Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00340/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00340-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARL W. HAMILTON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0340 DFL DAD P

vs.

EDWARD ALAMEIDA, et. al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this habeas corpus action. 

Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a 1980 San Bernardino County conviction for second degree

murder, for which he is serving a term of fifteen years to life in state prison. In this action

petitioner challenges the decision of the California Board of Prison Terms on October 27, 1999,

that petitioner was not suitable for parole at that time. Pursuant to this court’s order filed

February 19, 2002, petitioner filed an amended petition on March 4, 2002. Respondents filed

their answer to the amended petition on April 10, 2002, and petitioner filed his traverse on April

17, 2002.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

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 A complete copy of the transcript of petitioner’s October 27, 1999 subsequent parole

consideration hearing was provided by petitioner as Exhibit Y-1 to his petition filed February 12,

2002. The amended petition does not include a copy of Exhibit Y-1. 

2

PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

Petitioner’s initial parole consideration hearing was held in 1987. The Board

denied petitioner a parole date at that hearing and at subsequent parole hearings held in 1988 and

1990. Petitioner was granted a parole date at his third subsequent parole hearing in 1991, but the

date was rescinded in 1992. Petitioner was denied a parole date at subsequent parole

consideration hearings in 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997. At his subsequent parole

consideration hearing in 1998, petitioner was denied a parole date by the majority decision, but

the dissenter on the three-person panel found him suitable for parole. (Pet. filed Feb. 12, 2002,

Ex. Y-1 (“Tr.”) at 21-22.1)

Petitioner challenges the Board’s denial of a parole date at the subsequent parole

consideration hearing held on October 27, 1999. (Am. Pet. filed Mar. 4, 2002, at (2).) Petitioner

appealed from that decision on March 27, 2000. (Id., Ex. Y-2.) The Board of Prison Terms

Office of Policy and Appeals denied the appeal on the merits on September 12, 2000. Petitioner

received the decision on December 21, 2000. (Id., Ex. Y-3.) On December 22, 2000, petitioner

filed a habeas petition in the San Joaquin County Superior Court. (Id., Ex. X-3.) In a written

decision filed September 20, 2001, the petition was denied on the merits. (Id.) A habeas petition

filed in the California Court of Appeal on August 2, 2001, was summarily denied on August 9,

2001. (Id., Ex. W-2.) A habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court on September 28,

2001, was summarily denied on January 29, 2002. (Id., Ex. V-2.)

In his amended petition, petitioner alleges four grounds for relief, which the court

summarizes here:

(1) the Board gave extra weight to the gravity of petitioner’s

offense when it referred to a second victim, despite the fact that

petitioner’s conviction did not involve a second victim, and when

it described the manner in which the crime was carried out as cruel

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and callous, despite the fact that all murders by their very nature

are cruel and callous;

(2) the Board declared that petitioner is unsuitable for parole

because of his past social and criminal history and his failure to

take advantage of previous attempts to correct his criminal

conduct, but his criminal history was non-violent and he is a

recovering alcoholic who has made permanent life changes in order

to avoid the alcohol and drugs that brought about his past social

and criminal history and his recidivism;

(3) the Board considered petitioner’s gains to be recent and said he

needed to maintain those gains over a period of time, but

petitioner’s gains were made some time ago, have been maintained

for the past 20 years, and are not merely recent; and

(4) the Board claimed petitioner’s motivation for the crime was

inexplicable or trivial and discounted the roles played by stress and

chronic alcoholism, as well as other factors favorable to petitioner.

(Am. Pet. at (5)-(6) & Attachs. 5a-5c & 6a-6p.)

RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER

Respondents state that petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison

term of 15 years to life for his conviction of second degree murder after he shot his sister in the

chest and head, killing her, because he felt she was an unfit mother and promiscuous.

