Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02287/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02287-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC LUND individually and on 

behalf of other aggrieved 

employees of the California 

Highway Patrol and SUSANNAH LUND 

individually,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY DATZMAN, JOHN CARLI, JASON 

JOHNSON, STEVE CAREY, DAVID 

KELLIS, MATT LYDON, MARK FERREIRA, 

CHRIS LECHUGA, WARREN STANLEY, 

J.A. FARROW, NICK NORTON, SAMUEL 

DICKSON, STEVE WEST, KEVIN KNOPF,

HELENA WILLIAMS, KEVIN DOMBY,

DAVID VARAO, RYAN DUPLISSEY, TOM 

ANDRADE, JOHN BLENCOWE, ERIC BEAL, 

HAI LUC, WANONA IRELAND, KRISHNA 

ABRAMS, ILANA SHAPIRO, and DOES 1-

40, individually and as public 

employees, VACAVILLE POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY 

PATROL, SOLANO COUNTY DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, CITY OF 

VACAVILLE, COUNTY OF SOLANO, and 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, as public 

entities,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-02287-JAM-DMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Eric Lund (“Mr. Lund”) and Susannah Lund (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) filed a 185-page (including exhibits) Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) containing 73 causes of action against:

twenty-five individually named Defendants from the Vacaville 

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Police Department, California Highway Patrol, and the Solano 

County District Attorney’s Office; against the agencies 

themselves; and against the City of Vacaville, County of Solano, 

and State of California (Collectively “Defendants”). See SAC, 

ECF No. 43. Plaintiffs allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 

California Constitution, and California tort law against 

Defendants stemming from Mr. Lund’s arrest, prosecution, and 

conviction of possession of child pornography. Id. 

Before the Court are three separate motions to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ lengthy complaint from: (1) the Vacaville Police 

Department, its individual defendants, and the City of Vacaville 

(collectively “the Vacaville Defendants”), (2) the Solano County 

District Attorney’s Office, its individual Defendants, and the 

County of Solano (collectively “the Solano Defendants”), and 

(3) the California Highway Patrol, its individual Defendants, and 

the State of California (collectively “the State Defendants”). 

See Vacaville Mot. to Dismiss (“Vacaville Mot.”), ECF No. 54; 

Solano Mot. to Dismiss (“Solano Mot.”), ECF No. 53; State Mot. to 

Dismiss (“State Mot.”), ECF No. 49. Plaintiffs oppose the three 

motions. See Opp’n to Vacaville’s Mot. (“Vacaville Opp’n”), ECF 

No. 59; Opp’n to Solano’ Mot. (“Solano Opp’n”), ECF No. 58; Opp’n 

to State’ Mot (“State Opp’n”), ECF No. 57. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC.1

///

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for May 19, 2020.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court takes the facts, as best it can, from Plaintiffs’ 

SAC. Because the SAC is unnecessarily voluminous and mixes 

allegations and arguments in a confusing manner, the Court 

“cannot be sure [it] ha[s] correctly understood all the 

averments.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th. Cir. 

1996) (finding the Plaintiffs’ fifty-three page long complaint to 

be confusing and unfairly burdensome). If the Court has not, 

“[P]laintiffs have only themselves to blame.” Id. 

Mr. Lund worked as a California Highway Patrolman (“CHP”) 

for 26 years. SAC ¶ 50. Shortly before he planned to retire, 

Mr. Lund was detained by Vacaville Police Officers after arriving 

for duty at the Solano Area CHP office on October 16, 2014. Id.

¶ 52. The Officers, Detective Jeffrey Datzman and Sergeant Steve 

Carey, searched Mr. Lund’s vehicle pursuant to a search warrant. 

Id. ¶ 54. The officers found a bag full of technology, including 

a hard drive containing child pornography. Id. ¶¶ 55-56. The 

officers arrested Mr. Lund for possession and distribution of 

child pornography. Id. ¶ 58. 

On November 3, 2014, Solano District Attorney Krishna Abrams 

charged Mr. Lund with possession of child pornography. Id. ¶ 59. 

Deputy District Attorneys Natasha Jontulovich and Ilana Shapiro 

prosecuted the case against Mr. Lund. Id. ¶ 60. The first 

trial, in June 2018, resulted in a hung jury, and a mistrial was

declared. Id. ¶ 61. Shapiro tried the case again in October 

2018 and secured a conviction for possession of child 

pornography. Id. ¶ 62. Mr. Lund was sentenced to five years in 

state prison. Id. Mr. Lund appealed his sentence but that 

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appeal is still pending. Id. ¶ 63. His conviction has not been 

invalidated in any way and he is currently serving his sentence 

in state prison. 

