Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05345/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05345-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

---

ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

RAYMOND YU,

Plaintiff,

v.

DESIGN LEARNED, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.15-cv-05345-LB 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 19

INTRODUCTION 

Raymond Yu sued the defendants Design Learned, Inc., E.C.C. & Associates, Scott Learned, 

Kelly August, Michael Pfarr, and Ann Block for allegedly breaching an engineering and 

consulting agreement and engaging in unfair debt collection practices in violation of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).

1 Design Learned and the Design Learned employee 

defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.2The court finds that it can 

decide the matter without oral argument under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and vacates the hearing set 

for April 28, 2016. The court has subject-matter jurisdiction and grants the motion to dismiss

 

1 Compl. – ECF No. 1. Record citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); 

pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the tops of documents. 

2 Motion to Dismiss – ECF No. 19.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 2

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under Rule 12(b)(6) because Mr. Yu fails to state a claim against Design Learned or the individual 

defendants.

STATEMENT

Raymond Yu sued Design Learned, et al. (generally referred to in the complaint as the 

“defendants”) in connection with the alleged breach of an engineering and consulting services 

agreement.

3

The individual defendants are allegedly all Design Learned employees.

4

In his 

complaint, Mr. Yu asserts the following factual basis for his claims.

In February 2014, Mr. Yu and the defendants entered an engineering and consulting services 

agreement for a potential construction site.5 Among other things, the defendants were to perform 

“several site visits and site reviews of the potential construction site.”6The defendants additionally 

agreed to provide answers to requests for information (RFIs) and modify construction documents, 

as needed.7 Mr. Yu alleges that the defendants failed to perform these services.8

In addition to the above agreement, Mr. Yu also asserts that the defendants “represented that 

they would not charge additional fees for modest and reasonable delays in the project schedule.”9

The defendants did not live up to this representation; in September 2014, they “demanded that 

additional fees be paid in order to compensate them” for a then-ongoing delay.10 The defendants 

demanded these additional fees “before they would continue to perform additional services.”11 Mr. 

 

3

See generally Compl.

4

Id. 4-7.

5

Id. ¶ 13.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id. ¶ 14.

10 Id.

11 Id.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 3

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Yu needed the defendants’ services to continue construction and thus, “[a]cting under duress,” 

agreed to make additional payments.12

Mr. Yu brings four claims against the defendants: 1) breach of contract, for which he seeks 

$325,000; 2) promissory estoppel, for which he seeks $325,000; 3) declaratory judgment that he 

owes no money to the defendants; and 4) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

13 He asserts these claims against each of the named 

defendants.14

The defendants Design Learned, Scott Learned, Kelly August, Michael Pfarr and Ann Block 

(together, “Design Learned”) move to dismiss Mr. Yu’s complaint.15 They assert two bases for 

doing so. First, they argue the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Yu’s claims.16

Second, they argue Mr. Yu has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.17 They 

additionally move to strike Mr. Yu’s prayer for attorney’s fees.18 Mr. Yu opposes the motion.

19

GOVERNING LAW

1. Motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the ground for the court’s jurisdiction 

(unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La 

Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990). A defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) 

 

12 Id.

13 Id. ¶¶ 15-38.

14 See generally id.; see Opposition – ECF No. 34 at 5-7.

15 Motion to Dismiss – ECF No. 19.

16 Id. at 5-7.

17 Id. 7-9.

18 Id. at 9.

19 Opposition.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 4

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jurisdictional attack can be either facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 

2000). “A ‘facial’ attack asserts that a complaint’s allegations are themselves insufficient to 

invoke jurisdiction, while a ‘factual’ attack asserts that the complaint’s allegations, though 

adequate on their face to invoke jurisdiction, are untrue.” Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 

F.3d 776, 780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). Under a facial attack, the court “accept[s] all allegations of fact 

in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Warren 

v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). In a factual attack, the court 

“need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations” and “may review evidence 

beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

The defendants’ challenge here is a factual attack because they rely on extrinsic evidence to 

show the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 

(citing Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003)).

2. Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon 

which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be 

enough to raise a claim for relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(internal citations omitted). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, 

accepted as true, “‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 5

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unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

3. Leave to amend

If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern 

California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).