Respondents assert that the Board properly found petitioner unsuitable for parole

and deferred a further hearing for one year due to the nature of his commitment offense, the cruel

and callous manner in which the crime was carried out, his unstable or tumultuous social history,

and his failure to profit from society’s previous attempts to correct his criminality. In response to

petitioner’s four grounds for relief, respondents admit that the Board found petitioner’s crime

was carried out in a cruel and callous manner, admit that the Board found petitioner failed to

profit from society’s previous attempts to correct his criminality, deny that the Board found

petitioner not suitable for parole on the ground that his gains were recent, and admit that the

Board found the motive for petitioner’s crime inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the

offense. Respondents deny that the Board’s decision violated petitioner’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights and allege that petitioner has failed to raise a cognizable federal question.

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Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Respondents assert that jurisdiction is available only when there is some

transgression of federal law binding on state courts and is unavailable for alleged errors in the

interpretation or application of state law. Respondents contend that the alleged violations of

Fourteenth Amendment rights in this case do not present a substantial federal question sufficient

to invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III court. Respondents cite cases holding that a prisoner

has no constitutional right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence

but that a prisoner may be entitled to some measure of due process where state statutes or

regulations create a liberty interest in parole release. Respondents argue that California law does

not create such an interest and that the state legislature has given the Board of Prison Terms

virtually unfettered discretion to base a parole suitability decision on a wide and generalized

consideration of society’s interest in the parole release decision. Respondents contend that the

applicable statutes and regulations do not guarantee parole release to prisoners who merely jump

through certain hoops. Respondents point to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), and argue

that the denial of a parole date does not impose an atypical hardship in the context of ordinary

prison life. Respondents ask the court to deny the petition on the ground that there is no liberty

interest at stake in this case.

Respondents argue further that, if the case does present a federal question, the

petition should be denied because the state courts’ adjudication of petitioner’s claims did not

result in a decision contrary to law or involving an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Respondents assert that federal law

requires that there be some evidence in the record to support a parole decision and that the

evidence bear some indicia of reliability. Respondents note that this standard is minimally

stringent and a parole decision should be upheld if there is any evidence in the record to support

it.

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Respondents contend that the state court’s decisions to deny petitioner’s habeas

petition were not contrary to law because there was certainly some evidence to support the

Board’s decision: the gravity of petitioner’s crime, i.e., second degree murder; the fact that

petitioner committed the murder in an extremely cruel and callous manner; petitioner’s unstable

social history and prior criminality, which includes a long history of alcohol abuse; and

petitioner’s failure to profit from previous attempts to correct his criminality. Respondents argue

that petitioner does not deny the Board’s findings on these matters and that petitioner admits he

has an unstable and lengthy history of criminality as well as a history of failing to profit from

attempts to correct his criminality. Respondents contend that petitioner merely argues he was

under considerable stress compounded by chronic alcoholism when he murdered his sister for

allowing her daughter to be molested. Respondents conclude that petitioner’s excuses are

insufficient to render the Board’s decision unreliable and indeed demonstrate that the Board

properly found that petitioner is at risk of re-offending if released back into the community,

where he can be expected to be exposed to myriad stressors, including the easy availability of

alcohol. On this record, respondents ask the court to deny the petition.

PETITIONER’S TRAVERSE

Petitioner argues that Fourteenth Amendment due process entitles him to have

state and local governments follow both the letter and the spirit of their own laws and regulations

and that due process is not satisfied by a parole hearing that merely determines that a crime was

committed. Petitioner contends that due process requires the state to conduct parole hearings that

comply with the spirit of state law and that the federal court has jurisdiction under the Fourteenth

Amendment where the state fails to comply with the spirit of state law in the way it conducts

parole hearings.

Petitioner sets out and discusses the state statutes and regulations governing

parole. He contends that all of the factors that weigh against parole are factors that cannot be

changed and do not prove he is an unreasonable risk to public safety at the present time. He also

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contends that the factors that weigh in favor of parole in his case outweigh the negative factors. 

He argues that the Board’s broad discretionary powers do not permit the Board to violate due

process and equal protection guarantees or go against the intentions of the state legislature, state

courts, and state regulations. He reiterates that the positive factors acknowledged by the Board

are gains he has maintained over twenty years in prison. He concludes that the Board failed to

conduct his 1999 parole consideration hearing within the constraints of state law and therefore

violated petitioner’s federal rights. Petitioner asks the court to rule against the respondents, order

an evidentiary hearing for an unspecified purpose, find merit in his claims, and appoint counsel.

