Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04282/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04282-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THARON B. HILL,

Petitioner,

 v.

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF PRISON

TERMS,

Respondent.

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No. C 04-4282 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS; TO SHOW CAUSE

(Docket No. 6)

Tharon Hill (“petitioner”), a prisoner incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison and

proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a decision of the Board of Prison Terms (“BPT”) to deny him

parole. After reviewing the petition, the Court dismissed one of the two claims, finding a

failure to state a cognizable basis for federal habeas relief; the Court found cognizable the

remaining claim, specifically, petitioner’s claim that the denial of parole violated his right to

due process because such denial was not supported by any evidence. See Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456 (1985) (holding, in context of revocation of good time credits, “the

relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board”). The Court ordered respondent to show cause

why the petition should not be granted, and respondent thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the

petition on the ground that petitioner’s remaining claim is not exhausted, as required by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c). Petitioner has filed an opposition; respondent, athough ordered to do so,

has not filed a reply. 

Case 3:04-cv-04282-MMC Document 8 Filed 09/07/05 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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BACKGROUND

In 1987, petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and was

sentenced to twenty-five years to life in state prison. On March 5, 2003, the BPT held a parole

suitability hearing, at which it denied parole. Petitioner challenged the denial in a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus filed April 19, 2004 in the Marin County Superior Court. The petition

was transferred to the Butte County Superior Court, where it was denied on June 2, 2004. The

order denying the petition stated: “The vague, unsupported, and conclusionary allegations

contained in the Petition are insufficient to allow for intelligent consideration of the issues

which petitioner has attempted to raise. In re: Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300; In re Patton

(1918) 178 Cal. 629.” On June 17, 2004, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California

Court of Appeal, where, one week later, it was summarily denied in a one-line order without

citation. On July 8, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for review of that decision in the

California Supreme Court, which, on September 15, 2004, after having extended the time to

rule thereon, likewise summarily denied the petition in a one-line order without citation. The

instant petition followed. 

DISCUSSION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings the length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state judicial

remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest

state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they

seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-

16 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230,

231 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal habeas petition that contains an unexhausted claim must be

dismissed. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510.

Here, respondent does not argue that the due process claim remaining in the instant

petition was not included in the petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court;

rather, he argues that the claim was not “fairly presented” to that Court. In order to satisfy the

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1The other case cited by the Superior Court, In re Patton, 178 Cal. 629 (1918), simply contains an

earlier statement of the same bar against “vague, conclusory and unsupported” claims as set forth in Swain.

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exhaustion requirement, the federal claims must have been “fairly presented” to the highest

state court. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). It does not constitute “fair

presentation” if the claim is raised in a procedural manner that makes it unlikely that the claim

will be considered on the merits. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); see, e.g.,

Kibler v. Walters, 220 F. 3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding, where state habeas

petitioner failed to satisfy procedural requirements for presentation of his claims to

Washington Supreme Court, petitioner failed to fairly present his claims for purposes of

federal habeas review).

Here, respondent argues that petitioner did not fairly present his due process claim to

the California Supreme Court because he did not present the claim in such a way that it would

have been likely to have been considered on the merits. In support of this argument,

respondent points to the state court decisions rejecting petitioner’s habeas claims. In Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that where the last

reasoned opinion on a claim expressly imposes a procedural bar, it should be presumed that a

later decision summarily rejecting the claim did not silently disregard the bar and consider the

claim on its merits. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. Here, the California Supreme Court and

California Court of Appeal both summarily rejected petitioner’s claims, such that the last

reasoned state court opinion was that of the Butte County Superior Court. As explained above,

the Superior Court’s rejection of the claim was not on its merits, but was based on the Swain

procedural bar against vague and conclusory habeas claims. See In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d at 303

(holding court’s determination that vague, conclusory allegations of habeas petition are

insufficient to warrant issuance of writ does not constitute ruling on merits).1 Consequently,

the presumption set forth in Ylst is applicable. 

Petitioner argues that the California Supreme Court’s extension of its own deadline for

ruling on the petition nonetheless shows that the Supreme Court did in fact consider the

petition’s merits, because it would not have needed the extra time to rule on the petition if it

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In all, the California Supreme Court rendered its decision within 90 days of the date the petition for

review was filed. 

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was simply adopting the procedural bar imposed by the Superior Court. This argument is not

persuasive, in that any number of factors, including a large docket, could have resulted in the

California Supreme Court’s need for additional time to rule on the petition.2 Accordingly,

under Ylst, this Court presumes that the California Supreme Court’s denial of the petition for

review was based on the Swain procedural bar set forth in the Superior Court’s opinion and that

the Supreme Court did not silently disregard the Swain bar and consider the merits of the

claim. 

What remains to be determined is the effect of the California Supreme Court’s

rejection of petitioner’s due process claim based on Swain. When, as here, Swain is cited by a

state court to indicate claims were not alleged with sufficient particularity, that deficiency,

when it exists, can be cured in a renewed state petition and, as a result, state judicial remedies

are not considered exhausted. See Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Nevertheless, a citation to Swain does not itself establish a failure to exhaust. See id. at 1319. 

Rather, this Court must make an independent determination as to whether the due process

claim at issue herein was presented to the California Supreme Court "with as much particularity

as is practicable," see id. at 1320, and, if this Court finds the claim actually was alleged as

specifically as practicable, such claim must be considered exhausted, see id. at 1319-20.

In that regard, a review of the petition presented to the California Supreme Court

reflects that petitioner explained, over the course of four pages, why there was not “some

evidence” to support the BPT’s finding that petitioner was not suitable for parole. See Respt’s

Ex. G at 4-7. Petitioner specifically challenged eleven separate findings made by the BPT in

support of the denial, and he explained how each one of these findings lacked any evidentiary

support and/or was conclusively refuted by other evidence in the record. See id.; see also id. at

3 (citing, inter alia, Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 456). This Court is unable to discern,

and respondent does not explain, how petitioner, as a practical matter, could have presented his

claim with more particularity. See Kim, 799 F.2d at 1320. Accordingly, the Court finds

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petitioner fairly presented his due process claim to the California Supreme Court and,

consequently, that he has exhausted his state judicial remedies.

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on petitioner, within 60 days of the date

this order is filed, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted based on

petitioner’s cognizable claim. Respondent shall file with the answer and serve on petitioner a

copy of all portions of the state trial record that have been transcribed previously and that are

relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. 

If petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse with the

Court and serving it on respondent within 30 days of respondent’s filing of the answer.

Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be

granted, provided such requests are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend.

This order terminates Docket No. 6. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 7, 2005

 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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