise, the arbitrator’s order denying LCC’s Motion 

to Decertify [ECF No. 106, Ex. 13] is essentially an order denying reconsideration of the 

arbitrator’s own June 30, 2017 Order on Threshold Matters and on Respondent’s Motion 

for Clause Construction Award [ECF No. 106, Ex. 8] and/or his March 16, 2018 Order 

on Claimants’ Motion for Conditional Certification of Collective Claims and Proposed 

Notice [ECF No. 107, Ex. E.].

Thus, even if the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations apply to a 

collective—as opposed to a class—arbitration and even if those rules contemplate 

judicial review of the arbitrator’s Clause Construction Award, see Supplementary Rule 3, 

and of its Class Determination Award, see Supplementary Rule 5(d), the AAA’s 

Supplementary Rules do not provide for judicial review of the arbitrator’s denial of an 

untimely motion to reconsider either. Cf. Carpenter v. The Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 

1191 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that, in the context of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, “[a]n order that 

leaves class-action status unchanged from what was determined by a prior order is not an 

order ‘granting or denying class certification’” and does not “trigger another period for 

seeking interlocutory appeal”).

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Section 16(a)(1)(D) does not apply and does not provide a basis for this court to 

exercise jurisdiction over LCC’s appeal. 

* * *

LCC has not established a basis for this court to exercise jurisdiction over this 

interlocutory appeal. Following the conclusion of the arbitration, LCC “may return to the 

district court to seek a review of the award under the criteria laid out in 9 U.S.C. § 10.” 

See Comanche Indian Tribe, 391 F.3d at 1133. Following such a review, either LCC or 

appellees “may appeal to this court and raise challenges to the district court’s order . . . .” 

Id.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court

CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

by: Lisa A. Lee

 Counsel to the Clerk

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