Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02345/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02345-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

BLAIR REDMOND,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02345-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO AMEND; DIRECTIONS TO 

PLAINTIFF

[Re: ECF 39]

Before the Court is the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by pro se

plaintiff Blair Redmond (“Plaintiff”). Pl.’s Mot., ECF 39. Plaintiff filed her motion on March 30, 

2015 and, to date, Defendants have filed no opposition.1 The Court finds this matter suitable for 

submission without oral argument and hereby vacates the July 9, 2015 hearing date for the motion. 

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This civil rights lawsuit stems from an April 17, 2013 incident in the parking lot of 

Roosevelt Park in San Jose, CA, in which Plaintiff alleges that San Jose Police Department 

Officers Tony Diep, Daniel Pfiefer, and Matthew Blackerby initiated a confrontation with her and 

her boyfriend while they were seated in her parked car. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 6-

21. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Diep, Pfiefer, and Blackerby violated her constitutional rights 

on that day by arresting her without probable cause and physically assaulting her in the course of 

that arrest. She moreover claims that Diep, Pfiefer, and Blackerby, along with their Sergeants 

 

1

In a May 5, 2015 administrative motion to vacate the case schedule, Defendants indicated that 

they intended to oppose the motion. Def.’s Admin. Mot. 3, ECF 43. Defendants have not, 

however, filed any actual opposition and, in any event, the time to oppose Plaintiff’s motion had 

long passed by that date.

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Ronald Galea and Donald Perrier, conspired to falsify the police report of the incident in order to 

cover up their misconduct and to pursue charges against her that were ultimately dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 

22-55. Plaintiff alleges that she sustained physical injury and property damage and loss that day,

and that she continues to experience emotional and “cognitive” damage stemming from the 

incident. Id. ¶¶ 57-62. As such, in her original and first amended complaint, Plaintiff asserted a 

number of claims against defendants Diep, Pfiefer, Blackerby, Galea, and Perrier under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 for violations of her constitutional rights.

In her proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiff now seeks to add nine 

new defendants—eight police officers and one civilian—as well as to assert new claims and to 

“adjust” some of the existing claims. Pl.’s Mot. 6-7; Proposed SAC, ECF 40. Plaintiff asserts that 

she discovered the identities of these new defendants through discovery and that they “had some 

form of interest in her arrest, charges and civil rights violations and thus some form of liability.” 

Pl.’s Mot. 6-7. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to expand the scope of her claims to 

encompass anyone who had any involvement in the investigation into the underlying incident. 

The new officer defendants are alleged to have “aided and abetted” the conspiracy of the current 

defendants by giving or collecting accounts of the incident that Plaintiff alleges are at worst false 

and at best negligent. Id. Additionally, newly named defendant Rudy Daniel Contreras is a 

civilian witness who allegedly provided a false account of the incident to the police. Id. at 7. In 

addition to these new defendants, Plaintiff also seeks to add new state law claims for battery, false 

arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 

“violation of statues [sic].” Proposed SAC ¶¶ 107-110, 122-66 (Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 

Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Causes of Action “COAs”). It is unclear what “adjustments” 

Plaintiff proposes making to the existing federal claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) advises courts that they “should freely give leave [to 

amend] when justice so requires.” This policy is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” Owens v. 

Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morongo Band of 

Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). Generally, leave to amend is only 

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denied if the court finds that there has been “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part 

of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, 

etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any 

of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting 

leave to amend.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants have not filed any substantive opposition to Plaintiff’s motion and, in such 

instances, the Court would typically grant the motion as unopposed. The Court is moreover 

persuaded that Plaintiff has not unduly delayed in bringing this motion or made it in bad faith or 

with dilatory motive. Although it is clear that the addition of nine new defendants will 

significantly impact existing schedule and delay trial, Defendants’ failure to oppose the motion 

obviates any potential prejudice arising from the scheduling delay.

The Court concludes, however, that some of Plaintiff’s proposed claims are self-evidently

futile. Plaintiff’s proposed Tenth and Eleventh COAs against Pfiefer and the other officer 

defendants respectively for “violation of statues [sic]” invokes sections 118.1, 149, and 206 of the 

California Penal Code. Proposed SAC ¶¶ 133-66. “[A] private right of action exists only if the 

language of the statute or its legislative history clearly indicates the Legislature intended to create 

such a right to sue for damages.” Vikco Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Ohio Indemnity Co., 70 Cal. App. 4th 

55 (1999). The United States Supreme Court has indicated that a private right of action under a 

criminal statute has rarely been implied. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979). 

