Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05423/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05423-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT BRUMETT,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. /

No. C 04-05423 JSW

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 filed by Petitioner Scott Brumett (“Brumett”). The petition is now ripe for consideration

on the merits and, for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History.

On November 24, 1993, Brumett was convicted by a jury of one count of murder in the

second degree; gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated; driving with a blood alcohol level

in excess of .08% and causing injury to Wendy Holtz; and driving when privilege suspended for

prior convictions of driving under the influence. (Second Amended Pet. (“Pet.”) at 14-15.) The

jury also found that Brumett caused death or bodily injury to more than one victim and had prior

misdemeanor DUI convictions. (Id.) Brumett subsequently was sentenced to an indeterminate

sentence of fifteen years to life. (Id.) Brumett currently is confined at a California Correctional

Training Facility in Soledad, California. Brumett does not contest his conviction or the resulting

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1 This was the second petition filed in the court of appeals, the first having 

been denied for an alleged failure to “present a complete record of the administrative proceedings

and the trial court proceedings.” (Appendix A to Petition, (“Pet. App. A”), Ex. E.)

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sentence. Rather, he seeks habeas relief based upon the denial of parole at his first suitability

hearing, which was held on September 20, 2002 (“the Hearing”). 

On August 14, 2003, the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles

denied Brumett’s state habeas petition with the sole explanation that the decision was supported by

some evidence. (Answer, Ex. 8.) On September 8, 2004, the California Court of Appeal denied

Brumett’s petition stating that “Petitioner’s representation [] that a complete record of the

administrative proceedings is included in the record does not satisfy the requirements of People v.

Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995).” (Answer, Ex. 12.)1

 The Court of Appeal also denied the

petition on the merits concluding that the record “reflects some evidence to support the challenged

decision.” (Id.) On December 1, 2004, the California Supreme Court summarily denied review of

Brumett’s state habeas petition. (Answer, Ex. 14.) 

Brumett filed his original petition with this Court in December of 2004. Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss in June 2005, after which Brumett filed his first amended petition in July 2005. 

Respondent filed a second motion to dismiss in November 2005, which this Court granted. 

Brumett filed a second amended petition in October 2006. The Court denied Respondent’s

subsequent motion to dismiss and ordered Respondent to address Brumett’s claims. On August 3,

2007, Respondent filed his Answer to the Order to Show Cause. Brumett then filed a Traverse on

October 3, 2007. 

B. Factual Background.

The following facts are derived from the California Court of Appeal opinion as found by

that court on direct appeal from Brumett’s trial. Although Brumett does not challenge his

conviction, the facts underlying that conviction are pertinent to the resolution of his habeas

petition and are set forth as follows:

Viewed in accordance with the usual rules on appeal (People v.

Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 1199, 1206), the evidence established prior to May

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5, 1987, defendant was convicted of drunk driving after he lost control of his

car in the rain and crashed. Thereafter, from May 5, 1987,through August

5, 1987, defendant participated in a first offender program for persons

convicted of driving under the influence. The program informed defendant

of the dangers of driving under the influence. 

Some time prior to February 25, 1988, defendant was once again

convicted of driving under the influence and this time participated in a yearlong second offender program. In that program, defendant was exposed to

similar information as was taught in the first offender program. While he

was participating in the second offender program, defendant was arrested for

a third drunk driving offense. He did not inform the director of this incident.

According to the program director, defendant was repeatedly told that

by drinking and driving, he risked killing someone. 

Nevertheless, defendant was apparently intoxicated at 4 p.m. on

February 19, 1993, when he went to the Sunshine Childcare Center in

Valencia to pick up his eight-year-old daughter, Brittany. [Footnote omitted]

Cheryl Espinosa, the site director of the school informed defendant that

Brittany was not there. Espinosa noticed that defendant’s speech was slurred

and that he was swaying back and forth. Defendant was chewing gum and

Espinosa could not smell any alcohol on his breath, but she believed he was

drunk and should not be driving. Concerned, Espinosa telephoned Deaner

to request permission to remove defendant from the list of persons authorized

to pick Brittany up from the school. In response to Espinosa’s telephone call,

and fearing that defendant was drunk, Deaner called the Sheriff’s Office to

inquire whether he could refuse to put Brittany into defendant’s car. Deaner

never had to make that decision. 

At approximately 4:15 p.m. that afternoon, Jose Carrillo was traveling

east on Placerita Canyon Road at about 35 miles an hour behind a white

Escort. Carrillo recalled that it was drizzling and the road was wet and slick

at the time. About half a mile east of Highway 14, Carrillo saw a light blue

car traveling towards the white Escort at about 55 miles an hour. As the blue

car came around the curve, it crossed the double lines and hit the left front of

the white Escort. The white Escort went over the embankment and down the

hill while the blue car spun around and stopped crossways along the road.