Plaintiffs factual allegations all stem from the search, 

arrest, and prosecution of Mr. Lund’s conviction. Representing 

herself and Mr. Lund, Mrs. Lund filed their initial complaint on 

November 12, 2019. ECF No. 1. The Solano County Defendants 

filed a motion to dismiss that complaint, ECF No. 27, but 

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint before a ruling could be 

made on that motion, ECF No. 33. Defendants notified Plaintiffs 

of their intent to seek dismissal of that complaint as well, so 

the parties stipulated that Plaintiffs could file a SAC to try to

cure any deficiencies. ECF No. 37. The SAC, ECF No. 43 is the 

subject of the present motions to dismiss. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). Courts must 

dismiss a suit if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). To

defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must 

“plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). This plausibility standard requires “factual content 

that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “At this stage, the Court 

“must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 

complaint.” Id. But it need not “accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. Lastly, a 

plaintiff suing multiple defendants “must allege the basis of 

his claim against each defendant” to satisfy the pleading 

standards. Reyes ex. rel. Reyes v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 13-

0418 LJO SKO, 2013 WL 2147023, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2013). 

B. Judicial Notice

The State Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice 

of the government claims forms Plaintiffs filed with the 

Department of General Services. See Req. for Judicial Notice 

(“RJN”), ECF No. 65 & 69 (duplicate filing). Plaintiffs do not 

oppose this request. Since this request is unopposed and

proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ request.

C. Analysis

1. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiffs assert numerous Section 1983 claims against the 

State, Vacaville, and Solano Defendants. See City Opp’n, Exh. 

1, ECF No. 59 (chart of all 73 claims). Defendants all oppose 

these claims for the same reason—these claims are barred under 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See State Reply at 1; 

Vacaville Reply at 1; Solano Reply at 3. 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “to recover damages 

for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or 

for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render 

a conviction or sentence invalid, a Section 1983 plaintiff must 

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prove that the conviction or sentence has been” reversed, 

expunged, declared invalid, or called into question. 512 U.S.

at 487. In other words, if a Plaintiff brings a claim for 

damages based on “a conviction or sentence that has not been so 

invalidated,” the claim is not cognizable under Section 1983. 

Id. Therefore, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a Section 

1983 suit, the court “must consider whether a judgment in favor 

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

conviction or sentence.” Id. If it would, the complaint must 

be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. 

Otherwise, the action should be allowed to proceed unless there 

another bar to the suit. Id. 

It is uncontroverted that Mr. Lund’s conviction has not 

been overturned, or otherwise invalidated. SAC ¶ 62. But 

Plaintiffs argue that the “intent of this lawsuit is not to 

challenge the fact of conviction or duration of incarceration.” 

State Opp’n at 6. And that since they are pursuing claims that 

do not “necessarily invalidate[]” Mr. Lund’s conviction, they 

may proceed even if the facts they adduce could support a 

reversal of his conviction. State Opp’n at 6. The Court 

disagrees.

As each Defendant points out in its respective motion to 

dismiss, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims “are based on the 

prerequisite that [Mr. Lund] was wrongfully investigated, 

arrested, and convicted.” State Mot. at 8; see also SAC ¶¶ 293-

313, 359-420. Plaintiffs’ specific allegations include that: 

exculpatory evidence was excluded; “Warrant E” was unlawfully 

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obtained based on an unreliable tool; the investigation was 

faulty; “Warrant E” was improperly executed; evidence used 

against him in trial was unlawfully seized; search of his desk 

and locker lacked probable cause; his arrest was unlawful 

because the evidence was insufficient and lacked probable cause;

his property was wrongfully seized pursuant to the warrant and 

wrongfully delivered to the Court; a second warrant was based on 

improper, incorrect, or tainted information; and his home was 

unlawfully searched. Vacaville Mot. at 6. All of these 

allegations are inextricably linked to Mr. Lund’s conviction and 

necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction. 

Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants “do not point to a single 

cause of action in the SAC that directly seeks to invalidate” 

Mr. Lund’s conviction, is without merit. Vacaville Opp’n at 4. 