ANALYSIS

1. The court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Yu’s claims

When a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is brought with other Rule 

12(b) motions, the court first determines whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction before 

proceeding to other bases for the motion. See Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping 

Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007); Potter v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008). Here,

the court has federal-question jurisdiction over Mr. Yu’s FDCPA claim, but, because he 

insufficiently pleads this claim, it is unlikely to support supplemental jurisdiction over his statelaw claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995) (district 

court’s discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal claims 

have been dismissed). For this reason, the court also considers whether diversity jurisdiction exists

and concludes that it does.

1.1 The court has federal-question jurisdiction over Mr. Yu’s FDCPA claim

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Mr. Yu asserts a claim 

against all defendants for violation of the FDCPA.20 The court therefore has subject-matter 

jurisdiction over this claim because it arises under a federal statute.

 

20 Compl. ¶¶ 30-38 ; Opposition at 7.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 6

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1.2 The court has diversity jurisdiction over Mr. Yu’s state-law claims

Federal courts also have original jurisdiction where the opposing parties are citizens of 

different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the parties do not dispute the existence of complete diversity. Design 

Learned instead argues there is no diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy cannot 

be met.21

“Generally, the amount in controversy is determined from the face of the pleadings.” Crum v. 

Circus Circus Enterprises, 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). “The sum claimed by the plaintiff 

controls so long as the claim is made in good faith.” Id. “To justify dismissal, it must appear to a 

legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” Id. (quoting Budget 

Rent-A-Car v. Higashiguchi, 109 F.3d 1471, 1473 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted)). 

“[T]he legal certainty test makes it very difficult to secure a dismissal of a case on the ground that 

it does not appear to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. Only three situations clearly 

meet the legal certainty standard: 1) when the terms of a contract limit the plaintiff’s possible 

recovery; 2) when a specific rule of law or measure of damages limits the amount of damages 

recoverable; and 3) when independent facts show that the amount of damages was claimed merely 

to obtain federal court jurisdiction.” Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d 

362, 364 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting 14A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, 

Jurisdiction § 3702, at 48-50 (2d ed. 1985)).

Here, Design Learned argues the amount in controversy is, to a legal certainty, less than the 

jurisdictional amount.22 It asserts two bases to support its argument. 

First, it argues the agreement at issue limits its liability “under [the] Agreement” to the greater 

of $20,000 or the amount paid to it (apparently, $20,801.68).23 The court considers the contract for 

the limited purpose of determining the measure of damages, see Pachinger, 802 F.2d at 364, but 

 

21 Motion at 5-7.

22 Motion at 5-7.

23 Motion at 5-6; Learned Decl. – ECF No. 21, ¶ 3.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 7

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cannot on this basis conclude to a legal certainty that the damages amount falls below the 

jurisdictional threshold. The limitation of liability may limit Mr. Yu’s contract claim, which may 

arise “under the agreement,” but he asserts two additional claims against Design Learned: one for 

promissory estoppel and one for violating the FDCPA. These claims appear separate from — and 

thus not “under” — the agreement limiting Design Learned’s liability. For example, to the extent 

Mr. Yu’s promissory estoppel claim is based on promises not to charge additional fees (seemingly 

outside of the contract), this claim does not arise “under” the agreement.24 See, e.g., CalFarm Ins. 

Co. v. Krusiewicz, 131 Cal. App. 4th 273, 285-86 (2005) (promissory estoppel claim for breach of 

promise made outside of the subject insurance contract was distinct from claims made under the 

contract and did not support punitive damages). Similarly, his FDCPA claim relates to debt 

collection activities, not a breach of the contract.25 Although Mr. Yu may in the end not recover all 

the damages he seeks, for example because the construction project may have been completed,

26

the aggregate damages he recovers under each of these three claims may exceed $75,000, as he 

pleads in his complaint.27

Additionally, based on Mr. Yu’s pleadings, it is unclear if the contract attached to the 

defendants’ motion is the (only) agreement at issue. Mr. Yu refers generally to an “agreement,” 

not necessarily this specific contract, and refers to certain obligations of Design Learned (i.e. site 

visits) that are not readily identifiable in the attached contract. The court therefore cannot tell if the 

defendants’ attached contract is in fact the only agreement at issue and whether it limits Mr. Yu’s 

potential recovery. As discussed below, however, the court dismisses Mr. Yu’s contract claim and 

advises him to plead the terms of the agreement with adequate factual detail, or attach the 

agreement to his complaint, so the court and the defendants can identify the material terms.

