Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01403/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01403-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GOSZTYLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRENCH, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-01403-DJC-EFB (PC)

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action 

seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

On August 7, 2023, the Magistrate Judge filed findings and recommendations 

herein which were served on all Parties and notified them that any objections to the 

findings and recommendations must be filed within fourteen days. (ECF No. 56.) The 

Magistrate Judge recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed on the 

grounds that it is time-barred. (Id.) Plaintiff filed timely objections. (ECF No. 57.)

On April 30, 2024, this Court ordered the Parties to file supplemental briefing 

addressing whether Plaintiff is entitled to tolling pursuant to California Code of Civil

Procedure § 352.1(a), which permits tolling for the disability of incarceration. (ECF 

No. 63.) Specifically, the Court asked the Parties to address the impact of the Ninth 

Circuit’s decision in Mosteiro v. Simmons, No. 22-16780, 2023 WL 5695998 (9th Cir. 

Sept. 5, 2023) on the tolling analysis. (Id.) The Parties have now filed the requested 

briefing. (ECF Nos. 64, 65, 66.)

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, this Court has 

conducted a de novo review of the file. As discussed below, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff is entitled to tolling under section 352.1(a). Accordingly, the Court declines to 

adopt the findings and recommendations. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that, on March 9, 2018, four Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs 

stormed his residence, kicked in the bedroom door occupied by Plaintiff and his wife, 

and ordered Plaintiff to the ground. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff alleges the Deputy Sheriffs 

proceeded to assault him while he lay on the ground, causing Plaintiff serious injury. 

(Id.) Plaintiff filed this action on August 6, 2021, bringing one claim for excessive force 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 39.)

“For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding 

tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is 

inconsistent with federal law.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“California’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years.” Butler v. Nat’l 

Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). It is undisputed that 

Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on March 9, 2018. Plaintiff filed his complaint more 

than two years after his claim accrued. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred 

unless it is subject to any applicable tolling. 

The Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff’s claim was not subject to tolling. (See

ECF No. 56.) Of note, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff was not entitled to 

tolling pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1(a), which permits tolling 

for the disability of incarceration. (Id. at 6–8.) That section provides “[i]f a person 

entitled to bring an action . . . is, at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned 

on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term 

less than for life, the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the 

commencement of the action, not to exceed two years.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 

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§ 352.1(a). Thus, a prisoner serving a term less than life in California may have four 

years to file a federal section 1983 claim. See Cato v. Durst, No. 2:17-cv-1873-TLNEFB P, 2019 WL 2249636, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2019).

The Ninth Circuit previously held that a person “held in police custody prior to 

arraignment is faced with the same limitations as someone in custody after 

arraignment . . . [thus] actual, uninterrupted incarceration is the touchstone for 

assessing tolling under § 352(a)(3) [the precursor to § 352.1(a)], which covers all postarrest custody.” Elliott v. Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1994) (quotations 

omitted). Thus, under Elliott, a plaintiff held in continuous pre-trial custody following 

arrest could benefit from tolling pursuant to section 352.1(a).

Post-Elliott, however, the California Court of Appeal held that tolling under

section 352.1(a) is only available if the plaintiff is serving a term of imprisonment “in 

the state prison” at the time of accrual. Austin v. Medicis, 21 Cal. App. 5th 577, 582 

(2018), reh’g denied Apr. 11, 2018, review denied June 13, 2018. The appellate court 

specifically held that pre-trial custody in a county jail does not render an arrestee 

“imprisoned on a criminal charge” under section 352.1(a). Id. at 597.

The Magistrate Judge applied the holding in Austin to find that the Plaintiff was 

not entitled to tolling under section 352.1(a). As the Ninth Circuit has reasoned,

courts should “follow a published intermediate state court decision regarding 

California law unless [it is] convinced that the California Supreme Court would reject 

it.” Muniz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013). Applying this 

standard, the Magistrate Judge found (1) there was no post-Austin opinion from the 

Ninth Circuit indicating the California Supreme Court would decide differently, and 

(2) the court was unaware of any other evidence that the California Supreme Court 

would decide differently than Austin. (ECF No. 56 at 7–8.) The Magistrate Judge also

noted that the Ninth Circuit had issued two unpublished decisions relying on Austin’s 

holding that a pre-trial detainee is not entitled to the tolling available under section 

352.1(a). See Shaw v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 810 Fed. App’x 553, 554 (9th 

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Cir. 2020); Darbouze v. Christopher, No. 21-55133, 2022 WL 1769794, at *1 (9th Cir.

June 1, 2022). Thus, because Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued while he was arrested 

in his home, and not while imprisoned, the Magistrate Judge found section 352.1(a)

tolling did not apply.