When Carillo stopped his own car, he saw defendant sitting in the driver’s

seat of the blue car. Another car subsequently arrived and also stopped. That

driver stayed at the scene while Carrillo went for help. 

Within a few minutes Carrillo located city employee Norman Sieger.

Sieger used his radio to advise other units of the accident, then followed

Carrillo to the accident site. There, defendant told Carrillo that the white

Escort had veered to the left and caused the collision. Based on the way

defendant spoke and acted, Carrillo formed the opinion that defendant was

drunk. 

Sieger observed that defendant had blood on his shirt. When Sieger

asked defendant whether he was alright, defendant responded, “yeah, I think

I hit somebody.” Sieger noticed that defendant’s speech was slurred and he

was swaying from side to side; his eyes were glassy and his pupils were

dilated. 

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While he was speaking to defendant, Sieger heard a child crying in

the ravine below. Carrillo also heard children crying. When he later looked

down the hill to where the Escort had fallen, he saw defendant standing next

to the car while other people tried to help the occupants of the car. 

That same afternoon, Kurt Brewer was driving west on Placerita

Canyon Road when he came across the accident scene. He pulled onto the

left shoulder and saw defendant get out of the driver’s seat of a light blue or

gray car, walk to the side of the road, and toss between 6 and 12 silver cans

over the side of the hill. Brewer then accompanied Sieger down the hill to

the white Escort. There, Brewer observed a two-year-old girl in the back

seat, a little boy in the front passenger seat and a woman in the driver’s seat.

The woman was not breathing. The boy was unconscious and bleeding from

a head wound, but was breathing. The girl was conscious. Sieger and

Brewer took the children out of the car and brought them back up the hill. 

Deputy Sheriff Amos Cisneros and paramedic Robert Foster arrived

at the scene together. Foster observed defendant, who appeared uninjured,

apparently tossing a silver can over the embankment. While Foster went to

tend to the other victims, Cisneros addressed the crowd of bystanders and

asked the driver of the blue car to step forward. When no one responded,

Cisneros walked towards the car. Defendant stood up at the rear of the

vehicle, but did not immediately identify himself as the driver. Cisneros

observed a cardboard container with beer cans behind the rear bumper of the

car. Defendant walked towards Cisneros with an unsteady gait and Cisneros

detected alcohol on defendant’s breath. Cisneros also noted that defendant’s

eyes were red and bloodshot and that his speech was slow and deliberate.

Cisneros concluded that defendant was under the influence of alcohol.

Observing that defendant’s arm was bleeding, Cisneros asked defendant how

he had sustained this injury and defendant admitted that he was the driver of

the blue car. When Cisneros asked for a driver’s license, defendant gave him

an identification card, not a driver’s license.

Meanwhile, Foster was evaluating the injuries of the other victims.

He noted that the little girl who had been taken from the white Escort, Paige

Holtz, appeared to have no severe injuries. The little boy, Joshua Holtz,

however, had a serious skull fracture. While a bystander monitored the boy’s

respiration, Foster went down the hill to the Escort. He observed heavy

damage to the front and driver’s side of the car. The woman in the driver’s

seat, Wendy Holtz, had two broken legs and was not breathing. Foster

concluded that she was dead. 

While Foster was examining Wendy Holtz, the bystander who had

been monitoring Joshua’s condition yelled to Foster that the boy had stopped

breathing. Foster quickly returned to Joshua and saw that his lips were blue.

Foster concluded that there was internal head bleeding. He initiated CPR and

Joshua started to breathe again. Although Joshua regained consciousness a

minute later, his vital signs remained poor. While Foster worked on the boy,

he heard defendant say to Cisneros, “Why isn’t that paramedic working on

me. When will he come over and check me out?” When Foster finished with

Joshua and Paige, he went to defendant and observed that defendant had a

superficial arm wound. Foster smelled alcohol on defendant’s breath. 

California Highway Patrol Officer John Grindey interviewed

defendant at the scene of the accident. Defendant told Grindey that he was

going to pick up his daughter. Defendant knew that he was driving with a

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28 2 California has since replaced the Board of Prison Terms with the Board of

Parole Hearings. See Cal. Penal Code § 5075(a). 

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suspended license, but claimed he had no choice because he had to go to

work. Defendant claimed to remember only that the white Escort came over

the line and hit defendant’s car head-on. Grindey noted that defendant’s

speech was slurred, his eyes were red and glassy and his breath smelled like

alcohol. Defendant failed the several field sobriety tests Grindey asked him

to perform. Defendant told Grindey that he had had only three to four light

beers and claimed to have had no alcohol since 3:00 p.m.. He denied having

anything to drink after the accident. Grindey concluded that defendant had

been driving under the influence at the time of the collision. Before leaving

the scene, Grindey noticed several cans of Coors Light strewn behind

defendant’s car. When fire specialist Richard Waugh arrived at the scene, he

also noticed empty beer cans and one full can of beer on the embankment. 