 

24 Compl. ¶ 14.

25 Compl. ¶¶ 30-38; Opposition at 7.

26 See Learned Decl. ¶ 5.

27 Compl. ¶¶ 10, 21, 25.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 8

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Second, Design Learned argues there are independent facts demonstrating Mr. Yu claims the 

amount only to obtain federal court jurisdiction.28 In support of its argument, it asserts that 1) Mr. 

Yu filed suit only after E.C.C. & Associates began debt-collection activities, 2) Mr. Yu was 

satisfied with Design Learned’s services, 3) the accused breaches could not have caused the 

alleged damages, and 4) Mr. Yu fabricated his claims.29 At this stage, the court is not persuaded by 

the evidence presented by Design Learned that Mr. Yu alleges his damages only to obtain federal 

court jurisdiction. Cf. LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301, 307-308 (D. Conn. 1973) 

(“[A]mending a jurisdictionally defective complaint merely to raise the prayer above the 

jurisdictional amount may be independent evidence the amendment was colorable for the purpose 

of conferring jurisdiction.”).

The court thus cannot conclude to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy is less than 

the jurisdictional requirement. As such, the court has diversity jurisdiction over Mr. Yu’s state-law 

claims. The court notes, however, that the amount in controversy is dependent on Mr. Yu’s claims, 

which, as discussed below, are now inadequately pled. If Mr. Yu is unable to amend his complaint

with the required plausibility to support his claim for damages, the defendants may again 

challenge the jurisdictional sufficiency of the complaint.

2. Mr. Yu fails to state a plausible claim

2.1 Mr. Yu’s broad allegations fail to distinguish among the defendants

Under Rule 8(a), grouping multiple defendants together in a broad allegation is insufficient to 

provide the defendants with fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds for relief. See, 

e.g., Corazon v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, No. 11-00542 SC, 2011 WL 1740099 at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. May 5, 2011); In re Sagent Technology, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1094–95 (N.D. Cal.

2003) (“A complaint that lumps together thirteen ‘individual defendants,’ where only three of the 

individuals was alleged to have been present for the entire period of the events alleged in the 

complaint, fails to give ‘fair notice’ of the claim to those defendants.”); see also Gauvin v. 

 

28 Motion at 6-7.

29 Id.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 9

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Trombatore, 682 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (lumping together multiple defendants in 

one broad allegation fails to satisfy notice requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)).

For example, the plaintiff in Corazon, like Mr. Yu, “fail[ed] to differentiate among defendants 

or specify which defendant [was] the subject of Plaintiff’s various allegations, [and thus] 

violate[d] Rule 8(a)(2) because it fail[ed] to provide [the defendant] with fair notice of its alleged 

misconduct.” 2011 WL 1740099 at *4. There, the complaint “simply refer[ed] to ‘Defendants’ in 

nearly all of [the plaintiff’s] allegations.” Id. When the plaintiff alleged misconduct by a single 

defendant, “she fail[ed] to specify which one.” Id. As such, and because the complaint lacked 

factual allegations to state a plausible claim, the court dismissed the complaint. Id. at 4-5.

Here, similar to Corazon, Mr. Yu’s complaint makes allegations against a group of seven 

defendants without differentiating among them.30 For example, he alleges he “and Defendants 

entered an agreement for Defendants to perform certain engineering and consulting services 

. . . .”31 Moreover, “Defendants have also agreed to provide answers to RFIs, and other 

modifications . . . .”32 “To date, Defendants have failed to perform the aforementioned services”33

Similarly, he alleges that the “Defendants have also represented numerous times that they would 

not charge additional fees for modest and reasonable delays in the project schedule[,]” but that the 

“defendants” broke this promise.34

Mr. Yu argues in his Opposition that, “at this early stage of the litigation,” it is unclear which 

defendants are responsible for the alleged wrongdoings.35 He further argues he needs discovery to 

determine which defendants are responsible36 and the defendants are not prejudiced by his current 

 

30 See generally Compl.

31 Id. ¶ 13.

32 Id.

33 Id.

34 Id. ¶14.

35 Opposition at 5-7.

36 Id. at 7.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 10

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pleading format.37 To the contrary, however, Rule 8(a)(2) requires the complaint to “put 

defendants on sufficient notice of the allegations against them.” Corazon, 2011 WL 1740099 

at *4. Absent such notice, the defendants cannot respond to or otherwise defend the action. 

Because he fails to differentiate among the defendants, and because his factual allegations are 

insufficient to support a plausible claim (see below), Mr. Yu fails to satisfy his burden. See

Corazon, 2011 WL 1740099 at *5 (“Once a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint survives a motion 

to dismiss, then the plaintiff is indeed entitled to develop its facts for trial through the discovery 

process.”).

