Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01533/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01533-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The Court sua sponte substitutes James A. Yates, the current warden at Pleasant Valley State

Prison, in place of Gail Lewis, the former warden. Additionally, the Court DISMISSES former

California Attorney General, and current State Treasurer, Bill Lockyer from this case as an improper

party because he is not a proper respondent. See Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (state officer having

custody of petitioner is proper respondent). 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER LEON BAKER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 04-CV-1533 H

(BLM)

ORDER ADOPTING

REPORTS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS AND

DENYING PETITION

vs.

JAMES A. YATES,

1

 Warden,

Defendant.

Petitioner Christopher Leon Baker, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.)

Respondent answered the petition on November 15, 2004. (Doc. No. 10.) On February

17, 2005, Petitioner filed a traverse and supporting memorandum. (Doc. Nos. 19, 20.)

On July 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a supplement to his traverse regarding DNA testing

results (“Suppl. Traverse”). (Doc. No. 25.) Respondent filed a supplemental answer

on July 26, 2005. (Doc. No. 27.) The Magistrate Judge issued her first report and

recommendation (“R&R1”) proposing denial of the petition on November 17, 2005.

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 The Court notes that Petitioner filed an application for enlargement of time to file objections

to the R&R on December 12, 2005. (Doc. No. 29.) Because Petitioner’s objections to the R&R were

filed and accepted by the Court on January 10, 2006, Petitioner’s application for additional time is

moot. 

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(Doc. No. 28.) Petitioner filed his objections to R&R1 on January 10, 2006.2 (Doc. No.

30.) Respondent did not file a reply to Petitioner’s objections. On April 21, 2006, the

Court ordered Respondent to apprise the Court of the results of additional DNA testing.

(Doc. No. 31.) Respondent filed a copy of the report on supplemental DNA testing on

June 20, 2006. (Doc. No. 35.) On July 20, 2006, the Court granted in part Petitioner’s

objections to R&R1 and granted his request to expand the record to include

supplemental DNA testing. (Doc. No. 36.) Further, the Court referred the matter back

to the Magistrate Judge to issue an additional report and recommendation in light of

the expanded record. (Id.)

After the Magistrate Judge ordered further briefing regarding the most recent

DNA testing results, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief in support of his petition

(“Suppl. Brief”) on August 29, 2006. (Doc. No. 39.) On October 25, 2006,

Respondent filed a second supplemental answer to the petition. (Doc. No. 44.) The

Magistrate Judge ordered a second round of additional briefing, and Respondent filed

a supplemental memorandum of points and authorities on February 9, 2007. (Doc. No.

49.) Petitioner filed a second supplemental brief on April 11, 2007 (“2nd Suppl.

Brief”). (Doc. No. 53.) The Magistrate Judge issued a supplemental Report and

Recommendation (“R&R2”) proposing denial of the petition on June 15, 2007. (Doc.

No. 54.) Petitioner has not filed any objections to R&R2.

For the reasons stated below, the Court ADOPTS the Reports and

Recommendations and DENIES Petitioner’s petition. Further, the Court DENIES

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

State Proceedings

On January 20, 2000, the government filed a twelve count information in San

Diego Superior Court (Superior Court Case No. SCD 146719), charging Petitioner and

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 The information lists two counts of robbery within count seven: one committed against

Elizabeth J. and the other against Nikolas S.

4

 Only Petitioner was charged with counts ten, eleven, and twelve. 

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co-defendant Deandre MauriceLambertwith conspiracy (CaliforniaPenalCode (“PC”)

§ 182(a)(1)) (count one), forcible rape (PC § 261(a)(2)) (count two), forcible rape while

acting in concert (PC §§ 261(a)(2) and 264.1) (count three), sodomy by use of force

(PC § 286(c)(2)) (count four), sodomy while acting in concert (PC § 286(d)) (count

five), attempted rape by foreign object (PC §§ 289(a)(1) and 664) (count six), robbery

(PC § 211) (counts seven and eight),3 burglary (PC § 459) (count nine), receiving

stolen property (PC § 496(a)) (count ten), possession of a firearm by a felon (PC

§ 12021(a)(1)) (count eleven), and resisting an officer (PC § 148(a)(1)) (count twelve).4

(Lodgment 1, Clerk’s Transcript, Vol. 1 (“CT1”) at 12-24.) 

On February 1, 2000, a jury convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit first

degree robbery, rape, burglary, forcible rape, forcible rape while acting in concert,

sodomy by use of force, sodomy while acting in concert, attempted rape by foreign

object, attempted robbery of Elizabeth J., first degree robbery of Nikolas S., residential

burglary, receiving stolen property, possession of firearm by felon, and resisting an

officer. (Lodgment 2, Clerk’s Transcript, Vol. 2 (“CT2”) at 205-06.) The superior

court sentenced Petitioner to a term of thirty-five years to life plus twenty-six years on

September 28, 2000. (CT2 at 397-99.) 

On May 31, 2001, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment 11.) On the same day, Petitioner also filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, along with a request that the Petition

be consolidated with his pending appeal. (Lodgment 12.) The appellate court

consolidated Petitioner’s appeal with his habeas petition before denying the habeas

petition and affirming the conviction on April 24, 2002. (Lodgment 15, People v.

Baker, D036645.) On May 10, 2002, Petitioner appealed the appellate court’s decision

to the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 16.) The court denied review on July 10,

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 When Petitioner filed this habeas petition is unclear because the lodged copy does not contain

a legible file stamp. (Lodgment 18.) 

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2002. (Lodgment 17, People v. Baker, S107022.) 

Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in state superior court.5 (Lodgment 18.)

The petition was denied on July 11, 2003. (Lodgment 19, In re Baker, HC 17426, SCD

146719.) On August 11, 2003, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in state appellate

court. (Lodgment 20.) The state appellate court denied the petition on September 10,

2003, adopting the state superior court’s order. (Lodgment 21, In re Baker, D042686.)

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on October 14, 2003.

(Lodgment 22.) The California Supreme Court denied his petition on June 30, 2004,

stating in full: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.” (Lodgment 23, In re

Baker, S119680 (citing In re Clark 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993); In re Miller, 17 Cal.2d 734

(1941).) 

Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion in

People v. Baker, D036645 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002):

At approximately 12:30 a.m. on July 26, 1999, Elizabeth J., a

20-year-old college student, arrived at the apartment of her boyfriend

Nikolas S. In the Mission Beach area of San Diego. Elizabeth parked her

car in the driveway. Nikolas was in the process of making dinner and was

using a butcher knife to prepare the meal. 

After about 20 to 30 minutes, Elizabeth returned to her car for a

video movie and her overnight bag. While at the car, she noticed a black

Lexus drive by. The Lexus had dark tinted windows and shiny wheel rims.

The car was going about 15 to 20 miles per hour in a northward direction.

Deandre Lambert was the driver. Defendant and appellant Christopher

Leon Baker was the passenger. Both men looked at Elizabeth in a way that

she felt was odd. She returned to the apartment and entered through the

kitchen door. 

Fifteen to twenty minutes later, appellant and Lambert entered the

apartment through the kitchen door. Appellant kept his hand under his

shirt. He said he had a gun under the shirt and stated: “I have a gun. Don’t

make me shoot you.” Elizabeth believed him. Nikolas believed it was a

gun. Appellant followed Elizabeth, Nikolas and Lambert into the

livingroom. He was holding the large knife Nikolas had used to prepare

dinner. He waved the knife in the air and threatened Elizabeth and Nikolas

with it. 

