Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06231/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06231-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN ALVARADO YERON,

Plaintiff,

v.

N. HIRSCH, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 6231 OWW SMS P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1.) 

 Ruben Alvarado Yeron (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant

action on August 17, 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The

action was subsequently transferred to this Court and received on September 10, 2004. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that he Defendant Hirsch “refused” him medical treatment and proper

pain medication three times. Plaintiff also alleges that Medical Technical Assistants Tapia and

Ortiz were aware of his medical condition and did not use their professional capacity to provide

him with proper medical treatment. Plaintiff also alleges that on July 22, 2003, Defendant Eilers

broke his finger on his left hand and that Defendant Eilers refused him proper medical attention

saying that there was nothing seriously wrong with him, when it fact, it was later learned that his

finger was broken. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

In this case, 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts whatsoever concerning Defendants Eilers, Wadman,

Garza, Holland or Urena that give rise to any cognizable claim for relief. 

2. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim

"The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual treatment is violated

when officials remain deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of convicted

prisoners." Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical

care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level

of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). 

The “deliberate indifference” standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. 

First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second,

the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than

mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner

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unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). 

In addition, "mere delay of [medical treatment], without more, is insufficient to state a

claim of deliberate medical indifference." Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State of Prison Comm'rs,

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.1985). To prevail, Plaintiff "must show that the course of treatment

the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and ... that they chose this

course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [P]laintiff's health." Id. 

Finally, a "difference of medical opinion ... [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to

establish deliberate indifference." Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1996); Sanchez

v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, although Plaintiff states that he was denied proper medical treatment by

Defendant’s Hirsch, Ortiz, Tapia and Beagle, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to give

rise to an Eighth Amendment claim for relief. For example, Plaintiff merely states that

Defendant Hirsch failed to give him medical treatment but he does not elaborate what that

treatment was for, whether the Defendant was aware that treatment was needed or what date this

event occurred. Plaintiff similarly makes the same allegations with minimal facts against

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Defendants Tapia, Ortiz and Beagle. 

3. Excessive Force?

Plaintiff does indicate in his Complaint that Defendant Eilers broke Plaintiff’s finger but

he provides no facts surrounding how that happened. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the

relevant law on what may or may not be Plaintiff’s claim for relief. 

The use of excessive force by a prison official violates the eighth amendment. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). Determining whether there has been an eighth

amendment violation turns upon " 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' " See id.

at 6 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986)).

To prevail on an excessive force claim, an inmate must show the official applied force

"maliciously and sadistically" for the purpose of inflicting pain, rather than in a "good faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline." Id. at 4-5, 7, 112 S.Ct. at 999. Such factors as the need for

the application of the force, the relationship between the need for the application of force and the

amount of force used, and the extent of injury inflicted are relevant to the ultimate determination.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986). An inmate, however, does not

need to have suffered an injury to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 7.

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

time to file a first Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he wish to

do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Amended Complaint how the conditions complained of

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 

1980). The Amended Complaint must specifically state how each Defendant is involved. 

Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423,

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U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference the

appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. WITHIN

THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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