Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_08-cv-00316/USCOURTS-ared-5_08-cv-00316-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

BETTY J. THOMAS PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 5:08CV00316 JLH

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION;

LARRY NORRIS, Director, in both his individual

and official capacities; BRENDA J. BEARDEN, 

Deputy Administrator, in both her individual and

official capacities; and SYLVESTER TILLMAN, 

Lieutenant, in both his individual and official capacities DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

Betty J. Thomas commenced this action on December 2, 2008, alleging sex and race

discrimination in violation of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et

seq., and seeking relief against the Arkansas Department of Correction, Director Larry Norris,

Deputy Administrator Brenda J. Bearden, and Lieutenant Sylvester Tillman for wrongful

termination. The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff has

responded. For the following reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

I.

Betty J. Thomas, an African American female, was hired by the ADC as a correctional officer

in September 1999. In January 2008, she was assigned to the Diagnostic Unit in Pine Bluff,

Arkansas. In the Diagnostic Unit, Thomas reported to Sergeant Harold Dennis, her immediate

supervisor. Both Thomas and Dennis reported to Lieutenant Sylvester Tillman. Thomas was

responsible for guarding inmates when they were sent to outside medical facilities. Thomas alleges

that neither she nor any of the other officers were given clear rules or methods for controlling

inmates or policies regarding the duties of correctional officers in monitoring inmates in private

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hospital settings. Thomas also alleges that Lieutenant Tillman prohibited correctional officers from

using physical restraints on inmates at hospitals. 

On July 21, 2008, Thomas was assigned to ADC Inmate Jeffrey Davis at the University of

Arkansas Medical Center in Room 218. Inmate Davis was confined to the hospital bed with soft

restraints. Thomas alleges that, at about 12:45 a.m., she allowed Davis to get up from his hospital

bed to go to the bathroom. After she watched Davis step into the bathroom, Thomas called the

nurses’ desk and asked, “Is he suppose[d] to be up?” Pamela Parsons, the nurse who answered the

phone, replied, “I’m not sure. I will check with his nurse.” At about the same time, Licensed

Practical Nurse Ashley Riffel, who was standing at the nurses’ station, saw Inmate Davis running

unescorted down the hall toward the nurses’ station. Davis stopped briefly at the nurses’ station and

then ran into the day room. Riffel went into Room 218 where Thomas was getting up out of her

chair and told Thomas that Davis was running down the hall. Thomas and Patient Care Technician

Clement Aladesofi went to the day room and escorted Davis back to Room 218. While Aladesofi

was straightening Davis’s bed and Thomas was picking up restraints, Davis ran out of the room a

second time. Thomas and Aladesofi chased after Davis, apprehended him, escorted him to Room

218, placed soft restraints on his hands, and shackled his left leg to the bed rail.

At approximately 1:00 a.m., Officer James Kevin Julian of the UAMS Police Department

was dispatched to the floor. He was advised “that a prisoner was running loose on the floor and that

the guard assigned to the inmate had fallen asleep.” Upon his arrival, he found Inmate Davis in his

hospital bed and shackled with a leg restraint. Julian took written statements from three

witnesses—Riffel, Parsons, and Aladesofi—and wrote a narrative of the incident. In his narrative,

Julian reported that Riffel told him that Thomas “was getting out of the chair in a state of

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drowsiness.” During his investigation, Julian told Thomas that “I would have to contact her

supervisor of the allegation concerning her sleeping at the time of the incident.” Thomas denied

sleeping and said she “was aware that the prisoner had removed the soft restraints, the NG tube, the

iv lines and other medical equipment so as to get out of bed and use the restroom.” At

approximately 1:40 a.m., Thomas called Lieutenant Tillman at his home and advised him of the

situation.

