Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00611/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00611-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW STRONG,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv611 WQH

(WVG)

vs. ORDER

WALGREEN CO., doing business as

Walgreens; and RUDOLPH BRAGG,

Trustee of the Bragg Family Trust,

Dated April 22, 1982,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

 The matters before the Court are (1) the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Litigation

Expenses, Expert Costs, and Sanctions Against Plaintiff’s Counsel filed by Defendants

Walgreen Co. (“Walgreens”) and Rudolph Bragg, Trustee of the Bragg Family Trust,

dated April 22, 1982 (ECF No. 132); and (2) the Motion to Review and Re-Tax Costs

filed by Plaintiff Matt Strong (ECF No. 139).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2009, Plaintiff Matt Strong initiated this action by filing a

complaint against Walgreens and Rudolf Bragg, Trustee of the Bragg Family Trust

(collectively “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1).

On April 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint against

Defendants. (ECF No. 64). The First Amended Complaint alleged that the Walgreens

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store located at 215 North 2nd Street in El Cajon, California was not fully accessible

to him because of architectural barriers. Id. at 2, 7. The First Amended Complaint

alleged claims for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the

California Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”), the California Unruh Act (“Unruh Act”),

and the California Health and Safety Code. 

On November 8, 2011, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim as to 10 of the 13 architectural barriers alleged in

the First Amended Complaint, and denied summary judgment as to the remaining three

barriers. (ECF No. 74). The Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s CDPA and Unruh Act claims for statutory damages as to all alleged

barriers, concluding: “Plaintiff has submitted some evidence that he personally

encountered each of the alleged barriers and that he experienced difficulty or discomfort

as a result. Defendant[s] ha[ve] failed to establish that there is no genuine issue of

material fact regarding statutory damages under the Unruh Act and the [CDPA].” Id.

at 18. Although a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the CDPA and the

Unruh Act, the Court noted that Plaintiff can alternatively prove a violation of the

CDPA and Unruh Act by demonstrating that Defendants violated the California Code

of Regulations, Title 24.

On November 8, 2012, the Court held a bench trial to resolve federal claims of

three barriers under the ADA, and state claims of 13 barriers under the CDPA and

Unruh Act. (ECF No. 104). Following the bench trial, the parties filed proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law (ECF Nos. 110, 113) and several post-trial

motions (ECF Nos. 108-109, 113-16).

On May 9, 2013, the Court issued the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

concluding that Defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor on all claims as to

all alleged barriers. (ECF No. 125). That same day, the Clerk of the Court entered

Judgment consistent with the Court’s Order. (ECF No. 126).

On May 23, 2013, Defendants filed a Bill of Costs pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1924, requesting that the Clerk of the

Court tax $2,315.80 as costs incurred in this action. On June 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed an

Objection to the Bill of Costs. (ECF No. 133). On June 11, 2013, Defendants filed a

declaration of their counsel, Brian Crone, in support of the Bill of Costs. (ECF No.

135). On June 19, 2013, the Clerk of the Court issued an Order Taxing Costs, ordering 

that $1,467.75 be taxed against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants. (ECF No. 136).

On June 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Review and Re-Tax Costs

pursuant to Local Rule 54.1.h. (ECF No. 139). On July 15, 2013, Defendants filed an

opposition. (ECF No. 143). On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 144).

On June 7, 2013, Defendants filed the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Litigation

Expenses, Expert Costs, and Sanctions Against Plaintiff’s Counsel pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 12205, California Civil Code § 55, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and

28 U.S.C. § 1927. (ECF No. 132). On July 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (ECF

No. 141). On July 8, 2013, Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 142).

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

I. Standard of Review

Under the “American Rule,” each party to a lawsuit is generally responsible for

its own attorneys’ fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). Ordinarily,

the prevailing party in a lawsuit does not collect fees absent contractual or statutory

authorization. See Int’l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers v. Western Indus. Maint.,

Inc., 707 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1983). Upon determining that a fee award is in order,

the court must calculate the proper amount of the award to ensure that it is reasonable. 

See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. Reasonableness is generally determined using the

“lodestar” method, where a court considers the work completed by the attorneys and

multiplies “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable

hourly rate.” Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 

The moving party has the burden to produce evidence that the rates and hours worked

are reasonable. See Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 622-23 (9th Cir.