ANALYSIS

I. Applicable Standards

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts.” Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). Federal habeas

relief is not available for errors in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.

1986).

Section 2254 as amended in 1996 sets forth the following standards of review to

be applied by federal courts to state court decisions:

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim– 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A person alleging a

violation of the right to procedural due process must establish that he was deprived of an interest

cognizable under the Due Process Clause and that the procedures attendant upon that deprivation

were not constitutionally sufficient. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 459-60 (1989); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). In the parole context,

a petitioner alleging due process claims must demonstrate that he has a protected liberty interest

in parole and show that he was denied one or more of the procedural protections that must be

provided, i.e., the process due when a liberty interest is at stake.

The Ninth Circuit has determined that “California’s parole scheme gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th

Cir. 2002). However, because parole-related decisions are not part of the criminal prosecution,

the full panoply of rights due a defendant in criminal proceedings is not constitutionally

mandated. Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Due process

is satisfied in the context of a hearing to set a parole date where the prisoner is afforded notice of

the hearing, an opportunity to be heard and, if parole is denied, a statement of the reasons for the

denial. Id. (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,

16 (1979)). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (describing the procedural

process due in cases involving parole issues). Violation of state mandated procedures will

constitute a due process violation only if the violation causes a fundamentally unfair result. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 65

In California, the setting of a parole date for a state prisoner is conditioned on a

finding of suitability. Cal. Penal Code § 3041; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 2401 & 2402. As long

as the state’s decision regarding parole suitability is supported by “some evidence,” the federal

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court must find that the decision complies with the requirements of federal due process. Morales

v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds,

514 U.S. 499 (1995); Perveler v. Estelle, 974 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The

“some evidence” standard is met if there is evidence from which the conclusion of the

administrative tribunal can be deduced, Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir.

1986), and the decision bears some indicia of reliability, Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390; Perveler, 974

F.2d at 1134. The “some evidence” standard is minimally stringent, and a decision must be

upheld if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. Powell v.

Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56

(1985) and Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987)). Determining whether the “some

evidence” standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or the weighing of evidence. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at

1105. The question is whether there is any reliable evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached. Id.

A petitioner raising an equal protection claim in the parole context must

demonstrate that he was treated differently from other similarly situated prisoners and that the

Board lacked a rational basis for its decision. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 269-70

(1973) (reviewing differences in release dates under rational basis test and balancing the state’s

efforts to ensure that prisoners are sufficiently prepared for release to protect public safety, on the

one hand, with the prisoner’s interest in release, on the other hand).

II. State Court Decisions

In the present case, both the California Supreme Court and the California Court of

Appeal summarily denied habeas petitions attacking the Board’s October 27, 1999 decision. 

(Am. Pet., Exs. V-2 & W-2.) The order issued by each of these courts is “an unexplained order,”

i.e., “an order whose text or accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for the

judgment.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991). When confronted with a state

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court’s unexplained order, the federal court applies the following presumption: “Where there has

been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding

that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Id. at 803. In applying

the look-through presumption, unexplained orders are given no effect. Id. at 804.

Here, there was a reasoned state judgment by the San Joaquin County Superior

Court. (Am. Pet., Ex. X-3.) This court will look through the unexplained orders of the

California Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal to the decision of the San Joaquin

County Superior Court in order to determine whether the state courts’ adjudication of petitioner’s

federal claims satisfies the standards set forth in § 2254.

In his state habeas petitions, petitioner sought relief on the same claims presented

in his federal habeas petition. The San Joaquin County Superior Court addressed each claim. 

(Am. Pet., Ex. X-3 at 1-2.) With regard to the weight given to the gravity of the offense and

petitioner’s assertion that the Board in effect charged him with an additional crime by referring to

a second victim, the court found that petitioner had misconstrued the Board’s findings. (Id. at 1.) 

