Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01738/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01738-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

cal 

1 05cv1738

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Richard Romero,

Plaintiff,

v.

Stuart J. Ryan, Warden,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No.05cv1738 JTM (AJB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, Richard Romero, a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, Fay Arfa, Esq., filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On May 29, 2008, Respondent filed an

answer. On July 31, 2008, Petitioner filed a traverse. Based upon a review of the petition for writ of

habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer, Petitioner’s traverse and all supporting documents, the Court

RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED for the

reasons outlined below. 

Procedural Background

 On July 1, 2002, Petitioner was convicted of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted

murder in violation of California Penal Code §§ 664, 187(a), 190 and assault with a firearm in violation

of California Penal Code § 245(a)(2). (Lodgment 1 at 199-201.) As to each offense, it was found that

he personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm resulting in great bodily injury to the victim in

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 05cv1738

violation of California Penal Code §§ 12022.5(a)(1), 12022.53(d), 12022.7(a). (Id.) On October 18,

2002, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years to life. (Id. at 281-82.) 

On March 29, 2004, the California Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part with

directions. (Lodgment 5.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on June 9, 2004. 

(Lodgment 7.) On September 7, 2005, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in this Court. On

October 16, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. (Dkt. No. 33.) On

December 26, 2007, the court issued a report and recommendation denying respondent’s motion to

dismiss. (Dkt. No. 37.) On March 5, 2008, District Judge Miller adopted the report and recommendation as modified and dismissed claims 1, 2, 3, 9 and 10 as time-barred. (Dkt. No. 40.) On May 29,

2008, Respondent filed an answer. Petitioner filed a traverse on July 31, 2008. 

Factual Background

The following factual background is taken from the Court of Appeal opinion in People v. 

Richard Romero, unpublished opinion (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Div. 1, March 29, 2004). The Court

presumes these factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

About 2:55 a.m. on February 8, 2001, a San Diego County deputy sheriff pursued

a car speeding on Skyline Avenue in Lemon Grove. While in pursuit, the deputy

heard a radio call that a shooting had just occurred in the area and realized he

could be pursuing the shooter. When the car came to a stop at a dead-end street,

the passenger, wearing dark clothing and a beanie, fled on foot. The deputy

arrested the driver, Luis Arechiga. 

In the meantime, sheriff’s deputy who had responded to the scene of the shooting

found Steven Courtney on the ground outside a car, severely injured, unconscious

and bleeding from numerous bullet wounds. Paramedics transported Courtney to

a hospital, where he remained in a coma for several months. 

During the subsequent investigation, police interviewed Arechiga, among others,

and determined Romero was the owner and passenger of the car that had been

pursued by the deputy sheriff in the early morning hours of February 8. Officers

found gunshot residue on the exterior passenger door handle of the car and a

handgun lying about 200 yards from the car in the direction Romero had fled. 

The bullet casings and fragments recovered from the scene of the shooting were

consistent with the handgun found near Romero’s car. Almost a year after the

shooting, Romero turned himself in and was charged with attempted murder and

related crimes arising out of the incident. 

At trial, the jury heard testimony from numerous witnesses including: Courtney;

Arechiga, who testified under a plea agreement as an accessory to the shooting;

and the police officers and detectives who responded to and investigated the

shooting. The prosecution testimony revealed Romero and several men had spent

the afternoon before the shooting drinking beer at a tattoo parlor. Sometime

during the evening, Courtney joined them. About 10:00 p.m., the men went to a

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 05cv1738

bar near Old Town where they continued drinking alcohol. At some point, a fist

fight unexpectedly broke out between Romero and Courtney inside the bar and

continued in the parking lot after they were evicted from the bar by bouncers. 

When the fight ended, Romero’s face was bleeding and his shirt was torn. 

Romero threatened to kill Courtney. After Courtney left the scene, police arrived

and detained Romero until he was “no longer in an agitated state.” 

