Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00243/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARROLD G. JOHNSON, No. CIV S-04-0243-FCD-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1), filed on February

3, 2004.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are

satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds

upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which

support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it

is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are

vague and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: Doherty; Hass; Hetrick; Holiday;

Kofoed; Nunez; Orr; Thor; Toppenberg; Traquina; Volpe; and Wong. Plaintiff also names as

defendants the California State Prison, Solano, and the California Department of Corrections. 

Plaintiff claims that, on July 27, 2002, he injured his left shoulder playing softball and that he

was seen in the prison medical clinic shortly thereafter by defendant Doherty, a medical

technician assistant. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Doherty failed to consult with a registered

nurse or medical doctor before diagnosing a bruised shoulder and prescribing pain medication. 

Plaintiff asserts that this violated California prison regulations and procedures. 

Plaintiff states that, months later following an x-ray examination ordered by

defendant Toppenberg, it was determined that plaintiff had irregularities with his clavicle. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Toppenberg failed to follow up on the x-ray even though it

showed irregularities. 

Next, plaintiff claims that, on January 6, 2003, he was seen by a prison

radiologist, defendant Hetrick, who took a series of x-rays. As to defendant Hetrick, plaintiff

states that his claim is that defendant Hetrick “. . . failed to ensure that Toppenberg . . . received

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the results of the [x-ray] study.” 

Plaintiff next states that he was interviewed on May 23, 2003, by defendant

Holiday concerning his shoulder injury. According to plaintiff, defendant Holiday noted that

plaintiff had been referred to an orthopedic specialist, defendant Kofoed. Plaintiff states:

At issue with Defendant M. Holiday is that although she conducted a

review of Plaintiff’s medical record, yet, fails to recognize that there is a

systematic failure in that Defendant B. Doherty’s independent action is

noncompliant with the California Department of Corrections Licensed

Vocational Nurse’s Scope of Practice Standards.” [sic]

As to defendant Thor, plaintiff states:

Through silence, Defendant D.E. Thor condones Doherty’s failure to

notify a registered nurse, and or physician, her findings . . . Thor in shear

defiance ignores Doherty’s lack of compliance with The California

Department of Corrections, Health Care Services Division, Policies and

Procedures. . .

As to defendants Wong and Nunez, plaintiff alleges that they failed to correctly

diagnose plaintiff’s shoulder problem. As to defendants Orr and Volpe, plaintiff claims that they

failed to ensure that he was provided with prescribed medications. As to defendant Traquina,

plaintiff appears to assign liability because defendant Traquina denied plaintiff’s appeals. 

Plaintiff seeks various forms of equitable relief as well as compensatory and

punitive damages.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from two significant deficiencies. First, plaintiff

names the California State Prison, Solano, and the California Department of Corrections as

defendants. Such defendants, however, are immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Second,

plaintiff’s substantive allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a 1

state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

(1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th cir. 1993) (en banc).

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A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought

against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v.

Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition

extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. 1

Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, plaintiff names the California State Prison, Solano, and the

California Department of Corrections, both of which enjoy immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

Plaintiff claims that the medical treatment he has received in relation to his

shoulder injury “. . . was and continues to be inadequate, leaving Plaintiff with restricted range of

motion and constant pain.” Thus, the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that he was denied

adequate medical care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth

Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates

the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or

omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and

wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the

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Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

injury or illness, gives rise to under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see

also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health needs. 

See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is sufficiently

serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the

“. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th

Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors

indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is

worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily

activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also

demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

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90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

Assuming for the moment that plaintiff has alleged a sufficiently serious injury,

the court concludes, in light of plaintiff’s own characterization of his complaint, that plaintiff’s

claim amounts to no more than a claim based on alleged medical malpractice and/or a difference

of opinion. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be

dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 5, 2005.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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