Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-05788/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-05788-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADRIAN ALANIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER KEVIN ENTERLINE #3821, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05788-HSG (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a prisoner of the State of California currently incarcerated at Pleasant Valley 

State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two police 

officers at the San Jose Police Department and Santa Clara County deputy district attorney

Brandon Cabrera. Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. The 

complaint is now before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or an employee of a governmental 

entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b) (1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

According to the complaint, on August 7, 2012, defendant San Jose police officers Kevin 

Enterline (#3821) and David Kirby (#3817) conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which plaintiff 

was a passenger. The officers asked plaintiff to exit the vehicle, and he complied. Officer 

Enterline proceeded to pat search plaintiff. After Officer Enterline felt what he believed to be a 

gun in plaintiff’s pocket, Officer Enterline yelled “gun” to Officer Kirby. At that point, plaintiff 

pulled away from Officer Enterline and began to run. Although the allegations are not entirely 

clear as to what happened after plaintiff ran, the Court notes that plaintiff seeks damages for 

medical bills and “pain and suffering” caused by a police dog, that he identifies as “Officer Dog 

Rocko.” ECF No. 1 at 3-4.1 Attachments to the complaint further show that plaintiff was taken to 

a hospital after his arrest. See id. at 8. The Court understands plaintiff to be alleging that he was 

stopped by a police dog and suffered injuries as a result.

Plaintiff alleges that there was no probable cause for the vehicle stop or pat search, that the 

 

1 Citations are to the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pin cites are to the ECF-generated page 

numbers at the tops of the documents.

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officers acted without a warrant, and that plaintiff was not on any parole or probation that would 

require him to cooperate with a search. Plaintiff also represents that the Santa Clara County 

Superior Court granted his motion to suppress all evidence discovered as a result of the search and 

seizure.

Traffic stops, investigative stops, and arrests are covered by the Fourth Amendment’s 

protection “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. “An officer may 

conduct a traffic stop if the officer has ‘probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 

occurred.’” United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). “To justify an investigative stop, a police officer must have 

reasonable suspicion that a suspect is involved in criminal activity.” United States v. Colin, 314 

F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 2002). An arrest must be supported by probable cause. An arrest is 

supported by probable cause if, under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting 

officer, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that the defendant 

had committed a crime. Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2010).

A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force in the course of an arrest or 

other seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. See Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989); Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 

1994). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the 

Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘“the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’” against the countervailing governmental interests at 

stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).

Giving it the liberal construction to which it is entitled, the pro se complaint states 

cognizable § 1983 claims against officers Enterline and Kirby for Fourth Amendment violations 

based on an unlawful search and seizure and the use of excessive force in the course of the search 

and seizure.

The complaint fails to state a claim against defendant deputy district attorney Brandon 

Cabrera. Plaintiff fails to link this defendant to his claims. In any event, a state prosecuting 

attorney enjoys absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his conduct in 

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pursuing a criminal prosecution insofar as he acts within his role as an “advocate for the State”

and his actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler 

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 & n.33 (1976). Accordingly, defendant Cabrera is 

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable § 1983 claim against defendants 

Enterline and Kirby for violating plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Clerk shall terminate 

Brandon Cabrera as a defendant on the docket in this action.

2. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint (dkt. no. 1), with all attachments thereto, and a copy 

of this order upon defendants Officer Kevin Enterline (#3821) and Officer David Kirby (#3817)

at the San Jose Police Department. 

A courtesy copy of this order shall also be mailed to the San Jose Office of the City 

Attorney. 

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the 

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, defendants must so inform the 

Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for summary judgment also must be 

accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what 

is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 

2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be 

served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).2 

 

2

If defendants assert that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary 

judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014)

(en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that 

failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 

should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). 

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b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must do in 

order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted 

when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact 

that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a 

motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

(The Rand notice above does not excuse defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again 

concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

5. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’ counsel 

by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard any 

document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendants’

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

defendants, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

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counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No

further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

8. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to 

be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

9. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this case 

on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

1/25/2019

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