Romero and his friends then returned to the tattoo parlor to clean up. Romero had

a beer and made some calls to find out where Courtney lived. Romero changed

into dark clothes and a beanie, and asked Arechiga to drive him “to some girl’s

house” in Spring Valley because he was too drunk to drive. Romero told

Arechiga which streets to take, directed him to Courtney’s house, and told him to

stop near a parked car where Courtney was sitting as a passenger. Romero got

out of the car, walked up to the passenger window of the other car and shot

Courtney five times with a revolver in the neck, chest, arm and lower back. 

Arechiga heard the gunshots but did not see Romero shoot Courtney. Romero got

back into the car and told Arechiga to flee the scene. 

When Arechiga was arrested, he told police that Romero had been his passenger

and had been dressed in dark clothing and a beanie. Courtney and the driver of

the car in which he was shot also testified to the events of that night, describing

the shooter as tall and wearing dark clothes and a beanie, which was consistent

with Arechiga’s description of Romero. Romero did not testify. Rather he called

several witnesses, including his sister, to provide alibi and mistaken identity

defenses. A friend testified he had been with Romero at the tattoo parlor and had

driven him to Romero’s parents’ home after the fight with Courtney. Romero’s

sister confirmed he had come to their parents’ house that night with a bloody face.

She testified that Romero traveled with her and her boyfriend the next day to El

Centro where he stayed for several days. A forensic expert testified in Romero’s

defense that none of the useable fingerprints from his car driven by Arechiga

matched Romero’s fingerprints. The expert also criticized the sheriff’s investigation of both Romero’s car and the shooting scene. 

(Lodgment 5 at 3-5.)

Discussion

Petitioner raises five claims in his petition. First, he claims the prosecutor violated Petitioner’s 

federal due process rights by improperly eliciting highly prejudicial “mug shot” evidence informing the

jury about Petitioner’s prior criminality. Second, he claims that the trial court denied Petitioner due

process and a fair trial by jury by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser necessarily included offense of

attempted voluntary manslaughter. Third, he asserts that the trial court denied Petitioner due process 

and a fair trial by failing to properly instruct on the essential element of malice aforethought. Fourth, he

argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to request instructions

on voluntary intoxication. Fifth, he maintains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when

trial counsel failed to request jury instructions on attempted voluntary manslaughter, malice aforeCase 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 05cv1738

thought, and provocation. Lastly, he claims that the trial court denied Petitioner equal protection of the

law by imposing a 25 year to life punishment for firearm use during the commission of attempted

murder. 

A. Scope of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain

an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As amended, the AEDPA now reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The threshold question is whether the rule of law was

clearly established at the time petitioner’s state court conviction became final. Id. at 406. Clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States “refers to the holdings,

as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id.

at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). However, Ninth Circuit case law may be

“persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an

‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly

established.’” Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000). Only after the clearly

established Federal law is identified can the court determine whether the state court’s application of that

law “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” that clearly

established Federal law. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. 

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 05cv1738

A state court decision is “contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a

result different from our precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406. “A state-court decision involves

an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s

case” or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new

context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Id. at 407. Under Williams, an application of federal law is unreasonable only

if it is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Further, a state court’s decision results in a “decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State court

proceeding” if it “is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” 

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to

the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). A state

court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly

established federal law.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Petitioner claims that the prosecution violated his due process rights by eliciting testimony 

regarding “mug shot” evidence informing the jury of his prior criminality. At trial, on direct examination of the detective who had interviewed Arechiga, the detective testified that Arechiga identified

Petitioner from Petitioner’s mug shot which the detective obtained from the Sheriff’s Departments’

computer mug file. (RT 273-74.) Later at trial, it was revealed that the detective had shown Arechiga a

photograph of Courtney, not Petitioner. The detective stated that he had mistakenly represented that he

had shown Arechiga Petitioner’s photograph and in fact, it was Courtney’s photograph that was shown

to Arechiga in the interview. (Id. at 333.) 