California Highway Patrol Officer David Moeller eventually

transported defendant to the hospital to obtain a blood sample. At 5:44 p.m.,

a sample was taken. Testing revealed that defendant’s blood alcohol content

was 0.27 percent. Paul Kayne, a criminalist with the Sheriff’s Crime

Laboratory, opined that a person with a blood alcohol level of .27 percent at

5:45 p.m. would be impaired while driving a vehicle at 4:15 p.m. He also

opined that a person with a blood alcohol level of .27 percent at 5:45 p.m.

would have had a blood alcohol level of at least .08 at 4:15 p.m. 

Based upon his investigation, California Highway Patrol Officer

Robert Koetting, a collision causation expert, opined that the accident was

caused by defendant driving at an unsafe speed for the conditions then

present and making an improper turning movement at that speed. He

believed that defendant’s blood alcohol level was the primary cause of the

collision. 

(See Pet. App. A, Ex. A (California Court of Appeal Opinion at 3-10); Ex. C (Transcript of

September 20, 2002 Hearing (“Tr.”) at 8:22-17:16).) 

At the hearing, the Board of Prison Terms (“Board”)2

 found Brumett unsuitable for parole

and found that he posed an unreasonable risk or danger to society and a threat to public safety if

given a release date. The Board gave the following reasons for its decision:

The committing [sic] offense, the offense was carried out in an especially

callous manner. You caused the death of Wendy Holtz because you were

driving under the influence of alcohol. You had knowledge, prior

knowledge, that you had an alcohol problem and you refused to acknowledge

it. There were multiple victims attacked - strike that, or injured and killed in

the same incident. ... The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner because ... you were driving under a suspended license.

You had DUI arrests. You were driving at .0 or zero .0 [sic] blood alcohol

level. The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates

exceptionally callous disregard for human sufferings. In terms of leaving

these two young children motherless. The motive of the crime was

inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the offense and that’s because

you just didn’t heed the warning signs, that you had a problem, a problem

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with alcohol. ... Previous record, the prisoner has an escalating pattern of

criminal conduct. In terms of three arrests for DUI and participation in

treatment programming. ... He has an escalating – or strike that, has a history

of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others, beginning at an early

age. He started drinking around the age of 13, partially because of the loss

of a loved one, his father. Around the age of 15, he started drinking daily,

sometimes to the point of intoxication. He failed to – previous grants of

probation, previous grants of counseling, previous grants of jail time, to

acknowledge that you had a problem. And cannot be counted upon to avoid

criminality. An unstable social history of criminality which included, as

mentioned, convictions for Vehicle Code violations of alcohol. Three of

those, DUIs, one hit and run with an injury and driving on a suspended

license. Institutional behavior, he has not sufficiently participated in

beneficial self-help and therapy programming at this time. The psychosocial

report, dated March 29th of 2002, authored by William Gamard, Ph.D., Staff

Psychologist, is not totally supportive of release. In that, under the

Assessment of Dangerousness ... it states that the prisoner has only one risk

factor as precursor for problems in the future, should he be released would

be a return to alcoholism.

(Pet. App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 90:15-92:23; see also id. at 95:4-97:15 (setting forth basis for three year

denial).) 

The Board reviewed the factors that tended to favor suitability, and reviewed Brumett’s

numerous letters of support from friends and family offering employment and residence upon his

release. (Id. at 36:13-41:17.) In addition, the Board pointed out that Brumett should be

commended because:

he has remained disciplinary free. He hasn’t received any 115s in his entire

nine years of incarceration. He’s participated in the AA/NA 12-Step

Program. He participated in Life Skills programming, where he completed

and got a certificate. The Impact Program, the Impact Workshop for 13

weeks. He remains as a tutor and an instructor. He just recently completed

the Anger Management Program, which is about a 10-week program ... .

He’s got vocational trades, a Refrigeration and Air Conditioning certificate.

And he has a certificate for Type II Refrigerant and Transition Recovery. As

well as a Pasteurization license, and he’s renewed his Pasteurization license

in December of 2001. Positive work reports. He’s been in PIA Textiles as

a sewing machine operator. He’s trying to better himself in terms of

education. He’s upgrading his ability. He’s trying to receive an AA in

Business Management. 

(Id. at 93:25-94:20.)

The Board also noted that Brumett received numerous laudatory chronos for his work on

various assignments. (Id. at 29:20-30:8.) Indeed, one of the commissioners stated that “the

adjustment you’ve made since you’ve been incarcerated is as good, if not the best, that I’ve ever

seen. And absolutely, you are to be commended for that.” (Id. at 98:7-9.) 