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1983).

II. Contentions of the Parties

As the prevailing parties in this litigation, Defendants contend that they are

entitled to $82,670.55 in attorneys’ fees, $3,089.05 in costs, and $13,284.75 in expert

witness fees, for a total award of $99,044.35 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and

California Civil Code § 55. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s ADA claim was

frivolous, both as to the 10 alleged barriers for which the Court granted summary

judgment and the three alleged barriers that survived summary judgment. Alternatively,

Defendants contend they are entitled to recover, pursuant to California Civil Code § 55,

$39,765 in attorneys’ fees and $1,715.93 in costs that they incurred after the Court

issued its Order on the motions for summary judgment. Defendants contend that

Plaintiff’s CDPA and Unruh Act claims “were no longer litigated under the ADA” after

the Court’s November 8, 2011 Order on the motions for summary judgment, and thus,

an award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff is “mandatory” under California Civil Code §

55. (ECF No. 132-1 at 17).

Plaintiff contends that his ADA claim was not frivolous because it “survived

several dispositive motions” and ultimately failed only because Defendants “actively

remediate[d] barriers.” (ECF No. 141 at 3). With respect to his CDPA claim, Plaintiff

contends that “a federal district court cannot impose fees pursuant to Section 55 unless

the court determines that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous.” (ECF No. 141 at 6 (citing

Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d , 742, 745-47 (9th Cir. 2008); Oliver v. In-N-Out

Burger, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2013 WL 1927121, * 5 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2013) (Huff, J.)).

III. Discussion

A. Fees pursuant to the ADA

The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, provides for a

discretionary award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. The Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the statute to mean that attorneys’ fees may only be

awarded to a prevailing defendant in an ADA case where the plaintiff’s claims are

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frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. SoBreck, 554 F.3d at 744 (citing

Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

In this case, the Court granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor as to 10

of the 13 architectural barriers alleged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s ADA claim survived

summary judgment with respect to three alleged barriers: excessive slope in the parking

lot; improperly outlined parking spaces; and sharp edges on the toilet paper dispenser

in the restroom. The Court found that Plaintiff failed to prove a violation of the ADA

at trial with respect to these three barriers. Regarding the slope, the Court found the

testimony of Defendants’ expert witness “to be more reliable and believable than

Plaintiff’s testimony,” and concluded that Plaintiff failed to prove, by a preponderance

of the evidence, “that a slope exceeding 2% currently exists at the Store.” (ECF No.

125). With respect to the outlining of the disabled parking spaces and sharp edges on

the toilet paper dispenser, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that any sharp edge on the toilet paper dispenser or

worn paint on the disabled parking spaces “‘constitutes a barrier that denies the plaintiff

full and equal enjoyment of the premises in violation of the ADA.’” Id. (quoting

Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905). 

Based on this record, the Court does not find that Plaintiff frivolously pursued

his ADA claim. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to a fee award pursuant to §

12205. See SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d at 744.

B. Fees pursuant to the CDPA

Plaintiff may recover statutory damages for a violation of the CDPA by proving

a violation of the Construction Related Accessibility Standards Compliance Act

(“CRAS”). Under the CRAS, which became effective in 2008, a plaintiff alleging a

violation of the CDPA may recover statutory damages only if the violation denied him

or her “full and equal access to the place of public accommodation on a particular

occasion.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.56(a). The provisions in Sections 55.51 through 55.57

apply only to a “construction-related accessibility claim,” which is defined as a

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violation of a “construction-related accessibility standard” under federal or state law. 

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 55.51, 55.52(a)(1), (6).1

 A plaintiff can establish a violation of the

CDPA by establishing a violation of the ADA. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54(c), 54.1(d). 

California Civil Code § 55 provides that “[t]he prevailing party in [an action

brought under the CDPA] shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.” The

California Supreme Court has held that Section 55 mandates an award of attorney’s fees

to the prevailing party in all CDPA actions. See Jankey v. Lee, 55 Cal. 4th 1038, 1045-

46 (2012). Because Section 55 mandates mandatory fee-shifting in all CDPA actions

– even actions where the plaintiff’s claim is deemed non-frivolous – the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC held that the ADA preempts

Section 55. SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d at 742. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in SoBreck,

LLC held: “[T]o the extent that Section 55 does authorize the award of fees to a

prevailing defendant on nonfrivolous CDPA state claims that parallel nonfrivolous

ADA claims, there is a conflict and the ADA preempts Section 55 of the CDPA.” Id.