When Tillman arrived at work on the morning of July 21, 2008, he contacted the UAMS

Police Department and obtained a copy of the witness statements and incident report. Based on the

documents provided, Tillman suspended Thomas from the ADC for four violations of Employee

Conduct Standards AD 00-10: (1) unsatisfactory work performance (standard 6(a)); (2) sleeping

while on duty (standard 14(a)); (3) inattentiveness while on duty (standard 14(b)); and (4) failure to

perform or carry out work-related instructions (standard 17(a)). On July 23, 2008, Thomas met with

Tillman and Bearden to discuss the incident, and Bearden terminated Thomas that same day.

According to the termination letter,“it was reported that [Thomas] was asleep on the job and did not

know the location of Inmate Davis for a period of time long enough for him to exit the hospital room

and proceed down the hallway,” and “[t]his action is a major violation of a conduct standard

affecting the security and good order of departmental operations.”

Per ADC policy, Thomas filed a grievance, alleging that she had been discriminated against

because of her race and sex and that her termination was unjust. ADC Director Larry Norris utilized

an internal review committee to hear the grievance. On August 13, 2008, the committee conducted

a hearing on Thomas’s grievance and upheld Bearden’s decision to terminate Thomas. In a decision

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dated August 25, 2008, Norris adopted the committee’s recommendation to uphold Thomas’s

termination.

II.

A court should enter summary judgment when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When

a nonmoving party cannot make an adequate showing on a necessary element of the case on which

that party bears the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The

moving party bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. If the moving party meets this burden,

“the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348,

1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A genuine issue for trial exists only

if there is sufficient evidence to allow a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all inferences in his favor,

mindful that summary judgment seldom should be granted in discrimination cases where claims are

often based on inferences. Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2005); Bassett v.

City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1099 (8th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). But see Bainbridge v.

Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2004) (Arnold, J., dissenting).

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III.

Thomas asserts claims for relief pursuant to both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000 et seq. Although Title VII claims and section 1983 claims are analyzed under the same

standard, only employers may be held liable under Title VII; supervisors may not. See 42 U.S.C.

2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to . . . .”)

(emphasis added); Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Cent.-Everly Cmty. Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th

Cir. 1997) (reiterating that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII). The

plaintiff concedes that separate defendants Norris, Bearden, and Tillman are not employers under

Title VII. Thus, the Title VII claims against Norris, Bearden, and Tillman should be dismissed.

IV.

In analyzing Thomas’s employment discrimination claims, the Court uses the familiar

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) (establishing the burden-shifting test in the context of a Title

VII claim); Ottman v. City of Independence, Mo., 341 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying

McDonnell Douglas to a section 1983 claim). The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case

of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must show that (1)

she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate job expectations,

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) there are facts that give rise to an inference

of discrimination. Wells v. SCI Mgmt., L.P., 469 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Rorie v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 151 F.3d 757, 760-61 (8th Cir. 1998)). If the employee establishes a prima

facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for the termination, meaning that the presumption of unlawful discrimination disappears. Carraher

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v. Target Corp., 503 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 529 (8th

Cir. 2007)). If the employer provides such a reason, the plaintiff must then show that the proffered

reason is a pretext for the unlawful discrimination. Id. Where an employee is unable to show

pretext, summary judgment is appropriate. Pierce v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1988).

Without contesting the first three elements of the prima facie case, the ADC argues that there

are no facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination because no similarly situated Caucasian

or male employees were treated differently than Thomas. “If comparative evidence is relied on by

a plaintiff to support the final element of her prima facie case, courts . . . require such proof and so

characterize the fourth element.” Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1040

(8th Cir. 2010). In other words, a plaintiff who alleges that similarly situated employees outside of

the protected class were treated differently than the plaintiff must support that allegation with

evidence. At the prima facie stage of the analysis, the standard for determining whether employees

are similarly situated is a “low threshold” and merely requires that the employees “are involved in

or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.” Rodgers v. U.S.

Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 851-52 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d 959, 962

(8th Cir. 2009) (applying the low-threshold standard in light of the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in

Rodgers). A successful summary judgment defense must include more than inadmissible hearsaybased evidence, however. Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 927 (8th Cir. 2001); JRT,

Inc. v. TCBY Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1995). Here, Thomas contends that a white male

officer, Sterling Ivy, fell asleep while he was guarding an inmate at another hospital and was not

disciplined by the ADC. Tillman, who was also Officer Ivy’s supervisor, states in his affidavit that

Ivy never fell asleep on duty and was not accused of falling asleep on duty. Thomas concedes that

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she did not see Ivy fall asleep while on duty; rather, she testified that Officer Hardin, another

coworker, told her about the alleged incident, but neither Thomas nor Hardin was present when the

incident occurred. Thomas’s allegations regarding Ivy are solely based on hearsay. Thus, Thomas

has failed to provide evidence that a similarly situated employee was treated differently than she was

treated.

“Comparative evidence is certainly not the exclusive means by which a plaintiff may

establish an inference of discrimination . . . .” Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1040 (internal quotations omitted).

Thomas worked for the ADC for nine years without any prior disciplinary actions. Thomas alleges

that Lieutenant Tillman at times met with male officers prior to their shifts to provide them with

special instructions but did not meet with Thomas or Verna Kentle, the other female officer in the

Diagnostic Unit, prior to their shifts. Finally, Thomas argues that she was not asleep when Davis

left his hospital room as was alleged in her termination letter.

Even if these allegations are sufficient to meet Thomas’s initial burden under the McDonnellDouglas framework, they are not evidence of pretext. The ADC has articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Thomas’s employment: she was “asleep on the job and did

not know the location of Inmate Davis for a period of time long enough for him to exit the hospital

room and proceed down the hallway.” Thus, the burden returns to Thomas to show that this

proffered reason for terminating her is pretext for discrimination. A plaintiff may prove pretext by

establishing that an employer’s proffered reason for terminating her has no basis in fact. Stallings

v. Hussman Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2006). “In appropriate circumstances, the trier of

fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover

up a discriminatory purpose.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120

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 Thomas’s bare assertion that Lieutenant Tillman gave special instructions to male

officers but not female officers is unsupported and thus insufficient to support an inference of

pretext. See Rose-Maston v. NME Hosps., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 1998)

(“Conclusory affidavits, standing alone, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact precluding

summary judgment.”)

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S. Ct. 2097, 2108, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). Here, Thomas admits that she did not know Davis’s

location for a period of time long enough for him to sneak out of his hospital room and run down the

hallway. However, Thomas contends that she was not asleep at the time—she was on the phone with

the nurses’ station. According to the ADC’s Employee Conduct Standards: 

[s]leeping while on duty may be substantiated by firsthand witness testimony or

circumstantial evidence which shows that employee’s actions were so significantly

failing to meet standards of being alert, that there can be no substantive difference

between the alleged behavior of one who would be found asleep under the same

circumstances. 

Julian stated in his incident report that he was dispatched to the floor because “a prisoner was

running loose on the floor” and “the guard assigned to the inmate had fallen asleep.” Furthermore,

Julian wrote that Riffel “advised that he made contact with the guard who at the time was getting out

of the chair in a state of drowsiness.” Riffel’s written statement notes that Thomas was getting out

of the chair when Riffel walked in the room to inform her that Davis was in the hallway. Regardless

of whether Thomas was asleep or on the phone prior to the incident, the ADC could conclude from

the evidence that Thomas significantly failed to meet standards of being alert. Thomas has failed

to show that the ADC’s reason for terminating her has no basis in fact. It is not the task of the court

to determine whether the ADC’s investigation was sufficiently thorough or fair. Rorie, 151 F.3d at

761. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether Thomas has created a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether her termination was discriminatory. Id. She has not.1

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 To the extent that Thomas attempts to raise due process and equal protection claims in

her response to the motion for summary judgment, the Court finds such claims untimely.

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Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could not find that the ADC’s stated reason for

firing Thomas is pretext for discrimination, so the ADC is entitled to summary judgment on

Thomas’s claims.2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Thomas’s

section 1983 and Title VII claims, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Document #18.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of April, 2010.

 

J. LEON HOLMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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