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The Board deferred Brumett’s next parole hearing for three years and recommended that

Brumett remain disciplinary free, upgrade both vocationally and educationally, continue to

participate in Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”), and continue to participate in therapy. (Id. at 97:15-

98:3.) With respect to the latter recommendation, the Board found that Brumett needed further

therapy “in order to face, discuss and cope with stress in a non-destructive manner, so that he can

better understand the causative factors, [of] the things that he did. ... Until progress is made, the

prisoner continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others.” (Id. at 93:11-21.) 

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review.

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see

also Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1971). The Ninth Circuit has applied § 2254(d) to review of

parole suitability decisions. See Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007); Rosas v.

Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895,

901 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the petition in this case was filed after the effective date of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), AEDPA’s provisions apply. 

Jeffries v. Wood, 103 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Under AEDPA, this Court may grant the petition with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 413 (2000) (hereinafter “Williams”). Courts are not required to address the merits of a

particular claim but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground that relief is precluded by

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003). It is the habeas petitioner’s

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burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief by § 2254(d). Woodford v. Visciotti, 537

U.S. 19, 25 (2002).

“Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of

the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Barker v. Fleming, 423

F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005) (“clearly established” federal law determined as of the time of the

state court’s last reasoned decision); Alvarado v. Hill, 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court’s

jurisprudence.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The Supreme Court has explained repeatedly that

AEDPA, which embodies deep-seated principles of comity, finality, and federalism, establishes a

highly deferential standard for reviewing state-court determinations. See id. at 436. Thus, “[a]

federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when

the precedent from [the Supreme] Court is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12,

17 (2003) (per curiam).

Under the “contrary to” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant the writ

only if the state court “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme

Court] cases, ‘or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision’

of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different result.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of

section 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412. The

objectively unreasonable standard is not a clear error standard. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76; Clark

v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067-69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003). After Lockyer,

“[t]he writ may not issue simply because, in our determination, a state court’s application of

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federal law was erroneous, clearly or otherwise. While the ‘objectively unreasonable’ standard is

not self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a greater degree of deference to the state courts than

[the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] previously afforded them.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068.

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v.

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). If the highest state court has summarily denied a

petitioner’s claim, the habeas court may “look through” that decision to the last state court

addressing the claim in a reasoned decision. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2000) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)).

In this case, the Court of Appeal denied Brumett’s petition in a reasoned decision. (Pet.,

App. A, Ex. H.) The Supreme Court then summarily denied review of Brumett’s petition. (Pet.,

App. A, Ex. I.) Accordingly, this Court will “look through” the California Supreme Court’s

decision to the Court of Appeal’s decision in deciding whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

B. Legal Standards Applicable to Parole Suitability Determinations.

California’s parole scheme is set forth in California Penal Code § 3041, et seq. Section

3041(a) provides, in pertinent part:

In the case of any inmate sentenced pursuant to any provision of law ... [o]ne

year prior to the inmate’s minimum eligible parole release date a panel of two

or more commissioners or deputy commissioners shall again meet with the

inmate and shall normally set a parole release date as provided in Section

3041.5. ... The release date shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform

terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat

to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial

Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of

parole release dates.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). 

Penal Code section 3041(b) provides, in pertinent part:

The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity

of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of

the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

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Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b).

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations section 2402 (hereinafter “Section

2402”) sets forth the criteria used to determine whether an inmate is suitable for release on

parole. The opening paragraph of Section 2402(a) states:

Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner

will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). 

Section 2402(b) provides:

All relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall be considered

in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall include the

circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct

which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses,

including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and present

attitude toward the crime; any considerations of treatment or control,

including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

results in a finding of unsuitability.

Id. § 2402(b).

Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are: 

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered

include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder. 

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation

to the offense. 

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions

inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the

prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

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(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or

tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct

in prison or jail.

Id. § 2402(c).

Circumstances supporting a finding of suitability for parole are:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of assaulting

others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm

to victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably stable

relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate

the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage, seeking

help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or indicating that he understands

that nature and magnitude of the offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as a result of

significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has built over a long

period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of the crime,

the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome, as defined in section

2000(b), and it appears the criminal behavior was a result of that

victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant history of

violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the possibility of recidivism. 

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made realistic

plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use

upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an enhanced

ability to function within the law upon release.

Id. § 2402(d). 

The regulations also contain a matrix of suggested base terms depending on the murder

degree and the circumstances surrounding the murder. The matrix provides three choices of

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3 One axis of the matrix concerns the relationship between murderer and victim

and the other axis of the matrix concerns the circumstances of the murder. The choices on

the axis for the relationship of murderer and victim are “participating victim,” “prior

relationship,” and “no prior relationship.” The choices on the axis for the circumstances of

the murder are “indirect,” “direct or victim contribution,” and “severe trauma.” Each of the

choices are further defined in the matrix. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(c). 