Here, a review of the penal code sections identified by Plaintiff reveals no express private rights of 

action. Moreover, there does not appear to be any basis for inferring a private right, as other 

courts have acknowledged. See Willis v. City of Los Angeles, 57 F. App’x 283, 290 (9th Cir. 

2002) (unpublished) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants because 

§ 118.1 provides no private cause of action); Muhammad v. Garrett, No. 1:12-CV-01199-AWI, 

2012 WL 3205479, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (no private right of action under § 149); Treglia 

v. Cate, No. C 10-0757 LHK PR, 2010 WL 3398542, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010) (no private 

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right of action under § 206). Permitting Plaintiff to assert these claims would clearly be futile. 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is therefore DENIED with

respect to the proposed Tenth and Eleventh COAs.

In similar fashion, all of Plaintiff’s proposed claims against Rudy Contreras—a bystander 

who provided a witness statement to the police—are futile as pled. Plaintiff seeks to assert claims 

against Contreras for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), false arrest and 

imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), and violation of California 

Penal Code § 148.5 (Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Twelfth COAs). FAC ¶¶ 122-32, 157-66. Much 

like her other claims under the penal code, the proposed Twelfth COA has no basis in law because 

there is no private right of action under § 148.5. Rezek v. City of Tustin, No. SACV 11-01601 

DOC, 2012 WL 5829928, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012). As to the proposed IIED, false arrest, 

and NIED claims, Plaintiff asserts that Contreras’s account of the incident to the police is false 

because he “cannot be considered a credible witness.” FAC ¶ 161. There are no allegations that 

Contreras intended his statement to cause Plaintiff emotional distress or to lead to her arrest and 

imprisonment, as would be required to state a claim for IIED and false arrest. See Hughes v. Pair, 

46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009) (elements of IIED include, inter alia, “extreme and outrageous 

conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of 

causing, emotional distress”); Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715-16 (1994) (in bank) 

(false arrest and imprisonment requires a “nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, 

without lawful privilege” wherein the defendant has “the intent to confine, or to create a similar 

intrusion”). Nor, with respect to the proposed NIED claim, are there allegations showing that 

Contreras owed Plaintiff a duty—whether under the law or through a special relationship—the 

breach of which proximately caused her emotional distress. Gu v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 132 Cal. 

App. 4th 195, 203-10 (2005); see Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984 

(1993) (“[T]here is no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to another.”). 

Plaintiff’s motion is therefore DENIED with respect to the proposed Twelfth COA and DENIED, 

without prejudice, as to the proposed Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth COAs against Contreras.

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED with respect to the remainder of the proposed 

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amendments, although the Court has serious concerns regarding Plaintiff’s attempt to hold 

everyone involved in the investigation of the underlying incident liable as co-conspirators or aides. 

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave 

to File Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED with respect to her proposed Tenth, Eleventh, and 

Twelfth COAs;

2. Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED, without prejudice, with respect to her proposed 

IIED, false arrest, and NIED claims against Rudy Contreras only (Seventh, Eighth, 

and Ninth COAs);

3. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED with respect to the remainder.

By May 28, 2015, Plaintiff shall file the Second Amended Complaint into the record. The 

amended complaint must comply with this order in removing the claims for which amendment has 

been denied and in removing Contreras as a named defendant.

2

 Moreover, the Second Amended 

Complaint must be double-spaced, as is required by the local rules. Civ. L.R. 3-4(c)(2). No other 

changes may be made to the amended complete absent leave of court.

Upon the filing of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, the Clerk of the Court shall 

issue summons for the newly added defendants, and the U.S. Marshal for the Northern District of 

California shall serve a copy of the Second Amended Complaint, scheduling orders, attachments, 

and this order upon the new defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 14, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

 

2

To the extent Plaintiff intends to re-allege the IIED, false arrest, and NIED claims against 

Contreras in a manner consistent with this order, she must affirmatively seek leave of court to do 

so after filing the Second Amended Complaint into the record.

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