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Appellant told Elizabeth and Nikolas to “get down.” One of the men

yelled: “Who else is here? Who else is home?” Appellant then picked

Elizabeth up by the pants and asked: “Where’s the money? Where’s the

money?” 

Lambert approached Nikolas and threatened to shoot him. He hit

him on the side of the head with his fist. Lambert and appellant made the

couple lie on the living room floor for about two minutes during which

time they threatened to shoot and cut them. They then took the couple into

Nikolas’s bedroom where Elizabeth was made to bend over on the bed and

Nikolas was forced to kneel down.

 

As they continued to ransack the bedroom, appellant and Lambert

demanded money, guns, and drugs. Lambert struck Nikolas on the side of

the head three or four times. Nikolas told appellant and Lambert about a

box in the closet which contained about $100 in bills and Italian lire from

a trip to Italy. He saw appellant take this money and then go through his

wallet. He later discovered $20 had been taken from the wallet. 

Elizabeth told appellant and Lambert she had no money but did have

marijuana in her overnight bag in the kitchen. Appellant shoved and

wrestled her into the kitchen but when she produced a small amount of the

drug, he became upset and said: “Oh, you want to play games? Well, you

know, let’s play games.” He demanded she remove all of her clothing,

which she did. 

Appellant took Elizabeth into Nikolas’s roommate’s room and made

her lie down on the bed as he and Lambert searched the room. Lambert

had previously made Nikolas put his head under his bed so he could not

see what was happening.

When Lambert left the room, appellant demanded Elizabeth spread

her legs. He attempted to insert a plastic bottle of foot spray in her vagina.

He stopped because the bottle was too large. He left the room and returned

a minute later, again demanding she spread her legs. He put his penis in

her vagina, hurting her “very bad.” This lasted a minute or two. She told

him she needed to go to the bathroom. He stated: “Well, go pee. Go pee

or else I’ll cut you.” 

Lambert came into the room and told appellant there was no money

and they should leave. Lambert’s voice was getting louder. Appellant

tried to put his penis in Elizabeth’s anus and partially succeeded. She

screamed and appellant and Lambert left. 

Elizabeth curled up in a ball on the bed until she and Nikolas were

sure appellant and Lambert were gone. She then went into the bathroom

and noticed there was blood on her legs. She bled throughout the night. 

Nikolas called 911 and gave a description of the intruders and their

car. 

About sundown the evening before, appellant had arrived at a party

about a mile from Nikolas’s apartment. He arrived as a passenger in a

black Lexus sedan with shiny wheel rims and tinted windows. Lambert

had not been invited to the party but had been dating Terri Hazzard, the

person giving the party.

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Between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m., Jason Riley, who was waiting for a girl

he had arranged to see at the Hazzard party, noticed a black Lexus sedan

in the parking lot. He was not sure the car had been there when he left

earlier for the liquor store. About 10 minutes later, appellant, who had

been standing with a shorter man, approached Riley and asked for a ride.

Riley knew him slightly. They left in Riley’s girlfriend’s black Mazda

sedan. Riley drove down Mission Bay Drive to Interstate 8. 

As Riley and appellant reached the on ramp to Interstate 8, they were

spotted by San Diego Police Officer David Achenbach, who had heard the

descriptions of the suspects and their vehicle from Nikolas’s home

invasion. He called for backup support and pulled along side the Mazda.

He could clearly see appellant. As the Mazda pulled onto Interstate 805

south, one of the police officers activated his car’s overhead lights to stop

Riley. Riley took the first exit and stopped the car. He surrendered but

appellant ran down the sidewalk between two buildings. A neighborhood

search began and lasted about an hour. A red baseball cap and fanny pack

appellant was wearing were found on a walkway between the two

buildings. The fanny pack contained $21 in assorted change, a loaded

pistol stolen earlier that year and a watch belonging to Nikolas’s

roommate. 

 At about 2:30 a.m. James Pfeiffer was working on his trucks at his

North Park home when he saw police all over the area. He allowed police

to come up to his roof to look around. He then went into his house. As he

prepared to get ready for bed, his wife heard something and his dog “just

went nuts.” Pfeiffer went outside to check on the noise and encountered

appellant standing on a stairway. Appellant told him “Shut up. Give me

your phone and I’ll give you 50 bucks.” Pfeiffer responded “I’ll be right

back.” He returned with a shotgun. Appellant was arrested. The time of

the arrest was 2:50 a.m. 

Appellant told the police his name was Randy Smith. When

searched, he had in his possession two $20 bills, three $5 bills, two $1

bills, three silver dollars, four 50 cent pieces, five Susan B. Anthony

dollars and an Italian 50 lire piece. Five $20 bills were found in his sock.

Nikolas’s roommate later identified several of the 50 cent pieces, some

silver dollars and Susan B. Anthony coins as those taken from his room.

Police located Hazzard’s Lexus. Appellant’s prints were on the

driver’s side of the trunk lid. Lambert’s were on the driver’s side door

handle and passenger side of the trunk lid. 

On the afternoon of July 27, appellant telephoned Terri Hazzard.

When she asked why he had taken her car, he did not answer. He did,

however, want to know what happened when police came to her residence.

(Lodgment 15 at 1-5.)

Discussion

Petitioner asserts three claims in his federal petition. He claims: (1) the trial

court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it denied his request

for appointment of new counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 123-24

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 While Petitioner lists his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as two separate grounds

for relief in his petition, the Court will address them together. 

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(1970) (holding that, although the right to discharge court-appointed counsel and

substitute new counsel is within the discretion of the trial court, defendant is entitled

to new counsel if the defendant’s right to counsel would be substantially impaired by

continuing with the original attorney); (2) the trial court violated his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights when it denied his request to represent himself pursuant

to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that defendant has a Sixth

Amendment right to conduct his own defense, provided he knowingly and intelligently

waives his right to counsel); and (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his attorney: (a) failed to adequately investigate and present his case, including

his decision not to request DNA testing, (b) opposed Petitioner’s requests for a new

attorney and to represent himself, and (c) failed to call Elizabeth J.’s attending

physician to rebut the testimony of the Sexual Assault Response Team (“SART”)

nurse.6 Additionally, in his supplemental briefing, Petitioner asserts that postconviction DNA results substantiate his ineffective assistance claims and show that he

is innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted.

1. Standards of Review

A. Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects

to any portion of the report, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id. The Court reviews de

novo the magistrate judge’s conclusions of law. Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School

Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled on other grounds by United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Scope of Review of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition 

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of review

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for federal habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State Court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West Supp. 2003).

This action is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

as amended by the AEDPA:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A state court’s decision may be found “contrary to” clearly established Supreme

Court precedent: “(1) if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set of forth in [the Court’s] cases or (2) if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at

a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-06 (2000). A state-court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular

state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. Alternatively, an unreasonable application may be

found “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme

Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses

to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

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concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly . . . . Rather, that application

must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003)

(internal quotationmarks and citations omitted). Clearly established federal law “refers

to the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. A state court need not cite to Supreme Court precedent in

ruling on a habeas corpus petition. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). Indeed, the

state court need not even be aware “of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Id.

Habeas relief is also available if the state court’s adjudication of a claim,

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in state court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). In order to

satisfy this provision, Petitioner must demonstrate that the factual finding upon which

the state court’s adjudication of his claim rests, assuming it rests on a factual

determination, is objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003). This Court will presume the state court’s factual findings are correct, and

Petitioner may overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Finally, where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the

Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a

basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of

the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyear, 538

U.S. at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Analysis

A. Petitioner’s Request for New Counsel

Petitioner’s first claim is that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated when the trial court denied his request for new counsel. (Pet. at 8.) Petitioner

argued at trial that his counsel was unprepared, and he argues that the trial court

conducted an inadequate inquiry about counsel’s performance. Id. Petitioner also

asserts that, because his attorney was not adequately prepared, he did not represent

Petitioner adequately. (Traverse at 20-23.) 

