Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03585/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03585-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOYD A. FROST,

No. C- 03-03585 EDL

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress

claims in its April 13, 2006 Order. Three claims remain in this case: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for excessive force, a claim for false arrest/imprisonment and a claim against Defendant City &

County of San Francisco pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1977). 

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment references a

claim for illegal entry, but the amended complaint does not contain such a claim, and Plaintiff did

not seek or obtain leave to further amend. Nor would the Court grant leave at this late stage of the

litigation. 

Also in the April 13, 2006 Order, the Court deferred ruling on Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, gave Plaintiff leave to depose Defendant Officer Watts, and allowed Plaintiff to

file a supplemental opposition based on that deposition and Defendants to reply. Plaintiff

subsequently deposed Officer Watts and filed his supplemental opposition. Defendants filed a reply. 

The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and makes the following Order with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim brought pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 ( 1977)

against Defendant City and County of San Francisco only. 

Case 3:03-cv-03585-EDL Document 133 Filed 05/23/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Under Monell, individual action is insufficient to create government liability; liability can

only be based upon: 1) an unconstitutional policy or longstanding practice, 2) an isolated occurrence

if the person causing the violation has “final policymaking authority,” or 3) ratification of a decision

by a final policymaker. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235-39 (9th Cir. 1999). As the

Supreme Court stated: 

Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to

impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof

that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which

policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker. Otherwise, the

existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be separately

proved. But where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional,

considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in

every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the

municipality, and the causal connection between the “policy” and the

constitutional deprivation. 

City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). 

In support of its motion for summary judgment on the Monell claim, Defendants argued that

there was no evidence that any constitutional violation resulted from an unconstitutional policy,

custom or practice. In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff offered the following evidence

from Officer Watts’ deposition: Officer Watts testified that he was a probationary officer at the time

of the incident. Pl.’s Supp. Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 19:24-20:2. Officer Watts

testified that his partner, Gabriela Fischer, was also a probationary officer. Id. at 20:3-6. Officer

Watts and Officer Fischer were regularly partnered because they both wanted steady partners and

they got along. Id. at 21:10-16. Watts testified that pairing probationary officers together, but not

necessarily permanently, was common at the Mission Street station. Id. at 20:7-21:10. Plaintiff also

points to Officer Watts’ testimony that when he was at the police academy, he learned the standard

practice for an officer to block an open door with his or her body in order to prevent a separation

between a potential suspect and the officer. Id. at 35:15-36:9. In addition, Officer Watts testified

that he believed that Plaintiff had consented to the officers’ entry into his apartment by opening the

apartment door. Id. at 36:10-12. 

Plaintiff makes no legal argument in his opposition brief regarding the meaning of these facts

in relation to his Monell claim or how he believes these facts defeat summary judgment. To the

extent that Plaintiff is arguing that Defendant City has a policy of pairing probationary officers

Case 3:03-cv-03585-EDL Document 133 Filed 05/23/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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together that caused Plaintiff’s injuries, the Monell claim fails. Plaintiff has provided no evidence

that the policy of partnering probationary officers was itself unconstitutional or even that it was a

San Francisco Police Department policy. Nor has he provided any evidence that Officer Watts or

Officer Rosales had final policymaking authority or that their conduct was ratified by a final

policymaker. Moreover, even if Plaintiff is able to establish a triable issue of fact as to the

unconstitutionality of the single incident at issue in this case, there has been no showing that the

policy had any causal connection to what allegedly happened to Plaintiff. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691

(municipalities cannot be liable for unconstitutional acts of employees absent a “direct causal link

between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”). Plaintiff seems

to want the Court to conclude that probationary employees are not qualified to work together and are

more likely to engage in excessive force, and that therefore the policy caused Plaintiff’s injuries, but

there is no evidence to support these conclusions. 

Plaintiff may be arguing that the policy of pairing probationary employees was a tacitly

widespread custom that is sufficient for Monell liability, but this basis for Monell liability also fails. 

“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be

founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has

become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

1996). Although Officer Watts testified that partnering probationary officers together at night was

common at the Mission Street station, there has been no showing that the practice was sufficiently

longstanding, frequent and consistent to constitute an improper custom. Contrary to the requirement

of Tuttle, Plaintiff has not provided proof of any other incident to establish fault on the part of the

City, or causation. 

Similarly, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that a policy of instructing police officers to

block an open door with their bodies is unconstitutional or that the officers in this case had final

policymaking authority with respect to that policy. Also, there is no evidence that this policy was of

sufficiently widespread use to be a tacit custom for purposes of Monell liability. Plaintiff has not

shown any evidence that would create a question of fact as to whether the conduct of Officer Watts

in blocking the open door was ratified by a final policymaker. To impose liability on a municipality

for ratification, a plaintiff must prove that the “‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s

Case 3:03-cv-03585-EDL Document 133 Filed 05/23/06 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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decision and the basis for it.’” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d at 1239 (quoting City of St. Louis v.

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). Moreover, “. . . ratification requires, among other things,

knowledge of the alleged constitutional violation.” Id. (citations omitted). Significantly, Plaintiff

has not shown any evidence that a final policymaker had knowledge of the alleged constitutional

violation. Most importantly, Plaintiff has failed to show any causal connection between the alleged

policy and his injuries. Therefore, Monell liability based on this alleged policy fails. 

To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that either of these practices demonstrates a failure to

train, the Monell claim also fails. Inadequate training can serve as the basis for liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 “only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons with whom the municipal employees come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 389 (1989). Further, “[o]nly where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice

by a municipality - a ‘policy’ as defined by our prior cases - can a city be liable for such a failure

under § 1983.” Id. (“That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice

to fasten liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other

than a faulty training program. . . . Neither will it suffice to prove that an injury or accident could

have been avoided if an officer had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the

particular injury-causing conduct.”). There must also be a causal connection between the identified

deficiency in a training program and the injury. Id. at 391. Here, Plaintiff has not provided

evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to any inadequacy in police training, much less

causation of Plaintiff’s injuries due to inadequate training. 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Monell claim is

granted. The Court will address the viability of Plaintiff’s excessive force and false

arrest/imprisonment claims in the context of ruling on Defendant’s Motion in Limine numbers one

and two. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2006

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:03-cv-03585-EDL Document 133 Filed 05/23/06 Page 4 of 4