Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00421/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00421-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRA FENTRESS,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 00421 AWI WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 9]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Pending before the court is Respondent’s

motion to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

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1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the proceeding challenged arises out of Avenal State

Prison, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

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that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the following two grounds: 1) Petitioner’s

claims fail to establish standing and fail to state a claim; and 2) Petitioner has failed to exhaust state

judicial remedies. Petitioner has not responded to the motion. 

In first contending that Petitioner has failed to establish standing or to state a claim,

Respondent relies on the language of the two grounds for relief Petitioner sets forth in his petition. 

The entirety of ground one is as follows:

Petitioner was denied his Due Process Rights to have witnesses present at a Disciplinary

Hearing. Petitioner was found guilty at a Prison Disciplinary Hearing of Possion [sic] and

under the Influence of a controled [sic] substance.

Ground two provides as follows:

Failure by Prison Officials to appoint Staff Assistant violated Petitioners [sic] Due Process

wrights [sic], due to the Failure to provide Staff Assistance violated Petitioners Due Process

rights due to the fact that Petitioner has only a 2.2 Grade Point Average which makes the

Petitioner an [sic] funtioning [sic] Illiterate.

In moving to dismiss, Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient facts

to support his claim that his due process rights were violated, because he fails to challenge a specific

prison disciplinary proceeding. Respondent argues that without this information, he is unable to

defend the merits of the claim and determine whether affirmative defenses apply. Respondent also

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argues that the vague and conclusory allegations fail to establish that Petitioner has standing to bring

this petition.

It is well-established that notice pleading is insufficient in a habeas corpus petition: rather the

petition must include facts which if proven entitle the petition to habeas relief. O’Bremski v. Maas,

915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990). If a petition fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for th

habeas corpus relief, dismissal is proper pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases. Id. In this case, the court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner has failed to provide

sufficient facts to enable Respondent to address the claims. In particular, Petitioner has not provided

Respondent with the date of the disciplinary hearing at issue or the facts surrounding his claim to

entitlement to present witnesses. The court therefore concludes that this petition must be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 4. 

Respondent also moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that he has exhausted state judicial remedies. 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). th

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As Respondent notes, Petitioner states in his petition that he pursued a post-conviction

application for relief in both Superior Court and the Court of Appeals. Petitioner, however, does not

explain whether these actions challenged the same disciplinary hearing challenged in the present

petition. More importantly, Petitioner makes no reference to having pursued this action in the

California Supreme Court. The court must conclude, therefore, that Petitioner has failed to carry his

burden of demonstrating that he has exhausted his state judicial remedies.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1) that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED;

2) that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 and for failure to

exhaust state judicial remedies;

3) that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this

case.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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