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel is properly addressed in federal

habeas review because it implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

See e.g., Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2000). In reviewing a denial

of a request for substitute counsel, courts must consider “(1) the timeliness of the

motion; (2) the adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry; and (3) the extent of the conflict

created.” United States v. Nguyen, 262 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Schell, 218

F.3d at 1025. The trial court must conduct an “appropriate inquiry into the grounds for

such a motion, and [ ] the matter [must] be resolved on the merits before the case goes

forward.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025. A federal court conducting habeas review must

determine the constitutional question of whether the state trial court’s denial of the

Marsden motion “actually violated [the petitioner’s] constitutional rights in that the

conflict between [the defendant] and his attorney had become so great that it resulted

in a total lack of communication or other significant impediment that resulted in turn

in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth

Amendment.” Id. at 1026; see also LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1276-77 (9th

Cir. 1998) (noting particularly the Supreme Court’s instruction that a defendant has no

right to a meaningful relationship with counsel, but only a right to an ability to

communicate). 

The Supreme Court hasstated that the Sixth Amendment requires that an accused

have “‘counsel acting in the role of an advocate.’” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

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648, 656-67 (1984) (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967)). “[T]he

essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal

defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the

lawyer whom he prefers.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); see also

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that there is no automatic

right to new counsel simply because a defendant is dissatisfied). 

Under Nunnemaker, because the state supreme court summarily denied

Petitioner’s petition for review, (Lodgment 17), the Court must review the state

appellate court’s opinion on this issue. 501 U.S. at 801-06. In denying Petitioner’s

appeal, the state appellate court reviewed the record of Petitioner’s Marsden hearing

and explained: 

As we have pointed out, appellant met with his attorney, obtained

the preliminary hearing transcript and was provided the materials

necessary for discovery. Counsel followed leads supplied by the

appellant, without success. An eyewitness expert called by codefendant

Lambert was used by appellant’s counsel. 

Nor does the record support the conclusion appellant and counsel

had an irreconcilable conflict. In essence, appellant argued below that he

did not trust his counsel, who he felt was not safeguarding his rights. He

wanted him ‘checked out.’ These are not sufficient bases to support

substitution of counsel (internal citations omitted).

(Lodgment 15 at 9-11.)

First, the record does not reveal a conflict or total lack of communication

between Petitioner and his attorney; in fact, it establishes that counsel advocated for

Petitioner and assisted his defense. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026. The record establishes

that Petitioner and his attorney were communicating and met on several occasions for

a total of approximately 90 minutes. (Lodgment 5, Reporter’s Appeal Transcript, Vol.

1A (“RT, Vol. 1A”), at 9-15.) Petitioner never indicated an inability or even an

unwillingness to communicate with his counsel, nor did he describe the existence of

any significant impediment in their attorney-client relationship. (See e.g., id. at 7.)

Rather, Petitioner merely complained that he did not believe his attorney had

adequately prepared, that more investigation should have been done, and that he was

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concerned his attorney withheld evidence. (Id. at 1-19.) The trial court addressed each

of Petitioner’s concerns at the Marsden hearing, even ordering the production of

redacted discovery. (Id. at 15.) Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Petitioner

was generally dissatisfied with counsel’s performance and the evidence supporting his

defense up to the point of the Marsden hearing. (Id. at 1-19.) Without more, this is

insufficient to require the appointment of new counsel. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026;

Nguyen, 262 F.3d at 1004. 

Second, the record further supports the appellate court’s conclusion that

Petitioner’s Marsden hearing and the court’s denial of Petitioner’s request complied

with the Sixth Amendment. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025. Over the course of a

two-day Marsden hearing, the trial court conducted a thorough and appropriate inquiry

into Petitioner’s request and allegations. (Lodgment 4, Reporter’s Appeal Transcript,

Vol. 1 (“RT, Vol. 1") and RT, Vol. 1A.) At the hearing, Petitioner raised several

allegations to support his motion for new counsel, essentially arguing that counsel had

not prepared diligently and that his decision not to request DNA testing had prejudiced

Petitioner. (RT, Vol. 1A, at 1-19.) The trial court determined, however, that counsel

had met with Petitioner for at least 90 minutes leading up to trial and had complied

with Petitioner’s requests concerning discovery. (Id. at 7, 14-16.) Petitioner’s attorney

also explained that he had hired an investigator, but there was not much investigation

to be conducted given Petitioner’s factual statements and other evidence in the case.

(Id. at 9-13.) He also explained that none of Petitioner’s suggested leads had proved

helpful to his case. (Id.). Finally, as both the trial and appellate courts noted, defense

counsel’s recitation of the facts and handling of the case in general, both at the

Marsden hearing at throughout trial, demonstrated that he was sufficiently prepared to

represent Petitioner adequately. 

Finally, Petitioner did not request new counsel until the day trial was scheduled

to begin. (RT, Vol. 1, at 4-5.) As the trial court noted, Petitioner’s late request, if

granted, would have been disruptive to the trial schedule and his co-defendant. (RT,

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Vol. 1A, at 30.)

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the state court’s denial of

Petitioner’s request for new counsel was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see

also Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner relief

as to this claim. 

B. Petitioner’s Request for Self-Representation

Petitioner next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request to

represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). (Pet. at 7.)

The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant in a state-court proceeding has an

absolute right to be represented by counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806, 807. This right

also implicitly guarantees the corresponding right to self-representation. Id. at 821,

832; United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004). In order to

successfully invoke the right to self-representation, the defendant’s waiver of counsel

must be “timely, not for the purposes of delay, unequivocal, and knowing and

intelligent.” Erskine, 355 F.3d at 1167. 

While the Supreme Court did not specifically address the timeliness requirement

in Faretta, it did state a request made “weeks before trial,” 422 U.S. at 807, or one made

“well before the date of trial,” id. at 835, would be sufficient. In light of the ambiguity

in Faretta, the Ninth Circuit has held that courts are free to establish their own

timeliness standards so long as they comport with the Supreme Court’s holding in

Faretta. Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2005). In Marshall, the Ninth

Circuit addressed the timeliness issue in the context of a habeas appeal, upholding a

California court of appeal decision that a Faretta request made the morning of trial was

untimely. Id. at 1061. The court noted that “because the request fell well inside the

‘weeks before trial’ standard established by Faretta, the [state] court of appeal’s finding

of untimeliness clearly comports with Supreme Court precedent.” 

Here, the facts are similar to those in Marshall. Petitioner did not indicate his

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desire to represent himself until January 19, 2000, the day that trial was scheduled to

begin. (RT, Vol. 1A, at 19.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s request as untimely.

(Id. at 19, 21, 29-30.) The appellate court stated:

To be deemed timely, it should have been brought within a

reasonable time prior to trial. (Internal citation omitted.) It was

incumbent upon appellant to explain the reason for the late request,

demonstrate his need for the request was of recent origin and show there

was a basis for dissatisfaction with trial counsel. (Internal citations

omitted). 

Here the principle [sic] basis for appellant’s request was that he had

not reviewed all the evidence. The trial court confirmed appellant was

aware of the evidence and witnesses presented at the preliminary hearing

and assured appellant he would have the police reports to examine the

next morning. Given the concerns articulated by appellant and the late

request to represent himself, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his Farretta [sic] motion as untimely.