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 05cv1738

The clearly established constitutional standard governing prosecutorial misconduct claims is “the

narrow one of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). “The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). Therefore, under this standard, the question is whether the prosecutors’ misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642). In determining if Petitioner’s

due process rights were violated, the Court “must consider the probable effect of the prosecutor’s

[conduct] on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12

(1985). Relief is limited to cases in which the petitioner can establish that prosecutorial misconduct

resulted in actual prejudice. Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 930 (1995) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)). Put another way, prosecutorial misconduct violates due process when it

has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Ortiz-Sandoval

v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1996). 

California courts have not established a rule that any photograph of an accused which incidentally suggests that he has a prior criminal record is inadmissible. People v. Cook, 252 Cal. App. 2d 25,

29 (1967). Mug shots are admissible if the probative value is greater than its prejudicial value. See

People v. Peralez, 14 Cal. App. 3d 368, 377 (1971). “Except when it shows merely criminal disposition,

evidence which tends to establish a fact material for the prosecution is admissible although it may

connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge.” Cook, 252 Cal. App. 2d at 28 (citation

omitted). The court explained that the identification of an accused as a perpetrator of the crime charged

is a “fact material for the prosecution”and a photograph is relevant evidence of identification. Id. at 29. 

In the instant case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review in an

order containing no reasoning for its decision. (Lodgment 7.) Therefore, this Court must look to the

last reasoned state court decision and presume that the unexplained opinion rests upon the same ground. 

See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. The last reasoned state court decision was issued by the Court of Appeal on

March 29, 2004. (Lodgment 5.) 

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 05cv1738

The Court of Appeal concluded there was no due process violation because the reference to the

“mug file” was brief, it was not used in closing arguments and the photograph was not admitted into

evidence. (Lodgment 5 at 7-8.) Moreover, the court concluded that the evidence was very strong against

Petitioner that there was no reasonable probability a result more favorable would have been reached if

the jury had no knowledge of his prior arrest through the detective’s reference to Petitioner’s mug shot. 

(Lodgment 5 at 9.) 

The Court agrees that there was no prejudice to Petitioner. There was plenty of evidence that

Petitioner was at the shooting scene at 2:30 a.m. As the Court of Appeal noted: 

Courtney testified Romero threatened to kill him after the bar fight; Arechiga also

testified Romero threatened Courtney; Jason Simpson testified Romero called him on his

cell phone after the bar fight and asked where Courtney was and where he lived (Simpson

did not give Courtney’s address to Romero, implying Romero must have contacted others

to find out where he lived); Arechiga testified Romero asked him to drive Romero to

“some girl’s house” in Spring Valley, Romero directed him to Courtney’s house, where

Romero told him to stop, Romero got out of the car, Arechiga heard gunshots, and

Romero returned to the car and told Arechiga to flee. Deputy Joseph Leos testified that

he pursued a car registered to Romero but driven by Arechiga speeding from the area of

the shooting about 3:00 a.m., and when the car stopped, the passenger, wearing dark

clothes and a hat, fled; Arechiga told the deputy the passenger’s name was “Rich.” 

Gunshot residue was found on the exterior passenger door handle of the car, and bullet

casings and bullet fragments recovered from the scene and Courtney’s blood were

consistent with the handgun found along the path where the passenger fled, placing

Romero’s car and its passenger at the shooting scene. 

(Lodgment 5 at 9-10.) These facts provide significant evidence that Petitioner was the perpetrator of the

crime. Even if the reference to the “mug shot” was not made at trial, it would not have changed the

outcome of the trial. Therefore, Petitioner did not suffer any prejudice. See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 930. 

Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct be DENIED. 