The court cited the state regulation that requires the Board to consider “[a]ll relevant, reliable

information available to the panel.” (Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402).) The same

regulation specifies that relevant information includes past criminal history, which in turn

includes “involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented” and “the base

and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime.” (Id.

(citing § 2402(b)) .) The court observed that “[i]n petitioner’s case, the panel’s decision was

based, in part, upon the facts of the underlying crime - which did involve two victims regardless

of petitioner’s plea - as well as his prior record.” (Id. at 1.) The court reviewed the Board’s

decision and concluded that the facts cited were “more than adequate to support the panel’s

conclusion that the crime was carried out in an ‘especially cruel or callous manner,’

demonstrating ‘exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.’” (Id. at 2.) The court

found no evidence that petitioner’s rights had been violated with regard to the weight given to the

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gravity of his offense and the Board’s consideration of the facts concerning the person who

witnessed the shooting of his sister. (Id.)

With regard to alleged due process and equal protection violations arising from

the Board’s reliance on the manner in which the murder was carried out and petitioner’s social

and criminal history, the court noted that the Board was required by law to consider these facts

even if they will never change. Section 2402(b) lists “the circumstances of the prisoner’s social

history,” “past criminal history,” and the commitment offense as information that “shall be

considered.” The court rejected petitioner’s contention that considering facts that will not change

“is in essence resentencing him to life without parole.” The court explained that the Board’s

decision was not based on such facts alone. Those facts must be and were weighed against the

gains made by petitioner and the positive factors in his case, and therefore the Board did not in

effect resentence petitioner to life without parole. The court came to the same conclusion with

regard to the Board’s finding that petitioner failed to take advantage of past attempts to correct

his conduct. (Id.) 

With respect to the alleged due process and equal protection violations arising

from the Board’s finding that petitioner’s gains were recent, the court found that the evidence

considered by the Board was properly weighed under the applicable law, there was sufficient

evidence supporting the Board’s decision and there was no evidence of abuse of discretion. (Id.) 

The court disagreed with petitioner’s claim that the Board failed to take mitigating factors into

consideration. “The transcript indicates that these factors were brought to the panel’s attention at

petitioner’s hearing. The panel simply concluded that these factors did not outweigh the

circumstances which tend to show unsuitability.” (Id.)

III. Discussion

At the parole suitability hearing conducted on October 27, 1999, the Board

announced its decision on the record, finding that petitioner was not suitable for parole and that

he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released

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 Because of this other evidence relied upon by the Board, this is not a case where

petitioner’s due process rights are implicated by repeated parole denials based upon continued

reliance on the unchanging factors of the commitment offense and conduct prior to imprisonment

in the face of a positive psychological report and substantial evidence of remorse and rehabilitation.

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from prison. (Tr. at 27) The Board stated that “[t]he number one reason was the commitment

offense itself,” which the Board found was carried out “in an especially cruel or callous manner,”

one that demonstrated “an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” and for which

the motive “was inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” (Id.)

The Board cited the following facts regarding the commitment offense: Petitioner

“armed himself with a shotgun and went to a deserted area where his sister and another person,

their vehicle had broken down and he went there with the intent to assist them and when he got

there, he became angry, or was angry when he got there, took the shotgun, shot his sister in the

chest” and when the witness attempted to flee “he shot at the witness, wounding the witness, and

then he went over and shot his sister a second time in the head, killing her.” (Id. at 27-28.) The

Board also cited petitioner’s “history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others,” his

failure to profit from previous attempts to correct his criminality, including adult probation and

county jail, and his long history of alcohol abuse and arrests for driving under the influence. (Id.

at 28.) It found that petitioner’s gains were recent and stated that he must demonstrate an ability

to maintain his gains over an extended period of time. (Id.) The Board commended petitioner

for remaining disciplinary free, participating in AA, upgrading vocationally and educationally,

and participating in self-help and therapy programs, but found that these positive factors did not

outweigh the factors of unsuitability. (Id.) The Board recommended that petitioner remain

disciplinary free and continue to participate in self-help and therapy programs if possible.