 

(Lodgment 15 at 11-12.)

Petitioner argues that he was unable to bring his motion at an earlier date due to

his counsel’s “deceit and lack of communication.” (Traverse at 26.) Petitioner

provides no specific support for these allegations, however, and the record reveals the

opposite to be true. For instance, as the Court noted above, Petitioner’s Marsden

hearing revealed that his counsel had supplied him with investigative reports and that

they had met on at least three separate occasions for approximately 90 minutes before

trial. (RT, Vol. 1A, at 7, 14-16.) Furthermore, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate a

sufficient basis for dissatisfaction with counsel. Based on this evidence and the record

as a whole, the Court concludes that Petitioner was not prohibited from bringing his

motion for self-representation in a more timely manner. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s

claim regarding his Faretta motion was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see

also Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Therefore, the Court DENIES Petitioner relief on

this claim.

/ / / 

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C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Next, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. First,

he claims that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present his case.

(Pet. at 6.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that his attorney failed to follow up on leads,

failed to retain experts, and failed to have evidence tested for DNA matches and

exclusions. (Id.) As additional support, Petitioner asserts that the results of postconviction DNA testing substantiate these ineffective assistance allegations and prove

that he did not commit the crimes of which he was convicted. (See Suppl. Traverse at

2 (arguing that “newly discovered” DNA results from bed sheet excluded Petitioner as

source of DNA found on bed sheet); Suppl. Brief at 2-3, 5 (although DNA testing on

wristwatch, hairsrecovered frombed, and victim’s sweatpants do not affect Petitioner’s

claims, arguing that absence of victim’s blood and DNA from Petitioner’s penile and

pubic swabs proves he did not have intercourse with the victim); 2nd Suppl. Brief at

2-5 (arguing that DNA results from penile and pubic swabs prove beyond reasonable

doubt that Petitioner is innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted). Second,

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his Marsden

and Faretta hearings because his attorney allegedly lied to the court about his trial

preparation. (Pet. at 6; Traverse at 19-27.) Third, Petitioner contends that the failure

of his trial counsel to call a particular witness for the purposes of impeaching the

testimony of another witness also resulted in the ineffective assistance of counsel. (Pet.

at 9-9a; Traverse at 27-28.) 

The Supreme Court established the applicable law governing the ineffective

assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First,

Petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687. “This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”

Id. Second, Petitioner must establish counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. Id. This requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious they

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deprived Petitioner “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To satisfy this

standard,Petitioner must show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding

would have been different but for the error. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;Williams, 529

U.S. at 406. The prejudice analysis is to be considered in light of the strength of the

prosecution’s case. See Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 2002), amended,

311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). 

As noted above, Petitioner filed two separate habeas petitions with state courts.

In the first, he raised the first two aspects of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

and in his second habeas petition, he raised his last ineffective assistance of counsel

argument. Because the California Supreme Court summarily rejected both habeas

petitions, the Court must “look through” to the California Court of Appeal’s decision

as the basis for its analysis for the first two ineffective assistance of counsel claims and

to the California Superior Court’s decision for the last ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, as Petitioner’s second habeas petition also was summarily rejected by the

California court of appeal. See Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 801-06. Having considered

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the relevant state-court

decisions, the Court will now address each in turn. 

i. Failure to Investigate and Present Testimony

Petitioner’s first claim is that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his

case. (Pet. at 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that his attorney failed to interview

all persons at the Hazzard party to locate the real perpetrator, failed to locate

Petitioner’s girlfriend who may have testified to having given Petitioner an Italian coin,

and failed to explain to the jury that Petitioner fled from the police prior to his arrest

because he was on parole and there was an active arrest warrant for him unrelated to

this matter. (Traverse at 12-14.) Petitioner also argues that his attorney was ineffective

because he declined to have DNA testing done on evidence found at the crime scene.

Id. at 15-17. Since filing his traverse, Petitioner has had DNA testing done that he

asserts excludes him as a source of DNA found on evidence recovered from the crime

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scene. (Suppl. Traverse at 2; Suppl. Brief; 2nd Suppl. Brief.) Petitioner argues that the

lack of DNA testing prejudiced him because numerous people are exonerated by

negative DNA results. (Traverse at 15-18; Suppl. Brief; 2nd Suppl. Brief. ) 

In denying this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellate court stated:

With respect to communication with counsel, the record reflects

counsel and appellant met three times for 30 minutes each. He was able

to tell counsel what he wanted to tell him and by the time of the trial he

had received the preliminary hearing transcript and had met with the

investigator. Notably, trial counsel indicated he and the investigator met

with appellant twice and attempted to do the things appellant wanted

done. Unfortunately, nothing he wanted done was fruitful for the defense.

Appellant urges trial counsel could have conducted more

investigation, called additional witnesses and been a more effective

speaker and advocate. However, counsel did have all discovery available,

hired a private investigator, presented exculpatory witnesses and used the

eyewitness identification expert called by his codefendant Lambert.

While appellant counsel presents additional steps that could have been

taken, such as testing DNA and hiring a DNA expert, such additions

might well have produced results appellant was not willing to confront.

Trial counsel concluded the case required no motions or experts beyond

that produced by Lambert. Indeed, he noted the People had not

completely tested DNA and he did not wish to elaborate on DNA matches.

He noted the facts of the case were simple. Based on the record, we

conclude trial counsel’s case preparation and presentation were

reasonable. 

In any event, we conclude no prejudice resulted to appellant due to

trial counsel’s representation. We simply cannot say the result of the case

would have been any different if the alleged ineffectiveness was present.

The evidence against appellant was overwhelming. Elizabeth and Nikolas

had ample opportunities to see their attackers and they both positively

identified appellant as the home invader and assailant of Elizabeth.

Appellant had access to a black Lexus and that Lexus was described by

Elizabeth as the one she saw appellant in. His fingerprints were on the

drivers’ side of the trunk lid and Lambert’s were on the drivers’ door

handle and passenger side of the trunk lid. Unique personal property such

as the Italian lire matching that taken in the robbery was found on

appellant a the time of his arrest. Denominations of money matched that

taken. Appellant ran from police when stopped, offered a member of the

public $50 not to turn him in and gave a false name to police when

arrested. A red hat found near the scene of appellant’s arrest was

identified by Elizabeth as that worn by appellant during the crimes. Given

the overwhelming nature of the evidence and its solid evidentiary value,

we are hard-pressed to believe anything suggested by appellant now could

have changed the outcome of the case. 

. . . .

Moreover, with respect to appellant’s argument there had been no

DNA testing, his counsel explained the DNA sample was not sufficient

to link appellant to the crime and he felt it would jeopardize appellant if

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he insisted on further testing. He gave a detailed explanation of what he

had done and why his efforts had or had not been fruitful.

Appellant urges that if we conclude the record does not support

ineffective counsel it is because counsel inaccurately stated he was ready

for trial when he was not. As we have pointed out in the preceding

argument, the record of the trial does not support such an assertion. 