The First Amended Complaint alleged ADA and CDPA claims against

Defendants that were both predicated upon the same 13 barriers to access. The Court

granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim as to 10 of the

13 barriers, and denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the CDPA claim

as to all 13 barriers. Plaintiff proceeded to trial with his CDPA claim paralleling his

ADA claim with respect to only three alleged barriers. At trial, Defendants prevailed

1

California Civil Code § 55.52 provides:

‘Construction-related accessibility standard’ means a provision, standard, or regulation under state or federal law requiring compliance with standards for making new construction and existing facilities accessible to persons with disabilities, including, but not limited to, any provision,

standard, or regulation set forth in Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55 of this code,

Section 19955.5 of the Health and Safety Code, the California Building Standards Code (Title 24 of the California Code of Regulations), the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336; 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq.), and the federal Americans with Disabilities

Act Accessibility Guidelines (Appendix A to Part 36 of Title 28 of the

Code of Federal Regulations).

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on both claims as to the three parallel barriers and on the CDPA claim as to the 10 other

alleged barriers.

With respect to the three barriers alleged to be in violation of both the CDPA and

ADA, “it is impossible to distinguish the fees necessary to defend against the CDPA

claim from those expended in defense against the ADA claim.” SoBreck, LLC, 554

F.3d at 745. Under these circumstances, “a grant of fees on the California cause of

action [would] necessarily [be] a grant of fees as to the ADA claim.” Id. As discussed

above, Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 12205

because the Court does not find Plaintiff’s ADA claim frivolous. The Ninth Circuit’s

holding in SoBreck, LLC precludes the Court from awarding Defendants any fees

incurred defending against these three barriers pursuant to Section 55.

Although a violation of the ADA is sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the

CDPA, Plaintiff failed at summary judgment to show that a triable issue existed on his

ADA claim with respect to 10 alleged barriers. After summary judgment, the Court

issued an Order to Show Cause why the Court should continue exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims; in reply to the Order to Show

Cause, Plaintiff stated that the “state-law claims present a slightly larger scope of

issues.” (ECF No. 78 at 5). After considering the parties’ positions, the Court

proceeded to trial exercising exclusively supplemental jurisdiction as to 10 barriers to

resolve state claims under the CDPA. At trial, Plaintiff lacked a predicate ADA

violation to demonstrate a CDPA violation as to any of these 10 barriers. Plaintiff

attempted to prove that Defendants violated a construction-related accessibility standard

as to these 10 barriers. Plaintiff failed to do so. In the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, the Court analyzed Plaintiff’s CDPA claim pursuant to California

Building Code regulations, and ruled in Defendants’ favor as to all barriers. A grant of

fees in this case to Defendants on the CDPA claim as to the barriers that did not parallel

an ADA claim is not “a grant of fees as to the ADA claim.” SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d

at 745. With respect to these 10 barriers, this Court can “distinguish the fees [that were]

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necessary to defend against the CDPA claim” after summary judgment “from [the fees]

expended in defense against the ADA claim” before summary judgment. Id. The Court

concludes that ADA preemption principles do not preclude Defendants from recovering

their attorneys’ fees incurred defending against the 10 non-parallel barriers alleged in

Plaintiff’s CDPA claim after November 8, 2011 when the Court issued its Order on the

parties’ motions for summary judgment because there were no parallel federal claims. 

Counsel for Defendants, Brian Crone, states in a declaration attached to the

motion for attorneys’ fees that he billed 144.6 hours defending this case “after the Court

granted summary judgment to Defendants on 10 of 13 ADA claims.” (ECF No. 132-2). 

Crone states that he billed at an hourly rate of $275.00. Id. Plaintiff does not challenge

the reasonableness of the hours Crone billed after summary judgment or Crone’s hourly

rate. However, Defendants have failed to produce evidence demonstrating the number

of hours billed after summary judgment that were expended specifically in defending

against the 10-non parallel barriers. See Intel Corp., 6 F.3d at 622-23 (moving party has

the burden to produce evidence that the rates and hours worked are reasonable). 