2.2 Mr. Yu fails to state a claim under the FDCPA

The FDCPA “prohibits ‘debt collector[s]’ from making false or misleading representations and 

from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices.” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 

(1995) (citation omitted). “To establish a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is 

a consumer within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(3); (2) the debt arises out of a transaction 

entered into for personal purposes; (3) the defendant is a debt collector within the meaning of 

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); and (4) the defendant violated one of the provisions of the FDCPA, 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a–1692o.” Makreas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-02836-JST, 

2013 WL 3014134, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2013).

Mr. Yu apparently raises this claim against all defendants,38 but he insufficiently pleads facts 

to raise a plausible claim against the Design Learned defendants. Mr. Yu sufficiently pleads that 

he is a “consumer” within the FDCPA because he entered into the contract with Design Learned 

that created the debt.39 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (“Consumer” is defined to mean “any natural 

person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the debt.”) He does not, however, adequately plead 

the remaining elements against Design Learned. 

 

37 Opposition at 5-6.

38 See Compl. ¶¶ 30-38; Opposition – ECF No. 34 at 7 (“Defendants provide no basis as to why 

this claim should not apply to [Design Learned]. For example, Defendants have not clearly 

explained the relationship between [Design Learned] and E.C.C. & Associates. This further 

illustrates the need for Plaintiff to assert each claim against Defendants as a whole[.]”)

39 Compl. ¶¶ 13, 31. 

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 11

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First, he does not allege that the debt was for personal, family, or household purposes. See

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). See also Bloom v. I.C. Systems, Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(the FDCPA “applies to consumer debts and not business loans”). To the contrary, it appears the 

debt was incurred in connection with a construction site for a dog day care business.

40 The burden 

is on Mr. Yu to show this is a “personal” debt within the FDCPA. He fails to satisfy this element.

Second, Mr. Yu does not allege that Design Learned is a debt collector. A “debt collector” 

under the FDCPA includes a person who: 1) uses interstate commerce or the mail in a business the 

principal purpose of which is debt collection; 2) “regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly 

or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another[;]” or 3) is “any creditor 

who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would 

indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 

Mr. Yu argues in his opposition that the relationship between Design Learned and E.C.C. & 

Associates is unclear. If he intends to claim that Design Learned — as a creditor acting under a 

different name (i.e. E.C.C. & Associates) to collect its own debts — is a debt collector, then he 

must do so in his complaint. He currently alleges no facts to support the conclusion that Design 

Learned is a “debt collector.” His complaint is therefore insufficient to satisfy this element.

Third, Mr. Yu does not allege any facts indicating Design Learned violated the FDCPA. He 

asserts E.C.C. & Associates violated the FDCPA by initiating a telephone call at an inconvenient 

time, apparently in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1). He asserts no facts supporting the 

conclusion that Design Learned violated the FDCPA and therefore fails to satisfy this element.

Mr. Yu fails to state an FDCPA claim against Design Learned. This claim is dismissed with 

leave to amend.

2.3 Mr. Yu fails to state a claim for breach of contract

The elements of a breach of contract claim under California law are the following: 1) the 

existence of a contract; 2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; 3) defendant’s 

breach; and 4) resulting damage. See Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 8111, 821 

 

40 Learned Decl. Ex. A. at 6.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 12

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(2011). “To state a cause of action for breach of contract, it is absolutely essential to plead the 

terms of the contract either in haec verba or according to legal effect.” Langan v. United Servs. 

Auto. Ass’n, 69 F. Supp. 3d 965, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Twaite v. Allstate Ins. Co., 216 Cal. 

App. 3d 239, 252 (1989). “A plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead the terms of the contract if he does 

not allege in the complaint the terms of the contract or attach a copy of the contract to the 

complaint.” Id. “While it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to allege the terms of the alleged contract 

with precision, the Court must be able generally to discern at least what material obligation of the 

contract the defendant allegedly breached.” Id.