Lodgment 15, at 7-10.

a. Failure to Investigate

The Supreme Court has held that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). Choosing to forego a

particular investigation must be a “reasoned choice.” Id. While a lawyer’s failure to

investigate crucial witnesses may indicate an inadequate investigation, “counsel need

not interview every possible witness to have performed proficiently.” Riley v. Payne,

352 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Huffington v. Nuth, 140 F.3d 572, 580

(4th Cir. 1998) (noting that “the failure to investigate everyone whose name happens

to be mentioned by the defendant does not suggest ineffective assistance.”). “Strategic

choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options

are virtually unchallengeable . . . .” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

As detailed above, Petitioner’s trial counsel described at some length the extent

of his pre-trial investigations when questioned by the trial court judge at the Marsden

hearing. (RT, Vol. 1A.) Despite efforts of both trial counsel and the retained

investigator, potential leads did not yield any helpful information to Petitioner’s

defense. (Id. at 9-13, 17-19.) Additionally, none of the additional investigation

suggested by Petitioner involved crucialwitnesses or critical information. For instance,

the testimony of Petitioner’s former girlfriend that she may have given him an Italian

coin is weak in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. (Traverse at 12-14.)

Moreover, trial counsel stated in his declaration that Petitioner never told him to

contact his former girlfriend, that Petitioner did not provide any facts or witnesses to

establish an alibi, that Petitioner decided not to testify, and that although he tried to

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7

 The Court finds that Petitioner exhausted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised

on his attorney’s decision not to request DNA testing on evidence obtained from the crime scene. (See

Lodgment 17.) Even though the post-conviction DNA results could be considered new evidence not

presented to the state courts, “new factual allegations do not render a claim unexhausted unless they

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locate additional witnesses, he was unsuccessful because they were uncooperative,

unhelpful, or damaging to Petitioner’s case . (CT2 at 301-303.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his attorney was constitutionally

deficient in his conduct. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520. The appellate court determined

that “trial counsel’s preparation and presentation were reasonable.” (Lodgment 15 at

8.) Furthermore, some of the challenged decisions to not pursue certain avenues were

reasonable tactical decisions made by trial counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690;

Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (determining tactical decision to

allow jury to learn defendant was in custody was reasonable and did not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, in light of the presumption that trial

counsel’s performance was within the broad range of constitutionally reasonable

representation, the Court concludes that the appellant court did not commit an

unreasonable application of clearly established law in denying Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel on these grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

b. DNA Evidence

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to obtain

DNA testing results. Further, in supplemental briefing, Petitioner asserts that the

results of post-conviction DNA testing substantiate his ineffective assistance claim and

show that he is innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted. (Suppl. Traverse at

2; Suppl. Brief at 2-3, 5; 2nd Suppl. Brief at 2-5.) The Court has already granted

Petitioner’s request to expand the record to include the results of the post-conviction

DNA testing. As explained below, considering the DNA results, trial counsel’s

decision not to pursue DNA testing was a reasoned tactical decision entitled to

deference.7 See, e.g., Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (trial

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‘fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts.’” Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d

1459, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), overruled on other

grounds, 8 U.S.C. § 2254(c). Here, the DNA results do not fundamentally alter Petitioner’s claim, and

the state courts had the opportunity to review the ineffective assistance claim premised on the lack of

DNA testing. Additionally, the Court previously expanded the record to include the DNA test results.

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counsel’s tactical decisions deserve deference when counsel bases trial conduct on

strategic considerations, makes an informed decision based upon investigation, and the

decision appears reasonable under the circumstances).

(1) Summary of Post Conviction DNA Testing

In his supplemental traverse, Petitioner submitted the results of DNA testing

conducted on a bed sheet taken from the crime scene. (Suppl. Traverse, Ex. B.) The

victim and Petitioner were excluded as possible sources of the DNA material present

on the bed sheet. 

Next, at the request of Petitioner’s state court-appointed counsel, Forensic

Science Associates conducted DNA testing on several items of evidence related to

Petitioner’s criminal case: (1) a wristwatch bearing the inscription “With All My Heart,

Love Jen” belonging to the male victim’s roommate; (2) black sweatpants worn by

Elizabeth J. and two cuttings taken from the pants; (3) hairs recovered from a bed sheet

found at the crime scene; and (4) biological material recovered from Petitioner’s penile

and pubic swabs. (See Suppl. Report on DNA Testing)

After testing the wristwatch, Forensic Science Associates concluded that neither

Elizabeth J. nor Petitioner were likely contributors to the trace level alleles detected in

the wristwatch samples. (Id. at 30-31.) Further, the report stated: “It is not apparent

that the cellular debris from the wrist watch . . . can contribute to resolving

[Petitioner’s] claim in this case.” (Id. at 32.) Regarding the sweatpants, the report

concluded that the limited quantity of spermatozoa collected from the samples was

inadequate for successful genetic analysis. (Id. at 15-21.) Accordingly, the lab did not

perform any additional testing on the samples. (Id. at 18, 20-22.) As to the hairs

collected from the bed sheet, Forensic Science Associates found that two short hairs

collected were capable of mitochondrial DNA analysis. (Id. at 22-23.) Nevertheless,

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the lab did not perform further analysis because “found hairs on bedding from the

victim in this case can only provide inculpatory evidence; it cannot provide exculpatory

evidence that could logically undermine any defendant’s prior conviction because it

cannot be proven that these hairs originate from an assailant.” (Id. at 23.) In sum, as

Petitioner concedes, the results of testing on the wristwatch, sweatpants, and hair

samples were inconclusive and do not affect his claims. (Suppl. Brief at 2-3.)

Finally, the lab tested two penile swabs and two pubic swabs collected from

Petitioner upon his arrest. (Id. at 6-9.) Of the two penile swabs submitted for testing,

one had been consumed during previous examinations conducted by the San Diego

Police Department. The other penile swab was entirely intact, however, and

microscopic examination revealed a low level of epithelial cells, a moderate number

of dermal cells, and no spermatozoa. (Id. at 6-8.) DNA analysis revealed that the

genetic material obtained from the penile swab matched Petitioner’s genetic profile.

(Id. at 29.) Of the two pubic swabs, one was unconsumed, and microscopic

examination revealed a low level of dermal cells and no spermatozoa. (Id. at 9.) The

report stated that the pubic swab may have contained a trace level of DNA from a

second party, but Elizabeth J. was eliminated as the source of this genetic material. (Id.

at 30.) In sum, the lab concluded that Elizabeth J.’s cellular material was absent from

the penile and pubic swabs. (Id. at 31.) The report also noted that “vaginal epithelial

cells survive on an unwashed post coital penis for approximately one to two days after

intercourse.” (Id. at 3.)

(2) Counsel’s Decision Not to RequestAdditional DNA

Testing

The decision whether to request DNA testing is a tactical decision. See e.g.,

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that it was not

ineffective assistance where counsel did not move to exclude genetic-marker testing

evidence on basis that the scientific method was unreliable where counsel challenged

the evidence in other ways). Reasoned tactical decisions are entitled to deference.

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Ratelle, 21 F.3d at 1456. “Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to

make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520. Finally, as the Supreme Court has explained, “strategic

choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options

are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

With regard to trial counsel’s decision not to request additional DNA testing, the

appellate court stated: 

While appellant counsel presents additional steps that could have been

taken, such as testing DNA and hiring a DNA expert, such additions

might well have produced results appellant was not willing to confront.

Trial counsel concluded the case required no motions or experts beyond

that produced by Lambert. Indeed, he noted the People had not

completely tested DNA and he did not wish to elaborate on DNA matches.

He noted the facts of the case were simple. Based on the record, we

conclude trial counsel’s case preparation and presentation were

reasonable. 

(Lodgment 15 at 8.)