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suggested base terms for several categories of crimes. See id. § 2403. For second degree murders,

the matrix of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years, to a high of 19, 20 or 21 years,

depending on some of the facts of the crime.3

 

Although the matrix is to be used to establish a base term, an inmate’s base term is set

only when he or she has been found suitable for parole. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1087

(2005). Thus, the statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner’s

expectancy in an early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. Id. at 1070-71.

While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., lifemaximum) sentences should “normally” receive “uniform” parole dates for

similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies “unless [the

Board] determines” that a release date cannot presently be set because the

particular offender’s crime and/or criminal history raises “public safety” concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. (Italics added.) Nothing

in the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under

standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole

date on the grounds the particular offender’s criminality presents a

continuing public danger.

Id. at 1070 (emphasis, brackets, and parentheses as in original). In sum, “the Board, exercising its

traditional broad discretion, may protect public safety in each discrete case by considering the

dangerous implications of a life-maximum prisoner’s crime individually.” Id. at 1071. The

California Supreme Court’s determination of state law is binding in this federal habeas action. See

Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1979).

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime alone can

support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum, even if everything else about the prisoner is

laudable. “While the board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for

which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before

concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for the

prisoner’s release.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616,

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4 Brumett also theorizes that the Board breached a contract with him and

contends that this breach also violates Due Process. Brumett analogizes his situation to a

case where, as part of a plea bargain, the parties agreed the defendant would be released after

serving a specified prison term, if the defendant’s conduct in prison was disciplinary free. 

(See Pet. Mem. at 26-27 (citing Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003).) The Court

finds Brown to be inapposite to this case because Brumett did not plead guilty. To the extent

Brumett seeks relief on this basis, his Petition is DENIED.

5 In his Answer, Respondent denies that Brumett has a federally protected

liberty interest in parole. (Answer, ¶ 14.) He does not advance this argument as a basis for

denying the petition. Indeed, that argument would be foreclosed by controlling Ninth Circuit

authority. See, e.g., Irons, 505 F.3d at 850 (“California Penal Code section 3041 vests ... all

... California inmates whose sentences provide for the possibility of parole with a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole release date, a liberty

interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause.”); Sass v.

Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We hold that California

inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061

(2005).”).

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682-83 (2002) (“[t]he nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for

denying parole” but might violate due process “where no circumstances of the offense reasonably

could be considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a

conviction for that offense”).

C. The Board’s Decision to Deny Brumett Parole Did Not Violate Due Process.

1. Legal Standards.

 Brumett asserts that the Board’s decision to deny him parole at the September 2002

hearing violated his Due Process rights.4 “In analyzing the procedural safeguards owed to an

inmate under the Due Process clause, [a court] must look to two distinct elements: (1) a

deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate

procedural safeguards.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 2003).5

 The second prong

of this test is satisfied if: (1) the inmate has been afforded an opportunity to be heard and, if denied

parole, informed of the reasons underlying the decision; and (2) the Board’s decision is supported

“some evidence” or is not otherwise arbitrary. Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 542 (9th Cir.

2008) (citing Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 and Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128-29

(9th Cir. 2006)); Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Brumett does not argue that he was denied an opportunity to be heard or that the Board

failed to inform him of its reasons for the decision. Rather, he contends the Board’s conclusion

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that he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released is both arbitrary and not

supported by “some evidence.” Respondent argues that the “some evidence” standard is not

clearly established federal law. That argument is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit authority. See Sass,

461 F.3d at 1129. Respondent further argues, that even if the “some evidence” standard applies,

the Board’s decision that Brumett posed an unreasonable danger to society was supported by some

evidence.

“To determine whether the some evidence standard is met ‘does not require examination

of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion’ reached by the parole board.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S., 445, 455-56 (1985)). “Hill’s some evidence standard is minimal

and assures that ‘the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board

were without support or otherwise arbitrary.’” Id. at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457). 

Further, in order to determine whether the Board’s decision to find Brumett unsuitable for parole is

supported by some evidence, this Court must focus not on whether some evidence “that a

particular factor or factors indicating unsuitability exist,” but on whether there is some evidence to

conclude that “a prisoner’s release will unreasonably danger public safety.” Hayward, 512 F.3d at

543 (citations omitted). 

2. Analysis.

At the hearing, the Board found Brumett unsuitable for parole and an unreasonable 

risk or danger to others if released based on the following findings: (1) the commitment offense

was carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner; (2) the motive of the crime was

inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the offense; (3) his previous record demonstrated that

Brumett had an escalating pattern of criminal conduct; (4) that Brumett had a history of unstable

and tumultuous relationships with others; (5) Brumett had not sufficiently participated in

beneficial self-help and therapy programming; and (6) Dr. Gamard’s report was not totally

supportive of release.

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a. The Nature of the Offense.