C. Trial Court Error on Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense of Attempted

Voluntary Manslaughter

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his due process and right to a fair jury trial by

failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

The Supreme Court has expressly declined to decide whether a non-capital defendant has the

right to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 n.8

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 05cv1738

(1980); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Under the law of this circuit, the

failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser included offenses in a non-capital case does not present a

federal constitutional question.”) Because there is no clearly established federal law requiring the

giving of a lesser included offense instruction, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim. Stevenson

v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (because the Supreme Court has not decided whether the

Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth Amendment's vicinage right, the state court's decision

could not be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme Court law

"simply because no such law exists.”); Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If no

Supreme Court precedent creates clearly established federal law relating to the legal issue the habeas

petitioner raised in state court, the state court's decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.”)

Even if Petitioner is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense, he has failed to

show that the trial court was presented with evidence demonstrating heat of passion that would warrant

an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter. Petitioner claims that there were sufficient facts to

show he acted in the heat of passion because shortly before the shooting, Courtney hit Petitioner and

started a fight. Petitioner claims he became angry and the shooting occurred shortly afterwards. 

The Court of Appeal held that there was no evidence to show that the act was committed in the

heat of passion. (Lodgment 5 at 13.) In fact, the intervening events between the bar fight and the

shooting demonstrates a cooling of passion. (Id.) After the fight, the police detained Petitioner until he

was “no longer in an agitated state.” (Id.) Petitioner went back to the tattoo parlor to clean up, change

his clothes, had a beer and made telephone calls to find out where Courtney lived. (Id.) Petitioner then

obtained a gun and asked Arechiga to drive him to Courtney’s house. (Id.) When Petitioner found

Courtney in the passenger seat of a parked car, Petitioner had Arechiga stop, he got out of the car,

walked up to the window of the car and shot Courtney repeatedly in the neck and back. (Id.)

The evidence demonstrate that sufficient time had elapsed between the bar fight and the shooting

and the heat of passion to shoot Courtney had subsided. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to

instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the state

court’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 05cv1738

Federal law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim and

the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim of trial court error be DENIED.

D. Trial Court Error on Failure to Instruct on the Essential Element of Malice Aforethought

Petitioner argues that the trial court failed to properly instruct on the element of malice

aforethought. He claims that malice aforethought should have been defined as follows: “malice

aforethought equals a specific intent to kill in the absence of sudden quarrel, heat of passion, and

imperfect self-defense.” (Pet. at 26.) Petitioner contends that the People should prove the absence of

sudden quarrel or heat of passion to establish the malice element of murder. 

In Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973), the United States Supreme Court presented the

standard for jury instruction error in habeas cases. The only question for a federal habeas court is

whether, “under the circumstances as a whole and given the evidence in the case, the failure to give the

requested instruction rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process.” 

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 746 (1995) (citing Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). A single jury instruction

“may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” 

Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47. “An omission . . . is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the

law” and the petitioner bears an “especially heavy” burden. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155

(1977). 

In People v. Rios, the Court held that where murder is charged and evidence of provocation or

imperfect self-defense is presented to the jury, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

these circumstances were lacking in order to establish the malice element of murder. People v. Rios, 23

Cal. 4th 450, 462 (2000). 

The trial court instructed the jury on CALJIC 8.66 which defines attempted murder in part as

“[t]he person committing such act harbored express malice aforethought, name, a specific intent to kill

unlawfully another human being.” (Lodgment 1 at 169.) In addition, the jury was instructed on

CALJIC No. 8.67, which stated in part, 

[i]f you find that the attempt to commit murder was preceded and accompanied by a clear,

deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must

have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other

condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is an attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and

premeditated murder. 

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 05cv1738

(Id. at 171.) In the same instruction, the jury was instructed that “a mere, unconsidered and rash

impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation.” (Id.) 

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly instructed on express malice

aforethought. (Lodgment 5 at 15-16.) The Court agrees that the trial court did not have to sua sponte

duty to instruct the jury on the absence of heat of passion or sudden quarrel in its definition of malice

aforethought. There was no evidence of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion to warrant such an

instruction. The evidence shows that the shooting did not take place immediately after the bar fight

between Petitioner and Courtney and much time had passed to allow Petitioner to cool down. After the

fight, the police detained Petitioner until he was “no longer in an agitated state,” Petitioner returned to

the tattoo parlor, cleaned himself up, changed his clothes, made telephone calls to locate Courtney’s

address and directed Arechiga to Courtney’s house, identified the parked car where Courtney was a

passenger, approached the car window and shot Courtney in the face and neck. (Lodgment 5 at 4-5.) 