Plaintiffs also attempt to argue their claims are not 

barred because they are simply arguing there was an “unlawful 

arrest” and not denying that new evidence could have later 

appeared that allowed a proper conviction. Vacaville Opp’n at 

7. But Plaintiffs cite no authority for that contention. 

Instead, in their three Opposition briefs, Plaintiffs attempt to 

argue Heck does not apply because “subsequent caselaw has 

continued to reaffirm the narrow application of the bar.” See 

e.g., Solano Opp’n at 12. While they cite to cases that have in 

fact narrowed the holding, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how 

that narrowing applies to them or the specific facts of this 

case. 

The only Section 1983 claim the Court finds to not 

implicate Mr. Lund’s conviction is the 63rd Cause of Action 

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related to the Solano County District Attorney’s Facebook Post. 

See SAC 915-920. But the rest of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 

claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. See Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 

298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002)(finding leave to amend need 

not be granted when amendment would be futile). 

2. State Law Causes of Action

Plaintiffs state law claims are also barred by Heck. See

Vacaville Mot. at 7-8, see also State Mot. at 7. While Heck is 

a federal rule, the California Supreme Court determined the bar 

applies to “a state tort claim arising from the same alleged 

misconduct.” Yount v. City of Sacramento, 43 Cal. 4th 885, 902 

(2008). 

Plaintiffs concede that such a bar does exist against state 

law claims. Vacaville Opp’n at 7. But they argue that as long 

as Mr. Lund does not use this civil suit as “a vehicle to 

overturn his conviction,” his claims should not be barred. Id.

at 9. Moreover, they argue Defendants’ cited cases are

distinguishable because success on the claims involved in those 

cases necessarily invalidated an element of the state court’s 

finding, whereas here, “none of the elements of child 

pornography possession would be negated.” Id. At 8-9. 

Plaintiffs misconstrue the holding in Yount; it does not 

require that an element of the offense be necessarily 

invalidated for the bar to the apply. Rather the court held “a 

criminal defendant must obtain exoneration by postconviction 

relief as a prerequisite to obtaining relief for the legal 

malpractice that led to the conviction.” Yount, 43 Cal. 4th at 

902. Here, Plaintiffs challenge a whole range of alleged “legal 

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malpractice[s]” that led to his conviction. And while the 

California Supreme Court recognized this broad rule would 

preclude recovery in many instances, it nevertheless found it 

justified to promote judicial economy and to prevent “the

creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same 

or identical transactions.” Id. 

As Defendants assert, Plaintiffs’ 56 state law causes of 

action against them also “necessarily imply the invalidity of 

[Mr. Lund’s] criminal conviction.” See e.g., Vacaville Mot. at 

8. Indeed, all of Plaintiffs’ state law claims rely on the same 

set of factual allegations as the Section 1983 claims. See 

e.g., SAC ¶¶ 317-319 (The Common Law Abuse of Process claim is 

premised on the same “material statements and omissions in 

warrant” facts alleged for the first two Section 1983 claims). 

As explained above, these factual allegations challenge: the 

investigative techniques and tactics used to collect evidence 

against Mr. Lund, the scope of the investigation, the validity 

and sufficiency of the evidence used in his conviction, the 

validity of his arrest and detention for the charges in which he 

was convicted, the presentation of evidence at the criminal 

proceeding, and the transmission and communication of evidence 

the prosecution, among other things. See Vacaville Mot. at 8. 

Even the claims that at first glance might not necessarily 

invalidate Mr. Lund’s conviction, are also inextricably linked 

to the aforementioned factual allegations. For example, the 

causes of action stemming from the “private marital 

communication” allegations are premised on the search of Mr. 

Lund’s phone and his cross-examination at trial on evidence 

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obtained from that search. SAC ¶¶ 855-868. All of these 

factual allegations therefore also directly attack the basis for 

Mr. Lund’s conviction—regardless of Plaintiffs’ intention. Id.

The only two state law claims the Court finds to not implicate 

Mr. Lund’s conviction are the claims related to the Solano 

County District Attorney’s Facebook Post and the claim based on 

CHP’s alleged interference with his pension (which are further 

discussed below). The rest of Plaintiffs’ state law claims are 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

3. The Solano District Attorney’s Facebook Post

Plaintiffs assert claims for defamation (62nd cause of 

action), Section 1983 (63rd cause of action), and California 

Constitution violations (64th cause of action) against the Solano 

Defendants based on a post made by the Solano County District 

Attorney’s Office on Facebook. SAC ¶¶ 891-925. Defendants seek 

to dismiss these claims for numerous reasons including: (1) 

absolute immunity, (2) qualified immunity, (3) state law 

immunity under California Government Code Section 821.6, and (4) 

litigation privilege. See Solano Reply at 1-3. The Court will 

only address the relevant immunities. 