The first Section 2402 factor on which the Board relied to find Brumett unsuitable for

parole is that he “committed the offense in an especially callous manner.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(c)(1). “A prisoner’s commitment offense may constitute a circumstance tending to show that

a prisoner is presently too dangerous to be found suitable for parole, but the denial of parole may

be predicated on a prisoner’s commitment offense only where the Board can ‘point to factors

beyond the minium elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed’ that demonstrate

the inmate will, at the time of the suitability hearing, present a danger to society if released.” 

Irons, 505 F.3d at 852 (quoting Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071) (emphasis added). 

Here, the Board noted that Brumett had prior knowledge that he had an alcohol problem

and refused to acknowledge that problem. (Pet., App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 90:18-19.) The Board also

noted that multiple victims were injured, one of the factors to be used to determine whether a

“prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A). The Board also concluded that the offense was “carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner,” because Brumett was driving under a suspended license and

had previous DUI arrests. (Pet., App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 90:25-91:3).) See also 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(c)(1)(B). The Board further concluded that the “offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering (see id. § 2402(c)(1)(D)),

because Brumett left two young children motherless. (Pet., App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 91:4-8.) Finally,

the Board concluded the motive for the crime was trivial in relation to the offense (see 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(E)), because Brumett did not heed the warning signs of his problem with

alcohol. (Pet., App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 91:13.) 

As noted, Brumett was convicted of second degree murder, which by its nature evinces a

certain level of callousness because it “requires express or implied malice – i.e., the perpetrator

must kill another person with the specific intent to do so; or he or she must cause another person’s

death by intentionally performing an act, knowing it is dangerous to life and with conscious

disregard for life.” In re Smith, 114 Cal. App. 4th 343, 366 (2003). As the Smith court noted,

“[f]or this reason, it can reasonably be said that all second degree murders by definition involve

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some callousness – i.e., lack of emotion or sympathy, emotional insensitivity, indifference to the

feelings or suffering of others.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Therefore, to demonstrate ‘an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering’ ... the offense in question must have been

committed in a more aggravated or violent manner than that ordinarily shown in the commission

of second degree murder.” In re Scott, 119 Cal. App. 4th 871, 891 (2004) (citations omitted). 

In Irons, supra, the petitioner killed the victim following an argument over a suspected

drug theft. Irons fired twelve rounds into the victim and, after the victim complained that he was

in pain, Irons stabbed him twice in the back. Irons then wrapped the victim’s body in a sleeping

bag, and attempted to procure a car. During the ten days it took Irons to obtain a car, he left the

victim’s body in a room in the sleeping bag. Thereafter, Irons took the victim’s body to the coast,

weighted it, and disposed of it in the ocean. Irons, 505 F.3d at 849. The Irons’ court compared

the facts of Irons’ commitment offense to the facts of the commitment offense in Dannenberg, in

which the petitioner “struck multiple blows to his wife’s head with a pipe wrench and then pushed

her into a tub of water in which she drowned.” Id. at 852. The Irons court concluded that

“[b]ecause we find that Irons’ crime was similarly cruel or vicious [to Dannenberg’s crime], we

cannot say that there was not ‘some evidence’ to support the Board’s determination that Irons was

unsuitable for parole under California law.” Id. 

It is undisputed in this case that multiple victims were involved and that one was critically

injured and one was killed. It also is undisputed that Brumett consumed alcohol before getting

into the car to pick up his daughter from school so that his blood alcohol level at the time of the

accident was well above the permitted limit. Brumett acknowledges that he was in denial about

his problem with alcohol for practically all of his adult life. (Pet., App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 17:22-

27).) Although he stated that he was not clear on the events following the collision, Brumett also

admitted that he tossed beer cans over the embankment while waiting for police to arrive. (Id. at

18:1-8.) Although Brumett may not have intended to kill anyone on the day of the offense, he

clearly demonstrated he had ignored the potential perils of driving under the influence on a number

of prior occasions. As such, although the facts of this case might not be as egregious as the facts

of Irons, the Court concludes that the State Court’s decision was neither an unreasonable

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application of clearly established federal law nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of

facts in light of the evidence presented. 

b. Brumett’s Previous Convictions.

The Board determined that Brumett demonstrated an escalating pattern of criminal

conduct because, although he had no juvenile record, he had three prior DUIs and failed to benefit

from treatment. (Pet., App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 91:17-18).) Section 2402(c)(2) notes that if a

“prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim,” that

factor would tend to show unsuitability for parole. 

Brumett was convicted for a DUI on April 3, 1987 and placed on 36 months probation. 