However, after the findings and recommendations were issued, the Ninth 

Circuit issued a detailed opinion analyzing the appellate court’s reasoning in Austin, 

and holding that Elliott, not Austin, controls in federal court because “[c]onvincing 

evidence exists that the California Supreme Court, in interpreting § 352.1(a), would 

not follow Austin.” See Mosteiro, 2023 WL 5695998, at *2. Since Mosteiro was issued, 

district courts have applied Elliott, not Austin, when analyzing tolling. See, e.g.,

Prescott v. Contra Costa County, No. 24-cv-01660-HSG, 2024 WL 3090489 (N.D. Cal. 

June 21, 2024); Frias v. County of San Diego, No. 3:22-CV-00675-JO-AHG, 2023 WL 

8285195 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2023); Robinson v. County of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 

23-0836-DMG-PVC, 2023 WL 9420507 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2023).

Defendants urge the Court to disregard Mosteiro’s reasoning and apply Austin

instead. Defendants argue Mosteiro was incorrect in holding the California Supreme 

Court would not follow Austin as the Austin court correctly applied principles of 

statutory construction in analyzing section 352.1(a). (ECF No. 65 at 1–4.) Specifically, 

the Austin court found the language of section 352.1 was ambiguous, noting that the 

“Code of Civil Procedure does not define imprisoned on a criminal charge . . . and our 

research has not revealed any published California decision defining that term.” 

Austin, 21 Cal. App. 5th at 590. Thus, to resolve this ambiguity, Defendants argue the 

Austin court properly turned to legislative history to support their conclusion that 

section 352.1(a) does not apply to pre-trial custody. (ECF No. 65 at 3.) Defendants 

also argue Elliott is not good law, as it interpreted California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 352(a)(3), which has since been replaced by section 352.1, and wrongly “read the 

statute to apply to claims that accrued during arrest before imprisonment, if the 

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plaintiff remained in continuous custody thereafter, despite the statute’s clear 

pronouncement that it tolled claims that accrued during imprisonment.” (Id. at 4–5.)

The Court disagrees with Defendants and finds the detailed analysis in Mosteiro 

persuasive. In rejecting the conclusion in Austin, the Mosteiro court concluded that 

the state court’s analysis violated basic principles of statutory interpretation. 2023 WL 

5695998, at *3. Specifically, the Austin court looked to the meaning of “imprisoned”

in isolation, disregarding the rest of the statute, which states that tolling applies to 

anyone “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a 

criminal court for a term less than life.” Id. at *4. The Mosteiro court explained that a 

“criminal charge” ordinarily refers to “the specific crime the defendant is accused of 

committing” in a complaint, information, or indictment. Id. at *5. Therefore, the 

statute “plainly encompasses pretrial detention” when an individual is imprisoned on, 

but not yet convicted of, such charges. Id. at *5–6. The Austin court’s reading of the 

statute would also render superfluous the rest of the provision, which provides for 

post-conviction tolling when a person is imprisoned “in execution under the sentence 

of a criminal court for a term less than for life.” Id. at *6–7. Because the meaning of 

the statute is clear on its face, the Mosteiro court found that there was no need to 

consult legislative history. Id. at *7.

The Court is also not persuaded by Defendants’ arguments that Austin 

undermines the reasoning in Elliott. As an initial matter, the Austin case does not 

substantively wrestle with Elliott. It dismissed Elliott in a single sentence as 

“unpersuasive” because it “predated the enactment of section 352.1, [so] the Elliott 

court did not have the benefit of the legislative findings on this subject.” Austin, 21 

Cal. App. 5th at 590, n.4. However, the statutes considered by the courts in Elliott and 

Austin are nearly identical. “[T]he only difference between the prior and current 

versions [of the statute] is the length of the tolling period, which does not undermine 

Elliott’s reasoning.” Ruiz v. Ahern, No. 20-cv-01089-DMR, 2020 WL 4001465, at *5

(N.D. Cal. July 15, 2020). Moreover, the Elliott court's interpretation of “imprisoned on 

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a criminal charge” appears consistent with the plain meaning of the statute. The 

Austin court's interpretation, on the other hand, appears to sidestep the plain 

meaning of the statute in favor of scrutinizing its legislative history.

In short, “this case presents one of those rare instances where convincing 

evidence exists that the highest court of a state will not follow the result reached by 

some of that state's inferior appellate courts.” Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461,

1465 (9th Cir. 1983). The Court finds that Elliott remains good law and best predicts 

how the California Supreme Court would interpret section 352.1(a). Accord Moore v. 

Butte County, No. 2:22-CV-01517-DJC-JDP, 2024 WL 2853263, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 

2024). 

Accordingly, the Court holds that the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s 

excessive force claim ran four years after his cause of action accrued on March 9, 

2018, given that Plaintiff has been held in continuous custody following his arrest on 

that date. (See ECF No. 64 at 2.) As Plaintiff filed his action on August 6, 2021, his 

action is timely.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The findings and recommendations filed August 7, 2023 (ECF No. 56) are 

rejected; and

2. The matter is referred back to the Magistrate Judge to determine whether 

Defendant Michael French is entitled to summary judgment because he did 

not use force on Plaintiff (see ECF No. 52).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2024 

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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