Here, trial counsel made a reasoned, strategic choice not to pursue DNA testing

at trial. (RT, Vol. 1A, at 13, 17-19, 28-29.) In explaining his reasoning, trial counsel

told the trial judge that he did not know what the result of the testing would be, and

because the government did not have any DNA evidence supporting its allegations, he

preferred to argue to the jury that the government had no physical evidence and had

done a poor job investigating the case. (Id.) Thus, trial counsel expressly adopted a

trial strategy for which the fact that the biological evidence had not been tested was

crucial: that the prosecution’s case was completely lacking in DNA, blood, or

fingerprint evidence connecting Petitioner to the crime. (Id.; Lodgment 10 at 18-19

(opening statement emphasizing absence of biological evidence linking Petitioner to

crimes); Lodgment 8 at 699-701 (closing argument reiterating same).) By adopting this

strategy, counsel was able to call into question both the adequacy of the prosecution’s

investigation and the strength of its case with little risk to Petitioner. 

Moreover, the results of the DNA tests on the bed sheet and swabs do not alter

the fact that DNA evidence was not critical in this case. Importantly, the jury convicted

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Petitioner despite the fact that the government did not have physical evidence

connecting Petitioner to the crime, a fact Petitioner’s counsel established through

testimony and repeated argument. (Lodgment 6, Reporter’s Appeal Transcript, Vol.

2 (“RT, Vol. 2”) at 247-51, 373-77; Lodgment 7 at 502; Lodgment 10 at 18-19;

Lodgment 8 at 699-701.) The post-conviction DNA evidence does not significantly

affect this argument because it only corroborates evidence already submitted at trial.

Counsel still would have argued that there was no DNA or blood evidence tying

Petitioner to the crime; it only would have slightly increased the strength of the

argument. When viewed from counsel’s perspective without the benefit of hindsight,

this potential, slight benefit could reasonably be outweighed by the possible negative

consequences. See LaGrand, 133 F.3d at 1271.

Examining trial counsel’s decisions, the record indicates that he considered his

relevant plausible options after conducting his investigation and arrived at a reasoned

decision not to have DNA testing performed on the grounds that the results might

present evidence he would be unable to refute. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Smith

v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1272 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that

court’s refusal to grant continuance to allow for processing of a neutron activation test

violated due process by emphasizing, among other things, that “the test could have

sunk [petitioner’s] defense that he did not commit the murder”); Grisby v. Blodgett,

130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (in finding no prejudice in counsel’s failure to test

blood found at crime scene, noting that “it was plausible that, having considered the

matter, defense counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue this line of evidence

because they feared that [petitioner’s] blood would be found”) (emphasis in original);

Pratt v. Kernan, No. C 05-2062, 2007 WL 163246, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2007)

(finding no ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney made reasoned tactical

decision not to pursue DNA testing because if blood were tested and matched

petitioner, “it would be fatal to [the mistaken identity] defense”).

Further, in evaluating the sufficiency of counsel’s representation, courts should

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not “second-guess counsel’s decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty hindsight.”

LaGrand, 133 F.3d at 1271. Indeed, evaluating an attorney’s performance “requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct

the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In this case, trial

counsel had to decide whether to request DNA testing without knowing what the

results would be. In making this decision, counsel knew that without the testing, the

government did not have DNA evidence, fingerprints, or blood evidence tying

Petitioner to the crimes, and he would be able to argue the paucity of the government’s

case and evidence. He also knew that while negative DNA results might enhance

Petitioner’s defense that he did not commit the crimes, the results would not be

exonerating because substantial other evidence, including eyewitness identifications,

tended to show that Petitioner committed the crimes. Additionally, counsel knew that

test results placing Petitioner’s DNA on the victim or vice versa would be devastating

to Petitioner’s defense. Given this knowledge and choice, regardless of the ultimate

results of testing, counsel’s trial tactics and reasoned decision not to pursue DNA

testing and instead to argue vigorously the government’s lack of physical evidence

cannot be labeled ineffective assistance. In total, counsel’s decision to proceed without

DNA testing did not render his services “outside of the wide range of professionally

competent assistance,” and thus, ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688.

Furthermore, the Court notes that Petitioner did not suffer prejudice because the

post-conviction DNA results were not presented at trial. This is not a case where the

government used incorrect DNA results to convict Petitioner or where new DNA

results would potentially exonerate Petitioner. The overwhelming evidence against

Petitioner, includingthe two witnesses’ positive identifications, Petitioner’s flight from

police, and his possession of items stolen from the crime scene, would not have been

overcome by the addition of this marginally helpful evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner

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did not suffer any prejudice as a result of his counsel’s decisions regarding DNA

evidence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, the Court concludes that

Petitioner has not established either Strickland prong and DENIES Petitioner relief as

to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

(3) Petitioner’s Assertion of Innocence

In his supplemental briefing, in arguing the relevance of the post-conviction

DNA testing results on his ineffective assistance claims, Petitioner states that the test

results show that he is innocent of the sexual assault crimes. In an abundance of

caution, the Court construes Petitioner’s briefing to be asserting an actual innocence

claim.

The Supreme Court has explained that actual innocence claims may be either

procedural or substantive. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313-14 (1995). In a

procedural claim, a petitioner asserts actual innocence as a gateway to arguing an

otherwise procedurally barred claim. Id. In other words, passing through the Schlup

gateway does not entitle a petitioner to a declaration of actual innocence or to any

relief, but only permits a federal court to review underlying constitutional claims. See

Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2006). To succeed in bringing the

procedurally barred claim before the habeas court, a petitioner must show that, in light

of new evidence,“more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable

doubt” regarding the petitioner’s guilt. House v. Bell, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006).

The Supreme Court has noted that this standard “ensures that petitioner’s case is truly

‘extraordinary,’ while still providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid

a manifest injustice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (quoting McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S.

467, 494 (1991)). This standard “requires the federal court to assess how reasonable

jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record.” House, 126 S.Ct. at

2078. 

In contrast to asserting actual innocence as a gateway to an otherwise

procedurally barred claim, petitioners have also attempted to bring freestanding actual

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innocence claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings. In practice, however, the

Supreme Court has never explicitly held that a freestanding innocence claim is

available during habeas review, even in a death penalty case. For example, in Herrera

v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that “in

a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial

would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas

relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” Id. at 417.

Similarly, the Court revisited the issue and again refused to decide whether a

freestanding innocence claim is permissible in a capital case on habeas review,

concluding instead that, although petitioner “cast considerable doubt on his guilt” and

opened the Schlup gateway, he had not reached the “extraordinarily high” threshold for

a freestanding innocence claim. House, 126 S.Ct. at 2086-87. The Supreme Court has

not explained what a petitioner must show to meet this “extraordinarily high”

threshold, but it has noted that the showing is more stringent than the Schlup standard.

Further, according to the Ninth Circuit, a petitioner must “affirmatively prove that he

is probably innocent.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997);

Baldwin, 466 F.3d at 812 (citing Carriger).

Given that the court has considered the post-conviction DNA evidence in

resolving Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court need not

determine whether Petitioner met the Schlup gateway standard for bringing

procedurally barred claims. Therefore, the Court construes Petitioner’s briefing as

raising a freestanding actual innocence claim.

Reviewing all of the post-conviction DNA evidence, Petitioner falls far short of

demonstrating that “more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable

doubt” regarding Petitioner’s guilt,House, 126 S.Ct. at 2077, and therefore he also fails

to meet the more stringent standard for freestanding actual innocence claims,

affirmatively proving that he is probably innocent. 