a. Absolute Immunity

Both state and federal prosecutors are absolutely immune 

from Section 1983 claims stemming from not only the handling of 

a case before or during trial, but also the post-trial handling 

of a case. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 

1984). This protection exists because “resentful defendants 

[may] initiate suits irrationally or for purposes of harassment, 

[and] they are just as likely to ascribe unconstitutional 

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purposes to the prosecutor’s post-trial acts before and during 

trial.” Id. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 

claim, based on the Solano District Attorney’s Office’s post on 

Facebook detailing Mr. Lund’s conviction, falls under the 

protections of a post-trial handling of a case. Accordingly, 

the Defendants against whom this claim is brought are absolutely 

immune from this claim. The Court therefore DISMISSES this 

Section 1983 claim WITH PREJUDICE. 

b. Section 821.6

The Court finds the Solano Defendants are also immune from 

the state law claims (62nd and 64th causes of action) because of 

California Government Code Section 821.6. Solano Reply at 2-3. 

Section 821.6 provides: “[a] public employee is not liable 

for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial 

or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, 

even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. 

Gov. Code § 821.6. Immunity under this Section is not limited 

to claims for malicious prosecution—“[it] extends to other 

causes of action arising from conduct protected under the 

statute, including defamation and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress.” Roger v. County of Riverside, 44 Cal. App. 

5th 510, 527 (Jan. 29, 2020). In determining whether such 

immunity applies, the Court must consider whether the 

allegations occurred during “part of the ‘prosecution’ of a 

judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 821.6.” Id.

Only “discretionary” prosecutorial acts are protected. Id. at 

528. A discretionary act requires “personal deliberation, 

decision and judgment.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

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Ministerial acts, on the other hand, are those “in which the 

officer is left no choice of his own.” Id. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that affirmative defenses,

such as those brought under Section 821.6, “may [only] be 

considered properly on a motion to dismiss where the allegations 

in the complaint suffice to establish the defense.” Sams v. 

Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013). But such 

allegations exist here. In Gillian v. City of San Marino, a 

California court found that “[prosecutorial] [a]cts undertaken 

in the course of investigation, including press releases 

reporting the progress or results of the investigation, cannot 

give rise to liability.” 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1048 (2007). 

Here, it is clear from the Complaint that Plaintiffs assert 

claims for a Facebook post—the modern equivalent of a press 

release—made by the prosecutors to report on “the results of 

[their] investigation.” See SAC ¶¶ 891-911. Accordingly, the 

Solano Defendants are immune from the state law claims stemming 

from this discretionary prosecutorial act. The Court therefore 

DISMISSES these claims WITH PREJUDICE.

4. Tortious Interference With Lund’s Pension 

Plaintiffs allege the State Defendants tortiously 

interfered with Mr. Lund’s pension because two of the State 

Defendants conveyed “reckless inaccurate conclusions” that Mr. 

Lund was prosecuted for a crime arising from his official 

duties. SAC ¶¶ 1001-1011 (68th cause of action). The State 

Defendants seek to dismiss this claim for several reasons. See 

generally State Mot. However, these reasons are blanket 

arguments focused on dismissing all state law claims asserted 

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against them, rather than just this specific claim. Therefore, 

many of the arguments do not apply to the tortious interference 

claim. 

The Court does find, however, that the claim is barred by 

the Eleventh Amendment, as the State Defendants contend. State 

Mot. 15-16. Defendants specifically argue this bar applies to 

the State and to the CHP as a state agency. State Reply at 5. 

While Plaintiffs do respond to this argument in their 

Opposition, they do so on pages 18-20. See State Opp’n 18-20. 

As the Court noted when sanctioning Plaintiffs for violating its 

page limits, the Court will not consider arguments made past 

page 15 (the page limit). Minute Order Issuing Sanctions, ECF

No. 60. The Court therefore considers this argument to be 

unopposed and DISMISSES this Claim as against the State and the 

CHP WITH PREJUDICE.

However, the State Defendants fail to present any specific 

argument in support of their motion to dismiss this claim 

against individual Defendants Hai Luc and Wanona Ireland. 

Because the Court has no basis upon which to dismiss this claim 

against them, the case will proceed on this one claim as 

asserted only against Luc and Ireland. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART 

and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. All Defendants 

and all causes of action are dismissed from this lawsuit with 

prejudice except for the 68th cause of action as it applies to

individual Defendants Hai Luc and Wanona Ireland. These two 

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individual Defendants shall file their response to the SAC within 

twenty days of the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2020

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