These facts do not show that Petitioner acted in the heat of passion or immediately after the provocation. 

The Court concludes that the trial court’s failure to instruct on Petitioner’s definition of malice

aforethought did not infect the entire trial such that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated. See

Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Habeas

relief should not be granted as to his claim and the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim for

trial court error be DENIED.

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to

request instructions on voluntary intoxication, provocation, attempted voluntary manslaughter and

express malice aforethought. 

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective assistance of

counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d

1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that Strickland “has long been clearly established federal law

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir.

1997). A habeas petitioner must satisfy two requirements to demonstrate his assistance of counsel was

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 05cv1738

so defective that habeas relief is warranted. First, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance

was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Id. Second, the petitioner must show counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. The

test for prejudice requires that the defendant show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome would have been different. Id. at 694. In other words,

petitioner must demonstrate his counsel’s error rendered the result unreliable or the trial fundamentally

unfair. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Review of

counsel’s performance is “highly deferential” and there is a “strong presumption” that counsel rendered

adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment.” United States v. FerreiraAlameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1987); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The question is not

what defense counsel could have pursued but rather whether the choices made were reasonable. Babbitt

v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). “Failure to make the required showing of either

deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

700. 

1. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication 

A defendant charged with murder may introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication to show the

absence of malice aforethought. People v. Turk, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1361, 1375 ( 2008). A defendant is

entitled to an instruction of voluntary intoxication only when “there is substantial evidence of the

defendant’s voluntary intoxication and the intoxication affected the defendant’s ‘actual formation of

specific intent.’” People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 635, 677 (1997). 

The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no evidence to show Petitioner’s intoxication

precluded him from forming the specific intent to kill needed to support an attempted murder charge. 

(Lodgment 5 at 18.) The court commented that Petitioner appeared capable of reasoned decisions and

deliberate conduct. (Id.) Petitioner was released by the police after the bar fight with Courtney, made

telephone calls to ascertain Courtney’s address, changed into dark clothes and a beanie, realized he

could not drive, directed Arechiga to Courtney’s home, noticed the parked car where Courtney was

sitting as passenger, got out of the car, walked up to the passenger window of the other car and shot

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 05cv1738

Courtney five times. (Id.) Then, Petitioner got back into the car and told Arechiga to flee the scene. 

(Id.)

The Court agrees that these facts demonstrate that Petitioner’s specific intent to attempt to kill

Courtney was not impaired. Petitioner made specific steps to locate Courtney and when he found

Courtney, he shot him. There was nothing to indicate that intoxication affected his actions. Based on

the facts before his trial counsel, the decision not to request jury instructions on intoxication was

reasonable. See Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1173. Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s counsel was

not deficient for not requesting jury instructions on intoxication. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Since

the state court’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), habeas relief is not available on this claim. The

Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel be DENIED.

2. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request Instruction on Provocation

In order to demonstrate provocation, the evidence must show that Petitioner formed the intent to

kill as a direct response to the provocation and acted immediately. People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d

307, 329 (1983) overruled on other grounds in People v. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186, 201 (1995). 

The Court of Appeal determined that there was insufficient evidence to show provocation to

support a provocation instruction. (Lodgment 5 at 17-18.) The evidence shows that the shooting did not

take place immediately after the bar fight between Petitioner and Courtney and much time had passed to

allow Petitioner to cool down. (Id.) After the fight, the police detained Petitioner until he was “no

longer in an agitated state,” Petitioner returned to the tattoo parlor, cleaned himself up, changed his

clothes, made telephone calls to locate Courtney’s address and directed Arechiga to Courtney’s house,

identified the parked car where Courtney was a passenger, approached the car window and shot

Courtney in the face and neck. (Id.) These facts do not show that Petitioner acted immediately after the

provocation. Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel’s

failure to request instruction for provocation was not reasonable. See Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1173. 

Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Habeas relief is not available on this

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 05cv1738

claim and the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel be

DENIED.

3. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request Instruction on Lesser Included Offense of

Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter

The Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance of

counsel for not requesting jury instructions on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary

manslaughter. As explained above, the trial court did not fail to instruct on the lesser included offense

of voluntary manslaughter because there is no established federal law requiring the giving of a lesser

included offense instruction in a non-capital case. Alternatively, Petitioner failed to show that he acted

in the heat of passion to warrant an instruction of attempted voluntary manslaughter. For the same

reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner counsel was not deficient for not requesting jury instructions

on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter since there were no facts to support

such an instruction. See Strickland 466 U.S. at 688. Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Habeas relief is not available on this claim and the Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel be DENIED.

4. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request Instruction on Express Malice Aforethought

“Malice exists . . . only when an unlawful homicide was committed with the ‘intention

unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature’ (§ 188), or with awareness of the danger and a

conscious disregard for life.” Rios, 23 Cal. 4th at 460. In Rios, the California Supreme Court held that

where the issue of provocation or imperfect self-defense is presented in a murder case, the People must

prove the absence of provocation or of any belief in the need for self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt

to establish the malice element. Id. at 462. 

The Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance of

counsel for not requesting jury instructions on express malice aforethought. As described above, there

was no evidence of provocation that would justify a modified instruction on malice aforethought. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s counsel was not deficient for not requesting modified

jury instructions on malice aforethought. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Accordingly, the state court’s

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 05cv1738

decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Habeas relief is not available on this claim and the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel be DENIED.

F. Violation of Equal Protection 

Petitioner argues that the trial court denied him equal protection of the law by imposing a 25

years to life punishment for fire arm use during the commission of attempted murder causing great

bodily injury pursuant to California Penal Code § 12022.53(d). He claims that the enhancement for

attempted murder should not be greater than the enhancement for attempted voluntary manslaughter

because both crimes require the same act and are committed with the identical intent. 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. 

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim

may be established in two ways. First, a petitioner establishes an equal protection claim by showing that

he has been intentionally discriminated against on the basis of his membership in a protected class. See

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). If the action in question does not

involve a suspect classification, a petitioner may establish an equal protection claim by showing that

similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a

legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); SeaRiver Mar.

Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal protection claim

under this theory, a petitioner must allege that: (1) he is a member of an identifiable class; (2) he was

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.

The Court of Appeal denied his equal protection claim explaining that murder and voluntary

manslaughter are separate and distinct crimes and not identical acts committed with identical intent as

Petitioner argues. Therefore, the court concluded that a defendant charged with murder and a defendant

charged with manslaughter are not similarly situated and Petitioner’s equal protection claim fails. 

California has long separated criminal homicide into two distinct classes. Rios, 23 Cal.4th at

460. Manslaughter is committed with a less culpable intent than murder, which requires malice. Id.

Murder “is the unlawful killing of human being . . . with malice aforethought,” Cal. Penal Code § 187,

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 05cv1738

and manslaughter “is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.” Cal. Penal Code § 192. 

Defendants charged with attempted murder and defendants charged with attempted voluntary manslaughter have different culpability and are not similarly situated. Since Petitioner has not shown he is a

member of an identifiable class, Petitioner’s argument as to equal protection fails. The Court of

Appeal’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Habeas relief is not available on this claim and the Court

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim of violation of equal protection be DENIED.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED. This report and recommendation is submitted by the

undersigned Magistrate Judge to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of Title 28, United States Code, section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 26, 2008, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than October 10, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 28, 2008

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:05-cv-01738-JM-AJB Document 52 Filed 08/28/08 Page 15 of 15