First, testing conducted on the wristwatch, sweatpants, and hairs proved

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inconclusive, which Petitioner readily concedes. Second, the results from tests on the

penile and pubic swabs are ambiguous at best, and the findings do not significantly

affect the evidence supporting Petitioner’s convictions. Indeed, the record indicates

that Elizabeth J. used the bathroom during the assault and urinated and wiped her

genital area prior to her SART examination, which mitigates the effect of the lack of

DNA collected from the victim, crime scene, and Petitioner. (See, e.g., RT, Vol. 1, at

193 (Elizabeth J.’s testimony that she went to the bathroom during the attack but was

unable to urinate); id. at 221-22 (Elizabeth J.’s testimony that she used the bathroom

after the sexual assault but prior to her SART examination); RT, Vol. 2, at 237 (SART

nurse’s testimony that Elizabeth J. urinated and wiped her genital area prior to the

SART examination).) While the post-conviction DNA evidence may have bolstered

Petitioner’s defense, it does not directly contradict any evidence used to convict

Petitioner because the government did not present DNA or blood evidence and

Petitioner used the lack of such evidence as his defense. This stands in stark contrast

to the types of cases in which courts have found the Schlup standard satisfied. See,

e.g., House, 126 S.Ct. at 2076-78 (Schlup actual innocence satisfied where petitioner’s

conviction based upon blood evidence found on victim’s clothing, which government

argued during trial belonged to petitioner but was found after trial to belong to victim’s

husband, who also confessed to the crime); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478-79

(9th Cir. 1997) (Schlup gateway standard satisfied where petitioner presented sworn

affidavit of third party exonerating petitioner and confessing to the murder for which

petitioner was convicted).

Moreover, the test results do nothing to undermine the overwhelming evidence

of Petitioner’s guilt presented during trial. For example, Elizabeth J. provided

extensive testimony that she was forcibly raped and sodomized, that the perpetrator

attempted to penetrate her with a foreign object, and that he did penetrate her vaginally

and anally with his genitalia. (RT, Vol. 1, at 189-94, 217, 221.) The SART nurse

provided additional testimony regarding penetration, reciting the victim’s injuries and

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opining that all of the injuries were consistent with forcible sexual intercourse or

forcible sodomy. (RT., Vol. 2, at 237-44-51.) Accordingly, the record contains

significant evidence establishing penetration, and indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that

there was evidence of sexual assault, but argues that he was not the perpetrator. (See

2nd Suppl. Brief at 3.)

Further, both victims described distinguishing characteristics of the two intruders

and positively identified Petitioner as the perpetrator of the sexual assault. (See RT,

Vol. 1, at 136-48, 145-46, 162-70, 176-77, 179-83, 186-95, 200-02.) Petitioner was

taken into custody a short time following the attack, at which point a search uncovered

unique personal property matching that taken from the crime scene in Petitioner’s

possession. (See id. at 103-04, 174, 178-79; RT, Vol. 2, at 289, 310, 319-22, 324-25.)

Additionally, pursuing officers searching the neighborhood in which Petitionerwaslast

seen and eventually apprehended retrieved a fanny pack containing assorted change,

a loaded pistol, and a watch with the inscription “With All My Heart, Love Jen” that

belonged to Nikolas S.’s roommate. (See CT1 at 147; CT2 at 228-32, 288-97, 327-36.)

Finally, Petitioner’s conduct immediately after the crimes, specifically his fleeing and

hiding from police, pleading with a civilian for help in avoiding the police, and

providing a false name to arresting officers, is significant circumstantial evidence that

Petitioner was the perpetrator of the crimes. (See RT, Vol. 2, at 273-74, 286-88, 292-

93, 298, 309-11, 312-14, 324.)

Given the overwhelming evidence implicating Petitioner in the crimes, he has

failed to meet even the Schlup gateway standard, as he has not demonstrated that, in

light of the post-conviction DNA evidence, “more likely than not any reasonable juror

would have reasonable doubt” regarding his guilt. House, 126 S.Ct. at 2077.

Accordingly, even if a freestanding innocence claim is available to a petitioner under

these circumstances, Petitioner has not met the stricter standard for such a claim

because he is far from proving “affirmatively . . . that he is probably innocent.”

Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476. In sum, to the extent Petitioner brings an actual innocence

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claim, that claim fails. Therefore, the Court DENIES Petitioner relief as to this claim.

ii. Counsel’s Objection to Petitioner’s Marsden and Faretta

Motions

Petitioner also claims that he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel when his

attorney opposed his requests for new counsel and to represent himself. (Pet. at 6.)

Petitioner asserts that counsel made misrepresentations about his trial preparation and

his investigatory work to the trial court at the Marsden and Faretta hearings, causing

the trial court judge to deny his motions. (Id.; Traverse at 26.) Petitioner claims this

was ineffective assistance of counsel. (Pet. at 6.)

The appellate court noted that Petitioner’s claims made in his Marsden hearing

were essentially the same as those he made on appeal to support his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 10. As stated in the preceding section, the record

from Petitioner’s Marsden hearing does not support Petitioner’s claims. The appellate

court stated: 

Appellant met with his attorney, obtained the preliminary hearing

transcript and was provided the materials necessary for discovery.

Counsel followed leads supplied by the appellant, without success. An

eyewitness expert called by codefendant Lambert was used by appellant’s

counsel. Morever, with respect to appellant’s argument there had been no

DNA testing, his counsel explained the DNA sample was not sufficient

to link appellant to the crime and he felt it would jeopardize appellant if

he insisted on further testing. He gave a detailed explanation of what he

had done and why his efforts had or had not been fruitful.

 

Id. In sum, the appellate court stated that “the record does not support” Petitioner’s

assertion that his trial counsel inaccurately stated his trial preparation Id. 

First, Petitioner has provided no set of facts to support his allegations that trial

counsel made purposeful misrepresentations to the trial court during Petitioner’s

hearings. Furthermore, he has also failed to provide facts that suggest trial counsel was

unprepared for trial. In fact, the Court’s review of the trial and hearing transcripts

reveal facts that support the notion that counsel was prepared. (RT, Vol. 1A.)

Specifically, the trial and hearing transcripts demonstrate that counsel had command

of the relevant facts, adequately handled the trial, presented supporting witnesses,

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effectively cross-examined adverse witnesses,and highlighted arguments and facts that

favored Petitioner. (Lodgments 4-8.) 

Second, despite Petitioner’s assertions to the contrary, his Marsden and Faretta

motions were denied for a variety of other reasons, none of which relied on any alleged

misrepresentations by trial counsel. The appellate court recognized this, noting in

response to Petitioner’s accusations that counsel inaccurately stated he was ready for

trial when he was not that “the record of the trial does not support such an assertion.”

(Lodgment 15 at 10.) On the basis of this review, the Court concludes that trial

counsel’s performance during Petitioner’s hearings was not deficient, nor didPetitioner

suffer any prejudice by his counsel’s actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner did not suffer ineffective counsel at

his pre-trial hearings. See id. at 687. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner relief

as to this claim. 

iii. Failure to Call Attending Physician to Testify

Petitioner’s final argument is that he did not receive effective assistance of

counsel because his attorney did not call to testify Dr. Edward Thaler, the attending

physician who evaluated Elizabeth J. (Pet. at 9.) Petitioner argues that Dr. Thaler’s

examination of the victim revealed “no lacerations or abrasions” and thus, would have

contradicted the nurse’s testimony that there were numerous lacerations and abrasions.

(Id.) 

In denying Petitioner’s final ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel

erred by failing to call the emergency room physician to testify, the superior court

stated: 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that his trial counsel’s decision to not

place the emergency room physician on the stand prejudiced the outcome

of his case.