(Pet., App., Ex. A at 26 (Life Prisoner Evaluation Report).) His driving privileges were restricted

for 90 days and he was directed to attend a driver improvement program for a DUI treatment

program. (Id.) Brumett was again convicted of a DUI on May 3, 1987 for which the court placed

him on probation for 48 months, sentenced him to 48 hours in county jail, fined him $664.00,

directed him to participate in treatment or counseling and restricted his driving privileges for one

year. He was also ordered to attend AA meetings. (Id.) On November 8, 1988, Brumett was

again convicted for a DUI and placed on probation for 60 months. (Id.) On June 29, 1989,

Brumett was convicted for Hit and Run with Injury and Driving on a Suspended License. (Id.) He

was sentenced to 68 hours in County Jail and placed on 36 months court probation. (Id.) He was

ordered not to drive a motor vehicle unless licensed and insured. (Id.) The Board concluded that

these prior convictions demonstrated that Brumett failed benefit from society’s previous attempts

to rehabilitate him and demonstrated that he could not be “counted upon to avoid criminality.” 

(Pet., App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 92:3-7).)

With the exception of the conviction for a hit and run with injury, Brumett’s prior

convictions do not lead to the conclusion that he has a history of inflicting or attempting to inflict

serious injury on a victim. In light of the hit and run conviction, the Court cannot find that the 

State Court’s decision, which concluded that the Board’s decision to find Brumett unsuitable for

parole was supported by some evidence, was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. 

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6 Brumett also alleges that the Board cannot rely on his history with

alcoholism to deny him parole. (Pet. Mem. at 54-56.) This Court finds, however, that the

Board did not rely on his alcoholism as a factor to deny Brumett parole. Rather, the Board

relied on Brumett’s disregard for the problem as demonstrated by his DUI violations.

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c. Brumett’s Need for Continued Self-Help and Therapy.

The Board also based its denial on its determination that Brumett needs to continue with

therapy and self-help programming. Brumett has remained disciplinary free for his entire nine

years of incarceration. He has participated in Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous

programs. He has participated in, and completed, a Life Skills program for which he received a

certificate. He completed the Impact Program Workshop, in which he remains as a tutor and an

instructor. He also completed the Anger Management Program. He obtained a Refrigeration and

Air Conditioning certificate. He also received a certificate for Type II Refrigerant and Transition

Recovery. He has obtained a Pasteurization license, which he renewed in December of 2001. He

worked as a sewing machine operator. He was also working towards his AA in Business

Management. He continues to receive positive work reports.

Furthermore, the Staff Psychologist, Dr. Gamard, stated in his evaluation that Brumett

“would pose less than an average risk of violence when compared to other Level II inmates. And

that if released to the community, [Brumett’s] violence potential is estimated to be no higher than

the average citizen in the community,” which one of the Commissioners found “raise[d] a flag in

[his] own experience.” (Pet., App. A, Ex. C (Tr. at 34:9-12).) Dr. Gamard also noted that the

“only risk factor, precursor for problems in the future, when released on parole, would be if

[Brumett] were to return to alcohol use.” (Id. at 34:22-25.) Finally, Dr. Gamard noted in his

report that Brumett “is responsible for his behavior. He has no mental health disorder which

would necessitate any treatment, either while incarcerated or on parole.” (Id. at 34:27-35:3.) Dr.

Gramard’s only recommendation was that “since severe alcoholism is considered to be a disease or

a lifetime condition, which must be guarded against, [Brumett] would need a 12-Step or some

other support system should he be released.” (Id. at 35:3-8.) The Board, however, found that

because Dr. Gamard noted that Brumett’s return to alcohol would be a risk factor upon his release,

the report was not totally supportive of release. (Id. at 92:15-23.)6

 The Court concludes that the

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State Court’s determination that the Board’s decision that Brumett’s need for continued self-help

or therapy and programming presents some evidence showing that he still poses a danger to

society was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

d. Unstable Social History.

The Board also stated that it deemed Brumett unsuitable for parole based upon his

tumultuous or unstable relationships with others. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(3). The

record demonstrates that Brumett is divorced and does not have regular contact with his daughter,

although that apparently is not his choice. The Board also noted that Brumett began drinking

when he was about 13, apparently as a result of his father’s death. The Board also relied on the

fact that Brumett failed to heed previous grants of probation, counseling and jail time or

acknowledge that he had a problem, “and cannot be counted to avoid criminality.” However, the

record also demonstrates that Brumett’s family is quite supportive of him and has maintained close

contact with him while he has been incarcerated, and is ready to support him upon release. 

Although it is not this Court’s task to reweigh the evidence, the Court concludes that the record

does not support a finding that Brumett’s relationships with others demonstrate that he would pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released. See Hayward, 513 F.3d at 546. 

However, when the Court looks to the record as a whole, the Court finds that the State

Court’s determination that there was some evidence to support the Board’s decision to find

Brumett unsuitable for parole, was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Brumett’s petition is DENIED on this basis. 

e. The Concerns Articulated in Biggs v. Terhune Are Not Implicated In

this Case.

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit stated that,

[o]ver time, ... , should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior

and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of

the nature of his offense would raise serious questions involving his liberty

interest. ...

A continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance

of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.