Here, Mr. Yu does not attach the contract to the complaint but instead attempts to plead its 

terms. He identifies the contract: an engineering and consulting services agreement between 

himself and the defendants.41 He also identifies at least some of the terms at issue: the defendants 

were obligated to perform site visits and site reviews, provide answers to RFIs, and modify 

construction documents as needed.42 He asserts that he “substantially performed” his obligations 

under the contract43 but that the defendants breached the agreement by failing to perform the 

above mentioned services.44 And finally, he alleges that the defendants’ breach rendered the 

construction project incomplete and caused damages in excess of $325,000.45

The problem with Mr. Yu’s allegations is that they are vague and appear selective; and, as 

such, the court cannot determine the alleged breaches support his claim. For example, without 

additional facts, the court cannot tell if the alleged breaches were material to the contract. The 

court additionally cannot conclude these breaches plausibly support the damages he seeks to 

substantiate jurisdiction in federal court (see above). Mr. Yu therefore inadequately pleads the 

terms and the defendants’ breach thereof.

 

41 Compl ¶ 13.

42 Id.

43 Id. ¶ 18.

44 Compl. ¶¶ 13, 18. 

45 Id. ¶¶ 20-21.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 13

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As discussed above, Mr. Yu also does not adequately distinguish among the seven defendants 

in connection with his contract claim. Merely saying he entered into an agreement with the 

“defendants” and that the “defendants” breached the agreement is insufficient. Even if he cannot 

identify the individual defendant that failed to perform the alleged services — i.e. the individual 

responsible for conducting site visits — he can certainly identify the party to the agreement, and 

thus who is liable for its breach. These allegations do not sufficiently put the individual defendants 

on notice to defend the claim. Therefore, his claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

2.4 Mr. Yu fails to state a claim for promissory estoppel

Under California law, “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 

action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such 

action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” 

Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 23 Cal.4th 305, 310 (2000). 

Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine whose remedy may be limited “as justice so 

requires.” See id. The elements of promissory estoppel are: “1) a clear promise; 2) reasonable 

reliance; 3) substantial detriment; and 4) damages ‘measured by the extent of the obligation 

assumed and not performed.’” Errico v. Pacific Capital Bank, N.A., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1048 

(N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing and quoting Poway Royal Mobilehome Owners Ass'n. v. City of Poway,

149 Cal. App. 4th 1460, 1470 (2007)). 

Mr. Yu fails to adequately plead a claim for promissory estoppel. He appears to identify two 

promises: the defendants promised to perform certain site inspection and other services, and the 

defendants “represented numerous times that they would not charge additional fees for modest and 

reasonable delays in the project schedule.”46 But he does not satisfy the other elements. He does 

not adequately allege facts showing he reasonably relied on the representations to his substantial 

detriment. Instead, he merely asserts that he “relied on Defendants representations and promises” 

and that his reliance caused him damage.47 These allegations are wholly conclusory. Cf. Errico v. 

 

46 Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14; Opposition at 6-7.

47 Compl. ¶¶ 24-25.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 14

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Pacific Capital Bank, N.A., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (allegation sufficient 

where plaintiffs alleged defendants promised financing of an entire project and plaintiffs alleged 

“substantial detriment by investing substantial time and money in design and construction costs, 

and took on substantial credit obligations in the two loans for the commercial plaza and off-site 

improvements on the assurance that Defendant Pacific Capital Bank would finance the entire 

project . . . .”). Moreover, he does not allege facts showing his reliance was distinct from his 

performance of the obligation he incurred under the contract. See Mike Nelson Co., Inc. v. 

Hathaway, No. F 05-0208 AWI DLB, 2005 WL 2179310, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2005) (“If [a 

plaintiff’s] only claimed reliance is performance of the act bargained for, [promissory estoppel] is 

unavailable.”) (quoting 1 Witkin, Summary of California Law: Contracts § 251 (9th ed.). 

Similarly, although he alleges that his reliance caused damage, he does not allege how $325,000 is 

“the extent of the obligation assumed and not performed.” 

In addition to these deficiencies and as discussed above, Mr. Yu does not identify which 

defendants made this promise and which broke it. He therefore fails to state a claim for promissory 

estoppel and this claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

3. Motion to strike attorney’s fees is denied as moot

The defendants move to strike Mr. Yu’s claim for attorney’s fees because his complaint fails to 

identify the legal basis for seeking fees.48 Because the court dismisses the complaint, the motion to 

strike is denied as moot. See Varela v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. C-12-3502 KAW, 2012 

WL 6680261, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2012); Vinal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., C–11–03242–

EDL, 2011 WL 4344169, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Sept.15, 2011). 

 

48 Motion at 9.

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ORDER (No. 15-cv-05345-LB) 15

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CONCLUSION

The court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that Mr. Yu has failed to state 

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Mr. Yu may amend his complaint within 21 days from the date of 

this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2016

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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