. . . . 

Even if the testimony of the emergency room physician had been

introduced, Petitioner has failed to prove it would reasonably have

impacted the outcome of the trial. Thus, Petitioner has failed to make a

prima facie showing that he should be entitled to the relief requested. 

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(Lodgment 19 at 3-4.) The superior court also quoted the appellate court’s summary

of the evidence against Petitioner, concluding that “[g]iven the overwhelming nature

of the evidence and its solid evidentiary value, we are hard-pressed to believe anything

suggested by appellant now could have changed the outcome of the case.” (See

Appellate Opinion, D036645, p. 9). Id. 

The SART nurse testified that she first examined the victim without any

magnification and then examined her with the aid of a microscope. (RT, Vol. 2, at

238.) The victim was first examined at 3:20 a.m. (Id. at 236.) The nurse stated that

during the exam, the victim complained of soreness in her vagina and rectum. (Id. at

237.) The nurse stated that the victim had eight lacerations or abrasions on the exterior

of her genital area that were consistent with rape injuries. (Id. at 239-41, 244.) She

also testified that the area around the victim’s anus was swollen and bruised. (Id. at

241-42.) The nurse also noted that she detected some blood in the vaginal canal, but

could not determine its source. (Id. at 242.) Because of this bleeding, she referred the

victim to the emergency room. (Id.)

The emergency room physician, Dr. Thaler, examined the victim nearly three

hours later. (Lodgement 18, Ex. B.) The doctor’s report indicates he examined her for

fifteen minutes and found no evidence of lacerations or active bleeding. (Id.) He did,

however, note that there was a small amount of blood in the victim’s vagina. (Id.)

Based on the evidence at trial and the medical report of Dr. Thaler, the Court

concludes that the testimony of Dr. Thaler would not have affected the outcome of the

trial. Despite Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary, overall, Dr. Thaler’s report does

not contradict the SART nurse’s testimony. First, his exam was conducted nearly three

hours after the SART nurse examined the victim. Further, Elizabeth J. testified that she

showered and “cleaned up” before she reported to the emergency room for her

examination by the attending physician. (See RT, Vol. 1, at 196.) Second, there is no

indication that he utilized the same examination instruments as the nurse, most notably

a microscope, in examining the victim’s external genitalia. Finally, like the SART

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nurse, Dr. Thaler found a small pool of blood in the victim’s vaginal canal.

Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that his counsel acted in an ineffective manner

with respect to his decision not to call Dr. Thaler to testify. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687. 

The Court also notes that, in addition to failing to show that his counsel’s

performance was deficient, Petitioner also failed to show that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s actions. See id. As noted above, the strength of evidence against Petitioner

was overwhelming. SeeLuna, 306 F.3d at 966. First, both victims positively identified

Petitioner as the assailant and testified that he did not wear a mask or otherwise attempt

to obstruct his face. (RT, Volume 1, at 107-11, 180-84.) Elizabeth J. also identified

Petitioner as the person who had driven by her in a black Lexus just minutes prior to

the attack. (Id. at 187-94, 175-78.) Second, substantial evidence placed Petitioner in

immediate area of the attack. (CT2 at 252-66.) Third, officers identified Petitioner as

the person who fled when the vehicle in which he was a passenger was stopped. (RT,

Vol. 2, at 287-89.) Officers also identified the clothes and fanny pack that Petitioner

wore at the time he fled the car. (Id. at 303-04.) As the assailant fled, the pursuing

officer testified that the assailant entered into an apartment complex. (Id. at 296-98.)

A resident of the apartment complex identified Petitioner as the person who frantically

offered him fifty dollars for his cellular phone and not to turn him into the police. (Id.

at 311-14.) Fourth, unique personal property and money, including an Italian coin and

a personally engraved watch that belonged to the male victim’s roommate, were found

on Petitioner’s person or in items he discarded while attempting to flee from the police.

(Id. at 321-30.) 

The overwhelming evidence against Petitioner must be considered when

evaluating any potential prejudice suffered by him due to alleged ineffective assistance

of counsel. See Luna, 306 F.3d at 966. Based on this evidence, the Court concludes

that the state court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established

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Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner relief as to this claim. 

D. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing in his briefing. (Traverse at

2; 2nd Suppl. Brief at 6-7.) Respondent counters that Petitioner is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), as amended by AEDPA, a district court presented

with a request for an evidentiary hearing must first determine whether a factual basis

to support the petitioner’s claims was developed in the state court. Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000); Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1999).

If a factual basis was not developed in the state court, the district court must ascertain

whether the failure to develop the factual basis was attributable to Petitioner. Taylor,

529 U.S. at 432 (“[A] failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established

unless there is a lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or

the prisoner’s counsel.”). If so, a petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing

unless he establishes one of two narrow exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

If there has been no lack of diligence, however, “the prisoner has not ‘failed to develop’

the facts under § 2254(e)(2)’s opening clause, and he will be excused from showing

compliance with the balance of the subsection’s requirements.” Id. at 437.; see also

Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, the parties do not dispute that Petitioner did not develop the record in state

court. Further, Petitioner has demonstrated diligence with regard to his ineffective

assistance claim premised on the decision to forego DNA testing and any related actual

innocence claim. Nevertheless, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in

this case. First, the Court has already allowed Petitioner to supplement the record with

post-conviction DNA results, and the Court has considered all of Petitioner’s new

evidence in resolving his petition. Therefore, Petitioner does not need an evidentiary

hearing in order to obtain judicial review of this new evidence. Second, Petitioner has

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not alleged additional facts that, if proved, would entitle him to habeas relief. See

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 586 (9th Cir. 2004). As discussed above, the

Court has considered all of the new evidence submitted by Petitioner and determined

that the new evidence does not entitle him to habeas relief. The DNA testing results

do not exonerate Petitioner or negate or undermine the overwhelming evidence of guilt

presented at trial. 

Third,Petitioner has not shown what additional, non-speculative evidencewould

be obtained through an evidentiary hearing. Griffen v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 966 (9th

Cir. 2003) (evidentiary hearing not required where petitioner failed to show that

hearing would produce evidence more reliable or probative than that already

submitted). Rather, in supplemental briefing, Petitioner states in conclusory fashion

that only an expert could satisfactorily explain to the Court the significance of the

absence of Elizabeth J.’s cellular material from the penile and pubic swabs and state

with reasonable certainty whether the DNA results exonerate Petitioner. (2nd Suppl.

Brief at 7.) Petitioner does not provide any evidence or analysis as to why an expert

would provide a relevant and probative opinion or explain the scope of any such

opinion. Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (no hearing

required for several reasons, including that petitioner “has failed to show what more

an evidentiary hearing might reveal of material import on his assertion of actual

innocence”). Moreover, the state is not challenging the validity of the new DNA

evidence so the Court does not need to conduct a hearing to resolve any credibility

issues. Jaramillo, 340 F.3d at 883-84 (evidentiary hearing required to permit parties

to develop record and for court to “make the ultimate credibility determinations”).

In sum, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and DENIES

Petitioner’s request for a hearing. 

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the Reports and

Recommendations and DENIES Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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Additionally, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. The

Clerk shall close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 25, 2007

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO: 

Christopher Leon Baker, Pro Se

#H-11687

Pleasant Valley State Prison

BFB5-234L

P.O. Box 8502

Coalinga, CA 93210

Jeffrey J. Koch

Deputy Senior Assistant Attorney General

State of California

110 West A Street, Suite 1100

San Diego, CA 92101

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