Defendants have leave to submit supplemental materials within 20 days of the date of

this Order. Plaintiff has leave to file any response within 20 days from the date any

supplemental materials are filed by Defendants.

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Defendants contend that the Court should sanction Plaintiff’s counsel $15,510

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for “unnecessarily multiplying” the costs of this litigation. 

(ECF No. 132-1 at 20). Plaintiff contends that the request for sanctions should be

denied because Defendants have failed to show that “plaintiff’s counsel ... vexatiously

multiplied these proceedings.” (ECF No. 141 at 9-10).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “[a]ny attorney ... who so multiplies the

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to

satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred

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because of such conduct.” Section 1927 sanctions must be supported by a finding of

bad faith or recklessness. Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d

1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th

Cir. 1996). “Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a

frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an

opponent.” Id. The bad faith requirement sets a high threshold. Primus Auto. Fin.

Servs. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997). Sanctions pursuant to section

1927 are also available for “recklessness when combined with an additional factor such

as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989,

994 (9th Cir. 2001).

Federal courts also have inherent power to impose sanctions against attorneys and

parties for bad faith conduct in litigation. See Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 43

(1991). Before a court may award sanctions under its inherent powers, the court must

make an explicit finding that counsel’s conduct constituted or was tantamount to bad

faith. Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008); see

also Primus, 115 F.3d at 648 (explaining that a finding of bad faith is critical when a

party requests that the Court use its inherent powers to engage in fee-shifting). 

“Because inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be

exercised with restraint and discretion.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,

764 (1980).

As discussed above, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous. 

 Nor does the Court find that Plaintiff’s counsel litigated this case recklessly or in bad

faith. The Court will not exercise its discretion to award Defendants’ attorneys’ fees

as a sanction under either § 1927 or its inherent power. See Keegan, 78 F.3d at 437

(sanctions are “an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution”).

//

MOTION TO RETAX COSTS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) states that “[u]nless a federal statute,

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these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs – other than attorney’s fees –

should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Rule 54(d)(1)

creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party. See Ass’n of

Mexican-American Educators v. Cal., 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In

this case, the Clerk of the Court issued an Order Taxing Costs on June 19, 2013,

ordering $1,467.75 to be taxed against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants. (ECF No.

136).

Plaintiff contends that the Court should re-tax costs, and decline to award costs

to Defendants, on the basis that Plaintiff’s claims were not “frivolous” within the

meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Defendants contend the motion should be denied

because Plaintiff’s ADA claim was “frivolous” and an award of costs to Defendants in

this case “is not inequitable.” (ECF No. 143 at 2, 6).

Unlike most actions, where costs are routinely awarded to the prevailing party

as a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), in an action under

the ADA, costs may be awarded to a defendant only if the court finds that the action

was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246

F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). As discussed above, the Court does

not find that Plaintiff’s ADA claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundation.” Therefore, the Court cannot award costs to Defendants with respect to the

ADA claims. However, Plaintiff’s state law claims for violation of the CDPA and

Unruh Act must still be considered. See Doran v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., No.

Civ.S. 99 0386 WBS DA, 2004 WL 3619124, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2004) (evaluating

award of costs related to CDPA claim even though the court had already determined

that plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous under the ADA’s attorneys’ fees provision).

The award of costs with respect to Plaintiff’s CDPA and Unruh Act claims is

governed by federal law. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965); see also

Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1160, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the

award of costs is governed by federal law, not state law). Under federal law, Rule 54(d)

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creates a presumption that a prevailing party is entitled to recover costs. Stanley v.

Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In this case, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants as to all barriers

alleged to have violated the CDPA. Accordingly, Defendants are the prevailing parties

and are entitled to costs under Rule 54(d). Plaintiff’s Motion to Review and Re-Tax

Costs (ECF No. 139) is denied. See Doran, 2004 WL 3619124, at *1 (same). 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Review and Re-Tax Costs filed

by Plaintiff Matt Strong (ECF No. 139) is DENIED. The Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,

Litigation Expenses, Expert Costs, and Sanctions Against Plaintiff’s Counsel filed by

Defendants (ECF No. 132) will remain pending. 

DATED: October 10, 2013

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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