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7 See, e.g., McCullough v. Kane, 2007 WL 1593227 at *6, 9 (N.D. Cal. June 1,

2007) (finding due process violation in Governor’s reversal of the Board’s decision to grant

parole after petitioner had served twenty-one years of fifteen years to life sentence for second

degree murder and met circumstances tending to indicate suitability for parole); Brown v.

Kane, 2007 WL 1288448 at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007) (finding due process violation in

Governor’s reversal of the Board’s decision to grant parole at tenth parole suitability hearing

after petitioner had served twenty-four years of fifteen years to life sentence for second

degree murder and met circumstances tending to indicate suitability for parole); Pirtle v. Cal.

Bd. of Prison, 2007 WL 1140817 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007) (finding due process

violation in Board’s denial of parole based on petitioner’s commitment offense, criminal

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Id. at 916-17; cf. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1094 (“sole reliance on the commitment offense

might, in particular cases, violate” section 3041(a)’s “provision that a parole date ‘shall normally

be set’ under ‘uniform term principles, and might thus also contravene the inmate’s

constitutionally protected expectation of parole”); Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 682-83 (“[t]he

nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole” but

might violate due process “where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered

more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense”).

In issuing the note of caution in Biggs regarding continued reliance on unchanging factors,

the Ninth Circuit gave little guidance to district courts as to how they should evaluate such a claim. 

In Irons, however, the court noted that when it had determined that “a parole board’s decision to

deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comport[ed]

with due process, the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of

years required by his sentence.” Id. The court concluded that “[a]ll we held in [Biggs and Sass,]

and all we hold today, therefore, is that, given the particular circumstances of the offenses in these

cases, due process was not violated when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior

to the expiration of their minimum terms.” Id. at 853-54. The Irons court further “expressed its

hope that the Board will come to recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on

an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point

violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California

statutes.” Id. at 854.

The lessons this Court draws from Biggs, Sass, Irons, Dannenberg, Rosencrantz, and

various district court opinions that have applied the principles articulated therein,7 are as follows:

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record, unstable social history, failure to upgrade vocationally, and need for further therapy

to cope with stress), report and recommendation adopted 2007 WL 15446620 (E.D. Cal.

May 29, 2007); Thomas v. Brown, 513 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding due process

violation in Governor’s reversal based on petitioner’s commitment offense, his failure to

accept responsibility, his need for further therapy, and his criminal history). 

8 Brumett also alleges that his incarceration has become disproportionate to

offenses committed under similar circumstances. (Pet. Mem. at 62-66.) However, the Board

has not yet found Brumett suitable for parole. Pursuant to the California Supreme Court’s

decision in Dannenberg, a determination of suitability precedes a determination of the

appropriate matrix term. Accordingly, the Court finds this claim without merit and DENIES

the Petition on that basis as well.

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(1) that the Board may properly consider the nature of the commitment offense to determine

whether or not a prisoner is suitable for parole; (2) that in certain instances the nature of the

offense alone may support a finding that the prisoner is unsuitable for parole; and (3) at some

unspecified point, the nature of the offense will no longer be of sufficient predictive value in

determining whether or not a prisoner poses too great a risk of danger to be considered suitable for

parole. 

In his Petition, Brumett challenges the Board’s actions at his first suitability hearing,

which occurred nine years into a fifteen year to life sentence. Thus, Brumett has not yet served his

minimum sentence and the Court finds that the State Court’s rejection of his Due Process claims

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Although at

some point in the future, the Board’s reliance on unchanging factors may implicate Biggs, those

concerns are not raised by this Petition.8

 Brumett’s Petition is DENIED on this basis as well. 

D. Brumett’s Claim That the Board Operates Under a No-Parole Policy is Moot.

Brumett contends that, under former Governor Gray Davis’s administration, the Board

implemented a policy in which it denied parole to prisoners who had been sentenced to

indeterminate terms. Although the State Court did not address this claim, it is moot. Even if, as

Brumett asserts, a policy existed under the former Governor’s administration, the proper relief

would be to grant him a new hearing before a Board unaffected by the policy. See, e.g., Rush v.

Kane, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89259, n.5 *25 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Coleman v. Board of Prison

Terms, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29929, *12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 228 Fed. Appx. 673 (9th Cir.

2007)). Brumett acknowledged that he has received at least two additional hearings under

Case 3:04-cv-05423-JSW Document 52 Filed 03/28/08 Page 21 of 22
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Governor Schwarzenegger’s administration. Thus, because there is no evidence that suggests the

alleged “no parole” policy carried over into Governor Schwarzenegger’s administration, Brumett

already has been provided additional fair hearings. Accordingly, this claim is DENIED AS

MOOT. Rush, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89259 at *25. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A separate

judgment shall issue, and the Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2008 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-05423-JSW Document 52 Filed 03/28/08 Page 22 of 22