The Board’s findings concerning petitioner’s commitment offense, the manner in

which the offense was carried out, petitioner’s inability to explain his motive, and petitioner’s

social and criminal history are not disputed, except for petitioner’s objection to consideration of

the witness as a victim, and all of these matters are supported by the record. (See Tr. at 6-13.)2

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26 See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Although petitioner disagrees with the Board’s assessment of his gains as recent,

that finding is supported by the fact that all of petitioner’s gains have occurred during and as a

result of his confinement. In light of petitioner’s inability to explain why he shot and killed his

sister and his inclination to blame alcohol for his actions on the day he killed his sister as well as

for his inability to offer a reason for his actions, it is not surprising that the Board was concerned

about petitioner’s ability to avoid alcohol dependence and abuse if released from prison. In

response to direct questioning, petitioner stated that he was still in AA and was “working the

Steps.” (Tr. at 13-14.) He offered no details, and when the panel member asked him whether he

knew the steps, petitioner responded that he “didn’t memorize them all” but “can talk about some

of them.” (Tr. at 14.) The panel member asked petitioner if he has really dedicated himself to

the AA program, and petitioner responded that he has but admitted, when asked whether he

probably should know the steps, that he should. (Id.)

The most recent psychiatric report offered at the hearing was a report by Dr.

Obrochta dated February 11, 1999. Dr. Obrochta described petitioner’s alcohol dependence

history as being “in institutional remission.” (Tr. at 14.) Dr. Obrochta assessed petitioner as

“average in violence potential” and noted that “alcohol is seen as the precursor to any violence in

[petitioner’s] adjustment.” (Tr. at 15.) During the discussion of petitioner’s parole plans, a

second panel member indicated his concern regarding petitioner’s continued participation in AA

on parole:

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HARMON: Let me make a

suggestion to you. You know, one of your letters, or I guess it was

this, one of these documents. Anyway, it indicated that once you

got into the area that you were going to live in that you would try to

locate a alcohol AA program to participate in. You know, in light

of the fact of what you did, I would sure know what the address is

of the local AA program in either area. You know, that’s not

something that you should take lightly. I don’t. The idea that

you’re going to be in a program immediately upon release is real

important to me. You know, if you blew a .21 after five hours after

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the crime and you had the ability to blow away your sister, I sure

want to make sure you’re into an AA Program from the point you

get out until the day you die, you know what I’m saying?

INMATE HAMILTON: Yes, sir, I’m saying that’s part of

my plan too.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HARMON: What I’m saying

is that it’s still up in the air. You don’t even have an idea what

those addresses are in either location.

INMATE HAMILTON: It’s easy to find them in a phone

booth [sic].

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HARMON: There you go. 

Maybe some updating is in order. . . .

(Tr. at 20-21.) In closing, petitioner’s attorney noted his “severe drinking problem” and the

diagnosis of alcohol dependence in institutional remission. (Tr. at 22.) She pointed out that

petitioner had no disciplinary write-ups for “pruno” or substance abuse. She asserted that

petitioner is committed to sobriety, as demonstrated by his past 15 years in AA, his avoidance of

substance abuse in the institution, and his current involvement in 12-step programs. (Id. at 22-

23.) In his own closing remarks, petitioner stated that he has “been through a lot of hard times”

in prison and has not taken a drink and that he has “been involved with AA for 15 years, clean

and sober.” (Id. at 25.) 

Applying the minimally stringent “some evidence” standard to the record before

the court, the undersigned finds that there is reliable evidence in the record supporting the

Board’s decision. Although petitioner points to facts tending to indicate that he may not pose a

threat to society if released, the Board was not obligated to prefer that evidence over the evidence

it chose to rely upon. The record does not reflect any way in which petitioner was treated

differently from similarly situated prisoners. For these reasons, the court finds that the state

courts’ adjudication of petitioner’s due process claims and equal protection claims did not result

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law or a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

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the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief with regard to the Board’s denial of a parole date after the hearing on October 27, 1999.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file and

serve written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to objections

shall be filed and served within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 5, 2005.

DAD:13

hami0340.157

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